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
Subject: JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
SOVIET UNION GENERAL

File No. 50028-B-40

Volume 12

From March 16, 1962

To OCT. 31 1962

Date	Referred To	Returned	Date	Referred To	Returned						
											

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

50028-B-10	
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United States Embassy,
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada,
October 23, 1962.

C 9/62

g68

Dear Jim:

With reference to your letter of 4 October 1962,
I am returning with thanks Copy No. 53 of the JIC paper
in question.

Sincerely yours,

RK
Rolfe Kingsley,
Attache

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Attachment:
Copy No. 53 of JIC 447(62)
dated 19 September 1962.

*File letter
destroy annex
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J. J. McCardle, Esquire,
Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee,
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Brief Number: *2/82*
Copy Number : 0001
Date : 23 Oct 62

Prepared for: JIC

By : DMI

Source : CIA WASH, WOWIS, JICLON, JIC AUST, Press

Subject : SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE

Dateline : 22 Oct 62

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ITEM

1. Since the Spring of 1955, the Chinese Communists have occupied 14,000 square miles of territory India has historically administered as hers, and has laid claim to 37,000 square miles more. (See Annex "A").
2. On 9 Sep, about 200 Chinese troops crossed the McMahon Line into Indian North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) at a point about 15 miles NORTH of Towang and attacked an Indian outpost three miles SOUTH of the McMahon Line in the Gyukang Valley area. Minor skirmishes occurred in this area up until 10 Oct 62 when an Indian force, estimated at two battalion strength, drove the Chinese from the Gyukang Valley and apparently closed up to the McMahon Line at the Bum Pass.
3. On 20 Oct, the Indians reported that the Chinese Communist forces had opened attacks on Indian posts in the Galwan and Chip Chap River Valleys and the Pengong Lake area of Ladakh. (See Annex "A", Inset 1). In addition, Defence Minister Menon announced that the Chinese Communists had also attacked with very large forces in the NEFA area and that a large number of engagements were taking place in this area SOUTH of the Nyamjang River. (See Annex "A", Inset 2).
4. On 21 Oct, news sources indicated that the Indians in the NEFA had been forced to give ground in face of Chinese Communist wave attacks and that Towang was threatened.
5. Action is continuing in both areas. In Ladakh, several posts have been lost to the Chinese. In the NEFA, it has been reported that the Indians have launched a large scale counter-attack this date (22 Oct 62).
6. *Spanish* India claims that the border in the NEFA area is the McMahon line, which generally follows the Himalayan watershed. This line was drawn at the 1914 Simla Conference by representatives of the United Kingdom, Tibet and China, but the Simla agreement was not ratified by the Chinese government. China - both Communist and Nationalist - claims that the boundary is the Southern edge of the Himalayan foothills.
7. It is not clear whether the whole of the Towang area, as defined by the Indians, lies SOUTH of the McMahon line which has never been demarcated on the ground and it may well be that there is a narrow strip of disputed territory which each side regards as its own.

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8. Mr Nehru has publicly explained that while India does not want war, experience has convinced him that the Chinese, if not evicted, will use occupied positions as bargaining points. He has again stated that India will not contemplate negotiations until China has withdrawn her forces from Indian territory. Defence Minister Menon, after the recent setbacks has again voiced India's resolve to regain the lost territory. The probable limitation of the roads and tracks in the NEFA, and the onset of winter and, possibly, the activities of the Khamba rebels will pose very difficult logistic problems to the Chinese. Whereas, in the Ladakh area, the Chinese have a logistic advantage.

9. The NEFA gives access to the Brahmaputra Valley in Assam. Many internal divisions exist in Assam and the problem of rebellion in adjacent Nagaland remains unresolved. The whole of the NEFA and ASSAM is therefore, particularly sensitive from the Indian strategic viewpoint.

10. The Chinese Communists, before the recent outbreaks had two regiments (totalling 7,000) located in the adjoining area of Tibet immediately NORTH of the frontier, in the NEFA area.

11. India has recently re-organized her forces in the area. The original Corps which covered North Eastern India has now been split into two commands. General Kaul, formerly CGS Indian Army, has taken over one, probably consisting of two infantry divisions facing the Chinese threat in NEFA, Sikkim, and Bhutan. The second command, probably of one infantry division, has the task of dealing with the Naga problem and the East Pakistan frontier. An estimate of major dispositions in the immediate area, before 20 Oct 62, is given in Annex "B".

COMMENT

12. It is now evident that the Indian Army has been given a free hand (possibly to include deliberate incursions into Chinese territory if necessary) to drive the Chinese Communist forces from the area, and that Communist China intends to resist and counter the Indian effort.

13. The possibility of these border clashes developing into a full scale war is unlikely. Winter snows (due within a few weeks) will make further operations in the NEFA part of the frontier impossible. Both sides have insisted that the recent attacks have been carried out as acts of "self-defence".

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
ANNEX "A" to
DMI BRIEF No 25/62
dated 22 OCT 62

CHINA - INDIA FRONTIER AREA


- International Boundary
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- Chinese Claimed Boundary
- Indian Claimed Boundary
- McMahon Line
- Southern Border of Jammu and Kashmir
- NEFA
- Northeastern Frontier Area

Legend for Map Insets 1


- Chinese Outposts
- Indian Outposts
- Trails
- Rivers
- Frozen River Beds used as Trails
- Chinese thrusts
- Indian counter attacks
- Small villages




MAP INSET "1" LADAKH AREA



MAP INSET "3" NEFA AREA



ANNEX "A" to
DNI BRIEF No 25/62
dated 22 OCT 62





CHINA - INDIA FRONTIER AREA

- International Boundary
- - - Indefinite Boundaries
- ~~~~~ Chinese Claimed Boundary Line
- ~~~~~ Indian Claimed Boundary Line
- ~~~~~ McMahon Line
- Southern Border of Jammu and Kashmir
- NEFA Northeastern Frontier Agency

Legend for Map Insets 1 & 2

- ▲ Chinese Outposts
- ▲ Indian Outposts
- - - Trails
- ~~~~~ Rivers
- Frozen River Beds used as trails
- Chinese thrusts
- ← Indian counter attacks
- Small villages




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INDIAN AND CHINESE COMMUNIST DISPOSITIONS IN LADAKH AND NEFA

Sinkiang Province
(approx 33,000 tps in Sinkiang Mil Region)

ANNEX "B" to
DMI BRIEF No 25/62
dated 22 OCT 62



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D.L.(2)/S.GREY/VW

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S E C R E T

Ottawa, October 4, 1962.

Dear Mr.Kingsley:

1

I enclose, on the usual "see and return" basis, Copy No. 53 of a paper prepared by our Joint Intelligence Committee entitled "Civil Defence in the Soviet Union."

Yours sincerely,

J. J. MCCARDLE

J.J. McCardle

Mr. Rolfe Kingsley,
Attache,
United States Embassy,
O t t a w a, Ont.

D.L.(2)/S.GREY/VW

50028-B-10	
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S E C R E T

Ottawa, October 4, 1962.

Dear Mr. Hay:

1

I enclose, on the usual "see and return" basis, Copy No. 21 of a paper prepared by our Joint Intelligence Committee entitled "Civil Defence in the Soviet Union." Further copies of this paper have been referred to the Australian Joint Intelligence Committee through our High Commissioner in Canberra.

Yours sincerely,

J. J. MCCARDLE

J.J. McCardle

His Excellency D.O. Hay,
Australian High Commissioner,
90 Sparks Street,
O t t a w a, Ont.

D.L.(2)/S.GREY/VW

50028-B-40	
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S E C R E T

Ottawa, October 4, 1962.

Dear Mr. Rogers:

1

I enclose, on the usual "see and return" basis, Copy No. 54 of a paper prepared by our Joint Intelligence Committee entitled "Civil Defence in the Soviet Union."

Yours sincerely,

J. J. MCCARDLE

J.J. McCardle

Mr. M.H. Rogers,
First Secretary,
Office of the British High Commissioner,
Earncliffe,
O t t a w a, Ont.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO Office of the Canadian High
..... Commissioner, CANBERRA, Australia.
.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:.....

Subject: CANADIAN JIC 447 (62) dated
19 September, 1962, entitled
.....
..... "CIVIL DEFENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION"

Security: S E C R E T

No: DS- 296.

Date: October 4, 1962.

Enclosures: 10

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.

50028-B-40

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References

10

Attached for transmission to the Australian Joint Intelligence Committee are ten copies (Nos. 22 to 31 inclusive) of Canadian JIC 447 (62) dated 19 September, 1962, entitled "Civil Defence in the Soviet Union." One copy is for your retention.

2. Copies of this paper have also been made available to the New Zealand authorities.

J. J. MCCARDLE

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

D.L.(2)/S.GREY/VW

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TOOffice of the Canadian.....
.....High Commissioner, WELLINGTON, N.Z

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:.....

Subject: CANADIAN JIC 447 (62) dated.....

.....19 September, 1962, entitled.....

.....CIVIL DEFENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION.....

Security:.....S E C R E T.....

No:.....DS- 192.....

Date:.....October 4, 1962.....

Enclosures:.....9.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....Air.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.

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References

9

Attached for transmission to the New Zealand
Joint Intelligence Committee are nine copies (Nos. 32
to 40 inclusive) of Canadian JIC 447 (62) dated 19
September, 1962, entitled "Civil Defence in the
Soviet Union." One copy is for your retention.

2. Copies of this paper have also been made
available to the Australian authorities.

J. J. MCCARDIE

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

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X Ref 50306-C-4-10



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 7-17 (JIC)

27 September, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

CIVIL DEFENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION

Enclosure: (1) CANADIAN JIC 447(62) dated
19 September, 1962 on the
above subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for retention and further
distribution where indicated.

(Signature)
(A. Malysheff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.

Enc.

AM/2-5459/1c

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Returned to Mr. Malysheff

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S E C R E T

CANADIAN JIC 447(62)

19 September 1962

CIVIL DEFENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION

OBJECT

1. To provide an assessment of the Soviet Union's Civil Defence programme.

CONCLUSIONS

2. While command and training organizations for civil defence exist and are functioning in the USSR, training of the population has so far not gone beyond familiarization with the nature of nuclear warfare and with basic protective measures. No effective shelter construction programme has been undertaken against either fallout or blast. Moreover, there is no evidence of any workable evacuation programme.
3. It is difficult to draw conclusions about Soviet strategic policy from the state of civil defence in the USSR. For example, it might have been expected that in view of the great weight given to defensive weapons in Soviet defence as a whole, an extensive civil defence shelter programme would have been undertaken. However the fact that there is no evidence of this can be attributed to doubts about its usefulness, to considerations of cost or to prior claims on the construction industry, as much as to optimistic assessments of the risks of war. Its absence, at present, reflects a probable Soviet estimate that unacceptable damage could not be avoided in a major war. Beyond that, it can only be said that the Soviet government realizes the value of a population which is aware of the problem and is to some extent trained in basic protective measures. This situation may change in the future, but the costs of a full scale shelter programme for urban areas alone would likely be a restraining factor.

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S E C R E T

DISCUSSION

ORGANIZATION

4. Until late in 1959, overall responsibility for civil defence in the Soviet Union rested with the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs. DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and Fleet) was charged with the training programme. No official announcements concerning the fate of civil defence were noted when the Ministry of Internal Affairs was dissolved and it is only now becoming clear that the Ministry of Defence appears to have assumed overall control on a national scale of this sphere. DOSAAF has retained its position in the field of training the civilian population in civil defence procedures.

5. The highest identified authority is the Civil Defence Staff of the USSR. This staff is located in Moscow and is probably under the control of the Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces (Marshal Chuykov). No reference to a Civil Defence Chief (Nachalnik Grazhdanskiy Oborony) at the federal level has been noted.

6. In the republics, there is a Chief of Civil Defence who has a staff (Shtab Grazhdanskiy Oborony). They are responsible for the civil defence planning in the republic. At the municipal level there again is a Civil Defence Staff for the town or city, and the chief of this staff seems to be the most important figure in local civil defence matters. Prior to the reorganization, the Chairmen of the local elected executive committees were responsible for civil defence matters within their municipalities. Whether or not they have lost this task is not clear. It may well be that the Chief of the Civil Defence staff has assumed this responsibility.

METHODS

Rescue Operations

7. Rescue operations are the responsibility of Self Defence groups. These groups consist of about forty-eight people and are formed on the basis of one group for every 300 to 700 population, varying from the smaller figure in thinly populated rural areas, to the larger one in heavily settled cities and towns. These groups are organized as required on the basis of the nearest convenient units. These units might be apartment blocks, factories, or institutions or rural settlements. The senior officials of such units, the factory directors, or the apartment block managers, heads of institutions, or principals of schools, are ex officio appointed chiefs of the groups.

8. The duties of these teams are self explanatory. In the event of an air raid warning they are to proceed to their action stations, so that in the event of an actual raid developing, they are ready to perform their tasks. The civil population, in this period, are to carry out preparatory tasks to reduce fire hazards, to protect food or animals. These tasks include the extinguishing of lights and fires, the turning off of gas or electricity and the assembly of protective clothing, respirators and other equipment which might be necessary for their welfare and protection during the actual air raid. When the actual alert is sounded, therefore, they are ready to proceed to their shelters or seek protection as best they can. For the duration of the attack the various teams have full authority over the population and are responsible for all possible safety measures in their respective domains.

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S E C R E T

9. The concept of civil defence therefore, is based on self help at the local level, rather than on the use of some type of flying columns. It is not known whether or not this rather elaborate organization has actually been set up throughout the country, but Khrushchev stated in 1959 that there were 22 million trained civil defence workers in the Soviet Union and that an additional 5 million were being trained annually. Working on the ratio of one team per approximately 500 population, however, the 22 million figure quoted would indicate that this has probably been achieved.

Shelter and Equipment

10. No accurate information on the amount of equipment held by the civil defence organization for their exclusive use is available and the same applies to the provision of shelters. Until 1959 all new buildings were, by law, required to provide basement shelters, but this has been discontinued and discussions have indicated that free standing shelters were considered more suitable. However, only isolated instances of shelter construction have been reported by Western official observers and the conclusion has to be arrived at that such work is being given little, if any, attention in practice although the text books point to the need and value of shelters.

11. Estimates of the number of people who could find cover in shelters have been made. These claim that between 1/4 to 1/3 of the population in the larger cities could find some kind of cover by utilizing existing shelters of World War II type, subways and other means of protection. The real value of this is considered highly doubtful.

Training

12. The training of the population in civil defence matters is the responsibility of the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and Fleet (DOSAAF), which started its first programme in 1955 by giving a 10 hour basic anti-atomic training course, which, according to official statements, was attended by 85 per cent of the population during 1955-56. In 1957 a new, 22 hour training programme was instituted, which envisaged training against chemical and biological as well as nuclear attack. This programme was to have been completed by the end of 1958. Also prepared was a course for 1959-60 which was called "Prepared for Air Defence-Grade I" which was to be taught to the whole population between the ages of 16-65. The programme was practical in nature.

13. In early 1961 a fourth training course "Prepared for Air Defence-Grade II" was introduced. This course consisted of 18 hours of instruction designed to prepare the population so that they could assist the organized civil defence units in post attack operations.

14. There are a large number of civil defence schools where instructors are trained. There is at least one civil defence Staff College.

Training Literature

15. A fair amount of literature is published by DOSAAF and recently by the Ministry of Defence as well. This can be divided into two groups. The first consists of periodicals which are designed to maintain interest in DOSAAF activities and the second is training literature proper. To the first group belongs the biweekly newspaper Sovetskiy Patriot which deals with DOSAAF activities generally. There are also three monthly illustrated journals one each dealing with army, navy and air matters. Although these periodicals deal primarily with matters of imparting military skills in their

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- 4 -

S E C R E T

respective fields to members of the Society, civil defence matters are also included.

16. The second group of publications includes numerous paper-backed books dealing with all aspects of civil defence. These books range from those of a general nature, designed for public consumption which explain the nature, effect and results of atomic, chemical and biological weapons to scientific works dealing with specific aspects, particularly in the field of therapeutic medicine.

17. Books are also published on the subject of civil defence proper in which the duties of civil defence personnel are described in detail. These are used in the training programme referred to above.

Exercises

18. Only a few isolated instances of local civil defence exercises have been observed or reported and none of these were on a national scale.

Evacuation

19. In recent Soviet civil defence literature, the doctrine has been propagated that the only way to reduce the number of casualties in a nuclear war, would be through large scale pre-hostility evacuation. The means of achieving this, described in their text books, are not very realistic.

POLICY

20. Colonel General of Aviation, O. Tolstikov, writing in Voyennaya Znaniya #2, 1962 on the change of name of the civil defence organizations from Local Air Defence (MPVO) to Civil Defence (Grazhdanskaya Oborona), said that with the modern means of mass destruction, no line can be drawn between rear and front. Therefore Local Air Defence (MPVO) had become a misnomer and the name had been changed to Civil Defence. Furthermore, he said that civil defence had become one of the more important problems of the State and demanded the participation of every citizen of the country. Similar statements have been made by other military leaders such as Marshals Malinovskiy, Zhukov, Budenny, Vasilevskiy and Konev.

21. Although Soviet civil defence literature explains the value and use of shelters, Marshal Malinovskiy in a recent interview, described shelters as "coffins". Whether the statement was made to disparage the American interest in shelters, or to minimize the absence of shelters in the Soviet Union, or whether he really does not believe in the value of shelters, is difficult to say. However, the statement is a surprising one to have come from a Minister of National Defence. Khrushchev has stated that the Soviet Union could survive a nuclear attack because the country is so large and its industry and population so dispersed that everything would not be destroyed and life would continue.

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CC 1374-1 (JIC)

17 Sep 62

Ottawa, Ontario


DMI
JIB

CONFERENCE ON USSR RAILWAY CAPACITY

Reference: (a) CC 1374-1 (JIC) of 31 Jul 62

Enclosure: (1) SHAPE 0470.1/17 dated 24 Aug 62
on the above subject.

Enclosure (1) has been received in eight copies
and is circulated to DMI and JIB for consideration and
retention. Copies will be forwarded to other Directorates
on request.


(A. Malyshoff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.

Enc.

AM/2-5459/1c

cc: J.J. McCardle, Esq., (no enclosure)
Dept. of External Affairs.

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DAI	"
DSI	"
RCMP	"
CB NRC	"

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JIB BRIEF NO: 51/62

COPY NO: 3 OF 20

27 August 1962

INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

PREPARED FOR: J.I.C.

BY: J.I.B.

SUBJECT: Harvest Outlook in the Soviet Bloc

SOURCE: Press and Local Records

DATELINE: August, 1962

50028-B-40	
14	✓

1. Despite earlier optimistic statements by Mr. Khrushchov, it is apparent that this year's harvest is unlikely to be in any sense a bumper one, although the USSR itself may well fare better than the remaining Soviet Bloc countries.
2. In June, Khrushchov predicted a harvest as large as any in Soviet history between 148 and 164 million metric tons. However, Soviet press and radio have continued to exhort agricultural workers to greater efforts and the elimination of past mistakes, while at the same time making it clear that little has been done to overcome the causes leading to such "mistakes", e.g. the shortage of harvest labour in the New Lands and the lack of spare parts for agricultural machinery, which is exacerbated by slack and inefficient maintenance.
3. The country as a whole has not had weather conducive to good crops. In European Russia, the spring was unseasonably cold and wet and, conversely, but equally as serious, there has been a shortage of moisture in the New Lands area. The area seeded to grain this year has been expanded over 1961 by between 5 and 10 percent and this will help to disguise a reduced or static yield but it appears most unlikely that the record harvest of 1958 will be bettered in any proportionate sense, though it may be exceeded in absolute terms.
4. In the Satellites the prospect is even less favourable. Weather has been the chief problem, though continuing organizational difficulties and resistance to collectivization have also played their part. In Poland, whose 1961 results were good, poor spring weather and a late start on planting and field work will have an adverse effect on root and vegetable crops and the grain harvest is expected to be less than last year's. Similarly, in East Germany, unfavourable winter weather and a late spring are expected to contribute to a reduced crop and here, difficulties over forced collectivization have reduced the grain acreage. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Roumania are similarly afflicted by weather, having endured a lengthy autumn drought and a particularly cold winter as well as late spring planting. Bulgaria has suffered a drought in the late spring and early summer of this year which is expected to particularly curtail the harvest of potatoes, beets and corn and to a lesser extent grain crops in the latter stages of their growth.

RESTRICTED

JIB BRIEF NO: 51/52

COPY NO: OF 20

-2-

5. A stringency in food supplies is thus in prospect in all the Satellites in the forthcoming months and may be severe in some commodities, especially in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The USSR is not likely to have a very good harvest; any prospects of making good boasts of ample livestock and dairy produce supplies and a superabundance of grain appear to be out of reach.

DISTRIBUTION

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Mr. R. L. McGibbon	11 and 12
Mr. Fish for E.I.C.	13 to 16
Mr. J. Langley - XA	17
File	18 to 20

SECRET



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE *g6²*

50028-B-40	
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CSC 2173-1 (JIC)

27 August, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SOVIET MISSILES - PHOTOGRAPHS

- Reference: (a) CSC 2173-1 (JIC) dated 20 August, 1962
(b) DRB 71-16 SMIG(S&T) dated 15 August, 1962.

Reference (b) was a request from Chairman, SMIG(S&T) for JIC to authorize JPIC to issue six copies of photographs of Soviet missiles to Secretary SMIG(S&T) for distribution to other members of the Group.

2. The SMIG(S&T) request has now been cancelled and no further action is required.

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AUG 28 1962

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AM/2-5459/lc

cc: JIS (2)
SOJIR
SOCI

(A. Malysheff)
(A. Malysheff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.

RESTRICTED



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

*file
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CSC 7-17 (JIC)

22 August, 1962.

50028-B-	40
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Ottawa, Ontario

SOVIET LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION

CORRIGENDUM NO.1

Reference: (a) CANADIAN JIC 437/1(62) dated ²⁰~~29~~ Jun 62

The following correction to reference (a) is forwarded:

Page 23, paragraph 69, line 10, fifth word,

delete "unlikely"

insert "likely".

A. Malysheff

(A. Malysheff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.

AM/2-5459/1c

DISTRIBUTION

INTELLIGENCE POLICY COMMITTEE

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
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Secretary to the Cabinet
Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence
Chief of the Naval Staff
Chief of the General Staff
Chief of the Air Staff
Chairman, Defence Research Board
President, National Research Council
Deputy Minister of Finance
Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Secretary to Cabinet Defence Committee (Secretary)
Director of Communications Security

Mr. G.K. Grande

for High Commissioner, London
Ambassador, Washington
Canadian Missions Abroad
JIC Australia

Mr. D.O. Hay, Australian High Commissioner
JIC New Zealand

Mr. Rolfe Kingsley (see and return basis)

Mr. Martin Rogers (see and return basis)

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DAI

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SA(CGS)
SA(CAS)
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for JIBLO London
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CB NRC

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

(Mr. J.H. Fish, Secretary, JIB)

Secretary, JPC

for Members, JPS
Members, JPC

CJS

JIS(M)

JIS(JIB)

SOJIR

SOCI

JICLO(W)

for USIB

JICLO(L)

for British, JIC

JS/DSS

SECRET

50028-B-10

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

261

CSC 2173-1 (JIC)

20 August, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SOVIET MISSILES - PHOTOGRAPHS

Enclosure: (1) DRB 71-16 SMIG(S&T) dated
15 Aug 62

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for consideration of
members.

2. It is requested that approval or disapproval be
indicated to the Secretary by telephone by 27 Aug 62. In
the event that any disapproval is registered the subject
will be included on the agenda for the meeting on 29 Aug 62.

W. G. Gable

We don't sit in on
SMIG (S&T) so

Enc. presume this is
AM/2-5459/1c alright by us.

cc: JIS (2) Shall I say so
SOJIR
SOCI
by phone to the
Secretary?

A. Malysheff

(A. Malysheff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.

Whitaker

YES,
please

August 21/62

001985

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AUG 21 1962

File

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71-16 SMIG(S&T)

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD

Ottawa, Ontario,
15 August, 1962.

Chairman,
JIC.

Photographs of Soviet Missiles
(JPIC Distribution)

At present, photographs of Soviet missiles are sent to JPIC to the originating intelligence directorates only. The administrative obstacles to timely circulation to all intelligence agencies concerned could be overcome by sending six copies of each of such photographs to the secretary of SMIG(S&T) for distribution to members of the group.

This was discussed by SMIG(S&T) members and they agree that co-ordinated distribution would facilitate timely assessment of photographic intelligence.

JPIC have informed me that they could, upon receiving such photographs for study, make several copies and forward them to the Secretary of SMIG(S&T). However, they stated that they would not do so without JIC approval.


It is requested that the JIC approve the issue of six copies of photographs of Soviet missiles to Secretary SMIG(S&T) for the use of the group.

(sgd) (B.O. Baker)
Chairman, SMIG(S&T)

50028-B-	10
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CERTIFICATE OF DESTRUCTION

This is to certify that the document
enclosed with Transmittal Slip of July 16, 1962,
from Mr. Grande has been destroyed. (copy N° 50)



(Signature)

D.L.(2) File: 50028-B-40



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

50028-A-40
14 150

CSC 2-1-3-1 (JIC)
CSC 2-1-3-6 (JIC)

Mr. Olivier Les duple

10 August, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SOVIET AIR-TO-SURFACE
MISSILES

Serial 21 of the JIC Work Programme cover the preparation of a JIC paper on the above subject with cut-off date of 15 September, 1962. The last paper on the subject was JIC 1298/1(61) dated 14 September, 1961 and circulated under CSC 6-2, JIR 8-45-1 of 18 September, 1961.

2. The preparation of the new paper will be considered at the meeting on 15 August, 1962.

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AM/2-5459/1c

cc: CJS
JIS
SOJIR
SOCI

(A. Malysheff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.

001988

RESTRICTED
(Enclosure SECRET)



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 1145-1 (JIC)
CSC 1779-2 (JIC)

31 July, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SINO-SOVIET FOREIGN
POLICIES

Reference: (a) CSC 1145-1, CSC 1779-2
(JIC) of 9 Jul 62

Enclosure: (1) Canadian JIC comments on
JIC(AUST)(62)10 FINAL
dated May, 1962 on the
above subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.

Enc.

AM/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS
SOJIR
SOCI

(Signature)
(A. Malyshchik)
LCDR, R CN,
Secretary.

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Comments on JIC(AUST)(62)10 (Final) - dated May, 1962
SINO-SOVIET FOREIGN POLICIES

DMI: DMI has no disagreement with this paper and has no further comment.

DAI: DAI is in general agreement with this paper.

JIB: Russian Assistance

Para 10 - No doubt China wishes to reduce her dependence on the USSR for technical assistance and advanced industrial equipment as soon as possible, but the reduction since mid-1960 has been from necessity, not choice.

Albania

Para 18, last sentence - It seems more likely that the Chinese have supported and encouraged the Albania interpretation of Marxism-Leninism than that the Chinese have won over the Albanians to the Chinese view.

ECM

Para 42 - Russian policy towards the ECM, as set forth in this para, might receive more emphasis elsewhere; as, for instance, para 34, line 4, might read "defence alliances and economic associations" and in para 2 of the paper proper, point (K) might read "NATO and the ECM".

XA: This Department has no comments on this paper. The Australian JIC will already be aware of our views on this subject from our recently completed papers on Soviet and Chinese Communist Likely Courses of Action.

DNI, DSI, RCMP, CBNRC: No comments.

D.L.(2)/P.TROTTIER/VW

50-28-B-4-

27 50

RESTRICTED

Ottawa, July 27, 1962.

Our file: 50028-B-40
Your file: CSC 1145-1(JIC)
CSC 1779-2(JIC)

Lt. Cdr. A. Malysheff,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a, Ont.

Sino-Soviet Foreign
Policies

In reply to your letter of July 9, 1962,
we wish to inform you that this Department has no
comments on JIC (AUST) (62) 10 Final, dated May
1962, entitled "Sino-Soviet Foreign Policies."

The Australian JIC will already be aware
of our views on this subject from our recently
completed papers on Soviet and Chinese Communist
Likely Courses of Action.

(Sgd.) G. K. GRANDE

G.K. Grande
Defence Liaison (2) Division



SECRET

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
OTTAWA.

In reply quote No. 256/6

50028-B-40	26th July, 1962.
27	50

Dear Mr. Grande,

I should like to acknowledge with thanks your letters of the 16th and 23rd of July covering copy No. 67 of your Joint Intelligence Committee's paper "Soviet Likely Courses of Action" and copy No. 35 of the Committee's paper on "Chinese Communist Likely Courses of Action in the Next Five Years".

The High Commissioner will be away for the next few days and I shall be glad to retain these interesting documents for him to see on his return.

Yours sincerely,

(E. A. Warren)
Acting High Commissioner.

G. K. Grande, Esq.,
Defence Liaison (2) Division,
Department of External Affairs,
247 East Block,
OTTAWA.

SECRET 001992




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(Enclosure SECRET)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

157
CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1322-1 (JIC)

23 July, 1962.



Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SOVIET INTENTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO BERLIN

Reference: (a) CSC 7-17, CSC 1322-1 (JIC)
dated 28 Jun 62

Enclosure: (1) Canadian JIC comments on
US SNIE 11-13-62 dated 13
Jun 62 on the above subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.

(A. Maryshoff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.

Enc.

AM/2-5459/1c

cc JIS(2)
SOJIR
SOCI
JICLO(W) (for your personal information only)

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Comments on US SNIE 11-13-62 dated 13 Jun 62
"Soviet Intentions with Respect to Berlin"

DNI DNI considers that this estimate adequately outlines all rational Soviet alternative approaches to the Berlin situation.

DMI DMI is in general agreement with this estimate. It is to be noted however that Soviet statements on the anniversary of the German attack on the USSR, published in the Soviet press on 21 Jun 62, continue to indicate a clear intention to sign a separate German peace treaty if negative results are obtained from the USSR-USA exchanges on the subject. The continuance of this line, which reinforces a mass of similar statements in the past, is making it increasingly difficult to believe that the USSR intends to back down from its declared intention.

DAI This estimate tends to ignore the role that the Berlin situation plays in the larger aspects of Soviet foreign policy toward Germany, toward Europe or toward the Western alliances.

The specific estimates contained in the first three sentences of para 6 and in para 8 relating to Soviet actions directly related to Berlin are concurred in. The last sentence in para 6 is not concurred in entirely. It is contended that "new harassments" will be more aggressive and, with the growing capability of Warsaw Pact military forces, a greater military threat will be immediately applied to the situation than in the past. The aims would be to destroy West Berlin morale, to divide the NATO Alliance and encourage concession by the West to avoid escalation to all out war.

DAI considers that the "indecisiveness about how to proceed further on the Berlin issue" (para 2) may well be contrived, that Soviet prestige and particularly Khrushchev's personal prestige and position are more critical factors than are reflected in the SNIE and that Soviet adherence to continued negotiations on the subject of Berlin and other related issues is more in the nature of a time-marking holding action pending the generation of sufficient military power deployed in the field. (In short this year's Soviet activity in Europe is foreseen as a much stronger repetition of the activity seen in the fall of 1961. Such a course of action appears to offer the Soviets their greatest chance of success while still allowing them the initiative and control of the risks.

XA, JIB, DSI, RCMP, CBNRC: No comments.

SECRET



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CC 1544-1 (JIC)
20 July, 1962.

50028-B-40
27 | 52

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

REPORTING OF SOVIET BLOC SHIPS

Reference: (a) MC90 (Revised), Enclosure 1
of 14 Aug 61


Enclosure: (1) SACLANT 171857Z July 1962

Enclosure (1) is forwarded to holders of reference (a).

Enc.

AM/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS


(A. Malyshoff)
LCDR, RCN

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JUL 24 1962

**NATO
SECRET**

AC Paraphrase
not required..
No unclassified
reply or reference.

R 171857Z

FM SACLANT

TO SECDEF US CODS NORWAY MOD TURKEY CHOD DENMARK MOD ITALY
MOD FRANCE MOD CANADA MOD UK MOD THE NETHERLANDS MOD GREECE
MOD PORTUGAL MOD BELGIUM MOD GERMANY
INFO SECGEN SGN SACEUR CINCHAN SACLANTREPEUR CINCEASTLANT
CINCWESTLANT ISCOMICELAND COMSTRIKFLTANT

BT

NATO S E C R E T

NATO. REF MC790 ENCL 1.

1. INCREASE IN ACTIVITY OF SOVIET ELINT TRAWLERS AND HYDRO-SURVEY VESSELS DURING THE PAST YEAR HAS BEEN NOTED. LIAISON BETWEEN ELINT VESSELS AND SOVIET SUBMARINES HAS BEEN RECENTLY OBSERVED.
2. ALTHOUGH ELINT AND HYDRO VESSELS ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN PARA 3A (4) OF THE REFERENCE, SACLANT WISHES TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF REPORTING THEM FULLY

BT

0518/18 JUL 62

NATO SECRET

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RESTRICTED

Ottawa, July 20, 1962.


Your ref: CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1322-1 (JIC)

The Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a, Ont.

Soviet Intentions with Respect
to Berlin

We wish to inform you that this Department
has no comments on US SNIE 11-13-62 dated June 13, 1962,
entitled "Soviet Intentions with Respect to Berlin."

O.K. Grande
Defence Liaison (2) Division



Ottawa, July 20, 1962.

Your ref: JIR 2-19

The Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a, Ont.

Annual Review of Activities
in the Soviet North

We wish to inform you that this Department
has no comments on Canadian ^{draft} JIC 1348 (62) dated
July 16, 1962, entitled "Annual Review of Activities
in the Soviet North."

(Sgd.) G. K. GRANDE

G.K. Grande
Defence Liaison (2) Division



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(Enclosure SECRET)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

50028 B-40	CSC 7-17 (JIC)
27	18 July, 1962.
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
154
Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

TELEX COMMUNICATION -
SOVIET DISCRIMINATION

Enclosure: (1) External Msg 473 of 9 Jul 62

The Acting Chairman has directed that the enclosure be forwarded for information, observing that slowness of communications to and from Moscow has been noted by members in the past.



(A. Malysheff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.

Enc.

AM/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS
SOJIR
SOCI

D.L.	2



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FM MOSCOW JUL9/62 SECRET

TO TT EXTERNAL 473 DEFERRED PRIORITY FM LDN

REF MYLET515 JUN13

SOVIET DISCRIMINATION ON TELEX

WHEN I SAW GROMYKO ON SAT I TOOK OPPORTUNITY, AFTER SOME FIFTY FIVE MINUTES DISCUSSION ON DISARMAMENT, TO SPEAK ALSO ABOUT TELEX. I SAID THAT I WAS DISTURBED AS WELL AS PUZZLED BY FAILURE OF FOREIGN MINISTRY TO GIVE ME ANY REPLY TO MY REQUEST FOR TELEX FACILITIES TO WESTERN EUROPE. I WAS ENTIRELY AT LOSS TO UNDERSTAND WHY SOVIET GOVT WISHED TO DISCRIMINATE IN THIS MANNER AGAINST CDA. MANY OTHER DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN MOSCOW INCLUDING THOSE OF SEVERAL WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (I MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY ITALY, DENMARK AND NORWAY) HAD TELEX FACILITIES. SOVIET MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS HAD ASSURED ME THAT HE COULD GIVE CDN EMB TELEX FACILITIES WHICH WE DESIRED, PROVIDING I COULD GET CONSENT OF FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THIS. NEVERTHELESS DESPITE REPEATED REMINDERS TO HIS DEPUTIES SOBOLEV AND KUZNETSOV OVER PERIOD OF FIFTEEN OR SIXTEEN MONTHS FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD NOT RPT NOT GIVEN US THIS AUTHORIZATION, THOUGH THEY GAVE NO RPT NO EXPLICIT REFUSAL.

2. LACK OF ADEQUATE AND ECONOMICAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES WAS INTERFERING WITH ABILITY OF MY MISSION TO DO JOB I FELT WE SHOULD DO IN HELPING TO KEEP TWO GOVTS ADEQUATELY INFORMED OF EACH OTHERS THINKING. I COULD NOT RPT NOT SEE WHAT USSR COULD GAIN FM THIS. I SAID THAT THIS SOVIET DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CDA WAS DISTURBING. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT WAS ALSO CONTRARY TO SPIRIT AND TERMS OF VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES WHICH USSR AND CDA HAS SIGNED LAST YEAR AND WHICH PROVIDED THAT DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS HAD RIGHT TO MAKE USE OF ALL NORMAL METHODS OF COMMUNICATION, SPECIAL PERMISSION BEING REQUIRED ONLY FOR DIPLO-

...2

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PAGE TWO 473

MATIC WIRELESS, WHICH WE WERE NOT RPT NOT REQUESTING. I THEREFORE
HOPED WE COULD NOW RECEIVE WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY THE REQUIRED
AUTHORIZATION FOR TELEX FACILITIES.

3. GROMYKO SAID HE WAS NOT RPT NOT HIMSELF AT ALL FAMILIAR WITH
THIS PROBLEM, BUT HE PROMISED TO LOOK INTO IT

ARNOLD SMITH

SECRET	
50028-B-10	
14	52

Ottawa, July 16, 1962.

Lieut. Commander A. Malysheff,
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa.

Soviet discrimination on Telex

We thought that the members of the JIC might be interested in seeing the attached telegram no. 473, of July 9 from our Ambassador in Moscow on this subject. As you may know, from time to time members of the JIC have, with some justification, been complaining about the slowness of our communications to and from Moscow. Mr. Arnold Smith's request to the Soviet authorities for Telex is relevant to this.

Please send copies (12 attached) of the above telegram to all members of the JIC for their information.

