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Volume 28 From-De 84-01-31 To-À 84-02-02

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION  
Vol 28

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DATE 2007-03-05

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MINISTÈRE  
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TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION ( INITIATIVES )

DESARMEMENT  
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29

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SUBJECT •  
SUJET • Proposal by Mrs. Gandhi for  
Meeting on Peace

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Exactly the kind  
of affair, company  
and process we should  
stay away from!

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February 2, 1984  
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ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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The Indian High Commission has provided us  
... with the attached advanced copy of the text of a  
message from Prime Minister Gandhi to Prime Minister  
Trudeau. A copy of this communication has been  
transmitted to the Privy Council Office. You will  
note that it raises the possibility of a meeting of  
Heads of Government in New Delhi some time in early  
March focussed on a peace initiative being promoted  
by Mrs. Gandhi.



A.G. Vincent  
Director  
South and Southeast Asia  
Relations Division

2.2.21(US)

Message from Prime Minister of India

BEGINS

New Delhi, January 25, 1984.

Dear Prime Minister,

A delegation of the Parliamentarians for World Order met me last week to discuss their proposed initiative for resumption of a constructive dialogue to end and reverse the nuclear arms race. I am told they are also in touch with you.

They suggested that a few leaders should issue a joint public statement, indicating their willingness to help in whatever way possible to arrest the deterioration in the nuclear scene. I welcome the initiative. The crisis is so grave and stakes so overwhelmingly high that every such effort deserves support and encouragement. Your own personal commitment to this cause is well known.

Obviously, the joint statement should be one to which we can all subscribe. The PWO team proposed that senior officials representing the leaders should meet in early February to draft the statement. We have no objection. //

As regards the meeting of the leaders themselves, the PWO delegation felt - and I agree - that it should be convened early and to have the desired impact, it would be necessary to have the personal participation of the Heads of State/Government.

Unfortunately, it is not possible for me to leave India in the near future as the budget session of our Parliament begins in February. I realize, of course, that you also have many pressing pre-occupations at home. Nevertheless, if you decide, as I hope you will, to lend your valued support to this initiative, it would be a great honour if you could spare a day or two in early March to come to Delhi.



- : 2 : -

Besides Canada, the PNC have approached the leaders of Sweden, Greece, Spain, Romania and Tanzania. They are also contacting Mexico. I am writing similar letters to these Heads of State/Government.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

INDIRA GANDHI

The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau,  
Prime Minister of Canada.

ENDS

*To consult  
as to time, place, effort  
before support and interest*

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Les sinistrés du « Week-end rouge » de novembre 1974 réclament leur dû: environ \$1 million. Ils ont manifesté hier devant le local de l'Association des pompiers de Montréal. Ils ont gagné leur cause en Cour suprême, mais seules les petites réclamations de moins de \$3 000 ont été réglées,

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photo Robert Nadon, LA PRESSE

## PRENANT SES DISTANCES VIS-À-VIS DE WASHINGTON Trudeau dénonce la théorie de la dissuasion nucléaire

■ BUCAREST — Après avoir mis en doute, le week-end dernier, la volonté des États-Unis de déclencher une

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envoyé spécial de LA PRESSE

guerre pour sauver l'Europe, le premier ministre, M. Pierre Trudeau, a pris de nouveau ses distances hier par rapport à Washington en dénonçant la théorie

de la dissuasion nucléaire si chère à l'Administration Reagan.

Prenant la parole à l'occasion d'un diner d'État offert par le président de la Roumanie, M. Nicolae Ceausescu, à Bucarest, M. Trudeau a déclaré que cette théorie a été mise au point lorsque les hommes se battaient avec des arcs et des flèches, mais qu'elle a conduit l'humanité à une situation paradoxale.

« Nos populations doivent être

quelque peu étonnées du paradoxe dans lequel nous nous sommes engagés. Nous construisons des armes nucléaires dont nous savons ne jamais pouvoir nous servir, sauf dans un esprit de suicide. De part et d'autre, nous construisons un plus grand nombre d'armes nucléaires, dans l'espoir d'aboutir à des négociations qui concluront à la nécessité de diminuer les armes nucléaires. Nous vivons encore la

logique qui a été pensée du temps de l'Empire romain, alors que l'on disait: Si tu veux la paix, prépare la guerre. C'était peut-être une logique d'un autre âge, quand nous nous battions avec des flèches, des lances et des boucliers. Mais c'est aussi la logique qui est à la base de la théorie de la dissuasion nucléaire », a dit le premier ministre.

M. Trudeau a conclu: « Nous voir **TRUDEAU** en A 2

### Bronfman justifie sa valse des millions

page 2

### Québec &4

Au fur et à mesure que passent les saisons, approche la date fatidique du 23 juin lorsque sera donné le coup d'envoi des événements qui feront de Québec la capitale mondiale de la voile. Devant l'intérêt croissant que suscite déjà cette fête de 63 jours, LA PRESSE publie, à partir d'aujourd'hui, une chronique hebdomadaire intitulée, comme l'événement, Québec 84.

page A 16

### ORDRE CHRONOLOGIQUE DES ÉVÉNEMENTS

— ORGANISER LA  
RENCONTRE REAGAN-  
ANDROPOV

## TRUDEAU

SUITE DE LA PAGE A 1

avons, passé assez de temps à préparer la guerre, il faut maintenant préparer la paix.»

Cette intervention du premier ministre s'inscrit en faux contre l'Administration Reagan, qui continue de défendre la théorie de la dissuasion. Samedi dernier à Davos en Suisse, le sous-secrétaire d'Etat adjoint des États-Unis, M. Kenneth Dam, a consacré une bonne partie de son discours à justifier cette théorie, en expliquant qu'elle a réussi à préserver la paix depuis la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

M. Trudeau n'est cependant pas le seul chef de gouvernement des pays de l'Ouest commençant à mettre en doute la valeur de la dissuasion nucléaire. Lors de l'ouverture de la Conférence de Stockholm sur la confiance et la sécurité, le premier ministre suédois, M. Olof Palme, avait déclaré que la dissuasion avait peut-être fonctionné pendant un certain nombre d'années, mais qu'elle ne saurait être considérée comme la clef de voûte des relations entre superpuissances pour préserver la paix. Les propos de M. Trudeau viennent renforcer le malaise qui existe au sein même de l'OTAN, sur la question de l'attitude à adopter envers l'Union soviétique.

M. Trudeau, qui rentre aujourd'hui à Ottawa après une tournée de huit jours dans trois pays de l'Est, a eu une première rencontre, hier midi, avec le président de la Roumanie, M. Ceausescu. Ce dernier a déjà soumis une proposition visant à rapprocher les superpuissances, en demandant que l'OTAN et les pays du Pacte de Varsovie imposent un gel immédiat sur l'installation de tout nouveau missile, et que les deux parties retournent à la table de négociations. Cette proposition est inacceptable à l'OTAN parce qu'elle consacrerait la supériorité nucléaire de l'URSS, qui a déjà déployé ses SS-20. M. Trudeau s'est bien gardé, hier soir, d'appuyer cette proposition. Il s'est contenté de

déclarer qu'il appuyait l'esprit qui anime M. Ceausescu dans ses démarches.

Le président de la Roumanie a fait de même à l'endroit des propositions canadiennes, et il s'est montré moins dur que ses collègues des autres pays de l'Est à l'égard des États-Unis. Il s'est contenté de déclarer que l'installation des euromissiles avait créé une situation nouvelle et amené l'URSS à annoncer des mesures de représailles ce qui nous mène, a-t-il dit en substance, vers une autre course aux armements.

L'attitude de M. Ceausescu n'a surpris personne. Le chef de l'Etat roumain possède une réputation de franc-parler sur la scène internationale, mais il ne jouit pas d'une grande influence auprès du Kremlin.

L'arrivée de M. Trudeau en Roumanie a suivi d'une heure à peine le départ, de ce pays, du ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Andrei Gromyko. Sans l'admettre officiellement, l'entourage de M. Trudeau aurait souhaité une rencontre avec M. Gromyko, mais ce dernier n'a pas répondu aux signes discrets qu'on lui a lancés. M. Trudeau a donc retardé son départ de l'Allemagne de l'Est de deux heures hier matin, afin d'éviter l'embarras de croiser M. Gromyko à Bucarest sans pouvoir le rencontrer.

Détail intéressant, la visite du premier ministre en Roumanie coïncide avec une rencontre de trois jours entre les fonctionnaires de l'Énergie atomique du Canada et ceux du gouvernement roumain, pour discuter de l'achat d'un réacteur CANDU. Un fonctionnaire canadien a déclaré que ce dossier a débouqué de façon significative au cours des trois derniers mois, et que la Roumanie installera cinq CANDU, dont l'achat avait été négocié il y a plusieurs années, mais dont l'acquisition avait dû être reportée en raison d'un manque de liquidités. Le président Ceausescu a dit souhaiter, hier soir, que la collaboration entre son pays et le Canada, à ce chapitre, s'accroisse au cours des prochaines années.

## DIONNE

SUITE DE LA PAGE A 1

ment il a présidé la tapageuse

tombe sous le coup de la nouvelle loi des coroners qui n'est d'ailleurs pas promulguée.

La nouvelle loi 36 qui régira la Cour du coroner, prévoit que le huis clos pourra être décrété

cer une... vraiment, je trouve cela drôlement exagéré, non je ne suis absolument pas en faveur d'une nouvelle hausse».

Pour ce couple âgé, cette hausse était évidemment très mal venue, sinon inadmissible.

«On n'en finit plus d'augmenter les tarifs du transport en commun, mais nos pensions ne sui-

metro, peut-être qu'il changerait son capot de bord. Tout ça c'est de la politacillerie, c'est ridicule!»

### C'est l'inflation !

Un autre usager se demandait bien quand toutes ces augmentations allaient s'arrêter, se plaignant que son salaire, lui, régres-

sants... il fallait certes dire — cette jeune usagère pressée et emmitoufflée dans son foulard, a accueilli cette prochaine hausse avec un certain stoïcisme, presque comme une normalité.

«Moi je n'ai pas de voiture, le

# RCM : DesMarais déclare la guerre aux usagers des transports publics

■ Selon le président du Rassemblement des citoyens de Montréal, M. Jean Doré, l'opinion livrée hier par M. DesMarais est une véritable «déclaration de

### DENIS MASSE

guerre contre l'usager du transport en commun». Elle est à la fois «hypocrite et irresponsable» pour plusieurs raisons.

Le chef du parti d'opposition rappelle qu'une résolution adoptée au conseil de la CUM en décembre, prévoyait une étude de toutes les sources de financement possibles à faire par l'ensemble des élus. «Or, ce débat public qui n'a pas eu lieu, est encore à faire», souligne M. Doré.

Selon le RCM, la quote-part des usagers ne devrait en aucun cas dépasser 40 p. cent des coûts, à Montréal, compte tenu des revenus moyens des familles qui sont

très inférieurs à ceux de Toronto ou d'Edmonton, par exemple.

Ainsi, le RCM défendra toujours une répartition des coûts à peu près étagée comme suit: 40 p. cent par les usagers, 50 p. cent par les gouvernements (soit 30 p. cent par Québec et 20 p. cent par les municipalités) et enfin 10 p. cent par les non-usagers qui bénéficient du transport en commun, tels les automobilistes et les établissements industriels et commerciaux.

«Ici, ajoute M. Doré, on a peut-être à tort acquis la conviction que les coûts du transport en commun doivent être répartis entre trois seuls groupes, mais une analyse approfondie aurait peut-être révélé d'autres sources».

D'abord, continue-t-il, il est faux de prétendre que les municipalités ont atteint un plafond infranchissable pour leur quote-part au transport en commun quand on sait que la Ville de Montréal déclare un surplus bud-

gétaire de \$36 millions, que la CUM enregistre elle aussi un surplus de \$16 millions et que la récente loi de la réforme fiscale a considérablement allégé le fardeau fiscal des municipalités.

«Et que dire du surplus d'opération de l'ordre de \$12 millions de la CTCUM qui a été redistribué aux municipalités?» questionne-t-il.

«Il est faux de penser, fait ressortir M. Doré, que les municipalités sauveront de l'argent si l'on gèle leur quote-part à 15 p. cent. S'il s'ensuit une diminution de l'achalandage des transports collectifs, les municipalités auront à déboursier des sommes additionnelles qui se traduiront forcément par l'entretien de la voie publique, la voirie, l'ordonnance de la circulation, la dépollution, la qualité de l'environnement, etc. En définitive, ce que les municipalités sauveraient d'un côté, elles le dépenseraient dans d'autres secteurs».

# Les sinistrés du «week-end rouge» en manifestation chez les pompiers

■ Les sinistrés du «week-end rouge» de novembre 1974 ont manifesté hier devant le local de l'Association des pompiers de Montréal pour dénoncer ce qu'ils considèrent comme la «mauvaise foi» de l'association et, également, celle de leurs procureurs de l'Aide juridique, desquels ils réclament des actions immédia-

tes et qui a accepté l'offre de l'Association des pompiers de régler au tiers de sa demande parce qu'elle est pauvre, et aussi parce que le temps des Fêtes approchait».

Sur 140 sinistrés, une quarantaine ont ainsi disparu de la liste des réclamants. Il en reste donc

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photo Robert Nadon, LA PRESSE

*La Presse, 2-2-84 pp. 1-2.*

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« Nos populations doivent être

quelque peu étonnées du paradoxe dans lequel nous nous sommes engagés. Nous construisons des armes nucléaires dont nous savons ne jamais pouvoir nous servir, sauf dans un esprit de suicide. De part et d'autre, nous construisons un plus grand nombre d'armes nucléaires, dans l'espoir d'aboutir à des négociations qui concluront à la nécessité de diminuer les armes nucléaires. Nous vivons encore la

logique qui a été pensée du temps de l'Empire romain, alors que l'on disait: Si tu veux la paix, prépare la guerre. C'était peut-être une logique d'un autre âge, quand nous nous battions avec des flèches, des lances et des boucliers. Mais c'est aussi la logique qui est à la base de la théorie de la dissuasion nucléaire », a dit le premier ministre.

M. Trudeau a conclu: « Nous voir **TRUDEAU** en A 2



## Bronfman justifie sa valse des millions

page 2

## Québec 84

Au fur et à mesure que passent les saisons, approche la date fatidique du 23 juin lorsque sera donné le coup d'envoi des événements qui feront de Québec la capitale mondiale de la voile. Devant l'intérêt croissant que suscite déjà cette fête de 63 jours, LA PRESSE publie, à partir d'aujourd'hui, une chronique hebdomadaire intitulée, comme l'événement, Québec 84.

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### ORDRE CHRONOLOGIQUE DES ÉVÉNEMENTS

— ORGANISER LA RENCONTRE REAGAN-ANDROPOV

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO  
À. The Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs, OTTAWA (IDDZ)

FROM  
De The Canadian Embassy, PRAGUE

REFERENCE  
Référence

SUBJECT  
Sujet Prime Minister Trudeau's Meeting  
with President Husak

SECURITY  
Sécurité CONFIDENTIAL  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

DATE 2 February 1984

NUMBER  
Numéro 0203

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
MISSION	20-CDA-9-PM

ENCLOSURES  
Annexes

1  
DISTRIBUTION

Attached for whatever use they may be are our  
notes of the Trudeau-Husak meeting.

  
The Embassy



NOTES ON TALK BETWEEN  
PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU  
AND  
CZECHOSLOVAK PRESIDENT GUSTAV HUSAK  
HRADČANY CASTLE, PRAGUE  
JANUARY 26, 1984

---

HUSAK --

Welcomed Trudeau. After some initial informal exchanges by way of courtesy, said he had read Trudeau's speeches on his initiative and felt that they were important for peace and for ordinary people.

TRUDEAU --

We belong to opposing alliances but you have received us as friends - this is the beginning of dialogue. We belong to different systems but this does not mean that we need to be hostile. (Some historical reflections, noting that Europe had been torn by religious wars.) I hope that people have now learned the lesson of history that even though they belong to different systems they must avoid war. We should realize that we must agree to disagree and then live peacefully. Yesterday, I talked with Prime Minister Štrougal about the Prague Declaration and it struck\*that I am doing somewhat the same thing one year later - proposing dialogue and negotiations. But timing is all important; the Prague Declaration perhaps came too soon. It came in an atmosphere of hostility, when NATO countries were building to the end of 1983 and the implementation of the two-track decision. The Prague Declaration used some hostile language and was received by Western governments who were nervous about their unity. \*me

We must look to the past for lessons but we must not dwell on it. The important thing is to look to the future. My visit is symbolic of the need for us to talk rather than to shout. Our people want their leaders to behave in this way. Even Mrs. Thatcher is now talking of dialogue. Not a single Canadian politician has criticized my Eastern European trip. I think the atmosphere has changed; we can talk. I have come to seek wisdom from you on how we can open doors and give an example. You have great stature and have seen many things in your life; perhaps you can give some help to a leader of a younger country.

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CONFIDENTIAL  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

HUSAK --

Thank you for your tolerant approach. Wars today, I am afraid, would not last as long as the religious wars of our history. If other Western leaders thought as you do, we would have advanced further on the road to real peace. We read the Western press and we find in it more threats than good words. There are also honest efforts like yours but in practical terms we feel pressure against us. There is still a generation alive that has seen two world wars. We believe in this country that we have found the correct path; you could, if you had time, see that we are supported by our people. But in the meantime, only negative things are reported in your press about us. So we react defensively.

The Prague Declaration contains positive proposals and you have noted some of them. The meeting that adopted it was held here. It did have an element of defence against U.S. missiles in a European arms race and against U.S. economic discrimination. It bears the mark of its time, of our concerns for defence, and we must not forget its time.

In Helsinki, we agreed on certain measures. I visited the Federal Republic of Germany and had good talks there. We did not shout, there was no propaganda, there was a warming of of our mutual relations. We are important trade partners. I have also gone to Austria where we left out of our discussions items we disagreed on; our cooperation is not bad.

But serious deterioration in international relations has been brought about by U.S. efforts to obtain superiority, by their policy based on force. They have brought sharp, arrogant terms to talk; this brings a reaction from the other side and the situation worsens globally.

I agree we should respect each other's views on the equality of social systems and should have good relations in trade, culture, sports, etc. How do we do this? How do we implement your noble idea? Even in private life it is difficult. I know well the leaders of the Socialist countries. When we meet, as cooperative people, we always discuss the ideas you have tabled about cooperation in the world. For example, the Soviet leaders are unable to forget the devastation of war. They have it in their blood and they are frightened by the idea of new destruction. But to survive you must not forget defence if you feel somebody wants to attack you. Now in small Czechoslovakia (you give us too much weight comparing us with Canada as a middle power) we do our best for our population, but a few miles beyond our Western borders...we have to be able to defend ourselves. We would prefer to allocate funds to better purposes.

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CONFIDENTIAL  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

We welcome voices like yours from the West. We do not have to be pushed onto this path if it really exists. I have read your speeches, I see your desire for solutions and in substance I give my support to your efforts. But concretely, what shall we do? We feel pressure from the USA - economic, military, political, propaganda. We get used to it to some extent. There is goodwill with the USSR and others and we think we can solve problems. You mentioned a change in tone but we ask whether these changes are sincere or just a political manoeuvre. They have to be followed by deeds.

Perhaps you have read the recent interview of Andropov. He opens the question of negotiations at all levels including the Summit, but not negotiations for the sake of negotiation - that would be misleading people. Problems can be solved if there is a will to solve them. The American aggressive trend has grown in intensity under Reagan. The new round of the arms race is endless, backed by the military-industrial complex and business. Their intention is to dominate other people and to impose their ideas. I don't wish to interpret but to us this has brought about today's crisis. If after Reagan's last speech he had made one real gesture, it would have made all the difference and it would have brought a gesture from the other side.

Nobody wants war. The Western press speculates about a growing influence of the military in the USSR but I do not think this is true; the politicians are in control but force always provokes force. Who makes the first gesture? We think the cause of the problem is the behaviour of the USA which says that the USSR wants to destroy Europe.

I like your idea that political leaders should sit down and talk. I consider you a messenger looking for a third track, a light in the tunnel. I think gradually we will see a willingness to negotiate. Only insane people would want war but when weapons are stockpiled the risk of their use grows. How shall we act? I appreciate your coming here as a NATO leader. Your travels are beneficial to the cause we are both working for. Europe has many problems, not only its two political systems. There are economic problems which we all fight but the more we direct our efforts to defence the less we can fight them. Have I answered your question? The best move would be a concrete gesture from the Western countries; there would be a response.

TRUDEAU --

It is my understanding that you are concerned about what you see as the warlike attitudes of Reagan. I said in the

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CONFIDENTIAL  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

House of Commons that Reagan sounded warlike. I understand this concerns you as it does me and many in the USA. But we have to remember why Reagan was elected. The Helsinki conference created a document of détente but its year, 1975, was the culmination of East-West détente. During 1962-1975 there were many agreements, resolutions, and decisions by the USA and the USSR including multilateral ones at the United Nations. For example, the non-proliferation treaty, the partial test ban, hot line, seabed arms, outerspace. It was a period of attempted understanding.

I can't recall that after 1975 the USA behaved as warlike. Vietnam was over, there was no Grenada. President Carter negotiated peace between Egypt and Israel. Not until 1979 did NATO come to its two-track decision. I think the West did practice détente after 1975. But the American people felt humiliated and threatened by events in Tehran and were concerned about Afghanistan, Cambodia and Cuban adventurism in Angola. The American people felt Carter was weak so they elected a president who used warlike language and who had a mandate to build up their defence.

But history shows that no democracy remains warlike for long. The American people, satisfied that they are no longer humiliated by bandits in Tehran, are coming to yearn for peace again and even Reagan sees this. I agree we must judge a man by his actions and they are perhaps not very peaceful yet but I think he feels the U.S. people will not re-elect him unless he appears sincerely for peace. I do not think he has great schemes or policies; he is a politician and will do what he has to to get re-elected. The concept is that of following his people; it might be better if he were leading them. I too am afraid of the military-industrial complex. The "star wars" speech means perhaps that many scientists and others will gradually develop a vested interest in war in space but that danger is twenty years down the road. We must now develop the sense of security that will permit the USA to go back to its peaceful and democratic traditions.

What can we do that is concrete? We can't expect an immediate breakthrough in the negotiations in Geneva but it is possible in Stockholm and Vienna to bring NATO and Warsaw Pact members together to re-establish the dialogue that has been interrupted. I cannot say they will be successful for as you have noted, force begets force.

You have said that you are worried about your western borders; in western Europe, they worry about their eastern borders. It is not in the nature of Canada and the USA to want to have their forces in Europe. As Prime Minister, I cut our army in Europe in half and withdrew the nuclear role

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CONFIDENTIAL  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

of the Canadian Air Force. I was criticized for that. The opposition said the Soviet Union has a million, a million and a half troops in Europe. I don't think they want to attack but the fact that they are there is reason enough for us to be armed. I am not justifying, I am just explaining. Each side wants as much as the other and a little more.

I think we can break that vicious circle, at least in conventional arms. As I said to the Prime Minister, it is our duty to respond to your proposals in Vienna and we have said so publicly. If we can reach equilibrium through the Vienna MBFR negotiations, this will reduce the danger of war and the danger of the use of nuclear arms. If we show that we can progress in Vienna, I hope we can pressure the superpowers to make progress. That is why I am proposing a meeting of the five nuclear powers. I think it is the duty of the three lesser ones to pressure the USA and the USSR. They are tempted to escape that duty because they know the eyes of the world are on the superpowers. And many non-nuclear powers are coming closer to having nuclear weapons.

I am saying things that you know but I am trying to respond to your suggestion for concrete ideas. For Canada as a middle power, these can really only be energy. I am criticized because we are the second lowest contributor to NATO on a per capita budgetary basis but the Canadian tradition is to seek peace.

HUSAK --

Perhaps the talks in Stockholm and Vienna can push things forward; I hope so. I appreciate the interest you show - it has great possibilities. We must convince ourselves and others that this is the only reasonable way. We must not just wait as they did in the American film "The Day After".

I see many people, including diplomats, from many countries. I always say we should do all we can for peace. There is not one side that is an angel and one a devil. You often mention that the sound mind of man must govern him. We don't mind rhetoric but we do mind concrete facts. And we react to them.

I do appreciate your noble mission. The only desire of the Czechoslovak people and leaders is for peace and this is not an empty phrase. I accept your words and your position. As we always say at the end of a political meeting, we will do all we can to make our political dreams come true. This will not be easy. In a village, and I come from a village, a quarrel can last for two or three generations. Sometimes

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CONFIDENTIAL  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

the same thing happens to states. In a village a dispute may be over stealing fruit; with nations it is over power. Everyone says that never since the end of the war has the international situation been so complicated. But let's try.

I know you intend to make a trip to Moscow. They will be glad to receive you. It is one of the key places. They will welcome your position. And you should make mention again of the concrete steps we have talked of today, in a month or in a year. The Messiah has been crucified and you will not run such risk today but you must go on.

I think our bilateral relationship can be intensified in all fields.

We cannot quit our alliances and we know our motives. They should not be an obstacle to good relations. You will hear the same in Berlin and Mrs. Thatcher will hear it in Hungary. Let's fight for the good cause of coexistence and if we shout and spit at each other less, we will respect each other more. Your visit is very useful and we appreciate it. Canada is not small or meaningless as you imply. Czechoslovakia is small but it also has a certain influence and we want it used for a good cause.

TRUDEAU --


I find encouragement in your words. Thank you.

(Notes taken by H.D. Peel)

cc: ZCI NAWYOT/cic  
RBR  
RBL  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 001  
20/2/84



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES



TO  
A The Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs, OTTAWA (IDDZ)

FROM  
De The Canadian Embassy, PRAGUE

REFERENCE  
Référence

SUBJECT  
Sujet Prime Minister's Visit to Czechoslovakia

SECURITY  
Sécurité UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2 February 1984  
NUMBER  
Numéro 0202

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
MISSION	20-CDA-9-PM

ENCLOSURES  
Annexes

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DISTRIBUTION

While in Prague, G.J. Smith (IDA) was handed by a Czechoslovak official a report on telex paper of what western news agencies were saying about the Prime Minister's visit. We attach our office translation of this report. It is of interest as the only example we have seen of what the Czechoslovak Press Agency (ČTK) provides to senior officials - news that is not available to ordinary citizens.

The Embassy

CTK Express Info

Western News Agencies on P. Trudeau's Visit to Czechoslovakia

PRAGUE 25 JANUARY:

All the major western agencies state in their reports on P. Trudeau's visit to Czechoslovakia that the trip is a part of a peace mission of the Prime Minister of Canada who makes efforts to relax tension between East and West.

According to the UPI Agency Trudeau is going to inform leading representatives of Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R. and Romania on the up-to-date response to his proposal that a conference of five nuclear superpowers on disarmament take place. Trudeau wants to gain support for his initiative in these communist states with the aim to encourage the Soviet Union to renew disarmament talks with the United States. UPI states that Y. Andropov is the only supreme representative of the five nuclear superpowers with whom Trudeau has not yet discussed his plan. The Agency quotes a Canadian official who declared that Trudeau's trip cannot substitute for a visit to the Soviet Union; however, all the three states the Prime Minister is going to visit, are important in a certain way. The same official said that the Eastern bloc is not a "closed community" and "members of the Warsaw Pact can use their influence to develop fine pressure on the Soviets to withdraw from the rhetoric and to renew disarmament talks".

The UPI also states that the aim of Trudeau's trip is "to convince communist states to develop pressure on Moscow in order to achieve as fast as possible renewal of open and serious talks" on reduction of international tension.

The AP Agency writes in its report with reference to Canadian officials that Czechoslovakia and the GDR were selected for the visit because they are the states where the Soviet Union deploys rockets as an answer to the deployment of US rockets in Western Europe. Romania was chosen for its efforts to practice independent foreign policy". Ceausescu has openly supported Trudeau's initiative."

- 2 -

REUTER guess that the trip of the Prime Minister of Canada was "organized at the last minute as a temporary substitute for his trip to Moscow he'd like to make".

The DPA Agency emphasizes that "Trudeau would like NATO and the Warsaw Pact to have more mutual confidence thus contributing to relaxation of international tension". The Agency further states that in the first talk with Prime Minister Strougal Trudeau referred to repeated assertions of both the Pacts that they do not want to be the first to start a war. Both the blocs should not consider this declaration a mere propaganda. The IPS Agency states that Trudeau's visit is the first visit of a top western official in Czechoslovakia or the GDR since the Soviet tactical-operational rockets' deployment was commenced in these countries.

*MF*  
*action*

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---PMS INITIATIVE:USA CONCERNS

SUMMARY:AMB WAS CALLED IN TODAY TO SEE JOHN KELLY, ACTING ASST SEC OF STATE. KELLY CONVEYED USA CONCERN ABOUT STATEMENTS PM HAS MADE ON NATO STRATEGY AND USA COMMITMENT TO DEFEND ALLIANCE. KELLY CHARACTERIZED THESE STATEMENTS AS NOT/NOT HELPFUL TO ALLIANCE UNITY. KELLY ALSO SAID THAT WHILE USA APPRECIATES CDN MOTIVES IN TABLING CDN PROPOSALS IN CD, USA HAS SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS ABOUT OUR DOING SO. THE CD IS NOT/NOT APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR DISCUSSING STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

2. REPORT: AMB WAS CALLED IN TO SEE JOHN KELLY WHO IN ABSENCE OF RICK BURT WAS ACTING ASST SEC OF STATE. WE WERE TOLD DECISION WAS MADE TO CALL IN AMBASSADOR PERSONALLY TO EMPHASIZE SERIOUSNESS. KELLY SAID THE USA IS MOST DISTURBED BY THE THINGS THEY HAVE SEEN REPORTED OF THE PMS COMMENTS IN DAVOS AND BY THE PMS CHOICE OF EAST GERMANY TO REITERATE THEM.

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3. KELLY SAID THAT IN THE WAKE OF THE SOV RESPONSE TO INF DEPLOYMENT, STATEMENTS QUESTIONING NATO STRATEGY AND THE USA COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE WERE NOT/NOT HELPFUL IN MAINTAINING ALLIANCE UNITY. HE SAID THAT THE USA HAD NOTED THAT THESE QUESTIONS HAD NOT/NOT BEEN RAISED BY CDA IN NATO FORUMS OR IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE USA. THE USA WAS THEREFORE QUOTE SURPRISED AND DISMAYED UNQUOTE TO HEAR THE PM DISCUSSING THEM IN THIS MANNER. THE USA CONSIDERS THAT THE RAISON D ETRE FOR NATO CONTINUES TO EXIST AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NATO COUNTRIES TAKE A COMMON POSITION IN CONVEYING THIS CONVICTION. THE USA HOPES THAT CDA WILL TAKE STEPS TO CORRECT THE SENSE OF DISARRAY WHICH PMS COMMENTS HAVE CREATED.

USA ALSO HOPES THAT CDA WLD UNDERTAKE MORE AMPLE CONSULTATION BEFORE PUTTING CONCERNS SUCH AS THESE INTO THE PUBLIC ARENA.

4. TURNING TO THE CD, KELLY SAID THAT THE USA APPRECIATES CDAS MOTIVES THAT LIE BEHIND THE THREE PAPERS WE HAVE CIRCULATED IN NATO BUT THAT THE USA HOPES WE WLD NOT/NOT TABLE THESE THREE PROPOSALS IN GENEV. THE USA HAS SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS. THE USA HAS BEEN ENGAGED FOR FIFTEEN YEARS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGS WITH THE USSR AND SEES NO/NO MERIT IN PUTTING STRATEGIC ISSUES INVOLVING THE WEAPONS OF THE USA AND THE USSR INTO THE CD. THIS IS NOT/NOT THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR THE DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES. OTHER ALLIES HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT CDN PROPOSALS TO USA. THE USA HOPES THAT BEFORE CDA TABLES THESE DOCUS THAT WE SUBJECT THEM TO FURTHER BILATERAL AND NATO CONSULTATIONS.

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5.KELLY HANDED OVER PAPER OUTLINING PRELIMINARY USA VIEWS ON OUR CD PROPOSALS(PAPER FOLLOWS BY FAX).PAPER EMPHASIZES THAT USA SHARES CDAS DESIRE FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL BUT DOES NOT/NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE PROPOSALS PROMOTE THAT PROSPECT.PAPER ARGUES THAT CDN PROPOSAL ON OUTER SPACE WLD REMOVE ONUS FROM SOVIET UNION FOR ACTION AND WLD OFFER THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO DIVIDE WESTERN GROUP ON AN ISSUE CRUCIAL TO WESTERN SECURITY.THE PROPOSAL THAT NEW WEAPONS BE PROVED VERIFIABLE IS DESCRIBED AS UNWORKABLE.THE FOCUS ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION WEAKENS LONGSTANDING WESTERN POSITION ON COOPERATIVE MEASURES.MEASURE TO RESTRICT MOBILITY OF ICBMS IS SAID TO RUN DIRECTLY COUNTER TO CONCLUSIONS OF SCOWCROFT COMMISSION.PAPER CONCLUDES BY QUESTIONING APPROPRIATENESS OF CD AS A FORUM FOR ANY BUT THE ASAT PROPOSAL.

6.GOTLIEB REPLIED THAT THE PMS COMMENTS IN DAVOS WERE NOT/NOT INTENDED TO QUESTION CDN COMMITMENT TO NATO.PM WAS TALKING AT A FORUM THAT WAS INTENDED TO BE A FRANK AND OPEN DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS OF SECURITY AND THIS WAS QUESTION HE FELT CDL BE OPENLY MENTIONED.WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE REITERATION OF THESE POINTS IN EAST GERMANY WAS MADE TO CDN PRESS IN A FORM INTENDED FOR CDN CONSUMPTION.THEREFORE IT APPEARED THAT EAST EUROPEAN LOCATION WAS IRRELEVANT.KELLY DID NOT/NOT ACCEPT THIS ARGUMENT.

7.AMB ALSO POINTED OUT THAT PM HAD IN FACT RAISED QUESTION OF PROBLEM

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OF NATO STRATEGY DURING LUNCHEON MTG WITH SHULTZ AT WHICH TIME SHULTZ HAD REPLIED THAT AFTER THE CURRENT PHASE(IE THE NATO REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE HARMEL REPORT)THAT QUESTION MIGHT BE LOOKED AT.

8.WITH REGARD TO THE CD AND CDAS PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY WE POINTED OUT THAT INTENTION WAS TO CIRCULATE DOCUS TO CD DELS AND NOT/NOT TO TABLE THEM.KELLY SAID THIS DID NOT/NOT APPEAR TO BE A SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE TO HIM.DOCS WLD UNDOUBTEDLY BECOME SUBJECT OF CD DISCUSSION AND CLD PROVE TROUBLESOME FOR YRS TO COME.THE CDN PROPOSALS HE SAID GO TO THE HEART OF DETERRENCE.

9.AMB POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC PRESSURE TO SPEAK OUT ON SUCH ISSUES AND THAT THE PM FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SPEAK OUT ON THESE ISSUES IN AN AS OPEN A MANNER AS POSSIBLE.

NEVERTHELESS WE ARE SENSITIVE TO OUR ALLIES CONCERNS ON THESE ISSUES.KELLY RESPONDED THAT IT HAS LONG BEEN AN ARGUMENT THAT THOSE WITHOUT HARDWARE CAN NEVERTHELESS ~~CAN~~ STILL SPEAK OUT ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES BUT THAT THIS HAS GENERALLY BEEN A THIRD WORLD POSITION THAT DOES NOT/NOT HAVE PRECEDENT WITHIN NATO.AMB RESPONDED THAT HE CLD RECALL PERSONALLY SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST IN WHICH CDA HAS FELT IT NECESSARY TO SPEAK OUT ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND THAT CDA BELIEVES THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO DO SO.PMS DECISION TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES OPENLY LIKE HIS INITIATIVE ARE INTENDED TO SUPPLEMENT PRES REAGANS OWN EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.FOR EXAMPLE,PM HAS BEEN

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VOCAL IN COMMUNICATING HIS SUPPORT FOR PRES REAGANS RECENT SPEECH ON USA/USSR RELS AND STATING HIS BELIEF THAT PRES IS SINCERE.AMB ALSO POINTED OUT THAT CDA HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF INF DEPLOYMENT AND POINTED TO PMS LEADERSHIP IN DEFENDING CRUISE TESTING IN CDA.KELLY CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THE USA FULLY ACCEPTS THE GENUINE MOTIVATION BEHIND PMS STATEMENTS AND CDAS CD PAPERS.HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT USA HAD APPRECIATED WHAT PM HAD DONE IN THE PAST AND CITED HIS FIRM OPPOSITION TO GREEK PMS PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIM ON INF DEPLOYMENT.

10.DELAY IN EXPRESSING VIEWS ON PMS DAVOS STATEMENTS AND FACT THESE VIEWS WERE NOT/NOT TRANSMITTED FROM HIGHER LEVEL MAY INDICATE SOMETHING OF A USA DESIRE TO MAKE THIS DEMARCHE IN A MEASURED MANNER AND TO AVOID PUTTING IT CENTER STAGE IN THE AGENDA OF CDA/USA RELS. THEY ALSO WAITED UNTIL MR CLARK HAD FINISHED HIS VISIT HERE. NEVERTHELESS THERE CAN BE NO/NO DOUBT THAT USA IS INDEED SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT OUR INTENTION TO BRING OUR STRATEGIC STABILITY PROPOSALS TO THE CD AND ABOUT THE OPEN QUESTIONNING OF USA WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND EUROPE,WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION ON THESE ISSUES.

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*R.J. LYSYSHYN/th*

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### U.S. Views on Canadian Proposals for Enhancing Strategic Stability

Based on a preliminary review of the Canadian draft paper regarding how technological developments may be restricted to provide greater strategic stability, we wish to convey to the Government of Canada our serious concern with the three proposals contained therein and the forum chosen for their presentation. As all three of these proposals have serious implications for Western security interests, the U.S. urges that Canada consult fully with its Allies before taking any further steps toward tabling these proposals in Geneva.

The U.S. shares the desire of the Canadian government for progress in achieving balanced, verifiable arms control. We do not believe, however, that the three proposals under consideration promote that prospect.

The U.S. attaches great importance to outer space arms control and is already signatory to several international agreements regulating use of outer space. After discussions with our Allies last year, we agreed to the formation of an outer space working group provided that its mandate be limited to exclude negotiations. In doing so, the U.S. and its Allies agreed that Western unity must be preserved on this issue. The Soviet Union and its allies blocked consensus on this mandate, however. The Canadian proposal would remove the onus from the Soviets for that action and would offer them an opportunity to divide the Western group on an issue crucial to Western security. Tabling such a proposal at the CD, therefore, poses problems for the West. Doing so at the beginning of the session exacerbates those problems by redirecting CD discussions of outer space issues and precluding achievement of a common Western approach to the issue.

The other two proposals also pose significant problems for U.S. and Allied strategic policy. The proposal that new strategic weapons be proved verifiable before they are deployed appears unworkable. Its focus on national technical means [NTM] of verification seriously weakens the longstanding Western position that cooperative measures, including on-site inspection [OSI] is, in some cases, a necessary component of effective verification. Moreover, the proposal fails to recognize that the verifiability of any particular weapon or system can be determined only in the context of a state's agreed obligations under a specific arms control treaty relating to that weapon or system. In the absence of a treaty regime specifically prohibiting or limiting the weapon, states

CONFIDENTIAL



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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

have no compliance obligations which can be verified. Thus, the thrust of the proposal is unrealistic. Regarding the proposal to restrict the mobility of intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs], the U.S. notes that such a measure runs directly counter to the conclusions of the Scowcroft Commission, which recommended that mobile basing concepts for ICBMs be developed as one possible approach to enhancing ICBM survivability.

The U.S. believes strongly that these proposals should not be tabled in the CD. The choice of forum itself is completely inappropriate for the second and third proposals, as matters pertaining to the characteristics of strategic weapon systems are more appropriately dealt with in existing bilateral frameworks. While we have agreed to discuss outer space arms control in the CD, Western unity on this issue is vital should Western security interests be protected.

The U.S. sees no gain for the West in tabling these proposals in the CD when it reconvenes February 7. We strongly urge the Government of Canada to consult more fully with both the U.S. and all of the NATO Allies before taking any further action on these proposals.

CONFIDENTIAL

10  
*Mr. Gossage*



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

DIARY FILE

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

*WDC 005/02*

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
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SECURITY/  
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**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

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TRUDEAU ASSAILED

COMCENTRE: PLEASE FAX ATTACHED

COMMUNICATIONS  
FEB 21 1984  
CANADIAN EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON

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PUB AFFAIRS

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

Subject TRUDEAU ASSAILED FOR REMARKS ON NATO  
Sujet \_\_\_\_\_

Date Feb. 2/84

Publication \_\_\_\_\_

NEW YORK TIMES A-3

## Trudeau Assailed for Remarks on NATO

By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN

Special to The New York Times

OTTAWA, Feb. 1 — Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau has run into a storm of criticism at home for remarks he made in Europe last weekend questioning the fundamental assumption of the North Atlantic alliance's nuclear strategy.

The controversy over the Prime Minister's remarks has also led to the issuance through the United States Embassy here of an unusual State Department response saying Mr. Trudeau "has repeatedly expressed privately and publicly his full support for NATO's strategy of deterrence."

Mr. Trudeau, who is currently in Romania as part of his initiative to limit nuclear arms, touched off the controversy Saturday. During a symposium on international security held in Davos, Switzerland, he asked publicly whether any United States President would actually order a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union if Soviet troops moved on Western Europe.

This first-strike assumption, sometimes referred to as a flexible response, has been the principle on which strategic deterrence has been built, and while its validity has been debated by such figures as Henry A. Kissinger and Robert S. McNamara, no head of a NATO Government had raised it in a public forum.

### A Question of Credibility

Most of the criticism aroused by Mr. Trudeau dealt not so much with the substance of the remarks as with the fact that he made them and that by doing so he ran the risk of eroding the alliance's solidarity and credibility.

"Sometimes the Prime Minister forgets that his country is a part of the alliance," said Sinclair Stevens, the opposition critic on military issues, who led the attack on Mr. Trudeau in Parliament. That attack essentially followed the line set by Raymond Barre, the former French Prime Minister, who along with Kenneth W. Dam, the United States Under Secretary of State, argued with Mr. Trudeau at the Davos panel.

At that meeting, after Mr. Dam disputed Mr. Trudeau's contention that United States missile stockpiles in Europe were increasing, Mr. Trudeau said he had meant only to suggest that it was the quality of the weapons rather than their numbers that were rising, and then he added, "Incidentally, it draws us into the whole question of whether the NATO overall strategy is still the right one."

The Canadian leader, who had just finished a visit to Prague and who on Monday became the first head of government of a NATO country to set foot in East Berlin, said that the alliance's two-track policy — to deploy missiles while pressing for arms agreements with the Soviet Union — was based on the assumption that the United States nuclear arsenal could and would be committed if there was an invasion by Soviet conventional forces. Mr. Trudeau said this assumption was now being questioned.

### French Leader Challenged

When Mr. Barre said that the open debating of this issue would lead to "neutrality and pacifism" in Europe and reduced credibility in the alliance, Mr. Trudeau responded: "Let me ask you about your credibility, Mr. Barre. Do you think the President of the United States, in answer to an overrunning of Europe by conventional forces, will want to start World War III, an atomic war? You have to believe that in order not to have a credibility gap?"

Mr. Barre answered sharply, "I will never put the question because if I put the question, there is no longer credibility." Mr. Barre took the position that questioning such issues in public debate could lead Moscow to regard NATO as a less than united alliance.

This was echoed in Parliament here on Monday. One Conservative leader said it was a principle of any strategic alliance to "keep your adversary in

doubt" over possible responses and not debate them in public.

The Davos exchange has led the Conservative opposition to make its first direct challenge to the Prime Minister's peace initiative, which until now

has not been dealt with as a partisan issue. It also marked the first time during the three-month peace initiative that Mr. Trudeau had departed from his affirmation of the treaty organization's two-track policy.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

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Subject  
Sujet

Trudeau in E. Berlin

Date

30/1/84.

Publication

Christian Sci. Mon.

### Trudeau carries his plan for disarming to E. Berlin

East Berlin

Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau was met at Schönefeld Airport here Monday by East German chief of state Erich Honecker. Mr. Trudeau was to discuss his one-man nuclear disarmament initiative with Mr. Honecker in two sessions of formal talks today.

The Canadian leader is the first NATO head of government to visit East Berlin, which the alliance does not recognize as the capital of communist East Germany.

Western diplomats said Trudeau's visits to Czechoslovakia last week and to East Germany, both at his initiative, were chosen because they are the sites of new Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons. The Canadian leader goes on to Romania Wednesday for talks with President Nicolae Ceausescu at the latter's suggestion, the diplomats said.



Honecker

Edgar J.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

4/4

Pg 6E

Subject  
Sujet

Date January 31, 1984 Publication The Washington Times

### Trudeau in E. Berlin for talks

EAST BERLIN — Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau arrived in East Berlin yesterday to discuss his one-man nuclear disarmament initiative with East German chief-of-state Erich Honecker.

The Canadian leader is the first NATO head of government to visit East Berlin, which the alliance does not recognize as the capital of communist East Germany.

The talks are expected by Western diplomats to center on Mr. Trudeau's campaign for a global arms limitation forum to be established this year grouping the top five nuclear powers — the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China.

leds

*Handled by RBR*  
*Mr. De Me*  
*For action pls*  
*12/3/84*

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PRGUE WOGRO192 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 021600

---PMS VISIT:THANK YOU LETTERS

AS REQUESTED BY GJ SMITH,FOLLOWING ARE DRAFT TEXTS

FOR LETTERS OF THANKS FOR PMS SIGNATURE.WE DO NOT/NOT KNOW  
WHAT KIND OF LETTER IS USUAL IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES;THESE HAVE  
BEEN DRAFTED TO AVOID SUBSTANCE.

2.QUOTE DEAR PRIME MINISTER,HAVING JUST RETURNED FROM EUROPE,I  
AM WRITING AT ONCE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO YOU FOR THE  
ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR MY VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA.I APPRECIATE  
THEM ALL THE MORE AS THEY WERE UNDERTAKEN AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE.

IT WAS A PLEASURE FOR ME TO MEET YOU AGAIN AND TO EXCHANGE  
VIEWS ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DOTO REDUCE SOME OF THE DANGEROUS  
TENSIONS PRESENT IN WORLD TODAY.I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR  
SUCH EFFORTS THAT WE WERE ABLE TO HAVE FRANK AND CONSTRUCTIVE  
CONVERSATIONS.I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR EXPRESSING YOUR SUPPORT  
FOR MY INITIATIVES.

~~I ALSO WANT TO THANK YOU FOR THE TIME YOU TOOK FROM YOUR  
BUSY SCHEDULE TO SPEND WITH ME.I KNOW HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO  
GET AWAY FROM DAILY PRESSURES.~~

YOU KNOW HOW MUCH I ENJOYED MY AFTERNOON VISIT TO SLAVKOV TO  
SEE THE BATTLEFIELD AND MUSEUMS OF AUSTERLITZ.THIS WAS THE FUL-  
FILLMENT OF A DREAM I HAVE HAD FOR MANY YEARS AND MY GRATITUDE TO  
YOU IS IMMENSE.IT WAS PARTICULARLY GOOD OF YOU TO PROVIDE AN

...2

PAGE TWO WOGR0192 RESTR

AIRCRAFT FOR THE TRIP AND TO HAVE YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER ACCOMPANY ME.UNQUOTE.

3.QUOTE DEAR PRESIDENT HUSAK,NOW THAT I AM BACK IN CANADA I WANT TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY APPRECIATION FOR ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WERE MADE FOR MY VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND ESPECIALLY FOR THE TIME YOU SPENT IN CONVERSATION WITH ME.MY GRATITUDE IS ALL THE GREATER AS I UNDERSTAND YOU RETURNED FROM YOUR HOLIDAY ESPECIALLY FOR OUR TALKS.

I CONSIDER OUR DISCUSSION TO HAVE BEEN AN IMPORTANT PART OF EFFORTS TO PROVIDE MORE POINTS OF CONTACT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR WORDS OF SUPPORT FOR MY INITIATIVES IN THIS DIRECTION,IN THE DIRECTION OF REDUCING TENSION.UNQUOTE.

4.QUOTE DEAR MINISTER CHNOUPEK,IT WAS A PLEASURE FOR ME TO MEET YOU AGAIN DURING MY VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND TO HAVE THE CHANCE TO TALK WITH YOU INFORMALLY.I THINK OUR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AT DINNER AND DURING THE TRIP TO SLAVKOV WAS VERY WORTHWHILE. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR ACCOMPANYING ME ON THAT EXCURSION.YOUR KNOW-LEGE OF THE AREA AND OF NAPOLEON CERTAINLY ADDED TO MY ENJOYMENT. PLEASE ALSO EXTEND MY THANKS TO VICE MINISTER JOHANES.

THE TALKS I HAD IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE AN IMPORTANT PART OF MY EFFORTS TO BRING A STRONGER POLITICAL DYNAMISM TO BEAR ON THE PROBLEMS GIVING RISE TO EAST-WEST TENSIONS.I BELIEVE THEY SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE AND I HOPE THEIR RESULTS WILL BE EVIDENT

...3



PAGE THREE WOGR0192 CONF

BOTH IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND ON THE BROAD WORLD STAGE.  
UNQUOTE.

5. GRATEFUL YOU ALSO CONSIDER NOTE TO MR OTA SCHWARZENBERGER, CHIEF,  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND PROTOCOL, OFFICE OF PRIME MINISTER OF CSSR,  
ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE DEAR MR SCHWARZENBERGER, I WANT  
TO THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE EXCELLENT ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR  
MY VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WERE ALMOST  
ENTIRELY IN YOUR HANDS. YOU HAD A VERY SHORT TIME IN WHICH TO  
PREPARE BUT I WAS INDEED PLEASED THAT EVERYTHING WENT SO  
SMOOTHLY. UNQUOTE.

6. LETTERS COULD BE SENT TO US FOR FORWARDING OR SENT  
AIRMAIL; FORMER PREFERABLE. BAG CLOSES 0800 FRIDAYS.

CCC/175 021500Z WOGR0192

INFO

*MF*  
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UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM00122 02FEB84

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RBR RBD RCR RGB

---TRANSCRIPT OF THE PMS NEWS CONF, BUCST ROMANIA, THUR 02FEB84  
Q. MR PM, I WOULD LIKE YOU, IF IT IS POSSIBLE, TO TELL US WHAT ARE  
YOUR IMPRESSIONS AFTER THE MTG WITH PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU, AND HOW  
DO YOU VIEW HIS APPROACH TO THE INNATL MATTERS?

A. I FOUND A GREAT DEAL OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN OUR APPROACHES WHEN  
WE WERE DISCUSSING THE IMPORTANCE OF INVOLVING POLITICAL LEADERS  
IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. YOU'LL RECALL THAT LAST NIGHT I QUOTED  
THE STATEMENT THAT PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU HAD MADE AT HSNKI ABOUT  
THE IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOWING UP ON THAT FINAL ACT AND INVOLVING  
OURSELVES AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. I THINK THAT WAS QUITE PROPHETIC.  
I MYSELF AM ATTEMPTING TO DO THE SAME THING, TO ENSURE THAT  
POLITICAL LEADERS INVOLVE THEMSELVES DIRECTLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS  
FOR PEACE. SO, IN THAT AREA, OUR OBJECTIVES SEEM QUITE SIMILAR.

IN HIS OTHER INNATL PREOCCUPATIONS, WE DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH  
NORTH-SOUTH SUBJECTS--THE IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING THE GAP BETWEEN  
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND TRYING TO BRIDGE  
IT, AND THERE TOO, I FOUND A GREAT DEAL OF SIMILARITY.

...2

PAGE TWO PM00122 UNCLAS

I THINK THE ROMANIAN PRESIDENTS APPROACH TOWARDS UNIVERSALITY OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN IS ONE WHICH WE ALSO SHARE AND PROMOTE.

SO, ON THE PRINCIPLES, THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF PARALLELISM BETWEEN ROMANIAN OBJECTIVES IN THESE AREAS AND THE CDN OBJECTIVES. BRIAN KELLEHER (CBC). MR PM, YOUVE SAID THAT YOU CANT GO ON JUST INDEFINITELY DEVOTING THE AMOUNT OF TIME THAT YOUVE BEEN DEVOTING TO THE PEACE INITIATIVE, AND YOU INDICATED ON THE COMWEL TRIP THAT ABOUT NOW, CHRONOLOGICALLY, WOULD BE THE TIME THAT PERHAPS YOU WOULD REVIEW WHERE IT GOES.

I AM WONDERING IF IT IS NOW TIME TO REVIEW THAT, AND ALSO THE OTHER QUESTION THAT YOU MENTIONED AT THAT TIME, CONSIDERING YOUR OWN FUTURE, IS IT TIME TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF THAT NOW AS WELL?

A. I WOULD SAY THAT IT IS MY PLAN WHEN I RETURN TO OTT TO SIT DOWN WITH MR MACEACHEN AND MY POLICY ADVISORS ON THIS PEACE INITIATIVE, AND TO TRY AND DRAW A TEMPORARY BOTTOM LINE AT ANY RATE. WELL SEE WHERE WE ARE AT AND SEE IF THERE ARE ANY IMMEDIATE INITIATIVES WHICH SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE FUTURE AND MAKE AN ASSESSMENT, IN OTHER WORDS, OF PHASES I AND II OF MY INITIATIVE, SEE IF THEY SHOULD BE CONTINUED OR BROUGHT FORTH INTO ANOTHER PHASE. AND I SUPPOSE, DEPENDING ON HOW THAT IS ANSWERED, I WILL ASK MYSELF ABOUT MY OWN FUTURE, AND THEN IN THE USUAL WAY I WILL ANSWER THAT QUESTION PRIVATELY, TO MYSELF.

Q. MR PM, YOU SAID IN YOUR TOAST YESTERDAY THAT YOU REACHED SOME

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PAGE THREE PM00122 UNCLAS

COMMON CONCLUSION WITH PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU AND THAT YOU SUBSCRIBE TO THE SPIRIT OF HIS PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE PROBLEMS OF TODAY.

NOW, REFERRING TO THE MAIN PROBLEM--THE PROBLEM OF THE NUCLEAR ROCKETS--WHAT ARE, IN YOUR OPINION, THE WAYS AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE TALKS IN GENEV BEING RESUMED SO THAT MANKINDS FEARS SHOULD BE ELIMINATED?

A. WELL, AS I POINTED OUT TO PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU AND AS I HAVE TO OTHER LEADERS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE FIRST WAY IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS COULD IN FACT BE RESUMED WOULD BE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO COME BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

I REALIZE THAT THAT PRESENTS CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES NOW. I HOPE THAT NOW WILL NOT/NOT LAST FOR TOO LONG. IN THE MEANTIME, I AM DOING WHAT I HAD SAID I WOULD, WHEN LAST OCT I WAS SPECULATING ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BREAK DOWN WITHOUT CONCLUSION, THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD LEAVE THE TABLE, AND IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR OTHERS THAN THE SUPER POWERS, OTHERS TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN THE TYPE OF NEGOTIATION THAT I HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN AND WHICH LED TO THE MTG OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN STKHM AND WHICH WILL LEAD, I HOPE, TO A PROGRESSIVE RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS IN VIENN ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS.

SO, WHILE WAITING FOR THE SUPERPOWERS TO COME TOGETHER AGAIN, THERE ARE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THINGS WE CAN AND SHOULD BE DOING. PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU HAS MADE A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL ON THE INF;

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WE HAVE DISCUSSED THAT. I GUESS, ON THAT SPECIFIC PROPOSAL, IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT WE DID NOT/NOT REACH AN AGREEMENT. I MADE OTHER SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON, FOR INSTANCE, THE FIVE-POWER SUMMIT WHICH, I GUESS, IN HIS LANGUAGE WE COULD SAY THAT HE SALUTES THOSE PROPOSALS, BUT THERE MAY BE SOME ASPECTS OF IT THAT MAY DIFFER FROM MY APPROACH.

SO, WE HAVE DIFFERENT APPROACHES, BUT AS I SAID IN ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION, THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT WE ARE BOTH STATING THE NECESSITY OF POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE MIDDLE POWERS, EVEN THE NON-SUPERPOWERS, TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, SINCE ALL OF OUR PEOPLES WOULD BE INVOLVED IN A NUCLEAR WAR WHETHER THEY LIKE IT OR NOT/NOT.

BOB HEPBURN (TRNTO STAR) PM, YOU SAID IN BRLIN THAT CDN OFFICIALS AND GDR OFFICIALS WOULD MEET TO EXCHANGE PROPOSALS ON DISARMAMENT.

I WONDER IF, IN ROMANIA, YOU HAVE REACHED THE SAME SORT OF AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING WITH MR CEAUSESCU TO HELP YOUR ADVISORS MEET AND WHETHER YOU HAVE ALSO REACHED THAT SAME SORT OF UNDERSTANDING IN OTHER COUNTRIES THAT YOU'VE VISITED.

A. WELL, IN DIFFERENT WAYS, IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. HERE IN ROMANIA, AS I SAID, I BELIEVE, IN MY TOAST LAST NIGHT, WE COULD ALMOST TAKE A LOT OF THINGS FOR GRANTED BECAUSE THE ROMANIAN POSITION ON THE NEED TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CDN POSITION, AND BOTH OF OUR POSITIONS TO INVOLVE OURSELVES POLITICALLY, HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BEFORE WE MET. SO, IM SAYING WE HAD SOMEWHAT PARALLEL APPROACHES.

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OF COURSE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO DIALOGUE. THE ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IS TO VISIT CDA ALREADY NEXT WEEK. THESE DISCUSSIONS WILL BE CONTINUED AND, AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU HAS BEEN INVITED TO CDA BEFORE; I RENEWED THAT INVITATION. SO, THE DISCUSSIONS WILL CONTINUE BETWEEN US.

IN THE CASE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, I THINK WE STARTED FROM POSITIONS WHICH WERE MUCH FURTHER APART, AND IN OUR DISCUSSION I POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN AREAS OF THE NATO DECLARATION OF DEC AND CERTAIN AREAS OF THE PRGUE DECLARATION OF LAST JAN WHICH WARRANTED EXAMINATION SO THAT WE COULD TRY AND BRING TOGETHER THESE AREAS OF SIMILARITY. THAT IS WHAT OUR OFFICIALS WILL BE ATTEMPTING.

SO, AS I SAY, THE NEED IN BOTH COUNTRIES WAS NOT/NOT THE SAME, NOR IS THE FUTURE COURSE OF THINGS.

Q. MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, QUELLE EST VOTRE OPINION SUR LA PROPOSITION ROUMAINE CONCERNANT UNE RENCONTRE ENTRE PAYS MEMBRES DU TRAITE DE VARSOVIE ET DE L OTAN?

R. SUR L IMPORTANCE D UNE TELLE RENCONTRE, D UNE FACON GENERALE, JE SUIS D ACCORD ET CELA EXPLIQUE QUE J AI VOULU QUE NOUS AYONS CETTE REUNION A STKHM AU NIVEAU DES MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES AFIN QUE LES PAYS DE L OTAN ET LES PAYS DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE AINSI QUE LES PAYS NEUTRES ET NON ALIGNES SOIENT EN PRESENCE LES UNS DES AUTRES ET PUISSENT ENGAGER LE DIALOGUE POLITIQUE.

...6

PAGE SIX PM00122 UNCLAS

DE LA MEME FACON,AUX MBFR,E EST-A-DIRE AUX NEGOCIATIONS DE VIENNE,J AI PROPOSE QU IL Y AIT AUSSI DES RENCONTRES POLITIQUES.

DONC,IL Y A UNE CERTAINE SIMILITUDE DANS LES OPTIQUES DES DEUX PAYS.COMME JE VIENS DE LE DIRE,LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE LA ROUMANIE DOIT VENIR AU CDA,LE PRESIDENT AUSSI,JE L ESPERE. NOTRE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE ALLEMANDE SONGE A VENIR AU CDA AU PRINTEMPS.

ALORS,CES CONTACTS ENTRE PAYS DES DEUX BLOCS SONT IMPORTANTS; NOUS LES ENCOURAGEONS ET NOUS ALLONS LES POURSUIVRE.MAIS POUR CE QUI EST D UNE RENCONTRE FORMELLE DES MEMBRES DES DEUX PACTES MAINTENANT,JE N EN VOIS PAS LA REALISATION IMMEDIATE,ET EFFECTIVEMENT LE PRESIDENT DE LA ROUMANIE NE M A PAS FAIT DE PROPOSITION SPECIFIQUE POUR UNE TELLE RENCONTRE A UNE DATE PRECISE.MAIS NOUS SOMMES,ENCORE UNE FOIS,OUVERTS A CE DIALOGUE ENTRE LES MEMBRES D ALLIANCES MILITAIRES ET POLITIQUES OPPOSEES ET,DANS CE SENS LA,JE SUIS TOUT A FAIT D ACCORD AVEC L ESPRIT QUI ANIME LE PRESIDENT DANS SA PROPOSITION.

MIREILLE MASSE(RADIO-CDA)MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE,J AIMERAIS SAVOIR S IL Y A UNE FACON DE DEGAGER DE VOS TROIS RENCONTRES AVEC LE PRESIDENT HUSAK,LE PRESIDENT HONECKER ET LE PRESIDENT ROUMAIN AVANT...JE SAIS QUE VOTRE ANALYSE N EST PAS COMPLETE AVEC VOS CONSEILLERS,MAIS VOTRE PREMIERE IMPRESSION?EST-CE QUE VOUS ETES PLUS CONVAINCU MAINTENANT DE LA POSSIBILITE D UNE ...?



PAGE SEVEN PM00122 UNCLAS

REPRISE DES NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEV QUE VOUS L ETIEZ AVANT VOTRE  
DEPART D OTT?

R.EH BIEN,POUR LES NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEV,JE NE PEUX VRAIMENT  
PAS LE DIRE.CES PAYS N ONT PAS PRETENDU PARLER AU NOM DE L UNION  
SOVIETIQUE,PAS PLUS QUE MOI JE PUISSE PRETENDRE PARLER AU NOM DES  
ETATS-UNIS,MAIS IL Y A UNE CHOSE QUI M A FRAPPE CERTAINEMENT DANS  
LES DEUX PREMIERES RENCONTRES.C EST QUE CES RENCONTRES SONT  
TOUJOURS ENTRE DEUX PARTIES.ON TIENT UNLANGAGE TRES DUR ET  
PRESQUE AGRESSIF VIS-A-VIS CERTAINS AGISSEMENTS DE L OTAN ET  
DES ETATS-UNIS EN PARTICULIER ET ENSUITE,DANS UN DEUXIEME TEMPS,  
ON SE MET D ACCORD AVEC BEAUCOUP D OBJECTIFS COMMUNS ET UN  
SOUHAI MUTUEL DE CONTINUER LES ECHANGES.

DONC,JE SUIS OPTIMISTE SUR A POSSIBILITE D AVOIR UN DIALOGUE  
FRUCTUEUX AVEC CES PAYS.DANS LE CAS DE LA ROUMAINE,COMME JE  
L AI DIT TOUT A L HEURE,LE PREMIER TEMPS N ETAIT PRESQUE PAS  
NECESSAIRE PUISQUE NOUS EN COMMES VENUS IMMEDIATEMENT AU  
DIALOGUE ET A L ECHANGE CONSTRUCTIF.CE SONT LES IMPRESSIONS  
GENERALES.

Q.WE KNOW THAT YOU SOON RETURNED FROM GERMAN DEMOCRATIC  
REPUBLIC,AND I WANT TO ASK YOU SOMETHING ABOUT THE OPINIONS  
ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE TALKS WITH MR HONECKER,BECAUSE,YOU  
KNOW THAT YOU HAD A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE AND ON THE MAIN  
POINTS YOU WILL GET AN AGREEMENT.

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PAGE EIGHT PM00122 UNCLAS

A.YES, THAT IS SO. WE HAD A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE. AS I JUST POINTED OUT IN MY ANSWER IN FRENCH, THE FIRST PART OF THE MTGS WERE SOMEWHAT FORMAL AND PERHAPS A LITTLE BIT IN THE NATURE OF RECRIMINATIONS ABOUT THE PAST: NATO DID THIS, THE WSAW PACT COUNTRIES DID THAT, THE SOVIETS DID THIS, THE USA DID THAT. BUT AFTER THIS STAGE WAS OVER, WE GOT INTO AN EXAMINATION OF OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS FOR THE FUTURE, AND WE FOUND THAT THERE WAS A FAIR AMOUNT OF SIMILARITIES. MANY OF THE CONCRETE PROPOSALS OF THE WSAW PACT DECLARATION IN PRGUE LAST YEAR WERE THINGS THAT WE COULD ACCEPT TO EXAMINE AND WORK TOWARD. IN THE SAME WAY, I POINTED OUT TO PRESIDENT HONECKER, SEVERAL STATEMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE BY NATO IN BRU, OR EVEN STATEMENTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA, WHICH PUT FORWARD PRINCIPLES WHICH, I THINK, THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD ACCEPT, SUCH AS EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN US RATHER THAN SUPERIORITY, SUCH AS THE RESPECT OF EACH OTHERS LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS, AND SO ON. SO, I FOUND IT A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL OPENING TOWARD THE FUTURE. ONCE AGAIN, I BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE MANY DISAGREEMENTS IN THE PAST, AND WE MUST NOT SPEND OUR TIME WORRYING ABOUT THOSE DISAGREEMENTS AND ELABORATING ON THEM. WE MUST TURN OURSELVES TO THE FUTURE, AND AS I SAID LAST NIGHT IN MY TOAST, NOT ONLY PREPARE FOR WAR BUT WORK TOWARD PEACE. GILBERT LAVOIE (LA PRESSE) MONSIEUR LE PM, POUR CEUX QUI ONT ...9

PAGE NINE PMO0122 UNCLAS

ECOUTE LE DISCOURS DE MONSIEUR KENNETH DAM EN FIN DE SEMAINE,  
A DAVOS, C EST BIEN EVIDENT QUE LA DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE EST  
ENCORE POUR EUX...C EST ENCORE LEUR GRAND CREDO ET PROBABLEMENT  
LA MEME CHOSE DU COTE SOVIETIQUE AUSSI.

EST-CE QUE VOUS NE CRAIGNEZ PAS CIT D INFURIER FINCIT VOS  
ALLIES AMERICAINS EN DENONCANT PRESQUE, POUR AINSI DIRE, CETTE  
THEORIE-LA?.

R. QUAND EST-CE QUE J AURAI DENONCE CETTE THEORIE?.

Q. BIEN, DENONCE, VOUS AVEZ DIT QUE C ETAIT UNE THEORIE QUI ETAIT  
PEUT-ETRE VALABLE A LA PERIODE OU ON SE BATTAIT AVEC DES ARCS ET  
DES FLECHES, MAIS QUE C EST UNE THEORIE AUJOURDHUI QUI NOUS MENE  
A UNE SITUATION ABSURDE, A UN PARADOXE.

R. NON, JE NE VOUDRAIS PAS QUE VOUS VOUS INQUIETIEZ TROP A CE  
SUJET-LA. QUE JE RENDE FURIEUX VOS AMIS DU SUD, CA NE DEVRAIT  
PAS VOUS EMPECHER DE DORMIR. JE CROIS QUE LE PRESIDENT REAGAN  
LUI-MEME A DIT QUE LES ARMES NUCLEAIRES NE PEUVENT PAS SERVIR,  
NE DEVRAIENT PAS SERVIR, QU IL NE DEVRAIT PAS Y AVOIR DE GUERRE  
NUCLEAIRE. CE QUE J AI DIT ASSEZ CLAIREMENT HIER, IL ME SEMBLE,  
C EST QUE LA DISSUASION EST A LA BASE DE L EQUILIBRE QUI  
EXISTAIT ET DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX ENTRE LES DEUX SUPER-  
PUISSANCES, MAIS QU IL NE FAUT PAS S ARRETER LA. IL FAUT ALLER  
AU-DELA DE LA DISSUASION, QUI EST, AUX TERMES DE LA MAXIME  
ROMAINE QUE J AI CITEE, UNE FACON DE PREPARER LA GUERRE POUR  
...10

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AVOIR LA PAIX,MAUS IL FAUT AUSSI TRAVAILLER TRES ACTIVEMENT  
A LA PAIX.ET IL ME SEMBLE QUE C ETAIT LA AUSSI LA POSITION  
PRISE PAR L OTAN DANS SES DEUX VOIES ENONCEES EN DECEMBRE 79.  
IL FAUT PREPARER LE DEPLOIEMENT,MAIS EN MEME TEMPS IL FAUT  
NEGOCIER TRES ACTIVEMENT EN VUE DE LA PAIX.

JE SERAIS SURPRIS QUE QUELQU UN S ETONNE DE CELA.

Q.MR.PRIME MINISTER,LOOKING BACK OVER YOUR TOUR OF EASTERN  
EUROPE,HOW MUCH OF A SUCCESS WOULD YOU SAY IT HAS BEEN,AND  
WHAT ARE THE AREAS,IF ANY,WHERE YOUVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED?.

A.ON THE FIRST QUESTION,THAT OF SUCCESS OR FAILURE,I REALLY  
TURN MYSELF OVER TO THE CRITICS OF THE MEDIA.THEY WILL DECIDE  
WHETHER IT WAS A SUCCESS OR A FAILURE.BUT INSOFAR AS MY OWN  
FEELINGS,I WOULD REPEAT MY VIEW THAT EXCHANGES BETWEEN MEMBERS  
OF OPPOSING ALLIANCES,MILITARY AD POLITICAL ALLIANCES,AT THIS  
STAGE OF THE GAME ARE A VERY IMPORTANT THING.PARTICULARLY  
WHEN NEGOTIATIONS HGAVE BROKEN DOWN BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS,  
ITS IMPORTANT THAT WE KEEP THE DIALOGUE ALIVE AT THE LEVEL  
OF THE NON-SUPERPOWERS.THATS WHAT I HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN,AND  
I AM VERY SATISFIED THAT I HAVE MADE THAT DECISION TO CONTINUE  
THAT DIALOGUE,NOT ONLY WITH NATO COUNTRIES,AS I HAD BEGUN IN  
NOV,NOT ONLY WITH NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES,AS I CONTINUED IN DEC  
AND JAN,BUT WITH PEOPLE WHO ARE ALIGNED AGAINST US.I THINK IT  
IS IMPORTANT THAT WE TALK AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SHOOTING.

