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DATE 2007-03-06

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TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DÉSARMEMENT
MESURES
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
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TO/A IDA
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Disarmament and Development:
SUJET • French Demarche

Security/Sécurité
RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
March 23, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0246

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

1

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RCR

Attached for your consideration is an aide-mémoire left with me today by the Counsellor of the French Embassy, Mr. Lequetier. I did not comment on the contents of the aide-mémoire, but said that I would ask you to examine it and communicate any reactions to the French Embassy in due course.

2. Lequetier would also be interested in knowing whether Canada will be conveying its views on this question to the Secretary General within the time limit specified in the resolution adopted at the last UN General Assembly (i.e. before April 1, 1984). Would you please advise the French Embassy of where matters stand from the Canadian perspective.

LD
L. A. Delvoie

A. BASSADE DE FRANCE
AU CANADA

Ottawa, le 19 mars 1984.

A I D E - M E M O I R E

A.s. : Désarmement et développement.

I - Comme le sait le Gouvernement canadien, la proposition présentée par le Président MITTERRAND à la tribune des Nations-Unies le 28 septembre 1983, d'une concertation internationale approfondie sur le thème des liens entre désarmement et développement, a fait ensuite l'objet d'une recommandation, adoptée par consensus, de la 38ème session de l'Assemblée Générale.

Cette résolution, dont la France avait pris l'initiative :

- 1) invite les Etats membres à faire connaître au Secrétaire Général, avant le 1er avril 1984, leurs vues et propositions sur les points suivants :
 - a) l'évaluation du poids des armements dans le monde ;
 - b) l'incidence des dépenses d'armements sur la situation économique mondiale et le développement ;
 - c) la contribution qu'une réduction des armements et des dépenses militaires - notamment par les Etats dotés d'armes nucléaires et les autres Etats militairement importants - ou une contribution de ces Etats en proportion de leurs efforts militaires, permettrait d'apporter aux tâches de développement ;

.../...

2.-

d) les mécanismes qui permettraient de mettre en oeuvre cette contribution, particulièrement au profit du progrès économique et social des pays en développement ;

e) l'examen de propositions ayant trait à la convocation d'une conférence.

2) prévoit que la question sera inscrite à l'ordre du jour de la commission du désarmement, qui se réunira à New-York du 7 mai au 1er juin prochains.

II - Le Gouvernement français attache une grande importance aux thèmes énoncés par cette résolution et considère que la discussion de cette question, importante et complexe, nécessite la contribution de tous les pays intéressés.

III - A toutes fins utiles, les autorités françaises souhaiteraient faire part aux autorités canadiennes des réflexions suivantes :

1) Principaux aspects de la discussion globale.

L'expérience de la crise grave et prolongée que traversent les relations internationales amène à recommander une démarche globale. De l'avis de la France, la discussion doit porter sur l'ensemble des problèmes posés par la relation "désarmement-développement", de telle sorte qu'un dialogue politique systématique puisse s'engager à leur sujet.

a) L'examen doit porter en premier lieu sur le poids des armements. Ceci comprend la masse globale, du point de vue des sommes qui y sont consacrées dans le monde, et aussi les dépenses que consent chacun des principaux pays militaires. En effet, puisque l'importance de ces

.../...

charges est reconnue comme un facteur négatif pour l'ensemble de la communauté internationale, il existe pour celle-ci une nécessité de connaître la part de responsabilité de chacun.

b) Il faudra d'autre part examiner l'incidence des dépenses d'armement sur les problèmes économiques mondiaux non résolus. De nombreux aspects de la situation économique mondiale peuvent être examinés de ce point de vue. C'est bien entendu le problème du développement qui devra retenir l'attention en priorité.

c) Il importe également d'étudier la relation entre la sécurité et le développement. En effet, si le poids global des armements pèse en définitive davantage sur les pays en développement que sur les autres, ce n'est pas seulement parce que l'ampleur des ressources qui leur sont consacrées empêche les pays riches d'aider le Tiers-Monde autant qu'ils le pourraient. C'est aussi parce que les tensions internationales ont des conséquences particulièrement dures pour les pays les plus démunis. Les pays les plus pauvres, qui éprouvent les plus grandes difficultés à obtenir les financements nécessaires à leur développement, sont souvent aussi ceux qui se trouvent les plus menacés par la dégradation de l'environnement international, dont il ne sont le plus souvent guère responsables. En d'autres termes, non seulement des économies en matière d'armement pourraient permettre un accroissement de l'aide aux pays en développement, mais la sécurité apparaît, pour chacun des pays dans le besoin, comme une des conditions de l'essor économique et social.

d) Doit être posé, à partir de ce qui précède, le problème des responsabilités particulières des plus grandes puissances dans la détérioration de la situation internationale, et donc de la reconnaissance des obligations particulières qu'elles ont vis-à-vis de ceux des pays pauvres qui souffrent le plus de l'insécurité.

2) Types de solution à envisager.

Il est évident qu'une discussion d'ensemble comme celle que la France propose n'aura de sens que si elle débouche sur des conclusions.

.../...

Il est également clair que celles-ci ne pourront être dégagées de façon précise qu'à l'issue du débat.

Il est permis néanmoins d'évoquer dès à présent quelques directions de recherche.

Devant la situation que la résolution signale à son attention, la communauté internationale peut faire plusieurs choses :

a) Elle peut affirmer des principes.

Il ne suffit pas de proclamer que désarmement et développement sont l'un et l'autre des objectifs essentiels. On devrait mettre en discussion quelques idées plus spécifiques : étudier une combinaison du droit à la sécurité et du droit au développement pour les pays les plus démunis et les plus exposés aux dangers, établir le droit à compensation des pays "sinistrés de la sécurité", c'est-à-dire de ceux dont les populations, le territoire, l'économie, l'équilibre social, ont été directement frappés par la tension internationale, poser à cet égard la responsabilité des plus grandes puissances et souligner la priorité que ces questions doivent présenter pour les organisations internationales.

Peut-être serait-il également possible, en relation avec le rappel des objectifs communs en matière d'aide au développement, de souligner que celle-ci doit s'exercer notamment au profit des pays victimes de la tension internationale, et de marquer également qu'elle devrait prendre une place accrue dans les programmes d'assistance des pays développés, par rapport à l'aide militaire, que celle-ci se présente sous forme de dons ou de prêts, en matériels ou en argent.

b) Elle peut décider que les pays armés et riches dégageront, au profit du développement, des ressources additionnelles, et disposer de la façon dont ces ressources seraient utilisées.

La justification d'une telle décision réside dans la nécessité d'une approche réaliste par rapport à l'attente des pays démunis. Dégager des ressources additionnelles dès maintenant, c'est reconnaître que le moment où des économies substantielles résulteront d'accords de désarmement est malheureusement impossible à prévoir et

.../...

risque de n'être pas proche. Par rapport à ce moment, la décision suggérée aurait la valeur d'une anticipation et marquerait un accord politique quant à l'importance et à l'urgence du problème. D'où proviendraient ces ressources ? Un système de contributions volontaires serait concevable. Sans exclure ce système, la France croit nécessaire d'envisager la possibilité d'un accord contraignant établissant une sorte de taxe obligatoire proportionnelle aux dépenses d'armement. L'objectif à atteindre pourrait être une somme équivalant globalement à 1% ou 2% des dépenses militaires.

Il va de soi que pour répondre au problème posé, et pour constituer une incitation - même légère - au désarmement, cette contribution devrait émaner des pays les plus armés et tenir compte de l'importance de leur effort militaire. Des critères tenant à la richesse des différents pays pourraient être également envisagés. La contribution pourrait être répartie au prorata des dépenses militaires si un accord existait sur leur évaluation. Un tel accord est en lui-même un objectif très souhaitable, comme il a été dit plus haut ; mais il faudra du temps pour l'atteindre. Il faudrait dès maintenant recourir à un autre critère. Afin de marquer l'importance du problème de la réduction des armements nucléaires et en soulignant la responsabilité qui incombe à cet égard aux membres permanents du conseil de sécurité, il serait équitable qu'une avance sur la contribution à prévoir fût versée sans attendre par les puissances nucléaires au prorata du nombre de vecteurs de l'arme nucléaire dont disposent leurs forces armées.

Le caractère additionnel de ces fonds par rapport à l'aide publique au développement déjà existante devrait être affirmé et vérifié.

Il doit être clair que la décision et l'exécution ultérieures de mesures de désarmement effectif devraient conduire à l'affectation d'une partie des ressources dégagées à un effort supplémentaire en faveur du développement. De tels apports viendraient alors en déduction des contributions demandées précédemment aux Etats concernés.

.../...

c) Quant au mode d'utilisation des fonds ainsi dégagés, ceux-ci devraient aller à des programmes de développement supplémentaire dont la plupart pourraient être décidés et gérés par les organisations internationales déjà actives à cet égard. Cela serait plus efficace que de créer un nouvel organisme. Des règles seraient fixées pour la coopération avec les autres organisations internationales ou régionales. Une partie déterminée des contributions devrait être utilisée à des activités au profit des pays les moins développés. Une autre devrait être réservée à des actions en faveur des pays et régions particulièrement touchés par des troubles, tensions ou conflits internationaux, sous forme d'aide d'urgence aux populations affectées, y compris les réfugiés, de rétablissement d'infrastructures détruites, etc... Le rôle des Nations-Unies et celui des organisations régionales devrait être précisé. Une coordination devrait être établie entre les organisations internationales prenant part à ces diverses actions.

3) Cadre de la discussion internationale.

Le Président de la République a proposé, à la tribune de l'O.N.U. d'organiser la discussion de la relation désarmement-développement en deux étapes successives :

- une réunion restreinte que la France serait heureuse d'accueillir à Paris.

Il est apparu que le traitement d'un ensemble de problèmes aussi complexes serait plus efficace s'ils étaient abordés dans un premier temps entre un nombre limité de participants. La France suggère donc la réunion, dans un premier stade, d'une conférence restreinte mais représentative.

Le choix des participants devrait faire l'objet d'une large consultation. Il serait fait en fonction de critères correspondant à la situation des différents pays au regard des armements, et du niveau de développement, ceci de telle sorte que les principales catégories soient représentées de manière aussi équitable que possible.

.../...

La réunion restreinte devrait comprendre les puissances nucléaires ainsi qu'un certain nombre d'Etats dotés d'armements importants. Devraient d'autre part figurer des Etats choisis parmi les pays en développement, parmi lesquels quelques-uns des pays les moins développés.

La contribution particulière apportée par les Etats aux discussions internationales sur le désarmement et le développement pourrait également être prise en considération.

Enfin, il paraît indispensable que soit assuré dans la composition de la réunion un équilibre géographique et politique.

La réunion restreinte aurait pour tâche :

- a) de réfléchir aux conditions du débat sur les rapports entre le désarmement et le développement ;
- b) de proposer les études et travaux complémentaires ;
- c) de présenter des suggestions pour la deuxième conférence ;
- d) de proposer une série d'objectifs à atteindre pour les transferts de ressources au profit du développement, et éventuellement de recommander des mesures d'effet rapide.

- une réunion de l'ensemble des Etats membres des Nations-Unies serait ensuite convoquée, selon les modalités habituelles.

4) Rôle de la Commission du désarmement conformément à la résolution de l'Assemblée.

La France envisage de soumettre au Secrétaire Général des vues et propositions plus complètes sur le fond et sur la procédure.

Elle espère que la Commission du désarmement pourra, sur la base des contributions des Etats membres, procéder à un débat utile et fournir à l'Assemblée Générale et aux Etats membres des recommandations qui seront de nature à faire progresser la discussion et à permettre que des initiatives soient prises rapidement comme la convocation des réunions proposées./.

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO **W** **INGTON/Lysyshyn**
A

WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)

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NO. **IDDZ-0245** DATE **March 23**

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TO/À • URR
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Your memorandum URR-0195 of March 8
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • MacEachen/Shultz Bilateral:
SUJET The Prime Minister's Initiative

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
March 23, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0244

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

1

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Attached as requested is our contribution for
the scenario for the upcoming DPM/Shultz bilateral.

L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

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PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

You may wish to review the course of the Prime Minister's initiative since you last discussed this subject with Mr. Shultz during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington on December 15. Although one phase of the initiative ended with the Prime Minister's meeting with Chernenko in Moscow, the initiative is being pursued through diplomatic and institutional channels.

- With his meeting with Chernenko the Prime Minister completed "one phase" of his initiative, having consulted the leaders of all five nuclear powers, a wide range of Eastern and Western leaders, the UN Secretary General and a cross-section of the third world through the Commonwealth. But the ideas put forward by the PM in his initiative are being pursued, through diplomatic channels and international institutions.
- Our assessment is that the Canadian initiative has had some success and that there have been encouraging signs since January of a change in the deteriorating trend of East-West relations. We welcomed President Reagan's important January 16 speech and its offer of a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. General Secretary Chernenko told the Prime Minister that the Soviet Union did not have to be persuaded of the importance of political dialogue, but the Soviets did not want to help with an election campaign (i.e. the USA presidential election).
- As the Prime Minister told Chernenko, there is a political "window of opportunity" in the next few months - Stockholm will begin its second phase, the MBFR talks have begun again, the East-West policy review is underway in NATO, the London Summit will doubtless cover political as well as economic issues and the USA election campaign will not begin in earnest until the summer. You may wish to tell Mr. Shultz that the PM urged Chernenko to seize this opportunity to take concrete steps and to send signals of cooperation to the United States.
- On MBFR, for example, we welcome the new USA position, presented in NATO on March 19, (it involves more flexibility on data by dropping insistence on a full agreement on the number of all Eastern forces in the area concerned before reductions, in exchange for Eastern acceptance of more stringent verification measures). We would have liked the USA to have gone farther in the direction of the package of proposals Bonn was contemplating last

...2

year (it would appear that the USA position does not satisfy the FRG as it has ^{not} been put to NATO as a FRG initiative). But establishing categories concerning which data agreement could be delayed is a significant step in the direction of increased flexibility. These proposals by themselves are unlikely to unblock the talks. We think that a political push will be needed to surmount the impasse in MBFR. The USA proposals should, however, now allow the NATO review of MBFR to move more quickly toward the adoption of a set of Alliance proposals which could be tabled in Vienna shortly.

- On the Tindemans review, NATO in the 80s needs the sort of fundamental framework for policy that Harmel provided seventeen years ago. We attach great importance to this review of the political dimension of East-West relations, and hope that the Alliance will be able to move beyond the realm of analysis to the elaboration of a practical formulation of "future tasks" on the Harmel model.
- Next steps for the initiative include putting ten principles of a common bond between East and West (first proposed by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons) to both superpowers. You may wish to tell Mr. Shultz that the Prime Minister will be writing shortly to President Reagan and to General Secretary Chernenko to recommend these ten points which stake out common ground on which both sides might build.
- On the three suffocation proposals, we have had further consultation with the USA and European allies. We have not yet decided on the best method for disseminating these ideas.



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TO/À MCB
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Task Force on East-West Relations and
SUJET • International Security (IDDZ)

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
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March 23, 1984
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IDDZ-0243

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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Over the last few months, this Task Force has made some rather heavy demands on the administrative and support services of the Department. To cite but three:

- (a) The Printing Office was asked to produce nine briefing and policy books for us, usually on short notice and with very tight production deadlines.
- (b) The Communications Centre was called upon to process several hundred incoming classified telegrams addressed to us, most bearing a "delivery by" designation, as well as over a hundred outgoing classified messages, a dozen of which ran to over 30 pages, were delivered late in the day to the Comcentre and bore early "deliver by" instructions.
- (c) The Bureau of Communications and General Services was initially asked to provide office accommodation, equipment and phone services for the Task Force on short notice and, because of the numerous moves taking place in the Pearson Building, was obliged to move our whole plant twice thereafter.

The cooperation we received from these departmental units was outstanding. They invariably gave us prompt, competent and highly professional service. Through you, I should like to extend to them my warmest thanks and my congratulations on a job very well done.

L. A. Delvoie
L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

CONFIDENTIAL

March 23, 1984

IDDZ-0241

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R.Fowler)

Initiative: Situation Report

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with a short update on items and issues related to your initiative on East-West relations and international security.

Five Power Conference Proposal: We have transmitted a revised discussion paper to the UN Secretariat in New York and have asked our mission to keep us informed of any decision the Secretary General may take regarding informal consultations with the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

Suffocation Proposals: We await your instructions on how to proceed with these proposals. The options, as we see them, were put forward in our memorandum IDDZ-0222 of March 12.

MBFR: The revised USA position outlined in our memorandum IDDZ-0211 of February 29 will be formally tabled and discussed for the first time in NATO early next week. The Canadian Delegation will welcome the new USA proposal, but will make it clear that Canada would wish to see the Alliance adopt a more forthcoming stance in the process of shifting the focus of the negotiations from data to verification issues. It is expected that discussions at NATO headquarters will go on for several weeks before a common Alliance position is hammered out.

NATO Review of East-West Relations: This review is proceeding apace, but is experiencing the usual difficulties encountered in developing a text which has to be agreed upon by sixteen nations. We attach for your information a copy of the Canadian contribution to this review, which was approved earlier this week by Mr. MacEachen and which has been forwarded to NATO.

Stockholm Conference: The Conference concluded its first session last week and is now in recess until May 8. Although exchanges were occasionally sharp and tough, the tone of the Conference was generally business-like; it did not, as some had feared, give rise to East-

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West polemics. Our delegation reports, however, that "the tough Soviet statement with which the session closed confirmed that the positions of East and West are far apart. And this in turn suggests that little movement can be expected here in the foreseeable future." The Canadian delegation intervened frequently in the Conference on the basis of the themes of your initiative on East-West relations and international security.



L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/ADMPOL/ CPP/ DNACPOL/ DSTRATA

EA/MINA/USS/DMF/IFB/IDD/IDR/IDA/RBD/RBR

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CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION
ALLIANCE APPRAISAL OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS

March 6, 1984

Department of
External Affairs
Ottawa

001330

ALLIANCE APPRAISAL OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION: DÉVELOPMENTS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS
SINCE 1967

In considering Allies' future policy on East/West relations, the point of departure must be recognition that the international situation has changed since the issuance of the Harmel Report in 1967, and that the tasks confronting Allies have changed accordingly.

In 1967, Allies felt little sense of anxiety over the military balance in Europe, apart from a concern that the south-eastern flank was overly exposed. The Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority was offset by a marked NATO qualitative advantage, while the nuclear balance tended to favour the Alliance. But as a result of the high priority which Warsaw Pact nations accorded military spending in the intervening years, unmatched by corresponding Western expenditures, the Warsaw Pact is now approaching qualitative equality with the West in an important assortment of conventional weapons' categories, and has acquired an edge in some nuclear weapons' categories. As a result, the Alliance has found it difficult to preserve sufficient balance between the two sides' overall military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, to make clear that it would be able to respond to any type of aggression in an effective way. This, in turn, has undermined the strategy of flexible response and cast doubt on the credibility of NATO's deterrent. In addition, there is growing public anxiety over a deterrent that depends on the threat of nuclear war, the costs of which would be largely out of proportion to any conceivable benefits to be derived from engaging in it. Hence, one very important task now facing the Alliance is to find means of restoring the margin of credibility which the deterrent has lost in recent years.

In 1967, Allies were also inclined to adopt a rather hopeful attitude towards the evolution of Soviet and East European policies. While recognizing that basic problems remained, Allies hoped that the Soviet doctrine of "peaceful co-existence" as applied to détente would both change the nature of the confrontation with the West and foster a resolution of the German Question. These hopes were borne out to a large extent during the following decade, as cooperative relations developed in a variety of political, commercial, humanitarian, scientific and arms control fields and agreements were reached on a modus vivendi on Berlin and on normalizing relations

between the Germanies. But these achievements were not able to prevent a subsequent deterioration in relations beginning towards the end of the 1970's. Hence another task facing the Alliance is to develop means for arresting current trends and regenerating forward momentum.

Thirdly, in 1967 Allies also entertained hopes that a more stable relationship between East and West would permit the two sides to address "underlying political issues", bring an end to the "unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe", and ultimately produce a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees. Here too some initial progress was made, as issues such as democracy and human rights, the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and various conventional arms control proposals were added to the East/West agenda. But after a decade and half of negotiation, the Soviet commitment to the status quo in Europe seems unshakable. Hence, a further task facing the Alliance is to revise the existing framework for the conduct of its relations with the Warsaw Pact countries and to chart a new course to the end of the century.

II CURRENT SITUATION AND TRENDS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS

1. Major elements of Allied East/West Policy

In the situation of insecurity brought about by the actions of the Soviet Union after World War II, the North Atlantic Treaty signatories affirmed:

- their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments
- their determination to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and
- their resolve to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

In pursuit of their objectives, the signatories undertook "to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to consult together whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened". The signatories

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recognized that the deterrent role of NATO could only be discharged if the political and economic relations between members were cooperative and close.

In 1967, NATO governments commissioned a study of "the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace". The Harmel Report identified two principal tasks: (a) to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur; and (b) to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship with the Warsaw Pact, in which the underlying political issues could be solved.

Periodically since then, the Allies have reaffirmed their commitments under the Treaty and their devotion to the Harmel Report's dual policy of military security and the pursuit of detente, most recently at the level of heads of state and government in their Declaration at Bonn in June 1982. On that occasion, Allies set forth a Program for Peace in Freedom, in which they undertook to "maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity (and) on that basis (to) persevere in efforts to establish, whenever Soviet behaviour makes this possible, a more constructive East-West relationship through dialogue, negotiation and mutually advantageous cooperation".

In the Bonn Declaration, the Alliance made it clear that it will never use its weapons except in response to attack, that it does not seek military superiority over the Warsaw Pact, that it will seek to maintain forces only to the level required to ensure the credibility of its deterrent, that it will continue to examine ways for controlling and reducing arms, and that it will continue to extend to the Soviet Union and its allies the offer to work together to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship featuring an open, comprehensive political dialogue and cooperation based on mutual advantage.

These elements of policy have generally served the Alliance well over the years, and have been reflected in Allies efforts to maintain a military balance, to negotiate arms control agreements with the Warsaw Pact, and to cooperate with Warsaw Pact countries in non-military fields.

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The issuance of the Bonn Declaration, and more recently the Brussels Declaration, reflect a lingering concern within the Alliance that the "NATO message" has not always been getting through, either to the Warsaw Pact or to the general public in the West. As the Harmel Report noted, Alliance members share the same ideals and a high degree of common interest, but they remain sovereign states and are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decisions. Hence there is a permanent risk of Allies sending mixed or contradictory signals, and in recent years the public has perceived the incidence of such mixed signalling to be high.

At least part of the explanation for Alliance failings in this respect can be traced to deficiencies in the intra-Alliance consultative process, in particular "Allies' failure to take counsel from agreed assessments of Soviet strengths and weaknesses and to draw on such assessments in pursuing national courses of action. Too often, political and economic assessments arrived at after laborious examination of the available data have been ignored in subsequent national policy-making. This has been especially regrettable in recent years, when Alliance assessments (such as the 1978 and 1983 studies) were especially prescient and could have had a highly salutary effect on strains within the Alliance over policy towards the Soviet Union. Alliance assessments have sometimes been disparaged as too "cautious" reflecting only lowest common denominator views; but the absence of good evidence either way should have been a source of warning rather than disparagement.

Clearly Alliance policy would have been served were Allies to have abided by the advice of the 1956 Report of the Committee of Three that "Where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies (and) where an agreed and formal recommendation has emerged from the Council's discussions, governments should give it full weight in any national actions or policies related to the subject of that recommendation".

2. Current Soviet Attitudes

The 1978 Alliance Study of East/West Relations observed that "at the core of the thinking of the Soviet leadership lies the basic aim of maintaining and strengthening their hold on the USSR and Eastern Europe". But the study noted that there were other factors as well, "such as Soviet/Russian nationalism and pride, the conditioning effects of ideology, their desire to improve

and strengthen the position of the USSR, particularly vis-a-vis the US and NATO, and finally their preoccupation with China both in the inter-state and inter-party spheres". The study judged that Soviet leaders probably thought of their immense military strength and political influence throughout the world primarily as means of protecting the "gains of socialism"; but it did not rule out the possibility that their preoccupation with changes in the "balance of forces" and the acquisition of at least political and military parity with the United States might encourage a more adventurous approach to world affairs. On balance, however, the study thought "a calculated and cautious approach by the Soviet Union would likely prevail", provided the Allies continued to maintain a satisfactory East/West military balance. This would be particularly so in a period of leadership transition since new Soviet leaders, being less secure and less disposed to show flexibility, would be unlikely to break the basic continuity of policy. Those aspects of détente which carried material benefits for the Soviet Union would also likely be pursued, but the way in which the process was carried out would depend on several factors including Western policies towards the Soviet Union.

The 1983 analysis of Soviet Policy Trends and their Implications reached similar conclusions. Soviet foreign policy objectives, it noted, stemmed from "the interaction of two elements: national interests, among which the safeguarding of the security of the Soviet state is the overriding priority; and a self-appointed ideological mission". Direct military confrontation with Western countries was seen in the USSR as a potential danger to Soviet security and therefore to be avoided, while selective forms of economic and other cooperation with the Western industrialized world were seen as a hedge against military confrontation and as beneficial to the Soviet economy. Détente, the analysis concluded, would remain a high priority for the Soviet Union. During the succession period, the limits of outside influence on Soviet policies would be narrow, the study thought, but not negligible, provided the Allies continued to display evidence of their determination to maintain adequate defences and the political will to use them if necessary. The range of means available to influence the Soviet Union encompassed not only military, but political, diplomatic and economic measures.

Both the 1978 and 1983 papers, however, pointed out that the Soviet Union's concept of détente differed and would continue to differ from the West's, and exempted from its scope the continued "ideological struggle" and

support for national liberation movements, with force if necessary.

There is no reason today to dispute these basic judgements about Soviet attitudes.

(a) Soviet domestic policy

In the absence of a clear succession mechanism, the passing of the Andropov leadership will probably lead to a prolonged period of readjustment and some degree of collective decision-making at the top of the Soviet power structure, with attendant uncertainty about future policies. In the short term, the policies of the post-Andropov leadership will likely be modelled on existing ones. In the medium term, one can expect younger members of the leadership (Gorbachev, Dolgikh, Katushev) to press for change.

The Soviet economic rate of growth has been slowing since the mid-1970s, and economic problems will likely be the most important concern of Soviet leaders in the coming decade, when the Soviet Union may experience the worst period of economic stagnation it has seen since the Second World War. Soviet economic development is constrained by a highly centralized management system, a weak industrial infrastructure, exhaustion of cheap natural resources and energy sources, inefficient agriculture, and unfavourable demographic trends; but the introduction of necessary economic reforms is inhibited by economic conservatism, the vested interests of individuals within the system, and a reluctance to test workers' loyalties in instituting prolonged austerity measures.

If the economic downturn persists, Soviet authorities will not be able to continue to satisfy simultaneously their military, economic and social objectives to the extent possible during the 1970s. This will pose increasingly difficult resource allocation choices for the Soviet leadership, but the political risks associated with radical reform will probably be considered greater than living with shortcomings. There seems to be some inclination to "get the economy moving again", but reform will be gradual and accompanied by a tightening of controls.

The Soviet economy nonetheless remains broadly self-sufficient. Trade with the West, though important in several key areas, is small in both absolute and relative terms and is likely to remain so. The Soviet Union will continue to use trade principally to compensate for either

quantitative or qualitative shortcomings in its domestic economy. The Soviet Union also uses trade to aid in the development of its military potential: it seeks to derive whatever benefits from imports from the West might contribute to the Soviet military effort. Unless primary aims are at stake, the Soviet Union will try to avoid jeopardizing these trade ties, but it can do without them if necessary.

Socio-economic problems through the 1980s and beyond will be exacerbated by long-term demographic and economic trends. The growth rate of the labour pool is falling and will slow even further in the 1980s. In the long term, there will be an increasing imbalance in the regional supply and demand for labour as the Eastern minorities, which have traditionally resisted attempts to encourage their migration to the more industrialized areas, continue to grow at a faster rate than the rest of the population. Their increasing proportion of the population could also cause serious social and political problems if resentment of Russian domination continues to grow.

Soviet society has changed a good deal since the Second World War and has been characterized by a steady, albeit slow, improvement in living standards. But standards are now declining, a new experience for the overwhelming majority, and it remains unclear how they would respond to a prolonged period of belt-tightening. Urbanization will continue to create problems in housing and transportation. Problems such as juvenile delinquency, chronic alcoholism and corruption will remain features of Soviet life.

Dissent resulting from political, ideological, nationalistic, religious and socio-economic factors will continue on a small scale, but will not be allowed to threaten the stability of the State. Dissatisfaction with economic or bureaucratic conditions is likely to be more widespread than intellectual dissent, but should not pose a threat to the régime in the short term. Economic hardtimes will result in a strengthening of the state's authoritarian character.

(b) Soviet Foreign Policy

The accession of Konstantin Chernenko to the General Secretaryship could mark a change in the tone and style of the Soviet Union's approach to East/West relations, but there is nothing to suggest that the new leadership is likely to undertake major changes in

policy. The Soviet emphasis on stability, continuity and predictability will be nowhere more evident than in foreign policy. Indeed, it appears that Gromyko's control over foreign policy may have been consolidated, albeit as part of a collective leadership operating within the scope of the basic Brezhnev approach to détente.

For the time being, everything points to consistency in the Soviet approach to East/West relations. Having resisted the West on Afghanistan, on human rights, and on arms control and disarmament, the Soviet Union is not likely to adopt any abrupt change in approach. Indeed, the Soviets may not be convinced that they have yet extracted maximum benefit from their current approach and probably still hope that real concessions by the West are possible. Nor can a new Soviet leadership appear to respond weakly and indecisively to foreign challenges to the USSR's international position and prestige.

In addition, Soviet leaders remain deeply suspicious of the policies of the Reagan Administration. They represent USA defence budget increases as "undisguised militarism" and the pursuit of "world supremacy". The USSR is concerned that the USA is no longer prepared to recognize the Soviet Union on a level of military and political equality as a superpower. They are afraid that the USA is on the verge of a quantum leap in military technology which they believe could put the USSR on the strategic defensive. As a result, the USSR evinces scepticism about recent American proposals to improve the dialogue.

On the other hand, the initiatives of Western leaders, individually and collectively, over recent weeks and months have signalled to the Soviet leadership the West's interest in not seeing relations deteriorate further and, indeed, in improving the atmosphere under appropriate circumstances. The Brussels Declaration of December, 1983, while essentially a restatement of Allied principles and objectives, was significant both for its timing and as a political gesture, and may have been perceived as such by the Soviet leadership. With a new Soviet leadership in evolution, the Soviet Union may be ready to deal with Western overtures for renewed efforts at cooperation.

The Soviet Union's agreement to return to the MBFR negotiating table in mid-March, initiated before Andropov's death, was a clear signal from the Soviet side that it did not want altogether to close-off avenues of dialogue on arms control. There was also a definite impression given during the opening week of the Stockholm Conference, from conversations with Gromyko and other Eastern European foreign ministers, that the Soviet Union remained favourably disposed to multilateral and bloc-to-bloc arms control negotiations (MBFR, CD, CDE), and there have been hints that the Soviet Union would like to return to the START table as well.

From the meetings in Moscow at Andropov's funeral, it appears the Soviets are anticipating the first moves to occur at the MBFR negotiations. Movement in this forum could lead to a resumption of talks in Geneva and from there, perhaps after the United States elections, to a United States/Soviet Union summit meeting.

In the meantime, Soviet policy will remain one of differentiation between the United States and Western Europe. The USSR will continue to blame Washington for the tension in East/West relations, to support the European peace and disarmament movements, and to appear flexible with Western leaders other than President Reagan.

3. Eastern Europe: Situation and Prospects

The "Northern Tier" of the East bloc, i.e. the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland, is and will continue to be a vital element in the Soviet security system. It can confidently be predicted that evolution away from a pure client status will be very slow in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Soviet tolerance of a degree of domesticism in Poland comes from the knowledge that an attempt to impose a system more acceptable to the Soviet Union would, in all likelihood, produce results even less desirable than the present situation. In particular, it would deal a significant blow to Soviet/West European relations and would probably result in violent resistance with unforeseeable consequences for the rest of the East bloc. In short, where its immediate security concerns are at stake, the Soviet Union seems to prefer loyalty over orthodoxy.

The Soviet Union has permitted and, in certain cases, even encouraged economic experimentation in Eastern Europe. At the 26th Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev applauded the experiments being undertaken in Hungary and recommended that other nations (presumably including the

Soviet Union) give them serious study. Externally, the Soviet Union has welcomed the growth in trade between its clients and the West, and has permitted some of them to join the IMF (in contrast with the Soviet Union's refusal to allow Eastern Europe to participate in the Marshall Plan). Access to Western technology as well as a measure of relief from the costs of supporting the empire are the principal economic reasons for this trend.

More recently, however, the Soviet Union has called upon the Eastern Europeans to assess carefully their economic dependence on the West. This indicates that the Soviets are concerned over the political leverage the West stands to gain through trade with the East, notwithstanding the benefits of such trade. Simultaneously, the Eastern European nations, having witnessed the failure of Poland's policy of economic progress through the importation of technology, and seeing the severe debt crisis to which this policy led, are now seeking to reduce their own hard currency debts. Since their exports are, on the whole, still not competitive in the West, this effort to reduce indebtedness has meant some reduction in imports from the West. Thus, while a return to the autarkic policies of the late 1940s and early 1950s is unlikely, it is probable that for political and economic reasons trade with the West will continue, though not at the feverish pace of the 1970s.

The effects upon Eastern Europe of internal developments in the Soviet Union is difficult to predict. The death of Andropov and the election of Chernenko may encourage reform-minded Eastern European élites to test the limits of change, but much will depend upon the rapidity with which the new leadership establishes itself as well as its perceived strength and cohesion.

Equally uncertain is the effect upon Eastern Europe should the Soviet Union undertake a program of radical economic reform. One possibility is that the Soviet Union might show greater tolerance for diversity among its allies, and indeed might use that diversity as a laboratory for its internal policies. It is of course quite conceivable that were the Soviet leaders to feel it necessary to devote their attention to domestic reform, fear of the hidden perils of any such reform, both internally and in their empire, might lead them to pursue a still more rigid policy towards Eastern Europe. A policy of that sort would be intended to deny Eastern European reformers the opportunity to exploit Soviet preoccupation with domestic matters for their own purposes.

1. Overall State of Relations and Medium Term Prospects

From the foregoing it is clear that important changes have taken place in East/West relations since 1967 and that relations are currently in a state of considerable disrepair. It is also clear that, if left unattended, relations hold little prospect for stability in future.

In the latter half of 1983, many of the indicators were negative. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were the worst they had been since the Cuban missile crisis. Not even at the height of the Vietnam war had dialogue between Washington and Moscow been so limited and devoid of results. Even essential crisis-management mechanisms had deteriorated. There seemed scarcely to be any acknowledgement that the two sides shared a commonality of interests. The superpowers had not ratified a single significant arms control agreement in the previous decade. Nuclear arms control negotiations had been broken off by the Soviet Union while nuclear arms development on both sides continued apace. The three other nuclear powers were not party to any global management arrangements for dealing with nuclear crises or controlling nuclear weapons. Conventional arms control negotiations in Vienna were barely moving while negotiations on military confidence-building measures in Stockholm had yet to get off the ground. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was frequently stymied by sterile rhetoric and the NPT bargain appeared to be on the point of unravelling. Within the Alliance itself there was again evidence of an absence of candour in consultations and an unwillingness to deal with the seriousness of situations.

The need for corrective action in 1984 is obvious, and must be translated into action. But there are major hurdles to be cleared. In Moscow, fixation with security, fear of innovation, and a notorious poverty of imagination have been compounded by aging and uncertain leadership to limit severely the prospects for Soviet initiative. But Moscow does seem ready to reopen lines of communication, and the opportunity for contact should not be squandered. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, there is worry and sobriety, and even some imaginative thinking; but little political courage. Accordingly, it is mostly up to the Allies to break the impasse. And it is in Allies interest to try to do so.

III CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE APPROACH OF MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Three tasks which face the Alliance as a result of changes in East/West relations since 1967 have been identified as follows:

- (a) Restoring some of the lost credibility of the deterrent and reassuring public opinion,
- (b) Regenerating forward momentum in East/West relations, and
- (c) Revising the Alliance's framework for conducting its relations with Warsaw Pact countries.

(a) Restoring some of the lost credibility of the deterrent

Deterrence exists in the eye of the beholder, and all indications to date suggest that the Warsaw Pact remains deterred. Were this not so, one could expect more assertive behaviour by the Soviet Union against individual Alliance members. Instead of complaints about Western policy, there would be insistence on retribution; instead of offers to negotiate, there would be demands for compliance; instead of words, there would be action.

The reason for the effectiveness of the current deterrent, it is reasonable to assume, can be found in Soviet calculations that the likely costs of trying to overrun NATO defences (both to the military formations involved and to the rodina) would exceed by an unacceptable amount the likely advantages of successfully doing so. In other words, for the time being the Soviet leadership believes either that NATO conventional forces would not be easy to defeat or that NATO nuclear forces would be employed in counterattack, or both; and that the damage sustained to the Soviet Union even in the eventuality of "success" would not have been worth what it gained.

Clearly, then, to continue to be effective, NATO's deterrent requires (i) the maintenance of an East/West balance of conventional and nuclear forces (at the lowest possible level) and (ii) continued evidence of the Alliance's determination to use its forces as appropriate.

From the Soviet perspective, both of these ingredients remain present, but in diminished degree

compared to a decade or two ago. Western conventional defences, though the object of much improvement effort over the years, have not kept pace with the Soviet military build-up while the nuclear balance in Europe has shifted in favour of the Soviet Union. In addition, NATO's determination to defend itself, though firm in the minds of Alliance leaders, appears less resolute as a result of recent trans-Atlantic arguments over burden sharing and public controversy over the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance doctrine.

The risks and uncertainties associated with any Soviet assault against Western Europe are still so great as to reduce to virtually nil the likelihood of such an assault taking place in the foreseeable future. But a challenge facing the Alliance is to ensure that Soviet perceptions (and misperceptions) do not induce over the longer term a Soviet inclination to test the West. The means for accomplishing this have already been set in train -- the long term modernization program, the 3% target, deployment of INF, negotiations on a balance of arms, and repeated high-level pronouncements on the Alliance's determination to resist any Soviet encroachment. But despite these efforts, Allies cannot count on the Warsaw Pact being deterred unless Western public opinion is at the same time reassured, for the Warsaw Pact will not be convinced that NATO governments are firm in their determination to resist if these governments do not also appear to enjoy the confidence and support of their publics.

Reassurance, too, exists in the eye of the beholder, and the indications to date are that a growing body of public opinion in Western countries lacks confidence in a doctrine which appears to be highly dependent on early first use of nuclear weapons. This lack of confidence stems from a public perception that nuclear weapons could not be relied on to deter in a time of grave crisis, since their employment by one side would inevitably provoke retaliation by the other side and would, in any case, do irreparable ecological damage to both sides.

Alliance governments, therefore, must address the issue of public anxiety over NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. This will require at least three steps:

1. Accelerated introduction of those weapons systems and associated measures which would enable NATO to use conventional weapons systems to strike targets for which it now relies on nuclear systems both to deter and to

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counter Warsaw Pact military action, thereby altering the conventional/nuclear mix and raising the nuclear threshold.

2. A communications effort designed to counter anti-nuclear and unilateralist sentiment, to draw attention to the deterrent value of possessing nuclear weapons as long as the other side does, and to reinforce NATO's image as a uniquely defensive organization dedicated to achieving a military balance at the lowest possible level.

3. Renewed efforts to lower the military balance.

(b) Regenerating forward momentum in East/West relations

The achievements of the era of detente have already been documented, as have the immediate causes of its demise. The roots of the current crisis in East/West relations are also familiar. The need now is to regenerate forward momentum in East/West relations.

Several possibilities present themselves, but foremost among these is to effect a positive change in the political climate. Without such a change, all other courses of action would be severely impeded if not crippled. To achieve such a change requires the avoidance of stereotype descriptions of and assumptions about the other side's character and intentions, and the accumulation of numerous small but tangible signs, in speeches, visits and negotiations, that the two sides understand and respect (if not accept) each other's interests.

Thereafter, through dialogue, there is a need to identify and emphasize areas of common interest, especially in the security field, in order to generate a sense of common purpose, if only of limited character and limited domain. At least ten of these already can be identified:

1. Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
2. Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
3. Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
4. Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.

5. Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
6. Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
7. Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
8. Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.
9. Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
10. Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

Once a degree of mutual confidence and a sense of common purpose have been achieved, it is conceivable to envisage progress being possible in the field of arms control. But for reasons noted above, much of the initiative will have to come from the West. This does not mean that the West will necessarily have to make the accommodations, only that it will have to lead the way in demonstrating flexibility and innovation in order to encourage reciprocal action by the Soviet side. The initiative now lies with the West, and the opportunities this situation presents should not be overlooked.

Of all the negotiations in train or likely to be this year, the Stockholm Conference has the most momentum at present - largely as a result of the presence of ministers at its opening and the West's tabling of substantive proposals. Accordingly, priority should be accorded to ensuring that the momentum at Stockholm is sustained, through vigorous lobbying of both the Soviet bloc and the NNA to ensure these groups table their proposals soon and permit discussion thereafter to focus on specifics. If the negotiations begin to falter, ministers should take a personal hand in energizing them.

The situation is somewhat reversed on MBFR, where it is the East which has tabled proposals and is waiting for a response. Considering that these talks are the key to achieving parity in conventional forces in Europe and to raising the nuclear threshold, it is imperative that NATO respond soon to the Eastern proposals and in a manner which would help to move the negotiations forward. Here

too Ministers should be ready to intervene in person as necessary.

A third multilateral arms control conference requiring sustained political effort by the West is the CD in Geneva. The CD can serve not only as a forum for controlling existing weapons, but also as a vehicle for suffocating technological advances which have been undermining arms control agreements. Accordingly, the West should be examining with care the possibility of launching proposals designed to arrest those new technologies which, by their very nature, make stability a more elusive goal -- including technologies where the West might enjoy a temporary lead.

Finally, there are the interrupted negotiations on INF and START, where the onus is on the Soviet Union to return to the talks from which they withdrew unilaterally. But given the importance of these talks, there is also an obligation on the part of the West to make it as easy as possible for the Soviet side to return to Geneva. The West has proven its determination, by proceeding with the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles despite Soviet efforts to prevent it, and can feel confident in any position it now takes. The Soviet side, for its part, is in a state of uncertainty over how to proceed, given the failure of its efforts to prevent deployment and the collateral damage it has sustained in its relations with its staunchest East European allies. Hence the essential elements of the Western position now should be to provide the Soviet side with an opportunity to reflect in tranquility on where its interests lie (inevitably in a return to negotiations) undisturbed by Western taunts and challenges, and to suggest through quiet diplomatic channels formulas by which an INF agreement could be reached. One face-saving device deserving exploration might be a closer association of the INF and START negotiations. There is an unavoidable relationship between regional and global strategic balances, and Allies should simultaneously begin to consider means for devising a mutually acceptable and stable framework for relations between all five nuclear-weapons states.

(c) Revising the Framework for Conducting Relations with Warsaw Pact countries

Apart from the need to regenerate forward momentum in East/West relations, there is also a requirement for a broad policy to govern Alliance relations with Warsaw Pact countries to the end of this century - policy which is informed by allies' experience

with the period since 1967 and by their expectations for the future in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

As noted earlier, a major lesson of the era of detente was the depth of the Soviet attachment to the present division of Europe and the determined character of its resistance to any alterations in the loyalties or management methods of the regimes in Eastern Europe. But there were other lessons learned as well, as documented in both the 1978 East/West Study and the 1983 Soviet Policy Trends Study. In general, these were as follows: that Soviet foreign policy is informed by two conflicting impulses, one to preserve and protect the empire, the other to assert itself internationally; that for the foreseeable future Soviet interests would appear to accord priority to a controlled relationship with the West and to the avoidance of direct military confrontation; and that Soviet policy would be responsive to, but would not be dictated by, Western actions in the military, political and economic fields.

What these conclusions suggested, inter alia, was that a Soviet threat existed but that Western policy should also recognize the existence of legitimate Soviet security concerns; that Western policy should acknowledge a certain identity of interest between the East and West, and not approach East/West relations as a zero-sum game; that Western policy should appreciate the importance of maintaining a firm military posture towards the Warsaw Pact, short of seeking superiority; and that Western policy should employ the diplomatic and commercial leverage available to it to encourage the Soviet Union to move in desirable directions but not try publicly to force the Soviet Union to comply with Western desiderata.

Analysis carried earlier in this paper serves to confirm the soundness of these judgements and to reinforce the need to develop and reach agreement on a set of principles to inform Alliance policy to the end of the century. To the fullest extent possible, these principles should draw on Alliance assessments of trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and result from discussion within the Alliance which is candid and open, unafraid to examine past performance and unrestrained in exploring new approaches. Indeed, as a general rule, Allies should not be reluctant to discuss among themselves issues circulating widely in public.

In charting a course for the future, therefore, there is a need (a) to reach agreement on a common set of principles to guide policy, and (b) to ensure the continuation of frank and open discussion among allies.

IV - CONCLUSION

The following are suggestions for a set of principles to guide Alliance security policy:

1. to preserve the security of the North Atlantic area by means of forces adequate to deter aggression and intimidation.
2. to improve the Alliance's ability to deter aggression by means of conventional forces, and thereby reduce its reliance on the threat of early first use of nuclear forces.
3. to avoid projecting any aggressive intentions towards the Warsaw Pact and to increase public awareness of the Alliance's defensive character, peaceful intentions, and commitment to arms control.
4. to pursue with vigour and imagination negotiations aimed at reaching agreement on military confidence-building measures and a more stable balance of forces in Europe at the lowest possible level, subject to reasonable means of verification.
5. to examine more fully and systematically arms control measures which could address those new technologies which, by their very nature, make stability a more elusive goal.
6. to develop new approaches to the negotiation of nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements, which take account of the existence of five nuclear-powers and which initially address the perils of accident, miscalculation, crisis and systems failure which all must cope with.

The following are suggestions for principles to guide Alliance policy in the political, economic and related fields:

1. to pursue a policy of "stable competition" with the Soviet bloc, which recognizes both the fundamental differences which exist between East and West and the elements of common interest which should set limits to East/West competition.