(Sgd.) G. K. GRANDE

G.K. Grande,
Chairman,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

In Gladstone
This may be of
interest to various
of the members
of the C.C.?
J

FM MOSCOW JUL9/62 SECRET

TO IT EXTERNAL 473 DEFERRED PRIORITY FM LDN

REF MYLET515 JUN13

SOVIET DISCRIMINATION ON TELEX

13 JUL
1962

WHEN I SAW GROMYKO ON SAT I TOOK OPPORTUNITY, AFTER SOME FIFTY FIVE MINUTES DISCUSSION ON DISARMAMENT, TO SPEAK ALSO ABOUT TELEX. I SAID THAT I WAS DISTURBED AS WELL AS PUZZLED BY FAILURE OF FOREIGN MINISTRY TO GIVE ME ANY REPLY TO MY REQUEST FOR TELEX FACILITIES TO WESTERN EUROPE. I WAS ENTIRELY AT LOSS TO UNDERSTAND WHY SOVIET GOVT WISHED TO DISCRIMINATE IN THIS MANNER AGAINST CDA. MANY OTHER DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN MOSCOW INCLUDING THOSE OF SEVERAL WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (I MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY ITALY, DENMARK AND NORWAY) HAD TELEX FACILITIES. SOVIET MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS HAD ASSURED ME THAT HE COULD GIVE CDN EMB TELEX FACILITIES WHICH WE DESIRED, PROVIDING I COULD GET CONSENT OF FOREIGN MINISTRY TO THIS. NEVERTHELESS DESPITE REPEATED REMINDERS TO HIS DEPUTIES SOBOLEV AND KUZNETSOV OVER PERIOD OF FIFTEEN OR SIXTEEN MONTHS FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD NOT RPT NOT GIVEN US THIS AUTHORIZATION, THOUGH THEY GAVE NO RPT NO EXPLICIT REFUSAL.

2. LACK OF ADEQUATE AND ECONOMICAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES WAS INTERFERING WITH ABILITY OF MY MISSION TO DO JOB I FELT WE SHOULD DO IN HELPING TO KEEP TWO GOVTS ADEQUATELY INFORMED OF EACH OTHERS THINKING. I COULD NOT RPT NOT SEE WHAT USSR COULD GAIN FM THIS. I SAID THAT THIS SOVIET DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CDA WAS DISTURBING. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT WAS ALSO CONTRARY TO SPIRIT AND TERMS OF VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES WHICH USSR AND CDA HAS SIGNED LAST YEAR AND WHICH PROVIDED THAT DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS HAD RIGHT TO MAKE USE OF ALL NORMAL METHODS OF COMMUNICATION, SPECIAL PERMISSION BEING REQUIRED ONLY FOR DIPLO-

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This is a faulty argument, I think.

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PAGE TWO 473

MATIC WIRELESS, WHICH WE WERE NOT RPT NOT REQUESTING. I THEREFORE
HOPED WE COULD NOW RECEIVE WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY THE REQUIRED
AUTHORIZATION FOR TELEX FACILITIES.

3. GROMYKO SAID HE WAS NOT RPT NOT HIMSELF AT ALL FAMILIAR WITH
THIS PROBLEM, BUT HE PROMISED TO LOOK INTO IT

ARNOLD SMITH

SECRET

Copy No _____

20/62

JIB(CAN) _____

July, 1962.

Date _____

JOINT INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

Ottawa

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- Copy 402 to Eur. Div. done 2/8/62 *cmd*
- this copy for circ. in D.L. 2

4 return to me

NEW TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN AID POLICY

WORKING PAPER

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Joint Intelligence Bureau

Department of National Defence

OTTAWA, CANADA

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JIB (CAN) 20/62

NEW TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN AID POLICY

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Joint Intelligence Bureau

Ottawa

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JIB (CAN) 20/62

NEW TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN AID POLICY

1. Following the death of Stalin, the introduction of the "peaceful coexistence" line reflected the bankruptcy of the old policies and a Soviet decision to "come out into the world" and to compete with the West in all forms of non-military activity. Diplomatic posts were multiplied and expanded; a so-called cultural offensive was launched; and substantial programmes of economic and military aid were undertaken. In eight years the Bloc spent about \$3 billion and promised at least another \$4 billion. It became deeply involved in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America as a series of crises presented it with opportunities for intervention. The tone of Soviet writings at least during the early part of this period reflected an untroubled confidence in the "inevitable course of history", but as Soviet involvement became more complex it must have become apparent, even in Moscow, that the world from which the Soviet Union had previously been excluded was a complicated place and not necessarily amenable either to Marxist theory or Soviet manipulation.

2. Judged by the level of activity and against the background of its previous exclusion the performance of the Soviet Government looked superficially impressive. Often, the level of Soviet activity was taken as a direct indicator of the growth of Soviet prestige and influence. Nevertheless, any attempt to catalogue specific political dividends accruing to the Soviet Government from its new liabilities tended to evaporate in generalities about "Soviet presence" and it has become increasingly evident that Soviet capabilities to make a large political impact by economic means are much smaller than most observers had supposed. In the past few months there have been increasing indications that the Soviet Government itself may have some misgivings about its policies and that its attitude toward the non-communist, particularly the underdeveloped, world may be in the process of reassessment.

3. In the first six months of 1962 the rate of extension of Bloc economic credits has been radically reduced from previous years as follows:

1960	Jan - June	\$ 786 million
1961	Jan - June	\$ 465 million
1962	Jan - June	\$ 100-200 million ¹

It might be reasonably objected that this is too short a period to establish a trend were it not for other evidence of an increasingly tough Soviet attitude on economic aid. For example, Soviet authorities,

¹This does not include a probable \$100 million commodity credit to Cuba. It does include \$56 million from Czechoslovakia to the UAR which was probably a 5 year commercial type credit. There is some doubt about a recent \$90 million Soviet credit to Afghanistan.

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after completing a survey of a Moroccan harbour project free of charge, are apparently unwilling to proceed with construction except on cash terms; six projected Soviet aid projects in Ceylon have been cancelled "because reasonable progress had not been made to justify their retention in the schedule"; the Indian Minister of State for Irrigation and Power recently admitted the prospect of a decrease in the supply of Soviet power-generating equipment needed for the Indian Third Five Year Plan; although the UAR is still seeking over \$150 million for its current development plan, UAR-Soviet economic talks were recently concluded in Moscow without any hint of additional credits from the Soviet Union; the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba recently told the Canadian Ambassador in Havana that the Soviet Union had difficulty in meeting Cuban short-term requirements; and there have been some reports of Communist officials privately advocating economic ties with the West as a solution for the problems of the underdeveloped countries. While individually these developments and reports may not seem important, together they strongly suggest that a new trend is in fact underway and it is particularly interesting that this should be so at a time when new western aid programmes, of which the Alliance for Progress is only one example, are expanding.

4. Secondly, there are new signs of Soviet disenchchantment with the leaders of the new nations. The April issue of the theoretical journal *Communist and Khrushchev*, in a speech in Sofia on 19 May, have both attacked the national bourgeoisie. The Khrushchev speech implied that national bourgeois leaders were drawing too close to non-communist countries, that communists had a duty to agitate against their wrongheadedness, that Asian and African socialism was not the right kind and that, if the uncommitted leaders persisted in their follies, they would have to be overthrown. A recent Soviet article on the underdeveloped countries abandoned the traditional Marxist analysis in which class structure is the factor which determines a country's policies, implying instead that the only criterion of a country's progressiveness is its international alignment. Professor Potokhin of the African Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences has apparently been disappointed by the difficulty of fitting African facts into Marxist theory and has modified many of his earlier rigid concepts. There are other examples, but for the present purpose it is sufficient to note that Soviet thought about the underdeveloped countries has moved away from the confident technical and theoretical analyses which, a year or two ago, demonstrated the inevitability of the progression to socialism and the enlargement of the "world socialist system".

5. Thirdly, a regional analysis of Soviet programmes suggests that there is ample justification for a reappraisal of Soviet policies on pragmatic grounds. Soviet aid in many areas was extended at a moment of maximum anti-westernism but subsequent to the receipt of Soviet credits relations of the recipients with the West have improved. In the Middle East, the UAR and Iraq have both modified the strongly anti-western attitudes they assumed during the crises which offered the Bloc their first opportunities. What seemed at the time like a promising political endeavour has with the years become a demanding technical task without

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tangible evidence of gratitude. The UAR has accepted large western credits and shows no sign of modifying its attitude toward indigenous communists. In Iraq, the West if not popular, is no longer the universal whipping boy and communism has been contained, at least for the time being.

6. In Africa, the Bloc aid programme has also suffered some recent setbacks. Guinea has sought US aid and has modified its attitude towards the Brazzaville states, Sékou Touré having made it abundantly clear that his Marxism has little connection with the Moscow version and that he will tolerate no political interference. In Ghana, six Soviet IL-18's stand idle at Accra airport, the Bui project has reportedly been cancelled and the Ghanaian Chiefs of Staff have been singularly unimpressed by the prospect of Soviet military aid. In other key states such as Nigeria and Ethiopia the Bloc has made little impression.

7. In Latin America, the Cuban revolution seemed at first to present great opportunities to the Bloc. At present, however, the Bloc commitment in Cuba amounts to about \$600 million, including probable commodity credits, but the Cuban economy is still operating far below its pre-revolutionary standards. The prospect of a communist example for other Latin American states seems more remote than the possibility of a continued monument to the folly of the Castro regime. The problems are manifold - the disruption of sugar production and the sugar market, the drastic fall in foreign exchange earnings, the inexperience of the Cuban planners, the indifference and indolence of the work force, the inadequacy of Bloc technicians in the Cuban environment, the shortage of consumer goods, the problems of distance and the unsuitability of Bloc products are some of the more important. Basically, however, Bloc troubles have derived from their unfamiliarity with the problems of dealing with a relatively highly developed Latin American state which has been cut off from most of its natural regional associations. The Soviet Ambassador has been recalled and the Soviet Government is faced with the need to make a major economic effort to bring Cuba back to pre-revolutionary standards - the problems of initiating new economic growth are even greater.

8. While the Bloc has been technically quite successful in Asia, there is recent evidence that some Indian projects are subject to serious delays and difficulties; the Soviet programme in Ceylon has been curtailed; the Soviet-Burmese programme has been cancelled; and economic development planning has proceeded very slowly in Indonesia - the only country where there has been a major resurgence of anti-western feeling.

9. Fourthly, there is reason to believe that the Soviet authorities are only beginning to take the measure of Western economic power. They appear to view with increasing dismay the growing economic solidarity of the western world and the evolution of larger non-communist economic groupings. Recent attacks on the participation of underdeveloped countries in western "foreign-currency pools", the Common Market and other special economic arrangements seem to reflect Soviet worries in this respect.

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10. This anxiety is not ill-founded. Ninety-five per cent of the capital flowing into the underdeveloped countries comes from non-communist sources and ninety-two per cent of the trade of these countries is with other non-communist states. The virtual non-existence of the rouble as an international currency makes it difficult for the Soviet Union to offer benefits comparable with those offered by, for example, membership in the sterling area. Basically autarchic Soviet trade policies and the deliberate restriction of Soviet consumer demand also preclude the benefits which former colonies derive from association with western groups.

11. It has been estimated by the UN Economic Commission for Europe that the total trade turnover of Eastern Europe (the Soviet Bloc) in 1980 will be about \$80 billion or equal to Western Europe's trade turnover in 1958. At that time the underdeveloped countries will be exporting about \$70 billion worth of goods annually. North America, Western Europe and Japan will be taking about \$20 billion of this in foods, raw materials and fuels alone - not including manufactures. The Soviet Bloc could take as much as \$5-6 billion, including manufactured goods to the value of \$1½-2 billion. But, as the ECE report points out, it will be necessary for the Bloc "to start very soon to adjust their development policies so as to provide for a much wider international division of labour if their potentialities as a long-term market for the developing countries are to be realized in full".

12. Fifthly, there is evidence of serious economic problems within the Bloc. These lie beyond the scope of this paper and it is perhaps sufficient to note that the Bloc, particularly the Soviet, authorities face difficult investment decisions if they are to meet adequately their policy objectives in agriculture, defence, industrial growth and consumer welfare. In addition, Bloc requests for Western credits and Soviet gold sales suggest continuing foreign exchange difficulties. It seems reasonable to suppose that in this situation pressures for a curtailment of foreign aid might be substantial and that the possible rewards might be more carefully assessed than in the past.

13. Both the broad pattern outlined above and the detailed evidence suggest that Soviet foreign aid policies are being subjected to a searching reassessment and that they may be subject to radical change. It seems unlikely, however, that such a reassessment could lead to a sudden or total abandonment of aid because of the disastrous effect this might have on the image of the Soviet Union in non-communist countries. Nevertheless, economic aid policies are likely to be pursued with more discretion and with a good deal less exuberant optimism as internal problems in the Bloc multiply and the economic strength of the Western World becomes more apparent in Moscow. In sharp contrast to this prospect, the Soviet Government has recently given renewed emphasis to its military assistance programmes. This military bias in Soviet aid may, in view of the considerations outlined in this paper, become even more pronounced.



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(Enclosure SECRET)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 1145-1 (JIC)

CSC 1779-2 (JIC)

9 Jul 62

Ottawa, Ontario

→ G.K. Grande, Esq.,
Dept. of External Affairs.

DNI
DMI
DAI
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RCMP
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CB NRC

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SINO-SOVIET FOREIGN
POLICIES

Enclosure: (1) JIC(AUST)(62)10 FINAL
dated May, 1962 on the above
subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information and
would appreciate receiving members' comments by 23 Jul 62.

JUL 10

Enc.

AM/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS (no enclosure)

(A. Malysheff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.




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(Enclosure **SECRET**)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1322-1 (JIC)

28 June, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario



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**SOVIET INTENTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO BERLIN**

Enclosure: (1) US SNIE 11-13-62 dated
13 Jun 62 on the above subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for information and I
would appreciate members' comments by 17 Jul 62.

(A. Malysheff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.

Enc.

AM/2-5459/1c

cc: CCOS

→ G.K. Grande, Esq.,
Dept. of External Affairs.

JIS

(no enclosure)

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(Enclosure SECRET)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1322-1 (JIC)

26 June, 1962.

Ottawa

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY

Reference: (a) CSC 7-17, CSC 1322-1 (JIC)
dated 12 June, 1962.

Enclosure: (1) Canadian JIC comments on
US NIE 11-6-62 dated 23 May
62 on the above subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.

Enc.

AM/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS
SOJIR
SOCI
JICLO(W) (for your personal information only)

(A. Malysheff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.

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CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1322-1 (JIC)

26 June, 1962.

Comments on US NIE 11-6-62 dated 23 May, 1962
"Trends in Soviet Science and Technology"

DNI: DNI is in general agreement with this estimate.

DMI: DMI considers that this NIE provides a very sound review of the subject and agrees with the assessments contained therein.

DAI: Generally, this appears to be a concise, well reasoned summary which covers the main trends of development in Soviet technology.

DAI has the following minor comments to make:

- (a) Page 5 - para 19 - 1st sentence. It is a long standing view that the Soviets have a cautious, conservative approach to aircraft design because new generation aircraft appear to follow predecessors in the form of minor improvements known as the "step-by-step" process. This seems to DAI, the embodiment of empirical testing and building upon what is already proven and reliable. It may be that, on occasions, Soviet designs are put into service too quickly and apparently with inadequate "service trials" but this is the direct result of relying on the previous, similar and proven, models.
- (b) Page 5 - para 19 - 2nd sentence. DAI believes that to merely state that Soviet Air Forces are being extensively equipped with a variety of air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles, without commenting on the effectiveness of these systems, serves little or no useful purpose.
- (c) Page 6 - para 20 - 1st sentence. DAI agrees that the Soviets will devote substantial scientific effort in attempting to improve the performance characteristics of weapons and equipment already developed.
- (d) Page 6 - para 20 - last sentence. DAI has seen no evidence which suggests that the USSR has a programme for the military use of space.

XA, JIB, DSI, RCMP, CB NRC: No comments.

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COPY NO 23

CANADIAN JIC 437/1(62)

20 June 1962

(Supersedes JIC 354/2(60))

SOVIET LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION

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CANADIAN JIC 437/1(62)

20 June 1962

SOVIET LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION

OBJECT

1. The purpose of this paper is to review the major factors which may affect the courses of action of the Soviet government over the next five years, to examine the various means of action at the disposal of the Soviet government and to suggest how these may be applied in various regions.

CONCLUSIONS

2. The factors affecting Soviet policy are becoming increasingly complex as a result of the problems posed by the nature of modern war; the emergence of Communist China as a major power and the challenge it poses to Moscow's leadership of the Communist bloc and movement; the social and economic evolution of the Soviet Union itself; and developments in the non-Communist world. These factors are considered in detail in paragraphs 7 to 33 below; some of them offer the U.S.S.R. new opportunities for expansion but others at the same time limit its freedom of action.

3. The Soviet government has at its disposal a variety of instruments with which to extend its influence. These include: its military establishment, its diplomatic service, its trade and aid activities, its propaganda machine, its clandestine agencies, and the economic, scientific and cultural achievements of the Soviet state. These instruments and the manner in which they are likely to be employed are discussed in paragraphs 34 to 73.

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4. We conclude that the primary threat to the security of the Soviet state lies in the possibility of a global war. This threat will lead the Soviet government, while maintaining at least deterrent forces, to continue efforts over the next five years in search of at least partial settlement of important issues to its advantage, including the Berlin question, and perhaps some aspects of disarmament as well. We also conclude that a parallel long-term threat to the Soviet Union's supremacy in the bloc and in the world Communist movement (and therefore to its international position and influence) is posed by China. The threat from China, though a long-term one in view of China's own present limitations, nevertheless poses the immediate problem of the steps to be taken to eliminate it or, failing this, to contain it. The Chinese problem is therefore bound to divert some of the attention which the U.S.S.R. could otherwise devote more completely to the pursuit of the solution on Soviet terms of the problems arising from Soviet competition with the West.

5. The personality of Khrushchev and the way in which he views this Soviet competition with the West is another determining factor to take into account in our assessment of Soviet policy in the next five years. There appears to be little doubt that Khrushchev is a genuine and fervent believer in Communism. But this belief is accompanied by an urgent desire to increase the influence of the Soviet Union, which desire seems to lead him to press on all fronts at once: internally, he is pressing Soviet society to reform and raise the national potential ever higher; externally, he is pressing the western powers to agree to a Berlin settlement on Soviet terms; he is also

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pressing the Chinese to give up their challenge and return to the path of Soviet-defined orthodoxy. Khrushchev seems to be working to a timetable governed by the triple consideration of his own life expectancy, the growth of western (and especially German) military and economic strength, and the growth of the Chinese challenge to Moscow's leadership of international Communism. Therefore, in order to ensure the future greatness of the Soviet Union and of Soviet Communism against this triple risk, he is likely to continue to keep up the pressures he has generated, internally and externally, relying on the expanding Soviet economic, scientific and military power, in order to tip the present balance of power in his favour and make Soviet influence preponderant and decisive in world affairs.

6. The effect of Khrushchev's death, if it should occur during the time period of this study, is not likely to be such as to modify the substance of our discussion and conclusions if Khrushchev succeeds in transferring power reasonably smoothly to a man like Koslov whom he seems to be grooming for the succession. If, on the other hand, there should be a struggle for power more or less like the one which followed the death of Stalin, the consequences are more difficult to assess. It could conceivably have an inhibiting effect on Soviet foreign policy, entailing for instance some reduction in bold initiative and pressures. By and large, however, we believe that the realities of the international situation and the various pressures at work internally in the Soviet Union will continue to develop along present lines so that Soviet courses of action are not likely to be dramatically altered one way or another.

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FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION

7. We consider that the Soviet government aspires to the maximum extension of the "world socialist order" in which it believes by doctrine, and to the expansion of its wealth, influence and power, as the first and leading socialist country in the world. National expansion is pursued partly for itself and partly as the fulfillment of the national responsibility for the success of the international socialist objective; it is also in line with the traditional preoccupation with the integrity and the safety of the Russian state and territory. Our problem is to assess what, in the next five years, it will judge to be reasonable goals and what methods it will employ to achieve them. Such an assessment is complicated by the fact that, although the Soviet Union is more powerful than ever before in its history, there are very real limitations to the use of its power in the pursuit of its objectives. The first limitation stems from the nature of modern war, its influence on Soviet strategic thinking and on the possible use of Soviet military power. A second limitation derives from the difficulties of extraterritorial control which have arisen with Yugoslavia's successful escape from the Soviet orbit. These difficulties have been compounded by the emergence of China as an independent Communist country with an independent view of the "world socialist order" and of the policies and tactics best suited to achieve it. A third limitation results from the social, political and economic evolution of the Soviet Union internally. A fourth and last limitation stems from the Soviet view of the non-Communist world and of its intentions towards the Soviet and other Communist states.

Nature of Modern War and Soviet Strategic Thinking

8. Current Soviet courses of action are undoubtedly limited by an appreciation of the effects of modern war. The Soviet government has been successful in creating a strong force of medium-range bombers and missiles, a small force of heavy bombers and long-range missiles, a force of missile-launching submarines, and a stockpile of nuclear weapons. In the next five years it will build up an increasing capability in all ranges of guided missiles, including ICBM's. The ability of these forces to inflict casualties and damage on Europe and North America will constitute, in Soviet eyes, a deterrent against the initiation by the Western powers of global war and, in addition, would enable the Soviet government in certain circumstances to attempt a preemptive attack.

9. It must be clear to the Soviet government, from its knowledge of western capabilities and from its own nuclear tests, that a general war would result in the devastation of the Soviet Union on a scale vastly greater than that suffered during the Second World War. Although such a global war might be resorted to in the most desperate circumstances, it cannot be considered effective as an instrument of policy nor is the Soviet Union likely to carry any of its policies to the point of limited war if this involves unacceptable risks of a major conflict.

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As a matter of fact, present Soviet strategic thinking, as reflected in published material, seems to preclude the possibility -- and even to exclude the concept -- of limited war involving Soviet forces, by emphasizing that such a war would rapidly escalate into a major conflict automatically involving the use of the full range of nuclear weapons.

10. In itself, Soviet strategic thinking, as reflected in Soviet publications, would seem to be relatively unsophisticated. The possession of an effective deterrent would permit the concept of a retaliatory strike as well as that of a preemptive strike in circumstances where Soviet leaders would be convinced that a Western attack was imminent. Soviet strategic thinking seems to focus almost entirely on these two concepts and, as we have just said, it telescopes local and global wars by insisting that the former would inevitably lead to the latter. At first sight this would appear to give a character of almost rudimentary simplicity to Soviet strategic thinking. At the same time, however, this is a confusing object of study because, alongside the modern military principles and views permitted by the present state of Soviet nuclear and ballistic science, there are elements of traditional Russian military doctrine as well as considerations of ideology, propaganda and psychological warfare. For instance, the Russians have, together with their modern missile, bomber and missile submarine forces, a huge army which is more in line with the traditional requirements of the defence of the open plain in western Russia and eastern Europe. There is evidence of traditional thinking in the persistence of views that war can drag on in spite of the devastating power of modern weapons and that fighting on the ground will remain necessary to the extent of requiring the traditional large army.

11. There may be an additional justification for the traditional large army in the need to maintain satellite Communist regimes which were first established in the wake of the Soviet military penetration into, and domination of, eastern Europe at the end of the last war and since. In 1960, Khrushchev launched a programme to cut down the number of troops and streamline the Soviet Army, a move which was in keeping with modern military thinking (and also worked to the benefit, in manpower, of the Soviet economy). However, in the tense situation prevailing during the second half of 1961 because of the Communist pressure on Berlin Khrushchev reversed or at least suspended this programme. It thus became apparent that a policy of pressure in central Europe was not separable from the maintenance of a large army and this requirement may continue as long as Soviet policy on Berlin and Germany continues on the present lines. On the other hand, during the later part of the period of this study, increases in the Soviet I.C.B.M. capability, combined with improvements in the flexibility and mobility of Soviet field forces, may permit the continuance of a bold policy at the same time as reductions in manpower. It may also be that, as their I.C.B.M. capability against

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North America increases, the Soviet authorities may become ready to envisage the possibility of limited war involving Soviet forces in peripheral areas. In the meantime, however, the Soviet insistence that limited or local war would inevitably lead to global war seems to have less to do with strategic thinking as such than with the requirements of Soviet psychological warfare. In other words, the Russians deliberately refuse to distinguish between global and local wars in order to increase the psychological value of the Soviet deterrent, so that under the umbrella of this deterrent, bold political action can be taken, as in Berlin. They may also hope to dissuade the west from limited military engagements near Soviet or satellite territory and to discourage the buildup of western European conventional forces.

12. The only kind of war which the Russians at present seem willing to envisage and support is the war of so called "national liberation". This support is, however, in the nature of ideological and propaganda encouragement to those fighting against colonialism. It is a safe concept inasmuch as it implies little or no direct Soviet military involvement. Its safety is further ensured by the cautious way in which the Russians have so far been applying it, for instance when it involved a major western power, like France in Algeria, or when the Western commitment was heavy, as in Laos.

Problems of Extraterritorial Control

13. While the continued Yugoslav defiance of Soviet authority and maintenance of a heretical Communist doctrine was an irritant to the U.S.S.R. it could still be tolerated as a minor epiphenomenon as long as the rest of the Communist bloc retained its homogeneity under Soviet leadership. Of greater consequence however was the emergence of China as a major Communist power with independent, divergent views on Communist doctrine, policy and tactics. China's challenge to the Russians is fundamental because the Chinese contend that the Soviet government, under Khrushchev, is pursuing policies which are un-Marxist-Leninist and which can only lead to the undermining of Communist bloc solidarity and of international Communism to the benefit of the "imperialist capitalist" world. Disagreement between the two has been apparent for some time over China's Great Leap Forward programme and its communes, over points of doctrine such as the non-inevitability of war, the extent and form of possible peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev's policy of Soviet contacts with western leaders, the tactics to be employed in promoting Communism in the non-Communist world, and the problem of dealing with governments like those of India and Egypt which oppose Communism internally and even suppress it. The problem of authority over the world Communist movement was also a contentious one in 1960 and was not settled at the Moscow Conference of Communist parties in November of the same year which resulted in a purely formal compromise for the sake of showing the outside world a facade of unity.

14. Throughout this phase of the quarrel, the Chinese kept up a steady campaign against Yugoslav "revisionism" with the implicit object of criticizing

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Khrushchev's own "revisionism" and toleration of Yugoslav heresies as endangering the whole international Communist movement. Criticism thus remained indirect and the dispute, in spite of much ideological intransigence, did not exceed the bounds of a family quarrel unlikely to break up the family or affect its practical dealings with the remainder of the world. Indeed, the theoretical claim that, under the Marxist-Leninist scheme of things, there are no grounds for irreconcilable national antagonisms (for which capitalism alone is held responsible) provides strong ideological motivation for avoiding an open split because a split would expose the hollowness of the claim. On the other hand, Marxist-Leninist ideology leaves no room for fundamental divergencies: errors must either be retracted or result in expulsion from the bloc. This was feasible with a small country like Yugoslavia but is more difficult with a major power like China. In this case the dispute could theoretically go on until history or a change of leadership in either country proves the other one right. This is the attitude which the Chinese appear to be taking, standing plainly on established and proven doctrine largely because, in the relatively early stage of their revolutionary process, they have more to gain by insisting on the strict application of the original militant doctrine and in this they are supported by many of the non-bloc Communist parties who also have more to gain by revolutionary than by evolutionary methods. On the other hand, Khrushchev, at the head of a more evolved state, is confronted with a set of more complex national and international circumstances requiring practical adjustments and innovations. The onus of proving that these adjustments and innovations are warranted is on him, not on Mao. In this sense, Khrushchev is in more of a hurry than Mao, particularly since, being unable to rule by Stalinist methods (see paragraphs 20 to 26 below), he is compelled to de-Stalinize in order to overcome the routine and conservatism of a party and state bureaucracy which had entrenched itself under Stalin and had become more interested in self-continuation, to the detriment of the solutions required to the problems posed by an evolving society and economy. Khrushchev is thus less in a position to wait upon history to prove him right against Mao because of the domestic factors of resistance to the wind of change, which wind he feels compelled both to follow and to direct along appropriate channels compatible with the party control he still has to retain. Most of the satellites have adapted well enough to Khrushchev's style with the exception of the more backward Albania where more primitive social and economic conditions, combined with fear of Yugoslavia and consequently of Moscow's policy towards the latter, have caused Hoxha to strengthen his long established Stalin-type dictatorship, to purge his opponents and would-be Khrushchev supporters ruthlessly, and to defy Khrushchev as a consequence, thanks of course to China's support.

15. Internal and external factors therefore combined to motivate Khrushchev's attack, at the 22nd Party Congress last October, against Stalinism, the anti-party group of

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Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich, Albania and, by implication, China. The attack on Albania was followed by the rupture of Soviet-Albanian diplomatic relations in November. The immediate Chinese reaction was to come out in support of Albania and to express their defiance of Khrushchev through Chou-en-Lai's symbolic laying of a wreath, during the Party Congress, to "the great Marxist-Leninist, J.V. Stalin"...

16. The gap between Moscow and Peking is now very real and the question is whether the two will come to an open split. Since the Chinese have taken up the position of defenders of the doctrine and since they are capable of surviving, albeit at a near subsistence level without bloc trade or aid, we believe they can afford to wait for history to prove Khrushchev wrong and therefore that they will not take the initiative in provoking an open split (which does not mean that they will remain passive; on the contrary, they will do all in their power to foster pro-Chinese factions in non-bloc parties, etc.). Such an initiative is more likely to come from Khrushchev since it is he who is compelled to move and innovate and thus to widen the gap between Moscow and Peking. There is, however, a difference between purging a national party of one's rivals and purging an international movement of an entire national party. This could be done if an opposition could be counted on to replace the leadership of the expelled party but this does not seem to be the case in China on present evidence at least. The expulsion could still be attempted if Khrushchev could count on putting the Chinese in quarantine and keeping their influence in check within the bloc and the movement; but Peking's influence in non-bloc parties seems sufficiently strong, especially in Asian Communist parties, to prevent their being expelled because this would mean splitting the international Communist movement as well as splitting various national parties into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese wings.

17. The consequences upon the movement as a vehicle for the attainment of the "world socialist order" would be such as to make both Moscow and Peking pause and refrain from an open split. Either side has more to gain by eroding the other's position in the movement in order to achieve leadership of the whole of it. We therefore expect the current ideological war of attrition to continue during the foreseeable future in Communist front organizations such as the World Peace Council, the W.F.T.U. and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. We believe however that Khrushchev would not hesitate to cut off the Chinese if this were required by the Soviet national interest, or to save his own position, or again to save the Soviet position in the international Communist movement. For their part the Chinese can be expected to exploit any national or international difficulty in which Khrushchev could find himself. In particular a Soviet failure to bring Albania to heel after having gone to the lengths of breaking off diplomatic relations or a Soviet failure to score off the West in Berlin or on any other disputed aspect of East-West relations is likely to complicate Khrushchev's position vis-a-vis the Chinese as well as within the Communist bloc. It is also bound to be used by China to encourage national parties

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to defect or at least to refrain from endorsing the Soviet line.

18. As far as the West is concerned, the pressure of the Chinese challenge could cause Khrushchev to move further and further along the path of peaceful coexistence and compromise with the West in order to show some success for his policies. That, however, is likely to stimulate conservative resistance in the U.S.S.R. and weaken Khrushchev's position. Either in combination with this conservative resistance or by itself, Chinese pressure could force Khrushchev to take risks, e.g., in Berlin, in order to prove the correctness of his policies. However, we do not believe that Khrushchev would in fact allow himself to be goaded by Chinese criticisms into increasing the risk of war with the West but that his capacity for bold political action might increase, especially as the Soviet I.C.B.M. capability increases.

19. It remains, therefore, that whether or not the Russians and the Chinese reach an open split (which a common enmity towards the non-Communist world should prevent, at least for the immediate future), the immediate effects of Sino-Soviet differences will be on the international Communist movement whose unity will be affected and in which the existence of two poles of attraction will give non-bloc national parties greater room for manoeuvre and facilitate national and/or regional deviations. Among the bloc parties, the Russians could be expected to tighten their control on those situated on their periphery, i.e., in eastern Europe. There could be a struggle for control of the Mongolian, North Korean and North Vietnamese parties, with China being favoured by geographical proximity in the case of North Vietnam and to a lesser extent, North Korea, and by the inclination of these two countries to favour "Chinese" militancy in order to achieve control of their respective southern halves. In the case of Mongolia, the Soviet Union appears to be firmly entrenched for the time being. Moreover, Mongolian fears of absorption by China will likely result in policies which are more inclined towards the Soviet Union than towards China.

Soviet Domestic Problems

20. Khrushchev enjoys supreme but not absolute power as did Stalin who ruled from the centre, issuing orders to a monolithic and compliant government and party bureaucracy, and relying ultimately for their execution on the terror of the Secret Police. As none of Stalin's successors at the time could, or would, be allowed by his colleagues to rule in the same way, the Secret Police was quickly brought under close party control and collective leadership was decreed. In the ensuing conflicts of personalities and policies, Khrushchev finally won out in 1957 by taking the unprecedented step of appealing, over the heads of the majority of his colleagues in the Praesidium, to the Party Central Committee which then endorsed his views and gave him supreme authority. Since then, Khrushchev has restored to the duly recomposed Praesidium its policy-making functions and reorganized the Party apparatus but he has also resorted to various practices including personal

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appearances and travels throughout the Soviet Union in an effort to enlist more dynamic support and to tap unused resources of initiative in the implementation of his policies. He has put the emphasis on stimuli and incentives rather than terror and he has made the Party his main agency of political promotion, rejuvenating it, bringing new blood into it and instituting statutory personnel turnover in order to overcome the inertia and conservatism of elements entrenched since Stalin's days and more interested in self-perpetuation than dynamic service.

21. The requirements of an expanding and increasingly complex economy have combined with the conditions and manner in which Khrushchev achieved power to prevent a return to Stalin's crude methods of rule. It is his understanding of these requirements which has made Khrushchev the leader that he is today; but in his efforts at decentralizing the administration, at reinvigorating the party and government bureaucracies, at delegating responsibility--not, of course, for policy-making, but only for implementing the policy and carrying out the plan--he is encountering opposition. This opposition does not take the form of a coherent and organized group of critics capable of challenging him and of providing an alternative government. What confronts Khrushchev is rather the obstructionism and the resistance to change of functionaries whose long years of compliant, obedient service and experience make them fearful of innovation and resentful of activist new functionaries. They yearn for the good old days and the tested methods of work to which they had grown accustomed and owed their positions.

22. It is against the inertia of this legacy of Stalin's days that Khrushchev is attempting to carry out a continuing and terrorless revolution from above. This explains to a substantial degree the emphasis on de-Stalinization and the campaign against the anti-party group of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich whose conservatism (especially in the case of the first and third) makes them a logical choice as whipping boys and scapegoats for the continuing shortcomings of the regime. Beyond this however is the fact of continuing shortages in housing and food, two prime incentives in an increasingly industrialized and urbanized society. Housing last year fell short of the plan by more than fifteen per cent and the ever lagging Soviet agriculture still fails to deliver foodstuffs in the required quantity and variety, especially meat and dairy products.

23. In general, two economic factors will shape the U.S.S.R.'s internal and external courses of action in the immediate future. These are the rate of growth achieved in the economy and the disposition of the increases in production.

24. With respect to the first, it seems probable that the Seven Year Plan industrial targets will be achieved and that industrial output will continue to grow rapidly for the rest of this decade. Relative stagnation in agriculture may well depress the rate of growth of per capita income but, unless agricultural difficulties directly affect the government's capacity to concentrate resources on industrial development, that stagnation is unlikely to slow down the growth of Soviet economic power.

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25. As far as distribution is concerned, this increased power represents a growing capacity to intervene in areas of the world outside the immediate control of the U.S.S.R. with economic and military aid and to sustain a larger defence burden. However, two features of the Soviet economy are likely to inhibit the regime from devoting too large a proportion of growing industrial output to these ends. Firstly, the nature of Soviet central planning assumes that the economy (together with the Satellites) will remain essentially self sufficient. This autarky has prevented trade outside the Bloc from assuming more than a peripheral importance in development plans and there is little reason to expect that the Soviet government will change this feature of the economy to any extent. Secondly, the Soviet populace is itself experiencing a "revolution of expectations" which may well compel the government to devote a larger proportion of increased production to satisfy demands for an improved standard of living.

26. Khrushchev's attempts to meet this "revolution of expectations" has aroused the resistance of conservative elements who fear for the old, established priority in favor of heavy industry. There also appears to be competition between the investment requirements of a pro-consumer domestic economy and those of the large military programme necessary to support bold foreign policy initiatives. Khrushchev's effort in 1960 to rely on modern weapons and institute reductions in the traditional large army to the benefit of the domestic labour force appear to have met with the resistance of conservative elements in Soviet military circles. These elements may have used the increased tension over Berlin in 1961 as a pretext to force a reversal of the troop reduction policy. There may thus be limitations to the extent to which Khrushchev can fulfill his promises of a better life at home at the same time as his promises of political successes abroad (even while domestic prosperity is supposed to help extend Soviet influence abroad by making the Soviet way of life more attractive--but this is only one of the paradoxes of Soviet policy). His conservative critics can reproach him on both counts but he does not seem to be at a loss for schemes and initiatives which enable him to remain one step ahead of his critics.