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DAVID HALTON(CBC).PM,I WAS WONDERING IF YOU COULD BE A LITTLE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT YOUR DISAGREEMENTS WITH PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU ON HIS PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE NEW MISSILES ON BOTH SIDES.

A.WELL,WE HAD A VERY LENGTHY DISCUSSION ON THAT YESTERDAY. I THINK,IN ESSENCE,TO STATE THE SIMILIARITIES,WE BOTH FEEL AT SOME POINT THAT THE SUPERPOWERS WILL HAVE TO DISCUSS AND FIND WAYS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF EUROMISSILES ON BOTH SIDES.

PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU SAYS THAT HE HOPES EVENTUALLY FOR A EUROPE WHERE THERE WOULD BE NO EUROMISSILES ON EITHER SIDE.

I SAY THAT IS A NOBLE OBJECTIVE.BUT,WHEN HE PROPOSES THAT EACH SIDE STOP WHERE THEY ARE NOW,I FEEL THAT IS NOT A REALISTIC PROPOSAL IN THE SENSE THAT THERE ARE SO MANY MORE SS-20S--SOME 250 OF THEM--TARGETED TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE,EACH WITH THREE NUCLEAR WARHEADS,WHEREAS THE EUROMISSILES ON THE OTHER SIDE,HAVE JUST BEGUN TO BE DEPLOYED.

SO,I SAY THAT AT SOME POINT I HOPE THERE WILL BE A STARTING POINT,BUT IT WOULD NOT SEEM REALISTIC TO EXPECT EVEN THE EUROPEANS,LET ALONE THE AMERICANS,TO WANT TO START NEGOTIATIONS AT SUCH AN UNEQUAL POINT OF DEPARTURE.

CHRISTOPHER YOUNG(SOUTHAM NEWS).PM,FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO WAS HERE THIS WEEK,AND MANY OF THE PASSAGES OF HIS SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS READ RATHER LIKE A DIRECT REJECTION OF WHAT

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YOUVE BEEN SAYING IN YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE,AND IN PARTICULAR OF YOUR APPEAL TO THE SUPERPOWERS TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF RHETORIC.I WONDER IF YOU HAVE ANY REACTIONS TO THAT.

A.I AM SORRY;I HAVENT SEEN,READ NOR HEARD A WORD OF WHAT HE SAID.I THINK HE LEFT YESTERDAY,JUST BEFORE I ARRIVED,AND SINCE YESTERDAY IVE BEEN INVOLVED STRICTLY WITH ROMANIANS.

Q.PM, YOU HAVE BEEN IN DAVOS AT AN INNATL SYMPOSIUM.WOULD YOU BE SO KIND AS TO TELL US A FEW WORDS ABOUT YOUR CONCLUSION OF THIS SYMPOSIUM?.

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WORKING HYPOTHESES AND PROPOSE NEW ONES.SO,I FOUND IT VERY  
USEFUL AND SOMETHING TO BE ENCOURAGED.

MAYBE THEY WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF THE PRESS WERE ABSENT,  
BUT THAT IS A STRICTURE THAT I AM USED TO LIVING WITH WITHOUT  
FEAR AND TREMBLING,AND THEREFORE I SUPPORT THE WHOLE EFFORT.  
CHARLOTTE MONTGOMERY(GLOBE AND MAIL).MR.TRUDEAU,TO WHAT EXTENT  
DO YOUR PERSONAL PLANS DEPEND ON WHAT YOU DECIDE BACK IN OTT  
ABOUT THE PEACE INITIATIVE AND WHETHER THERE IS PERHAPS  
ANOTHER PHASE?.

A.WOULD YOU REPEAT AGAIN?.

Q.SORRY.TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOUR OWN PERSONAL PLANS DEPEND UPON  
WHAT YOU DECIDE ABOUT YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE AND WHETHER THERE  
IS ANOTHER PHASE OR SOMETHING FURTHER YOU SHOULD DO?.

A.MY DESTINY IS SO COMPLEX THAT I DONT THINK I WOULD LIKE TO  
TIE IT TO ANY PARTICULAR ASPECT OF MY MANY INTERESTS IN LIFE.

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INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS MOSCO PEKIN BNATO VMBFR STKHM PRMNY

BONN BRU HAGUE COPEN OSLO MADRID LSBON ROME ATHENS

ANKRA PRGUE BGRAD BPEST GENEV EXTOTT/IDDZ NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DACPOL

DISTR MINA MINT MINE USS DMF IFB IDR IDA FPR ZSI URR UGB

RBR RGB RBD RCR IMD

TRANSCRIPTION DU TOAST PORTE PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE LORS D UN  
DINER OFFERT EN SON HONNEUR A BERLIN-EST PAR LE PRESIDENT DE LA  
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE ALLEMANDE, M. HONECKER, LE MARDI 31  
JANVIER 1984

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL ET SECRETAIRE GENERAL,  
MESDAMES, MESSIEURS, CHERS AMIS,

JE VOUS REMERCIE DE VOTRE CHALEUREUX ACCEUIL QUI ME  
PERMET DE PORTER LE DIALOGUE ENTRE NOS DEUX PAYS AU PLUS HAUT  
NIVEAU. JE VOUS REMERCIE EGALEMENT, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, DE  
PARTAGER LE SENTIMENT D URGENCE QUI M ANIME ET DE BIEN VOULOIR VOUS  
INTERESSER A MA DEMARCHE POUR LA PAIX.

EMMANUEL KANT A ECRIT: CIT TOUT L INTERET DE MA RAISON EST  
COMPRIS DANS LES TROIS QUESTIONS SUIVANTES: QUE PUIS-JE SAVOIR?  
QUI PUIS-JE FAIRE? QUE M EST-IL PERMIS D ESPERER? FINCIT JE FAIS  
MIENNE LA METHODE DE CE GRAND MAITRE DE LA PENSEE ALLEMANDE ET  
UNIVERSELLE.

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CIT QUE PUIS-JE SAVOIR? FINCIT JE SAIS DEJA CE QUI NOUS SEPRE.  
NOUS SOMMES MEMBRES D ALLIANCES POLITIQUES ET MILITAIRES OPPOSEES.  
LE CANADA NE CACHE PAS SA LOYAUTE ENVERS L OUEST. IL EST SOLIDAIRE  
DES POSITIONS FONDAMENTALES DE L ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE. JE CONNAIS  
DONC BIEN NOS DIFFERENCES. MAIS CE N EST PAS A CELA QUE JE VEUX  
M ARRETER CE SOIR.

EN REALITE, JE SUIS DAVANTAGE CONSCIENT DE CE QUI NOUS  
RAPPROCHE. NOUS SOMMES DEUX PUISSANCES INDUSTRIELLES MOYENNES, NOS  
POPULATIONS SONT DE TAILLE COMPARABLE, ET SI NOUS AVONS DES  
OBLIGATIONS ET DES CONTRAINTES PROPRES, NOUS AVONS EGALEMENT DES  
INTERETS ET DES PREOCCUPATIONS EN COMMUN. LA RECHERCHE DE LA PAIX  
ET DE LA SECURITE FIGURE CERTAINEMENT AU TOUT PREMIER RANG DE CES  
PREOCCUPATIONS.

CAR LA MENACE D UNE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE SE POSE AVEC ACUITE  
A L ALLEMAGNE DE L EST, QUI EST AU COEUR DU PROBLEME, COMME AU  
CANADA, DONT LA SECURITE A, TOUT AU COURS DE CE SIECLE, ETE LIEE A  
CELLE DE L EUROPE. ET C EST D AILLEURS POURQUOI, QUOIQUE PAYS  
NORD-AMERICAIN, NOUS NOUS TROUVONS A STOCKHOLM, COMME NOUS NOUS  
TROUVIONS A HELSINKI, OU IL S AGISSAIT DE SECURITE, ET DE  
DESARMEMENT, ET DE COOPERATION EN EUROPE.

EST NOUS CONNAISSONS BIEN LES PRODRONES DE CETTE MENACE  
NUCLEAIRE: DEGRADATION INQUIETANTE DES RELATIONS ENTRE L EST ET  
L OUEST; RECOURS CROISSANT A LA FORCE, LE PROCESSUS POLITIQUE

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CEDANT DE PLUS EN PLUS LE PAS AUX SOLUTIONS MILITAIRES; ENFIN, EROSION DES MECANISMES ERIGES CONTRE LA PROLIFERATION DES ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES ET CONTRE LA CROISSANCE GEOMETRIQUE DES ARSENAUX.

POUVONS-NOUS RESTER INERTES DEVANT CES FAITS DONT LES CONSEQUENCES POURRAIENT ETRE FUNESTES NON SEULEMENT POUR NOS DEUX PEUPLES, MAIS POUR L'HUMANITE TOUT ENTIERE? D'OU LA PERTINENCE DE LA DEUXIEME QUESTION DE KANT: CIT QUE PUIS-JE FAIRE? FIN CIT

C'EST JUSTEMENT LE BESOIN DE SAVOIR CE QU'UNE PUISSANCE MOYENNE PEUT FAIRE POUR RENVERSER CES TENDANCES NEFASTES QUI M'A POUSSÉ À ENTREPRENDRE CETTE INITIATIVE EN FAVEUR DE LA PAIX.

LE FAIT QUE NOUS NE DISPOSONS PAS D'ARSENAUX MENACANTS ET QUE NOUS NE SOMMES PAS PARTIE AUX NEGOCIATIONS SUR LES ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES NE NOUS REND PAS POUR AUTANT IMPUISSANTS DANS NOTRE RECHERCHE DE LA PAIX. NOUS POUVONS ET NOUS DEVONS DONNER UNE IMPULSION NOUVELLE AU DIALOGUE POLITIQUE ENTRE L'EST ET L'OUEST.

EN EFFET, C'EST D'ABORD AU NIVEAU POLITIQUE, EN NOUS PARLANT DIRECTEMENT, COMME NOUS LE FAISONS EN TANT QUE DIRIGEANTS DE NOS DEUX PAYS, QUE NOUS POURRONS LE MIEUX DEMONSTRER LA FORCE DU DIALOGUE ET SA NECESSITE ABSOLUE DANS LE MONDE TOURMENTE OU NOUS VIVONS. C'EST LÀ, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, NOTRE ARME LA PLUS PUISSANTE. ET NOUS DEVONS NOUS EN SERVIR.

NOUS POUVONS EN OUTRE NOUS EFFORCER DE DONNER CORPS ET SUBSTANCE AUX DECISIONS DE L'ACTE FINAL D'HELSINKI, QUE NOUS AVONS

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TOUS DEUX SIGNE EN 1975, ET DONT IL FAUT FRANCHEMENT RECONNAITRE QUE TOUS LES VOEUX N ONT PAS ETE REALISES. CEUX QUI PARTAGENT UN INTERET PRIMORDIAL POUR LA PAIX NE DOIVENT RIEN MENAGER POUR DEVELOPPER LA COOPERATION, ACCROITRE LES ECHANGES COMMERCIAUX ET RENDRE ENFIN POSSIBLE LA LIBRE CIRCULATION DES PERSONNES ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST.

EN UN MOT, IL NOUS FAUT CHANGER FONDAMENTALEMENT NOTRE ATTITUDE SI NOUS VOULONS CONTRIBUER A LA PAIX. CAR UNE PAIX EN EQUILIBRE ENTRE LA TERREUR ET LA PARITE DES ARMEMENTS EST UNE PAIX BIEN PRECAIRE.

IL FAUT DONC SE POSER LA TROISIEME QUESTION DE KANT:  
CIT QUE M EST-IL PERMIS D ESPERER?

JE TIENS DE BONNE SOURCE, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, QUE VOUS NE CROYEZ PAS AUX MIRACLES. JE ME SUIS MOI-MEME INTERDIT, DEVANT LA COMPLEXITE DES PROBLEMES AUXQUELS NOUS SOMMES CONFRONTES, D EN PROMETTRE ET ENCORE MOINS D ESPERER EN ACCOMPLIR.

ALORS SOIT, NOUS N ATTENDONS PAS DE MIRACLES. MAIS PUISQUE VOUS ET MOI RECONNAISSONS QUE LA PAIX ET LA SECURITE SONT INDISSOCIABLES, JE VEUX ESPERER QUE NOUS TROUVERONS TRES BIENTOT DES CRANS D ARRET SUR LA ROUTE DANGEREUSE OU NOUS GLISSONS.

DEPUIS PLUSIEURS MOIS, J AI CONSACRE TEMPS ET EFFORTS A UNE DEMARCHE POUR FAVORISER LA PAIX ET LA COMPREHENSION ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST COMME ENTRE LES SUPERPUISSANCES. DEPUIS OCTOBRE

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DERNIER, J AI DISCUTE DE CETTE QUESTION AVEC LES CHEFS D ETAT ET DE GOUVERNEMENT DE PLUSIEURS PAYS, AVEC LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL DES NATIONS UNIES ET AVEC LES CITOYENS DE MON PAYS. ET JE LE FAIS MAINTENANT EN EUROPE DE L EST.

JE PUIS VOUS ASSURER QUE PARTOUT, J AI CONSTATE LES MEMES PREOCCUPATIONS DEVANT L ETAT INQUIETANT DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES. PARTOUT AUSSI, J AI RENCONTRE DES GENS PRETS A SE JOINDRE A MOI ET A CHERCHER CE QUE LEUR GOUVERNEMENT PEUT FAIRE CONCRETEMENT POUR ENRAYER LE COURS D EVENEMENTS QUI SEMBLANT MUS PAR LA LOGIQUE TERRIFIANTE ET IMPLACABLE D UN EVENTUEL CONFLIT.

LA RENCONTRE ET LES DISCUSSIONS QUE J AI EUES AVEC VOUS M ONT CONVAINCUS ENCORE PLUS FERMEMENT QUE LE DIALOGUE EST LA VOIE PRIVILEGIEE A POURSUIVRE ENTRE NOS DEUX PAYS, AVEC NOS ALLIES ET AVEC NOS AMIS. JE SAIS, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, QUE VOUS PARTAGEZ CETTE CONVICTION. VOUS LE DISIEZ A HELSINKI EN 1975, ET JE VOUS CITE: C'EST LA PAIX EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE SERAIT UNE GARANTIE IMPORTANTE POUR LA PAIX DANS LE MONDE. FINCIT COMME VOUS, JE SUIS CONSCIENT DU CHEMIN QU IL NOUS RESTE A PARCOURIR POUR L ASSURER. MAIS QUE NOUS SOYONS TOUS DEUX DECIDES A LE PARCOURIR, ENSEMBLE ET AVEC BEAUCOUP D AUTRES LEADERS POLITIQUES, VOILA QUI M EST SOURCE D ESPOIR.

JE TROUVE AUSSI, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, UNE SOURCE D ESPOIR DANS LE FAIT QUE LE CLIMAT POLITIQUE A DEJA COMMENCE A

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CHANGER. JE L'AI SENTI DANS NOS DISCUSSIONS D'AUJOURD'HUI, TOUT  
COMME DANS LES DISCUSSIONS QUE J'AI EUES AVEC PLUSIEURS CHEFS  
D'ETAT DEPUIS QUELQUES MOIS. VOUS ME CITIEZ CORRECTEMENT, MONSIEUR  
LE PRESIDENT, LORSQUE VOUS DISIEZ AU IL Y A UN AN, J'ENTENDAIS DES  
GENS DE L'ADMINISTRATION AMERICAINE PARLER DE GAGNER UNE GUERRE  
NUCLEAIRE. MAIS JE SUIS HEUREUX DE CONSTATER QUE DEPUIS QUELQUES  
MOIS, LE PRESIDENT DES ETATS-UNIS LUI-MEME DECLARE QU'UNE GUERRE  
NUCLEAIRE NE PEUT ETRE GAGNEE, ET DONC QUE NOUS NE DEVONS PAS LA  
LIVRER.

L'ECRIVAIN GEORGES BERNANOS DISAIT QUE LE VERITABLE  
ESPOIR, C'EST LE DESESPoir SURMONTE. C'EST A CET ESPOIR VERITABLE  
QUI COMMENCE A NAITRE DANS NOS COEURS QUE JE PROPOSE QUE NOUS  
LEVIONS NOTRE VERRE.

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TRANSCRIPTION DE TOAST PORTE PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE LORS D'UN  
DINER OFFERT EN SON HONNEUR A BUCAREST PAR LE PRESIDENT DE LA  
ROUMANIE, M. CEAUDESCU, LE MERCREDI 1ER FEVRIER 1984

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT DE CONSEIL, EXCELLENCE, MESDAMES,  
MESSIEURS, MES CHERS AMIS,

VOUS AVIEZ RAISON, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, AU DEBUT DE  
VOTRE DISCOURS, D'EVOQUER NOS RELATIONS BILATERALES, PUISQU'ELLES  
SONT TRES BONNES. MAIS NOUS CROYONS DE PART ET D'AUTRE, QU'ELLES  
PEUVENT DEVENIR ENCORE MEILLEURES ET NOUS SOMMES PRETS A Y  
TRAVAILLER TOUS LES DEUX.

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VOUS EVOQUIEZ NOTRE PREMIERE RENCONTRE A HELSINKI, IL LY A NEUF ANS. JE ME SOUVIENS MEME DE VOTRE HOSPITALITE ALORS QUE VOUS M AVIEZ RECU A L AMBASSADE DE ROUMANIE A HELSINKI. NOUS AVIONS EU UN LONG ENTRETEN. NOUS AVIONS PARLE DE TETENTE, BIEN SUR, MAIS NOUS AVIONS AUSSI EVOQUE LA NECESSITE D UNE COLLABORATION BILATERALE. NOUS AVIONS A CE MOMENT-LA FAIT LA PROMESSE DE NOUS VISITER L UN L AUTRE ET, COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ, NOUS VOUS ATTENDONS ET NOUS ESPERONS VOTRE VISITE DEPUIS LONGTEMPS AU CANADA.

MAIS SI IMPORTANTES QUE SOIENT LES RELATIONS BILATERALES, IL EST REMARQUABLE QUE C EST SUR LA QUESTION DE LA PAIX ET DU DESARMEMENT QUE NOUS AYONS TROUVE ABSOLUMENT NECESSAIRE DE NOUS RENCONTRER. ET JE SUIS VENU VOUS VOIR EN ROUMANIE PARCE QUE VOUS AVEZ LA REPUTATION D ETRE UN CHEF D ETAT QUI PARLE FORT ET HAUT SUR LE PROBLEME DE LA PAIX ET QUI Y CONSACRE UNE TRES GRANDE PARTIE DE SES ENERGIES.

VOUS EVOQUIEZ TOUT A L HEURE LES CONSEQUENCES D UNE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE. J AI EU MOI-MEME L OCCASION L ETE DERNIER, A ERICE, EN SICILE, D ASSISTER A UNE CONFERENCE D HOMMES DE SCIENCE REGROUPANT PLUSIEURS PRIX NOBEL ET, COMME VOUS, J EN AI TIRE LA CONCLUSION QUE LA CIVILISATION TELLE QUE NOUS LA CONNAISSONS NE SURVIVRAIT PAS A UNE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE.

IL EN SUIT QUE DES HOMMES DE GOUVERNEMENT, DES HOMMES POLITIQUES COMME VOUS ET MOI AVONS NON SEULEMENT LE DROIT, MAIS

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ENCORE L OBLIGATION D INJECTER NOTRE ENERGIE POLITIQUE DANS LES DISCUSSIONS ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST. ET MEME SI NOUS NE SOMMES PAS A LA TABLE A GENEVE, NOUS SAVONS QUE NOS PEUPLES AMERICAIN ET SOVIETIQUE DES CONSEQUENCES D UNE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE. PAR CONSEQUENT, C EST NOTRE DROIT DE NOUS SOUCIER DE LA RESOLUTION PACIFIQUE DE CES DIFFERENDS QUI SEparent LES SUPERPUISSANCES.

JE VOUS RENDS LE TEMOIGNAGE QUE NOUS AVEZ MONTRE UN ESPRIT DE LEADERSHIP DANS LA RECHERCHE DE LA PAIX ET DANS LES PROPOSITIONS QUE VOUS AVEZ RENDUES PUBLIQUES. VOUS AVEZ SOUVENT PRECHE L IMPORTANCE DE NOUS RENCONTRER ENTRE PAYS D ALLEGEANCES ET D IDEOLOGIES DIVERSES. VOUS AVEZ DONNE L EXEMPLE DE CETTE (INAUDIBLE) D ECHANGES EN M INVITANT, MOI, MEMBRE DE L ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE, A VENIR DANS VOTRE PAYS, MEMBRE DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE.

VOUS AVIEZ DIT A HELSINKI, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, UNE PHRASE EN QUELQUE SORTE PROPHETIQUE, QUE JE VOUDRAIS LIRE AU TEXTE. VOUS DISIEZ ALORS, EN 1975: CIT NOUS AURIONS TORT DE NOUS IMAGINER QUE NOUS POURRONS DESORMAIS NOUS CROISER LES BRAS EN TOUTE QUIETUDE. L HISTOIRE JUGERA CERTAINEMENT NOS DECLARATIONS ET LES DOCUMENTS QUE NOUS ALLONS SIGNER A HELSINKI, MAIS ELLE JUGERA AUSSI LES MOYENS QUE CHACUN DE NOS ETATS ET CHACUN DE NOUS PRENDRONS EN TANT QUE DIRIGEANTS POLITIQUES POUR DONNER SUITE AUX ENGAGEMENTS ENONCES DANS CES DOCUMENTS. FINCIT

C EST DONC EN TANT QUE DIRIGEANTS POLITIQUES QUE NOUS

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NOUS RENCONTRONS AUJOURD HUI ET QUE NOUS CHERCHONS PASSIONNEMENT LA PAIX QUE NOS PEUPLES SOUHAITENT PASSIONNEMENT. JE CROIS QUE NOS POPULATIONS DOIVENT ETRE QUELQUE PEU ETONNEES DU PARADOXE DANS LEQUEL NOUS SOMMES TOUS ENGAGES. NOUS CONSTRUISONS DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES DONT NOUS SAVONS QUE NOUS NE POURRONS JAMAIS NOUS SERVIR, SAUF DANS UN ESPRIT DE SUICIDE. DE PART ET D AUTRE, NOUS CONSTRUISONS UN PLUS GRAND NOMBRE D ARMES NUCLEAIRES DANS L ESPOIR D ABOUTIR A DES NEGOCIATIONS QUI CONCLURONT A LA NECESSITE DE MOINS D ARMES NUCLEAIRES.

JE CROIS QUE NOUS VIVONS ENCORE LA LOGIQUE QUI A ETE Pensee DU TEMPS DE L EMPIRE ROMAIN, DONT CERTAINS, PARAÎT-IL--CES ROMAINS SONT VOS ANCETRES--,DISAIENT A CE MOMENT-LA: CIT SI VIS PACEM, PARA BELLUM. FINCIT (SI TU VEUX LA PAIX, PREPARE LA GUERRE.) C ETAIT PEUT-ETRE UNE LOGIQUE D UN AUTRE AGE, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, ALORS QU ON SE BATTAIT AVEC DES FLECHES, DES LANCES ET DE BOUCLERS. C EST AUSSI LA LOGIQUE QUI EST A LA BASE DE LA THEORIE DE LA DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE, CHACUNE DES SUPERPUISSANCES BATISSANT UN NOMBRE INCROYABLE D ARMES NUCLEAIRES, POUR DISSUADER L AUTRE PARTIE D AVOIR ENVIE DE COMMERCE UNE GUERRE. JE CROIS QUE NOS POPULATIONS SENTENT UN PEU L ABSURDITE DE CETTE ACTION ET QU ELLES PENSENT COMME VOUS ET MOI QU ON DEVRAIT DIRE SI VIS PACEM, PARA PACEM. DONC, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, VOUS ET MOI, ET BEAUCOUP D AUTRES LEADERS POLITIQUES, CROYONS ENSEMBLE QUE NOUS AVONS ...10

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BEAUCOUP FAIT POUR PREPARER LA GUERRE, MAIS QU IL FAUT MAINTENANT  
PREPARER LA PAIX.

ET C EST AINSI QUE J AI ECOUTE ATTENTIVEMENT LES  
PROPOSITIONS QUE VOUS M AVEZ FAITES CET APRES-MIDI ET QUE JE  
SOUSCRIS ENTIEREMENT A L ESPRIT QUI VOUS ANIMAIT. JE CROIS QU UN  
NOMBRE CROISSANT DE LEADERS POLITIQUES SENTENT QUE NOUS DEVONS  
MAINTENANT METTRE TOUTES NOS ENERGIES A LA PREPARATIONS DE LA PAIX.  
ET C EST CE QUI EXPLIQUE QUE NOUS -- TOUS LES PAYS DU PACTE DE  
VARSOVIE, TOUS LES PAYS DE L OTAN ET LES PAYS NEUTRES ET NON  
ALIGNES -- AVONS ENVOYE NOS HOMMES POLITIQUES, NOS MINISTRES, A  
STOCKHOLM POUR DISCUTER DE LA PAIX. JE SOUSCRIS ENTIEREMENT A  
VOTRE SOUHAIT QUE LES NEGOCIATIONS REPRENENT ENTRE LES  
SUPERPUISSANCES, MAIS JE SOUSCRIS EGALEMENT A VOTRE PROPOSITION  
SELON LAQUELLE NOUS POUVONS--ET NOUS DEVONS--LES Y INVITER EN  
NEGOCIANT NOUS-MEMES BILATERALEMENT OU DANS DES RENCONTRES  
MULTILATERALES COMME CELLES DE STOCKHOLM OU DE VIENNE.

C EST DANS CET ESPRIT EGALEMENT, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT,  
QUE JE VOUDRAIS BOIRE A VOTRE SANTE, VOUS SOUHAITER BEAUCOUP DE  
COURAGE ET DE SUCCES DANS VOTRE OEUVRE DE PAIX, ET VOUS ASSURER QUE  
LE PEUPLE CANADIEN EST PRET A COLLABORER AVEC LE PEUPLE ROUMAIN  
DANS LA POURSUITE DE CET OBJECTIF. ET POUR CETTE RAISON, EN BUVANT  
A VOTRE SANTE, JE PEUX, SANS CRAINTE DE ME TROMPER, BOIRE A LA PAIX  
A LAQUELLE NOUS TRAVAILLONS TOUS DEUX ET A LAQUELLE NOS PEUPLES  
CROIENT PASSIONNEMENT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR8034 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO GENEV

DISTR IDA

REF OURTELS YBGR8029 31JAN YBGR6113 AND 6116 01FEB

---PMS INITIATIVE:ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

YOU NOW HAVE BELGIAN,BRITISH,DUTCH AND NORWEGIAN COMMENTS.IN  
ADDITION,USA DEL HAVE TELEPHONED TO CONFIRM STRONG USA  
RESERVATION BOTH AS TO PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE,WITH PROMISE OF  
DETAILED OBJECTIONS TO FOLLOW.FRG DEL WILL HAVE COMMENTS FEB3 WHICH  
THEY WILL DELIVER IN OTTAWA.SO FAR AS I AM EQUIPPED TO JUDGE  
THEM,COMMENTS ON SUBSTANCE RECEIVED SO FAR RANGE FROM LUKEWARM  
TO STRONGLY NEGATIVE;ON PROCEDURE,EVEN OUR BEST FRIENDS ARE  
ASKING US AT A MINIMUM TO ALLOW MORE TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS.  
IF YOU AGREE THAT THIS IS A FAIR READING,I HOPE YOU WILL BE  
ABLE TO TAKE REPRESENTATIONS OF OUR ALLIES INTO ACCOUNT.IF YOU  
DECIDE TO PROCEED IN GENEV NOTWITHSTANDING ALLIES RESERVATRIONS,  
I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE ME CONVINCING EXPLANATION TO  
ADVANCE TO OTHERS FOR SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION.NEEDLESS TO SAY,  
IN ASKING THIS I HAVE IN MIND A GENERATION OF PLEAS THAT OUR  
A LIES CONSULT US ON MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST

TAYLOR

CCC/070 021705Z YBGR8034

IDA -  
As agreed, you  
will be assuming this  
tel 1/2  
6/2/84

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

*master  
FILE*

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM WSHDC UNGR2026 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO STKEM/SCDEL BNATO CANMILREPNATO VMBFR LDN BONN MOSCO

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR IFB IDD IDDZ IDRA IDRL IDA

REF VMBFR TEL XTDR0025 08FEB

---MBFR:USA INITIATIVE

ACDA SOURCES CONFIRM INFO THAT PRES REAGAN HAS MBFR PROPOSAL  
BEFORE HIM.THEY CANNOT/NOT PREDICT WHEN DECISION WILL BE MADE.  
THEY RECALL THAT LAST TIME PROPOSAL WENT TO HIM REAGAN ASKED  
FOR MORE INFO.THEY CANNOT/NOT BE CERTAIN INFOI NOW PROVIDED  
WILL BE SUFFICIENT FOR HIM TO DECIDE.THEY ALSO POINT OUT  
THAT LEBANON CRISIS MAY DELAY DECISION.

CCC/241 092254Z UNGR2026

*Mr. Smith*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*major  
FILE*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2006 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ UGB DELIVER BY 030900

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENFV PARIS

HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS SCDEL/STKHM PCOOTT/FOWLER/AXWORTHY

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DACPOL/DNACPOL/CPD/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD RCD RSD

CPD ZSI ZSP URR URT URE LCD LSD IDDZ

---PMS INITIATIVE:USA CONCERNS

SUMMARY:AMB WAS CALLED IN TODAY TOSEE JOHN KELLY,ACTING ASST SEC OF STATE.KELLY CONVEYED USA CONCERN ABOUT STATEMENTS PM HAS MADE ON NATO STRATEGY AND USA COMMITMENT TO DEFEND ALLIANCE.KELLY CHARACTERIZED THESE STATEMENTS AS NOT/NOT HELPFUL TO ALLIANCE UNITY.KELLY ALSO SAID THAT WHILE USA APPRECIATES CDN MOTIVES IN TABLING CDN PROPOSALS IN CD,USA HAS SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS ABOUT OUR DOING SO.THE CD IS NOT/NOT APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR DISCUSSING STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

2.REPORT:AMB WAS CALLED IN TO SEE JOHN KELLY WHO IN ABSENCE OF RICK BURT WAS ACTING ASST SEC OF STATE.WE WERE TOLD DECISION WAS MADE TO CALL IN AMBASSADOR PERSONALLY TO EMPHASIZE SERIOUSNESS.KELLY SAID THE USA IS MOST DISTURBED BY THE THINGS THEY HAVE SEEN REPORTED OF THE PMS COMMENTS IN DAVOS AND BY THE PMS CHOICE OF EAST GERMANY TO REITERATE THEM.

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PAGE TWO UNGR2006 CONFD

3.KELLY SAID THAT IN THE WAKE OF THE SOV RESPONSE TO INF DEPLOYMENT, STATEMENTS QUESTIONING NATO STRATEGY AND THE USA COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE WERE NOT/NOT HELPFUL IN MAINTAINING ALLIANCE UNITY.HE SAID THAT THE USA HAD NOTED THAT THESE QUESTIONS HAD NOT/NOT BEEN RAISED BY CDA IN NATO FORUMS OR IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE USA.THE USA WAS THEREFORE QUOTE SURPRISED AND DISMAYED UNQUOTE TO HEAR THE PM DISCUSSING THEM IN THIS MANNER.THE USA CONSIDERS THAT THE RAISON D ETRE FOR NATO CONTINUES TO EXIST AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NATO COUNTRIES TAKE A COMMON POSITION IN CONVEYING THIS CONVICTION.THE USA HOPES THAT CDA WILL TAKE STEPS TO CORRECT THE SENSE OF DISARRAY WHICH PMS COMMENTS HAVE CREATED. USA ALSO HOPES THAT CDA WLD UNDERTAKE MORE AMPLE CONSULTATION BEFORE PUTTING CONCERNS SUCH AS THESE INTO THE PUBLIC ARENA.

4.TURNING TO THE CD,KELLY SAID THAT THE USA APPRECIATES CDAS MOTIVES THAT LIE BEHIND THE THREE PAPERS WE HAVE CIRCULATED IN NATO BUT THAT THE USA HOPES WE WLD NOT/NOT TABLE THESE THREE PROPOSALS IN GENEV. THE USA HAS SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS.THE USA HAS BEEN ENGAGED FOR FIFTEEN YEARS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGS WITH THE USSR AND SEES NO/NO MERIT IN PUTTING STRATEGIC ISSUES INVOLVING THE WEAPONS OF THE USA AND THE USSR INTO TH CD.THIS IS NOT/NOT THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR THE DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES.OTHER ALLIES HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT CDN PROPOSALS TO USA.THE USA HOPES THAT BEFORE CDA TABLES THESE DOCUS THAT WE SUBJECT THEM TO FURTHER BILATERAL AND NATO CONSULTATIONS.

PAGE THREE UNGR2006 CONF D

5.KELLY HANDED OVER PAPER OUTLINING PRELIMINARY USA VIEWS ON OUR CD PROPOSALS(PAPER FOLLOWS BY FAX).PAPER EMPHASIZES THAT USA SHARES CDAS DESIRE FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL BUT DOES NOT/NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE PROPOSALS PROMOTE THAT PROSPECT.PAPER ARGUES THAT CDN PROPOSAL ON OUTER SPACE WLD REMOVE ONUS FROM SOVIET UNION FOR ACTION AND WLD OFFER THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO DIVIDE WESTERN GROUP ON AN ISSUE CRUCIAL TO WESTERN SECURITY.THE PROPOSAL THAT NEW WEAPONS BE PROVED VERIFIABLE IS DESCRIBED AS UNWORKABLE.THE FOCUS ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION WEAKENS LONGSTANDING WESTERN POSITION ON COOPERATIVE MEASURES.MEASURE TO RESTRICT MOBILITY OF ICBMS IS SAID TO RUN DIRECTLY COUNTER TO CONCLUSIONS OF SCOWCROFT COMMISSION.PAPER CONCLUDES BY QUESTIONING APPROPRIATENESS OF CD AS A FORUM FOR ANY BUT THE ASAT PROPOSAL.

6.GOTLIEB REPLIED THAT THE PMS COMMENTS IN DAVOS WERE NOT/NOT INTENDED TO QUESTION CDN COMMITMENT TO NATO.PM WAS TALKING AT A FORUM THAT WAS INTENDED TO BE A FRANK AND OPEN DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS OF SECURITY AND THIS WAS QUESTION HE FELT CDL BE OPENLY MENTIONED.WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE REITERATION OF THESE POINTS IN EAST GERMANY WAS MADE TO CDN PRESS IN A FORM INTENDED FOR CDN CONSUMPTION.THEREFORE IT APPEARED THAT EAST EUROPEAN LOCATION WAS IRRELEVANT.KELLY DID NOT/NOT ACCEPT THIS ARGUMENT.

7.AMB ALSO POINTED OUT THAT PM HAD IN FACT RAISED QUESTION OF PROBLEM

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OF NATO STRATEGY DURING LUNCHEON MTG WITH SHULTZ AT WHICH TIME SHULTZ HAD REPLIED THAT AFTER THE CURRENT PHASE(IE THE NATO REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE HARMEL REPORT)THAT QUESTION MIGHT BE LOOKED AT.

8.WITH REGARD TO THE CD AND CDAS PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY WE POINTED OUT THAT INTENTION WAS TO CIRCULATE DOCUS TO CD DELS AND NOT/NOT TO TABLE THEM.KELLY SAID THIS DID NOT/NOT APPEAR TO BE A SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE TO HIM.DOCs WLD UNDOUBTEDLY BECOME SUBJECT OF CD DISCUSSION AND CLD PROVE TROUBLESOME FOR YRS TO COME.THE CDN PROPOSALS HE SAID GO TO THE HEART OF DETERRENCE.

9.AMB POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC PRESSURE TO SPEAK OUT ON SUCH ISSUES AND THAT THE PM FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SPEAK OUT ON THESE ISSUES IN AN AS OPEN A MANNER AS POSSIBLE.

NEVERTHELESS WE ARE SENSITIVE TO OUR ALLIES CONCERNS ON THESE ISSUES.KELLY RESPONDED THAT IT HAS LONG BEEN AN ARGUMENT THAT THOSE WITHOUT HARDWARE CAN NEVERTHELESS CAN STILL SPEAK OUT ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES BUT THAT THIS HAS GENERALLY BEEN A THIRD WORLD POSITION THAT DOES NOT/NOT HAVE PRECEDENT WITHIN NATO.AMB RESPONDED THAT HE CLD RECALL PERSONALLY SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST IN WHICH CDA HAS FELT IT NECESSARY TO SPEAK OUT ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND THAT CDA BELIEVES THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO DO SO.PMS DECISION TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES OPENLY LIKE HIS INITIATIVE ARE INTENDED TO SUPPLEMENT PRES REAGANS OWN EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.FOR EXAMPLE,PM HAS BEEN

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VOCAL IN COMMUNICATING HIS SUPPORT FOR PRES REAGANS RECENT SPEECH ON USA/USSR RELS AND STATING HIS BELIEF THAT PRES IS SINCERE.AMB ALSO POINTED OUT THAT CDA HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF INF DEPLOYMENT AND POINTED TO PMS LEADERSHIP IN DEFENDING CRUISE TESTING IN CDA.KELLY CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THE USA FULLY ACCEPTS THE GENUINE MOTIVATION BEHIND PMS STATEMENTS AND CDAS CD PAPERS.HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT USA HAD APPRECIATED WHAT PM HAD DONE IN THE PAST AND CITED HIS FIRM OPPOSITION TO GREEK PMS PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIM ON INF DEPLOYMENT.

10.DELAY IN EXPRESSING VIEWS ON PMS DAVOS STATEMENTS AND FACT THESE VIEWS WERE NOT/NOT TRANSMITTED FROM HIGHER LEVEL MAY INDICATE SOMETHING OF A USA DESIRE TO MAKE THIS DEMARCHE IN A MEASURED MANNER AND TO AVOID PUTTING IT CENTER STAGE IN THE AGENDA OF CDA/USA RELS. THEY ALSO WAITED UNTIL MR CLARK HAD FINISHED HIS VISIT HERE. NEVERTHELESS THERE CAN BE NO/NO DOUBT THAT USA IS INDEED SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT OUR INTENTION TO BRING OUR STRATEGIC STABILITY PROPOSALS TO THE CD AND ABOUT THE OPEN QUESTIONNING OF USA WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND EUROPE,WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION ON THESE ISSUES.

CCC/230 022325Z UNGR2006

TKO-005/02

MESSAGE

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PLACE	DEPARTMENT	ORIG. NO.	DATE	FILE/DOSSIER	SECURITY
LIEU	MINISTÈRE	N° D'ORIG.			SÉCURITÉ
TOKYO	UIGR	1084	02FEB84		UNCLASSIFIED
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TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

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ECONOMIC

SG..... *Anne Park*  
ANNE PARK

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT - TOKYO, 1 FEBRUARY

By the Prime Minister of Australia, the Hon. R.J.L. Hawke AC MP and the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone.

1. The relationship between Australia and Japan is of immense importance to both of us. The warmth of our relations reflects a common commitment to the ideals of freedom and democracy, as well as the extensive co-operation which has been developed in many fields.

As we look towards the 21st century, it is clear that the Asia-Pacific region will continue to demonstrate the most rapid and dynamic economic development in the world. Our two countries are committed to further strengthening our co-operation with other countries in the region to ensure its peace, stability and prosperity. Australia and Japan together are able to make great contributions to the development of the region.

2. The most urgent tasks in today's international society are the establishment of stable East-West relations and the achievement of arms control and disarmament. For this purpose, we are determined to continue to co-operate closely both because of common regional interests and from the standpoint that we are members of the free and democratic community of nations.

Under the present difficult international environment, the promotion of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, is strongly desired. In view of the important roles of the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament in this field, we intend to increase co-operation and make positive endeavours for the promotion of disarmament in these fora. We will continue to work together to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

We express regret that the two most important nuclear disarmament negotiations, namely the INF negotiations and the START talks, have been in the one case unilaterally suspended by the Soviet Union and in the other adjourned at Soviet initiative without the setting of a resumption date. We urge an early resumption of and real progress in these negotiations.

We are particularly concerned that the INF negotiations should be conducted from a global perspective, taking into account the security of the Asia-Pacific region as well.

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The Japanese side also reconfirms that Japan's basic stance on security is to achieve an effective defence capability limited to that necessary for self-defence, to maintain the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and to seek their smooth and effective operation, and that, maintaining a solely defensive posture under the Peace Constitution and its three non-nuclear principles, Japan will not become a military power nor pose any military threat to neighbouring countries.

For its part, Australia appreciates that Japan has a sovereign right to determine its own security and defence policies and understands Japan's stance.

3. The future outlook of the world economy is brighter today as the economies of the industrial nations are recovering. It is at this time that it is necessary for us to devote our utmost efforts to the further development of an open multilateral trading system. We jointly recognise that, from this viewpoint, it is important to promote the preparations for starting a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Global trade expansion is indispensable for maintaining prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The support of a wide range of countries, including developing countries, is important in the preparations for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. We declare that Japan and Australia will make co-operative efforts for the launching of the negotiations.

The co-operative efforts of Australia and Japan will be made in close consultation with their trading partners to ensure effective inputs from the Asia-Pacific region into the preparation for a new round. A new round of multilateral negotiations should deal effectively with the wide range of impediments to trade expansion and hence to world economic recovery.

We share the view that the expansion and development of economic and trade relations between Japan and Australia has made and will continue to make a significant contribution to the economic development of the two countries.

The Japanese side believes that the position of Australia as a supplier of primary products including minerals will not decline so long as these Australian products maintain their competitiveness and their stable supply is assured. The Japanese side confirms that it has no intention of dealing with trade problems with third countries at the expense of Australia.

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Australia intends making good use of new opportunities for exporting manufactured goods and services that are increasing in demand in Japan. Officials will discuss measures to promote trade revitalisation.

The Australian side outlined recent developments in industrial relations in Australia. The Japanese side welcomed the improvement in the industrial relations climate in Australia in recent months.

MESSAGE

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—PMS INITIATIVE: USA CONCERNS - 3 PAGES

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DIVISION/DIRECTION

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### U.S. Views on Canadian Proposals for Enhancing Strategic Stability

Based on a preliminary review of the Canadian draft paper regarding how technological developments may be restricted to provide greater strategic stability, we wish to convey to the Government of Canada our serious concern with the three proposals contained therein and the forum chosen for their presentation. As all three of these proposals have serious implications for Western security interests, the U.S. urges that Canada consult fully with its Allies before taking any further steps toward tabling these proposals in Geneva.

The U.S. shares the desire of the Canadian government for progress in achieving balanced, verifiable arms control. We do not believe, however, that the three proposals under consideration promote that prospect.

The U.S. attaches great importance to outer space arms control and is already signatory to several international agreements regulating use of outer space. After discussions with our Allies last year, we agreed to the formation of an outer space working group provided that its mandate be limited to exclude negotiations. In doing so, the U.S. and its Allies agreed that Western unity must be preserved on this issue. The Soviet Union and its allies blocked consensus on this mandate, however. The Canadian proposal would remove the onus from the Soviets for that action and would offer them an opportunity to divide the Western group on an issue crucial to Western security. Tabling such a proposal at the CD, therefore, poses problems for the West. Doing so at the beginning of the session exacerbates those problems by redirecting CD discussions of outer space issues and precluding achievement of a common Western approach to the issue.

The other two proposals also pose significant problems for U.S. and Allied strategic policy. The proposal that new strategic weapons be proved verifiable before they are deployed appears unworkable. Its focus on national technical means [NTM] of verification seriously weakens the longstanding Western position that cooperative measures, including on-site inspection [OSI] is, in some cases, a necessary component of effective verification. Moreover, the proposal fails to recognize that the verifiability of any particular weapon or system can be determined only in the context of a state's agreed obligations under a specific arms control treaty relating to that weapon or system. In the absence of a treaty regime specifically prohibiting or limiting the weapon, states

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have no compliance obligations which can be verified. Thus, the thrust of the proposal is unrealistic. Regarding the proposal to restrict the mobility of intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs], the U.S. notes that such a measure runs directly counter to the conclusions of the Scowcroft Commission, which recommended that mobile basing concepts for ICBMs be developed as one possible approach to enhancing ICBM survivability.

The U.S. believes strongly that these proposals should not be tabled in the CD. The choice of forum itself is completely inappropriate for the second and third proposals, as matters pertaining to the characteristics of strategic weapon systems are more appropriately dealt with in existing bilateral frameworks. While we have agreed to discuss outer space arms control in the CD, Western unity on this issue is vital should Western security interests be protected.

The U.S. sees no gain for the West in tabling these proposals in the CD when it reconvenes February 7. We strongly urge the Government of Canada to consult more fully with both the U.S. and all of the NATO Allies before taking any further action on these proposals.

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ACTION  
SUITE A DONNEE

*Mr. George J. R.*

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FM CHCGO YFGR0281 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO WSHDC/GOSSAGE

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---PRIME MINISTERS PEACE INITIATIVE: CHICAGO TRIBUNE

FEBRUARY 1 EDITORIAL OF CHICAGO TRIBUNE CAME OUT WITH ARTICLE IN PERSPECTIVE SECTION OF PAPER IN WHICH GORDON THOMPSON, A "CONSULTING SCIENTIST TO UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS" WROTE THE MOST SUPPORTIVE WORK THE TRIBUNE HAS PUBLISHED TO DATE ON P.M.S PEACE INITIATIVE. THE ARTICLE ENDS ON A RINGING NOTE BY SAYING IT "MAY BE THAT THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE--ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT GIVEN CANADA'S PLACE IN NATO AND INDUSTRIAL WORLD--IS THE START OF SOMETHING BIG: AN ANGRY GROUP OF NON-SUPER-POWERS DEMANDING THEIR RIGHT TO A WORLD FREE FROM U.S./SOVIET BRINKMANSHIP".

2. ARTICLE BEING FAXED SOONEST.

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AUTHENTICITY OF ROM ISSUED TEXT.BEGINS:

COMMUNIQUE CONJOINT

A LINVITATION DE SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR NICOLAE CEAUSESCU,  
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE SOCIALISTE DE ROUMANIE, LE PREMIER  
MINISTRE DU CANADA, LE TRES HONORABLE PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU A  
EFFECTUE UNE VISITE EN ROUMANIE DU 1 AU 2 FEVRIER 1984.

AU COURS DE LA VISITE, LE PRESIDENT DE LA ROUMANIE ET LE PREMIER  
MINISTRE DU CANADA ONT EU DES ENTRETIENS OFFICIELS QUI SE SONT  
DEROULES DANS UNE ATMOSPHERE CORDIALE, DESTIME ET DE COMPREHENSION  
RECIPROQUE. AUX ENTRETIENS ONT PARTICIPE, DU COTE ROUMAIN, CONSTANTIN  
DASCALESCU, PREMIER MINISTRE DU GOUVERNEMENT, STEFAN ANDREI, MINISTRE  
DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, FLOREA DUMITRESCU, MINISTRE SECRETAIRE DETAT,  
CONSEILLER DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE, CONSTANTIN MITEA, CONSEILLER  
DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE, DUMITRU APOSTOIU, SECRETAIRE  
PRESIDENTIEL ET DU CONSEIL DETAT, PETRE TANASIE, DIRECTEUR AU  
MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, MIHAI HIRJAU, SECRETAIRE PERSONNEL  
DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE. DU COTE CANADIEN: JACQUES SIMARD,  
LAMBASSADEUR DU CANADA A BUCAREST, R FOWLER, SECRETAIRE ADJOINT

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PAGE TWO UYGR0235 UNCLAS

DU CABINET POLITIQUE EXTERIEUR ET LA DEFENSE, JE JOHNSON, CHEF  
DU CABINET DU PREMIER MINISTRE, P HANCOCK, DIRECTEUR GENERAL AU  
MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, GJ SMITH, DIRECTEUR DE LA  
DIVISION POUR LE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET DU DESARMFMENT DU  
MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, DN GORESKY, PREMIER-SECRETAIRE  
ET CONSUL DU CANADA A BUCAREST.

LE PRESIDENT DE LA ROUMANIE ET LA PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN ONT  
EXPRIME LEUR SATISFACTION CONCERNANT LEVOLUTION FAVORABLE DES  
RAPPORTS BILATERAUX SUR LES PLANS POLITIQUE, ECONOMIQUE,  
TEHNICO-SCIENTIFIQUE ET CULTUREL ET ONT SOULIGNE LE DESIR DE  
LEURS DEUX PAYS DINTENSIFIER A LAVENIR CES RAPPORTS SUR DES  
BASES MUTUELLEMENT AVANTAGEUSES. DANS CE CONTEXTE, LES DEUX PARTIES  
ONT MIS EN EVIDENCE LA COLLABORATION FRUCTUEUSE ENTRE LES DEUX  
PAYS DANS LE DOMAINE DE LUTILISATION DE LENERGIE NUCLEAIRE A DES  
FINS PACIFIQUES.

PENDANT LES ENTRETIENS, UN LARGE ECHANGE DE VUES A EU LIEU  
CONCERNANT CERTAINS PROBLEMES INTERNATIONAUX MAJEURS ACTUELS.  
LES DEUX PARTIES ONT SOULIGNE AVEC SATISFACTION QUE LEURS DEUX  
PAYS POURSUIVENT DES OBJECTIFS COMMUNS OU TRES PROCHES EN  
PARTICULIER EN CE QUI CONCERNE LA RECHERCHE DE LA PAIX, LA  
NECESSITE DE LA PROMOTION DU DIALOGUE ET DE LA CREATION DUN  
CLIMAT DE CONFIANCE ET DE COOPERATION DANS LES RELATIONS ENTRE  
LES ETATS.

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PAGE THREE UYGR0235 UNCLAS

LE PRESIDENT DE LA ROUMANIE ET LE PREMIER MINISTRE DU CANADA ONT EXPRIME LEUR PREOCCUPATION A LEGARD DE LA AGGRAVATION DE LA SITUATION INTERNATIONALE, EN SOULIGNANT LE DANGER DE LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS ET EN PARTICULIER DE CELLE AUX ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES. LES DEUX PARTIES ONT EGALEMENT SOULIGNE LA NECESSITE D'INTENSIFIER LES EFFORTS DE TOUS LES ETATS POUR PREVENIR L'UTILISATION DES ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES, POUR SAUVEGARDER L'HUMANITE D'UNE CATASTROPHE, NOTANT QUE L'UTILISATION D'UNE PARTIE SEULEMENT DES ARSENAUX MILITAIRES EXISTANTS METTRAIT EN PERIL L'EXISTENCE MEME DES PEUPLES ET DE LA CIVILISATION.

LE PRESIDENT DE LA ROUMANIE ET LE PREMIER MINISTRE DU CANADA ONT MIS EN EVIDENCE LA NECESSITE DE TOUT FAIRE POUR LA CREATION D'UN CLIMAT QUI PUISSE MENER A LA REPRISE DES NEGOCIATIONS SOVIETO-AMERICAINES ET ABOUTIR A DES ACCORDS APPROPRIES. COMPTE TENU QUE CES PROBLEMES TOUCHENT A LA VIE ET A LA SECURITE DE NOMBREUX PEUPLES, IL EST NECESSAIRE QUE LES PAYS MEMBRES DU TRAITE DE VARSOVIE, DE L'OTAN, AINSI QUE LES AUTRES ETATS CONCERNES APPORTENT LEUR CONTRIBUTION DANS CE DEDAIN.

LES DEUX PARTIES ONT SOULIGNE L'IMPORTANCE DE LA CONFERENCE DE STOCKHOLM POUR LA CONFIANCE ET SECURITE ET POUR LE DESARMEMENT EN EUROPE QUI CONTRIBUE A L'INTENSIFICATION DU DIALOGUE ENTRE LES ETATS PARTICIPANTS ET ELLES ONT EXPRIME LA

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PAGE FOUR UYGR0235 UNCLAS

CONVICTION QU'IL FAUT TOUT FAIRE POUR QUE CETTE REUNION PUISSE  
DONNER DE RESULTATS POSITIFS, EN Y INJECTANT TOUTE LA VOLONTE  
POLITIQUE NECESSAIRE.

EN SE REFERANT A LA PROCHAINE REPRISE DES NEGOCIATIONS DE  
VIENNE, POUR LA REDUCTION DES FORCES ARMEES ET DES ARMEMENTS  
EN EUROPE CENTRALE, LES DEUX PARTIES ONT SOULIGNE LA NECESSITE  
QUE DES EFFORTS SOUTENUS SOIENT DEPLOYES AFIN D'ARRIVER A DES  
ACCORDS APPROPRIES.

LE PRESIDENT DE LA ROUMANIE ET LE PREMIER MINISTRE DU  
CANADA ONT DISCUTE EN PROFONDEUR LEUR VUES ET LEURS INITIATIVES  
ET PROPOSITIONS CONCERNANT LES PROBLEMES DE LA PAIX, DE LA  
SECURITE EN EUROPE ET DANS LE MONDE, PARTICULIEREMENT LE  
DESARMEMENT ET, TOUT D'ABORD, LE DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE. ILS ONT  
APPROUVE L'ESPRIT QUI ANIME CES PROPOSITIONS ET INITIATIVES ET  
ONT EXPRIME LEUR CONVICTION QUE LLES APPORTERONT UNE CONTRIBUTION  
SIGNIFICATIVE A LA RECHERCHE DE LA PAIX, A LA REALISATION DU  
DESARMEMENT, AU DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA CONFIANCE ET DE LA COOPERATION  
INTERNATIONALES.

LES DEUX PARTIES ONT SOULIGNE QUE LUNE DES CONDITIONS  
DE LA STABILITE ET DE LA PAIX, VISANT A SURMONTER LES DIFFICULTES  
ECONOMIQUES AVEC LESQUELLES SONT CONFRONTES LA PLUPART DES  
PAYS DU MONDE, CEST DE PRENDRE DES MESURES SUSCEPTIBLES  
D'ABOUTIR A LA REDUCTION <sup>de l'écart</sup> ~~ET A LA LIQUIDATION DES DECALAGES~~

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PAGE FIVE UYGR0235 UNCLAS

ENTRE LES PAYS DEVELOPPES ET CEUX EN DEVELOPPEMENT, DASSURER LE PROGRES ECONOMIQUE, SOCIAL ET HUMAIN, DES PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT, DE TOUS LES ETATS, AINSI QUE DASSURER DES RAPPORTS ECONOMIQUES EQUITABLES ENTRE TOUS LES PAYS.

LES DEUX PARTIES ONT REITERE QU'IL EST DANS L'INTERET DE LA PAIX ET DE LA STABILITE DANS LE MONDE ENTIER QUE TOUTES LES SITUATIONS DE CONFLIT OU DE GUERRE ENTRE LES ETATS SOIENT RESOLUS EXCLUSIVEMENT PAR DES MOYENS POLITIQUES, PAR NEGOCIATIONS.

LE PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN A EXPRIME, EN SON NOM ET AU NOM DES PERSONNES QUI L'AVAIENT ACCOMPAGNE EN ROUMANIE, DE VIFS REMERCIEMENTS POUR L'ACCUEIL CHALEUREUX ET AMICAL, POUR L'HOSPITALITE PARTICULIERE DONT ILS ONT ETE OBJET PENDANT LA VISITE.

LE PREMIER MINISTRE PIERRE ELIOTT TRUDEAU A RENOUVELE L'INVITATION ADRESSEE A SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE SOCIALISTE DE ROUMANIE ET A MADAMME ELENA CEAUSESCU DE EFFECTUER UNE VISITE OFFICIELLE AU CANADA. L'INVITATION A ETE ACCEPTEE AVEC PLAISIR; LA DATE DE LA VISITE SERA ETABLIE ULTERIEUREMENT, PAR VOIE DIPLOMATIQUE.

BUCAREST, LE 2 FEVRIER 1984

ENDS.

UUU/181 021900Z UYGR0235

MR AAVOIE

*This helps put things in  
context.*

*Jan*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRGUE WOGRO201 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

BONN PARIS BNATO LDN WSHDC MOSCO WSAW BUCST BGRAD BPEST VMBFR BRU  
PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/FOWLER

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0111 31JAN PARIS TEL WIGR3267 01FEB

---PMS VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA-PRESS REPORTS

YOU WILL WISH TO COMPARE NOTES FOR PMS TALKS WITH  
STROUGAL AND HUSAK WITH CZECHOSLOVAK MEDIA REPORTS(OURTELS  
WOGRO184 31JAN,WOGRO196 02FEB)AND TRANSCRIPT OF PRGUE PRESS MTG  
26JAN(PMOOTT9302 29JAN)TO IDENTIFY REMARKS ABOUT WHICH FRENCH  
HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS AND TO CONSIDER EXTENT TO WHICH YOU WISH  
TO REVEAL CONTENTS OF TALKS.

2.IT IS CLEAR IN TRANSCRIPT THAT WHEN PM SPOKE OF PRGUE  
DECLARATION TO PRESS HE DID SO IN CONTEXT OF MBFR.RUDE PRAVO  
(SEE PAGE 10 OF WOGRO184)QUOTED HIM FAIRLY ACCURATELY BUT OUT  
OF CONTEXT SO HIS APPROVAL APPEARED TO GO TO WHOLE DECLARATION.  
OTHER MEDIA REPORTS REPEATED RUDE PRAVO LINE.WE CAN FIND NO/NO  
REF IN LOCAL PRESS TO PM FAVOURING DECLARATION ON NON-USE OF  
FORCE,AS FRENCH HAVE MENTIONED.YOU WILL SEE FROM NOTES HOWEVER  
THAT SUBJ WAS MENTIONED IN TALKS WITH STROUGAL.

3.BY LOCAL STANDARDS,REPORTING ON PMS VISIT HAS BEEN  
REMARKABLY GOOD(EVEN IF IT DOES INDICATE,CONTRARY TO FACT,  
. PRESENCE OF T AXWORTHY AT TALKS).QUOTING OUT OF CONTEXT IS  
NOT/NOT FAULT EXCLUSIVE TO EAST EUROPEAN MEDIA.MEDIA REPORTS

...2



PAGE TWO WOGR0201 CONF

CONCENTRATE ON WHAT CZECHOSLOVAK SIDE SAID(OCCASIONALLY QUOTING REMARKS THAT WERE NOT/NOT MADE BUT THAT THEREBY BECAME OFFICIAL) AND PROVIDE LITTLE INFO ON VIEWS OF PM TRUDEAU,BUT THIS IS STANDARD PRACTICE.(YESTERDAYS RUDE PRAVO REPORTED GROMYKOS TALKS IN BUCST WITH APPARENTLY SILENT ROMANIANS).NEVERHTELESS HIS POSITION IS FAIRLY CLEAR TO SENSITIVE READERS HERE.AND OF COURSE COVERAGE IN LOCAL MEDIA WAS NOT/NOT ONE OF OUR MAJOR CONCERNS.IF WE HAD WANTED TO ENSURE ACCURATE SATEMENT OF PMS WORDS WE WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE RULED OUT JOINT COMMUNIQUE OR STATEMENT OF SOME KIND.PM WANTED TO REACH LEADERS WITH HIS MSG,AND DID SO.

4.AS AGREED WITH HANCOCK/RBD DURING VISIT,AMB AND EMB OFFICERS HAVE RESPONDED TO MANY REQUESTS FROM DIPLO COLLEAGUES WITH GUARDED AND CAUTIOUS DESCRIPTION OF VISIT AND,TO NATO MISSIONS,OF TALKS.FRENCH MAY HAVE PICKED UP SOME REF FROM THESE REMAKRS BUT THEY SHOULD HAVE CLARIFIED RATHER THAN COMPOUNDED ERRORS OF PRESS.

5.OUR NOTES OF PMS MTG WITH STROUGAL WERE SENT,AS INSTRUCTED, TO PMDEL/DAVOS(OURTEL WOGR0171 27JAN).OUR NOTES OF HUSAK MTG WILL GO BY NEXT BAG UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED.

CCC/175 021500Z WOGR0201

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

MF  
42

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRGUE WOGRO201 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

BONN PARIS BNATO LDN WSHDC MOSCO WSAW BUCST BGRAD BPEST VMBFR BRU  
PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/FOWLER

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0111 31JAN PARIS TEL WIGR3267 01FEB

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...2

PAGE TWO WOGR0201 CONF

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CCC/175 021500Z WOGR0201

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

MF  
12

UNCLASSIFIED

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

FM PRGUE WOCR0196 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 021500

INFO PMOOTT/COLEMAN PARIS BONN

DISTR RBT RBR FPR RBD

REF CURTELS WOCR0184 31JAN 0195 02FEB

---PMS VISIT-MEDIA REACTION

FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF COMMENTARY TAKEN FROM  
28JAN RULE PRAVO. HEADLINE QUOTE ON THE VISIT BY THE CDN  
PREMIER UNQUOTE. TEXT BEGINS: ARRIVING IN PRGUE AT THE INVITATION  
OF OUR PM, PIERRE TRUDEAU, CDN PREMIER FAMILIARIZED OUR TOP  
LEADERS WITH HIS PROPOSALS IN PARTICULAR CONCERNING NUCLEAR  
DISARMAMENT. PEACE PROPOSALS OF THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER COUNTRIES  
IN THE JAN83 POLITICAL DECLARATION WERE EVALUATED BY TRUDEAU  
AS A STEP FORWARD IN RIGHT DIRECTION-A STEP TO WHICH NATO SHOULD  
RESPOND POSITIVELY.

TALKS WITH CDN PREMIER WERE CHARACTERIZED BY SEEKING WAYS  
TO GENERATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY WITHIN  
THE FRAMEWORK OF AN OPEN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. IN THE TALKS  
THE VIEWPOINTS ON CAUSES OF DETERIORATED INTERNATIONAL SITUATION  
WERE NOT/NOT ALWAYS IDENTICAL. AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE, PM TRUDEAU  
PREFACED HIS RESPONSES WITH THE REMARK THAT HIS COUNTRY WAS A  
MEMBER OF NATO. OUR PUBLIC HAS BEEN INFORMED ABOUT RECENT  
EFFORTS BY THE CDN PEACE MOVEMENT TO PREVENT TESTS OF USA  
MISSILES IN COLD LAKE, ALBERTA, AFTER THE APPROVAL FOR THESE

...2

PAGE TWO W0GR0196 UNCLAS

TESTS HAD BEEN GIVEN BY THE CDN GOVT.

IT MUST BE REALISTICALLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT IT WAS THE AGGRESSIVE, MILITARISTIC POLICY OF THE USA AND NATO STRIVING TO GAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY-A POLICY TO WHICH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES INCLUDING CSSR WERE COMPELLED TO RESPOND BY MEASURES ENSURING THEIR OWN SECURITY. NOW IT IS NECESSARY FOR USA AND NATO TO SHOW A WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION THAT EXISTED BEFORE THE DEPLOYMENT OF USA MISSILES.

ALONG WITH THE WSAW PACT COUNTRIES, CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS READY TO POSITIVELY ASSESS ALL PROPOSALS CONTRIBUTING EFFECTIVELY TO THE RELAXATION OF TENSION AND THROUGH PRATICAL STEPS, TO A REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHILE RESPECTING THE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. AN ACCORD OF VIEWS WAS REACHED AS TO THE DETERMINATION BY BOTH SIDES TO SUPPORT ALL STEPS LEADING TO SUCCESSFUL COURSE AND CONCLUSION OF VIENN DISARMAMENT TALKS AND THE STKHM CONFERENCE, ALSO ON BOTH COUNTRIES INTEREST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAK-CDN RELATIONS, MAINTLY THE ECONOMIC SPHERE AND IN THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. IT IS IN FULL HARMONY WITH THE MAJOR AND MOST URGENT TAKS OF OUR TIME- TO AVERT THE NUCLEAR THREAT. TEXT ENDS.

2. FOLLOWING ARE ROUGH TRASCRIPTS OF COMMENTARIES ON RADIO PRGUE INNATL (FRENCH AND ENGLISH LANG BROADCASTS) AND CSSR TV. RADIO PRGUE INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST 27 JAN BEGINS

...3

PAGE THREE W0GR0196 UNCLAS

QUOTE...A LUI SEUL LE FAIT QUE LA TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE PAYS MEMBRE DU  
TRAITE DE VARSOVIE AIT RECU LA VISITE DU PREMIER PAYS D UN ETAT  
FAISANT PARTI DE L OTAN SIGNALE UN FAIT A SAVOIR QUE TOUS  
LES PAYS DE L OTAN NE SOUTINNENT PAS LA POLITIQUE ULTRA CONSERVATRICE  
ET MILITARISTE DES ETATS-UNIS.A LA CONFERENCE DE PRESSE QU IL  
A DONNE HEIR LE PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN A COMPARE SPIRITEUELLEMENT  
LA SITUATION ACTUELLE A CELLE D UN MATCH DE HOCKEY SUR GLACE,  
LORSQUE LE MATCH DONNE LIEU A UN AFFRONTLEMENT ENTRE LES  
ADVERSAIRES.IL A AJOUTE QUE LA QUESTION DE SAVOIR QUI A  
PORTE LE PREMIER COUP EST UNE QUESTION ACADEMIQUE ET QU IL IMPORTE  
DE REPRENDRE LE JEU,C EST A DIRE LES NEGOCIATIONS.QUELQUE  
SPIRITUELLE QU ELLE SOIT AUCUNE COMPARAISON N EST,NE PEUT ETRE  
TOUT A FAIT EXACTE.LE PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN PART DE LA  
POSITION QUE LES DEUX SUPERPUISSANCES,L UNION SOVIETIQUE ET  
LES ETATS-UNIS,ASSUMENT LA MEME RESPONSABILITE,POUR LA TENSION  
INTERNATIONALE ACTUELLE ET QU ELLES DEVRAIENT RECOMMENCER A  
NEGOCIER SANS DELAI.

OR DANS L ENTRETIEN QUE LE JOURNAL SOVIETIQUE PRAVDA  
URI ANDROPOV DIRIGEANT SOVIETIQUE AU SOMMET A INDIQUE QUE  
L UNION SOVIETIQUE EST PRETE A ENTAMER LE DIALOGUE.MAIS QUE  
DANS LA MESURE OU IL DEVRAIT S AGIR D UN DIALOGUE DE PARTENAIRES  
EG AUX ENDROIT QU AUCUN DES DEUX NE DEVRAIT PAS PAR AVANCE SE BASER  
SUR UN POSITION DE FORCE.RONALD REAGAN ALLAIT AUSSI SOULIGNER

...4

PAGE FOUR W0GR0196 UNCLAS

PLUSIEURS FOIS CES TEMPS DERNIERS QU IL EST DISPOSE A PRENDRE PART  
A DES NEGOCIATIONS MAIS SANS JAMAIS INDIQUER QU IL A L INTENTION  
DE LIQUIDER LA SUPERIORITE DANS LE DOMAINE MILITAIRE EN EUROPE,  
DONC, LA SUPERIORITE QUE REPRESENTENT LES PERSHING AMERICAINS  
EN REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D ALLEMAGNE, EN GRANDE BRETAGNE ET EN  
ITALIE. DIRE DONC QUE LES DEUX PUISSANCES ASSUMENT LA MEME  
RESPONSABILITE N EST PAS UNE APPROCHE OBJECTIVE. DE MEME NF  
PEUT PAS FERMER LES YEUX DEVANT LA QUESTION DE SAVOIR QUI EST  
RESPONSABLE DE CETTE SITUATION. TANT QUE L ON N AURA PAS  
PENETRE JUSQU AU FOND DU PROBLEME IL EST IMPOSSIBLE DE LE REGLER.  
EN REVENANT A LA COMPARAISON DE TRUDEAU TANT QUE LES HOCKEYEURS  
DE L UNE DES DEUX EQUIPES AGITERONT LEURS CROSTALORS QUE LES  
AUTRES ENCAISSERONT LES COUPS, LE JUE NE PEUT PAS ETRE  
POURSUIVI. C EST POURQUOI AU COURS DE L ENTRETEN QU IL A EU  
HIER AVEC PIERRE TRUDEAU LE PRESIDENT TCHECOSLOVAQUE GUSTAV  
HUSAK A CARREMENT DEBLARE QUE LA SITUATION DANGEREUSE QUI S EST  
CREE EN EUROPE RESULTE DE LA POLITIQUE AMERICAINE DONT LES  
NOUVEAUX MISSILES AMERICAINS EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE SONT  
L EXPRESSION CONCRETE. DANS SON COMMENTAIRE L AGENCE UPI  
INDIQUE QUE LE PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN A RECU UNE LECON AU  
NIVEAU DE LA REALITE DE LA VIE INTERNATIONALE. PEUT-ETRE CETTE  
FORMULATION EST-ELLE TROP RUDE. MAIS COMPRENDRE LA REALITE DU  
MONDE ACTUEL EST UN PREMIER PAS. ENCORE FAUT-IL REAGIR D UNE  
FACON REALISTE A CETTE REALITE. LE GOUVERNEMENT AMERICAIN ACTUEL  
...5

PAGE FIVE WOGR0196 UNCLAS

FERME LES YEUX DEVANT LA REALITE, SINON, IL DEVRAIT VOIR QUE LES NOUVEAU MISSILES AMERICAINS EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE MENECEMENT DIRECTEMENT LES PAYS SOCIALISTES. DONC QU IL EST DE LEUR DEVOIR D APPRECIER CE FAIT D UNE MANIERE REALISTE ET DE REAGIR EN CONSEQUENCE. MAIS LES PAYS SOCIALISTES REAGIRAIENT EGALEMENT D UNE MANIERE REALISTE SI LES ETATS-UNI COMMENCAIENT A PASSER DE LA MILITARISATION AU DESARMEMENT. VLADIMIR ZAGLADIN RESPONSABLE-ADJOINT DU DEPARTEMENT INTERNATIONAL DU COMITE CENTRAL DU PARTI COMMUNISTE DE L UNION SOVIETIQUE A TOUT RECEMMENT DECLARE QUE L UNION SOVIETIQUE REpondra A CHAQUE MESURE REALISTE ET CONSTRUCTIVE DES ETATS-UNIS. LE PROBLEME C EST QUE POUR LE MOMENT WSHDC N A PAS ADOPTE DE MESURES CONCRETES ALLANT DANS LA BONNE DIRECTION.