2. to reduce reliance on "megaphone diplomacy" and rely more frequently on traditional methods of diplomatic intercourse.
3. to seek agreement with the Soviet bloc on an agenda of political and diplomatic issues of interest to one side or the other, to be dealt with at a high level in the medium-term.
4. to recognize that mutually advantageous trade with the East on commercially sound terms contributes to constructive relations, so long as it is also consistent with broad security concerns and avoids contributing to Soviet military strength.
5. to seek improvements in East Bloc human rights attitudes and policies as an essential element in the development of East/West understanding.
6. to avoid treating East European countries in our political and economic contacts with them as mere satellites of Moscow, and to encourage their playing a greater and more independent role in promoting good East/West relations.
7. to promote the gradual evolution of the East European countries in the direction which their traditional, cultural and emotional links with Western Europe suggest.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS MTG AND ASAT CONSULTATIONS APR9-11
POLITICAL COMMITTEE(PAC)APPROVED REVISED AGENDA AT ITS MAR21
MTG.ONLY MAJOR CHANGES ARE ADDITION OF SUB-HEADING BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS TO ITEM I(CD ISSUES)AND INSERTION OF NEW ITEM III
QUOTE WESTERN GROUP COORDINATION UNQUOTE.WILL FORWARD CLEAN
TEXT OF REVISED AGENDA ON RECEIPT.

2.CCNCERNING ASAT CONSULTATIONS,CHAIRMAN REPORTED THAT HE
HAD BEEN ABLE TO SECURE MEETING ROOM FOR AFTERNOON APR11
BUT NOT/NCT FOR MORNING.FRENCH REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES
PREFERRED MTG AFTERNOON,APR1Ø,FOLLOWING CONCLUSION OF
DISARMAMENT EXPERTS MTG.NETH REP REITERATED STRONG PREFERENCE
FOR FULL DAY MTG.USA REP SAID THEIR PARTICIPANTS HAD OFFERED
TO GIVE PRESENTATION OGDUBJECT WHICHQXEIY HOPEO COULD LEAD
OFF DISCUSSION.WE NOTED THAT THIS ARGUED IN FAVOUR OF SETTING
ASIDE FULL DAY FOR SUBJECT.CHAIRMAN SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE
SEARCH FOR MTG ROOM FOR MORNING APR11.PAC WILL RETURN TO
SUBJECT AT ITS NEXT MTG WED MAR28.

3.AS WE HAVE HAD FALLING OUT WITH HYATT,SWB RESERVED FOR
CLEMINSON AT SHERATON APRIL8-1Ø.GRATEFUL INDICATION NDHQ
PARTICIPATION IN MTG AND ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENTS.

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---EAST/WEST RELATIONS

FOR THE RECORD, FOLLOWING IS THE LDN TIMES REPORT OF THE STATEMENT MADE IN THE HOUSE YESTERDAY ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS BY FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE. HOWE ADDS NOTHING NEW TO REPORTS OUR REFTELS AND REFLECTS VIEWS GIVEN RT HON JOE CLARK IN HIS TALKS EARLIER THIS WEEK WITH MINISTER OF STATE MALCOLM RIFKIND.

2. IN SUBSEQUENT DEBATE, GOVT POLICY RECEIVED TACIT SUPPORT FROM OPPOSITION LEADERS, WITH DENNIS HEALEY OBSERVING THAT GOVT WAS RIGHT IN OBSERVING THERE WAS PROBABLY LITTLE CHANCE OF IMPORTANT PROGRESS ON MAJOR ISSUES OF ARMS CONTROL IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE IF ONLY BECAUSE OF IMMINENCE OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. HEALEY WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT OTHER ISSUES ON WHICH UNDERSTANDING COULD BE DEVELOPED MUST BE SOUGHT, (OBSERVATION WITH WHICH GOVT WOULD CLEARLY NOT TAKE ISSUE), AND SUGGESTED THAT THESE SHOULD FOCUS ON REGIONAL PROBLEMS, AND PARTICULARLY ON MIDDLE EAST WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS MOST IMPORTANT REGIONAL PROBLEM NEEDING DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIANS.

2. COMCENTRE PLS SEND BY FACSIMILE.

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One of the lessons of the last few chilly years was that negotiations on arms control could not bear the full weight of East-West relations or

flourish in a political vacuum or make progress in an atmosphere of misunderstanding and mistrust. So they must try to broaden the dialogue and increase the range and frequency of contacts with the Soviet leadership.

Mr. Gromyko's deputy, Mr. Kornienko, would visit London next week for consultations with Mr. Malcom Rifkind, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and he (Sir Geoffrey Howe) would be visiting Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet government in July.

It was in Britain's interests as well as theirs that Soviet leaders should have as much first-hand knowledge of the West as possible. Meetings would therefore help but would only bear fruit in time and only if they involved a great deal of calm but plain talking.

Britain would make plain its concern about the Soviet military build-up. The re-opening of the MBFR talks in Vienna last week was a welcome step but the Russians should also return to the negotiating table in Geneva.

Britain would continue to reject the specious arguments put forward by the Soviet leaders to justify their massive occupation of Afghanistan, whose people should be allowed to determine their own future freely. The countries of eastern Europe should also be able to choose the policies which best reflected their people's wishes and this was nowhere more important than in Poland.

Even in areas where common interests were acknowledged, Soviet policy worked in a time-frame which could be frustrating to the West. They must therefore show themselves ready for the long haul.

The key to better East-West relations lay in a strong and confident transatlantic relationship. He sometimes got the impression the Opposition thought the worst of every proposal by the alliance and the best of every by the Soviet Union. The Labour Party had tended to become a cheer leader for policies which would weaken the defence of Britain and the alliance as a whole.

Shared responsibility was crucial to the defence relationship between the US and its allies and that relationship remained crucial to Britain's security.

File

L.I.T. Canada Canada

TO/À Permanent Mission of Canada to the
United Nations, NEW YORK

FROM/DE • The Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, OTTAWA

REFERENCE • Lee/Delvoie Conversation of February 24
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Initiative: Five Power Conference
SUJET

Sécurité/Sécurité
RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
March 22, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0240

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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Further to the conversation under reference, we attach for onward transmission to the UN Secretariat (Urquhart) a brief discussion paper on this subject. We should be grateful to know in due course whether the Secretary General intends to initiate informal consultations on this matter with the Permanent Representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

for *David Delvoie*
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Discussion Paper

FIVE POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE

I SUBJECT:

This paper describes an initiative which could result in a framework of arms control for the five declared nuclear weapons states.

II BACKGROUND:

Strategic nuclear arms control negotiations have thus far only taken place between the USA and the USSR. The other three declared nuclear weapons states (France, Great Britain and China) have not been involved, and their arsenals remain unconstrained by international agreement.

This proposal is based on the assumption that the five declared nuclear weapons states share the responsibilities that arise from the possession of nuclear weapons and, despite their differences, have a number of interests in common. As members of the Security Council and under the terms of the UN Charter they share particular responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. They also share special obligations in relation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Further, it could be argued that they share the responsibility for managing their nuclear forces in such a way as to avoid accidents and for ensuring that the international nuclear weapons equation evolves in such a manner as to avoid instability.

III THE PROPOSAL:

It is proposed that the five declared nuclear weapons states initiate discussions on the management of their shared nuclear responsibilities. This might best begin by informal, preliminary discussions at the ambassadorial level, perhaps by the representatives of the five powers at the U.N.

The ambassadors could, for example, examine whether there could be sufficient agreement on an agenda, terms of reference and guiding principles as to make a five power nuclear conference possible.

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- 2 -

The prospects for success of any such conference would clearly be advanced if a phased approach were adopted with the initial phases concentrating on those issues upon which the greatest degree of commonality of interest may exist. In this respect, and for illustrative purposes only, we would propose phases along the following lines:

Phase I: Negotiation of nuclear confidence building measures.

Phase II: Discussion of measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in view of the special responsibilities of the nuclear powers under the NPT.

Phase III: Negotiation of nuclear crisis management measures.

Phase IV: Negotiation on restraints on new destabilizing technologies.

Phase V: Pre-limitation phase: This phase would focus on those questions which would have to be settled before actual limits could be negotiated. This could include: definitions, inclusions/exclusions, unit of account, verification, compliance mechanisms and withdrawal provisions.

Phase VI: Limitations: An approach to limitation is outlined in the attached annex.

Phase VII: Reductions.

ANNEX

LIMITATIONS

A framework for the limitation of nuclear forces could lend overall predictability to the strategic balance, thereby reducing incentives to increase deterrent forces. Should negotiations produce a ratio of allowed strategic forces as between the parties, the expansion of forces beyond these mutually agreed levels would be constrained. This predictability, and the quantitative ceiling on national forces, would in turn increase the chances for meaningful arms reductions.

The following are designed to serve as general guidelines for negotiations designed to lead to an agreement on global nuclear arms limitation.

- (a) Talks should not be conducted on a bloc-to-bloc basis, but on the basis of individual state participation. Each state would retain a veto on the substance of any agreement.
- (b) The overall purpose of this phase would be to reach agreement on fixed ratios of national strategic forces.
- (c) Those ratios would have to reflect USA-USSR de jure equality.
- (d) The unit of account would be subject to negotiation, but agreement would be most likely if "warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles" were to be adopted as the unit of measurement. This would have the virtue of encouraging a move towards less vulnerable, single-warhead systems and away from vulnerable and destabilizing MIRVed systems; of preventing circumvention of the intent of the agreement through placing a larger number of warheads on a fixed number of launchers; and of non "handicapping" those forces which generally have less MIRV potential.
- (e) Currently planned modernization programs should be accommodated within the negotiated ratios.
- (f) These negotiations should not be seen as a substitute for START talks. Indeed, they would probably only be possible after the signing of a START agreement.

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ANNEX

- 2 -

- (g) Qualitative modernization programs which did not violate the agreed ratios should be allowed, subject to the other arms control agreements.
- (h) All air, land, and sea-based systems deemed through negotiations to be strategic in nature should be included.
- (i) If forces of less than intercontinental range were deemed to be strategic by the participants, they could be aggregated with those of intercontinental range with a freedom to deploy systems wherever this were deemed desirable by the parties, subject to the restrictions of other arms control agreements.
- (j) It would probably be necessary (and desirable) to attach specific numerical totals to the agreed ratios, thereby precluding quantitative increases beyond the agreed ratios which would legitimize proportional increases in the size of the forces of other parties.

Mr. Shultz
Dr. Fulda
Mr. McMe
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 22, 1984

NOTES ON CONVERSATION WITH LORD CARRINGTON - *S. Taylor*
ON AIRCRAFT TO OTTAWA, MARCH 22, 1984

Lord Carrington noted that, throughout his visit to Washington - including meetings with National Security Advisor MacFarlane, Secretary of State Shultz, and Secretary of Defense Weinberger - no one had mentioned that the Europeans were not spending sufficiently on defence. There were remarks to the effect that the younger generation in Europe were too comfortable and flabby. The key issue on the minds of United States officials was out-of-area problems.

Carrington said the three key issues from his perspective, in relative priority, were maintaining the credibility of the deterrent, trans-Atlantic relations, and East/West relations. He did not grasp why, in this perspective, the Americans were laying such heavy emphasis on the out-of-area question. He agreed that the Allies could not isolate themselves from developments outside the NATO geographic area. Were United States plans practical (e.g. the Rapid Deployment Force), he asked? In terms of the United States concerns, he questioned why the Europeans could not do more to meet those concerns, at least politically. Perhaps political directors could be convoked periodically to discuss out-of-area and other difficult issues? Or there could be private meetings of NATO Permanent Representatives, with the French absent if they wished, to discuss in a broader sense what the United States had on their minds and how the Alliance could respond.

In this context, Grenada was raised several times in Washington as a sore point. The Americans tended to blame all Europeans for lack of support, when really the finger was being pointed at Britain. Carrington said he thought the British, particularly Mrs. Thatcher, had not reacted properly. They could have, initially, said they disagreed with the United States but the Americans were Allies and Allies had to be supported. That was all. Instead, criticism seemed to emerge gradually and became more vocal, which is what upset the Americans. They tended, he said, to draw parallels between the Falklands and Grenada; the situations were exact opposites.

One of the problems, he said, was that while the Americans were intent on exercising their superpower prerogative, they still wanted to have widespread support, if not internationally then at least from their Allies. When we ran the world, in

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Carrington's words, we really did not bother considering what other people thought of our actions. The Americans do not think similarly, so part of their problem is self-imposed.

Discussion of out-of-area merged into that of consultations in general, with a good deal of time spent on the position of France. Carrington thought it anomalous that France, outside of the integrated military structure, cooperated closely if informally on many defence issues whereas on political questions they always drew back. Why, he asked, do we let the French get away with this? He commented that in terms of the Community, Britain had always had one major issue on which they were stubborn, whereas during his tenure as Foreign Secretary the French seemed to present difficulties on almost every thing.

The French could not be expected to rejoin NATO's military structure even though they were seeking ways, through various mechanisms, to cooperate closely. They had made proposals about enhanced European defence cooperation, saying they worried about German neutralism but in effect aiming for defence cooperation on their terms. This could only go so far because of the national character of the French (and British) nuclear deterrent.

He understood the Prime Minister's concerns regarding the inefficacy of free and frank consultations at NATO Summits. Even at Foreign Ministerial level, he was less than enthusiastic about what transpired at ministerial meetings. He thought there was ample room to have ceremony combined with sufficient time for effective discussion.



Brian Herman
Defence Relations Division

MF
28-6-1 - Bureau
Peace
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0693 22MAR84

TO EXTOTT/RCR

INFO BNATO BRU PARIS BONN WSHDC MOSCO PCOOTT/FO#LER VMBFR PRMNY

GENEV NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA USS DMF R3B IDA IDR IDDZ

REF OURTELS XNGR0690 21MAR;0691 22MAR

---ALLIANCE AND TRANSATLANTIC STRAINS;EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND

NO FIRST USE:CLARK DISCUSSIONS WITH IISS

SUMMARY:ROBERT ONEILL,DIRECTOR,INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES(IISS)WAS CONFIDENT IN TELLING MR CLARK THAT EUROPEANS DID NOT QUESTION BASIC DURABILITY OF NATO ALLIANCE.RATHER QUESTION WAS WHETHER ALLIANCE COULD CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE POLICY-MAKING BODY.THUS IISS IS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF KISSINGERS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATO RESTRUCTURING.CLOSER EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION IS NOT NEW IDEA,BUT LIKE ITS PREDECESSORS IS LIKELY TO FLOUNDER? ON NATIONAL INTERESTS,AND ON BRITISH CONCERN NOT TO FEED FRENCH AMBITIONS ON ONE HAND,YET NOT TO BE LEFT OUT ON OTHER.

MEANINGFUL INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE SUPERPOWER TIES MUST IN LAST ANALYSIS COME FROM SUPERPOWERS THEMSELVES-AND INTIALLY MUST BE AT LOW,LESS PUBLIC LEVELS OF FOREIGN MINISTRY AND RELATED BILATERAL CONTACT.WHILE IDEA OF QUOTE NO EARLY FIRST USE UNQUOTE COULD BE USEFUL AS PRIVATE NATO DOCTRINE,CONCEPT OF NO FIRST USE

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PAGE TWO XNGR0693 CONF

WAS DESCRIBED BY BOTH ONEILL AND ALFORD AS BEING WORTHLESS IF NOT DANGEROUS IDEA.

2.REPORT:BOTH ONEILL AND IISS DEPUTY DIRECTOR COLONEL ALFORD ARGUED THAT ALLIANCE HEALTH WAS BASICALLY SOUND:THERE WAS MUCH LESS PROPENSITY TO QUESTION FUNDAMENTAL RAISON D ETRE FOR NATO IN EUROPE THAN PRESS AND SOME ACADEMIC SPECULATION WOULD IMPLY. IN ELECTION YEAR,EVEN MORE THAN USUAL,MUCH WILL DEPEND ON PERSONAL ELEMENT IN US PRESIDENCY.BUT THERE IS ALWAYS DEEPEATED EUROPEAN WORRY ABOUT USA ATTACHMENT TO EUROPE(KISSINGER WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO TALK ABOUT ISOLATIONISM,BUT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE CORRECT TO HAVE REFERRED TO UNILATERALISM).AMERICAN COMMITMENT IS DURABLE, AND ARTICLES SUCH AS KISSINGER WROTE IN TIME MAGAZINE ARE DISTINCTLY UNHELPFUL.ONEILL WAS SHARPLY CRITICAL OF KISSINGERS PROPOSALS,SAYING HE DISAGREED QUOTE HEAD ON UNQUOTE WITH HIS THREE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS.QUOTE EVERYONE IN EUROPE AGREES ALLIANCE IS ALL WE HAVE:THIS OF COURSE DOES NOT STOP MEMBERS BEING CRITICAL,AND UNDERSTANDING OF THIS FACT MUST UNDERLIE ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT DIVERGENCES WITHIN ALLIANCE.IN THIS RESPECT, ONEILL WAS SOMEWHAT CRITICAL OF CDN INITIATIVE NOT ONLY FOR RAISING STRATEGIC DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS FIRST OUTSIDE OF NATO, BUT FOR ASSOCIATED IMPLICATIONS ARISING IN CONTEXT OF INITIATIVE FOR ELEMENTAL POLICIES OF NATO DEFENCE STRATEGY.

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3. NEITHER ONEILL NOR ALFORD SEEMED DISMAYED (OR FOR THAT MATTER PARTICULARLY SANGUINE) OVER PROSPECTS OF CLOSER EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION. ONEILL SUGGESTED THAT IF IT WERE TO RESULT IN RATIONALIZATION AMONG THREE LARGE WESTERN ENTITIES (EUROPE, US/CDA, JAPAN) CLOSER DEFENCE COOPERATION WOULD BE HELPFUL. HE NOTED HOWEVER THAT THERE HAVE BEEN GOOD PROPOSALS OVER NUMBER OF YEARS ON WAYS OF ACHIEVING THIS, AND THESE ALWAYS FELL AFOUL OF RELUCTANCE ON PART OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES TO GIVE UP SOVEREIGNTY. BECAUSE OF RETICENCE OF FRENCH TO SEEM TO BE CONTROLLED BY USA THROUGH NATO, FRENCH HAVE OFTEN TALKED OF CLOSER EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION. MORE RECENTLY, THEY APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR WAY BACK INTO WESTERN DEFENCE STRUCTURE, AND HAVE THUS FLOATED IDEA OF REVAMPED WEU. THEY ALSO CONTINUE TO WORRY ABOUT GERMAN POTENTIAL TO DRIFT INTO NEUTRALISM, AND WANT TO IMBED WEST GERMANY IN EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. ON OTHER HAND, TO QUOTE ONEILL, FRENCH WANT TO SEE DEFENCE COOPERATION ON THEIR TERMS, AND THIS IS STUMBLING BLOCK NOT ONLY FOR GERMANS, BUT MORE PARTICULARLY FOR BRITISH. UK VIEW IS ALSO COLOURED BY DISTRUST OF OLD EUROPEAN COALITION IDEA, BUT NONETHELESS IF THERE ARE DEVELOPMENTS, BRITAIN WANTS TO BE PART OF ACTION, -AND IF CLOSER DEFENCE COOPERATION WOULD GET FRANCE BACK IN DIRECTION OF INTEGRATED STRUCTURE, IT WOULD BE ALL TO GOOD.

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4. ON EAST/WEST TIES, ONEILL ARGUED THAT THERE WAS MUCH MORE STABILITY IN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS THAN MIGHT APPEAR, AND MORE EFFORT SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON MINIMIZING TEMPTATIONS FOR EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN AREAS WHICH COULD EVOLVE INTO CONFRONTATION: -IE LEBANON (WHERE HE SUGGESTED US ADMIN PUT MARINES ASHORE, THEN ASKED FOR WHAT PURPOSE THEY WERE THERE, AND ONLY THEN BEGAN TO EXAMINE LONGER TERM IMPLICATIONS OF HAVING PUT THEM THERE). HE MUSED THAT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO TALK IN TERMS OF SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, AND TO RECOGNIZE PROBLEMS ON PART OF BOTH SUPERPOWERS: HE SUGGESTS (AS SDP LEADER DAVID OWEN DID IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH MR CLARK) THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS GOOD EXAMPLE OF LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES, -THAT KAL INCIDENT MIGHT HAVE BEEN HANDLED DIFFERENTLY WITH BETTER SOVIET UNDERSTANDING OF PROBABLE WESTERN REACTION, AND VICE VERSA.

5. IN ONEILL'S VIEW, HOWEVER, INITIATIVE TOWARDS CLOSER UNDERSTANDING MUST COME FROM SUPERPOWERS, AND ALLIES ARE NOT IN STRONG POSITION TO PUSH THEM INTO IT. TROUGH IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS HAS LEVELLED OUT BUT MUCH NEEDS TO BE DONE AT LOWER, LESS PUBLIC AREAS OF CONTACT, EG THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTRIES. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THERE WAS POTENTIAL WILL ON BOTH SIDES FOR MORE CONSTRUCTIVE TIES, ONEILL SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED IN SHULTZ'S SPEECH AT STOCKHOLM, BUT ON OTHER HAND HAD NOTED THAT SOVIET

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DELEGATIONS VISITING LDN HAD SEEMED MORE CONSTRUCTIVE:HE SUGGESTED
THERE WAS UNANIMOUS FEELING IN IISS THAT EAST/WEST RELATIONS ARE
NOW BETTER THAN THEY HAD BEEN BEFORE.

6.MR CLARK FOLLOWED UP ON CONVERSATION EARLIER AT HIGH COMMISSIONERS
LUNCH CONCERNING NO FIRST USE/NO EARLY FIRST USE.ONEILL SUGGESTED
THAT NO FIRST USE WAS ITSELF A WORTHLESS POLICY-WEST WOULD BE
WRONG TO PLACE ANY VALUE ON SOVIET DECLARATION,AND IN ANY CASE,
NEEDED ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY WHICH POSSIBLE FIRST USE BROUGHT TO
NATO DETERRENT.QUOTE AS LONG AS WE HAVE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE
AND RELUCTANCE TO SPEND MONEY NECESSARY TO RIGHT IT,-AND AS LONG
AS NO ONE COULD BELIEVE SOVIETS WOULD STICK TO THEIR SIDE OF
SUCH DECLARATION IN MILITARY CRISIS,NO FIRST USE WILL BE
DANGEROUS CONCEPT UNQUOTE.NO EARLY FIRST USE IS HOWEVER DIFFERENT
MATTER.IF ALLIES WERE TO AGREE ON SUFFICIENT CONVENTIONAL BUILD-
UP,NO EARLY FIRST USE COULD BE HELPFUL AS PRIVATE DOCTRINE.ON
OTHER HAND,WEST SHOULD NOT GO ALONG PRETENDING TO BELIEVE
IN DECLARATIONS WHICH WE KNOW NEITHER WE NOR SOVIETS COULD KEEP
IN LAST ANALYSIS.MR CLARK ASKED ABOUT POTENTIAL FOR NUCLEAR
ACCIDENT OR CRISIS;ONEILL SUGGESTED THAT SENATORS NUNN/WERNER
PROPOSALS FOR NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTRES ARE SEEN BY IISS
AS PRACTICAL MEASURES IN FACE OF WHAT SOME COMMENTATORS HAVE
SUGGESTED IS MATHEMATICAL CERTAINTY THAT SOONER OR LATER NUCLEAR
WEAPON MUST EXPLODE.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0691 22MAR84

TO EXTOTT/RCR

INFO BNATO BRU PARIS BONN WSHDC MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER VMBFR PRMNY

GENEV NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA USS DMF RGB IDA IDR IDDZ

REF XNGR0690 21MAR

---EAST/WEST RELATIONS;EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES;INTRA-ALLIANCE TIES:

CLARK CONVERSATIONS WITH FCO MINISTER OF STATE MALCOLM RIFKIND

SUMMARY:AS FCO MINISTER RESPONSIBLE SPECIFICALLY FOR EASTERN

EUROPE AND EAST/WEST TIES,RIFKIND DESCRIBED ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

IN CONTEXT OF CURRENT STATE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS.CLOSELY

REFLECTING PM THATCHERS VIEWS,HE EMPHASIZED NEED FOR PRAGMATIC

DIALOGUE WHICH EXTENDED WELL BEYOND ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT.

HE NOTED THAT NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS ARE AT A HALT,AND THAT SOVIETS

SHOW NO DESIRE TO COME BACK AT LEAST UNTIL USA ELECTIONS ARE

OVER.HE SUGGESTED THAT WEST HAD PERHAPS PLACED TOO MUCH EMPHASIS

ON INF/START OVER PAST TWO YEARS,AND HAD LEFT POLITICAL RELATIONS

TO DEVELOP AS CONSEQUENCE OF ARMS CONTROL TALKS.RIFKIND SAID THE

SITUATION SHOULD BE IN FACT OTHER WAY AROUND,AND THAT WEST SHOULD

STRIVE FOR WORKABLE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP INVOLVING A NUMBER OF

SEPARATE OBJECTIVES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH BROADER CONTACT.WEST

MUST AIM TO ESTABLISH CONFIDENCE IN SOVIETS,TO FAMILIARIZE THEM

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WITH WEST, AND WHERE APPROPRIATE, TO GIVE THEM SENSE OF INVOLVEMENT IN MAJOR INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS. HE DESCRIBED ALLIANCE AS MATURE AND STRONG DESPITE NORMAL DIFFERENCES; USA COMMITMENT TO EUROPE REMAINED FIRM, THOUGH CLOSER EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION WAS WORTHWHILE OBJECTIVE IN WHICH UK WOULD PARTICIPATE—PROVIDED IT DID NOT IMPAIR ALLIANCE COHESION.

2. REPORT: RIFKIND OUTLINED CURRENT UK EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH OVER TIME, BROAD DIALOGUE WHICH PM THATCHER QUOTE CONTINUED UNQUOTE TO EMPHASIZE: FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWES PROPOSED VISIT JULY 02/03 TO MOSCO, SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIENKOS VISIT TO LDN NEXT WEEK, MRS THATCHERS VISIT TO HUNGARY, —NONE OF THESE IN ITSELF WAS OR COULD BE DRAMATIC, BUT PARTICULARLY IN PERIOD OF MISUNDERSTANDING, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP UP MINISTERIAL AND HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL CONTACT. (IN THIS CONTEXT, IN REPLY TO QUESTION BY MR CLARK CONCERNING VALUE OF SANCTIONS, RIFKIND OBSERVED THAT IF ONE RULES OUT SANCTIONS ENTIRELY THERE IS NOT MUCH LEFT. ON OTHER HAND, SYMBOLIC ACTS CAN CONVEY A MESSAGE VERY WELL, AND IT NEVER MAKES SENSE AT MAJOR POWER LEVEL TO BREAK OFF HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL TIES.)

3. LOOKING AT SITUATION WITHIN EASTERN BLOC, RIFKIND ARGUED THAT SOVIETS WOULD IF NECESSARY GO TO ANY LENGTHS TO MAINTAIN UNDISPUTED PREDOMINANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE; WHILE TO HAVE TO USE

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FORCE TO RETAIN THIS POSITION WOULD BE MAJOR BLOW TO THEM, THEY WOULD CERTAINLY PAY THE PRICE IF THEY HAD TO. ON OTHER HAND, EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE DEMONSTRATED INCREASING INTEREST IN TAKING MORE INDEPENDENT LINE BUT ALWAYS WORKING WITHIN RECOGNIZED SYSTEM. THUS BULGARIANS AND HUNGARIANS ARE CLEARLY RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT FURTHER SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENT, -AND HAVE BEEN WILLING TO MANIFEST THIS RELUCTANCE. (ON OTHER HAND, IF SOVIETS INSIST ON DEPLOYMENT, THEN WFO PARTNERS COULD NOT RESIST.) THIS TENDENCY TOWARDS INCREASING INDEPENDENCE WITHIN SYSTEM IS SEEN WITH GREAT INTEREST HERE. SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THEIR OWN ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS ARE LESS THAN THOSE OF MUCH OF EASTERN EUROPE AND AT SAME TIME, EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE THAT INTERNAL AUTONOMY WITH OVERALL SOVIET CONTROL CAN LEAD TO TANGIBLE BENEFITS.

4. PERHAPS MOST INTERESTING CURRENT CASE IS RECENT WARMING IN RELATIONS BETWEEN FRG AND GDR: RIFKIND ATTRIBUTES MUCH OF THIS TO CHANCELLOR KOHLS DESIRE TO PREVENT EFFORTS BY GERMAN SOCIALISTS TO INCH TOWARDS NEUTRALISM ON BASIS OF REUNIFICATION. IN REPLY TO QUERY BY CLARK AS TO WHAT RUSSIANS MIGHT DO WITH THIS, RIFKIND SAID THAT AS USUAL MUCH DEPENDS ON PEOPLE AT TOP OF KREMLIN - WHETHER THEY ARE PREPARED TO ALLOW HUNGARIAN MODEL TO DEVELOP IN GDR, OR WHETHER THEY PRESS FOR ABSOLUTE SOLIDARITY AND LOYALTY

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AS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

5. TURNING TO ALIANCE RELATIONS, RIFKIND OBSERVED THERE IS CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC COMMENT AND SPECULATION AS TO DIFFERENCES, BUT IN LARGE PART THIS HAS BEEN OVERDONE. QUOTE ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRATIC ALLIES IS ALWAYS BOUND TO HAVE PLENTY OF DIFFERENCES, - BUT IF WE COMPARE POSITION TODAY WITH THAT AT TIME OF PIPELINE DEBATE, WE SEE ALLIANCE OF CONSIDERABLE MATURITY AND GREAT STRENGTH UNQUOTE. HE TOLD CLARK THAT HE DID NOT SEE TINDEMANS REVIEW OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS PRODUCING PROBLEMS: OUTLOOK AMONGST PARTNERS IS FUNDAMENTALLY THE SAME; THERE WILL ALWAYS BE DEBATE ABOUT WHETHER EUROPE DOES ENOUGH FOR DEFENCE, BUT OVERALL APPROACH TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS IS AGREED.

6. RIFKIND SPOKE OF HIS FIRM CONVICTION THAT CURRENT US ADMINISTRATION WOULD REMAIN COMMITTED TO EUROPEAN ALLIES. HE SAID BRITISH GOVT HAD CERTAINLY NOTED COMMENTS CONCERNING AMERICAN DRIFT TO WEST, BUT SUGGESTED THAT THIS WOULD ONLY BE OF CONCERN HERE IF IT FORESHADOWED LONGER TERM POLITICAL TENDENCY WHICH WOULD ALTER COMMITMENT TO EUROPE.

7. EXAMINING FRANCE/FRG COOPERATION, RIFKIND SAID THAT UK WAS ENCOURAGED AT KOHLS COMMITMENT TO NATO, AND TO ALLIANCE AS BEING FUNDAMENTAL TO EUROPEAN DEFENCE. HE DESCRIBED GREATER EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION AS WORTH EXPLORING, PROVIDED IT HAD NO

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IMPLICATIONS WHICH MIGHT WEAKEN ATLANTIC TIES. USA WAS NOT IN
DANGER OF REVIVING ISOLATIONISM OR UNILATERALISM; CLOSE CONSULTATIONS
MAINTAINED WITH ALLIANCE ON INF NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN GOOD HABIT
TO ENCOURAGE, AND NOW US HAD SHOWN IT WAS WILLING TO DO THIS FOR
INF IT WAS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT WASHINGTON WOULD KEEP ALLIES
ON BOARD ON OTHER QUESTIONS AS WELL.

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C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE PARIS WIGR3717 22MAR84

A EXTOTT RCR IDA

INFO BONN BNATO BRU LDN WSHDC GENEV

DISTR DMF RGB RCD IDD IFB IDDZ IDR

--- VISITE DU M. CLARK - BILAN

MALGRE PROGRAMME ET HORAIRE TRES CHARGES, VISITE AURA SANS DOUTE
CONTRIBUE A REpondre AUX OBJECTIFS ET INTERETS DE M.CLARK A TRAVERS
DIVERSES RENCONTRES ET VARIETE D'INTERLOCUTEURS. DEVONS RECONNAITRE
EGALEMENT QUE PASSAGE PREALABLE A BONN AURA SUBSTANTIUELLEMENT
PERMIS D'ECLAIRER QUESTION IMPORTANTE, VUE DE PARIS, DES RAPPORTS
FRANCO-ALLEMANDS EN MATIERE DE SECURITE/DEFENSE EUROPEENNE.

2. BRIEVEMENT, RAPPELERONS PRINCIPAUX RESULTATS SELON PROGRAMME.

(A) TABLE RONDE A IFRI. ETAIENT PRESENTS MOISI/LELLOUCHE/KLEIN/
BOYER/SCHUTZ. QUATRE THEMES PRINCIPAUX ONT DOMINE RENCONTRE A
SAVOIR: QUESTION ALLEMANDE ET SES INCIDENCES POUR LA FRANCE/RAPPORT
FR/EUA ET EUROPE/EUA/CRISE DES EUROMISSILES ET APRES-PERSHING/
MENACE SOVIETIQUE ET PERSPECTIVE. ESSENTIELLEMENT COMMENTAIRES DES
SPECIALISTES DE IFRI ONT GLOBALEMENT CONFORTE ANALYSE QUE VOUS
SOUMETTIONS DANS NOTRETEL 3543 DU 05MAR.

(B) DEJEUNER AVEC MME GARAUD ET M. TATU. CONVERSATIONS ONT PORTE
SUR GAMME TRES VARIEE DE SUJETS PROFITANT DU FORMAT REDUIT DU
DEJEUNER. PLUS PARTICULIEREMENT, FURENT ABORDEES QUESTIONS DES

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PAGE DEUX WIGR3717 CONF

PROCHAINES ELECTIONS EUROPEENNES/THESE CONNUE DE MME GARAUD SUR STATION ORBITALE AMERICAINE. FAIT A SOULIGNER ET QU'A RETENU M.CLARK, PROPOS DE MME GARAUD ONT EU TENDANCE A RECONNAITRE ET CONFERER AU CDA UN ROLE IMPORTANT AU PLAN DES RELATIONS INNTALES EN RAISON NOTAMMENT DE SA LOCALISATION GEOGRAPHIQUE ENTRE EUA/URSS. QUANT A TATU, CONCERNANT SITUATION EN URSS, IL CONSIDERE QUE REGIME TCHERNENKO EN EST UN DE TRANSITION MAIS SUR UNE DUREE RELATIVEMENT ETENDUE(4 A 5 ANS TOUT AU MOINS).IL CONSIDERE QUE DIRECTION SOVIETIQUE ACTUELLE PROCEDE D UNE TROIKA QU OUTRE TCHERNENKO/GROMYKO SEMBLE PRIVILEGIEE USTINOV A GORBATCHEV.

(C) N'AVONS PAS ACCOMPAGNE M.CLARK A VICHY OU IL S'EST ENTRETENU PENDANT PRES DE TROIS HEURES AVEC AMB FORD.

(D) TABLE RONDE AU PS. Y PARTICIPAIENT SOPPELSA/BONIFACE/BUREAU/ROEMER/BATTESTI. D'ENTREE DE JEU RENCONTRE FUT PLACEE SOUS ANGLE DE RELFEXION/POSITION D'UN PARTI POLITIQUE (PS) DONT VUES SONT LARGEMENT CELLES REFLETEES PAR POSITIONS DU PRESENT GOVT. A NOUVEAU QUESTION ALLEMANDE A DOMINE DISCUSSIONS SURTOUT A LUMIERE DES CONTACTS PERIODIQUES ETABLIS ENTRE PS/SPD OU DES DIVERGENCES EXISTENT EN MATIERE DE DEFENSE DE MEME QU'AVEC LE LABOUR BRITANNIQUE. PLUS GLOBALEMENT, SOPPELSA A REPRIS PRINCIPALES IDEES CONTENUES DANS MANIFESTE DU PS DU PRINTEMPS 92 SUR DEFENSE/DESARMEMENT. FORCE EST DE RECONNAITRE D'AILLEURS UNE ETONNANTE PROXIMITE ENTRE

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POSITIONS GVTALES (Y COMPRIS AU NIVEAU DU QUAI) ET CELLE DU PS.
(E) DEJEUNER AVEC FONCTIONNAIRES I.E. MARTIN/JESSEL/BEAUCHATAUD/
RENOUARD/DUCLOS/PUISAI. A PLUSIEURS EGARDS, CE FUT POINT CULMINANT
DU PASSAGE A PARIS DE M.CLARK SURTOUT AU NIVEAU DES RESERVES
FRANCHES ET FERMES EXPRIMEES PAR PARTICIPANTS A EGARD DE INITIATIVE
DU PM. CRITIQUE FRANCAISE REPOSAIT SUR CONSTAT QUE INITIATIVE CDNNE
AVAIT EN QQUE SORTE CEDE A UN CIT ALARMISME FINCIT FAISANT SUITE AUX
RUPTURES DES NEGS DE GENEVE. POUR NOS INTERLOCUTEURS TANT EUA QUE
URSS N'ONT JAMAIS ROMPU DIALOGUE ET SAVAIENT TRES BIEN JUSQU'OU
POUVAIT ALLER CLIMAT DE TENSION EN DECOULANT. SELON EUX IL
IMPORTAIT SUITE A ECHEC DES SOVIETIQUES EU EGARD AU DEPLOIEMENT
DE PRENDRE LE TEMPS DE SE RETOURNER ET D'EVALUER SITUATION. POUR
PUISAI ET DUCLOS NOTAMMENT, PM CDN S'EST EN QQUE SORTE FAIT
PRENDRE AU JEU DES SOVIETIQUES QUI ONT MARQUE INTERET D'UNE
RENCONTRE AVEC ANDROPOV ET JUSQU'AU DERNIER MOMENT ONT EN QQUE
SORTE GARDE PM CDN EN HALEINE TOUT EN SACHANT QUE RENCONTRE
N'AURAIT SANS DOUTE JAMAIS LIEU. POUR RENOUARD, IL IMPORTE A TOUT
MOMENT DE DISTINGUER ENTRE LES PRINCIPES ET LA REALITE DES CHOSES.
CECI L'A AMENE A DIRE QUE DESARMEMENT/SECURITE SONT DES PROCESSUS
TRES LENTS QUI DOIVENT AVOIR LIEU EN UTILISANT FORA INTERNATIONAUX
DEJA ETABLIS ET QU'IL SERAIT ILLUSOIRE DE CONSIDERER QUE LEDIT
PROCESSUS PUISSE ETRE PAR QQUES INITIATIVES ACCELERE VERITABLEMENT.

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M. CLARK A POUR SA PART INDIQUE QUE S'IL PARTAGEAIT IDEE GENERALE DE INITIATIVE DU PM IL NE LUI APPARTENAIT PAS D'EN COMMENTER DETAIL. TOUTEFOIS IL A CONSTATE QUE INITIATIVE AVAIT CONCRETEMENT CONTRIBUE A CREER AU CDA UNE NOUVELLE CONSCIENCE DE CES QUESTIONS COMME LE DEMONTRAIT SERIE D'AUDIENCES PUBLIQUES A LAQUELLE IL VENAIT D'ASSISTER. CES AUDIENCES AVAIENT DEMONTRE QU'IL EXITE AU CDA UNE CRAINTE DE LA MENACE NUCLEAIRE. INTERLOCUTEURS FRANCAIS ONT AJOUTE QU'EN EUROPE ET FRANCE C'EST UNE CRAINTE DE LA GUERRE QUE L'ON Y SENTAIT DONT POSSIBILITE D'UN CONFLIT CONVENTIONNEL QUI APPARAIT INIMAGINABLE POUR EUA. SOMME TOUTE POIDS DES CONFLITS DE CE SIECLE SUFFIT A CREER VOLONTE D'EVITER QUE CELA NE SE REPRODUISE ET A CET EGARD FORCE ETAIT DE CONSTATER QUE DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE AVAIT CONTRIBUE DEPUIS TRENTE ANS A ASSURER LA PAIX.

(F) CONCERNANT RENCONTRE AVEC ATTALI, SEUL AMB DUPUY Y ETANT PRESENT, CROYONS COMPRENDRE QU'ELLE A PORTE SUR QUESTIONS ECONO ET RAPPORTS PLUTOT DECEVANT FRANCO-CDNS A CE TITRE AU NIVEAU DES GRANDS DOSSIERS. M. CLARK, SUJET A CONFIRMATION, AURAIT SOULIGNE QUE SELON TOUTE EVENTUALITE, QUQUE SOIT GOVVT AU CDA, RELATIONS AVEC FRANCE DEMEURERAIENT ESSENTIELLES ET PRIVILEGIEES.

3. AUSSI D'UNE MANIERE GENERALE, CONSIDERONS QUE PASSAGE DE M.CLARK FUT UN SUCCES NOTAMMENT EN CE QU'IL NOUS AURA FOURNI OCCASION D'UNE PART D'AVOIR CONSULTATIONS AVEC PS SUR UNE BASE DE DE PARTI POLITIQUE DANS UN DOMAINE DONNE ET D'AUTRE PART D'OBTENIR DU QUAI PERCEPTION FRANCHE ET MEME SEVERE DE INITIATIVE DU PM MAIS QUI FONDAMENTALEMENT EST CONFORME AUX RESERVES DEJA EXPRIMEES PRECEDEMMENT.

CCC/11B 221506Z WIGR3717

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0696 22MAR84

TO EXTOTT RCR

INFO BNATO BRU PARIS BONN WSHDC MOSCO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/

DSTRATA PCOOTT/FOWLER VMBFR PRMNY GENEV

DISTR MINA USS DMF RGB IDA IDR IDDZ

REF OURTEL XNGR0690 21MAR

---ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND EAST/WEST RELS: CLARK DISCUSSIONS

WITH SDP LEADER DAVID OWEN AND LABOUR DEFENCE SPOKESMAN SILKIN

1. SUMMARY: IN FORTHCOMING, WIDE RANGING TALKS WITH MR CLARK, SDP
LEADER DAVID OWEN AND LABOUR DEFENCE SPOKESMAN JOHN SILKIN GAVE
VARYING VIEWS ON PROSPECTS FOR EAST/WEST TIES, AND FOR PROGRESS ON
ARMS CONTROL- NEGOTIATIONS. NEITHER SAW MUCH CHANCE OF MOVEMENT BEFORE
USA ELECTION. DR OWEN WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF KISSINGERS TIME
MAGAZINE ARTICLE ON NATO RESTRUCTURING. HE PROPOSED THAT NATO REVIEW
OF POLICY (TINDEMANS INITIATIVE) SHOULD FOCUS ON INTERNAL DEFENCE
CONTRIBUTIONS, AND THAT IDEA OF TRADE OFF BETWEEN GREATER EUROPEAN
DEFENCE EFFORT AND USA ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY SHOULD BE DISCUSSED
AT LDN SUMMIT.

2. AGAINST BACKGROUND OF SOME DISTRUST OF LONGER TERM AMERICAN
COMMITMENT TO EUROPE, DR OWEN SUGGESTED TO MR CLARK POSSIBILITY OF
QUOTE TRADE-OFF UNQUOTE, BEGINNING AT LDN SUMMIT AND EXTENDING INTO
1985 SUMMIT, WHERE EUROPEAN ALLIANCE MEMBERS WOULD UNDERTAKE MAJOR

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DEFENCE COMMITMENT IN RETURN FOR USA COMMITMENT ON STRUCTURAL DEFICIT AND MORE RESPONSIBLE INTERNAL ECONOMIC POLICY. THIS, HE SAID, SHOULD ALSO BE MAIN FOCUS OF TINDEMANS UPDATE OF HARMEL REPORT. OWEN ARGUES THAT HARMEL REPORT REMAINS SOUND BASIS FOR NATO POLICY, THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO REDO QUOTE DEFENCE/DETENTE UNQUOTE BALANCE, AND THAT WHAT IS REALLY NEEDED IS INTERNAL ALLIANCE EXAMINATION OF HOW TO DEFINE VARIOUS ROLES; MANPOWER LEVELS AND EQUIPMENT FOR EACH MEMBER AND STUDY ACCOMPANYING FINANCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL IMPLICATIONS. (OUTCOME WOULD THUS BE RE-EVALUATION OF HOW TO IMPROVE EUROPEAN DEFENCES, AND BALANCE BETWEEN USA/EUROPE/CANADA, RATHER THAN RE-WORK OF HARMEL REPORT).

3. OWEN ARGUES THAT IT IS FUNDAMENTAL THAT USA FORCES BE MAINTAINED IN EUROPE, AND THAT FOR BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS, ADEQUATE LEVELS OF CDN FORCES MUST BE MAINTAINED HERE AS WELL. HE SUGGESTS THAT KISSINGERS TIME MAGAZINE ARGUMENT IS QUOTE A FRIGHTFUL COUNSEL OF DESPAIR, AND IRRESPONSIBLE UNQUOTE; THOUGH HE ARGUES THAT IT IS QUOTE OUTRAGEOUS UNQUOTE THAT EUROPE HAS NOT MADE A MORE SERIOUS RESPONSE TO ITS OWN DEFENCE NEEDS. IN THIS RESPECT, HE SEES MITTERRANDS SPEECH IN THE HAGUE AS IMPORTANT.

4. OWEN TAKES SOME ENCOURAGEMENT FROM CURRENT FRENCH INTEREST IN CLOSER EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION, AND NOTES THAT THEY HAVE BEEN MOVING QUOTE IN RIGHT DIRECTION TOWARDS NATO UNQUOTE FOR SOME TIME

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(THOUGH HE ARGUES THAT NATO CANNOT EXPECT FRANCE TO REJOIN INTEGRATED STRUCTURE). HE BELIEVES THAT FRENCH ARE WORRIED ABOUT FRG AND, LIKE OTHERS OF MR CLARKS CONTACTS HERE HE IS CONCERNED THAT SOCIALISTS, IN THEIR ENTHUSIASM FOR A UNITED GERMANY, MIGHT FIND OFFER OF NEUTRALITY IMPOSSIBLE TO RESIST.

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5. ON SPECIFIC DEFENCE ISSUES, OWEN QUOTE DISCOUNTS ENTIRELY UNQUOTE CONCEPT OF BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE RECOGNIZES THAT OBSTACLE TO THEIR ELIMINATION IS GERMAN RESISTANCE TO IDEA OF BATTLE ON THEIR NATIONAL TERRITORY: FOR FRG TO ACCEPT WITHDRAWAL OF BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO CONVINCE THEM THAT OTHER ALLIANCE PARTNERS MEAN BUSINESS IN THEIR COMMITMENT TO BEEFING UP CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THIS, AS OWEN OBSERVES, MEANS MONEY, AND HE IS FEARFUL THAT NO NATO GOVT WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO SUFFICIENT DEFENCE EXPENDITURE. (IN THIS CONTEXT, HE SUGGESTS THAT MRS THATCHER REALLY INTENDS ONLY .5 PERCENT INCREASE IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE IN 85/86, AND ATTRIBUTES MUCH OF HER RECENT EMPHASIS ON MORE PRAGMATIC DIALOGUE WITH EAST TO HER REALIZATION THAT SHE COULD NOT AT SAME TIME PORTRAY SOVIETS AS MONSTERS WHILE REDUCING HER DEFENCE BUDGET.) ON OTHER HAND, IF EUROPEANS ARE NOT PREPARED TO MAKE GREATER EFFORT, OLD ARGUMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BEING CHEAPEST DEFENCE WILL CONTINUE TO TRIUMPH.

