

50209-40

[P4.3.2]

**FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE  
SEE NEXT PART OF FILE**

Security .. **SECRET** ..

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

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| File No.<br><b>50209-40</b> |  |
| <b>6</b>                    |  |

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: ....THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR.....  
.....WASHINGTON, D.C.....

| Message To Be Sent  |          | No.   | Date            | For Communications Section Only |
|---|----------|---|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| AIR CYPHER  |          | <b>EX 506</b>   | March 31, 1954. | <b>SENT — MAR 31 1954</b>       |
| EN CLAIR  |          |   |                 |                                 |
| CODE  |          |   |                 |                                 |
| CYPHER  | <b>X</b> |   |                 |                                 |
| <b>Priority</b><br><b>IMMEDIATE</b> <b>MW</b>   |          | <b>REFERENCE:</b> Your telegram WA-440 March 15   |                 |                                 |
| <b>ORIGINATOR</b><br><br>.....<br>(Signature)<br><br><b>R.A. MacKay/MGR</b><br>.....<br>(Name Typed)<br><br>Div...USSEA.....<br><br>Local Tel...4803.....                                   |          | <b>SUBJECT:</b> Public statement on Continental Defence.<br><br>My immediately preceding telegram.<br><br>Following is our draft text of the<br>proposed public statement.<br><br>Text begins.<br><br>(Communications - please copy<br>attached statement).<br><br>Text ends. |                 |                                 |
| <b>APPROVED BY</b><br><br><b>MW</b><br>.....<br>(Signature)<br><br>.....<br>(Name Typed)  |          |   |                 |                                 |
| <b>Internal Distribution:</b><br>S.S.E.A. ✓ U.S.S.E.A. ✓<br><i>Done MacL Apr. 1/54</i><br>Defence Liaison 1<br><br>American<br><br>Press Office<br><br>Done.....<br>Date..... <b>1/4/54</b> |          |   |                 |                                 |
| <b>Copies Referred To:</b><br>Chairman, Chiefs of<br>Staff Committee.<br>General A.G.L.<br>McNaughton.<br><br>Done.....<br>Date..... <b>1/4/54</b>  |          |   |                 |                                 |

SECRET

Draft Public Statement on Continental Defence

FILE COPY

Because of the possibility of aggressive air attacks against North America, the Canadian and United States Governments after the second World War continued the cooperative arrangements for the defence of North America which had been brought into effect during the war. Since that time, there have been established in both countries fully manned radar screens for the detection of a potential enemy, and installations for interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. At all stages, planning has been carried on between the two countries on a joint basis.

2. For some time now, the Canadian and United States Governments have been appraising <sup>the</sup> air defence system to define the steps required to strengthen our defences in the light of recent advances in the destructive capabilities of atomic weapons against targets in our two countries.

3. For the past four years, work has been going on at high priority on the construction of a large and costly radar chain which is required not only to detect enemy bombers but also to control fighter aircraft engaged in the task of interception. This radar chain is known as the Pinetree Chain.

4. Long before the Pinetree project was approaching completion, the military planners of the two countries were engaged in an intensive study of what further steps might be desirable and practicable. In October 1953, a team of military and scientific advisers representing both countries recommended that additional early warning should be provided by the establishment of a further radar system generally to the north of the settled

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territory in Canada. The report of this team was considered by the Chiefs of Staff of each country later that same month. At a meeting in Washington in November 1953, the Canadian representatives informed the United States authorities that the Canadian Government was prepared to proceed immediately with the necessary surveys and siting for the proposed new early warning radar system. This work is already well advanced and the reconnaissance and siting will, in the main, be completed in June 1954. Construction will commence later this year.

5. There are many difficult problems to be solved in establishing this additional early warning system in the Canadian north. The system will extend over 5,000 miles and its survey will involve the examination of a great number of possible sites. Much of the ground is inaccessible except by tractor train and helicopter. In many areas, extreme temperatures are confronted for several months of the year. Many technical problems, including the interference of the auroral belt with electronic devices, have had to be overcome. To avoid stationing large numbers of men in this difficult country, the system is being designed to operate with as few men as possible. In overcoming the various technical problems involved the United States Air Force is working closely with the Royal Canadian Air Force.

6. It is obviously just as important to have early warning of aircraft approaching target areas in North America from over the sea as from over Northern Canada. For this reason, the United States Government is working on the formidable task of

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extending the early warning barrier across the north-eastern and north-western seaward approaches to North America. The Alaska and Greenland ~~air~~ radar systems are coordinated with those in Canada and the continental United States, and the development of airborne radar is well advanced.

7. In addition to these measures of common concern, both countries are working continuously to improve the air defence installations in the vicinity of the major target areas. Here too, cooperation between the United States and Canadian air defence commanders is close, and unidentified aircraft are investigated by the most immediately available interceptor force, whether Canadian or American.

8. The defence of North America is part of the defence of the North Atlantic region to which both Canada and the United States are pledged as signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus, the cooperative arrangements for the defence of this continent and for the participation of Canadian and United States forces in the defence of Europe are simply two sides of the same coin, two parts of a world-wide objective, to preserve peace and to defend freedom.

Footnote \* - Attention of the U.S. authorities should be drawn to mention of Greenland. Is it appropriate, and will the Danes object?

omit

Security .....**SECRET**.....

MESSAGE FORM  
OUTGOING

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| File No.<br>50209-40 |    |
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FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

|                    |               |                         |   |
|--------------------|---------------|-------------------------|---|
| Message To Be Sent | EX<br>No. 505 | Date<br>March 31, 1954. | For Communications Section Only<br>SENT - MAR 31 1954 |
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| AIR CYPHER |   |
| EN CLAIR   |   |
| CODE       |   |
| CYPHER     | X |

Priority  
IMMEDIATE *mw*

ORIGINATOR  
.....  
(Signature)  
R.A. MacKay/MGR  
(Name Typed)

Div. USSEA  
Local Tel. 4803

APPROVED BY  
*M. L. S. H.*  
(Signature)  
.....  
(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:  
S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.  
*one to H. K. Apr. 1/54*  
Defence Liaison (1)  
American Div.  
Press Office

one. *17*  
date. 1/4/54

Copies Referred To:  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,  
General A.G.L. McNaughton.

one. *17*  
date. 1/4/54  
Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

REFERENCE: Your telegram WA-440 March 15.  
  
SUBJECT: Public statement on Continental Defence.

The draft statement sent you previously has been revised and is now approved by the Minister. In view of the announcement that the United States authorities intend to release the film showing <sup>an</sup> atomic explosion, it is now felt that we should proceed with issuing a joint statement. Although the Minister felt previously that the statement was rather limited in that it covered only radar defence, he now agrees that this is the phase which should be emphasized since the release of the film is likely to give rise to enquiries about progress on radar defence in the North.

2. Since the proposal to issue a statement was discussed between General Foulkes and Admiral Radford, General Foulkes requests that Admiral DeWolf clear the statement with Admiral Radford if possible. Please make clear to the State Department and Admiral Radford that although the draft has been seen by our Minister and the Minister of National Defence it would probably require full Cabinet approval here. We would not propose to proceed further at this end until we receive comments or redrafts from Washington.

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3. Would you also discuss with the American authorities the timing of the release. We would prefer that it be released before the film is released to the public. Presumably the release of the statement here would take the form of a statement in Parliament.

4. For text of draft see my immediately following telegram. Ends.

CONFIDENTIAL



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF

OTTAWA

30 March, 1954. *File WTB*

R.A. MacKay, Esq.,  
Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
Ottawa, Canada.

Joint Statement  
Continental Defence

Dear Mr. MacKay:

*50219-AE-70* You will recall that during the discussions which took place in Washington on 4 March it was agreed that it would be advisable to release a joint statement on progress in continental defence, particularly in regard to early warning. It was agreed that I would prepare a draft joint statement and forward it to Admiral Radford for United States clearance. You will note that in paragraph 43 of the Record of the Meeting of Consultation on 4 March, this procedure was agreed to.

Further, you will recall that during the discussions in regard to the reply to the letter from Representative Cole, a draft public statement was drawn up here and after a series of amendments was agreed to by Mr. Claxton and forwarded to Washington. However, this draft statement has not yet been passed to the Americans.

You will further remember that in the discussions on 4 March it was emphasized that a joint statement should be made before the release of the film in regard to the thermomuclear explosion at Eniwetok. I have now learned that the President has agreed to the release of this film on 7 April.

I am further informed that Mr. Campney is to make a speech to a group of Canadian and United States journalists at the Seignior Club on 8 April and I understand that he wishes to make some reference to continental defence and may be asked questions by this group, and it would be most unfortunate if we have not by that time agreed with the United States as to what is to be said, particularly regarding early warning chains to be set up in Canada.

I would, therefore, appreciate if you could expedite the clearance of the draft public statement so that I can forward it to Admiral Radford as early as possible.

Yours sincerely,

*Charles Foulkes*  
(Charles Foulkes)  
General  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

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*30-3-20(US)*

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| SECRET   |

L. B. PEARSON

March 29, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER:

Continental Defence - Reply to Letter from  
Representative Cole

I believe you will be interested in the attached letter No. 550, dated March 25, 1954, from our Ambassador in Washington reporting on the reply sent by the State Department to Representative Cole in answer to the latter's enquiry as to the status of United States negotiations with Canada on the establishment of an early warning line for continental defence. I think the reply, as finally sent to Representative Cole, is quite satisfactory from our point of view and is certainly a great improvement over the original draft. Whether the reply will satisfy Representative Cole remains to be seen.

*RAM*  
R. A. M.

30-3-26/58)  
29.3.53/55)

000989

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

File No.

50209-40

52-50

Priority

System

No. WA-517

Date March 26, 1954.

EN CLAIR

Departmental  
Circulation

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD'N  
SECTION

Reference:

Subject: Continental Defence

The following is the text of a press release issued on March 25 by Senator Saltonstall, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee after the committee had been given a secret briefing on continental defence by Robert C. Sprague, a Massachusetts electronics expert and manufacturer who had been commissioned by the committee to make a detailed study of the present status of United States continental defences and plans for their improvement. Members of the committee described Sprague's report as "the most top secret briefing ever given the committee". Sprague was to appear before the committee again today, March 26, to continue the briefing.

Text begins:

Recognizing the growing menace to the security of the continental United States because of Soviet developments in the nuclear and thermonuclear fields, the interim subcommittee on preparedness of the committee on armed services proceeded last October with an inquiry into the adequacy of our defenses.

In an effort to obtain an independent appraisal, the subcommittee arranged for Mr. Robert C. Sprague, Chairman of the Board of the Sprague Electric Co., North Adams, Massachusetts, to make a detailed study of the present status of our continental defenses and plans for their improvement. Mr. Sprague is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and a postgraduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After appropriate security clearance he was given extraordinary access privileges by the executive branch to review pertinent studies, reports, and plans. He was given authority to question key individuals in all branches of the government. In the course of his investigation Mr. Sprague was given the full cooperation of all concerned.

After a thorough and searching investigation, an oral report was made to the subcommittee in a series of closed meetings held over the weekend of January 16, 1954, and later on March 25, 1954, to the full committee.

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29 MAR 1954

References

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Chairman Saltonstall stated that these reports are of such sensitivity and scope that the national interest requires that they remain classified.

Mr. Sprague's reports point out that in 1948 the Congress authorized certain defensive measures to be taken against the growing threat to the security of the United States. Also, that the Defense Department initiated a number of studies, including contracts with universities and scientific groups, to determine scientifically the best means and weapons systems to provide an adequate continental defense. Substantial defense programs, both military and non-military, now have considerable momentum and there has been gratifying cooperation with Canada to insure the development of a coordinated system.

Information in Mr. Sprague's reports strongly supports the conclusion that the specific programs now underway combine to constitute a sound over-all continental defense program. The reports emphasize that they are probably the minimum programs that should be accepted as goals, yet because of certain controlling factors, they are probably the maximum feasible programs that can be obtained, and that both military and non-military portions of the programs, including research and development, for continental defense should be supported in their entirety.

As the study progressed certain specific recommendations were made which are now being considered on their merits by the appropriate agencies.

The measures now underway and planned for the future should, together with our offensive forces, provide an effective defense for the United States commensurate with the threat. Nevertheless, even if every resource of our country were to be put into its offenses and defenses, it would not buy complete assurance that we will not be attacked, nor complete protection in the unfortunate event of an atomic attack against us. The full requirement, then, is to face up to the fact that the threat of atomic attack introduces a new factor in our way of life. Living with it may not be so comfortable as before, but it is a burden which the country can abide and still remain free. Text ends.

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1954 1954  
AM 10:48

CLEAR  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reference: Our telegram WA-448 of March 15.

Subject: Continental Defence--Reply to letter

from Representative Cole.

Security:.....S.E.C.R.E.T.....

No:.....550.....

Date: March 25, 1954.

Enclosures: 2

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

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| Ottawa File No. |    |
| 50209-XA        |    |
| 22              | 50 |

References

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26 MAR 1954

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts

Raynor gave us on March 24 a copy of the State Department's reply to the letter of March 5 from the Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy in which Representative Cole asked for a report on the status of United States negotiations with Canada on the establishment of an early warning line for continental defence. Raynor also gave us a copy of Cole's letter, excerpts from which were included in our telegram WA-414 of March 11. Copies of the two letters are attached. You will note that the State Department letter is classified "secret".

2. The State Department reply is, we believe, much better than the draft reply which was shown to us earlier, the text of which was included in our telegram WA-413 of March 11. Most of the suggestions which we made have been taken into account. The technical difficulties which stand in the way of the establishment of an early warning line have been stressed. The unfortunate phrasing of the first draft which gave the impression that problems of principle existed between the United States and Canadian Governments has been excised. The Canadian Government's co-operation in joint continental defence efforts is labelled "prompt and effective". (Cole's letter gave the impression that what was probably needed was some arm twisting by the United States to speed up Canadian co-operation.) The reply puts the proposed more distant early warning line in proper perspective, emphasizing the experimental nature of the project and indicating clearly that further negotiations with Canada will be necessary if a United States decision is taken to establish the line. We had suggested that some more detailed attention might be given in the reply to the radar installations in Canada which have already been completed under previous agreements. The State Department, however, was content to cover this in a single sentence. Mr. Pearson's suggestion that it might be wise to make no mention in the reply of the possibility of the issuance of an agreed public statement by the two Governments on continental defence was accepted by the State Department. Finally and possibly of most importance there is no suggestion in the letter that it was drafted with the assistance of the Canadian Government. In no sense could we be held responsible for any of the views set out in the reply.

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3. There is still some question in our minds as to whether the State Department reply will satisfy Representative Cole since it remains a pretty vague answer to his inquiry. However there is not much point in anticipating difficulties before they arise and, from our experience in this instance, I believe we may feel fairly confident, that if any further substantive exchange with Representative Cole becomes necessary the State Department will give us an opportunity to comment.

*Sanford Smith*  
The Embassy.

1954 MAR 26 PM 4:00

000994

C O P Y

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY  
(Created Pursuant to Public Law 585, 79th Congress)

March 5, 1954.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, I would appreciate a report on the status of our negotiations with Canada concerning the establishment of an early warning line for continental defense.

My inquiries into the problem of continental defense have convinced me of the critical importance of advance notice of hostile attack. In fact, I believe that the success of all our other continental defense preparations, and the success of our civil defense program as well, will hinge upon our ability to detect an enemy striking force before it reaches our borders.

I therefore deem it of the highest importance that we quickly come to an agreement with the Canadian Government on an early warning line, and then take all steps necessary to make this line operational as soon as possible.

It is my understanding that we have so far failed to reach agreement with Canada on how the responsibilities for manning and equipping such a line would be divided between the two nations.

While I have no doubt that many difficult problems are involved in these negotiations, I am frankly not now satisfied in my own mind that we are attacking them with the full sense of urgency they merit. I would accordingly be grateful to receive your assurances that we are now assigning these negotiations all possible priority, and that we are doing everything in our power to bring them to a speedy and satisfactory close.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ Sterling Cole

Chairman.

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State

C O P Y

S E C R E T

March 19, 1954.

Dear Mr. Cole:

Reference is made to your letter dated March 5, 1954, to the Secretary, the receipt of which has been acknowledged by telephone, requesting a report on our negotiations with Canada concerning the establishment of an early warning line for continental defense.

The problem of safeguarding North America against air attack has been receiving the constant attention of the Department of Defense and other appropriate agencies of this Government, with a view to determining what actions may be necessary. This Department has the responsibility, of course, only for carrying out the negotiations with Canada necessary to those parts of the program requiring Canadian cooperation. The United States Government is in close and continuous consultation with the Canadian Government on this and on all phases of defense. When the Canadian Prime Minister visited the United States in May of 1953, he explored various proposals with the President. Again when President Eisenhower visited Ottawa in November of 1953 continental defense was foremost among the subjects discussed, and complete agreement was reached between the two governments on the need for effective measures against air attack. Since that time I have been giving this matter my close personal attention in various stages of discussion with the Canadians.

The cooperation received from the Canadian Government has been prompt and effective. Action has already been initiated by the Royal Canadian Air Force and by the United States Air Force, which are the agencies of the two governments charged with the responsibility of carrying out the necessary construction and operation of a sub-Arctic early warning line. Aerial photographic surveys and, in sections where weather has permitted, ground surveys as well, of the line have almost been completed and studies are proceeding with all priority to select the necessary types of equipment and communications. I believe that all aspects of this important project are going forward with the sense of urgency which they merit, and with all practicable dispatch consistent with orderly planning and sound administration. Many technical problems have been encountered in the development of this project, owing to the difficulties of terrain and weather in the area. Both the United States Air Force and the Royal Canadian Air Force are expediting their work to solve these problems, recognizing that sound decisions must be reached prior to the physical establishment of the system, if it is to operate properly.

In addition, joint studies by the military services of the two countries are being pressed forward with respect to a proposed more distant early warning line, as well as of all other phases of defense against air attack. Experimental stations have been established in Alaska and the Canadian Arctic and tests are now going forward. Should these experiments determine that the project is feasible and should the decision be made to carry it out, this Department will initiate the necessary negotiations with Canada.

The Honorable  
Sterling Cole,  
Chairman, Joint Committee on  
Atomic Energy,  
House of Representatives.

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I am sure you are already familiar with the extensive radar installations in Canada which have been completed or are in the process of construction, under previous agreements with the Canadian Government.

I shall appreciate it if you will maintain confidential the information in this letter, in view of the need for security and in the light of our continuing discussions with the Canadians. You may be certain that the Governments of the United States and of Canada share a common appreciation of the necessity and importance of taking necessary measures for continental defense. In so far as the responsibilities of this Department are concerned, I can assure you that our negotiations with Canada on this matter will continue to receive the high priority which they deserve.

Sincerely,

/S/ Walter B. Smith

Under-Secretary.

Defence Liaison (1)/W.H.Barton/jf

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

50209-40  
File WTB  
TOP SECRET

March 19, 1954

50209-40  
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Dear General Foulkes,

I wish to acknowledge your letter of March 17, 1954 in which you drew attention to the fact that the aerial photography for the Mongoose Line is only partially completed and that our telegram EX 402 of March 13 was not entirely correct in stating that the work had been completed.

I learned that this was the case on March 17 and telephoned our Embassy in Washington immediately. Mr. Glazebrook undertook to ensure that the amendment was passed on to the State Department.

Yours sincerely,

J. A. MacKAY

Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

General Charles Foulkes,  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,  
Department of National Defence,  
"A" Building,  
OTTAWA, Ontario.

19.3.30(us)

~~TOP SECRET~~



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OTTAWA

50209-40

17 March, 1954.

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

50209-40  
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D L D  
R.A. MacKay, Esquire,  
Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Mr. MacKay:

With reference to telegram EX-402 of 13 March, Air Vice Marshal Miller has drawn to my attention that the statement made in the second last sentence of para. 3 - that the aerial photography has been completed - is not entirely correct; and he suggests that in any further despatch we should state that the aerial photography is partially completed.

I realize that these messages have already been sent to the State Department, but if we are given an opportunity of seeing the State Department's answer to Representative Cole, and this statement occurs in the letter, it should be modified as certain U.S.A.F. officers will be aware that the whole of the aerial photography is not yet completed.

Yours sincerely,

(Charles Foulkes)  
General  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTING SLIP

DATE

March 22

SECURITY

Secret

TO:

~~Mr. Rogers (DLG)~~

Mr. Bastien *WMB*

FROM:

Washby

☐ For Signature

☐ For Action

☐ For Comments

☐ For Approval

For Information and

File



Destroy



Return



COMMENTS: (This space is not for comments of a permanent character which should be formally recorded in a memorandum)

I guess reaction is possible - beyond asking Washington in a few weeks to send a copy of the finished public product

001000



*File 50209-40 WMB*  
SECRET AND PERSONAL

Washington, D.C.,  
March 17, 1954.

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| 50209-40 |
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*Confidential Reference*  
Dear Bert,

In the course of a telephone conversation last Friday you asked me to find out what I could about a release of material on continental defence by the Senate Armed Services Committee which I think you said had been mentioned in the course of a conversation you had with Outerbridge Horsey. Together with the Joint Staff we made inquiries and it turned out that the release in question was that shown by Admiral Radford to General Foulkes at the meeting of consultation on March 4.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has been briefed in executive session on a number of occasions over the last couple of months by Admiral Radford and the other service chiefs. As is the custom with Congressional committees here a report had to be prepared referring in general terms to the information given the Committee in executive session. One of these briefing sessions was devoted to the subject of continental defence. As we understand it the Senate Committee Report was drafted and sent to the Defense Department to be sanitized. The Defense Department completed this task and returned the Report to the Committee. Apparently what Admiral Radford showed to General Foulkes was the Defense Department's suggested version of the briefing which had been given the Committee on continental defence. We have been told that the Committee decided that the revised

R. A. MacKay, Esquire,  
Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
Ottawa.

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Report was altogether too sanitary and returned it to the Defense Department to see if some fuller version of the briefings could not be released. We understand that the Defense Department will maintain its stand on the whole Report and we have been given some assurance, albeit indirect assurance, that the text of the portion of the Report dealing with continental defence will be that which General Foulkes has already seen. I might add parenthetically that neither we nor the State Department have seen this text.

While we consulted the Canadian Desk at the State Department on this matter, we found that the officials there seemed to know very little about it and our best source of information was Colonel Fleischer, the Director of the Office of Legislative Liaison in the Department of Defense. He told McCardle yesterday that he had been speaking to Robert Cutler, the President's representative on the National Security Council, who had assured him that nothing concerning continental defence to which Canada could take exception would be included in the Committee's Report. As I mentioned, this is a somewhat indirect assurance but I doubt if we can do any better. I hope what we have been able to find out will be sufficient for your purposes.

Yours sincerely,



G.P. deT. Glazebrook.

50209-40  
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TOP SECRET

Washington, March 16, 1954.

MEMORANDUM TO MR. PEARSON

Public Statement on Continental Defence

Copies of the most recent exchange of telegrams with Ottawa concerning our comments on a State Department reply to Representative Cole are attached for your information (WA-440 of March 15, EX-413 of March 13 and WA-447 of March 15). We are satisfied that in speaking to Raynor yesterday, March 15, about the Cole letter we made the point dealt with in Mr. Claxton's message to you (EX-413). You will remember that it was your suggestion that we might use the material in Ottawa's draft of a possible public statement as a basis for our comments on the Cole letter.

2. In the course of the discussion with Raynor the parallel question of a public statement on continental defence came up. One of the first points discussed was how comprehensive such a public statement should be. Raynor said that it was clear to him from studying the record of the recent meeting of consultation that both Bedell Smith and Admiral Radford were in favour of some public statement on continental defence, the objective of which would be to off-set criticisms (especially those inspired by civil defence authorities seeking increased appropriations) that not enough was being done in this vital field. Raynor was certain, therefore, that at a high level in both the State Department and the services there was support for issuance of some public statement on continental defence, but he was not certain that much detailed thought had been given to how comprehensive it should be.

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
REVIEW A SECRET

...

-2-

Horsey, from the Canadian Desk, who was also present said that he thought what was normally an unimportant problem of semantics might assume greater importance if a joint or agreed statement were to be issued by the two Governments. When United States authorities speak of "continental defence" they mean literally defence of the continental United States and all that that involves and not merely the early warning systems to be installed in Canada. "Continental defence" for them, in other words, covers almost all aspects of United States defence policy except United States overseas commitments. A United States public announcement, therefore, covering continental defence might include reference to projects which were purely American. After some discussion of this point we did agree, however, that there were a good many projects in addition to the mid-Canada early warning line which were of joint Canadian-United States concern in the defences of the continent. I suggested that even a purely American project such as the seaward extensions of the early warning line was so closely related to the mid-Canada line that reference to it might properly be included in any agreed release of information by the two countries. Raynor said that consultations between various agencies of the Administration including reference to the White House would be necessary if anything like the kind of statement we were discussing was to be prepared and he indicated that this kind of consultation could not be completed in a few days. Until he had explored thinking in his own Department a little more fully he could offer no definite opinion as to what the United States Government's attitude would be. He promised to follow the matter up, however, since it was his impression

...3

-3-

from the recent meeting of consultation that United States interest in a statement of some kind as expressed by Smith and Radford was probably as great as was the Canadian interest. In answer to his question as to which we preferred, a joint or an agreed statement, I said that there were indications that we would prefer an agreed statement and that in all likelihood we would wish to make any such release in the form of a statement by the responsible Minister in the House.

3. Raynor said that he was certain that in view of the opinions expressed at the recent meeting of consultation the desire of both Governments was to supply as much information as possible to the public on the progress of the build-up of continental defences. If this was the case it seemed only reasonable that the agreed release should be as detailed as military security would allow and should fit the particular early warning projects into the perspective of the total defence efforts of the two countries. It should, among other things, be one contribution to the United States effort to convince its European allies that a prudent build-up of the defences of the continent did not signify a return to isolationism by the United States Government. Both State Department representatives referred to the relevant passages of your speech at the Press Club in this context.

4. While it may take some time to clear a comprehensive statement through the labyrinth of interested United States agencies, the end result would, in our opinion, be much more useful than a restricted statement along the line of the draft contained in Ottawa's telegram EX-404 of March 13. If it would have the support of Smith and Radford, as we think it would from the views expressed at the recent meeting of consultation, the time required for clearance might well be reduced. Mr. Glazebrook has seen this memorandum.

*Jaime*  
*pm*

*J.H.*  
J.M.

*McCandle, Can. Embassy, Washington*

001005

TOP SECRET

*File  
WMB.*

File No. 50209-40.

March 16, 1954. *54*

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

Telegram EX-402, March 13, paragraph  
3, second last sentence.

After discussion with Air Vice Marshal  
Miller it was agreed that this sentence should  
be modified, as follows:

"The aerial photography has been completed" -  
to read instead:

"The aerial photography has been largely  
completed".

I informed Mr. Glazebrook by telephone and he  
agreed to pass this on to the State Department.

*RAM*

R.A.M.

UPGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# ORIGINAL

Copy No. ... of 26 copies.

|   |
|---|
| FROM:   |
| THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES            |
| <b>DOWNGRADED TO SECRET</b>                             |
| <b>REDUIT A SECRET</b>                                  |
| TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA |

|                         |    |
|-------------------------|----|
| Security Classification |    |
| TOP SECRET              |    |
| File No.                |    |
| 50209-40                |    |
| 52                      | 50 |

|   |   |            |   |
|---|---|------------|---|
| Priority  | System  | No. WA-447 | Date March 15, 1954<br>(Rec'd March 16, 1954) |
| IMMEDIATE   | CYPHER - AUTO   |            |   |
| Departmental<br>Circulation<br>MINISTER 2<br>UNDER/SEC 3<br>D/UNDER/SEC 4<br>A/UNDER/SEC'S 5<br>POL/CO-ORDIN 6<br>SECTION 7<br>Bygones 9. | <p>Reference: Your EX-402 of March 13 and WA-440 of March 15.</p> <p>Subject: Continental defence.</p> <p>We gave to Raynor on March 15 the views contained in your teletype under reference on the State Department draft reply to Representative Cole. He expressed the deep appreciation of the State Department not only for the substantive comments which you made, but also for the speed with which those comments were offered.</p> <p>2. Mr. Pearson suggested that as a basis for our comments to the State Department we should use not only the material contained in your telegram EX-402 of March 13, but also relevant points from the text of the draft public statement which was included in your telegram EX-404. Raynor was certain that most of the points which we made could be taken into account in a re-draft of the State Department's letter and would greatly strengthen the reply to Representative Cole. We particularly stressed the fact that we were offering informal comments at the official level and also our understanding that the letter to be sent by the State Department to Representative Cole should not give any impression of joint Canadian-United States authorship. Raynor indicated his complete understanding of our position. We informed Raynor of Mr. Pearson's suggestion (our teletype WA-440 of March 15) that consideration might be given to omitting any reference in the State Department's reply to Cole to the possible issuance of a joint Canada-United States public statement on continental defence.</p> <p>3. Raynor said that every effort would be made to show us the State Department's reply to Representative Cole before it is sent. If that does not prove possible, we shall be given a copy of the letter after it goes to Cole.</p> |            |   |
| References  | Mr. Alston<br>CCOS  |            |   |
| + File<br>1011B   |   |            |   |
| 16/3/54   |   |            |   |



CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 MAR 16 PM 2 : 20

001008

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

COPY NO. .... / ..... OF 23 COPIES.

FROM:  
  
THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.  
  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

|                         |    |
|-------------------------|----|
| Security Classification |    |
| TOP SECRET              |    |
| File No.                |    |
| 50209-40                |    |
| 6                       | 50 |

|                       |                       |               |                         |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| Priority<br>IMPORTANT | System<br>CYPHER-AUTO | No.<br>WA-440 | Date<br>March 15, 1954. |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------|-------------------------|

Departmental Circulation  
MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD'N SECTION

COPIES SECTION

One \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Reference: Your telegrams EX-403 and EX-404 of March 13.

Subject: Public statement on continental defence.

Following for the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, Begins:

Mr. Pearson has had an opportunity to study the draft statement concerning continental defence which was dealt with in your telegrams under reference and has suggested that action might be delayed on those telegrams until he has had an opportunity to have a word with you. In general he believes that a somewhat more comprehensive statement than that contained in EX-404 of March 13 might be desirable.

2. Mr. Pearson has suggested in addition that we might indicate to the State Department our view that no reference to a possible joint Canada-United States statement be made in the reply to representative Cole (WA-413 of March 11). If the State Department's letter to representative Cole becomes public knowledge, as it may very well do, Mr. Pearson believes it would be unfortunate if the impression were created that a joint statement by the two governments was occasioned by a congressional letter on one aspect alone of our joint efforts to improve the defences of the continent.

3. You may wish to discuss this in more detail with Mr. Pearson by telephone. Ends.

References

Mr. Claxton *done*

ccos - 3 copies

Jim McNaughton

+ file

*WMB*

One \_\_\_\_\_

Date *11/1/54*

## DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTING SLIP

DATE  
SECURITY

TO:

*A/4500A <sup>seen by</sup> Mr Mackley.  
TO SEE*

FROM: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

☐ For Signature☐ For Action☐ For Comments☐ For Approval

For Information and

File ☐Destroy ☐Return ☐

COMMENTS: (This space is not for comments of a permanent character which should be formally recorded in a memorandum)

*The attached telegram  
was received at 7:08 p.m.  
last evening - too late  
for Departmental approval.*

001010

FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA  
TO: CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON

SENT — MAR 15 1954

March 15, 1954.

No.

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

EX-413

Reference: Your telegram WA-440 of March 15

50209-40  
6 50

FOLLOWING FOR PEARSON FROM CLAXTON, BEGINS,

WHAT WE HERE THOUGHT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THAT WE SHOULD GET INTO US HANDS A DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BEFORE THEY SENT A REPLY TO MR. COLE SO THAT THEY COULD SEE OUR VIEW OF WHAT SHOULD BE SAID. EVEN IF THIS WAS NOT FOLLOWED UP CLOSELY IT WOULD PROBABLY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR REPLY. THIS SEEMED TO ME TO BE THE BEST WAY TO GET ACROSS TO THEM JUST HOW INADEQUATE THEIR REPLY WAS WITHOUT PUTTING OURSELVES IN THE POSITION OF EXPRESSLY COMMENTING ON IT.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
RECLASSIFIED TO SECRET

HERE THIS SEEMED TO US TO BE A MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND EXTREME URGENCY AS IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF A REPLY WAS SENT TO MR. COLE ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT AND THIS SUBSEQUENTLY LEAKED OUT. THIS WOULD CERTAINLY LEAD TO OUR BEING ASKED QUESTIONS HERE. I WOULD THINK IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING TO WARN THE AMERICANS OF THIS POSSIBILITY AND TO INDICATE TO THEM THAT IF WE WERE ASKED WE WOULD MAKE A REPLY ALONG THE LINES OF OUR DRAFT, SUBJECT TO SUCH MODIFICATIONS AS THEY MIGHT SUGGEST AND WE MIGHT ACCEPT.

IT WAS NOT MY THOUGHT THAT THE REPLY TO MR. COLE WOULD REFER TO THE STATEMENT. I DON'T SEE THAT IT WOULD MATTER VERY MUCH IF PEOPLE DID LINK UP THE TWO. THE FACT THAT MR. COLE HAD MADE AN INQUIRY HAD INDICATED TO US THE DESIRABILITY OF MAKING IMMEDIATELY A STATEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR SOME TIME. ENDS.

Copy referred to CCOS  
Mar 16/54.

LB

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 MAR 15 PM 7:08

001012

SEEN

L. B. PEARSON  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTGOING MESSAGE  
ORIGINAL

Security Classification

~~TOP SECRET~~

File No.

50209-40

32 50

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.,

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER  
EN CLAIR  
CODE  
CYPHER

X

No. WA-440 Date March 15, 1954.

For Use of Communications Staff Only  
DESPATCHED

3:13

Priority

IMPORTANT

Originator

J. J. McCARDLE/hb  
Signature

Approved By

Signature

Internal Distribution

Done .....

Date .....

Copies Referred To

Done .....

Date .....

Ext. 18 (Rev. 11/52)

Reference: Your telegrams EX-403 and EX-404 of March 13.

Subject: Public Statement on Continental Defence.

Following for the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs. BEGINS: Mr. Pearson has had an opportunity to study the draft statement concerning continental defence which was dealt with in your telegrams under reference and has suggested that action might be delayed on those telegrams until he has had an opportunity to have a word with you. In general he believes that a somewhat more comprehensive statement than that contained in EX-404 of March 13 might be desirable.

2. Mr. Pearson has suggested in addition that we might indicate to the State Department our view that no reference to a possible joint Canada-U.S. statement be made in the reply to Representative Cole (WA-413 of March 11). If the State Department's letter to Representative Cole becomes public knowledge, as it may very well do, Mr. Pearson believes it would be unfortunate if the impression were created that a joint statement by the two governments was occasioned by a Congressional

- 2 -

letter on one aspect alone of our joint efforts  
to improve the defences of the continent.

3. You may wish to discuss this in more detail  
with Mr. Pearson by telephone. ENDS.

Security ..TOP SECRET.....

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

|                      |    |
|----------------------|----|
| File No.<br>50209-40 |    |
| 54                   | SD |

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, WASHINGTON

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~  
~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

|  |             |   |                        |   |
|--|-------------|---|------------------------|---|
| Message To Be Sent   |             | No. <u>EX 405</u>   | Date<br>March 15, 1954 | For Communications Section Only<br>SENT - MAR 15 1954 |
| AIR CYPHER   |             |   |                        |   |
| EN CLAIR   |             |   |                        |   |
| CODE   |             |   |                        |   |
| CYPHER   | <u>Auto</u> |   |                        |   |
| Priority<br><u>IMMEDIATE</u>   |             | REFERENCE: My EX 402 and EX 404 of March 13, 1954   |                        |   |
| ORIGINATOR<br>(Signature)<br>W.H. Burton/jf<br>(Name Typed)<br>Div. D.L.(1)<br>Local Tel. 7509 |             | SUBJECT: Continental Defence<br><br>The following are the changes requested by Mr. Claxton to the telegrams under reference:<br><br><u>EX 402</u><br>(1) In the final sentence of paragraph 3 delete the words "was accepted and".<br>(2) Delete the text of paragraph 4 and substitute the following: "If the reply is to refer to the distant early warning line, we think that it should be made clear that it is still entirely experimental".<br><br><u>EX 404</u><br>(1) In the second sentence of paragraph 2, change "in 1953" to read "in October 1953".<br>(2) In the first sentence of paragraph 3, change "during the month of October 1953" to read "during the same month". |                        |   |
| APPROVED BY<br>(Signature)<br>(Name Typed)   |             |   |                        |   |
| Internal Distribution:<br>S.S.E.A. / U.S.S.E.A.  |             |   |                        |   |
| Done <u>mae</u><br>Date <u>Mar. 16/54</u>  |             |   |                        |   |
| Copies Referred To:<br>Gen. McNaughton<br>AVM Miller<br>CCOS (4)                               |             |   |                        |   |
| Done <u>97</u><br>Date <u>15/3/54</u>  |             |   |                        |   |



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Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

RECEIVED  
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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 MAR 15 AM 9 : 49

001016

Security .... TOP SECRET .....

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

|                      |    |
|----------------------|----|
| File No.<br>50209-40 |    |
| 6                    | 50 |

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST WASHINGTON

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER  
EN CLAIR  
CODE  
CYPHER

AUTO

No. EX-404

Date

March 13, 1954

For Communications Section Only

SENT - MAR 13 1954

REFERENCE: My immediately preceding telegram.

Priority

IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: CONTINENTAL DEFENCE

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

B. Claxton/NN

(Name Typed)

USSEA

Div.....

Local Tel. 4803

APPROVED BY

(Signature)

(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:  
S. S. E. A. - U. S. S. E. A.

Done.....

Date.....

Copies Referred To:

General McNaughton  
AVM Miller  
CCOS (4)

Done.....

Date.....

Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

Following is text of draft public statement, begins:

## North American Air Defences

1. The Canadian and United States Governments have for some time now been appraising our air defence system to define the steps required to strengthen our defences in the light of recent advances in the destructive capabilities of atomic weapons against targets in our two countries.

2. Long before the existing radar control and warning chain<sup>in Canada</sup> (known as the PINETREE chain) was approaching completion, the two countries were engaged in the intensive study of what further steps might be desirable and practicable. In 1953, a team of Service and scientific advisers representing both countries recommended that additional early warning be provided by the establishment of a new radar system generally to the north of the settled territory in Canada.

3. The report of this team was considered by the Chiefs of Staff of each country during the month of October 1953. At a meeting in Washington early in November, the Canadian representatives informed the

12.3.47 (U.S.)

- 2 -

United States authorities that the Canadian Government was prepared to proceed immediately with the necessary surveys and siting for the proposed new early-warning radar system. This work is already well advanced and the reconnaissance and siting will in the main be completed in June 1954. Construction will commence later this year.

4. There are many difficult problems to be solved in establishing this early warning system in the Canadian North. The system will extend over more than 5,000 miles and its survey will involve the examination of a great number of possible sites. Much of the ground is inaccessible except by tractor train and helicopter. In many areas extreme temperatures are confronted for several months of the year. Many technical problems, including the interference of the auroral belt with electronic devices, have had to be overcome. To avoid stationing large numbers of men in this difficult country the system is being designed to operate with as few men as possible. In overcoming these problems the U.S. Air Force is working closely with the RCAF.

5. At the same time the United States Government is working on the extension of the warning system to the seaward approaches in the northeastern and northwestern sectors of the system. The Alaska and Greenland radar systems are coordinated with those in Canada and the continental United States, and the development of radar-equipped picket ships and airborne radar is well advanced.

6. In these matters the two governments are working in the closest cooperation so that the resulting system will best serve the needs of both countries in their common defence. End of draft.

- 3 -

7. Following for Glazebrook. This draft has not yet been checked finally by Mr. Claxton, but we are putting it on the wire now as Mr. Claxton will not be available until this evening. MacKay will telephone you not later than noon Sunday if any changes are required.

REC'D 10 10 3 1962

Security .TOP SECRET.....

MESSAGE FORM  
OUTGOING

|          |    |
|----------|----|
| File No. |    |
| 50209-40 |    |
| 6        | 50 |

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

WASHINGTON, D.C.

UPGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

|                              |  |   |                 |                                 |
|------------------------------|--|---|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| Message To Be Sent           |  | No.   | Date            | For Communications Section Only |
| AIR CYPHER                   |  | Ex 403  | March 13, 1954. | SENT — MAR 13 1954              |
| EN CLAIR                     |  |   |                 |                                 |
| CODE                         |  |   |                 |                                 |
| CYPHER                       |  |   |                 |                                 |
| Priority                     |  | REFERENCE: My immediately preceding telegram.   |                 |                                 |
| Immediate                    |  | SUBJECT: Continental Defence.   |                 |                                 |
| ORIGINATOR                   |  | Following from Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs.  |                 |                                 |
| (Signature)                  |  | 1. The understandable desire of the State Department to reply to Mr. Cole at an early date must inevitably be related to the consideration of the proposed joint or agreed statement on the subject of Continental Defence. The understanding between General Foulkes and Admiral Radford at their meeting on March 4 was that Foulkes would prepare a draft and forward this to Radford for consideration. It seems to us here that there is a great deal to be said in favour of issuing a public statement at about the time of the reply to Cole. In any event I would think that any reply to Cole would take into account the terms of a draft public statement if they were available at the time of the final preparation of the reply to Cole. |                 |                                 |
| B. Claxton (Name Typed) / JL |  | 2. There is another aspect to be considered in settling the timing. If the letter to Cole should leak to the press, it might do considerable harm by confusing public understanding in both countries. This eventually would be safeguarded if an official public statement had been issued at the same time by the two governments.  |                 |                                 |
| Div. USSEA                   |  |   |                 |                                 |
| Local Tel. 4803              |  |   |                 |                                 |
| APPROVED BY                  |  |   |                 |                                 |
| (Signature)                  |  |   |                 |                                 |
| B. Claxton (Name Typed)      |  |   |                 |                                 |
| Internal Distribution:       |  |   |                 |                                 |
| S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.        |  |   |                 |                                 |
| Done                         |  |   |                 |                                 |
| Date 3/15/54                 |  |   |                 |                                 |
| Copies Referred To:          |  |   |                 |                                 |
| General McNaughton           |  |   |                 |                                 |
| AVM Miller                   |  |   |                 |                                 |
| CCOS (4)                     |  |   |                 |                                 |
| Done                         |  |   |                 |                                 |
| Date 3/15/54                 |  |   |                 |                                 |

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

3. Consequently I think there is much to be said for presenting the draft of <sup>an agreed</sup> ~~a joint~~ public statement to the State Department and Radford before the reply to Cole is sent. If this is done, the State Department and the Pentagon might feel that there is a good deal to be said for agreeing on the public statement and issuing it either before or at the time of the reply to Cole.

4. Accordingly we have prepared a preliminary draft of a possible public statement and this is contained in the immediately following telegram. The draft, as originally prepared by Foulkes, ~~had~~ has been revised by me and discussed with Mackay and General McNaughton. The draft as finally worked out would be subject to final approval by the Ministers concerned if not the Cabinet.

5. I suggest that you do the following as quickly as possible:

(a) Give the draft to the State Department and ask deWolf to give it to Radford, making it clear that the draft (or indeed the question of whether there is to be any public statement) has not (not) yet been decided by the Canadian Government.

(b) Without delaying action on (a), please discuss the draft with Mr. Pearson who will perhaps wish to discuss it with Mr. Howe.

6. If it should be decided, as I hope, to have an agreed public statement next week by both Governments, it would of course take the form in Ottawa of a statement in Parliament.  
ENDS.

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

3. The attention of the State Department might also be drawn to the fact that its draft reply to Representative Cole makes no mention of the seaward extensions to the Sub-Arctic line in the Atlantic and the Pacific, and the Airborne radar back-up which greatly strengthens the scope of the seaward extensions to the early warning line. This portion of the project is purely American and could be expedited without any consultation with Canada. Reference <sup>might</sup> also be made to the fact ~~that~~ in order for the early warning line to meet the air defence requirements of the two countries, it is necessary for the Canadian Sub-Arctic line to be constructed in most difficult terrain where the weather in winter is as extreme as anywhere in the North American continent. It is these difficulties of terrain and weather which are tending to set the pace in the rapid construction of the line. There are no roads and the sites are accessible only by caterpillar tractor trains and by helicopters. The temperatures are such that the reconnaissance parties must be limited to men who have had experience in operating in this kind of climate. Since November 6, 1953, when the project was accepted and commenced by Canada, the aerial photography has been completed, and by June 1, 1954 most of the line will have been reconnoitered and the sites selected. Actual construction and installation will commence later this year.

4. If the reply is to refer to the distant early warning line, we think that it should be made clear that it is a purely United States project (not a <sup>joint</sup> ~~government~~ one), that it is experimental, and that the cooperation which the Canadian Government was asked to give was in fact given without delay. End of comments.

5. You may recall that I made a statement on continental defence in the House of Commons beginning on page 363 of Hansard, on November 26, 1953. The more important parts of this begin at the bottom of the right-hand column on page 364 and continues on the left-hand column on page 365. This had been

cleared with the State Department. It should be added that on several other occasions here, it had been made plain that in deciding to commence work and in actually commencing work, our Government <sup>took the</sup> ~~acted on its own~~ initiative.

6. We shall inform you in a separate telegram of the situation with respect to the possibility of issuing a joint or agreed public statement on the subject of continental defence.

7. Please express to the officials of the State Department our appreciation for being taken into their confidence.



TOP SECRET



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF

OTTAWA

*File 5-209-40*

12 March, 1954.

*WAB*

R.A. MacKay, Esquire,  
Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

|        |   |    |
|--------|---|----|
| 50209- |   | 40 |
| 6      | 1 | 50 |

Dear Mr. MacKay:

I have reviewed the telegrams WA.397, 412, 413 and 414 regarding the letter of Representative Cole and their suggested replies by the State Department. My preliminary views on these telegrams are as follows:

I hope to have a draft press release in front of Mr. Claxton to-day, which I hope can be cleared and forwarded to Washington so that an early release can be made. This, I hope, will clarify some of the difficulties encountered by the State Department in dealing with Mr. Cole's remarks. I am of the opinion that this is the most important contribution that we can make toward settling these remarks of Representative Cole's.

I agree with the remarks made by the Ambassador in Washington in para. 5 of WA.412, and I am of the opinion that perhaps more could be given to Representative Cole than is stated in the draft reply. I am a bit alarmed regarding the tone of Representative Cole's letter in regard to the delays which he attributes to Canadian-U.S. negotiation. While the reply of the State Department attempts to remove this accusation of delay, it still contains the following sentence:

"There are of course many problems in arranging co-operative matters of such magnitude where many agencies of two governments are involved".

I feel it would not be out of place to remind the Americans that this question of continental defence could not have been treated with greater despatch than actually was the case, and that the first request for the commencement of the sub-arctic

(Continued)

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REDUIT A SECRET

- 2 -

TOP SECRET


early warning line was 22 October, and Canadian agreement was given and work started on 6 November. This appears to me to be a record even for any Canadian project, and I think the mentioning of these dates would completely remove any suggestion that we have been dragging our feet.

You might further suggest that in the reply to Representative Cole no mention has been made of the sea-borne extensions to the sub-arctic line in the Atlantic and the Pacific, backed up by air-borne radar, which greatly strengthens the scope of the early warning line. This is the American portion of the project and could be expedited without any consultation with Canada. I feel that the State Department could emphasize that in order for this early warning line to meet the air defence requirements of the United States and Canada, it is necessary for this line to be constructed in the Canadian sub-arctic in most difficult terrain and where the weather in winter is as extreme as anywhere in the North American continent. It is these difficulties of terrain and weather which are the main obstacles to an earlier construction of the line. It should be emphasized that there are no roads and the areas are accessible only by caterpillar tractor trains and helicopters. The temperatures are such that the reconnaissance parties are limited to men who have had experience in operating in this kind of climate.

We also feel that the letter could be strengthened by mentioning that since 6 November, when the project was accepted by Canada, aerial photography has been completed and by 1 June the majority of the line will have been reconnoitred and site selected, and later this year work will have commenced.

Regarding the distant early warning line, we consider that this should not be included as this is not a joint project but is a purely U.S. project and the progress of this experiment is solely in the hands of the United States and any delays here can in no way be attributed to Canada U.S. difficulties.

Yours sincerely,

  
(Charles Foulkes)

General,  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

TOP SECRET

March 12, 1954.

*These are Mr. Claxton's preliminary drafts of the messages which were finally despatched on Mar. 13th, 1954 as EX 402-403-404.*

*File 50209-46*

50209-46  
6 6

1. We agree with your views that the letter sent by the State Department to Representative Cole should not be regarded in any sense as a product of joint authorship. With the clear understanding that whatever is sent is the responsibility of the State Department, we would offer the following comments.
2. We are concerned about the tone of Representative Cole's letter with respect to the delays which he attributes to negotiations between the two countries. While the State Department's reply attempts to refute this accusation of delay, it still contains the following sentence - "There are, of course, many problems in arranging co-operative matters of such magnitude where many agencies of two Governments are involved". We suggest that the State Department reply might draw attention to the fact that the military recommendation for a Sub-Arctic early warning line was first put forward on October 22, 1953 and that the Canadian Government had agreed and ordered the RCAF to start work on November 6, 1953. The mention of these dates should completely remove any suggestion that inter-governmental negotiation had delayed the project.
3. The attention of the State Department might also be drawn to the fact that its draft reply to Representative Cole makes no mention of the seaward extensions to the Sub-Arctic line in the Atlantic and the Pacific, and the Airborne radar back-up which greatly strengthens the scope of the seaward extensions to the early warning line. This portion of the project is purely American and could be expedited without any consultation with Canada. Reference

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- 2 -

might also be made to the fact that in order for the early warning line to meet the air defence requirements of the two countries, it is necessary for the Canadian Sub-Arctic line to be constructed in most difficult terrain where the weather in winter is as extreme as anywhere in the North American continent. It is these difficulties of terrain and weather which are tending to set the pace in the rapid construction of the line. There are no roads and the sites are accessible only by caterpillar tractor trains and by helicopters. The temperatures are such that the reconnaissance parties must be limited to men who have had experience in operating in this kind of climate. Since November 6, 1953, when the project was ~~accepted~~ and commenced by Canada, the aerial photography has been completed, and by June 1, 1954 most of the line will have been reconnoitered and the sites selected. Actual construction and installation will commence later this year.

4. In our view, the distant early warning line should not be mentioned in the State Department's reply to Representative Cole since it is not a joint project but is a purely U.S. project. The progress of this experiment is solely in the hands of the United States and any delays in its conduct can in no way be attributed to Canada-U.S. difficulties. End of comments.

5. You may recall that I made a statement on continental defence in the House of Commons beginning on page 363 of Hansard, on November 26, 1953. The more important parts of this begin at the bottom of the right-hand column on page 364 and continues on the left-hand column on page 365. This had been cleared with the State Department. It should be added that on several other occasions here, it had been made plain that in deciding to commence work/<sup>and in actually commencing work,</sup> our Government acted on its own initiative.

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6. We shall inform you in a separate telegram of the situation with respect to the possibility of issuing a joint or agreed public statement on the subject of continental defence.

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March 12, 1954.

(2)

1. The understandable desire of the State Department to reply to Mr. Cole at an early date must inevitably be related to the consideration of the proposed joint or agreed statement on the subject of Continental Defence.

The understanding between General Foulkes and Admiral Radford at their <sup>meeting following the suggestion made at the</sup> last week <sup>meeting at the</sup> was that General Foulkes would <sup>State</sup> prepare a draft and forward this to General Radford for <sup>consideration</sup> consideration. It seems to us here that there is a great deal to be said <sup>has attempted at one to meet these views by giving them the draft of</sup> to meet the views of General Foulkes and Admiral Radford by issuing a statement <sup>about</sup> at about the time of the reply to Mr. Cole. In any event I would think that any reply to Mr. Cole would <sup>have to</sup> take into account the terms of a draft statement if <sup>it were</sup> they were available at the time of the preparation of the reply to Mr. Cole.

*1. At least  
suggested  
replied*

2. There is another point to be considered. If a reply to Mr. Cole along the lines of the draft were to appear in public, it would almost inevitably lead to the buildup of anti-Canadian sentiment and certainly would lead to questions in the House here. We would reply to these quite frankly and we might be led into the necessity of asserting our position with regard to the complete control of our defence in Canadian territory. Such a course might at this time set back our work for joint defence. Canadian sentiment as aroused over the cases of Gouzenko and White has shown just how quick our people would be to respond to any kind of irresponsible criticism and proposal that might emerge before the situation could be brought under control again.

3. This view may be considered at this moment to be extreme but experience in recent months has shown just how

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

fast and how far things may go for lack of proper understanding of the essential kind of approach to a problem involving the co-operation of two sovereign states.

4. Consequently I think there is a great deal to be said for presenting the draft of a joint statement to the State Department and Admiral Radford before the reply to Mr. Cole is sent. It is only fair that we should give ~~him~~ frankly what we consider to be a fair description of what has happened. If this is done the State Department and the Pentagon might feel that there is a good deal to be said for agreeing on the statement and issuing it either before or at the time of the reply to Mr. Cole.

5. Accordingly we have prepared a preliminary draft of a possible statement and this is contained in the immediately following telegram. The draft, as originally prepared by General Foulkes, has been revised by me and it has been seen by General McNaughton. The draft as finally worked out would be subject to final approval by the Ministers concerned if not the Cabinet. As you know we could secure immediate consideration of any changes and a reply within an hour or two of their receipt here.

6. At a luncheon given to Dr. Hannah I found that he was familiar in a general way with the proposal that there should be a joint statement and with Mr. Cole's letter. At a reception to be given for him by General McNaughton tonight, there might be an opportunity to discussing this further but we did not think it desirable to go into this further with him here.

TOP SECRET

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March 12, 1954.

North American Air Defences

1. The Canadian and United States Governments have for some time now been appraising our air defence system to define the steps required to improve our defences so that the increasing Soviet capability to strike at the targets in our two countries can be dealt with as effectively as possible. Even before the news was received of the Soviets' H-bomb explosion much work had been done, and plans, with appropriate priorities, had been made to expand and improve the components of the system.

2. Long before <sup>the planned and approved</sup> transcontinental radar control and warning chain was approaching completion, the two countries were engaged in the intensive study of what further steps were desirable and practicable. In <sup>October</sup> 1954, a team of Service and scientific advisors representing both countries recommended <sup>that</sup> a new defence line be established, generally to the north of the settled territory in Canada and to be equipped largely with what has come to be known as McGill Fence equipment which has just recently been developed in Canada.

3. Even before this report had been formally considered by the United States Chiefs of Staff, conversations had taken place between representatives of both countries at Washington during this same month. At a subsequent meeting in Washington early in November, the Canadian representative informed the United States authorities that the Canadian government had already decided to proceed with the necessary surveys and siting for the proposed new line of defence for which it was intended to use the McGill equipment. This work is already well advanced and the reconnaissance and siting will ...



TOP SECRET

- 2 -

will in the main be completed in June and construction of the actual line will be commenced this summer.

4. There are many difficult problems to be solved in establishing this early warning chain in the Canadian sub arctic. The length of the chain to be reconnoitred and constructed is something over 5,000 miles and will involve 200 stations, including the reconnaissance of over 400 sites. Much of the ground is inaccessible except by tractor train and helicopter. In many parts of the chain extreme temperatures are confronted for several months of the year. Many technical problems have still to be solved, including the interference of the auroral belt with electronic devices. To avoid stationing large numbers of men in this inaccessible area the line is being devised to use as few men as possible. This again creates new problems as it is believed that it is the first time that such a line has been established in remote areas or for that matter anywhere else.

5. At the same time the US Government was working on the extension of the warning system to the seaward approaches in the Northeastern and Northwestern sectors of the system. The Alaska and Greenland radar chains have been pushed ahead with great rapidity and the development of radar-equipped picket ships and airborne radar is well advanced.

6. To expedite the completion of these projects they are being implemented by each Government working in close co-operation with the other at every level. Any installation of this or other type in the Northern parts of the Continent of course are of benefit to both countries. Arrangements have been made, therefore, to insure that there is continuous joint consultation by Canadian and US governmental agencies so that the ultimate air defence system meets the requirements of the continent as a whole.

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*12/11/54*  
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March 12, 1954  
*Mr Clayton*  
*deputy*

North American Air Defences

1. The Canadian and United States Governments have for some time now been appraising our air defence system to define the steps required to improve our defences so that the increasing Soviet capability to strike at the targets in our two countries can be dealt with as effectively as possible. Even before the news was received of the Soviets' H-bomb explosion much work had been done, and plans, with appropriate priorities, had been made to expand and improve the components of the system.
2. Long before transcontinental radar control and warning chain was approaching completion, the two countries were engaged in the intensive study of what further steps were desirable and practicable. In 1954, a team of Service and scientific advisors representing both countries recommended a new defence line be established, generally to the north of the settled territory in Canada and to be equipped largely with what has come to be known as McGill Fence equipment which has just recently been developed in Canada.
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- 2 -

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001034

# INCOMING MESSAGE

*File  
50219-40*

# ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

*50219-40*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

*52 30*

Priority  
IMPORTANT

System  
CYPHER-AUTO

No. WA-414

Date March 11, 1954

Departmental  
Circulation

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD'N  
SECTION

Reference: Our WA-412 of March 11.

Subject: Public statement on continental defence.

This telegram contains excerpts from representative Cole's letter of March 5, to the State Department which is mentioned in our telegram under reference. You will note the forthright views put forward by representative Cole and will appreciate the difficulties for the State Department in framing a suitable reply.

2. Representative Cole stated that he would "appreciate a report on the status of our negotiations with Canada concerning the establishment of an early warning line for continental defence". He went on to indicate his growing concern over the weakness of United States continental defence in light of the known capabilities of the Soviet Union for atomic attack. "I, therefore, deem it of the highest importance that we quickly come to an agreement with the Canadian Government on an early warning line and then take all steps necessary to make this line operational."

3. Representative Cole indicated that he appreciated the difficulty and complexity of inter-governmental negotiations on matters of such importance. He continued "I understand we have so far failed to reach an agreement with Canada on how the responsibility for manning and equipping such a line would be divided". The letter is concluded with the following sentence "I am frankly not now satisfied in my own mind that we are attacking them (the problems of negotiation) with the full sense of urgency they merit. I urge that all possible priority be given to the negotiations with Canada and that we do everything in our power to bring these negotiations to a speedy and satisfactory close."

References

*Gen McNaughton  
Mr. Gault  
cc OS  
Done  
WMB*

Done

Date

# INCOMING MESSAGE

*File  
WMB*

# ORIGINAL

FROM:

THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

**S E C R E T**

File No.

*Copy on 50219-AE 50209-40*  
*52 50*

Priority  
**IMPORTANT**

System  
CYPHER-AUTO

No. WA-413

Date March 11, 1954.

Departmental  
Circulation

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD'N  
SECTION

Reference: Our WA-412 of March 11.

Subject: Public statement on continental defence.

The following is the text of the State Department draft reply to representative Cole, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, which is mentioned in our telegram under reference. It bears the State Department security classification "secret". Text begins:

My dear Mr. Cole:

Reference is made to your letter dated March 5, 1954, the receipt of which has been acknowledged by telephone, regarding our negotiations with Canada concerning the establishment of an early warning line for continental defense.

This matter is one which, as you know, has been receiving the constant attention of all the interested departments within the United States Government, with a view to determining what actions may be necessary to improve our continental defense against air attack. The United States is in close and continuous consultation with the Canadian Government on this and on all phases of defense. When the Canadian Prime Minister visited the United States in May of 1953, he explored various proposals with the President. Again when President Eisenhower visited Ottawa in November of 1953 continental defense was foremost amongst the subjects discussed, and complete agreement was reached between the two governments on the need for effective measures against air attack. Since that time I have been giving this matter my close personal attention in various stages of discussion with the Canadians.

The Permanent Joint Board of Defense, United States-Canada, which is the primary organization for the consideration and recommendation of joint measures for the defense of the two countries keeps the progress on this important matter under continuous and searching review.

The cooperation received from the Canadian Government has been prompt and effective. Action has already

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been initiated by the RCAF and by the USAF which are the agencies of the two governments charged with the responsibility of carrying out the necessary construction and operation of a sub-Arctic early warning line. Preliminary surveys are going forward on the ground and studies are proceeding with all priority with a view to selecting the necessary types of equipment and communications. I may say that all aspects of this important project are going forward with the sense of urgency which they merit, and with all practicable dispatch consistent with orderly planning and sound administration. There are, of course, many problems in arranging a cooperative project of such magnitude where many agencies of two governments are involved. I assure you that these problems are being solved in a spirit of the utmost frankness and harmony, and I am confident that arrangements will be made which are completely satisfactory to both governments. In addition, studies are being pressed forward with respect to a more distant early warning line in the Canadian Arctic. These investigations, designed to determine the feasibility, have not yet been completed.

I shall appreciate it if you will maintain the above-mentioned information in confidence for the present in view of the need for security and in the light of our continuing discussions with the Canadians. It is expected that the two governments will in the near future be able to issue a joint public statement, outlining the progress which has been made towards the establishment of an early warning line. I am sure you are already familiar with the extensive radar installations in Canada which have been completed or are in the process of construction under previous agreements with the Canadian Government.

Your interest in writing is much appreciated. I can assure you that this department is fully aware of the necessity and the vital importance of taking necessary measures for continental defense.

Sincerely yours,

Acting Secretary.

Text ends.

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COMMONS  
EXTENSION

1954 MAR 11 PM 4 42

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INCOMING MESSAGE

*File*  
*WMB*  
**ORIGINAL**

FROM: *Copy on 50209-AE-40*

THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

|                         |           |
|-------------------------|-----------|
| Security Classification |           |
| SECRET                  |           |
| File No.                |           |
| <i>50209-40</i>         |           |
| <i>58</i>               | <i>50</i> |

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| Priority  | System      | No.    | Date                       |
| IMPORTANT | CYPHER-AUTO | WA-412 | March 11, 1954 <i>J-16</i> |

Departmental  
Circulation

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S

POL/CO-ORD'N  
SECTION

Reference: Our telegram WA-397 of March 10.

Subject: Public Statement on Continental Defence.

Raynor, Director of the State Department's office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, gave us, late on March 10 a draft of a possible State Department reply to representative Cole's letter mentioned in our telegram under reference. The text of the draft reply is included in a following telegram. In addition, Raynor let us take notes on representative Cole's letter itself and these are contained in a separate following telegram.

2. Raynor emphasized that the draft reply has been cleared only to his level in the State Department. He has reason to believe that it will be satisfactory to the joint chiefs. It has not, however, been seen yet by more senior officers in the State Department or the Department of Defence. The draft, therefore, must be regarded as a preliminary one even though Raynor did not anticipate any serious objection to it by his superiors.

3. Raynor said that because our two governments were cooperating so closely in the joint effort to improve the defences of the continent, and since representative Cole's letter dealt primarily with that joint effort, the State Department thought it was only reasonable and courteous that Canadian comments on the reply be sought. The State Department would like to know whether the Canadian authorities would have any serious objections, either to the substance of the draft reply or to the method of answering representative Cole's query.

4. We said that, of course, the draft would have to be seen in Ottawa before any Canadian comment could be offered on it. We told Raynor that we thought it would be possible to get informal Canadian comments on the draft at the official level but we did not think it likely that the formal concurrence of the Canadian Government would be forthcoming. We expressed the view that you would probably wish to have every precaution taken that the letter sent to representative Cole could not be regarded in any sense as the product of joint authorship. The letter was after all a request by a United States Congressional Representative for information, as to what the United States was doing to advance the cause of better continental defence and concerned the Canadian Government only indirectly. Raynor seemed to appreciate these points.

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Done: *Done: COMM'S SECTION*

Date: *MAR 12 1954*

References

*Mc Cluskey*  
*ccos*  
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5. You may be interested in a few of our preliminary comments on the draft reply. In general terms it strikes us that the draft reply is so vaguely phrased as not to constitute too great a problem so far as Canadian interests are concerned. This vagueness leads us to wonder whether representative Cole will be satisfied with a reply along these lines. Even with this general view in mind, we believe certain improvements in the text, from our point of view, could be made. The reference in the last sentence of the fourth paragraph to the attention being given to the more distant early warning line may cause some concern. It may be possible, in addition, to improve on the drafting of the two preceding sentences which deal with the difficulties "in arranging a co-operative project of such magnitude". These sentences suggest that the problems of principles between governments. Some balance might be added if reference were made to difficulties and delays caused by the purely technical problems which must be solved before any early warning line can be established. In the fifth paragraph reference is made to the possible issuance of a joint public statement by the two governments on the progress in establishing an early warning line. I believe that the references made to this matter in the recent meeting of consultation were in more general terms and not related to any particular warning line. I am not certain, in addition, that in the thought which you have given to this matter you have considered the issuance of a joint statement. You may simply have had in mind an agreed statement.

6. As we suggested in our telegram under reference representative Cole's query seems to us to increase the urgency of some public announcement being made by the Canadian and United States Governments concerning improvements in continental defence. It would obviously be much more desirable that a progress report on Canadian activities be made public by Canadian authorities than through congressional leaks of information. Raynor told us he is certain that Bedell Smith holds the same view.

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ALFRED  
COMMONWEALTH  
EXTENSION OFFICE

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7. The State Department is under compulsion to reply promptly to congressional enquiries and have, therefore, expressed the hope that we will be able to offer Canadian comment by Monday, March 15, at the latest. I would be grateful, therefore, if you could let us have your instructions as to:

- (A) Whether views should be expressed to the State Department on the draft reply to Cole;
  - (B) If so, what those views should be;
  - (C) Whether they should be made under conditions, e.g. that no reference be made to any Canadian consultation;
  - (D) Whether these views should be defined, e.g. as informal and official (without ministerial sanction?)
-

M.H.Wershof/NN

TOP SECRET

March 11, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CLAXTON

Proposed Public Statements on Continental Defence

Enclosed are copies of the following telegrams received from Washington today: WA-397, WA-412, WA-413, WA-414. A set has been sent to General Foulkes.

From these telegrams, supplemented by the report which General Foulkes sent to you on his return from Washington, it appears that three different statements are being considered in Washington.

First, there is a report which a Senate Committee proposes to make public regarding Continental Defence. Admiral Radford, I believe, showed this document to General Foulkes. This Department has not seen the proposed Senate report and I think that we should immediately ask the State Department to try to get a copy for us, and to try to hold up the report until we have had an opportunity to comment if we so desire.

Second, there is a letter which the State Department proposes to send to Mr. Cole, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The letter is to be marked "secret" but we must assume that its contents will leak out. The State Department asks us to comment by Monday, March 15, at the latest. I think that we should ask for more time, in view of the possible relationship between this document and the one discussed in the next paragraph.

Third - At the meeting of Consultation in

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*Smith*

Washington, on March 4, General ~~Rowles~~ threw out the suggestion that the two governments might consider issuing a joint or simultaneous public statement on the progress of Continental Defence. This suggestion has not yet been considered by the Canadian Government and it seems to me that it will take at least a week to decide whether Canada desires such a statement and to settle the text of it with Washington.

I think that it would be most unfortunate if these matters are unduly rushed. There is no reason why the proposed governmental public statement should be rushed unless our hand is forced by the premature publication of the Senate report and the premature sending and leaking of the reply to Mr. Cole.

If you agree with this line, I will send instructions to the Embassy in Washington tonight or first thing tomorrow morning.

H. A. MacKAY

H.A.M.

# INCOMING MESSAGE

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COPY

COPY NO. ....21....OF 23 COPIES

FROM:

THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

*Original on 50219-AE-40*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

TOP SECRET

File No.

50209-40

50

50

Priority

System

CYPHER-AUTO

No. WA-397

Date March 10, 1954.

Departmental  
Circulation

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD'N  
SECTION

Reference:

Subject: Meeting of consultation, March 4,-- Public statement on continental defence.

Following for the Acting Under-Secretary, Begins:

You will remember the discussion at the meeting of consultation with United States authorities on March 4 concerning the desirability of the issuance of a public statement or a press release on the progress of joint Canadian-United States efforts to strengthen the defences of the continent.

2. Our record of the meeting of consultation, which we should be able to send you in the next few days, contains two references to the discussion on this point. The first reads, "The Chairman suggested that the possible issuance of a press release (on continental defence) might be considered by the Canadian and United States authorities." The second reference reads, "The meeting ended with agreement on both sides that no mention of these meetings of consultation should be made in any public statement but that responsible authorities in both countries might be asked to cooperate in the preparation of a draft press release or public statement concerning the progress of installations for continental defence."

3. While a comparison of the Canadian and United States records of the meeting was being made at the State Department on March 9, Raynor informed us of a development which suggests that early attention should be given to the release of some information on the work being done with respect to continental defence. He said that the State Department had received a letter from representative Cole, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, asking why more was not being done to improve continental defences. The State Department had been unsuccessful in attempting to convince representative Cole to delay the sending of his letter. Some reply would have to be sent to him in the very near future.

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4. No final decision has been reached in the State Department as to what reply should be sent to representative Cole. It is possible, however, that within a day or two a draft of the State Department reply will be shown to us. It is not clear whether the State Department will seek Canadian concurrence to their reply. If that should be the case, we shall consult you before offering any Canadian comments on the letter.

5. Raynor was of the opinion, with which I agree, that the sooner some agreed public announcement is made by the Canadian and United States Governments concerning improvements in continental defence the less difficulties will be caused our governments. No matter what security classification is given to the State Department's reply, the danger always exists of a congressional leak. You may also have some draft statement in mind which you could send us for discussion with United States authorities. Ends.

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TOP SECRET

M.H. Wershof/NN  
March 10, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ARNOLD SMITH  
MINISTER'S OFFICE

Minister's Speech to National War College  
in Washington - Your memo of March 8.

Mr. MacKay asked me to see what we could provide in the way of material on defence. He does not think that Civil Defence cooperation is worth including in this speech.

So far as defence is concerned, the Minister could certainly talk about Continental Defence. He might also wish to talk about U.S. defence activities in Canada in general and about the functioning of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Enclosed are the following documents:

- (a) Memorandum dated October 3, 1953 on Continental Radar Defence;
- (b) Handbook article dated December 30, 1953 "United States Defence Activities in Canada";
- (c) Handbook article dated December 30, 1953 entitled "Permanent Joint Board on Defence";
- (d) Copy of speech which General McNaughton gave to the National War College three years ago regarding the PJBD.

At the suggestion of Mr. MacKay I spoke to General McNaughton. He told me that he

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had spoken to the College three years ago but was not scheduled to speak this year and, therefore, there would be no danger of duplication if Mr. Pearson would like to talk about the PJBD. General McNaughton thought it would be an excellent idea for the Minister to devote part of his speech to this subject, and said that the Minister should feel free to borrow as much as he likes from General McNaughton's speech of three years ago.

I hope that it will be possible for you to return these enclosures eventually. However, if you find that you must cut them up, no irreparable harm will be done.

M. H. WENISHOR

M.H.W.

MEMORANDUM

FROM THE OFFICE OF

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

To ..... Acting Under-Secretary.....

March 8, 1954

*Cross referenced with "H" 9943-40*  
*50209-40*  
*82 52*  
The Minister has accepted an invitation to lecture at the National War College in Washington at 3:30 p.m., Monday, March 15th.

2. If the Department has any topics on which it is felt that it would be useful for the Minister to speak, rough notes would be appreciated. They should be ready by Wednesday night.

3. The audience, as you know, are 121 War College students (mainly Army, Navy, Air and State Department officers) and 150 students of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

4. It is obviously an opportunity for the Minister to emphasize the importance of consultation in our alliance.

5. Other possible topics are:

(a) continental defence;

(b) economic cooperation;

(particular reference to mobilization plans, armed forces procurement, etc. -- the sort of subject in which Industrial College and War College graduates might have influence shortly after they return to their departments).

(c) civil defence cooperation.

*maximize  
of cooperation*

*ReS*  
A.C.S.

*Copy to Mr. Ritchie, Ec. Div.*  
*9.3.13(us)*

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Canadian Eyes Only

Extract from Notes by General Foulkes on Conversations held in Washington on March 4 and 5, 1954  
(Copy No. 2 of 6 copies was sent to Mr. Pearson by Mr. Claxton under cover of a letter dated March 8, 1954)

Note: Some of the information contained in this paper was secured on a personal basis on the understanding that its use would be seriously restricted. Therefore, this paper should not be circulated, nor should it be quoted in such a way as to reveal the source of the information.

### Discussion with General Twinning

3. ....

4. I then asked about further continental defence projects and he confirmed the views expressed in Canada two weeks earlier; that he has no immediate requests and agrees the Mongoose project with the seaward extensions are the first priority, and until these are well advanced he does not propose anything further.

### Discussions with Secretary Wilson

7. I had only intended to make a formal call on the Secretary but Mr. Hannah mentioned several matters which we had dealt with at the consultation meetings and asked me to discuss them with the Secretary. I outlined the progress on the detailed siting of the Mongoose line and the general operation, location, etc., of this project. Secretary Wilson was very interested and asked about the Distant line and the Corrode Project. I emphasized that we still had worries about the Distant line, especially manpower implications which involved about 200 at each site. I pointed out we wished to try out the McGill fence idea on the Mongoose line and see if we could provide the warning by automatic means. I mentioned the problem of identification and the system of providing gaps covered by scanning radar. He asked a number of questions about the date the line would be in operation and he mentioned the need for a statement about progress to avoid more heat from "Alsops" that nothing was being done.

### Discussion with Admiral Radford

He mentioned that he had asked the Bureau of Roads to investigate the possibility of constructing any new "thru ways" near big US cities in the same manner as the German "autobahn", so that they could provide emergency fighter strips for dispersal of fighter forces in the event of attacks on US airfields.

17. Admiral Radford then raised again the desirability of an agreed statement being issued about "Mongoose" emphasizing progress. He said it would be most helpful to them as they were being pressed by Congressional groups as well as the press. Admiral Radford showed me a press release that a Joint Committee on Armed Services were proposing to issue about an investigation into continental defence. It was a very innocuous statement which mentioned the helpful co-operation of Canada, but nothing else which had any Canadian implication.

### Discussion with Colonel Graling

22. I saw Colonel Graling in General Lemnitzer's anti-room. He informed me that he was accompanying Mr. Hannah to Canada next week. He mentioned the question of a USAF Major-General in Ottawa to co-ordinate US-Cdn air matters. I gave him no encouragement and emphasized some of the difficulties. He stated that this matter would be pursued when the CAS went to Washington next week.

Ext. 1800

*Copy on 50102-E-40  
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C.H.B.  
done  
March 19*

OTTAWA FILE

No. 50209-40

Despatch No. 124

Date March 5th, 1954

52 50  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, MEXICO

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA  
Letter No. 4010 of December 15th from The Canadian Delegation

Reference: to the North Atlantic Council

Subject: Ministerial Meeting of NATO Council

Para. 29 of the Numbered Letter under  
reference reads as follows:

"Mr. Pearson added that in Canada we had much in mind the new urgency of an old responsibility: American continental defence. We considered continental defence as part of NATO defence and in accepting additional burdens in this regard we were making the same kind of contribution to the common security as if we were sending more units across the Atlantic. While we were prepared to accept a large share of the burden we were not, however, considering a reduction of our commitments in Europe".

2. There is the possibility of a serious misunderstanding here based on two different interpretations of the expression "American continental defence". This expression has a very precise meaning when used by the signatories of the Inter-American Treaty of reciprocal assistance. You are aware that, under the terms of the treaty, the signatories agreed that an armed attack against any American state is an attack against all. Further, Canada is included in the security zone covered by the treaty although not a party thereto. According to the information we have on file here, the Cabinet Defence Committee, on August 12th, 1947, decided that Canada should not participate in hemispheric defence arrangements.

3. On the one hand, therefore, the policy of the Canadian Government towards hemispheric defence over the last few years was that the Canadian Government would not adhere to the Inter-American Treaty, nor would it participate in the work of the Inter-American Defence Board; on the other hand, the report of the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Council refers to "the new urgency of an old responsibility: American continental defence". It is quite easy to see that the misunderstanding referred to above could arise within this context.

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18 MAR 1954

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
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4. If left in its NATO context, the expression "American continental defence" applies only to the security of the two North American signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. This distinction, however, could not be understood in this part of the world and, were it to be used in any public pronouncement, the normal reaction of any Latin American country would be that Canadian policy towards hemispheric defence is going through a period of major readjustments.

5. Naturally, in a world of overlapping security arrangements, such confusion is to be expected, but the eagerness with which our Latin American friends would welcome us in their security arrangements should be met with clear indications of Canadian policies in this field. If, therefore, we are unwilling to assume specific security responsibilities in Latin America, it would be preferable that no public reference be made to our renewed interests in American continental defence.



Ambassador.

SECRET

March 1, 1954.

General A. G. L. McNaughton;  
Rear Admiral W. O. Creevy;  
Major General H. A. Sparling;  
A/V/M P. B. Miller;  
Mr. R. A. Mackay.

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| 50209-40 |
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Conditions Governing Canadian Govern-  
ment Approval of United States Defence  
Activities in Canada

At the last meeting of the PJBB, General Sparling suggested to me that it would be useful to have a compilation of the principles or conditions governing Canadian Government approval of United States defence activities in Canada. I am enclosing two copies of a memorandum dated February 25, 1954, which does this.

It would be appreciated if you could give me any comments or suggestions you might have.

W. H. B.

W. H. Barton,  
Secretary, Canadian Section.



*Original on 50115-1-40*  
586

30209-40  
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February 25, 1954

S E C R E T

THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND  
THE OEEC, PARIS

Your letter No. D-71 of February 5, 1954

Implications of United States Strategy

In addition to political consequences of the first importance for NATO, the new United States strategy will undoubtedly have effects on Canadian and also NATO military planning.

2. To the extent that the new United States strategy is to concentrate power and to develop ability to retaliate massively at points of United States choosing, the protection of this retaliatory power will assume progressively greater importance and, in the end, it will become inseparable from the power itself. In a figurative but very real sense, the United States and the North American Continent will become a fortress as well as the power house of Western ability to deter and defeat aggression. The strength and invulnerability of the fortress will be essential elements of NATO security.

3. Canada must inevitably be part of the fortress "America"; and it is not difficult to foresee that a greater part of our military effort than hitherto will have to be devoted to the integrated defence system of the American Continent. This will be a contribution not only to our own and to United States security but to the defence of the Free World. If such is the case, there seem to be implications as regards the strength, nature and deployment of our forces.

none

4. As regards strength, the danger to America and therefore to Canada rises in proportion to the increase on Soviet power to wage unlimited atomic war. A few years hence, the main front may shift from Europe and centre in the armament competition between the offensive-defensive capacity of the Soviet Bloc and the American Continent. The race will not only involve better weapons but also a redeployment of those weapons (i.e. thicker walls for the fortress). Unless we can reduce our commitments outside the American Continent, our defence bill in future years may therefore be higher.

7/5/11

5. Moreover, it seems possible that a re-appraisal of the balance and the character of our forces might be necessary as the new United States strategy will almost inevitably bring the forces of our two countries into closer relationship. By a fact of geography, our strategy must be inseparably linked with, and follow closely, that

...2

of the United States.. So far, our strategy, in common with that of NATO as a whole, has been based on the assumption that the main danger was in Europe and that our principal contribution was to help to provide the shield for that area. This resulted in the development of our present force structure which may not meet the needs of a different role than the one previously envisaged. It seems, therefore, that we should also have a "new look" at our force structure.

6. The deployment of our forces will probably create problems. In this regard there is likely to be a conflict between political and military requirements. It will now be necessary to re-examine carefully the allocation of our forces, within the NATO area. This is not a new problem, but it may become more acute. Hitherto, it was largely agreed that Europe was the threatened area and North American requirements were low in comparison. The North American area, because of the change in the United States strategic concept, and the development in Soviet atomic capabilities, seems now to have a relatively higher priority. Unless there is an overall increase in the forces available, it will be necessary to make some reallocation of existing forces or perhaps a change in the direction of the defence effort. Our European partners will oppose any such suggestions, and we must be careful not to weaken the European front to the point where European morale will deteriorate in the knowledge that Soviet forces could occupy Western Europe easily; a new and delicate balance must be found between conflicting European and North American defence requirements. The final decision will not be made on military grounds alone; for political reasons, it may not be possible for the United States and ourselves to reduce our forces in Europe as much as purely military expediency might suggest.

7. If these tentative conclusions are examined in relation to some of the problems now facing NATO, the results are of interest.

8. Let us take first the field of defence expenditures. The general agreement that the curve should flatten at approximately the present level, we feel, should be a tentative one. Bearing in mind that there can be no absolute security, defence expenditures should, in general, depend upon three factors: an assessment of Soviet political intentions, an assessment of Soviet military capabilities (atomic and otherwise) and the defence strategy that is employed. These interdependent factors will not remain constant and must, therefore, be the subject of continuous review. In practice, we suspect, that as commitments cannot easily be reduced in Europe, and North America becomes more exposed, defence expenditures will go on increasing.

9. In connection with the "new look" concept, the point has been made that it offers only the alternative of an atomic attack (global war) or the loss of a local war, and is, therefore, much more likely to encourage piecemeal concessions. In reality, we doubt whether the "new look" implies such a fundamental change. As we see it, the arsenal of the West should continue to be diversified; it should continue to have both atomic weapons and conventional forces; it should be prepared both for atomic warfare and local aggression. The proper balance of forces is likely to be achieved by a series of approximations rather than by a single formula, but in any case, it seems unlikely that the aggregate cost will be less.



10. Further, in modern conditions, as the danger of a lightning attack increases, the need for larger and larger standing forces, with higher and higher standards of readiness grows. Our "peacetime" forces are larger than they have ever been. Other factors being equal, it is difficult to see how we will be able to avoid having even larger forces if the present trend continues.

11. The conclusions of this rather cursory review of the implications of the new United States strategy would appear to be that:

(a) NATO defence burdens in spite of the availability of new and more efficient weapons may increase in the long run;

(b) there is likely to be a shift in the allocation of resources in favour of the North American as compared to the European area (hence the fresh need of a German contribution);

(c) the nature, structure, and distribution of the Canadian forces are likely to be affected.

L. D. WILGRESS

THE DELEGATION

Defence Liaison (1) G. R. Bruce/aba

**TOP SECRET**  
**CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

February 25, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

A Study of Recent Changes and Trends in  
United States Defence Policy and the  
Implications it Might Have on Canadian  
Defence Policy.

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D.L. 2  
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You may recall that in a despatch of January 22, 1954, we received from Mr. Heeney a description and an analysis of United States Defence Policy resulting from the "New Look". On February 2 you submitted to the Prime Minister a memorandum on this subject.

Mr. Heeney's despatch was well received in the Department of National Defence. In preparation for the recent meeting with General Twining and Assistant Defense Secretary Douglas, Mr. Claxton asked the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff to review this despatch, and to prepare a memorandum discussing the possible implications of United States defence policy to Canadian defence policy. I am attaching for your information a copy of this study which was obtained through our representation on the Joint Planning Committee.

General Foulkes asked his staff specifically to restrict the distribution of this paper to National Defence Headquarters. We have, therefore, considered ourselves equally bound to limit circulation to the Department in Ottawa.

R. A. MacKAY

R.A.M.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
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SECRET

February 25, 1954.

Department of Defence

General Order

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| 50209-40 |
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General Order Concerning Canadian Gov-  
ernment Approval of United States  
Defence Activities in Canada

1. Since the publication in 1947 by the Governments of Canada and the United States of the ~~a~~ joint statement regarding defence co-operation between the two countries, the Canadian Government has evolved a number of "conditions" or "principles" which, with minor variations to suit specific circumstances, are applied as appropriate to every defence arrangement with the United States Government. These principles are outlined below for the convenience of the Members of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

Reciprocity:

2. Whenever appropriate, and in particular when permission is granted by the Canadian Government for United States defence activities in Canada which are not related to a particular exercise or project, the privileges so granted are made reciprocal. An example is PJBD Recommendation 53/1 concerning the principles governing the interception of unidentified aircraft.

Ownership of Land:

3. Title to any land required for United States defence installations in Canada is acquired and retained by the Government of Canada.

Tenure:

4. Assurance of tenure has varied depending on circumstance. The Canadian Government has itself never granted right of tenure to the United States Government for a period longer than twenty years, although it had to accept the ninety-nine year leases negotiated in 1941 between the United States and United Kingdom Governments for the bases in Newfoundland. A twenty year lease for an area of land at RCAF Station, Goose Bay, was granted to the United States Government in return for United States acceptance of certain modifications which Canada desired to have made to the Ninety-nine Year Leased Bases Agreement.

5. The Pinetree Agreement of 1951 provided that neither Government would discontinue the operation of any radar station or any part of the Radar Extension without the prior concurrence of the other Government. In a sense, this was a form



of indefinite tenure, but its effect was mitigated by the provision that Canada could take over the manning and operation of any station for which the United States was responsible, and the United States would continue to bear the cost of operating the station, exclusive of military manpower costs.

6. For the past two years the Department of External Affairs, by direction, has in its negotiations with the United States Government, followed a policy of offering minimum assurances of tenure. To this end a formula was evolved which first appeared in the Exchange of Notes of November 4 and 8, 1952, concerning the global communications installation near Harmon Air Force Base:

"This land will be available without charge to the United States for its exclusive use while there is a continuing need for the facilities for defence communications in the mutual interest of both countries. In the event that either Government wishes to discontinue the arrangement, the question of continuing need will be referred to the PJBD. In considering the question of need, the PJBD will take into account the relationship of the communications facilities erected on this land with those established at or in the vicinity of Goose Bay. If it is decided at any time in the future by either Government, following consideration by the PJBD as provided above, that the facilities are no longer necessary for mutual defence purposes, the land together with any immoveable facilities on it, will, on twelve months' notice, revert to the use of the Canadian Government."

7. A similar formula was used in the case of the Haines - Fairbanks Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953, except that because of the possible commercial importance of the pipeline, and because the United States Government had undertaken to make it available to meet Canadian civil requirements in the area, it was agreed that the common defence interests of the two countries would require the continuance of the pipeline for a minimum period of twenty years.

8. At the present time, negotiations are being conducted between the two Governments with respect to the arrangements for tenure for nine temporary radar stations which the United States Government wishes to construct and operate on Canadian territory. The Canadian Government has proposed that the GLOBECOM formula outlined above should be used. The United States Government has proposed that the formula be modified by amending the first sentence to read:

"The Canadian and United States Governments agree that all or any of the stations shall be maintained in operation for a period of ten years or such shorter period as shall be agreed by both countries in the light of their mutual defence interests."

The United States proposal is now under consideration by the Canadian Government.

Plans and Reports:

9. The Canadian Government requires that it be provided with all particulars pertaining to United States projects in Canada, and that wherever appropriate, they should be subject to prior approval by the Canadian authorities. The Canadian Government also requires that it be provided with copies of all reports, charts, maps, etc., produced in connection with, or at the conclusion of, any United States defence project in Canada.

Canadian Observers:

10. The Canadian Government reserves the right to have its officials attend as observers at any United States defence project in Canada.

Communications:

11. The Canadian Government requires that arrangements for radio communication, including frequencies, in connection with United States defence projects in Canada, be submitted, usually through service channels, for approval by the Department of Transport prior to the commencement of the project.

Claims for Damages:

12. In the case of regular United States military activities in Canada, claims for damages are dealt with as prescribed in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. However, in cases which were not normally military activities, e.g., cloud seeding to produce precipitation, the Canadian Government might require that the United States Government undertake to make reasonable provisions for the disposition of claims and for the satisfaction of any proper claims arising out of damage or injury to persons or property in Canada in the course of the project.

Use of Canadian Contractors, Equipment and Labour:


13. The Canadian Government requires that so far as practicable construction of U.S. defence installations in Canada should be carried out by Canadian agencies and contractors with Canadian labour and materials. Electronic and other equipment manufactured in Canada should also be used so far as practicable.

Department of External Affairs,  
O t t a w a , Ontario,  
February 25, 1954.

NOT FOR  
CIRCULATION OUTSIDE  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA.

CANADIAN EYES ONLY  
TOP SECRET.

February 22, 1954.



Political Co-ordination Section,  
American Division,  
Economic Division.

FROM

Defence Liaison (1) Division.

*Original (with enclosure) on  
50209-40*

A study of recent changes and trends  
in US Defence Policy and the possible implications on  
Canadian Defence Policy.

--- Attached for your information is a paper  
entitled "A Study of Recent Changes and Trends in  
United States Defence Policy and the Implications  
It Might Have on Canadian Defence Policy". This  
study was prepared for the use of Mr. Claxton and  
General Foulkes in their recent meeting in Ottawa  
with General Twining, Chief of the U.S. Air Force,  
and Mr. Douglas, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence.  
You might wish to know that the last paragraph  
(para.15) was added by General Foulkes.

2. Since General Foulkes ~~subsequently~~  
directed his staff to restrict the circulation of  
this paper to the Headquarters of the Department  
of National Defence we have also limited the  
circulation to Ottawa.

BENJAMIN ROGERS

THOMAS H. HARRIS

Defence Liaison (1) Division.

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

To D.L.(1)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

File  
WNB

TO: ..... Mrs. MacKay;  
..... Mr. Wershof;  
..... Mr. Rogers.

Security .. TOP SECRET .....

Date ..... February 19, 1954 .....

FROM: ... Defence Liaison (1) Division .....

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REFERENCE: ..... Copy on 50210-B-40 .....

SUBJECT: Continental Defence .....

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REDUIT A SECRET

I have been trying without success for the last two or three weeks to get some information from the RCAF on the progress being made on the fifty-fifth parallel early warning line. However, Dr. Abrams of the Defence Research Board, who is the Head of the Canadian Section of the Scientific Advisory Team, has just come back from a visit to Washington, so I discussed the matter with him.

2. Abrams said that because of A/V/M Miller's view that the RCAF should move very cautiously on this project, and because of the antipathy and distrust in the RCAF Telecommunications Organization of the work of the D.R.B., the RCAF is apparently planning to duplicate a good deal of the work done by the D.R.B. on the experimental link of the McGill Fence Line which has been operating for the past eighteen months between Arnprior and North Bay. Apart from any question of whether this duplication is justified or not, it is clear that it will seriously delay the commencement of the construction of the fifty-fifth parallel line.

3. At the same time as this test programme will be going on, a joint RCAF - USAF team will be working out the operational requirement for the fifty-fifth parallel line. From all indications, the RCAF members of the team will be approaching this task with an "open" mind and without any particular feeling of allegiance to the concept developed in the Military Study Group that the line should be no more than a warning fence and should be very simple. According to Abrams, the United States members of the team will be approaching the problem in the light of the concept that as soon as possible the main interception line should be moved north to the fifty-fifth parallel. To this end, they

will be supporting the view that the fifty-fifth parallel line should be based on the "Lincoln" concept, utilizing manned scanning radar. They will argue that this could be done for approximately the same amount as the McGill Fence can be built. Abrams does not believe that this could in fact be done, but the cost of either system is sufficiently uncertain that it would be difficult to refute.

4. Abrams informed me that the oblique hints given to the PJBD at Colorado Springs that the USAF was thinking of increasing the depth of the combat zone were developed in much greater detail at a subsequent meeting between A/V/M James, General Chidlaw, General Myers and General Aitcheson from Alaska. The U.S. plan would involve the replacement in three or four years of the fifty-fifth parallel line by a new type of G.C.I. radar known as Muldar. It is much smaller than existing G.C.I. installations and would incorporate automatic data transmission equipment. While this was being installed, a complex of fighter bases, Bomarc installations, etc., would be built up in the area between the fifty-fifth and forty-ninth parallels to take advantage of the G.C.I. installation. This whole concept is, of course, dependent upon the existence of a more distant early warning line, i.e., Corrode Line. Abrams felt that the Americans would start pushing for the Corrode Line within the next couple of months, probably in the first instance through the M.S.G. He thought that the whole "master plan" would, as usual, be unveiled step by step, but that the period of grace before we were confronted with the problem would be short. To support his beliefs, he told me that he had been given to understand that in calculating requirements for new type radars and for data transmission equipment, the Americans had included estimates of what would be needed for installation in Canada to make the "master plan" possible.

5. Abrams himself was not at the meeting of Air Defence Commanders mentioned above, so the information he gave me on what took place there is second-hand. However, he is arranging to have Dr. Lindsey, who is now stationed at St. Hubert, come to Ottawa on Monday and give me a direct account of the discussions.

6. It is difficult to see just what External Affairs can do to bring these issues into the open. I suggest that as a first step



I should attempt to confirm and supplement the information given above by further discussions with officers in the Department of National Defence. If it appears that the story is substantially correct, you might consider suggesting to General Foulkes that you suspect that the "defence in depth" concept referred to in the PJBD Colorado Springs paper is much further advanced than the discussions at Colorado Springs would indicate, and that it might be worthwhile for General Foulkes to ask for the views of the C.A.S. and A/V/M James on this matter.

WJTB

Defence Liaison (1) Division

Source should be protected from.

Dr. Solandt raised the main points here in Chief of Staff Committee today. The Chairman said that General Turing and Mr. Douglas when here last week stated categorically that no further requests on Canada were pending. He felt that any such requests as were mentioned in this memo emanated from "enthusiasts" and not from the joint chiefs. I was mentioned however that was a D.C. appeared to have heard something along these lines from the U.S. ADC. The C.A.S. was accordingly requested to look into the matter & report.

22/2/54

RAB

Ottawa, February 12, 1954.

TOP SECRET  
FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY

50209-40

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*False copy  
on 50115-40*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING UNDER-SECRETARY

U.S. Defence Policy

I attach copy No. 42 of a paper entitled  
"A Study of Recent Changes and Trends in United  
States Defence Policy and the Implications It  
Might Have on Canadian Defence Policy", which  
has been prepared for the use of Mr. Claxton in  
the discussions which he is to have next week  
with General Twining and Mr. Douglas, U.S.  
Assistant Secretary of Defence. I understand  
that the final paragraph was added by General  
Foulkes.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

*Benjamin Rogers*

Defence Liaison (1) Division

*P.S. Should Mr. Twining see this on his  
return?*

*Yes, with a brief note on the Douglas Twining visit -  
unless anything has happened at the dinner last night -  
no new or strange proposals - a good will concert  
probably to open us up*

*RAH*

12.2.44 (U.S.)



CANADA

# Department of National Defence

TOP SECRET

## JOINT STAFF JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
CHAIRMAN,  
CHIEFS OF STAFF,  
OTTAWA

50269-46  
57 SD

11 February, 1954

Q 13

Copy of enclosure 500 B-40  
Cross ref. on 50115-P-40  
Cross ref. 50115-40  
7-5-40

Joint Planning Committee

A Study of Recent Changes and Trends in United States Defence Policy and the Implications it Might have on Canadian Defence Policy.

1. Attached hereto, for your information and retention, is a copy of the revised paper on the above subject.
2. This paper has now been forwarded to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

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11 FEB 1954

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EA/4972/NR

*E. Atkins*  
(E. Atkins), Squadron Leader,  
Secretary,  
Joint Planning Committee.

### DISTRIBUTION

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12 - DNPO(S)/S  
13 - External Affairs Rep  
(Mr. Rogers)  
14 - Sec JPC  
15 - CJS

As requested in a  
Memorandum of Feb 11/54  
page 6 of the attached  
paper is the final  
revised page.  
B.

FILE COPY

FOR  
CANADIAN  
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 13

CSC 1883-1 (JRS)

10 February, 1954

A STUDY OF RECENT CHANGES AND TRENDS IN UNITED STATES DEFENCE POLICY  
AND THE IMPLICATIONS IT MIGHT HAVE ON  
CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

INTRODUCTION

1. As a result of recent statements by spokesmen of the Eisenhower Administration and actions by the United States Government, it has become evident that the U.S. Government have re-assessed their defence policy and that a "New Look" on defence appears to have emerged.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this paper is to examine the "New Look" and consider what implications it may have on Canadian defence policy.

UNITED STATES DEFENCE CONCEPT

3. Broadly speaking United States defence policy under the Truman Administration was one of periphery defence with a build-up of local and United States defence forces on this periphery. Examples of this policy were the build-up of NATO forces to contain the Russians in Europe, the actions taken by the U.S. in Korea, and U.S. aid to Indo-China. To back up their policy, the United States built up a strategic air force and an atomic bomb stockpile to be either a deterrent or a means of massive retaliatory striking power. During this period it was considered that the threat to North America was, in an overall assessment of the world-wide threat, secondary to the threat to Europe. It was also considered during the Truman Administration that the general threat of Russian aggression was greater than is considered now.

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TOP SECRET

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4. Since the Eisenhower Administration took office there have been indications that there may be a change in United States defence policy and strategy. Public statements by leading spokesmen of the Eisenhower Administration have emphasized the fact that the United States Government has taken another look at their defence policy. For example, at the Ministerial Meeting of NATO in December 1953, Mr. Dulles emphasized the "long haul" concept and later in a speech on January 12, 1954, Mr. Dulles said that the United States will "place more reliance upon community deterrent power and less dependence upon local defensive power". This means depending "primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places of our own choosing".

5. The Canadian Ambassador to the United States in discussing the question of possible changes in United States defence policy in his despatch No. 142 dated 22 Jan 54, attributes these changes in part at least to the following factors:

- (a) the attitude taken by the Administration, not unrelated to the Republican campaign promises for reductions in Government expenditures, that the United States economy cannot maintain in peacetime the levels of defence built up after the outbreak of the Korean war;
- (b) the appreciation of the Administration that there has been some slight reduction in world tensions and that the threat of Soviet aggression is not as immediate as it was considered to be for planning purposes during the Truman Administration;
- (c) the reports presented to the Chiefs of Staff on the capabilities and availability of nuclear weapons taken together with the decision on the part of the Administration to seek Congressional approval to share with friendly allies certain knowledge concerning the tactical use of nuclear weapons;
- (d) the decision taken by the Administration with the concurrence of its highest military advisers to rely on the "deterrent or massive retaliatory power" to a greater degree than on

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TOP SECRET

"local defences", i.e., the meeting of aggression on the ground where it occurs.

Although the above factors would seem to be the principal reasons for any changes in United States defence policy, in our view the most important factor which should not be overlooked is the increasing Russian capability to attack North America with nuclear weapons.

6. Mr. Heeney developed his factors and arrived at the conclusion that there has been no important change in United States defence policy insofar as United States policy means United States commitments within the structure of collective security, but that there probably will be gradual changes in strategy. Some of the more obvious shifts of emphasis which will affect the planning of United States strategy in the foreseeable future would seem to be:

- (a) A general tightening up on United States defence expenditures which will mainly affect personnel strengths and administrative overhead.
- (b) A greater reliance on new weapons including nuclear weapons shared with friendly allies to compensate for reductions in United States manpower and to offset additions to the Soviet arsenal.
- (c) Further strengthening of United States air power and especially of its ability to deliver the atomic goods.
- (d) Increased attention to continental defence in cooperation with Canada to protect the main base of the striking power of the free world.
- (e) The build-up in the United States of a strategic reserve of trained soldiery and weapons which will be committed to action where the Service Chiefs think they will do the most good, not necessarily at the point of actual aggression.
- (f) A highly cautious approach to involvement in any further incidents of the Korea type which would result in the commitment to battle of United States ground troops.

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7. The Canadian military view is in agreement with the conclusions drawn by Mr. Heeney on the possible changes in United States strategy. The soundness of such changes have not been considered in this paper.

POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS TO CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

North America.

8. It would appear that proposed changes in United States strategy relative to the defence of the North American Continent based on the increased Russian capability will be of prime importance to Canada and as a result it is probable that the whole problem of Canadian participation in the air defence of North America will have to be re-considered. Already the greater emphasis on North American defence has resulted in Canadian and United States

approval of:

- (a) the mid-Canada line;
- (b) the seaward extension of the mid-Canada line;
- (c) additional gap-filling radar stations.

Further measures will undoubtedly be advocated by the United States and will probably include:

- (a) integration of the Canada-U.S. air defence forces;
- (b) increase in the number of all-weather fighter squadrons;
- (c) increase in AA (guided missile) forces;
- (d) formation of Bomarc squadrons (advanced type of ground to air guided missile);
- (e) requirement for construction of U.S. fighter bases in Canada;
- (f) construction of a northern chain of radar stations;
- (g) location of U.S. AA sites in Canada particularly in the vicinity of vital border points.

9. Should the above measures be proposed by the United States, it is inevitable that they will press for the establishment of an integrated command for the air defence of North America.

NATO.

10. While the fear has been expressed that the new United States strategy may result in the withdrawal of some United States forces from

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the European theatres, there is no indication at least for the present time, of United States intention to withdraw effective combat forces from the NATO European theatre in spite of the movement of United States atomic weapons to that theatre. This particular factor does not affect Canadian commitments to NATO for the time being.

Use of Nuclear Weapons.

11. It is known that no restriction now remains on consideration by United States military planners of the possible use of atomic weapons in any critical situation involving the commitment of United States forces. The resultant effect of the U.S. policy to use nuclear weapons may undoubtedly alter the structure of their armed forces. It is considered that due to the close proximity of such forces to Canada and their possible use in North American defence, that some changes in the structure of Canadian forces will be required.

Korea

12. It is thought that the planned withdrawal of two United States divisions from Korea implies United States confidence in the military situation there. However, it should be noted that these two divisions are being replaced in the UN order of battle by two ROK divisions recently brought to combat efficiency. The planned reduction in United States Army forces under the proposed 1954-55 budget amounts to approximately two divisional slices. It is possible, therefore, that the two divisions withdrawn from Korea, or two others now in the United States, may be deactivated before 1 July 1955. Any further plans for withdrawal of United States forces from Korea will undoubtedly necessitate serious consideration of an immediate reduction of Commonwealth Forces.

Mobile Strategic Reserve.

13. It is considered the United States policy of holding a strategic reserve of forces centrally in the United States stems from an increasing reliance on retaliatory air power and from the desire of the United States authorities to have their forces available for deployment to meet sudden aggression, rather than have them committed in peripheral defence with the

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consequent loss of flexibility and the problems of reinforcement, supply and costs. There is no evidence that this policy involves converting present formations to air transportable formations or a noticeable increase in the troop carrier command, nor is there evidence of plans for increased stockpiling of equipment for these reserve forces in likely combat areas to which they could be moved quickly. It is considered that this policy is based simply on the fact that forces held centrally within the U.S. could be deployed more quickly to any desired area than if they had to be first extricated from another overseas theatre.

#### CONCLUSION

14. It can therefore be deduced from the foregoing that the main implications to Canada of the "New Look" in United States defence policy will primarily be in the field of continental air defence. This will involve further recommendations from the United States to improve and expand radar coverage, fighter defence and AA forces, and inevitably the integration of Canadian and United States air defence forces under one command.

15. It is quite obvious that the U.S. have not clarified their own minds on the extent of the new look or its full implications. The President's statement about retaining the initiative appears to be restricted to using the threat of atomic action on major aggressors to deter local aggression. It is inconceivable that the U.S. could contemplate a preventative war. It is further evident that the U.S. have relaxed the former restriction on the use of "A" weapons and are now planning their use in any type of military action. Therefore, because of our close association with the U.S. in the military field we may find ourselves involved in an atomic war without much consultation. This situation suggests the following considerations:

- (a) Every effort on every level should be made to improve our information regarding U.S. strategical thinking and plans, so that we are able to determine Canadian military policy in advance of U.S. action.
- (b) Action must be pressed to arrange for the training of Canadian forces under conditions and in areas where atomic explosions have occurred.
- (c) Revise our military plans to give greater support to Civil Defence and give priority to survival during first few weeks of "A" warfare.
- (d) Consider Canadian position regarding storage and transport of "A" weapons on Canadian territory and through Canadian air space.

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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC 1883-1 (JFC)



# Department of National Defence

## JOINT STAFF JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

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ADDRESS REPLY TO  
CHAIRMAN,  
CHIEFS OF STAFF,  
OTTAWA

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11 February, 1954

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### Joint Planning Committee

Study of Recent Changes and Trends in U.S.  
Defence Policy and the Implications they  
Might have on Canadian Defence Policy.

12 FEB 1954

1. Further to memorandum of similar file dated 11 Feb 54,  
the holders of the paper on the above subject are requested to:

- destroy present page 6 and replace with  
attachment to which has been added an  
additional paragraph prepared by the  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff;
- mark the paper "FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY".

*Done  
B  
Feb 16  
11*

*E. Atkins*

(E. Atkins), Squadron Leader,  
Secretary,  
Joint Planning Committee

EA/4972/NR

### DISTRIBUTION

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(Mr. Rogers)  
Sec JFC  
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COPY NO. 15

11 Feb 54

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING

Held in Room 4813, Joint Staff Conference Room,  
at 1030 hours, Wednesday, 10 Feb 54

PRESENT

|  |                       |
|--|-----------------------|
| Air Commodore W.I. Clements (Chairman) | C Plans I             |
| Colonel G.A. Turcot                    | DMO & P               |
| Group Captain E.M. Reyno               | DAPS                  |
| Commander H.A. Stowell                 | D/DNPO                |
| Lieutenant-Commander A.H. McDonald     | DNPO(S)/S             |
| Squadron Leader P.W. Holloway          | Assistant D/DAPS      |
| Mr. B. Rogers                          | External Affairs Rep. |

ALSO PRESENT

|                                   |              |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| Air Commodore H.H.C. Rutledge     | CJS          |
| Commander J.C. Smyth              | Joint Staff  |
| Lieutenant-Colonel R.E. Nourse    | DMO & P Rep. |
| Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Gillespie | Joint Staff  |
| Wing Commander W.Y. Martin        | Joint Staff  |

SECRETARY

|                           |             |
|---------------------------|-------------|
| Squadron Leader E. Atkins | Joint Staff |
|---------------------------|-------------|

Special/54-1 A STUDY OF RECENT CHANGES AND TRENDS IN UNITED STATES DEFENCE POLICY AND THE IMPLICATIONS IT MIGHT HAVE ON CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY (Secret)  
(Minutes of Special JPC Meeting 5 Feb 54)

1. The Committee had for consideration the "Aide Memoire" on the above subject prepared by the Joint Planning Staff.
2. The Committee, after reviewing this "Aide Memoire" in detail, directed the Joint Planning Staff to revise it incorporating the amendments which were noted secretarially.

*E. Atkins*  
(E. Atkins) Squadron Leader  
Secretary,  
Joint Planning Committee

EA/4972/NR

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15 - JPS(XA)  
16 - JPS  
17 - File

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

*File*  
*WMB*

TO: *WMB*  
Mr. Rogers and Mr. Barton.

Security **SECRET**

Date **February 5, 1954**

FROM: Mr. Bruce.

File No.

**50209-40**

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: **Analysis of Trends and Developments in U.S. Defence Policy.**

*original in 50045-E-40*

*Stuart*  
At this morning's briefing the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, stated that Mr. Claxton had requested urgently a paper on "Trends and Developments in U.S. Defence Policy and the Implications for Canadian Defence". This paper is required as a brief for Claxton for his use at a meeting on Monday, February 15, with General Twinning and Ambassador Douglas to discuss the general problem of continental defence. He requested a description of announced changes in U.S. policy, e.g. withdrawal of some U.S. forces from Korea; reduced wings in strategic air forces; trend from a policy of stationing U.S. forces abroad to the development of "retaliatory power". He also wished an outline of other aspects of U.S. policy which have not been formally announced, e.g. the emphasis in U.S. planning on continental defence. In this connection he noted General McNaughton's paper prepared at the conclusion of the January PJBD meeting in Colorado Springs.

2. In particular General Foulkes and Claxton were interested in the effects of the "New Look" on Canadian policy. General Foulkes noted that changes in U.S. strategic air planning was of little direct military interest to Canada, while, on the other hand, planning for continental defence was of fundamental and direct concern. In this connection he mentioned the development of interceptor wings, the early warning system, guided missiles and the defence of border points.

3. This paper must be ready for next Friday, February 12.

*Bruce*

Defence Liaison (1) Divis001075

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5 February, 1954

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE  
MINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING

*Original ~*  
*50031-1-40*

Held in Room 2717, RCAF Conference Room,  
 at 1430 hours, Friday, 5 Feb 54

PRESENT

|  |                  |
|--|------------------|
| Air Commodore W.I. Clements (Chairman) | C Plans I        |
| Colonel G.A. Turcot                    | DMO & P          |
| Group Captain E.M. Reyno               | DAPS             |
| Lieutenant-Commander A.H. McDonald     | DNPO(S)/S        |
| Squadron Leader P.W. Holloway          | Assistant D/DAPS |

ALSO PRESENT

|                                   |              |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| Air Commodore H.H.C. Rutledge     | CJS          |
| Colonel R.P. Rothschild           | D/CJS        |
| Commander J.C. Smyth              | Joint Staff  |
| Lieutenant-Colonel R.E. Nourse    | DMO & P Rep. |
| Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Gillespie | Joint Staff  |
| Wing Commander W.Y. Martin        | Joint Staff  |
| Mr. I. Bowen                      | Director JIB |
| Mr. J. Bruce                      | Joint Staff  |

SECRETARY

|                           |             |
|---------------------------|-------------|
| Squadron Leader E. Atkins | Joint Staff |
|---------------------------|-------------|

Special/54-1

A Study of Recent Changes and Trends in United States Defence Policy and the Implications it might have on Canadian Defence Policy. (Secret)

(Minister of National Defence Memorandum 4 Feb 54 and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 4 Feb 54 refer)

1. The Chairman advised the Committee that this special meeting was called to discuss the above noted memoranda and to determine a method of attacking the assigned task.
2. Since copies of the memoranda were not available for distribution to each Committee member, the Chairman briefed the Committee on their content, outlining briefly each aspect of the required study and noting particularly the sources of material which were available.
3. After lengthy discussion, the Committee directed the Joint Planning Staff to prepare immediately an "Aide Memoire" entitled "A Study of Recent Changes and Trends in United States

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Defence Policy and the Implications it might have on Canadian Defence Policy" for use at the meeting on 15 Feb 54 between the Minister of National Defence and U.S. officials. Subsequently a more detailed paper on the same subject will be required.



(E. Atkins), Squadron Leader,  
Secretary,  
Joint Planning Committee

EA/4972/NR

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(Mr. Rogers)  
10 - Sec JPC  
11 - 14 - CJS  
15 - JPS(XA) ✓  
16 - JPS  
17 - File

DEFENCE LIAISON (D/L) - B. PARTON/BB  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Canadian Embassy,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your Letter No. 146 of Jan. 25, 1954

Subject: Continental Defence

Security: TOP SECRET

No: D-148

Date: February 3, 1954

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50209-40

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References

Attached for your information is a copy of a letter sent to General Foulkes informing him of your views regarding the suggestion that you take up with the State Department the points raised in his letter of January 7, 1954.

You will note that no mention is made in the letter to General Foulkes of the question you asked in paragraph 6 of your letter No. 146 as to whether paragraph 4 of General Foulkes' letter was intended to inhibit you from discussing Continental Defence. We are satisfied that General Foulkes' remark was not so intended.

R. A. MacKAY

Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts

Refer:

American Division;  
Washington  
(with covering letter)

T O P S E C R E T

February 3, 1954.

The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,  
Department of National Defence,  
"A" Building,  
O t t a w a , Ontario.

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Continental Defence.

I refer to your letter of January 7, 1954, in which you commented on Letter No. 2451 of December 29, 1953, from our Ambassador in Washington, regarding conversations with the State Department concerning Continental Defence.

2. I referred your letter to Mr. Heeney with the suggestion that he should, without seeking a special interview for the purpose, take the next opportunity of conversation with Mr. Arneson or Mr. Bedell Smith or both, to make it clear that the Canadian authorities do not agree with Mr. Arneson's interpretation in this respect of the record of the October 22 Meeting of Consultation, and that Canada has not given the northern line "equal priority" with the southern line. Mr. Heeney has replied that, while he agrees with your interpretation of the record, he is doubtful that it would be a good idea for him to take the matter up with the Under Secretary or with Mr. Arneson. He added that he could see no reason why we should attempt to correct the United States view of their own position

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so long as it is clear, and in this case it certainly is, that the Canadian Government does not share their view. Mr. Heeney said that he might draw casual attention to the different Canadian position when there was a suitable opportunity with Mr. Arneson, but he would not wish to go further.

R. A. MacKAY

Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security... *Secret* .....

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Type of Document... *Letter* ..... No. .... Date... *Jan. 27/54* .....

From... *Joint Planning Committee* .....

To... *External Affairs* .....

Subject: *Canada - U.S. Cooperative Measures Currently in Effect - Item 4(E) of Meeting 5/54, Feb. 9/54*

Original on File No... *50031-40* .....

Copies on File No... *50212-40* .....

Other Cross Reference Sheets on.....

Prepared by... *J. Chéné* *Defence S/R* .....



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF

OTTAWA

|           |     |
|-----------|-----|
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26 January, 1954.

Dear General McNaughton:


Thank you very much for your letter of January 22nd enclosing a report on some aspects of United States air defence policy. This report will be of considerable help to myself and, I am sure, to the Chiefs of Staff during our deliberations on this very important subject.

Yours sincerely,

  
(Charles Foulkes)  
Lieutenant-General

General, The Hon. A.G.L. McNaughton, CH, CB, CMG, DSO,  
Chairman, Canadian Section,  
Permanent Joint Board on Defence,  
East Block,  
Parliament Buildings,  
Ottawa, Canada.

*Mr. Boulton*  
*for your files*  
*2*  
*28/Jan 54*



*File*  
*Copy on 50286-40*

Letter No. *146*.....

Date... *January 25, 1954*.....

OTTAWA FILE

No. *50209-40*

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference... Your Letter No. D-59 of January 13, 1954.

Subject: ... Continental Defence.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**

**REDUIT A SECRET**

29 JAN 1954

I do not believe that it would be a good idea for me to take up with the Under Secretary or with Mr. Arneson the points made by the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff in his letter to you of January 7th regarding the United States view of the relative priority of the so-called northern and southern early warning lines.

2. It is true that I saw General Foulkes's letter when I was in Ottawa, but I am afraid I did not digest it in the few minutes I had to run over it on that occasion. However, I have now had an opportunity of considering it carefully.

3. General Foulkes is, of course, entirely correct in stating that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Government have not accepted the same priority for the northern line as for the southern line; indeed, there is no indication or record of which I am aware that Canadian authorities are committed to more than consideration of the results of CORRODE and possibly other studies now in process".

4. On the other hand, the United States authorities tell us that they regard the northern line "as having equal priority with the southern line". And this despite the admitted fact that, on their own record (as General Foulkes points out) the southern line to be completed "as early as possible" and the northern line "over the next two years" and then only "if proved feasible" by current studies.

5. Nevertheless, I see no reason why we should attempt to correct the United States view of their own position so long as it is clear, and in this case it certainly is, that the Canadian Government do not share their view. We might draw casual attention to the different Canadian position when there is a suitable opportunity with Mr. Arneson, but I would not wish to go further.

6. Incidentally, I take it that the final sentence in paragraph 4 of General Foulkes's letter is not intended to inhibit us in any way in this Embassy from discussing continental defence; nor, indeed, that it is intended to prevent the Joint Staff from acquiring such information on this subject concerning U.S. plans and attitudes as they can. I assume that what General Foulkes has in mind is discussions on specific proposals leading to decisions.

*A.D.P. Heeneey*  
A.D.P. HEENEY.

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CANADA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

CANADIAN SECTION

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Canadian Eyes Only

January 22, 1954.


OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
EAST BLOCK, PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS  
OTTAWA

Dear Mr. MacKay,

During the last meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which was held at U.S. Air Force Air Defence Command Headquarters, Colorado Springs, Colorado, the Board was able to acquire a very clear picture of the plans and policies of the USAF Air Defence Command by means of briefings from ADC staff officers and by informal discussions with them.

In the opinion of the Canadian Section, the information thus acquired is of importance to the Canadian Government. We have therefore prepared the attached report. I am also sending copies of this report to Mr. Claxton, Mr. Pearson, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary to the Cabinet and the Chairman, Defence Research Board.

Yours sincerely,

  
A. G. L. McNaughton.

R. A. MacKay, Esquire,  
Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
East Block,  
O t t a w a , Ontario.

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

January 21, 1954.

SOME ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES AIR DEFENCE POLICY

As Enunciated to the PJBD by the Staff of the  
USAF Air Defence Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado

INTRODUCTION

1. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence held its January, 1954 meeting at the Headquarters of the United States Air Force Air Defence Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado. In the course of the visit the Canadian Section of the Board was given a series of presentations by USAF Air Defence Command Staff Officers which together constituted a comprehensive exposition of the views of these officers on the threat to North America, what must be done to meet that threat, and the progress of the technological developments which will affect both air offence and defence during the next few years. The statements made were objective and very frank.

THE THREAT

2. The Board was given an account in some detail, not only of the USAF Air Defence Command estimate of Soviet capabilities to launch air attacks and the areas of North America which could be reached by such attacks, but also of the methods used in appraising the intelligence information upon which the estimate was based. The briefing on intelligence included a visit to the "Indications Room" and a general discussion of the indicators used and their relative significance. The estimates of Soviet capabilities were essentially the same as given in Canadian-United States agreed intelligence papers, but as one would expect, when making use of these estimates in the development of United States plans, an "insurance factor" was included.

3. In order to demonstrate the destructive capability possessed by an enemy who has the hydrogen bomb, the Board was shown a TOP SECRET film on "OPERATION IVY", the thermonuclear test carried out at Eniwetok in November, 1952. Great emphasis was placed on the fact that this was the first occasion that the film had been shown to persons other than United States citizens. The pictures of the explosion showed clearly the awesome power of the weapon and helped to explain why the United States is so concerned about the problem of air defence.

4. The most important conclusion to be drawn from all the discussions on the threat is that responsible United States officials are firmly of the opinion that the Soviet Union has now, or will have shortly, the capability of launching an atomic attack on North America on a scale sufficient to eliminate this continent as an effective source of resistance to the achievement of Soviet objectives. For this reason, the United States officials assert that even to provide a margin of protection sufficient only to

- 2 -

keep our losses to the point where we would have the ability to recuperate and retaliate, the North American air defence system must be greatly expanded and that it is necessary that this be done rapidly.

### MEETING THE THREAT

#### A. Early Warning

5. The USAF Air Defence Command has associated with it a Joint Air Defence Board which is responsible for carrying out long-range planning studies. The Joint Air Defence Board's concept of early warning covers the whole of the northern hemisphere. Studies now being carried out embrace measures which might be taken to improve the radar systems of friendly countries bordering the Soviet Union and its satellites; the use of airborne early warning in areas adjacent to Russia; the installation of alarm-type radars on merchant ships and civil aircraft which operate in suitable areas; the construction of the far-northern Canadian line and the 55th parallel line; the establishment of the seaward extensions of the early warning system in Canada from Newfoundland to the Azores and from Alaska to Hawaii; and the improvement of the existing heavy radar installations in Canada and the United States by the installation of gap-filling equipment and data transmission and analysis equipment. Some of the above measures, particularly those concerned with the North American warning system, are already included in the implementing programmes of the USAF Air Defence Command. Others are at this stage only preliminary proposals for possible implementation at a later date if studies now in progress bear out their value.

6. The U.S. Members of the PJBD have expressed interest in the Observer Corps organization in Northern Canada, and in the provision of effective means for the transmission of reports; also in the possibility of putting alarm-type radar equipment at the northern weather stations and other places where the few suitably qualified personnel required would be available.

#### B. Engaging the Enemy

7. In addition to the fighter forces in Alaska and Northeast Command (which are not under control of Air Defence Command), there are at present 51 squadrons of interceptor aircraft in the continental United States under Air Defence Command, 41 of which are equipped with all-weather aircraft. The defence programme now accepted by the U.S. Defence Department provides for the expansion of this force to 69 all-weather squadrons by 1955, and ADC planning is now being carried out on the basis of a further increase to 85 - 100 squadrons by 1960. In addition to the forces directly under ADC Command, further support in event of emergency can be provided on a few hours' notice by Tactical and Strategic Air Commands and the U.S. Navy. Ground defences are also being expanded. There are now 61 anti-aircraft battalions, 20 of which will be equipped with the Nike ground-to-air guided missile by the end of 1954. Planning is being carried out by the Anti Aircraft Artillery Command on the basis of 160 - 190 Nike battalions by 1960.



- 3 -

8. An account in some detail was given of the arrangements for co-ordination with the Alaskan and Northeast Air Commands of the United States Air Force, and with the Royal Canadian Air Force Air Defence Command. It was made clear, however, that although these arrangements had been developed to a high standard, they could never, in the view of the United States, be as effective as would a true integration, and the hope was expressed that the day might come when this would be possible. (Presumably if integration were carried out it would mean the establishment of a North American Air Defence Command which would control all air defence forces in both Canada and the United States).

9. On several occasions reference was made to the desirability of increasing the depth of the combat area when the existence of more distant early warning would make this useful. Members of the Canadian Section tried to find out what was meant by this thought and to learn whether there were any plans involving the stationing of fighter forces or the establishment of bases in Canada, but the U.S. officers were not prepared to comment on this.

#### THE IMPACT OF NEW WEAPONS

10. The United States Air Force has now under development a supersonic all-weather fighter (the F-102) which will be armed with an air-to-air guided missile. By 1960 the USAF Air Defence Command anticipates that there will be available a ground-to-air missile known as BOMARC, with a range of 250 miles and armed with an atomic warhead. Planning is being carried out on the basis of 3000 BOMARC missiles, to be used initially primarily for defence of the seaward approaches. General Chidlaw, the Commanding General of Air Defence Command told the Canadian Chairman that rapid progress was being made in the development of missiles of this type, and of intercontinental missiles, and he expressed the opinion that there might well be only one more manned fighter developed by the United States after the F-102.

#### CONCLUSIONS

11. The Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence concluded that the combination of formal briefings and informal conversations was definitely planned to convey to the Canadian Section of the PJBD the importance attached by the United States Air Defence Command to the necessity of raising the level of North American air defence to a point which will insure that no Soviet attack will be able to reduce United States and Canadian warmaking capacity below that required to recuperate and retaliate effectively.

12. The features of the presentation which the Canadian Section of the PJBD considers were of most immediate importance to Canada were the expression of U.S. Air Defence Command belief

- (a) in the necessity for an early warning line along the Arctic coast from Alaska to Baffin Island in addition to the line along the 55th parallel;

- 4 -

- (b) that integration of the North American air defence system is desirable;
- (c) that the depth of the "combat area" should be increased. Presumably this would mean fighter or guided missile bases in Canada.

13. In bringing these matters to the attention of those concerned, the Canadian Section of the PJBD is merely reporting the views placed before it by the Commanding General and senior staff officers of the USAF Air Defence Command.

## DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTING SLIP

DATE Feb. 1, 1954.  
SECURITY TOP SECRET

TO: MR. R.A. MacKAY (A/USSEA)

FROM: Office of SSEA

☐ For Signature☒ For Action☐ For Comments☐ For Approval

For Information and

File ☐Destroy ☐Return ☐

COMMENTS: *(This space is not for comments of a permanent character which should be formally recorded in a memorandum)*

Referred at the direction of  
the Minister.

*E. de L.*  
E. de Lotbinière.

001090

CANADA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

CANADIAN SECTION

TOP SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
EAST BLOCK, PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS  
OTTAWA

January 22, 1954.

SEEN  
L.B. PEARSON

Dear Mr. Pearson,

During the last meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which was held at U.S. Air Force Air Defence Command Headquarters, Colorado Springs, Colorado, the Board was able to acquire a very clear picture of the plans and policies of the USAF Air Defence Command by means of briefings from ADC staff officers and by informal discussions with them.

In the opinion of the Canadian Section, the information thus acquired is of importance to the Canadian Government. We have therefore prepared the attached report. I am also sending copies of this report to Mr. Claxton, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Chairman, Defence Research Board.

Yours sincerely,

A. G. L. McNaughton

The Honourable L. B. Pearson,  
Minister of External Affairs,  
East Block,  
O t t a w a , Ontario.

**TOP SECRET**  
**CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

January 21, 1954.

SOME ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES AIR DEFENCE POLICY

As Enunciated to the PJBD by the Staff of the  
USAF Air Defence Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado

INTRODUCTION

1. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence held its January, 1954 meeting at the Headquarters of the United States Air Force Air Defence Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado. In the course of the visit the Canadian Section of the Board was given a series of presentations by USAF Air Defence Command Staff Officers which together constituted a comprehensive exposition of the views of these officers on the threat to North America, what must be done to meet that threat, and the progress of the technological developments which will affect both air offence and defence during the next few years. The statements made were objective and very frank.

THE THREAT

2. The Board was given an account in some detail, not only of the USAF Air Defence Command estimate of Soviet capabilities to launch air attacks and the areas of North America which could be reached by such attacks, but also of the methods used in appraising the intelligence information upon which the estimate was based. The briefing on intelligence included a visit to the "Indications Room" and a general discussion of the indicators used and their relative significance. The estimates of Soviet capabilities were essentially the same as given in Canadian-United States agreed intelligence papers, but as one would expect, when making use of these estimates in the development of United States plans, an "insurance factor" was included.

3. In order to demonstrate the destructive capability possessed by an enemy who has the hydrogen bomb, the Board was shown a TOP SECRET film on "OPERATION IVY", the thermonuclear test carried out at Eniwetok in November, 1952. Great emphasis was placed on the fact that this was the first occasion that the film had been shown to persons other than United States citizens. The pictures of the explosion showed clearly the awesome power of the weapon and helped to explain why the United States is so concerned about the problem of air defence.

4. The most important conclusion to be drawn from all the discussions on the threat is that responsible United States officials are firmly of the opinion that the Soviet Union has now, or will have shortly, the capability of launching an atomic attack on North America on a scale sufficient to eliminate this continent as an effective source of resistance to the achievement of Soviet objectives. For this reason, the United States officials assert that even to provide a margin of protection sufficient only to

- 2 -

keep our losses to the point where we would have the ability to recuperate and retaliate, the North American air defence system must be greatly expanded and that it is necessary that this be done rapidly.

### MEETING THE THREAT

#### A. Early Warning

5. The USAF Air Defence Command has associated with it a Joint Air Defence Board which is responsible for carrying out long-range planning studies. The Joint Air Defence Board's concept of early warning covers the whole of the northern hemisphere. Studies now being carried out embrace measures which might be taken to improve the radar systems of friendly countries bordering the Soviet Union and its satellites; the use of airborne early warning in areas adjacent to Russia; the installation of alarm-type radars on merchant ships and civil aircraft which operate in suitable areas; the construction of the far-northern Canadian line and the 55th parallel line; the establishment of the seaward extensions of the early warning system in Canada from Newfoundland to the Azores and from Alaska to Hawaii; and the improvement of the existing heavy radar installations in Canada and the United States by the installation of gap-filling equipment and data transmission and analysis equipment. Some of the above measures, particularly those concerned with the North American warning system, are already included in the implementing programmes of the USAF Air Defence Command. Others are at this stage only preliminary proposals for possible implementation at a later date if studies now in progress bear out their value.

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#### B. Engaging the Enemy

7. In addition to the fighter forces in Alaska and Northeast Command (which are not under control of Air Defence Command), there are at present 51 squadrons of interceptor aircraft in the continental United States under Air Defence Command, 41 of which are equipped with all-weather aircraft. The defence programme now accepted by the U.S. Defence Department provides for the expansion of this force to 69 all-weather squadrons by 1955, and ADC planning is now being carried out on the basis of a further increase to 85 - 100 squadrons by 1960. In addition to the forces directly under ADC Command, further support in event of emergency can be provided on a few hours' notice by Tactical and Strategic Air Commands and the U.S. Navy. Ground defences are also being expanded. There are now 61 anti-aircraft battalions, 20 of which will be equipped with the Nike ground-to-air guided missile by the end of 1954. Planning is being carried out by the Anti Aircraft Artillery Command on the basis of 160 - 190 Nike battalions by 1960.

- 3 -

8. An account in some detail was given of the arrangements for co-ordination with the Alaskan and Northeast Air Commands of the United States Air Force, and with the Royal Canadian Air Force Air Defence Command. It was made clear, however, that although these arrangements had been developed to a high standard, they could never, in the view of the United States, be as effective as would a true integration, and the hope was expressed that the day might come when this would be possible. (Presumably if integration were carried out it would mean the establishment of a North American Air Defence Command which would control all air defence forces in both Canada and the United States).

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#### THE IMPACT OF NEW WEAPONS

10. The United States Air Force has now under development a supersonic all-weather fighter (the F-102) which will be armed with an air-to-air guided missile. By 1960 the USAF Air Defence Command anticipates that there will be available a ground-to-air missile known as BOMARC, with a range of 250 miles and armed with an atomic warhead. Planning is being carried out on the basis of 3000 BOMARC missiles, to be used initially primarily for defence of the seaward approaches. General Chidlaw, the Commanding General of Air Defence Command told the Canadian Chairman that rapid progress was being made in the development of missiles of this type, and of intercontinental missiles, and he expressed the opinion that there might well be only one more manned fighter developed by the United States after the F-102.

#### CONCLUSIONS

11. The Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence concluded that the combination of formal briefings and informal conversations was definitely planned to convey to the Canadian Section of the PJBD the importance attached by the United States Air Defence Command to the necessity of raising the level of North American air defence to a point which will insure that no Soviet attack will be able to reduce United States and Canadian warmaking capacity below that required to recuperate and retaliate effectively.

12. The features of the presentation which the Canadian Section of the PJBD considers were of most immediate importance to Canada were the expression of U.S. Air Defence Command belief

- (a) in the necessity for an early warning line along the Arctic coast from Alaska to Baffin Island in addition to the line along the 55th parallel;

- 4 -

- (b) that integration of the North American air defence system is desirable;
- (c) that the depth of the "combat area" should be increased. Presumably this would mean fighter or guided missile bases in Canada.

13. In bringing these matters to the attention of those concerned, the Canadian Section of the PJBD is merely reporting the views placed before it by the Commanding General and senior staff officers of the USAF Air Defence Command.



Similar letter sent to addressees  
noted in second paragraph.  
(except Chairman, Chiefs of Staff)

TOP SECRET  
Canadian Eyes Only

January 22, 1954.

Dear Mr. Claxton,

During the last meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which was held at U.S. Air Force Air Defence Command Headquarters, Colorado Springs, Colorado, the Board was able to acquire a very clear picture of the plans and policies of the USAF Air Defence Command by means of briefings from ADC staff officers and by informal discussions with them.

In the opinion of the Canadian Section, the information thus acquired is of importance to the Canadian Government. We have therefore prepared the attached report. I am also sending copies of this report to Mr. Pearson, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Chairman, Defence Research Board.

Yours sincerely,

*gr*  
A. G. L. McNaughton

The Honourable Brooke Claxton,  
Minister of National Defence,  
"A" Building,  
O t t a w a , Ontario.


D. L. (1)/W.H.Barton/da

*File W.H.B.*

**TOP SECRET**

January 22, 1954.

General A. G. L. McNaughton,  
Chairman, Canadian Section,  
PJBD, Ottawa.



Rear Admiral W. G. Greery,  
Canadian Navy Member,  
PJBD, Ottawa.

Major General H.A. Sparling,  
Canadian Army Member,  
PJBD, Ottawa.

A/V/M F. R. Miller,  
Canadian Air Member,  
PJBD, Ottawa.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET**

**Draft Report on PJBD Visit to  
USAF Air Defence Command**

Attached for your comments are two copies of the draft paper on U.S. Air Defence Policy revised in accordance with the discussion at the meeting of the Canadian Section, PJBD, on January 20, 1954.

2. I should be grateful if you would have your comments telephoned to me as soon as possible.

*W.H.B.*

W. H. Barton,  
Secretary, Canadian Section

Defence Liaison (1) / W. H. Barton / BB

*Done 1954  
Jan 21 1954*  
REFER:

Military Members, PJBD

TOP SECRET

CANADIAN EYES ONLY

January 22, 1954.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

Dear General Foulkes,

50209-40  
59 50

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In the opinion of the Canadian Section, the information thus acquired is of importance to the Canadian Government. We have therefore prepared the attached report. I am also sending copies of this report to Mr. Claxton, Mr. Pearson, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Chairman, Defence Research Board.

As you know, the Vice Chiefs of Staff serve as the Military Members of the PJBD. I assume that, in accordance with the usual practice, they will have informed their Chiefs of the nature of this report.

Yours sincerely,

*A 2*

A. G. L. McNaughton

General C. Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO & CD,  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,  
Department of National Defence,  
"A" Building,  
O t t a w a , Ontario.

*Mr Barton*

*Top Secret*

SEEN  
L.B. PEARSON

January 20, 1954.

*File WMB*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER:

Attached is a draft of a very interesting paper on the U.S. Air Defence Policy which is going before the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. I thought you might like to have it in advance, since it has considerable relevance to the memorandum you did for the Prime Minister.

50209-1  
591 ✓

*It is indeed  
very interesting*

*R.A.M.*

R.A.M.

TOP SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

January 19, 1954.

United States Air Defence Policy

INTRODUCTION

1. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence held its January, 1954 meeting at the Headquarters of the United States Air Force Air Defence Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado. In the course of the visit the Canadian Section of the Board was given an extremely frank and skilfully planned exposition of United States views on the threat to North America, what must be done to meet the threat, and the progress of the technological developments which will affect both air offence and defence during the next ten years.

THE THREAT

2. The Board was given a quite detailed account, not only of the United States estimate of Soviet capabilities, but also of the methods used in appraising the intelligence information upon which the estimate is based. The briefing on intelligence included a visit to the "Indications Room" and a comprehensive discussion of the indicators used and their relative significance. The estimates of Soviet capabilities were essentially the same as given in Canadian - United States agreed intelligence papers, but as one would expect, when making use of these estimates in the development of United States plans, an "insurance factor" of at least thirty per cent was always added on.

3. In order to demonstrate the destructive capability possessed by an enemy who has the hydrogen bomb, the Board was shown a TOP SECRET film on "OPERATION IVY", the thermo-nuclear test at Eniwetok. Great stress was placed on the

... 2 ...

fact that this was the first occasion that the film had been shown to persons other than United States citizens. The pictures of the explosion showed clearly the awesome power of the weapon and helped to explain why the United States is so concerned about the problem of air defence.

4. The most important conclusion to be drawn from all the discussions on the threat is that the responsible United States officials are firmly of the opinion that the Soviet Union has now, or will have shortly, the capability of launching an all-out atomic attack on North America which would effectively eliminate this continent as the main source of resistance to the achievement of Soviet objectives. For this reason, even to provide a margin of protection sufficient only to keep our losses to the point where we would have the ability to recuperate and retaliate, the North American air defence system must be greatly expanded as rapidly as possible.

#### MEETING THE THREAT

##### A. Early Warning

5. The United States Air Defence Command's concept of early warning covers the whole of the northern hemisphere. Studies now being carried out embrace measures which might be taken to improve the radar systems of friendly countries bordering the Soviet Union and its satellites; the use of airborne early warning in areas adjacent to Russia; the installation of alarm-type radars on merchant ships and civil aircraft which operate in suitable areas; the construction of the far-northern Canadian line and the 55th parallel line; the establishment of the seaward extensions of the Canadian line from Newfoundland to the Azores and from Alaska to Hawaii;

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and finally the improvement of the existing heavy radar installations in Canada and the United States by the installation of gap-filling equipment and data transmission and analysis equipment.

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6. In addition to the fighter forces in Alaska and Northeast Command (which are not under control of Air Defence Command), there are at present 51 squadrons of interceptor aircraft in the continental United States under Air Defence Command, 41 of which are equipped with all-weather aircraft. The recently approved defence programme provides for the expansion of this force to 69 all-weather squadrons by 1955, and planning is now being carried out on the basis of a further increase to 85 - 100 squadrons by 1960. In addition to the forces directly under ADC command, further support in event of emergency can be provided on a few hours' notice by Tactical and Strategic Air Commands. Ground defences are also being expanded. There are now 61 anti-aircraft battalions, 20 of which will be equipped with the Nike guided missile by the end of 1954. Planning is being carried out on the basis of 160 - 190 Nike battalions by 1960.

7. A fairly detailed account was given of the arrangements for co-ordination with the Alaskan and Northeast Air Commands of the United States Air Force, and with the Royal Canadian Air Force Air Defence Command. It was made clear, however, that although these arrangements had been developed to a high standard, they could never be as effective as would a true integration, and the hope was expressed that the day might come when this would be possible.

8. On several occasions reference was made to the

... 4 ...

desirability of increasing the depth of the combat area when the existence of improved early warning would make this possible. Members of the Canadian Section tried to find out what was meant by this thought and to learn whether there were any plans involving the stationing of fighter forces or the establishment of bases in Canada, but no explanations were forthcoming.

#### THE IMPACT OF NEW WEAPONS

9. The United States Air Force has now under development a supersonic all-weather fighter (the F-102) with characteristics generally similar to the Canadian CF-105. It will be armed with an air-to-air guided missile. By 1960 it is anticipated that there will be available a ground-to-air missile known as BOMARC, with a range of 250 miles and armed with an atomic warhead. Planning is being carried out on the basis of 3000 BOMARC missiles being assigned to 30 squadrons, to be used initially primarily for defence of the seaward approaches. Because of the rapid progress being made in missiles of this type, and of intercontinental missiles, General Chidlaw, the Commanding General of Air Defence Command, expressed the opinion that there might well be only one more manned fighter developed after the F-102.

#### CONCLUSIONS

10. The Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence concluded that the combination of formal briefings and informal conversations was skilfully planned to convey to the Canadian authorities the importance attached by the United States Government to the necessity of raising the level of the North American air defence to a point which will insure that



... 5 ...

no Soviet attack will be able to reduce United States and Canadian warmaking capacity below that required to recuperate and retaliate effectively.

11. The features of the presentation which were of most immediate importance to Canada were:

- (a) the United States belief in the necessity for an early warning line along the Arctic coast from Alaska to Baffin Island;
- (b) the United States belief that integration of the North American air defence system is desirable;
- (c) the United States belief that the depth of the "combat area" should be increased. Presumably this would mean fighter or guided missile bases in Canada.

TOP SECRET

January 18, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

General A. G. L. McNaughton,  
Chairman, Canadian Section, 11380  
PJBD, Ottawa.

Rear Admiral W. G. Greery,  
Canadian Navy Member, 10381  
PJBD, Ottawa.

Major General H. A. Sparling, 10382  
Canadian Army Member,  
PJBD, Ottawa.

A/V/M F. R. Miller,  
Canadian Air Member, 10383  
PJBD, Ottawa.

Meeting of Canadian Section, PJBD

Attached are two copies of a draft paper reporting on the information obtained at the recent PJBD meeting on United States Air Defence Policy. This draft is to be discussed at the meeting of the Canadian Section to be held on Wednesday, January 20, at 2:30 p.m., in the Chief of the Air Staff's Conference Room.

It is also proposed to discuss arrangements for the meetings of the Board to be held in New York in April and in Canada in June or July.

W. H. Barton,  
Secretary, Canadian Section

50209-40  
59 50

UPGRADED TO SECRET  
REBUT A SECRET

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Canadian Embassy,  
Washington, D. C.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your Letter No. 2451 of December  
29, 1953.  
Subject: Continental Defence.

Security: TOP SECRET  
No: D - 59  
Date: January 13, 1954  
Enclosures: 1  
Air or Surface Mail: Surface  
Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50209-40

59

58

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

References

CCDS  
(without  
enclosure)

With enclos.

Chrman.DRB;  
Sec. to Cab.

Internal  
Circulation

American Div.

tribution  
to Posts

Enclosed is a copy of a letter of January 7 from the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, commenting on Mr. Arneson's interpretation of the relative priority, in the United States view, of the northern and southern early warning lines. Mr. Heeney saw this letter when he was in Ottawa.

2. It seems to us that the points made by General Foulkes are well-taken and important. If you see no objection, I suggest that the Ambassador should, without seeking a special interview for the purpose, take the next opportunity of conversation with Mr. Arneson or Mr. Bedell Smith or both, to make it clear that the Canadian authorities do not agree with Mr. Arneson's interpretation in this respect of the record of the October 22 Meeting of Consultation, and that Canada has not given the northern line "equal priority" with the southern line. In fact, the idea of a northern line will not even be considered by the Canadian Government before the Military Study Group has submitted a report on what was till recently called "Project Corrode".

M. H. WENSTON

for Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs


14.1.3 (45)

SECRET

Refer: Secretary to the  
Cabinet (attn. Mr. Phillips)

January 12, 1954.

*Alone*  
*12/1/54*  
The Deputy Minister,  
Department of Northern Affairs  
and National Resources,  
Ottawa.



Continental Defence

Mr. Phillips of the Privy Council Office has suggested that we draw your attention to a paragraph in a letter, dated December 29, from the Canadian Ambassador, Washington, regarding a conversation that Dr. Solandt and a representative of the Embassy had with Mr. Arneson of the State Department on continental defence.

Basing himself on remarks made by Admiral Radford, Mr. Heeney says that the Embassy's understanding of the view of the United States authorities is that the proposed northern early warning line is regarded by them as having equal priority with the southern line, if it is proved feasible by current project "Corrode" and the studies now in progress. Mr. Heeney says that it is evidently thought in Washington that, should feasibility be established, the northern line should be constructed on a basis of equal priority with the southern line.

BENJAMIN ROGERS

FOR THE

Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.