JUSQU ICI LE PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN TRUDEAU N A PAS DEPASSE SA PROPRE OMBRE. MAIS IL A FAIT PREUVE DE REALISME EN SE RENDANT EN TCHECOSLOVAQUIE, EN APPRECIANT POSITIVEMENT LES PROPOSITIONS CONTENUES DANS LA DECLARATION POLITIQUE FAITE EN JANVIER DE L AN DERNIER A PRGUE PAR LES PAYS MEMBRES DU TRAITE DE VARSOVIE. PARLANT DE CETTE DECLARATION IL A DECLARE QU ELLE A CONSTITUTE UN PAS EN AVANT DANS LA BONNE DIRECTION ET QUE LES PAYS DE L OTAN DEVRAIENT REAGIR POSITIVEMENT AUX PROPOSITIONS DE PAIX QU ELLE CONTIENT. JUSQU ICI DONC NOTRE NOTE D ACTUALITE... VOUS ECOUTEZ RADIO PRGUE INTERNATIONAL. TEXT ENDS.

...6



PAGE SIX W0GR0196 UNCLAS

3.CSSR TELEVISION COMMENTARY JAN28.TEXT BEGINS.

PERHAPS,BECAUSE THEY KNOW THE PHILOSOPHY AND HABITS OF THEIR SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURS SO WELL,CDN POLITICAL CIRCLES HAVE BEEN OBVIOUSLY AWARE OF THE DANGEROUS(INTERNATIONAL)SITUATION FOR A LONG TIME.THIS IS WHY MR TRUDEAU HAS PAID AND PAYS A NUMBER OF VISITS TO THE KEY COUNTRIES OF AMERICA,EUROPE AND ASIA.

IN HIS WORDS,THE PURPOSE OF THE VISITS IS TO ATTEMPT TO FIND MORE REASONABLE AND MORE REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES,TO ATTEMPT TO EVOKE MORE CONCERN REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT THIS CDN ACTIVITY WOULD HAVE MET WITH NO/NO ENTHUSIASM FROM WELL KNOWN COLD WAR CIRCLES IN THE WESTERN PRESS.DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE MUST WAIT TO SEE HOW THE INITIATIVE WILL DEVELO AND EVEN THOUGH THE ATTITUDE OF CERTAIN POLITICAL CIRCLES IN CDA(THOSE WHO HAVE RECENTLY GIVEN THEIR APPROVAL FOR THE TESTING OF USA MISSILES ON CDN TERRITORY) HAVE NOT/NOT ALWAYS BEEN CONSISTENT,IT IS QUITE EVIDENT THAT THIS EFFORT BY CDAS PM DESERVES UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATION.

BESIDES,WITHOUT OVERESTIMATING THE IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE OF OUR COUNTRY,IT FOLLOWS FROM MR TRUDEAUS VISIT THAT THE CDN PREMIER IS AWARE OF THE SIGNIFICANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA,ALONG WITH OTHER COUNTRIES,ENJOYS IN THE SPHERE OF PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.TEXT ENDS.

...7

FF SEVEN WOGR0196 UNCLAS

4.RADIO PRGUE BROADCAST 29JAN.TEXT BEGINS.WITHIN THE WHOLE  
CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,TRUDEAUS VISIT IN  
PRGUE CONSTITUTED AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW OVERALL INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS.MR TRUDEAU PROVED HE WAS A REALISTICALLY THINKING MAN,  
ESPECIALLY WHEN HE PRAISED THE WSAW TREATY COUNTRIES PEACE PROPOSALS  
VOICED IN THE POLITICAL DECLARATION PUBLISHED IN JAN03 AND SAID  
IT WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION WHICH SHOULD RECEIVE  
POSITIVE REACTION FROM NATO.HE ALSO INTRODUCED TO CZECHOSLOVAK  
LEADERS HIS OWN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA ALONG WITH THE OTHER WSAW TREATY MEMBER  
COUNTRIES IS PREPARED TO POSITIVELY CONSIDER ALL PROPOSALS  
AND ACTIONS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND SECURITY  
WHICH WOULD LEAD TOWARDS THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THIS FACT WAS EXPRESSED ALSO IN THE JOINT PROCLAMATION  
OF CZECHOSLOVAK PREMIER STROUGAL AND CDN PREMIER TRUDEAU  
WHICH SAYS:AT PRESENT,THERE IS ONE MOST IMPORTANT TASK  
FOR ALL STATEMEN AND THAT IS TO DO ALL TO ACHIEVE DETENTE,  
STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AS THE BASIS  
FOR PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION ALL OVER THE WORLD.  
TEXT ENDS.

UUU/175 021400Z WOGR0196

INEO

ME  
22

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PRGUE WOGR0195 02FEB84

TO BONN PARIS DELIVER BY 021400

INFO PMOOTT/COLEMAN EXTOTT LDDZ RBR RBT RGB RBD RBRD FPR

REF BON TEL ZQGR0041 31JAN PARIS TEL WIGR3267 01FEB

---PMS VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA-PRESS REPORTS

IN VIEW OF SMITH VISITS TO BONN AND PARIS WE ARE

REPEATING TO YOU OURTEL WOGR0184 31JAN CONTAINING REPORTS

IN RUDE PRAVO ON PMS VISIT HERE.YOU WILL ALSO RECEIVE

OURTEL WOGR0196 02FEB WITH FURTHER LOCAL MEDIA REPORTS.

CCC/175 021045Z WOGR0195

*action*

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PRGUE WOGRO192 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 021600

---PMS VISIT:THANK YOU LETTERS

AS REQUESTED BY GJ SMITH,FOLLOWING ARE DRAFT TEXTS

FOR LETTERS OF THANKS FOR PMS SIGNATURE.WE DO NOT/NOT KNOW  
WHAT KIND OF LETTER IS USUAL IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES;THESE HAVE  
BEEN DRAFTED TO AVOID SUBSTANCE.

2.QUOTE DEAR PRIME MINISTER,HAVING JUST RETURNED FROM EUROPE,I  
AM WRITING AT ONCE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO YOU FOR THE  
ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR MY VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA.I APPRECIATE  
THEM ALL THE MORE AS THEY WERE UNDERTAKEN AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE.

IT WAS A PLEASURE FOR ME TO MEET YOU AGAIN AND TO EXCHANGE  
VIEWS ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DO TO REDUCE SOME OF THE DANGEROUS  
TENSIONS PRESENT IN WORLD TODAY.I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR  
SUCH EFFORTS THAT WE WERE ABLE TO HAVE FRANK AND CONSTRUCTIVE  
CONVERSATIONS.I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR EXPRESSING YOUR SUPPORT  
FOR MY INITIATIVES.

I ALSO WANT TO THANK YOU FOR THE TIME YOU TOOK FROM YOUR  
BUSY SCHEDULE TO SPEND WITH ME.I KNOW HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO  
GET AWAY FROM DAILY PRESSURES.

YOU KNOW HOW MUCH I ENJOYED MY AFTERNOON VISIT TO SLAVKOV TO  
SEE THE BATTLEFIELD AND MUSEUMS OF AUSTERLITZ.THIS WAS THE FUL-  
FILLMENT OF A DREAM I HAVE HAD FOR MANY YEARS AND MY GRATITUDE TO  
YOU IS IMMENSE.IT WAS PARTICULARLY GOOD OF YOU TO PROVIDE AN

...2

PAGE TWO WOGR0192 RESTR

AIRCRAFT FOR THE TRIP AND TO HAVE YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER ACCOMPANY ME.UNQUOTE.

3.QUOTE DEAR PRESIDENT HUSAK,NOW THAT I AM BACK IN CANADA I WANT TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY APPRECIATION FOR ALL THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WERE MADE FOR MY VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND ESPECIALLY FOR THE TIME YOU SPENT IN CONVERSATION WITH ME.MY GRATITUDE IS ALL THE GREATER AS I UNDERSTAND YOU RETURNED FROM YOUR HOLIDAY ESPECIALLY FOR OUR TALKS.

I CONSIDER OUR DISCUSSION TO HAVE BEEN AN IMPORTANT PART OF EFFORTS TO PROVIDE MORE POINTS OF CONTACT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR WORDS OF SUPPORT FOR MY INITIATIVES IN THIS DIRECTION,IN THE DIRECTION OF REDUCING TENSION.UNQUOTE.

4.QUOTE DEAR MINISTER CHNOUPEK,IT WAS A PLEASURE FOR ME TO MEET YOU AGAIN DURING MY VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND TO HAVE THE CHANCE TO TALK WITH YOU INFORMALLY.I THINK OUR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AT DINNER AND DURING THE TRIP TO SLAVKOV WAS VERY WORTHWHILE. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR ACCOMPANYING ME ON THAT EXCURSION.YOUR KNOW-LEGE OF THE AREA AND OF NAPOLEON CERTAINLY ADDED TO MY ENJOYMENT. PLEASE ALSO EXTEND MY THANKS TO VICE MINISTER JOHANES.

THE TALKS I HAD IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE AN IMPORTANT PART OF MY EFFORTS TO BRING A STRONGER POLITICAL DYNAMISM TO BEAR ON THE PROBLEMS GIVING RISE TO EAST-WEST TENSIONS.I BELIEVE THEY SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE AND I HOPE THEIR RESULTS WILL BE EVIDENT

...3

PAGE THREE WOGR0192 CONF

BOTH IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND ON THE BROAD WORLD STAGE.  
UNQUOTE.

5. GRATEFUL YOU ALSO CONSIDER NOTE TO MR OTA SCHWARZENBERGER, CHIEF,  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND PROTOCOL, OFFICE OF PRIME MINISTER OF CSSR,  
ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE DEAR MR SCHWARZENBERGER, I WANT  
TO THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE EXCELLENT ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR  
MY VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WERE ALMOST  
ENTIRELY IN YOUR HANDS. YOU HAD A VERY SHORT TIME IN WHICH TO  
PREPARE BUT I WAS INDEED PLEASED THAT EVERYTHING WENT SO  
SMOOTHLY. UNQUOTE.

6. LETTERS COULD BE SENT TO US FOR FORWARDING OR SENT  
AIRMAIL; FORMER PREFERABLE. BAG CLOSES 0800 FRIDAYS.

CCC/175 021500Z WOGR0192

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

ME  
2

R E S T R I C T E D

FM MOSCO XYGR0139 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

INFO LDN PARIS BONN ROME BNATO BREEC WSHDC PRGUE WSAW BGRAD BPEST

PRMNY BUCST BRU PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINE MINT USS DMF DMT IFB EFB UGB URR LGB SFR PGB RGB RSD RCD

RBD RBR IFB GGB CCB FPR RBRD

---PMS INITIATIVE:INDICATIONS OF SOVIET INTEREST

BELGIUM DIP COLLEAGUE INFORMS US THAT AT MTG ABOUT WEEK AGO

BETWEEN VISITING BELGIUM MP FRANK SWAELEN AND LM ZAMYATIN,

HEAD OF INFO DEPT OF CENTRAL CTTEE SECRETARIAT, LATTER ON THREE

SEPARATE OCCASIONS AND AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE REFERRED TO PM

TRUDEAUS DIALOGUE-ENCOURAGING ACTIVITIES IN POSITIVE WAY,

IMPLYING PM TINDEMANS AND OTHER WESTERN LEADERS SHLD ACT SIMILARLY.

CCC/144 021230Z XYGR0139

mf

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM COPEN YJGR0136 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT RSR

INFO BREEC LDN HAGUE PARIS BONN BRU ATHENS ROME OSLO LSBON ANKRA

WSHDC MOSCO STKHM

DISTR RGB JCD (IDDZ MINT MINE USS DMF IFB UGB RBD RBR RCR IMD IDA IDR  
FPR

---INTRODUCTORY CALL ON FM ELLEMANN-JENSEN:PMS INITIATIVE

DURING INTRODUCTORY CALL ON DANISH FM,I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF  
HIM ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON PMS INITIATIVE,DRAWING ON IDDZ-0046  
17JAN AND SUBSEQUENT TRAFFIC.ELLEMANN-JENSEN SAID THAT DESPITE  
DISCORDANT NOTES,HE THOUGHT STKHMS FM MTGS HAD SERVED USEFUL PURPOSE  
IN HELPING TO RESTORE DIALOGUE AND HE WISHED PM WELL IN HIS EFFORTS  
TO MAINTAIN SOME MOMENTUM IN EAST/WEST TALKS DURING HIS CURRENT  
VISITS IN EASTERN EUROPE.AT SAME TIME,HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD  
MODEST EXPECTATIONS AS TO WHAT COULD BE ACHIEVED IN MOSCO AT THIS  
STAGE,GIVEN UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ANDROPOVS HEALTH.HE RECALLED THAT HE  
HAD VISITED MOSCO IN DEC83 AND HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH GROMYKO  
WITHOUT DETECTING SLIGHTEST MOVEMENT ON ANY ISSUE OF CONSEQUENCE.

2.RECENT DANISH ELECTIONS AND UNCERTAIN PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION  
WHICH HAS FOLLOWED HERE HAS CLEARLY BEEN MAJOR PREOCCUPATION OF  
DANISH GOVT AND WE SHOULD PROBABLY NOT/NOT EXPECT THEM TO GIVE HIGH  
PRIORITY TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS AT THIS STAGE.YOU WILL HAVE NOTED  
TONE OF PM SCHLUTERS RECENT LETTERS IN REPLY TO PM WHICH WAS

...2



PAGE TWO YJGR0136 RESTR

ESSENTIALLY POLITE AND SUPPORTIVE BUT RATHER TEPID AND LACKING IN  
SUBSTANCE. MINS PERSONAL COMMENTS WERE MADE IN THE SAME VEIN

WANG

CCC/237 020906Z YJGR0136

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BGRAD ZLSV0071 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ MGTC

INFO PRGUE WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME BONN HAGUE BRU BNATO PRMNY

PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA MOSCO WSAW RPEST BUCST PMDELDAVOS

NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/CPP/CIC PCOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBR ABRD RBP RBT ZSP ZSI IDD IDA

IDR FPR

REF OURTEL ZLGR3194 31JAN YOURTEL MGTC6378 01FEB(NOTAL)

---PM INITIATIVE:YUGO PRESS COVERAGE

AT ORIGINATORS REQUEST AMEND SYMBOL IFP/IFP TO READ IFB/IFB

2.MGTC:PLSE PASS COPY OUR REFTL TO IFB.

UUU/148 021200Z ZLSV0071

MF  
12

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR0043 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PRGUE BUCST WSAW STKHM/SCDEL BNATO MOSCO WSHDC LDN PARIS  
BPEST BGRAD NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/  
COLEMAN

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RCR RBG RBR RBD RBP XDV IDD IDR

REF BNATO YBGR6099 27JAN

---A FRG VIEW OF USSR INTENTIONS

SUMMARY.PFEFFER,ADM FOR EUROPE,FRG MFA,HIGHLIGHTED SETBACK  
SOVIET UNION HAD SUFFERED IN RECENT MONTHS AS RESULT OF TOTAL  
FAILURE OF ITS STRATEGY ON INF DEPLOYMENT AND PARALLEL SERIOUS  
SETBACK EXPERIENCED IN RELATIONS WITH ITS OWN WARSAW PACT  
PARTNERS.FRG GOVT BELIEVED THAT INCREASING CONCERN WITHIN  
SOVIET UNION ABOUT A PERCEIVED WEAKENING OF ITS INNATL SECURITY  
REQUIRED CAREFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE HANDLING BY WESTERN  
COUNTRIES.

2.REPORT.WE MET WITH PFEFFER TO BRING HIM BRIEFLY UP TO  
DATE ON DEVELOPMENTS VIS A VIS PMS INITIATIVE.IN DOING SO  
WE DREW TO HIS ATTN CONCERNS AND INTERESTS EXPRESSED BY  
TELTSCHIK IN MTG WITH AMB 20JAN(OURTEL ZQGR0030 23JAN)AND  
NOTED THAT THESE THOUGHTS HAD BEEN PASSED TO PMS DEL.WE  
DREW ATTN TO FORTHCOMING VISIT TO BONN OF HANCOCK(NOW SMITH)  
FOR DEBRIEFING ON PMS EAST EUROPEAN TOUR.WE ALSO NOTED THAT

...2

PAGE TWO ZGR0043 CONFD

ARRANGEMENTS FOR PMS VISIT TO DDR HAD TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY ALLIES BONN GROUP FOR FIRST VISIT BY NATO HOG TO EAST BERLIN (LOW-KEY ARRIVAL, NO/NO CALL AT EAST BERLIN CITY HALL, NO/NO SIGNING OF GOLDEN BOOK, NO/NO TOUR OF WALL, ETC). PFEFFER EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CDN GOVTS ATTN TO THESE MATTERS AND WILLINGNESS TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON EAST-WEST ISSUES.

3. IN REFLECTING ON STATE OF PRESENT SOVIET POSITION, POST FRGS 22 NOV DEPLOYMENT DECISION, PFEFFER COMMENTED THAT SOVIET UNION AND WARSAW PACT HAD BEEN DEEPLY SHAKEN BY EVENTS. IT WAS HIS ASSESSMENT THAT SOVIET OBJECTIVES VIS A VIS WEST HAD NOT/NOT CHANGED IN LAST YER OR TWO. HE BELIEVED THAT WHILE SOVIET UNION WOULD CONTINUE TO ESPOUSE DEPARTURE OF USA FROM EUROPE, AS IT ALWAYS HAD DONE, IT WAS ENTIRELY AWARE THAT THIS WAS UNREALISTIC OBJECTIVE. GERMANY BELIEVED THAT SOVIET STRATEGY IN RESPECT OF INF ISSUE WAS FIRST OF ALL TO INTRODUCE DIVISIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND USA AND SECONDLY TO FRACTURE UNITY OF NATO ON DOUBLE TRACK DECISION AROUND EDGES, IE IN NETHERLANDS, ITALY, ETC. SOVIET UNION HAD HOPED TO CARRY OUT THESE OBJECTIVES BY APPEALING TO WESTERN EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION.

4. FRG GOVT BELIEVED SOVIET UNION HAD FAILED MISERABLY. IN GERMANY SILENT MAJORITY HAD SHOWN ITS SUPPORT FOR NATO AND EVEN TACITLY FOR DEPLOYMENT. DIVISIONS BETWEEN

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PAGE THREE ZQGR0043 CONF

EUROPE AND USA HAD NOT/NOT COME ABOUT.AND EDGES OF ALLIANCE  
HAD HELD.THUS SOVIET STRATEGY HAD BEEN TOTAL FAILURE.WHAT  
SOVIET UNION HAD NOT/NOT PREDICTED WAS NEGATIVE IMPACT OF  
DEVELOPMENTS SURROUNDING INF ISSUE,WITHIN ITS OWN ALLIANCE  
AND WITHIN SOVIET UNION ITSELF.USSR,SAID PFEFFER,HAD HOPED TO  
STAGE MISSILES IN HUNGARY AND BULGARIA BUT WAS NOT/NOTABLE  
TO DO SO.AND IT HAD RECVD UNPRECEDENTED PUBLIC REFUSAL  
FROM ROMANIA.IN FALLING BACK ON ITS ONLY ALTERNATIVES,DDR  
AND CZZR,IT HAD PROVOKED WITHIN THOSE COUNTRIES ANTI-  
NUCLEAR SENTIMENT.FURTHERMORE,LETS WERE NOW BEING RECVD IN  
KREMLIN FROM SOVIET CITIZENS EXPRESSING PROFOUND CONCERN  
ABOUT NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS.THIS,HE SAID,WAS NEW EXPERIENCE  
FOR SOVIET LEADERSHIP.SOVIET UNION WAS NOW FACED WITH  
NEED TO RECONSIDER NOT/NOT ONLY ITS RELATIONS WITH WEST  
BUT ALSO RELATIONS WITHIN WARSAW PACT.IT WAS OBLIGED TO DO SO  
AT TIME WHEN ITS FEARS OF ENCIRCLEMENT WERE BEING FED BY  
DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA/USA,CHINA/JAPAN,AND CHINA/JAPAN/KOREA  
RELATIONSHIPS AND ALSO DEVELOPMENTS ON ITS SOUTHERN BORDERS.  
6.COMMENT.WE FOUND PFEFFERS COMMENTS ON SOVIET POSITION  
INTERESTING IN THAT THEY REPRESENTED STRONGER DEVELOPMENT OF  
THEME WE HAVE BEEN HEARING BOTH FROM CHANCELLORS OFFICE AND  
FOREIGN OFFICE ON IMPACT SOVIET INF SETBACK IS HAVING ON SOVIET  
ASSESSMENT OF ITS SITUATION VIS A VIS WEST AND OTHER INNATL

...4

PAGE FOUR ZQGR0043 CONF

PARTNERS.CONCLUSIONS WHICH FRG GOVT HAS DRAWN FROM ITS ASSESS-  
MENT OF SITUATION,ACCORDING TO MFA AND CHANCELLORS OFFICE  
ALIKE,IS THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES,WHILE TAKING SOME  
SATISFACTION IN NATO UNITY ON INF DEPLOYMENT,MUST BE  
CAREFUL TO APPROACH SOVIET UNION IN MANNER WHICH DOES  
NOT/NOT ENHANCE ITS CONCERNS ABOUT ITS IMAGE AND SECURITY,  
IE WEST MUST SEEK TO BROADEN AND DEEPEND DIALOGUE AND  
OFFER FACE-SAVING MEANS OF BRINING SOVIET UNION BACK  
INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

CCC/242 030900Z ZQGR0043

TELEGRAM RETRANSMIT FORM

CONCENTRE:

Please repeat telegram number PMDL0033

FROM PMDELBUCAST DATED 02FEB84

Classification CONFIDENTIAL/CEO (copy attached)

Action TO ANKRA COPEN

INFO \_\_\_\_\_

DISTR \_\_\_\_\_

J. McNee  
Authorizing Officer

IDDZ  
Division

5-5912 9 02FEB84  
Phone Date

NOTE:

It is the responsibility of the authorizing officer to  
attach a copy of telegram to be repeated to this form.

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELBUCAST PMDL0033 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 020900

INFO PRGUE WSHDC LDN BONN MOSCO ROME PARIS BNATO VMBFR WSAW RPEST  
BGRAD HAGUE BRU OSLO ATHNS MDRID LSBON PRMNY VIENN GENEV STKHM/SCDEL  
PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/DACPOL

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA ZSI RBR RBD RGB RCR URR UGB CPD

---PM INITIATIVE:VISIT TO GDR

**SUMMARY:**

GDR GENERAL SECRETARY ERICH HONECKER SUPPORTED THRUST OF PMS  
INITIATIVE AND IN PARTICULAR CONFERENCE OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS.  
IN THE FORMAL SESSIONS AND IN PRIVATE MEETINGS TWO LEADERS WERE  
ABLE TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL PEACE INITIATIVE AND WIDE RANGE OF  
DISARMAMENT ISSUES. BOTH SHARED CONVICTION THAT ONLY WITH POLITICAL  
PARTICIPATION COULD ATMOSPHERE OF EAST-WEST DISTRUST BE ALLEVIATED.  
PM PROPOSED AND HONECKER READILY AGREED THAT CDN AND GDR DISARMAMENT  
EXPERTS SHOULD SEEK TO IDENTIFY AREAS OF COMMON AGREEMENT IN EACH  
OTHERS POSITIONS AND THOSE OF THE ALLIANCES TO WHICH THEY BELONG.  
PITFALLS ASSOCIATED WITH STATUS OF BERLIN ISSUE WERE AVOIDED. ONE  
SOUR NOTE WAS IN GDR TOAST WHICH DREW DEFENCE OF USA ADMIN FROM PM.

**REPORT:**

2. GDR HOSTS WERE ON THEIR BEST BEHAVIOUR FOR FIRST EVER VISIT BY  
NATO HEAD OF GOVT TO EAST BERLIN. THEY CLEARLY DISPENSED WITH NORMAL  
PRACTICE TO MEET OUR WISHES. NONE OF POTENTIALLY STATUS OF BERLIN

...2



PAGE TWO PMDL2033 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

ISSUES AROSE DURING VISIT. THIS VERY FACT CONTRIBUTED TO OPEN FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH PM AND HONECKER COULD FOCUS FULLY ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE.

3. TWO SESSIONS OF FORMAL TALKS LASTED ABOUT THREE AND A HALF HOURS. WORKING SESSION ENABLED BOTH SIDES TO OUTLINE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON MAJOR EAST-WEST DISARMAMENT ISSUES. COMMON THEME OF NEED TO REESTABLISH DIALOGUE AT POLITICAL LEVEL WAS QUICKLY ESTABLISHED. PRIME MINISTER PROPOSED POSSIBLE MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE WHEN VIENN TALKS RESUME IN MAR. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT RETURN OF MINISTERS TO STKHM-HE WAS PREPARED TO ATTEND HIMSELF IF IT WAS FELT HEAD OF GOVT PARTICIPATION WOULD BE USEFUL-COULD ADD VALUABLE POLITICAL ENERGY TO CONFERENCE. PM POINTED TO RECENT MODERATION IN USA STATEMENTS QUOTING PRESIDENT REAGANS SPEECH TO JPNS DIET AND STATE OF UNION ADDRESS. PM ALSO MADE DELIBERATE REF TO EXTENT TO WHICH CDN PURPOSES WERE SHARED BY CHANCELLOR KOHL.

4. EARLY HONECKER REMARKS WERE VERY STRUCTURED, CLOSELY FOLLOWING WPO LINE AND IT WAS ONLY IN AFTERNOON SESSION THAT PM WAS ABLE TO DIVERT HONECKERS ATTENTION FROM QUOTE PAST UNQUOTE AND HAVE HIM CONSIDER WHAT CDA AND GDR MIGHT DO AS MIDDLE POWERS AND MEMBERS OF OPPOSITE ALLIANCES TO REDUCE TENSION AND PROMOTE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE.

5. PM REFERRED TO POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN STATEMENTS MADE BY BOTH SIDES DESPITE FREQUENTLY HARSH RHETORIC. ELEMENT OF PRGUE DECLARATION, DISASSOCIATED FROM POLEMICAL CONTEXT, MAY POINT TO COMMON GROUND.

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PAGE THREE PMDL0033 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

DEC NATO BRU DECLARATION WAS VERY POSITIVE SIGNAL TO WPO. PM PROPOSED AND HONECKER AGREED THAT DISARMAMENT EXPERTS FROM EACH SIDE WOULD STUDY OPPOSITE ALLIANCES POSITIONS AND INAUGURATE BILATERAL AND CONSULTATIONS. SMITH (IDDZ) AND ERNST KRABATCZ (DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING IN GFR MFA) WERE GIVEN TASK OF COMING UP WITH LIST OF PROPOSALS FROM TWO ALLIANCES WHICH HAVE POTENTIAL FOR ACCEPTANCE BY BOTH SIDES. STUDY WILL COVER ALL NATO AND WPO PROPOSALS INCLUDING THOSE TO BAN WEAPONS IN SPACE AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

6. HONECKER WAS CLEARLY PLEASED WITH ABOVE AGREEMENT. HE TOLD PM THAT PRESS THAT COULD BE TOLD OF AGREEMENT AS WELL OF HIS SUPPORT FOR PMS PEACE INITIATIVE INCLUDING SPECIAL REF TO FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE. IN LATTER CONTEXT, GOVT CONTROLLED EAST GERMAN NEWS AGENCY ADN ANNOUNCED HONECKERS BACKING INITIATIVE DESCRIBING IT AS QUOTE USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO EASING WORLD TENSIONS UNQUOTE.

7. TOUGH UNIMAGINATIVE DINNER SPEECH BY CHAIRMAN WAS DISAPPOINTING AFTER RELATIVE OPENESS HE HAD DISPLAYED DURING DISCUSSIONS.

PARTICULAR SOUR NOTE WAS HONECKERS RED <sup>f?</sup> IN TOAST TO COMMENT CARRIED IN TORONTO STAR LAST MAY QUOTING CRITICAL REMARKS MADE BY PM ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN. PM RESPONDED WITH AD LIB REF TO RECENT POSITIVE STATEMENTS BY REAGAN. WE CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT WITH MEDIA PRESENT HE WOULD NOT/NOT RISK STRAYING FROM WPO NEGOTIATING POSITIONS.

NEVERTHELESS THIS DID NOT/NOT TAKE AWAY FROM OVERALL MOST POSITIVE ASPECTS OF WHAT MUST BE DESCRIBED AS VERY SUCCESSFUL VISIT.

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PAGE FOUR PMDL0033 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

PM RECEIVED ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR HIS PEACE INITIATIVE, PRECEDENT  
SETTING COOPERATION WAS ARRANGED FOR STUDY OF TWO ALLIANCES OF  
PEACE AND DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS AND CDA/GDR RELATIONS RECEIVED  
VALUABLE SHOT IN ARM.

CCC/181 021200Z PMDL0033

Mr. McNeil  
7.2.84

Mr. De. vitz

I suggest that you read pp. 10-13

- ① Hague Declaration - 10, 12
- ② Williamsburg - 11
- ③ 2-Track Decision - 12
- ④ Refereeing between the superpowers  
- 13-14
- ⑤ MBAR - 17
- ⑥ Stockholm (heads of govt to  
attend?) - 18
- ⑦ Reagan's anti-communism - 23-24

DM

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DOLNER**

Division Phoned M. Delrie  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time 1858

*Hold for Morning Run*

Mr. Mc Nee

*As agreed, you  
were going to review  
this for potentially  
controversial points*  
*hgd*

**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELBRLIN PMDL0032 02FEB84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 020900

INFO PRGUE WSHDC LDN BONN MOSCO ROME PARIS BNATO VMBFR

PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CLPP/DACPOL

BAG WSAW BPEST BGRAD HAGUE BRU OSLO ATHNS MDRID LSBON VIENN

GENEV DE PAR PRMNY DE OTT

DISTR DMF IFB IDA ZSI RBR RGB

---PM MTG WITH SZECHOSLOVAK PM STROUGAL 25JAN:COMPTE RENDU

PM STROUGAL; I AM HAPPY TO WELCOME YOU AND HAPPY THAT YOU ACCEPTED  
OUR INVITATION. I WELCOME YOU ON BELALF OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE  
GOVT. I AM HAPPY YOU ARE HERE IN THE PRESENT EMPHATIC SITUATION.  
IN MY VIEW THE CURRENT INNATL SITUATION IS THE MOST COMPLICATED  
SINCE THE END OF WW II. YOUR VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, IS AN HISTORIC  
ONE BECAUSE IT IS THE FIRST EVER BY A CDN PM TO THIS COUNTRY.  
IT IS THEREFORE MOST WELCOME. IT TAKES PLACE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK  
OF MUTUAL INTEREST IN DIALOGUE WHICH SHOULD LEAD A WAY OUT OF THE  
CURRENT CRISIS IN INNATL RELATIONS. WE ALL WANT TO PLAY AN ACTIVE  
PART IN TRYING TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT COMPLICATED PROBLEMS. WE  
ASSESS POSITIVELY THE BASIC FEATURES OF YOUR INITIATIVE, THE AIM  
OF WHICH IS TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES. AS  
SUCH YOUR INITIATIVE IS VERY VALUABLE AND MUCH NEEDED BY THE  
PRESENT WORLD. LET ME INTRODUCE THE MEMBERS OF MY DELEGATION:  
1. ING SVATOPLUK OTAK, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE  
STATE PLANNING COMMISSION

PAGE TWO PMDL0032 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

2.ING BOHUSLAV CHNOUPEK,MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

3.JUDR JAROMIR JOHANES,DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

4.ING FRANTISEK KOURIL,HEAD OF PRESS DEPT OF THE OFFICEOF THE  
GOVTS PRESIDUM

5.ING OTA SCHWARZENBERGER,HEAD OF DEPT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND  
PROTOCOL OF THE OFFICE OF GOVTS PRESIDUM

6.A HUBKA,HEAD OF THE OFFICE OF GOVTS PRESIDUM

7.ING RUDOLF JAKUBIK,HEAD OF DEPT SIX,MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.  
(CDN DEL NCLUDED:PM,FOWLER(PCO),JOHNSON AND COLEMAN(PMO),HANCOCK  
(RBD),SMITH(IDDZ),AMB PEEL AND THORPE OF EMB.)

PM TRUDEAU:I AM VERY GRATEFUL TO YOU PM AND TO YOUR GOVT FOR THE  
SYMPATHY YOU HAVE EXPRESSED IN YOUR WORDS NOW,AT THE AIRPORT,AND  
IN THE CAR ON THE WAY IN AS WELL AS HAVING ARRANGED THE VISIT AT  
SHORT NOTICE.ITIS CLEAR THAT YOU SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE  
CDN GOVT.IN FACT I MIGHT SAY THAT YOU ARE ALSO AN ACCOMPLICE OF  
MINE IN PURSUANCE OF THESE OBJECTIVES.YOU SEE AND UNDERSTAND IT  
WELL.THE REAL OBJECTIVE IS TO RE-ESTABLISH CONTACTS BETWEEN  
POLITICAL LEADERS,LEADERS WHO FOR PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAVE TENDED  
TO BEHAVE AS MEMBERS OF A BLOC(WPO AND NATO).WHAT WE ARE SHOWING  
TO OUR FELLOW ALLIES IN NATO AND IN THE WARSAW PACT IS THAT AS  
POLITICIANS WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO DIALOGUE.

CDA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE NOT/NOT GREAT POWERS.WE ARE MIDDLE  
POWERS.WE DONTWANT TO WAGE WAR AGAINST EACH OTHER.CDA HAS NO/NO

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PAGE THREE PMDL0032 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

INTENTION OF ATTACKING CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND WE BELIEVE CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS NO/NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING US. YET WE KNOW THAT IF WW III BEGINS BY ACCIDENT OR DESIGN, NOT/NOT ONLY WOULD BE FIGHTING EACH OTHER, BUT WE WOULD BE ALMOST TOTALLY DESTROYED. WE KNOW THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS ON THE FRONT LINE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, JUST AS CDA IS ON THE NORTH-SOUTH FRONTIERS BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS. YOU AND I THEREFORE HAVE A DUTY AS POLITICAL LEADERS TO DIMINISH THE TENSION WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THOUGH WE ARE EACH PART OF EAST AND WEST, WE ARE SHOWING TO THE WORLD BY OUR MTG HERE TODAY, THAT WE ARE NOT/NOT HOSTILE. THE SYMBOL OF OUR MTG TOGETHER IS FOR ME WORTH A GREAT DEAL. I AM CONVINCED THAT WE WILL ADD SUBSTANCE TO THAT SYMBOL IN OUR DISCUSSIONS. LET ME REPEAT MY APPRECIATION FOR RECEIVING ME ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE AND THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO/NO HOSTILITY BETWEEN US. THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA BEFORE. WE ARE THEREFORE BREAKING NEW GROUND AND HELPING TO REDUCE TENSION.

CDA LIKE CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS NOT/NOT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GENEV, BUT WE WOULD BOTH SUFFER IF GENEV FAILS. THEREFORE WE HAVE EVERY RESPONSIBILITY TO ATTEMPT TO REDUCE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO BLOCS, EAST AND WEST. FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS, IT SEEMED AS THOUGH VERY LITTLE PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN GENEV AND IN THE LAST MONTHS OF 1983, IT SEEMED INEVITABLE THAT THERE WOULD BE A CRISIS IN THE LAST MONTH OF 1983. WHETHER THE KOREAN AIRLINE INCIDENT, THE CARIBBEAN OR IN CENTRAL AMERICA, IT SEEMED OBVIOUS,

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PAGE FOUR PMDL2032 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

TO US AT LEAST, THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF EXCHANGE OF STRONG WORDS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA AND I COULDN'T VERNOT BELIEVE THAT WHEN TWO NATIONS TALKED TO EACH OTHER IN THAT WAY AND APPEARED TO HATE EACH OTHER THAT THEY COULD NEGOTIATE SUCCESSFULLY. SUSPICIONS WERE TOO HIGH TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS.

THEREFORE I THOUGHT THE FIRST TASK OF A MIDDLE POWER, LIKE CDA, WAS TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE TWO LEADERS OF THE SUPERPOWERS WOULD BE FORCED TO TALK TO EACH OTHER RATHER THAN SHOUT. IN SEP AND OCT, CDA PROPOSED THAT THERE BE CONTACTS BETWEEN NATO AND WFO AND SUGGESTED THAT THERE BE A MTG OF POLITICIANS IN VIENNA AND STKH. WE RIGHTLY FELT THAT AFTER THE END OF DEC BOTH SUPER POWERS WOULD BE LOCKED INTO POSITIONS UNDER WHICH A SUMMIT MTG WOULD NOT/NOT BE POSSIBLE. THAT IS WHY WE WORKED TOWARDS A MTG OF FOREIGN MINS AT STKH AND THE SOVIET AND USA FOREIGN MINS DID MEET THERE. IN ESSENCE OUR OBJECTIVE WAS TO CHANGE THE TREND LINE TOWARDS EVER INCREASING TENSION BY PUTTING AN END TO WHAT LORD CARRINGTON HAS TERMED QUOTE MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY UNQUOTE, AND BY INJECTING POLITICAL ENERGY INTO DEBATES WHICH IN VIENNA SEEMED BOGGED DOWN AFTER TEN YEARS OF MTGS.

IN THAT SENSE I BELIEVE WE ARE NOW AT THE POINT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS WHERE WE CAN SAY THAT THE TREND LINE IS NO/NO LONGER DOWNWARDS BUT HAS STABILIZED. WE MAY BE SUCCESSFUL IN CREATING  
...5



PAGE FIVE PMDL0032 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

A CLIMATE IN WHICH FURTHER EXCHANGES AND MTGS MAY BE POSSIBLE AND WHERE WORDS ARE LESS VIOLENT. BUT THE NEXT STEP IS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, GOING FROM WORDS INTO DEEDS, NOT/NOT TO TALK ABOUT AGREEMENT BUT TO TAKE ACTION TO REACH AGREEMENT. AS YOU KNOW I HAVE MADE SEVERAL PROPOSALS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, BUT BEFORE I GO INTO DETAIL ON THEM PERHAPS YOU WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON THE REMARKS I HAVE MADE ON OUR GENERAL POSITION.

*SPOULKIN* WHEN WE MET THE LAST TIME IN HSNKI, IT WAS AN UNFORGETTABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR ME AND MY DELEGATION. IT WAS A GOOD ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH NO/NO REALISTIC POLITICIAN WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE WAY OF DETENTE WOULD EVER BE ABANDONED. THIS CONTINUED FOR TWO OR THREE YEARS, BUT THEN IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1970S THE SITUATION CHANGED. IN VIENNA IN 1979, (CARTER-BREZHNEV MTG) IT WAS DECLARED THERE WAS AN APPROXIMATE BALANCE BETWEEN NATO AND WPO FORCES. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THINGS BEING SAID IN THE SPEECHES OF WESTERN POLITICIANS THAT THINGS WERE NOT/NOT GOOD. THE SHARP DETERIORATION IN NATL RELATIONS CONTINUED. IN DEC 1979, NATO MADE ITS DUAL TRACK DECISION WHICH RESULTED IN THE CREATION OF A NEW STRATEGIC SITUATION. BY THE BEGINNING OF THE 1980S THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR WAS THERE. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION TOOK AN INCREASINGLY IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO NATL RELATIONS AND THIS APPROACH WAS ECHOED BY OTHER WESTERN POLITICIANS AND CULMINATED IN 1983 WITH THE CALL FOR A CRUSADER WAR AGAINST

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PAGE SIX PMDL0032 CONF D CDN EYES ONLY

SOCIALIST STATES AND USA ADOPTION OF MEASURES FOR A NEW ARMS RACE. THE AMERICAN OBJECTIVE IS NOT/NOT BALANCING AS THEY CLAIM, BUT GAINING SUPERIORITY. THE SALT II TREATY HAS NOT/NOT BEEN RATIFIED. THE HELSINKI SPIRIT OF COOPERATION HAS BEEN REPLACED BY CONFRONTATION.

THE AMERICAN POLICY OF MILITARIZATION GIVES PRIORITY TO THE POLITICS OF FORCE AND MISSILES. DEPLOYMENTS INTENDED TO GIVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY TO NATO BOTH GLOBALLY AS WELL AS IN EUROPE. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS STARTED TAKING CONTER MEASURES. ALSO OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ARE STARTING TO INCREASE THEIR DEFENCE. THESE WERE MEASURES WE WERE COMPELLED TO DO. OUR OBJECTIVE IS, AS IT ALWAYS HAS BEEN, SAME AND EQUAL SECURITY. THESE COUNTERMEASURES ARE TACTICAL AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES NOT/NOT BEING TAKEN AT OUR INITIATIVE, BUT IN RESPONSE TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE AND PERSHING MISSILES ON OUR BORDER. WE DONT WANT TO BECOME WEAKER. WE HAVE OUR OWN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, OUR HISTORY HAS SHOWN US THAT WE ARE NOT/NOT A GREAT POWER, BUT RATHER JUST A SMALL COUNTRY IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITH HISTORIC EXPERIENCE. IN THE LAST 1000 YEARS WE WERE SELDOM SPARED FROM EUROPEAN WARS INCLUDING WW I AND WW II. WE WERE BETRAYED IN MUNICH. IN THE POST WAR PERIOD WE FEEL DISCRIMINATED AGAINST PARTICULARLY BY THE USA. THE HELSINKI ACT IS NOT/NOT OBSERVED BY AMERICAN POLICY AND STATEMENTS. VICE PRESIDENT BUSH IN VIENNA ...7

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DIRECTLY REFERRED TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS A DISOBEDIENT COUNTRY THAT SHOULD BE PUNISHED. BY THE END OF THE 1970S IN FACT WE HAD TO CONCLUDE THAT THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DETERIORATION IN THE INNATL SITUATION. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IS DANGEROUS NOT/NOT ONLY FOR WPO COUNTRIES BUT FOR NATO AS WELL. AS YOU NOTED, NEITHER OF US ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE GENEV NEGOTIATIONS. CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS HOWEVER FOLLOWING SITU ATTENTIVELY. SOVIET UNION, WITH CONSENT OF WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES LEFT GENEV BECAUSE IT COULDNT BE PRESENT THERE. THE SOVIET UNION SIMPLY COULD NOT/NOT BE PRESENT IN NEGOTIATIONS ON DISARMAMENT WHEN USA AND NATO STARTED TO DEPLOY MISSILES ON EUROPEAN TERRITORY. HENCE THERE WAS NO/NO DISARMAMENT THERE, BUT RATHER AN ARMS RACE. IT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO US WHY THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION COULD NOT/NOT REACT POSITIVELY TO SOME WPO PROPOSALS, IN PARTICULAR THAT LAST PROPOSAL ON INF MADE BY THE SOVIET UNION, TO DECREASE THE NUMBER OF SS20S IN EUROPE TO THE LEVEL OF FRENCH AND BRITISH MISSILES. INSTEAD ALL THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION SHOWED WAS A WILLINGNESS TO DEPLOY MORE MISSILES IN EUROPE. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ALSO INCLUDED A COMMITMENT NOT/NOT TO DEPLOY OTHER MISSILES IN THE USSR. THIS WAS A REALISTIC PROPOSAL, IMPLEMENTATION OF WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE DEPLOYMENT TRACK. PEOPLE COULD UNDERSTAND IT, ACCORDING TO CALCULATIONS BY EXPERTS. THE PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE MEANT A

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BALANCE IN EUROPE WHICH THE WPO WANTS. AMERICAN NUMBERS ON THE TABLE DO NOT/NOT MAKE SENSE TO US. THEREFORE IF TRENDS ARE TO BE CHANGED THE CARDS LIE IN THE HAND OF THE UNITED STATES. IF THE UNITED STATES SHOWS WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO THE POSITION PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT WE WILL DO THE SAME. IT IS NOT/NOT LOGICAL FOR EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION TO SEEK SUPERIORITY. THE SOVIET UNION LOST 20 MILLION PEOPLE IN WW II AND WAS DEVASTATED - CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS WELL IN BOTH HUMAN AND MATERIAL TERMS. WE CANNOT/NOT THEREFORE BE SUSPECTED OF WANTING TO START ANOTHER WAR. AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST BE CAUTIOUS AND ARE AFRAID OF LOSING OUR FREEDOM AND SOVEREIGNTY. LET US LOOK AT THE WPO PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT/NOT ACCEPT IN A POSITIVE WAY OUR PROPOSALS. HOW CAN THEY BE DEPRECIATED? FOR EXAMPLE, OUR PROPOSALS ON THE NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHY DOESN'T THE UNITED STATES ACCEPT IT? WE ALSO PROPOSED LAST JAN A TREATY ON MUTUAL RENOUNCIATION OF FORCE BETWEEN NATO AND THE WPO AND MAINTAINING PEACEFUL RELATIONS. WE HAVE ALSO MADE A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS FOR DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AND OUTER SPACE; NUCLEAR FREE ZONES AND A CHEMICAL WEAPON BAN IN EUROPE. WE WANT TO DISCUSS THESE SERIOUSLY. WE THEREFORE VERY MUCH WELCOME YOUR VISIT. WE WERE HAPPY TO SEE THE CALLING OF THE STOCKHOLM MTG; IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT SCHULTZ AND GROMYKO MEET. BUT MTGS OF OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE ALSO IMPORTANT, SUCH AS THE MTG BETWEEN FOREIGN MIN CHOUPEK AND MR MACEACHEN.

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SO WE ASSESS POSITIVELY THE STKHM CONFERENCE. IT SHOWED THAT THERE WAS A CHANCE FOR DIALOGUE EVEN THOUGH OUR APPROACHES ARE DIFFERENT. STKHM CANT REPLACE GENEV OF COURSE BUT IT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO DISCUSSION OF MILITARY POINTS. OUR PROPOSALS HAVE A MILITARY/ POLITICAL APPROACH-THOSE OF NATO ARE MILITARY/TECHNICAL. WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS NATO PROPOSALS BUT AT THE SAME TIME WANT OUR OWN TO BE DISCUSSED. NOT/NOT JUST MERE WORDS. WE SHOULD FIND CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON WHICH WE SHOULD AGREE, THEN DISCUSS CONTROL AND VERIFICATION, IF THERE ARE GUARANTEES THAT TREATIES WOULD BE ABIDED BY.

YOU WERE VERY RIGHT TO MENTION A CHANGE IN RHETORIC. BUT THAT IS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM. IT IS AN IMPORTANT BUT NOT/NOT ESSENTIAL FACTOR. THIS WAS EVIDENT IN THE SHULTZ AND GROMYKO SPEECHES. I HAVE READ IN THE WESTERN PRESS THAT GROMYKOS SPEECH WAS VERY HARSH, MAYBE IT WAS IN FORM BUT NOT/NOT IN CONTENT. BUT SCHULTZS WAS NOT/NOT LESS HARSH, AND HE EVEN EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE PEACEFUL ARRANGEMENTS IN EUROPE. THEREFORE THE KEY IS CONTENT; WHATS REALLY BEING PROPOSED, WHETHER THERES A POLICY OF REDUCTIONS OF ARMAMENTS, OR SHALL WE CONTINUE THE SPIRAL OF THE ARMS RACE. FOREIGN MINS HAVE NOT/NOT SAID THE LEAST THING ABOUT THIS; THATS THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED. THOSE ARE OUR VIEWS OF THE INNATL SITUATION. IT OFFERS A NUMBER OF WAYS OUT. PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU: I UNDERSTAND YOUR FRUSTRATIONS WITH THE

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# PRAGUE DECLARATION

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WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE PRGUE DECLARATION. I UNDERSTAND THIS WELL. AS YOU POINTED OUT, YOUR COUNTRY WAS VERY SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGED BY REPEATED WARS. OBVIOUSLY YOU PREFER PEACE AND DIALOGUE TO WAR AND AGGRESSION. I THINK CDA WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS MUCH ON THE PRGUE DECLARATION WHICH IS TO BE COMMENDED. IT MAKES MANY POSITIVE PROPOSALS, SUCH AS STAYING AT THE TABLE IN GENEV AND NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY. SOME LIKE THOSE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND CHEMICAL WARFARE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING FURTHER DISCUSSED AND ADVANCED.

AT THE SAME TIME, I UNDERSTAND WHY A LACK OF RESPONSE FOLLOWED THE PRGUE DECLARATION. IT PROVES MY POINT. THE PRGUE DECLARATION CAME AT A TIME AND IN AN ATMOSPHERE WHEN NATO WAS NOT/NOT PREPARED TO LOOK AT IT SERIOUSLY AND ANSWER THE POSITIVE THINGS IN THE PRGUE DECLARATION. I WONDER IF YOU IN PRGUE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THE DECLARATION INCLUDED AGGRESSIVE LANGUAGE WHICH LED NATO NOT/NOT TO LOOK SERIOUSLY AT THE PROPOSALS. IF THE PRGUE DECLARATION HAD BEEN MADE IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF DETENTE, LIKE IN 1975, YOU WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE FELT COMPELLED TO REACT TO IT IN A NEGATIVE FASHION. THIS PROVES MY POINT. IF WE WANT TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND MAKE PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL, WE FIRST HAVE TO MAKE CLEAR PROPOSALS ARE MADE IN A CLIMATE OF GOODWILL RATHER THAN POLITICAL AGGRESSION. I HOPE FOR INSTANCE, YOUR PROPOSALS AND OURS IN STKHM WILL BE EXAMINED IN LESS PASSION AND WITH GREATER OBJECTIVITY THAN A YEAR ...11

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AGO. IN THE SAME WAY I BELIEVE THAT WHEN THE VIENN TALKS RESUME  
ON 16MAR, AS GROMYKO PROPOSED, THEY MAY BE MORE PRODUCTIVE NOW  
THAN IN THE PAST FEW YEARS WHEN THERE WAS VERY LITTLE PROGRESS.  
WE ARE BOTH POLITICIANS, PRIME MINISTER, AND HAVE TO ADMIT THAT  
THE POLITICAL PROCESS CAN EITHER FACILITATE DETENTE OR CAN MAKE IT  
*Williamsburg* MORE DIFFICULT. IT IS NOT/NOT A SECRET THAT AT WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT  
IN JUN AND IN PARTICULAR IN THE DECLARATION ON EAST-WEST RELNS IT  
WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO GET SEVERAL OF MY COLLEAGUES TO PUT  
IN SOME WORDS WHICH SAID WE WERE LOOKING FOR PEACE, AND NOT/NOT  
ONLY DEPLOYMENT OF INF. SO IF I CAN BE SUSPECTED BY MY FELLOW  
ALLIES AS BEING TOO DOVISH ON SUBJ OF PEACE, YOU SHOULD UNDERSTAND  
THEREFORE THAT THE PRGUE DECLARATION WOULDNT BE RECEIVED WITH  
OPEN ARMS BY SOME PEOPLE WHO DID NOT/NOT WANT TO TALK ABOUT  
PEACE IN THE WILLIAMSBURG DECLARATION.

I REPEAT THE POLITICAL CLIMATE HAS CHANGED. PERHAPS IT GOT WORSE  
FOR A TIME AFTER WILLIAMSBURG, BUT FOR MY PART I FEEL ITS CHANGING.  
NOW EVEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PM THATCHER ARE USING THE LANGUAGE  
OF PEACE FOR WHICH THEY ACCUSED ME OF BEING WEAK 9 MONTHS AGO.  
YOU MUST ALSO BE AWARE THAT THE NATO COMMUNIQUE IN DEC MADE IT  
CLEAR THAT NATO RESPECTED THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF  
THE WPO COUNTRIES AND THAT THE NATO COUNTRIS WERE NOT/NOT LOOKING  
FOR SUPERIORITY BUT MERELY EQUILIBRIUM; AND THAT WE MUST STRIVE  
FOR GENUINE DETENTE.

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THE WORD DETENTE, AT LEAST IN NATO, HAD BECOME A DIRTY WORD FOR SOME YEARS, BUT NOW WE ARE STARTING TO USE IT AGAIN. I AGREE THESE ARE ONLY CHANGES IN WORDS AND I CAN UNDERSTAND YOUR SUSPICION OF WORDS AND WHY YOU QUESTION WHETHER THEY CORRESPOND TO GENUINE FEELINGS AND WHETHER THEY WILL BE FOLLOWED BY GENUINE ACTION. BUT YOU AND I ARE NOT/NOT LEADERS OF SUPER POWERS. I THINK WE MUST DO WHAT WE CAN TO RE-ESTABLISH CONTACTS SO AS TO ENSURE THAT PROPOSALS SUCH AS THOSE IN THE PRGUE DECLARATION WILL BE LOOKED AT OBJECTIVELY BY NATO COUNTRIES AND WILL BE EXAMINED ON THEIR MERIT IN A CLIMATE OF CALM AND DETENTE RATHER THAN LOOKED AT SUSPICIOUSLY.

YOU REFERRED TO THE 1979 DUAL TRACK DECISION. I DONT WANT TO DISPUTE THE HISTORY OF THAT PERIOD AS YOU SEE IT. I THINK YOU, LIKE I, ARE MORE INTERESTED IN PROGRFSS IN THE FUTURE RATHER THAN LAMENTING THE PAST. I WOULD LIKE TO SAY FOLLOWING ABOUT TWO TRACK DECISION. I AM NOT/NOT A MILITARY EXPERT, BUT I DONT UNDERSTAND THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF EUROMISSILES WOULD BE USEFUL TO THE UNITED STATES IN ANY MILITARY SENSE. THE UNITED STATES HAS ENOUGH WEAPONRY TO HAVE DETERRENT POWER. IF A WAR STARTED THE UNITED STATES CAN INCLICT UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE ON THE SOVIET UNION. IT DOES NOT/NOT REALLY NEED IN A MILITARY SENSE THE CRUISE OR PERSHING II. SO IF THE USA DOESNT NEED THEM MILITARILY, WHY ARE THEY BEING DEPLOYED? THE ANSWER IS FOR POLITICAL REASONS. THE SAME IS TRUE FOR

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2-TRACK DECISION



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SS-20S FOR MILITARY REASONS BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION HAS ENOUGH INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES TO INFLICT UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE ON THE USA. THEREFORE IF THE USSR DOESNT NEED THE SS20S TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST USA IN A MILITARY SENSE IT HAD TO BE FOR POLITICAL REASONS. I AM NOT/NOT SAYING THAT THE MILITARY IN BOTH CAMPS DONT WANT MORE NUMBERS AND MORE ADVANCED WEAPONS, THEY OBVIOUSLY DO; BUT THEY CANT MAKE A CONVINCING CASE TO POLITICIANS TO HAVE THOSE WEAPONS. SO I RETURN TO MY EARLIER POINT, WE CANT BLAME THE GENERALS OR MARSHALS FOR MAKING THE WORLD MORE DANGEROUS PLACE FOR NUCLEAR DANGER. THEY MAY ALWAYS TRY TO CONVINCE THE POLITICIANS THEY NEED MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT ITS THE POLITICIANS WHO MAKE THE DECISIONS. WE ARE LIVING IN A PERIOD WHEN POLITICIANS ARE HAVING TO LIVE WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF EARLIER DECISIONS. IN 1979, WE SAID YOU MUST WITHDRAW THE SS20S OR WE WILL PROCEED WITH INF. MORE RECENTLY SOVIET POLITICIANS HAVE SAID YOU MUST WITHDRAW THE CRUISE AND PERSHING OR WE WILL WITHDRAW FROM GENEV. IN DEC 1983, NATO HAD TO PROVE THEY WERE UNITED AND STRONG AND NOT/NOT DIVIDED BY DEPLOYING THE MISSILES. THUS THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO LEAVE THE NEGOTIATING TABLE EVEN THOUGH THEY SAID THEMSELVES THEY WERE MAKING PROGRESS. WE KNOW THAT SOME DAY THE TWO SUPER POWERS WILL HAVE TO START TALKING AGAIN. SO YOU AND I MUST PREPARE A SAFETY NET SO THAT THE CLASHING WILLS OF POLITICIANS DONT LEAD THE WORLD TO CHAOS AND NUCLEAR WAR. WE MUST ACT LIKE REFEREES AT A

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HOCKEY MATCH WHEN PLAYERS GET CARRIED AWAY AND START FIGHTING. WE  
MUST TELL THE PLAYERS TO COOL DOWN AND PLAY IN A MORE CIVILIZED WAY.

PM STROUGAL: I AM CONVINCED BY YOUR SINCERITY AND YOUR BELIEF IN  
WHAT YOU SAY. YOUR CAREER HAS THROUGHOUT BEEN CONNECTED WITH THE  
CAUSE OF PEACE. YOU NEVER CALLED FOR A CRUSADE AGAINST SOCIALISM  
IN THE COMING GENERATION. YOU NEVER MILITARIZED FOREIGN POLICY.  
YOU ALWAYS STOOD FOR DETENTE. YOUR WORDS IN FACT ARE VERY CONVINCING,  
BUT YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT WE CZECHOSLOVAKS LIVE IN EUROPE.  
572 INTERMEDIATE MISSILES ARE TO BE DEPLOYED HERE. LET US SHOW  
WILLINGNESS TO GO BACK TO THE POSITION WE WERE IN BEFORE THE  
DEPLOYMENT BEGAN. 32 MISSILES HAVE ALREADY BEEN DEPLOYED—THIS IS  
THE KEY. THERE WAS NO/NO MILITARY NEED TO DEPLOY THEM. INDEED I HAVE  
BEEN VERY INTERESTED IN FOLLOWING THE PUBLIC REACTION IN THE WEST  
TO THE AMERICAN FILM QUOTE THE DAY AFTER UNQUOTE. MR MCNAMARA HAS  
SAID ALMOST THE SAME AS YOU. I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT THERE MAY HAVE  
BEEN A POLITICAL NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE POLITICAL THRUST OF NATO,  
BUT I DON'T UNDERSTAND THE MILITARY ISSUE.

572 INTERMEDIATE MISSILES WILL DEFINITELY CREATE A NEW SITUATION IN  
EUROPE. THEY TAKE ONLY A FEW MINUTES TO FLY FROM WEST GERMANY TO  
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR US TO TAKE COUNTER-  
MEASURES. THE DEPLOYMENT WILL ALTER THE GLOBAL BALANCE, AND THE  
TERRITORIAL BALANCE AS WELL. LET US DISCUSS THIS. I CANNOT/NOT ACCEPT  
GENSCHERS VIEW THAT NOTHING HAS HAPPENED—MUCH HAS CHANGED. WE ARE  
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ASKED TO ACCEPT A PERMANENT UPWARD SPIRAL AND THE DANGER OF WAR WILL INCREASE.WE THEREFORE HAVE MADE PROPOSALS.PREVENTING ACCIDENTAL WAR IS IMPORTANT.THEREFORE TRANSPARENCY,VERIFICATION AND CONTROL ARE NECESSARY,BUT SUBSTANCE IS MORE IMPORTANT.THE ARMS RACE IS INCREASING.WE NEVER THOUGHT WE WOULD HAVE TO SPEND SO MUCH OF OUR BUDGET ON ARMAMENTS AND THESE FUNDS COULD OBVIOUSLY BE USED ELSEWHERE,INCLUDING THE THIRD WORLD.DIALOGUE MUST THEREFORE BE STARTED ON THE ESSENTIAL MATTERS.THE VIENNA TALKS WILL RESUME ON 16MAR.AT THE SAME TIME,I HAVE READ IN THE WESTERN PRESS THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS INSTRUCTED HIS DELEGATION TO CONTINUE TO PROCEED ACCORDING TO OLD INSTRUCTIONS,AND NOT/NOT TO CHANGE TACTICS.APPARENTLY,NEW PROPOSALS ARE NOT/NOT BEING CONSIDERED. WE HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF SUBMITTING INCORRECT DATA TO THE VIENN TALKS.

PM STROUGAL:WE HAVE SAID THE TRUTH.WE CANT HIDE IT OR LIE BECAUSE THIS IS A DENSELY POPULATED COUNTRY AND EVERYONE KNOWS WHERE AND HOW MANY TROOPS WE HAVE,WHERE THEY ARE STATIONED AND WHEN THEY ARE TRANSFERRED.THERE ARE NO/NO NO-MANS LAND HERE.THEY CAN BE SEEN BY THE WHOLE POPULATION.OUR FIGURES ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.STILL WE ARE ACCUSED OF LYING.THEREFORE WHAT CAN I EXPECT IN VIENN?WE CAN CONTINUE AS WE HAVE UP TO NOW WHICH HAS PRODUCED NO/NO RESULTS FOR 10 YEARS.OUR REALISTIC PROPOSALS ARE NOT/NOT BEING DISCUSSED BECAUSE THE TRUTH ON THE INFORMATION WF HAVE SUBMITTED IS DOUBTED.

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IN THE FACE OF THIS SHOULD WE REALLY BELIEVE THERE HAS BEEN A  
CHANGE IN THE TREND?

YES, WE ARE FOR DIALOGUE, BUT THE KEY IS WHAT WILL THE SUBSTANCE OF  
DIALOGUE BE? WILL IT BEAR ON ESSENTIAL POINTS? WERE NOT/TALKING  
ABOUT SOVERIGNTY OR FREEDOM, BUT THE SURVIVAL OF THE HUMAN RACE.  
THAT'S THE REALITY OF TODAY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I SAW THE DAY AFTER.  
THIS MOVIE ENDED ON VERY IDEALISTIC GROUNDS. IT WAS NOT/NOT  
REALISTIC ENOUGH. IT WOULD BE MUCH WORSE, THE FATE OF CIVILIZATION IS  
AT STAKE. THERE CAN BE NO/NO LOCAL NUCLEAR WAR. IF NUCLEAR WAR  
BROKE OUT IN EUROPE, IT WOULD AFFECT EVERYONE, AND LIFE ON THE  
PLANET WOULD END. THIS MUST BE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DIALOGUE. WE MUST  
REDUCE ARMAMENTS AND LIMIT THE ARMING PROCESS AND NOT/NOT CONTINUE  
TO PURSUE THE SHARP UPWARD SPIRAL WHICH WLD BE VERY DANGEROUS.

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS RELEASED A DOCU YESTERDAY CHARGING THE  
SOVIET UNION WITH VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS. IS IT REALLY TRUE  
THEREFORE THAT THE TREND TOWARDS WORSENING RELATIONS HAS BEEN  
CHANGED? HOW ARE WE TO UNDERSTAND SUCH A DOCU WHICH IS AN OFFICIAL  
DOCU OF THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE USA GOVT? LIES BECOME FACT. IT SAID  
THE SOVIET UNION VIOLATED SALT I. PRESIDENT REAGAN EVEN HAD THE  
COURAGE TO REFER TO SALT II WHICH HE DID NOT/NOT RATIFY. I AGREE  
WE SHOULD MOVE AWAY FROM SUSPICION, BUT I AM UNFORTUNATELY WORRIED  
BY FACTS. I AGREE THAT THERE ARE SOME POSITIVE FACTORS, AS YOU  
MENTIONED, BUT WE ARE STILL FAR AWAY FROM DIALOGUE. IF I AM

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MISTAKEN, I WOULD BE PLEASED. THERE ARE BILATERAL EFFORTS TO GET TO SENSE OF MATTER. I AM AWARE OF MY OWN POSSIBILITIES.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU: ON MBFR I SHOULD SAY THAT YOUR ASSESSMENT IS CORRECT. THE WPO HAS MADE SOME PROPOSALS, AS COUNTERS TO THOSE OF NATO, AND I CONSIDER YOUR PROPOSALS A GOOD BASIS FOR RENEWED DISCUSSIONS. I AM NOT/NOT JUST SAYING THIS TO YOU PERSONALLY. THERE WAS A DECISION TAKEN IN BRU IN DEC THAT NATO FOREIGN MINS WOULD RE-EXAMINE THEIR POSITION AT VIENN AND TAKE A PERSONAL INTEREST IN ADVANCING THE TALKS. I AM NOW/NOT EMPOWERED TO SPEAK FOR NATO, BUT CAN TELL YOU SEVERAL IMPORTANT MEMBERS OF NATO, INCLUDING CDA, BELIEVE THE WPO PROPOSALS ON JUN83 ARE INTERESTING, THAT IS THAT, WE SHOULD FORGET ABOUT ESTABLISHING THE EXACT NUMBER OF TROOPS KNOWN AND WORK TOWARDS A REDUCTION ON BOTH SIDES TO 900,000 TROOPS FORGETTING WHERE EACH OF US STARTED FROM, BUT INSISTING ON VERIFICATION TO INSURE EACH OF US REACHES 900,000.

IT IS PROBABLY TRUE TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS MORE CAUTIOUS THAN OTHERS, BUT I CAN TELL YOU MANY NATO COUNTRIES BELIEVE IT IS THEIR DUTY TO RESPOND TO WPO PROPOSALS. THIS IS BECAUSE MANY BELIEVE LIKE YOU IT IS IMPORTANT TO RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. I PERSONALLY BELIEVE, AND SO DO OTHERS OF MY COLLEAGUES, THAT IF BOTH SIDES ARE CONVINCED THERE IS EQUALITY OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, I HOPE NATO COUNTRIES COULD ESPOUSE NON-FIRST USE DOCTRINE YOU PROPOSED IN PRGUE DECLARATION. I CAN'T PREDICT THE CHANCES OF  
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SUCCESS, BUT WE ARE WORKING TOWARDS THAT. I HAVE STATED THIS PUBLICLY AND OTHER NATO LEADERS HAVE SAID THE SAME. HOPEFULLY WHEN WE MEET AGAIN IN VIENN IN MAR, YOU CAN SEE IF THE DIALOGUE IS REAL OR JUST A MATTER OF WORDS. THIS IS THE WAY WE HAVE TO MAKE PROGRESS.

IN STKHM, IT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO ME AS A POLITICIAN, TO HEAR THAT IT WILL TAKE SIX YEARS TO AGREE ON CBMS. AS YOU SAY, WE'VE BEEN IN VIFNN FOR TEN YEARS. IT IS UP TO US AS POLITICIANS TO MAKE SURE STKHM ISNT AS SLOW AS VIENN. THE QUESTION IS HOW DO WE PREVENT IT FROM BEING SO. AS PMS IN OFFICE FOR 12 AND 16 YEARS, WE CANT BE ACCUSED OF BEING IN A HURRY. BUT THOSE IN OUR COUNTRIES ARE. THIS WAS THE IDEA BEHIND OUR PROPOSAL TO HAVE NATO SEND OUR FOREIGN MINS TO STKHM RATHER THAN LEAVE IT TO THE MILITARY ACCOUNTANTS. IF IN THREE OR SIX MONTHS YOU OR I FIND OUT THEYRE WASTING TIME, PHONE ME, OR ILL CALL YOU AND WELL GO THERE AND MAKE SURE THEY WORK FASTER. MAYBE WE SHOULD REQUEST THAT NATO, WPO AND N/NA SHD ENVISAGE SENDING LEADERS TO STKHM TO INJECT POLITICAL WILL. IN THE AME WAY MY FOREIGN MINISTER AND I HAVE ASKED NATO TO CONSIDER SENDING FOREIGN MINS TO VIENN TO INJECT POLITICAL ENERGY INTO THOSE TALKS.

AS A POLITICIAN I HAVENT THE ANSWERS TO ALL THESE QUESTIONS, BUT I DO KNOW THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF POLITICAL ENERGY AND STATECRAFT WE HAVE SEEN THE SUPORPOWERS INCREASE THEIR ARMS WAY BEYOND LEVELS NEEDED TO DESTROY EACH OTHER. THATS WHY IVE GONE TO FOUR OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS IN THE PAST THREE MONTHS TO TRY TO CONVINCE ...19

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THEM THAT THEY HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO LIVE UP TO IN THE SPIRIT OF THE NPT THEY SIGNED IN 1971(SIC).IT OBLIGES THEM TO REDUCE THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS,BUT NEITHER USSR,CHINA,BRIT,USA OR FRANCE ARE LIVING UP TO THEIR OBLIGATIONS.THEY ARE ALSO THE FIVE PERMANENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE CHARTER GIVES THEM RIGHTS TO PREVENT ACTION THROUGH THE VETO;IT ALSO CONFERS ON THEM AN OBLIGATION TO SEEK PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.SO HERE IS A PROSPECT OF ACTION.IT DOES NOT/NOT GUARANTEE LASTING PEACE WILL FOLLOW,BUT OUR PEOPLE ARE CRYING FOR PEACE.WE MUST ANSWER THEIR CALL.WHAT WE SHOULD DO IS RENEW THE DIALOGUE AND MAKE PROGRESS.NOBODY CAN PROMISE MIRACLES BUT WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO DO OUR UTMOST.

PM STROUGAL:YOU HAVE ALREADY TOUCHED THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM IN YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE.I AGREE WE SHOULD DEVELOP OUR EFFORTS IN VIENN AND STKHM.WE ARE BOTH IN THE SAME BOAT;OUR IDEAS ARE IDENTICAL.WE DONT WANT THE STKHM MTGS TO BE DRAWN OUT.ITS JUST STARTING OF COURSE,AND WE CANNOT/NOT YET ASSESS THE REAL CHANCES OF SUCCESS. ALL THE PROPOSALS HAVE NOT/NOT YET BEEN TABLED,AND IT WILL TAKE TIME FOR SOME TO TAKE SHAPE.BUT IN VIENN AND STKHM PROGRESS SHOULD BE ATTAINED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT VIENN OPENS UP FAVOURABLE EXPECTATIONS.ON STKHM,WE MUST WAIT AND SEE.MUCH WILL DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEXT MONTH,NOT/NOT JUST IN STKHM BUT ALSO IN THE GLOBAL CLIMATE.