// / J. Jones
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6. OWEN RECOGNIZES WHAT HE CALLS REAL DANGERS FOR UK DETERRENT. OWEN

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SUPPORTS MAINTENANCE OF INDEPENDENT DETERRENT, BECAUSE AS HE SAYS,
HE DOUBTS STRENGTH OF USA COMMITMENT TO EUROPE; HE DOESNT LIKE FRANCE
BEING ONLY EUROPEAN NUCLEAR STATE; AND BELIEVES BRITISH DETERRENT
MAKES IT HARDER FOR USA TO MOVE AWAY FROM EUROPEAN COMMITMENT.

7. MR CLARK ASKED WHETHER DR OWEN REALLY BELIEVED USA MIGHT MOVE AWAY
FROM EUROPE IN TIME OF CRISIS; OWEN REPLIED THAT IT WAS THIS CONCERN
THAT MADE HIM SEE CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN NATO AS SO IMPORTANT.

8. ON OTHER HAND, OWEN CONTINUES TO OPPOSE BRITISH ACQUISITION OF
TRIDENT MISSILES, DESCRIBING THEM AS DANGEROUS INCREASE IN
MEGATONNAGE, AND AS TOO SOPHISTICATED FOR UK FORCES. WHILE HE SAID HE
IS DELIGHTED THAT USA HAS SUCH EFFICIENT WEAPON, HE IS CONCERNED
THAT BECAUSE OF ITS SOPHISTICATION, UK WILL RUN RISK OF BEING QUOTE
CUT OFF UNQUOTE AS DEPLOYMENT NEARS. HE ARGUES INSTEAD FOR NUCLEAR-
POWERED SUBS FIRING CRUISE MISSILES FROM TORPEDO TUBES.

9. MR. SILKIN FOCUSED MORE ON BROADER EAST/WEST QUESTIONS: BECAUSE
LABOUR HAS NOT/NOT RESOLVED ITS OWN INTERNAL DIFFERENCES ON DEFENCE
AND DISARMAMENT, HE MADE NO EFFORT TO CRITICIZE BRITISH GOVT OR NATO
DEFENCE POLICY. HE DID ARGUE THAT SOVIETS WERE GENUINELY WORRIED
ABOUT CRUISE/PERSHING DEPLOYMENT, AND THAT THESE MISSILES COULD
STRIKE RUSSIAN TERRITORY. ARGUING ON ONE HAND THAT ONLY POSSIBILITY
OF RESUMING INF TALKS WOULD BE TO FREEZE DEPLOYMENT AND UNDERTAKE
TO REMOVE EXISTING MISSILES (ALONG LINES OF ROUMANIAN PROPOSAL),

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SILKIN THEN RECOGNIZED THAT NEITHER SOVIETS NOR USA WOULD QUOTE WANT TO SEE VANITY OF NATIONS OVERTHROWN TO THAT EXTENT UNQUOTE: IDEA THAT ONE CANNOT LOSE FACE IS ALBATROSS NOT ONLY FOR USA AND USSR, BUT EVEN HERE IN LONDON.

10. HE REFERRED TO RECENT CONVERSATIONS HE HAS HAD HERE IN LDN WITH SOVIET, ROUMANIAN AND BULGARIAN OFFICIALS WHICH HAVE LED HIM TO BELIEVE THAT EAST IS ANXIOUS TO FIND OUT WHETHER MRS THATCHERS NEW EMPHASIS ON PRAGMATIC DIALOGUE IS SINCERE. HE HAS STRONG IMPRESSION SOVIETS HAVE GIVEN UP ON USA PRESIDENT REAGAN: EAST IS CLEARLY WAITING FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND BULGARIANS AND ROUMANIANS HAVE BOTH IMPLIED TO SILKIN THAT THERE CAN BE NO/NO MOVEMENT IN INF UNTIL ELECTIONS ARE HELD, THOUGH HE HIMSELF THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME IMPLICATION THAT START MIGHT PROCEED BEFORE NEXT NOVEMBER.

11. SILKIN ARGUED THAT SOVIET UNIONS RELATIONS WITH ITS WARSAW PACT ALLIES HAS ALTERED MARKEDLY IN LAST FEW YEARS: QUOTE EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES ARE NOW FREER, AND CHARACTER OF RELATIONSHIP HAS CHANGED COMPLETELY SINCE STALIN UNQUOTE EAST IS NOT/NOT REGARDED BY MOSCO AS DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC SPACE ANY LONGER, AND YOUNGER LEADERSHIP IN SOVIET UNION WILL COME INCREASINGLY TO APPRECIATE THAT RUSSIA CAN AFFORD TO, AND BENEFIT FROM, GIVING WPO SATELLITES MORE REIN.

SILKIN SEES LITTLE HOPE THAT CURRENT LEADERSHIP GENERATION ASSOCIATED WITH CHERNENKI COULD BRING THEMSELVES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE

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OF MORE RELAXED RELATIONS WITH EASTERN COUNTRIES, NOR DOES HE EXPECT MUCH FROM THEM IN WAY OF IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS:

QUOTE WITH CHERNENKI THERE IS NOT MUCH OF A QUESTION OF ACCOMMODATION, BUT AS WITH ANY NEW LEADER, ITS WORTH TRYING UNQUOTE.

12. SILKIN DESCRIBES DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AS QUOTE A SEA CHANGE UNQUOTE. HE POINTS TO MRS THATCHERS TRIP TO HUNGARY AS NOT JUST A WHIM BUT AS SORT OF CONTACT WHICH IS NEEDED TO REMOVE EAST/WEST RELATIONS FROM CONTEXT OF DEMONOLOGY, AND TO INDICATE TO SOVIETS THAT RUSSIANS ARE REGARDED HERE AS EUROPEAN POWER, AND IN MAJOR RESPECTS AS SUPERPOWER.

13. ON TRANSATLANTIC TIES, SILKIN ARGUES USA CONNECTION WITH EUROPE IS TOO DOMINANT. HE RECOGNIZES THAT CONNECTION MUST BE KEPT, BUT CLAIMS THAT USA DOES NOT/NOT CONSULT WITH ITS ALLIES ENOUGH, AND SINGLES OUT GRENADA AS TURNING POINT IN BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF USA/UK RELATIONSHIP.

14. IN A MORE PERSONAL ASIDE, SILKIN SUGGESTED TO MR CLARK THAT HE DID NOT ALTOGETHER DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIETS MIGHT OFFER GERMANY UNIFIED NEUTRALITY, AND WERE THE OFFER TO BE MADE, SILKIN BELIEVES THEY WOULD ACCEPT IT. HE DESCRIBED EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS AS REGENERATION OF STRONG PRE-DETENTE FEELINGS WHICH HAD DISAPPEARED DURING DETENTE PERIOD, BUT WHICH CAME BACK IN FULL FORCE WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. LATTER HE DESCRIBED AS BEING IN

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IN MANY RESPECTS QUOTE FATHER OF EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS UNQUOTE.
IN HIS VIEW BRITISH PEACE MOVEMENT HAS REACHED HIGH WATER MARK,
BUT WOULD REMAIN STEADY INFLUENCE: MOVEMENT HERE WAS MORE FEMALE
THAN MALE, AND MORE UNDER 30 THAN OVER (SILKIN SUGGESTED THAT
MAJORITY OF INTELLIGENT YOUNG PEOPLE WERE IN FACT MEMBERS OF
PEACE MOVEMENT IN ONE GUISE OR ANOTHER).

CCC/170 221540Z XNGR0696

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0694 22MAR84

TO EXTOTT/RCR

INFO BNATO BRU PARIS BONN WSHDC MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER VMBFR PRMNY

GENEV NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA USS DMF RGB IDA IDR IDDZ

REF OURTELS XNGR0690 21MAR 0691 22MAR 0693 22MAR

---EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL:MR CLARKS CONVERSATION
WITH PROFESSOR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

SUMMARY:PROFESSOR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN,DEPT OF WAR STUDIES,KINGS
COLLEGE,TOLD MR CLARK THAT IN HIS VIEW EAST/WEST TIES HAD BEGUN
TO PULL BACK FROM TROUGH.THERE IS NONETHELESS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD
OF IMPROVED EAST/WEST RELATIONS-OR OF MOVEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL-
SHORT OF US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.SOVIET UNION DOES NOT TRUST
PRESIDENT REAGAN AND DOES NOT BELIEVE HIS ADMINISTRATION
NEGOTIATES SERIOUSLY.SOVIETS WERE NOT IMPRESSED BY REAGANS
16JAN STATEMENT,AND CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR HARD EVIDENCE TO BACK
UP PRESIDENTS RECENT,MORE CONCILIATORY LANGUAGE.WHILE LITTLE CAN
BE EXPECTED ON MBFR(MUCH LESS NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS),SOME PROGRESS
MAY BE POSSIBLE SHORTLY AFTER ELECTION IF NOT BEFORE ON OUTER
SPACE AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS,-AREAS WHERE BOTH SUPERPOWERS SHARE
CONCERNS,AND THUS MAY HAVE COMMON INTEREST IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATION.

2.REPORT:IN TELLING MR CLARK THAT SOVIETS WERE LOOKING FOR

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CONCRETE MEASURES TO BACK UP PRESIDENT REAGANS RECENT SHIFT IN EMPHASIS, FREEDMAN SUGGESTED EVIDENCE COULD COME IN TWO FORMS:

1) GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN BROADER INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND PARTICULARLY, IN NON-EUROPEAN REGIONS, IE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA; OR 2) THROUGH PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, IE AT STOCKHOLM (WHERE HE SAID NO ONE SEEMS READY TO ALLOW ANYTHING TO HAPPEN FOR AT LEAST A YEAR) AND IN MBFR (WHERE FREEDMAN REFLECTED FCO THINKING IN SUGGESTING THAT QUOTE DUCKING DATA ISSUE UNQUOTE TO OBTAIN MOVEMENT WOULD BE UNPLEASANT SHOCK IN LONDON, AND WOULD IN FACT BE QUOTE FRAUD UNQUOTE WHICH WOULD ONLY DELAY PROBLEMS AND WOULD HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF ACHIEVING LASTING AGREEMENT UNLESS POLITICAL CLIMATE HAD FIRST BEEN IMPROVED.

3. FREEDMAN COMPARED CDN INITIATIVE AND PM THATCHERS SEARCH FOR BROAD, PRAGMATIC DIALOGUE, SUGGESTING BOTH ARE GOING IN RIGHT DIRECTION; SOVIETS HAVE RESPONDED FAVOURABLY TO BRITISH CHANGE IN EMPHASIS (QUOTE THEY LIKE PEOPLE PAYING THEM HOMAGE UNQUOTE), BUT IT REMAINS DIFFICULT TO SEE ANY CURRENT DEVELOPMENT WHICH COULD TRIGGER MORE WIDESPREAD AMELIORATION IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. IN RESPONSE TO MR CLARKS QUESTION AS TO ROLE OF SUPERPOWERS IN IMPROVING ATMOSPHERE, FREEDMAN SUGGESTED THIS OBJECTIVE COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED SIMPLY BY MRS THATCHER GOING TO HUNGARY OR SIR GEOFFREY HOWE GOING TO MOSCO, -BUT THAT SUCH CONTACTS ARE USEFUL IN PASSING

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AND GIVING MESSAGES. IN END, HOWEVER, SITUATION DEPENDS ON USA GIVING SOVIETS SOMETHING TO ALLOW THEM TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION AND RETURN TO NEGOTIATING TABLE WITHOUT APPEARING TO CLIMB DOWN.

4. MR CLARK MADE POINT HERE AS WITH OTHER CONTACTS THAT IN CDA PUBLIC CONCERN OVER EAST/WEST TENSION WAS RISING, AND THERE WAS POLITICAL DANGER AHEAD IF GOVTS FAIL TO MEET THIS CONCERN WITH EFFECTIVE RESPONSE. MR FREEDMAN DID NOT DISPUTE THIS, BUT AGREED WITH MR CLARK'S OTHER LDN CONTACTS THAT BEFORE US ELECTION THERE IS LITTLE IN SOVIET VIEW TO ENTICE THEM BACK TO TALKS, OR TO LOOK FOR HAPPIER RELATIONS WITH USA. ON OTHER HAND, THOUGH SOME USA POLICY DIRECTORS WOULD LIKE TO SEE IMPROVED RELATIONS, THERE ARE MANY IN WASHINGTON AS WELL WHO WOULD RESIST NECESSARY MOVES PRIOR TO ELECTION.

FREEDMAN ARGUED THAT WHETHER REAGAN HART OR MONDALE WINS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT CONCILIATORY RHETORIC BEGUN PRIOR TO ELECTION BE SUSTAINED IN FOLLOWING MONTHS.

5. TAKING BROADER VIEW, FREEDMAN QUESTIONED HOW FAR EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIPS REALLY HAD DETERIORATED: HE ARGUED THEY HAD NOW BEEN QUOTE PULLED BACK FROM TROUGH UNQUOTE, THAT CURRENT NUCLEAR RELATIONS ARE DANGEROUS BUT NOT NOW MORE DANGEROUS THAN THEY HAD BEEN BEFORE INF DEPLOYMENT. UK PUBLIC REACTION TO CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT HAD REACHED PLATEAU, AND IS LOSING STEAM: THERE IS THUS NOT GREAT EVIDENCE THAT THERE IS POLITICAL DYNAMIC IN BRITAIN, OR

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✓ IN USA, OF SORT WHICH WOULD FORCE EARLY CHANGES IN WESTERN POLICY.
✓ AND WITHOUT SOMETHING ON OFFER, SOVIETS WILL NOT RESPOND.

6. FREEDMAN SUGGESTED SOVIETS WERE SUFFICIENTLY CONCERNED OVER OUTER SPACE AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO MAKE THESE MOST PROMISING AREAS FOR MOVEMENT. WHILE SOVIETS MAY NOT REALLY REGARD STAR WARS/ ABM AS TENABLE PROPOSITION, AND THUS MAY NOT WISH TO GIVE IT MORE PROMINENCE THAN IT IS WORTH, THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ASAT (WHERE FREEDMAN SUGGESTS USA MISSED OPPORTUNITY IN 1970S TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT), AND ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT CHEMICAL WEAPONS. DEFINITIONS HAVE ALREADY LARGELY BEEN WORKED OUT, AND WITH RECENT SOVIET CONCESSION ON CHEMICAL WEAPON VERIFICATION, RELATIVELY RAPID PROGRESS COULD WITH POLITICAL WILL BE MADE.

7. IN OTHER AREAS, FREEDMAN WAS NOT SO SANGUINE: ON MBFR HE REFLECTED TO INTERESTING DEGREE FCO VIEW THAT FUDGING DATA ISSUE WOULD BE QUOTE FRAUD UNQUOTE, AND AT EXPENSE OF WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS. ON CDE HE SAID NO ONE REALLY WANTS TO MOVE QUICKLY. INF HAS LITTLE CHANCE OF BEING TAKEN UP IN SEPARATE FORUM THOUGH START OFFERS SOMEWHAT MORE HOPEFUL PROSPECT AND COULD SUBSUME SOME INF ELEMENTS. (FREEDMAN SAYS USA WOULD HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEM TRYING TRANSFER TO MERGED NEGOTIATIONS ELABORATE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS WHICH WORKED WELL WITH WESTERN PARTNERS ON INF.)

8. IN RESPONSE TO MR CLARKS QUERY AS TO WHERE IMPETUS FOR PROGRESS

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IN THESE AREAS MIGHT COME FROM, FREEDMAN SUGGESTED THAT NEITHER
SOVIETS NOR NATO ARE LIKELY TO OFFER TYPE OF IMPETUS WHICH IS
REQUIRED: BREAKTHROUGH MUST COME AT POLITICAL LEVEL, EG FOREIGN
MINISTERS, AND HE TAKES ENCOURAGEMENT FROM OBSERVATION THAT SOME
OF THIS IS GOING ON ALREADY.

CCC/224 221124Z XNGR0694

R E S T R I C T E D

DE EXTOTT RBR0559 22MAR84

A BONN DELIVER BY 230900

INFO WSHDC LDN MOSCO ROME PARIS BNATO VMBFR HAGUE BRU OSLO ATHNS
MDRID LSBON PRMNY VIENN GENEV STKHM/SCDEL PMOOTT/AXWORTHY PCOOTT/
FOWLER NDBQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/DACPOL

DISTR MINA USS DMF DMT IFB IDA ZSI RBRD RBD RGB RCR CPD EER EPT

FPR IDDZ

REF VOTRETEL ZQGR1116 19MAR

---INITIATIVE DU PM -POLITIQUE INTERIEURE RDA

POUR VOTRE INFO RESULTATS DES CONSULTATIONS SUR CE SUJET A OTT
ET QR POUR LE MIN.

SUJET: LE PREMIER MINISTRE TRUDEAU AURAIT OFFERT UN CREDIT DE
1 MILLIARD DE MARKS A LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE ALLEMANDE LORS
DE SA VISITE A BERLIN-EST EN JANVIER.

SOURCE: DER SPIEGEL, EDITION DU 19 MARS 1984.

EVALUATION: CETTE RUMEUR EST NON FONDEE, LES QUESTIONS FINANCIERES
N ONT PAS FAIT L OBJET DE DISCUSSION LORS DE LA VISITE DU PM A
BERLIN-EST. LA VISITE A ETE CONSACREE A L INITIATIVE DE PAIX.

FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS, PM DE BAVIERE ET CHEF DU PARTI SOCIAL-CHRETIEN
(CSU), AURAIT DECLARE QUE LES BANQUES CANADIENNES ONT OFFERT A LA
RDA UN PRET DE 1 MILLIARD DE MARK ET QUE LE PM TRUDEAU EN A FAIT
L OFFRE LORS DE SA VISITE A BERLIN-EST. CECI EXPLIQUERAIT, SELON
M. STRAUSS, LE DESINTERET DE LA RDA D OBTENIR UN PRET DE 1 MILLIARD

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PAGE TWO RBR0559 RESTR

DE MARKS DE LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D ALLEMAGNE.

REPONSE SUGGEREE; LE PREMIER MINISTRE TRUDEAU N A PAS DISCUTE DE
FINANCEMENT LORS DE SA VISITE A BERLIN-EST.SA VISITE A ETE
CONSACREE A L INITIATIVE DE PAIX.

A MA CONNAISSANCE LES BANQUES CANADIENNES N ENVISAGENT PAS
D OFFRIR DES CREDITS DE L ENVERGURE DE 1 MILLIARD DE MARKS A LA
RDA.

QUANT AUX FACILITES DE CREDIT OFFICIELLES OFFERTES PART LE
CANADA, ELLES SE REDUISENT A UN CREDIT RENOUVELABLE POUR L ACHAT
DE CEREALES, SOIT 1 MILLION DE TONNES PAR ANNEE SUR UNE PERIODE DE
TROIS ANS; ET A UNE LIGNE DE CREDIT (PLAFOND DE 100 M) DE LA SOCIETE
POUR L EXPANSION DES EXPORTATIONS (EDC) UTILISEE A 2.5 MILLIONS
AU PREMIER JANVIER 84.

CCC/252 222311Z RBR0559

A-6

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

B10
JPM

UNCLASSIFIED

FM SJOSE #WGR0068 22MAR84

TO EXTOTT LCR IMMEDI

DISTR IMU LCRA

---UNIV OF PEACE

ACC	334114	840529
FILE	20-1-2-CRICA	DOSSIER
28-6-1-Trudeau Peace MISSION		

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LET TO PM TRUDEAU FROM RODRIGO CARAZO, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, UNIVERSITY OF PEACE:QUOTE:

SIR:

I HAVE FOLLOWED WITH GREAT INTEREST YOUR RECENT PEACE INITIATIVE AIMED AT RE-ESTABLISHING COMMUNICATION AND DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS. AS AUTHOR PIERRE-ALBERT JOURDAN SAYS QUOTE C EST LE PROPRE DES HOMMES PUIS D APPELER LA RENCONTRE, LA RECONCILIATION UNQUOTE. IN THIS TIME OF NUCLEAR VULNERABILITY, EFFORTS LIKE YOURS ARE MANDATORY.

AS A FORMER PRESIDENT OF COSTA RICA AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY FOR PEACE, I AM GRAVELY DISTURBED BY THE UNCONCERN OF NUCLEAR GOVERNMENTS WITH THE SURVIVAL OF HUMANITY. A CALCULATED OR ACCIDENTAL DESTRUCTION OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IS AS EASY TO ACHIEVE IN 1984 AS NEVER BEFORE, AND THE ABSENCE OF POLITICAL WILL TO NEGOTIATE MAKE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE EVEN DIMER. I BELIEVE YOUR EFFORTS TO BRING LEADERS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE SHOULD BE FURTHER ENCOURAGED WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MOBILIZE A GLOBAL PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST THE LEGAL AND MORAL STATUS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO FIND NEW APPROACHES TO THE BUILDING AND MAINTENANCE OF PEACE. WHILE IT IS IMMEDIATELY NECESSARY TO DEFUSE

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PAGE GWO WWGR0068 UNCLAS

THE PRESENT PERILOUS SITUATION, IT IS ALSO FUNDAMENTAL THAT WE GAIN A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF WAR, AND OF THE TRENDS TOWARDS PEACE. SUCH UNDERSTANDING, AND ITS CORRESPONDING ACTION, HAVE TO BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. TOWARDS THIS END, THE CREATION OF THE UNIVERSITY FOR PEACE WAS APPROVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN DECEMBER 1980. IT OPERATES OUTSIDE THE FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND IS LOCATED IN COSTA RICA, WHERE IT ENJOYS THE AUTONOMY AND PRIVILEGES ACCORDED TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

I HAVE RECENTLY READ AN ARTICLE IN WHICH YOU ARE QUOTED AS SAYING YOUR DESTINY IS SO COMPLEX YOU DONT WANT TO TIE IT TO ANY PARTICULAR ASPECT OF YOUR MANY INTERESTS IN LIFE. HOWEVER, SHOULD YOU DECIDE TO FOCUS ON THE ISSUE OF PEACE, MAY I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST YOU JOIN THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY FOR PEACE, WHERE EDUCATING FOR PEACE IS THE MAIN CONCERN, WITH A VIEW TO ADVISING US ON PRIORITIES AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR PROGRAMMES.

I WILL BE IN OTTAWA ON APRIL 6 AND 7 AND WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH YOU AT YOUR CONVENIENCE TO ASK YOU PERSONALLY TO SHARE WITH THE UNIVERSITY FOR PEACE YOUR CONCERNS AND HOPES. IF DUE TO YOUR SCHEDULE THE ABOVE DATES ARE NOT AGREEABLE TO YOU, I WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET YOU AT ANY OTHER TIME, RESPECTFULLY YOURS, RODRIGO CARAZO, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL UNQUOTE.

UUU/161 22223Z WWGR0068

MF
28.6.1 - Tudlow
Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR 0690 21MAR84

TO EXTOTT/RCR

INFO BNATO BRU PARIS BONN WSHDC MOSCO NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/DNACPOL/

DSTRATA PCOOTT/FOWLER VMBFR PRMNY GENEV

DISTR MINA USS DMF RGB IDA IDR IDDZ

---ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS: CLARK

DISCUSSIONS IN LDN

SUMMARY: MR CLARK'S LDN MEETINGS WERE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE IN ELICITING ACCURATE, REPRESENTATIVE PICTURE OF BRITISH CONCERNS ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES AND ON HOW THESE FIT INTO BROADER EAST/WEST DIALOGUE.

NEITHER ACADEMICS (PROFESSOR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, PROFESSOR NEVILLE BROWN) NOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL LEADERS (SDP LEADER DAVID OWEN, LABOUR DEFENCE SPOKESMAN JOHN SILKIN) TOOK ISSUE WITH TIMELINESS OR NECESSITY OF INITIATIVES ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS, OR OF PM

THATCHER'S EMPHASIS ON BROAD, PRAGMATIC DIALOGUE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE,

BUT EXTEND WELL BEYOND ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS. POLITICAL FIGURES

TO WHOM MR CLARK SPOKE RESISTED TEMPTATION TO CASTIGATE BRITISH

GOVT, THOUGH SILKIN INSISTED SOVIETS NEEDED SUBSTANTIAL MOVE FROM

WEST (IN FORM OF FREEZE OF INF DEPLOYMENT?) BEFORE THEY WOULD

RETURN TO NUCLEAR TALKS, AND OWEN SPOKE STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF

MAINTAINING BRITISH DETERRENT, BUT AGAINST ACQUISITION OF TRIDENT

MISSILES. GOVT SPOKESMEN (FCO MINISTER RIFKIND, ASSISTANT UNDER-

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PAGE TWO XNGR0690 CONF

SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT CARTLEDGE) WERE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IN PROVIDING BACKGROUND ON UK APPROACHES TO ARMS CONTROL, AND IN REFLECTING UK VIEWS ON MBFR (CONTINUING CAUTION), SDI (CAUTION HERE AS WELL), AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION (OK IF IT DOESNT IMPAIR ALLIANCE OR FOCUS ON FRANCE, -AND WHATEVER HAPPENS UK MUST BE INCLUDED IN IT). NUMBER OF CONTACTS SUGGESTED CDA HAD ROLE TO PLAY IN IMPROVING EAST/WEST TIES, BUT STRESSED THAT THIS MUST BE DONE FROM WITHIN ALLIANCE AND CAUTIONED AGAINST MISINTERPRETATION WHICH MIGHT ARISE FROM APPEARING TO QUESTION PUBLICLY BASIC ALLIANCE STRATEGIC POLICIES. FIVE POWER CONFERENCE AND STRATEGIC SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS WERE NOT RAISED, THOUGH CARTLEDGE REPEATED UK CONCERN OVER PROSPECT OF RAISING SPACE QUESTIONS IN CD. FOLLOWING IS RECORD OF TALKS WITH CARTLEDGE; OTHER REPORTS FOLLOW IN SEPARATE TELS.

2. REPORT: DISCUSSION WITH ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE CARTLEDGE: EAST/WEST RELATIONS, MBFR, NUCLEAR ISSUES AND OUTER SPACE: IN BROAD REVIEW OF CURRENT ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT SCENE, CARTLEDGE TOLD MR CLARK HE FOUND MOSCO SIGNALS DEPRESSING: HIGH LEVEL SPEECHES SINCE CHERNENKOS ACCESSION (LATELY REFLECTED IN CHERNENKOS TALKS WITH SPD LEADER VOGEL) HAVE CAUSED A CHANGE IN UK PERCEPTION OF LONGER TERM SOVIET OBJECTIVES: WHEREAS SIX MONTHS AGO LONDON HAD THOUGHT THAT EVEN THOUGH INF WAS DEFINITELY

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PAGE THREE XNCR069Z CONF

OFF, SOVIETS WERE SUFFICIENTLY INTERESTED IN START TALKS TO REGARD THEIR RESUMPTION AS DISTINCT POSSIBILITY (PARTICULARLY IF ELEMENTS OF INF COULD BE WORKED IN), CURRENT VIEW IN FOREIGN OFFICE IS MORE DISCOURAGING. OFFICIALS HERE NOW SEE ANY SOVIET MOVEMENT AS VERY MUCH SUBJECT TO THEIR JUDGEMENT OF USA ELECTION. SUDDEN APPEARANCE ON SCENE OF HART HAS MADE THIS JUDGEMENT EVEN MORE QUOTE IFY UNQUOTE, AND UK NOW BELIEVES SOVIETS HAVE IN ALL LIKELIHOOD DISCOUNTED RETURN EVEN TO START, AT LEAST UNTIL WELL AFTER NEXT NOVEMBER. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM MR CLARK AS TO WHETHER SOVIETS MAY NOT YET HAVE ARRIVED AT POSITION, CARTLEDGE REPLIED THAT THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN SO CATEGORICAL IN THEIR REFUSAL TO RETURN THAT THEY WOULD NOW FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GO BACK ON THIS REFUSAL WITHOUT SORT OF MOVEMENT FROM WEST WHICH AT MOMENT IS SIMPLY NOT POSSIBLE. CARTLEDGE NOTED THAT SOVIETS ARE ACCUSTOMED TO WAITING TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES; THEY WILL NOT FIND IT DIFFICULT TO SIT ON THEIR HANDS AND WAIT UNTIL AFTER ELECTIONS: SOVIETS HAD ALWAYS EXPECTED THAT DEPLOYMENT WOULD BECOME TROUBLESOME FOR WEST AND THUS OPEN DOOR FOR THEM; THEY HAVENT YET GIVEN UP THAT HOPE, AND STILL EVIDENTLY LOOK TO WESTERN PEACE MOVEMENTS TO PRESSURE GOVTS INTO PROVIDING SORT OF OPENING THEY REQUIRE.

3. ON MBFR, CARTLEDGE WAS ONLY LITTLE MORE OPTIMISTIC: SUGGESTING

PAGE FOUR XNGR0690 CONF

THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE ANY INCENTIVE FOR SOVIETS TO ABDICATE CURRENT POSITION OF SUPERIORITY AND THUS TO TALK SERIOUSLY, CARTLEDGE NONETHELESS NOTED SENSE WITHIN ALLIANCE THAT TIMING IS NOW RIGHT TO PUT SOMETHING ON TABLE AS INDUCEMENT. BUT IN ANSWER TO CLARKS QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THERE WAS SOMETHING THAT COULD BE DONE PRIOR TO 16APR, CARTLEDGE SUGGESTED THAT IN HIS VIEW MBFR REMAINS LONG TERM PROSPECT, UNLIKELY TO EVOLVE SIGNIFICANTLY THROUGH NEXT TWELVE MONTHS. HE NOTED THAT SOVIET DELEGATION HE HAD SEEN LAST WEEK (ON DATE WHICH MBFR NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED) HAD NOT EVEN MENTIONED SUBJECT; HE COMMENTED THAT THERE IS NO REAL PUBLIC PRESSURE IN BRITAIN FOR MOVEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS. (SEE OURTEL 0669 22MAR FOR FULLER DISCUSSION OF BRITISH ATTITUDES ON MBFR).

4. CARTLEDGE WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC CONCERNING WHAT HE CALLED PROMISING AREAS WITHIN CD, - PARTICULARLY CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HE SUGGESTED THAT IRAN/IRAQ EXPERIENCE WOULD HAVE USEFUL POLITICAL SPIN-OFF ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND NOTED SOVIET MOVE ON VERIFICATION AS BEING SIGNIFICANT INDICATION THAT PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE. IN THIS CONTEXT, UK IS URGING USA TO PRODUCE THEIR TREATY BEFORE END OF THIS SESSION IN MID-APRIL IN ORDER TO CAPITALIZE ON ATTENTION CURRENTLY BEING GIVEN CW.

5. ANOTHER HIGH PROFILE AREA, - THOUGH AGAIN, OF LONGER TERM PROSPECTS,

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PAGE FIVE XNGR0690 CONF

IS OUTER SPACE-SDI AND, MORE IMMEDIATELY, ASAT. IN THIS CONTEXT
CARTLEDGE REFERRED TO PM TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE, AND TOLD MR CLARK
THAT BRITISH SHARE CDN VIEW OF NECESSITY OF ADDRESSING ASAT
IN APPROPRIATE FORUM - BUT NOT IN CD, ARGUING THAT IT IS NECESSARY
TO HANDLE USA DELICATELY ON SPACE QUESTIONS, CARTLEDGE SUGGESTED
THAT THERE COULD BE A MOMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE ASAT RIPE FOR
AGREEMENT (USSR HAS RUDEMENTARY LEAD AND USA MUST STILL CATCH
UP), - BUT EARLY TALKS WOULD BE IMPEDED BY SUPERPOWER PERCEPTION
THAT MAIN OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO KEEP AHEAD. ABOVE ALL, USA WOULD
BAULK AT DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC SPACE QUESTIONS IN GENEVA
WHERE ISSUE (AND US SENSITIVITIES) WOULD NOT RECEIVE CAREFUL
HANDLING, AND PREDOMINANCE THERE OF NNAS WOULD MAKE ISSUE INTO
POLITICAL FOOTBALL. WHEN MR CLARK ASKED WHICH FORUM COULD USEFULLY
CONSIDER ASAT, CARTLEDGE TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS BEST DONE WITH
BILATERAL FOCUS AT THIS STAGE: CLOSE ALLIES COULD QUOTE CAREFULLY
MESSAGE UNQUOTE BOTH SIDES, BUT EVEN THIS, IN ELECTION YEAR,
WAS LONGER TERM PROSPECT.

5. LOOKING AT BROADER AREAS OF NATO POLICY FORMULATION, MR CLARK
ASKED WHETHER CARTLEDGE SAW PERMANENT IMPEDIMENT TO AGREEMENT IN
ALLIANCE. REPLY WAS THAT ALLIANCE WAS REMARKABLY COHESIVE AND
STRONG, AND THAT THIS WAS TRUE EVEN FOR MBFR. DIFFERENCES SHOULD
NOT BE EXAGGERATED. ON UK/SOVIET RELATIONS, CARTLEDGE SUGGESTED

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PAGE SIX XNGR0690 CONF

THAT HOWE VISIT TO MOSCO IN JULY WOULD TAKE PLACE AGAINST
BACKGROUND OF RECOGNITION HERE OF NEED FOR DIALOGUE BEYOND ARMS
CONTROL. PM THATCHERS VISIT TO HUNGARY, HER SUBSEQUENT BRIEF
CONVERSATION WITH CHERNENKO IN MOSCO, AND HOWES VISIT TO MOSCO
ALL ARE DESIGNED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS PROCESS OF BROADER
DIALOGUE, -ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE ARMS CONTROL TO MORE APPROPRIATELY
PROPORTIONATE AREA IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. MR CLARK ASKED IF
SOVIETS REGARDED VISITS TO EASTERN EUROPE AS PART OF THIS SAME
APPROACH. CARTLEDGE AGREED SOVIETS MIGHT BE SUSPICIOUS, AND
SUGGESTED THAT WEST COULD HANDLE THESE VISITS MORE TACTFULLY
THAN IN SOME AREAS THEY HAVE, REFERRING TO US VICE PRESIDENT
BUSH SPEECH IN VIENNA AFTER HIS TRAVEL TO HUNGARY. AT SAME TIME,
EAST EUROPEANS DO NOT APPRECIATE BEING SINGLED OUT AS GOODIES,
AND IT IS UNFAIR TO THEM TO SEE THEM MERELY AS STEPPING STONES
TO MOSCO. THATCHER VISIT WAS EVIDENTLY TAKEN FOR WHAT IT WAS -
AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY A MESSAGE TO SOVIET LEADERSHIP, AS WELL
AS TO STRENGTHEN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH SIGNIFICANT EASTERN
BLOC COUNTRY.

6. CARTLEDGE REFERRED ONLY OBLIQUELY IN HIS CONVERSATIONS TO
PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE, BUT RETURNED TO SUBJECT AGAIN AT
HIGH COMMISSIONERS LUNCH, TO ARGUE THAT AT CURRENT JUNCTURE
PARTICULARLY, ALLIANCE MEMBERS NEEDED TO TAKE SPECIAL CARE NOT TO
APPEAR TO SOVIETS EITHER TO BE PRESSING TO HOLD OUT INCENTIVES
TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS, NOR TO GIVE IMPRESSION OF REGARDING
SOVIETS AND AMERICANS AS EQUIDISTANT.

CCC/102 220939Z XNGR0690

001395

**ACTION
SITE A DONNER**

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM GENEV YTGR2110 21MAR84

TO ~~EXTOTT~~ IDA IDDZ

INFO NDHQ~~OTT~~/DNACPOL LDN BNATO

DISTR IDAO IDAN

REF BNATO TEL YBGR6282 16MAR

---MTG OF DISARMAMENT EXPERTS:09-10APR:PM INITIATIVE

HAVE HAD INFORMAL ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS (PERHAPS CORRECT WORD WOULD BE CONVERSATIONS) WITH GENEVA NATO COLLEAGUES WHO ATTEND THESE REGULAR MTGS. CONSENSUS IS THAT AGENDA PREPARED BY NATO SECRETARIAT (REFTEL) IS BOTH TOO BROAD AND TOO DETAILED TO PERMIT ANY SERIOUS POLICY CONSIDERATION. THERE IS ALSO FEELING HOWEVER THAT PENDING GREATER NATO SECRETARIAT UNDERSTANDING OF ACD MULTILATERAL PROCESS IN GENEVA AND NEW YORK, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT MUCH COULD BE DONE TO CHANGE OMNIBUS AND LOW LEVEL APPROACH THE SECRETARIAT HAS ADOPTED. NEVERTHELESS, NUMBER OF CD AMBS ARE NOW THINKING OF ATTENDING MTG 09-10APR SO AS TO BEEF UP CONTENTS AND SUBSTANCE OF DISCUSSION, INCL AMBS OF BELGIUM, FRG, USA AND UK (AND POSSIBLY FRANCE).

2. WITH REFERENCE TO BNATO REFTEL, QUOTE LEOPARD UNQUOTE NON-GROUP AT BRITISH INITIATIVE SOUGHT TO IMPROVE LIAISON/COORDINATION MECHANISM AMONGST INNER CORE OF ALLIANCE, PARTICULARLY ON ACD ISSUES BEFORE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. RESULTS OF THEIR REVIEW OF THIS OPERATION, FOLLOWING OUR MTGS IN LDN AND GENVA, ARE NOW REPORTED

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PAGE TWO YTGR2110 CONFD CEO

IN BNATO REFTE: IN SHORT BRITS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT STRUCTURAL AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES WEIGH AGAINST SEEKING TO IMPROVE NATO CONSULTATIVE PROCESS BEYOND ENSURING THAT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON UNGA BE GIVEN MORE ATTENTION AND GREATER PROMINENCE IN ORDER TO ENHANCE ALLIES TRACK RECORD IN THAT BODY; AND THAT EARLY THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO PREPARING WESTERN STRATEGY FOR THIS YEARS UNGA.

3. PREVIOUS MESSAGES HAVE INDICATED THAT YOUR IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS TO PURSUE PMS INITIATIVE, PARTICULARLY ON OUTER SPACE, IN NATO CONTEXT. NATO MTG HELD EARLIER THIS SPRING WITH PRESENCE OF CDN TEAM PROVED TO BE VALUABLE AND ONE OF OUTCOMES OF THAT MTG WAS AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS IN NATO, BUT NOW THERE IS SOME QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER OUTER SPACE ISSUE SHOULD BE GIVEN SEPARATE TREATMENT ON APR10, OR HELD OVER UNTIL WED APR11.

FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS USA INTENTION TO MAKE PRESENTATION THEMSELVES ON OUTER SPACE DURING SLOT RESERVED FOR SUBJ ON EITHER APR10 OR 11. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN VIEW OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF SUBJ, WE HAVE LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR SECRETARIATS APPARENT DIFFICULTY IN FINDING SUITABLE MTG ROOM, AND HOPE THAT OUR DEL AT BNATO WILL CONTINUE TO EXERT PRESSURE TO RESOLVE THIS APPARENT PROBLEM.

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PAGE THREE YTGR211 CONFD CEO

4.INSOFAR AS MISSION ATTENDANCE IS CONCERNED,THIS WILL CONFIRM THAT,AS AGREED IN SKINNER/CHISTOFF TELECON LAST WEEK,AMB BEESLEY WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS MTG,PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF INTENTION OF OTHER WESTERN AMBS TO BE PRESENT.WE WILL PROVIDE FURTHER VIEWS ON THIS MATTER EARLY NEXT WEEK.

CCC/125 231523Z YTGR2110

RETURN TO REVOYER AU	3100	POUR - ETRE PORTE AU DOSSIER
ACC		REF DATE
FILE	88-6-1-Trudeau	
	DOSSIER	

Peace Mission

MF

Ms. McMeel

Your request?

MR DEWOLF

Yes - I wanted this to do a brief, but found that neither we nor PCO/PMO had the original. Jan 22/3/84

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

NONCLASSIFIE

DE LSBON XMGR0217 21MAR84

A EXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER BNATO

DISTR RGB FSR RSD

REF VOTTEL IDDZ0238 16MAR

---PM INITIATIVE

TEXTE DE LETTRE DU PM MARIO SOARES ADRESSEE AU PM TRUDEAU EN DATE

DU 10JANV SUIT

QUOTE DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

FIRST OF ALL LET ME THANK YOU FOR THE LETTERS YOU ADDRESSED TO ME ON THE 26TH OCTOBER AND 16TH NOVEMBER, WHICH I READ WITH THE UTMOST INTEREST.

LIKE YOURSELF, I AM DEEPLY UPSET WITH THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IN FACT, THE INCREASING SPIRIT OF CONFRONTATION CANNOT HELP AFFECTING IN A NEGATIVE SENSE SEVERAL AREAS OUTSIDE EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, THUS PREVENTING ANY THOROUGH AND LASTING SOLUTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS AND EXTREMELY COMPLEX CRISIS.

IN THE VERY DEPRESSING SCENARIO WE HAVE TO FACE, I THINK THAT THE INITIATIVES YOU DECIDED TO PUT FORWARD CONSTITUTE A VALUABLE AND TIMELY CONTRIBUTION FOR THE RE-LAUNCHING OF THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CLIMATE OF GREATER CONFIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THESE ARE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS AS IT MAKES NO

PAGE TWO XMGR2217 UNCLAS

SENSE TO SUBSTITUTE DIALOGUE AND CONFIDENCE FOR ARMAMENT.

YOU CAN THEREFORE COUNT, MR. PRIME MINISTER, ON BY GOVERNMENTS
SUPPORT, NAMELY DURING THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE (CDE), IN WHICH THE
NATO MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WILL PARTICIPATE, FOLLOWING A
CANADIAN SUGGESTION. YOURS SINCERELY, MARIO SOARES UNQUOTE

UUU/215 211515Z XMGR0217

S E C R E T

FM ECNN ZQGR1119 21MAR84

TC EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 210900

INFO BNATO WSHDC VMBFR LDN NDHQOTT/INACPOL/DSTRATA STKHM/

SCDEL

IISTR IFE IDDZ IDD IDA IDRA

REF YOURTEL IDR1026 19MAR

---MEFR:USA DRAFT GUIDANCE

WE SPOKE WITH RUTH AND HELIK ABOUT USA DRAFT GUIDANCE. FRG IS QUOTE ON BOARD UNQUOTE WITH USA ONLY TO EXTENT THAT IT HAS AGREED TO DISCUSS USA PROPOSAL IN BRU AND WITHHOLD TABLING THEIR CWN PROPOSAL AT PRESENT. BONN HAS SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM WITH ANY ATTEMPT TO USE COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT TROOPS AS BASIS FOR REDUCTION OR IN EFFECT TO CREATE NEW SUB-CEILING CONSISTING OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT TROOPS. FRG BELIEVES THIS FURTHER REDUCES FLEXIBILITY FOR COUNTRIES WITH FORCES THAT WOULD BE REDUCED AND HAS SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIANCES FORWARD DEFENSE. GERMANS WILL THUS OBJECT TO ANY CREATION OF SUB-CEILING. WHAT THEY COULD ACCEPT WOULD BE FIRST DATA EXCHANGE CONCENTRATING ONLY ON COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT TROOPS. 2. GERMANS WILL THEREFORE ALLOW DISCUSSION TO FOCUS ON USA PROPOSAL WITHOUT EITHER TRYING TO SUBSTITUTE PART OF GERMAN PACKAGE OR ATTEMPTING TO BROADEN SCOPE TO MAKE IT MORE ATTRACTIVE TO EAST. THEY WILL RAISE DIFFICULTY THEY HAVE WITH USA IDEAS. SHOULD THERE BE NO/NO AGREEMENT IN BRU ON USA DRAFT,

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PAGE TWO ZQGR1119 SECRET

FRG WOULD THEN TABLE ITS OWN PROPOSAL.

3.FRG DOES NOT/NOT THINK USA PROPOSAL OFFERS EAST MUCH.

IF ANYTHING IT MAKES DISCREPANCY AND ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION PROBLEMS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT.HELIK POINTED OUT THAT UNDER USA PLAN REDUCTION RATION WOULD BE 4:1 AND EAST WOULD FIGURE THAT OUT RATHER QUICKLY.GERMANS HAD NOTHING AGAINST COSMETICS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGS BUT THIS ATTEMPT WAS NOT/NOT VERY GOOD ONE.HELIK NOTED USA BELIEVES DISCREPANCY IS GREATER IN CASES OF NON/NON-COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT TROOPS BUT FRG DOES NOT/NOT BELIEVE THIS TO BE SO.

4.HELIK ALSO SAID FRG HAD IN RECENT DAYS MADE COMPROMISE PROPOSAL TO WSHDC CONSISTING OF AMALGAM OF FRG AND USA IDEAS.THIS INVOLVED DATA COMPARISON ON US AND USSR FORCES ONLY FOLLOWED BY VERIFICATION PHASE.WSHDC HAD REJECTED THIS BUT FRG MIGHT ALSO BRING IT UP IF USA PROPOSAL DOES NOT/NOT ENJOY CONSENSUS IN BRU.

CCC/242 210925Z ZQGR1119

mf

R E S T R I C T E D

FM LDN XNGR0676 21MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFC STKHM/SC DEL

DISTR IDAO IDAN RSR IDDZ ABRT RCR

REF YOURTEL IDA0359 16MAR

---CDN CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

WHILE BOTH ONEILL AND ALFORD REMAIN FULLY COMMITTED TO IISS COUNCIL MEETINGS MARCH 28/29, ONEILL HAS SUGGESTED THAT INSTITUTES INFORMATION RESEARCH OFFICER, MAJOR ROBERT ELLIOT, COULD PROVIDE BRIEFING ON MECHANICS OF INSTITUTE, AND COULD GIVE GENERAL DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES, RELATIONS WITH GOVT AND OTHER INSTITUTES AND FOUNDATIONS. HE WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, HAVE LONGER TERM VIEW OF RESEARCH GOALS AND PROJECTS WHICH INSTITUTE HAS IN MIND.

2. IF MR PEARSON WOULD FIND CONVERSATION WITH ELLIOT WORTHWHILE, WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO REBOOK HOTEL ACCOMMODATION NIGHT 28MAR. COMMENT: WITH CAVEAT THAT HIS OVERVIEW OF INSTITUTE ACTIVITIES MAY BE SOMEWHAT LESS EXTENSIVE THAN THAT WHICH ONE MIGHT EXPECT FROM DIRECTOR OR DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ELLIOT IS HIGHLY EFFECTIVE IISS STAFF MEMBER WHO COULD GIVE USEFUL BRIEFING. PARTICULARLY IF THERE ARE OTHER APPOINTMENTS MR PEARSON WOULD WISH TO KEEP IN LDN, TALK WITH ELLIOT WOULD CERTAINLY BE HELPFUL.

