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Volume 2 From - De 78-04-01 To - À 82-04-30

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**MGID**

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VOLS ACCESSION NO. 32230

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TITLE — TITRE:

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NOS. 68/001, 69/063 AND  
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AND

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINISTÈRE  
DES  
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES





*file*

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO  
À SPF

SECURITY  
Sécurité UNCLASSIFIED

FROM  
De DFP

DATE April 30, 1982

REFERENCE  
Référence Your memo SPF-0128 of April 28

NUMBER  
Numéro DFP-68

SUBJECT  
Sujet Prime Minister's Notre Dame Speech

|         |         |
|---------|---------|
| FILE    | DOSSIER |
| OTTAWA  | 57-7-PM |
| MISSION | 9       |

ENCLOSURES  
Annexes

With apologies for missing the deadline, the following are our comments on your draft.

DISTRIBUTION

2. Basically, it strikes us as a highly commendable effort, on which to build the speech. As far as the general development is concerned, however, it seems to us that the heavy emphasis on the negative experience of the 1930s and the 1933 London "Summit" in particular is perhaps unnecessary. A more up-beat impression could be created by concentrating on application of "our creative spirit to today's economic and security problems" (page 5), and referring in a paragraph or two to the "collective memory of the thirties", and the risk of returning to that situation if we do not succeed.

DFP-2

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3. Another general comment is that the emphasis, coming from the Prime Minister of a middle power, is rather heavy on the role of the super-powers, rather than on that of the middle-powers, concerning which, as Prime Minister of one of them, he can speak from first-hand knowledge.

PCO/Fowler

SSEA/Moore

MINA

4. Finally, we felt that the development becomes rather diffuse toward the end, as though the points that were left over, such as arms control, were being fitted in at this point. This is perhaps related, in turn, to a feeling that, what we take to be your theme - "responsibility - as it is borne by nations in proportion to their power" (page 14) is not as clearly stated and developed as it might be.

5. The following are our more detailed comments:

Page 2, bottom paragraph - Appropriate reference to UNSSOD II should be included here if the PM decides to attend.

Page 3, para beginning "Indeed ..." - We suggest the revision of this paragraph, especially the second sentence, or its deletion.

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Page 3, para beginning "Summit ..." - While the sentiment concerning assertion of "the spiritual force of our societies" appears valid, the earlier parts of the paragraph appear to us as overly simplistic and should perhaps be deleted.

Page 6, para beginning "I think ..." - We suggest a reference specifically to NATO, and possibly to one or more international economic organizations, as examples of the post-war "safety nets".

Page 6, para beginning "There are ..." - The U.S. surely "disengaged from Europe and turned inward" ten years earlier than 1929, when it failed to join the League of Nations.

Pages 7 and 8 - The picture painted here of the U.S. and Soviet Union as virtually alike in their role as super-powers is one that may not be too palatable to an American audience that instinctively sees the two countries as vastly different morally, and thus in the role they play in the world.

Page 8, 6th last line - Delete "and mobile", which is not correct.

Page 8 - We suggest that a paragraph should be added pointing out that the possession of a nuclear arsenal, which it cannot use, is no asset to a super-power in dealing with many international problems, e.g. it does not help the Russians in dealing with Poland, or the U.S. in trying to mediate the Falkland Islands crisis.

Page 12, last line - We suggest deletion of the reference to the Netherlands and Denmark, as unnecessary.

Page 13, para beginning "American hospitality ..." - This paragraph could be considerably expanded to outline briefly the nature of the economic problems with which the U.S. and its Western allies are currently faced. The point could be made that, unless the U.S. takes into account to a greater extent the impact of its economic and fiscal policies on the economies of Western Europe, they should not count on them making the contribution to the common defence effort that the U.S. would like. Reference could then be made to the inter-relationship of the Versailles and Bonn Summits.

Page 13, para beginning "In reviewing ..." - We suggest substituting the following first sentence: "We value the consultations that your government is having with its allies and


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- 3 -

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friends as it develops its negotiating position in the vital area of arms control." In this connection, we learned yesterday from Eugene Rostow that President Reagan will not speak publicly on START until May 30, following consultation in NATO (and, incidentally, after the PM's Notre Dame speech).

Page 14, para beginning "We in ..." - We suggest deletion of reference to "general and complete disarmament", which is low on our current list of priorities. The point to be made here is that, unlike the Russians, we in the West do not rely on armed forces to control our societies.



R. P. Cameron,  
Assistant Under-Secretary,  
Bureau of International  
Security Policy and  
Arms Control Affairs

*File*

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO  
A Mr. R. P. Cameron

SECURITY  
Sécurité

FROM  
De K. C. Brown

DATE April 28, 1982

REFERENCE  
Référence

NUMBER  
Numéro

SUBJECT  
Sujet Factors Affecting Preparation of PM's Speech  
as Président d'Honneur at NATO Summit in  
Bonn on June 10, 1982

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| FILE    | DOSSIER |
| OTTAWA  | 57-7-PM |
| MISSION |         |

ENCLOSURES  
Annexes

1. Development of a Theme

The PM's Notre Dame speech is supposed to be a pre-Summit tour d'horizon, which will state attitudes that can be incorporated, as appropriate, in the PM's statements at the Versailles Summit (June 4-16), the NATO Summit (June 9-10) and UNSSOD II (Canadian statement on June 14).

The first draft of the May 16 Notre Dame speech, now being prepared by Mr. Hancock, is supposed to be ready sometime today. My understanding is that Mr. Hancock is using his tentative outline and is drawing as well on Section A (The United States and Western Leadership) of Mr. Taylor's outline. The philosophical theme will thus be on lines of the differing responsibilities of nations - super-powers and "middle" powers - and the ways in which these are reflected at the Summit. This is bound to have particular application to the role of the United States, as the super-power on which the Western alliance depends, and of President Reagan, who will be attending his first NATO Summit and UNSSOD, but not his first economic summit.

2. Role of the Prime Minister

As a Canadian, Mr. Trudeau can speak from the unique point of view of the only NATO member, apart from the super-power member, with a North American view of the trans-Atlantic alliance relationship. He will also speak as one of its senior statesmen whose view, on this occasion, should transcend immediate alliance concerns, or at least attempt to put them in the broadest possible perspective.

3. Relationship between the Summits

Considering the close juxtaposition of the two Summits and UNSSOD, it is inevitable that their relationship one with the other will be in people's minds and will be reflected in speeches, including the PM's in Bonn. The interdependence of the economic, political and security concerns of the West is likely to come up in each forum, with differing emphasis according to the main thrust

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- Mr. Hammond
- Mr. Wade

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
of the meeting. Political questions are bound to be discussed at Versailles, especially as this will be the first meeting of the leaders, but the main thrust will remain economic. At Bonn, it is for consideration to what extent there might be reference to economic concerns, perhaps in the Article 2 context. Perhaps more important is the desirability of stating the consistency of the alliance security strategy and the policies to be advanced at UNSSOD.

4. Impact of Events

Unforeseen international events could have a decisive impact on the mood and focus of the summits. The PM's Bonn speech will presumably be subject to review, and even major revision at the last minute, to take account of such contingencies. A Soviet initiative, designed to influence the Summit proceedings cannot be ruled out. On the side of the alliance, it will be necessary to take account of initiatives, particularly by the U.S. - e.g. an announcement by President Reagan, which now seems likely by mid-May, about START.

5. Relationship of NATO Ministerial Meeting (May 17-18)

This meeting will deal with preparations for the NATO Summit, and substantively is bound to cover some of the same ground while probably concentrating on immediate problems such as the alliance response to the declaration of martial law in Poland. However, more general questions, such as the development of a strategy for East-West relations, are bound to be discussed. Decisions may therefore be required as to what the division of labour will be as between the PM's speech in Bonn and the Minister's speech as Président d'Honneur in Luxembourg. Perhaps some overlapping will be inevitable.



Kenneth C. Brown

*file*

*cc 55-16-1-Britain*

*ND.*

Laurier LaPierre

Le 23 mars 1977

Monsieur Jacques Montpetit  
Directeur adjoint  
des Affaires culturelles  
Ministère des Affaires extérieures  
Ottawa (Ontario)  
K1A 0G2

SJ-7-2-Brit  
in es

Cher Monsieur Montpetit,

Veuillez d'abord m'excuser de ne pas vous avoir écrit plus tôt car je suis très occupé depuis mon retour d'Europe.

Ce séjour au Royaume-Uni fut très agréable. On m'avait réservé là-bas un accueil cordial, et des rencontres très intéressantes composées de gens fort sympathiques et riches en connaissances de toutes sortes. En somme, ce fut pour moi une expérience des plus enrichissantes.

J'aimerais bien vous entretenir plus longuement là-dessus. Comme je suis fréquemment de passage à Ottawa, je suggère qu'on se rencontre le 28 ou 29 avril prochain, à l'heure du déjeuner. Si cela vous est possible, je vous prie de faire part de la date, de l'heure et de l'endroit qui vous conviennent à Mon assistante Francine Métivier.

Je vous réitère mes remerciements pour votre bienveillante coopération, et vous prie d'agréer, cher Monsieur, l'expression de mes meilleurs sentiments.

*Laurier LaPierre*

Laurier L. LaPierre

*file*  
55-16-1-Britain  
*MD*

CURRICULUM VITAE

LAURIER L. LaPIERRE

DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED] Lac Mégantic, Québec

MARITAL STATUS: [REDACTED]

EDUCATION:

Primary and Secondary Schools:

St. Patrick's Academy, Sherbrooke, Québec;  
Institut Bilingue Lallier, Sherbrooke, Québec;  
St. Charles College, Baltimore, Maryland.

Undergraduate:

St. Michael's College, University of Toronto, B.A., 1955

Post graduate:

History Dept., University of Toronto, M.A., 1957  
Thesis: "Joseph Israel Tarte: A Dilemma in Canadian  
Politics, 1874-1896".

History Dept., University of Toronto, Ph.D., 1962.  
Thesis: "Politics, Race and Religion in French Canada:  
Joseph Israel Tarte".

Scholarships:

Maurice Cody Research Fellowship;  
Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship;  
Council of Arts Scholarship  
Council of Arts Research Scholarship

POSTS HELD:

|         |         |                                                                   |
|---------|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| s.19(1) | 1959-61 | Teaching Assistant, History Dept., University of Western Ontario. |
|         | 1961-63 | Assistant Professor, History Dept., Loyola College                |
|         | 1962-63 | Teaching Assistant, History Dept., McGill University              |
|         | 1963-65 | Assistant Professor, History Dept., McGill University             |

- 2 -

- 1963-65 General Secretary, French Canada Studies Program,  
McGill University.
- 1965-68 Professor, History Dept., McGill University.
- General Director, French Canada Studies Program,  
McGill University.
- 1969 — Professor, History Dept., McGill University.

PUBLICATIONS:

Genesis of a Nation, British North America: 1776-1867. C.B.C.  
International Services, History of Canada, no. 2, Montréal: 1966

The Apprenticeship: Canada, 1867-1914, C.B.C., International  
Services, History of Canada, no. 3, Montréal: 1967.

"The Sixties", from The Canadians: 1867-1967, eds. J.M.S. Careless  
and R.C. Brown. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1966.

Editor: Québec hier et aujourd'hui. Toronto: The Macmillan  
Company of Canada, 1967

French-Canadian Thinkers of the Nineteenth and Twentieth  
Centuries. Montréal: McGill University Press, 1966

Articles in: Encyclopedia Britannica, Canadian Forum, International  
Review, Parallel, Commentator, Toronto Telegram, etc.

Work in progress: Volume of Documents in Canadian History, 1867-1918  
in collaboration with G.R. Cook. General Editor,  
C.P. Stacey for MacMillan Company of Canada.

OTHER ACTIVITIES:

Research program on "Federal Intervention under Section 93 of the  
British North America Act" for the Report of the Royal Commission  
on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. 1966

Historian consultant at Canadian Pavilion, Expo '67

Preparation of texts for "Le Train de la Confédération" and "Caravane  
du Centenaire", in collaboration with Blain Fraser

Radio and television commentator: C.B.C. (This Hour has Seven Days),  
CJOH; CTV; CBFT; CKLM; CJMS.

- 3 -

Director of the Collection: "La Saberdache Québécoise", McClelland and Stewart Limited, since 1970.

Planification and Programming Director of Bushnell Communications, Ottawa, Ontario, 1969/70.

General Secretary for Immedia Inc. 53 Queen Street, Ottawa, Ontario (conception, television programmes and documentary films producer)

Host for "Midnight", C.B.C., 1974/75

Host for "LaPierre", C.B.C., 1975/76, 1976/77.


Host for "En se racontant l'histoire d'ici", Radio-Québec, 1974/75, 1975/76.

Host for "This Morning", C.B.C. 1976.

Host for "Les Anglais sont arrivés", Radio-Québec, 1976/77.

Host for "Sunday Morning", C.B.C. 1976/77.

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MESSAGE

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**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

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---BONN SUMMIT-PMS SPEECH

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR PMS SPEECH AS PRESIDENT D HONNEUR

AT NATO SUMMIT JUN10.BEGINS.

(COMCENTRE:PLEASE COPY ATTACHED).

ENDS.

|             |                    |           |                                                                                       |
|-------------|--------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| PREPARED BY | DIVISION/DIRECTION | TELEPHONE | APPROVED                                                                              |
| KCBROWN/sc  | DFP                | 2-9368    |  |

## Introductory Remarks

It is a great honour to me personally, and to the country I represent, to be able to address such a distinguished gathering. This gives me the opportunity, on behalf of my NATO colleagues, of expressing to our host, who has just welcomed us so eloquently, our thanks to him, and to his government, for the superb arrangements of which we are aware on all sides. These induce, if I may say so, a sense of well-being which should contribute much to the success of our deliberations.

I also have the honour and pleasure to be able, on behalf of my colleagues in the Alliance, to welcome the representative of Spain for the first time in our company. This is indeed a momentous occasion, one which many of us have anticipated and worked for over the years. It provides gratifying proof that NATO is an organization capable of renewed vitality in the pursuit of peace.

## Why Are We Here?

Recognition that this is a time of uncertainty, that calls for stock-taking and a renewed definition of purpose and direction in the Alliance.

Four years since last NATO Summit in Washington, which coincided with UNSSOD I. This meeting overlaps with UNSSOD II and follows by a few days a summit where the economic

problems of the West have been intensively reviewed. We are thus reminded of the close inter-relationship which inevitably exists between the political, economic and security well-being of the Alliance. Political health is only possible when based on economic health; security can only be assured through the complementary elements of maintenance of a convincing defence posture, on the one hand, and vigorous pursuit, on the other hand, of equitable and verifiable agreements on arms control and disarmament.

08174 e

State of the Alliance

The Alliance has served well its purpose of deterring war with the Soviet Union and is as much needed today by its members as it ever was.

It provides the trans-Atlantic bridge which binds North America and Western Europe in political and security terms. For Canada, the only North American member of the Alliance apart from the United States, this relationship is an indispensable element of our national well-being.

The active participation and leadership of the United States are as important as ever and the presence of President Reagan today is evidence that his administration shares this point of view.

The problems within the Alliance are those which are bound to arise between independent countries with long histories and traditions. There is recognition, however, of the need to harmonize policies in the interest of the common purpose. This can only be successful if the habit of early and thorough consultation, to which we subscribe, becomes much more engrained in our normal relations.

### East-West Relations

Turning now to the state of relations between East and West, I have to say that this is not merely uncertain, but depressing and potentially alarming. Even four years ago, it was still possible to pin one's hopes on the possibilities of a détente policy which would work to the benefit of both East and West. In the interval these hopes have largely been pushed aside by the actions of the Soviet Union through its unremitting increase in military strength; failure to live up to the Helsinki Final Act; and its actions in Afghanistan and Poland.

It is a time of uncertainty concerning the leadership of the Soviet Union. A new generation of leaders is bound to emerge, and the question of how to deal with them will be a vital one. The only safe assumption is that they will be cast in the mould of the present leadership, largely because of the imperatives of the Soviet situation: in particular, they will have to maintain and develop the armed strength of the Soviet Union, to maintain its strategic position as the world's second super power, and to enable it to maintain control of its European empire. Events in Poland must have been particularly unsettling to the Soviet leaders as they try to chart the course ahead.

For the West, the armed strength of the Soviet Union is the core of the problem, since in other areas it is largely discredited: ideologically, politically, and economically it can serve as a model for no one, whether in the West or East, and certainly not in the Third World.

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The West, on the other hand, has the great advantage that it can serve as a model for much of the world, provided it maintains the health and strength of its institutions. Our faith in the strength of free societies and institutions allows for the possibility of development to suit the particular social and economic needs of different states and societies. We can therefore work for an international order based on a high degree of mutual tolerance of differences, something that is unacceptable to the Soviet Union, wedded as it is to a philosophy darkened by arguments about the inevitability of struggle and the need to transform the world by violence, if necessary, to conform to a single model - that of the present Soviet state.

DFP 74 C

### Developing a Strategy

What I have been presenting is, of course, a personal analysis of the state of our relations with the Soviet Union and its allies. What we lack, indeed, is a comprehensive and coherent strategy for the management of East-West relations in the 80s. This problem has been studied before, but the time may have come for a new look at it by the best minds we can muster.

We need to examine what lies behind Soviet policy and behaviour if we are to choose the policy instruments for coping really effectively with the Soviet arms build-up, with the problems of Eastern Europe and with Soviet opportunism in the Third World.

The list of questions that can be posed in this context is a long one, of which the following are merely examples: What place are we to assign to arms control in the pursuit of our security? What do we think we can achieve by the use of sanctions? Where does the balance of Western interests lie in the pursuit of East-West trade and in the development or non-development of Soviet energy resources? How do we reconcile our various objectives? In what proportion should carrots and sticks be part of our longer-term strategy?

DFP 74 C

Meeting the Challenge

Important as the need to redefine our objectives in East-West relations is, it should be clear, as I have said, that the overriding challenge to the West continues to be how to deal with the unremitting increase in Soviet military strength. This is as old as NATO, and becomes more and more disturbing with the passing years. The challenge is to maintain our security without being drawn into a sterile arms competition which would run the risk of getting out of control. We must remember, too, that the risk of a nuclear confrontation has become a matter of deep concern to the publics on both sides of the Atlantic, in a way that cannot be attributed solely to the propaganda machine of the Soviet Union.

The announcement by President Reagan of the willingness of his government to resume strategic arms talks, placing emphasis on reductions, is the best possible news for this assemblage. It tackles at the top the problem of how to halt and reverse the escalating production of arms, while maintaining our security. It can provide a framework for all the other efforts at controlling and reducing weapons and forces, whether nuclear or conventional. Negotiations already underway in Vienna (MBFR) and Geneva (INF) could receive a significant impetus.

Indeed, the spirit of START, combined with the new initiatives already being taken in Vienna and Geneva, could provide the West with the basis for a positive position in

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the deliberations of UNSSOD II, and could go far in enlisting the public support which is so vital to the success of our efforts.

It might even provide the Soviet leadership with the first stirrings of confidence that its country's position in the world can be assured without the kind of muscle-flexing that has recently been so disturbing to friend and foe alike.

Consultation as the Key

I cannot conclude without a further word about the importance of consultation within the Alliance as the key to our success. Only if this is timely and substantive will the necessary harmonization of policies emerge in response to the challenges we face. I am thinking particularly of all aspects of the East-West relationship, and of the range of negotiations for arms control and reduction which is about to begin. It will be especially important for the relationship between START and INF negotiations to be clear and for these to be consistent with Western positions at UNSSOD II.

DFP 74 e

- 9 -

A Renewed Purpose and Direction

To sum up, our purpose and direction in the 80s will be those that have enabled us to avoid a major war for a third of a century, adapted to cope with the uncertainties and challenges that we can see ahead. We must remain strong and cohesive, through the give-and-take of which democratic societies are capable. And in the ongoing task of managing the Alliance's relationship with the Soviet Union, we must ensure that we maintain a sensitive awareness of its interests, strengths and limitations, so as to maximize the opportunities for control and reduction of arms and relaxation of tensions which are so vital in this nuclear age.

DFP74

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|       |                                                                                                  |            |            |         | <b>Nov 3 22 11 '81</b> | PRECEDENCE |
| TO/A  | WSHDC, ATNTA, BOSTN, BFALO, CHCGO, CLVND, DALAS, DTROT, LNGLS, MNPLS, NRLNS, PHILA, SFRAN, SEATL |            |            |         |                        |            |
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SUB/SUJ PM'S NOV5 SPEECH - NY

ON EVENING OF THURS NOV5 PRIME MINISTER WILL BE IN NY TO RECEIVE GOLD MEDALLION AWARD OF SOCIETY FOR THE FAMILY OF MAN SPONSORED BY NY CITY COUNCIL OF CHURCHES. AWARD TO BE PRESENTED BY FORMER PRES GERALD FORD. LAST CDN TO RECEIVE AWARD WAS LESTER PEARSON IN 1965. LAST YEAR'S RECIPIENT WAS HELMUT SCHMIDT.

2. AS EXPERIMENT HAVE ARRANGED WITH CNGNY TO MAKE VIDEOTAPE OF PRESENTATION CEREMONY AND PM'S SPEECH WITH IDEA COPIES WILL BE DESPATCHED WITHIN 24 HOURS TO ALL USA POSTS. IT IS HOPED THIS VISUAL PRESENTATION OF MAJOR SPEECH BY PM IN USA WILL SERVE VARIETY OF POSSIBLE POST PUBLIC INFO PURPOSES INCLUDING:  
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| SIG.....<br>CJ MARSHALL | FIP                | 5-6092    | SIG <i>[Signature]</i><br>CJ MARSHALL |

*Ad*

4. IT IS ANTICIPATED VIDEOCASSETTES WILL LEAVE NY LATE FRI NOV6 VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS SYSTEM AND SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO YOU FIRST THING MON MORNING NOV9. IF POSSIBLE PACKAGE WILL ALSO CONTAIN VERBATIM TEXT OF PM'S REMARKS FOR SEPARATE BUT RELATED PUBLIC INFO PURPOSES.

5. DECISION TO MAKE VIDEOTAPES OF PM'S SPEECH AVAILABLE IS PART OF OVERALL EFFORT TO INNOVATE IN TERMS OF INFO FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO USA POSTS. IT IS NECESSARILY EXPERIMENT AND WE WILL LOOK TO YOU TO FIND WAYS IN WHICH IT CAN BE UTILIZED IN YOUR LOCAL PUBLIC INFO PROGRAM. WE WILL <sup>ALSO</sup> LOOK FOR FEEDBACK FROM POSTS AS TO WHETHER THIS KIND OF TOOL PROVES USEFUL TO THEM. IF SO, IT IS ANTICIPATED VIDEOTAPES OF OTHER SPEECHES BY SENIOR CABINET MINISTERS ON TOPICS RELEVANT TO CDA-USA RELATIONS WOULD BE PROVIDED FROM TIME TO TIME.

6. SINCE PM'S NOV5 SPEECH WILL BE FIRST ITEM IN THIS EXPERIMENT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IDEAL IF SUBJECT MATTER WERE CDA-USA RELATIONS. GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES AND OCCASION, HOWEVER, UNDERSTAND IT WILL BE ON BROADER, MORE PHILOSOPHICAL THEME. IT WILL BE FOR YOU TO ADVISE US IN DUE COURSE WHETHER THIS FACT LIMITS VIDEOTAPE'S USEFULNESS FOR POST INFO PROGRAM PURPOSES.

ACTE FILE DIARY CIRC CHRON

MESSAGE

OMB059/29/030  
57-7-PM  
19 -

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPT. NO. PLACE LIEN ORIG. NO. NO. DIRIG. DATE  
FM EXTOTT FIAS063 28OCT81

Oct 28 19 09 '81  
PRECEDENCE

TO CNGNY/WEATHERUP

---COVERAGE PM SPEECH NOV. 5/81

PLAN AND COST OF COVERAGE OF THE PM SPEECH IN NYORK NOV. 5/81

HAS BEEN APPROVED BY FIA. PROCEED AS DISCUSSED IN OUR TELECON

OCT. 28/81. KEEP US INFORMED.

SUBJECT

NAME OF TRANSMITTER

CLASSIFICATION

REFERENCE

*G.S. Delanoë*  
G.S. DELANOE/sp

FIA

6-2199

*D. Arnould*  
for D. ARNOULD  
130

J.R. Moodie

UNCLASSIFIED

G.S. Delanoë

October 27, 1981

Coverage of PM Speech in New York, Nov. 5/81

57-7-PM  
19

Arrangements are being made with our Consulate in New York for coverage of the P.M. speech on November 5th, 1981, in acceptance of the award.

J. Hammill

2. The cost should be \$480.00 for the coverage of the event by TV crew and \$360.00 for 16 copies to be distributed in the U.S. Can we proceed?

G. Delanoë  
G.S. Delanoë

ACT ILE DIARY CIRC CHRON

CC: G. AGIS

0MCO19/097  
57-7-PM  
19

SEP 8 21 53 '81

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT FIA4234 8SEP81

TO DAKAR

REF YRTEL 2069 4SEP81

---PM SPEECH IN NROBI

RE TRANSMITTING TEL ESE 1749 AUG 17 TO YOU. THIS IS OFFICIAL  
VERSION IN FRENCH OF PM AUG 11 SPEECH.

L. STORSATER/sm

FIA

2-6170



L. STORSATER

*Lami 8/1/81*

*File*

*(D. Gajo)*

57-7-PM  
19 81

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*11/9/81*  
*[Signature]*

NONCLASSIFIE  
DE DAKAR YLFC2069 04SEP81  
A EXTOTT FIA

---DISCOURS DE PM TRUDEAU A NROBI  
VOUS PRIONS DE NOUS FAIRE PARVENIR LE DISCOURS  
QUE LE PM TRUDEAU A TENU A LA CONF DE NU SUR  
SOURCES D ENERGIE RENOUVELABLES EN AOUT 81  
A NAIROBI.ENVISAGEONS D UTILISER CE DISCOURS  
DANS LE SUPPLEMENT DU PROCHAIN CDA-AFRIQUE,  
(NUMERO 9)QUI SERA CONSACRE AUX ENERGIES RENOUVELABIES.  
UUU/243 050800Z YLFC2069

*ZL FM-4234 Sept 8/81*

R. Fadden (D/AEG)

GEA

cc 37-7-PM

|               |   |
|---------------|---|
| 38-10-3-POUND |   |
| 13            | - |

UNCLASSIFIED

August 26, 1981

GEA 1549

Prime Minister's Press Conference

We have prepared the attached talking points on Canada's economic assistance to Poland for the Prime Minister's possible use at his press conference on August 27, 1981.

A.P. McLaine  
Director  
Eastern European Division

Canadian Economic Assistance to Poland

- Canada is in the very forefront of Western states in offering economic assistance to Poland.
- We shall continue to supply and finance grain shipments to Poland of up to 1.5 million tonnes annually through 1982. This will involve the provision of approximately \$350 million of new credits in 1981 alone. The USA total is \$771 million (of which \$670 million is expected to be utilized) for new commodity credits this year and the aggregate total for all EEC member states is approximately \$1 billion.
- Canada and the United States are alone among Poland's western creditors in providing new commodity credits that equal over 50 per cent of the total of existing official loans to Poland. Canada is extending roughly as much new credit assistance in 1981 as the total of our bilateral trade in 1980; no other state can match that.
- Canada is also party to a multilateral agreement signed last April to reschedule Polish payments on existing credits. In Canada's case this will mean the rescheduling of approximately \$125 million in payments that were due in the last eight months of 1981.

ACTC FILE DIARY CIRC CHRON

1 555 200

*OMK=022/23/24*

*57-7-PM<sub>A</sub>*

**Aug 21 21 53 '81**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT FIA3998 21AUG81

TO BONN BREEC TOKYO LDN CNBRA

INFO NROBI PARIS

REF ESE TEL 1795 18AUG81

---UNERG -- PM SPEECH

RETRANSMITTING ESE 1795 TO YOU WHICH IS ENGLISH VERSION OF PM  
SPEECH IN NROBI AUG 11. YOU MAY WISH TO USE PARTS IN YR POST  
PUBS (ESP. FROM LAST PARA P. 6 TO END OF TEXT).

2. NROBI SENDING US FIVE B&W PHOTOS WHICH WE WILL REPRODUCE AND  
SEND YOU.

3. POUR PARIS: VOUS ENVERRONS PHOTOS.

L. STORSATER/sm

FIA

2-6170



L. STORSATER

004224

ACTC FILE DIARY CIRC CHRON

CC: N. REEDER

*82015/11/81*

*57-7-PM  
19 -*

**AUG 18 19 10 '81**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT FIA3927 18AUG81

TO PARIS BREC

ATTN: POST PUBLICATIONS

REF ESE TEL 1794 17AUG TO NROBI

---UNERG -- PM SPEECH

RETRANSMITTING ESE 1794 TO YOU WHICH IS FRENCH VERSION OF PM  
SPEECH IN NROBI AUG 11. YOU MAY WISH TO USE PARTS IN YR POST  
PUBS (ESPECIALLY FROM LAST PARA P.6 TO END OF TEXT).

L. STORSATER/sm

FIA

2-6170

*L. Storsater*  
L. STORSATER

~~FILE~~ DIARY CIRC CHRON

FIA/D. KING/5-0439/sm



**DIVISIONS LISTED BELOW**

UNCLASSIFIED

July 3, 1981

D. Stuemmer - FIA

57-7-PM  
19

Prime Minister's speech on Foreign Policy

Attached is a copy of the Prime Minister's speech on foreign policy made in the House of Commons June 15, 1981. It is for your interest only.

*D. Stuemmer*

Policy Information Service,  
External Information Programs  
Division

|                |                |     |
|----------------|----------------|-----|
| CSR            | FCO            | UNS |
| DFD            | FLE            | UNO |
| DFR            | FLO            | ZSP |
| EGD            | GAA            |     |
| ECO            | GAE            |     |
| ECR            | GAM            |     |
| ESE            | GKA            |     |
| <del>ESS</del> | GEB            |     |
| ESS            | <del>GEB</del> |     |
| FAC            | GNT            |     |
| FAN            | GPO            |     |
| FAP            | GPS            |     |
| FEC            | GSC            |     |
| FCF            | GSL            |     |

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned FIA (Mayne)  
Person DMIC  
Local Time 1827

*Lawrie*  
*16/81*  
*[initials]*

*Telo*  
*June 17/81*  
*[initials]*

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|---------|----|
| 57-7-PM |    |
| 19      | 24 |

NCNCLASSIFIE

DE PARIS WIFC4218 17JUN81  
A EXTOTT FIA LIVRAISON 171000

INFO PMCOTT/SENECAL

---DISCOURS PM POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE

APPRECIERIONS VIVEMENT RECEVOIR, MEILLEURS DELAIS, TEXTE INTEGRAL

DISCOURS PM A L OCCASION DU DEBAT DE POLITIQUE ETRANGERE AUX

CCMMUNES LE LUNDI 15/15 JUIN. SERAIT UTILE QU AYONS EN MAIN

CE TEXTE AU PLUS TARD 22/22 JUIN.

UUU/047 171244Z WIFC4218

*Tel.*

*PARIS*

*Re: Foreign Policy White*  
*at: ECR, ECD, POL*  
*Sub: PAA*

*Sending PAA via Handcarred dyplo bag plus*

*govt response to N-S parliamentary task*  
*free report.*

*Tel FIA-3014 June 17/81*

FILE DIARY CIRC CHRON

FIA/D, KING 5-0439/mc

All Posts


UNCLASSIFIED

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

March 27, 1981

FIA-(M)-1650

Constitution



Attached are copies of Prime Minister Trudeau's  
speech in the House of Commons, made on March 23, 1981, during  
the constitutional debate.

GEB

FCO

FLE

**L. K. Storsaker**

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

ACID MESSAGE

ACTC FILE CIRC DIARY DIV W.F.

|       |            |            |                  |              |           |
|-------|------------|------------|------------------|--------------|-----------|
| PLACE | DEPARTMENT | ORIG. NO.  | DATE             | FILE/DOSSIER | SECURITY  |
| LIEU  | MINISTÈRE  | N° D'ORIG. |                  |              | SÉCURITÉ  |
| FM/DE | OTT        | EXTAFF     | FLO-0002 11JAN81 |              | SANS COTE |

JAN 11 1981

46'81

TO/A DAKAR/PDEL LIVRAISON 120800

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| DATE           |             |
| ACC 112943     | REF         |
| FILE 20-13-2-2 | Docucent    |
| BY HAND        | PAR PORTEUR |
| ATTN:          |             |

INFO

DISTR. GAF FCF FLP FLA UNP UNO UNS

37-7-PM

REF YOURTEL 0052 11JAN81,OURTEL 0001 11JAN81

SUB/SUJ DISCOURS DU PREMIER MINISTRE

TEXTE COMPLET DE CIT DECLARATION SUR L'OCTROI DE L'  
AUX  
INDEPENDANCE AUX PAYS ET/PEUPLES COLONIAUX FINCIT ~~BOX~~  
DONT ARTICLE 6 EST CONTEHU DANS NOTRETEL SOUS RUBRIQUE  
SUIT.CIT

COMCENTRE PLSE COPY ATTACHED TEXT

FINCIT.

|                          |                    |           |                     |
|--------------------------|--------------------|-----------|---------------------|
| DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR        | DIVISION/DIRECTION | TELEPHONE | APPROVED/APPROUVE   |
| SIG.....D.Malone./dmm... | UNS/FLO            | 2-8658    | SIG.....J. Reiskind |

MESSAGE

ACTC FILE DIARY CIRC DIV W.F.

|       |            |            |          |              |           |
|-------|------------|------------|----------|--------------|-----------|
| PLACE | DEPARTMENT | ORIG. NO.  | DATE     | FILE/DOSSIER | SECURITY  |
| LIEU  | MINISTÈRE  | N° D'ORIG. |          |              | SÉCURITÉ  |
| FM/DE | OTT        | EXTAFF     | FLO-0001 | 11 JAN 81    | SANS COTE |

JAN 11 23  
 LIVRAISON 120800

DATE 112940  
 ACC 20-13-2.2  
 FILE 20-13-2.2  
 BY BAND PAR FOURIER  
 ATTN: 57-7-PM

TO/A DAKAR/PDEL

INFO

DISTR. GAF FCF FLP FLA UNP UNO UNS

REF VOTRETEL 0052 11JAN81

SUB/SUJ DISCOURS DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

LES CITATIONS SUIVANTES NS SEMBLANT CORRESPONDRE AUX EXIGENCES DU DISCOURS DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES PRESENTES (BIBLIOTHEQUE FERMEE ET NOMBREUX AGENTS QUI AURAIENT PU COMPLETER CETTE LISTE ABSENTS POUR LA FIN DE SEMAINE).

2. DANS CIT DECLARATION SUR L'OCTROI DE L'INDEPENDANCE AUX PAYS ET AUX PEUPLES COLONIAUX FINCIT ADOPTEE PAR LA RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) DE L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DE L'ONU LE 14 DECEMBRE 1960, PARA 6 SE LIT CIT TOUTE TENTATIVE VISANT A DETUIRE PARTIELLEMENT OU TOTALEMENT L'UNITE NATIONALE ET L'INTEGRITE TERRITORIALE D'UN PAYS EST INCOMPATIBLE AVEC LES BUTS ET PRINCIPES DE LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES FINCIT.

3. TEXTE COMPLET DE CETTE RESLN VS PARVIENDRA DANS TEL QUI SUIIT. PASSAGE QUE NS AVONS CITE SUIIT ARTICLES SUR LE DROIT A L'AUTODETERMINATION DES PEUPLES.

4. ARTICLE 2.4 DU CHARTE MEME DE L'ONU SI LIT CIT LES

|                                       |                    |           |                   |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR                     | DIVISION/DIRECTION | TELEPHONE | APPROVED/APPROUVE |
| SIG. J. REISKIND/FLO... D. MALONE/UNS | FLO/UNS            | 2-8658    | SIG. J. Reiskind  |

-2-

MEMBRES DE L'ORGANISATION S'ABSTIENNENT ,DANS LEURS RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES,DE RECOURIR A LA MENACE OU A L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE ,SOIT CONTRE L'INTERGITE TERRITORIALE OU L'INDEPENDANCE POLITIQUE DE TOUT ETAT,SOIT DE TOUTE AUTRE MANIERE INCOMPATIBLE AVEC LES BUTS DES NATIONS UNIES FINCIT.

1902  
L'ANNEXE DE LA  
5. DANS/CIT DECLARATION RELATIVE AUX PRINCIPES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL TOUCHANT LES RELATIONS AMICALES ET LA COOPERATION ENTRE LES ETATS CONFORMEMENT A LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES FINCIT ADOPTEE PAR L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DANS SA RESOLUTION 2625/DU 24 OCTOBRE 1970 LE PARA SUIVANT (XXV) COMPRIS DANS LA SECTION TRAITANT DE L'EGALITE DE DROITS DES PEUPLES ET DE LEUR DROIT A DISPOSER D'EUXMEMES NS SEMBLE PERTINENT.CIT RIEN DANS LES PARAGRAPHERS PRECEDENTS NE SERA INTERPRETE COMME AUTORISANT OU ENCOURAGEANT UNE ACTION,QUELLE QU'ELLE SOIT, QUI DEMEMBRERAIT OU MENACERAIT ,TOTALEMENT OU PARTIELLEMENT,L'INTEGRITE TERRITORIALE OU L'UNITE POLITIQUE DE TOUT ETAT SOUVERAIN ET INDEPENDANT SE CONDUISANT CONFORMEMENT AU PRINCIPE DE L'EGALITE DE DROITS ET DU DROIT DES PEUPLES A DISPOSER D'EUXMEMES ENONCE CI-DESSUS ET DOTE AINSI D'UN GOUVERNEMENT REPRESENTANT L'ENSEMBLE DU PEUPLE APPARTENANT AU TERRITOIRE SANS DISTINCTION DE RACE,DE CROYANCE OU DE COULEUR FINCIT.

A 30/30/161

MESSAGE

|       |            |            |         |              |          |
|-------|------------|------------|---------|--------------|----------|
| PLACE | DEPARTMENT | ORIG. NO.  | DATE    | FILE/DOSSIER | SECURITY |
| LIEU  | MINISTÈRE  | N° D'ORIG. |         |              | SÉCURITÉ |
| OTT   | EXT        | GPO-1969   | 28OCT80 |              | UNCLASS  |

FM/DE

TO/A

INFO

PRECEDENCE

CNBRA

OCT 29 00 04 '80

57-25-PM

DISTR.

REF YRTEL YAGR 4199 27OCT  
SUB/SUJ SSEA SPEECH 14OCT

ABLE TO SCRAPE UP TEN COPIES WITHOUT RESORT<sup>ING</sup> TO USE  
 OF PHOTOCOPIER. THEY HAVE BEEN DESPATCHED IN UNCLASS  
 BAG.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG.....  
L. Edwards/cb

GPO

20497

SIG.....  
J.A. Whittleton

TO/À BPF/STRATEGISTS  
FROM/DE • BPF  
REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE  
SUBJECT •  
SUJET SPEECHES BY PM AND SSEA

|                            |
|----------------------------|
| Security/Sécurité          |
| <b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>        |
| Accession/Référence        |
| File/Dossier<br>57-7-PM    |
| Date<br>September 26, 1980 |
| Number/Numéro<br>BPF-0352  |

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

BPF

We have received instructions that speeches by the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), which have significant foreign policy implications, should be sent in their entirety to all missions abroad. Should you find out that either the Prime Minister or SSEA are to make such a speech, please bring this to Marthe Saint-Louis' attention.

*Alan Darisse*  
Alan Darisse  
Deputy Director  
Foreign Policy  
Communications Division

JUL - 3 1980

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned TUBE  
Person MC  
Local Time 1230

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LDN XNFC1526 3JUL80

TO EXTOTT FPR DELIVER BY 031400

DISTR POL MIN

REF YOURTEL FPR0809 JUL2

---MINISTERS SPEECH IN LDN

PLEASE SUPPLY 50 COPIES OF SSEA CHATHAM HOUSE SPEECH IN ENGLISH,  
FIVE IN FRENCH.

UUU/004 031539Z XNFC1526

~~9~~ + file  
BICO

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| 57-7-PM |  |
| 4       |  |

FILE CONCENTRE DIARY TELBOOK

MESSAGE

DIV. DIARY CIRC. OMF 43/2/35

|       |       |            |                        |            |              |                    |
|-------|-------|------------|------------------------|------------|--------------|--------------------|
| FM/DE | PLACE | DEPARTMENT | ORIG. NO.              | DATE       | FILE/DOSSIER | SECURITY           |
|       | LIEU  | MINISTÈRE  | N <sup>O</sup> D'ORIG. |            |              | SECURITÉ           |
|       | OTT   | EXT        | FPR-809                | JUL 2 / 80 | 57-7-PM      | UNCLAS             |
| TO/A  | LDN   |            |                        |            |              | PRECEDENCE         |
| INFO  |       |            |                        |            |              | DELIVERY BY        |
|       |       |            |                        |            |              | 09:00 HOURS        |
|       |       |            |                        |            |              | JUL 3 / 80         |
|       |       |            |                        |            |              | <i>[Signature]</i> |
|       |       |            |                        |            |              | CERTIFIED          |
|       |       |            |                        |            |              | <i>[Signature]</i> |

DISTR. POL MIN

REF

SUB/SUJ — MINISTERS SPEECH IN LDN

SSEA WILL BRING WITH HIM TO LDN COPIES IN FRENCH AND ENGLISH OF HIS SPEECH TO CHATHAM HOUSE JUL 7. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD TELL US HOW MANY COPIES IN FRENCH AND ENGLISH YOU NEED. PLEASE REPLY JUL 3 LATEST.

|                                |                    |           |                                                    |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|-----------|----------------------------------------------------|
| DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR              | DIVISION/DIRECTION | TELEPHONE | APPROVED/APPROUVÉ                                  |
| SG..... NICOLE SENECAI/MG..... | FPR                | 5-1874    | <i>Nicole Senecal</i><br>SG... NICOLE SENECAI..... |

MESSAGE

|       |       |            |            |        |              |                      |
|-------|-------|------------|------------|--------|--------------|----------------------|
| FM/DE | PLACE | DEPARTMENT | ORIG. NO.  | DATE   | FILE/DOSSIER | SECURITY<br>SÉCURITÉ |
|       | LIEU  | MINISTÈRE  | N° D'ORIG. |        | 57-7-PM      |                      |
|       | OTT   | EXT AFF    | FIA-0010   | 5/5/80 | 19           | unclassified         |

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|------|-----------------|-----------------|------------|
| TO/A | LDN WSHDC CNGNY | MAY 5 22 29 '80 | PRECEDENCE |
| INFO |                 |                 |            |

DISTR. AEG MDG JGG RJO JHT PEB SER FCO FPR FIP FAP FCP FLM

REF

SUB/SUJ

SPEECH OF THE PRIME MINISTER : OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT  
(TO THE MONTREAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE MAY 2 1980)  
QUOTE...

ACTC PLS COPY [REDACTED]  
ABBREVIATE AS YOU SEE FIT

... UNQUOTE

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG.....

50439

SIG..... T. O'Grady.....

T. O'GRADY

Office of  
The Prime Minister

Cabinet du  
Premier ministre

RELEASE

COMMUNIQUÉ

Date:

For Release:

Pour Publication:

~~TRANSLATION OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF AN ADDRESS TO THE CHAMBER  
OF COMMERCE IN MONTREAL ON MAY 2, 1980~~

~~THE RIGHT HONORABLE PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU~~

~~Messrs. Chairmen,~~

~~Colleagues,~~

~~Friends,~~

~~Ladies and Gentlemen:~~

QUOTE

With only a few minor amendments, the constitution of the United States has been serving that country for two hundred (200) years. During that same period, France lived through at least fifteen (15) fundamental constitutional changes. Quebec and Canada occupy a middle ground between these two extremes: Quebec has been living under one constitution for the last one hundred and ten (110) years, and under at least half a dozen different constitutions during the one hundred and ten (110) years before that.

There is therefore nothing disheartening or surprising in the idea of a fundamental constitutional change. On the contrary, a mature people, or a mature individual, should not fear a re-examination of basic issues. Such fundamental reviews are hazardous, dangerous, but they are exciting tests

004237

contribute to our growth, provided they are met with courage and pride.

Today Canada is faced with such a test. Nearly all Canadians, including provincial and federal governments are now discussing constitutional change. What barely ten (10) years ago was viewed as an esoteric exercise for politicians, and possibly academics and pundits, is now an ever present issue, a topic for discussion at all levels of political activity.

The issue confronting Canada today is fundamental. That is: ~~to~~ remain within Canada. Every province, every group of citizens must answer this question: do we remain in Canada? or do we pull out?

Or, to borrow from Musset: "a door must be either open or shut."

During my childhood, Canadians were still proudly singing a tune that went more or less like this: "Either you are a Canadian, or you are not!".

(Applause)

Well... there are those who wish to remain Canadians and I do not know of any one among them who does not wish to

take advantage of the present ferment to renew the constitution.

Mr. Ryan has submitted his proposal, in the form of his paper, THE BEIGE PAPER. The governments of other provinces, from Ontario to British Columbia, have contributed their own proposals. Our government, following the appointment of the Pepin-Robarts Commission, proposed a new theme, A TIME FOR ACTION, and introduced a Bill, Bill C-60, that, incidentally, included a number of proposals for a fundamental renewal.

There are those, then, who wish to remain Canadians but are prepared for a change and willing to improve federalism. And there are those, on the other hand, who want out. This should not be a cause for shock or dismay, coming from people who, for twenty (20) years or so, have devoted most of their political activities to promote Quebec independence or separation. To the contrary, one should not be surprised to see them today asking the population of Quebec to choose: do you no longer wish to be Canadians, yes or no? do you wish to live in an independent Quebec, yes or no?

These are mutually exclusive choices. For us who have chosen Canada, the independence option is, of course, an error. We recognize however, that there is strength in the concept. Those who twenty (20) years ago wrote on the subject, such as Marcel Chaput who wrote POURQUOI JE SUIS UN SEPARATISTE, or those who, during the same period, were organizing the Ralliement pour l'indépendance nationale with Bourgault and D'Allemagne, they were the adversaries. We thought their idealism somewhat cloudy, we felt that their

sense of honour, like Don Quixote's, was stronger than their sense of reality.

But we also knew that others looked upon them as prophets, and for that they deserved respect.

Where are the prophets?

Where are those intellectuals, those artists, publicists, those academics who showed their contempt for those who chose the Canadian option, the federal option, because that option, they said, lacked courage, did not dare to meet directly the challenge of Quebec's destiny, was made up of a number of compromises in order to get along with others in this large country?

Where are they, these knights of independence, these crusaders for the Quebec nation, these worthy champions of separation, of sovereignty?

Separation became independence; independence became sovereignty. But, fearing that even this might be too transparent, sovereignty-association was introduced. Then, to reassure us, they quickly explained that one would not be accomplished without the other. Not one without the other - indeed, we were asked to believe that they only wanted a mandate to negotiate toward the objective, not to achieve it; this would require a referendum.

-5-

Let us say that in terms of steadfastness of purpose, nobility of ideal, decisiveness, we have seen better.

(Applause)

And now these people, speaking in the name of the pride and the clearest right of Quebec Canadians, of French Canadians, to choose their destiny, ask us to vote for a proposition that would in fact place this destiny in the hands of others because, really, what are we talking about?

To say sovereignty-association is to say that one shall not happen without the other.

This is what we are told, we Quebecers: vote for sovereignty, for independence, and it can be said that this is up to you, but this independence is not to be achieved unless, at the same time, we conclude an agreement of association, this, however, is to be determined by others.

Is this not placing one's destiny in the hands of others?

Can you conceive, for instance, of Ireland in the twenties (20's), fighting for its freedom, the country ablaze, sending this message to Great-Britain: "We shall make Ireland independent, provided you join us in a monetary union".

(Applause)

Can you imagine Algeria, in the fifties (50's), in the middle of its fight for independence - and the developments in that struggle were followed with passionate interest by a whole generation of Quebecers - can you imagine, then, Algeria telling France: "We shall fight to the death to make Algeria independent, provided you accept us as members of the French Union".

And in the eighties (80's), we can think of Zimbabwe. If, after fifteen (15) years of guerilla warfare they had announced to the world they were going to achieve independence provided they became members of the Commonwealth, loud laughter would have greeted the announcement.

I do not want to limit my analogies to changes made through revolutions and violence.

The small island of Grenada in the Caribbean Sea and the Fiji Islands far into the Pacific achieved their independence a few years ago, and then petitioned for participation in the Commonwealth.

It was a question of pride; even a population as small as that of Grenada or the Fiji Islands expressed its pride by stating: "We do want to be independent. And, then, so much the better if we may later join the Commonwealth". It is for independence that political battles are fought.

You see, what I blame the Parti Québécois for is that, having brought Quebec to a truly historic turning point, having told the citizens of this province, and of the rest of this country, that they were going to hold a plebiscite, a referendum, to give the people a chance to choose, having said that, what are they asking?

In a conditional, ambiguous way, they are asking that the P.Q. government be given what belongs to the people of Quebec: access to sovereignty and independence.

This is done in a conditional way, and then they ask for a mandate to negotiate an association, down to specific details, including a monetary union; but this, essentially, depends upon the response others will provide.

And this is where a wrong turn was taken. This is the outcome, after years of debate for the people of my generation, of the generation before that, of the generation that follows us. For years we discussed this issue among us, Quebecers: was it best to remain in or to leave Canada? This took the best of our energies, intelligence and activities instead of devoting them to cultural achievements, economic development, or to deal with a question that cannot be implemented by ourselves and is stated in such a way and with such guarantees that if the other party simply said: "No; we do not wish to enter into an association with you Quebecers", Quebecers would then be prevented from carrying out what they claim they want *PS* to do by themselves.

Is it not true that the Premiers of the provinces, that the Government of Canada, that the people of Canada outside of Quebec - if we are to rely on Mr. Gallup - is it not true that they all said, that we all said, that we would not join in arriving at sovereignty-association?

I said it before the House of Commons, about two weeks ago, on behalf of the Canadian government, and I shall come back to this in a moment.

So that Quebec, the Parti Québécois is marshalling all its resources in an effort to receive from Quebec a mandate to accomplish something which depends upon the will of others.

And what, then, does the P.Q. say to avoid the impasse.

Their answer is: "The others will agree to negotiate sovereignty-association with us". You shall see.

The Prime Minister of Canada said: "No". The provincial Premiers said: "No".

The polls indicate that the population said: "No". Even the most carefully prepared surveys say: "We don't know."

Nevertheless, I, Premier of Quebec, I assure you that they will give us our independence.

And what is the irrefutable argument?

We are told that these people respect fair play and -  
respect the democratic process.

And, following a proud and clear YES, meaning: YES,  
we want sovereignty-association, who, on the other side, would  
be so undemocratic as to say: "Well, we reject the Quebecers'  
expressed wish".

This point is well worthy of our consideration, partic-  
ularly for us in the federal government since, as you well know,  
our strength is in great part founded upon the number of M.P.'s  
elected in Quebec and the support we were given by the Quebec  
electorate two (2) months ago.

Let us suppose that the same people would now tell us:  
"Well, we realize that it's complicated, difficult, perhaps  
somewhat confusing, but you see, what we really want is sovereignty-  
association.

You may not like it, you may feel that the situation  
is not quite clear, but still, that's what we want.

Why don't you grant it to us since we ask for it in  
such a democratic way?"

This approach deserves our attention because there is  
great sophistry there, not to say a booby-trap, and because,

and I repeat it, a democratically expressed wish of the people of Quebec may possibly bind, morally or legally, those who asked the question. 10

But, is it binding for others?

Let us take a fairly straightforward example.

Let us say that Cuba or Haiti wish to enter into an association with Canada, to create a common market with us, that they like Canadian prosperity, Canadian landscapes, Canadian girls, Canadian economic standing, and so on. Overwhelmingly, the Cuban or Haitian voter would say: "Yes, we want to join with Canada in this project".

Should we, in the name of democracy, be bound to accept this union?

Should we, in the name of fair play, be bound to say: "Of course yes, the vote was unanimous, there is nothing we can say".

(Laughter and applause)

Let me tell you that, whatever the measure of esteem in which you may hold the leadership of Cuba or Haiti, let me tell you that these people would not have subjected their people to the humiliation of receiving NO for an answer without first trying to find out, in advance, if the answer might be YES.

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In other words, Mr. Castro or Mr. Duvalier would, as minimum measures, send us few trial balloons, conduct preliminary negotiations, evaluate the trends in Canadian public opinion before declaring: "We want to enter into an association with Canada", and they would do to avoid the risk of a "Go and fly a kite" answer from Canada, a rather humiliating response.

And yet, this is exactly the position in which approach chosen by the P.Q. places the Quebec people.

They, who speak in the name of pride, they, who are so willing to express their contempt for the supporters of the NO answer, accusing them of being obscure, backward, treacherous. They, who are so proud of their alternative, they are the ones putting Quebecers in that position. They go even further, they ask Quebecers to give a YES to an alternative which, as we already know, will be rejected.

And this, you see, is the heart of the matter.

This is what is unacceptable. This is what we cannot accept from those who twenty (20) or thirty (30) years ago talked with pride of working for independence with courage and honour.

And now they are leading us, Quebecers, into an impasse, with the humiliating rejection of association as the

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only possible outcome. Because, given their option as stated in the referendum question, association cannot be separated from independence, the two are tied together. They place us in the position of having the rest of the country refuse <sup>P</sup> <sub>12</sub> the YES answer that the people of Quebec might give to the referendum question.

This is why we of the Government of Canada, M.P.'s and ministers elected by the people of Quebec and of the rest of the country, were under a strict obligation to tell Quebecers, in advance, that, should their answer to the referendum question be YES, then we would have reached a dead-end. And this not only because the rest of Canada does not want this association, and has said so because it is not in its best interests, but also for tactical reasons, since a rejection of association by the rest of Canada would prevent Quebec from achieving independence and breaking the country apart - the very promises of the independentists who have joined the two issues together.

And we, the Canadian government, received a clear mandate on February 18 to legislate for Quebec and we are not prepared to say that this mandate could be withdrawn in the event that Mr. Lévesque would receive an ambiguous mandate to achieve independence subject to a condition which would not be met.

The pequistes' reply to the impasse argument is to state: "Oh, well! Of course elections were held on February 18, but a referendum takes precedence over a general election;

that is why we are holding a referendum".

Perhaps, provided there is no ambiguity and provided those asking the question are in a position to implement the results. But not so, obviously, in this instance and it is our strict duty as the Government of Canada, to state rather curtly that the tearing apart of a country cannot be based upon an ambiguity.

One does not destroy a country like Canada - a country so much advanced along the paths of liberty, material prosperity, tolerance, fraternity, dialogue and exchange of cultures. One does not tear apart a country that for one hundred years placed itself among the world leaders in the practice of freedom and the achievement of prosperity. One cannot use an ambiguous mandate to tear this country apart.

(Applause)

And should Quebec, unfortunately, reply YES to the referendum question, our answer is already known: "You better hold your second referendum right away; we shall talk again when you can come to us with a serious proposal, show the courage of your convictions and have the willingness to face the people openly, stating as clearly as possible that your objective is independence. Then we shall talk."

(Applause)

And we see once more that we must examine the  
p14 [ results achieved after a whole generation devoted its drive  
and energy to this issue. Where are we now?

Those who truly believe in independence are cheated  
by this question because the referendum does not dare to ask  
Quebecers to clearly state: do you wish to leave Canada, yes  
or no?

It is a dead-end for those who truly want indepen-  
dence and would have the courage of their convictions. A  
dead-end also for those who want a renewed federalism, since  
the proposed alternative, sovereignty-association presupposes  
sovereignty, a negation of federalism which implies two (2)  
levels of government, each legislating on different matters,  
but for the same people; sovereignty, (and the referendum  
question says so), implies full legislative and taxation  
powers.

And so, my friends, this is the point we have now  
reached. It is clear that those who want independence will  
find the question frustrating. It is equally clear that  
those who do not want independence but renewed federalism  
will also, most probably, feel frustrated.

And now I would like to draw some conclusions with  
you.

For our part, we have clearly indicated the steps we would take, should the answer be YES, or should it be NO.

But does anyone know Mr. Lévesque's intentions should the NO win? After all, it could happen; there is a choice, YES or NO.

(Applause)

Of course we know that the supporters of a YES vote hope to win; this is understood. It is the way democracy works. But the question is legitimate, and you did put it to the Government of Canada and of the other provinces, to Mr. Blakeney, to Mr. Davis, etc. You wanted to know what would happen in the case of a YES vote.

Mr. Lévesque took upon himself to tell Quebecers what Ottawa and the other provinces would do in the event of a YES answer: "They would have no choice, once again in the name of fair play, but to arrive at an association".

Mr. Lévesque speaks for others. Can he speak for himself? What will he do if the NO vote wins? Do you know?

(Applause)

Does Mr. Lévesque know? And if he does, will he tell us?

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If the Quebec people say NO - and we are all equals in this province; one Quebecer, one vote - if they say NO, will Mr. Lévesque and his party say: "Well, we lost our bet, sovereignty-association shall not be. We shall again be the effective government we claimed to be in nineteen hundred and <sup>P16</sup> [seventy-six (1976), before the elections.

(Applause)

And, as such, we shall sit down with other more or less effective governments from the rest of the country and try to improve federalism since the Quebec people said NO even to sovereignty-association".

Did Mr. Lévesque give you this commitment?

Is it likely that the PQ will say: All right, no sovereignty-association, let's build a renewed federalism since Quebecers said NO to our option"?

Or is it likely that we shall be told that, you see, a NO does not quite have the same legal clout as a YES?

(Applause)

And also that a NO is not a definitive answer, that there will be a second referendum, and a third should the NO win again, and perhaps a fourth, until NO becomes YES; because, you see, the NO is not important in this game, only the YES

counts.

When we see the contempt some pequists show for the proponents of a strong and united Canada, we are justified in asking this question. It may be unfair to Mr. Lévesque personally, I don't know. Once more, it may be that, should the NO win, he will then say: "All right, let's negotiate renewed federalism".

As for me, I cannot say that I shall not do it because I would be at that time responsible for representing the status quo. Should Quebec vote NO, I shall then negotiate renewed federalism with the other partners. But I do not know what his answer will be and I believe we have a right to know.

Everywhere large posters are proclaiming: WE KNOW WHAT WE WANT! (ON SAIT CE QU'ON VEUT!)

(Applause)

We know what you are asking for, Mr. Lévesque, but we do not know what you want.

As for us, Quebecers, should the NO win, you know what we shall do: we want to stay in Canada, but also see to it that Quebec has its place in it.

(Applause)

So, Mr. Lévesque and the Quebec Government have been spending a lot of time these past days and weeks telling the people of Quebec that if they voted for sovereignty association, the rest of Canada would have no choice but to negotiate sovereignty association.

Mr. Lévesque and his people have been telling us that they know what the other people would do if Quebec votes YES. Now we ask him to tell us what they would do if Quebec votes NO.

P18 [ Would Mr. Lévesque renounce any aim of making Quebec an independent state? Would he sit down and negotiate a renewed form of federalism? Or would he say: heads I win, tails you lose, and in my game, if you vote "yes", it means yes; but if you vote "No", it means you will have another referendum?

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And there we are! I may have imposed upon your patience a little too long and I see that desert and coffee are being delayed.

During the fifteen (15) days or so before the referendum, I would like every Quebecer to answer a question and, more important, to ask that same question of those who wrote the referendum question and those who dictated it.

I would like to see every Quebecer request an answer from the supporters of the YES vote - and I wish they too would seek an answer - I wish that every one of us would ask the leader of the Government of Quebec, Mr. Lévesque, this question: "What will you do if Quebec votes NO? We are entitled to know, we want to know; and if you do not dare reply, we shall then know that your referendum is a trap and that you do not have the heart to tell us your true intentions."

Thank you.

(Applause)

UNQUOTE.

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A.C.I.D.

Notes for Remarks By The Right Honourable P.E. Trudeau

Halifax Board of Trade, Halifax, N.S.

January 25, 1985

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Ladies and Gentlemen, chers amis,

I must tell you how much I admire your stamina in agreeing to listen to three national Party leaders in less than three weeks. I know that having politics for lunch is a fine Nova Scotian tradition, but I would forgive you for thinking that enough is enough. Which is what a lot of people are thinking about the Clark government.

I am proud to be visiting with you in the company of Gerry Regan -- one of the ablest and most respected candidates the Liberal Party has attracted in this campaign, anywhere in Canada. He has served you extremely well in Province House. He will serve you even better when he returns to the House of Commons. I know he deserves your support, and I am confident that you will give it to him.

But, in case there are one or two diehard Tories here today, I'd better tell you a story for your own good. It is a story about one of the truly great men of Halifax -- Joseph Howe. He fought against Sir John A. Macdonald's Tories for most of his adult life. But with the onset of senility, he switched and supported the Tories. A little while later, he died. Now, I can't say for sure that it was supporting the Tories that killed him -- but it's something for you to think about.

But Joseph Howe was also a great partisan who relished elections and loved a good fight. So you will forgive me if I follow his partisan example by taking this opportunity to discuss one of the most critical subjects of the election campaign -- energy.

There are three critical issues that divide the major parties on energy policy and I would like to discuss them with you this afternoon.

The first issue is oil and gas pricing. The essential question here is what is the final yardstick or standard that should be applied. Does Canada have to accept OPEC as the yardstick of our pricing system, or can we set a more independent course?

I am sure that it has not escaped anyone in this room that the past year has been a time of incredible instability, sometimes nearly chaotic, in the international petroleum market. Over the past year, the world price for oil has more than doubled; at the present time it costs more than \$30 Canadian to bring a barrel of foreign oil to Canada; for oil purchased in the important spot market, prices as high as \$45 are not uncommon. So let us understand exactly what has happened. Out of the turmoil in Iran and the heightened political tension throughout the Middle East has come a world oil price in which the price of oil -- like gold -- serves as a yardstick for measuring international political anxiety.

The OPEC price for oil now has everything to do with politics and almost nothing to do with economics. And here is the fundamental issue. The Conservatives accept, as we do not, that world prices should dictate the price of domestic oil. The recent budget made a commitment that Canada would rapidly reach near world prices within four years. Instead of off-setting OPEC, the Tories have endorsed it.

I say that what is good for OPEC is not now in the interest of Canada. World prices would mean a windfall for the multinationals and for the treasuries of the

provinces. But they would be a disaster for the <sup>rest</sup> of us. What began as an OPEC crisis would very quickly become a Canadian crisis, a crisis of recession, unemployment and double digit inflation. No one knows what the world prices sold by the cartel could rise to -- \$40 -- \$50 -- \$100. But we are told by the Tories that we should tie ourselves to that measure anyway. This Liberals will not accept, and I will explain our approach.

Energy security is the second issue, and here the Tory record is a disgrace. They have hurt exploration efforts at home and imperiled supplies abroad. No one knows that better than Nova Scotians. The Tories have cut \$80 million from Petro-Canada's exploration budget -- the budget which was used to search for oil and gas in Atlantic coastal waters. Last year, for example, Petro-Canada participated in 9 of 11 wells drilled off the East Coast.

That search has resulted in the gas discovery at Sable Island, and the Hibernia oil discovery off the coast of Newfoundland. The search is just beginning to be successful so the Tories have cut the budget. You figure it out. I can't.

This Petro-Canada folly does not end at Canada's shores. The Clark government took Petro-Canada out of the oil buying business in Mexico and Venezuela. Even though that decision threatened Eastern Canada with oil shortages. Just last month Venezuela reduced the amount of oil coming to Canada through EXXON by 45,000 barrels a day. This is 10.5% of Eastern Canada's total supply.

We now rely on the charity of EXXON to ensure that oil shortages do not occur. That reduction need not have happened. Petro-Canada had been negotiating a state to state oil deal with Mexico and Venezuela, but when the Tories came to power they told Petro-Canada not to get involved. They left Atlantic Canada to the mercy of the EXXONS. This too, Liberals will not accept.

The third issue is the relation of energy to economic development. The energy policy central to the Clark budget would have made virtually every economic indicator worse. Take only one aspect of their energy policy -- the 18 cents excise tax on gasoline. That tax wasn't brought in for energy security or energy conservation. It was brought in to pay for a foolish Conservative election promise. In 1983, according to the budget's own figures, that tax would raise \$2.4 billion, but the mortgage plan would cost \$2.8 billion.

So if that tax had been implemented -- and Mr. Clark is so proud of the budget he says he will re-introduce it in its entirety -- every time every Canadian bought gasoline he would be helping to pay for a policy that benefits only one segment of the population.

That tax is particularly onerous on Nova Scotians because many in this province have to use their cars to get to work. Because there are not subways or commuter trains in Nova Scotia, and because most of your smaller communities have no public transit system at all, you have no choice but to drive your cars where you want to go.

What is the result? Under the Clark energy plan the average Nova Scotian household would be paying over \$200 more in gas and fuel costs this year, rising to over \$600 in 1982.

No wonder Tory MPs, like Bob Coates, had a real problem deciding whether they could run again, when their own party was damaging the people they represented. In a classic understatement Mr. Coates, President of the Conservative Party, said of his own Tory government "I don't really believe there was the degree of emphasis on the region that I had hoped for."

And the damage doesn't stop with those who drive. Particular occupations are singled out. One group hit hardest is the mainstay of the Nova Scotia economy -- its fishermen. For an in-shore fishing vessel consuming 1,000 gallons of fuel, the Tory energy proposals could raise costs an extra \$200 this year, rising to over \$500 more in 1982.

So every Nova Scotian would have to pay \$200 more this year and the fishermen would receive an extra treat by paying an additional \$200 above that. \$400 for the fishermen, \$200 for everybody else. I say, that budget wasn't fair, it had to be stopped, and that is what we did.

So these are the issues that dominate the energy debate. This afternoon I want to outline the Liberal approach to our energy problem. I want to discuss a seven point energy policy for the 1980s.

The Liberal plan seeks to achieve energy security at a fair price for all Canadians. Our energy program for the 1980s consists of 7 major commitments. We would start at once to:

- 1) Set a Made in Canada pricing policy to secure adequate supplies of energy at reasonable prices.
- 2) Achieve energy security through the accelerated development of Canada's domestic potential and the ensuring of Canada's off-shore supply.
- 3) Develop a more balanced energy program through the replacement of oil by natural gas and other energy forms.
- 4) Strengthen and expand Petro-Canada as an instrument of national policy.
- 5) Place a new emphasis on conservation and the promotion of energy alternatives.
- 6) Ensure that Canada's energy sector becomes more Canadian-owned and controlled.
- 7) See that energy becomes part of the larger economic strategy, forming the core of any industrial or regional development approach.

I will take a few minutes to expand on these seven points. But first since I am announcing this policy to all of Canada I will repeat them in French.

Le plan du Parti libéral vise à assurer la sécurité énergétique du pays à un prix équitable pour tous les Canadiens. Notre programme énergétique pour les années 80 comprend 7 engagements majeurs:

- 1) Nous instaurerons une politique des prix "faite au Canada" afin de garantir des approvisionnements suffisants à des prix raisonnables.
- 2) Nous assurerons la sécurité énergétique du Canada en accélérant le développement du potentiel énergétique canadien et en garantissant nos approvisionnements en provenance de l'étranger.
- 3) Nous élaborerons un programme énergétique mieux équilibré en substituant au pétrole le gaz naturel et d'autres formes d'énergie.
- 4) Nous renforcerons et accroîtrons le rôle de Petro-Canada en tant qu'instrument d'une politique énergétique canadienne.
- 5) Nous mettrons davantage l'accent sur la conservation et sur le développement des sources nouvelles d'énergie.
- 6) Nous ferons en sorte qu'il y ait accroissement de la propriété et du contrôle canadiens dans le secteur de l'énergie.
- 7) Nous intégrerons notre politique de l'énergie à une stratégie économique globale et elle sera au coeur de nos politiques de développement industriel et régional.

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First, we need a Made in Canada energy pricing policy. Liberals believe that the time has now come to disconnect the Canadian price of oil from the OPEC cartel. Energy policy should attempt to provide security at the minimum price necessary -- not at a maximum, as the Tories would have us do with world prices. The Conservative budget proposed rapid increase of all oil prices -- both conventional oil already discovered, and the new more costly non-conventional oil like the tar sands. The result would be a windfall profit on the conventional reserves -- oil that cost only \$8 to produce, for example, would be sold at the world price of over \$30.

For these reasons, Canada must set its own energy prices, geared to Canadian requirements. That will be the basic oil pricing principle of the Liberal Government. And not only must we set our own oil prices, but we must distinguish between the different categories of oil. Conventional wells supply the bulk of the oil we currently use, approximately 70%. Whether the price is \$10 per barrel or \$50, these wells can keep pumping at a profit.

Over time as these wells are depleted, new sources will have to come on stream. Replacement and additions will most likely come from the tar sands, from the Arctic, from the continental shelf.

In other words, from unconventional sources of supply. This second category, bringing new sources on stream will be expensive. Then there is the third category of oil imports for which we will have to pay world price.

Now making this type of distinction is not new. The producing provinces, for the purposes of royalties, already distinguish between "old" and "new" oil. The former Liberal Government also began to move in this direction when it allowed synthetic oil from the Syncrude plant to have a much higher price than conventional sources.

We will build on the Syncrude precedent. The prices of these three categories of oil will be different for the producers and we will arrive at one blended price for the consumer uniform across the country.

As we use up our sources of conventional oil, there will be a shift in the mix towards the more expensive new sources. This will necessitate a gradual increase in price. But this formula will result in a phased-in price, not an abrupt excessive acceleration such as the Tories tried to implement.

The Government of Canada will continue to subsidize the import component of the "Made in Canada" price for the period of time that is necessary to ensure that price increases are gradual and do not result in hardship for consumers and businesses.

The Made in Canada price will also be fair -- there will be a lower return for oil already in reserve and higher prices for oil from new developments. So there will be an incentive for companies to actively explore, rather than simply wait for the price to go up on their existing holdings.

In order to ensure that the costs assigned by the formula to conventional and unconventional oil are fair, a new permanent agency, the Petroleum Pricing and Auditing Agency will be established to investigate and report on industry costs, profits and operations. This information will allow the government concerned to estimate appropriate level of price in the industry. It will enable the public to see that moneys earned in Canada are re-invested to find new sources of energy.

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So that, Ladies and Gentlemen, is the Made in Canada pricing policy. It is a whole new method for deciding an oil price that is appropriate for Canada. Our goal is to have the system in place by July 1, 1980.

Now I know that many people are asking what the exact cost of the Made in Canada price would be. This can only be determined after we negotiate with the provinces. Through the petroleum pricing and auditing agency, we must first determine what the replacement costs of oil are, and upon having this information we must negotiate in good faith with the provinces.

But I can tell you this. The Made in Canada price will result in a lower price to consumers than the one proposed for the next four years in the Clark budget. It will be a lower price because we will not impose an 18 cent excise tax on gas and diesel; it will be a lower price because existing reserves of conventional oil will not receive a windfall price; and it would be a lower price because even the highest estimates of costs for new tar sand plants and the like are below world prices. That is our position on pricing.

Second, we will increase Canada's domestic supply of energy, both through the Made in Canada incentive policy and an expanded effort by Petro-Canada. We will restore the \$80 million cut from Petro-Canada's exploration budget, and we will mandate Petro-Canada to participate in the development of the tar sands and heavy oil.

Especially important to the Maritimes, I tell you today that if we are successful on February 18th, we will immediately instruct Petro-Canada to resume negotiations with Mexico and Venezuela.

Security of supply is our goal and Petro-Canada  
will be our tool.

Third, we will develop a more balanced energy program through the replacement of oil by natural gas. At present oil accounts for 44% of Canadian consumption, while natural gas makes up only 18%. We need to substitute plentiful resources, like natural gas, for the one energy resource of which we are short -- oil. Therefore, under the Made in Canada policy, natural gas will not be pegged to rising international prices. It will be set at a lower level to provide an incentive for people to switch.

But in order to switch, people must have access to gas. Nowhere is access needed more than in Eastern Canada. I am announcing today, as part of our program, that a Liberal Government will take immediate action to ensure the full cooperation of all parties in the construction of a natural gas pipeline to Quebec City and the Maritimes. The pipeline will have reversible capacity so that Maritimers will have the opportunity, both to use Western natural gas now and to send off-shore gas to Central Canada later. Like the railroad in the 1980s, energy pipelines in the 1980s have the potential to be a steel link uniting the nation.

Next, our fourth commitment concerns Petro-Canada. Unlike Mr. Clark we have a consistent Petro-Canada policy. On Petro-Canada Mr. Clark has changed direction more often than the Dartmouth Ferry. But that comparison is unfair, at least the ferry is predictable. Our policy on Petro-Canada is simple: we will keep it, we will strengthen it, we will expand it. As I have already mentioned Petro-Canada's exploration budget will be increased and it will resume a vigorous role in state to state deals.

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But we also want Petro-Canada to enter new fields, and that is the major departure in our program to increase conservation and develop new alternative energy sources, our fifth commitment. We will create a subsidiary of Petro-Canada, the Alternate Energy Corporation of Canada. This new crown corporation will assume all existing and planned federal activities relating to the research and development of wind, solar, tidal, biomass, coal liquification, and other energy forms.

Like C.D. Howe, who developed the new energy source of his era -- nuclear energy -- with the creation of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, we must now concentrate on the new energy source of our era -- the renewables. This program is not pie in the sky. The Harvard report of Energy Future estimates that solar and renewables could provide up to 20% of American energy needs by the year 2000, the new conservation techniques can save more than 35% as well. Conservation and the renewables must be regarded as a largely untapped source of energy. We must move on our oil problems now, but we must also think ahead.

The Liberal Party makes an equal commitment to the objective of Canadian ownership. I am announcing today that a Liberal Government will set, as a specific goal, that Canadian citizens own at least 50% of petroleum industry assets before the end of this decade. This goal is entirely feasible. Under the former Liberal government good progress was made -- between 1970 and 1978 foreign control of the domestic assets of the oil and gas industry declined from 91% to 75%. We want this trend to continue. Petro-Canada, federal land regulations, and tax allowances will make it happen.

Finally, energy must be the core of industrial and regional development. At least \$100 billion will be spent in the energy sector in the next 10 years. A Liberal Government would be committed to directing the benefits of this energy boom to Canadians

Industry will be developed close to energy sources so that the producing areas in the West (and here as production comes on stream) will have first crack at processing their resources.

We will use energy as an economic tool by keeping our energy costs below world price, we will give our secondary manufacturing industries the edge they need to compete in a tough world. We will use revenues, raised through energy taxation, to make the big projects happen: Railway building, pipeline construction, a western electric grid, coal liquification, are only a few of the projects that the energy boom could produce. We pledge that the Federal Government will be a partner not an adversary in their development.

So that is our energy commitment.

The Liberal Party has a record of solid performance in the area of energy, a record of solid performance in the service of the people of Nova Scotia. We want to form the next government as a positive step towards building a better Canada for all Canadians. Mr. Clark had a chance, it's time once again to give Canada a chance.

TRANSCRIPT OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU'S SPEECH  
WINDSOR, ONTARIO - FEBRUARY 14, 1980

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TRANSCRIPTION D'UN DISCOURS DONNE PAR LE TRES HONORABLE PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU  
A WINDSOR (ONTARIO) - LE 14 FEVRIER 1980

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I'm very grateful that you receive me tonight with open hearts and open arms to this great Liberal rally. I'm happy to see Canadians in this election turn out in great numbers to show not only their interest in the election campaign which is going on, but to do it with the kind of happiness and good spirits that I see here tonight, the kind of enthusiasm that I saw just a few hours ago in Chatham, that we encountered last night in Winnipeg, that we encountered yesterday noon in Vancouver. The kind of turn-out of happy concerned Canadians who want to be given a chance on next Monday to join us, your Members of Parliament, who began to defeat the Clark government on December 13 and you want to finish the job with us.

I was delayed a little bit this morning in Winnipeg. My plane had some trouble in taking off. Just like Mr. Clark's campaign. So I was reading some clippings from the editorials and from the columnists that are published in Toronto and in Winnipeg and in Vancouver and in points in between, and almost to a man or woman these editorialists and these columnists were saying this is a winter election that the Canadian people don't want, this is an election that isn't needed, the Canadian people are angry at this needless winter election. Well, you don't look very angry to me, not at having an election anyhow.

If the Canadian people are angry, they're not angry at the winter election. For one thing, it's the most mild winter we've had in 100 years. And even the heavens are cooperating with us to turn Mr. Clark out. If Ontarians are mad about anything, if these people, picketers out in the street with signs are mad about anything, it's not about having an election. They're mad at the 57 Tory M.P.'s which were elected in this province and who kept quiet when Mr. Clark and Mr. Crosbie were preparing their budget which was going to be a disaster for the people of Ontario, a disaster for the people of Canada. And don't take my word for it. I'm sure you've heard Mr. Davis and Mr. Miller say that it was a disaster. A budget that in Mr. Miller's own words, the Secretary of Ontario, a Tory, said would cost Ontario at least 20,000 jobs which wouldn't be created. A budget which Mr. Davis felt so bad about that he would go down to Florida for most of the election to look for electors down there. If the people are mad, it's because they have a budget which means injustice for the people of Canada. It means increased taxes of an average of 16 per cent for the average Canadian. It means increased fuel costs. It means an 18 cents excise tax on gasoline which increases inflation according to that budget by 11 per cent, and means hardship to people on fixed incomes - particularly retired pensioners. It's a budget which for the first time in the history of Canada puts a tax on the fuel that the farmers need in <sup>their</sup> trucks and tractors to grow their crops. It's a tax which for the first time in Canadian history falls on the fisherman

who has to go out to sea to catch his fish. And all we hear from Mr. Crosbie is that this budget will make people save energy.

Well, what's an old person supposed to do? Not heat his home or just light the furnace one day out of two. And what's the fisherman going to do? Only go halfway toward where the fish are so he can save some energy?

This budget coming... 20,000 jobs, that's the figure Mr. Miller, the Treasurer of Ontario, gave. Yes, and that's the calculation that this budget will give at a time when the economies of the Western World are slowing down, at a time when our main market in the United States is suffering an economic slowdown. This budget is a prescription for a recession. We should be doing the contrary. We should be making sure, as Liberals have in the past, as we did in 74 and 75 when the whole world, the whole industrialized world was suffering a recession. Canada alone showed growth in those years because we stimulated the economy, because we wanted jobs. And as Gene, and as Herb, and as Mark say, the Liberal Party puts people first, and it's on that basis that we will worry about the deficit after we finish worrying about the unemployed. These are the people we want to think about first.

And it's not very hard to understand in a city like Windsor, how this budget can mean unemployment. Because, obviously, when the cost of everything goes up because Mr. Clark and his budget have put a tax on everything that moves, when he puts a tax which Mr. Miller, the Treasurer of Ontario, calculates will increase the payment for heating your home and running your car in Ontario of an average of \$575. a year, it's obvious that when people have less to spend they have to make choices. And when they make choices, obviously they can't stop eating and they can't stop heating their homes. So what do they do? They look for other ways to cut their spending. And as you know here, the first thing many people decide to do is to postpone the purchase of a new automobile. Now, this is substantiated by a very highly respected firm of economists in Canada called Data Resources Inc. It has estimated that the Tory budget, the one that we defeated, would cause the loss of more than 113,000 new car sales over the next two years. So when people decide they're going to postpone the purchase of a car, that means workers being laid off. And when autoworkers are being laid off, it doesn't take many brains for people to understand that everyone is hit and that in Windsor, a city where the automobile industry is so important, the pinch falls on everybody, not only on the autoworkers.

Now, fortunately, Mr. Crosbie, the Minister of Finance, has told you what to do about that. He said: You need some short-term pain for a long-term gain. Well, we say: Let the Tories feel the pain on Monday! Let the Tories feel the pain and Canada will gain!

Well, tonight particularly I would want to ask for a few minutes of your attention to talk in a little bit of detail about the automobile industry. Because a few days ago, I talked about our industrial policy generally, I spelled out the energy program - some \$100 billion worth of them which will be invested in Canada over the next ten years - and I indicated the principles which would be

guiding a Liberal government, if you do us the favour of electing us on Monday in developing that industrial policy. I would like to say a few words about the effect of it and how it would be applied here in Windsor and in other automobile towns, because everyone in this room knows the importance of that industry not only to your region and to Ontario but the importance of that industry for all of Canada.

Total automotive trade between Canada and the United States is over \$220 billion. Now there are 462 Canadian firms engaged in the automotive market. Most of them, small and Canadian-owned. And although the industry is dominated as we know by the big four automakers and the eight multinational auto part makers, we have to remember that some 462 are Canadian firms. Now, the industry employs something over 117,000 Canadians and most of them are here in this province. So we can say that autos are as important to this province as the oil and gas industry is to Alberta. But we shouldn't forget too that we're not only talking about Ontario, because there's the GM plant in Ste-Thérèse in Quebec, and there's The Volvo in Nova Scotia, and of course there's the truck manufacturers in Western Canada and the auto part firms which are located all over the country. But, by its very size and impact, the future of the automotive industry then would have to be of concern to any Canadian government.

But there is also another reason that I want to mention why that sector occupies such a critical place in the Liberal Party strategy for industrial development. Automobiles can be an industry for the future if we begin to act now. In other words, when we talk of the automotive industry, we mustn't just think of the past, of buying into what is there. That might be important if we have the money. But we must look at the future. Because if we want to achieve objectives such as balanced regional growth or increase Canadian ownership, we must put priorities in place now. We must do that now to affect the pattern of development or the opportunity will be lost. Because we all know that a new generation of automobiles is coming forth, we all know that there're problems in that industry but that there're immense opportunities. Because now the automobile must conform to new standards, new standards of safety, the environment, energy saving. So a new era is emerging in the automotive manufacturing as the industry shifts towards smaller, lighter vehicles.

Side by side with these developments in assembly will come the opportunities for part producers to achieve world-scale production of automotive components. We know that by 1985, the big four automakers are expected to invest up to \$75 billion. That's in the next five years. \$75 billion for re-tooling, plants and equipment, research and development, in order to design and produce the fuel-efficient automobile of the future.

Well, the Liberal goal in face of all these facts can be simply stated. We want a fair share for Canada! We have the energy. We have the raw materials. We have the brains. We have the skill to produce the cars of the future. But we can fall behind if we don't make sure that we also share in the new technologies that will emerge. So we must begin to act at once and that's why a Liberal government looking towards the future is the kind of government that you people

here in Windsor are happy to elect. So our first step will be to inform the United States that Canada will exercise its right under the Auto Pact to begin formal consultations on areas of joint concern.

You'll recall that a few years ago the President of the United States and myself agreed that each country should undertake separate parallel studies of the automotive industry and these reports have given us a strong factual base to begin discussions. Now second, a little over a year ago our government also appointed Mr. Simon Reisman to head a commission of enquiry and we want to discuss Mr. Reisman's many proposals with our American neighbours. Now, it's not that we're saying we want to renegotiate the whole Auto Pact. These formal consultations will simply serve as the first step in our program to reduce the 1979 automotive trade deficit of \$3.1 billion with the United States and to obtain a fair share of production of research and development in auto parts as well as in assembly. Second, a new Liberal Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce will meet immediately with the heads of the domestic auto companies and with the chief executives of the multinationals to obtain greater sourcing for automotive parts in Canada and increase research and development. We will expect the major manufacturers both to stimulate the development of a high technology parts industry in Canada and to begin to do more research and development in Canada.

You know, in 1977 - and these are in the Reisman Report - it's been estimated that the subsidiaries of the major American automobile manufacturers contributed \$375 million towards the head office research and development budget while spending less than \$5 million in Canada. \$375 million for R&D to the head office, \$5 million in Canada. Well, that record I say here in Windsor is a disgrace and it must be changed!

And I add that we look forward to working with the industry to make those changes. But if there's resistance to this national objective, we will examine the possibility of limiting the amount of R&D payments to head offices which may be deducted from tax programs because we must...

Third, we will encourage the re-tooling and new investments in the auto parts industry and to do that we will set up an automobile investment division as part of the enterprise development program in Ottawa. This division will have the responsibility for administering financial assistance to the industry and it will have officers who are competent and experienced in matters relating to auto parts manufacturing. The full range of enterprise development program: loans, grants and loan guarantees will be available, but most of the assistance will be in the form of loan guarantees. This will help the small auto parts manufacturer get low interest loans from banks. As a general rule, the automobile investment divisions will give preference to Canadian-owned firms.

Now, I know here in Windsor, Chrysler is in a special situation. Well, I can say, and Mark reminded you, or was it Herb or Gene - it was Mark. We helped Ford establish itself here when they were tempted to go elsewhere.... Well, that's exactly what I'm going to say. This man is very interested in the election and I'm happy. Great! I'm telling you, we will work with Chrysler to help them get

that capital, but we will put a condition. We will want in return a commitment on employment, on jobs, on R&D and on car parts. So it won't be a one-sided deal. We want to make sure that any help in getting that capital is advantageous not only to Chrysler but to the people who work at Chrysler and to the Canadian people.

Lastly, let me just mention that two years ago, the Liberal government introduced a duty remission program to encourage the sourcing of Canadian parts by Volkswagen. Well, this scheme has been successful and it has resulted in Volkswagen increasing its purchases of Canadian parts. So, we will expand this program to other foreign manufacturers or take equally effective steps to ensure that Canadian manufactured parts gain entry to foreign markets. Now, that's our commitment to Canada's automotive industry. I can't go into great detail today. I just once again tell you: Look what we have done in the past. Look what we did with Ford. Look what we have done when a Liberal government created the Auto Pact and look what it meant in terms of new development for Canada.

So, I'm telling you tonight that we want to expand the industry and we particularly want to expand the Canadian owned part of that industry! I repeat: our goal is fair shares for Canada. Whether it be automobiles, whether it be energy, whether it be industry generally, we want to form the next government as a positive step toward building a better Canada for Canadians.

Now, we have tonight with me perhaps the strongest team of candidates and Members of Parliament that any region of the country has put together in any party!

Well, I'm very happy to see how well you appreciate them because I can tell you that I appreciate them and I can tell you that when these men and similar men and women who are running and winning for the Liberal Party in other parts of Canada, when they are in Ottawa - either sitting in Parliament or discussing in caucus, or arguing with Cabinet - I can tell you that they don't forget the province, the region, the city, the people they represent. They're not! These three Liberals together did more even in opposition than the 57 Tory M.P.'s sitting on the government side. And the reason I can say that and the reason that you believe that is because those 57 silent Tory M.P.'s let Mr. Crosbie and Mr. Clark bring down a budget which was weakening Ontario. Weakening Ontario according to the Conservative Premier of Ontario. And I can tell you - and I've said this in every part of Canada - you can't have a strong Canada if you have a weak Ontario, anymore that you can have a strong Canada with any weak province.

You are Liberals here, you understand the basic concern of the Liberal Party. The basic concern of our party historically is to make sure that every part of Canada and every person in Canada had equality of opportunity. We're not preaching artificial equality for everybody and that everybody must look alike and have exactly the same bank account. We're saying that every region and every person should have equality of opportunity so that he or she - no matter where he or she lives in Canada - has the opportunity to develop, to fulfill himself, to fulfill herself to the utmost, to be Canadian like every other Canadian and that's what the Liberal Party is about: uniting us together in a strong Canada!

FID/R. FRANCIS/3-7025/amk

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November 13, 1979

Statements and Speeches Series

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| 57-7-PM |  |   |
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Please include in the above-mentioned series the following speech:

Address by the Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, Prime Minister of Canada to the 25th session of the North Atlantic Assembly, October 26, 1979, in Ottawa.  
"Canada and NATO".

- 2. English text of the speech is attached. It has been cleared for inclusion in the series by: DFR/Bickford. No french text is available.

Ruth Francis  
(initials)

Ruth Francis,  
Domestic Information  
Programs Division.

W 261  
SA 1 (79) 7

- 2 -

3 Address by the Rt. Hon. Joseph Clark, PC MP, Prime Minister  
of Canada

Mr. Clark spoke as follows: I would like to thank you Mr. President, for this opportunity to speak about the importance my Government attaches to the North Atlantic Alliance. This twenty-fifth annual session of the North Atlantic Assembly is the first occasion for me to outline to you, the elected representatives of NATO countries, my Government's views on the Alliance as it enters its fourth decade.

But first of all, I should like to extend a warm welcome to Ottawa to my Parliamentary colleagues attending this meeting. My Government is intent on increasing the participation of parliamentary groups and others in the study of general policies, including defence policy. Consequently, a group such as this, which shares the same objective in all member countries of the Alliance, is even more welcome in our capital.

For thirty years now, the Alliance has been of great service to its members when peace keeping was at stake. No-one can say with certainty what would have happened in the absence of a collective defence structure such as NATO. Nonetheless, I am convinced, as most Canadians are, I am sure, that Western European stability and security and, consequently, Canadian security owe much to the existence of NATO. Since its inception, the Alliance has been based on the principle of association between European member nations, the United States and Canada, as well as on the indivisibility of defence of its two continental sectors. Basically then, NATO plays an essential role in Canada's security.

Canada is not on the sidelines in the conflict of values and goals between the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As I have publicly declared before, there is no question about our full commitment to the Alliance.

On this positive note, let me take this opportunity of confirming that my government has every expectation of achieving a 3% real growth in defence expenditure in the coming financial year. Under the difficult economic conditions facing Canada and other member nations, I think this serves to demonstrate both the priority we place on making our own forces more effective and the importance we give to our role in the Alliance.

As most of you will know, we are embarked on major - and too long delayed - re-equipment programmes involving a new tank, a new maritime patrol aircraft, a new fighter aircraft and a new frigate programme. These will involve a major expenditure of funds.

Nevertheless, I firmly believe that it is easy to place too great an emphasis on how much is spent on defence and too little on how well it is used. As a new government, we are reviewing our foreign and defence policies to ensure they are attuned to the world of the 1980s. In particular, we shall pay attention to the effectiveness of our defence spending. I think it is appropriate to mention our concern over the growth in financial contributions to NATO. No one can fault the logic of sharing costs for NATO infrastructure. No one can dispute the desirability of certain common funded programmes; but, we expect the same efficiency in the management of things we do collectively as we demand in our own management of national defence programmes.

It is against this background of ensuring we get good value for our defence dollar that we are committed to re-equipping our own forces and increasing their effectiveness in the North American and European sectors of the Alliance. To produce this increased effectiveness, we shall continue to commit our best efforts to meet the goal of an annual 3 per cent real growth in defence expenditures during the five-year period ending in 1984. Clearly what we actually achieve - and what we aim to achieve after that period - will depend on international developments, national circumstances and the results of our examination of defence policy and its effectiveness both at home and abroad.

A few minutes ago I spoke of the two sectors of the Alliance, namely, the European and the North American. I chose to express myself as such to underline the fact that Canada is also part of the protected sector of NATO. This fact sometimes seems to be forgotten in Europe. Furthermore, our defence efforts in North America contribute to the security of the United States strategic deterrent force which gives its support to the Alliance, and reinforce, as does our participation in NATO's traditional land, sea and air forces, the Alliance's global deterrent capability.

We do not say that, by reason of our contribution to the defence of North America, we should reduce our contribution to European defence. On the contrary, as I have already stated, it is our intention to reinforce our contribution by means of our re-equipment programmes. We do, however, want our allies in Europe to be fully aware of the twofold contribution that we make.

For Canadians, NATO has always been much more than a purely military alliance. It is for us the principal forum for consultation among the NATO partners on a wide range of political questions, particularly in East-West relations. This dialogue on broad political and strategic issues serves a country like Canada particularly well, and we must constantly strive to develop and extend the habit of consultation among NATO nations.

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- 4 -

The process of political consultation in NATO has, from time to time, I think you will agree, left something to be desired. This not surprising, for that process has to contend with the strains of seeking consensus among a group of nations characterized by vast differences in size, population, wealth and military resources.

Even so, these imperfections must be seen against the impressive degree of consultation and cooperative effort that has been achieved. For Canada, the NATO Council and the bodies reporting to it constitute an important piece of consultative machinery. Without it the task of advancing Canadian viewpoints on specific issues would be difficult. What has been accomplished in shaping common policies among a group of sovereign governments is an additional but fundamental reason why our interest in NATO countries remains a powerful one.

At the current time, the most important topics of consultation include the pursuit of meaningful detente, the identification of confidence-building measures, as well as efficient and well-controlled arms limitation in the East and West. For many years now, the member countries of NATO have been holding intensive consultations to formulate the Organisation's position on mutual and balanced force reductions. Close consultation will also be necessary if progress is to be achieved at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be held in Madrid. Furthermore, consultations on the vital questions of the modernisation of nuclear forces in Europe and control of arms, including tactical nuclear weapons, being held in the third round of talks on strategic arms limitation, are progressing rapidly.

Canada's hope, of course, is that SALT II will enter into force soon. In my letters to President Carter and President Brezhnev last June I made clear that Canada fully supported this agreement as a valuable contribution to stability in strategic weapons. A third round of SALT can provide an opportunity not only to seek more substantial reductions in intercontinental systems but also to deal, for the first time, with the longer-range nuclear forces in the European theatre. To this end, the Alliance must encourage the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously.

All NATO members are carefully examining President Brezhnev's recent speech in East Berlin. His declared willingness to reduce Soviet conventional forces in East Germany and to pursue negotiations on confidence-building measures is to be welcomed and, indeed, applauded - as must any initiative that offers the prospect of relaxing tensions. It is in this context that President Brezhnev's proposals on theatre nuclear weapons require analysis and clarification. They appear to allow Soviet modernization while denying it to NATO forces.

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Canada is not, of course, a nuclear-weapon power in its own right. It, Canadian security is dependent on an Alliance that relies on a defence and deterrent strategy that combines intercontinental and theatre nuclear forces with conventional forces. Our Alliance will face crucial tests - this year and throughout its fourth decade - as it strives to meet the need for the right mixture of both nuclear and conventional force modernization on the one hand and the pursuit of agreements on balanced and effective measures of restraint on the other. If we are sufficiently skillful and careful, we should be able to enhance the credibility of our conventional and nuclear deterrent and increase the stability of our relations with the Warsaw Pact countries. In so doing we will help to ensure the success of our Alliance in deterring war and in assuring a climate of peace less open to constant challenge.

Mr. President, I wish you and all the delegates present much success in your proceedings.

4. Address by Mr. Paul Thyness, President of the Assembly

The President spoke as follows:

Distinguished guests, fellow delegates to the North Atlantic Assembly, ladies and gentlemen,

We meet at a particularly crucial time in the life of the North Atlantic Alliance. Thirty years ago the Alliance was formed to give a weak and war-devastated Western Europe the protection of the world's then only nuclear power, the United States of America, and at the same time to provide a framework for co-operation in building a counterforce to the vast conventional superiority of the Soviet Union on the continent of Europe.

We never really succeeded in building that counterforce, but we did manage to narrow the gap both in actual numbers and by bringing our superior technology to bear. As long as the Alliance had a monopoly or a near monopoly of nuclear forces, some inferiority in conventional forces did not matter too much.

But sooner or later this situation had to change. There never was any way to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring its own intercontinental nuclear capability. And when that happened it became of small importance whether our central systems were superior to theirs, or vice versa. Once both sides acquired a second strike capability - that is, the ability to inflict intolerable damage even after itself absorbing a first nuclear attack, or "mutual assured destruction" - we had in fact arrived at a plateau where incremental advantage in the area of central systems no longer paid political, diplomatic or military dividends. I would like to underline this point: a competition in throw-weight or numbers of warheads is not very relevant. We must do whatever necessary to preserve our second strike capability, but as long as that is intact there is not much more the central systems can do for us.

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*For [unclear]*

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

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| From / De: A.C.I.A.   |
| SEP 6 1979            |
| Att'n: <i>M. Long</i> |

TO  
à The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, OTTAWA FIA

SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED  
Sécurité

FROM  
De The Canadian Embassy, OSLO

DATE August 30, 1979

REFERENCE  
Référence

NUMBER  
Numéro 264

SUBJECT  
Sujet PM Trudeau's "Mansion House" Speech

| FILE                        | DOSSIER |
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| OTTAWA<br>57-7-PM           |         |
| MISSION<br>17 56-11-NOR/ICE | ✓       |

ENCLOSURES  
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

We have received a request/a copy of the /for above speech made by Mr. Trudeau in London, England on relations between developed and developing countries. We believe the speech was made early in 1975.

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]* The Embassy

SEP - 7 1979

**ETION  
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---ANTENNE 2:ENTREVUE PM TRUDEAU, JOURNAL PARLE, 20H30 DU 8DEC  
NOISEUX A RECU TELEPHONE RESPONSABLE JOURNAL PARLE POUR ENTREVUE  
PM TRUDEAU, JOURNAL PARLE DE 20H30, 8DEC.

2.ON NS A RAPPELE QUE DERNIERE FOIS TF1, AVONS EU EXCLUSIVITE  
A L OCCASION VISITE PM TRUDEAU. ANTENNE 2 PRETE A FILMER ENTREVUE  
AU LIEU DE RESIDENCE DU PM DS L EVENTUALITE QU IL NE PUISSE  
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3.AVONS BIEN PRECISE QUE VISITE TRUDEAU A PARIS ETAIT UNF  
VISITE DE TRAVAIL ET QU AUCUNE ENTREVUE AVEC LA PRESSE N ETAIT  
PREVUE AU PROGRAMME. ANTENNE 2 A IMMEDIATEMENT OFFERT QUE  
TRUDEAU PARLE EN GENERAL DES RELATIONS FRANCE-CDA SANS REFERENC  
AUX DISCUSSIONS QU IL AURAIT EUES AVEC PRESIDENT GISCARD  
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4.SANS NS ENGAGER AVONS TOUT SIMPLEMENT PROMIS DE COMMUNIQUER  
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5.RECONNAISSANTS VOS REACTIONS POUR 09:00 4DEC.

CCC/010 301655Z WIFC5672



Office of  
The Prime Minister

Cabinet du  
Premier Ministre

August 21, 1978  
le 21 août 1978

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| 57-7-P.M. |  |
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TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S TELEX TO THE  
PREMIERS OF AUGUST 18, 1978 ON THE  
SUBJECT OF EXPENDITURE REDUCTIONS IN  
THE FEDERAL PROGRAM

TEXTE DU TELEX ENVOYE PAR LE PREMIER  
MINISTRE AUX PREMIERS MINISTRES  
PROVINCIAUX TRAITANT DE REDUCTIONS DE  
DEPENSES DANS UN GRAND NOMBRE DE  
PROGRAMMES FEDERAUX

MESSAGE

| PLACE | DEPARTMENT | ORIG. NO. | DATE | FILE/DOSSIER | SECURITY<br>SÉCURITÉ |
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REF

SUB/SUJ

MY DEAR PREMIER:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL TREASURY BOARD, THE HONOURABLE ROBERT ANDRAS, ANNOUNCED LAST WEDNESDAY A SERIES OF EXPENDITURE REDUCTIONS IN A LARGE NUMBER OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS. THESE REDUCTIONS REFLECT THE COMMITMENT WE MADE AS FIRST MINISTERS AT OUR FEBRUARY CONFERENCE TO REDUCE THE RATE OF GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, AND ARE INTENDED TO IMPLEMENT, IN PART, MY PERSONAL COMMITMENT OF SEVERAL WEEKS AGO TO REDUCE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET BY AT LEAST \$2 BILLION.

THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THIS EXERCISE IS, OF COURSE, TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS SPENDING AND TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH IT IS SPENT. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE SHARE THAT PAYMENTS TO PROVINCES REPRESENT IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET, IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT SOME PROVINCIAL PROGRAMS MAY BE AFFECTED BY A REDUCTION OR RE-ORDERING OF FEDERAL EXPENDITURES.

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IT IS TO EXPRESS OUR INTENTION TO MINIMIZE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE THE EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL MEASURES ON THE PROVINCES THAT MR. ANDRAS HAS INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH IN HIS RECENT STATEMENT:

"SOME OF THE REDUCTIONS WILL HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECTS OR PROGRAMS THAT WE UNDERTAKE JOINTLY WITH THE PROVINCES. IN EACH CASE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PROVINCES WILL BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO SEE HOW WE CAN ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES WITH A MINIMUM OF DISRUPTION TO THE PRIORITIES OF OTHER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT."

IN ADDITION TO THIS COMMITMENT, WE WILL UNDERTAKE TO FULLY DISCUSS WITH YOU BEFORE DECIDING TO MAKE CHANGES TO FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONTRACTUAL OR LEGISLATIVE ARRANGEMENTS PRESENTLY IN EFFECT. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS MOST ANXIOUS NOT TO AMEND UNILATERALLY EXISTING CONTRACTUAL OR LEGAL COMMITMENTS. IN CERTAIN CASES, WE WILL ASK THE PROVINCES TO START DISCUSSIONS OR NEGOTIATIONS OF SOME FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL AGREEMENTS WHEN WE FEEL THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO MEET ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PEOPLE TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF ITS SERVICES AND TO REDUCE THEIR COSTS. IN OTHER CASES, WE MAY WISH TO INVOKE THE TERMINATION CLAUSE IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO MODIFY IN DUE TIME THE WAY SOME JOINT OR SHARED-COST PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN FUNDED.

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WITHIN THE EXPENDITURE CUTS ALREADY ANNOUNCED, EACH ONE OF THE FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS THAT ARE AFFECTED WILL EXAMINE THE EXPENDITURES THAT HAVE BEEN REDUCED OR ELIMINATED IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THOROUGHLY THE FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL IMPLICATIONS. IN THESE CASES, HOWEVER, OUR COMMITMENT IS THAT IN ANY CASE THE DOLLAR AMOUNTS OF EXPENDITURE REDUCTIONS ATTACHED TO DEPARTMENTS WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED.

I SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO NOTE THAT IN PAST YEARS, PROVINCIAL PREMIERS HAVE FREQUENTLY STATED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM A NUMBER OF FIELDS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THEIR COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE REGINA CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 9-11, PREMIERS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT "DUPLICATION IN MANY FIELDS HAS BEEN CAUSED BY FEDERAL INTRUSION" AND THAT "MORE STUDIES ARE NOT NEEDED; WE NEED...SPECIFIC ACTION ON SPECIFIC PROBLEMS". SOME OF THE FEDERAL EXPENDITURE REDUCTIONS ANNOUNCED AT THIS STAGE (FOR INSTANCE, IN THE FIELD OF HOUSING) SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AN INITIAL FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE WISHES EXPRESSED SO CLEARLY BY PROVINCIAL PREMIERS. WE ARE OF COURSE PREPARED TO CONSIDER OTHER AREAS WHERE YOU WOULD WISH US TO WITHDRAW OUR PROGRAMS AND LEAVE THESE AREAS TO THE PROVINCES.

SINCERELY,

PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU  
PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA

(AND S, MNOO  
00/0) VBI LX

Telex to be sent to:

THE HONOURABLE PETER LOUGHEED, Q.C.  
PREMIER OF ALBERTA  
LEGISLATIVE BUILDING  
EDMONTON, ALBERTA

THE HONOURABLE WILLIAM RICHARDS BENNETT  
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THE HONOURABLE STERLING LYON  
PREMIER OF MANITOBA  
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REGINA, SASKATCHEWAN

Monsieur René Lévesque  
Premier Ministre du Québec  
Hotel du Gouvernement  
Québec, Québec  
G1A 1A2

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

Le Président du Conseil du Trésor fédéral, l'honorable Robert Andras, a annoncé mercredi soir une série de réductions des dépenses dans un grand nombre de programmes fédéraux. Ces réductions vont dans le sens de l'engagement que nous avons pris comme Premiers ministres, à notre conférence de février, de freiner le taux de croissance des dépenses de l'état. Elles visent aussi à remplir l'engagement personnel que j'ai pris il y a quelques semaines de réduire d'au moins \$2 milliards le budget du gouvernement fédéral.

Bien entendu, l'objectif principal de cette initiative est de réduire les dépenses fédérales et d'en améliorer les résultats. Cependant, étant donné la part que représentent dans le budget fédéral les virements aux provinces, on doit s'attendre qu'une réduction ou réaffectation des fonds fédéraux touche certains programmes provinciaux.

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C'est d'ailleurs dans le dessein de faire savoir notre intention de minimiser autant que possible les effets des mesures fédérales sur les provinces que M. Andras a inclus l'alinéa suivant dans sa récente déclaration:

"Certaines réductions auront des répercussions sur des projets ou programmes entrepris conjointement avec les provinces. Dans chaque cas, nous entamerons le plus tôt possible des discussions avec les provinces sur la façon d'atteindre nos objectifs en portant le moins atteinte aux priorités des autres niveaux de gouvernement."

En plus de cet engagement, nous prendrons les mesures nécessaires pour discuter à fond avec vous avant de décider d'effectuer des changements à tout arrangement fédéral-provincial de nature contractuelle ou législative présentement en vigueur. Le gouvernement fédéral désire vivement éviter d'amender unilatéralement les ententes contractuelles ou juridiques existantes. Dans certains cas, nous demanderons aux provinces de procéder à la discussion ou à la négociation de certains accords fédéraux-provinciaux, quand nous estimerons que les termes de l'accord gênent l'action du gouvernement fédéral dans l'engagement qu'il a pris auprès de la

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population d'augmenter l'efficacité de ses services et d'en réduire les coûts. Dans d'autres cas, nous voudrions peut-être invoquer la clause de cessation de manière à pouvoir modifier en temps opportun la façon dont certains programmes conjoints ou à frais partagés sont financés.

Dans le cadre des coupures budgétaires déjà annoncées, chacun des ministères fédéraux concernés examinera les dépenses qui ont été comprimées ou éliminées pour évaluer très précisément les suites sur le plan fédéral-provincial. Cependant, en chaque cas, la somme des réductions de dépenses pour un ministère donné demeurera inchangée.

Je rappelle que, ces dernières années, les Premiers ministres provinciaux ont maintes fois souhaité que le gouvernement fédéral se retire de certains champs d'activité. Par exemple, dans le communiqué qu'ils ont émis à la fin de la conférence de Régina, du 9 au 11 août, ils ont exprimé l'opinion que "le double emploi résulte de l'ingérence du gouvernement fédéral dans des secteurs de compétence provinciale" et que "le temps n'est plus aux études, mais plutôt à des analyses et des actions précises sur des problèmes bien définis". Certaines des réductions de dépenses fédérales déjà annoncées

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(comme, par exemple, à l'égard du logement) doivent s'interpréter comme une première réponse fédérale au désir exprimé si clairement par les Premiers ministres provinciaux. Bien sûr, nous sommes disposés à examiner d'autres champs d'activité dont vous voudriez que le gouvernement fédéral se retire au profit des provinces.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Premier ministre, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Pierre E. Trudeau  
Premier ministre du Canada

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

**SUBJECT TO CORRECTION**  
**SUSCEPTIBLE D'ETRE CORRIGE**

UNCLASSIFIED

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JUL 19 1978

FM BONN PDEL0025 JUL19/78

TO EXTOTT LEPR DELIVER BY 190800

Division Phonoc  
Person  
Local Time

INFO CIDAFULL/DUPUIS ITCOTT/OBALDESTON MOTOTT/CLOUTHIER

AGRICOTT/G LUSSIER PCOOTT/DUDOIK FINOTT/SFOYAMA

DISTR KGO ECB ECP FBD FLM FLP FLO ECW GAP GAA UNO

---ECOST BONN:PMS REPLY AT CHANCELLORS DINNER JUL18

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PMS REPLY AT CHANCELLORS DINNER JUL18:

TEXT BEGINS QUOTE HERR BUNDESKRANZLER,FRAU SCHMIDT,MEINE DAMEN  
UND HERREN

THESE HAVE BEEN BUSY AND PRODUCTIVE DAYS.YET

WITH ALL THE PREOCCUPATIONS OF YOUR POSITION,MR CHANCELLOR,

YOU HAVE FOUND TIME FOR WARM AND WISE WORDS WITH EACH OF YOUR

NUMEROUS GUESTS.MORE THAN THAT,YOU HAVE BEEN KIND ENOUGH IN

MY OWN CASE TO INVITE ME TO STAY ON FOR A FEW DAYS IN GERMANY,

TO SEE SOMETHING MORE OF YOUR COUNTRY,AND TO TALK AT GREATER

LENGTH WITH YOU,PRIVATELY AND EASILY,LIKE THE GOOD FRIENDS WE

HAVE BECOME,BOTH ABOUT THOSE GREAT QUESTIONS THAT HAVE ABSORBED

US THIS PAST WEEK,AND ABOUT THE INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT RELATIONS

BETWEEN CDA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.FOR ALL THIS,I

AM MORE GRATEFUL THAT I CAN SAY.

MR CHANCELLOR,WE IN CDA ARE GLAD TO HAVE SO MUCH THAT UNITES

US WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC.THE GERMAN AND CDN PFOLE SHARE

TIES OF KINSHIP AND OF THE HEART AND SPIRIT.FOR MANY GERMANS,/  
5 8 (8, 80 8 )8534-),SINCE CDNS OF GERMAN ANCESTRY NOW FORM THE

THIRD LARGEST GROUP WITHIN CDAS POPULATION,AFTER THOSE OF BRIT AND

FRENCH ORIGIN.

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MORE BROADLY, WE SHARE IN THE CULTURAL HERITAGE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION. OUR FEELINGS TOWARDS EACH OTHER ARE STRENGTHENED BY THE PRESENCE OF CDN TROOPS IN GERMANY AND OF GERMAN TROOPS TRAINING IN CDA. AND OUR LINKS ARE REINFORCED BY INVESTMENT AND TRADE.

YET WHEN WE LOOK AT THE EXTENT OF OUR MUTUAL INVESTMENT AND TRADE, WE SEE THAT IT IS GROSSLY UNDERDEVELOPED. GERMANY AND CDA, BOTH AMONG THE WORLDS LEADING TR AGU

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NE ANOTHER. OUR ECONOMIES ARE ALMOS

T IDEALLY SUITED

TO COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER, AND YET THIS HAS NOT/NOT OCCURRED.

HOW CAN WE EXPLAIN THIS? IS IT IN PART THE RESULT OF ASSUMING THAT WE KNOW EACH OTHER BETTER THAN IN FACT WE DO?

I SUSPECT THAT IT IS.

I SUSPECT THAT THE AVERAGE GERMANS VIEW OF CDA IS A ROMANTIC ONE--OF A LAND OF SPACES, OF RESOURCES AND WILDERNESS AND MOUNTAINS--AND THAT THE AVERAGE CDNS VIEW OF MODERN GERMANY IS NO/NO LESS DISTORTED. I SUSPECT THAT CDAS HISTORICAL TIES WITH BRIT AND FRANCE HAVE OBSCURED A REALISTIC VIEW OF THE CONTINENT. JUST AS GERMANS CLOSE ASSN WITH THE UNITED STATES MAY HAVE OBSCURED TO MANY GERMAN EYES THE SECOND REALITY IN NORTH AMERICA, DISTINCT AND DIFFERENT FROM THE UNITED STATES, BUT EQUALLY YOUR FIRM ALLY IN ALL THE GREAT ENTERPRISES OF DEMOCRATIC WESTERN SOCIETY.

WE HAVE TO ADMIT THAT, EVEN IN THIS AGE OF INSTANT COMMUNICATIONS, NATIONS AND PEOPLES STILL SEE EACH OTHER TOO OFTEN IN STEREOTYPES.

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THE IMAGES WE HAVE ARE PARTIAL AND DEFFECTIVE;THEY RESIST CHANGE.  
YET GERMANY IS BEGINNING TO OCCUPY A MUCH LARGER SHARE OF THE CDN  
CONSCIOUSNESS NOW THAN FOR YEARS PAST;AND THE IMAGE WE HAVE OF YOU  
IS,I BELIEVE,BECOMING A MORE ACCURATE REFLECTION OF GERMAN  
REALITY THAT EVER BEFORE.

CDNS FIND MUCH TO ADMIRE IN GERMANY.YOU WILL NOT/NOT BE SURPRISED  
TO KNOW THAT WE ADMIRE YOU AS WORKERS,PRODUCERS,ORGANIZERS AND  
MANAGERS.WE THINK OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AS A COUNTRY THAT,WITH  
THE HELP OF OTHERS-BUT ABOVE ALL,BY ITS OWN EFFORTS-HAS  
RECONTRUCTED ITS SHATTERED ECONOMY AND GONE ON TO CREATE AND  
TO DEFEND,AT THE STRATEGIC HEART OF EUROPE,ONE OF THE MOST STABLE,  
PRODUCTIVE AND DYNAMIC SOCIETIES IN THE WORLD.THIS GREAT TASK  
HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN CONDITIONS OF VIGOROUS DEMOCRACY AND  
FREE INSTITUTIONS,ON A CIVILIZED MODEL OF SOCIAL COHESION AND  
RESPONSIBILITY,AND WITH GREAT RESPECT FOR AN ANCIENT CULTURE.

YOUR ECONOMIC POLICY HAS MANAGED TO KEEP POPULAR EXPECTATIONS  
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF REALISM.

YOUR SYSTEM OF MANAGEMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS HAS MAINTAINED  
STABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY IN YOUR INDUSTRY.

YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTISES HAVE AVOIDED THE PITFALLS OF  
UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION WHILE ENSURING A STRONG VOICE FOR GERMANY  
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

YOU HAVE FACED AND COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEMS OF URBAN  
TERRORISM WITHOUT SACRIFICING THE INTEGRITY OF YOUR DEMOCRATIC  
IDEALS.

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IT IS THEREFORE HARDLY SURPRISING THAT YOUR CHANCELLOR ASSUMED THE PLACE OF LEADERSHIP HE OCCUPIED AT THE RECENT SUMMIT MTGS.

CDNS SEE AND APPRECIATE ALSO THAT GERMANY'S POLITICAL IMAGINATION AND LEADERSHIP ARE PLACED INCREASINGLY AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IN THE EAST, RECONCILIATION AND DETENTE GUIDE YOUR POLICY TOWARDS YOUR NEIGHBOURS, WHILE IN THE WEST, YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE STATESMANSHIP IN LEADING THE WAY TOWARD THE CREATION OF A NEW EUROPE AND NEW FORMS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION. GERMANY'S STATESMANSHIP IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS BEEN OF DECISIVE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE. IT HAS BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND PROSPERITY AND PROMISES TO BE EVEN MORE SO IN YEARS TO COME. CDNS APPRECIATE THE VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR THEM OF DEVELOPING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

AT THE SAME TIME, GERMANY, UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP, MR CHANCELLOR, HAS BEEN STRENGTHENING ITS VIGOROUS TIES WITH NORTH AMERICA. GERMANY LEADS IN THE COMMON SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD; AND GERMANY IS MORE PRESENT THAN EVER IN THE DIALOGUE WITH THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. CDNS, LOOKING ACROSS THE ATLANTIC, SEE AT THE CENTRE OF A RESURGENT EUROPE A STABLE AND POWERFUL FRIEND AND ALLY WITH WHOM THEY SHARE MUCH ALREADY AND WITH WHOM THEY WISH TO SHARE MORE.

AS TO WHAT GERMANS THINK OF CDA, PERHAPS I CAN FOCUS YOUR IMAGINE OF US MORE SHARPLY, AND LET YOU SEE US AS WE ARE. YOU WILL KNOW

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THAT CDA IS A VAST COUNTRY. BUT, BY GERMAN STANDARDS, IT IS AT THE SAME TIME A SMALL COUNTRY, WITH A THIRD OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLICS POPULATION. YOU WILL THINK OF US AS A YOUNG COUNTRY, RAPIDLY DEVELOPING AND CHANGING, AS A COUNTRY OF THE FUTURE--ALL THAT IS TRUE ALSO. BUT WE ARE EQUALLY AN OLD COUNTRY, WHOSE BASIC CULTURAL HERITAGE IS THE SAME EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION WE SHARE WITH YOU; A COUNTRY WHICH HAS BEEN EVOLVING POLITICALLY SINCE THE 17TH CENTURY AND IS NOW SEEKING TO ADAPT ITS BASIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, CREATED OVER A CENTURY AGO, TO CONTEMPORARY NEEDS. YOU PROBABLY THINK OF US AS SUPPLIERS OF WHEAT AND WOOD PULP, OF COAL AND OIL AND GAS, OF URANIUM. YOU MAY NOT/NOT RECOGNIZE US YET THE SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGIES WE HAVE DERIVED FROM OUR GEOGRAPHY AND RESOURCES: FOR NEW TYPES OF AIRCRAFT AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT APPROPRIATE TO VAST DISTANCES AND DIFFICULT CONDITIONS; FOR A UNIQUE AND UNIQUELY SUCCESSFUL MODEL OF NATURAL URANIUM REACTOR, FOR MINING EQUIPMENT AND FARM MACHINERY.

CDA, A STRONG AND EXTRAORDINARILY FORTUNATE COUNTRY BY WORLD STANDARDS, FOR ALL ITS GOOD FORTUNE HAS SOME PROBLEMS THAT ARE FOR CDNS ALONE TO SOLVE. THEY GO TO THE HEART OF OUR NATIONAL EXISTENCE. WE ARE DEALING WITH THESE PROBLEMS. WE ARE ADDRESSING THEM WITH PATIENCE, BUT WITH IMAGINATION AND WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY; WITH RESPECT FOR ONE ANOTHER, FOR OUR HISTORY, FOR OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS A NATION, OF WHICH WE ARE PROUD, AND FOR THE COMPLEXITY AND SENSITIVITY OF THE ISSUES AT STAKE; BUT ABOVE ALL, WITH ABSOLUTE

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CONFIDENCE THAT WE WILL SUCCEED.

MR CHANCELLOR, YOU AND I HAVE JUST PARTICIPATED IN A SUMMIT MTG WHICH, UNDER YOUR GUIDANCE, HAS DEMONSTRATED ONCE AGAIN THE REMARKABLE CAPACITY OF OUR FREE PEOPLES AND DEMOCRATIC GOVTS TO ADAPT AND RENEW THEMSELVES: WE HAVE THE GRACE TO BEND WITH PRESSURE AND YET ARE TOUGH ENOUGH NOT/NOT TO BREAK UNDER IT. CDA EMERGED FROM THIS MTG YESTERDAY MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT MUTUAL COOPERATION AMONGST LIKE-MINDED NATIONS IS THE ONLY HOPE FOR SECURITY AND PROSPERITY.

AND TODAY, MR CHANCELLOR, I BEGAN IMMEDIATELY TO ACT UPON THIS CONVICTION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO OF THOSE NATIONS, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND CDA: I HAD DOWN-TO-EARTH DISCUSSIONS WITH A GROUP OF LEADING FIGURES IN GERMAN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY ABOUT WAYS IN WHICH CDNS AND GERMANS CAN WORK TOGETHER TO CREATE MORE JOBS AND PRODUCE MORE FOR EACH OTHERS BENEFIT. TOMORROW, YOU AND I WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN TWO DAYS OF PRIVATE TALKS. WE WILL WANT TO REFLECT TOGETHER ON WHAT WE AND THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS ACCOMPLISHED AT THE SUMMIT, AND HOW CDA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC CAN TRANSLATE THESE ACCOMPLISHMENTS INTO PRACTICAL BENEFITS IN THEIR OWN RELATIONS AS WE MOVE FORWARD WITH OTHERS TO MEET THE SUMMIT GOALS.

WE COUNT UPON AN EVEN CLOSER PARTNERSHIP WITH GERMANY AS A PRACTICAL INSTRUMENT OF THAT RESOLVE.

WORKING CLOSELY WITH GERMANY, CDNS LOOK  
...TO EARLY AND VIGOROUS ACTION TO RESTRAIN INFLATION AND ENCOURAGE  
...7

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EMPLOYMENT,

...TO THE URGENT REINFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY BY  
BALANCED INITIATIVES IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING OUR MILITARY  
COMMITMENT, ON THE ONE HAND, WHILE RESPONDING FLEXIBLY AND  
POSITIVELY TO EVERY REALISTIC OPPORTUNITY FOR DETENTE AND ARMS  
REDUCTION,

...TO A FRESH EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OF THE  
DEVELOPING AND THE DEVELOPED NATIONS,

AND, ABOVE ALL,

...TO CONSTANT VIGILANCE FOR THE PROTECTION OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES  
AND THE IDEALS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION.

WE MUST ROOT THESE OBJECTIVES IN THE MUTUAL INTERETS OF  
OUR TWO COUNTRIES BY DRAWING EVEN TIGETER THE SPIRITUAL TIES  
AND COMMERCIAL LINKS I NOTED EARLIER. WE MUST BUILD ON THE  
HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS--EVEN THE MILLIONS--OF INDIVIDUAL  
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG OUR CITIZENS.

MEINE DAMEN UND HERREN, ALLOW ME TO RAISE MY GLASS TO THE  
HEALTH OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, TO THE CHANCELLOR  
AND TO FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. UNQUOTE.

CIT MONSIEUR LE CHANCELIER, FRAU SCHMIDT, MESDAMES ET MESSIEURS,  
NOUS VENONS DE VIVRE DES HEURES CHARGEES ET PRODUCTIVES. CEPENDANT,  
EN DEPIT DES NOMBREUX SOUCIS INHERENTS A VOTRE POSITION, MONSIEUR  
LE CHANCELIER, VOUS AVEZ TROUVE LE TEMPS D ADRESSER DES PAROLFS  
CORDIALES ET SAGES A CHACUN DE VOS NOMBREUX INVITES. EN PLUS, VOUS  
AVEZ EU LA GENTILLESSE, EN CE QUI ME CONCERNE, DE M INVITER A  
RESTER EN ALLEMAGNE QUELQUES JOURS DE PLUS AFIN QUE JE PUISSE

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VOIR EN PEU PLUS DE VOTRE PAYS ET PARLER PLUS LONGTEMPS AVEC VOUS, EN PRIVE ET SANS CONTRAINTE, EN BONS AMIS QUE NOUS SOMMES DEVENUS, DES GRANDES QUESTIONS QUI NOUS ONT ABSORBES LA SEMAINE DERNIERE ET DES RELATIONS DE PLUS EN PLUS IMPORTANTES ENTRE LE CDA ET LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D ALLEMAGNE. POUR TOUT CELA, JE VOUS SUIS PLUS RECONNAISSANT QUE JE NE PEUX L EXPRIMER.

M LE CHANCELIER, LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE ET LE CDA ONT BEAUCOUP DE TRAITS COMMUNS. LES PEUPLES ALLEMAND ET CDN PARTAGENT DES LIENS DE FAMILLE, DE COEUR ET D ESPRIT. POUR BEAUCOUP D ALLEMANDS, CES LIENS DE FAMILLE SONT VERITABLES PUISQUE LES CDNS DE DESCENDANCE ALLEMANDE CONSTITUENT LE TROISIEME GROUPE EN IMPORTANCE AU SEIN DE LA POPULATION CDN. DANS UN SENS PLUS LARGE, NOUS PARTAGEONS L HERITAGE CULTUREL DE LA CIVILISATION OCCIDENTALE. NOTRE SOLIDARITE EST APPROFONDIE PAR LA PRESENCE DE TROUPES CDNS EN ALLEMAGNE ET DE TROUPES ALLEMANDES QUI S ENTRAINENT AU CDA. LE COMMERCE ET LES INVESTISSEMENTS RENFORCENT NOS LIENS. CEPENDANT SI L ON CONSIDERE LE VOLUME DE NOTRE COMMERCE ET DE NOS INVESTISSEMENTS MUTUELS, NOUS CONSTATONS QU IL EST LARGEMENT SOUS-DEVELOPPE. NOS DEUX PAYS, LES TROISIEME ET QUATRIEME NATIONS COMMERCIALES AU MONDE, EXPORTENT TOUS LES DEUX UN QUART DE LEUR PRODUIT NATIONAL BRUT, MAIS NE TRANSIGENT MEME PAS 2 POURCENT DE LEUR COMMERCE L UN AVEC L AUTRE. NOS ECONOMIES SE COMPLETENT PRESQUE IDEALEMENT; LA REALITE, POURTANT, NE LE REFLETE PAS.

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COMMENT EXPLIQUER CELA?PARCE QUE NOUS PRETENDONS MIEUX NOUS  
CONNAITRE QUE NOUS NOUS CONNAISSONS VRAIMENT?PEUT-ETRE BIEN.  
JE SUPPOSE QUE L IMAGE QUE SA FAIT L ALLEMAND MOYEN DU CDA EST  
ROMANTIQUE--LE PAYS DES GRANDS ESPACES,DES RESSOURCES ILLIMITEES,  
DES PAYSAGES SAOUVAGES,DES CIT MOUNTIES FINCIT(POLICE A CHEVAL).  
L IDEE QUE SE FAIT LE CDN MOYFN DE L ALLEMAGNE MODERNE N EST PAIS  
MOINS FAUSSEE.JE SUPPOSE QUE LES LIENS HISTORIQUES DU CDA AVEC  
LA GRANDE BRITAGNE ET LA FRANCE OUT EMBROUILLE NOTRE PERCEPTION  
DU CONTINENT EUROPFEN,COMME L ASSOCIATION ETROITE DE L ALLEMAGNE  
AVEC LES ETATES-UNIS A PEUT-ETRE VOILE A BEAUCOUP D ALLEMANDS  
UNE SECONDE REALITE EN AMERIQUE DU NORD,UN PAYS DIFFERENT DES  
ETATES-UNIS MAIS,COMME EUX,UN ALLIE RESOLU DANS TOUTES LES  
GRANDES ENTREPRISES DE LA SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE OCCIDENTALE.

SI J ARRIVÉ AVEC VOTRE AIDE A MIEUX CONNAITRE LA REPUBLIQUE  
FEDERALE D ALLEMAGNE,JE FAIS LA MEME EXPERIENCE QUE FONT DES  
CDNS DE PLUS EN PLUS NOMBREUX.BIEN QUE NOUS SOYONS ENTRES DANS  
L ERE DES COMMUNICATIONS INSTANTANEEES LES NATIONS ET LES PEUPLES  
CONTINUENT TROP SOUVENT DE SE PERCEVOIR MUTUELLEMENT EN TERMES  
DE CLICHES.LES IMAGES QUE NOUS NOUS FAISONS SONT PARTIALES ET  
IMPARFAITES;ELLES RESISTENT AUX CPANGEMENTS.TOUTEFOIS,LES CDNS  
DEVIENNENT BEAUCOUP PLUS CONSCIENTS DE L ALLEMAGNE QU IL Y A  
QUELQUES ANNEES ET JE CROIS QUE L IMAGE QUE NOUS AVONS DE VOUS  
DEVIENT UN REFLET DE LA REALITE ALLEMANDE PLUS PRECIS QUE JAMAIS  
PAR LE PASSE.

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PAGE TEN PDEL0025 UNCLAS

LES CDNS ONT BEAUCOUP D ADMIRATION POUR L ALLEMAGNE.VOUS NE SEREZ PAS SURPRIS D APPRENDRE QU ILS VOUS ADMIRENT EN TANT QUE TRAVAILLEURS,PRODUCTEURS,ORGANISATEURS ET GESTIONNAIRES.NOUS VOYONS LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE COMME UN PAYS QUI,AVEC L AIDE D AUTRES PAYS,---MAIS AVANT TOUT DE SES PROPRES FORCES---A RECONSTRUIT UNE ECONOMIE DEVASTEE.CE PAYS A SU CREER ET DEFENDRE AU CENTRE STRATEGIQUE DE L EUROPE,UNE DES SOCIETES LES PLUS STABLES,LES PLUS PRODUCTIVES ET LES PLUS DYNAMIQUES AU MONDE.VOUS AVEZ ACCOMPLI CETTE TACHE ENORME DANS UN CLIMAT DE DEMOCRATIE VIGOUREUSE ET D INSTITUTIONS LIBRES,SELON UN MODELE DE COHESION ET DE RESPONSABILITE SOCIALES ET DANS LE PLUS GRAND RESPECT DE VOTRE CULTURE TRADITIONELLE.

VOTRE POLITIQUE ECONOMIQUE A REFUSSE A GARDER LES ATTENTES DE VOTRE PEUPLE DANS LES LIMITES DU RAISONNABLE ET DU REALISABLE.

VOTRE SYSTEME DE GESTION ET DE RELATIONS DE TRAVAIL A SOUTENU LA STABILITE ET LA PRODUCTIVITE DE VOTRE INDUSTRIE.

VOUS AVEZ EVITE PAR VOS PRATIQUES CONSTITUTIONNELLES DE TOMBER DANS LE PIEGE DES CHEVAUchements INUTILES TOUT EN DONNANT A L ALLEMAGNE UNE VOIX FORTE DANS LE DOMAINE DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES.

VOUS AVEZ SU AFFRONTER ET MAITRISER LES PROBLEMES DU TERRORISME URBAIN SANS SACRIFIER POUT AUTANT L INTEGRITE DE VOS INDEAUX DEMOCRATIQUES.

IL N EST DONC PAS SURPRENANT QUE VOTRE CHANCELIER AIT JOUE

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UN ROLE DE PREMIER PLAN LORS DE NOS REUNIONS AU SOMMET.

LES CDNS CONSTATENT ET APPRECIENT EGALEMENT LE FAIT QUE LE LEADERSHIP ET L'IMAGINATION POLITIQUES DE L'ALLEMAGNE SONT MIS A LA DISPOSITION DE LA COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE. A L'EST, LA RECONCILIATION ET LA DETENTE SONT LES PRINCIPES DIRECTEURS DE VOTRE POLITIQUE A L'EGARD DE VOS VOISINS. A L'OUEST, VOTRE POLITIQUE CONSTRUCTIVE CONDUIT A LA CREATION D'UNE EUROPE NOUVELLE, AVEC DES FORMES NOUVELLES D'ORGANISATION POLITIQUE ET ECONOMIQUE. HISTORIQUEMENT, LA POLITIQUE DE L'ALLEMAGNE DANS LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE A ETE UN FACTEUR DECISIF POUR LE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX ENTRE LES NATIONS, DE LA PROSPERITE MONDIALE. ELLE PROMET DE L'ETRE ENCORE DAVANTAGE DANS LES ANNEES QUI VIENNENT. LES CDNS SONT CONSCIENTS DE L'IMPORTANCE VITALE D'ETABLIR DES RELATIONS PARTICULIERES AVEC LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE.

EN MEME TEMPS, MONSIEUR LE CHANCELIER, L'ALLEMAGNE, SOUS VOTRE GOUVERNE, A RENFORCE SES LIENS VIGOUREUX AVEC L'AMERIQUE DU NORD. L'ALLEMAGNE NOUS GUIDE DANS LA RECHERCHE COMMUNE DE SOLUTIONS AUX PROBLEMES DU MONDE INDUSTRIALISE. PLUS QUE JAMAIS L'ALLEMAGNE EST PRESENTE DANS LE DIALOGUE AVEC LES PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT. LES CDNS, REGARDANT DE L'AUTRE COTE DE L'ATLANTIQUE, VOIT AU CENTRE D'UNE EUROPE RANIMEE UN AMI STABLE ET PUISSANT ET UN ALLIE AVEC QUI ILS PARTAGENT DEJA BEAUCOUP ET AVEC QUI ILS SOUHAITENT PARTAGER DAVANTAGE.

PUIS-JE MAINTENANT ESSAYER DE PRECISER UN PEU PLUS L'IMAGE

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PAGE TWELVE PDEL0025 UNCLAS

QUE SE FONT LES ALLEMANDS DU CDA ET VOUS DIRE CE QUE NOUS SOMMES  
VRAIMENT.VOUS SAVEZ DEJA QUE LA CDA EST UN PAYS VASTE.MAIS,  
POUR LES ALLEMANDS,C EST EN MEME TEMPS UN PETIT PAYS N AYANT  
QU UN TIERS DE LA POPULATION DE LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE.VOUS NOUS  
PERCEVEZ COMME UNE JEUNF NATION SE DEVELOPPANT ET SE TRANSFORMANT  
AVEC RAPIDITE,COMME UN PAYS D AVENIR;VOUS AVEZ RAISON.MAIS  
NOUS SOMMES EGALEMENT UN VIEUX PAYS,DONT L HERITAGE CULTUREL  
PUISE AUX SOURCES MEMES DE LA CIVILISATION EUROPEENNE QUE NOUS  
PARTAGEONS;UN PAYS QUI EVOLUE POLITIQUEMENT DEPUIS LE 17E  
SIECLE ET QUI CHERCHE DESORMAIS A ADAPTER SES INSTITUTIONS  
POLITIQUES FONDEMENTALES,CREEES IL Y A PLUS D UN SIECLE,  
POUR REpondre AUX EXIGENCES DE LA REALITE D AUJOURD HUI.VOUS NOUS  
VOYEZ SANS DOUTE COMME FOURNISSEURS DE BLE,DE PULPE DE BOIS,  
DE CHARBON,DE PETROLE,DE GAZ ET D URANIUM.VOUS IGNOREZ PEUT-ETRE  
LES TECHNOLOGIES SOPHISTIQUEES QUE NOUS AVONS TIREES DE NOTRE  
GEOGRAPHIE ET DE NOS RESSOURCES;LES NOUVEAUX TYPES D AVION ET  
D EQUIPEMENT DE COMMUNICATIONS PROPRES AUX LONGUES DISTANCES ET  
A DES CONDITIONS NATURELLES DIFFICILES;UN MODELE DE REACTEUR  
A URANIUM NATUREL UNIQUE ET DONT LA REUSSITE EST SANS EGAL;  
L EQUIPEMENT MINIER ET LA MACHINERIE AGRICOLE QUE NOUS AVONS  
DEVELOPPES.

LE CDA,PAYS FORT ET EXTRAORDINAIREMENT PRIVILEGIE,A TOUT DE  
MEME DES PROBLEMES QUE SEULS LES CDNS PEUVENT RESOUNDRE.ILS  
TOUCHENT LE COEUR MEME DE NOTRE VIE NATIONALE.NOUS NOUS

...13

PAGE THIRTEEN PDEL0025 UNCLAS

LES APPROCHONS AVEC PATIENCE MAIS AUSSI AVEC IMAGINATION, ET  
CONSCIENTS QU IL FAUT AGIR REPIDEMENT; AVEC RESPECT POUR LES UNS  
LES AUTRES, POUR NOTRE HISTOIRE, POUR LES REALISATIONS DONT NOUS  
SOMMES FIERES, POUR LA COMPLEXITE ET LA SENSIBILITE DES QUESTIONS  
EN JEU; MAIS AVANT TOUT, NOUS LES ABORDONS AVEC UNE CONFIANCE  
INEBRANLABLE QUE NOUS REUSSIRONS.

MONSIEUR LE CHANCELIER, VOUS ET MOI VENONS TOUT JUSTE DE  
PARTICIPER A UNE RENCONTRE AU SOMMET QUI, SOUS VOTRE DIRECTION,  
A DEMONTRÉ UNE FOIS DE PLUS LA CAPACITE REMARQUABLE DES PEUPLES  
LIBRES ET DES GOUVERNEMENTS DEMOCRATIQUES DE S ADAPTER ET DE  
SE RENOUVELER; NOUS AVONS SOUPLÉSSE DE PLIER DEVANT LES PRESSIONS  
ET A RESISTANCE DE NE PAS ROMPRE. LE CDA SORT DE NOTRE RENCONTRE  
D HIER PLUS CONVAINCU QUE JAMAIS QUE LE SEUL ESPOIR POUR LA  
SECURITE ET LA PROSPERITE DEMEURE LA COOPERATION MUTUELLE PARMIS  
LES NATIONS QUE PARTAGENT LES MEMES CONVICTIIONS.

ET AUJOURD, HUI, MONSIEUR LE CHANCELIER, J AI COMMENCE IMMEDIATEMENT  
A AGIR SUR LA BASE DE CETTE CONVICTIION, DANS LE CONTEXTE DES  
RELATIONS ENTRE DEUX DE CES PAYS, LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE ET LE  
CDA: J AI EU DES DISCUSSIONS PRATIQUES ET DE FONDS AVEC UN GROUPE  
D IMPORTANTES PERSONNALITES DU MONDE DES AFFAIRES ET  
DE LA INDUSTRIE ALLEMANDES SUR LES VOIES ET LES MOYENS PAR  
LESQUELS LES CDNS ET LES ALLEMANDS PEUVENT COOPERER EN VUE  
DE CREER PLUS D EMPLOIS ET DE PRODUIRE DAVANTAGE DANS NOTRE  
INTERET MUTUEL. DEMAIN, VOUS ET MOI AURONS L OCCASION D ENTAMER  
QUELQUES JOURS D ENTRETIENS. NOUS REFLECHIRONS ENSEMBLE SUR CE  
QUE NOUS ET LES AUTRES PARTICIPANTS AVONS ACCOMPLI AU SOMMET

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PAGE FOURTEEN PDEL0025 UNCLAS

ET COMMENT LE CDA ET LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE PEUVENT TRADUIRE  
CES REALISATIONS EN BENEFICES PARTIQUES DANS LEURS RELATIONS ET  
DANS LA MISE EN OEUVRE AVEC NOS PARTENAIRES DES OBJECTIFS DE SOMMET.

NOUS COMPTONS SUR UN PARTNERSHIP PLUS ETROIT AVEC L ALLEMAGNE  
COMME INSTRUMENT PRATIQUE POUR REALISER NOTRE DETERMINATION.

DANS LEUR COOPERATION ETROITE AVEC L ALLEMAGNE, LES CDNS  
S ATTENDENT A

-UNE ACTION PROMPTE ET VIGOUREUSE EN VUE DE RESTRAINdre L INFLATION  
ET D ENCOURAGER LA CREATION D EMPLOIS,

-UN RENFORCEMENT URGENT DE LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALE PAR DES  
INITIATIVES EQUILIBREES TOUT EN MAINTENANT NOS ENGAGEMENTS  
MILITAIRES DU UNE PART, ET EN REpondANT D UNE MANIERE  
FLEXIBLE ET POSTIVE A TOUTE OCCASION REALISTE DE DETENTE ET  
DE REDUCTION D ARMES,

-UN NOUVEL EFFORT D ACCOMMODER LES INTERETS MUTUELS DES PAYS  
DEVELOPPES ET EN DEVELOPPEMENT,  
ET SURTOUT

-UNE VIGILANCE CONSTANTE POUR LA PROTECTION DES VALEURS  
DEMOCRATIQUES ET DES IDEaux DE LA CIVILISATION OCCIDENTALE.

NOUS DEVONS ENRACINER CES OBJECTIFS POUR L INTERET MUTUEL DE  
NOS DEUX PAYS EN RESSERRANT ENCORE PLUS FORTEMENT LES LIENS  
SPIRITUELS ET COMMERCIAUX QUE JE VIENS DE SIGNALER. NOUS DEVONS  
BATIR SUR LES CENTAINES DE MILLIERS-MEME MILLIONS-DE RELATIONS  
INDIVIDUELLES ENTRE NOS CITOYENS.

MEINE DAMEN UND HERREN, PERMETTEZ-MOI DE LEVER MON VERRE A LA  
SANTE DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE, A MONSIEUR LE  
CHANCELIER ET A L AMITIE ENTRE NOS DEUX PAYS. FINCIT.

UUU/148 190900Z 03550

## TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO / À WSHDC ATTN: PUBLIC AFFAIRS/ SANDRA CLARK

WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)

UNCLASSIFIED

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. DATE  
JULY 13, 1978

| QUANTITY<br>QUANTITÉ | DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION        | REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE          |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1.                   | PM SPEECH TO CDN CLUB, VANCOUVER | REF: OUTELCON<br>JULY 12, 1978 |

*By facsimile pls*

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

*13 JUL 78*  
DATE*M. B. A. C. E.*  
SIGNATURE AETE

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

C.L. LONG/RESEARCH & WRITING SECTION  
INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION (FAI)

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

004304

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| 57-7-PM |    |
| 27      | 28 |

*done* *ACC 2*  
*cc MJC*  
*and file*  
*to see*  
*Mr. [unclear] to see*

UNCLASSIFIED

*London*

FM LDN XNGR1080 JUN14/78

TO PMOOTT

INFO EXTOTT/MIN/AE/KGO/DFD/DF/GEB/FPR

---PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAUS SPEECH TO UNSSOD:CONGRATULATIONS FROM  
BRITISH MPS

I RECEIVED TODAY DEL OF SIX LEFT WING LABOUR MPS AND ONE LABOUR LORD  
WHO WISHED TO CONVEY LETTER OF CONGRATULATIONS ON THEIR BEHALF AND THAT  
OF FOUR OTHER COLLEAGUES ABOUT PRIME MINISTERS SPEECH AT SPECIAL SESSION

THEY FOCUSED ON WITHDRAWAL FROM NUCLEAR ROLE IN EUROPE AND REPLACEMENT  
OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT BY CONVENTIONALLY ARMED PLANES.I THANKED  
GROUP LED BY FRANK ALLAUN MP FOR THEIR VISIT AND INDICATED I WOULD REPOR  
T

SAME TO PRIME MINISTER.

2.WE ADVISED PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE HERE AND FCO OF MPS CALL AT HIGH  
COMMISSION.PLAN FOR CALL RECEIVED SOME LOCAL NEWSPAPER MENTION ON  
WEEKEND.

3.TEXT OF MPS LETTER IN SEPARATE TEL  
MARTIN.

UUU/107 141615Z 00120

c.c. : Ministère des Affaires extérieures  
Ottawa (GAF)



Re notre télégramme YLGR-1418 en  
date du 12 juin 1978  
Canadian Embassy

|               |  |
|---------------|--|
| 57-7-P.M.     |  |
| 20-1-2-AFRICA |  |
| 15            |  |

Ambassade du Canada

|                       |          |
|-----------------------|----------|
| To / A                | GAF      |
| From / De:            | BICO A-2 |
| JUN 22 1978           |          |
| Ann: NON PASSE        |          |
| Dakar, le 9 juin 1978 |          |

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|  |  |

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Premier Ministre du Canada, Monsieur Pierre Elliott Trudeau, donnait une conférence de presse à Washington, D.C., le 31 mai dernier. J'ai pensé qu'il vous intéresserait d'en tenir un résumé ainsi que des extraits, notamment en ce qui concerne ... l'Afrique. Vous voudrez bien les trouver en pièce jointe.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

L'Ambassadeur,

*Jacques Asselin*  
Jacques Asselin

Monsieur Babacar Bâ  
Ministre d'Etat chargé des Affaires étrangères  
de la République du Sénégal  
DAKAR

~~ATTC~~/FILE/DIARY/CIRC/CHRON **MESSAGE**

|       |        |            |            |               |               |  |          |
|-------|--------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------|--|----------|
| FM/DE | PLACE  | DEPARTMENT | ORIG. NO.  | DATE          | FILE/DOSSIER  |  | SECURITY |
|       | LIEU   | MINISTÈRE  | N° D'ORIG. | JUN 7<br>1978 | 57-7-PM<br>35 |  | SÉCURITÉ |
|       | EXTOTT |            | FAB-517    |               |               |  | UNCLAS   |

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| <b>TO/A</b>   | TAVIV BERUT JEDDAH CAIRO BGHDD WSHDC NYORK | PRECEDENCE |
| <b>INFO</b>   | ITCOTT/MED/PAB PMOOTT                      |            |
| <b>DISTR.</b> | AEG MDG JGG MIN GAM ECB FAP FAI            |            |

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| <b>REF.</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                             | 578 |
| <b>SUB/SUJ</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | PM UNITED JEWISH APPEAL SPEECH:ARAB BOYCOTT |     |
| <p>AT UJA DINNER JUN5 PM SPOKE OF CDAS COMMITMENT TO INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF ISRAEL; BELIEF THAT MOMENTUM TO SETTLEMENT WOULD BE REGAINED; SUPPORT FOR LESSENING OF MIDEAST TENSION; DISTURBING TRENDS IN ACQUISITION OF ARMS IN REGION AND SAID PEACE WOULD COME ONLY WHEN SIDES WORKED OUT WAY TO LIVE TOGETHER WITH MUTUAL RESPECT. DWELT ON POSSIBILITIES OF ARAB/ISRAEL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION IF PEACE ACHIEVED.</p> <p>2. MEDIA ATTENTION FOCUSED ON BOYCOTT AND NOTED THAT WHILE PM STATED GOVT POLICY FORCEFULLY HE IGNORED SUGGESTION OF INTRODUCTORY SPEAKER THAT GOVT DECIDE TO MOVE TO LEGISLATION. MEDIA INCORRECTLY CALLED ATTENTION TO PM DENOUNCING BOYCOTT AS REPUGNANT. YOU WILL NOTE FROM TEXT PM SAID CDNS CONSIDER DISCRIMINATION REPUGNANT. FULL TEXT BY BAG. BOYCOTT REF FOLLOWS. QUOTE...UNQUOTE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">COMCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACHED TEXT</p> |                                             |     |

|                                            |                           |                  |                                 |
|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|
| <b>DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR</b>                   | <b>DIVISION/DIRECTION</b> | <b>TELEPHONE</b> | <b>APPROVED/APPROUVÉ</b>        |
| SG..... <i>R. Francis</i><br>R. FRANCIS/ya | FAB                       | 5-3660           | SG..... <i>RF</i><br>R. FRANCIS |

~~to resume the interrupted peace negotiations. I am confident  
the will resume. I am confident that peace will be achieved.~~

~~Canada stands ready to do whatever it can to  
lessen tension in the Middle East. Our interest and good will  
is tangibly represented by the presence of those hundreds of  
Canadian service men and women serving under the flag of the  
United Nations, enduring long periods of separation from their  
families and their homes because they and we want to help reduce  
violence and save lives.~~ ①

QUOTE :

Canada also stands ready, however, to firmly  
resist any attempt to involve us in the conflict in ways which  
are inconsistent with our national interest, our values, and  
the rights and dignity of our people .

That is why we have refused to co-operate with  
the Arab Boycott of Israel. It is in our national interest to  
expand our trade with all Middle Eastern countries, and we  
will seize every honourable opportunity to do so.

But we will neither sanction nor support any trading  
arrangement which seeks to restrict our freedom to do business where  
and how we wish, or which might involve Canadians in the kind of  
discrimination which is repugnant to the deepest principles by  
which this country lives.

... → 2

- 2 -

We have recently clarified and strengthened our policy. We are determined to make sure that Canadian exporters know without question that this government will not assist those who would discriminate against Canadian Jews or companies, or those who would restrict the freedom of any Canadians to maintain enlarge or initiate commercial relations with Israel. Only Canada and the United States of all the countries in the world have taken such significant action.

We will turn the spotlight of public opinion upon any company which is refused government trading support because of acceptance of the boycott, and we will continue to consult with Canadians on the best methods of making sure that the rights and freedoms of the people of this country are not restricted by others. *UNQUOTE*

~~Naturally, we would prefer our involvement in Middle Eastern affairs to be supportive of positive and helpful initiatives originating in that part of the world. I realize, as you do, that if peace is to be achieved, it will be because of initiatives taken by the parties directly involved. It cannot be imposed by others. Peace will come only when Arabs and Israelis sit down together and work out a way to live together with mutual respect for each other's rights.~~

~~The disturbing acceleration in recent years in the acquisition of armaments in the Middle East not only increases the prospects for destruction in the event they are used, but also diverts critical resources away from economic development.~~

~~The Latin American countries can do the same thing~~

DRAFT

GAM/J.M.Fraser/2-80147ps

June 2, 1978

cc MIN/Burney  
AEG  
GAP  
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Diary  
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CONFIDENTIAL

External Affairs Contribution

Prime Minister's Speech  
to the United Jewish Appeal  
Toronto, June 5, 1978

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| 57-7-P.M. |  |
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(Page 2, paragraph 2 concludes: "I wanted to share with you in the worldwide celebration of the 30th birthday of that modern miracle, the State of Israel.")

3. (I suppose) Canada can claim to have been one of the midwives to the birth of modern Israel. Certainly we have been involved with the problem of Palestine in one way or another ever since Mr. Justice Rand was a member of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947. That Committee wrestled with the problem that continues to trouble the consciences and the strategic calculations of world statesmen to this day: how to reconcile the aspirations of the Jewish people for their own national state in Israel with the claims of the Arab inhabitants of that same land.

4. At the heart of the dilemma, I think, is the fact that Arabs and Israelis have never really understood the emotions of their antagonists. I think it is fair to say that the Arabs have not fully understood what it is like to be a Jew. Nor have they quite appreciated the

depth of the shadow cast by the Holocaust and what this means in terms of the intense concern felt by all Israelis for their future security. They have not always appreciated the depth of longing that Jews have had for centuries for an eventual return to their holy land. Equally, there is an emotional content to Arab claims which I am not sure that the Israelis fully understand, although it is not dissimilar from their own. There is the same almost mystical attachment to the land, the same sense of historic tradition reinforced by religious faith. There is the same resentment of injustice and former servitude. In the case of the Palestinian Arabs who have left, there is perhaps some of the same deep longing to return that sustained the Jewish people in its centuries of exile.

5. This mutual comprehension gap, if I can call it that, is not dissimilar to the one that has existed for so long between French and English-speaking Canadians. How much more difficult for two solitudes to understand each other when each is burdened with the bitterness of recent wars and the fear of future ones.

6. Because of this fundamental lack of mutual understanding, the very existence of Israel has been at risk since the day the new state was proclaimed. Throughout this 30 years, support for the survival, integrity

and security of Israel has been a cornerstone of Canada's Middle East policy and it is so today. During this time, we have been concerned not only to support Israel but to make whatever contribution we can to developing conditions in which Israel and its neighbours might be able to settle their disputes by mutual accommodation and live together in peace. Our involvement in every U.N. Middle East peacekeeping operation testifies to the sincerity of our concern.

7. With the people of Israel, we rejoiced at President Sadat's extraordinary decision to visit Jerusalem and speak before the Knesset. For the first time a major Arab leader talked to Israel with the language of the heart. He welcomed the Jewish state as a neighbour and potential friend. He accepted the fulfillment of the Jewish people's ancient dream of re-establishing, proudly and joyfully, their ~~h~~homeland in Israel for all time. It seemed as if the prospect of closing the comprehension gap could become a reality. The enthusiasm and spontaneous joy that greeted Sadat in Jerusalem and Israeli visitors in Cairo made it clear that both leaders were expressing the deepest aspirations of their people when they pledged together that there should be no more war between, them. It would be a tragedy indeed if this moment of hope were to remain unfulfilled.

8. It is unfortunate that the nations of the Middle East have been so slow to recognize the interests they share in a region that has historically been the strategic and economic crossroads of the world. Not only is there a common interest in peace, to end the crippling burdens of war, but there is a clear interest in the closest possible cooperation to protect and develop the resources of the area in conditions of stability and orderly progress. Disunity and conflict can only open the way to attempts from outside the region to control what is probably the most valuable real estate in the world.

9. The passions of the Arab-Israeli dispute have obviously made it difficult to see the considerable community of interests vis-à-vis the outside world that exists among Israel and the major Arab states. Perhaps it is easier for an outside observer to see some of the parallels that exist. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, there is very great awareness of the need to check Soviet influence and the growth of other radical forces in the area. I doubt that there would be any serious disagreement with this perception in Israel - or in Jordan or Egypt or even Syria. As for Canadians and other outsiders, the prospect of anti-Western forces seeking to gain control over the vital oil resources and strategic shipping routes in the area is truly

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horrifying. So too, the prospect of another Middle East war with its inherent dangers of direct involvement by the super-powers. We should surely work instead to create a structure of cooperation in the Middle East like that which the nations of Western Europe began to develop soon after a long and savage war. Beginning with practical cooperation in a few key sectors, this has grown into the European Community, binding traditional enemies in a web of cooperation and interdependence that has made war between them almost unthinkable. The same vision and imagination could surely transform the Middle East from an altar of destruction to a new cradle of civilization.

10. We regard peace in the Middle East as essential - for Israel and for all of us. Of course we are concerned, as everyone who thinks about the Middle East must be, about Israel's immediate and compelling security needs, but we are also concerned about the long-term perspective. It is simply not possible to imagine that Israel can continue to flourish and prosper if it is indefinitely surrounded by bitter, vengeful and more populous enemies and if the vicious cycle of tension and war repeats itself mindlessly into the future. Nor can Israel realize its full potential until the energies and inspiration of its people no longer have to be concentrated on national survival. True security depends on more than

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military factors and security for Israel depends ultimately on peace.

11. The contribution made to human civilization, through history, by the Jewish people is immeasurable. The accomplishments of the modern state of Israel in every field of human endeavour have won the admiration of the world. Only in conditions of real peace can Israel make its full contribution to the Middle East and the whole world and so fully realize its own highest aspirations. Throughout history Israel has been at the crossroads of the world's great civilizations. So it is today. It is not simply a Western-European enclave in the Third World as some have charged. It is a microcosm of co-existence between the cultures of East and West, and of technology and inventive skill harnessed to the problems of underdevelopment. Modern Israel surely has the potential to become "a light unto the Nations" in fulfillment of Scripture, but only with peace. Free from the pressures of the threat of new wars and the constant drain of military preparedness, there is no limit to what Israel can achieve.

12. I hope you will not expect me to go on and outline point by point some ingenious new plan for peace in the Middle East. There is no "Canadian Plan". We believe, indeed, that no plan from outside can do more than point the way towards a solution. A peace settlement

between Israel and its neighbours can only be worked out in negotiations between the parties directly concerned and it can only be based on what the governments and ultimately the peoples of the region are willing to accept as meeting their vital interests. Such a settlement will clearly have to provide convincing assurances to the people of Israel that their security is not being placed in jeopardy, but do so in such a way that will not perpetuate an Arab sense of grievance.

13. It would also have to involve an end to such petty and essentially futile manifestations of the state of war as the Arab boycott of Israel. Canada is concerned to make sure that the boycott does not impose limitations on the freedom of Canadians to trade as and how they choose, or force Canadian firms to engage in any form of discrimination on the basis of race, religion, ethnic or national origin. The Government is dedicated to working against these aspects of the boycott until such time as its whole structure is swept away in a peaceful settlement.

14. It is no less obvious, of course, that any peace settlement will have to meet the basic concerns of the Arab peoples living next to Israel. This will require understanding as well for the aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs - analagous in many ways to those of the

Jewish people in Israel. Only if these are fully taken into account can we look forward to the just and lasting peace that Israel, its neighbours and the whole world need so desperately in the Middle East.

15. The gap between the positions of the two sides is still so wide that it will require the utmost statesmanship, goodwill and imagination from all concerned to reach a settlement. And, to be realistic, no settlement that could be agreed to is going to be fully satisfactory to either side. Certain extreme Arab positions, however logical and justified they may seem to their proponents, cannot be accommodated within the bounds of a realistic and viable settlement; and similarly, there are demands made by some Israeli circles which, despite their appeal, do not appear to be a practical possibility as part of a settlement, given the psychological realities of the situation. Like the forging of national unity here in Canada, the creation of a solid peace in the Middle East will be an immensely demanding task, emotionally and intellectually, for all concerned, governments and peoples alike. The easy answers are mostly those which lead nowhere. But I am increasingly hopeful that Israel and its neighbours will be capable of meeting the challenge and the opportunity which they now have, that of creating a common peaceful destiny together.

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16. It would be wrong, of course, for me to leave the impression that your interests are directed solely or exclusively toward Israel ...

(and so on as per page 7 of draft)

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**ACTION  
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---DISARMAMENT-PMS ADDRESS TO UN

SAUDI NATIONWIDE TV NEWS MAY30 HIGHLIGHTED PMS DISARMAMENT

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ANKRA LSBON OSLO COPEN HAGUE VMBFR TAVIV NDHQ/ADMPO/DIAC/POL  
PCOOTT PMOOTT/GOSSAGE

INFO EXTOTT DFR

DISTR *FAP* FAI FAB FPR GNP GNG

---STATEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER TO FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF NATO  
SUMMIT WSHDC MAY30

QUOTE THIS SUMMIT IS AN HISTORIC OCCASION. I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE IMAGINATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE BY OUR HOST TO PROVOKE AMONG US A STIMULATING DIALOGUE AND ENABLE US TO CHART THE BEST COURSE FOR THE ALLIANCE AS IT FACES THE CHALLENGES OF THE 1980S. WE CAN ONLY DO THIS WITH LASTING PROFIT IF WE TALK TO ONE ANOTHER RATHER THAN AT ONE ANOTHER.

WHEN WE MET IN LONDON A YEAR AGO WE ENDORSED CERTAIN INITIATIVES LARGELY INSPIRED BY PRESIDENT CARTER. IN THE INTERVENING TWELVE MONTHS OUR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE, AS A RESULT, TAKEN A CAREFUL LOOK AT LONGER TRENDS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE. EXTENSIVE WORK HAS BEEN DONE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LONG TERM DEFENCE PROGRAMME. A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE MEANS TO DEEPEN COOPERATION IN ALL ASPECTS OF DEFENCE PRODUCTION HAS BEEN LAUNCHED.

THESE THREE INITIATIVES WERE IMPORTANT IN THEMSELVES,

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BUT THEIR OBJECTIVES AND THEIR RESULTS MUST, IN MY OPINION, BE VIEWED IN CLOSE RELATION TO ONE ANOTHER, THE REQUIREMENTS FOR STRENGTHENED DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE WHICH THE LONG TERM DEFENCE PROGRAMME IS DESIGNED TO MEET, MUST BE ESTABLISHED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE EAST-WEST STUDY. LIKEWISE, THESE REQUIREMENTS CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY BE SATISFIED WITHIN A FRAMEWORK OF DEFENCE COOPERATION WHICH AIMS AT MINIMIZING COSTS AND MAXIMIZING BENEFITS FOR THE ALLIES, COLLECTIVELY AND INDIVIDUALLY.

NO/NO LESS IMPORTANT, THESE THREE INITIATIVES MUST BE CONSIDERED AS PARTS OF THE MOSAIC OF REALITIES WITHIN WHICH WE WILL HAVE TO LABOUR IN THE YEARS AHEAD. OUR PURPOSE AT THIS SUMMIT IS, AS I SEE IT, TO DISCUSS OUR FUTURE SECURITY IN ITS BROADEST SENSE—A SECURITY WHICH HAS MANY DIMENSIONS: IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, TECHNICAL, MILITARY. THIS IS SO BECAUSE THE SECURITY OF OUR COUNTRIES AND OF OUR PEOPLE WILL BE DETERMINED BY MORE THAN THE MILITARY POWER WE FACE OR POSSESS. IT WILL DEPEND, FUNDAMENTALLY, ON THE STRENGTH OF OUR COLLECTIVE CONVICTION, AS FREE PEOPLE, THAT THE VALUES PROFESSED BY OUR SOCIETIES ARE SOUND AND WORTH PRESERVING; THAT OUR INSTITUTIONS ARE UNIQUELY CAPABLE OF RESPONDING TO CHANGING NEEDS; THAT FULFILMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL IS THE GOAL TOWARDS WHICH SOCIETIES SHOULD BE ORDAINED; AND THAT THE STATE EXISTS AND SHOULD BE PROTECTED TO DO THOSE THINGS THAT INDIVIDUALS CANNOT/NOT DO THEMSELVES.

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WHAT IS THE SITUATION THAT CONFRONTS US ON THE OTHER SIDE?  
THE ALLIANCE STUDY OF LONG TERM TRENDS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS  
HOLDS OUT LITTLE PROSPECT OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE SOVIET  
UNION. THAT IS PERHAPS TOO CONSERVATIVE A CONCLUSION. BUT WE MUST  
PROBABLY ACCEPT THAT WHAT CHANGE MAY COME ABOUT WILL NOT/NOT BE  
SUCH AS RADICALLY TO ALTER THE CALCULATIONS ABOUT WESTERN SECURITY  
THAT WE HAVE HAD TO MAKE OVER THE PAST GENERATION.

THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO REGARD THE USA AS THE ONLY  
POWER CAPABLE OF FUNDAMENTALLY CHALLENGING SOVIET SECURITY WHICH  
MEANS THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO MATCH THE USA AS A  
GLOBAL POWER WITH POWER GLOBALLY DEPLOYABLE. IT WILL ALSO, PRESUMABLY,  
CONTINUE TO ASSESS THE OTHER COMBINED THREATS TO SOVIET SECURITY,  
INCLUDING THE DESIRE TO PRESERVE ITS PARAMOUNTCY IN EASTERN  
EUROPE, AS REQUIRING A MILITARY POSTURE THAT WE IN THE WEST  
REGARD AS BEING EXCESSIVE ON ANY REASONABLE ASSUMPTIONS. AS HAS  
BEEN SAID BY A SEASONED OBSERVER OF THE SOVIET SCENE, THE SOVIET  
UNION IS UNLIKELY EVER TO FEEL SECURE EXCEPT IN CIRCUMSTANCES  
WHERE EVERYONE ELSE FEELS INSECURE.

WE HAVE RECEIVED REPEATED ASSURANCES FROM SOVIET LEADERS THAT  
THEIR MASSIVE MILITARY CAPACITY NEITHER THREATENS NOR IS INTENDED  
TO THREATEN OUR SECURITY. WE SHOULD NOTE THESE ASSURANCES AND  
WEIGH THEM CAREFULLY. THEY ARE NOT/NOT WITHOUT IMPORTANCE OR VALUE.  
BUT IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT IF WE WERE TO BASE OUR POLICIES ON

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ASSURANCES. RATHER THAN ACTIONS—ON DECLARED OR ASSUMED INTENTIONS RATHER THAN ON MANIFEST CAPABILITIES. WE CANNOT/NOT WAIT FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO DEVELOP SUCH A PREPONDERANCE OF MILITARY CAPABILITY THAT THE BALANCE WILL SWING STRONGLY IN ITS FAVOUR ENABLING IT TO ACHIEVE SECURITY ON ITS OWN TERMS. THE SOVIETS ASSURANCE OF COMPLETE SECURITY CANNOT/NOT BE BOUGHT AT THE COST OF OUR INCAPACITY TO PROTECT OURSELVES. THAT WOULD BE NO/NO BASIS EITHER FOR SECURITY OR FOR DETENTE. IN SEEKING TO IMPROVE THE REALITY OF OUR SECURITY WE MUST MAINTAIN THE BALANCE OF DETERRENT STRENGTH. BUT OUR SECURITY PROBLEM WILL NOT/NOT BE SOLVED SIMPLY BY THE REACTIVE POLICY OF TRYING TO MATCH THE MILITARY CAPACITY OF THE POTENTIAL ADVERSARY. WE MUST ALSO PURSUE WITH VIGOUR, AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY AND ALONG EVERY AVENUE OPEN TO US, THE GOALS OF A MEANINGFUL POLICY OF DETENTE AND OF A GENUINE REDUCTION IN OUR MUTUAL CAPACITY TO WAGE WAR.

IN THE LONG RUN, THERE IS NO/NO REAL ALTERNATIVE TO PURSUING DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION—A PROCESS WHICH WE MUST CONTINUE TO PROMOTE. BUT FOR DETENTE TO BE PURSUED AND MADE A PERMANENT FEATURE OF THE EAST—WEST RELATIONSHIP, CONFIDENCE MUST EXIST NOT/NOT ONLY BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS. IT MUST EXIST ALSO BETWEEN AND AMONG OUR CITIZENS FOR, IN THE WEST, IT IS OUR PUBLICS THAT DETERMINE HOW FAST AND IN WHAT DIRECTION WE CAN PROCEED. THIS PUBLIC CONFIDENCE CAN ONLY MAINTAINED IF THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF DETENTE,

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AS EMBODIED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IS RESPECTED AND THE INDIVIDUAL IS ALLOWED HIS RIGHTFUL PLACE IN SOCIETY AND IN CONTACTS ACROSS FRONTIERS. IF DETENTE IS SEEN TO BE APPLIED SELECTIVELY SUPPORT FOR IT IS LIKELY TO ERODE. THIS PROSPECT CANNOT/NOT BE TREATED LIGHTLY BY ANY GOVERNMENT.

I ATTENDED THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO. WHILE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ARE SOMETIMES OBSCURED BY CONTROVERSY AND DIVERTED BY RHETORIC, I BELIEVE THERE IS TODAY A REAL AND WIDESPREAD YEARNING FOR A TURNING OF THE CORNER—FOR A REVERSAL OF THE ARMS RACE AND A REAL CONCERN ABOUT WHERE PRESENT TRENDS WILL LEAD US. THIS PRESENTS NATO WITH BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY AND A CHALLENGE TO FIND WAYS IN WHICH SECURITY CAN BE ACHIEVED AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENT. THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY CAN TOO EASILY BE CONDUCTED ONLY THROUGH ARMEMENTS IMPROVEMENT. IT MUST ALSO BE SOUGHT THROUGH EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD UNDERTAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO DEVELOP FURTHER POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS IN THIS DOMAIN.

MY GOVERNMENT HAS FOLLOWED CLOSELY AND HAS APPRECIATED THE DETAILED CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE UNDERTAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA IN THE COURSE OF ITS STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE RECOGNIZE THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUES AND UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED. WE RETAIN

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THE HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROCESS OF WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS FORM A PART WILL CONTINUE AND THAT, OVER TIME, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE SIGNIFICANT STEPS TOWARDS THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMAMENT.

WE SHOULD REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO IMPART SOME POLITICAL RESOLVE FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT AT VIENNA, WHERE, FOR FIVE FRUSTRATING YEARS, OUR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN LABOURING HARD TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES CONFRONTING ONE ANOTHER IN EUROPE. NEITHER THE PROCESS OF DETENTE NOR THE AGREEMENTS REACHED ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE ARE LIKELY TO GO VERY FAR UNLESS WE CAN MAKE SOME HEADWAY IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. DESPITE REPEATED WESTERN INITIATIVES, THE TALKS REMAIN BOGGED DOWN. THE TIME HAS SURELY COME TO GIVE THESE TALKS SOME FRESH IMPETUS AND TO TEST WHAT WILLINGNESS THERE IS ON THE OTHER SIDE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT.

STILL, EVEN AS WE CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WE CANNOT/NOT WISH AWAY THE REALITY OF THE MASSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY WHICH FACES US AND WHICH IS GROWING. THE LONG TERM DEFENCE PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT COLLECTIVELY WE MAKE THE BEST POSSIBLE USE OF OUR RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE DETERRENT AND DEFENCE POSTURE.

I SUPPORT THE CONCEPT AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM. IT IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH CANADA, IN COMMON WITH ITS ALLIES, CAN PURSUE THE PROGRAMS NECESSARY TO ADJUST

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THE COLLECTIVE DETERRENT STRENGTH OF NATO TO THE NEEDS OF THE NEXT DECADE, AND TO ENSURE THAT CANADA'S MILITARY CONTRIBUTION IS COMPATIBLE WITH THOSE NEEDS.

I ALSO FULLY SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVES OF CLOSER COOPERATION IN THE INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR DEFENCE. IT MAKES NO/NO SENSE THAT WE SHOULD EACH GO OUR OWN WAY IN EQUIPPING OUR ARMED FORCES. THE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES OF A LACK OF REASONABLE STANDARDIZATION OF OUR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND OF OUR OPERATIONAL DOCTRINES ARE AN UNECONOMIC USE OF RESOURCES AND A SERIOUS LOSS OF EFFECTIVENESS.

I AM INFORMED THAT, THOUGH IT IS SLOW, PROGRESS IS BEING MADE TOWARDS GREATER STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY. THIS IS WELCOME BUT CLEARLY MUCH MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE. IT IS ALSO OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE THAT THERE BE FULLER AND BROADER COOPERATION IN PRODUCING EQUIPMENTS TO MEET DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS. DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE BEEN INITIATED TO THIS END SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED AND SERIOUS EFFORTS MADE TO ACHIEVE GENUINE PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING THIS COOPERATION.

THE MORE EFFICIENT USE OF OUR RESOURCES IS A STEP FORWARD. BUT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS WE WILL NOT/NOT BE MILITARILY STRONG UNLESS WE ARE ECONOMICALLY STRONG. MOREOVER, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT INDUSTRIAL ENDOWMENT DIFFERS AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. A COMMON APPROACH TO DEFENCE SHOULD THEREFORE TRY TO ENSURE THAT THE BURDENS IMPOSED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE HAVE SOME COUNTERPART

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IN THE INDUSTRIAL BENEFITS ENJOYED BY ITS MEMBERS.

MR CHAIRMAN, THE WORK OF THE PAST YEAR HAS AMPLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE ALLIANCE REMAINS UNRIVALLED AS A FORUM IN WHICH MEMBER COUNTRIES CAN CONSULT FREELY AND FRANKLY ON ALL MATTERS RELATING TO THEIR COMMON INTERESTS. CONTINUING CONSULTATION AMONG US ALL WILL BE ESSENTIAL AS WE COME TO GRIPS WITH THE DIFFICULT AND VARIED ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, INCLUDING DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE, DISARMAMENT AND DETENTE. THESE ARE ALL SO INTRICATELY LINKED THAT IT IS INCONVEIVABLE THAT THEY COULD BE DEALT WITH IN ISOLATION FROM ONE ANOTHER.

BUT CONSULTATION IS NOT/NOT AN END IN ITSELF. IT PROVIDES A PROPER BASIS FOR DECISIONS WE AS GOVERNMENTS HAVE TO TAKE TO MEET THE PROBLEMS OF THE 1980S. IT WOULD MAKE LITTLE SENSE IF, IN TAKING THEM, WE WERE TO LEAVE ONE ANOTHERS INTERESTS AND PREOCCUPATIONS OUT OF ACCOUNT. UNQUOTE

CIT CE SOMMET EST UN EVENEMENT HISTORIQUE. JE SAIS GRE A NOTRE HOTE DES DISPOSITIONS NOVATRICES QUI A PRISES POUR SUSCITER PARMI NOUS UN DIALOGUE STIMULANT ET NOUS PERMETTRE DE TRACER LA MEILLEURE VOIE QUE PEUT SUIVRE LALLIANCE POUR REPONDRE AUX DEFIS DES ANNEES 80. POUR MENER A BIEN CETTE MISSION, NOUS DEVONS NOUS EFFORCER DE DIALOGUER VRAIMENT PLUTOT QUE DE MONOLOGUER.

LORS DE NOTRE RENCONTRE A LONDRES LAN DERNIER, NOUS AVONS ENTERINE CERTAINES MESURES LARGEMENT INSPIREES PAR LE PRESIDENT CARTER.

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DEPUIS, NOS REPRESENTANTS ONT ETUDIE ATTENTIVEMENT LEVOLUTION A LONG TERME DES RELATIONS EST-OUEST ET SON INCIDENCE POUR LALLIANCE. ON A COMSACRE BEAUCOUP DE TRAVAIL A LELABORATION DUN PROGRAMME DE DEFENSE A LONG TERME ET ENTREPRIS UN EXAMEN DETAILLE DES MOYENS DE RESSERRER LA COOPERATION DANS TOUS LES ASPECTS DE LA PRODUCTION DE DEFENSE.

CES TROIS INITIATIVES ETAIENT IMPORTANTES EN ELLES-MEMES, MAIS LEURS OBJECTIFS ET LEURS RESULTATS DOIVENT A MON AVIS ETRE CONSIDERES COMME ETANT ETROITEMENT LIES. LES BESOINS DE RENFORCEMENT DE NOTRE CAPACITE DE DISSUASION ET DE DEXENSE QUE VISE A SATISFAIRE LE PROGRAMME DE DEFENSE A LONG TERME, DOIVENT ETRE ETABLIS EN FONCTION DES CONCLUSIONS DE LETUDE EST-OUEST. DAILLEURS, LA SOLUTION LA PLUS EFFICACE SINSCRIT DANS LE CADRE DUNE COOPERATION DE DEFENSE QUI MINIMISE LES COUTS ET MAXIMISE LES AVANTAGES INDIVIDUELS ET COLLECTIFS.

FACTEUR TOUT AUSSI IMPORTANT, CES TROIS INITIATIVES DOIVENT ETRF CONSIDEREES COMME DES ELEMENTS DE LA MOSAIQUE DES REALITES AVEC LAQUELLE NOUS DEVRONS COMPOSER DANS LES ANNEES A VENIR. NOTRE OBJECTIF A CE SOMMET ME SEMBLE DAILLEURS ETRE LANALYSE DE NOS BESOINS PREVISIBLES EN MATIERE DE SECURITE, UNE SECURITE FAITE DE COMPOSANTES IDEOLOGIQUES, POLITIQUES, ECONOMIQUES, SOCIALES, TECH-NOLOGIQUES ET MILITAIRES, EN EFFET, LA SECURITE DE NOS PAYS ET DE NOS POPULATIONS NE SERA CERTES PAS SEULEMENT DETERMINEE PAR

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LA PUISSANCE MILITAIRE QUE NOUS AFFRONTONS OU QUE NOUS POSSEDONS; ELLE DEPENDRA DABORD ET AVANT TOUT DE LA MESURE DANS LAQUELLE NOUS SERONS COLLECTIVEMENT CONVAINCUS, EN TANT QUE PEUPLES LIBRES QUE LE PANOUISSEMENT DE L'INDIVIDU EST LE BUT VERS LEQUEL LA SOCIETE DOINT TENDRE, QUE LES VALEURS DEFENDUES PAR NOS SOCIETES SONT SAINES ET DIGNES D'ETRE PRESERVEES, QUE NOS INSTITUTIONS PEUVENT PARTICULIEREMENT BIEN S'ADAPTER A DES BESOINS EN EVOLUTION ET QUE L'ETAT EXISTE BEL ET BIEN ET QU'IL FAUT LE PROTEGER POUR LUI PERMETTRE DE REALISER CE QUE NE PEUVENT FAIRE LES INDIVIDUS.

A QUELLE SITUATION DEVONS-NOUS FAIRE FACE? L'ETUDE DE L'ALLIANCE TOUCHANT L'EVOLUTION A LONG TERME DES RELATIONS EST-OUEST LAISSE TRES PEU DESPOIRS QUANT A UNE TRANSFORMATION SENSIBLE EN UNION SOVIETIQUE. IL S'AGIT PEUT-ETRE LA DUNE CONCLUSION TROP CONSERVATRICE. MAIS IL NOUS FAUDRA PROBABLEMENT ACCEPTER LE FAIT QUE LES CHANGEMENTS QUI SURVIENDROIENT NE SERONT PAS ASSEZ IMPORTANTS POUR MODIFIER LES PLANS DE SECURITE OCCIDENTALE QUE NOUS AVONS DU FAIRE AU COURS DE LA DERNIERE GENERATION.

L'UNION SOVIETIQUE CONTINUERA A CONSIDERER LES ETATS-UNIS COMME LA SEULE PUISSANCE VRAIMENT CAPABLE DE DEFIER SA SECURITE, CE QUI VEUT DIRE QUELLE CONTINUERA DE SEFFORCER DE GALER LES ETATS-UNIS AU MOYEN DUNE PUISSANCE DEPLOYABLE DANS LE MONDE ENTIER. IL FAUT EGALEMENT SUPPOSER QUELLE CONTINUERA CONSIDERER LES AUTRES MENACES COMBINEES A SA SECURITE, DONT LE BESOIN DE PRESERVER SA PREDOMINANCE EN EUROPE ORIENTALE, COMME EXIGEANT UNE CAPACITE MILITAIRE

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QUE NOUS JUGONS EXCESSIVE SELON TOUT CRITERE RAISONNABLE. COMME LA FAIT REMARQUER UN SPECIALISTE DES QUESTIONS SOVIETIQUES, L'UNION SOVIETIQUE NE SE SENTIRA PROBABLEMENT EN SECURITE QUE LORSQUE TOUS LES AUTRES SE SENTIRONT INSECURES.

LES DIRIGEANTS DE L'URSS NOUS ONT RAPPELE A MAINTES REPRISES QUE LEUR IMPOSANTE CAPACITE MILITAIRE NE MENACE NI NE VISE A MENACER NOTRE SECURITE. NOUS DEVRIONS PRENDRE ACTE DE CES ASSURANCES ET LES PESER AVEC SOIN CAR ELLES ONT LEUR IMPORTANCE ET LEUR VALEUR. IL SERAIT TOUTEFOIS IMPRUDENT DE FONDER NOS POLITIQUES SUR DES PROMESSES PLUTOT QUE SUR LA REALITE CEST-A-DIRE SUR DES DECLARATIONS OU DES PRESOMPTIONS D'INTENTION PLUTOT QUE SUR UNE CAPACITE MANIFESTE. NOUS NE POUVONS ATTENDRE QUE L'UNION SOVIETIQUE ACQUIERE UNE PREPONDERANCE MILITAIRE TELLE QUE LEQUILIBRE PENCHE NETTEMENT EN SA FAVEUR ET LUI PERMETTE DE PARVENIR A LA SECURITE A SES PROPRES CONDITIONS. IL NE FAUDRAIT PAS QUE SA QUIETUDE TOTALE AU CHAPITRE DE LA SECURITE SOBTIENNE AU PRIX D'UNE INCAPACITE A NOUS PROTEGER NOUS-MEMES. CET ETAT DE CHOSES NE SERVIRAIT NI LA SECURITE NI LA DETENTE. EN CHERCHANT A CONSOLIDER NOTRE SECURITE, IL NOUS FAUT MAINTENIR LEQUILIBRE DE LA FORCE DE DISSUASION. MAIS NOUS NE POURRONS REGLER CE PROBLEME SIMPLEMENT EN NOUS EFFORCANT D'EGALER LA CAPACITE MILITAIRE DE L'ENNEMI EVENTUEL. NOUS DEVRONS EGALEMENT POURSUIVRE AVEC VIGUEUR A CHAQUE OCCASION ET PAR TOUTES LES VOIES QUI SOFFRENT A NOUS LES OBJECTIFS D'UNE VERITABLE POLITIQUE DE LA DETENTE ET D'UNE

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REELLE REDUCTION DE NOTRE CAPACITE MUTUELLE A LIVRER LA GUERRE.

A LONG TERME, IL NY A PAS DE VRAI SUBSTITUT A LA POURSUITE DE LA DETENTE AVEC L'UNION SOVIETIQUE, PROCESSUS QUE NOUS DEVONS CONTINUER DE PROMOUVOIR. MAIS POUR QUE LA POURSUITE DE LA DETENTE DEVIENNE UN ELEMENT PERMANENT DES RELATIONS EST-OUEST, IL FAUT QUE LA CONFIANCE DEBORDE LE CADRE GOUVERNEMENTAL POUR IMPRESSIONNER NOS POPULATIONS CAR, EN OCCIDENT, C'EST L'OPINION PUBLIQUE QUI DECIDE DU RYTHME ET DE L'ORIENTATION DE NOTRE EVOLUTION. CE SENTIMENT DE CONFIANCE NE PEUT ETRE NOURRI QUE SI L'ON RESPECTE LA DIMENSION HUMAINE DE LA DETENTE TELLE QUE LA DEFINIT L'ACTE FINAL D'HENSHILKI, QUE SI L'ON RECONNAIT A L'INDIVIDU LA PLACE QUI LUI REVIENT DANS LA SOCIETE ET QUE SI L'ON FACILITE LES CONTACTS TRANSFRONTIERES. CETTE CONFIANCE SE FRUITERAIT PROBABLEMENT SI ON PERCOIT LA DETENTE COMME UN PROCESSUS D'APPLICATION SELECTIVE ET AUCUN GOUVERNEMENT NE PEUT TRAITER CETTE PERSPECTIVE A LA LEGERE.

JE PARTICIPAIS IL Y A QUELQUES JOURS A LA SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LE DESARMEMENT. MEME SI LES QUESTIONS DE CONTROLE DES ARMES ET DE DESARMEMENT SONT PARFOIS OBSCURCIES PAR LA CONTROVERSE ET DEFLECHIES PAR LA RHETORIQUE, JE SENS AUJOURD'HUI UN DESIR REEL ET GENERAL D'UN RENVERSEMENT DE LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS AINSI QU'UNE PREOCCUPATION VERITABLE DEVANT L'EVOLUTION DE LA SITUATION ACTUELLE. VOILA POUR L'OTAN UNE OCCASION

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ET UN DEFI DE CHERCHER DES MOYENS DASSURER LA SECURITE AVEC  
DES NIVEAUX D'ARMEMENT MOINDRES. IL EST TROP FACILE DE NE RECHERCHER  
LA SECURITE QUE DANS L'AMELIORATION DES ARMEMENTS; IL FAUT EGALEMENT  
L'ENVISAGER DANS L'OPTIQUE D'UN CONTROLE DES ARMES ET D'UN DESARMEMENT  
EFFICACES. L'ALLIANCE DEVRAIT FAIRE UN EFFORT CONSIDERABLE POUR  
ELABORER DE NOUVELLES PROPOSITIONS CONSTRUCTIVES DANS CE DOMAINE.  
MON GOUVERNEMENT A SUIVI DE PRES ET A APPRECIE LES CONSULTATIONS  
DETAILLEES QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT DES ETATS-UNIS A TENUES AVEC  
L'ALLIANCE PENDANT SES POURPARLERS AVEC L'UNION SOVIETIQUE SUR LA  
LIMITATION DES ARMES.

NOUS SOMMES CONSCIENTS DE LA COMPLEXITE DES PROBLEMES ET COM-  
PRENONS LEURS DIFFICULTES. NOUS MAINTENONS L'ESPOIR TOUTEFOIS QUE  
LE PROCESSUS DONT CES NEGOCIATIONS FONT PARTIE SE POURSUIVRA ET  
QUE, AVEC LE TEMPS, IL SERA POSSIBLE DE PROGRESSER DE FACON  
SUBSTANTIELLE DANS LA VOIE DES REDUCTIONS DE L'ARSENAL NUCLEAIRE  
STRATEGIQUE.

NOUS DEVRIONS REDOUBLER NOS EFFORTS POLITIQUES POUR RELANCER  
LES DISCUSSIONS DE VIENNE OU, PENDANT CINQ ANNEES DE FRUSTRATIONS,  
NOS REPRESENTANTS ONT TRAVAILLE FERME POUR OBTENIR UNE REDUCTION  
D'UN NIVEAU DES FORCES CLASSIQUES QUI SAFFRONTENT EN EUROPE. NI LE  
PROCESSUS DE LA DETENTE NI LES ACCORDS SUR LA SECURITE ET LA  
COOPERATION EN EUROPE N'AURONT GRAND FONDEMENT SI NOUS NE POUVONS  
FAIRE AVANCER CES DISCUSSIONS QUI, ET DE PIT DES NOMBREUSES

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INITIATIVES OCCIDENTALES, SONT DEMEUREES EMBOURBEES. LE TEMPS EST SUREMENT VENU DE LEUR IMPRIMER UN NOUVEL ELAN ET DE TESTER JUSQUA QUEL POINT LAUTRE PARTIE EST DESIREUSE DE PARVENIR A UN ACCORD.

TOUT EN ENVISAGEANT LA POSSIBILITE DUNE REDUCTION DU NIVEAU DES FORCES EN EUROPE CENTRALE, NOUS NE POUVONS TOUTEFOIS FERMER LES YEUX SUR LA REALITE DE LA CONCENTRATION MILITAIRE TOUJOURS PLUS MASSIVE DE LAUTRE PARTIE. LE PROGRAMME DE DEFENSE A LONG TERME VISE A ASSURER LA MEILLEURE UTILISATION COLLECTIVE POSSIBLE DE NOS RESSOURCES POUR MAINTENIR UNE CAPACITE ADEQUATE EN MATIERE DE DISSUASION ET DE DEFENSE. J'APPUIE LE CONCEPT ET LES OBJECTIFS DU PROGRAMME. CEST LA UN ELEMENT IMPORTANT DU CADRE A L'INTERIEUR DUQUEL LE CANADA, DE CONCERT AVEC SES ALLIES, PEUT POURSUIVRE LES PROGRAMMES NECESSAIRES POUR AJUSTER LA FORCE DE DISSUASION DE L'OTAN ET LES BESOINS DE LA PROCHAINE DECENNIE, ET POUR ASSURER QUE SA CONTRIBUTION MILITAIRE A L'ALLIANCE CORRESPOND A CES BESOINS.

J'APPUIE EGALEMENT A PART ENTIERE LES OBJECTIFS DUNE COOPERATION PLUS ETROITE A LEGARD DES ACTIVITES INDUSTRIELLES LIEES AU MAINTIEN DE NOTRE DEFENSE. IL SERAIT INSENSE QUE NOUS NE COLLABORIONS PAS A LEQUIPEMENT DE NOS FORCES ARMEES. UNE UTILISATION IRRATIONNELLE DES RESSOURCES ET UNE PERTE SERIEUSE DEFFICACITE SONT LES CONSEQUENCES INEVITABLES DUN MANQUE DE STANDARDISATION RAISONNABLE

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DE NOTRE EQUIPEMENT DE DEFENSE ET DE NOS DOCTRINES OPERATIONNELLES. LON ME DIT QUE MEME SI CEST TRES LENT, UN CERTAIN PROGRES SE FAIT VERS UNE PLUS GRANDE STANDARDISATION ET INTERUTILISATION. CES DEVELOPPEMENTS SONT BIENVENUES MAIS IL EST CLAIR QUE BEAUCOUP PLUS EST REQUIS. IL EST NOTAMMENT ESSENTIEL D'AVOIR UNE COOPERATION PLUS COMPLETE ET PLUS VASTE DANS LA PRODUCTION DES EQUIPEMENTS DEVANT POURVOIR A NOS BESOINS DE DEFENSE. LES DISCUSSIONS ENTAMEES A CETTE FIN DOIVENT ETRE ENCOURAGEES ET DE SERIEUX EFFORTS FAITS POUR ATTEINDRE UN PROGRES VERITABLE DANS LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE CETTE COOPERATION.

UNE MEILLEURE UTILISATION DE NOS RESSOURCES EST UN PAS EN AVANT. MAIS EN DERNIERE ANALYSE, NOTRE FORCE MILITAIRE DEPENDRA DE NOTRE VIGUEUR ECONOMIQUE. IL NOUS FAUT EN OUTRE RECONNAITRE QUE NOS INFRASTRUCTURES INDUSTRIELLES NE SONT PAS TOUTES AU MEME NIVEAU. EN ELABORANT UNE CERTAINE CONTREPARTIE DANS LES AVANTAGES INDUSTRIELS QUILS PEUVENT EN RETIRER.

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, NOS ACTIVITES DE LAN DERNIER ONT PLEINEMENT MONTRE QUE L'ALLIANCE NA PAS SON EGAL EN TANT QUE MECANISME AU SEIN DUQUEL DES ETATS MEMBRES PEUVENT LIBREMENT AVOIR DES CONSULTATIONS FRANCHES SUR TOUTES LES QUESTIONS LIEES A LEURS INTERETS COMMUNS. IL NOUS FAUDRA POURSUIVRE CETTE CONSULTATION PERMANENTE LORSQUE NOUS NOUS ATTAQUERONS AUX FACETTE A LA FOIS NOMBREUSES ET COMPLEXES DES RELATIONS EST-OUEST, DONT LA DEFENSE

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ET LA DISSUASION, LE DESARMEMENT ET LA DETENTE. CES QUESTIONS SONT  
SI INTIMEMENT LIEES QU'ON NE PEUT ESPERER LES REGLER INDIVIDUELLE-  
MENT.

MAIS LA CONSULTATION N'EST PAS UNE FIN EN ELLE-MÊME; ELLE CONSTITUE  
UNE BASE ADEQUATE AUX DECISIONS QUE NOUS, EN TANT QUE GOUVERNEMENTS,  
DEVONS PRENDRE POUR RESOUDRE LES PROBLEMES DES ANNEES 80. IL  
SERAIT ALORS INSENSE QUE CES DECISIONS NE REFLETENT PAS LES  
PREOCCUPATIONS ET LES INTERETS DE TOUS LES MEMBRES. FINCIT

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TO EXTOTT FPR

PARIS ALGER BPEST BRDUX POECD PESCO RABAT STBPG TUNIS YUNDE LDN  
ACCRA BERUT BGRAD BONN BRLIN BRU BUCST BNATO BREEC CLMBO COPEN  
CPTWN DUBLN HAGUE HSNKI LAGOS MOSCO OSLO PRET PRGUE STKEM VIENN WSAW  
ABDJN CAIRO ROME VATCN TOKYO BNGKK DACCA HKONG WSHDC GTMLA HAVAN  
PRNCE CNBRA KLMPR SPORE WLGTN PSPAN GRGTN BRSLA NROBI DSLAM LSAKA  
ADDIS ANKRA ATHNS BAIRS BDGTN BERN BGHDD BGOTA CRCAS DAKAR DELHI  
GENEV ISBAD JEDDA JKRTA KNGTN KNSHA LIMA LSBON MANIL MDRID MXICO  
PEKIN SEOUL SJOSE STAGO TAVIV TERAN KWAIT

BH NYORK DE NYK

AM ATNTA BFALO BOSTN CHCGO CLVND DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS NRLNS PHILA  
SEATL SFRAN DE NYK

DISTR GENERAL

THERE FOLLOWS TEXT IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH OF PM TRUDEAUS ADDRESS TO  
TENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DISARMAMENT, TO BE  
DELIVERED AT 1500 HOURS FRI MAY26. TEXT BEGINS: MR PRESIDENT,  
CDA TAKES ITS PLACE IN A WORLD DISCUSSION ON DISARMAMENT AS AN  
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY, GEOGRAPHICALLY PLACED BETWEEN TWO HEAVILY  
ARMED SUPERPOWERS, WITH AN OBVIOUS STAKE IN THE PREVENTION OF WAR IN  
A NUCLEAR AGE. WE ARE A MEMBER OF A REGIONAL DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE THAT  
INCLUDES THREE OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. WE ARE NONETHELESS  
A COUNTRY THAT HAS RENOUNCED THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR  
THE ACQUISITION OF SUCH WEAPONS UNDER OUR CONTROL. WE HAVE WITHDRAWN  
FROM ANY NUCLEAR ROLE BY CDAS ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE AND ARE NOW IN

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THE PROCESS OF REPLACING WITH CONVENTIONALLY ARMED AIRCRAFT THE NUCLEAR CAPABLE PLANES STILL ASSIGNED TO OUR FORCES IN NORTH AMERICA. WE WERE THUS NOT/NOT ONLY THE FIRST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD WITH THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT CHOSE NOT/NOT TO DO SO. WE ARE ALSO THE FIRST NUCLEAR ARMED COUNTRY TO HAVE CHOSEN TO DIVEST ITSELF OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HAVE NOT/NOT, FOR MORE THAN A DECADE, PERMITTED CDN URANIUM TO BE USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES BY ANY COUNTRY. WE ARE A COUNTRY THAT MAINTAINS STRICT CONTROLS OVER EXPORTS OF MILITARY EQPT AND DOES NOT/NOT EXPORT ANY TO AREAS OF TENSION OR ACTUAL CONFLICT. WE ARE, ON THE OTHER HAND, A MAJOR SOURCE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQPT AND TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

IT HAS BEEN AN ASSUMPTION OF OUR POLICY THAT COUNTRIES LIKE CDA CAN DO SOMETHING TO SLOW DOWN THE ARMS RACE. BUT, OBVIOUSLY, WE CAN DO A GREAT DEAL MORE IF WE ACT TOGETHER. THAT IS WHY A GREAT RESPONSIBILITY RESTS UPON THIS SPECIAL SESSION. IT IS NOT/NOT THE BUSINESS OF THIS SESSION TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS. THAT WILL BE THE TASK OF OTHERS. WHAT WE ARE HERE TO DO IS TO TAKE STOCK AND TO PRESCRIBE HIGH EXPECTATIONS ARE FOCUSED ON OUR DELIBERATIONS IN ALL OUR COUNTRIES. TO DO JUSTICE TO THESE EXPECTATIONS WE MUST IMPART A FRESH MOMENTUM TO THE LAGGING PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT. THE TIME FOR DOING SO COULD NOT/NOT BE MORE OPPORTUNE.

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT INSTRUMENTS OF ARMS CONTROL WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PUT IN PLACE IS THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. IT IS ALSO ONE OF THE MOST FRAGILE BECAUSE ANY PARTY MAY WITHDRAW FROM IT ON THREE MONTHS NOTICE. THE TREATY REFLECTS A DELICATE BALANCE OF UNDERTAKINGS.

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MANY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES REGARD IT AS AN UNEQUAL TREATY. IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE IN THE TREATY. THE BEST WAY TO DO SO IS TO TAKE EARLY AND EFFECTIVE STEPS TO BRING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE TO A HALT. THAT IS THE UNDERTAKING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES ASSUMED WHEN THEY SIGNED THE TREATY.

NON-PROLIFERATION IS NOT/NOT THE ONLY DIMENSION OF THE INTL SYSTEM THAT IS PUT AT RISK BY AN UNRELENTING ARMS RACE. DETENTE ALSO IS IN DANGER. THE DOMINANT PREMISE OF A POLICY OF DETENTE IS CONFIDENCE. THAT IS HOW IT IS DEFINED IN THE FINAL ACT TO WHICH THIRTY-FIVE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVT SUBSCRIBED IN HSNKI IN 1975. ONLY IN A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE WILL IT BE POSSIBLE, OVER TIME, TO TRANSCEND THE HARSHER REALITIES OF DIVERGENT IDEOLOGIES AND TO FASHION THE LINKS OF A COOPERATION BASED ON COMMON INTERESTS AND CONCERNS. THE ARMS RACE CUTS ACROSS THESE PURPOSES. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EACH NEW WEAPONS SYSTEM CARRIES THE RISK OF UNBALANCING THE EXISTING SECURITY EQUATION. A POLICY OF POLITICAL DETENTE, WHICH HAS TO BE BASED ON CONFIDENCE, CANNOT/NOT BE EXPECTED TO WITHSTAND SUCH STRAINS INDEFINITELY.

THE ARMS RACE ALSO DEFIES THE LOGIC OF AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD. IT IS HARDLY CREDIBLE THAT NATIONS WHICH HAVE LEARNED THAT THEIR DESTINIES ARE LINKED, THAT NATL AIMS CAN NO/NO LONGER BE WHOLLY REALIZED WITHIN NATL BOUNDARIES, THAT BEGGARING OUR NEIGHBOURS IS THE SUREST WAY OF BEGGARING OURSELVES, SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERED NO/NO BETTER ALTERNATIVE TO ASSURING THEIR SECURITY THAN AN ESCALATING BALANCE OF TERROR. AND IT IS EVEN LESS CREDIBLE THAT, IN A WORLD OF

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FINITE RESOURCES AND IN SO MANY PARTS OF WHICH BASIC HUMAN NEEDS REMAIN UNSATISFIED, NEARLY DLRS 400 BILLION IN RESOURCES SHOULD HAVE TO BE SPENT YEAR BY YEAR FOR PURPOSES OF SECURITY.

SECURITY, EVEN ABSOLUTE SECURITY, IS NOT/NOT AN END IN ITSELF. IT IS ONLY THE SETTING THAT PERMITS US TO PURSUE OUR REAL ENDS: ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, CULTURAL ATTAINMENT, THE FULFILMENT OF THE HUMAN PERSONALITY. BUT THOSE ENDS ARE ALL INCOMPATIBLE WITH A WORLD OF NEIGHBOURS ARMED TO THE TEETH.

ON ALL THESE COUNTS, WE ARE RIGHT IN HAVING CHOSEN THIS MOMENT TO PAUSE AND SURVEY THE DISARMEMENT SCENE. WHAT WE FACE IS A GENERAL TENDENCY TO ADD TO ARSENALS AS THE ONLY WAY OF CORRECTING PERCEIVED IMBALANCES IN SECURITY. THAT WAY LIES THE LOGIC OF THE ARMS SPIRAL. WE MUST RECOGNIZE IT FOR WHAT IT IS: A SEARCH FOR SECURITY, HOWEVER ELUSIVE. AND WE MUST DEAL WITH IT ON ITS OWN TERMS. TO ATTEMPT TO DIVORCE DISARMAMENT FROM SECURITY IS TO BE LEFT ONLY WITH THE BARF BONES OF RHETORIC.

HOW TO ACHIEVE SECURITY THROUGH DISARMAMENT IS THE THEME OF THE GREAT DEBATE THAT HAS BEEN WAGED THROUGH MUCH OF THE PRESENT CENTURY. WE ARE TAKING UP THAT DEBATE AGAIN AT THIS SPECIAL SESSION. THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE HAVE BEEN DRASTICALLY ALTERED IN THE LAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS BY TWO DEVELOPMENTS. ONE WAS THE ADVENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH HAS FORCED US TO ASSIMILATE THE CONCEPT OF UNUSABLE POWER. THE OTHER WAS THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL MAP WHICH HAS BROUGHT A WHOLE HOST OF NEW INNATL ACTORS INTO THE DISARMAMENT DEBATE. IT IS USEFUL, NONETHELESS, TO REVIEW THE PRINCIPAL STRANDS OF THE HISTORIC DEBATE TO SEE WHAT RELEVANCE THEY MAY HAVE FOR OUR EFFORTS AT THIS SPECIAL SESSION.

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THE BROAD SPECTRUM OF PROPOSALS TO ACHIEVE GREATER WORLD STABILITY AND THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS RANGES ALL THE WAY FROM WHAT IS SOMETIMES CALLED THE DECLARATORY APPROACH TO THE NOTION OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT.

THE DECLARATORY APPROACH ENCOMPASSES THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF NON-AGRESSION PACTS, TREATIES OF GUARANTEE, SECURITY ASSURANCES AND BANS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN WEAPONS. THE CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF THIS TYPE OF APPROACH WAS THE BRIAND-KELLOGG PACT OF 1928. THE PARTIES TO IT, WHICH INCLUDED ALL THE MAJOR POWERS OF THE TIME, RENOUNCED WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATL POLICY AND PLEDGED THEMSELVES TO SETTLE DISPUTS BY PEACEFUL MEANS ONLY. THE PACT WAS REGARDED AS THE PORTENT OF A NEW ERA. THE MORE DEVASTATING JUDGEMENT OF HISTORIANS IS THAT IT CLOUDED THE VISION OF THE STATESMEN OF THE NINTEEN THIRTIES.

THE DECLARATORY APPROACH IS NOT/NOT DEAD. IT IS IMPLICIT IN THE IDEA OF A COMMITMENT TO NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT IDEA IS BEING SERIOUSLY ADVANCED BY SOME AND SERIOUSLY ENTERTAINED BY OTHERS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISMISS BECAUSE IT WOULD GIVE EXPRESSION AND AUTHORITY TO A WIDELY SHARED PERCEPTION OF INNATL MORALITY.

IT MAY HAVE A PART TO PLAY AS AN ASSURANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT HAVE RENOUNCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT NOT/NOT TO MISTAKE THE SHADOW FOR THE SUBSTANCE. DECLARATIONS OF GOOD INTENT ARE NO/NO SUBSTITUTE FOR REAL DISARMAMENT. THEY NEED BE VIOLATED ONLY ONCE. AT THAT POINT THEY BECOME SCRAPS OF PAPER. THEY HAVE NO/NO IMPACT ON CAPABILITIES NOR/NOR ON THE RESOURCES THOSE CAPABILITIES CONSUME. INDEED, THEIR EFFECT MAY BE NEGATIVE BY DIVERTING ATTN FROM THE REQUIREMENT OF REAL DISARMAMENT WHICH IS TO REDUCE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

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IF THE DECLARATORY APPROACH PLACES AN UNREASONABLE RELIANCE ON THE VALUE OF GOOD INTENTIONS, THE NOTION OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT HAS PROVED TO BE EQUALLY UNREALISTIC IN ITS EXPECTATIONS.

THE TERM WAS COINED AT THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE OF 1932. BUT THE NOTION WAS AT THE HEART OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. THE COVENANT SPOKE OF THE QUOTE REDUCTION OF NATL ARMAMENTS TO THE LOWEST POINT CONSISTENT WITH NATL SAFETY UNQUOTE. THE PERSPECTIVE SHIFTED WITH THE COMING INTO BEING OF THE UN. WITH THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR STILL FRESH IN MIND, THE EMPHASIS OF THE CHARTER WAS ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY. WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE FAILURE OF THE IDEAS EMBODIED IN THE CHARTER, GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT AGAIN EMERGED AS THE DOMINANT THEME IN THE DISARMAMENT DEBATE. IT HAS SINCE BEEN REAFFIRMED IN COUNTLESS RESLNS AS THE BASIC PRINCIPLE AND ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER HOW WIDE A RANGE OF VISION WAS EMBRACED BY THE CONCEPT OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN THE EARLY NINETEEN SIXTIES. WHAT WAS ENVISAGED WAS NOT/NOT ONLY THE DISBANDING OF ARMED FORCES, THE DISMANTLING OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS, THE CESSATION OF WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND THE ELIMINATION OF WEAPONS STOCKPILES. THE COUNTERPART TO GLOBAL DEMILITARIZATION WAS A GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEM INVOLVING RELIABLE PROCEDURES FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER.

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THE VISION IS NOT/NOT TO BE FAULTED.GENERAL AND COMPLETE  
DISARMAMENT REMAINS THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF OUR EFFORTS TO ADVANCE  
THE REALITY OF DISARMEMENT.IN PRACTICE,IT RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS  
IN THE MINDS OF THE NEGOTIATORS:WHAT SHOULD BE THE MILITARY BALANCE  
AT EACH STAGE OF THE PROCESS;WHAT KIND OF AN INSPECTION SYSTEM COULD  
BE RELIED UPON TO GIVE ASSURANCE THAT ENGAGEMENTS WERE BEING CARRIED  
OUT;HOW WOULD AN INNATL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION BE COMPOSED AND  
WITH WHAT POWERS WOULD IT BE INVESTED;WHAT WOULD BE THE SHAPE OF  
ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE IN A DISARMED WORLD.IN SUM,WHAT  
WOULD BE THE IMPACT OF THIS AMBITIOUS CONCEPT ON THE SECURITY,  
NOT/NOT TO SPEAK OF THE SOVEREIGNTY,OF THE PARTIES AT THE END OF  
THE DAY.

IN THE FULNESS OF TIME WE HAVE TO FIND ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS.  
BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE ANSWERS HAVE SO FAR ELUDED US.IT  
WAS NATURAL,THEREFORE,THAT WE SHOULD HAVE LOWERED OUR SIGHTS TO THE  
MORE PRACTICAL AIM OF MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS A DISARMED WORLD BY  
BUILDING IT BRICK BY BRICK.

THIS IS THE COURSE WE HAVE PURSUED OVER THE PAST DECADE OR SO.OVER  
THAT PERIOD,WE HAVE MANAGED TO NEGOTIATE A NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS OF  
ARMS CONTROL ON WHICH WE CAN LOOK BACK AS USEFUL MILESTONES IN THE  
CONSTRUCTION OF AN INNATL SECURITY SYSTEM.AS A RESULT,THE DEPLOYMENT  
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE SEABED AND IN OUTER SPACE HAS BEEN  
PRECLUDED;BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED;ENVIRONMENTAL  
WARFARE HAS BEEN OUTLAWED IN LARGE MEASURES;AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN

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REACHED TO BAN NUCLEAR TESTS IN ALL ENVIRONMENTS EXCEPT UNDER GROUND, AND TO HALT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO COUNTRIES NOT/NOT YET POSSESSING THEM. THESE ARE NOT/NOT NEGLIGIBLE MEASURES EVEN THOUGH ALL MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT STATES HAVE NOT/NOT YET ADHERED TO THEM.

THE MEASURES WE HAVE TAKEN ARE SOMETIMES DESCRIBED AS PERIPHERAL. I BELIEVE THAT TO CALL THEM PERIPHERAL IS SERIOUSLY TO UNDERRATE THEM. THEY ARE A GREAT ADVANCE OVER DECLARATIONS OF INTENTION BECAUSE THEY DEAL WITH CAPABILITIES AND THEY ARE, THEREFORE, VERIFIABLE WHICH INTENTIONS ARE NOT/NOT. THEY HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE ARMS RACE BY CLOSING OFF CERTAIN OPTIONS. IT IS TRUE THAT THE MEASURES TAKEN SO FAR HAVE FORECLOSED OPTIONS THAT WERE, IN LARGE PART, HYPOTHETICAL. BUT THEY DO SET THE STAGE FOR AN ATTACK ON THE HEART OF THE ARMS RACE WHICH IS HOW TO FORECLOSE OPTIONS THAT ARE REAL AND, IN THE ABSENCE OF RESTRAINT, INESCAPABLE.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, LET ME TURN TO THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR POWERS AND THEIR ALLIES TODAY RESTS PRIMARILY ON THE MUTUAL BALANCE OF DETERRENCE BETWEEN THE TWO MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS. SIMPLY PUT, THAT BALANCE MEANS THAT ANY ACT OF NUCLEAR WAR BY EITHER WOULD BE INCALCULABLE FOLLY. NEVERTHELESS, THE APPARENT SUCCESS SO FAR OF THIS SYSTEM IN PREVENTING A GLOBAL WAR SHOULD NOT/NOT CLOSE OUR MINDS TO THE PROBLEMS IT RAISES.

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WHAT PARTICULARLY CONCERNS ME IS THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPULSE THAT CONTINUES TO LIE BEHIND THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONRY. IT IS, AFTER ALL, IN THE LABORATORIES THAT THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE BEGINS. THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAN REQUIRE A DECADE OR MORE TO TAKE A WEAPONS SYSTEM FROM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO PRODUCTION AND EVENTUAL DEPLOYMENT. WHAT THIS MEANS IS THAT NATL POLICIES ARE PRE-EMPTED FOR LONG PERIODS AHEAD. IT ALSO COMPLICATES THE TASK OF THE FOREIGN POLICY-MAKER BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF INFERRING CURRENT INTENTIONS FROM MILITARY POSTURES THAT MAY BE THE RESULT OF DECISIONS TAKEN A DECADE EARLIER. THUS HOWEVER MUCH GOVTS DECLARE THAT THEY INTEND TO PURSUE A POLICY OF PEACE, THEIR DECLARATIONS CANNOT/NOT HELP BUT BE CALLED INTO QUESTION: FOR THEY HAVE ALLOWED THE BLIND AND UNCHECKED MOMENTUM OF THE ARMS RACE TO CREATE AND TO PUT AT THEIR DISPOSAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE THAT OTHER GOVTS CANNOT/NOT PRUDENTLY IGNORE. IN SUCH A SITUATION, THERE IS A RISK THAT FOREIGN POLICY CAN BECOME THE SERVANT OF DEFENCE POLICY WHICH IS NOT/NOT THE NATURAL ORDER OF POLICY-MAKING.

THERE IS ALSO A HIGH RISK THAT NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS WILL REVIVE CONCERNS ABOUT A DISARMING FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY; OR THAT THEY WILL TEND TO BLUR THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WARFARE; OR THAT THEY WILL INCREASE PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION. ALL THIS SUGGESTS THAT STABLE DETERRENCE REMAINS AN INADEQUATE CONCEPT. AND AN INADEQUATE CONCEPT IS A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR GENUINE WORLD SECURITY.

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THESE DANGERS HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED BY BOTH MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS. I BELIEVE THAT BOTH ARE SERIOUS IN WANTING TO ARREST THE MOMENTUM OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THEY HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN A DIALOGUE ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS FOR SOME YEARS. THE DIALOGUE HAS PRODUCED SOME USEFUL QUANTITATIVE LIMITS AND OTHERS ARE UNDER NEGOTIATION. BUT THE PROCESS IS PAINSTAKING AND AS I HAVE WATCHED IT, WITH A FULL APPRECIATION OF ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF MY OWN COUNTRY, I HAVE WONDERED WHETHER THERE MAY NOT/NOT BE ADDITIONAL CONCEPTS THAT COULD USEFULLY BE APPLIED TO IT.

THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER WAY BETWEEN THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS HAVE SHOWN THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONFIRM OR CODIFY AN EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES. BUT THEY HAVE ALSO SHOWN HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO GO BEYOND THAT AND TO CUT BACK ON WEAPONS SYSTEMS ONCE THEY HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED. THAT IS NOT/NOT ONLY BECAUSE THEY ARE THERE AND VESTED INTERESTS HAVE BEEN CREATED IN THEIR DEPLOYMENT. IT IS ALSO BECAUSE IT HAS PROVEN IMMENSELY COMPLEX TO ACHIEVE THE MAGIC FORMULA OF EQUAL SECURITY BY PLACING LIMITS ON WHAT ARE OFTEN QUITE DISPARATE WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

THE CONCLUSION I HAVE REACHED IS THAT THE BEST WAY OF ARRESTING THE DYNAMIC OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE MAY BE BY A STRATEGY OF SUFFOCATION, BY DEPRIVING THE ARMS RACE OF THE OXYGEN ON WHICH IT FEEDS. THIS COULD BE DONE BY A COMBINATION OF FOUR MEASURES. INDIVIDUALLY, EACH OF THESE MEASURES HAS BEEN PART OF THE ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE FOR MANY YEARS. IT IS IN THEIR COMBINATION THAT I SEE THEM AS REPRESENTING A MORE

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COHERENT, A MORE EFFICIENT AND A MORE PROMISING APPROACH TO CURBING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THE MEASURES I HAVE IN MIND ARE:

FIRST, A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TO IMPEDE THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. SUCH A BAN IS CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION. IT HAS LONG BEEN CDAS HIGHEST PRIORITY. I AM PLEASED THAT THE EFFORTS OF CDAS REPS AND THOSE OF OTHER COUNTRIES STAND A GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCESS DURING 1978. THE COMPUTER CAN SIMULATE TESTING CONDITIONS UP TO A POINT. BUT THERE IS NO/NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT A TOTAL TEST BAN WILL REPRESENT A REAL QUALITATIVE CONSTRAINT ON WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT.

SECOND, AN AGREEMENT TO STOP THE FLIGHT-TESTING OF ALL NEW STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES. THIS WOULD COMPLEMENT THE BAN ON THE TESTING OF WARHEADS. I AM SATISFIED THAT, IN THE PRESENT STATE OF THE ART, SUCH AN AGREEMENT CAN BE MONITORED, AS IT MUST BE, BY NATL TECHNICAL MEANS.

THIRD, AN AGREEMENT TO PROHIBIT ALL PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES. THE EFFECT OF THIS WOULD BE TO SET A FINITE LIMIT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIAL. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE BACKED UP BY AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. IT WOULD HAVE THE GREAT ADVANTAGE OF PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES ON A MUCH MORE COMPARABLE BASIS WITH NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES THAN THEY HAVE BEEN THUS FAR UNDER THE DISPENSATIONS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

FOURTH, AN AGREEMENT TO LIMIT AND THEN PROGRESSIVELY TO REDUCE MILITARY SPENDING ON NEW STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THIS WILL REQUIRE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NECESSARY OPENNESS IN REPORTING, COMPARING AND VERIFYING SUCH EXPENDITURES.

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IT IS ARGUABLE THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD BE STRENGTHENED BY PLACING THE SUMS RELEASED FROM NATL ACCOUNTS ON INNATL DEPOSIT, AT LEAST FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD, POSSIBLY IN THE FORM OF SPECIAL LOANS TO INNATL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS. SUCH AN IDEA WOULD BE IN LINE WITH CONVENTIONAL THINKING ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH AT LEAST SOME OF THE SAVINGS FROM DISARMAMENT. BUT I DO NOT/NOT THINK IT MAKES GOOD SENSE TO PENALIZE COUNTRIES THAT ACT RESPONSIBLY BY CUTTING BACK ON ARMAMENTS. I AM MUCH MORE ATTRACTED BY THE LOGIC OF THE IDEAS ADVANCED EARLIER THIS YEAR BY THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE. I BELIEVE THAT, IF PENALTIES ARE TO BE EXACTED, THEY SHOULD BE EXACTED FROM THOSE WHO, BY EXCESSIVE MILITARY SPENDING AND IN OTHER WAYS, CONTRIBUTE TO THE INSECURITY OF OTHERS. I HOPE THAT FURTHER THOUGHT CAN BE GIVEN TO THESE IDEAS BEFORE THIS SPECIAL SESSION DRAWS TO A CLOSE.

A STRATEGY OF SUFFOCATION SEEMS TO ME TO HAVE A NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES. IT IS NOT/NOT MERELY DECLARATORY BECAUSE IT WILL HAVE A REAL AND PROGRESSIVE IMPACT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS. IT WILL HAVE THAT IMPACT IN THREE WAYS: BY FREEZING THE AVAILABLE AMOUNT OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL; BY PREVENTING ANY TECHNOLOGY THAT MAY BE DEVELOPED IN THE LABORATORY FROM BEING TESTED; AND BY REDUCING THE MONEYS DEVOTED TO MILITARY EXPENDITURE. IT IS ALSO A REALISTIC STRATEGY BECAUSE IT ASSUMES THAT, FOR SOME TIME TO COME AT LEAST, TOTAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IS PROBABLY UNATTAINABLE IN PRACTICE. IT AVOIDS SOME OF THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

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IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CURRENTLY UNDER WAY IN THAT IT DOES NOT/NOT INVOLVE COMPLEX CALCULATIONS OF BALANCE BUT LEAVES THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES SOME FLEXIBILITY IN ADJUSTING THEIR FORCE LEVELS USING EXISTING WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY. IT HAS AT LEAST THE POTENTIAL OF REDUCING THE RISKS OF CONFLICT THAT ARE INHERENT IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL MOMENTUM OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION.

THE ULTIMATE INTENT OF A STRATEGY OF SUFFOCATION IS TO HALT THE ARMS RACE IN THE LABORATORY. BUT AN OFFER TO HALT THE ARMS RACE AT ANY STAGE IS A STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF GENUINE DISARMAMENT. THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA HAS SHOWN THE WAY IN RECENT WEEKS WITH HIS FARSIGHTED POSTPONEMENT OF A DECISION TO PRODUCE A SPECIAL BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE MUST ALL HOPE THAT THE RESPONSE OF THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE SUCH AS TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO EXTEND THAT POSTPONEMENT INDEFINITELY.

SO MUCH FOR THE VERTICAL DIMENSION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM. LET ME NOW SAY A WORD ABOUT THE HORIZONTAL SPREAD OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES.

THERE ARE THOSE WHO HAVE A FATALISTIC VIEW OF THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY ARGUE THAT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS ULTIMATELY UNAVOIDABLE AND THAT THERE IS LITTLE SENSE IN PUTTING UNDUE CONSTRAINTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF NUCLEAR ENERGY RESOURCES IN THE HOPE OF BEING ABLE TO STEM THE PROCESS.

I DO NOT/NOT SHARE THAT VIEW. I NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE LIST OF COUNTRIES SAID TO BE ON THE VERGE OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY IS NOT/NOT VERY DIFFERENT TODAY FROM WHAT IT WAS A DECADE OR SO AGO.

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I BELIEVE WORLD SECURITY WOULD BE SERIOUSLY DIMINISHED BY THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THAT IT IS THE RESPONSIBLE COURSE FOR GOVTS TO PURSUE POLICIES BASED ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT PROLIFERATION CAN BE STOPPED.

WE IN CDA HAVE PERHAPS GONE FURTHER IN OUR SUPPORT FOR AN EFFECTIVE NON-PROLIFERATION SYSTEM THAN HAVE MOST OTHER COUNTRIES. IN PART, THIS IS THE RESULT OF NATL EXPERIENCE. BUT IN MUCH LARGER PART, IT IS A REFLECTION OF PUBLIC OPINION IN CDA WHICH DOES NOT/NOT BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD BE SERVING THE CAUSE OF A RATIONAL WORLD ORDER BY BEING NEGLIGENT IN THE REQUIREMENTS WE PLACE ON CDN NUCLEAR EXPORTS.

I MAKE NO/NO APOLOGY FOR CDAS PRECEDENT-SETTING SAFEGUARDS POLICY THOUGH IT HAS BEEN CRITICIZED BY SOME AS BEING TOO STRINGENT. CDA IS ASKING OF OTHERS NO/NO MORE THAT WHAT WE HAVE OURSELVES ACCEPTED VOLUNTARILY AS A PARTY TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. WE HAVE NOT/NOT MANIPULATED OUR SAFEGUARDS FOR COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE NOR/NOR HAVE WE HESITATED TO ACCEPT COMMERCIAL LOSS WHERE OUR SAFEGUARDS HAVE INHIBITED NUCLEAR SALES. WE HAVE SHARED OUR TECHNOLOGY FREELY WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND WE HAVE APPLIED OUR SAFEGUARDS TO ALL ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS AND WITHOUT TRYING TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CAPABILITY AND INTENTION.

CDA JUDGED IT NECESSARY TO ADOPT A NATL POLICY EVEN THOUGH NUCLEAR TRANSFERS WERE ALREADY WITHIN THE COMPASS OF INNATL REGULATION. CDN ACTION WAS BASED ON GENUINE CONCERN ABOUT OUR ROLE AS A NUCLEAR SUPPLIER. WE DID NOT/NOT THINK THAT THE INNATL SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, AS

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IT STOOD, WAS LIKELY TO BE EQUAL TO THE PROBLEMS POSED BY THE ADVANCE OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. OUR OBJECT WAS TO BRING ABOUT A NEW, MORE EFFECTIVE, INNATL CONSENSUS.

CDA RECOGNIZES THAT THE INNATL SYSTEM WILL NEED TIME TO ADAPT TO THE NEW ENERGY SITUATION. IT IS NOW ACCEPTED BY ALL THAT NUCLEAR ENERGY WILL HAVE TO PLAY AN INCREASING PART IN MTG INCREMENTAL WORLD ENERGY NEEDS IN THE REMAINDER OF THE CENTURY. IT IS EQUALLY ACCEPTED THAT THE BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY MUST BE ACCESSIBLE TO ALL COUNTRIES HAVING NO/NO ALTERNATIVE ENERGY OPTIONS. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT, WITH THE EXPERIENCE OF ANOTHER ENERGY CRISIS STILL FRESH IN THEIR MINDS, MANY COUNTRIES WOULD LIKE TO AIM AT A HIGH DEGREE OF ENERGY INDEPENDENCE. IN PARTICULAR, THEY WILL EXPECT TO BE PROTECTED AGAINST THE INTERRUPTION, WITHOUT DUE CAUSE, OF ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES OF NUCLEAR FUEL. ANY NEW SYSTEM WILL NEED TO ACCOMMODATE THESE ASPIRATIONS.

BUT WE SHALL ALSO HAVE TO CONSIDER THAT WE ARE HOVERING ON THE THRESHOLD OF A PLUTONIUM ECONOMY. WE SHALL HAVE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE VULNERABLE POINTS IN THE FUEL CYCLE ARE CAPABLE OF BEING ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARDED BY TECHNICAL MEANS AND THAT, WHERE THAT CANNOT/NOT BE EFFECTIVELY DONE, WE CAN DEVISE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR INNATL MANAGEMENT. I BELIEVE THAT, IN THE END, THE BEST PROSPECT FOR COUNTRIES TO ASSURE THEIR NATL ENERGY SECURITY LIES IN AN INNATL SYSTEM THAT CARRIES THE CONFIDENCE OF NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS.

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THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE CONTRIBUTION THAT CAN BE MADE BY NATIONS ACTING UNILATERALLY. I BELIEVE THAT CDAS EFFORTS TO DATE HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND EFFECTIVE, BUT FURTHER ACHIEVEMENT CAN BE MADE ONLY THROUGH MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT. WE INTEND TO PLAY OUR FULL PART IN THE WORKING OUT OF THE ASSURANCES AND THE CONSTRAINTS THAT WILL INEVITABLY HAVE TO FORM PART OF AN ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF NON-PROLIFERATION.

WHILE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION REMAINS A SOURCE OF CONCERN, IT HAS SHOWN ITSELF AMENABLE TO CONTROL. THAT IS MORE THAN CAN YET BE SAID ABOUT THE TRANSFER OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IS SERIOUS. THIS SPECIAL SESSION CANNOT/NOT AFFORD TO LEAVE IT UNATTENDED. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ARE THE GERMS OF A HIGHLY CONTAGIOUS DISEASE. EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE WORLD'S MILITARY EXPENDITURES ARE FOR CONVENTIONAL PURPOSES. SOME FIFTEEN PERCENT OF THOSE EXPENDITURES ARE ACCOUNTED FOR BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. WELL OVER HALF OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVOTE AT LEAST TEN PERCENT OF THEIR PUBLIC SPENDING TO MILITARY PURPOSES; NEARLY A QUARTER OF THEM SPEND IN EXCESS OF TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT. IT IS WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS THAT 133 WARS HAVE BEEN FOUGHT SINCE 1945, INVOLVING 80 COUNTRIES AND KILLING 25 MILLION PEOPLE. MEANWHILE THE TRANSFER OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IS ASSUMING MASSIVE PROPORTIONS; IN THE AGGREGATE SOME DLRS 20 BILLION IS BEING EXPENDED ON IT EACH YEAR. THERE CAN BE NO/NO FIRST AND SECOND PRIORITIES, THEREFORE, AS BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR AND A WHOLE SERIES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACES. BOTH ARE RELEVANT TO THE MAINTENANCE OF WORLD

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SECURITY; BOTH ARE ABSORBING RESOURCES BETTER DEVOTED TO OTHER PURPOSES; BOTH ARE THE LEGITIMATE BUSINESS OF AN ORGANIZATION WHOSE PURPOSE IT IS TO HARMONIZE THE ACTIONS OF NATIONS.

THE TRAFFIC IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS INVOLVES PRODUCERS, CONSUMERS AND THE TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN THEM. WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT.

THE MORE CLOSELY WE LOOK AT THE PROBLEM, THE MORE CLEARLY WE CAN SEE THAT THE QUESTION OF SALES IS NOT/NOT EASILY DIVORCED FROM THE QUESTION OF PRODUCTION. THE PRODUCTION OF MILITARY EQPT IS ATTRACTIVE FOR COUNTRIES WITH AN APPROPRIATE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND WITH REQUIREMENTS OF SUCH EQPT FOR THEIR OWN ARMED FORCES. IT CONTRIBUTES TO NATL SECURITY; IT REDUCES EXTERNAL PAYMENTS; IT CREATES JOBS. MOREOVER, THE ATTRACTION OF PRODUCTION FOR DEFENCE IS ENHANCED BY THE FACT THAT SOME SEVENTY PERCENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY TODAY DERIVES FROM THE MILITARY AND SPACE SECTORS.

THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE MORE STATES GO INTO THE PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS TO MEET THEIR OWN SECURITY NEEDS, THE MORE TEMPTING IT IS FOR THEM TO TRY TO ACHIEVE LOWER UNIT COSTS AND OTHER ECONOMIC BENEFITS BY EXTENDING THEIR PRODUCTION RUNS AND SELLING SUCH WEAPONS ABROAD. ALMOST EVERY COUNTRY THAT PRODUCES SOME MILITARY EQPT FINDS ITSELF, TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE, CAUGHT ON THE HORNS OF THIS DILEMMA. MY COUNTRY IS NO/NO EXCEPTION.

OF COURSE, ANY PARTICULAR COUNTRY INTENT ON MAKING A CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD SECURITY COULD DECIDE TO ABSTAIN FROM PRODUCING ARMS. BUT WHAT SIGNIFICANCE WOULD SUCH A GESTURE ACTUALLY HAVE. SO LONG AS ARMS ARE BEING BOUGHT, ARMS WILL BE PRODUCED. THERE IS NO/NO PARTICULAR MORAL MERIT IN A COUNTRY THAT IS BUYING ARMS NOT/NOT PRODUCING THEM. AND IF THE MAIN REASON FOR NOT/NOT PRODUCING THEM IS NOT/NOT TO BE INVOLVED IN SELLING THEM, IT WILL HAVE NO/NO PRACTICAL IMPACT ON THE

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ARMS RACE BECAUSE OTHER SUPPLIERS WILL READILY FILL THE GAP.

ONE WAY OUT OF THIS DILEMMA WOULD BE FOR SUPPLIERS, ACTING IN CONCERT, TO PRACTICE RESTRAINT. THAT IS EASIER WHERE THE INCENTIVE FOR ARMS SALES IS MAINLY COMMERCIAL. IT IS MORE DIFFICULT WHERE CONSIDERATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY ARE INVOLVED. CDA IS NOT/NOT AN IMPORTANT EXPORTER OF MILITARY EQPT. WE COULD ACCEPT ANY CONSENSUS THAT MAY BE ARRIVED AT AMONG SUPPLIERS TO CUT BACK ON MILITARY EXPORTS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR POSITION DIFFERS FROM THAT OF OTHERS. THE MAJOR POWERS, IN PARTICULAR, SOMETIMES SEE ARMS SALES AS A MEANS OF MAINTAINING A BALANCE OF CONFIDENCE IN SITUATIONS WHERE POLITICAL SOLUTIONS CONTINUE TO ELUDE THE PARTIES. BUT THE MAJOR POWERS MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT A BALANCE OF CONFIDENCE CAN BE ACHIEVED IN SUCH SITUATIONS AT LOWER LEVELS OF COST AND RISK. I WELCOME THE RECENT DECISION OF THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO LOOK FOR A BASIS OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN THEIR SALES OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

RESTRAINT BY SUPPLIERS WILL HELP. BUT IT IS AN INCOMPLETE ANSWER TO THE ARMS TRAFFIC PROBLEM. IT MAY ALSO CAUSE RESENTMENT AMONG POTENTIAL ARMS PURCHASERS. FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE, MUCH OF THE ARMS TRAFFIC TAKES PLACE BETWEEN INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE PURCHASING COUNTRIES SEEK, AS IS THEIR RIGHT, TO ENSURE THEIR OWN SECURITY. IN MANY CASES, THEY SEEK NO/NO MORE THAN TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER ON THEIR NATL SOIL. TO CURB THEIR RIGHT TO ACQUIRE ARMS BY PURCHASE, EVEN TO PLACE QUALITATIVE RESTRAINTS ON SUCH PURCHASES, WOULD REVIVE MUCH OF THE ACRIMONY OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALECTIC. IT WOULD BE REGARDED, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, AS ANOTHER INSTANCE WHERE THE RIGHT ARE TRYING TO SUBSTITUTE THEIR JUDGEMENT FOR THAT OF THE POOR.

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MOREOVER, ATTEMPTS TO CURB THE TRANSFER OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WOULD DO NOTHING TO CHANGE THE INCENTIVE FOR ACQUIRING THEM.

IT IS AT THE LEVEL OF INCENTIVES THAT WE ARE LIKELY TO MANAGE BEST TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. THE INCENTIVE TO ACQUIRE ARMS IS ROOTED IN APPREHENSIONS OF INSECURITY. THE BEST WAY TO ALLAY SUCH APPREHENSIONS IS THROUGH COLLECTIVE REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA HAVE SET THE WORLD A USEFUL EXAMPLE IN TURNING THEIR CONTINENT INTO A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE AND IN PERSUADING OUTSIDE POWERS TO RESPECT THAT STATUS. SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS ARE CONCEIVABLE, IN LATIN AMERICA AS ELSEWHERE, TO DEAL WITH THE ACQUISITION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS. IT WOULD BE FOR REGIONAL DECISION-MAKERS TO DEVISE INCENTIVES FOR RESTRAINT AND SANCTIONS FOR EXCESS IN THE ACCUMULATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARSENALS AND IN THE BUILD-UP OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THAT, IN THE LONG RUN, SEEMS TO ME THE BEST PROSPECT OF CURBING THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACE WITHOUT DAMAGE TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS.

WHILE WE ARE EXPLORING THESE AND OTHER WAYS OF MAKING PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT, WE MUST ALSO STRENGTHEN OUR JOINT CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN INNATL PEACE AND SECURITY. SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT IS AT BEST A MATTER OF YEARS, IF NOT/NOT OF DECADES. MEANWHILE THE SECURITY OF NATIONS IS BOUND TO REMAIN PRECARIOUS. IN A WORLD OF A HUNDRED AND FIFTY OR MORE STATES, MANY OF WHICH HAVE CLAIMS UPON THEIR NEIGHBOURS, AND WHERE RESOURCE SHORTAGES AND POPULATION MOVEMENTS RAISE QUESTIONS OF LIFE AND DEATH FOR MILLIONS OF PEOPLE, VIOLENCE WITHIN AND BETWEEN STATES IS A REGRETTABLE

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FACT OF LIFE. THE UN WAS CREATED TO RESTRAIN AND, IF POSSIBLE, TO PREVENT WAR. ITS RECORD IS A MIXED ONE. BUT WHATEVER WE MAY THINK OF ITS CAPACITIES, WE MUST WORK AS BEST WE CAN TO IMPROVE AND TO STRENGTHEN THEM. RECENT EVENTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED ONCE AGAIN BOTH THE UNCERTAINTIES OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND THE CONTINUING NEED TO MAKE THESE OPERATIONS A SUCCESS. IT MUST BE OUR OBJECTIVE TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS THAT WILL PERMIT ALL MEMBERS TO RESPOND QUICKLY, IMPARTIALLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO THREATS TO PEACE WHENEVER THEY ARE CALLED UPON BY THE UN TO DO SO. I MAKE THIS PLEA ON BEHALF OF A COUNTRY THAT HAS MADE PEACEKEEPING A SPECIAL PLANK IN ITS DEFENCE POLICY AND HAS PARTICIPATED IN EVERY MAJOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATION OF THE UN.

I WANT TO ADD A BRIEF POSTSCRIPT ON THE MATTER OF INSTITUTIONS WHICH IS ALSO BEFORE OUR SPECIAL SESSION. IT IS EASY ENOUGH TO CHANGE INSTITUTIONS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT NEW INSTITUTIONS DO NOT/NOT NECESSARILY MAKE INTRACTABLE ISSUES LESS INTRACTABLE.

I BELIEVE THAT IT IS RIGHT FOR THE UN TO DEAL WITH DISARMAMENT AT TWO LEVELS. DISARMAMENT IS A COMMON CONCERN OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND THERE MUST BE A DELIBERATIVE BODY IN WHICH THE MEMBER STATES IN THEIR TOTALITY CAN PERIODICALLY BRING THEIR VIEWS TO BEAR ON THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS AS WE ARE DOING HERE. ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS, HOWEVER, MUST CONTINUE TO BE PURSUED IN A BODY OF MORE MANAGEABLE SIZE OPERATING ON A BASIS OF CONSENSUS. CDA CONSIDERS IT OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE THAT FRANCE HAS DECIDED TO REJOIN THE DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE.

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IT IS A PROMISING OMEN FOR THE SUCCESS OF OUR DELIBERATIONS. WE ALSO HOPE THAT THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA WILL SEE ITS BEST INTERESTS SERVED BY JOINING ITS EFFORTS TO THOSE OF OTHERS IN ADVANCING THE CAUSE OF DISARMAMENT.

PROPOSALS HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE TO STRENGTHEN THE CAPACITY OF THE UN FOR RESEARCH ON DISARMAMENT MATTERS AND TO MAKE THE RESULTS OF SUCH RESEARCH MORE WIDELY AVAILABLE. WE WELCOME PROPOSALS OF THIS KIND. IN THIS AS IN OTHER MATTERS OF PUBLIC POLICY, GOVTS CAN ONLY BENEFIT FROM MORE INFORMED DISCUSSION. DISARMAMENT IS THE BUSINESS OF EVERYONE BUT ONLY A FEW ARE ABLE TO FOLLOW THE ISSUES. THE CONSEQUENCE IS THAT SPECIAL INTERESTS DOMINATE THE DEBATE AND DISTORT THE CONCLUSIONS. WE MUST MAKE SURE THAT THEY DO NOT CARRY THE DAY. DISPASSIONATE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, PRESENTED IN TERMS THAT PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND, WOULD DO MUCH TO RIGHT THE BALANCE.

MR PRESIDENT,

AS LONG AGO AS 1929, THAT MOST ELOQUENT OF ADVOCATES OF DISARMAMENT, SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA, SPOKE OF DISARMAMENT AS BEING QUOTE REALLY THE PROBLEM OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY UNQUOTE. IN THE LARGER SENSE OF THE WORD, HISTORY HAS PROVED HIM RIGHT. THE ARMS RACE WE ARE HERE TO STOP IS A SYMPTOM OF THE INSECURITY OF NATIONS. BUT IT IS MORE THAN THAT. IT IS A LATENT SOURCE OF WORLD CATASTROPHE. THAT IS WHY THIS SPECIAL SESSION HAS BEEN CALLED TOGETHER. IT IS THE FIRST MAJOR ASSIZE ON DISARMAMENT TO HEVE BEEN HELD SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. WE MUST NOT/NOT ALLOW THE OPPORTUNITY TO PASS WITHOUT PUTTING OUR IMPRINT ON THE COURSE OF EVENTS. WE CANNOT/NOT

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EXPECT TO SETTLE ALL THE ISSUES IN OUR DELIBERATIONS. WE SHALL CERTAINLY NOT/NOT SETTLE THEM BY PRODUCING PAPER. WHAT WE MUST TRY TO ACHIEVE IS A REASONABLE CONSENSUS ON BROAD OBJECTIVES AND ON A PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS. IF WE CAN DO THAT, IF WE CAN HOLD OUT HOPE THAT THE ARMS RACE CAN BE REVERSED, WE WILL HAVE TAKEN A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARDS THE BETTER ORDERING OF THE AFFAIRS OF OUR PLANET. MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT,

LE CDA SE PRESENTE A CETTE RENCONTRE MONDIALE SUR LE DESARMEMENT A TITRE DE NATION INDUSTRIELLE SITUEE ENTRE DEUX SUPER-PUISSANCES FORTEMENT ARMEES. IL A DONC TOUT INTERET A PREVENIR LA GUERRE A L'EGALE NUCLEAIRE. NOUS SOMMES MEMBRES D'UNE ALLIANCE REGIONALE DE DEFENSE QUI COMPREND TROIS DES CINQ ETATS DOTES DE L'ARME NUCLEAIRE. POURTANT, NOTRE PAYS A RENONCE A LA PRODUCTION D'ARMES NUCLEAIRES OU A L'ACQUISITION DE TELLES ARMES PLACEES SOUS NOTRE AUTORITE.

EN EUROPE, LE CDA A DEJA RETIRE A SES FORCES ARMEES TOUTE VOCATION NUCLEAIRE, ET EN AMERIQUE DU NORD, NOUS SOMMES ACTUELLEMENT EN TRAIN DE REMPLACER PAR DES AVIONS EQUIPES D'ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES LES APPAREILS PORTEURS D'ENGINS NUCLEAIRES QUI SONT ACTUELLEMENT ASSIGNES A NOS TROUPES. AINSI, NOUS AVONS ETE LE PREMIER PAYS AU MONDE A RENONCER A LA FABRICATION D'ARMES NUCLEAIRES ALORS QUE NOUS EN AVIONS LA CAPACITE, ET NOUS SOMMES MAINTENANT LE PREMIER PAYS DOTE D'ARMES NUCLEAIRES A SE DEPARTIR LUI-MEME DE CE TYPE D'ARMEMENT.

DEPUIS PLUS D'UNE DECENNIE, NOUS NE PERMETTONS A AUCUN PAYS D'UTILISER L'URANIUM CANADIEN A DES FINS MILITAIRES. NOUS REGLEMENTONS RIGOREUSEMENT LE PEU DE MATERIEL MILITAIRE QUE NOUS EXPORTONS ET

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NOUS NE N'ACHEMINONS JAMAIS VERS LES ZONES DE TENSION OU DE CONFLIT ARME. PAR CONTRE, LE CDA EST UNE SOURCE IMPORTANTE DE MATIERES PREMIERES, D'OUTILLAGE ET DE TECHNIQUES, DESTINEES A L'USAGE PACIFIQUE DE LATOME.

NOTRE POLITIQUE REPOSE SUR LA CONVICTON QU'UN PAYS COMME LE CDA PEUT CONTRIBUER A RALENTIR LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS. MAIS NOUS POUVONS EVIDEMMENT FAIRE BIEN D'AVANTAGE EN AGISSANT DE CONCERT AVEC LES AUTRES NATIONS. C'EST POURQUOI LA PRESENTE SESSION EST SI LOURDE DE CONSEQUENCES. NOUS NE SOMMES PAS ICI POUR NEGOCIER DES ACCORDS. D'AUTRES EN CHARGERONT. NOTRE MISSION EST DE FAIRE LE POINT ET D'ARRETER DES PRINCIPES. CHACUN DE NOS PAYS ATTEND BEAUCOUP DE NOS DELIBERATIONS. POUR ETRE A LA HAUTEUR, NOUS DEVONS IMPRIMER UN NOUVEL ELAN AU PROCESSUS DU DESARMEMENT QUI NE PROGRESSE GUERE. LE MOMENT D'AGIR EN CE SENS NE SAURAIT ETRE MIEUX CHOISI.

LE TRAITE SUR LA NON-PROLIFERATION EST L'UN DES INSTRUMENTS LES PLUS IMPORTANTS QUE NOUS AYONS PU METTRE EN PLACE POUR LA REGLEMENTATION ET LA SURVEILLANCE DES ARMEMENTS. C'EST AUSSI L'UN DES PLUS FRAGILES DU FAIT QUE L'UNE OU L'AUTRE DES PARTIES PEUT LE DENONCER SUR PREAVIS DE TROIS MOIS. CE TRAITE EST UN AGENCEMENT DELICAT D'ENGAGEMENTS. PLUSIEURS PARTIES AU TRAITE QUI NE POSSEDENT PAS D'ARMES NUCLEAIRES LE TROUVENT INJUSTE. RAISON DE PLUS POUR QUE LES ETATS QUI EN SONT DOTES RENFORCENT LA CONFIANCE DANS LE TRAITE ET LA MEILLEURE FACON DE LA FAIRE, C'EST DE PRENDRE AU PLUS TOT DES MESURES EFFICACES POUR ARRETER LA COURSE AUX ARMES ATOMIQUES. C'EST D'AILLEURS L'ENGAGEMENT QUE CES DERNIERS ONT PRIS EN SIGNANT LE TRAITE.

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IL NY A PAS QUE LA NON-PROLIFERATION QUI, DANS LE SYSTMEE INNATL, SOIT MENACEE PAR UNE INTERMINABLE COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS. LA DETENTE AUSSI EST EN DANGER. EN EFFET, TOUTE POLITIQUE DE DETENTE REPOSE AVANT TOUT SUR LA CONFIANCE. DU MOINS, EST-ELLE AINSI COMPRISE DANS LACTE FINAL AUQUEL ONT SOUSCRIT TRENTE-CINQ CHEFS DETAT OU DE GOUVERNEMENT A HSNKI EN 1975. CE NEST QUE DANS UN CLIMAT DE CONFIANCE QUIL SERA POSSIBLE, AVEC LE TEMPS, DE SURMONTER LES RAIDEURS IDEOLOGIQUES ET DE FORGER LES LIENS DUNE COOPERATION FONDEE SUR DES PREOCCUPATIONS ET DES INTERETS COMMUNS. LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS VA A LENCONTRE DE CES DESSEINS. LA PRIVEE DE CHAQUE NOUVEAU SYSTEME DARME RISQUE EN EFFET DE DFTRUIRE LEQUILIBRE DE LA SECURITE. ON NE PEUT SATTENDRE QUUNE POLITIQUE DE DETENTE, QUI DOIT ETRE FONDEE SUR LA CONFIANCE, PUISSE INDEFINIMENT SUPPORTER CES TENSIONS.

LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS DEFIE AUSSI LA LOGIQUE DUN MONDE INTERDEPENDANT. IL EST DIFFICILE DE CROIRE QUE DES NATIONS CONSCIENTES QUE LEURS DESTINEES SONT LIEES, QUE LEURS OBJECTIFS NATIONAUX NE PEUVENT PLUS ETRE PLEINEMENT REALISES A LINTERIEUR DES FRONTIERES NATIONALES, QUE DE DEPOUILLER SON VOISIN EST LA FACON LA PLUS SURE DE SE DEPOUILLER SOI-MEME, NAIENT PAS DECOUVERT DE MEILLEURS MOYENS POUR ASSURER LEUR SECURITE QUE DACCENTUER LEQUILIBRE DE LA TERREUR. IL EST ENCORE PLUS INCONCEVABLE QUE DANS UN MONDE AUX RESSOURCES LIMITEES, OU LES BESOINS FONDAMENTAUX DE LHOMME DEMEURENT SI SOUVENT NEGLIGES, DES RESSOURCES DUNE VALEUR DE PRES DE 400 MILLIARDS DE DOLLARS SOIENT DILAPIDEES CHAQUE ANNEE A LA RECHERCHE DE LA SECURITE MILITAIRE.

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LA SECURITE, MEME LA SECURITE ABSOLUE, NEST PAS UNE FIN EN SOI. ELLE NEST QUE LE CADRE QUI NOUS PERMET DE POURSUIVRE NOS VERITABLES OBJECTIFS, A SAVOIR LE BIEN-ETRE ECONOMIQUE, LE PANOUISSEMENT CULTUREL, BREF, LA PLEINE REALISATION DE LA PERSONNE. MAIS RIEN DE TOUT CELA NEST POSSIBLE DANS UN VOISINAGE OU TOUT LE MONDE EST ARME.

POUR TOUTES CES RAISONS, NOUS NE POUVIONS CHOISIR MEILLEUR MOMENT POUR PRENDRE DU REcul ET FAIRE LE POINT SUR LA QUESTION DU DESARMEMENT. LA PREMIERE EVIDENCE QUI NOUS FRAPPE EST LA TENDANCE GENERALE A GARNIR TOUJOURS DAVANTAGE LES ARSENAUX, SOUS PRETEXTE QU'IL N'Y A PAS D'AUTRE FACON DE CORRRRIGER CE QUE L'ON CROIT ETRE DES DESEQUILIBRES EN MATIERE DE SECURITE. CEST SUR CET ARGUMENT QUE REPOSE LA LOGIQUE DE LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS. CETTE COURSE, NOUS DEVONS TOUTEFOIS EN RECONNAITRE LA VRAIE NATURE, SOIT CELLE D'UNE QUETE DE SECURITE, SI ALEATOIRE QUELLE SOIT. ET NOUS DEVONS EN TENIR COMPTE DANS NOS DELIBERATIONS. SI NOUS TENTONS DE DISSOCIER DESARMEMENT ET SECURITE, NOUS AURONS TOUT SIMPLEMENT EVACUE LE REFL AU PROFIT DE LA RHETORIQUE.

COMMENT PARVENIR A LA SECURITE PAR LE DESARMEMENT. TELLE EST LA GRANDE QUESTION QUI A PREOCUPE LES ESPRITS DURANT LA PLUS GRANDE PARTIE DU XXE SIECLE. NOUS LA REPRENONS ICI, MAIS DANS UN CONTEXTE PROFONDEMENT MODIFIE PAR DEUX REALITES QUI ONT VU LE JOUR AU COURS DES VINGT-CINQ DERNIERES ANNEES. LA PREMIERE EST L'AVENEMENT DES ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES, QUI NOUS A FORCES A ADMETTRE L'IDEE DE PUISSANCE INUTILISABLE. LA SECONDE EST LA TRANSFORMATION DE LA CARTE

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POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE ET L'ARRIVEE D'UN GRAND NOMBRE DE NOUVEAUX INTERVENANTS DANS LE DEBAT SUR LE DESARMEMENT. EN DEBIT DE CES CHANGEMENTS, IL ME SEMBLE UTILE DE PASSER EN REVUE LES PRINCIPAUX ELEMENTS DE CE DEBAT HISTORIQUE AFIN DE DETERMINER DANS QUELLE MESURE ILS PEUVENT GUIDER NOS EFFORTS AU COURS DE CETTE SESSION SPECIALE.

LA GAMME DES PROPOSITIONS VISANT UNE PLUS GRANDE STABILITE DANS LE MONDE ET L'APAISEMENT DES TENSIONS EST VASTE. ELLE VA DE CE QU'ON APPELLE COMMUNEMENT LA DECLARATION D'INTENTIONS A LA NOTION DE DESARMEMENT COMPLET ET GENERAL.

LA DECLARATION D'INTENTIONS RECOUVRE L'ENSEMBLE DES PACTES DE NON-AGRESSION, DES TRAITES DE GARANTIE, DES ASSURANCES DE SECURITE ET DES INTERDICTIONS D'UTILISER CERTAINES ARMES. L'EXEMPLE CLASSIQUE DE CE GENRE DE FORMULE EST LE PACTE BRIAND-KELLOGG DE 1928. PAR CETTE ENTENTE, LES PARTIES, DONT TOUTES LES GRANDES PUISSANCES DE L'EPOQUE, RENONCAIENT A LA GUERRE COMME INSTRUMENT DE POLITIQUE NATIONALE ET S'ENGAGEAIENT A REGLER LEURS DIFFERENDS UNIQUEMENT PAR DES MOYENS PACIFIQUES. CE PACTE INAUGURAIT UNE NOUVELLE EPOQUE, CROYAIT-ON. LE VERDICT BEAUCOUP PLUS CRUEL DES HISTORIENS EST QU'IL A OBNUBILE LA VISION DES HOMMES D'ETAT DES ANNEES TRENTES.

LA DECLARATION D'INTENTIONS N'EST PAS DESUETE POUR AUTANT. ELLE EST IMPLICITE DANS L'IDEE DE LA RENONCIATION A RECOURIR LE PREMIER AUX ARMES NUCLEAIRES. C'EST AVEC UN EGAL SERIEUX QUE CERTAINS PRONENT CETTE IDEE ET QUE D'AUTRES L'ENVISAGENT. IL EST DIFFICILE DE L'ECARTER SANS PLUS, CAR ELLE DONNERAIT VOIX ET AUTORITE A UNE CONCEPTION LARGEMENT ETENDUE DE LA MORALITE INTERNATIONALE.

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IL SE PEUT QUELLE PUISSE ENCORE CONTRIBUER A RASSURER LES PAYS QUI ONT RENONCE AUX ARMES NUCLEAIRES. MAIS NE NOUS LEURRONS PAS: LES DECLARATIONS D'INTENTION NE REMPLACERONT JAMAIS LES GESTES CONCRETS DE DESARMEMENT. IL SUFFIT D'UNE SEULE VIOLATION POUR QUELLES NE SOIENT PLUS QU'UN CHIFFON DE PAPIER. ELLES N'ONT D'EFFET NI SUR LES DISPOSITIFS MILITAIRES NI SUR LES RESSOURCES QU'ON Y CONSACRE. ELLES PEUVENT MEME ETRE NEFASTES DANS LES MESURES OU ELLES FONT OUBLIER LE PREALABLE A TOUT DESARMEMENT VERITABLE, SOIT LA REDUCTION DES EFFECTIFS MILITAIRES ET DES ARMEMENTS.

SI LA DECLARATION D'INTENTIONS S'APPUIE TROP SUR LA VALEUR DES BONNES INTENTIONS, LA NOTION DE DESARMEMENT GENERAL ET COMPLET, PAR CONTRE, A FAIT MONTRE D'UN EGAL IRREALISME DANS SES ATTENTES.

CETTE DERNIERE EXPRESSION A ETE CREEE LORS DE LA CONFERENCE MONDIALE DU DESARMEMENT DE 1932, MAIS LA NOTION SE TROUVAIT DEJA AU COEUR DU PACTE DE LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS, QUI PARLAIT DE LA REDUCTION DES ARMEMENTS NATIONAUX AU MINIMUM COMPATIBLE AVEC LA SECURITE NATIONALE FINCI. CETTE OPTIQUE SEST MODIFIEE PAR LA SUITE AVEC LA CREATION DES NATIONS UNIES. LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE ETANT TOUJOURS PRESENTE DANS LES ESPRITS, LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES A PLUTOT MIS L'ACCENT SUR LA SECURITE COLLECTIVE. MAIS LE PERFECTIONNEMENT DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES ET LE CHEC DES IDEES CONSACREES PAR LA CHARTE ONT REPLACE LE DEBAT SOUS LE THEME DU DESARMEMENT GENERAL ET COMPLET. D'INNOMBRABLES RESOLUTIONS REPRENENT, DEPUIS QUELQUES ANNEES, CETTE IDEE POUR EN FAIRE LE PRINCIPE FONDAMENTAL ET LE BUT ULTIME DE LA COMMUNAUTE MONDIALE.

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IL IMPORTE DE SE RAPPELER COMBIEN ENGLOBANTE ETAIT CETTE IDEE DE DESARMEMENT GENERAL ET COMPLET AU DEBUT DES ANNEES SOIXANTE.ON NE SONGEAIT PAS SEULEMENT AU LICENCIEMENT DES ARMEES, AU DEMEMBREMENT DE L'APPAREIL MILITAIRE, AU DEMANTELEMENT DE L'INDUSTRIE DE GUERRE ET A L'ELIMINATION DES STOCKS D'ARMES.PARALLELEMENT A CETTE DEMILITARISATION GLOBALE, ON PRECONISAIT UN SYSTEME GLOBAL DE SECURITE PREVOYANT DES MECANISMES FIABLES POUR REGLER PACIFIQUEMENT LES CONFLITS ET DES ARRANGEMENTS EFFICACES POUR VEILLER AU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX EN CONFORMITE DES PRINCIPES DE LA CHARTE.

IL NY A PAS LIEU DE RECUSER CET IDEAL.LE DESARMEMENT GENERAL ET COMPLET DEMEURE L'ULTIME OBJECTIF DE NOS EFFORTS.EN PRATIQUE, CET IDEAL SOULEVE TOUTEFOIS DE GRAVES QUESTIONS DANS L'ESPRIT DES NEGOCIATEURS.QUEL DEVRAIT ETRE LEQUILIBRE MILITAIRE A CHAQUE ETAPE DE LA DESESCALADE?QUELLE SORTE DE SYSTEME D'INSPECTION NOUS ASSURERAIT LE RESPECT DES ENGAGEMENTS?QUELLE SERAIT LA COMPOSITION D'UN ORGANISME INTERNATIONAL DE DESARMEMENT, ET DE QUELS POUVOIRS SERAIT-IL INVESTI?QUELLE SERAIT LA NATURE DES ARRANGEMENTS DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAX, DANS UN MONDE OU L'ON AURAIT DEPOSE LES ARMES?AU BOUT DU COMPTE, QUEL SERAIT L'EFFET DE CET IDEAL AMBITIEUX SUR LA SECURITE, VOIRE LA SOUVERAINETE DES PARTIES?

UN JOUR, IL NOUS FAUDRA REpondre A CES QUESTIONS.MAIS IL FAUT BIEN ADMETTRE QU'ELLES DEMEURENT AUJOURD'HUI SANS REponse.IL EST NORMAL DANS CES CONDITIONS QUE NOUS AYONS VISE MOINS HAUT ET CHERCHE PLUTOT A MENAGER DES ETAPES DANS NOTRE QUETE D'UN MONDE SANS ARMES.

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CEST LA VOIE QUE NOUS AVONS SUIVIE DEPUIS UNE DIZAINE D'ANNEES. PENDANT CE TEMPS, NOUS AVONS REUSSE A NEGOCIER UN CERTAIN NOMBRE D'INSTRUMENTS DE LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS QUE NOUS POUVONS, AVEC LE RECU, CONSIDERER COMME DES GAINS IMPORTANTS DANS L'EDIFICATION D'UN SYSTEME INTERNATIONAL DE SECURITE. AINSI, ON A EMPECHE LE DEPLOIEMENT DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES AU FOND DES OCEANS ET DANS L'ESPACE EXTRA-ATMOSPHERIQUE; ON A PROSCRIT LES ARMES BIOLOGIQUES ET INTERDIT, DANS UNE LARGE MESURE, LA GUERRE MESOLOGIQUE; ON S'EST ENTENDU POUR BANNIR LES ESSAIS NUCLEAIRES PARTOUT, SAUF SOUS TERRE, ET ON A CONVENU QUE LE CLUB DES ETATS DOTES D'ARMES NUCLEAIRES NE SOIT PAS ELARGI. VOILA DES MESURES QUI NE SONT PAS NEGLIGEABLES BIEN QUE TOUS LES PAYS DISPOSANT D'UNE PUISSANCE MILITAIRE APPRECIABLE N'Y AIENT PAS ENCORE SOUSCRIT.

ON QUALIFIE PARFOIS CES MESURES DE PERIPHERIQUES. A MON SENS, CETTE EPITHETE NE LEUR REND PAS JUSTICE. ELLES VONT EN EFFET BEAUCOUP PLUS LOIN QUE LES SIMPLES DECLARATIONS D'INTENTIONS PUISQUELLES PORTENT SUR DES CAPACITES ET SONT, PAR CONSEQUENT, VERIFIABLES A L'ENCONTRE DES INTENTIONS. ELLES INFLUENT SUR LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS DU FAIT QU'ELLES INTERDISENT CERTAINES OPTIONS. IL EST VRAI QUE LES MESURES PRISES JUSQU'A PRESENT N'ONT ECARTE QUE DES OPTIONS EN GRANDE PARTIE HYPOTHETIQUES. MAIS ELLES PERMETTENT DE NOUS ATTAQUER AU COEUR DU PROBLEME DE LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS, EN ELIMINANT DES CHOIX REELS ET, EN L'ABSENCE DE TOUTE CONTRAINTE, INEVITABLES.

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CECI DIT, REVENONS A LA QUESTION DE LA COURSE AUX ARMES ATOMIQUES. AUJOURD'HUI, LE MAINTIEN DE LA PAX ET DE LA SECURITE ENTRE PAYS DETENTEURS D'ARMES NUCLEAIRES ET LEURS ALLIES REPOSE SURTOUT SUR LEQUILIBRE DE LA DISSUASION ENTRE LES DEUX PRINCIPALES PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES. PLUS SIMPLEMENT, CELA SIGNIFIE QUE TOUT ACTE DE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE PAR LUNE OU L'AUTRE DES DEUX PARTIES SERAIT INSENSE. NEANMOINS, LE SUCCES APPARENT DE CE SYSTEME, QUI A PERMIS D'EVITER JUSQU'A MAINTENANT UNE GUERRE MONDIALE, NE DEVRAIT PAS NOUS FAIRE PERDRE DE VUE LES PROBLEMES QU'IL SOULEVE.

CE QUI ME TROUBLE PARTICULIEREMENT, C'EST L'EFFET D'ENTRAINEMENT DE LA RECHERCHE SUR LA PROLIFERATION DE L'ARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE STRATEGIQUE. CAR, APRES TOUT, C'EST DANS LES LABORATOIRES QUE DEBUTE LA COURSE AUX ARMES ATOMIQUES. EN UNE DIZAINE D'ANNEES, UN SYSTEME D'ARMEMENT PEUT PASSER DE LA RECHERCHE ET DE LA MISE AU POINT A LA PRODUCTION ET AU DEPLOIEMENT. C'EST DONC DIRE QUE LES POLITIQUES NATIONALES SONT ARRETEES LONGTEMPS A L'AVANCE. LA TACHE DES ARTISANS DE LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE SE TROUVE EN OUTRE COMPLIQUEE DU FAIT QU'IL EST DIFFICILE DE SUPPUTER LES INTENTIONS DU JOUR A PARTIR DE SITUATIONS MILITAIRES QUI RESULTENT PEUT-ETRE DE DECISIONS PRISES DIX ANS PLUS TOT. DE SORTE QUE, SI OUVERTEMENT QUE LES GOUVERNEMENTS MANIFESTENT LEUR INTENTION DE POURSUIVRE UNE POLITIQUE DE PAIX, LEURS DECLARATIONS NE PEUVENT PAS ETRE MISES EN QUESTION. CAR IL SONT PROFITES D'UNE COURSE AVEUGLE ET EFFRENEE AUX ARMEMENTS POUR SE DOTER D'UNE PUISSANCE MILITAIRE TELLE QUE LES AUTRES

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GOUVERNEMENTS SE VOIENT OBLIGES, EN TOUTE PRUDENCE, EN TENIR COMPTE. DANS UNE TELLE SITUATION, LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE RISQUE DETRE SUBORDONNEE A LA POLITIQUE DE DEFENSE, CE QUI VA A L'ENCONTRE DU COURS NORMAL DES CHOSES.

PAR AILLEURS, LE RISQUE EST GRAND QUE DE NOUVEAUX SYSTEMES D'ARMES RAVIVENT LES INQUIETUDES SUR LA POSSIBILITE D'UNE PREMIERE FRAPPE MASSIVE, QU'ILS ESTOMPENT LA DISTINCTION ENTRE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE ET GUERRE CLASSIQUE OU ENCORE QU'ILS AUGMENTENT LES PROBLEMES DE VERIFICATION. TOUT CELA DONNE A PENSER QUE LE PRINCIPE D'UNE FORCE DE DISSUASION STABLE NE SUFFIT PAS. OR, UN PRINCIPE INSUFFISANT N'EST QU'UN BIEN PIETRE SUBSTITUT A LA VERITABLE SECURITE MONDIALE.

LES DEUX PRINCIPALES PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES SONT CONSCIENTES DE CE DANGER ET JE CROIS QU'ELLES DESIRENT SERIEUSEMENT CONTENIR L'ELAN DE LA COURSE AUX ARMES NUCLEAIRES. DEPUIS QUELQUES ANNEES DEJA, ELLES SE LIVRENT A UN DIALOGUE SUR LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS STRATEGIQUES QUI A DONNE LIEU A L'IMPOSITION DE LIMITES QUANTITATIVES APPRECIABLES ET AU COURS DUQUEL ON EN ENVISAGE D'AUTRES. MAIS LE PROGRES EST LABORIEUX. PENETRE DE L'IMPORTANCE DE CE DIALOGUE POUR LA SECURITE DE MON PAYS, J'EN SUIS VENU A ME DEMANDER SI ON NE POURRAIT PAS ELARGIR LE DEBAT PAR L'APPORT D'AUTRES IDEES.

LES NEGOCIATIONS EN COURS ENTRE LES GRANDES PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES ONT MONTRÉ QU'IL EST POSSIBLE DE CONSACRER OU DE CODIFIER L'EQUILIBRE EFFECTIF DES FORCES. MAIS, ELLES ONT AUSSI MONTRÉ COMBIEN IL EST DIFFICILE D'ALLER PLUS LOIN ET DE REDUIRE LES SYSTEMES D'ARMES, UNE FOIS QU'ILS ONT ÉTÉ MIS AU POINT ET DÉPLOYÉS. CETTE DIFFICULTÉ NE TIENS PAS À LEUR SEULE PRÉSENCE ET AUX DROITS ACQUIS PAR LEUR DÉPLOIEMENT; ELLE TIENS AU FAIT QU'IL S'EST RÉVÉLÉ EXTREMEMENT

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DIFFICILE DE TROUVER LA FORMULE MAGIQUE DE LEGALITE DE LA SECURITE,  
EN IMPOSANT DES LIMITES A DES SYSTEMES D'ARMES SOUVENT TRES  
DISPARATES.

JEN AI CONCLU QUE LE MEILLEURE FACON D'ARRETER LA DYNAMIQUE DE LA  
COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES SERAIT DE LA COUPER DE TOUT CE QUI  
L'ALIMENTE.

ON POURRAIT Y PARVENIR EN CONJUGUANT QUATRE MESURES QUI, DEPUIS  
NOMBRE D'ANNEES, SONT INDIVIDUELLEMENT CONSIDEREES DANS LE DIALOGUE  
SUR LA REGLEMENTATION DES ARMEMENTS. MAIS CEST SURTOUT ENSEMBLE  
QUELLES POURRONT CONSTITUER UNE SOLUTION PLUS COHERENTE ET EFFICACE  
A LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES. VOICI LES MESURES AUXQUELLES  
JE SONGE:

PREMIEREMENT: L'INTERDICTION TOTALE DES ESSAIS AFIN D'ENTRAVER LE  
PERFECTIONNEMENT DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES. ON NEGOCIE PRESENTEMENT UNE  
INTERDICTION DE CE GENRE. LE CANADA LUI ACCORDE DEPUIS LONGTEMPS  
LA PLUS HAUTE PRIORITE. ET JE SUIS HEUREUX DE CONSTATER QUE LES  
EFFORTS DES REPRESENTANTS DU CANADA ET D'AUTRES PAYS A CET EGARD  
ONT DE BONNES CHANCES D'ABOUTIR EN 1978. CERTES, L'ORDINATEUR PEUT,  
DANS UNE CERTAINE MESURE, SIMULER DES ESSAIS, MAIS JE NE DOUTE PAS  
QU'UNE COMPLETE INTERDICTION DES ESSAIS IMPOSERA UNE LIMITE  
QUALITATIVE APPRECIABLE A LA PRODUCTION DE NOUVELLES ARMES NUC-  
LEAIRES.

DEUXIEMEMENT: UN ACCORD SUR L'ARRÊT DES VOLS D'ESSAI DE TOUS LES  
NOUVEAUX SECTEURS STRATEGIQUES, QUI VIENDRAIT SAJOUTER A

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L INTERDICTION DE L ESSAI DES OGIVES. JAI LASSURANCE QUE, DANS LETAT ACTUEL DES CHOSES, CETTE SURVEILLANCE INDISPENSABLE PEUT SEFFECTUER PAR DES MOYENS TECHNIQUES A LEHELLE DE CHAQUE PAYS.

TROISIEMEMENT: UN ACCORD INTERDISANT TOUTE PRODUCTION DE MATIERES FISSIBLES A DES FINS DARMEMENT, CE QUI AURAIT POUR EFFET DE LIMITER LA QUANTITE DE MATIERES PREMIFRES QUI PEUVENT SERVIR A LA FAB-  
RICATION DARMES NUCLEAIRES. IL FAUDRAIT QUUN TEL ACCORD REPOSE SUR UN REGIME EFFICACE DE GARANTIES INTEGRALES. CELA AURAIT LAVANTAGE MARQUE DE RENDRE LA COMPARAISON ENTRE LES PAYS DOTES DARMES NUCLEAIRES ET LES AUTRES BEAUCOUP PLUS FACILE QU ELLE NE LA ETE JUSQU ICI, EN RAISON DES EXEMPTIONS DU TRAITE SUR LA NON-PROLIFERAT-  
ION.

QUATRIEMEMENT: UN ACCORD LIMITANT PUIS REDUISANT PROGRESSIVEMENT LES BUDGETS MILITAIRES AFFECTES AUX NOUVELLES ARMES NUCLEAIRES STRATEGIQUES. POUR CELA, IL FAUDRA APPRENDRE A FAIRE MONTRE DE FRANCHISE DANS LA PRESENTATION, LA COMPARAISON ET LA VERIFICATION DE CES DEPENSES.

ON PEUT PENSER QUE LA CREDIBILITE DUN TEL ACCORD SE TROUVERAIT RENFORCEE SI, AU MOINS DURANT UNE PERIODE DE TRANSITION, ON VERSAIT LES SOMMES EPARGNEES DANS UN FONDS INTERNATIONAL QUI CONSENTIRAIT DES PRETS SPECIAUX AUX ORGANISEMES DE DEVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAUX.

UNE TELLE IDEE CADRERAIT BIEN AVEC LA FACON HABITUELLE DE CONCEV-  
OIR L AFFECTATION, AU MOINS PARTIELLE, DES SOMMES DEPENSEES GRACE

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AU DESARMEMENT. JE NE CROIS PAS CEPENDANT QU'IL SERAIT TRÈS SAGE DE  
PENALISER AINSI LES PAYS QUI, CONSCIENTS DE LEURS OBLIGATIONS,  
REDUISENT LEURS DÉPENSES EN ARMEMENTS. JE SUIS BEAUCOUP PLUS ATTIRÉ  
PAR LA LIGNE DE PENSÉE MISE DE L'AVANT PLUS TÔT CETTE ANNÉE PAR  
LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA FRANCE. S'IL DOIT Y AVOIR DES PÉNALITÉS, JE CROIS  
QU'ELLES DEVRAIENT FRAPPER LES PAYS QUI, PAR LEURS DÉPENSES  
MILITAIRES EXCESSIVES ET D'AUTRES GESTES DU GENRE, ENTRETIENNENT  
L'INSÉCURITÉ DES AUTRES. J'ESPERÉ QUE L'ON POURRA APPROFONDIR CES  
IDÉES AVANT QU'ELLE NE PRENNE FIN CETTE SESSION.

IL NE SEMBLE QUE LA STRATÉGIE DE L'ASPHYXIE COMPORTE PAR  
AILLEURS UN CERTAIN NOMBRE D'AVANTAGES. ELLE VA BIEN AU DELÀ DE LA  
SIMPLE DÉCLARATION D'INTENTIONS, PUISQU'ELLE SE PROPOSE D'AGIR EFFECTI-  
VEMENT, BIEN QUE GRADUELLEMENT, SUR LA MISE AU POINT DE NOUVELLES  
ARMES STRATÉGIQUES. ET CELA DE TROIS FAÇONS: EN GÉLANT LE STOCK DE  
MATIÈRES FISSILES DISPONIBLES; EN EMPECHANT QU'IL NE SOIENT SOUMISES  
À L'ÉPREUVE LES TECHNIQUES INVENTÉES EN LABORATOIRE; EN REDUISANT,  
ENFIN, LES SOMMES AFFECTÉES AUX DÉPENSES MILITAIRES. CETTE STRATÉGIE  
EST AUSSI RÉALISTE PARCE QU'ELLE TIENS POUR ACQUIT, QU'AU MOINS POUR  
LES PROCHAINES ANNÉES, LE DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE COMPLET EST PROBABLE-  
MENT IRRÉALISABLE. ELLE PERMET AU SURPLUS D'ÉVITER CERTAINS PROBLÈMES  
QUE RENCONTRENT ACTUELLEMENT LES NÉGOCIATEURS, DANS LA MESURE OÙ  
ELLE N'ENTRAÎNE PAS DES CALCULS COMPLEXES D'ÉQUILIBRE ET LAISSE  
AUX PAYS DOTÉS D'ARMES NUCLEAIRES UNE CERTAINE SOUPLESSE DANS

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L AJUSTEMENT DE LEUR PUISSANCE,GRACE A LUSAGE DES TECHNIQUES EXISTANTES.ENFIN,ELLE PEUT DIMINUER LES RISQUES DE CONFLIT QUI ACCOMPAGNENT FATALEMENT LESSOR TECHNIQUE ISSU DE LA CONCURRENCE STRATEGIQUE.

L INTENTION DERNIERE DUNE STRATEGIE DE LASPHYXIE EST DARRETER LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS DES L ETAPE DU LABORATOIRE.MAIS TOUTE OFFRE VISANT A STOPPER CETTE COURSE A UN STADE ULTERIEUR CONSTITUE UN PROGRES REEL VERS LE DESARMEMENT.EN CE SENS,LE PRESIDENT DES ETATUS-UNIS A FAIT MONTRE DE CLAIRVOYANCE,AU COURS DES DERNIERES SEMAINES,EN REMETTANT A PLUS TARD TOUTE DECISION SUR LA FABRICATION DUN NOUVEAU TYPE D'ARME TACTIQUE NUCLEAIRE.NOUS DEVONS TOUS ESPERER QUE LA RESPONSE DE LUNION SOVIETIQUE A CE GESTE PERMETTRA DE RETARDER INDEFINIMENT LA DECISION A CET EGARD.

VOILA POUR LA DIMENSION VERTICALE DE LA QUESTION NUCLEAIRE. PERMETTEZ-MOI MAINTENANT DE TRAITER DE LA DISSEMINATION HORIZONTALE DES TECHNIQUES NUCLEAIRES.

CERTAINS ENVISAGENT LA PROLIFERATION DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES AVEC RESIGNATION.IL SOUTIENNENT QU'ELLE EST INEVITABLE ET NE VOIENT DONC AUCUNE UTILITE A IMPOSER DES CONTRAINTES INDUES AUX ECHANGES INTERNATIONAUX,DANS LE DOMAINE DE L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE,COMME FACON ENRAYER LE PROCESSUS.

JE NE PARTAGE PAS CETTE FACON DE VOIR.JE REMARQUE AVEC SATISFACTION QU'LE LISTE DES PAYS QU'ON DIT PRETS A SE Doter D'ARMES NUCLEAIRES NEST PAS TRES DIFFERENTE DE CE QU'ELLE ETAIT IL Y A UNE DIZAINE DANNEES.JE CROIS QU'UNE PLUS GRANDE DISSEMINATION DES

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ARMES NUCLEAIRES REDUIRAIT SERIEUSEMENT LA SECURITE MONDIALE ET  
QUIL INCOMBE DONC AUX GOUVERNEMENTS DE DEFINIR LEURS POLITIQUES  
EN POSTULANT QUE CETTE PROLIFERATION PEUT ETRE CONTENUE.

LE CANADA A PEUT-ETRE FAIT DAVANTAGE QUE LA PLUPART DES AUTRES  
PAYS POUR ENCOURAGER LA MISE EN PLACE DUN SYSTEME EFFICACE DE  
NON-PROLIFERATION.CELA TIENT, EN PARTIE, A DES DONNEES DE NOTRE  
HISTOIRE.MAIS, SURTOUT, DELA REJOINT LOPINION PUBLIQUE CANADIENNE  
QUI NE CROIT PAS QUE NOUS SERVIRIONS LA CAUSE DUN ORDRE MONDIAL  
RATIONNEL SI NOUS NEGLIGIONS DASSUJETTIR NOS EXPORTATIONS NUCLEAIRES  
AUX GARANTIES LES PLUS SURES.

JE NESTIME PAS DEVOIR JUSTIFIER LA POLITIQUE DE GARANTIES QU  
IMPOSE LE CANADA, BIEN QUE D AUCUNS LA JUGENT TROP SEVERE.LE CANADA  
NE DEMANDE A AUTRUI QUE CE QUIL SEST LUI-MEME IMPOSE DE PLEIN GRE  
EN ADHERANT AU TRAITE SUR LA NON-PROLIFERATION.NOUS AVONS REFUSE  
DE SUBORDONNER NOS EXIGENCES DE GARANTIES A NOS INTEREST COMMER-  
CIAUX ET NOUS N AVONS PAS HESITE A PERDRE DES MARCHES LORSQUON  
NACCEPTAIT PAS NOS CONDITIONS.PAR AILLEURS, NOUS AVONS PARTAGE  
LIBREMENT NOTRE TECHNIQUE AVEC LES PAYS EN VOIE DE DEVELOPPEMENT  
ET NOUS AVONS EXIGE LES MEMES GARANTIES DE TOUS, SANS TRAITEMENT  
DIFFERENTIEL ET SANS TENTER DETABLIR UNE DISTINCTION ENTRE LES  
INTENTIONS ET LES POSSIBILITES DUTILISATION DES INSTALLATIONS  
NUCLEAIRES.

LE CANADA A JUGE NECESSAIRE DE SE Doter DUNE POLITIQUE NATIONALE,

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MEME SI LES ECHANGES NUCLEAIRES TOMBAIENT DEJA SOUS LE COUP DE REGLEMENTS INTERNATIONAUX.SI NOUS AVONS AGI DE LA SORTE,CEST QUE NOUS ETIONS VRAIMENT PREOCCUPES DE NOTRE ROLE DE FOURNISSEUR NUCLEAIRE.LE REGIME DE GARANTIES INTERNATIONALES DANS SA FORME DALORS NOUS SEMBLAIT PEU ADAPTE AUX PROBLEMES ENGENDRES PAR LES PROGRES DE LA TECHNIQUES NUCLEAIRE.NOTRE OBJECTIF ETAIT DONC LE PROVOQUER UN NOUVEAU CONSENSUS INTERNATIONAL,PLUS OPERANT,SUR CETTE QUESTION.

LE CANADA RECONNAIT QUE LE SYSTEME INTERNATIONAL METTRA DU TEMPS A S ACCLIMATER A LA NOUVELLE SITUATION EN MATIERE DENERGIE.MAIS TOUS RECONNAISSENT MAINTENANT QUE LENERGIE NUCLEAIRE DEVRA JOUER UN ROLE DE PLUS EN PLUS IMPORTANT,FACE A LAUGMENTATION SANS CESSSE CROISSANTE DES BESOINS MONDIAUX,DICI LA FIN DU SIECLE.ON ADMET EGALEMENT QUE TOUS LES PAYS DEPOURVUS DAUTRES RESSOURCES ENERGE-TIQUES DOIVENT POUVOIR BENEFICIER DES AVANTAGES NUCLEAIRES.DE MEME, AU LENDEMAIN DUNE CRISE DE LENERGIE,IL EST NORMAL QUE DE NOMBREUX PAYS VEUILLENT ATTEINDRE UN NIVEAU ELEVE DINDEPENDANCE EN LA MATIERE.ILS S ATTENDENT EN PARTICULIER A ETRE PROTEGES CONTRE TOUTE INTERRUPTION ARBITRAIRE DES LIVRAISONS DE COMBUSTIBLE NUCLEAIRE ESSENTIEL A LEURS BESOINS.TOUT NOUVEAU SYSTEME DEVRA REpondre A CES ASPIRATIONS.

MAIS NOUS DEVONS AUSSI ENVISAGER LE FAIT QUE NOUS SOMMES AU SEUIL DUNE ECONOMIE DE PLUTONIUM.NOUS DEVRONS DONC NOUS ASSURER QUE LES POINTS VULNERABLES DU CYCLE DU COMBUSTIBLE PEUVENT ETRE PROTEGES

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CONVENABLEMENT PAR DES MOYENS TECHNIQUES OU, QU'A DÉFAUT, NOUS  
PUISSIONS CONCEVOIR DES ARRANGEMENTS INSTITUTIONNELS POUR PLACER  
LE COMBUSTIBLE SOUS GESTION INTERNATIONALE. POUR MA PART, JE SUIS  
CONVAINCU QUE LA MISE EN PLACE D'UN SYSTÈME INTERNATIONAL CAPABLE  
D'INSPIRER CONFIANCE AUX FOURNISSEURS NUCLEAIRES OFFRE, EN FIN DE  
COMPTE, À TOUS LES PAYS, LA MEILLEURE CHANCE D'ASSURER LEUR SÉCURITÉ  
NATIONALE EN MATIÈRE D'ÉNERGIE. IL Y A DES LIMITES AUX CONTRIBUTIONS  
UNILATÉRALES QUE PEUVENT FAIRE LES NATIONS. JE CROIS QUE LES EFFORTS  
DU CANADA, À CE JOUR, ONT ÉTÉ CONSTRUCTIFS ET VALABLES. MAIS POUR  
FAIRE PLUS, IL FAUT AGIR PAR LE BIAIS D'ENTENTES MULTILATÉRALES.  
NOUS COMPTONS PARTICIPER PLEINEMENT À L'ÉLABORATION DES ASSURANCES  
ET DES RESTRICTIONS QUI DEVRONT INÉVITABLEMENT FAIRE PARTIE D'UN  
MEILLEUR SYSTÈME INTERNATIONAL DE NON-PROLIFÉRATION.

BIEN QUE LA DISSEMINATION DES TECHNIQUES NUCLEAIRES DEMEURE UN  
SUJET D'INQUIÉTUDE, IL SEMBLE AU MOINS QU'ON PUISSE LA CONTENIR.  
ON NE PEUT EN DIRE AUTANT DU COMMERCE DES ARMES CLASSIQUES.

EN EFFET, LE PROBLÈME DES ARMES CLASSIQUES EST GRAVE ET NOUS NE  
POUVONS LE PASSER ICI SOUS SILENCE. LES ARMES CLASSIQUES ENGENDRENT  
UNE VÉRITABLE FIÈVRE DES DÉPENSES. QUELQUE QUATRE-VINGT POUR CENT  
DES BUDGETS MILITAIRES MONDIAUX SONT CONSACRÉS AUX FORCES ET AUX  
ARMES DE TYPE CLASSIQUE. ENVIRON QUINZE POUR CENT DE CES DÉPENSES  
SONT SUPPORTÉES PAR LES PAYS EN VOIE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT. PLUS DE LA  
MOITIÉ ENTRE EUX AFFECTENT AU MOINS DIX POUR CENT DE LEURS FONDS

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PUBLICS A DES FINS MILITAIRES, ALORS QUE PRES DU QUART Y CONSACRENT PLUS DE VINGT-CINQ POUR CENT. DEPUIS 1945, CEST AVEC DES ARMES CLASSIQUES QUE SE SONT LIVREES 133 GUERRES METTANT EN CAUSE 80 PAYS ET CAUSANT LA MORT DE 25 MILLIONS DE PERSONNES. PENDANT CE TEMPS, LE COMMERCE DES ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES A PRIS DES PROPOGITIONS COLOSSALES. DANS L'ENSEMBLE, QUELQUE 20 MILLIARDS DE DOLLARS Y SONT CONSACRES CHAQUE ANNEE. ON NE SAURAIT, EN CONSEQUENCE, SOPPOSER A LA COURSE AUX ARMES NUCLEAIRES PLUTOT QUA LA COURSE AUX ARMES CLASSIQUES. L'UNE ET L'AUTRE MENAGENT LA SECURITE DU MONDE; LES DEUX ABSORBENT DES RESSOURCES QUI L SERAIT PLUS UTILE DAFFECTER A D'AUTRES FINS; LES DEUX RELEVANT DE LA COMPETENCE D'UNE ORGANISATION DONT LA FOUNCTION ESSENTIELLE EST D HARMONISER LES RELATIONS ENTRE NATIONS.

LE COMMERCE DES ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES SE RESUME EN FAIT A DES TRANSACTIONS ENTRE PRODUCTEURS ET CONSOMMATEURS. QUE POUVONS-NOUS Y FAIRE?

EN Y REGARDANT DE PLUS PRES, NOUS CONSTATONS QUE LA QUESTION DES VENTES NE SAURAIT ETRE AISEMENT DISSOCIEE DE CELLE DE LA PRODUCTION. LA PRODUCTION DE MATERIEL MILITAIRE EST ATTRAYANT POUR LES PAYS DOTES DE LA BASE INDUSTRIELLE NECESSAIRE ET QUI EN ONT BESOIN POUR LEURS FOCES ARMEES. ELLE CONTRIBUE A LA SECUVITY NATIONALE; ELLE REDUIT LES SORTIES DE DEVISES; ELLE CREE DES EMPLOIS. EN OUTRE- L'ATTRAIT DE LA PRODUCTION A DES FINS DE DEFENSE SE TROUVE REHAUSSE

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PAGE FORTY WKGR1208 UNCLAS

DU FAIT QUE QUILQUE SOIXANTE-DIX POUR CENT DE LA TECHNIQUE DE  
POINTE PROVIENT AUJOURD HUI DES SECTEURS MILITAIRE ET SPATIAL.

EVIDEMMENT, PLUS LES PAYS PRODUISENT DES ARMES POUR ASSURER LEUR  
SECURITY, PLUS ILS SONT TENTES DESSAYER DE DIMINUER LES FRAIS DE  
PRODUCTION A L UNITE ET D OBTENIR D AUTRES BENEFICES ECONOMIQUES  
EN AUGMENTANT LEUR PRODUCTION ET EN VENDANT CES ARMES A L ETRANGER.  
PRESQUE TOUS LES PAYS PRODUCTEURS DE MATERIEL MILITAIRE SE TROUVENT,  
DANS UNE CERTAINE MESURE, ENFERMES DANS CE DILEMME. MON PAYS NE FAIT  
PAS EXCEPTION A LA REGLE.

TOUTE NATION DESIREUSE DE CONTRIBUER A LA SECURITE MONDIALE POUR-  
RAIT DECIDER DE SABSTENIR DE PRODUIRE DES ARMES. MAIS QUEL PIONS  
AURAIT CE GESTE? AUSSI LONGTEMPS QU IL Y AURA DES ACHETEURS, ON  
PRODUIRA DES ARMES. LE PAYS QUI ACHETE DES ARMES NA PAS DE MERITE  
PARTICULIER A NES PAS EN PRODUIRE. ET SIL NEN PRODUIT PAS POUR  
SABSTENIR DEN VENDRE, SON GESTE NAURA PAS DINFLUENCE REELLE SUR LA  
COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS PARCE QUE D AUTRES FOURNISSEURS SEMPRESSERONT  
DE PRENDRE SA PLACE.

LE DELEMME POURRAIT ETRE RESOLU SI LES FOURNISSEURS CONVENAIENT  
DE FAIRE MONTRE DE MODERATION. LA CHOSE EST PLUS FACILE LORSQUE LES  
MOTIFS SONT SURTOUT D ORDRE COMMERCIAL. ELLE EST PLUS DIFFICILE  
LORSQU INTERVIENNENT DES CONSIDERATIONS DE POLITIQUE ETRANGERE.  
LE CANADA NEST PAS UN GROS EXPORTATEUR DE MATERIEL MILITAIRE.

IL LUI SERAIT POSSIBLE D ACCEPTER TOUT CONSENSUS AUQUEL POURRONT  
PARVENIR LES FOURNISSEURS SUR LA REDUCTION DES EXPORTATIONS MILIT-  
AIRES.

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PAGE FORTY ONE WKGR1208 UNCLAS

NOUS RECONNAISSONS QUE NOTRE SITUATION EST DIFFERENTE DE CELLE DES AUTRES. LES GRANDES PUISSANCES SURTOUT VOIENT DANS LA VENTE D'ARMES UN MOYEN DE CONSERVER L'EQUILIBRE DE LA CONFIANCE LORSQUE LES REGLEMENTS POLITIQUES ECHAPPENT AUX PARTIES. MAIS LES GRANDES PUISSANCES DOIVNT AUSSI RECONNAITRE QUE, DANS LES SITUATIONS DE CE GENRE, CET EQUILIBRE EST REALISABLE A UN PRIX ET A UN RISQUE MOINS ELEVES. JE SUIS HEUREUX QUE LES ETATS-UNIS ET L'UNION SOVIETIQUE AIENT DECIDE RECEMMENT DE CHERCHER UNE FACON DE DIMINUER DE PART ET D'AUTRE LES VENTES D'ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES.

LA MODERATION EST UN PAS DANS LA BONNE DIRECTION, MAIS ELLE NE SUFFIT PAS. ELLE RISQUE D'ENGENDRER LE RESENTIMENT DES EVENTUELS ACHETEURS D'ARMES. POUR LE MEILLEUR OU POUR LE PIRE, LE PLUS GROS DES VENTES D'ARMES SE FAIT ENTRE PAYS INDUSTRIALISES ET PAYS EN VOIE DE DEVELOPPEMENT. LES PAYS ACHETEURS CHERCHENT, COMME CEST LEUR DROIT, A ASSURER LEUR SECURITY. DANS BIEN DES CAS, IL NE CHERCHENT QU'A MAINTENIR LA LOI ET L'ORDRE PUBLIC SUR LEUR TERRITOIRE. LEUR ALIENER LE DROIT D'ACHETER DES ARMS, VOIRE LEUR IMPOSER DES RESTRICTIONS QUALITATIVES, NE FERAIT QU'ACCENTUER L'ACRIMONIE QUI MARQUE LE DIALOGUE NORD-SUD. ON CROIRAIT, A TORT OU A RAISON, QUE LES RICHES TENTENT ENCORE UNE FOIS DE SUBSTITUER LEUR JUGEMENT A CELUI DES PAUVRES. DE PLUS, PRETENDRE FREINER LE CIRCULATION DES ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES NE CHANGE RIEN AUX MOTIFS DES ACHETEURS.

CEST AU NIVEAU DES MOTIFS QUE NOUS AVONS LE PLUS CH CHANCES DE MAITRISER LE PROBLEME DE L'ACHAT DES ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES, CAR

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PAGE FORTY TWO WKGR1208 UNCLAS

CEST LA PEUR DE L INSECURITE QUI POUSSE LES PAYS A VOULOIR SEN  
PROCURER. LES ARRANGEMENTS REGIONAUX COLLECTIFS CONSTITUENT LA  
MEILLEURE FACON DAPAISER CETTE CRAINTE. LES PAYS D AMERIQUE LATINE  
ONT DONNE AU MONDE UN EXEMPLE A SUIVRE: IL ONT FAIT DE LEUR CONTINENT  
UNE ZONE EXEMPTÉ D ARMES NUCLEAIRES ET ONT CONVAINCU LES AUTRES  
PUISSANCES DE RESPECTER LEUR DECISION. DES ARRANGEMENTS DU MEME  
GENRE POURRAIENT ETRE APPLIQUES, EN AMERIQUE LATINE COMME AILLEURS,  
A LACQUISITION DES ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES. IL APPARTIENDRAIT AUX  
AUTORITES REGIONALES DE TROUVER DES MOYENS D INCITER TOUTES LES  
PARTIES A LA MODERATION ET DE PREVOIR DES SANCTIONS EN CASE D ABUS.  
A LONGUE ECHEANCE, CEST, A MON AVIS, LA MEILLEURE FACON DE FREINER LA  
COURSE AUX ARMES CLASSIQUES SANS NUIRE AUX RELATIONS ENTRE NATIONS.

TOUT EN EXPLORANT CES MOYENS, ET D AUTRES ENCORE, DE FAIRE AVANCER  
LA CAUSE DU DESARMEMENT, NOUS DEVONS RENFORCER NOTRE CAPACITE  
MUTUELLE DE MAINTENIR LA PAIX ET LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALES. EN  
METTANT LES CHOSES AU MIEUX, LA REALISATION DE PROGRES CONCRETS EN  
MATIERE DE DESARMEMENT PRENDRA DES ANNEES, VOIRE DES DECENNIES.  
ENTRETEMPS, LA SECURITE DES NATIONS RESTERA FORCEMENT PRECAIRE.  
DANS UN MONDE DE PLUS DE CENT CINQUANTE ETATS, DONT UN GRAND NOMBRE  
ONT DES PRETENTIONS SUR LEURS VOISINS, ET OU LA PENURIE DE RESSOURCES  
ET LES DEPLACEMENTS DE POPULATIONS SOULEVENT DES QUESTIONS DE VIE  
OU DE MORT POUR DES MILLIONS DE GENS, LA VIOLENCE AU SEIN DES PAYS  
ET ENTRE EUX EST UNE DEPLORABLE REALITE QUOTIDIENNE. L ORGANISATION

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PAGE FORTY THREE WKGR1208 UNCLAS

DES NATIONS UNIES A ETE CREEE POUR CONTENIR ET, SI POSSIBLE,  
EMPECHER LA GUERRE. SON BILAN EST FAIT DE REUSSITES ET DECECS.  
MAIS, QUOI QUE NOUS PUISSIONS PENSER DE SES POSSIBILITES, NOUS  
DEVONS FAIRE DE NOTRE MIEUX POUR LES AMELIORER ET LES ACCROITRE.  
DE RECENTS EVENEMENTS ONT MONTRE ENCORE UNE FOIS LES INCERTITUDES  
QUI PESENT SUR LES OPERATIONS DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX ET COMBIEN LEUR  
SUCCES EST NECESSAIRE. NOUS DEVONS VISER A CREER LES CONDITIONS QUI  
PERMETTRONT A TOUS LES MEMBRES DE REAGIR RAPIDEMENT, IMPARTIALEMENT  
ET EFFICACEMENT AUX MENACES FAITES A LA PAIX CHAQUE FOIS QUE LES  
NATIONS UNIES LEUR DEMANDENT DE LE FAIRE. JE M EXPRIME AINSI AU NOM  
DUN PAYS QUI A FAIT DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX UN VOLET SPECIAL DE SA  
POLITIQUE DE DEFENSE ET QUI A PARTICIPE A TOUTES LES GRANDES  
OPERATIONS DES CASQUES BLEUS DE L ONU.

JE DESIRE AJOUTER QUELQUES MOTS SUR LA QUESTION INSTITUTIONNELLE,  
QUI EST AUSSI A LORDRE DU JOUR DE NOTRE SESSION SPECIALE. IL EST  
ASSEZ FACILE DE CHANGER LES INSTITUTIONS, MAIS IL FAUT COMPRENDRE  
QUE DE NOUVELLES INSTITUTIONS NE RENDENT PAS NECESSAIREMENT PLUS  
FACILE LA SOLUTION DES QUESTIONS DIFFICILES.

A MON SENS, IL EST BON QUE LES NATIONS UNIES S OCCUPENT DU  
DESARMEMENT A DEUX NIVEAUX. COMME CEST UN PROBLEME QUI INTERESSE  
TOUT LE MONDE, IL NOUS FAUT UNE ASSEMBLEE DELIBERANTE OU TOUS LES  
ETATS MEMBRES PEUVENT PRESENTER REGULIEREMENT LEURS POINTS DE VUE  
SUR LE DESARMEMENT COMME NOUS LE FAISONS ICI. PAR CONTRE, LES

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PAGE FORTY FOUR WKGR1208 UNCLAS

NEGOCIATIONS DOIVENT SE POURSUIVRE AU SEIN D UN ORGANISME PLUS RESTREINT ET QUI FONCTIONNE PAR CONSENSUS. DE L AVIS DU CANADA, EN SE JOIGNANT DE NOUVEAU AU DIALOGUE SUR LE DESARMEMENT, LA FRANCE A PRIS UNE DECISION TRES IMPORTANTE ET QUI AUGURE BIEN DU SUCCES DE NOS DELIBERATIONS. ET NOUS ESPERONS QUE LA REPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DE CHINE CONSIDERERA QU IL VA DE SON INTERET D UNIR SES EFFORTS A CEUX DES AUTRES PAYS POUR FAIRE PROGRESSER LA CAUSE DU DESARMEMENT.

PAR AILLEURS, ON A FAIT DES PROPOSITIONS POUR AMELIORER LES MOYENS DE RECHERCHE DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LES QUESTIONS DE DESARMEMENT ET ASSURER UNE PLUS VASTE DIFFUSION DES RESULTATS OBTENUS. NOUS SOMMES TOUT A FAIT OUVERTS A DES PROPOSITIONS DE CE GENRE. SUR CETTE QUESTION D INTERET PUBLIC COMME SUR D AUTRES, LES GOUVERNEMENTS NE PEUVENT QUE TIRER PROFIT DE DISCUSSIONS MIEUX DOCUMENTEES. LE DESARMEMENT EST LAFFAIRE DE TOUS, MAIS A L HEURE ACTUELLE SEULS QUELQUES-UNS SONT AUF FAIT DU PROBLEME. CEST POURQUOI DES INTERETS PARTICULIERS DOMINENT LE DEBAT ET FAUSSENT LES CONCLUSIONS. IL FAUT S ASSURER QUE LEUR POINT DE VUE NE PREVAUDRA PAS. DES RECHERCHES ET DES ANALYSES IMPARTIALES, PRESENTEES EN TERMES ACCESSIBLES, CONTRIBUERAIENT POUR BEAUCOUP A REDRESSER L EQUILIBRE.

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT,

DEJA EN 1929, SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA, LUN DES PLUS ELOQUENTS APOTRES DU DESARMEMENT, AFFIRMAIT QU IL S AGISSAIT CIT EN FAIT DU PROBLEME DE L ORGANISATION DE LA COMMUNAUTE MONDIALE FINCIT. EM UN

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PAGE FORTY FIVE WKGR1208 UNCLAS

SENS TRES GLOBAL, L HISTOIRE LUI A DONNE RAISON. LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS A LAQUELLE NOUS TENTIONS DE METTRE FIN EST UN SYPTOME DE L INSECURITE DES NATIONS. PLUS QUE CELA, ELLE RISQUE DE PROVOQUER UNE CATASTROPHE MONDIALE. CEST POUR CETTE RAISON QU A ETE CONVOQUEE CETTE SESSION SPECIALE. CE SONT LES PREMIERE ASSISES SUR LE DESARMEMENT DEPUIS LA FIN DE LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE. NE LAISSONS PAS ECHAPPER CETTE OCCASION DE MARQUER LE COURS DES EVENEMENTS. NOUS NE POUVONS NOUS ATTENDRE A REGLER TOUS LES PROBLEMES AUD COURS DE NOS DELIBERATIONS ET CE NEST CERTAINEMENT PAS EN NOIRCISSANT DU PAPIER QUE NOUS Y PARVIENDRONS. IL FAUT PLUTOT ESSAYER DEN ARRIVER A UN ACCORD RAISONNABLE SUR DES OBJECTIFS GENERAUX ET SUR UN PLAN DACTION POUR LES PROCHAINES ANNEES. SI NOUS REUSSISSONS, SI NOUS SAVONS GARDER INTACT NOTRE ESPOIR DE METTRE FIN A LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS, ALORS NOUS AURONS POSE UN GESTE IMPORTANT DANS LA CONDUITE DES AFFAIRES MONDIALES.

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AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO / À The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, OTTAWA - GAM

FROM / De The Canadian Embassy, BAGHDAD, Iraq

REFERENCE / Référence

SUBJECT / Sujet Press Release - Notes for a Speech by the Prime Minister in Montreal on occasion of Yom Ha'atzmaut, May 10, 1978

10  
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FRONTIER SECURITY  
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CONFIDENTIAL

JUN 7 1978

DATE May 23, 1978

NUMBER / Numéro 209

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We have just received and read the above release and note with dismay the reference to "the Jewish race" in the first paragraph on page 4 of the English version. We certainly hope that the Prime Minister delivered that paragraph in the French version or that the notes were revised before delivery for such a public reference can only lend support to the racist theory as applied to our Jewish compatriots and indeed to those of the Hebrew faith throughout the world. As you are aware, the reference is anthropologically incorrect and gives support to the contention that "Zionism is Racism" which we so firmly oppose.

*Wm Jones*  
Ambassador

35  
JUN 7 1978  
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TO Le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures  
À OTTAWA (FAB)

SECURITY — SÉCURITÉ

WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)  
SANS COTE

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. 194

DATE 25/4/78

| QUANTITY<br>QUANTITÉ                                        | DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |    |  |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|--|--|
|                                                             | <p><u>SUJET:</u> Discours du Premier ministre au<br/>Economic Club de New York</p> <p><u>PIECE JOINTE:</u><br/>Copie de notre communiqué de presse<br/>en date du 24 avril 1978.</p> <p><u>DISTR.</u> (PAR LA MISSION)<br/>(avec les annexes)</p> <p>EXTOTT / ECB<br/>          / GPS<br/>          / FAI</p> <p>CIDAHULL / ADO<br/>            / INFO</p> <p><i>done in FAB</i></p> | <p>Votre lettre FAB-(M)-338<br/>du 5 avril 1978</p> <div data-bbox="1063 627 1485 929" style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>To/A <u>FAI</u><br/>From/De: <u>ACRA</u><br/><i>file</i><br/><b>MAY 2 1978</b><br/>Att'n:</p> </div> <div data-bbox="1104 952 1502 1111" style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>57-7-PM</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 33%;">35</td> <td style="width: 33%;"></td> <td style="width: 33%;"></td> </tr> </table> </div> | 35 |  |  |
| 35                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |    |  |  |
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Canadian High Commission

Haut Commissariat du Canada

Canada

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - TRUDEAU

"There is a moral imperative to do what we can to eliminate starvation and deprivation in the world", according to the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliot Trudeau. In remarks before the Economic Club of New York, Mr. Trudeau said that "we must also admit the countries of the Third World as full partners to the councils of mankind", because "their fortunes and ours are now inextricably bound together".

Mr. Trudeau called for a renewed commitment to development, while noting that development efforts must be appropriate to the needs of individual countries. In line with this, the Canadian Government recently converted the Taka 12.2 crore (Cdn \$9 million) Canadian component of the IDA Muhurri River project from a loan to a grant. As a result, all Canadian assistance is provided to Bangladesh on a total grant basis. Canadian grants to Bangladesh in the past year amounted to Taka 100 crore (Cdn \$75 million) bringing total Canadian development assistance grants since Liberation to Taka 435 crore (Cdn \$325 million).

... Excerpts from the Prime Minister's remarks are attached.

- 30 -

Canadian High Commission  
DACCA, Bangladesh  
Tel.: 315181

April 24, 1978.

NOTES FOR REMARKS BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
PIERRE ELLIOT TRUDEAU, TO THE ECONOMIC CLUB OF NEW YORK, MARCH 22, 1978.

(Excerpts)

The events of the 1970's have been disruptive of the progress made in developing countries through the 1950's and 1960's. There is evidence that they have recovered some ground in the last two years. And, Robert McNamara, the President of the World Bank, has reported discernibly better prospects for the period ahead than there were even twelve months ago. But he has noted, as well, that despite the progress we have made in the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, in Unctad IV at Nairobi and at CIEC, the North/South Dialogue in Paris which Canada co-chaired, the most urgent issues remain largely unresolved.

It is now evident that without an extraordinary effort on the part of the industrial world and of the OPEC nations we shall make little progress in narrowing the real income gap that exists between us and many countries of the Third World. Worse still, we shall make little progress in eliminating the poverty and penury of the more than one billion people in those countries. Once again this is a moral and a practical matter. There is a moral imperative to do what we can to eliminate starvation and deprivation in the world. And as a practical matter, we cannot hope to return the world to stability, economic growth and a growth in human spirit unless we can make this extraordinary effort.

The difference in culture and development among the countries of the Third World are as great, or greater, than among industrial countries. We do little service in concerting world efforts by conducting our councils as if there were a homogenous industrial view and a homogenous Third World view. For some, access to our markets is the issue and we must be prepared to facilitate such access. For others, an increasing capacity for self-reliance, in food, in the provision of other basic requirements, is the issue, and we must be prepared to respond. For many, assistance will be required and assistance can take many forms. What is appropriate in one country may be inappropriate in another.

We must not wait to put our own house in order, or to put the industrial world in order, before turning to third world countries. Their fortunes and ours are now inextricably bound together. I endorse Robert McNamara's proposal that we concert a magnificent development plan, a plan which would make clear the commitment required of us, a plan which could make a significant difference over the coming decades.

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SECURITY — SÉCURITÉ

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TO / A Le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures  
OTTAWA (FAB)

NO. 194

DATE 25/4/78

QUANTITY  
QUANTITÉ

DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION

REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE

SUJET: Discours du Premier ministre au  
Economic Club de New York

57-7-Pm  
Votre lettre FAB-(M)-338  
du 5 avril 1978

PIECE JOINTE:

Copie de notre communiqué de presse  
en date du 24 avril 1978.

To/A FAI  
From/De: ACRA  
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Att'n: *[Signature]*

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

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---PMS VISIT TO NYORK AND SPEECH TO EC CLUB

NYORK MEDIA COVERAGE OF PM TRUDEAUS VISIT/SPEECH  
EXTENSIVE. DELAY IN TRANSMISSION DUE TO WAIT FOR  
NY BI-WEEKLIES TO APPFAR.

2. NEW YORK TIMES (NYT) BROUGHT ITS OTT CORRES-  
PONDENT HERE TO COVER STORY (PAGE 1 REPORT) AND  
ALSO RAN EXCERPTS OF SPEECH ON INSIDE PAGE. LEAD  
PARAS ON HIS CALL FOR INTL MEASURES TO COMBAT  
INFLATION AND OTHER PROBLEMS. ARTICLE ALSO COVERED  
PMS STATEMENTS ON QUEBEC AND SEPARATISM. REPORT  
SAID OPINION POLLS SHOW FEWER THAN 35 PER CENT OF  
QUEBECERS FAVOUR OUTRIGHT INDEPENDENCE. SAID  
RECORD INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT ARE LIKELY  
ISSUES IN COMING FEDERAL ELECTION.

CONTINUED.....

PAGE 2 YIFC00175 APRIL 11/78

3. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (WSJ) FLAGGED THE STORY ON PAGE 1, PICKING OUT TRUDEAUS REMARK THAT THE GOVT WAS TRYING TO RESTRAIN ITS INTERVENTION IN THE CDN ECONOMY. A FULL REPORT OF SPEECH APPEARED ON INSIDE PAGE. MENTIONED THAT HIS VISIT COINCIDED WITH 750 MILLION DOLLAR BOND ISSUE. TONE OF ARTICLE FAVOURABLE, QUOTED TRUDEAU EXTENSIVELY.

4. BUSINESS WEEK PEGGED AN INTERPRETATIVE CDN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STORY ON THE TRUDEAU SPEECH. IT SAID THAT TRUDEAUS APPROACH TO WALL STREET HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND HE MAY BE ABLE TO HEAD OFF THE SEPARATISTS. IT SAID HE WOULD TRY TO FOCUS THE ELECTION ON QUEBEC AND DE-EMPHASIZE CDAS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, BUT THEY WONT GO AWAY.

5. NEWSDAY, AN INFLUENTIAL DAILY NEWSPAPER OF LONG ISLAND (CIR 1/2 MILLION) COVERED THE SPEECH IN A VERY POSITIVE WAY. IT HAD JUST ENDED A 5-PART SERIES ON CDN UNITY AND ON THE 19TH HAD RUN A PRO-UNITY EDITORIAL. REPORTING OF THE TRUDEAU VISIT FOLLOWED ON THIS VERY POSITIVE COVERAGE.

6. THE NEW YORK POST RAN A SHORT ARTICLE WHICH FOCUSED ON TRUDEAUS STATEMENT THAT HE FELT QUEBEC WOULD NOT/NOT SECEDE.

ARTICLE RECALLED LEVESQUE HAD ADDRESSED THE GROUP FOURTEEN MONTHS EARLIER.

CONTINUED.....

PAGE 3 YIFC00175 APRIL 11/78

7. THE TRIB REPORTED FAVOURABLE ON THE SPEECH.

BEGAN WITH QUOTE ON NEW DETERMINATION TO GET ON WITH THE JOB. LOOKED AT THE MAIN ISSUES TRUDEAU TACKLED, FOCUS ON INTL ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS.

8. AN ALL-NEWS RADIO STATION OF WESTING HOUSE GROUP, WINS, COVERED THE TRUDEAU SPEECH ON THREE SEPARATE NEWS BROADCASTS MAR 23.

9. WIRE SERVICES ALL FILED - CP, REUTERS, UPI AND AP. ALL FELT BROADCAST LIVE TO CDA FROM THE HILTON WAS SIGNIFICANT. AP FOCUS ON TRUDEAU STATEMENT THAT WHILE QUEBEC SEPARATIST CAMPAIGN IS DAMAGING CDAS ECONOMY, THE PROVINCE WILL NOT/NOT SEPARATE. ARTICLE GAVE BRIEF BACKGROUND TO SPEECH AND ISSUES CDA FACES. COPY FILED SAID SPEECH QUOTE APPEARED TO BREAK LITTLE NEW GROUND UNQUOTE.

10. TRUDEAU SPEECH/QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS DISTRIBUTED TO EC CLUB(WHICH FACED MULTIPLE REQUESTS MAR 23 AND USED 100 COPIES); TO COMMERCIAL SECTION FOR U.S. BUSINESSMEN (50 COPIES); TO CDN MISSION/U.N. (200 COPIES); AND GENERAL DISTRIBUTION TO TARGET AUDIENCE JOURNALISTS AND OTHER CDA-WATCHERS (100 COPIES).

UUU/880 111830Z 00580

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

WASHINGTON

FM WSHDC UNFC1400 APR6/78

TO EXTOTT FAI

INFO NYORK

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*C.C. H. M.*  
*of file*  
*AM*

DISTR GNG FAB

REF YOURTEL FAI1834 MAR31

---PM VISIT TO NY-MEDIA EVALUATION

PM VISIT AND SPEECH WERE WELL PROMOTED AND GOT GOOD PLAY IN WSHDC/BALTIMORE AREA.

2. PRIOR TO VISIT EMB ISSUED PRESS RELEASE AND DELIVERED PRESS KITS SUPPLIED BY YOU TO 75 CDA WATCHERS AND MEDIA REPS. WE THEN DID NEXT DAY PRINTING AND MAILING OF ECONOMIC CLUB SPEECH COMPLETE WITH Q AND A TO WIDER LIST OF 5000 RECIPIENTS. VIDEO TAPE SHOWING WAS ORGANIZED MARCH 23 FOR WASHINGTON BASED JOURNALISTS, AND WAS VIEWED BY 12 MEDIA REPS AS WELL AS BY EMB STAFF AND OFFICE OF CDN AFFAIRS IN STATE DEPT.

3. VISIBLE RESULT OF THIS ACTIVITY WAS FRONT SECTION 15 COLUMN INCH ARTICLE IN WSHDC POST AND 12 INCHES IN BALTIMORE SUN. POST LEAD ACCENTED TRUDEAUS DOWNPLAYING LIKELIHOOD OF SEPARATION WHILE SUN RAN NYT STORY LEADING OFF WITH TRUDEAU CALL FOR STRONG INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TO COMBAT PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES. NY PUBLICATIONS WHICH COVERED TRUDEAU SPEECH SUCH AS NYT, WSJ, AND BUSINESS WEEK OF COURSE ALSO HAVE LARGE CIRCULATION WSHDC AREA.

4. WE WERE SATISFIED WITH COVERAGE WHICH WAS ACCURATE AND RESPONSIBLE, ENHANCING STATURE OF PM AS WORLD STATESMAN WHILE PRESENTING BALANCED ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES.

UUU/105 062155Z 00250

*M. Mayne*  
*Done*  
*lc. c. H. M.*  
*& file*  
*Jan*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED (CLEVELAND)

FM CLVND YGFC0142 APR06/78

TO EXTOTT FAI

INFO WSHDC CNGNY

DISTR GNG FAB

REF URTLX FAI 1834

---PMS VISIT TO NYORK AND SPEECH TO ECONOMIC CLUB

PM VISIT-PRESS KITS HAND DELIVERED TO LOCAL MEDIA AM 3-21 AND

O.T. VIA UPS SAME DAY. TELEX COPIES OF SPEECH HAND DELIVERED

LOCALLY 3-23, O.T. UPS SAME DAY. LOCAL PRINT COVERAGE NIL.

UUU/855 062330Z 00055

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**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

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LOS ANGELES

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LNGLS XOFC0169 05 APR 78

TO EXTOTT /FAI

INFO SFRAN NYRK WSHDC

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DISTR GNG FAB

REF OUR TEL 0153 OF 29 MAR AND YOURTEL 1334, 31 MARCH

---PM SPEECH TO KCONOMIC CLUB

OUR RFFTEL INDICATED TECHNIQUES WE USED TO REACH PRIORITY AUDIENCES.

REACTION TO SPEECH WAS GENERALLY OPTIMISTIC AND POSITIVE. AUDIENCES

WE SHOWED SPEECH TO ALREADY WELL INFORMED OF CDN INTERNAL REALITIES.

SPEECH HELPED ADD POSITIVE PICTURE OF CDA AND IS ANOTHER ELEMENT

USEFUL IN POSTS PROGRAM TO CULTIVATE OPINION FORMERS. SERIES OF

QUESTIONS AFTER SPEECH RELATED TO NATIONAL UNITY QUESTION.

2. ALTHOUGH OUR PRIORITY MEDIA CONTACTS WERE NOTIFIED OF PM SPEECH

BY PERSONAL LETTER AND CONTACT, SPEECH WAS ONLY COVERED BRIEFLY IN

MEDIA USING WIRE STORIES.

UUU/820 050100Z 00050

*McC. H. M.*  
*Done me*  
*o file*  
*SPM*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

**DETROIT**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM DTROT YOFC0349 APR5/78

TO EXTOTT FAI

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INFO WSPDC

REF FAITFL 1834 MAR31/78

---PM IN NY ECON CLUB

REGRET DELAY. IMPACT OF SPEECH HERE MINIMAL. NO NEWS NEXT DAY.

ONLY COVFRAGE NEUBACHFR OF DTROT FREE PRESS FEW DAYS LATER

(MAR27). SPEECH AND INTERVIEW SENT TO EDITORIAL WRITERS AS SOON

AS AVAILABLE TO US. NO RESULT.

UUU/850 051830Z 00040

File ✓  
Diary  
Circ  
Chron

FAB/R. FRANCIS/5-3660/gg

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Lettre adressée aux missions énumérées ci-dessous

SANS COTE

Sous-secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures,  
OTTAWA

le 5 avril 1978

FAB-(M)-338

Discours du Premier ministre au Economic Club de  
New York

Vous avez sans doute reçu le texte du discours que le Premier ministre a prononcé le 12 mars, à New York, devant les membres du Economic Club; FAB l'a distribué à toutes les missions comme Directive no 88-78.

MDG  
JGG  
CAFT  
FAP  
CAF  
GPS

2. Dans son discours, le Premier ministre traite des espoirs du tiers monde et de l'importance qu'il attache, à partir de considérations morales et pratiques, aux efforts que doivent faire les pays industrialisés en vue de diminuer l'écart qui sépare, au plan économique et social, les pays développés et ceux en voie de développement.

3. Peut-être aurez-vous déjà songé à procéder à une distribution du texte ou d'extraits du discours auprès de quelques-uns des officiels de votre/ vos pays d'accréditation; si tel n'est pas le cas, nous vous encourageons à le faire dans la mesure où vous le jugerez utile ou à propos - sans omettre le Chef de Gouvernement ou d'Etat si la coutume s'y prête.

*pour le*

Sous-secrétaire d'Etat  
aux Affaires extérieures

Original Signed by  
Original signé par  
H. A. LAWLESS

Ambassades du Canada à:

|         |             |         |
|---------|-------------|---------|
| Abidjan | Islamabad   | Rabat   |
| Alger   | Kinshasa    | Tunis   |
| Bamako  | Niamey      | Yaoundé |
| Dakar   | Ouagadougou |         |

Haut-commissariats du Canada à:

Dacca            New Delhi

FILE DIARY CIRC CHRON

FAB/R. FRANCIS/5-3660/1c

MULTIPLE LETTER TO POSTS LISTED BELOW

UNCLASSIFIED

The Under-Secretary of State for External  
Affairs, OTTAWA

April 5, 1978

FAB-(M)-338

Prime Minister's speech to N.Y. Economic  
Club

You have probably received by now, the Prime  
Minister's speech of March 12 to the Economic Club of  
New York. It was distributed by FAB as Press Guidance 88-78.

MDG  
JGG  
CAFT  
FAP  
GAF  
GPS

2. May we draw your attention to the Prime Minister's  
remarks about the aspirations of the Third World and the  
importance, both moral and practical, which he attaches to  
attempts by the industrialised world to narrow the gap  
between developed and developing countries.

3. You may perhaps already have done so, but it  
occurs to us that some of your host government contacts  
might be interested in the Prime Minister's opinions if  
you think it appropriate to pass on his comments or distribute  
a copy of his speech. Depending upon the practice you  
normally follow in these matters, you may wish to consider  
forwarding a copy of Mr. Trudeau's remarks to the Head of  
the host government.

Original Signed by  
Original signé par  
H. A. LAWLESS

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

TO:  
The Canadian Embassies:

|         |             |         |
|---------|-------------|---------|
| ABIDJAN | ISLAMABAD   | RABAT   |
| ALGIERS | KINSHASA    | TUNIS   |
| BAMAKO  | NIAMEY      | YAOUNDE |
| DAKAR   | OUAGADOUGOU |         |

The Canadian High Commissions:

DACCA            NEW DELHI

*100-H.M.*  
*file*  
*done*  
*me*  
*WMM*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DOWNER**

**SAN FRANCISCO**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM SFRAN WVFC0529 APR 4/78

57-7-PM  
35

TO EXTOTT (FAI)

INFO WSHDC NYORK

DISTR GNG FAB

REF YRTEL 1834 MAR 31/78

---PMS SPEECH ECONOMIC CLUB

ALTHOUGH WE HIGHLIGHTED TO ABOUT 150 PRIORITY CONTACTS, VIA NEWSLETTER, FACT SPEECH WLD TAKE PLACE, AND LATER DISTRIBUTED HALF-PAGE SUMMARY OF TALK TO SAME CONTACTS, INCLUDING 30 MEDIA, THEY HAVE SHOWN MINIMAL INTEREST IN SPEECH CONTENT. BRIEF SURVEY INDICATES CONTACTS SEE NO STRIKING DEPARTURES IN REMARKS EITHER ON NATIONAL UNITY OR ECONOMIC ISSUES. FOR REASONS BEYOND YOUR AND OUR CONTROL, VIDEOTAPE WAS TEMPORARILY INCOMMUNICADO IN CUSTOMS WAREHOUSE OVER EASTER WEEKEND AND WILL NO DOUBT BE USED BY POST OFFICERS ONLY.

2. WE CONGRATULATE ALL CONCERNED ON EXCELLENT DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH IS NOW PERMITTING US TO PROVIDE TIMELY INFO OF THIS SORT TO OUR CONTACTS. IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER, CONTACTS DID NOT SHOW MUCH INTEREST.

UUU/815 031800Z 00130

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DOWNEE**

**BUFFALO**

*10.c.c. H. M. Done*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BFALO ZXTD0781 APR04/78

57-7-PM

TO EXTOTT (FAI)

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INFO WSHDC NYORK

DISTR GNG FAB

REF URTEL FAI 1834 MAR31/78

---PMS VISIT TO NYORK SPEECH TO ECONOMIC CLUB

UPSTATE NEW YORK MEDIA COVERAGE OF PM TRUDEAUS VISIT TO NYORK

FIS SPEECH TO ECONOMIC CLUB WAS QUITE EXTENSIVF SUCCINCT.  
 MAJOR NEWSPAPERS NOT/NOT ONLY RELIED ON THEIR OWN STAFF REPORTS, BUT  
 ALSO DREW HEAVILY ON WIRE SERVICE STORIES. TO DATE, THERE HAVE BFEN  
 NO/NO NEWSPAPER EDITORIALS ON VISIT, BUT THIS MAY BE TPUE ONLY  
 BECAUSE UPSTATE NYORK IS SO WELL INFORMED ABOUT CDA THAT SUCH COM-  
 MENTARY MAY NOT/NOT PAVE BEEN DEEMED NECESSARY AT THIS TIME.  
 FM OUR VANTAGE POINT WE FEEL INITIATIVES TAKEN BY NYORK, PQS  
 WSHDC WERE EXCELLENT THAT ALL MATERIALS SUPPLIED WERE FIRST  
 RATE. HOWEVER, WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DO BETTER JOB OF UTILIZING

... 2

NOV 1986  
DISTRIBUTION & STATUS

BRIEFING BOOK TO ITS FULLEST POTENTIAL IF WE HAD HAD A LITTEL MORE  
TIME IN WHICH TO CURCULATE THESE ON PERSONAL BASIS. AS IT WAS, WE  
WERE COMPELLED TO QUICKLY DELIVER BRIEFING BOOKS BY MEANS OF PRIVATE  
CARRIAR; THEREBY LOSING SOME OF IMPACT PERSONAL DELIVERY WUD HAVE  
CREATED.

ALL COMMENTARY BY MEDIA PROVED TO BE FAVORABLE, ACCURATELY ELABORATED  
ON MAIN POINTS OF EMPHASIS OF SPEECH. WE MIGHT ADD THAT VIDEOTAPE OF  
PMS SPEECH ALSO PROVED TO BE QUITE HELPFUL INTERNALLY DURING PAST WK,  
IN THAT IT ENABLED US TO GET BETTER FEEL FOR OCCASION. IN OUR DISCUS-  
SIONS WITH KEY OPINION FORMERS DURING WK FOLLOWING SPEECH, WE CAN  
SAFELY CONCLUDE THAT SUBSTANCE OF PM TRUDEAUS SPEECH WAS VERY WELL  
RECD. QUITE LIKELY, ON BALANCE, IT UNDOUBTEDLY DID MUCH TO CLARIFY  
STRENGTHEN UNDERSTANDING OF ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN CDA ALL OF U S.

UUU/860 041925Z 00220

**ACTION**  
**JITE A DONNER**

**NEW ORLEANS**

*[Handwritten signature]*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM NRLNS WCAG0043 APR 3/78

TO EXTOTT **FAI**

INFO NEW YORK, WSHDC

DISTR GNG FAB

REF YOURTEL FAI1834 MAR 31

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---PMS VISIT TO NYORK AND SPEECH TO ECONOMIC CLUB

PMS REMARKS AND TRANSCRIPT ANSWERS AND QUESTIONS FORWARDED

25 NEWSPAPERS OUR TERRITORY MAR 23 (BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS

DISTRIBUTED LOCAL AP AND UPI REPS INTER ALIA MAR 20).

THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY LOCAL COVERAGE TO DATE. WILL REPORT

ON ANY SIGNIFICANT COMMENTS/VIEWS WHICH MAY BE EXPRESSED.

UUU/830 032100Z 00060

*m. [unclear]*

*acc. H.M. done  
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of file*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DORNER**

PHILADELPHIA

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PHILA WLFA0159 3APR78

TO EXTOTT *FAL*

INFO PRMNY

DISTR, FAB

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TIMING OF PREPARED DOCUMENTS WAS RIGHT FOR POST DISTRIBUTION TO SELECTED MEDIA. A COVER LETTER WAS SENT WITH THE PRESS KITS ADVISING A TEXT OF THE P.M.S SPEECH WOULD BE DELIVERED TO THEM AS SOON AS WE RECEIVED BY TELEX. THIS WAS CARRIED OUT WITH RECIPIENTS BEING MCCULLOUGH OF THE BULLETIN AND CORR OF INQUIRER. SPACE ALLOCATED IN THE INQUIRER WAS MINIMAL BUT BULLETIN WAS MORE EXTENSIVE.

THOSE IN N.Y. WHOSE JOB IT WAS TO FEED THE WIRE SERVICES NEED A PAT ON THE BACK FOR THE METHOD WAS APPARENTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR FINE ELECTRONIC COVERAGE.

MOST OF PRESS CONTACTS SAY MATERIAL SENT IS BEING RETAINED FOR EDITORIAL USE, ESPECIALLY TRUE FOR MCCULLOUGH OF BULLETIN.

IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING FOR JOHN CORR OF THE INQUIRER WHO WILL BE IN CANADA APRIL 12-18.

UUU/870 032100Z 00150

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

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2) (C.C.H.M.)  
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of file Done  
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UNCLASSIFIED

ATLANTA

FM ATNTA ZGCS072 APR03/78

TO EXTOTT FAI

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| 57-7-PM |  |    |
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REF YOURTEL FAI1834 MAR31/78

--- PM SPEECH

BRIEFING BOOKS WERE MAILED TO KEY EDITORS IN AREA AND COPIES OF SPEECH

MAILED TO THOSE ON MEDIA CONTACT LIST. AS SPEECH CONTAINED NO HARD NEWS WE COULD NOT JUSTIFY GENERAL TELEX TO SOUTHEASTERN NEWSPAPERS. ONE ATLABTA PAPER CARRIED WIRE SERVICE STORY. CLIPPINGS FROM REST OF TERRITORY NOT YET ARRIVED.

UUU/835 032047Z 00080

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

~~C.C. to  
Mr. Ralph Coleman~~

UNCLASSIFIED DALLAS

FM DALAS YMFC0215 APL 3/78

TO EXTOTT FAI

52-7-PM  
35 | | es

of file  
HM

INFO WASHDC NYORK

DISTR GNG FAB

REF YT TEL FAI1834 MAR 31/78

---PMS VISIT TO NYORK AND SPEECH TO ECONOMIC CLUB---

1. PMS SPEECH WAS WIDELY AND QUICKLY AVAILABLE TO ALL MEDIA VIA WIRE SERVICES HERE WHICH MOSTLY CARRIED IT IN TOTO. WE SUPPLEMENTED THIS WITH BRIEFING BOOKS TO LEADING EDITORIALISTS WITH NEWSPAPERS AND TELEVISION IN THE FOUR LARGEST CENTRES - HOUSTON, DALLAS, AUSTIN AND SAN ANTONIO. RADIO AND TELEVISION COER (COER SHOULD READ COVERAGE) FROM THE WIRE WAS PROMPT, WIDESPREAD BUT FLEETING WHILE NEWSPAPERS, SO FAR AS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE, GAVE SPEECH LITTLE OR NO/NO ATTENTION.

2. OPINIONS OF NEWSTAFF AND EDITORS WE HAVE CANVASSED WERE FAIRLY UNIFORM IN CONSIDERING SPEECH TOO BLAND AND GENERAL TO MERIT MORE COVERAGE HERE. PART OF THIS MAY, HOWEVER, REFLECT AS MUCH THIS REGIONS RELUCTANCE TO TREAT YANKFE ARFA AS SIGNIFICANT AS ANY REFLECTION ON SPEECH. SOME CONTACTS EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT PM DID NOT/NOT USE OCCASION TO EXPLAIN STRATEGY HE IS FOLLOWING OR INTENDS TO FOLLOW REGARDING QUEBEC OR GIVE SPECIFIC NEW PROPOSALS TO EITHER COOPERATE MORE

PAGE TWO

OR LESS WITH THE U.S. ESPECIALLY IN SUCH FIELDS AS ENERGY

AND DEFENCE WHICH ARE AMONG PRIME INTERESTS HERE. ONE LEADING  
LOCAL EDITORIALIST WHO HAD PREPARED PIECE ON CONFEDERATION  
REPORTEDLY PLANNED TO USE SPEECH AS INTRO BUT HAS SINCE TOLD  
US THAT QUOTE AS SPEECH WAS MORE HISTORY LESSON THAN ANYTHING  
ELSE UNQUOTE WILL DELAY PUBLICATION PENDING QUOTE SOME MORE  
DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENT

3. ON MORE POSITIVE NOTE WE FOUND VTR MOST USEFUL TOOL FOR  
BRIEFING OFFICERS ON SPEECH SO THAT THEY BE WELL INFORMED IN  
SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THEIR CONTACTS AND WILL ALSO USE  
SPEECH FOR BRIEFING EDITORIAL WRITERS WHENEVER POSSIBLE

UUU/825 031550Z 00300

*McAlpine*

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

**BOSTON**

*1/4/78*

*1c.c. FCO*

*1c.c. HM*

*file HM Done SW AM*

FM BOSTN ZSFC0070

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TO EXTOTT FAI

INFO WSHDC CNGNY

DISTR GNG FAB

REF YOURTEL FAI 1834 OF MAR31

---PMS VISIT TO NYORK AND SPEECH TO ECONOMIC CLUB

PRESS KITS AND TEXT OF SPEECH WERE DELIVERED TO CARFULLY CHOSFN LIST OF KEY MEDIA CONTACTS. THOUGH VERY LITTLE MEDIA REACTION FOLLOWED EVNT WAS USEFUL IN ALLOWING US TO REASSERT OUR PRESENCE AT THIS POINT.

2. REASONS EXPLAINING LACK OF INTEREST HERE ARE MANY: SPEECH HAD NO HARD NEWS IMPACT, ATTENTION OF MEDIA WAS DIVERTED TO MID-EASO DEVELOPMENTS AND LOCAL SCANDALS. BOSTON GLOBE IS LABORING OVER SUNDAY APRIL 23 SUPPLMENT OF CANADA AND FINALLY MOST CANADA-WATCHERS HAVE THEIR ATTENTION ON UPCOMING LOCAL EVENT: P.M. LEVESQUES VISIT TO HARVARD.

UUU/875 222100Z 00090