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YOUR PROPOSAL ON THE CONFERENCE OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD BE WELCOMED, BUT IT HAS NO/NO GUARANTEE OF IMPLEMENTATION. IT IS NOT/NOT A NEW PROPOSAL BUT IT IS TO BE WELCOMED. TWO OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ARE MOST IMPORTANT AND HAVE THE LEADING ROLE TO PLAY. WE ARE INTERESTED IN YOUR PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCING THE NPT IN ADVANCE OF THE CONFERENCE ON REVIEW OF THE NPT. I KNOW THE NPT HAS RISKS AND WEAK POINTS REGARDING PROLIFERATION AND NON-SIGNATORIES - THAT THERE ARE DEFICIENCIES IN THE SYSTEM. THE TECHNOLOGY OF PRODUCTION IS NO/NO SECRET. SOME COUNTRIES WHO ARE NOT/NOT YET PRODUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS CLEARLY COULD.

REAL PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON ONE OF YOUR PROPOSALS, THAT IS A BAN OF WEAPONS IN OUTERSPACE. WE SUPPORT IT GLOBALLY, HOWEVER, NOT/NOT JUST WEAPONS AT HIGH ALTITUDE BUT IN SPACE AS WELL. WE MUST, HOWEVER, NEGOTIATE RAPIDLY AS WE HAVE READ IN THE PRESS THAT SUCH SYSTEMS ARE BEING DEVELOPED AND EVEN TESTED. IT IS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER, ONE WHICH WILL ALSO AFFECT THE MILITARY BALANCE AND HAVE A DECISIVE INFLUENCE.

YOUR PROPOSALS ARE SINCERE, USEFUL AND DESERVING TO BE IMPLEMENTED ON BASIS OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND SUPPORT. UNDOUBTEDLY IN TIME YOUR PROPOSALS WILL TAKE GREATER SHAPE AND BECOME MORE CONCRETE. YOUR WORK IS USEFUL AND LAUDABLE AND YOUR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IS HIGHLY APPRECIATED.

PERMIT TO TURN TO BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE HAVE HAD A POSITIVE MTG

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OF OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN STKHM AND I HOPE YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER  
WILL COME TO PRGUE FOR MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS.

OF BILATERAL AND INNATL ISSUES.FRANKY IN ALL ASPECTS OF OUR  
BILATERAL RELATIONS WE SHOULD BE DOING MUCH MORE.YOU HAVE A  
VERY ABLE AMBASSADOR HERE.HE IS VERY ACTIVE,RESPECTED AND  
APPRECIATED.IN CDA WE HAVE A VERY STRONG COMMERCIAL PROGRAM.  
I MET MR WHELAN A FEW MONTHS AGO AND WE AGREED MUCH COULD BE  
DONE.THUS FAR NOT/NOT MUCH AS BEEN IMPLEMENTED.I RECALL THAT  
WHEN I WAS MIN OF AGRICULTURE THERE WERE HUNDREDS OF CZECHOSLOVAK  
EXPERTS STUDYING IN CDA AND SINCE THEY HAVE DONE MUCH FOR  
CZECHOSLOVAK AGRICULTURE.NOW THERE ARE NO/NO CZECHOSLOVAKS  
STUDYING IN CDA.WHOSE FAULT IS IT?WE HIGHLY APPRECIATED THE  
PULP MILL BUILT IN RUZOMBEROK AND ARE SATISFIED WITH ITS  
PERFORMANCE:FAVOURABLE CREDITS WERE GRANTED TO BUILD IT AND  
WE EXPECTED THERE WOULD BE A FURTHER REVIVAL OF MUTUAL TRADE  
BUT IT IS STAGNATING.WE SHOULD MAKE ANOTHER STEP FORWARD,  
INCLUDING CO-OPERATION IN THIRD MARKETS WHERE THE OPPORTUNITIES  
ARE OBVIOUS.MUCH COULD ALSO BE DONE IN CULTURAL COOPERATION.  
THERE HAVE BEEN SOMEACHIEVEMENTS,IN PARTICULAR CZECHOSLOVAK  
MUSIC GROUPS HAVE GONE TO CDA AND WE PURCHASE SOME CDN MOVIES.  
HOWEVER RELATIONS COULD BE MUCH MORE ALIVE.THE POLITICAL  
THRUST OF YOUR VISIT AND THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE BILATERAL MTG  
WILL PERMIT PROGRESS AND GIVE A CERTAIN DYNAMISM IN MUTUAL  
...22

PAGE TWENTY TWO PMDL0032 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

RELATIONS.CDA IS A COUNTRY WITH GREAT AUTHORITY AND RESPECT  
HERE.WE ARE NOT/NOT INDEBTED TO CDA AND WE CAN BE RELIABLE  
AND GOOD PARTNERS.WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DEVELOP RELATIONS.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU;YOU ARE CORRECT;THE TWO QUESTIONS ARE  
LINKED.IF WE WANT A BETTER MULTILATERAL CLIMATE WE SHD DO MORE  
BILATERALLY.WE HAVE TO END ISOLATION FROM ONE ANOTHER.IN CDA WE  
HAVE LARGE AND WEALTHY MARKETS CLOSE TO OUR BORDERS.SOMETIMES WE  
HAVE BEEN LAZY IN LOOKING TO ASIA AND ELSEWHERE.WAY TO REMEDY  
THIS LAZINESS IS TO ENCOURAGE BUSINESSMEN TO VISIT CZECHOSLOVAKIA  
AND CONVERSELY CZECHOS TO VISIT CDA SO THEY CAN SEARCH OUT  
OPPORTUNITIES.IM SO HAPPY YOU RAISED BILATERAL RELATIONS.THEY  
SHOULD BE FURTHER DEVELOPED.I HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE IN YOU TO  
WORK IN THAT DIRECTION.

LIKE IN VIENN,NOT/NOT JUST AMBASSADORS SHOULD MEET;POLITICAL  
LEADERS NEED TO BE ENCOURAGED TO MEET IN ORDER TO ENHANCE BOTH  
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RELATIONS.IT SEEMSTO BE THAT AFTER  
PERIOD OF RELATIVE ISOLATION,MORE AND MORE COUNTRIES ARE STARTING  
VISITS SUCH AS THATCHER TO HUNGARY AND CRAXI TO EASTERN EUROPE AS  
WELL.THIS EMPHASIZES IMPORTANCE OF DIALOGUE.KOHL AND SCHMIDT  
ALWAYS ENCOURAGED ENHANCED EAST-WEST COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.SO  
MAYBE WERE SLOWLY PROGRESSING IN WEST TO EAST CONTACT AND  
HOPEFULLY IN EAST TO WEST IN ORDER TO HELP REBUILD DETENTE.

ON THE NPT I SHARE THE SAME CONCERNS AS YOU AND WILL USE ALL

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PAGE TWENTY THREE PMDL0032 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

INSTRUMENTS TO ENSURE THE REVIEW IN 1985 IS SUCCESSFUL. BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT ONLY WAY TO REDUCE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION IS FOR THE NUCLEAR POWERS TO REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS AS WELL. I RECENTLY SPENT 10 DAYS WITH COMWEL LEADERS IN DELHI. THEY SAID GO TALK TO THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS FIRST AND TELL THEM TO LIVE UP TO THEIR OBLIGATIONS, THEN, IF THEY DO, WE MAYBE WILL TAKE OUR OBLIGATIONS SERIOUSLY.

YOU ALSO REFERRED TO VARIOUS OF MY SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS IN OUTERSPACE AND THE IMPORTANCE TO PREVENT ITS USE IN HIGH ALTITUDE AND EVENTUALLY IN LOWER ALTITUDES. CDA WILL TABLE IN FEB AN ELABORATION OF OUR PROPOSALS. I HOPE YOU WILL STUDY THEM WITH YOUR USUAL INTEREST. THIS IS AN AREA WHERE YOUR CONCERNS AND OURS ARE EXACTLY THE SAME; WE MUST BE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH WEAPONS.

*On Reagan*  
LET ME OFFER A FEW COMMENTS ON THE UNITED STATES. I DONT THINK I WOULD BE REVEALING ANY GREAT SECRETS IF I TOLD YOU THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HATES COMMUNISTS, BUT MORE FOR POLITICAL REASONS THAN FOR LOGICAL REASONS. HE IS A VERY ABLE POLITICIAN AND THEREFORE CAN SENSE AND RESPOND TO THE FEELINGS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. HE AND I KNOW THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DONT WANT WAR. THE AMERICANS HAVENT SEEN DESTRUCTION AT HOME SUCH AS OCCURED IN EUROPE IN WW II, BUT THEY KNOW THAT THEY WOULD BE DESTROYED AS A CIVILIZATION IN A

...24

PAGE TWENTY FOUR PMDL0032 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

THIRD WAR. REAGAN KNOWS USA PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT. THAT WHY MCNAMARA HAS WRITTEN AN ARTICLE IN FOREIGN POLICY THAT HE DIDNT THINK ANY PRESIDENT WOULD BE FIRST TO FIRE A NUCLEAR WEAPON IN EUROPE AND USA. WHEN YOU HEAR STRONG ANTI-COMMUNIST LANGUAGE, YOU SHOULD NOT/NOT CONCLUDE THAT THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT WANTS TO START A WAR AGAINST YOU, BUT RATHER THAT HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT DEFENDING USA AGAINST WAR STARTED BY OTHERSIDE EITHER BY DESIGN OR ACCIDENT.

MANY CDNS AND AMERICANS DONT SHARE PRESIDENT REAGANS OBSESSION WITH COMMUNISM, BUT I KNOW HIM WELL ENOUGH TO SAY THAT IN HIS HEART HE DOESNT WANT WAR NOR WOULD HE START WAR.

SIMILARLY ON OUTERSPACE WEAPONS, YOU AND I KNOW THAT THEY CAN BE VERY DESTABILIZING; I DONT THINK PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS THOUGHT THAT THROUGH YET. HE SINCERELY BELIEVES ITS A WAY TO PREVENT WAR. WHEN I READ EXCERPTS FROM PRAVDA OR READ THAT GROMYKO HAS BEEN SAYING, I REGRET THE VIOLENT TONE BUT DONT CONCLUDE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL START WAR. I AM JUST SUGGESTING THAT YOU SHOULD THINK THE SAME WAY WHEN YOU HEAR TOUGH WORDS FROM REAGAN AND OTHER NATO LEADERS. WERE POLITICIANS WITHOUT PASSION BUT OTHER LIKE TO SPEAK LOUD AND EXPRESS THEIR PASSION. I HOPE IM STILL INVITED TO DINNER TONIGHT EVEN THOUGH IVE SAID SOME NICE THINGS ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN.

PRIME MINISTER STROUGAL: (LAUGHING) I APPRECIATE YOUR FRANK AND OPEN DIALOGUE AND THE CONVINCING WORDS YOU HAVE CONCLUDED WITH.

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PAGE TWENTY FIVE PMDL0032 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

I LISTENED TO THOSE REMARKS WITH INTEREST. I KNOW YOU ARE SINCERE AND SPEAK FRANKLY AND OPENLY. WE HAVE NOTED THIS VERY POSITIVELY. I APPRECIATE YOUR OPEN DIALOGUE. I AM MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN AT THE BEGINNING OF OUR MTG. I BELIEVE THINGS CAN MOVE FORWARD. BUT ITS NOT/NOT ENOUGH TO BELIEVE IT. WE MUST DO SOMETHING. YOUR APPROACH IS CORRECT. WE SHOULDN'T JUST WATCH WHAT IS HAPPENING IN VIENNA AND STOKHOLM, BUT AS WITH A SICK CHILD WE SHOULD HELP HIM GET BETTER AND READY FOR LIFE. ITS UP TO THE POLITICIANS. I WANTED TO BE A DOCTOR AND SOMETIMES I WISH I HAD BEEN ONE. I'VE BEEN IN OFFICE 14 YEARS TODAY AND IN GOVT 25 YEARS. THEREFORE, I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTAKES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS. I THINK WE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT AND HAVE THE DUTY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS. CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS A VERY SMALL COUNTRY IN THE HEART OF EUROPE. HISTORY HAS PUSHED US AROUND ALL THE TIME. THEREFORE, WE HAVE TO CONTRIBUTE TO ITS MAKING AND NOT/NOT ONLY REMAIN PASSIVE. YOUR INITIATIVE MAKES ME OPTIMISTIC. WE NEED MORE VIGOR. THANK YOU FOR YOUR INITIATIVE. IT IS VERY COURAGEOUS, ACTIVE, USEFUL, JUST AND CORRECT.


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**YORK**  
UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES

4700 KEELE STREET, DOWNSVIEW, ONTARIO, CANADA M3J 2R2



February 1, 1984.

*FLS*  
*PR*  
*INITIATIVES*

Mr Louis Delvoie  
Lester B. Pearson Building  
125 Sussex Dr.  
K1A 0G2

Dear Mr Delvoie:

I have been working with a group at York and the Université de Montréal on modelling patterns of complex organizational behaviour, by identifying and integrating a basic set of underlying logics. On this basis, multiple characteristics of organizational relationships can be defined in terms which can be presented in simple graphic forms. We are beginning to apply these in quite varied operational settings -- for example in a national system of cooperatives in Africa, and in the financial services sector, and also in a provincial-local government setting in Canada. We are not experts in disarmament. Our area of expertise is inter-organizational and power relationships. Although the diverse settings in which we have been working are different from disarmament, we see similar patterns.

The model is not fully operationalized at this time, although it is well-defined in theoretical and conceptual terms. For that reason, we would not be getting in touch with you for the next two to three months, except for the urgency of the Prime Minister's peace initiative.

In terms of East-West arms reduction, the model clearly distinguishes between capacity between the two super-powers and a potential level which might lead to some progress. In making a distinction between levels of capacity, we are raising three points which are perhaps somewhat new: One, the notion itself of increased capacity; Two, the ability to make a clear distinction between levels of capacity; and three, ways and means to achieve a higher and hopefully adequate capacity. The model suggests that the present capacity is quite inadequate, which in the end can only lead to disaster with increasingly powerful technologies.

- 2 -

We believe that this approach might provide Mr Trudeau with a conceptual tool for designing his own strategy and also for communicating his position in both his public and private initiatives. Hopefully, the pattern might be the basis for him to build momentum in various quarters.

In getting the potential for our approach assessed for Mr Trudeau, we thought that it would be appropriate to get in touch with you as a first step. I am at your disposal to elaborate on the above.

Yours Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'M Chevalier' with a stylized flourish at the end.

Michel Chevalier  
Professor

**TRANSCRIPTION DU TOAST PORTÉ PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE LORS D'UN  
DÎNER OFFERT EN SON HONNEUR À BUCAREST PAR LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA  
ROUMANIE, M. CEAUDESCU, LE MERCREDI 1<sup>er</sup> FÉVRIER 1984**

**TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S TOAST AT A DINNER HELD IN HIS  
HONOUR BY PRESIDENT CEAUDESCU OF ROMANIA, BUCAREST, WEDNESDAY,  
FEBRUARY 1, 1984**

Monsieur le Président du Conseil, Excellence, Mesdames,  
Messieurs, mes chers amis,

Vous aviez raison, Monsieur le Président, au début de  
votre discours, d'évoquer nos relations bilatérales, puisqu'elles  
sont très bonnes. Mais nous croyons de part et d'autre, qu'elles  
peuvent devenir encore meilleures et nous sommes prêts à y  
travailler tous les deux.

Vous évoquiez notre première rencontre à Helsinki, il y a  
neuf ans. Je me souviens même de votre hospitalité alors que vous  
m'aviez reçu à l'ambassade de Roumanie à Helsinki. Nous avons eu  
un long entretien. Nous avons parlé de détente, bien sûr, mais  
nous avons aussi évoqué la nécessité d'une collaboration  
bilatérale. Nous avons à ce moment-là fait la promesse de nous  
visiter l'un l'autre et, comme vous le savez, nous vous attendons  
et nous espérons votre visite depuis longtemps au Canada.

Mais si importantes que soient les relations bilatérales,  
il est remarquable que c'est sur la question de la paix et du  
désarmement que nous ayons trouvé absolument nécessaire de nous  
rencontrer. Et je suis venu vous voir en Roumanie parce que vous  
avez la réputation d'être un chef d'État qui parle fort et haut sur  
le problème de la paix et qui y consacre une très grande partie de  
ses énergies.

Vous évoquiez tout à l'heure les conséquences d'une  
guerre nucléaire. J'ai eu moi-même l'occasion l'été dernier, à  
Erice, en Sicile, d'assister à une conférence d'hommes de science  
regroupant plusieurs prix Nobel et, comme vous, j'en ai tiré la  
conclusion que la civilisation telle que nous la connaissons ne  
survivrait pas à une guerre nucléaire.

Il en suit que des hommes de gouvernement, des hommes  
politiques comme vous et moi avons non seulement le droit, mais  
encore l'obligation d'injecter notre énergie politique dans les  
discussions entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Et même si nous ne sommes pas  
à la table à Genève, nous savons que nos peuples américain et

.../2



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viétique des conséquences d'une guerre nucléaire. Par conséquent, c'est notre droit de nous soucier de la résolution pacifique de ces différends qui séparent les superpuissances.

Je vous rends le témoignage que vous avez montré un esprit de leadership dans la recherche de la paix et dans les propositions que vous avez rendues publiques. Vous avez souvent prêché l'importance de nous rencontrer entre pays d'allégeances et d'idéologies diverses. Vous avez donné l'exemple de cette (inaudible) d'échanges en m'invitant, moi, membre de l'Alliance atlantique, à venir dans votre pays, membre du Pacte de Varsovie.

Vous aviez dit à Helsinki, Monsieur le Président, une phrase en quelque sorte prophétique, que je voudrais lire au texte. Vous disiez alors, en 1975: "Nous aurions tort de nous imaginer que nous pourrions désormais nous croiser les bras en toute quiétude. L'histoire jugera certainement nos déclarations et les documents que nous allons signer à Helsinki, mais elle jugera aussi les moyens que chacun de nos États et chacun de nous prendrons en tant que dirigeants politiques pour donner suite aux engagements énoncés dans ces documents."

C'est donc en tant que dirigeants politiques que nous nous rencontrons aujourd'hui et que nous cherchons passionnément la paix que nos peuples souhaitent passionnément. Je crois que nos populations doivent être quelque peu étonnées du paradoxe dans lequel nous sommes tous engagés. Nous construisons des armes nucléaires dont nous savons que nous ne pourrions jamais nous servir, sauf dans un esprit de suicide. De part et d'autre, nous construisons un plus grand nombre d'armes nucléaires dans l'espoir d'aboutir à des négociations qui concluront à la nécessité de moins d'armes nucléaires.

Je crois que nous vivons encore la logique qui a été pensée du temps de l'Empire romain, dont certains, paraît-il -- ces Romains sont vos ancêtres --, disaient à ce moment-là: "si vis pacem, para bellum." (Si tu veux la paix, prépare la guerre.) C'était peut-être une logique d'un autre âge, Monsieur le Président, alors qu'on se battait avec des flèches, des lances et des boucliers. C'est aussi la logique qui est à la base de la théorie de la dissuasion nucléaire, chacune des superpuissances bâtissant un nombre incroyable d'armes nucléaires, pour dissuader l'autre partie d'avoir envie de commercer une guerre. Je crois que nos populations sentent un peu l'absurdité de cette action et qu'elles pensent comme vous et moi qu'on devrait dire si vis pacem,

.../3

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ra pacem. Donc, Monsieur le Président, vous et moi, et beaucoup d'autres leaders politiques, croyons ensemble que nous avons beaucoup fait pour préparer la guerre, mais qu'il faut maintenant préparer la paix.


Et c'est ainsi que j'ai écouté attentivement les propositions que vous m'avez faites cet après-midi et que je souscris entièrement à l'esprit qui vous animait. Je crois qu'un nombre croissant de leaders politiques sentent que nous devons maintenant mettre toutes nos énergies à la préparation de la paix. Et c'est ce qui explique que nous -- tous les pays du Pacte de Varsovie, tous les pays de l'OTAN et les pays neutres et non alignés -- avons envoyé nos hommes politiques, nos ministres, à Stockholm pour discuter de la paix. Je souscris entièrement à votre souhait que les négociations reprennent entre les superpuissances, mais je souscris également à votre proposition selon laquelle nous pouvons -- et nous devons -- les y inviter en négociant nous-mêmes bilatéralement ou dans des rencontres multilatérales comme celles de Stockholm ou de Vienne.

C'est dans cet esprit également, Monsieur le Président, que je voudrais boire à votre santé, vous souhaiter beaucoup de courage et de succès dans votre oeuvre de paix, et vous assurer que le peuple canadien est prêt à collaborer avec le peuple roumain dans la poursuite de cet objectif. Et pour cette raison, en buvant à votre santé, je peux, sans crainte de me tromper, boire à la paix à laquelle nous travaillons tous deux et à laquelle nos peuples croient passionnément.

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# The purple dawn

a monthly newsletter - donation-supported



*Global Citizenship — The Growing World-wide Whisper*

GLOBAL CITIZENS' ASSOCIATION

BOX 94 STANSTEAD  
QUEBEC JOB 3EO

Editor - Duncan Graham

No 69 Feb 1983

Douglas Roche M.P. (Canada) has been awarded - World Federalists/Canada Peace Award for 1983. It will be presented at their conference banquet, Concordia University, Montreal, Sat. evening 11th June 83. Roche is International Chairman of Parliamentarians for World Order, an international network of legislators committed to the goal of world peace through world law. Conference of PWO will be held in New York in June. Write them at - PWO, 7th Floor, 336 East 45th St, New York 10017 U.S.A.

## QUOTES

From "A Study of Future Worlds" by Richard Falk, World Order Models Project, Institute of World Order, 777 UN Plaza, New York 10017.

We are saying that preparations for drastic change may be largely latent until a sudden energy gives them relevance of a visible kind at a particular historical moment. We believe that such latent preparations for a new system of world order are part of the reality of the present context. Hence, mainstream judgments as to what is possible by the year 2000 are likely to be too conservative because they tend to overlook these latent preparations. The term *preparation* may be deceptive to the extent that it suggests deliberative acts aimed at a specific goal. World order preparations, in our use, refer to the combination of forces that are undermining or imperiling the structure of the present system and making the emergence of a new system more likely, perhaps even inevitable, by a certain time. As with undiagnosed termites demolishing a house, one might not have much warning of the proximity of collapse.

We are living in a period of upheaval and transition. Many observers note the decay of old forms and traditional values under the impact of basic changes in the economic, social, and moral order. The adequacy of the sovereign state as a central organizing basis for post-industrial national societies seems increasingly questionable. The vulnerability of all societies to nuclear attack, however strong their military capability, illustrates the inability of states to solve the challenges of national security, although the drive to develop superior defense systems continues to divert unprecedented peacetime resources and energies to the creation of new weapons systems. All societies are potentially vulnerable to the consequences of the mismanagement of basic ecological issues involving pollution, climate, and the maintenance of ocean quality. Whereas nuclear catastrophe can be caused by a human decision, implemented in a matter of minutes, ecological catastrophe may be brought about by cumulative developments that are virtually imperceptible, and whose danger points are not yet generally understood. The interdependent aspects of modern industrial societies also make traditional statist modes of unilateral policy-making dangerously anachronistic in relation to the dynamics of the world economy.

## Maclean's Magazine

"The bankers and their crisis"

Michael Posner

The president of First Boston Corporation, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, starkly calls it "the end of the music." Former French prime minister Raymond Barre detects a "general mood of uncertainty and pessimism." Willy Brandt, head of the commission on North-South issues, warned in Ottawa that economic and financial catastrophes loom unless emergency measures are taken. And a statement published last week by 26 economists from 14 countries concludes bluntly: "The world is in an economic crisis. There is a risk of breakdown."

Indeed, three months after the International Monetary Fund pulled Mexico from the brink of collapse, most specialists conclude that the world remains mired in a dangerous crisis of confidence—and of credit. World trade is spinning into a negative spiral, impelled by punishing interest rates, fierce levels of unemployment and the inevitable reflex of protectionism.

MASTER FILE

ROMANIA

Wednesday, February 1, 1984

1145 hours - Departure East Berlin for Bucharest

1500 hours - Arrive Bucharest - Otopeni Airport  
(Flying time 2 hours and 15 minutes)  
(Plus one hour time change)

- Media deplanes first:  
Ambassador and Chief of Protocol go  
up to greet Prime Minister
- Prime Minister descends and meets  
Romanian officials
- Prime Minister Dascalescu accompanied  
by some Ministers and Military  
authorities (four or five altogether)  
will greet Prime Minister Trudeau.  
(We understand that one or two  
Vice-Presidents of Council of State  
might also be there. In Romanian  
protocol, they occupy a position  
higher than Prime Minister  
Dascalescu)
- Prime Minister meets Canadians
- The two Prime Ministers walk to small  
honour guard.
- Two national anthems will be played.

1515 hours- Prime Minister leaves terminal for  
Guest house by car accompanied by  
Prime Minister Dascalescu accompanied  
by one interpreter.

1530 hours- Prime Minister and official  
delegation arrive at Guest House,  
Palais Floreasca. Rest of official  
delegation goes to Hotel Triumf  
(Hotel used for official guests only)

1605 hours - Prime Minister leaves Palâis  
Floresca.

.../2

-2-

- 1615 hours - First session between Prime Minister and President Ceausescu at Palace of Council of State (ex-Royal Palace)
- 1900 hours - End of session. Return to official guest house.
- 1950 hours - Leave Palais Floreasca for dinner
- 2000 hours - Official dinner at Palace of Council of State.
- 2200 hours - End of official dinner. Return to Palais Floreasca.

Thursday, February 2, 1984

- 0920 hours - Leave Palais Floreasca.
- 0930 hours - Second session with President Ceausescu at Palace of Council of State.
- 1200 hours - End of session. Prime Minister leaves for scrum with press.
- 1215 hours - Scrum at Presss Centre of Hotel Intercontinental.
- 1245 hours - Leave for private lunch
- 1450 hours - Prime Minister returns to Palais Floreasca where he is met by Prime Minister Dascalescu.
- 1500 hours - Departure of two Prime Ministers for airport.
- 1515 hours - Arrival at airport. Departure ceremony. Prime Ministers walk to honour guard. Two national anthems played. Salute Canadians. Salute Romanian Delegation. Canadian delegation boards aircraft. Prime Minister Trudeau boards aircraft.
- 1530 hours - Aircraft departs.



DEPUTY MINISTER (POLITICAL AFFAIRS)  
SOUS-MINISTRE (AFFAIRES POLITIQUES)

MF

*Handwritten:* le 1er février  
*Signature:* [Signature] / PCO  
M. Louis Delvoile / IDDA

Ci-joint lettre remise à M. Marchand  
par l'Ambassadeur de DANEMARK pour transmission  
au Cabinet du Premier ministre.

*Handwritten:* [Signature]  
DMF

de Montigny Marchand



Copenhagen, January 5th, 1984

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter dated 18 November 1983 in which you elaborate on various aspects of your initiative to improve the presently strained East-West relationship. I am grateful to be given this opportunity to present the Danish Government's views on the concrete proposals contained in your most recent message.

In the shorter term you suggest that all NATO members be represented at the inaugural meeting of the CDE in Stockholm on 17 January, 1984 at a high political level. I share with you the satisfaction that the NATO council meeting in Brussels 8-9 December revealed full agreement among the Allies that their Foreign Ministers should attend the opening. This decision can be considered yet another token of the importance that we all attach to the imminent restoration and subsequent intensification of the high level political dialogue between East and West in general, and to the favourable and substantial outcome of the CDE in particular.

In this connection I also welcome the Ministers' decision that a thorough appraisal of East-West relations be undertaken with a view to achieving a more constructive East-West dialogue. This step, in my view, is fully in tune with the aims of your initiative and could, no doubt, further efforts to establish a more stable East-West relationship.


- 2 -

I have also studied your proposals to reinvigorate the MBFR negotiations. As I stated in my letter of 16 November 1983, the Danish Government is prepared to consider favourably any concrete steps aimed at promoting the achievement of this goal. Such steps seem even more needed now that the Eastern side has chosen to desist from setting a date for the resumption of the Vienna negotiations after the present recess.

It is not least against this background that the Danish government shares the view of a number of NATO members that now is the time for undertaking a review of the Western negotiating position in order to redefine our strategies at the MBFR negotiating table and to resume as soon as possible substantial negotiations in Vienna. This approach could also result in a more active posture on the part of the West and in your words, Mr. Prime Minister, would demonstrate to the East and to our own publics our desire to make meaningful progress in the arms control field.

I will be awaiting the outcome of your further contemplations on the elements of your initiative with interest.

Yours sincerely, ..



Poul Schlüter

H.E. the Prime Minister of Canada  
Mr. Pierre Trudeau

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CONFIDENTIAL

THE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE

BACKGROUND

The emissary of Romanian President Ceaușescu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Georgehe Dolgu, visited Ottawa on December 5, 1983 to present the Romanian proposals on INF, and renewed an invitation for the Prime Minister to visit Bucharest for consultations on how Canada and Romania might cooperate in helping to find a way out of the current impasse.

Vice-Minister Dolgu was received by Minister Pepin and Deputy Minister de Montigny Marchand. He had previously visited Moscow and Washington.

SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSALS

The Romanian proposals call for the USA to halt its INF deployments in Europe, and for the USSR to reconsider the countermeasures which it has announced. They also propose USA/USSR bilateral meetings at the foreign minister and summit levels, a NATO/Warsaw Pact meeting on INF in parallel with the (hopefully resumed) USA/USSR negotiations, acceleration of the MBFR talks, and a conference on conventional weapons.

CANADIAN REACTION

We explained that Romania's specific proposals on INF (details in Annex) which amount to a freeze at present unequal levels and require inclusion of the British and French nuclear forces, were not acceptable in terms of the present Canadian and NATO positions. (We understand other Allies approached reacted in similar terms). However, we agreed with the primary objective of President Ceaușescu's initiative which was to restore East-West dialogue and that a visit by Prime Minister Trudeau to Romania would therefore be useful.

JOINT ROMANIAN-GREEK DECLARATION


A call by Ceaușescu and Papandreou on the occasion of the Greek Prime Minister's visit to Bucharest last December for a freeze on missile deployments by both sides in Europe obviously did not meet with the approval of NATO countries for the same reasons the Romanian INF proposals on which it was based had to be rejected. In addition, as Greece acted without prior consultation with its Allies,

.../2

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CONFIDENTIAL

as it had done when it called for a delay in NATO deployments last August, the Greek action was found regrettable. In the Canadian response to this joint appeal, we stressed our support for the idea behind the appeal which was to prevent the deterioration of the situation in Europe and to curb the arms race, but were not able to support the freeze proposal given the present imbalance of nuclear forces in Europe.



## ROMANIAN PROPOSALS ON INF

1. The new American missiles which have been shipped to Europe should be kept in storage and the USSR should stop all work connected with the emplacement of medium-range missiles on GDR and Czechoslovak territory.
2. Pending an agreement between the USA and the USSR taking into consideration the global ratio of forces between the two superpowers, two compromise formulas are suggested:
  - A. No USA missile should be deployed in Europe. The USSR should withdraw, dismantle and store all medium-range missiles located on the European part of its territory (or, in the version presented in the FRG, all missiles located west of 80 degrees east longitude) until an agreement is reached. The USA should accordingly reduce its INF on ships and aircraft targetting Eastern Europe;
  - or
  - B. The USA should deploy no medium-range missiles in Europe. The USSR could temporarily keep in the European part of its territory a number of nuclear warheads equal to the number of British and French nuclear warheads, and the Soviet missiles should be sited at a distance from the West German border equal to the distance of British and French missiles from the territory of the USSR,
- AND
- when an agreement is reached the concomitant scrapping of both Soviet and American missiles should take place //
3. A meeting of the foreign ministers of the USA and the USSR should take place this year, and a summit meeting as soon as possible (in the first half of 1984, according to the Romanian emissary to Bonn). A consultative meeting of NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers should take place in parallel with the USA-USSR negotiations in Geneva in order to help the two superpowers to reach an agreement on INF.
4. The MBFR negotiations should be reactivated and there should also be a conference of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries for reduction of conventional weapons as well as military budgets.

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ANNEX

5. The French and British missiles cannot be ignored; they should be included right from the beginning, but only in making a global estimation of the balance of forces between the two sides.
6. European peoples are called upon to do everything to halt the siting of new INF missiles and for the withdrawal and destruction of existing ones.

TALKING POINTS

- We fully agree with the primary objective of President Ceausescu's peace initiative which is to restore East-West dialogue.
- However, Romania's specific proposal on INF, which amounts to a freeze at present unequal levels and requires inclusion of British and French nuclear forces, is not acceptable in terms of the Canadian and NATO positions.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING  
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

ISSUE

With the Conference now underway, an exchange of views with the Romanian Foreign Minister would allow him to explain the rationalization for the measures which Romania has proposed and may provide insights into Soviet bloc thinking on the prospects for success of the Conference.

BACKGROUND

At the Second CSCE Follow-up Meeting recently concluded in Madrid, one of Canada's objectives, shared by our NATO allies, was "to cooperate in efforts to relax East-West tensions by enhancing security and cooperation in Europe". This objective was partially achieved when the thirty-five CSCE participants adopted by consensus the mandate for a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) which began in Stockholm on January 17, 1984.

The aim of the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) is to strengthen confidence in order to pave the way to disarmament in conventional and, ultimately, nuclear weapons. Previous attempts to disarm, for instance at MBFR, by first dealing with capabilities and counting numbers which would later be verified, have not been able to break the arms spiral. One side, mistrusting the intentions of the other, attempts to redress perceived imbalances which prompts the other side to take counter measures. The root of this lack of confidence is not only concern about what the other side can do, but doubts about what it intends to do. CSBMs address intentions. If they were clarified, a normal pattern of military behaviour could be established. States would be confident that they are not threatened and that they could detect changes in intentions when one side broke the normal pattern of activities. In these circumstances, States would have the confidence to reduce forces to more stable and lower levels. Any force reductions, however, would be the subject of the second phase of the CDE. The mandate of the CDE does not specify any kind of armed forces. The West intends that the CDE should deal with conventional forces. The WPO and the NNA may wish to talk about nuclear forces as well.

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CONFIDENTIAL

The mandate, which is a compromise arrived at after three years of difficult negotiations, directs that the Conference will be carried out in two phases; the first will deal with Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Largely meeting Western views, these CSBMs are to be applicable to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, according to specific criteria: military significance, politically binding and provided with forms of verification according to their content. Although the text of the mandate follows essentially Western lines, there are sufficient ambiguities in it which will undoubtedly be exploited by the Soviet Union. They will try to introduce such declaratory measures as non-aggression pacts and to extend the CSBM zone into the North Atlantic. At the same time, they can be expected to put up stiff opposition to the adoption of Western proposals designed to lead ultimately to a greater transparency in military activities. As a result of this diametrical difference in philosophy and objectives, the first phase of the Conference will be a prolonged one, lasting at least until the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting in 1986.

The Western Europeans, in particular the Germans, have also placed great emphasis on the holding of a CDE. They wish to be able to demonstrate to their respective publics that despite the INF deployment they are making all possible efforts in the field of arms control. They would also like to be able to point to this new and on-going conference as evidence that INF deployment has not disrupted the political and arms control dialogue with the East. Other countries, however, such as the UK, have been quick to point out that the CDE should be seen as complementary to all ongoing arms control and disarmament efforts but not as a priority in the same sense as INF/START.

At the Vienna Follow-up Meeting the participating CSCE states will assess the progress achieved during the first phase of the Conference. Following the conclusion of the first phase, the participants will decide at a future CSCE Follow-up Meeting the ways and appropriate means for the participating States to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe including the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next phase of the CDE. This condition was introduced at the insistence of the United States, which has serious reservations about the utility of negotiating arms control reductions on a consensus basis in a forum of 35 nations.

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Complicating the CDE negotiations and frustrating those who are hoping for an early (by 1986) conclusion of Stage I will be the following factors:

- (a) The Stockholm Conference has begun one and a half months after the beginning of the INF deployments. In his statement at the opening of the Conference, Foreign Minister Gromyko charged that the deployments had aggravated the situation in Europe and that the United States was bent on achieving nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. The tone used in Mr. Gromyko's speech and press conference suggests that, for the immediate future, the Soviet Union and its allies will continue their propaganda barrage against the West at the expense of a more constructive approach, although Mr. Gromyko did tell Secretary of State Shultz that he had instructed the Soviet Delegation to cooperate with other delegations to achieve a suitable outcome.
- (b) Due to the presidential election this year, the United States will avoid making major policy decisions from mid-July until at least mid-November and possibly until early in the new year (1985).
- (c) One Neutral and Non-Aligned foreign minister has referred to 1984 as a "cooling-off year" after the politically charged events of 1983. It seems certain that the Soviet Union will require time to assess and react to the change of approach that was signalled in President Reagan's January 16 speech. Should he not run for election or be defeated, the Soviet Union will not make any major moves until they have determined the attitudes and policies of the next administration.
- (d) Some Neutral and Non-Aligned (notably Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) do not appear to have given full consideration to the implications to their national defence plans that the adoption of a set of concrete, militarily significant and verifiable CSBMs would have. Once the full realization strikes them, they too may be reluctant to make concessions because, unlike the members of the two alliances, they alone are responsible for their own defences.
- (e) the Maltese have demonstrated a propensity to misuse the consensus principle in pursuit of their own goals. It seems a certainty they will do it again in the CDE.

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The foregoing suggests that Stage I of the CDE will be a long (six years plus), sometimes acrimonious, and difficult conference. Success will come slowly, with the first signs unlikely to appear until 1986.

#### CANADIAN POSITION

During the first phase at Stockholm, Canada and the rest of our NATO allies will attempt:

- (a) to undertake, in stages, new effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament;
- (b) to negotiate and adopt a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

An additional Canadian objective will be to strengthen our relations with Europe - the whole of Europe, including the Neutrals and Non-Aligned as well as the nations of Eastern Europe - by participating actively in and contributing to the deliberations and resolution of their political and security concerns. To achieve these goals, Canada and our allies in NATO presented on January 24 a comprehensive package of mutually supportive CSBMs which, if adopted and implemented, could set the stage for meaningful arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Canada can take some credit for what, in time, will be considered a relatively successful beginning to the Stockholm Conference. The Prime Minister's démarches during his European tour, Mr. MacEachen's efforts at the December NATO Ministerial Meeting and our démarches in Eastern European capitals in late December created the momentum necessary to convince the governments of the participating States to send their ministers to Stockholm. Once at the Conference, the foreign ministers undertook a series of bilateral meetings which must be considered to be the first important steps towards restoring high level political dialogue between East and West. Certainly the productive meeting between US Secretary of State Shultz and Mr. Gromyko holds out the promise that the superpowers will develop a more businesslike approach to the problems confronting them.

#### ROMANIAN POSITION

In his speech to the Conference on January 20, Foreign Minister Andrei devoted a significant portion

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of his time deploring the NATO INF deployment and the WPO intentions regarding counter-deployment. To resolve the problem, the Romanian made a number of proposals including a superpower summit, a Ministerial meeting involving foreign ministers of NATO and the WPO, the establishment of a consultative commission to analyze proposals and the adoption of a disarmament programme under international control which would ensure the cessation of the production of nuclear arms.

The Foreign Minister also enumerated fifteen CSBMs which should be adopted to "give expression to the principle of non-use and threat of force". These proposals included restriction on military manoeuvres in border zones, establishment of nuclear free zones, limitation on the size of manoeuvres, a treaty on the renunciation of force, a freeze and eventual reduction of military budgets, the creation of zones of "peaceful cooperation" and the elimination of hostile propaganda. Almost all of these proposals fall within the categories of declaratory measures for which verification is difficult or impossible or constraint measures which we believe could be more suitably examined after the adoption and successful implementation of measures of information and stability.

### TALKING POINTS

- We should be relatively satisfied with the way in which the Stockholm Conference began. One of the most important aspects of the opening was the opportunity that it afforded for Ministers to meet each other to resume the high level political dialogue that had been absent in recent months.
- We believe that the Western proposal, tabled on January 24, represents a careful blend of measures which, if adopted, would fulfil the initial goals of the Conference and could lead to the adoption of restrictions on certain military activities and negotiated reductions in force levels.
- We have begun an examination of the proposals which Mr. Andrei outlined in his speech at Stockholm. Perhaps the Foreign Minister could provide more details on the major elements of their proposals and outline for us how they envisage their proposed measures being verified.

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WARSAW PACT DECLARATION

ISSUE:

In the "declaration" that followed the January 4-5, 1983 Warsaw Pact Summit meeting in Prague, a series of proposals relating to arms control were made including a non-aggression treaty proposal addressed to NATO countries. This offer was reiterated in the WPO Foreign Ministers Communiqué last April. There are indications that the East will return to the charge at the Stockholm Conference.

BACKGROUND:

The declaration was partly an attempt by the WPO to respond to the Bonn NATO Summit declaration of June 1982 and the NATO Communiqué of December 82. The declaration should be interpreted in the context of the broader Soviet and WPO propaganda campaign to influence Western publics in particular with regard to the implementation of the NATO 1979 nuclear modernization decision and the Geneva INF negotiations. The declaration seeks to portray the Warsaw Pact as a group of peace-loving countries committed to redressing the current poor state of East-West relations for which only the West can be held responsible.

The declaration pulls together a large number of previous Soviet and WPO proposals in the field of security and arms control. There is little substantially new although some proposals show differences in formulation. Because the declaration was the first document of this type to be issued since the coming to power of Andropov, it was considered worthy of more attention than usual by some Western governments.

The centre piece of the declaration, a proposal for a "treaty on the mutual non-use of force and maintenance of relations of peace" between member states of opposing alliances is put forward as an alternative to dissolving the alliances. Such "non-aggression" pact proposals go back to 1955. The central element would be a declaration concerning the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, to which is added the non-use of conventional weapons. The proposal is ambiguous as to whether or not it would apply to member states of one alliance. It does not address the concept of the threat of force, as well as political and other kinds of pressure. Thus it falls short of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act obligations which the USSR continued to ignore in Poland, Afghanistan and Kampuchea. It reflects the long-standing Soviet interest in formalizing the post-war settlement in Europe by whatever means possible.

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The Prague declaration alludes to a long-term proposal to make Europe free of nuclear weapons. In other fora the WPO have specifically endorsed the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ) in Scandinavia, Central Europe and the Balkans. They have raised the subject at the Stockholm Conference in general terms. NATO has been against the establishment of such NWFZs in Europe because nuclear munitions could be quickly reintroduced into a NWFZ, any agreements would be difficult to negotiate and to verify and could create an unfounded impression of enhanced security. Furthermore all such NWFZ proposals have not included nuclear weapons stationed on Soviet territory.

Of the many other arms control proposals set out in the declaration, including those in the context of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, virtually none contains new elements, despite some differences in formulation. These proposals seem to have been rehearsed more with an eye to presenting a complete record than with the intention that serious negotiations should ensue on concrete matters. The more specific treatment given to INF issues compared to the vagueness of START-related proposals undoubtedly reflected the clear priority for the WPO of preventing NATO INF deployments. The concept of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries is emphasized in the document, and a distinction is drawn between ideological issues and the problems of state-to-state relations.

#### POSITION OF ALLIES:

During discussions in NATO, the question of an Alliance response was debated. Opinions were divided as to the principle as well as the modality of a common response. The tendency was to leave national authorities to respond if they wished but preferably on the basis of common conclusions drawn within NATO. There was general preference to address the question in the NATO Spring 1983 Ministerial Communiqué. The spectrum of Allied reaction to the declaration varied from cautious interest to a large degree of scepticism. The NATO Ministerial Communiqué of June 1983 did not refer directly to the WPO Summit proposals but rather indirectly addressed some of the issues covered in the declaration.

#### CANADIAN POSITION:

Canada was among the NATO countries to react more positively to the WPO declaration. We suggested to NATO allies that, while the declaration contained little which was new, there were differences and positive elements to

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be studied carefully and possibly openings which we could exploit, both to rebut WPO charges that the Alliance is dragging its feet on arms control issues and to stimulate progress towards concrete agreements. While fraught with weaknesses that could be dangerous to the West, the proposed non-aggression pact between alliances could be potentially useful to reaffirm obligations assumed in other fora in the past (UN and CSCE) providing it is not treated as a substitute for balanced arms control and disarmament agreements.

Canada gave an official response to the declaration proposal in a press release along above lines issued after the Czechoslovak Ambassador officially presented a copy of the declaration on January 21, 1983. Deputy Minister Marchand received the Czechoslovak Ambassador after the April 1983 WPO Ministerial Meeting which reiterated the non-aggression treaty proposal. The Ambassador was told that a careful study of the WPO declaration by Canada had not yielded very much that was fundamentally new or likely to lead to progress toward concrete and verifiable agreements in arms control and disarmament. Thus having concluded that it merely represented a catalogue of earlier Eastern proposals tabled in various forums, we did not intend to give the declaration a further Canadian response.

WARSAW PACT POSITION:

As the host to the Prague WPO Summit, the Czechoslovak government was given the task to sound out individual NATO governments on the proposal. It is probable that the authorities in Prague will take the opportunity of the Prime Minister's visit to reiterate the non-aggression treaty proposal addressed to NATO. The GDR appears to have inherited the task of reiterating the proposal at the Stockholm Conference. The speech by the GDR Foreign Minister on the opening day of the conference on January 17 focussed mostly on the Prague declaration, intimating that the WPO would take up at the conference particularly the non-aggression pact which might be extended to other European and non-European states, the non-first use of nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons-free zones (North, South-East and Central Europe) proposals.

### Talking Points

- A number of proposals put forward by the Warsaw Treaty countries at their Summit meeting in Prague in January 1983, have been reiterated at the Stockholm meeting, and will be carefully studied in the context of those negotiations.
- The main proposal, an offer to conclude a non-aggression treaty between alliances, would only reaffirm obligations already assumed in the past by the countries concerned under the UN Charter and in CSCE.
- Such a reaffirmation of obligations should not be treated as a substitute for balanced arms control and disarmament agreements.
- A careful study of the other proposals in the WPO declaration by Canada last year did not yield very much that was fundamentally new or likely to lead to progress toward concrete and verifiable agreements in arms control and disarmament.

HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK - BRIEFING NOTE  
LIVRE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES - NOTES D'INFORMATION

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Section

Subject/Highlights Sujet/Points saillants

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Stockholm Conference proposed 6 possible measures to be considered by the Conference. These included the following declaratory measures: no first use of nuclear weapons; a non-aggression pact between alliances; a ban on chemical weapons in Europe; a limitation on military expenditures and establishment of nuclear-free zones.

Source

Montreal Gazette, February 1 and wire services

Assessment Évaluation

Classification

RESTRICTED

Unlike the NATO and Romanian proposals, the Soviet Union did not table specific proposals; rather, the Soviet Ambassador simply outlined them in a speech at the plenary meeting. With the exception of the idea of a chemical weapons free zone and the willingness to consider some types of notification, all the Soviet proposals were included in the Prague Declaration of January 1983. While each proposal is flawed or unacceptable in its own right (e.g., a global chemical weapons ban is being negotiated at the CD in Geneva; a non-aggression pact among alliances would leave the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty unaffected; a "no-first-use" agreement would require a complete reorganization of NATO strategy), the major problem with all the Soviet proposals is that they are not verifiable - non-compliance is only evident when they are breached. As such they enhance uncertainty and instability rather than reducing mistrust which is the objective of the first stage of the Stockholm Conference.

Suggested Reply Réponse suggérée

- In my address to the Conference in Stockholm two weeks ago, I indicated that, in considering proposals, Canada would concentrate on the realistic goals defined in the mandate of the Conference.
- I also said that we should be vigilant about ideas that, by suggesting slick and easy and apparent solutions to agonizingly difficult problems, could lead us into a false and dangerous sense of security.
- At first glance the proposals made in the Soviet delegate's speech appear to be declaratory in nature and not easily verified.
- We will be in a better position to assess the Soviet proposals on their merit once they have been presented in detail at the Conference.

Prepared by Préparé par  
D.A. Snider

Division Direction  
IDA

Date  
01 Feb 84

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**TRANSCRIPTION DU TOAST PORTÉ PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE LORS D'UN  
DÎNER OFFERT EN SON HONNEUR À BUCAREST PAR LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA  
ROUMANIE, M. CEAUDESCU, LE MERCREDI 1<sup>er</sup> FÉVRIER 1984**

**TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S TOAST AT A DINNER HELD IN HIS  
HONOUR BY PRESIDENT CEAUDESCU OF ROMANIA, BUCAREST, WEDNESDAY,  
FEBRUARY 1, 1984**

Monsieur le Président du Conseil, Excellence, Mesdames,  
Messieurs, mes chers amis,

Vous aviez raison, Monsieur le Président, au début de  
votre discours, d'évoquer nos relations bilatérales, puisqu'elles  
sont très bonnes. Mais nous croyons de part et d'autre, qu'elles  
peuvent devenir encore meilleures et nous sommes prêts à y  
travailler tous les deux.

Vous évoquiez notre première rencontre à Helsinki, il y a  
neuf ans. Je me souviens même de votre hospitalité alors que vous  
m'aviez reçu à l'ambassade de Roumanie à Helsinki. Nous avons eu  
un long entretien. Nous avons parlé de détente, bien sûr, mais  
nous avons aussi évoqué la nécessité d'une collaboration  
bilatérale. Nous avons à ce moment-là fait la promesse de nous  
visiter l'un l'autre et, comme vous le savez, nous vous attendons  
et nous espérons votre visite depuis longtemps au Canada.

Mais si importantes que soient les relations bilatérales,  
il est remarquable que c'est sur la question de la paix et du  
désarmement que nous ayons trouvé absolument nécessaire de nous  
rencontrer. Et je suis venu vous voir en Roumanie parce que vous  
avez la réputation d'être un chef d'État qui parle fort et haut sur  
le problème de la paix et qui y consacre une très grande partie de  
ses énergies.

Vous évoquiez tout à l'heure les conséquences d'une  
guerre nucléaire. J'ai eu moi-même l'occasion l'été dernier, à  
Erice, en Sicile, d'assister à une conférence d'hommes de science  
regroupant plusieurs prix Nobel et, comme vous, j'en ai tiré la  
conclusion que la civilisation telle que nous la connaissons ne  
survivrait pas à une guerre nucléaire.

Il en suit que des hommes de gouvernement, des hommes  
politiques comme vous et moi avons non seulement le droit, mais  
encore l'obligation d'injecter notre énergie politique dans les  
discussions entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Et même si nous ne sommes pas  
à la table à Genève, nous savons que nos peuples américain et

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oviétique des conséquences d'une guerre nucléaire. Par conséquent, c'est notre droit de nous soucier de la résolution pacifique de ces différends qui séparent les superpuissances.

Je vous rends le témoignage que vous avez montré un esprit de leadership dans la recherche de la paix et dans les propositions que vous avez rendues publiques. Vous avez souvent prêché l'importance de nous rencontrer entre pays d'allégeances et d'idéologies diverses. Vous avez donné l'exemple de cette (inaudible) d'échanges en m'invitant, moi, membre de l'Alliance atlantique, à venir dans votre pays, membre du Pacte de Varsovie.

Vous aviez dit à Helsinki, Monsieur le Président, une phrase en quelque sorte prophétique, que je voudrais lire au texte. Vous disiez alors, en 1975: "Nous aurions tort de nous imaginer que nous pourrions désormais nous croiser les bras en toute quiétude. L'histoire jugera certainement nos déclarations et les documents que nous allons signer à Helsinki, mais elle jugera aussi les moyens que chacun de nos États et chacun de nous prendrons en tant que dirigeants politiques pour donner suite aux engagements énoncés dans ces documents."

C'est donc en tant que dirigeants politiques que nous nous rencontrons aujourd'hui et que nous cherchons passionnément la paix que nos peuples souhaitent passionnément. Je crois que nos populations doivent être quelque peu étonnées du paradoxe dans lequel nous sommes tous engagés. Nous construisons des armes nucléaires dont nous savons que nous ne pourrions jamais nous servir, sauf dans un esprit de suicide. De part et d'autre, nous construisons un plus grand nombre d'armes nucléaires dans l'espoir d'aboutir à des négociations qui concluront à la nécessité de moins d'armes nucléaires.

Je crois que nous vivons encore la logique qui a été pensée du temps de l'Empire romain, dont certains, paraît-il -- ces Romains sont vos ancêtres --, disaient à ce moment-là: "si vis pacem, para bellum." (Si tu veux la paix, prépare la guerre.) C'était peut-être une logique d'un autre âge, Monsieur le Président, alors qu'on se battait avec des flèches, des lances et des boucliers. C'est aussi la logique qui est à la base de la théorie de la dissuasion nucléaire, chacune des superpuissances bâtissant un nombre incroyable d'armes nucléaires, pour dissuader l'autre partie d'avoir envie de commercer une guerre. Je crois que nos populations sentent un peu l'absurdité de cette action et qu'elles pensent comme vous et moi qu'on devrait dire si vis pacem,

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ara pacem. Donc, Monsieur le Président, vous et moi, et beaucoup d'autres leaders politiques, croyons ensemble que nous avons beaucoup fait pour préparer la guerre, mais qu'il faut maintenant préparer la paix.

Et c'est ainsi que j'ai écouté attentivement les propositions que vous m'avez faites cet après-midi et que je souscris entièrement à l'esprit qui vous animait. Je crois qu'un nombre croissant de leaders politiques sentent que nous devons maintenant mettre toutes nos énergies à la préparation de la paix. Et c'est ce qui explique que nous -- tous les pays du Pacte de Varsovie, tous les pays de l'OTAN et les pays neutres et non alignés -- avons envoyé nos hommes politiques, nos ministres, à Stockholm pour discuter de la paix. Je souscris entièrement à votre souhait que les négociations reprennent entre les superpuissances, mais je souscris également à votre proposition selon laquelle nous pouvons -- et nous devons -- les y inviter en négociant nous-mêmes bilatéralement ou dans des rencontres multilatérales comme celles de Stockholm ou de Vienne.

C'est dans cet esprit également, Monsieur le Président, que je voudrais boire à votre santé, vous souhaiter beaucoup de courage et de succès dans votre oeuvre de paix, et vous assurer que le peuple canadien est prêt à collaborer avec le peuple roumain dans la poursuite de cet objectif. Et pour cette raison, en buvant à votre santé, je peux, sans crainte de me tromper, boire à la paix à laquelle nous travaillons tous deux et à laquelle nos peuples croient passionnément.

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- C O N F I D E N T I A L NON-PAPER

U.S. VIEWS ON CANADIAN PROPOSALS  
FOR ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY

*Mr. Calder*

*MI-*

BASED ON A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CANADIAN DRAFT PAPER REGARDING HOW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS MAY BE RESTRICTED TO PROVIDE GREATER STRATEGIC STABILITY, WE WISH TO CONVEY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA OUR SERIOUS CONCERN WITH THE THREE PROPOSALS CONTAINED THEREIN AND THE FORUM CHOSEN FOR THEIR PRESENTATION. AS ALL THREE OF THESE PROPOSALS HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS, THE U.S. URGES THAT CANADA CONSULT FULLY WITH ITS ALLIES BEFORE TAKING ANY FURTHER STEPS TOWARD TABLING THESE PROPOSALS IN GENEVA.

THE U.S. SHARES THE DESIRE OF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT FOR PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING BALANCED, VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL. WE DO NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE THREE PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION PROMOTE THAT PROSPECT.

THE U.S. ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL AND IS ALREADY SIGNATORY TO SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS REGULATING USE OF OUTER SPACE. AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR ALLIES LAST YEAR, WE AGREED TO THE FORMATION OF AN OUTER SPACE WORKING GROUP PROVIDED THAT ITS MANDATE BE LIMITED TO EXCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS. IN DOING SO, THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES AGREED THAT WESTERN UNITY MUST BE PRESERVED ON THIS ISSUE. THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES BLOCKED CONSENSUS ON THIS MANDATE, HOWEVER. THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL WOULD REMOVE THE ONUS FROM THE SOVIETS FOR THAT ACTION AND WOULD OFFER THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO DIVIDE THE WESTERN GROUP ON AN ISSUE CRUCIAL TO WESTERN SECURITY. TABLING SUCH A PROPOSAL AT THE CD, THEREFORE, POSES PROBLEMS FOR THE WEST. DOING SO AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SESSION EXACERBATES THOSE PROBLEMS BY REDIRECTING CD DISCUSSIONS OF OUTER SPACE ISSUES AND PRECLUDING ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMMON WESTERN APPROACH TO THE ISSUE.

THE OTHER TWO PROPOSALS ALSO POSE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED STRATEGIC POLICY. THE PROPOSAL THAT NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS BE PROVED VERIFIABLE BEFORE THEY ARE DEPLOYED APPEARS UNWORKABLE. ITS FOCUS ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM) OF VERIFICATION SERIOUSLY WEAKENS THE LONGSTANDING WESTERN POSITION THAT COOPERATIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION (OSI) IS, IN SOME CASES, A NECESSARY COMPONENT OF EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. MOREOVER, THE PROPOSAL FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE VERIFIABILITY OF ANY PARTICULAR WEAPON OR SYSTEM CAN BE DETERMINED ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A STATE'S AGREED OBLIGATIONS UNDER A SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL TREATY RELATING TO THAT WEAPON OR SYSTEM. IN THE ABSENCE OF A TREATY REGIME SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITING OR LIMITING THE WEAPON, STATES HAVE NO COMPLIANCE OBLIGATIONS WHICH CAN BE VERIFIED. THUS, THE THRUST OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L NON-PAPER

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- C O N F I D E N T I A L NON-PAPER

THE PROPOSAL IS UNREALISTIC. REGARDING THE PROPOSAL TO RESTRICT THE MOBILITY OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMS), THE U.S. NOTES THAT SUCH A MEASURE RUNS DIRECTLY COUNTER TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION, WHICH RECOMMENDED THAT MOBILE BIASING CONCEPTS FOR ICBMS BE DEVELOPED AS ONE POSSIBLE APPROACH TO ENHANCING ICBM SURVIVABILITY.

. THE U.S. BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT THESE PROPOSALS SHOULD NOT BE TABLED IN THE CD. THE CHOICE OF FORUM ITSELF IS COMPLETELY INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE SECOND AND THIRD PROPOSALS, AS MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS ARE MORE APPROPRIATELY DEALT WITH IN EXISTING BILATERAL FRAMEWORKS. WHILE WE HAVE AGREED TO DISCUSS OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL IN THE CD, WESTERN UNITY ON THIS ISSUE IS VITAL SHOULD WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS BE PROTECTED.

. THE U.S. SEES CONSIDERABLE HARM TO WESTERN INTERESTS SHOULD THESE PROPOSALS BE TABLED IN THE CD WHEN IT RECONVENES FEBRUARY 7. WE STRONGLY URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA TO CONSULT MORE FULLY WITH BOTH THE U.S. AND ALL OF THE NATO ALLIES BEFORE TAKING ANY FURTHER ACTION ON THESE PROPOSALS.

C O N F I D E N T I A L NON-PAPER



Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)  
National Defence

Sous-ministre adjoint (Politiques)  
Défense nationale

*Mr. Smith only  
for info file*

February, 1984. *ed*

The Minister

PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS AT THE  
DAVOS SYMPOSIUM

1. You will have seen press reports of the statements made by the Prime Minister in the course of a panel discussion during a symposium on world affairs at Davos. The press has carried extensive extracts of his remarks coupled with editorial comment on the validity of his views and the appropriateness of their having been expressed in public, particularly in Europe. There has been speculation regarding the effect his remarks may have on Canada's relations with our European allies and with the United States as well as on their consequences for the Prime Minister's current initiative.

2. The following paragraphs seek to provide you with an identification of the delicate or contentious aspects of what the Prime Minister said on various issues which are themselves controversial and on which you may, therefore, be invited to comment. The purpose of the analysis is not to suggest what your comments might be, but rather to provide warning of the lines of comment or criticism you may encounter. The statements themselves are, perforce, quoted without the context in which they were made. However there is attached a transcript of the statements and exchanges during the question and answer period. Each of the questions was answered by other members of the panel. However apart from Kenneth Dam (US Deputy Secretary of State) and Raymond Barre (former Prime Minister of France) we do not know who was on the panel or how they answered the questions.

Item A Responding to the proposition that the arms race between the superpowers is an alternative to war and should be institutionalized the Prime Minister observed that the only sensible course is to seek greater security through equilibrium at lower rather than ever higher levels. He went on:

.../2

- 2 -

"Incidentally, that is very important to keep in mind when we are looking at future wars. Escalation of the type that is suggested in this question eventually will mean wars in outer space -- or, perhaps more realistically, the use of high-altitude satellites in order to seek a military advantage over the other side. That is ten or twenty years down the road; it is what people sometimes understand by Star Wars. It is a frightening prospect for all of us. It will be extraordinarily costly if we ever can reach that stage. It is likely to be extraordinarily destabilizing."

✓ Comment It is evident from remarks made later by Kenneth Dam that he drew, from this and subsequent remarks by the Prime Minister, an inference that the USA was being criticized for the stress the present administration has placed on defence effort as well as the emphasis it has given to military strength, with particular reference to nuclear weapons (vertical proliferation). The observation that might fairly be made is that a great many conclusions have been drawn regarding the implications and consequences of President Reagan's celebrated "Star Wars" speech of March 23, 1983 which bear little relationship to what President Reagan actually said on that occasion or, indeed, has said since. It is worth recalling that President Reagan's initiative was based in considerable measure on the conviction western publics would be unwilling to depend on a strategy of mutual deterrence or mutual vulnerability indefinitely and that other bases must be explored. The Prime Minister was absolutely right in his reference to all this being "ten or twenty years down the road". He is also correct about the costs involved. It is, however, less than certain that either the objective or the consequence of the major research effort proposed by President Reagan will be military advantage. It is also very early days to label either the effort or the result as "likely to be extraordinarily destabilizing". Indeed it could be argued that as part of his peace initiative the Prime Minister could as usefully promote collaboration between the super powers (and others) as proposed by President Reagan in his speech and since, to achieve an effective defence against ballistic missiles as to urge mutual forbearance in this area.

Item B In exposing his views on the baneful consequences of horizontal proliferation of the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons the Prime Minister said:

.../3

- 3 -

"There is something absurd in it, but the real absurdity is that the five nuclear weapon states have not been able to live up to the undertaking of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to reduce those nuclear weapons, to reduce the deadliness -- though in some cases they have reduced the quantity of them. And because the five nuclear powers have not lived up to their undertaking, the others, the non-signatories of the NPT, have said, "Well, since you can't live up to your obligations, we will seek to acquire the atom bomb". So you will have horizontal proliferation."

Comment There is no question that the nuclear weapons states which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty undertook particular obligations with respect to reduction of nuclear weapons. They (along with all other parties) undertook "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". It is, however, placing some strain on the terms of the agreement to suggest that in undertaking individually to negotiate in good faith they were thereby undertaking individually to reduce the quantity or the deadliness of those weapons in the absence of international agreements concerning them. The views of the United Kingdom, France and China regarding the possible reduction of their nuclear weapons capability has recently been made clear in their responses to the Prime Minister's suggestion regarding a Five Power Nuclear Conference. In the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty the position of China and France is particularly strong for neither France nor China is a party to that treaty.

Item C Kenneth Dam commented on what he called a misconception implicit in the Prime Minister's remarks that the USA "has been steadily building up the number and megatonnage of its nuclear weapons". The Prime Minister responded by observing that

- a. while numbers may have been decreased their deadliness and effectiveness have increased;
- b. the reduction by 1400 decided at Montebello relates to obsolete weapons or weapons which "made our flexible response (sic) strategy impossible";

.../4



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- c. one might wonder about the continued appropriateness of NATO strategy and speculate as to whether the President of the United States will really order a use of an atomic weapon, even in Europe, if he knows it is going to result in World War III.

Panel Chairman Raymond Barre, picking up the Prime Minister's last remark pointed to its inherent implications for the Alliance in terms of credibility, solidarity, pacifism and neutralism. To this the Prime Minister responded "I am not arguing that that should be the course. I am arguing that our strategy is not necessarily one which leads away from that course, in fact".

Comment a. While Kenneth Dam was referring to reductions in the US nuclear stockpile both globally and in Europe the Prime Minister would appear to have been focussing, in his remarks, only on delivery systems in Europe. It is true that the GLCM is a replacement for a delivery system (the bomber) whose survivability and capacity to penetrate enemy air defences has steadily eroded over the years. The improved capability of the GLCM over the bomber in these areas coupled with its highly accurate navigation and targetting system make it more effective though it is questionable whether it should be regarded as more deadly. A weapon capable of making a surgical strike on a relatively small target is more effective but less deadly than one that may need to obliterate a whole city in order to destroy a target located within it. It would, moreover, be difficult to justify in logic the replacement of relatively inaccurate or unreliable weapons with weapons that are even less accurate or reliable.

As regards the replacement of US Pershing I missiles by an equivalent number (108) of Pershing IIs two points should be noted. The first is that the Pershing I missiles which are under German control (the warheads remaining in US custody) will remain as an effective element in the spectrum of deterrent systems deployed in Europe. There is, therefore, no change in deadliness or effectiveness of weaponry at the ranges covered by the Pershing I. The second point is that the Pershing II has a strategic purpose which is quite different from that of the Pershing I - a purpose unrelated to the military effectiveness or deadliness of either weapon. The

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- 5 -

strategic purpose of the Pershing II is to bolster the deterrent value of aircraft and GLCMs capable of reaching targets on the territory of the Soviet Union. The Pershing II is the only land based ballistic missile system in western Europe which is capable of such ranges. It should also be noted that the range of the missile has deliberately been limited so that from the deployment areas for the Pershing II it cannot reach Moscow and thereby represent a "decapitating" first strike threat. The Pershing II (together with the GLCM) simply deprives the Soviet Union of its sanctuary from missile attack from western Europe while it continues the deployment of its own SS-20 missiles targetted on western Europe.

Comment b. It will be recalled that the decision taken at the NPG meeting in Montebello in October 1983 related to warheads in the nuclear stockpile in Europe. The responsibility for identifying and recommending the nature and location of the weapons systems involved was placed upon SACEUR who has yet to report his conclusions. Thus, for the time being what weapons will be affected by the decision is a matter for speculation. At the same time the identification of "Honest John", atomic artillery shells and land mines is probably not an unreasonable guess as to the candidates which will be among those put forward.

The Prime Minister appeared, however, to go on to argue that short range nuclear weapons are of doubtful utility because, given their range, they would have to be used early in a conflict or else they would be overrun and lost. This led him "into the whole question of whether the NATO overall strategy is the right one" and to speculate on US willingness to have its nuclear warheads employed if western Europe were to be overrun.

Comment c. Two fundamental questions have been raised by the Prime Minister:

- a. Is the NATO strategy of forward defence and flexible response still appropriate?
- b. Should obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty, as they have been interpreted for over three decades, be taken seriously if nuclear war might be the consequence?

.../6

- 6 -

These related questions do not admit of adequate treatment in the brief compass of this paper. Volumes have been written and literally thousands of hours have been spent by well informed and thoughtful people in discussing them. Still they yield no absolute answers, and cannot. Forward defence and flexible response is as much a peacekeeping as it is a war fighting strategy. It relies to a marked degree for its effectiveness as a deterrent to attack on a combination of certainty and uncertainty; certainty that capabilities across the full range exist and that there will be immediate resistance; and uncertainty in the minds of those who might be disposed to attack as to just what the response might be, as to how far the allied might go to defend their territories, and as to what level of violence the Alliance might rise in retaliation. In his comment on the Prime Minister's remarks Raymond Barre illustrated the fragility of the strategy when subjected to public scrutiny by responsible political leaders for the credibility of the strategy depends very heavily on the credibility of national, in particular, US undertakings. To ask the question is, in itself, to create doubt regarding the credibility of the undertaking. (To use the analogy of a marriage one might wonder as to the consequences for the relationship of the partners if one of them were to raise, purely as a matter of intellectual speculation, the possibility of divorce.)

*Public confidence*

A separate paper on the origins and nature of current NATO strategy is in preparation and will not be rehearsed here. It should, however, be borne in mind that no alliance strategy is likely to be effective if there is an absence of confidence among the allies as to their collective willingness to pursue it. It can of course be argued that in creating its own nuclear force, France displayed a lack of confidence in American credibility. But de Gaulle's purpose was different. He was concerned not only to provide a domestic rationale for the French nuclear force, he was also determined to link USA strategic forces ever more closely to Europe by providing an independent European trigger. Otherwise France, which for many years has stood outside the military arrangements of NATO, has studiously avoided criticism of alliance strategy. The anxieties created in Europe by Henry Kissinger in 1979 when, reflecting on his earlier responsibilities as US Secretary of State, he raised doubts about the reality of extended deterrence illustrate

.../7

- 7 -

the wisdom of French forbearance. It is worth recalling that in lamenting allied governments' excessive reliance on nuclear weapons, and the predicament in which they found themselves, Kissinger's purpose was to emphasize the need to create other, ie conventional, means to resist aggression.

Attached for information are a few editorials from Canadian journals on the Prime Minister's remarks in Davos.

J.F. Anderson

cc: DM  
CDS

MASTER FILE

Berlin, the Divided City:  
Political/Legal Status

Berlin symbolizes the division of Germany and the continuing potential for tension and confrontation in Central Europe with consequences extending beyond Europe. The status of Berlin is a vital element in inter-German relations and therefore East-West relations. Conversely, the state of East-West relations, and in particular those between the FRG and the USSR and the GDR, affect the environment in which Berliners live and work.

The status of the city rests on the so-called "original rights" of May 8, 1945, by which, after the unconditional surrender of Germany, sovereignty over Germany was transferred to the victors. The country was divided into three (later four) zones of occupation while Berlin, located 180 kilometers inside the then Soviet zone of Germany, became a special area under the joint occupation of the four powers and was itself divided into four sectors.

Tensions soon appeared in the Allied Control Council and on 16 June 1948 the Soviet representative left his seat in the Allied Kommandatura. This date also marked the start of the Berlin Blockade. Berlin had become the focus of the Cold War.

The Four Powers continue some joint functions which include the Air Safety Centre, the activities of which were not interrupted even during the Blockade, and supervision of the prison for war criminals in Spandau which now contains only one prisoner, Rudolph Hess. In addition military patrols continue in all sectors. The Soviet War Memorial in the British sector is guarded by Soviet troops, who are in turn protected by British soldiers and the Berlin civilian police.