CCC/041 211031Z XNGR0676

C O N F I D N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA0367 21MAR84

TO BNATO GENEV

INFO CANMILREP NATO PRMNY NDHQOTT/PPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR IDD IDDZ IDR IDAN IDAO IMU

REF YOURTELS YBGR6234 06MAR, YBGR6282 16MAR

---NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS MTG AND ASAT CNSULTATIONS APR 09-11,
1984

CONCUR WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIONS TO DEVOTE FULL DAY TO ASAT AND
RELATED ISSUES. CLEMINSON WILL BE ATTENDING FROM IDA
FOR BOTH EXPERTS MTG AND ASAT CONSULTATIONS. REQUEST ACCOMMODATION
HYATT IF POSSIBLE NIGHTS OF 08-10 APR INCL. PLS CONFIRM.

2. FOR GENEV: UNDERSTAND SOME CD AMBASSADORS (USA, UK, FRG, FRANCE)
NOW DEFINITELY ATTENDING EXPERTS MTG. GRATEFUL LATEST INFO
YOU MAY BE ABLE TO OBTAIN. WITH YOUR CONCURRENCE PROPOSE CLEMINSON
SHOULD PROCEED TO GENEV FOLLOWING BRUSSELS MTGS TO ATTEND ED
MTGS IN SESSION AND DISCUSS RANGE OF CD ISSUES REGARDING
RESEARCH SUPPORT. IF YOU AGREE, REQUEST ACCOMMODATION NIGHTS OF
11-13 APR INCL. INTERCONTINENTAL IF POSSIBLE. PLEASE CONFIRM.

CCC/252 212311Z IDA0367

S E C R E T

FM VMBFR XTDR0058 21MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 220930

INFO BNATO WSHDC BONN LDN NDHQOTT/ CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

STKHM/SCDEL

DISTR IFB ADDZ IDD IDA IDRA IDRL

REF YOURTEL IDR1026 19MAR

---MFFR:USA DRAFT GUIDANCE TO AHG

SUMMARY:THIS TEL ATTEMPTS TO SPECULATE,AS REQUESTED,ABOUT THE NEGOTIABILITY OF USA PROPOSAL AND EASTERN REACTION TO IT AS WELL AS TO IDENTIFY WHAT WE PERCEIVE TO BE ADVANTAGES/MERITS AND DISADVANTAGES/SHORTCOMINGS OF USA PROPOSAL IN ITS PRESENT FORM.THIS ANALYSIS IS INFLUENCED BY OUR CONVICTION THAT IMPORTANCE OF WESTS COMING UP WITH SOME NEW NEGOTIATING MATERIAL NO/NO LATER THAN 19APR IS PROBABLY EVEN GREATER THAN DESIRABILITY IN PRINCIPLE OF ELABORATING ON USA PROPOSAL.FURTHER PROTRACTED DELAY BY WEST WOULD RUN RISK OF SUSPENSION OF NEGS BY EAST,WHICH THIS TIME COULD LAST AT LEAST UNTIL USA ELECTIONS AND PERHAPS BE PERMANENT. SUBMISSION OF NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL IN FORM USA HAS SUGGESTED WOULD NOT/NOT NECESSARILY LOCK EAST INTO CONTINUATION OF NEGS,IF,FOR EXAMPLE,THEY HAVE LOST WHATEVER INTEREST IN THEM THAT HAS KEPT THEM HERE FOR TEN YEARS,BUT IT WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT WAS LAST DEC FOR EAST TO CARRY OUT SUSPENSION AND EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO BLAME WEST FOR IT.

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PAGE TWO XTDR0058 SECRET

(A) NEGOTIABILITY

2. IT IS WELL TO BEAR IN MIND THAT NEGOTIABILITY, BOTH IN SHORT AND LONGER TERM, OF USA PROPOSAL, OR FOR THAT MATTER ANY OTHER WESTERN PROPOSAL, IS AFFECTED NOT/NOT ONLY BY ITS CONTENT BUT ALSO BY BASIC SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS AND EXTENT TO WHICH THEY MAY SHIFT OVER TIME. FOR EXAMPLE, IF, AS SOME CONTEND, USSR IS NOT/NOT PREPARED TO SURRENDER ITS TROOP ADVANTAGE IN CENTRAL EUROPE BY ACCEPTING THE ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH PARITY IN MILITARY PERSONNEL, THEN USA PROPOSAL CANNOT/NOT RESULT IN BREAKING OF LOG JAM. BUT, ON SAME PREMISE, NEITHER COULD PROPOSAL BASED ON FRG IDEAS OR INDEED ANY OTHER PROPOSAL DESIGNED TO ENSURE OUTCOME OF PARITY, WHICH IS CRUCIAL WESTERN OBJECTIVE IN MBFR.

3. THUS, IN OUR VIEW, KEY CRITERION OF VIABILITY OF ANY PROPOSAL IS WHETHER IT PROVIDES POLITICALLY, MILITARILY AND TECHNICALLY SOUND WAY OF TRYING TO RESOLVE CERTAIN EXISTING ISSUES PROVIDED OTHER SIDE DESIRES TO DO SO. PROPOSAL MAY FULLY MEET THIS CRITERION BUT STILL FAIL OR PROVE UNACCEPTABLE TO OTHER SIDE FOR ANY NUMBER OF REASONS. WE SUSPECT THAT USA PROPOSAL FALLS INTO THIS CATEGORY. IT WILL NOT/NOT BE RECEIVED WITH ENTHUSIASM BY OTHER SIDE AS IT CONFRONTS DATA ISSUE HEAD-ON RATHER THAN CIRCUMVENTING IT. WHETHER ITS NEGOTIABILITY WOULD IMPROVE OVER TIME IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT AS IT WOULD DEPEND ON SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND CALCULATIONS.

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(B) ADVANTAGES OF USA PROPOSAL

4. USA PROPOSAL IS INNOVATIVE APPROACH. IT IS HELPFUL TO NARROW DATA FOCUS TO COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS AND BE RELATIVELY RELAXED ABOUT EVENTUAL DATA EXCHANGE ON REAR SUPPORT. SIMILARLY, IT IS LOGICAL TO SETTLE FOR RESOLVING DATA IN COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT WITHIN BANDS THAT CORRESPOND TO CONFIDENCE LEVELS/MARGINS OF ERROR IN OUR OWN ESTIMATES OF EASTERN FOCES IN EACH CATEGORY.

5. USA PROPOSAL DOES SEEM TO CONTAIN NECESSARY INGREDIENTS FOR A SOLUTION OF DATA DISPUTE PROVIDED EAST IS WILLING TO ACCEPT ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. IN PARTICULAR IT ENABLES EAST, IF IT IS WILLING TO TABLE DATA ON NEW BASIS, TO DO SO IN MANNER THAT AVOIDS CONFLICT WITH ITS PREVIOUS OFFICIAL DATA OR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT IT WAS INCOMPLETE.

6. SINCE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT/NOT BE CONCLUDED AND NO/NO WESTERN REDUCTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN BEFORE BASIC DATA ISSUE WAS RESOLVED FOR COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT CATEGORIES, PROPOSAL AVOIDS BASIC DIFFICULTY INHERENT IN FRG APPROACH, NAMELY, THAT IT MIGHT MERELY POSTPONE DATA DISPUTE UNTIL AFTER AGREEMENT HAD ENTERED INTO FORCE AND SOME WESTERN REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN. USA PROPOSAL ALSO HAS MERIT OF PROVIDING FOR STRENGTHENED VERIFICATION MEASURES OPERATING FROM OUTSET OF AGREEMENT, CLEARLY SPECIFIED AND HENCE VERIFIABLE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS, STAGED REDUCTIONS AND INTERIM CEILINGS. PRESENTATIONALLY,

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HOWEVER, IT IS ADVANCE OVER OUR JULY 82 PROPOSAL IN THAT IT WOULD REDUCE REDUCTION TO PARITY PROCESS FROM SEVEN TO FIVE YEARS.

7. IF (AS SEEMS QUITE POSSIBLE) EAST SHOULD SOONER OR LATER REJECT PROPOSAL AND MAINTAIN ITS REFUSAL EVEN TO DISCUSS SIZE OF ITS FORCES IN REDUCTIONS AREA, WEST WILL AT LEAST HAVE MADE GAINS IN PROBING EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PROGRESS AND IN EXPOSING EASTERN UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT PARITY AS REAL STUMBLING BLOCK IN NEGS. FOR THIS REASON EAST WILL HAVE AT LEAST TO THINK CAREFULLY BEFORE REJECTING PROPOSAL.

8. ONE OF MOST POSITIVE FEATURES OF USA PROPOSAL IN ITS PRESENT REASONABLY WELL ARTICULATED FORM IS THAT IT ENJOYS FAIR PROSPECT OF WINNING EARLY ENDORSEMENT IN BRU IN SO FAR AS IT STEERS BETWEEN TWO POLES IN SPC OF FRG ON ONE HAND AND UK ON OTHER. WHILE WE FIND ASPECTS OF EARLIER FRG APPROACH, WHICH HAS YET TO BE PRESENTED TO ALLIES IN DETAIL, ATTRACTIVE, BASIC QUESTION IS WHETHER FRG HAS ANY PROSPECT WHATEVER OF OBTAINING AGREEMENT ON ANYTHING LIKE ITS APPROACH OVER STRONG UK/BELGIAN OBJECTIONS, GIVEN FACT THAT IT HAS BEEN REJECTED BY USA ADMIN. (ORIGINAL HOPE WAS THAT IF FRG COULD GET USA SUPPORT, THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO BRING UK/BELGIUM ROUND.) MOREOVER, AS USA AND FRG APPROACHES ARE INCOMPATIBLE IN WAY THEY WOULD DEAL WITH DATA DISPUTE, WE DO NOT/NOT SEE HOW THEY COULD BE COMBINED. THUS, USA PROPOSAL, WITH OR WITHOUT SOME PRESENTATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS DISCUSSED BELOW, SEEMS TO PROVIDE ONLY PROSPECT

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FOR WEST TO REGAIN TACTICAL INITIATIVE BY 19APR AND TO SMOTHER EASTERN ACCUSATIONS OF WESTERN PROCRASTINATION AND FAILURE TO OFFER ANY COUNTER-PROPOSAL IN LAST YEAR.

(C)WEAKNESSES OF USA PROPOSAL

9. IN ORDER TO ENTERTAIN USA PROPOSAL ON DATA AND VERIFICATION SERIOUSLY EAST WOULD HAVE TO REVERSE ITS FIELD AND IN PARTICULAR BACK DOWN FROM ITS PRESENT VEHEMENT CATEGORICAL REFUSAL TO DISCUSS DATA. UNLESS USSR ITSELF FEELS SOME STRONG INCENTIVE TO REACH EARLY AGREEMENT BASED ON PARITY, WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN APPARENT, IT HARDLY SEEMS LIKELY THAT EAST WOULD ACCEPT THIS APPROACH EVEN BEFORE OUTCOME OF USA PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS KNOWN AND BEFORE IT IS IN A POSITION TO EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT WESTERN POSITION MAY BECOME SOFTER IN TIME.

10. BECAUSE IT BEARS NO/NO RESEMBLANCE TO EASTERN 1983 PROPOSALS AND CANNOT/NOT BE PRESENTED AS COMPROMISE BETWEEN THEM AND WESTS JULY 82 PROPOSAL, USA PROPOSAL IS ON THAT ACCOUNT A LITTLE EASIER FOR EAST TO REJECT, ALBEIT AT CONSIDERABLE COST TO ITS CREDIBILITY ON DATA ISSUE.

11. MOST IMPORTANT PRESENTATIONAL WEAKNESS OF USA PROPOSAL IN OUR VIEW IS ITS FAILURE, WHILE FULLY PROTECTING WESTERN POSITION ON DATA AND STRENGTHENING VERIFICATION (INCLUDING INCREASE IN QUOTA OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS), TO MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSION WHATEVER TO EASTS POSITION ON ISSUES OUTSIDE CENTRAL DATA AND VERIFICATION DISPUTE, FOR EXAMPLE ON AIR FORCE SUB-CEILING, 50 PERCENT RULE, OUT-OF-AREA APPLICATION

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OF OUR AM ONE AND AM TWO OR SIZE OF INITIAL US/SOVIET REDUCTIONS. WHILE WESTERN CONCESSIONS IN A FEW OF THESE LOW-COST/NO-COST AREAS WOULD DOUBTLESS BE OBJECTIONABLE TO SOME ALLIES AND WOULD PROBABLY NOT/NOT MAKE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION BY EAST, THEY WOULD HELP TO ENHANCE EVIDENCE OF WESTERN FLEXIBILITY AND MAKE IT HARDER FOR EAST TO REJECT PROPOSAL OUT OF HAND SINCE IT WOULD AT LEAST WANT TO QUOTE POCKET UNQUOTE THESE CONCESSIONS. SIMILARLY, INCLUSION OF SOME QUOTE CARROTS UNQUOTE OF THIS KIND WOULD MAKE IT MUCH HARDER FOR EAST SIMPLY TO BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS ON RECEIPT OF WESTERN PROPOSAL.

12. ON OTHER HAND, IF INCLUSION OF SUCH CARROTS SHOULD PROVE SUFFICIENTLY CONTROVERSIAL IN NATO TO RUN RISK OF PREVENTING WEST FROM MEETING TARGET DATE OF APPROVAL BY 16 APR (SO PROPOSALS CAN BE PRESENTED AT INFORMAL 17 APR AND THUS IN PLENARY 19 APR), THEN IT WOULD BE BETTER IN OUR VIEW TO PRESENT USA PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS THAN TO ALLOW DATE OF 19 APR TO PASS WITH NO/NO WESTERN COUNTERPROPOSAL ON THE TABLES.

(D) TACTICAL SITUATION

13. WHILE WEST HAS NOT/NOT ACCEPTED EAST'S PROPOSAL THAT 32ND ROUND SHOULD END ON 19 APR, AND AHG DOES NOT/NOT PROPOSE TO DO SO IF EAST DOES NOT/NOT AGREE TO START UP DATE FOR NEXT ROUND, IT SEEMS INHERENT IN DELICATE TACTICAL SITUATION THAT IF THERE SHOULD BE NO/NO WESTERN COUNTERPROPOSAL BY 19 APR,

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THERE COULD BE ANOTHER UNILATERAL SUSPENSION OF NEGS BY EAST.
THIS TIME, HOWEVER, SINCE END-OF-ROUND ADJOURNMENT WOULD NOT/NOT
HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY AGREED BY THE SIDES, SUSPENSION WOULD AMOUNT
TO AN EASTERN WALK OUT.

CCC/126 220915Z XTDR0058

MF

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BONN ZQGR1117 20MAR84

TO EXTOTT RCR

INFO BRU BNATO LDN PARIS WSHDC MOSCO

DISTR MINA USS DMF RGB IDA IDR IDDZ

---CLARK VISIT-CALL ON JENNINGER

SUMMARY:STATE MINISTER IN CHANCELLORS OFFICE TOLD JOE CLARK
FRG HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT STRONG INDICATION CHERNENKO HAD
GIVEN KOHL OF WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE E-W RELATIONS WITH
PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON ARMS CONTROL.HE PLACED QUESTION
OF INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS SQUARELY IN CONTEXT OF

REUNIFICATION OF EUROPE.JENNINGER ALSO SAID HE WOULD NOT/NOT
DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY OF EUROPE MOVING AT TWO SPEEDS TOWARDS
POLITICAL INTEGRATION.

2.REPORT:DURING HIS VISIT 10-13MAR JOE CLARK MET WITH PHILLIP
JENNINGER,MIN OF STATE IN CHANCELLOR KOHLS OFFICE.

JENNINGER(WHO IS MP)HAS PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
E-W AND INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS.HE OPENED DISCUSSION BY REFERRING
TO KOHLS MTG IN MOSCO WITH CHERNENKO AT TIME OF ANDORPOV
FUNERAL.JENNINGER SAID GERMANS HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT
STRONG INDICATEION CHERNENKO HAD GIVEN OF READINESS TO
IMPROVE E-W RELATIONS.GEN SEC HAD PARTICULARLY STRESSED
ARMS CONTROL.

JENNINGER SAID USSR HAD SUFFERED DIPLOMATIC DFFEAT ON INF AND
NEEDED SOME TIME TO GET OVER IT.WEST WAS NOW WELL PLACED AND

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PAGE TWO ZQGR1117 RESTR

NEEDED TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE ATTITUDE RE ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT, WHICH WERE CENTRAL ISSUE. COMMENT. JENNINGER REFL-
ECTED MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE ON PART OF GENSEC THAN TELTSCHIK
(KOHSL SENIOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR AT OFFICIAL LEVEL) HAD
DONE PREVIOUSLY TO US. AT SAME TIME WE WOULD ALSO NOTE IN THIS
CONTEXT THAT GERMAN JUDGEMENT THAT USSR MIGHT RETURN SOON TO
GENEV HAS IN RECENT WEEKS BEEN MODIFIED. SURGE BY HART IN USA
PRIMARIES AMONG OTHER FACTORS HAS, IN VIEW OF GERMANS THAT WE
(AND GEORGE GRANDE) HAVE SPOKEN TO, LEAD SOVIETS TO HARDEN THEIR
POSITION ON E-W QUESTIONS. GERMANS REALIZE USA-USSR SUMMIT IS
NOT/NOT POSSIBLE THIS YEAR AND ARE NOW PUSHING ANOTHER SHULTZ-
GROMYKO MTG. //

3. JENNINGER DEVOTED SOME TIME TO QUESTION OF GERMAN YOUTH AND
INNER GERMAN RELNS. USSR CALCULATION THAT YOUNG GENERATION
BROUGHT UP IN COMMUNIST ENVIRONMENT WOULD BE MORE TRACTABLE
HAS PROVEN FALSE. YOUTH ON BOTH SIDES DID NOT/NOT ACCEPT
DIVISION OF GERMANY AND BONN THUS HAS SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY.
NETWORK OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO GERMANYS WAS NECESSARY TO
MAKE DIVISION MORE TOLERABLE. YOUNG PEOPLE WERE QUOTE
FED UP WITH YALTA UNQUOTE. AT SAME TIME RE WESTERN EUROPE,
JENNINGER SAID MITTERAND WAS PASSIONATE EUROPEAN AND
JENNINGER WOULD NOT/NOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY OF THOSE IN
WESTERN EUROPE MOVING TOGETHER WHO WANTED TO MOVE. GERMANS WERE
DISAPPOINTED THAT EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION WAS NOT/NOT
DEVELOPING. EUROPE OF TWO SPEEDS WAS A POSSIBILITY.

PAGE THREE ZQGR1117 RESTR

4.ON FRANCE-FRG DISCUSSIONS ON DEFENCE,JENNINGER SAID PURPOSE
WAS TO MAKE STRONGER EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO NATO AND
PROMOTE POLITICAL PROGRESS IN EUROPE.ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP
WAS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE AND KOHL HAD STRESSED THIS
IN HIS FIRST ADDRESS TO BUNDESTAG AS CHANCELLOR.

CCC/242 201535Z ZQGR1117

S E C R E T

FM LDN XNGR0669 20MAR84

TO EXTOTT/IDR DELIVER BY 201600

INFO BNATO WSHDC VMBFR BONN NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/DSTRATA STKHM/SC DEL
DISTR IFB IDDZ IDD IDA IDRA RCR

REF YOURTEL IDR1026 19MAR;OURTEL XNGR0538 07MAR

---MBFR:USA DRAFT GUIDANCE:CONTINUING BRITISH CAUTION

SUMMARY:CONSCIOUS THAT MBFR HAS PART TO PLAY IN PM THATCHERS
SHIFT TOWARDS BROAD,FRAGMATIC EAST/WEST DIALOGUE,AND THUS AGREEFING
WITH OTHER ALLIANCE PARTNERS THAT TIME HAS COME TO OFFER SOVIETS
SOME MEANS OF GETTING THEMSELVES OFF DATA QUOTE HOOK UNQUOTE,
BRITISH OFFICIALS NONETHELESS CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT ANY SHIFT
IN ALLIANCE POSITION,INCLUDING USA PROPOSAL,MUST BE EVALUATED
AGAINST STANDARD OF WESTERN SECURITY AND DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS.
THEIR INITIAL APPRCACH IN INSTRUCTED DISCUSSION WILL THUS BE TO
CHARACTERIZE USA PROPOSALS AS HELPFUL:INSOFAR AS US GUIDANCE
RETAINS FOCUS ON IMPORTANCE OF CONFIRMED FORCE LEVEL INFORMATION
BEFORE REDUCTIONS AND INCLUDES STRONG VERIFICATION PACKAGE,IT
MAY WELL OFFER FRAMEWORK ACCEPTABLE NOT ONLY TO WEST BUT TO
SOVIETS.BUT IN MOVING AWAY FROM INITIAL DEMAND FOR AGREEMENT ON
DATA,ALLIANCE MUST HAVE CLEAR IDEA OF HOW EVENTUAL AGREEMENT ON
SIZES OF FORCES CAN BE ACHIEVED AND VERIFIED,AND PERHAPS MORE
IMPORTANTLY,OF WHAT OPTIONS ARE OPEN TO ALLIANCE IF AT END OF DAY,

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PAGE TWO XNGR0669 SECRET

EASTERN FIGURES STILL DO NOT/NOT TALLY.

2.REPORT:LIKE CDN COUNTERPARTS,FCO DEFENCE DEPT OFFICIALS ARE STILL IN PROCESS OF EXAMINING DETAILS OF US DRAFT GUIDANCE AND DATA EXCHANGE PROPOSALS.AND AS WE REPORTED OURTEL XNGR0538 07MAR, THEIR CONSIDERATIONS,AND ADVICE THEY WILL PUT TO MINISTERS,WILL BE BASED ON CONTINUING CONCERN THAT WEST AVOID TEMPTATION TO MOVE IN MBFR IN WAY WHICH WOULD HAVE LONGER,PERHAPS NOT YET FULLY UNDERSTOOD,IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIANCE DEFENCE STRATEGY.EARLY PROGRESS IN MBFR WOULD BE HELPFUL IN ACHIEVING UK AND ALLIANCE OBJECTIVE OF BROADER,PRAGMATIC EAST/WEST DIALOGUE.TO THIS EXTENT, UK AGREES WITH ITS ALLIANCE PARTNERS WHO ARGUE THAT TIME HAS COME TO HELP SOVIETS OUT OF CORNER INTO WHICH THEY HAVE PAINTED THEMSELVES.US IDEAS DO FOCUS ON NECESSITY OF OBTAINING REASONABLY ACCURATE INFORMATION ON FORCE LEVELS BEFORE REDUCTIONS TAKE PLACE,- AND IN THIS RESPECT,US GUIDANCE MAY OFFER SOME PROSPECT OF EVENTUALLY BEING ACCEPTABLE TO EAST,AND OF ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE ADVERSE IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN SECURITY.BUT UK HAVE NOT BEEN CONVINCED OF SOVIET SINCERITY OR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT REDUCTIONS FROM POSITION OF SUPERIORITY, AND THUS UK APPROACH IN BRUSSELS WILL REMAIN CAUTIOUS.

3.FCO DEFENCE DEPT OFFICIALS AGREE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE THAT SOVIET FIGURES FOR COMBAT TROOPS DO NOW INCLUDE SUPPORT TROOPS,AND,GIVEN

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PAGE THREE XNCR0669 SECRET

OPPORTUNITY TO RE-ALIGN FIGURES ACCORDING TO ADJUSTED DEFINITIONS, SOVIETS MAY SEE BASIS FOR BARGAINING. THEY ALSO AGREE THERE IS ALWAYS POSSIBILITY THAT INITIAL DIALOGUE ON DEFINITIONS COULD LEAD TO FIGURES THAT WOULD TALLY. IF THIS IS TO HAPPEN, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON OVERALL ATMOSPHERE IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS, -AND MORE RECENT STATEMENTS FROM MOSCO (AS WELL AS CLOSING STATEMENT IN CDE) OFFER LITTLE INDICATION THAT SOVIETS ARE FEELING SUFFICIENTLY BENIGN TO WANT PRACTICAL ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVEMENTS IN MBFR. NONETHELESS, IN SEQUEL TO US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IF NOT BEFORE, US PROPOSALS MAY PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO ALLOW SOVIETS TO RETHINK THEIR FIGURES. IN MEANTIME, HOWEVER, BRITISH QUESTION WHY SOVIETS WOULD SUDDENLY WANT TO REMOVE FORCES NOW IN PLACE; THEY SEE AS EQUALLY UNLIKELY PROSPECT THAT SOVIETS CAN COME UP WITH FIGURES, EVEN WITH NEW DEFINITIONS, WHICH WOULD TALLY WITH WESTERN ASSESSMENTS. THERE IS IN FACT STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIETS WILL SIMPLY TABLE FIGURES WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO BE OUT 200,000 OR SO FROM THOSE WHICH WEST BELIEVES TO BE ACCURATE. THUS WEST MUST BE PREPARED TO DEMAND VERIFICATION PACKAGE WHICH WOULD NOT/NOT ONLY CONFIRM SOVIET ACCURACY, BUT WHICH COULD PROVE DISCREPANCIES. THIS LATTER PROSPECT IS SEEN HERE AS NOT ONLY AWKWARD IN ITSELF, BUT AS REQUIRING WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF RECIPROCAL ACTION. QUOTE IF ALLIANCE ONCE BEGINS TO LOCK ITSELF INTO AGREEMENT AND THEN FINDS THAT EAST IS NOT/NOT

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COMPLYING, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO BRING BACK (USA) TROOPS WHICH HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN, AND WOULD BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO CONVINCING PUBLIC OPINION OF NEED FOR WEST TO STOP OR REVERSE MBFR PROCESS MUCH LESS TO BREAK AGREEMENT.

4. OFFICIALS THUS EXPECT UK DEL WILL COME TO INSTRUCTED DISCUSSION PREPARED TO WELCOME US PROPOSALS AS POSSIBLY HELPFUL - BUT TO STRESS CONTINUING NEED FOR CONFIRMED FORCE LEVELS INFORMATION BEFORE REDUCTIONS, AND TO INSIST ON MUCH STRENGTHENED VERIFICATION PACKAGE. MAIN PITCH WILL CONTINUE (NOT SURPRISINGLY) TO BE ONE OF CAUTION, AND WILL BE AIMED AT FURTHER STUDY IN NATO BEFORE IDEAS ARE PUT IN VIENNA.

5. PARAGRAPHS ONE TO FOUR CONTAIN INFORMATION AND OPINIONS PROVIDED BY FCO, AND MUST BE TREATED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.

CCC/065 201712Z XNGR0669

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGE0367 20MAR84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO ENATO CANMILREP NATO BRU WSHDC LDN BONN ROME VMPFR GENEV
PARIS HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS SCDEL/STKHM TAVIV JEDDA PCOOTT/
FOWLER/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DACPOL/DNACPOL/CPD/DSTRAT/CIS
DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD RCD RSD
CPD ZSI ZSP URR URT URE LCD LSD IDDZ GMR GMD GMT

---VISIT OF SPD LEADER VOGEL TO USSR

SUMMARY: ON MAR12-13 VISIT TO MOSCOW, SPD LEADER MET NUMEROUS
SENIOR CPSU LEADERS, INCL GENL-SECTY CHERNENKO. ON MAJOR EAST-
WEST ISSUES, SOV SPOKESMEN SET OUT CONSISTENTLY HARD-LINE
POSITIONS. SOVS WERE NEGATIVE ON IDEA OF MERGING START/INF NEGS.
WHILE REGISTERING SPD DIFFERENCES WITH FRG GOVT ON CERTAIN
EAST-WEST/DISARMAMENT ISSUES, VOGEL DEFENDED OVERALL STANCE OF
NATO AND FRG ROLE THEREIN. HE DEFLECTED SOV URGINGS THAT SPD
SHLD LEAD ALLIANCE OF ALL ANTI-INF FORCES IN FRG AGAINST FURTHER
DEPLOYMENTS. ON FRG-USSR BILATL RELATIONS, SOV SIDE WAS AMBIVALENT
ABOUT CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR THEIR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. TO OUR
AMB VOGEL PROFESSED SATISFACTION WITH HIS RECEPTION AND VOICED
SUPPORT FOR PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE.

2. REPORT: ON MAR12-13 SPD LEADER HANS JOCHEN VOGEL VISITED MOSCO
FOR SECOND TIME IN LITTLE OVER A YEAR; HE LAST VISITED IN JAN83
DURING FRG ELECTION CAMPAIGN, WHEN HE SAW ANDROPOV. THIS TIME
VOGEL SAW A RANGE OF CPSU LEADERS, INCL CHERNENKO. ALTHOUGH VISIT

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PAGE TWO XYGR0367 CONF

WAS NOMINALLY ON INTER-PARLIAMENTARY ONE, SOV PROGRAM ARRANGEMENTS WERE OF TYPE USUALLY RESERVED FOR INTER-PARTY VISITS. ALTERNATE POLITBURO MEMBER AND CHIEF OF INTL DEPT OF CENTRAL CTTEE (CC), BORIS PONOMAYOV LED HOST SIDE THROUGHOUT, WITH GALAXY OF CC MEMBERS IN SUPPORTING ROLES (AM ALEXANDROV, ASSISTANT TO CHERNENKO; VV ZAGLADIN, FIRST DEPUTY HEAD, INTL DEPT; GA ARBATOV, DIRECTOR OF USA-CDA INSTITUTE; MARSHAL SF AKHROMEYEV, FIRST DEPT CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF; GA ZHUKOV, CHAIRMAN OF SOV PEACE CTTEE; AND AN YAKOLEV, DIRECTOR OF INST OF WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTL RELATIONS). THERE WERE ALMOST 4/4 HOURS OF INTER-DEL DISCUSSIONS. CHERNENKO JOINED ONE SESSION FOR 50/50 MINUTES AND ALSO HAD 20/20 MINUTE TETE-A-TETE WITH VOGEL. INTERESTINGLY, AT NO/NO POINT WAS FM GROMYKO NOR/NOR ANY MFA OFFICIAL INVOLVED IN MTGS.

3. ON MAJOR EAST-WEST AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, SOV SIDE EXPRESSED GENERALLY HARDENED POSITIONS AS COMPARED TO EARLIER. IN PARTICULAR, IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT INF TALKS CLD NOT/NOT RESUME UNTIL QUOTE OBSTACLES UNQUOTE HAD BEEN REMOVED, IE UNTIL NATO INF DEPLOYMENTS WERE HALTED AND REVERSED. SAME PRECONDITION WAS NOT/NOT EXPLICITLY PUT FORWARD RE START NEGS, PERHAPS BECAUSE VOGEL FOCUSED ON INF SITUATION. SOV SIDE WAS FIRMLY NEGATIVE ON POSSIBILITY OF MERGIN SALT AND INF NEGS, SAYING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ISSUES WERE FOR SUPERPOWERS TO DISCUSS AND MERGER WLD GREATLY COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS. PONOMARYOV URGED THAT SPD SEEK ALLIANCE OF ALL ANTI-INF FORCES IN FRG TO WAGE CAMPAIGN AGAINST INF

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PAGE THREE XYGR0367 CONF

DEPLOYMENTS. VOGEL FLATLY REFUSED. HE MADE FIRM DEFENCE OF GENERAL NATO STANCE AND FRG ROLE THEREIN. HE EMPHASIZED THAT SPD FAVOURED ELIMINATION OF DEPLOYMENTS ON BOTH SIDES AND THEREFORE REGRETTED ACCELEPATED MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN GDR AND CZECH. 4. SOV SIDE ASSERTED INTEREST IN RESTORATION OF DETENTE AND LISTED A SPECTRUM OF QUOTE CONCRETE STEPS UNQUOTE, AS SET OUT IN CHERNENKOS ELECTORAL SPEECH, WHICH USA SHLD TAKE TO PROVIDE FOUNDATION FOR CONSTRUCTIVE E-W DIALOGUE. RE POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON CW CONVENTION, IN RESPONSE TO VOGELS EXPLANATION THAT SPD LOOKED WITH FAVOUR ON POSSIBLE TREATY APPLYING TO EUROPEAN REGION PROVIDED THERE WERE ADEQUATE PROVISION FOR NON-IMPORT OF CW WEAPONS, AKHROMEYEV INDICATED THAT SOV ON-SITE INSPECTION OFFER MADE IN GENEV WLD APPLY FOR ANY EUROPEAN AGREEMENT. VOGEL, RECALLING SCHMIDT PROPOSAL AT UNSSOD-I, WELCOMED IN PRINCIPLE IDEA OF AGREEMENT ON MILITARY BUDGET REDUCTIONS. SOVS APPARENTLY ACCEPTED PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT CTTEE OF TWO PARTIES (SPD-CPSU) TO STUDY MATTER. RE QUOTE CORRIDOR PROPOSAL UNQUOTE AS PUT FORWARD BY PALME COMMISSION, VOGEL INDICATED SPD SUPPORT FOR CONCEPT AND THAT IT SHLD INCLUDE PROHIBITIONS ON TANK UNITS. AKHROMEYEV TERMED THIS LATTER IDEA AS QUOTE SENSELESS UNQUOTE.

5. ON BILATL MATTERS, VOGEL INVOKED QUOTE TREATIES POLICIES UNQUOTE OF BRANDT/BREZHNEV YEARS AND URGED DEVELOPMENT OF STRONGER BILATL TIES. SOVIET SIDE MADE POSITIVE NOISES ABOUT EXPANDED ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS BUT THERE WAS SOME RUMBLING IN CORRIDORS ABOUT CONSTRAINING EFFECTS OF CONTINUING MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS.

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PAGE FOUR XYGR0367 CONF

SPD SIDE RAISED FAMILY REUNIFICATION ISSUES AND PRESENTED LIST OF
HARDSHIP CASES. IN SIDE MTG WITH SCIENCE ACADEMY PRESIDENT ALEXANDROV,
RICHARD VON WEIZSACKER RAISED CASE OF SAKHAROV, CITING LETTER WHICH
HAD BEEN SENT TO ANDROPOV BY THREE PROMINENT FRG SCIENTISTS ASKING
THAT SAKHAROV AND WIFE BE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL TO FRG. ALEXANDROV
REPLIED THAT REQUEST WAS QUOTE COMPLETELY ILLUSORY UNQUOTE
SINCE SAKHAROV KNEW TOO MUCH EVER TO BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE USSR.

6. SOV PUBLIC HANDLING OF VISIT WAS GENERALLY RESTRAINED. TASS
COVERAGE OF CHERNENKO MTG WITH VOGEL HAD TWO MAIN POINTS OF
INTEREST. FIRST, THERE WAS EMPHASIS ON COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOV POLICY AND ON CONTINUITY OF THAT POLICY.
SECOND, OCCASION WAS TAKEN TO RESTATE, IN CHERNENKOS NAME,
PRECONDITIONS FOR RESUMED NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS. KEY PASSAGE
READ AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE THE SOVIET UNION IS STILL READY TO
RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF BOTH STRATEGIC AND HALF-QUOTE EUROPEAN
END HALF-QUOTE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS ON A CONSTRUCTIVE, MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE BASIS. THE TALKS CAN BE RESUMED AT ANY MOMENT-LET
ONLY THE USA REMOVE THE OBSTACLES WHICH IT CREATED BY FIELDING
ITS NEW MISSILES IN EUROPE. THEN THERE WILL BE NO/NO NEED FOR
RESPONSE MEASURES. UNQUOTE.

7. AT MTG ON SOCIAL OCCASION, VOGEL EXPRESSED TO AMB GENERAL
SATISFACTION WITH VISIT AND ITS PUBLIC HANDLING BY SOVS. HE
PRAISED PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE, SAYING HE SUPPORTED IT AND IT
UGHT TO BECOME MORE WIDELY KNOWN.

CCC/095 200910Z XYGR0367

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PAIRS ZYGR0311 20MAR84

TC EXTCTT LIDDZ

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME BNATO GENEV PRMNY DELHI TOKYO PEKIN MOSCO
EONN MERID BRSLA STAGO MXICO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DDI/PPP/DIPOL/
LSPP

DISTR MINA MINE USS DMF IFB IDA IDR SCS LSR LSRC CPD

---ARGENTINE SUPPORT FOR PM TRUDEAUS PEACE MISSION

SET OUT BELOW IS UNOFFICIAL TEXT OF 20MAR ARTICLE IN LEADING ARGEN
DAILY QUOTE LA NACION UNQUOTE REPORTING ON ADM CHARLANDS CALL ON
PRES ALFONSIN 19MAR.

2.TEXT BEGINS THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATION EXPRESSED YESTERDAY HIS
SOLIDARITY WITH AND SUPPORT OF THE PEACE MISSION UNDERTAKEN BY THE
PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA, PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU, IN THE HOPE OF
PROMOTING DETENTE IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THIS INFO WAS GIVEN BY
THE SECY OF EXT RELATIONS, DR ELSA KELLY, AT THE END OF THE AUDIENCE
GRANTED BY PRES ALFONSIN TO THE CDN ASST DEPUTY MIN FOR EXTAFF IN
CHARGE OF LATAM AFFAIRS. ALSO ATTENDING THE MEETING WITH THE
PRESIDENT WAS THE CDN AMB LORNE CLARK. DR KELLY ADVISED THAT, DURING
THE MTG, THE QUESTIONS OF BIL
TERAL RELATIONS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
COOP IN FIELDS SUCH AS TRANSPORTATION, MINES AND COMMUNICATIONS, WERE
RAISED. FOR HIS PART, MR CHARLANE INDICATED HE HAD MENTIONED HYDRO-
ELECTRICAL PROJECTS BUT DENIED, IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, THAT THE
NUCLEAR THEME WAS DISCUSSED. HE ADDED THAT TRUDEAU, AIMING AT A

...2

PAGE TWO ZYGR0311 UNCLAS

LETENTE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, HAD MET WITH SOME
WORLD LEADERS SUCH AS CHERNENKO, INDIRA GANDHI, RONALD REAGAN, PRIME
MINISTER OF JAPAN AND OTHERS. TEXT ENDS.

UUU/028 201956Z ZYGR0311

Canada

IDR/Brian Herman/2-5457/jas

TO/A Addressees Below

FROM/DE IDR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Visit of Ambassador J.H. Taylor to Ottawa:
SUJET General Consultations, March 21st

MR. DUDOIT
MIGHT I ATTEND?
JAM 19/3/84

Security/Sécurité RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date March 19, 1984
Number/Numéro IDR-1004

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

File
Diary
Circ
W/F

Ambassador Taylor will be in Ottawa this week for the visit of NATO Secretary-General Designate Lord Carrington.

2. We are taking advantage of his presence for consultations on a range of Alliance and East/West issues. Along with his individuals calls, we have arranged a roundtable session for members of both External Affairs and National Defence. The meeting is scheduled for 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, March 21st, in the Tenth Floor conference room, Tower "A".

3. Please feel free to attend.



J.R. Francis
Director
Defence Relations Division

MINA/Mr. Dudoit
IFB/Mr. Shenstone
RGB/Mr. Molgat
UGB/Mr. Burney

RBD	CPD
IDDZ	IDR/All Officers
RSD	IDA/All Officers
RCD	DMF/Mr. Friedlaender
RSR	NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/ /DIPOL/DNACPOL
RCR	
URR	
EER	PCOOTT/Mr. Fowler/Brig.General Archdeacon
CGE	
TDO	

MF

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

RETURN TO RENOYER AU	DICO	FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORTE AU DOSSIER
ACC	REF	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER	
28-6-1-Trudeau		
Peace Mission		

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN ZQGR1116 19MAR84

TO EXTOTT LDDZ

INFO WSHDC LDN MOSCO ROME PARIS BNATO VMBFR HAGUE BRU OSLO

ATHNS MDRID LSBON PRMNY VIENN GENEV STKHM/SCDEL PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DACPOL

DISTR MINA USS DMF DMT IFB IDA ZSI RBR RBD RGB RCR CPD EER EPT

---PM INITIATIVE-INNER GERMAN RELSN

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF OFFICE TRANSLATION OF THREE PARAS IN 19MAR

ISSUE OF DER SPIEGEL LEAD ARTICLE.COMMENTS IN SEPARATE TEL.

QUOTE EAST BERLIN DOES NOT/NOT SEEM AT THE MOMENT TO BE KEEN

ON ANOTHER BILLION MARK LOAN.NEITHER HONECKER NOR

POLITBUREAU MEMBER GUNTER MITTAG NOR FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER

HORST SOLLE APPROACHED LAMBSDORFF IN LEIPZIG ON THE SUBJECT.

AS CHANCELLOR OFFICE MINISTER JENNINGER COMMENTED,ALMOST

WITH DISAPPOINTMENT:QUOTE WE HAVE NO/NO INDICATIONS THAT THE

OTHER SIDE HAS ANY INTEREST IN THIS.UNQUOTE.

IT IS ONCE AGAIN FRANZ-JOSEF STRAUSS WHO IS THE FIRST TO

HAVE AN EXPLANATION FOR THIS UP HIS SLEEVE.CANADIAN

BANKS,HE SAYS,HAVE OFFERED THE GDR A BILLION MARK LOAN.

CANADAS PREMIER TRUDEAU PUT FORWARD THE OFFER DURING HIS VISIT

TO EAST BERLIN A FEW WEEKS AGO.THIS HE HAD FROM A QUOTE SEMI-

OFFICIAL SOURCE UNQUOTE,WAS THE WORD SPREAD BY STRAUSS IN

THE FEDERAL CAPITAL.

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PAGE TWO ZQGR1116 UNCLAS

NOW THOSE IN BON ARE PUZZLING AS TO WHETHER IT WAS PERHAPS
STRAUSS FRIEND, EAST BERLIN STATE SECTY ALEXANDER SCHALCK-
GODLODKOWSKI, WHO PUSHED THE NEWS ACROSS TO THE BAVARIAN
MINISTER-PRESIDENT WITH THE AIM OF GETTING THE CSU CHIEF AND
THE FEDERAL GOVT ON THEIR TOES AGAIN. THE FEDERAL GOVT IS
ALREADY CONSIDERING TOO WHETHER IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE BETTER
IF IT INJECTED ANOTHER BILLION ITSELF IN ORDER TO GET FURTHER
HUMANITARIAN EASEMENTS. UNQUOTE.

UUU/242 200830Z ZQGR1116

S E C R E T

FM BNATO YBGR6287 19MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 191000

VMBFR DELIVER BY 191600

INFO NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/DSTRATA WSHDC LDN BONN

BAG STKHM/SCDEL DE OTT

DISTR IDDZ IDD IDRA IDRL

REF OURTEL YBGR6286 19MAR

---MBFR:USA DRAFT GUIDANCE TO AHG

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF USA DRAFT GUIDANCE TO AHG.

2.QUOTE:DRAFT NAC GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP

IN ITS ORAL REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF 25NOV83,AND IN ITS WRITTEN REPORT TO MINISTERS OF 21NOV83,THE AD HOC GROUP RECOMMENDED THAT A TIMELY EVALUATION OF THE ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING POSITION IN MBFR WAS NEEDED IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET MOVES IN VIENNA.IN THE MINISTERIAL SESSION OF THE NAC IN DECEMBER IT WAS AGREED THAT A REVIEW WAS APPROPRIATE.

ON THE BASIS OF AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION AND THE ALLIANCE POSITION,THE COUNCIL HAS DECIDED THAT,IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD LONG-STANDING WESTERN MBFR OBJECTIVES,THE AD HOC GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO PRESENT THE FOLLOWING INITIATIVE TO EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES,AND TO NEGOTIATE TOWARD REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON THE BASIS OF THIS INITIATIVE.

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PAGE TWO YBGR6287 SECRET

(1) IN EXCHANGE FOR NEW AND SIGNIFICANT FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE EAST IN MEETING WESTERN VERIFICATION CONCERNS, THE WEST WOULD BE PREPARED TO RELINQUISH ITS LONG-STANDING REQUIREMENT FOR A PRIOR FORMAL AGREEMENT ON DATA, BY REQUIRING ONLY THAT THERE BE AN EXCHANGE OF DATA, IN A FORMAT TO BE AGREED, SUFFICIENT TO FALL WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE RANGE OF WESTERN DATA ESTIMATES, AND BY REQUIRING SUCH DATA ONLY ON GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE.

(2) THE FORMAT AND MODALITIES OF THE DATA EXCHANGE WHICH WOULD SUBSTITUTE FOR PRIOR FORMAL DATA AGREEMENT AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 1 ABOVE WOULD BE AS SET FORTH IN ATTACHMENT (A). WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD INDICATE THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FORMAT AND MODALITIES FOR THE DATA EXCHANGE, AND THE DEFINITIONS AND COUNTING RULES TO BE APPLIED TO COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT. IN RESPONSE TO EASTERN QUESTIONS, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE DATA EXCHANGE CAN ONLY BE MADE ONCE ACTUAL FIGURES HAVE BEEN TABLED BY BOTH SIDES. (3) INITIAL USA AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES REDUCTIONS OF 13,000 AND 30,000 RESPECTIVELY WOULD BE TAKEN IN COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES IN UNIT CONFIGURATIONS WITH UP TO 10 PERCENT AS INDIVIDUALS. THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN RESIDUAL CEILINGS AT THE CONCLUSION OF PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS ON THE LEVELS OF USA AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE

...3

PAGE THREE YBGR6287 SECRET

COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA.

(4) FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES BY THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND REDUCTIONS OF SUCH FORCES BY THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, TO BE TAKEN IN THE SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION PHASES IN UNIT CONFIGURATIONS WITH UP TO 10 PERCENT AS INDIVIDUALS, WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD LEAD TO INTERIM SUB-CEILINGS ON THE LEVELS OF USA AND SOVIET COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA AND IN OVERALL INTERIM SUB-CEILINGS FOR COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES AT LEVELS TO BE DETERMINED. THESE INTERIM SUB-CEILINGS WOULD BE IN EFFECT AT LEAST UNTIL COMPLETION OF ALL WITHDRAWALS TO PARITY AND SATISFACTORY VERIFICATION OF ALL FORCES AT PARITY. (WE WOULD WELCOME ALLIED VIEWS AS TO WHETHER IT WOULD BE IN THE ALLIANCE INTEREST TO RETAIN THE SUB-CEILINGS BEYOND THE COMPLETION OF REDUCTIONS TO PARITY AND THE VERIFICATION OF ALL FORCES TO PARITY. IN OUR JUDGMENT THIS ISSUE REQUIRES DETAILED TECHNICAL ANALYSIS.) IN ADDITION TO THE REDUCTIONS OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD TAKE REDUCTIONS IN OTHER FORCES SUFFICIENT TO ARRIVE AT THE COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILINGS OF 700,000 ON GROUND FORCES AND 900,000 ON COMBINED GROUND AND AIR FORCES. FOR THAT PURPOSE, RELEVANT DATA FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AND AIRFORCE PERSONNEL WOULD BE EXCHANGED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.