Soviet Image of the West and "Peaceful Co-existence"

27. The Soviet image of non-Communist states and the effect of non-Communist actions on Soviet policy are probably the most difficult to assess of all the relevant factors. Communist ideology forms the intellectual basis of the Soviet view of the world and a guide to the political actions of the Soviet government, but the particular focus of the latter's view and interpretation of ideological precepts have varied greatly. The value of Communist literature in predicting the Soviet future is therefore limited. Communist precepts are interpreted and changed in such a way as to ensure the survival of the Soviet government. On the one hand, there seems to be a basic and genuine faith in the spirit of the Communist system and in its ability to win the competition with the West in conditions of "peaceful co-existence". On the other hand

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Soviet leaders show no lack of tactical opportunism and no scrupulousness in taking such short cuts to extend Soviet influence as they may find in either or both the weakness of the Western position and the advantages procured by a Soviet success, e.g., in the field of science. Thus in 1961 while a new American President was hobbled by the Cuban problem and while the Russians were scoring an important "first" with Gagarin's space flight, underlined by Titov's subsequent multi-orbit flight, the U.S.S.R. judged the circumstances favorable to a renewal of pressure on the Western powers in Berlin. It also tried to capitalize upon and exploit the widespread fear of war, when it resumed nuclear testing and resorted to multi-megaton bomb rattling in the hope of obtaining a Berlin settlement on its terms. Should Soviet military power be substantially increased by a scientific breakthrough, this would certainly be exploited to the full and, depending on the degree of immunity to itself resulting from the breakthrough, the Soviet government could make war, limited or global, an instrument of foreign policy. However, a scientific breakthrough would be unlikely to be implemented during the time period covered by this paper. The two current doctrines-- (a) that war between the Communist and capitalist states is not unavoidable, and (b) that violent revolution is not an essential step in the creation of a Communist state-- could then easily be reversed without posing any major ideological problem to the Soviet authorities. Barring a scientific breakthrough or a development (e.g., a revolution in a satellite) likely to upset the present balance of power, the Russians can be expected to adhere to the concept of "peaceful co-existence."

28. This concept stems from the concern to avoid a war which might destroy Soviet achievements. The Soviet government is probably convinced that the United States will not deliberately initiate war against the Soviet Union within the next few years. At the same time, it may well be fearful that ultimately the danger of western preemptive action will become more serious. Even if it judges that the Soviet deterrent will be effective in the long term, it is probably concerned that the elimination of all communist regimes, or at least the maximum erosion of Soviet power, is the ultimate western aim. It is doubtless anxious, therefore, to reduce and, if possible, eliminate those problems and weapons which pose a threat to the Soviet system and to place the emphasis in its struggle with the West on fields where its technical achievements, its increasing economic power, its better discipline and its ability to exploit major political issues can be used with the minimum of risk.

29. The concept of "peaceful co-existence" is designed to give the Soviet authorities the freedom to compete with the Western powers by any means they choose, short of war. The object is to remove all remnants of colonialism and help in the emancipation (not only political but also economic) of newly independent countries in such a way that the U.S.S.R. will become their champion and protector. In other words, what is sought in those countries is the replacement of Western by Soviet influence. "Peaceful co-existence" does not only mean direct competition between the Soviet bloc and the Western powers for the future alignment of those countries; it also means competition between Communist socialism and capitalism within the various newly independent, underdeveloped countries, so that their domestic structure will be modified to the

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disadvantage of the West and to the benefit of the expanding "world socialist order".

30. The Soviet government is undoubtedly encouraged in its support of "peaceful co-existence" by its consciousness of the difficulties facing the Western powers in coordinating their policies and in building the kind of societies and achieving the power to which they aspire. The competition between Western trading blocs, the conflict of Western national aspirations, labour difficulties and periodic economic depressions limiting Western economic growth, and the "over-emphasis" on consumer goods and other problems, partially understood or exaggerated in the Soviet mind, doubtless provide some encouragement. Western alliances with a variety of "decadent" regimes, the apparently narrow view which the West takes of its interests and the lack of social discipline in Western societies must also occasion some optimism. There nevertheless remains a substantial fear in Soviet governing circles of unrestricted contact with Western ideas and wealth and, although the government is probably confident of its ability to enforce the necessary restrictions, any relaxation is likely to be closely related to the growing prestige of the Soviet system. The difficulty in determining the appropriate degree of relaxation will be complicated by the partial reliance of the Soviet regime, like most totalitarian regimes, upon the real or fancied existence of an external enemy as a justification for restraining internal pressures.

31. Apart from the foregoing considerations many developments throughout the world are to a large extent beyond the control of the Soviet government, or for that matter the control of any major power. Local forces can bring about situations which the Soviet government would wish to avoid but which may oblige it to adopt some positive course of action. The Middle East and Laotian situations, the Albanian problem and, in 1956, the Hungarian uprising are all examples of situations evolving according to a logic of their own and requiring a variety of Soviet reactions.

32. In short, the Soviet government must assert its increasing wealth and power in the face of increasingly complex problems. Like the Western powers, its first requirement is to avoid a war which would destroy its achievements; its second is to create an atmosphere in which it can freely employ its political and economic strength. Against this background, the decisions it makes and its specific short-term intentions depend to a large extent upon the personality of Khrushchev.

33. There appears to be little doubt that Khrushchev is a genuine and fervent believer in Communism. But this belief is accompanied by an urgent desire to increase the influence of the Soviet Union, which desire seems to lead him to press on all fronts at once: internally, he is pressing Soviet society to reform and raise the national potential ever higher; externally, he is pressing the Western powers to agree to a Berlin settlement on Soviet terms; he is also pressing the Chinese to give up their challenge and return to the path of Soviet-defined orthodoxy. Khrushchev seems to be working to a timetable governed by the triple consideration of his own life expectancy, the growth of Western (and especially German) military and economic strength, and the growth of the Chinese challenge to Moscow's leadership of

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international Communism. Therefore, in order to ensure the future greatness of the Soviet Union and of Soviet Communism against this triple risk, he is likely to continue to keep up the pressures he has generated, internally and externally, relying on the expanding Soviet economic, scientific and military power, in order to tip the present balance of power in his favour and make Soviet influence preponderant and decisive in world affairs.

INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET POWER

34. The Soviet government has at its disposal substantially the same means of action as the Western powers. These include military forces, a diplomatic service, a propaganda machine and a clandestine service, as well as the economic, scientific and cultural achievements of the state. However, the manner in which the Soviet government has chosen to use these instruments has in the past differed substantially from Western practice. The following paragraphs contain a general review of how we expect the Soviet Union to employ its means of action in the future. This review is not intended to imply that each asset is employed in isolation from the others. On the contrary, all means of action are closely interrelated as, for example, in the case of Khrushchev's proposal for the diversion to underdeveloped countries of funds made available by disarmament. This proposal has strategic, economic, diplomatic and propaganda implications.

Military

35. For the reasons set out in paragraphs 8-10 above, we do not believe that the Soviet Union will use its present military power in the deliberate initiation of a major war. Nor do we believe that it is capable of developing, within the next five years, a defence establishment which could prevent the destruction of Soviet society in such a war, although its advances in anti-missile missile technology will enhance its capability in this regard.

36. Accordingly, the Soviet government will, in our judgment, seek to avoid the overt employment of its forces or those of the European satellites in local situations where there is an inherent danger of conflict with the West, subject to the proviso that Soviet strategic planners might develop, and perhaps put to the test, a concept of limited war later during the coming five years. Depending on the evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Soviet authorities can be expected either to restrain the Chinese Communist government or to withhold any military assistance to it (which would also have a restraining effect). Nevertheless, circumstances could arise in which the Soviet government felt, as a result of Western disinterest, indecision or weakness, that it could act with impunity. Alternatively, it might feel forced to act to defend what it considered to be vital interests in a situation where the Western powers had either taken or were about to take forceful action. The danger of such situations occurring is greatest in Germany, the Middle East, Korea, Vietnam, Laos and the Taiwan Straits.

37. Within bloc territory, restraints on the use of Soviet force, although present especially in East Germany, will be far less strong. The Soviet government, while preferring other

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means, will therefore be prepared to employ the amount of force necessary to maintain pro-Soviet regimes. This is however not likely to apply in the case of the erring Albanians, in spite of the Hungarian precedent, because Albania is not contiguous to Soviet controlled territory, because Yugoslavia, which lies between the bloc and Albania, is not likely to allow the use of Soviet force which would threaten its own independence, because of the risk of a definite split with the Chinese, and because also the Soviet Union would damage its international reputation and perhaps incur the risk that NATO forces might become involved.

38. Limitations on the actual use of force do not in any sense preclude the "political" employment of the Soviet strategic striking force. It is apparent, from statements by Khrushchev and from Soviet propaganda, that the Soviet government is seeking to spread and reinforce the belief that its force can not be prevented from virtually destroying Western countries in the event of war.

Diplomatic

39. In the diplomatic field there are three approaches open to the Soviet government--conferences at the summit, public debate and traditional diplomacy. We expect that, as in the past, all three approaches will be carefully coordinated in an effort to further Soviet aims. This careful coordination does not rule out the possibility that Soviet national interest will dictate some decisions such as that of resuming nuclear tests in 1961, contrary to the public debate stimulated and exploited by the Russians on, for instance in that year, the dangers of nuclear testing. It is apparent, however, that direct negotiation between political leaders continues to be most attractive to Khrushchev. Summit conferences have obvious advantages from his point of view. Apart from offering increased possibilities of genuine progress, they enhance his personal position, they are easier to control since they involve no delegation of authority, they eliminate "obstructive" elements at lower levels, and they offer greater opportunities to make propaganda gains and to place the blame for failure on the West. Public diplomacy, particularly in the United Nations, offers the Soviet government the opportunity to project the desired image of itself, to marshal neutral forces behind particular Soviet positions and to develop situations which will embarrass the West. Khrushchev will also probably continue to speak freely to unofficial Western visitors, as a supplementary means of publicizing Soviet "reasonableness" without any obligation to act. Traditional diplomacy is likely to be used primarily in a supporting role (like the Rusk-Gromyko, Gromyko-Thompson and Rusk-Dobrynin talks) to fill in time between higher level or Summit meetings, to conclude agreements on marginal or highly technical problems and to supplement the general line of Soviet foreign policy.

Propaganda

40. The propaganda apparatus of the Soviet government differs radically from the information services of Western countries. Whereas Western facilities are largely restricted to

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projecting a favourable image of the West and to the objective reporting of foreign news, Soviet propaganda is designed to achieve specific political results. For example, propaganda aimed at certain countries like Iran is designed to discredit and embarrass the existing regimes to the extent that the latter would be obliged to make political concessions in order to escape further criticism.

41. Propaganda is used both strategically, in pursuance of broad objectives, and tactically, to achieve limited local results. It is therefore not necessarily consistent in detail, although anomalies are carefully confined to the particular languages and areas in which they are intended to be effective.

42. It is also used defensively to reduce the effect of Western statements and to modify the impact of embarrassing Soviet actions. This defensive aspect includes the jamming of Western broadcasts, the control of travel and restrictions on foreign correspondents. Recently, the Soviet government has allowed Izvestia to print the text of an interview with President Kennedy, thus giving the Soviet readers a Western account direct from source: but subsequent press criticisms of President Kennedy's statements have tended to qualify the significance of this exercise, whose repetition would seem to depend on the extent to which the Soviet authorities expect to obtain satisfaction from the West on disputed questions.

Clandestine

43. The Soviet government has clearly demonstrated its awareness of both the value and limitations of clandestine activities in support of its aims. There is substantial evidence that it is currently seeking to modify the activities of foreign communist parties, to encourage their alliance with other and more moderate left-wing groups and to achieve for them an aura of respectability. As with propaganda, therefore, we do not regard recent changes as fundamental. A decision to revert to older methods would depend on a number of factors, the most important being the productivity of the new policies. Illegal and covert organizations for espionage are maintained in most countries.

Economic

44. The December 1960 Declaration of the Communist Parties of the World, more recent statements by Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders, a variety of articles in Soviet journals and the current activities of the Soviet Union in the underdeveloped areas all testify to the importance which the Soviet Government attaches to economic means in extending its influence throughout the world. In recent years total Sino-Soviet Bloc economic aid to the underdeveloped countries was extended at the rate of about \$1 billion per year and, although there have been no large new commitments so far in 1962, could continue at this rate or increase at least in proportion to the growth of Bloc economies. There is a renewed emphasis on military aid which continues to be concentrated in Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia and Cuba, and there are indications that Bloc trade with the underdeveloped areas will continue to increase.

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45. It is virtually inevitable that these Soviet efforts will meet with some success, that some economic development will take place under Soviet auspices, that some governments will depend on Soviet military supplies, and that Soviet markets will attract an increasing proportion of the trade of the underdeveloped areas. The Soviet government can therefore look forward with a high degree of confidence to the further growth of its influence through the development of these ties. Nevertheless, the dialogue with Nasser over the plight of local communists, the serious differences with Guinea, the undertone of dissatisfaction with Soviet aid in several countries and the apparently genuine determination of most states to avoid domination by either East or West suggest that current Soviet policies hold only the most uncertain prospects for political domination in these areas. As Soviet economic aid programmes grow their limitations as a political instrument, long familiar in the West, will become more apparent in Moscow.

46. Over the next five years this realization and the lack of any spectacular political achievements may result in Soviet policies becoming increasingly subject to criticism from those elements in the Bloc, particularly the Chinese, who favour more extreme measures. If Khrushchev is able to resist such criticism we would expect a gradual expansion of Soviet economic ties with the underdeveloped areas and the emergence of some new candidates for "national democracy" status. However, Soviet and Western influence are likely to remain in an acceptable balance as long as the Western alternative remains open in the form of active economic aid, commercial and other policies. If, on the other hand, Khrushchev is unable to resist the opposition to his policies, which we consider unlikely, Soviet actions could assume more offensive forms.

47. In contrast to the political motives of its economic activities in the underdeveloped countries, the Soviet Government will probably continue to regard its trade with the industrial nations of the West primarily as providing valuable assistance to its domestic economic development plans. It will seek to expand its exports of commodities capable of earning foreign exchange, particularly oil, in order to maintain its imports but is unlikely to engage in the deliberate disruption of world commodity markets. In certain special cases, particularly Japan and Finland, it probably regards its economic policies as having a more direct bearing on its foreign relations. Generally speaking, however, it lacks the resources to exert significant political influence on any Western state by economic means alone and could only jeopardize its imports of valuable goods by seeking to do so.

48. In addition, there has been evidence recently of an increasing Soviet concern over developments in the European Economic Community. This concern is generated in part by the threat to the competitive position of communist bloc exports (especially Czech and Polish) to Western Europe. However, the Soviet Government is perhaps even more disturbed by the political implications of a strong and expanding European community which may include Great Britain and other European countries. It seems likely therefore that Soviet efforts to have the tariff arrangements of the Common Market modified and to restrict its membership will intensify over the next few years.

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Scientific

49. The Soviet government is keenly aware of the political and economic advantages accruing from major scientific achievements. The propaganda which results from such genuine technological accomplishments as sending the first men into space contributes to the image of Moscow as the scientific center of the world. We expect the Soviet government to continue and enhance its reliance on the development of science. In this respect, there are two major areas in which we can anticipate continued or increased exploitation. One is that of space. The firings of the Venus probe and of the manned satellites during 1961, have spectacularly demonstrated Soviet scientific and technological competence. The magnitude of this effort is a measure of the importance which the Soviet Government attaches to this programme. The other major area is that of automation and cybernetics. Studies in this field will include machine programmed state planning to optimize resources and efforts to educate large segments of the population in pre-conditioned automatic response supporting the socialist ideal.

50. Nevertheless, such social and space developments are not expected to affect significantly the balance of power during the period under review. The Russians will, therefore, press vigorously scientific research and technological developments to improve upon existing weapons systems and particularly to reduce their vulnerability and improve their accuracy, reliability and destructive power. This effort will find particular application in the development of ICBMs, missile launching submarines and ABM systems.

51. In summary, the Soviet Union will continue to exploit science in order to maintain its prestige, improve its military position and develop an improved social state.

COURSES OF ACTION

52. The Soviet Union, like any major power, is concerned first with maintaining the integrity of its boundaries, secondly with protecting its interests in areas where it has more or less direct control and thirdly with the extension of its influence beyond these limits.

The Security of the Soviet State

53. There are no specific threats to Soviet boundaries as such except from China. This is of course not imminent, but there are still undemarcated portions of the Sino-Soviet boundary which could cause friction and turn into a threat to the Soviet Union. Russian interest in filling up the eastern spaces of the Soviet Union is at least partly related to a real or imagined uneasiness over Chinese intentions towards Soviet Asia. This uneasiness is not lessened by the fact that large portions of Soviet Asia were formerly part of the Chinese empire. Rivalry between China and the Soviet Union over Mongolia is a complicating factor in this respect. The main

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threat to the security of the Soviet state is therefore a deterioration of international relations which might lead to global war. This fear in Soviet eyes is given substance by U.S. strategic striking power and by NATO. The Soviet government is therefore likely to seek on their terms at least partial solutions in disarmament, through summit conferences and in the settlement of major issues such as Berlin. In the meantime, or in the last resort, it must rely on the maintenance of deterrent forces.

54. Although Soviet propaganda on disarmament continues to play up the slogans of "general and complete disarmament" and "no controls without disarmament", Soviet policy in this respect is likely to focus during the next five years on West Germany in order to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons and to obtain the denuclearization of West German territory--which would deny nuclear weapons to NATO troops in Central Europe. The Soviet government is already proposing agreements to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons outside the present nuclear club (which agreements may, in the Soviet view, aim at denying these weapons to China as well as West Germany). It is also proposing agreements whereby "definite geographic areas would be made free from the production and stationing of these weapons of mass destruction". The Soviet government may also be prepared to consider specific regional schemes for safeguards against surprise attacks in areas of decision like Central Europe but it is likely to resist plans involving Soviet territory. Nuclear test suspension seems to have lost its priority as a subject for possible agreement since the Russians insist that such an agreement would have to be part of a general disarmament agreement. They are currently separating nuclear tests from disarmament for negotiating purposes but, on substance, progress with the former is likely to remain geared to progress within the wider disarmament talks forum. On the fundamental problem of control of any agreed disarmament or nuclear test suspension measures, the major Soviet concern continues to be that control would be used for espionage purposes to the prejudice of Soviet security. So far the Russians have only acquiesced in the verification of the actual destruction of agreed quantities of armaments, but not of the levels of armaments retained after these destructions--in line with the principle that destructions must not alter the balance of forces. There is no indication that they are likely to alter their position in this regard.

Soviet Zone of Control

55. There are areas of instability in the Soviet zone of control and this fact vitiates the opportunities for further extensions of Soviet influence. The four major problem areas on the frontier of the Soviet bloc in Europe are Finland, Yugoslavia, Albania and Germany. Through various forms of economic and political pressure the Soviet government has succeeded in maintaining in Finland a government favourable to its interests, although it may well be concerned about the prospects for the future. Yugoslavia has perforce been excluded from the bloc but problems created by the existence of this heretical national communist state on the periphery of the Soviet area of control, although persistent and irritating, are still tolerable.

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Albania has been declared guilty of Stalinism and the Soviet government has broken off diplomatic relations with it and kept it out of recent Warsaw Pact and other Bloc meetings. Because Albania's defiance of Moscow depends at present on Chinese support, the problem it poses is essentially part of the wider problem of Sino-Soviet relations. Germany, on the other hand, poses a threat to the Soviet Bloc frontier which is totally unacceptable from the Soviet point of view.

56. Communism in East Germany is, for a variety of domestic reasons, inherently unstable. This situation is aggravated by the existence of the West Berlin enclave. The importance of the latter, as a standing advertisement of Western achievements and a permanent invitation to defection, has been sharply reduced by the erection of the sector border wall, but at a proportional cost in morale and productivity in East Germany. Furthermore, West Germany's economic progress and continuing rearmament, its membership in NATO and the EEC, its possession of weapons with a potential nuclear capability and its three to one superiority in population presents an active threat to East Germany. In these circumstances, it can safely be assumed that the Soviet government hopes to eliminate the Berlin enclave, to stabilize the East German regime and, in the long term, to neutralize West Germany at least to the extent of preventing it from exercising a detrimental influence upon East Germany.

57. Since general war, or any policy carrying grave risks of war, is unacceptable for the reasons noted above, the scope for Soviet action is limited. On the basis of past Soviet performance, however, it is possible to suggest a wide variety of less forceful actions which the Soviet government might take over a period of years in an effort to improve its position.

58. The first and most important would be a continuing attempt to extract concessions from the West through negotiation, preferably at the summit. Apart from the probability of direct success, this course has the added advantage of establishing an "a priori" Soviet case, of reducing the danger of armed conflict and or providing the Soviet government with a variety of propaganda opportunities. To this extent we believe that the Soviet government's interest in negotiation is genuine and that it will seek, over the next five years or so, a series of meetings at the diplomatic, foreign minister and summit levels.

59. It will also probably take a number of actions designed to erode the Western position. These will vary in severity from interference with access to Berlin to the threat of armed intervention. The Russians will also make threats whose withdrawals they will later represent as concessions. Diplomatically, they may make various moves to force the international acceptance of the German Democratic Republic, including the signing of a separate peace treaty. We cannot predict with any precision the timetable for such specific actions because they will depend largely on future Western actions and the Soviet assessment of them. These erosion tactics are likely to retain their appeal, however, provided plans for the improvement of the East German economy proceed reasonably well and there remains some prospect for progress in negotiations or some hope that the political climate in West Germany might change in favour of

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direct negotiation. If negotiations break down without any progress or promise of it we would anticipate increasing pressure on Berlin through minor harassing actions, perhaps culminating in the signing of a separate peace treaty and the threat of military action. We do not consider it likely, however, that the Soviet government would deliberately carry out any military threat or that it would take any steps which would obviously or inevitably lead to a major armed clash. Nevertheless, some desperate action might be taken if, after fruitless negotiations, the stability of the East German regime deteriorated rapidly, while the West remained adamant or became more forceful. The likelihood that Soviet military doctrine might develop a concept of limited war, during the latter part of the next five years introduces the possibility of a Soviet recourse to limited engagements but the practical circumstances of these cannot be forecast.

60. In summary, we anticipate that the Soviet authorities will continue their pressure (a) on the Western Powers, in Berlin and at the disarmament negotiating table (see paragraphs 53-54); (b) on West Germany, to induce it into direct negotiation; all against a background of carefully cultivated fear of open conflict and with the hope that the situation will evolve favourably from the Soviet point of view. Periods of pressure and mounting tensions will alternate with periods of detente of a greater or lesser duration depending on the success of the erosion tactics and of such negotiations as will be taking place and depending also on internal and Bloc factors.

The Extension of Soviet Influence

61. With regard to broader objectives in Europe, the Soviet government may hope that a policy of negotiation against a background of modulated threats will gradually weaken the resolve of the Western powers or increase their willingness to make concessions and its propaganda will undoubtedly be directed to this end.

62. In the Middle East, the Soviet government continues to recognize the importance of Arab nationalism and to base its policy on the opportunities offered by the existence of widespread poverty in conjunction with decadent regimes or outmoded social systems. It also seeks to exploit the difficulties encountered by the Western powers in maintaining direct control over their interests in the area. Accordingly, Soviet policy consists in supporting nationalist regimes, whether radical or reformist, providing substantial economic and military aid and encouraging Middle East governments in their efforts to reduce Western influence.

63. The Soviet Union continues to refrain from direct political action and intervention in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern countries. Its continuation of economic and military aid in the face of extreme local anti-communist action suggests that it prefers to increase its contacts with existing regimes and to develop its presence in the area in a respectable and respectful way. Hostile propaganda outbursts marred Soviet-Egyptian relations at one point in 1961 and the phenomenon could recur but its occasional nature so far should not alter the

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overall pattern of Soviet Middle Eastern policy. It does not seem to bank on the potential of any particular regime as suggested by the rapid recognition it extended to Syria upon the latter's defection from the U.A.R. and by the equal support it gives to both Qassim and Nasser, avoiding taking sides between the two in their continuing rivalry. In Iraq, while Communist China was giving full backing to the local Communist party, the Soviet Union refrained from so doing and there are even indications that it would find the establishment of a Communist regime in Baghdad somewhat embarrassing to its overall Middle Eastern policy. Algeria has been a delicate subject and the Russians, while not giving up their support of the liberation movement (to which the Chinese committed their support more thoroughly), have been careful not to antagonize the French government right up to the signature of the Evian Agreements following which they were overhasty in recognizing the GPRA and miscalculated the French reaction thereto. Future Soviet political gains in Algeria would now seem to depend on such openings as may be provided by Franco-Algerian divergencies in the application of the Evian Agreements.

64. The Soviet government probably considers the long-term trends in the Middle East to be in its favour. It doubtless foresees the gradual elimination of direct Western control and the emergence of social and economic problems which will offer increasing opportunities for the extension of Soviet influence. We anticipate that it will employ primarily diplomatic and economic means to maintain and extend its present influence and that it will continue to refrain from direct political action. Its propaganda is likely to be directed for the most part to the projection of a desirable image of the Soviet Union and, in some instances, to the exacerbation of differences with the West. In the event of a crisis leading to Western military intervention, the Soviet government would doubtless resort to military threats. We think it unlikely, however, that it would actually intervene because it would judge that such Western action, if left to take its course, would damage rather than advance the Western cause. Indeed, it is difficult at this point to envisage circumstances in which the Soviet position in the area would be better served by large-scale military intervention than by limited military support, perhaps through "volunteers", coupled with vigorous pro-Arab diplomatic action. We expect that such "volunteers" would actually be limited to instructors and technicians.

65. Iran will be an exception to the above pattern. The objective of Soviet policies there is to secure Iran's withdrawal from CENTO and we expect Soviet pressures, through all the means at the disposal of the Soviet government, except direct military action, to be applied to this end. In particular, every attempt will be made to exploit the domestic difficulties of the Shah's regime.

66. As in the Middle East, the Soviet government is undoubtedly conscious of the opportunities offered by African nationalism and by the social and economic problems of the African continent. Outside the ex-Belgian Congo, Soviet activities have so far primarily consisted in normal diplomatic and economic contacts. Bloc countries have responded with alacrity to statements of specific economic needs by newly independent African nations and have moved quickly to increase their

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diplomatic representation in the area. Propaganda and limited covert activities may be directed toward the embarrassment of the West and the advancement of left-wing regimes but, on the whole, we believe that the Soviet government has learnt the lesson in Guinea that excessive zeal arouses anti-Soviet national sensitivities and will attempt to maintain its respectability (see also paragraph 45 above). This should also apply in the Congo unless there is a split, accompanied or followed by the formation of a leftist, extremist group which the Russians would consider expedient to support as they supported Lumumba and Gizenga at one time. Angola may offer similar opportunities.

67. In the Far East and South Asia, the primary problem of the Soviet government is to maintain its relations with Communist China without at the same time damaging its position vis-a-vis other Asian nations. This is made difficult by the different approaches of the two countries to foreign affairs. Where the Soviet Union is cautious about the use of military force, Communist China asserts its intention to liberate Taiwan and skirmishes with India; where the Soviet Union seeks a detente with the Western powers Communist China is openly hostile; where Soviet propaganda is mild, that of Communist China is vituperative; and where the Soviet Union urges relatively moderate united front tactics on foreign communist parties, Communist China exhorts them to violent anti-colonial activism.

68. The evidence suggests that the Soviet government sees in India, which it probably regards as a counter-balance to China, the key to its Asian policy and is hopeful that Indian political evolution will take place in increasingly close association with the Soviet Union. As in the Middle East, it is therefore anxious that no action should be taken which would alienate non-communist opinion. It has accepted the Indian decision on Kerala without serious demur and it has refrained from taking sides in the Sino-Indian border dispute. It has continued large scale economic aid and has been at pains to avoid hurting Indian sensibilities. It has accepted neutral governments in Burma and other Southeast Asian countries, while Communist China has been anxious to move more quickly toward the establishment of communist regimes.

69. We consider that the Soviet government will continue to follow relatively moderate policies in the Far East and South Asia, to increase its stature and avoid the more offensive forms of political action. It should continue to moderate extreme Chinese policies, and even in the event of an open Sino-Soviet split, some moderating effect might remain as a result of the unlikelihood that the Russians would come to the assistance of the Chinese in a serious crisis in the Taiwan straits for instance if the Chinese provoked the crisis. In most local situations, such as Laos, it is unlikely to reject precipitate and violent courses of action although it will, through propaganda, aid and diplomatic action, attempt to embarrass the West. Indonesia may pose a special problem if it follows on its present belligerent course and attempts to wrest West New Guinea from the Dutch by force. The Indonesian Communist Party which used to have a Soviet orientation has begun to show a growing inclination towards China since the 22nd Congress and the Chinese of course have no hesitation in encouraging the Indonesians to violent action. The Russians have not tried to discourage the Indonesians but have been cautious in

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their advice over the West New Guinea issue. At the same time they have significantly increased their military assistance, although the Indonesian Army is on the whole anti-communist. We assume that Soviet rather than Chinese influence will remain preponderant in Indonesia and that this influence will be aimed at preventing a successfully negotiated peaceful settlement of the West New Guinea issue especially if such a settlement were to be initiated under the auspices of the United States, or result from the latter's mediating efforts. The Russians are not likely to encourage Indonesian belligerence to the point of open warfare against the Dutch unless and until there is a reasonable chance of Indonesian victory which would permit the Russians to advertise themselves as the champions of national liberation struggles whose support is indispensable for the success of such struggles.

70. Only in Japan, which is doubtless viewed in Moscow as the Asian counterpart of a rearmed Germany, do we foresee greater Soviet pressures. Through diplomatic and direct political action the Soviet government will continue to exploit anti-U.S. and anti-militarist elements. It will also continue to take advantage of the Japanese interest in expanded trade and the resentment of U.S. control of former Japanese territories. Its propaganda will support these actions and will include threats concerning the consequences of foreign bases on Japanese soil.

71. The political instability, economic backwardness and chronic anti-Americanism in Latin America provide the Soviet government with opportunities that are particularly attractive because of the strategic position of that continent in relation to the U.S.A. Castro's successful defiance of the latter adds to these opportunities but also introduces complications because the Cuban pattern of revolution founded on guerrilla activities may not always be reconcilable with the Soviet gradualist tactics of using local communist forces, not to make open bids for power but to infiltrate non-communist groupings and to generate popular pressures for policies leading to closer political and economic relations with the Soviet bloc. This policy of promoting the development of independent national democracies by non-violent methods is likely to prevail during the next five years. The Russians, however, would find it difficult not to support a successful local movement using violent tactics so that there may be exceptions to their general gradualist, evolutionary policy.

72. Since the opportunities for direct communist action in North America are extremely limited, we believe that Soviet policies will be limited to encouraging the acceptance of the "Peaceful competition" thesis through propaganda and increased cultural contact. The Soviet government will also probably continue its attempts to increase trade. The main impact of the Soviet attitude to North America will be felt elsewhere in the world where, as indicated above, Soviet efforts will be directed toward the reduction, either relative or absolute, of United States' influence.

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73. Soviet policy towards the United Nations looked most negative during 1960, being characterized by fierce attacks on the Secretary-General and on U.N. policy in the Congo where the Russians had suffered a setback. The Soviet "troika" proposal also seemed the opposite of constructive and cooperative. In 1961 however their acceptance of U Thant as Acting Secretary General indicated a return, though perhaps a reluctant one, to better dispositions. These now appear confirmed by the recent announcement that the Soviet government had paid \$3,550,000 for an apartment building near the U.N. headquarters to provide office space and living quarters for its Permanent Mission. This provides some evidence that Soviet membership is now on balance considered profitable and worth the relatively small Soviet contribution to the regular budget of the organization. It is likely that the Russians look forward to the day when their influence in the U.N. will equal or even surpass that of the Americans. The advantage, if and when that day arrives, of administering defeat to the latter in the heart of New York is no doubt looked upon as enormous. In the meantime the Russians can be expected to exploit every opportunity for embarrassment and obstructionism. The eventual entry of the Communist Chinese could, on the other hand, gradually bring out qualities of moderation and cooperation from the Soviet representatives, and even more so in the event of an open Sino-Soviet split.



RESTRICTED

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1322-1 (JIC)

19 June, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Reference: (a) CSC 7-17, CSC 1322-1 (JIC) of
25 May 62

Enclosure: (1) Canadian JIC comments on US NIE
11-9-62 dated 2 May 62 on the
above subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.

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JUN 22 1962

Enc.

AM/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS (2)
SOJIR
SOCI
JICLO(W) (for your personal information only)

A. Malysheff
(A. Malysheff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.

RESTRICTED

CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1322-1 (JIC)

19 June, 1962.

Comments on US NIE 11-9-62 dated 2 May 62
"Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy"

DNI: DNI has no disagreement with the conclusions of this paper.

DMI: DMI agrees with the contents of this paper.

XA, DAI, JIB, DSI, RCMP, CB NRC: No comments.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy
MOSCOW

Reference: Your Letter No. DS-305 of May 31

Subject: Soviet Statistical Material

Security: RESTRICTED *file*

No: *518* *W*

Date: June 19, 1962.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air Bag

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50028-B-40

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References

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We are forwarding by sea bag two copies of
"The U.S.S.R. in Figures, 1961" requested in your
letter under reference. We will certainly try to
scan new Soviet publications for works of this nature
which may interest JIB.

L. L. Benton

The Embassy

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JUN 27

Moscow
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B

to
Mr. Olivier - I wrote the letter
under reference at Bob McGibbon's (JIB)
request, and added in Peter Robert's
desire to have 1 copy of "The
USSR in Figures, 1961" as well.

He 002043

Internal
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Distribution
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NO ENCLOSURES

1962 JUN 27 PM 12:30

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(Enclosure SECRET)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

15 June, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

→ G.K. Grande, Esq.,
Dept. of External Affairs.

DNI
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CB NRC

50028-B-10
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846

SINO-SOVIET BLOC WAR POTENTIAL
1962-66

Reference: (a) CSC 7-17, CSC 1824-1 (JIC) dated
15 Mar 62

(b) CSC 7-17, CSC 1824-1 (JIC) dated
19 Apr 62

Enclosure: (1) Reference British JIC(62)3(Final)
dated 30 May 62 on the above
subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.

JUN 18 1962

Enc.

AM/2-5459/lc

E. Malysheff
(A. Malysheff)
LCDR, RCN,
Secretary.

D.L.(2)/P.TROTTIER/VW

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RESTRICTED

Ottawa, June 15, 1962.

Our file: 50028-B-40
Your file: CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1322-1 (JIC)

Lt.Cdr. A. Malysheff,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a, Ont.

TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

In reply to your letter of May 25,
1962, we wish to inform you that this Department
has no comments on US NIE 11-9-62 dated May 2,
1962, entitled "Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy."

(S41.) B. H. GILMORE

G.K. Grande
Defence Liaison (2) Division

S E C R E T

File
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Extract from the Minutes of the 893rd
Meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee
held on June 6, 1962.

50028-B-40

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XI. ANNUAL REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES
IN THE SOVIET NORTH

(SECRET)

18. Mr. Bowen stated that when it was agreed, at the 887th meeting on 2 May, to prepare the paper on the Annual Review of Activities on the Soviet North it had also been agreed that this paper would not include details on the Soviet nuclear testing programme carried out in the Soviet north as this particular subject would be dealt with in a separate JIC paper. Mr. Bowen suggested that as no plans have been made to prepare a separate paper on this subject the previous decision of the Committee should be reviewed and perhaps the DSI should now be invited to submit a short resume on this activity to be included in the paper. G/C Dilworth suggested that this item be restricted to a report on the nuclear testing operations and not concern itself with their technical significance.

(CSC 2106-1 (JIC))

19. The Committee agreed to these suggestions.

ACTION: DSI

20. The Committee noted Mr. Bowen's remarks.



RESTRICTED
(Enclosure SECRET)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

1 June, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

→ G.K. Grande, Esq.,
Dept. of External Affairs.

DNI
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CB NRC

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RUSSIAN MILITARY ACADEMIES

Enclosure: (1) BRITISH JIC(62)51(Terms
of Reference) dated 18 May
62 on the above subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for the information
members.

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JUN 1

(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

DESPATCH

TO:.....
The Canadian Embassy,
Moscow, USSR.
.....
FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.
Reference:.....
Subject:.....
Soviet Statistical Material
.....
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RESTRICTED
Security:.....
No:.....
DS- 305
Date:.....
May 31, 1962.
Enclosures:.....
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Air or Surface Mail:.....
Courier
Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50028-B-40	
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References

We have noted in the "Soviet News Bulletin", published by the Soviet Embassy here, that the year book of the Central Statistical Board "The USSR in Figures, 1961" is now available. We should be grateful if you could send us two copies of this publication, one for the Department and the other for JIB.

2. For your information JIB have commented that this publication and any other statistical material which you can obtain for them are of inestimable value.

KENNETH C. BROWN

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Internal
Circulation

European Division

Distribution
to Posts



OUR FILE REF. JIBF 1-6-1

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD

OTTAWA, Ontario.
29 May, 1962.

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
The Under Secretary of State,
Department of External Affairs,
East Block,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

ATTENTION: Mr. K.C. Brown

We would be very grateful if you would obtain for us through our Embassy in Moscow a copy of the yearbook of the Central Statistical Board "The U.S.S.R. in Figures, 1961".

An announcement that this had been published appeared in the "Soviet News Bulletin" dated 9 May, published by U.S.S.R. Embassy in Canada.

These and any other statistical material which our Embassy can obtain for us are of inestimable value.


R.L. McGibbon,
Joint Intelligence Bureau.



RESTRICTED
(Enclosure SECRET)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1322-1 (JIC)
25 May 62

Ottawa, Ontario

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TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Reference: (a) CSC 7-17, CSC 1322-1 (JIC)
dated 7 Mar 62

243

Enclosure: (1) US NIE 11-9-62 dated 2 May 62
on the above subject.

The NIE at enclosure (1) is forwarded for information and comment. It would be appreciated if comments could reach the Secretary by 11 Jun 62.

2. For the convenience of members past NIE's referred to in this document were distributed to members under reference (a) above.

E.A. Blais
(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: G.K. Grande, Esq.,
Dept. of External Affairs. (no enclosure)
CCOS
JIS (no enclosure)

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MAY 29

Done
June 15/62
V.W.

no comment letter. pl



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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 9-27 (JIC)

18 May 62

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Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

50028-B-40	
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UNITED STATES-SOVIET EXCHANGES
AGREEMENTS

Enclosure: (1) Dept. of External Affairs
Letter 627 of 19 Apr 62.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.

E.A. Blais
(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS (2)
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MAY 22

Spide
to

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

Reference: Our letter No. 473 of March 26, 1962

Subject: United States-Soviet Exchanges Agreements

Security: ~~Restricted~~

No: 627

Date: April 19, 1962

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

References

Last week we attended one of a series of seminars sponsored by the American Friends Service Committee on the topic "A Fresh Look at Soviet-American Exchanges". The Quakers sponsor such seminars on current international problems regularly, with participants drawn from among Administration officials, members of Congress and the academic world as well as from the diplomatic community. Participating in this seminar, for example, were a member of the House of Representatives, Secretary Rusk's special assistant and other officials from the State Department, and representatives from the Defence Department and the National Academy of Sciences. The experts who led the discussion included Professor F. C. Barghoorn of Yale, author of the book "The Soviet Cultural Offensive" and two professors from Indiana University who direct the work of the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants. The latter organization is responsible for the administration of the United States side of the student exchange part of the bilateral exchanges agreement, including selection of the United States participants. Much of the discussion centred on details of the student exchange, but some more general comments were made and a brief report may be of interest to you.

Internal
Circulation

2. An effort was made to assess why the Soviet Union has involved itself in a broad programme of exchanges with Western countries in spite of such disadvantages as displaying to Western observers the backwardness of many aspects of Soviet life. It was suggested that the desire for information and advanced knowledge was probably the most important element in Soviet interest in these programmes. This was borne out in their requests to send delegations to study industrial and other fields where the Soviet level of attainment was low. There was however as well an element of national pride in certain important scientific accomplishments and in the popularity of some of their cultural ensembles in the West. It was pointed out also that it is to their advantage from the prestige viewpoint and particularly in relation to their exchange programmes in underdeveloped countries, to be able to point to their arrangements for cultural relations with the most developed Western nations. On this point one of the State Department officials present remarked that one feature of the recent United States-Soviet negotiations was the Russians' obvious determination to achieve agreement on a basis no less broad than the previous ones, even though they were not anxious for expansion of contact in many fields. This suggested that for the Russians the maintenance of the agreement was almost as important as any benefits they might derive from operations under it. Professor Barghoorn thought that the policy of enlarged cultural exchanges also fitted well with the image of peaceful coexistence which the Russians had attempted to project.

Distribution
to Posts

London
NATO, Paris
Moscow

- 2 -

3. On the student exchanges, the experts present expressed general satisfaction. It was hard to specify what advantages had been gained for the United States so far, but there was no doubt in their minds that the programme was worthwhile and should be continued. Professor Barghoorn thought that only after exchanges had continued for 15 or 20 years would the values become clear and capable of accurate assessment, but the others pointed to the fact that there were already 103 persons in the United States better informed, through personal experience, of conditions in the Soviet Union, and better able to judge Soviet developments and Soviet propaganda. Moreover, although all the Soviet students had said on leaving that their experiences had not altered their essential appreciation of the United States, it was doubtful whether a year here would not make some impression on them, and probably lead at least to broader understanding. Mr. Viederman of the Inter-University Committee remarked, as State Department officials have, on the obstacles which United States students encounter in pursuing their studies at Moscow and Leningrad Universities, including the difficulties of living in Soviet conditions on the stipend the Soviet authorities provide, the delays involved in securing access to research facilities (including, in the case of science students, access to the laboratories of the Institutes) as well as the provocations that are sometimes engineered against them. On the question of access, he mentioned the instance of a student preparing a thesis on Dutch-Muscovite relations in the sixteenth century who had waited eight months to be allowed into the Archives, only to find nothing there he had not already seen in the Netherlands. Mr. Viederman said that they had had to repatriate only two of the participants before their term was up, both having suffered from a form of "culture shock" and unable to carry on with their studies. In spite of separation from families (the Soviet authorities have agreed that wives may be allowed to accompany students, but have drawn the line at children) and the other difficulties, however, Viederman thought that the United States students had come through remarkably well and gained a great deal from the programme. Only time and further experience, however, would allow a thorough assessment.

4. As to the future of the student exchange programme, the experts thought that it would likely continue at about the same level and on the same basis, though they would of course keep trying to improve the conditions in which their students pursue their work in the Soviet Union. Viederman noted that, although the Inter-University Committee had engaged in a broad information campaign in all the universities in the United States, they had received only 107 applications for places on the 1962-63 exchange, and that after screening, these would likely not fill all the 50 places available, though they hoped to send between 40 and 50. General interest in the possibility of study in Russia continued high, but the difficulties cited above, together with the language obstacle and the fact that studies available in Moscow do not match many of the students' specialties, inhibited students from applying in great numbers. Viederman also mentioned projects that have been put forward from various quarters in the United States for extensions of the programme, including an elaborate plan for a "junior year in Moscow", but said that most of these were impractical and had had to be discouraged.

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5. It was noted that the Soviet authorities appeared less than enthusiastic about the student exchange programme, even though their students had a much better chance, in terms of living conditions, freedom of travel and contact with the local community than their United States counterparts. Their relative disinterest was reflected in the fact that the full number of Soviet students provided for in the agreement has never been sent, and the quality of the student-participants has been much lower than would appear to be warranted. Mr. Viederman did not agree that the latter reflected exclusively a desire to send only thoroughly-trusted and Communist-indoctrinated students to the United States, although he thought this was a factor. Neither was there any reason, in their experience so far, for the Russians to fear defections (though he thought that in each case there was some close relative at home to provide insurance that the student returned). It was a fact, however, that most of the Soviet students knew so little English as to make it impossible for them to embark immediately on the courses of their choice, and in spite of intensive efforts here, some of them never attained even a passing ability in the language. Moreover, the professional qualifications of most of the students were not high. The discussion of this point did not reach any conclusions as to Soviet motives: it was suggested that the Soviet authorities wished to keep their best students at home, or that there were better uses to be made of the higher-quality students, especially those with a facility for English, in some of the underdeveloped areas where the Russians also have student exchanges.

6. Mention was made incidentally of the interest expressed by several Canadian students in the United States in participating in the United States-Soviet exchange. It was unfortunately impossible to encourage these persons because of the rule that had been established that all participants from this side had to be United States citizens.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
S. F. RAE
The Embassy

50028-B-40
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CONFIDENTIAL

Minutes of
Extract from the 890th Meeting of the
Joint Intelligence Committee held on
May 16, 1962.

VIII. LOGISTIC INTELLIGENCE GUIDE ON
THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

(CONFIDENTIAL)

13. The Committee gave further consideration to an invitation from the Standing Group for CUSRPG representation at a conference in London in October 1962 to revise SG 252, Logistic Intelligence Guide on the Soviet Armed Forces.

(CC 1544-1 (JIC) of 1 May 62)

14. Mr. Bowen stated that he would like Mr. Trotman, the JIBLO(L) to attend these meetings. Col. Hogarth said that in so far as the Logistic Guide was concerned with Ground Forces logistics, it would be useful to have a Canadian representative whose normal work encompassed this subject.

15. After further discussion, the Committee agreed that the Secretary should inform the CUSRPG Secretariat that it would be desirable to have CUSRPG representation at this conference. The following Canadian representation is recommended:

ZK 4494 Captain J.B. Rose, Canadian Army *
Mr. J.H. Trotman, JIBLO(L)

* If only one Canadian representative is permitted, Captain Rose is designated.

ACTION: Secretary



Department of National Defence

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
No. CSC 1145-1 (JIC)

CONFIDENTIAL

834
May 10, 1962.

G.K. Grande, Esq.,
Chairman, JIC.

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CANADIAN JIC 432/2(62)
Review of Trends in Sino-Soviet
Bloc Policies

I refer to my letter on this file dated 8 Jan 62 which forwarded copies of NZ JIC paper on the Sino-Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1961-1965.

2. Due to the similarity in scope of the NZ JIC paper and our "Review of Trends" paper it was decided that comments on the New Zealand paper would not be required. Instead we would forward the NZ JIC copies of our "Review of Trends" paper.

3. You will note that the distribution of CANADIAN JIC 432/2(62) as shown in the minutes of the 887th meeting, Item VIII, includes JIC New Zealand. It is therefore suggested that when your office forwards copies of CANADIAN JIC 432/2(62) to the NZ JIC, that the covering note take account of our receipt of the NZ JIC paper and words to the effect "that our thoughts on this subject are expressed in the JIC paper now forwarded".

E.A. Blais
(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

EAB/2-5459/1c

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AY 14 1962

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM:Office of the High Commissioner,....
.....KUALA LUMPUR, Malaya.....

Reference:..Your Letter DS-91 of April 13, 1962

Subject:.....SINO-SOVIET BLOC TECHNICAL.....
.....ASSISTANCE.....

Security:.....S.E.C.R.E.T.....

No:.....174.....

Date:.....May 7, 1962.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....14-4.....

Ottawa File No.

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MAY 16 1962

The Federation of Malaya does not now and never has accepted Sino-Soviet bloc technical assistance and therefore most of the questions asked by the JIB are not applicable.

2. The Federation which has been actively engaged in fighting Communist terrorists for the past decade is so wary of Communist assistance that it once refused an FAO offer of machinery because the equipment would come from the USSR. Moreover, Malaysians proceeding abroad under the Colombo Plan or other aid schemes have their passports endorsed in such a way that it is forbidden for them to travel to any Communist country; police permission must be obtained for trainees even to pass through Hong Kong because of the possibility that they might slip across the border into mainland China.

3. We were told privately by a Trade Union representatives of one of their colleagues who ignored the passport endorsement and stopped off in Moscow for a day or so while en route home from Western Europe. On arrival in Kuala Lumpur he was arrested and at last report is still in jail.

Internal
Circulation

M. Sherrard
F.E.

Distribution
to Posts

Office of the High Commissioner

NO ENCLOSURES

NO ENCLOSURES

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

1962 MAY 15 PM 3:25

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: [illegible]

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RESTRICTED
(Enclosure SECRET)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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CSC 7-12 (JIC) 55 | 50
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

3 May, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SOVIET BLOC AND CHINESE PENETRATION
OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

Enclosure: (1) Canadian JIC comments on
UK JIC(61)59(Final) on the
above subject.

The comments at enclosure (1) were approved at the 887th meeting on 2 May and have been forwarded to the JICLO(L). Copies of the revised comments are now forwarded for the information of members.

E.A. Blais
(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS (2)
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CANADIAN JIC COMMENTS ON UK JIC(61) 59(FINAL) OF 1 FEB 62

SOVIET BLOC AND CHINESE PENETRATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

1. The Canadian JIC feels that there is a tendency in this paper to over-emphasize the activity of the communists at the expense of the objectives of Sino-Soviet policy. We would also attach rather more importance to the dilemma which communist governments face in the choice between cultivating good relations with existing governments and encouraging the development of effective communist opposition groups.
2. On the first point, we consider that the difficulties which the Soviet Union has encountered with its efforts at "diplomatic penetration" in the Congo and Guinea are particularly significant. The failure of the Soviet troika idea and the Soviet line on anti-colonialism at the last session of the UN General Assembly to gain widespread support from the countries of this area also seems important. These diplomatic failures are perhaps as significant as the not too surprising willingness of the underdeveloped countries to accept the money and equipment which is offered to them. Economic and military aid are important instruments of communist policy but other less tangible forms should not be underestimated in evaluating the success of the communists in the Middle East and Africa as elsewhere. Moreover, the relative success or failure of the communists must be judged, insofar as it is important to attempt to foresee their likely policies in the future, by the objectives they have set themselves. We do not believe that a sufficiently precise statement of these objectives has been included and, while we do not differ with the paper's description of communist activities, we cannot accept entirely the analysis in its final paragraphs.
3. The notion that Soviet "strategy is to contribute to the instability of the area by all means within her power" is too strongly worded. In our view, the essential dilemma of Soviet policy is the choice between the expansion of Soviet "state influence" and the encouragement of the spread of communism. In spite of some local mismanagement, as for example recently in Guinea, we believe that the Soviet Government is primarily concerned with its own influence and prestige vis a vis existing governments. It certainly fosters anti-westernism but has no vested interest in encouraging instability which might damage its influence with important African leaders.
4. Our conclusion would perhaps be, from the viewpoint of the West, both more optimistic of the political advantage which the Bloc has so far derived from its activities and more pessimistic on the possibility of a dramatic increase in these activities in coming years. In the short term the Soviet Union wishes to destroy Western influence in the under-developed areas. This objective coincides with the indigenous nationalist aims. The nationalists wish to become free of colonial ties, both in political and economic terms; the communists wish to remove Western influence so that the political, economic, and military vacuums may be filled by the Soviet Union (and China). Nevertheless the long-term communist objective of bringing nationalist governments within the control of the Soviet Bloc is undoubtedly as obnoxious to the nationalists as would be the continuation of colonialism. In consequence, Soviet objectives must be cautiously implemented. The communist governments have not solved their dilemma mentioned above and it seems to us that the extremists within the Bloc are likely to have increasing doubts about the value of underwriting the "bourgeois nationalist" regimes of the area. The increase in communist activities may well be out of proportion to the advantages derived from them but the scale of Bloc activity is likely, nevertheless, to increase quite rapidly.

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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CSC 7-17 (JIC)

3 May, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario


MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

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SOVIET LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION

Reference: (a) CANADIAN JIC 437(62) - Soviet
Likely Courses of Action -
CSC 7-17 (JIC) of 1 May, 1962.

When reading this paper members are asked to read paragraph 70 immediately after paragraph 47. This correction will be reflected in the final paper.


(E.A. Blais) -
Major,
Secretary.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS (2)
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MAY 4 1962



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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 7-17 (JIC)

1 May, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

G.K. Grande, Esq.,
Dept. of External Affairs.

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SOVIET LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION

Reference: (a) Minutes of the 865th meeting
Item XII

Enclosure: (1) CANADIAN JIC 437(62) on the
above subject.

MAY 3 1962

The draft CANADIAN JIC paper at enclosure (1) has
been prepared by the Department of External Affairs and
is now forwarded for comments by members.

2. It would be appreciated if these comments could
reach the Secretary by 17 May, 1962.

(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS (2)
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CANADIAN JIC 437 (62)

1 May, 1962.

COPY NO. 1

SOVIET LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION

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CANADIAN JIC 437 (62)
1 May, 1962.

SOVIET LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION

OBJECT

1. The purpose of this paper is to review the major factors which may affect Soviet courses of action over the next five years, to examine the various means of action at the disposal of the Soviet government and to suggest how these may be applied in various regions.

CONCLUSIONS

2. The factors affecting Soviet policy are becoming increasingly complex as a result of the problems posed by the nature of modern war; the emergence of Communist China as a major power and the challenge it poses to Moscow's leadership of the Communist bloc and movement; the social and economic evolution of the Soviet Union itself; and developments in the non-Communist world. These factors are considered in detail in paragraphs 6 to 32 below; some of them offer the U.S.S.R. new opportunities for expansion but others at the same time limit its freedom of action.

3. The Soviet government has at its disposal a variety of instruments with which to extend its influence. These include: its military establishment, its diplomatic service, its trade and aid activities, its propaganda machine, its clandestine agencies, and the economic and scientific ^{cultural} achievements of the Soviet state. These instruments and the manner in which they are likely to be employed are discussed in paragraphs 33 to 72.

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S E C R E T

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4. We conclude that, while the primary threat to the security of the Soviet state lies in the possibility of a global war, a secondary threat to its supremacy in the bloc and in the world Communist movement (and therefore to its international position and influence) is posed by China. The primary threat will require from the Soviet government a continued effort over the next five years to settle important issues on Soviet terms, including the Berlin question, and perhaps some aspects of disarmament as well. The threat from China, though a long-term one in view of China's own present limitations, nevertheless poses the immediate problem of the steps to be taken to eliminate it or, failing this, to contain it. The Chinese problem is therefore bound to divert some of the attention which the U.S.S.R. could otherwise devote more completely to the pursuit of the solution on Soviet terms of the problems arising from Soviet competition with the West.

5. The personality of Khrushchev and the way in which he views this Soviet competition with the West is another determining factor to take into account in our assessment of Soviet policy in the next five years. There appears to be little doubt that Khrushchev is a genuine and fervent believer in Communism. But this belief is accompanied by an urgent desire to increase the influence of the Soviet Union, which desire seems to lead him to press on all fronts at once: internally, he is pressing Soviet society to reform and raise the national potential ever higher; externally, he is

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pressing the western powers to agree to a Berlin settlement on Soviet terms; he is also pressing the Chinese to give up their challenge and return to the path of Soviet-defined orthodoxy. Khrushchev seems to be working to a timetable governed by the triple considerations of his own life expectancy, the growth of western (and especially German) military and economic strength, and the growth of the Chinese challenge to Moscow's leadership of international Communism. Therefore, in order to ensure the future greatness of the Soviet Union and of Soviet Communism against this triple risk, he is likely to continue to keep up the pressures he has generated, internally and externally, relying on the expanding Soviet economic, scientific and military power, in order to tip the present balance of power in his favor and make Soviet influence preponderant and decisive in world affairs.

FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION

6. We consider that the Soviet government aspires to the maximum extension of the "world socialist order" in which it believes by doctrine and to the expansion of its wealth, influence and power, as the first and leading socialist country in the world. National expansion is pursued partly for itself and partly as the fulfillment of the national responsibility for the success of the international socialist objective; it is also in line with the traditional preoccupation with the integrity and the safety of the Russian state and territory. Our problem is to assess what, in the next five years, it will judge to be reasonable goals and what methods it will employ to achieve them. Such an assessment is complicated

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by the fact that, although the Soviet Union is more powerful than ever before in its history, there are very real limitations to the use of its power in the pursuit of its objectives. The first limitation stems from the nature of modern war, its influence on Soviet strategic thinking and on the possible use of Soviet military power. A second limitation derives from the difficulties of extraterritorial control which have arisen with Yugoslavia's successful escape from the Soviet orbit. These difficulties have been compounded by the emergence of China as an independent Communist country with an independent view of the "world socialist order" and of the policies and tactics best suited to achieve it. A third limitation results from the social, political and economic evolution of the Soviet Union internally. A fourth and last limitation stems from the Soviet view of the non-Communist world and of its intentions towards the Soviet and other Communist states.

Nature of Modern War and Soviet Strategic Thinking

7. Current Soviet courses of action are undoubtedly limited by an appreciation of the effects of modern war. The Soviet government has been successful in creating a strong force of medium-range bombers, a small force of heavy bombers and missiles and a stockpile of nuclear weapons. In the next five years it will build up an increasing capability in all ranges of guided missiles, including ICBM's. The ability of these forces to inflict casualties and damage on Europe and North America will constitute, in Soviet eyes, a deterrent against the initiation by the Western powers of global war and, in addition, would enable the

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Soviet government in certain circumstances to attempt a preemptive attack.

8. It must be clear to the Soviet government, from its knowledge of western capabilities and from its own nuclear tests, that a general war would result in the devastation of the Soviet Union on a scale vastly greater than that suffered during the Second World War. Although such a global war might be resorted to in the most desperate circumstances, it cannot be considered effective as an instrument of policy nor is the Soviet Union likely to carry any of its policies to the point of limited war if this involves unacceptable risks of a major conflict. As a matter of fact, present Soviet strategic thinking seems to preclude the possibility--and even to exclude the concept--of limited war, by emphasizing that such a war would rapidly escalate into a major conflict automatically involving the use of the full range of nuclear weapons.

9. In itself, Soviet strategic thinking would seem to be relatively unsophisticated. The possession of an effective deterrent permits the concept of a retaliatory strike as well as that of a preemptive strike in circumstances where Soviet leaders would be convinced that a Western attack was imminent. Soviet strategic thinking seems to focus almost entirely on these two concepts and, as we have just said, it telescopes local and global wars by insisting that the former would inevitably lead to the latter. At first sight this would appear to give a character of almost rudimentary simplicity to Soviet strategic thinking. At the same time, however, this is a confusing object of study because, alongside the modern military principles and views permitted by the present state of Soviet nuclear and ballistic science, there are

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elements of traditional Russian military doctrine as well as considerations of ideology, propaganda and psychological warfare. For instance, the Russians maintain, together with their modern missile and bomber force, a huge army which is more in line with the traditional requirements of the defence of the open plain in western Russia and eastern Europe. There is evidence of traditional thinking in the persistence of views that war can drag on in spite of the devastating power of modern weapons and that fighting on the ground will remain necessary to the extent of requiring the traditional large army.

10. There may be an additional justification for the traditional large army in the need to maintain satellite Communist regimes which were first established in the wake of the Soviet military penetration into and domination of eastern Europe at the end of the last war and since. In 1960, Khrushchev launched a programme to cut down the number of troops and streamline the Soviet Army, a move which was in keeping with modern military thinking (and also worked to the benefit, in manpower, of the Soviet economy). However, the tense situation prevailing during the second half of 1961 because of the Communist pressure on Berlin caused this programme to be reversed or at least suspended. It thus became apparent that a policy of pressure in central Europe was not separable from the maintenance of a large army and this requirement may continue as long as Soviet policy on Berlin and Germany continues on the present lines. On the other hand, during the later part of the period of this study, increases in the Soviet I.C.B.M. capability, combined with improvements in the flexibility and mobility of Soviet field forces may permit the continuance of a

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bold policy at the same time as reductions in manpower. It may also be that, as their I.C.B.M. capability against North America increases, the Soviet authorities may become ready to envisage the possibility of limited war involving Soviet forces in peripheral areas. In the meantime, however, the Soviet insistence that limited or local war would inevitably lead to global war seems to have less to do with strategic thinking as such than with the requirements of Soviet psychological warfare. In other words, the Russians deliberately refuse to distinguish between global and local wars in order to increase the psychological value of the Soviet deterrent, so that under the umbrella of this deterrent, bold political action can be taken, as in Berlin. They may also hope to dissuade the west from limited military engagements near Soviet or satellite territory and to discourage the buildup of western European conventional forces.

11. The only kind of war which the Russians at present seem willing to envisage and support is the war of so called "national liberation." This is however more in the nature of an ideological and propaganda concept (rather than a specifically strategic one) designed to provide encouragement to those fighting an "anti-colonial" struggle. It is a safe concept inasmuch as it implies little or no direct Soviet military involvement. Its safety is further ensured by the cautious way in which the Russians have so far been applying it, for instance when it involved a major western power, like France in Algeria, or when the Western commitment was heavy, as in Laos.

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Problems of Extraterritorial Control

12. While the continued Yugoslav defiance of Soviet authority and maintenance of a heretical Communist doctrine was an irritant to the U.S.S.R. it could still be tolerated as a minor epiphenomenon as long as the rest of the Communist bloc retained its homogeneity under Soviet leadership. Of greater consequence however was the emergence of China as a major Communist power with independent, divergent views on Communist doctrine, policy and tactics. China's challenge to the Russians is fundamental because the Chinese contend that the Soviet government, under Khrushchev, is pursuing policies which are un-Marxist-Leninist and which can only lead to the undermining of Communist bloc solidarity and of international Communism to the benefit of the "imperialist capitalist" world. Disagreement between the two has been apparent for some time over China's great leap forward programme and its communes, over points of doctrine such as the non-inevitability of war, the extent and form of possible peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev's policy of Soviet contacts with western leaders, the tactics to be employed in promoting Communism in the non-Communist world, and the problem of dealing with governments like those of India and Egypt which oppose Communism internally and even suppress it. The problem of authority over the world Communist movement was also a contentious one in 1960 and was not settled at the Moscow Conference of Communist parties in November of the same year which resulted in a purely formal compromise for the sake of showing the outside world a facade of unity.

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13. Throughout this phase of the quarrel, the Chinese kept up a steady campaign against Yugoslav "revisionism" with the implicit object of criticizing Khrushchev's own "revisionism" and toleration of Yugoslav heresies as endangering the whole international Communist movement. Criticism thus remained indirect and the dispute, in spite of much ideological intransigence, did not exceed the bounds of a family quarrel unlikely to break up the family or affect its practical dealings with the remainder of the world. Indeed, the theoretical claim that, under the Marxist-Leninist scheme of things, there are no grounds for irreconcilable national antagonisms (for which capitalism alone is held responsible) provides strong, ideological motivation for avoiding an open split because a split would expose the hollowness of the claim. On the other hand, Marxist-Leninist ideology leaves no room for fundamental divergencies: errors must either be retracted or result in expulsion from the bloc. This was feasible with a small country like Yugoslavia but is more difficult with a major power like China. In this case the dispute could theoretically go on until history or a change of leadership in either country proves the other one right. This is the attitude which the Chinese appear to be taking, standing plainly on established and proven doctrine largely because, in the relatively early stage of their revolutionary process, they have more to gain by insisting on the strict application of the original militant doctrine and in this they are supported by many of the non-bloc Communist parties who also have more to gain by revolutionary than by evolutionary methods. On the other hand, Khrushchev, at the head of a more evolved state, is confronted with

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a set of more complex national and international circumstances requiring practical adjustments and innovations. The onus of proving that these adjustments and innovations are warranted is on him, not on Mao. In this sense, Khrushchev is in more of a hurry than Mao, particularly since, being unable to rule by Stalinist methods (see paragraphs 19 to 25 below), he is compelled to de-Stalinize in order to overcome the routine and conservatism of a party and state bureaucracy which had entrenched itself under Stalin and had become more interested in self-continuation to the detriment of the solutions required to the problems posed by an evolving society and economy. Khrushchev is thus less in a position to wait upon history to prove him right against Mao because of the domestic factors of resistance to the wind of change, which wind he feels compelled both to follow and to direct along appropriate channels compatible with the party control he still has to retain. Most of the satellites have adapted well enough to Khrushchev's style with the exception of the more backward Albania where more primitive social and economic conditions, combined with fear of Yugoslavia and consequently of Moscow's policy towards the latter, have caused Hoxha to strengthen his long established Stalin-type dictatorship, to purge his opponents and would-be Khrushchev supporters ruthlessly, and to defy Khrushchev as a consequence, thanks of course to China's support.

14. Internal and external factors therefore combined to motivate Khrushchev's attack, at the 22nd Party Congress last October, against Stalinism, the anti-

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party group of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich, Albania and, by implication, China. The attack on Albania was followed by the rupture of Soviet-Albanian diplomatic relations in November. The immediate Chinese reaction was to come out in support of Albania and to express their defiance of Khrushchev through Chou-en-Lai's symbolic laying of a wreath, during the Party Congress, to "the great Marxist-Leninist, J.V. Stalin."

15. The gap between Moscow and Peking is now very real and the question is whether the two will come to an open split. Since the Chinese have taken up the position of defenders of the doctrine and since they are capable of surviving, albeit at a near subsistence level without bloc trade or aid, we believe they can afford to wait for history to prove Khrushchev wrong and therefore that they will not take the initiative in provoking an open split (which does not mean that they will remain passive; on the contrary, they will do all in their power to foster pro-Chinese factions in non-bloc parties, etc.). Such an initiative is more likely to come from Khrushchev since it is he who is compelled to move and innovate and thus to widen the gap between Moscow and Peking. There is, however, a difference between purging a national party of one's rivals and purging an international movement of an entire national party. This could be done if an opposition could be counted on to replace the leadership of the expelled party but this does not seem to be the case in China on present evidence at least. The expulsion could still be attempted if Khrushchev could count on putting the Chinese in quarantine and keeping their influence in check within the bloc and the movement;

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but Peking's influence in non-bloc parties seems sufficiently strong, especially in Asian Communist parties, to prevent their being expelled because this would mean splitting the international Communist movement as well as splitting various national parties into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese wings.

16. The consequences upon the movement as a vehicle for the attainment of the world socialist order would be such as to make both Moscow and Peking pause and refrain from an open split. Either side has more to gain by eroding the other's position in the movement in order to achieve leadership of the whole of it. We therefore expect the current ideological war of attrition to continue during the foreseeable future in Communist front organizations such as the World Peace Council, the W.F.T.U. and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. We believe however that Khrushchev would not hesitate to cut off the Chinese if this were required by the Soviet national interest, or to save his own position, or again to save the Soviet position in the international Communist movement. For their part the Chinese can be expected to exploit any national or international difficulty in which Khrushchev could find himself. In particular a Soviet failure to bring Albania to heel after having gone to the lengths of breaking off diplomatic relations or a Soviet failure to score off the West in Berlin or on any other disputed aspect of East-West relations is likely to complicate Khrushchev's position vis-a-vis the Chinese as well as within the Communist bloc. It is also bound to be used by China to encourage national parties to defect or at least

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to refrain from endorsing the Soviet line.

17. As far as the West is concerned, the pressure of the Chinese challenge could cause Khrushchev to move further and further along the path of peaceful coexistence and compromise with the West in order to show some success for his policies. That, however, is likely to stimulate conservative resistance in the U.S.S.R. and weaken Khrushchev's position. Either in combination with this conservative resistance or by itself, Chinese pressure could force Khrushchev to take risks, e.g., in Berlin, in order to prove the correctness of his policies. However, we do not believe that Khrushchev would in fact allow himself to be goaded by Chinese criticisms into increasing the risk of war with the West but that his capacity for bold political action might increase, especially as the Soviet I.C.B.M. capability increases.

18. It remains, therefore, that whether or not the Russians and the Chinese reach an open split, the immediate effects of Sino-Soviet differences will be on the international Communist movement whose unity will be affected and in which the existence of two poles of attraction will give non-bloc national parties greater room for manoeuvre and facilitate national and/or regional deviations. Among the bloc parties, the Russians could be expected to tighten their control on those situated on their periphery, i.e., in eastern Europe. There could be a struggle for control of the Mongolian, North Korean and North Vietnamese parties, with China being favoured by geographical proximity in the case of North Vietnam and to a lesser extent, North Korea, and by the inclination of these two countries

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to favour "Chinese" militancy in order to achieve control of their respective southern halves. In the case of Mongolia, the Soviet Union appears to be firmly entrenched for the time being. Moreover, Mongolian fears of absorption by China will likely result in policies which are more inclined towards the Soviet Union than towards China.

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Soviet Domestic Problems

19. Khrushchev enjoys supreme but not absolute power as did Stalin who ruled from the centre, issuing orders to a monolithic and compliant government and party bureaucracy, and relying ultimately for their execution on the terror of the Secret Police. As none of Stalin's successors at the time could, or would, be allowed by his colleagues to rule in the same way, the Secret Police was quickly brought under close party control and collective leadership was decreed. In the ensuing conflicts of personalities and policies, Khrushchev finally won out in 1957 by taking the unprecedented step of appealing, over the heads of the majority of his colleagues in the Praesidium, to the Party Central Committee which then endorsed his views and gave him supreme authority. Since then, Khrushchev has restored to the duly recomposed Praesidium its policy-making functions and reorganized the Party apparatus but he has also resorted to various practices including personal appearances and travels throughout the Soviet Union in an effort to enlist more dynamic support and to tap unused resources of initiative in the implementation of his policies. He has put the emphasis on stimuli and incentives rather than terror and he has made the Party his main agency of political promotion, rejuvenating it, bringing new blood into it and instituting statutory personnel turnover in order to overcome the inertia and conservatism of elements entrenched since Stalin's days and more interested in self-perpetuation than dynamic service.

20. The requirements of an expanding and increasingly complex economy have combined with the

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conditions and manner in which Khrushchev achieved power to prevent a return to Stalin's crude methods of rule. It is his understanding of these requirements which has made Khrushchev the leader that he is today; but in his efforts at decentralizing the administration, at reinvigorating the party and government bureaucracies, at delegating responsibility--not, of course, for policy-making, but only for implementing the policy and carrying out the plan--he is encountering opposition. This opposition does not take the form of a coherent and organized group of critics capable of challenging him and of providing an alternative government. What confronts Khrushchev is rather the obstructionism and the resistance to change of functionaries whose long years of compliant, obedient service and experience make them fearful of innovation and resentful of activist new functionaries. They yearn for the good old days and the tested methods of work to which they had grown accustomed and owed their positions.

21. It is against the inertia of this legacy of Stalin's days that Khrushchev is attempting to carry out a continuing and terrorless revolution from above. This explains to a substantial degree the emphasis on de-Stalinization and the campaign against the anti-party group of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich whose conservatism (especially in the case of the first and third) makes them a logical choice as whipping boys and scape-goats for the continuing shortcomings of the regime. Beyond this however is the hard economic reality of shortages in housing and food, two prime incentives in an increasingly industrialized and urbanized society. Housing last year fell short of the plan by more than

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fifteen per cent and the ever lagging Soviet agriculture still fails to deliver foodstuffs in the required quantity and variety, especially meat and dairy products.

22. In general, two economic factors will shape the U.S.S.R.'s internal and external courses of action in the immediate future. These are the rate of growth achieved in the economy and the disposition of the increases in production.

23. With respect to the first, it seems probable that the Seven Year Plan industrial targets will be achieved and that industrial output will continue to grow rapidly for the rest of this decade. Relative stagnation in agriculture may well depress the rate of growth of per caput income but, unless agricultural difficulties directly affect the government's capacity to concentrate resources on industrial development, that stagnation is unlikely to slow down the growth of Soviet economic power.

24. As far as distribution is concerned, this increased power represents a growing capacity to intervene in areas of the world outside the immediate control of the U.S.S.R. with economic and military aid and to sustain a larger defence burden. However, two features of the Soviet economy are likely to inhibit the regime from devoting too large a proportion of growing industrial output to these ends. Firstly, the nature of Soviet central planning assumes that the economy (together with the Satellites) will remain essentially self sufficient. This autarky has prevented trade outside the Bloc from assuming more than a peripheral importance in development plans and there is

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little reason to expect that the Soviet government will change this feature of the economy to any extent.

Secondly, the Soviet populace is itself experiencing a "revolution of expectations" which may well compel the government to devote a larger proportion of increased production to satisfy demands for an improved standard of living.

25. Khrushchev's attempts to meet this "revolution of expectations" has aroused the resistance of conservative elements who fear for the old, established priority in favor of heavy industry. There also appears to be competition between the investment requirements of a pro-consumer domestic economy and those of the large military programme necessary to support bold foreign policy initiatives. Khrushchev's effort in 1960 to rely on modern weapons and institute reductions in the traditional large army to the benefit of the domestic labour force appear to have met with the resistance of conservative elements in Soviet military circles. The increased tension over Berlin in 1961 forced a reversal of the troop reduction policy. There may thus be limitations to the extent to which Khrushchev can fulfill his promises of a better life at home at the same time as his promises of political successes abroad (even while domestic prosperity is supposed to help extend Soviet influence abroad by making the Soviet way of life more attractive--but this is only one of the paradoxes of Soviet policy). His conservative critics can reproach him on both counts but he does not seem to be at a loss for schemes and initiatives which enable him to remain one step ahead of his critics.

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Soviet Image of the West and "Peaceful Co-existence"

26. The Soviet image of non-Communist states and the effect of non-Communist actions on Soviet policy are probably the most difficult to assess of all the relevant factors. Communist ideology forms the intellectual basis of the Soviet view of the world and a guide to the political actions of the Soviet government, but the particular focus of the latter's view and interpretation of ideological precepts have varied greatly. The value of Communist literature in predicting the Soviet future is therefore limited. Communist precepts are interpreted and changed in such a way as to ensure the survival of the Soviet government. On the one hand, there seems to be a basic and genuine faith in the spirit of the Communist system and in its ability to win the competition with the West in conditions of "peaceful co-existence." On the other hand Soviet leaders show no lack of tactical opportunism and no scrupulousness in taking such short cuts to extend Soviet influence as they may find in either or both the weakness of the Western position and the advantages procured by a Soviet success, e.g., in the field of science. Thus in 1961 while a new American President was hobbled by the Cuban problem and while the Russians were scoring an important "first" with Gagarin's space flight, underlined by Titov's subsequent multi-orbit flight, the U.S.S.R. judged the circumstances favorable to a renewal of pressure on the Western powers in Berlin. It also tried to capitalize upon and exploit the widespread fear of war, when it resumed nuclear testing and resorted to multi-megaton bomb rattling in the hope of

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obtaining a Berlin settlement on its terms. Should Soviet military power be substantially increased by a scientific breakthrough, (e.g., an effective anti-missile missile), this would certainly be exploited to the full and, depending on the degree of immunity to itself resulting from the breakthrough, the Soviet government could once again make war, limited or global, an instrument of foreign policy. The two current doctrines--(a) that war between the Communist and capitalist states is not unavoidable, and (b) that violent revolution is not an essential step in the creation of a Communist state--could then easily be reversed without posing any major ideological problem to the Soviet authorities. Barring a scientific breakthrough or a development (e.g., a revolution in a satellite) likely to upset the present balance of power, the Russians can be expected to adhere to the concept of "peaceful co-existence."

27. This concept stems from the concern to avoid a war which might destroy Soviet achievements. The Soviet government is probably convinced that the United States will not deliberately initiate war against the Soviet Union within the next few years. At the same time, it may well be fearful that ultimately the danger of western preemptive action will become more serious. Even if it judges that the Soviet deterrent will be effective in the long term, it is probably concerned that the elimination of all communist regimes, or at least the maximum erosion of Soviet power, is the ultimate western aim. It is doubtless anxious, therefore, to reduce and, if possible, eliminate those problems and weapons which pose a threat to the Soviet

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system and to place the emphasis in its struggle with the West on fields where its technical achievements, its increasing economic power, its better discipline and its ability to exploit major political issues can be used with the minimum of risk.

28. The concept of "peaceful co-existence" is designed to give the Soviet authorities the freedom to compete with the Western powers by any means they choose, short of war. The object is to remove all remnants of colonialism and help in the emancipation (not only political but also economic) of newly independent countries in such a way that the U.S.S.R. will become their champion and protector. In other words, what is sought in those countries is the replacement of Western by Soviet influence. "Peaceful co-existence" does not only mean direct competition between the Soviet bloc and the Western powers for the future alignment of those countries. It also means competition between Communist socialism and capitalism within the various newly independent, underdeveloped countries, so that their domestic structure will be modified to the disadvantage of the West and to the benefit of the expanding "world socialist order."

29. The Soviet government is undoubtedly encouraged in its support of "peaceful co-existence" by its consciousness of the difficulties facing the Western powers in coordinating their policies and in building the kind of societies and achieving the power to which they aspire. The competition between Western trading blocs, the conflict of Western national aspirations, labour difficulties and periodic economic depressions

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limiting Western economic growth, and the "over-emphasis" on consumer goods and other problems, partially understood or exaggerated in the Soviet mind, doubtless provide some encouragement. Western alliances with a variety of "decadent" regimes, the apparently narrow view which the West takes of its interests and the lack of social discipline in Western societies must also occasion some optimism. There nevertheless remains a substantial fear in Soviet governing circles of unrestricted contact with Western ideas and wealth and, although the government is probably confident of its ability to enforce the necessary restrictions, any relaxation is likely to be closely related to the growing prestige of the Soviet system. The difficulty in determining the appropriate degree of relaxation will be complicated by the partial reliance of the Soviet regime, like most totalitarian regimes, upon the real or fancied existence of an external enemy as a justification for restraining internal pressures.

30. Apart from the foregoing considerations many developments throughout the world are to a large extent beyond the control of the Soviet government, or for that matter the control of any major power. Local forces can bring about situations which the Soviet government would wish to avoid but which may oblige it to adopt some positive course of action. The Middle East and Laotian situations, the Albanian problem and, in 1956, the Hungarian uprising are all examples of situations evolving according to a logic of their own and requiring a variety of Soviet reactions.

31. In short, the Soviet government must assert its increasing wealth and power in the face of

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increasingly complex problems. Like the Western powers, its first requirement is to avoid a war which would destroy its achievements; its second is to create an atmosphere in which it can freely employ its political and economic strength. Against this background, the decisions it makes and its specific short-term intentions depend to a large extent upon the personality of Khrushchev.

32. There appears to be little doubt that Khrushchev is a genuine and fervent believer in Communism. But this belief is accompanied by an urgent desire to increase the influence of the Soviet Union, which desire seems to lead him to press on all fronts at once: internally, he is pressing Soviet society to reform and raise the national potential ever higher; externally, he is pressing the Western powers to agree to a Berlin settlement on Soviet terms; he is also pressing the Chinese to give up their challenge and return to the path of Soviet-defined orthodoxy. Khrushchev seems to be working to a timetable governed by the triple consideration of his own life expectancy, the growth of Western (and especially German) military and economic strength, and the growth of the Chinese challenge to Moscow's leadership of international Communism. Therefore, in order to ensure the future greatness of the Soviet Union and of Soviet Communism against this triple risk, he is likely to continue to keep up the pressures he has generated, internally and externally, relying on the expanding Soviet economic, scientific and military power, in order to tip the present balance of power in his favor and make Soviet influence preponderant and decisive in world affairs.

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INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET POWER

33. The Soviet government has at its disposal substantially the same means of action as the Western powers. These include military forces, a diplomatic service, a propaganda machine and a clandestine service, as well as the economic and scientific achievements of the state. However, the manner in which the Soviet government has chosen to use these instruments has in the past differed substantially from Western practice. The following paragraphs contain a general review of how we expect the Soviet Union to employ its means of action in the future. This review is not intended to imply that each asset is employed in isolation from the others. On the contrary, all means of action are closely interrelated as, for example, in the case of Khrushchev's proposal for the diversion to underdeveloped countries of funds made available by disarmament. This proposal has strategic, economic, diplomatic and propaganda implications.

Military

34. For the reasons set out in paragraphs 7-9 above, we do not believe that the Soviet Union will use its present military power in the deliberate initiation of a major war. Nor do we believe that it is capable of developing, within the next five years, a defence establishment which could prevent the destruction of Soviet society in such a war, although its advances in anti-missile technology will enhance its capability in this regard.

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35. Accordingly, the Soviet government will, in our judgment, seek to avoid the overt employment of its forces or those of the European satellites in local situations where there is an inherent danger of conflict with the West, subject to the proviso that Soviet strategic planners might develop, and perhaps put to the test, a concept of limited war later during the coming five years. Depending on the evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Soviet authorities can be expected either to restrain the Chinese Communist government or to withhold any military assistance to it (which would also have a restraining effect). Nevertheless, circumstances could arise in which the Soviet government felt, as a result of Western disinterest, indecision or weakness, that it could act with impunity. Alternatively, it might feel forced to act to defend what it considered to be vital interests in a situation where the Western powers had either taken or were about to take forceful action. The danger of such situations occurring is greatest in Germany, the Middle East, Korea, Viet Nam, Laos and the Taiwan Straits.

36. Within bloc territory, restraints on the use of Soviet force, although present especially in East Germany, will be far less strong. The Soviet government, while preferring other means, will therefore be prepared to employ the amount of force necessary to maintain pro-Soviet regimes. This is however not likely to apply in the case of the erring Albanians, in spite of the Hungarian precedent, because Albania is not contiguous to Soviet controlled territory, because Yugoslavia,

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which lies between the bloc and Albania, is not likely to allow the use of Soviet force which would threaten its own independence, because of the risk of a definitive split with the Chinese, and because also the Soviet Union would damage its international reputation and perhaps incur the risk that NATO forces might become involved.

37. Limitations on the actual use of force do not in any sense preclude the "political" employment of the Soviet strategic striking force. It is apparent, from statements by Khrushchev and from Soviet propaganda, that the Soviet government is seeking to spread and reinforce the belief that its force can not be prevented from virtually destroying Western countries in the event of war.

Diplomatic

38. In the diplomatic field there are three approaches open to the Soviet government--conferences at the summit, public debate and traditional diplomacy. We expect that, as in the past, all three approaches will be carefully coordinated in an effort to further Soviet aims. It is apparent, however, that direct negotiation between political leaders continues to be most attractive to Khrushchev. Summit conferences have obvious advantages from his point of view. Apart from offering increased possibilities of genuine progress, they enhance his personal position, they are easier to control since they involve no delegation of authority, they eliminate "obstructive" elements at lower levels, and they offer greater opportunities to make propaganda gains and to place the blame for failure on the West.

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Public diplomacy, particularly in the United Nations, offers the Soviet government the opportunity to project the desired image of itself, to marshal neutral forces behind particular Soviet positions and to develop situations which will embarrass the West. Khrushchev will also probably continue to speak freely to unofficial Western visitors, as a supplementary means of publicizing Soviet "reasonableness" without any obligation to act. Traditional diplomacy is likely to be used primarily in a supporting role (like the Rusk-Gromyko, Gromyko-Thompson and Rusk-Dobrynin talks) to fill in time between higher level or Summit meetings, to conclude agreements on marginal or highly technical problems and to supplement the general line of Soviet foreign policy.

Propaganda

39. The propaganda apparatus of the Soviet government differs radically from the information services of Western countries. Whereas Western facilities are largely restricted to projecting a favourable image of the West and to the objective reporting of foreign news, Soviet propaganda is designed to achieve specific political results. For example, propaganda aimed at certain countries like Iran is designed to discredit and embarrass the existing regimes to the extent that the latter would be obliged to make political concessions in order to escape further criticism.

40. Propaganda is used both strategically, in pursuance of broad objectives, and tactically, to achieve limited local results. It is therefore not necessarily consistent in detail, although anomalies are carefully confined to the particular languages and areas in which they are intended to be effective.

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41. It is also used defensively to reduce the effect of Western statements and to modify the impact of embarrassing Soviet actions. This defensive aspect includes the jamming of Western broadcasts, the control of travel and restrictions on foreign correspondents. Recently, the Soviet government has allowed Izvestia to print the text of an interview with President Kennedy, thus giving the Soviet readers a Western account direct from source: but subsequent press criticisms of President Kennedy's statements have tended to qualify the significance of this exercise, whose repetition would seem to depend on the extent to which the Soviet authorities expect to obtain satisfaction from the West on disputed questions.

Clandestine

42. The Soviet government has clearly demonstrated its awareness of both the value and limitations of clandestine activities in support of its aims. There is substantial evidence that it is currently seeking to modify the activities of foreign communist parties, to encourage their alliance with other and more moderate left-wing groups and to achieve for them an aura of respectability. As with propaganda, therefore, we do not regard recent changes as fundamental. A decision to revert to older methods would depend on a number of factors, the most important being the productivity of the new policies. Illegal and covert organizations for espionage are maintained in most countries.

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Economic

43. The December 1960 Declaration of the Communist Parties of the World, more recent statements by Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders, a variety of articles in Soviet journals and the current activities of the Soviet Union in the underdeveloped areas all testify to the importance which the Soviet Government attaches to economic means in extending its influence throughout the world. Total Sino-Soviet Bloc economic aid to the underdeveloped countries is currently being extended at the rate of about \$1 billion per year and could continue at this rate or increase at least in proportion to the growth of Bloc economies. There is a renewed emphasis on military aid which continues to be concentrated in Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia and Cuba, and there are indications that Bloc trade with the underdeveloped areas will continue to increase.

44. It is virtually inevitable that these Soviet efforts will meet with some success, that some economic development will take place under Soviet auspices, that some governments will depend on Soviet military supplies, and that Soviet markets will attract an increasing proportion of the trade of the underdeveloped areas. The Soviet government can therefore look forward with a high degree of confidence to the further growth of its influence through the development of these ties. Nevertheless, the dialogue with Nasser over the plight of local communists, the serious differences with Guinea, the undertone of dissatisfaction with Soviet aid in several countries and the apparently genuine determination of most states to avoid domination by either East or West suggest that current Soviet policies

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hold only the most uncertain prospects for political domination in these areas. As Soviet economic aid programmes grow their limitations as a political instrument, long familiar in the West, will become more apparent in Moscow.

45. Over the next five years this realization and the lack of any spectacular political achievements may result in Soviet policies becoming increasingly subject to criticism from those elements in the Bloc, particularly the Chinese, who favour more extreme measures. If Khrushchev is able to resist such criticism we would expect a gradual expansion of Soviet economic ties with the underdeveloped areas and the emergence of some new candidates for "national democracy" status. However, Soviet and Western influence are likely to remain in an acceptable balance as long as the Western alternative remains open in the form of active economic aid, commercial and other policies. If, on the other hand, Khrushchev is unable to resist the opposition to his policies, which we consider unlikely, Soviet actions could assume more offensive forms.

46. In contrast to the political motives of its economic activities in the underdeveloped countries, the Soviet Government will probably continue to regard its trade with the industrial nations of the West primarily as providing valuable assistance to its domestic economic development plans. It will seek to expand its exports of commodities capable of earning foreign exchange, particularly oil, in order to maintain its imports but is unlikely to engage in the deliberate disruption of world commodity markets. In certain special cases, particularly Japan and Finland, it probably regards its

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economic policies as having a more direct bearing on its foreign relations. Generally speaking, however, it lacks the resources to exert significant political influence on any Western state by economic means alone and could only jeopardize its imports of valuable goods by seeking to do so.

Scientific

47. The Soviet government is keenly aware of the political and economic advantages accruing from major scientific achievements. The propaganda which results from such genuine technological accomplishments as sending the first men into space contributes to the image of Moscow as the scientific center of the world. Other things being equal, it attracts under-developed countries towards the U.S.S.R. for technical guidance and assistance. This, in turn, leads to closer industrial relationships and economic dependence. We expect the Soviet government to continue its reliance on the development of science. In this respect, there are two major areas in which we can anticipate continued or increased exploitation. One is that of space. The other is that of the combined field of automation and cybernetics which will undertake studies of machine programmed state planning to optimize resources and efforts to educate selected though relatively large segments of the population towards pre-conditioned automatic response supporting the socialist ideal.

48. Nevertheless, such social and space developments are not expected to affect significantly the balance of power during the period under review. The Soviets will, therefore, press vigorously the research and development of weapons, defensive systems and proven

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social and planning techniques in order to gain a dominant position in the world. They will also exploit quickly any scientific breakthrough which their large research programme might produce.

49. In summary, we consider that the attitude of the Soviet government toward the use of its assets will be governed by relatively narrow, but not necessarily short-term, national considerations. Any changes will therefore be dependent upon its assessment of the usefulness, in terms of Soviet interests, of new methods versus old. The remainder of this paper is concerned with the specific short-term goals which the Soviet government might hope to achieve by the application of the instruments discussed above to the problems before it.

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COURSES OF ACTION

50. The Soviet Union, like any major power, is concerned first with maintaining the integrity of its boundaries, secondly with protecting its interests in areas where it has more or less direct control and thirdly with the extension of its influence beyond these limits.

The Security of the Soviet State

51. There are no specific threats to Soviet boundaries as such except from China. This is of course not imminent, but there are still undemarcated portions of the Sino-Soviet boundary which could cause friction and turn into a threat to the Soviet Union. Russian interest in filling up the eastern spaces of the Soviet Union is at least partly related to a real or imagined uneasiness over Chinese intentions towards Soviet Asia. This uneasiness is not lessened by the fact that large portions of Soviet Asia were formerly part of the Chinese empire. Rivalry between China and the Soviet Union over Mongolia is a complicating factor in this respect. The main threat to the security of the Soviet state is therefore a deterioration of international relations which might lead to global war. This fear in Soviet eyes is given substance by U.S. strategic striking power and by NATO. The Soviet government is therefore likely to seek on their terms at least partial solutions in disarmament, through summit conferences and in the settlement of major issues such as Berlin. In the meantime, or in the last resort, it must rely on the maintenance of deterrent forces.

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52. Although Soviet propaganda on disarmament continues to play up the slogans of "general and complete disarmament" and "no controls without disarmament," Soviet policy in this respect is likely to focus during the next five years on West Germany in order to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons and to obtain the denuclearization of West German territory--which would deny nuclear weapons to NATO troops in Central Europe. The Soviet government is already proposing agreements to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons outside the present nuclear club (which agreements may, in the Soviet view, aim at denying these weapons to China as well as West Germany). It is also proposing agreements whereby "definite geographic areas would be made free from the production and stationing of these weapons of mass destruction." The Soviet government may also be prepared to consider specific regional schemes for safeguards against surprise attacks in areas of decision like Central Europe but it is likely to resist plans involving Soviet territory. Nuclear test suspension seems to have lost its priority as a subject for possible agreement since the Russians insist that such an agreement would have to be part of a general disarmament agreement. They are currently separating nuclear tests from disarmament for negotiating purposes but, on substance, progress with the former is likely to remain geared to progress within the wider disarmament talks forum. On the fundamental problem of control of any agreed disarmament or nuclear test suspension measures, the major Soviet concern continues to be that control would be used for espionage purposes to the prejudice of Soviet security. So far the Russians have only acquiesced in the verification of the

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actual destruction of agreed quantities of armaments, but not of the levels of armaments retained after these destructions--in line with the principle that destructions must not alter the balance of forces. There is no indication that they are likely to alter their position in this regard.

Soviet Zone of Control

53. There are areas of instability in the Soviet zone of control and this fact vitiates the opportunities for further extensions of Soviet influence. The four major problem areas on the frontier of the Soviet bloc in Europe are Finland, Yugoslavia, Albania and Germany. Through various forms of economic and political pressure the Soviet government has succeeded in maintaining in Finland a government favourable to its interests, although it may well be concerned about the prospects for the future. Yugoslavia has perforce been excluded from the bloc but problems created by the existence of this heretical national communist state on the periphery of the Soviet area of control, although persistent and irritating, are still tolerable. Albania has been declared guilty of Stalinism and the Soviet government has broken off diplomatic relations with it and kept it out of recent Warsaw Pact and other Bloc meetings. Because Albania's defiance of Moscow depends at present on Chinese support, the problem it poses is essentially part of the wider problem of Sino-Soviet relations. Germany, on the other hand, poses a threat to the Soviet Bloc frontier which is totally unacceptable from the Soviet point of view.

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54. Communism in East Germany is, for a variety of domestic reasons, inherently unstable. This situation is aggravated by the existence of the West Berlin enclave. The importance of the latter, as a standing advertisement of Western achievements and a permanent invitation to defection, has been sharply reduced by the erection of the sector border wall, but at a proportional cost in morale and productivity in East Germany. Furthermore, West Germany's economic progress and continuing rearmament, its membership in NATO and the EEC, its possession of weapons with a nuclear capability and its three to one superiority in population presents an active threat to East Germany. In these circumstances, it can safely be assumed that the Soviet government hopes to eliminate the Berlin enclave, to stabilize the East German regime and, in the long term, to neutralize West Germany at least to the extent of preventing it from exercising a detrimental influence upon East Germany.

55. Since general war, or any policy carrying grave risks of war, is unacceptable for the reasons noted above, the scope for Soviet action is limited. On the basis of past Soviet performance, however, it is possible to suggest a wide variety of less forceful actions which the Soviet government might take over a period of years in an effort to improve its position.

56. The first and most important would be a continuing attempt to extract concessions from the West through negotiation, preferably at the summit. Apart from the probability of direct success, this course has the added advantage of establishing an "a priori" Soviet case, of reducing the danger of armed conflict and or providing the Soviet government with a variety of

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propaganda opportunities. To this extent we believe that the Soviet government's interest in negotiation is genuine and that it will seek, over the next five years or so, a series of meetings at the diplomatic, foreign minister and summit levels.

57. It will also probably take a number of actions designed to erode the Western position. These will vary in severity from interference with access to Berlin to the threat of armed intervention. The Russians will also make threats whose withdrawals they will later represent as concessions. Diplomatically, they may make various moves to force the international acceptance of the German Democratic Republic, including the signing of a separate peace treaty. We cannot predict with any precision the timetable for such specific actions because they will depend largely on future Western actions and the Soviet assessment of them. These erosion tactics are likely to retain their appeal, however, provided plans for the improvement of the East German economy proceed reasonably well and there remains some prospect for progress in negotiations or some hope that the political climate in West Germany might change in favour of direct negotiation. If negotiations break down without any progress or promise of it we would anticipate increasing pressure on Berlin through minor harassing actions, perhaps culminating in the signing of a separate peace treaty and the threat of military action. We do not consider it likely, however, that the Soviet government would deliberately carry out any military threat or that it would take any steps which would obviously or inevitably lead to a major armed clash. Nevertheless, some desperate action might be taken if, after fruitless negotiations, the stability of the East

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German regime deteriorated rapidly, while the West remained adamant or became more forceful. The likelihood that Soviet military doctrine might develop a concept of limited war, during the latter part of the next five years introduces the possibility of a Soviet recourse to limited engagements but the practical circumstances of these cannot be forecast.

58. In summary, we anticipate that the Soviet authorities will continue their pressure (a) on the Western Powers, in Berlin and at the disarmament negotiating table (see paragraphs 51-52; (b) on West Germany, to induce it into direct negotiation; all against a background of carefully cultivated fear of open conflict and with the hope that the situation will evolve favourably from the Soviet point of view. Periods of pressure and mounting tensions will alternate with periods of detente of a greater or lesser duration depending on the success of the erosion tactics and of such negotiations as will be taking place and depending also on internal and Bloc factors.

The Extension of Soviet Influence

59. With regard to broader objectives in Europe, the Soviet government may hope that a policy of negotiation against a background of modulated threats will gradually weaken the resolve of the Western powers or increase their willingness to make concessions and its propaganda will undoubtedly be directed to this end.

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60. In the Middle East, the Soviet government continues to recognize the importance of Arab nationalism and to base its policy on the opportunities offered by the existence of widespread poverty in conjunction with decadent regimes or outmoded social systems. It also seeks to exploit the difficulties encountered by the Western powers in maintaining direct control over their interests in the area. Accordingly, Soviet policy consists in supporting nationalist regimes, whether radical or reformist, providing substantial economic and military aid and encouraging Middle East governments in their efforts to reduce Western influence.

61. The Soviet Union continues to refrain from direct political action and intervention in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern countries. Its continuation of economic and military aid in the face of extreme local anti-communist action suggests that it prefers to increase its contacts with existing regimes and to develop its presence in the area in a respectable and respectful way. Hostile propaganda outbursts marred Soviet-Egyptian relations at one point in 1961 and the phenomenon could recur but its occasional nature so far should not alter the overall pattern of Soviet Middle Eastern policy. It does not seem to bank on the potential of any particular regime as suggested by the rapid recognition it extended to Syria upon the latter's defection from the U.A.R. and by the equal support it gives to both Qassim and Nasser, avoiding taking sides between the two in their continuing rivalry. In Iraq, while Communist China was giving full backing to the local Communist party, the Soviet Union refrained from so doing and there are even indications that it would find the establishment of a Communist

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regime in Baghdad somewhat embarrassing to its overall Middle Eastern policy. Algeria has been a delicate subject and the Russians, while not giving up their support of the liberation movement (to which the Chinese committed their support more thoroughly), have been careful not to antagonize the French government right up to the signature of the Evian Agreements following which they were overhasty in recognizing the GPRA and miscalculated the French reaction thereto. Future Soviet political gains in Algeria would now seem to depend on such openings as may be provided by Franco-Algerian divergencies in the application of the Evian Agreements.

62. The Soviet government probably considers the long-term trends in the Middle East to be in its favour. It doubtless foresees the gradual elimination of direct Western control and the emergence of social and economic problems which will offer increasing opportunities for the extension of Soviet influence. We anticipate that it will employ primarily diplomatic and economic means to maintain and extend its present influence and that it will continue to refrain from direct political action. Its propaganda is likely to be directed for the most part to the projection of a desirable image of the Soviet Union and, in some instances, to the exacerbation of differences with the West. In the event of a crisis leading to Western military intervention, the Soviet government would doubtless resort to military threats. We think it unlikely, however, that it would actually intervene because it would judge that such Western action, if left to take its course, would damage rather than advance the Western cause. Indeed, it is difficult at this point to envisage circumstances in which the Soviet position in the area would be better

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S E C R E T

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served by large-scale military intervention than by limited military support, perhaps through "volunteers," coupled with vigorous pro-Arab diplomatic action.

63. Iran will be an exception to the above pattern. The objective of Soviet policies there is to secure Iran's withdrawal from CENTO and we expect Soviet pressures, through all the means at the disposal of the Soviet government, except direct military action, to be applied to this end. In particular, every attempt will be made to exploit the domestic difficulties of the Shah's regime.

64. As in the Middle East, the Soviet government is undoubtedly conscious of the opportunities offered by African nationalism and by the social and economic problems of the African continent. Outside the ex-Belgian Congo, Soviet activities have so far primarily consisted in normal diplomatic and economic contacts. Bloc countries have responded with alacrity to statements of specific economic needs by newly independent African nations and have moved quickly to increase their diplomatic representation in the area. Propaganda and limited covert activities may be directed toward the embarrassment of the West and the advancement of left-wing regimes but, on the whole, we believe that the Soviet government has learnt the lesson in Guinea that excessive zeal arouses anti-Soviet national sensitivities and will attempt to maintain its respectability (see also paragraph 44 above). This should also apply in the Congo unless there is a split, accompanied or followed by the formation of a leftist, extremist group which the Russians would consider expedient to support as they supported Lumumba and Gizenga at one time. Angola may offer similar opportunities.

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S E C R E T

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65. In the Far East and South Asia, the primary problem of the Soviet government is to maintain its relations with Communist China without at the same time damaging its position vis-a-vis other Asian nations. This is made difficult by the different approaches of the two countries to foreign affairs. Where the Soviet Union is cautious about the use of military force, Communist China asserts its intention to liberate Taiwan and skirmishes with India; where the Soviet Union seeks a detente with the Western powers Communist China is openly hostile; where Soviet propaganda is mild, that of Communist China is vituperative; and where the Soviet Union urges relatively moderate united front tactics on foreign communist parties, Communist China exhorts them to violent anti-colonial activism.

66. The evidence suggests that the Soviet government sees in India, which it probably regards as a counter-balance to China, the key to its Asian policy and is hopeful that Indian political evolution will take place in increasingly close association with the Soviet Union. As in the Middle East, it is therefore anxious that no action should be taken which would alienate non-communist opinion. It has accepted the Indian decision on Kerala without serious demur and it has refrained from taking sides in the Sino-Indian border dispute. It has continued large scale economic aid and has been at pains to avoid hurting Indian sensibilities. It has accepted neutral governments in Burma and other Southeast Asian countries, while Communist China has been anxious to move more quickly toward the establishment of communist regimes.

67. We consider that the Soviet government will continue to follow relatively moderate policies in the Far East and South Asia, to increase its stature and

S E C R E T

- 43 -

avoid the more offensive forms of political action. It should continue to moderate extreme Chinese policies, and even in the event of an open Sino-Soviet split, some moderating effect might remain as a result of the unlikelihood that the Russians would come to the assistance of the Chinese in a serious crisis in the Taiwan straits for instance if the Chinese provoked the crisis. In most local situations, such as Laos, it is likely to reject precipitate and violent courses of action although it will, through propaganda, aid and diplomatic action, attempt to embarrass the West. Indonesia may pose a special problem if it follows on its present belligerent course and attempts to wrest West New Guinea from the Dutch by force. The Indonesian Communist Party which used to have a Soviet orientation has begun to show a growing inclination towards China since the 22nd Congress and the Chinese of course have no hesitation in encouraging the Indonesians to violent action. The Russians have not tried to discourage the Indonesians but have been cautious in their advice over the West New Guinea issue. At the same time they have significantly increased their military assistance, although the Indonesian Army is on the whole anti-communist. We assume that Soviet rather than Chinese influence will remain preponderant in Indonesia and that counsels of caution will prevail with Sukarno but an open Sino-Soviet split could be a complicating factor.

68. Only in Japan, which is doubtless viewed in Moscow as the Asian counterpart of a rearmed Germany, do we foresee greater Soviet pressures. Through diplomatic and direct political action the Soviet government will continue to exploit anti-U.S. and anti-

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S E C R E T

- 44 -

militarist elements. It will also continue to take advantage of the Japanese interest in expanded trade and the resentment of U.S. control of former Japanese territories. Its propaganda will support these actions and will include threats concerning the consequences of foreign bases on Japanese soil.

69. The political instability, economic backwardness and chronic anti-Americanism in Latin America provide the Soviet government with opportunities that are particularly attractive because of the strategic position of that continent in relation to the U.S.A. Castro's successful defiance of the latter adds to these opportunities but also introduces complications because the Cuban pattern of revolution founded on guerrilla activities may not always be reconcilable with the Soviet gradualist tactics of using local communist forces, not to make open bids for power but to infiltrate non-communist groupings and to generate popular pressures for policies leading to closer political and economic relations with the Soviet bloc. This policy of promoting the development of independent national democracies by non-violent methods is likely to prevail during the next five years. The Russians, however, would find it difficult not to support a successful local movement using violent tactics so that there may be exceptions to their general gradualist, evolutionary policy.

70. Apart from general progress in scientific achievements, we regard space exploration as a particularly important field for extending Soviet influence and increasing Soviet prestige. The firings of the Venus probe and of the manned satellites during

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S E C R E T

- 45 -

1961 have spectacularly demonstrated Soviet scientific and technological competence. The magnitude of this effort is a measure of the importance which the Soviet government attaches to this programme. We may also expect to see scientific research and technological developments pursued vigorously to improve upon existing weapon systems, particularly to reduce their vulnerability and to improve their accuracy, reliability and destructive power. This effort will find particular application in the development of ICBM's, missile launching submarines and an effective ABM system. Such progress in the development of a machine model of their economics' system that proves meaningful will be exploited. While the application of advanced social indoctrination is a major gamble, it will have a serious influence in the long-term on Soviet likely courses of action. In summary, the Soviet Union will continue to exploit science to maintain its prestige, to improve its military position and to develop an improved social state.

71. Since the opportunities for direct communist action in North America are extremely limited, we believe that Soviet policies will be limited to encouraging the acceptance of the "Peaceful competition" thesis through propaganda and increased cultural contact. The Soviet government will also probably continue its attempts to increase trade. The main impact of the Soviet attitude to North America will be felt elsewhere in the world where, as indicated above, Soviet efforts will be directed toward the reduction, either relative or absolute, of United States' influence.

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S E C R E T

- 46 -

72. Soviet policy towards the United Nations looked most negative during 1960, being characterized by fierce attacks on the Secretary-General and on U.N. policy in the Congo where the Russians had suffered a setback. The Soviet "troika" proposal also seemed the opposite of constructive and cooperative. In 1961 however their acceptance of U Thant as Acting Secretary General indicated a return, though perhaps a reluctant one, to better dispositions. These now appear confirmed by the recent announcement that the Soviet government had paid \$3,550,000 for an apartment building near the U.N. headquarters to provide office space and living quarters for its Permanent Mission. This provides some evidence that Soviet membership is now on balance considered profitable and worth the relatively small Soviet contribution to the regular budget of the organization. It is likely that the Russians look forward to the day when their influence in the U.N. will equal or even surpass that of the Americans. The advantage, if and when that day arrives, of administering defeat to the latter in the heart of New York is no doubt looked upon as enormous. In the meantime the Russians can be expected to exploit every opportunity for embarrassment and obstructionism. The eventual entry of the Communist Chinese could, on the other hand, gradually bring out qualities of moderation and cooperation from the Soviet representatives, and even more so in the event of an open Sino-Soviet split.

SECRET



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CC 1544-1 (JIC)

1 May, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

→ G.K. Grande, Esq.,
Dept. of External Affairs.

DNI
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LOGISTIC INTELLIGENCE GUIDE ON
THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

Enclosure: (1) CUSM-1200 dated 18 Apr 62


The memorandum at enclosure (1) invites CUSRPG participation "to act as an observer and to render such assistance to the Committee as may be required" at a conference in London in October 1962 to revise SG 252 Logistic Intelligence Guide on the Soviet Armed Forces.

2. SG 252/2(60) was distributed to members on the above file on 9 Jun 60.

3. Members are requested to:

- (a) State their desires on CUSRPG representation at this conference; and,
- (b) If this is in the affirmative, decide upon the Canadian representation.

4. This item will be considered at the JIC meeting to be held on 9 May, 1962.


(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

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NATO - SECRET

COPY NO. _____

CANADA-UNITED STATES REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP

CUSM-1200

18 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Members, Regional Planning Committee
Canada-United States Regional Planning Group

SUBJECT: Logistic Intelligence Guide on the Soviet
Armed Forces

Reference: SCM-244-62, 12 April 1962

① 1. The reference advises that the Standing Group intends to convene an Ad Hoc Logistic Intelligence Working Group in London in October 1962 to produce a revised edition of SG 252, "Logistic Intelligence Guide on the Soviet Armed Forces", incorporating such new material as has become available since the previous issue of May 1960. The Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group, among others, has been invited to send a representative to act as observer and to render such assistance to the committee as may be required. Agencies intending to participate have been further requested to inform the Standing Group and the Ministry of Defence, London, of the composition of their delegation and the names of observers by 1 September 1962. Delegations and observers are expected to make their own arrangements for accommodations in London.

2. It is requested that the CUSRPG Secretariat be informed by 1 August 1962 of the desires of the Members of the Regional Planning Committee with respect to attendance at this conference in order that the Standing Group and the Ministry of Defence, London, may be advised accordingly.

ROBERT A. NOLAN
Lt. Colonel, -USAF

X G. R. WOOD
LCDR, RCN X

Secretaries

(FIB last time?)

NATO - SECRET

002112

S E C R E T

Your file: CSC 7-12 (JIC)
Our file: 50028-B-40
55 50

Ottawa, April 27, 1962.

Major E.A. Blais,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a, Ont.

Soviet Bloc and Chinese Penetration
of the Middle East and Africa

With reference to your letter of April 13, 1962, and also to Item XIV of the Minutes of the 885th Meeting of the JIC, I am sending you the attached comments prepared in this Department on the U.K. JIC (61) 59 Final, dealing with "Soviet Bloc and Chinese Penetration of the Middle East and Africa."

(Sgd.) G. K. GRANDE

G.K. Grande
Defence Liaison (2) Division

S E C R E T

COMMENTS ON
UK JIC (61) 59 Final
"Soviet Bloc and Chinese Penetration
of the Middle East and Africa"

Unfortunately, from our point of view the revised Canadian comments on this U.K. paper are, in many respects, less satisfactory than the original, mainly because they are more specific and less general. Before suggesting possible amendments to CSC 7-12 (JIC) 1824-1(JIC) of April 4, which we understand will be the basis for the JIC discussion of the U.K. paper, it may be of some value to make the following general observations as a summary of the situation as we see it. Leaving aside the summary of the U.K. paper and turning to the annex (that is, to the paper itself), the situation seems to be the following:

Paragraph 1

Definition of Penetration: We do not agree with, and from earlier comments we assume that at least some of the intelligence authorities do not agree with, the all-inclusive definition of penetration.

Paragraphs 2-35

Description of Communist activities: We are prepared to accept, and we assume from their comments that the Canadian intelligence authorities accept, the descriptive parts of the paper as generally satisfactory.

Paragraphs 36-39

Assessment of communist success: Since the U.K. paper does not explicitly describe the specific objectives which communist efforts are intended to achieve, and since penetration is defined according to the intention rather than the effect of communist activities, it is difficult, even while agreeing with the paper's description of these activities, to judge what success they have had by the communists' own standards; consequently it is difficult to reconcile the paper's assessment with our own.

S E C R E T

- 2 -

Paragraphs 40-48

Likely future developments: For the same reason, and while we do not differ over the likely actions of Middle Eastern and African Governments (paras. 42-44), in the absence of a precise description of communist objectives we are not certain that it is reasonable to conclude (paras. 46-48) that the communists will react in the fashion suggested and that they will continue their activities in the present form or perhaps employ different tactics.

2. In the light of these remarks the summary of the U.K. paper also has certain shortcomings.

3. In general, therefore, while there are no serious differences over the nature of communist activities, the failure of the paper to define the goals which these activities seek to achieve makes it difficult to agree upon the net balance of success or failure and on the likelihood that the communists will continue with their present tactics or shift to new ones.

4. If the foregoing analysis of our differences with the British paper is correct and to the extent that it covers the views of all the Canadian authorities concerned, the draft Canadian comment of April 4 might be altered as follows:

(1) Revise 1st sentence of paragraph 1 to read:

We feel that there is a tendency in this paper to over-emphasize the activities of the communists at the expense of the objectives of Sino-Soviet policy.

(2) Add at end of paragraph 2:

Economic and military aid are important instruments of communist policy but other less tangible forms should not be underestimated in evaluating the success of the communists in the Middle East and Africa as elsewhere. Moreover, the relative success or failure of the communists must be judged, insofar as it is important to attempt to foresee their likely policies in the future, by the objectives they have set themselves. We do not believe that a sufficiently precise statement of these objectives has been included and, while we do not differ with the

S E C R E T

- 3 -

paper's description of communist activities, we cannot accept entirely the analysis in its final paragraphs.

- (3) Omit paragraph 3, first word "Secondly" [For drafting purposes/.
- (4) Omit paragraph 4 in its entirety [to avoid the necessity of commenting on other points of detail/.
- (5) Revise paragraph 5 to read:
Our conclusion would perhaps be, from the viewpoint of the West, both more optimistic of the political advantage which the Bloc has so far derived from its activities and more pessimistic on the possibility of a dramatic increase in these activities in coming years. In the short term the Soviet Union wishes to destroy Western influence in the under-developed areas. This objective coincides with the indigenous nationalist aims. The nationalists wish to become free of colonial ties, both in political and economic terms; the communists wish to remove Western influence so that the political, economic, and military vacuums may be filled by the Soviet Union (and China). Nevertheless the long-term communist objective of bringing nationalist governments within the control of the Soviet Bloc is undoubtedly as obnoxious to the nationalists as would be the continuation of colonialism. In consequence, Soviet objectives must be cautiously implemented. The communist governments have not solved their dilemma mentioned above and it seems to us that the extremists within the Bloc are likely to have increasing doubts about the value of underwriting the "bourgeois nationalist" regimes of the area. The increase in communist activities may well be out of proportion to the advantages derived from them but the scale of Bloc activity is likely, nevertheless, to increase quite rapidly.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

To: **THE CANADIAN EMBASSY**
HAVANA, CUBA

From: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: **Your Letter No. L-138 of March 23**

Subject: **Material on Sino-Soviet Bloc**
Developments

Security: **RESTRICTED**

No.: **Y-- 104**

Date: **April 25, 1962**

Enclosures: **None**

Air or Surface Mail: **Air**

Post File No.: _____

Ottawa File No.	
50328B-B-40	
26	✓

References

European
DL(2)

Your letter under reference has been brought to the attention of Far Eastern, European and Defence Liaison (2) Divisions, and as requested, in future you will be included in the circulation list for despatches dealing with Communist bloc policy developments.