The Soviet ultimatum of 27 November 1958 demanded the withdrawal of the troops of the Western powers and the conversion of Berlin (West) into a "free demilitarized city". Otherwise, the Soviet Union threatened to conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR, under which the rights of the Allies in Berlin would cease to exist. As this "offensive" policy proved fruitless, a "defensive" phase started in August 1961 with the construction of the Wall aimed at isolating the Western sectors and stopping the flow of refugees from the GDR. A year later, the Soviet city Kommandatura was dissolved and its duties passed to the military authorities of the GDR, which included East Berlin under its control and conscription regulations.

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On 28 June 1979 the East German authorities completed the integration of Berlin (East) into the GDR by legislating direct election of Berlin (East) representatives to the National People's Chamber.

Canada, like its NATO allies, has never accepted as legal the incorporation of Berlin (East) into the GDR and continues to regard Berlin (East) as the Soviet sector of Greater Berlin.

The Quadripartite Agreement signed in 1971 by Britain, France, the USA and the USSR did not endeavour to solve the problems of the legal status of Berlin; its aim was to establish practical arrangements regulating access to the city, ties between Berlin (West) and the Federal Republic, and visits between Berlin (West) and the GDR and Berlin (East). The agreement represents an equilibrium between three legal theories: the West German one, according to which "Berlin is a land of the Federal Republic (originally enshrined in an article - suspended by the Allies in 1950 - of the Basic Law or Constitution); the USSR/GDR theory according to which Berlin (East) is the capital of the GDR while Berlin (West) is a "third entity" separate from the FRG and the GDR; and finally, the Allied theory according to which the Allied Kommandatura had been instituted on the strength of agreements concluded between the four Occupying Powers which could be altered or abrogated only by agreement of all the parties, but certainly not unilaterally.

While it has provided for maintenance and development of "ties" between Berlin (West) and West Germany, the Quadripartite Agreement has not affected the notion that Berlin (West) is not a constituent part of West Germany and hence cannot be governed by it.

As a result of its special status, Berlin sends 22 representatives to the West German Bundestag and Bundesrat. These representatives have voice but no vote in plenary sessions. But they are permitted to vote in committees. Laws of the Federal Republic do not automatically apply to Berlin (West), but must be adopted by the House of Representatives by means of an "umbrella law". Berlin adopts most federal laws except those dealing with defence and security. The latter are still the sole responsibility of the Protecting Powers.

The legal responsibility for the "status and security" of Berlin rests with the Kommandatura or the Occupying Powers. They retain supreme authority although almost all civilian administrative functions have been

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turned over to the elected Berlin government. However, all legislation is vetted and may be vetoed if it is considered to alter the status or affect the security of the city.

The present role of the Western Occupying Powers is apparent from the usage of the term "Protecting Powers", for that is precisely what they do. They safeguard the legal position of the city as well as access to it by land and air. They maintain a garrison of some 13,000 troops in Berlin (West). The three Ambassadors (USA, UK, France) in Bonn are heads of their respective military governments. In the city, within each sector, there is a commandant (of major general rank), and a deputy commandant or minister who is a foreign service officer.

Notwithstanding its special legal position, Berlin is, in practical terms, firmly incorporated into the legal, economic and financial system of the Federal Republic.



TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À DMF (through IFB)

FROM/DE IDD

SUBJECT/SUJET Canadian Institute (Centre) for  
Peace and Security (Studies)

*MF*

Security Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
File Dossier	
Date	February 1, 1984

ATTACHMENT/Mémorandum to the Deputy Prime Minister and  
PIÈCE JOINTE Secretary of State for External Affairs (IDR-0384)

DISTRIBUTION	RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions) RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION (Noms des individus/Directions)	ACTION/SUITE À DONNER
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EXT 401



J.R. Francis,  
Defence Relations Division,  
2-7921

CONFIDENTIAL

February 1, 1984

IDR-0384

Memorandum for:  
The Deputy Prime Minister and  
Secretary of State for External Affairs

cc: Minister for International Trade  
cc: Minister for External Relations

SUBJECT: Canadian Institute (Centre) for Peace and  
Security (Studies)

PURPOSE:

To present Mr. Pearson's report to you on the proposed Canadian Institute for Peace and Security and to recommend what steps might be taken next.

DISCUSSION:

On the basis of a first round of consultations, Mr. Pearson has submitted a preliminary report on the publicly funded centre forecast in the Speech from the Throne. The report is brief and we suggest that you read it in its entirety, focussing particularly on the conclusions on pp 8-12.

Mr. Pearson has recommended that the institute should have four main objectives:

- (a) to survey and examine critically the ideas and proposals relating to international and Canadian security held by Canadians;
- (b) to make available to the public the main findings of research and investigation into these questions in other countries, especially as they affect east/west relations;
- (c) to stimulate and enhance Canadian research and teaching by bringing together scholars, officials, journalists and educators to discuss specific issues and projects, and by making funds available for research (criteria to be established);

.../2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

- (d) to bring to the attention of the government those ideas and proposals it believes merit political response.

He concludes that the terms of reference and modus operandi of the Institute require further consultation and thought. If it is decided to name soon a chairman of the Board or a founding committee and commit funds, the announcement should be sufficiently general to allow room for change in the mandate. SCEAND might be given a role, or the Chairman or founding committee might hold meetings or commission a study.

At a meeting of senior officials from the Department, National Defence and PCO/PMO, Mr. Pearson's conclusions were broadly endorsed, and a number of additional observations made:

- the Institute should be an addition to present governmental resources, not a substitute for them. The need to do research using classified material and to prepare confidential advice to Government will increase, not diminish; such activities should not be part of the Institute's responsibilities, since it's orientation should be entirely public in character;
- the Institute should probably concentrate more on policy questions than on "hardware" problems which could probably be best tackled within government;
- the Institute should not assume an advocacy role, and should not become part of the policy process, pushing fixed ideas or solutions;
- The Institute might be asked by Government to undertake specific research projects, but the results should be published, to demonstrate this organization was not in the government's pocket;
- because the Canadian community of defence and arms control and disarmament experts is small, the Institute would have to begin work on a modest scale, and be careful not to disrupt the work of existing institutions including universities;

RECOMMENDATIONS:

We recommend that you transmit copies of the report to the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence, and seek an early opportunity to discuss it with them.

We understand that the Prime Minister may wish to refer to the establishment of the Institute in his speech to the House next week. If he does, we believe it is important

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CONFIDENTIAL

... for him to seek all-party support for the Institute and to avoid setting unrealistic deadlines for the beginning of its functions. A proposed form of words is attached for your consideration and possible discussion with the Prime Minister. A text along these lines is included in the draft speech being telexed to Mr. Trudeau in Bucharest this evening for his consideration on the flight home.

Original Signed by  
Original signé par  
M. SHENSTONE

Original Signed by  
Original signé par  
de MONTIGNY, MARCHAND

M. Shenstone  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
Political and International  
Security Affairs

de Montigny Marchand

In the speech from the Throne last December, the Government announced its intention to create a publicly funded centre to deal with defence and arms control issues. I am pleased to report that preparatory work on this project has gone ahead at a rapid pace, and is continuing. The Centre will perform four principal functions:

- (a) to survey and examine critically the widest array of ideas and proposals relating to Canadian and international security;
- (b) to make available to the public the main findings of research conducted in Canada and other countries, especially as they affect East-West relations;
- (c) to stimulate and enhance research and scholarship in Canada;
- (d) to bring to the attention of the government and the public those ideas and proposals it believes merit political response.

The creation of this centre will enhance the ability of Canada and Canadians to play their full role in the great debate now taking place on international peace and security, and to help shape its outcome. It is an enterprise which merits the active support of all Canadians and I propose to consult the leaders of the other parties in the House on ways to ensure its rapid realization.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT PSR0228 01FEB84

TO DELHI

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REF YOURTEL WBGR0053 30JAN

---GANDHI-TRUDEAU MESSAGE

FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED 01FEB THROUGH INDIAN HICOMM OTT AND  
TRANSMITTED TO PCOOTT AND IDDZ.

QUOTE MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA,BEGINS:

NEW DELHI,JANURAY 25,1984.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

A DELEGATION OF THE PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR WORLD ORDER MET ME LAST  
WEEK TO DISCUSS THEIR PROPOSED INITIATIVE FOR RESUMPTION OF A  
CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE TO END AND REVERSE THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.  
I AM TOLD THEY ARE ALSO IN TOUCH WITH YOU.

THEY SUGGESTED THAT A FEW LEADERS SHOULD ISSUE A JOINT PUBLIC  
STATEMENT,INDICATING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HELP IN WHATEVER WAY  
POSSIBLE TO ARREST THE DETERIORATION IN THE NUCLEAR SCENE.I WELCOME  
THE INITIATIVE.THE CRISIS IS SO GRAVE AND STAKES SO OVERWHELMINGLY  
HIGH THAT EVERY SUCH EFFORT DESERVES SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT.YOUR  
OWN PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THIS CAUSE IS WELL KNOWN.

OBVIOUSLY,THE JOINT STATEMENT SHOULD BE ONE TO WHICH WE CAN ALL  
SUBSCRIBE.THE PWO TEAM PROPOSED THAT SENIOR OFFICIALS REPRESENTING

...2

PAGE TWO PSR0228 CONFD

THE LEADERS SHOULD MEET IN EARLY FEBRUARY TO DRAFT THE STATEMENT.  
WE HAVE NO/NO OBJECTION.

AS REGARDS THE MEETING OF THE LEADERS THEMSELVES,THE PWO DELEGATION  
FELT-AND I AGREE-THAT IT SHOULD BE CONVENED EARLY AND TO HAVE THE  
DESIRED IMPACT,IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HAVE THE PERSONAL PARTICIPATION  
OF THE HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT.

UNFORTUNATELY,IT IS NOT/NOT POSSIBLE FOR ME TO LEAVE INDIA IN THE  
NEAR FUTURE AS THE BUDGET SESSION OF OUR PARLIAMENT BEGINS IN  
FEBRUARY.I REALIZE,OF COURSE,THAT YOU ALSO HAVE MANY PRESSING  
PREOCCUPATIONS AT HOME.NEVERTHELESS,IF YOU DECIDE,AS I HOPE YOU WILL,  
TO LEND YOUR VALUED SUPPORT TO THE INITIATIVE,IT WOULD BE A GREAT  
HONOUR IF YOU COULD SPARE A DAY OR TWO IN EARLY MARCH TO COME  
TO DELHI.

BESIDES CANADA,THE PWO HAVE APPROACHED THE LEADERS OF SWEDEN,GREECE,  
SPAIN,ROMANIA AND TANZANIA.THEY ARE ALSO CONTACTING MEXICO.I AM  
WRITING SIMILAR LETTERS TO THESE HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT.

WITH WARM REGARDS,YOURS SINCERELY, INDIRA GANDHI.  
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU,PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA.  
ENDS.UNQUOTE.

2.GRATEFUL ANY INFO YOU MAY HAVE ON MTG BETWEN GANDHI AND  
PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR WORLD ORDER:WERE THERE ANY CDN MPS INVOLVED?

CCC/277 021904Z PSR0228

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO BGRAD

INFO BNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS BRU PRMNY

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IDR FPR

REF YOURTEL ZLGR3157 25JAN84

---PM INITIATIVE: INVITATION TO VISIT BULGARIA

BULG AMB PRESENTED INVITATION TO RGB/MOLGAT ON DAY OF PMS DEPARTURE  
FOR CZECHO.

2.RGB INFORMED AMB THAT GIVEN PMS TIGHT SCHEDULE,VISIT NOT/NOT  
POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME.HE UNDERTOOK HOWEVER TO HAVE INVITATION  
BROUGHT TO PMS ATTENTION PRIOR TO DEPARTURE ON EAST EUROPEAN  
SWING,AND ASSURED AMB THAT IT WOULD BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION  
FOR FUTURE.RGB STRESSED IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO EXCHANGES OF  
VIEWS WITH BULG AS REFLECTED IN ANNUAL POL CONSULTATIONS.

3.PM WILL IN DUE COURSE BE ANSWERING ZHIVKOV'S INVITATION.

CCC/088 012335Z RBR0221



MESSAGE

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File/Dossier

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
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INFO

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---PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE: DAVOS SYMPOSIUM

SUBJ/SUJ

SUMMARY: CANDEL DAVOS RECEIVED SUBSTANTIVE BUT CONTROVERSIAL  
COVERAGE (NOTE: PETRO-CDAS HOPPERS REPORTED CRITICAL REMARKS IN  
PARA 3 BELOW) IN 31JAN PRESS WITH FRONT PAGE ARTICLE IN GLOBE BY  
NORMAN WEBSTER ENTITLED QUOTE FIRA HEAD WARMS TONE IN PITCH TO  
EXECUTIVES UNQUOTE (SEE <sup>PRESSSCAN 31 JAN</sup> ~~REFTEL~~ FOR HIGHLIGHTS). ARTICLE  
ESSENTIALLY FOCUSSED ON FIRA COMMISSIONER RICHARDSON AND INTL  
TRADE MIN. REGANS EFFORTS AT DAVOS IN ENTICING FOREIGN INVESTORS  
TO CDA, AND FEATURED REMARKS BY MIN REGAN, RICHARDSON AND PETRO-  
CDA CEO HOPPER (SEE PARAS 2 TO 4 BELOW). 01FEB MORNING CP WIRES  
FEATURED MIN LUMLEYS REACTION TO PETRO-CDA HOPPERS CRITICISM OF  
FIRA AT DAVOS (SEE PARA 5 BELOW).

2. REPORT RICHARDSON AGREED (WITH JON PITHERS - ~~SAMRI~~ PLC OF BRITAIN <sup>HE (PITHERS) IS</sup>  
CRITICISM OF COSTLINESS OF FIRA TO FOREIGN INVESTORS) QUOTE ~~HE~~  
RIGHT ABOUT THE LAWYERS FEES. LORD, WEVE BUILT A LEGAL PROFESSION  
ON FIRA UNQUOTE. THE COMMISSIONER SAID HE WOULD BE LOOKING  
SERIOUSLY AT AN IDEA SUGGESTED YESTERDAY MORNING - THAT HE GO THROUGH  
THE FILES TO IDENTIFY PEOPLE WHO WERE TREATED BADLY UNDER THE OLD  
APPROACH AND SEND THEM A LETTER SAYING: QUOTE OKAY, LETS TALK...

.../2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG F. Gregory/jf

FPR

5-1874

SIG D. Buckley-Jones

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PAGE TWO FPR 0109 UNCLASSIFIED

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(RICHARDSON) QUOTE

(A) WHEN YOU TREAT A CUSTOMER BADLY, IT TAKES HARD WORK TO GET  
BACK ON GOOD TERMS WITH HIM UNQUOTE.

(B) HIS APPROACH THESE DAYS IS STRAIGHT<sup>T</sup> FORWARD, RICHARDSON SAID.  
QUOTE I TELL THEM THAT IT WASN'T<sup>NOT</sup> PERFECT THEN AND IT ISN'T<sup>NOT</sup> PERFECT  
NOW, BUT ITS CERTAINLY IS A HELL OF A LOT BETTER THAN IT WAS...

(RICHARDSON)

(C) ONE PROBLEME MAY BE THAT IM NOT DEFENSIVE ENOUGH. PEOPLE SAY:  
QUOTE WHY DONT YOU GET UP AND TELL THEM<sup>H</sup> NOW MUCH HARDER IT IS  
TO INVEST IN JAPAN, FOR EXAMPLE. BUT I DONT LIKE TO DO BUSINESS  
THAT WAY. ITS LIKE A CAR DEALER TRYING TO SELL CARS BY SAYING THERE  
ARE EIGHT MODELS THAT ARE WORSE THAN HIS. ITS A NEGATIVE APPROACH.  
UNQUOTE. AT YESTERDAYS SESSION, ONE QUESTIONER ASKED ABOUT DANGERS  
DOWN THE ROAD FOR A COMPANY THAT DEVIATED FROM THE PLAN IT FILED  
WITH FIRA TO GET ITS INVESTMENT ACCEPTED.

(D) IN RESPONSE TO <sup>(this)</sup> ~~A QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE~~ RICHARDSON SAID  
A DEFAULTING COMPANY FROM THE PLAN IT FILED WITH FIRA COULD BE  
TAKEN TO COURT, BUT HE COULD NOT RECALL ITS EVER HAPPENING.

<sup>(THAN RICHARDSON)</sup>  
3. HOPPER, OF PETRO-CANADA, PUT IT MORE BLUNTLY. QUOTE LET ME SAY  
SOMETHING THE COMMISSIONER CANT SAY: NOTHING REALLY HAPPENS  
WHEN A COMPANY DEFAULTS FIRA. THATS THE REALITY. ANY REASONABLY  
INNOVATIVE BUSINESSMAN CAN MOVE AROUND THE BUREAUCRATS UNQUOTE.  
HOPPER ADDED: QUOTE I LL TELL YOU SOMETHING ELSE THAT THE  
COMMISSIONER CANT SAY. I THINK ITS A VERY GOOD BET THAT THE ACT  
WILL BE CHANGED IN THE NEXT LITTLE WHILE TO STOP SOME OF THE



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SILLY STUFF THAT GOES ON. AND THERE STILL IS SOME UNQUOTE.

4. AT A LUNCHEON 30 JAN INTNL TRADE MINISTER REGAN ALSO LAID OUT THE WELCOME MAT: QUOTE THINK OF YOUR ENTERPRISES 50 YEARS DOWN THE LINE UNQUOTE,

HE SAID: QUOTE IF I HAD TO INVEST WITH A VIEW TO THE FUTURE, IF I HAD TO BUY INTO A COUNTRY THAT IS A GROWTH STOCK, I WOULD INVEST IN A COUNTRY THAT WAS UNDERPOPULATED, A COUNTRY ABUNDANT IN RESOURCES, A COUNTRY WITH A HIGHLY DEVELOPED EDUCATION SYSTEM, A COUNTRY THAT IS POLITICALLY STABLE UNQUOTE. ON EXTRA SELLING POINT FOR CANADA, HE SAID, IS THAT ITS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ALTERNATES BETWEEN TWO NON-SOCIALIST PARTIES WHILE THE SOCIALISTS ARE HIVED AWAY FROM POWER, NEVER WINNING MORE THAN 30 SEATS.

5. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF <sup>(C17et)</sup> MORNING CP WIRES:

(A) IT IS INACCURATE TO SAY THAT NOTHING HAPPENS TO COMPANIES THAT FAIL TO LIVE UP TO THEIR COMMITMENTS MADE TO FIRA, INDUSTRY MINISTER LUMLEY SAID TUESDAY. THE MINISTER SAID, HE WAS NOT AWARE OF COMMENTS REPORTEDLY MADE BY WILLIAM HOPPER, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF PETRO-CANADA, THAT QUOTE NOTHING REALLY HAPPENS UNQUOTE (WHICH HOPPER ALLEDGEDLY STATED AT THE DAVOS SYMPOSIUM).

(B) LUMLEY SAID THE AGENCY'S COMPLIANCE DIVISION HAS BEEN BEEFED UP BUT SAID HE COULDN'T THINK OF ANY COMPANY THAT HADN'T MET ITS COMMITMENTS, EXCEPT WHERE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS HAD CHANGED.

(C) AGENCY SPOKESMAN GORDON DEWHIRST SAID THAT IF ECONOMIC

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REASONS ARE BEHIND A COMPANYS FAILURE TO COMPLY THEN FIRA TRIES TO  
WORK OUT AN ARRANGEMENT TO GIVE THE COMPANY MORE TIME. HOWEVER,  
NO COMPANY HAS EVER BEEN TAKEN TO COURT FOR REFUSING TO CARRY  
OUT ITS UNDERTAKINGS, HE SAID.

(D) LUMLEY, ALSO SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY CHANGES BEING PLANNED  
TO THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACT. HOPPER REPORTEDLY SAID HE  
FELT IT WAS A GOOD BET THE ACT WILL BE CHANGED TO STOP SOME OF  
THE SILLY STUFF THAT GOES ON.

(E) THE PRESS REPORT SUGGESTED RICHARDSON IS ON A FENCE-MENDING TRIP  
AT DAVOS. HOWEVER, THAT SUGGESTION TOO WAS REJECTED BY LUMLEY WHO  
SAID: QUOTE WE DONT MAKE FENCE-MENDING TRIPS. I DONT THINK WE HAVE  
TO APOLOGIZE TO ANYBODY IN THE WORLD FOR INVESTING IN CANADA UNQUOTE.

mf

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT CPD0103 01FEB84

TO PMDELBUCAST DELIVER BY 020830

INFO PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON

DISTR USS DMF DMT CCB IFB RGB UGB (LDDZ IDR URR RBR MINA

---SPEECH FOR PM ON RETURN FROM EUROPE

BEGINNING IN PARA 2 IS REDRAFT OF SPEECH FOR PM.HAVE TRIED TO  
REFLECT COMMENTS CONVEYED BY FOWLER AND HANCOCK.TEXT HAS BEEN  
SEEN BY 8TH FLOOR.

2.BEGINS

WHEN THE FIRST ATOMIC BOMB EXPLODED IN A NEW MEXICO DESERT IN  
1945,LIFE ITSELF CHANGED.MAN GAVE HIMSELF THE POWER OF HIS OWN  
DESTRUCTION.

NEVER AGAIN WOULD CHILDREN BE FREE FROM THE FEAR OF THE BOMB.  
NEVER AGAIN WOULD WE PARENTS BE ABLE TO REASSURE THEM.NOR TO STILL  
OUR OWN ANXIETIES.

A NUCLEAR WAR WOULD MAKE NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN RICH OR POOR,  
BETWEEN WHICH SIDE OF THIS HOUSE WE FIND OURSELVES ON,BETWEEN  
EAST OR WEST,NORTH OR SOUTH,BETWEEN WHO IS RIGHT AND WHO IS WRONG.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXIST.THEY WILL PROBABLY ALWAYS EXIST.AND THEY  
WORK,WITH HORRIFIC EFFICIENCY.

WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO MANAGE THE RISK THEY PRESENT TO US ALL.  
NEVER AGAIN CAN WE PUT THE TASK OUT OF OUR MINDS;NOR TRIVIALIZE IT;  
NOR MAKE IT ROUTINE.

NOR DARE WE LOSE HEART.

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MANAGING THIS RISK IS THE PRIMORDIAL TASK OF BOTH EAST AND WEST. CANADIANS ARE CONCERNED THAT THE SUPERPOWERS MAY HAVE BECOME DIVERTED FROM THIS ELEMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY. THAT THE SUPERPOWERS MAY BE TOO CAUGHT UP IN IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION, IN COMPLEX THEORIES ABOUT DETERRENCE, IN ENDLESS MEASUREMENTS OF PARITY.

CANADIANS ARE TELLING US, AS PEOPLE EVERYWHERE ARE TELLING THEIR OWN LEADERS, THAT THE DANGER IS TOO NEAR. THEY WANT THEIR LEADERS TO ACT, TO ACCEPT THEIR POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY, TO WORK TO REDUCE THE NUCLEAR RISK.

LAST FALL I SPOKE OF AN OMINOUS RHYTHM OF CRISIS. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE CONFLUENCE OF THREE POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS TRENDS—THE RESORT TO FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES, THE RISK OF THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORSENING STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. I DECIDED TO USE CANADA'S INFLUENCE TO CALL INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO THE DANGER, TO TRY TO INJECT A JOLT OF HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL ENERGY INTO EAST-WEST RELATIONS, TO TURN THE TREND LINE OF CRISIS, TO WORK AT THE INTERSECTION OF COMMON INTEREST.

THE COMMON INTEREST IS REAL.

BOTH SIDES WISH TO BE FREE OF THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL WAR OR SURPRISE ATTACK.

BOTH SIDES HAVE AN INTEREST IN INCREASING SECURITY WHILE REDUCING THE COST.

BOTH HAVE AN INTEREST IN AVOIDING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

...3

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BUT TO BUILD ON THIS COMMON INTEREST THE MEGAPHONES MUST BE PUT AWAY, AN ARMISTICE DECLARED IN THE WAR OF IDEOLOGY, AN END MADE OF THE MANICHAISM OF BOTH SIDES.

#### THE INITIATIVE

SINCE LAST FALL I HAVE TRAVELLED TO BONN, LONDON AND PARIS, TO BRUSSELS, ROME AND THE HAGUE. I HAVE ATTENDED THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN INDIA. I HAVE GONE TO JAPAN. I HAVE MET WITH THE LEADERS OF CHINA, WITH THE POPE AND WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. I HAVE CALLED ON PRESIDENT REAGAN. I HAVE VISITED THREE CAPITALS OF EASTERN EUROPE.

MY MESSAGE IN EACH CASE WAS SIMPLE. CANADA WAS NOT LOOKING FOR A SEAT AT THE SUPERPOWER TABLE. BUT OUR LIVES AND OUR FUTURE WERE ON THAT ABLE. AND SO WERE EVERYONE ELSE'S. WE ALL HAD A RIGHT AND A RESPONSIBILITY TO INVOLVE OURSELVES, TO PRESS THOSE AT THE TABLE TO REMEMBER THEIR OWN HUMANITY, AS EINSTEIN ONCE URGED, TO MANAGE THE NUCLEAR RISK.

WE PROPOSE THAT A FORUM OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS BE ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE GLOBAL LIMITS AND, EVENTUALLY, REDUCTIONS TO THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. I SUGGESTED TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL THAT CONFIDENTIAL MEETINGS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE POWERS BE CONVENED IN NEW YORK OR GENEVA TO EXPLORE THE IDEA OF A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE. THE FIVE POWERS ARE THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THEY HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES AS WELL AS VETOES.

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AT EACH STEP ALONG THE WAY WE URGED ACTION TO REINFORCE THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO BE REVIEWED IN 1985. PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IN THE INTEREST OF SUPERPOWER, MIDDLE POWER AND MICROSTATE ALIKE.

AT EACH STEP ALONG THE WAY WE URGED THAT BOTH SIDES INVEST POLITICAL EFFORT TO STIMULATE THE TALKS IN VIENNA ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS. IF ENHANCED SECURITY CANNOT BE ACHIEVED THROUGH FORCE REDUCTIONS THE WEST MAY HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO PUT GREATER EMPHASIS ON ITS OWN CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE. CANADA WILL PLAY ITS PART EITHER WAY.

WE PROPOSED GIVING POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE CDE, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR IN EUROPE.

WE PROPOSED CONCRETE MEASURES TO INCREASE EVERYONES SECURITY-A BAN ON HIGH ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS, RESTRICTIONS ON THE MOBILITY OF ICBMS, IMPROVEMENTS IN THE VERIFIABILITY OF FUTURE STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS. IN THE ABSENCE OF A CHANGE IN POLITICAL DIRECTION, SCIENTISTS WILL BRING US FURTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, NOT FEWER, AND MORE DANGER, NOT LESS.

ABOVE ALL AT EACH STEP ALONG THE WAY I URGED POLITICAL LEADERS TO GET INVOLVED PERSONALLY, TO PUT PEACE AT THE TOP OF THEIR AGENDAS, TO EXERCISE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THE DANGEROUS SITUATION WE FOUND OURSELVES IN DEMANDED, TO RESTART THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. I TOLD PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT THE SIGNALS HE WAS SENDING ...5



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OF AMERICAN STRENGTH WERE BEING RECEIVED IN THE EAST BUT THAT THE MESSAGE OF PEACE WHICH HE WAS ALSO SENDING WAS NOT GETTING THROUGH.

#### SIGNS OF PROGRESS

THE MISPERCEPTIONS AND MISTRUST ON BOTH SIDES DID NOT MAKE THE TASK EASIER. BUT I BELIEVE WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE SIGNS OF PROGRESS.

IN GOA, COMMONWEALTH LEADERS DECLARED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO WORK FOR PEACE AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR MY EFFORTS TO RESTORE POLITICAL DIALOGUE AMONG THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.

IN BRUSSELS, NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS OFFERED THE EAST A BALANCED AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. THEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE WEST DID NOT ASPIRE TO STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY. AND THAT THE WEST RESPECTED THE SOVIET UNIONS LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS.

TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACHED TO HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE, THE NATO MINISTERS DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE THEMSELVES IN THE OPENING OF THE CDE, IN STOCKHOLM. THEY UNDERTOOK TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN STIMULATING PROGRESS AT VIENNA IN THE MBFR TALKS. THE NATO MINISTERS ALSO DECIDED TO COMMISSION A REVIEW OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

LAST MONTH, IN WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT REAGAN SIGNALLED A CONSTRUCTIVE TONE IN AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS THE USSR. THE RESPONSE FROM MOSCOW HAS BEEN STILL VERY CAUTIOUS, AND CAST IN RHETORICAL TERMS BETTER AVOIDED.

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LAST MONTH, IN STOCKHOLM THE WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS RESPONDED TO THE WESTERN INITIATIVE AND ALSO ATTENDED THE CDE. CONTACT AT SENIOR POLITICAL LEVELS WAS THUS RE-ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF EAST AND WEST. SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO MET WITH MY COLLEAGUE THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, AS WELL AS WITH OTHER NATO MINISTERS INCLUDING U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ. SINCE THOSE MEETINGS EAST AND WEST HAVE AGREED ON DATES FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF MBFR TALKS.

THE AMERICANS HAVE ALSO REITERATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RESUME TALKS IN GENEVA ON STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HAS EMBARKED UPON AN INITIATIVE OF HER OWN TO IMPROVE CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

IN MY TALKS WITH PREMIER ZHAO IN JANUARY I FOUND THAT THE CHINESE HAD WARMED TO THE IDEA OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO BEGIN TO REDUCE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS.

IN MY TALKS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS I FOUND, TO BE SURE, A PREDICTABLE ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSE OF THE CRISIS. BUT I ALSO FOUND A DESIRE FOR PROGRESS, A RECOGNITION OF THE ELEMENTAL NEED TO REDUCE THE NUCLEAR RISK.

I BELIEVE WE HAVE MADE PROGRESS.

I SOUGHT TO GET POLITICAL LEADERS MORE INVOLVED AND TO RE-ESTABLISH DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THAT IS HAPPENING. I SOUGHT TO PERSUADE BOTH SIDES TO TURN DOWN THEIR RHETORIC. I BELIEVE THAT THAT HAS NOW BEGUN TO HAPPEN, AS WELL. THE TREND LINE OF CRISIS HAS TURNED.

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MY TALKS WITH EAST AND WEST HAVE RENEWED MY CONFIDENCE IN A PROPOSITION WE ALL KNOW IN OUR HEARTS TO BE TRUE. PEACE IS POSSIBLE IF WE HAVE THE POLITICAL WILL TO CREATE IT.

BOTH SIDES AGREE A NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT BE WON.

BOTH SIDES AGREE A NUCLEAR WAR MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT.

BOTH SIDES SEE THE ARGUMENTS FOR REDUCING THEIR VAST INVENTORIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

BUT BOTH SIDES ALSO AGREE THAT A NUCLEAR WAR IS POSSIBLE. NOT PROBABLE, BUT POSSIBLE.

WAR COULD BE TRIGGERED BY MISCALCULATION. IT COULD ALSO START BY MISJUDGEMENT. OR GROW FROM A REGIONAL CONFLICT. WORLD WAR I BEGAN IN SARAJEVO. THE CURRENT CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THREATENS TO DRAW THE SUPERPOWERS INTO AN EAST-WEST IMPLOSION.

THE OBJECTIVE FOR US ALL, THEREFORE, IS TO WORK TO MAKE NUCLEAR WAR LESS PROBABLE. AND THERE IS PLENTY ON THE AGENDA.

#### THE AGENDA

OUR DELEGATION TO THE UN CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT WILL CIRCULATE THREE CANADIAN DISCUSSION PAPERS: ONE ON BANNING HIGH ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS, ONE ON RESTRICTING THE MOBILITY OF ICBMS, AND ONE ON ENHANCING THE VERIFIABILITY OF FUTURE STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS. EACH OF THESE MEASURES IS PRACTICAL AND USEFUL IN ITSELF. PROGRESS ON ANY ONE WOULD HELP. PROGRESS ON ALL THREE WOULD HAVE DISPROPORTIONATE BENEFITS ON THE CLIMATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. BUT THE VERY DISCUSSION OF THEM WILL IN ITSELF BE BENEFICIAL.

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IN THE SPEECH FROM THE THRONE LAST DECEMBER, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO CREATE A DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL CENTRE. PREPARATORY WORK ON THIS PROJECT IS WELL UNDER WAY. THE CENTRE WILL PERFORM FOUR MAIN FUNCTIONS.

IT WILL EXAMINE THE WIDEST ARRAY OF IDEAS AND PROPOSALS RELATING TO CANADIAN AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

IT WILL MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC THE MAIN FINDINGS OF RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN CANADA AND OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY AS IT AFFECTS EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

IT WILL STIMULATE AND ENHANCE RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP IN CANADA.

AND IT WILL BRING TO GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ATTENTION IDEAS AND PROPOSALS IT BELIEVES MERIT POLITICAL ACTION.

THIS CENTRE WILL ENHANCE THE ABILITY OF CANADA AND CANADIANS TO PLAY THEIR FULL ROLE IN THE GREAT DEBATE NOW TAKING PLACE ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AND TO HELP SHAPE THE OUTCOME OF THAT DEBATE. IT IS AN ENTERPRISE WHICH MERITS THE SUPPORT OF ALL CANADIANS. I PROPOSE TO CONSULT THE LEADERS OF THE OTHER PARTIES IN THE HOUSE ON WAYS TO ENSURE ITS RAPID REALIZATION.

WE LOOK TO MR PEREZ DE CUELLAR, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN, TO EXPLORE WITH THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HOW PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE AMONGST THEM TOWARDS A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE.

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TOGETHER, THE NUCLEAR POWERS HAVE PERHAPS 50,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE EXISTENCE OF SO MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS. OUR FAITH IN OUR OWN TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY TO CONTROL THEM CANNOT BE ABSOLUTE. ACCIDENTS DO HAPPEN; MISTAKES ARE MADE. JUMBO JETS ARE MISTAKEN FOR SPY PLANES. A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE SHOULD, THEREFORE, HAVE AS A FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS THE DISCUSSION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT, PARTICULARLY FOR HANDLING NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENTS, AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS.

I HAVE ASKED MY COLLEAGUE THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, TO KEEP THE IDEA OF A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE IN THE FOREFRONT OF HIS EFFORTS IN THE COMING MONTHS.

HE WILL ALSO MONITOR PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA CLOSELY. IF NECESSARY, CANADA WILL PROPOSE THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS AGAIN TAKE A PERSONAL HAND IN ENERGIZING THE TALKS IN THESE TWO FORUMS.

IMPORTANT AS THESE TALKS ARE, WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE MAIN ISSUE. IT IS VITAL THAT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS ON CONTROLLING AND REDUCING INTERMEDIATE RANGE AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE RE-ESTABLISHED. NO ONE IS ASKING THE SUPERPOWERS TO LOVE EACH OTHER. BUT THEY MUST NOT LET THEIR VIEWS OF THE MORALITY AND LEGITIMACY OF EACH OTHER PREVENT AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THEY MUST TALK; THEY MUST ACQUIT THEIR SUPER-RESPONSIBILITIES. THEY MUST FIND A WAY TO EMPLOY THE SAME TECHNOLOGICAL GENIUS, DEDICATION AND RESOURCES TO REDUCING THEIR ARMS AS THEY HAVE TO DEVELOPING THEM.

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SECURITY IS INDIVISIBLE. OUR SAFETY IS EVERYONES SAFETY. IF COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT NOW HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACQUIRE THEM, EVERYONES SECURITY WILL BE DIMINISHED. IT IS THE CURRENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES WHO HAVE THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE BASIS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) BARGAIN WAS THAT THE NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS IN RETURN FOR THE NON-NUCLEAR POWERS NOT BUILDING THEIR OWN. CANADA WAS THE FIRST COUNTRY TO RENOUNCE THIS OPTION. IN THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO NEXT YEARS REVIEW OF THE TREATY, WE WILL PRESS OTHERS TO KEEP THEIR END OF THE NPT BARGAIN.

THE EAST-WEST AND NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES ARE THE COMPASS OF OUR AGE. PROBLEMS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH CANNOT BE SOLVED IN THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS ON GLOBAL SECURITY. MASSIVE MILITARY EXPENDITURES ARE BEING MADE BY EAST AND WEST TO TRY TO BUY A GREATER MEASURE OF SECURITY. THESE EXPENDITURES ARE DISTORTING ECONOMIC POLICIES AND DIVERTING RESOURCES AWAY FROM GLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THIS IN TURN WORSENS THE THIRD WORLD INSTABILITIES THAT ENSNARE EAST AND AND WEST.

AND THE PROBLEM IS NOT READILY REVERSIBLE. WE WILL NOT BE EASILY FORGIVEN OUR NEGLECT. POVERTY AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE IN THE SOUTH TODAY BREEDS INSECURITY FOR OUR CHILDREN TOMORROW.

ALSO ON THE AGENDA IS NATO STRATEGY.

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SINCE 1967 NATO HAS RELIED ON A STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. FUNDAMENTAL TO THIS STRATEGY IS THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER AN ATTACK AT WHATEVER LEVEL THE EAST MIGHT INITIATE. NATO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES DO NOT PROVE ADEQUATE. THE CERTAINTY THAT NATO WOULD RESPOND AND THE UNCERTAINTY OF HOW IT WOULD RESPOND ARE CENTRAL TO THE DETERRENT DIMENSION OF THE STRATEGY. IT BEARS REPEATING THAT THE NATO ALLIANCE IS PURELY DEFENSIVE. IT WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO USE FORCE.

IT IS 16 YEARS SINCE THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WAS ADOPTED. IN THAT TIME, THE ADVENT OF STRATEGIC PARITY HAS ALTERED THE DETERRENT EQUATION. THE STATE OF MANS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE CATAclysmic CLIMATIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR HAS ADVANCED. YET NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NOT CONVENTIONAL FORCES, ARE STILL THE BACKBONE OF THE STRATEGY.

A NUMBER OF RESPECTED WESTERN POLITICAL FIGURES, ACADEMICS, RETIRED MILITARY LEADERS AND OFFICIALS HAVE BEGUN TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT EXISTING NATO STRATEGY. THE FORMER U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENCE, ROBERT MCNAMARA, HAS EXPRESSED DOUBT WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD INITIATE THE USE OF WEAPONS IN DEFENCE OF EUROPE, BEARING IN MIND THE RISK THAT DOING SO COULD TRIGGER AN ALL OUT NUCLEAR WAR. THE EMINENT AMERICAN SCIENTIST, CARL SAGAN, HAS ARGUED THAT NOT JUST THE SUPERPOWERS, AND NOT JUST EAST AND WEST, BUT ALL MANKIND MIGHT PERISH IN THE NUCLEAR WINTER OF A THERMONUCLEAR ATTACK.

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DO WE NOT HAVE TO ASK OURSELVES WHETHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS SERVE ANY MILITARY PURPOSE EXCEPT TO DETER THE OTHER SIDE FROM USING ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS? AND IF NOT, WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR NATO STRATEGY? THE NATURE OF OUR DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES PERMITS US, INDEED REQUIRES US, TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES. WE POLITICIANS HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO OUR PEOPLE TO ENGAGE OURSELVES AND TO KEEP THE STRATEGY'S BASIC PRINCIPLES UNDER REVIEW. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE WILL HAVE TO FACE THESE ISSUES IF WE WANT A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR TO FIND OUR DETERRENT CONVINCING.

LET ME BE CLEAR. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS IMPRESSED BY THE MEANS NATO HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO DEFEND ITSELF, AND BY THE DETERMINATION NATO ALLIES HAVE SHOWN TO EMPLOY THOSE MEANS IF NECESSARY.

IT IS TRUE THAT THERE IS AN IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THAT THIS IMBALANCE NEEDS TO BE CORRECTED—PREFERABLY THROUGH WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS OR, IF NECESSARY, THROUGH NATO INCREASES. BUT NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENCES ARE NOT A PUSH-OVER, AND SOVIET GENERALS WOULD BE INSANE TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK IN THE EXPECTATION OF A QUICK OR EASY VICTORY.

BUT WHAT I AM ARGUING FOR IS THAT WE TAKE ACCOUNT OF WHAT IS HAPPENING AROUND US, IN THE LABORATORIES AND IN THE MINDS OF MEN AND WOMEN, ON BOTH SIDES OF THE EAST/WEST DIVIDE, AND THAT OUR STRATEGY FOR ENSURING OUR SECURITY EVOLVE ACCORDINGLY.

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PAGE THIRTEEN CPD0103 REST

CANADA IS A WESTERN NATION, BY GEOGRAPHY, BY HISTORY AND BY VALUES. WE ARE NOT NEUTRAL. NOR ARE WE PACIFIST. CANADIANS HAVE FOUGHT AND DIED FOR WHAT THEY BELIEVED IN THE PAST; THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT THEY WOULD DO SO AGAIN. BUT CANADIANS ARE NOT NAIVE. THEY DO NOT WANT TO FIGHT A WAR THAT EVERYONE WOULD LOSE.

CANADIANS KNOW THE GRAVITY OF THESE ISSUES. THEY KNOW THAT CANADA'S POWER IS LIMITED AND THAT WE CANNOT FORCE OTHERS TO LISTEN TO US. THEY ALSO KNOW THAT IT ISN'T ENOUGH TO SIT ON THE SIDELINES, HOPING THE NUCLEAR WHISTLE WILL NEVER BLOW. THEY KNOW THERE IS A ROLE FOR THEIR COUNTRY TO PLAY. AND WE HAVE PLAYED IT.

I BELIEVE WE HAVE CATALYZED THE PEACE PROCESS AND HELPED TO MOVE IT OFF SQUARE ONE. BUT PEACE CANNOT BE A ONE-MAN OR ONE-COUNTRY JOB. THE ONUS TO ACT HAS NOW SHIFTED TO STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA, TO NEW YORK AND GENEVA, TO THE INSTITUTIONS WHERE THE BUSINESS OF PEACE IS CONDUCTED.

PEACE IS EVERYONE'S BUSINESS. IT IS THE COMPELLING PRIORITY OF MANKIND. BUT IT IS THE NUCLEAR POWERS, AND ABOVE ALL THE SUPERPOWERS, WHO BEAR THE GREATEST RESPONSIBILITY. LET IT BE SAID OF THEM IN THE FUTURE THAT THIS WAS THE TIME WHEN THEIR POLITICAL JUDGEMENT CONTROLLED THEIR TECHNOLOGICAL GENIUS, WHEN THEIR SELF-INTEREST WAS THE COMMON GOOD. BECAUSE IF HISTORY DOES NOT JUDGE THEM GENEROUSLY, THERE MAY NOT BE ANY JUDGEMENT AT ALL.

...14

PAGE FOURTEEN CPD0103 REST

I APPEAL TO ALL THE LEADERS OF EAST AND WEST, AS HUMAN BEING TO  
HUMAN BEING. LET NOT IDEOLOGY SUBSTITUTE FOR THOUGHT. LET NOT  
STATISTICS REPLACE POLITICAL JUDGEMENT. MAKE SCIENCE MANS SERVANT.  
REMEMBER YOUR HUMANITY. DISPEL THE SHADOW OF WAR.

CCC/045 020037Z CPD0103

*Concentre requested  
to action.  
2/2/84  
re*

ACTION

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PMSV0101 01FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PMDEL WSHDC BNATO BONN LDN PARIS ROME HAGUE COPEN MDRID

LSBON ATHNS ANKRA GENEV VMBFR MOSCO PRGUE WSAW BGRAD BPEST

BUCST STKHM BRU PEKIN PRMNY

REF CURTEL PMO0104 31JAN

ADD DISTR LINE QUOTE

DISTR MINA MINT MINE USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RBD RBR RCR IMD IDA IDR

FPR ZSI

UNQUOTE

ERROR REGRETTED.

UUU/001 011915Z PMSV0101



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

FACSIMILE

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	<b>C O N F I D E N T I A L</b>	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0116 01JAN84 <sup>FEB</sup>		
TO/À	TO USHDC/LYSYSHYN DELIVER BY 020900		
INFO			
DISTR	REF TELCON/LYSYSHYN/CALDER 01JAN <sup>FEB</sup>		
REF	P--PM INITIATIVE: SUFFOCATION		
SUBJ/SUJ	AS REQUESTED WE ATTACH VERSION OF DISCUSSION PAPER CIRCULATED TO NATO AS WELL AS COPY OF LATEST BRIEF ON THIS SUBJECT.		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

DR. K. CALDER

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

## MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.  
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC  
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSIDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and " (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.  
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

## PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:  
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC  
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et " (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:  
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quant il comporte une signature.

QUOTE

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WORKING PAPER OUTLINING MEASURES FOR RESTRAINING  
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY

SUBJECT

This paper outlines three measures designed to enhance strategic stability through placing restraints on military technologies and bolstering the capacity of arms control agreements to manage the strategic nuclear relationship.

BACKGROUND

These proposals, and their associated papers, elaborate on ideas advanced by the Prime Minister of Canada on November 13, 1983. They are designed to place realistic limits on new strategic weaponry, the development and deployment of which would render arms control negotiations more difficult, and would act to destabilize the global nuclear balance.

Historically, arms control negotiations have failed to limit satisfactorily or preclude the deployment of particular strategic weapons technologies whose characteristics have been such as to cause the stability of deterrence to erode. Such deployments have, in turn, encouraged the deployment of countervailing systems, and have rendered the task of future arms control negotiations far more difficult.

By addressing weapons systems yet to be developed or deployed, and by proposing the upgrading of existing verification provisions, it is intended that dangerous new avenues of the arms competition be shut off before the cycle of weapons development and deployment begins. It is thereby hoped that the strategic relationship between the nuclear powers will be restricted to more stabilizing technologies and deployments, and that the task of arms control will be made more manageable.

These proposals are designed to maximize negotiability and stability. Taken together, or singly (as listed below and described in Annexes 1 - 3), they would contribute to the stability of the nuclear balance and the progress of arms control:

- an agreement to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude Anti-Satellite systems

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- an agreement that states must demonstrate and ensure the verifiability of new strategic weapons systems
- an agreement to restrict the mobility of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).

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## MEASURE I

- I     Proposal:    An Agreement to Ban the Testing and  
                         Deployment of High-Altitude  
                         Anti-Satellite Systems (ASATs)

## II    Background/Rationale

1.    There is an increasing reliance on satellite systems for various strategic purposes; these include the verification of arms control agreements, intelligence gathering, meteorology, early warning, and strategic communications and navigation. This reliance is likely to increase in the future as the capabilities represented by space-based systems are exploited.
2.    In general terms, the use of satellites for passive military purposes is stabilizing. Although satellites may provide data and command and control capabilities useful for the initiation of conflict, the stabilizing functions of satellite technology override these concerns. Satellites are critical to the stability of deterrence and the progress of arms control. By providing warning, intelligence information, and secure command and control capabilities, satellites reduce the dangers of surprise attack and decrease incentives to adopt destabilising 'launch-on-warning' postures. In addition, by assuring more resilient control over retaliatory forces, the credibility of deterrence is enhanced.
3.    In terms of arms control, the ability of satellites to verify compliance with existing agreements (so-called National Technical Means (NTMs)) has proven critical to the negotiation of arms control measures particularly those pertaining to strategic weapons. Other methods of verification, including on-site inspection, have proven difficult to negotiate, and do not in and of themselves represent adequate verification provisions.
4.    In this connection, the ongoing development of anti-satellite capabilities is dangerous from the point of view of deterrence stability and



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prejudicial to the future success of arms control. One operational ASAT capability already exists, while other systems are approaching the testing and deployment stages.

5. As currently designed, however, these systems are only able to operate against satellites in low orbit. These satellites are primarily used for reconnaissance and meteorology. More critical satellites used for strategic command, control and navigation reside at higher altitudes. The most destabilising development in ASAT technology would, therefore, be the development of ASAT systems which were capable of operating at these higher altitudes.
6. It would seem, therefore, that an important step in negotiating an arms control regime for ASAT systems would be to ban the testing and deployment of systems capable of high altitude operation. This agreement would be valuable in its own right and might, in addition, be seen as a crucial first step towards an overall ASAT ban. By addressing systems yet to be developed, but whose development would be even more serious than current programs, negotiability may be enhanced.

### III Evaluation

#### (a) Stability

The majority of the most critical command and control and navigation satellites are currently placed in higher altitudes. If ASATs capable of destroying these satellites were banned, the stability of deterrence would be enhanced. Moreover, by creating a sanctuary for satellite deployment at these altitudes, there would be an incentive to move satellites increasingly into higher orbits, where possible. In addition, it should be noted that low altitude satellites, though important for arms control verification, are not generally considered to be as critical to the stable functioning of deterrence. Should an ASAT ban at higher altitudes be negotiable, and prove enduring, sufficient confidence may be created to ban or restrict other systems.

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(b) Negotiability

Currently deployed ASAT systems, or those under advanced development, are designed to provide matching low-altitude capabilities, to serve as a mutual deterrent against use and possibly as bargaining chips in future ASAT negotiations. They also seem intended to provide a military capability against low altitude satellites used to support general purpose forces.

No state has yet developed a high altitude ASAT capability. The reliance on high altitude satellites for critical command, control and communications systems is likely, however, to increase. The creation of a sanctuary at higher altitudes would preserve these satellites from potential destruction, thereby enhancing deterrence, and would foreclose a costly area of defence expenditure. These potential effects of a high altitude ASAT ban would be in the interests of all states concerned.

IV Details of Proposal

Although the precise nature and wording of the agreement should be left up to the negotiating parties, the following represent considerations which should be taken into account in constructing this proposal.

- (i) The ban should be on both deployment and testing. This arises from the fact that some systems may be difficult to distinguish from others in terms of their high-altitude capability. However, no party would contemplate deployment and use of a high altitude system without testing. Such testing, moreover, could be detected using ground and space-based systems.
- (ii) A ban on development is unlikely to be successful. States may insist on maintaining an active R and D program to avoid unanticipated developments and deployment by the other side. Moreover,

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a ban on development would be difficult, if not impossible, to verify, even with more intrusive methods of inspection.

- (iii) The definition of 'testing' would have to be carefully worked out. It is possible, for example, to test an ASAT system without exploding the destructive mechanism. This may, therefore, require limitations on the proximity of satellites to each other and other measures such as limits on the testing of crucial ASAT components.
- (iv) ASATs can be deployed in a variety of basing modes. To secure agreement, a ban on land, sea, air and space-based systems would be the most advantageous.
- (v) All destructive mechanisms should be precluded including high explosives, nuclear weapons, lasers, particle beams, and direct kinetic kill.
- (vi) The altitude limit should be established at the maximum operational altitude of existing and developing systems. This would have to be resolved through negotiation. Distinguishing between high and low altitude systems would pose problems for verification. This might only be able to be drawn by the monitoring of testing against high altitude targets.
- (vii) A mechanism such as a Standing Consultative Commission is likely to be necessary to provide a forum for information exchange and to deal with compliance issues.
- (viii) All states should be encouraged to join this agreement.
- (ix) Verification arrangements would be difficult to agree upon given the existence of many devices with a marginal ASAT capability and the dynamic state of ASAT technology. Nevertheless, given the high value placed on high altitude satellites, it should be possible to establish an adequate verification regime.

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## MEASURE II

### I Proposal

An Agreement that States must Demonstrate and Ensure the Verifiability of New Strategic Weapons Systems.

### II Background/Rationale

1. A central concern of arms control negotiations has always been the verifiability of provisions in the resulting agreements. Such verification is deemed necessary in order to ensure compliance, thereby enhancing mutual confidence, and preventing clandestine measures intended to circumvent treaty provisions.
2. Hitherto, verification means have resided primarily in so-called National Technical Means (NTMs). These include satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, radar facilities, etc. It has generally been felt that the types of technologies and the manner in which they have been restricted by past arms control agreements have been such as to allow for adequate verification utilizing NTMs. This is reflected in the absence of the requirement for on-site verification provisions in past strategic arms control agreements, and the provisions contained therein which oblige the participants to refrain from measures designed to interfere with the operation of NTMs.
3. Verification, however, is likely to become increasingly difficult as new strategic technologies are developed and deployed. Weapons developed without adequate attention to verifiability may make arms control negotiations increasingly difficult, may increase distrust as to treaty adherence, and may thereby act to decrease overall deterrence stability.
4. There are essentially two approaches to dealing with this problem. The first, on-site verification, has become increasingly relevant to ongoing arms control negotiations and the technologies they seek to limit. Such measures may, however, be inadequate, or difficult to

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negotiate to the mutual satisfaction of the parties concerned. Therefore, the second approach to verification, that secured through National Technical Means, may require strengthening. Were measures agreed to and undertaken to ensure the verifiability of weapons to be deployed, through National Technical Means, the requirement for on-site or co-operative verification may be somewhat alleviated.

5. In this connection, it may be desirable to alter existing provisions concerning verification by National Technical Means. Thus far, it has simply been required that there be non-interference in the operation of NTMS, together with provisions designed to preclude concealment measures which are intended to impede verification by NTMS. Enhanced verifiability by NTMS may be secured if the party deploying a given weapon system is required to demonstrate that the system is indeed verifiable by NTMS. If the deploying party is unwilling or unable to do so to the satisfaction of others, the deploying party would be required to suggest other verification provisions which would ensure verifiability. Were these acceptable to the non-deploying party, such other verification provisions as agreed to would immediately become reciprocal for both parties in terms of similar weapons systems.
6. The net effect of such provisions would be such as to ensure that strategic weapons systems are designed and deployed so as to be verifiable by NTMs, or by NTMs and a combination of other verification techniques acceptable to the parties concerned.

### III Evaluation

#### (a) Stability

As explained earlier, the enhancement of confidence in the adherence of the parties to arms control agreements is highly stabilizing. Verifiability is necessary for such mutual confidence. Given the potential development of new strategic weapons technologies which are difficult to verify by NTMs, the effect of this

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proposal would be such as to increase the incentives to design weapons systems which were verifiable by NTMS. Were systems designed which were not verifiable by NTMS, there would be a requirement to agree to additional reciprocal on-site or co-operative measures. This would enhance deterrence stability through encouraging the verifiability of weapons systems, particularly of those new systems which were allowed by an arms control agreement, but whose characteristics would be such as to hamper verification.

(b) Negotiability

Although parties to arms control negotiations have displayed varying degrees of concern as to the question and methods of verification, all states share a general interest in maintaining adequate verification capabilities. This commonality of interest is likely to increase as new technologies are developed which would greatly impede the verification task. Given the reciprocal nature of this proposal, the parties to arms control negotiations should regard this measure as roughly equal in its effects.

V Details of Proposal

The precise nature and wording of the proposal should be left up to the parties concerned. Discussions as to verifiability and verification mechanisms should take place in a verification body which would serve as an adjunct to the Standing Consultative Commission created by the SALT I and SALT II agreements.

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### MEASURE III

#### I Proposal:

An Agreement to Restrict the Mobility of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).

#### II Background/Rationale

1. At the centre of a stable deterrence system is the maintenance by both sides of a secure capacity for retaliation. If both sides maintain such a capability, neither will attack first, out of fear that such action could trigger a devastating response. On the other hand, a capability to engage in a disarming first strike against the nuclear forces of one's opponent would be destabilizing. Such a capability could generate fears of attack in a crisis, perhaps inducing the opponent to strike first in order to avoid being disarmed. Pressures to develop an equivalent capability could be created; the prospects for meaningful arms control would be seriously eroded. The confidence of states in their ability to retaliate, and therefore to deter, would be seriously eroded and the stability of the deterrence system as a whole would suffer.
2. In recent years concern has developed that such instabilities may be developing in the strategic balance. Trends in ICBM force characteristics (numbers, accuracy, destructive power, etc.) have led many to conclude that ICBM forces may be increasingly vulnerable to a disarming strike. Indeed, it is on the basis of such conclusions that radical reductions are being sought in ICBM assets at the START negotiations, and that planning is underway to move to less vulnerable basing modes for ICBM forces and single warhead ICBM's.
3. Of course these concerns over vulnerability apply primarily to one element of the triad of nuclear forces; bomber and submarine forces are not, at this time, considered to be vulnerable to the same degree. What is troubling is the possibility that the most reliable, capable and hitherto secure forces may be threatened. Although the logic of this concern is open to

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debate, given the invulnerability of other elements of strategic forces, states nevertheless attach significance to the ICBM vulnerability issue, and are modernizing their forces partly as a consequence of this concern. In addition, problems at arms control talks have resulted from demands for reductions in ICBM capability.

4. In response to this issue, the development of mobile ICBM systems has begun. In general terms, such moves help to defuse the vulnerability question, and enhance the prospect for stable deterrence. Greater success in arms control negotiations may be expected as both sides would have reduced incentives - and capabilities - in the counterforce area.
5. It is possible, however, that a move towards mobility may be destabilizing because of the consequent difficulty this would pose in verifying by so-called National Technical Means (NTMs) (Satellites, radars, etc.). If this were allowed to transpire, arms control could become difficult to negotiate, and fears of "breakout" (unauthorized sudden increases in forces) could produce pressures for larger forces and generate considerable instability in the deterrence system.
6. It will be necessary and desirable, therefore, to preclude such developments through adequate verification procedures and force deployment patterns. On-site inspection and remote sensing may provide for some assurances in this regard, but are unlikely to be in and of themselves adequate. Perhaps more promising is the possibility of prior agreement to configuring mobile ICBM forces in such a manner that verification by National Technical Means (NTMs) is possible.
7. Some possible elements of this proposal are presented in Section IV, but details should be left up to the powers to negotiate. These details relate to as yet undetermined, but critical, factors such as mobile ICBM force size, and the characteristics of the missiles themselves.



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### III Evaluation

#### (a) Stability

As explained earlier, to the extent that mobile ICBMs are deployed, the stability of deterrence may be bolstered as there would be reduced first strike fears and incentives. If these deployments were accompanied by adequate verification procedures resulting from various agreed restrictions on ICBM mobility and deployment, arms control agreements legitimizing this shift in strategic forces in more stabilizing directions would become easier to secure. In addition, fears of unauthorized deployments would be reduced, if not eliminated.

#### (b) Negotiability

As noted earlier, there is likely to be a general move in the direction of mobile ICBMs. All states are likely to be in favour of measures designed to enhance the verifiability of such deployments, particularly if such measures would reduce the requirement for intrusive verification procedures.

### IV Details of Proposal

Although the precise nature and wording of the proposal should be left up to the negotiating parties, the following represent considerations which should be taken into account in constructing this proposal.

#### i) Designated Areas of Deployment

The parties would agree to deploy mobile ICBMs only in certain fixed locales to be identified by agreement. Systems located outside these areas would be considered a violation of the agreement.

#### ii) Size and Nature of Deployment Area

In order to assist in verification, the size of the deployment area at the locales

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identified in (i) above would have to be identified. These areas, in turn, should be distinguishable from surrounding territory, ideally by man-made barrier. In addition, designated entry and exit points for missiles being deployed or removed for repair or testing should be agreed to.

iii) Frequency of Movement

In addition to the above measures, it may be desirable to limit the frequency of movement of the missiles in order to assist satellite verification. Movement frequency would be established to enhance verifiability without thereby increasing vulnerability.

iv) Missile Storage

It may be desirable to establish guidelines for the storage of replacement and surplus missiles in order to enhance confidence that missile reload/refires are not being clandestinely deployed.

UNQUOTE

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PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE  
SUFFOCATION MEASURES

Issue:

To discuss the status of the three suffocation measures.

Background:

In his November 13 speech the Prime Minister put forward three new measures to further his strategy of suffocation. He announced that Canada would be advocating international agreement (a) to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems, (b) to restrict excessive mobility of ICBM's and (c) to require that future strategic weapon systems be verifiable by national technical means. These measures are designed, not to reduce existing weapon systems, but to forestall the development of potentially destabilizing technologies. The ASAT proposal would be a first step in dealing with the threat to satellites, would not involve the abandonment of any existing systems and would protect the most important satellites, those used for strategic command, control and communication. The second measure responds to the threat to arms control, through verification, posed by mobile ICBM's. The third seeks to facilitate future arms control by anticipating and avoiding verification problems. Of these three proposals, the one on ASAT has attracted the widest support from the public and from informed commentators. It is the most substantive, and the most important for future arms control.

At Meach Lake it had been decided that while these rather technical measures would be enunciated publicly they would not be pursued personally by the Prime Minister with other governments. For that reason the Prime Minister did not raise them in his visits to foreign capitals. On November 28-29 a member of the Task Force visited Washington in order to discuss the substance of these measures with experts in the State Department and ACDA. A discussion paper, explaining these measures, is attached.

Canadian Position:

The Canadian position is that discussion papers on these measures will be tabled by Canada in the CD when it reconvenes in February.

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Position of Others:

The USA is not enthusiastic about the proposal for a ban on high altitude ASAT systems, citing problems of verification as a major weakness of this proposal. There is evidence to suggest, however, that the real explanation for the negative American reaction is that there are significant elements in this administration that see space as providing an opportunity for a technological "end run" around the Soviet Union and, therefore, do not want to be inhibited by arms control. On the question of mobility of ICBM's, USA experts reacted positively to the Prime Minister's proposal, indicating that they were working along similar lines but that it was too early to be more forthcoming. USA experts were leary about the Prime Minister's proposal in NTM's arguing that the acceptance of such a proposition would inhibit the activities of a democratic government while having no effect on an authoritarian one. The UK and the FRG have reacted cautiously, claiming that these measures are for the superpowers. Norway has expressed its support. In consultations with Pearson the Soviets would not comment in these measures but were not negative. The Chinese were non-committal.

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QUOTE

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- 2 -

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## MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

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SECURITY  
SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL CDN EYES ONLY

12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0115 01FEB84

TO/À

TO PMDELBUCST DELIVER BY 020800

INFO

DISTR

---PM INITIATIVE:NEXT SPEECH

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

FOLLOWING MEMO TO PM, SIGNED JOINTLY BY DMF/MARCHAND AND IDDZ/DELVOIE,  
SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO HIS ATTN IN CONJUNCTION WITH DRAFT SPEECH TO  
BE FORWARDED BY SEPARATE TEL.

2.TEXT BEGINS.

AT YOUR REQUEST, WE HAVE INCLUDED IN YOUR DRAFT SPEECH FOR FEB9 A  
PASSAGE RAISING QUESTIONS REGARDING THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THE  
NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND THE USA COMMITMENT TO USE  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DEFENCE OF WESTERN EUROPE IN THE EVENT OF A  
SUCCESSFUL CONVENTIONAL ATTACK BY THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. AS WE  
HAVE ALREADY INDICATED, WE CONSIDER THAT THESE ARE ALL VALID  
QUESTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE POSED IN THE CONTEXT OF A REVIEW OF NATO  
STRATEGY, TO BE LAUNCHED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME WITHIN THE COUNCILS  
OF THE ALLIANCE AND TO BE UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT PREJUDGING ITS OUT-  
COME. KEY TO THE SUCCESS OF ANY SUCH ENTERPRISE, HOWEVER, WILL BE  
QUESTIONS OF TIMING AND PRESENTATION, AS WELL AS IN-DEPTH DIPLOMATIC  
CONSULTATIONS TO ENSURE THAT A COALITION OF SIGNIFICANT NATO  
COUNTRIES IS PREPARED TO BACK THE PROJECT FROM THE OUTSET. WE  
BELIEVE IT NECESSARY, HOWEVER, TO DRAW TO YOUR ATTENTION SOME OF THE  
DRAWBACKS OF BROACHING THESE SUBJECTS IN A SPEECH ON THE FLOOR OF  
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, WHICH WILL BE REGARDED AS AN AUTHORITATIVE

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A. Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG de Montigny Marchand

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PAGE TWO IDDZ0115 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

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PUBLIC STATEMENT OF THE VIEWS AND THINKING OF THE CDN GOVT:

**LEADERS AND INDEED THEIR**

(A) RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, MOST NATO **LEADERS AND INDEED THEIR** NATIONS FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE MUST REST ON THREE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS RELATED TO THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE WARSAW PACT: (1) CERTAINTY REGARDING NATO MILITARY CAPABILITIES; (2) SOME DEGREE OF CERTAINTY REGARDING NATO POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTENTIONS; AND (3) SOME DEGREE OF UN/UNCERTAINTY REGARDING NATO POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTENTIONS. IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR DECISION AND ACTION BY NATO TO ACHIEVE TOTAL MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE WPO AND TO MAKE USE OF ALL ASPECTS (CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR) OF THAT SUPERIORITY IN THE EVENT OF WAR, THE NATO DETERRENT WILL CONTINUE TO RELY HEAVILY ON THE ELEMENT OF UN/UNCERTAINTY OF INTENTIONS. WHILE CLARIFYING CERTAIN AMBIGUITIES IN NATO DOCTRINE MAY BE INTELLECTUALLY ATTRACTIVE, IT IS UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES **BY MOST** REGARDED AS STRATEGICALLY UNSOUND. THE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE, WHICH IS AIMED AT ENSURING THAT THE WEAPONS ON WHICH IT IS BASED WILL NEVER HAVE TO BE USED, GAINS STRENGTH AND CREDIBILITY FROM THE FACT THAT NO/NO OPTIONS ARE FORECLOSED. CONVERSELY, ITS CREDIBILITY IS WEAKENED BY FORECLOSING OPTIONS AND REMOVING THE ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY, THUS PERMITTING MORE PRECISE CALCULATIONS BY THE POTENTIAL ADVERSARY OF THE MORE LIMITED RISKS INVOLVED IN LAUNCHING A WAR.

(B) SOME OF THE QUESTIONS RAISED TO DATE BY RETIRED WESTERN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONCERNING THE USA'S COMMITMENT TO USE NUCLEAR

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WEAPONS IN DEFENCE OF EUROPE HAVE NOT/NOT OBJECTIVELY HAD THE EFFECT  
OF WEAKENING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NATO DETERRENT IN THE EYES OF  
THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES. THE MOST COGENT ARGUMENTS ADVANCED  
IN THIS REGARD ARE THOSE PUT FORWARD BY FORMER USA SECRETARY OF  
DEFENCE ROBERT MCNAMARA. HE HAS INDICATED THAT BETWEEN 1961 AND 1968  
HE HAD RECOMMENDED TO PRESIDENTS KENNEDY AND JOHNSON THAT THEY  
NEVER BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND HAS SAID THAT HE QUOTE  
BELIEVED UNQUOTE THAT THEY ACCEPTED HIS ADVICE. THESE REVELATIONS  
CAME FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER THE FACT AND, OF COURSE, OFFERED NO/NO  
SUGGESTION--LET ALONE GUARANTEE--THAT THESE VIEWS WERE HELD BY  
SUBSEQUENT USA ADMINISTRATIONS. IN THE EYES OF THE SOVIET UNION,  
THEREFORE, THE ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE NATO STRATEGY OF  
DETERRENCE CONTINUED TO PREVAIL; IT NO/NO DOUBT CONTINUES TO PREVAIL  
TODAY WITH RONALD REAGAN IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND CASPER WEINBERGER  
AT THE PENTAGON.

(C) RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, QUESTIONS RAISED PUBLICLY ABOUT THE VALIDITY  
OF THE USA COMMITMENT TO EUROPE ARE VIEWED BY THE USA GOVERNMENT AS  
ATTACKS UPON ITS HONOUR, ITS RELIABILITY AND ITS LOYALTY TO ITS  
ALLIES. RAISING SUCH QUESTIONS IN PUBLIC CAN ONLY HAVE AN ADVERSE  
EFFECT UPON THE PURSUIT OF CANADIAN INTERESTS WITH AN ADMINISTRATION  
THAT STILL HAS ONE MORE YEAR IN OFFICE AND MAY WELL HAVE FIVE MORE  
YEARS IN OFFICE.

(D) ALL THE EVIDENCE WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO COLLECT INDICATES CLEARLY

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PAGE FOUR IDDZ0115 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

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THAT OUR MAJOR WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTNERS (THE FRG, FRANCE AND  
BRITAIN) ARE FIRMLY OPPOSED AT THIS TIME TO ANY CALLING INTO  
QUESTION OF THE NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, BOTH FOR  
STRATEGIC REASONS AND FOR REASONS OF NATIONAL POLITICS. THE FRG IN  
PARTICULAR, WHICH HAS JUST RECENTLY RECOVERED FROM A SHATTERING  
DEBATE OVER THE DEPLOYMENT OF INF SYSTEMS, DOES NOT/WISH SO  
SOON TO REOPEN THE POLITICAL WOUNDS TO WHICH IT GAVE RISE. FURTHER-  
MORE, THE FRG, WITH LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF WARSAW PACT FORCES ON  
ITS DOORSTEP, HAS FOUND IT POLITICALLY NECESSARY UNDER SUCCEEDING  
GOVERNMENTS NOT/NOT TO CLARIFY SOME OF THE AMBIGUITIES WHICH EXIST  
IN THE CURRENT NATO STRATEGY. AMONG OTHER NATO COUNTRIES, ONLY THE  
NETHERLANDS AND NORWAY MIGHT CONCEIVABLY SEE MERIT IN A REVIEW OF  
NATO STRATEGY, AND EVEN THEY WOULD INSIST THAT IT BE CONDUCTED  
WITHIN THE PRIVACY OF NATO COUNCILS. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, OUR WESTERN  
EUROPEAN PARTNERS REGARD THESE IDEAS AS UNWELCOME AT THIS TIME AND  
THEIR PUBLIC ESPOUSAL BY CANADA COULD HAVE A DETRIMENTAL IMPACT ON  
THEIR GOVERNMENTS ATTITUDES TOWARD CANADA.

(E) MANY OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF WESTERN EUROPE HAVE BEEN AMONG THE  
PRINCIPAL SUPPORTERS OF YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE AND IT WOULD SEEM  
UNDESIRABLE TO ALIENATE THAT SUPPORT.

(F) IN MANY QUARTERS IN CANADA AND ABROAD, ANY PUBLIC QUESTIONING  
OF CONTINUED RELIANCE ON THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT IN DEFENCE OF  
EUROPE HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE VIEWED AS HYPOCRITICAL ON

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THE PART OF CANADA, WHICH LIES FOUR THOUSAND MILES FROM THE FRONT  
LINE OF CONFRONTATION, COMFORTINGLY SHELTERED BY THE USA STRATEGIC  
NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. WHILE CANADA'S CREDIBILITY IN PUTTING FORWARD  
THESE IDEAS MIGHT BE IMPROVED IF ACCOMPANIED BY A FIRM CANADIAN  
COMMITMENT TO SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE LEVEL OF CONVENTIONAL  
FORCES COMMITTED TO NATO, THE PUBLIC ENUNCIATION OF THE IDEAS THEM-  
SELVES WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE CONSIDERED UNWELCOME IN WESTERN EUROPE  
AND THE USA ON BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL GROUNDS.

3. WE CONSIDER THAT THE ARGUMENTS OUTLINED ABOVE ARE OF SUFFICIENT  
WEIGHT IN TERMS OF WESTERN STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND OF THE CANADIAN  
NATIONAL INTEREST THAT WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND AGAINST YOUR RAISING  
THESE QUESTIONS PUBLICLY IN YOUR FORTHCOMING SPEECH.

L A DELVOIE  
CHAIRMAN  
TASK FORCE WORKING GROUP

DE MONTIGNY MARCHAND  
DEPUTY MINISTER FOR  
POLITICAL AFFAIRS

4. TEXT ENDS.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SIG J. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG L.A. DELVOIE



SECRET

23

PUBLICATION

The Ottawa Citizen

DATE

Jul 31 1982

QUOTE

## Self-inflicted wounds

The prime minister's peace mission, not much helped by pats on the head and lukewarm endorsements, suffered more serious damage in Switzerland. And it was self-inflicted.

The prime minister used his particular brand of circuitous rhetoric at a symposium in Davos to cast doubt on the credibility of the U.S. commitment to NATO.

Trudeau implied (see text on the opposite page) that the United States might not be prepared to use nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet attack on Western Europe with conventional forces.

This question, as Trudeau rightly indicated, is a crucial one in Europe. It has been for a long time, since it is the cornerstone of NATO policy. As former French premier Raymond Barre strongly — but courteously — implied, the question should not have been put because it undermines the credibility of the Western alliance and the policy of deterrence.

Trudeau plays right into the hands of Soviet propagandists when he leaves it open for anyone to get the impression that he himself doubts the integrity of the American promise to Europe. He may, in

the days to come, try to waltz around his own culpability by playing semantic games, but that won't wash.

The prime minister of Canada, the leader of a country that is part of the Western alliance and a bilateral ally of the U.S., appears to have hinted that he doubts the determination of Washington.

Yet he wants still to be the statesman who brings the heads of the world's nuclear governments to the negotiating table. How can he hope to succeed if he insults or undermines one of the protagonists he wishes to convince?

Clearly, he can't.

Last year the prime minister impugned President Reagan with a similarly-constructed oblique denunciation, saying that some people see the president as warlike. He referred to critics in the Pentagon as "pipsqueaks." And now he has made it easy for Europeans to believe that even he doesn't believe American promises.

One of the people at the same symposium was U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam. We can assume that his report back to the administration will fall a good distance short of warm approval of the Trudeau initiative.

UNQUOTE



External Affairs    Affaires extérieures  
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- MGTC M. FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

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QUOTE THE NUCLEAR QUESTION UNQUOTE.

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*J. McNEE*  
J. McNEE

IDDZ

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*L.A. Delvoie*  
L.A. DELVOIE

# The nuclear question

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QUOTE

Truth may be stranger than fiction, but it is not always more advantageous. In asking rhetorically whether the American nuclear umbrella over Western Europe is collapsible, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau undermines a useful fiction of the Western alliance and replaces it with an awkward truth.

In Davos, Switzerland, Mr. Trudeau asked former French Prime Minister Raymond Barre, "Do you think the President of the United States, in answer to an overrunning of Europe by conventional Soviet forces, will want to start World War III, an atomic war?"

When the U.S. enjoyed a post-war atomic monopoly, it almost certainly would have employed it to counter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. But that probability became only an outside possibility as the Soviet Union acquired the capability to launch a nuclear strike on the U.S.

Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle both realized in the 1950s that the U.S. nuclear umbrella was becoming frayed. (Paris might be worth a mass, but would it be worth World War III to the U.S.?) Britain and France therefore each invested in an independent nuclear capability that would allow them individually to deter a conventional attack by Moscow against their territories.

Former U.S. secretaries of state have themselves rained skepticism on the nuclear umbrella. Christian Herter told his confirmation hearing in 1959 that he could not "conceive of any president engaging in all-out nuclear war unless we were in danger of all-out devastation ourselves." Henry Kissinger waited until he was out of office to tell a European audience in 1979, "The European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or, if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if

we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization."


These admissions, like Mr. Trudeau's casual query, roiled the waters of the Seine and the Rhine. Why, you ask, is it taboo for North Americans to doubt publicly a U.S. commitment which Churchill and de Gaulle doubted privately three decades ago?

There are two reasons. The first is that public utterances of this kind erode whatever residual deterrent value the nuclear guarantee has. It elevates a Soviet belief into a Soviet certainty that the U.S. would not risk everything to defend Europe. That is hardly helpful to the preservation of a stable balance of power.

Perhaps even more important is the effect such talk has on those Western European nations which haven't an independent nuclear deterrent of their own. If West Germans become convinced they cannot count on the U.S. to wield nuclear weapons on their behalf, they face some unpalatable choices.

They could contemplate a nuclear deterrent of their own (which would horrify their British and French allies and which is forbidden by the treaties which created the Federal Republic). Or they could move toward a supine accommodation of the Soviet Union, a kind of Rhineland Finland. This neutralism has already infected part of German public opinion.

The third choice would be for the West Europeans and their North American friends to strengthen the alliance's conventional muscle in Europe. That is the kind of non-nuclear deterrent Mr. Trudeau should have, but has not, proposed. Failing that alternative, it is irresponsible to flail at the nuclear umbrella. It may not be leak-proof, but as the Europeans show by accepting the cruise and Pershings, they would rather not leave home without it.



## Mr. Lalonde

Difficult as it is to be gay and nasty at the same time, federal Finance Minister Mr. Lalonde somehow achieved a dubious double with his clumsy effort in the Commons to pale Opposition Leader Brian Mulroney on his own words. The episode, which might have been hilarious but for the venom it contained, was deplorable in every respect but one: the ploy backfired.

Mr. Lalonde set it in motion by suggesting that Mr. Mulroney's criticisms of Government policies on the economy and unemployment were at odds with representations he made while he was in private business. At that time, he maintained, Mr. Mulroney's interest lay in an "advantage for the rich and a deal which would have benefited him rather than the unemployed."

There was a great anticipatory smacking of Liberal lips as Mr. Lalonde promised to produce documentary evidence of the shallowness of Mr. Mulroney's principles. Astonishingly, there turned out to be no evidence whatever; the Mulroney letters were, as the author characterized them, "absolutely proper and legitimate repre-

ideas are no longer taken seriously

anything. So there.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO EXTOTT IDA

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---PMS INITIATIVE:NETHS COMMENTS ON WORKING PAPERS

DUTCH DEL PASSED US ADVANCE COPY OF THEIR COMMENTS ON  
THREE WORKING PAPERS WITH APOLOGIES FOR ENGLISH TRNSLATION.  
MORE POLISHED TEXT WILL BE CIRCULATED TO ALL DELS IN COURSE  
OF NEXT FEW DAYS.DUTCH WORKING PAPER ON ARMS CONTROL AND  
OUTER SPACE MENTIONED IN TEXT WAS FORWARDED UNDER TS-506,  
JAN13.(SEE OURTEL YBGR6063 11JAN).

2.TEXT BEGINS QUOTE...

MEASURE I:BAN ON HIGH-ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS  
TACTICAL ASPECTS

ALTHOUGH THE NETHERLANDS WELCOME THAT CDA HAS PUT  
FORWARD A PROPOSAL THAT HAS BEEN PLACED IN THE PROPER  
FRAMEWORK OF STRENGHTENING STRATEGIC STABILITY,WE ARE  
RATHER DISAPPOINTED THAT THE PROPOSAL IN ITS ELABORATED  
FORM HAS BEEN CIRCULATED ONLY AT SUCH A DATE THAT HARDLY  
ANY TIME IS LEFT FOR A SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSION IN NATO  
AND AMONGST WESTERN COUNTRIES AT THE CD IN GENEV.  
THE COMPELLING REASONS FOR INTRODUCING THIS PROPOSAL  
SO SOON IN THE CD TO THE DETRIMENT OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS

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PAGE TWO YBGR6116 CONF

ARE NOT/NOT CLEAR TO US. A THOROUGH AND SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSION  
WITHIN NATO ABOUT THE COMPLEX QUESTION OF THE PREVENTION  
OF AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE IS IN OUR VIEW HIGHLY NECESSARY.  
THE RECENTLY DISTRIBUTED NETHERLANDS WORKING DOCUMENT IS  
PRECISELY INTENDED TO GIVE A FIRST IMPULSE TO SUCH A  
DISCUSSION. ON THE BASIS OF THAT PAPER, CONCRETE POSSIBILITIES  
FOR ARMS CONTROL COULD BE INVESTIGATED. THE CDN PROPOSAL  
NOW INTRODUCES A SPECIFIC MEASURE AND, AGAIN INSUFFICIENT  
TIME IS LEFT TO THE ALLIES TO WEIGH THE PROS AND CONTRAS  
OF THIS PROPOSAL AND OF OTHER POSSIBILITIES. WE DOUBT FOR  
EXAMPLE, IF ONLY FOR TACTICAL REASONS, WHETHER IT IS WISE  
TO PROPOSE AS AN OPENING-BID AN ASAT MEASURE LIMITED TO  
HIGH ALTITUDES.

SUBSTANTIAL ASPECTS.

THE POSSIBILITY TO CONSIDER FIRST A HIGH ALTITUDE ASAT MEASURE  
IS NOT/NOT NEW. THIS IS ALSO ONE OF THE OPTIONS MENTIONED IN THE  
NETHERLANDS WORKING DOCUMENT (PARA 25).

THE QUESTION IS WHETHER SUCH A MEASURE WOULD REALLY LEAD TO  
PROGRESS SEEN FROM THE ANGLE OF STRATEGIC STABILITY AND ARMS  
CONTROL. THE QUESTION IS ALL THE MORE VALID, SINCE THE BAN PROPOSED  
BY CDA IS RESTRICTED TO TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT. DEVELOPMENT,  
PRODUCTION, POSSESSION AND ALSO DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING SYSTEMS  
ARE - IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES WHICH

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PAGE THREE YBGR6116 CONF

WE ALSO RECOGNIZE-FOR THE TIME BEING EXCLUDED FROM THE BAN.  
OUR MAIN OBJECTION OF SUBSTANCE AGAINST THE CDN PROPOSAL  
CONCERNS THE LEGITIMIZING EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON ANTI-SATELLITE  
WARFARE AGAINST LOW ALTITUDE SATELLITES.

THE NETHERLANDS IS CERTAINLY NOT/NOT CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET  
TESTS IN THIS FIELD, THAT HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR YEARS AND  
THE FIRST TEST OF THE AMERICAN ASAT SYSTEM OF JAN21,  
MAKE A TOTAL BAN ON ALL ANTI-SATELLITE WARFARE AN UNREALISTIC  
OR IMPOSSIBLE IDEA. IN MAR OF LAST YEAR, THE NETHERLAND  
PROPOSED TWO CONCRETE MEASURES IN THE CD:

- .AN AGREEMENT TO DECLARE SATELLITES INVULNERABLE;
- 2. A BAN ON THE TESTING, DEPLOYMENT AND USE OF ASATS.

WITH RESPECT TO THE CDN PROPOSAL WE FEAR THAT CONSIDERABLE  
TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WILL BE CREATED IF ONLY HIGH ALTITUDE ASATS  
ARE BANNED. SINCE IT MEANS THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOW ALTITUDE  
ASATS COULD PROGRESS UNIMPEDED.

IT MAY ALSO BE TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE TO USE LOW ALTITUDE ASATS  
LAUNCHED BY HEAVY LAUNCHING VEHICLES AGAINST HIGH ALTITUDE  
SATELLITES OR TO TEST HIGH ALTITUDE ASATS IN LOW ORBITS.

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE THE NETHERLANDS STRONGLY PREFERS THAT  
CDA SHOULD GIVE ITS ALLIES MORE TIME TO DISCUSS THOROUGHLY  
THE CDN PROPOSAL AS WELL AS OTHER OPTIONS.

IDEALLY WE SHOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE CDN PROPOSAL IN

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PAGE FOUR YBGR6116 CONF D

CONNECTION WITH THE NETHERLANDS WORKING DOCUMENT IN A MEETING  
OF THE PAC WITH EXPERTS AS WE HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED.

MEASURES II AND III: VERIFIABILITY OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS.  
MOBILITY OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES.

THE CDN DRAFT WORKING PAPER CONTAINS A NUMBER OF  
INTERESTING CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE IMPORTANT PROBLEM  
OF THE STRATEGIC STABILITY, OF WHICH THE NETHERLANDS  
HAVE TAKEN NOTE WITH INTEREST. WITH REGARD TO THE  
PROPOSALS ABOUT THE VERIFIABILITY OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS  
AS WELL AS THE MOBILITY OF ICBMS IN RELATION TO  
VERIFIABILITY, THE QUESTION ARISES, HOWEVER, WHY CDA  
INTENDS TO TABLE THESE IN THE CD. THESE PROPOSALS ARE, AS INDICATED  
IN THE WORKING PAPER ITSELF CLEARLY RELATED TO START.

THEREFORE IT SEEMS MORE APPROPRIATE TO BRING THESE SUGGESTIONS UP  
IN THE ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS ON START. IN THE CD THESE  
QUESTIONS COULD AT MOST BE DISCUSSED IN A GENERAL  
WAY, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF DISCUSSIONS ON  
VERIFICATION. THE CDN ASSUMPTION THAT IT WOULD BE  
DESIRABLE FOR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS TO BE OPEN FOR THE MONITORING  
CAPABILITIES OF THE OPPONENT, CAN BE SUBSCRIBED TO  
IN GENERAL. THIS ASSUMPTION ALSO FITS WITH THE WESTERN  
PHILOSOPHY ON TRANSPARENCY. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT/NOT SEEM

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PAGE FIVE YBGR6116 CONF D

EASY TO REGULATE THIS QUESTION IN ABSTRACTO. THE MEASURES  
NECESSARY FOR VERIFICATION DEPEND ON LIMITATIONS  
ON WHICH WE HAVE TO SEEK AGREEMENT. A TACTICAL PROBLEM  
THAT CAN EMANATE FROM THE CDN INITIATIVE IS THAT  
THE EMPHASIS WHICH IS BEING PUT ON MEASURES WHICH FACILITATE  
VERIFICATION BY NTMS WOULD GIVE THE SOVIET UNION AN  
ARGUMENT TO RESIST ON-SITE INSPECTION, WHEREAS THE SOVIET  
UNION IN A NUMBER OF FORA SEEMS TO BE LESS RETICENT THAN  
BEFORE WITH REGARD TO ON-SITE VERIFICATION. WITH REGARD  
TO THE MEASURE ON ICBMS THERE IS A CERTAIN CONTRADICTION  
BETWEEN THE INHERENTLY CORRECT STATEMENT THAT A DEVELOPMENT  
TOWARDS MORE MOBILE SYSTEMS CAN BE CONDUCIVE TO THE  
STABILITY OF THE DETERRENCE-THE VULNERABILITY DECREASES-  
AND ON THE OTHER HAND THE PROPOSED LIMITATION OF THE  
MOBILITY OF ICBMS. THE EMPHASIS IN THE CDN PROPOSAL  
SEEMS TO BE MORE DIRECTED TO THE PROMOTION OF VERIFICATION  
BY SOME RESTRICTIONS ON MOBILITY. THIS WOULD HAVE TO  
BE MADE CLEAR IN THE PRESENTATION. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER  
THESE RESTRICTIONS ARE REALLY NECESSARY FOR ADEQUATE VERI-  
FICATION. THEY MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THAT BUT A LIMITATION ON  
THE MOBILITY IS NOT/NOT THE ONLY FEASIBLE WAY OF VERIFICATION.  
LEAVING ASIDE THE QUESTION WHETHER, IN VIEW OF THE SYSTEM  
AND INFRASTRUCTURE OF MOBILE ICBMS, VERIFICATION IS INDEED  
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PAGE SIX YBGR6116 CONFD

SUCH A PROBLEM, ONE COULD FOR EXAMPLE ALSO IMAGINE DISPLAYING THE SYSTEM FOR OBSERVATION BY SATELLITES DURING THE ASSEMBLY PHASE. ALSO WITH REGARD TO SUBMARINES, VERIFICATION IS CENTERED ON THAT PHASE.

IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHAT THE CDN IDEAS ARE ABOUT THE POSSIBLE FURTHER PROCEDURES, FOR EXAMPLE WITH REGARD TO TABLING IN THE CD, THE WAY TO TABLE THEM ETC. UNQUOTE.  
CCC/298 011735Z YBGR6116

*Dr. Colde*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6113 01FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO GENEV PRMNY WSHDC OSLO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DNACPOL

PCOOTT/FOWLER

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---PMS INITIATIVE:ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSION PAPERS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMMENTS OF NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY  
ON THREE DISCUSSION PAPERS. NORWEGIAN COLLEAGUE SAID THAT  
AS NORWAY WAS NOT/NOT MEMBER OF CD, HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE  
TO CONVEY COMMENTS PRIVATELY AND ORALLY ALTHOUGH, BECAUSE  
OF URGENCY, HE AGREED TO GIVE US TEXT. NORWEGIAN PERMREP  
VIBE ALSO SPOKE WITH TAYLOR STRESSING THAT OSLO WOULD  
WELCOME FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS PAPERS BEFORE THEY  
WERE TABLED IN GENEV.

2.TEXT BEING QUOTE...

AN AGREEMENT TO BAN THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH-  
ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS(ASATS).

EVEN THOUGH WE SHOULD STICK TO THE AIM OF A  
GENERAL PROHIBITION AGAINST ASAT SYSTEMS, IT MIGHT BE  
FEARED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENERAL PROHIBITION MAY  
BE SURPASSED BY EVENTS. THE ALTERNATIVE OUTLINED IN THE  
CANADIAN DOCUMENT, NAMELY A QUALITATIVE LIMITATION, MIGHT  
WELL IN THE PRESENT SITUATION PROVE TO BE A BETTER APPROACH.

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PAGE TWO YBGR6113 CONF

IN THIS CONNECTION IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT ALSO TESTING BE INCLUDED IN A POSSIBLE APPROACH. THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS WOULD APPEAR NOT/NOT TO BE INSURMOUNTABLE. EVEN THOUGH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IDEALLY WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPRISED BY THE PROPOSAL, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, EVEN IF PERMITTED, WOULD BE OF LIMITED VALUE AS LONG AS TESTING WAS NOT/NOT ALLOWED. THE DOCUMENT CORRECTLY POINTS OUT THAT A PROHIBITION AGAINST RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CREATES SIGNIFICANT VERIFICATION PROBLEMS.

AN AGREEMENT THAT STATES MUST DEMONSTRATE AND ENSURE THE VERIFIABILITY OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

AGREEMENTS PROVIDING BETTER POSSIBILITIES FOR THE VERIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THROUGH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WOULD BE POSITIVE IN THEMSELVES, AND MIGHT ALSO HAVE POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS. SEEN IN THIS PERSPECTIVE, THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL SEEMS WORTHY OF FURTHER STUDY.

AT THE SAME TIME THE PROPOSAL RAISES CERTAIN QUESTIONS. WHAT WOULD BE THE MEASURES ENVISAGED IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT THE PROPOSAL IS IMPLEMENTED, AND HOW SHOULD ONE GET OUT OF A SITUATION WHERE NONE OF THE PARTIES CAN ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS OF THE OTHER PARTY, RE. II.5?

FURTHER IT SEEMS THAT THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE PARTICULARLY  
...3

PAGE THREE YBGR6113 CONF

UNADVANTAGEOUS FOR THAT PARTY WHICH MIGHT BE IN THE PROCESS  
C. INITIATING IMPORTANT MODERNIZATION PROGRAMMES OF EXISTING  
FORCES. THIS NEGATIVE ASPECT OF THE PROPOSAL MAY PERHAPS  
BE REMEDIED IF THE PROPOSAL WAS ENLARGED TO COVER ALL  
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

AN AGREEMENT TO RESTRICT THE MOBILITY OF INTER-CONTINENTAL  
BALLISTIC MISSILES(ICBMS).

THERE IS EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT BOTH  
SUPER-POWERS IN THE RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE WILL HAVE MOBILE  
ICBMS IN THEIR ARSENALS. THIS ALSO SEEMS TO BE THE POINT  
OF DEPARTURE FOR THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL. THE AIM OF INCREASED  
MOBILITY IS FIRST AND FOREMOST TO REDUCE THE VULNERABILITY  
CONNECTED WITH ICBMS AND THUS BRING THEM MORE INTO LINE WITH  
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SLBMS. MEASURES LIMITING MOBILITY  
MAY BE POSITIVE, SEEN FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF VERIFICATION,  
BUT MIGHT ON THE OTHER HAND RECREATE MANY OF THE PROBLEMS  
WHICH A TRANSITION TO MOBILE ICBMS AIMS AT SOLVING. THE  
CANADIAN PROPOSAL THUS CONTAINS A BALANCING BETWEEN BETTER  
VERIFICATION AND REDUCED VULNERABILITY, A BALANCING WHICH  
PROBABLY WOULD HAVE DIFFERENT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL  
WEAPONS SYSTEMS. ON THE OTHER SIDE THERE IS A NEED FOR  
VERIFICATION ALSO OF MOBILE SYSTEMS. IF DEVELOPMENTS IN  
THIS FIELD SHOULD CONTINUE WITHOUT ANY POSSIBILITIES FOR  
CONTROL BY THE OTHER PARTY, THE RESULT WOULD BE AN INCREASE  
IN THE ARMS RACE WITHOUT INCREASED SECURITY AND STABILITY.  
UNQUOTE.

CCC/070 011640Z YBGR6113



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**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

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---EDITORIAL - PM'S PEACE INITIATIVE

THE ATTACHED EDITORIAL, BRIDGE BUILDING A LA TRUDEAU, APPEARED IN  
THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL ON JANUARY 30TH AND IS THEIR SECOND EDITORIAL  
IN PRAISE OF THE PEACE INITIATIVES OF THE PRIME MINISTER.  
WE ARE PLEASED TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FORWARD COPIES OF SPEECHES AND  
OTHER INFORMATION TO THE EDITORIAL WRITERS AT THE JOURNAL AND  
CONSIDER THEM TO BE THIS TERRITORIES LEADING AND MOST SUPPORTIVE  
NEWSPAPER IN THIS MATTER.

*[Signature]*  
Ed. W. Lysne

General Relations 312 427-1031

APPROVED: APPROVED  
*[Signature]*  
David E. Lysne

001204

2/2

## Bridge building, a la Trudeau

COURAGE  
30 Jan.

As the prime minister of a bilingual country and owner of a bilingual name, Canada's Pierre Elliott Trudeau knows something about bridging cultural gaps.

Since last fall, he has been trying to span the dangerous gap that has developed between the US and the Soviet Union. This week, he is off to enlist East European support in his bridgeman'ship.

The gap has shrunk slightly as a result of (1) the moderate tone President Reagan took in his Jan. 16 speech, (2) the Stockholm meeting between Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and (3) the agreement to resume US-Soviet talks on reducing conventional forces in Europe.

But the gap is still there, and there is no certainty that Washington or Moscow will narrow it further on their own. That's one reason why outside help, a la Trudeau, is so welcome.

In a speech last October, Trudeau said, "Just as war is too important to be left to the generals, so the relationship between the superpowers may have become too charged with animosity for East-West relations to be entrusted to them alone."

Trudeau seeks to do more than revive the spirit of US-Soviet detente that prevailed a decade ago; he also has proposed a meeting of the five countries that now are known to have nuclear weapons:

the US, the USSR, Britain, France, China and India.

Two-nation talks on arms control are difficult enough. Five-nation nuclear-arms talks, as Trudeau proposes, would mean an increase in complexity and difficulty. Yet, it seems foolish to ignore the other members of the Atomic Club. The Soviets already have insisted that French and British weapons be included in any agreement on nuclear arms in Europe.

If, sooner or later, the weapons of the other nuclear nations will have to be the focus of negotiation, why not, as Trudeau suggests, start the process now? There is no reason to suppose that delaying the inevitable will make things easier.

Trudeau is a good person to lead the effort, not only because of his experience reconciling Canada's English and French cultures. He is a veteran statesman; except for nine months in 1979 and 1980, he has been prime minister of Canada since 1968.

He is a neighbor and ally of the US, but he seems to have a reputation for independence and impartiality. His demarche has won at least polite support everywhere he has presented it, including Washington.

If Trudeau's efforts fail, no additional harm will have been done; if they succeed, a great deal of good will have been achieved. That alone is reason to encourage them.

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

*Questions  
On chercheait ces files,  
first ce pour?*

*Mr. Mc Mea  
What's this about?*

*MR. [Signature]*

*nd*

*Attached is the transcript  
of the meeting with  
the press in Prague.*

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PRGUE WOGR0186 01FEB84

TO EXTOTT LDDZ DELIVER BY 010900

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN PMDELBUCAST BNATO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON  
BONN ROME ATHENS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE WSHDC WSAW BGRAD MOSCO  
VMBFR DAVOS/MINDEL PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR RCD RCR IDR IDA

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0111 31JAN

---PM INITIATIVE

RE PARA 6 REFTTEL, ONLY TRANSCRIPT WE HAVE WAS SENT US FROM OTT IN  
TEL PM09032 29JAN. IT COVERED PMS MTGS WITH PRESS ON 25JAN AND 26JAN.  
2. OURTEL WOGR0184 31JAN CONTAINS TRANSLATIONS OF REPORTS ON PMS  
VISIT IN OFFICIAL CZECHOSLOVAK PRESS.

CCC/175 010955Z WOGR0186

MASTER FILE

ACTION

BURROUGHS DEX 3500

P. 1

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TEX-3502  
(212) 246-7424

UNCLASSIFIED  
NONCLASSIFIÉ

*Mc Smith*

Facsimile  
TRANSMISSION  
fac-similé

Our file/no. dossier:

NYC

NO. GRPA - 126 DATE 01 FEBRUARY 1984

PAGES TWO  
(incl. cover)  
(y compris la page  
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General  
DU : Consulat général du Canada  
NEW YORK

SECTION: General Relations & Public  
Affairs  
Mr./Ms. BRADY/  
M./Mad. Weatherup


TO : Mr./Ms.  
A : M./Mad.

Department:  
Service : EXTOTT: IDDZ

Phone :  
Téléphone :

Subject :  
Objet : NEW YORK TIMES 01 FEBRUARY 1984 (A-3)

"EAST GERMANY TRIES ACCOMMODATION"



Associated Press

Erich Honecker, right, the East German leader, with Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada in East Berlin. East Germany has sought to maintain good relations with West Germany and other Western nations.

## East Germany Tries Accommodation

By JAMES M. MARKHAM  
Special to The New York Times

BONN, Jan. 31 — The alacrity with which East Germany has allowed two groups of asylum-seekers to go to West Berlin from East Berlin underscores the Communist Government's anxiety to sustain good relations with West Germany, according to officials and diplomats here.

On Jan. 22, a group of six East Germans who had spent two days in the United States Embassy were given permission to travel to West Berlin after negotiations involving Wolfgang Vogel, an East Berlin lawyer who specializes in such cases. The East Germans had called attention to their situation by alerting West European news agencies in East Berlin.

### Avoiding Bad Publicity

Two days later, 12 East Germans barged into the West German diplomatic mission in East Berlin and demanded asylum. They were quickly taken to West Berlin without publicity. Government spokesmen in Bonn declined official comment after the newspaper Bild Zeitung reported the incident, but a senior Government official privately confirmed its accuracy.

Last week, the East Germans made another conciliatory gesture by releasing two women, Bärbel Bohley and Ul-

rike Poppe, who had been imprisoned on Dec. 12 for "treasonous divulging of information" to Western antinuclear activists. Their case had drawn considerable attention in the West.

Government officials and Western diplomats said that Erich Honecker, the East German leader, was apparently trying to avoid bad publicity just as the 35-nation conference on military confidence-building measures was beginning in Stockholm.

Another factor prompting the speedy resolution of the two asylum cases was a visit to East Berlin on Friday by Claude Cheysson, the French Foreign Minister, who opened a cultural center in the East German capital. Mr. Cheysson had postponed an earlier visit after the East Germans published regulations that seemed to restrict access to the center, and the East Germans did not want the French Foreign Minister to put off his visit a second time.

Another consideration, the officials said, is a visit this week by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the Canadian Prime Minister, who is on a tour of Eastern European countries to sound out their leaders on new talks on limiting nuclear arms.

The officials and diplomats said the confluence of foreign policy considerations apparently put pressure on Mr. Honecker to avoid protracted and embarrassing sieges of the United States and West German missions.

"It's clear that they're not interested in many negative headlines," said one Bonn official. "When it comes to concrete cases they have been rather accommodating."

### Maintaining Good Relations

But the overriding consideration, the officials said, was Mr. Honecker's concern to maintain the good ties that he has developed with Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Government.

Mr. Vogel, the East German lawyer, underlined this concern in an unusual interview with a West German radio station after the six East Germans left the United States Embassy. Insisting that West Germany had paid no money to free the six, Mr. Vogel said their liberation had been made possible by "the coalition of reason" prevailing between the two Germanies.

With an estimated \$7.9 billion owed to Western banks, East Germany is reported to be seeking new credits of \$2 billion from West German banks. But Mr. Kohl has suggested in public statements that he does not believe the East Germans have yet fulfilled the humanitarian concessions expected after a

\$397 million loan last summer.

"By being accommodating," said the Bonn official, "Honecker makes it impossible for us to argue that they have not been forthcoming in concrete human rights terms. It's good tactics, because they create good will even among the conservatives here."

### Surveillance Increased

Since the two successful attempts to gain asylum through the legations, the East German police have stepped up surveillance of Western diplomatic missions in East Berlin.

"It's reaching a magnitude," said a Western analyst of East German affairs, "where I'm getting worried myself. The top priority for that regime is, and always has been, its internal security. And once a certain point is reached, there could be a harsh crack-down."

The six East Germans were not the first to seek asylum through the United States Embassy. In April 1962, Bernhard Marquardt, a prominent East German sociologist, and his fiancée, Angelika Machol, took refuge in the United States Embassy, but left it a week later after receiving guarantees that they would be allowed to leave the country.

Mr. Marquardt, however, was arrested in May on espionage charges. Following the intervention of the United States Embassy, he was freed and, with his fiancée, permitted to come to West Germany on Jan. 26, 1963.

ACTION

SUITE A DONNER

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST PMDEL0031 01FEB84

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ DELIVER BY 020900

INFO PCOOTT/ARCHDEACO PMOOTT/SMITH MOSCO

DISTR MINA DMF IFB

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0109 31JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:RUMOURS OF MOSCO VISIT

PRESS TRAVELLING WITH PMDEL SAY THESE RUMOURS EMANATED FROM OTT.

WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING ABOUT POSSIBLE MOSCO VISIT BEYOND THAT ABOUT  
WHICH YOU ARE ALREADY AWARE.

2.GROMYKO DEPARTED BUCST TODAY AT 1430 THIRTY MINUTES BEFORE  
ARRIVAL OF PM.NO/NO CONTACT MADE.

CCC/181 020730Z PMDL0031

FROM; PMDEL BUCHAREST 1 FEB 1984 UNCLAS

PMDEL 030

TO: EXTOTT/IDDZ (DELIVER BY 020900)

MAUTER FILE

INFO:WSAW, BGRAD, PRAGUE, BREST, MOSCOW, WASHDC  
BNATO, BONN BRU, PARIS, ROME  
VMBFR, GENEV, HAGUE, OSLO, LDN,  
PCO/ARCHDEACON, NDHQOTT/PPP/DACPOL

SUB: PM VISIT TO GDR: HONECKER TOAST

FOLLOWING IS TOAST DELIVERED BY QUOTE GENERAL  
SECRETARY OF CENTRAL CTTEE OF SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF  
GERMANY AND CHAIRMAN OF GDR COUNCIL OF STATE UNQUOTE,  
ERICH HONECKER, AT DINNER IN HONOUR OF PM IN EAST  
BERLIN JAN. 31/84

2. TEXT AS FOLLOWS;



## Toast

proposed by the General Secretary  
of the Central Committee of the  
Socialist Unity Party of Germany  
and Chairman of the GDR Council of  
State, Erich Honecker, at a dinner  
in honour of The Right Honourable  
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime  
Minister of Canada, in Berlin  
on 31 January 1984.

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QUOTE

Mr. Prime Minister,  
Ladies and gentlemen,  
Dear comrades,

It gives me great pleasure once again to cordially welcome you, Mr. Prime Minister, and your party to the German Democratic Republic. We highly value your visit and the exchange of opinions we have had today. We view this event as an expression of the good relations existing between our two States regardless of their different social systems, as an expression of the favourable development of our diplomatic relations since their inception on the occasion of the Helsinki Conference, as an expression of our joint endeavour to help ensure, in the face of the dangerous exacerbation of the international situation, that reason and good will become a determinant factor of world politics.

Canada, whose affairs you have been directing as Prime Minister for well over a decade now, holds an important and respected

position in the world. Its stand for beneficial cooperation among nations, its economic strength and scientific achievements and cultural appeal are widely known.

Your visit, Mr. Prime Minister, is an event whose significance is noted far beyond the frontiers of our two countries. It is taking place at a time where it is crucial to search for ways of steering international affairs back towards a normal and fruitful course. The aggravation of the world political situation, the growing danger of a nuclear war cannot be overlooked. This trend must be counteracted in the peoples' interest. We highly appreciate the initiatives which you, Mr. Prime Minister, undertook to this end.

Today it is obvious that the stockpiling of further nuclear weapons does not mean more security for humanity. The arms race, which has again been fuelled through the deployment of nuclear first-strike weapons of the USA in

Western Europe, casts a shadow on world politics in their entirety. It is fraught with the threat of extinction of all life on our planet.

All this imposes on us the historic obligation to leave nothing undone to bar such a course of events. We, opposed as we are to the use of military force and committed to the maintenance of peaceful relations on the international scene, cannot but reject those theses which claim not only that a nuclear war could be fought and won but seek to give it an ethical disguise into the bargain.

We have noted with interest, Mr. Prime Minister, that, as the Toronto Star reported, you spoke up against such a playing down of adventurous designs back in May 1983. It quoted you as saying that some of the people in and around the US administration talked of winning a nuclear war. That was pretty absurd. The point was that we wanted to avoid a nuclear war.

Yes, that is the point. That is why the German Democratic Republic, together with its allies, has for years been proposing general, radical disarmament both in the nuclear and conventional fields. We see eye to eye with all those who consider that the drive for military superiority, supported by doctrines alleging that nuclear wars are fightable and winnable, puts a serious strain on the international atmosphere, for such line of thinking betrays disrespect for the right of peoples to peaceful activity and a decent life.

Calls for overcoming that status quo in Europe, i.e. for undoing the results of World War Two and of post-war development as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, are as unrealistic as they are dangerous. We are against playing with fire, all the more so since that involves the risk of fire being set to the neighbour's house as well.

In view of the dark clouds looming on the world political horizon, nothing can be more important and more urgent than to redouble

efforts to make peace secure. It should be the concern of all responsibly minded statesmen and politicians, indeed all people of good will, to make as great as possible a contribution to these efforts by concrete action. In our time it is particularly obvious that there is no acceptable alternative to the peaceful coexistence of States having different political and social systems.

We are agreed, Mr. Prime Minister, that the negative development of the world situation is not irreversible. If those who are vested with responsibility for the political affairs of States are guided in what they do by common sense, prudence and a desire for calculability, it will be possible to achieve a recovery of the international situation, a return to the road of détente.

It is the firm resolve of the German Democratic Republic to make every effort, jointly with the USSR and its other allies,

to avert the danger of war and to open the door to peace. We are for a turn for the better in the international situation and we reaffirm our readiness to extend our hand to all those who seek peace and peaceful co-operation.

Mr. Prime Minister, we concur in the view that peace must be waged steadily, with caution and with realism. What matters is indeed not just the destructive capability of weaponry but the intentions of governments controlling those weapons. A course aimed at the aggravation of military confrontation, involving the calculated risk of nuclear war, conflicts with the interests of the peoples. The essential thing is to reduce the level of this confrontation and to eventually eliminate it altogether.

Our proposals are contained in the Political Declaration which the Warsaw Treaty States made in Prague last January,

and in the Joint Statement which the leaders of socialist countries issued in Moscow last June. They are valid now as before. A return to the situation which existed before the deployment of the new U.S. nuclear missiles in Western Europe began would make it possible for the talks on the limitation and reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons systems to be resumed. We remain fully committed to a cessation of the arms race. Renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear powers, as already pledged by the Soviet Union, a freeze on nuclear armaments, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and corridors, withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Europe, a strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - all these proposed measures, if carried into effect, would help lessen tensions, enhance confidence and safeguard peace. In this way, and based on the indispensable principle of equality and equal security, the level of military capabilities could gradually be reduced and greater stability and security be achieved.

I wish to mention in particular our initiative calling for the conclusion of a treaty between the members of the Warsaw Pact and those of NATO on the non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. Such a treaty would, no doubt, generate positive stimulants in the pursuit of arms limitation and disarmament.

The German Democratic Republic attaches great importance to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe currently being held in Stockholm. Here is, in our view, a chance of making substantial progress towards lessening military confrontation and building confidence. The German Democratic Republic will not fail to cooperate actively in the search for tangible results. It hopes that the other participating States will act in the same spirit. All would thus stand to gain and no one would lose.



The Stockholm Conference bears witness to the vitality of the process initiated in Helsinki and reaffirmed in Madrid as well as to the sense of realism on which it is based. Reason and good will and a dedication to peaceful coexistence and fruitful cooperation should prevail everywhere. In that spirit we also welcome the latest understanding to resume the Vienna force-reduction talks on 16 March 1984. After all, what is at stake for mankind is to be or not to be.

A cautious and constructive approach is also required to eliminate the numerous explosive hotbeds of conflict existing in the world today. The events in the Middle East, in Central America and in southern Africa pose a threat to peace not only in those regions; those focuses of tension may at any time burst into a global inferno. Resort to the threat of military force and its use against States and peoples must be replaced by employment of peaceful means in the resolution of disputes. This is an elementary requirement for preserving peace.

Mr. Prime Minister,

I think I can rightly say about our discussions today that they have been useful. Your proposals for the launching of negotiations among the five nuclear-weapon States on global limits on their arsenals, for the assertion of the principles of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, for achieving parity in conventional armaments, for the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons systems in outer space, for the continuation of a regular East-West dialogue, chiefly between the USA and the USSR, for a return to détente, for the reinforcement of economic cooperation between East and West, for a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests, for the proscription of chemical weapons, and the refusal of having nuclear arms produced or deployed in Canada--they all have our full support.

Especially the present time provides fresh evidence of the need for a frank political dialogue between representatives of States

with different social systems. Despite different or even opposed views on a number of international issues we agreed that the pursuit of peace, arms limitation and disarmament, détente and confidence-building as well as peaceful coexistence should always be given priority.

On that basis, also the relations between our two countries can continue to prosper and flourish. By proceeding on this road, the German Democratic Republic and Canada will not only serve their own peoples, but also advance the cause of world peace.

Ladies and gentlemen, dear comrades,

May I now ask you to join me in a toast

- to the good health and well-being of the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Pierre Elliott Trudeau,
- to fruitful and peace-promoting relations between the German Democratic Republic and Canada, and
- to the good health of all those present here.

UNQUOTE

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**  
**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS**

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Division Phoned                       
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Local Time                     

**S E C R E T    ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT**

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**INFO PMDELBUCAST      LIVRAISON 011500**

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**PARIS ROME BERN OSLO MOSCO WSAW PRGUE BPEST PRMNY GENEV**

**PCOOTT/FOWLER**

**DISTR MINA MINT MINE DMF RGB RSR RCM RCD RSD IDA IDR IDAO IDAN**

**REF NOTRETEL ZNGR0062 23JAN**

**---RENCONTRE PM-AUBERT**

**SOMMAIRE-CONSEILLER FEDERAL AUBERT A MENAGE UN ACCUEIL PARTICULIEREMENT CHALEUREUX AU PM A ZURICH, LUN 30JAN. ECHANGES DE VUES ONT PORTE SUR LA CONFERENCE DE STKHM, L'INITIATIVE DU PM, LA SITUATION DES NATIONS UNIES. AUDELA DES PROPOSITIONS DU PM, QU ILS CONNAISSAIENT DEJA, SUISSSES ONT ETE VIVEMENT INTERESSES PAR LES PERSPECTIVES QUI SE SONT DEGAGEES DE SES MULTIPLES ENTREVUES ET NOTAMMENT AVEC PEREZ DE CUELLAR, DENG HSIAO PING ET LA VISITE EN TCHECOSLOVAQUIE. AUBERT A FAIT PART DU SOUTIEN DU CONSEIL FEDERAL A L'ENTREPRISE DU PM.**

**2. RAPPORT-AUX COTES D AUBERT, PARTICIPAIENT NOTAMMENT LE SEC D ETAT PROBST, SEC D ETAT DESIGNE BRUNNER, AMB MUHEIM ET AMB RITTER, CHEF DE LA DEL SUISSE A STKHM. DANS SON ALLOCUTION D ACCUEIL, AUBERT A SIGNALE LA DETTE DE RECONNAISSANCE DE LA SUISSE A L'EGARD DU CDA QUI EN PARTICIPANT AUX DEUX GUERRES MONDIALES AVAIENT PERMIS LA SAUVEGARDE DE LA DEMOCRATIE SUISSE. APRES AVOIR**

**...2**

PAGE DEUX DAV0015 SECRET ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

RAPPELE QUE LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE DE LA SUISSE ETAIT FONDEE SUR LA NEUTRALITE PERMANENTE ET ARMEE, IL SOULIGNA QUE NOS DEUX PAYS PARTAGEAIENT UN PROFOND ATTACHEMENT AUX MEMES VALEURS.

3. AUBERT A RAPPELE L'IMPORTANCE DE LA CONFERENCE DE STKHM ET DU CADRE DE LA CSCE, LE SEUL AUQUEL LA SUISSE PARTICIPE DE CONCERT AVEC 35 PAYS EUROPEENS ET NORD-AMERICAINS, ET LE SEUL LIEU DE RENCONTRE EN CE MOMENT SUR LES QUESTIONS DE SECURITE ET DE DESARMEMENT. IL A DEVELOPPE LES POSITIONS DEJA RAPPORTEES ANTERIEUREMENT, SOUTIEN EGAL AUX VOLETS DESARMEMENT ET DROIT DE L'HOMME, APPROCHE FONDEE SUR CRITERES ET PRINCIPES ADOPTES A MDRID. TOUT EN MENTIONNANT QUE LES NNA NE FORMAIENT PAS/PAS UN BLOC ET QUE CHACUN GARDAIT LEUR ATTITUDE PROPRE, LES SUISSSES CHERCHAIENT A METTRE AU POINT DE CONCERT AVEC EUX DES PROPOSITIONS QUI EXPRIMERAIENT LES POINTS DE VUE DES NNA. LA SUISSE ET LES AUTRES NNA N'EN RESTAIENT PAS/PAS MOINS DISPONIBLES A TOUTE ENTREPRISE DE MEDIATION SUSCEPTIBLE DE RAPPROCHER L'EST ET L'OUEST A STKHM. AUBERT A FAIT ETAT DES DIVERSES ENTREVUES QU'IL A EUES A STKHM AVEC SCHULTZ, GROMYKO ET AUTRES. IL A CONSTATE NOTAMMENT DU COTE DE L'EST UN DECALAGE ENTRE LE TON DU DISCOURS PRIVE ET PUBLIC QUI LUI DONNAIT QUELQUES ESPOIRS MAIS EVIDEMMENT A TERME.

4. AMB RITTER A BROSSE UN TABLEAU PESSIMISTE DE LA SITUATION A STKHM. D'UN COTE, IL Y AVAIT LES PROPOSITIONS DE L'OTAN DANS LA COULEE DE MDRID, DE L'AUTRE, UN DISCOURS RUSSE DECRIVANT EN TERMES APOCALYPTIQUES LE CHANGEMENT DE SITUATION CREE PAR L'ARRIVEE DES MISSILES AMERICAINS DEPUIS MDRID, QUI RENDAIENT CADUQUES SES

PAGE TROIS DAV0015 SECRET ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

PRESCRIPTIONS ET NECESSITAIENT ADOPTION PREALABLE D UNE  
DECLARATION DE NON RECOURS A LA FORCE, RITTER ESTIMAIT QUE C ETAIT  
SANS DOUTE UNE POSTURE DE NEGOCIATIONS, MAIS QU IL FAUDRAIT DU  
TEMPS POUR L ENTAMER. UN DECLENCHEMENT POLITIQUE QUELCONQUE SERAIT  
SANS DOUTE NECESSAIRE POUR AMENER DES PROGRES.

5. PM A SOULIGNE QU UNE RENCONTRE AVEC AUBERT S IMPOSAIT DANS SON  
PERIPLE EUROPEEN COMPTE TENU DU ROLE QUE JOUE LA SUISSE DANS LA  
RECHERCHE DE LA SECURITE ET DU DESARMEMENT. IL A RAPPELE LA PART  
IMPORTANTE QU A PRISE LA SUISSE DANS LE DEVOUEMENT DE LA CONFEREN-  
CE DE MDRID, QUI PERMETTAIT MAINTENANT LA TENUE DE STKHM. IL A  
DEGAGE LA CONCORDANCE ENTRE LE DISCOURS D AUBERT A STKHM ET SA  
PROPRE APPROACHE A L EGARD DU DESARMEMENT. TOUT EN PARTAGEANT LES  
PREOCCUPATIONS SUISSSES A L EGARD DES DROITS DE L HOMME, IL METTAIT  
NETTEMENT L ACCENT SUR LA SECURITE ET LE DESARMEMENT DANS LA  
CONJONCTURE ACTUELLE. DANS CETTE PERSPECTIVE, IL ETAIT ENCOURAGE PAR  
LA REPRISE DES MBFR EN MARS. LA REPOSE REMANIEE QUE POURRAIT  
APPORTER L OTAN A DES PROPOSITIONS SOVIETIQUES RELATIVEMENT  
MODEREES, PERMETTAIT DE FONDER QUELQUES ESPOIRS. ON POUVAIT ESPERER  
AUSSI LA REPRISE DES INF A GENEV EN JUIN.

6. UN POINT MARQUANT DE L INTERVENTION DU PM A ETE DE SOULIGNER  
L IMPORTANCE DE LA PARTICIPATION PERSONNELLE DES HOMMES POLITIQUES.  
ELLE ETAIT NECESSAIRE POUR ASSURER ET ACCELERER LE DECLENCHEMENT  
D UN VERITABLE DIALOGUE POLITIQUE, QUI PERMETTRAIT D ABO TIR A DES  
RESULTATS. ON NE POUVAIT ACCEPTER QUE LE PROCESSUS TRAIN QUINZE

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PAGE QUATRE DAV0015 SECRET ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

ANS COMME CELA S ETAIT PASSE A VIENN.ET DANS NOS DEMOCR TIES,LA  
SITUATION COMMANDAIT QUE LES HOMMES POLITIQUES ENGAGENT LEURS  
RESPONSABILITES VIS-A-VIS DE LEURS POPULATIONS.

7.PM A EVOQUE LA DECISION DE L OTAN D ENVOYER LES MINIS RES DES  
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES A LA PREMIERE REUNION DE LA CONFERENCE,QUI  
AVAIT PERMIS,ENTRES AUTRES,LA RENCONTRE SCHULTZ-GROMYKO.IL A  
FORMULE LE VOEU D UNE PARTICIPATION PLUS SOUTENUE A CE NIVEAU  
AFIN DE FAIRE AVANCER LA CONFERENCE.

8.DANS LA DISCUSSION QUI A SUIVI,AMB BRUNNER A FAIT VALOIR  
QU IL FALLAIT UNE APPROCHE REALISTE DANS LE DOMAINE DES DROITS  
DE L HOMME.IL SERAIT ILLUSOIRE DE PENSER QUE LES PAYS DE L EST  
ACCEPTERAIENT DE TRANSFORMER LEUR SYSTEME POUR INTEGRER DES  
LIBERTES QUI NOUS SONT CHERES,TELLS QUE LA LIBERTE D INFO.EN  
REVANCHE,IL ETAIT POSSIBLE D OBTENIR D EUX BEAUCOUP DE CHOSES  
PAR EXEMPLE SUR LE PLAN DE LA REUNIFICATION DES FAMILLES,SI L ON  
SE PRENAIT D UNE FACON QUI NE HEURTAIT PAS/PAS DE FRONT LEURS  
SUSCEPTIBILITES IDEOLOGIQUES.DE PART ET D AUTRE ONT ETE EVOQUES,  
LES SUCCES OBTENUS ET LES DIFFICULTES RENCONTREES AVEC DIVERS  
PAYS DE L EST(RDA,TCHECOSLOVAQUIE,ROUMANIE).SUISSES ONT SOULIGNE  
QUE LEURS RESULTATS FAVORABLES ONT ETE D AUTANT PLUS MARQUES  
QU ILS SONT RESTES DISCRETS.

9.LE COTE SUISSE A EMIS QUELQUES RESERVES A L EGARD D UNE PARTI-  
CIPATION SOUTENUE AU NIVEAU MINISTERIEL A STKHM.TOUT EN RECONNAIS-  
SANT L INTERET POLITIQUE DE CE NIVEAU,IL ESTIMAIT QU IL FALLAIT  
L UTILISER DE FACON MESUREE PAR EXEMPLE EN PREVOYANT DES REUNIONS

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A DATES FIXES.IL FALLAIT EVITER DE DEVALUER CE NIVEAU S IL N Y A PAS/PAS UNE PERSPECTIVE REALISTE DE PROGRES.C EST POURQUOI ILS AVAIENT ETE INITIALEMENT CONTRE LA PARTICIPATION D AUBERT A STKHM.AUBERT S Y ETAIT FINALEMENT RENDU,COMPTE TENU DE L IMPORTANCE DE LA DECISION INSPIREE PAR LE CDA A L OTAN,QUI DEVAIT ETRE INTERPRETEE DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES COMME UN SIGNAL POLITIQUE MAJEUR.

10.LE PM A DECRIT LES CIRCONSTANCES QUI L ONT AMENE A PRENDRE LA DECISION DE LANCER SON INITIATIVE DE PAIX SUITE A L ABATTAGE DE L AVION SUD-COREEN ET DANS LA PERSPECTIVE DE L ARRIVEE DES MISSILES AMERICAINS EN EUROPE.ELLE PROVENAIT D UNE PART,D UNE ANALYSE CONJONCTURELLE DE LA SITUATION,DE LA NECESSITE D INJECTER L ENERGIE POLITIQUE NECESSAIRE EN VUE DE LA REPRISE DU DIALOGUE. ELLE RESSORTAIT AUSSI D UNE ANALYSE PLUS FONDAMENTALE DE LA SITUATION A PARTIR DES DANGERS GRANDISSANTS DE PROLIFERATION VERTICALE ET HORIZONTALE,THEMES QU IL AVAIT ETE DEVELOPPES DEPUIS LONGTEMPS DEJA,ET DE FACON GLOBALE.

11.LA PROLIFERATION DES ARSENAUX NUCLEAIRES POSAIT UNE MENACE NON SEULEMENT POUR CEUX QUI LES POSSEDENT MAIS POUR LES AUTRES ETATS.A CET EGARD,IL ESTIMAIT QUE LES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES MEMBRES DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE AVAIENT EN CETTE QUALITE UNE RESPONSABILITE INTERNATIONALE MAJEURE QU ILS AVAIENT JUSQU ICI REFUSE D EXERCER COLLECTIVEMENT.LE DANGER IMMEDIAT ETANT CELUI DE LA PROLIFERATION VERTICALE,IL AVAIT ENTREPRIS DE LEUR POSER



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PERSONNELLEMENT LE PROBLEME. LE PM A DECRIE LES REPONSES POLIES CERTES, MAIS DANS LE GENRE D ALPHONSE ET GASTON QUE LUI AVAIENT DONNE QUELQUE-UNS DE SES INTERLOCUTEURS DE HAUT NIVEAU. LES CHINOIS POUR LEUR PART ESTIMAIENT QU UNE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE ETAIT A PEU PRES INEVITABLE A TERME, ET QU APRES TOUT, ILS NE S EN SORTIRAIENT PAS/ PAS SI MAL. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, TOUT EN ESTIMANT PREMATUREE UNE ACTION DES PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES CIT MINEURES FINCI N AVAIT PAS/ PAS FERME LA PORTE. LES TROIS POINTAIENT LE DOIGT VERS LES DEUX GRANDS DU NUCLEAIRE. APRES AVOIR RENCONTRE LE PRESIDENT REAGAN, IL LUI RESTAIT EVIDEMMENT A SE RENDRE EN RUSSIE POUR COMPLETER LE TABLEAU.

12. S IL ETAIT TROP TOT POUR PARLER DE RESULTATS TANGIBLES, IL AVAIT LE SENTIMENT D AVOIR AMORCE UNE REFLEXION NOUVELLE. IL Y AVAIT DES OBSTACLES, TELLES QUE LES HABITUDES PRISES DANS LE SYSTEME DE DISSUASION ACTUEL ET, EGALEMENT, UN COURANT DE Pensee DANS L ADMINISTRATION AMERICAINE QUI REVE D UN RETOUR A LA SUPREMATIE D ANTAN PAR L USAGE DE MOYENS TECHNOLOGIQUES NOUVEAUX. PM ETAIT PARTICULIEREMENT SATISFAIT DE SA RENCONTRE AVEC PEREZ DE CUELLAR. IL A MENTIONNE LE FAIT PEU CONNU, QUE LES REPS MILITAIRES DES CINQ GRANDS SE REUNISSAIENT REGULIEREMENT. IL AVAIT ESPOIR QUE L ON PARVIENNE A REHAUSSER LE NIVEAU DE CES RENCONTRES ET A LEUR DONNER UN CONTENU QU ELLES N ONT PAS/ PAS EU JUSQU ICI.

13. LES SUISSSES ONT PRODIGUE LES MEILLEURS ENCOURAGEMENTS DANS LEURS REACTIONS A L EXPOSE DU PM. AUBERT A DECLARE CIT SI NOUS ETIONS UNE PUISSANCE NUCLEAIRE NOUS N HESITERIONS PAS/ PAS A

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ACCEPTER VOS PROPOSITIONS FINCIT. ILS ONT ETE CAPTIVES PAR LES  
APERCUS REVELATEURS QU A PU DONNER LE PM DE SES DIVERSES REN-  
CONTRES. ILS ONT MANIFESTE UN APPUI COMPLET A TOUTES LES  
AVENUES DU DIALOGUE ENTRE PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES TANT DANS LE  
CADRE DE STKHM QU EN DEHORS (MBFR, INF, START). ILS ONT AUSSI EXPRIME  
LE SOUHAIT DE POURSUIVRE LE DIALOGUE AVEC NOUS SUR CES QUESTIONS  
D IMPORTANCE VITALE.

14. DES PROPOS ONT ETE AUSSI ECHANGES SUR LE SYSTEME DES NATIONS  
UNIES, QU AUBERT AVAIT MIS A L ORDRE DU JOUR. EN REPONSE A LA  
QUESTION DU PM CIT COMMENT SE FAIT-IL QUE VOUS N Y ETES PAS/PAS  
ENCORE FINCIT. AUBERT ET SES COLLEGUES ONT DECRIT EN TERMES TRES  
FRANCS LES LENTEURS ET LES DIFFICULTES DU SYSTEME SUISSE DE  
DEMOCRATIE DIRECTE NOTAMMENT DANS LES QUESTIONS DE POLITIQUE  
ETRANGERE. LE RETRAIT DES USA DE L UNESCO APPORTE UN DIFFICULTE  
DE PLUS DANS LA DEMARCHE SUISSE POUR DEVENIR MEMBRE A PART  
ENTIERE DES NATIONS UNIES.

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MF

# PM raises questions about U.S. credibility, NATO plans

Prime Minister Trudeau's remarks at a symposium in Switzerland have created a controversy. Following excerpts of the prime minister's remarks at a question-and-answer session at the Davos Symposium, Switzerland, Jan. 28 put the remarks in perspective.

**Three questions:** First, according to some observers, the escalating arms race between the U.S. and the Soviets should be seen as our only alternative to actual war. It should be institutionalized rather than aborted. What do you think?

The second: Is nuclear weapon proliferation beneficial for those countries which object to the military interventionism of the superpowers?

And the third: The United Nations was founded to make impossible the use of force in resolving conflicts. Now we have numerous military conflicts, all of which have happened over the last years. Is the monumental bureaucracy of the United Nations obsolete?

**Answer.** Well, the first question, as I understand it, has to do with the advantage of an ever-escalating arms race as an alternative of actually going to war. That seems to me a strange and certainly not erroneous proposition. People arm themselves to seek security. They arm because they feel endangered.

If you feel there is no other way to reduce your insecurity but by ever escalating the quantity of arms you have, you are denying that it is possible to feel secure at a lower level of armament. Given the state of armament between two powers, if one side feels insecure it has the choice of either increasing its arms or getting the other side to reduce its arms.

This is, in the convention area, the dilemma which is being posited by the Vienna talks. We feel that the Soviets have more conventional strength in Europe and, therefore, we, the NATO countries have the choice of increasing our conventional strength or getting the Soviets to reduce theirs.

It would seem to me that if enhanced security can come from either of those two propositions, the only sensible course is to try to find greater security at a lower level of equilibrium than at a constantly escalating level. That is why arms talks must eventually look for reduction in arms and not an equilibrium at a higher level.

Incidentally, that is very important to keep in mind when

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we are looking at future wars. Escalation of the type suggested in this question will mean wars in outer space — or perhaps, more realistically, the use of high-altitude satellites. That is 10 or 20 years down the road; it is what people sometimes understand by Star Wars. It is a frightening prospect. It will be extraordinarily costly if we ever reach that stage. It is likely to be extraordinarily destabilizing.

One of the objectives of the Canadian peace initiative is to seek suffocation of future techniques of waging war. It would seem that that is the only sensible direction in which humanity can proceed: not to involve ever higher degrees of technology and all the requirements of capital and ingenuity to draw resources from the progress of humanity, but to make wars ever more costly and technical. I think that is enough on the first question.

The second was: "Is nuclear weapon proliferation beneficial for those countries which object to the military interventionism of the superpowers?"

Well, nuclear weapons proliferation can be of two kinds.

The vertical proliferation which means the superpowers and the other three, which are not superpowers but are nuclear powers, will increase their arms and the deadliness of them. Therefore, that type of proliferation cannot be beneficial to those countries which object to the military intervention of the superpowers — and there is another kind of proliferation, which is the horizontal proliferation — which will mean that more and more countries will have nuclear weapons.

I guess that is the kind of proliferation which is understood here, the feeling being that the more countries that have nuclear weapons, the more they will be able to decide the use and non-use of those weapons in another war and, therefore, they gain some measure of independence from the superpowers. The proposition sounds paradoxical but from discussions I have had with many leaders of Third World countries, this seems to be a little bit their view: Why should only five countries have the nuclear power? Why shouldn't more and more of us have the nuclear power?

It seems a little bit absurd when you hear it for the first time, but it is linked to questions of sovereignty, to questions of status. And I think the nuclear powers all abhor the possibility of more than themselves having nuclear arms. It is bad enough that five countries have nuclear arms; if 10, 20 countries have nuclear



Trudeau wonders about U.S. response

arms, obviously the dangers of a nuclear holocaust are escalated. And yet, the five nuclear powers are not in a position to convincingly demonstrate this to the others, particularly if they are not white. There is also some racial undercurrent here: You know, why shouldn't the brown, the black or the yellow nations also have weapons if the white nations have them.

There is something absurd in it, but the real absurdity is that the five nuclear weapon states have not been able to live up to the undertaking of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to reduce those nuclear weapons, to reduce the deadliness — though in some cases they have reduced the quantity. And because the five nuclear powers have not lived up to the their undertaking, the others, the non-signatories of the NPT, have said, "Well, since you can't live up to your obligations, we will seek to acquire the atom bomb." So you will have horizontal proliferation.

It may be a way to object to the military intervention of the superpowers — but not in the sense that you can defend yourself from the superpower because you have a few dozen atomic bombs, but rather in the sense that you will be also the master of the survival or demise of the human race — which seems a way of cutting off your nose to spite your face because the non-superpowers will also die in a nuclear war.

The third question was on the United Nations and whether it has become obsolete because there are so many wars. Well, the United Nations is the only game in town. It would be better if it worked efficiently, but it is based precisely on the peaceful settlement of disputes.

It has a costly bureaucracy, as the question puts it, which

is applied to try and solve some of the disputes. If it were on the record of its "un-success" in terms of military confrontation, I suppose you could say it has been quite ineffective. But one must keep in mind the very many other functions of the United Nations including, of course, the improvement of the gap between North and South and marvelous work it is doing in the areas of health, labor relations, care of children, spreading of technology, and so on.

Therefore, I can't really agree with those who say it is obsolete. I must say we all have a duty, because it is the only game in town, to make it more effective and give it more means of becoming effective. But, there again, the five permanent members of the Security Council have an obligation which, in my view, they have not fully discharged.

**Kenneth Dam** — I would like to make a comment upon an assumption in what Prime Minister Trudeau said — at least, it seems to me it was an assumption in what he was saying and, indeed, perhaps it was explicit. Let me say that, in general, I agree with his overall position, but I mention this because I think it is a widespread misconception.

The misconception is that the United States has been steadily building up the number and the megatonnage of its nuclear weapons. Nothing could be further from the truth. With regard to nuclear weapons, since the peak in 1967, the United States has reduced by one-third the number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile. There was a rapid decrease until about 1970, a slight build-up in the early '70s and, since 1973 approximately, there has been a steady decline in the total number of nuclear

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weapons in our stockpile.

The reduction in the megatonnage of the nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile has declined even more rapidly. The peak in megatonnage was in 1960. Since that time, there has been a decline. There has been a 40 per cent decrease in megatonnage since 1970 and the decrease is continuing.

This is not only true with regard to the overall U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons, it is also true with regard to nuclear weapons in Europe. There was an alliance decision in approximately 1980 to withdraw 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe, and that was carried out. There has been a further decision just this past fall, at the NATO ministers meeting in Montebello, Canada, to reduce a further number on the order of 1,400. So, it is not true that there has been a build-up of U.S. nuclear weapons either globally or regionally in Europe.

**Prime Minister Trudeau —** I agree with Mr. Dam and, indeed, I slipped that into my answer. Though, when I said in many instances we have reduced the number of nuclear weapons, the question is: Have we reduced their deadliness and their effectiveness? The whole reason for introducing the cruise, for instance, is to make them more effective. The reason we want to have a Pershing II after Pershing I is to make it more effective.

In the case of the 1,000 reduction decided in 1979 and the 1,400 decided last Oct. 29, we in effect are withdrawing weapons the usefulness of which has ceased in great part. They have become obsolete or, alternatively, they are contrary to our own stated strategy in NATO.

For instance, what has been reduced or will be reduced essentially in Germany are the "Honest Johns," the nuclear weapons fired from artillery shells, and also the land-mine atomic weapons. Not only are they obsolete but they make our flexible response impossible.

If you have an atomic land-mine on the eastern frontier of West Germany, it means that any overstepping of that line by conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact countries will deprive us of our flexible response because you have to have an atomic war start right away if your artillery is of a limited range and if your land-mines are right there.

It means that you don't have any choice but to have early first use; therefore, we withdraw these. I think it is a very sensible and important decision, but it does re-open the question of quantity versus

quality. Incidentally, it draws us into the whole question of whether the NATO overall strategy is still the right one.

If I could comment on your first comment about de-coupling. I guess what the questioner really meant was: Is the United States liable to start World War III because Europe is being over-run? That is why the Europeans asked for the two-track decision and that is why the two-track decision was taken.

But the question that is being increasingly asked is: Yes, but will the U.S. president really order a use of an atomic weapon, even in Europe, if he knows it is going to result in World War III? I don't know the answer of the president, but I guess one can speculate as to whether he would want to start World War III through INF anymore than he would through START weapons.

**Raymond Barre —** Thank you, Mr. Trudeau. But, if what you say is true, that if there is incredibility in the solidarity of the alliance in all respects, at this time in Europe you will get neutralism and pacifism.

**Prime Minister Trudeau —** I am not arguing that that should be the course. I am arguing that our strategy is not necessarily one which leads us away from that course, in fact.

**Raymond Barre —** The problem is a problem of credibility. If there is a credibility gap, Europe is in very bad shape.

**Prime Minister Trudeau —** Well, all right. Let me ask you about your credibility, Mr. Barre. Do you think the president of the United States, in answer to an over-running of Europe by conventional Soviet forces, will want to start World War III, an atomic war? You have to believe that in order to not have a credibility gap.

**Raymond Barre —** I will never put the question because if I put the question, there is no longer credibility.

**Prime Minister Trudeau —** Which in religious terms is agnosticism.

**Raymond Barre —** Have you read Pascal?

**Prime Minister Trudeau —** It is what some would call the leap of faith, but democracies don't work that way. People are entitled to ask questions in democracy, otherwise, they will not support their governments.

**Editor's note:** Each of the other participants answers three questions in turn, then each is asked to respond to the following question — only Mr. Trudeau's reply is given here.

*Mr. Mee*  
*Dr. Balder*  
*Mr. Smith*

DMF

RCD

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Déclarations du PM à Davos: commentaires  
de l'Ambassadeur de RFA

*J. J. J.*  
*8/2/84*

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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L'Ambassadeur Behrends a rendu une  
visite de courtoisie au ministre Pepin, lundi  
matin le 30 janvier. Au cours de la conversation,  
M. Pepin lui a demandé quelles étaient ses réactions  
aux commentaires du Premier Ministre à Davos.  
L'Ambassadeur a répondu: "I have no reaction,  
only that this is not the kind of thing we say  
in public".

Directeur général  
Direction des Relations avec les  
pays européens du Sommet et la  
Communauté européenne,

*R.*

A.R.A. Gherson

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TO/À TRANSCRIPT

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CBC: At an international symposium on security held in Switzerland over the past weekend, Prime Minister Trudeau raised questions about the NATO Alliance's nuclear strategy. He was criticized for doing so both by U.S. officials and by Opposition politicians in Canada. Dr. Paul Caffon of Halifax, President of Physicians for Social Responsibility, thinks the critics are wrong.

Dr. Caffon: Media reports over the weekend suggested that Prime Minister Trudeau damaged his peace initiative by quarreling with American and French officials over NATO's nuclear strategy. The claim is made that by distancing himself ever so slightly from the Reagan Administration on NATO nuclear weaponry, Mr. Trudeau has undermined his own peace initiative. My view is the opposite. By his courage and honesty, Mr. Trudeau has reinforced his peace initiative. Mr. Trudeau's disagreement with M. Barre of France was over the credibility of the overall NATO nuclear strategy. The Prime Minister suggests that conventional war with the USSR should not automatically evoke a nuclear response from the United States. In saying this, Mr. Trudeau comes close to a declaration that NATO should follow the Warsaw Pact and declare that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. He also disputed the hypocritical claim of the United States that it is decreasing its nuclear arsenal. The obvious point which our Prime Minister made is that the American arsenal discards only outmoded weapons and that it is far more dangerous with the addition of Cruises, Pershings and eventual MXs. Mr. Trudeau's statements in Switzerland come in the wake of a series of peace luncheons, during which some of us asked him to be more forthcoming about the truth of the American nuclear arsenal and to show courage in resisting American intimidation, designed to ensure that Canada follows the Reagan lead in nuclear arms. I am impressed that Mr. Trudeau


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appears to be doing exactly this. Mr. Trudeau's statements certainly increase his stature with Warsaw Pact countries, who may otherwise have seen our Prime Minister as too closely tied with the U.S. to be of value in any nuclear disarmament process. And, although the remarks may not be well received by Britain's Thatcher or West Germany's Kohl, they also provide further support for those West European countries, like Norway, Italy and Holland, which have been reluctant up to now to discuss openly their concerns about NATO nuclear strategy. Mr. Trudeau's peace initiative cannot be destroyed by losing credibility with the Reagan Administration, which is far too committed to nuclear superiority to give it any in the first place. Canadian experience with the United States has consistently shown that we must challenge strongly American positions which we wish to change. The peace initiative could be destroyed only by too great a dependence on the U.S. In this regard, Mr. Trudeau's weekend remarks have taken his peace initiative a great step forward. It is a step we should all support. For Commentary, this is Paul Caffon in Halifax.

  
Dilys Buckley-Jones  
Acting Director  
Press Office



- ① PRAGUE DECLARATION - 413, P3, P13-14  
② INF, SS-20's - P5-6  
③ NATO STRATEGY - P. 8-10  
④ NOW (FIRST) USE - P. 11-12 ~~14~~
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TAPE QUALITY WAS POOR. PLSE MAKE APPROPRIATE REVISIONS AND REPLY  
BY RETURN TELEX.

TRANSCRIPT OF THE PMS NEWS CONFERENCE, EAST BERLIN, JAN31, 1984  
TRANSCRIPTION DE LA CONFERENCE DE PRESSE DU PM A BERLIN-EST,  
LE 31 JANVIER 1984

Q.MR PM, YOUR PEACE MISSION HAS TAKEN YOU TO DELHI AND PEKIN, THE  
CAPITALS OF THE WEST AND THE EAST. WHAT EXPECTATIONS DO YOU HAVE?  
AND, MR PM, YOUR PROPOSAL FOR A GLOBAL CEILING: WOULD YOU MIND  
INCLUDING, ALSO, A BAN ON FIRST STRIKE WEAPONS WHEN THE CEILING IS  
ESTABLISHED?

A. A BAN OF WHAT?

Q. FIRST STRIKE. A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE BAN.

A. WELL, YOU'RE ASKING ME WHAT PROGRESS I SEE AND WHY I AM HERE. I HAVE  
BEEN PREACHING THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND  
WEST, BETWEEN NATO COUNTRIES AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, AND I  
ESSENTIALLY CAME TO THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, LIKE I WENT TO  
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, IN ORDER TO PRACTICE WHAT I PREACH AND TO DIALOGUE  
WITH THE LEADERS OF THESE COUNTRIES, AS I WILL WITH THE LEADER OF

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ROMANIA WHEN I VISIT THERE NEXT.

SO, IN ESSENCE, THATS WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING. WE HAVE BEEN EXCHANGING VIEWS. I HAVE FOUND US PROCEEDING TO A NEW DEGREE OF MATURITY IN OUR RELATIONS. WE ARE SEEING--CERTAINLY IN THESE BILATERAL VISITS--A NON-USE OF INVECTIVE, WHICH IS IMPORTANT, AND AN EFFORT TO LOOK AT CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS IN AREAS WHERE BOTH SIDES CAN AGREE, AND WE HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED IN THAT TASK TODAY.

YOU SPEAK OF A BAN ON FIRST STRIKE WEAPONS. I AM NOT/NOT QUITE SURE WHAT YOU MEAN. ANYTHING CAN BE A FIRST STRIKE WEAPON: A REVOLVER OR--

Q. NO/NO. I MEAN, THAT THE NUCLEAR POWERS MAKE A PLEDGE THAT, ONCE THE GLOBAL CEILING IS ESTABLISHED--EVEN BEFORE THE GLOBAL CEILING IS ESTABLISHED--THAT THEY WILL NOT/NOT BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A CONFLICT.

WHAT IS THE GUARANTEE. EVEN IF YOU HAVE A HUNDRED WEAPONS ON EACH SIDE, IF THERE IS NO GUARANTEE ONE OF THEM WONT FIRE FIRST AND CREATE A NUCLEAR STRIKE.

A. WELL, AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE WORKING TOWARDS A FULFILLMENT OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, BUT WE GO BEYOND YOUR SUGGESTION. I THINK WE ARE ALL SIGNATORS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER WHICH SAYS THAT THERE SHALL BE NO/NO FIRST USE OF FORCE, NUCLEAR OR OTHERWISE, AND CERTAINLY CANADA AND ITS ALLIES HAVE NO/NO INTENTION OF USING FORCE FIRST. AND I THINK THE SAME WOULD BE SAID BY MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES.

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Q. PAUL KORING (CP) MR PM, COULD YOU TELL ME  
IF YOU THINK THE INTRODUCTION OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS IN  
EUROPE BY NATO IN DEC HAS ENHANCED THE CREDIBILITY OF NATOS  
POLICY OF TRYING TO RESPOND TO--

A. THAT IS A QUESTION WHICH WAS ASKED IN DAVOS AND ANSWERED  
THERE, AS FAR AS I CAN REMEMBER. IT IS A MATTER OF OPINION. I  
THINK, SINCE IT WAS A DECISION OF NATO, TAKEN MAINLY AT THE REQUEST  
OF THE EUROPEANS, I PRESUME THAT THEY FEEL THAT IT HAS ENHANCED.

Q. PM TRUDEAU, WAS REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY--  
THAT SUBJECT-- BROUGHT UP AT ALL DURING YOUR DISCUSSIONS TODAY,  
AND IF SO (INAUDIBLE)?

A. NO, SIR.

Q. AS A RESULT OF YOUR VISIT HERE, THERE HAS BEEN QUITE (INAUDIBLE)  
BILATERAL RELATIONS.

CAN WE EXPECT SOME GROWTH (INAUDIBLE) COOPERATION  
BETWEEN CANADA AND THE GDR?

A. I THINK YOU CAN. CERTAINLY, CHAIRMAN HONECKER AND I  
AGREED THAT WE SHOULD LOOK AT AREAS OF AGREEMENT IN THE POSITIONS  
TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES. FOR EXAMPLE, I HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT IN THE  
PRAGUE DECLARATION OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES LAST YEAR, THERE  
WERE SOME POSITIVE PROPOSALS THAT WE FROM NATO CAN AND SHOULD  
ACCEPT, AND IN THE SAME WAY, I BELIEVE, THAT THERE ARE SOME  
STATEMENTS MADE BY NATO IN BRUSSELS IN DEC WHICH THE WARSAW  
PACT COUNTRIES CAN AND COULD ACCEPT.

...4

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MBFR  
THEREFORE, WE HAVE ASKED OUR OFFICIALS AND MINISTERS TO  
WORK TOGETHER TO SORT OF IDENTIFY THE AREAS WHERE WE CAN AGREE, AND  
THIS IS WHAT I CALL GOING BEYOND THE INVECTIVE AND WORKING  
POSITIVELY TO FIND AREAS OF AGREEMENT. AND I THINK MIDDLE POWERS,  
LIKE THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND LIKE CANADA, CAN DISCHARGE  
THEIR POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS BY IDENTIFYING SUCH AREAS OF AGREEMENT  
AND THEN TURNING TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIES AND SAYING, QUOTE WELL,  
MAYBE WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS IN SOME PLACES UNQUOTE. FOR INSTANCE, IN OUR  
TALK TODAY, WE POINTED OUT THAT THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE  
REDUCTION TALKS IN VIENNA WAS AN AREA WHERE WE BOTH SOUGHT THE SAME  
OBJECTIVES, AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS UP TO NATO COUNTRIES NOW TO  
RESPOND TO THE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD IN MOSCOW, I BELIEVE, LAST  
JUNE.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWER MEETING UNDER  
THE AEGIS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SINCE  
THEY ARE ALSO THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,  
AND CHAIRMAN HONECKER SAID THAT HE SUPPORTED SUCH AN INITIATIVE AND  
HE WOULD URGE, INsofar AS HE WAS ABLE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PROCEED  
WITH SUCH A SUGGESTION.

SO, THERE ARE MANY IDEAS THAT WE SHARE IN COMMON, BUT IN  
THE PAST, PARTICULARLY THE PAST FEW YEARS, THEY HAVE BEEN ENVELOPED  
IN SUCH AGGRESSIVE LANGUAGE OR THEYVE BEEN PRESENTED IN SUCH A  
PUBLIC FORUM THAT THEY DIDNT SEEM LIKE FIERCE NEGOTIATING

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PROPOSALS, BUT THERE ARE MANY SUCH PROPOSALS, AND WE HAVE RESPECTIVELY UNDERTAKEN TO TRY AND IDENTIFY THEM AND EVENTUALLY ACT ON THEM.

Q. WHAT ABOUT ECONOMICS? WERE BILATERAL RELATIONS ON THE AGENDA?

A. THEY WERENT ON THE AGENDA PER SE, BUT TOWARD THE END OF THE MEETING WE DID TALK OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS BRIEFLY, AND REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE VISIT OF ONE OF OUR MINISTERS LAST SEPTEMBER, WHICH LED UP TO AN AGREEMENT ON TRADE, AND REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE POSSIBLE VISIT OF A MINISTER OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO CANADA.

Q. CHRIS YOUNG (SOUTHAM) PM, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET (INAUDIBLE) GERMANY, SEEMS TO BE ANOTHER STEP AT ESCALATION. DID YOU EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS ON THAT TO THE CHAIRMAN TODAY (INAUDIBLE)?

A. WE BOTH TALKED A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE PAST THIS MORNING.  
FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW, ITS THE EUROMISSILES; FROM OUR POINT OF  
VIEW, ITS THE SS-20S. BUT HAVING STATED THAT WE BOTH REGRETTED  
THE DETERIORATION OF THE ATMOSPHERE WHICH TOOK PLACE AND WHICH HAS  
MADE THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT SEEM SO FAR IN THE PAST, WE AGREED TO  
LOOK FORWARD RATHER THAN TO THE PAST AND TO START FROM THE FACTS AS  
THEY ARE, RATHER THAN WE WOULD HAVE LIKE THEM TO HAVE BEEN.

THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO GREAT DISCUSSION ABOUT EACH  
OTHERS RESPECTIVE POSITIONS--OUR TWO-TRACK DECISION, THE SS-20

...6

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DECISION. IT IS, AS I THINK I ANSWERED TO THE FIRST QUESTION,  
SOMETHING WHICH IS PAST AND WE PREFER TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE TO SEE  
HOW WE COULD REDUCE THIS BUILD-UP AND THESE TENSIONS WHICH ARE TOO  
GREAT.

Q. (INAUDIBLE)

NATO'S  
2-TRACK  
decision

A. WELL, THEY ARE DECISIONS WHICH WERE TAKEN IN THE PAST: ON  
OUR PART, TO LIVE UP TO THE TWO-TRACK DECISION; ON THE PART OF THE  
SOVIETS AND THE WARSAW PACT, TO LEAVE THE NEGOTIATION TABLE. THEY  
ARE DECISIONS WITH WHICH, AS I HAVE EXPLAINED BEFORE, IN DAVOS IN  
PARTICULAR, BOTH SIDES ARE SADDLED, AND IT IS BECAUSE OF THOSE  
DECISIONS AND THE INEVITABILITY OF TENSIONS BUILDING UP RESULTING  
FROM THEM THAT THE CANADIAN PEACE INITIATIVE WAS BORN. IT WAS TO  
SORT OF SAY QUOTE OKAY, THESE THINGS ARE HAPPENING, THE BUILD-UP WILL  
CONTINUE AND NEVER STOP, AND NOBODY WILL EVER RETURN TO THE TABLE,  
NEITHER IN GENEVA NOR/NOR IN VIENNA, UNLESS SOMETHING IS DONE TO  
GO UNQUOTE--TO REPEAT MY FORMULA--QUOTE BEYOND INVECTIVE INTO A  
MORE MATURE RELATIONSHIP UNQUOTE. AND IT IS THAT MATURE RELATIONSHIP  
THAT, I BELIEVE, WERE IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING.

Q. WHAT DOES CANADA EXPECT FROM THE CONFERENCE WHICH IS  
GOING ON NOW IN STOCKHOLM?

A. WELL, THE FACT THAT BOTH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, THE  
NATO COUNTRIES AND ALSO THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED STARTED THE  
CONFERENCE AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL IS FOR US A SIGN OF

...7

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STOCKHOLM

ENCOURAGEMENT. IT MEANS THAT THE GOVERNMENTS WANT TO BE INVOLVED IN THOSE CONFERENCES AND THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY LACK OF PROGRESS. IT IS TOO EARLY TO KNOW IF THERE WILL BE PROGRESS, BUT I HAVE BEEN URGING MY COLLEAGUES--AND I ALSO URGED CHAIRMAN HONECKER--TO SEND OUR MINISTERS BACK TO STOCKHOLM IF THEY ARE NOT/NOT PROGRESSING ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE ESTABLISHED IN MADRID. BUT THAT SCHEDULE ITSELF, TO ME, IS IMPORTANT, BUT IT IS VERY CAUTIOUS. IT TALKS OF A REVIEW IN 1986, A REVIEW OF MILITARY CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, AND I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD WAIT TILL 1986 TO MAKE PROGRESS ON ARMS REDUCTIONS. THAT IS WHY I HAVE BEEN VERY INSISTENT ON THE NEED TO RETURN TO THE TABLE IN VIENNA AND TO MAKE, VERY SOON, PROGRESS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, AND HOPEFULLY, AT SOME POINT, BEFORE 1986, THE SOVIET UNION WILL RETURN TO THE TABLE IN GENEVA AND LET THE PAST BE PAST AND SAY QUOTE OKAY, WHAT CAN WE DO NOW? UNQUOTE AND MAKE PROGRESS THERE. I THINK IT IS THE DUTY OF COUNTRIES LIKE YOURS AND MINE, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THESE OPPOSING ALLIANCES, TO ENCOURAGE THIS KIND OF PROGRESS AND NOT/NOT WAIT TILL 1986.

SPUR THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWER MEETING THAT WE HAVE BEEN URGING--AND I'M VERY HAPPY THAT THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IS SUPPORTING IT, AND AS I'VE SAID IN ANOTHER AREA, THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IS SUPPORTING IT--I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE PUT PRESSURE ON THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS TO

...8

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THAT THEY LIVE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE NPT,  
WHICH IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF REDUCING THEIR NUCLEAR ARMS.

SO, I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE BEGINNING IN  
STOCKHOLM, BUT THERE ARE OTHER FORUMS, AND I THINK WE SHOULD  
KEEP PRESSURE SO THAT PROGRESS BE MADE IN THESE OTHER  
FORUMS.

Q. JEAN-MICHEL LEPRINCE (RADIO-CANADA)  
(INAUDIBLE)

R. OH, C'EST UN JUGEMENT QUE PLUSIEURS  
PERSONNES ONT EU, COMME VOUS DITES, MAIS CE N'EST PAS MA FAÇON  
DE VOIR LES CHOSSES. COMME JE L'AI EXPLIQUÉ À DAVOS, LES  
MEMBRES DE L'OTAN SONT DES PAYS DÉMOCRATIQUES. ILS DISCUTENT  
CES CHOSSES DEPUIS FORT LONGTEMPS ET FORT PUBLIQUEMENT.  
KISSINGER EN A PARLÉ EN 79. LA REVUE FOREIGN AFFAIRS EN EST  
PLEINE DANS LES ARTICLES DE MCNAMARA. LE LEADER DE  
L'OPPOSITION AU PARLEMENT CANADIEN, MONSIEUR MULRONEY, A  
PROPOSÉ QUE NOUS REEXAMINIONS LA QUESTION DU CIT FIRST STRIKE  
FINCIT.

ALORS, CE N'EST PAS UNE NOUVELLE QUI A ÉTÉ  
CRÉE À DAVOS. C'EST LA CONTINUATION D'UNE DISCUSSION QUI  
EXISTE ET DONT NOUS SERIONS HYPOCRITES DE NIER L'EXISTENCE.  
POUR CE QUI EST DE NUIRE À MON INITIATIVE,  
J'AURAIS CRU AU CONTRAIRE QUE ÇA L'AIDERAIT, MAIS C'EST UNE  
QUESTION DE JUGEMENT.

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Q.MR PM, YOU ARE THE FIRST NATO HEAD OF  
GOVERNMENT IN EAST BERLIN. ARE YOU UPSET THAT MAY BE A PRECEDENT  
THAT COULD ANNOY YOUR PARTNERS (INAUDIBLE)?

A. FRANKLY, IT DOESN'T WORRY ME. NATO ITSELF, IN ITS  
DECEMBER STATEMENT, ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES WHICH, IT SEEMS TO ME, I  
AM APPLYING IN VISITING MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT ALLIANCE. WE  
TALKED IN NATO IN DECEMBER OF RESPECTING EACH OTHERS LEGITIMATE  
SECURITY INTERESTS, AND HOW ELSE DO YOU ESTABLISH THEM EXCEPT  
THROUGH VISITS OF THIS KIND?

DAVID HALTON (CBC) A SLIGHTLY MORE FOCUSED VERSION OF AN  
EARLIER QUESTION. THE CONSERVATIVES IN PARLIAMENT YESTERDAY SAID  
THAT YOU HAVE NO/NO BUSINESS GOING AROUND UNDERMINING THE CREDIBILITY  
OF THE US NUCLEAR CONTINGENCY. (INAUDIBLE) AS PREMIER BARRE WAS  
SAYING, THAT YOU SHOULDN'T BE ASKING THAT KIND OF QUESTION IN  
PUBLIC?

A. WELL, I AM ASTONISHED AT BOTH THE AUTHORS OF THE QUESTION  
THAT YOU ASK.

AS FAR AS THE CONSERVATIVES IN PARLIAMENT, THE CANADIAN  
PARLIAMENT, ARE CONCERNED, IT WAS MR MULRONEYS FIFTH PROPOSITION  
IN HIS STATEMENT ON THE PEACE INITIATIVE WHICH HE MADE BEFORE  
CHRISTMAS. HIS FIFTH PROPOSITION WAS PRECISELY THAT WE SHOULD ASK  
QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT HE CALLED NATOS FIRST STRIKE DOCTRINE.

AND AS FOR MONSIEUR RAYMOND BARRE, I THINK HE WAS BEING A

...10

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force  
de  
frappe

LITTLE BIT PARALOGISTIC. I MEAN, HE WAS DOING HIS DUTY AS A CHAIRMAN OF ASKING QUESTIONS, BUT I DONT THINK HE WAS SERIOUS IN REFERRING TO PASCAL AND SAYING QUOTE WE MUST SIGN OURSELVES WITH HOLY WATER AND BELIEVE UNQUOTE. I MEAN, IF ANYBODY HAS BEEN ASKING QUESTIONS OF THE KIND THAT YOU MENTIONED, IT HAS BEEN THE FRENCH.

I MEAN, THE WHOLE QUOTE FORCE DE FRAPPE UNQUOTE WHICH MR BARRES GOVERNMENT AS PRIME MINISTER NOT/NOT ONLY SUPPORTED BUT ADVANCED, THE WHOLE GAULLIST THEORY OF THE QUOTE FORCE DE FRAPPE UNQUOTE IS THAT WE CANT BE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THE AMERICANS WILL DEFEND US; THEREFORE, WE SHOULD HAVE QUOTE LA FORCE DE FRAPPE UNQUOTE. SO, I DONT THINK BARRE WAS SERIOUS, AND I DONT THINK YOURE SERIOUS WHEN YOU QUOTE MULRONEY.

Q...THE CREDIBILITY OF THIS DETERRENT MUST BE MAINTAINED BY MAINTAINING AT LEAST A DOUBT THAT (INAUDIBLE).

7 11  
A. EXACTLY. THEREFORE, IF I HELPED IN  
CREATING THE DOUBT, THEN I DID MY DUTY AS A MEMBER OF NATO.

Q. MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, SI J AI BIEN COMPRIS, VOUS DES PAYS DE L OTAN EST LES PAYS MEMBRES DU TRAITE DE VARSOVIE ONT L INTENTION D AVOIR RECOURS AU PREMIER ACCORD DE L APPORT MILITAIRE.

QUELLES SONT, D APRES VOUS, LES DIFFICULTES QUI SE POSENT A CE QUE LES PAYS DE L OTAN ET LES PAYS MEMBRES DU TRAITE DE VARSOVIE SIGNENT UN ACCORD OU UN TRAITE SUR LA

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DECLARATION OF NON (FIRST)  
USE OF  
FORCE

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REVENDICATION MUTUELLE A L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE MILITAIRE?

R. JE PENSE QUE L OBJECTIF PEUT ETRE PARTAGE

PAR LES DEUX ALLIANCES PUISQUE, COMME VOUS L AVEZ DIT, NOUS

RENONCONS AU PREMIER USAGE DE LA FORCE LEN ETANT SIGNATAIRES

DE LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES. JE CROIS QUE CE QUE LES PAYS

DE L OTAN PENSENT D UNE TELLE PROPOSITION C EST QU ELLE VIENT

PLUTOT COMME UN COURONNEMENT LORSQUE NOUS AVONS ETABLI LES

METHODES DE VERIFICATION, LORSQUE NOUS AVONS REETABLI DES

MESURES DE CIT CONFIDENCE BUILDING FINCIT, DE CONFIANCE, LORSQUE NOUS

AVONS REETABLI LE DIALOGUE, BIEN, NOUS POUVONS ULTIMEMENT

ALLER DANS LA DIRECTION D UN TEL ACCORD, MAIS DE SIGNER

L ACCORD AU TOUT DEBUT, AVANT MEME QUE LES NEGOCIATIONS AIENT

PROGRESSE, CA DEVIENT SIMPLEMENT UNE SIGNATURE DECLARATOIRE.

NOUS DECLARONS QUE NOUS NE NOUS AGRESSERONS PAS. NOUS

REPETONS AU PEU CE QUE NOTRE ENGAGEMENT, QUI A ETE FAIT LORSQUE

NOUS AVONS ADHERE A LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES, MAIS JE CROIS

AUSSI QUE NOUS SOMMES UN PEU CRAINTIFS DE REPETER L EXPERIENCE

DE L ENTRE-DEUX GUERRES ALORS QU IL Y A EU BEAUCOUP DE

FORMULES DECLARATOIRES QUI ONT REUNI LES PAYS D EUROPE. ENFIN,

JE PENSE AU PACTE BRYANT-KELLOGG PAR EXEMPLE, QUE ETAIT UNE

DECLARATION SOLENNELLE DE DESARMEMENT, MAIS QUI ETAIT PUREMENT

DECLARATOIRE, QUI N AVAIT PAS LES ETAPES ET LES CRANS D ARRET

QUI PERMETTAIENT DE RENDRE CETTE DECLARATION VERIFIABLE ET

EFFECTIVE.

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ALORS, PLUTOT QUE DE COMMENCER PAR LA  
DECLARATION, NOUS TROUVONS UTILE D'ETABLIR LES ETAPES  
PRELIMINAIRES, MAIS LES OBJECTIFS SONT LES MEMES ET, QUANT A  
|| MOI, JE NE VOIS PAS D'OBJECTION A COMMENCER A EN DISCUTER  
D'UNE FACON OU D'UNE AUTRE.

Q. GILBERT LAVOIE (LA PRESSE): MONSIEUR  
LE PREMIER MINISTRE, UNE QUESTION DE DEUX POINTS. D'UNE PART  
(INAUDIBLE)... D'AUTRE PART, EST-CE QUE VOUS CROYEZ TOUJOURS  
UTILE ET EST-CE QUE VOUS AVEZ TOUJOURS L'INTENTION D'ALLER A  
MOSCOU QUAND CE SERA POSSIBLE?

R. EH BIEN, POUR CE QUI EST DE LA PREMIERE  
QUESTION, JE NE VEUX PAS ENGAGER LE GOUVERNEMENT DU PAYS QUI  
ME RECOIT, JE N'AI PAS CHERCHE UN ENGAGEMENT A LE FAIRE,  
MAIS J'AI EXPLIQUE QUE C'ETAIT UNE IDEE QUE, DE MON COTE,  
J'ALLAIS POUSSER ET IL M'A SEMBLE QUE, AU MOINS EN CE QUE  
REGARDE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE D'ALLEMAGNE,  
ILS CROYAIENT AUSSI QUE C'ETAIT UNE BONNE IDEE, MAIS JE  
NE SUIS PAS LA POUR LES ENGAGER.

EN CE QUI EST DE LA VISITE DE MOSCOU, CA RESTE  
*Moscow* HYPOTHETIQUE. JE VOUS AI PARLE IL Y A UNE SEMAINE DE LA  
LETTRE DE MONSIEUR ANDROPOV QUI INSISTAIT QU'IL VOULAIT ME  
RECEVOIR QU'IL NE VOULAIT PAS QUE JE VISITE MOSCOU POUR VOIR  
D'AUTRES PERSONNES QUE LUI, MAIS QUI M'A DEMANDE D'ATTENDRE  
...13

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ENCORE QUELQUE TEMPS AVANT DE RECEVOIR UNE DATE. ALORS,  
J'ATTENDS ET, QUAND J'AURAI LA DATE, J'ESSAIERAI D'ALLER.

Q. BRIAN KELLEHER (CBC) I WONDER IF YOU COULD  
SUGGEST ANY OTHER CURRENT POLICIES BESIDES THE CURRENT US COMMITMENT  
TO EUROPE THAT WOULD REDUCE TENSIONS WHILE MAINTAINING THE FLEXIBLE  
RESPONSE.

A. NO/NO. IF I HAD SUCH PROPOSALS, I SUPPOSE I  
WOULD BE TAKING THEM TO THE NATO COUNCILS AND DISCUSSING THEM  
THERE--IF I HAD THEM, AND I COULDN'T CLAIM THAT I DO. I DON'T  
SUPPOSE I WOULD BE PROPOSING THEM TO THIS AUDIENCE. I WOULD  
BE PROPOSING THEM TO THE NATO COUNTRIES THEMSELVES, IN SECRET  
CONCLAVE.

Q. PM, IS IT CORRECT TO SAY THAT  
YOUR INITIATIVES ARE DIRECTED TOWARD REPLACING CONFRONTATION  
WITH NEGOTIATION?

A. YES, I THINK THAT IS A GOOD SUMMATION OF  
THE INITIATIVES. IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE PAST COUPLE OF YEARS,  
AND PARTICULARLY 1983, HAS BEEN A PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION AT  
LEAST IN WORDS AND ALSO IN DEEDS BY THE CARRYING OUT OF THE  
TWO-TRACK DECISION ON ONE HAND AND THE ABANDONING OF THE TABLE  
ON THE OTHER, AND I THINK BECAUSE IT WAS A PERIOD OF HOSTILITY  
AND TENSION, SOME OF THE PROPOSALS MADE BY BOTH SIDES WEREN'T  
SERIOUSLY EXAMINED BY THE OTHER SIDE. I GAVE THE EXAMPLE OF  
THE PRAGUE DECLARATION WHICH I DON'T THINK WAS EXAMINED ON

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PRAGUE  
DECLARATION

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ITS MERITS AND RESPONDED TO BY THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE BECAUSE  
THEY WERE PROPOSALS WHICH WERE MADE IN A VERY HEATED  
ATMOSPHERE; THEY WERE MADE IN A PUBLIC WAY AND THEY CARRIED  
A FAIR MEASURE OF INVECTIVE IN THEM. BUT THERE WERE CERTAIN  
GOOD CONCRETE PROPOSALS.

IN THE SAME WAY, I HAVEN'T SEEN THE WARSAW  
PACT COUNTRIES GIVE MUCH ATTENTION TO, I THINK, THE VERY  
CONSTRUCTIVE AND POSITIVE STATEMENT MADE IN NATO LAST  
DECEMBER.

THEREFORE, I AM--EXACTLY AS YOU PUT IT--  
TRYING TO GO BEYOND THAT PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION INTO A  
PERIOD OF NEGOTIATION, AND THAT IS ESSENTIALLY WHAT CHAIRMAN  
HONECKER AND MYSELF DISCUSSED.

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*Mr. McMe*

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... Attached for your information is  
the transcript of the press conference held  
by PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang on January 18  
in Ottawa.

*R. H. Sanchez*  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

PRESS CONFERENCE - PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG

January 18, 1984 - Ottawa

MODERATOR: The Premier will make a statement and the entire Press Conference will last thirty minutes.

ZHAO: I am very glad to have the opportunity of meeting our Canadian friends from the media. I thank you for your contributions to increasing mutual understanding between the Chinese and Canadian peoples. I would like to ask you to convey to the great Canadian people the cordial greetings and high respect of the Chinese people. At the kind invitation of Prime Minister Trudeau, I have come to visit your country with the aim of enhancing friendship, strengthening cooperation and safeguarding peace. My talks with the Prime Minister and other senior officials of the Canadian Government have been very friendly and fruitful. Both sides have expressed readiness to take further measures to develop Sino-Canadian friendly relations and cooperation and make efforts for the relaxation of

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international tension and the preservation of world peace. The two sides have signed the Investment Insurance Agreement between the People's Republic of China and Canada, which will offer more favourable conditions for our economic cooperation. I am also honoured to have held cordial meetings with His Excellency the Governor-General, Honourable members of the Parliament, leaders of political parties and other personages of varied circles in Canada. Our party will visit Montreal tomorrow and then proceed to Toronto and Vancouver so that we can better acquaint ourselves with the life of the Canadian people and your achievements in the development of various sectors.

Both China and Canada are great countries. The friendly relations between our two peoples have a long history. The development of friendly relations and cooperation is based on a firm foundation and has a broad prospect. We wish to work together with our Canadian friends from all walks of life so that the tree of Sino-Canadian friendship will bloom more splendidly and bear richer fruits.

Now I am ready to answer your questions.

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MODERATOR: First question from Terry Milewsky of CBC.

T.MILEWSKY: Mr. Premier, some Canadian critics find  
(CBC Television) that China is open to western technology but not to western freedoms, and some western analysts recently have detected a crackdown in China against unorthodox thinkers, intellectuals who do not toe the party line, the arrest of a Catholic bishop near Peking, the detention of priests in Shanghai, the harrassment of Tibetans, there is a long list. My question is what can you say to those who charge that China is entering an anti-democratic period in which human rights and freedoms are not respected?

ZHAO: Well it is not true that China welcomes all foreign technology indiscriminately. We only welcome and import technologies which we need. We also allow the import and introduction of the western culture, education and art which we need, but we will not introduce those things which the Chinese people don't like. For instance, we wouldn't like to import murder or pornographic things from western countries. But I believe that even most developed countries wouldn't like to see these things happen in their countries, because they also have the pressure of their

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public opinion. Every nation has its own characteristics and its own likes. And when the people don't like something, for instance when the Chinese people don't like certain things, the Chinese government cannot try to impose them on the people. As for the charges you talked about just now, this is news to me., I have never heard it.

And of course in China, we don't allow the freedom to murder people, to rape or to create explosions in public places. We punish those crimes and with very severe punishments at that.

We allow free discussion of theoretical and ideological questions. Persecution of intellectuals doesn't exist in China. People can freely air their views in groups or in the press. Through discussions they may retain their views or change their views if they think that their original views were not right. In short, the kind of things that happened during the Cultural Revolution have gone forever.

Paule de  
RIVIERES:  
(Le Devoir)

Mr. Premier I would like to talk to you about

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the peace initiative of Prime Minister Trudeau. His main proposal is to have a summit of the five nuclear nations. Until now you seem to say that you agree with this peace initiative but not with that particular part of it, that particular proposal. Can you say why and can it change?

ZHAO:

In my talks with Prime Minister Trudeau he was kind enough to tell me how his peace initiative had progressed after his contacts with various countries concerned following our discussions in Beijing. He also explained to me some of his new ideas. These talks are useful and we agreed to keep in contact and cooperate closely on this matter.

China has always supported and appreciated Prime Minister Trudeau's efforts to relax international tension and preserve world peace. We also appreciate his appeal for participation for more world leaders in promoting relaxation of international tension. You all know this so I won't dwell on it.

MODERATOR:

Next question - Paul Majendie, Reuters.

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P.MAJENDIE:  
(Reuters)

For Beijing, which problem is the greater priority and needs solving first, Hong Kong or Taiwan? Will the blueprint you have suggested for Hong Kong also be applied to Taipei?

ZHAO:

First I would like to say that all the policies we are going to adopt towards Hong Kong can also be applied to Taiwan and even more.

As to which is given the first priority, I would answer you both. Because for China, reunification is the most pressing task; we hope and strive for peaceful reunification at an early date.

MODERATOR:

Brian Kelleher, CBC Radio.

B.KELLEHER:  
(CBC Radio)

You said in your toast last evening that you hoped the close consultation with Canada would lead to specific acts to further the cause of peace. In what areas do you think specific acts are possible at this time, and what might examples of some of those specific acts be?

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ZHAO: In our view the root cause of international tension is the escalation of the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. In order to relax international tension, it is important to compel the two superpowers to drastically cut down their nuclear armaments. In this respect I am in agreement with Prime Minister Trudeau and we are going to have close cooperation in this field.

MODERATOR: Paule de Rivières, Le Devoir.

P. DE RIVIERES: Yes, Premier Zhao, I would like to know how  
(Le Devoir) you reconcile the increasing importance put on tourism in your country with the anti-western campaign also going on?

ZHAO: I would like to correct you -- there is no anti-western movement in China.

When foreign tourists go to China they bring certain things which the Chinese people would like to learn from. For instance, in ladies hair styles and fashions, I think some Chinese girls would like very much to learn from the western styles and actually

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they have already learned some things. If you go to Beijing, you will find that the dresses there are more colourful than before and we are pleased to see it. But not all the things that the foreign tourists bring to China are welcomed by the Chinese people.

And I would like to stress once again that it is not true that there is an anti-western movement in China. You can see the Chinese gentlemen present here are all wearing western suits. Perhaps they are under the influence of the western tourists in China.

MODERATOR: OK, yes, next question.

B. WILSON  
(Western  
Producer)

Barry Wilson from the Western Producer. Mr. Premier, Canadian government officials suggest that Canada is considered the wheat supplier of preference for China, the wheat supplier of first demand. I am wondering, when the current wheat agreement expires next year, if Canada can be assured of a long-term market for wheat and for grains in China? Secondly, is there an opportunity

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for other types of agricultural exports, machinery or other products to China on a long term basis?

ZHAO:

Well, I am sure China is going to continue to buy Canadian wheat on a long-term basis. But as for the next agreement, whether China will agree to buy more or less or maintain the same level of wheat purchases as before, I am not in a position to answer you. We will find out only when the grain officials of the two countries sit down together and negotiate another agreement.

But I think it will be to our mutual benefit if the two sides conclude another agreement on long term wheat trade.

MODERATOR:

Two more questions. Aubrey Bell.

A.BELL:  
(Infocom Media  
Services)

Mr. Premier, during your speech yesterday you mentioned that the Hong Kong situation can be resolved through negotiations. What has occurred in recent weeks to give you this optimism?

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ZHAO: Well, I can only tell you that there is progress in the second phase of negotiations between China and Britain. Our two sides have reached an agreement that we will not tell details of the negotiations to outsiders.

When I said that I was optimistic about the solution of the Hong Kong question, however, this was not just casual talk. There are grounds for me to say so.

MODERATOR: One last question from the Globe and Mail gentleman here.

S.OCIEWICZ:  
(Globe & Mail) With all due respect, Mr. Premier, you have not answered the question about Mr. Trudeau's peace initiative. Friendship between countries and peoples means being frank. What are your government's reservations about Prime Minister Trudeau's peace initiative as he has spelled it out?

ZHAO: I wonder if you noticed that I said just now, when I answered that question, that we discussed the new ideas of Prime Minister Trudeau for his peace initiatives. As for

...11

- 11 -

the specific content of his new ideas,  
it is better to ask Prime Minister Trudeau  
himself.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much gentlemen.

ZHAO: Thank you.

-----

NOTE: Premier Zhao used an interpreter throughout the  
Press Conference. This record has been slightly  
edited.

MINA(2)

FILE

CMR

FPR

IDDZ/J.McNee/5-5912/cf

M. FILE/IDDZ  
DIARY

PLEASE RETURN TO IDDZ AFTER SIGNATURE.

IDDZ-0119

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

FEB 9 1984  
FEV

Mr. George V. Haythorne  
2190 Alta Vista Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1H 7M1

Dear Mr. Haythorne:

Thank you for your letter of January 9 and for sending me a copy of your thoughtful letter to the Prime Minister.

It is clear to me that the Prime Minister is voicing the concerns of a great many Canadians when he argues the urgency of restoring constructive dialogue to East-West relations and facing up to the critical problems of our nuclear predicament.

I share your objective of finding a way to bring about a reduction of nuclear arsenals, but I am not certain that a nuclear weapons freeze is the best method. Despite its evident attractiveness, a comprehensive freeze proposal has certain shortcomings. For example, it would lock into place certain destabilizing features of the current strategic balance; certain aspects (e.g. a freeze on the production of weapons) are virtually unverifiable; and it could destroy some of the incentives to negotiate reductions.

The challenge to my mind is to find ways of persuading and pressing the superpowers and the other nuclear weapon states to limit and then reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals. The Prime Minister's call for a conference of the five nuclear powers is both a proposal for an eventual solution and, of itself, a means of exerting pressure on the nuclear powers.

FEB 7 1984  
A 65070  
IDDZ

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- 2 -

While I am not persuaded that a new U.N. agency is the answer, the U.N. could play a key role in this process. In his meeting with the Secretary-General, the Prime Minister suggested that as all five nuclear powers are permanent members of the Security Council, the United Nations in New York could be the logical place for the five to begin discussions. The U.N. Charter confers on those five states both special rights and responsibilities.

The idea of a disarmament fund for development, of shifting global resources from arms to development, is a noble one and worthy of very serious consideration.

I, too, am very concerned at the erosion of the U.N.'s effectiveness and want to find ways to reinforce its work, especially its role in the resolution and prevention of conflicts.

With best regards.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by  
Original signé par  
ALLAN J. MacEACHEN

Allan J. MacEachen




TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À MINA  
FROM/DE IDDZ  
SUBJECT/SUJET PM's initiative and the U.N.

Security Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
File Dossier	IDDZ-0119
Date	January 31, 1984.

ATTACHMENT  
PIÈCE JOINTE

DISTRIBUTION	RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions) RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION (Noms des individus/Directions)	ACTION/SUITE À DONNER
MINA(2) FILE CMR FPR		<p>The attached letter is for your signature, if you agree:</p> <p>REQUIRED BY/DEMANDÉ POUR</p> <p> L.A. Delvoie Chairman Task Force Working Group</p>

TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINÉ AU DOSSIER

EXT 401



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

m		No. <b>A</b> 05070
Subject Sujet <del>XXX</del> George V. Haythorne Ont. re PM's initiative etc. and the U.N.		Action div./Dir. responsable IDA IDD2
Letter dated/Lettre en date du 84-01-09	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. 84-01-16
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par		84-01-25
Comments/Commentaires		

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de for appropriate action	Action officer/Agent responsable
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date
<div>                     ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT                 </div> <div>5-1047</div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA FEB 3 1984

A-05070

2190 Alta Vista Drive  
Ottawa K1H 7M1  
January 9, 1984

Hon. Allan MacEachen  
Minister of External Affairs  
Parliament Buildings  
Ottawa


Dear Allan,

I thought you might be interested to see the enclosed copy of a letter sent last week to Prime Minister Trudeau.

There is nothing particularly new about the suggestions for UN action. You and your people in External will have already thought of them and may have put them aside. It seemed timely, though, to raise such possibilities on the eve of the Prime Minister's visit to New York.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

  
George V. Haythorne

2190 Alta Vista Drive  
Ottawa K1H 7M1  
January 5, 1984

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau  
Parliament Buildings  
Ottawa

Dear Mr. Trudeau,

I am writing to express strong support of your excellent efforts to bring about a more realistic approach to world peace on the part of the United States and the USSR and a reversal of their present disastrous nuclear arms race.

I am pleased too you will be spending some time next week with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Especially in view of your encouraging responses from NATO and Commonwealth countries, China and Japan, it now appears timely to consider possible initiatives in the UN forum.

Following the Stockholm meeting this month I have wondered if Canada might consider sponsoring a resolution at the next meeting of the General Assembly or other appropriate UN organ designed to secure world wide endorsement of the principal steps you have proposed, including a nuclear weapons freeze.

The resolution might also recommend the creation of a special United Nations Agency charged with developing and executing measures, in close cooperation with the US, USSR and other nuclear weapons countries, to ensure the freeze and to achieve a steady reduction in existing nuclear weapons leading to their total elimination within a reasonable period.

The Agency would require a policing power. Since sanctions are not, as yet, readily invoked and effective in the international community, provision would probably be needed for a speedy reference to the International Court or other International Judicial body with tough penalties for proven default.

I have wondered too if it might be recommended that this Agency or an existing UN body develop a workable world wide plan designed to balance agreed reductions in nuclear and other arms expenditures against other forms of productive employment aimed at cushioning reduced arms employment and increased contributions to world food, health and other programs urgently needed by seriously disadvantaged people particularly in developing countries.

Besides helping to advance your initiatives, action along these lines would serve to bolster



- 2 -

the current weakened position of the United Nations. I have been saddened to see this weakening occur after all the solid work Canada has done in the ILO and other UN bodies over many years.

Many factors have contributed to the diminished status of the UN. One of these clearly is the tendency often of countries to adopt narrow national or regional positions and of some Agencies to become politicized rather than focussing on the best interests of the whole of humanity. This turn of events calls not for retreat but for more resolute and bolder support of the UN on Canada's part.

My experience over much of the last ten years in Southern Africa, working with the governments of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, strongly suggests that steps to help the UN meet its urgent global challenges would be not only applauded but backed enthusiastically by these and other developing countries.

With kind regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,

  
George A. Haythorne



*file*

TO/A APN/N.Valentine

FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Our memorandum IDDZ-0299 of December 15  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Support Staff for Prime Minister's Task  
SUJET Force on East-West Relations

Security/Sécurité
Unclassified
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
January 31, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0112

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

ETN/Lonergan


IDR/Johnston

Further to our memorandum under reference, it is now expected that the Task Force will continue to be in operation until approximately mid-February. It is therefore necessary that the following temporary agency personnel be extended for the duration of the Task Force:

OCE-2 operator from Quantum Management Services  
(Lynn Cross)

SCY-2 from Barbara Personnel Inc.  
(Francine Létourneau)

2. The coding for the above staff is 014-186-186-000-2301.

  
L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group



MGTC M. FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/  
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0111 31JAN84

TO/À

TO PMDEL <sup>BUCHARES</sup> ~~BERLIN~~ <sup>1200</sup> DELIVER BY 010000

INFO

DISTR

INFO BNATO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO

REF

BRU HAGUE WSHDC PRGUE WSAW BGRADE MOSCO VMBFR MINDEL/DAVOS PCOOTT/

SUBJ/SUJ

ARCHDEACON

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR RCD RCR IDR IDA

REF PRAGUE TEL WOGRO181 30JAN

---PM INITIATIVE

(ACCOMPANIED BY IDDZ/DELVOIE)  
FRENCH AMB CALLED ON DMF ~~AND IDDZ/DELVOIE~~ ON 31JAN TO QUERY CZECH  
PRESS REPORTS OF STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO PM IN PRAGUE ON PRAGUE  
DECLARATION AND ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE.

2. FRENCH AMB SAID CZECH PRESS REPORTS PM AS HAVING DESCRIBED PRAGUE  
DECLARATION AS A STEP FORWARD WHICH SHOULD GENERALLY BE FOLLOWED-UP  
BY NATO, WHILE HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT PM HAD ONLY CALLED PRAGUE  
DECLARATION A STEP FORWARD IN THE CONTEXT OF MBFR. DELVOIE REPLIED  
THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAD NOT/NOT SEEN A TRANSCRIPT OF PM S REMARKS IT  
WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT PM WOULD HAVE COMMENDED PRAGUE DECLARATION

<sup>INTERMS</sup>  
TO NATO ~~AS REPORTED BY CZECH PRESS. AND SAID OUR PRELIMINARY REPORT  
ON PRAGUE VISIT WAS QUOTE NO SURPRISES UNQUOTE.~~

3. FRENCH AMB ALSO RAISED CZECH PRESS REPORT THAT PM HAD FAVOURED  
SOVIET PROPOSAL OF DECLARATION OF NON-USE OF FORCE AND ASKED IF PM S  
POSITION HAD CHANGED. HE OBSERVED THAT PERHAPS CZECHS WERE PUTTING

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO IDDZ0111 CONF

12

10

WORDS IN PM S MOUTH. DELVOIE REPLIED THAT AS NATO WAS A DEFENSIVE  
ALLIANCE AND NATO S CHARTER ~~WAS AGAINST~~ <sup>RULED OUT FIRST</sup> USE OF FORCE WE SAW NO/NO  
NEED FOR A DECLARATION ON NON-USE OF FORCE AND, IN ANY EVENT, PM  
~~WAS~~ <sup>LIKELY TO</sup> ~~WOULD~~ <sup>ASSOURCE</sup> NOT/NOT CITE PRAGUE DECLARATION IN DISCUSSING THIS SUBJ.

4. AS A GENERAL COMMENT, FRENCH AMB SAID THAT FRENCH GOVT SAW NO/NO  
VIRTUES IN PRAGUE DECLARATION AND WAS OPPOSED TO TRYING TO FIND  
POSITIVE FEATURES IN IT. THEY SEE PRAGUE DECLARATION AS DESIGNED TO  
ENCITE PACIFIST SENTIMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE (WEST GERMAN AND DUTCH  
PEACE MOVEMENTS CONTINUE TO CITE IT) AND HE IS AFRAID PACIFISTS WILL  
NOW TRY TO COUNT PM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR VIEWS (E.G. L'HUMANITE  
29JAN HAD GIVEN LARGE PLAY TO PM S REPORTED REMARKS IN PRAGUE  
(PRINCIPALLY) AND DAVOS). HE OBSERVED THAT FRANCE HAD SO FAR ESCAPED  
FROM PACIFIST WAVE AND WISHED TO KEEP THINGS THAT WAY.

5. DMF REPLIED THAT THESE CONCERNS WOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE PM S  
ATTENTION. ~~GRATEFUL YOU DRAW SUBSTANCE OF THIS TEL TO PM S ATTN.~~

6. FOR PRAGUE: GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE TRANSCRIPT OF PM S MTGS WITH  
PRESS (SEE REFTTEL PARA 2).



*file*

TO/À                    MFSM/R.R.Fraser

FROM/DE              •    IDDZ

REFERENCE •    Your memorandum MFS-606 of October 24/83  
RÉFÉRENCE    and Fraser/Connick telecon of January 30/84

SUBJECT •        Task Force Word    Processing Requirements  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
January 31, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0110

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

MRMP

The rental contract for the AES Alphaplus 12 Word Processor expired on December 25, according to information which we received by telephone from Martin Laide of AES.

2.                We still have the word processor and will continue to require it until the Task Force terminates its work, now estimated to be February 15.

3.                Would you please arrange to have the contract renewed for the time required. We have requested a service call on this machine, which AES is unable to provide until the contract is renewed.

*Sheila Connick*

Prime Minister's Task Force  
on East-West Relations and  
International Security



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0109 31JAN84	<div>31 JAN 84 14 40Z</div>	
TO/À	TO PMDEL BUCST/FOWLER/SMITH		
INFO	INFO PC00TT/ARCHDEACON PM00TT/SMITH MOSCO		
DISTR	DISTR MINA DMF IFB		
REF	---		
SUBJ/SUJ	PM INITIATIVE: RUMORS OF MOSCO VISIT		
WE HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY THREE DIFFERENT CDN JOURNALISTS ASKING US ABOUT RUMORS, SUPPOSEDLY EMANATING FROM PMDEL BERLIN, TO EFFECT THAT SOVIET UNION HAS INDICATED THAT PM COULD VISIT MOSCO BETWEEN FEB15 AND FEB20. WE HAVE OF COURSE PLEADED TOTAL IGNORANCE. CAN YOU OFFER ANY ENLIGHTENMENT?			

DELIVER BY 311600

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

L.A. Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. Delvoie

FACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

MF  
Mr. Calder  
Let's speak  
HD

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR8029 31JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BRU GENEV WSHDC LDN HAGUE PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPO/ADMPOL/  
CPP/DNACPOL

DISTR IDA IDR

REF LDN TEL XNGR0195 27JAN OURTEL YBGR8026 31JAN(NOTAL)

---PMS INITIATIVE: BRIT VIEWS ON OUR THREE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

BRIT PERMREP DULY RAISED THIS SUBJ AT PERMREPS LUNCH 31JAN. HE

SAID LDN CONSIDERED OUR FIRST PROPOSAL TACTICALLY UNSOUND

(BRITISH WOULD PREFER STUDY GROUP ON ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER

SPACE). SECOND AND THIRD PROPOSALS THEY CONSIDER CONTRARY TO

CURRENT WESTERN POSITIONS. BRITS WERE THEREFORE REQUESTING THAT

WE NOT/NOT ADVANCE PROPOSALS IN CD PENDING FURTHER CONSULTATIONS.

2. NETHERLANDS PERMREP SAID HE HAD JUST RECEIVED LONG TEL

COMMENTING ON OUR PROPOSALS WHICH HE UNDERTOOK TO SEND ME AS

QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

3. BELGIAN PERMREP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WERE INTERESTED, MIGHT

WISH TO COMMENT, BUT FOUND TIME LIMIT TOO SHORT; HE ASKED WE

POSTPONE FURTHER ACTION PENDING CONSULTATION.

4. USA PERMREP SAID HE HAD NO/. NO INSTRUCTIONS BUT THAT, GIVEN

WHAT HE KNEW OF USA POSITIONS ON QUESTIONS RAISED BY OUR

PROPOSALS, WE SHOULD NOT/NOT TAKE USA SILENCE AS INDICATING

CONSENT.

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR8029 CONF

5.I SIMPLY UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THESE REACTIONS WITHOUT COMMITMENT  
AS TO WHETHER YOU WERE PREPARED TO TAKE ALLIES VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT.

6.MAY I HAVE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS?

TAYLOR

CCC/070 311615Z YBGR8029



**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

MF  
LD

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR8026 31JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

DISTR IDR IDA

REF MYTEL YBGR8024 27JAN

---PMS INITIATIVE

AT TODAYS LUNCH OF AMBASSADORS, I WAS ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS BY  
SEC GEN AND MY COLLEAGUES ABOUT PMS VISITS TO EASTERN EUROPE  
AND POSSIBILITY OF VISIT TO MOSCOW. I REPLIED THAT I HOPED TO BE  
ABLE TO CIRCULATE AN ASSESMENT OF VISITS TO EASTERN EUROPE IN  
DUE COURSE BUT HAD NOTHING TO PASS ON FOR MOMENT; AS TO VISIT TO  
MOSCOW, I DESCRIBED PROSPECTS FOR VISIT ON BASIS OF PARA2 OF  
YOUR IDDZ0046 17JAN, NOTING THAT WHILE RUSSIANS SEEM ANXIOUS  
THAT VISIT SHOULD TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS ANDROPOVS HEALTH  
PERMITS, AND APPEAR TO PREFER THAT PM SHOULD SEE ANDROPOV HIMSELF,  
NO/NO DATE FOR VISIT HAS BEEN FIXED AND WE HAVE NO/NO CLEAR  
IDEA OF WHEN IT MAY TAKE PLACE.

2. I WAS ALSO QUERIED ABOUT OUR THREE ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES.  
SEPARATE TEL FOLLOWS

TAYLOR

CCC/070 311530Z YBGR8026

MF  
R

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BGRAD ZLGR3194 31JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PRGUE WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME BONN HAGUE BRU BNATO PRMNY  
PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA MOSCO WSAW BPEST BUCST PMDELDAVOS  
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/CIC PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFP RGB RBD RBR ABRD RBP RBT ZSP ZSI  
IDD IDA IDR FPR

---PM INITIATIVE:YUGO PRESS COVERAGE

FOLLOWING FROM YUGO PRESS SERVICE TANJUG:

QUOTE CANADIAN PREMIER IN PRGUE.INDIRECT MESSAGE VIA TRUDEAU?PRGUE,  
30JAN(TANJUG).THE CTRIES OF THE WSAW PACT ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER  
WITH COMPLETE RESPONSIBILITY ALL WESTERN PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT,ON  
THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY,CONTRIBUTE  
TO THE REDUCTION OF INNATL TENSIONS AND REPRESENT A PRACTICAL STEP  
TOWARD THE LIMITATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS BUILD-UP.

2.THIS IS THE MESSAGE WHICH-IT IS BELIEVED IN PRGUE-THE WSAW PACT  
HAS SENT TO NATO INDIRECTLY ON THE OCCASION OF TALKS BETWEEN THE  
HIGHEST CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS AND CDN PREMIER PIERRE TRUDEAU SOME  
DAYS AGO IN PRAGUE.UNQUOTE.

UUU/096 311045Z ZLGR3194

FACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

MF  
12

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BGRAD ZLGR3193 31JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO MOSCO GENEV BNATO WSHDC STKHM/SCDEL LDN PARIS BONN  
ROME HAGUE VIENN PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOC/CPP  
PRGUE BUCST WSAW BPEST VMBFR BRU OSLO MINDELDAVOS  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR ZSI RCR URR RGB RBD  
REF YOURTEL IDDZ0046 17JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:YUGO VIEWS

SUMMARY:WE USED MEDIA GUIDANCE(REFTEL)TO BRIEF YUGO MFA  
SPECIAL DISARMAMENT ADVISOR ON CURRENT STATUS OF PM  
INITIATIVE.HE REITERATED YUGO SUPPORT BUT,ON PERS  
BASIS,WAS GLOOMY AND EVEN BITTER ABOUT SHORT-TERM  
PROSPECTS FOR SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN E-W RELS.HE MADE  
SOME INTERESTING OBSERVATIONS ON CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARD  
PROPOSED 5-NWS CONF,AND ON SOVIET APPROACH TO INF.  
ALTHOUGH TONE OF E-W DIALOGUE HAD IMPROVED,SUBSTANCE  
HAD NOT/NOT;STATE OF DISARMAMENT NEGS,ESPECIALLY  
SINCE PRES REAGAN TOOK OFFICE,WAS IN HIS VIEW  
WORSE THAN AT ANY TIME IN POSTWAR PERIOD.

2.REPORT:ON BASIS MAINLY OF REFTEL WE BROUGHT MFA  
SPECIAL DISARMAMENT ADVISOR DRAGOMIR DJOKIC UP TO DATE  
ON PM INITIATIVE.AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS,HE REITERATED  
THAT YUGO SUPPORTED ALL INITIATIVES WHICH MIGHT HELP TO

...2

PAGE TWO ZLGR3193 CONF

IMPROVE SITU. LAST NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) SUMMIT, HE NOTED, HAD PRODUCED SOME IDEAS SIMILAR TO THOSE BEING PURSUED BY PM, AS HAD NAM MINISTERIAL COORDINATING BUREAU MTG BEFORE LAST UNGA.

3. PROPOSED CONF OF FIVE NWS, SAID DJOKIC, WAS CLOSE TO YUGO HEARTS, ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT/NOT SEE IT BEING REALIZED IN NEAR FUTURE. NEVERTHELESS, NOTHING COULD BE ACHIEVED IN THIS QUOTE STUPID WORLD UNQUOTE (A PHRASE WHICH HE USED MORE THAN ONCE) WITHOUT AT LEAST ATTEMPTS TO GET NEGOTIATIONS UNDER WAY. THAT SUCH ATTEMPTS WERE BEING MADE WAS IN ITSELF A SORT OF LIMITED SUCCESS. THUS, YUGO VIEW OF PM INITIATIVE WAS POSITIVE, REGARDLESS OF OUTCOME.

4. DJOKIC NOTED THAT THERE WAS SOME LOGIC TO CHINESE POSITION THAT USA AND USSR SHOULD MAKE MAJOR REDUCTIONS IN THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS BEFORE ANY 5-NWS CONF WAS CONVENED. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER PRC COULD BE PERSUADED TO JOIN SUCH AN ENDEAVOUR FROM OUTSET, ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME SLIGHT CHANGES TO THEIR POSITION. IF SO, THIS COULD BE RESULT OF REFLECTION ON THEIR PART THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST NOT/NOT TO REFUSE INVITATION TO JOIN QUOTE CLUB UNQUOTE OF FIVE IF IT GOT TO POINT OF BEING FORMED. THIS DID NOT/NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THEY WOULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN NEGOTIATIONS. DJOKIC BELIEVED THAT FRENCH POSITION WAS BROADLY SIMILAR. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER,

...3

PAGE THREE ZLGR3193 CONF

IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO OBTAIN ANDROPOVS REACTION.

5.GLOOMILY,DJOKIC OBSERVED THAT DISARMAMENT EFFORTS HAD  
SUNK TO SUCH A LOW EBB THAT WE ALL WERE REDUCED TO DISSECTING  
REAGAN AND ANDROPOV STATEMENTS TO ANALYZE NUANCES AND CHOICE  
OF WORDS.HE AGREED THAT LANGUAGE IN RECENT REAGAN STATEMENTS  
WAS ENCOURAGING,BUT SUGGESTED THAT EXCESSIVE EMPHASIS WAS  
BEING PLACED ON SUCH MATTERS AS LANGUAGE AND TONE.IT WOULD  
HAVE BEEN BETTER HAD REAGAN NEVER REFERRED TO USSR AS QUOTE  
EVIL EMPIRE UNQUOTE,BUT IT WAS NOT/NOT VERY IMPORTANT THAT  
HE HAD;THERE HAD BEEN SIMILAR NAME-CALLING FOR YEARS FROM  
SOVIET SIDE.WHAT WAS TRULY IMPORTANT WAS WILL TO ENTER INTO  
SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS,AND FROM THAT PERSPECTIVE THERE HAD  
BEEN NO/NO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS SINCE WW2.

6.DJOKIC DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE THAT EITHER USA OR USSR HAD  
BEEN SERIOUS IN INF NEGOTIATIONS.USA WAS CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING  
ITS SUPERIORITY,PARTICULARLY IN TECHNOLOGICAL TERMS,HAD  
ALWAYS BEEN ABLE TO DO SO,AND HAD NO/NO REASON TO SETTLE FOR  
PARITY.USSR,ON OTHER HAND,WOULD NOT/NOT ACCEPT INFERIORITY.  
USSR,HE SAID,WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT PERSHING II,  
WHICH THEY BELIEVED TO HAVE RANGE OF 2,500 TO 3,000 KM AND  
THUS TO REPRESENT A FIRST-STRIKE THREAT.IN RESPONSE TO OUR  
POINTING OUT THAT PERSHING II RANGE WAS ONLY 1,800 KM,DJOKIC  
AGREED THAT THIS WAS WHAT USA MAINTAINED;USSR,HOWEVER,BASED  
THEIR APPROACH ON WHAT THEY THEMSELVES BELIEVED.

...4

PAGE FOUR ZLGR3193 CONF

7. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE GOOD TO FIND SOMETHING ENCOURAGING IN RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, SAID DJOKIC, HE HAD NOT/NOT DETECTED ANYTHING GENUINELY POSITIVE IN EITHER USA OR SOVIET STATEMENTS. THERE WERE AT PRESENT NO/NO NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS ON ANY SUBJECT - A SITU WHICH HAD NOT/NOT EXISTED SINCE WW2. ONLY THREE YEARS AGO THERE HAD BEEN A BROAD NETWORK OF E-W NEGS IN PLACE. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO PROGRESS IN CD IN LAST FOUR YEARS BEYOND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON VERIFICATION. MBFR HAD BEEN STALEMATED FOR 5-6 YEARS WITH AGREEMENT ONLY ON GLOBAL CEILINGS. THERE WERE NOW NO/NO USSR-USA NEGOTIATIONS ON INF, START, OR CW, AND NO/NO TRILATERAL CTB NEGOTIATIONS.

8. GIVEN SUCH A BALANCE SHEET ON SUBSTANCE, DJOKIC FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO DRAW ANY ENCOURAGEMENT FROM SOFTER LANGUAGE NOW BEING EMPLOYED. IT WAS ELECTORALLY IMPORTANT TO REAGAN TO SHOW THAT HE WAS NOT/NOT A QUOTE WARRIOR UNQUOTE. BUT IF SUBSTANTIVE IMPROVEMENT WAS DESIRED, WHY WAS CHANGE IN TONE TAKING PLACE ONLY NOW? WHY HAD POSTPONEMENT OF INF DEPLOYMENTS BEEN REJECTED? WHY HAD USSR REACTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DESTROY ANY HOPE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE RENEWED? JUST AS REAGAN WAS SOFTENING HIS IMAGE FOR ELECTORAL REASONS, USSR WAS AVOIDING ANY ACTION THAT WOULD HELP TO RE-ELECT HIM. CURRENT ARGUMENT OVER DECLARATORY MEASURES IN CCSBMDE WAS A SIMILAR PROPAGANDA GAME.

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9.DJOKIC ACCEPTED POINT THAT PM INITIATIVE ORIGINATED WITH  
SIMILARLY SOMBRE ANALYSIS OF STATE OF E-W RELATIONS.HE AGREED  
THAT CDN AND YUGO INNATL INTENTIONS AND ARGUMENTS WERE SIMILAR  
AND THAT WE SHOULD HOPE FOR BEST.BUT,HE REITERATED,NO/NO  
SUBSTANTIVE IMPROVEMENTS COULD BE EXPECTED VERY SOON.

CCC/148 311030Z ZLGR3193

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

*MF*  
*ED*

**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS**

**C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY**

FM WSHDC UNGR2003 31JAN84

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EPG EED EFR

---ARMS CONTROL:VISIT OF RT HON JOE CLARK

MR CLARK HAS AHD VERY ACTIVE TWO DAYS AND HAS FULL ROGRAMME 21FEB  
INCLUDING MTGS WITH DAM,IKLE,MCFARLAND,ADELMAN AS WELL AS PEOPLE ON  
HILL AND ACADEMIC EXPERTS.BEFORE HE LEAVES TOMORROW CLARK WILL MEET  
SEVERAL OTHERS INCLUDING SEN KENNEDY,SEN PRESSLER AND JAMES BILLINGTON  
AT MTGS.HE WILL MEET OTHERS SUCH AS NITZE AND SCOWCROFT SOCIALLY.AT MR.  
CLARKS REQUEST AMB OR EMB OFFICER HAS ACCOMPANIED HIM TO ALL MTGS,AND  
WHILE WE SHALL BE REPORTING LATER ON BASIC POINTS TO HAVE EMERGED  
IN BRIEFINGS HE RECD,A FEW POINTS SHLD BE REGISTERED RIGHT AWAY.

2.ADMIN BRIEFINGS ARE EMPHASIZING EXTENT TO WHICH REAGAN IS GENUINE  
IN HIS DETERMINATION FOR ARMS CONTROL AGMTS WITH US R.ADMIN CRITICS  
ACCEPT HIS PERSONAL SINCERITY BUT DOUBT ABILITY OF HIS ADMIN TO  
DELIVER.ADMIN WILL BE ABLE TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN START-INF NEGS BUT  
WILL NOT/NOT BE TRYING TO ATTRACT USSR BACK TO TABLE BY PREEMPTIVE  
CONCESSIONS.USSR COUNTER-DEPLOYMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE HAVE BEEN

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PAGE TWO UNGR2003 CONFD

PROGRAMMED FOR SOME TIME AND IF ADMIN REACTS AGAINST THEM IT IS TO HELP USSR NOT TO HAVE TO REACT ADDITIONALLY TO INF EMPLOYMENTS ELSEWHERE. THERE IS GEN ACCEPTANCE THAT USSR WILL NOT/NOT BE BACK AT INF TABLE FOR NOW AND A DISPOSITION TO SEE INF AND START TALKS MERGED. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF THEY WERE NONETHELESS SEPARATED AS NEGOTIATING ACTIVITIES.

3. ADMIN WILL BE MAKING SOME EFFORTS IN NEXT FEW MON HS TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WITH USSR BUT DID NOT/NOT WANT TO PUT SUBSTANCE INTO REAGAN'S SPEECHES OF 16 JAN AND 21 JAN SO AS TO FACILITATE PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS. THEY ARE MODERATELY ENCOURAGED BY RESPONSE SO FAR.

4. REAGAN HAS NOW EFFECTIVELY POSITIONED HIMSELF WITH RESPECT TO AMERICAN PUBLIC SO THAT IF USSR COOPERATES, THEN IT IS OK FOR REAGAN POLITICALLY, BUT HE DOES NOT HAVE TO HAVE SOVIET COOPERATION.

5. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF DETAIL OF STATE OF E-W RELNS, OF SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS, OF ANDROPOV HEALTH (FAIRLY SERIOUSLY ILL), OR WEST-WEST RELNS (ON SECURITY SIDE OK AS FAR AS GOVTS ARE CONCERNED BUT NOT SO HOT ON ECONOMIC SIDE), AND OF IN-FIGHTING ON THE ISSUES IN THE ADMIN. MORE ON THIS LATER. FOLLOWING IS REPORT ON DISCUSSION WITH NSC ADVISER MCFARLANE.

6. AS PREPARATORY NOTE, WE SHLD INDICATE THAT DEPUTY SECTY OF STATE DAM (IN FACT ACTING SECTY AS SHULTZ HAS GONE TO BRAZIL) MET WITH MR CLARK FOR 45 MINS THIS AFTERNOON AND DAVOS EPISODE NEVER CAME UP.

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7. AFTER ABOUT AN HOUR OF DISCUSSION WITH TWO KEY NSC AIDES MATLOCK AND LEHMAN, MCFARLANE JOINED MTG FOR ADDITIONAL 30 MINS.

8. HE BEGAN BY EXPRESSING CONCERN THAT LEADERS OF OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE MAKING A VARIETY OF PUBLIC OBSERVATIONS ON WASH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. SOME QUESTION REAGAN'S MOTIVATION IN MAKING RECENT STATEMENTS AND PROPOSALS. MCFARLANE WANTED TO DISPEL THE IMPRESSION CREATED BY THESE OTHER LEADERS THAT REAGAN WAS NOT SINCERE. (IN THIS RESPECT, THERE WAS NO INDICATION PM TRUDEAU IS CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF SUCH LEADERS.)

9. HE REVIEWED 3 YEARS OF ADMIN APPROACH TO USSR. USA HAD ALLOWED THE MILITARY FOUNDATION TO DETERRENCE TO DETERIORATE. USSR EXPANSIONISM HAD PROCEEDED. THE FOUNDATION HAD TO BE REPAIRED TO PERMIT NEG OF STABILITY AT LOWER LEVEL OF ARMS AND NEGOTIATION OF CERTAIN AGMTS ON INTERNATL CONDUCT. IN ADDITION, ADMIN HAD TO ESTABLISH ITS OWN BONA FIDES AS WESTERN LEADER AND AS SUCCESSFUL MANAGER OF AMERICAN ECONOMY AND OF POLITICAL SIT. WILLINGNESS OF PUBLIC TO SPEND SIX PERCENT OF GNP ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION HAD TO BE DEMONSTRATED. ALLIANCE COHESION AND WILL HAD TO BE DEMONSTRATED.

10. NOW USSR IS GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF INTROSPECTION, ASSESSING SIGNIFICANCE OF ABOVE. AS THEY ARE TAKING THIS REVIEW, REAGAN WANTED THEN TO KNOW HOW HE FEELS ABOUT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP FOR YEARS AHEAD. HENCE HIS EXPRESSIONS OF COMMITMENT TO IMPROVEMENT IN DIALOGUE. HE IS CONFIDENT TIMING IS NOW RIGHT AND THAT HE CAN WIN SUPPORT OF SENATE (ECHOED BY ALL) AND COUNTRY. TIMING IS NOT DICTATED BY 84 ELECTION AND HE WILL NOT/NOT NEGOTIATE MORE GENEROUSLY BECAUSE OF ELECTION.

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11.THERE IS NOT MUCH OF A SUBSTANTIVE ANSWER FROM U SR YET WHICH IS NOT SURPRISING.ADMIN EXPECTS ONE IN MONTH OR TWO.US R IS EXPECTED TO APPRECIATE THAT A NEW ARMS RACE WILL GIVE USA ADVANTAGE BY LATE 80S. IF THEY DO NONETHELESS WANT A RACE,ADMIN IS SERENE.

12.MCFARLANE ALSO SAID ADMIN WLD RESIST PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES IN THIS ELECTION YEAR BUT IT WLD BE TOUGH.AGRIC PROBLEMS WITH EEC HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH.THERE WAS ALSO A QUOTE DISTRESSING AGENDA UNQUOTE WITH JAPAN BUT REAGAN HAD A COOPERATIVE COMMITMENT FROM NAKASONE. JAPANESE NTBS LOOKED VERY DIFFICULT TO CRACK.HOWEVER,ADMIN WAS TALKING WITH ENERGY MAJORS ABOUT SENDING ALASKA GAS TO JAPAN AS INCENTIVE FOR PROGRESS ON TOUGH ISSUES.RELNS WITH CDA WERE QUOTE EXTREMELY GOOD UNQUOTE.

13.AMONG OTHER THINGS,MR CLARK SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT REAGANS SINCERITY BUT INDICATED THE CONTRADICTIONS WHICH USA POLICY AND ACTIONS SEEMED TO CDN PUBLIC TO REPRESENT.MCFARLANE SEIZED ON THIS TO APOLOGIZE FOR CLUMSY HANDLING OF STRATEGIC DEFEN E ISSUE AND DESCRIBED ITS BACKGROUND.

14.MR CLARK HAS NOW COMPLETED HIS MTGS WITH ADMIN.01FEB PROGRAMME IS DEVOTED TO MORE ACADEMIC EXPERTS AND REMAINING CONTACTS ON HILL (SENS PRESSLER AND KENNEDY AND FROM HOUSE,FOREIGN AFFAIRS CTTEE CHAIRMAN FASCELL AND CDA-USA HOUSE CHAIRMAN MIKE BARNES).

CCC/059 0100242 UNGR2003

*MT*



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MESSAGE

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*J. Houtby*  
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2/23

NOTES FOR AN ADDRESS BY

ALLAN E. GOTTLIEB

AMBASSADOR OF CANADA TO THE UNITED STATES

CANADA, THE UNITED STATES,

AND

WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY

AMERICAN FRIENDS OF THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

WASHINGTON, D.C.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1984

3/23

THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY IS AT THE FOUNDATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES. EACH COUNTRY JUDGES ITS SITUATION DIFFERENTLY. INTERESTS ARE DIFFERENT, AS ARE VULNERABILITIES. BASICALLY, WHAT WE ARE ALL TRYING TO DO IS MAKE OUR ENVIRONMENTS AS PREDICTABLE AS POSSIBLE, AND FAVOURABLE TO OUR RESPECTIVE OVERALL INTERESTS. WE ARE AFTER INFLUENCE. WE CHOOSE DIFFERENT MEANS, ACCORDING TO THE AMOUNT OF LEVERAGE WE CAN EACH BRING TO BEAR.

THE UNITED STATES IS A SUPERPOWER, MEASURED BY A VARIETY OF TESTS, PERHAPS THE ONLY TRUE SUPERPOWER. VITAL INTERESTS ARE GLOBALLY SPREAD. IN THAT RESPECT THE OPTION OF ISOLATIONISM IS PROBABLY NO LONGER A REAL ONE FOR THIS COUNTRY. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT WITHDRAW FROM ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS NOW INTERDEPENDENTLY SHARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. BUT A MODERN VARIANT OF THAT AMERICAN OPTION, UNILATERALISM, IS A POSSIBLY MORE READILY AVAILABLE U.S. POLICY. THIS TENDENCY SEEMS TO IMPLY A READINESS TO INTERVENE DECISIVELY ABROAD IN DEFENCE OF VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS, WITHOUT EXTENSIVE REFERENCE TO MULTILATERAL MACHINERY. THE FIRST OF THESE INTERESTS IS THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND SECURITY A SEARCH WHICH

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SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR WE IN THE WEST HAVE TRIED TO INSTITUTIONALIZE AND MULTILATERALIZE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, AT LEAST IN THEORY.

CANADA ALSO HAS A GLOBAL FOREIGN POLICY, IN THAT WE HAVE IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIPS IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD. WE TOO SEEK TO DEVELOP OVER TIME THE SORT OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS OF INFLUENCE WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH OUR INTERESTS. BUT IN CANADA THE INSTINCT FOR PRIMARY RELIANCE ON MULTILATERALISM PERSISTS. CANADA CONTINUES TO STRESS THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION TO HELP TO SHAPE A WORLD CONGENIAL TO OUR INTERESTS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY SO WHEN IT CONCERNS THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

IT IS A NATURAL VIEWPOINT FOR A COUNTRY WHICH HAS BEEN CALLED VARIOUSLY A MIDDLE POWER, A MAJOR POWER, AND A PRINCIPAL POWER, ALL OF WHICH ARE WAYS OF SAYING CANADA DOES NOT ITSELF HAVE DECISIVE POWER. IN RECENT YEARS, AS BEFITS A COUNTRY WITH IMPORTANT INTERESTS AND A LARGE STAKE IN THE WORLD, CANADA HAS BEEN EMPHASIZING ITS KEY BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE WEST AND IN THE THIRD WORLD TO FURTHER ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS. BUT IN THE WORLD

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AHEAD WHERE UNPREDICTABILITY AND SURPRISE WILL BE NORMAL, WE WILL CONTINUE TO RELY A GOOD DEAL ON UNIVERSAL MULTILATERALISM TO DISPERSE AND REFRACT THE SHOCK WAVES. YOUR COUNTRY, WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT THE SUPERPOWERS' INFLUENCE OVER EVENTS HAS DECLINED, NONETHELESS RELIES TO A MUCH GREATER EXTENT ON UNILATERALISM, BILATERALISM, OR VERY SELECTIVE MULTILATERALISM, VIA ALLIANCES, TO HELP SHAPE DEVELOPMENTS.

BOTH OF OUR NATIONS ARE ALSO MELIORISTS, DRAWN TO SOME EXTENT FROM OUR COMMON COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES. THIS URGE TO IMPROVE THE WORLD HAD IN THE PART ITS EXPRESSION FOR BOTH OF US IN THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM ALTHOUGH YOUR COUNTRY HAS TENDED INCREASINGLY TO DISTRUST MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS AS BEING DOMINATED BY FORCES AND PLAYERS WORKING IN THE OTHER DIRECTION.

THESE BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATIONAL APPROACHES ARE PERFECTLY OBVIOUS. I UNDERLINE THEM AT THE OUTSET SO AS TO TRY TO DESCRIBE THE CONTEXT IN WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES TODAY FACE THE OVERRIDING ISSUE OF OUR TIME, THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. YOUR



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COUNTRY SEES THIS ISSUE AS A SUB-THEME OF ITS CENTRAL  
PRE-OCCUPATION IN FOREIGN POLICY, STRATEGIC, AND EVEN  
IDEOLOGICAL, RIVALRY WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

I SUGGEST THAT EVEN WITHOUT IDEOLOGICAL  
COMPETITION, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION  
WOULD BE RIVAL WORLD POWERS WHOSE SPECIFIC BILATERAL  
RELATIONSHIP HAS PROPERTIES ALL ITS OWN. THE  
FUNDAMENTAL DISTINGUISHING FEATURE IS, OF COURSE, THAT  
THE RELATIONSHIP IS UNIQUELY DEFINED BY THE STRATEGIC  
NUCLEAR RIVALRY. AN INCREASE IN TENSION IN THE  
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP AGAINST AN INCREASE IN DISORDER  
IN THE WORLD GENERALLY, SEEMS TO MOST PEOPLE IN THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, TO INCREASE THE THREAT OF  
NUCLEAR WAR. BECAUSE THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS  
ENGAGED IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE BILATERAL  
RELATIONSHIP, THEY ARE MORE APT TO MINIMIZE THAT  
THREAT, TO SEE IT VERY MUCH AS A SUB-THEME OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

BUT THE CANADIAN PUBLIC IS MUCH MORE PRONE  
TO SEE THE THREAT AS THE CENTRAL THEME ITSELF. IN  
THIS, THE PUBLIC MOOD IN CANADA SEEMS CLOSER TO THE  
PUBLIC MOOD IN EUROPE.

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THE QUESTIONS OUR GOVERNMENT ASKS REFLECT THIS PUBLIC WORRY. THEY DO NOT REFLECT DEFEATISM, NEUTRALISM, OR BETTER RED THAN DEAD-ISM. FAR FROM IT. WE ARE MEMBERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, MEETING OVER 30% REAL GROWTH TARGET IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE, STILL WITH SEVERAL THOUSAND SOLDIERS IN EUROPE. WE BELIEVE FIRMLY THAT THE BEST SECURITY FOR THE WEST STILL LIES IN A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE DETERRENT. OUR CONTRIBUTION TO YOUR OWN DEFENCE IS ALSO VERY IMPORTANT. SOMEONE HAS SAID THAT CANADA'S DEFENCE POLICY PROBLEM IS THAT IT DOESN'T HAVE ONE. BUT THE FACT IS WE COOPERATE ACTIVELY WITH YOU AND IN CASE ANYBODY FORGETS, WE ARE THE SPACE BETWEEN THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS SAID THAT SATELLITES HAVE MADE THIS PASSIVE GEOGRAPHIC CONTRIBUTION IRRELEVANT. BUT THE CALCULATIONS OF SPACE AND TIME AND STRATEGIC PLANNERS ARE THE CALCULATIONS OF THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE ANYTHING TO CROSS OUR SPACE. AND, IN A LOOK-DOWN, SHOOT-DOWN ABM STAR WARS SORT OF NIGHTMARE WORLD, CANADIANS CAN GUESS WHERE THE HYPOTHETICAL SHOOTING GALLERY IS SUPPOSED TO BE!

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OUR ANXIETY IS THE ANXIETY OF THE 80'S. THE

PUBLIC FEELS DISENFRANCHISED BY THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR  
WAR, BY THEIR LACK OF INFLUENCE.

NUCLEAR WAR IS A THOUGHT OF SUCH APPALLING  
AND GROTESQUE FINALITY THAT TO FEAR IT AS GENUINELY A  
POSSIBILITY IS TO EXPRESS A TERRIBLE FRUSTRATION. HOW  
DO WE INFLUENCE EVENTS? OR BLUNTLY, HOW DO WE USE OUR  
INFLUENCE TO ENSURE THAT ONE EVENT, THE TERRIBLE  
EVENT, NEVER TAKES PLACE? OBVIOUSLY, AS PRESIDENT  
REAGAN SAID LAST WEEK, THIS COUNTRY IS DETERMINED TO  
ASSURE THAT A NUCLEAR WAR NEVER TAKES PLACE. BUT THE  
FEAR OF SUCH A THREAT IS NONETHELESS REAL IN THE MINDS  
OF OUR PUBLIC. IN POLICY TERMS IT IS EXACERBATED BY  
THE DECLINE IN RECOURSE TO, AND THE INFLUENCE OF, THE  
MULTILATERAL SYSTEM FOR QUESTIONS OF PEACE AND  
SECURITY. BECAUSE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY HISTORY, AND  
BECAUSE OF OUR GEOGRAPHIC POSITION, THIS IS A  
PARTICULARLY ABRASIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR CANADA.

IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT IT BECOMES AN  
IMPERATIVE OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY TO DO EVERYTHING  
WE CAN TO HELP TO ENSURE THAT NUCLEAR WAR IS AVOIDED,  
DESPITE THE RISK OF LOOKING PIOUS AND BEING A PAIN IN

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THE NECK IN THE PROCESS. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO CHANGE THE "TREND LINE" IN TERMS OF THE LEVEL OF TENSIONS IN THE WORLD. THIS MEANS, IN OUR VIEW, TRYING TO POLITICIZE THE PROCESS, IN THE SENSE OF GETTING GREATER CONTROL OF EVENTS IN THE HANDS OF POLITICIANS RATHER THAN THE TECHNICIANS, AND TO ENSURE THAT POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE WORLD ARE IN CONTROL OF EVENTS RATHER THAN VICE-VERSA.

THERE HAS BEEN A WORRYING TENDENCY IN RECENT YEARS TO ALLOW THE PURSUIT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT TO SLIP AWAY FROM THE POLITICAL PROCESS INTO THE LARGER BUT COLDER EMBRACE OF SKILLED TECHNICAL EXPERTS. THESE EXPERTS, HOWEVER WELL-INTENTIONED, HAVE, NOT SURPRISINGLY, HAD A DISTORTING IMPACT ON THE BASIC EQUATIONS INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. POLITICAL INTENTIONS HAVE TENDED TO BE DOWNGRADED OR EVEN CARICATURED IN THE DEBATE WHICH HAS CHOSEN, INSTEAD, TO FOCUS ON MILITARY OR TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES AND, EVEN WORSE, ON THEORETICAL CAPABILITIES. WE ARE TOLD THAT THE USA MUST PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO DETER THE SOVIET UNION FROM USING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS; WE ARE TOLD THE SOVIET UNION MUST DEPLOY MISSILES THAT

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CAN REACH THE UNITED STATES IN THE SAME TIME THE SOVIETS MISTAKENLY BELIEVE THE PERSHING II CAN REACH MOSCOW. AGAIN NOT SURPRISINGLY, THESE EXPERTS, WHOM PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU CALLED NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANTS, HAVE NOT GIVEN US GREATER PEACE AND SECURITY. IN FACT THEY HAVEN'T EVEN GIVEN US ARMS CONTROL. WHAT WE HAVE IS A FORM OF WAR BY OTHER MEANS, A WAR OF ANALYSIS. ITS FRONTS ARE WINDOWS OF VULNERABILITY, ITS WEAPONS OF ASSAULT ARE BARRAGES OF STATISTICS, AND ITS DEAFENING SALVOS AN ENDLESS DEBATE OVER "BALANCE". ITS RESULT IS AN UNENDING SPIRAL OF INCREASINGLY DEVASTATING WEAPONS OF SELF-DESTRUCTION.

THE ADDITIONAL RESULT ON THE ANXIOUS PUBLIC IS THE DEPRESSING IMPRESSION THAT THESE WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES ARE INCREASINGLY BEYOND THE COMPREHENSION OF EVEN EDUCATED MEN AND WOMEN. THERE IS A CRISIS OF DEHUMANIZATION OF THE GREATEST PROBLEM OF HUMANITY. IT IS TRUE THAT EXPERTS ARE OBVIOUSLY BETTER EQUIPPED TO COUNT MEGATONNAGE AND TO DETERMINE THE CIRCULAR ERROR PROBABLE FOR MISSILE ACCURACY. THEY ARE ALSO NECESSARY TO DETERMINE IF THE OTHER SIDE REALLY HAS WHAT HE SAYS HE HAS. IF SECURITY IS INITIALLY A

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FUNCTION OF THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERRENT, AND IT IS, THEN WE OBVIOUSLY NEED EXPERTS, HIGHLY SKILLED ANALYSTS, AND DISPASSIONATE THINKERS TO CONTEMPLATE EVEN THE UNTHINKABLE. BUT THE SUM OF THEIR EFFORTS IS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AND SECURITY. IT IS A GREAT, VERY GREAT PERIL TO MAKE THE MISTAKE OF ASSUMING THAT IT IS. TO MAKE THIS MISTAKE IS TO ABROGATE OUR OWN RESPONSIBILITIES.

WHEN I TALK ABOUT OUR RESPONSIBILITIES, I AM NOT TALKING PARTICULARLY OF MINE AS A CIVIL SERVANT, OR OF THOSE OF PEOPLE LIKE ME. WE ARE PART OF IT, BUT ONLY A SMALL PART. I AM TALKING ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MEMBERS OF A DEMOCRATIC STATE AND OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUR VARIOUS LEADERS TO REFLECT THESE. I BELIEVE THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES APPLY EQUALLY TO THE PUBLIC AND LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER CLOSED THEIR SECURITY.

THE CANADIAN PEACE INITIATIVE, THEREFORE, IS ABOUT INSTILLING POLITICAL WILL--THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AND THEIR LEADERS--INTO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND SECURITY. IN THE ABSENCE OF HIGH POLITICS IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THERE

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IS NO LONGER TRUST OR CONFIDENCE IN THE INTENTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE. WHAT IS MISSING IS THE TRACES OF WHAT PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU CALLED "THE POLITICAL CRAFT AND CREATIVITY" WHICH SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN SEEKING TO IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP. BY PLACING TOO MUCH FAITH IN THE HANDS OF THE NUCLEAR PRIESTHOOD, WE ARE "DE-POLITICIZING THE MOST IMPORTANT POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE", AS WELL AS HUMANITY'S GREATEST PROBLEM. WE ARE REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING FIRMER UNDERSTANDINGS ON INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT, WITHOUT WHICH THERE CAN BE NO GENUINE DETENTE. WITHOUT SUCH UNDERSTANDINGS, MUTUAL AND DEMONSTRABLE CONFIDENCE, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL FOR RATIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL TREATIES, IS LESS LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE..

IN REACHING THIS CONCLUSION, I DO NOT THINK THAT PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU CONSIDERS HE IS SAYING ANYTHING STARTLING NEW. THE IMPETUS DID NOT COME OUT OF THE BLUE. ITS FORCE AND ITS TIMING WERE REALLY DETERMINED BY PUBLIC SENTIMENT IN CANADA, WHERE MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ITS EFFECTS ON AN OPEN-ENDED ARMS RACE HAVE GRIPPED THE NATION'S ATTENTION. THE PUBLIC CONTROVERSY OVER THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO ALLOW THE CRUISE

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MISSILE TO BE TESTED IN CANADA WAS FOR SOME TIME A  
FOCUS OF THIS MALAISE.

OF COURSE, THE ANTI-CRUISE MOVEMENT IN  
CANADA WHICH HAS INVOLVED LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE DID  
NOT GROW UP BECAUSE THESE PEOPLE BELIEVED THAT THE  
CRUISE MISSILE WAS WORSE THAN ALL OTHER SYSTEMS OR  
WEAPONS. IT HAPPENS TO BE THE CANADIAN FOCUS OF A  
GENERALIZED PUBLIC ANXIETY; AS THE ANTI-DEPLOYMENT  
MOVEMENT IS THE EUROPEAN EQUIVALENT. SIMILARLY, THE  
FREEZE MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES IS NOT BASED ON A  
DEEP-SEATED PUBLIC CONVICTION ARRIVED AT BY DETAILED  
ANALYSIS THAT OF ALL THE VARIOUS ARMS CONTROL  
PROPOSALS THAT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN THIS MOST OPEN  
OF SOCIETIES, A FREEZE IS THE REAL ANSWER.

IN ASKING AMERICAN POLITICIANS TO ESPOUSE  
THE NUCLEAR FREEZE, THE SUPPORTERS OF THE MOVEMENT ARE  
NOT ASKING FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION IN ARMS CONTROL  
NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT THEY ARE ASKING FOR IS A  
DEMONSTRATION OF POLITICAL WILL FROM THEIR POLITICAL  
LEADERS. THIS IS ALSO THE ESSENCE OF THE PRIME  
MINISTER'S PEACE INITIATIVE. THE VEHICLE IS DIFFERENT  
BUT THE IMPETUS IS MUCH THE SAME.



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IN PURSUING HIS VIEWS, PRIME MINISTER

TRUDEAU MET WITH SOME CRITICISM. HE WAS TOLD THAT CANADA DID NOT HAVE THE WEAPONS, DID NOT SPEND THE DEFENCE DOLLARS, AND DID NOT HAVE THE INFLUENCE TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE. IT WAS INTIMATED BY SOME THAT THIS QUESTION IS ONE THAT BELONGS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE SUPERPOWERS--TO THE SOVIET UNION AND TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS WAS NOT THE POSITION OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION, I HASTEN TO ADD, BUT IT WAS A VIEW THAT HOVERED NEAR THE SURFACE OF UNOFFICIAL COMMENTARY.

TO ACCEPT THIS THESIS IS TO ACCEPT THREE FALLACIES. THE FIRST IS TO PROPOSE THAT CANADA IS NOT PULLING ITS WEIGHT IN DEFENCE OR IN NATO. I HAVE EXPLAINED EARLIER THAT WE ARE. AND THE CRUISE IS BEING TESTED IN CANADA. THE SECOND FALLACY IS THAT THE WEST IS A MONOLITH. TO ACCEPT THIS POINT OF VIEW IS TO DENY WHAT THE WEST IS AND WHAT IT IS WE ARE WILLING PRINCIPALLY TO DEFEND. IT IS ALSO TO DENY THE RIGHT OF THOSE MANY PEOPLE WHOSE LIVES WOULD BE DESTROYED IN A NUCLEAR WAR, WHO LIVE NEITHER IN THE SOVIET UNION NOR IN THE UNITED STATES, TO BE ACTIVELY

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INVOLVED IN THE SEARCH FOR THEIR OWN PEACE AND  
SECURITY.

THE THIRD FALLACY IS THAT PEACE AND SECURITY  
IS THE RESULT ENTIRELY OF EXPERT NEGOTIATIONS  
INVOLVING THE COUNTING OF THROWWEIGHT, MISSILE  
WARHEADS, LAUNCHERS AND WINDOWS OF VULNERABILITY,  
RATHER THAN PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL  
PROCESS AND THE EXERCISE OF POLITICAL WILL.

IN LAUNCHING HIS PEACE INITIATIVE, THE  
CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER HAS SOUGHT TO COMPLEMENT THE  
DETERRENCE PROVIDED BY THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR ARSENAL  
WITH THE DETERRENCE THAT COMES FROM THE APPLICATION OF  
THE POLITICAL WILL OF NOT ONE COUNTRY BUT OF ALL OUR  
COUNTRIES TO THE TASK OF AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR. THE  
EMPHASIS OF THIS INITIATIVE IS NOT TECHNICAL, OR EVEN  
INSTITUTIONAL. THE PRIME MINISTER IS PROPOSING A  
FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE, IS TALKING ABOUT LIMITING THE  
MOBILITY OF NUCLEAR MISSILES, AND HAS PROPOSED A BAN  
ON HIGH-ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS. BUT THESE  
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ARE MEANT AS CONCRETE ILLUSTRATIONS  
OF WAYS TO CHANGE THE TREND LINE IN EAST-WEST

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RELATIONS, TO TAKE US AWAY FROM MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY,  
TO BRING US BACK TO A DIALOGUE ON A POLITICAL LEVEL.

IT SEEMS WE ARE IN FACT GETTING THERE.

IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS, SEVERAL POLITICAL  
LEADERS, AND PARTICULARLY PRESIDENT REAGAN, HAVE RE-  
AFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO DIALOGUE, AS A PREFERENCE  
TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION, AND THEIR WISH TO SEE  
EAST-WEST RELATIONS MANAGED IN A MANNER CALCULATED TO  
ENHANCE PEACE AND SECURITY.

WHILE AN OLIVE BRANCH HAS BEEN OFFERED, IT  
IS WORTH REMINDING OURSELVES THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT  
MANAGING THE RELATIONSHIP, NOT ABOUT CHANGING ITS  
SUBSTANTIVE NATURE. THE OPEN NATURE OF OUR DEMOCRATIC  
SOCIETIES WILL LIMIT THE CHARACTER OF OUR RELATIONSHIP  
WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHOSE OWN IDEOLOGY PROMISES AND  
EVEN PRESCRIBES INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION WHOSE FORMS  
CAN BY DEFINITION BE A THREAT TO PEACE. IN SUCH  
CIRCUMSTANCES, IN LAUNCHING THE PEACE INITIATIVE,  
PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU WAS AT GREAT PAINS TO EMPHASIZE  
THAT "AS CANADIANS, WE KNOW WHERE WE STAND". HE SAID  
"WE HAVE PLAYED OUR PART IN PERIODS OF CO-OPERATION

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AND PULLED OUR WEIGHT IN PERIODS OF CONFRONTATION". CANADA'S POLICY DOES NOT COME FROM OUTSIDE THE POLITICAL DIVISION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THIS IS WHY IT IS THEREFORE REASSURING TO HIM NOW TO SEE VIRTUALLY ALL WESTERN LEADERS ALSO SPEAKING OUT ON THE NECESSITY OF IMPROVING DIALOGUE WITH THE USSR, SO AS TO LIMIT THE RISKS OF MISCALCULATION, ACCIDENT, AND VIOLENCE, IN WHATEVER FORM COMPETITION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST DOES TAKE.

IF SEVERAL PEOPLE ARE SPEAKING OUT NOW IN A WAY THEY DIDN'T BEFORE ABOUT THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE TO IMPROVE THE STATE OF WORLD RELATIONS, IT IS A VALID QUESTION TO ASK OURSELVES IF THEY ARE, IN FACT, TALKING ABOUT THE SAME THING.

MOST OF THESE LEADERS STRESS THEY PERCEIVE AN INCREASED RISK OF WAR BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST. PRESIDENT REAGAN IN A SEEMING CONTRADICTION TALKS ABOUT HOW HE BELIEVES THE DANGER OF WAR NOW IS FAR LESS THAN IT WAS THREE YEARS AGO. THERE IS A DIFFERENCE HERE BUT IT IS NOT AS GREAT AS IT MIGHT SEEM. WHEN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU MET PRESIDENT REAGAN LAST DECEMBER HE TOLD HIM THAT HE AGREED THAT

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IT IS NECESSARY TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SOVIET UNION OUR STRENGTH AND OUR RESOLVE. BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT WE MUST ALSO COMMUNICATE OUR PEACEFUL INTENTIONS IF WE ARE TO ARRIVE AT STABILITY THROUGH THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR MILITARY DETERRENT. IT IS A PROBLEM OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, ONE THE PRESIDENT IS ADDRESSING.

AT THE BASE THERE IS NO INHERENT CONTRADICTION THERE BETWEEN WHAT DIFFERENT LEADERS ARE SAYING. THEIR VIEWS ARE COMPLEMENTARY. WHEN YOU LOOK CAREFULLY, THERE IS EVEN MORE IN COMMON.

SPEAKING IN MONTREAL ON NOVEMBER 13, 1983, PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU IDENTIFIED WHAT HE SAW AS THREE "DOMINANT AND DISTURBING TRENDS" WHICH THREATEN OUR PEACE AND SECURITY WHEN SET SIDE BY SIDE.

THE FIRST TREND THAT PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU IDENTIFIED IS THE INCREASING RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. HE SAID THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN ABDICATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN DEFERENCE TO MILITARY SOLUTIONS.

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NEXT, AFTER DECRYING THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS SPENT FOR NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND ARGUING THAT THEY SHARE TOO GREAT A PROPORTION OF THE BUDGETS OF IMPOVERISHED THIRD WORLD NATIONS HE SAID THE SECOND TREND WAS A STEADY UNRAVELLING OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE THIRD TREND WHICH HE IDENTIFIED WAS THE WORSENING STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND PARTICULARLY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO GIVE TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS A "THIRD RAIL" OF POLITICAL ENERGY, OF DIALOGUE, TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE THROUGH ACTIVE POLITICAL CONTACT AND CONSULTATION.

WHEN HE ADDRESSED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON JANUARY 16, PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT THERE ARE THREE MAIN TASKS FACING THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. THESE WERE, FIRST, HE SAID, "TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE IN SOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES". THE SECOND TASK SHOULD BE TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE THE VAST STOCKPILES OF ARMAMENTS IN THE WORLD. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT IS TRAGIC "TO SEE THE WORLD'S DEVELOPING NATIONS SPENDING MORE THAN \$150

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BILLION ON ARMED FORCES, SOME 20% OF THEIR NATIONAL BUDGETS." THE THIRD TASK HE SAID IS TO ESTABLISH A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP, ONE MARKED "BY GREATER CO- OPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING". THE PURPOSE IS OF COURSE TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE; CONFIDENCE IN EACH OTHER'S BEHAVIOUR, AND INTENTIONS, SUFFICIENT TO ACCEPT THE SHORTFALLS IN VERIFICATION WHICH WILL ACCOMPANY ANY SIGNIFICANT ARMS CONTROL TREATY.

THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT IN ANYONE'S MIND THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS ARE TALKING ABOUT THE SAME THING. OUR LEADERS ARE TALKING ABOUT THE NEED TO RESPOND TO THE IMPERATIVES OF THEIR POLITICAL OFFICE, IMPERATIVES PLACED ON THEM BY THE PEOPLE WHOM THEY SERVE. IN DOING SO THEY TASK ALL OF US, WHO ARE INVOLVED, HOWEVER PERIPHERALLY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TO WORK TOWARDS IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS AND AND DIALOGUE, TO BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND TRUST IN ORDER TO ENHANCE OUR PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND TO ENSURE OUR SECURITY.

IN DOING SO WE IN TURN IMPOSE A BURDEN ON THE SOVIET UNION TO RESPOND IN A SIMILAR MANNER. THIS

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MAY NOT BE EASY TO ACHIEVE, BUT THE DIFFICULTY OF THE TASK DOES NOT EXCUSE US FROM TRYING.

SIMILARLY THE OBSTINANCE OF A DICTATORSHIP DOES NOT EXCUSE US FROM THE IMPERATIVES OF DEMOCRACY. THESE IMPERATIVES DEMAND THAT WE KEEP ON WORKING ACTIVELY TO PROMOTE PEACE AND SECURITY.

AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES COME TO THE QUESTION IN DIFFERENT MANNERS IN THAT THE UNITED STATES IS A SUPERPOWER. IT HAS A PRIVILEGED PLACE IN THE WORLD BUT IT ALSO BEARS GREAT RESPONSIBILITIES AND WE DO NOT DENY THAT THE USA MUST TAKE THE LEAD IN ANSWERING THE QUESTION OF HOW BEST TO PURSUE PEACE IN A COMPLEX, EVER-CHANGING WORLD. THIS IS A HARD, AND PERHAPS, IMPOSSIBLE QUESTION TO ANSWER WITH ONE VOICE. PERHAPS WE TRY TOO HARD TO FIND THAT ONE VOICE. HARMONY IS AS PLEASING AND EFFECTIVE AS UNISON.

IN NATO, AND IN THE WESTERN WORLD, THE UNITED STATES IS RECOGNIZED AS OUR LEADER. BUT IS IT NOT OUR TYRANT. WE ARE AN ALLIANCE NOT A BLOC. THIS



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GIVES US IN CANADA AND OUR ALLIES IN EUROPE NOT JUST THE RIGHT TO SPEAK OUT BUT THE RESPONSIBILITY TO DO SO AND TO DO SO IN A MEANINGFUL MANNER THAT WILL ENHANCE THE VALUES ON WHICH OUR SOCIETIES HAVE BEEN BUILT AND PRESERVE PEACE.

BECAUSE CANADA IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE UNITED STATES IN A SENSE WE ARE LEFT WITH DIFFERENT OPTIONS. UNILATERALISM IN THE AREA OF PEACE AND SECURITY IS NOT FOR US A VIABLE OPTION. THAT IS WHY WHEN CANADIANS APPROACH THE QUESTION OF PEACE AND SECURITY THEY BASICALLY HAVE TWO VERY SIMPLE CHOICES. ONE IS NOT TO ACT. THE OTHER IS TO ACT. IF WE ACT, ACTION FOR OUR LEADERS HAS TO BE ON A GLOBAL BASIS. IN PURSUING OUR EFFORTS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND EASTERN EUROPE (THE PRIME MINISTER IS EVEN TODAY IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC), IN CHINA AND JAPAN AND AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF THE COMMONWEALTH, CANADA IS FOLLOWING THAT GLOBAL OPTION. OUR APPROACH IS DICTATED, "BY THE COMPLEX INTERLINKAGE OF DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OF SUPERPOWER ANIMOSITY, AND THIRD WORLD RIVALRIES, OF THE RESORT TO FORCE, AND THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND OF NUCLEAR BALANCES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD."

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AT HEART, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE ONLY  
OPTION FOR CANADA. THE OPTION TO DO NOTHING IS NOT  
THERE. NOT IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, NOT IN ANY HUMANE  
SOCIETY.

THE PRIME PRIME MINISTER SAID WE CAN EITHER  
ABANDON OUR FATE TO THE MINDLESS DRIFT TOWARD NUCLEAR  
WAR OR WE CAN GATHER OUR STRENGTH, AND WORKING IN GOOD  
COMPANY, TURN ASIDE THE FORCES BEARING DOWN ON US.  
IT IS THE DECISION THE PEOPLE OF CANADA HAVE MADE. IT  
IS THE DECISION THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE. WE MUST  
PURSUE IT TOGETHER AS GOOD FRIENDS AND AS CREATIVE  
ALLIES.

THANK YOU.

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BUCHAREST-OTTAWA 02FEB IS 82-349/84-MEO.

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**ACTION  
REQUEST**

**FICHE DE  
SERVICE**

To — A

File No — Dossier N°

Date

From — De

*DMF*  
*IDD 2 - 2 février*

☐ Please call  
Prière d'appeler

tel No — N° de tel

Ext — Poste

☐ Returned your call  
Vous a rappelé

☐ Will call again  
Vous rappellera

☐ Wants to see you  
Desire vous voir

Date

Time — Heure

Message received by  
Message reçu par

☐ Action  
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☐ Approval  
Approbation

☐ Note & return  
Noter et retourner

☐ Comments  
Commentaires

☐ Draft reply  
Projet de réponse

☐ Note & forward  
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☐ As requested  
Comme demandé

☐ Signature

☐ Note & file  
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*Voici transcrits en page 10  
de ce tel, reçu en regard du  
passage auquel j'ai mis  
référence April de 70 pour  
l'instant. Au retour de la  
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je fonderai les éléments  
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---PMS VISIT-CZECHOSLOVAK MEDIA REACTION

FOLLOWING ARE TRANSLATIONS OF ARTICLES IN RUDE PRAVO, ORGAN OF CENTRAL  
CTTEE OF CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY.

2.JAN26-HEADLINE QUOTE PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU IN PRGUE UNQUOTE.TEXT  
BEGINS:PIERRE ELLIOT TRUDEAU,CDN PRIME MINISTER,ARRIVED FOR  
A VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON WEDNESDAY.AT RUZYNE AIRPORT,  
DECORATED WITH STATE FLAGS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES,HE WAS WELCOMED  
BY LUBOMIR STROUGAL,CZECHOSLOVAK PRIME MINISTER,AT WHOSE INVITATION  
THE VISIT TAKES PLACE.

THE WELCOMING CEREMONY WAS ATTENDED BY LADISLAV GERLE,  
JOSEF KORCAK,KAROL LACO,MATEJ LUCAN AND SVATOPLUK POTAC,  
CZECHOSLOVAK DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS,BOHUSLAV CHNOUPEK,MINISTER  
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,ARY GENERAL MARTIN DZUR,MINISTER OF  
NATIONAL DEFENCE,AND BY OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,HUGH DAVID  
PEEL,CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA,WAS ALSO PRESENT.

PRAGUE PIONEERS PRESENTED THE CANADIAN PREMIER AND MEMBERS  
OF HIS ENTOURAGE WITH BOQUETS OF FLOWERS.

TALKS BETWEEN LUBOMIR STROUGAL AND PIERRE ELLIOT TRUDEAU  
BEGAN IN PRAGUES HRZAN PALACE IN THE AFTERNOON.ON THE CZECHO-  
SLOVAK SIDE THEY WERE ATTENDED BY SVATOPLUK POTAC,DEPUTY

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PRIME MINISTER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION,  
BOHUSLAV CHNOUPEK, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND BY OTHER  
OFFICIALS. ON THE CANADIAN SIDE BY AMBASSADOR HUGH DAVID  
PEEL, THOMAS AXWORTHY, PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME  
MINISTER, AND BY OTHER CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK PREMIER SET THE MAIN PRINCIPLES OF  
THE CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY RELYING ON THE EFFORTS OF CZECHO-  
SLOVAK PEOPLE TO LIVE IN PEACE AND TO PROMOTE ALL STEPS DIRECTED  
TOWARDS IT. IN THIS CONNECTION HE STRESSED THAT THE LATEST  
MEASURES AIMED AT RAISING THE DEFENCE CAPACITY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA  
HAD BEEN ENFORCED BY THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MISSILES IN  
WESTERN EUROPE AND BY THE VIOLATION OF MILITARY BALANCE TO THE  
BENEFIT OF NATO STATES. HE RECALLED THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD WELCOMED  
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING  
MEASURES AND ON DISARMAMENT, AND POINTED TO PEACEFUL PROPOSALS  
OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE APPROVAL OF WHICH WOULD MEAN AN IMPORTANT  
STEP TOWARDS THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL  
SITUATION, AS WISHED BY ALL MANKIND. HE WELCOMED THE VISIT OF  
THE CANADIAN PREMIER TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND DESCRIBED IT AS A  
CONTRIBUTION TO THE EFFORTS FOR RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL  
TENSION, INTENSIFICATION OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION  
OF FRIENDLY ALL-ROUND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE TWO  
COUNTRIES.

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P E TRUDEAU ACQUAINTED LUBOMIR STROUGAL WITH HIS OPINIONS AND HIS PEACE INITIATIVE, THE AIM OF WHICH IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO INTERNATIONAL DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PERMANENT DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND THE WEST FOR CONSOLIDATION OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALL-ROUND COOPERATION AMONG STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS. HE NOTED THAT RECENTLY THERE EMERGED CERTAIN SIGNS OF HALTING THE DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT AND IT WAS THE CAUSE OF ALL REALISTICALLY THINKING POLITICIANS TO SEEK THE WAYS OF STABILISING AND SUPPORTING THE TENDENCY, IN ORDER TO RID THE WORLD OF THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT.

AT THE END OF THE TALKS THE TWO STATESMEN DISCUSSED SOME QUESTIONS OF INTENSIFICATION OF MUTUAL ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS.

AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE TALKS STROUGAL AND P E TRUDEAU MET CZECHOSLOVAK AND CANADIAN JOURNALISTS AND INFORMED THEM ABOUT THE COURSE OF THE TALKS.

BOTH OF THEM APPRECIATED FRANK EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. THEY DECLARED THAT AT PRESENT THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK FOR ALL STATESMEN WAS TO EXERT ALL EFFORTS TOWARDS REDUCTION OF TENSION, CONSOLIDATION OF CONFIDENCE AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AS THE BASIS FOR PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION ON THE WORLD-WIDE SCALE.

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LUBOMIR STROUGAL HELD A GALA DINNER IN HONOUR OF PE  
TRUDEAU IN PRGUES CERNIN PALACE.

THE DINNER WAS ATTENDED BY PETER COLOTKA, LADISLAV GERLE,  
MATEJ LUCAN, MAROMIR OBZINA AND SVATOPLUK POTAC, CZECHOSLOVAK  
DEPUTY PRMIERS, MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, TOMAS  
TRAVNICEK, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL FRONT CENTRAL COMMITTEE,  
AND BY OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK POLITICAL AND  
PUBLIC LIFE. HUGH DAVID PEEL AND MEMBERS OF THE ENTOURAGE OF  
THE CANADIAN PREMIER WERE ALSO PRESENT.

THE TWO STATESMAN DELIVERED SPEECHES AT THE DINNER.

LUBOMIR STROUGAL RECALLED SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE MEETING  
WHEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, PARTICIPANTS IN THE HSNKI  
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, WHICH  
HAVE DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND BELONG TO DIFFERENT MILITARY  
GROUPINGS, MEET FOR A FRANK DIALOGUE. MOREOVER THIS TAKES PLACE  
UNDER VERY COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WHEN THE DEPLOYMENT  
OF NEW AMERICAN MSSIELS IN WESTERN EUROPE MEANS AN ATTEMPT TO  
THWART THE STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE AND THUS TO IMPERIL  
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK PREMIER CLARIFIED THE REASONS WHICH,  
IN THE SPIRIT OF ALLIED COMMITMENTS AND WITH REGARD TO OWN SECURITY,  
LED THE THE DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILE COMPLEXES OF OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL  
DESIGNATION ON THE CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORY. THESE DEFENCE MEASURES-  
HE STRESSED-CHANGED NOTHING ON OUR GOOD WILL FOR COEXISTENCE,

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ON OUR BELIEF THAT GENERAL PEACE IS THE SOLE REASONABLE OPTION  
FOR THE PRESENT-DAY WORLD.

THE PRINCIPLED POSITION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA TOWARDS THE VITALLY  
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS AS THE HALTING OF EXCESSIVE ARMAMENT AND  
DISARMAMENT, IN PARTICULAR NUCLEAR, NON-USE OF FORCE OR THREAT  
OF FORCE, UNVIOLABILITY OF BORDERS, NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL  
AFFAIRS AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO DECIDE ABOUT THEIR FORTUNES  
CONTINUES TO REMAIN UNCHANGED, LUBOMIR STROUGAL STATED. IN THIS  
CONNECTION HE POINTED TO THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE POLITICAL  
DECLARATION OF THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES AND TO THE ACTIVE  
PARTICIPATION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATION IN THE STOCKHOLM  
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND ON  
DISARMMENT.

AT THE END STROUGAL APPRECIATED PERSONAL POSITION OF PE  
TRUDEAU ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, ON THE POLICY OF DETENTE AND  
DISARMAMENT AND VOICED HIS CONVICTION THAT HIS VISIT WOULD ALSO  
CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF ALL-ROUND COOPERATION  
BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND CANADA.

AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS SPEECH PIERRE ELLIOT TRUDEAU THANKED  
FOR THE INVITATION TO VISIT CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND FOR FRIENDLY  
RECEPTION AND HOSPITALITY, GRANTED TO HIM IN THIS COUNTRY.

HE SPOKE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN EUROPE, WHICH IS A SERIOUS  
REASON FOR CONCERN. THE HOPES OF MANKIND-HE SAID-ARE

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NEVER MORE AT STAKE THAN AT WAR, IN PARTICULAR NUCLEAR. THERE-  
FORE THE LONGING FOR PEACE IS SO MARKEDLY FELT JUST IN EUROPE,  
THE CONTINENT DEVASTED BY MANY WARS. THE HISTORY OF CANADA,  
HER SAFETY AND HER FUTURE, HAS BEEN AND WILL BE CLOSELY LINKED  
WITH THE FUTURE OF EUROPE-THE CANADIAN PREMIER STATED.

WE STATESMEN-HE CONTINUED-HAVE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY  
TO DO OUR UTMOST FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE DANGER OF WAR AND  
FOR THE HALTING OF THE ARMS RACE. IT IS A DUTY WHICH WE HAVE  
NOT/NOT ONLY TO OUR PEOPLE BUT TO THE WHOLE MANKIND. IN CASE  
OF NUCLEAR WAR MOST OF WHAT MANKIND HAS CREATED FOR CENTURIES  
WOULD BE DESTROYED.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND CANADA, WHICH ARE NOT/NOT BIG POWERS AND  
ARE MEMBERS OF DIFFERENT ALLIANCES, MUST FIND A SPHERE IN WHICH  
THEY CAN MOSTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE. ACCORDING  
TO MY OPINION, THE CANADIAN PREMIER SAID-IT IS THE POLITICAL  
SPHERE. IN IT IT IS NECESSARY TO STRIVE BY ALL MEANS TO INSTALL  
CONFIDENCE AND TO IMPROVE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. THE CURRENT  
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SHOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS AIM. TEXT ENDS.  
3. JAN27-HEADLINE QUOTE PE TRUDEAU ENDS HIS VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA  
UNQUOTE. TEXT BEGINS:

IN THE PRESENCE OF LUBOMIR STROUGAL, CZECHOSLOVAK PRIME  
MINISTER, PRESIDENT GUSTAV HUSAK RECEIVED AT PRAGUE CASTLE  
ON THURSDAY PIERRE ELLIOT TRUDEAU, PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA,  
WHO IS ON A VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

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IN A FRANK CONVERSATION, THE TWO STATESMEN EXCHANGED OPINIONS ON THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS OF THE PRESENT COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. THEY VOICED THEIR CONCERN OVER THE EXACERBATION OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE DANGER ARISING FROM THE STEPPING UP OF EXCESSIVE ARMAMENT. THEY VOICED THEIR CONVICTION ABOUT THE NECESSITY TO SEEK WAYS LEADING TOWARDS RELAXATION OF TENSION IN THE WORLD.

GUSTAV HUSAK STRESSED THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA, TOGETHER WITH OTHER WARSAW PACT STATES, WAS CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR RELAXATION OF TENSION IN THE WORLD, FOR LIMITATION AND HALTING OF ARMAMENT, IN PARTICULAR IN THE PRAGUE POLITICAL DECLARATION OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES IN JANUARY 1983 AND IN THE DOCUMENT FROM THE MOSCOW MEETING OF LEADING PARTY AND STATE REPRESENTATIVES OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HELD IN JUNE 1983, WERE DIRECTED TOWARDS THIS AIM. OTHER PEACE INITIATIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY COUNTRIES, EXPRESSED ESPECIALLY IN YURI ANDROPOV'S STATEMENTS, ARE OF BASIC IMPORTANCE TOO.

PIERRE ELLIOT TRUDEAU ACQUAINTED GUSTAV HUSAK WITH HIS INITIATIVES SUBMITTED AT THE END OF LAST YEAR, CONCERNING IN PARTICULAR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DEMILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED HIS CONVICTION ABOUT THE USEFULNESS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS IN THE INTEREST OF CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

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THE WARSAW PACT STATES, GUSTAV HUSAK SAID, ARE READY POSITIVELY TO EXAMINE ALL PROPOSALS WHICH, WHILE RESPECTING THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, WOULD EFFICIENTLY CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THE REDUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND TOWARDS PRACTICAL STEPS LEADING TO THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE PEACE ENDEAVOURS MUST REALISTICALLY TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT A DANGEROUS SITUATION HAD BEEN CREATED IN EUROPE DUE TO THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF THE MILITARISTIC FORCES, MAINLY OF THE USA, STRIVING TO VIOLATE THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES AND TO GAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY IN THE WORLD. THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN SOME WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, LEADING TO FURTHER RAISING OF TENSION IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD, IS A PART OF THIS POLICY.

SOCIALIST STATES INCLUDING CZECHOSLOVAKIA WERE COMPELLED TO REACT TO THIS STEP BY THE ADOPTION OF MEASURES ASSURING THEIR SAFETY. IT IS KNOWN THAT SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE WILLING TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE ON A CONSTRUCTIVE AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS IN ORDER TO PREVENT FURTHER ROUND OF EXCESSIVE ARMAMENT. BUT IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE USA AND NATO TO SHOW WILLINGNESS TO RESTORE THE SITUATION BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MENTIONED AMERICAN MISSILES.

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PAGE NINE WOGR0186 UNCLAS

GUSTAV HUSAK STRESSED THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONSIDERED AS THE MOST URGENT TASKS OF THE PRESENT TO DO EVERYTHING FOR THE AVERTING OF THE DANGER OF WAR AND FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE IN THE WORLD IN THE SPIRIT OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE. IN THIS CONTEXT HE APPRECIATED INITIATIVES AND EFFORTS OF THE CANADIAN PREMIER DIRECTED TOWARDS THE IMPROVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE, CONSOLIDATION OF CONFIDENCE AMONG STATES AND TOWARDS THE SOLUTION OF QUESTIONS OF DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

INTEREST WAS EXPRESSED TO CONTINUE THE DEVELOPMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAK-CANADIAN RELATIONS AND TO EXPAND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS COOPERATION, IN PARTICULAR IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE. JOINT WILLINGNESS WAS SIMULTANEOUSLY CONFIRMED TO CONTINUE POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN THE INTEREST OF PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARDS RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION.

THE AUDIENCE WAS ATTENDED BY BOHUSLAV CHNOUPEK, CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUGH DAVID PEEL, CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THOMAS AXWORTHY, PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER, AND BY OTHER CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES.

AT A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD ON THURSDAY IN PRAGUE INTER-CONTINENTAL HOTEL, PE TRUDEAU ANSWERED QUESTIONS OF CZECHOSLOVAK AND CANADIAN JOURNALISTS AND FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS ACCREDITED TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HE STRESSED THE DUTY OF ALL STATESMEN TO STRIVE FOR THE REDUCTION OF TENSION AND THE AVERTING OF THE ...10

PAGE TEN WOGR0186 UNCLAS

DANGER OF WAR. HE CHARACTERISED HIS VISIT AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST AND BETWEEN THE TWO MILITARY GROUPINGS.

HE APPRECIATED THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE POLITICAL DECLARATION OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBERS STATES OF JANUARY 1983. THE PRAGUE DECLARATION-HE SAID-WAS A STEP FORWARD IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND NATO STATES SHOULD POSITIVELY REACT TO ITS PEACE PROPOSALS.

THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER STATED THAT CREATION OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY, WHICH COULD BE CONDUCIVE TO THE LIMITATION OF EXCESSIVE ARMAMENT, WAS AN IMPORTANT TASK OF TODAY. HE VOICED HIS CONVICTION THAT NOW THERE EXISTED CERTAIN HOPE TO CREATE SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE AND THEREFORE IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE MUTUAL DIALOGUE. HE SAID THAT IN TALKS WITH HIGHEST CZECHOSLOVAK REPRESENTATIVES-ALTHOUGH THE OPINIONS ON THE CAUSES OF AGGRAVATED INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WERE DIFFERENT-A DETERMINATION WAS EXPRESSED ON BOTH SIDES TO SUPPORT ALL STEPS LEADING TOWARDS THE SUCCESSFUL COURSE AND COMPLETION OF THE VIENNA DISARMAMENT TALKS AND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. HIGHER REPRESENTATIVES OF PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES SHOULD RETURN TO THE LATTER IN THE EVENT OF ITS STAGNATION, THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER SAID.

ON THE PROSPECTS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK-CANADIAN RELATIONS

...11

PAVE ELEVEN WOGR0186 UNCLAS

PE TRUDEAU SAID THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ABOUT THE NEED AND USEFULNESS OF THEIR FURTHER EXPANSION, IN PARTICULAR IN THE ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL SPHERES, BUT ALSO IN CULTURE AND SPORTS.

PE TRUDEAU ENDED HIS VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON THURSDAY AND LEFT PRAGUE.

AT RUZYNE AIRPORT, DECORATED BY THE STATE FLAGS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE CANADIAN PREMIER WAS SEEN OFF BY LUBOMIR STROUGAL AT WHOSE INVITATION THE VISIT TOOK PLACE. THE FAREWELL CEREMONY WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY PETER COLOTKA, LADISLAV GERLE, JOSEF KORCAK, KAROL LACO, JAROMIR OBZINA, SVATOPLUK POTAC AND RUDOLF ROHLICEK, FEDERAL DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS, BOHUSLAV CHNOUPEK, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ARMY GENERAL MARTIN DZUR, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, VRATISLAV VAJNAR, MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

HUGH DAVID PEEL, CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS ALSO PRESENT.

ON DEPARTURE THE CANADIAN PREMIER AND HIS MEMBERS OF HIS ENTOURAGE WERE PRESENTED WITH BOQUETS OF FLOWERS BY PRAGUE PIONEERS.  
TEST ENDS.

4.JAN30-HEADLINE QUOTE ON THE CDN PRIME MINISTERS VISIT UNQUOTE.  
TEXT BEGINS: CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU, WHO ARRIVED IN PRAGUE AT THE INVITATION OF OUR PRIME MINISTER, ACQUAINTED HIGHEST  
...12

PAGE TWELVE WOGR0186 UNCLAS

REPRESENTATIVES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WITH HIS PROPOSALS, CONCERNING IN PARTICULAR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. HE APPRECIATED THE PEACE PROPOSALS OF THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER COUNTRIES, SUMMED UP (IN) JANUARY 1983 POLITICAL DECLARATION, AS A STEP FORWARD IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, TO WHICH THE NATO SHOULD POSITIVELY REACT.

AS IT MUST BE THE CASE IN THE SEEKING OF WAYS TOWARDS THE CREATION OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY, THE TALKS WITH THE CANADIAN PREMIER WERE HELD WITHIN A FRANK EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS, AND NOT/NOT ALWAYS THE OPINIONS ON THE CAUSES OF THE WORSENERD INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WERE IDENTICAL. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE, WHILE FORMULATING CERTAIN STANDPOINTS, PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU REMARKED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS A MEMBER OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT. AND OUR PUBLIC KNOWS THE RECENT EFFORTS OF THE CANADIAN PEACE MOVEMENT TO PREVENT TESTS OF AMERICAN CRUISE MISSILES, FOR EXAMPLE AT COLD LAKE, ALBERTA PROVINCE, WHEN THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONSENTED TO THESE TESTS ON CANADIAN TERRITORY.

IT IS NECESSARY REALISTICALLY TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN EUROPE HAS ARISEN DUE TO THE AGGRESSIVE MILITARISTIC POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATO, STRIVING TO GAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY, IE A POLICY, TO WHICH SOCIALIST STATES INCLUDING CZECHOSLOVAKIA WERE COMPELLED TO REACT BY MEASURES ASSURING THEIR SAFETY. AND NOW IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE USA AND THE NATO TO SHOW WILLINGNESS TO RESTORE ...13



PA THIRTEEN WOGR0186 UNCLAS

THE SITUATION WHICH EXISTED BEFORE THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MISSILES.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA TOGETHER WITH OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES IS READY POSITIVELY TO EXAMINE ALL PROPOSALS, WHICH WOULD EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THE REDUCTION OF TENSION WHILE RESPECTING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AND WOULD REPRESENT PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARDS THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AN AGREEMENT WAS ACHIEVED IN MUTUAL DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT ALL STEPS CONDUCIVE TO SUCCESSFUL COURSE AND COMPLETION OF THE VIENNA DISARMAMENT TALKS AND STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND IN THE INTEREST TO CONTINUE THE DEVELOPMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAK-CANADIAN RELATIONS, IN PARTICULAR ECONOMIC, AND THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. IT IS IN FULL HARMONY WITH THE BASIC AND MOST URGENT TALKS OF TODAY-IE AVERTING OF NUCLEAR DANGER. TEXT ENDS.

UUU/175 311510Z WOGR0184

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN ZQGR0040 31JAN84

TO EXTOTT RCR

INFO BUCST/PMDEL BGRAD PRGUE WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU BNATO  
PRMNY PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA MOSCO WSAW BPEST NDHQOTT/ADMPOL.CPP/CIC  
PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

DISTR MINA USS DMF RGB RBD RBR ABRD RBP RBI ZSP ZSI IDD IDA IDR FPR  
--PM VISIT TO GDR

PM VISIT TO EAST BERLIN IS RECEIVING FAIRLY WIDE COVERAGE  
IN WEST GERMAN PRESS AND MEDIA.MOST OF IT THUS FAR IS  
FACTUAL,MERELY RECORDING THAT VISIT IS WORKING ONE AND NOTING THAT  
HONECKER MET PM ON ARRIVAL.NUMBER OF PAPERS(USUALLY BASED ON AP  
WIRE REPORTS)STATE THAT BILATERAL QUESTIONS WOULD BE DISCUSSED.  
ALMOST ALL REFER TO VISIT AS BEING THREE DAYS LONG.FOLLOWING  
IS TEXT OF TODAYS(31JAN)EDITORIAL APPEARING IN BONN GENERAL  
ANZEIGER ENTITLED QUOTE MODEST PROFIT UNQUOTE(UNOFFICIAL  
OFFICE TRANSLATION).QUOTE...YESTERDAY ALSO BEGAN THE VISIT  
OF A WESTERN HEAD OF GOVT,THE FIRST BY A NATO STATE.PIERRE  
TRUDEAU WILL UNDERLINE CDAS INTEREST IN THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE  
FOR THE NEXT THREE DAYS.BILATERAL AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS  
AND THE WIDENING OF DIPLO RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO STATES WILL  
ALSO BE DISCUSSED.THE RED CARPET GLOWS.IT(RED CARPET)WOULD  
NOT/NOT HAVE GONE TOGETHER WELL WITH THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THOSE  
WHO TOOK REFUGE IN THE(USA)EMB.HONECKER HANDLED THAT WELL.

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*sent to IDDZ*  
*BH*  
*1/2/84*

PAGE TWO ZQGR0040 UNCLAS

NOT/NOT ALL VISITORS FROM THE WEST ARE SO WELCOME AS CHEYSSON  
AND TRUDEAU. VISITS OF STATE ARE IN SOME WAY CONNECTED TO HOW  
PRIVATE VISITS FUNCTION. IF THEY DID NOT/NOT TAKE PLACE, NEITHER  
WOULD THOSE OF THE PROMINENT VISITORS. CITIZENS OF THE GDR  
UNDERSTAND THIS CONNECTION. THEY KNOW THAT THE STATE THAT WILL  
NOT/NOT LET THEM LEAVE UNTIL THEY RETIRE IS NOT/NOT GOING TO BECOME  
MORE LIBERAL THROUGH THE VISIT OF THE CDN AND THE FRENCHMEN. BUT  
THEY KNOW TOO THAT IN A MODEST WAY THEY PROFIT FROM THE  
RESPECTIBILITY THAT THE GDR IS RECEIVING FROM INNATL EAST-WEST  
TRAFFIC. UNQUOTE.

UUU/005 011423Z ZQGR0040

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN ZQGR0039 31JAN84

TO PMOOTT DELIVER BY 311100

INFO EXTOTT IDD

DISTR LIDDZ

REF YOURTEL PM09031 28JAN

---PMS REMARKS AT DAVOS SYMPOSIUM

PLEASE RE-TRANSMIT PAGE 9 OF REFTL, IN PARTICULAR SENTENCE  
BEGINNING QUOTE IF YOU HAVE AN ATOMIC LANDMINE.....UNQUOTE.

URGENTLY REQUIRED FOR AMB BREAKFAST MTG 0800 LOCAL TIME 01FEB  
WITH VOGEL.

UUU/005 311448Z ZQGR0039



External Affairs / Affaires étrangères  
Canada / Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

1/6

Align first ab. number of Security Classification / Aligner le premier numéro de la Sécurité de la Classification

SECURITY /  
SECURITE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM/DE

LNGLS XOGR037 31JAN84 IMMEDIATE

IO/A

EXTOTT IDA

INFO

WSHDC BNATO GENEV SFRAN NDHQ/DNAC(POL)/CORAE/ORAE(GILMAN)

DISTR

PMOOTT/FOWLER

REF

IDDZ IDD IDR IDRL IDRA IDAN IDAC URR ZSI SCR  
OURTELS XOGR316 26OCT83 & XOGR375 08DEC83 (NOTAL)

SUBJ/SUJ

--- ARMS CONTROL - CONF ON VERIFICATION AT UCLA 25-26JAN84

SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS

CONF ORGANIZED BY UCLA CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC AFFAIRS (CISA) WAS FOLLOW-ON TO PREV VERIFICATION CONF AFTER WHICH BOOK QUOTE VERIFICATION AND SALT UNQUOTE PUBLISHED IN 1980. CISA ASSOC DIR POTTER INTENDS TO EDIT SIMILAR BOOK FOLLOWING THIS CONF. NINE PAPERS PRESENTED DURING ONE-AND-HALF DAY CONF ON SUBJECTS RANGING FROM VERIFICATION OF BOMBER AND CRUISE MISSILE LIMITATIONS TO VERIFYING TEST BAN TREATIES. (COMPLETE PROG BY BAG.) ALTHOUGH PARTICIPANTS PRESENT ON PERSONAL BASIS, SEVERAL NOTEWORTHY INSTITUTIONS, BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL, WERE REPRESENTED: THINK-TANKS SUCH AS RAND CORP AND L.A.-BASED QUOTE RDA UNQUOTE (RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES), HOUSE INTELLIGENCE CTEE, U.S.A. UNIVERSITIES (MICHIGAN, M.I.T., HARVARD, U.S.C.), LIVERMORE AND LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORIES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, AND C.I.A. (COMPLETE LIST BY BAG).

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DHAFER/REDACTED

DIVISION / SECTION

SECRET

APPROVED / APPROUVE

J. LEGG

GEN RELATIONS 627-9511

SIG

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2. CDN PARTICIPATION (CLEMINSON - EXTOTT IDA, GILMAN - NDHQ/DRAE, AND LEGG - LNGLS) AT ABOVE CONF VERY USEFUL IN NUMBER OF RESPECTS. IT GAVE OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN VIEWS OF INFLUENTIAL SCHOLARS AND OFFICIALS ON POLITICAL AND TECH ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION, A SUBJ OF FIRST IMPORTANCE IN ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT (ACD) AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO CDA. CDN PAPER ON VERIFICATION IN CW AND BW AND EXCELLENT INTERVENTIONS BY CLEMINSON AND GILMAN DEMONSTRATED TO PARTICIPANTS CDA'S CONCERN WITH AND COMPETENCE IN ACD VERIFICATION. DISCUSSIONS IN CORRIDORS AND DURING DAY AFTER CONF ALLOWED BETTER VIEW OF PRESENT CURRENTS OF THOUGHT IN ACD IN U.S.A., AND GAVE INSIGHTS INTO U.S. GOVT RESEARCH PROJECTS IN PROGRESS AND CONTEMPLATED. ALTHOUGH MORE COMPLETE REPORT BEING SENT BY LET, FOLLOWING PARAS GIVE HIGHLIGHTS OF PAPERS AND PARTICULARS RE RESEARCH PROJECTS OF INTEREST TO CDA.

REPORTS

3. MAIN CONCLUSION OF PAPER BY WARREN HECKROTTE QUOTE VERIFYING THE TEST BAN TREATIES UNQUOTE IS THAT, FOR A CTB, AN UNDERGROUND EXPLOSION OF ONE KILOTON LEVEL IS DETECTABLE BUT SOME OF THE SEISMIC EVENTS AT THIS LEVEL WOULD BE AMBIGUOUS, MAKING ONSITE INSPECTION NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. HECKROTTE NOTED THAT DE-COUPLING COULD REDUCE EFFECT OF EXPLOSION BY UP TO ONE HUNDREDTH OF BLAST, MEANING THAT 100/100 KT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A ONE KT EXPLOSION. HE POINTED OUT HOWEVER THAT NON-SEISMIC NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS MIGHT ASSIST IN RESOLVING SOME AMBIGUITIES.

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4. TYPE OF QUESTION ASKED AFTER CLEMINSON'S PRESENTATION OF CW VERIFICATION PAPER APPEARED TO DEMONSTRATE LACK OF SOME DETAILED KNOWLEDGE IN CW PRESENT IN OTHER ARMAMENTS CATEGORIES. PAPER DELIBERATELY SPOKE OF POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS IN 1984, AND THIS MAY HAVE BEEN READ AS UNJUSTIFIED OPTIMISM AS SOME QUESTIONS APPEARED TO EXPRESS DOUBTS RE CONCLUSION OF COMPREHENSIVE TREATY IN NEAR FUTURE.

5. REASON FOR LAST MINUTE POSTPONEMENT OF AFTERNOON'S FIRST SCHEDULED SPEAKER CAME CLEAR WHEN CHAIRMAN POTTER EXPLAINED THAT TWO USAF OFFICERS OF LT.COL AND COL RANK HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE (UNSUCCESSFULLY) JEFFREY RICHARDSON OF AMERICAN UNIV NOT TO PRESENT PAPER QUOTE TECHNICAL COLLECTION AND ARMS CONTROL UNQUOTE. POTTER DELIBERATELY TOLD L.A.TIMES REP THAT HIS REMARKS DESCRIBING UCLA STAND AGAINST SUCH CENSORSHIP WERE ON-THE-RECORD (IN CONTRAST TO REST OF CONF); TWO ARTICLES AND EDITORIAL (BY BAG) CRITICIZING USAF CONDUCT RESULTED. PAPER (PRESENTED WITH NO/NO DELETIONS) WAS DETAILED CATALOGUE OF CAPABILITIES OF ALL TYPES OF COLLECTION (DIFF TYPES OF SATELLITE, UNDERSEA, AIRCRAFT SURVEILLANCE, ETC), AND CONCLUDED THAT ALTHOUGH GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS MADE, SIGNIFICANT WEAKNESSES EXISTED (E.G. EASTERN EUROPE UNDER CLOUD COVER 60/60 TO 70/70 PERCENT OF YEAR). QUESTIONING AFTER PAPER WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF ALLEGEDLY ROBY IMPRESSION GIVEN, WITH FIRST OF MANY PUNGENT REMARKS FROM AMROM KATZ QUOTE WE HAVE NEVER FOUND ANYTHING THE SOVIETS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY HIDDEN UNQUOTE. IT ALSO BECAME OBVIOUS THAT PAPERS MIGHT BE SUBSTANTIALLY RE-WORKED BEFORE PUBLICATION; ALL WILL BE CIRCULATED BY POTTER TO OTHER PARTICIPANTS, WITH REQUEST FOR DETAILED COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS.

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6. PAPER QUOTE VERIFYING BOMBER AND CRUISE MISSILE LIMITATIONS UNQUOTE BY DEAN WILKENING CONCLUDED THAT VERIFICATION SITUATION IS DISMAL IF NTM'S ONLY USED. DISCUSSION SHIFTED TO COOPERATIVE MEASURES AND COUNTING RULES AS ONLY POSSIBILITIES, BUT PARTICIPANTS WERE BROUGHT BACK TO REALITY BY COMMENT FROM KATZ THAT THESE APPROACHES GLOSS OVER FACT OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF VERIFICATION AND DANGERS FROM DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT. ROBERT PERRY OF RAND INSISTED THAT CONCENTRATING ON LAUNCHERS (GROUND, AIR, OR UNDERSEA) WAS EQUALLY FUTILE AS EFFORTS FOCUSSED ON CRUISE MISSILES THEMSELVES. LEON FUERTH, IMPRESSIVE REP FROM HOUSE INTELLIGENCE CTEE, CONCLUDED THAT ENTIRE FIELD IS STERILE FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS, AND ATTEMPTED TO OUTLINE POSS NEW APPROACH WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS NOT WELCOMED AS SHOWING A WAY OUT.

7. SOME NEW IDEAS EMERGED IN GORDON KANE'S PAPER QUOTE VERIFICATION OF TEST LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS UNQUOTE, WHICH INCLUDED FOLLOWING PROPOSALS: A) A BAN ON QUOTE INTEGRATED TESTING UNQUOTE (E.G. COORDINATED TESTING OF STRATEGIC, INTERMEDIATE AND BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR ARMS AS WELL AS TROOP MANOEUVRES), WITH OBLIGATORY INSERTION OF AT LEAST ONE DAY DELAY BETWEEN TESTS, B) BAN ON SHORTER FLIGHTS FROM SLBM'S (TO REDUCE DE-STABILIZING EFFECTS OF CLOSE OFF-SHORE SUBS), C) BAN ON SUPERSONIC AND LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, D) BAN ON ASAT WEAPONS. RE LAST PROPOSAL, WILL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN ADVANCE COPY OF PAPER. EFFECT OF QUESTIONING WAS TO DOWNPLAY POSSIBILITIES SUGGESTED BY KANE.

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8. MAIN CONCLUSION OF PAPER BY JAMES SCHEAR ENTITLED QUOTE COOPERATIVE MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION: HOW FEASIBLE? HOW EFFECTIVE? UNQUOTE WAS THAT SUCH MEASURES ARE OVER-RATED FOR INF AND START NEGOTIATIONS.

9. STEPHEN MEYER PAPER ABOUT THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE ON VERIFICATION DID NOT UNEARTH ANYTHING MOST COM FSDS FAMILIAR WITH ACD/EAST-WEST RELATIONS DO NOT/NOT ALREADY KNOW.

10. DISCUSSION FOLLOWING LAST TWO PAPERS HOWEVER, DEALING WITH DOMESTIC POLITICAL ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION, WERE INSTRUCTIVE. ROBERT BUCHHEIM, U.S.A. COMMISSIONER OF SALT I STANDING CONSULTATIVE CTEE, PREDICTED THAT, IN RESPONSE TO REAGAN ADMIN'S REPORT ON SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE THAT A) SOVIETS WOULD MAKE THEIR OWN ACCUSATIONS, AND B) RE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ABM TREATY BY CONSTRUCTION OF KRASNOYARSK RADAR, SOVIETS WILL CALL IT A QUOTE SPACE-TRACK RADAR UNQUOTE, A CATEGORY WHICH HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN A STRICT ENOUGH DEFINITION IN SALT I AGREEMENT. WE SEE FROM L.A. TIMES ARTICLE THIS A.M. ON SOVIET COUNTER ACCUSATIONS THAT FIRST PART OF PREDICTION WAS ACCURATE. SOME DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE AROUND ADMIN'S REPORT, AND WARNING WAS MADE THAT IT COULD PROVE TO HAVE IRREVERSIBLY CHANGED CHARACTER OF FUTURE EAST-WEST ACD NEGOTIATIONS.

11. CALL ON ALAN PLATT AND RICHARD DARILEK OF RAND CORP GAVE US A GLIMPSE OF VAST AMT OF VALUABLE WORK BEING DONE IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND POINTED TO CONCURRENCE OF INTEREST WITH EXTOTT IDA & IDR. PLATT HAS BEEN WORKING ON SALT & INF, AND HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED BOOK QUOTE THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SUCCESSOR GENERATION UNQUOTE. DERILEK INVOLVED FOR SOME TIME IN MBFR, AND RECENTLY CO-WROTE STUDY QUOTE PREVENTING NUCLEAR CONFLICT: WHAT CAN THE BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES CONTRIBUTE? UNQUOTE. STUDY ALSO DONE

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(BEING DONE?) ON REAGAN'S STAR WARS SCENARIO; DARILEK CONCLUSION IS THAT UNDER THIS SCENARIO, THINGS WOULD GET WORSE BEFORE AND IF, REPEAT IF, THEY GOT BETTER. WE WILL FOLLOW THIS UP. CLEMINSON DESCRIBED PLAN FOR CARLETON SEMINARS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY THIS SUMMER, AND WENT ON TO MENTION THAT HE HAD HOPED FOR SOME TIME TO SEE CDA INITIATE A SIMULATION EXERCISE ON EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. ALSO ON LONGSTANDING LIST OF PLANS/HOPES IS A WAR-GAMING EXERCISE TO TEST VERIFICATION OF EUROPEAN CBM'S. BOTH RAND INTERLOCUTORS EXPRESSED AMAZEMENT AND DELIGHT THAT THESE SAME EXERCISES ARE AT PRESENT UNDER SERIOUS STUDY AT RAND FOR INITIATION, IN COOPERATION WITH VARIOUS U.S. GOVT AGENCIES, IN NEAR FUTURE. PLATT UNDERTOOK TO KEEP YOU POSTED THROUGH INFORMAL CHANNELS, I.E. US.

12. IN ADDITION TO ANY PAPERS/STUDIES ON ISMA YOU WILL SEND FOR BOB PERRY OF RAND, OTHERS YOU MAY THINK OF (E.G. VERIFICATION COMPENDIUM, CW USE REPORTS, ETC.) WOULD, WE PRESUME, ALSO BE USEFUL IN KEEPING CDN STAR HIGH IN SKY, AND PUMP PRIMED FOR RETURN FLOW.

MF

INFO

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PMDELBRILIN PMDL0026 31JAN84

TO BONN IMMED

INFO EXTOTT( IDDZ

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE

SMITH REPLACING HANCOCK.WILL ARRIVE FEB02/02 1900 HRS

LH239 EX ZURICH AND DEPART FEB04/04 LH736 FOR FRANKFURT

ENROUTE TO MTL/OTT.

CCC/209 311510Z PMDL0026

M R

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMDELBRLIN PMDL0024 31JAN84

TO TT ATOC TRENTON IMMED DE CAF

INFO NDHQOTT/DAOT3/DTO-4 TT 437 SQN TRENTON IMMED DE CAF

EXTOTT XDV BUCST IMMED

DISTR IDDZ RBR

REF TEL CNGNY YIGR0011 20JAN

---PMS INIATIVE-VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE

FOLLOWING IS AMENDMENT TO PUBLISHED ITINERARY FOR CAF3760:

02 FEB DEPART BUCHAREST 1530/1530 HRS

02 FEB ARRIVE OTTAWA 1900/1900 HRS

UUU/209 311135Z PMDL0024

MF

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FM PMDELBRLIN PMDL0023 31JAN84

TO EXTOTT XDV IMMED

INFO PMOOTT/JOHNSON/COLEMAN/DURDIN PCOOTT/FOWLER

RCMPOTT/5 VIP BUCSH TT 437 SQN TRENTON DE CAF IMMED

DISTR LIDDZ RBR

---PMS INITIATIVD:VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE

PM AND DEL ARRIVED AS SCHEDULED JAN30.PM AND DEL ACCOMMODATED

AT GUEST HOUSE TELEPHONE 48020 DEL OFFICE 218.MEDIA

INTERHOTEL PALAST 2410.PRESS CENTRE 2216.CREW METROPOL HOTEL

22040.

2.DEPARTING EAST BERLIN FOR BUCHAREST FEB01. 1145 HRS.

UUU/209 311128Z PMDL0023

MF

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FM CANDELDVAVOS DAV0013 31JAN84

TO OSLO DELIVER BY 311500

INFO EXTOTT MINA GENEV PARIS CNGNY BONN PRMNY ROME LDN TOKYO

COPEN SPORE PEKIN STKHM BOSTN HSNKI HAGUE DELHI CNBRA BRU

PMOOTT/SMITH

DISTR MINT MINE USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RBD RBR RCR IMD (IDDZ

IDA IDR FPR

----DAVOS SYMPOSIUM:PM TRUDEAUS REMARKS ON INNATL SECURITY-

JAN28.WE HAVE ASKED EXTOTT TO RETRANSMIT TRANSCRIPT OF PM

TRUDEAUS REPLIES TO QUESTIONS AT DAVOS SYMPOSIUM SEMINAR

ON INNATL SECURITY SITUATION.OTHER PARTICIPANTS WERE KEN

DAM USA DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE,PMS OF MALAYSIA AND TURKEY

AND RAYMOND BARRE,CHAIRMAN.WE DO NOT/NOT HAVE TRANSCRIPT OF

PMS OPENING INTERVENTION.TRYGUE RAMBERG EDITOR OF

AFTENPOSTEN,OSLO REQUESTED COPY OF TRANSCRIPT.PLEASE ENSURE

COPY DELIVER ASAP.

UUU/125 311200Z DAV0013