(5) TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CEILINGS AND SUB-CEILINGS ON

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COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES, THE PARTIES WOULD BE PROHIBITED FROM TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FOR GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT ROLES THOSE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OR OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE AREA. THESE PROVISIONS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION.

(6) THE CURRENT WESTERN SCHEDULE FOR REDUCTIONS CALLS FOR A SEVEN YEAR SCHEME WITH ALTERNATIVE YEARS DEVOTED TO VERIFICATION. FOCUSING SPECIFIED REDUCTIONS ON GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES MIGHT ALLOW SOME COMPRESSION ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES;

YEAR 1: USA-SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES OF 13,000 AND 30,000 RESPECTIVELY WITH UP TO 10 PERCENT AS INDIVIDUALS;

YEAR 2: REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO AN INTERIM CEILING ON GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES;

YEAR 3: NO/NO REDUCTIONS. VERIFICATION OF INTERIM CEILINGS ON COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES.

YEAR 4/5: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN AGREED CATEGORIES ON COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AND AIR FORCES. COMPLETION OF REDUCTIONS OF ALL FORCES TO PARITY: 900,000 CEILING ON TOTAL FORCES, 700,000 ON TOTAL GROUND FORCES.

(7) TO ENSURE THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE FULLY VERIFIABLE UNDER THESE MODIFIED DATA CONDITIONS, THE PARTIES WILL NEED TO AGREE PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE TO THE ENHANCED PACKAGE OF VERIFICATION MEASURES PRESENTED BY THE WEST. THE ENHANCED PACKAGE WHICH WILL BE

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REQUIRED IS AS SET FORTH IN ATTACHMENT(B).

(8)ALL ASSOCIATED MEASURES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURE 6 FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WOULD COME INTO EFFECT AT TREATY SIGNATURE.

(9)ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE WESTERN DRAFT TREATY OF JULY 1982 REMAIN UNCHANGED.

DRAFT ATTACHEMENT A TO NAC GUIDANCE

THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD PROPOSE TO THE EAST TO DEFINE CATEGORIES OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER TO SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR A FUTURE DATA EXCHANGE.THESE CATEGORIES WOULD ENCOMPASS ALL PERSONNEL WHICH ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERED BY THE ALLIANCE AS SUBJECT TO MBER AND WOULD BE AGREED TO PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE.WESTERN NEGOTIATORS SHOULD PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING FORMAT AS THE BASIS FOR A DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST ON DEFINITIONS AND COUNTING RULES TO BE APPLIED TO CATEGORIES FOR COMBAT,COMBAT SUPPORT,AND SERVICE SUPPORT FORCES.

I.COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT

PERSONNEL IN DIVISIONS

- 1.PERSONNEL IN TANK DIVISIONS
- 2.PERSONNEL IN MOTORIZED RIFLE/MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISIONS
- 3.PERSONNEL IN OTHER DIVISIONS

NON-DIVISIONAL PERSONNEL

- 4.MOTORIZED RIFLE/MECHANIZED INFANTRY/AIRBORNE/AIR MOBILE

...6

PAGE SIX YBGR6287 SECRET

- 5.TANK
- 6.ROCKET/MISSILE/ARTILLERY ANTITANK
- 7.AIR DEFENSE
- 8.COMBAT HELICOPTERS
- 9.INTELLIGENCE/RECONNAISSANCE
- 10.SIGNAL
- 11.RADIO-TECHNICAL/ELECTRONIC WARFARE
- 12.NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL DEFENSE
- 13.ENGINEER
- II.SERVICE SUPPORT
- 14.TRANSPORTATION
- 15.TRAINING
- 16.SUPPLY
- 17.MAINTENANCE
- 18.MEDICAL
- 19.CONSCRIPTION/MOBILIZATION STAFFS
- 20.MAJOR HEADQUARTERS
- 21.ALL PERSONNEL NOT/NOT IN THE ABOVE CATEGORIES

IT SHOULD BE INDICATED TO THE EAST THAT THE WEST PROPOSES, THAT
PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE, DATA SHOULD BE EXCHANGED ONLY ON THOSE
CATEGORIES OF FORCES MUTUALLY AGREED WITH THE EAST AS INCLUDING ALL
COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT PERSONNEL. (NB: FOR INTERNAL ALLIANCE
UNDERSTANDING, SHOULD THE EVENTUAL EXCHANGE OF EASTERN DATA FAIL TO
...7

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FALL WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE RANGE OF WESTERN ESTIMATES, THE ALLIANCE MAY HAVE TO ASK FOR FURTHER DISAGGREGATION OF THE DATA TO RESOLVE THE DISCREPANCY.)

DRAFT ATTACHMENT B, MODIFICATIONS IN THE WESTERN
VERIFICATIONS MEASURES PROPOSALS

WESTERN FLEXIBILITY ON THE REQUIREMENT FOR A PRIOR AGREEMENT ON DATA MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING WESTERN ASSOCIATED MEASURES PROPOSALS:

1. WE WOULD ADD THE FOLLOWING PROVISION: EACH SIDE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO OBSERVE THE REDUCTIONS SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY.

2. MEASURE 4, INSPECTION:

(A) EACH SIDE SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT 18 INSPECTIONS IN ANY CALENDAR YEAR IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY.

(B) WE WOULD ENHANCE THE INSPECTION MEASURE BY PROVIDING THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE 18 ANNUAL INSPECTION PERMITTED TO EACH SIDE THROUGHOUT THE AGREEMENT, EACH SIDE SHALL BE PERMITTED 12 ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS IN THE FIRST YEAR FOLLOWING INITIAL REDUCTIONS BY ALL PARTICIPANTS, AND IN THE FIRST YEAR FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF REDUCTIONS TO THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, TO FACILITATE VERIFICATION OF THE REDUCTIONS ACCOMPLISHED.

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(C) IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE INFORMATION OBTAINABLE WE SHOULD INCREASE THE DURATION OF INSPECTIONS, EG, TO 5 DAYS.

(D) THE REQUESTED SIDE WOULD BE STRICTLY OBLIGATED TO GRANT A REQUEST FOR INSPECTION.

(E) IN CARRYING OUT INSPECTIONS, THE REQUESTING SIDE SHALL BE GIVEN INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE, MANNING, AND ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITS BEING INSPECTED AND BE GRANTED ACCESS TO ALL BUILDINGS WITHIN AREAS BEING INSPECTED, EXCEPT FOR SPECIFIC SITES OR ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD BE CLOSED TO INSPECTION BY PRIOR MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES.

3. MEASURE 5-DECLARED EXIT-ENTRY POINTS WITH OBSERVERS:

(A) UNDER THIS MEASURE, EACH SIDE WOULD DESIGNATE PERMANENT DECLARED ENTRY-EXIT POINTS THROUGH WHICH ALL GROUND AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL OF NON-INDIGENOUS PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES WOULD ENTER AND LEAVE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE OTHER SIDE WOULD BE ABLE TO STATION PERMANENTLY AT EACH SUCH SITE 7-10 OBSERVERS AND 3-5 TECHNICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL ACCOMPANIED BY 3 ESCORT PERSONNEL OF THE HOST SIDE.

(B) THE AGREEMENT MUST ENSURE THAT OBSERVERS CAN FULFILL THEIR ROLE AT EACH ENTRY-EXIT POINT WITHOUT INTERFERENCE. OBSERVERS SHOULD BE GRANTED ESCORTED FREE ACCESS WITHIN SPECIFIC AREAS AT EACH SITE TO MONITOR THE INWARD AND OUTWARD MOVEMENT OF TROOPS THROUGH THE SITE. WITHIN SUCH AREAS, OBSERVERS SHOULD HAVE UNRESTRICTED MOVEMENT BY FOOT OR GROUND VEHICLE TO OBSERVE THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS. IN

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ADDITION, OBSERVERS WILL BE FURNISHED INFORMATION REGARDING THE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL AND THEIR UNIT DESIGNATIONS INVOLVED IN THE MOVEMENT AND BE ABLE TO MAKE SPOT CHECKS TO DETERMINE THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION.

(C) ENTRY-EXIT POINTS SHOULD BE SELECTED FROM AIRPORTS, SEAPORTS, AND GROUND TRAVEL CONTROL POINTS TO CAUSE MINIMUM INTERFERENCE WITH THE NORMAL PEACETIME MOVEMENT OF FORCES INTO AND OUT OF THE REDUCTION AREA AND OTHER ROUTINE PEACETIME ACTIVITY.

(D) A SIDE UTILIZING TEMPORARY ENTRY-EXIT POINTS AS CALLED FOR IN THE WESTERN DRAFT TREATY WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE OTHER SIDE TO POSITION OBSERVERS AT THE SITE DURING ITS USE AS A TEMPORARY ENTRY-EXIT POINT.

(E) THE SIDES WILL AGREE ON THE METHOD BY WHICH FORCES PASSING THROUGH THE ENTRY-EXIT POINTS WILL BE ACCOUNTED FOR. THIS METHOD MUST ALLOW SUFFICIENT ACCURACY TO ACCOUNT FOR FORCES REDUCED AND TO MONITOR THE EFFECT OF MOVEMENTS ON AGREED RESIDUAL CEILINGS.

(F) LIMITATION ON OBSERVER ACTIVITIES WILL BE SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT.

(G) LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THE PERSONNEL MANNING EACH SITE WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SIDE TO WHICH THOSE PERSONNEL BELONG.

4. MEASURE 6 EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

THE WEST WILL BE PRESENTING AN ELABORATION OF ITS PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE VI OF ANNEX II OF THE DRAFT TREATY COVERING SUBSEQUENT

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PAGE TEN YBGR6287 SECRET

EXCHANGES OF DATA, TO FACILITATE VERIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT. THE ELABORATION WILL BE BASED ON THE PATTERN OF CATEGORIES FOR THE INITIAL EXCHANGES SET OUT IN ATTACHMENT A, AND WILL PROVIDE FOR DISAGGREGATION OF THE FORCES WITHIN THOSE CATEGORIES AS NECESSARY.

5. MEASURES 1 AND 2 --- PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF AND EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES. (ORIGINAL TEXT)

(A) THE TERM QUOTE DIVISION FORMATION OUT-OF-GARRISON UNQUOTE REFERS TO A TROOP FORMATION WHICH HAS HALF OR MORE OF ITS MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS (THAT IS, TANK, INFANTRY, MOTORIZED RIFLE, AIRBORNE BRIGADES-REGIMENTS OR EQUIVALENT-SIZED FORMATIONS) CARRYING OUT A SINGLE ACTIVITY UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND.

(B) WHERE NORMALLY PRE-NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED AS ALERT ACTIVITIES AND EXTEND BEYOND X HOURS, OBSERVERS SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AFTER X HOURS AND SHALL BE INVITED AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION.

UNQUOTE.

CCC/070 191222Z YBGR6287

m Delors/OR

MF

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T

DE STKHM/SCDEL SCDL0294 19MAR84

A EXTOTT IDA

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO VMBFR WSHDC PARIS LDN BONN GENEV MOSCO

DISTR IDAN IDAO IDD (IDDZ IDR RGX RBD RBR RCR

---CONF DE STKHM:PLENIERE 16MAR:ALLOCUTIONS FRANCE,RDA,CDA ET URSS

SOMMAIRE:AU NOM DES DIX,FRANCE A DRESSE BILAN RELATIVEMENT POSITIF

DE LA PREMIERE SESSION.ELLE A SOULIGNE QUE MALGRE CERTAINES

DECLARATIONS POLEMIQUES CLIMAT SEREIN AVAIT PREVALU.CONF DE

STKHM NE/NE PEUT SE SUBSTITUER AUX NEGOCIATIONS PORTANT SUR ARMES

NUCLEAIRES OU CHIMIQUES.TOUT EN RECONNAISSANT UTILITE PHASE

EXPLORATOIRE,RDA A DECLARE QUE PROPOSITION DE L OTAN CONTIENT

MESURES PEU SIGNIFICATOIRES AU PLAN MILITAIRE PUISQU ELLES NE/NE

MODIFIENT EN RIEN RISQUES D UNE CONFRONTATION NUCLEAIRE OU

CHIMIQUE EN EUROPE ET QU ELLES IGNORENT INTERETS LEGITIMES DE

CERTAINS ETATS EN MATIERE DE SECURITE.DISCOURS CDA,ENVOYE NOTRE

TEL SCDL0288(06MAR).URSS(GRINEVSKI),DANS INTERVENTION FORTE(MAIS

EVIDEMENT TACTIQUE)A RAPPELE QUE DEPLOIEMENT ARMES NUCLEAIRES

INTERMEDIALES CIT DE PREMIERE FRAPPE FINCIT ET DOCTRINE MILITAIRE

DE L OTAN EXIGENT CONSIDERATION DES QUESTIONS NUCLEAIRES,SOIT

RENONCIATION USAGE INITIAL ARMES NUCLEAIRES ET TRAITE NON-RECOURS

A LA FORCE.PROPOSITION DE LA ALLIANCE DIMINUE PERSPECTIVES DE CONF

DE STKHM EN LES RAMENANT A DES CONSIDERATIONS TECHNICO-MILITAIRES

D INTERET SECONDAIRE.TRANSPARENCE EST DESTINEE A AVANTAGER OTAN

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PAGE DEUX SCDL0294 RESTR

EN EXCLUANT DE SON CHAMPS D APPLICATION FORCES PRINCIPALES DES ETATS-UNIS.URSS RECONNAIT QUE PROPOSITION DES NNA(SC.3)ADMET POSSIBILITE REAFFIRMATION DU CONCEPT DE NON-RECOURS A LA FORCE; ELLE DEPLORE TOUTEFOIS UN CERTAIN MANQUE DE COHERENCE ILLUSTRÉ PAR ABSENCE DE REFERENCE A UN NOUVEL INSTRUMENT JURIDIQUE INNATL.

2.RAPPORT:AU NOM DES DIX,FRANCE,A L INSTAR DES AUTRES INTERVENANTS OCCIDENTAUX,AIDRESSE BILAN POSITIF DE LA PREMIERE SESSION.CELLE-CI A PREMIS DE NOMBREUX ECHANGES DE VUE ET LE DEPOT DE TROIS PROPOSITIONS.CERTAINS POINTS DE CONVERGENCE ONT DIAILLEURS ETE IDENTIFIES.MALGRE DECLARATIONS POLEMIQUES CLIMAT SEREIN AVAIT PREVALU.LES DIX SOUHAIENT PROGRESSION DE CE DIALOGUE AU COURS DE LA SECONDE SESSION AFIN QUE SOIENT ENTREPRISES NEGOCIATIONS VERITABLES SUR PROPOSITIONS CONCRETES.

3.RDA:DEPLOIEMENT DE NOUVEAUX MISSILES EN EUROPE OCCIDENTAL EXIGE MESURES DESTINEES A REDUIRE RISQUES DE CONFLIT NUCLEAIRE,TELLE RENONCIATION USAGE INITIAL ARMES NUCLEAIRES.CONTRAIREMENT A L OTAN, CIT ETATS SOCIALISTES FINCIT NE/NE PRETENDENT NULLEMENT A L EXCLUSIVITE DE SES PROPOSITIONS.MESURES OCCIDENTALES SONT PEU SIGNIFICATIVES AU PLAN MILITAIRE PUISQU ELLES NE/NE MODIFIENT EN RIEN RISQUES DE CONFRONTATION NUCLEAIRE ET CONVENTIONELLE EN EUROPE ET QU ELLES NE/NE TIENNENT PAS COMPTE DES INTERETS LEGITIMES DE SECURITE DE CERTAINS ETATS.IL EST A ESPERER QUE PAUSE PERMET A L OTAN DE REVOIR SON APPROCHE UNILATERALE.PROPOSITION DES NNA EST UNE ETAPE QUI CONTRIBUE A DEFINIR BASE COMMUNE SANS POUR AUTANT ...3

PAGE TROIS SCDL0294 RESTR

ETRE MEDIATION ENTRE PROPOSITIONS DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE ET CELLES DE L OTAN.SC.3 CONTIENT ELEMENTS QUI CORRESPONDENT A POSITIONS DU PACTE.

4.URSS(GRINEVSKI):PREMIERE SESSION A PERMIS ECHANGES UTILES QUI ONT FACILITE CLARIFICATION DES POSITIONS RESPECTIVES.ORIENTATION DES TRAVAUX DE LA CONF EST UNE QUESTION CRUCIALE A CAUSE DE L ACCROISSEMENT DE LA TENSION QUI RESULTE DES POLITIQUES DES ETATS-UNIS ET LEUR PRINCIPAUX ALLIES DE LA OTAN:DEPLOIEMENT MISSILES NUCLEAIRES EN EUROPE OCCIDENTAL ET DOCTRINE MILITAIRE QUI PREVOIT USAGE INITIAL DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES.CHERNENKO AVAIT REAFFIRME NECESSITE IMPERIEUSE DE CONVENIR D UN ENSEMBLE DE NORMES REGISSANT LE COMPORTEMENT DES ETATS NUCLEAIRES.CELLES-CI IMPLIQUENT RENONCIATION USAGE INITIAL,QUI EST PARTICULIEREMENT IMPORTANT A CAUSE DU DEPLOIEMENT CIT FIRST-STRIKE WEAPONS FINCIT,AINSI QUE TRAITE NON-RECOURS A LA FORCE.UN ACCORD A CE SUJET CONSTITUERAIT BASE SOLIDE POUR DESARMEMENT ETANT PLUS SPECIFIQUE QUE CHARTE D L ONU ET ACTE FINAL CAR IL INCLURAIT RENONCIATION USAGE INITIAL ARMES NUCLEAIRES ET CLASSIQUES.RENFORCEMENT DE LA CONFIANCE SERAIT EGALEMENT FACILITER PAR CONSIDERATION GEL PUIS REDUCITON BUDGETS MILITAIRES,INTERDICTION CW EN EUROPE,CREATION NWFZ DANS DIFFERENTES REGIONS DU CONTINENT ET,ENFIN,ELARGISSEMENT DES CBM DE L ACTE FINAL.PROPOSITION DE L OTAN DIMINUE POSSIBILITES DE LA CONF EN LES RAMENANT A DES CIT SECONDARY MILITARY TECHNICAL QUESTIONS FINCIT ET EXCLUE TOUTE LIMITATION DES ACTIVITES MILITAIRES.

...4

001440

PAGE QUATRE SCDL0294 RESTR

5.OBJET DE CIT TRANSPARENCY FINCIT EST D AVANTAGER OTAN EN EXCLUANT FORCES PRINCIPALES DES ETATS-UNIS.PROPOSITION DE L ALLIANCE EST UNILATERALE ET CONTIENT DISPOSITIONS TOUT A FAIT INACCEPTABLES QUI N/N ONT PAS ETE ELABOREES DANS LE BUT DE REALISER ACCORD.ETATS PARTICIPANTS DOIVENT ETRE SENSIBLES A L APPEL DE L OPINION PUBLIQUE.URSS A PRIS NOTE DU FAIT QUE PROPOSITION NNA ADMET POSSIBILITE DE RECONSIDERER REAFFIRMATION CONCEPT NON-RECOURS A LA FORCE:CIT THIS IS BE ITSELF A POSITIVE FACT,BUT THIS IDEA IS PURSUED INCONSISTENTLY,IT IS NOT/NOT PROPOSED TO MATERIALIZE IT IN SPECIFIC INNATL LEGAL FORMS.FINCIT 6.REAPPELANT DECISIONS REUNION PREP HSNKI,YUGOSLAVIE EST INTERVENUE AFIN DE PROPOSER QUE SUEDE,EN SA QUALITE DE PAYS HOTE, INVITE SEC GEN ONU A S ADRESSER A LA CONF DE STKHM DURANT REUNION PLENIERE PUBLIQUE A LA DEUXIEME SESSION.AUCUNE OBJECTION N/N A ETE SOULEVEE.

CCC/152 191400Z SCDL0294

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CABINET DU
SECRETÉRIE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MEMORANDUM

1002

To
A Office of the Under-Secretary

From
De MINA

Security
Sécurité UNCLASSIFIED

Reference
Référence Date March 16, 1984

Subject
Sujet Parliamentary Report - March 16

DPM/SSEA (2)
MINA (11)
MINE/Jalbert/
Laverdure
MINT/Burbridge/
MacDonald
PMO/Fairbairn
PCO/Fadden/
Elcock/
Mitchell

USS MCB
CMR (2) NAX
DMT PED
DMF PPD
CCB PSD
CCBR RBD
SFB RCD
TFB RGB
IFB RGX
EFB RSD
LGB SCD
PGB SCS
SCI
FPR SCH
ACB SFP
ADA SIC
APD SID
APZ SIM
CCBM SIO
CCBA SIS
CGD TAD
CGE TID
CGL UGB
CGS URD
CMD XDX
CML ZEP
CPD ZSP
EED ZSS
EPD IMU
ETD
GAD ESD
GGB TGX
GMD
IDD TDD
IDDZ TED
IMD UTD
JCD
LCD IMC
LCR

ON THE HILL

The House met at 11:00. Following Question Period, resumed debate on the CSIS legislation (C-9).

Yesterday, Gordon Gilchrist, the Conservative Member from Scarborough East, who was recently convicted of income tax evasion, rose following Question Period and tendered his resignation. Maintaining his innocence, he claimed his experience portrayed "in all-too graphic terms, the staggering burden imposed on the taxpayers in the country of meeting both the absurd complexities of the Canadian tax system and the overwhelming power of Revenue Canada."

Minister Gray tabled amendments to the Financial Administration Act in relation to Crown Corporations (C-24).

Appearing before Committee yesterday, the DPM/SSEA answered questions from David Kilgour on the peace initiative, NATO strategy and membership in the OAS (on this latter issue, the Minister said the question is still under review); spoke on extraterritoriality and tabled a statement on this issue and its relation to the US Export Administration Act in response to questions from Stan Hudecki; promised to provide information on the number of EX positions in the Dept to Bill McKnight, to whom he also explained the purpose of the aid-trade fund; discussed Canadian policy in Central America and the reasons behind the decision to send observers to monitor the March 25 elections in response to the concerns raised by Maurice Dupras; told Gérald Laniel that he would take the proposed renewal mandate for the Canadian Forces in Cyprus to Cabinet; promised answers on a number of questions concerning the Central American situation to Walter McLean; advised the Committee he is prepared to give them a reference for study of east-west relations wide enough to embrace peacekeeping; answered Pauline Jewett's fears over future testing of US weapons systems by saying they would have to be considered by Cabinet and allowed that he hoped to introduce within a short time, legislation on an Arms Control and Disarmament Centre. WRONG LANGUAGE

Member Statements of interest: Pauline Jewett informed Members that a cross-country peace petition caravan campaign had been launched with the support of the NDP and that its goals were fourfold: no cruise tests; a nuclear weapons-free Canada; conversion of military industrial complexes into civilian use; free votes in Parliament on these issues.

Q.P. questions of departmental interest: CANADA-EC
NEWSPRINT DISPUTE; SEALS AND FISHERIES

SENSE OF THE HOUSE

With all the press over at the Chateau Laurier's Blue Room listening to John Turner declare that he had decided to return to public life, (report below) Question Period was a pretty tame affair. The Opposition, once again, led on economic policy with John Crosbie accusing Minister Lalonde of being a "miserable failure" for his inability to reverse the economy's downward trend and Nelson Riis complaining about the rise in interest rates and domestic profits of Canadian banks. Minister Lalonde suggested Mr. Crosbie was losing his cool and said that the only downward trend of which he was aware, was the decline in popular support of the Conservatives.

URR URE
RCR RCM
RCT EEA
TAF IDR
IDA

Minister Bégin admitted to Terry Sargeant that the study of contaminants in the St. Regis River was 18 months behind schedule but that it was important that the problem be thoroughly explored.

CANADA-EC NEWSPRINT DISPUTE

Frank Oberle was worried by the EC decision to lower Canada's newsprint quota for 1984 from 1.5 million tonnes to .5 million tonnes. Minister Regan said that negotiations at all levels had been carried on with the EC with the aim of reaching an equitable settlement, but that the EC had not been able to come up with an acceptable proposal. Mr. Regan speculated that on some issues the EC appears to act on the basis of consensus and that sometimes this resulted in the triumph of the lowest common denominator. Confirming the interim quota of 500,000 tonnes, the Minister said this did not necessarily represent the final total. Mr. Regan said the current difficulty had resulted as a consequence of the EC reaching a special with Scandinavian countries which gave the latter special access. As the largest supplier outside of Europe, the Minister said Canada was most affected. He was confident, nonetheless, that our quota would be raised and that "our position will be vindicated."

SEALS AND FISHERIES

In response to Lloyd Crouse, who questioned the accuracy of Minister De Bané's assurances that no buyers were boycotting Canadian fish products over the seal hunt and cited a conversation with Safeway's buyer who said his company had decided to boycott fish shipments, the Minister said he did "not think it is conducive to the public interest to give a full detailed report of the situation." The Minister said "all of the reports we have show that no buyer has cancelled any contract." The Minister said he could arrange for Mr Crouse to have a detailed report on a confidential basis by his dept's officials because "I do not think it is conducive every day in the House to say that we spoke to Mr So and So in this or that company...I do not think it is proper for the Minister to give a report every day of where it is at."

IDRC

In response to Ron Huntington's query over the exemption of the IDRC from the accountability set out in Bill C-24, the PM said it was because the IDRC is a very special type of corporation and its Board of Directors consisted of half who are not Canadian citizens. To ensure "that this agency, which is exemplary in the sense that it is being used as an example for other countries which want to follow Canada's lead in establishing a research centre on north-south problems" outside of Govt interference, it was treated differently.

JOHN TURNER

The setting was simple, a single Canadian flag with a backdrop of blue drapes in the Chateau Laurier's Blue Room and a podium covered by red Liberal maple leaf on a white background. The candidate wore a single-breasted gray Brooks Brothers' style suit. Looking tanned and fit, he said he had decided to return to public service and give up a secure and comfortable life for the risks of politics, because he believed "every Canadian has a duty to serve our country." Promising to restore the Liberal Party's national base and achieve a new consensus in Confederation, he said he would lead the country in rebuilding our economy in a newly competitive world. Speaking on foreign policy, he said he would continue the thrust of the last three leaders who have been "in the forefront of the search for world peace and international stability." On defence, he said he thought Canada should "pull its weight." Refusing to be drawn out on the record of the current Govt, Mr. Turner said each Prime Minister brought his own stamp to Govt and that he hoped his would be "openness." On French language rights in Manitoba, he implied he would leave it up to the province. The room was overflowing with journalists, aides from all three parties, passers-by and a few members (e.g. Norm Kelly, Minister Smith, Roland Comptois). While there have been reports that Ministers Axworthy, Pepin, Gray, Ouellet and Fox are supporting the acknowledged front runner, the only member of the Ministry present was David Smith.


D. Colin Robertson
Departmental Assistant

Distribution: MINA (9) IFB URT
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 FPR UGB
~~XXX~~ SCS URD
 URR

HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK - BRIEFING NOTE
 LIVRE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES - NOTES D'INFORMATION

Section

Subject/Highlights Sujet/Points saillants

New Projects submitted by the USA under the terms of the CANUS Test and Evaluation Agreement

Source

Questions in the House of Commons, March 15, 1984

Assessment Évaluation

Classification

SECRET


Speculation by the press and in the House of Commons regarding items proposed in the Interim Forecast of Projects submitted by the USA Department of Defense to DND last month, appear to be based on assessment of the probabilities coupled with imaginative guesswork. It has been suggested that the Pershing II, ground-launched cruise missile and stealth cruise missile are on the list. In fact, the list had included the Pershing II guidance system and the ground-launched cruise missile but the USA has agreed to withdraw both. The remaining items included the continuation of the LANTIRN program and testing of a number of tactical conventional weapons including the Maverick; Walleye 1; MK66 2.75" rocket; the MK82 Laser-Guided Bomb; FMU-140 Fuze and the GATOR Mine. It is suggested we neither confirm nor deny allegations mentioned in journalistic and HOC "fishing expeditions."

Suggested Reply Réponse suggérée

- All projects proposed under the Canada-USA Test and Evaluation Agreement are considered by officials prior to their submission to Ministers. At this time I am not prepared to either confirm or deny the existence of specific individual proposals under consideration. I can assure you that my colleague Mr. Blais and I will subject all proposals to the closest scrutiny prior to seeking a decision.

Prepared by Préparé par

P.E. Barton



Division Direction

Defence Relations

Date

Mar 16/84

Tel. no. N° de té

2-9263001444

~~D R A F T~~

Mr. Schabas
Mr. Carter
Mr. [unclear]

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MF

INF Deployment

The deployment schedule for INF is as follows:

<u>IOC Date</u>	<u>Warheads</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Cumulative Total</u>
December 1983	96 GLCM	UK	96
March 1984	112 GLCM	Italy	208
February 1986	108 Pershing II	FRG	316
February 1987	96 GLCM	FRG	412
March 1987	48 GLCM	Belguim	460
December 1987	112 GLCM	UK and Netherlands	572

This schedule reflects the dates for Initial Operating Capability. The physical deployment of missiles would precede these dates. Since deployment is strictly a bilateral issue between the USA and the countries concerned, we are not privy to more precise information. The schedule does indicate, however, that deployment is a slow process offering ample time for negotiation.

INF Moratorium

There have in the past been a number of suggestions for a moratorium on NATO deployment of INF systems in order to facilitate negotiations. Such suggestions were put forward before the initial deployment of NATO systems and before the Soviets walked out of the negotiations. The idea was that if NATO were to

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declare a unilateral deployment moratorium there would be more time for negotiations before any seemingly irrevocable steps were taken. Such a moratorium would be different than a freeze in that it would be unilateral and unnegotiated. In contrast, a mutual verifiable freeze would take as long as a reduction agreement to negotiate and would be meaningless in a situation where the Soviets had completed their deployment program while NATO had not even begun its own.

Regardless of the merits these proposals might have had in the pre-December 1983 situation, before NATO had begun deployment and while the Soviets were still negotiating, similar proposals must now be judged in relation to the current, rather different, situation.

The first argument in favour of a moratorium is that it would provide time to negotiate. If the USA were in a position today to deploy all 572 missiles in Europe and indeed intended to do so in the near future, a moratorium might be a useful way of prolonging the process, thereby providing time for negotiation. The above schedule indicates, however, that deployment cannot be completed before the end of 1987. Time for negotiation does exist. It is not clear that a moratorium would add anything in this respect and it is doubtful that any advantage would be served by prolonging the negotiating time beyond the end of 1987.

The second argument that might be put forward in favour of a moratorium is that it might be a way of bringing the Soviets back to the bargaining table. Can this proposition, however, withstand rational analysis.

A moratorium dated, for example, at March 1984 would leave NATO with 208 missiles in Europe. It would leave the Soviets with their full complement of SS20's, SS4's and SS5's (approximately 1,000). This balance is better than anything the Soviets could ever hope to achieve through negotiations. A moratorium would therefore reduce the military incentives for the Soviets to negotiate. Indeed, the Soviets would probably be well advised in such circumstances to avoid negotiations and await the end of the moratorium to see whether NATO had the political will to recommence deployment.

The Soviets have indicated that they would return to the negotiating table when NATO reverts to the conditions preceding deployment, i.e. the withdrawal of those GLCM's already deployed. A moratorium would not, therefore, satisfy the Soviet precondition. While one cannot be certain as to how they would react to such an initiative, there is no reason to believe that it would bring them back to the bargaining table. Indeed, if it were seen as their reward for walking out of the talks, it might have the opposite effect, as well as establishing a regrettable precedent for other arms control negotiations.

While the Soviet reaction cannot be predicted with confidence no such uncertainty arises in relation to the reactions of our NATO allies to such a proposal. All of our major allies, the USA, the UK, France and Germany, would oppose any form of INF moratorium. It would fly in the face of the positions on INF already enunciated by Reagan, Thatcher, Kohl and Mitterrand. A moratorium would necessarily have a terminal date. That date would become the focus of attention for the opponents of NATO's program and, as a result, the European basing countries would probably have to have parliamentary debates on the question preceding that date, just as many of them had to have such debates in the period preceding the initial deployment. None of our European allies would appreciate a proposal which forced another parliamentary debate upon them, particularly after the ordeal they went through during the autumn of 1983.

In short it is difficult to see what advantages such a proposal would offer. There would be clear disadvantages, as indicated above. In addition it could:

- rob the PM's initiative of the support already achieved in Germany and Italy;
- be seen to be in conflict with the cruise missile testing decision;

- 5 -

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- be seen to be in conflict with the PM's, November 13 speech as well as to all of the assurances so far given to our allies that the PM's initiative was consistent with NATO INF program.

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ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

PM ENATC YBGR6573 24JUN83

TO EXTOTT/DFR

INFC-CANMILREP NATO-NHQOTT/ADMPOL/ CPP/ENACPOL/CORA/CIS/DSTRATA/DIPOL
DISTR DFP

27-4-NATO-1-6

---INF:DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

MGIX INDEX

WE HAVE BEEN DIGGING TO COME UP WITH A MORE CURRENT SCHEDULE OF
LRINF DEPLOYMENTS THAN SHOWN IN APPENDIX D TO HIG REPORT ON LRINF
MODERNIZATION OF OCT79(NATO DOCU NPG/D(79)4). WHILE THERE IS
NO/NC SINGLE DOCU WE CAN POINT TO WITH UP TO DATE SCHEDULE, WE
HAVE GLEANED FOLLOWING INFO FROM IMS BASED ON REPORTS OF SHAPE
GLCM COORDINATING GRUP MTGS(ALL INFO SECRET):GLCM-

(A)UK(GREENHAM COMMON):FLIGHTS (FLTS)-6;LAUNCHERS(LRS)
24;WARHEADS(WH)-96;ORIGINAL INTITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
(ICC)IEC83;REVISED IOC-NO/NO CHANGE.

at top of
page ple

(B)ITALY:FLTS-7;LRS-28;WH-112;CRIGINAL IOC-INTERIM
SITE(SIGONELLA NAVAL AIR STATION,SICILY)MAR84;PERMANENT SITE
(COMISO,SICILY)DEC85;REVISED IOC-NO/NO CHANGE.

(C)BELGIUM:FLTS-3;LRS-12;WH-48;ORIGINAL IOC-MAR85;
REVISED IOC-MAR87.

(D)FRG:FLTS-6;LRS-24;WH-96;ORIGINAL IOC-MAR86;
REVISED IOC-FEB87.

(E)NETH:FLTS-3;LRS-12;WH-48;CRIGINAL IOC-SECOND
QUARTER 87;REVISED IOC-BLANK.

(F)UK(MOLESWORTH):FLTS-4;LRS-16;WH-64;ORIGINAL IOC-
IEC87;REVISED IOC-NO/NO CHANGE.

2. BY END DEC83 THERE WILL BE ONE FLT OF GLCM(16 MISSILES)IN UK(
GREENHAM COMMON)AND ONE BATTERY OF PERSHING II(12 MISSILES)IN FRG.
FINAL OPERATING CAPABILITY FOR FULL COMPLEMENT OF 9 PII BATTERIES
(108 MISSILES)SCHEDULED FOR FEB86.

CCC/262 241656Z YBGR6573

1 flight
76 WH

1 flight
9 P II

16 UK.
9
25.
operational

27-4-NATO-1-6

5 years
100/year.

IDDZ

CGS

Security/Sécurité
SECRET
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
March 16, 1984
Number/Numéro
CGS-0077

Your memorandum IDDZ0230 of
March 14, 1984

Proposed Canadian Institute for Inter-
national Peace and Security

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

2

DISTRIBUTION

- USS
- DMF
- DMT
- IFB
- CCB
- CGD
- CGL
- CGE
- CPD
- IDR

Thank you for sending us the memorandum under reference and the attached draft legislation with respect to the Institute. The current draft Bill raises a number of issues, only one of which, endowment vs. annual allocation, is addressed in the memorandum (without, we note, firmly recommending one or the other).

2. As we see them, other key related issues are:

- (i) the relationship of this Institute to existing government programs with similar objectives.

As revealed in the attached draft Table I, there seems to be a great deal of overlap and, therefore, a high risk of duplication. We understand that this problem was of concern to the Department even before the idea of the Institute was first broached and that efforts are currently under way to rationalize these various programs (for the range of existing programs, see Table II). This in turn raises questions about:

- (ii) the appropriateness of the proposed funding level.

An endowment of the size proposed in the draft Bill would, assuming an annual rate of return on investment of 10%, would produce the following levels of income over the planning period:

<u>84-85</u>	<u>85-86</u>	<u>86-87</u>	<u>87-88</u>
(\$M)			
--	2.0	2.5	3.0

As indicated in Table II, as we are able to project government spending for existing programs in this area it appears to be:

...2

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<u>84-85</u>	<u>85-86</u>	<u>86-87</u>	<u>87-88</u>
		((\$M)	
3.5	3.8	4.0	4.4

Given the substantial funding already being provided, one concern is whether the peace and international security "community" would be able to absorb funding increases of the magnitude implicit in the proposed funding levels for the Institute; and

- (iii) Source of funding. The designation of the CRF as the source of funding for the endowment only partly resolves this issue (and, of course, there is always the possibility that the Minister of Finance might object or that the annual allocation mechanism will be chosen). There remains the related issue of interim funding (level and source) which we assume will be necessary until the endowment starts to produce revenue.



C.V. Svoboda
Acting Director
Sector Policy
and Coordination

SECRET

March 16, 1984

DRAFT TABLE I

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF OBJECTIVES OF EXISTING MAJOR PROGRAMS AND OF THAT OF THE PROPOSED INSTITUTE

<u>Program</u>	<u>Disarmament Fund (DEA)</u>	<u>Military and Strategic Studies Program (DND)</u>	<u>Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security</u>
<u>Arms Control and Disarmament: Verification Program (DEA)</u>			
<u>Objectives</u>			
To apply Canadian expertise in seismology, remote sensing, toxicology and protective measures against chemical weapons and communications satellites in the negotiation of agreements on nuclear, chemical, and conventional research for application to problems in ongoing negotiations;	To encourage research and stimulate information activities in the arms control and disarmament field (with the exception of verification)	To develop a domestic competence and national interest in military and strategic issues of current and future relevance to our national security by:	To increase knowledge of the issues related to international peace and security, with particular emphasis on defence, arms control and disarmament; and to:
To undertake specialized training programs applying Canadian expertise;		a) encouraging research and teaching programs at Canadian universities;	a) collect and disseminate information and ideas on international peace and security;
To liaise with national and international bodies working on verification issues; and		b) providing fellowships and scholarships to a number of Canadian graduate students; and	b) promote scholarship in matters related to international peace and security;
To promote increased attention to R and D in the private sector		c) promoting an informed discussion of related matters among interested Canadians	c) encourage public discussion of international peace and security issues; and
			d) foster, fund and conduct research on international peace and security issues of particular interest to Canadians or to the Government of Canada

DRAFT TABLE 1.1

CONFIDENTIAL
March 16, 1984

Current and Projected Government Spending Related to the Deepening of Knowledge of the Issues Involved in the Fields of International Peace and Security, with Particular Emphasis on Defence, Arms Control and Disarmament

	<u>83-84</u>	<u>84-85</u>	<u>85-86</u>	<u>86-87</u>	<u>87-88</u>
<u>Directly-Related</u>	(Current \$K)				
<u>DEA</u>					
<u>G & C</u>					
Disarmament Fund (Includes contracts)	650	787	937	1,099	1,276
Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament	--	100	100	100	100
<u>Operating</u>					
Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Program	500	1,000	1,050	1,100	1,155
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>1,150</u>	<u>1,887</u>	<u>2,087</u>	<u>2,209</u>	<u>2,531</u>
<u>DND</u>					
<u>G & C</u>					
Military and Strategic Studies Program	586	616	636	668	701
Conference of Defence Associations	148	156	164	172	181
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies	50	50	50	50	50
International Institute of Strategic Studies	50	--	--	--	--
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>789</u>	<u>822</u>	<u>850</u>	<u>890</u>	<u>932</u>
<u>CIDA (Public Participation Program)</u>					
Jeunesse du Monde	118	?	?	?	?
Project Plough Shares	85	?	?	?	?
Christian Movement for Peace	19	?	?	?	?
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>222</u>	<u>233¹</u>	<u>245</u>	<u>257</u>	<u>270</u>
<u>Secretary of State Department</u>					
Project Plough Shares	40	?	?	?	?
Canadian Human Rights Foundation	40	?	?	?	?
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>84¹</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>97</u>
<u>EMR</u>					
Comprehensive Test Ban; Internatl Seismic Data Exchange	200	210	221	232	244
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>210</u>	<u>221</u>	<u>232</u>	<u>244</u>
<u>TOTAL DIRECTLY-RELATED:</u>	<u>2,441</u>	<u>3,236</u>	<u>3,491</u>	<u>3,681</u>	<u>4,074</u>
<u>Indirectly-Related²</u>					
<u>DEA</u>					
<u>G & C</u>					
United Nations Association in Canada	55	85	100	110	120
CIIA	50	50	50	50	50
Centre Québécois des Relations Internationales	35	35	35	35	35
Atlantic Council of Canada	8	8	8	8	8
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>148</u>	<u>178</u>	<u>193</u>	<u>203</u>	<u>213</u>
<u>CIDA (Public Participation Program)</u>					
Canadian Council for Internatl Cooperation	84	?	?	?	?
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>84¹</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>102</u>
<u>TOTAL INDIRECTLY-RELATED:</u>	<u>232</u>	<u>266</u>	<u>286</u>	<u>300</u>	<u>315</u>
<u>GRAND TOTAL:</u>	<u>2,673</u>	<u>3,502</u>	<u>3,777</u>	<u>3,981</u>	<u>4,389</u>

1. In absence of more precise information, the projections are based on growth rate of 5% p.a.

2. Does not include programs (e.g., Social Science and Humanities Research Council) which are known to fund activities in this field but for which data are not available.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
17 MAR 84 03 08Z 10

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0238 16MAR84
TO LSBON
INFO PC00TT/FOWLER BNATO
DISTR RGB RSR RSD
REF YRTEL 0033 13JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:PORTUGUESE REPLY TO PM S LETS
GRATEFUL YOU SEND BY TEL TEXT OF PORTUGUESE REPLY OF 10JAN TO PM S
26 OCT AND 16NOV LETS ON HIS PEACE AND SECURITY INITIATIVE.PORTUGUE-
SE REPLY DOES NOT/NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN OTTL

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

001456



IDDZ/L.A.Delvoie/5-5912/sc

MF

TO/À • MINA DMF IFB

FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Initiative: Parliamentary Resolution
SUJET

Security/Sécurité CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date March 16, 1984
Number/Numéro IDDZ-0236

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

Attached for your information are copies of the following documents on this subject:

- (a) memorandum from the PCO to the Prime Minister;
- (b) letters from the Prime Minister to Mr. Mulroney and Mr. Broadbent;
- (c) revised version of a draft resolution to be submitted to the House of Commons.

L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

CONFIDENTIAL

March 14, 1984


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
c.c. Mr. Osbaldeston
Mr. Elcock

House Resolution

Further to our telephone conversation this afternoon, please find attached revised letters to Messrs Mulroney and Broadbent and a revised draft Resolution in accordance with your instructions.

The wording (paragraph 2 of the letter to Mr. Mulroney) has been checked with Legislation and House Planning, and with Mr. Pinard.

From our conversation, I understood that you and Mr. MacEachen agreed to trade off Mr. Mulroney's suggestion that a number of items be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence against a general reference on East/West relations, Arms Control and Disarmament (final paragraph on page 3). We have drafted the resolution and letters accordingly. Naturally, if you preferred that paragraph could be omitted and the letters changed so as to make the offer of a reference on East/West relations separate and distinct from the Resolution.


R.B.F.



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

March 15, 1984.

Dear Mr. Mulroney,

Thank you for your letter of March 7 in which you propose an amended version of the draft House Resolution that I sent to you on February 23. Attached for your consideration is a new draft which includes some of the useful points you made and which expands somewhat upon your suggestion that several matters be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence.

The Government intends to introduce a Bill to establish the "centre on defence and arms control" promised in the Speech from the Throne, in the next week or so. In respect of your wish to have the legislation considered by the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence, if a timetable were to be agreed among House Leaders such that passage of the Bill would be ensured within a month with virtually all that time allocated for the Committee to study the legislation, I think your concern would be met.

In addition, you will see that in the revised Resolution, we propose that the broad issues of East/West relations, and arms control and disarmament be referred to the Standing Committee. I am sure that a referral made in this manner would encompass not only the specific proposals you made in your reply to my letter but also any other related subjects that members might wish to see studied by the Committee.


Mr. Brian Mulroney
Leader of the Opposition
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario

- 2 -

Finally, you will see that the ten points of agreement that I cited in my speech on February 9, and which you mentioned in your draft, are once again listed in the Resolution. This is because I wish to refer to these principles, and to the fact that they have the support of the House, in the letters I will be sending to Mr. Reagan and Mr. Chernenko.

I have also written to Mr. Broadbent, and I hope that it will be possible to agree that this revised Resolution can be put before the House in the near future.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "B. J. Pender". The signature is written in dark ink on a white background. The first part of the signature is a large, stylized "B" with a loop, followed by "J." and "Pender" written in a more standard cursive hand.

DRAFT RESOLUTION

That this House,

mindful of Canada's place in the community of Western nations and of its enduring commitment to the principles and purposes of the North Atlantic Alliance;

recalling the efforts made by successive Canadian governments over the last forty years in the cause of international peace and security;

troubled by the state of East-West relations, by serious instability in the international security situation, by the continuing arms race and, above all, by the risk of nuclear war which threatens the survival of humanity;

- (i) endorses on behalf of all Canadians the efforts and initiatives of successive Governments of Canada to build a climate of confidence in East-West relations, to re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and to contribute to the vital goal of arms control and disarmament;

- 2 -

(ii) draws to the attention of all countries of East and West the following ten principles on which they can build in developing their relations on the basis of mutual interest:

1. Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
2. Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
3. Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
4. Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
5. Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
6. Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
7. Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.

8. Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
 9. Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
 10. Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.
-
- (iii) calls for resumed negotiations between the superpowers on nuclear arms control and disarmament;
 - (iv) calls for renewed vigour in promoting nuclear non-proliferation among those countries now possessing nuclear technology and those which have the potential of developing non-peaceful uses of such technology; and
 - (v) reaffirms support for full scope safeguards in the transfer and sale of nuclear technology to other countries.
 - (vi) directs the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence to address the questions of East/West relations, arms control and disarmament.



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

March 15, 1984.