J. M. TEAKLES
FOR THE

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Internal
Circulation

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Distribution
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, HAVANA, Cuba.

Reference:.....

Subject: Material on Sino-Soviet Bloc Developments.

Security:.....**RESTRICTED**

No:.....**L-138**

Date:.....**March 23, 1962.**

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....**Courier**

Post File No:.....**10-4-3**

Ottawa File No.

50393-40 "Y"

23

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In view of Cuba's close association with the Sino-Soviet bloc, I think it would be useful for this Embassy to be included in the circulation list for despatches dealing with broad policy developments within the bloc. We do not wish to receive too large a volume of material, but we should be grateful if the appropriate Divisions would bear our interest in mind.

Y	TO: <i>Mr. Hall</i>
	APR 17 1962
REGISTRY	

George P. Ridd
Ambassador.

Internal
Circulation
D. L. (2) GW.
(Done by In-mail
Distribution Section)

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Distribution
to Posts

NO ENCLOSURES

RESTRICTED
(Enclosure SECRET)



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CC 1544-5 (JIC)

25 April, 1962. *933*

Ottawa, Ontario

DNI (1)
DMI (1)
DAI (3)
JIB (2)
DSI (1)

50028-B-40	
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SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIRCRAFT

Reference: (a) CC 1544-5 (JIC) dated
2 November, 1961.

Enclosure: (1) Sino-Soviet Bloc Aircraft
dated 12 Feb 62 (Change No.1)

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.

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APR 26

E.A. Blais
(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: → G.K. Grande, Esq.,
Dept. of External Affairs. (no enclosure)
RCMP "
CB NRC "
JIS (1)

File
[Signature]
002119

RESTRICTED

50028-B-10

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE 14 50



CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

19 April, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

232

THE MILITARY EFFECT OF SOVIET ACQUISITION
OF BASES AND FACILITIES IN FINLAND

Reference: (a) CSC 7-17, CSC 1824-1 (JIC)
of 22 Mar 62

The British Joint Intelligence Committee has informed us that they have now cancelled BRITISH JIC(62)11(Final) dated 8 Mar 62 on the above subject.

APR 25 .962

EAB/2-5459/1c

(E.A. Blais)

Major,
Secretary.

Registry
you
I have done what
is stated in the
attached 2/10



RESTRICTED
(Enclosure CONFIDENTIAL)
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE


CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

19 April, 1962.

230
Ottawa, Ontario

→ J.K. Starnes, Esq.,
Dept. of External Affairs.

DNI
DMI
DAI
DSI
RCMP
JIB
CB NRC



SINO-SOVIET BLOC WAR POTENTIAL
1962-66

Reference: (a) CSC 7-17, CSC 1824-1 (JIC)
of 15 Mar 62

Enclosure: (1) Corrigendum to BRITISH
JIC(62)3(Final) dated 16 Feb 62
on the above subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.

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APR 24 1962

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/lc

(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: Defence Liaison (2) Division

Security **SECRET**

Date April 18, 1962

FROM: African & Middle Eastern Division

File No.

50028-B-40
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REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: UK JIC(61) 59 Final - Soviet Bloc and Chinese Penetration
of the Middle East and Africa.

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APR 27

Unfortunately, from our point of view the revised Canadian comments on this U.K. paper are, in many respects, less satisfactory than the original, mainly because they are more specific and less general. Before suggesting possible amendments to CSC 7-12(JIC) 1824-1(JIC) of April 4, which we understand will be the basis for the JIC discussion of the U.K. paper, it may be of some value to make the following general observations as a summary of the situation as we see it. Leaving aside the summary of the U.K. paper and turning to the annex (that is, to the paper itself), the situation seems to be the following:

Paragraph 1

Definition of Penetration: We do not agree with, and from earlier comments we assume that at least some of the intelligence authorities do not agree with, the all-inclusive definition of penetration.

Paragraphs 2-35

Description of communist activities: We are prepared to accept, and we assume from their comments that the Canadian intelligence authorities accept, the descriptive parts of the paper as generally satisfactory.

CIRCULATION

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Paragraphs 36-39

Assessment of communist success: Since the U.K. paper does not explicitly describe the specific objectives which communist efforts are intended to achieve, and since penetration is defined according to the intention rather than the effect of communist activities, it is difficult, even while agreeing with the paper's description of these activities, to judge what success they have had by the communists' own standards; consequently it is difficult to reconcile the paper's assessment with our own.

Paragraphs 40-48

Likely future developments: For the same reason, and while we do not differ over the likely actions of Middle Eastern and African Governments (paras. 42-44), in the absence of a precise description of communist objectives we are not certain that it is reasonable to conclude (paras. 46-48) that the communists will react in the fashion suggested and that they will continue their activities in the present form or perhaps employ different tactics.

2. In the light of these remarks the summary of the U.K. paper also has certain shortcomings.

3. In general, therefore, while there are no serious differences over the nature of communist activities, the failure of the paper to define the goals which these activities seek to achieve makes it difficult to agree upon the net balance of success or failure and on the likelihood that the communists will continue with their present tactics or shift to new ones.

4. If the foregoing analysis of our differences with the British paper is correct and to the extent that it covers the views of all the Canadian authorities concerned, the draft Canadian comment of April 4 might

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be altered as follows:

- (1) Revise 1st sentence of paragraph 1 to read:
We feel that there is a tendency in this paper to over-emphasize the activities of the communists at the expense of the objectives of Sino-Soviet policy.
- (2) Add at end of paragraph 2:
Economic and military aid are important instruments of communist policy but other less tangible forms should not be underestimated in evaluating the success of the communists in the Middle East and Africa as elsewhere. Moreover, the relative success or failure of the communists must be judged, insofar as it is important to attempt to foresee their likely policies in the future, by the objectives they have set themselves. We do not believe that a sufficiently precise statement of these objectives has been included and, while we do not differ with the paper's description of communist activities, we cannot accept entirely the analysis in its final paragraphs.
- (3) Omit paragraph 3, first word "Secondly" /for drafting purposes/.
- (4) Omit paragraph 4 in its entirety /to avoid the necessity of commenting on other points of detail/.
- (5) Revise paragraph 5 to read:
Our conclusion would perhaps be, from the viewpoint of the West, both more optimistic of the political advantage which the Bloc has so far derived from its activities and more pessimistic on the possibility of a dramatic increase in these activities in coming years. In the short term the Soviet Union wishes to destroy Western influence in the under-developed areas. This objective coincides with the indigenous nationalist aims. The nationalists wish to become free

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of colonial ties, both in political and economic terms; the communists wish to remove Western influence so that the political, economic, and military vacuums may be filled by the Soviet Union (and China). Nevertheless the long-term communist objective of bringing nationalist governments within the control of the Soviet Bloc is undoubtedly as obnoxious to the nationalists as would be the continuation of colonialism. In consequence, Soviet objectives must be cautiously implemented. The communist governments have not solved their dilemma mentioned above and it seems to us that the extremists within the Bloc are likely to have increasing doubts about the value of underwriting the "bourgeois nationalist" regimes of the area. The increase in communist activities may well be out of proportion to the advantages derived from them but the scale of Bloc activity is likely, nevertheless, to increase quite rapidly.

SBH. h.

African & Middle Eastern
Division



SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CC 1374-1 (JIC)

17 April, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

CAPACITY OF SOVIET RAILWAYS

Reference: (a) CC 1374-5, CC 1374-1 (JIC)
of 2 Mar 62

In my letter at reference (a) I asked JIB to advise me if, in view of the fact that the JIC had decided not to send a delegate to the May 1962 SHAPE railway conference, there was any point in completing the forms forwarded by SHAPE.

2. JIB has now informed me that there is no information from Canadian sources which would enable them to answer any of the detailed questions in the proforma.

3. I have therefore forwarded a message to ACNMR SHAPE to the effect that:

"Canadian JIC will be unable to provide any of the information requested in the proformas forwarded with your letter of 26 Feb. Delay in reply is regretted."

E.A. Blais
(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS (2)
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APR 18

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SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 7-12 (JIC)

13 April, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SOVIET BLOC AND CHINESE PENETRATION
OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

Reference: (a) CSC 7-12, CSC 1824-1 (JIC)
of 4 April, 1962

Enclosure: (1) DAI memorandum M42-1000(DAI) of
9 April, 1962.

APR 16, 1962

My letter at reference (a) forwarded revised JIB
comments on British JIC(61)59 on the above subject.

2. DAI have now forwarded the additional comments at
enclosure (1). In order that the final JIC comments may
be prepared to be sent to the JICLO(L) for the British
JIC, this item will be considered under "Other Business".

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: CJS
JIS (2)
SOJIR
SOCI

(E.A. Bleis)
Major,
Secretary.

SECRET

C O P Y

M42-1000 (DAI)

MEMORANDUM

Ref CSC 7-12
CSC 1824-1 (JIC) 4 Apr

9 Apr 62

Sec JIC

Soviet Bloc and Chinese Penetration
of the Middle East and Africa

1. DAI is not in complete agreement with the draft reply. It would appear that two British phrases have been taken out of context and may have been misinterpreted. JIC(61)96 (Final) attempts to cover a very large subject, is terse and does not repeat basic conclusions included in related British papers.
2. In the short term, the Soviet Union wishes to destroy Western influence in the underdeveloped areas. This objective coincides with the indigenous nationalist aims. The nationalists wish to become independent of colonial ties; the Communists wish to remove Western influence so that the political, economic and military vacuums may be filled by the Soviet Union. To achieve this initial objective, Communist "strategy is to contribute to the instability of the Area". Instability facilitates activity directed against established ties.
3. The aforementioned British conclusion, it is suggested, is not at variance with the subsequent statement that "the Russians ...have in general a relatively cautious and long term outlook". The long term Communist objective is the creation of governments subservient to Moscow. Such a policy is undoubtedly as obnoxious to the nationalists as continued colonialism. In consequence, the Soviet long term objective must be cautiously implemented. Open support for indigenous Communist parties might reveal the ultimate USSR objective. Direct Soviet support is therefore withheld from local CPs where such action might endanger the full implementation of the short term objective.
4. The draft makes no reference to the fact that the West has lost major military advantages in the countries under review. Essential air and naval bases have been forfeited; staging rights have been denied. Even where the Communist Bloc has failed to establish an economic and political foothold, the astute exploitation of local nationalism has undermined the Western position. The loss of Western military installations in Jordan, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia fall within the latter category.

(LC Dilworth) G/C
DAI
2-2668

SECRET



RESTRICTED
(Enclosure SECRET)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

10 Apr 62

JFS

Ottawa, Ontario	
50028-B-	40
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

THE MILITARY EFFECTS OF SOVIET
ACQUISITION OF BASES AND FACILITIES
IN FINLAND

Reference: (a) CSC 7-17, CSC 1824-1 (JIC)
of 22 Mar 62

Enclosure: (1) Canadian JIC comments on
BRITISH JIC(62)11(Final)
dated 8 Mar 62 on the above
subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.

E.A. Blais
(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS (2)
SOJIR
SOOI

JICLO(L) (for your personal information only)

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APR 11
[Signature]

SECRET

CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

10 April, 1962.

Comments on BRITISH JIC(62)11(Final) of 8 Mar 62
"The Military Effects of Soviet Acquisition of Bases
and Facilities in Finland"

DMI: DMI considers this is a very interesting paper, particularly if read in conjunction with the recent Kekkonen-Khrushchev conversations. DMI believe it to be an accurate and logical assessment.

DMI agrees with the conclusions that the military advantages accruing to the Soviets by gaining bases in Finland would be small. However, DMI believes they have much to gain politically from such a move and will no doubt seek another opportunity for military consultations with Finland in the near future.

DNI: Paragraph 6 of this paper refers to the effect on Naval Operations in the Baltic in the event certain Finnish Naval Bases and strategic islands were occupied by Soviet Forces. DNI does not disagree with any of the points brought forward by the British JIC in this paragraph.

DNI concurs with the conclusion of this paper.

DAI: DAI is in agreement with the conclusions expressed in this paper. Nevertheless, DAI considers that the paper should include reference to the existing arrangements linking Finnish early warning to the Soviet air defence system. At present, the paper, (para 3 and 4) implies the absence of preparatory work in this field and thereby excludes the information reported in JICLON 23 dated 22 Mar 60 and subsequent related reports.

XA, JIB, DSI, CBNRC, RCMP: No comments.

Circulated for information.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: D. L. (2)

FROM: African and Middle Eastern Division

REFERENCE: UK-JIC Paper 6159 - Sino-Soviet
Penetration of Middle East and
SUBJECT: Africa.

SECRET
Security CANADIAN EYES ONLY

Date April 9, 1962

File No.

50028-B-40

55 -

It had been our intention to comment on the substance of the British paper on Sino-Soviet penetration of the Middle-East and Africa, but we understand that for your purpose it might be sufficient if we restricted ourselves to clearing the comments on this paper by Canadian intelligence authorities which you have already transmitted to Canada House.

2. We support the general reservations made by both JIB and DAI. The British paper is too general and its conclusions give rise to misleading impressions. It fails to give a clear picture of Bloc objectives or of the problems faced in these areas by the Sino-Soviet countries. Consequently it is exceedingly difficult to determine from the paper whether the communists themselves may reasonably be satisfied with their efforts thus far and whether by our own standards the extent of communist success should be considered a threat or a challenge to the interests of the West in those areas.

3. We have no serious disagreement with the specific comments made by the intelligence authorities concerned although for example we would not be inclined to play down, as DAI did, the importance of the Bloc's military and economic aid in terms of its total activity in the areas under consideration. We have no objections therefore to the release of these comments to UK-JIC authorities.

Ure
African and Middle Eastern
Division

CIRCULATION



RESTRICTED
(Enclosure CONFIDENTIAL)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

5 Apr 62

Ottawa, Ontario

→ J.K. Starnes, Esq.,
Dept. of External Affairs.

DNI
DMI
DAI
DSI
RCMP
JIB
CB NRC

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THE SOVIET MISSILE THREAT UP TO
THE END OF 1966 AS ON 1ST FEBRUARY, 1962

Reference: (a) CSC 7-17, CSC 1824-1 (JIC)
of 28 Mar 62

Enclosure: (1) Corrigendum to British JIC
(62)28(Final) dated 22 Mar 62
on the above subject.

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Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.

APR 6 1962

(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

RESTRICTED

Your file: CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)
Our file: 50028-B-40
O t t a w a, April 2, 1962.

Major P.A. Blais,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a, Ont.

The Soviet Missile Threat up to the
end of 1966 as on 1st February 1962

In reply to your letter of March 28, 1962,
we wish to inform you that this Department has no
comments on British JIC (62) 28 (Final) dated
March 20, 1962, entitled "The Soviet Missile Threat
up to the end of 1966 as on 1st February 1962."

J.K. Starnes
Defence Liaison (2) Division



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 7-17 (JIC)

30 March, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

POST REPORT

Enclosure: (1) Post Report - Moscow, U.S.S.R.
March 1962.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for the information of
members.

E.A. Blais
(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS

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MAR 30

[Signature]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POST REPORT

MOSCOW, U.S.S.R.

MARCH 1962

POST REPORT
CANADIAN EMBASSY, MOSCOW
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Appendix I - Travel to the Soviet Union via
London-Leningrad Sea Route.

Appendix II - Items of Particular Interest
to Service Personnel.

POST REPORT
CANADIAN EMBASSY, MOSCOW
STAFF AS OF NOVEMBER 1961

HEAD OF MISSION

Ambassador

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1 Counsellor
1 First Secretary
1 Third Secretary
1 Attaché - Administrative Officer
1 Attaché - Vice-Consul
1 Secretary to Ambassador
3 Stenographers
2 Clerks
1 Communicator
2 Technicians

TRADE AND COMMERCE

1 Counsellor (Commercial)
1 Stenographer

NATIONAL DEFENCE

1 Naval Attaché
1 Military Attaché
1 Air Attaché
1 Assistant Air Attaché
1 Military Clerk (Army)
1 Military Clerk (Air Force)

LOCAL STAFF

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Administrator
3 Translatresses-Telephonists
5 Chauffeurs
1 Messenger-Driver
2 Dvorniks
1 Gardener-Dvornik
1 Butler (Ambassador's Senior Servant)
1 Charwoman

TRADE AND COMMERCE

Commercial Assistant (Translator-Interpreter)
1 Stenographer-Translatress
1 Chauffeur

NATIONAL DEFENCE

4 Chauffeurs

NOTE: Other servants are maintained at the personal expense of the members of the Embassy staff.

A. THE U.S.S.R.

(a) General

Following its expansion at the expense of Poland, Roumania, Finland, the Baltic States and East Prussia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics now straddles Europe and Asia from the borders it shares with Norway, Finland, Poland (95 miles east of Warsaw), Roumania and Turkey, to the Bering Sea and the Sea of Japan, flanking Iran, Afghanistan, China and Outer Mongolia. Its southernmost point touches 36° latitude. It is divided into fifteen administrative areas or "republics". Although all republics are of theoretically equal status within the Union, the degree to which the R.S.F.S.R. predominates politically, economically and culturally, may be judged from the fact that it includes 55% of the

- 2 -

country's population and an even larger percentage of the territory and natural resources. The Ukraine includes over 20% of the population, while the remaining 25% is distributed amongst the other thirteen republics.

Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.)	(Moscow)
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	(Kiev)
Moldavian S.S.R.	(Kishenev)
Byelorussian S.S.R.	(Minsk)
Kazakh S.S.R.	(Alma Ata)
The "Baltic Union Republics":	
Lithuanian S.S.R.	(Vilnius)
Latvian S.S.R.	(Riga)
Estonian S.S.R.	(Tallin)
The "Union Republics of Transcaucasia":	
Azerbaijan S.S.R.	(Baku)
Armenian S.S.R.	(Yerevan)
Georgian S.S.R.	(Tbilisi)
The "Union Republics of Central Asia":	
Turkmen S.S.R.	(Ashkhabad)
Uzbek S.S.R.	(Tashkent)
Tadjik S.S.R.	(Stalinabad)
Kirghiz S.S.R.	(Frunze)

In area, the U.S.S.R. is the largest country in the world, and is more than twice the size of Canada which is the next largest. According to the latest census figures, the Soviet population amounts to 216,200,000 of which 48% is urban. Its greatest economic development is in the field of heavy industry, especially machine construction, and the U.S.S.R. is now second only to the U.S.A. in gross volume of industrial production. It remains well behind the U.S.A. and most West European countries in terms of per capita production. Of its total area of 8,708,070 square miles, about one-third is under agriculture, the remaining two-thirds being undeveloped (forest areas, tundra, deserts, mountains, and swamps). Some parts of this, although marginal land at best, are capable of being developed for agriculture. The European part of the U.S.S.R. (from the Polish and Roumanian borders eastward to the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea) is the most developed agriculturally. In this area there is uncultivated land only in the north and in the extreme southeast (arid steppes, mountains and semi-desert). The largest expanse of under-developed land lies to the east, in the taiga and tundra belts of Siberia, its mountain belt in the south and, to the southeast, in the deserts and mountains of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Only the strip of territory adjoining the main line of the Siberian Railway and narrowing towards the east has been under cultivation for any length of time. Especially in the steppe zone of Kazakhstan and

- 3 -

Western Siberia, considerable areas of this long-fallow land (called the new or virgin lands) have been developed for wheat farming and have produced good crops during the past few years.

(b) Language

The language of the Russian nationals, Russian is the official language of the Soviet Union. Together with the Ukrainian and White Russian languages it forms the Eastern Slavonic group of the Slavonic tongues. It is extremely rich in folklore and literature. The native languages of most minorities are taught in their respective regional schools, and in the Republics and autonomous areas where a single minority language predominates, it has at least semi-official status locally, together with Russian.

(c) Religion

The only existing party in the U.S.S.R. is the Communist Party, avowedly atheistic. The former Orthodox Greek State Church was disestablished in 1917, and most of the churches and monasteries were taken over as state property. (Many of its unique and rich treasures can today be seen in museums). All organized religion is under the control of state agencies (e.g., the Council of the Affairs of Religious Cults under the USSR Council of Ministers) which consider various questions pertaining to church buildings, assistance to churches, etc., as well as the question whether any given religious community can be registered as a recognized religious body. Subject to this restriction, religious services may be openly held and churches may be leased from the state by not less than 20 citizens constituting part of the congregation. Priests and clergy have no electoral rights and are prohibited to use religion as a political instrument.

Article 124, of the Constitution of the Soviet Union, speaks of religious freedom in the following words, "in order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens." It should be noted that while freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized, no such freedom for religious propaganda is mentioned and this, of course, permits the government to instigate and actively support periodic anti-religious campaigns. Anti-religious propaganda has, however, tended to be less offensive since a special decree on this subject in November 1954.

(d) Transportation Facilities

Air and rail travel in the USSR are reasonably efficient, although the latter is rather slow. All large centres in the country are connected by regular air service, many by jet. International air service (provided by Aeroflot, the state airline, and foreign carriers with which it has agreements) has increased considerably in the past few years and there are now direct flights to and from London, Paris, Vienna, Brussels, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki, Delhi, and other capitals. Apart from the satellites, foreign airlines flying into Moscow include BEA, Air France, Sabena, KLM, SAS, Air India, Finnair and others. Although these airlines maintain offices in Moscow and can provide valuable assistance in making reservations, giving information about connecting flights in Western Europe, etc., the actual purchase of tickets in Moscow can be arranged only through Aeroflot. Road conditions, although they vary from town to town, are generally not good. Rural highways tend to be rough and unpaved, but travel by car between the main centres is feasible.

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(e) Travel Restrictions

All travel by foreigners beyond a 25-mile radius from the centre of Moscow must be approved by the Foreign Ministry, and 48 hours' notice of intent to travel must be given. Border areas and other large, apparently sensitive sections of the country, are banned for foreigners and other restrictions are periodically imposed for limited periods. Even within these limitations, it is possible to see a good part of the country.

(f) Photographic Restrictions

The Soviet restrictions must be observed strictly. Where the regulations are not precise, common sense in using a camera will do much to avoid unpleasant incidents. The regulations read as follows (as of February 11, 1954, and still valid):

"The Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. presents its compliments to all Embassies and Missions and, in connection with requests made by a number of Embassies and Missions concerning the rights of taking photographs on the territory of the U.S.S.R., has the honour to state that, according to the existing régime towards foreign citizens:

- (1) It is permitted in all the territory of the U.S.S.R., with the exception of the points and places which foreigners are forbidden to visit, to take photographs as well as to make drawings of monuments of architecture, buildings of cultural-educational and medical enterprises, educational institutions, theatres, museums, parks of rest and culture, stadiums, streets and squares, dwellings, as well as views and landscapes whose background do not contain the objectives enumerated hereunder in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e).

In industrial plants engaged in the production of civilian goods, in state farms, collective farms and machine tractor stations, in railroad stations, airports, river ports, state enterprises, educational institutions and public organizations, taking photographs and drawings in certain cases can be made with the permission of the management of those enterprises and organizations.

- (2) It is forbidden to take pictures or to make drawings:
 - (a) In the 25 kilometre border zone, with the exception of points and places which foreigners are not forbidden to visit - in these places it is permitted to photograph the objectives enumerated in paragraph (1);
 - (b) All types of military technics and armaments, all military objectives and enterprises and warehouses of combustible materials;
 - (c) Seaports, large hydro-technical constructions (sluice gates, dams, pumping stations), railroad junctions, tunnels, railway and highway bridges;

- 5 -

- (d) Industrial plants, scientific-research institutes, constructors' bureaus, laboratories, electro stations, radio beacons, radio stations, telephone and telegraph stations;
- (e) From the airplanes on trips over the territory of the U.S.S.R., as well as aerial perspectives in the form of sketches and drawings of industrial cities."

Needless to say, amateur photographers will find great scope in the Soviet Union. However, the carrying of a camera requires the exercise of considerable discretion. Experience has shown that foreigners may be detained by the M.V.D. for taking pictures of forbidden subjects whether or not they have done so, and whether or not they have been carrying cameras. If stopped by the militia, a person may be asked to surrender or spoil his film, but his camera is not touched and further unpleasant consequences do not frequently occur.

B. LOCAL INFORMATION (MOSCOW)

1. General

Moscow, the capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and also of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, is the centre of Soviet governmental, social and cultural activities. It is situated on a large plain on the banks of the Moscow and Yauza Rivers at approximately 55°45' N. and 37°37' E. The rivers are not navigable for ships of any great size and are frozen for about five months of the year. Local traffic connecting with the great Volga River system is carried by barges and small passenger steamers. The surrounding country-side is generally flat; there are no large lakes in the vicinity, but there are a few small rivers.

Moscow is the rail and air hub of the country. Eleven railroads radiate from the city, and there are two airports used for commercial traffic. The main airport (at which foreigners arriving in Moscow usually land) is about forty minutes' drive on a good road from the centre of the city. By these means, Moscow is directly connected with the principal areas of the Soviet Union, as well as with the larger cities of Asia and of Western and Eastern Europe.

Moscow is 525 to 815 feet above sea level and sprawls over seven very low hills. The heart of the city is the Red Square and the walled area of the Kremlin. Wide modern traffic arteries radiate out from the Kremlin and from two concentric circles around it. The facades of "Soviet modern" buildings on the newer thoroughfares and the hundreds of building cranes scattered all over the city, indicate ambitious plans for a monumental city, but the dilapidated 18th century and early 19th century mansions in neo-classical style, set between recently built, barrack-like apartment buildings and wooden huts, give a truer impression of the conditions under which the majority of the city's inhabitants live. The metropolitan area covers some 28 square miles and is officially accorded a population of about 7,200,000. It is estimated that the population is actually 9,000,000 or more if the suburbs and "unregistered" inhabitants are included. The shortage of housing space and the congestion of shopping facilities remains a difficult problem even though great efforts are now being made in new construction, especially on the perimeter of the city.

- 6 -

2. Climatic Conditions

The climate of Moscow is continental and, in general, compares with that of Ottawa, with its long and cold winter and short hot summers. There is, however, considerably less sunshine both in winter and in summer than in Ottawa, the winter is longer, and the damp chill of the monotonously dreary days of late autumn is especially depressing. Consecutive days of clear sunshine are rare, but are an event worth waiting for.

The prevailing winds are southerly and south-westerly. The average precipitation is 21 inches a year and is heaviest during a six months' period from May to October, and lightest from January to March. The average number of rainy (or snowy) days per year is 178. The 50-year average of barometer pressure is 747.2 millimetres. As in Ottawa, humidity is high, both in summer and winter.

The average daily temperature during the coldest months of December, January and February is 14° - 15° above zero Fahrenheit. The lowest on record was in February 1940, when the temperature reached minus 54°F. The highest recorded temperature was 96°F. in August 1946. The general average for June and July is 64° - 66°F.

3. Health Conditions

Living conditions and sanitation among the ordinary people in Moscow are poor in comparison with Canadian standards. It is not at all uncommon to find three or four people occupying one medium-sized room. To the inadequacy of bathing, (some Moscow homes are not serviced with running water and probably a majority have no hot running water) toilet and laundry facilities for the greater part of the population must be added the general lag in sanitary food handling practices. However, hotels and railway stations in Moscow frequented by foreigners are equipped with adequate though usually poorly maintained facilities.

The municipal health department is under the supervision of the Ministry of Health. No statistics for health conditions or for occupational and infectious diseases are ever released, but typhoid and para-typhoid fever do occur sporadically. There are reasons to believe that the rate of tuberculosis is high amongst the local population. Public acknowledgement has also now been made of the high incidence of poliomyelitis.

The most common ailment which afflicts Canadians as well as other members of the foreign colony is an intestinal bacterial infection, which is particularly - though not exclusively - troublesome during the summer months when fresh fruits and vegetables are available in the farm markets. This "Moscow tummy" usually occurs in the form of simple gastritis and diarrhoea. While an annoying affliction, it is usually not a serious one. Flies and the summer dust are also a menace in spreading intestinal infections. Protective measures in the Embassy cannot be fully effective owing to the lack of control over the preparation and preservation of food before it is bought.

During the winter months head colds, tonsillitis and middle ear infections are common. Persons suffering from chronic sinus trouble, bronchitis or asthma do not fare well in Moscow. For foreigners, the best safeguard against diseases common in Moscow is a generally high health standard on arrival. According to a report prepared by the United States Embassy doctor, living in Moscow is inadvisable for those suffering from the following illnesses: gastric or duodenal ulcer, pernicious anaemia, chronic myelogenous leukemia, chronic kidney, liver or gall-bladder diseases, diabetes, tuberculosis

- 7 -

(even if arrested), chronic pleurisy, chronic heart diseases of any type, or excessively high blood pressure. That people with such illnesses should not come to Moscow is not so much because of any dangers in the Moscow climate, but rather that in Moscow it may not be possible to continue the treatment given by Canadian physicians and hospitals.

4. Physical Examination and Vaccination

All persons appointed to the Canadian Embassy in Moscow should have a complete physical examination prior to their departure. Vaccination and inoculations against the following diseases are essential: smallpox, tetanus, typhoid and paratyphoid fevers. In addition, children must be immunized against diphtheria, scarlet fever, whooping cough and poliomyelitis (Salk vaccine), and BCG (tuberculosis) immunization is also considered useful. Salk vaccination is desirable also for adults (up to 30 years old, it is essential; between 30 and 40, advisable; and over 40, optional).

With the British and Australian Embassies the Canadian Embassy shares the financial support of a Commonwealth doctor. The doctor has a dispensary in the British Embassy, which is about ten minutes' drive from the Canadian Embassy. It is not equipped for X-ray or extensive laboratory procedure. When such treatment is required it is necessary to go to a Soviet hospital. The Soviet authorities have now agreed that the Commonwealth doctor will be allowed to be present during operations on his patients, and he is also permitted to visit patients during their convalescence, as an ordinary visitor. He has, however, no official status with respect to Commonwealth patients in Soviet hospitals and cannot prescribe treatment or medication. The United States Embassy also maintains a doctor in Moscow who, with the Commonwealth doctor, tends to the minor ailments of the vast majority of the foreign missions. In cases of serious illness, members of the staff would be well advised to enter a hospital in Western Europe. Although many foreigners have of necessity made use of Moscow hospitals, Soviet medical practices (for example, poor sanitation, and reluctance to give a general anaesthetic) are not such as to inspire confidence in Western patients and their use is restricted to emergencies. On the other hand, there is a special polyclinic available to members of foreign embassies which has very good facilities for many types of therapy on an out-patient basis and which arranges consultations with leading Soviet medical experts.

There are maternity hospitals available in Moscow, but conditions in the best and most modern, which is the one usually designated for maternity cases among the foreign population, are below Canadian standards. Although foreigners have usually received reasonably satisfactory care in Soviet maternity wards, delivery is more of a strain than in Western hospitals (again in part due to reluctance to use sufficient anaesthetic), and there have been illnesses and cases of infant mortality which various United States and Commonwealth doctors here have ascribed to lagging medical practice and knowledge. There are, moreover, some psychological disadvantages, such as an absence of anaesthetics and a ban on smoking, visitors and telephone calls. Mothers who have had babies in Moscow describe the facilities in the delivery room as crude. But by far the worst hazard is its enormous size which means that normally ten or fifteen mothers may be delivering simultaneously. As a result of all these considerations it is recommended that arrangements should be made for confinement in Western Europe.

About 70% of the Soviet medical practitioners are women. It is said that the average physician compares in ability with the average third-year student in America - a statement which is very

difficult to prove, but which may not be far wrong. There are highly qualified specialists and many advanced research scientists, but the standards of general medical practice are low and limited by the nature of the equipment and medication available. Knowledge of recently-discovered techniques, universally known in Western countries, is usually non-existent among general practitioners.

5. Dental Care

All necessary dental treatment should be completed before departure for the Soviet Union, and periodic dental checks should be made in Western European centres. Dental treatment is available in Soviet dental clinics but normally foreigners do not make use of Soviet dental facilities unless the care which they need will not wait until they next have a chance to see a dentist in Western Europe.

6. Oculists and Opticians

Persons requiring glasses should have their eyes examined and lenses checked before leaving for the Soviet Union. It is advisable to bring an extra pair of glasses. If glasses are broken, they are usually sent to Canada through the diplomatic bag for replacement. A quite satisfactory alternative would be to have the work done in Western Europe (in Sweden, for example). Ordinary repairs or adjustments to glasses have not been readily available locally. However, facilities continue to improve and at least temporary repairs can be obtained in an emergency.

7. Accommodation

The Embassy is situated at 23 Starokonyushenny Pereulok, a quiet street about twenty minutes' walk from the Kremlin and the centre of the city. It is only two blocks from one of Moscow's well-known shopping districts, the Arbat. The 2½-storey Embassy building, with a small house and outbuildings in the rear of the compound, was formerly the home of a wealthy textile merchant. Until the war it was used by the Danish Legation, and it is now rented on a yearly lease from the Soviet Government. The main building contains the Chancery and one flat on the ground floor, with the Ambassador's Official Residence occupying the second floor. The basement is used primarily for storage but it is intended to create a staff lounge and kitchen out of a flat which is now occupied by a member of the administrative staff.

An additional wing to the Chancery will be completed in the near future and will provide office space for almost all the Canadian staff. The ground floor and part of the second floor of the house in the garden form a maisonnette which is occupied by the Counsellor; the remainder of the second floor of this house (a four-room flat with separate entrance) being occupied by a married member of the administrative staff.

Other members of the Embassy staff are housed in flats outside the Embassy compound. All of them are located in large blocks of flats, the furthest of them approximately fifteen minutes by car from the Embassy. Most of the unmarried staff at present share flats comprising two bedrooms and a common living room plus kitchen and bathroom. All staff flats are provided with Government-owned furniture and essential equipment.

Under the present system of allowances, each member of the staff pays the amount appropriate to his grade as his share in the rent of the flats. Light, heat and water are a charge on the Government but telephone charges are paid personally.

(NOTE: Service Personnel See Appendix II)

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8. Heating

The Embassy buildings are now linked to the Moscow municipal steam heating system, which operates from October 1 to April 30. When the fall or spring is cold at a time when the municipal service is not in operation, the Embassy's auxiliary heating system is put into service. Flats outside the Embassy are of course heated from the municipal system only.

9. Electric Current

Electric current in Moscow is A.C. 50-cycle. The Embassy premises and some of the staff flats are on 127-volt current, while others are on 220 volts. Since transformers are provided where necessary, members of the staff need not concern themselves with the voltage in flats which they are to occupy. However, electric equipment having motors should be adapted to 50-cycle current before leaving Canada.

On the whole, the electrical wiring in Moscow apartment buildings is poor, and as a result it is not recommended that staff members bring high wattage electrical appliances such as electric frying pans, deep fryers, etc. No appliance having a wattage greater than 750 (approx.) should be brought.

10. Telephone and Cable

Long-distance telephone calls can be made to Western Europe, North America and most other parts of the world. (As an example, charges to Canada are 12 roubles for 3 minutes during the week, and 9 roubles on Sunday.) There is a commercial cable service between Moscow and all parts of the world. As is customary, "letter telegrams" may be sent cheaper than straight cables, but the charges are not exorbitant in either case.

11. Domestic Servants

Because of marketing difficulties and the unavailability of baby sitters on a casual basis, Moscow households employ more servants on the average than families in Western European missions, although not as great a number as would be customary, for example, in Far Eastern posts.

For Embassy officers who have representational duties, experience suggests that at least one full-time servant is necessary, especially if the officer concerned has a child. At the present time the Ambassador employs a cook and two maids (in addition to the butler who is paid by the Department), and the Counsellor (married with two children) a maid and a French student who acts as part-time governess. The Ambassador employs a laundress who also does some of the laundry for the Counsellor. The Second Secretary (unmarried) and the Third Secretary (married with one child) both employ full-time maids. All those with entertainment responsibilities require extra help for special occasions such as cocktail and dinner parties and for these occasions they usually obtain the services of maids of other members of the staff.

Some members of the non-diplomatic staff have either full-time or part-time servants, while others look after all their housekeeping by themselves.

Maids and maid-cooks are paid monthly wages ranging from about 80-130 roubles a month. A good cook may cost 120 roubles per month or more and a butler from 150 roubles up. All servants must, in addition, be given three or four weeks' holidays with pay. Contracts are signed with all servants, which set out the wages to

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be paid, the holidays to be given, the hours to be worked (seven hours per day), and the amount of clothes that must be furnished by the employer. An average household must supply a maid-cook once a year with the following items: uniforms (2 morning, one black; one apron for black and 2 morning aprons), one pair of shoes, one pair of slippers, three pairs of nylons and two pairs of woollen stockings. It is much cheaper to buy the uniforms in England than in Canada, and they can be ordered after arrival at the post. In addition to their three or four weeks' holidays, the servants, according to Soviet law, get one hour off the day before their weekly day off and the national holidays (November 7th and 8th, May 1st and 2nd, New Year's Day and Constitution Day in December). Sunday is the weekly day off for all domestic servants. They generally speak only Russian. They are supplied by UPDK, a section of the Foreign Ministry that deals with the wants of diplomats (it is not possible to hire a maid oneself or through the local papers). If the servants sent are unsatisfactory, they can be released after a specified probation period. It is also customary, in fact almost obligatory, to give servants gifts (clothing or material, liquor, chocolates, etc.) at Christmas/New Year's and to a lesser extent on November 7 and May Day, the two main Soviet holidays.

Local servants who have worked for the Embassy for many years are relatively efficient and well trained. However, they insist upon working very specific hours according to the signed contract. Therefore if one wishes to have someone for regular baby sitting, it is necessary to have an additional servant, or a nanny or governess for this purpose. Servants to either live in or work part time are normally not obtainable in Moscow. Many diplomats with children bring a nanny or governess from Scandinavia, England, France, Germany or other West European countries for about \$45-\$65 per month plus transportation both ways. There is quite a colony of these girls in Moscow so they are not lonely. It is necessary to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of cramped quarters and lack of privacy with having a built-in baby sitter, but bringing a nanny or governess with one is the best solution if space is adequate. For couples without children the local servants are quite adequate. If a foreign servant is brought in she should be called either nurse or governess for visa purposes since ones called "maids" have been refused visas for entry. Married personnel with children and no nanny overcome the baby sitting problem in one or two ways:

- (a) by husband and wife alternating in going out, or
- (b) by making a reciprocal agreement with another couple in the same position. By this means both couples can have the opportunity to get out together occasionally.

12. Laundry

As stated previously, the Ambassador employs a full-time laundress who also does some of the laundry for the Counsellor. Those members of the staff with domestic servants find that they are reluctant to do much laundry work and demand extra pay for any done. They and the members of the staff without servants therefore send most of their heavy laundry out. The cost is not great but the quality is not very good. Soviet drycleaning facilities are not on the whole satisfactory and most members of the staff arrange to have drycleaning done when they go out of the Soviet Union on holidays. Members of the staff on posting to Moscow would be well advised to have all their clothes drycleaned before arrival here.

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13. Water

The authorities state that Moscow water is safe both for cooking and drinking, and this has been found to be so. It is not necessary to boil water for drinking or for washing food. However it is advisable to boil water for use by small children and when suffering from stomach upsets.

14. Shopping

(a) General

Comparatively speaking, shopping is not feasible for a Westerner in the Soviet Union except for certain fresh food items and a very limited range of more durable goods. It is essential to bring certain things with one when one first comes to Moscow, and to make periodic orders of basic supplies from export houses in Western Europe. Among the latter, Ostermann Petersen and Peter Justesen in Copenhagen and Saccone and Speed in London have been found to be reliable and to give good service, but wines, for example, may be ordered more cheaply (at the cost of a little more effort) direct from France, and members of the staff coming to Moscow may know of other suppliers who are accustomed to dealing with diplomatic missions. So far as clothing and other more durable goods are concerned, prospective staff members may find it wise to enquire about the services offered by large West European department stores, for example, Harrod's in London, Nordiska Kompaniet in Stockholm, or Stockmann's in Helsinki.

In Moscow there is in general little point in going from one shop to another looking for a "better buy" since all shops are government-controlled and prices vary only with the season. Food shopping is done in the gastronom (meat, fish, dairy products, etc.) and the kolkhoz market and much the same products are available in both (although not always at the same time), the market being the more expensive of the two on the average. There are in addition small specialty stores selling bread, fruit, fish, etc. Gastronom orders are sent through the Embassy and are delivered, but shopping in smaller stores and the market must be done personally or by one's maid. As a general rule, it is wise to buy in quantity when a given food product is on sale, since the availability of such items is still somewhat erratic, especially in winter. Freezers which are provided for all Embassy personnel are a great help in taking advantage of those times of the year (primarily the summer months) when availability and quality are at their high point.

On the whole shopping has improved greatly in the last few years and is likely to continue to improve. However, while many more goods are available now than was the case formerly, they are expensive and in general still not sufficiently up to Western standards to provide a reasonable substitute for goods brought in on first arrival or ordered from Western Europe.

(b) Food

Within the limitations suggested above the supply of fresh food is reasonably good except in winter and is improving. Nonetheless it is still necessary to supplement local supplies with large orders of food of various kinds, canned goods, luxury items, etc., from abroad. Food shopping in Moscow is also a time-consuming business when compared with Canada, although perhaps not substantially worse in this respect than in certain other European countries, when one allows for the fact that gastronom orders are made through the Embassy and delivered.

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The following additional comments may be made about food procured locally:

- (1) Russian flour is not particularly good, and it is both more economical and preferable to order plenty of flour from Denmark. The local bread, however, is of good quality.
- (2) Practically all vegetables procurable in Canada can be obtained in Moscow during the summer months. During the winter, although a few root vegetables are still obtainable, tinned vegetables ordered from abroad must be relied upon.
- (3) Fruits such as apples, peaches, pears, strawberries, raspberries, etc., are obtainable during the summer, and although they are not available during the winter months, some of them can be frozen with a reasonable degree of success. For about a two-week period at the height of their season, the price is reasonable. Citrus fruits, when available, are very expensive.
- (4) The local meat and poultry are of varying quality and, though edible on the whole, provide a rather monotonous diet.
- (5) Most Russian alcoholic drinks, be it wine, champagne, brandy or beer, are poor in quality. One or two Georgian wines are well enough suited to Western tastes to be considered a possible exception. Russian vodka should be imported from Copenhagen if customs "points" permit (see paragraph 20 below), since it sells there at less than one-third the Russian price.

As noted above, all members of the staff will find it essential to supplement local supplies by ordering food from Denmark or a supplier in another Western European country. It is difficult to set down general rules which would cover food orders by all prospective staff members, and it is therefore desirable that individuals consult recent food orders placed by members of the Embassy, write to the person whom they are replacing for specific advice on orders, and only then arrange to place an order with Ostermann Petersen, Peter Justesen or a similar firm. Up-to-date catalogues from these suppliers may be obtained direct (their addresses are available in the Department), and orders should be placed as soon as possible after learning of one's posting. Insofar as it is possible, it is also best to arrange for shipments to arrive in the period April-November, since freight rates are higher in winter and wines and certain other perishables cannot be shipped at that time. (See Section on Notes Regarding Food Orders).

When ordering wines and spirits, Canadian whiskey as well as other brands should be purchased from European suppliers (both Ostermann Petersen and Peter Justesen have the best known brands) since shipments from Canada run a much greater risk of loss or breakage.

Canned Foods and Staples

All canned goods and staples such as sugar, flour, coffee, tea, spices, etc., should be ordered from Copenhagen. Some are available here -- e.g., frozen and canned peas, canned corn, jam, and in an emergency one can buy flour, sugar, etc., at the local shops, but the prices are higher and the quality usually inferior to imported goods.

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Meat, Fish, Fowl

All members of the Embassy use local meat, fish and poultry to some extent, although some supplement the local supply by orders from Helsinki where customs "points" permit (see paragraph 20 below). At the gastronom (and to some extent at the market) one can buy beef steaks, pork chops, lamb, ham, chicken, turkey, some varieties of fresh fish and some imported frozen fish fillets, canned salmon, spratts, smoked salmon, caviar, etc. Prices at the gastronom are fixed by the state but they are nonetheless very expensive by Canadian standards. Supplies of fresh meat are still not satisfactory in the winter, and in any case quality is generally higher in the summer, as a result of which it is wise insofar as is possible to stock up on meat (in the deep freeze) during the summer months and the fall.

Other meats are available to some extent in the market, but prices are a good deal higher than in the gastronom. In general standard Canadian cuts of beef are not available in Moscow, although it is possible to approximate them on occasion at the market or to trim them to resemble (at least vaguely) a Canadian cut. On certain days, one may also find liver, kidneys, etc., at the market.

Dairy Products

There is no universally accepted opinion among members of the diplomatic corps as to the advisability of drinking Russian milk. The milk is pasteurized but the cows are not T.B. tested and bottles are not well sterilized, and as a result many people consider it unwise to drink the local milk regularly or to give it to children on a regular basis. Moreover, it has been the experience that in the last two years the milk supply in Moscow has been quite unreliable at various seasons of the year. It is therefore generally considered advisable to import powdered milk, preferably from Canada as European brands often do not suit Canadian tastes. If a new member of the staff intends to buy powdered milk from Canada he should either bring it with him or allow a considerable length of time for delivery. Carnation evaporated milk, as well as two Danish brands, are available from Copenhagen. The Danish is cheaper as it is diluted with $1\frac{1}{2}$ parts of water to 1 part of milk to make the equivalent of whole milk, versus 1:1 for Carnation. Since there are also some seasonal difficulties in getting cream, particularly whipping cream, it is wise to import a certain amount. "Pream", which is not available in Copenhagen, is probably worth bringing with one from Canada. Russian sour cream (smetana) and ice cream are very good, and - perhaps rather illogically in view of the misgivings about milk - widely used by members of the diplomatic corps. Butter is always available and quite good, but it is more expensive than Danish butter which can be imported in tins. Russian butter is not recommended for frying as it smells strongly of herring oil when hot. Margarine is available but is very expensive. Soviet cheese is obtainable but it is neither of a high quality nor to the taste of most Canadians.

Eggs are available at both the gastronom and the market and are usually in good supply and of reasonable quality. They are, however, much more expensive than in Canada - 15 cents an egg and higher.

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Fruits and Vegetables

The supply of fresh fruit and vegetables is strictly seasonal and the prices often very high. During the late spring, summer, and early fall fresh vegetables (lettuce, tomatoes, radishes, cucumbers, green peppers, green onions, carrots, etc.) are in reasonably good supply in the market, although they are not always available in the quantity and quality to which Canadians will be accustomed. Fresh fruit of fairly good quality is available on the same basis during these months. Later in the fall, in the early spring and very occasionally during the winter it is possible to buy a few fresh vegetables (tomatoes and cucumbers for example), but prices are extremely steep -- in the case of tomatoes, as high as \$6.00 per kilo at one point during the 1958-59 winter. Fruit is also available on occasion during these months, but prices -- while not as high as that given for tomatoes -- are much higher than would be customary in Canada.

Members of the staff are able to supplement fruits and vegetables which are available locally in the winter in two ways: (a) they should freeze vegetables and fruits which are available in the summer for use during the winter months -- strawberries, raspberries, green beans and green peppers, for example, may be frozen quite successfully; (b) where customs "points" and personal finances permit they may import frozen vegetables (peas, beans, broccoli, spinach, for example) and fresh vegetables and fruit from Helsinki. Vegetables and fruits obtained from Helsinki are normally of quite good quality although the prices (including freight) are high.

Miscellaneous

- | | |
|----------------------|--|
| Baby food | - Copenhagen |
| Wines and spirits | - Spirits from Copenhagen. Wines can also be ordered from Copenhagen, but a better selection, better quality, and a better price can be had from French suppliers (for example, Bordeaux wines may be obtained from Henri Delpérier, Delpérier Frères, Bergerac (Dordogne), France; and Burgundy wines from J. Thorin, Pontanevaux (S. & L.) France. |
| Cigarettes | - Copenhagen, Canada or London. Canadian cigarettes imported from Canada are somewhat cheaper than American or English ones available in Copenhagen, but usually take over two months to arrive. American and English cigarettes can be obtained from Saccone and Speed in London and delivery time has been found to be satisfactory. |
| Soaps and toiletries | - Copenhagen. |
| Paper products | - Copenhagen and Canada. (Freezer wrappings and cartons should best be brought with one from Canada, but can be obtained from England or brought with one if one passes through England on the way to Moscow. Foil may be ordered from Ostermann Petersen and Peter Justesen.) |
| Drugs | - Canada or Copenhagen, depending on the type of drug required. Vitamin pills and certain medicines may be obtained from the Commonwealth doctor. |

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Notes Regarding Food Orders

It must be emphasized that any member of the administrative staff coming to Moscow should make sure to contact the Embassy about food before placing an order in Ottawa, as there may be some supplies at the Embassy which he can take over from his predecessor. However, no stocks of food, liquor or cigarettes are held by the Embassy as such. Supplies and Properties Division should be consulted about arrangements for paying for large food orders. At present the Department will prepay and recover by allowance deductions over twelve months up to \$1,000 of a food order in addition to the normal posting loan. For Service personnel, the Department of National Defence will not pay for food orders, per se, but will advance \$1500. to NCO's and \$2,000. to officers to defray the expenses incurred in moving, ordering food, buying clothing, etc. However, interest is charged on any such advance. Officers may be able to take over supplies of tinned goods, wines and spirits from their predecessor; it would be wise for them to get in touch with their predecessor, in advance of arrival, so that if this is not possible orders can be placed in advance to avoid delays.

15. Clothing

With the exception of fur hats, it is considered by most members of Western Embassies that no suitable clothing can be bought in Moscow.

In general, the same clothing which is worn in Ottawa can be worn in Moscow. Winter clothing should be concentrated upon as the summers are very short although hot. The usual Canadian-type of winter clothing, as warm as possible, should be brought, and clothing for skiing and skating and a fur hat, if possible. Warm sweaters for use indoors will be appreciated, since many of the flats which are now occupied by staff members are not sufficiently warm for those accustomed to Canadian apartments and houses. Some light summer clothes are necessary as well as tennis and swimming wear. Slacks and shorts are seldom worn by Soviet women. However, they are useful for casual wear.

The three most important things to remember about clothing are:

- (1) A complete supply should be brought on first arrival. It is not necessary to bring a two-year supply, because clothing can be bought during visits to Western Europe on leave (reasonable prices at a discount are offered in Stockholm);
- (2) All the clothes should be cleaned and shoes repaired before leaving Ottawa as neither of these services is satisfactory in Moscow and soiled clothing must be taken out for cleaning when on leave in other parts of Europe.
- (3) As much of the clothing as possible should be of wash-and-wear material.

For Embassy officers and their wives social life in the diplomatic corps is very active. Regrettably, it remains the case that contacts with the local population are limited, and the vast majority of entertaining (and being entertained) involves lunches, cocktails and dinners with other members of the diplomatic and press corps. So far as formal clothes are concerned, it is essential for officers to bring black tie, but they will not need formal daytime wear (morning coats, chancery jackets, etc.). White tie functions are very rare and in general it is not considered necessary

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for an officer to purchase tails for his posting to Moscow. For wives of officers the number of formal dresses which are needed will depend to a large extent on the rank of their husbands. At the present time the Counsellor, the Service Attachés, the First Secretary and their wives attend a considerable number of black tie functions, but the Second and Third Secretaries do so less frequently. Accordingly, it would be wise for wives of officers in the more senior grades to bring at least four short formal dresses (long evening dresses are seldom worn, and in any case are rather impractical in Moscow where snow and the lack of proper cleaning can be problems), and for more junior officers' wives to bring at least two.

Two or three stoles are a good idea, since heating in some embassies and flats is liable to be erratic. For dinner parties, basic dresses are most useful; for lunch, a suit or wool dress and a hat is useful; and for cocktails, suits, tailored dresses, and hats. Cocktail dresses and dressier hats -- the number again depending to some extent on the rank of the husband -- are needed for wear on National Days and at official receptions.

For male members of the non-diplomatic staff, it is probably not essential to purchase black tie, although there are occasions during the year to which Canadians are invited at which formal dress is traditional.

Stenographers posted to Moscow should bring with them two or three cocktail type dresses which will also do for evening wear. Some basic wool dresses and suits which can be worn with basic accessories will be useful. For daytime wear and at the office the usual dresses, suits, blouses, sweaters and skirts which are worn in Canada are of course just as appropriate in Moscow. A good supply of all items of everyday wear (e.g. stockings and shoes) should be brought with one since those available in Moscow are very expensive and poor in quality and style. In general, count on buying all clothing before posting or while on leave, not in Moscow.

A few observations which apply to all staff members, where winter clothes and clothes for attending Moscow theatres are concerned, may be useful: a fur coat is not absolutely necessary, but a warmly lined coat of some kind is; good snow boots, warm woollen underwear, stockings, balaclavas and scarves are necessary for those who like to be outdoors during winter; skating and skiing clothes for those interested should be brought with one; as many things as possible should be washable material; for the theatre dressing up is not required -- the tendency is to informality, and the individual's taste and comfort are the deciding factors.

For children, the same clothing is necessary as in Canada (snowsuits, boots, mittens, etc.). Again it is preferable that the material be of a type which does not require dry cleaning.

16. Hairdressing, etc.

There are barber shops in the main hotels but beauty shop facilities for women are none too good. Hairdressers are to be found in a number of Moscow hotels but it is advisable to bring hairpins, curlers, shampoos, etc., and all things necessary to home hairdressing (home perm, taper comb) since Soviet hairdressers have none of the supplies preferred by Canadians. (Many women in the corps do their own or each other's hair.)

17. Cosmetics

A number of brands of cosmetics are obtainable from Ostermann Petersen and Peter Justesen, but if one has a preference for a particular brand not available there, it is better to bring

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as large a supply as possible on posting, and to supplement it when on leave in Western Europe.

18. Tailoring and Shoe Repairing

Dressmaking is available for minor alterations, but in general (unless one makes one's own clothes) it will not be possible to have them made in Moscow. Shoe repairing facilities are also available and improving in quality, but the prices make it desirable to have at least major repairs done before arrival.

19. Furniture and Equipment

All living accommodation is supplied by the Department, furnished and equipped with essential items including cutlery, linen (table and bed), tableware, curtains, carpets, glassware and kitchen utensils and appliances. Each apartment is supplied with a gas stove, electric refrigerator and deep-freeze. All flats will shortly be equipped with radiograms, toasters and irons. The flats of married staff members are being supplied with washing machines.

Many members of the staff, particularly those who are required to do much entertaining, should supplement the government furnishings with a certain number of small personal articles which are not supplied by the government. The following supplementary items are suggested:

Pictures

Ash Trays (Small ones for the dinner table are useful because of the number of sit-down dinners among diplomatic officers. Non-diplomatic dinners are usually buffet style.

Serving trays

Table decorations (flowers are usually obtainable only in the spring and summer).

Flower containers

Candles and candlesticks

Cocktail shakers

Corkscrews

Ice bucket

Small dishes for nuts, etc.

It is suggested that personnel being posted from Ottawa should consult Supplies and Properties Division as to the furniture and equipment provided for the flat which he or she will occupy. A detailed list can be obtained from the inventory for each flat.

Any special equipment and furniture for infants and children should be brought personally from Canada as nothing of the sort is provided in the staff flats.

When in doubt concerning the extra articles for living quarters which should be brought to Moscow, the new staff member should write to the Embassy for detailed advice.

Electric plug connections are of the European type (round prongs) which may be substituted locally for the usual Canadian plugs, unless a supply of Marconi type interchangeable plugs are brought.

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Television sets should not be brought from Canada as they will not operate in Moscow without extensive and very expensive modifications. Soviet television sets are of reasonably good quality. A number of people in this and other missions have television sets which are useful when one is trying to learn the language.

20. Customs Regulations, etc.

Soviet laissez-passers are issued upon application to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or to a Soviet mission abroad for diplomatic officers and their families proceeding to or from the Soviet Union. It is of great importance that diplomatic officers obtain laissez-passers for themselves and their families in order to avoid the nuisance of minute examination of luggage by Soviet customs officials and also to avoid possible separation from their baggage at the point of entry into the U.S.S.R.

Imports are restricted by the customs-free quotas allowed by the Soviet Government. The following annual limits have been established (figures are customs value and duties are high); goods for Embassy use 30,000 roubles; for the Ambassador 12,000 roubles; for the Counsellor 4,000 roubles; for each Service Attaché 4,000 roubles; for other diplomatic members of the staff 2,000 roubles.

It is important that each person posted to Moscow seek further information regarding these regulations as soon as he is advised of his assignment. This information is available in Posting Services Section of Administrative Services Division.

21. Local Churches

Aside from approximately 30 Russian Orthodox churches and an Old Believers' Cathedral, there are in Moscow one Roman Catholic church (regularly attended by foreigners), one Jewish Synagogue, one Mohammedan Mosque, and one Baptist church open for regular services. A Protestant service according to the Anglican rite is held each Sunday morning at the British Embassy. The service is usually conducted by a member of the staff of the British, Canadian or American Embassies, although three or four times a year an Anglican clergyman from Helsinki is present for the celebration of Holy Communion. An American Roman Catholic priest is at present stationed in Moscow, and he holds regular masses in a permanent chapel located in his residence. Announcements of masses are issued regularly. There are daily services held at the central Synagogue which are attended by the foreign as well as by the Soviet Jewish community.

22. Educational Facilities

The Anglo-American School, operated jointly by the American and British Embassies, is open to English-speaking children of the diplomatic corps and of foreign journalists in Moscow. Because of space limitations in the school building, the school cannot accommodate more than 120 children. Priorities for admission go first to children of the British and American Embassies and English-speaking children of other Commonwealth countries.

Instruction is given from kindergarten through Grade VIII; the curriculum and texts are basically American. While the standard of schooling varies somewhat from year to year depending on the quality of the teachers, it has in the last two years compared favourably with Canadian educational standards. It is considered quite satisfactory for children up to the age of 11 or 12. Anyone having children beyond Grade VIII age should normally arrange for schooling elsewhere.

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Fees are \$210.00 (U.S.) per year in kindergarten and \$300.00 (U.S.) per year in other grades. There are no extra charges for text books. Russian-language instruction is available and optional, at an extra cost of approximately \$20.00 per year. Children are taken to and from school by school buses or Embassy transport. The kindergarten operates only in the morning but in the remaining grades the children stay in school from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m., taking a box lunch with them.

There is a very small French-language school run by the French Embassy covering the first six years of schooling in the French system, but there is only one full-time teacher. The West German Embassy also conducts a small school in the German-language for children from 6 to 14 years. Some Westerners have in recent years been able to enrol their children in Soviet primary schools, the first grade of which starts at the age of 7 years. All instruction, of course, is in the Russian-language.

For further details of educational facilities in Moscow, please consult Moscow's letter No. 1285 of December 7, 1960.

23. Local Amusements

The most popular entertainment for foreigners in Moscow during the winter is the theatre, opera, ballet and concerts. During the summer months the normal theatres are closed but there are many performances outdoors in the numerous parks of culture and rest. Tickets to public cinemas showing Soviet films are easy to obtain and cheap. There are several restaurants in Moscow, some with dance orchestras. They range all the way from the restaurant on the top of the Moskva Hotel to the open air restaurant at the Khimki River Port. Food is expensive and, while fairly good by Soviet standards, falls far short of the quality found at home or in any Western capital.

In addition to public amusements in Moscow, the American House (where the American military clerks live) and the British Embassy run clubs at which members of the Embassy are welcome. One or the other is open every night (and both on several evenings), and both offer films, dancing, bingo, etc., on a regular basis in addition to larger parties from time to time.

24. Recreation

Winter Sport

Skating: In addition to the skating rink in the British Embassy grounds, the Embassy staff may skate at any of the numerous rinks in the Moscow parks. Persons intending to skate should bring skates and not rely on buying them here.

Skiing: Facilities near Moscow cannot compare with the opportunities near Ottawa. Many foreigners, however, ski either on the Lenin Hills very near Moscow, or at Tsaritsino about 15 miles from the city. There are no club facilities or tows. Because of the terrain, skiing is limited to short slopes or cross-country.

Badminton: There is a badminton court at the American Embassy.

Squash: The Indian Embassy has a squash court.

Summer Sport

Tennis: Members of the Canadian Embassy may use the court at the British Embassy. Balls should be imported. To avoid sending racquets out for restringing nylon is handier than gut.

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Volleyball: Some of the Embassy staff, together with members of the British and American Embassies, play volleyball each Saturday during the summer at one of the three Embassies. Balls and other equipment are available, but if one wishes to play it is wise to bring running shoes.

Swimming: There are very few places to swim in or near Moscow, but members of the Embassy regularly visit one or two spots during the summer, usually for picnics. There is a heated outdoor pool in Moscow which is available to members of foreign missions both in summer and, for the hardier souls, in winter.

Walking: There are a fair number of possibilities for walking in the pleasant wooded country outside Moscow but one's movements near the city are much restricted by the travel ban.

Motoring: Many beauty spots and places of historical interest are located in zones which are not open to foreigners, but a few points of interest are still accessible to Embassy staff. As noted above, travel beyond the 40 kilometer (25 mile) limit can only be undertaken with the permission of the Foreign Ministry and after 48 hours' notice. Non-diplomatic personnel, however, are not permitted to own or drive an automobile in the Soviet Union.

25. Financial Arrangements

All personal financial arrangements are made through the Embassy which draws the necessary roubles from the State Bank. No member of the Embassy has a private banking account in the Soviet Union. Since roubles required are drawn from the Embassy against cheques written in favour of the Receiver General of Canada, it is necessary to maintain a checking account with a Canadian bank. Service personnel can obtain roubles by means of an Acquittance Roll and the dollar equivalent is debited to the individual's Pay Account in due course.

The official rate of the rouble is 90 kopecks (.90 roubles) to the United States dollar. Roubles may not be taken out of or brought into the Soviet Union.

26. Maintenance Services, etc.

Services for electrical equipment, plumbing, etc., domestic staff, theatre tickets, etc., are arranged for through the Embassy administrative office. This is necessary because of centralization on the Russian side, and to avoid the confusion which would result if requests are not co-ordinated.

27. Local Transportation

The cost of taxis in Moscow is reasonable but they are not numerous and a long wait is often necessary either at the taxi ranks or after telephoning for a taxi, especially late in the evening. Street cars and buses are very crowded in rush hours but are used on occasion by members of the Embassy staff at other hours. On the whole they compare favourably with any municipal transportation system.

The Moscow subway (metro) services a large number of stations throughout the city, although there are no stations within easy walking distance of the apartment blocks which house the majority of the Canadian staff. There are, however, two subway stations within about five minutes' walking distance of the Embassy.

Apart from the Ambassador's car, the Embassy maintains station wagons which are used by the staff to take them to and from work and which can also be used on occasion for weekend outings or early evening engagements. Embassy officers and their wives having

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valid Canadian drivers' licenses may obtain a Soviet license from the Foreign Ministry without a driving test. Insurance can be obtained locally. It is therefore possible for officers to own their own automobiles if they wish but to date the Department has not agreed to pay the cost of having an officer's personal automobile shipped to Moscow. It has been considered inadvisable for Embassy personnel not protected by the immunities of diplomatic status to drive in the USSR.

28. Travel Notes

(a) Entry by land or sea

The two best methods of entering the Soviet Union are:

- (a) From London to Helsinki by ship, from Helsinki to Moscow by train; and
- (b) From London to Leningrad by ship, from Leningrad to Moscow by overnight train (from May to November only).

These are by far the best routes to Moscow and of the two (a) is the better since arrangements can be made to have heavy baggage moved from the ship in Helsinki to the train and one's baggage accompanies one all the way. The Leningrad route usually results in the heavy baggage arriving in Moscow up to three weeks later. However, both routes allow travel in comfort with ample space for baggage and both are extensively used by foreigners travelling from London. Assistance for those not speaking Russian can be expected from fellow passengers or from Intourist in Leningrad, if that route is used. In both cases, tickets should be booked well in advance and in the former case arrangements should be made to have the baggage transferred in Helsinki.

(b) Entry by air

As noted above, there are now several flights to Moscow each week from a number of West European and other capitals, either on Soviet or Western aircraft, mostly jets. Members of the Embassy who find it convenient to fly to Moscow will have no difficulty in obtaining further information from the Travel Section or direct from agencies of the following airlines: Aeroflot, Air France, BOAC or BEA, Sabena, KLM, SAS, Finnair, Air India.

29. Soviet Visas

It may take some time to obtain a Soviet entrance visa. These visas are limited in validity, both in time and in the frontier points for which they may be used. In case travel plans are altered, it is essential to ensure that the visa is valid for the alternative arrangement. If a visa is not perfectly in order, the Soviet authorities will subject foreigners to considerable inconvenience and embarrassment. It is highly desirable that a translation of the Soviet visa and other Soviet documents be obtained as soon as possible after they have been issued.

Upon arrival in Moscow, diplomatic staff receive from the Foreign Ministry multi-entry-visas of one year's validity, non-diplomatic staff of three months' validity. These visas are valid for use at specified border points only.

30. Passport Photographs

A person assigned to Moscow should bring with him at least a dozen small copies of his passport photograph (and if possible also the negative). These will be required for registration with the Soviet authorities.

31. What to Bring

The general principle which should guide those preparing to come to Moscow is that very little for personal use is obtainable at this post. Soviet consumer goods are becoming easier to obtain and are constantly improving in variety and quality. However, it is rare that the quality, price or suitability is comparable with that of their Canadian counterparts. It is wise to bring a good supply of items necessary for day-to-day existence. This supply can be supplemented in many cases by an order to Ostermann Petersen or, in most cases, by purchases while on leave in Western Europe.

Old and new dance music on records is a good thing to have in Moscow, as well as other records according to individual taste. It is, however, advisable not to purchase them at home, but to take advantage of the discounts offered to staff serving abroad by the major English and European record companies, and the New York discount houses (a file is maintained at the Embassy on these and other offers). Russian records (both long playing and 78 rpm.) and tapes are cheap, but not always of good technical quality.

Books are cheap in the Soviet Union and certain works are available in English. However, the choice is restricted to "approved" authors and the number of titles obtainable is not large. Accordingly it is wise for those who enjoy reading on a free evening to bring at least a certain number of books with them. Books can, of course, be ordered from the United States and Great Britain after arrival and they are permitted to enter the Soviet Union duty-free.

It is recommended that colour film, which can be processed in Western Europe, be brought. Supplies can be replenished from Western Europe.

Some of the miscellaneous articles (other than household items listed in section 19) which cannot be obtained satisfactorily in Moscow and which are easily overlooked because of their easy availability in Canada are:

Toothbrushes	Band-aids, 222's, Alka Seltzer, etc.
Lighter flints	String
Cigarette lighters	Cocktail sticks
Lighter fuel	Cheque books - good supply
Razor blades	Sundry toilet articles
Freezer wrapping and cartons	Cold cream, etc.
Refrigerator storage bowls and containers, especially for juice	First aid kit
Plastic clothes bags	Thumb tacks
Spot remover	Moth balls
Gift wrapping paper	Good clothes brush
Assortment of cards (birthday, etc.)	Sewing kit (including needles, cotton, buttons, thread, ribbon, elastic, etc.)
Pream	Scotch tape
Milk	Scissors
Fruit pie fillings	Clothes sprinkler
Thermos bottles	Clothes hangers (Not supplied to flats)
Lunch boxes and thermos flasks (for children of school age)	Face cloths (Not supplied to flats)
Garbage bags	Dish cloths or mops (Not supplied to flats)
Light suitcases or small flight bags	

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32. Mail

Members of the Embassy may wish from time to time to supplement their supplies of certain of the above items and other favourite Canadian brands by parcels sent from Canada. They should bear in mind that Departmental regulations permit a limited number of parcels (of specified weight and size) to be sent through the bag each month. Parcels of this kind can, however, be received only from sources (either persons or firms) which have been nominated by the staff member in writing to the Mail Room. They should therefore contact the Mail Room or Posting Services Section before departure for Moscow in order to make the necessary arrangements. These rules also govern the receipt of mail through the bag from correspondents in Canada and elsewhere. They apply equally to members of the External Affairs and Trade and Commerce staffs, and to the Service Attachés and their staff.

It is emphasized that anything sent through the open mail is opened by the Soviet authorities and then re-sealed before delivery. When making up your list of correspondents to give to the Mail Room of External Affairs, make sure it includes all your correspondents.

General

Because conditions of life in Moscow and of travel to Moscow are constantly changing, it is strongly recommended that all new members of the staff write to the Embassy immediately on learning of their posting.

Postscript

This post report, taken by itself, is not a fair commentary on living conditions in the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. In order to help future members of the staff to prepare for their stay in the U.S.S.R., it is necessary to warn them of the difficulties which will be found at this particular post. Living conditions are very difficult from those to which Canadians are accustomed, but it would be a mistake to consider life in this Embassy as frugal or materially hard.

Against the details set down in the post report, it should be emphasized that the material necessities of life are being well provided. The living accommodation is at least as favourable as that available to any other foreigners of comparable status elsewhere in Moscow. We are fortunate in being able to avoid the worst disadvantage of Moscow supplies by leaning heavily on Canadian and Scandinavian imports of food, cigarettes, liquor and other necessities. Although some of the forms of recreation on which Canadians depend at home cannot be pursued in Moscow, there are significant compensations. For anyone with an enquiring mind, a full term in Moscow is a short enough time to absorb all the interest of life in one of the world's most engrossing countries.

Moscow, November 1961.

APPENDIX I

MEMORANDUM

TRAVEL TO THE SOVIET UNION
VIA LONDON-LENINGRAD SEA ROUTE

For the benefit of future travellers to Moscow from London by sea via Leningrad, the following suggestions are worth bearing in mind.

Passengers should take with them, if they possibly can, all their own effects as personal luggage. They should be prepared to pay the ship baggage master, in cash (sterling) fairly stiff excess baggage charges, approximately £ 1 per heavy piece. If they consign any baggage as freight direct to the Canadian Embassy, they will not be able to take it off the ship themselves in Leningrad, its arrival in Moscow will be delayed but it will not be subject to customs examination as long as it has entered the Soviet Union under a laissez-passer and is addressed to the person who holds the laissez-passer. The heavy personal luggage can be put in the hold. Quite a considerable quantity of lighter baggage (say the equivalent of six large suitcases) can be taken in the cabin or stowed somewhere in the corridor outside. Most cabins are two-berthed but there are some single cabins. The ship is quite comfortable, the crew adequate, and there is a fairly well-stocked bar. The ship usually spends a few hours in Copenhagen, Stockholm and Helsinki.

On arrival in Leningrad the traveller can do nothing until the representatives of Intourist arrive (which has been known to be four hours after the ship has docked). If the traveller is not to be on the diplomatic list and thus not provided with a Soviet laissez-passer, he will be subjected to a customs examination, which is usually courteously but very thoroughly conducted. The representatives of Intourist speak English and though inefficient, are fairly helpful. They take charge of the transport of luggage, which they load on to a ramshackle bus. The charge for the transport of each piece of luggage from the ship to the bus is fixed at one rouble, which is exorbitant. Travellers are thus well advised to carry as much as they reasonably can off the ship. Intourist pay the porters and demand repayment afterwards without giving a receipt. Passengers are then driven to a hotel and, if there is time before the train leaves, given a room in which to deposit their luggage. It is advisable to make sure that all baggage, including any that may have been in the hold of the ship, has reached the hotel. The charge for portage into and out of the hotel is forty kopecks and the charge for the room is about 3 roubles 80 kopecks. Meals are easily obtainable at the hotel and cost approximately three roubles 50 kopecks, including drinks. A deposit will have been made to Intourist in Moscow in order to pay for all expenses in Leningrad so that the traveller need not bother about expenses as a bill will be submitted by Intourist against the deposit made by the Embassy. Travellers are nearly always placed on the "Red Arrow" and their luggage, unless it can be placed in the compartment, will follow on to Moscow within a couple of days. Sleepers are two-berthed and passengers should be put into the best class which is called the "International" coach. If there is no room, they may be put in the almost equally good "Soft" class. "Soft" class can only take four suitcases and sleeps four people. Also there is no wash basin in the compartment. The remainder of the luggage has to be registered, and the receipt is given by the traveller to the Embassy in Moscow, so that the luggage can be picked up by the Embassy truck. Charge for portage at the station is as at the dock, one rouble per piece of heavy luggage and 50 kopecks for light luggage. The train is comfortable. It arrives in Moscow at about

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0900 and, as tea is provided on awakening, it is not necessary to take food along on the journey. The Hotel Astoria will, however, look after the packing of lunches if they are desired.

On arrival in Leningrad, after Intourist has booked train seats to Moscow, it is necessary to notify the Embassy in Moscow, so that it can be arranged to meet the train. Also if any difficulties of any sort are encountered in Leningrad, the traveller may call the Embassy. A note should be made of the Embassy telephone numbers as no telephone directories are available to the public. They are 41.90.34 and 41.30.67.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix II to
Post Report--
November 1961
Canadian Embassy
Moscow

ITEMS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO SERVICE PERSONNEL

Introduction

1. This Appendix has been prepared in accordance with para 12 of "Reporting Instructions for Service Attachés" issued under the authority of JIC letter CSC 9-4-3(JIC) dated February 20, 1961.

General

2. Conditions of life in Moscow are not those to which a Canadian is accustomed, and it is necessary to begin this Appendix with a warning that many difficulties and frustrations will be met by Service personnel and that a disproportionate amount of time must be devoted to administrative matters, particularly, those pertaining to personal administration. However, once one learns to accept and to expect frustration and delays as normal, life is far from unbearable.

Accommodation

3. Office Accommodation. All Service personnel are very shortly expected to occupy the top floor of a new wing which has been added to the Embassy. The Naval and Military Attachés will share one office, the Air and Assistant Air Attachés will share another office and a further office will be shared by the respective Attaché clerks.

4. Living Quarters. The various Service Attachés and their clerical staff are all housed in separate apartments in different apartment blocks throughout the city. The central heating in these apartments is normally adequate but it is advisable to bring warm clothing for use in the apartments on cool or damp days in the Spring and Fall during periods when the central heating system is not in operation. All DND apartments are equipped with suitable transformers but no appliances consuming more than 750 watts should be brought, as the standard Soviet wiring will not stand the strain. All the apartments are furnished but the standard varies somewhat from apartment to apartment. Steps have been taken to improve some of the furnishings in some of the apartments. It is therefore strongly recommended that Service personnel, on hearing of their transfer to this post, should write as soon as possible to the person they are replacing and it will then be possible to give up to date advice as to the smaller items which should be brought.

5. Some details of the DND apartments are given below:

- (a) Naval Attachés apartment. This apartment has two bedrooms and a den.
- (b) Military Attachés apartment. This apartment at present is suitable for a bachelor but is too small for a married couple. Negotiations are under way for the acquisition and furnishing of the neighbouring apartment. Once this has been achieved, the apartment will have two bedrooms and a den.
- (c) Air Attachés apartment. This apartment has only one bedroom and a den.

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- (d) Assistant Air Attachés apartment. This apartment is identical to the present Military Attaché's apartment and is suitable for a bachelor but is too small for a married couple. It has no den and only one very small bedroom.
- (e) Army Clerk Attaché's apartment. This apartment has only one bedroom but steps are being taken to obtain a larger apartment with two bedrooms.
- (f) RCAF Clerk Attaché's apartment. This apartment has two bedrooms.

Russian servants

6. In addition to the servants mentioned in the Post Report, a driver is supplied for each of the Service Attaché staff cars. These drivers are also reasonable mechanics and they carry out normal repairs and maintenance. According to their contracts they must be supplied with certain items of uniform which, at the present time, have to be paid for by the Attaché concerned. Treasury Board have a submission before them on this matter and it is possible that eventually the Department of National Defence will pay some or all of these expenses.

Foodstuffs

7. The initial food order, which should be ordered from Ottawa through Ostermann Petersen or Peter Justesen, will be in the order of \$1000.00 since it is necessary to import anything which will freeze, before the winter sets in and in sufficient quantity to last the winter.

Imports

8. Accompanied baggage may be brought in by Attachés free of customs duty on a Laissez-passer, but there is no way of recovering freight charges on baggage over and above the DND baggage allowance.

Clothing

9. Uniforms

Uniform is worn only for official receptions such as National Days, Armed Forces Days, etc. (these average more than one a week), paying official calls, attending military parades, welcoming visiting heads of states, and the very rare visits to military installations.

10. Orders of Dress can be listed as follows:

(a) Navy

- (i) No. 1 Blue Service Dress with medals and sword. Worn very occasionally for parades and official calls.
- (ii) No. 3 Blue Service Dress. Worn for national days and official receptions during winter months.
- (iii) No. 6 Blue Mess Undress. Worn very seldom at mess functions within the Attaché Corps.
- (iv) No. 7 Blue Mess Dress. Worn occasionally at balls given within Attaché Corps. Boat cloak recommended.

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(v) No. 10 White Dress. Worn for National Day and official receptions during summer months.

(vi) No. 11 White Mess Undress. Not worn.

(vii) No. 12 White Mess Dress. Not worn.

(viii) No. 15 Khaki Service Dress. Not worn.

(ix) Aiguillettes. Worn at all times when in uniform. Two sets are held by NA and will be transferred to relief.

(x) Sword. Worn occasionally. Sword with knot and scabbard are held by NA and will be transferred to relief.

(xi) Medals and ribbons for all above uniform dress are required.

(xii) Greatcoat or British warm is required.

(b) Army

(i) No. 1 or No. 2 dress - for all official receptions except during the summer months.

(ii) No. 4 dress - for paying official calls, attending military parades and visiting service installations except during the summer months.

(iii) No. 5 dress - the present MA does not have the newly authorized white undress and therefore wears No. 5 dress for (i) and (ii) above during summer months.

(iv) No. 3 dress - this is very rarely worn.

(v) No. 6 dress - this is never worn.

(vi) Medals - these are required but are seldom worn.

(vii) Cape - this is extremely useful with blues for official receptions. It is frequently worn.

(viii) Aiguillettes - these are always worn with uniforms and will be handed over on post.

(c) Air Force

(i) No. 1 Service Dress - for all official receptions except during the summer months.

(ii) No. 5 Service Dress Winter - for paying official calls, attending military parades and visiting service installations except during the summer months.

(iii) No. 6 Service Dress Summer - for all occasions mentioned in (i) and (ii) above during the summer months.

(iv) No. 8 Mess Dress - this is very rarely worn.

(v) No. 5A Working Dress Winter - this is never worn.

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- (vi) No. 8A and 8B Mess Undress - these are never worn.
 - (vii) Medals - these are required although they are seldom worn.
 - (viii) Raincoat or overcoat - used as required for occasions mentioned in (i), (ii) and (iii) above.
 - (ix) Aiguillettes - Gold and blue cord aiguillettes are always worn on the left shoulder with uniform. These should be obtained from AU/SSup0 prior to coming to Moscow
- (d) NCO's
- Summer and winter uniforms are required on a few occasions each year.

Civilian Dress

- 11.
- (a) Working clothes worn to the office and in Moscow are informal, ranging from lounge suits to sports jackets and slacks. Outer clothing required is a heavy winter overcoat, a light topcoat, a trench coat, and a fold-up plastic raincoat.
 - (b) At least one old suit should be earmarked for travelling as these clothes soon get dirty and dry cleaning is difficult. Light suitcases are required for both clothes and food when travelling, since one must carry one's own baggage, and food requirements on rail trips are heavy. A small flight bag is also very useful.
 - (c) For social occasions dark suits are required for luncheons, cocktail parties and informal dinner parties. There are a great many "black tie" dinners and some supper dances, but there is no requirement for "tails" or morning coat. White dinner jackets are frequently worn in summer, but a light-weight dinner jacket is useful both in summer and winter. Most apartments are very warm.
 - (d) Due to the dry cleaning difficulties here, a good supply of RENUZIT is useful. It is also recommended that two or three dark wash-and-wear suits be brought. As long as these are chosen so that both the jacket and trousers may literally be washed and hung up to dry without detriment, they solve most of the dry cleaning difficulties.
 - (e) At least one pair of heavy walking shoes are necessary. The type rather like desert boots with a thick rubber sole (available from Armstrong-Richardsons) is excellent in this respect.
 - (f) NCO's may ignore paras (b), (c) and (e) as these are not applicable. For social occasions, NCO's require dark suits.

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Wives Clothing

12. In general, this should conform to the above.

- (a) For National Day receptions, better type afternoon dresses, basic black dresses or two-piece dark suits are worn, light wool in winter, silk crepe or cotton in summer.
- (b) For "black tie" dinners - long dinner dresses are worn infrequently. Canadian type cocktail dresses are most frequently worn.
- (c) Ball gowns (long dresses) - these are sometimes required, but short evening dresses are more common.
- (d) Cocktail parties - less fussy than Canadian type cocktail dresses - more in the way of afternoon dresses.
- (e) Informal dinner parties - as for cocktail parties.
- (f) Hats or cocktail veils are worn to National Day receptions.
- (g) A fur coat is not absolutely necessary, but a warm cloth coat, a spring top coat and a raincoat are needed.
- (h) Wool and/or fur stoles are most useful.
- (j) Comfortable shoes for standing at receptions and for walking are required. Stadium boots and light-weight plastic overshoes are very useful.
- (k) Wardrobes can be replenished on trips out of the country on leave, and dry cleaning and repairs can be looked after at this time.
- (l) Suits and woollen dresses are suitable for coffee and tea parties and for travelling.
- (m) An old coat should be brought for going to market and travelling within the USSR.

Leave

13. Leave outside the country is a necessity, but is also very expensive and, because of the distances involved, the only practical way to travel is by air; except for trips to Helsinki, which take 24 hours by train.

14. DND permits air transportation for all service personnel and dependents to be claimed as far as Vienna or Stockholm once per leave year. However, no such claims can be entertained during either the first six months or during the last six months of one's tour.

Mail

15. It is emphasized that anything sent through the open mail is opened by the Soviet authorities and then re-sealed before delivery. When making up your list of correspondents to give to the Mail Room of External Affairs, make sure it includes all your correspondents.

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Transportation

16. Staff cars and drivers are supplied to all Attachés. The supply of gasoline, lubricants, anti-freeze and polishes, etc., is the responsibility of the Attaché. The various services supply any spare parts required.

17. Soviet drivers licences are issued by the Soviet authorities to members of the Canadian Embassy on a reciprocal basis, which makes it unnecessary to take the Soviet test. However, if one can obtain an International Driving Licence before arrival here, it will be found most useful.

18. Private cars are unnecessary for Attachés as the staff cars cater to all requirements. It is regretted that NCO's are not permitted to own cars here as it is considered inadvisable due to their not having diplomatic immunity. The statement in the Post Report that Embassy transport is available for use by the junior staff after hours and on week-ends does not apply to military NCO's, unless members of the Embassy are using the cars, in which case this form of transportation may be used on a space-available basis. Otherwise, public transportation has to be used, if available.

Cards

19. Calling cards are provided by DND for Attachés and their wives. About 750 will be required by Attachés and about 500 by their wives. About 200 of each are handed over to the Embassy on arrival for automatic distribution throughout the diplomatic colony.

20. Invitation cards are a personal responsibility and an initial order of about 300 is advisable. Samples of such cards can be obtained from the officer one is replacing.

21. Plain place cards for dinner parties are required. An initial order of 400 is recommended.

Entertainment

22. Social life in Moscow is confined almost entirely to the diplomatic colony. There is a constant flow of official receptions, dinners and luncheon parties with the odd cocktail party thrown in for good measure. This frequently means two or three functions on the same day.

23. Dinner parties are either formal (black tie) or informal (dark suit), the only real difference being the dress. At an Embassy or when an Ambassador is attending, black tie is a "must". Some members of the colony entertain with informal buffets.

24. Receptions are usually from 1700-1900 or 1800-2000 and dinners are usually either at 2000 or 2030 hours.

25. The amount of personal entertaining done by Attachés and their wives varies to some degree, but the average runs at two dinner parties a month and as many luncheons, teas or coffee parties as seem desirable.

26. Cocktail parties are usually only given for a specific purpose, such as introducing or saying farewell to people.

27. Other entertainment is detailed in the Post Report. Tickets to the ballet, theatre, etc., are obtained through the administrative office at the Embassy.

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Travel to Post

28. There are several ways to travel to Moscow, but the best is from London to Helsinki by sea and from Helsinki to Moscow by rail. If travel is on the "BALTIKA", heavy baggage will be shipped on the same boat. On some ships arrangements must be made by CJS (London) to ship heavy baggage to Helsinki on another boat. Arrangements should be made with CJS(L) and the Canadian Embassy in Helsinki to have Victor Ek Company in Helsinki transfer heavy baggage from the boat to the Moscow train. In this way separation from baggage is avoided.

29. If disembarkation takes place at Leningrad the passenger is separated from his heavy baggage there and it takes up to 3 weeks to arrive in Moscow. This is inconvenient and at times embarrassing as uniforms; dinner jackets and lounge suits are needed by Service Attachés immediately upon arrival.

30. Arrival by air or train across the continent should be avoided if at all possible as this will mean separation from baggage for many weeks or even months.

31. The cabins on the Soviet Baltic ships are minute. For this reason there is a restriction of 50 kopecks on the cabin luggage. Dress on these ships is most informal - even to the wearing of sports clothes for dinner.

Conclusion

32. A tour as a Service Attaché in Moscow is not a pleasant one, but is interesting. Your friends are all in the same boat and this results in the existence of a considerable amount of camaraderie in the Attaché corps.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MEMORANDUM

Mr. Teakles
Circulation
Diary
File

TO: Defence Liaison (2) Division

(Mr. Trottier)

FROM: Far Eastern Division

REFERENCE:

Security S.E.C.R.E.T.

Date March 30, 1962.

File No.		
50-28-B-4-0		
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SUBJECT: JIC Paper "Soviet Likely Courses of Action" (JIC 437)

This is an excellent paper and in our opinion covers the subject admirably.

2. In response to your request, the following are our major comments, while minor drafting suggestions have been pencilled into the attached report.

Page 1, paragraph 3

3. To complete the list of instruments available to the Soviet Union, economic activities might usefully be added, to those mentioned, i.e., trade and aid (economic, military and technical).

Page 2, paragraph 4

4. The threat from China may well be long-term because China at present lacks the sheer power and technical stature of the Soviet Union, but the threat is also short-term in nature since it already exists. The Chinese challenge to Soviet supremacy in the bloc and in the world communist movement became evident in 1957 and was clearly staked out in 1960: in the series of commemorative articles on Lenin (the most important of which was "Long Live Leninism") and still more clearly at the Bucharest and Moscow Party meetings. The Chinese stand at and since the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961 demonstrated that the Chinese threat has not abated. Considered in this light, the paper could be a little more positive in the last sentence by saying "The Chinese problem is therefore bound to divert some of the attention....."

Pages 3 - 4, paragraphs 7 - 8

5. We agree with the substance of these two paragraphs but it is not quite made clear that what the Soviet Union is trying to do is to avoid direct involvement in limited wars. In fact, the Russians have demonstrated that they are willing to run some risk of involvement in limited wars, for example, by supplying the Pathet Lao in Laos, the Indonesians etc. This aid is, of course, indirect but it could contribute to the development of a limited war in situations like the one existing in Laos. Our criticism might be met by revising line 4 on page 4 along the following lines: "and even to exclude the concept.....of direct involvement in limited wars."

CIRCULATION

European Division

S E C R E T

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6. Part of our criticism regarding paragraphs 7 and 8 has been met in paragraph 10 and our main point is simply that the paper should be more explicit in stating that the Soviet Union wishes to avoid direct involvement in limited wars since these may escalate into major wars, although it is not above taking some risks by supplying belligerents or potential belligerents like the Pathet Lao or Indonesians.

Page 5, paragraph 9

7. Is there not a third reason for a large standing army in the Soviet Union: internal security? The actual need for a large army to back up internal security forces may in fact no longer exist but does not traditional thinking along these lines still exist?

8. The latter part of paragraph 9 overlooks what seems to be Khrushchov's view that communism can defeat capitalism and the West in economic and technical terms, and his realization that warfare of either the local or global variety would require the expenditure of efforts and resources which would detract from and postpone the achievement of this defeat.

Page 7, paragraph 11

9. Although implied in the list of items over which there is Sino-Soviet disagreement, it might be useful to include an explicit reference to Chinese dislike of Soviet aid to non-communist governments, some of which the Chinese are actively trying to subvert by training anti-communist elements in sabotage etc. and others, such as the Indian Government, with which the Chinese are quarrelling.

Page 9, paragraph 12

10. In lines 6 and 7, would it not be more accurate to say that Khrushchov feels compelled to control and direct the winds of change rather than the resistance to them?

Page 11, paragraph 16

11. Eighth line -- We would suggest dropping the clause "who are presumably not interested.....his policies for success". While it is no doubt true that the Chinese do not like to see a too successful Khrushchov, they remain dedicated international communists and any defeat of the West, whether in Central Europe or elsewhere, would be welcomed by the Chinese communists.

Page 12, paragraph 17

12. This paragraph requires considerable tidying up and a number of suggestions have been pencilled in. In addition it may be seriously questioned whether "monolithic unity" ever existed, at least insofar as the Chinese Communist Party is concerned. It came to power largely by its own efforts (and to some degree in spite of Stalin's actions). The fact that a crack in Sino-Soviet unity has only recently become markedly apparent has been due largely to Chinese preoccupation with their own revolution and to their view that Khrushchov in recent years has become a revisionist.

13. In addition to the pencilled suggestions the

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S E C R E T

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following might be added as a final sentence: "In the case of Mongolia, the Soviet Union appears to be firmly entrenched for the time being. Moreover, Mongolian fears of absorption by China will likely result in policies which are more inclined towards the Soviet Union than towards China."

Page 15, paragraph 21

14. We would suggest dropping the phrase "the decisions which govern" since the economic factor involved would in fact be the disposition of increases in production -- rather than the decisions taken. In addition, would not population growth be a third major economic factor?

Page 15, paragraph 22

15. Second sentence -- Contrary to what is stated in the paper, agricultural difficulties must surely affect the government's capacity to concentrate resources on industrial development and stagnation must surely slow down (but not necessarily stop) growth of Soviet economic power.

Page 15, paragraph 23

16. There appears to be some confusion in this paragraph between the "economy" and the economic thinking or philosophy of the Soviet Union which affects the economy (see pencilled suggestions).

Pages 16 - 17, paragraph 25

17. The final sentence of this paragraph appears to be over-simplified. In addition to what is stated, Soviet adherence to peaceful co-existence might well be altered by Western successes or Soviet reverses, for example, a revolt of the Hungarian type in one of the Soviet satellites, but one which is more successful in shedding Soviet control.

Page 20, paragraph 31

18. The first sentence is of course correct but might be qualified by making clear that the type of communism Khrushchov believes in is rather a different sort from that believed in by either his predecessors or his Chinese counterparts.

Page 21, paragraph 31

19. It seems to us that there is a fourth compulsion which is the Soviet Union's internal "revolution of expectations".

Page 23, paragraph 35

20. To the list included in the final sentence might be added "because of the risk of a definitive split with the Chinese".

Page 29, paragraph 49

21. The promotion of international communism might be added as a fourth concern of the Soviet Union.

Page 35, paragraph 53

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Page 29, paragraph 50

22. This paragraph overlooks the possible threat to the Soviet Union from China. This may not be imminent, but there are still undemarcated portions of the Sino-Soviet boundary which could cause friction and turn into a threat to the Soviet Union. Russian interest in filling up the eastern spaces of the Soviet Union is at least partly related to a real or imagined uneasiness over Chinese intentions towards Soviet Asia. This uneasiness is not lessened by the fact that large portions of Soviet Asia were formerly part of the Chinese empire. Rivalry between China and the Soviet Union over Mongolia also fits into this category.

Page 35, paragraph 60

23. The final sentence of this paragraph has been overtaken by events, since the Soviet Union has now succeeded in annoying the French by extending recognition to the Algerians, the result being French insistence on withdrawal of Soviet and French Ambassadors from Paris and Moscow respectively.

Page 37, paragraph 64

24. Communist China, like the Soviet Union, also makes a great play of granting aid "without strings". In addition we are not quite sure what is meant by the statement that "Communist China openly uses foreign economic assets for political purposes" and suspect that where the Soviet Union has such assets it will not be too diffident about using them for political ends.

Page 38, paragraph 66

25. Some mention might be made of the fact that relative Soviet moderation in Asia is due at least in part to greater preoccupation with events in Europe and greater physical remoteness from Southeast Asia than is the case with China.

26. In our opinion, a Sino-Soviet split would have to be virtually irreparable for the Soviet Union to completely abandon the Chinese in the face of a major Western threat over, for example, the Taiwan Straits, Vietnam or Laos.

J. M. TEARLES

Far Eastern Division.

Lib
MD

RESTRICTED

Ottawa, March 27, 1962.

Our file: 50028-B-40
Your file: CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

50028-B-40	
55	52

Major E.A. Blais,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a, Ont.

Statements on Soviet Armed Forces Day

In reply to your letter of March 22, 1962,
we wish to inform you that this Department has no
comments on British JIC (62) 26 (Final) dated
March 8, 1962, entitled "Statements on Soviet
Armed Forces Day."

(Sgd.) J. K. STARNES

J.K. Starnes
Defence Liaison (2) Division



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RESTRICTED
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

50028-B-40
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CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1322-1 (JIC)

March 27, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
USSR AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD

Reference: (a) CSC 7-17, CSC 1322-1 (JIC) of
7 March, 1962.

Enclosure: (1) Canadian JIC comments on US NIE
11-5-62 dated 21 February, 1962
on the above subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for the information of
members.

MAR 28 1962

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS (2)
SOJIR
SOCI
JICLO(W) (for your personal information only)

(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

RESTRICTED

CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1322-1 (JIC)

Comments on US NIE 11-5-62 dated 21 February, 1962
"Political Developments in the USSR and the
Communist World"

DMI: DMI have no adverse comments to make on this first-class political study.

DNI: DNI has nothing to add to this long and detailed analysis of Sino Soviet relations and Soviet political trends.
The general conclusions are concurred in.

XA, DAI, DSI, JIB, RCMP, CB NRC: No comments.

Circulated for information.



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

CSC 7-12 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

March 24, 1962.
Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SOVIET BLOC AND CHINESE PENETRATION
OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

Reference: (a) CSC 7-12, CSC 1824-1 (JIC) of
13 Mar 62 on the above subject.

In a recent letter the JICLO(L) has referred to our comments on British JIC(61)59(Final) on the above subject which were forwarded for his personal information only. Mr. Black is of the opinion that they contain a number of useful and interesting comments and wonders if they could be forwarded to the British JIC.

2. While it is noted that our comments are classified Canadian Eyes Only, this classification pertains only to the comments submitted by JIB.

3. I would like to clear this matter on a Secretarial basis and would therefore appreciate receiving members' comments by 6 Apr on Mr. Black's proposal that the comments be passed to the British JIC. Perhaps JIB would reconsider their Canadian Eyes Only classification or alternatively, indicate those portions of their comments which they would prefer NOT to be passed to the British JIC.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS(2)

E.A. Bleis
(E.A. Bleis)
Major,
Secretary.

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AR 26, 1962

RESTRICTED
(Enclosure SECRET)



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

50028-B-10

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CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

22 March, 1962

Ottawa, Ontario

Mr. Webster
Done Mar. 27/62
1. Do report, please
Mr. Radcliffe
This is largely a military paper & I doubt if we wd have comments. Do you agree?

→ J.K. Starnes, Esq.,
Dept. of External Affairs.

DNI
DMI
DAI
DSI
RCMP
JIB
CB NRC

Mr. Webster

"In comments"
letter, please
under copy 167

Done March 29/62

Miss Burton (Eur.)

THE MILITARY EFFECT OF SOVIET
ACQUISITION OF BASES AND FACILITIES
IN FINLAND

Enclosure: (1) BRITISH JIC(62)11 (Final) dated
8 March, 1962.

The BRITISH JIC paper at enclosure (1) is forwarded
for the information of members and comments would be ap-
preciated by 9 Apr 62.

See Mr. Starnes
Antony F. D.
Spice

E.A. Blais
(E.A. Blais)
Major,
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS (no enclosure)

CONFIDENTIAL

Extract from the 878th Meeting of the JIC...
March 21, 1962.

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XVI. TRIPARTITE MEETING ON SOVIET BW AND CW (CONFIDENTIAL)

26. The Committee considered a memorandum from the Secretary containing members' comments on Canadian participation in a tripartite meeting on Soviet BW and CW sponsored by DSI, London. It was suggested that the JIC endorse attendance at this conference by representatives of those intelligence directorates who have a prime interest in this subject.

(CSC 1439-4, (JIC) of 19 Mar 62)

27. Lt-Col Haynes and Dr. Martineau stated that their directorates wished to be represented at this conference. After discussion it was agreed that those directorates who wished to attend this conference would make the necessary arrangements under the authority of their particular service. It was further agreed that DSI would coordinate arrangements with DSI, London.

ACTION:

DSI
DMI

COPY NO. 1

SECRET
(Unless otherwise
Classified)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Minutes of the 878th meeting of the Joint Intelligence
Committee held in Room 4437, "A" Building on Wednesday,
21 March, 1962 at 0930 hours.

PRESENT

Mr. J.K. Starnes, (Chairman)
Department of External Affairs.
Capt. R.W. Murdoch,
Director of Naval Intelligence.
Col. R.E. Hogarth,
Director of Military Intelligence.
G/C L.C. Dilworth,
Director of Air Intelligence.
Superintendent W.H. Kelly,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
Mr. I. Bowen,
Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau.
Dr. R. Martineau,
Representing the Director of Scientific Intelligence.
Mr. E.M. Drake,
Director, CB NRC.

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SECRETARIAT

Maj. E.A. Blais,
Joint Staff.

MAR 23

ALSO PRESENT

Col. R.G. Kingstone,
Deputy Coordinator, Joint Staff.
Mr. E.A. Cureton,
Joint Intelligence Staff.
S/L D.A.L. Bell,
Staff Officer, Current Intelligence.
Maj. J.E. Steinbuckl,
Staff Officer, JIR.
Mr. P. Trottier,
Department of External Affairs.
Mr. Martin Rogers,
Representing British JIC.
Lt.Col. C.P. Haynes,
Directorate of Military Intelligence.
Lt.Cdr. J.G. Wright,
Directorate of Naval Intelligence.
Mr. B.O. Baker,
Chairman, SMIG(S&T), Item I
Dr. R.S. Eaton,
Directorate of Scientific Intelligence, Item I

THESE MINUTES ARE TO BE SEEN BY CANADIAN OFFICIALS ONLY

878th meeting

SECRET

- 2 -

I. INTELLIGENCE BRIEFS

(CONFIDENTIAL)

1. The Committee amended and approved certain intelligence briefs which were distributed to members during the week ending 20 Mar 62. The Committee agreed that SMIG(P&O) Brief No. 4/62 of 8 Mar 62 could be released to appropriate British/US authorities.

ACTION:

SOCI
Secretary,
SMIG(P&O)

II. JIC WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT

(CONFIDENTIAL)

2. The Committee amended and approved JIC Intelligence Report No. 12/62 for the period 14-20 March 1962.

ACTION:

SOJIR

III. "WESTERN" EXERCISES SCHEDULED FOR MAR 62

(RESTRICTED)

3. The SOJIR stated that the report of "WESTERN" exercises scheduled for the remainder of the month of March, 1962 tabled at the 876th meeting, remained valid.

IV. RELEASE OF WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT

(SECRET)

4. The Committee agreed that the entire contents of WIR 12/62 could be released to the Australian JIC.

ACTION:

SOJIR

V. CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

(RESTRICTED)

5. The Committee agreed that the intelligence briefing of the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 22 March, 1962 would be given by S/L Bell and Mr. Eon would attend on behalf of the Committee.

ACTION:

DSI
S/L Bell

VI. CALL-OVER OF WORK IN ARREARS

(CONFIDENTIAL)

6. The Committee noted the weekly review of contributions and comments in arrears.

(CSC 2-1-3-1 (JIC) of 20 Mar 62)

878th meeting

SECRET

- 3 -

VII. MINUTES OF THE 876th MEETING (RESTRICTED)

7. The Committee approved the Minutes of this meeting.

ACTION: Secretary

VIII. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES IN AREAS ADJACENT TO CANADA (SECRET)

8. The Committee considered CANADIAN JIC 1324/1 (62) on the above subject which had been revised by DNI in the light of the discussion at the 872nd meeting.

(CSC 7-17 (JIC), JIR 3-13-1 of 19 Mar 62)

9. The Committee amended paragraphs 1 to 15 and agreed to complete the review of this paper at a special meeting to be held at 1100 hrs on Thursday, 22 Mar 62.

ACTION: Chairman
Members
Secretary

IX. TRIPARTITE ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE, LONDON, 2-13 APRIL 1962 (RESTRICTED)

10. The Committee reviewed the following EIWG papers which are to be presented at the Tripartite Electronics Intelligence Conference in London in April:

- (a) CANUKUS Paper No. 5, prepared by the Directorate of Signals;
- (b) CANUKUS Paper No. 9, prepared by CB NRC.

11. The Committee noted these papers.

X. THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (CONFIDENTIAL)

12. The Committee considered a memorandum from the Secretary covering a request from the Directorate of Military Intelligence for CANADIAN JIC 433/2 (62) on the above subject to be published in the Canadian Army Intelligence Review at SECRET classification without attribution to the JIC.

(CSC 7-12 (JIC) of 15 Mar 62)

878th meeting

SECRET

- 4 -

13. G/C Dilworth inquired as to the agreed procedure for publishing excerpts from JIC papers in various Service intelligence reviews. Colonel Hogarth stated that it was his understanding that when a paper was approved by the JIC its distribution was restricted to the distribution authorized at that time. Any further distribution which subsequently was desired, required JIC authorization. In this particular case DMI sought authority to republish this JIC paper in the CAIR.

14. The Committee agreed with Colonel Hogarth's remarks and authorized the publication of CANADIAN JIC 433/2 (62) in the CAIR without attribution to the JIC.

ACTION:

DMI

XI. CHINESE COMMUNIST LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION FIVE YEARS AHEAD (RESTRICTED)

15. The Chairman proposed and the Committee agreed to a further deferment of this item of one week.

(CSC 7-2-1 (JIC))

ACTION:

Chairman
Secretary

XII. REPORT OF THE MINISTER'S MANPOWER STUDY GROUP (CONFIDENTIAL)

16. The Chairman recalled that at the 876th meeting it was agreed that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Strategic Intelligence Review would inform the JIC as to the date its report would be ready for consideration, bearing in mind the overall deadline date of 8 May 62.

(CSC 2417-1 (JIC))

17. Mr. Bowen stated that work on this item had commenced and that it was anticipated that a preliminary report would be available to the JIC by 11 Apr 62. Colonel Hogarth stated that the three Service directors of intelligence had met on the Foreign Liaison question and that a draft paper was being prepared.

18. The Committee noted Mr. Bowen's and Colonel Hogarth's remarks.

ACTION:

DMI
JIB

878th meeting

SECRET

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XIII. TRIPARTITE WORKING GROUP CONFERENCE ON (CONFIDENTIAL)
MISSILE DEPLOYMENT AND TRAINING -
OTTAWA, JUNE 1962

19. Mr. Bowen stated that the Chairman SMIG(P&O) wished to ascertain if the JIC had any objection to an item on missile production being included in the agenda for the missile deployment and training conference to be held in Ottawa. A new study prepared by British authorities on production had been received and it was considered to be relevant to the agenda as a whole.

(CSC 6-2 (JIC))

20. The Committee agreed to this proposal.

ACTION: Chairman, SMIG(P&O)

XIV. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL BY CANADIAN (SECRET)
SERVICE ATTACHES IN THE USSR AND BY
SOVIET SERVICE ATTACHES IN CANADA

21. The Chairman expressed concern over the fact that in two recent cases the principles set out in CANADIAN JIC 435/2 (62), on the above subject, had not been applied in refusing permission to travel to members of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. The Chairman pointed out that it had been agreed, and had in fact been the general practise, that when a refusal was necessary it was made clear to the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa that the Canadian action was directly related to a trip refused or obstructed by the Soviet authorities in Moscow.

(CSC 1462-2 (JIC))

22. The Chairman read a message from the Canadian Ambassador in Moscow which outlined the danger of escalation in applying restrictions and counter-restrictions, and pointed out that our recent refusal to the Soviet Embassy on grounds other than a purely reciprocal basis had indeed resulted in a similar rejection by the Soviet authorities in Moscow for a Canadian visit. Colonel Hogarth stated that our system for clearance of all Soviet trips in Canada, both by military and civilian officers, was not working properly and he suggested that the Committee discuss this question at the next meeting. The Chairman then suggested that the Committee address itself to two particular aspects of this problem:

- (a) the principles to be applied; and,
- (b) the procedures to be followed in dealing with Soviet requests to travel in Canada.

878th meeting

SECRET

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23. The Committee instructed the Secretary to include this item on the Agenda for the meeting to be held on 28 Mar 62.

ACTION:

Secretary

XV. ELECTRONIC WARFARE INFORMATION

(CONFIDENTIAL)

24. The Committee considered a request from SHAPE for information on Soviet and Satellite electronic capabilities in various fields which could be released to SADTC, SHAPE and subordinate commanders.

(CSC 1858-1 (JIC) of 20 Mar 62)

25. After discussion the Committee agreed that the Secretary invite EIWG to review this request and to advise the Committee what information of Canadian origin could be provided. If possible, the Committee would like to have this information by 25 Apr 62.

ACTION:

Secretary

XVI. TRIPARTITE MEETING ON SOVIET BW AND CW

(CONFIDENTIAL)

26. The Committee considered a memorandum from the Secretary containing members' comments on Canadian participation in a tripartite meeting on Soviet BW and CW sponsored by DSI, London. It was suggested that the JIC endorse attendance at this conference by representatives of those intelligence directorates who have a prime interest in this subject.

(CSC 1439-4, (JIC) of 19 Mar 62)

27. Lt-Col Haynes and Dr. Martineau stated that their directorates wished to be represented at this conference. After discussion it was agreed that those directorates who wished to attend this conference would make the necessary arrangements under the authority of their particular service. It was further agreed that DSI would coordinate arrangements with DSI, London.

ACTION:

DSI
DMI

878th meeting

SECRET

- 7 -

XVII. SECRETARIAL REVIEW

(CONFIDENTIAL)

28. The Committee instructed the Secretary to discuss the following item with the British JIC Liaison Officer:

(a) Intelligence Briefs.

(CSC 1769-1 (JIC))

ACTION:

Secretary



(E.A. Blais)
Major
Secretary

EAB/2-5459/wb
22 March, 1962

DISTRIBUTION:

Nos.	1-4	-	Mr. J.K. Starnes
Nos.	5-7	-	DNI
Nos.	8-10	-	DMI
Nos.	11-15	-	DAI
Nos.	16-18	-	DSI
No.	19	-	RCMP
Nos.	20-21	-	JIB
No.	22	-	JIB - for Chairman - JAWG/SMIG(P&O)
No.	23	-	CB NRC
No.	24	-	CCOS
No.	25	-	Chairman, CJS London
No.	26	-	Chairman, CJS Washington
No.	27	-	CJS
Nos.	28-29	-	JIS
No.	30	-	SOJIR
No.	31	-	Chairman, EIWG (Mr. J.W. Cox, DRB)
No.	32	-	Chairman, SMIG(S&T) (Mr. B.O. Baker, DRB)
No.	33	-	JICLO(W)
No.	34	-	JICLO(L)
No.	35	-	JS/DSS
No.	36	-	JIC File

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: DEFENCE LIAISON (2) *h m Jelle*

Security ... CONFIDENTIAL

Date ... March 20, 1962

FROM: EUROPEAN DIVISION

File No.		
50028-B-40		
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REFERENCE: Your Memo of March 2, 1962

SUBJECT: UK JIC(61) 59 (FINAL) of Feb. 1 - "Soviet Bloc and Chinese Penetration of the Middle East and Africa"

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We find the above-mentioned paper to be very worthwhile reading. We would, however, agree with your criticism that the paper does not take into account sufficiently the difficulties which the Soviet Union has encountered in its diplomatic relations with the countries of the Middle East and Africa.

2. We also think that the paper did not stress sufficiently the differences between the Soviet and Chinese methods of penetration into these countries.


3. The paper maintains that there is no evidence of Sino-Soviet conflict or rivalry over penetration in the Middle East and Africa. In ideological terms there is now a very definite conflict of aims. Although, naturally enough, the Chinese cannot extend vast amounts of aid to these countries it is surely significant that the aid which it does extend goes to those countries which, in the opinion of the Chinese, are favouring proletarian revolution.

4. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, seems to extend aid fairly indiscriminately. It is perhaps relevant to mention that Soviet policy regarding the achievement of socialism in countries outside the Soviet Union has been modified to the point where socialism may be attained through peaceful means rather than a bloody revolution. The Chinese do not concur with this idea, and, in fact, it is one of the basic disagreements between the Chinese and the Russians.

CIRCULATION

A&ME Div.
Far Eastern

5. Although the paper does mention these differences of opinion between the Chinese and the Russian approaches, it could have been emphasized more effectively. The Soviet-Chinese dispute at the recent Afro-Asian Writers Conference in Cairo last ~~January~~^{February} is surely evidence of a fairly definite conflict of policy.


European Division.



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

CSC 1439-4 (JIC)

19 March, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

TRIPARTITE MEETING ON SOVIET BW AND CW

Reference: (a) CSC 1439-4 (JIC)
of 27 Feb 62.

1. On 27 February I asked for members' views (reference (a)) on Canadian participation in a tripartite meeting on Soviet BW and CW to be held in London on 21 - 23 May 62.

2. Following are comments received from members:

- (a) DAI Intelligence concerning Soviet BW and CW capabilities is outside of DAI's present terms of reference, except possibly for aircraft load carrying capabilities. In connection with the subject meeting it is not our intention to nominate a DAI delegate. However, as DAI considers DSI to be the Canadian authority on the subject, and to whom we turn for such information as may be required from time to time, DSI attendance at the meeting is strongly supported.
- (b) DMI DMI recommends that Major JEJ Caryi (MI-10) represent them at this conference, in view of the emphasis expected to be placed on matters of primary interest to technical intelligence. Major Caryi will be in London at this time attending the Technical Intelligence Conference.
- (c) CBNRC No views on this subject.
- (d) XA No objection to this proposal if other members find merit in it.


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CONFIDENTIAL

3. Members will please note that this conference is not sponsored by the British JIC, but rather by DSI, London. The JIC may therefore wish to endorse attendance at this conference by representatives of those intelligence directorates who have a prime interest in this matter.

4. This item will be considered at the meeting to be held on 21 Mar under "Other Business".


(E.A. Blais)
Major
Secretary

EAB/2-5459/wb

cc: CJS
JIS (2)
SOCI
SOJIR

RESTRICTED

Your file: CSC 1571-1 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

Ottawa, March 19, 1962.

Gik
AD

Major R.A. Blais,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
Department of National Defence,
Room 4431, "A" Building,
O t t a w a, Ont.

50028-B-40	
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Indications of Sino-Soviet Bloc
Preparations for Early War

In reply to your letter of March 15, 1962,
we wish to inform you that this Department has no
comments on British JIC (62) 21 dated March 2, 1962,
on "Indications of Sino-Soviet Bloc Preparations for
Early War."

J.K. Starnes
Defence Liaison (2) Division

D.L.(2)/R.M. MIDDLETON/VW

RESTRICTED

Ottawa, March 19, 1962.

Your file: CSC 7-17(JIC)
CSC 1322-1(JIC)

Our file: 50028-B-40

Jib
AD

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Major E.A. Elais,
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee,
Department of National Defence,
Room 4431, "A" Building,
O t t a w a, Ont.

Political Developments in
The USSR and The Communist World

In reply to your letter of March 7, 1962,
we wish to inform you that this Department has no
comments on US NIF 11-5-62 dated February 21, 1962,
on "Political Developments in the USSR and the
Communist World."

J.K. Starnes
Defence Liaison (2) Division

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

D.L.(2)/R.M. MIDDLETON/VW

Jib
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RESTRICTED

Ottawa, March 19, 1962.

Your file: CSC 7-17 (JIC)
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)
Our file: 50028-B-40

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Major E.A. Blais,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a, Ont.

Sino-Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1962-66

In reply to your letter of March 15, 1962,
we wish to inform you that this Department has no
comments on British JIC (62) 3 (Final) dated February 16,
1962, on "Sino-Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1962-66."

J.K. Starnes
J.K. Starnes
Defence Liaison (2) Division