


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Volume 30 From-De 84-02-08 To-A 84-02-09

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION  
Vol 30

VOIES ACCESSION NO. 18840

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DISARMEMENT  
MEASURES  
PLANS AND PROPOSALS  
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION ( INITIATIVES )

DESARMEMENT  
MESURES  
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS  
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX ( INITIATIVES )


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
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28 Nelson Road  
Aylmer, Québec  
J9H 1G8  
Tel: 237-5340 (office)  
684-7710 (residence)

*MF*

February 9, 1984.

Mr. Geoffrey Pearson  
Institute of Research for Public Policy  
275 Slater Street  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1P 5H9

Dear Mr. Pearson:

Subject: Follow-up to Meeting and Working Luncheon with Prime Minister  
Pierre Trudeau on January 10, 1984.

As a member of the Canadian Third Track for Peace, it was a pleasure and a privilege to meet with Prime Minister Trudeau, Gary Smith, David Crenna and yourself on the most pressing issue of our time.

I was quite interested in the discussion you initiated on the potential role(s) of the publicly funded centre on disarmament and peace, announced as one of the measures of the government in the speech from the Throne on December 7, 1983. We explored with you a number of options, including information dissemination, policy advocacy and conflict resolution. I also raised a fourth option, endorsed by George Ignatieff and Mel Hurtig, which I called mutual trust development. Sepcifically, I suggested that the centre could be an initiator or facilitator of projects designed to foster mutual understanding and trust between East and West. To illustrate the idea, I have enclosed copies of articles describing the Volga Peace Cruise and USA-USSR Dialogue, two events that occurred in 1983 as the result of joint efforts by Soviet and American citizens.

I have also enclosed a proposal sent to me recently by Duncan Taylor, a retired foreign service officer, in which he advocates a massive student exchange program between East and West. Although I would question such specifics as the numbers of students in the initial stage ("... a minimum of 100,000 from each side...") and the age category ("... thirteen to fifteen year-olds..."), the very idea itself would merit a thorough assessment by the disarmament and peace centre, if it were assigned such a role.



Many other creative ideas, such as pen pal diplomacy between Canadian and Soviet citizens (as recently advocated by MPP Michael Cassidy) or summer peace camps in Canada for American and Soviet children, could be forwarded by groups and citizens to the centre for assessment and consideration. In fact, the Speech from the Throne admirably states in relation to the creation of this centre: "Fresh ideas and new proposals, regardless of source, will be studied and promoted".

Should you and your advisors retain this mutual trust option as one of the potential roles of the centre, I would be pleased to assist in the development of this option in the design phase, and/or in the facilitation or implementation of mutual trust projects once the centre is operational.

I hold a Bachelor's degree from the University of Ottawa and a Master of Social Work from Carleton University, and I consider myself fluently bilingual. My work experience over the past twenty years covers the fields of social services, social planning and development, and education. I am the former assistant executive director of a social planning body, and executive director of two social agencies. My current position is co-ordinator of the social service program at Algonquin College, which entails management, teaching and community development functions. Throughout my professional career, I have had extensive experience in co-ordinating human service projects that often required creativity, diplomacy and determination to achieve a consensus on working toward a common goal. I believe these qualities are important in any work related to mutual trust development between East and West.

I would appreciate discussing this matter further with you, and will supply my curriculum vitae and references on request.

Yours sincerely,



Yvon Dugas

YD/dv

cc/David Crenna

L.A. Delvoie ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

Gary Smith

# The Volga Peace Cruise 1983

by Douglas Mattern

As this article was being written, Korean flight 007 was shot down by the Soviet military, invoking condemnation around the world. Many questions remain to be answered over this tragic incident. The New York Times (Oct. 7) reports that most U.S. intelligence analysts conclude the Soviets thought they were tracking a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft, and believed that is what they shot down. It is even possible that when all the evidence is in, other parties may share the blame. Nevertheless, censure for this incident is correct.

Having said that, the hate campaign that was launched against the entire Soviet nation and its people was irresponsible and wrong. With all the name calling by the Reagan administration, it would do us well to recall that only a decade ago most of the world was condemning the U.S. as barbaric for Vietnam policies. Remember the napalm, the saturation bombing, the search and destroy missions? Moreover, this was not a singular incident, but a government policy that involved the entire nation. If the tragedy of flight 007 proved anything, it is that our world has become so militarized that any incident could ignite the nuclear fuse, thus the threat to all of us is the militarism and fear that dominates events. To break this stranglehold over the world community requires that we work together as never before to end the nuclear madness, and begin to build the better world that is mandatory for the future. As this article attempts to express, the Soviet people—like the majority of Americans—want peace and are anxious to work in cooperation with us to achieve it.

On July 18, 1983, during a sunny Monday afternoon in Moscow, some 5,000 Soviet citizens carrying signs and banners written in Russian saying, "No to the arms race, and yes to peace," joined with a diverse group of 146 United States citizens from 19 states to hold the first joint U.S./USSR demonstration for a nuclear freeze. With banners held together and to the sound of music, the two groups joined to march through Moscow's Gorky Park. A peace rally was held in the park's large amphitheater where three speakers from the U.S. and the USSR addressed the crowd. A festive mood was added by entertainment, which included singing, dancing, and even circus acts.

The Moscow demonstration, which was seven months in the planning and initiated in the U.S., was only the first of several joint peace rallies which were held in the Soviet Union during the month of July. The U.S. group was co-sponsored by Promoting Enduring Peace, which is based in Connecticut; the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship; and the World Citizens Registry (U.S. Section) which is based in San Francisco. The Soviet co-sponsor for these demonstrations was the Soviet Peace Committee. This latter organization is based in Moscow and has over 120 branches located throughout the country. It is the only secular Soviet organization that is financed entirely by private donations. Many Soviet workers, for example, regularly pledge one hour's pay per month as a donation to the committee's peace fund.

The U.S. contingent was known as the Volga Peace Cruise, as after leaving Moscow, the group would travel to the City of Rostov to board a ship which would journey 1200 miles up the Volga River. Stops were made along the route to hold peace rallies with Soviet citizens. After Rostov, where the rally featured a highly decorated war veteran who gave an emotional speech on how he could never go to war with Americans because of the memories of serving as allies in World War II, the group traveled to Volgograd. This city was formerly named Stalingrad, the site of the historic World War II battle which marked the beginning of the end for Hitler's dream of world conquest. Here the Volga Peace Cruise received an official city reception, with children colorfully dressed to give members presents, and beautiful young Russian women in traditional costumes offering bread and salt as a symbol of friendship. Following this ceremony, a group of U.S. WWII veterans on the cruise presented a wreath to the city's monument for war dead as a remembrance that our nations were allies during that dark period of human history.

After Volgograd, the peace cruise moved on to other joint rallies in the cities of Ulyanovsk, Kazan, the capital city of the Tartar Republic, and then by airplane to Kiev and Leningrad. In Kazan, the five busloads of Americans were transported through the city to the site of the peace rally by a police escort. This left us wondering when in our country a group of Soviet citizens and speakers would receive a friendly police escort to a peace rally?

In addition to the public rallies, regular informal dis-

cussion sessions were held on the boat with five Soviet professors who were invited on the trip. The sessions involved a variety of subjects on Soviet life and policies, and they were very candid with much exchange of viewpoints.

As one of the three designated speakers for the U.S. group at the joint peace rallies, I can vouch that we were free to say whatever we wanted with no guidelines, and that our comments were accurately reported in the Soviet press. In this context, the Volga Peace Cruise received extensive coverage in the Soviet Union. National Soviet television carried three separate segments on the demonstrations, and ten articles appeared in Soviet newspapers, including Pravda, and Izvestia. The sad

irony is that the only news blackout we received came from the U.S. press which declined to attend the Moscow rally, or to carry the TASS (Soviet International News Agency) reports on the rallies. The other two speakers on the cruise were Yvonne Logan who is the U.S. President of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and Professor Mark Solomon of Simmons College in Massachusetts. At each rally the speakers from both countries stressed the desperate need for a bilateral nuclear freeze, to be followed with strict measures on arms control, and deep bilateral reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. The Soviets believe that after decades of catching up to the U.S. in the nuclear arms arena, their country has made important attempts to end the arms race. They cite the Soviet Union's announced policy never to be first to use nuclear weapons, their vote in the United Nations endorsing a nuclear freeze, and their approval for a resolution to ban further testing of nuclear weapons. Other examples were also provided, but they see no tangible response from the United States, but rather what seems to them an obsession to escalate the arms race. They expressed particular fear and anger over the plan to deploy U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, beginning in late 1983. These latter missiles have the ability to strike Moscow, Leningrad, and Soviet missile silos and command centers within six to fourteen minutes flight-time. We can simply imagine the response of the American people if the Soviets had announced plans to deploy hundreds of intermediate-range missiles carrying nuclear warheads in Mexico, Cuba, Panama and Nicaragua.



Soviet citizens at Moscow rally

It is impossible for a sensitive observer to visit the Soviet Union and not recognize the deep psychological impact World War II has on the people: from the old with their painful memories of the past, to the young who recognize that peace is essential to their future. The devastation the war brought to the country is simply beyond the comprehension of most Americans. In Leningrad, for example, we visited a memorial cemetery where 500,000 people are buried—all victims of the Nazi's 900 day siege of the city. Leningrad alone lost over twice as many people as our entire country lost in the war.

In the City of Kiev, capital of the Ukrainian Republic, we visited the Babi Yar Memorial where the Germans murdered as many as 200,000 people and buried them in a common trench. This memorial is highlighted by a massive work of towering dark statues representing the victims. It is topped by a poignant sculpture of a doomed woman with her hands tied behind her back and kissing a child. This is to symbolize that life will go on and hope for the future. These war memorials are common throughout the country, many massive in scope and profound in artistic expression. The Soviet people do not forget their past, or the sacrifice of the 20 million who perished in the war. It is common for young couples to place flowers on war memorials after their wedding ceremony. Contrary to what some people in the West believe, these memorials are not to glorify war, but to remind everyone of the horror of war and the terrible sacrifice that had to be paid to defeat the Nazi invaders.

Continued on Page 8



The stage and speakers at the Moscow rally.

-OVER-



and give the country a future. This contrasts sharply with our country where Memorial Day is much more a time of automobile races and picnics than remembering those who died in the wars, or Veterans Day when school children and government office workers have a holiday while veterans work.

The Soviet people know war, and they want peace. We told the Soviets that the American people also want peace, citing the vast majority who want a nuclear

Moscow we met for two hours with Yuri Zhukov, President of the Soviet Peace Committee, and one of the nation's leading newspaper columnists. He accepted and answered questions on every sort of issue ranging from the country's housing shortage, to alcoholism, to dissidents. On the matter of emigration from the Soviet Union, which has often been a subject of controversy in our country, he offered a point of understanding—if not acceptance—by reminding us that the United States



Young Soviet women offering bread and salt in Volgograd

freeze, and the many demonstrations against the arms race, including the one million people who marched in New York City in 1982.

Our two countries have many differences, but we also have much in common, including this need for peace. Ending the arms race, and resolving other global problems, including alleviating the tragic poverty and hunger that haunts 60 percent of humanity, can only be attained by our two countries working in cooperation, and never if we work apart as enemies. We recognized that only as allies can we avert disaster, end the nuclear madness, and begin to build a better world in which disputes between nations can be eventually settled by world law and not by war. These goals, which are mandatory with humanity on the threshold of the 21st century, cannot be advanced under the present hostile conditions; thus a first priority is to end the cold war rhetoric, the fear, and the misunderstanding that are so prevalent.

Soviet people recognize they have domestic problems, just as we do, and they are willing to discuss them. In

is a country of immigrants while the Soviet Union is a nation deeply rooted to the soil, thus a difference of opinion on this issue is inevitable. While recognizing their problems, the Soviets are also proud of their accomplishments, and we found the youth to have a real confidence in the future.

The Volga Peace Cruise of 1983 was an important event, not only in establishing the first joint U.S./USSR rallies for a nuclear freeze, but in helping to promote a better understanding between our peoples. To continue and enlarge on this process is imperative. Promoting Enduring Peace, under the direction of Howard and Alice Frazier, is planning a repeat Volga Peace Cruise in 1984, this time as a prelude to a 1985 Mississippi Peace Cruise. A challenge for our country will be to receive Soviet guests and speakers with the same warmth, respect, and honest reporting as our group received in the Soviet Union. It is this type of commitment to peace and building friendship on which all the hopes and dreams of future generations depend.



Soviet peace marchers at Kazan rally

# Peace Seminar On The Volga

By EDNA RUTH JOHNSON

**"NOTHING** justifies killing people," declared the Soviet journalist from *Pravda*, Victor Linnik, in our peace seminar aboard the *Alexander Pushkin* cruising the Volga River. "Our different economic systems must co-exist; we must come to know each other."

One hundred and sixty-five Americans from twenty-two states and Canada had gathered in Moscow early in August under the auspices of Promoting Enduring Peace (founded by Jerome Davis; now directed by Howard Frazier) to join in a "Peace Cruise" which was to begin in two days in Rostov-on-Don. Four Soviet "officials," two of them professors, became part of our seminar — and entered into our casual talks, too — during an unforgettable ten days of cruising and talking.

Victor Linnik spoke "Americanese" as if he had grown up in Kansas, though he has never been in the USA. He played guitar to accompany American songs, in which we joined warmly in friendship and good optimistic cheer. How could we be anything but friends?

Victor recalled American historic events and quotes from major American speeches. "We Soviets know a lot more about the United States than vice versa," he said jovially. He had said in an earlier seminar meeting that "Brezhnev is strongly identified with the average Russian. He has never been an actor. There is no gulf between the people and Brezhnev."

"A lot of investment goes into a person in the USSR," he told us, "from kindergarten through college. Anyone who would choose to leave the country after that would be frowned upon. Yours is a nation of immigrants. We are different; give us that benefit."

He summed up the situation, often misunderstood: "The motivation in leaving the Soviet Union is usually material — more money — which is contrary to our moral sense of thinking in terms of building up our country for us all."

Americans tend to equate our 200-some years of progress with the Soviets' 65 years, which began in illiteracy, inexperience, struggle, and a new ideal. And we cannot bring ourselves easily to imagine the devastation that wars have brought to these people. Their loss of twenty million during World War II after the loss of millions in 1919 when the new socialist society was getting underway is keenly felt by young and old. Most families suffered losses. They survived the 1919 attack by fourteen Western nations, including the USA, "to strangle the baby in its crib," as Churchill put it, and fought back the Nazis at great cost. No wonder they take glowing pride in the inordinate accomplishments which were in evidence wherever we went.

A volume of building has been going on: apartments, hotels, recreation facilities for workers, theatres, schools, memorials. What gigantic monuments we saw in all the Soviet cities we visited! The National Economic Achievement Exposition in Moscow is like a World's Fair of arts, crafts, industrial development, even solar experimentation.

Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) is itself a monument to the Nazi retreat. As a reminder, as if one is needed, a gutted brick mill stands alongside a modern structure; the contrast tells its own story. Gratitude to those who died "that we could live" is everywhere present. Fresh flowers adorn all war memorials and monuments to heroes, perhaps even more today than in 1957 and 1973 when I acclaimed

them on my previous visits to the Soviet Union.

We ourselves carried flowers to the Volgograd commemorative statues and markers at Mamayev Kurgan. One by one, we walked upon the raised stones in the moat surrounding the Weeping Mother to cradle fresh flowers at the base of the sculpture by Evgeny Vuchetich, who created also the bronze sculpture at the United Nations, "Swords Into Ploughshares." (The "Weeping Mother" was depicted in *The Churchman* as background to George F. Kennan's poem, "Dehumanizing the Russians," in June-July; the "Swords Into Ploughshares," in February, accompanied Charles Mackintosh's "Unilateral Wisdom.") The sculpture is so huge we stood on tip-toe to reach its foundation to pay our reverent homage.

We walked up the dozens of steps (at least 100 feet wide) to approach the overwhelming Fallen Heroes Square. The stair walls are flanked by bas relief portraits of heroes, and their last words on notes retrieved from the burning debris. A background recording of wartime songs, the crash of gunfire, the shouts of soldiers, the dramatic voice of a radio announcer reading war bulletins, brought vivid recollection of war's awful realities.

The Hall of Valour, shaped like a huge military pill-box, its walls lined in a mosaic of color and gold — all in subdued, impeccably good taste — bore the names of 7,200 of the fallen. The sad, gentle music of Schuman's "Reverie" plays in the background as visitors gaze at the eternal flame at its center and look upward to see the tip of the Victory statue, thirty stories high, a few hundred feet away. Around the top of the round hall runs the circular scroll: "We were just mere mortals and few of us survived, but we did our sacred duty to our beloved Motherland!"

On the charred wall of a bombed building, someone had written: "If I die, remember I was a Communist!"

There are 16-million communists in the Soviet Union out of 270-million people. Their respect and admiration for a party member is quite different from o

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## PROMOTING ENDURING PEACE

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negative attitude. "A communist must be an example of high morality," explained Dr. Zalman V. Litvin of the Institute of World Economy, Moscow. "There are two kinds of incentive — material and moral. A party member must be morally clean; he must keep the honor. He may have extras like a boat, a summer place (we saw many of them on the high banks above the Volga's sandy beaches), jewelry, money in the bank at a 2-3% interest, but it must be bought with honest money. Yes, wealthy persons, such as the composer Shostakovitch, can leave money to their children, but usually the source of income is from personal work."

Graciously and without hesitation, Dr. Litvin responded to our pointed questions in fluent English. "Grievances? Dissent? People may write to the Central Committee — all party members — which treats the complaints with concern. It is not as open as in your country, but we don't have to emulate you. In order to be 'good guys,' should we be exactly like yourselves? We deserve to be like we would like ourselves to be."

As for human rights, "we have social equality; we have put an end to unemployment and poverty. We have free health care; we have housing for all; we have a social security system. We support our government's peace policy. In order to fulfill a peace policy, you must oppose your government."

"But our differing systems are not to be decided on the battlefield. Let history be the judge."

The inevitable question of Afghanistan arose. Dr. Litvin clarified the Soviet view: "Since 1921, we had good relations with Afghanistan. We educated them free in our colleges. We had wide economic relations. Afghanistan is a poor country with thousands under the heels of the landlords. Women were exploited. Fourteen times we were invited to intervene and to aid the revolution which began in 1978. We did not intervene — as we did not in Chile — but finally, after a painful decision, we felt we must give internal help to Afghanistan. Besides, the arms given to the landlords by the

United States and China threatened our 2,000-mile border with Afghanistan. The West obviously wants to undermine the Afghanistan revolution. But we want discussion, conferences; not arms. If arms to those opposing the poor were to cease, we would leave immediately."

As for Poland, "the majority of the communist party members there belong to the Roman Catholic Church. In Poland, that church plays an important role. In rising to a new position, a Pole must consider the church's role in politics."

The Jews? "As a Jew and a communist, I find no discrimination against the Jews in the communist party. No identification sets us apart. Of the two million, two hundred thousand Jews in the USSR, less than one percent, many are popular writers, some published in the Jewish language. Our Deputy Prime Minister is Jewish; there are many Jews in our government. Jews should be thankful to the Soviet Army for saving them from the Nazis. If

the Nazis had won, even America would have been endangered. Jews go to school here free. All of them have rights they never had before. I cannot guarantee that everybody should like them.

"We are in a socialist stage. Social equality is not economic equality. We are not privileged as party members. We have plenty of problems. We want to raise the standard of living. How can we do it when we must spend so much on arms? We welcome any discussion — any measure — that would put an end to the arms race."

In Kazan, capital of the Tartar Autonomous Republic, the warmth and amity of 500 Young Pioneers brought tears of joy and appreciation to our eyes. Children aged 5 to 17 entertained us on their camp stage for two hours with dances, gymnast exercises, songs, recitations — some in English — all approaching perfection in performance. We joined them in singing "Let there be sunshine; Let there be blue sky; Let there be Mommy; And let there be me!" We longed for the blue sky of friendship to shield us all always.

#### To the People of Volgograd

**W**E HAVE come across oceans,  
Over mountains and rivers,  
Deserts, vast forests, and fertile fields,  
Giant cities, and tiny hamlets,  
To lay our flowers at the base of your monuments,  
To share your sorrow for your fallen comrades  
Who gave their lives that we, too, may know  
The blessings of peace.  
And we have come to draw from the sacrifices  
Of the awesome dead  
And indomitable survivors  
Of the Battle of Stalingrad.  
Their courage and will overcame all obstacles to peace  
Between our nations.

To this end, we pledge  
All the resources at our command toward friendship.  
This is our promise to your children and ours.

Thank you for the countless memories  
We shall take back with us  
Of smiling faces and gestures of friendship  
That transcend words  
We could not understand.

ESTHER GINSHERMAN

Mrs. Ginsberman of Louisville, Kentucky, wrote the above poem while aboard the *Alexander Pushkin* cruising on the Volga River, after a stopover at Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad).

# Couple on peace trip to Russia

FRAN and ROBERT BOEHM

"A peace cruise on the Volga" was how the trip was publicized - though that was a fair description, it turned out to be much more. Promoting Enduring Peace, a Connecticut based organization, chartered the Soviet passenger ship "Alexander Pushkin" for a Volga cruise from July 14 through 30, 1983. Three other organizations agreed to be co-sponsors, National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and World Citizens Registry, U.S. Section. The demand for reservations was so great that a second cruise was arranged for a later date.

## Visiting Moscow

Of the 160 members of our group, many were seeing Moscow for the first time. They were surprised to find a vast city of eight million people, organized in districts reaching out in all directions, with broad avenues and innumerable areas of greenery - rather than the concentrated and skyward crowding of Manhattan and the centers of many American cities. The miles of new buildings recently completed or still under construction along the way from Sheremetyevo Airport to the impressive, new, built for the Olympics, Cosmos Hotel, opposite the grounds of the All-Union Exposition of Economic Achievement, made an impact, as did the sight of hundreds of tourists from every corner of the world in the hotel lobby. There were East Europeans, Africans, Latins, Vietnamese, Indians, Chinese and Japanese. After checking in and having supper, many crossed the square to a brand-new Metro station where for five kopeks (eight cents) they rode downtown to see Red Square, the Kremlin and St.

Basil's Cathedral illuminated at night.

On Saturday there were visits to the Kremlin with its historic cathedrals, Red Square and the Lenin Mausoleum, and in the afternoon a city tour that culminated in front of Moscow University in the Lenin Hills, where scores of beribboned automobiles were bringing brides and grooms to the magnificent promenade overlooking the Moscow River. They went to pay their respects to their beloved city, a traditional visit for the about-to-be married. In the evening, we were in for a real treat - the State Chorus of Omsk (a group from Siberia). It was a unique experience since it was not only the singing that was outstanding, but also the dancing. The range of music went from folk, to comic to revolutionary, including a dancing "bear" in the final number. We also included in that busy day a meeting at the headquarters of the Soviet Peace Committee. There were speeches by the chairman of the Committee, some veterans of World War II, and a Soviet journalist. Everything was translated into English including speeches by some of the leaders in our group - each group indicating its commitment to work for world peace and against nuclear war. There was also an opportunity for people in the audience to ask questions. In brief, 36 hours had dispelled many of the myths and accepted cliches concerning Soviet people and their life in their capital, but many remained for some of the people even by the conclusion of the trip.

## Peace demonstration

Before leaving Moscow, we participated in a first-ever experience - a joint American-

Soviet peace demonstration in Gorky Park. The experience was unforgettable and began on our way to the demonstration when ordinary pedestrians, noticing the peace signs in both English and Russian, which we had placed in the windows of our buses (we were travelling in five vehicles), waved to us and looked very surprised and happy as we passed by. When we got to the park, we were greeted by hundreds of Russians and by a large brass band and applause. We marched side by side into the park to a large reviewing stand. It was a colorful sight with banners, flags and peace signs waving in the breeze. There were many speeches in English and Russian and the whole experience was very uplifting. To illustrate the kind of warmth and hospitality we received, we were sitting next to a Soviet couple and the sun was beating down for it was an unusually hot day. They had umbrellas to protect from the sun and they insisted on our taking their umbrella - what a relief that was. In addition, entirely unsolicited, they bought Eskimo Pies for a group of us. Warmth and good feeling permeated the atmosphere.

## Things to come

Our anticipation for exciting things to come had been whetted as we boarded the plane for the flight to Rostov-on-Don where we were to commence our river cruise and travel north as far as Kazan. We did not know what to expect when the ship left its moorings, but as the ship's band played and hundreds of Soviet citizens waved goodbye, we were all keyed up for the adventures to come. At each of the cities we visited we were met at the dock by hundreds of Soviet people,



The Kremlin

giving us warm and friendly welcomes. Flowers and gifts were presented to us; young women and children in native costumes of the various Republics greeted us and there were welcoming speeches. Our arrival was written up in the local newspapers and we were presented and discussed on radio and T.V. We were not merely American tourists. We were representative Americans (coming from all parts of the U.S.) who were showing them our interest in maintaining peace and they responded in the heartiest manner.

It was surprising to us that notwithstanding the tension between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on a governmental level, that the feelings of friendship by the Soviets could be expressed so strongly, but soon we understood that the Soviets draw a sharp distinction between the American government and the American

people. Since we had come this distance to be with them they showed their appreciation in no uncertain terms.

In Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad), we visited the amazing war memorial at Mamayev Hill on top of which is the giant figure of Mother Russia. She holds a large sword in her hand to beat back the invaders. There are many other large sculptures as part of this memorial, and it would take too long to describe, but the drama and beauty of this memorial is almost impossible to fully comprehend. After the visit and a meeting with the Soviets at which many speakers - both Soviet and American - discussed the dangers of nuclear war, we were treated to entertainment of a high order. Soviet style, featuring dancing, choral singing, individual singing and accordionists.

While we mentioned this in Volgograd, we had much the same experiences in other cities as well, Ulyanovsk, Togliatti (the auto manufacturing center) and finally at Kazan,

the capital of the Tatar Republic (which is one of the autonomous republics forming a part of the Russian Republic).

Our Soviet informants seemed quite free to acknowledge and discuss many grave unsolved problems in their country and mistakes that have been made. Though we saw much to criticize and perhaps dislike, we were seeing with our own eyes something quite different from President Reagan's jaundiced and perhaps ignorant view - since he has never been to the Soviet Union. That it is a markedly different culture and system society from our own is apparent but to brand it as an "evil empire" or as something aberrant and an economic failure on the point of disintegration is to buck the historic realities. This can only lead to continuing confrontation and ultimate catastrophe for all of us.

Not every one was satisfied by the answers given to many of the questions raised about domestic policies of the Soviet Union. They implied that the motivation for most of these actions was essentially defensive and not expansionist. The point emphasized that the Soviet Union, instead of sending troops into Poland, had at considerable cost to its people, continued to provide oil, natural gas and food to help that country work its way out of its economic collapse; and the Soviet Union had not involved itself in the Persian Gulf situation but was seeking an end to the Iraqi-Iranian conflict; it had not challenged the naval presence of the United States in the Mediterranean, in spite of the Israeli attack on Lebanon; and the Soviet Union was presently proposing better relations with both China and the United States.

In the matter of wages and salaries, jobs and changing jobs, elections, the nature and role of the Communist Party, religious freedom, civil liberties, the Helsinki Accords, the right of emigration and the status of Jews. The answers were not always satisfactory but they were informative because they helped us grasp the fact that people see many of these questions in the different context of a society attempting to organize itself on a group or collective principle, which is very different from our own society. To summarize in a few words the reaction to this whole Volga trip, I would like to quote the words of Howard Melish, who took the same trip last year, and who expresses it so much better than we can...

"The question most frequently asked of those of us who advocate American-Soviet detente, cooperation and friendship is: 'Can we trust the foreign and the Soviets?' We wish that they could see what we have seen on this remarkable trip, because they never again would they ask this question. They would know first-hand that the Soviet people are determined to end the nuclear threat, to moderate the arms race, and to get on with the building of a new society. 'We who have been to the U.S.S.R. can only ask our fellow citizens to think in terms of Soviet self-interest. We saw at Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) how these people suffered from war, and want more of it - either for themselves or any one else. Along the Volga, for more than 1500 miles, we saw new cities rising with enterprises designed to improve the standard of living of their people: kindergartens, schools, hospitals, athletic facilities and

continued



cultural centers. We realized that the arms race is diverting monies to defense that would greatly apply to social advancement.

"Everything we saw indicates that their commitment is to peace, based on national and self-interest. If Americans can understand this basis, perhaps we can begin a fresh approach to the indispensable business of finding common ground for co-existence and individual survival from the threat of mutual destruction."

We would spend our days touring these cities both by bus and on foot and at night would return to our hotel "the Alexander Pushkin." The evening programs would include seminars with Soviet authorities and American peace activists to lead the discussions, with Howard Frazier of Promoting Enduring Peace, as the over-all moderator. The entire group would meet in plenary session on the upper deck and then divide into five sections of approximately 32 each for workshops, moving to the social rooms in various parts of the ship. One of the Soviet specialists and one of the Americans sat in with each workshop in turn, so that everyone had an opportunity to hear and question all the speakers. Bob was asked to be one of the American resource persons for the workshops because of his experience and background as an American lawyer involved with the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy. Without any advance preparation or background material, he was able to very effectively carry out his responsibilities. In fact he was asked to address an audience of some 1000 people at our final large meeting with the Soviet people in Ulyanovsk as spokesman for our cruise. He spoke on the illegality of nuclear weapons under existing

international law and was greeted with thunderous applause of approval. The Boehms were mighty proud that evening.

The Soviet spokesmen were Prof. Zalman Litvin, a senior research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow; Dr. Anatoly I. Utkin, senior research fellow, Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies; Vladimir Semenov, consultant of Soviet Peace Committee for Contacts with Western Europe; Michael Skulenko, Kiev State University, Department of Journalism; Leonid Dobrohotov, Academy of Social Sciences and Central Committee on Developments of Culture.

The American discussion leaders included Howard Frazier, chairman of Promoting Enduring Peace; Yvonne Logan, chairwoman of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; Mark Solomon, professor and head of History Department, Simmons College, Boston; Douglas Mattern, chairperson World Citizens Registry and Robert Boehm, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy. Jim Montavalli, one of our tour members, taped much of the proceedings for WBAI, and two other tour members covered the entire trip for a TV station with a view to making a documentary for showing in the fall.

The Soviet speakers made themselves available at all times and the opportunity to talk informally with them on deck or in the public rooms or over a drink in the bar proved invaluable.

The Volga River proved to be a surprise. Because of two huge hydro-electric power dams just above Volgograd and at Kuibyshev, the river widens into vast and long reservoirs and then again becomes a river with visible banks and sometimes lovely bluffs. In addition, there are many canals connecting different levels of the river and locks are employed so we could see the lowering and raising of the level of the water to let the ship pass through. The heavy river traffic, consisting of tourist liners, hydrofoils, self-propelling and tug-propelled barges laden with all kinds of goods, was fascinating; and it was interesting to see automobile campers setting up their tents and lighting their camp fires on the shore.

The greatest product of this experience was that it helped to humanize a country and a people where we are constantly taught to de-humanize. Here we were seeing and talking with people whose land was devastated and their cities destroyed by Nazis, yet who have not only rebuilt them but

have created entirely new industrial communities designed to serve their entire country.

The Soviet participants made their country's position clear: nuclear warfare would mean universal disaster; there is a rough equivalency in existing destructive capacity, which must never be used; the U.S.S.R. has made a pledge not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons, challenging the U.S. to do the same, which Washington has refused to do. Although they did not say so, it was clear that they hoped the growing American peace movement would alter or at least influence the American political scene for the better. The Russians were asked whether there is a comparable peace movement in the Soviet Union to that in our country. The response was that in the U.S. the peace movement is opposing an administration that is bound by a "cold war ideology" and is against disarmament and against a nuclear freeze, whereas in the Soviet Union the government wants to reduce the nuclear threat - has made innumerable overtures to the U.S. government - and is in favor of a nuclear freeze. We were also informed that the U.S. press or other media has not informed us of the hundreds of peace and anti-nuclear meetings throughout the Soviet Union and that 93,000,000 people in their country have signed petitions for a nuclear freeze. The Soviet people, we were informed, would welcome an end to the present tension and the re-deployment of what they are spending on armaments back to the satisfaction of their many civilian needs, civilian needs.

FRAN and ROBERT BOEHM

## Five Towns couple recalls peace trip to Russia



Fran Boehm (left) at Russian wedding.

# USA-USSR Dialogue — Minneapolis May 24-29, 1983



**A Meeting of Minds for Peace**  
by Alice Z. Frazier

Lou Zemel had a dream — that since Salt II was never consummated and arms negotiations stalled, a kind of non-governmental USA-USSR conference should be held. Representatives from the two superpowers, he thought, would meet unofficially to discuss ways to shift from the false "security" of the arms race to plans assuring not only co-existence, but indeed, existence itself on this planet. Lou Zemel, as a board member, and Howard Frazier, as director on behalf of Promoting Enduring Peace, approached the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington D.C. with this idea since, as a respected leading U.S. "think-tank", they had the expertise and the connections necessary for such an ambitious undertaking. IPS immediately sensed its possibilities and Lou's dream was born into real life.

Next a delegation of ten travelled to the USSR to present this idea to IPS's counterpart think-tank, the Institute for US and Canada Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow. The idea found a receptive audience there and plans for Minneapolis, perhaps the peacemakers' Pugwash, were launched. Unfortunately Lou did not live to see his dream become a reality, but he has, indeed, left a legacy to the cause of peace.

## Who? Where?

Why Minneapolis? Mayor Don Fraser, a most unusual political figure, with vision and courage and one of the original planners, offered his progressive city as the site for the conference. The Sheraton-Ritz provided excellent facilities for meetings and expert simultaneous translations were given over a fine wireless system. It was obvious that much attention had been paid by the conference planners both to its efficient management and to the comfort and pleasure of its delegate guests. Some of the department stores had placards welcoming US-USSR dialogue.

The delegation of 26 Soviets led by Nikolai Blohin, President USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, included researchers from the Institute for US and Canada Studies, World Economics and International Relations, officials of the USA-USSR Society and Cultural Relations with foreign countries. Other members were a Baptist minister, an Eastern Orthodox bishop, a poet laureate, political columnists and commentators, professors, factory managers and workers.

Donald McHenry, former permanent US representative to the UN and Marcus Raskin of the Institute for Policy Studies, were co-chairs of some 40 US delegates. Don Fraser, mayor of Minneapolis, Albert Quie, former governor of Minnesota, Pat Derian, former assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, were among those with governmental background who took part. Academicians included professors of political science, international law and history, university presidents, members of the Institute for Policy Studies, and the Hubert Humphrey Institute. **Peaceroots America** was represented by Randy Forsberg of the Institute for Defense & Disarmament, William Sloan Coffin of the Riverside Church Disarmament Program, Betty Bumpers of Peace Links, Committee for National Security, and Howard Frazier of Promoting Enduring Peace, to name a few. A small number of observers, the author included, occupied seats daily in the back of a very impressive gold damask ballroom where delegates sat in no formal order at tables arranged in a square. Though the mirrors and chandeliers suggested perhaps Versailles or Vienna, thankfully the discussions had a new fresh quality and seemed sincerely directed at finding a common road to world peace.

It would be presumptuous to try to subsume under any one title the variety of approaches suggested of how to get there from here in disarmament. Like a Rorschach test, each participant brought to the table the sum total of his research, education, experience, and most of all, his perception of the situation. When all was said and done, the very sophisticated schemes for halting the arms race seemed to hinge on a very simple factor — trust. It was stimulating and heartening to witness six days of comprehensive, productive and often creative verbal exchange between think-tanks, as opposed to the prospect of nuclear fire from real tanks, designed to kill.

## World Disarmament

Marcus Raskin (IPS), citing the Star Wars scenario of present nuclear war fighting system offered a very imaginative antidotal scheme for an International Disarmament Organization which would render Darth Vader hawks extinct and, over a 15 year period (three 5 year plans) systematically bring about complete world disarmament through a true "build-down" concept. A master-mix of eclecticism, using the McCloy Zorin agreement, he attempted to resurrect from the UN previous efforts to develop international disarmament organizations and take the most powerful elements previously junked and rejuvenate them. What makes this seem futuristic at first is the inclusion of citizens as well as officials in the disarming process. He points out, in this connection, that present arms control has no independent political energy while the nuclear freeze movement, an existentialist wail which said, "Enough is Enough!", has had mass

support. Nuclear age citizens are less prone to accept the idea that nations are able to offer security either to their citizens or to their allies. Raskin's 48 page document delineates a step by step process which, through making all nations a party to the disarmament treaty, safeguards at each step the security of the signatories through a true peacekeeping force and deals with a systematic disposal of arsenals, the halting of research, development and production of weaponry and carriers. The plan utilizes a Board of Inquiry, the Secretary general of the UN, the UN military staff, a verification agency, in addition to non-governmental organizations, scientists, educators to help monitor non-compliance and to educate for the successful outcome of the plan. Each nation would be assessed for the work of the IDO and excess monies would be funneled to developing nations.

Professor Louis Sohn, professor emeritus Harvard Law School, and expert in international law recounted in his paper the United Nation's attempts to formulate peacekeeping rules and made suggestions for restoring confidence in their ability to maintain peace. Disarmament measures must, he contended, be broadened to include peacekeeping, peaceful settlement and a disarmament agency. The future, asserted Sohn, belongs not to the timid, but to those who are willing to venture more to gain more. This statement drew a round of applause from all present.

## Europe — Disengagement and Nuclear Free Zones

Robert Borosage, IPS director, cited the grisly contradictions of deterrence in Europe where defense of allies is promised by preparation for a war which would insure their destruction. He first painted the dark side . . . 1500 nuclear warheads nearly 75 percent of the global military budget expended yearly by the two superpowers. Talks in Vienna on mutual force reductions have gone on for ten years, but not one tank or troop has been removed as a result. Borosage was not alone in recognizing that technical arms control has been an integral part of the arms race. He did, however, predict the evolution of a more independent West Europe with a noticeable divide between the political culture of the US and its European allies. This would entail a build-up of conventional forces in Europe and greater strategic self-defense. A delicate and unstable political transition must be made, he asserted; to cross it will require a clear demonstration of who truly wants peace. In an attempt to brighten the picture Borosage recalled Kennan's plan for disengagement (1957) and Polish Adam Rapacki's plan for a nuclear free zone in Central Europe. His suggestion was that by tying short term goals, a freeze on nuclear weapons, conventional arms reductions to a broader objective, an updated Rapacki (or Kennan) plan would attract broad citizen support in both East and

West Europe. His plan includes independent initiatives by the US and USSR to demonstrate their commitment to the process. The US could emulate the Soviets' offer of no first use, withdraw outmoded tactical weaponry in West Germany, announce the postponement of deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles until talks are completed. The Soviets could remove two or more tank divisions from East Germany and, or dismantle SS20's to the level of the French and British.

How would such a plan threaten the US? Expansion of nuclear free zones might be a first step towards European neutralism; disengagement will open political space for far greater independence viz-a-viz the United States. How threaten the USSR? It would increase the political challenge to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe; the USSR would gain greater military security at the price of less political control.

Boris Khalosha, Academy of Science Researcher, listed past initiatives of the USSR; the proposal made to the General European Conference 1) not to be the first to use against each other nuclear or conventional weapons, 2) not to widen existing military blocs and not to create new military blocs, 3) to reduce military activities to NATO and WTO, and 4) to create nuclear free zones in various regions of Europe. He recalled the negative response given to "no first strike" as well as other initiatives, including the Swedish plan to create in Europe a zone free from battlefield nuclear weapons. Khalosha stressed the importance of a proposal to convene a general European conference on confidence building measures, security and disarmament in Europe and the need for adopting effective measures to lessen the distrust between NATO and WTO participants. He reminded the group of the Prague Political Declaration in which a treaty on non-use of military force was proposed. He then asked, "What is the alternative proposed by the West?" The no first strike concept provoked a variety of reactions. Peter Weiss, a lawyer, advanced the idea that if both parties agreed to a no first use policy, people would begin to ask what are we building all this for — if we're not going to use them? Good question. Grossman, Council for a Liveable World added that besides the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and India have declared no first use also.

#### Arms Control?

Considerable frustration was evidenced on both sides at the current impasse in negotiations. At one point William Sloan Coffin cried out half jokingly, "You guys have got to do something! Make a move! We can't do anything with Reagan!"

General Milshtein, a Soviet delegate asserted American proposals are aimed at breaking the existing strategic parity and achieving unilateral military advantages. The Soviet Union, he said, proposed to cut its strategic forces by more than 25 percent, and to freeze strategic weapons of the two sides during talks, but the Reagan administration is more interested in building up their nuclear weapons than limiting them or reducing them.

Commenting on the present course of official US-USSR talks, Genrikh Trofimchenko, US and Canada Institute, said that the US was trying to achieve superiority either through negotiation or a new generation of the arms race. He agreed with several American speakers on the importance of mutual trust and suggested that trust could be promoted by treaties, but more so by the behavior of the signatories to the agreements.

#### Trust

Randy Forsberg, of the Institute for Defense & Disarmament, pointed out that if we had successful arms control measures this would create trust, the kind of communication which has to precede a really deep understanding of human rights differences. Too often, she said, true human rights issues are just a series of accusations, a list of violations hurled at each other. Any sincere attempt should, she insisted, be serious discussions of what human rights are, as seen by all involved.

Matveev, political columnist, *Izvestiya*, added that human rights issues are often used as an ideological club by the US to halt negotiations. Emphasizing human rights didn't help matters in the last few years: we must emphasize the nuclear danger, he said.

Gerasimov, also a political columnist for *Novosti* press, said that arms control is becoming a vehicle for the arms race. We're not saying that unless you treat your illegals from south of the border better we're not going to talk to you. Human rights cannot blossom under supply-side economics.

Ruth Adams, editor of *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, thought that we no longer control arms — the arms race controls us.

Seymour Melman, of Columbia University, took issue with the underlying assumption of arms control that by regulation of military force, we can limit danger. Ideas about deterrence, he maintained, are dead-ended. The difference between weapons is less and less meaningful. Negotiations are merely agreed escalation of the arms race. Reversal of the arms race is the only remaining military strategy. We need, he asserted, to ask a new question. How can we improve conditions by the reversal of the arms race? His final statement echoed the thinking of many. We need a new perception, freeing the mind.

#### Third World Conflicts — Conventional Arms

Michael Klare (IPS) constantly emphasized the growing risk of convergence; a future conventional conflict in the third world will escalate into a major regional conflagration, pulling in one or both superpowers, igniting a thermonuclear war. Conflicts of this kind, ie: Afghanistan, Central America, are becoming the rationale for the arms race. Now with the new generation of nuclear weapons, ie: small, portable neutron bombs, the firebreak between conventional and nuclear weaponry is erased, making escalation across that critical divide easier to justify in a wartime situation. He quoted this dire prediction of our own Department of

Defense: "The environment of future warfare is likely to differ greatly from any we have known in the past. Combat against well-armed adversaries will be of higher intensity and duration, and... feature intensive electronic warfare and possibly chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons." Therefore Klare argues that efforts to control the nuclear arms race will ultimately prove futile unless accompanied by efforts to reduce the other non-nuclear arms race. He made the following suggestions:

1. Conventional force reductions in Europe (Vienna Talks).

2. Conventional arms transfer limitations, reconvene conventional arms talks (CCAT).

3. Superpower non-interventionism in third world countries, establishment of non-intervention zones (Middle East, Northwest Asia, Southern Africa.)

4. Naval reductions and crisis disengagement, limits on classes of warships, recognitions of "oceans of peace" where combat vessels are barred, disengagement agreements — navies move apart in a crisis to avoid unintended confrontation.

Dr. Nodari Simoniya, history professor of Oriental Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, summarized the growth of the US sphere of activities after WWII, storage facilities for "emergency periods" in developing countries, the increasing rapid deployment forces, Cencom, and the development in the late 70's and early 80's of the mini arms race. He pointed out that the US and their main allies account for not less than 2/3 of the world export of armaments. This proliferation of the arms race destabilizes the situation at the region and inter-state levels, compelling genuinely non-aligned and peace-loving countries to redistribute their resources, scarce as they are, to the reinforcement of their defensive capacity. This leads to a further decrease in the rates of growth in developing countries, deteriorates their export capabilities, and promotes an increase in state deficits. It undermines the possibility of creating a new international economic order and in the long run, he asserted, is conducive to deepening contradictions between the West and developing countries.

Randy Forsberg contended that the purpose of the ongoing nuclear arms race is, from the point of view of the United States, to give the US greater freedom to intervene in developing countries without risking a conventional challenge on the part of the Soviet Union and to inhibit Soviet conventional intervention. From the point of view of the USSR, the purpose of trying to match US nuclear developments is to nullify the nuclear factor in global power politics. Salt negotiations, she asserted, have been directed at managing an ongoing arms race. Room was made in the Salt II treaty for the US to acquire the counterforce MX missile. Forsberg insisted that we should be working hard and consistently to avoid any interventionary use of US military forces. We should be working to develop international standards, codes of behavior that are held up clearly to superpowers, to the developing

countries and to other industrialized countries that absolutely forbid such uses of military force. She re-emphasized Klare's point that what drives the arms race is, ultimately, the continued aggressive potential and use of conventional force on the two sides.

In his presentation, Richard Barnett stated that the most important function of disarmament is political communication. Disarmament cannot be achieved unless its primary function is seen as building trust. To maintain the political climate to keep the arms race going requires painting the adversary as so threatening and so evil that political support for even such limited agreements cannot be maintained. He then commented that the Superpowers are lacking models of behavior appropriate to the nuclear age, continuing old historical patterns. Einstein really said it all — with the splitting of the atom everything has changed save man's thinking . . .

Ruth Adams of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, said there is one thing greater than nuclear weapons, and arms control — it is our fear of each other. This thread of trust, perception, fear, and imagery seems an integral part of the fabric of any agreement or discussion of such. Surely attention to the affective side was seen by the conference members as a basic need. Toward the end of the conference, the group broke up into four sections: Trust/Perception, Conventional Disarmament, Comprehensive Nuclear Disarmament, and NATO/Warsaw Pact Alliance. Given a choice, a large number chose the Trust section.

#### Trust/Perception Workshop

Bishop Paul Moore echoed earlier sentiment expressed by Rev. William Sloan Coffin when he said it's almost impossible to raise the question of human rights without being self-righteous. Moore said that distrust goes up and down. We preach at each other. We need to have a deep conviction of what we're doing rather than self-righteousness. Moore went on to say that we need a balance between decent patriotism and chauvinism. He mentioned an instance where missiles on a chart were colored white if American, and gray if Russian, suggesting the white cowboy hat as good guys, and that black cowboy hat as bad guys syndrome. Human rights, said Moore, is not an isolated good — peace activists and human rights activists should work together. The will to disarm is more important than the number of weapons.

Turkatenko, of monthly USA, asserted that we need trust based upon knowledge, the public should not be manipulated by the mass media. He pointed out that it would be impossible in the USSR to show a movie with a scenario between the US and the USSR. We would consider it to be war propaganda.

Betty Bumpers, of Peace Links, declared that fighting is no longer a viable option to conflict. She continued by saying that women will find a way to influence our government. Those in government will keep from co-extinction.

Roger Wilkins, former member of the New York Times and Washington Post, emphasized the necessity for more free-

dom to operate for journalists on both sides.

Matveev of Izvestiya, stressed the importance of spreading the idea that there are no good weapons. He pointed out that at the 26th Congress of the Supreme Soviet, the conclusion was that the enemy is not the United States: the enemy is the weapons themselves. He quoted Baruch, "in order to deprive the military of its main motive, we should deprive it of profit."

Like two-headed Janus, the author looks back at the conference and ahead to what's next for USA-USSR Dialogue.

Peace is a process. The conference was certainly that. It was an energizing, educating, socializing process, with those who had more to offer of any aspect, freely sharing it with other participants. At times all seemed in touch with some "Other" dimension that transcended politics, war-fighting systems, and national and ideological boundaries (ie: our common humanity).

Touching moments: the day the Eastern Orthodox Bishop appeared at the author's door with a lovely carved bird (not knowing that she had 20 birds on her mantelpiece at home.) Tuned in? The morning the poet laureate of the USSR presented the author with golden Azerbaijanian slippers, a perfect fit! Cinderella? The time Burlatsky, the Soviet writer, shared with conferees a poignant conversation with his young son about whether he would survive a nuclear attack on the USSR and Roger Wilkins responded with a vignette of almost identical fears voiced by his son in Washington, D.C.

About laughs: the story about a very charming Soviet delegate dining at the home of a prominent wealthy family in Minneapolis and, proposing a toast to his hosts, prefaced it with, "Well I wouldn't call this (maids etc.) exactly grass-roots America!"

About Tears: A very sweet quiet member of the Soviet delegation, a woman factory worker, told us in a soft voice of her war experiences in Leningrad; nary a dry eye in the crowd when she finished, including one reporter previously not sympathetic to the thrust of the conference.

Gestures of friendship: the wonderful reception and dinner hosted at Minnesota's impressive capitol by Governor Perpich and legislators both Republican and Democrat.

Of ice cream cones and roses: Howard Frazier told of seeking a taxi unsuccessfully on a rainy day in Leningrad when two Russian youths came along in a car, and not only took him to his destination, but waited for him and returned him to his hotel. They also insisted on buying him an ice cream cone, to boot. A Russian participant shared his experience in a Minneapolis flower shop where he went to buy roses for his dinner hostess and was told to accept them as a token of American friendship by the shop owner. In international relations, all agreed, little things mean a lot.

Pioneer Press summed up very well his impressions toward the conclusion of the conference "Both the Soviets and the Americans get such a steady supply of misinformation about each other." He further stated, "on the scale of megabucks and megarubles being sluiced into defense budgets, that it would be peanuts monetarily to arrange a broad scale swap of, say 10,000 or so citizens a year from all walks of life. It (cultural exchange) would, however, tend to sweep away the dangerous overburden of myths and misinformation which are so valuable to rabble rousers on both sides. And in time, he concluded, Americans and Soviets could do their disagreeing without interpreters. And, we would hope they could keep on disagreeing and have a future to disagree about."

At week's end, a joint statement summarized the areas of concern and announced that USA-USSR Dialogue would be a continuing process where some members of the conference would pursue ideas put forward in Minneapolis, but the scene will now shift to Moscow in early 1984.

This author had a sense of having taken part in a historic event. Surely it was a giant step down the road of reconciliation and understanding that leads to a lasting peace. It was a tribute to Lou Zemel's great vision and, somehow, many of us felt his presence all along the way.

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#### EDITORS NOTE:

Alice Z. Frazier, Author of this report is the wife of Howard Frazier who is the executive Director of Promoting Enduring Peace, Box 5103 Woodmont, Conn. 06460. He is a good friend of the Farm News editor and a few years ago he wrote a series of articles entitled, "Whats Happening to our Country?" which were carried in Farm News. He also addressed an Annual Convention of the Farmers Association in Des Moines a few years ago.

Both Fraziers are dedicated peace workers and this article will bring Farm News readers up to date on the latest, effective action for world peace.





DUNCAN R TAYLOR  
1239 MAJOR ST  
OTTAWA ONTARIO  
K2C 2S3

TEL-225-6606

Dear Mr Angus:

Jan 17/89

This is simply to support you  
in your endeavours for peace,  
and to let you know that there are  
others who support your views.  
Further, as I have learned that  
you are involved in teaching "Family  
Studies", I am improving upon  
your position by sending you a  
copy of a Proposal for Peace. I  
have sent a number out to various  
politicians & papers but, have had  
no response as yet. However, I  
remain hopeful that someone in  
authority will see the light.

If you choose to use this paper  
as a discussion point in any of your  
groups (students or teachers) I should  
be pleased to know the reaction. In  
the meantime, all the best to you  
in your endeavours.

Yours sincerely,

Duncan R Taylor

(P.S. I retired from Canada's Fgn. Service  
at the end of 80) &

PROPOSAL FOR PERMANENT PEACE

BY D.R.TAYLOR

Notwithstanding any action by other parties, the fact remains that the key 'players' in the search for peace are the leaders of the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. It is obvious, too, that the nuclear threat is the greatest concern in today's world, over-riding the fear of famine, flood, pestilence or any other single man-made problem. After all, what does it matter if the world "economy" were to reach its greatest peak in history, but we continue on the nuclear course of world annihilation?

It is my sincere hope, as it is of all others, that my children and my grandchildren should never know the horrors of even a "conventional" war. With all the recent concern about the showing of "The Day After" (which I did not watch, as I was involved enough in W.W.Two to realize I don't need to be hit on the head with a sledge-hammer to know that it hurts) my thoughts have been very much on the question of how the nations of the world might not only "temper the arms race" but also insert into their negotiations some physical guarantee (or bond) that their country would not be the first to launch a nuclear weapon. Listening to the discussions about "The Day After", a thought occurred to me which at first might appear to be "The Impossible Dream" but which, given considerable thought, now seems to be totally realistic and at least a stepping-stone to world peace, not just for a few short years but, if followed through, might go on for a long, long time (perhaps forever).

My feelings were strengthened when I read an article in the Nov.24 Ottawa Citizen. Written by Anthony Lewis of the New York Times and titled "Tensions Must Drop to Ensure Survival", it read in part as follows:

"In a great speech two years ago at Dartmouth College, George Kennan said that the United States would not deal successfully with the Soviet Union until we were less "Childish...until we consent to see there another great people in all its complexity and variety, embracing the good with the bad.....people whose life, whose views, whose habits, whose fears and aspirations, whose

successes and failures are the products, just as ours are, not of any inherent iniquity but of the relentless discipline of history, tradition and national experience".

Lewis goes on to say : " In short, an American president trying to deal with the Russians on the issues of life and death would not have to accept their system. But he would have to accept their common humanity and their common interest in peace. He could say something like this in a speech:

" No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans we find Communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements..

" Both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avoid those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy...or of a collective death-wish for the world".

Lewis ended by saying: " President Kennedy said that at American University on June 10, 1963. His speech evoked a real response from the Soviet Union and it touched the pent-up desire for peace in Americans. Those possibilities are still there".

Reading Lewis's comments confirmed in my mind that others may be thinking along lines similar to my own but his use of the word "childish" (quoting Kennan's speech) "hit the nail on the head" and drove it a little deeper into mine.

This nuclear matter is one which is very much in the minds of our youngsters today. Some are scared out of their wits at the prospect of "not seeing tomorrow" but most appear to be concerned enough to want to do something about it (in a positive way, not a destructive one). Our

children are our greatest asset and, naturally, they are the ones who have to deal with whatever assets and liabilities we leave them. Children's bias is not passed on by the 'genes' (at least in my opinion ) but is derived from the attitudes and actions of their parents. I think that all one has to do to prove that is to observe children in a kindergarten, where there is normally no indication whatever of racial, religious or colour discrimination.

My thought is this:- we have under our control today, in every country in the world, weapons much more sophisticated than the nuclear bomb. Why don't we, in the so-called West-block nations, come to agreement with the East-block nations to turn loose equal numbers of those weapons at the same time, under the same conditions and with the full agreement that new releases would be made each year thereafter ? In the cases of the United States and the U.S.S.R., I suggest the minimum should in the beginning number not less than 100,000 from each side, with numbers proportionate to their populations also to be released by each of the other nations in the West and East blocks. The "weapons" of which I write are teenagers between the ages of thirteen and fifteen years. ~~These~~ The "release" would be in respect of the greatest "student exchange" program ever conducted. I suggest the ages of thirteen to fifteen because these young people's minds and attitudes would not be "fixed in cement" but their basic principles and loyalties will have been established (if their parents have done their jobs). I also suggest that the period of stay should be two years, with the numbers released each year to remain at least constant, if not on an increasing scale, so that there would always be some "experienced" ones on hand to guide the newcomers.

Such exchanges would do wonders for the real "education" (in contrast to "schooling") of these youngsters, in both directions; in substance, they would be getting first hand and therefore (hopefully) unbiased opinions of their counterparts. Just imagine the spread across the world of international understanding. Has it not been said that to know your neighbour is to understand him ? I suggest that the period of stay be two years, as one year may



be just enough, in some cases, for the youngsters to get to know the areas in which they will be residing, as well as for the "barriers" to be broken down among the members of the families involved. Preferably they should stay with the same family for the agreed period, thus establishing lasting relationships. In substance, they would become surrogate sons, daughters, brothers and sisters of the members of the host families. The countries to which the youngsters would be destined should be delegated appropriate proportions of the totals involved, so that not all Russian children would come to the U.S.A., nor would all of any West-block country's children go to Russia. As a result, all the children involved should gain knowledge of different countries and different areas of those countries, by sharing experiences with the other children from their own countries. In that respect, proportions might even be allocated from the larger communities on either side.

Let's not sell our children short. These youngsters are far smarter (and far more concerned) than we are prepared to admit. We all know of families who have for generations made it a practice to send their children off to private boarding schools and who may see little of the children during their whole school careers. Why then should we be reluctant to "slacken the reins" on our children for two years ? When the goal is world peace and understanding why would we hesitate?

A far-out proposal, you say. I agree, but not nearly as far out as nuclear bombs would put all of us. In my optimistic view, such a program would merit, and probably get, world-wide support, as it should make for better understanding of others all over the globe. What would it really matter if the children concerned learned only the language and the customs of their hosts? A two-year "sabbatical" from the normal school subjects might just help students of this age group, just as a long-distance runner changes his pace when he starts up a long hill and then again changes 'gear' when he has crested the hill. So what if they are nineteen or even twenty years of age when they have finished secondary school? ( That might even help the unemployment statistics). They will have had an experience which

5/which

will, or at least should, serve them in good stead for the rest of their  
life .

I had thought at first that a massive program of "support by donations" might be initiated, with the donors being allowed to deduct the full amount of their donations from income for tax purposes. However, I have changed my mind, for there would be little or no need to continue the production of weapons of destruction and those funds could simply be diverted for such purposes of peace as this could become.

Naturally, a number of questions arise. Among the basic ones are the following:

- (1) How would ~~the~~ children be chosen? Preferably they should be volunteers, with both the consent and the approval of their parents. They might also be recommended by teachers as being suitable candidates, on the basis of knowledge, maturity and common (or is it now uncommon?) sense.
- (2) Would they be cut off from their own countries during their stay abroad? I suggest that each child be registered with the nearest Embassy or Consulate representing his/her country. In addition, they should have the name, address and telephone number of an appropriate member of the embassy staff, as a point of (national) contact when needed or desired.
- (3) What about living costs? The children should, as much as possible, be placed with families of similar social status. Those families would undertake to deal with the "guest" child as they would with their own (except, perhaps, in the matter of politics, although that might be used as part of the education process as well). Those "host" families would, preferably, have children of their own involved in the program. Children of members of the governments involved should be encouraged to ~~take~~ part in the program. That would be the next best thing to having the members themselves on the firing line in the

6/the

event of a war.

- (4) Transportation costs? To, from and within the host country, these should be met from the established funds which, if necessary, could be aided by donations as mentioned above.
- (5) What are the risks involved? No matter what the age group, there is always the chance that a child's opinion will change (on any number of subjects) as the result of personal experience. Doesn't a child's opinion change anyway, during the early teens? In any event, it should be borne in mind that their children would be subjected to the same influences from our side of the fence. In my opinion, the odds would be in our favour.

That, then, is a rough sketch of what has been (and is) in my mind. Idealistic? Perhaps, but if one has no ideals, why bother to breathe? The more I think about it, the more I am convinced that we must come up with some such plan for continuing peace. I believe that this plan would work. Why? Because I do not think that any government in the world would dare to "push the button" to rain death on their own children. That is, of course, unless they had the death-wish referred to by President Kennedy. Surely mankind has not yet reached that stage. I suggest that we stop "clutching at straws" for rescue and, instead, turn our attention to a realistic program for the benefit of all mankind.

I will end this epistle by saying that I have long been suspicious of the Russians. While serving abroad, I had a personal experience which led me to think that they are a devious people. Having said that, and admitting that the incident might have been coincidental, I think that we must learn to put aside our personal feelings about them and at least give them the opportunity to show their reaction to a proposal of this nature or any other which will give the world a chance for survival.



## Centre for International Studies

University of Toronto

9 February 1984

*File*

Mr. L.A. Delvoie  
Director General  
International Security and Arms Control Bureau (IDD)  
Department of External Affairs  
Lester B. Pearson Building  
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2

Dear Mr. Delvoie,

I'm delighted that we have been able to schedule your visit to the University of Toronto for Monday 20 February. I enclose copies of the notices which have been sent out for the seminar (which you will note I have scheduled for 2:00 rather than 3:00 pm) and for the dinner. We can sit at the table after dinner and continue the discussion until we exhaust you or you have to leave for the airport -- whichever comes earlier! When you have your travel plans arranged, please let me know. If you arrive in time for lunch I would be glad if you could join me. Otherwise, I suggest that we meet in my office a few minutes before 2:00 and go along the corridor to the Board Room together.

Yours sincerely,


ROBERT SPENCER,  
Director.

RAS/pmj

Encl.

c.c.: Mr. R.P. Cameron





## Centre for International Studies

University of Toronto

9 February 1984

Dear

Mr. Louis Delvoie, the Director General of the International Security and Arms Control Bureau of the Department of External Affairs has now agreed to visit the University to speak to an off-the-record seminar (as you will see from the enclosed notice) on the prime minister's peace initiative on Monday 20 February, 2:00 to 4:00 pm in the Board Room, Trinity College.

You are of course cordially invited to attend this seminar.

I should also like to invite you to join a small group for dinner in the Small Dining Room, Trinity College, at 6:30 for 7:00 the same evening. At the dinner, and in an informal session after it, Mr. Delvoie has agreed to discuss two topics with us: our projected conference on Canada and International Security Institutions scheduled for 14-15 June; and University research in international security and arms control which might be of interest to the Department of External Affairs, and the prospects for the Centre's involvement in such research.

I hope very much that you can attend the dinner (and the afternoon seminar). Please let us know by noon Friday 17 February.

Yours sincerely,

ROBERT SPENCER,  
Director.

RAS/pmj

Att.



## Centre for International Studies

University of Toronto

9 February 1984

Dear

I am pleased to invite you to a special off-the-record seminar on:

The Prime Minister's Peace Initiative: Problems and Prospects

Speaker: Mr. Louis Delvoie  
Director General International Security and Arms Control Bureau,  
Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

Time: 2:00 pm

Date: Monday 20 February 1984

Place: Board Room, Trinity College

Mr. Delvoie was the chairman of the task force which prepared the prime minister's initiative, and he has accompanied the prime minister on some of his travels and was part of the Canadian delegation to the ministerial sessions of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which opened in Stockholm on 16 January.

Yours sincerely,

ROBERT SPENCER,  
Director.

RAS/pmj



IDR/P.E. Barton/2-9263/ac

TO/A IDD (through Mr. Francis)

FROM/DE • IDR

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • 167th PJBD - Colorado Springs, Colorado  
SUJET March 6-9, 1984

Security/Sécurité
SECRET
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
February 9, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDR-0484

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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DIARY  
WF

I attach a memorandum from the Canadian Military Secretary Lieutenant-Colonel R.C. Conn outlining the Canadian section meetings which will take place in preparation for the 167th PJBD. After the second meeting on Wednesday, February 22, 1984, I will be able to brief you more fully on travel arrangement details, costs, dress and other pertinent matters.

2. As you know, we have a problem over the chairmanship. Mr. Francis will be telephoning his contact in the Prime Minister's Office on or about February 16 for an update. At that time we would have to press for a decision as to whether Mr. Hees should be asked to chair one last meeting, whether a senior official might be asked to serve as one-time chairman, or whether the new chairman will be designated sufficiently in advance to enable the formalities to take place (a letter from Prime Minister Trudeau to President Reagan introducing the new chairman) in time for the upcoming 167th PJBD.

3. My American counterpart has advised me that the United States delegation would very much appreciate a situation report/update on Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative for peace. I appreciate that this is a subject that would require updating right up to the last moment. Nevertheless, I would be grateful if you could provide me, by close of work Friday, February 17, with a point-form outline of the elements of the initiative which you would like to see stressed in the portion of the opening statement to be devoted to the Prime Minister's initiative.

4. I attach a preliminary program, a list of participants and a provisional agenda as discussed at the first preparatory meeting held on February 2, 1984.

P.E. Barton  
Defence Relations Division


x Anne Brumette, PCO

Canada

United States of America

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE  
COMMISSION MIXTE PERMANENTE DE DÉFENSE

Canadian Section Canadienne



1150-110/P2 (Mil Sec)

National Defence Headquarters  
Ottawa, Canada  
K1A OK2

26 January 1984

Distribution List

CANADIAN SECTION MEETINGS  
167TH PJBD

1. The 167th Meeting of PJBD will be held during the period 6 to 9 March, 1984 at Colorado Springs, Colorado. Meetings of the Canadian Section of PJBD in preparation for the March meeting have been scheduled as follows:

a. First Section Meeting

- (1) Thursday, 2 February, 1984, 1000 hours.
- (2) ADM(Pol) Conference Room, 12th Floor  
Centre Block North, National Defence  
Headquarters, 101 Colonel By Drive.
- (3) Chaired by Military Secretary.
- (4) Assistant Members and Advisers to attend.

b. Second Section Meeting

- (1) Wednesday, 22 February, 1984, 1000 hours.
- (2) Conference Room A, 13th Floor North Tower,  
National Defence Headquarters, 101  
Colonel By Drive.
- (3) Chaired by External Affairs Member,  
Mr. L.A. Delvoie.
- (4) Members, Assistant Members and Advisers  
to attend.

c. Third Section Meeting

- (1) Friday, 2 March, 1984, 1000 hours.
- (2) Conference Room B, 13th Floor South Tower,  
National Defence Headquarters, 101 Colonel  
By Drive.
- (3) Chaired by the Canadian Chairman.
- (4) Members, Assistant Members and Advisers  
to attend.



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2. Meetings of the U.S. Section are currently scheduled to take place on 1 and 22 February, and 2 March, 1984.



R.C. Conn  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Military Secretary

DISTRIBUTION LIST

External

DEA - Mr. L.A. Delvoie  
~~DEA - Mr. R.E. Barton~~  
DEA - Mr. J.C. Bradford

Internal

Assoc ADM(Pol)  
CMDO  
CLDO  
CADO  
DAP  
DMOPR  
DLO  
ADM(Pol) Secrétariat - WO Lessard

30 Jan 84

167TH PJBD

1ST CANADIAN SECTION MEETING

STATUS OF AGENDA ITEMS AND BACKGROUND PAPERS

- NOTES:
1. Background Papers and Item Statements should be submitted to the Military Secretary not later than 17 Feb 84.
  2. Sub-topics listed are those discussed during the 166th Meeting; whether they should be included for the 167th Meeting is at the discretion of Members.
  3. Suggestions for new Agenda Items should be communicated to the Military Secretary as soon as possible.
  4. Background Notes should be prepared for all Agenda Items and sub-topics, except Secretarial Notes.

<u>Agenda Item</u>	<u>Topic</u>	<u>Sub-Topic</u>	<u>OPI</u>
-	Introductory Remarks	TBA	Sec
1.	Personnel Changes	US Mr. JM Medas - State Dept Member  Replacement TBA for Commodore Carlson, who has been re- assigned  <u>CDA</u>  Nil.	Mil Sec
2.	Defence Programs General	US <u>Navy:</u> - Strait of Juan de Fuca - Port Security Vulnerability Study - Argentia North Side Properties  <u>Army:</u> - REFORGER 83 - AHUAS TARA II  <u>AF:</u> - ALCM Program	

- 2 -

<u>Agenda Item</u>	<u>Topic</u>	<u>Sub-Topic</u>	<u>OPI</u>
		<u>CDA</u> <u>Navy</u> : - Strait of Juan de Fuca - Port Security - Vulnerability Study - Towed Array Tactics - Port Visits - CASAP - CPF	CMDO
		<u>Army</u> : - Small Unit Exchanges - RV-83 NATO Army Try in Cda	CLDO
		<u>AF</u> : - CF-18 Program - Exercises - Information Exchange, NOFORN	CADO
		<u>Policy</u> - 1965 Consultation Agreement	Assoc ADM(Pol)
3.	Air Defence Programs	<u>US</u> - NWS Program - OTH-B - AWACS - ATWC	
		<u>CDA</u> - NWS - OTH-B - CADIN/Pinetree - SDA 2000 - MILSTAR - Joint R&D	CADO
4.	Sharing North American Air Defence Responsibilities	<i>Burkeard</i>	Assoc ADM(Pol)
5.	Defence Economic Cooperation		Mr. Bradford
6.	DOD Use of Canadian Test Sites		Assoc ADM(Pol)
7.	Goose Bay		CADO
8.	US Personnel In Canada		Assoc ADM(Pol)

- 3 -

<u>Agenda Item</u>	<u>Topic</u>	<u>Sub-Topic</u>	<u>OPI</u>
9.	Secretarial Notes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Strategic Petroleum Reserves</li><li>- Undersea Surveillance</li><li>- Anti-Armour Systems</li><li>- Rapid Reinforcement of NATO</li><li>- Maritime Planning for the Pacific Area</li><li>- Electronic Warfare</li><li>- Chemical Warfare</li><li>- Integrated Lines of Communication</li></ul>	

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

ATTENDEES

167TH MEETING, COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO

6-9 MARCH, 1984

CANADIAN SECTION

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External Affairs Member

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ADM(Pol) and Military  
Coordinating Member

Rear Admiral S.W. Riddell  
Navy Member

Major-General G.H.J. Lessard  
Army Member

Major-General L.A. Ashley  
Air Force Member

Captain (N) J.G. Comeau  
Assistant Navy Member

Colonel J.E.L. Gollner  
Assistant Army Member

Colonel G.E.C. McArthur  
Assistant Air Force Member

Mr. P.E. Barton  
External Affairs Secretary

Mr. J.C. Bradford  
Defence Program Bureau  
Adviser

Lieutenant-Colonel R.C. Conn  
Military Secretary

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Air Force and Steering and  
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Brigadier General Anthony A. Smith, USA  
OASD(ISP) Member

TBA  
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Commodore Steele, USN  
Navy Member

Major General Andrew L. Cooley, USA  
Army Member

Captain Willice R. Mullins, USN  
Assistant Navy Member

Colonel Stanley Kwieciak, Jr., USA  
Assistant Army Member

Colonel Peter B. Lane, USAF  
Assistant Air Force Member

Colonel Allan W. Melvin, USAF  
OJCS Adviser

Mr. Robert J. Montgomery  
State Department Secretary

Lieutenant Colonel Roy L. Linder, USAF  
Military Secretary

167th PJBD - 1st Section Meeting

1. Colorado Springs 6-9 Mar 84

2. Travel by COSMOPOLITAN aircraft

ETD OW (tentative) 0815L 6 Mar  
to ADW

ETA Peterson Field 1500L

ETD Peterson Field 0900L 9 Mar  
to ADW

ETA OW 1845-1915

\* - Transportation to AMU: Bus from NDHQ?

Individual Arrangements from wherever?

(transport from AMU to home-staff car as normal)

3. Itinerary: Main Events:

- a. billeted on USAF Academy
- b. Tour of Academy
- c. Lunch with Cadets
- d. NORAD Tour (Cheyenne Mountain)
- e. One evening to be left free

4. Agenda: (handout)

no major changes

\* input to MIL SEC by 17 Feb 84

no need to do backgrounder on "SECRETARIAL NOTES"

5. Personnel Changes:

- \* a. Canadian Chairman
- b. US Navy Member

...2



- 2 -

6. Costs:

- a. Accommodation
- b. Lunch at Academy: \$4.00 per person (out of \$50.00)
- c. Extra assessment of \$50.00 for hospitality suite  
"take home kit" - lunch at Academy

7. Telephone Numbers:

VOQ: Commercial (303) 472-3127

Autovan 136-259-3127

8. Claim:

our practice has been to advise Members that we in  
ADM(Pol) claim accommodation, non-hosted meals,

¢ (for which we do not pay), incidentals

9. Next Section Meeting:

Wednesday 22 Feb 84 1000 hours - Room "A"

MINA (3) IFB GENEV  
MIN IDDZ BNATO  
MINI (2) IDD PRMNY  
PARL SEC IDR LONDON  
USS FILE WASHINGTON  
DMF DIV UGB RBD  
DMT DIARY URR RBR  
FPR IDA (2) RGB RCR  
CPD DNACPOL RGX  
CMRR (2) ADMPOL RSR

MF

O.A. Chistoff  
Arms Control and  
Disarmament Division  
992-5039

CONFIDENTIAL

IDA-0195

February 9, 1984

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister and  
Secretary of State for External Affairs

cc: Minister for External Relations  
cc: Minister for International Trade

SUBJECT: Prime Minister's Initiative: Proposals

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of the reaction of our allies to the Prime Minister's three proposals for restraining strategic technology.

BACKGROUND:

In his November 13 speech, Prime Minister Trudeau announced that Canada would be putting forward in the appropriate disarmament forum and at the appropriate time papers calling for a ban on anti-satellite weapons in outer space, reduced mobility of ICBM's and verification of new strategic weapons systems by national technical means. Subsequently, the Prime Minister announced publicly that the papers would be submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva which began its 1984 session on February 7. (The session is divided into two parts, roughly from February to the end of April and from June to the end of August).

In keeping with normal practice, we distributed the papers in NATO during the last week of January indicating our intention to circulate the papers to CD delegations in Geneva at the beginning of the CD session and soliciting comments from our allies.

So far we have received detailed reactions from only the USA, Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, the FRG, Belgium and Italy. It is clear from the reactions which we have received that our NATO partners do not see the urgency in our presenting the papers to the CD and want time to consult with us. Secondly, although some of our allies question the tactical wisdom of submitting the ASAT proposal to the CD, they do not question the appropriateness of the CD as a forum. Thirdly, they do, however, question the submission of the other two proposals to the CD and, with the

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... exception of the USA and Britain which are strongly opposed to the whole initiative, they generally consider START as the more appropriate forum. Attached is a more detailed summary of the various reactions, the majority of which are essentially tactical or procedural rather than substantive.

The Norwegians and the Dutch have been quickest off the mark in providing reactions. The Norwegians have simply submitted written comments in Brussels while the Dutch not only did the same but also made representations to our Ambassador in the Hague and to the Department in Ottawa at the divisional level. While expressing unease at our intentions regarding these papers, both have generally tried to offer constructive comments in an effort to encourage further consultations. So far, the Germans, Belgians and Italians have not made representations to us. Their written comments have generally been put forward in a constructive vein.

By contrast (and not unexpectedly), the Americans and British have taken a very negative approach in an effort to dissuade us from proceeding with the circulation of these papers in the CD. The Americans have made strong representations to our Ambassador in Washington and have provided written comments. Their Chargé d'Affaires has also made representations to me. The British have raised the question with the High Commission in London and the British High Commissioner has called twice on Mr. Shenstone to make representations.

Our initial response to the British and United States representations (which we have conveyed to our missions abroad) has been that:

- (a) it is still our intention to circulate these papers to CD delegations;
- (b) we are prepared to show some flexibility on timing in order to obtain the detailed comments on our allies; and
- (c) we would not intend to "table" our papers but would circulate them in a form that would take account of the views of our alliance partners.

CONSIDERATIONS:

In light of the reactions of our allies so far, there does not appear to be any overriding reason to depart from the general approach outlined above. In the course of a discussion with Mr. Delvoie on February 8, the Prime Minister agreed to our delaying the circulation of these proposals in Geneva until further consultations had been held with NATO

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allies. Consequently, the section of the Prime Minister's February 9 statement to the House which deals with these papers was drafted to indicate that "Following further consultations with our NATO allies we shall, in the course of the current session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, circulate three proposals to gear down the momentum of new technology".

We think that it is important to proceed seriously with consultations in NATO (and eventually in the Western group in the CD). We would intend to reinforce our NATO delegation with experts during such consultations. As our mission in Geneva has cautioned, we must take into account the effect which presenting these papers could have on the Canadian ability to maintain an effective role vis-à-vis the CD as a whole (as well as within the Western group) should this initiative fail to be correctly understood or, perhaps more seriously, should it be actively and openly opposed by any of our allies.

We think the Belgian comments in relation to the ASAT proposal are also worth considering seriously, that is, that the USA is isolated on the question of outer space and is quite prepared to remain so. It is determined not to agree to anything involving negotiations on this subject. The submission of the Canadian paper now runs the risk of dividing the Western group in the CD. Our primary concern on this issue at the current CD session is to get a Working Group on Outer Space established even if its mandate this year is limited and does not provide for negotiation of a treaty on outer space. We would not wish our ASAT proposal to provide either a distraction from this objective or a pretext for the USA not to agree to the establishment of the working group. A delay in putting forward our paper in the CD while we satisfy the demand of the Americans and our other allies for consultations could, therefore, work to our advantage in the long run if, during that period, the working group issue can be settled.

*Michael Shenstone*

Michael Shenstone  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
Political and International  
Security Affairs

*Signed*

de Montigny Marchand

ANNEX

REACTION OF ALLIES TO  
PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S PROPOSALS  
FOR RESTRAINING STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY

USA

- In general, the USA argued that it had been engaged for 15 years in arms control negotiations with the USSR and sees no merit in putting strategic issues involving the weapons of the USA and USSR into the CD. This is not the appropriate forum for a discussion of these issues (except perhaps ASATS). The documents do not promote balanced, verifiable arms control. They could prove troublesome for years to come. The proposals go to the heart of deterrence. The USA is, therefore, seriously concerned about our intention to bring these proposals to the CD and has strongly urged us to subject them to bilateral and NATO consultations before taking any further action on them. They see no substantive difference between "distributing" and "tabling" these proposals as we have tried to argue.
- ASATS: The USA agreed last year to the formation of an outer space working group provided that its mandate be limited to exclude negotiation. The USA and its allies agreed that Western unity must be preserved on this issue. The Canadian proposal would remove the onus from the USSR for having blocked consensus on this mandate last year and would give them an opportunity to divide the Western group on an issue crucial to Western security. Tabling the proposal at the beginning of the CD session would restrict CD discussions of outer space issues and preclude the achievement of a common Western approach to the issue.
- NTM: This proposal appears unworkable. Its focus on NTM seriously weakens the longstanding Western position that cooperative measures, including on-site inspection, are a necessary component of effective verification. The thrust of the proposal is unrealistic since it fails to recognize that the verifiability of any particular weapon or system can be determined

only in the context of a state's agreed obligations under specific arms control treaty relating to that weapon or system.

- ICBM's: This proposal runs directly counter to the conclusions of the Scowcroft Commission which recommended that mobile basing concepts for ICBM's be developed as one possible approach to enhancing ICBM survivability.

Britain

- ASATS: While there is some sympathy for the inspiration behind the Canadian initiative, the British are dismayed at our intention to raise ASAT in the CD context without having the "agreement" of our American and other NATO allies. This paper is tactically unsound, in their view. It was raising an issue at a time when the USA Administration was not well-disposed to even sensible proposals on arms control in outer space. The Canadian paper could drive the USA to adopt a hard and fast decision to reject limitations. The allies had worked hard to move the USA into a more flexible position on this issue in the CD and it would be in no one's interest to see the USA retrench. The ASAT paper should, therefore, not be circulated in the CD. The British preferred a study group on arms control in outer space. (It should be recalled that the British were the only delegation which abstained at UNGA 38 on a near-unanimous resolution calling on the CD to establish a working group on outer space with a negotiating mandate. The USA was the only delegation to vote against that resolution).

The British are also concerned that the Soviet Union will exploit the Canadian paper to advocate launching negotiations on the basis of the Soviet draft treaty on outer space.

- NTM: The British consider that this paper represents a radical change of policy by placing the onus on a state deploying a strategic system to demonstrate its verifiability to the satisfaction of the other party (as opposed to undertaking not to impede surveillance by NTM). This is contrary to current Western positions. Such



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a proposal shift required consultation within the alliance because of its implications for NATO, both militarily and from the point of view of long term negotiating objectives.

- ICBM'S: This paper is in direct conflict with the strategic doctrine of the Scowcroft Commission report which had suggested moving from large MIRV systems to small mobile single warhead systems. This report had been endorsed by the USA Administration and supported by other allied governments.

In general, the British believe that the introduction of any of the three proposals into the CD would be counter-productive and will only serve to harden USA ideas. The papers should not receive wider international circulation.

- Netherlands - ASATS: The Canadian initiative is welcomed but the Netherlands see no urgency in submitting it to the CD without proper consultations in NATO and the Western group in the CD. It should be considered together with the Netherlands NATO paper on the arms race in outer space. For tactical reasons, it is not wise to propose as an opening bid an ASAT measure limited to high altitudes. The Dutch are also concerned that the submission of such a proposal to the CD at this point could jeopardize or delay the establishment of a working group on outer space in the CD. They are concerned that, as the Canadian proposal excludes from the ban the development, production, possession and destruction of existing systems, it could have a legitimizing effect on ASAT warfare against low-altitude satellites. Considerable technical problems will be created if only high-altitude ASATS are banned e.g. the development of low-altitude ASATS could progress unimpeded and high-altitude ASATS could continue to be tested in low orbits. They believe a total ban on all ASAT warfare is realistic.

NTM and Mobility of ICBM's: These proposals are related to START. In the CD these questions could, at most, be discussed in a general way in the framework of discussions on verification. While the Dutch can

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subscribe to the Canadian point that strategic systems should be open for the monitoring capabilities of the opponent, agreement is required on verification. The Canadian emphasis on verification by National Technical Means (NTM) would give the USSR an argument to resist on-site inspection when the USSR is becoming less reticent about on-site verification. Regarding ICBM's, the Dutch question whether restrictions on mobility are really necessary for adequate verification. A limitation on mobility is not the only feasible way of verification.

Norway

- ASATS: Although a general prohibition of ASAT systems is preferred, the qualitative limitation of the Canadian paper might be a better approach in the present situation. Verification problems are not insurmountable.
- NTM: Verification of arms control agreements through NTM might have positive implications for negotiations of other arms control arrangements. There are, however, some negative aspects of the Canadian proposal: how to ensure that the proposal is implemented; how to deal with the situation where none of the parties can accept the proposals of the other. The proposal would, moreover, be disadvantageous for the party which might be in the process of initiating important modernization programmes of existing forces. To remedy this, the proposal might be enlarged to cover all strategic systems.
- ICBM's: Measures limiting mobility may be positive from the point of view of verification but might recreate many of the problems which a transition to mobile ICBM's aims at solving. The Canadian proposal balances better verification and reduced vulnerability. There is a need for verification of mobile systems. If developments in this field continue without any possibilities for control by the other party, there would be an increase in the arms race without increased security and stability.

FRG

- ASATS: The FRG agrees that a complete ASAT ban is not realistic in view of existing ASAT capabilities in lower orbits. However, the

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ANNEX

Canadian paper should be introduced in the CD only in agreement with the USA.

- NTM: The FRG agrees that verification is important and that NTM are increasingly proving inadequate for verification as new strategic systems are developed. The Germans question where the Canadian proposal that parties should undertake to ensure verification by NTM or alternative means can contribute to practical solutions. Every agreement should specify in very concrete terms how verification is to be operated.
- ICBM's: The Germans agree with the stabilizing effect of less vulnerable ICBM's but in the absence of further Canadian clarifications, they are not convinced about our concern that mobile systems may not be adequately verifiable. A real problem is the reloadability of these systems, as the Canadian paper points out. A solution to this problem will not be facilitated by restrictions on mobility. They advise against putting too much emphasis on the stability-promoting effect of mobility as a basis for arms control considerations.
- ASATS: The Belgians question whether the Canadian initiative is opportune, given the fact that the USA is opposed to any limitation at all on ASATS and is prepared to remain isolated on this subject (with Britain). The Canadian paper will only serve to divide the Western group in the CD where it will have to defend a non-negotiating mandate for a working group on outer space against the Eastern bloc. In view of the fundamental difference of views between the USA and most of its allies, it is better that there should be an in-depth debate on this major issue in NATO.
- NTM and ICBM's: These papers deal with strategic nuclear arms and involve a framework for international agreements which should inspire equally the Americans and the Russians. The Belgians remind Canada about USA sensitivity about equidistancing the two superpowers. They regard the NTM proposal as being more attractive but draw attention to possible controversies over verifiability of

Belgium

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new types of weapons because of the difference between the two superpowers regarding publicity given their defence programmes. The ICBM's paper is more troubling, quite apart from its implications regarding the Scowcroft Commission conclusions. If mobility of ICBM's helps defuse the vulnerability question, why limit it? The Belgians think our reply that mobile weapons are destabilizing because they are difficult to verify is not adequate. They point to the need for carefully controlling areas of non-deployment of such weapons especially in a closed society where possibilities of concealment are greater.

Italy

- ASATS: The Canadian proposal should be taken into due account since the satellites of more vital importance are at higher altitudes and ASATS that have already been tested are only able to operate against satellites in low orbit. A more exhaustive evaluation of the Canadian proposal can only be made after the USA completes its review of the problems inherent in disarmament in outer space.
- NTM: One cannot underestimate the difficulty of reaching an agreement on the verification of new strategic weapons systems that is not related to an agreement on the limitation and the reduction of strategic arms.
- ICBM's: The Italians agree that mobile missiles have a stabilizing effect regarding the strategic balance since they diminish the risks of vulnerability. They have, therefore, some (unspecified) reservations about certain aspects of our proposal and about the effectiveness of the specific proposed modalities for restricting mobility.



TO/À IDDZ

FROM/DE RBD

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Griffiths on the Initiative  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
February 9, 1984
Number/Numéro
RBD0014


ENCLOSURES  
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I attach a paper prepared by Professor Franklyn Griffiths of the University of Toronto, entitled "Following Through on the Peace Initiative". It develops further his counter-cyclical approach to superpower ups and downs and he elaborates on the terms of reference for a Canadian institute for international peace and security.

Frank tells me that he has sent the original to Tom Axworthy.

  
Peter Hancock,  
Director General,  
USSR and Eastern Europe Bureau.

## FOLLOWING THROUGH ON THE PEACE INITIATIVE

In venturing forth with the peace initiative, the Prime Minister has created the elements of a policy that deserves to persist, to grow and to succeed. This brief considers what may be required for success in the long haul.

What's required comes down to two things: a unifying concept to guide and explain Canada's peace effort to others and to Canadians, and the creation of intellectual and institutional resources to sustain Canada's participation in the discussion of international security affairs. //

### Concept

The unifying concept should of course flow from the peace initiative. Of all the things that might have been attempted to strengthen international peace and security, the initiative has rightly centred on American-Soviet relations. The medium of the Prime Minister's venture has been one of technical arms control, but the message has been that a political effort is required at the highest level if the prospects for human survival are to improve. The initiative has above all given priority to the task of getting others, including those in Moscow and Washington, to join together in reversing the trend toward nuclear confrontation and war in American-Soviet relations. //

The current trend is however part of a larger pattern in the dealings of the superpowers. A Canadian peace effort that is good for the long haul will have to address the larger pattern. What's required of us is a counter-cyclical international security



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// policy or a counter-cyclical strategy of peace.

The American-Soviet relationship is cyclical. Since the early 'fifties there have been four superpower detentes -- in 1955, 1959-60, 1963-64 and in 1972-73. Detentes were also attempted in 1968 and 1979. Each of these was marked by an apparent improvement in the outlook for nuclear survival. But each was followed by a return to tension, acrimony and dwindling prospects for restraint and cooperation. Right now, we are on the down side of the curve.

If past performance is a guide, the cycle will turn up again. The outlook will seem to improve, only to be overtaken by yet another bout of contention sooner or later this decade. All the while new and increasingly destabilizing weapons and military doctrines are being brought into use.

As matters stand, the Soviet Union, the United States, and all the rest of us along with them, seem condemned to repeat ourselves in a continuing sequence of ups and downs that could yet yield the greatest downer of all.

If the Americans and Soviets are to do substantially better in lowering the risks of annihilation, they must begin jointly to regulate the cycle in their political relations. They must flatten the curve into a line that inclines gradually upward toward higher levels of cooperation.

The two giants cannot be expected to take the initiative on behalf of a counter-cyclical international security policy. They are too much rivals to lead the way, perhaps even to see what's really happening.

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The Prime Minister's initiative does however begin to show the way. It directly confronts the challenge of getting the superpowers to get a grip on their relationship. It strives for consensus on political action that escapes the confines of the defence-arms control fixation and that starts to create preconditions for mutual reassurance and cooperation between the superpowers.

As well, the initiative as I see it is directed first to the United States and to our West European allies. Its significance is greatest initially in the context of West-West relations, in the modification of American thinking and practice within a common alliance framework. Anything the Soviets and their allies come up with at this stage is likely to be incidental to the main task of altering the direction of American policy. Only later are pronounced counter-cyclical effects likely to be had directly in the domain of American-Soviet relations. We're in for the long haul or not at all. And we're in essentially as an alliance member.

We need a speech from the Prime Minister that presents the fundamental lessons of the past few months and that begins to outline the requirements of a continuing Canadian and international peace effort. The paucity of results from the initiative to date could be turned to advantage in providing the basis for an explanation of the situation we have to deal with. The Prime Minister should also make a point of telling us what we need to know, as well as suggesting what Canada and other countries might do in the long term.

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### Resources

What we need to know about American-Soviet relations should be a primary but not the sole concern of the new institute announced in the speech from the throne.

Call it the Canadian Institute of American-Soviet Relations or the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, the new establishment should be a world-class centre of research and deliberation. To it Americans and Soviets as well as Canadians, Europeans and analysts from the Third World would come to develop new knowledge of the dynamics of superpower relations.

A central task of the Institute should be to explain the pattern of ups and downs in American-Soviet affairs. Given an understanding of the workings of the superpower cycle, the elements of a counter-cyclical strategy could be elaborated to guide the policy of interested states. It should be a foremost purpose of the Institute to break out of the intellectual straightjacket of 1950s national security thinking.

The Institute should accordingly inquire into (1) the effects of mutual perception and misperception, (2) policy-making and its domestic sources in both countries, (3) the influence of one side's actions on the play of political forces within the other, and (4) into the effects of local conflicts and third-party action on bilateral American-Soviet relations. In so doing, it should consider the full range of issues on which the superpowers interact -- trade and technology transfer, scientific and cultural ties, human rights, behaviour in multilateral negotiating fora and so on as well as the more familiar problems of alliance relations, deterrence,

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defence, arms race behaviour and arms control.

Again, the ultimate aim would be to acquire knowledge of the political wave on which the prospects for superpower collaboration ride. Priority should go as well to elucidating the role of Canada in creating preconditions for cumulative American-Soviet cooperation.

Needless to say, there is a risk in going after new knowledge, in setting up an institution to study a relationship on which the government of Canada has not chosen to comment publicly until the peace initiative occurred. There may be a temptation to occupy the Institute with accepted issues, to employ accepted analytical frameworks, to shy away from a central concern with American-Soviet affairs, to address the agenda of the Canadian public and its attentive groups (general disarmament, arms control, defence requirements, nuclear proliferation, arms transfers, etc.). To the extent that the temptation prevails, the promise of the peace initiative will be dissipated.

Aside from sponsoring innovative policy research, the new Institute should strive to create new intellectual resources in the field of international security affairs. The peace initiative has revealed how poorly equipped we are as a country to support an active diplomacy of peace and security.

It should be a major aim of the Institute to create new human resources by furthering graduate and postgraduate study and research in international security affairs and area studies (especially the USSR and Eastern Europe, and American studies). To this end the Institute should administer (1) a national fellowship

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programme and (2) a programme of support for existing research institutions such as the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, DND-created university programmes in military studies, and for the community of Canadians occupied with peace research.

Great care should be taken to further and not to duplicate or compete with, the work done by established bodies. A research focus on American-Soviet relations would have the added advantage of not infringing on the operations of others, there being no body that concentrates on this particular set of problems in Canada or for that matter in the world.

Over and above research and the generation of new intellectual resources, a third mission of the new Institute could be that of public education, information and liaison on the full array of security issues of concern to Canadians. The procedure here, as with existing research centres, should be to support and utilize established national and regional organizations.

Public education at the national level, for example, is a major purpose of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the United Nations Association. These and other such bodies such as the Centre Quebecois des Relations Internationales should be supported and encouraged, not subjected to competition.

As to information, the same organizations and the network of peace and defence associations should be provided with data and funding so as to create the basis for increasingly informed national and regional discussion of international security issues and Canadian security policies. The Institute might well be advised to set up regional libraries and possibly reading rooms in

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large urban centres. A great many people are saying they cannot get the information they want. By making primary documentation and secondary sources more readily available, the Institute could perform a significant public service. The establishment of regional libraries and local reading centres should be considerably more effective than issuing newsletters, factsheets and the like on a national basis.

Where liaison is concerned, the Institute could assume and enlarge upon the functions of the DEA Consultative Committee on disarmament and arms control. It ought to provide, and publicize, annual reports on the peace and security concerns of Canadians to Parliament through the House Standing Committee.

Finally, where the Government itself is concerned, there is a real need (1) to make better use of and (2) to increase the intellectual and bureaucratic resources available to support an active Canadian diplomacy of peace and security.

A compelling case for internal reform has been made in the brief submitted by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, dated January 1984. Little needs to be added to the Centre's submission beyond noting that in the absence of reform, the capacity of the Government to follow up on the peace initiative will surely be compromised. Furthermore, if the policy interests of the peace initiative are not given an institutional basis and political strength within Government, the research, resource-building and public education activities of the new Institute will be diminished in their effectiveness. As well, the ability of the Government to make use of the Institute as a diplomatic instrument would be greatly qualified in the absence of a new agency that



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institutionalizes the commitment of the ad hoc Task Force.

7 Feb 84.



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Subject /Sujet  <b>NUCLEAR WAR / Pm's Peace Initiative</b>		Comments /Commentaires
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Subject / Sujet  <b>NUCLEAR WAR / PM's PEACE INITIATIVE</b>	Comments / Commentaires	

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Réponse pour la signature du ministre
- ☐ Reply for the signature of  
Réponse pour la signature de
- ☐ Reply by division  
Réponse de la direction
- ☒ Note and file  
Noter et mettre au dossier
- ☐ Draft reply to be incorporated in letter by Minister's staff  
Projet de réponse requis pour inclusion dans lettre rédigée par les assistants du Ministre

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
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ENERGY

The whole universe is energy, manifesting itself in many thousands of ways, both on the physical and mental plane.

Humanity is dual in nature, the negative which is the material and physical aspect, and the positive is the spiritual and moral aspect. When we have the negative and positive in balance, then we have peace and harmony, but if we go to the extreme in either direction then we are in deep trouble.

Human history has a tendency to manifest itself in cycles of about three hundred years?

The human endeavour in the past three hundred years has seemed to emphasise the negative, or material side of human nature. Due to the great advances in technology, this has brought about the nuclear age. Because of the threat of a nuclear war, man is now beginning to change his method of thought, away from the negative and towards the positive.

When I attended a conference of the World Association of World Federalists in 1975, and was introduced to Indira Gandhi, she placed her two hands together, and I immediately realized that the source of her political strength over some 800 million people, was spiritual, having a very great psychological effect.

THIS IS  
NORMAL  
SALUTATION  
IN ASIA.

When India negotiated their political independence from Great Britain some years ago, they did so in a climate of goodwill and mutual trust. There was no physical force used in any manner. Rioting in Bombay, Calcutta

Some years later using these same methods pioneered by India, we Canadians attained our political independence.

Irrespective of our political faith or allegiance, we should give credit to Prime Minister Trudeau, in trying to negotiate an end to the arms race between the big powers.

Although I am not a member of his party, in regard to this matter he has my full support, and I wish him the physical and emotional energy that will be needed for success in this effort.

Yours sincerely,

*J. Alex Hyde.*  
Alex Hyde.

J.A. Hyde  
RR #3 Courtenay, B.C.  
V9N 5M8.

**INWARD**235/24  
Copy to R.P. McDougallPER Division  
DEA.to M. Maher  
ETN Division  
DEAto O.A. Christoff  
IDA Division  
DEAO.PK31051 WPOL  
TOR 2119 09.02.84to J. Maclellan  
Task Force (IDDZ)  
DEA

① Mr DeLoe ② Mr Smith ③ Mr [unclear]

Now two Prime Ministers  
have quoted you! See p. 6.5  
JH

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TO PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS OFFICE, PARLIAMENT HOUSE, CANBERRA  
E. AND G.E. - PROOF ONLY.

P.M.: LET ME SAY THAT I FOUND THE TALKS WITH PREMIER ZHAO AS I EXPECTED EXTRAORDINARILY USEFUL AS I FOUND THEM IN CANBERRA. HE IS I BELIEVE AN OUTSTANDING LEADER, ARTICULATE AND COMMUNICATIVE AND ONE WITH WHOM IT IS POSSIBLE TO HAVE VERY USEFUL AND DIRECT INTER-CHANGE OF THOUGHTS. TODAY'S SESSION COVERED INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND AS YOU KNOW TOMORROW WE WILL BE GOING ON TO DISCUSS REGIONAL AND BILATERAL MATTERS.

AT THE OUTSET I CONVEYED TO THE PREMIER BY WAY OF SETTING THE CONTEXT THAT IF YOU LOOK AT AUSTRALIA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE LAST DECADE, PROBABLY THE OUTSTANDING FEATURE OF IT HAS BEEN THE TRANSLATION OF CHINA IN THAT RELATIONSHIP FROM A SYMBOLIC AND

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INWARD

2-0:PK31051

DIVISIVE ISSUE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 70'S TO A POSITION WHERE CHINA IS NOW A MAJOR PARTNER OF AUSTRALIA IN THE ECONOMIC AND TRADING SENSE AND POLITICALLY A COUNTRY WITH WHOM WE SHARE A WIDE NUMBER OF COMMON BASIC PERCEPTIONS.

IN THAT OPENING CONTEXT I TALKED WITH THE PREMIER ABOUT THE FACT THAT SINCE WE LAST MET IN APRIL OF 1983, THE WORLD IS A LESS STABLE AND SECURE PLACE AND THAT THE TENSIONS INVOLVED AND RIVALRY BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS HAS INCREASED AND IS REFLECTED SADLY IN THE SUSPENSION OF THE INF TALKS AND, IN REGARD TO START, NO DATE HAVING BEEN SET FOR THE RESUMPTION. AND I PUT TO THAT PREMIER THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO AUSTRALIA BECAUSE, AS CENTRAL TO OUR POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, IS OUR PURSUIT OF THE ISSUE OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT.

NPT  
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I SPENT A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME ON THIS ISSUE AND SAID THAT OUR CONCERNS WERE IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR TESTING AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. MAY I SAY ON THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING, I CONVEYED TO THE PREMIER OUR STRONG HOPE THAT CHINA WHICH HAS NOW NOT TESTED IN THE ATMOSPHERE SINCE THE LATTER PART OF 1980 WOULD NOT RESUME ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTING.

IN THE AREA OF NON-PROLIFERATION I PUT THE VIEW TO THE PREMIER THAT, WHILE WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAD SOME DIFFERENCES WITH US ON THE QUESTION OF THE NPT, THERE WERE CERTAIN BASIC ISSUES THAT I WANTED TO DE. AND THAT WAS THAT WE UNDERSTOOD AND UNDERSTAND THAT THE LOGICAL BASIS OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE NPT WAS, IF YOU LIKE, THE BARGAIN CONCEPT THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS NOT ENGAGING IN VERTICAL PROLIFERATION THERE WOULD BE AN ACCEPTANCE ON THE PART OF THE OTHER NATIONS OF THE WORLD THAT THEY SHOULD NOT THEMSELVES BECOME INVOLVED IN THE NON-PEACEFUL USE OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR CAPACITY.

HAVING SAID THAT THAT OF COURSE WAS THE CONCEPTUAL LOGICAL BASIS OF THE NPT, I PUT TO THE PREMIER THAT THE FACT THAT, IF YOU LIKE, THE BARGAIN HAD NOT BEEN ADHERED TO BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS AND THAT THEREIN LAY A GREAT RISK TO THE WORLD ... A POSSIBLE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. AND THAT DID NOT OF ITSELF CONSTITUTE ANY REASON LOGICALLY OR ON ANY OTHER GROUNDS FOR NOT BEING CONCERNED WITH THE HORIZONTAL RISK. AND I PUT TO HIM BOTH IN OPENING AND IN LATER STAGES THAT WE HAVE A PERCEPTION THAT IN THE YEARS AHEAD THE RISK TO THE WORLD, POTENTIAL RISK TO THE WORLD, OF THE ACQUISITION AND POTENTIAL USE OF DELIGERENT NUCLEAR CAPACITY IS SOMETHING OF GREAT CONCERN TO US.

THIS DISCUSSION OCCUPIED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TIME IN MY EXPOSITION AND THE PREMIER'S RESPONSE AND LATER A REJINDER OF MINE. BUT I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO SAY, AS I PUT TO THE PREMIER, THAT WE WELCOME THE SIGNS EVIDENT IN RECENT TIME INCLUDING PARTICULARLY OBSERVATIONS MADE BY THE PREMIER IN WASHINGTON AND REPEATED AGAIN IN

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MINIWARD

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DISCUSSIONS WITH ME, SIGNS OF AN INCREASING DEGREE OF CONVERGENCE OF CONCERN BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON THESE ISSUES. AND INDEED WE'VE WELCOMED THE VERY RECENT INDICATIONS WE'VE RECEIVED, JUST WITHIN THE LAST 48 HOURS FROM THE CHINESE DELEGATION ON THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT OF THEIR DESIRE TO CO-OPERATE CLOSELY WITH US IN THAT PARTICULAR FORUM.

I WON'T GO INTO ANY MORE DETAILS ON THAT ... BUT I WANT TO MAKE THE BASIC POINTS TO YOU: FIRSTLY, THAT THE QUESTION OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD OF COURSE, OCCUPIED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF OUR TIME.

AND SECONDLY, THAT WHILE THERE ARE SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US IN THE MECHANICS, IF YOU LIKE, IN THE APPROACH PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO THE SPT WHICH AS YOU KNOW CHINA HAS NOT ADHERED TO - NEVERTHELESS WE WELCOME THE CONVERGENCE OF OBJECTIVES AND THE INCREASING SIGNS OF A CAPACITY FOR CO-OPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA.

FROM THOSE BROAD ISSUES I WENT TO A NUMBER OF PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE. I WELCOMED THE STRENGTHENING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES REFLECTED IN THE RECENT VERY SUCCESSFUL VISIT OF THE PREMIER TO THE UNITED STATES. AND WE WERE GRATEFUL THAT WE WERE ABLE TO PLAY SOME PART FOLLOWING OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PREMIER LAST YEAR IN CONVEYING CERTAIN CONCERNS OF THE CHINESE TO THE UNITED STATES. IN TURN THE PREMIER EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION TO US FOR THAT.

IN THE AREA OF NORTH EAST ASIA WE EXPRESSED TODAY OUR CONCERN THAT I HAVE EXPRESSED IN AUSTRALIA AND EARLIER ON IN THIS VISIT ON THE EXTENSION OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE CAPACITY WITHIN THE REGION AND TARGETTED ON THE REGION. AND I EXPRESSED AGAIN OUR CONCERN THAT THE DISCUSSIONS IN EUROPE IF AND WHEN THEY RESUME IN THE INF AREA WOULD NOT IN ANY SENSE BE SATISFACTORY IF THE SOVIET DEPLOYMENT WERE TO BE CHANGED FROM TARGETTING ON EUROPE TO THIS REGION. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT OF TALKING ABOUT THE ADDED TENSION IN THE REGION OF NORTH EAST ASIA THAT I WENT TO THE QUESTION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA. I EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN TO THE PREMIER THAT THIS REMAINED A POTENTIAL TROUBLE POINT FOR WORLD PEACE. I PUT TO HIM THE REALITIES, THE UNAVOIDABLE REALITIES, THAT THERE ARE TWO GOVERNMENTS, TWO DISTINCT ENTITIES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA - THAT HAS TO BE RECOGNISED, AND THAT THE ESSENCE OF GETTING A RESOLUTION OF THIS POTENTIAL CONFLICT IS THE NECESSITY FOR DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THOSE TWO ENTITIES. I EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE CONCEPT OF TRIPARTITE TALKS ADVANCED RECENTLY BY THE DPRK WAS NOT, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, ACCEPTABLE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. AND I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD LIKE CHINA AND AUSTRALIA, EACH IN THEIR WAYS WITH CONTACTS WITH ON THE ONE HAND THE DPRK AND OURSELVES WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO PLAY SOME PART IN PRODUCING A SITUATION, WHETHER IT BE IN A QUADRIPARTITE OR EVEN IN A LARGER FRAMEWORK, WHERE

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A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO ENTITIES COULD TAKE PLACE. I CAN SAY THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT, A CONGENIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN US OF THE POTENTIAL DANGER AND OF THE NEED TO SECURE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THOSE TWO COUNTRIES.

I DID RAISE WITH THE PREMIER THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA AND I DID THIS PARTICULARLY BECAUSE WHEN HE'D BEEN TO AUSTRALIA HE HAD RAISED THE ISSUE WITH ME. I WAS ABLE TO REPORT TO THE PREMIER THE VERY USEFUL DISCUSSIONS I'D WITH SAM NJOMO, THE LEADER OF SWAPO, WHEN I WAS IN DELHI AND INDICATED TO THE PREMIER OUR VIEW THAT THE QUESTION OF LINKAGE WAS NOT WE BELIEVE SOMETHING THAT WAS PRODUCTIVELY CAPABLE OF BEING PURSUED - THAT THERE WAS A NEED, WE BELIEVE, FOR DIRECT TALKS WITH THE FRONT LINE STATES AND INDEED DIALOGUE WITH SWAPO. THAT I HAD FOLLOWING MY TALKS WITH NJOMO AND MY CONVICTION OUT OF THOSE TALKS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INTENTION ON THE PART OF A FREE NAMIBIA TO BE A SITE FOR SOVIET BASES, OR THERE WOULD NOT BE AN UNWELCOMING ATTITUDE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT. THAT HAVING RECEIVED THOSE ASSURANCES FROM HIM I CONVEYED THOSE VIEWS TO THE UNITED STATES AND THAT I HOPED THAT THERE COULD BE FOLLOWING THOSE EVENTS SOME LOOSENING UP OF THE SITUATION IN THAT AREA.

I INDICATED TO THE PREMIER THAT IN FACT THERE DID SEEM TO BE SOME SLIGHT EVIDENCE OF MOVING TO THAT DIRECTION WHICH WE WELCOMED. AND THE PREMIER EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR WHAT WE'VE DONE IN THAT AREA AND HIS FEELINGS OF WHAT WAS OCCURRING.

WITHOUT THE MATTER BEING DEVELOPED IN ANY WAY I SIMPLY INDICATED TO THE PREMIER ALSO THAT WE STILL REGARDED THE MIDDLE EAST AS THEY DID - AS AN AREA OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT TO ALL THE REST OF THE WORLD AND INDICATED OUR GREAT CONCERN WITH THE INCREASING TRAGEDY OF LEBANON. WE DID NOT PURSUE THAT - I MERELY INDICATED THAT IF WE WERE, AS HE'D ASKED ME TO GIVE A CONSPECTUS OF OUR VIEWS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, I OBVIOUSLY HAD TO REFER TO THAT, BUT WE DIDN'T PURSUE THE DISCUSSION FURTHER.

FINALLY, I INDICATED TO HIM THAT IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT IF ONE WAS TALKING ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION YOU COULDN'T JUST REFER TO THE POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. ONE HAD TO REFER TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THAT HAD BEEN PERLEXING AND BEDEVILLING THE WORLD IN RECENT YEARS. I INDICATED TO HIM THAT IT WAS PROBABLY APPROPRIATE THAT WE PICK UP AN ISSUE AND THE INITIATIVES THAT WE HAD BEEN TAKING IN REGARD TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALISATION AND A REGIONAL APPROACH TO THAT. TOMORROW WE HAVE AGREED THAT WE WILL DO THAT.

WELL LADIES AND GENTLEMEN THOSE ARE THE ISSUES, THE SORTS OF THINGS THAT I PUT, SOME BROAD INDICATION OF THE RESPONSES OF THE PREMIER. I WOULD REPEAT AGAIN THAT IT WAS A DIALOGUE BETWEEN TWO VERY FRIENDLY NATIONS AND I REPEAT THAT AT THE END OF THE THREE HOURS I HAD WITH

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PREMIER ZHAO I AM EVEN MORE STRENGTHENED AND CONFIRMED IN MY VIEW THAT YOU KNOW I'VE EXPRESSED TO YOU BEFORE, THAT AUSTRALIA INDEED DOES HAVE EXTRAORDINARILY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THAT IT IS A RELATIONSHIP OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US BILATERALLY, TO EACH OF US, AND IMPORTANTLY WE DO SHARE COMMON PERCEPTIONS IN REGARD TO I THINK THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES OF CONCERN IN THE WORLD TODAY. WHERE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES THAT DO EXIST, THERE ARE AGREED POINTS OF DEPARTURE AND COMMON OBJECTIVES BETWEEN US.

JOURNALIST: HOW DID PREMIER ZHAO REACT WHEN YOU EXPRESSED ... (TESTING?)

P.M.: THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC RESPONSE TO THAT BUT I MAY SAY THAT HE RECEIVED THE OBSERVATION CONGENIALLY. WE GOT NO PROMISES OR INDICATIONS, I SUPPOSE IT WAS A BIT TOO MUCH TO EXPECT THAT YOU WOULD HAVE GOT SPECIFIC INDICATIONS. BUT ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT I PUT OUR CONCERN STRONGLY TO THE PRESIDENT.

JOURNALIST: PRIME MINISTER, WAS THERE ANY DISCUSSION ON KAMPUCHEA?

P.M.: NO, WE DELIBERATELY DID NOT GO TO THAT TODAY. THAT WILL BE A MATTER TO BE EMBRACED WITHIN REGIONAL ISSUES TOMORROW.

JOURNALIST: WHAT WAS HIS RESPONSE TO YOUR CONVEYANCE TO HIM OF THE ROK'S REQUEST FOR WARMER RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE ...

P.M.: WELL, LET ME MAKE IT CLEAR - YOU REFER TO MY CONVEYING OF THEIR REQUEST. THE WAY IN WHICH THIS OCCURRED WAS THAT I EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN, AUSTRALIA'S CONCERN, ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR A WIDER CONFLICT AND ARISING OUT OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, AND IN THAT CONTEXT I INDICATED THAT I BELIEVED THAT ONE OF THE OPTIMISTIC FEATURES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE LAST FEW YEARS HAVE BEEN THE WAY IN WHICH CHINA HAD OPENED UP ITS RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD IN GENERAL, AND PERHAPS MOST PARTICULARLY WITH THE UNITED STATES. AND I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT AGAINST THE SITUATION WHERE CURRENTLY THEY DID NOT HAVE FORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE ROK THAT THEY WOULD SEE THEIR WAY CLEAR TO DO THAT. AND IN THAT CONTEXT I WAS ABLE TO SAY TO THEM THAT IT WAS CLEARLY THE WISH OF THE ROK THAT THAT SHOULD HAPPEN. NOW THE PREMIER KEENLY OBSERVED WHAT I HAD TO SAY ON THAT - IT WAS CLEARLY A MATTER OF INTEREST TO HIM. AND ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT TIME WILL TELL WHAT THE RESPONSE WILL BE.

JOURNALIST: DID YOU MAKE ... ABOUT ALL NATIONS SIGNING THE NPT ...

P.M.: THE WAY I PUT IT WAS THAT TO USE THE LANGUAGE OF OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS, THE NPT IS THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN. AND THAT WE THOUGHT IT APPROPRIATE THAT THAT BEING THE ONLY AVENUE IN THE FORMAL SENSE, THAT IT SHOULD BE PURSUED AND THAT WE INTEND TO PURSUE IT. AND PARTICULARLY I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WHILE CHINA, BECAUSE IT AT

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THIS STAGE REGARDED THE NPT AS SOMEWHAT DISCRIMINATORY AND IT HAD NOT ITSELF BECOME AN ADHERENT SIGNATORY, NEVERTHELESS I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY GIVE SUPPORT TO THE NPT ADVERSARY STATES THAT ONE CAN IDENTIFY IN THE WORLD TODAY.

JOURNALIST: PRIME MINISTER DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO THE EVENTS IN THE LEBANON IN THE LAST 24 HOURS OR 48 HOURS.

P.M.: YES, YOU KNOW THAT I'VE EXPRESSED IN THE PARLIAMENT AND ELSEWHERE A SENSE OF GREAT TRAGEDY ABOUT THE LEBANON. I'VE DONE THAT FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME NOW AND EXPRESSED SOME SENSE OF PESSIMISM. AND ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT THE RECENT EVENTS CLEARLY CONFIRM THOSE VIEWS THAT I'VE EXPRESSED BEFORE. THERE IS LITTLE THAT AUSTRALIA CAN DO TO ALTER THE COURSE OF EVENTS. I WOULD SIMPLY ON BEHALF OF AUSTRALIA EXPRESS THE PLEA TO EVERYONE CONCERNED, THAT IS THE COUNTRIES BORDERING LEBANON AND THE FACTIONS WITHIN LEBANON ITSELF, THAT THEY SHOULD BE CONSCIOUS OF THE HORRENDOUS LOSS OF LIFE THAT HAS BEEN SUFFERED IN THAT COUNTRY PARTICULARLY SINCE '75. AND ISSUE A PLEA TO ALL NATIONS AND THE FACTIONS CONCERNED TO TRY AND FIND A WAY TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS IN THAT TRAGICALLY SCARRED COUNTRY.

JOURNALIST: DO YOU BELIEVE THE AMERICAN TROOPS SHOULD STAY THERE?

P.M.: I'M NOT HERE TO PUBLICLY ADVISED THE UNITED STATES ON ITS POLICY IN REGARD TO THE LEBANON.

JOURNALIST: AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATS ARE CLEARLY IN SOME DANGER THERE. WOULD YOU CONSIDER WITHDRAWING THEM.

P.M.: I BELIEVE THAT THAT'S A MATTER WHICH IS CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION IN OUR APPROPRIATE QUARTERS. I DON'T THINK ANYTHING IS ADVANCED BY ME GOING BEYOND THAT. IT IS A MATTER WHICH IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

JOURNALIST: DO YOU KNOW OF THEIR SAFETY, PRIME MINISTER?

P.M.: ALL I'VE BEEN TOLD THIS MORNING, YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT WE'VE BEEN PREPARING FOR AND THEN GOING INTO THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PREMIER, THAT WHAT WAS CONVEYED TO ME WAS THAT WHEN THE SHELL WENT INTO THE CHANCERY, NO-ONE WAS INJURED. SO I HAVEN'T BEEN INFORMED OF ANY CASUALTY AND, AS I SAY, INDICATIONS ARE TO ME THAT CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO THE APPROPRIATE STEPS THAT NEED TO BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF OUR PERSONNEL.

JOURNALIST: JUST GOING BACK TO THIS DISARMAMENT QUESTION. WAS THERE ANY DISCUSSION OF PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE.

P.M.: YES IS DID RECEIVE REFERENCE. THE PREMIER REFERRED TO THE

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FACT THAT PIERRE HAD COME HERE IN NOVEMBER OF THE LATTER PART OF THE CHOGH MEETING. THE PREMIER INDICATED WITH REFERENCE TO THAT INITIATIVE THE BASIC POSITION OF CHINA WHICH IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE AS A FIRST STEP ACTION BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS TO REDUCE TO STOP ANY FURTHER TESTING OR INCREASED SOPHISTICATION OF OR ADDITION TO THE STOCKPILE OF THE SUPERPOWERS AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MOVE IMMEDIATELY BY THE SUPERPOWERS TO A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION OF THEIR ARSENALS. AND THEN IN THAT CONTEXT A CONFERENCE OF ALL THE POWERS CONCERNED. AND CLEARLY THAT APPROACH OF THE CHINESE IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE TRUDEAU APPROACH WHICH CALLS FOR THE IMMEDIATE CONFERENCE OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS.

JOURNALIST: ...AND TOMORROW, WHAT WILL YOU BE COVERING ... TRADE?

P.M.: WE'LL BE REVIEWING THE ECONOMIC, TRADING AND CULTURAL AND OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS, TO SEE JUST WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED SINCE OUR MEETING IN APRIL. AND THERE HAS BEEN VERY CONSIDERABLE ACHIEVEMENT AND THEN THERE ARE CERTAIN SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING RELATIONS. AND I'LL MEET WITH YOU AFTER THE SESSION TOMORROW AND TELL YOU.

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OFFICE OF  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRSCABINET DU  
SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MEMORANDUM

To  
A Office of the Under-SecretaryMASTER FILEFrom  
De MINAPAGE 2Security  
Sécurité UNCLASSIFIEDReference  
Référence

Date February 9, 1984

Subject  
Sujet Parliamentary Report - February 9ON THE HILLDPM/SSEA (2)  
MINA (11)  
MINE/Jalbert/  
Laverdure  
MINT/Burbridge/  
MacDonald  
PMO/Fairbairn  
PCO/Adam/Fadden/  
Elcock/Mitchell

The House met at 11:00 to conclude debate on the Speech from the Throne, today being the eighth and final appointed day. A vote on the Govt motion in response to the address will be held at 5:45. By prior agreement, the Leaders of the three Parties, beginning with the Prime Minister, discussed the Canadian peace initiative from 11:00 to 1:00 p.m. (see below).

Yesterday, Minister Fox introduced Bill C-20 (Bell Canada Reorganization Act).

Q.P. questions of Departmental interest: OFFSHORE MARKETS FOR ATLANTIC SALTED FISH.

Member Statements of Departmental interest: Ed Broadbent, in speaking to the plight of the Pacific fisheries called for a halt to the harvest of high-sea fish by other Pacific nations.

SENSE OF THE HOUSE

There was a sense of anti-climax after the morning's events. The TV booths, the kleig lights had been dismantled and the miles of cable wound up. Once again, the main thrust of the Opposition attack was its allegation of Liberal "pork-barrelling" regarding Special Recovery Capital Projects Programme and job creation funds. Last evening, CTV news reporter Roger Smith said a Govt document showed more than \$500 million in employment creation funds had gone to Quebec, which is represented by 74 Liberal MPs, while the four western provinces with only 2 Liberal members in Parliament, had received less than \$300 million. Led by Tom Siddon, Conservative members Lorne Greenaway and Jim Hawkes and the NDP's Ian Waddell charged that politics is more important than unemployment when Liberals hand out help. Minister Pepin said that one had to "look, as Mr. Clark would say 'at the totality' and see how monies for reduction of employment are deployed" and he gave as an example the grain stabilization fund which benefits primarily the west. After Opposition MPs had complained about the amount of monies which had gone into advertising this programme and Ian Waddell had expressed skepticism as to why \$300,000 from the Special Employment Initiative had been allocated without Civil Service approval to a Judo club in Quebec, the PM protested that our duty "as MPs and politicians is to get programmes for our constituents and the citizens of Canada... we take out advertising to let the people know. I have heard ad nauseum about coverup, but when we tell the people about benefits, we get this kind of reaction" (cheers from the Govt benches.)

John Crosbie waxed indignant about the proposed press lockup for next Wednesday's budget which would prevent reporters from leaving the briefing session until one hour after Minister Lalonde had spoken. He accused the Govt of censorship and asked

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DMT MCB  
DMF NAX  
CCB PED  
CCBR PPD  
SFB PSD  
TFB RBD  
IFB RCD  
EFB RGB  
LGB RGX  
PGB RSD  
SCD  
FPR SCS  
ACB SCI  
ADA SCH  
APD SFP  
APZ SID  
CCBM SIS  
CCBA TAD  
CGD TID  
CGE UGB  
CGL URD  
CGS XDX  
CMD ZEP  
CML ZSP  
CPD ZSS  
EED IMU  
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whether the Govt's theme song is "Role out the Porkbarrel, or I'm Going to Wash the Press Right Out of my Hair" (guffaws from the gallery and some Honourable Members.)

Once again, Minister Bussi res was attacked for his Dept's tax collection methods, Minister Pinard told Scott Fennell that while the Govt would provide Canadians with the best possible protection in the event of nuclear catastrophe, the best solution was support for the PM's peace initiative.

#### OFFSHORE MARKETS FOR ATLANTIC SALTED FISH

Lloyd Crouse claimed that the lack of salt fish offshore had resulted in Canadian producers diverting their products to the New England markets. Minister de Ban  said that the Govt was committed to finding markets everywhere for Canadian salt fish and he noted that as a result of a recent trip he had made to Portugal, the Portuguese had agreed to consider Canada as the principal source for their salted cod.

#### THE PEACE INITIATIVE

The galleries were packed, the Govt and Opposition benches full and an array of Senators, diplomats, including UK High Commissioner Lord Moran, Operation Dismantle's Jim Stark, and Party officials from all sides watched from above as first the PM, clad in his blue pinstripe, then Brian Mulroney, in double-breasted blue, and finally Ed Broadbent in a dark suit, spoke to arms control and disarmament in the context of the peace initiative. All three spoke from notes.

After pointing out the threat of nuclear weapons and, consequently, the Canadian stake in arms talks, the PM related the areas in which the Canadian defence commitment was being strengthened (replacement of Maritime patrol planes, introduction of the leopard tank, frigate programme, phasing out of nuclear weapons) and summarized the main results of his recent trips abroad. Signs of progress, the PM declared could be found in the NATO Foreign Ministers' declaration of Dec 1, 1983, respecting the Soviet's legitimate security interests, the Commonwealth Leaders' GOA declaration of Nov 1983, supporting the PM's efforts, attendance at the Ministerial level early last month at the opening of the stockholm CDE Conference, the meetings between Secretary Schultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko, PM Thatcher's visit to Budapest last week, President Reagan's signals last month to create a constructive tone in US policy towards the USSR and the cautious response from the Soviet Union. The PM listed three conclusions based on his most recent visit to Eastern Europe: 1) the contrast between "the cordial, reasonable and non-ideological private talks and the occasional blast of Warsaw Pact fundamentalism"; 2) the discovery of areas of common interest; 3) the necessity to "grapple with difficult problems of misperception and judgement." The PM then suggested 10 principals of a common bond between east and west: a nuclear war cannot be won; a nuclear war must never be fought; both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war; both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons; both sides understand the need to reduce the cost of security; both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of using force against one another; both sides recognize each has legitimate security interests; both sides recognize the dangers of horizontal proliferation; both sides recognize the awesome consequences of first use of force; both recognize security cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side. The PM said he would make his decalogue the basis of letters to Presidents Reagan and Andropov. The PM said that new proposals to gear down the momentum of new technology, including a ban on high-altitude satellite systems, restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs, improvements in the verifiability of future strategic weapons would be circulated in due course at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and Canada would continue to press for a Conference of the five nuclear weapons states which would focus on crisis management and the improvement of crisis communications. The PM also called for a review of NATO strategy in the same spirit as that which took place in 1967 at the urgings of Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel. In this regard the PM complemented the efforts of the current Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans and the ideas of incoming NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington. Concluding, the PM said:

"Let it be said of the other nations that they saw their own responsibility to work to reduce the threat of annihilation, to forego

nuclear weapons, and to serve the purpose of a durable peace.

And let it be said of Canada, and of Canadians: that we saw the crisis; that we did act; that we took risks; that we were loyal to our friends and open with out adversaries; that we lived up to our ideals; and that we have done what we could to lift the shadow of war."

Agreeing with the PM that the "world today is subjected to strains and tensions unique in modern history", the Opposition Leader reconfirmed the support he gave last Nov 14 for the objectives of the PM's initiatives. Mr. Mulroney regretted, however, that until now, Parliament had had to glean its information "from a political <sup>meeting</sup> in Montreal...and from the reception halls of eastern Europe." He chastised the PM for refusing to accept his Dec 4 offer to introduce a bipartisan resolution endorsing his initiatives, an endorsement which Mr. Mulroney claimed would have the unanimous approval of the House. In the absence of this, Mr. Mulroney claimed "the PM could have dismissed as unworthy arguments about the partisan nature of his initiative. With such a mandate, the PM could have properly claimed the support of all Canadians for his initiative." The Opposition Leader suggested that such support could still be given and that it should include a reference to SCEAND to study existing areas of conflict. The SCEAND reference, he argued should also include a study of the proposed Arms Control and Disarmament Centre mentioned in the Throne Speech. Declaring Soviet policies in Europe to be animated by two clear aims - the preservation of Soviet dominance in eastern Europe and the weakening of the western alliance, especially the links between the US and Europe, Mr. Mulroney said that Canadian policy must be guided by three clear principles: 1) "we are a western nation, a member of NATO; 2) we are committed to the ideals of individual and collective freedoms; 3) we are children of liberty and that there must be no compromise on these principles, because "we are prepared to accept neither the inexorable Finlandization of Europe nor a neutralist Canada." Mr. Mulroney went on to criticize the PM for having chided him last Dec 9 for urging consideration of the existing non-first strike policy within the private counsels of NATO Foreign Ministers and then going on to question the determination of NATO allies to carry out existing policies during his Warsaw Pact tour. Mr. Mulroney was also astonished at the decision to establish a committee of officials and ministers with east Germany in order to discuss disarmament. The Opposition Leader then catalogued 15 years of Govt disregard for Canada's conventional defences - an ignorance that had led to the present unhappy situation whereby NATO strategy is heavily dependent upon recourse to nuclear weapons. Mr. Mulroney put forward three fundamental principles for future discussion:

- "Canada's foreign policy should rest on a bi-partisan search for consensus;
- The cornerstone of our security is the NATO framework;
- And, finally, only through the strengthening of the non-nuclear deterrent can we reduce the present reliance on nuclear weapons."

The Opposition Leader concluded that the challenge before us is overwhelming, but, as Browning put it "Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for."

Mr. Broadbent paid tribute to the disarmament groups in Canada and put forward his own five principles for Canadian policy based on the abolition of nuclear weapons, domestically and abroad: 1) all those who seek to achieve this should be supported and he gave as an example the Swedish proposal for a nuclear weapons free zone; 2) increased funding for disarmament research; 3) follow up to the PM's anti-satellite warfare suggestion by, for example, joining the International Satellite Monitoring Agency proposed by France; 4) openly declaring our opposition to the first use of nuclear weapons; 5) not testing the cruise missile and the NDP Leader pointed out that at the Dec 1979 NATO meeting, a decision was made to deploy only the Pershing missile and the ground launched cruise missile. Nothing, the NDP Leader claimed, had been said about the air launched cruise missile, the purpose of which was to buttress US security interests.



D. Colin Robertson  
Departmental Assistant

NOTES POUR UNE ALLOCUTION DU PREMIER MINISTRE À LA CHAMBRE DES  
COMMUNES SUR LA PAIX ET LA SÉCURITÉ, OTTAWA, LE 9 FÉVRIER 1984

(Traduction)

L'explosion de la première bombe atomique dans le désert du Nouveau-Mexique, en 1945, a remis en question la survie même de l'humanité. L'homme se donnait ainsi le pouvoir de s'auto-détruire.

Depuis ce moment, la peur de la bombe hante constamment les enfants. Et nous, leurs parents, sommes devenus tout aussi impuissants à dissiper leurs craintes qu'à apaiser les nôtres.

Car une guerre nucléaire ne ferait aucune sélection: que nous siégeons de ce côté de la Chambre ou de l'autre; que nous soyons du côté de ceux qui ont raison ou de ceux qui ont tort; que nous soyons riches ou pauvres; que nous appartenions à l'Est ou à l'Ouest, au Nord ou au Sud.

Les armes nucléaires font partie de la réalité. Elles existeront probablement toujours. Et elles fonctionnent avec une efficacité horrifiante qui rend incertaine la survie de l'espèce humaine. La seule issue possible est que nous contrôlions ce risque. Nous ne pourrions plus jamais repousser cette tâche, ni la traiter à la légère, ni en faire une affaire de routine.

Mais il nous est surtout interdit de céder au découragement.

C'est à l'Est et l'Ouest que revient le devoir primordial de gérer ce risque. Les Canadiens constatent toutefois avec inquiétude que les superpuissances semblent s'être détournées de cette responsabilité capitale, qu'elles semblent trop absorbées par leurs rivalités idéologiques, leurs incessants calculs de parité, leurs démonstrations de force et de volonté. Les Canadiens savent également qu'il serait téméraire d'espérer que l'animosité existant entre l'Est et l'Ouest disparaîtra avant d'atteindre le point de non-retour.

Les spécialistes voudraient nous faire croire que les questions afférentes à une guerre nucléaire sont devenues trop complexes pour être laissées à d'autres qu'eux. Ils voudraient que nous fassions confiance à une poignée de seigneurs de la stratégie nucléaire ainsi qu'aux scientifiques qui nous ont fait passer des bombes atomiques aux ogives thermonucléaires, des missiles à une seule ogive aux missiles à dix ogives et plus, des armes simplement dissuasives aux armes qui mettent en péril l'existence de chaque être humain.

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Les Canadiens, comme tous les autres peuples estiment qu'une génération passée à fignoler des théories et des instruments capables de les annihiler a compromis bien plus qu'elle n'a augmenté leur sécurité. La poussée technologique rencontre trop souvent une oreille sympathique dans la sphère politique. Ce sont en effet les dirigeants politiques qui décident des budgets consacrés à la défense et à la recherche. Puisque ce sont eux qui gouvernent, ce sont eux qui doivent affirmer leur volonté de paix. Sinon la science continuera de mettre au point des engins de plus en plus meurtriers.

La sécurité du Canada est en jeu; nous avons acquis le droit d'être entendus, en temps de paix comme en temps de guerre. Nous n'avions absolument été pour rien dans le déclenchement des deux guerres mondiales: pourtant, des milliers de Canadiens ont combattu et sont morts durant ces conflits. Et nous avons contribué à la reconstruction du monde après la guerre: nous étions à Bretton Woods lorsque fut établie la Banque mondiale; nous étions à Dumbarton Oaks et à San Francisco lorsque l'ONU fut créée.

Nous avons prôné l'adhésion de tous les pays aux Nations Unies à une époque où cela n'était pas toujours bien vu. Qu'on se souvienne du rôle joué par le Premier ministre Diefenbaker pour favoriser l'adhésion de Cuba. Ou de l'appui de MM. St-Laurent et Pearson, qui a permis à de nombreux États indépendants d'entrer à l'ONU. Ou encore du rôle joué par mon gouvernement en faveur de la reconnaissance de la République populaire de Chine et de son accession au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU.

Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le Canada était l'un des rares pays à posséder la technologie et les ressources nécessaires à la construction des armes nucléaires. Mais nous avons vu ces terribles engins à l'oeuvre et savions ce dont ils étaient capables. Tous les gouvernements qui suivirent renoncèrent donc à l'option nucléaire et mirent les compétences canadiennes au service de l'utilisation pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire. Et au lieu de nous doter d'une force nucléaire nationale, nous nous sommes joints à des organisations de sécurité collective telles que l'ONU, l'OTAN et NORAD.



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Le Canada est un partenaire loyal de chacune de ces organisations. Nous avons joué un rôle de premier plan dans les initiatives de l'ONU visant à l'établissement et au maintien de la paix au Moyen-Orient, en Asie et en Afrique. Au sein de l'OTAN, nous sommes l'un des rares pays à maintenir en permanence des forces à l'extérieur de nos frontières. Au sein du NORAD, nous fournissons une chose qui n'a pas de prix: notre espace aérien. Les États-Unis peuvent établir leur propre système de défense en sachant que les 4000 kilomètres situés au nord de leur frontière sont occupés par un allié sûr.

Nous ne badinons pas avec nos engagements. Nous avons remplacé nos avions de patrouille maritime par les appareils les plus perfectionnés au monde. Nos brigades armées sont maintenant équipées d'un char d'assaut très fermement, le Léopard. Nous sommes en train de nous doter d'avions tactiques et d'interception des plus modernes. Nous avons mis sur pied un programme pour acquérir de nouvelles frégates. Tout cet équipement, le plus perfectionné qui soit, est destiné à des fins défensives.

En 1969, nous avons décidé qu'il n'était plus approprié que nos forces armées soient équipées d'armes nucléaires. Nous avons alors annoncé notre intention de nous départir graduellement de ces systèmes d'armement au fur et à mesure de leur remplacement, mais tout en respectant nos engagements envers nos alliés. Dès 1970, nous n'avions plus de roquettes sol-sol "Honest John" en Europe. Et dès 1972 nous avons achevé la conversion de nos avions basés en Europe pour les faire servir en cas d'offensive non plus nucléaire mais classique.

Également en 1972, l'appareil Bomarc équipé de missiles sol-air fut retourné aux États-Unis. Nous avons ensuite décidé de remplacer les CF-101 basés au Canada et munis d'armes nucléaires par les excellents chasseurs CF-18. Ces appareils assureront plus efficacement notre défense aérienne avec des armes classiques que les CF-101 avec des armes nucléaires. Ainsi, nous nous débarasserons cette année des derniers vestiges d'armement nucléaire.

Mais nous avons fait beaucoup plus que de voir à notre défense. Nous nous sommes penchés sur les causes de l'insécurité et de l'instabilité, surtout dans le tiers-monde. Les axes Est-Ouest et Nord-Sud gouvernent les relations de notre époque. La résolution des problèmes du Sud dépend d'une amélioration de la sécurité mondiale. En consacrant des sommes faramineuses à leur dépenses militaires, l'Est, l'Ouest et le Sud faussent les politiques économiques et

déterminent d'importantes ressources qui pourraient être affectées au développement économique mondial. Ceci entraîne une aggravation de l'instabilité politique dans le tiers-monde, laquelle se répercute à l'Est et à l'Ouest et ajoute à notre insécurité.

Les Canadiens ont pleinement le droit de prendre position. À chacun de nous qui les représentons dans cette Chambre, les Canadiens disent que le danger est devenu trop imminent. Dans le monde entier, les populations tiennent des propos semblables à leurs dirigeants. Ils veulent que ceux-ci agissent, qu'ils acceptent leurs responsabilités politiques et cherchent à réduire les risques d'une conflagration nucléaire.

L'automne dernier, j'ai parlé d'une conjonction alarmante de diverses crises. J'ai attiré l'attention sur la convergence de trois tendances qui peuvent se révéler désastreuses: le recours à la force pour régler les différends, le risque d'une prolifération des armes nucléaires et la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest. J'ai donc décidé de tenir l'engagement pris l'été dernier par les sept chefs d'État et de gouvernement des pays industrialisés réunis à Williamsburg, soit "de consacrer toutes nos ressources à réduire la menace de guerre".

J'ai décidé d'user de l'influence du Canada pour sensibiliser la communauté internationale à ce danger, essayer de revitaliser au plus haut niveau politique les relations Est-Ouest, tenter de renverser le courant actuel d'affrontement et rechercher un intérêt commun aux deux parties.

J'ai suggéré qu'on mette de côté les mégaphones, qu'on suspende la guerre des idées et des mots, qu'on mette fin au manichéisme dans les deux camps, qu'on fasse preuve de leadership et d'habileté politique dans les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest -- la plus importante relation stratégique qui soit.

#### L'INITIATIVE DE PAIX

Depuis l'automne dernier, j'ai fait part de ces idées à Paris, La Haye, Bruxelles et Rome, ainsi qu'au Vatican, à Bonn, à Londres et à Zurich. Je les ai présentées à Tokyo, à Dacca, et à la réunion des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth, à New Delhi. Je me suis rendu à Pékin, à Washington et aux Nations Unies. J'ai rencontré les dirigeants politiques à Prague, Berlin-Est et Bucarest afin de m'assurer que notre message soit compris des plus hautes instances du Pacte de Varsovie.

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Chaque fois, mon message fut direct. Le Canada ne cherche pas à siéger à la table des superpuissances. Mais nos vies et notre avenir sont en jeu à cette table. Et il en va de même pour les neuf dixièmes de la population mondiale qui vivent ailleurs qu'aux États-Unis et en Union soviétique. Tous, nous avons le droit et la responsabilité de nous engager et de rappeler aux protagonistes leur appartenance à la race humaine.

Nous avons proposé de donner un élan politique nouveau à la Conférence de Stockholm sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe. Alors que tous les autres ponts entre l'Est et l'Ouest s'effondraient, cette conférence a pris une importance considérable et est devenue la seule tribune servant le processus de détente amorcé à Helsinki.

Nous avons proposé qu'on fasse de part et d'autre des efforts au niveau politique en vue d'aiguillonner les négociations de Vienne sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces. Ces pourparlers sont cruciaux pour établir l'équilibre des forces classiques en Europe centrale, relever le seuil nucléaire et ainsi réduire le risque d'un premier recours hâtif aux armes nucléaires.

Je souhaiterais ouvrir une parenthèse et préciser que les négociations de Genève portent sur une "réduction" des forces. Ces négociations n'ont pas but d'établir un nouvel équilibre à un échelon supérieur mais bien à un niveau inférieur. Et je ne comprends vraiment pas -- après tout je l'ai expliqué maintes fois -- pourquoi mes critiques persistent à croire que relever le seuil nucléaire en équilibrant les forces classiques signifie l'établissement d'un équilibre à un niveau supérieur. Le but des négociations sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces est vraiment d'obtenir un équilibre à un échelon inférieur et donc de relever le seuil nucléaire.

Nous avons proposé des rencontres des cinq puissances nucléaires aussitôt que possible afin que soit créée une tribune où l'on pourra négocier des limites globales et, ultimement, des réductions à leurs arsenaux nucléaires.

Nous avons demandé instamment que soient prises des mesures pour renforcer le Traité sur la non-prolifération. La non-prolifération des armes nucléaires est aussi bien dans l'intérêt des superpuissances et des puissances moyennes que des micro-États.

Or tant que les cinq puissances nucléaires ne manifesteront pas davantage leur intention d'amorcer les réductions prévues dans ce pacte, nous courons le grave danger de voir les engins nucléaires se propager dans de nouvelles régions du globe et exciter les anciennes rivalités.

En définitive, à chaque étape j'ai pressé les dirigeants de s'engager personnellement, d'accorder à la paix la plus haute priorité, d'exercer le leadership politique que commande la gravité de la situation et de relancer le dialogue entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

J'ai fait remarquer au président Reagan que l'Est recevait bien les signes qu'il donnait de la puissance des États-Unis, mais non un message de paix. Et j'ai dit aux dirigeants de l'Europe de l'Est que la dureté de leurs déclarations avaient entraîné à coup sûr le rejet des propositions plus constructives formulées par le Pacte de Varsovie.

#### SIGNES DE PROGRÈS

L'incompréhension et la méfiance sont profondément enracinées dans les deux camps. Mais nous commençons à entrevoir des signes de progrès.

À Goa, en novembre, quarante-deux dirigeants du Commonwealth ont fortement appuyé nos efforts en vue de restaurer le dialogue politique entre l'Est et l'Ouest et de favoriser les négociations entre les États dotés d'armes nucléaires.

À Bruxelles, en décembre, les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord sont arrivés à un consensus sur plusieurs questions que j'avais défendues avec vigueur ces dernières années, en particulier aux réunions au sommet de l'OTAN. Dans leur déclaration, ils ont offert aux pays de l'Est une relation équilibrée et constructive. Ils ont montré clairement que les pays occidentaux n'aspiraient pas à la supériorité stratégique et qu'ils respectaient les intérêts légitimes de l'Union soviétique au chapitre de la sécurité. Il y a les déclarations de Bruxelles de décembre; une rencontre à laquelle le vice-premier ministre et secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures a pris part; une réunion où il a joué un rôle majeur en faisant accepter ces points.

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Conformément à notre initiative, l'Est et l'Ouest ont convenu de reprendre le 16 mars les pourparlers de Vienne sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces. Et ils ont convenu en outre que les ministres des Affaires étrangères devraient contribuer plus activement au progrès des ces négociations.

Également à notre suggestion, et pour souligner l'importance qu'ils attachent au dialogue politique de haut niveau, les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'OTAN ont participé le mois dernier à l'inauguration de la Conférence de Stockholm. Les ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays membres du Pacte de Varsovie répondirent à cette initiative occidentale en se rendant eux aussi à Stockholm. Il importe de noter la rencontre de cinq heures que n'auraient pas eue autrement le secrétaire d'État américain, M. Shultz, et le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Gromyko. Les deux ont également rencontré mon collègue, le vice-premier ministre et secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.

C'était la première fois depuis la clôture acrimonieuse de la Conférence de Madrid, en septembre dernier, et la tragédie de l'avion sud-coréen que les pays de l'Est et de l'Ouest renouaient contact au plan politique.

Même le premier ministre Thatcher a entamé des démarches en vue d'améliorer la qualité des rapports entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Sa visite à Budapest, la semaine dernière, témoigne d'un nouvel élan dans le dialogue Est-Ouest, d'une volonté de trouver des points d'entente entre membres d'alliances opposées et d'un désir de rassurer sur les intentions.

Contrairement à ses déclarations antérieures, le président Reagan a mentionné le mois dernier à deux occasions que les États-Unis étaient disposés à rechercher un dialogue constructif avec l'URSS. Moscou a choisi de répondre de façon mitigée, alliant une rhétorique plutôt dure avec des signes prudents de disposition à rétablir la communication.

Monsieur le Président, je viens tout juste d'avoir des entretiens avec les dirigeants de la Tchécoslovaquie, de la République démocratique allemande et de la Roumanie. Ces États sont bien représentatifs des pays de l'Europe centrale. Ce sont des puissances moyennes qui ont une longue expérience des tensions entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Ils sont, bien sûr, très liés à l'URSS. Dans les circonstances actuelles, leur identité propre, leur influence et le leadership qu'ils exercent sont significatifs. J'ai noté, par exemple, qu'ils avaient répondu favorablement à ma suggestion que les puissances moyennes de chaque alliance puissent jouer un rôle constructif en renouant avec la tradition des consultations politiques au plus haut niveau entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Je leur ai exposé les idées de l'Ouest sur le déclin de la détente et l'importance de la ranimer. Et j'ai écouté les leurs. Nous avons parlé des signaux hétéroclites que s'envoient l'Est et l'Ouest, de la nécessité de dépasser un certain niveau de langage et de poser des gestes susceptibles de rétablir la confiance et de réduire les tensions.

Des discussions que j'ai eues en Europe de l'Est, je conclus ceci:

-- En premier lieu, j'ai été frappé du contraste entre des rencontres privées, toutes empreintes de cordialité et de pondération et où l'idéologie est absente, et les sorties publiques fracassantes du Pacte de Varsovie dont nous sommes parfois les témoins. Cela illustre bien l'importance du contact personnel et du dialogue à huis clos. Car sans le dialogue, nous risquons des deux côtés de demeurer prisonniers de nos propres polémiques.

-- Ensuite, si lors de nos rencontres privées nous pouvons laisser de côté les invectives que nous échangeons publiquement sur les questions importantes, alors je crois que nous sommes capables d'entamer un processus de discussions portant sur des sujets d'intérêt commun. Cela va prendre du temps, mais j'ai l'intime conviction que l'Est et l'Ouest peuvent atteindre ce degré de maturité dans leurs relations.

-- Enfin, pour atteindre ce stade de maturité, nous devons résoudre nos problèmes mutuels d'incompréhension -- fermeture d'esprit, déformation de faits, erreurs subjectives d'analyse et de jugement.

Peu de mes interlocuteurs, par exemple, ont semblé vraiment capables de comprendre ou encore d'admettre la menace grave que les SS-20 soviétiques font peser sur les pays occidentaux. Quant à nous, je me demande si nous n'avons pas sous-évalué les répercussions qu'ont eues sur le Pacte de Varsovie le déploiement des forces nucléaires de portée intermédiaire et les propos fermes que nous avons tenus ces dernières années.

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Il ne sera pas facile d'apprendre à mieux nous comprendre et à mieux mesurer l'impact de nos faits et gestes. Entre l'impasse de la confrontation, exigeant que le déploiement des forces nucléaires de portée moyenne se poursuive, et la nécessité de rouvrir les négociations, seule la "troisième voie", celle de la confiance politique et de la communication, favorisera une solution rapide et constructive.

En réfléchissant à ces conclusions et aux entretiens que j'ai eus tant à l'Est qu'à l'Ouest, il me semble évident que nous partageons -- et cela commence d'ailleurs à se voir -- une communauté de vues et d'idées. J'aimerais ici faire état de dix principes qui rapprochent l'Est et l'Ouest:

1. Les deux reconnaissent l'impossibilité de gagner un conflit nucléaire.
2. Les deux conviennent qu'une guerre nucléaire ne devrait jamais être déclenchée.
3. Les deux souhaitent s'affranchir des risques d'une guerre accidentelle ou d'une attaque surprise.
4. Les deux reconnaissent le danger inhérent aux armes déstabilisatrices.
5. Les deux comprennent la nécessité de disposer de techniques améliorées pour gérer les crises.
6. Les deux alliances sont conscientes des conséquences funestes qu'entraînerait le fait d'être la première à lancer une attaque.
7. Les deux ont intérêt à accroître leur sécurité et à en réduire les coûts.
8. Les deux ont intérêt à prévenir la prolifération des armes nucléaires dans les autres pays, souvent appelée prolifération horizontale.
9. Les deux en sont arrivés prudemment à reconnaître leurs intérêts mutuels et légitimes au chapitre de la sécurité.

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10. Les deux comprennent que leur sécurité stratégique ne peut dépendre de la défaillance politique ou économique de l'autre.

Décatalogue modeste, sans doute. Mais, en cette période où se manifestent des signes de résorption de la crise, peut-être est-il à propos de revenir à l'essentiel. De redémarrer en nous appuyant sur des principes auxquels nous pouvons adhérer de part et d'autre. De trouver un point de départ, une base commune, même restreinte.

Nous entendons donc nous appuyer sur ces dix principes pour cerner les éléments d'une communauté d'intention propre à rapprocher les dirigeants de l'Est et de l'Ouest.

Je m'apprête à écrire aux présidents Reagan et Andropov, à des dirigeants des deux alliances et à d'autres hommes d'État pour leur proposer ces principes comme base de rapprochement entre les deux camps. Car il existe des points d'accord à côté des sujets de désaccord. Il y a un moyen de sortir de l'impasse des derniers mois. On peut percevoir des indices prometteurs et je pense que la crise a inversé son cours.

Si nous considérons le travail accompli au cours des quatre derniers mois et les perspectives pour les mois à venir, nous avons lieu d'être encouragés par les résultats que nous commençons à observer. Ainsi, nous avons cherché à susciter un dialogue entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Ce dialogue est engagé. Nous avons également cherché à persuader les deux camps de mettre une sourdine à leur rhétorique. Là aussi, nos efforts commencent à porter fruit.

J'ai en outre cherché à m'associer à des dirigeants d'opinions semblables dans divers milieux un peu partout dans le monde. Beaucoup parmi eux ont engagé, ou poursuivi, leurs propres initiatives pour réduire les tensions, et avancé des propositions personnelles pour le contrôle des armements. Mon collègue, le vice-premier ministre et secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, et moi-même avons poursuivi l'initiative du Canada au sein d'institutions multilatérales, dans des contacts bilatéraux, à des conférences spéciales et dans des entretiens avec des groupes et des individus.

#### LE PROGRAMME

Nous avons imprimé une impulsion politique aux relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Mais cette impulsion n'est pas suffisante en soi. Il faut y ajouter le soutien de l'imagination et la force de la



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persistance, et l'appuyer par des actes. En effet, nous avons besoin d'imagination pour trouver des idées inédites nous permettant de résoudre de vieilles impasses et de faire face à de nouveaux dangers. De persistance pour négocier de nouvelles ententes et relever les défis de la technologie. Et d'actes, fussent-ils très humbles, pour manifester notre bonne foi. Nous devons aussi prendre des mesures précises, comme trouver les moyens de vérifier les ententes sur le contrôle des armements, et favoriser la tenue de consultations régulières entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

(Texte)

Au cours des mois à venir, le Canada s'appliquera à consolider les progrès réalisés jusqu'ici pour favoriser le développement et la mise en oeuvre de nos idées. Nous ne prétendons pas détenir le monopole des propositions, et nous ne nous attendons pas non plus à les voir acceptées du jour au lendemain. Ce qui compte, c'est qu'au moins quelques-uns des principaux baromètres des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest montrent qu'elles ont enfin cessé de se mettre au rouge.

J'entends pour ma part poursuivre mes efforts dans ce sens, quoique de façon nécessairement moins intensive qu'au cours des derniers mois -- on reconnaîtra que seize pays plus les Nations-Unies en trois mois, est un rythme auquel je ne peux me soumettre tout au long de l'année. J'ai l'intention de me rendre à Moscou lorsque les circonstances le permettront. Mes collègues du Cabinet, nos ambassadeurs à l'étranger et tous les Canadiens qui partagent nos buts assureront également le suivi de notre initiative.

Le Canada fera sa part dans les assemblées de l'Ouest, dans les pourparlers bilatéraux, aux réunions et conférences multilatérales, et dans les contacts avec l'Union soviétique et ses alliés.

Nous mettrons toutes nos énergies à favoriser les progrès à la Conférence de Stockholm, comme l'avancement des pourparlers sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces. Et si ces pourparlers traînent en longueur, le Canada veillera à ce que les dirigeants politiques interviennent de nouveau personnellement pour les stimuler. Mais lorsque les négociations de Vienne reprendront, le mois prochain, l'OTAN devra absolument être en mesure de répondre à la proposition faite l'été dernier par les membres du Pacte de Varsovie.

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Après plus amples consultations avec nos alliés de l'OTAN, nous diffuserons, au cours de la session actuelle de la Conférence de Genève sur le désarmement, trois propositions destinées à ralentir la poussée des nouvelles techniques. Nous renforcerons ainsi la stratégie d'"asphyxie" que j'ai mise en avant en 1978. Ces propositions sont les suivantes:

-- interdiction de mettre au point des systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude;

-- restrictions à la mobilité des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux;

-- amélioration des possibilités de vérification des nouveaux systèmes d'armements stratégiques.

D'ici à la révision du Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires, l'année prochaine, nous continuerons d'exhorter les deux groupes à en respecter les engagements. Car la sécurité forme un tout indissociable. Et si des pays non détenteurs d'armes nucléaires décident d'en acquérir, la sécurité de chaque être humain se trouvera menacée.

Selon le compromis à la base du Traité sur la non-prolifération, les puissances nucléaires devaient réduire leurs arsenaux et les États non nucléarisés acceptaient en contrepartie de ne pas se doter d'armes atomiques. Les unes et les autres devaient par ailleurs veiller à partager les avantages de l'utilisation pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire. Les États actuellement dotés d'armes atomiques portent donc l'immense responsabilité d'en prévenir la dissémination.

Voilà pourquoi nous devons réitérer notre proposition de convoquer une conférence des cinq États dotés d'armes nucléaires, proposition dont la logique me paraît contraignante. Ces cinq États sont en effet les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité. À ce titre, ils détiennent des responsabilités tout autant qu'un droit de veto. C'est pourquoi j'ai demandé au secrétaire général des Nations Unies, M. Perez de Cuellar, d'envisager et de favoriser la tenue de réunions à huis clos de leurs représentants à New York. Au cours de mes entretiens avec le Premier ministre Zhao, en janvier, j'ai constaté que, depuis ma visite à Pékin, les Chinois paraissaient désormais disposés à envisager de tels contacts sans y poser les conditions dont ils avaient fait état précédemment.

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Cette idée fera son chemin lentement, bien sûr, comme toute autre idée nouvelle. Mais je pense qu'elle finira par emporter l'adhésion des intéressés. Car la menace nucléaire comporte des dangers tels qu'accidents, erreurs de calcul, crises, défaillance des systèmes, auxquels les cinq puissances en cause doivent faire face et qu'elles ont la responsabilité de gérer de concert. C'est pourquoi, à mon sens, les consultations entre les cinq devraient porter en premier lieu sur la gestion des crises, particulièrement en cas d'incidents impliquant des armes nucléaires, et sur l'amélioration des communications en période de crise.

Parmi les cinq États dotés d'armes nucléaires, les deux superpuissances possèdent de loin les plus importants arsenaux. Elles ont en conséquence la responsabilité de faire preuve pour les réduire du même génie qu'elles ont appliqué à les construire. Et elles doivent s'interdire de laisser leur opinion sur la moralité et la légitimité de l'autre entraver une reprise rapide des pourparlers sur le contrôle des armements. Elles doivent absolument revenir à la table des négociations sur le contrôle et la réduction des armes nucléaires stratégiques et de portée moyenne.

Au cours des dix dernières années, les superpuissances n'ont pas signé une seule entente importante sur le contrôle des armements. Pendant la décennie précédente, elles en avaient pourtant conclu une douzaine. Elles doivent maintenant poser des gestes pour dissiper la méfiance. Dans ce sens, elles auraient intérêt à sanctionner une entente qu'elles observent déjà : le Traité sur l'imposition d'un seuil de limitation des essais nucléaires souterrains.

J'ai accordé beaucoup d'attention jusqu'ici aux relations entre les cinq, à l'environnement bilatéral des superpuissances et aux négociations et conférences multilatérales. Le processus consultatif que nous offre l'OTAN renforce dans une large mesure notre contribution à ces travaux. L'OTAN est en effet une tribune importante pour le Canada tant en ce qui concerne sa politique nationale que la sécurité collective et la conduite fondamentale des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Lors de la création de l'OTAN, en 1949, le Canada avait insisté pour que cette alliance soit non seulement militaire mais aussi politique. Et il continue en toute loyauté de respecter ses engagements de longue date envers l'Alliance et ses politiques.

Mais toutes les institutions tendent naturellement à glisser sur la pente de l'inertie, à moins que leurs membres ne les vivifient et ne repensent leurs orientations. Je me suis donc réjoui de la décision prise par les ministres de l'OTAN, à leur réunion de décembre, de faire procéder à un examen complet des mesures que l'Alliance peut prendre pour améliorer les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Le Canada avait d'ailleurs préconisé une telle mesure à plusieurs réunions au sommet de l'OTAN.

Le dernier examen de ce genre avait été effectué en 1967, à l'initiative de M. Pierre Harmel, ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Belgique. On avait à ce moment-là, tout comme aujourd'hui, le sentiment qu'un changement s'imposait. L'Alliance avait besoin de se donner une vision de l'avenir et une stratégie politique pour la réaliser. Le document issu de ce travail, intitulé "Les tâches futures de l'Alliance", marqua une étape importante dans l'orientation de l'OTAN. Il vint répondre, comme nous devons le faire aujourd'hui, au besoin d'une politique générale pour orienter notre sécurité militaire et lui donner son plein sens.

Les conclusions les plus profondes contenues dans ce document étaient les suivantes:

- la sécurité militaire n'est pas incompatible avec une politique de détente. Au contraire, l'une et l'autre doivent se compléter;
- le travail de réduction équilibrée des forces militaires et les efforts pour enrayer l'instabilité et l'insécurité doivent être intensifiés;
- le monde a changé depuis la création de l'OTAN, en 1949, et il nous faut orienter notre action en fonction de notre vision de l'avenir;
- chaque membre de l'Alliance a une contribution à y apporter, de plain-pied et en consultation avec les autres États qui en font partie.

En dépit d'échecs fréquents, les résultats de cette politique s'avèrent impressionnants, surtout si on les considère dans la perspective actuelle : les règlements interallemands de la fin des années soixante; la promotion bilatérale de liens avec l'URSS par de nombreux pays de l'Ouest, y compris ma propre visite en 1971; les éléments d'un rapprochement entre les superpuissances, et l'Acte final d'Helsinki conclu en 1975.

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Nous devons aborder la période à venir avec le même esprit de recherche, la même diplomatie créatrice et la même vision prospective.

Le monde a encore changé depuis 1967. Nous percevons les transferts de pouvoir et l'évolution des mentalités. Et les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest sont beaucoup plus complexes qu'elles ne l'étaient il y a 17 ans, car des courants d'autarcie, d'interaction et d'interdépendance, imprévisibles alors, viennent les perturber.

Le nouvel examen décrété par les ministres de l'OTAN doit de toute nécessité permettre de définir l'orientation de l'Alliance pour jusqu'à la fin du siècle. Le Canada participera à ce travail et se conformera à ses résultats. Qu'il me soit permis de féliciter ici le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Belgique, M. Léo Tindemans, d'avoir lancé cette initiative. Et de saluer dans la personne du nouveau secrétaire général de l'OTAN, lord Carrington, un homme dont les idées sur les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest seront pour nous une source de créativité en même temps que de bon sens.

L'OTAN est une alliance de démocraties. L'ouverture des discussions et l'autonomie d'action sont tout aussi importantes pour nous qu'elles l'étaient pour M. Harmel. Une alliance qui ne saurait pas respecter la démocratie dans ses assemblées ne réussirait pas davantage à la défendre sur le terrain. Les réunions au sommet de l'OTAN revêtent une importance particulière et devraient constituer l'échelon suprême du leadership responsable et du véritable dialogue. Mme Thatcher et moi-même avons discuté ce point lors de sa visite au Canada, en septembre dernier. Dans mon allocution suivant le dîner donné en son honneur à Toronto, je disais:

"... le Canada considère l'OTAN comme la pierre angulaire de sa politique de défense. Nous ne voulons cependant pas en être des partenaires silencieux. Il s'agit après tout d'une alliance politique, et les politiciens aiment à discuter, voire à argumenter. Si, de temps à autre, nous sommes en désaccord et déployons de grands efforts pour résoudre nos différends, loin d'être un symptôme de faiblesse, c'est plutôt un signe de la force qui imprègne notre association libre de pays indépendants."

Tout comme le dernier cadre de politique général de l'OTAN avait été le produit du ferment intellectuel et de la turbulence militaire des années soixante, de même le prochain examen de ses orientations devrait tenir compte, au moins en tant que toile de fond, de toutes

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1 idées actuelles sur la sécurité internationale et les effets des armes nucléaires. Nombre de ces idées sont troublantes, incompatibles et difficiles à aborder. Mais elles ont cours, et aucune conspiration de silence ne les fera disparaître.

Ni l'Alliance ni les démocraties qui en font partie ne sont fondées sur une foi aveugle. Et les dogmes politiques ou stratégiques ne suffisent pas à eux seuls à rallier l'appui des peuples aux politiques de défense et aux dépenses qu'elles entraînent. Pour combler le fossé entre la sagesse établie et l'inquiétude du public, il faut assurément pénétrer un domaine actuellement occupé par de nombreux critiques de toutes convictions: celui des idées et doctrines contemporaines.

A mon sens, le nouvel examen des orientations de l'OTAN devra refléter ce que j'ai appelé le besoin de haute politique à tous les paliers des rapports entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Et il devra tenir compte, comme l'avait fait M. Harmel, des différences de perceptions entre les membres de l'Alliance; des perspectives, inconséquences et ambiguïtés européennes et nord-américaines, et des doutes et aspirations encore vagues qui se font jour de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique.

(Traduction)

Les Canadiens savent à quel point l'heure est grave. Ils savent que notre influence est limitée et que nous ne pouvons forcer les autres pays à nous écouter. Mais ils savent aussi que le Canada a un rôle à jouer. Dans ce sens, le gouvernement s'occupe de créer un institut chargé de la défense et du contrôle des armements pour aider le Canada et les Canadiens à orienter et faire progresser le débat sur la paix et la sécurité.

De nombreux Canadiens et Canadiennes m'ont appuyé et encouragé tout au cours de mes démarches pour subordonner la science de la guerre à l'art de la politique. Je tiens à leur exprimer mes remerciements, Monsieur le Président...

(Texte)

...mais je veux aussi remercier en langue française les correspondants très nombreux qui m'ont écrit en cette langue pour m'encourager de leurs conseils, de leurs prières, et les remercier très vivement d'avoir voulu participer avec nous le gouvernement, avec nous le Parlement, à cette démarche...

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(...aduction)

...et je leur donne l'assurance, à eux et à tous les députés ici présents, que le travail amorcé se poursuivra. Le gouvernement du Canada est voué à cette entreprise et il entend la mener à bonne fin.

Mais nous avons besoin pour cela de la collaboration des États qui possèdent des armements nucléaires et ont le pouvoir d'y recourir. Car ce sont les puissances nucléaires, et par-dessus tout les superpuissances, qui portent en l'occurrence la plus grande part de responsabilité. Souhaitons que la postérité puisse dire d'elles que notre époque fut celle où elles surent soumettre leur génie technique à leur jugement politique et subordonner leur intérêt au bien commun. Souhaitons, en d'autres termes, qu'il y ait une postérité.

Et souhaitons que l'on puisse affirmer des autres nations qu'elles ont pris conscience de leur responsabilité de travailler à réduire la menace d'anéantissement, à promouvoir le renoncement aux armes nucléaires et à établir une paix durable.

Souhaitons enfin que l'on puisse dire du Canada et des Canadiens que nous avons vu venir la crise; que nous avons agi et pris des risques; que nous avons été loyaux envers nos amis et ouverts avec nos adversaires et que, fidèles à nos idéaux, nous avons fait tout en notre pouvoir pour écarter le spectre de la guerre.

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**TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON PEACE  
AND SECURITY, OTTAWA, FEBRUARY 9, 1984**

(TEXT)

When the first atomic bomb exploded in a New Mexico desert in 1945, life itself changed. Man gave himself the power of his own destruction.

Never again would children be free from fear of the bomb. Never again would we parents be able to reassure them. Nor to calm our own anxieties.

A nuclear war would make no distinction between the sides of this House on which we find ourselves, between right and wrong, between rich or poor, between east or west, north or south.

Nuclear weapons exist. They probably always will. And they work, with horrible efficiency. They threaten the very future of our species. We have no choice but to manage that risk. Never again can we put the task out of our minds; nor trivialize it; nor make it routine.

Nor dare we lose heart.

Managing the threat of nuclear war is the primordial duty of both East and West. But Canadians are concerned that the superpowers may have become diverted from this elemental responsibility. That they may be too caught up in ideological competition, in endless measurements of parity, in trials of strength and will. Canadians also know it would be foolhardy to expect that animosity between East and West will somehow disappear this side of the point of no return.

The experts would have us believe that the issues of nuclear war have become too complex for all but themselves. We are asked to entrust our fate to a handful of high priests of nuclear strategy. And to the scientists who have taken us from atom bombs to thermonuclear warheads, from missiles with one warhead to missiles with ten and more, from weapons that deter to weapons that threaten the existence of us all.

Canadians, and people everywhere, believe their security has been diminished, not enhanced, by a generation of work spent on perfecting the theories and instruments of human annihilation.



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But technological push too often finds a sympathetic political pull. It is leaders who decide on defence budgets and research budgets. It is leaders who must direct; it is leaders who must assert their will for peace, or science will devise ever more lethal weapons systems.

Canadian security is at stake; and Canada has earned the right to be heard, in peacetime and in war. Thousands of Canadians fought and died in two world wars that Canada had no hand in starting. We helped to shape the post-war world -- at Bretton Woods where the World Bank was launched; and at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, where the United Nations organization was born.

We advocated universal membership in the international community -- when it was not always popular to do so. As Prime Minister Diefenbaker demonstrated with respect to Cuba. As Prime Ministers St. Laurent and Pearson demonstrated in helping many independent states gain admission to the UN. And as my government demonstrated in recognizing the People's Republic of China and its right to a seat on the UN Security Council.

Canada emerged from World War II as one of the very few nations with both technology and resources to build nuclear weapons. But we had seen the terrible nature of these weapons and their work. Successive governments, therefore, renounced this nuclear option, and applied Canadian skills to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In place of a national nuclear force, we joined with others in systems of collective security -- in the UN, in NATO, and in NORAD.

Canada is a steadfast member of each of these three organizations. In the UN, we took the lead in peacemaking and peacekeeping in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. In NATO, Canada is one of the few countries to maintain Alliance forces permanently outside its borders. In NORAD, we contribute an element of priceless value: the airspace above our vast land. The United States can design its own defences knowing that for 4,000 kilometres north of them, the land is occupied by a stable ally.

We take our commitments seriously. We have replaced our maritime patrol planes with the most advanced aircraft of their kind in the world. We have equipped our armoured units with the high-performance Leopard tank. We are phasing in sophisticated tactical and interceptor aircraft. We have launched a program to acquire new frigates. All of this is the most modern equipment available. All of it tasked to defensive purposes.

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We decided in 1969 that it was no longer appropriate for the Canadian Armed Forces to be equipped with nuclear weapons. We announced our intention to phase these systems out in a manner fully consistent with our commitments to our allies and as quickly as equipment replacement permitted. By 1970, we had divested ourselves of the surface-to-surface Honest John rockets in Europe. By 1972, we had completed the conversion of Canadian aircraft in Europe from a nuclear strike to a conventional attack role.

Also, by 1972, the Bomarc ground to air missiles based in Canada had been returned to the USA. We subsequently decided to replace the nuclear-equipped Canada-based CF-101s, by state-of-the-art CF-18 interceptors. Those CF-18s will carry out our air defence role more effectively with conventional armaments than the CF-101 could do with nuclear weaponry. This means that later this year we shall have rid ourselves of the last vestiges of nuclear weapons.

We have done more than look to our defences. We have addressed the causes of insecurity and instability, particularly in the third world. East-West and North-South are the four points of the political compass of our modern age. The problems of the South cannot be solved in the absence of progress on global security. Massive military expenditures are distorting economic policies and diverting resources away from global economic development. This in turn is worsening third world instabilities that ensnare East and West and add to the insecurity of us all.

Canadians, therefore, have earned the right to speak. They are telling us, the members of this House, as people everywhere are telling their own leaders, that the danger is too near. They want their leaders to act, to accept their political responsibility, to work to reduce the nuclear threat.

Last fall I spoke of an ominous rhythm of crisis. I drew attention to the confluence of three potentially disastrous trends -- the resort to force to settle disputes, the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the worsening state of East-West relations. I decided to practice what all seven leaders of the industrialized democracies had proclaimed last summer at Williamsburg: "...to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war".

I decided to use Canada's influence to call international attention to the danger, to try to inject high-level political energy into East-West relations, to turn the trend line of crisis, to work at the crossroads of common interest between the two sides.

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I proposed that the megaphones be put away, that an armistice be declared in the war of ideology and recrimination, that an end be made to manichaeism on both sides. That we exercise leadership, and apply statecraft, in East-West relations -- the most important strategic relationship that we have.

### THE INITIATIVE

Since last fall I have taken that message to Paris, The Hague, Brussels and Rome; to the Vatican, to Bonn, to London and to Zurich. I presented it in Tokyo, and Dhaka, and to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi. To Peking, to Washington, and to the United Nations. I met with leaders in Prague, East Berlin and Bucharest, to ensure that our message was heard in the highest councils of the Warsaw Pact.

At each step along the way, my message was straightforward. Canada was not looking for a seat at the superpower table. But our lives and our future were on that table, as were those of the nine-tenths of the world's population living outside the USA and the USSR. We all had a right and a responsibility to involve ourselves, to press those at the table to remember their own humanity.

We proposed giving political impetus to the Stockholm Conference on measures to build confidence and reduce the risk of war in Europe. As many other East-West contacts collapsed, that conference took on importance even beyond its status as the only forum serving the Helsinki process of detente.

We insisted that both sides invest political effort to stimulate the talks in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions. These MBFR talks are the key to achieving parity of conventional forces in Central Europe and to raising the nuclear threshold, thereby diminishing reliance on early first use of nuclear weapons.

If I may make an aside, I want to insist that the MBFR are concerned with force reductions. They are not seeking equilibrium at a higher level. They are seeking equilibrium at a lower level. And I can't understand for the life of me, because I have explained it many times, why raising the nuclear threshold by balancing conventional forces is always interpreted by my critics as balancing at a higher level. Surely the purpose of MBFR is to seek a balance at a lower level, and therefore raise the nuclear threshold.

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We also proposed meetings as soon as possible of the five nuclear powers so that a forum might be established wherein to negotiate global limits and, eventually, reductions to their nuclear arsenals.

We urged action to reinforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is in the interest of superpower, middle-power and micro-state alike. And yet, as long as the five nuclear powers show little sign of initiating the reductions called for in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we run the grave risk of seeing nuclear weapons spread to new regions and to old rivalries.

Above all, at each step along the way I urged political leaders to commit themselves personally; to put peace at the top of their agenda; to exercise the political leadership the current dangerous situation demands -- to restart the dialogue between East and West.

I told President Reagan that the signals he was sending of American strength were being received in the East -- but that a message of peace was not getting through. I told leaders in Eastern Europe that the harsh rhetoric of their declarations had guaranteed rejection of the Warsaw Pact's more positive proposals, and there were some.

#### SIGNS OF PROGRESS

Misperceptions and mistrust on both sides run deep. But I believe we are beginning to see signs of progress.

In Goa, in November, forty-two Commonwealth leaders strongly endorsed our efforts to restore East-West political dialogue and to promote negotiations among the nuclear weapons states.

In Brussels, in December, NATO foreign ministers reached a consensus on several points I have argued strenuously during the past few years: particularly at NATO summits that were held. They made a declaration which offered the East a balanced and constructive relationship; they made it clear that the West did not aspire to strategic superiority; and that the West respected the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests. These are statements out of Brussels, in December; a meeting attended by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister; a meeting where he played an important role in getting these points accepted.

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In accordance with our initiative, East and West have now agreed to resume the MBFR talks in Vienna on March 16. And they have agreed that foreign ministers should play a more active role in stimulating progress at those talks.

At our insistence, NATO foreign ministers participated early last month in the opening of the Stockholm Conference, to underline the importance they attached to high-level political dialogue. The Warsaw Pact foreign ministers responded to this Western move and also went to Stockholm. Of special significance was the presence in Stockholm -- and it would not have happened otherwise -- of US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who met for over five hours. Both also met with my colleague the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Broad political contact was thus re-established between the countries of East and West for the first time since the acrimonious conclusion of the Madrid Conference last September, in the shadow of the Korean airliner tragedy.

Even Prime Minister Thatcher has taken steps to improve contacts between East and West. Her visit to Budapest last week is a further signal of momentum in East-West dialogue -- a determination to seek out areas of understanding between members of opposing alliances, and to promote a reassuring clarity about intentions.

In contrast to earlier statements, President Reagan twice last month signalled a constructive tone in American policy towards the USSR. The response from Moscow has been mixed -- elements of tough rhetoric together with signs of a cautious readiness to re-open lines of communication.

I have, Mr. Speaker, just returned from consultations with the leaders of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Romania. Those countries represent a middle-European geography, and a middle-power psychology, with long experience of East-West tensions.

Obviously they are closely allied to the Soviet Union. But their leadership, their influence, and their identity are, in present circumstances, significant. I found, for example, a very positive response to my suggestion that the middle powers of each alliance could play a constructive part in reviving habits of consultation at the highest levels of East-West politics.

I gave them our Western perspective on the decline of détente, and on the importance of its renewal, and I listened to their own. We talked about the mixture of signals between East and West, and about the need to go beyond an improvement in rhetoric, toward acts and gestures to restore confidence and reduce tensions.

I return with several conclusions from my talks in Eastern Europe:

- First, I was struck by the contrast between the cordial, reasonable, and non-ideological private talks, and the occasional blast of Warsaw Pact fundamentalism to which we were subjected in public. I believe this disparity underlines the importance of personal contact and private dialogue. Without that dialogue, both sides risk remaining prisoners of their own polemic.
- Second, because we were able in our private talks to strip away much of the invective surrounding key issues, I believe we were able to begin a process of exposing areas of common interest. That process will take time, but I dare hope that a new level of maturity in East-West relations is within our grasp.
- Third, if we are to reach that level of maturity, we shall have to grapple with difficult problems of misperception on both sides -- blind spots and distortions, subjective errors of analysis or of judgment.

Few of my interlocutors, for example, seemed genuinely able to perceive, let alone concede, the gravity of the threat posed to Western countries by the deployment of Soviet SS-20's. And for our part, I wondered whether we in the West had not significantly underestimated the full impact on the East of the combination of INF deployment with the harsh rhetoric of recent years.

It will be uphill work to gain a more accurate perception of each other, and to gauge more accurately the consequences of our various words and deeds. From a confrontational deadlock where INF deployment must continue, and negotiations must be restored, only the "third rail" of political confidence and communication can ensure an early and constructive outcome.

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In reflecting on these conclusions, and on the substance of my talks in Eastern and Western capitals alike, it is clear to me that areas of common interest are beginning to emerge. Let me suggest ten principles of a common bond between East and West:

1. -- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
2. -- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
3. -- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
4. -- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
5. -- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
6. -- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
7. -- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
8. -- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
9. -- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
10. -- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

As decalogues go, this may seem modest. But I wonder, in this period when there are positive signs of emergence from a time of crisis, whether there is not sound purpose in going back to basics. Beginning again, with a commitment to principles which can be shared. Finding a place to start -- surveying a little common ground on which to stand.

Therefore, we intend to draw on these ten principles, to develop elements of a common purpose among the leaders of East and West.

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I shall be writing to President Reagan and to President Andropov, to leaders in both alliances, and to other statesmen, to propose that these are principles upon which both sides can build. Because there are points of agreement as well as disagreement. There is a way around the impasse of recent months. There are signs of promise and I believe that the trend-line of crisis has turned.

As we look back on our work over the past four months, and look to the months ahead, I am encouraged that we are beginning to see results. We sought to catalyze a dialogue between East and West. And that is happening. We sought to persuade both sides to turn down their rhetoric. And that has begun to happen.

I sought to associate myself with like-minded leaders in several quarters of the world. Many of them have begun, or continued, to make their own contribution to a reduction of tensions, to put forward their own proposals for arms control. My colleague the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs and I have pursued the Canadian initiative in multilateral institutions, in bilateral relations, at special conferences, and in dialogue with groups and individuals.

#### THE TASKS AHEAD

We have injected political energy into East-West relations. But political energy is not, by itself, enough. It must be nourished by imagination, fortified by persistence, and confirmed by action. Imagination to find new ideas, which break old deadlocks and address emerging dangers. Persistence to negotiate new agreements and to meet the challenge of technology. Action in the form even of small steps as evidence of good faith. Action on specific tasks such as developing the means to verify arms control agreements, or in regularly scheduled consultations between East and West.

#### (TRANSLATION)

In the months ahead Canada will build on the progress so far achieved, to ensure that our ideas are further developed and implemented. We have no monopoly of proposals, nor do we expect them to gain acceptance overnight. What counts is that some, though by no means all, of the key East-West indicators show that their downward course has been arrested.



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My own personal contribution, though necessarily less intensive than in recent months, will definitely continue. One will understand that 16 countries plus the United Nations in three months is a pace that I could not keep for an entire year. I intend to go to Moscow, whenever circumstances permit. Our initiative will also be taken forward by my Cabinet colleagues, by our ambassadors abroad and by all Canadians who share our purposes.

Canada will play its part in the councils of the West, in bilateral talks, at multilateral meetings and conferences, in contacts with the Soviet Union and its allies.

We shall work vigorously for progress in the Stockholm Conference and the MBFR talks. If these talks bog down, Canada will endeavour to ensure that political leaders again take a personal hand in energizing them. Once the MBFR negotiations resume in March, it will be imperative that NATO respond to the proposal made last summer by the Warsaw Pact.

Following further consultations with our NATO allies, we shall in the course of the current session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, circulate three proposals to gear down the momentum of new technology. We will thus give additional substance to the strategy of suffocation which I put forward in 1978. These proposals are:

- a ban on high-altitude anti-satellite systems,
- restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs,
- improvements in the verifiability of future strategic weapons.

In the months leading up to next year's review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we shall continue to press both sides to keep the NPT bargain. For security is indivisible. If countries which do not now have nuclear weapons acquire them, then everyone's security is diminished.

The basis of the NPT bargain was that the nuclear powers would reduce their armaments in return for the non-nuclear powers not building their own, and that both would cooperate in sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus, the current nuclear weapons states bear an immense responsibility in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

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Consequently, we must also continue to press our proposal for a conference of the five nuclear weapons states. It is a concept whose logic is compelling. Those five nuclear powers are at the same time the permanent members of the Security Council. They have responsibilities as well as vetoes. That is why I asked the UN Secretary General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, to explore and to promote confidential meetings of their representatives in New York. In my talks with Premier Zhao in January, I found that the Chinese had, since my visit to Peking, begun to express a readiness to consider such contacts in New York without the pre-conditions they had raised before.

The idea will take hold slowly, to be sure, as new ideas do. But I believe that it will take hold. For example: accident, miscalculation, crisis, systems failure -- these are nuclear perils which all of the five powers must cope with. And which they have the responsibility to manage cooperatively. I suggest, therefore, that an early focus of five-power consultations should be crisis management; particularly the handling of nuclear weapons incidents, and the improvement of crisis communications.

Among the five nuclear weapons states, the two super-powers have by far the largest arsenals. They bear a corresponding responsibility to apply the same genius to reducing their arms as they did to building them. They must not let their views of each other's morality and legitimacy prevent an early resumption of arms control talks. It is vital that they resume negotiations on limiting and reducing intermediate range and strategic nuclear weapons.

This past decade the superpowers have not ratified a single significant arms control agreement. In the preceding decade they had ratified a dozen. Gestures are needed to lift the clouds of suspicion. A useful step would be for both sides to ratify an agreement which they observe already: the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

I have been giving considerable attention so far to five-power relationships, to the bilateral environment of the super-powers, to multilateral talks and conferences. Much of our own contribution to this work is enhanced by the consultative process open to us in NATO. NATO is a significant forum for Canada, whether in terms of national policy, of collective security, or of basic approaches to East-West relations.

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When NATO was formed in 1949, Canada insisted that it be a political alliance, as well as a military one. And Canada continues on that basis loyally to maintain our long-standing commitment to NATO and to its policies.

But all institutions tend, by their very nature, towards inertia unless their members give them energy and a renewed sense of direction. Thus I was gratified that NATO ministers decided, at their December meeting in Brussels, to commission a full review of the steps NATO can take to improve East-West relations. Canada had been urging such an approach at successive NATO summits.

The last such review, in 1967, took place at the initiative of Pierre Harmel, Foreign Minister of Belgium. Then, as now, there was a sense that things ought to change. There was a need for the Alliance to develop a vision of the future, and a political strategy to achieve it. The document which resulted, known as "The Future Tasks of the Alliance", was a landmark in NATO thinking. It came to terms, as in this period we also must come to terms, with the need for a broad policy which governs, and gives purpose to, our military security.

The Harmel Report's most profound conclusions were:

- that military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory. On the contrary, they must be complementary;
- that work towards a balanced reduction of military forces should be intensified, as well as efforts to overcome instability and insecurity;
- that the world had changed since the formation of NATO in 1949, and that there was a need to look ahead -- to gain sightlines on the future and to work along them.
- and that each member of the NATO Alliance had a contribution to make, not in subordination to, but in consultation with, the other members of the NATO Alliance.

Despite frequent setbacks, the results of that policy are impressive, especially when viewed from today's perspective: the inter-German settlements of the late sixties; the bilateral promotion of ties with the USSR by many Western countries, including my own visit in 1971; elements of rapprochement in the superpower relationship -- and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

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We need to approach the coming period with the same spirit of enquiry, the same creative diplomacy, the same forward-looking vision.

The world has changed since 1967. We sense the shifts of power and psychology. East-West relations are far more complex than they were 17 years ago. There are competing trends of autarky, interaction, and interdependence, unforeseeable at that time.

It is essential that this new review chart a course for the Alliance to the end of this century. Canada will make its own contribution to the work, and abide by the results. I congratulate the current Belgian Foreign Minister, Leo Tindemans, for his part in launching the review. I welcome the incoming Secretary General, Lord Carrington -- a man whose own ideas on East-West relations will inspire us with creativity and guide us with common-sense.

NATO is an alliance of democracies. Open discussion and independent action are as important for us as they were for Harmel. An alliance which fails to defend democracy in its councils will surely fail in its defence of democracy in the field. NATO summit meetings have a particular importance, and should be the senior level, the supreme level of responsible Alliance leadership and authentic debate. Prime Minister Thatcher and I discussed this point during her visit here last September. In my remarks after dinner in Toronto, I suggested that:

"...Canadians look upon NATO as the cornerstone of our defence policy. We do not wish to be silent partners, however. It is a political alliance, after all, and politicians like to discuss and even argue the issues. If we disagree from time to time, and expend great effort in trying to resolve our differences, that is not a sign of weakness in the Alliance, but a sign of the strength which pervades a free association of independent countries".

Just as NATO's last general policy framework emerged from the intellectual ferment and military turbulence of the 1960s, so should the next review take into account, if only as background, the full range of ideas now current about international security and the effects of nuclear arms. Many of these ideas are uncomfortable, incompatible, and awkward to examine. But they are there, and no conspiracy of silence will make them go away.

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Neither the Alliance, nor its member democracies, are built on blind faith. National support for defence policies -- and for defence expenditures -- cannot be sustained by political or strategic liturgy alone. Bridging the gap between accepted wisdom and public anxiety surely means an open examination of the intellectual territory now occupied by many critics -- critics of every persuasion, I might add -- of contemporary concepts and doctrines.

I believe the new NATO review should reflect what I have been calling the need to bring statecraft and high politics to every level of the East-West system. And I suggest that the review will also have to cope, as Harmel did, with differences of perception among Alliance members. With European and North American perspectives, inconsistencies and ambiguities. With inchoate doubts and aspirations on each side of the Atlantic.

(TEXT)

Canadians know the gravity of these issues. They know that Canada's power is limited and that we cannot force others to listen to us. But they also know that Canada has a role to play. That is why the government is creating a defence and arms control institute: to help Canada and Canadians more fully contribute to advancing the debate on peace and security, and to shaping that debate.

Throughout my own personal efforts to subject the science of war to the art of politics, I have been sustained by the support of many Canadians, and encouraged by their good wishes. I thank them now...

(TRANSLATION)

...but I wish also to thank in French the numerous people who have written to me in that language to encourage me with their advice, their prayers, and thank them heartily for having participated with us, the government, and us, the Parliament, in this process...

(TEXT)

...and assure them, as well as this House, that the work we have started will continue. The Government of Canada is committed to these purposes and will carry them forward.

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But we can carry them only so far without the collaboration of those who own and control nuclear weapons. Because it is the nuclear powers, and above all the superpowers, who bear the greatest responsibility. Let it be said of them in the future that this was the time when their political judgment controlled their technological genius, when their best interest served the common good. Let history survive, that it may judge them generously.

Let it be said of the other nations that they saw their own responsibility to work to reduce the threat of annihilation, to forego nuclear weapons, and to serve the purpose of a durable peace.

And let it be said of Canada, and of Canadians: that we saw the crisis; that we did act; that we took risks; that we were loyal to our friends and open with our adversaries; that we lived up to our ideals; and that we have done what we could to lift the shadow of war.

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# news release/communiqué

Office of the Leader of the Opposition/Bureau du Chef de l'Opposition

NOTES FOR AN ADDRESS

BY

BRIAN MULRONEY, M.P.,

LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION,

TO

THE THRONE SPEECH DEBATE

-- FOREIGN AFFAIRS --

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

FEBRUARY 9, 1984.

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY



WE MEET TO DISCUSS THE MOMENTOUS ISSUE OF PEACE AT A TIME WHEN HUMANITY IS FACED WITH THE AWFUL ALTERNATIVES OF SEEKING A PROCESS TO REDUCE INTERNATIONAL TENSION OR CREEPING TO THE BRINK OF NUCLEAR DEVASTATION.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE WORLD TODAY IS SUBJECTED TO STRAINS AND TENSIONS, UNIQUE IN MODERN HISTORY.

IT IS SOMEWHAT CURIOUS THAT WHILE MEN AND WOMEN MEET IN A SPIRIT OF AMITY FOR THE WINTER OLYMPICS -- THEIR POLITICAL LEADERS IGNORE THAT MAJESTIC EXAMPLE SET BY OUR YOUTH AND SPEAK INSTEAD OF THE IMPERATIVES OF CONFLICT THAT CAN ONLY DECIMATE THE SAME GENERATION.

PERHAPS THERE IS A LESSON FOR US IN THE PAGE OF HISTORY WHICH SHOWS HOW, IN EARLIER GENERATIONS, WAR BECAME INEVITABLE ONLY BECAUSE SO MANY THOUGHT IT WAS SO.

WE MUST NEVER SUCCUMB TO THE EASY TEMPTATION TO BELIEVE THAT WAR CANNOT BE AVOIDED, BECAUSE WE ARE AT THAT POINT IN HISTORY WHERE WE WILL NOT SURVIVE NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION. NOR CAN WE AFFORD A CONVENTIONAL WAR THAT MIGHT LEAD TO THE ULTIMATE COUNT-DOWN.

LET THERE BE NO ILLUSION ON THAT SCORE.

A NUCLEAR COUNT-DOWN ANY TIME IN THE FUTURE MEANS A COUNT-DOWN FOR ALL HUMANITY. THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONS. THERE ARE NO SAFE HAVENS.

WE ARE HERE TO RE-DEDICATE OURSELVES TO THE WEARYING ROAD OF COMPROMISE AND NEGOTIATION IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.



WE ARE HERE BECAUSE WE WANT TO BE, BECAUSE WE  
MUST.

WE ALL DREAM FOR THE DAY WHEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE  
BANISHED FROM THE EARTH.

BUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS CANNOT BE DISINVENTED. THEY  
ARE A TERRIFYING REALITY WHICH POLITICAL LEADERSHIP MUST  
SEEK TO CONSTRAIN. YET A FAILURE TO INCORPORATE A CREDIBLE  
NUCLEAR COMPONENT WITHIN NATO'S OVERALL STRATEGY WOULD BE  
AN INVITATION TO NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL WITH CONSEQUENCES TOO  
TERRIBLE TO CONTEMPLATE. SO IN THIS SENSE THE REAL  
QUESTION BEFORE US IS HOW CAN WE BEST ACHIEVE POLICIES  
WHICH REDUCE THE RECOURSE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND  
ELSEWHERE.

MY PARTY AND I APPROACH THIS MOST IMPORTANT  
QUESTION THROUGH THREE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES:

1. CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD REST ON A  
BI-PARTISAN SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS.
2. THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR SECURITY IS NATO  
SOLIDARITY.
3. ONLY THROUGH THE STRENGTHENING OF THE  
NON-NUCLEAR DETERRENT CAN WE REDUCE THE  
PRESENT RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

MR. SPEAKER PERMIT ME TO ELABORATE.

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SPOKEN ELOQUENTLY OF THE NEED FOR REDUCING EAST-WEST TENSION.

WE SHARE THIS VIEW AND, AS I STATED IN THE HOUSE LAST NOVEMBER 14TH AND SINCE, HAVE WISHED HIM WELL.

THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IS CRITICAL TO EVERY HOPE WE HAVE FOR CANADA, TO EVERY DREAM WE WISH FOR CANADIANS.

WE SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVES AND WELCOME HIS REPORT TO PARLIAMENT ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER WHICH HAS SO PRE-OCCUPIED HIS PERSONAL ATTENTION IN RECENT MONTHS.

UNTIL NOW, PARLIAMENT HAS GLEANED ITS INFORMATION FROM A POLITICAL PLATFORM IN MONTREAL WHERE THE PRIME MINISTER ELABORATED HIS PROPOSALS, AND FROM THE RECEPTION HALLS OF EASTERN EUROPE WHERE HE FILLED IN SOME BLANKS.

WE REGRET THIS DISRESPECT FOR PARLIAMENT. WE REGRET THAT HE HAS FAILED TO EQUIP HIMSELF IN A WAY THAT WOULD HAVE GIVEN HIS INITIATIVE ENORMOUS ADDITIONAL CREDIBILITY.

THE MISSING DIMENSION IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S APPROACH HAS BEEN A FORMAL ENDORSATION OF HIS PROPOSALS AND THE INCLUSION OF PERHAPS YET OTHERS BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS -- BEFORE HE BEGAN HIS INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL.

IN MY SPEECH OF DECEMBER 4TH, I URGED THE PRIME MINISTER TO INTRODUCE SUCH A RESOLUTION AND I'M SURE, HAD HE DONE SO, IT WOULD HAVE GAINED THE UNANIMOUS APPROVAL OF THIS HOUSE.

WITH SUCH AN ENDORSEMENT, THE PRIME MINISTER COULD HAVE DISMISSED AS UNWORTHY ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE PARTISAN NATURE OF HIS INITIATIVE.

WITH SUCH A MANDATE, THE PRIME MINISTER COULD HAVE PROPERLY CLAIMED THE SUPPORT OF ALL CANADIANS FOR HIS INITIATIVE.

I NOW CALL UPON THE PRIME MINISTER AGAIN TO BRING FORWARD AN APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION SO THAT THE MEMBERS OF THIS HOUSE MAY JOIN WITH HIM IN A WORTHWHILE ENDEAVOUR.

SUCH FORMAL SUPPORT OF ALL MEMBERS FOR A PEACE INITIATIVE HAS OTHER PRACTICAL AND POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES.

AS A REFLECTION OF THE UNANIMOUS SUPPORT OF THIS HOUSE, ALL-PARTY, NON-PARTISAN DELEGATIONS TO DISARMAMENT CONFERENCES CAN AND SHOULD PROVIDE DRAMATIC, VISUAL PROOF OF THE RESOLVE OF THIS HOUSE.

ANOTHER PRACTICAL EXTENSION OF THIS FORMAL, ALL-PARTY SUPPORT SHOULD BE A REFERENCE TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE TO STUDY EXISTING AREAS OF CONFLICT.

WHILE WE MAY BE PREOCCUPIED WITH NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE, WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT SOME 4 MILLION SOLDIERS ARE PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN MORE THAN 35 ARMED CONFLICTS.

A QUARTER OF THE WORLD'S NATIONS ARE CURRENTLY CAUGHT UP IN SUCH CONFLICTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY CLAIMED OVER 5 MILLION LIVES.

AND, AS THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MEMBER FOR YELLOWHEAD WARNED IN REPLY TO THE THRONE SPEECH ON APRIL 15, 1980 THIS DECADE "SEEMS CERTAIN TO BE A PERIOD OF VIRTUALLY CONTINUOUS REGIONAL INSTABILITY" WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME "RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS ARE DETERIORATING."

THE EVENTS IN LEBANON, SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND CENTRAL AMERICA UNDERLINE THE URGENCY TO FOCUS PARLIAMENTARY ATTENTION ON WAYS IN WHICH CANADA CAN BE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION.

A CALL FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE INF DISARMAMENT TALKS IN GENEVA WOULD BE STRONGER IF ENDORSED BY THIS HOUSE. SO WOULD THE PRIME MINISTER'S CALL FOR MEETINGS OF THE WORLD'S FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION HAS PREOCCUPIED CANADIANS FOR MANY YEARS. I CANNOT HELP BUT RECALL THE INITIATIVE TAKEN BY THE THEN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, HOWARD GREEN, AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE U.N. COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN 1962 WHERE HE PROPOSED THE SPECIFIC TEXT OF A DRAFT DECLARATION INTENDED TO BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM OUTER SPACE.

WITH PARLIAMENT'S ENCOURAGEMENT, CANADA COULD RESUME WITH RENEWED VIGOUR THIS LONG-STANDING AND LEADING ROLE IN PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AMONG THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH NOW POSSESS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND THOSE WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL OF DEVELOPING NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY.

I HAVE NOT BEEN A MEMBER LONG, BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT WE NEED TO RESTORE THIS CHAMBER AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR SEEKING NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON THE CHALLENGE WE FACE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. NOT EVERYTHING NEED BE DEFINED IN NARROW PARTISAN OR ADVERSARIAL POLITICS.

INDEED, IN A VERY REAL SENSE THIS CHAMBER AND ITS INSTRUMENTS SHOULD BE THE CENTER FOR THE PROMOTION OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PROGRAMS IN CANADA.

FEW INITIATIVES COULD BE MORE ENNOBLING.

FEWER STILL COULD BRING MORE COMFORT TO CANADIANS.

CANADA HAS FOR MANY YEARS TAKEN PRIDE IN ITS ABILITY TO PLAY THE ROLE OF HONEST BROKER IN WORLD AFFAIRS.

THIS IS A VALID AND IMPORTANT ROLE FOR CANADA.

THE PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE IS, I BELIEVE, INTENDED TO BE IN THIS TRADITION.

IT IS WITH SOME CONCERN, AND NO SENSE OF PARTISANSHIP, THAT I NOTE AN APPARENT CONFUSION IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT BETWEEN ON THE ONE HAND, THE ROLE OF ALLIANCE MEMBER AND, ON THE OTHER, SOME NEUTRALIST OBSERVER OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

THAT CONFUSION ARISES, I BELIEVE, FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO UNDERSTATE THE VALUE OF SOME VERY IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES IN THE HOPE OF MAKING SOME PROGRESS WITH HIS PROPOSALS FOR PEACE.

I TELL YOU CLEARLY:

WE ARE A WESTERN NATION, A MEMBER OF NATO.

WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE IDEALS OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE FREEDOMS.

WE ARE CHILDREN OF LIBERTY.

ON THESE PRINCIPLES WE CANNOT AND SHALL NOT  
COMPROMISE.

WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT NEITHER THE INEXORABLE  
FINLANDIZATION OF EUROPE NOR A NEUTRALIST CANADA.

WE IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE ARE PREPARED TO  
DEFEND OURSELVES AGAINST ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ALIEN AND  
ODIOUS SYSTEMS ON US THROUGH THE USE OF FORCE OR THREATS  
OF FORCE.

WE SHOULD VIEW SOVIET INTENTIONS REALISTICALLY.

SOVIET POLICY IN EUROPE HAS BEEN ANIMATED BY TWO  
CLEAR AIMS: THE PRESERVATION OF SOVIET DOMINANCE IN  
EASTERN EUROPE; AND THE WEAKENING OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE,  
ESPECIALLY THE LINKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP MUST BE EVER VIGILANT TO  
AVOID BECOMING A PAWN IN THIS SOVIET STRATEGY.

THAT IS WHY NATO SHOULD QUITE PROPERLY BE THE  
FORUM FOR OUR INITIATIVES.

IN TORONTO LAST DECEMBER 4, PRIOR TO HIS  
DEPARTURE FOR BRUSSELS, I ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO URGE FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE  
EXISTING NON-FIRST STRIKE POLICY WITHIN THE PRIVATE  
COUNCILS OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS.

I RECOGNIZE THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF MY URGINGS  
AND I WANT TO RETURN TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL, BUT  
THE FORUM -- PRIVATE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS -- IS  
EQUALLY IMPORTANT.

THAT IS THE FORUM IN WHICH TO DISCUSS NATO  
POLICY.

INDEED, THE PRIME MINISTER, COMMENTING ON MY  
TORONTO REMARKS IN THIS HOUSE LAST DECEMBER 9, CHIDED ME  
FOR GOING AS FAR AS I DID, SAYING IT WOULD BE BETTER IF "I  
RESERVED THIS KIND OF DISCUSSION FOR THE NATO FORUM,  
WHICH", HE WENT ON TO SAY, "WE ARE DOING".

I WAS, THEREFORE, DISTURBED BY TWO ASPECTS OF THE  
PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT TOUR OF WARSAW PACT CAPITALS.

FIRST, WHILE DISCUSSION WITHIN THE COUNCILS OF  
THE ALLIANCE IS ONE THING, IT IS QUITE ANOTHER MATTER TO  
PUBLICLY -- IN THE COURSE OF THIS TOUR OF WARSAW PACT  
COUNTRIES -- CALL INTO QUESTION THE DETERMINATION OF NATO  
ALLIES TO CARRY OUT EXISTING POLICIES OF THE ALLIANCE.



AS FORMER FRENCH PRIME MINISTER BARRE POINTED OUT, TO DO SO IS TO UNDERMINE THE FOUNDATION OF SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE CREDIBILITY ON WHICH COLLECTIVE SECURITY RESTS.

SECOND, I WAS ASTONISHED TO LEARN THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND CHAIRMAN HONECKER OF EAST GERMANY HAD AGREED TO ESTABLISH A COMMITTEE OF OFFICIALS AND MINISTERS "TO WORK TOGETHER TO SORT OF IDENTIFY THE AREAS WHERE WE CAN AGREE."

SUCH CONSULTATION, OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE FRAMEWORK, CAN ONLY LEAD TO CONFUSION AND POTENTIAL MISCALCULATION.

THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR SECURITY IS NATO SOLIDARITY. BUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S ATTITUDE AS EXPRESSED LAST WEEK IN DAVOS AND EASTERN EUROPE IS PART OF A PATTERN WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED HIS GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO DEFENCE AND THE ALLIANCE.

IN APRIL, 1969, THE PRIME MINISTER UNILATERALLY CUT OUR NATO COMMITMENT IN HALF SAYING "CANADA HAD NO FOREIGN POLICY OF ANY IMPORTANCE EXCEPT THAT WHICH FLOWED FROM NATO AND THIS IS A FALSE PERSPECTIVE FOR ANY COUNTRY."

UNDER THIS PRIME MINISTER, DEFENCE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP HAS BEEN CUT BY 38%.

THIS POLICY OF WILFULL NEGLECT OF OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE HAS LED TO A SITUATION IN WHICH CANADA SPENDS LESS PER CAPITA ON DEFENCE THAN ANY OTHER NATION IN THE NATO ALLIANCE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF LUXEMBOURG.

WE DAILY SEND OUR COURAGEOUS MILITARY PERSONNEL OUT IN OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT AND ASK THEM TO CARRY OUT DANGEROUS MISSIONS.

CANADIANS VALUE THE DEDICATION AND DEVOTION OF OUR ARMED FORCES AND DO NOT EXPECT THEM TO RISK THEIR LIVES IN SUCH OUTDATED EQUIPMENT.

THIS PATTERN OF NEGLECT OF THE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT HAS DAMAGED OUR REPUTATION FOR RELIABILITY AMONG OUR ALLIES.

IT HAS COMMENSURATELY DIMINISHED OUR INFLUENCE IN THE SAME COUNCILS. I TAKE NO PLEASURE IN SETTING OUT THESE FACTS! CANADIANS TAKE NO PRIDE IN ACKNOWLEDGING THEIR ACCURACY.

SUCH NEGLECT OF THE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT HAS CONTRIBUTED TO AN OVER-RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. YOU CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS.

YOU CAN'T ECHO SUPPORT FOR NATO AND CONSISTENTLY NEGLECT SUPPORT FOR OUR ARMED FORCES SO THAT OUR ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS CANNOT BE HONOURED. NOR CAN WE CONTINUE TO FLAIL AT THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA AND NOT BE PREPARED TO ENHANCE THE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT.

A DETERMINED EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO REDUCE OUR PRESENT DEPENDENCE ON A POSSIBLE EARLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVING THE CONVENTIONAL COMPONENT OF OUR DEFENCE.

WHILE WE CANNOT -- AT LEAST IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE -- HOPE TO ESCAPE FROM USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DETER AGGRESSION, WE MUST MAKE AN ENERGETIC ATTEMPT TO REDUCE NATO'S PRESENT DEPENDENCE ON THE EARLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A DETERRENT.

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE NON-NUCLEAR DETERRENT ARE MOST URGENTLY REQUIRED AND SHOULD BE A TASK OF HIGH POLITICAL PRIORITY IN CANADA AND ALL OTHER NATO COUNTRIES.

IF WE ARE NOT TO SELL OUR MOST CHERISHED VALUES SHORT, WE MUST ACCEPT THE REQUIREMENT OF EFFECTIVE CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

GENERAL BERNARD ROGERS, THE PRESENT SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER IN EUROPE, STATED IN THE SUMMER OF 1982 THAT MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES WERE FEASIBLE AT A MODEST PRICE. THESE IMPROVEMENTS, HE SAID, WOULD PERMIT A SHIFT FROM THE PRESENT STRATEGY REQUIRING THE EARLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO A STRATEGY OF "NO EARLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

GENERAL ROGERS ESTIMATED THE COST TO BE APPROXIMATELY 1% GREATER THAN THE 3% ANNUAL REAL INCREASE WHICH NATO AGREED TO IN 1978. ROGERS FURTHER POINTED OUT THAT WHAT THIS 1% ANNUAL INCREASE IN REAL TERMS MEANS IS SLIGHTLY MORE THAN \$10 (U.S.) PER MAN, WOMAN AND CHILD THROUGHOUT NATO.

A FURTHER REPORT ANALYZING THESE POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVING AWAY FROM NATO'S PRESENT NUCLEAR RELIANCE WAS CONDUCTED BY THE PRESTIGIOUS EUROPEAN SECURITY STUDY.

THEIR REPORT CONCLUDES THAT NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES COULD BE STRENGTHENED SUBSTANTIALLY AT A TOTAL COST SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE MX MISSILE.

ONLY AFTER CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE IMPROVEMENTS ARE IN PLACE COULD NATO MINISTERS THEN CONSIDER SETTING IN MOTION A SERIES OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS WHICH COULD ULTIMATELY REDUCE THE RECOURSE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE ENHANCED WESTERN CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT I'VE DESCRIBED SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE WARSAW PACT FROM ACHIEVING A RAPID STRATEGIC SUCCESS.

AS A RESULT, ARMS CONTROL COULD BE USED AS A MEANS TO INTRODUCE INCENTIVES WHICH WOULD HELP MOVE NUCLEAR FORCES AWAY FROM PROVOCATIVE AND DESTABILIZING POSTURES.

WE STAND READY TO ACCEPT THIS POLICY. WE BELIEVE THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF CANADIANS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS APPROACH.

A NEW GOVERNMENT WILL ENCOURAGE SUCH ACTION. ONLY BY SO DOING CAN WE HELP TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION.

IT IS MY BELIEF THAT MINIMIZING THE RECOURSE TO TO SUCH WEAPONS IS A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY.

BUT ALL OF THIS IS POSSIBLE ONLY THROUGH A

CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES  
I OUTLINED, NAMELY:

- CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD REST ON A  
BI-PARTISAN SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS;
- THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR SECURITY IS THE NATO  
FRAMEWORK;
- AND, FINALLY, ONLY THROUGH THE STRENGTHENING  
OF THE NON-NUCLEAR DETERRENT CAN WE REDUCE  
THE PRESENT RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

I URGE THE GOVERNMENT AND THIS HOUSE TO  
REVITALIZE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ALLIANCE SECURITY.

BECAUSE, ONLY THROUGH SUCH SUPPORT CAN THE  
POLITICAL COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE BE MAINTAINED, THEREBY  
LEADING TO THE CONSIDERATION AND HOPEFULLY THE ADOPTION OF  
THOSE MEASURES WHICH LEAD TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

WE HAVE TO WALK THIS ROAD TO PEACE TOGETHER AND I  
TELL YOU THAT I AM LIKE MANY IN THIS CHAMBER AND ACROSS  
CANADA.

I HAVE THREE YOUNG CHILDREN AT HOME AND I WANT TO  
LEAVE FOR THEM A WORLD FREE OF THE MENACE OF NUCLEAR WAR.

THIS WOULD BE THE GREATEST GIFT WE COULD LEAVE TO  
THE CHILDREN OF THE WORLD.

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BUT TO SUCCEED IN THIS DREAM WE MUST STRIVE WITH GREATER RESOLVE. WE MUST NEGOTIATE WITH GREATER SENSITIVITY.

WE MUST SPEAK WITH A SOFTER VOICE. THIS CONVEYS A MORE SUBSTANTIAL MESSAGE. THE CHALLENGE IS OVERWHELMING BUT AS BROWNING SO ELOQUENTLY SAID, "AH, BUT A MAN'S REACH SHOULD EXCEED HIS GRASP, OR WHAT'S A HEAVEN FOR."

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Prime Minister Trudeau's Speech  
in the House of Commons

February 9, 1984

SUMMARY

In a wide ranging review of current prospects for peace, and of his own recent role in that process, the Prime Minister stated that managing the threat of nuclear war was the promordial duty of both East and West and that Canada had earned its right to be heard. He said that Canadians were telling their government "as people everywhere are telling their own leaders, that the danger is too near. They want their leaders to act, to accept their political responsibility, to work to reduce the nuclear threat".

Recalling his own decision to launch a peace initiative, the Prime Minister said "I decided to practice what all seven leaders of the industrialized democracies had proclaimed last summer in Williamsburg: '... to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war'... I decided to use Canada's influence ... to try to inject high level political energy into East-West relations, to turn the trend line of crisis...".

The Prime Minister reviewed the principal proposals he took on his mission, then emphasized that each step along the way he urged leaders to "exercise the political leadership the current dangerous situation demands -- to restart the dialogue between East and West". "I told President Reagan", he said, "that the signals he was sending of American strength were being received in the East -- but that a message of peace was not getting through. I told leaders in Eastern Europe that the harsh rhetoric of their declarations had guaranteed rejection of the Warsaw Pact's more positive proposals".

- 2 -

The Prime Minister gave examples that indicated some progress in reducing tensions. He noted particularly the renewal of high level contact between East and West at the Stockholm Conference, "for the first time since the acrimonious conclusion of the Madrid Conference last September, in the shadow of the Korean Airliner tragedy".

"In contrast to earlier statements", he continued, "President Reagan twice last month signalled a constructive tone in American policy towards the USSR" and he underlined that Prime Minister Thatchers visit to Budapest was "a futher signal of momentum in East West dialogue -- a determination to seek out areas of understanding, ... and to promote a reassuring clarity about intentions".

Turning to his own recently completed consultations in Eastern Europe, the Prime MInister said he found a "very positive response" to my suggestion that the middle powers of each alliance could play a constructive part in reviving habits of consultations and reason, but that without personal contact "both sides risk remaining prisoners of their own polemic". He said that neither side appeared to understand the others' fear of further deployment and wondered whether "we in the West had not significantly underestimated the full impact on the Warsaw Pact of the combination of INF deployment with the harsh rhetoric of recent years".

Summing up talks in Eastern and Western capitals, the Prime Minister listed ten principles that represent areas of common interest and agreement between East and West:

"1. -- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.



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2. -- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
3. -- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
4. -- Both side recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
5. -- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
6. -- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
7. -- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
8. -- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.
9. -- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
10. -- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side."

"We intend to draw on these principles", the Prime Minister stated, "to develop elements of a common purpose among the leaders of East and West". He said there could be a sound purpose served in "going back to basics" and that he would be writing to President Reagan and President Andropov to propose these as principles on which both sides can build.

- 4 -

The Prime Minister said that Canada would continue to build on the progress already achieved and that although his own personal involvement would be less intense, that he intended to go to Moscow "whenever circumstances permit". He added that through the Secretary of State for External Affairs, other Cabinet Colleagues and Ambassadors Canada would play its part in the Councils of the West, in the Stockholm Conference and the MBFR in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament where Canada will circulate three proposals to gear down the momentum of technology, and in pursuing the idea of a conference of the five nuclear states which he characterized as a "concept whose logic is compelling". He suggested in this regard that an early focus on five power consultations should be crisis management including the handling of nuclear weapons incidents and the improvement of crisis communications.

The Prime Minister also stressed that Canada would press both sides to keep the non-proliferation bargain that nuclear powers would reduce their armaments in return for non-nuclear powers not building their own. "Security is indivisible", he said, "if countries which do not now have nuclear weapons acquire them, then the security of all of us is diminished".

Turning to the critical role of the superpowers, the Prime Minister warned that the "must not let their views of each others' morality and legitimacy prevent an early resumption of arms control negotiations".

While reaffirming Canada's long standing commitment to NATO and its policies, the Prime Minister urged that the current review underway in the Alliance of ways to improve East-West relations be undertaken with the same "spirit of enquiry, the same creative diplomacy" that characterized the last such review in 1967, the Harmel Report. "It is essential, he said, "that this new review chart a course for the alliance

001721

- 5 -

to the end of this century". "I believe the new NATO review, "he added, "should reflect what I have been calling the need to bring statecraft and high politics to every level of East-West system". It should cope with divergences of view on both sides of the Atlantic.

Summing up, the Prime Minister said that Canada would continue its efforts to subject the science of war to the art of politics, but that such efforts could only be carried so far. He said it was above all the superpowers who bore the greatest responsibility. "Let it be said of them in the future", he said, "that this was the time when their political judgement controlled their technological genius, when their self interest was the common good".

"And let it be said of of Canada" he concluded "and of Canadians: that we saw the crisis: that we did act; that we took risks; that we were loyal to our friends and open with our adversaries; that we lived up to our ideals; and that we have done what we could to lift the shadow of war."

PM COMMONS SPEECH - Media Guidance

- 1 - Media should be reminded that the speech was written for the House of Commons and was followed by speeches from the Leader of the Opposition and the Leader of the NDP. Hence its length, and style.
- 2 - It is a strong defence of Canada's right and duty to speak out and be heard on a subject of intense concern to Canadians. The PM is speaking as a politician sensitive to the deep fears of a middle power sandwiched between the world's most powerful and threatening adversaries. Hence the long passages in the speech detailing both Canada's role as a peacekeeper and seeker of multilateral solutions to world problems and its parallel material commitment to NATO and to the defence of Europe and North America.
- 3 - The PM is sufficiently encouraged by progress in the reduction of tension and in the increase in East-West dialogue to propose ten principles on which he feels both sides could agree. These are a direct result of his consultations with both sides; he is the only leader to have had such a wide range of high-level dialogues in the past three months. Trudeau's ten points could serve as a reference point for further superpower dialogue, a proposal he will put to Reagan and Andropov in the very near future.

- 2 -

- 4 - The initiative can be seen as passing from a "personal" initiative of the PM into a "Canadian" initiative. The speech clearly details forums and areas in which Canada will pursue proposals still on the table, and underlines that this avocation will continue. Note that the five power emerges in a staged form, taking encouragement from the possibility of the UN as a forum and from the change of heart of the Chinese. While there is no need to underestimate the difficulty inherent in selling the idea, we should stress our firm belief that its time will come.
- 5 - The most difficult part of the speech involves the section on the review of NATO concerning East-West relations. The PM is not suggesting it become a review of NATO strategy, but rather suggests an approach to the review as agreed which would be liberal, innovative, deal squarely with diverging views on both sides of the Atlantic, and underline our traditional emphasis on the political nature of the Alliance.
- 6 - The speech does not in any respect address the question of the PM's own political future, and comments on this kind of speculation should be avoided. It rather provides elements of a platform on which a broader approach for Canada to issues of disarmament and world peace can be built.

- 3 -

7 - The initiative and our relations with our allies. Whatever individual allies think of individual proposals (if they all agreed on them, there would have been no need for an initiative), we should stress that there has been full consultation at every step, from the first letters, through bilateral meetings of the SSEA, through official visits (to Washington to see arms control community prior to PM visit, by emissary to Peking and Moscow, by official to Paris and Bonn following East European swing, at NATO and Stockholm, and in constant liaison with Ambassadors in Ottawa), through normal diplomatic contacts in major capitals. We have relied heavily on advice from our senior diplomats in NATO capitals. The exercise was, however, designed to bring pressure on the major nuclear players. In some respects, we were obliged to reach well beyond the safe and conventional to underline the gravity of the crisis, and to set targets that would engage public debate. We will continue to do so.

Moscow: While we have no new indications that bring us nearer to a visit with Andropov, the PM as stated in the speech still intends to go when circumstances permit.

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, K1A 0G2

February 9, 1984

IDDZ-0159

Magda Havas  
Institute of Environmental Studies  
University of Toronto  
Toronto, Ontario  
M5S 1A4

Dear Magda Havas:

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your letter of January 21 in which you suggest that Thomas C. Hutchinson join the Prime Minister's Task Force.

Thank you for the suggestion and for drawing to our attention Professor Hutchinson's expertise on the climatic effects of a nuclear exchange. We, too, are preoccupied by the consequences for human and animal life on this planet of nuclear war. As Carl Sagan and others have persuasively argued, this threat may well have been widely underestimated in the past.

As for your suggestion of Professor Hutchinson joining the Task Force, the Task Force is a small group of officials who have been taken from their normal duties in the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence and the Privy Council Office to work full-time in support of the Prime Minister's initiative. At this stage, we do not anticipate expanding the Task Force to include outside experts.

The Prime Minister is very appreciative of support for his initiative. It is clear that he is voicing the deep concerns of a great many Canadians in his efforts to reduce international tensions and improve the chances of progress in arms control and disarmament.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L. A. Delvoie".

L. A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

c.c. PCO/M.D. Archdeacon  
PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
EA/CMR/Johnston



Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada  
Privy Council Office / Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

Date: 31 February 1984

*Mr. Mc Nee*  
*for reply for my*  
*signature pls*  
*RD*

MEMORANDUM TO: *Mr. R. Francis (I.D.D.)*  
*Director General International Security*  
*and Arms Control Bureau*

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

MAGDA HAVAS

PMO Ref. No: *4031.047*

We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for a reply (within seven working days) to the attached letter for signature at the appropriate level within the Department of External Affairs and with copies to PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier) and External Affairs/CMR/Johnston. I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

*Maurice D. Archdeacon*

Maurice D. Archdeacon  
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston

RECEIVED - REÇU  
Feb 6 1984  
IN IDD

Canada



**PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ**

**CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE**

**FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE**

**TO/A:** Mr. Fowler

**CC:** Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

**RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:**

Magda Havas

**DATE:**

January 21, 1984

**SUBJECT/SUJET:**

Peace Initiatives

**CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:**


4031 047

**Judy Cameron**

**DATE:** February 2, 1984

- ☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.
- ☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.
- ☐ REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.  
RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.
- ☐ NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.  
AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

**ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:**



4031 047

# Institute for Environmental Studies

*Institut pour l'Etude de l'Environnement*

January 21, 1984.

RÉC'D. / REÇU

FEB 2 1984

Coordination

Prime Minister Trudeau,  
 Honourable P.E. Trudeau,  
 House of Commons,  
 Ottawa, Ontario,  
 K1A 0R6.

Dear Mr. Trudeau,

I recently read an article entitled "the 'elite team' behind Trudeau's peace plan" in the Saturday January 21st issue of the Toronto Star, and would like to suggest an additional member for your team--Thomas C. Hutchinson, who is a professor at the University of Toronto.

Tom Hutchinson has been aware of the rapid deterioration in American/Societ relations and is very much concerned about the threat of nuclear war. He was a member of the group of scientists invited by the New York Academy of Arts and Sciences to a meeting held in Boston last April 1983, to consider in detail the consequences of a major nuclear exchange on the world climate and on its biota. These studies were released at the Washington Conference held in November 1983 on the Long-term Consequences of Nuclear War. Some of that information was published in the December 23rd issue of Science.

Tom Hutchinson has given several lectures on the long-term ecological consequences of nuclear war and is rapidly becoming an expert in this field. He is the Canadian representative to SCOPE on the nuclear war issue. In addition to his ecological expertise, he also has some original and practical suggestions on ways to reduce inadvertent nuclear attack.

I am very much in favour of your peace initiative, which I consider essential, and an act of leadership. Despite the clear difficulties of such a role, like many people in the world, I believe that you are the ideal person to help relax tension between the nuclear superpowers.

Although I am certain your peace team of experts is knowledgeable and effective, I strongly believe that Tom Hutchinson could make a significant contribution to your peace initiative as a member of your Canadian team.

I wish you continued success in your peace effort.

Respectfully Yours,

*Magda Havas*  
 Magda Havas

ORIGINAL TO *R. Fowler (15)*  
 ORIGINAL ENVOYÉ À *A. D. O'Brien*  
 C.C. PMO FILE  
 C.C. DOSSIERS CPM

February 1, 1984.

Magda Havas,  
Institute of Environmental Studies,  
University of Toronto,  
Toronto, Ontario.  
M5S 1A4

Dear Magda Havas:

On behalf of the Prime Minister and in his  
absence, I acknowledge your letter of January 21.

Please be assured that it will be brought  
to Mr. Trudeau's attention upon his return.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by  
Original signé par

Marie-Andrée Pastien,  
Correspondence Director.

Original to: R. Fowler

MAE/ev20

4031 047

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, K1A 0G2

February 9, 1984

IDDZ-0158

Dr. William S. Glazier  
MANNA  
RD No. 1  
Box 254  
Woodstock, Connecticut 06281  
U.S.A.

Dear Dr. Glazier:

Your letter of January 16 to the Prime Minister has been referred to the Task Force for reply.

The Prime Minister is very appreciative of support for his initiative. It is clear that he is voicing the concerns of a great many Canadians and many others when he speaks of the urgent necessity of reversing the deteriorating trend in East-West relations and in squarely facing the central issues of nuclear disarmament.

While I am sympathetic to the case you put forward for reinforcing the U.N.'s ability to counter the threat of aggression, I am not so sanguine about the prospects of revision of the U.N. Charter or structural change of the Security Council. The Prime Minister has called attention to the fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council, who not coincidentally are the five nuclear weapon states, have special rights and privileges within the U.N. system, but also bear special responsibilities. It is our hope that preliminary discussions amongst the five might begin at the U.N. in New York and might lead eventually to a five power conference to limit strategic nuclear arsenals.

I note that you have written to U.N. Permanent Missions in New York and suggest that you might best pursue your ideas with those missions.

Thank you again for your support for the Prime Minister's efforts to ease international tensions and improve East-West relations.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "L. A. Delvoie".

L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston



Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada  
Privy Council Office / Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

Date: 30 January, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO:

MA TR FRAUCIS  
Director General, International  
Security and Arms Control

Mr. Mc Mac  
For reply pls,  
my signature

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

WILLIAM S. GAZIER

PMO Ref. No: 4027.015


We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for a reply (within seven working days) to the attached letter for signature at the appropriate level within the Department of External Affairs and with copies to PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier) and External Affairs/CMR/Johnston. I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

Maurice D. Archdeacon  
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston



Canada

**CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE**

**FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE**

TO/A:

Mr. Fowler

CC:

Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:

William S. Glazier

DATE:

January 16, 1984

SUBJECT/SUJET:

Peace Initiatives

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:

4027 015

Judy Cameron

DATE: January 30, 1984

☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.  
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AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

4027 015

~ MANNA ~  
RD #1 Box 254  
Woodstock, CT. 06281

January 16, 1984

The Honorable Pierre Elliot Trudeau  
Gorphwyfsa  
24 Sussex Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
Canada

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

You and I are both beneficiaries of Joseph Merrill Currier, MP, my great grandfather. You live in the house he built, and I dine on the table from his home around which Parliament on occasions informally met. If the house has stood up as well as the diningroom set, you are indeed fortunate.

My mother married an American which accounts for this address, but I have always been proud of and thankful for my Canadian heritage and associations. The former include Nicholas Sparks and a great uncle, Sir Percy Sherwood. And my uncle Cyril Currier will be 103 years old on March 8th. He lives in Peterborough now and is hale and hearty.

Another interest in common we share is that of world peace and the reduction of strategic arms. Congratulations to you for addressing the United Nations and suggesting that the heads of states with nuclear capabilities meet to ban antisatellite systems and non-verifiable systems. And the best of wishes to Mr. Garry Smith and the Canadian Task Force on the Peace Initiative.

At MANNA Center, non-profit educational organization, a second son of a Canadian mother from Toronto, Dr. William Lonsdale Tayler, Ph.D., a retired professor of political science and one of the authors of the UN Charter forty years ago along with about ten others have formed a World Conflict Resolution Research Committee. We believe that the reduction of strategic weapons systems will not be possible until such time that the threat of aggression between member states of the United Nations is decreased by the functioning of a stronger UN which was intended to have a permanent peacekeeping force. The current unanimity voting rule is one hinderance to this goal.

Enclosed is a copy of out recommendation for a conference

ORIGINAL TO *R. Fowler (20)*  
ORIGINAL ENVOYE A  
C.C. PMO FILE  
C.C. DOSSIERS CPM

001734 *R*

to revise the UN Charter to start on October 24, 1985. The revision could include your recommendations mentioned above and in fact could state that strategic weapons of any kind should not be possessed by any member state.

We have written all UN Permanent Missions in New York and have visited several missions hoping to interest some General Assembly member state to raise question of revising the UN Charter. At present, the U.S.A. does not seem to be one to do it. But to further raise the option in the U.S.A., several of our committee members will present the case at an Assembly of the World Federalist Association, March 9-11, in Washington, D.C.

Should your Canadian Task Force on the Peace Initiative be willing to share information with us, we would be honored and would be glad to return the favor.

And you and all Canadians are always welcome to dine at the Gorphwyfsa table, part of Canadian heritage and history.

With joyous wishes to you and prayers for peace,

Sincerely,

*William S. Glazier*  
William S. Glazier, Ph.D.

Encl.



# ~ MANNA ~

RD #1 Box 254  
WOODSTOCK, CT. 06281

July 8, 1983

The WORLD CONFLICT RESOLUTION RESEARCH COMMITTEE (WCRRRC) submits the following proposal for a Charter Revision Conference of the United Nations to be convened in 1985.

The WORLD CONFLICT RESOLUTION RESEARCH COMMITTEE of MANNA Center has studied several documents solicited from Permanent Missions of the United Nations on issues surrounding nuclear armament. It was noted numerous times that nuclear weaponry imperils all life on Planet Earth. The continued proliferation of these weapons increases the likelihood of their use.

Our major conclusion is that the United Nations must prepare itself to deal with that horrendous danger. We do recognize the United Nations has made substantial social, educational, charitable and cultural contributions toward a better world; however, its original mandate was to maintain world peace by negotiation, arbitration, and if necessary, sanctions by a United Nations peace-keeping force. With the exception of a few truce-line guarding operations, history reveals the impotency and ineffectiveness of the United Nations to avert numerous and significant wars during its almost forty years of existence.

In order to enable the United Nations to fulfill its Charter obligation as an international peacekeeper, the Charter of the United Nations must be revised. We urge that there be a Charter Revision Conference called to convene on October 24, 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations.

Prior to the Conference, we urge organizations within Member States to conduct study programs within their states focusing on the purposes, functions and goals of the United Nations and to consider needed changes within the Charter. In a similar fashion, history records the Constitution of the United States replaced the original Articles of Confederation after a ten-year trial period.

For example, consider the present ability of any permanent member of the Security Council to block an action on a substantive matter by a single negative vote. This defeats the purpose of the Charter to maintain international peace. If more than a single vote were required

to negate action, world opinion would have greater impact than it now has. To accomplish this change, Article 27, Section 3 needs revision. The revised text might read:

Decisions of the Security Council on all substantive matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of three of the five permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph three of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. No substantive matters shall be defeated by a single negative vote of a permanent member.

We believe that the peoples of the world recognize that unbridled nationalism must give way to effective world cooperation. With an efficient operational system of law and enforcement, we believe that the United Nations could greatly assist in preventing nuclear holocaust. A nuclear armament freeze and/or weapons reduction can best be accomplished under a revised Charter.

Therefore, we recommend the highest priority be given to a study of the present limitations of the United Nations Charter and that necessary changes be made at the suggested 1985 Charter Revision Conference.

Your comments and suggestions on the above proposal will be warmly received.

Signed,

*Stephen Kenneth Light*  
*Paul Egade Nisura*  
*Ruth Dyer Wells*  
*Robert S. Williams*  
*Lorna L. Lanya*  
*William Stuart Hagler*

Copies to: The Secretary-General of the United Nations  
All Permanent Missions of the United Nations  
The United Nations Association  
The World Federalist Association  
The Foreign Policy Association  
The News Media, Educational and Religious  
Organizations

January 27, 1984.

Mr. William S. Glazier,  
Manna,  
RD No. 1,  
Box 254,  
Woodstock, Connecticut 06281  
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Glazier:

On behalf of the Prime Minister and in his absence, I acknowledge your letter of January 16.

Please be assured that it and the enclosed document will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's attention upon his return.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by  
Original signé par

Marie-Andrée Bastien,  
Correspondence Director.

Original to: R. Fowler

MAB/dt  
4027 015

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO K1A 0G2

February 9, 1984

IDDZ-0157

Ambassador Francis J. Galbraith  
2242 Decatur Place, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008  
USA

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your kind letter of December 20. Please forgive me for the delay in writing to you.

The Prime Minister is very appreciative of the widespread support for his initiative. It is clear that he is voicing the concerns of a great many Canadians and others abroad when he argues the urgent necessity of improving relations between East and West, and between the two superpowers in particular.

We must find ways of creating conditions that will be more propitious to a constructive dialogue between the superpowers. It is essential that they regain the habit of consultation at the most senior levels of the East-West system. The superpowers must have a sense of their overarching political relationship and responsibilities if the vital nuclear arms control negotiations are to succeed.

Yours truly,

L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston



Government of Canada  
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada  
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

Date: 2 February 1984

*M. u. y. p. m.*

MEMORANDUM TO: *Mr. R. Francis*  
*Director General, International*  
*Security and Arms Control Bureau (IDD)*

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

FRANCIS S. GALBRAITH

PMO Ref. No: *4003 160*

We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.


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If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

*M. D. Archdeacon*

Maurice D. Archdeacon  
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston



Canada

001740

**PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ**  
**CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE**  
**FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE**

**TO/A:** Mr. Fowler

**CC:** Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

**RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:** Francis J. Galbraith  
**DATE:** December 20, 1983

**SUBJECT/SUJET:** Peace Mission

**CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:**  
4003 160

Judy Cameron

**DATE:** January 6, 1984

- ☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.
- ☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.  
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**ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:**

4003 160

FRANCIS JOSEPH GALBRAITH

2242 DECATUR PLACE, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

(202) 332-7643

December 20, 1983

REC'D. / REÇU

JAN 6 1984

Coordination

The Honorable Pierre Trudeau  
Prime Minister  
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In your intention to promote dialogue among the world nuclear powers lies the hope of mankind.

In times of a threat to North Americans, to the Soviet people and to others, on this planet alike, we have achieved parity, equality, a common destiny.

We, the Soviets and others must agree that whether nuclear exchange starts with a blunder, an avoidance of imminent defeat in a conventional conflict, an intentional first strike, or whatever, a nuclear war means the end of life on this planet as we have known it. It means suffering of a kind and on a scale beyond our ability to imagine. It means the destruction of creation over billions of years.

As the U.S. and the USSR balance precariously on the precipice of a nuclear conflict that will eclipse forever these superpowers and other nations, the most important and effective action you or any other statesman can make is to convince the U.S. and Soviet Governments that they must, together, find a way back from the road to Armageddon on which they have set forth.

You, Prime Minister Trudeau, are uniquely qualified to initiate a more rational approach. Your country lies geographically between the USSR and the U.S. You are an ally of the U.S. but independent in your foreign policy choices and action.

If you can but cool the rhetoric and guide the introduction of a new dialogue in which we can get beyond the macho handling of the nuclear arms race and begin to talk to each other as equals faced by a common threat, you will have


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*R. Fowler (19)*

given the world the statesmanship it so urgently needs.

You may yet, Mr. Prime Minister, pull us -- the USSR and the U.S. -- back from the brink. I wish you Godspeed.

Sincerely,



Francis J. Galbraith  
Ambassador U.S.A.  
Retired

CC: American Committee on East-West Accord



January 5, 1984.

Mr. Ambassador Francis J. Galbraith,  
2242 Decatur Place, N.W.,  
Washington, D.C. 20008  
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I acknowledge your letter of December 20, 1983.

Please be assured that it will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's attention.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by  
Original signé par

Marie-Andrée Bastien,  
Correspondence Director.

Original to R. Fowler

MAB/lc

*file*

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, K1A 0G2

February 9, 1984

IDDZ-0156

Mr. Edward E. Henry  
Judge of Superior Court, Retired  
2105 East Interlaken Boulevard  
Seattle, Washington 98112

Dear Judge Henry:

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your kind letter of January 18.

The Prime Minister is very appreciative of the widespread public support, in Canada and abroad, for his efforts to halt and reverse the deterioration in East-West relations and to help build a constructive dialogue between the two sides as a first essential step to real progress on arms control and disarmament.

... Thank you for drawing the McClay-Zorin Agreement to our attention. The Prime Minister has been thinking along somewhat similar lines as he proposed in his speech to the House of Commons today ten fundamental principles based on common interest that could be agreed by both East and West.

Thank you again for your support for the Canadian initiative.

Yours truly,

*L. A. Delvoie*

L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

c.c. PCO/M.D. Archdeacon  
PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston



Government of Canada  
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada  
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

Date: 1. Feb. 1984

Mr. McMeel  
for reply pls, my  
signature  
IDD2

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Ross Francis (IDD).....  
Director General International Security  
and Arms Control Bureau.....

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

Edward E. Henry

PMO Ref. No: 4031.060.....

We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for a reply (within seven working days) to the attached letter for signature at the appropriate level within the Department of External Affairs and with copies to PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier) and External Affairs/CMR/Johnston. I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

Maurice D. Archdeacon

Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston

Canada

EDWARD E. HENRY

JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, RETIRED

2105 EAST INTERLAKEN BLVD.

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98112

January 18, 1984

Honorable Pierre E. Trudeau  
Prime Minister of Canada  
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As a member of the Executive Committee of the World Peace Through Law Section of the Washington State Bar Association, I congratulate you on your desire to promote world peace.

We are fortunate that you as Prime Minister of Canada have the desire and ability to meet personally with the leaders of the Super-Powers for the purpose of getting them to meet together to discuss ways and means to achieve world disarmament.

Enclosed is a copy of the McCloy-Zorin Agreement of "Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations" that was introduced by the United States and the Soviet Union to the United Nations in 1961, and adopted by the General Assembly without a dissenting vote.

We hope that you would discuss this proposal in your meetings with President Andropov and President Reagan. It presents an excellent program for World Disarmament.

Kindest personal Regards Mr. Prime Minister.  
Keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

Edward E. Henry,  
Judge Superior Court-Retired  
Member Executive Committee  
World Peace Through Law Section  
Washington State Bar Association

DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, introduced by the United States and the Soviet Union, 1961

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -  
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

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# THE McCLOY/ZORIN AGREEMENT

## "JOINT STATEMENT OF AGREED PRINCIPLES FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS"

**I**n 1961, at President John F. Kennedy's direction, John J. McCloy, advisor to President Eisenhower and eminent New York lawyer, held three meetings with Valerian A. Zorin, representing the USSR, in an effort to reach agreement on the fundamental principles for future disarmament negotiations. They met in Washington, D.C. June 19-30, in Moscow July 17-29, and in New York September 6-19. On September 20, 1961,

they signed the Joint Statement of Agreed principles for Disarmament Negotiations, known as the McCloy-Zorin Agreement. Both governments then reported their agreement to the United Nations General Assembly which adopted the McCloy-Zorin Agreement on December 13, 1961 as the foundation for future negotiations toward general and complete disarmament. Here is the complete official text:



**DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATORS**

Valerian A. Zorin, right, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and John J. McCloy, President Kennedy's special representative on disarmament, pose June 19, 1961 at the State Department in Washington. The two met in an effort to find a way to resume general disarmament talks.

*The United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multi-lateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other states to co-operate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles:*

### **1. SECURE DISARMAMENT AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES... WAR NO LONGER**

The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure:

- (a) That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and
- (b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

### **2. RETENTION OF NON-NUCLEAR FORCES FOR DOMESTIC ORDER AND A UN PEACE FORCE**

The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide manpower for a United Nations peace force.

### **3. ALL MILITARY FORCES, BASES, STOCKPILES, WEAPONS, AND EXPENSES TO BE ENDED**

To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

- (a) The disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, including bases, the cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;
- (b) The elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cessation of the production of such weapons;
- (c) The elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;
- (d) The abolition of organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, the cessation of military training, and the closing of all military training institutions; and
- (e) The discontinuance of military expenditures.

**4. IMPLEMENTATION BY TIMED STAGES WITH COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION AGREED TO AT EVERY STAGE**

The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

**5. EQUITABLE BALANCE AT EVERY STAGE SO NO ADVANTAGE TO ANYONE AND SECURITY FOR ALL**

All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

**6. STRICT CONTROL TO MAKE SURE OF COMPLIANCE BY ALL PARTIES AND CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION WITH INSPECTORS HAVING UNRESTRICTED ACCESS EVERYWHERE WITHOUT VETO FOR FULL VERIFICATION**

All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honoring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

**7. DISARMAMENT PROCESS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY MEASURES TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY AND A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE STRONG ENOUGH TO DETER OR SUPPRESS ANY THREAT OR USE OF ARMS IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER**

Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

**8. STATES SHOULD SEEK WIDEST AGREEMENT AT EARLIEST DATE WHILE CONTINUING TO SEEK MORE LIMITED AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL FACILITATE AND FORM PART OF THE OVERALL PROGRAM FOR SECURED GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD**

States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.

**Note:**

Taken from Pamphlet: "PEACE IS POSSIBLE"  
published by World Federalist Association,  
Suite 119, 1011 Arlington Blvd.,  
Arlington, Va. 2209. Phone (703) 524 2141

Judge Edward E. Henry-ret.  
2105 E. Interlaken Blvd.  
Seattle, Washington 98112

*Agreement  
Proposed in  
H.E.R. #123  
in U.S. House  
of Representatives*





External Affairs  
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---PM INITIATIVE

GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE LORD CARRINGTON WITH A COPY OF PM S 09FEB

HOUSE OF COMMONS SPEECH REPORTING ON HIS INITIATIVE (SEE OUR REFTEL)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

*[Signature]*  
SIG J. MCNEE

DIVISION/DIRECTION

IDDZ

TELEPHONE

5-5912

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

*[Signature]*  
SIG L.A. DELVOIE



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---SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER EDITORIAL

MANY POINTS IN EDITORIAL MORE THAN ANSWERED, AND IN SOME DETAIL, IN  
PM S HOUSE OF COMMONS SPEECH. SUGGEST YOU MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO  
CONVINCE THEM IN SPIRIT OF FAIRNESS TO REPRINT RELEVANT SECTIONS OF  
PM S SPEECH.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

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P. GOSBAGE/cf

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

001753

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Canada                Canada

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---PM COMMONS SPEECH - MEDIA GUIDANCE

PLSE FIND ATTACHED THE MEDIA GUIDANCE S TEXT.

(COMCENTRE: PLSE COPY ATTACHED)

~~FOR CAST~~ *POSTS*

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SIG P. GOSSAGE

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SIG L.A. DELVOIE

PM COMMONS SPEECH - MEDIA GUIDANCE

1. Media should be reminded that the speech was written for the House of Commons and was followed by speeches from the Leader of the Opposition and the Leader of the NDP. Hence its length, and style.
2. It is a strong defence of Canada's right and duty to speak out and be heard on a subject of intense concern to Canadians. The PM is speaking as a politician sensitive to the deep fears and worries of Canadians. Hence the long passages in the speech detailing both Canada's role as a peacekeeper and seeker of multilateral solutions to world problems and its parallel material commitment to NATO and to the defence of Europe and North America, i.e. to a system of collective security.
3. The PM is sufficiently encouraged by progress in the reduction of tension and in the increase in East-West dialogue to propose ten points on which he feels both sides could agree. These represent a decantation of his consultations with both sides; he is the only leader to have had such a wide range of high-level dialogues in the past four months. Trudeau's ten points could serve as a reference point for further superpower dialogue, a proposal he will put to Reagan and Andropov in the near future.
4. The initiative can be seen as passing from a primarily "personal" initiative of the PM into a "Canadian" initiative. The speech clearly details forums and areas in which Canada will pursue proposals still on the table, and underlines that this avocation will continue. Note that the five power proposal emerges in a staged form, taking encouragement from the possibility of the UN as a forum and from the change of heart of the Chinese. While there is no need to underestimate the difficulty inherent in selling the idea, we should stress our firm belief that its time will come.

- 2 -

5. The most difficult part of the speech is the section on the NATO review of East-West relations. The PM is not/not suggesting a review of NATO military strategy, but rather suggests an approach which would be wide ranging, innovative, deal squarely with diverging views on both sides of the Atlantic, and underline our traditional emphasis on the political nature of the Alliance.
6. The speech does not in any respect address the question of the PM's political future, and comments on this kind of speculation should be avoided.
7. The initiative and our relations with our allies. Whatever individual allies think of individual proposals (if they all agreed on them, there would have been no need for an initiative), we should stress that there has been extensive consultation at every step: two letters from DM to every NATO head of government numerous bilateral meetings on the DPM/SSEA, visits abroad by officials (to Washington, London, Paris, Bonn, Peking and Moscow), extensive contacts with Ambassadors in Ottawa and normal diplomatic contacts in major capitals and NATO headquarters. We have relied heavily on advice from our senior diplomats in NATO capitals. The exercise was, however, designed to bring pressure on the major nuclear players. In some respects, the PM was obliged to reach well beyond the safe and conventional to underline the gravity of the crisis, and to set targets that would engage public debate and support. The Canadian government will continue to do so.
8. Moscow. Refrain from commenting on this situation beyond what is said in speech text and summary.
9. The ten points are intended for precisely the purpose outlined in the speech - i.e. as "basic, as points of departure on which discussions between various leaders on both sides could take place. They are not negotiating positions, nor should they be seen to be directly relevant to other fora.



MESSAGE

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---PM INITIATIVE:EAST EUROPEAN TRIP

AS WE DO NOT/NOT WISH TO QUOTE OPEN UP UNQUOTE LINES OF COMMUNICA-  
TION WITH RUSSIANS IN THIRD CAPITALS,SUGGEST YOU RESTRICT YOURSELF  
TO GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN OURTEL IDDZ0046 OF 17JAN AS WELL AS  
ELEMENTS OF PM S 09FEB SPEECH IN HOUSE OF COMMONS.

2.PLEASE LET US KNOW IF YOUR RUSSIAN CONTACT IS JUST FISHING OR  
HAS SOMETHING TO SELL.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <u>G.J. Smith</u>	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG <u>G.J. Smith</u>

Affaires extérieures  
Canada**FAX SIMILE**

## MESSAGE

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---PPT COMMONS SPEECH - MEDIA GUIDANCE

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~~LA DELVOIE~~ 001758

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- 2 -

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---ALLOCATION DU PM:CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

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SUIT VERSION FRANCAISE DES NOTES DE L'ALLOCATION DU PM A LA CHAMBRE  
DES COMMUNES AUJOURD'HUI A 1100 HRES.

(COMCENTRE:SVP COPIER TEXTE CI-JOINT)

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L.A. DELVOIE

001761

NOTES POUR UNE ALLOCUTION DU PREMIER MINISTRE À LA CHAMBRE DES  
COMMUNES SUR LA PAIX ET LA SÉCURITÉ, OTTAWA, LE 9 FÉVRIER 1984

(Traduction)

L'explosion de la première bombe atomique dans le désert du Nouveau-Mexique, en 1945, a remis en question la survie même de l'humanité. L'homme se donnait ainsi le pouvoir de s'auto-détruire.

Depuis ce moment, la peur de la bombe hante constamment les enfants. Et nous, leurs parents, sommes devenus tout aussi impuissants à dissiper leurs craintes qu'à apaiser les nôtres.

Car une guerre nucléaire ne ferait aucune sélection: que nous siégeons de ce côté de la Chambre ou de l'autre; que nous soyons du côté de ceux qui ont raison ou de ceux qui ont tort; que nous soyons riches ou pauvres; que nous appartenions à l'Est ou à l'Ouest, au Nord ou au Sud.

Les armes nucléaires font partie de la réalité. Elles existeront probablement toujours. Et elles fonctionnent avec une efficacité/horrifiante qui rend incertaine la survie de l'espèce humaine. La seule issue possible est que nous contrôlions ce risque. Nous ne pourrions plus jamais repousser cette tâche, ni la traiter à la légère, ni en faire une affaire de routine.

Mais il nous est surtout interdit de céder au découragement.

C'est à l'Est et l'Ouest que revient le devoir primordial de gérer ce risque. Les Canadiens constatent toutefois avec inquiétude que les superpuissances semblent s'être détournées de cette responsabilité capitale, qu'elles semblent trop absorbées par leurs rivalités idéologiques, leurs incessants calculs de parité, leurs démonstrations de force et de volonté. Les Canadiens savent également qu'il serait téméraire d'espérer que l'animosité existant entre l'Est et l'Ouest disparaîtra avant d'atteindre le point de non-retour.

Les spécialistes voudraient nous faire croire que les questions afférentes à une guerre nucléaire sont devenues trop complexes pour être laissées à d'autres qu'eux. Ils voudraient que nous fassions confiance à une poignée de seigneurs de la stratégie nucléaire ainsi qu'aux scientifiques qui nous ont fait passer des bombes atomiques aux ogives thermonucléaires, des missiles à une seule ogive aux missiles à dix ogives et plus, des armes simplement dissuasives aux armes qui mettent en péril l'existence de chaque être humain.

- 2 -

Les Canadiens, comme tous les autres peuples estiment qu'une génération passée à fignoler des théories et des instruments capables de les annihiler a compromis bien plus qu'elle n'a augmenté leur sécurité. La poussée technologique rencontre trop souvent une oreille sympathique dans la sphère politique. Ce sont en effet les dirigeants politiques qui décident des budgets consacrés à la défense et à la recherche. Puisque ce sont eux qui gouvernent, ce sont eux qui doivent affirmer leur volonté de paix. Sinon la science continuera de mettre au point des engins de plus en plus meurtriers.

La sécurité du Canada est en jeu; nous avons acquis le droit d'être entendus, en temps de paix comme en temps de guerre. Nous n'avions absolument été pour rien dans le déclenchement des deux guerres mondiales: pourtant, des milliers de Canadiens ont combattu et sont morts durant ces conflits. Et nous avons contribué à la reconstruction du monde après la guerre: nous étions à Bretton Woods lorsque fut établie la Banque mondiale; nous étions à Dumbarton Oaks et à San Francisco lorsque l'ONU fut créée.

Nous avons prôné l'adhésion de tous les pays aux Nations Unies à une époque où cela n'était pas toujours bien vu. Qu'on se souvienne du rôle joué par le Premier ministre Diefenbaker pour favoriser l'adhésion de Cuba. Ou de l'appui de MM. St-Laurent et Pearson, qui a permis à de nombreux États indépendants d'entrer à l'ONU. Ou encore du rôle joué par mon gouvernement en faveur de la reconnaissance de la République populaire de Chine et de son accession au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU.

4 Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le Canada était l'un des rares pays à posséder la technologie et les ressources nécessaires à la construction des armes nucléaires. Mais nous avons vu ces terribles engins à l'oeuvre et savions ce dont ils étaient capables. Tous les gouvernements qui suivirent renoncèrent donc à l'option nucléaire et mirent les compétences canadiennes au service de l'utilisation pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire. Et au lieu de nous doter d'une force nucléaire nationale, nous nous sommes joints à des organisations de sécurité collective telles que l'ONU, l'OTAN et NORAD.

Le Canada est un partenaire loyal de chacune de ces organisations. Nous avons joué un rôle de premier plan dans les initiatives de l'ONU visant à l'établissement et au maintien de la paix au Moyen-Orient, en Asie et en Afrique. Au sein de l'OTAN, nous sommes l'un des rares pays à maintenir en permanence des forces à l'extérieur de nos frontières. Au sein du NORAD, nous fournissons une chose qui n'a pas de prix: notre espace aérien. Les États-Unis peuvent établir leur propre système de défense en sachant que les 4000 kilomètres situés au nord de leur frontière sont occupés par un allié sûr.

Nous ne badinons pas avec nos engagements. Nous avons remplacé nos avions de patrouille maritime par les appareils les plus perfectionnés au monde. Nos brigades armées sont maintenant équipées d'un char d'assaut très fermement, le Léopard. Nous sommes en train de nous doter d'avions tactiques et d'interception des plus modernes. Nous avons mis sur pied un programme pour acquérir de nouvelles frégates. Tout cet équipement, le plus perfectionné qui soit, est destiné à des fins défensives.

En 1969, nous avons décidé qu'il n'était plus approprié que nos forces armées soient équipées d'armes nucléaires. Nous avons alors annoncé notre intention de nous départir graduellement de ces systèmes d'armement au fur et à mesure de leur remplacement, mais tout en respectant nos engagements envers nos alliés. Dès 1970, nous n'avions plus de roquettes sol-sol "Honest John" en Europe. Et dès 1972 nous avons achevé la conversion de nos avions basés en Europe pour les faire servir en cas d'offensive non plus nucléaire mais classique.

Également en 1972, l'appareil Bomarc équipé de missiles sol-air fut retourné aux États-Unis. Nous avons ensuite décidé de remplacer les CF-101 basés au Canada et munis d'armes nucléaires par les excellents chasseurs CF-18. Ces appareils assureront plus efficacement notre défense aérienne avec des armes classiques que les CF-101 avec des armes nucléaires. Ainsi, nous nous débarasserons cette année des derniers vestiges d'armement nucléaire.

Mais nous avons fait beaucoup plus que de voir à notre défense. Nous nous sommes penchés sur les causes de l'insécurité et de l'instabilité, surtout dans le tiers-monde. Les axes Est-Ouest et Nord-Sud gouvernent les relations de notre époque. La résolution des problèmes du Sud dépend d'une amélioration de la sécurité mondiale. En consacrant des sommes faramineuses à leur dépenses militaires, l'Est, l'Ouest et le Sud faussent les politiques économiques et

détriment d'importantes ressources qui pourraient être affectées au développement économique mondial. Ceci entraîne une aggravation de l'instabilité politique dans le tiers-monde, laquelle se répercute à l'Est et à l'Ouest et ajoute à notre insécurité.

Les Canadiens ont pleinement le droit de prendre position. À chacun de nous qui les représentons dans cette Chambre, les Canadiens disent que le danger est devenu trop imminent. Dans le monde entier, les populations tiennent des propos semblables à leurs dirigeants. Ils veulent que ceux-ci agissent, qu'ils acceptent leurs responsabilités politiques et cherchent à réduire les risques d'une conflagration nucléaire.

L'automne dernier, j'ai parlé d'une conjonction alarmante de diverses crises. J'ai attiré l'attention sur la convergence de trois tendances qui peuvent se révéler désastreuses: le recours à la force pour régler les différends, le risque d'une prolifération des armes nucléaires et la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest. J'ai donc décidé de tenir l'engagement pris l'été dernier par les sept chefs d'État et de gouvernement des pays industrialisés réunis à Williamsburg, soit "de consacrer toutes nos ressources à réduire la menace de guerre".

J'ai décidé d'user de l'influence du Canada pour sensibiliser la communauté internationale à ce danger, essayer de revitaliser au plus haut niveau politique les relations Est-Ouest, tenter de renverser le courant actuel d'affrontement et rechercher un intérêt commun aux deux parties.

J'ai suggéré qu'on mette de côté les mégaphones, qu'on suspende la guerre des idées et des mots, qu'on mette fin au manichéisme dans les deux camps, qu'on fasse preuve de leadership et d'habileté politique dans les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest -- la plus importante relation stratégique qui soit.

#### L'INITIATIVE DE PAIX

Depuis l'automne dernier, j'ai fait part de ces idées à Paris, La Haye, Bruxelles et Rome, ainsi qu'au Vatican, à Bonn, à Londres et à Zurich. Je les ai présentées à Tokyo, à Dacca, et à la réunion des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth, à New Delhi. Je me suis rendu à Pékin, à Washington et aux Nations Unies. J'ai rencontré les dirigeants politiques à Prague, Berlin-Est et Bucarest afin de m'assurer que notre message soit compris des plus hautes instances du Pacte de Varsovie.

Chaque fois, mon message fut direct. Le Canada ne cherche pas à siéger à la table des superpuissances. Mais nos vies et notre avenir sont en jeu à cette table. Et il en va de même pour les neuf dixièmes de la population mondiale qui vivent ailleurs qu'aux États-Unis et en Union soviétique. Tous, nous avons le droit et la responsabilité de nous engager et de rappeler aux protagonistes leur appartenance à la race humaine.

Nous avons proposé de donner un élan politique nouveau à la Conférence de Stockholm sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe. Alors que tous les autres ponts entre l'Est et l'Ouest s'effondraient, cette conférence a pris une importance considérable et est devenue la seule tribune servant le processus de détente amorcé à Helsinki.

Nous avons proposé qu'on fasse de part et d'autre des efforts au niveau politique en vue d'aiguillonner les négociations de Vienne sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces. Ces pourparlers sont cruciaux pour établir l'équilibre des forces classiques en Europe centrale, relever le seuil nucléaire et ainsi réduire le risque d'un premier recours hâtif aux armes nucléaires.

Je souhaiterais ouvrir une parenthèse et préciser que les négociations de Genève portent sur une "réduction" des forces. Ces négociations n'ont pas but d'établir un nouvel équilibre à un échelon supérieur mais bien à un niveau inférieur. Et je ne comprends vraiment pas -- après tout je l'ai expliqué maintes fois -- pourquoi mes critiques persistent à croire que relever le seuil nucléaire en équilibrant les forces classiques signifie l'établissement d'un équilibre à un niveau supérieur. Le but des négociations sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces est vraiment d'obtenir un équilibre à un échelon inférieur et donc de relever le seuil nucléaire.

Nous avons proposé des rencontres des cinq puissances nucléaires aussitôt que possible afin que soit créée une tribune où l'on pourra négocier des limites globales et, ultimement, des réductions à leurs arsenaux nucléaires.

Nous avons demandé instamment que soient prises des mesures pour renforcer le Traité sur la non-prolifération. La non-prolifération des armes nucléaires est aussi bien dans l'intérêt des superpuissances et des puissances moyennes que des micro-États.

Or tant que les cinq puissances nucléaires ne manifesteront pas davantage leur intention d'amorcer les réductions prévues dans ce pacte, nous courons le grave danger de voir les engins nucléaires se propager dans de nouvelles régions du globe et exciter les anciennes rivalités.

En définitive, à chaque étape j'ai pressé les dirigeants de s'engager personnellement, d'accorder à la paix la plus haute priorité, d'exercer le leadership politique que commande la gravité de la situation et de relancer le dialogue entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

J'ai fait remarquer au président Reagan que l'Est recevait bien les signes qu'il donnait de la puissances des États-Unis, mais non un message de paix. Et j'ai dit aux dirigeants de l'Europe de l'Est que la dureté de leurs déclarations avaient entraîné à coup sûr le rejet des propositions plus constructives formulées par le Pacte de Varsovie.

#### SIGNES DE PROGRÈS

L'incompréhension et la méfiance sont profondément enracinées dans les deux camps. Mais nous commençons à entrevoir des signes de progrès.

À Goa, en novembre, quarante-deux dirigeants du Commonwealth ont fortement appuyé nos efforts en vue de restaurer le dialogue politique entre l'Est et l'Ouest et de favoriser les négociations entre les États dotés d'armes nucléaires.

À Bruxelles, en décembre, les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord sont arrivés à un consensus sur plusieurs questions que j'avais défendues avec vigueur ces dernières années, en particulier aux réunions au sommet de l'OTAN. Dans leur déclaration, ils ont offert aux pays de l'Est une relation équilibrée et constructive. Ils ont montré clairement que les pays occidentaux n'aspiraient pas à la supériorité stratégique et qu'ils respectaient les intérêts légitimes de l'Union soviétique au chapitre de la sécurité. Il y a les déclarations de Bruxelles de décembre; une rencontre à laquelle le vice-premier ministre et secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures a pris part; une réunion où il a joué un rôle majeur en faisant accepter ces points.



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Conformément à notre initiative, l'Est et l'Ouest ont convenu de reprendre le 16 mars les pourparlers de Vienne sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces. Et ils ont convenu en outre que les ministres des Affaires étrangères devraient contribuer plus activement au progrès des ces négociations.

Également à notre suggestion, et pour souligner l'importance qu'ils attachent au dialogue politique de haut niveau, les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'OTAN ont participé le mois dernier à l'inauguration de la Conférence de Stockholm. Les ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays membres du Pacte de Varsovie répondirent à cette initiative occidentale en se rendant eux aussi à Stockholm. Il importe de noter la rencontre de cinq heures que n'auraient pas eue autrement le secrétaire d'État américain, M. Shultz, et le ministre soviétique des Affaires étrangères, M. Gromyko. Les deux ont également rencontré mon collègue, le vice-premier ministre et secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.

C'était la première fois depuis la clôture acrimonieuse de la Conférence de Madrid, en septembre dernier, et la tragédie de l'avion sud-coréen que les pays de l'Est et de l'Ouest renouaient contact au plan politique.

Même le premier ministre Thatcher a entamé des démarches en vue d'améliorer la qualité des rapports entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Sa visite à Budapest, la semaine dernière, témoigne d'un nouvel élan dans le dialogue Est-Ouest, d'une volonté de trouver des points d'entente entre membres d'alliances opposées et d'un désir de rassurer sur les intentions.

Contrairement à ses déclarations antérieures, le président Reagan a mentionné le mois dernier à deux occasions que les États-Unis étaient disposés à rechercher un dialogue constructif avec l'URSS. Moscou a choisi de répondre de façon mitigée, alliant une rhétorique plutôt dure avec des signes prudents de disposition à rétablir la communication.

Monsieur le Président, je viens tout juste d'avoir des entretiens avec les dirigeants de la Tchécoslovaquie, de la République démocratique allemande et de la Roumanie. Ces États sont bien représentatifs des pays de l'Europe centrale. Ce sont des puissances moyennes qui ont une longue expérience des tensions entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Ils sont, bien sûr, très liés à l'URSS. Dans les circonstances actuelles, leur identité propre, leur influence et le leadership qu'ils exercent sont significatifs. J'ai noté, par exemple, qu'ils avaient répondu favorablement à ma suggestion que les puissances moyennes de chaque alliance puissent jouer un rôle constructif en renouant avec la tradition des consultations politiques au plus haut niveau entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Je leur ai exposé les idées de l'Ouest sur le déclin de la détente et l'importance de la ranimer. Et j'ai écouté les leurs. Nous avons ~~parlé~~ parlé des signaux hétéroclites que s'envoient l'Est et l'Ouest, de la nécessité de dépasser un certain niveau de langage et de poser des gestes susceptibles de rétablir la confiance et de réduire les tensions.

Des discussions que j'ai eues en Europe de l'Est, je conclus ceci:

-- En premier lieu, j'ai été frappé du contraste entre des rencontres privées, toutes empreintes de cordialité et de pondération et où l'idéologie est absente, et les sorties publiques fracassantes du Pacte de Varsovie dont nous sommes parfois les témoins. Cela illustre bien l'importance du contact personnel et du dialogue à huis clos. Car sans le dialogue, nous risquons des deux côtés de demeurer prisonniers de nos propres polémiques.

-- Ensuite, si lors de nos rencontres privées nous pouvons laisser de côté les invectives que nous échangeons publiquement sur les questions importantes, alors je crois que nous sommes capables d'entamer un processus de discussions portant sur des sujets d'intérêt commun. Cela va prendre du temps, mais j'ai l'intime conviction que l'Est et l'Ouest peuvent atteindre ce degré de maturité dans leurs relations.

-- Enfin, pour atteindre ce stade de maturité, nous devons résoudre nos problèmes mutuels d'incompréhension -- fermeture d'esprit, déformation de faits, erreurs subjectives d'analyse et de jugement.

Peu de mes interlocuteurs, par exemple, ont semblé vraiment capables de comprendre ou encore d'admettre la menace grave que les SS-20 ~~soviétiques~~ soviétiques font peser sur les pays occidentaux. Quant à nous, je me demande si nous n'avons pas sous-évalué les répercussions qu'ont eues sur le Pacte de Varsovie le déploiement des forces nucléaires de portée intermédiaire et les propos fermes que nous avons tenus ces dernières années.

Il ne sera pas facile d'apprendre à mieux nous comprendre et à mieux mesurer l'impact de nos faits et gestes. Entre l'impasse de la confrontation, exigeant que le déploiement des forces nucléaires de portée moyenne se poursuive, et la nécessité de rouvrir les négociations, seule la "troisième voie", celle de la confiance politique et de la communication, favorisera une solution rapide et constructive.

En réfléchissant à ces conclusions et aux entretiens que j'ai eus tant à l'Est qu'à l'Ouest, il me semble évident que nous partageons -- et cela commence d'ailleurs à se voir -- une communauté de vues et d'idées. J'aimerais ici faire état de dix principes qui rapprochent l'Est et l'Ouest:

1. Les deux reconnaissent l'impossibilité de gagner un conflit nucléaire.
2. Les deux conviennent qu'une guerre nucléaire ne devrait jamais être déclenchée.
3. Les deux souhaitent s'affranchir des risques d'une guerre accidentelle ou d'une attaque surprise.
- 15 / 4. Les deux reconnaissent le danger inhérent aux armes déstabilisatrices.
5. Les deux comprennent la nécessité de disposer de techniques améliorées pour gérer les crises.
6. Les deux alliances sont conscientes des conséquences funestes qu'entraînerait le fait d'être la première à lancer une attaque.
7. Les deux ont intérêt à accroître leur sécurité et à en réduire les coûts.
8. Les deux ont intérêt à prévenir la prolifération des armes nucléaires dans les autres pays, souvent appelée prolifération horizontale.
9. Les deux en sont arrivés prudemment à reconnaître leurs intérêts mutuels et légitimes au chapitre de la sécurité.

10. Les deux comprennent que leur sécurité stratégique ne peut dépendre de la défaillance politique ou économique de l'autre.

Décatalogue modeste, sans doute. Mais, en cette période où se manifestent des signes de résorption de la crise, peut-être est-il à propos de revenir à l'essentiel. De redémarrer en nous appuyant sur des principes auxquels nous pouvons adhérer de part et d'autre. De trouver un point de départ, une base commune, même restreinte.

Nous entendons donc nous appuyer sur ces dix principes pour cerner les éléments d'une communauté d'intention propre à rapprocher les dirigeants de l'Est et de l'Ouest.

Je m'apprête à écrire aux présidents Reagan et Andropov, à des dirigeants des deux alliances et à d'autres hommes d'État pour leur proposer ces principes comme base de rapprochement entre les deux camps. Car il existe des points d'accord à côté des sujets de désaccord. Il y a un moyen de sortir de l'impasse des derniers mois. On peut percevoir des indices prometteurs et je pense que la crise a inversé son cours.

Si nous considérons le travail accompli au cours des quatre derniers mois et les perspectives pour les mois à venir, nous avons lieu d'être encouragés par les résultats que nous commençons à observer. Ainsi, nous avons cherché à susciter un dialogue entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Ce dialogue est engagé. Nous avons également cherché à persuader les deux camps de mettre une sourdine à leur rhétorique. Là aussi, nos efforts commencent à porter fruit.

J'ai en outre cherché à m'associer à des dirigeants d'opinions semblables dans divers milieux un peu partout dans le monde. Beaucoup parmi eux ont engagé, ou poursuivi, leurs propres initiatives pour réduire les tensions, et avancé des propositions personnelles pour le contrôle des armements. Mon collègue, le vice-premier ministre et secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, et moi-même avons poursuivi l'initiative du Canada au sein d'institutions multilatérales, dans des contacts bilatéraux, à des conférences spéciales et dans des entretiens avec des groupes et des individus.

#### LE PROGRAMME

Nous avons imprimé une impulsion politique aux relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Mais cette impulsion n'est pas suffisante en soi. Il faut y ajouter le soutien de l'imagination et la force de la

persistance, et l'appuyer par des actes. En effet, nous avons besoin d'imagination pour trouver des idées inédites nous permettant de résoudre de vieilles impasses et de faire face à de nouveaux dangers. De persistance pour négocier de nouvelles ententes et relever les défis de la technologie. Et d'actes, fussent-ils très humbles, pour manifester notre bonne foi. Nous devons aussi prendre des mesures précises, comme trouver les moyens de vérifier les ententes sur le contrôle des armements, et favoriser la tenue de consultations régulières entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

(Texte)

Au cours des mois à venir, le Canada s'appliquera à consolider les progrès réalisés jusqu'ici pour favoriser le développement et la mise en oeuvre de nos idées. Nous ne prétendons pas détenir le monopole des propositions, et nous ne nous attendons pas non plus à les voir acceptées du jour au lendemain. Ce qui compte, c'est qu'au moins quelques-uns des principaux baromètres des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest montrent qu'elles ont enfin cessé de se mettre au rouge.

J'entends pour ma part poursuivre mes efforts dans ce sens, quoique de façon nécessairement moins intensive qu'au cours des derniers mois -- on reconnaîtra que seize pays plus les Nations- Unies en trois mois, est un rythme auquel je ne peux me soumettre tout au long de l'année. J'ai l'intention de me rendre à Moscou lorsque les circonstances le permettront. Mes collègues du Cabinet, nos ambassadeurs à l'étranger et tous les Canadiens qui partagent nos buts assureront également le suivi de notre initiative.

Le Canada fera sa part dans les assemblées de l'Ouest, dans les pourparlers bilatéraux, aux réunions et conférences multilatérales, et dans les contacts avec l'Union soviétique et ses alliés.

Nous mettrons toutes nos énergies à favoriser les progrès à la Conférence de Stockholm, comme l'avancement des pourparlers sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces. Et si ces pourparlers traînent en longueur, le Canada veillera à ce que les dirigeants politiques interviennent de nouveau personnellement pour les stimuler. Mais lorsque les négociations de Vienne reprendront, le mois prochain, l'OTAN devra absolument être en mesure de répondre à la proposition faite l'été dernier par les membres du Pacte de Varsovie.

Après plus amples consultations avec nos alliés de l'OTAN, nous diffuserons, au cours de la session actuelle de la Conférence de Genève sur le désarmement, trois propositions destinées à ralentir la poussée des nouvelles techniques. Nous renforcerons ainsi la stratégie d'"asphyxie" que j'ai mise en avant en 1978. Ces propositions sont les suivantes:

-- interdiction de mettre au point des systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude;

-- restrictions à la mobilité des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux;

-- amélioration des possibilités de vérification des nouveaux systèmes d'armements stratégiques.

D'ici à la révision du Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires, l'année prochaine, nous continuerons d'exhorter les deux groupes à en respecter les engagements. Car la sécurité forme un tout indissociable. Et si des pays non détenteurs d'armes nucléaires décident d'en acquérir, la sécurité de chaque être humain se trouvera menacée.

Selon le compromis à la base du Traité sur la non-prolifération, les puissances nucléaires devaient réduire leurs arsenaux et les États non nucléarisés acceptaient en contrepartie de ne pas se doter d'armes atomiques. Les uns et les autres devaient par ailleurs veiller à partager les avantages de l'utilisation pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire. Les États actuellement dotés d'armes atomiques portent donc l'immense responsabilité d'en prévenir la dissémination.

Voilà pourquoi nous devons réitérer notre proposition de convoquer une conférence des cinq États dotés d'armes nucléaires, proposition dont la logique me paraît contraignante. Ces cinq États sont en effet les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité. À ce titre, ils détiennent des responsabilités tout autant qu'un droit de veto. C'est pourquoi j'ai demandé au secrétaire général des Nations Unies, M. Perez de Cuellar, d'envisager et de favoriser la tenue de réunions à huis clos de leurs représentants à New York. - Au cours de mes entretiens avec le Premier ministre Zhao, en janvier, j'ai constaté que, depuis ma visite à Pékin, les Chinois paraissaient désormais disposés à envisager de tels contacts sans y poser les conditions dont ils avaient fait état précédemment.

Cette idée fera son chemin lentement, bien sûr, comme toute autre idée nouvelle. Mais je pense qu'elle finira par emporter l'adhésion des intéressés. Car la menace nucléaire comporte des dangers tels qu'accidents, erreurs de calcul, crises, défaillance des systèmes, auxquels les cinq puissances en cause doivent faire face et qu'elles ont la responsabilité de gérer de concert. C'est pourquoi, à mon sens, les consultations entre les cinq devraient porter en premier lieu sur la gestion des crises, particulièrement en cas d'incidents impliquant des armes nucléaires, et sur l'amélioration des communications en période de crise.

Parmi les cinq États dotés d'armes nucléaires, les deux superpuissances possèdent de loin les plus importants arsenaux. Elles ont en conséquence la responsabilité de faire preuve pour les réduire du même génie qu'elles ont appliqué à les construire. Et elles doivent s'interdire de laisser leur opinion sur la moralité et la légitimité de l'autre entraver une reprise rapide des pourparlers sur le contrôle des armements. Elles doivent absolument revenir à la table des négociations sur le contrôle et la réduction des armes nucléaires stratégiques et de portée moyenne.

Au cours des dix dernières années, les superpuissances n'ont pas signé une seule entente importante sur le contrôle des armements. Pendant la décennie précédente, elles en avaient pourtant conclu une douzaine. Elles doivent maintenant poser des gestes pour dissiper la méfiance. Dans ce sens, elles auraient intérêt à sanctionner une entente qu'elles observent déjà : le Traité sur l'imposition d'un seuil de limitation des essais nucléaires souterrains.

J'ai accordé beaucoup d'attention jusqu'ici aux relations entre les cinq, à l'environnement bilatéral des superpuissances et aux négociations et conférences multilatérales. Le processus consultatif que nous offre l'OTAN renforce dans une large mesure notre contribution à ces travaux. L'OTAN est en effet une tribune importante pour le Canada tant en ce qui concerne sa politique nationale que la sécurité collective et la conduite fondamentale des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Lors de la création de l'OTAN, en 1949, le Canada avait insisté pour que cette alliance soit non seulement militaire mais aussi politique. Et il continue en toute loyauté de respecter ses engagements de longue date envers l'Alliance et ses politiques.

Mais toutes les institutions tendent naturellement à glisser sur la pente de l'inertie, à moins que leurs membres ne les vivifient et ne repensent leurs orientations. Je me suis donc réjoui de la décision prise par les ministres de l'OTAN, à leur réunion de décembre, de faire procéder à un examen complet des mesures que l'Alliance peut prendre pour améliorer les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Le Canada avait d'ailleurs préconisé une telle mesure à plusieurs réunions au sommet de l'OTAN.

Le dernier examen de ce genre avait été effectué en 1967, à l'initiative de M. Pierre Harmel, ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Belgique. On avait à ce moment-là, tout comme aujourd'hui, le sentiment qu'un changement s'imposait. L'Alliance avait besoin de se donner une vision de l'avenir et une stratégie politique pour la réaliser. Le document issu de ce travail, intitulé "Les tâches futures de l'Alliance", marqua une étape importante dans l'orientation de l'OTAN. Il vint répondre, comme nous devons le faire aujourd'hui, au besoin d'une politique générale pour orienter notre sécurité militaire et lui donner son plein sens.

Les conclusions les plus profondes contenues dans ce document étaient les suivantes:

- la sécurité militaire n'est pas incompatible avec une politique/de détente. Au contraire, l'une et l'autre doivent se compléter;
- le travail de réduction équilibrée des forces militaires et les efforts pour enrayer l'instabilité et l'insécurité doivent être intensifiés;
- le monde a changé depuis la création de l'OTAN, en 1949, et il nous faut orienter notre action en fonction de notre vision de l'avenir;
- chaque membre de l'Alliance a une contribution à y apporter, de plain-pied et en consultation avec les autres États qui en font partie.

En dépit d'échecs fréquents, les résultats de cette politique s'avèrent impressionnants, surtout si on les considère dans la perspective actuelle : les règlements interallemands de la fin des années soixante; la promotion bilatérale de liens avec l'URSS par de nombreux pays de l'Ouest, y compris ma propre visite en 1971; les éléments d'un rapprochement entre les superpuissances, et l'Acte final d'Helsinki conclu en 1975.



Nous devons aborder la période à venir avec le même esprit de recherche, la même diplomatie créatrice et la même vision prospective.

Le monde a encore changé depuis 1967. Nous percevons les transferts de pouvoir et l'évolution des mentalités. Et les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest sont beaucoup plus complexes qu'elles ne l'étaient il y a 17 ans, car des courants d'autarcie, d'interaction et d'interdépendance, imprévisibles alors, viennent les perturber.

Le nouvel examen décrété par les ministres de l'OTAN doit de toute nécessité permettre de définir l'orientation de l'Alliance pour jusqu'à la fin du siècle. Le Canada participera à ce travail et se conformera à ses résultats. Qu'il me soit permis de féliciter ici le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Belgique, M. Léo Tindemans, d'avoir lancé cette initiative. Et de saluer dans la personne du nouveau secrétaire général de l'OTAN, lord Carrington, un homme dont les idées sur les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest seront pour nous une source de créativité en même temps que de bon sens.

L'OTAN est une alliance de démocraties. L'ouverture des discussions et l'autonomie d'action sont tout aussi importantes pour nous qu'elles l'étaient pour M. Harmel. Une alliance qui ne saurait pas respecter la démocratie dans ses assemblées ne réussirait pas davantage à la défendre sur le terrain. Les réunions au sommet de l'OTAN revêtent une importance particulière et devraient constituer l'échelon suprême du leadership responsable et du véritable dialogue. Mme Thatcher et moi-même avons discuté ce point lors de sa visite au Canada, en septembre dernier. Dans mon allocution suivant le dîner donné en son honneur à Toronto, je disais:

"... le Canada considère l'OTAN comme la pierre angulaire de sa politique de défense. Nous ne voulons cependant pas en être des partenaires silencieux. Il s'agit après tout d'une alliance politique, et les politiciens aiment à discuter, voire à argumenter. Si, de temps à autre, nous sommes en désaccord et déployons de grands efforts pour résoudre nos différends, loin d'être un symptôme de faiblesse, c'est plutôt un signe de la force qui imprègne notre association libre de pays indépendants."

Tout comme le dernier cadre de politique général de l'OTAN avait été le produit du ferment intellectuel et de la turbulence militaire des années soixante, de même le prochain examen de ses orientations devrait tenir compte, au moins en tant que toile de fond, de toutes

les idées actuelles sur la sécurité internationale et les effets des armes nucléaires. Nombre de ces idées sont troublantes, incompatibles et difficiles à aborder. Mais elles ont cours, et aucune conspiration de silence ne les fera disparaître.

Ni l'Alliance ni les démocraties qui en font partie ne sont fondées sur une foi aveugle. Et les dogmes politiques ou stratégiques ne suffisent pas à eux seuls à rallier l'appui des peuples aux politiques de défense et aux dépenses qu'elles entraînent. Pour combler le fossé entre la sagesse établie et l'inquiétude du public, il faut assurément pénétrer un domaine actuellement occupé par de nombreux critiques de toutes convictions: celui des idées et doctrines contemporaines.

A mon sens, le nouvel examen des orientations de l'OTAN devra refléter ce que j'ai appelé le besoin de haute politique à tous les paliers des rapports entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Et il devra tenir compte, comme l'avait fait M. Harmel, des différences de perceptions entre les membres de l'Alliance; des perspectives, inconséquences et ambiguïtés européennes et nord-américaines, et des doutes et aspirations encore vagues qui se font jour de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique.

(Traduction)

Les Canadiens savent à quel point l'heure est grave. Ils savent que notre influence est limitée et que nous ne pouvons forcer les autres pays à nous écouter. Mais ils savent aussi que le Canada a un rôle à jouer. Dans ce sens, le gouvernement s'occupe de créer un institut chargé de la défense et du contrôle des armements pour aider le Canada et les Canadiens à orienter et faire progresser le débat sur la paix et la sécurité.

De nombreux Canadiens et Canadiennes m'ont appuyé et encouragé tout au cours de mes démarches pour subordonner la science de la guerre à l'art de la politique. Je tiens à leur exprimer mes remerciements, Monsieur le Président...

(Texte)

...mais je veux aussi remercier en langue française les correspondants très nombreux qui m'ont écrit en cette langue pour m'encourager de leurs conseils, de leurs prières, et les remercier très vivement d'avoir voulu participer avec nous le gouvernement, avec nous le Parlement, à cette démarche...

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(Transition)

...et je leur donne l'assurance, à eux et à tous les députés ici présents, que le travail amorcé se poursuivra. Le gouvernement du Canada est voué à cette entreprise et il entend la mener à bonne fin.

Mais nous avons besoin pour cela de la collaboration des États qui possèdent des armements nucléaires et ont le pouvoir d'y recourir. Car ce sont les puissances nucléaires, et par-dessus tout les superpuissances, qui portent en l'occurrence la plus grande part de responsabilité. Souhaitons que la postérité puisse dire d'elles que notre époque fut celle où elles surent soumettre leur génie technique à leur jugement politique et subordonner leur intérêt au bien commun. Souhaitons, en d'autres termes, qu'il y ait une postérité.

Et souhaitons que l'on puisse affirmer des autres nations qu'elles ont pris conscience de leur responsabilité de travailler à réduire la menace d'anéantissement, à promouvoir le renoncement aux armes nucléaires et à établir une paix durable.

Souhaitons enfin que l'on puisse dire du Canada et des Canadiens que nous avons vu venir la crise; que nous avons agi et pris des risques; que nous avons été loyaux envers nos amis et ouverts avec nos adversaires et que, fidèles à nos idéaux, nous avons fait tout en notre pouvoir pour écarter le spectre de la guerre.

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IDDZ/L.A.Delvoie/5-5912/sc

*m. Delvoie*  
*to see*  
*o/r*  
*MAJOR* **FILE**

TO/À

UGB

FROM/DE

• IDDZ

REFERENCE  
RÉFÉRENCE

• Your memorandum UGB-013 of February 7

SUBJECT  
SUJET

• PM's Initiative: Implications for  
Canada/USA Relations

Security/Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

Date

February 9, 1984

Number/Numéro

IDDZ-0136

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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URD

URR

CPD

WSHDC

We have taken note of the views expressed in your memorandum under reference, and will bring them to the Prime Minister's attention if you so wish. Please advise.

*L. A. Delvoie*  
L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

*I have conveyed my views to the only unit in this department (?) which claims responsibility for the initiative. What you do with my views is a matter for your judgment, as presumably are decisions on future steps.*

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO  
À  
IDDZ

FROM  
De  
UGB

REFERENCE  
Référence

SUBJECT  
Sujet  
P.M.'s Initiative: Implications for  
Canada/U.S. Relations

SECURITY  
Sécurité  
CONFIDENTIAL

DATE  
February 7, 1984

NUMBER  
Numéro  
UGB-013

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ENCLOSURES  
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Although the views of the Embassy in Washington need no repetition from me, I would like to endorse the conclusion (WSHDC telegram UNGR2010 of February 3) and, at the same time, offer some additional comments regarding the peace initiative. I have said, from the beginning, that, if our objective was to change mind sets or trend lines and inject political energy into the East-West dialogue, we should mobilize virtually all our influence on the one super-power on whom we can exercise influence. We have not done so consistently nor, I submit, have we chosen to acknowledge appropriately the degree to which there has been a change in tone emanating from Washington. Domestic political considerations in the U.S. have obviously been a significant but not an exclusive factor. Equally we have failed regularly to consult with (or even inform) the U.S. and other major allies as new steps are undertaken.

2. Public statements in Davos, followed by more pungent remarks in East Berlin and Bucharest, have raised more than eyebrows in Washington. They have generated concern about the impact on basic tenets of NATO strategy and on the credibility of the U.S. commitment. They play directly, but one-sidedly, into concerns about security in Europe and into intensive domestic debates within allied countries of Europe. The issue is not whether questions of this kind are permissible. The issue is whether those with questions have answers or, more particularly, commitments to offer as alternatives to those now in place. Arms control proposals represent one answer, but are they being played for show or for effect? If the latter, are we prepared to stop and consult further or are we determined to press on regardless of the views of our major allies?


3. I cannot help but be concerned about the extent to which the initiative is now beginning to jeopardize our bilateral relations. The potential for fallout is genuine; it is certain to increase as elections draw closer and will be conditioned by the manner in which we respond to (or ignore) what I would characterize as a measured message of concern from Washington. I think

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CONFIDENTIAL

it is time to take stock of the various elements involved with the initiative, bring a clearer focus on the procedural or substantive proposals which merit priority and are attainable and choose our tactics accordingly. I would suggest that an important first step immediately thereafter would be to meet with appropriate U.S. (and European officials) and consult in the spirit we often demand of them. This means systematic debriefing and advance notice. I am concerned that we seem to want to break new ground before we replace at least some divots.

4. Most of all I object to a continuing effort being cast as the P.M.'s "personal" initiative, for which responsibility, as well as basic analyses, become blurred and the follow-up is of the damage-control or 'least objectionable next-step' variety - a posture which, I submit, is as reckless as it is irresponsible.

  
D.H. Burney  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
(United States)



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier

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DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 SIG P. Gossage/cf	IDDZ	5-5912	 SIG L. A. DELVOZE

(TEX)

When the first atomic bomb exploded in a New Mexico desert in 1945, life itself changed. Man gave himself the power of his own destruction.

Never again would children be free from fear of the bomb. never again would we parents be able to reassure them. Nor to still our own anxieties.

A nuclear war would make no distinction between the sides of this House on which we find ourselves, between right and wrong, between rich or poor, between east or west, north or south.

Nuclear weapons exist. They probably always will. And they work, with horrible efficiency. They threaten the very future of our species. We have no choice but to manage the risk they present to us all. Never again can we put the task out of our minds; nor trivialize it; nor make it routine.

Nor dare we lose heart.

Managing the threat of nuclear war is the primordial duty of both East and West. But Canadians are concerned that the superpowers may have become diverted from this elemental responsibility. That they may be too caught up in ideological competition, in endless measurements of parity, in trials of strength and will. Canadians also know it would be foolhardy to expect that animosity between East and West will somehow disappear this side of the point of no return.

The experts would have us believe that the issues of nuclear war have become too complex for all but themselves. We are asked to entrust our fate to a handful of high priests of nuclear strategy. And to the scientists who have taken us from atom bombs to thermonuclear warheads, from missiles with one warhead to missiles with ten and more, from weapons that deter to weapons that threaten the existence of us all.

Canadians, and people everywhere, do not accept that proposition. They believe their security has been diminished, not enhanced, by a generation of work spent on perfecting the theories and instruments of human annihilation.

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But technological push too often finds a sympathetic political pull. It is leaders who decide on defence budgets and research budgets. It is leaders who must direct; it is leaders who must assert their will for peace or science will devise ever more lethal weapons systems.

Canadian security is at stake; and Canada has earned the right to be heard, in peacetime and in war. Thousands of Canadians fought and died in two world wars that Canada had no hand in starting. We helped to shape the post-war world -- at Bretton Woods where the World Bank was launched; and at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, where the United Nations was born.

We advocated universal membership in the international community -- when it was not always popular to do so. As Prime Minister Diefenbaker demonstrated with respect to Cuba. As Prime Ministers St. Laurent and Pearson demonstrated in helping newly independent states gain admission to the UN. And as my government demonstrated in recognizing the People's Republic of China and its right to a seat on the UN Security Council.

Canada emerged from World War II as one of the very few nations with both technology and resources to build nuclear weapons. But we had seen the terrible nature of these weapons and their work. Successive governments, therefore, renounced this nuclear option, and applied Canadian skills to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In place of a national nuclear force, we joined with others in systems of collective security -- in the UN, in NATO, and in NORAD.

Canada is a steadfast member of each of these organizations. In the UN, we took the lead in peacemaking and peacekeeping in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. In NATO, Canada is one of the few countries to maintain Alliance forces permanently outside its borders. In NORAD, we contribute an element of priceless value: the airspace above our vast land. The United States can design its own defences knowing that for 4,000 kilometres north of them, the land is occupied by a stable ally.

We take our commitments seriously. We have replaced our maritime patrol planes with the most advanced aircraft of their kind in the world. We have equipped our armoured units with the high-performance Leopard tank. We are phasing in sophisticated tactical and interceptor aircraft. We have launched a program to acquire new frigates. All of this is the most modern equipment available. All of it tasked to defensive purposes.

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We decided in 1969 that it was no longer appropriate for the Canadian Armed Forces to be equipped with nuclear weapons. We announced our intention to phase these systems out in a manner fully consistent with our commitments to our allies and as quickly as equipment replacement permitted. By 1970, we had divested ourselves of the surface-to-surface Honest John rockets in Europe. By 1972, we had completed the conversion of Canadian aircraft in Europe from a nuclear strike to a conventional attack role.

Also, by 1972, the Bomarc ground to air missiles based in Canada had been returned to the USA. We subsequently decided to replace the nuclear-equipped Canada-based CF-101s, by state-of-the-art CF-18 interceptors. Those CF-18s will carry out our air defence role more effectively with conventional armaments than the CF-101 could do with nuclear weaponry. This means that later this year we shall have rid ourselves of the last vestiges of nuclear weapons.

We have done more than look to our defences. We have addressed the causes of insecurity and instability, particularly in the third world. East-West and North-South are the four points of the political compass of our modern age. The problems of the South cannot be solved in the absence of progress on global security. Massive military expenditures are distorting economic policies and diverting resources away from global economic development. This in turn is worsening third world instabilities that ensnare East and West and add to the insecurity of us all.

Canadians, therefore, have earned the right to speak. They are telling us, the members of this House, as people everywhere are telling their own leaders, that the danger is too near. They want their leaders to act, to accept their political responsibility, to work to reduce the nuclear threat.

Last fall I spoke of an ominous rhythm of crisis. I drew attention to the confluence of three potentially disastrous trends -- the resort to force to settle disputes, the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the worsening state of East-West relations. I decided to practice what all seven leaders of the industrialized democracies had proclaimed last summer at Williamsburg: "...to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war".

I decided to use Canada's influence to call international attention to the danger, to try to inject high-level political energy into East-West relations, to turn the trend line of crisis, to work at the crossroads of common interest between the two sides.

I proposed that the megaphones be put away, that an armistice be declared in the war of ideology and recrimination, that an end be made to manichaeism on both sides. That we exercise leadership, and apply statecraft, in East-West relations -- the most important strategic relationship that we have.

#### THE INITIATIVE

Since last fall I have taken that message to Paris, The Hague, Brussels and Rome; to the Vatican, to Bonn, to London and to Zurich. I presented it in Tokyo, and to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi. To Peking, to Washington, and to the United Nations. I met with leaders in Prague, East Berlin and Bucharest, to ensure that our message was heard in the highest councils of the Warsaw Pact.

At each step along the way, my message was straightforward. Canada was not looking for a seat at the superpower table. But our lives and our future were on that table, as were those of the nine-tenths of the world's population living outside the USA and the USSR. We all had a right and a responsibility to involve ourselves, to press those at the table to remember their own humanity.

We proposed giving political impetus to the Stockholm Conference on measures to build confidence and reduce the risk of war in Europe. As many other East-West contacts collapsed, that conference took on importance even beyond its status as the only forum serving the Helsinki process of detente.

We insisted that both sides invest political effort to stimulate the talks in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions. These MBFR talks are the key to achieving parity of conventional forces in Central Europe and to raising the nuclear threshold, thereby diminishing reliance on early first use of nuclear weapons.

We proposed meetings as soon as possible of the five nuclear powers so that a forum might be established wherein to negotiate global limits and, eventually, reductions to their nuclear arsenals.

We urged action to reinforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is in the interest of superpower, middle-power and micro-state alike. And yet, as long as the five nuclear powers show little sign of initiating the reductions

called for in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we run the grave risk of seeing nuclear weapons spread to new regions and to old rivalries.

8 — Above all, at each step along the way I urged political leaders to commit themselves personally; to put peace at the top of their agenda; to exercise the political leadership the current dangerous situation demands -- to restart the dialogue between East and West.

I told President Reagan that the signals he was sending of American strength were being received in the East -- but that a message of peace was not getting through. I told leaders in Eastern Europe that the harsh rhetoric of their declarations had guaranteed rejection of the Warsaw Pact's more positive proposals.

### SIGNS OF PROGRESS

Misperceptions and mistrust on both sides run deep. But I believe we are beginning to see signs of progress.

In Goa, in November, forty-two Commonwealth leaders strongly endorsed my efforts to restore East-West political dialogue and to promote negotiations among the nuclear weapons states.

In Brussels, in December, NATO foreign ministers reached a consensus on several points I have argued strenuously during the past few years: They made a declaration which offered the East a balanced and constructive relationship; they made it clear that the West did not aspire to strategic superiority; and that the West respected the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests.

In accordance with our initiative, East and West have now agreed to resume the MBFR talks in Vienna on March 16. And they have agreed that foreign ministers should play a more active role in stimulating progress at those talks.

At our insistence, NATO foreign ministers participated early last month in the opening of the Stockholm Conference, to underline the importance they attached to high-level political dialogue. The Warsaw Pact foreign ministers responded to this Western move and also went to Stockholm. Of special significance was the presence in Stockholm of US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who met for over five hours. Both also met with my colleague the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs.

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Broad political contact was thus re-established between the countries of East and West for the first time since the acrimonious conclusion of the Madrid Conference last September, in the shadow of the Korean airliner tragedy.

Even Prime Minister Thatcher has taken steps to improve contacts between East and West. Her visit to Budapest last week is a further signal of momentum in East-West dialogue -- a determination to seek out areas of understanding between members of opposing alliances, and to promote a reassuring clarity about intentions.

In contrast to earlier statements, President Reagan twice last month signalled a constructive tone in American policy towards the USSR. The response from Moscow has been mixed -- elements of ~~tough~~/rhetoric together with signs of a cautious readiness to re-open lines of communication.

I have, Mr. Speaker, just returned from consultations with the leaders of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Romania. Those countries represent a middle-European geography, and a middle-power psychology, with long experience of East-West tensions.

Obviously they are closely allied to the Soviet Union. But their leadership, their influence, and their identity are, in present circumstances, significant. I found, for example, a very positive response to my suggestion that the middle powers of each alliance could play a constructive part in reviving habits of consultation at the highest levels of East-West politics.

I gave them our Western perspective on the decline of détente, and on the importance of its renewal, and I listened to their own. We talked about the mixture of signals between East and West, and about the need to go beyond an improvement in rhetoric, toward acts and gestures to restore confidence and reduce tensions.

I return with several conclusions from my talks in Eastern Europe:

- First, I was struck by the contrast between the cordial, reasonable, and non-ideological private talks, and the occasional blast of Warsaw Pact fundamentalism to which we were subjected in public. I believe this disparity underlines the importance of personal contact and private dialogue. Without that dialogue, both sides risk remaining prisoners of their own polemic.

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- Second, because we were able in our private talks to strip away much of the invective surrounding key issues, I believe we were able to begin a process of exposing areas of common interest. That process will take time, but I dare hope that a new level of maturity in East-West relations is within our grasp.
- Third, if we are to reach that level of maturity, we shall have to grapple with difficult problems of misperception on both sides -- blind spots and distortions, subjective errors of analysis or of judgment.

Few of my interlocutors, for example, seemed genuinely able to perceive, let alone concede, the gravity of the threat posed to Western countries by the deployment of Soviet SS-20's. And for our part, I wondered whether we in the West had not significantly underestimated the full impact on the East of the combination of INF deployment with the harsh rhetoric of recent years.

It will be uphill work to gain a more accurate perception of each other, and to gauge more accurately the consequences of our various words and deeds. INF deployment must continue -- and negotiations must be resumed. But only the "third rail" of political confidence and communication can ensure an early and constructive outcome.

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In reflecting on these conclusions, and on the substance of my talks in Eastern and Western capitals alike, it is clear to me that areas of common interest are beginning to emerge. Let me suggest ten principles of a common bond between East and West:

1. -- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
2. -- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
3. -- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
4. -- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
5. -- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
6. -- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.

7. -- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
8. -- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.
9. -- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
10. -- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

As decalogues go, this may seem modest. But I wonder, in this period when there are positive signs of emergence from a time of crisis, whether there is not sound purpose in going back to basics. Beginning again, with a commitment to principles which can be shared. Finding a place to start -- surveying a little common ground on which to stand.

Therefore, we intend to draw on these ten principles, to develop elements of a common purpose among the leaders of East and West.

I shall be writing to President Reagan and to President Andropov, to leaders in both alliances, and to other statesmen, to propose that these are principles upon which both sides can build. Because there are points of agreement as well as disagreement. There is a way around the impasse of recent months. There are signs of promise and I believe that the trend-line of crisis has turned.

As we look back on our work over the past four months, and look to the months ahead, I am encouraged that we are beginning to see results. We sought to catalyze a dialogue between East and West. And that is happening. We sought to persuade both sides to turn down their rhetoric. And that has begun to happen.

I sought to associate myself with like-minded leaders in several quarters of the world. Many of them have begun, or continued, to make their own contribution to a reduction of tensions, to put forward their own proposals for arms control. My colleague the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs and I have pursued the Canadian initiative in multilateral institutions, in bilateral relations, at special conferences, and in dialogue with groups and individuals.

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## THE TASKS AHEAD

We have injected political energy into East-West relations. But political energy is not, by itself, enough. It must be nourished by imagination, fortified by persistence, and confirmed by action. Imagination to find new ideas, which break old deadlocks and address emerging dangers. Persistence to negotiate new agreements and to meet the challenge of technology. Action in the form even of small steps as evidence of good faith. Action on specific tasks such as developing the means to verify arms control agreements, or in regularly scheduled consultations between East and West.

(TRANSLATION)

In the months ahead Canada will build on the progress so far achieved, to ensure that our ideas are further developed and implemented. We have no monopoly of proposals, nor do we expect them to gain acceptance overnight. What counts is that some, though by no means all, of the key East-West indicators show that their downward course has been arrested.

My own personal contribution, though necessarily less intensive than in recent months, will definitely continue. I intend to go to Moscow, whenever circumstances permit. Our initiative will also be taken forward by my Cabinet colleagues, by our ambassadors abroad and by all Canadians who share our purposes.

Canada will play its part in the councils of the West, in bilateral talks, at multilateral meetings and conferences, in contacts with the Soviet Union and its allies.

We shall work vigorously for progress in the Stockholm Conference and the MBFR talks. If these talks bog down, Canada will endeavour to ensure that political leaders again take a personal hand in energizing them. Once the MBFR negotiations resume in March, it will be imperative that NATO respond to the proposal made last summer by the Warsaw Pact.

Following further consultations with our NATO allies, we shall in the course of the current session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, circulate three proposals to gear down the momentum of new technology. We will thus give additional substance to the strategy of suffocation which I put forward in 1978. These proposals are:

.../10



- 10 -

- a ban on high-altitude anti-satellite systems,
- restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs,
- improvements in the verifiability of future strategic weapons.

In the months leading up to next year's review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we shall continue to press both sides to keep the NPT bargain. For security is indivisible. If countries which do not now have nuclear weapons acquire them, then everyone's security is diminished.

The basis of the NPT bargain was that the nuclear powers would reduce their armaments in return for the non-nuclear powers not building their own, and that both would cooperate in sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus, the current nuclear weapons states bear an immense responsibility in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Consequently, we must also continue to press our proposal for a conference of the five nuclear weapons states. It is a concept whose logic is compelling. Those five nuclear powers are at the same time the permanent members of the Security Council. They have responsibilities as well as vetoes. That is why I asked the UN Secretary General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, to explore and to promote confidential meetings of their representatives in New York. In my talks with Premier Zhao in January, I found that the Chinese had, since my visit to Peking, begun to express a readiness to consider such contacts in New York without the pre-conditions they had raised before.

The idea will take hold slowly, to be sure, as new ideas do. But I believe that it will take hold. For example: accident, miscalculation, crisis, systems failure -- these are nuclear perils which all of the five powers must cope with. And which they have the responsibility to manage cooperatively. I suggest, therefore, that an early focus of five-power consultations should be crisis management; particularly the handling of nuclear weapons incidents, and the improvement of crisis communications.

.../11

- 11 -

Among the five nuclear weapons states, the two super-powers have by far the largest arsenals. They bear a corresponding responsibility to apply the same genius to reducing their arms as they did to developing them. They must not let their views of each other's morality and legitimacy prevent an early resumption of arms control talks. It is vital that they resume negotiations on limiting and reducing intermediate range and strategic nuclear weapons.

This past decade the superpowers have not ratified a single significant arms control agreement. In the preceding decade they had ratified a dozen. Gestures are needed to lift the clouds of suspicion. A useful step would be for both sides to ratify an agreement which they observe already: the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

I have been giving considerable attention so far to five-power relationships, to the bilateral environment of the super-powers, to multilateral talks and conferences. Much of our own contribution to this work is enhanced by the consultative process open to us in NATO. NATO is a significant forum for Canada, whether in terms of national policy, of collective security, or of basic approaches to East-West relations.

18 — When NATO was formed in 1949, Canada insisted that it be a political alliance, as well as a military one. And Canada continues on that basis loyally to maintain our long-standing commitment to NATO and to its policies.

But all institutions tend, by their very nature, towards inertia unless their members give them energy and a renewed sense of direction. Thus I was gratified that NATO ministers decided, at their December meeting in Brussels, to commission a full review of the steps NATO can take to improve East-West relations. Canada had been urging such an approach at successive NATO summits.

The last such review, in 1967, took place at the initiative of Pierre Harmel, Foreign Minister of Belgium. Then, as now, there was a sense that things ought to change. There was a need for the Alliance to have a vision of the future, and a political strategy to achieve it. The document which resulted, known as "The Future Tasks of the Alliance", was a landmark in NATO thinking. It came to terms, as in this period we must come to terms, with the need for a broad policy which governs, and gives purpose to, our military security.

.../12

- 12 -

The Harmel Report's most profound conclusions were:

- that military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary;
- that work towards a balanced reduction of military forces should be intensified, as well as efforts to overcome instability and insecurity;
- that the world had changed since the formation of NATO in 1949, and that there was a need to look ahead -- to gain sightlines on the future and to work along them.
- and that each member of the Alliance had a contribution to make, not in subordination to, but in consultation with, the other members of the Alliance.

Despite frequent setbacks, the results of that policy are impressive, especially when viewed from today's perspective: the inter-German settlements of the late sixties; the bilateral promotion of ties with the USSR by many Western countries, including my own visit in 1971; elements of rapprochement in the superpower relationship -- and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

We need to approach the coming period with the same spirit of enquiry, the same creative diplomacy, the same forward-looking vision.

The world has changed since 1967. We sense the shifts of power and psychology. East-West relations are far more complex than they were 17 years ago. There are competing trends of autarky, interaction, and interdependence, unforeseeable at that time.

It is essential that this new review chart a course for the Alliance to the end of this century. Canada will make its own contribution to the work, and abide by the results. I congratulate the current Belgian Foreign Minister, Leo Tindemans, for his part in launching the review. I welcome the incoming Secretary General, Lord Carrington -- a man whose own ideas on East-West relations will inspire us with creativity and guide us with common-sense.

.../13

- 13 -

NATO is an alliance of democracies. Open discussion and independent action are as important for us as they were for Harmel. An alliance which fails to defend democracy in its councils will surely fail in its defence of democracy in the field. NATO summit meetings have a particular importance, and should be the senior level of responsible Alliance leadership and authentic debate. Prime Minister Thatcher and I discussed this point during her visit here last September. In my remarks after dinner in Toronto, I suggested that:

"...Canadians look upon NATO as the cornerstone of our defence policy. We do not wish to be silent partners, however. It is a political alliance, after all, and politicians like to discuss and even argue the issues. If we disagree from time to time, and expend great effort in trying to resolve our differences, that is not a sign of weakness in the Alliance, but a sign of the strength which pervades a free association of independent countries".

Just as NATO's last policy framework emerged from the intellectual ferment and military turbulence of the 1960s, so should the next review take into account, if only as background, the full range of ideas now current about international security and the effects of nuclear arms. Many of these ideas are uncomfortable, incompatible, and awkward to entertain. But they are there, and no conspiracy of silence will make them go away.

Neither the Alliance, nor its member democracies, are built on blind faith. National support for defence policies -- and for defence expenditures -- cannot be sustained by political or strategic liturgy alone. Bridging the gap between accepted wisdom and public anxiety surely means an open examination of the intellectual territory now occupied by many critics -- critics of every persuasion, I might add -- of contemporary concepts and doctrines.

I believe the new NATO review should reflect what I have been calling the need to bring statecraft and high politics to every level of the East-West system. And I suggest that the review will also have to cope, as Harmel did, with differences of perception among Alliance members. With European and North American perspectives, inconsistencies and ambiguities. With inchoate doubts and aspirations on each side of the Atlantic.

.../14

(TEXT)

Canadians know the gravity of these issues. They know that Canada's power is limited and that we cannot force others to listen to us. But they also know that Canada has a role to play. That is why the government is creating a defence and arms control institute: to help Canada and Canadians more fully contribute to advancing the debate on peace and security, and to shaping that debate.

Throughout my own personal efforts to subject the science of war to the art of politics, I have been sustained by the support of many Canadians, and encouraged by their good wishes. I thank them now, Mr. Speaker, and assure them, as well as this House, that the work we have started will continue. The Government of Canada is committed to these purposes and will carry them forward.

But we can carry them only so far without the collaboration of those who own and control nuclear weapons. Because it is the nuclear powers, and above all the superpowers, who bear the greatest responsibility. Let it be said of them in the future that this was the time when their political judgment controlled their technological genius, when their best interest served the common good. Let history survive, that it may judge them generously.

Let it be said of the other nations that they saw their own responsibility to work to reduce the threat of annihilation, to forego nuclear weapons, and to serve the purpose of a durable peace.

And let it be said of Canada, and of Canadians: that we saw the crisis; that we did act; that we took risks; that we were loyal to our friends and open with our adversaries; that we lived up to our ideals; and that we have done what we could to lift the shadow of war.



External Affairs    Affaires extérieures  
Canada                Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ  
UNCLASSIFIED

FM/DE  
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INFO  
DISTR  
REF  
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0134 09FEB84

TO DALAS CLVND DTROT MNPLS PHILA ATNTA BUFLO

---PM S HOUSE OF COMMONS SPEECH-SUMMARY

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF PM S SPEECH TO BE DELIVERED IN HOUSE OF  
COMMONS 1100 HRS OTT TIME THURSDAY. PLEASE GUARD UNTIL THAT TIME.  
FULL TEXT WILL BE SENT ASAP.

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

*SEATL-SFRAN-LNG-LS*

IMMED

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DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG *P. Gossage*

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

*L.A. Delvoie*

Prime Minister Trudeau's Speech  
in the House of Commons

February 9, 1984

SUMMARY

In a wide ranging review of current prospects for peace, and of his own recent role in that process, the Prime Minister stated that managing the threat of nuclear war was the promordial duty of both East and West and that Canada had earned its right to be heard. He said that Canadians were telling their government "as people everywhere are telling their own leaders, that the danger is too near. They want their leaders to act, to accept their political responsibility, to work to reduce the nuclear threat".

Recalling his own decision to launch a peace initiative, the Prime Minister said "I decided to practice what all seven leaders of the industrialized democracies had proclaimed last summer in Williamsburg: '... to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war'... I decided to use Canada's influence ... to try to inject high level political energy into East-West relations, to turn the trend line of crisis...".

The Prime Minister reviewed the principal proposals he took on his mission, then emphasized that each step along the way he urged leaders to "exercise the political leadership the current dangerous situation demands -- to restart the dialogue between East and West". "I told President Reagan", he said, "that the signals he was sending of American strength were being received in the East -- but that a message of peace was not getting through. I told leaders in Eastern Europe that the harsh rhetoric of their declarations had guaranteed rejection of the Warsaw Pact's more positive proposals".

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The Prime Minister gave examples that indicated some progress in reducing tensions. He noted particularly the renewal of high level contact between East and West at the Stockholm Conference, "for the first time since the acrimonious conclusion of the Madrid Conference last September, in the shadow of the Korean Airliner tragedy".

"In contrast to earlier statements", he continued, "President Reagan twice last month signalled a constructive tone in American policy towards the USSR" and he underlined that Prime Minister Thatchers visit to Budapest was "a further signal of momentum in East West dialogue -- a determination to seek out areas of understanding, ... and to promote a reassuring clarity about intentions".

Turning to his own recently completed consultations in Eastern Europe, the Prime Minister said he found a "very positive response" to my suggestion that the middle powers of each alliance could play a constructive part in reviving habits of consultations and reason, but that without personal contact "both sides risk remaining prisoners of their own polemic". He said that neither side appeared to understand the others' fear of further deployment and wondered whether "we in the West had not significantly underestimated the full impact on the Warsaw Pact of the combination of INF deployment with the harsh rhetoric of recent years".

Summing up talks in Eastern and Western capitals, the Prime Minister listed ten principles that represent areas of common interest and agreement between East and West:

"1. -- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.



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2. -- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
3. -- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
4. -- Both side recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
5. -- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
6. -- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
7. -- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
8. -- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.
9. -- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
10. -- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side."

"We intend to draw on these principles", the Prime Minister stated, "to develop elements of a common purpose among the leaders of East and West". He said there could be a sound purpose served in "going back to basics" and that he would be writing to President Reagan and President Andropov to propose these as principles on which both sides can build.

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The Prime Minister said that Canada would continue to build on the progress already achieved and that although his own personal involvement would be less intense, that he intended to go to Moscow "whenever circumstances permit". He added that through the Secretary of State for External Affairs, other Cabinet Colleagues and Ambassadors Canada would play its part in the Councils of the West, in the Stockholm Conference and the MBFR in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament where Canada will circulate three proposals to gear down the momentum of technology, and in pursuing the idea of a conference of the five nuclear states which he characterized as a "concept whose logic is compelling". He suggested in this regard that an early focus on five power consultations should be crisis management including the handling of nuclear weapons incidents and the improvement of crisis communications.

The Prime Minister also stressed that Canada would press both sides to keep the non-proliferation bargain that nuclear powers would reduce their armaments in return for non-nuclear powers not building their own. "Security is indivisible", he said, "if countries which do not now have nuclear weapons acquire them, then the security of all of us is diminished".

Turning to the critical role of the superpowers, the Prime Minister warned that the "must not let their views of each others' morality and legitimacy prevent an early resumption of arms control negotiations".

While reaffirming Canada's long standing commitment to NATO and its policies, the Prime Minister urged that the current review underway in the Alliance of ways to improve East-West relations be undertaken with the same "spirit of enquiry, the same creative diplomacy" that characterized the last such review in 1967, the Harmel Report. "It is essential, he said, "that this new review chart a course for the alliance

- 5 -

to the end of this century". "I believe the new NATO review, "he added, "should reflect what I have been calling the need to bring statecraft and high politics to every level of East-West system". It should cope with divergences of view on both sides of the Atlantic.

Summing up, the Prime Minister said that Canada would continue its efforts to subject the science of war to the art of politics, but that such efforts could only be carried so far. He said it was above all the superpowers who bore the greatest responsibility. "Let it be said of them in the future", he said, "that this was the time when their political judgement controlled their technological genius, when their self interest was the common good".

"And let it be said of of Canada" he concluded "and of Canadians: that we saw the crisis: that we did act; that we took risks; that we were loyal to our friends and open with our adversaries; that we lived up to our ideals; and that we have done what we could to lift the shadow of war."

*info*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMCOTT PM09043 09FEB84

TO LDN/PHILLIPS PARIS/BILODEAU DELIVER BY 090900

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ/GOSSAGE

---INTERVIEW WITH PM

DUE TO OLYMPICS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, UNAVAILABILITY OF SATELLITE TIME,  
PROPOSED 4-CAPITAL INTERVIEW WITH PM FOR FRIDAY IS CANCELLED.

APPRECIATED YOUR EFFORTS.

UUU/146 090511Z PM09043

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10/2/88

PAGE TWO YBGR6150 SECRET

IN THE FORWARD AREA WOULD INHIBIT SURPRISE ATTACK AND  
ENHANCE WARNING. NEGOTIATION OF A SATISFACTORY EXCEPTIONS  
REGIME WOULD, HOWEVER, REMAIN AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE  
BARGAIN IF ALLIANCE CAPABILITY IS NOT TO BE PREJUDICED, AS  
ALSO WOULD THE RETENTION OF SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY OVER OUR FORCE  
CEILINGS TO ALLOW HEADROOM FOR ANY FORESEEABLE WESTERN  
REQUIREMENTS. MBFR WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO ALLOW ANY  
SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN DEFENCE SPENDING AS FAR AS THE UK  
IS CONCERNED; IN THE SHORT TERM IT MIGHT REQUIRE SOME INCREASE.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WESTS PROPOSED PACKAGE OF  
ASSOCIATED MEASURES WOULD ENHANCE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY  
AND, THROUGH THE NEGOTIATION OF A REGIME FOR ON-SITE  
INSPECTIONS, WOULD ESTABLISH A VALUABLE PRECEDENT FOR OTHER  
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF:

- A. THE FACT THAT, EVEN AT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL EVOLUTION  
OF THE ALLIANCE GOAL OF MANPOWER PARITY AT 700,000/900,000,  
SOME OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS STUDIES SUGGESTED THAT THIS  
WOULD REDUCE RATHER THAN ENHANCE ALLIANCE CAPABILITY TO  
RESIST A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK IN THE CENTRAL REGION; AND
  - B. THE WIDE RANGE OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING BOTH NATO AND WP
- ...3

PAGE THREE YBGR6150 SECRET

MILITARY CAPABILITIES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE 1973.

WHICH OVERALL ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE OPERATED TO THE  
ADVANTAGES OF THE ALLIANCE;

UK MILITARY AUTHORITIES WOULD WELCOME A FUNDAMENTAL RE-EXAMINATION OF THE MBFR OBJECTIVES TO ENSURE THAT THESE REMAIN CONSISTENT WITH THE NEED AT LEAST NOT TO LOWER, AND PREFERABLY TO RAISE, THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. SUCH A RE-EXAMINATION MIGHT ALSO USEFULLY EXPLORE THE SCOPE FOR COMBINING SOME PROVISIONS FOR REDUCTIONS IN COMBAT EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL WITH THE EXISTING, BUT LESS MEANINGFUL, AIM OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

SOVIET VIEWS

MBFR WAS A WESTERN INITIATIVE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION ONLY AGREED IN RETURN FOR WESTERN PARTICIPATION IN CSCE. THE SOVIET UNION HAS FROM THE BEGINNING REGARDED THE WEST AS THE DEMANDEUR IN THE TALKS AND BEEN PREPARED TO PLAY A WAITING GAME.

WE CONSIDER THAT THE SOVIET UNIONS MAIN INTEREST IN THE TALKS HAS BEEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO SECURE POLITICAL GAINS (E.G. BY CAUSING DIVISION BETWEEN THE US AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES, OR IN EXERCISING A DROIT DE REGARD OVER INDIVIDUAL WESTERN DEFENCE PROGRAMMES IN THE GUIDELINES AREA), WHILE PRESERVING THE MILITARY STATUS QUO. IT IS THE LATTER, AND NOT ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS,

...4

PAGE FOUR YBGR6150 SECRET

THAT THE EAST UNDERSTANDS BY ITS COMMITMENT TO QUOTE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY UNQUOTE, A CONCEPT WHICH IT HAS CONSISTENTLY PURSUED UNDER DIFFERENT GUISES. WE KNOW OF NO INDICATION THAT THEY ARE GENUINELY READY TO ACCEPT PARITY NOW OR INDEED OF ANY REAL INCENTIVE FOR THEM TO DO SO. WE HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT SOME BROADER POLITICAL CONSIDERATION, ARISING FROM OUTSIDE THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PERSUADE THE SOVIET UNION TO ALTER ITS POSITION SUBSTANTIALLY. WE SEE NO SUCH CONSIDERATION AT THE MOMENT.

ON THE OTHER HAND THERE COULD WELL BE ATTRACTIONS FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN SOME KIND OF LIMITED, POSSIBLY INITIAL, AGREEMENT WHICH, AT THE COST OF MINOR REDUCTION AND ACCEPTANCE OF SOME (INEFFECTIVE) VERIFICATION MEASURES NOT AFFECTING SOVIET TERRITORY GAVE JURIDICAL SANCTION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN EUROPE AND PRESERVED DE FACTO EASTERN SUPERIOITY IN MANPOWER. WE BELIEVE THAT THE HOPE OF ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT ON THESE LINES MAY UNDERLIE THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE EAST IN 1983. UNQUOTE.

CCC/290 091425Z YBGR6150



**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*Dr Calder*  
*A. J. Conner*  
*MT*

C O N F I D E N T I E L ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

DE PARIS WIGR3343 09FEV84

A EXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO BNATO BONN WSHDC LDN VMBFR ROME PRMNY MOSCO WSAW BUCST BPEST  
PRGUE BGRAD GENEV STKHM/SCDEL HAGUE BRU NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/DACPOL  
PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD RGB RCR ZSI URR CPD

REF NOTRETEL WIGR3332 DU 08FEV

--- INITIATIVE DU PM - CONSULTATIONS AVEC LE QUAI/CONCLUSIONS  
NOUS EN REMETTANT A NOTRETEL EN REF POUR DETAILS DES CONSULTATIONS  
TENUES AVEC QUAI 06FEV LORS PASSAGE DE IDDZ, SUIVENT CEPENDANT  
QQUES COMMENTAIRES ADDITIONNELS ET CONCLUSIONS QUI EN DECOULENT.

2. (A) PRINCIPAL FACTEUR DE PREOCCUPATION APPARU COTE FRANCAIS  
CONCERNAIT ALLUSIONS A DECLARATION DE PRAGUE. FRANCE DESAPPROUVE  
CETTE DECLARATION TANT DANS SA FORME, EN TANT QUE SUGGERANT NEG DE  
PACTE A PACTE, QUE DANS SA SUBSTANCE, EN TANT QUE RECAPITULATIF DES  
PROPOSITIONS SOVIETIQUES EN LA MATIERE. PLUS ENCORE, RESPS FRANCAIS  
CRAignent QU'EN ACCORDANT INTERET/IMPORTANCE A CETTE DELCARATION ON  
RISQUE D'OUVRIR LA VOIE A MANIPULATION SOVIETIQUE PAR PAYS DE L'EST  
INTERPOSES. CONCRETEMENT, UNE EXPRESSION POSSIBLE D'UNE TELLE  
MANIPULATION SERAIT DE METTRE SUR MEME PIED PII/CRUISE EN EUROPE  
OCCIDENTALE AVEC SS-20 DEPLOYES DANS PAYS SATELLITES AU TITRE DE  
CONTRE-MESURES. C'EST POURQUOI NE SERAIT-CE QUE DES ALLUSIONS A

...2

PAGE DEUX WIGR3343 CONFIDENTIEL ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

LADITE DECLARATION EQUIVAUDRAIENT A ACCORDER AUX PAYS DE L'EST UN POIDS QU'ILS N'ONT PAS VIS-A-VIS DE URSS. SI PRESSIONS DOIVENT ET PEUVENT ETRE EXERCEES PAR PAYS DE L'EST, ELLES DEVRAIENT RESULTER DE RESISTANCE OCCIDENTALE CONFIRMANT ERREUR D'APPRECIATION DES SOVIETIQUES ET QUI CONFRONTE PAYS DE L'EST AUX MEMES RISQUES QUE SS-20 FONT COURRIER SUR EUROPE OCCIDENTALE.

(B) CONCERNANT CONFERENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES, IL EST CLAIREMENT APPARU QUE TOUTE SITUATION/DEVELOPPEMENT/PROPOSITION CONFRONTANT FRANCE AVEC DECISION DE RAPPROCHER HORIZON DE LEUR PARTICIPATION SUSCITE SENSIBILITE PARTICULIERE. INTERLOCUTEURS FRANCAIS ONT RECONNU QUE POSITION TELLE QU'ENONCEE LAISSAIT CETTE IMPRESSION, DE PAR NATURE ET AMPLIEUR DES CONDITIONS POSEES, QUE FRANCE N'ETAIT PAS PRETE A DISCUTER MAINTENANT DE DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE. POURRIONS D'AILLEURS AJOUTER QUE TELLE PERCEPTION EST SANS DOUTE REVELATRICE DE FRAGILITE RELATIVE DE SON DISCOURS POLITIQUE A CET EGARD SI CE N'EST DU CONCEPT MEME DE DISSUASION TELLE QU'ELLE L'ENTEND. AVONS D'AILLEURS PU CONSTATER LORS MENTION QUE CHINE AVAIT LEVE SA CONDITION D'UNE REDUCTION QUANTITATIVEMENT PRECISEE POUR SA PARTICIPATION A UNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ. UN CERTAIN DESARROI CHEZ NOS INTERLOCUTEURS.

CONSEQUENCE IMMEDIATE DE CECI EST QUE FRANCE SE RETROUVE DANS POSITION DE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE POTENTIEL, PAR SES CONDITIONS, A UNE TELLE CONFERENCE. POUR NOTRE PART SOMMES D'AVIS QUE SI PARTICIPATION

...3

PAGE TROIS WIGR3343 CONFIDENTIEL ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

FRANCAISE EST ESSENTIELLE, ATTENTION TOUTE PARTICULIERE DEVRAIT  
ETRE ACCORDEE TANT A NATURE DES PRESSIONS DONT ELLE SERA OBJET POUR  
L'Y AMENER QUE SUR CONSEQUENCES SUR SA POSITION PROPRE ET VIS-A-VIS  
DE SES PARTENAIRES EUROPEENS COMPTE TENU DES CONDITIONS ACTUELLES.  
SI FRANCE DOIT PARTICIPER A TELLE CONF IL IMPORTE QUE SA POSITION  
STRATEGIQUE N'EN SOIT PAS POUR AUTANT FRAGILISEE ET QU'ELLE EN TIRE  
UN CERTAIN PRESTIGE FINCI.

3.(C) MALGRE NOS DIVERSES INTERROGATIONS N'AVONS PU OBTENIR QUELQUE  
SIGNE QUE CE SOIT D'UN CHANGEMENT D'ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS D'UNE  
INCLUSION EVENTUELLE DE SON DISPOSITIF NUCLEAIRE DANS NEG INF/  
START, Y COMPRIS DANS PERSPECTIVE D'UNE FUSION. PAS PLUS N'AVONS NOUS  
PU DECOUVRIR INDICATIONS D'UNE REFLEXION EN COURS A CET EFFET PAR  
ENTREMISE D'UN QUELCONQUE GROUPE D'ETUDE RESTREINT. EN FAIT, IDEE  
EVOQUEE A CE SUJET PAR MARIE FRANCE GARAUD N'A PAS DANS NOS  
CONVERSATIONS OBTENU DE MEILLEUR FONDAMENT.

(D) PAR CONTRE, DEGRE ELEVE DE SENSIBILITE ACCORDE A QUESTION DU  
DECOUPLAGE EUROPE/EUA ET A NECESSITE DE RENFORCER DIALOGUE POLITIQUE  
ENTRE EUROPEENS EN MATIERE DE SECURITE S'EST VU CONFIRME. EXISTENCE  
D'UN GROUPE DE TRAVAIL PS/QUAI/ELYSEE SUR CONSEQUENCES D'UN RETRAIT  
AMERICAIN EN EUROPE QUI NOUS A ETE SIGNALEE PAR SOPPELSA LORS DE  
SA RENCONTRE AVEC DMF, NE NOUS A PAS ETE DIRECTEMENT REVELEE. AU PLUS  
A-T-ON ADMIS CONSTANTE D'UNE CERTAINE POLYSYNODIE FINCI BUREAUCRATIQUE  
EN PLUSIEURS DOMAINES. CONFIRMATION NOUS A ETE DONNEE DE IMPORTANCE

...4

PAGE QUATRE WIGR3343 CONFID ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT  
QUE FRANCE ACCORDE A REDYNAMISATION DE UEO ET A PRODUCTION  
COMMUNE D'ARMEMENTS PRECISEMENT COMME MOYENS DE FAVORISER CETTE  
COOPERATION ACCRUE TANT SOUHAITEE. ACCENT Y EST CEPENDANT CLAIREMENT  
PLACE SUR DEVELOPPEMENT D'UN AXE FR/RFA RENFORCE.

4. (E) INTERLOCUTEURS NOUS ONT EGALEMENT INDIQUE INTERET MAINTENU  
PAR FRANCE CONCERNANT THEME CIT DESARMEMENT/DEVELOPPEMENT FINCIT.  
COMITE INTERMINISTERIEL DE REFLEXION EST ACTUELLEMENT A PIED  
D'OEUVRE ET DEVRAIT METTRE AU POINT SOUS PEU DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL  
DEVELOPPANT IDEE FRANCAISE DEJA LANCEE PAR PRES MITTERRAND A ONU  
EN SEP, REPRENANT UNE IDEE DE GISCARD D ESTAING.  
COPIE DEVRAIT NOUS EN ETRE FOURNIE PREALABLEMENT  
A DIVULGATION AUPRES INSTANCES APPROPRIEES.

5. BIEN QUE CONVERSATIONS AVEC QUAI AIENT PORTE SUR ASPECTS  
RELATIVEMENT TECHNIQUES ET DETAILLES TANT DE INITIATIVE DU PM  
QUE DE DEMARCHE CDNNE EN MATIERE DE DESARMEMENT, FORCE EST  
TOUTEFOIS DE RECONNAITRE QUE RESULTAT LE PLUS IMPORTANT DE CES  
CONSULTATIONS FUT D'INDIQUER A LA FOIS SERIEUX DU CDA DANS CE  
DOMAINE ET MESSAGE CLAIR QUE DEVONS ETRE COMPTES PARMY INTERLOCU-  
TEURS DE PREMIER PLAN. PUISQUE TELLE FUT CONSEQUENCE DE CES  
CONSULTATIONS, AVONS TOUT LIEU DE CROIRE QUE FRANCAIS VOUDRONT  
COLLABORER DAVANTAGE AVEC NOUS ET NOUS COMPTER PARMY PRINCIPAUX  
CONTACTS NE SERAIT-CE QU'EN CE QUI CONCERNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ  
NUCLEAIRES OU DEFINITIVEMENT CDA MARQUE LE PAS.

CCC/118 091722Z WIGR3343

marker  
FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2025 09FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO BNATO BUCST BGRAD ROME PARIS LDN BONN STKHM/SCDEL VMBFR

ATHNS

DISTR URR RBD IDR IDA (IDDZ ZSI ZSP

---RELS WITH ALBANIA

DURING A DISCUSSION WITH DEP ASST SEC PALMER ON PMS TRIP TO EASTERN EUROPE, PALMER SAID TO US THAT THE USA IS VERY INTERESTED IN SEEING CDA ESTABLISH RELS WITH ALBANIA. USA IS AWARE THAT THE ALBANIANS HAVE BEEN MAKING SOME INITIATIVES AND SOUNDINGS IN OUR DIRECTION AND HOPES THAT WE WLD BE ABLE TO RESPOND. CDA CAN DO WHAT THE USA CANNOT/NOT BECAUSE THERE IS NO/NO EVIDENCE OF AN ALBANIAN DESIRE TO ESTABLISH RELS WITH THE USA.

2. PALMER POINTED OUT THAT HOXHA IS GETTING OLD AND THAT IT MIGHT WELL BE USEFUL TO MOVE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. THE SOV UNION IS TRYING VERY HARD TO GET BACK INTO ALBANIA. FOR EXAMPLE THE SOVS MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS TWO FULL TIME PEOPLE WORKING ON ALBANIA ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NO/NO RELS. THERE ARE SEVERAL SENIOR PEOPLE IN THE ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP WHO WERE TRAINED IN THE SOV UNION SO THAT SOV UNION MAY HAVE SOME LEVERAGE THERE WHICH CLD IN PART BE BALANCED BY CDN RELS WITH ALBANIA.

3. PALMER DESCRIBED ALBANIA AS THE LAST BIT OF UNCLAIMED TERRITORY IN EUROPE AND THE USA CONSIDERS THAT IT WLD BE FOOLISH FOR THE

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2025 CONF

WEST NOT/NOT TO MAKE A MOVE TOWARD INFLUENCING IT.HE TOLD US  
THAT NEXT MONTH FRENCH WILL BE MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO ALBANIA  
ON BEHALF OF THE UK AND USA ON THEIR GOLD CLAIMS WHICH HAVE  
BEEN EXISTING SINCE THE END OF THE WAR. PLEASE PROTECT).PALMER  
SAID THIS IS THE ONLY PROBLEM THAT EXISTS IN USA/ALBANIAN RELS.  
HE SAID THAT THE ITALIANS AT USA PRODDING HAD BEEN DOING A VERY  
GOOD JOB IN MAINTAINING TIES WITH ALBANIA AND POINTED TO THE  
FERRY LINK THAT IS HEAVILY SUBSIDIZED BY THE ITALIANS.

4.GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE US UPDATE ON CURRENT CDN THINKING ON  
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELS WITH ALBANIA AND WITH GUIDANCE ON EXTENT  
TO WHICH WE CAN BRIEF PALMER.

CCC/241 092255Z UNGR2025

master FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2024 09FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DIPOL/DNACPOL/DMPC

LDN PARIS BONN VMBFR

DISTR URR RCR RSR(IDDZ IDA IDRL

REF YOURTEL IDR0450 07FEB

---USA NOTIFICATION OF NATO FORCE ADJUSTMENTS

WE DISCUSSED SUBJ WITH CONTACTS IN EUROPEAN BUREAU OF STATE DEPT.  
MAIN POINT MADE TO US WAS THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT  
WHAT WAS AT ISSUE WAS NOT/NOT REDUCTIONS IN USA FORCES BUT RATHER  
ADJUSTMENTS THAT USA MUST MAKE IN ORDER TO STAY WITHIN THE  
PERSONNEL CAP THAT CONGRESS HAS IMPOSED ON USA FORCES IN EUROPE.  
THE USA CANNOT/NOT DO THE MODERNIZATION WHICH IT WANTS TO DO  
WITHOUT REARRANGING THE CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE.WHAT THE USA IS  
DOING IS CARRYING OUT HIGHER PRIORITY TASKS BY REMOVING PERSONNEL  
FROM LOWER PRIORITY ONES.OUR CONTACTS SAID THAT IN DUE COURSE  
THERE WILL PROBABLY BE OTHER CHANGES THE USA WILL WISH TO MAKE  
IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE AS SPECIAL PROGRAMS ARE IMPLEMENTED.THIS  
WILL NOT/NOT HOWEVER HAPPEN WITH THE GLCM DEPLOYMENT AS THE ADMIN  
RECEIVED A SPECIAL EXEMPTION FROM THE CAP FOR GLCM.HOWEVER GLCM  
IS THE ONLY PROGRAM THAT HAS THIS EXEMPTION.THE DECISION ON THE  
OV10 HAS BEEN MADE AT THIS TIME BECAUSE THE OV10 IS RAPIDLY  
REDEPLOYABLE BACK TO EUROPE IF NEEDED.

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PAGE TWO UNGR2024 CONF

2.OUR INTERLOCUTORS WERE COY WITH REGARD TO THE REFERENCE TO ALLIES AND BURDEN SHARING IN THE USA LETTER.THEY SAID IT IS, FIRST OF ALL,A STATEMENT OF FACT.HOWEVER,THE INTENTION IS TO REMIND THE ALLIES OF SOMETHING THE ADMIN HAD TO DEAL WITH.THE USA HAS BEEN REMINDING ALLIES OF THIS IN EVERY WAY IT CAN FOR SOME TIME.THE ALLIES MUST BE AWARE THAT THE ABILITY TO INCREASE USA FORCES IN EUROPE IS LIMITED BY THIS CAP.OUR CONTACTS POINTED OUT THAT AT PRESENT THERE IS NO/NO ACTIVE MOVEMENT TO DECREASE USA FORCES HOWEVER SHLD AT ANY TIME THE ANNUAL DOD REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO JOINT DEFENSE SHOW A REDUCTION OF ALLIED FORCES IN EUROPE QUOTE ALL BETS ARE OFF UNQUOTE AND USA WLD PROBABLY HAVE A REDUCED CAP IMPOSED ON ITS FORCES VERY QUICKLY.

CCC/241 092255Z UNGR2024



MASTER FILE

R E S T R I C T E D

FM WSHDC UNGR2021 09FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO MOSCO LDN PARIS BNATO BUCST BPEST PRGUE WSAW BGRAD PRMNY

GENEV STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER NDEQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP

DISTR MINA MINE FGB RBRD RCD RSR UGB URR IDD IDA IDDZ ZSI

REF MOSCO TEL XYGR0175 08FEB

---USA/SOV RELS

SUMMARY

NSC STAFF MEMBER MATLOCK SAYS THAT USA/USSR RELS ARE GOOD AND THAT  
SITU IS NOT/OT DANGEROUS. TO GET FULL MEASURE OF USA/USSR RELS ONE SHLD  
LOOK BEYOND SUPERFICIAL ELEMENTS SUCH AS RHETORIC TO BASICS. PRES  
REAGAN 16JAN SPEECH IS IMPORTANT AFFIRMATION OF HIS REALIZATION THAT  
REGARDLESS OF WHAT USA MAY FEEL OR THINK ABOUT USSR IT IS NECESSARY  
FOR USA TO DEAL WITH USSR. MATLOCK IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT FUTURE OF RELS  
SAYING IT IS IN SOV INTEREST TO IMPROVE RELS. HE PUT HEAVY EMPHASIS ON  
USA MILITARY BUILD-UP AS ONE OF ELEMENTS FORCING USSR TO RECOGNIZE  
IMPROVED RELS ARE IN THEIR INTEREST. MATLOCK, UNLIKE OTHER OBSERVERS,  
DOWNPLAYS IDEA THAT SOVS ARE GENUINELY ANGRY ARGUING WHAT WE ARE  
SEEING IS SOVS VENTING THEIR FRUSTRATION AT THEIR OWN FAILURES OF  
FOREIGN POLICY.

REPORT

2. JACK MATLOCK, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PRES REAGAN IN NSC FOR EUROPEAN  
AND SOV AFFAIRS SPOKE TO KENNAN FORUM YESTERDAY ON USA/USSR RELS.

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PAGE TWO UNGR2021 RESTR

KENNAN FORUM IS A PUBLIC FORUM BUT COMMENTS ARE MADE ON THE BASIS OF NON-ATTRIBUTION. HIS COMMENTS WERE OBVIOUSLY ANYTHING BUT SELF-CRITICAL.

3. BASIC THRUST OF MATLOCKS COMMENTS WAS THAT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USA AND USSR IS NOT/NOT AT A DANGEROUS STAGE. MATLOCK SAID HE CLD UNDERSTAND PEOPLE CONCLUDING THAT SITU WAS DANGEROUS BUT THIS RESULTED FROM A SUPERFICIAL LOOK AT THE RELATIONSHIP. IF YOU FOCUSED ON THE PUBLIC ASPECTS YOU CLD WELL MAKE THIS ERROR. YOU SHLD IN FACT LOOK BEYOND THE PUBLIC ASPECTS TO THE BASICS WHERE IN FACT A FAIRLY SUBSTANTIAL DIALOGUE IS TAKING PLACE. MATLOCK MADE THE NOW STANDARD COMPARISONS OF CURRENT STATE OF RELS TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND TO THE 1973 MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

4. MATLOCK POINTED TO PRES REAGANS 16 JAN SPEECH SAYING IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ITS MAIN PURPOSE WAS IN PUTTING USA POLICY OUT IN THE OPEN. IT DID NOT/NOT SIGNAL A CHANGE IN POLICY BUT WAS SIMPLY CLARIFYING AN OLD POLICY THAT HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD. MATLOCK SAID THAT IN THIS SPEECH THE PRES WAS BASICALLY ACKNOWLEDGING THAT WHATEVER VIEWS ONE HAS OF THE USSR THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE NECESSITY OF NEGOTIATING WITH THEM NOR SHLD IT INTERFERE WITH THE NEGS. MATLOCK ACKNOWLEDGED HOWEVER A STRONG LINKAGE BETWEEN VIEWS AND NEGS AS THE FAILURE OF THE CARTER ADMIN TO GET SALT II RATIFIED HAD SHOWN. NEGATIVE VIEWS DECREASE ABILITY TO HAVE RESULTS OF NEGS RATIFIED OR ACCEPTED.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2021 RESTR

5. THE 16 JAN SPEECH SPECIFICALLY AVOIDED MENTIONING ANY SPECIFIC NEW INITIATIVES. ACCORDING TO MATLOCK SOVS BELIEVE THAT ALL INITIATIVES PUT FORWARD PUBLICLY ARE BASICALLY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. THE USA THEREFORE HOPES TO WORK THROUGH PRIVATE DIPLOMACY TO IMPROVE RELS WITH THE SOV UNION. MATLOCK SAID WORK WILL BE DONE IN THREE CATEGORIES:

(A) REGIONAL ISSUES: TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF THE USE OF FORCE AND TO CONSULT MORE;

(B) ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: SOVS ARE STAYING AWAY FROM THE TALKS IN GENEV. ONE SHLD REALIZE HOWEVER THAT DISCUSSIONS ARE STILL GOING ON ON THESE SUBJS ON BACK CHANNELS AND THAT IT SHLD NOT/NOT BE A TEST OF THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF USA POLICY WHETHER OR NOT/NOT THE SOVS RETURN TO THE TABLE. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO REALIZE THAT WHAT KEEPS THE PEACE IS NOT/NOT NEGOTIATIONS BUT THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR DETERRENT.

(C) HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL ISSUES.

6. MATLOCK SAID THAT HE IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF USA/USSR RELS. NOT/NOT ONLY DOES THE USA WISH TO IMPROVE THESE RELS BUT HE BELIEVE IT IS IN THE SOV UNION BEING OVEREXTENDED IN ITS ACTIVITIES ABROAD. BECAUSE THEY ALSO FACE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES AT HOME, THEY MAY WISH TO DIMINISH THEIR DIFFICULTIES ABROAD BY NEGOTIATING WITH THE USA. MATLOCK SAYS THAT THE SOV UNION CANNOT/NOT AND DOES NOT/NOT WANT TO COMPETE WITH THE USA IN AN ARMS BUILD-UP. LATER IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR MATLOCK CAME BACK TO THE THEME OF WHY THE SOV UNION SHLD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE. THIS TIME HE FOCUSSED ON THE EFFECT

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PAGE FOUR UNGR2021 RESTR

OF THE USAS ONGOING PROGRAM OF ARMS BUILD-UP.HE SAID THAT THE USA ARMS BUILD-UP POSES BOTH A THREAT TO THE USSR AND AN ECONOMIC BURDEN THAT THE USSR WLD SEEK TO AVOID.(MANY IN AUDIENCE FOUND THIS PART OF MATLOCKS PRESENTATION TO BE UNSETTLING, SAYING IT WAS IN FACT ANOTHER FORM OF THE ARGUMENT MADE LAST YR THAT ONLY ACTUAL USA STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF INF MISSILES WLD FORCE THE SOVS TO BARGAIN SERIOUSLY) MATLOCK THEN IN A RATHER MACABRE WAY DISTORTED SAMUEL JOHNSON TO SAY THAT THE AMERICAN ARMS BUILD-UP WAS SERVING TO CONCENTRATE THE MINDS OF THE RUSSIANS.MATLOCK ALSO SAID SOVS KNOW THAT REAGAN IS THE ONW US POLITICIAN WHO CAN GET AGREEMENT RATIFIED.

7.MATLOCK DEALT ALSO WITH THE ISSUE OF CURRENT SOV ANGER WHICH HAS BEEN A SUBJ OF CONSIDERABLE DEBATE AMONG EXPERTS ON THE USSR IN THIS COUNTRY.(THE MOST CONCISE STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS ANGER APPEARED IN SUNDAYS NEW YORK TIMES IN AN ARTICLE BY SEWERYN BIALER.BIALER ARGUES THAT BASED ON HIS EXPERIENCE THE USSR ANGER WITH THE USA IS SERIOUS, PERVASIVE AND THEREFORE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS.SOVS EXPECT THEIR LEADERSHIP TO ACT FORCEFULLY TO COUNTERACT THE REAGAN STATEMENTS AND POLICIES THAT HAVE EVOKED STRONG PUBLIC SENTIMENTS IN USSR).

8.WHEREAS BIALER SEES THIS ANGER AS BEING COMPOUNDED BY A SENSE OF FRUSTRATION MATLOCK IN CONTRAST SEEMED TO FEEL THAT WHAT WE ARE HEARING DOES NOT/NOT INCLUDE MUCH ANGER BUT IS PRIMARILY FRUSTRATION.HE DESCRIBED FRUSTRATION AS COMING FROM THREE CAUSES.FIRST:IN THE 70S SOVS FELT THAT THE QUOTE CORRELATION OF FORCES UNQUOTE WAS MOVING IN

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR2021 RESTR

THEIR FAVOUR. IN PART THIS WAS A MISTAKEN PERCEPTION AND SOV UNION OVERESTIMATED AMOUNT OF ADVENTURISM AND EXPLOITATION ON THEIR PART THE WEST WLD ACCEPT. HOWEVER IN RECENT MONTHS SOVS HAVE SEEN THAT WORLD EVENTS AND THEREFORE THE QUOTE CORRELATION OF FORCES UNQUOTE HAS NOT/ NOT BEEN MOVING IN THEIR FAVOUR. THE SECOND CAUSE OF FRUSTRATION ACCORDING TO MATLOCK WAS THE EXTREME CRITICISM SOV UNION HAS RECEIVED FOR THEIR HANDLING OF THE KAL INCIDENT AND THEIR EMBARRASSMENT AT THE WEAKNESSES THE INCIDENT SHOWED UP IN THEIR SYSTEM. THE THIRD CAUSE OF FRUSTRATION IS THEIR BLUNDER ON THEIR TACTICS ON INF.

9. MATLOCK REJECTED THE ARGUMENT THAT AMERICAN RHETORIC WAS THE CAUSE OF THE SOV ANGER. HE SAID THAT PRES REAGAN HAD CALLED SOV UNION AN EVIL EMPIRE ONLY ONCE BUT THAT IT HAD BEEN REPEATED AD NAUSEUM?). AMERICAN RHETORIC DID NOT/NOT AMOUNT TO VERY MUCH WHEN COMPARED TO THE CONSTANT FLOW OF SOV RHETORIC WHICH IS NOT/NOT JUST DIRECTED AGAINST THE USA OR CAPITALISM BUT IS VERY PERSONALIZED. THE USA HAS NEVER ENGAGED AND WILL NOT/NOT ENGAGE IN THAT KIND OF PERSONAL RHETORIC. MATLOCK WENT ON TO SAY SOME RHETORIC AND FRANK DESCRIPTIONS OF DIFFERENCES OF POINTS OF VIEW ARE VERY NECESSARY IN THE USA/USSR RELATIONSHIP AND INDEED THERE HAVE BEEN INCIDENTS IN THE PAST SUCH AS SOV INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN WHERE PROBLEMS HAVE DEVELOPED EXACTLY BECAUSE THE USA WAS NOT/NOT CLEAR AND FRANK IN SETTING OUT ITS POINTS OF VIEW TO THE SOV UNION.

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PAGE SIX UNGR2021 RESTR

10. MATLOCK DID NOT/NOT ADDRESS THE EFFECT OF THE SOV RHETORIC AND SOV EXPRESSIONS OF ANGER ON SOVIET PUBLIC (SEE PARA 5 OF MOSCOW REFTTEL) BUT ON OTHER OCCASIONS WE HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS EFFECT OF SOV USE OF STRIDENT RHETORIC TO CONJURE UP IMAGE OF AN EXTREMELY VOLATILE SITU WITH VARIOUS SOV POLICY EXPERTS IN THIS CITY. FOR EXAMPLE DURING CLARK VISIT THIS SUBJ WAS DISCUSSED AT LUNCH WITH GROUP OF EXPERTS THAT INCLUDED JEREMY AZRAEL OF STATE DEPT, JAMES BILLINGTON OF WOODROW WILSON CENTER, HERB ELLISON OF KENNAN CENTER, PETER REDAWAY OF LSC AND MICHAEL HOWARD OF OXFORD AMONG OTHERS. CONSENSUS IN THIS GROUP SEEMED TO BE THAT SOVS HAD INDEED DECIDED FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS TO TRY TO PORTRAY REAGAN AND USA AS POSING DISTINCT THREAT TO USSR. THESE REASONS INVOLVE BOTH NEED TO PROVIDE STIMULUS AT TIME OF IMPOSITION OF MORE RIGOROUS DISCIPLINE AND ALSO THE NEED TO ENHANCE CONTROL OVER A SOCIETY THAT SOME FELT WAS BECOMING MORE RESTIVE (SEE PARA 22 OF OURTEL UNGR2011 03FEB ON JEREMY AZRAEL'S VIEWS ON ANDROPOV ACSESSION). THERE WAS ALSO AGREEMENT HOWEVER THAT SOV RHETORIC HAD HAD AN UNFORESEEN EFFECT ON SOV PEOPLE AND IT HAD SCARED THEM FAR MORE THAN SOVS HAD PLANNED.

11. WHEN CHALLENGED BY A QUESTIONER ON THE NATURE OF THE DIALOGUE THAT HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THE USA AND USSR MATLOCK CLAIMED THAT HARTMAN WAS HAVING FAR MORE FREQUENT AND MORE SENIOR LEVEL DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW THAN HAD EVEN TAKEN PLACE DURING THE HEIGHT OF DETENTE. UNDER PRESSURE HOWEVER MATLOCK WAS WILLING TO CONCEDE THAT TO SOME EXTENT

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PAGE SEVEN UNGR2021 RESTR

THESE CONVERSATIONS AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN HELD  
RECENTLY ARE COMPLEMENTARY MONOLOGUES RATHER THAN DIALOGUES.

12. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION TODAY, DEP ASST SEC PALMER AT STATE DEPT  
TOLD US THAT A SET OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR AREAS OF COOPERATION  
HAVE BEEN PUT TO PRES REAGAN AND THAT THE STATE DEPT EXPECTS TO GET  
GUIDANCE FROM HIM VERY SHORTLY.

CCC/086 092254Z UNGR2021

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BONN ZQGR1032 09FEV84

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PMOOTT/CLEARY PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR XDU RGB IFB IDA IDR RCR RCD

REF NOTRETEL 0027 23JAN

---PM LET TO KOHL

APPRECIEIONS CONNAITRE DECISION SUR PROJET MODIFIE DE LET DU

PM A KOHL.CETTE LET DEVRA PETU-ETRE CONTENIR REF A NOUVEAUX

DEVELOPPEMENTS A MOINS QU ORIGINAL NATI DEJA ETE SIGNE.

DESIRONS ACHEMINER LE PLUS TOT POSSIBLE SCULPTURE ESQUIMAUDE A

KOHL ACCOMPAGNE DE PM LET.AVISEZ.

CCC/242 100910Z ZQGR1032



**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I E L ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

DE EXTOTT IDR0499 09FEV84

A PARIS

INFO MOSCO BNATO WSHDC LDN NDHQOTT/DGIS/CPD

DISTR DMF IFB IDA IDD RCR RGB RBR ZSI IDDZ

REF VOTRETEL WIGR3241 30JAN

---FNI-UNE OUVERTURE DE LA FRANCE?

CONSIDERONS REFLEXIONS DE MME GARAUD TRES INTERESSANTES MAIS UN  
PEU SURPRENANTES.SI FRANCE CONSIDERE SERIEUSEMENT OFFRIR PRISE EN  
COMPTE DE SES 16 MISSILES DU PLATEAU D ALBION DANS LES INF,IL S AGI-  
RAIT LA D UN CHANGEMENT DE POSITION AUSSI IMPORTANT QU INATTENDU.  
POSITION FERME MAINTENUE PAR INTERLOCUTEURS DU QUAI LORS DU  
PASSAGE DE GARY SMITH A PARIS SEMBLE INDIQUER QUE FONCTIONNAIRES  
RESPONSABLES DE CE SECTEUR NE SONT PAS ENCORE DISPOSES A LAISSER  
ENTREVOIR POSSIBILITE QUELCONQUE DE FLEXIBILITE CE QUI SERAIT  
REACTION PARFAITEMENT NORMALE ET COMPREHENSIBLE A CE STADE MEME S IL  
Y AVAIT CIT ANGUILE SOUS ROCHE FINCIT.NEANMOINS VOUS SAURIONS GRE  
D ESSAYER DE TIRER L AFFAIRE AU CLAIR SI POSSIBLE.ANDREANI QUI  
FERAIT PARTI DU GROUPE DES QUATRE DONT SOPPELSA NOUS A PARLE  
RECEMENT A OTTAWA SERAIT PEUT-ETRE EN MESURE DE NOUS EN DIRE PLUS  
LONG A CE SUJET.POURRIEZ AUSSTENTER DE CLARIFIER POINT SUIVANT  
SI OCCASION SE PRESENTE.SUIVANT LA LOGIQUE D UNE COMPARAISON DE  
SYSTEMES COMPARABLES EST-CE QUE PRISE EN COMPTE DANS LES FNI DES  
MISSILES FRANCAIS BASES AU SOL NE CONDUIRAIT PAS A DES PRESSIONS  
...2

PAGE DEUX IDR0499 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

SOVIETIQUES POUR INCLURE MISSILES BASES SUR SOUSMARINS (AUSSI BIEN FRANCAIS QUE BRITANNIQUES) DANS LES START?

2. SOMMES EGALEMENT TRES INTERESSES IDEES DE MME GARAUD CONCERNANT PROGRAMME DE RECHERCHE SPATIALE EUROPEEN POUVANT CONDUIRE A INSTALLATION SYSTEME DE DEFENSE ANTI-BALISTIQUE. ARTICLE PARU DANS LE DEVOIR CONCERNANT PROPOSITION MITTERRAND EXHORTANT PAYS OUEST-EUROPEENS A COOPERER POUR INSTALLATION EVENTUELLE STATION SPATIALE D ALERTE AVANCEE IRAIT PEUT ETRE DANS CE SENS. APPRECIERIONS EGALEMENT CONNAITRE POSITION FRANCAISE VIS A VIS PROGRAMME DE RECHERCHE AMERICAIN QUI FAISAIT L OBJET D UN RECENT BRIEFING A OTTAWA. (NOTRE TEL IDR-0443 DU 7 FEVRIER).

CCC/003 092350Z IDR0499

R E S T R I C T E D

MASTER FILE

FM HAGUE YWGR0354 09FEB84

TO EXTOTT RCR IMMED

INFO PCOOTT/PETTIGREW BNATO LDN WSHDC PARIS

DISTR ETT LDDZ IDA IDAO IDR RWPT RSR

REF YOURTEL RCR0227 08FEB

---MITTERANDS PROPOSAL-SPACE STATION

EXCERPT OF MITTERANDS SPEACH CONCERNING A SPACE STATION YOU HAVE REQUESTED FROM PARIS READS AS FOLLOWS:QUOTE LE CHAMP RESTE VASTE CEPENDANT QUI NOUS PERMETTRA DE PLUS EN PLUS DE VEILLER A NOTRE SECURITE.NON SEULEMENT PAR LES ARMEMENTS CONVENTIONNELS MAIS AUSSI PAR LES NOUVEAUX MOYENS QUI VONT FAIRE IRRUPTION SUR LA SCENE DU GLOBE.IL FAUT DEJA PORTER LE REGARD AU DELA DU NUCLEAIRE SI I ON NE VEUT PAS ETRE EN RETARD SUR UN FUTUR PLUS PROCHE QU ON NE LE CROIT.JE NE CITERAI QU UN EXEMPLE:CELUI DE LA CONQUETE SPATIALE. QUE L EUROPE SOIT CAPABLE DE LANCER DANS L ESPACE UNE STATION HABITEE QUI LUI PERMETTRA D OBSERVER,DE TRANSMETTRE ET DONC DE CONTRARIER TOUTE MENACE EVENTUELLE ET ELLE AURA FAIT UN GRAND PAS VERS SA PROPRE DEFENSE.SANS OMETTRE LES PROGRES DU CALCUL ELECTRONIQUE ET DE LA MEMOIRE ARTIFICIELLE,AINSI QUE LA CAPACITE DEJA CONNUE DE TIRER DES PROJECTILES QUI SE DEPLACENT A LA VITESSE DE LA LUMIERE.UNE COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DE L ESPACE SERAIT, A MON SENS,LA REPONSE LA MIEUX ADAPTEE AUX REALITES MILITAIRES DE DEMAIN. UNQUOTE.

CCC/155 091538Z YWGR0354

*action*

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE PRMNY WKGR0248 09FEV84

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO WSHDC PARIS LDN MOSCO GENEV NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DACPOL  
PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD RGB URR ZSI CPD

---INITIATIVE DE PAIX PM

A SA DEMANDE, AI DEJEUNE HIER MIDI EN TETE A TETE CHEZ AMBASSADEUR DE  
RPC. IL FUT CLAIR DES DEBUT DE CONVERSATION QUE LING VOULAIT SAVOIR  
QUELLE IDEE PM CDA SE FAISAIT DES POURPARLERS SUGGERES ENTRE CINQ  
PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES ET MEMBRES DE CS A L ONU.

2. LING A POSE TOUTES QUESTIONS EN GROS ET DETAIL DEPUIS CIT EST-CE  
QUE CES CONVERSATIONS SERAIENT PRESIDEES PAR SEC GEN ONU? FINE CIT JUSQU  
A CITS AGIT-IL DANS VOTRE ESPRIT DE NEGS FORMELLES ENTRE LES CINQ  
FINE CIT. ME FONDANT SUR CONVERSATION PM-SEC GEN, J AI REPONDU AU MIEUX  
TOUT EN PRECISANT BIEN QUE PM AVAIT SOIGNEUSEMENT RESPECTE AUTORITE  
ET AUTONOMIE DE PEREZ DE CUELLAR ET DES CINQ ET N AVAIT MEME PAS  
VOULU SAVOIR SI SEC GEN FERAIT QUELQUE CHOSE DANS CE SENS OU RIEN  
DU TOUT.

3. LING A TENU A SOULIGNER QUE SEMBLABLES CONVERSATIONS A ONU-NY LUI  
PARAISSAIENT JUSTIFIEES PAR RESPONSABILITES PAIX ET SECURITE  
CONFIEES AUX CINQ PAR LA CHARTE. IL A REPETE A PLUSIEURS REPRISES QUE  
CHINE VOULAIT BIEN COMPRENDRE QUELLE FORME POURRAIT PRENDRE  
CONVERSATION A CINQ AUX NU SUR MENACE NUCLEAIRE ET DETENTE EST/QUEST

...2

PAGE DEUX WKGR0248 CONFD

EN SERAIENT LES OBJECTIFS PRECIS. IL A RAPPELE APPEL LANCE CIT AUX  
QUINZE MEMBRES DU CS ET MME GANDHI FINCIT PAR PRES ANGU ILLUECA EN  
FIN DE SESSION. IL A NOTE EN PASSANT QUE NON ALIGNES MEMBRES DU CS  
NE VERRAIENT PAS D UN J BON OEIL LEUR EXCLUSION DE POURPARLERS A CINQ.

4. EN FIN DE CONVERSATION, LING A SOULIGNE CIT JE NE SAIS PAS  
EXACTEMENT CE QUE PENSE PM DE CHINE A CE SUJET MAIS JE SUIS CERTAIN  
QU IL RESTE CONVAINC U AUUCUNE NEG VERITABLE NE PEUT ETRE ENGAGEE  
ENTRE LES CINQ A MOINS QUE LES DEUX SUPERPUISSANCES NE REDUISENT  
D ABORD DE FACON DRAMATIQUE LEURS PROPRES ARSENAUX NUCLEAIRES FINCIT.

5. IMPRESSION GENERALE DE CETTE RENCONTRE EST QUE CHINOIS APPUIENT  
DE FACON GENERALE INITIATIVE ET SONT DISPOSES A COLLABORER QUAND  
SEC GEN METTRA CONVERSATIONS EN ROUTE. ILS VEULENT BIEN SE JOINDRE A  
FRANCE ET ROYAUME UNI POUR FAIRE PRESSION SUR USA-URS MAIS ILS SONT  
SOUCIEUX DE PROTEGER LEURS ARRIERES ET DE NE PAS ETRE ENTRAINES PLUS  
LOIN QU ILS ONT DECIDE D ALLER. EN PARTICULIER, ILS ONT SOUCI EVIDENT  
DE FAIRE DISTINCTION NETTE ENTRE CONVERSATIONS ET NEGS ET DE NE PAS  
SE COUPER DU MNA

PELLETIER

CCC/085 091638Z WKGR0248

Mr. Del... OR.  
UNASS... FIC

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT UGP0225 09FEB84

TO SEATL

INFO WSHDC

DIST URR IDA (IDDZ SCS FPR

REF YOURTEL UAGR5090 02FEB84

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:SPEAKING NOTES

POST SHLD HAVE ON HAND COPIES OF PRIME MINISTERS STMTS TO DATE ON  
PEACE INITIATIVE ALL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO POSTS ALONG  
WITH BACKGROUND INFO.PRESS COMMENT. SEE AS WELL SPECIAL INSERT  
ON SUBJ IN QUOTE CANADA TODAY/AUJOURDHUI UNQUOTE NOV/83 ISSUE.)  
IN ADDITION AS YOU WILL NOW BE AWARE IDDZ WILL BE FORWARDING COPY  
OF PMS STMT TODAY TO HOUSE ON INITIATIVE WHICH SHLD OBVIOUSLY FORM  
KEY FOCUS POINT FOR CON GEN STMT.

2.UNFORTUNATELY WE ARE NOT/NOT AWARE OF ANY STMTS BY OFFICIALS ON  
SUBJ.FOR CLARIFICATION,IF REQUIRED,OF ANY PARTICULAR POINT,  
RECOMMEND THAT YOU CONTACT IDDZ OR IDA DIRECTLY.

UUU/300 100008Z UGP0225

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA0197 09FEB84

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INFO BNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN VMBFR NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

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REF SNIDER/ANSTIS TELECON 09FEB

---STKHM CONF: PM SPEECH

AS SPEECH IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO YOU NOW IN UNCLAS FORM SUGGEST  
YOU CIRCULATE IT TO PARTICIPANTS RATHER THAN GIVING IN PLENARY ORAL  
SUMMARY OF ONE OR TWO SECTIONS.

2.QUOTE SHARED PERCEPTION UNQUOTE (PRINCIPLE)

NUMBER SIX STATES QUOTE BOTH SIDES ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE  
AWSOME CONSEQUENCES OF BEING THE FIRST TO USE FORCE AGAINST  
THE OTHER UNQUOTE WHICH IS NOT/NOT SAME AS ENDORSING SOVIET DEMAND  
FOR TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE. RATHER IT IS AN OBSERVATION OF PRESENT  
DAY REALITY. AS WELL IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN ARTICLE 1/1 OF NORTH  
ATLANTIC TREATY. MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE AFFIRM UNDERTAKING TO REFRAIN IN  
THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN ANY  
MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH PURPOSES OF UN. IN EFFECT, THIS IS COMMIT-  
MENT NOT/NOT TO BE FIRST TO USE FORCE.

3. SHOULD ANYONE DELIBERATELY OR OTHERWISE MISINTERPRET PASSAGE IN  
PM SPEECH WE ASSUME THAT YOU WOULD TAKE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO SET  
THEM STRAIGHT.

CCC/099 100111Z IDA0197

*section*

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BRU ZVGR0181 09FEV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ LIVRAISON 090900

INFO BNATO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO

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REF VOTRETEL IDDZ126 07FEV

---INITITIVE DU PM:TOURNEE EN EUROPE ORIENTALE

LE CONSEILLER DE L AMB DE L URSS NOUS A DEMANDE A NOUS VOIR

LUNDI PM POUR FAIRE LE POINT SUR L INITIATIVE DU PM,NOTAMMENT

SUR LA VISITE DU PM EN EUROPE ORIENTALE.NOUS AVONS ACCEPTE DE

LE VOIR A TITRE DE COURTOISIE.IL S AGIT DE LA DEUXIEME VISITE

DE CE GENRE (VOIR NOTRETEL ZVGR0533 18NOV83).NOUS NOUS PROPOSONS

DE NOUS LIMITER AU CONTENU DE VOTRETEL IDDZ0046 DU 17JAN (MEDIA

GUIDANCE) ET DES TELS SUR LE DISCOURS DU PM DU 9 FEVRIER.TOUT

COMMENTAIRE DE VOTRE PART SUR CE PLAN D ACTION, AU PLUS TARD LUNDI

13 A 0900, SERAIT LE BIENVENU.

CCC/133 091125Z ZVGR0181



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FM BNATO YBDR1918 09FEB84

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LDN PARIS BONN VMBFR

DISTR URR RCR RSR IDDZ IDA IDRL

REF OURTELS YBDR1908 03FEB 1914 07FEB YOURTEL IDR0450 07FEB

---USA FORCE REDUCTIONS

SITUATION IN REFS HAS TAKEN NEW TURN.WITH RESPECT TO USA PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 2 SQNS OF OV-10 AC DURING 1984,SHAPE REP WILL MAKE FOL STATEMENT AT DRC MEETING 14FEB:QUOTE SACEUR STATES THAT CONSULTATIONS ARE REQUIRED BECAUSE THE OV-10 ISSUE APPEARS TO BE THE START OF FURTHER POTENTIAL REDUCTIONS RESULTING FROM THE TROOP CEILING UNQUOTE.

2.WRITTEN CONFIRMATION OF THIS INTENT HAS BEEN FWD SHAPE TO DRC..

3.ON 14FEB WE WILL PRESS FOR EARLY INDICATION OF DETAIL OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS FROM USA AND SHAPE.POLITICAL DIMENSION OF ISSUE,IN ACCORD WITH C-M 55/80,WILL EVENTUALLY BE RAISED BY SACEUR IN DPC.

CCC/054 091143Z YBDR1918

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE EXTOTT RCR0227 08FEV84

A PARIS

INFO PCOOTT/PETTIGREW BNATO LDN WSHDC HAGUE

DISTR ETT IDDZ IDA IDAO IDR RWPT

---PROPOSITION MITTERRAND:STATION SPATIALE

CIT LE DEVOIR FINCIT RAPPORTE QUE PRES MITTERRAND,DANS UN DISCOURS.  
PRONONCE A LA HAYE 07FEV,A DEMANDE AUX PAYS OUEST-EUROPEENS DE COM-  
MENCER A COOPERER CIT A MISE AU POINT D UNE STATION SPATIALE.

D ALERTE AVANCEE FINCIT.

2.AIMERIONS RECEVOIR TEXTE EXACT DECLARATION.TOUTE LUMIERE QUE VOUS  
POURRIEZ JETER SUR LA NATURE DE CE PROJET SERAIT APPRECIEE.SUJET  
NOUS INTERESSE CAR,COMME VOUS SAVEZ,INITIATIVE DE PAIX DU PM  
S OPPOSE A UTILISATION D ESPACE AUX FINS MILITAIRES.

CCC/146 082250Z RCR0227

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

major  
FWR

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE MDRID XQGR0070 09FEV84

A EXTOTT LIDDZ

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FPR RWP

---INITIATIVE DU PM-PRESSE ESPAGNOLE Y REVIENT

APRES UN LONG SILENCE SUR L'INITIATIVE TRUDEAU, QUOTIDIEN CIT EL  
PAIS FINCIT A PUBLIE 7FEV ANALYSE DE SON CORRESPONDANT A BRU.  
ANDRES ORTEGA, SOUS LE TITRE CIT LURSS A T ELLE RAISON DANS LE  
DEBAT SUR LES EUROMISSILES FINCIT. SI ARTICLE EST ASSEZ CRITIQUE DE  
POSITION USA ET DE LOTAN, CONCLUSIONS REJOignent SENSIBLEMENT  
ANALYSE CDNNE. LES NEGOCIATIONS BILATERALES USA/URSS ONT ECHOUÉ,  
CIT IL EST CLAIR QU'IL FAUDRA ENTRER DANS UNE NEGOCIATION MULTILATE-  
RALE FINCIT. ET PLUS LOIN CIT LE PREMIER MINISTRE CDN, PIERRE TRUDEAU,  
A LANCE SON INITIATIVE DUNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES  
NUCLEAIRES. L'ESPAGNE NE POURRAIT ELLE PAS AUSSI APPORTER QUELQUE  
CHOSE A CELA? FINCIT.

2. CELA NOUS CONFIRME QUE SI DANS UNE ENTREVUE AVEC TV ESPAGNOLE  
(A LOCCASION VISITE DU ROI), PM SOULIGNAIT APPUI QUE PRESIDENT  
GONZALEZ LUI A ACCORDE DANS SA LETTRE, IL RECUEILLERAIT ICI UN LARGE  
APPUI (VOIR NOS TELS XQGR052 ET 056 DES 2 ET 3FEV).

CCC/150 091530Z XQGR0070

OFFICE  
OF THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CABINET  
DU  
SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT  
AUX  
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO/A: IDDZ

Date 8/2/84

FROM/DE: MINA/Du ~~doit~~

REFERENCE/RÉFÉRENCE:

SUBJECT/SUJET: Minister's decision/Décision du Ministre

Memo to PM signed by the SSEA.

MASTER  
FILE

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À MINA (via DMF)

FROM/DE IDDZ

SUBJECT/SUJET PM's Private Conversation  
with Czech PM Strougal

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	SECRET
FILE DOSSIER	
DATE February 3, 1984	

RECORD OF CONSULTATION - RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION

COPIES SENT TO: (DIV. SYMBOLS) EXEMPLAIRES ADRESSÉS À: (SYMBOLES DE DIR.)	PREPARED IN CONSULTATION WITH (NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS AND DIVISIONAL SYMBOLS) ÉTABLI EN CONSULTATION AVEC (NOMS DES INDIVIDUS ET SYMBOLES DE DIRECTION)
PMO MINA ✓ DMF IFB IDDZ	

For your signature,  
if you agree.

Original Signed by  
de MONTICNY MARCHAND

TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINE AU DOSSIER

EXT. 934/BIL. (REV. 7/71)

Deputy Prime Minister  
Secretary of State for External Affairs

Deputy Prime Minister  
Secretary of State for External Affairs

SECRET

FEB  
FEV

8 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

YOUR PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH CZECH PM STROUGAL

I have read with great interest the account of your private conversation with Prime Minister Strougal in the course of which he gave you some information on the state of President Andropov's health and on Soviet thinking regarding the future of the INF and START negotiations. Although I cannot be sure how new this information might be to the USA Administration, I think that it is of direct interest to the USA and should be shared.

If you agree, we might communicate this information to the USA by (a) your sending a personal letter to President Reagan or (b) having our ambassador in Washington pass it on to a senior official in the State Department or (c) transmitting it through existing Canada-USA intelligence channels. In this instance, I think that a démarche by Ambassador Gotlieb might be most appropriate.

I should be grateful for your views on this matter.

Original Signed by  
Original signé par  
**ALLAN J. MacEACHEN**

A.J.M.

External Affairs    Affaires extérieures  
Canada            Canada

K. Cross/jf FPR-5-1874

TO/À            •    FILE

FROM/DE        •    FPR

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •        CBC - The Journal - NATO - 2 February 1984  
SUJET            •    Interview with Lord Carrington

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
8 February 1984
Number/Numéro
FPR-134

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EXT 407

Barbara Frum:        Lord Carrington, is NATO today in the kind  
of disarray that's beyond even your wit  
and skill to heal?

Carrington:        Well, I don't know. I've been connected  
with NATO for a great many years in one  
form or another. I've never known any occasion when  
people didn't say NATO was in disarray. I think it always  
has its problems and I don't think it's any worse now  
than it ever was. I'm quite sure it's perfectly soluble.

B.F.:                Has Mr. Trudeau made your job easier, as  
he seems to believe? Providing some useful  
candour about the fundamental problem of the NATO strategy.

L.C.:                Well, are we talking about the military  
strategy or the political strategy?

B.F.:                The military.

L.C.:                Well, I don't think I would like to talk  
about the military strategy five months  
before I get to NATO, before I've had a talk with Gen. Rogers,  
before I've learned a bit about it myself. I think that over  
the years the NATO strategy has changed and perhaps the most  
important thing about NATO has been its success. After all,  
the object is to prevent the Third World War and that's  
really just exactly what NATO has done.

B.F.:                Our Prime Minister, of course, has been  
part of the NATO Council now for 13, 14,  
15 years and he seems to believe that if he helped wake up  
the Western Europeans, the West Germans, the British, the  
Dutch, that no American President would ever risk nuclear  
war to prevent the overrunning of Europe, then he says as  
a good NATO member he's provided a useful service.

L.C.:                Yes, but don't you think... I mean no  
doubt that's perfectly true, that there  
is great uncertainty about what happens in military

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strategy nowadays. After all, earlier on, when the Americans had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, there was no question of a Third World War starting. And later on, when there was a vast superiority on the American side, it would have been extremely unlikely that the Soviet Union would have risked a war in which they couldn't retaliate against the American continent. Now you have a parity of nuclear weapons, it seems to me that the peace of the world is more held together by uncertainty than almost anything else. And uncertainty, I think, is a very good way. If nobody really quite knows what's going to happen, nobody with the power of these weapons is going to chance their arm and do it.

B.F.: So you think there's still reason to rely on U.S. resolve in defending Europe?

L.C.: Yes, of course. Certainly, I think Western Europe does not have a credible defence without the very significant involvement of the United States. I don't believe that if I were in the Soviet Union, I mean I have no reason to suppose that the Soviet Union have military designs on Europe, but should they have military designs on Europe, I do not believe that Europe, on its own, would present a credible defence.

B.F.: How have Western Europeans reacted to his suggestion that they shouldn't rely on any future American President?

L.C.: I think the Europeans can obviously and could obviously do more for themselves, I'm not saying that. I mean we had the speech made, I think yesterday, by Mr. Eagleburger, in which he said that there was a feeling in the United States that the Europeans didn't do enough. And I know that is a current feeling, after all it's a feeling that's been growing over the years. And so we could do more. We could certainly spend more money on conventional forces. I think one has to remember that when you, in Canada, or the Americans, talk about Europe, you're really talking about fourteen different countries with fourteen different political systems and complexions of government. It isn't really quite as easy as that. But certainly we could spend more on

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conventional forces. But I don't see, myself, that it is very likely that Europe is going to be able to provide itself with a full armoury of nuclear weapons in the sense that the Soviet Union has got one, and obviously from that point of view, would be at a very considerable disadvantage and open to some kind of blackmail.

B.F.: Lord Carrington, is the logical extension of what our Prime Minister was trying to say that you should switch NATO strategy now, away from a nuclear deterrent policy at all? Would you consider that, to absolutely abandon the notion of retaliating with nuclear weapons ever?

L.C.: I think that you've got to have all these things. I think that you've got to have nuclear weapons and I think you've got to have conventional weapons and as strong a conventional force as you have. But I myself think, you know, the idea of no first use of nuclear weapons and so on, it in a sense makes things more predictable and therefore that much more dangerous. If you say I'm never going to use nuclear weapons first, and you know very well that the Soviet Union has got an enormous conventional superiority, then that puts you immediately in a position of inferiority and I think that's a dangerous position to be in.

B.F.: The message that has come through here is that somehow we should not proceed believing that the United States sees the defence of Hamburg the way it sees the defence of Boston, that the United States no longer will think that the defence of Europe is worth World War III.

L.C.: Well, I mean, that is a point of view which some people may have. I think you have to look at it, as I said earlier, in the context of what any government at any particular time may happen to think is of vital importance to the United States and the Western world generally. And the main thing to do is to keep up a credible defence, credible in nuclear terms, credible in conventional terms, which will leave no doubt in the minds of the Soviet Union that if they did actually start some kind of war, whether it be conventional or whether it be nuclear, the West does have the capacity to respond. And the uncertainty about how it would respond is in itself a guarantee against anybody doing it.

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B.F.: So, you don't think the Soviets think we're only blustering.

L.C.: No, I don't.

B.F.: You think they take that threat seriously still.

L.C.: No, I don't. I don't think that any... no responsible person sitting in the Kremlin would say, look here, I know perfectly well that in no circumstances, if I went into Western Europe or did something on the fringes of Europe, which was considered to be unacceptable by the Western Allies, by NATO, any responsible man sitting in the Kremlin would say, well I'm perfectly certain they're going to do nothing about it, so I'll take a chance on it. Certainly don't take a chance on it when weapons of the size and the destructive power and the horror that we now possess exist.

B.F.: Lord Carrington, is the thesis of protesters here, that the whole notion of a Soviet military threat against Europe is something of a hoax, something of a product strictly of Ronald Reagan's fevered mind.

L.C. Well, I don't know. You look at what's been happening over the years in the Soviet Union and see what they've been doing building up armaments and they're not just defensive armaments. Nobody could say that they were armaments which were solely for the defence of the USSR. And I think you have to ask yourself what those armaments are for. There are all sorts of explanations for them. I mean maybe it's just been military bureaucracy or incompetence or a mistake or anything you like. I mean there may be a dozen and one reasons. But until such time as there is an adequate explanation for them, and not only that, but I should have thought a reduction in those armaments, I would have thought it singularly imprudent and unwise unilaterally to disarm.

B.F. Lord Carrington, if I could ask you specifically about Canada's role in NATO. Do you think we're doing enough?

L.C.: Well, I don't think it's for me... certainly I think I would be fairly silly if... here we are at the beginning of February and I'm going to Brussels

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at the end of June, if I were to start criticizing the sixteen governments about what they've been doing in the past. That would be the last thing that I would do or that would be sensible for me to do. I think that we all of us have to consider, each of the sixteen governments, have to consider our own situations, our own political, our own geographical, our own economic positions. And given that, I think we've got to contribute as best we may to the Alliance, because I'm quite sure that the Alliance has been the factor which has prevented the Third World War.

B.F.: I ask, you see, because, as you think about preventing the Third World War, you've said the greatest need right now is to augment the conventional strength of NATO, and I'm wondering if you think Canada will be there for you when you make that specific call.

L.C.: Well, I mean, I think that when I talk about strengthening the conventional forces of NATO, I think I must inevitably be talking about the European countries, because here we are in Europe, this side of the Atlantic. It is basically, I think, for us to strengthen our conventional weapons, though any contributions, I've no doubt, from Canada would come in very handy.

B.F.: Do you think Canada should be there at all? That question is bound to be raised in this country, I think, in the coming weeks, as people think about the implications of what the Prime Minister's been saying.

L.C.: Well, I don't think it's for the Secretary General of NATO, or the potential Secretary General of NATO, to interfere in the internal affairs of your country. I think you have to make up your minds what you ought to do. I think that all of us, the rest of us in the way that we would hope that you would go, but in the end it's up to you to do it. Nothing is more irritating than to be told by other people what you should do.

B.F.: But does it make any difference to NATO if we're there or not?

L.C.: Oh, I think it makes a lot of difference if Canada doesn't belong to NATO and if it doesn't contribute. Yes, I do.

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B.F.: What difference does it make?

L.C.: I think the difference it makes is that you are part of the Western community in the Atlantic. If Canada disappeared from the NATO Alliance, from the North Atlantic Alliance, there would be an enormous gap, not just a military and geographical gap, but a political gap and a psychological gap. And I think that would be very serious.

B.F.: Lord Carrington, how much more tension can European public opinion take over U.S. missiles? Some people think that the Soviet Union has been using this period to, in fact, drive a wedge between Europe and the United States and that to some extent at least they've succeeded.

L.C.: Yes, I think that it's true that there has been tension. But you know, I think one can overemphasize and overstress the tension. If you remember, two or three years ago we had a great difference of opinion between Europe and America about the pipeline and we all thought that it was going to end up in a very great deal of difficulty, but it's all forgotten now. I think what we've honestly got to do and do very very as much as we can is to remember in Europe that, as I said earlier, without the United States, European defence isn't really credible. And I think that the Americans too, in a sense, have got to be forbearing and realize that we in Europe are diverse countries. You can't expect the Turks to look at things in the same way as the Danes look at them or the Icelanders to look at them in the same way as the Italians, and I think got little patience in the diversity of Europe.

B.F.: Lord Carrington, finally, what is going to move Moscow? The East German leader, Mr. Honecker, told our Prime Minister at the beginning of this week that middle powers, like Canada and Czechoslovakia, can have great impact on the other superpowers, their relative superpowers. Do you equate Canada and Czechoslovakia in that way and do you see Czechoslovakia having such an influence ?

L.C.: Well, to be honest, I think in the end it will depend upon the relationship between the United States and Soviet Russia. I believe that there is a genuine wish on the part of the American administration

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
to take arms limitation talks seriously, to take the Stockholm talks seriously, to get talks going and I very much welcome what President Reagan said the other day before the Stockholm Conference, in his State of the Union message. I think that we in Europe and you in Canada, if I may say so, should encourage President Reagan in what he said and do everything we can to help him, because I'm sure that's the way to get on terms with the Soviet Union.

B.F.:            How about encouraging the Eastern Bloc to pressure Moscow?

L.C.:            Well, I think that might be a little more difficult.

B.F.:            Lord Carrington, thanks so much for giving us your time.

L.C.:            You're welcome.

  
John J. Noble  
Director  
Press Office

TO/A FILE  
FROM/DE FPRREFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

World at six -CBC- 2 February 1984

SUBJECT •  
SUJET

Prime Minister's Peace Initiative

Security / Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession / Référence
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CIRC

CBC: This is Ken McCreath in Ottawa. As the Prime Minister flies home from Europe, his Minister for External Affairs says it's time to take a brief pause in the Peace Initiative. Mr. MacEachen wants to sit down and assess the results. He doesn't think, though, it's time for Mr. Trudeau to hang up his peace hat.

DPM/SSEA: I think the Prime Minister is doing his share in terms of trying to establish a dialogue. I think other Western leaders will do the same thing before this year is out and in that sense the Peace Initiative will be continuing.

Q: Is the Prime Minister's role in the Initiative then coming to an end? Is that what you're saying?

DPM/SSEA: No, I'm not saying that at all.

CBC: One of the Prime Minister's apparent successes on his European swing has drawn fire from the Conservatives. East Germany seems to have agreed to have its officials meet with Canadians to talk about disarmament. Details of the meetings haven't been figured out. Conservative External Affairs critic Sinclair Stevens doesn't like the idea of Canadians and East Germans meeting unless the NATO allies agree.

Sinclair Stevens: The Lone Ranger stuff is fine but I would say when you're dealing with something as serious as the ongoing dialogue between East and West you've got to be very guarded if you don't want the risk of inadvertently, let's say, harming your own side.

CBC: Mr. Stevens calls the idea reckless. He fears Canadians negotiators might inadvertently leak NATO secrets to the East Germans.


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Mr. MacEachen says he's been out of touch with the Prime Minister for a couple of days. He doesn't know anything about any groups set up to talk about disarmament with the East Germans.

Ken McCreath, CBC News, Ottawa.

  
John J. Noble  
Director  
Press Office



MASTER FILE

SUBJECT/SUJET

PUBLICATION

La Presse

DATE

53 - 8 1984

## MISSION DE PAIX

# L'étape des pays de l'Est sème le doute aux Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA - Le voyage que le premier ministre Pierre Elliott Trudeau vient d'effectuer dans les pays de l'Est a été décidé en dépit des réserves émises par les fonctionnaires des Affaires extérieures et du groupe de travail chargés de conseiller le premier ministre dans sa mission de paix.

### GILBERT LAVOIE

de notre bureau d'Ottawa

LA PRESSE a appris de sources sûres que la quasi-totalité des conseillers du premier ministre étaient en désaccord avec cette dernière étape de la mission de paix, préparée à la toute dernière minute pour remplacer le voyage prévu à Moscou à la fin de janvier.

Les principaux arguments des fonctionnaires tournaient autour des points suivants :

- une visite en Roumanie ne donnerait aucun résultat ; le président de ce pays, M. Nicolae Ceaucescu, qui fait bande à part dans les pays de l'Est à cause de son franc-parler, est à peine toléré et n'a aucune influence auprès des dirigeants du Kremlin.

- la Tchécoslovaquie, écrasée sous le joug soviétique depuis 1968, n'offrirait aucune chance de contribuer à modifier les relations Est-Ouest.

- l'Allemagne de l'Est ne constituait de son côté qu'un satellite bien endoctriné du bloc de l'Est, insensible à toute tentative de persuasion de la part de l'Ouest.

### Faire du tort

Les fonctionnaires qui sont chargés de conseiller M. Trudeau esti-

maient donc qu'un périple dans ces pays présentait plus de risques que de chances réelles de progrès, et ils sont nombreux aujourd'hui à déclarer que ce dernier voyage risque de faire plus de tort que de bien à la mission de paix canadienne.

« Nous avons un problème Est-Ouest, nous avons maintenant un problème Ouest-Ouest », a révélé l'un d'entre eux, en faisant allusion aux déclarations de M. Trudeau en Suisse sur la détermination américaine face à une invasion éventuelle de l'URSS en Europe. M. Trudeau a mis en doute la stratégie de l'OTAN, en disant douter que le président américain déclenche une guerre nucléaire pour riposter à une telle agression.

La plupart des fonctionnaires interrogés estiment que le premier ministre a commis une erreur de parcours en faisant une telle déclaration à la conférence de Davos en Suisse. Ils imputent cet incident aux relations personnelles tendues entre le premier ministre et deux des panellistes qui participaient à cette conférence, l'ancien premier ministre français M. Raymond Barre et le sous-secrétaire d'Etat adjoint des Etats-Unis, M. Kenneth Dam.

Pourquoi M. Trudeau a-t-il accepté de se joindre à un tel panel ? « Parce qu'il ne croyait pas que les journalistes y seraient admis », a expliqué l'un de ses adjoints.

LA PRESSE a également appris que certains éléments du plan de paix soumis par le premier ministre au cours des derniers mois sont controversés au sein même du ministère des Affaires extérieures et du groupe de travail. La réunion des cinq puissances nucléaires et l'arrêt du développement des armes anti-satellite sont considérés comme étant des propositions trop spécifiques de la part d'un pays comme le Canada, qui ne dispose pas de grands moyens de persuasion auprès de la communauté internationale.

Plusieurs fonctionnaires estiment que la mission de paix de M. Trudeau aurait dû prendre fin avec sa visite à Washington à la mi-décembre. La majorité des fonctionnaires interrogés estiment que M. Trudeau est sincère dans sa démarche, mais ils pensent qu'il a été conseillé de continuer par certains de ses adjoints qui ont des préoccupations beaucoup plus partiales à l'approche des élections fédérales.





## MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	<b>R E S T R I C T E D</b>	121	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0133 08FEB84		
TO/À	TO BNATO LDN PARIS MDRID LBDON BONN ROBE ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU		
INFO	MAGUE MOSCO GENEV TOKYO MSAU BPEST PRGUE BGRAD BUCST STKHH/SCOEZ		
DISTR	VMDFR CNBRA HL6TN VIENN PEKIN DELHI USHDC PRNNY CNGNY CHCGO COSTON		
REF	SEATL CHCGO SFRISCO LNGLS		
SUBJ/SUJ	REF OURTEL IDDZ0131 08FEB		
---PM S HOUSE OF COMMONS SPEECH-SUMMARY			
FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF PM S SPEECH TO BE DELIVERED IN HOUSE OF			
COMMONS 1100 HRS OTT TIME THURSDAY.PLEASE GUARD UNTIL THAT TIME.			
FULL TEXT WILL BE SENT ASAP.REGRET NOT/HOT TIME FOR FRENCH TRANS-			
LATION.TEXT WILL INCLUDE SOME FRENCH FOR KEY PASSAGES.			
(CONCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)			

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

P.Gossage/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A.Delvoie

## MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.  
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC  
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSIDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and " (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.  
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

## PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:  
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC  
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et " (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:  
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quant il comporte une signature.



*file*

TO/À URR

FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Your memorandum URR-0034 of January 25  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Communications with the USA  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
<b>RESTRICTED</b>
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
February 8, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0132

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

UGB  
URD  
WSHDC

We note your point about the importance and value of using our Embassy in Washington rather than the USA Embassy here when "new policy ground is broken".

2. As we already have explained to the Embassy in Washington, it is not always possible to follow this principle when dealing with an extremely fast-moving operation as was the case of the PM's visit to Eastern Europe which had to be planned and organized within a week. When it became clear that the news of the visit had been leaked to CBC and was to appear on television that very evening, we utilized Jaegar's presence in the building on other business (at 1900 hours) to inform him of the visit before it became public knowledge. We did the same with the FRG Ambassador, and with the British and French also because of the status of the Berlin issue.

3. Geoffrey Pearson, who is not a full-time member of the Task Force, was in Washington on business related to the creation of an arms control and defence centre in Canada, and not specifically the peace initiative. There was no immediate reason, therefore, to utilize his presence in Washington to convey information even if the timing factor so permitted.

*L. A. Delvoie*

L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group



MEMORANDUM

TO/À

IDDE

FROM/DE

URR

REFERENCE  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT  
SUJET

Communications with the USA

*Mr. Smith O/R*  
*first Washington file*  
*row...*

Security/Sécurité
RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
January 25, 1984
Number/Numéro
URR-0034

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

UGB  
URD  
WSHDC

We noted that the U.S. Embassy Counsellor George Jaeger had been briefed on the P.M.'s travel plans to Eastern Europe before the information had been conveyed to our Embassy in Washington. As you know, this has happened before, and this time it happened on the eve of a meeting Mr. Pearson and a representative from the Embassy were to have with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Niles to discuss East-West Relations, the P.M.'s peace initiative and the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Stockholm. It would have been useful for the Embassy to be able to convey new information on the P.M.'s plans during that meeting.

2. In our view it would always reinforce our lines of communication with the senior echelons in the State Department if our Embassy in Washington is seen as a valuable interlocutor on priority issues like the peace initiative. There is also no reason to accord any favours to Jaeger who on a variety of issues has been singularly unhelpful to the Department.

3. We hope this will be borne in mind and that every effort will be made to use our Embassy in Washington as the principal channel for communications with the State Department when new policy ground is broken.

M.G. von Nostitz  
Director  
U.S. General Relations Division



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	8 FEB 84 16 50Z	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0131 08FEB84			
TO/À	TO WSHDC ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS NRLNS			
INFO				
DISTR	PRMNY CNGNY PHILA SFRAN SEATL <b>IMMEDIATE</b>			
REF	---PM INITIATIVE: HOUSE OF COMMONS SPEECH			
SUBJ/SUJ	PM WILL DELIVER THIRD MAJOR SPEECH ON PEACE INITIATIVE TO HOUSE OF COMMONS APPROX 1100 HRS THURSDAY. SPEECH WILL REVIEW PROGRESS TO DATE AND DETAIL DIRECTION PM SEES CANADA GOING IN CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO EASING WORLD TENSIONS AND IMPROVING THE CHANCES OF ACHIEVING ARMS REDUCTIONS. <del>IT IS NOT A WRAPUP OF THE INITIATIVE.</del>			
	2. MEDIA CONTACTS SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT YOU ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO DELIVER TEXT TO THEM IN TIME FOR THEIR DEADLINES TOMORROW, ALTHOUGH FINAL DRAFT MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE THURSDAY AM IN WHICH CASE YOU WILL HAVE TO WORK FROM TELEX TEXT. IN ANY CASE, PREPARING TODAY A TWO PAGE SUMMARY WHICH WE WILL SEND TO POSTS WITH SECURE FAX <sup>ASAP</sup> <del>OVERNIGHT</del> UNDER EMBARGO. OTHERS WILL RECEIVE THIS THURSDAY PM.			
	3. PLEASE PASS TO PAOS			

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

P. BOSSAGE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

001852

External Affairs Canada Affaires extérieures Canada

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT PPR0131 08FEB84		
TO/À	TO ESHDC/AMBASSADOR BY VACSIMILE IMMED		
INFO	---		
DISTR	ARTICLE IN GAZETTE 08FEB BY PETER CALAMAI, SOUTHAM NEWS		
REF	ARTICLE ENTITLED QUOTE OUR ENVOYS OFTEN FLY FREE--BUT CANT/NOT		
SUBJ/SUJ	CLAIM DLRS 21 FOR MOVING CAT UNQUOTE APPEARED IN TODAYS MTL PAPER. TEXT FOLLOWS. QUOTE (COMCENTRE:PLS COPY ATTACHED TEXT) UNQUOTE.		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG GOSSAGE/LAROCQUE PPR		5-1874	SIG JOHN J. NOBLE



B-4

The GAZETTE, Montreal, Wednesday, February 8, 1984

# Our envoys often fly free — but can't claim \$21 for moving cat

By PETER CALAMAI  
Southam News

OTTAWA — One Canadian ambassador accepts a free air trip worth about \$400 to attend a society ball in a sunny resort with his wife, and there are no questions from External Affairs headquarters.

Another ambassador pays \$21 in excess baggage to fly the family cat home from Washington, and the bill is vetoed by External's auditors.

These are two glimpses into a hitherto-secret aspect of the federal bureaucracy — expense accounts.

If senior federal bureaucrats are supposed to live high off the hog — as Progressive Conservative Leader Brian Mulroney has complained — then diplomats ought to be the freest spenders in the public service. But an unprecedented look at the travel expenses of three high-profile diplomats shows that thrift is as common as extravagance.

The three diplomats are:

• Allan Gotlieb, 55, ambassador to the U.S. since December, 1981. Gotlieb is one of Ottawa's top mandarins, having held down senior

posts in three federal ministries, including the highest civil service job in External.

• Peter Towe, 62, ambassador to the U.S. from July, 1977, until December, 1981, and now a senior official with the international arm of Petro-Canada. A career diplomat, Towe served widely in Europe after joining External Affairs in 1947.

• Jean Casselman-Wadds, 63, high commissioner to the U.K. from 1979 until December, 1982. A Tory stalwart, Wadds was an MP from 1958 to 1968 and national secretary of the PC party for four years. She is now a member of the Macdonald Royal Commission on the economy.

## Sheaf of vouchers

Southam News looked at the travel expenses of these three diplomats for periods of between five months and a year using the access-to-information law.

Consisting of a few typewritten sheets, supported by a thick sheaf of vouchers, receipts and memos, the expense accounts reveal a world of the best hotels interwoven with niggardly regulations, such as tips lim-

ited to 35 cents a suitcase.

The accounts also detail the upheaval to a normal family life suffered by anyone living abroad and provide glimpses of down-to-earth cares, as when Casselman-Wadds noted on a \$6.25 cab ride: "I am sure I was over-charged but I obtained a receipt, which is attached."

The travel claims raise questions about how effectively External Affairs oversees its own regulations. Here are a few examples:

• Gotlieb, it is well known, does not dance much. Nevertheless society balls are all in an ambassador's day, as wife Sondra wrote in the *Washington Post*. So there was nothing untoward about the Gotliebs leaving dull and damp Washington on Jan. 29, 1982, for Florida's sunny Palm Beach.

There was, however, something remarkable about an expenses claim of only \$35 U.S. for a visit that lasted until Feb. 1.

The \$35 was claimed for two return taxi trips (\$20) plus \$15 to hostess, in lieu of meals.

The claim form was marked: "No charge for air transportation, tickets provided by Red Cross."

In Palm Beach, a benefit ball for the local Red Cross chapter has been a social occasion for decades. To encourage attendance at the \$150-a-

ticket event by the well-heeled who winter in Palm Beach, the organizers invite a clutch of diplomats from Washington and dub the event the International Red Cross Ball.

"They don't have any expenses at all," says Sue Whitmore, heiress to the Listerine fortune and chairman of the ball.

Air fares for the ambassadors and spouses are paid by Whitmore and her friends; while in Palm Beach, the diplomatic couples are house guests of prominent residents.

## Transportation rules

Accepting free transportation, according to External's conflict-of-interest guidelines, "can offend against the accepted standards of behaviour in the public service." The guidelines were issued in August, 1981, when Gotlieb was under-secretary of state, the top bureaucrat at External Affairs.

The guidelines continue: "Heads of Post, before accepting or authorizing acceptance of such invitations which are not local or purely program-related, should refer the matter to Headquarters for consideration and advice."

Ottawa is regularly asked for such rulings by Canadian embassies, says R.E. Reynolds, the official who oversees the guidelines; last month a

consul general making a series of speeches was told not to accept an offer of free travel on Air Canada.

There is no record that Gotlieb requested advice.

• Canadian taxpayers paid \$12,099.90 in real estate and legal fees for Towe in 1981. The fees arose from the sale of one home and purchase of another, both in Ottawa, where Towe was returning as chairman of a federal Crown agency, the Petro-Canada International Development Corp.

Odd to an outsider, but all done according to the book. The book, in this case, is 300-plus pages of detailed regulations known as the Foreign Service Directives — FSDs, in External jargon.

FSD-16 outlines the policy for real estate and legal fees. The government will pay real estate and legal fees involved in the sale of a principal residence in the Canadian city where the diplomat normally works, and the legal fees involved in buying a principal residence in the same city.

These amounts will be paid only once; they can be claimed anytime after the diplomat is first sent abroad but only so long as he is still employed with External Affairs.

Like all diplomats, Towe suffered the expense and inconvenience of

living overseas while maintaining a house in Ottawa. Since he was leaving External after 34 years, it was Towe's last chance to invoke FSD-16. And he did.

Not all Towe's claims went so smoothly in the nine months from April to December, 1981.

• An excess air baggage charge of \$21 (U.S.) for shipping the Towe family cat back to Ottawa was nixed by an External overseer on the grounds that Mrs. Towe could have brought the pet in the car she drove to Canada from Washington.

## Back problems

• Despite standing authority for first-class travel because of back problems, Towe had to write a memo justifying use of first class one-way on an Ottawa visit.

• In July, 1981, Britain's Royal Ballet came to Canada; so did Jean Casselman-Wadds, then Canada's high commissioner to the U.K.

Arriving four days early in Toronto, Casselman-Wadds stayed first with friends. Then she moved to an \$80-a-night hotel room and got into the swing: one official lunch, three official dinners and six ballet performances at the O'Keefe Centre.

When the six-day balletmania was over, the "temporary duty" had cost Canadian taxpayers \$2,169.28.

*action*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6143 08FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO WSHDC PARIS LDN VMBFR BONN ROME PRMNY MOSCO WSAW BUCST BPEST

PRGUE BGRAD GENEV STKHM/SCDEL HAGUE BRU OSLO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/

DACPOL PCCOTT/ARCHDEACON

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD RGB URR ZSI CPD

REF BONN ZQGR0047

---PM VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE:ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

WE DREW ON REFTTEL TO BRIEF ALLIES BOTH IN POLITICAL CTTEE  
AND AT PERMREPS LUNCHEON ON PM EAST EUROPEAN TOUR. BRIEFINGS  
GENERATED GOOD DEAL OF INTEREST AS IT WAS CLEAR PM HAD  
ELICITED INFO AND COMMENT WHICH HAD NOT/NOT BEEN HEARD  
ELSEWHERE. COLLEAGUES WERE PARTICULARLY INTRIGUED BY CZECH  
PM STROUGALS OBSERVATIONS ON CSBMS PACKAGE AND INF  
NEGOTIATIONS. FRG DEPUTY PERMREP RANTZAU NOTED THAT CZECHS  
WERE RENOWNED FOR THEIR STRICT ADHERENCE TO SOVIET LINE  
AND STROUGALS COMMENTS DESERVED TO BE WEIGHED VERY CAREFULLY  
AS THEY WERE LIKELY TO REFLECT THINKING IN MOSCO MORE  
FAITHFULLY THAN SIMILAR COMMENTS BY OTHER EAST EUROPEAN  
LEADERS. IF SUCH WAS INDEED CASE THEN, IN FRG VIEW, IT  
DEMONSTRATED CORRECTNESS OF WESTERN TACTICS.

2. IT WAS CLEAR FROM RESPONSE TO BRIEFING THAT DETAILED  
AND COMPREHENSIVE ACCT OF PMS DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE WELCOME  
BY ALLIES. IDEALLY THIS SHOULD BE IN FORM WHICH WOULD ALLOW  
FOR CIRCULATION IN WRITING. MEANWHILE WE WILL BE GUIDED  
BY YOURTEL IDDZ0124 06FEB IN RESPONDING TO FURTHER  
ENQUIRIES.

CCC/298 081150Z YBGR6143



**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I E L ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

DE PARIS WIGR3332 08FEV84

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO WSHDC BNATO BONN LDN VMBFR ROME PRMNY MOSCO WSAW BUCST BPEST  
PRGUE BGRAD GENEV STKHM/SCDEL HAGUE BRU NDRQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/CACPOL  
PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON/FOWLER

DISTR MINE DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD RGB RCR ZSI URR CPD

--- INITIATIVE DU PM - VISITE SMITH ET CONSULTATIONS AVEC LE QUAI  
RESUME: CONSULTATIONS TENUES AU QUAI 06FEV PROFITANT DU PASSAGE DE  
IDDZ ONT FAIT APPARAÎTRE (A) VIVES INQUIETUDES DE FRANCE QUANT AUX  
REFERENCES RAPPORTEES DU PM CDN A DECLARATION DE PRAGUE (B) DE MEME  
QU'UNE CERTAINE RESISTANCE A NE PAS SE LAISSER ENTRAINER DANS UN AVENIR  
PLUS RAPPROCHE QU'ELLE NE LE SOUHAITE DANS UNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ  
PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES DANS CONDITIONS ACTUELLES. SUR ASPECTS PLUS  
TECHNIQUES, QUAI NE SOUHAITE PAS REALISATIONS DE PROGRES DANS  
CADRE DES NEGS MBFR ET CONSIDERE QUE NPT EST MENACE DANS SA SURVIE.  
DANS SECTEUR DES ARMES CHIMIQUES ET DE ESPACE, DISCUSSIONS ONT FAIT  
APPARAÎTRE SIMILARITE D'INTERETS/OBJECTIFS SI CE N'EST DIFFERENCE  
DE TACTIQUE A ADOPTER DANS SECOND CAS.

2. RAPPORT: PROFITANT DU PASSAGE DE SMITH/IDDZ, AVONS EU QQUES  
QUATRES HEURES D'ENTRETIENS AVEC PRINCIPAUX RESPONSABLES POUR AFF  
STRAT ET DESARMEMENT AU QUAI (RENOUARD/DABOVILLE) AUXQUELS S'ETAIT  
ADJOINT RICHARD (DIRECTEUR ADJ EUROPE ORIENTALE). D'ENTREE DE JEU

...2

PAGE DEUX WIGR3332 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

PARTIE FRANCAISE A FAIT ETAT DE SA CIT SURPRISE FINCIT SUITE AUX COMMENTAIRES RECUS ET RAPPORTES DU PM CDN ET PLUS SPECIFIQUEMENT SUR REFERENCE FAITE A DECLARATION DE PRAGUE, PROPOS QUI ONT D'AILLEURS FAIT, COMME LE SAVEZ, OBJET D'UNE DEMARCHE A OTT POUR FINS DE CLARIFICATION. BIEN QU'ATTRIBUANT LE TOUT A UN PROBLEME DE TRANSCRIPTION, INTERLOCUTEURS SE SONT NEANMOINS DITS PREOCCUPES PAR CIT FOND DE LA PENSEE FINCIT DU PM A CET EFFET ET SURTOUT CONCERNANT IDEE DE NON RECOURS A LA FORCE. FRANCAIS ONT INDIQUE D'EMBLEE LEUR OPPOSITION A DECLARATION DE PRAGUE NOTAMMENT SOUS SON ASPECT D'UN DIALOGUE DE BLOC A BLOC QUI NE LEUR APPARAÎT PAS SOUHAITABLE EN RAISON DE PERSISTANCE DU PROBLEME NUCLEAIRE EN EUROPE ET DE INSISTANCE DE L'EST POUR INCLUSION DES FORCES NUCLEAIRES TIERCES DANS NEGS ET DONC DU DISPOSITIF FRANCAIS.

3. AVEC CETTE PREOCCUPATION EN ARRIERE-PLAN, SMITH A DRESSE RAPPORT SUBSTANTIEL DES PRINCIPAUX RESULTATS DE CETTE TOURNEE ESSENTIELLEMENT SELON CANEVAS EVOQUE DANS TEL DE BONN ZQGR047 DU 03JAN84. SUR DECLARATION DE PRAGUE, SMITH A RAPPELE QUE CDA AVAIT REJETTE CELLE-CI EN RAISON DE SON LANGAGE DECLARATOIRE, DU CLIMAT DE TENSION L'ENTOURANT ET DE INCITATION QUI EN DECOULAIT SUR PACIFISME DANS PAYS OCCIDENTAUX. A LA QUESTION DE SAVOIR SI PUISQUE CIRCONSTANCES ONT CHANGE, PM CDN A-T-IL MAINTENANT REACTION PLUS POSITIVE A CELLE-CI, SMITH A PRECISE QUE PENSEE DU PM ETAIT A L'EFFET QUE DECLARATION

...3

PAGE TROIS WIGR3332 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

CONTENAIT SANS DOUTE DES PROPOSITIONS OU MIEUX DES SUJETS DE PREOCCUPATIONS QUI POURRAIENT DANS UN MEILLEUR CLIMAT ETRE DISCUTES. CATALOGUE QUE CONSTITUE DECLARATION RECOUPE SOUS PLUSIEURS ASPECTS THEMES SIMILAIRES EVOQUES PAR OTAN NOTAMMENT DETERMINATION A ACCENTUER DIALOGUE EST/OUEST/CW/PROGRES AUX MBFR, ETC. SMITH A PRECISE QUE IDEE DU PM PAR CETTE REF A DECLARATION ETAIT SOUCI DE NE PAS REJETTER AUTOMATIQUEMENT CE QUI VIENT DE L'AUTRE COTE ET QUE CECI A ETE FAIT ESSENTIELLEMENT DANS SENS DU DEVELOPPEMENT D'UNE MEILLEURE COMPREHENSION POLITIQUE AVEC COMME ARRIERE-PENSEE VOLONTE D'ENCOURAGER TCHEQUES A FAIRE PAR EUX-MEMES EFFORTS AUPRES DE MOSCO. SOMME TOUTE, SI REFERENCES ONT PU ETRE EVOQUEES DE CERTAINS ASPECTS DE DECLARATION DE PRAGUE, CECI NE CONSTITUE PAS UN ENDOSSEMENT DE LADITE DECLARATION ET ENCORE MOINS A LA LETTRE DES PROPOSITIONS QU'ELLE CONTIENT. EN CE QUI A TRAIT NOTAMMENT A QUESTION DU NON USAGE DE LA FORCE, IL FUT INDIQUE AUX FRANCAIS QUE PM CDN AVAIT SOULIGNE QUE CELA N'ETAIT PAS AU CENTRE DE SES PREOCCUPATIONS IMMEDIATES ET SE SITUAIT DONC A UN HORIZON PLUS LOINTAIN.

4. PRECISANT DAVANTAGE SON INQUIETUDE, MME RENOARD A SOULIGNE QUE QUESTIONS NON-EMPLOI/NON-USAGE CONSTITUAIENT MESSAGES PRINCIPAUX DE DECLARATION DE PRAGUE. SELON ELLE, SI DIALOGUE DOIT ETRE REANIME PRIORITE DOIT ETRE ACCORDEE AUX PROPOSITIONS SUR

...4

PAGE QUATRE WIGR3332 CONFID ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT  
SECURITE ET CELA N'EST PAS POSSIBLE PAR DECLARATION DE PRAGUE.  
TOUT LE DEBAT DE 1983 SUR EUROMISSILES ET DISSUASION A LAISSE  
DES TRACES EN EUROPE QUI OBLIGENT GOUVT A DES EXPLICATIONS  
CONSTANTES AUPRES DES OPINIONS PUBLIQUES SUR NECESSITE DU NUCLEAIRE  
A DES FINS DISSUASIVES ET COMME GARANTIE DE LA PAIX, DE MEME QUE SUR  
LE FAIT QUE OCCIDENT NE PEUT SE PRIVER DE POSSIBILITE D'Y RECOURIR.  
DANS UN TEL CONTEXTE, IL IMPORTE SELON ELLE D'INDIQUER CLAIREMENT  
A L'EST QUE DECLARATION N'EST PAS LE BON MESSAGE ET QUE N'AVONS  
PAS AVANTAGE A LA VALORISER. SUR CE, DABOVILLE A INDIQUE QUE  
DECLARATION (A) NE CONTENAIT AUCUNE NOVATION SI CE N'EST MOMENT  
AUQUEL ELLE EST INTERVENUE (B) QU'ELLE POSAIT DANS IDEE D'UN  
PROGRES DE PACTE A PACTE UNE METHODE DE DIALOGUE QUE FRANCE  
DESAPPROUVE ET (C) QU'ELLE NE CONSTITUAIT QU'UNE RECAPITULATION DE  
TOUT CE QUE URSS AVAIT A CE JOUR PRODUIT. PUISQUE ASPECT SYMBOLI-  
QUE DU MOMENT ETAIT DEPASSE DEMEURAIT DONC IDEE D'UNE NEG DE PACTE  
A PACTE. SELON LUI CECI COMPORTE UN DOUBLE DANGER: (A) CONFERER  
A L'EST UN DROIT DE REGARD SUR L'OUEST D'OU NE PEUT SURGIR QU'UNE  
PARALYSIE GLOBALE; (B) PRESENTER LES DANGERS DE GUERRE COMME ETANT  
EXCLUSIVEMENT EN EUROPE ET DONC DONNER PIED AU DECOUPLAGE. POUR  
DABOVILLE, DECLARATION DE PRAGUE EST A MANIER AVEC PRECAUTION. IL  
FAUT DONNER A L'EST LE TEMPS DE SE DESINTOXIQUER DE SA PROPAGANDE,  
SANS FORCER LA NOTE, ET LEUR LAISSER LE TEMPS DE REALISER ERREUR  
...5

PAGE CINQ WIGR3332 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

PROFONDE D'APPRECIATION FAITE DE RESISTANCE OCCIDENTALE. POINT IMPORTANT EST DE NE PAS FONDER UNE REPRISE DU DIALOGUE SUR UNE BASE POSEE PAR EST.

5. SECONDE PARTIE DES CONVERSATIONS A PORTE SUR SUJETS PLUS TECHNIQUES. CONCERNANT MBFR, FRANCAIS ONT SOULIGNE QUE RESULTAT SERAIT DE CREER UN DOUBLE STATUT AU SEIN DE ALLIANCE PAR ETABLISSEMENT D'UNE ZONE SUR LAQUELLE EST AURA DROIT DE REGARD. PLUS ENCORE, ET DESAPPROUVANT PRINCIPE D'UNE NEG DE PACTE A PACTE, INTERLOCUTEURS SE SONT DIT PEU CONVAINCUS QUE MBFR ELEVENT LE SEUIL DU NUCLEAIRE. MBFR AURONT PLUTOT EFFETS POLITIQUES QUE RESULTATS SUR SECURITE. A CET EGARD CDE EST PLUS CREDIBLE/UTILE DE PAR ZONE SUR LAQUELLE ELLE PORTE. MBFR CREENT DES ATTENTES SUR DES SOLUTIONS PARTIELLES. SOMME TOUTE DABOVILLE A ADMIS QU'IL ETAIT CIT CONTRE DES PROGRES A VIENNE FINCIT.

6. SUR NPT ET MEME SI FRANCE N'Y EST PAS PARTIE, DABOVILLE CROIT QUE TRAITE EST MENACE ET QUE S'IL DOIT SURVIVRE, IL NE SERA MAINTENU QUE SI PARTIES Y ONT UN INTERET. AINSI EN LIANT SURVIE DU TRAITE A DES PROGRES (NOTAMMENT ART 6) ON FRAGILISE TRAITE. DEMONSTRATION QUI DOIT ETRE FAITE EST QUE ASPECT DISCRIMINATOIRE (I.E. VOLONTE DU MONDE BLANC A GARDER SA TECHNOLOGIE) NE SOIT PAS CAUSE DE DESEQUILIBRES ACCRUS. CHOIX DU NUCLEAIRE EST UN CIT CHOIX DE SOUVERAINETE FINCIT ET ON NE DOIT PAS METTRE DE L'AVANT ...6

PAGE SIX WIGR3332 CONFÉ ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

UNE CIT ABSTINENCE FORCÉE FINCIT (REF AU CTB).

7. SUR ESPACE, INTERLOCUTEURS ONT MARQUÉ LEUR ACCORD AVEC CDA SUR OBJECTIFS MEME SI FRANCE DIFFÈRE SUR TACTIQUE À ADOPTER. POINT IMPORTANT, SELON EUX EST D'ENGAGER UN DIALOGUE RAISONNABLE ET PROGRESSIF À CD. C'EST POURQUOI IL SERAIT POSSIBLE D'ABORDER DANS UN PREMIER TEMPS LES PROBLÈMES JURIDIQUES POUR ENSUITE PASSER AU ASAT. FRANCE CRAINT QU'EN ALLANT TROP VITE, ON NE SUSCITE UN BLOCAGE ET UN REJET DE LA PART DES AMÉRICAINS DÉJÀ TRÈS NERVEUX SUR CETTE QUESTION. SUR LA BASE DE NOTRE INTENTION DE DÉPOSER UN DOCUMENT À CD, DABOVILLE A DIT CRAINDRE QUE CECI NE SOIT PRÉMATURE ET CONTRE-PRODUCTIF. IL Y AURAIT AVANTAGE À SUSCITER D'ABORD DÉBAT À OTAN, COMME IL Y AURAIT INTÉRÊT À SE CONCENTRER DANS UN PREMIER TEMPS SUR ORBITE BASSE. CONCERNANT ABM, ACCORD EXISTANT AUTORISE RECHERCHES. NEANMOINS ON NE SAIT CE QUE FONT SOVIÉTIQUES EN LA MATIÈRE ALORS QUE DU CÔTÉ AMÉRICAIN CERTAINS SYSTÈMES SONT ÉVOQUÉS (LASER/MISSILE COUPLE). SUR ENSEMBLE DE CETTE QUESTION, ÉLÉMENT ESSENTIEL EST DE NE PAS FAIRE ARBITRER PAR NNA/WPO UN DÉBAT QUI DOIT D'ABORD ÊTRE POSÉ ENTRE ALLIÉS D'OU NECESSITE D'UNE DÉMARCHÉ PROGRESSIVE.

8. CONCERNANT CONFÉRENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES, PARTIE FRANÇAISE A SOULIGNÉ QUE DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE S'INSCRIT DANS LA DURÉE ET QU'IL IMPORTE DANS CONDITIONS ACTUELLES DE NE PAS PLACER ...7

PAGE SEPT WIGR3332 CONFD ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

LES CINQ SUR UN MEME PIED. RISQUE QUI EN DECOULERAIT SERAIT DE FAIRE PORTER DISCUSSIONS SUR CONDITIONS QUE POSENT LES PETITS POUR Y ASSISTER EN OCCULTANT RESPONSABILITES DE EUA/URSS. SMITH A RAPPELE SUR CETTE QUESTION DISCUSSIONS ENTRE PM ET SEC GEN DE ONU. AINSI TOUT EN RECONNAISSANT UTILITE QUE EUA/URSS PARVIENNENT A UN ACCORD SUR START, SMITH A EVOQUE IDEE QUE DANS UN PREMIER TEMPS LES CINQ DISCUTENT NOTAMMENT DE MESURES DE CONFIANCE NUCLEAIRE EN TEMPS DE CRISE TOUT EN SONDANT ENGAGEMENT EVENTUEL DE FRANCE POUR CE FAIRE. RAPPELANT POSITION FRANCAISE CONNUE SUR CETTE CONF (TROIS CONDITIONS), MME RENOARD A PRECISE QUE REALITE REND TELLE DISCUSSION INUTILE. SELON ELLE, MESURES DE CONFIANCE N'ONT PAS A FAIRE OBJET D'UNE NEG A CINQ. ACCORD TECH EXISTE DEJA ENTRE FRANCE/URSS ET EXPERIENCE DEMONTRE QU'EN LA MATIERE URSS A CONSTANTE PREOCCUPATION DE TRANSFORMER ACCORD TECH EN CONSULTATIONS POLITIQUES. SELON INTERLOCUTEURS, TELLES DISCUSSIONS OUVRENT LA PORTE A UNE MANIPULATION PAR URSS TOUT EN INTRODUISANT UN NIVEAU DE COMPLEXITE QUI N'A PAS SA RAISON D'ETRE (REF FUT FAITE A IDEE DU SEN NUNN DE CONSULT ENTRE ETATS-MAJORS).

9. ENFIN QUANT UNE POSSIBLE PRISE EN COMPTE DU DISPOSITIF NUCLEAIRE FRANCAIS ADVENANT MEME UNE FUSION START/INF, INTERLOCUTEURS SE SONT MONTRES CATEGORIQUES DANS LEUR REPONSE NEGATIVE SOULIGNANT QUE CECI N'AURA DE SENS QUE LORSQUE CONDITIONS ET TERMES DES RAPPORTS DE

...8

PAGE HUIT WIGR3332 CONFD ENTRE SEULEMENT  
FORCES AURONT CHANGE DE SORTE QUE FORCES FRANCAISES AURONT  
ACQUISES PLACE/IMPORTANCE QU'ELLES N'ONT PAS DANS EQUILIBRE  
ACTUEL.

10. TEL SEPRE Fournit APPRECIATION DE CES ENTRETIENS ET TIENDRA  
LIEU DE CONCLUSION PROSPECTIVE SOUS LEURS DIVERS ASPECTS.

CCC/074 081803Z WIGR3332



MASTER FILE

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR1022 08FEB84

TO EXTOTT 1DDZ

INFO FRGUE WSHDC LDN MOSCO ROME PARIS BNATO VMBFR WSAW BUCST  
BFEST BGRAD HAGUE BRU OSLO ATHENS MDRID LSBON PRMNY VIENN GENEV  
STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/CPP/DACPOL  
DISTR MINAW USS DMF IFB IDA ZSI RBR RBD RGB RCR URR UGB CPD  
REF OURTEL ZQGR1020 07FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:DEBRIEFING FRG ON EASTERN EUROPEAN VISITS  
SUMMARY:SMITH BRIEFED MFA ON PMS VISITS TO PRGUE,E BERLIN AND  
BUCST,CONCENTRATING ON ATMOSPHERE AND THOSE ELEMENTS OF PARTICULAR  
INTEREST TO FRG(HONECKER ON REUNIFICATION,STATUS OF E BERLIN).  
MFA WAS INTERESTED IN DECISION TO PREPARE CDA-FRG PAPER ON  
DISARMAMENT ISSUES,ON CDN EXPERIENCE WITH ISSUES AFFECTING STATUS  
OF E BERLIN,ON CDN VIEWS OF EXTENT TO WHICH E EUROPEANS HAD  
BREATHING SPACE AND WOULD USE IT AND LEADERSHIP SITU IN CZECH  
AND USSR.ON POLAND MFA SAID FRG IS LOOKING AT POSSIBILITY OF  
CONSULTATIONS AT POL DIR LEVEL.

2.REPORT:SMITH BRIEFED MFA(VON BRAUNMUHL,DIR GEN E EUROPEAN  
BUREAU)ON PMS VISIT TO CZECH,GDK AND ROMANIA.HE MADE PARTICULAR  
REF TO ITEMS OF INTEREST TO FRG EG NO/NO CRITICISM BY ANY LEADER  
OF FRG RE DECISION TO PROCEED WITH INF STATIONING OR ON ANY OTHER  
SUBJECT)AND HONECKERS POSITIVE DESCRIPTION OF EXCHANGES AT ALL LEVELS  
BETWEEN FRG AND GDR AND THEIR HOPE THESE WOULD CONTINUE QUOTE

...2

PAGE TWO ZQGR1022 CONF

WE CANNOT/NOT ALLOW INTER GERMAN RELNS TO BE DAMAGED UNQUOTE.

3. BRAUNMUHL'S FIRST QUESTION WAS TO ASK WHAT EXACTLY HAD BEEN DECIDED REGARDING CDA-GDR CONSULTATIONS ON DISARMAMENT. PAPERS HAD REPORTED EST OF WORKING GROUP OR CTTEE. SMITH DESCRIBED GENESIS OF DECISION AND PROCEDURE INVOLVING PREPARATION OF PAPER IN TIME FOR FISCHER VISIT TO OTT IN MAY. BRAUNMUEHL MADE NO/NO FURTHER COMMENT. HOWEVER HIS HAVING ASKED QUESTION AND AMB RUTH RAISING POSSIBLE QUOTE PITFALLS UNQUOTE OF THIS PROCEDURE AND REF TO NEED FOR ALLIANCE CONSULTATION SEEMS TO INDICATE FRG WILL WATCH THIS PARTICULAR DEVELOPMENT QUITE CLOSELY.

4. SMITH'S REF TO CDN SENSITIVITY TO STATUS OF E BERLIN ISSUES AND OFFER TO SHARE INFO ON OUR EXPERIENCE DURING VISIT ELICITED POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM BRAUNMUEHL. HE SAID IT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE BONN GROUPS INFO AND GUIDELINES WERE DATE AND THEY WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVINGT MEMO ON DETAILS OF CDN EXPERIENCE ON SUCH THINGS AS VISITS TO PARL ETC.

5. BRAUNMUEHL WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CDN PERCEPTION OF EXTENT TO WHICH E EUROPEANS HAD ROOM TO MANOEUVRE AND JUDGEMENT AS TO HOW MUCH THEY WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT ROOM. HE SAID GERMANS WERE NEVER SUR WHY E EUROPEANS VISIT BONN WAS IT BECAUSE THEY WERE LOOKING TO EXPAND THEIR ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE OR WAS IT BECAUSE THEY WERE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO HAMMER WEDGES. BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICA. THEY BELIEVED IT WAS FORMER

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PAGE THREE ZQGR1022 CONF

BUT IT WAS DANGEROUS TO MAKE FACILE ASSUMPTIONS. HE ALSO NOTED PM INITIATIVE APPEARED TO BE INFORMED BY SUGGESTION THAT MIDDLE POWERS HAD INTERESTS THAT WERE SEPARATE AND SEPARABLE FROM THOSE OF SUPER POWERS. THIS WAS ASPECT ON WHICH FRG COULD IDENTIFY WITH CDA.

6. LEADERSHIP SITUATION IN BOTH CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND USSR WAS ON BRAUNMUEHL'S MIND. HE ASKED ABOUT ROLE BELACK HAD PLAYED IN PRGUE. RE MOSCO HE SEEMED TO DOWNPLAY ROMANOV'S CHANCES BUT OTHERWISE DID NOT/NOT PUT FORWARD ANY GERMAN FAVORITES.

7. BRAUNMUEHL ECHOED TELTSCHIK'S COMMENTS (REFTEL) CONCERNING POLAND, AND FRG VIEW WEST SHOULD BE RELAXING RESTRICTIONS. THERE HAD BEEN NUMBER OF FRG-POLISH MTGS IN THIRD COUNTRIES RECENTLY AND PLANS WERE NOW BEING MADE FOR SR OFFICIAL LEVEL MTGS (AT POL DIR LEVEL) IN EITHER WSAW OR BONN.

8. BRAUNMUEHL WAS FINALLY INTERESTED IN REACTION OF WSHDC TO PM INITIATIVE AND E EUROPEAN TOUR. WE DID NOT/NOT HAVE IMPRESSION HE HAD ANY SPECIAL INFO ON WSHDC VIEW OF E EUROPEAN VISITS OR OF PMS STATEMENTS ON NATO DETERRENCE POLICY. AS POINTED OUT REFTEL, NEITHER HE NOR TELTSCHIK MADE ANY REF TO THESE STATEMENTS.

CCC/005 091323Z ZQGR1022

*mm Delva*  
MASTER FILE

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZCGR1020 08FEB84

TO EXTOTT 1DDZ

INFO WSHDC BNATO PARIS LDN VMBFR ROME PRMNY MOSCO WSAW BUCST

BPEST PRGUE BGRAD GENEV SKTHM/SCDEL HAGUE BRU OSLO

NDEQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/CAPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD RGB URR ZSI CPD RCR

---PM INITIATIVE-DEBRIEFING OF FRG ON EASTERN EUROPEAN VISITS

SUMMARY: SMITH PROVIDED SENIOR FRG OFFICIALS FROM CHANCELLORS

OFFICE AND MFA WITH DEBRIEFING OF PMS EASTERN EUROPEAN TOUR

AND ON CURRENT STATE OF INITIATIVE. INTERLOCUTORS GREATLY

APPRECIATED RECEIVING SUCH TIMELY DEBRIEFING AND REQUESTED WE

CONTINUE TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH. PARTICULAR INTEREST WAS

ACCORDED TO MSG FROM MOSCO AND IN RECEPTION GIVEN TO, AND

CURRENT STATUS OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONFD IDEA. INTERLOCUTORS

DID NOT/NOT COMMENT ON DECISION TO PREPARE CDA-GDR PAPER

ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES. NO/NO QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ABOUT PMS

DAVOS OR EAST BERLIN REMARKS ON NATO DETERRENCE POLICY.

AS RESULT OF QUALITY AND TIMELINESS OF DEBRIEFING PROVIDED,

INTEREST OF FRG INTERLOCUTORS IN INITIATIVE HAS BEEN

MAINTAINED AND WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

ENHANCED.

2. REPORT: SMITH MET 03FEB IN TURN WITH TELTSCHIK (CHANCELLORS  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR), AMB RUTH (FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER)

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PAGE TWO ZQGR1020 CONF

AND VON BRAUNMUHL (MFA DIR GEN FOR EASTERN EUROPE). FOLLOWING IS ON MTG WITH TELTSCHIK (SEPARATE REPORTS ON OTHER MTGS). SMITH GAVE GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PMS TALKS IN PRGUE, EAST BERLIN AND BUCST. HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO MENTION OF FRG DURING TALKS, IE PMS QUESTION TO HONECKER ON REUNIFICATION (TELTSCHIK SAID IT WAS GOOD QUESTION BUT MADE NO/NO COMMENT ON HONECKERS ANSWER- IE FRG WOULD HAVE TO BECOME SOCIALIST BEFORE REUNIFICATION COULD TAKE PLACE AS CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM DID NOT/NOT MIX ANY BETTER THAN OIL AND WATER) AND FACT THERE WAS NO/NO CRITICISM OF FRG BY ANY EASTERN LEADER IN CONNECTION EITHER WITH INF STATIONING OR ANY OTHER SUBJ.

3. SMITH CONVEYED INTER ALIA ELEMENTS OF STROUGAL QUOTE MSG FROM MOSCO UNQUOTE. IE USSR HOPED ANDROPOV COULD MEET PM IN 6-8 WEEKS, WAS PLEASED WITH CDE BEGINNING, INTENDED TO CONCRETIZE ITS MBFR PROPOSALS, INTENDED TO RETURN TO SOME KIND OF INF/START NEGOTIATIONS IN 6 MONTHS, AND, WHILE DETECTING DIFFERENT TONE COMING FROM WEST, STILL HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT CERTAIN THINGS HAPPENING IN WSHDC. SMITH REPORTED ON DIFFERENCES IN RECEPTION THREE LEADERS GAVE PMS FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONF IDEA. HE ALSO DESCRIBED GENESIS OF PM/HONECKER DECISION TO ASK OFFICIALS TO DRAW UP PAPER IDENTIFYING AREAS OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES. TELTSCHIK MADE NO/NO COMMENT ON THIS POINT. SMITH DESCRIBED CDN EFFORTS TO AVOID COMPROMISING

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PAGE THREE ZCGR1020 CONF

ACTIONS RE STATUS OF EAST BERLIN AND NOTED EAST GERMANS HAD  
THROWN SEVERAL NEW CURVES ON WHICH WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE  
BONN GROUP WITH MEMO. TELTSCHIK EXPRESSED KEEN INTEREST IN  
RECEIVING SUCH INFO.

4. TELTSCHIK RESPONDED BY NOTING FIRSTLY HE HAD MET AMB TWICE ON  
PM INITIATIVE AND APPRECIATED OUR INFORMING THEM SO QUICKLY ON  
EASTERN SWING. WE COULD HANDLE ANY PROBLEMS THAT MIGHT ARISE  
(EG CDN-DDR EXCHANGES) IF WE KEPT EACH OTHER CLOSELY INFORMED.  
IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GO ON WITH OUR DIALOGUE WITH EAST GERMANS  
CONTINUED TO SUPPORT PMS INITIATIVE. HE ASKED FOR INFO RE  
RECEPTION BY LEADERS OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ON PMS CONF IDEA.  
SMITH PROVIDED SAME, GIVING ALSO DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT STEP-  
BY-STEP APPROACH AND PEREZ DE GUELLARS INVOLVEMENT. TELTSCHIK  
RESPONDED THAT CONF OF COURSE COULD NOT/NOT BE HELD IMMED.  
INTERESTING POINT WAS INFO THAT USSR MIGHT RETURN TO INF/START  
NEGOTIATIONS LATER THIS YEAR. HE NOTED FRG HAD AT OFFICIAL  
LEVEL RAISED FIVE POWER CONF WITH FRANCE AND UK LAST AUTUMN WHEN  
IT BECAME APPARENT INF NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING TO BREAK DOWN  
ON USSR INSISTENCE FRANCE AND UK BE INCLUDED. THERE WAS  
CONTINUING NEED TO GET UK AND FRANCE INVOLVED. IT WAS HOWEVER  
EASIER FOR CDA THAN FOR FRG TO PUT PUBLIC PRESSURE ON UK AND  
FRANCE AND PUSH FIVE POWER CONF IDEA. EMB MIN-COUNSELLOR NOTED  
IT MIGHT BE EASIER FOR FRG TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY IN CONTEXT OF

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PAGE FOUR ZQGR1020 CONF

UN SEC GEN INVOLVEMENT. TELTSCHIK DID NOT/NOT RESPOND.

5. TELTSCHIKS OTHER PRINCIPAL CONCERN APPEARED TO BE POLAND. HE ASKED WHY POLAND HAD NOT/NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN PMS EASTERN SWING AND NOTED THAT FRG CONSIDERED IT WAS TIME WEST RELAXED ITS RESTRICTIONS ON POLAND. POLAND IN 1984 WAS AFTER ALL LESS REPRESSIVE THAN HUNGARY ON 1956. GIVEN LEADERSHIP SITUATION IN USSR AND APPARENT LACK OF FIRM LINE FROM MOSCO, FRG BELIEVED POLAND HAD CHANCE MAKE PROGRESS AND TIME HAD ARRIVED FOR WEST TO DEVELOP WITH ITS MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS.

6. DISCUSSION OF LEADERSHIP SITUATION IN USSR GAVE RISE TO COMMENT BY TELTSCHIK THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT/NMOT FORGET USSR; THERE WAS SOME DANGER IN CONCENTRATING TOO EXCLUSIVELY ON COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. HONECKER WAS CURRENTLY QUOTE MOST COURAGEOUS UNQUOTE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO USE WHAT LIMITED BREATHING SPACE HE HAD. HOWEVER MOSCO WAS STILL FIRST PRIORITY. TELTSCHIK WAS ENCOURAGED BY EXCHANGES PM HAD HAD WITH ANDROPOV.

7. AS FINAL COMMENT TELTSCHIK NOTED THAT WEST HAD REGAINED INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST QUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES (USSR REALIZED NOW THAT LEAVING INF TABLE IN GENEV HAD BEEN MISTAKE) AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RETAIN THIS INITIATIVE AND NOT/NOT BE PLACED ON DEFENSIVE. EAST NOW HAD TO REACT TO US AND THAT WAS ALL TO THE GOOD.

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PAGE FIVE ZQGR1020 CONFD

8.CONCLUSION:IT WAS CLEAR BY TELTSCHIKS REACTIONS AS WELL AS BY COMPOSITION OF GROUPS DRAWN TOGETHER IN HIS OFFICE AND MFA AND BY THEIR RAPT ATTN TO SMITH DEBRIEFING,THAT RESPONSIBLE FRG PARTIES ARE GREATLY APPRECIATIVE OF ATTN ACCORDED THEM AS RESULT OF PMS DECISION TO DISPATCH MEMBER OF HIS DEL TO DEBRIEF THEN EVEN BEFORE,AS SMITH POINTED OUT,RAW INFO AND COMMENTS HAD BEEN DIGESTED AND REFLECTED UPO.SMITH PERFORMED MASTERFULLY IN TAILORING HIS BRIEFINGS TO INTERESTS AND PREOCCUPATIONS OF INTERLOCUTORS.AS RESULT,INTEST OF FRG INTERLOCUTORS IN INITIATIVE HAS BEEN MAINTAINED AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE ITS POTENTIAL FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ENCHANCED.CLOSE INTERACTION ON THIS ISSUE IS HAVING POSITIVE IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT OF CDN RELATIONS WITH PRESENT GOVT OF FRG,AND IT OCCURS TO US THAT COMON CDA-FRG INTERESTS COULD BE FURTHERED THROUGH INSTITUTION/RESUMPTION OF REGULAR, SEMI-ANNUAL,SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON EAST-WEST AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES.

CCC/005 091015Z ZQGR1020



MAJOR FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTCTT RBR0267 08FEB84

TO BUCST

INFO MOSCO BONN HAGUE BRU OSLO ATHENS MDRID LSBON ANKRA WSHDC

BNATO LDN PARIS ROME PRMNY VMBFR GENEV WSAW PRGUE BPEST BGRAD

STKEM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTH/COLEMAN

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA LIDDZ IDR FPR RBRD RBD RGB UGB UGR SCE

---FM STEFAN ANDREIS VISIT

SYNOPSIS:ANDREI VISIT HAS PROVIDED USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE  
DIALOGUE BEGUN BY PM IN BUCST AND GAIN CLEARER INSIGHTS INTO  
ROMANIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTL SITUATION.MTGS WITH AECL AND NUCLEAR  
INDUSTRY REPS COULD HELP TO OVERCOME CURRENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS RE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF CANDU PROJECT.ANDREI/DPM/SSEA TALKS CONCENTRATED  
ON E/W RELATIONS,WITH FOCUS ON NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE.NOTE-  
WORTHY WAS RELATIVELY BALANCED VIEW TAKEN BY ANDREI RE CAUSES FOR  
EROSION OF DETENTE.ME SITU WAS ALSO REVIEWED,AGAINST BACKGROUND OF  
CRISIS IN LEBANON.BILATERAL AGENDA WAS TOUCHED ON BRIEFLY;FAMILY  
REUNIFICATION ON CDN SIDE AND TEXTILE AND CARBON AND ALLOY STEEL  
EXPORTS TO CDA,CONSULAR AGREEMENT AND INVESTMENT INSURANCE ON ROM  
SIDE.PM RECEIVED BRIEF COURTESY CALL FROM ANDREI AND SUGGESTED  
CEAUSESCU VISIT COULD TAKE PLACE IN FALL AFTER POPES VISIT ON  
DATES TO BE AGREED.ROMANIA IS STILL CONSIDERING PARTICIPATION IN  
EXPO 86.

REPORT:THIS REPORT SUMMARIZES DPM/SSEA DISCUSSION WITH ANDREI 07FEB.

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PAGE TWO RBR0267 CONF

COMPTE RENDU WILL FOLLOW BY BAG ALONG WITH SEPARATE REPORTS ON ANDREI MTGS WITH AECL OFFICIALS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY REPS IN OTT AND TRNTO.

1. ANDREI AT OUSSET AND SEVERAL TIMES IN COURSE OF EXCHANGE WITH DPM/SSEA REFERRED BACK TO PM/CEAUSescu TALKS STRESSING THE SHARED CONCERNS AND OBJECTIVES OF CDA AND ROM RE REDUCTION OF INTL TENSION AND DISARMAMENT. HE FREQUENTLY UNDERLINED ROMS DEEP CONCERN ABOUT PARLOVS STATE OF E/W RELNS AND NEED TO HALT AND REVERSE NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE.

2. INF: ANDREI DESCRIBED CEAUSescu INITIATIVE IN FAMILIAR TERMS AND CREDITED ROM WITH ORIGINALLY PROPOSING ZERO SOLUTION PRIOR TO NATO DUAL TRACK DECISION. HE CONTENDED THAT EVEN AFTER 1979 DECISION PROPOSALS BY USA AND USSR IN GENEV CONTAINED ALL NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR AGREEMENT. OPPORTUNITY HAD BEEN MISSED AND NOW WITH USA MISSILES BEING DEPLOYED, AND SOVIET COUNTER DEPLOYMENTS AGREEMENT WOULD BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. SITU WAS NOT/NOT HELPED BY USA ELECTION AND ANDROPOVS ILLNESS.

3. GROMYKO HAD MADE IT CLEAR IN BUCST THAT SOVIETS COULD NOT/NOT RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL NATO WAS READY TO REVERT TO PRE DEC83 SITU. SOVIETS WERE NOT/NOT PARTICULARLY TEMPTED BY IDEA OF AMALGAMATING INF/START TALKS.

4. DPM/SSEA RECALLING PM EXCHANGE WITH CEAUSescu SAID IT WAS SIMPLY NOT/NOT POSSIBLE FOR NATO TO GO BACK ON DEC79 DECISION AND WITHDRAW ...3

PAGE THREE RBR0267 CONF D

INF WHILE SS-20S REMAINED IN PLACE. IT WAS REGRETTABLE SOVIETS HAD WALKED AWAY FROM TABLE; IT WAS HARDLY RECIPROCAL TREATMENT FOR THEM TO BOYCOTT GENEV TALKS WHEN NATO WAS PREPARED TO GO ON NEGOTIATING WHILE SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS PROCEEDED. SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO RETURN EVENTUALLY.

5. AS TO WHETHER SOVIETS HAD SERIOUSLY MISCALCULATED WESTERN REACTION TO SS-20S, ANDREI SAID EARLIER DEPLOYMENTS OF SS-4S AND SS AND PERSHIN I, TOGETHER WITH USA NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT HAD CONDITIONED MCSCC TO ASSUME SUCH SYSTEMS WERE PART OF ACCEPTED MILITARY EQUATION IN EUROPE.

6. STKH: ANDREI RECALLED THAT ROMANIA WAS FIRST WFO COUNTRY TO ENDORSE MINISTERIAL LEVEL OPENING AT STKH. HE WELCOMED SCHULTZ/ GROMYKO MTG. IT WAS AS IMPORTANT THAT IT HAPPENED AS FOR WHAT WAS DISCUSSED. HE FORSAW LONG AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS BUT AGREEMENT WOULD BE POSSIBLE IF ELEMENTS WERE DRAWN FROM BOTH NATO AND WFO PROPOSALS INCLUDING UNDERTAKING ON NON-USE OF FORCE FOR WHICH ROMANIA CLAIMED PATERNITY IN 1976 AT TIME WHEN SOVIETS WOULD ONLY ACCEPT NON USE OF NUCLEAR FORCE. GENERAL CLIMATE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS WOULD DETERMINE PROGRESS IN STKH. SOVIETS WERE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF WESTERN CBM PROPOSALS CALLING FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY PARTICULARLY SINCE USA TERRITORY WOULD BE IMMUNE FROM SUCH MEASURES.

7. DPM/SSEA NOTED THERE WERE MANY PROPOSALS ON TABLE AND PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO LOOK SERIOUSLY AT WHAT CAN BE DONE TO BUILD CONFIDENCE.

...4

PAGE FOUR RBR0267 CONF

AT MOMENT STKEM OFFERED ONLY FUNCTIONING FORUM FOR DIALOGUE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE UTILIZED TO FULL.

8.PM INITIATIVE:FOR ROMANIA FACT THAT POL DETENTE HAD NOT/NOT BEEN MATCHED BY MILITARY DETENTE HAD BEEN CENTRAL CAUSE OF DISILLUSIONMENT AFTER EUPHORIA OF HSNKI.ARMS BUILD UP,ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR,BY BOTH SIDES HAD UNDERCUT DETENTE AND INCREASED TENSION.THUS PMS EFFORTS TO INJECT NEW POL WILL TO REDUCE TENSION AND MISTRUST WAS AS TIMELY AS IT WAS WELCOME.AS LONG AS THE MEASURE/COUNTER MEASURE CYCLE CONTINUES THERE WAS NO/NO HOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

9.ASKED BY DPM/SSEA TO GIVE HIS REASONS FOR DEMISE OF DETENTE ANDREI GAVE VERY BALANCED ASSESSMENT LISTING CONTINUATION OF ARMS RACE ON BOTH SIDES,AFGHANISTAN,CAMBODIA,ETHIOPA AND OTHER REGIONS,NORMALIZATION OF CHINA/USA AND JPN/CHINA RELATIONS,MIDDLE EAST(BY EXCLUDING USSR,QUOTE CAMP DAVID WAS WORST THING THAT COULD HAVE HAPPENDED UNQUOTE)AND USA ATTITUDES TO POLAND AS AFTERTHOUGHT ANDREI ADDED CARTERS EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

10.USA/USSR RELATIONS:DPM/SSEA TRIED TO DRAW OUT ANDREI RE SUPER-POWER RELATIONSHIP STRESSING MORE MODERATE TONE OF RHETORIC OUT OF WSHDC AND RECENT POSITIVE SPEECHES BY REAGAN.IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR OTHER SIDE TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNIY TO OPEN DIALOGUE.

11.ANDREI SAID SOVIETS COULD HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO CHANGE POSITION DAY AFTER REAGAN AND SCHULTZ DELIVERED THEIR SPEECHES.SOVIETS ARE NOT/NOT SO FLEXIBLE THAT THEY CAN ALTER THEIR ATTITUDES OVERNIGHT.

...5

PAGE FIVE RBR0267 CONF

AFTER ALL IT TOOK REAGAN LONG TIME TO ALTER TONE AND SUBSTANCE OF HIS RHETORIC.

12.ANDREI ASSERTED USA/USSR CONFLICT WAS PURELY IDEOLOGICAL IN CHARACTER-TWO COUNTRIES HAD NO/NO SERIOUS ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES UNLIKE USA RELATIONS WITH JAPAN OR EEC-AND USA HAD EXAGGERATED THIS DOCTRINAL CLEAVAGE.WE RISKED A THROWBACK TO THE TIME OF RELIGIOUS WARS.

13.ANDREI OBSERVED THAT SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP AFFECTED EVERYONE ELSE ALTHOUGH FORTUNATELY IT WAS NO/NO LONGER A BI-POLAR WORLD.EVEN WITHIN BLOCS MEMBER STATES WERE NOW EXERCISING MORE INDEPENDENCE. BUT THEY MUST BE VIGILANT THAT SUPERPOWERS DID NOT/NOT ARRIVE AT AGREEMENTS QUOTE ON THE BACKS OF OTHERS UNQUOTE.APART FROM THREAT IT PCSES TO WORLD PEACE DEPLOYMENT OF EURO MISSILES THREATENED TO INTENSIFY BLOC COHESION AND UNDERCUT GREATER INDEPENDENCE OF MEMBER STATES.THIS IN ROMANIAN VIEW WOULD BE SERIOUSLY RETROGRADE DEVELOPMENT.

14.MIDDLE EAST:MINISTERS AGREED CURRENT SITUATION WAS EXTREMELY GRAVE AND THAT SYRIA MUST,OF NECESSITY,PLAY KEY ROLE IN SOLUTION TO LEBANESE CRISIS.DPM/SSEA SAID THAT IMPORTANCE OF SYRIAN ROLE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED UPON HIM AS A RESULT OF HIS TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST LAST FALL.ANDREI ALSO PUT STRESS ON EGYPTIAN ROLE AND NOTED THAT COUNTRYS RECONCILIATION WITH PLC AND PENDING READMISSION TO ARAB LEAGUE WERE MOST WELCOME DEVELOPMENTS AND COULD CONTRIBUTE TO

...6

PAGE SIX RBR0267 CONF

EVENTUAL MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION. ARAFAT/HUSSEIN DIALOGUE WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT. HOWEVER FOR ROMANIANS BOTTOM LINE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME KIND OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IF THERE IS TO BE ANY LASTING SOLUTION IN MIDDLE EAST.

15. BILATERAL ISSUES: IN ALMOST PRO FORMA WAY ANDREI REVIEWED OUTSTANDING ISSUES ON BILATERAL AGENDA TOUCHING BRIEFLY ON CDN IMPORT POLICIES RE CARBON AND ALLOY STEEL AND TEXTILES, OUR INTENTIONS RE CONSULAR AND INVESTMENT INSURANCE AGREEMENTS AND STRESSED IMPORTANCE ROMANIA ATTACHES TO SCIENTIFIC AND ACADEMIC EXCHANGES. AFTER REHEARSING CDN POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES DPM/SSEA TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO REGISTER OUR CONCERNS ABOUT FAMILY REUNIFICATION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT NOTHING WOULD BE MORE CONDUCTIVE TO BETTER CLIMATE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS THAN FORTHCOMING ROMANIAN APPROACH TO THESE HUMANITARIAN CASES. LISTS OF CASES WAS PASSED TO RACEANU AT CLOSE OF MEETING.

16. CEAUSESCU VISIT: DURING BRIEF COURTESY CALL BY ANDREI, PM INDICATED THAT ROMANIAN PRESIDENT MIGHT COME TO CANADA IN FALL AFTER POPE'S VISIT IN SEPTEMBER. MATTER WAS ALSO TOUCHED ON BRIEFLY IN MTG WITH DPM/SSEA AND IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT EMBASSIES WOULD BE IN TOUCH IN ORDER TO FIX A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATE.

17. COMMENT: NEITHER PM NOR DPM/SSEA MADE ANY FIRM COMMITMENT ON DATES UNTIL SHAPE OF POLITICAL CALENDAR FOR REST OF 1984 BECOMES CLEAR, IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER WE WILL BE IN POSITION TO SUGGEST PRECISE DATES, IF ANY, FOR CEAUSESCU VISIT IN FALL.

...7

PAGE SEVEN RBR0267 CONFD

19. ANDREI ALSO EXTENDED INVITATION TO DPM/SSEA TO VISIT ROMANIA IF POSSIBLE BEFORE PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU COMES TO CANADA. MINISTER EXPRESSED THANKS AND SAID QUOTE HE WOULD HOPE AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF INVITATION UNQUOTE.

20. DPM/SSEA MADE PITCH FOR ROMANIAN PARTICIPATION IN EXPO 86 AND HANDED PIN AND PROMOTIONAL LITERATURE TO ANDREI. FM SAID THAT ROMANIA WAS CONSIDERING MATTER WITHIN QUOTE FRAMEWORK OF CANADA/ROMANIA RELATIONS UNQUOTE.

CCC/166 082339Z RBR0267

MF  
hd

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRMNY WKGR0240 08FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 090900

INFO STKHM/SCDEL BNATO

DISTR IDA IMU

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0123 06FEB;OURTEL WKGR0083 13JAN

---STKHM CONF:PRESENTATION BY UN SEC GEN

WE SPOKE WITH USG URQUHART YESTERDAY WHO HAD NOTHING NEW TO  
ADD TO INFO OBTAINED DURING OUR CONVERSATIONS JAN 13(OUR  
REFTEL).HE HAD NOT YET PREPARED OPTIONS FOR SEC GEN STEMMING  
FROM PMS VISIT JAN 11.PEREZ DE CUELLAR HIMSELF RETURNED TO NY  
FEB 5 AFTER HAVING BEEN CONTINUOUSLY ABSENT SINCE JAN 12.

CCC/017 082310Z WKGR0240



major  
FILE

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE EXTOTT RCR0227 08FEV84

A PARIS

INFO PCOOTT/PETTIGREW BNATO LDN WSHDC HAGUE

DISTR ETT IDDZ IDA IDAO IDR RWPT

---PROPOSITION MITTERRAND:STATION SPATIALE

CIT LE DEVOIR FINCIT RAPPORTE QUE PRES MITTERRAND,DANS UN DISCOURS.  
PRONONCE A LA HAYE 07FEV,A DEMANDE AUX PAYS OUEST-EUROPEENS DE COM-  
MENCER A COOPERER CIT A MISE AU POINT D UNE STATION SPATIALE  
D ALERTE AVANCEE FINCIT.

2.AIMERIONS RECEVOIR TEXTE EXACT DECLARATION.TOUTE LUMIERE QUE VOUS  
POURRIEZ JETER SUR LA NATURE DE CE PROJET SERAIT APPRECIEE.SUJET  
NOUS INTERESSE CAR,COMME VOUS SAVEZ,INITIATIVE DE PAIX DU PM  
S OPPOSE A UTILISATION D ESPACE AUX FINS MILITAIRES.

CCC/146 082250Z RCR0227

SFO 02/08

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

11/DOSSIER

1/2

SECURITY/SECURITE UNCLASSIFIED

FM/DE SFRAN WVFC 0075 08FEB84

TO/A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO WSHDC CNGNY

DISTR UGP SCS FPR IDA

REF

SUBJ/SUBJ ---SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER EDITORIAL

ATTACHED IS EDITORIAL FROM SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER OF 06FEB.ITS

THRUST IS NEGATIVE WITH MANY FACTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL ERRORS,REQUIRING  
A RESPONSE ON OUR PART.

2.HAVE DISCUSSED EDITORIAL WITH CANADA WATCHER ON THE EDITORIAL BOARD  
AND LEARNED THE ORIGIN OF PIECE TO BE WITH THE HEAD OF EDITORIAL  
BOARD,WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH MEMBERS.WILL BE MEETING WITH MEMBER  
OF BOARD TODAY TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER ALONG WITH PROPER RESPONSES.  
3.WILL BE DISCUSSING THE SITUATION WITH THE PUBLISHER/EDITOR AS WELL,  
WITH SUGGESTION THEY MAY WISH TO RUN OP-ED OPINION PIECE TO BALANCE  
EDITORIAL.

4.REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE PIECE TO  
OFFER AS AN OP-ED ARTICLE,AS WELL AS OTHER APPROPRIATE MATERIALS  
FOR SUCH A RESPONSE.

...2

DRAFTER/REDACTED

DATE/TIME

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROVED

SIG HH/AU:pr

415/981-2670

SIG H. HICKMAN/A. UNGER

EXT 518-1

001881

*Mr. Gossage*  
*We might tell*  
*them to use SPM speed*  
*of Feb 9*  
*Doc 10020141*  
*RD*

3  
2

PAGE TWO WVFC 0075 08FEB84

SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER - 06FEB84 - EDITORIAL PAGE

## The futile quest of Pierre Trudeau

**W**HEN Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau embarked on his one-man crusade for nuclear arms reduction three months ago, he said that he did so with scant hope of picking up many new friends along the way.

That turns out to have been an understatement. Trudeau not only has failed to recruit any adherents to his specific proposals, he has succeeded in raking the hackles of some friends of the North Atlantic alliance to which his own nation is a party.

His latest slip of the lip occurred at an international arms control symposium in Switzerland, at which he publicly - and undiplomatically - inquired whether any U.S. president actually would order the use of nuclear weapons if the Soviets should invade Western Europe with a wave of conventional forces. A stunned participant in the symposium told Trudeau in no uncertain terms that to debate such an assumption, at the head-of-government level, ends all credibility in the alliance.

Trudeau came under attack at home, where a member of the Canadian Parliament said the prime minister, apparently forgetting that his country is part of NATO, had contributed to the erosion of the alliance's solidarity. Other critics contend that the prime minister's remark could

easily lead the Russians to believe there is serious disunity in NATO.

By contrast, President Reagan, using personal diplomacy, has taken some steps toward getting the Soviet Union back to the bargaining table on the arms question. In a little-publicized meeting with President Milka Spiljak of Yugoslavia at the White House, the two chief executives agreed on the urgent need for a resumption of talks, and Spiljak indicated he would convey those thoughts to Soviet leaders.

Quiet moves of this nature may, in the end, bring the world closer to disarmament than Trudeau's highly publicized missionary travels. He means well, but the Communist powers had shown beforehand their utter disdain of spectacular arms control moves of the kind he asks them to accept. Also, they react with icy suspicion to high-visibility salesmanship. When he got a cold shoulder early in these travels from the People's Republic of China, the jig was up for his mission, sad to say.

Arms reduction is a matter of laborious bargaining behind the scenes. Those who have tried show-biz gestures to win the Soviets over, as President Carter did initially, have wound up with nothing. If Trudeau should succeed, he would be the grand exception, but the signs are all to the contrary.

*Mr. Smith* *MF*  
*Let's discuss*  
*WD*  
ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6143 08FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO WSHDC PARIS LDN VMBFR BONN ROME PRMNY MOSCO WSAW BUCST BPEST  
PRGUE BGRAD GENEV STKHM/SCDEL HAGUE BRU OSLO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/  
DACPOL PCCOTT/ARCHDEACON

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD RGB URR ZSI CPD

REF BONN ZQGR0047

---PM VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE: ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

WE DREW ON REFTTEL TO BRIEF ALLIES BOTH IN POLITICAL CTTEE  
AND AT PERMREPS LUNCHEON ON PM EAST EUROPEAN TOUR. BRIEFINGS  
GENERATED GOOD DEAL OF INTEREST AS IT WAS CLEAR PM HAD  
ELICITED INFO AND COMMENT WHICH HAD NOT/NOT BEEN HEARD  
ELSEWHERE. COLLEAGUES WERE PARTICULARLY INTRIGUED BY CZECH  
PM STROUGALS OBSERVATIONS ON CSBMS PACKAGE AND INF  
NEGOTIATIONS. FRG DEPUTY PERMREP RANTZAU NOTED THAT CZECHS  
WERE RENOWNED FOR THEIR STRICT ADHERENCE TO SOVIET LINE  
AND STROUGALS COMMENTS DESERVED TO BE WEIGHED VERY CAREFULLY  
AS THEY WERE LIKELY TO REFLECT THINKING IN MOSCO MORE  
FAITHFULLY THAN SIMILAR COMMENTS BY OTHER EAST EUROPEAN  
LEADERS. IF SUCH WAS INDEED CASE THEN, IN FRG VIEW, IT  
DEMONSTRATED CORRECTNESS OF WESTERN TACTICS.

2. IT WAS CLEAR FROM RESPONSE TO BRIEFING THAT DETAILED  
AND COMPREHENSIVE ACCT OF PMS DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE WELCOME  
BY ALLIES. IDEALLY THIS SHOULD BE IN FORM WHICH WOULD ALLOW  
FOR CIRCULATION IN WRITING. MEANWHILE WE WILL BE GUIDED  
BY YOURTEL IDDZ0124 06FEB IN RESPONDING TO FURTHER  
ENQUIRIES.

CCC/298 081150Z YBGR6143

MASTER FILE

AS DELIVERED

FEBRUARY 8, 1984

NOTES FOR REMARKS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS  
BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU

FEBRUARY 9, 1984

WHEN THE FIRST ATOMIC BOMB EXPLODED IN A NEW  
MEXICO DESERT IN 1945, LIFE ITSELF CHANGED. MAN GAVE  
HIMSELF THE POWER OF HIS OWN DESTRUCTION.

NEVER AGAIN WOULD CHILDREN BE FREE FROM FEAR  
OF THE BOMB. NEVER AGAIN WOULD WE PARENTS BE ABLE TO  
REASSURE THEM. NOR TO <sup>CLAM</sup>~~STILL~~ OUR OWN ANXIETIES.

- 2 -

A NUCLEAR WAR WOULD MAKE NO DISTINCTION  
BETWEEN THE SIDES OF THIS HOUSE ON WHICH WE <sup>SIT</sup>~~FIND~~  
~~OURSELVES~~, BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG, BETWEEN RICH OR  
POOR, BETWEEN EAST OR WEST, NORTH OR SOUTH.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXIST. THEY PROBABLY ALWAYS  
WILL. AND THEY WORK, WITH HORRIBLE EFFICIENCY. THEY  
THREATEN THE VERY FUTURE OF OUR SPECIES. WE HAVE NO  
CHOICE BUT TO MANAGE THAT RISK. NEVER AGAIN CAN WE PUT  
THE TASK OUT OF OUR MINDS; NOR TRIVIALIZE IT; NOR MAKE  
IT ROUTINE.

- 3 -

NOR DARE WE LOSE HEART.

MANAGING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR IS THE  
PRIMORDIAL DUTY OF BOTH EAST AND WEST. BUT CANADIANS  
ARE CONCERNED THAT THE SUPERPOWERS MAY HAVE BECOME  
DIVERTED FROM THIS ELEMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY. THAT THEY  
MAY BE TOO CAUGHT UP IN IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION, IN  
ENDLESS MEASUREMENTS OF PARITY, IN TRIALS OF STRENGTH  
AND OF WILL. CANADIANS ALSO KNOW IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY  
TO EXPECT THAT ANIMOSITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WILL  
SOMEHOW DISAPPEAR THIS SIDE OF THE POINT OF NO RETURN.

- 4 -

THE EXPERTS WOULD HAVE US BELIEVE THAT THE  
ISSUES OF NUCLEAR WAR HAVE BECOME TOO COMPLEX FOR ALL  
BUT THEMSELVES. WE ARE ASKED TO ENTRUST OUR FATE TO A  
HANDFUL OF HIGH PRIESTS OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY. AND TO  
THE SCIENTISTS WHO HAVE TAKEN US FROM ATOM BOMBS TO  
THERMONUCLEAR WARHEADS, FROM MISSILES WITH ONE WARHEAD  
TO MISSILES WITH TEN <sup>OR</sup> ~~AND~~ MORE, FROM WEAPONS THAT  
DETER TO WEAPONS THAT THREATEN THE EXISTENCE OF US ALL.

CANADIANS, AND PEOPLE EVERYWHERE, ~~DO NOT~~  
~~ACCEPT THAT PROPOSITION.~~ THEY BELIEVE THEIR SECURITY  
HAS BEEN DIMINISHED, NOT ENHANCED, BY A GENERATION OF  
WORK SPENT ON PERFECTING THE THEORIES AND INSTRUMENTS  
OF HUMAN ANNIHILATION.



- 5 -

BUT TECHNOLOGICAL PUSH TOO OFTEN FINDS A  
SYMPATHETIC POLITICAL PULL. IT IS LEADERS WHO DECIDE  
ON DEFENCE BUDGETS AND RESEARCH BUDGETS. IT IS LEADERS  
WHO MUST DIRECT; IT IS LEADERS WHO MUST ASSERT THEIR  
WILL FOR PEACE OR SCIENCE WILL DEVISE EVER MORE LETHAL  
WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

*MR SPEAKER*

(CANADIAN SECURITY IS AT STAKE; AND CANADA HAS  
EARNED THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD, IN PEACETIME AND IN WAR.  
THOUSANDS OF CANADIANS FOUGHT AND DIED IN ~~TWO~~-WORLD  
~~TWO~~ ~~WORLD~~  
WARS THAT CANADA HAD NO HAND IN STARTING. WE HELPED TO  
SHAPE THE POST-WAR WORLD -- AT BRETTON WOODS WHERE THE  
WORLD BANK WAS LAUNCHED; AND AT DUMBARTON OAKS AND SAN  
FRANCISCO, WHERE THE UNITED NATIONS <sup>ORGANIZATION</sup> WAS BORN.

- 6 -

WE ADVOCATED UNIVERSAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -- WHEN IT WAS NOT ALWAYS  
POPULAR TO DO SO. AS PRIME MINISTER DIEFENBAKER  
DEMONSTRATED WITH RESPECT TO CUBA. AS PRIME MINISTERS  
ST. LAURENT AND PEARSON DEMONSTRATED IN HELPING <sup>MANY</sup> ~~NEWLY~~  
INDEPENDENT STATES GAIN ADMISSION TO THE U.N. AND AS MY  
GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATED IN RECOGNIZING THE PEOPLE'S  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND ITS RIGHT TO A SEAT <sup>IN</sup> ~~ON~~ THE U.N  
SECURITY COUNCIL.

- 7 -

CANADA EMERGED FROM WORLD WAR II AS ONE OF  
THE VERY FEW NATIONS WITH BOTH TECHNOLOGY AND RESOURCES  
TO BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT WE HAD SEEN THE TERRIBLE  
NATURE OF THESE WEAPONS AND THEIR WORK. SUCCESSIVE  
GOVERNMENTS, THEREFORE, RENOUNCED THIS NUCLEAR OPTION,  
AND APPLIED CANADIAN SKILLS TO THE PEACEFUL USES OF  
NUCLEAR ENERGY. IN PLACE OF A NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCE,  
WE JOINED WITH OTHERS IN SYSTEMS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY  
-- IN THE UN, IN NATO, AND IN NORAD.

- 8 -

CANADA IS A STEADFAST MEMBER OF EACH OF THESE *THREE* ORGANIZATIONS. IN THE UN, WE TOOK THE LEAD IN PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ASIA AND AFRICA. IN NATO, CANADA IS ONE OF THE FEW COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN ALLIANCE FORCES PERMANENTLY OUTSIDE ITS BORDERS. IN NORAD, WE CONTRIBUTE AN ELEMENT OF PRICELESS VALUE: THE AIRSPACE ABOVE OUR VAST LAND. THE UNITED STATES CAN DESIGN ITS OWN DEFENCES KNOWING THAT FOR 4,000 KILOMETRES NORTH OF THEM, THE LAND IS OCCUPIED BY A STABLE ALLY.

- 9 -

WE TAKE OUR COMMITMENTS SERIOUSLY. WE HAVE REPLACED OUR MARITIME PATROL PLANES WITH THE MOST ADVANCED AIRCRAFT OF THEIR KIND IN THE WORLD. WE HAVE EQUIPPED OUR ARMoured UNITS WITH THE HIGH-PERFORMANCE LEOPARD TANK. WE ARE PHASING IN SOPHISTICATED TACTICAL AND INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT. WE HAVE LAUNCHED A PROGRAM TO ACQUIRE NEW FRIGATES. ALL OF THIS IS THE MOST MODERN EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE. ALL OF IT TASKED TO DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.

- 10 -

WE DECIDED IN 1969 THAT IT WAS NO LONGER APPROPRIATE FOR THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES TO BE EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE ANNOUNCED OUR INTENTION TO PHASE THESE SYSTEMS OUT IN A MANNER FULLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR COMMITMENTS TO OUR ALLIES AND AS QUICKLY AS EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT PERMITTED. BY 1970, WE HAD DIVESTED OURSELVES OF THE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE HONEST JOHN ROCKETS IN EUROPE. BY 1972, WE HAD COMPLETED THE CONVERSION OF CANADIAN AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE FROM A NUCLEAR STRIKE TO A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK ROLE.

- 11 -

ALSO BY 1972, THE BOMARC GROUND TO AIR  
MISSILES BASED IN CANADA HAD BEEN RETURNED TO THE USA.  
WE SUBSEQUENTLY DECIDED TO REPLACE THE NUCLEAR EQUIPPED *GENIE*  
CANADA-BASED CF-101S BY STATE-OF-THE-ART CF-18  
INTERCEPTORS. THOSE CF-18S WILL CARRY OUT OUR AIR  
DEFENCE ROLE MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH CONVENTIONAL  
ARMAMENTS THAN THE CF-101 COULD DO WITH NUCLEAR  
WEAPONRY. THIS MEANS THAT LATER THIS YEAR WE SHALL  
HAVE RID OURSELVES OF THE LAST VESTIGES OF NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS. *APPAR-5*

- 12 -

WE HAVE DONE MORE THAN LOOK TO OUR DEFENCES.  
WE HAVE ADDRESSED THE CAUSES OF INSECURITY AND  
INSTABILITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE THIRD WORLD.  
EAST-WEST AND NORTH-SOUTH ARE THE FOUR POINTS OF THE  
POLITICAL COMPASS OF OUR MODERN AGE. THE PROBLEMS OF  
THE SOUTH CANNOT BE SOLVED IN THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS  
ON GLOBAL SECURITY. MASSIVE MILITARY EXPENDITURES ARE  
DISTORTING ECONOMIC POLICIES AND DIVERTING RESOURCES  
AWAY FROM GLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THIS IN TURN IS  
WORSENING THIRD WORLD INSTABILITIES THAT ENSNARE EAST  
AND WEST AND ADD TO THE INSECURITY OF US ALL.



- 13 -

CANADIANS THEREFORE HAVE EARNED THE RIGHT TO  
SPEAK. THEY ARE TELLING US, THE MEMBERS OF THIS HOUSE,  
AS PEOPLE EVERYWHERE ARE TELLING THEIR OWN LEADERS,  
THAT THE DANGER IS TOO NEAR. THEY WANT THEIR LEADERS  
TO ACT, TO ACCEPT THEIR POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY, TO  
WORK TO REDUCE THE NUCLEAR THREAT.

LAST FALL I SPOKE OF AN OMINOUS RHYTHM OF  
CRISIS. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE CONFLUENCE OF THREE  
POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS TRENDS -- THE RESORT TO FORCE TO  
SETTLE DISPUTES, THE RISK OF THE PROLIFERATION OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE WORSENING STATE OF EAST-WEST  
RELATIONS. I DECIDED TO PRACTICE WHAT ALL SEVEN  
LEADERS OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES HAD  
PROCLAIMED LAST SUMMER AT WILLIAMSBURG: "...TO DEVOTE  
OUR FULL POLITICAL RESOURCES TO REDUCING THE THREAT OF  
WAR".

- 14 -

I DECIDED TO USE CANADA'S INFLUENCE TO CALL  
INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO THE DANGER, TO TRY TO INJECT  
HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL ENERGY INTO EAST-WEST RELATIONS,  
TO TURN THE TREND LINE OF CRISIS, TO WORK AT THE  
CROSSROADS OF COMMON INTEREST BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

I PROPOSED THAT THE MEGAPHONES BE PUT AWAY,  
THAT AN ARMISTICE BE DECLARED IN THE WAR OF IDEOLOGY  
AND RECRIMINATION, THAT AN END BE MADE TO MANICHAISM  
ON BOTH SIDES; THAT WE EXERCISE LEADERSHIP, AND APPLY  
STATECRAFT, IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS -- THE MOST  
IMPORTANT STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP ~~THAT~~ WE HAVE.

- 15 -

THE INITIATIVE

SINCE LAST FALL I HAVE TAKEN THAT MESSAGE TO  
PARIS, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS AND ROME; TO THE VATICAN, TO  
BONN, TO LONDON AND TO ZURICH. I PRESENTED IT IN  
TOKYO, <sup>1st SACC A</sup> AND TO THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT  
MEETING IN NEW DELHI. TO PEKING, TO WASHINGTON, AND TO  
THE UNITED NATIONS. I MET WITH LEADERS IN PRAGUE, EAST  
BERLIN AND BUCHAREST, TO ENSURE THAT OUR MESSAGE WAS  
HEARD IN THE HIGHEST COUNCILS OF THE WARSAW PACT.

- 16 -

AT EACH STEP ALONG THE WAY, MY MESSAGE WAS  
STRAIGHTFORWARD. CANADA WAS NOT LOOKING FOR A SEAT AT  
THE SUPERPOWER TABLE. BUT OUR LIVES AND OUR FUTURE  
WERE ON THAT TABLE, AS WERE THOSE OF THE NINE-TENTHS OF  
THE WORLD'S POPULATION <sup>LIVING</sup> ~~LIVING~~ OUTSIDE THE USA AND THE  
USSR. WE ALL HAD A RIGHT AND A RESPONSIBILITY TO  
INVOLVE OURSELVES, TO PRESS THOSE AT THE TABLE TO  
REMEMBER THEIR OWN HUMANITY.

- 17 -

WE PROPOSED GIVING POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON MEASURES TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR IN EUROPE. AS MANY OTHER EAST-WEST CONTACTS COLLAPSED, THAT CONFERENCE TOOK ON IMPORTANCE EVEN BEYOND ITS STATUS AS THE ONLY FORUM SERVING THE HELSINKI PROCESS OF DETENTE.

WE INSISTED THAT BOTH SIDES INVEST POLITICAL EFFORT TO STIMULATE THE TALKS IN VIENNA ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS. THESE MBFR TALKS ARE THE KEY TO ACHIEVING PARITY OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND TO RAISING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD, THEREBY DIMINISHING RELIANCE ON EARLY FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

- 18 -

I am making an amendment, ~~namely~~  
convert into four voluntary cuts equal  
at lower level, at high level, = raising number

WE PROPOSED MEETINGS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF  
THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS SO THAT A FORUM MIGHT BE  
ESTABLISHED WHEREIN TO NEGOTIATE GLOBAL LIMITS AND,  
EVENTUALLY, REDUCTIONS TO THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

Limit is taken on levels  
opt. for.

- more - 15 red below -  
at lower level  
o. i. more number down

APPLAUSE.

- 19 -

WE URGED ACTION TO REINFORCE THE  
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IN THE INTEREST OF SUPERPOWER,  
MIDDLE-POWER AND MICRO-STATE ALIKE. AND YET, AS LONG  
AS THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS SHOW LITTLE SIGN OF  
INITIATING THE REDUCTIONS CALLED FOR IN THE  
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, WE RUN THE GRAVE RISK OF  
SEEING NUCLEAR WEAPONS SPREAD TO NEW REGIONS AND TO OLD  
RIVALRIES.

- 20 -

ABOVE ALL, AT EACH STEP ALONG THE WAY I URGED  
POLITICAL LEADERS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES PERSONALLY; TO  
PUT PEACE AT THE TOP OF THEIR AGENDA; TO EXERCISE THE  
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THE CURRENT DANGEROUS SITUATION  
DEMANDS<sup>ED</sup> -- TO RESTART THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND  
WEST.

I TOLD PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT THE SIGNALS HE  
WAS SENDING OF AMERICAN STRENGTH WERE BEING RECEIVED IN  
THE EAST -- BUT THAT A MESSAGE OF PEACE WAS NOT GETTING  
THROUGH. I TOLD LEADERS <sup>OF</sup> IN EASTERN EUROPE THAT THE  
HARSH RHETORIC OF THEIR DECLARATIONS HAD GUARANTEED  
REJECTION OF THE WARSAW PACT'S MORE POSITIVE PROPOSALS.

There  
were  
some.



- 21 -

SIGNS OF PROGRESS

MISPERCEPTIONS AND MISTRUST ON BOTH SIDES RUN  
DEEP, BUT I BELIEVE WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE SIGNS OF  
PROGRESS.

IN GOA, IN NOVEMBER, FORTY-TWO COMMONWEALTH  
LEADERS STRONGLY ENDORSED <sup>Our</sup> ~~MY~~ EFFORTS TO RESTORE  
EAST-WEST POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND TO PROMOTE  
NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.

- 22 -

PARTICULAR  
AT ONE  
FOR NOW  
SUMMER  
THAT  
WENT  
WENT

IN BRUSSELS, IN DECEMBER, NATO FOREIGN  
MINISTERS REACHED A CONSENSUS ON SEVERAL POINTS I HAD  
ARGUED STRENUOUSLY DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS. THEY  
MADE A DECLARATION WHICH OFFERED THE EAST A BALANCED  
AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. THEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT  
THE WEST DID NOT ASPIRE TO STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, AND  
THAT THE WEST RESPECTED THE SOVIET UNION'S LEGITIMATE  
SECURITY INTERESTS. There are stated in J. B.,  
about 1955, played a role, agents the agency. //

APPLAUSO

IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR INITIATIVE, EAST AND  
WEST HAVE NOW AGREED TO RESUME THE MBFR TALKS IN VIENNA  
ON MARCH 16. AND THEY HAVE AGREED THAT FOREIGN  
MINISTERS SHOULD PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN STIMULATING  
PROGRESS AT THOSE TALKS.

20

- 23 -

AT OUR INSISTENCE, NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS PARTICIPATED EARLY LAST MONTH IN THE OPENING OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACHED TO HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE. THE WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS RESPONDED TO THIS WESTERN MOVE AND ALSO WENT TO STOCKHOLM, OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE WAS THE PRESENCE IN STOCKHOLM <sup>AND IT WAS NOT KARE KARPANEN (STOCKHOLM)</sup> OF US SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, WHO MET FOR OVER FIVE HOURS. BOTH ALSO MET WITH MY COLLEAGUE THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

- 24 -

BROAD POLITICAL CONTACT WAS THUS  
RE-ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF EAST AND WEST  
FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE ACRIMONIOUS CONCLUSION OF  
THE MADRID CONFERENCE LAST SEPTEMBER, IN THE SHADOW OF  
THE KOREAN AIRLINER TRAGEDY.

EVEN PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HAS TAKEN STEPS  
TO IMPROVE CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. HER VISIT  
TO BUDAPEST LAST WEEK IS A FURTHER SIGNAL OF MOMENTUM  
IN EAST-WEST DIALOGUE -- A DETERMINATION TO SEEK OUT  
AREAS OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN MEMBERS OF OPPOSING  
ALLIANCES, AND TO PROMOTE A REASSURING CLARITY ABOUT  
INTENTIONS.

- 25 -

IN CONTRAST TO EARLIER STATEMENTS, PRESIDENT REAGAN TWICE LAST MONTH SIGNALLED A CONSTRUCTIVE TONE IN AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS THE USSR. THE RESPONSE FROM MOSCOW HAS BEEN MIXED -- ELEMENTS OF TOUGH RHETORIC TOGETHER WITH SIGNS OF A CAUTIOUS READINESS TO RE-OPEN LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

I HAVE, MR. SPEAKER, JUST RETURNED FROM CONSULTATIONS WITH THE LEADERS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND ROMANIA. THOSE COUNTRIES REPRESENT A MIDDLE-EUROPEAN GEOGRAPHY, AND A MIDDLE-POWER PSYCHOLOGY, WITH LONG EXPERIENCE OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

- 26 -

OBVIOUSLY THEY ARE CLOSELY ALLIED TO THE  
SOVIET UNION. BUT THEIR LEADERSHIP, THEIR INFLUENCE,  
AND THEIR IDENTITY ARE, IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES,  
SIGNIFICANT. I FOUND, FOR EXAMPLE, A VERY POSITIVE  
RESPONSE TO MY SUGGESTION THAT THE MIDDLE POWERS OF  
EACH ALLIANCE COULD PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE PART IN  
REVIVING HABITS OF CONSULTATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS  
OF EAST-WEST POLITICS.

- 27 -

I GAVE THEM OUR WESTERN PERSPECTIVE ON THE  
DECLINE OF DETENTE, AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS  
RENEWAL, AND I LISTENED TO THEIR OWN. WE TALKED ABOUT  
THE MIXTURE OF SIGNALS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND ABOUT  
THE NEED TO GO BEYOND AN IMPROVEMENT IN RHETORIC,  
TOWARD ACTS AND GESTURES TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE AND  
REDUCE TENSIONS.

I RETURN WITH SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM MY  
TALKS IN EASTERN EUROPE:

- 28 -

- FIRST, I WAS STRUCK BY THE CONTRAST BETWEEN  
THE CORDIAL, REASONABLE, AND NON-IDEOLOGICAL  
PRIVATE TALKS, AND THE OCCASIONAL BLAST OF  
WARSAW PACT FUNDAMENTALISM TO WHICH WE WERE  
SUBJECTED IN PUBLIC. I BELIEVE THIS  
DISPARITY UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF  
PERSONAL CONTACT AND PRIVATE DIALOGUE. *Per*  
WITHOUT THAT DIALOGUE, BOTH SIDES RISK  
REMAINING PRISONERS OF THEIR OWN POLEMIC.

APPLAUS



- 29 -

- SECOND, BECAUSE WE WERE ABLE IN OUR PRIVATE TALKS TO STRIP AWAY MUCH OF THE INVECTIVE SURROUNDING KEY ISSUES, I BELIEVE WE WERE ABLE TO BEGIN A PROCESS OF EXPOSING AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST. THAT PROCESS WILL TAKE TIME, BUT I DARE HOPE THAT A NEW LEVEL OF MATURITY IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS IS WITHIN OUR GRASP.

- THIRD, IF WE ARE TO REACH THAT LEVEL OF MATURITY, WE SHALL HAVE TO GRAPPLE WITH DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF MISPERCEPTION ON BOTH SIDES -- BLIND SPOTS AND DISTORTIONS, SUBJECTIVE ERRORS OF ANALYSIS OR OF JUDGMENT.

- 30 -

FEW OF MY INTERLOCUTORS, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEMED GENUINELY ABLE TO PERCEIVE, LET ALONE CONCEDE, THE GRAVITY OF THE THREAT POSED TO WESTERN COUNTRIES BY THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET SS-20'S. AND FOR OUR PART, I WONDERED WHETHER WE IN THE WEST HAD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERESTIMATED THE FULL IMPACT ON THE THE EAST OF THE COMBINATION OF INF DEPLOYMENT WITH THE HARSH RHETORIC OF RECENT YEARS.

IT WILL BE UPHILL WORK TO GAIN A MORE ACCURATE PERCEPTION OF EACH OTHER, AND TO GAUGE MORE ACCURATELY THE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR VARIOUS WORDS AND DEEDS. ✓ INF DEPLOYMENT MUST CONTINUE -- AND NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE RESUMED. BUT ONLY THE "THIRD RAIL" OF POLITICAL CONFIDENCE AND COMMUNICATION CAN ENSURE AN EARLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME.

*From an ideological  
dilemma. When*

- 31 -

IN REFLECTING ON THESE CONCLUSIONS, AND ON  
THE SUBSTANCE OF MY TALKS IN EASTERN AND WESTERN  
CAPITALS ALIKE, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT AREAS OF COMMON  
INTEREST ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE. LET ME SUGGEST TEN  
PRINCIPLES OF A COMMON BOND BETWEEN EAST AND WEST:

1. -- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT A NUCLEAR WAR  
CANNOT BE WON.
2. -- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT A NUCLEAR WAR MUST  
NEVER BE FOUGHT.
3. -- BOTH SIDES WISH TO BE FREE OF THE RISK OF  
ACCIDENTAL WAR OR OF SURPRISE ATTACK.

- 32 -

4. -- BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THE DANGERS INHERENT IN  
DESTABILIZING WEAPONS.

5. -- BOTH SIDES UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR IMPROVED  
TECHNIQUES OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT.

6. -- BOTH SIDES ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE AWESOME  
CONSEQUENCES OF BEING THE FIRST TO USE FORCE AGAINST  
THE OTHER.

7. -- BOTH SIDES HAVE AN INTEREST IN INCREASING  
SECURITY WHILE REDUCING THE COST.

8. -- BOTH SIDES HAVE AN INTEREST IN AVOIDING THE  
SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

*so called  
horizontal  
proliferation*

- 33 -

9. -- BOTH SIDES HAVE COME TO A GUARDED RECOGNITION  
OF EACH OTHER'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS.

10. -- BOTH SIDES REALIZE THAT THEIR SECURITY  
STRATEGIES CANNOT BE BASED ON THE ASSUMED POLITICAL OR  
ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF THE OTHER SIDE.

AS DECALOGUES GO, THIS MAY SEEM MODEST. BUT  
I WONDER, IN THIS PERIOD WHEN THERE ARE POSITIVE SIGNS  
OF EMERGENCE FROM A TIME OF CRISIS, WHETHER THERE IS  
NOT SOUND PURPOSE IN GOING BACK TO BASICS, BEGINNING  
AGAIN, WITH A COMMITMENT TO PRINCIPLES WHICH CAN BE  
SHARED. FINDING A PLACE TO START -- SURVEYING A LITTLE  
COMMON GROUND ON WHICH TO STAND.

- 34 -

THEREFORE, WE INTEND TO DRAW ON THESE TEN  
PRINCIPLES, TO DEVELOP ELEMENTS OF A COMMON PURPOSE  
AMONG THE LEADERS OF <sup>BOTH</sup> EAST AND WEST.

I SHALL BE WRITING TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND TO  
PRESIDENT ANDROPOV, TO LEADERS <sup>OF</sup> ~~IN~~ BOTH ALLIANCES, AND  
TO OTHER STATESMEN, TO PROPOSE THAT THESE ARE  
PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH BOTH SIDES CAN <sup>AND</sup> BUILD. BECAUSE  
THERE ARE POINTS OF AGREEMENT AS WELL AS DISAGREEMENT,  
THERE IS A WAY AROUND THE IMPASSE OF RECENT MONTHS.  
THERE ARE SIGNS OF PROMISE AND I BELIEVE THAT THE  
TREND-LINE OF CRISIS HAS TURNED.

- 35 -

AS WE LOOK BACK ON OUR WORK OVER THE PAST  
FOUR MONTHS, AND LOOK TO THE MONTHS AHEAD, I AM  
ENCOURAGED THAT WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE RESULTS. WE  
SOUGHT TO CATALYZE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.  
AND THAT IS HAPPENING. WE SOUGHT TO PERSUADE BOTH  
SIDES TO <sup>TALK</sup> ~~TURN~~ DOWN THEIR RHETORIC. AND THAT HAS BEGUN  
TO HAPPEN.

- 36 -

I SOUGHT TO ASSOCIATE MYSELF WITH LIKE-MINDED LEADERS IN SEVERAL QUARTERS OF THE WORLD. MANY OF THEM HAVE BEGUN, OR CONTINUED TO MAKE THEIR OWN CONTRIBUTION TO A REDUCTION OF TENSIONS, TO PUT FORWARD THEIR OWN PROPOSALS FOR ARMS CONTROL. MY COLLEAGUE THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND I HAVE PURSUED THE CANADIAN INITIATIVE IN MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS, IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, AT SPECIAL CONFERENCES, AND IN DIALOGUE WITH GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS.



- 37 -

### THE TASKS AHEAD

WE HAVE INJECTED POLITICAL ENERGY INTO EAST-WEST RELATIONS. BUT POLITICAL ENERGY IS NOT, BY ITSELF, ENOUGH. IT MUST BE NOURISHED BY IMAGINATION, FORTIFIED BY PERSISTENCE, AND CONFIRMED BY ACTION. IMAGINATION TO FIND NEW IDEAS, WHICH BREAK OLD DEADLOCKS AND ADDRESS EMERGING DANGERS. PERSISTENCE TO NEGOTIATE NEW AGREEMENTS AND TO MEET THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGY. ACTION IN THE FORM EVEN OF SMALL STEPS AS EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH. ACTION ON SPECIFIC TASKS SUCH AS DEVELOPING THE MEANS TO VERIFY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, OR IN REGULARLY SCHEDULED CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

- 38 -

IN THE MONTHS AHEAD CANADA WILL BUILD ON THE PROGRESS SO FAR ACHIEVED, TO ENSURE THAT OUR IDEAS ARE FURTHER DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED. WE HAVE NO MONOPOLY OF PROPOSALS, NOR DO WE EXPECT THEM TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE OVERNIGHT. WHAT COUNTS IS THAT SOME, THOUGH BY NO MEANS ALL, OF THE KEY EAST-WEST INDICATORS SHOW THAT THEIR DOWNWARD COURSE HAS BEEN ARRESTED.

MY OWN PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION, THOUGH  
NECESSARILY LESS INTENSIVE THAN IN RECENT MONTHS, WILL  
DEFINITELY CONTINUE. I INTEND TO GO TO MOSCOW,  
WHENEVER CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT. OUR INITIATIVE WILL  
ALSO BE TAKEN FORWARD BY MY CABINET COLLEAGUES, BY  
OUR AMBASSADORS ABROAD AND BY ALL CANADIANS WHO SHARE  
OUR PURPOSES.

*cannot keep up pace  
of 4 weeks ~ 4 months*

- 39 -

CANADA WILL PLAY ITS PART IN THE COUNCILS OF THE WEST, IN BILATERAL TALKS, AT MULTILATERAL MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES, IN CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES.

WE SHALL WORK VIGOROUSLY FOR PROGRESS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND THE MBFR TALKS. IF THESE TALKS BOG DOWN, CANADA WILL ENDEAVOUR TO ENSURE THAT POLITICAL LEADERS AGAIN TAKE A PERSONAL HAND IN ENERGIZING THEM. ONCE THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS RESUME IN MARCH, IT WILL BE IMPERATIVE THAT NATO RESPOND TO THE PROPOSAL MADE LAST SUMMER BY THE WARSAW PACT.

- 40 -

FOLLOWING FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR NATO ALLIES, WE SHALL, IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT SESSION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, CIRCULATE THREE PROPOSALS TO GEAR DOWN THE MOMENTUM OF NEW TECHNOLOGY. WE WILL THUS GIVE ADDITIONAL SUBSTANCE TO THE STRATEGY OF SUFFOCATION WHICH I PUT FORWARD IN 1978. THESE PROPOSALS ARE:

- 41 -

- A BAN ON HIGH-ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE  
SYSTEMS,
- RESTRICTIONS ON THE MOBILITY OF ICBMS,
- IMPROVEMENTS IN THE VERIFIABILITY OF FUTURE  
STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

- 42 -

IN THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO NEXT YEAR'S REVIEW OF THE TREATY, WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PRESS BOTH SIDES TO KEEP THE NPT BARGAIN. FOR SECURITY IS INDIVISIBLE. IF COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT NOW HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACQUIRE THEM, THEN EVERYONE'S SECURITY WILL BE DIMINISHED.

THE BASIS OF THE NPT BARGAIN WAS THAT THE NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS IN RETURN FOR THE NON-NUCLEAR POWERS NOT BUILDING THEIR OWN, AND THAT BOTH WOULD COOPERATE IN SHARING THE BENEFITS OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. THUS THE CURRENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE BEAR AN IMMENSE <sup>(a FIRST)</sup> RESPONSIBILITY IN PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

- 43 -

CONSEQUENTLY, WE MUST ALSO CONTINUE TO PRESS  
OUR PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS STATES. IT IS A CONCEPT WHOSE LOGIC IS  
COMPELLING. THOSE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ARE, AT THE SAME  
TIME, THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.  
THEY HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES AS WELL AS VETOES. THAT IS  
WHY I ASKED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, MR. PEREZ DE  
CUELLAR, TO EXPLORE AND TO PROMOTE CONFIDENTIAL  
MEETINGS OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK. IN MY  
TALKS WITH PREMIER ZHAO IN JANUARY, I FOUND THAT THE  
CHINESE HAD, SINCE MY VISIT TO PEKING, BEGUN TO EXPRESS  
A READINESS TO CONSIDER SUCH CONTACTS IN NEW YORK  
WITHOUT THE PRE-CONDITIONS THEY HAD RAISED BEFORE.

Approved

- 44 -

THE IDEA WILL TAKE HOLD SLOWLY, TO BE SURE,  
AS NEW IDEAS DO. BUT I BELIEVE THAT IT WILL TAKE  
HOLD. FOR EXAMPLE: ACCIDENT, MISCALCULATION, CRISIS,  
SYSTEMS FAILURE -- THESE ARE NUCLEAR PERILS WHICH ALL  
OF THE FIVE POWERS MUST COPE WITH. AND WHICH THEY HAVE  
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO MANAGE COOPERATIVELY. I SUGGEST,  
THEREFORE, THAT AN EARLY FOCUS OF FIVE-POWER  
CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE CRISIS MANAGEMENT; PARTICULARLY  
THE HANDLING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCIDENTS, AND THE  
IMPROVEMENT OF CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS.



- 45 -

AMONG THE FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES, THE TWO SUPER-POWERS HAVE BY FAR THE LARGEST ARSENALS. THEY BEAR A CORRESPONDING RESPONSIBILITY TO APPLY THE SAME GENIUS TO REDUCING THEIR ARMS AS THEY DID TO DEVELOPING THEM. THEY MUST NOT LET THEIR VIEWS OF EACH OTHER'S MORALITY AND LEGITIMACY PREVENT AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF ARMS CONTROL TALKS. IT IS VITAL THAT THEY RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING AND REDUCING INTERMEDIATE RANGE AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

- 46 -

THIS PAST DECADE THE SUPERPOWERS HAVE NOT (S) C W E S  
RATIFIED A SINGLE SIGNIFICANT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT.  
IN THE PRECEDING DECADE THEY HAD RATIFIED A DOZEN.  
GESTURES ARE NEEDED TO LIFT THE CLOUDS OF SUSPICION. A  
USEFUL STEP WOULD BE FOR BOTH SIDES TO RATIFY AN  
AGREEMENT WHICH THEY OBSERVE ALREADY: THE THRESHOLD  
TEST BAN TREATY.

- 47 -

I HAVE BEEN GIVING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION SO FAR TO FIVE-POWER RELATIONSHIPS, TO THE BILATERAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SUPER-POWERS, TO MULTILATERAL TALKS AND CONFERENCES. MUCH OF OUR OWN CONTRIBUTION TO THIS WORK IS ENHANCED BY THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS OPEN TO US IN NATO. NATO IS A SIGNIFICANT FORUM FOR CANADA, WHETHER IN TERMS OF NATIONAL POLICY, OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY, OR OF BASIC APPROACHES TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

WHEN NATO WAS FORMED IN 1949, CANADA INSISTED THAT IT BE A POLITICAL ALLIANCE, AS WELL AS A MILITARY ONE. AND CANADA CONTINUES ON THAT BASIS LOYALLY TO MAINTAIN OUR LONG-STANDING COMMITMENT TO NATO AND TO ITS POLICIES.

- 48 -

BUT ALL INSTITUTIONS TEND, BY THEIR VERY NATURE, TOWARDS INERTIA UNLESS THEIR MEMBERS GIVE THEM ENERGY AND A RENEWED SENSE OF DIRECTION. THIS I WAS GRATIFIED THAT NATO MINISTERS DECIDED, AT THEIR DECEMBER MEETING IN BRUSSELS, TO COMMISSION A FULL REVIEW OF THE STEPS NATO CAN TAKE TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS. CANADA HAD BEEN URGING SUCH AN APPROACH AT SUCCESSIVE NATO SUMMITS.

- 49 -

THE LAST SUCH REVIEW, IN 1967, TOOK PLACE AT THE INITIATIVE OF PIERRE HARMEL, FOREIGN MINISTER OF BELGIUM. THEN, AS NOW, THERE WAS A SENSE THAT THINGS OUGHT TO CHANGE. THERE WAS A NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE TO HAVE A VISION OF THE FUTURE, AND A POLITICAL STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE IT. THE DOCUMENT WHICH RESULTED, KNOWN AS "THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE", WAS A LANDMARK IN NATO THINKING. IT CAME TO TERMS, AS IN THIS PERIOD WE MUST COME TO TERMS, WITH THE NEED FOR A BROAD POLICY WHICH GOVERNS, AND GIVES PURPOSE TO, OUR MILITARY SECURITY.

THE HARMEL REPORT'S MOST PROFOUND CONCLUSIONS WERE:

- 50 -

- THAT MILITARY SECURITY AND A POLICY OF  
DETENTE ARE NOT CONTRADICTORY BUT  
COMPLEMENTARY;
- THAT WORK TOWARDS A BALANCED REDUCTION OF  
MILITARY FORCES SHOULD BE INTENSIFIED, AS  
WELL AS EFFORTS TO OVERCOME INSTABILITY AND  
INSECURITY;
- THAT THE WORLD HAD CHANGED SINCE THE  
FORMATION OF NATO IN 1949, <sup>2 ans 67</sup> AND THAT THERE WAS  
A NEED TO LOOK AHEAD -- TO GAIN SIGHTLINES ON  
THE FUTURE AND TO WORK ALONG THEM.

- 51 -

-- AND THAT EACH MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE HAD A  
CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE, NOT IN SUBORDINATION  
TO, BUT IN CONSULTATION WITH, THE OTHER  
MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.

DESPITE FREQUENT SETBACKS, THE RESULTS OF  
THAT POLICY ARE IMPRESSIVE, ESPECIALLY WHEN VIEWED FROM  
TODAY'S PERSPECTIVE: THE INTER-GERMAN SETTLEMENTS OF  
THE LATE SIXTIES; THE BILATERAL PROMOTION OF TIES WITH  
THE USSR BY MANY WESTERN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING MY OWN  
VISIT IN 1971; ELEMENTS OF RAPPROCHEMENT IN THE  
SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP -- AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT  
OF 1975.

- 52 -

WE NEED TO APPROACH THE COMING PERIOD WITH  
THE SAME SPIRIT OF ENQUIRY, THE SAME CREATIVE  
DIPLOMACY, THE SAME FORWARD-LOOKING VISION.

THE WORLD HAS CHANGED SINCE 1967. WE SENSE  
THE SHIFTS OF POWER AND PSYCHOLOGY. EAST-WEST  
RELATIONS ARE FAR MORE COMPLEX THAN THEY WERE 17 YEARS  
AGO. THERE ARE COMPETING TRENDS OF AUTARKY,  
INTERACTION, AND INTERDEPENDENCE, UNFORESEEABLE AT THAT  
TIME.



- 53 -

IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS NEW REVIEW CHART A  
COURSE FOR THE ALLIANCE TO THE END OF THIS CENTURY.  
CANADA WILL MAKE ITS OWN CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORK, AND  
ABIDE BY THE RESULTS. I CONGRATULATE THE CURRENT  
BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, LEO TINDEMANS, FOR HIS PART  
IN LAUNCHING THE REVIEW. I WELCOME THE INCOMING  
SECRETARY GENERAL, LORD CARRINGTON -- A MAN WHOSE OWN  
IDEAS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS WILL INSPIRE US WITH  
CREATIVITY AND GUIDE US WITH COMMON-SENSE.

*APR 1980*

*APR 1980*

- 54 -

NATO IS AN ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRACIES. OPEN  
DISCUSSION AND INDEPENDENT ACTION ARE AS IMPORTANT FOR  
US AS THEY WERE FOR HARMEL. AN ALLIANCE WHICH FAILS TO  
DEFEND DEMOCRACY IN ITS COUNCILS WILL SURELY FAIL IN  
ITS DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE FIELD. NATO SUMMIT  
MEETINGS HAVE A PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE, AND SHOULD BE  
THE SENIOR LEVEL OF RESPONSIBLE ALLIANCE LEADERSHIP AND  
AUTHENTIC DEBATE. PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AND I  
DISCUSSED THIS POINT DURING HER VISIT <sup>IN COST</sup> HERE LAST  
SEPTEMBER. IN MY REMARKS AFTER DINNER IN TORONTO, I  
SUGGESTED THAT:

- 55 -

"...CANADIANS LOOK UPON NATO AS THE  
CORNERSTONE OF OUR DEFENCE POLICY. WE DO NOT  
WISH TO BE SILENT PARTNERS, HOWEVER. IT IS A  
POLITICAL ALLIANCE, AFTER ALL, AND  
POLITICIANS LIKE TO DISCUSS AND EVEN ARGUE  
THE ISSUES. IF WE DISAGREE FROM TIME TO  
TIME, AND EXPEND GREAT EFFORT IN TRYING TO  
RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES, THAT IS NOT A SIGN  
OF WEAKNESS IN THE ALLIANCE, BUT A SIGN OF  
THE STRENGTH WHICH PERVADES A FREE  
ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES".

APPLAUSE

APPLAUSE

- 56 -

JUST AS NATO'S LAST POLICY FRAMEWORK EMERGED FROM THE INTELLECTUAL FERMENT AND MILITARY TURBULENCE OF THE 1960'S, SO SHOULD THE NEXT REVIEW TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, IF ONLY AS BACKGROUND, THE FULL RANGE OF IDEAS NOW CURRENT ABOUT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR ARMS. MANY OF THESE IDEAS ARE UNCOMFORTABLE, INCOMPATIBLE, AND AWKWARD TO ENTERTAIN. BUT THEY ARE THERE, AND NO CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE WILL MAKE THEM GO AWAY.

- 57 -

NEITHER THE ALLIANCE, NOR ITS MEMBER  
DEMOCRACIES, ARE BUILT ON BLIND FAITH. NATIONAL  
SUPPORT FOR DEFENCE POLICIES -- AND FOR DEFENCE  
EXPENDITURES -- CANNOT BE SUSTAINED BY POLITICAL OR  
STRATEGIC LITURGY ALONE. BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN  
ACCEPTED WISDOM AND PUBLIC ANXIETY SURELY MEANS AN OPEN  
EXAMINATION OF THE INTELLECTUAL TERRITORY NOW OCCUPIED  
BY MANY CRITICS -- CRITICS OF EVERY PERSUASION, I MIGHT  
ADD -- OF CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINES.

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I BELIEVE THE NEW NATO REVIEW SHOULD REFLECT  
WHAT I HAVE BEEN CALLING THE NEED TO BRING STATECRAFT  
AND HIGH POLITICS TO EVERY LEVEL OF THE EAST-WEST  
SYSTEM. AND I SUGGEST THAT THE REVIEW WILL ALSO HAVE  
TO COPE, AS HARMEL DID, WITH DIFFERENCES OF PERCEPTION  
AMONG ALLIANCE MEMBERS. WITH EUROPEAN AND NORTH  
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, INCONSISTENCIES AND  
AMBIGUITIES. WITH INCHOATE DOUBTS AND ASPIRATIONS ON  
EACH SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC.

END OF FR

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CANADIANS KNOW THE GRAVITY OF THESE ISSUES. THEY KNOW THAT CANADA'S POWER IS LIMITED AND THAT WE CANNOT FORCE OTHERS TO LISTEN TO US. BUT THEY ALSO KNOW THAT CANADA HAS A ROLE TO PLAY. THAT IS WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS CREATING A DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL INSTITUTE: TO HELP CANADA AND CANADIANS MORE FULLY CONTRIBUTE TO ADVANCING THE DEBATE ON PEACE AND SECURITY, AND TO SHAPING THAT DEBATE.

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THROUGHOUT MY OWN PERSONAL EFFORTS TO SUBJECT  
THE SCIENCE OF WAR TO THE ART OF POLITICS, I HAVE BEEN  
SUSTAINED BY THE SUPPORT OF MANY CANADIANS, AND  
ENCOURAGED BY THEIR GOOD WISHES.

<sup>WISH</sup>  
I THANK THEM NOW, MR. SPEAKER, AND ASSURE  
THEM, AS WELL AS THIS HOUSE, THAT THE WORK WE HAVE  
STARTED WILL CONTINUE. THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA IS  
COMMITTED TO THESE PURPOSES AND WILL CARRY THEM  
FORWARD.

*That the  
progs. that, come -  
in the long  
run*



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BUT WE CAN CARRY THEM ONLY SO FAR WITHOUT THE  
COLLABORATION OF THOSE WHO OWN AND CONTROL NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS. BECAUSE IT IS THE NUCLEAR POWERS, AND ABOVE  
ALL THE SUPERPOWERS, WHO BEAR THE GREATEST  
RESPONSIBILITY. LET IT BE SAID OF THEM IN THE FUTURE  
THAT THIS WAS THE TIME WHEN THEIR POLITICAL JUDGMENT  
CONTROLLED THEIR TECHNOLOGICAL GENIUS, WHEN THEIR BEST  
INTEREST SERVED THE COMMON GOOD. LET HISTORY SURVIVE,  
THAT IT MAY JUDGE THEM GENEROUSLY.

LET IT BE SAID OF THE OTHER NATIONS THAT THEY  
SAW THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITY TO WORK TO REDUCE THE  
THREAT OF ANNIHILATION, TO FOREGO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND  
TO SERVE THE PURPOSE OF A DURABLE PEACE.

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AND LET IT BE SAID OF CANADA, AND OF  
CANADIANS: THAT WE SAW THE CRISIS; THAT WE DID ACT;  
THAT WE TOOK RISKS; THAT WE WERE LOYAL TO OUR FRIENDS  
AND OPEN WITH OUR ADVERSARIES; THAT WE LIVED UP TO OUR  
IDEALS; AND THAT WE HAVE DONE WHAT WE COULD TO LIFT THE  
SHADOW OF WAR.