Dear Mr. Broadbent,

Following our telephone conversation, and after considering a letter from Mr. Mulroney which I received last week, I have made several changes to the draft House Resolution which I sent to you on February 23. More recently, you mentioned you might have additional suggestions which I would be pleased to try to accommodate.

Attached for your consideration, however, is a new draft which you will see expands somewhat on the original version, and which has its first preambular paragraph amended so as to take account of your suggestion. You will note, in particular, that the revised Resolution instructs the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence to address the questions of East/West relations, arms control, and disarmament.


I have also written to Mr. Mulroney, and I hope that it will be possible to agree that this revised Resolution can be put before the House next week.

Mr. Edward Broadbent
Leader of the New Democratic Party
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario

- 2 -

On a related subject, Mr. Mulroney has suggested on several occasions that the new "centre for defence and arms control issues" which was promised in the Speech from the Throne be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence. The Government intends to introduce a Bill establishing such a centre in the next week or so. I have suggested to Mr. Mulroney that his concerns could be met if a timetable were to be agreed among House Leaders such that passage of the Bill would be ensured within a month with virtually all that time allocated for the Committee to study the legislation. I hope you will find it possible to support this arrangement.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "B. J. Mulroney". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "B" and "J".

DRAFT RESOLUTION

That this House,

mindful of Canada's place in the community of Western nations and of its enduring commitment to the principles and purposes of the North Atlantic Alliance;

recalling the efforts made by successive Canadian governments over the last forty years in the cause of international peace and security;

troubled by the state of East-West relations, by serious instability in the international security situation, by the continuing arms race and, above all, by the risk of nuclear war which threatens the survival of humanity;

- (i) endorses on behalf of all Canadians the efforts and initiatives of successive Governments of Canada to build a climate of confidence in East-West relations, to re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and to contribute to the vital goal of arms control and disarmament;

- 2 -

(ii) draws to the attention of all countries of East and West the following ten principles on which they can build in developing their relations on the basis of mutual interest:

1. Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
2. Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
3. Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
4. Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
5. Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
6. Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
7. Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.

8. Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
 9. Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
 10. Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.
- (iii) calls for resumed negotiations between the superpowers on nuclear arms control and disarmament;
- (iv) calls for renewed vigour in promoting nuclear non-proliferation among those countries now possessing nuclear technology and those which have the potential of developing non-peaceful uses of such technology; and
- (v) reaffirms support for full scope safeguards in the transfer and sale of nuclear technology to other countries.
- (vi) directs the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence to address the questions of East/West relations, arms control and disarmament.

Canada

Canada

IDR/A.A.Després/2-6205/r1

Copies?

TO/À PR

FROM/DE • IDR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • MBFR: Western Press Statement by
SUJET Ambassador Hammond

Security/Sécurité	RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	March 16, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDR-1003

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

2

DISTRIBUTION

IDDZ
IDA
NDHQ/DNACPOL
VMBFR
(without
attach.)

Attached are copies of the statement made by the Head of the Canadian MBFR Delegation, Ambassador Hammond, at the Opening of Round press conference on March 16. While the statement has Canada's support as a Western statement reflecting NATO tactics at the negotiating table, after consultations in this department and the Department of National Defence, we have concluded that it should not be issued as a Canadian statement but could be made available to journalists on request.

A.A. Després,
Deputy Director,
Defence Relations Division.

The Head of the Canadian Delegation to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, Ambassador T.C. Hammond, made the following statement in the name of Western participants after the first Plenary meeting of the MBFR talks which resumed in Vienna today after a three month pause.

"The Western participants welcome the resumption of the Vienna negotiations. For our part, we would have preferred, and have been ready, to continue work in January after the usual winter recess of about a month. In fact, the break in the negotiations, which was not of our creation, has extended to three months. While we regret this hiatus, we take the East's return as a sign of its commitment to serious dialogue and to continuing efforts to achieve further progress in these negotiations.

"Despite our mutual efforts here over the years, which have included some progress, a stark fact remains: Central Europe continues to be the side of the largest concentration of military forces confronting each other in the world. These negotiations are unique in trying to deal with the problem posed by this formidable array of forces through reductions and limitations. For more than ten years our joint endeavour has been an important element in the East-West dialogue, and it remains so today.

.../2

- 2 -

"The Western commitment to the enterprise of lowering this level of confrontation and building a more stable relationship in Europe is clear. Only last December the NATO Foreign Ministers restated that 'they remain firmly committed to balanced and verifiable arms control at the lowest possible level of forces and will work for greater stability and progress toward genuine detente in East-West relations'.

"Accordingly, the NATO nations represented here attach major importance to the Vienna negotiations. We are committed to a serious process and to a search for concrete results. Our Ministers also made this clear in December when they stressed their 'determination to work for a sound mutually acceptable solution to the issues still barring progress'.

"Much work has been done to date in these negotiations, which has indeed brought the positions of the sides closer together. As a result of the understandings that have been reached, a common framework of agreement has begun to emerge. The most important of these achievements has been agreement on the aim of parity in military manpower in Central Europe -- that is, both sides should reduce to a common ceiling of 900,000 ground and air force personnel, of which not more than 700,000 would be ground forces. There has also been a convergence of views on the need for effective verification and for confidence-building measures, on the principle of collectivity and on beginning the reduction process with US and Soviet forces.

"But there is much work that obviously needs to be done on the differences that remain. For an agreement to be effective and equitable, there are certain requirements that must be met. Pre-eminently, each side must be confident that the other is carrying out its obligations. This means that the obligations must be clearly delineated and their implementation effectively verified throughout the life of the agreement.

.../3

- 3 -

"There are two proposals on the negotiating table. The Western draft treaty offers a sound, comprehensive approach that meets the requirements for an effective agreement. But the East, refusing to discuss the size of its forces in the area, has chosen not to accept it and has put forward its own proposal, which merely glosses over the disagreement between the sides on existing Eastern force levels.

"The Western participants have addressed the Eastern proposal in detail. We have welcomed certain positive features, including the acceptance of verification concepts that are an advance over their earlier proposals. At the same time, we have demonstrated that the Eastern proposal contains two major flaws. First, because it would not specify all reduction amounts necessary to reach parity, the Western side would have to cut tens of thousands of troops without knowing that the size of Eastern reductions would be sufficient to reach parity. Second, because it would postpone the implementation of most verification measures until after reductions had been taken, the Western side would not be able to verify adequately what was happening to Eastern forces for a number of years.

"Thus, we need, for example, to work together to get agreement on the size of the forces that have to be reduced to get to our agreed levels -- not just agreement on the final levels alone. And we need to agree on what actually constitutes effective verification of the forces to be reduced and the forces that are to remain in Central Europe -- not just agreement that some such measures are necessary. These are fundamental parts of any MBFR agreement. They cannot be overlooked or wished away.

While time has been lost, there are grounds for some optimism. For its part, the West wishes to seize the opportunities that now exist for progress. That is why we are glad that our Eastern colleagues have returned. It is also why we have, in the Western Plenary statement today by the Head of the UK Delegation, Ambassador Simons, invited the East to join us in a patient and businesslike discussion of specific key issues, like verification, where further progress should be attainable.

W F

UNCLASSIFIED

FM STKHM/SCDEL SCDL0238 16MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO ENATO CANMILREP NATO VMBFR GENEV LDN PARIS BONN WSHDC

NDHQOTT/ CPP/ DNACPOL/ DSTRATA

DISTR IDAN IDAG IDD(IDZ IDR RSR RSD R3X RBD RCR RBR

---STKHM CONF: PLENARY 16MAR: CDN STATEMENT

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AME AND HOD:

QUOTE:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

OUR MINISTERS, WHEN THEY WERE HERE IN JANUARY, GAVE HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL EXPRESSION TO WIDELY FELT CONCERNS ABOUT THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. THEY CONFIRMED THE TASK SET OUT IN OUR MANDATE: TO ADOPT CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY TO REDUCE THIS RISK.

EVEN THOUGH THESE ARE STILL EARLY DAYS, ANY ASSESSMENT OF OUR WORK MUST BEGIN FROM THAT DIRECTIVE. IT WILL BE THE YARDSTICK THROUGH THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD IN EVALUATING OUR PROGRESS, IN ACCOUNTING FOR OURSELVES AND OUR EFFORTS--TO OUR GOVERNMENTS, AND TO PUBLIC OPINION IN OUR COUNTRIES WHOSE ASPIRATIONS AND ANXIETIES ARE SO RELEVANT TO OUR CONFERENCE. GREAT EXPECTATIONS ATTEND OUR WORK, AND WE MUST NOT/NOT DISAPPOINT THEM.

HOW HAVE WE DONE SO FAR? IN A WIDE-RANGING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WE HAVE DEVELOPED THE THEMES OUTLINED BY OUR MINISTERS. WE HAVE

...2

PAGE TWO SCDDL0288 UNCLAS

EXPLAINED POSITIONS IN A PROGRESSIVE WAY, ADDING DETAILS HERE, AND EMPHASIZING POINTS THERE. WE HAVE ALSO CLARIFIED SOME IMPORTANT MATTERS. THIS IS A PART OF THE CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING PROCESS. SLOW AND LABORIOUS, PERHAPS, BUT NECESSARY AND INDEED UNAVOIDABLE.

SOME MAY HAVE THOUGHT AT TIMES THAT WE WERE TALKING PAST, RATHER THAN TO, EACH OTHER. I DO NOT/NOT SHARE THAT VIEW. OUR IDEAS HAVE BEEN WIDELY DISCUSSED HERE, IN A MULTIPLICITY OF CONTEXTS OF WHICH THE PLENARY IS ONLY THE MOST FORMAL, AND STATEMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS ENUNCIATED HERE HAVE BEEN WIDELY REPORTED TO AND DISCUSSED IN OUR CAPITALS. AS A RESULT, OUR CONCERNS HAVE BECOME CLEARER, AND WE HAVE BEGUN TO EXAMINE WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT GO ABOUT DEALING WITH THEM. THIS SHARPENING OF PERCEPTION, AND THE DEEPENING OF UNDERSTANDING TO WHICH LEADS US, IS, I SUGGEST, THE VERY ESSENCE OF CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING. AND WE HAVE BEGUN THAT PROCESS, WITHOUT DOUBT.

OF COURSE, WE HAVE NOT/NOT ADOPTED ANY MEASURE. BUT A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS ARE ON THE TABLE ALREADY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI PREPARATORY MEETING, WHEREBY WE AGREED TO INTRODUCE OUR PROPOSALS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE AT ITS FIRST SESSION. IN THE SENSE, WE WELCOME THE PROPOSAL TABLED AT THE END OF THE LAST WEEK BY EIGHT OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES. WE SHALL STUDY THE IDEAS IT CONTAINS CAREFULLY.

...3

PAGE THREE SCDI0288 UNCLAS

HOW FAR DO THE PROPOSALS NOW FORMALLY ON THE TABLE GO IN SHOWING THE WAY TO REDUCING THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE? THEY ARE VARIED, OF COURSE, REFLECTING PARTICULAR SECURITY CONCERNS: AND SOME OF THEM APPEAL TO US MORE THAN OTHERS --AND INDEED SOME APPEAL NOT/NOT AT ALL. BUT THAT IS NORMAL FOR ANY NEGOTIATION, AND TAKING THESE FORMALLY PRESENTED IDEAS AS A WHOLE, THEY REVEAL A REINFORCING COMPLEMENTARITY--AT LEAST OF THE INTENTIONS BEHIND THEM.

THE BASIS PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING MANY OF THESE PROPOSALS IS CLEARLY ROOTED IN THE NATURE OF THE CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING PROCESS: MORE INFORMATION MUST BE MADE AVAILABLE ABOUT MILITARY AFFAIRS SO THAT DECISIONS ARE TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF CLEARER AND MORE ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS OF INTENTIONS. THIS CONGRUENCE OF VIEWS--WHERE IT EXISTS--FORMS IN ITSELF A SOLID BASIS FOR BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEXT SESSION. THE PROPOSALS ALSO SHOW A DETERMINATION TO TACKLE THE ISSUES BEFORE US IN A PRAGMATIC WAY.

THERE IS NOT/NOT, HOWEVER, FULL UNANIMITY ABOUT HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED, IN THE SENSE THAT IN SOME QUARTERS OF THE CONFERENCE THERE SEEMS TO BE A MORE THEORETICAL AND ABSTRACT ASSESSMENT--A LESS PRAGMATIC AND CONCRETE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF SECURITY IN EUROPE. THIS TREND OF THOUGHT SEEMS TO PROCEED FROM RATHER DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS, AND THOSE WHO ARGUE THIS CASE HAVE BEEN

...4

PAGE FOUR SCDL0288 UNCLAS

TELLING US THAT THE COMPLEX EQUATIONS OF MISTRUST AND TENSION IN EUROPE COULD VERY WELL BE WRONG--BECAUSE WE DO NOT/NOT KNOW PRECISELY WHAT THIS APPROACH ENVISAGES BY WAY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS AND CONCRETE RESULTS.

BUT WE CAN SPECULATE. THE ADVOCATES OF A TREATY SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT SIGNING SOMETHING OF THIS NATURE WOULD SET THINGS RIGHT IN EUROPE AS IF BY THE STROKE OF A MAGICIANS WAND.

I RECALLED A FEW WEEKS AGO THAT A TREATY WAS PROPOSED TO US AT THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN BELGRADE. IN FACT, MANY OF THE NOTIONS THAT WE HEARD THEN, AND THAT WE HEAR NOW, GO A LONG WAY BACK: THREE DECADES, IF NOT/NOT FURTHER.

THUS A STRANGE PARADOX HAS EMERGED AT THE CENTRE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE. WHILE CONSTANTLY BEING REMINDED THAT A TOTALLY NEW SITUATION HAS COME INTO BEING, AND THAT RECENT EVENTS HAVE CHANGED THE WHOLE FACE OF EUROPE, WE ARE BEING URGED TO CONSIDER THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ONLY REMEDY IS A VERY OLD ONE: AND INDEED ONE THAT HAS SELDOM BEEN APPLIED IN THE PAST, AND HAS NEVER WORKED WHEN IT HAS.

THE TREATY IDEA OVERLOOKS THE FACT THAT MUCH HAS HAPPENED IN EUROPE IN THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY. WE FIND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE SHOULD LOOK BACKWARD TO CONSIDER A CONCEPT OF YESTERYEAR, AS IF NOTHING HAD CHANGED, WHILE BEING URGED TO LOOK FORWARD TAKING INTO ACCOUNT RECENT EVENTS THAT HAVE, SO THE ARGUMENT RUNS, TRANSFORMED THE STATE OF AFFAIRS ON THE CONTINENT.

...5

PAGE FIVE SCDL0282 UNCLAS

MY DELEGATION, AMONG OTHERS, HAS REPEATEDLY CALLED FOR A NEW AND IMAGINATIVE AND INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF CONFIDENCE. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE MEASURES IN CSCE/SC.1 ARE OF THIS NATURE--AND MANY OF THE OTHER FORMALLY SUBMITTED PROPOSALS WOULD SEEM INTENDED TO US TO LEAD IN THE SAME DIRECTION. THEY ARE MODERN MEANS ADAPTED TO MEET CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS.

THE TREATY CONCEPT IN PLAY IS, HOWEVER, A KIND OF ANTIQUE: CHARMING ENOUGH IN ITS DAY, PERHAPS, BUT NOT/NOT--AS THEY SAY IN THE FURNITURE BUSINESS--NOT/NOT DESIGNED FOR MODERN LIVING. PUT IN OTHER TERMS, DECLARATORY MEASURES SEEM TO US ILL-SUITED TO SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF TODAY'S EUROPEAN REALITIES. A SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF THAT REALITY IS THE IMBALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES ON THE CONTINENT, AND, UNFORTUNATELY, THE MISTRUST WHICH IS SO DEEPLY ROOTED IN THIS IMBALANCE. SO LONG AS THIS DISEQUILIBRIUM PERSISTS, THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE, ARISING FROM MISCALCULATION OF INTENTIONS, OR WEAKNESSES, REMAINS THE ISSUE. AND IT MUST REMAIN AT THE FOREFRONT OF OUR MINDS UNTIL WE FIND A WAY OF RESOLVING IT. LOFTY PRONOUNCEMENTS, EVEN IF INFLATED INTO TREATY FORM, WILL NOT/NOT MAKE IT GO AWAY.

THE CONFIGURATION OF PROPOSALS NOW FORMALLY ON THE TABLE BEFORE US SUGGESTS ONE FAIRLY OBVIOUS CONCLUSION. THE MAJORITY OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES WANT TO GET DOWN TO BUSINESS. THEY WANT TO ADOPT A REGIME OF CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AS

....6

PAGE SIX SCDL0288 UNCLAS

A NECESSARY FIRST STEP TOWARDS REDUCING THE CORROSIVE EFFECTS
ON OUR INTERRELATIONS THAT WE HAVE BEEN SUFFERING FROM AS A
RESULT OF THE MILITARY DISPARITIES AND IMBALANCES TO WHICH I
HAVE REFERRED.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

UUU/006 161340Z SCDL0288

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6283 16MAR84

TØ EXTOTT IDA

INFO CANMILREP NATO VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL GENEV PRMNY WSAW PRGUE LDN

BPEST MOSCO BONN WSHDC BUCST NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/DIPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR IDD IDDZ IDR IMU IDAO IDAN RBD RER

REF OURTEL YBGR6272 14MAR

---WPO PROPOSAL ON REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS

FOLLOWING ARE UK VIEWS ON SUBJECT PROPOSAL.

2.TEXT BEGINS QUOTE

2.THE WARSAW PACT MUST ANTICIPATE A COOL NATO RESPONSE TO
THEIR LATEST PROPOSAL, WHICH OF COURSE IS LARGELY A REPETITION OF
ONES UNSUCCESSFULLY CIRCULATED PREVIOUSLY IN A NUMBER OF FORA,
MOST RECENTLY AT THE CDE. THE WARSAW PACTS PURPOSE IN
RELAUNCHING IT NOW SEEMS DESIGNED TO DEFLECT CRITICISM OF THEIR
OWN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE INF AND START TALKS BY FOCUSING ATTENTION
ON WHAT THEY WILL EXPECT TO BE THE WESTS UNFORTHCOMING RESPONSE.
WE DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS EXPECT MEANINGFUL NEGOTIA-
TIONS GIVEN THEIR REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE IN WORK AT THE UN TO
ACHIEVE GREATER TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION ON DEFENCE SPENDING
AND ON A STANDARDISED REPORTING SYSTEM.

3.ALTHOUGH WE NEED TO REPLY INDIVIDUALLY, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT
THAT THE GENERAL LINES OF OUR APPROACH SHOULD BE AGREED IN NATO
SINCE THE ROMANIAN DEMARCHE WAS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE WARSAW

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR6283 CONF D

PACT AS A WHOLE. WE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WHILE WE FAVOUR REDUCED EXPENDITURE ON ARMAMENTS, CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF THE ROMANIAN PROPOSALS SHOWS THAT THEY MARK NO/NO SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE ON EARLIER ONES, ABOUT WHOSE FLAWS WE HAVE ALREADY MADE OUR RESERVATIONS CLEAR: IN PARTICULAR THEY DO NOT/NOT ADDRESS THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF COMPARABILITY AND VERIFICATION. IT REMAINS IMPRACTICAL TO SEEK AN AGREEMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF GENUINELY OBJECTIVE FIGURES FOR WARSAW PACT DEFENCE SPENDING. IF THE WARSAW PACT WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING PROGRESS, THEY SHOULD BEGIN BY PARTICIPATING LIKE THE WEST ON WORK IN THE UN ON A STANDARDISED REPORTING SYSTEM FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURE. WITH EXISTING FORA IN NEW YORK AND ELSEWHERE, WE SEE NO/NO NEED FOR ESTABLISHING YET A FURTHER SET OF NEGOTIATIONS. DESIRABLE THOUGH THE LIMITATION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE IS WE SHOULD NOT/NOT BE DEFLECTED FROM THE MAIN PURPOSE OF ARMS CONTROL IE THE REDUCTION OF ACTUAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

4. IN OUR PUBLIC LINE, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPLEMENT THE ABOVE BY MAKING CLEAR THAT THE VAST DISCREPANCY BETWEEN OUR ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING AND PUBLIC SOVIET FIGURE UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF A COMMON REPORTING SYSTEM. IF CHALLENGED ABOUT OUR EVIDENCE OF SOVIET FIGURES, THE UK WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN OUR QUOTE BUILDING BLOCK UNQUOTE OR QUOTE DIRECT COSTING UNQUOTE MEANS OF ANALYSIS. WE WOULD ADD THAT, IN VIEW
...3

PAGE THREE YBGR6283 CONF

OF THE MANIFEST IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES, IT IS ABSURD FOR THEM TO SUGGEST THAT THEIR MILITARY EXPENDITURE (WHICH AMOUNTS TO 85 PERCENT OF THE WARSAW PACT TOTAL) HAS NOT/NOT INCREASED IN THE LAST DECADE: AND THAT IT IS SIMILARLY ABSURD TO SUGGEST AS THEY DO THAT RUSSIANS MILITARY EXPENDITURE IS LOWER (SIC) THAN THAT OF THE UK. WE WOULD ALSO POINT OUT THE OPENNESS OF ALLIANCE MEMBERS IN PUBLISHING DETAILS OF OUR OWN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE. TEXT ENDS UNQJCTE.

CCC/270 161655Z YBGR6283

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19
C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0650 16MAR84

TO EXTOTT/IDR

INFO BNATO NDHQOTT/OMND/ADMPOL/GPP/DIPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER/ARCHDEACON
WSHDC

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDDZ IDRL XDV

REF YOURTELS IDR0951 15MAR;0943/0944 14MAR

---CARRINGTON VISIT

LORD CARRINGTON HAS ASKED US TO CONVEY HIS APPRECIATION FOR
EXCELLENT PROGRAMME ARRANGEMENTS SET OUT REFTELS. HE REQUESTS THAT
DETAILS OF DEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON BE PASSED TO BRITISH EMBASSY
THERE AS WELL AS TO USA AUTHORITIES.

2. ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED FOR MEETING WITH MR MULRONEY ARE ALSO
WELCOMED. BECAUSE CARRINGTON HAS TO LEAVE FROM THERE LATE AFTERNOON
FRIDAY, MARCH 23, HE WOULD FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE WERE MEETING TO
TAKE PLACE AT RIDEAU GATE THAN ON HILL, AND HAS ASKED US TO CONVEY
THIS TO MR MULRONEYS OFFICE THROUGH YOU.

CCC/224 161641Z XNGR0650

Man W. Wright O/R
+ M.F.I.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM STKHM/SCDEL SCDL0292 16MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO BNATO CANMILREP NATO VMBFR WSHDC BONN PARIS LDN MOSCO GENEV

NLHQOTT/ CPP/ DNACPOL/ DSTRATA

DISTR IDAN IDAO/IDDZ IDR RGX RBD IDD

REF OURTEL SCDL0291 16MAR

---STKHM CONF:WESTERN CAUCUS 14MAR:REPORT TO NATO COUNCIL(20MAR)

FOLLOWING ARE DRAFT SPEAKING NOTES FOR WESTERN CAUCUS CHAIRMAN

(FRG)REPORT TO NATO COUNCIL 20MAR.QUOTE:

DRAFT ELEMENTS FOR A SHORT REPORT OF THE

CHAIRMAN ON THE FIRST ROUND OF THE CDE

-WE WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH THE COUNCIL.

-AS WE ALL HAVE FAITHFULLY REPORTED ON ALL DEVELOPMENTS IN STOCKHOLM TO OUR CAPITALS AND THROUGH THEM TO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES, THERE IS NO/NO NEED TO INFORM THE COUNCIL ON DETAILS.

-MY REPORT IS AN ATTEMPT

-TO GIVE YOU A SHORT EVALUATION OF THE FIRST ROUND,

-TO MENTION SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WE WILL FACE IN THE NEXT ROUND,

-TO INDICATE IN GENERAL TERMS HOW WE PLAN TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES.

1)-THANKS TO THE GOOD WORK DONE IN THE COUNCIL,THE CSBM WORKING GROUP AND THE OTHER ALLIANCE BODIES,WE WERE ABLE TO INTRODUCE THE WESTERN TABLING PAPER AS THE FIRST DOCUMENT OF THE CONFERENCE.

...2

PAGE TWO SCDL0292 CONFD

-WE MAINTAINED THE INITIATIVE THROUGHOUT THE FIRST ROUND AND SUCCEEDED IN FOCUSING ATTENTION TIME AND AGAIN ON THE WESTERN PROPOSALS.

-WE KEPT IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH NAN DURING THE PREPARATION OF THEIR DOCUMENT.THEIR PAPER REFLECTS ALMOST NONE OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PROPOSALS OF THE WP.

-EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO IMPACT ON THE CONFERENCE WITH PROPAGANDA STATEMENTS FAILED.THEIR PRESENTATIONS WERE NOT/NOT VERY CONVINCING.OUR INSISTENCE ON THE NEED FOR A RATIONAL DIALOGUE FOUND THE SUPPORT OF THE NAN AND FORCED THE WP STATES TO TONE DOWN THEIR POLEMICS.

-THE CAUCUS MET REGULARLY 3 OR 4 TIMES A WEEK AND WORKED WELL TOGETHER,THE MILITARY ADVISORS DID USEFUL WORK ON THE BASIS OF ALLIANCE POSITIONS TO ADVISE HEADS OF DELEGATIONS ON URGENT MATTERS.

-THE MEDIA INTEREST WHICH WAS STRONG AND POSITIVE IN THE BEGINNING DIMINISHED DURING THE COURSE OF THE LAST WEEKS.

2)OUR AIM IN THE NEXT ROUND IS:

-TO CONCENTRATE THE INTEREST OF THE CONFERENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION ON OUR CONCEPT,TO STRESS THE ADVANTAGES OF OUR CONCRETE PROPOSALS,

-TO MAINTAIN AS CLOSE A CONTACT AS POSSIBLE WITH THE NAN INTER ALIA BY STRESSING THE COMMON GROUND OF SC 1 AND SC 3.

...3

PAGE THREE SCDL0292 CONF D

3) WE MAY HAVE TO FACE THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS:

-THE WP-COUNTRIES MAY INTRODUCE A DOCUMENT OF THEIR OWN WHICH WOULD FURTHER DIMINISH THEIR FLEXIBILITY. THEY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO DEAL WITH OUR PROPOSALS UNLESS WE SHOW SOME KIND OF WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THEIR MAIN PROPOSALS: NON-USE OF FORCE AND NO/NO-FIRST-USE.

-THE WP-COUNTRIES MAY TEND TO SUPPORT SOME OF THE CONSTRAINT-PROPOSALS OF THE NAN, PARTICULARLY THE MANOEUVRE CEILINGS AS THEY DISLIKE MOST OF THE OTHER ITEMS OF THE NAN-PAPER. THIS IN TURN MAY LEAD SOME NAN TO SHOW MORE INTEREST FOR CONSTRAINTS THAN WE MAY LIKE.

-THE WP MAY START TO POINT TO THOSE ELEMENTS IN THE WESTERN PACKAGE WHICH FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW ARE NOT/NOT BALANCED (FOR EXMPLE EXCLUSION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES AND TRANSIT FORCES). (THEY HAVE DONE SO ALREADY IN PRIVATE TALKS IN THE FIRST ROUND.)

4) LET ME TRY TO INDICATE HOW WE TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE AND TO AVOID STAGNATION IN STOCKHOLM:

-WE WILL TRY TO MAINTAIN OUR ENDEAVOURS TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF THE CONFERENCE.

-WE PROPOSE TO CONTINUE THE EXPLANATION OF OUR SIX MEASURES IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE THE INTEREST OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONCRETE ACTIONS. WE PLAN TO ADD SLOWLY SOME OF THE DETAILS.

...4

PAGE FOUR SCDL0292 CONF D

-WE WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR COMMON GROUND, ESPECIALLY BY
POINTING TO THE NINE FIRST MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE NAN.
-WE SHOULD INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO SET UP A WORKING GROUP TO
DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH THE PROPOSALS WHICH ARE ON THE
TABLE. WE MAY SETTLE AFTER SOME BARGAINING TO AGREE TO ONE
SINGLE WORKING BODY, A KIND OF WORKING PLENARY, WHERE WE COULD
BEGIN A REAL DIALOGUE WITH QUESTIONS ASKED AND IMMEDIATELY
ANSWERED.

WE SHOULD NOT/NOT EXCLUDE OTHER SOLUTIONS AS LONG AS THEY
SERVE OUR INTERESTS.

5) WE HOPE TO CONTINUE THE EXCELLENT CONSULTATIONS PROCESS WE
HAVE HERE IN BRUSSELS AND IN STOCKHOLM. WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO
THE RESULTS OF THE STUDIES UNDERTAKEN BY VARIOUS COMMITTEES IN
BRUSSELS, PARTICULARLY THE FINALIZATION OF THE MAIN DOCUMENT. MY
COLLEAGUES WILL STRESS SOME OF THE OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS ON
WHICH WE SHALL NEED ADVICE FROM CAPITALS AND THE COUNCIL IN
THE MONTHS TO COME. UNQUOTE.

CCC/006 191033Z SCDL0292



MEMORANDUM

CF

To
A Office of the Under-Secretary

From
De MINA

Security
Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

Reference
Référence

Date

March 15, 1984

Subject
Sujet Parliamentary Report - March 15

DPM/SSEA (2)
MINA (11)
MINE/Jalbert/
Laverdure
MINT/Burbridge/
MacDonald
PMO/Fairbairn
PCO/Fadden/
Elcock/
Mitchell

ON THE HILL

The House met at 11:00 and resumed second reading debate on the Borrowing Authority (Bill C-21).
The DPM/SSEA meets SCEAND this afternoon to defend the Dept's Main Estimates.

Yesterday, Bill Yurko introduced a Private Member's bill to grant a pardon to Louis Riel. The Speaker observed that although the bill could be introduced and read for the first time, debate on second reading stage should not be entered upon until Royal Assent is obtained because the granting of a pardon is the prerogative of the Crown.

SCEAND will meet twice next week in room 269 WB to consider the Main Estimates. At 8:00 p.m. on March 20, Maggie Catley-Carlson will witness for CIDA, on March 22, from 11:00 12:15, it is the turn of Minister Regan. The following Tuesday Minister Blais will again meet Committee at 9:30 a.m.

Minister Gray tabled amendments to the Financial Administration Act (C-22).

Member Statements of Departmental interest: Father Bob Ogle drew attention to the forthcoming conference in Montreal of the Latin American Association for Human Rights and to the presence there of the Vice-Presidents of Bolivia and Ecuador. Father Ogle criticized the Dept of External Affairs for not confirming funding and high-level participation by the Govt of Canada for the conference; Jim Peterson reminded Members of Anatoly Scharansky's continuing imprisonment in the USSR and his deteriorating physical condition.

There were no Q.P. questions of Departmental interest.

SENSE OF THE HOUSE

Economic issues dominated questioning. The Opposition was especially concerned with the effect of the Bank of Canada's decision today to raise the prime rate. John Crosbie quoted a Globe headline in which Minister Lalonde apparently promised no further rise in the bank rate, while Ed Broadbent warned of the dire consequences for small business, producers, homeowners and employment generally.

In other debate, Scott Fennell and Nelson Riis hectored the Ministry over Canadair; Chris Speyer continued to complain about National Revenue's tax collection methods.

Last night's entry into the leadership campaign, John Roberts, spoke to claims that he would sell Canadair. The PM admitted that it was not the Govt's interest to administer troubled corporations like Canadair forever.

Terry Sargeant was outraged that Placido Domingo would be a beneficiary of Govt employment grants when the Met comes to help celebrate Toronto's sesquicentennial. Minister Roberts dismissed the Member as "Fatuous."

D. Colin Robertson
Departmental Assistant

USS MCB
CMR (2) NAX
DMT PED
DMF PPD
CCB PSD
CCBR RBD
SFB RCD
TFB RGB
IFB RQX
EFB RSD
LGB SCD
PGB SCS
SCI
FPR SCH
ACB SFP
ADA SIC
APD SID
APZ SIM
CCBM SIO
CCBA SIS
CGD TAD
CGE TID
CGL UGB
CGS URD
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TO/À • IFB
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • SCEAND: Briefing Material
SUJET

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	March 15, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0235

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

-1-
DISTRIBUTION

As requested, attached is a copy of the basic brief we provided the Minister's Office on the Prime Minister's initiative. As for the proposed Institute, we simply drew attention to the memorandum to the DPM/SSEA of March 14 which commented on the draft bill.

L.A. Delvoje
L.A. Delvoje
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUE

The purpose of this brief is to discuss the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. The PM is interested in seeing if by opening lines of communication to Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals on MBFR and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level in Vienna (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative, but not pursued personally by the PM with other governments, are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

REACTIONS

The reactions of other governments may be roughly summarized as follows:

European allies have given encouraging support. The Western Europeans share his analysis of the dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.

The French were generally supportive, with reservations as to timing. Their statements on the five power conference have been contradictory, but generally reserved. The Germans were positive and generally supportive (and have subsequently endorsed the five power conference idea). The British were generally supportive of the broad purpose, but have reservations about specific proposals (especially the five power conference). The Dutch and Belgians reacted very positively, with some reservations as to timing (they think such an initiative may be most needed in the spring of 1984 once INF deployment has taken place). The Italians were generally supportive and have publicly endorsed the idea of a five power conference. (Also, there have been very positive and fully supportive written responses from the Danes and Norwegians and a very positive reactions from the Spaniards and Turks. The Greeks generally support the initiative, but disagree with NATO's INF deployment.)

PM Nakasone of Japan was very receptive and fully supportive when the PM visited Tokyo on November 19.

Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed PM Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security.

The Chinese are mildly supportive of the broad political purpose. They have not yet agreed to attend a five power conference, but they will participate in preliminary discussions of the idea with the U.N. Secretary General in New York. They argue that the first priority is concentrating pressure on the superpowers to reduce their arms.

The USA has assured the Prime Minister of its support for the broad political objectives he is pursuing in East-West relations, while laying most of the blame for the current state of those relations on Soviet attitudes and actions. The USA administration has reservations about most of the specific arms control measures put forward by the Prime Minister.

U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has commended and encouraged the Prime Minister's efforts.

The Czechoslovaks, East Germans and Romanians, have given general support to the Prime Minister's basic political purposes.

Soviet General Secretary Chernenko described the initiative as useful and practical and encouraged its continuation when he met the Prime Minister. The Soviets agree on the need for political dialogue, but argue that it must be on the basis of equality. They have been non-committal on a five power conference.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (c) the "Brussels Declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- (d) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO ministerial meeting on what actions might be taken to improve them.

There have been additional signs of progress. There has been some moderation of the strident rhetoric of both superpowers, which have recently indicated the importance they attach to political dialogue, President Reagan in his speech of January 15 and General Secretary Chernenko in his meeting with the Prime Minister.

Broad political contact between East and West was re-established at the beginning of the Stockholm Conference for the first time since the acrimonious conclusion of the Madrid Conference last September.

Western political leaders, including the Prime Minister and Prime Minister Thatcher, have gone to the East to open lines of communication.

It has been agreed that the MBFR negotiations will resume in Vienna on March 16.

These are all indications of a change in the deteriorating trend in East-West relations that was apparent in the autumn of 1983.

UNCLASSIFIED

March 12, 1984

IDDZ

IDD

IMD

re Mr. Shenstone's comment at the top of the
attached memo

Could I please ask you to let me have a copy
of the documents which pertain to your section.

Many thanks.


Jean Trowbridge
IFB

001493

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CABINET DU
SECRETÉAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

Office of the Under-Secretary

MEMORANDUM

MINA

Security
Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

Date March 9, 1984

Handwritten notes:
JT -
8
15
9
Mar 27
(insertion)

SCEAND Appearances by Ministers and Departmental Officials
concerning 1984/85 Estimates and Supplementary Estimates (C) 1983/84.

The Steering Committee of SCEAND has provisionally set the following agenda regarding the consideration of the Estimates of External Affairs and CIDA for fiscal year 84/85 and those Supplementary (C) to fiscal year 83/84:

Shea
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March 13 Minister of National Defence 9:30

March 15 DPM/SSEA 3:30-5:00 p.m.

March 20 CIDA 8:00 p.m.

March 22 Minister Regan 11:00 a.m.

March 27 External Affairs (officials) 9:30 a.m.

April 10 Minister Pepin 9:30 a.m.

Other possible dates as yet unscheduled - April 3, 5, 12, 17.

In preparation for these appearances, we would be grateful if Divisions would ensure that the House of Commons briefing material they have submitted to MINA since the resumption of Parliament in January, is current.

Committee members will likely concentrate their questioning on the following areas:

1. Central America: in particular, the efforts and Canadian policy towards Contadora; the disputes between Nicaragua and its neighbouring states; the human rights situation and Canadian aid policies, particularly towards Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua; US and Cuban/Soviet activities in the region; Canadian participation and policy regarding elections.

2. Caribbean: Canadian policy generally, in the wake of Grenada; the level of aid activity; Canadian policy towards Jamaica in light of the recent controversial elections; Canadian aid policies towards Haiti and CIDA's reaction to the recent North-South report.

3. Latin America: the human rights situation and the Canadian response in Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay; Canadian policy regarding the debt situation in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina; Canadian visa requirements in Guyana, etc.

4. Africa: Canadian policy in southern Africa (human rights; aid; trade, etc.); aftermath of the Nujoma visit and Canada's participation in the Namibian contact group; Canadian and human rights policies in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Kenya; general state of relations with the francophonie; Canadian relations with Nigeria following the recent coup; Canadian assistance to the Maghreb and famine situation in other parts of Africa; Canadian policy on the regional conflicts in Mauritania/Algeria, Chad/Libya, Eritrea/Somalia.


5. Western Europe: fish boycott in the UK; boundary negotiations over St. Pierre/Miquelon with France; newsprint; fisheries-Portugal and Spain.

6. Eastern Europe: debt situation in Poland; human rights and the Soviet Union; sale of nuclear reactors and countertrade with Romania.

7. Asia: war in Afghanistan; human rights in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Philippines; trade with Taiwan, including AECL dealings, possible opening of Chamber of Commerce office; Asia-Pacific Foundation; Canadian trade with the region; textiles, shoes.

- 1.
2. 8.) Arms Control and Disarmament: situation regarding PM's peace initiative, Arms Control and Disarmament Centre (as promised in Throne Speech); status of MBFR, INF, START, Stockholm and Geneva disarmament talks; peacekeeping; cruise.
9. United States: trade policy paper and sectoral free trade; various trade irritants (specialty steel, buy America, US reciprocity, lumber, autos, potatoes, textiles, etc); environmental irritants (Garrison, acid rain); Pacific Salmon; Gulf of Maine; extra-territoriality (Bank of Nova Scotia); Orlikow case.
10. Japan: Auto negotiations; sale of LNG and coal; investment.
11. Middle East: general policy; Iran/Iraq, Arab/Israeli disputes; Canadian trade; commitment to Israel; trade; war in Lebanon; PLO.
12. Summary of the contents in the Main Estimates and Supplementary (C).
13. Consular cases outstanding: Bruce Curtis
14. Papal visit
15. UN: Canadian activities in Commission on Human Rights; policy regarding UNESCO.
16. Department of External Affairs: state of reorganization.

Material should be, where possible, prepared on Q. and A. forms. All material must be submitted by 5:00 p.m. Tuesday, March 13.



D. Colin Robertson
Departmental Assistant

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/A **MINA**
 FROM/DE **IDDZ**
 SUBJECT/SUJET **New Indira Gandhi Peace Foundation and PM's initiative.**
 ATTACHMENT **Letter for signature of DPM/SSEA**
 PIÈCE JOINTE

Security Sécurité	Unclassified
File Dossier	IDDZ-0239
Date	March 15, 1984.

DISTRIBUTION	RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions) RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION (Noms des individus/Directions)	ACTION/SUITE À DONNER									
MINA (2) FILE CMR FPR M. FILE DIARY		For signature, please, if you agree. <div data-bbox="958 712 1469 1064" data-label="Form"> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>RETURN TO REVOYER AU</td> <td>2100</td> <td>FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORTÉ AU DOSSIER</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ACC</td> <td>REF</td> <td>DATE</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FILE REQUIRÉ BY/DEMANDÉ POUR</td> <td colspan="2">28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission</td> </tr> </table> </div> <p><i>L.A. Delvoie</i> L.A. Delvoie Chairman Task Force Working Group</p>	RETURN TO REVOYER AU	2100	FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORTÉ AU DOSSIER	ACC	REF	DATE	FILE REQUIRÉ BY/DEMANDÉ POUR	28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission	
RETURN TO REVOYER AU	2100	FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORTÉ AU DOSSIER									
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TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINÉ AU DOSSIER

EXT 401



RECEIVED - REÇU
FEB 22 1984
IN IDD

FROM DE CMR/Brunton

File No. (originator) — Dossier n° (source)

TO A IDR/Francis IDA

File No. (addressee) — Dossier n° (destinataire)

Subject - Objet Privy Council Office Correspondence

Would you please check your records to see if a reply was done to the letter from Edward McWhinney (re: Proposed Indira Gandhi Int'l Peace Foundation), which was referred to you January 30, 1984 from the Privy Council Office (PCO#4019 042).

Could you please forward a copy of the reply to CMR (B-3).

Signature

Date February 21, 1984

Telephone 3-6487

Reply - Réponse

Please find attached copy of the letter of March 28, 1984 (IDDZ-0239) signed by DPM/SSEA.

7540-21-029-0717

Signature

Date

Telephone

1 ADDRESSEE DESTINATAIRE

Please add reply — Keep this copy and return copy 2 to originator.
Inscrire la réponse — Garder cette copie et expédier la copie 2 à l'initiateur


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External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada / Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES
ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

From / De Prof. Edward McWhinney B.C.		No. / N° A 05193
Subject / Sujet U. Simon Fraser re new Indira Gandhi Peace Foundation and PM,s peace initiative etc.		Action div./Dir. responsable <i>IDA</i> IDDZ cc <i>PSR</i>
Letter dated/Lettre en date du <i>84-01-16</i>	Date rec'd in MINA / Date de réception à MINA <i>84-01-23</i>	Date sent to div. / Date d'envoi à la dir. <i>84-01-23</i>
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by / L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par		Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s) 84-01-31
Comments/Commentaires		

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA / Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu <i>January 23/84</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of / Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable <i>J. McNEE</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division / Réponse de la direction	Disposition
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action / Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date MAR 23 1984
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA Original Signed by / Original signé par ALLAN J. MacEACHEN



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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES
ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

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Letter dated/Lettre en date du 84-01-16	Date rec'd in MINA / Date de réception à MINA 84-01-23	Date sent to div. / Date d'envoi à la dir. 84-01-23
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par Comments/Commentaires		84-01-31

ACTION REQUIRED / ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE / POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
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ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT	5-1047



A-05193



SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY, BURNABY, B.C., CANADA V5A 1S6
POLITICAL SCIENCE; 291-4293

January 16, 1984

Hon. Allan J. MacEachen, M.P.
Secretary of State for
External Affairs
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0G2

Dear Allan:

I am taking the liberty of sending you, herewith, copy of a note that I have sent to the Prime Minister, concerning discussions I had in New Delhi in late December with my friend, Judge Nagendra Singh of the World Court, as to the new Indira Gandhi Peace Foundation. You will note that the Indian initiatives closely parallel Prime Minister Trudeau's own recent initiatives as to peace, security, and nuclear disarmament, and no doubt were partly inspired by them. I think that, with some help, the two initiatives could be rendered fully complementary, with gain to us all at this most difficult and dangerous point of time in international relations.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ted".

Edward McWhinney, Q.C.
Professor of International Law & Relations
Membre de l'Institut de Droit International

EMcW*mp

Enclosure





SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY, BURNABY, B.C., CANADA V5A 1S6
POLITICAL SCIENCE 291 4293

January 16, 1984

PERSONAL

Rt. Hon. P.-E. Trudeau, M.P.
Prime Minister
Parliament House
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A9

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was in New Delhi in middle and late December meeting with the Indian Law Commission and various Indian Government officials, and also giving some public lectures under University and other auspices. Nagendra Singh, who is a Judge of the World Court at The Hague, and who chaired one of my public lectures in New Delhi, to the Indian Society of International Law of which he is President, raised with me the subject of the proposed new Indira Gandhi International Peace Foundation, whose goals seem very, very close to those contained in your own current peace initiative. Nagendra Singh is chairman of the establishment committee of the Indira Gandhi Foundation and already has pledges of collaboration from various Universities around the World - from Cambridge, Columbia, Heidelberg, Paris, Moscow, to list only a few of them. He has now sought, through me, the collaboration of Simon Fraser University and our President should be replying to him very soon.

The idea of the Indira Gandhi Peace Foundation has aroused intense interest in India. Apart from the tribute to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that is involved, Nagendra Singh is a key member of the Indian Establishment and shares their concerns about the absence of real dialogue today between the two superpowers, the renewed nuclear armaments race, and the comparative importance of international institutions to repair the break-down of detente. Are these not also your own concerns?

My reasons for writing to you now, apart from signalling to you the fact of Nagendra Singh's welcome proposal which so closely parallels your own thinking, as I see it, is that some recent Press statements have suggested you may be prepared, as a part of our Government's commitment to peace and disarmament, to finance fundamental academic-scientific research on peace and security and disarmament questions. If this is so, my own University, Simon Fraser University, could easily undertake such research and study responsibilities on nuclear and general disarmament and its relation to security issues

Continued on Page 2....



Rt. Hon. P.-E. Trudeau, M.P.

January 16, 1984

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and the peace processes generally. The School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi has, indeed, expressed keen interest in developing joint Canadian-Indian research in these fields, on a collaborative basis between our two Universities. They would, of course, bear the costs of the Indian part of any such work.

If you think the idea fruitful and it in fact comes within your own envisaged development of our Government's current Peace initiative, then I would be pleased to take the matter further. I wonder if we should not, in fact, consider developing within Canada and some Canadian University something very like the new Indira Gandhi Institute and having the same basic objectives.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,



Edward McWhinney, Q.C.
Professor of International Law & Relations
Membre de l'Institut de Droit International

EMcW*mp

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

March 15, 1984.

IDDZ-0234

Ms. Carol Seaborn, Staff
Parliamentary Centre for
Foreign Affairs and
Foreign Trade
275 Slater, 5th Floor
Ottawa, Ontario

Dear Ms. Seaborn:

... Attached are the final briefing notes on the
Prime Minister's initiative and the Stockholm Conference.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Smith".

fn Gary J. Smith
Task Force Working Group

Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité
et sur le désarmement en Europe, Stockholm

La Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe, qui a débuté le 17 janvier 1984, est une importante composante du processus multilatéral engagé par la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE). Grâce aux initiatives occidentales, la Conférence de Stockholm se déroule sur la base du mandat convenu à la Réunion sur les Suites de la CSCE qui s'est achevée à Madrid en septembre 1983. Les trente-cinq Etats signataires de l'Acte final d'Helsinki y prennent part.

