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File No. Dossier 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

Volume 17 From-De 84-01-01 To-À 84-01-05

MGID CLASSIFIÉ

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EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR
M. Baudouin
2007-03-02

VOLS ACCESSION NO. 18829

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DEPARTMENT
OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINISTÈRE
DES
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES



18829

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
Vol 19

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT
MESURES
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

gc

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Retention period—Période de retention:

20Yrs (7A-13D) J



Government
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CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM
À COMPTER DU

84-01-01

TO
JUSQU'AU

84-01-05

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

VOLUME

20

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PEKIN WJGR0011 05JAN84

TO EXTOTT LPR IDDA DELIVER BY 050900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR PER FPR IDDZ PGB PED

REF OURTEL WJGR0008 04JAN

---ZHAO COMMENTS ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE

ZHAO COMMENTS AT 02JAN PRESS CONFERENCE WERE SAME AS THOSE MADE

TO AMB IN 20 MIN MTG WITH ZHAO 31DEC. AMB TOLD ZHAO THAT PM TRUDEAU

WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY USE OPPORTUNITY OF HIS VISIT TO BRIEF CHINESE PM

ON PROGRESS OF CDN PEACE INITIATIVE. ZHAO REPLIED THAT QUOTE HE

SUPPORTED EFFORTS MADE BY TRUDEAU TO RELAX WORLD TENSIONS AND THAT

HE WAS WILLING TO HEAR ANY NEW IDEAS REGARDING PMS PEACE INITIATIVE.

HE ALSO EXPRESSED HIS INTEREST IN EXCHANGING VIEWS ON WORLD PEACE.

2. NEITHER COMMENTS TO AMB OR AT PRESS CONFERENCE APPEAR TO REPRESENT

DEPARTURE FROM VIEWS EXPRESSED BY ZHAO TO PM TRUDEAU DURING LATTERS

NOV VISIT TO PEKING. NONETHELESS, PUBLIC REITERATION OF SUPPORT FOR

BROAD GOALS OF PMS INITIATIVE, COMBINED WITH PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF

GREATER INVOLVEMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS DEMONSTRATES CONTINUED

PRC ENDORSEMENT OF PM TRUDEAU'S EFFORTS TO REDUCE INTL TENSION.

ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC ENDORSEMENT OF FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE

CAN PROBABLY BE READ AS CONTINUED LACK OF SUPPORT FOR THIS PROPOSAL.

(HOWEVER, PM ZHAO'S STRESS ON POINTS OF CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS IS

WELCOME).

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FILE 20-1-1-100018
20-6-11

TRUDEAU
PEACE
14881PM

PAGE TWO WJGR0011 CONFD

3. STRESS OF PM ZHAO ON CHINAS CONCERN OVER OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR CONTRASTS SOMEWHAT IN TENOR WITH PRIVATE COMMENTS BY DENG TO PM TRUDEAU DURING HIS VISIT. DENG APPEARED TO HOLD MORE SANGUINE VIEW OF NUCLEAR WAR. DIFFERENCE IN EMPHASIS BY ZHAO MAY BE SIMPLY DUE TO PUBLIC NATURE OF FORUM, BUT DIFFERENCES IN STYLE BETWEEN ZHAO, AND RATHER MORE BLUNT DENG, ALSO REFLECT DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH OF TWO LEADERS (AND CONCEIVABLY EVEN REPRESENT DIVERGENCES IN RESPECTIVE VIEWS OF INNATL SITU BY TWO LEADERS).

4. WE DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE CHINESE VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT HAVE EVOLVED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE VISIT OF PM TRUDEAU BUT STATEMENTS OF ZHAO CLEARLY INDICATE CHINESE REMAIN SYMPATHETIC TO APPROACH OF PM TRUDEAU, EVEN IF PRC LEADERSHIP CANNOT/NOT ENDORSE ENTIRE PACKAGE.
CCC/002 050620Z WJGR0011

**ACTION
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
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CCC/002 050620Z WJGR0011

L.A. DELVOYE *de*

M ARCHDEACON

G. SMITH

K. CALDER

J. CARON

J. MCNEE

~~SECRET~~

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DMFX-0007 - Jan 5/84

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TO/À DMF - Mr. Marchand
FROM/DE • DMFX - W.T. Delworth

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND
SUJET • SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT
IN EUROPE

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
January 5, 1984
Number/Numéro
DMFX-0007

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

See attached
Distr List

As the beginning of the Stockholm Conference approaches I would appeal to all interested parties within the Department to abandon the designation of this international meeting as "the CDE," a designation which, because it stands for "Conference on Disarmament in Europe" suggests that the subjects under negotiation in Stockholm will be something they are not.

2. This could lead to serious misunderstandings through a mis-interpretation in the public mind of the purpose which the Stockholm Conference is designed to serve and this in turn could be embarrassing for governments in due course. If there is to be a Conference on Disarmament in Europe which will deal with measures on disarmament rather than measures of confidence-building, this will not come about until the results of the Stockholm meeting have suggested that such a second phase might profitably be undertaken. Although it can be argued that the Conference on Disarmament in Europe is a long-term process involving several phases, the first of which is about to begin in Stockholm, it strikes me that this line of reasoning is too attenuated and subtle to be fully appreciated by the media and the public, and should if possible be avoided.

3. It would be much better if all concerned could begin referring to the Stockholm Conference as "the Stockholm Conference" or as "the Conference on European Security in Stockholm" or some such form of words which avoids any reference to "disarmament." When written out in full - Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe - the addition of "(CDE)" at the end of the description might be justified since the full and proper title has been spelled out.


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- 2 -

4. Against the foregoing background it would be appreciated if telegrams and other forms of communication which do not use the full and proper title of the Conference or its logical abbreviation into CCSBMDE, could identify the meeting as "Stockholm Conference" or "Stockholm Conference on European Security." The telegraphic address for the Canadian Delegation has been decided as SCDEL Stockholm standing, of course, for Stockholm Conference.

5. I have given this memorandum the distribution indicated.



W. T. Delworth
Special Adviser to the
Deputy Minister (Foreign Policy)



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	6 JAN 84 00 02 12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0011 05JAN84		
TO/À	TO STKHM		
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REF	L A DELVOIE ARRIVES STKHM 15JAN AT 1300 HRS ON AIR FRANCE FLIGHT		
SUBJ/SUJ	FROM PARIS.		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG L.A.Delvoie	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> L.A. Delvoie



TO/À
FROM/DE •
REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT •
SUJET

FILE *MF*
IDDZ/J.McNee
Task Force Meeting January 4 - Next steps.

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	January 5, 1983.
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0010

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

It was agreed:

1. January 10 Luncheon with members of Coalition for The Third Track -

15 members of the group will attend, the PM, and two to assist him (1 from PMO, 1 from the Task Force). (Archdeacon to report who is to attend.)

2. January 11 Visit to UN Secretary General, N.Y. - (followed by brief meeting with press)

On the PM's plane are to be: PM, M. Pelletier, Ted Johnson, Fowler, Smith, Coleman and Shenstone (to N.Y. only). The RCMP, PMO/M. Duerdin, and XDV will travel separately. It has been proposed to the PM that he meet privately with the New York Times editorial board in New York and it will be suggested that on return to Ottawa January 12 that he give interviews to CBC/Halton and TVA.

3. East Bloc
Visitors:

- a) Soviet journalist - Bovin cannot come; a Tass man has been offered in his stead (RBD)
- b) Soviet Vice-Minister for Trade (responsible for wheat) will visit later this month (RBD)
- c) Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei is to visit 7-9 February and has asked to see the PM (RBD)

4. Jan.17-18 Zhao visit to Ottawa -

Zhao to address House of Commons Jan. 18 to be introduced by PM (Caron, to begin work and to consult PER/Davidson, McNee)

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- 2 -

5. Moscow

Transport will be by 707 as this is the only way the press can get in (45 - 50 may want to go). Points for consideration include:

- (a) who is to go?
- (b) is a communique desirable? unavoidable? on advance party may have to go to negotiate a communique
- (c) a logistical advance team (PMO/Duerdin, RCMP, XDV) will be sent
- (d) bilateral content: is a minimum Canadian interests package needed?

6. Mid-February

Major Speech in House of Commons -

Paul Heinbecker will call a meeting to discuss ideas to be contained in the last speech.

7.

Present were Delvoie, Smith, Calder, Coleman, Hancock, Dudoit, Caron, Heinbecker, PCO/P&P/O'Hara, McNee.



John McNee
Task Force Working Group
(IDDZ)



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

5 JAN 84 17 50Z 10

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TO/À

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REF

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SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE:VISIT TO MOSCO

PM HAS DECIDED THAT HE WISHES TO PURSUE POSSIBILITY OF HIS VISITING MOSCO BEFORE END JAN, EVEN IF THIS MEANS HE WILL NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO SEE ANDROPOV. GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF YOU WOULD TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MSG FROM PM TO ANDROPOV ASAP. IN HANDING OVER MSG, YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT PM'S PREFERRED TIMEFRAME FOR VISIT IS FROM JAN 23 TO 27, WITH FALLBACK TIMEFRAME BEING JAN 30 TO FEB 2. (FYI: WE PROPOSE TO PASS COPY OF MSG TO SOVIET EMB OTT MORNING OF JAN 9, SINCE PM WILL BE SEEING SOVIET AMB EVENING OF JAN 9 AT DINNER HOSTED BY CZECH AMB.)

2.TEXT BEGINS.QUOTE.

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

UNQUOTE.TEXT ENDS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A.Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG *L.A. Delvoie*

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT ANDROPOV

Dear Mr. President,

As we enter 1984, I have renewed confidence that the political will exists to repair lines of communication between East and West and to begin to build a more constructive relationship. I was pleased to receive support for this endeavour in your reply to my message of early November.

I have completed consultations with a large number of Western and Third World leaders. Without exception, I have received vigorous encouragement for my undertaking to reduce tensions and promote productive dialogue. I am pleased to note that Mr. Gromyko will be going to Stockholm and that he will have an opportunity to meet Western foreign ministers. I know that the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. MacEachen, looks forward to an opportunity to meet Mr. Gromyko privately to exchange views on a number of topical bilateral and international questions.

I remain firmly committed to the importance of deepening the dialogue with you and your colleagues in the Soviet leadership. In that regard, I fully understand that it has not yet been possible to fix a firm date for me to take up your personal invitation to visit Moscow. In planning the course of my initiative for the weeks ahead, I still hope it will be possible to visit Moscow before the end of January. If, however, you believe that this would

- 2 -

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
impose unduly on your personal agenda, I want you to know that I am prepared to meet in Moscow in that time period with those of your colleagues whom you might personally designate.

Last November, my emissary outlined to Mr. Gromyko and other senior officials some of my ideas on positive steps to improve the level of East-West understanding. I would like to elaborate on the results of my consultations with other leaders thus far, and gain first-hand the assessment of the Soviet leadership of the international situation and the Soviet approach to the political challenges which face us all.

Mr. President, may I extend to you my sincere personal wishes for a happy and successful new year and my prayers for an early and full recovery.

Yours sincerely,

P. E. Trudeau





PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

O T T A W A, K1A 0A2

January 5, 1983

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.../2

His Excellency Yuri Andropov
President of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet
Moscow, USSR

- 2 -

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Mr. President, may I extend to you my sincere personal wishes for a happy and successful new year and my prayers for an early and full recovery.

Yours sincerely, *with warm*

regards.

A large, stylized handwritten signature, likely of Ronald Reagan, written in dark ink. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a prominent 'R' and a long, sweeping horizontal line at the end.

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
Àe Canadian Embassy
PARIS, France**CONFIDENTIAL**

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. **IDDZ-0008** DATE **Jan. 5, 1983**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE
	ORIGINAL LETTER FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.	Ref. Ourtel IDDZ-0182 of 18NOV83.
	John McNee Task Force Working Group (IDDZ)	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE	IDDZ/OTTAWA



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

le 17 novembre 1983

Mon cher Président,

Dans ma lettre du 25 octobre, je vous ai fait part des inquiétudes que m'inspire le piètre état des relations Est-Ouest et de la sécurité internationale, et je vous ai annoncé mon intention de travailler à l'amélioration de cet état de choses.

Lors de mon passage en Europe, la semaine dernière, j'ai eu l'occasion de m'entretenir personnellement de ce sujet avec six collègues de l'OTAN (dont vous-même, lors de notre fructueuse rencontre du 8 novembre à l'Elysée), et l'accueil qu'ils m'ont réservé m'a encouragé. Je les ai trouvés unanimement d'accord sur l'urgente nécessité de rétablir un climat de confiance et de jeter les bases d'un dialogue suivi et concerté entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Indépendamment de leur valeur intrinsèque à plus long terme, un tel climat et un tel réseau de contacts constitueraient un filet de sécurité qui pourrait se révéler indispensable au cours de la prochaine année.

Ma tournée européenne m'a permis aussi de discuter en détail certaines propositions plus précises avancées dans ma dernière lettre, dont le besoin d'une tribune où pourraient se négocier des limites globales aux arsenaux des cinq puissances nucléaires; la nécessité de réaffirmer avec plus de force les principes de non-prolifération, et celle non moins grande de donner, au plus haut niveau politique, une impulsion aux négociations sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces de même qu'à la "Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe", qui s'ouvrira prochainement à Stockholm.

Son Excellence

Monsieur François Mitterrand

Président de la République française

Paris (France)

- 2 -

Mon collègue, M. Allan MacEachen, a l'intention de soulever ce dernier point à la réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays de l'OTAN le 8 décembre, à Bruxelles, et j'aimerais solliciter votre appui personnel pour que soit prise à cette occasion une décision sur les deux propositions suivantes:

a) que tous les membres de l'OTAN soient représentés à un haut niveau politique lors de la séance inaugurale de la conférence de Stockholm, le 17 janvier; et

b) que l'OTAN réponde aux propositions de l'Est sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces tôt l'an prochain et se tienne prête à faire suivre sa réponse d'une réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères à Vienne.

Je suis convaincu qu'une entente sur ces deux points démontrerait avec force aux pays de l'Est comme à la population de nos propres pays notre volonté, en tant que dirigeants politiques, d'accomplir des progrès significatifs dans le domaine du contrôle des armements, de façon à réduire l'état de tension actuel.

Je tiens aussi à vous informer que j'ai écrit aux dirigeants de la Chine et de l'Union soviétique et que j'enverrai sous peu un émissaire personnel à Pékin et à Moscou pour y exprimer mes inquiétudes au sujet de la situation internationale actuelle. Je vous tiendrai au courant des résultats de ces rencontres.

J'apprécierais recevoir tout commentaire que vous inspirerait ma démarche et je compte, à ce sujet, rester en contact étroit avec vous au cours des mois à venir.

Je vous remercie d'avoir trouvé le temps de me recevoir la semaine dernière malgré votre horaire chargé et ma demande de dernière minute. Merci également de votre généreuse hospitalité.

*cordiales salutations
Jim S. F.*

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO Th Canadian Embassy
A Rome, ITALY**CONFIDENTIAL**
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)NO. **IDDZ-0007** DATE **Jan. 5, 1983**

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	ORIGINAL LETTERS FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PRESIDENT CRAXI.	Ref. Ourtel IDDZ-0181 of 18NOV83.
		John McNee Task Force Working Group (IDDZ)
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À IDDZ/OTTAWA
DATE	SIGNATURE	



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA K1A 0A2

le 17 novembre 1983

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L'honorable Bettino Craxi
Président du Conseil des ministres
Rome (Italie)

- 2 -

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
b) que l'OTAN réponde aux propositions de l'Est sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces tôt l'an prochain et se tienne prête à faire suivre sa réponse d'une réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères à Vienne.

Je suis convaincu qu'une entente sur ces deux points démontrerait avec force aux pays de l'Est comme à la population de nos propres pays notre volonté, en tant que dirigeants politiques, d'accomplir des progrès significatifs dans le domaine du contrôle des armements, de façon à réduire l'état de tension actuel.

Je tiens aussi à vous informer que j'ai écrit aux dirigeants de la Chine et de l'Union soviétique et que j'enverrai sous peu un émissaire personnel à Pékin et à Moscou pour y exprimer mes inquiétudes au sujet de la situation internationale actuelle. Je vous tiendrai au courant des résultats de ces rencontres.

J'apprécierais recevoir tout commentaire que vous inspirerait ma démarche et je compte, à ce sujet, rester en contact étroit avec vous au cours des mois à venir.

Je vous remercie de votre réponse fort encourageante à ma lettre du 25 octobre. Merci également d'avoir trouvé le temps de me recevoir la semaine dernière malgré votre horaire chargé et ma demande de dernière minute. J'ai fort apprécié votre généreuse hospitalité.

avec mes bons vœux personnels


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John McNee
Task Force Working Group (IDDZ)

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FOLLOW-UP — COPIE POUR FAIRE SUITE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

le 17 novembre 1983

Mon cher Premier ministre,

Dans ma lettre du 25 octobre, je vous ai fait part des inquiétudes que m'inspire le piètre état des relations Est-Ouest et de la sécurité internationale, et je vous ai annoncé mon intention de travailler à l'amélioration de cet état de choses.

Lors de mon passage en Europe, la semaine dernière, j'ai eu l'occasion de m'entretenir personnellement de ce sujet avec six collègues de l'OTAN, et l'accueil qu'ils m'ont réservé m'a encouragé. Je les ai trouvés unanimement d'accord sur l'urgente nécessité de rétablir un climat de confiance et de jeter les bases d'un dialogue suivi et concerté entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Indépendamment de leur valeur intrinsèque à plus long terme, un tel climat et un tel réseau de contacts constitueraient un filet de sécurité qui pourrait se révéler indispensable au cours de la prochaine année.

Ma tournée européenne m'a permis aussi de discuter en détail certaines propositions plus précises avancées dans ma dernière lettre, dont le besoin d'une tribune où pourraient se négocier des limites globales aux arsenaux des cinq puissances nucléaires; la nécessité de réaffirmer avec plus de force les principes de non-prolifération, et celle non moins grande de donner, au plus haut niveau politique, une impulsion aux négociations sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces de même qu'à la "Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe", qui s'ouvrira prochainement à Stockholm.

Son Excellence
Monsieur Pierre Werner
Premier ministre du Luxembourg
Luxembourg

- 2 -

Mon collègue, M. Allan MacEachen, a l'intention de soulever ce dernier point à la réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays de l'OTAN le 8 décembre, à Bruxelles, et j'aimerais solliciter votre appui personnel pour que soit prise à cette occasion une décision sur les deux propositions suivantes:

a) que tous les membres de l'OTAN soient représentés à un haut niveau politique lors de la séance inaugurale de la conférence de Stockholm, le 17 janvier; et

b) que l'OTAN réponde aux propositions de l'Est sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces tôt l'an prochain et se tienne prête à faire suivre sa réponse d'une réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères à Vienne.

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J'apprécierais recevoir tout commentaire que vous inspirerait ma démarche et je compte, à ce sujet, rester en contact étroit avec vous au cours des mois à venir.

Unicales saluta l'und





PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA K1A 0A2

le 17 novembre 1983

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Son Excellence
Monsieur Wilfrid Martens
Premier ministre de la Belgique
Bruxelles (Belgique)

- 2 -

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Je vous remercie d'avoir trouvé le temps de me recevoir la semaine dernière malgré votre horaire chargé et ma demande de dernière minute. Merci également de votre généreuse hospitalité.

Un cordial salut
Quin S. F.

Lin Smytz Prepared by J. Caron 5.1.84

CONFIDENTIAL

Possible outline of Prime Minister's introductory remarks for Zhao Ziyang's speech before Parliament

1. Appropriate welcoming remarks, possibly couched with references to Chinese classics.
2. Rapid review of evolution of Canada/China relationship, with references to the Prime Minister's own visits.
3. Comments on satisfactory state of current relationship.
4. Relationship placed in context of uncertain international situation.
5. Prime Minister's initiative with special references to commonality of views with established Chinese positions.
6. Future directions, with comments on substance of Trudeau/Zhao talks.
7. Hopes for the future.

Timing for Zhao's speech is uncertain although morning of January 18 appears likely.

Speech should be roughly of 5 to 8 minutes' duration, which converts to 4 to 5 typed pages, double spaced.

First draft of speech should be available by mid-day Wednesday December 11 with final text for the Prime Minister's attention included in briefing package going forward January 13.

Jan

MF the initiative
of the
CONFIDENTIAL

- our revision of the section of the
scenario brief for the Zhao visit

YOUR INITIATIVE

JRM 5.1.84

You might wish to lead off with a review of recent developments relating to your initiative. Of specific interest to the Chinese would be your visit to Washington, your call on the United Nations Secretary General, your current plans for a visit to Moscow and your assessment of the results of your initiative to date. At the time of your visit to Peking, Premier Zhao welcomed your efforts to begin a process aimed at improving East/West relations and at reducing international tension. In China's view, however, responsibility for the arms race lay with the two superpowers and pressure needed to be brought to bear on them. Hence, the Chinese were only prepared to consider participation in a five power conference once the two superpowers had announced their intention to reduce their nuclear arsenals.

You might agree that prime responsibility for nuclear disarmament lies with the superpowers, but eventually all five nuclear weapon states must come together to discuss these matters. You could argue that greater pressure can be brought to bear on the super powers at, rather than away from, the negotiating table. The Premier also confirmed that China would not accede to the NPT. It would be interesting to learn from the Premier whether in the weeks since your visit the Chinese position on such matters has evolved. Of note in this context, during a January 2 press conference,

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Premier Zhao indicated Chinese appreciation for your efforts and support for your appeal for more politicians to participate in peace efforts. Given China's reservations on a five power conference and rejection of the NPT, you might ask how China might contribute to nuclear disarmament and easing world tensions beyond following "an independent" foreign policy, as Deng Xiaoping suggested to you.

In your conversation with Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the Special Advisory Committee, you were told that the Chinese leadership still considered there to exist a danger of war and that should a nuclear war occur it would not necessarily mean the end of the human race. You might wish to follow up on this line of reasoning since it would suggest a distinct lack of appreciation by the Chinese of the devastation, world-wide, that would ensue from any all-out nuclear exchange.

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To accompany Prime Minister for Meeting in New York with U.N. Secretary-General

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Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, Canada
K1A 0G2

January 5, 1984

Dear Mr. Ryan,

On behalf of the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. MacEachen, permit me to reply to your letter of November 27 concerning the Prime Minister's recent diplomatic efforts to encourage enhanced East/West dialogue.

I do not believe that the concerns you express about the Prime Minister's initiative are well founded. Both in public and private, the Prime Minister has repeatedly made it clear that Canada remains fully committed to the purposes and policies of NATO. I think you may be interested in this regard in reading the attached texts of the two major speeches which the Prime Minister has made in explaining his initiative.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Louis A. Delvoie".

Louis A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

Mr. Larry Ryan
70 Linden Avenue
Victoria, British Columbia
V8V 4C8

~~L.A. BELVOIR~~

M. ARCHDEACON

~~G. SMITH~~

~~K. CALDER~~

J. CARON

J. MONEE

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He writes all
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alone (P)

RD

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DEPARTMENT

The Honourable Allan Rock MP
Minister of External Affairs
OTTAWA

DATE

27.11.1983

SUBJECT

MESSAGE

Dear MR. MacEachern:

As a long-time pro-NATO member of the public — and
brother of Prime Minister Trudeau — I wish to comment on
the PM's current peace ~~people~~ initiative.

I hope the PM doesn't end up doing more harm than good.

As I see, this kind of initiative could damage the Alliance.
NATO is something more than a community of weapons. It is
also a community of common ideas and values and
human rights. In these respects all the NATO partners
are equal. They do not take above individual
members behind their backs, which is what the PM is
likely doing now in so far as our good friend and
neighbour the United States is concerned.

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SUBJECT

- 2 -

MESSAGE

In the past Canada had some influence in Washington. That was when we spoke to the Americans, not about them. We should be the last NATO member to act thus.

Nor am I impressed with the Commonwealth looking at New Delhi. How could it be otherwise? Who could vote against peace? Nor could any responsible NATO ally voice disapproval in public. It would only worsen the situation.

All this must be sweet music in Moscow. The reaction here among the extreme left is organized chaos is one of wild surmise.

But I'm sure the PM means well. But there will be some suspicious people. There are some grounds for suspicion.

USE LOWER PORTION FOR REPLY

REPLY FROM

DATE

00004

9

DEPARTMENT

DATE

SUBJECT

— 3 —

MESSAGE

Arthur Schlesinger writing recently in The New Republic explains why American Presidents "so often succumb to the lure and glamour of foreign affairs." He does not excuse Presidents Reason of doing this - i.e. he gives him credit for not doing it. But Schlesinger thinks it a poor policy, as the "trips abroad and meetings with foreign potentates sustain the exhilarating illusion of high statecraft."

That judgement by the distinguished American historian is worth noting.

Respectfully Submitted
Larry Ryan

cc Senator Ray Perrault

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CA

The Honourable Allan Rock
Minister of External Affairs
OTTAWA



TO/A • IDDZ

FROM/DE • IMU

REFERENCE • Your request of January 3
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Biographic Notes on U.N. Officials
SUJET

Martin F. L.

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Kergin

Enclosed are biographic notes on the following three U.N. officials that the Prime Minister can be expected to meet during his call on the U.N. Secretary-General on January 11, 1984.

- (a) Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar;
- (b) Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Brian Urquhart; and
- (c) Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jan Martenson.

2. We would note this will be the third time that the Prime Minister has met with Mr. Perez de Cuellar. The two previous occasions were at lunch on June 18, 1982 during the UNSSOD II session of the General Assembly and on October 1, 1983 for approximately one hour in the Secretary-General's office when the Prime Minister was in New York for Mrs. Gandhi's Heads of Government meeting.

R.M. Middleton
Director
United Nations Affairs Division

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January 5, 1983

RBR-0014

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs

cc: Minister for International Trade
Minister for External Relations

Subject: Request for Departmental Funding of a Soviet/
Canadian Disarmament Round-table

The purpose of this memorandum is to obtain your approval of, and signature of replies to, four letters asking for Departmental financial support for a conference on disarmament issues between a group of prominent Canadians and officials of the Soviet Institute of the USA and Canada.

ISSUE

The problem is that there are two proposals for a conference with the USA/Canada Institute.

The first is that of a group of four knowledgeable and concerned Canadians (Walter Gordon, George Ignatieff, Professor Rod Byers and Dr. Robert Reford) for a disarmament round-table with prominent Soviet disarmament specialists such as Georgi Arbatov. The proposal is to reciprocate a visit by the group to the USSR in 1983. The agenda is essentially Soviet; there is no provision or intent to follow-up the meeting; and it is based on personalities rather than institutions.

The second involves an initiative begun in January 1983 by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) for a long-term relationship involving conferences and exchanges. The agenda includes discussion of international political issues, but is oriented more to the full range of Canada/USSR questions, including economic topics.

... /2

- 2 -

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
There is a question whether the Gordon group proposal fully meets our bilateral purposes. The CIIA proposal in our judgement better reflects Canadian interests and is less prone to be exploited for Soviet propaganda reasons.

Both groups are Toronto-based. They have discussed ways in which their proposals might be merged; however, at present, joint arrangements are complicated by conflicts over the agenda and sponsorship as well as differences between some of the organizers (Walter Gordon, George Ignatieff on one side; CIIA on the other).

The Soviets, led by Georgi Arbatov, are eager to come to Canada for discussions and would prefer to deal with the group headed by Walter Gordon because of Gordon's prominence and the agenda. However, we believe that Arbatov would eventually agree to the CIIA proposal since it represents the kind of institutional relationship he has been seeking in Canada. Hence our own preference that the round-tables be merged under the auspices of the CIIA.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that you indicate support for the idea of the round-table as well as for the merger of the two proposals by signing the attached letters to Walter Gordon, George Ignatieff, Robert Reford and Rod Byers. The replies encourage them in their discussions with the CIIA and hint at Departmental financial support if these two groups can act in concert.



D. Molgat
Assistant Deputy Minister
(Europe)

de Montigny Marchand

Deputy Prime Minister
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Vice-premier ministre
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, Ontario
K1A 0G2

Mr. George Ignatieff,
Chancellor,
University of Toronto,
Toronto, Ontario,
M5S 1A1

Dear Mr. Ignatieff,

Thank you for your letter of November 21 concerning your idea of a round-table with the Soviet Institute of the USA and Canada. I think that this is a worthwhile undertaking and one which indeed is timely.

I understand as well that your group is discussing with the Canadian Institute for International Affairs how these types of meetings might continue on a more regular basis. That, in my view, is the most important product of your visit to the USSR last summer and the initiative which you took. Continuity of dialogue and maintenance of stability in contacts which yield mutual benefit are objectives which I support wholeheartedly.

Insofar as the financial support which you are seeking is concerned, I would prefer to consider Professor Byers' proposal in the context of an ongoing programme arising out of a more formalized framework for such discussion. In this connection, I hope the interests of you and your colleagues can be combined with that of the CIIA in a comprehensive proposal for continuing discussions with this Soviet institute.

I am indeed interested in this project and I hope that you will keep me informed.

Yours sincerely,

Allan J. MacEachen

A-04789
RBR



Chancellor's
Room

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

November 21, 1983

Honourable Allan MacEachan
Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lester B. Pearson Building
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2

Dear Mr. MacEachan:

You will recall that prior to the visit which Walter Gordon, Professor Rod Byers, Bob Reford and I made to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Institute of the USA and Canada, we discussed the proposed visit with you and some of your officials. I enclose for your information a record of the round-table discussions I made from notes recorded at the time. As you will see on page 14, it was understood that there would be a return round-table, to be held in Toronto, May 4-14th, 1984.

Professor Rod Byers of York University is coordinating the arrangements for this return visit and I write to you in support of his request that favourable consideration be given by the government for a contribution of \$11,000 to help defray local expenses for the round-table which I understand will be led on the Soviet side by Georgi Arbatov.

Such a round-table would seem to be a natural follow-up to the Prime Minister's peace initiative which I have publicly supported, ever since I had the privilege of introducing him at the Guelph conference. I believe that the round-table in Toronto would discuss subjects such as measures for the improved stabilization of nuclear deterrents and of further controlling nuclear proliferation; the definition of what constitutes "peaceful coexistence" in an increasingly interdependent world and matters of particular bilateral Canada-USSR concern such as cooperation in the Arctic. As we hope to contact the Institute early in the New Year about return arrangements, we would greatly appreciate a reply at your early convenience.

With every good wish and kindest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

George Ignatieff
Chancellor

c.c. Professor Rod Byers
Mr. Walter Gordon
Mr. Robert Reford

Deputy Prime Minister
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Vice-premier ministre
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, Ontario
K1A 0G2

The Hon. Walter L. Gordon, P.C.,
Suite 2080 - Commerce Court West,
P.O. Box 131,
Commerce Court Postal Station,
Toronto, Ontario
M5L 1E6

Dear Walter,

Thank you for your letter of November 29 concerning your proposal for a meeting with the Soviet Institute of the USA and Canada.

Certainly I support the idea of such a round-table; but, as I have mentioned in separate replies to your colleagues in this project, I would prefer to consider any request for financial assistance in the context of initiating and continuing a dialogue with Soviet experts. I understand that your group is discussing, with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, ways in which your interests could be merged and how the involvement of the CIIA might contribute to regular meetings. Once these arrangements are clarified, I hope that some sort of program with the Soviet institution can be proposed. I am certainly prepared to consider Departmental assistance, including financial, in such a combined venture.

Yours sincerely,

Allan J. MacEachen

Walter L. Gordon

Suite 2080 Commerce Court West

P.O. Box 131

Commerce Court Postal Station, Toronto, Ont. M5G 1E6

(416) 868-0596

November 29, 1983.

A-04440

The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen,
Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Lester B. Pearson Building,
Ottawa.
K1A 0G2

Dear Allan:

Professor Rod Byers of York University and
Dr. Robert Reford have sent me copies of their
letters to you in which they ask for your support
for a Canada-USSR Round Table Meeting to be held
next May. In particular, they ask for financial
assistance from the Department of External Affairs.
The three of us and Mr. George Ignatieff, who were
in Russia last July, think such a meeting would be
useful; certainly, that was our conclusion of the
meeting held in Moscow. The Soviet representatives
will be from their Institute on U.S. and Canadian
Affairs and we would hope they would be led by
Academician G.A. Arbatov and his deputy Vitaly
Zhurkin.

I shall look forward to hearing from you at your
convenience.

Yours sincerely,

Walt

Walter L. Gordon.
dm

Deputy Prime Minister
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Vice-premier ministre
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, Ontario
K1A 0G2

Professor R. B. Byers,
Director,
Research Programme in Strategic Studies,
York University,
4700 Keele Street,
Downsview, Ontario,
M3J 1P3

Dear Professor Byers,

Thank you for your letter of November 15 concerning your proposal for a round-table with members of the Soviet Institute of the USA and Canada.

First and foremost, I should say that I subscribe fully to the type of communication which this initiative will produce. Especially in times of tension, we cannot afford to stop the dialogue between East and West.

I must admit, however, that I would prefer to consider your request for financial support in the context of a programme as opposed to an isolated event. I understand that you and your colleagues are discussing a joint venture with the Canadian Institute for International Affairs with a view to establishing regular contact with the USA and Canada Institute. I think that this is a good idea and I would ask you to keep me and my Department informed. We will, of course, assist you in your discussions with the Soviet institute if you wish.

Yours sincerely,

Allan J. MacEachen



YORK
UNIVERSITY

Research Programme in Strategic Studies
Programme de Recherche en Études Stratégiques
4700 KEELE STREET, DOWNSVIEW, ONTARIO M3J 1P3

November 15, 1983

The Honourable Allan MacEachan
Department of External Affairs
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0G2

Dear Mr. Minister,

As you recall the Institute of the United States and Canada in Moscow hosted a Round Table in July 1983 when myself, Walter Gordon, George Ignatieff and Robert Reford visited the Institute for purposes of discussing East-West relations.

I have been asked to organize the 1984 Round Table and we intend to hold the discussions during the first two weeks of May.

The purpose of this letter is to request financial support from the Department of External Affairs for the Round Table.

The Soviet delegation, to be headed by Dr. G. Arbatov, will pay their travel costs to Canada, but it will be our responsibility to cover local travel and related expenses (see enclosed preliminary budget).

It is our understanding that the Soviet delegation will consist of five or six members and in our correspondence with Dr. Arbatov we intend to ask that an invitation be extended to Ambassador Yakovlev as the recently appointed Director of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations.

On the Canadian side we expect to have six to eight representatives and would be pleased to discuss the composition with members of your Department. It may be

The Honourable Allan MacEachan

- 2 -

November 14, 1983


appropriate to have a representative from External Affairs as part of the Canadian delegation.

I would also like to arrange for the Soviet delegation to meet with senior officials of the Department to discuss the current state of East-West relations.

Given the initiatives currently being undertaken by the Prime Minister and given the lack of meaningful dialogue between the superpowers the Soviet-Canadian Round Table can serve as a vehicle to increase our appreciation of the Soviet view regarding current issues and also convey to them our perspectives of the current international environment.

I would be more than pleased to come up to Ottawa to discuss possible arrangements with members of your Department. Thank you for your consideration, I remain

Yours sincerely,


R. B. Byers
Director

cc: Mr. George Ignatieff
Chancellor
University of Toronto

1984 Soviet-Canadian Round Table

Preliminary Budget

<u>Soviet Delegation</u> - six members for ten days	\$
- Travel in Canada - Montreal-Toronto - Ottawa - Toronto (\$300. per)	1800.
- Lodging - 10 nights at \$60/night	3600.
- Meals - 10 days at \$40/day	2400.
- Local Travel (taxis)	300.
<u>Canadian Delegation</u> - eight members for three day Round Table	
- Lodging - four members at \$60/night	720.
- Meals - eight x \$40 x 3	960.
- Travel - Toronto-Ottawa for 3 members	620.
- Local Travel	200.
<u>Administrative Support</u> - Phones, typing of papers, duplicating costs	500.
Total	\$11,000.

Note: Members of the Canadian delegation will be asked to cover their own travel costs to Toronto.

Deputy Prime Minister
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Vice-premier ministre
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, Ontario
K1A 0G2

Dr. Robert W. Reford,
President,
International Consultants Corporation,
12 Metcalfe Street,
Toronto, Ontario,
M4X 1R6

Dear Dr. Reford,

Thank you for your recent letter in support of Professor Rod Byers proposal for a round-table meeting with officials of the Soviet Institute of the USA and Canada.

I support the idea of this venture, but, as I have written to your colleagues, I strongly prefer to consider the question of financial assistance in the context of a longer-term proposal. In this connection, I am pleased to hear that you have been discussing just such an idea with the CIIA. I hope that a merger of interests can be achieved in time for a meeting next spring which will in turn lead to regular contact.

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. It is encouraging to have the support of well-informed Canadians in this very complex world of arms control. Dialogue, negotiation and control are key concepts which will help to reduce the impulses which fuel the arms race. Your round-table idea is the type of contribution to dialogue with the USSR which I strongly support.

Yours sincerely,

Allan J. MacEachen

REFORD-McCANDLESS

INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS CORPORATION

12 METCALFE STREET

TORONTO CANADA M4X 1R6

TELEPHONE (416) 967 5830

Hon. Allan J. MacEachen
Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lester B. Pearson Building
Ottawa
Ontario K1A 0G2

23 November 1983

Dear Mr. MacEachen,

Professor Byers has sent me a copy of his letter to you of November 15 in which he asks for your support for a second Canada-USSR Round Table Meeting, to be held next May. His letter included a specific request for financial assistance from the Department of External Affairs.

I am writing to say that I endorse this request, and I hope you will give it favorable consideration.

It was always understood that a meeting in Moscow, such as the one we had last July, should be followed by a second one in Canada. Our invitation for this was accepted with alacrity by the Russians. They suggested May as a suitable date, and Academician G.A. Arbatov and his deputy, Vitaly Zhurkin, indicated that they would be able to come.

The four of us who were in Moscow agree on the importance of this kind of informal exchange of views. I believe this enabled us to understand better how relations between the superpowers have developed in recent months. I think all of us have shared these impressions with many people on both formal and informal occasions, and I hope this has led to a better understanding and greater appreciation of the Prime Minister's peace initiative.


Yours sincerely,



Robert W. Reford
President

cc: Prof. R.B. Byers
Hon Walter L. Gordon
George Ignatieff

P.S. I enclose a piece of mine published in The



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



33 *Mr. McMeu*
Mr. Smith
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES *file*

TO
A Sous-secrétaire d'Etat
aux Affaires extérieures (IDDZ) OTTAWA

FROM
De L'Ambassade du Canada, BELGRADE

REFERENCE
Référence Notre télégramme ZLGR3009 du
3 janvier 1984

SUBJECT
Sujet CDE: PARTICIPATION des Pays de l'est
à Niveau ministeriel

SECURITY
Sécurité RESTREINTE
DATE 5 janvier 1984
NUMBER
Numéro BGRAD-003

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
MISSION	20-4-CSCE

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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/DNACPOL
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IDRA
RBR
DMFX

Suite à notre télégramme en référence, vous trouverez ci-incluse une traduction de bureau d'un article qu'a publié le 8 décembre dernier Rabotnichesko Délo, la tribune préférée du gouvernement et Partie communiste bulgares.

2. Les lecteurs bulgares auront été edifiés par un résumé pour le moins tendancieux de l'évolution à Madrid et à Stockholm des propositions pour une conférence sur les mesures de renforcement de la confiance et de la sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe. L'approche occidentale en la matière est critiquée en termes prévisibles.

3. A noter qu'au moment de publication de cet article, la question du niveau de participation était ouverte "puisque dans les capitales de nombreux pays continue d'être lancée l'idée de la participation à l'inauguration des ministres des affaires étrangères". Il est donc possible de conclure que la décision des ministres d'affaires étrangères de l'OTAN de se rendre à Stockholm aurait incitée leurs homologues Est-européens à une décision semblable, bien que le ministre Mladenov nous a dit qu'il a toujours été l'intention de la Bulgarie de participer à un haut niveau politique.

4. En fin d'article, trouvons un avertissement que la conférence "sera éprouvée par l'ombre des nouveaux missiles américains...". Pour l'auteur, l'installation de ces missiles est "une violation des accords, de l'esprit et de la lettre de l'Acte final d'Helsinki ainsi que du document de clôture de Madrid".

[Signature]
1'Ambassade

75/4

3) ~~LES YEUX Tournés vers~~ STOCKHOLM (Par M. Néltcho Iskrov)

Le 17 janvier 1984 à Stockholm s'ouvrira la conférence sur les mesures de renforcement de la confiance et de la sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe. Conformément au document de clôture de Madrid, elle fut précédée par une rencontre préparatoire à Helsinki du 25 octobre au 11 novembre 1983.

La réalisation de l'idée lancée par l'URSS et les autres pays socialistes sur l'organisation d'une conférence à laquelle seront examinés les problèmes du renforcement de la confiance et seront envisagées des mesures concrètes en matière de désarmement effectif a traversé de sérieuses épreuves pendant plus de quatre ans et demi. Lancée officiellement dans le Communiqué du Comité des ministres des affaires étrangères des pays membres du Traité de Varsovie en mai 1979, développée et concrétisée dans la Déclaration du Comité politique consultatif des Etats membres du Traité de Varsovie du 15 mai 1980, l'idée de la conférence s'est rapidement répandue et est devenue populaire, tandis que sa réalisation pratique sortait au premier plan de l'activité diplomatique des pays socialistes. La question de la conférence fut posée à la base des travaux des délégations des pays socialistes à la rencontre de Madrid et elle des devenue centrale dans la lutte politique et diplomatique compliquée menée à la rencontre. Des efforts sérieux et persistants ont été nécessaires de la part des pays socialistes et des autres Etats européens, afin de surmonter la résistance de la délégation des Etats-Unis qui, initialement, s'est opposée à l'idée même d'une telle conférence et, plus tard, à la fixation de son mandat.

L'achèvement fructueux de la rencontre de Madrid, la réalisation d'un accord sur la convocation d'une conférence sur le désarmement ne s'inscrivaient pas dans la stratégie de politique étrangère des Etats-Unis.

La ligne de conflit ouvert avec les pays socialistes, les tentatives de diktat des Etats-Unis à la rencontre sont entrées en contradiction avec la volonté et l'intention de la majorité des pays, y compris de leurs alliés de l'OTAN. Le résultat est connu: à Madrid l'ont emporté le réalisme politique, la ligne de dialogue, de compréhension et de coopération mutuelle, de solution des problèmes litigieux par la voie des négociations. La prise d'une décision sur la convocation de la conférence sur les mesures de renforcement de la confiance et de la sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe a conféré une valeur et un poids particuliers aux résultats du forum de Madrid.

73/5

La rencontre préparatoire d'Helsinki ~~devait être le premier pas~~
~~pratique dans la nouvelle~~ et importante ^{orientation} de la politique européenne
que peut et doit constituer la conférence de Stockholm.

Indépendamment de la situation internationale tendue, les travaux de la rencontre préparatoire se sont déroulés dans une atmosphère relativement normale de travail, dont le mérite revient notamment à la bonne organisation de la rencontre et au rôle positif actif du pays d'accueil.

Les délégations de la RP de Bulgarie et des autres pays socialistes, soutenant leur ligne commune coordonnée fixée dans les documents respectifs du Traité de Varsovie, ont essayé dès le début d'assurer l'élaboration d'un ordre du jour clair et souple, ainsi que de conditions d'organisation ne limitant pas les possibilités de négociations, ne donnant pas d'avance la réponse aux questions, mais permettant d'assurer une atmosphère de travail dans les salles de conférence de Stockholm.

La conception des pays socialistes sur l'ordre du jour, le programme de travail et les autres conditions d'organisation fut formulée dans le document diffusé non officiellement par la délégation polonaise. Le projet polonais élaboré en pleine conformité avec le mandat fixé à Madrid a obtenu le soutien complet et sans réserve des autres pays socialistes. Plus tard, d'autres délégations ont aussi déposé leurs projets, avant d'arriver au document proposé par plusieurs pays neutres et non-alignés qui a servi de bonne base lors de l'élaboration définitive des décisions de la rencontre.

Les tentatives de plusieurs pays de l'OTAN et avant tout des Etats-Unis de faire admettre leurs interprétations tendancieuses du mandat de la conférence, de soumettre la marche des négociations de Stockholm à la future rencontre de Vienne, de placer à la base des travaux ce qu'ils appellent "la dimension humanitaire" de la confiance et de la détente, l'évolution du processus européen dans son ensemble, sont demeurées vaines et la rencontre préparatoire a débouché sur l'élaboration de décisions coordonnées dans le délai prévu de trois semaines.

Conformément aux décisions prises sur l'ordre du jour, le programme de travail et les autres conditions d'organisation, après l'inauguration solennelle, la conférence de Stockholm commencera ses travaux par des discours d'introduction des chefs de délégations des pays participants, la question du niveau restant pour le moment ouverte, puisque dans les capitales de nombreux pays continue d'être lancée l'idée de la participation à l'inauguration des ministres des affaires étrangères.

75/6

~~On suppose qu'immédiatement après les discours d'introduction, les travaux~~
de la conférence se concentreront sur le principal point de l'ordre du
jour: la déposition de propositions, l'examen et l'adoption d'un paquet de
mesures se complétant mutuellement pour la consolidation de la confiance
et de la sécurité, c'est-à-dire en accord complet avec le document final
de Madrid, y compris la coordination des formes et de la procédure
d'entrée en vigueur des dispositions coordonnées et adoptées par les parti-
cipants aux négociations. Enfin, point non moins important, la conférence
doit examiner des initiatives sur l'achèvement de la première étape.

La rencontre préparatoire, confirmant le mandat de Madrid, note que
le progrès qui sera atteint à la première étape de la conférence doit être
évalué à la prochaine rencontre du type de celles de Madrid et de Belgrade
qui doit commencer le 4 novembre 1986 à Vienne.

Le strict respect du mandat fixé à Madrid sera d'une importance pri-
mordiale pour la marche fructueuse de la conférence de Stockholm. Il prévoit
que les mesures de renforcement de la confiance et de la sécurité sur les-
quelles pourrait être obtenu un accord à la conférence couvrent toute
l'Europe, ainsi que les eaux des mers et des océans qui s'y rapportent
et l'espace aérien respectif. Les mesures seront notables du point de vue
militaire et politiquement obligatoires; elles assureront des formes de
vérification adéquates correspondant à leur contenu. Elles doivent être
fondées sur des principes comme l'égalité des droits, l'équilibre et la
réciprocité, le respect égal des intérêts de la sécurité de tous les Etats
participants.

L'expérience nous montre que le succès de toute rencontre ou conférence
implique l'apport de tous les Etats qui y participent. Cela est parti-
culièrement important dans l'actuelle situation internationale compliquée
où sera convoquée la conférence et se dérouleront ses travaux. Sans doute,
elle sera éprouvée par l'ombre des nouveaux missiles américains de moyenne
portée dont l'installation en Europe est en pleine marche. Ces actes de
l'impérialisme américain et le soutien que lui accordent les gouvernements
de certains pays membres de l'OTAN conduisent à la perturbation du statu quo
en Europe, de ce fragile équilibre sur lequel s'édifiait la confiance entre
les participants au processus européen. Cela est une violation des
accords obtenus, de l'esprit et de la lettre de l'Acte final d'Helsinki
ainsi que du document de clôture de Madrid. (Rab.Délo du 8.12.83,p.4)

Mr. Smith
for info
MD

S E C R E T

FM BNATO YBGR6003 05JAN84

T0 EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 051200

INFO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN OSLO ANKRA COPEN

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---CCSBMDE:PACKAGE OF CSBMS:EXPERTS MTGS:3-4JAN

TWO LONG SESSIONS FAILED TO CLEAN UP PACKAGE FOR ADOPTION BY
NAC ENDING IN DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE READY IN TIME FOR
OPENING OF STKHM MTG.FOUR ISSUES REMAINED UNRESOLVED;
IN PARTICULAR,TRANSITS(RAPID DEPOLYMENT AND FORCE-RDF)AND
INFO ON FORCE DEPLOYMENTS,BOTH OF WHICH ARE CRUCIAL TO
WESTERN POSN.SLOW PROGRESS ON OHTER QUESTIONS REFLECTED
NOT/NOT ONLY NARROW TECHNICAL APPROACH AMONG ALLIES BUT GAPS
IN APPROACH BETWEEN MFAS AND MODS DUE TO LATE START IN
DEVELOPING PACKAGE.AS RESULT THERE REMAIN SOME DUBIOUS
PATHS FOR ALLIANCE TO FOLLOW AT STKHM.

2.FOLLOWING UP BNATOS ATTEMPTS TO GET ALLIES MOVING,CANDEL
LED OFF FIRST SESSION NOTING THAT DRAFT WAS RIEDLED WITH
SQUARE BRACKETS(47 SETS);THOSE WHICH REFLECTED NATIONAL
PREFERENCE AND TACTICAL VIEWS MUST BE REMOVED QUICKLY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH MAJORITY OPINION,WHILE PAYING DUE REGARD
TO LEGITIMATE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS.CDN EXHORTATIONS WERE
SUBSEQUENTLY RECALLED WITH DUE PIETY ON OCCASION,BUT MOSTLY DELS

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR6003 SECRET

JEALOUSLY HELD TO POSNS EVEN ON MINOR ISSUES SOMETIMES FOR HOURS BEFORE CEDING.

3. TURKS AT OUTSET REFUSED TO AGREE TO PROVIDE INFO ON TROOP DEPLOYMENTS AT BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL. AT END THEY STILL REFUSED TO BUDGE.

4. FOLLOWING UP SHULTZ LET TO NATO FMS AMERICANS FLATLY REJECTED ANY REF IN PACKAGE TO TRANSIT THROUGH CSBM ZONE BY FORCES STATIONED OUTSIDE EUROPE, IE RDF. PROTESTING STOUTLY AGAINST DESTABILIZING EFFECT OF FAILURE TO NOTIFY SUCH ACTIVITIES. FRENCH SUGGESTED COMPROMISE (WITH ADMITTED LOOPHOLE WHICH WOULD LEAVE UNNOTIFIED USE OF SOVIET FORCES CROSSING URALS FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION AS IN RECENT CASE OF POLAND). SUBSEQUENTLY, AMERICANS REPORTED THAT THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, EMANATING FROM QUOTE HIGH POLITICAL CIRCLES UNQUOTE, DID NOT/NOT PERMIT THEM TO BUY FRENCH PROPOSAL. AMERICANS WOULD HOWEVER QUOTE SEEK TO CHANGE SHULTZS MIND UNQUOTE BEFORE NAC MTG ON 10 JAN.

5. AT CONCLUSION OF SESSIONS CANDEL RECALLED THAT HIGH POLITICAL PURPOSE ELSEWHERE (PM INITIATIVE, DECISION BY MINS TO ATTEND CONF) WAS INVOLVED, WHICH CREATED NEED TO AGREE ON PACKAGE. WE SAW STKHM AS DECISIVE OCCASION FOR RENEWING HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL CONTACTS AND RESTORING POLITICAL ENERGY INTO EUROPEAN ARMS TALKS. OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS THESE ENDS WERE IN PART BASED ON TRUST THAT WEST WOULD TABLE STRONG PACKAGE OF CSBMS AT STKHM WHICH COULD START PROCESS OF

...3

PAGE THREE YBGR6003 SECRET

REDUCING EAST-WEST TENSIONS BY CLARIFYING MISPERCEPTIONS OF
AGGRTESSIVE POSTURES ON BOTH SIDES.

6. EXPERTS WILL TRY AGAIN ON MORNING OF 09JAN TO RESOLVE OUTSTAND-
ING ISSUES IN PACKAGE BEFORE WESTERN CCSBMDE HEADS OF DEL DEAL WITH
IT THAT AFTERNOON AND NAC IS SEIZED WITH IT ON FOLLOWING DAY.

7. FOLLOWING TEL PROVIDES FURTHER DETAIL ON TRANSIT ISSUE.

GENERAL REPORT AND FURTHER DETAILS ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES WILL BE
SENT FROM CTT.

CCC/070 051144Z YBGR6003

MF
ID

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM WSHDC UNGR1012 05JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN GENEV PARIS VMBFR BONN NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/
CPP/DNACPOL/CIS/DSTRATA PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY STKHM BRU HAGUE
COPEN PEKIN TOKYO OSLO MDRID WSAW BGRAD BPEST

DISTR MINA USS DMF DMFX IFB IDDZ IDRA IDRL IDA RGB RGD RBR UGB URD
URR ZSP ZSI CPD RCD RCR

REF YOURTEL IDR4833 15DEC83

---SOVIET LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES ON DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL(DAC)
NEGS

SUMMARY:IT IS DOUBTFUL ESSENTIAL AND OPERATIONAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVE
OF USSR IN INF AND RELATED DAC NEGS IS WITHDRAWAL OF USA MILITARY
PRESENCE FROM EUROPE,THOUGH IT IS TRUE NITZE BELIEVES IT IS.SOVIET
BEHAVIOUR IN RECENT DAC NEGS CAN BE EXPLAINED BY OTHER FACTORS.ONCE
IT BECAME CLEAR THAT INF DEPLOYMENT WLD PROCEED,USSR CLD NOT/NOT
AGREE TO PARTIAL AGMT FOR VARIETY OF REASONS OF DOCTRINE AND POL-
ITICS.BUT IS HAS CERTAINLY ALWAYS BEEN IN USSR INTEREST TO ENCOURAGE
AS MUCH DISSENSION AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE AND USA.
NEUTRALIST AND WEAKENED WESTERN EUROPE WITHOUT USA PRESENCE MAY BE
AN ULTIMATE THEORETICAL GOAL OF USSR STILL,BUT ADMIN EXPECTS SOVIET
POLICY VIEW IS MORE REALISTIC AND PRAGMATIC.ALTHOUGH UNILATERALISM IS
INCREASINGLY THE VOGUE IN USA,THERE IS LITTLE IF ANY PRESSURE HERE
FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE,DESPITE GENUINE DIFFERENCES OF

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OPINION WITH SOME EUROPEAN ALLIES; FOR EXAMPLE FRG OVER RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE.

2. REPORT: REFTTEL EVOKES SOME OF THE GREAT ISSUES DETERMINED BY POST-WAR ARRANGEMENTS IN EUROPE AND DEVELOPMENTS OF LAST 40 YRS AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE CATEGORICAL OR CONCISE ABOUT THEIR SHAPING OVER NEXT 10 OR 20 YRS. BUT ON ESSENTIAL QUESTION YOU RAISE WHETHER POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF USSR IN INF AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGS IS WITHDRAWAL OF USA MILITARY PRESENCE FROM EUROPE, OUR VANTAGE POINT REVEALS LITTLE BASIS TO VALIDATE SUCH THESIS APART FROM APPARENT CONVICTION NITZE HAD DRAWN FROM HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH KVITSINSKY THIS IS USSR GOAL.

3. BASIC DISTINCTION HAS TO BE MADE BETWEEN USA NUCLEAR PRESENCE AND CONVENTIONAL PRESENCE. ANOTHER DISTINCTION HAS FOR SOME TIME BEEN MADE HERE BETWEEN FORMAL USSR POSITION ON POINTS OF POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND WHAT USSR CAN OR CANNOT ACCEPT PRAGMATICALLY IN POINT OF ACTUAL FACTS. BUT THIS SECOND DISTINCTION IS ONE HARD-LINERS IN ADMIN TEND NOT/NOT TO MAKE.

4. ON INF, USA HAS NEVER BEEN ENTIRELY SURE OF USSR INTENTION. ADMIN JUDGED USSR THOUGHT INF DEPLOYMENT CLD BE STOPPED BY PUBLICS IN WESTERN EUROPE AT LEAST UNTIL ALST SPRING. ONCE IT BECAME CLEAR THEY HAD FAILED AND INITIAL DEPLOYMENT WLD GO AHEAD, USA CONCLUDED THAT USSR WLD ACCEPT THIS RATHER THAN TRY TO NEGOTIATE PARTIAL AGMT WHICH LIMITED TWO SIDES TO ROUGHLY EQUAL INF FORCE LEVELS.

5. USA KNEW USSR WOULD NOT/NOT DISMANTLE ITS HARDWARE TO SATISFY USA
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ZERO OPTION BUT, IN USA VIEW, USSR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ALSO MADE INTERIM AGMT UNOBTAINABLE AND USA INITIAL DEPLOYMENT INEVITABLE. IN EAGLEBURGER VIEW (OURTEL UNGR0950 14MAR83), THIS WAS BECAUSE OF USSR'S DOCTRINAIRE INABILITY TO RECOGNIZE IN TREATY FORM THAT USA HAD RIGHT TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THIS KIND IN W/EUROPE. IN NITZE VIEW, INABILITY TO AGREE TO PARTIAL USA DEPLOYMENT WAS MORE TO PROTECT USSR POLITICAL POSITION WITH PEACE MOVEMENT WHO WANTED NO/NO USA DEPLOYMENT.

6. IN ANY EVENT BY SPRING ADMIN ESTIMATED CHANCES FOR AN INF AGMT IN 1983 AS QUOTE ZERO UNQUOTE (SEE OURTEL UNGR1096 13MAY83 REPORTING ON DISCUSSIONS WITH DAM, EAGLEBURGER AND NITZE). BUT IT WAS THEN CONSIDERED USSR WLD NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN FIRST PART OF 1984 ONCE, AS NITZE PUT IT, USSR WLD BE NEGOTIATING SS-20S AGAINST REAL USA MISSILES AND NOT/NOT PAPER ONES. OUR INTERLOCUTORS THOUGHT THAT INF TALKS WLD BE FOLDED INTO START. THIS WLD PERMIT BURYING IN LARGER FRAMEWORK (A) USSR OBJECTIONS FOR DOCTRINAIRE OR CONSTITUENCY REASONS TO FORMAL INF DEPLOYMENT AGMT AND (B) USSR CONCERNS ABOUT UK AND FR FORCE POTENTIALS AND ASIAN PROBLEM, WHILE (C) PERMITTING STRATEGIC TALKS TO TAKE PLACE WITH GREATER KNOWLEDGE OF OBVIOUSLY RELEVANT SIT RE INF. (BURTS RECENT ADVICE TO SCG AGAINST FOLDING INF NEGS INTO START FLIES IN FACE OF THESE EARLIER CALCULATIONS. IT IS PRESUMABLY TACTICAL ADVICE, MEANT TO LEAVE BALL IN USSR COURT AS LONG AS USA CONSIDERS IT IS POLITICALLY OPPORTUNE. THERE ARE ORGANIZATIONAL -I.E. BUREAUCRATIC- OBJECTIONS TO ...4

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FOLD-IN HERE BUT THEY WLD NOT/NOT PREVAIL IF SUBSTANCE DICTATES IT IS DESIRABLE).

7.POINT OF ABOVE IS TO SHOW THAT IT IS INDEED AMERICAN VIEW USSR QUESTIONED LEGITIMACY OF USA NUCLEAR PRESENCE IN W/EUROPE AS MATTER OF DOCTRINE AND POLITICAL COSMETICS.BUT IT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED USSR HAS BEEN PREPARED TO TOLERATE IT IN FACT.AGAIN,IT IS NOT/NOT A MILITARY MATTER.ADMIN CANNOT/NOT BELIEVE USSR REALLY CONSIDERS P-IIS AND GLCMS CHANGE ANYTHING OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE MILITARILY. THERE IS REVERSE COUPLING THESIS YOU HAVE DESCRIBED IN ANOTHER TEL (PARA 9 OF 4843 16DEC83)BUT THAT IS MORE DOCTRINAIRE THAN PRACTICAL SINCE BOTH SIDES ASSUME NUCLEAR WAR CLD NOT/NOT BE LIMITED TO INF EXCHANGES IN EUROPE IN ANY CASE.

8.OF COURSE,USA MAY UNDERESTIMATE USSR ANTIPATHY TO USA DEPLOYMENT OF INF WEAPONS IN EUROPE.SINCE DEPLOYMENT IS NOT/NOT OF GREAT MILITARY CONSEQUENCE,ANTIPATHY WLD HAVE TO SPRING FROM DEEPER PSYCHOLOGICAL AND GEO-POLITICAL CURRENTS IN USSR THINKING.USA WLD ASSUME THESE ARE RELATED PRIMARILY TO STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH USA AND PARTICULARLY TO INHERENT UNFAIRNESS OF GEOGRAPHY WHICH HAS ALWAYS ENABLED USA TO DEPLOY IN A VISIBLE MANNER ANYTHING MORE CLOSELY TO USSR THAN THE REVERSE.IT IS IN THIS SENSE ADMIN CLD EXPECT USSR TO INVOKE ITS POSITION AS EUROPEAN POWER WHOSE SPHERE USA DEPLOYMENT VIOLATES,TO TRY TO(A)GAIN SOME CREDITS FOR STRATEGIC BARGAINING AND(B)OBLIGE USA TO COMPENSATE USSR FOR UK AND FRANCH ARMS POTENTIAL.

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9.MOST EXPERIENCED EXPERTS DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE THAT USSR IS INVOKING ITS CHARACTER AS EUROPEAN POWER WITH SUCH DEEPER AND BROADER OBJECTIVE IN MIND AS THE WITHDRAWAL OF USA AS MILITARY PRESENCE FROM EUROPE ALTOGETHER.

10.NITZE AND SOME OTHERS HAVE NEVERTHELESS COME TO HOLD THIS VIEWS THEY KNOW PROGAMATIC REASONING THAT SUCH OBJECTIVE IS NOT/NOT ANIMATING SOVIET APPROACH TO SPECIFIC(ANC?)NEGS TODAY,BUT IN THEIR HEART OF HEARTS THEY FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF MAKING POLICY THAT IGNORES THE BASIC ASPECTS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.IT IS IN MOMENTS WHEN THEY FEEL THEY HAVE TO REMIND OTHERS OF HOW DANGEROUS THE USSR REALLY IS THAT THEY INVOKE THE ARGUMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO NITZE IN ROME.

11.WE ARE TOLD THAT NITZE WAS ALREADY PRE-DISPOSED TO THIS VIEW WHEN KVITZINSKY IN MOMENT OF PIQUE AT ABOUT WALK IN WOODS TIME 18 MONTHS AGO TOLD NITZE USA SHLD NOT/NOT BE IN EUROPE AT ALL,WHICH TO NITZE, CONFIRMED HIS VIEW.BUT OTHERS WITH EXPERIENCE DOUBT VERY MUCH THIS IS REAL AND OPERATIONAL SOVIET OBJECTIVE,RECALLING 1973-74 MBFR EXPERIENCE REVEALED USSR ACTUALLY WANTED USA FORCES IN EUROPE AS FUNCTION OF STABILITY.

12.THIS IS NOT/NOT TO SAYUSSR MAY NOT/NOT INVOKE INONE FORUM OR ANOTHER THE NOTION THAT USA PRESENCE IN EUROPE IS INAPPROPRIATE SINCE VIEW IS PART OF WHAT THE USSR SEES AS ITS PROPER ROLE IN EUROPE WHICH SOV IDEOLOGY CLAIMS WILL BE THE INEVITABLE RESULT OF HISTORY(VIZ

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QUOTE THE POSITIVE CORRELATION OF FORCES UNQUOTE).THIS IDEA ALSO HAS ITS SUPPORT IN EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS.BUT FOR USSR TO MAKE THIS A CONCRETE OBJECTIVE WLD MEAN THEY HAVE WORKED OUT FOR THEMSELVES AMONG OTHER THINGS A FAVOURABLE SCENARIO FOR GERMANY IN WHICH THEY HAVE CONFIDENCE;THAT IS VERY DOUBTFUL.IT HAS BEEN POINTED OUT TO US THAT KVITZINSKY IS PRIMARILY A GERMAN EXPERT AND MAY HAVE COME TO THE VIEW THAT GERMANY,UNIFIED OR NOT/NOT,IS A SPENT FORCE MILITARILY AND NO/NO LONGER A THREAT TO USSR.BUT THIS IS UNCONVENTIONAL AS A SOVIET VIEW EVEN FROM KVITZINSKYS POST-WWII GENERATION.

13.OBVIOUSLY,THE FUTURE OF GERMANY IS CENTRAL TO EVERYTHING.FOR USSR, IS A NEUTRAL,DISARMED,UNIFIED GERMANY PREFERABLE TO PERPETUALLY DIVIDED GERMANY?WHICH WLD ENCOURAGE POLYCENTRIST TENDENCIES IN EAST-ERN EUROPE MORE?AS TAYLOR POINTED OUT(BNATO TEL 8148)WLD PRESSING FOR USA MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM NOT/NOT OBLIGE FRG TO ARM ITSELF EVEN MORE,MAKING POSSSIBILITY OF DISARMED GERMANY,IF THAT IS SOV OBJECT-IVE,EVENMORE REMOTE?WLD NOT/NOT THOSE FRG ARMS THEN BE MORE LIKELY TO INCLUDE EVENNUCLEAR WEAPONS?

14.USSR LEADERS MAY HAVE ANSWERS TO SOME OF ABOVE QUESTIONS BUT WE WLD DOUBT VERYMUCH THEY WLD KNOW HOW TO GET FROM HERE TO THERE.IN ACTUAL FACI THEY WLD PREFER TOLEAVE SCHEMES OF THIS GRANDEUR TO THE JUDGEMENT OF QUOTE HISTORY UNQUOTE IN WHICH THE TRIUMPH OF COMMUNISM IS STILL CONSIDERED OFFICIALLY TO BE INEVITABLE.

15.OBVIOUSLY USSR WILL WANT TO MAKE IT AS TOUGH IN EUROPE FOR USA
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AS POSSIBLE.THEY MUST SHARE ADMIN VIEW THAT REAL POLITICAL COSTS TO WEST OF DEPLOYMENT CLD BE SEVERAL YRS DOWN THE ROAD WHEN SPD CLD FIND ITSELF SERIOUSLY QUESTIONING NATO ROLE FOR FRG.USSR WILL WANT TO BE PREPARED FOR SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY POSITIVE FOR THEM.BUT WANTING TO MAKE THINGS DIFFICULT FOR THE WEST IS NOT/NOT THE SAME AS WANTING INSTABILITY IN WESTERN EUROPE WHICH CLD HAVE WORRISOME IMPACT ON EASTERN EUROPE.USA MILITARY PRESENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE IS STILL JUDGED HERE TO BE STABILIZING.

16.NEITHER SIDE EXPECTS THOSE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE ACTUALLY EVEN TO BE USED THERE,AT LEAST IN ESTIMATION OF STRATEGIC PLANNERS HERE.RIGHT WING RHETORIC MAY FOCUS ON THE THREAT OF A SOV ARMY THAT CLD OVER-RUN EUROPE IN THREE DAYS BUT PENTAGON THINKRS SEE MUCH GREATER CHANGE OF HOSTILITIES BREAKING OUT IN QUOTE OUT OF AREA UNQUOTE SIT SUCH AS GULF THAN IN EUROPE ITSELF AND THEY PRESUME USSR WLD AGREE.

17.THIS IS BASIC MOTIF OF THOSE IN USA SENATE AND ELSEWHERE WHO WANT TO SEE USA PRESENCE IN EUROPE REDUCED.FORCES ARE MORE NEEDED ELSE-WHERE.PRESUMABLY USSR WLD BE HAPPIER TO SEE THEM IN EUROPE.THERE ARE OTHER THEMES AT PLAYAS WELL,NOTABLY CONVICTION EUROPEANS CAN AFFORD TO TAKE COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE OF USA VIA SUBSIDIES AND OTHER PROGRAM-MES BECAUSE USA SHOULDERS MORE THAN ITS SHARE OF THE MILITARY COSTS I EUROPE.BUT THERE IS REALLY NO/NO ONE OF CONSEQUENCE HERE WHO WLD ARGUE USA SHLD LEAVE EUROPE ALTOGETHER.IT IS A QUESTION OF DEGREES ...8

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OF PRESENCE. WHEN SHULTZ REFERRED TO CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENT IN DISCUSSION WITH PM, HE WAS THINKING OF VIEW USA PRESENCE CLD BE REDUCED, NOT/NOT ELIMINATED, IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HE IS ALSO POSSIBLE THINKING OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE DISPUTE WITH FRG IN PARTICULAR WHICH IS NOW AT CENTRE OF CDE PREPS. FRG OBJECTED TO DEPLOYMENT OF USA EQPT TO MIDEAST IN 73 MIDEAST WAR AND TENSION HAS ENDURED, LEADING TO SOME HERE TO SAY TROOPS IN EUROPE SHLD BE DEPLOYED FROM ELSEWHERE THAN EUROPE TO CLOSE THE ARGUMENT.

18. BUT IN LONG TERM, USA MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE MAY INDEED SEEM TO SOME HERE DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT INDEFINITELY. USA IS EXPERIENCING INCREASINGLY PROFOUND TREMORS OF UNILATERALISM, IF NOT/NOT ISOLATIONISM. CENTRE OF GRAVITY OF REAGAN ADMIN WAS SUPPOSED TO BE MORE PACIFIC THAN ATLANTIC-CENTERED IN PRINCIPLE, THOUGH WE QUESTION IF IT HAS BEEN INFECT. AND THERE IS FOREBODING ANTICIPATION OF PART OF EAGLEBURGER AT LEAST THAN IN 10 OR 20 YRS USA WILL HAVE TO BE MUCH MORE PREOCCUPIED WITH EVENTS IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE, SOUTH OF THE BORDER, LEAVING LESS OPPORTUNITY FOR COSTLY EUROPEAN ENGAGEMENTS.

19. HOWEVER, THESE ARE INDEFINITE IMPULSES AND NO/NO MORE TRANSLATABLE BY USA INTO REAL POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR TODAY'S DIPLOMACY THAN ARE THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE FOR USSR. ATTENTION NOW IS FOCUSED ON FUTURE OF INF AND START TALKS IN PARTICULAR AND MOST IMMEDIATELY ON SHULTZ-GROMYKO MTG 18 JAN. WE SHALL REPORT ON THESE AFTER GOTLIEB MEETS BURT ON FRIDAY 06 JAN.

CCC/086 052354Z UNGR1012

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDR0053 05JAN84

TO WSHDC

INFO CANMILREP NATO BNATO GENEV PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADM POL/
DNACPOL/ CPP/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDDZ IDA URR

---INF:POSSIBLE VISIT TO OTT BY AMB NITZE

POSSIBILITY OF VISIT TO OTT BY AMB NITZE WAS DISCUSSED IN IDR/
LYSYSHYN TELECON MID-DEC. WE UNDERSTAND FROM YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH
NITZE THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH CDN OFFICIALS LATE JAN
OR EARLY FEB AFTER ADMIN IN WSHDC HAS HAD CHANCE TO RECONSIDER INF
ARMS CONTROL POLICY IN LIGHT OF SUSPENSION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND AFTER
CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES (JAN 11 SCG MTG IN BRU).

2. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CONFIRM TO NITZE CDN INTEREST IN SUCH A
VISIT AND EXPLORE TIMEFRAME WHICH WOULD SUIT HIM. WHILE OFFICIALS
CONCERNED WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH NITZE AT HIS CONVENIENCE,
WE ARE ALSO LOOKING INTO POSSIBILITY OF ARRANGING CALLS AT POLITICAL
LEVEL INCLUDING PM AND DPM/SSEA. THIS WILL OF COURSE HAVE BEARING ON
TIMING OF VISIT AND MIGHT RULE OUT END OF JAN.

3. ADVISE.

CCC/088 052350Z IDR0053

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Master File

Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRMNY WKGR0024 05JAN84

TO EXTOTT LIEDZ/SMITH DELIVER BY 051900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC MOSCO LDN PARIS BONN TOKYO PEKIN ROME

HAGUE BRU GENEV BNATO NDHQOTT/DM/ADM POL/CPP VMBRF

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR IMU IMD UGB URR RPR RBD ZSI

---PM INITIATIVE:MTG WITH UN SEC GEN

TO ASSIST PREPARATION FOR PM MTG WITH UN SEC GEN JAN11, THIS
TEL ATTEMPTS TO DRAW OUT CERTAIN THEMES EVIDENT IN PEREZ DE
CUELLARS APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND ^{the} ARMS RACE TAKEN
FROM STATEMENTS, PRESS INTERVIEWS AND OUR OWN OBSERVATIONS. THIS
BRIEF ANALYSIS THEN SUGGESTS SCENARIO (DESCRIBED AT END OF TEL)
WHEREBY SEC GEN MIGHT BE INDUCED BY PM TO UTILIZE UN MECHANISMS,
PARTICULARLY SECURITY COUNCIL, IN SUPPORT OF PMS GOAL TO STIMULATE
DIALOGUE BETWEEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.

2. IN HIS INAUGURAL SPEECH TO UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEC15, 1981
FOLLOWING ELECTION TO POSITION OF UN SEC GEN, PEREZ DE CUELLAR
STATED HIS QUOTE FIRM PURPOSE TO REACTIVATE THE POLITICAL ROLE
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL WITHIN THE (CHARTERS) CONSTITUTIONAL
PARAMETERS UNQUOTE. THIS DEFINITIVE STATEMENT OF INTENT WAS
FULLY BORNE OUT BY HIS UNPRECEDENTED FIRST ANNUAL REPORT ON
WORK OF UN ORGANIZATION TEN MTHS LATER WHICH DEPARTED FROM
TRADITIONAL BALANCE SHEET OF UN ACTIVITIES AND ADDRESSED
SQUARELY PROBLEM OF ORGANIZATIONS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL
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PEACE AND SECURITY. IN REPORT PEREZ DE CUELLAR DECLARED THAT QUOTE MOST URGENT GOAL IS TO RECONSTRUCT CHARTER CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR PEACE AND SECURITY SO AS TO RENDER UN MORE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION UNQUOTE.

3. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK, REPORT FOCUSED ON TWO ORGANS: UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND OFFICE OF SEC GEN. REGARDING FORMER, HE STRESSED SPECIAL ROLE OF FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL AS HAVING QUOTE SPECIAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER UN CHARTER AND SHARING A SACRED TRUST THAT SHLD NOT/NOT GO BY DEFAULT OWING TO THEIR BILATERAL DIFFICULTIES UNQUOTE. REGARDING HIS OWN OFFICE, SEC GEN EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF ROLE TO UNDERTAKE QUOTE MORE SYSTEMATIC APPROACH UNQUOTE IN IMPLEMENTING ART 99 OF UN CHARTER IN BRINGING ITEMS RELATING TO PEACE AND SECURITY TO ATTENTION OF COUNCIL. REPORT DWELLED ON POTENTIAL FOR MORE ACTIVIST FUNCTION RELATING TO QUOTE PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY UNQUOTE: FACT FINDING, GOOD OFFICES, MEDIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION.

4. SEC GEN'S SECOND REPORT TO UN ONE YEAR LATER (SEPT/83) REITERATED IMPORTANCE OF REASSERTING UNS CENTRAL ROLE IN INNATL CONFLICT CONTROL AND RE-EMPHASIZING SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS. HE DEPLORED THAT QUOTE WEAKENING OF COMMITMENT, ESPECIALLY OF PERMANENT MEMBERS, TO OPERATE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF CHARTER HAS MORE THAN EVERY OTHER FACTOR LED TO PARTIAL PARALYSIS OF UN AS THE GUARDIAN OF INNATL PEACE AND ...3

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SECURITY UNQUOTE.REPORT FURTHER DEVELOPED IDEA OF QUOTE
EFFECTIVE CONCERTED APPROACH BY PERMANENT MEMBERS WHICH
WLD DISPOSE OF GREAT RESOURCES OF PERSUASION AND,IF NECESSARY,
OF PRACTICAL LEVERAGE UNQUOTE.SEC GEN NOTED THAT THIS APPROACH
WAS QUOTE BASIC IDEA OF THE UN CHARTER UNQUOTE WHICH WLD QUOTE
GO A LONG WAY TO DEVELOPING IN PRACTICE SYSTEM FOR INNATL
PEACE AND SECURITY DESIGNED TO SUPERSEDE ARMS RACES,MILITARY
AND OTHER FORMS OF CONFLICT AND THE INHERENT RISK OF ULTIMATE
DISASTER UNQUOTE.REPORT ALSO DWELLED SOMEWHAT ON NUCLEAR
ARMS RACE AND CONCLUDED THIS SECTION BY NOTING THAT QUOTE KEY
TO SOLUTION REMAINED IN HANDS OF TWO MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS
UNQUOTE.

5.SEC GENS THOUGHTS ON ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS ARE ESSENTIALLY
CONTAINED IN TWO MAJOR SPEECHES:ONE AT OUTSET OF SECOND
SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT JUNE 1982 AND THE OTHER TO
UNIVERSITY OF PHILADELPHIA IN MARCH 1983 DELIVERED AFTER VISITING
WSHDC IN JAN AND ON EVE OF MTG WITH ANDROPOV MAR30.PRINCIPAL
THEME OF FIRST STATEMENT WAS IMPOSSIBILITY OF WINNING NUCLEAR WAR
DUE TO CONSEQUENCES RESULTING IN QUOTE APOCOLYPSE OR DEATH OF
SPECIES AS VERY REAL POSSIBILITY UNQUOTE.PHILADELPHIA SPEECH
OUTLINED DESPERATE URGENCY FOR DISARMAMENT WHICH QUOTE HAS
BECOME NOTHING LESS THAN CONDITION FOR THE SURVIVAL OF HUMANITY
UNQUOTE.SPEECH ALSO BUILT FURTHER ON LINK BETWEEN DISARMAMENT
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AND DEVELOPMENT AND QUESTIONED CURRENT ASSUMPTION THAT ARMS RACE ACTS AS SPUR TO SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT OR ENHANCES ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY.

6. SEC GEN'S END OF YEAR PRESS CONF DEC 21 REVEALED STRONG IMPACT ON HIS THINKING OF SUSPENSION OF MAJOR BILATERAL ARMS TALKS WHEN IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT HE NOTED QUOTE ONE OF MOST DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENTS OF PAST YEAR HAS BEEN IMPAIRMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE MAJOR POWERS UNQUOTE. IN MORE SPONTANEOUS FASHION IN ANSWER TO PRESS QUESTIONS HE EXPRESSED CONCERN (PREVALENT IN FORUM HE SERVES) THAT NATIONS NOT/NOT PARTIES TO CONFLICT WLD BE QUOTE VICTIMS OF IRRESPONSIBLE DECISIONS BY ONE, TWO, THREE OR FOUR LEADERS UNQUOTE. LATER IN CONF, HE MORE POINTEDLY UNDERLINED SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITY OF TWO SUPERPOWERS AND, IN RESPONSE TO DIRECT QUESTION OF UTILITY OF HOLDING QUOTE HIGH LEVEL SECURITY COUNCIL MTG TO BRING PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR. ANDROPOV TOGETHER UNQUOTE, HE DEMURRED THAT NUCLEAR ARMS RACE HAD TO BE QUOTE DEALT WITH IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN LEADERS OF USSR AND USA UNQUOTE. HE REITERATED AGAIN THAT IT IS THEY WHO MUST MEET DIRECTLY AROUND NEGOTIATING TABLE.

7. FROM ADMITTEDLY SELECTIVE SURVEY ABOVE, FOUR PRINCIPAL AND CONSISTENT ELEMENTS EMERGE WHICH APPEAR TO BE RELEVANT TO PM TRUDEAU'S OBJECTIVES AND WHICH MIGHT BE DEVELOPED DURING HIS MTG WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR NEXT WEEK: (1) SEC GEN'S ABIDING CONCERN

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REGARDING PRESSING DANGER AND FINALITY OF NUCLEAR WAR; (2) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMS RACE AND INNATL SECURITY AS PROVIDED FOR BY THE UN CHARTER SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SFCURITY FOR WHICH FIVE PERM MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY; (3) ACTIVIST ROLE OF UN SEC GEN IN WORKING WITH COUNCIL TO AVERT CRISES REACHING POINT OF VIOLENCE(IE QUOTE PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY UNQUOTE); AND (4) SEC GENS ACUTE PREOCCUPATION REGARDING BREAKDOWN IN DIALOGUE BETWEEN PROTAGONISTS. *and the ongoing line of communication*

8. ONCE HAVING DESCRIBED ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVFS OF CDN INITIATIVES AND BROUGHT SEC GEN UP TO DATE ON HIS VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH WORLD LEADERS, PM TRUDEAU MAY WISH TO DRAW ON ABOVE FOUR ELEMENTS AS POINTS OF COINCIDENCE BETWEEN CDN AND SEC GENS THINKING IN THIS AREA, AS WELL AS OFFERING SOME POSSIBILITIES FOR ROLE WHICH UN CAN PLAY IN LOOSENING RESISTANCE TO DIALOGUE.

9. AT OUTSET, PM MIGHT DWELL ON CDAS STRONG AND PUBLICLY ENUNCIATED SUPPORT FOR SEC GENS EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN UN INSTITUTION AND PARTICULARLY TO UTILIZE ART 99 OF CHARTER TO PLAY ACTIVIST ROLE IN CONFLICT CONTROL. CDN POLICY OF SUPPORT HAS BEEN CONVEYED PERSONALLY BY DPM/SSEA AND HIS MTG WITH SEC GEN LAST JUNE, BY AMB PELLETIER IN SEVERAL ENCOUNTERS AND HAS BEEN HIGHLIGHTED AS PRINCIPAL THEME IN CDN SPEECH TO UNGA GENL DEBATE LAST SEPT. (SPECIFICALLY WELCOMED BY SEC GEN IN HIS MTG LAST SEPT WITH PM).

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10.PM MIGHT THEN AGREE WITH SEC GENS OFT-STATED VIEW THAT FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF COUNCIL HAVE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY BOTH IN TERMS OF CHARTER AND BECAUSE OF STRATEGIC REALITIES IN ESTABLISHING WORKING RELATIONSHIPS TO FURTHER IMPORTANT CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY ENSHRINED IN CHARTER AND ENDORSED BY SEC GEN.HE MIGHT THEN ENQUIRE WHETHER THERE WOULD BE VALUE IN SEC GEN INSTITUTING VERY INFORMAL PRIVATE GATHERINGS OF AMBS OF PERM MEMBERS OF COUNCIL(FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES)UNDER HIS AUSPICES IN ORDER TO REANIMATE DIALOGUE ON REGULARIZED BASIS. FIVE PERM REPS IN NY,WHO ARE EACH TOP LEVEL POL/DIPLO REPS ENJOYING SENIOR CONFIDENCE IN THEIR CAPITALS.ARE BACKED BY HIGHLY EQUIPPED AND EXPERT STAFFS.THIS MAKES UN NY UNIQUE FORUM FOR HIGH LEVEL AUTHORIATIVE DIALOGUE WHICH CAN BE CONDUCTED IN QUIET PRODUCTIVE MANNER WITHOUT RAISING UNDUE EXPECTATIONS THROUGH OVERT MEDIA EXPOSURE.INITIAL EXCHANGES OF POLITICAL NATURE ON STATE OF POLITICAL TENSIONS MIGHT POSSIBLY LEAD EVENTUALLY TO MORE FORMAL STRUCTURE INCORPORATING EXPERTS AND DEALING WITH MORE SPECIFIC ISSUES RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL. HOWEVER PROCESS WLD START AS POLITICAL,NON TECHNICAL DIALOGUE, CONSISTENT WITH SEC GENS VIEWS RE COLLECTIVE SECURITY APPROACH -AND WITH CDN DESIRE TO ENERGISE THE POL DIALOGUE.

11.AS EVIDENCED BY END OF YEAR PRESS CONF,SEC GEN HAS CONF ON RECORD THAT TWO SUPERPOWERS ARE ESSENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ...?

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RESUMING NUCLEAR DIALOGUE; HENCE HE HAS QUESTIONED USEFULNESS
AT THIS POINT OF HIGH LEVEL SECURITY COUNCIL MTG. NEVERTHELESS
PMS EMPHASIS ON IMPORTANCE OF DISCRETION, OF AVOIDING QUOTE
MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY UNQUOTE ASSOCIATED WITH PUBLIC ENCOUNTER
MIGHT WELL APPEAL TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR, PARTICULARLY WHEN
COUPLED WITH VIEW THAT OTHER THREE MEMBERS OF COUNCIL HAVE
IMPORTANT SUPPORTING ROLE IN ASSISTING SUPERPOWER DIALOGUE.
FROM OUR READING OF SG, WE WLD SUGGEST THAT PM COMMENTS HERE
MIGHT HAVE GREATER APPEAL FOR SEC GEN IF APPROACHED FROM MORE
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CHARTER IDEA OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
THAN IN MORE DIRECT ARMS CONTROL CONTEXT OF DEVELOPING EMBRYO
FOR FIVE POWER NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONF. HE COULD, FOR EXAMPLE,
NOTING CURRENT WORLD TENSIONS AND NEED FOR DIALOGUE, TELL
5 PERM REPS ASSEMBLED INFORMALLY IN HIS OFFICE HE WOULD LIKE
TO START A DIALOGUE WITH THEM ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
THAT COULD BE ENVISAGED, NOT/NOT JUST IN ONE REGION OF WORLD (IE
EUROPE WHERE STKHM CONF OFFERS SOME PROMISE) BUT IN VARIOUS
PARTS OF WORLD AND AMONG GREAT POWERS.

12. OF COURSE SEC GEN WLD NO/NO DOUBT BE INTERESTED IN ANY
SPECIFIC CDN PROPOSALS FOR ARMS CONTROL (SUCH AS HIGH ALTITUDE
SATELLITES) WHICH WLD INVOLVE CURRENTLY ACTIVE AND RELEVANT UN
BODIES SUCH AS CTTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEV.

13. ASIDE FROM HIS INITIATIVE, AND TIME PERMITTING, PM MAY

...8

PAGE EIGHT WKGR0024 CONFD

WISH TO CONSIDER REQUESTING SEC GENS VIEWS ON RECENT USA
STATEMENT OF INTENT TO LEAVE UNESCO, WHETHER SEC GEN SEES THIS
AS HAVING ANY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR REST OF UN SYSTEM AND
WHETHER HE ENVISAGES ANY ACTIVITIES BEHIND SCENES TO AVERT USA
WITHDRAWAL.

CCC/085 052342Z WKGR0024

PAGE ONE OF TWO

MF

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

EA 20-6

Unclassified

MNPLS XXFC002005JAN84

EXTOTT/100Z

BA
FPR/NOBLE, PMOTT/COLEMAN, UGP: LAM WSHDC DE MPS
DEOTT

---EDITORIAL COMMENT ON PM'S PEACE INITIATIVE

ATTACHED IS ANOTHER EDITORIAL ON THE PM. IT WAS WRITTEN BY RON CLARK, EDITORIAL EDITOR OF THE ST. PAUL DISPATCH AND PIONEER PRESS WHO WAS ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE RECENT REGIONAL EDITORS VISIT TO CANADA.

G. FOLEY

Gerry Foley

Public Affairs

612/333-4641

Gerald Foley

PAGE TWO OF TWO

MNA CLIPPING SERVICE

ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS
Ramsay Co.

DEC. 19. 1983

Trudeau's quest

312
No Canadian has achieved greater recognition for advancing the cause of world peace than the late Lester B. Pearson, former Canadian prime minister for whom that nation's state department building in Ottawa is named. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts in setting up a United Nations peacekeeping force in the Gaza Strip in 1956 to separate warring Israelis and Egyptians.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the current Canadian prime minister who appears to be nearing the end of a long reign as his country's top elected official, now has elevated the goal of reduced international tensions to the top of his agenda. Mr. Trudeau's world travels on behalf of his so-called "peace initiative" brought him to Washington last week for talks with President Reagan.

Among Mr. Trudeau's goals are a five-power summit meeting of nuclear weapons nations to halt the arms race and a ban on testing anti-satellite systems. His visit to the White House came on the heels of trips to numerous Western European capitals, as well as to Peking and Tokyo. His next stop is expected to be Moscow.

Some have been quick to label Mr. Trudeau's proposals as a last-gasp effort to revive his Liberal government's abysmal popularity rating in Canadian opinion polls. However, that ignores his long-standing interest in peaceful co-existence around the globe. Further, it runs counter to political facts of life in Canada and elsewhere that link the fates of elected leaders more to domestic than international events.

Mr. Trudeau has little to show for his travels so far. Under their breath, many world leaders probably find his pitch annoying.

John Holmes, a former Canadian undersecretary of state for external affairs, says the best thing Mr. Trudeau's initiative has going for it is that no one wants to reject it. That comes close to damning with faint praise. Although the prime minister has received little encouragement that his efforts will pay off, he should continue the quest. Whether or not Mr. Trudeau achieves his specific goals, he may help pave the way toward a resumption of nuclear arms control talks between the United States and Soviets. That in itself is an accomplishment worth pursuing.

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT RBR0019 05JAN84

TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 060900

INFO LDN PARIS BONN WSHDC BNATO TOKYO WSAW BUCST PRGUE BPEST BGRAD
PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CPD/DGIS

DISTR MINA USS DMF DMFX RGB RBD RBRD IDDZ IDD IDA IDR

---STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE-BILATERAL WITH GROMYKO

DPM/SSEA WISHES TO ARRANGE MTG WITH GROMYKO WHILE AT STKHM CONF
16-20JAN. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD APPROACH MFA IMMEDIATELY WITH REQUEST
FOR BILATERAL AND FOR INDICATION OF CONVENIENT TIME AND LOCATION.
2. SUGGESTION FOR BILATERAL HAS BEEN RAISED HERE BY SOV EMB ON BASIS
THAT WE SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE. WE WILL FOLLOW-UP WITH EMB TO
CONFIRM THEIR SUPPORT FOR OUR REQUEST.

CCC/146 052304Z RBR0019

Refce: PCO *Att* *Hawler*
DMEX *Done*
IFB *5/1/84*
file *sc*
ED

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0015 05JAN84

TO BNATO

INFO EXTOTT RBR BRU WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN

DISTR LDDZ IDR RBD

REF YOURTEL YBGR7724 21DEC83 AND OURTEL XYGR4274 28DEC83

---IS MOSCO CURTAILING CONTACTS WITH WEST?(CONT)

OUR REFTEL GAVE EXAMPLE WHICH LED USA COLLEAGUES TO REPORT APPARENT DOWNGRADING BY MOSCO OF SOVIET-AMERICAN BILATERAL RELATIONS(BECAUSE OF INF).

2.LOCAL AMERICAN VIEW NOW IS THAT CONSCIOUS SOVIET POLICY TO AVOID DIALOGUE WITH WSHDC HAS BEEN REVERSED.TWO EXAMPLES ARE CITED IN SUPPORT.

3.FIRST CONCERNS SOVIET URGING ON A MORE FORMAL BASIS TO MEET WITH AMERICANS ON NON PROLIFERATION ISSUES IN VIENN(AS PER OUR REFTEL).WSHDC IS TO RESPOND POSITIVELY FOR RESUMPTION OF THESE PERIODIC BILATERAL EXCHANGES EVEN THOUGH THEY WONT TAKE PLACE IN WSHDC OR MOSCO AS HERETOFORE.

4.MORE SIGNIFICANT PERHAPS IS FORTHCOMING RESUMPTION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN CONTACTS ON CRISIS COMMUNICATION.FIRST MTG SINCE AUG83 ON WAYS TO IMPROVE QUOTE HOT LINE UNQUOTE WILL TAKE PLACE ON 11JAN84 IN WSHDC.USA IS PLEASED EVEN THOUGH SOVIETS PREFERENCE IS TO KEEP AGENDA LTD TO HOT LINE WHILE AMERICANS TAKE BROADER APPROACH TO GENERAL SUBJ OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT.

GCC/044 051105Z XYGR0015

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

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2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PEKIN WJGR0011 05JAN84

TO EXTOTT PER IDDZ DELIVER BY 050900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR PER FPR IDDZ PGB PED

REF OURTEL WJGR0008 04JAN

---ZHAO COMMENTS ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE

ZHAO COMMENTS AT 02JAN PRESS CONFERENCE WERE SAME AS THOSE MADE TO AMB IN 20 MIN MTG WITH ZHAO 31DEC. AMB TOLD ZHAO THAT PM TRUDEAU WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY USE OPPORTUNITY OF HIS VISIT TO BRIEF CHINESE PM ON PROGRESS OF CDN PEACE INITIATIVE. ZHAO REPLIED THAT QUOTE HE SUPPORTED EFFORTS MADE BY TRUDEAU TO RELAX WORLD TENSIONS AND THAT HE WAS WILLING TO HEAR ANY NEW IDEAS REGARDING PMS PEACE INITIATIVE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED HIS INTEREST IN EXCHANGING VIEWS ON WORLD PEACE. 2. NEITHER COMMENTS TO AMB OR AT PRESS CONFERENCE APPEAR TO REPRESENT DEPARTURE FROM VIEWS EXPRESSED BY ZHAO TO PM TRUDEAU DURING LATTERS NOV VISIT TO PEKING. NONETHELESS, PUBLIC REITERATION OF SUPPORT FOR BROAD GOALS OF PMS INITIATIVE, COMBINED WITH PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF GREATER INVOLVEMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS DEMONSTRATES CONTINUED PRC ENDORSEMENT OF PM TRUDEAU'S EFFORTS TO REDUCE INTL TENSION. ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC ENDORSEMENT OF FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE CAN PROBABLY BE READ AS CONTINUED LACK OF SUPPORT FOR THIS PROPOSAL. (HOWEVER, PM ZHAO'S STRESS ON POINTS OF CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS IS WELCOME).

...2

PAGE TWO WJGR0011 CONFD

3. STRESS OF PM ZHAO ON CHINA'S CONCERN OVER OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR CONTRASTS SOMEWHAT IN TENOR WITH PRIVATE COMMENTS BY DENG TO PM TRUDEAU DURING HIS VISIT. DENG APPEARED TO HOLD MORE SANGUINE VIEW OF NUCLEAR WAR. DIFFERENCE IN EMPHASIS BY ZHAO MAY BE SIMPLY DUE TO PUBLIC NATURE OF FORUM, BUT DIFFERENCES IN STYLE BETWEEN ZHAO, AND RATHER MORE BLUNT DENG, ALSO REFLECT DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH OF TWO LEADERS (AND CONCEIVABLY EVEN REPRESENT DIVERGENCES IN RESPECTIVE VIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION BY TWO LEADERS).

4. WE DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE CHINESE VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT HAVE EVOLVED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE VISIT OF PM TRUDEAU BUT STATEMENTS OF ZHAO CLEARLY INDICATE CHINESE REMAIN SYMPATHETIC TO APPROACH OF PM TRUDEAU, EVEN IF PRC LEADERSHIP CANNOT/NOT ENDORSE ENTIRE PACKAGE.

CCC/002 050620Z WJGR0011

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM CNGNY YIGR0006 05JAN84

TO EXTOTT/URR DELIVER BY 051200

INFO WSHDC PMO/AXWORTHY PCO/FOWLER

DISTR UDDZ UGB FPR UGP

REF TELCON FOX-MCKECHNIE DEC29/83

--- PM VISIT TO NY

FOLLOWING UP ON VERBAL CONFIRMATION IN REFTELCON THAT PM WILL BE IN NEW YORK JAN19-21 FOR RINALDO GALA, WE WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO 19 OR 20JAN MEETING WITH NYT EDITORIAL BOARD.

2. IN CONTEXT OF PEACE INITIATIVE WHICH HAS REC'D SOME COVERAGE IN TIMES, INTERVIEW WITH BOARD WOULD PROVIDE EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR MORE IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION AND ATTENTION TO PM'S CONCERNS AND PROPOSALS. TIMING WOULD ALSO BE PROPITIOUS COMING A MONTH AFTER MTG WITH PRES REAGAN, A FEW DAYS AFTER MTG WITH UN SEC GEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND IN ANTICIPATION OF VISIT TO MOSCOW. YOU WILL RECALL NYT'S EXPRESSED INTEREST IN INTERVIEWING PM WHEN HE WAS IN NY END OF OCTOBER. NO CONTACT HAS YET BEEN MADE WITH NYT AND WE WILL AWAIT YOUR REACTION BEFORE DOING SO.

3. ABOVE SUGGESTION STRIKES US AS OBVIOUS PRIORITY BUT YOU MAY WISH TO HAVE US PURSUE OTHER ELEMENTS FOR INCLUSION IN PM'S NY PROGRAM. GRATEFUL REPLY ASAP.

UUU/880 051200Z YIGR0006

CONFIDENTIAL

January 5, 1984


NOTE FOR MR. DELVOIE (IDDZ)

Subject: 1983 NATO East/West Political Study

As you requested, attached is a brief summary assessment of the 1983 political study, as approved by NATO Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Paris last June.

Of particular interest is point (b) under Western objectives, and the general paragraph following.

+ LAST POINT
ON EASTERN
EUROPE



Brian Herman
Defence Relations Division

CONFIDENTIAL

NATO POLITICAL STUDY

The final version of the NATO Political Study has been agreed and, while compromises were inevitable in finalizing the approved NATO text, there is a consensus that the end result is a product of high quality. The study demonstrates the Alliance's determination to pursue a rational and moderate course in East/West relations.

Its chief findings are as follows:

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

- (a) Under the leadership of Andropov, no radical changes are expected in either Soviet domestic or foreign policy - rather it is more a question of "tinkering" with the present system.
- (b) Soviet defence spending will not lessen.
- (c) While the Soviet leadership will continue to attach great importance to its relations with the United States, it will be increasingly disinclined to offer political concessions for the sake of improved East/West cooperation. Rather, it will attempt to keep the USA on the defensive and drive wedges between the United States and its Alliance partners.
- (d) The primary objective in Soviet arms control policies will continue to be to undermine the NATO "two-track" policy and stop the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles.

WESTERN OBJECTIVES

- (a) The fundamental Western objective is to limit the spread of Soviet influence by maintaining Alliance cohesion and adequate defences.
- (b) The West must promote greater stability in East/West relations by negotiating a military balance at the lowest possible level, by encouraging greater East/West dialogue and by promoting the evolution of less rigid and repressive systems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Allies recognize that their means to accomplish these goals, apart from progress in the areas of defence and arms control, are limited. They agree, however, that greater

.../2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

effort must be made to take the initiative on East/West issues and, in doing so, manage relations to ensure the West is seen as the side which shapes the East/West agenda and forces the USSR to address issues of concern to the West.

Finally, the paper suggests that a differentiated approach to the countries of Eastern Europe offers the best hope for pursuing both productive relations with, and gradual liberalization within, the individual countries concerned.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
COLLEGE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

4 January 1984

Mr. A. de W. Matthewson
Chief Policy Planning
ADM Pol Group
National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ont.
K1A 0K2

Dear Arthur,

I prepared the attached as a sort of self-mind-clearing exercise with vague thoughts of a possible article in some journal. I now think that the topic itself is too susceptible to being overtaken by events for the latter purpose and so I don't intend to refine it further. However, perhaps it will contribute to your own reflections.

Att.

J.D. Toogood
J.D. Toogood
Captain(N)

cc: Mr. G.A.H. Pearson
→ Mr. L.A. Delvoie
Mr. R. Francis
Mr. G.J. Smith
Mr. A. Després

J.D. 100800d
23 Dec 83Arms Control at the End of 1983: What are the ^{Levee to} Russians up to?

(The following paper is entirely based on personal reflections on recent developments in the East-West arms control field without the benefit of having seen any accounts other than those in newspapers on what has transpired nor reporting telegrams from NATO HQ, delegations or capitals. Thus various important factors or nuances may not have been taken into account at all or not given their due weight).

Preamble

1. In the course of the past several weeks the Soviets have in effect caused three arms control negotiations to be suspended until such time as certain conditions are met. Such a unilateral step in ongoing formal arms control negotiations is unprecedented^{*} at least in the post-war era. On other occasions, though, the Soviets have from time to time issued dire warnings, ultimatums etc which have usually been responded to by Western spokesmen with expressions of determination, steadfastness, hope for careful reconsideration by the East.... Perhaps this sort of "tough it out" reaction is again the course that will be followed and perhaps it is the most prudent. But given the above noted lack of precedent some deeper consideration of alternatives appears to be warranted.

Introduction

2. The framework within which the formal arms control dialogue and negotiations take place, particularly that between east and west, has consisted of five forums: the UN, CSCE, MBFR, SALT/START and INF. These same five mechanisms can be viewed as four concentric circles reflecting coincidentally the extent of participation as well as the military technical versus political

* The Technical Conference to Prevent Surprise Attack recessed by mutual agreement

nature of the undertakings in each. Thus the inner circle could represent USA/USSR bilateral negotiations of a highly technical nature on the control of strategic and intermediate nuclear weapons, (SALT/START, INF); the second circle the bloc-to-bloc military/political MBFR negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces; the third circle the mostly political but somewhat military CSCE/CDE process attended by all European states plus the USA and Canada; and the outer circle the United Nations, a politically deliberative global body albeit with subordinate negotiating fora.

3. Recent Soviet actions with regard to the bilateral negotiations and MBFR have not absolutely closed these negotiations forever but the fact remains that notwithstanding nuances in Soviet pronouncements the two most militarily significant areas of negotiation are in some kind of state of suspension. Whatever action may be taken to restore the mechanisms to something like a status quo ante the effect of these Soviet actions will continue to be felt.

Motives

4. Any examination of possible motives must by its nature be speculative but such consideration can be useful in helping to identify not just what counteraction may be taken but also the effects of any given decision. On the face of it the Soviets abandoned START and INF because of the commencement of NATO's deployment of cruise missiles, and in MBFR their action was purportedly^{also} precipitated by a lack of western response to what must be acknowledged as a serious Eastern proposal earlier this year. These factors are probably valid as far as they go but the strategic consequences of the Soviet actions could have far-reaching importance and a deeper scrutiny of possible motives should therefore be useful.

5. It is always difficult to discern what prompts the Soviets to do anything particularly because it is very difficult for a Westerner to put himself in a

- 3 -

position to make appraisals in the same way that a Russian would. Frequently what seems to us to be self-evident or completely logical in an Anglo-Saxon fashion may seem quite different to an Easterner. Given that caveat, I have nevertheless noted a propensity among Russians with whom I have dealt to take an almost Teutonic approach in drawing up a balance sheet of assets and liabilities when appraising a given situation. In this case I suspect that their balance might look something like the following:

a. Substance

In all three fora (START, INF and MBFR) the Soviets may have concluded that in the past couple of years or more the West has demonstrated that it is not negotiating seriously 'by refusing almost all Eastern proposals, by making proposals of its own whose common feature would be military advantage for the West, and by choosing to shift the hitherto confidential nature of dialogue into the public realm. It might be noted that the Soviets have frequently stated that, as far the first two of these elements is concerned, this is indeed their ^{opinion.} ~~option.~~

b. Defence

The West has made no secret of its increased allocation of resources to defence expenditures in both the nuclear and conventional fields. Many segments of Western public opinion are not keen about these programmes and the Soviets have asserted that the West uses arms control negotiations as a cover to elicit public support ^{for them}. This is done, the Soviets say, by trying to demonstrate active involvement in arms control negotiations as well as justifying armament expenditures in the context that successful negotiations can only be carried out from positions of added strength. The Soviets could therefore have concluded that an absence of serious negotiation would undermine Western public support for defence programmes. (Admittedly, a completely opposite conclusion could be reached but the Soviet action indicates this was not the case).

- 4 -

c. Political

There appear to be four dimensions to this factor. These are:

(i) USA

The combination of Reagan administration rhetoric and a perception of one-sided substance in Western proposals could well have led the Soviets to conclude that under present circumstances arms control agreements acceptable to them are impossible. Thus as far as substance itself is concerned there would be nothing to lose by stopping the effort. By the same token it would be in the Soviet interest to see Reagan defeated in the 1984 presidential elections and refusal to negotiate could also be intended as a demonstration that he cannot handle this aspect of East-West relations.

(ii) NATO

The Soviets have had no difficulty in discerning the impatience of some Western European allies with a minimalist approach to arms control. A refusal to continue negotiations would be a felicitous manoeuvre in the long term strategy of splitting Western Europe from the US and causing other dissension in the ranks as well e.g. Greek disaffection. Moreover, the Soviets could have also discerned that various Western European governments are unlikely to be able to maintain support for their defence budgets and, indeed, in some cases ^{perhaps even} their membership in NATO itself without a perceived respectable effort in arms control. Finally, Western peace movements have up to now been motivated less by fear than a desire for a better world. The stick of no negotiations could therefore cause them to intensify their efforts.

.../5

(iii) Other Europeans

In the CSCE forum the Soviets have not done very well. At review meetings in Belgrade and Madrid they have exhibited an extraordinary tolerance for harsh criticism of their human rights record. At Madrid their vulnerability resulted in a mandate for the new Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) to be held in Stockholm that almost entirely reflects Western demands. They may foresee difficulties in Stockholm when that conference opens as well as at the next CSCE review meeting to be convened in Vienna in 1986. These difficulties have resulted from the hitherto correct Western appreciation that the Soviets were vulnerable through the unqualified commitment to pursue the Brezhnev policy of détente no matter how rough the going might become. A demonstration that there is indeed a limit to their tolerance could therefore be useful.

(iv) The World

The risk of engendering a negative reputation in UN circles could have been appraised as being offset by recent anti-UN rhetoric by the US ("we will come down to the dock and wave you goodbye"). Thus the Soviets could believe that they are able to continue to portray themselves as the only superpower with a sincere interest in constructive participation in the UN.

6. Domestically, the Soviets of course have no great problem in successfully defending any shift in this field in the post-Brezhnev era.

7. Finally, as far as arms control negotiating itself is concerned, the Brezhnev policy and their own previous military inferiority had caused the Soviets usually to be in a demandeur position when negotiating. The West on more than one occasion demonstrated that in some quarters it was considered that agreeing

- 6 -

to negotiate at all was a concession or a favour to the East.

Effects

8. When considering possible effects there is a very real danger of extrapolating on speculations that rest on assumptions. One can nevertheless venture a little distance down such a path. From a historical perspective the single most significant element in the recent Soviet moves will probably be identified as being in effect an announcement of satisfaction that military equivalency with the West had at last been attained. More immediately, however, the Soviets have upped the ante in the arms control game presumably because they feel war will not thereby become more imminent or, if it does, that risk is acceptable. They have also demonstrated that dialogue they appraise as unproductive is not considered by them to be ^{intrinsically} of overriding importance. As a final general observation it would appear that either the hawks in Moscow are in the ascendancy or, not surprisingly, that Andropov himself is considerably more hawkish than was Brezhnev.

9. As touched upon above these moves have the potential to affect severely the defence aspect of NATO strategy. If it is concluded by Western leaders that some governments can only continue to maintain adequate defence preparations if the public is confident that the arms control effort is also adequate it follows that somehow NATO will have to restore the latter to protect the former.

10. In the domestic political field in the USA, the Soviets have handed the democratic party's nominee what could become his lead issue in the forthcoming campaign i.e., that Reagan cannot do business with the Russians. This may be helpful should Reagan himself decide to reduce his vulnerability in this regard by finding ways to demonstrate that there is indeed progress in arms control.

11. In ~~the~~ negotiations themselves the situation is unlikely to be the same in the future as it has in the past. If indeed there is more to the Soviet

- 7 -

walk-outs than merely the INF deployment, then the Soviets have demonstrated that they have a new solution to Western persistence in pressing "unacceptable" proposals. This is a factor that will be on the minds of all delegations when they convene in Stockholm in January. In the CDE as well as in ^{or} restored START, INF ^{or} and MBFR talks, should they come to pass, the West will have to take greater care with negotiating decisions (whatever the ^{or} ~~AT~~ may mean in practice) so as to enable the furtherance of meaningful negotiations.

12. The challenge to Western statecraft, in other words, may well have changed. Hitherto the West could afford to negotiate in a sturdy fashion, demonstrating resolve to protect sovereign interests. Now, however, the perceived arrival of military equivalency and the Soviet's demonstrated willingness to act accordingly means that proclamations of steadfastness, determination and optimism may no longer be enough when confronted with Soviet intransigence. A need for increased attention to mutual interests seems indicated.

13. As a further point, the shift to public diplomacy should now be seen to have run its course if serious negotiations are to take place.

14. The immediate problem is to find ways to restore the structure of negotiations and to replace dialogue with substantive achievement. Dialogue qua dialogue is apparently no longer enough for the Soviets and in all probability it will no longer be considered to be enough by Western public opinion with all that means for NATO defence preparedness as discussed above.

15. Similarly, political dialogue will not of itself be a substitute. To be meaningful, the substance of arms control agreements must be military and technical no matter how irritating that may be to political authorities. Militarily significant agreements cannot be otherwise. High level political supervision of substantive negotiations is certainly needed and has often been inadequate in the past but that supervision can only be an impetus to ensure

that mutually perceived political goals are pursued in detailed negotiations

Conclusion

16. Whatever their motives may be, the one demonstrable fact is that the Soviets have deliberately caused three important arms control negotiations to be put on hold. In the not too distant future it will become apparent whether this action will become but another footnote in the textbook of negotiating tactics or whether the nature of arms control negotiations has indeed now undergone a more far-reaching change.

INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

file
Jan. 4/84

Next Steps

<u>January 10</u>	Luncheon with members of the Committee for the Third Track
<u>January 11</u>	Visit to U.N. Secretary General in New York, followed by brief meeting with the press
<u>January 12</u>	Meeting with Editorial Board of the NEW YORK TIMES Interview with CBC and TVA in Ottawa
<u>January 13</u>	Meeting with Malaysian Prime Minister in Ottawa
<u>January 16</u>	Luncheon with members of peace groups (?)
<u>January 17-18</u>	Follow-up with Premier Zhao Ziyang in Ottawa
<u>January 16-20</u>	DPM/SSEA attends NATO meeting and CDE opening in Stockholm
<u>January 27-28</u>	PM and DPM/SSEA participate in Davos Symposium (?)
<u>January 30-31</u>	Visit to Moscow (?)
<u>mid-February</u>	Major speech in House of Commons, Ottawa

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

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FM PEKIN WJGR0008 04JAN84

TO EXTOTT PER IDDT

DELIVER BY 040900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR PGB PED IDDT FPR

REF YOURTELS PER0004 03JAN IDDA0003 03JAN


---ZHAO COMMENTS ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMMENTS MADE BY ZHAO ZIYANG AT 02JAN
PRESS CONFERENCE. BRIEF COMMENTS WILL FOLLOW BY SEPARATE TEL.

QUOTE:CTV REPORTER BOB HURST:WHEN PM TRUDEAU WAS IN PEKIN
SEVERAL WEEKS AGO CHINA SAID IT WOULD STUDY CDN PEACE PROPOSALS.
WHAT HAS CHINA FOUND?HAS CHINA STUDIED PROPOSALS AND DOES CHINA
HAVE ANY NEW INITIATIVES TO GET NUCLEAR DISCUSSIONS GOING?

PM ZHAO:PEOPLE ALL OVER WORLD ARE GENUINELY CONCERNED OVER INNATL
TENSION AND AGGRAVATION OF ARMS RACE.THEY ARE ALSO WORRIED THAT
NUCLEAR WAR MIGHT BREAK OUT.CHINESE PEOPLE ARE ALSO CONCERNED.WE
FULLY UNDERSTAND CONCERN AND EFFORTS MADE BY CDN GOVT OVER INNATL
TENSION AND TOWARDS RELAXATION OF INNATL TENSION.WE APPRECIATE
EFFORTS MADE BY PM TRUDEAU AND SUPPORT HIS APPEAL FOR MORE
POLITICIANS IN WORLD TO PARTICIPATE IN PEACE EFFORTS.CHINA
DESIRES PEACE.WE DO NOT/NOT WANT A HOT OR COLD WAR,SO IN MY
FORTHCOMING VISIT TO CDA I WILL BE DISCUSSING ANY SUGGESTIONS OR
PROPOSALS RIGHT HONOURABLE PM TRUDEAU MAY PRESENT TO ME IN THIS
REGARD.UNQUOTE.

...2



CC20-6-14
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE
MISSION

820103 8 31951

PAGE TWO WJGR0008 UNCLAS

2.SLIGHTLY RE-WORDED FRONT-PAGE STORY IN CHINA DAILY OF 04JAN
AS FOLLOWS:

TEXT BEGINS:ANSWERING A QUESTION RAISED BY A CDN TV REPORTER ON
PM TRUDEAUS PEACE PROPOSALS ZHAO SAID QUOTE WE APPRECIATE EFFORTS
MADE BY PM TRUDEAU AND SUPPORT HIS APPEAL TO DRAW MORE STATEMEN ALL
OVER WORLD TO CAUSE OF SAFE-GUARDING WORLD PEACE UNQUOTE.ZHAO SAID
HE WILL DISCUSS WITH TRUDEAU ANY PEACE PROPOSALS MADE BY LATTER
DURING HIS VISIT TO CDA ON JAN17-23 TEXT ENDS.

UUU/002 040805Z WJGR0008

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT IDD⁴0003 03JAN88

TO PEKIN

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR PER FPR


---PM INITIATIVE

CBC RADIO REPORTS PREMIER ZHAO AS HAVING SAID QUOTE CHINA DESIRES PEACE.WE DO NOT/NOT WANT TO SEE A HOT WAR OR A COLD WAR;SO IN MY FORTH-COMING VISIT TO CANADA.ILL BE DISCUSSING ANY SUGGESTIONS OR PROPOSALS THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU MAY SUGGEST TO ME IN THIS REGARD.UNQUOTE.

2.CBC CORRESPONDENT J.F.LEPINE THEN OBSERVED QUOTE THE CANADIAN PEACE INITIATIVE WILL BE DISCUSSED IN OTTAWA WHEN PRIME MINISTER ZHAO ZIYANG WILL VISIT CANADA LATER THIS MONTH.CANADIAN DIPLOMATS IN PEKING SAY TODAY S STATEMENT IS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN ON THE PART OF CHINA. UNQUOTE.

3.GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE FULL TEXT OF ZHAO S STATEMENT IF AVAILABLE,AND YOUR ASSESSMENT OF IT.

CCC/026 032316Z IDDZ0003



28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE
MISSION

IFB/MICHAEL SHENSTONE 3-4228/jpt

cc (IDD) *AB*
IDA (Pearson)

M.F.

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA K1A OG2,
January 4, 1984.

Professor John E. Trent,
Professor,
Department of Political Science,
University of Ottawa,
OTTAWA, Ontario K1N 6N5.

Dear John,

I am sorry about the delay in acknowledging your letter of November 28, in which you raised the possibility of collaboration by the International Political Science Association with Prime Minister Trudeau's peace initiative. I was absent at the Commonwealth Conference in India when your letter was received, and got caught up in some other issues on my return.

You mentioned that from the point of view of the Association, collaboration would be dependent on the Prime Minister's endeavour becoming a longer term undertaking. The future of the Canadian initiative beyond a fairly short time-frame of weeks or months is still largely indeterminate, so it is rather difficult at present to foresee how a dialogue with the Association could be translated into practical cooperation, despite the very interesting ideas indicated in your letter.

Let us resume contact on this subject in a month or so. I should also like an opportunity to chat with you about a number of other topics on the peace and disarmament front.

Yours sincerely,

Michael

Michael Shenstone,
Assistant Deputy Minister,
Political and International
Security Affairs.

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TRUDEAU
PEACE MISSION

TOTAL A DONNER

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PEKIN WJGR0008 04JAN84

TO EXTOTT PER IDDZ DELIVER BY 040900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR PGB PED IDDZ FPR

REF YOURTELS PER0004 03JAN IDDA0003 03JAN

---ZHAO COMMENTS ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMMENTS MADE BY ZHAO ZIYANG AT 02JAN
PRESS CONFERENCE. BRIEF COMMENTS WILL FOLLOW BY SEPARATE TEL.

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SEVERAL WEEKS AGO CHINA SAID IT WOULD STUDY CDN PEACE PROPOSALS.
WHAT HAS CHINA FOUND? HAS CHINA STUDIED PROPOSALS AND DOES CHINA
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TENSION AND TOWARDS RELAXATION OF INNATL TENSION. WE APPRECIATE
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DESIRES PEACE. WE DO NOT/WANT A HOT OR COLD WAR, SO IN MY
FORTHCOMING VISIT TO CDA I WILL BE DISCUSSING ANY SUGGESTIONS OR
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...2

PAGE TWO WJGR0008 UNCLAS

2.SLIGHTLY RE-WORDED FRONT-PAGE STORY IN CHINA DAILY OF 04JAN
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TEXT BEGINS:ANSWERING A QUESTION RAISED BY A CDN TV REPORTER ON
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MADE BY PM TRUDEAU AND SUPPORT HIS APPEAL TO DRAW MORE STATEMEN ALL
OVER WORLD TO CAUSE OF SAFE-GUARDING WORLD PEACE UNQUOTE.ZHAO SAID
HE WILL DISCUSS WITH TRUDEAU ANY PEACE PROPOSALS MADE BY LATTER
DURING HIS VISIT TO CDA ON JAN17-23 TEXT ENDS.

UUU/002 040805Z WJGR0008

118.

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

January 4, 1984

IDDZ-0005

Mr. Aftab H. Mirza
President
Pakistan Students Association
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario
N2L 3G1

Dear Mr. Mirza:

Thank you for your letter of December 7 to the Department of External Affairs concerning the Prime Minister's initiative on East-West relations and international security.

We are encouraged by the widespread public support for the Prime Minister's efforts. It is clear that he is voicing the concerns of a great many Canadians when he speaks of the urgent need to reduce the prevailing high international tensions and to restore confidence and a high-level political dialogue between East and West.

Thank you for your invitation to your seminar on this topic. I very much regret that there are only a very few officials who are fully conversant with the Prime Minister's initiative and they are fully occupied on the Task Force Working Group; hence they are, unfortunately, unable to address your seminar.

Yours truly,

Louis A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

Pakistan Students Association

UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO - WATERLOO, ONTARIO

6
6
SVIP
DMG

To: A	N2L SGT SCR
From: A	NSIA
Date	December 7, 1983
Att'n.	

SCG

Ref. No. _____

Madam Donna Gross,
Educational Information Publications,
The Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa, Ontario,
Canada.

Dear Madam Gross,

Ours is an student Organization the main objective of which is to organize seminars, panel discussions, and debates on current national and international affairs of general interest on the university campus.

Since Prime Minister Trudeau's Peace Initiative has become the topic of great interest among the student community on this campus, we would like to invite a guest speaker from the External Affairs Department to address the University students on this topic.

You are, therefore, requested to kindly arrange a guest speaker who is expert on this topic, to attend the seminar organized by our Association.

We intend to hold this seminar some times in late January. The final date, however, would be set in accordance with the availability and convenience of the guest speaker.

I am sure we will have your complete help and cooperation in this regard.

Thanking you,

Yours Sincerely,

Aftab H. Mirza

Aftab H. Mirza

President

Pakistan Student's Association
University of Waterloo.



From/De	No. No	Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINE by / L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINE avant
Letter dated/Lettre en date du 19-12-83	Date received in MINE/Date de réception à MINE 17-12-83	Date 30-12-83
Action Division/Direction responsable 1002	Information Division(s) Direction(s) informée(s)	Date sent to Division/Date d'envoi à la direction 21-12-83
Subject/Sujet FRIDIAU'S PEACE MISSION	Comments/Commentaires	

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE

- ☐ Reply for minister's signature
Réponse pour la signature du ministre
- ☐ Reply for the signature of
Réponse pour la signature de
- ☐ Reply by division
Réponse de la direction
- ☐ Note and file
Noter et mettre au dossier
- ☐ Draft reply to be incorporated in letter by Minister's staff
Projet de réponse requis pour inclusion dans lettre rédigée par les assistants du Ministre

ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINE REGISTRY (5-7221)

LE REGISTRE DE MINE DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT (5-7221)

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Dec. 20/83

Action officer/Agent responsable

S. Y. C. Lee

Disposition and date/Disposition et date

Exp. 4/83 1602

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Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

January 4, 1984

IDDZ-0004

Mr. and Mrs. Harold Scutt
Box 1232
Moosomin, Saskatchewan

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Scutt:

The Honourable Jean-Luc Pépin has asked me to reply to your letter of November 28 in support of the Prime Minister's initiative.

It is clear that the Prime Minister is voicing the concerns of a great many Canadians when he speaks of the urgent need to reduce the prevailing international tensions and to reverse the arms race. As first steps we must try to restore confidence and re-establish a genuine political dialogue between East and West.

Thank you for your support and encouragement for the Prime Minister's efforts.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Louis A. Delvoie".
Louis A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

Box 1232,
Moosomin, Sask.
Nov. 28, 1983

The Honorable Jean Luc Pepin,
Sir,

This is written to support Mr. Trudeau's peace plan. We hope that there may be a resolution in the House of Commons which will draw unanimous support from all Members of Parliament and declare our support to the world. Escalation is madness, we must stand down.

Yours truly,
Harold and Mary Scott

MINE REGISTRY REGISTRE MINE
DEC 14 1983
TO: <u>Mr. [Signature]</u>
A 9-2

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O/A • ALL DIVISIONS
ROM/DE • MGTC (Out Telegram Desk)
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SUBJECT • Telegram Numbering Series
OBJET


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Accession/Référence
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January 04, 1984
Number/Numéro
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ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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2. Inquiries can be made to 992-2920 or 995-4500.


Signalmaster of MGTC



TO/A IDDZ

FROM/DE IMU

mf

REFERENCE • Your request
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Prime Minister's Initiative: Meeting with
SUJET Secretary-General: Analysis of the Military
Staff Committee of the Security Council

Security/Sécurité
RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
January 4, 1984
Number/Numéro
IMU-0016

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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... As requested, attached is a brief analysis of the moribund Military Staff Committee which concludes that it is highly unlikely, despite a number of coincident factors, that this Committee could be rejuvenated as a useful forum for the discussion of arms control and disarmament measures among the five nuclear weapons states. While the idea could be mentioned in passing as interesting it should be dismissed as being impractical and not worth the expenditure of political effort. This recommendation was also made and accepted in April 1949 when it was decided that Canada as a member of the Security Council would not initiate any move to have the Military Staff Committee reconsidered in that forum.

2. Nevertheless, the idea behind this suggestion that the U.N. and its facilities might be used to promote the Prime Minister's initiative to stimulate a dialogue among the five nuclear weapon states is not without considerable merit for the following reasons:

(a) the five states involved maintain strong and influential permanent delegations at the U.N. in New York. (Mrs. Kirkpatrick is a member of the United States Cabinet and the National Security Council.);

(b) each delegation has all the necessary administrative facilities as well as rapid and secure communications with their respective capitals;

(c) Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar strongly shares the Prime Minister's concern at the current lack of adequate and effective dialogue between the superpowers especially the United States and the Soviet Union. Like Canada, the Secretary-General is also determined to do what he can to strengthen the effectiveness of the in promoting international peace and stability particularly through greater use of his office and in the Security Council; UN

.../2

- 2 -

RESTRICTED

(d) the Secretary-General, ably supported by Brian Urquhart, the experienced Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs and peacekeeping wizzard, has demonstrated great diplomatic and negotiating skill since assuming office. His initiative and innovative proposals almost resolved the Falklands/Malvinas dispute from which he personally emerged with high praise from both combatants.

3. "You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink". The key problem in promoting a dialogue remains to get the parties to agree to come together in whatever capacity, format and forum is acceptable to them to discuss the sources of current international tensions. Given their commonality of interest the Secretary-General appears to be in a good position to explore and perhaps promote this aspect of the Prime Minister's initiative. As a minimum using the justification of the "good offices" role of his position, Perez de Cuellar might seek to hold a small private dinner party without any press coverage that would involve only the permanent representatives of the five nuclear weapons states. Depending on developments at the dinner, he could brief the representatives on his discussions with the Prime Minister and see where the conversation leads. He could conclude the evening by indicating that he proposes to have another dinner at some future date. While never stated, it would be clear that he was seeking to establish a forum for discussion that could be used for future contacts if the five chose to agree. This is but one suggestion, and if the Secretary-General were interested perhaps Canada could offer to prepare detailed briefing notes for his personal use only, at such a dinner and provide some staff support from IDDZ just prior to meeting, if this were thought useful.

4. Such action would be very much in keeping with the role of his office in seeking to be a catalyst to build effective lines of communication. In this context the Security Council itself has played a de facto second line of contact in crisis management when issues such as the Cuban missile crisis are debated in public. It provides both a forum for confirmation of, and a check on, whatever may be said in private channels. The Secretary-General might establish an effective private channel.



R.M. Middleton
Director
United Nations Affairs Division

MF

/A FILE (through MTM)

OM/DE RBR

REFERENCE

SUBJECT Canada/USSR Joint NPT Declaration

Security/Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

Date

January 4, 1984.

Number/Numéro

RBR0006

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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A.P. Makarov (Counsellor, Soviet Embassy, Ottawa) called on RBR/Mace on January 3 to raise "unofficially" the idea of a joint declaration on NPT in the context of a visit to Moscow by the Prime Minister. He said that a draft had been prepared in the Soviet MFA in late 1977 in preparation for a visit to the USSR by the then SSEA/Jamieson (the visit was cancelled after the mass explosions of February 1978). Makarov said that the Embassy had no copy of the draft, but that it was thought to have been passed to Klaus Goldschlag by Ambassador Yakovlev. (Strangely, Yakovlev had not reported doing so, according to Makarov.)

Makarov asked us to think about the idea and to let the Embassy know whether the Canadian Government considered it worth pursuing. If so, the original draft (if it could be located) might be developed or a new version could be prepared. Makarov suggested that work start soon in any event so that it would be ready for use in Moscow during the Prime Minister's visit.

Mr. Mace enquired whether this initiative meant that a reply on the Prime Minister's visit would be forthcoming soon. Makarov said, that while the Embassy hoped for a reply soon, he had nothing to add. He mentioned that he and others in Ottawa had fully expected Andropov to surface for the plenum and had been surprised at his absence. The question of a reply was "complicated" and the Embassy could not even press Moscow for a response in the circumstances.

To Mr. Mace's query on the substance of the declaration, Makarov pleaded ignorance, but mentioned that something could be prepared quickly. He said that there were two passages on NPT in the 1971 communiqués, implying that these could be enlarged. The essence, according to Makarov, was that there was substantial agreement on many NPT aspects between Canada and the USSR and that it would be desirable to have a concrete result to the Prime Minister's visit instead of a "God speed".

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Makarov said that an identical unofficial demarche was being made simultaneously by Eugenny Gusarov on Mark Moher/ETN.

RH

Ron Halpin,
USSR and Eastern Europe
Relations Division.

M F

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BOSTN ZSFC0621 04JAN84

TO PCOOTT

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INFO WSHDC

REF WSHDC TEL UNGR3067 28DEC83

---PEACE INITIATIVE: PMS LUNCH, TRAVEL COSTS

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INFO WSHDC

---PM VISIT: MEDIA

THE NEW YORK TIMES SERVICE AND ASSOCIATED PRESS, WITH THE ACCOMPANYING PHOTO OF THE PM SCOOTING CLOSER TO REAGAN WERE WIDELY CARRIED IN THE SOUTHWEST, WITH LESSER ATTENTION PAID TO EAGLEBURGER'S UNDIPLOMATIC REMARK.

2. FOLLOWING IS COPY OF ONLY EDITORIAL RECEIVED THUS FAR ON THE VISIT, A FAVORABLE ONE IN THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, THE NEWSPAPER NOT/NOT OWNED BY CDNS.

TEXT BEGINS

THE BALL IS IN KREMLINS COURT

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD A VISITOR FROM THE NORTH THIS WEEK, PIERRE TRUDEAU, THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA. TRUDEAU CAME TO THE WHITE HOUSE BEARING, NOT GIFTS, BUT HIS OWN QUOTE PEACE INITIATIVE UNQ, WHICH CALLS FOR A MEETING OF THE WORLDS FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS TO TALK ABOUT ARMS CONTROL.

THE CDN VISITOR MET WITH WHAT MUST BE CALLED A POLITE RECEPTION. REAGAN SAID HE SHARED TRUDEAUS WISH FOR PEACE BUT MADE NO COMMITMENT TO THE PRIME MINISTERS PLAN, WHICH HAS BEEN WELCOMED IN SOME OTHER CAPITALS.

THOSE SO INCLINED WILL FIND IN THE PREEIDENTS FAILURE TO WHOLLY EMBRACE THE TRUDEAU PLAN EVIDENCE OF WHITE HOUSE TRUCULENCE

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Refcc to: FPR
PMO/Kolman
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PAGE TWO YMFC0013 UNCLAS

AND INTRANSIGENCE ON THE ARMS CONTROL ISSUE. BUT THE RECORD CLEARLY SUGGESTS OTHERWISE. IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS THE SOVIET UNION - NOT THE UNITED STATES - HAS CHOSEN TO WALK AWAY FROM ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS IN THREE MAJOR FORUMS. AS A RESULT, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS THERE ARE NOW NO ARMS DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. IT WAS RONALD REAGAN - NOT YURI ANDROPOV - WHO VOWED TO GO ANYWHERE TO SEEK ANSWERS TO THIS PROBLEM. THE PRESIDENT HAS, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, REITERATED THAT DESIRE.

THERE IS LITTLE QUESTION OF TRUDEAUS SINCERITY IN THE MATTER. THERE IS, HOWEVER, AN IMPLIED ASSUMPTION IN HIS PLAN, AS IN OTHERS OF SIMILAR GOOD INTENTION, WHICH IS FLAWED. IT IS THE SHOPWORN IDEA THAT THE BURDEN FOR BRINGING NEW PROPOSALS TO THE TABLE (AND BY FURTHER IMPLICATION, RESPONSIBILITY FOR PAST FAILURES) NECESSARILY LIES WITH THE WEST, PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS STUFF AND NONSENSE. BOTH SIDES MUST SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INITIATIVE. AND SO FAR THE OTHER SIDE HASNT.

ON THE WHOLE MATTER OF ARMS CONTROL THE BALL IS IN THE KREMLINS COURT - AS IT HAS BEEN SINCE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS CEASED TO NEGOTIATE. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS MADE PLAIN HIS WILLINGNESS TO TALK. IT IS UP TO HIS COUNTERPARTS IN THE KYEMLIN TO RETURN TO THE TABLE AND BEGIN BARGAINING IN GOOD FAITH.

TEXT ENDS.

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**ACTION
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INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR PGB PED IDDZ FPR

REF YOURTELS PER0004 03JAN IDDA0003 03JAN

---ZHAO COMMENTS ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE

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RECEIVED
JAN 18 1985

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HE WILL DISCUSS WITH TRUDEAU ANY PEACE PROPOSALS MADE BY LATTER
DURING HIS VISIT TO CDA ON JAN17-23 TEXT ENDS.

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THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
School of Advanced International Studies

CENTER OF CANADIAN STUDIES

ADVISORY COUNCIL TO THE
CENTER OF CANADIAN STUDIES

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January 4, 1984

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James Coutts
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Paul Desmarais
Donald S. Macdonald
William D. Mulholland
Peter M. Towe
Michael H. Wilson

Mr. Louis A. Delvoie, Chairman
Task Force Working Group/IDDZ
Department of External Affairs
Lester B. Pearson Building
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa K1A 0G2

Dear Mr. Delvoie:

We are very pleased that you will be able to meet with our group during our visit to External Affairs next week on January 12. The group will consist of approximately twelve graduate students in international affairs/economics whose geographic area of specialization is Canada. Accompanying the group will be myself and Dr. Charles Doran, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center of Canadian Studies.

Enclosed please find a copy of our most recent Annual Report.

We look forward to meeting with you.

Sincerely yours,

Joel J. Sokolsky
Instructor in Canadian Studies

enclosure as mentioned/



CENTER
OF

CANADIAN
STUDIES

The Johns Hopkins University
Washington, D.C.

FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

CENTER OF CANADIAN STUDIES

1982 - 1983

School of
Advanced
International
Studies

FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

CENTER OF CANADIAN STUDIES

1982 - 1983

September 1983

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I. PREFACE

Canadian Studies at Johns Hopkins has a three-fold mission. Research on Canada and Canadian-U.S. relations, especially in leading policy areas, is a high priority. In conjunction with the other programs of learning at the School, the Center must also provide rigorous instruction to a small group of highly qualified graduate students. Finally, the Center has the obligation to explain matters Canadian to the larger Washington policy community. These tasks merge in a concentrated program of activities that have made the Center a national focal point for research and education on Canada and Canadian-American relations.

In terms of research and writing, Professor Doran's study, Forgotten Partnership: U.S.-Canada Relations Today, will be available in the late fall from The Johns Hopkins University Press. His short research monograph on interdependence was published by The Institute for Research on Public Policy (Ottawa), and several articles appeared in the International Journal and other scholarly journals. Professor Sokolsky has published articles on Canadian security and policy in Policy Options and in the Journal of Royal United Services Institute. Professors Knight and Woroby have published articles in their respective specialities on Canadian monetary policy and on the history of Canadian immigration policy. Doran and Sokolsky are also in the process of completing a monograph sponsored by the Canadian Business Fund, examining the new Canadian lobbying effort with the U.S. Congress. Professor Doran has most recently accepted the co-directorship of a conference scheduled for November 1984 at Arden House leading to the publication of a set of papers on U.S.-Canada relations for the American Assembly and the Council on Foreign Relations.

-2-

With respect to teaching, a new upper level seminar dealing with specialized policy topics was added to the curriculum. The seminar this year examined the nature of public diplomacy and the role of Congress in Canada-U.S. relations, supported in part by a Canadian Business Fund grant whose sponsors were Northern Telecom and other Canadian firms. Two first-year students were honored with summer State Department internships at the Canada desk in Washington and in the U.S. Embassy in Paris, and Center students won the three top positions in the SAIS student government. Despite the recession and the very tight employment situation, Center students found attractive jobs primarily with the two federal governments, international banks, and other multinational firms.

The Center continues to contribute to the lively dialogue on Canada-U.S. relations within the Washington policy community. During the year the Center sponsored two major conferences. The first conference was convened among the leadership of the fifteen international labor unions with the largest membership in Canada. The purpose of the conference was to enable academics and the trade union movement jointly to explore problems in the Canada-U.S. relationship in the areas of trade, investment, acid rain and energy. The second conference was held in June and was entitled "Congress and the Foreign Lobbies: Lessons for Canada." It was attended by governmental policy-makers, businessmen, lawyers, journalists and academics. Front page coverage in the Globe and Mail and major reportage in Macleans indicate the degree of interest in the subject matter of the conference.

In April the Center Advisory Council met in Washington. The afternoon business meeting began with a discussion of the proposed creation

of a new trade-oriented Department at the U.S. Cabinet level. The formal topic of discussion focused upon the impending problems for bilateral and multilateral relations brought on by the telecommunications revolution. Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spoke at lunch on the prospects for economic recovery.

Initially sponsored by USIA (ICA) and open to the Washington policy community, the noonday lecture series by visiting specialists on a variety of Canadian topics was continued into its second year. Center faculty, in turn, were called upon to lecture widely. During the past year Professor Doran was invited to address the 8th Annual Minerals Symposium in Washington, D.C. He also lectured on Canada at Berkeley and at Michigan State, and he delivered a joint paper with Visiting Scholar Brian Job of the University of Minnesota at a conference on Quebec at Harvard. Professor Doran delivered, additionally, two scholarly papers at the International Studies Association meetings in Mexico City and at the Learned Societies meeting in Vancouver. Professor Sokolsky received a NATO fellowship for his analysis of Canada and contemporary maritime strategy in the North Atlantic. He also lectured at SUNY Plattsburgh and at St. Lawrence University and appeared on television and radio in Canada and the U.S.

Culminating the year was an announcement from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation that The Johns Hopkins Center of Canadian Studies had been the recipient of a handsome endowment grant. This grant, given contingent on funds from other sources, expresses the confidence and spirit of the Center as it looks forward to its future of educational service.

II. THE CENTER ADVISORY COUNCIL MEETING

In April this year, the Advisory Council had its second annual meeting at SAIS in Washington. Membership includes distinguished participants from the public and private sectors of Canada and the United States as listed below. The Advisory Council has two purposes. First, it provides the Center and the School with suggestions and information based on the long experience of its members. This information can be extremely helpful in terms of the planning and administration of a program that must be alert to the changing professional needs of government and private communities within the two nations. Second, the content of the Council's proceedings may be helpful to the two governments with respect to the resolution of bilateral difficulties and the anticipation of future trouble spots. The Center provides the members of the Council with an opportunity to discuss in a neutral and informal atmosphere future issues having a two-to-five year time horizon.

Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spoke to the group at lunch on the question of the degree and rapidity of economic recovery. His talk was informal and off-the-record and was followed by a vigorous question and answer period.

At the regular business session in the afternoon, the members examined proposed changes in the Commerce Department and the Special Trade Representative's Office which would lead to a new Department of Industry and Trade. These changes have the potential to impact the

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bilateral relationship positively and significantly. The remainder of the session was devoted to a discussion of telecommunications issues that are likely to arise and to affect Canada-U.S. relations over the next several years.

Canadian Ambassador Gotlieb hosted a reception for the Council members following the discussion session. An informal dinner at the Metropolitan Club concluded the very full day of talks and analysis.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE CENTER ADVISORY COUNCIL

AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS:

- Mr. Robert O. Anderson
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Atlantic Richfield Corporation
- The Honorable Malcolm Baldrige
Secretary of Commerce
- Dr. Joseph V. Charyk
President and Chief Executive Officer
Communications Satellite Corporation
- The Honorable Barber B. Conable, Jr.
U.S. House of Representatives
- Mr. Christian Herter, Jr.
Former Head of U.S. Section
International Joint Commission
- Mr. Donald M. Kendall
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Pepsico, Inc.
- The Honorable Edmund Muskie
Former Secretary of State and Senator
- The Honorable Roger L. Stevens, Chairman
The John F. Kennedy Center for the
Performing Arts

CANADIAN PARTICIPANTS:

- Mr. James Coutts
Former Aide to Prime Minister Trudeau
- Mr. David M. Culver
President and Chief Executive Officer
ALCAN Aluminium Ltd.
- Mr. Paul Desmarais
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Power Corporation of Canada
- The Honorable Donald S. Macdonald
Former Minister of Finance
- Mr. William Mulholland
Chairman of the Board
Bank of Montreal
- The Honorable Peter Towe
Former Ambassador to the United States
Chairman
Petro-Canada International
- The Honorable Michael Wilson
Member of Parliament

III. CONFERENCE ON "THE FOREIGN LOBBIES AND CONGRESS: LESSONS FOR CANADA"

In conjunction with its major research project on Canada and Congress, the Center hosted a unique conference in Washington, D.C. on June 15-16, 1983. The School of Advanced International Studies and the Canadian government each provided partial funding. Noted Canadian scholars on Canada-U.S. relations, well-known Americans in the field of Congressional studies, and individuals from the Washington policy community were brought together for two days of discussion highlighted

by the presentation of scholarly papers. The unique location of the Center of Canadian Studies in the nation's capital has facilitated research on this topic and has made the Center a logical place to hold the conference.

AGENDA

PANEL I:

Moderator: Charles Doran

Principals: Arthur Maass, Harvard University
Introduction and Overview

John Kirton, University of Toronto
"Canadian Perceptions of the
Congressional Role in Foreign Policy"

Discussants: Martha Derthick, The Brookings Institution

Norman Ornstein, American Enterprise
Institute

PANEL II:

Moderator: Charles Doran

Principals: Stephen Clarkson, University of Toronto
"The Capabilities of the Governments of
Canada to Deal with Congress"

Dennis Stairs, Dalhousie University
"Public versus Quiet Diplomacy in the
Canadian-U.S. Context"

Discussants: Edward Nef, Edward Nef Associates

Abraham Rotstein, University of Toronto

Dinner

Speaker:

Jeremy Kinsman, Minister
Embassy of Canada
"Lobbying in Washington: A Canadian
Perspective"

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PANEL III:

Moderator: Joel Sokolsky, Center of Canadian Studies

Principals: Fred Holborn, SAIS
"Congressional Attitudes on Foreign
Lobbying"

Fred Thompson, Columbia University
"Interest Groups and Public Policy:
Canada and the United States"

Discussants: Walter Pincus, The Washington Post

Roger Davidson, Congressional Research
Services

PANEL IV:

Moderator: Charles Doran

Principals: Donald Barry, University of Calgary
"U.S.-Canadian Relations and the East
Coast Fisheries Agreement"

Alan Murray, The Congressional Quarterly
"Japan and Congress"

Discussants: Peter Morici, National Planning Association

David Cox, Queen's University

PANEL V:

Moderator: Charles Doran

Principals: Robert Jackson, Carleton University
"Lobbying in Canada"

Robert Peabody, The Johns Hopkins University
"What is the Legislative Impact of Foreign
Government Lobbying?"

Discussants: Rufus Smith, Association of Canadian Studies
in the United States

Nelson Polsby, Roosevelt Center for
American Policy Studies

Luncheon
Speaker:

Congressman Don Baker, Washington
"Lobbying in Washington: A Congressional
Perspective"

IV. LABOR CONFERENCE ON CANADIAN-U.S. RELATIONS

Lucius Battle, Chairman of the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, moderated the symposium on "The Crisis in U.S.-Canada Relations," held in October for the leadership of the major international unions with membership in Canada. As its attention to problems involving Poland, Central America and Japan suggest, the international labor movement has demonstrated a growing sensitivity towards world events and concerns. However, the vast interdependence of the U.S. and Canadian economies makes this bilateral relationship of particular importance to U.S. labor unions.

The objective of the conference was to provide an opportunity for faculty members to acquaint labor leaders with the Center's close observation and study of the issues affecting U.S.-Canadian relations and governmental responses to them, and, in turn, to enable scholars to hear first-hand the views of labor on those issues at the core of the difficulties between the two countries.

The faculty of the Canadian Center presenting commentary included Professors Tamara Woroby, Malcolm Knight, Joel Sokolsky and Charles Doran. The agenda covered problems in the trade and commercial areas, the changing international energy situation and the U.S. response to Canada's National Energy Program, the worsening environmental situation associated with acid rain, and the institutional interaction between the two governments. Ample time was left for discussion and examination of these issues in the light of the concerns of the labor unions.

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Present at the conference were Tom Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, Ken Brown, President of the Graphic Arts Union, Lynn Williams, International Secretary of the U.S. Steel Workers, and a number of other officers and union leaders. A dinner followed the afternoon discussion seminar and was attended by members of the U.S. State Department and the Government of Canada as well.

UNIONS REPRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE

AFL-CIO	Machinists
Autoworkers	Newspaper Guild
Carpenters	Office Employees
Clothing & Textile	Railway Clerks
Electrical, Radio	Rubber Workers
Electrical Workers	Service Employees
Food & Commercial	Steelworkers
Graphic Arts	Transit

V. USIA LECTURE SERIES

The Center was awarded a grant from the U.S. Information Agency in 1981/82 to sponsor a series of lectures throughout the academic year. Prominent Canadian and American speakers were invited to present their views on such subjects as the Canadian economy, foreign relations, domestic politics, the Constitution, defense and environmental questions to an audience of fifty to sixty participants from U.S. governmental,

private and public sectors, and the press. This noon lecture series soon became a significant forum for the study of matters Canadian for the larger Washington community.

With remaining funds from the grant, the Center was able to sponsor three additional luncheon/lectures this academic year, bringing the total number of prominent Canadian and American speakers in this series to thirteen. In addition to the ten speakers during the previous academic year, the Center was pleased to welcome Professor Richard Leach, Director of Canadian Studies at Duke University, who treated the problem of federalism and federal/provincial relations in the aftermath of Constitutional patriation; Mr. William Diebold, Jr., Senior Fellow on the Council of Foreign Relations, who discussed Canadian trade and commercial policy; and Professor Herbert Quinn of Concordia, who presented views emanating from his current research on the Quebec liberal party since the Quiet Revolution.

VI. SPEAKERS, VISITORS, & VISITING SCHOLARS

In conjunction with the Security Studies Program at the School, the Center co-sponsored a visit by Dr. George Ignatieff, Chancellor, University of Toronto, who spoke on Canadian perceptions of the current arms control effort and the problems confronting Canada regarding the testing of the cruise missile. Under the auspices of the Alliance française and SAIS, the Center was very pleased to welcome Mr. Raymond Gosselin, Delegate General, Government of Quebec (New York), whose talk in French was heavily attended by people in the Washington francophone community, as well as by the French Department faculty

and SAIS students currently studying French. Afterward, a luncheon in his honor was given at the Alliance française headquarters on Wyoming Avenue, to which Center faculty and staff were invited. In addition to the the above lectures, the Center sponsored a number of other distinguished guests throughout the year as follows:

SPEAKER

TOPIC

Mr. Ed Neufeld
Senior Vice President & Chief Economist
The Royal Bank of Canada

Current Canadian domestic and
international monetary and
financial developments

Professor Fred Lazar
York University

Canadian industrial policy

Mr. James Matkin
Deputy Minister, Intergovernmental Affairs
Province of British Columbia

Canadian/American relations from a
Western perspective

Mr. James R. Hurley
Director of Constitutional Planning
Canadian Cabinet Secretariat

The Canadian Constitution:
New directions in federalism

From time to time, the Center hosts small luncheons for visitors to which other members of the SAIS faculty and those with mutual interests throughout the policy community are invited. Mr. David Peterson, Leader of the Liberal Party, Government of Ontario, and Mr. John Halstead, former Canadian Ambassador to NATO and currently with Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, were two of our special guests.

Each year, lecturers from outside the Center are invited to participate in Canadian courses. These lecturers included: Dr. John M. Curtis, Director of the International Economics Program, Institute for Research on Public Policy (Ottawa); Mr. Robert Montgomery, Assistant Director of Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Dr. Norman London, Director of Academic Relations at the Canadian Embassy; and Professor Martin Lubin, currently on

sabbatical at the University of California.

A number of visiting fellows and scholars with research interests in Canadian Studies and in U.S./Canada relations are invited to make use of the Center's and the School's facilities. Those individuals who have recently been in residence at the Center include: Mr. Arthur Smith, former director of the National Planning Association; Mr. Christian A. Herter, Jr., former chairman of the U.S. Section of the International Joint Commission; Dr. Brian Job, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota; Dr. Brigitte Schroeder, Professor of Political Science, University of Montreal; and Dr. David Cox, Professor of Political Science, Queen's University. Participation by these individuals and others in research seminars and policy discussions serves to enrich the scholarly activity of the Center and provide varying perspectives to the SAIS student.

VII. CULTURAL SEMINAR SERIES INAUGURATED

In response to student requests, the Center inaugurated a Canadian Cultural series during the second semester. This three-part series proved quite successful, and the Center plans its continuation during the coming academic year.

The first speaker in the series was Dr. Ellen Babby, Executive Officer for the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States (ACSUS), who gave a historic overview of trends in Canadian literature from the 1800's to the present. The second speaker, Dr. Peter van Lent, Professor of French and French Canadian Literature at St. Lawrence University, concentrated on various aspects of Quebecois literature, and analyzed several poems in French for the group.

As its final speaker in the series, the Center was very pleased to welcome Mrs. Sandra Gotlieb, noted author and wife of Ambassador Allan Gotlieb, who gave a reading from her latest novel, A Woman of Consequence. Mrs. Gotlieb's delightful humor was a much-needed diversion during exam week.

VIII. LIBRARY GRANTS AND ACQUISITIONS

The Center continued to receive its annual library grant from the Government of Canada. Over the past few years the fund has been used to fill gaps in our holdings in Canadian government, politics, economics, foreign policy and defense. This year, the Center was able to use more of the grant to acquire the most recent works in these fields, as well as to maintain our extensive Canadian periodical holdings and the latest publications of research institutes.

Under a special grant from the Canadian government, the Center was able to expand greatly its microfilm and microfiche holdings. Purchased under this grant were several years of the Globe & Mail and the Canadian News Index, two excellent research tools.

The Center continues to make purchases in the field of Quebec Studies from a previous grant for this purpose made available by the Government of Quebec.

With well over four thousand monographs, thirty periodical subscriptions, and other research sources, the SAIS library is today one of the most important sources of specialized policy information on Canada in the United States.

IX. ARTWORK DONATED TO THE CENTER

The Center recently acquired thirty original caricatures from Mr. Don Evans, also known as Isaac Bickerstaff professionally, whose drawings have appeared in Friends, Hosers and Countrymen, Canajan, Eh?, and French Canajan, Hé? These politically-oriented caricatures of well-known individuals in both Canada and the United States will be displayed in Center offices. The grand opening of the "gallery" will take place in September, with Mr. Evans as the Center's special guest. The Center will invite members of the press, the Washington community, and the Embassy to this event.

X. CURRICULUM

The SAIS M.A. candidates specializing in Canadian Studies must take six courses in this area while completing courses in international economics, foreign policy analysis and comparative government as well. The candidate must also acquire a working knowledge of French demonstrated by (1) translation of written materials both from English into French and from French into English, and (2) a one-half hour discussion, in French, of contemporary policy issues with experts in the field.

This year, the Center offered seven courses. Professor Woroby taught the Evolution of the Canadian Polity. Professor Sokolsky taught Canadian Government and Politics, and Canadian National Defense Policy.

Professor Malcolm Knight, a member of the research staff of the International Monetary Fund, returned to teach his course on the Canadian Economy. Professors Doran and Sokolsky also taught a required course in Canadian/American Relations.

Professor Doran also introduced a special research seminar on Advanced Topics in Canada/U.S. Relations, taught jointly with Professor Sokolsky. This seminar was offered in conjunction with a major research project underway at the Center examining recent trends in Canadian/American diplomacy, in particular Canada's new emphasis on relations with Congress. Participating in the seminar were a number of outside guests from the Canadian Embassy, Congress, and the State Department. A student taking the course was invited to examine one particular aspect of Canada's relations with Congress and to present findings to the seminar group in the form of an oral presentation and a final written report.

Last year, the Center made the Quebec Society and Politics course mandatory and changed the format to offer it every other year. This change makes more efficient use of the funds needed to bring in lectures from Quebec, while ensuring that all students have at least one opportunity to take the course. Financial support from the Government of Quebec, which partially offsets the cost of the course, is greatly appreciated. This year, distinguished lecturers from Quebec included:

LECTURER

TOPIC

Professor Louis Balthazar
Université Laval

Historical background of Quebec nationalism
and its evolution

Professor Storrs McCall
McGill University

The anglophone community of Quebec

Professor Francois LaCasse
Université de Sherbrooke

The Quebec economy



LECTURER

TOPIC

Professor Daniel Latouche
McGill University

Quebec and Quebec/Federal relations

Marie Claire Kirkland-Casgrain
Provincial Court of Quebec

The Quebec judicial system and the
Bourasse years

Professor Dale Thomson
McGill University

The legacy of the Quiet Revolution

The Center did not take its study trip to Canada this year. In past years, the Center has assumed an ever-increasing share of the cost of the transportation, subsidizing student airfare in order to minimize time lost on travel and the risks associated with a long car trip in mid-winter. In an effort to continue covering these costs, it was decided that the trip would be conducted once every two years to ensure maximum participation and effective use of available funds. The trip will be offered once again in January 1984. The Center appreciates the continued support of the Government of Canada in partially offsetting these expenses.

XI. STUDENTS

In 1982/83, Center enrollment continued to be high, with 18 M.A. candidates concentrating in Canadian Studies. This enrollment is near the maximum considered appropriate for the program. The majority of students are American, many of whom have had some background in Canadian studies at the undergraduate level. Over the last few years, Center faculty have made a special effort to maintain contacts with the undergraduate programs in Canadian studies in the United States through professional exchanges and

lectures. As a result, for example, the Center will welcome students from the Canadian Studies programs at St. Lawrence University and SUNY Plattsburgh in September. Continuing as well is enrollment by Canadian students seeking to study Canada through the broader international perspective. Enrollment in the M.A. program for academic year 1982/83 is as follows:

FIRST-YEAR STUDENTS

Christiane Loiselle	Can.	University of Minnesota
David Oliver	U.S.	McGill University
Eric Scheinkopf	U.S.	Hamilton College
Laura Neil Smith	U.S.	Bennington College
David Staples	Can.	University of Cincinnati
Alec Stone	U.S.	Western Washington University

SECOND-YEAR STUDENTS

Barbara Brereton	U.S.	Wellesley College
Marie-Claire Brien	U.S.	University of California at Davis
David Crum	U.S.	St. Lawrence University
Linda Filardi	U.S.	SUNY Plattsburgh
Rob Gian	U.S.	Hamilton College
Terry Hall	Can.	Queen's University
Jaime Harper	Can.	Bowdoin College
Tod Hutchins	U.S.	Wesleyan University
Pat McGurn	U.S.	Duke University
Bill Sabourin	U.S.	SUNY Albany
Anne-Marie Stanley	U.S.	St. Lawrence University
Ellen Stolfa	U.S.	McGill University

This year three Center students, Anne-Marie Stanley, Ellen Stolfa, and Marie-Claire Brien, won the three top positions in the SAIS student government. Two first-year students, Eric Scheinkopf and Alec Stone, were honored with summer State Department internships at the Canada Desk in Washington and in the

U.S. Embassy in Paris, respectively.

The Center is proud to announce that one of our Ph.D. candidates, Mr. Larry Kohler, successfully completed an excellent dissertation and oral defense on Canadian/American Oil Diplomacy: The Adjustment of Conflicting National Oil Policies, 1955-1973. Ms. Abby Gilbert, SAIS Canadian Studies graduate and presently and analyst with the U.S Treasury Department, is continuing her doctoral thesis on the analysis of U.S. decision-making toward Canada in trade and commerce during the Nixon years, with special emphasis on the beef trade. Col. David Stothers, a Canadian citizen who received his Master of International Public Policy degree at SAIS, is pursuing research on the impact of military procurement in Canada on industrialization policy and regional development.

Accepted into the Ph.D. program at the Center this year is Ms. Sarah Stevens, currently employed in a teaching position at Blair Academy. Ms. Stevens holds an M.A. from SAIS where she specialized in Canadian Studies, and an M.A. in Economic History from the London School of Economics. She will devote her efforts at the Center to research on Canadian trade policy.

XII. ONGOING RESEARCH BY CENTER FACULTY

Professor CHARLES DORAN, director of the Center, has just completed a broad historical and theoretical study of U.S./Canada relations for the Johns Hopkins University Press. According to John Holmes, the distinguished Canadian specialist on Canadian foreign policy and the former director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Dr. Doran's study is "by far

the best analysis an American has ever made of the U.S.-Canada relationship." This book is due to appear during the fall of 1983. In addition to this major volume, Dr. Doran has recently completed a smaller research monograph for the Institute for Research on Public Policy (Ottawa), which examines the impact of commercial interdependence between Canada and the U.S. on the Canadian sense of cultural and political autonomy. Two recent articles in the International Journal trace contemporary U.S. foreign policy toward Canada, while another article, co-authored with Professor Brian Job of the University of Minnesota and originally presented as a paper at a Harvard conference, treats the U.S. attitude toward the province of Quebec and francophone Canada.

A larger research project, jointly undertaken with Professor Sokolsky and funded by a grant from the Canadian Business Fund, examines the history of foreign government lobbying and Congress with an emphasis on the Canadian experience. As a result of the year-long research exercise, a monograph on the limits and prospects of Canadian government lobbying in Washington viewed both from the Canadian and American perspective will be forthcoming during the summer of 1983. The project culminated in a conference on this subject, the details of which can be found in Section III.

In addition, Professor Doran has recently been asked to co-edit a volume on U.S.-Canada relations funded jointly by the American Assembly and the Council on Foreign Relations. These papers will be presented at a four-day conference at Arden House in November, 1984, and will subsequently be published by the two sponsoring organizations.

JOEL SOKOLSKY specializes in Canadian security matters, federal/provincial relations, and domestic political institutions. A NATO fellowship supported his Harvard doctoral thesis on NATO maritime strategy which is

① scheduled for completion this year. Under a Magowan grant from the research program of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, he is also finishing a monograph on Canadian forces' maritime roles in the light of new developments in naval warfare. He is contributing to a book produced by the National Security Studies Group at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, on the same general topic. For the fall of 1983, he has been asked to contribute an article on Canadian defense policy to Conflict Quarterly, a Canadian international affairs journal. Recent publications on related topics and on federal/provincial relations have appeared in the Journal of Royal United Services Institute (London) and in Policy Options (Ottawa).

TAMARA WOROBY is an expert on Canadian economic policy and history. Her principal research interest is the impact of Canadian immigration policy on Canadian income distribution. Dr. Woroby has written on the determinants of American migration to Canada and on various aspects of bilateral and sectoral trade policy between the United States and Canada. During the spring semester of 1983, she was on leave in Western Europe doing comparative research on immigration policy and income distribution. In 1983, she received a "Distinguished Woman of the Year" award from the Junior Chamber of Commerce.

MALCOLM KNIGHT is an expert on the Canadian economy and on various aspects of balance of payments and monetary policy. He is currently writing a monograph entitled "Canadian Economy: Structure and Development", in addition to undertaking empirical research on the factors responsible for current account developments in non-oil-developing countries. Another area of considerable interest to Canada and to the United States is Dr.

Knight's work on theoretical and empirical analysis of current account adjustment and on the international debt burden of non-oil-developing countries. His most recent publication is an article entitled, "Economic Change and Policy Response in Canada under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates," co-authored with Donald J. Mathieson.

XIII. BUDGET (July 1, 1982 - September 30, 1983)

EXPENSES:

Faculty salaries and benefits	\$ 76,993
Staff salaries and benefits	21,620
Research assistants	7,680
Office expenses (supplies, postage, xerox, telephone, etc.)	6,918
Seminar expenses, publications, honoraria, etc.	9,086
Travel (fundraising, guest lecturers, etc.)	10,592
Library acquisitions	1,591
Fellowships	54,376
TOTAL EXPENSES:	\$188,856

REVENUES:

Endowment income	\$ 88,241
Special Reserve Fund	30,601
Corporate fellowships/grants	41,625
Canadian government	24,186
Quebec government	2,500
U.S. government	1,703
TOTAL REVENUES:	\$188,856

XIV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF FUNDING

The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies is very pleased to announce receipt of a \$350,000 challenge grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. The grant, which must be matched two to one with additional new restricted endowment funds, is designed to strengthen the research and teaching programs of the SAIS Center of Canadian Studies.

The Center of Canadian Studies was created with the help of a grant of \$1 million (over five years) from the William H. Donner Foundation in the United States. In 1975, the Donner Foundation made an additional grant of \$250,000 toward a \$1 million endowment for the Center. Two other large gifts for the endowment were contributed by The Arthur Vining Davis Foundation (\$500,000), and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (\$250,000).

Other major contributions to the Center over the years have been received from:

- The Exxon Corporation
- International Nickel Company
- Aluminium Company of Canada, Ltd.
- Government of Canada
- Government of Quebec
- PPG Industries
- Salomon Brothers
- Canadian Business Fund
- Crown Zellerbach

The Center greatly appreciates the generous gifts of these and other donors in the support of Canadian Studies at SAIS.

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INFO WSHDC

---PM VISIT: MEDIA

THE NEW YORK TIMES SERVICE AND ASSOCIATED PRESS, WITH THE ACCOMPANYING PHOTO OF THE PM SCOOTING CLOSER TO REAGAN WERE WIDELY CARRIED IN THE SOUTHWEST, WITH LESSER ATTENTION PAID TO EAGLEBURGER'S UNDIPLOMATIC REMARK.

2. FOLLOWING IS COPY OF ONLY EDITORIAL RECEIVED THUS FAR ON THE VISIT, A FAVORABLE ONE IN THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, THE NEWSPAPER NOT/NOT OWNED BY CDNS.

TEXT BEGINS

THE BALL IS IN KREMLINS COURT

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD A VISITOR FROM THE NORTH THIS WEEK, PIERRE TRUDEAU, THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA. TRUDEAU CAME TO THE WHITE HOUSE BEARING, NOT GIFTS, BUT HIS OWN QUOTE PEACE INITIATIVE UNQ, WHICH CALLS FOR A MEETING OF THE WORLDS FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS TO TALK ABOUT ARMS CONTROL.

THE CDN VISITOR MET WITH WHAT MUST BE CALLED A POLITE RECEPTION. REAGAN SAID HE SHARED TRUDEAUS WISH FOR PEACE BUT MADE NO COMMITMENT TO THE PRIME MINISTERS PLAN, WHICH HAS BEEN WELCOMED IN SOME OTHER CAPITALS.

THOSE SO INCLINED WILL FIND IN THE PREEDENTS FAILURE TO WHOLLY EMBRACE THE TRUDEAU PLAN EVIDENCE OF WHITE HOUSE TRUCULENCE

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AND INTRANSIGENCE ON THE ARMS CONTROL ISSUE. BUT THE RECORD CLEARLY SUGGESTS OTHERWISE. IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS THE SOVIET UNION - NOT THE UNITED STATES - HAS CHOSEN TO WALK AWAY FROM ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS IN THREE MAJOR FORUMS. AS A RESULT, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS THERE ARE NOW NO ARMS DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. IT WAS RONALD REAGAN - NOT YURI ANDROPOV - WHO VOWED TO GO ANYWHERE TO SEEK ANSWERS TO THIS PROBLEM. THE PRESIDENT HAS, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, REITERATED THAT DESIRE.

THERE IS LITTLE QUESTION OF TRUDEAU'S SINCERITY IN THE MATTER. THERE IS, HOWEVER, AN IMPLIED ASSUMPTION IN HIS PLAN, AS IN OTHERS OF SIMILAR GOOD INTENTION, WHICH IS FLAWED. IT IS THE SHOPWORN IDEA THAT THE BURDEN FOR BRINGING NEW PROPOSALS TO THE TABLE (AND BY FURTHER IMPLICATION, RESPONSIBILITY FOR PAST FAILURES) NECESSARILY LIES WITH THE WEST, PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS STUFF AND NONSENSE. BOTH SIDES MUST SHARE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INITIATIVE. AND SO FAR THE OTHER SIDE HASN'T.

ON THE WHOLE MATTER OF ARMS CONTROL THE BALL IS IN THE KREMLIN'S COURT - AS IT HAS BEEN SINCE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS CEASED TO NEGOTIATE. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS MADE PLAIN HIS WILLINGNESS TO TALK. IT IS UP TO HIS COUNTERPARTS IN THE KREMLIN TO RETURN TO THE TABLE AND BEGIN BARGAINING IN GOOD FAITH.

TEXT ENDS.

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AM-T, JEAN

TRUDEAU Will Take Peace Initiative to United Nations

OTTAWA; JAN 3; REUTER - CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU; TRYING TO HALT THE ARMS RACE WITH A ONE-MAN PEACE CRUSADE; WILL DISCUSS HIS DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES WITH U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN NEW YORK NEXT WEEK.

A SPOKESMAN IN TRUDEAU'S OFFICE SAID TRUDEAU WOULD MAKE A ONE-DAY VISIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS NEXT WEDNESDAY.

TRUDEAU; NATO'S LONGEST-SERVING PRIME MINISTER; HAS VISITED SIX WEST EUROPEAN CAPITALS; THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT IN NEW DELHI; JAPAN; CHINA AND MOST RECENTLY WASHINGTON IN A BID TO GET THE SUPERPOWERS TO TONE DOWN THEIR ANGRY RHETORIC.

THE CANADIAN LEADER; WHO HAS BEEN POLITELY RECEIVED BUT WON NO SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS; HAS CALLED FOR A CONFERENCE OF THE WORLD'S FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS; A BAN ON "STAR WARS" ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS AND A BOOST TO CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTION TALKS.

A PLANNED TRUDEAU VISIT TO MOSCOW HAS BEEN THWARTED BY SOVIET LEADER YURI ANDROPOV'S ILL HEALTH.
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814

AM-TRUDEAU; 1ST ADD: 0240
OTTAWA - 1ST ADD 812. . QUESTION. * *

LATE JANUARY?

IF TRUDEAU SUCCEEDS IN SETTING UP A MOSCOW TRIP IT WILL NOT LIKELY HAPPEN UNTIL AT LEAST LATE THIS MONTH; AFTER THE 35-COUNTRY EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE WHICH OPENS JAN. 17 IN STOCKHOLM.

THAT CONFERENCE HAS BEEN UPGRADED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL; A MOVE URGED BY TRUDEAU AS PART OF HIS CALL FOR MORE EAST-WEST COMMUNICATION. SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO AND U.S. STATE SECRETARY GEORGE SCHULZ WILL ATTEND AND WILL ALSO HOLD PRIVATE TALKS IN THE SWEDISH CAPITAL JAN. 18.

IT IS UNLIKELY TRUDEAU COULD SQUEEZE IN A MOSCOW TRIP BEFORE THEN.

AFTER HIS MEETING IN NEW YORK WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR; WHICH MAKES UP FOR A PROPOSED MEETING THAT FELL THROUGH LAST MONTH; TRUDEAU PLAYS HOST HERE JAN. 12-13 TO MALAYSIAN PRIME MINISTER MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD AND JAN. 16-17 TO CHINESE PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG.

THE PRIME MINISTER MAY ALSO TRAVEL TO VANCOUVER FOR A STATE DINNER FOR ZHAO JAN. 22.

OFFICIALS SAY TRUDEAU WOULD PREFER TO GO TO MOSCOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE; AS A LOGICAL FOLLOW-UP TO PREVIOUS CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY EUROPEAN LEADERS; COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES; THE CHINESE AND U.S. PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN.

BUT THERE MAY BE ANOTHER UNSPOKEN REASON FOR HIS HASTE. IF TRUDEAU IS PLANNING TO ANNOUNCE HIS RETIREMENT SOMETIME THIS WINTER; AS MANY OBSERVERS SUSPECT; HE WOULD WANT TO GET THE MOSCOW TRIP OUT OF THE WAY FIRST.

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT IDDX0003 03JAN88⁴

TO PEKIN

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR PER FPR

---PM INITIATIVE

CBC RADIO REPORTS PREMIER ZHAO AS HAVING SAID QUOTE CHINA DESIRES
PEACE.WE DO NOT/NOT WANT TO SEE A HOT WAR OR A COLD WAR;SO IN MY FORTH-
COMING VISIT TO CANADA.ILL BE DISCUSSING ANY SUGGESTIONS OR
PROPOSALS THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU MAY SUGGEST TO
ME IN THIS REGARD.UNQUOTE.

2.CBC CORRESPONDENT J.F.LEPINE THEN OBSERVED QUOTE THE CANADIAN PEACE
INITIATIVE WILL BE DISCUSSED IN OTTAWA WHEN PRIME MINISTER ZHAO
ZIYANG WILL VISIT CANADA LATER THIS MONTH.CANADIAN DIPLOMATS IN PEKING
SAY TODAY S STATEMENT IS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN ON THE PART OF CHINA.
UNQUOTE.

3.GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE FULL TEXT OF ZHAO S STATEMENT IF AVAILABLE,AND
YOUR ASSESSMENT OF IT.

CCC/026 032316Z IDDX0003

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20-1-1-1
→ 28-6-1-1 TRUDEAU
PEACE MISSION

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TRUTH MISSION

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AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES
J. M. M. F. L. O.

TO A Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs, OTTAWA (IDDZ)

FROM De The Canadian Embassy, BELGRADE

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT Prime Minister's Initiative:
Sujet Yugoslav Reaction

SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED
Sécurité

DATE January 3, 1984

NUMBER BGRAD-001
Numéro

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
MISSION	28

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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Attached is an office translation of a commentary on the Prime Minister's initiative which appeared in the Belgrade daily "Politika" on December 24, 1983.

Sam Hanson
for The Embassy

B1 B2 B3

POLITIKA 24 12 83

TRUDEAU'S PEACE PLAN

No one wants to "flatly reject". So far, this has been the most characteristic feature of the latest "peace initiative" of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, about which the Canadian Prime Minister has informed more than 30 statesmen around the world. The feature is not discouraging - for starters.

Essentially, Trudeau's initiative involves a plea to "turn the trend" concerning the aggravated international situation, characterized by deep conflicts and escalation of armament.

The concrete proposal of Canada's statesman includes the meeting of the five nuclear super-powers, the ban on tests of anti-satellite systems, renewal of efforts and attempts to limit the spreading of nuclear arms both vertically and horizontally. Canadian Prime Minister's ideas might be taken into consideration in re-opening of the East-West dialogue.

Actually, there have already been noted the different nuances of support to Trudeau's initiative during his tour. In Brussels, den Hague, Tokyo, Vatican and at the summit of Commonwealth countries in Delhi, the support was "very warm", according to the reports. "A polite" support was given in Paris, London, Rome and Bonn talks with his colleagues. Among the nuclear powers (although the meeting in Moscow hasn't taken place yet) the most interested seems to be China: Prime Minister Jao Tsiyang invited Trudeau to visit Beijing after the Delhi summit ends, pointing out that the world's most populated country wishes for a nuclear reduction, but, same as Britain and France, insists on the super-powers making the first step in that direction.

"The President supported all that is known as "my peace initiative", although I believe that our talk meant more than just support"; this was Trudeau's comment after the recent talk with Reagan, about which the American officials added that "we wish a general talk with the Soviets" and that "Reagan doesn't want to meet Andropov just for the purpose of meeting", in other words, he doesn't want a "meeting that wouldn't produce results".

According to Canadian press, the former Canadian Ambassador to Moscow Jeoffrey Pearson, after informal talks with Soviet officials, pointed to "rather large chances" of Trudeau's being invited to Moscow. There's also talk about "an open invitation from Andropov"...

And the Prime Minister of the world's second largest country keeps on repeating that "no country is great because of the size of its army. It is as influential in the world as its heart is big and its conscience wide". This might sound "poetic", but sometimes these words aren't far from truth.

N. Dragović

mmt/31229-1



MESSAGE

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---PM INITIATIVE

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AND YOUR ASSESSMENT OF IT.

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PROGRAM: EMISSION:	NATIONAL NEWS	DATE: JANUARY 3, 1984 DATE:
NETWORK / STATION: RESEAU / STATION:	CTV/CJOH	TIME: 11:00 PM HEURE:

CTV: Some encouraging overtures have rejuvenated Prime Minister Trudeau's global peace initiative. Next week Mr. Trudeau will meet with UN Secretary Perez de Cuellar and Chinese premier Zhao (?) has offered his support for the peace plan. However, one major stumbling block remains. That is an invitation to the Soviet Union. But as Jim Munson, the Soviets may be changing their mind.

REPORTER: Last week Kremlin leaders were emerged in their central committee meetings and the Soviet parliament. The absence of the Soviet president Yuri Andropov was a key factor since he is instrument to stage two of Trudeau's peace mission. But with the Christmas and New Year breaks over Soviet officials such as Yeugeny Pozdnykov of the Embassy in Ottawa re giving our hints, hints that the Prime Minister will soon be given a list of dates to go to Moscow. Says Pozdnykov, I think things will happen soon. Perhaps there will be dates in another week or so. Asked who would Trudeau see, Pozdnykov replied, I would presume the somebody in the top echelon would see him, perhaps on the

../2

level of Prime Minister Tikenov (?). Pozdnykov also stressed
Trudeau would be welcomed by the Soviet hierarchy.

POZDNYKOV: Well, if Prime Minister comes to the Soviet Union
he'll be not only well received, but very positively
received and I think that positive results will come out of this
visit.

REPORTER: But before there is any visit to Moscow the Prime
Minister is off to New York next week in a private
meeting with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuallar. It's all
part of his continuing consultations with world leaders on his
peace initiative. Jim Munson, CTV News, Ottawa.

* * *

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
January 3, 1984
Number/Numéro
FPR-0002

TO/À

FILE TRANSCRIPT

FROM/DE

FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCESUBJECT •
SUJET

CBC 0800 3 January 1984
Prime Minister's Peace Initiative -
Possibility of Wider Support from China

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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CBC: China has indicated it may give wider support to Prime Minister Trudeau's peace initiative. The Chinese Prime Minister made the comment today at a news conference in Peking as he prepares for a visit to Canada and the United States later this month. Jean-François Lépine reports.

Jean-François Lépine: When Pierre Trudeau extended his peace mission to Peking last November, Chinese authorities greeted him with a rather cool reception. Mr. Trudeau himself told journalists at that time his Chinese counterpart, Zhao Ziyang, had responded coolly to his proposal of a five-power conference on nuclear disarmament. Today, after more than a month since he first heard of Pierre Trudeau's initiative, Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang showed at least he wanted to know more about it.

Translator: "China desires peace. We do not want to see ~~like~~ a hot war or a cold war. So in my forthcoming visit to Canada, I'll be discussing any suggestions or proposals the Right Honourable Prime Minister Trudeau may suggest to me in this regard."

J.F.L.: "The Canadian peace initiative will be discussed in Ottawa when Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang will visit Canada later this month. Canadian diplomats in Peking say today's statement is an encouraging sign on the part of China." Jean-François Lépine, CBC News, Peking.

John J. Noble
Director
Media Relations



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

STC/DIARY/CHRON/CIRC/FILE

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DISTR	DISTR PGB PED IDDZ	28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION		
REF	---ZHAO COMMENTS ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE	C28-6-1		
SUBJ/SUJ	WE HAVE RECEIVED PARTIAL AND SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTORY REPORTS OF COMMENTS MADE BY ZHAO ZIYANG AT 02JAN PRESS CONF HIGHLIGHTING HIS UPCOMING USA/CDN VISIT. REMARKS APPARENTLY INCLUDE ENDORSEMENT OF EITHER SUBSTANCE OF PMS PEACE/SECURITY INITIATIVE OR AT LEAST PMS INTENT AND TACTICS (NOT/NOT CLEAR WHICH). GRATEFUL YOUR REPORT BY RETURN TEL (FOR INCLUSION IN SCENARIO BRIEF) ON JUST WHAT ZHAO SAID ABOUT CDN VISIT IN GENERAL AND PMS INITIATIVE IN PARTICULAR, INCLUDING CLARIFICATION OF ABOVE POINT RE SUBSTANCE/INTENT.			

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R.H. DAVIDSON

CONFIDENTIAL

January 3, 1984

IDDZ-0002

Memorandum for the Prime Minister (through R.R. Fowler)

Initiative: Visit to Moscow

President Andropov's failure to appear at last week's meetings of the Central Committee and of the Supreme Soviet has given rise to a new flurry of speculation regarding his health and his role in the Soviet leadership. Most serious observers admit to being totally in the dark regarding Andropov's health and refuse to venture any firm predictions as to when he may be expected to recover, or otherwise. It is our judgment, however, that whatever may be wrong with Andropov, he remains at present the dominant political influence in the country whether through his continuing direct control of affairs or through the intermediary of a group of close associates acting in his name. What seems far less certain is whether the Soviet leadership has yet worked out the policy it wishes to pursue in East-West relations in the aftermath of the first deployments of American INF weapon systems in Europe.

Against this background, there would appear to be three broad options on the basis of which to pursue plans for your visit to Moscow in the context of your peace initiative. These are outlined below, along with some of the considerations affecting each:

(A) Await a response from the Soviet Union in the expectation that this will eventually produce a visit involving meetings with President Andropov.

This would appear to be the preferred option of the Soviet authorities. They have repeatedly asked both Geoffrey Pearson and Peter Roberts that we not press them on the timing of a visit; they have encouraged us to be patient, while at the same time assuring us that your visit would be high on the agenda of the Soviet leadership, with the unspoken assumption that it would take place as soon as possible after Andropov's recovery.

In purely substantive terms, this would appear to be the preferred option. It would not only permit you to engage in a dialogue with the most authoritative leader in the country (as you have in the course of your visits to other countries in pursuit of the initiative), but would also provide some assurance that the Soviet leadership, with Andropov's involvement, had given due consideration to the line it might take in East-West relations in the aftermath of the first deployments of INF systems in Western Europe.

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- 2 -

On the other hand, this approach could lead to the indefinite postponement of your visit to Moscow in view of the uncertainties prevailing regarding Andropov's health, a state of uncertainty which may continue for quite some time. This could in turn mean that you might find it necessary to terminate your intensive personal involvement in this initiative, which is primarily geared to the politics of East-West relations, without direct contact with the Soviet leadership. The drawbacks, both substantive and presentational, of such an eventuality are readily evident.

(B) Propose a visit to Moscow by the DPM/SSEA, without precluding a later visit by the Prime Minister.

The principal arguments in favour of this approach are made in the attached telegram from our ambassador in Moscow, which we recommend to your attention, since it also assesses very cogently the current state of affairs within the Soviet leadership.

While a visit by the DPM/SSEA might produce some highly valuable exchanges with Soviet leaders on the themes of your initiative, it would not be seen either in Canada or elsewhere as a substitute for a visit by you, in view of the very personal nature which your initiative has assumed to date. After an early visit by the DPM/SSEA, all of the uncertainty which now exists about the possibility of a visit by you involving meetings with President Andropov might well continue to prevail. We would thus not necessarily be any further advanced than by pursuing the first option. In any event, the DPM/SSEA will have ample opportunity for discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko when he sees him at the opening of the Stockholm Conference on January 17.

(C) Make it clear to the Soviets that you wish to visit Moscow within the next five weeks, even if this means it will not be possible for you to see Andropov.

The Soviet authorities may react in one of two ways to this approach. They may reject it or not respond to it, in order to avoid having to advertise Andropov's incapacity any more than absolutely necessary, thus fuelling further speculation about him and the leadership. They may accept it as a means of demonstrating that there is an effective collective leadership in Moscow, which can and does operate normally with or without Andropov's active participation. The record to date (Andropov last appeared in public in August) would argue in favour of the first view, but there must also be a growing realization within the leadership that it would not be in the interest of the Soviet Union to allow this situation to persist overly long and that a return to "business as usual" in dealing with foreign governments will have to occur sooner or later regardless of Andropov's fate.

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
- 3 -

A visit to Moscow involving meetings with Andropov's associates (e.g. Tikhonov, Gorbachev, Romanov, Gromyko) rather than with the President himself might leave something to be desired in terms of substance and public impact, but seems to us distinctly preferable on both counts to no visit at all. It would mean that you had in the end covered all the logical and essential bases in an initiative primarily geared to the politics of East-West relations; all fair-minded commentators would recognize this, while perhaps deploring the fact that you had not seen Andropov due to circumstances entirely beyond your control.

If, as we assume, you wish to terminate your intensive personal involvement in the initiative by mid-February, we would on balance recommend the third option, since it is the only one which offers some prospect of a visit to Moscow within the next few weeks. It would, of course, be entirely consistent with the public statement which you made after your meeting with Georgi Arbatov in Tokyo on November 19, 1983, to the effect that you would be prepared to go to Moscow even if it were not possible to see Andropov.

If you agree, we would suggest that you send a personal message to Andropov along the lines of the attached draft, since this seems more likely to mobilize the Soviet leadership to respond rapidly than would a diplomatic démarche. If a response is not forthcoming by mid-January, we would propose that the DPM/SSEA follow up on the message with Foreign Minister Gromyko when he sees him at the opening of the Stockholm Conference on January 17.

Do you agree?


L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy
PCO/Osbaldeston
DND/Anderson
DEA/MINA USS DMF IFB RBR IDR

(January 3, 1984)

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT ANDROPOV

Dear Mr. President,

As we enter 1984, I have renewed confidence that the political will exists to repair lines of communication between East and West and to begin to build a more constructive relationship. I was pleased to receive support for this endeavour in your reply to my message of early November.

I have completed consultations with a large number of Western and Third World leaders. Without exception, I have received vigorous encouragement for my undertaking to reduce tensions and promote productive dialogue. I am pleased to note that Mr. Gromyko will be going to Stockholm and that he will have an opportunity to meet Western foreign ministers. I know that the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. MacEachen, looks forward to an opportunity to meet Mr. Gromyko privately to exchange views on a number of topical bilateral and international questions.

I remain firmly committed to the importance of deepening the dialogue with you and your colleagues in the Soviet leadership. In that regard, I fully understand that it has not yet been possible to fix a firm date for me to take up your personal invitation to visit Moscow. In planning the course of my initiative for the weeks ahead, I still hope it will be possible to visit Moscow before the end of January. If, however, you believe that this would

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

impose unduly on your personal agenda, I want you to know that I am prepared to meet in Moscow in that time period with those of your colleagues whom you might personally designate.

Last November, my emissary outlined to Mr. Gromyko and other senior officials some of my ideas on positive steps to improve the level of East-West understanding. I would like to elaborate on the results of my consultations with other leaders thus far, and gain first-hand your assessment of the international situation and the Soviet approach to the political challenges which face us all.

Mr. President, may I extend to you my sincere personal wishes for a happy and successful new year and my prayers for an early and full recovery.

Yours sincerely,

P. E. Trudeau

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---PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE-ANDROPOV ABSENCE

SUMMARY:

ANDROPOVS FAILURE TO APPEAR AT EITHER OF THIS WEEKS HIGH LEVEL
EVENTS DOES NOT/NOT MEAN HE IS OUT OF PICTURE.ON CONTRARY,THERE ARE
MANY SIGNS THAT HE IS STILL POWERFUL INFLUENCE IN SOVIET AFFAIRS,
AND THAT LEADERSHIP IS FUNCTIONING EFFECTIVELY AND TAKING DECISIONS.
HOWEVER,ANDROPOVS ABSENCE FROM THESE EVENTS MEANS THAT IT WOULD BE
PRUDENT TO MAKE OUR PLANS ON ASSUMPTION OF CONTINUING ABSENCE.AMB
PROPOSED THEREFORE THAT DPM/SSEA VISIT MOSCOW AS SOON AS HE CAN
AFTER NEW YEAR,TO DISCUSS PMS INITIATIVE WITH GROMYKO AND OTHER
MEMBERS OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP.VISIT WOULD BE PRECURSOR OF VISIT BY
PM TO TALK TO ANDROPOV,IF THAT TURNS OUT TO BE POSSIBLE.

FAILURE OF ANDROPOV TO APPEAR AT EITHER OF THIS WEEKS EVENTS
(CENTRAL CTTEE PLENUM WHERE HE SHOULD HAVE PRESIDED AND READ REPORT,
AND MTG OF SUPREME SOVIET WHERE HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENT BUT
NOT/NOT HAVE PRESIDED OR READ REPORT)SEEMS TO ME TO CALL FOR
REAPPRAISAL OF WHERE WE STAND WITH RUSSIANS,ESPECIALLY IN
CONTEXT OF PMS INITIATIVE.MOSCOW IS NOW BEYOND QUESTION A SHRINE
WHEREOF THE SAINT IS OUT.IF THE MAN IS TOO ILL TO TURN UP AT

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR4283 CONFD

SUPREME SOVIET, WHERE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING WOULD BE REQUIRED OF HIM BUT TO WALK IN AND OUT, AND SIT FOR AN HOUR OR TWO BETWEEN, THEN HE MUST BE REALLY ILL, OR AT LEAST UNPRESENTABLE TO PUBLIC FOR ONE MEDICAL REASON OR ANOTHER. SUSLOV'S CONFIDENT PREDICTION TO ME (MY TEL XYGR4268 22DEC83) THAT ANDROPOV WOULD BE PRESENT AT SUPREME SOVIET IS PUZZLING. BUT SUSLOV HAS BEEN WRONG BEFORE ON MATTERS TOUCHING LEADERSHIP. (HE ASSURED ME, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT AT 07 NOV KREMLIN RECEPTION LEADERSHIP WOULD SHAKE HANDS WITH GUESTS, AND WAS AS ASTONISHED AS I WHEN THEY SHUFFLED OUT OF ROOM WITHOUT DOING SO, CONTRARY TO ALL PRECEDENT). IN MY VIEW ONLY SAFE ASSUMPTION TO MAKE NOW IS THAT WE ARE AT LEAST SEVERAL WEEKS AWAY FROM SEEING ANDROPOV HIMSELF BACK IN ANY KIND OF ACTION USEFUL TO US OR REST OF WORLD. OR COURSE HE MAY APPEAR TOMORROW AND FOOL US ALL, BUT WE HAVE TO MAKE SOME KIND OF WORKING HYPOTHESIS AND ONLY RATIONAL ONE IS THAT WE ARE WITHOUT HIM FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

3. REFTEL ANALYSES ANDROPOV'S QUOTE TEXT UNQUOTE, WHICH WAS PRESUMABLY READ ON HIS BEHALF AT FIRST DAY OF PLENUM, 26 DEC (OR IT MAY HAVE BEEN SIMPLY DISTRIBUTED; PRESS ACCOUNTS DO NOT/SPECIFY). I HAVE READ SPEECH CAREFULLY MYSELF, AND WITHOUT CLAIMING TO BE EXPERT ON ANDROPOV OR ON SUBJECTS HE DISCUSSES, I AM QUITE CERTAIN THAT IT IS HIS WORK OR AT LEAST PREPARED UNDER HIS GUIDANCE. THERE IS AUTHENTIC NOTE OF ASPERITY, IMPATIENCE AND FRUSTRATION IN HIS DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE OF INDUSTRIAL AND AGRIC MANAGERS TO GET

...3

PAGE THREE XYGR4283 CONF

ON WITH MANAGERIAL REFORMS, ANDROPOVS PRESCRIPTION FOR SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC FUTURE. IT IS AS THOUGH HE HAD JUST HEARD THAT SOVIET SYSTEM IS IN GRIP OF WORLDS MOST STUBBORNLY CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT, ENEMIES OF ANY REFORM OR INNOVATION. IN SPITE OF ALL OUR EFFORTS, HE SAYS IN ONE PLACE, THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM REMAINS ON OUR DAILY AGENDA. THAT SOUNDS LIKE ANGER AND DISAPPOINTMENT. MY POINT IS THAT THE SPEECH SOUNDS TO ME LIKE THE MAN. I AM ASSUMING THEREFORE THAT THE MAN STILL EXISTS, KNOWS WHAT HE WANTS, AND IS CAPABLE OF INFLUENCING EVENTS AT LEAST TO SOME EXTENT. THAT TWO OF HIS PROTEGES BECAME FULL MEMBERS OF POLITIBUREAU 27 DEC, AND THAT HIS ACHIEVEMENTS WERE CELEBRATED (IN CONNECTION WITH FORTHCOMING QUOTE ELECTIONS UNQUOTE) FOR A SOLID 35 MINUTES ON LAST NIGHTS TV NEWS, REINFORCES THIS CONCLUSION.

4. THIS IS POSITIVE EVIDENCE OF A KIND. BUT ON OTHER SIDE OF LEDGER THERE SEEMS LITTLE NEGATIVE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EAGLEBURGER THEORY THAT QUOTE THERES NOBODY HOME IN MOSCOW UNQUOTE. SOVIET DECISIONS TO WITHDRAW FROM INF TALKS AND PUT TWO ON BACK BURNERS MAY VERY WELL BE MISTAKES, AS SOME PEOPLE IN WEST THINK, BUT THEY DO NOT/NOT LOOK LIKE RESULT OF ACK OF DIRECTION, BUMBLING

OR PANIC. IN MY VIEW, SOV MISTAKE WAS MADE SEVERAL YEARS AGO WHEN THEY BLANDLY ASSUMED WEST WOULD ACCEPT SS20 DEPLOYMENT. IT IS NOT/NOT YET DEMONSTRATED THAT THEIR RELIANCE ON WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION TO STOP NATO INF DEPLOYMENT WAS MISTAKE. RETURNS ARE NOT/NOT YET IN. KAL WAS CERTAINLY MISTAKE, BUT CANNOT/NOT BE ATTRIBUTED

...4

PAGE FOUR XYGR4283 CONFD

TO LACK OF LEADERSHIP EXCEPT IN MOST GENERAL WAY. ONLY REAL DOCUMENTED FUMBLE DURING ANDROPOVS ANBSENCE HAS BEEN COMIC OPERA BUSINESS OF WALK IN GENEVA BOTANICAL GARDENS, AND THAT I DO FIND BIZARE. BUT IF ANDROPOV WAS OUT TO LUNCH, SO MUST GROMYKO AND KORNIEKO HAVE BEEN TO LET SUCHA CRUDE MANOEUVRE GET BY THEM. SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES THINK THEY DETECT SIGNS OF OF UNCERTAINTLY IN SOV MIDEAST POLICY. BUT I CANNOT/NOT MYSELF FIND MUCH CHANGE OVER PAST FOUR MONTHS SINCE ANDROPOV WAS LAST SEEN. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT EAGLEBURGER AND OTHERS FIND QUOTE NOBODY HOME UNQUOTE IN MOSCOW NOT/NOT BECAUSE THERE IS LACK OF LEADERSHIP, OR A WEAK LEADERSHIP DISTRACTED BY A SUCCESSION STRUGGLE, BUT BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS HAVE DECIDED THEY HAVE NOTHING TO GAIN BY TALKING TO THIS USA ADMIN. PRES REAGON REFERRED (IN HIS QUOTE TIME UNQUOTE INTERVIEW) TO LINES OF COMMUNICATION WHICH HE HAD TO OPEN TO MOSCOW. IF THESE ARE ANYTHING MORE THAN THE DESULTORY GROMYKO-HARTMAN MTGS, I DO NOT/NOT KNOW ABOUT THEM. I CONCLUDE THEREFORE THAT ABSENCE OF SOVIET -USA POLITCAL DIALOGUE INDICATES NOT/NOT SOVIET INABILITY TO PICK UP PHONE, BUT DELIBERATE DECISION NOT/NOT TO PICK IT UP, EVEN IF THEY HEAR IT RINGING, WHICH THEY DO NOT/NOT.

5. A MTG OF SUPREME SOVIET IS PERHPAS NOT/NOT A GOOD PLACE TO MAKE JUDGEMENTS ABOUT LEADERSHIP MATTERS. THE SENIOR PEOPLE IN THE PRESIDUM KNOW THAT THE TELEPHOTO LENSES AND BINOCULARS ARE ON THEM AND NO/NO DOUBT BEHAVE ACCORDINGLY. NEVERTHELESS, IF THERE WAS ANY SENSE ...5

F E FIVE XYGR4283 CONF D

OF CRISES ACCOMPANYING NON-APPEARANCE OF ANDROPOV, IT WAS WELL HIDDEN INDEED AT YESTERDAYS SESSION, OF WHICH I ATTENDED FIRST HOUR AND A HALF. WHILE BAIBAKOV READ HIS LONG REPORT ON NEXT YEARS PLAN, GROMYKO AND USTINOV, SITTING SIDE BY SIDE, CHATTED AMIABLY, EXCHANGED SMILES, AND EVENTUALLY FISHED OUT THEIR BRIEFCASES AND SETLED DOWN TO WORK, IGNORING THE SPEAKER. THE TWO NEWLY APPOINTED POLITBUREAU MEMBERS (ABOVE) TALKED TO EACH OTHER ANIMATEDLY THROUGHOUT. DEPUTIES ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE (SO TO SPEAK) READ PRAVDA, CHATTED, WROTE NEW YEARS CARDS, AND GENERALLY BEHAVED JUST AS THOUGH THEY WERE REAL MPS.

6. THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP WHICH FORMED AROUND ANDROPOV A YEAR AGO IS, I AM SURE, STILL THERE AND STILL WORKING, AND ANDROPOV IS STILL PART OF IT.

7. ONE COULD OF COURSE ARGUE THAT THE REAL EVIDENCE OF DISARRAY AT THE TOP IS A LACK, IN BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY, OF ANY STRONG ACTION. ANDROPOVS DOMESTIC ECONOMIC REFORMS, NOT/NOT VERY RADICAL TO BEGIN WITH, BY HIS OWN ADMISSION ARE MAKING SLOW HEADWAY. THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO DRAMATIC GESTURE TO SPEED THEM UP. ABROAD IT COULD BE ARGUED SOVIETS HAVE SUFFERED CRUSHING DEFEAT IN INF DEPLOYMENT AND ARE TOO PARALYZED AT THE TOP TO RESPOND OTHER THAN BY TAKING THEIR BALL AND GOING HOME. WHY DO THEY NOT/NOT FOLLOW THE SCENARIO SO CONFIDENTLY LAID OUT FOR THEM BY THE WEST, IF THAT WHEN THEY SEE THE MISSILES IN PLACE, THEY WILL BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY? WE MAY KNOW MORE ABOUT THESE MATTERS AFTER THE STKHM ...6

PAGE SIX XYGR4283 CONF D

OPENING BUT, IN THE MEANTIME, TRYING TO PUT MYSELF IN THE SOVIETS PLACE, I AM NOT/NOT SURE THEY WOULD SEE BEST ACTION FOR THEM AS RETURNING TO THE NF TABLE, CAP IN HAND, OFFERING NOW TO NEGOTIATE QUOTE SERIOUSLY UNQUOTE. TRUE, THEY DO NOT/NOT LIKE THE P2 BUT IF THEY MUST ACCEPT SOME P2, THEY MIGHT AS WELL ACCEPT THEM ALL, REFUSE TO RETURN TO THE TABLE AND SEE HOW MUCH TROUBLE THEY CAN STIR UP FOR THE AMERICANS IN THE MEAN TIME. MY POINT IS THAT APPARENT INACTION, IF THAT IS COURSE THEY HAVE DECIDED UPON, MAY BE AS MUCH A MATTER OF DELIBERATE POLICY AS ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN. I DOUBT IF IT SHOULD BE SEEN AS RESULT OF INDECISION OR INABILITY TO TAKE DECISIONS AT TOP. 8. SO THERE IS LEADERSHIP, AND THERE IS ANDROPOV AS AN IMPORTANT PART OF IT. BUT ANDROPOV CANNOT/NOT BE GOT AT THE ONLY SAFE ASSUMPTION, IT SEEMS TO ME, IS THAT THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS WILL CONTINUE FOR QUITE SOME TIME. HOW DOES THIS SITUATION AFFECT PMS INITIATIVE? ANSWER IS QUITE A LOT. PM IS ONLY LEADER OF MAJOR WESTERN COUNTRY (SAY OF SUMMIT 7) WITH IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT TO TALK TO ANDROPOV. KOHL HAS ALREADY BEEN TO MOSCO. REAGAN AND NAKASONE ARE OUT OF QUESTION FOR LONG TIME TO COME. MITTERAND WILL WANT TO MEET SOVIET LEADERSHIP SOME TIME BUT NOT/NOT YET. VISIT BY CRAXI WOULD CREATE TOO MANY PROBLEMS FOR HIM AT HOME. MRS THATCHER IS GOING TO BDPST BUT IT IS A LONG WAY FROM THERE TO MOSCO. OUR PM IS THUS IN A VERY SPECIAL SITUATION AND SINCE SUCCESS OF HIS MISSION DEPENDS ON FINDING SOME SUPPORT IN MOSCO, AND SOON, MATTER CANNOT/NOT BE ALLOWED TO SLIDE. ANSWER, IT SEEMS TO ...?

PAGE SEVEN XYGR4283 CONFD

ME, IS FOR DPM/SSEA TO DECIDE NOW TO PAY SPECIAL VISIT TO MOSCO, IN
CONTEXT OF PMS INITIATIVE, EVEN BEFORE KNOWING FOR SURE WHETHER
OR NOT/NOT HE WILL ALSO TALK TO GROMYKO IN STKHM. SECOND POSSIBILITY
WOULD BE FOR PM TO COME HIMSELF, AND SEE WHOMEVER SOVIETS PRODUCES
(PROBABLY GROMYKO, GORBACHEV AND TIKHONOV, AT A MINIMUM.). I PERSONALLY
LIKE THIS POSSIBILITY LESS (AS I THINK SOVIETS WOULD ALSO LIKE IT LESS -
IN FACT PROBABLY NOT/NOT LIKE IT AT ALL) NOT/NOT BECAUSE I THINK
OTHER MEMBERS OF COLLECTIVE INCAPABLE OF RESPONDING TO PMS MSG, BUT
BECAUSE IT WOULD END PMS ROUND OF VISITS ON WEAK NOTE IN PR TERMS.
VISIT BY DPM/SSEA TO HIS HOMOLOGUE, WHO LIKE DPM HAS SPECIAL STATURE,
COULD BE SEEN AS APPROPRIATE IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF ANDROPOVS ABSENCE,
AND NEED NOT/NOT PRECLUDE LATER VISIT BY PM. I PROPOSE THIS BECAUSE
I SEE DANGER OF PMS INITIATIVE RUNNING INTO SAND AND LOSING HOLD
WHICH IT NOW HAS ON PUBLIC IMAGINATION. THIS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY SO
IF SUBSTANTIVE SCHULTZ-GROMYKO MTG TOOK PLACE IN STKHM. I THINK
RIGHT TIME FOR DPM/SSEA VISIT TO MOSCO WOULD BE BEFORE NOT/NOT
AFTER, OPENING OF CDE IN STKHM.

9. I HAVE DISCUSSED NONE OF THIS WITH ANY SOVIET OFFICIAL. I AM
TOMORROW TO SEE GRINEVSKI, SOV REP AT CDE STOCKHOLM, AND WILL OF
COURSE REVIEW PMS INITIATIVE AND RELATED MATTERS. BUT GRINEVSKY WILL
BE IN NO/NO POSITION TO TALK ABOUT ANDROPOVS PROGRAM. MY THOUGHT IS
THAT SOVS WOULD WELCOME EARLY VIST BY DPM/SSEA (ASSUMING GROMYKO
AVAILABLE) AND NOT/NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT WOULD TAKE SOME HEAT OFF THEM.

...8

PAGE EIGHT XYGR4283 CONF

THEY WOULD CONSIDER IT PRELIMINARY TO AND NOT/NOT REPLACEMENT FOR
PM TALK WITH ANDROPOV. HOWEVER, SINCE THAT TALK HAS NOW BECOME
ABSOLUTELY UNPREDICTABLE, I THINK WE HAVE MUCH TO GAIN AND
NOTHING TO LOSE BY PROPOSING TO DPM/SSEA THAT HE CONTEMPLATE
QUICK VISIT HERE AS SOON AS INTERLOCUTEURS CAN RECEIVE HIM AFTER
NEW YEAR.

ROBERTS

CCC/044 291330Z XYGR4283

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

January 3, 1984

IDDZ-0001

Mr. Serge Kozlovski
5114 Cote St. Antoine
Montreal, Quebec
H4A 1N7

Dear Mr. Kozlovski:


Thank you for your letter of December 13.

It is clear that the Prime Minister is voicing the concerns of a great many Canadians when he speaks of the urgent necessity of lessening international tensions and restoring a constructive dialogue between East and West as the way to achieve arms limitations and reduce the risks of confrontation.

Thank you for your offer of assisting the Prime Minister's Task Force. The Task Force is composed of a small group of officials from the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence and the Privy Council Office who have been temporarily taken from their normal duties to work on this special project. It is not contemplated that this group will be enlarged to include individuals outside the public service.

We note your thoughts on a permanent UN emergency/peacekeeping force; this proposal would seem to fall outside the ambit of the Prime Minister's initiative which aims to lessen the risk of armed conflicts occurring.

Yours sincerely,


Louis A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

c.c. The Honourable Warren Allmand, M.P.
House of Commons

Serge Kozlovski
5114 Cote St. Antoine,
Montreal, P.Q.
H4A 1N7

December 13, 1983

Delvoie
svp pourriez vous
anticiper?

Mr. L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group
Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0G2

Re.: IDDZ-0216

Oct 31.
Dear Mr. Delvoie,

Sincere thanks for your November 25th letter in reply to my letter to the Prime Minister. I was indeed much pleased to learn that there has been substantial positive response to the Prime Minister's peace initiative. Unfortunately, one can not say the same about our media. Thus I was pleased to have had the opportunity to raise the question and to elaborate on the possibilities and the importance of the initiative during radio phone-in shows (CJAD). In particular on one occasion, during the station's interview with the Hon. Paul Martin, when my question permitted a detailed response on the importance of the initiative.

As for my offer, re. my October 31 letter to the Prime Minister, I would much appreciate your having a second look at it. The domain in which I could be usefull could involve anticipated dealings with the Soviet Union, no doubt in early 1984. Aside from top level discussions between the Prime Minister and Yuri Andropov, or with whoever would replace the latter, there will be probably consultations, or rather some exchange of opinions on the subject on much lower levels. Perhaps I could be of some use there.

Referring to my previously mentioned qualifications, I would like to emphasize the following: fluency in Russian, good knowledge of the Soviet Union and the mentality of the people - this from personal experience and studies (see enclosed copy of a term paper, SGWUni.). In addition, my personal convictions and previous work towards world peace.

In closing, a brief reference to my previous correspondence with the Prime Minister concerning the establishment of a permanent U.N. Emergency/Peace Keeping Force. No doubt, my proposal was somewhat simplistic, and I fully realize the complexity of the matter and the difficulties to be surmounted. Nevertheless, the time is ripe, and I anticipate that a new bold and clear cut proposal within the framework of the Prime Minister's initiative and cutting through the red ribbon and interminable committee negotiations, could contribute a great deal towards arousing public opinion and will, thereby greatly accelerating deliberations towards this goal.

Your comments will be much appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

c.c. Warren Allmand, M.P., Ottawa
Mr. Thomas A. Monti, Montreal

Serge Kozlovski

J Kozlovski

Nov. 15. 1968

Political Science 413.1

Evening Division - Dr. J. A. Csabafi

Mid-term examination EXCELLENT 'A'

A-2

The communist ideology is of great importance to the Soviet system of government. In essence this system is very much like systems of government we find in many other countries, be it within the capitalistic range of governments, in neutral countries, or dictatorships. In all we find an element of power politics, preoccupation with economic problems etc.

The communist ideology, however, places the Soviet Union in a different category. By stressing high humanitarian principles, calling for equality in opportunities for all, speaking for the "underdog" - it gives the system a humanitarian aura. For most Soviet citizens, as well as for the uninitiated in the outside world, these slogans are important, and the fact that the reality is often different becomes secondary because of lack of information, difficulty of comparison etc.

One of the main attractions of Marxism was the promise of the eventual disappearance of the state machinery, much hated in the past by large segments of the underprivileged. Lenin promoted the idea, although he had to reshape it to fit actual needs, as he had to do with other aspects of Marxism.

Lenin, having established a powerful communist party machinery, used it among other things to spread the communist line, communist ideology among the masses, to indoctrinate the population, to convert.

2

In the name of this ideology the party leadership could perpetrate acts of terror, eliminate opposition, introduce censorship etc. Since the establishment of a classless society, a workers paradise, was the ultimate goal, many hardships that the Soviet population had to endure, could be excused by the need of subordination of everything else to the ultimate goal. Heavy industry had to come before consumer goods.

A-3

There are several characteristic features in the Soviet political system, the roots for which can be found in the Russian history and the revolutionary Bolshevik movement.

In the marriage of government and the party in the Soviet Union, we witness the tradition of the earlier union of Tsar and the Orthodox Church.

Russia had a long tradition of autocratic rulers, of which Stalin was a representative in the S.U. While the one-man dictatorship appears to have presently disappeared, the rule by decree is still a prominent feature of the Soviet government, although the mechanics have changed.

An important feature of the Soviet political system is the transition of its society from an underdeveloped, primarily agricultural to a comparatively industrialized.

We must bear in mind that Marx's writings were aimed primarily to the highly industrialized countries of Western Europe and not czarist Russia. The Bolshevik revolution has therefore gone a different pattern than envisaged by Marx.

A highly centralized government with a large, influential bureaucracy is another feature that had its roots in old Russia, and as a consequence local government had seen very meagre development.

Considering that the Russian population was not the ideal type for the communist experiment - the population had to be indoctrinated, and swung to the support of the new government - hence we had the development of a powerful mass-indoctrinating

tion machinery, - which evidently has
brought good results.

The machinery has been working for some time now and has brought about a considerable improvement in the quality of the work done. The results have been very satisfactory and it is hoped that the machinery will continue to work well for some time to come.

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5

A-5 Although communists pretend building a classless society, and indeed actually claim having achieved this goal, - it has become obvious that several distinct "new" classes have emerged in the Soviet Union, and it is doubtless whether these will ever disappear. At least five such groups can be singled out.

At the top of the system we have the elite - to which belong high ranking government officials, usually high ranking party officials, who direct the country's policies. The group has various privileges, which are almost hereditary. They are well in a position to articulate demands, which are usually satisfied.

The next group are the intellectuals, called intelligencia, who encompass scientists, engineers, educators, artists etc. Because this group has different interests, their demands can not be well aggregated and articulated. Since the group includes many well known names, they nevertheless can present a source of frustration to the Soviet government - as we have witnessed in the demands of certain authors or poets, and in their trials.

This group is followed by the white collar workers, who comprise the vast bureaucracy of the country. It is for the government an important sector of population, since being part of the centralized government and party machinery, they are in strategic positions to spread ideology and to provide feedback on situation and feelings from all corners of the land.

Part Two

Being only executioners of rules & regulations, they have little power, hence any demands they might have, would get little attention.

The next group are the industrial workers, and finally the workers in agriculture. While there are trade unions in the Soviet Union their significance or power are negligible, hence these groups are, no doubt, in a poorer negotiating position, than their counterparts in the Western World.

4) The Soviet Union has a very high level of literacy, and a high level of technical education. This is due to the fact that the Soviet Union has a long tradition of education, and a high level of technical education. This is due to the fact that the Soviet Union has a long tradition of education, and a high level of technical education.

5) The Soviet Union has a very high level of literacy, and a high level of technical education. This is due to the fact that the Soviet Union has a long tradition of education, and a high level of technical education. This is due to the fact that the Soviet Union has a long tradition of education, and a high level of technical education.

6) The Soviet Union has a very high level of literacy, and a high level of technical education. This is due to the fact that the Soviet Union has a long tradition of education, and a high level of technical education. This is due to the fact that the Soviet Union has a long tradition of education, and a high level of technical education.

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8) The Soviet Union has a very high level of literacy, and a high level of technical education. This is due to the fact that the Soviet Union has a long tradition of education, and a high level of technical education. This is due to the fact that the Soviet Union has a long tradition of education, and a high level of technical education.

Part Two

7

Handwritten: *Handwritten*

- 1) Mir - meaning peace - designates an old Russian village unit.
- 2) Plekhanov, one of Lenin's close collaborators, and old Bolshevik party member, who was prominent in interpreting Marxist-Leninist state and law theories.
- 3) "Zemstvo" was an attempt at local government. It comprised a deliberating body (as established by a decree of Alexander II) to look into the affairs of a country region with a number of villages.
- 4) "Bloody Sunday" refers to the first revolution (1905) when a mass of people moved towards the Tsar's Winter Palace in St. Petersburg to demand concessions, and were met by volleys of bullets and Cossacks' sabres.
- 5) Soviets were instituted by Bolsheviks as a local government unit in factories, villages etc, but which had little to say after the revolution.
- 6) Kornilov was one of the white generals to contest the Red Army.
- 7) Duma was instituted by Nicholas II as a legislative and deliberating body, in response to demands from the population. It was however very ineffective, since the Tsar could overrule or dismiss it at his pleasure.
- 8) Stolypin was the last Russian Prime Minister, who was to introduce various reforms, but was assassinated while in a theatre.

- 11 Rasputin was a monk, a mystic with certain hypnotic and other mysterious power, who looked after Tsarevitch Alexei's blood illness, thus becoming influential with Alexandra & hence Nicholas (including politics & government).
- 13 Kulaks were richer peasants, landlords, who opposed collectivization and were bitterly antagonized or subjugated.
- 14 Kolhoz - a collective farm
- 15 Sovkhoz - government farm
- 17 MTS - Motor-Tractor-station

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

November 25, 1983.

IDDZ-0216

Mr. Serge Kozlovski
5114 Cote St. Antoine
Montreal, Quebec
H4A 1N7

Dear Mr. Kozlovski:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, permit me to reply to your letter of October 31 in which you express support for the Prime Minister's current set of initiatives aimed at enhancing the level of dialogue between East and West.

You will be pleased to know that the Prime Minister has received many letters such as yours, fully supporting the effort which, it is hoped, will lead to some movement in the international dialogue on arms control and disarmament. Like you, many have offered to lend their good offices for further advancing these efforts. I can assure you that the Prime Minister greatly appreciates the support. It is the concern of Canadians such as yourself which he is endeavouring to bring to the attention of many of the world leaders. While the results of these efforts have yet to emerge, there is no question that the effort has to be made.

Your letter also raises several new points regarding your proposal for the establishment of a U.N. Emergency/Peace Keeping Force. These have been brought to the attention of the Department of External Affairs, which had taken note of your previous recommendations.

Thank you for expressing your interest in this most important endeavour.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L.A. Delvoie".

L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

1005 022

Serge Kozlovski
5114 Cote St. Antoine
Montreal, P.Q.
H4A 1N7

October 31, 1983

The Right Honorable
Pierre Elliott Trudeau,
Prime Minister,
Ottawa, Ont.


Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Your letter of April 5, 1982 dealing with my paper proposing the establishment of a United Nations Peacekeeping/Emergency Force was very much appreciated. Being fully aware of your time limitations, I refrained from any further comments on the subject. Although I would like to reopen the matter at some later date, I shall contain myself today with a reference to two points raised on the second page of your letter.

Firstly, - the mentioned preference of nations to rely on their own forces or alliances will no doubt remain such for a long time to come; however, the nationals of any one country trained as members of a potential U.N. Force will all return to their respective countries, and would be available for the defence of their own country, should such need arise.

Secondly, - the matter of recruitment and maintenance cost. This item should be negligible considering reciprocity. Each country selected for the training of such Forces, initially 10 countries training 5000 men each, will cover all costs. The United Nations will have to assume all expenses if and when these Forces are called upon for specific U.N. duties.

The main purpose of this letter is a different subject. I am following with great interest, much hope, and sincere best wishes for success your new initiative in the domain of international peace. I am aware that you have already formed a task force for this purpose, but I wonder whether I could be of some use at one time or another, at one place or another, in this most important and urgent undertaking aimed at nothing less than human survival.



R. Funder (70)

P.M.C. 1983
C.C. 00511-10 01

- 2 -


My qualifications:

- a) A most sincere and deeply rooted desire for international peace and understanding.
- b) Life experience and maturity: born Oct.7, 1922 in Europe. Witnessed World War II and its aftermath.
- c) Education: B.A. 1969, S.G.W. University, Montreal. Major in Economics and Political Science.
- d) Languages: fluent in English, French, Russian and German. Partial knowledge of Spanish and Italian.
- e) Good knowledge of North and South American continents, as well as Europe.
- f) Member U.N. Association, World Federalists, Federal and Provincial Liberal Parties.
- g) Flexibility in time allocation, being self-employed Real Estate broker.

I would much appreciate hearing from you, should you or somebody on your task force consider that I could be of some use. As reference I enclose copies of some documents.

I trust you will not object that copies of this letter are given to two gentlemen with whom I had the opportunity to discuss my U.N. Force ideas, and who expressed interest in an eventual follow-up on the subject.

Yours sincerely,



c.c. Warren Allmand, M.P., Ottawa
Mr. Thomas A. Monti, Montreal

Enclosures

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

TO/A:

Mr. Fowler

CC:

Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:

Serge Koslovski

DATE:

October 31, 1983

SUBJECT/SUJET:

Offer of assistance

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:

3305 017

Judy Cameron

DATE: November 3, 1983

☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.

☐ REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.
RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

☐ NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.
AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

Reply sent by Mr. Delvoic/EA/25 NOV 83

C.M.

November 2, 1983.

Mr. Serge Kozlovski,
5114 Côte St. Antoine,
Montreal, Quebec.
H4A 1N7

Dear Mr. Kozlovski:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I acknowledge
your letter of October 31.

Please be assured that it and the enclosed
documentation will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's
attention.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by
Original signé par

Marie-Andrée Bastien,
Correspondence Director.

Original to: R. Fowler

cc: FILE 3305 017

MAE/jgh

Montreal, Jan. 24, 1978

U.N. PEACE - KEEPING / EMERGENCY FORCE

2103 015

The subject is not a new one. The need for such a Force is obvious. No matter how many disarmament conferences will be held, there will be no positive outcome until the creation of a neutral military force capable to guarantee the protection and defence of a disarmed nation or country.

There are many who consider the formation and maintenance of such a force an impossibility, and they refer to various obstacles - different languages, difference in political ideologies, financing difficulties, etc. No doubt, certain complications might and will arise as well in the initial as later stages in the creation or existence of such an army; but it is my opinion that basically the establishment of a UN Force is feasible and even simple, provided there is goodwill and the required determination to make the idea work.

Necessarily, the first step would be the elaboration of a detailed plan outlining a step by step procedure for the creation of a permanent UN Peace-Keeping/Emergency Force. It must be a plan which can be understood and appreciated not only by various governments but also by ordinary citizens. The next step would be the promotion of the plan to generate widespread acceptance by governments and public; and finally, - the implementation of the plan.

It can be assumed that the plan will be elaborated by representatives from UN and various Governments, in cooperation with experts of all sorts and interested organizations, but here are my own ideas and proposals.

The Force is to consist as far as possible from volunteers, to be supplemented by conscripts, if required. The duration of service 30 month (unless this is considered too long, in which case an inferior number of month will be chosen).

Ten selected countries (for the start any of the following could be considered: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Holland, India, Iran, Italy, Lebanon, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia) will initially provide 5000 men/women each, along with training facilities for 5000 persons. Each participating country should provide two training camps accomodating 2500 recruits each, of which 700 would be nationals while the remaining 1800 would come from 9 other countries, at 200 persons each. This means that from its contingent of 5000 each country keeps 1400 and sends 400 each to 9 other participating countries, thus providing 200 to each of the foreign countries' training camps.

Each training camp will house a selfsufficient unit (2500 strong) consisting of combat troops, engineering, first aid, communications and other detachments. While the 200 contingent from any one country assigned to a specific camp could and should be subdivided further, - the smallest unit consisting of one nationality should be a platoon (or similar unit) under the command of a man/woman of the same nationality.

All commanding personnel from platoon leader up should be taught English, to facilitate communications among staff. This should present minor difficulties since English is being taught as a second language in most countries in the world; and for this purpose only a limited vocabulary will be required.

Arms and equipment will be standarized throughout the Force, and will be aquired by H.Q. from all UN member countries in proportion to their support of UN.

The training camps should be located in the vicinity of larger cities to facilitate communications with local population as well as with the external world. Each participating country could grant to UN a certain parcel of land for this and other UN purposes. This would become UN territory, flying the UN flag, subject to UN rules and regulations; creating thereby beginnings of a new international order.

The implementation of the plan which will involve initially 10 countries, will be expanded gradually to comprise 20, 30 and eventually 40 countries; at which time there will be a minimum contingent of 200,000 in UN training camps. Suppose the first 50,000 start service on July 1st 1979, the next 50,000 on Oct. 1st, 1980, the third 10 countries with another 50,000 will join on Jan.1st 1982, at which time 100,000 recruits will join the Force; and the last 10 countries will enter the scheme on April 1st, 1983, and again 100,000 recruits join the Force (see attached schedule covering a 10 year period).

In the initial stages the 5000 person strong contingent provided by a country should include sufficient national army trained officers and auxiliary staff to assure the proper functioning of a training camp. Provision for the creation of UN Officers' schools should be considered, as well as the eventual addition of naval and air forces.

Assuming that the plan is implemented as proposed - aside from the 200,000 persons in training camps at any one time, there would be a Reserve Force of nearly 1 million troops having received training in UN Camps within the span of the first 10 years. As for the selection of the participating countries, - the first 2x10 should present little difficulties, while the selection of the next 10 would depend on future politico-economical developments in the world; and finally the last 10 countries could possibly include also contingents from super powers. Naturally, and for obvious reasons the participation of very small countries, as well as those with reactionary or unstable regimes will be avoided. Eventually the representation should be as broad as possible, establishing a network of training camps (80) covering the globe from East to West

UN Force.....

3

and from South to North.

A good part of the instruction should be devoted to training in rescue work, and the Emergency Force should be called upon to assist in situations of disaster, - floods, earthquakes & the like.


I am convinced that a proposal for the creation of a UN Peace-Keeping/Emergency Force, if presented in all detail would not only prove its workability but will dissipate doubts of those who without analyzing the possibilities or implications reject it as impossible because of the magnitude of such a plan.

The plan must be prepared in absolute detail to forestall the usual scepticism - "it sounds good, but...". For example there should be an explanation why it would be preferable to adopt English as the official language for the Force. The shortest possible dictionary of words and terms to be used by the Force should be included, along with a simple language instruction manual.

The workweek for recruits should also be detailed and could perhaps consist of a 5 day x 8 hour schedule, subdivided in-to 2 hours each -detail work, guard duty, gym etc.; military instruction - theory; military practice - field duty; learning a variety of subjects towards acquiring trade, skills, profession.

A budget not only for the entire Force but also for a typical 2500 person training camp should be presented in all details. The financing of the Force should present no major problem, as a participating country could reduce their own military forces by 5000 and thus assuming the greatest part of costs. The money should go to UN , from where expenses will be covered as they occur.

In conclusion, - the force would be not only an instrument of peace and stability, and a valued help in times of disaster, but it will promote by its mere existance understanding and cooperation among countries.



Serge Kozlovski,
Montreal.

See addendum.

Force.....

4

Addendum

UN PEACE-KEEPING/EMERGENCY FORCE

Force formation and country participation table.

Date	Countries				Total
	1-st 10	2-nd 10	3-rd 10	4-th 10	
July 1, 79	50,000				50,000
Oct. 1, 80	<u>-50,000-</u>	50,000			100,000
Jan. 1, 82	50,000	<u>-50,000-</u>	50,000		150,000
Apr. 1, 83	<u>-50,000-</u>	50,000	<u>-50,000-</u>	50,000	200,000
July 1, 84	50,000	<u>-50,000</u>	50,000	<u>-50,000</u>	200,000
Oct. 1, 85	<u>-50,000-</u>	50,000	<u>-50,000-</u>	50,000	200,000
Jan. 1, 87	50,000	<u>-50,000-</u>	50,000	<u>-50,000-</u>	200,000
Apr. 1, 88	<u>-50,000-</u>	50,000	<u>-50,000-</u>	50,000	200,000
July 1, 89	50,000	<u>-50,000-</u>	50,000	<u>-50,000-</u>	200,000

NB! "50,000" - recruits

"-50,000-" - half-way through training.

Immeubles (J.V.) Real Estate

Serge Kozlovski, B.A. F.R.S.

Charles A. Baker

file
21


CONFIDENTIAL

March 29, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

UN Peacekeeping

Attached for your approval and signature is a letter to Mr. S. Kozlovski in response to a paper which you received from him.



R.R.F.

Carlson



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

April 5, 1982

Dear Mr. Kozlovski,

Your paper proposing the establishment of a permanent United Nations Peacekeeping/Emergency Force has been reviewed with interest. I would like to offer several general comments.

As you are aware, Canada has had considerable experience in the field of peacekeeping under UN auspices. In some cases, the results were less than satisfactory. You quite rightly have identified certain of the reasons for this, and Canada has consistently endeavoured to improve matters.

It has been said that what peacekeeping needs is not a permanent army but a set of permanent concepts. Canada has been a very active member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Forces (the Committee of 33). There we have attempted to draw on our peacekeeping experience and to suggest practical measures to deal with some of the problems you have addressed in your paper, but we accept that this is and will be a long and difficult process. Because Canada has so far been unsuccessful in the Committee of 33 in attempting to strengthen the logistical and administrative arrangements for UN peacekeeping forces, I believe the prospects of success in creating a permanent UN military force are much more remote.

Mr. S. Kozlovski
Broker
3445 Drummond
Suite 504
Montreal, Quebec
H3G 1H9


- 2 -

Most nations seem to prefer to rely on their own military forces for the maintenance of their security. Many nations also choose to rely on alliances to guarantee their defence in the face of military threats. Moreover, there is no guarantee that nations would be willing to participate in the permanent force you suggest, particularly as an alternative to maintaining their national armed forces.

There are a number of other difficulties with the concept of a permanent UN force, including the lack of universality, the cost of recruitment and maintenance, the legal basis for its operation and its potential image as an international unit of mercenary forces. But fundamentally what those various considerations suggest clearly is that even if it were desirable, the achievement of an organization such as you propose would not be feasible in the current world political environment. Regrettably, the time is not ripe for supra-national means of strengthening international security.

Thank you for your interest in this very complex and important subject.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "B. Linder". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop at the beginning and a long, sweeping underline.

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

November 25, 1983.

IDDZ-0216

Mr. Serge Kozlovski
5114 Cote St. Antoine
Montreal, Quebec
H4A 1N7

Dear Mr. Kozlovski:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, permit me to reply to your letter of October 31 in which you express support for the Prime Minister's current set of initiatives aimed at enhancing the level of dialogue between East and West.

You will be pleased to know that the Prime Minister has received many letters such as yours, fully supporting the effort which, it is hoped, will lead to some movement in the international dialogue on arms control and disarmament. Like you, many have offered to lend their good offices for further advancing these efforts. I can assure you that the Prime Minister greatly appreciates the support. It is the concern of Canadians such as yourself which he is endeavouring to bring to the attention of many of the world leaders. While the results of these efforts have yet to emerge, there is no question that the effort has to be made.

Your letter also raises several new points regarding your proposal for the establishment of a U.N. Emergency/Peace Keeping Force. These have been brought to the attention of the Department of External Affairs, which had taken note of your previous recommendations.

Thank you for expressing your interest in this most important endeavour.

Yours sincerely,

L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

Government
of CanadaGouvernement
du Canada**ACTION FICHE DE
REQUEST SERVICE**

To — A

File No. — Dossier N°

Date

From — De

☐ Please call
Prière d'appeler

Tel. No. — N° de tél.

Ext. — Poste

☐ Returned your call
Vous a rappelé☐ Will call again
Vous rappellera☐ Wants to see you
Désire vous voir

Date

Time — Heure

Message received by
Message reçu par☐ Action
Donner suite☐ Approval
Approbation☐ Note & return
Noter et retourner☐ Comments
Commentaires☐ Draft reply
Projet de réponse☐ Note & forward
Noter et faire suivre☐ As requested
Comme demandé☐ Signature☐ Note & file
Noter et classer**RECEIVED — REÇU****JAN 6 1984****IN IDD**

JTAAN BESAR REPUBLIK INDONESIA
OTTAWA



Ref cc to C/O Fowler
EMBASSY OF INDONESIA
AMBASSADE DE L'INDONESIE

*2 simulak
+ file
8401 03*


GW
No. : 0001/POL-II/aa/01/84

FILE	SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED	DATE
JAN 11 1984		
FBI - OTTAWA		

The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to transmit to the Department a photo-copy of the 1983 year's end press statement delivered by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Prof. Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja.

The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, January 3, 1984



Department of External Affairs
O t t a w a

NO. 7C-001/010284 EX-DITPENLUGRI TTK 2 JANUARI 1984 TTK NEWS TTK

I. INTL ASIONAL/REGIONAL :

1. FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR KUSUMARTHADJA REMINDED THAT NUCLEAR ARMS MAY RUN THE RISK OF THE OUTBREAK OF A THIRD WORLD WAR.

MINISTER MOCHTAR THEREFOR REGRETTE THE USE OF HUGE SUMS OF MONEY BY THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES FOR INCREASING THEIR ARMAMENTS, WHILE THE DEVELOPING NATIONS WERE IN DIRE NEED OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR THEIR GROWTH.

IN HIS YEAR-END PRESS STATEMENT, THE MINISTER FURTHER STATED THAT THE CORE OF THE ARMS RACE BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS LIED IN THE CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS, AND HE WAS ALSO OF THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEM SO LONG AS CONFLICT HAS NOT ENDED.

THE MINISTER ALSO EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS SUCH ARMAMENTS MAY EVENTUALLY, ALTHOUGH NOT INTENTIONALLY, LEAD TO THE THIRD WORLD WAR.

HE SAID THE VARIOUS PEACE MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE IN PROTEST AGAINST THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WERE GENERALLY TRIGGERED BY A DEEP FEAR OF ANOTHER OBVIOUSLY MORE CATASTROPHIC WORLD WAR.

MOCHTAR, MEANWHILE, EXPRESSED SLIGHT RELIEF IN VIEW OF A RECENT STATEMENT MADE BY UOSS PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN IN TOKYO THAT A NUCLEAR WAR MUST BE AVOIDED.

HOWEVER, HE ADDED, THE FAILURE IN THE TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER POWERS OF THE WORLD - THE UOSS AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THE DEPLOYMENT OR DISMANTLING OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE HAS BROUGHT THE WORLD IN A HIGHLY CRITICAL SITUATION.

TO AVOID A NUCLEAR ENCOUNTER, MOCHTAR WAS OF THE VIEW THAT THERE WAS NO OTHER WAY BUT FOR THE TWO SUPER POWERS TO GET BACK AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE AND TALK ABOUT DECREASING THEIR NUCLEAR ARMS.

IN THIS RESPECT INDONESIA, ACCORDING TO MOCHTAR, HIGHLY APPRECIATED CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU'S PROPOSAL FOR THE HOLDING OF A CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS OF THE WORLD.

MINISTER MOCHTAR IN THIS CONTEXT REINTERATED THAT NON-NUCLEAR STATES SHOULD BE ASKED TO JOIN TALKS ABOUT NUCLEAR ARMS, AT LEAST AT CERTAIN STAGES.

2. INDONESIA MADE ENCOURAGING PROGRESS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY IN 1983, MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MOCHTAR KUSUMARTHADJA STATED IN HIS '83 YEAR-END PRESS CONFERENCE BE MADE IN JAKARTA ON DEC 30.

INDONESIA'S IMAGE IN BILATERAL AS WELL AS MULTILATERAL RELATIONS WAS ENCOURAGING, AND THE WORLD INCREASINGLY ACKNOWLEDGED INDONESIA'S IMPORTANT POSITION, ACCORDING TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

THE PROGRESS INDONESIA MADE LAST YEAR WAS THANKS TO THE MAINTENANCE OF POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE COUNTRY AND HIGH GROWTH REPECTED IN THE RESULT OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, DESPITE THE WORLD ECONOMIC RECESSION.

SOCIO-CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN INDONESIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IS ONE OF FACTORS ENABLING INDONESIA TO MAKE A SUCCESS IN ADOPTING HER FOREIGN POLICY AND DEVELOPING INTERNASTIONAL RELATIONS, SAID MOCHTAR.

M.F.

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BGRAD ZLGR3009 03JAN84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ IMMED

INFO MOSCO WSAW PRGUE BUCST BPST BNATO LDN WSHDC PARIS ROME
ATHNS BRU BONN MDRID LSBON COPEN OSLO HAGUE VIENN GENEV STKHM
HSNKI ANKRA NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/CPP/DNACPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR RINA IDD IDA IDAO IDR IDRL IDRA IFB RGB RBD RBR DMFX CMRT
REF YOURTEL IDDZ0312 22DEC83

---CDE:WSAW PACT(WP)MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE

SUMMARY:BULGARIAN FORMIN MLADENOV CONFIRMED THAT HE WILL BE IN
STKHM FOUR DAYS FOR OPENING OF CONF AND PROPOSED BILATERAL WITH
DPM/SSEA.HE WAS INTERESTED IN AND WELL BRIEFED ON PMS INITIATIVE
AND ASKED FOR FURTHER DETAILS.HE AFFIRMED THAT WP CTRIES WOULD
APPROACH CDE IN SERIOUS EFFORT TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
RESULTS.HE CRITICIZED WESTERN APPROACH TO VIENN AND GENEV
NEGOTIATIONS IN FAMILIAR TERMS,NOTING THAT PMS INITIATIVE HAD
NOT/NOT ADDRESSED INF OR START.GENEV NEGOTIATIONS,HE SAID WITHOUT
SPECIFYING WHICH ONES,COULD BE RESUMED UNDER RIGHT CONDITIONS.
2.REPORT:MLADENOV RECEIVED ME FOR 40 MINUTES 2JAN DESPITE HOLIDAY
AND APOLOGIZED FOR NOT/NOT BEING ABLE TO SCHEDULE MEETING EARLIER.
PCHELINTSEV,WHO IS NOW HEAD OF MFA FOURTH DEPT,ALSO ATTENDED.I WAS
ACCOMPANIED BY HANSON.I MADE DEMARCHE AS OUTLINED IN REFTL,NOTING
THAT IN LIGHT OF NEWS FROM OTHER WP CAPITALS,WE MIGHT BE PUSHING ON
OPEN DOOR,AND ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS ON STKHM CONF.

...2

PAGE TWO ZLGR3009 CONF

3. MLADENOV VIEWED CALL AS FOLLOW-UP TO OUR FIRST MTG LAST NOV, WHEN I HAD GIVEN HIM TEXT OF PMS 27OCT83 SPEECH AND WE HAD DISCUSSED PROSPECTS FOR GENEV NEGOTIATIONS AND EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. PROBLEMS, HE SAID, REMAINED THE SAME. BULGARIANS HAD STUDIED PMS STATEMENT CAREFULLY AND FOLLOWED PROGRESS OF INITIATIVE WITH CLOSE INTEREST. THEY FULLY UNDERSTOOD UNDERLYING MOTIVES. BULGARIA CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED ANY PROPOSALS OR INITIATIVES BY ANY CTRY, WP, NATO OR NNA, WHICH AIMED AT ENSURING PEACE AND INNATL SECURITY. THIS ALSO APPLIED TO PMS INITIATIVE, WHICH THEY APPROACHED WITH QUOTE GREATEST SERIOUSNESS UNQUOTE AND ON WHICH THEY WOULD WELCOME FURTHER DETAILS.

4. MLADENOV EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN PMS PROPOSALS ON 5-POWER CONF, MBFR, AND HIGH-ALTITUDE ASAT SYSTEMS. ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR 5-POWER CONF, PMS PROPOSAL HAD SPECIFIC ASPECTS WHICH MADE IT PARTICULARLY RELEVANT TO PRESENT SITU. HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS NEED TO GIVE IMPETUS TO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT MAINTAINED THAT IT WAS NATO WHICH HAD BEEN BLOCKING PROGRESS. ON ASAT, HE NOTED THAT USSR HAD MADE MORE GENERAL PROPOSAL ON DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS AND ASAT SYSTEMS IN OUTER SPACE. HE NOTED THAT GENEV NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT/NOT FIGURE IN PMS INITIATIVE, DESPITE FACT THAT PROBLEMS IN THOSE TALKS WERE PRESENTLY MOST SERIOUS OF ALL.

5. ON STKHM CONF, MLADENOV NOTED THAT CDE HAD BEEN ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT EASTERN INITIATIVES AT MDRID AND THAT BULGARIA HAD FROM BEGINNING ATTACHED GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO IT. THEY INTENDED TO WORK ...3

PAGE THREE ZLGR3009 CONFD

SERIOUSLY FOR MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE RESULTS AND HOPED THAT NATO APPROACH WOULD BE EQUALLY CONSTRUCTIVE. COURSE OF CONF, WHETHER IT WENT ASTRAY OR EMBARKED ON PATH TO TRUE CMBS (AND HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO CBMS, RATHER THAN DISARMAMENT AS SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CONF), WOULD BE SET AT BEGINNING. THUS, BULGARIANS HAD NEVER/NEVER ENTERTAINED ANY DOUBTS AS TO IMPORTANCE OF ATTENDANCE AT HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL. HE WOULD THEREFORE BE ATTENDING OPENING OF CONF AND, ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT/NOT SPEAK FOR HIS WP COUNTERPARTS HE BELIEVED THAT THEIR THINKING WAS SIMILAR. BILAT MTGS WOULD BE JUST AS USEFUL AS STATEMENTS WHICH MINS WOULD BE MAKING.

6. RETURNING TO SUBJ OF GENEV NEGOTIATIONS, MLADENOV SAID HE BELIEVED THAT PRESENT PROBLEMS COULD BE SOLVED AND NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED PROVIDED THAT NO/NO ULTIMATA WERE ISSUED EITHER AS TO OUTCOME OR CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH TALKS WOULD CONTINUE. (IT MAY BE BARELY POSSIBLE THAT THIS FORMULATION WAS INTENDED TO IMPLY CRITICISM OF BOTH USA AND USSR.) IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY BE KEPT INTACT.

7. MLADENOV NOTED THAT BEGINNING OF USA INF DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE HAD BEEN GREETED BY SOME USA MEDIA AND JOURNALS AS VICTORY FOR USA FOREIGN POLICY; BASED ON ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT WP HAD BEEN FORCED TO ACCEPT USA POLICY. WP, HE SAID, WOULD NEVER/NEVER SUBMIT TO POWER POLITICS AND FAIT ACCOMPLI: IMMEDIATE COUNTERMEASURES HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED AND AS WESTERN DEPLOYMENTS PROCEEDED, SO WOULD COUNTERMEASURES. THIS

...4

PAGE FOUR ZLGR3009 CONFD

REITERATION OF PARTY LINE MAY HAVE BEEN TO OFFSET COMMENTS REPORTED
IN PREVIOUS PARA.

8. ON PERS BASIS, I NOTED THAT UNDERLYING PROBLEM IN DISARMAMENT
NEGOTIATIONS WAS THAT TO WHICH PMS INITIATIVE WAS ADDRESSED. EXPERT
NEGOTIATORS HAD NOT/NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON WHAT
CONSTITUTED BALANCE AND WHETHER BALANCE EXISTED OR NOT/NOT. INJECTION
OF POLITICAL SENSE HAD TO TAKE PLACE TO PROVIDE EXPERTS WITH A
POLITICAL AGREEMENT, IMPLEMENTATION OF WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE TO
NEGOTIATE. MLADENOV'S REACTION WAS INTERESTED BUT NONCOMMITTAL.

9. ON STKHM, I COMMENTED THAT LACK OF CONFIDENCE WAS AT ROOT OF PRESENT
DISAGREEMENTS AND SEEMING ABSENCE OF WILL NECESSARY TO REACH
AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL ISSUES. SUCCESS AT STKHM COULD PROVIDE BASIS
ON WHICH TO ADDRESS OTHER PROBLEMS AND REDUCE TENSIONS. MLADENOV
REPLIED THAT IN THAT CASE WE WOULD BE WORKING FOR SAME GOAL.

10. AT END OF MTG, MLADENOV NOTED THAT HE HAD NOT/NOT HAD BILAT MTG
WITH CDN COUNTERPART SINCE SIGNING OF FISHERIES AGREEMENT IN LATE
1970S. HE WOULD BE SPENDING FOUR DAYS IN STKHM AND HOPED THAT MTG
COULD BE ARRANGED. PLS ADVISE.

FRASER

CCC/096 040830Z ZLGR3009

External Affairs Canada
Affaires extérieures Canada

SUITE A DONNER

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ

FM/DE

TO/A

INFO

DISTR

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

CONFIDENTIAL - FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

FM WSHDC POL0751 03JAN83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ

---VISIT OF RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK - 3 PAGES

MR. DE VORE + MR. SYLVAH

4.1.84

M. VON NOSTITZ CALLED: HE AND D. BURNETT APPEAR TO BE EXERCISED BY THIS

BUSINESS OF MR CLARK DEALING DIRECT

WITH WASHDC MANFRED HAS A CALL IN TO

PEBBY MASON: WHEN SHE CALLS BACK SHE'S GOING TO

SUGGEST THAT THE TASK FORCE OR URR ^{(IF HIS INTERESTS GO BEYOND THE} WOULD BE THE INITIATIVE

PLEASE TO CO-ORDINATE A PROGRAMME FOR MR CLARK

+ THAT THIS MIGHT BE SIMPLEST.

MANFRED WILL ALERT ME OF WHAT TRANSPIRES

* BEFORE I'D CALLED PEBBY MASON

TOR/TOB
COMMUNICATIONS
JAN 3 20 20 '84
CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

288

SIG

R.J. LISYSHEIN/th

J.Kinsman/rcc/Ext.286.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

2-
3

FILE

SECURITY
Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE

December 29, 1983

NUMBER
Numéro

J.K.B. KINSMAN

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Objet
Visit of Right Honourable Joe Clark

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
MISSION	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

ambassador

Lysyshyn

OTT/URG/

RR/Von

Nostitz

Mr. Clark called today to say he was planning a trip to Washington to follow on from his visit to Geneva. He was thinking of 3 days or so, starting on January 29.

2. On arms control, we agreed he'd want to consult here with the State Department, the Department of Defence, and ACDA, and possibly the NSC. Probably, he would be received at a high level but substantive briefings should also be sought with those deeply involved with the negotiations, such as Eagleburger, Burt, Poole and Nitze.

3. I thought he'd want to meet with experts from outside the Government, at Brookings, The New York Times, etc. Mr. Clark thought this a good idea if it were no problem for the Administration. I assured him that it would not be.

4. He wanted some meetings on the Hill, again if it were not a problem politically. I said several Senators would be of interest to him and that going to the Hill for briefings was accepted here as a necessity of life.

5. Mr. Clark said he also wanted briefings from experts on the USSR, beyond the arms control issue, on perceptions and purposes. I said there were lots of very qualified Sovietologists around, and mentioned Hyland, Barrington and Sonnenfeldt as example.

...../2

3/3

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

6. He saw all this as an interesting menu and hoped 3 days could accommodate it though more might be available if necessary.

7. He hoped his visit could be as private as possible. He was pleased the Geneva visit only became known to the press after the fact. I said there would be little chance of keeping a visit hidden from the Canadian press corps here. He recognized that but stressed he wanted no publicity or fanfare. He would be pleased to have a dinner at the Ambassador's, of course, with American guests. In general, he said he wanted his visit to be a help to the Embassy.

8. Mr. Clark was leaving shortly for two weeks' travel but next week a staff assistant, Peggy Mason, will be in touch with us about details.

~~Jeffrey Kinsman~~

J.K.B. Kinsman

External Affairs - Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

1/2

WDC 003/04

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

TOR/TOD
COMMUNICATIONS

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche.

SECURITY/SECURITE

UNCLASSIFIED

PA-265 CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

N/DE

WCHDC

N/A

IDDZ UGP URR PMOOTT/COLEMAN

IFO

ISTR

EF

OBJ/SUJ

BALTIMORE SUN ARTICLE

ARTICLE BY JOE STERNE, EDITORIAL PAGE EDITOR OF THE BALTIMORE
SUN FOR 31DEC83 ENTITLED QUOTE US POLICY CHANGES WORRY
CANADIANS UNQUOTE. ARTICLE FOLLOWS MR. STERNE'S PARTICIPATION
IN REGIONAL SR EDITORS VISIT TO CDA DEC 4-8, AND IN INTERVIEW
WITH PRIME MINISTER DURING HIS VISIT TO WSHDC 15DEC83.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

P. Chappell/sg

Public Affairs

X209

SIG P. Gossage

EXT 518-1 (22/4)

2/2

Dated: November 30, 1983.
Raeeta B. Barnes,
Regional Administrator, Region 10.
[FR Doc. 83-33593 Filed 12-18-83; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6360-60-M

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Oklahoma; Amendment to Notice of
Major Disaster Declaration

[FEMA-A693-DR]

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management
Agency.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the
Notice of a major disaster for the State
of Oklahoma [FEMA-693-DR], dated
October 26, 1983, and related
determinations.

DATED: December 12, 1983.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Sewall H. E. Johnson, Disaster
Assistance Programs, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, Washington, D.C.
20472 (202) 287-0501.

Notice

The notice of a major disaster for the
State of Oklahoma dated October 26,
1983, is hereby amended to include the
following area among areas determined
to have been adversely affected by the
catastrophe declared a major disaster
by the President in his declaration of
October 26, 1983:

The Counties of Kiowa, Okfuskee and
Oklahoma for Public Assistance.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance No.
93.516, Disaster Assistance)

Samuel W. Speck,

Associate Director, State and Local Programs
and Support, Federal Emergency
Management Agency.

[FR Doc. 83-33597 Filed 12-18-83; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6710-02-M

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

Shipping Conditions in the U.S.
Atlantic and Gulf/Ecuador Trade;
Filing of Petition

December 14, 1983.

Coordinated Caribbean Transport has
petitioned the Federal Maritime
Commission to investigate certain
alleged discriminatory actions against
Petitioner in the trade between United
States Atlantic and Gulf ports and
Ecuador. Specifically, it is alleged that
Petitioner has been restricted in its
selection of ports of call in Ecuador

while other carriers have not been so
restricted. This restriction, it is alleged,
has: (1) Created special conditions
unfavorable to shipping in the foreign
commerce of the United States within
the purview of section 19 of the
Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46 U.S.C.
876), and (2) resulted in the imposition of
unfair and discriminatory burdens by
the Government of Ecuador on
Petitioner's vessels within the purview
of section 28 of the Shipping Act, 1916
(46 U.S.C. 825).

Petitioner requests that the
Commission institute an investigation
into the matters alleged and issue rules
pursuant to 46 CFR Part 508 as would be
necessary and appropriate. It is
requested that such rules include
appropriate countervailing restrictions
on Ecuadorian-flag vessels.

In order for the Commission to make a
thorough evaluation of Petitioner's
allegations, interested persons are
requested to submit views, arguments or
data on the petition no later than
January 20, 1984. Responses shall be
directed to the Secretary, Federal
Maritime Commission, Washington, D.C.
20573, in an original and 15 copies.
Responses shall also be served on
counsel for Petitioner: Richard W.
Kurrus, Esq., Kurrus and Dyer, 1055
Thomas Jefferson St., NW., Washington,
D.C. 20007.

Copies of the petition are available for
examination at the Washington, D.C.,
office of the Commission, 1100 L Street,
NW., Room 11101.

Francis C. Hurney,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 83-33603 Filed 12-18-83; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6730-01-M

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Health Resources and Services
Administration

Availability of Funds for Home Health
Services and Training

AGENCY: Health Resources and Services
Administration, Public Health Service,
HHS.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA)
announces that funds are available for
grants and loans for the development
and expansion of home health programs
and services. Public Law (Pub. L.) 98-
139, the Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education Appropriations
Act of 1984, signed on October 31, 1983,
appropriates \$5 million under section

339 of the Public Health Service (PHS)
Act (42 U.S.C. 255) to provide home
health services and for the training of
paraprofessionals to provide home
health services. This notice contains
information of interest to prospective
applicants for such funding.

DATE: To receive consideration as being
on time, mailed applications must be
postmarked on or prior to May 15, 1984
and received at the appropriate HHS
regional office (see Appendix) in time
for processing. Hand delivered
applications must be received by close
of business May 15, 1984. Awards will
be made in July 1984.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Appropriate Regional Health
Administrator (see Appendix).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Orphan Drug Act (Pub. L. 97-414),
passed on January 1, 1983, revised title
III of the PHS Act (the act) to establish
the Home Health Services program.
Section 339(a) of the Act provides that
the Secretary may make grants to public
and private non-profit entities to meet
the initial costs of establishing and
operating home health programs, and
may make loans to proprietary entities
for these purposes. Grants and loans
may also be awarded to existing entities
for expanding home health services to a
new geographic service area. Under
section 339(b) of the Act, the Secretary
may award grants to public and private
entities for programs to train
paraprofessionals, including homemaker
home health aides, to provide home
health services.

HRSA has decided to allocate the \$5
million provided by Pub. L. 98-139 for
carrying out section 339 as follows: \$4
million will be awarded as grants and
loans under section 339(a) of the Act for
providing of home health services in
areas in which such services are
inadequate or not readily accessible,
including services in rural towns and
villages, and \$1 million will be awarded
as grants under section 339(b) of the Act
for training programs for home health
paraprofessionals.

In making loans or awarding grants
for the development of new home health
service programs or the expansion of
existing home health service programs
into new areas, HRSA will give
preference to those applicants which
intend to provide services in areas
where there is a high percentage of the
population composed of individuals who
are elderly (persons over 65 years of
age), medically indigent (persons at or
below the HHS poverty income
guidelines, see 48 FR 7010, February 17,
1983), or disabled (those disabled

Government
of CanadaGouvernement
du Canada**ACTION FICHE DE
REQUEST SERVICE**

To — À

File No. — Dossier N°

Date

From — De

☐ Please call
Prière d'appeler

Tel. No. — N° de tél.

Ext. — Poste

☐ Returned your call
Vous a rappelé☐ Will call again
Vous rappellera☐ Wants to see you
Désire vous voir

Date

Time — Heure

Message received by
Message reçu par☐ Action
Donner suite☐ Approval
Approbation☐ Note & return
Noter et retourner☐ Comments
Commentaires☐ Draft reply
Projet de réponse☐ Note & forward
Noter et faire suivre☐ As requested
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PA-266 contains article
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External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
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MESSAGE

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FILE/DOSSIER

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CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

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INFO UGP FPR

EF NY TIMES ARTICLE JAN. 3 - ARMS-CURB IDEAS WORTHY OF US RESPECT

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG P. GOSSAGE/rs

PUB. AFFAIRS

206

SIG P. GOSSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

Subject
Sujet

Date 31/December/83

Publication Baltimore Sun

U.S. policy changes worry Canadians

By Joseph R. L. Sterne
Editorial Page Editor of The Sun

Ottawa — Canada's ambassador to the United States, Allan E. Gottlieb, went before a business audience in Calgary recently with a blunt message: You had better start "networking" Capitol Hill or Canadian interests will be flattened by new forms of logrolling in the U.S. Congress.

Mr. Gottlieb then launched into an analysis of the recent dramatic changes in Congress: its increasing defiance of the executive branch, the breakdown of its own leadership, the growth of huge ancillary substructures and a proliferation of committees and subcommittees.

These have altered the role of the average lawmaker, who now has the leverage to build up ad hoc alliances for passage of bills of particular interest to his district.

"People may love Canada, but we don't have votes in the U.S. Congress," said the ambassador. "When a congressman proposes legislation inimical to us, and when it comes to a saw-off between his colleagues' domestic political interests and their sentimental attachment to Canada, they may be inclined to defer, understandably enough, to the colleague whose support they will need later on."

The statement was a glimpse into the intricate ties between the United States and Canada, ties rooted and tangled in politics, economics, defense and a sharing of a large part of the North American continent.

Mr. Gottlieb lamented, for example, that Canada is often the victim of the "sideswipe" effect. U.S. legislation or regulations retaliating against unfair trade practices in Japan and Western Europe can clobber Canadian businesses that are doing nothing wrong.

His remedy is "networking" Congress by personal contacts with U.S. businessmen, through lobbyists and by hiring agencies that specialize in watching the flow of legislation through the congressional maze.

Canada's minister for international trade, Gerald Regan, has a bolder plan. After deploring the "constant risk of unilateral and unpredictable action by Congress," he urged New York importers and exporters this month to consider expansion of the kind of free trade arrangement pioneered in the 1960s by an "Autopact" that permits free entry of cars manufactured on both sides of the border.

Continuing in Ottawa, in elaborating their complaints about Congress voice special alarm about protectionist tendencies within the Democratic caucus. The domestic content bill, which has the support of the AFL-CIO

and former Vice President Walter F. Mondale, a Democratic candidate for president, would torpedo the "Autopact" by requiring a certain percentage of American labor and parts in every car sold in the United States.

"If Mondale is elected and implements his protectionist planks, we are in for some very tough times," said an expert in U.S.-Canada relations.

The same source conceded that it's a bit of a turnaround to hear Canadians talking about Democrats this way. As a country that is traditionally several notches to the left of the United States politically, Canada and its ruling Liberal Party have felt an affinity for New Deal-Great Society traditions south of the border.

Nevertheless, Ambassador Gottlieb talks publicly in terms of "a significant improvement" in relations with the Reagan administration. And Trade Minister Regan says bilateral trade relations "are generally in good shape" because the Reagan administration has, with one of two exceptions, resisted protectionist pressures.

This benign attitude by a Liberal government is seen by observers here as partly the handiwork of Secretary of State George P. Shultz. He has been adhering to an agreement to meet four times yearly with his "old M.I.T. buddy," External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachan, to review the vast, complicated and, in Canadian eyes, neglected bilateral relationship.

Noting a two-way trade totaling \$93 billion, which is the largest cross-border traffic in the world, Mr. Shultz observed that "we must be doing something right."

The Canadians, however, think the United States is doing a lot wrong as well.

Efforts by U.S. courts to apply American law in controlling the operations of American companies in Canada and some Canadian enterprises in third countries is especially irksome.

"When the extraterritorial application of American laws falls on us," Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau said on the eve of his recent visit to the White House, "it is because we are not confident in ourselves and because we are not prepared to stand up to these, our best friends, and say, 'Your law, its writ, will not run in our country.'"

"Will we be part of a continental United States?" he asked, evoking a fear that has threaded through all of Canadian history.

Yet when Mr. Trudeau saw President Reagan the next day to promote his peace initiative, he was far less

combative. As he later described the meeting to American reporters, he praised Mr. Reagan for his success in "reestablishing the United States as a country that will stick up for its rights and honor" and lamented that Mr. Reagan's "message of peace" was not getting through to the world.

"Is this too sycophantic?" he asked. "Does it look like I was taken in?"

Mr. Trudeau's ambiguity is typical of his country. The U.S. invasion of Grenada, for example, had apparent wide popular support in the United States, but Canada's ruling establishment was infuriated that the United States had taken against against a Western Hemisphere member of the Commonwealth without consulting Ottawa.

Even the opposition Progressive Conservative Party, which criticizes Prime Minister Trudeau for needlessly irritating the United States, has not condoned the Grenada operation.

There also are serious misgivings about Reagan administration policies in Central America. Canada leans to the view that the region's problems are primarily social and economic, that Washington has exaggerated the Soviet-Cuban role in upheavals and revolutions.

For its part, the United States is resentful about Canada's scanty contributions to mutual security while taking refuge under the U.S. defense umbrella. "We are relieved that you have the fleets to move around from sea to sea," conceded one Canadian diplomat. "We just don't like it when you start playing cowboy."

Canadians sometimes justify their willingness to rely on the U.S. shield by pointing to their relatively generous foreign aid program. This fits in with Mr. Trudeau's efforts to identify with the Third World while remaining a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

What is more pertinent to current issues, however, is Mr. Trudeau's controversial decision to permit the testing of U.S. cruise missiles next spring on a 1,500-mile range in northern Canada.

One Canadian diplomat said the United States should now realize that Canadian territory, in all its vastness, is in itself a major contribution to North American security.

Mr. Trudeau's world travels on behalf of a new dialogue among the nuclear-weapons powers puts Washington in the position of agreeing with him in principle but privately taking issue with some of his specifics.

External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada / Canada

ACTION
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MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	PA-265	03 JAN 84	12	10
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OBJ/SUJ	BALTIMORE SUN ARTICLE				
	ARTICLE BY JOE STERNE, EDITORIAL PAGE EDITOR OF THE BALTIMORE SUN FOR 31DEC83 ENTITLED QUOTE US POLICY CHANGES WORRY CANADIANS UNQUOTE. ARTICLE FOLLOWS MR. STERNE'S PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL SR EDITORS VISIT TO CDA DEC 4-8, AND IN INTERVIEW WITH PRIME MINISTER DURING HIS VISIT TO WSHDC 15DEC83.				

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG P. Chappell/sg	Public Affairs	X209	SIG P. Gossage

2/2

Dated: November 30, 1983.
Ernesta B. Barnes,
Regional Administrator, Region 10.
[FR Doc. 83-33563 Filed 12-18-83; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9560-80-M

**FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY**

**Oklahoma; Amendment to Notice of
Major Disaster Declaration**

[FEMA-693-DR]

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the Notice of a major disaster for the State of Oklahoma [FEMA-693-DR], dated October 26, 1983, and related determinations.

DATED: December 12, 1983.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Sewall H. E. Johnson, Disaster Assistance Programs, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C. 20472 (202) 287-0501.

Notice

The notice of a major disaster for the State of Oklahoma dated October 26, 1983, is hereby amended to include the following area among areas determined to have been adversely affected by the catastrophe declared a major disaster by the President in his declaration of October 26, 1983:

The Counties of Kiowa, Okfuskee and Oklahoma for Public Assistance.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance No. 93-516, Disaster Assistance)

Samuel W. Speck,

Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. 83-33567 Filed 12-18-83; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6718-02-M

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

**Shipping Conditions in the U.S.
Atlantic and Gulf/Ecuador Trade;
Filing of Petition**

December 14, 1983.

Coordinated Caribbean Transport has petitioned the Federal Maritime Commission to investigate certain alleged discriminatory actions against Petitioner in the trade between United States Atlantic and Gulf ports and Ecuador. Specifically, it is alleged that Petitioner has been restricted in its selection of ports of call in Ecuador

while other carriers have not been so restricted. This restriction, it is alleged, has: (1) Created special conditions unfavorable to shipping in the foreign commerce of the United States within the purview of section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46 U.S.C. 876), and (2) resulted in the imposition of unfair and discriminatory burdens by the Government of Ecuador on Petitioner's vessels within the purview of section 26 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (46 U.S.C. 825).

Petitioner requests that the Commission institute an investigation into the matters alleged and issue rules pursuant to 46 CFR Part 508 as would be necessary and appropriate. It is requested that such rules include appropriate countervailing restrictions on Ecuadorian-flag vessels.

In order for the Commission to make a thorough evaluation of Petitioner's allegations, interested persons are requested to submit views, arguments or data on the petition no later than January 20, 1984. Responses shall be directed to the Secretary, Federal Maritime Commission, Washington, D.C. 20573, in an original and 15 copies. Responses shall also be served on counsel for Petitioner: Richard W. Kurrus, Esq., Kurrus and Dyer, 1055 Thomas Jefferson St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20007.

Copies of the petition are available for examination at the Washington, D.C., office of the Commission, 1100 L Street, NW., Room 11101.

Francis C. Hurney,
Secretary.

[FR Doc. 83-33603 Filed 12-18-83; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6730-01-M

**DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES**

**Health Resources and Services
Administration**

**Availability of Funds for Home Health
Services and Training**

AGENCY: Health Resources and Services Administration, Public Health Service, HHS.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) announces that funds are available for grants and loans for the development and expansion of home health programs and services. Public Law (Pub. L.) 98-139, the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act of 1984, signed on October 31, 1983, appropriates \$5 million under section

339 of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act (42 U.S.C. 255) to provide home health services and for the training of paraprofessionals to provide home health services. This notice contains information of interest to prospective applicants for such funding.

DATE: To receive consideration as being on time, mailed applications must be postmarked on or prior to May 15, 1984 and received at the appropriate HHS regional office (see Appendix) in time for processing. Hand delivered applications may be received by close of business May 15, 1984. Awards will be made in July 1984.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Appropriate Regional Health Services Administrator (see Appendix).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Orphan Drug Act (Pub. L. 97-414), passed on January 1, 1983, revised title III of the PHS Act (the Act) to establish the Home Health Services program. Section 339(a) of the Act provides that the Secretary may make grants to public and private non-profit entities to meet the initial costs of establishing and operating home health programs, and may make loans to proprietary entities for these purposes. Grants and loans may also be awarded to existing entities for expanding home health services to a new geographic service area. Under section 339(b) of the Act, the Secretary may award grants to public and private entities for programs to train paraprofessionals, including homemaker home health aides, to provide home health services.

HRSA has decided to allocate the \$5 million provided by Pub. L. 98-139 for carrying out section 339 as follows: \$4 million will be awarded as grants and loans under section 339(a) of the Act for providing of home health services in areas in which such services are inadequate or not readily accessible, including services in rural towns and villages, and \$1 million will be awarded as grants under section 339(b) of the Act for training programs for home health paraprofessionals.

In making loans or awarding grants for the development of new home health service programs or the expansion of existing home health service programs into new areas, HRSA will give preference to those applicants which intend to provide services in areas where there is a high percentage of the population composed of individuals who are elderly (persons over 65 years of age), medically indigent (persons at or below the HHS poverty income guidelines, see 48 FR 7010, February 17, 1983), or disabled (those disabled

External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada / Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

**SECTION
SUITE A DONNER**

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

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EXTOTT/UGP/MUELLER

INFO

DISTR

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

NYT ARTICLE "ARMS CURB IDEAS WORTHY OF US RESPECT"

COMCENTRE: PLS COPY ATTACHED ARTICLE.

cc: ~~155A~~

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CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

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TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

PWS
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Public Affairs

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SIG

P. Gossage
P. Gossage

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

2/2
Editorial Page
#18

Subject

Sujet

Date

3/9 January/84

Publication

New York Times

Arms-Curb Ideas Worthy of U.S. Respect

To the Editor:

The continuing efforts of the Reagan Administration to trivialize Prime Minister Trudeau's arms reduction initiatives (news story Dec. 23) reflect the least attractive and potentially most dangerous attributes of American foreign policy: arrogance born of egocentrism.

It appears to be beyond the capacity of the Administration to imagine that anyone beyond the U.S. borders could have something useful to contribute to stimulating genuine arms-reduction negotiations. This attitude persists in the face of the utter failure of the Administration's own efforts and in the shadow of increasing superpower tensions.

Worse still, this attitude implicitly assumes that American interests are the dominant interest at stake in the arms negotiations. Of course, the opposite is closer to the truth: it is the other nations of the Western world that have the most to lose from failure and to gain from success since they, unlike the United States, do not control the nuclear arsenal.

Thus, the only real weapon that Canadians and other free people



Arthur Young

have is the power of ideas. And when the U.S. Government fails to take ideas seriously, and to meet them on their merits, the American ideal is tarnished and our continued existence further threatened.

J. ROBERT S. PRICHARD
Cambridge, Mass., Dec. 23, 1983

The writer is visiting professor of law at Harvard.

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO PEKIN DELIVER BY 040900

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---ZHAO COMMENTS ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE

WE HAVE RECEIVED PARTIAL AND SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTORY REPORTS OF
COMMENTS MADE BY ZHAO ZIYANG AT 02JAN PRESS CONF HIGHLIGHTING HIS
UPCOMING USA/CDN VISIT. REMARKS APPARENTLY INCLUDE ENDORSEMENT OF
EITHER SUBSTANCE OF PMS PEACE/SECURITY INITIATIVE OR AT LEAST PMS
INTENT AND TACTICS (NOT/NOT CLEAR WHICH). GRATEFUL YOUR REPORT BY
RETURN TEL (FOR INCLUSION IN SCENARIO BRIEF) ON JUST WHAT ZHAO SAID
ABOUT CDN VISIT IN GENERAL AND PMS INITIATIVE IN PARTICULAR,
INCLUDING CLARIFICATION OF ABOVE POINT RE SUBSTANCE/INTENT.

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**ACTION
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**ACTION
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2.MGTC PLEASE AMEND AND PROTECT TO RCR.

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REF YOURTEL IDDZ0311 23DEC83

---PMS INITIATIVE:RELATIONS WITH CHANCELLORS OFFICE

SUMMARY.DISSCUSSION WITH TELTSCHIK,CHANCELLOR KOHLS FOREIGN

AFFAIRS ADVISOR,REVEALED CONTINUING STRONG SUPPORT OF

CHANCELLOR FOR PMS INITIATIVE.EQUALLY STRONG ENCOURAGEMENT

TO PROCEED WITH VISIT TO MOSCO BUT WITH STRATEGY EXAMINED IN

CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH AMERICANS AND HOPEFULLY FRG.

REAFFIRMATION OF FRG INTEREST IN MBFR DEVELOPMENTS,AND STRONG

RESERVATIONS,INDEED OPPOSITION,TO FUNDAMENTAL REVISION OF

NATO MILITARY STRATEGY-THOUGH RECOGNITION OF NEED OPTICALLY

TO BE SEEN TO BE WILLING TO DISCUSS.

2.REPORT.YOUR DETAILED AND TIMELY TALKING POINTS PROVIDED GOOD

BASIS FOR USEFUL LUNCHTIME DISCUSSION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR AND

TELTSCHIK ON PMS INITIATIVE AND CHANCELLORS APPORACH TO

PRESENT STATE OF EAST WEST RELATIONS.

3.IN SUMMARIZING TONE AND SUBSTANCE OF EXCHANGES ON PMS

INITIATIVE BETWEEN PM AND PRESIDENT REAGAN IN WSHDC,

...2

Mr. Smith
Primary responsibility
for answering query on p.5
rests in European Bureau.
Pls touch base to them
h.d

PAGE TWO ZQGR0001 CONF

AMBASSADOR HIGHLIGHTED POLITICAL APPROACH USED. TELTSCHIK WAS PARTICULARLY TAKEN BY PMS USE OF PRESIDENT REAGANS STATEMENT TO JPNESE DIET AS MEANS OF ENGAGING HIS INTEREST IN INITIATIVE. HE COMMENTED THAT FRG VERY MUCH HOPED THAT PM WOULD GO TO MOSCO, AND IN DOING SO WOULD BRING QUOTE SECRET UNQUOTE PROPOSALS DEVELOPED WITH AMERICANS AIMED AT BRINGING ABOUT RESUMPTION OF SOVIET/USA NEGOTIATIONS: SECRET DISCUSSION WAS NEEDED TO DETERMINE BASIS ON WHICH BOTH COULD RETURN TO NEGOTIATING TABLE. IT WOULD NOT/NOT DO TO TRY OUT IDEAS WHICH ONE OR OTHER WOULD LATER REJECT, HENCE NEED FOR PRE-DISCUSSION WITH USA. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADORS COMMENT THAT ON RETURN FROM MOSCO, PM OR MEMBER OF DEL MIGHT STOP OVER IN BONN FOR DEBRIEFING ON VISIT, TELTSCHIK COMMENTED FAVOURABLY AND WHILE NOTING VISIT WOULD NOT/NOT TAKE PLACE PRIOR TO VISIT TO MOSCO. FRG WOULD STILL LIKE CHANCE BEFORE VISIT TO GIVE US BENEFIT OF ANY LAST-MINUTE VIEWS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE TO SOVIET UNION AT THIS POINT, AND PARTICULARLY AS MATTERS WERE, FOR PRESENT, SO CONFUSED IN KREMLIN. AMB AGREED WE WOULD LET FRG KNOW OF DATES WHEN CONFIRMED AND WOULD PASS ON TO PM, CHANCELLORS ADVICE AND COMMENTS PRIOR TO MOSCO VISIT.

4. AMB INVITED TELTSCHIK TO COMMENT ON FRGS APPROACH TO CDE, MBFR AND OVERALL PROSPECTS OF ENCOURAGING MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. TELTSCHIK ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FRG WAS REMAINING CLOSELY IN CONTACT WITH EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES,

...3

PAGE THREE ZQGR0001 CONF

INTER ALIA FOREIGN MINISTER OF HUNGARY HAD RECENTLY VISITED. CHANCELLOR HAD LATELY DIRECTED LETS TO ALL WSAW PACT LEADERS ENCOURAGING THEM TO TAKE SERIOUSLY NATO BRU DECLARATION. FRG WAS CONVINCED THAT USSR MUST RETURN TO NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH USA BUT CONVINCED ALSO THAT IT COULD NOT/NOT RETURN TO SAME TABLE. IN ORDER TO SAVE FACE, DIFFERENT FORUM WOULD NEED TO BE FOUND, WHETHER ACSQVSGBFRSYQBV INF AND START OR BY OTHER MEANS. FRG WAS PERSUADED THAT USA AND NATO MUST AVOID SIMPLY WAITING FOR USSR TO MAKE PROPOSALS TO WHICH ALLIANCE, AFTER CONSIDERABLE TOING AND FROING, WOULD RESPOND. RATHER USA MUST KEEP INITIATIVE BY COMING UP WITH ITS OWN PROPOSALS.

5. HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MIN HAD LED KOHL TO BELIEVE THAT ALL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE LIKELY TO BE REPRESENTED AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN STKHM AND THAT IN FINAL ANALYSIS GROMYKO WAS LIKELY ALSO TO BE THERE. PROBLEM WOULD BE TO ENSURE USA AND USSR FORMINS MET, AS THEY MUST.

6. ON QUESTION OF MBFR, AMB DRES ATTN TO CDN DISAPPOINTMENT THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING APPARENT AGREEMENT ON SUBJECT DURING MTG BETWEEN DPM/SSFA AND GENSCHER AT BRU, FRG REP HAD NOT/NOT OFFERED SUPPORT IN NATO COUNCIL FOR CDN PROPOSAL IN FAVOUR OF MINISTERIAL LEVEL INVOLVEMENT IN VIENN. TELTSCHIK ACKNOWLEDGED THIS, BUT SAID IT WAS NOT/NOT INTENDED TO MEAN ANY LESSENING OF FRG SUPPORT FOR SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN MBFR FORUM OR FOR LINE GENSCHER HAD TAKEN WITH DPM.

...4

PAGE FOUR ZQGR0001 CONFD

7.ON QUESTION OF CURRENT REVIEW IN NATO(HARMEL REVISITED)
TELTSCHIK GAVE REVEALING RESPONSE.WHILE INVITED EXPLICITLY
TO COMMENT ON FRGS POSITION,HE COMMENTED INSTEAD THAT
SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATE MILITARY/STRATEGIC
STRATEGY WAS PRECLUDED BY REALITY THAT FRANCE,AND ALSO
NETHERLANDS,BELGIUM AND PERHAPS UK,COULD NOT/NOT CONCEIVE
OF ENGAGING IN INCREASED ALLOCATIONS OF FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER
RESOURCES THAT WOULD BE INVOLVED IF EMPHASIS WERE SWITCHED TO
CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE.AND,OF COURSE,SAME WAS TRUE FOR GERMANY.
THUS THERE WAS NO/NO ALTERNATIVE TO PRESENT STRATEGY OF
DETERRENCE AND TO SUGGEST THAT ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES BE EXPLORED
WAS TO IMPLY TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION THAT PRESENT NUCLEAR
FETERRENT STRATEGY WAS DEFECTIVE.REALISTICALLY,IT WAS NOT/;,95.
ONE COULD AND SHOULD,OF COURSE,SPEAK POSITIVELY AND
ENTHUSIASTICALLY IN PUBLIC ABOUT NEED FOR RAISING THRESHOLD,
BUT DO SO ONLY IN FULL UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WOULD BE
UNFEASIBLE.HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT,WHILE FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES,
ONE WOULD HAVE TO ADMIT THAT STRATEGY COULD BE SUBJECT TO
REVIEW,IN FACT THERE WAS NO/NO ALTERNATIVE AS FRG DEFENCE
MIN HAS BEEN PUBLICLY STATING AT THIS TIME:IE QUOTE WE HAVE
THE ONLY POSSIBLE POLICY UNQUOTE WITHOUT JUDGING WHETHER IT IS
THE ONLY DESIRABLE ONE.

8.ON PARTING,TELTSCHIK REVEALED THAT KOHL AGREED JUST BEFORE
CHRISTMAS TO VISIT REAGAN IN WSHDC,AND USA HAD BEEN ASKED
...5

PAGE FIVE ZQGR0001 CONFD

WHETHER 04-06MAR84 WOULD BE CONVIENT.NO/NO RESPONSE YET AND
SHAPE OF VISIT NOT/NOT YET DEFINED,BUT IT WAS CLEAR EAST-WEST
DISLUSSIONS WOULD PREDOMINATE.(FACT OF PROPOSED VISIT MUST BE
GUARDED AS IT IS CONFD AT PRESENT).AMB COMMENTED THAT
DURING HIW OWN VISIT TO OTT TWO WEEKS AGO THFRE HAD BEEN
INDICATIONS OF STRONG INTEREST IN POSSIBILITY OF HAVING
CHANCELLOR KOHL VISIT OTT AT VERY EARLY STAGF.GRATEFUL
FOR YOUR VIEWS IN LIGHT OF PROBABLE USA VISIT IN MAR.

CCC/242 031245Z ZQGR0001

JANUARY 1984
VOL. 40, NO. 1

Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists



The Bulletin Clock, symbol of the threat of doomsday hanging over humanity, stands at three minutes to midnight.

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
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On the cover: The quotation by social scientist Robert Redfield appeared on the cover of the October 1949 Bulletin, when the hands of the clock advanced to three minutes to midnight. Cover design by Lisa Grayson.

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A peace initiative from Canada

Canada's prime minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, has not been conspicuous in advocating concrete steps for an end to the nuclear arms race (see October 1983 Bulletin). But in a remarkable speech given at the University of Guelph, Ontario, on October 27, 1983, Pierre Trudeau pledged in effect to devote the rest of his political career to "reducing the threat of war." We reprint below, with permission, a condensed version of the speech. The Bulletin welcomes the Prime Minister's initiative, believing it worthy of more general support. We will watch his progress with great interest. The Editors

By Pierre Elliott Trudeau

I AM DEEPLY TROUBLED: by an intellectual climate of cynicism and uncertainty; by the parlous state of East-West relations; by a superpower relationship which is dangerously confrontational; and by a widening gap between military strategy and political purpose. All these reveal most profoundly the urgent need to assert the pre-eminence of the mind of man over the machines of war.

There is today an ominous rhythm of crisis. Not just an arms crisis. It is a crisis of confidence in ourselves, a crisis of faith in others. How can we change that ominous rhythm? I start from what I suppose is a problem in epistemology—the difficulty all of us experience in trying to know what is going on in the world—to know it and to understand it in a manner that is accurate, that provides the ground for useful action.

Too often our knowledge and our judgments are true and false at the same time. This is often the distinctive sign of rapidly changing realities which tend to elude our understanding. For example, we know that there are, in the 1980s, many new kinds of power and many new centers of power. There is the power of oil, or of cheap labor, or of regional hegemony. We call it a multipolar world—which suggests that no nation can act in isolation, that no power is truly dominant. But surely it is also true, and perhaps now with a special force, that the superpower relationship is at this time as dominant and as crucial as it ever was in the 1950s, when we had a more simplistic bipolar model with which to understand the world.

Another example: military strategy is the subject of much debate these days. This is a positive sign. Many stra-

tegists, in rightly trying to increase the odds against the nuclear gamble, advocate increased strength in conventional weapons, and new doctrines for conventional deterrence. Some of these doctrines have the sound purpose of delaying, or even preventing, the terrible resort to nuclear weapons in any European conflict.

I believe that such a raising of the nuclear threshold in Europe is a concept of the first importance. It would not be an easy or inexpensive task. But even as I am attracted to this concept in its application to Europe, I am troubled by a broader implication. Non-nuclear weapons are in an advanced state of technology and are widely marketed. Sea-skimming missiles, laser-guided bombs and fragmentation weapons are available for distribution. Is it the purpose of nuclear arms control to make the world safe for conventional warfare? Surely a basic term is missing in this equation: the encouragement of an equilibrium of conventional arms and forces, balanced at lower rather than higher

*Our central purpose must be
to create a stable environment
of increased security
for both East and West.*

levels, an agreed framework of conventional deterrence against armed aggression—but significantly reducing any dangerous concentration of forces.

This is to some extent the task of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR) in Vienna. But those talks will not succeed unless their importance in terms of military strategy is developed within a wider framework of East-West confidence and political will.

LET ME SUGGEST a further example of our difficulty in understanding a time which appears to be out of joint. Interdependence is the accepted description of the world as we know it. We think it describes a rational and positive condition, an ethic to be encouraged. But we are also learning that the consequences of interdependence are frequently unforeseen, often irrational, negative and out of control—rogue trends which promote inequality and deep strains among states.

If we have difficulty understanding the intricacies of interdependence, we are not yet even close to managing the economic linkages with peace and security. The debate




Pierre Elliott Trudeau is prime minister of Canada.

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over East-West economic relations reveals the fundamental and unresolved question of how much economic interdependence is desirable between the two systems. Some say less. Some say more. Those who argue for less are often, paradoxically, the first to advocate the punitive merit of economic sanctions, which are only effective if interdependence exists and if Soviet behavior is modified by the expectation of economic benefit. Moreover, some who argue for economic sanctions in the civilian sector apparently believe that this will influence Soviet military spending. Yet they may add that there is little if any relationship between civilian and military economies in the Soviet Union.

This particular debate tends also to lay open one of the most gaping self-inflicted wounds of the current period: the unfortunate tendency for a discussion which starts off about East-West relations to wind up in the fratricide of West-West relations. There have been days when I or



Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher may seem to have been accused, for whatever reason or passion of the moment, of posing a greater threat to the security of the West than do the Soviets and their associates. It is almost as though the diversity, pluralism and freedom of expression which we are determined to preserve through the Alliance are not seen as appropriate within the Alliance.

The Alliance in arms against itself is a paradox rich with historical allusion. NATO will avoid that fate if we are wise. But institutions cannot grow to meet new challenges if their level of debate—their intellectual universe of discourse—does not expand to meet the changing realities of our environment. Therefore, I am uneasy with these paradoxes. I am not satisfied with our ability to analyze and understand the complexities of an entirely new phase in East-West relations. I am not reassured by the posture and rhetoric of an earlier wartime age. It is not our nerves which are being tested now, and these are not playing fields on which we stand and cheer. It is the killing-ground of life itself, and what is being tested is whether the force and will of our statecraft can reverse the momentum of the nuclear arms race.

HOW DID WE ARRIVE at such an impasse? Some of

the answers lie in the ragged course of East-West relations over the past 15 years. Those relations have an innate tendency to defy management and control. They are animated by competing philosophies and civilizations, and armed with weaponry that is global in scope.

I don't believe we had any illusions about the short-lived and much-maligned period of detente. But the process too soon became part of the problem. The main achievements of the late 1960s and early 1970s were carried forward with difficulty, perhaps with an overload of linkage. Detente rapidly showed signs of a process being drained of its substance. Core issues were held hostage by one side or the other—human rights, economic cooperation, hegemony in key spheres of influence. Detente became both divisible and reversible.

And yet, I am not ready to call detente a failure. It did coincide with, or provoke, an important impulse in the early 1970s which seems to have been lost without trace. It is the impulse toward political dialogue, toward regular consultation at the most senior levels of the East-West system.

With the loss of that impulse, and in the absence of high politics in the East-West relationship, it is not surprising that any shred of trust or confidence in the intentions of the other side appears to have vanished as well. Also missing, and this troubles me deeply, is much trace of political craft and creativity directed at ameliorating the intentions of the other side. There is a disturbing complacency, a readiness to adapt to the worse rather than to exert our influence for the better. We are, in short, de-politicizing the most important political relationship we have.

The responsibility for this lies partly, but by no means exclusively, with both superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union outstrip the rest of us in their global reach, their armaments, and their leadership responsibilities. Naturally, they differ greatly—and I am not committing the fallacy of describing them as equals in any moral sense at all. Nevertheless, they breathe an atmosphere common to themselves and share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates.

It is therefore facile to deny the grave responsibilities which are shared in Washington and Moscow, or to deny that what both seem to lack at the present time is a political vision of a world wherein their nations can live in peace. What is essential to assert is that, just as war is too important to leave to the generals, so the relationship between the superpowers may have become too charged with animosity for East-West relations to be entrusted to them alone.

Military scientists make a routine distinction between capabilities—what weaponry the enemy has—and intentions—when, how and why they intend to use it. I am profoundly concerned that we are devoting far too great a proportion of our time to the enumeration of capabilities, and far too little to the assessment of intentions which govern the use of arms. We may at some point be able to freeze the

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nuclear capability in the world at greatly reduced levels. But how do we freeze the menacing intentions which might control those weapons which remain? Therein lies the inadequacy of the nuclear freeze argument.

THIS IS A PERIOD of deep questioning of many of the strategic concepts which have dominated the post-war world. New-school strategists, and critics from left and from right, are probing the fundamentals of strategic thought in the nuclear age from many points of view. They are in agreement, however, when they point to changing realities, to evolution in the psychology of those who live constantly with the spectre of nuclear war, and to the importance of weeding out obsolete ideas.

But much of this questioning, provocative as it is, strikes me as missing an important point. And that is the place of military strategy in the nuclear age. I believe that military strategy must, above all, serve a comprehensive set of political objectives and controls, which dominate and give purpose to modern weapons and to military doctrine. Our central purpose must be to create a stable environment of increased security for both East and West. We must aim at suppressing those nearly instinctive fears, frustrations or ambitions which have so often been the reason for resorting to the use of force.

Therefore it is essential to Western purposes, in my judgment, to maintain in our policies elements of communication, negotiation and transparency about our own intentions—plus a measure of incentive for the Soviet Union first to clarify, and then to modify, its own objectives toward the West. This was, in a limited sense, the philosophy which underpinned the NATO response to the Soviet buildup of 85-20 missiles in Europe. We had to ask ourselves what purpose of political intimidation could be served by that buildup. That is why we decided to respond with a two-track approach—deployment and negotiations. This approach has given the Soviet Union both the clear incentive to reach agreement and the table at which to do so. I and my fellow NATO heads of government remain firmly committed to that two-track decision.


Our two-track decision may also require a "third rail" of high level political energy to speed the course of agreement—a third rail through which might run the current of our broader political purposes, including our determination not to be intimidated.

The risk of accident or miscalculation is too great for us not to begin to repair the lines of communication with our adversaries. The level of tension is too high for us not to revive a more constructive approach to the containment of crises. The degree of mutual mistrust is too intense for us not to try to rebuild confidence through active political contact and consultation. Only in this way can the quality and credibility of efforts toward peace and security, from whatever quarter, be animated and reinforced. But it is a precondition of that goal that Western councils, particularly at the head of government level, benefit from the free

flow of ideas which we maintain in our own societies and which we advocate for others. That, too, forms part of our armament and we should not hesitate to deploy it.

The trend is for arms negotiations, like military strategy itself, to become ever more distanced from the political energy of the participants. The MBFR talks in Vienna have labored for over 10 years and produced very little by way of results. Those talks require urgent political attention if they are to move off dead center. Over the years, other leaders and I have made several proposals in that direction—proposals which now merit wider support.

We have high hopes for the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, opening in January 1984. We recognize the importance of agreement on confidence building measures of



Richard C. Holbrooke, United States

a military nature. But these negotiations, important as they are, will not advance our larger hopes if they proceed in a political vacuum. The delicate framework of security in Europe cannot be balanced on the fate of one or two sets of negotiations alone. These negotiations must be grounded in a structure of stable East-West understanding: reciprocal acknowledgment of legitimate security needs, regular high-level dialogue, and a determined approach to crisis management. Here, again, we require that jolt of political energy which I have described as the third rail.

What is missing is a strategy of confidence-building measures of a political nature:

- steps that reduce tensions caused by uncertainty about objectives or by fear of the consequences of failure;
- steps that mitigate hostility and promote a modicum of mutual respect; and

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• steps that build an authentic confidence in humanity's ability to survive on this planet.

In short, we must take positive political steps in order to reverse the dangerously downward trend-line in East-West relations.

We must work in a balanced and rational fashion, with a degree of trust, a degree of belief in the good sense of mankind, and with a strong recognition that the task is urgent. The negotiations on theater nuclear forces in Europe, and on strategic forces, are taking place between the superpowers. Canada is not at the table, and we have no wish to insert ourselves into this vital and delicate process. It is my hope, however, that we might help to influence the atmosphere in which these negotiations are being conducted, and thereby enhance the prospects of early agreement. We need to be realistic about the hard factors at play. We must appreciate the primordial drive for security and for sovereignty which is never very far below the surface of the arms control debate.

We will want to look at several elements:

• ways of designing a consistent structure of political and economic confidence with which to stabilize East-West relations;

• ways to draw the superpowers away from their concentration on military strength toward regular and productive dialogue, toward a sense of responsibility commensurate with their power;

• ways to persuade all five nuclear-weapons states to engage in negotiations aimed at establishing global limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals;

• ways of improving European security through the raising of the nuclear threshold, including the imposition of a political dynamic upon the static MBFR talks in Vienna; and

• ways to arrest the proliferation of nuclear weapons among other states.

It is my personal purpose to live up to the undertaking, made by leaders at the Williamsburg Summit last May, "to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war." The questions to be raised are not easy. There are priorities which inevitably conflict. A new climate of East-West confidence cannot be instilled in a day, nor can the arms race be stopped overnight. But in so far as I, and other leaders who share this purpose, can work together to build authentic confidence, I pledge that we shall.

Not to do so at this time would, I believe, amount to a form of escapism - an escapism well defined by the Harvard Nuclear Study Group in their thoughtful book, *Living with Nuclear Weapons*. The book cautions against two forms of escapism: to believe that nuclear weapons will go away and to think that nuclear weapons can be treated like other military weapons in history. And I would add a third form of escapism, in which we indulge at our peril. That is the escapism of allowing shrill rhetoric to become a substitute for foreign policy, of letting inertia become a substitute for will, of making a desert and calling it peace. □



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Joint Soviet-Canadian Declaration on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons

This document could in our opinion:

- 1) Give a political assessment of the danger of the present international situation; —
- 2) State the intent of the two sides to work towards its improvement; ✓
- 3) Emphasize the threat of spreading nuclear arms in the world; —
- 4) Renew the commitment of the two sides to the NPT; ✓
- 5) Urge the increased role of International Atomic Energy Agency in the control of peaceful use of nuclear materials; ✓
- 6) Appeal to other countries to join the NPT; ✓
- 7) Renew the commitment of the sides to observe the NPT in all their activities; ✓
- 8) Consultations on a bilateral basis in the preparation for the 1985 Review Conference. ✓

Possible addition to speech by M.F. May/84
M.D., but decided DRAFT Speech was not
suitable to purposes of PM initiative *Jan*

Yet it is not enough to concentrate on military hardware and capabilities. One of the basic emphases of Prime Minister Trudeau's current initiative on East-West relations and international security is to reassert the importance of the consideration of the aims and intentions that govern the use of arms. This is essential as a way to reduce the threat of nuclear war.

I would like to conclude by mentioning several aspects of the situation in Europe, the most heavily armed region of the earth, where East and West stand toe to toe.

We should first remind ourselves that NATO has been a bulwark against war in Europe and must continue to be the guarantee of peace on the continent. But because there is an imbalance in conventional forces in Europe - the Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO - there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. That is why we say that the nuclear threshold in Europe is too low.

Canada is committed to raising that threshold. The solution is to establish a more reasonable balance of conventional forces on either side. The simplest way to achieve this would be

- 2 -

to increase NATO's conventional forces in Europe, but the more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels. Canada is urging NATO allies to follow this path and to give fresh impetus to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna which have been proceeding very slowly over the past ten years.

This week the Stockholm conference on increasing military and political confidence in Europe gets underway. There Western foreign ministers, including my colleague Allan MacEachen and Secretary Shultz, are meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and other Eastern ministers.

This is exactly the sort of political dialogue that is necessary if we are to re-establish East-West relations on a constructive, long-term basis. It is in the common interests of East and West, and of the superpowers especially, to find ways together to guarantee their mutual security.

The Stockholm conference will not achieve any dramatic breakthroughs, but it aims to reduce the risks of war in Europe. It is critical that we devote ourselves to that goal.

- 3 -

In the nuclear age peace cannot be separated from security. A strong and resolute defence is essential to maintain our security. At the same time, political leaders must devote their efforts to ensuring that armed conflict does not break out.

MF



Embajada de España

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

TEXT OF LETTER ADDRESSED TO PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I thank you for your letter of 17 November
which I have read very attentively.

In my letter of 16 November, I was pointing
out that I shared your concern about the alarming situation
of international tension.

Unfortunately, in the past weeks this
deterioration has increased with the decision of the Soviets
to leave the negotiation table and with the beginning of
the deployment of North American medium range missiles in
Europe.

This climate of renewed tension confirms
the opportunity of your initiative in order to unblock international
dialogue and secure effective disarmament measures.

I agree that one way of stressing the importance
of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, a forum which
must be used to the maximum to revitalize the spirit of distension,

. / .



Embajada de España

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is that western countries send a high level representation to Stockholm, at the opening of sessions in mid-January.

I have followed with interest, Mr. Prime Minister, your recent trips and I hope you will be able to inform me on the reception you have found with regards to your initiative. Should you be planning another trip to Europe, I would welcome with great pleasure the opportunity of meeting with you personally to analyze jointly this and other matters of common interest.

Awaiting to hear from you, I send you my most cordial greetings,

Felipe González



Embajada de España

Text of letter addressed to Prime Minister Trudeau from the President of the Government of Spain (the original letter will be forwarded shortly):

"Estimado Primer Ministro:

Le agradezco el envío de su nueva carta de 17 de noviembre, que he leído con toda atención.

En la que yo le envié el 16 de noviembre le expresaba que compartía su preocupación por la alarmante situación de tensión internacional.

Desgraciadamente, se ha acentuado en las últimas semanas ese deterioro con el abandono soviético de la mesa de negociaciones y el inicio del despliegue de misiles norteamericanos de alcance medio en Europa.

Este clima de renovada tensión confirma la oportunidad de su iniciativa para desbloquear el diálogo internacional y obtener medidas efectivas de desarme.

Estoy de acuerdo en que una manera de dar realce a la Conferencia para el Desarme en Europa, Toró que conviene aprovechar al máximo para vigorizar el espíritu de distensión, es que los países occidentales envíen una

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Embajada de España

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representación de alto nivel a Estocolmo, con ocasión de la
apertura de las sesiones a mediados del próximo mes de enero.


He seguido, Sr. Primer Ministro, con interés
sus recientes viajes y espero que pueda informarme sobre la
acogida que haya encontrado en lo que se refiere a su iniciativa.
Si entre sus planes se encuentra un nuevo desplazamiento a
Europa, contemplaría con sumo agrado la oportunidad de que
mantuviéramos una entrevista personal, para examinar conjuntamente
éste y otros temas de interés común.

A la espera de sus noticias, le envío mis más
cordiales saludos.

Felipe González"

The purple dawn

a monthly newsletter



Global Citizenship — The Growing World-wide Whisper

GLOBAL CITIZENS' ASSOCIATION

BOX 94 STANSTEAD
QUEBEC JOB 3E0

Editor - Duncan Graham
Tel: 819-876-5438

No 80 January 1984

Five Embassy Witness A short, symbolic, silent demonstration, vigil, witness was held at Noon on 17th Jan. '84 outside the embassies of China, France, Britain (High Commission), U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. in Ottawa.

Organised by the small Ottawa group of Global Citizens it was designed as described in their media release, "to focus on the collective responsibility of their leaders (Ziyang, Mitterand, Thatcher, Reagan and Andropov) for world peace and security as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council which they set up to save succeeding generations (that's us) from the scourge of war. It was a prayer, meditation, visualisation for a flash of intelligence, wit and wisdom to the five leaders." It coincided with the visit of Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang to Ottawa. In its way it was a demonstration of grass-roots support for Pierre Trudeau's peace initiative. The sign at each embassy listed the names of the leaders and the words - "Peacemakers or War Criminals". ?????

FIRST STEPS On CHRO-TV Ottawa we were asked what would be our first preferred steps to a better world.

Somehow, in some way, there must be a crack in the facade of nation-state sovereignty, a transition phase within the United Nations structure towards the principle of world sovereignty for issues of global concern on behalf of the people of the planet. First steps could be:

1. A permanent United Nations Peace Force - even that described in Article 43 and 47 of the U.N. Charter. For the U.N. to work to its own, present, book of rules would be a start. While we wait for the five major leaders to awaken from their primordial state to human consciousness the United Nations could move ahead with the International Satellite Monitoring Agency. First proposed by France in '78 and supported by a U.N. committee study it would give the U.N. an independent monitoring capability. The world has a right to look at itself. The two super-powers can look down on each other, and the rest of us, with incredible detail - though frown on the U.N. doing likewise. The Parliamentarians for World Order, New York passed the following resolution on 23 Sept 81 :

URGES THE UNITED NATIONS TO ESTABLISH A STANDING PEACEKEEPING FORCE INDIVIDUALLY RECRUITED, SUCH RECRUITS TO BE CAREFULLY SCREENED TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE OF HIGH CALIBRE AND CHARACTER; AND ALSO

URGES THE UNITED NATIONS TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE MONITORING AGENCY TO PROVIDE IMPARTIAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTEGRITY OF INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE WORLD'S MILITARY FORCES.

This organisation, now made up of 1000 legislators from 50 countries represent more people in their combined constituencies than half the member states of the U.N. Their call for a tax on international trade as a means of independent U.N. financing lacks a world community perspective. Milton Freidman's world free trade proposals are better.

Purple Dawn is distributed to members, Govt agencies and some U.N. Mission

PACEM in TERRIS - Encyclical of
Pope John XXIII

PART IV

*Insufficiency of modern States
to ensure the universal common good*

The unity of the human family has always existed, because its members were human beings all equal by virtue of their natural dignity. Hence there will always exist the objective need to promote, in sufficient measure, the *universal common good*, that is, the common good of the entire human family.

In times past, one would be justified in feeling that the public authorities of the different political Communities might be in a position to provide for the universal common good, either through normal diplomatic channels or through top-level meetings, by making use of juridical instruments such as conventions and treaties, for example: juridical instruments suggested by the Natural Law and regulated by the law of nations and international law.

As a result of the far-reaching changes which have taken place in the relations between the human family, the universal common good gives rise to problems which are complex, very grave and extremely urgent, especially as regards security and world peace. On the other hand, the public authorities of the individual political Communities—placed as they are on a footing of equality one with the other—no matter how much they multiply their meetings or sharpen their wits in efforts to draw up new juridical instruments, they are no longer capable of facing the task of finding an adequate solution to the

problems mentioned above. And this is not due to a lack of good will or of a spirit of enterprise, but because of a structural defect which hinders them.

It can be said, therefore, that at this historical moment the present system of organization and the way its principle of authority operates on a world basis no longer correspond to the objective requirements of the universal common good.

*Connection between the
common good and political authority*

There exists an intrinsic connection between the common good on the one hand and the structure and function of public authority on the other. The moral order, which needs public authority in order to promote the common good in human society, requires also that the authority be effective in attaining that end. This demands that the organs through which the authority is formed, becomes operative and pursues its ends, must be composed and act in such a manner as to be capable of bringing to realization the new meaning which the common good is taking on in the historical evolution of the human family.

Today the universal common good poses problems of world-wide dimensions, which cannot be adequately tackled or solved except by the efforts of public authorities endowed with a wideness of powers, structure and means of the same proportions: that is, of public authorities which are in a position to operate in an effective manner on a world-wide basis. The moral order itself, therefore, demands that such a form of public authority be established.

In 1980 we attended the conference on "The Arms Race and the Human Race" at the United Nations, New York. At one session a panel of religious leaders from around the world spoke on peace and brotherly (sic) love. No church leader, however, has spoken so plainly on the need for a new world framework as Pope John XXIII.

If it is homicide to kill a single human, and genocide to exterminate a race, and "omnicide" to extinguish all living humans, then, Schell asks, "what crime is it to cancel the numberless multitude of unconceived people?" The pulling of the trigger not just on ourselves but on all who are to come would be the ultimate evil. In acquiescing in that threat we are accomplices in the ultimate crime.

Contributed items
from "The Progressive"

The danger of universal nuclear destruction will always be with us because, having learned the natural laws on which nuclear weapons are based, there is no way we can forget them. But there is a way to ease the immediate danger, to pull back the hands on the doomsday clock of *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. It is by eliminating nuclear weapons, by getting rid of conventional weapons as well, by replacing the system of national state sovereignty, by reinventing politics, by reinventing the world.

Had future generations been so fortunate as to have a hydrogen bomb explode every so often in one of *our* cities, there is little doubt that by now the world would have been reinvented to provide the minimum protection. But the fates have not seen fit to provide us with such fearsome object lessons. We must rely instead on our own sense of fear, or outrage, or love for humanity, or obedience to God, or simple reverence for life—anything to cut through the psychic numbness, the moral torpor, the bureaucratic inertia that have thus far kept us on the course to nuclear oblivion.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEXT OF THE GREEK-ROMANIAN JOINT DECLARATION.

BEGIN TEXT:

~~W~~ NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA AND ANDREAS PAPANDREOU, PRIME MINISTER OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC, EXCHANGED VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD, ESPECIALLY ON THE SITUATION CREATED FOLLOWING THE ARRIVAL OF THE NEW INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE, WHICH LED TO THE BREAKING OFF OF THE SOVIET-U.S. TALKS IN GENEVA ON MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES. JUST AS OF THE VIENNA TALKS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

THE TWO SIDES NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH AT PRESENT THERE IS NO OPEN CONFRONTATION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE ESCALATING ARMS RACE. THE HEIGHTENING INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THE LACK OF A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ENHANCE THE DANGER OF A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE. THEY ARE OF THE OPINION THAT ALL THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES--AND PARTICULARLY THE COUNTRIES IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE TWO MILITARY BLOCS--SHOULD TAKE A MORE ACTIVE STAND IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE CONTINENT AND IN THE WORLD AND CONTRIBUTE IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER, TO REACHING APPROPRIATE ACCORDS

DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF DIFFERENT ALLIANCES THEY BELIEVE THAT THE PREVENTION OF A NUCLEAR WAR SHOULD BE THE PRIORITY TASK OF ALL PEOPLES

EXPRESSING THEIR DEEP CONCERN OVER THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW MISSILES IN EUROPE AND THE BREAK-OFF OF THE SOVIET U.S. TALKS IN GENEVA ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. PRESIDENT NICOLAE CEAUSESCU AND PRIME MINISTER ANDREAS PAPANDREOU DECLARED FOR THE HALTING OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF THE NEW U.S. MISSILES AND AT THE SAME TIME OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ;NUCLEAR COUNTERMEASURES ANNOUNCED BY THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS TO THE END OF REACHING AN ACCORD CONDUCIVE TO THE REDUCTION AND EVENTUALLY, TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL NUCLEAR MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. TO THE BUILDING OF A UNITED EUROPE OF PEACE AND COOPERATION, FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

STARTING FROM THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THEIR PEOPLES, FROM THE INTERESTS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE, SECURITY AND UNDERSTANDING. PRESIDENT NICOLAE CEAUSESCU AND PRIME MINISTER ANDREAS PAPANDREOU EXPRESSED THE FIRM DETERMINATION OF THEIR STATES TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE ALONGSIDE THE OTHER STATES, TO PREVENT THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE CONTINENT AND WORLDWIDE HAIT THE ARMS RACE AND ACHIEVE A PASSAGE TO DISARMAMENT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE FIRST PLACE. A RESUMPTION OF DIALCGUE AND TO BROADLY PROMOTE A POLICY OF PEACE INDEPENDENCE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND UNDERSTANDING

13
SUBJECT/SUJET

NEW YORK TIMES

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If the Reagan Pattern Continues, America May Face Nuclear War

By W. Averell Harriman

For three years, I have refrained from directly criticizing the President of the United States. I have been reticent because I believe that America must stand united before the world, particularly in the face of our foremost adversary, the Soviet Union. I also believe a President should be given fair time to pursue his goals and test his policies. In this sense, politics should stop at the water's edge. But this cannot mean that all criticism should be muted indefinitely, no matter how wrong a President may be or how critical the world situation may become.

President Reagan has had his fair chance, and he can no longer expect Americans to support policies that make our relationship with the Soviet Union more dangerous than at any time in the past generation.

This is the grim result of Reagan Administration diplomacy: If present developments in nuclear arms and United States-Soviet relations are permitted to continue, we could face not the risk but the reality of nuclear war.

To be silent in this situation is not patriotic but irresponsible. In the last month, nuclear arms negotiations have collapsed. Communication of all kinds between the United States and the Soviet Union has broken down; instead, we have propaganda barrages and the spectacle of the leaders of the two mightiest nations on earth trading insults, as if they had no more serious obligations than their own personal pride and political survival.

Flush with the polls and the overwhelming victory of 6,000 Americans over 600 Cubans on Grenada, the Administration now shows every sign of drawing the wrong lesson from that experience and risking defeats of a proportion it seemingly cannot even imagine.

Day by day in the Middle East, the Administration sinks further into a quagmire, committing American lives and American honor with no clear policy, no certain plan and, indeed, no obvious concern for the day when American soldiers and Soviet soldiers come face-to-face, no longer safely separated by the buffers of distance and surrogate military forces.

Moreover, Lebanon is only the most immediate trouble spot. Around the world, possible points of conflict and escalation become more volatile than ever as each superpower, in today's deteriorating situation, may be tempted to confront rather than to compromise, to treat every test as a measure of national will. The destruction of the South Korean airliner by the Soviet Union last summer provided chilling proof of the increasing potential for miscalculation and misunderstanding. Events can too readily overwhelm common sense and human safeguards.

These trends by themselves would be cause enough for worry, but they take place against the backdrop of a nuclear arms race rapidly escaping out of control — and dangerously passing the point of no return.

Within a few years, both the United States and the Soviet Union will have in place intercontinental missiles interpreted each by the other as instruments of a massive first strike. Within a span of months, both nations will put shorter-range nuclear missiles nearer each other's territory, missiles capable of striking critical command and control centers with flight times so short that caution may be the first casualty of some future crisis.

As if this were not sufficient, thousands of nuclear-armed cruise missiles will soon be stationed on American submarines, to be followed by thousands more carried on Soviet ships, or hidden, in uncountable numbers, in the vast expanse of the Soviet Union. These cruise missiles will pose extremely difficult challenges to arms control verification and they will vastly complicate our ability ever to achieve the nuclear reductions both American and Soviet leaders say they seek.

Perhaps the most tragic trend — because it is so avoidable — is that the arms race is about to be launched into space. Anti-satellite weapons will constitute a continuing threat to early warning, reconnaissance and communications satellites — all critical to our security and vital to preventing nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.

The Administration's "Star Wars" defense scheme will mean more than the destruction of three solemn arms control treaties — the Limited Test Ban, the Outer Space Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty — that have served our security so well. It will mean that both sides will accumulate thousands more offensive weapons to overcome whatever defenses they each might devise. It promises security that is beyond our capability to provide and thus plays cruelly on the fear and the hope of every citizen. It promises a technological shield when the solution is in ourselves — in serious negotiation and mutual restraint.

It is always easy for Americans to blame the Soviet Union, and no American — no matter how much he or she desires a safer world — should lose sight of the fact that the Soviet Union does indeed bear a heavy responsibility for where we are today. But blaming the Soviet Union, which has been the single-minded indulgence of this Administration since the

first day it took office, is not a strategy or a policy. It will not reshape the Russian nation; it will not bring down the Iron Curtain; and, above all, it will not reduce the nuclear threat that hangs over every American.

Anyone can assail the Soviet Union for the failure of Soviet-American relations. But we must demand more

of our President, who, after all, is elected not to preside over failure but to find an acceptable solution even in the face of formidable problems. The unfortunate truth, however, is that we are now witness to more than a Presidential failure to act or an Administration's lack of policy. President Reagan and his Administration bear their own heavy measure of responsibility for the situation we face today.

No President in the nuclear age, strengthened abroad as was Mr. Reagan by the consensus at home for a strong national defense, secure politically on the right and the left for the endeavor of arms control, has had such an opportunity to reverse the nuclear arms race. Yet this opportunity has been squandered. And all Americans hoped that when he took office his past opposition to arms control would end. Yet the record of three years has betrayed these hopes.

Despite his campaign pledge to the nation that "as President, I will immediately open negotiations on a SALT III treaty," Mr. Reagan waited more than 17 months before even

beginning to talk with the Soviet Union about such an agreement. Since then, the pace of negotiation has been, to put it politely, tepid; the discussions have been punctuated by long recesses, and there have been no significant results. All that has been done is to rename SALT, to call it Start; the talks have now stalled indefinitely.

The negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe have collapsed completely. In the most promising initiative during those talks, the so-called "walk in the woods" proposal, our negotiator, a veteran hardliner in dealing with the Soviet Union, was repudiated by the Administration for trying too hard to reach a workable compromise that actually would have been greatly to our advantage.

Indeed, the behavior and the proposals of the Administration in both the strategic and European nuclear discussions have raised serious doubts in the minds of many about whether there ever was any intention to reach any reasonable agreement. Negotiations have been treated as a forum for propaganda, an occasion for invective, a mask to cover new deployments and an arena to gain advantage — rather than as a path to human survival on this planet. This is a most shortsighted policy, for its outcome will simply be more missiles in Soviet hands — scarcely a sensible program for America's security.

The SALT II treaty, negotiated by three Presidents — two of them Republicans — was rejected by this Administration, with the President's own counselor saying, "We feel there is no legal or moral commitment to abide by SALT I and SALT II," international law to the contrary. Apart from its effect on the negotiating cli-

mate with the Soviet Union, this rejection means that almost 300 Soviet missiles and bombers that would have been destroyed under the terms of SALT II still are targeted on our cities and towns. What should have remained at worst an irresponsible election slogan was elevated to the level of a national policy, ushering in a new era of strategic instability.

Other actions amplify my deep concern about the course that the Administration has taken.

Despite the mounting threat of nuclear terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons to more nations, the Administration has rejected the imperative of nuclear nonproliferation, and in fact has undercut important initiatives of previous Republican and Democratic Presidents. The goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban — a prerequisite to effective nonproliferation and an objective of every other President since Dwight D. Eisenhower — has been summarily discarded. The President will not even discuss the control of space weapons with the Soviet Union.

The issue of verification — so central to arms control — has been blurred by the Administration. Serious problems with Soviet compliance have been submerged in irresponsible charges, innuendo and leaks. The objective, instead, should be to clarify questionable Soviet behavior and insist on compliance — not to exploit these concerns in order to further poison our relations, repudiate existing agreements, or, worse still, terminate arms control altogether.

Additionally, even the instruments with which our Government carries on the business of arms control have been degraded. Long-time opponents of arms restraint have been put in charge of policy making. American delegations have arrived at the Geneva negotiations empty-handed, then waited weeks to receive formal negotiating instructions. Fifteen months after taking office, the Administration could not agree on an opening position to take in strategic arms talks. Three years after taking office, the Administration still does not have a policy on verification. This lack of professionalism presents a stark contrast with the precision and purpose of our adversaries — and, insignificant though it may appear to some, it speaks volumes about attitude and commitment. That is what disturbs me most of all.

It will not be easy to undo these three years of nuclear irresponsibility, or to free both nations from excessive pride, or to control new weapons while we set about the task of controlling all weapons. But we are obliged to try with every ounce of strength we can muster, lest our generation of Americans be the first to imperil the legacy of life it has been given.

I am convinced that Soviet leaders desire serious negotiations. Such negotiations will not be easy; they will involve, as they always have, a hard-headed struggle to improve the na-

tional security of both countries. Nor need they signal our approval of other Soviet actions, such as the invasion of Afghanistan or the repression in Poland. Their object, despite the irreconcilable ideologies of our two nations, is the common goal that nuclear weapons have made a necessity: the prevention of nuclear war.

I am also convinced that constructive agreements to reduce nuclear arms, to make their use less likely, are possible — even at this late date. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban of 1963, after all, came after the Cuban missile crisis and years of tension in Berlin. Both sides, however, must want an agreement. Each side must be willing to seize on what is positive in the other's proposal rather than be paralyzed by the least favorable elements presented by each. Both sides must be willing to work for an agreement that will serve our mutual advantage. This essential change in attitude alone could be the catalyst for progress.

To put it plainly, President Reagan must be ready and willing to negotiate; he must want progress even more than he wants to berate the Soviet Union.

I am convinced that we must engage ourselves now in this fundamental choice about our future — and that is why I write as the New Year begins. We must demand a new effort to prevent war, not to prepare for it. A leadership for peace can be the finest expression of America's dream. We dare not fail. We are only human beings, subject to all the mortal perils of life, all the temptations to power; but, at the same time, in our very humanity, we must seek to pass on to our children and grandchildren not fear, but hope; not an arms race, but arms control; not the death of the earth, but a better and safer world.

W. Averell Harriman, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and to Britain, has been an adviser to five Presidents and was chief negotiator of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.