Le lien entre la Conférence de Stockholm et le processus de la CSCE est nettement défini dans le mandat de la Conférence adopté à Madrid. Ainsi, dans le cadre de la CSCE, une prochaine réunion de suivi comme celle tenue à Madrid - par exemple la réunion prévue à Vienne en 1986 - pourrait décider du passage à la phase suivante de la Conférence. Il sera ainsi possible d'éviter ce que ni les pays occidentaux ni les participants neutres et non alignés ne pourraient jamais accepter, à savoir que les discussions militaires des Trente-cinq ne tiennent pas compte des autres aspects de l'Acte final d'Helsinki et, de façon plus précise, du respect des droits de l'homme.

Une réunion préparatoire à la Conférence a été tenue à Helsinki en octobre 1983: on y a alors convenu d'un ordre du jour et de modalités pour la tenue de la Conférence de Stockholm. La première phase de cette Conférence sera consacrée à la négociation et à l'adoption d'une série de mesures de confiance et de sécurité se complétant mutuellement. Ces mesures doivent être des actions concrètes visant à réduire le risque d'affrontement militaire en Europe. Une future réunion sur les Suites de la CSCE étudiera d'autres voies et moyens appropriés par lesquels les 35 Etats participants pourront poursuivre leurs efforts en vue d'assurer la sécurité et le désarmement en Europe.

Les préoccupations justifiant des négociations sur le désarmement nucléaire - qui par leur nature dépassent l'aspect régional - ne devraient pas masquer la menace posée par le déséquilibre des forces conventionnelles en Europe. C'est en effet là que se trouve la plus importante concentration de forces conventionnelles dans le monde, et l'Union soviétique et ses alliés y ont une nette supériorité. Ce qui pose un important danger d'instabilité politique et militaire en Europe. Toutefois, au contraire des armes nucléaires, les forces conventionnelles se prêtent à une approche régionale, mais à la condition que toute l'Europe ait son mot à dire, y compris toute la partie européenne de l'Union soviétique. Ainsi, la Conférence de Stockholm aura pour objectif de réduire le risque d'une attaque surprise en

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Europe. Elle devrait également rendre plus difficile le recours à la force militaire à des fins d'intimidation politique, et réduire le risque que des mauvais calculs, des accidents ou des mauvaises interprétations ne mènent à des situations dangereuses, dont le recours à la force.

La Conférence de Stockholm ne vient évidemment pas remplacer les pourparlers sur des réductions mutuelles et équilibrées des forces en Europe (MBFR), qui poursuivent des objectifs différents, regroupent d'autres participants et couvrent une zone distincte. Elle ne peut non plus remplacer les négociations FNI et START de Genève, que les pays occidentaux espèrent voir reprendre un jour. Mais en ce qui concerne les forces conventionnelles, la Conférence de Stockholm offre une importante possibilité d'ouvrir un dialogue efficace entre les trente-cinq pays participants sur des problèmes qui, jusqu'à maintenant, n'ont été que partiellement traités. La Conférence de Stockholm est donc une importante étape dans le débat sur la sécurité en Europe.

La politique du Canada en matière de sécurité est fondée sur la dissuasion par la défense collective au sein de l'Otan et de Norad, sur le règlement pacifique des différends ainsi que sur la recherche de mesures vérifiables de contrôle des armements. A notre avis, le problème de la sécurité en Europe est autant d'ordre politique que militaire. L'objectif ultime n'est pas seulement d'éviter le déclenchement d'une guerre, mais également d'assurer que l'Union soviétique n'utilise pas sa force militaire comme moyen d'intimidation politique. Les tensions entre blocs sont aggravées par la dimension militaire, mais ne sont pas créées par elle. L'impasse des efforts de contrôle des armements en Europe n'est pas attribuable à une absence d'idées techniques, mais plutôt à l'écart qui existe entre la stratégie militaire et la détermination politique. Les négociations, qui s'attachent à ce que l'autre partie peut faire plutôt qu'à ce qu'elle entend faire, sont lentement allées à la dérive: et c'est justement ce sentiment de "dérive" qui inquiète le Canada.

Alors que les négociations MBFR se sont concentrées sur les capacités militaires, la Conférence de Stockholm se penchera sur les intentions, par le biais des mesures de confiance et de sécurité. De cette façon, elle assure un lien entre l'instauration de la confiance aux plans militaire et politique et, en ce sens, offre la possibilité de donner un nouvel élan politique à la maîtrise des armements en Europe. C'est pourquoi la Conférence recherchera des moyens de promouvoir la confiance qui, en limitant les options de recours à la force, relèvent davantage de l'intention politique que de la stratégie militaire. Si la guerre est en elle-même une action politique, l'effort pour l'éviter doit lui aussi constituer une action politique. Le Canada a pour position que les négociations de Stockholm devraient toujours être guidées par un sentiment de volonté politique, y compris des contacts de haut niveau lors des moments décisifs.

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Le mandat de la Conférence de Stockholm, comme il a été suggéré par les pays occidentaux à Madrid et finalement accepté avec l'appui des participants neutres et non alignés, prévoit une approche à deux phases. La première sera limitée à une entente sur des mesures de confiance et de sécurité qui seront militairement significatives, politiquement contraignantes, assorties de formes adéquates de vérification et s'appliquant de l'Atlantique à l'Oural. Pour être militairement significatives, ces mesures devront donc contribuer véritablement à renforcer la sécurité des nations d'Europe. L'expression "politiquement contraignantes" signifie que chaque nation doit s'engager envers les mesures adoptées par tous. La vérification constituera en elle-même un facteur important de l'instauration de la confiance, étant donné que tout refus de l'accepter soulèvera autant de méfiance que la violation des mesures. Enfin, parce que tous les participants devraient être traités d'une manière égale, les mesures couvriront l'ensemble de la zone. Aucune disposition convenue ne devrait être assujettie à des contraintes géographiques.

La première phase de la Conférence aura pour tâche d'établir un code de conduite touchant les forces militaires conventionnelles en Europe. Le facteur clé sera une plus grande ouverture et une plus grande prévisibilité de façon à réduire le secret et l'incertitude qui caractérisent actuellement les relations. De plus, si nous pouvons renforcer le climat de confiance mutuelle en améliorant notre connaissance des forces présentes et en réglant certaines des importantes questions de vérification, nous pourrions ainsi ouvrir des possibilités de nouveaux progrès en ce qui touche le désarmement. De fait, la deuxième phase de la Conférence, qui se tiendra à un moment et à un endroit encore indéterminés, s'attachera à élaborer des mesures de désarmement en supposant que la première phase justifie la poursuite du processus.

Le Canada et ses alliés ont préparé des propositions touchant un ensemble de mesures de confiance et de sécurité qui, prises ensemble, tenteront pour la première fois de renforcer sensiblement la confiance mutuelle en Europe. Les propositions occidentales, présentées officiellement le 24 janvier, s'inspireront quantitativement et qualitativement des mesures de confiance contenues dans l'Acte final d'Helsinki. Mais elles les dépasseront également sous nombre d'aspects importants. Nous proposerons des mesures qui prévoient une plus grande ouverture en ce qui touche les renseignements militaires essentiels, un délai plus long pour la notification d'une plus vaste gamme d'activités militaires, des échanges obligatoires d'observateurs à d'importantes activités militaires ainsi que des moyens de vérifier tout accord conclu.

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Ces mesures permettraient d'assurer que les activités militaires courantes d'autres participants européens ne posent pas une menace, et rendraient plus difficile à cacher toute préparation inhabituelle à l'engagement d'hostilités. Les mesures occidentales traitent également d'un problème pratique qui découle d'une confiance mutuelle actuellement limitée: c'est-à-dire, de la façon de traiter les cas d'urgence ou les accidents qui pourraient déclencher des crises en Europe.

Les mesures de confiance et de sécurité que nous proposons ne transformeront pas du jour au lendemain les relations Est-Ouest. Mais elles prévoient des initiatives pratiques et réalistes pour renforcer la confiance que les forces militaires maintenues en temps de paix ne le sont que pour la défense, et non pour l'attaque. Elles constitueront des contributions sérieuses et concrètes à la sécurité et à la stabilité, et non des déclarations de bonnes intentions vagues et invérifiables. Le Canada espère que ses interlocuteurs à Stockholm sauront faire preuve d'une attitude suffisamment constructive pour permettre des résultats concrets qui, même s'ils ne modifient pas immédiatement le sérieux déséquilibre qui existe actuellement au niveau des forces conventionnelles en Europe, le rendra moins menaçant pour les pays en cause.

De façon plus précise, les mesures occidentales renforceront la confiance et la sécurité:

- en prévoyant un échange d'information sur les niveaux et les déploiements de forces militaires;
- en établissant nettement un modèle de comportement militaire normal par la notification, rendant ainsi difficiles à cacher les préparatifs inhabituels visant le déclenchement d'hostilités ou la prise de mesures d'intimidation;
- en établissant un système de vérification, d'observation et d'inspection qui permettra à tous les participants de confirmer que ces activités ne les menacent pas.

Le Canada et les pays occidentaux représentés à Stockholm seront bien sûr disposés à envisager d'autres mesures conçues pour réduire le risque d'une attaque surprise et pour renforcer la confiance mutuelle, conformément aux critères convenus à Madrid.

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Après la première semaine de la Conférence de Stockholm, au moment où les ministres étaient présents, les participants se sont attaqués à un programme de réunions quotidiennes entrecoupées de nombreux échanges bilatéraux. Les pays occidentaux ont présenté leur proposition le 24 janvier 1984, et la Roumanie en a présenté une le lendemain. Il a fallu attendre au 31 janvier avant que l'Union soviétique n'indique ce qu'elle souhaitait voir inclure dans un accord négocié. Jusqu'à présent, les pays neutres et non-alignés n'ont pas été capables de s'entendre sur une proposition commune. Bien que les pays du Pacte de Varsovie aient continué publiquement de dénoncer vigoureusement les Etats-Unis, le ton est un peu moins dur qu'on ne s'y attendait.

Dans les déclaration qu'il a faites jusqu'à maintenant, le Canada a attiré l'attention sur la nécessité d'établir des dispositions viables en matière de vérification, quelles que soient les mesures finalement acceptées, si l'on veut véritablement améliorer la sécurité en Europe. Il a en outre souligné qu'une plus grande ouverture (c'est-à-dire une plus grande transparence), qui permettraient une meilleure connaissance de la situation et des évaluations plus fiables, se trouvait au coeur même de l'établissement de mesures de confiance.

En ce sens, la confiance est un préalable au ralentissement de la course aux armements et à l'introduction de limites à la politique d'armement.

Quoique l'Union soviétique n'ait pas présenté de proposition officielle, le délégué soviétique, à l'occasion d'un discours prononcé le 31 janvier, a exposé six "initiatives", dont cinq de nature déclaratoire: engagement à ne pas recourir en premier aux armes nucléaires, non-recours à la force, gel et réduction des budgets militaires, zones exemptes d'armes chimiques et zones dénucléarisées. Depuis le début de la Conférence, les représentants soviétiques ont laissé savoir clairement que leur priorité absolue était la conclusion d'un traité entre les deux blocs sur le non-recours à la force, et que si cela était accepté par les autres, l'URSS étudierait alors la possibilité d'élargir encore la portée des mesures de confiance contenues dans l'Acte final d'Helsinki. Même s'il est encourageant d'entendre les Soviétiques faire allusion à la possibilité d'en arriver à des résultats concrets à Stockholm, le fait qu'il s'agisse de propositions déclaratoires, mises de l'avant dans le but de contrer la détérioration de la sécurité créée par le déploiement des euromissiles, indique que les Soviétiques ont une conception très différente de la nôtre de ce que seraient des résultats utiles, et que les négociations que nous avons entreprises, quoique utiles, seront laborieuses.

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La politique du Canada en matière de sécurité est fondée sur la dissuasion par la défense collective au sein de l'Otan et de Norad, sur le règlement pacifique des différends ainsi que sur la recherche de mesures vérifiables de contrôle des armements. A notre avis, le problème de la sécurité en Europe est autant d'ordre politique que militaire. L'objectif ultime n'est pas seulement d'éviter le déclenchement d'une guerre, mais également d'assurer que l'Union soviétique n'utilise pas sa force militaire comme moyen d'intimidation politique. Les tensions entre blocs sont aggravées par la dimension militaire, mais ne sont pas créées par elle. L'impasse des efforts de contrôle des armements en Europe n'est pas attribuable à une absence d'idées techniques, mais plutôt à l'écart qui existe entre la stratégie militaire et la détermination politique. Les négociations, qui s'attachent à ce que l'autre partie peut faire plutôt qu'à ce qu'elle entend faire, sont lentement allées à la dérive: et c'est justement ce sentiment de "dérive" qui inquiète le Canada.

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contribuer véritablement à renforcer la sécurité des nations d'Europe. L'expression "politiquement contraignantes" signifie que chaque nation doit s'engager envers les mesures adoptées par tous. La vérification constituera en elle-même un facteur important de l'instauration de la confiance, étant donné que tout refus de l'accepter soulèvera autant de méfiance que la violation des mesures. Enfin, parce que tous les participants devraient être traités d'une manière égale, les mesures couvriront l'ensemble de la zone. Aucune disposition convenue ne devrait être assujettie à des contraintes géographiques.

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interlocuteurs à Stockholm sauront faire preuve d'une attitude suffisamment constructive pour permettre des résultats concrets qui, même s'ils ne modifient pas immédiatement le sérieux déséquilibre qui existe actuellement au niveau des forces conventionnelles en Europe, le rendra moins menaçant pour les pays en cause.

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Le Canada et les pays occidentaux représentés à Stockholm seront bien sûr disposés à envisager d'autres mesures conçues pour réduire le risque d'une attaque surprise et pour renforcer la confiance mutuelle, conformément aux critères convenus à Madrid.

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Dans les déclarations qu'il a faites jusqu'à maintenant, le Canada a attiré l'attention sur la nécessité d'établir des dispositions viables en matière de vérification, quelles que soient les mesures finalement acceptées, si l'on veut véritablement améliorer la sécurité en Europe. Il a en outre souligné qu'une plus grande ouverture (c'est-à-dire une plus grande transparence), qui permettraient une meilleure connaissance de la situation et des évaluations plus fiables, se trouvait au coeur même de l'établissement de mesures de confiance.

En ce sens, la confiance est un préalable au ralentissement de la course aux armements et à l'introduction de limites à la politique d'armement.

Quoique l'Union soviétique n'ait pas présenté de proposition officielle, le délégué soviétique, à l'occasion d'un discours prononcé le 31 janvier, a exposé six "initiatives", dont cinq de nature déclaratoire: engagement à ne pas recourir en premier aux armes nucléaires, non-recours à la force, gel et réduction des budgets militaires, zones exemptes d'armes chimiques et zones dénucléarisées. Depuis le début de la Conférence, les représentants soviétiques ont laissé savoir clairement que leur priorité absolue était la conclusion d'un traité entre les deux blocs sur le non-recours à la force, et que si cela était accepté par les autres, l'URSS étudierait alors la possibilité d'élargir encore la portée des mesures de confiance contenues dans l'acte final d'Helsinki. Même s'il est encourageant d'entendre les Soviétiques faire allusion à la possibilité d'en arriver à des résultats concrets à Stockholm, le fait qu'il s'agisse de propositions déclaratoires, mises de l'avant dans le but de contrer la détérioration de la sécurité créée par le déploiement des euromissiles, indique que les Soviétiques ont une conception très différente de la nôtre de ce que seraient des résultats utiles, et que les négociations que nous avons entreprises, quoique utiles, seront laborieuses.

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe (CCSBMDE), which opened on January 17, 1984 is a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). As the result of Western initiatives, the Stockholm Conference is being conducted on the basis of the mandate agreed at the CSCE Follow-up Meeting concluded in Madrid in September 1983. The thirty-five signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act are taking part.

The link between the Stockholm Conference and the CSCE process is clearly defined by the Conference mandate adopted in Madrid. Thus, in the framework of the CSCE, at an upcoming follow-up meeting like that held in Madrid, for example, the one scheduled for Vienna in 1986, could decide the transition to the next stage of the CCSBMDE. It will thus be possible to avoid what neither the West nor the Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA) participants could ever accept, that the military discussions of the Thirty-Five not take account of the other aspects of the Helsinki Final Act and, in particular, human rights.

A preparatory meeting for the Conference was held in Helsinki in October 1983, at which time an agenda and modalities for the CCSBMDE were agreed. The first stage of the Stockholm Conference will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM). CSBMs are to be concrete measures to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. A future CSCE follow-up meeting will consider other appropriate ways and means for the Thirty-Five Participating States to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe.

The preoccupations justifying nuclear disarmament negotiations, which by their nature go beyond regions, should not hide the threat posed by the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe. The world's largest concentration of conventional forces is located there and the Soviet Union and its allies have a clear superiority in these forces. This contributes significantly to the risk of political and military instability in Europe. However, unlike nuclear weapons, conventional forces lend themselves to a regional approach, but on the condition that all of Europe is involved, including the entire European part of the Soviet Union. Thus, it will be the goal of the Stockholm Conference to reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe. It should also make more difficult the use of military force for the purposes of political intimidation and reduce the risk that

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miscalculations, accidents or misinterpretations lead to dangerous situations, including the use of force.

The CCSBMDE naturally is not a substitute for MBFR, which has different objectives, participants and a separate zone of application. It also cannot replace the Geneva INF and START negotiations which Western states hope will eventually resume. For the conventional forces, however, the Stockholm Conference offers an important opportunity to open an effective dialogue among thirty-five countries on problems which up until now have only been partially treated. The Conference in Stockholm is thus a major event in the debate on the security of Europe.

Canadian security policy is based on deterrence through collective defence in NATO and NORAD, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the pursuit of verifiable measures of arms control. In our view, the problem of European security is as much political as military. The ultimate goal is not only to avoid the outbreak of war but also to ensure that the Soviet Union does not translate its military might into an intimidating political influence. Tensions between blocs are aggravated by the military dimension but are not created by it. Deadlock in European arms control efforts has not been caused by any lack of technical ideas, but by the gap between military strategy and political purpose. Negotiations which are preoccupied by what the other side can do, instead of what it intends to do, have drifted on, and it is this sense of "getting nowhere" that has caused Canadian concern.

While the MBFR negotiations have concentrated on military capabilities, the Stockholm Conference will address intentions through CSBMs. In this way the Stockholm Conference provides a link between military and political confidence-building and in this sense offers an opportunity to restore the political impetus to arms control in Europe. The Conference, accordingly, will deal with ways to promote confidence which, in limiting options for the use of force, are more a matter of political intent than military strategy. If war itself is a political action, the effort to avoid war must by the same token be a political action. It is the Canadian position that the Stockholm negotiations should be guided at all times by a sense of political direction, including high-level contacts at decisive moments.

The mandate of the CCSBMDE, as suggested by the West in Madrid and finally adopted with the support of the Neutral and Non-Aligned participants, envisions a two-stage approach. The first will be limited to agreement of

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confidence- and security-building measures, which are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable and applicable from the Atlantic to the Urals. This means that to be militarily significant, CSBMs must make some real progress in improving the security of the nations of Europe. Politically binding means that each nation must acknowledge the commitment to the measures adopted by all. Verification will itself constitute an important factor in building confidence, as refusal to accept it will raise suspicions in the same manner as a violation of the measures. Finally, because all participants should be treated on an equal basis, the measures will apply consistently throughout the zone. No provision agreed to should be subject to geographical limitations.

In short, the task of the first stage of the Conference will be to develop a code of conduct concerning conventional military forces in Europe. A key factor will be more openness, less secrecy; more predictability and less uncertainty. In addition, if we can improve the atmosphere of mutual trust by increasing the knowledge of present forces and by resolving some of the important issues of verification, this could open up prospects for new progress in disarmament. In fact, the second stage of the Conference, for which a time and venue have not yet been selected, is envisaged as seeking measures of disarmament assuming that the first stage achieves a sufficient degree of success to warrant moving on.

Canada and its allies have prepared proposals for a package of CSBMs which, taken together, will try for the first time significantly to enhance mutual confidence in Europe. The Western proposals which were formally tabled 24 January will build, quantitatively and qualitative, on the Confidence Building Measures contained in the Helsinki Final Act. But they will also go considerably beyond them in important ways. We will propose measures which envisage more openness about basic military information, earlier notice of a wider range of military activities, mandatory rather than voluntary exchanges of observers at important military activities and ways to verify any agreements reached.

These measures would promote assurance that the routine military activities of other participants in Europe are not threatening, and make unusual preparation for hostilities more difficult to conceal. The Western package also addresses a practical problem which arises from the present limited mutual confidence: that is, how to deal with emergencies or accidents which could spark crises in Europe.

The CSBMs which we are proposing will not transform East-West relations overnight. But they envisage practical

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and realistic steps to increase confidence that military forces in peacetime are intended only for defence and not attack. They will be concrete solid contributions to security and stability and not vague and unverifiable declarations of good intentions. Canada hopes that its interlocutors at the Stockholm Conference will show a sufficiently constructive attitude which will permit concrete results. Such results, even if they do not immediately modify the serious imbalance of conventional forces in Europe today, will at least make them less menacing in the perception of the countries involved.

Specifically, the Western measures would enhance trust and security by:

- providing for an exchange of information about the levels and deployment of military forces;
- establishing a clear pattern of normal military behaviour through notification, thus making unusual preparations for hostilities or intimidation difficult to conceal;
- setting up a system of verification, observation and inspection that will allow all participating states to confirm that activities are unthreatening.

Canada and the other Western participants at the CCSBMDE will, of course, be prepared to consider other measures designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack and to enhance mutual confidence consistent with the criteria agreed by all participants in Madrid.

Following the opening week when Ministers were present, the Stockholm Conference has settled down to a work schedule of daily meetings punctuated by numerous bilateral exchanges. The Western proposal was tabled on January 24, 1984 followed the next day by a Romanian one. It was not until January 31 that the Soviet Union gave an indication of what it wished to see included in a negotiated agreement. To date the NNA have not been able to agree on a common submission. Although the WPO participants have continued publicly to be harshly critical of the United States, the level of rhetoric has been slightly less than originally expected.

In statements to the Conference to date, Canada has drawn attention to the need to establish viable verification provisions for whatever measures are eventually agreed if security in Europe is to be enhanced in a real way. We have also pointed out that more openness (i.e., "transparency") resulting in greater knowledge and more reliable assessments were at the very heart of the confidence-building process.

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In this sense, confidence itself is a pre-requisite for constraining the pace of military build-up and inducing limits in armaments policy.

While the Soviet Union has not presented a formal proposal, the Soviet Delegate, in a speech on January 31, outlined six "initiatives" for consideration, five of which were declaratory in nature (no first use of nuclear weapons, no use of force, freeze and reduction of military budgets, chemical weapons free zones, nuclear weapon free zones). Since the beginning of the Conference the Soviet representatives have made it clear that their first priority is a bloc to bloc treaty on the renunciation of force and if that was accepted by the others then the USSR would consider further expansion of the CBMS contained in the Helsinki Final Act. While the Soviet references to the possibility of achieving concrete results in Stockholm are encouraging, the context in which they are put forward (i.e., declaratory proposals are promoted as the way to counter the deterioration of security created by the INF deployments) shows that the Soviet conception of useful results is very different from ours and that the negotiations that we have undertaken will be a difficult though not a barren one.

PROPOSITION SOUMISE PAR LES DÉLÉGATIONS DE LA BELGIQUE, DU CANADA, DU DANEMARK, DE LA FRANCE, DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE D'ALLEMAGNE, DE LA GRECE, DE L'ISLANDE, DE L'ITALIE, DU LUXEMBOURG, DES PAYS-BAS, DE LA NORVEGE, DU PORTUGAL, DE L'ESPAGNE, DE LA TURQUIE, DU ROYAUME-UNI ET DES ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE

Mesures de confiance et de sécurité

- Rappelant que la Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe est partie intégrante du processus engagé par la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe et que, selon le Document de clôture de Madrid, l'objectif de la première phase de la Conférence est d'adopter une série de mesures de confiance et de sécurité se complétant mutuellement;
- Les États susmentionnés sont fermement décidés à rechercher l'adoption de mesures susceptibles de donner plus d'ouverture et de prévisibilité aux activités militaires afin de réduire le risque d'une attaque surprise, d'atténuer la menace de conflit armé en Europe résultant de mésententes et de mauvais calculs, et d'empêcher le recours à la force à des fins d'intimidation politique;
- La mise en application et la vérification de telles mesures, ainsi que le respect des engagements internationaux déjà pris, favoriseraient la stabilité, contribueraient au maintien de la paix et pourraient ouvrir des possibilités de nouveaux progrès en matière de désarmement;
- Ayant ces buts à l'esprit et se conformant au mandat de la Conférence, les États susmentionnés proposent les mesures de confiance et de sécurité suivantes:

I. MESURES D'INFORMATION

Mesure 1: Echange d'informations militaires

Au début de chaque année civile, les États participants conviennent d'échanger des renseignements sur la structure de leurs forces terrestres et aéroterrestres dans la zone d'application des mesures convenues, tel que prévu dans le mandat de la Conférence.

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Des renseignements seront également fournis sur les règlements appliqués dans la zone CDE en ce qui touche les personnels militaires accrédités.

Une clarification de ces informations pourra être demandée par les moyens appropriés.

L'information ainsi échangée servira de base à d'autres mesures touchant les activités militaires.

II. MESURES DE STABILISATION

Mesure 2: Échange de programmes d'activités militaires soumises à la notification préalable

Les Etats participants échangeront les calendriers annuels de toutes les activités militaires dans la zone CDE qui devront faire l'objet d'une notification préalable en vertu de toute autre mesure de confiance et de sécurité. Il ne sera pas nécessaire d'annoncer les modifications au calendrier si une activité notifiable constitue un ajout ou un changement; cette information sera fournie lors de la notification proprement dite.

Une clarification de l'information contenue dans le programme annuel pourra être demandée par les moyens appropriés.

Mesure 3: Notification des activités militaires

Les Etats participants donneront 45 jours à l'avance une notification des activités suivantes entreprises par la zone CDE:

- Activités terrestres hors garnison.

Lorsque une ou plusieurs divisions terrestres ou unités équivalentes ou troupes terrestres de 6 000 hommes ou plus non regroupées en une division, ou forces comprenant plus qu'un nombre spécifié de chars de bataille lourds, ou de véhicules blindés de transport de troupes ou autres véhicules de bataille de l'infanterie mécanisée mènent une activité commune sous un commandement intégré, qu'il s'agisse d'une activité indépendante ou combinée à un soutien aérien et/ou amphibie.

- Activités de mobilisation.

Lorsque des effectifs de 25 000 hommes ou plus ou les éléments de combat majeurs de trois divisions ou plus sont en cause.

- Activités amphibies.

Lorsque trois bataillons ou plus ou des unités amphibies de plus de 3 000 hommes effectuent un débarquement dans la zone CDE.

Lorsqu'une activité terrestre hors garnison, une activité de mobilisation ou une activité amphibie soumise à notification est menée, sur bref préavis, comme un exercice d'alerte, ladite activité sera notifiée au moment où elle commence, c'est-à-dire lorsque les troupes recevront l'ordre de la déclencher.

Toutes les notifications seront données selon un modèle normalisé convenu.

Le respect des arrangements convenus en vertu de cette mesure fera l'objet de diverses formes de vérification, y compris l'invitation d'observateurs et une inspection. Les questions concernant le respect des arrangements convenus en vertu de cette mesure pourront être traitées selon les moyens appropriés.

III. MESURES D'OBSERVATION ET DE VÉRIFICATION

Mesure 4: Observation de certaines activités militaires

Les États participants conviennent d'inviter des observateurs de tous les États participants à toutes les activités ayant fait l'objet d'une notification préalable, et de les aviser de toute activité qui, durant plus longtemps que la période spécifiée, est menée sur leur territoire situé dans la zone CDE. L'État hôte s'assurera que les observateurs ont la possibilité de se faire une opinion, appuyée par l'observation directe dans la zone d'activité, quant à la nature routinière de l'activité.

Mesure 5: Respect des dispositions et vérification

A. Moyens techniques nationaux.

Les États participants conviennent de ne pas faire obstacle aux moyens techniques nationaux de vérification. En utilisant leurs moyens techniques nationaux à des fins de vérification, les États participants respecteront les principes de droit international généralement reconnus.

B. Surveillance du respect des dispositions.

Sous réserve des limites et modalités à convenir, les États participants pourront demander une inspection concernant le respect des mesures de confiance et de sécurité convenues.

Ces dispositions donnent aux États participants la possibilité de surveiller les activités notifiées, et par conséquent de s'assurer qu'elles ne constituent pas une menace, qu'elles correspondent aux renseignements fournis dans les notifications, et que toutes les activités assujetties à ces dispositions font l'objet d'une notification adéquate.

Mesure 6: Développement de moyens de communication

Des arrangements devraient être pris pour améliorer les moyens de communication entre les États participants.

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF BELGIUM,
CANADA, DENMARK, FRANCE, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY, GREECE, ICELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG,
NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, TURKEY,
UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)

- Recalling that the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is an integral part of the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and that, according to the Madrid Concluding Document, the objective of the first stage of the Conference is to adopt a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures;
- The above-named States are determined to work for the adoption of measures that would create greater openness and more predictability in military activities in order to reduce the risk of surprise attack, diminish the threat of armed conflict in Europe resulting from misunderstanding and miscalculation and inhibit the use of force for the purpose of political intimidation;
- Implementation and verification of such measures, as well as respect for existing international commitments, would enhance stability, contribute to the preservation of peace and could open up prospects for new progress in disarmament;
- With these goals in mind and in conformity with the mandate for the Conference the above-mentioned States propose the following confidence- and security-building measures:

I. MEASURES OF INFORMATION

Measure 1: Exchange of Military Information

At the start of each calendar year, the participating States agree to exchange information on the structure of their ground forces and land-based air forces in the zone of application for agreed CSBMs as agreed in the mandate for the Conference.

Information will also be given on the existing regulations in the CDE zone for accredited military personnel.

Clarification of information may be sought by appropriate means.

The information thus exchanged will form a basis for further measures dealing with military activities.

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II. MEASURES DESIGNED TO ENHANCE STABILITY

Measure 2: Exchange of Forecasts of Activities Notifiable in Advance

The participating States will exchange annual forecasts of all military activities in the CDE zone which would be notifiable in advance under any other CSBM. Amendments to the forecast need not be given if a notifiable activity is either an addition to or a change from the forecast; such information will be provided in the actual notification for that activity.

Clarification of information contained in the annual forecast may be sought by appropriate means.

Measure 3: Notification of Military Activities

Notification will be given by the participating States 45 days in advance of the following activities in the CDE zone:

- Out-of-garrison land activities.

When one or more ground force divisions or equivalent formations or 6,000 or more ground troops not organized into a division, or forces comprising more than a specified number of main battle tanks, or armoured personnel carriers/mechanized infantry combat vehicles are carrying out a common activity under a single command, whether independent or combined with air and/or amphibious support.

- Mobilization Activities.

When 25,000 or more troops or the major combat elements of three or more divisions are involved.

- Amphibious Activities

When three or more battalions or 3,000 amphibious troops carry out a landing in the CDE zone.

When a notifiable out-of-garrison land activity, mobilization activity or amphibious activity is carried out on short notice as an alert activity, it will be notifiable at the time it begins, that is, when troops are ordered to carry out the activity.

All notifications will be made in a standardized format to be agreed on.

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Compliance with arrangements agreed under this measure will be subject to various forms of verification including the invitation of observers and inspection. Questions concerning compliance with the arrangements agreed under this measure can be dealt with by appropriate means.

III. OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION MEASURES

Measure 4: Observation of Certain Military Activities

The participating States agree to invite observers from all other participating States to all pre-notified activities and to alert activities of longer than a specified period conducted in the CDE zone on their territory. The host State shall ensure that observers are provided the opportunity to form a judgement, supported by direct observation in the area of activity, as to the routine nature of the activity.

Measure 5: Compliance and Verification

A. National Technical Means

Participating States agree not to interfere with national technical means. In using their national technical means for the purpose of verification, participating States will respect generally recognized principles of international law.

B. Monitoring of Compliance

Subject to limitations and modalities to be agreed, participating States may request inspection concerning compliance with agreed CSBMs.

These provisions provide participating States with the opportunity to monitor and thus verify whether notified activities are non-threatening and correspond to the details given in notifications, and that all notifiable activities are properly notified.

Measure 6: Development of Means of Communication

Arrangements should be made which will enhance the means of communication between participating States.

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

- The point of departure for the initiative is Canada's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and NORAD. The Prime Minister reiterated our commitment to NATO and its policies in his speech to the House of Commons on February 9.
- It can be seen as Canada's effort to make good the commitment made at the Williamsburg by the economic summit partners to devote their full political resources to the cause of peace.
- The Prime Minister found a strong echo and wide support for his initiative in his meetings with Western European leaders.
- The Prime Minister has been voicing the deep concerns of a great many Canadians who are worried that Canada's security is at stake and want their government to do what it can to lessen the risks of war in the nuclear age.
- The underlying conviction on which the initiative is based is that before progress can be made on specific arms control and disarmament proposals it is necessary to restore East-West relations to a more constructive basis, to establish an overall political framework for relations between the two sides.

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- There have been encouraging signs of progress over the last few months: both superpowers have indicated the importance they attach to political dialogue, broad political contact between East and West was re-established at the Stockholm Conference; Western leaders, including the Prime Minister and Prime Minister Thatcher, have gone to the East to open lines of communication; the Mutual and Balance Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations resumed on March 16 in Vienna.

- The initiative continues to be pursued in NATO, at the Stockholm Conference, at MBFR in Vienna, at the United Nations and at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

POINTS DE DISCUSSION PROPOSÉS

- L'initiative de paix procède de l'appartenance du Canada à l'Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord et au NORAD. Dans son discours du 9 février à la Chambre des communes, le Premier ministre a réitéré notre fidélité à l'OTAN et à ses politiques.
- On peut voir dans l'initiative un effort du Canada en vue de concrétiser l'engagement pris par les participants au sommet économique de Williamsburg de consacrer toutes leurs ressources politiques à la cause de la paix.
- Lors de ses rencontres avec les dirigeants de l'Europe de l'Ouest, le Premier ministre a pu constater que son initiative jouit d'un soutien considérable.
- Le Premier ministre s'est fait le porte-parole d'un grand nombre de Canadiens qui craignent profondément pour la sécurité de leur pays et veulent voir leur gouvernement faire tout son possible pour réduire les risques de guerre nucléaire.
- L'initiative est fondée sur la conviction qu'il ne saurait y avoir de progrès sur des propositions précises de contrôle des armements et de désarmement avant le rétablissement d'un dialogue plus constructif entre l'Est

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et l'Ouest et l'élaboration d'un cadre politique global aux fins des relations entre les deux parties en présence.

- Au cours des derniers mois, des signes encourageants de progrès se sont fait jour: les deux superpuissances ont fait état du prix qu'elles attachent au dialogue politique; la Conférence de Stockholm s'est ouverte sur le rétablissement des contacts politiques entre l'Est et l'Ouest; des dirigeants occidentaux, y compris les Premiers ministres Trudeau et Thatcher, se sont rendus à l'Est pour ouvrir de nouvelles lignes de communication; et les négociations sur les réductions mutuelles et équilibrées des forces (MBFR) ont repris le 16 mars à Vienne.

- L'initiative de paix se poursuit au sein de l'OTAN, à la Conférence de Stockholm, aux négociations MBFR à Vienne, aux Nations Unies et à la Conférence sur le désarmement à Genève.

TO/À IDA (Through Mr. L.A. Delvoie)
FROM/DE • IDDZ
REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT •
SUJET • Conference on Disarmament: Bangladesh
Candidacy for membership.

Security/Sécurité	RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	March 15, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0233

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES
-1-
DISTRIBUTION

IDD

The Bangladeshi Counsellor, Mr. Shamsheer M. Chowdhury called on me (in place of G. Smith) on March 15 ... to leave the attached note which asks for Canada's support for Bangladesh's candidature for membership in the Enlarged Conference on Disarmament.

Without commenting on the representation, I undertook to relay the note to IDA. Chowdhury may seek to follow-up with Alec Chistoff next week.

[Signature]
John McNee
Task Force Working Group



HIGH COMMISSION

for

The People's Republic of Bangladesh
85 Rungis Road, Suite 1007, Ottawa, Canada, K1N 8J6
Telegram: BANGLADOO1. Telex: 0534283
Telephone (613) 236-0133
and 236-0137

No. Pol-77/84

The High Commission of the People's Republic of Bangladesh presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to state that the Government of Bangladesh has decided to seek election to the Enlarged Conference on Disarmament (previously known as the Committee on Disarmament).

It is expected that during the Spring Session of the Conference on Disarmament, which commenced in February, consultation on the enlargement of the membership from its present size of 40 members will figure prominently and the whole gamut of the enlargement of the membership is likely to be reviewed in depth.

The High Commission has the honour to underscore the following points in favour of the Bangladesh candidature for election to the Conference on Disarmament :-

- (a) Bangladesh has always pursued a forward looking non-aligned foreign policy based on equality of states, respect for the territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs of other states, the peaceful settlement of international disputes according to the Charter of the United Nations and mutual respect and friendship between the states. In this perspective Bangladesh has consistently supported initiatives for general and complete disarmament in all international fora like the United Nations, the Commonwealth and Organisation of Islamic Conference;
- (b) Of the states which have so far expressed interest in the membership of the enlarged Conference on Disarmament, in terms of population Bangladesh is the largest with 93 million inhabitants. The defence expenditure of Bangladesh as a proportion of its GNP, and the total strength of its armed forces in ratio to its population are among the lowest in the world. Bangladesh is also the only other country in the South Asian Sub-continent, besides Sri Lanka, to have signed the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons and accepted safeguards agreements in force with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Bangladesh has also acceded to the UNMOD Convention (Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.) and consistently supported the proposal for the establishment of Nuclear free Zones in different parts of the world in consultation with and agreement of all concerned states!

- (c) In terms of scientific manpower, Bangladesh has the largest scientific manpower in numerical terms among all the candidates for the Conference on Disarmament. This is relevant with respect to the technical and scientific infrastructure necessary to make high quality contribution to the deliberation of the Conference on Disarmament.
- (d) Bangladesh is the only consensus candidate from Asia and if elected it would be the second LLDC in the enlarged Conference. Since its independence, Bangladesh has supported the principle of an organic link between disarmament and development. The election of Bangladesh to the enlarged Conference on Disarmament will assume vital importance since it will ensure adequate representation of the LLDC countries in this multilateral body.
- (e) The active and constructive role played by Bangladesh during SSOD I and II and the 15 point programme declared by the Head of the Government while addressing the SSOD II Session has been deeply appreciated by all!
- (f) Bangladesh was the first country to have applied formally for membership of the enlarged Conference on Disarmament and the members of this body should be impressed upon to give adequate importance to the priority of our application;
- (g) Genuine commitment of Bangladesh to disarmament will have a positive effect in the working of negotiation body.

The High Commission of Bangladesh, therefore, seeks the valuable support of the Government of Canada to its candidature for membership to the Enlarged Conference on Disarmament.

The High Commission for the People's Republic of Bangladesh avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, March 14, 1984.

The Department of External Affairs,
Government of Canada,
Ottawa.



MESSAGE

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

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SECURITY SÉCURITÉ C O N F I D E N T I A L 12 10

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SUBJ/SUJ

---INTER-ACTION COUNCIL OF FORMER HEADS OF GOVT

MARTIN LEES OF COUNCIL SECRETARIAT CALLED ON US YESTERDAY AND, AT HIS REQUEST, WAS GIVEN FULL BRIEFING ON PM TRUDEAU INITIATIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY. LEES IN TURN GAVE US EXPLANATION OF GENESIS AND PURPOSES OF COUNCIL, WHICH CLOSELY PARALLELED THAT PROVIDED IN YOUR REFTEL. HE LEFT WITH US A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DOCUMENTATION ON COMPOSITION AND ACTIVITIES OF COUNCIL. WE ARE FORWARDING THIS MATERIAL TO PCO/FOWLER.

2. LEES TOLD US ON PERSONAL AND UNOFFICIAL BASIS THAT HE THOUGHT IT MOST LIKELY THAT PM TRUDEAU WOULD BE INVITED TO JOIN COUNCIL ON LEAVING OFFICE. HE THOUGHT PM TRUDEAU WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROACHED FOR THIS PURPOSE BY COUNCIL MEMBER WHO KNEW HIM WELL (E.G. HELMUT SCHMIDT) IN WEEKS AHEAD. LEES ALSO THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT PM MIGHT BE INVITED TO ATTEND NEXT MTG OF COUNCIL TO BE HELD IN BRIONI, MAY 25-26, TO OUTLINE HIS VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELNS AND INNATL SECURITY SITUATION. (PLS. PROTECT.)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG L.A. Delvoie/sc	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> SIG L.A. Delvoie

001534



TO/A IFB
FROM/DE • IDDZ

PM initiative folder

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • SCEAND: Briefing Material
SUJET

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	<i>28.6.1. Trudeau Peace Mission</i>
Date	March 15, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0235

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

-1-
DISTRIBUTION

As requested, attached is a copy of the basic brief we provided the Minister's Office on the Prime Minister's initiative. As for the proposed Institute, we simply drew attention to the memorandum to the DPM/SSEA of March 14 which commented on the draft bill.

L.A. Delvoje
L.A. Delvoje
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUE

The purpose of this brief is to discuss the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. The PM is interested in seeing if by opening lines of communication to Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals on MBFR and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level in Vienna (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative, but not pursued personally by the PM with other governments, are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

REACTIONS

The reactions of other governments may be roughly summarized as follows:

European allies have given encouraging support. The Western Europeans share his analysis of the dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.

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The French were generally supportive, with reservations as to timing. Their statements on the five power conference have been contradictory, but generally reserved. The Germans were positive and generally supportive (and have subsequently endorsed the five power conference idea). The British were generally supportive of the broad purpose, but have reservations about specific proposals (especially the five power conference). The Dutch and Belgians reacted very positively, with some reservations as to timing (they think such an initiative may be most needed in the spring of 1984 once INF deployment has taken place). The Italians were generally supportive and have publicly endorsed the idea of a five power conference. (Also, there have been very positive and fully supportive written responses from the Danes and Norwegians and a very positive reactions from the Spaniards and Turks. The Greeks generally support the initiative, but disagree with NATO's INF deployment.)

PM Nakasone of Japan was very receptive and fully supportive when the PM visited Tokyo on November 19.

Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed PM Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security.

The Chinese are mildly supportive of the broad political purpose. They have not yet agreed to attend a five power conference, but they will participate in preliminary discussions of the idea with the U.N. Secretary General in New York. They argue that the first priority is concentrating pressure on the superpowers to reduce their arms.

The USA has assured the Prime Minister of its support for the broad political objectives he is pursuing in East-West relations, while laying most of the blame for the current state of those relations on Soviet attitudes and actions. The USA administration has reservations about most of the specific arms control measures put forward by the Prime Minister.

U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has commended and encouraged the Prime Minister's efforts.

The Czechoslovaks, East Germans and Romanians, have given general support to the Prime Minister's basic political purposes.

Soviet General Secretary Chernenko described the initiative as useful and practical and encouraged its continuation when he met the Prime Minister. The Soviets agree on the need for political dialogue, but argue that it must be on the basis of equality. They have been non-committal on a five power conference.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (c) the "Brussels Declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- (d) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO ministerial meeting on what actions might be taken to improve them.

There have been additional signs of progress. There has been some moderation of the strident rhetoric of both superpowers, which have recently indicated the importance they attach to political dialogue, President Reagan in his speech of January 15 and General Secretary Chernenko in his meeting with the Prime Minister.

Broad political contact between East and West was re-established at the beginning of the Stockholm Conference for the first time since the acrimonious conclusion of the Madrid Conference last September.

Western political leaders, including the Prime Minister and Prime Minister Thatcher, have gone to the East to open lines of communication.

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It has been agreed that the MBFR negotiations will resume in Vienna on March 16.

These are all indications of a change in the deteriorating trend in East-West relations that was apparent in the autumn of 1983.

TO/A IFB through IDDZ

FROM/DE • IDA

MF

REFERENCE • Stockholm Telegramme SCDL 0242 of 7 March, 1984
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Stockholm Conference; Proposal to link a Treaty on
SUJET • Non-Use of Force and an Agreement on Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
28-4-6
Date
15 March 1984
Number/Numéro
IDA-0358

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

SUMMARY

DISTRIBUTION

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The interdepartmental CSBMs Working Group, expanded to include representation from JLO, met 14 March to study the proposal contained in Stockholm's telegramme referred to above. The group's discussion focussed on three aspects of the proposal; the desirability/feasibility of a Treaty on the Non-Use of Force; the desirability/feasibility of an agreement on the peaceful settlement of disputes in the security context and the feasibility of linking the two ideas as a negotiating tactic at the Stockholm Conference. It was the conclusion of the Working Group that a) the conclusion reached by the Delegation that the Conference was deadlocked was premature; b) there are strong legal grounds for rejecting a treaty on the non-use of force; c) somewhere down the line the West may be required to indicate a willingness to consider, at a later stage of the Conference, the re-affirmation of the principle of non-use of force; d) the usefulness of an agreement on the peaceful settlement of disputes lies in areas outside of the security context and e) the linking of a treaty on non-use of force and an agreement on peaceful settlement of disputes in the Stockholm context was something to be viewed, in the words of the legal adviser, "with concern and alarm".

2. In a number of instances in its telegramme, the Delegation implies that the Conference is deadlocked and that it is incumbent upon the West to make concessions to break this deadlock. We consider these assumptions to be, at best, premature. Rather we believe that what we are witnessing is standard Soviet multilateral negotiating procedures where, by threats and posturing, they are attempting to intimidate the other participants into redefining the terms of the negotiation in a way that will advance their objectives. We must bear in mind that the conference mandate is essentially a Western one and that it was expected that the East would undertake actions in an attempt to redefine it. It was also expected that the Soviet Union would use at least the first two sessions this year to generate Western public support for their positions in arms control negotiations, particularly those with the United States. With regard to the assumption

.../2

that the West must concede first, we do not agree that we should be placing the onus on ourselves to "blink" first. The West, and more recently the NNA have submitted written proposals and we suspect that once these two groups begin comparing the merits of their proposals at the next session, the East will feel moved to join the debate or end up being isolated. It was stressed more than once during the Working Group meeting that when negotiating with the Soviets there is always a "price" to be paid to obtain quick results.

3. The delegation questioned whether the Alliance has a policy on the concept of a treaty on non-use of force and, after a review of selected documents concluded that it does not. We disagree. The Soviet Union has proposed treaties on non-use of force in a number of fora, for example, in the United Nations, which we and most Western nations have rejected on legal grounds. There are two serious legal objections: a) it is a negative obligation which cannot be developed or elaborated except to qualify it, but more important b) non-use of force is embodied in the UN Charter (a legally-binding document) and since it is not possible to elaborate on the Charter, any so-called regional system unless its purpose was for mutual self-defence, would derogate from the force of the UN Charter. If this concept differed from that of the Charter, (or, for that matter, if the proposed treaty departed in any respect from the Charter obligation not to use force) it would be contrary to international law, specifically contrary to our obligation to ensure that the Charter prevails over all other treaties (Article 103). If the proposed treaty is somehow linked to the UN system, it would be redundant. There is, in sum, no legal justification for establishing a separate non-use of force régime in Europe. There is, as well, the political argument that as long as the Soviet army is in Afghanistan violating Article 2 of the Charter (legally binding) and Principle 2 of the Helsinki Final Act (politically binding) it would be senseless to negotiate a treaty on the non-use of force with the Soviet Union.

4. It may be that in posing its question, the delegation is confusing the concepts of "treaty" and "re-affirmation". It was pointed out in the Working Group that there is no consensus within the Alliance on when or how, or if, indeed, we should re-affirm the principle of non-use of force in the Stockholm context. Some allies have indicated a willingness to re-affirm the principle sooner rather than later in the negotiations while others such as the Americans are opposed to even hinting at the possibility in the foreseeable future. We have held the view that somewhere down the road, but not during this stage of the Conference, we will be required to re-affirm in some form of conference document our adherence to the principle of non-use of force.

.../3

But it would be inappropriate and, indeed, unwise to do so except in conjunction with a régime of concrete CSBMs.

5. The principle of peaceful settlement of disputes will be of real benefit to the CSCE participants in relation to the issues with which it has traditionally been discussed at the experts meeting, for example, boundary problems, immigration, commercial relations, etc. Its ambit could be as broad as the scope of the Final Act itself and the USA has advanced a proposed agreement for consideration at the Athens meeting along these lines. That proposal, quite correctly expressly excludes security questions from the scope of a proposed treaty. Progress on peaceful settlement - as the Montreux meeting demonstrated - is difficult enough in the traditional areas of interstate relations without seeking to send it out into uncharted waters. We must also keep in mind that the Montreux meeting was, for all practical purposes, a failure. Certainly from a legal point of view the results could not have been worse. The intransigent position of the USSR with regard to the question of third party settlement is the main obstacle in this connection. In addition, the experts meeting raised theoretical problems - which may in the end prove insurmountable - particularly in the form of the introduction of the pernicious Soviet concept of compulsory consultations.

6. In practical terms, what would be the implications of the delegation's proposal for the experts meeting on peaceful settlements, due to resume in Athens next week? Conceivably one effect would be to kill the latter process. If peaceful settlement is injected into the Stockholm meeting, the Soviets may use this as a pretext for terminating the experts meeting. Not only would they not have lost anything, they would have eliminated a conference that they do not like and obtained Western agreement to discuss non-use of force as a first step towards establishing a pan-European security system of their own devising. Acceptance of peaceful settlement by them would have little significance because in the security context it would be of no practical effect.

7. As can be determined from the foregoing the linking of movement on a treaty on non-use of force with an agreement to consider peaceful settlement of disputes raises serious and, we believe, irreconcilable problems. While non-use of force can be said to be complementary to the principle of peaceful settlement, it is difficult to see conceptually how it could be developed in parallel with the latter principle. Rather than conceptualizing the two principles as existing or developing in parallel, they should be seen as part of a horizontal continuum. One starts (peaceful settlement) where the other leaves off. Refraining from use of force does not

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resolve the dispute - whatever its nature - but obviously the dispute cannot be settled while force is employed. However, the fact of the matter is that we already have obtained Soviet acquiescence on peaceful settlement - they gave their agreement to that at Helsinki and we therefore do not need it at Stockholm. In other words, the USSR has nothing to give the West in the area of peaceful settlement in return for agreement to discuss a treaty on non-use of force.

8. The gist of the delegation's proposal is that if the East, by arguing that a treaty on non-use of force is a CSBM, wants to have considered a measure which is clearly outside the conference mandate, we could acquiesce if they, in turn would agree to permit us negotiation of a measure which we know full well is not a CSBM and, therefore is also outside the mandate. Clearly, this idea is unacceptable for a number of reasons not the least of which is the Western concept of sanctity of negotiated agreements. Our negotiators in Madrid spent three long years to achieve a mandate with which the West could live comfortably. To propose to allow each side to re-open negotiations on the mandate and to redefine parts of it would be tantamount to throwing three years of hard work out of the window. But worse, it would leave the mandate in tatters, paving the way for the Soviets to introduce anything they wished including their propagandistic proposals for arms control in nuclear, chemical and outer space issues. This would kill the Stockholm Conference. Furthermore by introducing the peaceful settlement question in Stockholm we would be overriding provisions of the larger Madrid Concluding Document which designated Athens as the site of the experts meeting and gave it a more general mandate than that envisaged in the proposal. The long term effects of this would be counter-productive for the CSCE process. By setting the precedent of allowing an agreed CSCE document to be re-defined we would be leaving the way clear for the Soviet Union to re-define or ignore provisions of the Final Act such as the humanitarian aspects of Basket Three. In the end the CSCE process would wither because there would be little inclination to negotiate agreements where there was no certainty that they would be considered final and binding.

9. Finally, we are reasonably certain that for the reasons listed above and more, there would be absolutely no support for a proposal of this nature among our allies and among most of the NNA. Like ourselves, our European allies consider the CSCE process to be indispensable to the management of East-West relations - it is inconceivable that they would acquiesce in a proposal that would require the legitimization of the circumvention of an agreed CSCE document. The USA and some other allies are equally adamant that the principle of non-first use will not even be discussed in the restricted confines of NATO. In short, the

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CONFIDENTIAL/CEO

advancement of a proposal along the lines suggested by the delegation would put Canada so far out of step with its allies that there would be the very real risk that our delegation would be excluded from the more restricted NATO deliberations on Conference strategy and tactics.

10. We would propose that a substantive reply along the lines of the foregoing but cast in positive terms, be prepared for dispatch to the delegation. In view of the added emphasis placed on the proposal by Ambassador Delworth you might wish to have the telegramme go out under your signature.



O.A. Chistoff
Acting Director
Arms Control and
Disarmament Division

ME

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0633 15MAR85

TO EXTOTT/RBR DELIVER BY 150900

INFO BNATO WSHDC BONN PARIS MOSCO ROME BRU HAGUE COPEN MDRID

WSAW GENEV PRMNY ATHNS VMBFR BPEST BCUST PCOOTT/FOWLER

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/CORAE/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR RBD RGB DMF RCR IDR IDA IDD IDDZ IFB ZSI CPD

REF OURTEL XNGR0185 26JAN;0325 23FEB

---EAST/WEST RELATIONS: SIR GEOFFREY HOWE VISIT TO MOSCO
WITH APPROPRIATE CAVEATS THAT ONGOING BRITISH EFFORTS TO
ESTABLISH BROAD, PRAGMATIC CONTACTS WITH SOVIET UNION WILL DEMAND
IMMENSE PATIENCE AND MODEST EXPECTATIONS, FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE
ANNOUNCED TO COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 14MAR THAT HE
IS ACCEPTING GROMYKO INVITATION TO VISIT MOSCO 02/03JULY.
2. YOU WILL BE AWARE OUR REFTELS THAT HOWE HAS BEEN LOOKING
FOR A DEFINITE INVITATION SINCE HIS STOCKHOLM MEETING WITH
GROMYKO. HE HAS BEEN UNDER PRESSURE IN PARLIAMENT TO GO TO MOSCO,
PARTICULARLY FROM SDP LEADER DAVID OWEN, WHO FREQUENTLY REMINDS
HIM THAT AS FOREIGN SECRETARY IN EARLIER LABOUR GOVT, HE (OWEN)
PAID LAST VISIT TO MOSCO OF ANY BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER, -IN
1977.
3. WHILE BRITISH GOVT CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT ESTABLISHING MORE
CONFIDENT RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS IS LONG TERM, CAREFUL PROCESS,
...2

PAGE TWO XNGR0633 CONF D

BOTH MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS ARE AWARE OF NEED TO FIND PRACTICAL MEASURES APART FROM ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS TO PUT SUBSTANCE TO PMS MORE RECENT EMPHASIS ON BROADER, SENSIBLE DIALOGUE.

IN THIS CONTEXT, TRADE MINISTER PAUL CHANNON WILL GO TO MOSCO (AS SCHEDULED FOR SOME TIME) FOR ANNUAL BILATERAL TRADE TALKS IN MAY. INVITATION TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIENKO TO PAY VISIT TO BRITAIN, POSTPONED AT TIME OF KAL INCIDENT, REMAINS ON BOOKS, BUT HAS NOT YET BEEN TAKEN UP BY SOVIETS.

CCC/065 151300Z XNGR0633

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0349 15MAR84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BNATO BUCST BPEST PRGUE WSAW BGRAD PRMNY
GENEV STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP BONN ROME
DISTR MINA MINE RGB RBRD RCD RSR URR UGB IDD IDA IDDZ ZSI
DMF ZSP

REF WSHDC TEL UNGR2125 12MAR

---USA/USSR RELATIONS

SUMMARY:RESIDENT USA DIPLOMATS INTERPRET RECENT USA-SOV CONTACTS
AS SIGNIFYING A STIFFENING OF SOV POSITIONS ON CENTRAL EAST-
WEST ISSUES,ESP NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGS.THEY HAVE GROWING
DOUBTS THAT SOVS WILL BUDGE ON CENTRAL ISSUES AT LEAST FOR
SEVERAL MONTHS(I.E.CLOSE TO OR AFTER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS),
THOUGH SOME OF THE PERIPHERAL ASPECTS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO
SUPPERPOWERS MAY BE PURSUED IN MEANTIME.THEY SUSPECT GROMYKO
HIMSELF IS MAIN ADVOCATE,AS WELL AS EXECUTOR OF HARDLINE SOV
APPROACH.

2.REPORT:USA AMB HARTMAN,AT HIS OWN REQUEST,MET WITH FM GROMYKO
FOR TWO AND A HALF HOURS 11MAR.MTG WAS DESCRIBED TO US AS PART
OF SERIES WHICH BEGANLAST NOV.MAIN PURPOSE THIS TIME WAS TO
BRIEF GROMYKO ON RESULTS OF HARTMANS RECENT TALKS IN WSHDC AND
TO REITERATE MAIN THEMES OF REAGANS 16JAN SPEECH.ON ARMS
CONTROL QUESTIONS,HARMAN SET OUT IN STANDARD TERMS USA INTEREST

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR0349 CONF D

IN RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT USA QUOTE WAS NOT/NOT BEGGING AND WLD NOT/NOT BRIBE UNQUOTE TO BRING ABOUT RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS. HARTMAN REGISTERED US INTEREST IN CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS AND IN PURSUING A RANGE OF POSSIBLE STEPS IN BILATL AREA, E.G. BOUNDARY DEMARCATION TALKS, POSSIBLE CONSULATE OPENINGS IN KIEV/NY, CONSULAR TALKS AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES. HARTMAN ALSO APPARENTLY TOUCHED ON RANGE OF REGIONAL ISSUES, E.G. IRAN/IRAQ, SOUTHERN AFRICA SITUATION.

3. IN WHAT HE ENIGMATICALLY TERMED QUOTE PRELIMINARY RESPONSE UNQUOTE, GROMYKO SPOKE ONE AND HALF HOURS WITHOUT INTERRUPTION. USA EMB OFFICIAL SAYS ENTIRE REPLY WAS QUOTE NOT/NOT POSITIVE UNQUOTE. USA POLICIES RE START, CTB, INF, REGIONAL ACTIVITIES AND USE OF MILITARY FORCE WERE ALL STRONGLY CRITICISED. AS PER CHERNENKOS ELECTORAL SPEECH (OURTEL XYGR0295 05MAR), GROMYKO SET OUT SOV-PROPOSED QUOTE MENU UNQUOTE OF USEFUL STEPS USA MIGHT TAKE TO RESTORE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP. GROMYKO DID NOT/NOT ADDRESS SPECIFIC REGIONAL ISSUES IN ANY SUBSTANTIVE WAY.

4. RECENT VISIT BY GROUP OF EMINENT EXPERTS (INCLUDING PAUL DOUGHTY, EX-CHIEF OF STAFF JONES, GRANT SCOWCROFT, ARNOULD HORLECH, WILLIAM HYLAND) UNDER AUSPICES OF DARTMOUTH GROUP GAVE SIMILAR IMPRESSION. GROUP HAD COME WITH HOPES OF PROBING SOVS ON POSSIBLE WAYS TO BRING ABOUT REVIVED ARMS CONTROL NEGS. IN MTGS WITH SOV EXPERTS LED BY ARBATOV, THEY QUOTE RAN INTO BRICK

...3

PAGE THREE XYGR0349 CONF D

WALL UNQUOTE. ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL BUT SUBSTANCE WAS HARD. IN BOTH FORMAL SESSIONS AND IN PRIVATE, SOV SPOKESMEN WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO SQUELCH ANY SPECULATION RE SOV READINESS IN NEAR FUTURE TO RESUME NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGS WITH USA. SOVS REFUSED TO BE PINNED DOWN ON WHETHER SATISFACTION ON HALF QUOTE PERIPHERAL ISSUES END HALF QUOTE WLD ELIMINATE NEED TO QUOTE REMOVE OBSTACLES UNQUOTE. RE POSSIBLE MERGER OF START AND INF TALKS, SOV REPLY WAS QUOTE WHY SHLD ONE MARRY TWO CORPSES? UNQUOTE. ONLY HINT OF POSSIBLE SELF-DOUBT ON SOV SIDE SAME IN PRIVATE ASIDE TO USA EMB OFFICIAL WHEN REF WAS MADE TO QUOTE SCARS UNQUOTE WHICH HAVE BEEN INFLICTED BY CURRENT USA ADMIN, AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, THERE WAS NEED TO LOOK TO WORDS OF QUOTE THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN AROUND LONGEST UNQUOTE. IN PRESENT CIRCS, QUOTE MORE USA PUSHES, MORE IT WILL GET QUOTE WRONG ANSWERS UNQUOTE. OUR AMERICAN SOURCE INTERPRETED THIS AS OBLIQUE HINT THAT GROMYKO HIMSELF IS MAIN ADVOCATE AND EXECUTOR OF SOV HARD LINE AND THOSE WITH DIFFERENT IDEAS FEEL THEY ARE NOT/NOT IN POSITION TO MOVE QUICKLY.

5. INFO CONTAINED IN PARAS 1-4 OBTAINED IN CONFIDENCE FROM OFFICIAL OF AMERICAN EMB.

CCC/144 151514Z XYGR0349

→ 1DDZ

SIR GEOFFREY HOWE TO VISIT MOSCOW.
BY HUM WILLIAMS, LPS DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

LONDON. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS INVITED BRITAIN'S FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE TO MOSCOW THIS SUMMER. NEWS OF THE VISIT EMERGED HERE ON 14 MARCH WHEN THE FOREIGN OFFICE SECRETARY WAS GIVING EVIDENCE TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.

WHILE ANSWERING QUESTIONS ON ANGLO/SOVIET RELATIONS, SIR GEOFFREY REVEALED THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO GO TO MOSCOW ON 2 AND 3 JULY. HE ADDED THAT HE SAW THE VISIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A FULL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH HIS OPPOSITE NUMBER MR ANDREI GROMYKO AND A CHANCE TO INTENSIFY AND BROADEN THE PROCESS OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE SOVIET UNION.

THIS WILL BE THE FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO MOSCOW BY A BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY FOR SEVEN YEARS. THE LAST WAS BY DR DAVID OWEN IN 1977. HOWEVER, SIR GEOFFREY WAS IN MOSCOW LAST MONTH WHEN HE ACCOMPANIED PRIME MINISTER MRS MARGARET THATCHER TO THE FUNERAL OF MR ANDROPOV, AND HE MET MR GROMYKO BRIEFLY THEN.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS, OF COURSE, MET MR GROMYKO ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. THEY HAD TALKS LAST SEPTEMBER IN MADRID DURING THE CLOSING SESSION OF THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE, THOUGH THIS MEETING WAS OVERSHADOWED BY THE KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT. MORE RECENTLY THE TWO MET DURING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM IN JANUARY AND IT WAS IN THE COURSE OF THOSE TALKS THAT THEY AGREED TO TRY TO ARRANGE A FURTHER MEETING BEFORE SEPTEMBER WHEN THEY WOULD NORMALLY HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO MEET AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

WHITEHALL SOURCES WERE SAYING THAT WHILE IT WAS FAR TOO EARLY TO SPECULATE ON THE SUBJECTS THAT WOULD BE COVERED DURING THE JULY MEETING, BRITAIN WOULD BE LOOKING FOR GOOD SUBSTANTIAL TALKS COVERING A WIDE AGENDA. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TRY TO BROADEN THE BASE OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION SO THAT ARMS CONTROL TALKS DID NOT REMAIN THE SOLE BAROMETER OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

IN THE WAKE OF THIS NEWS THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT SIR GEOFFREY'S VISIT WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR A LATER OFFICIAL VISIT TO MOSCOW BY MRS THATCHER, POSSIBLY NEXT YEAR. THE PRIME MINISTER IS KNOWN TO BE KEEN ON PROMOTING A BETTER EAST/WEST DIALOGUE, AND HER VISIT TO HUNGARY AT THE BEGINNING OF LAST MONTH, AS WELL AS HER ATTENDANCE AT MR ANDROPOV'S FUNERAL, WHEN SHE HAD TALKS WITH THE NEW SOVIET LEADER, MR CHERNENKO, CAN BE SEEN AS PART OF THIS PROCESS.

MR PAUL CHANNON, BRITAIN'S TRADE MINISTER, IS DUE TO GO TO MOSCOW IN MAY TO ATTEND THE MEETING OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION. THERE IS ALSO THE LIKELIHOOD OF A VISIT TO BRITAIN SOON BY THE SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MR KORNIENKO.

ENDS

THE DAILY MAIL WRITES: 'FLYING PICKETS. THAT'S THE POLITE TERM FOR THEM. MORE LIKE PROTECTION GANGS ROAMING THE DISSIDENT COALFIELDS.. STRONG-ARMING THEIR WAY FROM PIT TO PIT.. SUBSTITUTING MOB RULE FOR MINeworkERS' DEMOCRACY. IN NOTTINGHAMSHIRE, WHERE MOST OF THE MEN WANT TO GO ON WORKING UNTIL THEY HOLD THEIR BALLOT, INTIMIDATION FROM YORKSHIRE IS TOPPING THEM DOING SO. OF COURSE THE POLICE HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO DO ALL THEY CAN TO PREVENT SUCH VICIOUS SCENES FROM TAKING PLACE. OF COURSE THE COAL BOARD CHAIRMAN, IAN MACGREGOR, HAD EVERY RIGHT TO GO TO LAW TO SEEK - AND GAIN - AN INJUNCTION AGAINST THIS MOST VIRULENT FORM OF SECONDARY PICKETING. IF THE LAW CANNOT TAKE SIDES WHEN THE CHOICE IS BETWEEN A HALF BRICK AND A BALLOT, THEN IT IS A POOR LOOKOUT FOR US ALL. AFTER THE GRISLY CONFRONTATIONS OF YESTERDAY AND EARLIER THIS WEEK, LET US HOPE WE MAY NOW SEE THE GENUINELY DEMOCRATIC TRADITION OF MINeworkERS GIVEN A CHANCE TO REASSERT ITSELF. THAT WAS THE DAILY MAIL.

ENDS PRESS REVIEW FOR THURSDAY 15TH MARCH 1984

UK INTEREST RATES CUT
BY JOHN BARROWS, LPS CHIEF ECONOMICS CORRESPONDENT

LONDON BRITAIN'S MAJOR CLEARING BANKS CUT THEIR BASE INTEREST RATES FROM 9 TO 8.5 PER CENT ON 14 MARCH, THE LOWEST LEVEL FOR NEARLY SIX YEARS.

THE ANNOUNCEMENTS CAME IN THE WAKE OF YESTERDAY'S ANNUAL BUDGET STATEMENT BY CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER NIGEL LAWSON, WHO MADE CLEAR THAT LOWER INTEREST RATES REMAINED A PRIME OBJECTIVE OF GOVERNMENT POLICY.

A HALF PER CENT CUT IN BASE RATES IS ESTIMATED TO REDUCE INDUSTRIAL AND BUSINESS COSTS BY AROUND 250 MILLION STERLING, AND THE GOVERNMENT SEES CHEAPER BORROWING AS ONE OF THE KEY FACTORS IN ENCOURAGING INVESTMENT AND THE CREATION OF NEW JOBS.

WITH ONE OR TWO MINOR HICCOUGHS, UK BASE RATES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT DOWN FAIRLY STEADILY FROM THEIR 16 PER CENT LEVEL IN OCTOBER 1981.

IN CITY CIRCLES IT WAS THOUGHT VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT UK BUILDING SOCIETIES, WHICH ADVANCE MONEY TO HOME BUYERS, WILL BRING DOWN THEIR INTEREST RATES IN THE WAKE OF TODAY'S DECISION BY THE BIG BANKS.

THE BUILDING SOCIETIES ASSOCIATION MEETS ON 16 MARCH, AND A CUT IN THEIR RATES, DEPENDING ON ITS SIZE, COULD LOWER THE UK'S ANNUAL INFLATION RATE BY ANYTHING BETWEEN A QUARTER AND HALF A PER CENT.

THIS WOULD HELP TO OFFSET THE EFFECT OF THE RAISING OF EXCISE DUTIES IN THE BUDGET, WHICH WILL HAVE AN UPWARD INFLUENCE OF A LITTLE LESS THAN THREE-QUARTERS OF A PER CENT ON THE RETAIL PRICES INDEX USED TO MEASURE INFLATION.

ENDS

MF

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, Ontario
K1A 0G2

March 14, 1984

Mr. John M. Lamb
Executive Director
Canadian Centre for Arms Control
and Disarmament
275 Slater Street, Fifth Floor
Ottawa, Ontario
K1P 5H9

Dear Mr. Lamb:

On behalf of Louis Delvoie and myself,
I wish to thank you for your letters of March 2
with reference to the two articles by Michael
McDowell which appeared in the GLOBE AND MAIL on
February 29 and March 2.

Thank you very much for the clarifica-
tions you have provided.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Gary J. Smith'.

Gary J. Smith
Director
Arms Control and
Disarmament Division



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche



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SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ
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TO GENEV
FOR BEESLEY
DISTR JCD JLO MCB
REF YOURTEL YTGR1846 13MAR

---CONSULTATIONS IN OTT
DELVOIE AND SMITH LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AND PROPOSE MTG IN
DELVOIE OFFICE (C-4) AT 0900 HRS ON THURS 22MAR.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG L.A.Delvoie/sc	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> SIG L.A. Delvoie

001553

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À DMF (through IFB)
FROM/DE : IDDZ
SUBJECT/SUJET The proposed "Canadian Institute
for International Peace and
Security
ATTACHMENT
PIÈCE JOINTÉ Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs (IDDZ-0230)

Security / Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
File / Dossier	
Date	March 14, 1984

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ACTION/SUITE À DONNER

The attached memorandum is for your signature, if you agree.

REQUIRED BY/DEMANDÉ POUR


L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group
Prime Minister's Task Force
on East-West Relations and
International Security

TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINÉ AU DOSSIER

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CPD
CMRR (2)

G. J. Smith
Prime Minister's Task Force
on East-West Relations and
International Security
995-5912

CONFIDENTIAL

March 14, 1984

IDDZ-0230

Memorandum for:
The Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs

c.c. Minister for International Trade
c.c. Minister for External Relations

SUBJECT: The proposed "Canadian Institute for
International Peace and Security"

... The purpose of this memorandum is to provide comments on the attached draft Bill on the Institute, which was provided to the Department by the PCO early yesterday afternoon. (At their request, a copy was sent immediately to your attention prior to the meeting with the Prime Minister.) We were informed by the PCO that the draft had been prepared over the weekend by the Justice Department drawing on the proposed drafting instructions that had been worked out last Friday, March 9, by officials on an ad referendum basis. The drafting instructions were forwarded to you for your consideration and approval in memorandum IFB-0069 of the same date, March 9. We understand that you discussed the question of the drafting of the bill with Mr. Osbaldeston yesterday.

With two important exceptions, the draft Bill is virtually the same as the proposed drafting instruction except for some minor language adjustments of a legal nature. These two exceptions are: (a) the fact that the Prime Minister is listed on the front of the Bill instead of the DPM/SSEA (we were told by PCO that this was an "error" committed by officials from Justice); (b) the financial aspects contained in paragraph 27 where the Institute's endowment has been increased from twenty million dollars by a further five million dollars in three successive years, bringing the suggested endowment up to a total of thirty-five million dollars.

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

The original suggestion of an endowment emanated from PCO officials, who thought that this would be a good means of protecting the Institute from possible future changes of view about the importance of its work in arms control, etc., on the part of successive governments over the years. In our memorandum of March 9 to you, however, we pointed out that an endowment for the Institute would contrast with the repeated denials of an endowment to the proposed Asia Pacific Foundation. We should also have remarked that the legislative mandates for analogous bodies such as the IDRC and the Science Council similarly make no provision for a long-term endowment.

Another point is that financing of the Institute through annual parliamentary appropriations instead of an endowment would provide an effective informal means of control over the general scope and direction of its activities. At issue here is the degree to which the Institute would appear to be, and would be in practice, at arms length from the government of the day. On reflection, we think that the parliamentary appropriations route would be more in accord with the general role you have in mind for the Institute.

The point raised under "Section 5 - Powers" of our earlier memo (concerning the means of guaranteeing your entitlement to call on the Institute for confidential information or advice) comes up in Articles 25 and 26 of the draft bill. Article 26 could be controversial; whether the same result can be achieved by less formal means is a question of judgement.

*Sgd by Th. Shenstone
for*

Michael Shenstone
Assistant Deputy Minister
Political and International
Security Affairs

de Montigny Marchand

CONFIDENTIAL

C-

Second Session, Thirty-second Parliament,
32-33 Elizabeth II, 1983-84

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA

BILL C-

An Act to establish the Canadian Institute for
International Peace and Security

First reading, , 1983-84

THE PRIME MINISTER

35080-13-3-84

CONFIDENTIEL

C-

Deuxième session, trente-deuxième législature,
32-33 Elizabeth II, 1983-84

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES DU CANADA

PROJET DE LOI C-

Loi constituant l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la
sécurité mondiales

Première lecture le 1983-84

LE PREMIER MINISTRE

001557

2nd Session, 32nd Parliament,
32-33 Elizabeth II, 1983-84

2^e session, 32^e législature,
32-33 Elizabeth II, 1983-84

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES DU CANADA

BILL C-

PROJET DE LOI C-

An Act to establish the Canadian Institute
for International Peace and Security

Loi constituant l'Institut canadien pour la
paix et la sécurité mondiales

Her Majesty, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate and House of Com-
mons of Canada, enacts as follows:

Sa Majesté, sur l'avis et avec le consente-
ment du Sénat et de la Chambre des commu-
nes du Canada, décrète :

SHORT TITLE

TITRE ABRÉGÉ

Short title

1. This Act may be cited as the *Canadian
Institute for International Peace and Security
Act*.

1. Loi sur l'Institut canadien pour la paix
5 et la sécurité mondiales.

Titre abrégé
5

INTERPRETATION

Definitions

"Board"

"

"Chairman"

"

"Institute"

"

"Minister"

"

2. In this Act,
"Board" means the Board of Directors of the
Institute;
"Chairman" means the Chairman of the Board;
"Institute" means the Canadian Institute for
International Peace and Security estab-
lished by section 3;
"Minister" means such member of the
Queen's Privy Council for Canada as is
designated by the Governor in Council as
the Minister for the purposes of this Act.

2. Les définitions qui suivent s'appliquent
à la présente loi.
«conseil» Le conseil d'administration de
l'Institut.
«Institut» L'Institut canadien pour la paix et
la sécurité mondiales constitué par la pré-
sente loi.
«ministre» Le membre du Conseil privé de la
Reine pour le Canada chargé par le gou-
verneur en conseil de l'application de la
présente loi.
«président» Le président du conseil.

Définitions
«conseil»
«Institut»
«ministre»
«président»

INSTITUTE ESTABLISHED

CONSTITUTION DE L'INSTITUT

Institute
established

3. A corporation is hereby established to
be called the Canadian Institute for Interna-
tional Peace and Security consisting of a
Board of Directors that is composed of a
Chairman, an Executive Director and not
more than 15 other directors to be appointed
as provided in sections 6 to 8.

3. Est constitué l'Institut canadien pour la
paix et la sécurité mondiales, doté de la
personnalité morale et composé d'au plus
dix-sept administrateurs, dont le président et
l'administrateur délégué, nommés conformé-
ment aux articles 6 à 8.

Constitution

	PURPOSE	MISSION	
Purpose	<p>4. The purpose of the Institute is to increase knowledge of the issues related to international peace and security, with particular emphasis on defence, arms control and disarmament, and to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(a) collect and disseminate information and ideas on international peace and security;(b) promote scholarship in matters related to international peace and security; 10(c) encourage public discussion of international peace and security issues; and(d) foster, fund and conduct research on international peace and security issues of particular interest to Canadians or to the Government of Canada. 15	<p>4. L'Institut a pour mission d'accroître la connaissance des questions relatives à la paix et à la sécurité mondiales, particulièrement en matière de défense, de limitation des armements et de désarmement, ainsi que :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) de recueillir et diffuser informations et idées sur la paix et la sécurité mondiales;b) de stimuler la recherche de haut niveau en matière de paix et sécurité mondiales;c) d'encourager les débats publics sur les questions relatives à la paix et à la sécurité mondiales; 10d) de stimuler, subventionner et poursuivre des recherches sur les questions intéressant particulièrement les Canadiens ou le gouvernement du Canada en matière de paix et de sécurité mondiales. 15	Mission
Powers	<p>5. The Institute has the capacity, rights, powers and privileges of a natural person and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, the Institute may,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(a) establish, maintain and operate information and data centres and facilities for research and other activities relevant to its purpose;(b) support or assist research by governments, by international, public or private organizations and agencies, or by individuals into matters related to its purpose; 25(c) publish or otherwise disseminate scientific, technical or other information; 30(d) enter into contracts or agreements with governments, with international, public or private organizations and agencies, or with individuals;(e) sponsor or support conferences, seminars and other meetings; 35(f) acquire and hold real property or any interest therein and sell or otherwise dispose of the same;(g) acquire any property, money or securities by gift, bequest or otherwise, and hold, expend, invest, administer or dispose of any such property, money or securities subject to the terms, if any, on which such property, money or securities is given, 45	<p>5. L'Institut a la capacité d'une personne physique et peut notamment :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a) constituer et exploiter des centres et des établissements d'informations et de données en vue d'effectuer des recherches et d'exercer d'autres activités relatives à sa mission; 20b) appuyer ou aider les recherches effectuées par les pouvoirs publics, par des organisations ou organismes internationaux publics ou privés ou par des particuliers dans des domaines liés à sa mission; 25c) diffuser, par publication ou autres moyens, des informations à caractère scientifique, technique ou autre; 30d) conclure des contrats ou des accords avec les pouvoirs publics, des organisations ou organismes internationaux publics ou privés ou des particuliers; 35e) appuyer ou prendre en charge la tenue de congrès, colloques ou autres réunions;f) acquérir, détenir ou aliéner des biens immobiliers ou des droits sur ces biens; 40g) acquérir, par don, legs ou autre mode de libéralités, des biens, notamment sous forme d'argent ou de valeurs mobilières, et les employer, gérer ou aliéner, pourvu qu'il respecte les conditions dont sont assorties ces libéralités; 45	Pouvoirs

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Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité mondiale

3

bequeathed or otherwise made available to the Institute;

(h) expend, for the purposes of this Act, the revenue from the money endowed to it pursuant to section 27 as well as all moneys as may be appropriated by Parliament for the work of the Institute or received by it through the conduct of its operations;

(i) establish and award scholarships or fellowships for study related to the purpose of the Institute; and

(j) do such other things as are conducive to the fulfilment of its purpose and to the exercise of its rights, powers and privileges.

h) employer, pour l'application de la présente loi, les revenus de la dotation reçue en vertu de l'article 27, de même que les crédits qui peuvent lui être affectés par le Parlement pour ses travaux ou les recettes provenant de ses activités;

i) créer et attribuer des bourses d'études dans des domaines liés à sa mission;

j) prendre toute autre mesure utile à la poursuite de sa mission et à l'exercice de ses attributions.

ORGANIZATION

ORGANISATION

Chairman

6. The Chairman of the Board shall be appointed by the Governor in Council to hold office during good behaviour for a term not exceeding three years.

6. Le gouverneur en conseil nomme le président à titre inamovible pour un mandat maximal de trois ans.

Président

Executive Director

7. The Executive Director of the Board shall be appointed by the Governor in Council to hold office during good behaviour for a term not exceeding five years.

7. Le gouverneur en conseil nomme l'administrateur délégué à titre inamovible pour un mandat maximal de cinq ans.

Administrateur délégué

Other directors

8. The directors of the Board, other than the Chairman and the Executive Director, shall be appointed by the Governor in Council to hold office during good behaviour for such term not exceeding three years as will ensure as far as possible the expiration in any one year of the terms of fewer than half of the directors so appointed.

8. Le gouverneur en conseil nomme les autres administrateurs à titre inamovible pour des mandats respectifs de trois ans au maximum, ces mandats étant, dans la mesure du possible, échelonnés de manière que leur expiration au cours d'une même année touche moins de la moitié des administrateurs.

Autres administrateurs

Re-appointment

9. A director, including the Chairman and the Executive Director, whose term of office has expired is eligible for re-appointment to the Board in the same or another capacity.

9. Le mandat du président, de l'administrateur délégué et des autres administrateurs peut être reconduit, à des fonctions identiques ou non.

Reconduction

Vice-Chairman

10. The Board shall elect one of the directors, other than the Executive Director, to be Vice-Chairman of the Board.

10. Le conseil choisit son vice-président en son sein, exception faite de l'administrateur délégué.

Vice-président

Absence of Chairman

11. In the event of the absence or incapacity of the Chairman, or if the office of Chairman is vacant, the Vice-Chairman has and may exercise and perform all the duties and functions of the Chairman.

11. En cas d'absence ou d'empêchement du président ou de vacance de son poste, la présidence est assumée par le vice-président.

Intérim du président

Role of Executive Director	12. The Executive Director is the chief executive officer of the Institute and has supervision over and direction of the work and staff of the Institute.	12. L'administrateur délégué est le premier dirigeant de l'Institut. A ce titre, il en assure la direction et contrôle la gestion de son personnel.	Attributions de l'administrateur délégué
Acting Executive Director	13. The Board may authorize an officer of the Institute to act as Executive Director in the event that the Executive Director is absent or incapacitated or if the office of the Executive Director is vacant, but no person so authorized shall act as Executive Director for a period exceeding sixty days without the approval of the Governor in Council.	13. En cas d'absence ou d'empêchement de l'administrateur délégué ou de vacance de son poste, le conseil peut autoriser un dirigeant de l'Institut à assurer l'intérim pendant un maximum de soixante jours, sauf prorogation approuvée par le gouverneur en conseil.	Intérim de l'administrateur délégué
Fees of directors	14. The Chairman and other directors, other than the Executive Director, shall be paid such fees for attendances at meetings of the Institute as are fixed by the Governor in Council.	14. Le président et les autres administrateurs, à l'exception de l'administrateur délégué, ont droit, pour leur participation aux réunions de l'Institut, à la rémunération que fixe le gouverneur en conseil.	Rémunération des administrateurs
Salary of Executive Director	15. The Executive Director shall be paid such salary as is fixed by the Governor in Council.	15. L'administrateur délégué reçoit le traitement que fixe le gouverneur en conseil.	Traitement de l'administrateur délégué
Expenses	16. Each director, including the Chairman and the Executive Director, is entitled to be paid such travelling and living expenses incurred by him in the performance of his duties as are fixed by the Governor in Council.	16. Les administrateurs, y compris le président et l'administrateur délégué, ont droit aux frais de déplacement et de séjour, engagés dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, que fixe le gouverneur en conseil.	Indemnités
Qualification	17. The Chairman, Executive Director and at least eight of the other directors of the Board must be Canadian citizens.	17. Le président, l'administrateur délégué et au moins huit des autres administrateurs doivent être des citoyens canadiens.	Conditions de nomination
Principal office	18. The principal office of the Institute shall be in the National Capital Region described in the schedule to the <i>National Capital Act</i> .	18. Le siège de l'Institut est fixé dans la région de la Capitale nationale définie à l'annexe de la <i>Loi sur la Capitale nationale</i> .	Siège
Meetings	19. The Board shall meet at such times and places as the Chairman deems necessary, but it shall meet at least twice in each year, with at least one such meeting at the principal office of the Institute.	19. Le conseil se réunit aux dates et lieux fixés par le président; il tient un minimum de deux réunions par an, dont une au moins au siège de l'Institut.	Réunions
Officers and employees	20. The Board may appoint such officers, agents and employees as are necessary for the proper conduct of the work of the Institute.	20. Le conseil peut employer le personnel et les mandataires qu'il estime nécessaires à l'exécution des travaux de l'Institut.	Personnel
Not agent of Her Majesty	21. The Institute is not an agent of Her Majesty and, except as provided in section 22, the Chairman and Executive Director, the other directors and the officers, agents	21. L'Institut n'est pas mandataire de Sa Majesté et, sous réserve de l'article 22, son président, son administrateur délégué et ses autres administrateurs, ainsi que son person-	Statut

1983-84

Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité mondiale

5

and employees of the Institute are not part of the public service of Canada.

nel et ses mandataires, ne font pas partie de l'administration publique fédérale.

Deemed employment in Public Service

22. The Executive Director and the officers and employees of the Institute shall be deemed to be employed in the Public Service for the purposes of the *Public Service Superannuation Act* and to be employed in the public service of Canada for the purposes of the *Government Employees Compensation Act* and any regulations made under section 107 of the *Aeronautics Act*.

22. L'administrateur délégué et le personnel de l'Institut sont réputés être employés dans la fonction publique pour l'application de la *Loi sur la pension de la Fonction publique* et être des employés de l'administration publique fédérale pour l'application de la *Loi sur l'indemnisation des employés de l'État* et des règlements pris en application de l'article 7 de la *Loi sur l'aéronautique*.

Application de certaines lois

Application of PSSA to Chairman and directors

23. The *Public Service Superannuation Act* does not apply to the Chairman or the other directors, other than the Executive Director, unless, in the case of any of them, the Governor in Council directs that it shall apply.

23. Sauf instruction contraire du gouverneur en conseil, la *Loi sur la pension de la Fonction publique* ne s'applique pas au président ni, exception faite de l'administrateur délégué, aux autres administrateurs.

Idem

BY-LAWS

RÈGLEMENTS ADMINISTRATIFS

By-laws

24. The Board may, with the approval of the Governor in Council, make by-laws respecting,

24. Le conseil peut par règlement administratif, avec l'approbation du gouverneur en conseil, prévoir :

Règlements administratifs

- (a) the duties of officers, agents and employees of the Institute;
- (b) the conditions of employment and the remuneration of officers, agents and employees of the Institute;
- (c) the procedure in all business at meetings of the Board or its committees; and
- (d) generally the conduct and management of the affairs of the Institute.

- a) les fonctions du personnel et des mandataires de l'Institut;
- b) leurs conditions d'emploi ainsi que leur rémunération;
- c) la conduite de ses travaux ou de ceux de ses comités;
- d) de façon générale, l'exercice de ses activités.

ADVICE TO MINISTER

AVIS AU MINISTRE

Advice to Minister

25. On request therefor, the Institute shall undertake research for or provide advice to the Minister in relation to any issue involving international peace and security.

25. À la demande du ministre, l'Institut lui fournit des avis et entreprend des travaux de recherche à son intention sur toute question relative à la paix et à la sécurité mondiales.

Avis au ministre

Disclosure with consent only

26. The Institute shall not disclose the contents of any research undertaken or advice given by it pursuant to a request under section 25 unless expressly authorized by the Minister.

26. L'Institut ne peut révéler la teneur des avis fournis ou des travaux de recherche entrepris en vertu de l'article 25 qu'avec l'autorisation expresse du ministre.

Révélation des avis

FINANCIAL

FINANCEMENT

Endowments

27. The Minister of Finance shall, as soon as practicable after the coming into force of

27. Le ministre des Finances verse à l'Institut, aussitôt que possible après l'entrée en

Dotation

and employees of the Institute are not part of the public service of Canada.

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Idem

BY-LAWS

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a) les fonctions du personnel et des mandataires de l'Institut;

(b) the conditions of employment and the remuneration of officers, agents and employees of the Institute;

b) leurs conditions d'emploi ainsi que leur rémunération;

(c) the procedure in all business at meetings of the Board or its committees; and

c) la conduite de ses travaux ou de ceux de ses comités;

(d) generally the conduct and management of the affairs of the Institute.

d) de façon générale, l'exercice de ses activités.

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FINANCIAL

FINANCEMENT

Endowments

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Dotation

this Act, pay to the Institute out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund an initial endowment of twenty million dollars and in each of the three successive fiscal years, a further endowment of five million dollars.

vigueur de la présente loi, une dotation initiale de dix millions de dollars sur le Fonds du revenu consolidé et, au cours de chacun des trois exercices suivants, une dotation 5 complémentaire de cinq millions de dollars.. 5

Appropriations

28. The fees, salaries and expenses under this Act and the expenses of administration of the Institute shall be paid out of the revenues of the Institute or, if those revenues are not sufficient, out of moneys appropriated by Parliament for the purpose.

28. Les rémunérations, traitements et autres frais engagés pour l'application de la présente loi, ainsi que les frais d'administration de l'Institut, sont prélevés sur les 10 revenus et recettes de l'Institut ou, si ces 10 derniers sont insuffisants, sur les crédits affectés à cette fin par le Parlement.

Affectation de crédits

AUDIT

VÉRIFICATION

Audit

29. The accounts and financial transactions of the Institute shall be audited annually by the Auditor General of Canada and a report of the audit shall be made to the Institute and to the Minister.

29. Le vérificateur général du Canada examine chaque année les comptes et opérations financières de l'Institut et lui en fait 15 rapport de même qu'au ministre.

Vérification

REPORT

RAPPORT

Report

30. The Chairman shall, within four months after the end of each fiscal year, submit to the Minister a report of the activities of the Institute during that year, including the financial statements of the Institute and the report of the Auditor General of Canada thereon, and the Minister shall cause each such report to be laid before each House of Parliament on any of the first 25 fifteen days on which that House is sitting after the day the Minister receives it.

30. Dans les quatre premiers mois de chaque exercice, le président présente au ministre le rapport d'activité de l'Institut pour l'exercice précédent, y compris les états 20 financiers de l'Institut et le rapport du vérificateur général, y afférent. Le ministre le fait déposer devant chaque chambre du Parlement dans les quinze premiers jours de 25 séance de celle-ci suivant sa réception. 25

Rapport

L. A. DELVOYE 

~~G. SMITH~~

~~K. CALDER~~

J. MCNEE 

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HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK - BRIEFING NOTE
LIVRE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES - NOTES D'INFORMATION

Section

Subject/Highlights	Sujet/Points saillants
INF and SALT	

Source

Assessment / Évaluation	Classification
	RESTRICTED

In November and December 1983 respectively, the Soviet Union unilaterally broke off the INF and START negotiations in large part to protest the deployment of nuclear weapons in Western Europe. In INF, notwithstanding modifications introduced since the negotiations began in 1981, and the limited progress which resulted, neither side had moved from its essential position. Moscow has made the resumption of the INF talks conditional on Western readiness to remove missiles already deployed in Europe. In response to Western deployments, the Soviet Union has taken a number of measures which are more politically than militarily significant. We believe that given the importance of the INF and START processes, there is an obligation on the part of the West to put polemics aside and make it as easy as possible for the Soviet side to return to Geneva and to suggest through diplomatic channels formulas by which an INF agreement could be reached. One face-saving device to be explored might be a closer association of the INF and START talks.

Suggested Reply / Réponse suggérée

- We regret the unilateral suspension of the INF and START negotiations by the Soviet Union. We do not believe that this was justified.
- The United States negotiated in Geneva during a period when Soviet SS-20 missiles were being deployed at the rate of one per week.
- NATO Ministers made it clear in the communiqué issued at their last meeting in Brussels that Western deployments could be reversed at any time if justified by the terms of an agreement.
- We hope that the Soviet Union will soon conclude that it is in their own interest to return to the negotiating table.
- We believe that the atmosphere in East-West relations has improved in recent months and that this could be an important element in reaching a mutually satisfactory outcome in the INF and START Talks if they were to resume without too much delay.

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HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK - BRIEFING NOTE
LIVRE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES - NOTES D'INFORMATION

Section

Subject/Highlights / Sujet/Points saillants
MBFR Talks resume in Vienna on March 16.

Source

Assessment / Evaluation Classification
RESTRICTED

The last round of the MBFR talks ended on December 15, 1983 with Eastern participants refusing to agree to the Western proposal to return to the negotiating table at the end of January. Instead, the East suggested that the date be set later through diplomatic channels. The date of March 16 was proposed by Gromyko at the Stockholm Conference in January and agreed by both sides. The Soviet tactic of delaying the beginning of the MBFR winter round was partly in protest to Western INF deployments and to underline the Western failure to respond to the latest Eastern moves in 1983. The NATO Study of MBFR mandated by Foreign Ministers at their December meeting has produced only meagre results because of differences of views in the Reagan Administration and within NATO about the desirability of tabling substantive Western proposals. Despite pressure from Canada and other participants to have a package of substantive proposals ready for the beginning of the round, the Western move will be delayed for at least a few weeks while a lesser package, apparently approved by the White House, is being finalized for tabling in Brussels. Ambassador Hammond, the head of the Canadian Delegation in Vienna, has been given the difficult and sensitive job of Western Spokesman for this round in Vienna.

Suggested Reply / Réponse suggérée

- We are pleased that the MBFR negotiations will resume on March 16 in Vienna after a three month pause.
- The Alliance is at present reviewing the substance of these negotiations, as mandated by NATO Foreign Ministers last December, in light of encouraging Eastern moves toward the Western position on verification last year.
- We hope the West will be in a position to table new proposals sometime after the round begins. If the East continues to cooperate we are confident that progress towards a verifiable agreement to reduce and limit conventional forces in Central Europe can be made.
- In our view, such an agreement would have considerable stabilizing effects on security in Europe and would reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence.