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File No. Dossier 28-6+1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
Volume 80 From-De 83-11-18 To-À 83-11-21

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VOLS ACCESSION NO. 18820 2003

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT
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Canada/Brazil Political Affairs
Consultative Committee Meeting
21-22 November 1983

Cda Briefing?
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M.R. Grinius
Arms Control and
Disarmament Division
6-6320

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE ON
EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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ISSUE

Brazilian Foreign Minister Guerreiro may wish to discuss Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative on East-West relations and international security.

BACKGROUND

On October 27, 1983 Prime Minister Trudeau delivered a major speech at the University of Guelph's Conference on Strategies for Peace and Security in the Nuclear Age. The speech (copy attached) suggested a strategy of political confidence-building as a means of restoring a productive East-West dialogue and reducing the current disturbing climate of distrust. In taking this initiative, Prime Minister Trudeau also hoped to break the current East-West stalemate in arms control and disarmament negotiations and to help improve the international security situation generally.

This initiative inaugurates a series of public statements by the Prime Minister and personal meetings at the highest level. It is the result of an in-depth review of several elements, including the background to the present state of East-West relations; the negotiating positions of the major state actors in this field; the various ideas submitted to the Government in recent months by an interested Canadian public; and the prospects for the successful implementation of a range of peace and security actions in a variety of fora.

The speech provides a global framework and evaluation of factors that have produced a dangerous lack of political contact between East and West and suggests a series of areas which, if developed and accepted, could provide a basis for the two sides to start to work together again. A series of more detailed proposals will be the subject of discussions the Prime Minister is pursuing with NATO Heads of Government, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in New Delhi and in other fora.

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CONFIDENTIAL

The Prime Minister had his first direct consultations with Heads of Government or staff in Europe with President Mitterand in Paris on November 8, and Chancellor Kohl in Bonn on November 10. In addition he had meetings with Prime Ministers Martens of Belgium, Lubbers of the Netherlands and Craxi of Italy. Prime Minister Thatcher was in Ottawa recently and Mr. Trudeau was to discuss these important issues with her again while in New Delhi at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

The speech does not/not suggest or imply a change in NATO's two-track approach on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). Indeed, the Prime Minister has recently emphasized publicly Canada's full support for the two-track decision, and in his speech he reiterates Canada's commitment to the Alliance. The Prime Minister is not proposing himself as a messenger or shuttle diplomatist between Washington and Moscow. Rather, he hopes, with the support of other leaders, to encourage a frank and useful East-West dialogue. The speech does not imply a review of the Canadian Cruise Testing decision nor any support for a moratorium on the installation of Cruise and Pershing II in Europe pending the outcome of negotiations. The Prime Minister is not suggesting that French and British missiles be counted in the INF negotiations.

The speech does suggest involving other nuclear powers in a more open dialogue. It suggests that a way ought to be found to constrain the arsenals of all five nuclear powers, but not in the context of bilateral negotiations like INF or START.

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Canada/Brazil Political Affairs
Consultative Committee Meeting
21-22 November 1983

M.R. Grinius
Arms Control and
Disarmament Division
6-6320

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

ISSUE

Although the approaches of Canada and Brazil on arms control and disarmament issues differ in some important areas, cooperation in promoting some priority issues is possible and, given the current lack of progress in disarmament negotiations, desirable.

BACKGROUND

Although the Geneva Committee on Disarmament (soon to be called the Conference on Disarmament) is regarded as the main multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, it has shown little negotiating dynamic over the past year. Procedural and other matters have acted as a distraction to substantive issues. With the exception of the chemical weapons question, the CD has not demonstrated an ability to reach agreement on any substantive issue before it.

The reaction of CD members to the lack of progress in the CD has been frustration and disillusionment with the CD, although the experience with the Chemical Weapons Working Group under Canadian Chairmanship has shown that if used in the right way, on the right subject under the right conditions and with enough determination, the CD retains a potential for negotiation. On the basis of the CD experience, the process of consensus building at the UNGA will be difficult with strong support likely for Soviet-sponsored declaratory resolutions and less support for alternative Western resolutions.

CANADIAN POSITION

The general position of Canada on most arms control and disarmament issues is undoubtedly well-known to Brazil. Our priorities are: to encourage the continuation of talks

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on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe and of the ongoing negotiations on strategic arms (START); to promote early progress towards the realization of a multilateral comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT); to assist in preparing a convention to completely prohibit chemical weapons; to promote the evolution of an effective non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty; to participate actively in negotiations to limit and reduce conventional forces; and to strive, step-to-step, to ultimately achieve general and complete disarmament, consistent with the legitimate security needs of states.

Consistent with its non-proliferation objectives, Canada has been sympathetic, in principle, to the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NFWZ) where they are feasible in the sense of commanding support of countries in the area and where they would promote stability. We believe that, to be effective, such zones must apply to a well-defined geographic area; be based on proposals which emanate from and are agreed to by most countries in the area concerned, including the principal military powers of the area; not give military advantage to any state or group of states; contain adequate treaty assurances and means to verify that all countries abide by the commitments involved; and not permit countries of the area to have independent nuclear explosive capability. We have supported UN General Assembly resolutions calling for such zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. We have also backed measures which would consolidate the establishment of an NFWZ in Latin America in accordance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Our position on arms control and disarmament was recently outlined to the United Nations General Assembly by the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs (September 27) and the Canadian Representative on the ... First Committee (November 1). Copies of their Speeches are attached. In his speech to the University of Guelph on October 27, Prime Minister Trudeau dealt with this subject in the broad context of East-West relations. (See separate brief).

BRAZILIAN POSITION

Brazil's bilateral relationship with Argentina and its status as a developing country more in tune with the aspirations of the non-aligned movement have been the two most important influences in the formulation of Brazil's foreign policy in arms control and disarmament issues. The importance that Brazil attaches to the question of arms

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control and disarmament is reflected in its active participation in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. This year at the CD, Brazil was particularly helpful to Canada which chaired the Chemical Weapons (CW) Working Group. This working group was the only one which was able to make substantial progress at the 1983 CD.

On most arms control and disarmament issues, Brazil's position has been relatively close to that of the neutral and non-aligned countries. This would account for many of the differences in the approach our two countries take on these issues. However, even more important is how Brazil views its relationship with Argentina. Thus Brazil, as Argentina, has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is keeping its nuclear option open. Moreover, although it has signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America, Brazil has not put the treaty into force since it has yet to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It has stated that it is willing to put the treaty into force but only after Argentina has done the same. Argentina has not yet ratified the treaty.

PROPOSALS FOR COOPERATION WITH BRAZIL

While there are basic differences between Canada and Brazil on disarmament issues, areas where we agree should be emphasized. For example, Canada and Brazil have been able to work closely together within the context of the CD in preparing a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and on other subjects including the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency, the prevention of the arms race in outer space and the prohibition of anti-satellite systems.

TALKING POINTS

ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR WEAPON POTENTIAL

On a regular basis, stories emerge in the press about the possibility that Argentina is planning to build a nuclear weapon. What are Brazil's views on this subject?

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Canada is a strong supporter of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) as the basis of an effective non-proliferation régime. Since Brazil is not yet a signatory of the NPT, can Brazil outline its main objections towards the treaty?

TREATY OF TLATELOLCO

Canada has been sympathetic to the idea of regional nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) where they are feasible and promote stability. One such NWFZ could be Latin America. Indeed most Latin American countries have put into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Brazil signed the treaty in 1967 and ratified it in 1968, yet has never put it into effect. Can Brazil outline what other requirements need to be satisfied before this treaty is put into effect?

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS

As a member of the Committee on Disarmament, Brazil has been of considerable help in the discussion on Chemical Weapons, especially in coordinating one of the contact groups. We look to continued support from Brazil in promoting a convention on Chemical Weapons.

MESSAGE *A7*

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// We are all of us -- you and I, our friends and families, citizens, governments and corporations -- on that crowded global stage, which is alive with our hopes and our fears, our failures and our successes. But there are today three dominant and disturbing trends which, when set side by side, threaten to bring down the curtain on our human performance.

// The first trend is an increasing resort to the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. Despite the solemn affirmation of the UN Charter that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force" there have been, since 1945, approximately 130 conflicts in which 35 million human lives have been lost.

// There is a habit of aggression which is gaining ground. An abdication of the political process in deference to military solutions. A coarse element of belligerence, of menacing rhetoric, of governments which rise and fall at gun-point. The trend is global -- and it is gathering speed.

// This brutalization of political life takes on a particularly dangerous tone when it is driven by the clash of confrontational ideologies, and armed with sophisticated weapons. Weapons claiming an annual expenditure on the order of 600 billion dollars for nuclear and conventional arms combined. Weapons claiming too great a share of the budgets of impoverished Third World nations. Weapons which promote a rising tide of violence and engulf more peaceful ways to resolve disputes. That is the first trend: the brutalization of international relations.

// The second trend is the steady unravelling of the international regime designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

// This proliferation has two fundamental directions. We call it vertical proliferation when we mean the development of ever-larger nuclear weapons programmes, ever more-advanced in destructive technology, by the five nuclear-weapons states: the USA, USSR, France, UK and China. We call it horizontal proliferation when we mean the potential spread of nuclear weapons to other states, especially to those who now have the capacity to produce nuclear arms, or soon will have that capacity.

// We are today preoccupied mainly with the evident need to assert restraint over the arsenals of all five nuclear powers. But from a global perspective, and in the near term, the consequences of horizontal proliferation to other states, pose an equally grave threat. Perhaps more grave, since the use of nuclear weapons by other nations would be unchecked by the assurance of mutual destruction which obtains among the five powers.

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TRANSCRIPT OF REMARKS BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON PEACE AND SECURITY,
MONTREAL, QUEEN ELIZABETH HOTEL, SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1983

(TRANSLATION)

Ladies and gentlemen, mesdames, messieurs, dear colleagues, dear friends,

First of all, let me thank you for your welcome. I must say that, after a trip like the one I have just made, it is good to be back among my own people, and to receive such a warm welcome.

I want to thank Marc Lalonde for having said such friendly things about me, and about the direction which, together, we have tried to give to the party. Marc is a friend, so that partly explains the nice things he said about me. He is also a great minister of Finance, a fact which sometimes requires him, too, to travel to foreign countries. Just a few months ago, he came back from the annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and from the meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers. He came back from the Caribbean. He came back from Washington. But I must say that his speeches were less interesting than the kind he gives when he comes back from Kénogami and Jonquière. If we don't watch out, he's going to become one spell-binding orator.

Well, today the roles are a bit reversed. In recent years, I have often taken advantage of these occasions to talk about Quebec, about Canada -- sometimes a bit boisterously. Today, in contrast, I would like to give you a report on the trip I have made. I would like to speak to you about peace and disarmament, and to share with you some reflections on a world in disarray.

We meet together today as part of the long-standing democratic process in this country -- a process which, as your generous presence shows, is alive and well in Canada. We take pride in the vigour and diversity of our political life, in the bright promise of our future.

If our future depended on Canadians alone, we could be confident that it was safe and sound. But no nation today holds its future securely in its own hands. We share this planet with about 160 other nations, all of whom interact with us in a global system embracing our security, our economy, the health of our environment, and the quality of our lives.

Those 160 governments are, however, by no means the only players. The stage is crowded with alliances, with regional associations, with international institutions such as the United Nations, with multinational corporations, with cartels, pressure groups and lobbies of all kinds.

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// It was precisely to arrest both kinds of proliferation that a formal agreement -- the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- came into effect in 1970, and is up for review in 1985. That treaty represented an implicit covenant between those nations with nuclear weapons and those without: an undertaking by the nuclear powers that they would pursue negotiations in good faith on arms control and on limiting the spread of their weapons technology; and an undertaking by other states that they would forego the military use of nuclear energy in return for the benefits of its peaceful use, in fields such as energy, medicine, or agriculture.

// But the trend is for this bargain to come unstuck. The treaty stands now at a cross-roads between peaceful aspiration and military strategy. It is the crossroads at which nuclear and non-nuclear countries -- East and West, North and South -- preoccupied with their survival, with their sovereignty, or with current conflicts, will decide whether the covenant still holds.

// The third trend which threatens the global system is the worsening state of relations between East and West, particularly of relations between the two superpowers. Two weeks ago, when I spoke in Guelph, I deplored the absence of high politics in East-West relations, and the tendency for arms control negotiations to run their course outside any structure of understanding of, and respect for, each

other's security needs. I reaffirmed our fidelity to the NATO two-track decision, and declared my hope that we might add a "third rail" of political energy, of dialogue and of confidence, in order to improve the downward course of relations between East and West.

(TEXT)

// So I ask you now to consider these three trends in relation to each other -- laminated together, as they are in real life. An increasing resort to the use of force. The growing reality of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And a superpower relationship charged with animosity. I believe it is evident that only a global approach to peace and security can reverse the path of this sinister, composite trend-line.

// Because, as tensions build, the East-West relationship becomes particularly vulnerable to events on the periphery. An endemic instability is evident in areas largely understood to be the sphere of influence of one or the other superpower. At other flashpoints, such as the ever-volatile Middle East, we see the tinder for a spreading conflagration.

// The penetration of East-West rivalry into the Third World will reach its deepest and most dangerous point if, despite the Non-Proliferation Treaty, front-line antagonists -- locked in rivalry or combat -- begin to arm themselves with nuclear weapons.

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(TRANSLATION)

As Canadians, our energies are deeply devoted to the security of the Western community, on this continent and in Europe. But our loyalties, our national and global interests, by no means end there.

Canada's place on the Pacific Rim gives us a privileged relationship with Japan, with China, and with the Association of South-East Asian Nations and, of course, with Australia and New Zealand. Our extensive programme of development assistance takes us to many parts of the world, remote in distance, but close in partnership. Our standing in the community of francophone nations, and in the Commonwealth, demands that we share the full range of political, economic and security concerns to which our national character gives us access.

That is why, in pursuing an initiative to improve the prospects for peace, I determined from the start that our approach must be global in scope and in perspective. Such an approach is dictated by the complex interlinkage of disarmament and development; of superpower animosity and Third World rivalries; of the resort to force and the availability of weapons; of nuclear balances in Europe and in Asia.

One man representing one country cannot promise a miracle, let alone deliver one. I have absolutely no illusions about the complexity of the issues in play. Nonetheless it is essential, in my judgement, to seek stability at a number of points along the downward trend-line, and to recognize that peace and security in the modern age are indivisible.

Moreover, I am not alone. Other leaders have joined their concerns with mine. There is a growing community of political leadership which is determined to subject the science of arms to the art of politics. I draw encouragement from the support of that community.

You will know that I have just returned from meetings in Europe with several leaders of the Atlantic Alliance, with His Holiness the Pope, and with Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands. I return from Europe with clear expressions of support for my initiative, confident that my sense of urgency is shared by our friends and allies. I found a particular consensus on the need to lay down a third rail of confidence and communication -- a rail charging our dealings with the other side with a current of political energy.

// I took to my European colleagues for discussion, and for refinement in light of their own views, elements of a programme for political management of the current crisis. I return with the assurance of their personal attention to this programme. Let me set out some of the elements.

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// The first is the need to establish, as soon as possible in the course of the coming year, a forum in which global limits might be negotiated for all five nuclear-weapons states. This proposal is without prejudice to the INF or START talks between the USA and USSR. But those talks, and rightly so, do not cover British, French or Chinese nuclear forces.

// What we must seek to provide is a negotiating forum for those five states which recognizes the rights of the United States and the Soviet Union as strategic equals -- what a recent Trilateral Commission report calls "inevitable parity" between them -- and which provides a mutually acceptable and stable framework for the relationship between the forces of the other three states and those of the superpowers.

// In this way neither Britain, nor France, nor China need fear that their forces will be subject to restraints which do not recognize their own national interests.

// Once relative levels of armament were stabilized, I believe the five nuclear powers could begin to address the reductions called for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to consider measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic arms race.

// A second element is remedial action to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself -- that covenant between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states which I mentioned a few minutes ago. The Treaty has been signed by some 119 nations. But a number of key states remain aloof, including several with the capacity now, or the potential soon, to develop their own nuclear arms.

// If the five nuclear-weapons states could begin to strengthen their side of the non-proliferation bargain, then the rest of us could more easily bring good sense to bear on those who have not yet signed on. No doubt we need to increase the incentives for Third World states to forego nuclear weapons -- there must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development. And we shall also have to ensure that a full range of safeguards adequately governs the transfer, from all nuclear suppliers, of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The area of safeguards is one in which Canada has taken a leading part for many years, and will continue to do so.

Those two elements begin to address the global dimension of security in the nuclear age. But we must also recognize that there is in the heart of Europe a most dangerous concentration of forces -- conventional as well as nuclear. A war in Europe could destroy everything that each side desires to protect.

Throughout my talks with European leaders, there ran a common theme of concern at the present imbalance of conventional forces between the two sides. The Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO. There is an

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apprehension in Western Europe that the Warsaw Pact forces could be tempted to gamble on a conventionally-armed attack. They would throw down the challenge to Western leaders either of accepting defeat, or of being the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in our own defense.

As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. That is why we say that the nuclear threshold in Europe is too low. And of course we can never be certain that the use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre would not escalate rapidly to ever more massive nuclear retaliation on an international scale. The conclusion we draw is that the best way to raise the nuclear threshold is to establish a more reasonable balance of the conventional forces on each side.

How then do we achieve this balance? This question prompts the third element of my approach. The simple, though expensive, answer is for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. I see this as a last resort. The far more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels, a task to which we have devoted the past ten years at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. There is today some sign of movement in those talks, but at far too slow a pace. Hard questions remain to be resolved. That is why I explored, with my colleagues in the Alliance, ways to break the deadlock in Vienna, ways to give fresh political impetus to the MBFR talks..

Another negotiating forum will open soon in Stockholm, this January. Its lengthy title, showing the complexity of its task, is the "Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe". It is imperative that this Conference not lose its way in litigation about procedures, or in the linguistics of technicality. In other words, we don't have to follow the same path with this conference, on disarmament in Europe, to which countries attach so much importance, as we have followed with the Vienna negotiations where, as I have said, we have talked for ten years without really arriving at an agreement. I have therefore proposed that we consider the merits of high-level political representation at the very start of the Stockholm negotiations. You see, I come back always to the notion of the third rail, the need to inject political will, and the presence of political people, into these debates. They have become debates among technicians, among weighers of balances, among nuclear accountants. These technical quarrels can harm the process, rather than giving it a real push, a political impetus, which I call the third rail.

Finally, a fourth element in my initiative flows from the strategy of suffocation which I first proposed to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. That strategy -- which still requires, and awaits, the support

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// Japan's association with the Williamsburg Declaration last May, in which the leaders of the industrialized democracies agreed to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war, expresses both the resonance of history and the reality of the present day. My visit there will bear witness to the indivisibility of global security in the nuclear age.

// I can also announce that, in addition to the consultations under way with the United States, I have initiated consultations with the Soviet Union and with China -- two nuclear powers upon which much depends.

// I look forward to taking an active part in the discussion of peace and security issues at the New Delhi meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, where I will be heading after Japan. I look forward particularly to consultations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on the matter of non-proliferation, and on her perspective, as current chairman of the council of non-aligned nations, on the linkage between disarmament and development.

I am encouraged by this momentum, and heartened by the response. But I am also well aware that critics of my initiative have difficulty in grasping this step by step approach. Some would prefer the passionate embrace of an unattainable ideal. Others are paralyzed by the complexities of the issues in play. I believe that peace must be waged steadily, with caution and with realism. We must work with due respect for the fragility of political trust, for the importance of building carefully, for the need to search out common ground on which to stand.

The imperative of political action is made all the more urgent by the pace of conflict and confrontation, which threatens to overtake our ability to understand what is happening, and our capacity to manage it.

Let me remind you that when Alfred Nobel invented dynamite in 1867 he believed that the prospect of its military application was so awesome that governments would be forced to live in peace. And yet today we have long since lost the ability to comprehend the force of a nuclear blast in terms of any comparison with traditional explosives.

(TRANSLATION)

Peace and security are not cold abstractions. Their purpose is to preserve the future of mankind, the growth of the human spirit, and the patrimony of our planet.

The choice we face is clear and present. We can without effort abandon our fate to the mindless drift toward nuclear war. Or we can gather our strength, working in good company to turn aside the forces bearing down on us, on our children, on this Earth.

As for me, I choose to move forward, and I know I do so with your support.

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Le choix qui s'impose à nous est donc clair et pressant. Ou bien nous nous laissons entraîner par le courant aveugle qui nous mène à une guerre nucléaire, ou bien nous rassemblons nos énergies et nous travaillons ensemble à maîtriser les forces qui pèsent sur nous, sur nos enfants et sur le monde.

Quant à moi, j'ai fait mon choix. J'ai choisi de lutter. Je sais que je peux compter sur votre appui.

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

FOLLOWING IS BRIEF PROPOSED FOR SSEA AND COPIED TO MIN PEPIN REPORT-
ING ON EUROPEAN VISIT AND OUTLINING FOLLOWUP. ADDITIONALLY, JAPANESE
PM NAKASONE WAS VERY SUPPORTIVE OF PM INITIATIVE IN THEIR MTG IN
TOKYO. PM HAS SENT SPECIAL EMISSARY TO PEKIN AND MOSCO TO EXPLAIN
PURPOSES OF HIS INITIATIVE.

2. IF ASKED ABOUT USA REACTION, USA HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF
INITIATIVE, BUT HAS EXPRESSED CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT SPECIFIC ARMS
CONTROL MEASURES. PM IS NOW EN ROUTE TO CHOGM IN DELHI (BEGINS 22NOV)
WHERE HE PLANS TO EXPAND RANGE OF HIS CONTACTS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH
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G. J. Smith
Prime Minister's Task Force on
East-West Relations &
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5-5912

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IDDZ-0133

November 14, 1983

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister
and Secretary of State for External Affairs

cc: Minister of State (International Trade)
cc: Minister of State (External Relations)

Subject: QUOTE
PM's Visit to Europe: Follow-Up ~~PM~~

Prime Minister Trudeau's meetings in Europe on his initiative went very well. During the short period of November 8-11 he had in-depth conversations with six European leaders (President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, Prime Ministers Lubbers, Martens, Craxi and Thatcher), as well as with the Pope and Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands.

P ✓ The Prime Minister was well received in all capitals. His initiative was seen as serious and coming from a country with appropriate credentials. (As Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans put it to the press, the PM occupies a unique place within the Alliance for a role of this kind, being neither European nor American.) The PM found support all along the way for his general message of the need to reestablish a dialogue with Moscow and to create a "safety net" around the INF negotiations. This was particularly the case with Chancellor Kohl, and indeed to a surprisingly positive extent also with Mrs. Thatcher. Mitterrand, Kohl, Thatcher and Martens mentioned the unsettled and unclear situation as to what was happening in Moscow and what appeared to be a lessening of political control in the Kremlin. They shared the PM's analysis that a Reagan-Andropov summit was desirable, if properly prepared and held in an amicable atmosphere, and might have occurred sometime next spring if it had not been for the KAL incident. Unless something was done by NATO leaders to change the atmosphere, however, a summit would not occur, due to the USA presidential election, for 1 1/2 - 2 years, too lengthy a period in the current unhealthy and dangerous climate which exists between the two superpowers.

...2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

On specific points, there was general agreement on the need for Foreign Ministers to attend the opening of the Stockholm Conference on January 17. Cheysson said he had indications Gromyko would attend (unconfirmed by others) and that Shultz, although reluctant, would likely participate if everyone else did. Mrs. Thatcher was highly interested in the idea of possibly having even Heads of Government attend the Stockholm opening, seeing in it a mechanism by which a Reagan-Andropov meeting might be more acceptable and possible.

The Five-Power Nuclear Conference received a good hearing. Mitterrand's reaction was more positive than anticipated, not being against it provided it did not occur until after INF deployments were underway. Kohl similarly said he had an understanding with Mitterrand to the same effect. While Mrs. Thatcher was more negative she did not have a clear understanding of our proposal which already took account of two of the concerns she raised: (a) the need not to impede the UK modernization programme, and (b) not to aggregate UK, French and USA nuclear forces. The related issue raised by the PM concerning NPT and horizontal proliferation received a good reception, although largely without commitment.

While there was no immediate agreement achieved on having Ministers attend an MBFR meeting, there was support for the concept of having NATO respond to the most recent Eastern initiative.

Follow-up: During your meeting with the Prime Minister at 1715 hours today, he will be interested in discussing follow-up to the European trip and is particularly anxious to seek your views on how to best approach the December NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on the subjects of the CDE in Stockholm and MBFR.

p4
The Prime Minister wishes prior to his departure for Tokyo to write to his NATO colleagues to inform them of the results of his European trip and, with your agreement, to propose that decisions be reached at the NATO meeting on two points that could figure in the NATO communiqué:

- (a) that NATO members will be represented at a high political level at Stockholm, and
- (b) that NATO will respond to the latest Eastern proposal on MBFR and will be prepared to meet with the Warsaw Pact at ministerial level in Vienna in order to provide political impetus to these negotiations.

...3

- 3 -


CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

In this regard, the Prime Minister will be interested in learning whether you are prepared to attend the Stockholm opening January 17 as well as a possible Foreign Ministers meeting on MBFR in Vienna sometime early in the spring.

Further follow-up is intended to include:

- (a) visits by Geoffrey Pearson (as the PM's personal emissary) and a member of the Task Force to Peking (November 21) and Moscow (November 25) to discuss the initiative;
- (b) further consultations with the USA, a key element of which will be your breakfast meeting tomorrow morning with USA Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam;
- (c) a possible visit by you to Eastern Europe, where keen interest in the initiative has been expressed, particularly by President Ceaușescu of Romania.

//UNQUOTE



L. A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

RBR/B. Mawhinney/sk/2-7791

(FILE) CIRC DIARY

IDDZ/Delvoie

RBR

A-7

RESTRICTED	
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	
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	44

Call on Mr. Pepin by Ambassador Bulajic:
Prime Minister's Peace Initiative

November 21, 1983.

RBR0624

RBD

During the Yugoslav Ambassador's call on Mr. Pepin, November 18, the Minister, without too much success, tried to draw out Mr. Bulajic on his government's view of the Prime Minister's peace initiative. In response to Mr. Pepin's suggestion that Yugoslavia, along with India, could play a helpful role in enlisting support from the NNA for the initiative particularly in reaffirming the importance and goals of the NPT, Mr. Bulajic said only that, while his authorities were "very keen" about the Prime Minister's initiative, it was perhaps too early for Belgrade to provide a substantive reply.

Mr. Pepin noted that in a recent conversation he had with an Eastern European Ambassador (I think it was Ambassador Velchev of Bulgaria) the latter had thought it was somewhat "abnormal" for the Prime Minister to consult Western European countries and not do the same with Eastern European countries. Mr. Pepin told Mr. Bulajic that he thought there was some logic in this and implied, jokingly, that he might perform the role of an emissary to Belgrade.

I report this only because Mr. Bulajic and perhaps Mr. Velchev may in due course follow up Mr. Pepin's suggestion with formal proposals that he visit their capitals.

syd

B. Mawhinney,
Director,
USSR and Eastern Europe
Relations Division.

WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANEXE(S)

DFC 12 1981

NO. ~~15~~ 1DDZ0198 DATE 21NOV83

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DESCRIPTION	DESCRIPTION	

REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE

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21Nov.

Text of the PM's speech of November 13
in Montreal.

13
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE
MISSION

9

J.A. McNee
Task Force Working Group

RECEIPT,ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

IDDZ - OTTAWA

DATE _____

SIGNATURE



External Affairs Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

MESSAGE

28-6-1-TRUSTED FILE/DOSSIER *PEACE*
20 1 1 7 MISSION

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

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FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDA0200 21NOV83
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INFO TO PMDEL/DACCA (**DELIVER BY 221000**)
DISTR INFO CHOGMDELHI/SHENSTONE
REF REF TEL FM PMDELDHAKA PMDL0040 OF 21NOV
SUBJ/SUJ DISTR DMF IDA MRCP URR

---PM INITIATIVE: ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENCE INFO (2)

FOLLOWING (BY YEAR AND TITLE) ARE PRINCIPAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
SINCE WORLD WAR TWO (AND REFERENCE TO GENEVA ACCORDS). CANADA SHOWN
WHERE PARTY TO AGREEMENT; BRACKETED FIGURE REFERS TO NUMBER OF
PARTIES.

2. (Comcentre please copy attached).

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG *J.P. CARON/PEC*

IDDZ

55912

SIG *L.A. DELVOIE*

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: IMPORTANT EVENTS

1925 Geneva Protocol	The Parties undertook not to use poison gas or biological weapons in war. Many Parties (including the UK, US and Soviet Union) interpret this as a ban on the first use of weapons but not on their use in retaliation.
1932-34 World Disarmament Conference	Failed to reach agreement on World Disarmament.
1939-45 Second World War	The first atom bomb was exploded in 1945.
1945 Creation of the United Nations	
1949 The Geneva Conventions	These four Conventions deal with the treatment of Prisoners of War, the Wounded and Sick on land and at sea, Shipwrecked Persons and the Protection of Civilians in War. They provide the main body of humanitarian law in armed conflict.
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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: IMPORTANT EVENTS

CDA represents CDN signing of treaty/convention and

page 3

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1963 "Hot Line" Agreement	To reduce the danger of accidental nuclear war, the US and Soviet Union agreed on a direct communications link between their two Governments - the "Hot Line".
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1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America seeks to limit the spread of nuclear weapons by preventing their introduction into areas hitherto free of them. Allows for explosion of nuclear weapons for quote peaceful purposes unquote. Guaranteed by the five nuclear powers. (25/25)
1967 Outer Space Treaty	Bans the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space or on the moon or in orbit around earth, and prohibits the use of the moon or other celestial bodies for military purposes. CDA (84/84)
1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty	Those signatories which do not possess nuclear weapons promise not to acquire them, while those with nuclear weapons undertake to seek through negotiations nuclear and ultimately general and complete disarmament. So far 117 countries have signed the treaty including the UK, USA, and USSR. CDA (117/117)
(3) 1969-78 Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)	Took over from the ENDC. Played a part in the negotiation of agreements such as the Seabed Treaty (see below).
1971 Seabed Treaty	Bans the placing of nuclear weapons on the sea bed. CDA (73/73)

- 3 -

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Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States
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weapons, but this Treaty resulting
from a British initiative bans the
possession of biological weapons for
"germ warfare".
CDA (96/96)

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This comprised

(a) Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty

Limits (to two, later reduced to one)
the number of sites which the two
parties may defend from nuclear
attack using anti-ballistic missiles. The
intention was to ensure that neither side
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out the risk of unacceptable
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- 4 -

1973

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- 5 -

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Negotiations**

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**1977-80 Comprehensive
Test Ban
Negotiations**

These talks between the UK, US and USSR aimed at banning all nuclear explosions.

**1977 Environmental
Modification
Convention**

Bans the use of techniques to change the weather or other aspects of the environment for hostile purposes.
CDA (42/42)

**1977 Additional Geneva
Protocol**

Extended the humanitarian principles embodied in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

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Session on
Disarmament**

The UN General Assembly met for six weeks to discuss disarmament. It agreed priorities for disarmament negotiations on the basis that there should be progress in conventional as well as nuclear disarmament. A second UNSSD will be held in 1982 (see below).

**1977 Belgrade Review
Meeting of the
Conference on
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Focussed principally on criticism of Eastern implementation of 1975 Helsinki Final Act provisions on human rights.

-6-

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both sides are observing its
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11
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Conference

Reached agreement on restrictions
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reasons.

CDA (22/22)

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Meeting of the
Conference on
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To discuss the overall framework
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Talks began between the USA and
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External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED	12	10
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TO/À
INFO
DISTR
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SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDA0200 21NOV83
TO PDEL/DACCA DELIVER BY 221000
INFO CHOGDELHI/SHESTONE
REF TEL FM PDEL/DHAKA PNDL0040 OF 21NOV
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DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

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SIG J.P. CARON/PEC

1002

55912

SIG L.A. DELVOIE

MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSIDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and " (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et " (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:
...2
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MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flècheSECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO PMDEL/DHAKA

DELIVER BY 221000

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INFO CHOGMDELHI/SHENSTONE

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DISTR DMF IDA MRCP URR

SUBJ/SUJ

REF TEL FM PMDELDHAKA PMDL0040 OF 21NOV

---PM INITIATIVE: ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENCE INFO (1)

FURTHER TO REFTEL HAVE ASSEMBLED INFORMATION ON BASIS OF EXISTING
CDN GOVT BRIEFINGS ON SUBJECTS AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH CDN AND USA
ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU
REQUIRE INFORMATION ADDITIONAL TO THAT PROVIDED BELOW. THIS TEL WILL
DEAL WITH ARMS TRADE STATISTICS AND NUMBER OF CONVENTIONAL WARS SIN-
CE WW2 (PARTS A AND B REFTEL). SEPARATE TEL WILL PROVIDE LIST OF
PRINCIPAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

(A) GROSS STATS ON WORLD ARMS TRADE:

2. ACCORDING TO ZEP SOURCES: TOTAL WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES NOW
APPROACHING ONE TRILLION CURRENT USA DOLLARS; IN ADDITION, GROWTH
RATE OF TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES ESTIMATED AT 4 PERCENT PER
ANNUM. SIPRI ESTIMATES TOTAL EXPENDITURES (IN 1980 USA DOLLARS) AS
FOLLOWS: 1975/503 BILLION; 1980/561 BILLION; 1981/579 BILLION;
1982/619 BILLION.

3. OBVIOUSLY SITUATION VARIES IMMENSELY BUT AVERAGE NATL MILITARY
EXPENDITURES ON PROCUREMENT VARY BETWEEN 15-40 PERCENT OF TOTAL
NATL MILITARY EXPENDITURES. WHEN DEVELOPMENT, OPERATION AND MAINTEN-

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

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10

NANCE COSTS OF THAT EQUIPMENT ARE ADDED, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT HALF OF TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES IS DEVOTED TO THE EQUIPMENT ELEMENT IN NATIONAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURES (WHEN BROADLY DEFINED, IE INCLUDING RANDD ETC). OF THE TOTAL OF WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR 20 PERCENT. 4. INNATL TRADE IN MILITARY HARDWARE NOW ESTIMATED AT 25 BILLION CURRENT USA DOLLARS, AND GROWING AT APPROX 8.5 PERCENT PER ANNUM, WHICH IS TWICE RATE QUOTED ABOVE FOR TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SAID TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR 80 PERCENT OF INNATL TRADE IN ARMS. EVER INCREASING COSTS OF MILITARY HARDWARE AND THE ATTRACTION OF HARD CURRENCY SALES HAVE VARIOUSLY INFLUENCED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO INVEST IN THEIR OWN ARMS INDUSTRIES. DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTRIBUTION TO INNATL ARMS SALES INCREASED FROM 3 TO 6 PERCENT OVER 1971-1980 PERIOD.

5. REGARDING STATISTICAL APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS EXPENDITURES, NO HARD INFORMATION ^{IS} ~~APPEARS TO BE~~ AVAILABLE.

AN EDUCATED GUESS WOULD BE

ONE CAN ASSUME THAT THE NUCLEAR POWERS DEVOTE BETWEEN 15 AND 25 PERCENT OF BUDGETS ON UNFORTUNATELY BUDGETS OF ON PROCUREMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SUBSTANTIAL RESEARCH IN PRIMARY NUCLEAR POWERS DO NOT NORMALLY SEPARATE PROCUREMENT SOURCES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO COME UP WITH A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE TO COSTS AS BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL. THIS QUERY.

(B) NUMBER OF CONVENTIONAL WARS SINCE WW2:

6. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT DIFFICULTY IN COMING TO AGREED FIGURE IS

...3



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MATTER OF SEMANTICS.THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE,IN OUR BRIEF REVIEW
OF MATTER,QUOTE AN INNATLLY RECOGNIZED AND ACCURATE FIGURE UNQUOTE.
DND OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT GIVES TOTAL OF
184 WARS FROM 1941 TO 1980; UPDATE ADDS 13 CONFLICTS,FOR A TOTAL OF
197.THESE INCLUDE CONVENTIONAL QUOTE INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE
(INCLUDING CIVIL,GUERRILLA,ETC) WARS,COLONIAL CONFLICTS AND WHAT IS
DEFINED AS EAST/WEST CRISES.THE CENTRE FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION (CDI)
WASHINGTON COUNT IS 130.THIS IS ALSO THE FIGURE USUALLY QUOTED BY
USA GOVT OFFICIALS.CDI WAS LOATHE TO QUOTE DEFINE WAR UNQUOTE BUT
INDICATED THAT THEIR NOTIONAL DEFINITIONS RELATED TO INTERSTATE AND
INTRASTATE CONFLICT AND ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO GOVTS OVER EXTENDED
PERIOD OF TIME.BROOKINGS INSTITUTE,DEPENDING ON DEFINITIONS,USED 115
TO 197 (WE WERE TOLD TO TAKE OUR PICK).GIVEN THAT PM HAS USED 120-130
IN MONTREAL SPEECH,SUGGEST THAT YOU PROBABLY WISH TO CONTINUE TO USE
SAME FIGURE.

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
ÀCanadian Embassy
Abidjan - Ivory CoastUNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)NO. **IDDZ0198** DATE **21NOV83**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>---PM INITIATIVE.</p> <p>Text of the PM's speech of November 13 in Montreal.</p> <p>J.A. McNee Task Force Working Group</p>	<p>Ourtel IDDZ0197 of 21Nov.</p>
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE	IDDZ - OTTAWA



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FM EXTOTT IDZ0197 21NOV83

TO/À

TO ABDJN

INFO

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DISTR GAF GAD RCR IFB FPR

REF

REF YOURTEL ZAGR3275 OF 21NOV

SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE

REGRET WE DO NOT/HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF PM EUROPEAN VISIT WHICH
COULD BE PUBLISHED.

2.SUGGEST YOU REFER TO PM S 13NOV SPEECH IN MTL ON PEACE AND DISAR-
MAMENT IN WHICH PM ALLUDES TO EUROPEAN VISIT. (WE ARE SENDING IT BY
BAG.)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

SIG

J. McNEE

DIVISION/DIRECTION

IDZ

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22 Nov 83 00 42

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C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0196 21NOV83

TO/À

TO PMDEL/DELHI DELIVER BY 220900

INFO

DISTR

FOR FOWLER ONLY FROM DELVOIE

REF

DISTR MINA DMF

SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE:USA REACTIONS

WE HAVE RECVD NUMEROUS ENQUIRIES FROM CDN JOURNALISTS AND FOREIGN
DIPLOS POSTED IN OTT RE COMMENTS MADE LAST WEEK BY USA OFFICIALS
PARTICIPATING IN MTG ON NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY IN NYORK. IN RESPOND-
ING, WE HAVE TAKEN LINE THAT WHAT WE REGARD AS VIEWS OF USA ADMIN
ARE THOSE COMMUNICATED BY PRES REAGAN IN HIS LET TO PM TRUDEAU AND
THOSE COMMUNICATED BY DEP SEC STATE DAM IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH
DPM/SSEA. WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT VIEWS PUT FORWARD BY OTHER OFFICIALS
REPRESENT INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS RATHER THAN OFFICIAL ADMIN POSITIONS.
WE HAVE REFRAINED HOWEVER FROM PASSING ANY JUDGMENT ON NATURE OR
SOURCES OF THOSE OPINIONS IN ORDER TO AVOID CREATING UNNECESSARY
IRRITANTS TO BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP OR TO ONGOING CONTACTS WITH
USA ADMIN RE PM INITIATIVE.

2. IN RESPONDING TO ANY FURTHER ENQUIRIES YOU MAY RECEIVE ON THIS
SUBJ, YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO ADOPT LINE WE ARE USING IN OTT

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

L.A. Delvoie/sc

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DISTR	FOR FOWLER		
REF	INFO OSLO PC00TT/CARON BNATO VMBFR		
SUBJ/SUJ	DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGB RSD RSR		
	---PM INITIATIVE:NORWEGIAN REACTION		
	IN COURSE OF CALL ON IDDZ TODAY,NORWEGIAN AMB SAID THAT HIS PRIME		
	MINISTER AND GOVT FULLY SUPPORT PM TRUDEAU INITIATIVE AND WISHED TO		
	ENCOURAGE HIM TO PURSUE IT.HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT IN COURSE OF		
	FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE IN NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT SEVERAL MEMBERS OF		
	PARLIAMENT HAD REFERRED IN POSITIVE AND FREQUENTLY GLOWING TERMS TO		
	PM TRUDEAU INITIATIVE.FINALLY,AMB NOTED THAT NORWEGIAN PM SUPPORTED		
	IDEAS OUTLINED IN PM TRUDEAU LET OF NOV17 RE ACTION TO BE TAKEN AT		
	NEXT NATO MINISTERIAL MTG (I.E.ON CDE AND MBFR);NORWEGIAN PM WOULD		
	BE WRITING PERSONAL LET TO PM TRUDEAU TO THIS EFFECT SHORTLY.		

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TO/À

TO PMDEL/DHAKA

INFO

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INFO DELHI CHOGMDELHI/OSBALDESTON/SHENSTONE PEKIN/PEARSON/SMITH

REF

MOSCO/ARCHDEACON

SUBJ/SUJ

REF TEL FM PMDELDHAKA PMDL033 OF 20NOV
---SPEECH BY IVAN HEAD

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF HEAD NOVEMBER 4 DRAFT FOLLOWED BY ARCHDEACON
ANALYSIS OF NOVEMBER 9.

2.TEXT OF DRAFT SPEECH (COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED TEXT QUOTE TO
UNQUOTE).

3.TEXT OF TEL FM PC00TT PC01270 OF 09NOV (COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTA-
CHED TEL BEGIN QUOTE TO UNQUOTE).

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SIG

J. CARON

IDDZ

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SIG

L.A. DEL VOIE

PABA 2

QUOTE

Less than 40 years have passed since the conclusion of World War II, yet in that relatively brief period the world has been witness to a cascade of technological events: some of extraordinary accomplishment, some of terrifying potential, all of them to be marvelled at. We have adjusted our lives to accommodate microwave ovens, colour television, and cordless telephones. We accept as routine earth-orbiting satellites, industrial lasers, and recombinant DNA. Our every-day existence is vastly different than it was even a quarter of a century ago, and much as we effect a nostalgia for the "good old" days, few of us would willingly give up the new comforts that are now part of our routine lives.

Advances on the dark side of the sciences have been equally as breath-taking. Sophisticated weapons scarcely even dreamed of a few years ago are now deployed, ready for action, some pointed at us, some pointed away. The accuracy of guidance systems permits a tiny target to be struck by a rocket launched thousands of miles distant. The explosive force of a large nuclear warhead is now 30,000 times greater than that of the atomic bomb which obliterated Nagasaki, itself the most powerful bomb ever detonated in the history of war.

- 2 -

Our adjustment to these changes has not been adequate. We continue to think that military strength is automatically equated to security. We continue to define deterrence in terms no longer logical. We fail to understand that today the utmost strength coincides with the utmost vulnerability. In these terms - military terms - the "good old" days were immeasurably better, for there was then some likelihood that military arsenals could be kept in balance; some confidence that weapons-systems would act as reliable deterrents.

That is no longer the case.

There is a considerable psychological element to a deterrent. One's adversary must take it seriously, must regard it as formidable, must believe that it is for defence. And there, of course, lies the rub. Uncounted wars have been launched by defensive units. Likely still greater numbers have been launched as pre-emptive strikes, because of apprehension that the other side's strength would be employed offensively. Luxembourg was once the strongest fortress in Western Europe. It was designed and built solely for the defence of that Duchy against outsiders. Yet times in centuries it was destroyed by outsiders who feared that it represented a security threat against them.

- 3 -

In Grecian times, elaborate rules dictated the formations employed by sailing vessels as they approached an alien coast. Certain formations were peaceful, others hostile, and shore defences were able to respond accordingly. Deceptive uses of formations were a breach of international law, and the subject of later arbitration.

Mistakes which contribute to war have always been tragic because of the suffering and destruction that has ensued. Yet in Grecian times, in medieval times, and even in recent times, those mistakes were capable of remedy. Troy was rebuilt several times. So was Luxembourg. The Coventry Cathedral has been replaced. Dresden, too. Even the introduction in this century of the hitherto unknown concepts of total war and absolute surrender did not precipitate irremedial destruction. Slowly and painfully, societies could extricate themselves from the rubble, and begin again.

The advent of nuclear weapons has changed that. The commencement of a nuclear war would set in train a sequence of irreversible consequences. It would lead to irremedial harm. For the first time in the history of mankind, there would be no recovery. Every reputable study concludes that all biological

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life on this planet would be in peril. The brilliant accomplishments of seven millennia of poets and architects, musicians and scholars, theologians and artists, would forever be destroyed. The genius of humankind would be extinguished, quite possibly forever.

↳ It is against this setting that concepts of security and defence and deterrence must be considered. The defenders of Troy received two years warning of the invasion preparations of the avenging Greeks. An intermediate range ballistic missile can speed across Europe, eastward or westward, from launch site to target, in ten minutes.

The accuracy and destructive force of these missiles virtually guarantees that the side which first launches them will destroy much of the other side's retaliatory capacity. The old, relatively stable concept of second - or retaliatory - strike capacity has now disappeared. Neither side can permit the other to strike first. Each side must anticipate the intentions of the other. And each has less than 10 minutes to come to a decision.

This kind of force posture is madness. If military theorists have brought us to this position, they must be instructed to edge us away. If political leaders are responsible, we must quickly begin to set a reverse course. The

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present hair-trigger circumstances East and West, with the destruction of civilization the guaranteed result, must give way to stable, reliable defence systems. Such systems must consist of two major elements: deterrence and reassurance. Deterrence is the effective discouragement of resort to war; the knowledge that the commencement of hostilities will result in a military response which would inflict unacceptable punishment. Reassurance is the maintenance of self-confidence within each military alliance that one's own and one's adversary's military strength is adequate and is intended for defence, not for attack.

The current introduction of destabilizing weapons systems has interfered with the balance between deterrence and reassurance. It places us all now in a peril of incalculable proportions. A way out must be found and taken, step by cautious step. These steps must reflect certain shared concerns, must seek a broadened common cause, as perilous circumstances have always in the past demanded.

The markings of a great period of history are always found in the appearance of fresh understandings, in the extension of common cause. Men and women worldwide look back to the Golden Age of Athens as one such period. Another was that occasion in 1945 when representatives of half a hundred different governments

- 6 -

agreed on a number of universal values and exchanged with one another a complex of confidences that, no matter how much they disagreed on day to day issues, would remain in effect without exception and would serve to support a global structure based on order, not on war. Those understandings extended to an agreement that international peace and security was desirable and attainable; that the dignity and worth of the human person was a principle beyond controversy, to be pursued and upheld through international cooperation; that social progress and better standards of life were goals common to all; that nations should practice tolerance one to the other and live together as good neighbours. The network of trust was completed by mechanisms designed to ventilate differences, and to arbitrate disputes.

In the almost four decades since that compact was signed, half a hundred further nations joined the first 50, adhering to a community of shared goals and purposes; and then a half hundred more; and then another seven. A total of 157 countries now supports this litany of human aspirations which is the Charter of the United Nations. Yet in all too many instances there is an absence of the confidence and trust which is the essential lubricant for the effective functioning of the international system it created.

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The shared knowledge of universal peril - from nuclear war, from environmental degradation, from economic stagnation - has not yet been sufficient to introduce into the global dialogue an element of trust or confidence adequate to permit a shared dedication to problem solving. There is not yet present in the international community a rule similar to that in Parliament where Members are not permitted to impute to one another dishonourable motives; where Members even in the most intense heat of debate are not permitted to challenge the rulings of the Chair.

It would be naive to expect, in a world with interests so diverse, that some sort of common parliamentary procedure might evolve in a single generation, or that accepted fora for international decision-taking and dispute settlement would easily be found.

— Equally, however, it would be foolhardy in the extreme to assume that in this age of irreversible error, differences will somehow dissipate short of the point of no return. Yet I fear that that assumption is all too widespread. It is fostered by a belief that today's issues are of such extraordinary complexity that only a handful of experts are capable of addressing them. We are asked to believe that a few hundred high

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priests of nuclear strategy, residing in a handful of countries, having weened their leaders and their industries from nuclear to thermo-nuclear warheads, from liquid to solid fuel propellants, from single to multiple delivery vehicles, from weapons that are deterrents to ones that challenge survival - that in these persons must we place our faith for the future of humankind. That proposal is preposterous and is increasingly under challenge by millions of persons worldwide who, like me, recognize that our security has been diminished, not enhanced, by the accomplishments of a generation of scientists and technologists encouraged to perfect instruments of human annihilation.

Tragically, the international climate at this moment discloses precious little evidence of confidence and trust between East and West. Yet there exists without question elements of common cause of immediate importance to each side. Neither side, obviously, desires annihilation. Each side, already, has declared that in its judgement a nuclear war cannot be won; that every effort must be devoted to ensuring the avoidance of nuclear hostilities. Both NATO and Warsaw Pact understand the need for the reduction of dangers now posed by mishap or miscalculation, of the need for enhanced techniques of crisis management. Each realizes the dangerous trend of destabilizing weapons systems and knows that a deterrent must

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deter, not provoke. Each subscribes to a condemnation of the current climate of unwholesome and debilitating fear. Each supports a pluralistic international community.

This small catalogue of modest commitments bears little resemblance to the lofty expression of sense and purpose found in the U.N. Charter or in any number of great constitutional documents. Nevertheless, these commitments are as basic as life itself. And in a period when life itself is threatened on a global scale, when events anywhere are viewed increasingly as evidence of global challenge, when hostility and potential aggression are perceived with increasing frequency, perhaps it is necessary to begin again with the basics. Perhaps by so doing, the esoteric theoreticians and games players can be instructed to reverse course and to take us away from the edge of this bottomless chasm on which we now teeter, pretending that our precariousness is really security, that our imbalance is a necessary ingredient in our survival.

Canadians claim no special status in their endeavour to inject into this chilling fog the warmth of political stimulus. Quite the contrary. We claim only to be human beings, individuals who have been enriched immeasurably by the contributions of generations past, who aspire with modesty for a

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dignified life for our children, who depend for our livelihood and our tranquility upon the natural environment that we have alternatively challenged and cherished for centuries. We are recognized by others as living in an admired way, as having succeeded in moulding a pluralistic society that embraces widespread differences springing from disparities in culture, language, geography, and ideology. We are known to be a pacific people; yet none would dare suggest we are pacifist. It is our balance between these two qualities that permits us, as members of an imperilled human race, to implore others to recognize survival as a noble and challenging quest, to accept the proposition that human dignity is a multi-faceted and highly desirable goal, to lend to discussion and negotiation at least the same urgency and the same resources that are now dedicated to armament acquisition and military planning.

This quest of Canada is no more than another step in a continuum of international activity that has marked our international posture for almost three quarters of a century. At the conclusion of World War I Canada insisted on the right to participate in the peace conference that led to the Treaty of Versailles - insisted against the resistance of major powers who had accepted with eagerness our contribution to war but were much less willing to hear our contribution to peace. Canada was a

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member of the League of Nations; Canada earned the right in World War II to be a major actor in the negotiations at Bretton Woods and at Dumbarton Oaks and at Quebec City that led to the creation of the World Bank, and the United Nations, and the Food and Agriculture Organization; Canadians have participated in major U.N. peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in Asia, the Middle East, central Africa and the eastern Mediterranean; Canada has been elected four times to serve as a member of the Security Council; Canada has been one of the primary contributors to the creation of international legal regimes of the environment and of the oceans. Canadian foreign policy has consistently advocated universality in the international community as Prime Minister Diefenbaker demonstrated with respect to Cuba, Prime Ministers St. Laurent and Pearson argued with respect to a host of applicants for admission to the U.N, and as my government established with the recognition of the People's Republic of China and its acceptance as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Canada is a steadfast and dependable member of two regional security organizations - NATO and NORAD. In NATO, we are one of only three members (out of 15) that station armed forces permanently outside its borders; we are one of only two members that discharge responsibilities in two continents and the

- 12 -

ocean between. To NORAD, Canada contributes an element of priceless and irreplaceable value: the airspace above its vast territory. The United States is able to look northward to the Soviet Union, and to design its air defence perimeters, confident in the knowledge that for 4,000 kilometres the land mass is occupied by a politically stable ally, one that has been its sole continental defence partner for more than 43 years - since the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940.

We take seriously our defence commitments and are dedicated to the North Atlantic Treaty in its entirety, inclusive of those clauses that spell out reaffirmation of "the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations", the resolution to "the preservation of peace and security", and the promotion of "conditions of stability and well-being." In 1969, Canada indicated to its NATO allies that stability in Europe, in our opinion, would be promoted by a reduction in the numbers of nuclear warheads, and proposed that the Canadian air element withdraw from the nuclear strike role and that the Canadian artillery batteries be relieved of their Honest John munitions in favour of conventional arms. Canada argued its case strenuously against, I readily admit, strong opposition from some other members. In the result, however, NATO accepted the Canadian position, the first significant step in an alliance strategy that

- 13 -

became fully formulated by United States Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger in 1975 and given the formal title of "Raising the Nuclear Threshold". Canada stated in 1969 that it would re-arm its CF-104s with conventional weaponry, and it did. It stated that it would re-organize its artillery batteries, and it did. ¹²⁻ It stated as well that it would replace the air-to-air nuclear-tipped Genie missiles from its NORAD interceptor aircraft as soon as could be done without reducing the effectiveness of our continental commitments. The current phasing out of the CF-101s and their replacements by CF-18s will shortly be completed at which time Canada will have completed the transformation of its armed forces from nuclear to conventional weaponry.

Since 1968, Canada has transformed its Armed Forces' long range air transport fleet from propellers to jets, has replaced entirely its fleet of long range patrol aircraft dedicated to ASW to the most modern in the world, has equipped its armoured brigades with the highly acclaimed Leopard tank, has replaced its armoured personnel carriers, is now phasing in state of the art tactical and interceptor aircraft, and has commenced a new patrol frigate program for the maritime element. All of this the most modern equipment available. All of it armed with conventional munitions. All of it tasked to defensive purposes. All of it consistent with Canada's dedication to peacekeeping activities, including our standby U.N. battalion.

001341

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I continue to believe, and I am confident that the majority of Canadians agree with me, that the best defence against war, however, is not the acquisition of weaponry but the removal of the causes of war. Among those are economic insecurity and political instability in the Third World. As its contribution to the alleviation of these factors, Canada has been a major contributor - on a per capita basis always in the upper half of all OECD contributors since 1968. It is pledged to do even better.

Suspicion and mistrust which have so often in the past been another cause of war require painstaking attention in a number of ways. Political will is one element and this I have spoken about. Another, in the space age, is the costly, highly technical development of verification techniques and procedures. An immense amount of dedicated research is necessary to permit countries to assure themselves that arms-control treaty provisions are being honoured. This research must be directed both to warhead technology and delivery systems technology. It must encourage more effective sensors of a broad variety - short range, remote and seismic. It must address itself to monitoring and analysis procedures, to on-site inspection procedures, to information exchange systems, to legal regimes embracing complaint mechanisms, review conferences and control procedures.

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The multi-faceted verification field is every bit as complex, as challenging, and as necessary as is the development of an adequate defence posture. Yet in the long term it will unquestionably contribute more to security and to peace.

Verification is an activity to which the Government of Canada has dedicated a major effort. I am able to reveal tonight that an additional sum of \$ _____ will be made available to this activity over the next _____ years, bringing the total by 198_ to \$ _____.

Canada is a world leader in the development of remote-sensing technology. Few countries have greater experience in the application, for mining and hydrocarbon exploration purposes, of seismological techniques. With this knowledge and this experience, Canada has a contribution to make. With this fresh infusion of funds, that contribution will be, I pledge, a significant one.

Mr. Chairman, because of their dedicated and successful efforts in the cause of peace, two of the most respected figures of the 20th century were Mike Pearson and Dwight Eisenhower. I should like to refer in closing to something said by each of these men at the height of their careers.

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President Eisenhower wrote in 1956:

"I have spent my life in the study of military strength as a deterrent to war, and in the character of military armaments necessary to win a war. The study of the first of these questions is still profitable, but we are rapidly getting to the point that no war can be won...(when) arguments as to the exact amount of available strength as compared to somebody else's are no longer the vital issues."

Prime Minister Pearson spoke in 1957 on his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize:

"The stark and inescapable fact is that today we cannot defend our society by war since total war is total destruction, and if war is used as an instrument of policy, eventually we will have total war. Therefore, the best defence of peace is not power, but the removal of the causes of war...."

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Sir Harold Macmillan summed it all up most succinctly in Canberra in 1958: "Jaw-jaw is better than war-war", he said. That, Mr. Chairman, undoubtedly in far less articulate language, is the message I am currently endeavouring to deliver to world statesmen.

UNQUOTE

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TO ROME/PMDEL FOWLER DELIVER BY 100900

---DRAFT SPEECH NUMBER THREE

IVANS DRAFT SPEECH FLOWS WELL, MAKES SOME
EXCELLENT POINTS AND WILL BE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO
SPEECH III.

HOWEVER THERE IS ONE IMPORTANT IDEA WHICH DOES
NOT/NOT WITHSTAND ANALYSIS AND WEAKENS THE WHOLE. PAGE 4,
SECOND FULL PARA IN EFFECT MAKES THE QUOTE WINDOW OF
VULNERABILITY UNQUOTE ARGUMENT FOR BOTH SIDES. SCOWCROFT AND
OTHERS HAVE SAID THAT THERE IS NO/NO SUCH WINDOW OF
VULNERABILITY FOR THE US BECAUSE THE SUBMARINE LAUNCHED
AND BOMBER(AIRBORNE ALERT)LAUNCHED FORCES ARE INVULNERABLE
AND ARE SUFFICIENT TO DESTROY AN ADVERSARY MANY TIMES
OVER. THUS A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK BY EITHER SIDE AGAINST THE
LAND BASED ICBMS OF THE OTHER IS DETERRED NOW, AS IT HAS
BEEN FOR YEARS, BY THE CERTAINTY OF AN UNACCEPTABLY
DESTRUCTIVE RESPONSE. THIS ARGUMENT APPLIES EQUALLY TO PAGE
2, QUOTE THAT IS NO/NO LONGER THE CASE UNQUOTE.

THOUGH THE PERSHING II IS NOT/NOT NAMED IT IS
CHARACTERISED BY IMPLICATION AS TERRIBLY DESTABILISING, QUOTE
THIS KIND OF FORCE POSTURE IS MADNESS UNQUOTE(PAGE 4). THE
PM WOULD NOT/NOT WISH TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT, GIVEN HIS FIRM
SUPPORT FOR PERSHING DEPLOYMENTS.

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THERE IS A MINOR ERROR, BOTTOM OF PAGE 11, CANADA
IS ONE OF FIVE (BELGIUM, UK, FRANCE, US) NOT/NOT ONE OF
THREE WHO PERMANENTLY STATION TROOPS IN WEST GERMANY.

AS A COMPLETE SPEECH, THE MAJOR WEAKNESS IN OUR
VIEW STEMS FROM THE VERY STRENGTH AND ELOQUENCE OF THE
TEXT. AS ONE READS, THE INEVITABLE QUESTION ARISES: WHAT IS
TO BE DONE? THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION MUST BE INFERRED,
EXCEPT FOR THE SPECIFIC STATEMENTS THAT CANADA WILL INCREASE
SPENDING ON VERIFICATION MEASURES, AND WILL ALSO ADVOCATE
QUOTE JAW-JAW RATHER THAN WAR WAR UNQUOTE. SOMETHING MORE
THAN THAT SEEMS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE A SPEECH WHICH SO
ELOQUENTLY STATES OUR CURRENT PREDICAMENT.

IN SUM, A USEFUL BEGINNING FOR WORK ON
SPEECH III. BUT NOT/NOT YET SPEECH III ITSELF.

CCC/001 092039Z PC01270

UNQUOTE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

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SUBJ/SUJ

---CHOGM - PM S INTERVENTION ON WORLD POLITICAL SITUATION.

FLWG IS POINT FORM SUMMARY OF DRAFT OF PM S INTERVENTION WHICH WAS

PREPARED AND SENT TO YOU ~~PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FM OTT~~ QUOTE

PCO ON WED NOV 16

(COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED DOCUMENT QUOTE TO UNQUOTE).

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNee

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE WORLD POLITICAL
SCENE - GLOBAL TRENDS AND PROSPECTS
CHOGM - NEW DELHI - 1983

QUOTE

- I am deeply troubled by the worsening trend in relations between East and West, by a superpower relationship of escalating confrontation, by a high level of tension, by ever-increasing nuclear arsenals.
- Commonwealth states, aligned and non-aligned, can give great momentum to an idea:
- I ask you to join me in trying to improve the poisoned climate between East and West and to find ways to reverse the increase and spread of nuclear weapons.
- we live in a multi-polar world, but the superpower relationship is as dominant and crucial as ever.
- the superpowers appear to have lost sight of their overarching political relationship.
- since Afghanistan and the KAL airliner tragedy relations have been deteriorating;
- the USA and USSR are increasingly isolated from each other, separated by a widening gulf of suspicion.
- what makes the current situation so serious is the superpowers' tendency to view local and regional crises in terms of their global rivalry: this magnifies individual conflicts and makes them threaten wider East/West stability.
- recent months have seen a troubling accumulation of crises (KAL, Lebanon, Grenada); each seems to build and play on the next and with the erosion of the UN's effectiveness in providing collective security, superpower force, or the threat of its use, increasingly becomes the ultimate arbiter.

- 2 -

- détente brought genuine achievements, but its back was broken when the Soviets demonstrated that they considered it divisible.
- what is needed is political dialogue, a minimum degree of mutual trust; there is an absence of high politics between East and West.
- the public is demanding that politicians lower tensions and reverse the arms race.
- I have called for the exercise of political leadership at the highest level and put forward proposals which might help reverse the downward trend in East/West relations and lessen the threat of nuclear war.
- earlier this month I had encouraging discussions with NATO allies in Europe and today I appeal to Commonwealth leaders for their reinforcement and support.
- there must be a truly global approach to the limitation of nuclear weapons, to halting "vertical" and "horizontal" proliferation.
- vertical proliferation: I propose a conference of the five nuclear powers next year with the aim of establishing global limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals, according to fixed national ratios, and allowing for USA/USSR parity.
- the natural complement is a renewed effort to halt the risks of horizontal proliferation, to shore up the NPT.
- the arguments against the NPT are well known, but it is "the only game in town": adherence to its régime is the only option open to those genuinely concerned to stop the dangers of proliferation.

- 3 -

- either this generation of world leaders must reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, and prevent their spread, or we bequeath to our peoples a future where the chances of global destruction increase every day.
- all Commonwealth members can make a contribution to world peace, either by adhering or strengthening their commitment to the NPT.
- as nuclear war would destroy North and South alike the Third World nations have a direct security interest in the arms race and they should inject these concerns in their dealings with the superpowers.
- nowhere does the world seem more out of joint than when we see how continuing worldwide armament thwarts development. Arms expenditures by both North and South represent a huge misappropriation of resources which might otherwise be devoted to development. I discussed with President Mitterrand his ideas relating to the eventual creation of a Disarmament Fund for Development.
- but if developing nations do attach importance to aid flows from the North, should they not show the way by decreasing their vast expenditures on military hardware? Should they not turn away from the perilous and terribly costly path of developing their own nuclear weapons?
- I challenge the Commonwealth nations to accept their responsibilities and bend their efforts to the cause of peace.

UN POPE

TRANSCRIPT OF A SCRUM WITH THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING A MEETING
WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH
NOVEMBER 21, 1983.

TRANSCRIPTION D'UNE ENTREVUE SUR LE VIF ACCORDÉE PAR LE PREMIER
MINISTRE À LA SUITE D'UNE RENCONTRE AVEC LE GOUVERNEMENT DU BANGLADESH
A DHAKA LE 21 NOVEMBRE 1983.

Q. What are the main issues that you discussed with
General Ershad today?

A. We spent a great deal of time on international problems --
North-South problems and East-West problems. We talked of Kampuchea,
Afghanistan, the Mideast and other such trouble spots. It gave me an
occasion to explain on behalf of the Canadian government the peace
initiative that I have been pursuing for the past few weeks. We also
discussed some bilateral subjects, though I must say they had been
dealt with more extensively by officials before the General and I
entered the room. So the accords we have just signed were prepared
in advance. But we took some time to explain each others' country to
each other. For instance, we were very interested in hearing the
point of view of your Minister of Finance on the North-South subject
and the international financial situation and we discussed that for
a while. We did the same thing with your Foreign Minister, seeing
the applications of Bangladesh foreign policy in various parts of the
world. That's about a summary of what we discussed today.

.../2

- 2 -

Q. What economic issues did you discuss with Bangladesh?

A. Well, we discussed the world financial situation and we discussed the way in which international institutions might or could be reformed--the IMF, the World Bank. We talked about international development assistance and the reasons why in the past, we seemed to have failed to find common ground between North and South to begin the global dialogue, the global negotiations. This was discussed at some length. But as I was saying to your colleague, we also got into problems near at home. And we heard from the Minister of Finance about the investment needs and plans for Bangladesh. We heard from your Minister of Agriculture on progress on land reform. We heard about the desire of your Minister of Finance to balance investment on infrastructure with developmental investment. Those are the general subjects we discussed.

Q. Prime Minister, on your peace initiative would you characterize your meeting with Mr. (Georgi) Arbatov in Tokyo the other day? Was he supportive in any way, and did he give any indication of what the Soviet leadership's position would be on your initiative?

A. On the latter question, the answer is no. He did not purport to speak on behalf on the Soviet leadership. On the first question, the support was, I suppose, somewhat muted. To be frank, Mr. Arbatov is somewhat pessimistic about the state of East-West relations and he didn't seem to entertain great hopes that I would be able to convince the USA to be, to use his words, more reasonable. In other words, he expressed the point of view of the Soviet Union in the negotiations at Geneva as being very willing to seek an agreement, but being met with a negotiator who was not, -- and I am, of course, paraphrasing Mr. Arbatov --these are not my thoughts.

- 3 -

Q. Prime Minister, could you describe to us what kind of role you thought Mr. Arbatov was playing? Was he in fact acting as an emissary for the Soviet leadership, or was he acting on a totally freelance basis?

A. Perhaps neither one nor the other. Certainly not as an emissary, because I understand he had been in Tokyo for some time and was going to remain there for a while. In other words, he had not come to Tokyo with any special message for me or, as far as I know, any special plan to meet me. He just heard I was in town, let us know that he would make himself available and since eventually I will perhaps be hearing from or even exchanging views with the Soviet leadership--as you know, I have already written the President of the Soviet Union--I think he wanted to make it clear that if I wanted to pursue the discussion, he was available. As my whole initiative is in trying to lower the tensions between East and West, I thought it made sense for me to establish contact with him since he was making himself available--much as I have talked to a certain number of Americans over the past few months of the subject of East-West tensions.

.../4

- 4 -

Q. Prime Minister, do you think he was privy to the Soviet leadership's thinking on your initiative?

A. I have no particular reason to think that. Mr. Arbatov is said to be close to the Soviet leadership, but I repeat, he didn't indicate that he was speaking on behalf of Mr. Andropov or anything like that.

Q. Prime Minister, last night in your banquet speech, you said that your country would maintain high levels of participation in Bangladesh. Would you kindly spell out the specific fields where you are going to cooperate with Bangladesh, or are going to help Bangladesh, or give light on the agreements you have just signed with the Bangladesh Head of Government.

A. The general areas where we expect to cooperate more intensively are in transportation, agriculture and food resources. Those are the three levels on which on a government-to-government basis we are pursuing discussions. But the aid money which is available to Bangladesh will not necessarily all be spent in those areas because as you know, I have met this morning with Canadian businessmen who are here, and they have very wide ranging interests. For instance, one was from a vaccine institute. Another was from an engineering firm interested in energy, and so on. So these are areas where we may be called on to cooperate between our countries. But they will be determined by the choices your own government makes in following its own priorities. And they will be determined also by the funds available from international institutions like the World Bank, the Asia Development Bank, and so on. But once again, the government-to-government priorities have been pin pointed to such areas as transportation, food and agriculture.

.../5

- 5 -

Q. Prime Minister, what ideally would you like to see come from the Pearson/Smith mission to Peking and Moscow? Does that seem to make it more likely that you will yourself be going at some point to Moscow?

A. I can't say. I think the emissary is somewhat the equivalent of the contact that we have had with, say, Washington through our embassy or even through that meeting that Mr. MacEachen had with Secretary of State Schultz. It is sounding out how those powers are reacting to my peace initiative, answering their questions, explaining what we are attempting to do. Eventually, we will have to make a judgement on whether a personal meeting between the leaders of those countries and myself is warranted. I certainly don't want to go there if my emissaries say, you know, "they're not interested at all. At this stage they seem to think that East-West tensions are so high and that they cannot be bettered", which as I hinted a moment ago, seemed a little bit the attitude of Mr. Arbatov. He wasn't a discouraging contact, but he didn't seem optimistic about the lowering of tensions. But I am perhaps not as pessimistic as he is, and that is why I am waiting to hear from Mr. Pearson and Mr. Smith after they have made those visits.

Q. From Bangladesh you are going to Delhi to attend the Commonwealth meeting. Would you please say what issues will dominate the conference of Commonwealth Heads in Delhi?

A. I think the first couple of days will be taken up with the problem of politics in the world today and talking of international relations. I would expect that we will be spending

- 6 -

State of East-West relations which, I hope, will give me the occasion to propose at least some aspects of my peace initiative to the membership of the Commonwealth Summit. But we will certainly be looking at specific areas: whether it be the Mideast or Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Central America, and probably Grenada will be the subject of some discussion, since we will have many of the Caribbean countries there. I think that will be the order of the day for the first couple of days...

perhaps I shouldn't omit Namibia which will certainly be discussed under the political heading. As members of the contact group, Canada or Britain will be asked, as well as the front line Presidents, what we seem to be heading for in solving or not, the problem of Namibia.

Then, I would expect that most of the next two days would be discussing the international economic questions. There, we will get to the Helliner report which has been produced at the request of the Ministers of Finance of the Commonwealth in September. It was referred to us. We will be discussing that which, as you know, is a report trying to find some solutions to the gap between North and South economic development.

Then, of course, there will be the usual agenda items on Commonwealth technical aid programmes, student programmes. We intend raising the subject, also, of the possibility of a meeting of Commonwealth ministers responsible for the status of women so that we lead the way in improving the developmental role of women in our societies, their economic potential.

Q. Prime Minister, have you been attempting to seek clarification of the remarks attributed to U.S. officials last week regarding your peace initiative and, if you have, have you had any response at this point?

.../7

- 7 -

A. I have no idea. Mr. Arbatov gave the usual explanations: he was ill - he took a long time recovering from a cold - as he recovered he went into a rest period and vacation, and that's it. I'm not giving you that as any news or saying whether it has much foundation or not. Mr. Arbatov did say that he had not seen Mr. Andropov for a while. But he certainly expressed the opinion that, having been invited to the Soviet Union by Mr. Andropov, it was very likely that my letter to him would be favourably received and responded to in terms of a visit.

Q. Would you be content, sir, to go to Moscow and see someone else, other than Mr. Andropov?

A. The question is pretty hypothetical. I don't even know if the response that I will get through Mr. Pearson and Mr. Smith will be more encouraging than seemed to be the attitude of Mr. Arbatov and, therefore, I don't know if I will want to go to Moscow, but if I do, I wouldn't think that I had to see Andropov if Andropov isn't seeable. There is a certain number of leaders there, members of the Politburo. It would be in keeping certainly with my feeling of the need to establish contacts between the East and West that I don't just insist on seeing the top man if the top man is not seeable. For instance, Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Canada last spring was I think, an important one in terms of a younger member of the Politburo. I honestly don't stand on rank, if I can't see the president because the president is sick. But if I think it is important to discuss my ideas with the Soviet Government, I will discuss them with whomever will want to see me.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ottawa, November 21, 1983

Mr. R. R. Fowler
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet
Privy Council Office
Langevin Block
Ottawa

Dear Mr. Fowler:

I am enclosing a letter from the Ambassador to the Prime Minister transmitting the text of a letter received telegraphically from the President to the Prime Minister. I would appreciate it if you would have it brought to the Prime Minister's attention as soon as possible.

Sincerely,


John H. Rouse
Minister

Enclosure

SECRET ENCLOSURE

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OTTAWA, CANADA

Ottawa, November 21, 1983

The Right Honorable Pierre Elliott Trudeau,
P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L., M.A., F.R.S.C.
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa

Monsieur Pierre,

I have the honor to enclose the text of a letter
received telegraphically from President
Ronald Reagan.

Sincerely,



Paul H. Robinson, Jr.
Ambassador

Enclosure

SECRET ENCLOSURE

S E C R E T

Dear Pierre:

As you know, the Soviet Union has recently suggested in Geneva that, if the U. S. were to propose equal reductions of 572 on each side, the Soviet Union would accept such a proposal. Now the Soviet union has begun saying that the U. S. negotiator, rather than their own, put forward these suggestions. This is a total fabrication.

The fact is that the Soviet negotiator approached Ambassador Nitze on instructions last Sunday with the suggestion that the U. S. advance a proposal for "equal reductions" which would result in zero U. S. deployments while leaving about 120 SS-20 missiles targetted on Europe. Ambassador Nitze, although agreeing to forward Ambassador Kvitsinsky's suggestions to Washington, made clear that he thought it certain Washington would not convert a Soviet proposal into a U. S. proposal.

Indeed, the Soviet suggestions are unacceptable. They do not change the consistent Soviet demand for a monopoly in longer-range land-based INF missiles. Under the proposals, the Soviet Union would retain at least 360 warheads targetted on Europe and an approximately equal number targetted on Asia. The U. S. would have zero.

Also, although the Soviets have indicated that under their suggestion no specific mention would be made of British and French systems, in fact they are seeking compensation. First, they have demanded de facto compensation in the form of their monopoly of 360 warheads targetted on Europe. Second, they are seeking to include UK and French systems also in some other arms control forum.

I greatly appreciate and value the close consultations which have developed within the Alliance in handling the INF issue. The Alliance has demonstrated a truly extraordinary depth of understanding and cohesion in difficult circumstances. As you know, I believe that the latest proposals we have advanced provide a sound basis for an agreement. The solidarity of the Alliance has provided the essential foundation for the negotiating effort from the beginning. On this basis, we are continuing our search for an equitable and verifiable outcome in Geneva.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ron

Ronald Reagan

S E C R E T

001361



Distribution: MINA (9) IDDZ
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HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK - BRIEFING NOTE
LE LIVRE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES - NOTES D'INFORMATION

Section IDA-Arms Control &
Disarmament Division

Subject/Highlights Sujet/Points saillants

THE DAY AFTER - A commercial film about a nuclear war and its
consequences on the survivors.

Source

ABC/Global television screening of the film, November 20, 1983

Assessment Évaluation

Classification

RESTRICTED

This film, which graphically illustrates the physical consequences of a nuclear exchange, adds no information to that already known. It does serve to underscore the ineffectiveness of emergency preparations and, through the sheer magnitude of the catastrophe, the human inability to cope. But none of this is new. The film continues to ask the question "why is this happening?" without attempting to deal with the issues. It could serve to stampede viewers into an irrational quest for a simplistic solution which does not exist. By doing so, it could induce a situation which might more readily bring on the calamity it was apparently intended to avoid.

Suggested Reply Réponse suggérée

- I did not see the film but have heard a great deal about it.
- The Government fully recognizes what the consequences of a nuclear war would be. That is why we are pursuing all possible realistic initiatives to prevent such an event through the negotiation of mutual and verifiable agreements which all people everywhere desire.
- That is also why the Prime Minister is attempting to help develop a political dynamic to stimulate the arms control and disarmament process. We recognize that films about negotiations and verification are not commercially viable but these are subjects which must never be overlooked in any discussion of arms control and disarmament issues.

Prepared by Préparé par

S. Uyeyama/F.R. Cleminson

Division Direction

IDA

Date

November 21/83

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Non paper

(left by Norwegian amb 21/11/83)

1. The first element in Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative is to establish a forum for negotiations where the five nuclear powers will be able to discuss global limitations on nuclear weapons.

We have in Norway with considerable interest taken note of the Canadian views concerning an extended dialogue between the nuclear powers with the aim of reducing the number of nuclear weapons. We share the Canadian view that nothing must happen which might complicate ongoing negotiations about reductions.

The debate concerning French and British systems in an INF-context has shown that it is difficult not, to some extent, to consider third-country nuclear weapons, even if this is done in a geographically different context than the INF talks. However, in practice it has become clear that it is difficult to establish a dialogue on nuclear weapons which includes all five powers. The reason for this is because the two superpowers have a much bigger arsenal than the other three. This is also the reason for the relatively broad international understanding so far for the argument favouring an initial reduction on the part of the US and the USSR, followed by reductions by all five nuclear powers.

2. Prime Minister Trudeau's second element is a strengthening of the NPT. This will not be an easy task, but is an objective which deserves unreserved Norwegian support. In 1985 the third NPT review conference takes place. There are indications that the Treaty at that time will be faced with its most serious test so far. Non aligned countries will probably accuse the nuclear weapon states of not having done enough in support of the

- 2 -

exploitation of nuclear power by the non-weapons states and of not having fulfilled their obligations under the NPT as far as nuclear arms reductions are concerned. Prime Minister Trudeau hints at a more direct linkage between arms reductions and development, without elaborating. This has for a long time been a leading issue for the Norwegian Government in the United Nations. However, the initiative has met with little enthusiasm from the major powers.

3. The third element in Prime Minister Trudeau's program is a correction of the conventional imbalance in Europe through Eastern reductions rather than Western increases in order to lift the nuclear threshold. Trudeau refers, in particular, to the MBFR negotiations. This is in full conformity with Norwegian views. Ten years of negotiations without results have shown that only by giving the negotiations higher political impetus will it be possible to guide the negotiations away from the present technical/political impasse.

Prime Minister Trudeau also mentions the role which the Stockholm conference might play and stresses that it is important that the conference finds itself on the right track from the outset. This also is fully supported by Norway.

4. The fourth and last element is an invitation, in particular to the superpowers, to adjust the technological development of weapons in order to achieve better stability in the strategic balance. Trudeau mentions a ban on anti-satellite systems (ASAT) and an international agreement which limits the development of strategic systems which makes verification more difficult.

The initiative concerning a ban on ASAT systems fully conforms with Norwegian views. The vital importance of satellite warning in the context of the strategic balance has for long not been fully recognized. New arms control measures in outer space, of which an ASAT ban is one example, therefore, should be supported.

- 3 -

Prime Minister Trudeau's thoughts on agreements aimed at limiting weapons development in order to make it easier for the other side to verify, are interesting, but may be difficult to realize. When the Western side in recent years more and more often has demanded increasingly comprehensive forms of verification, it is because there is a lack of confidence as to whether or not the opposing side will live up to their obligations. It is, therefore, a question if any longer it is possible or desirable to base itself only on national technical means.

TO/À FILE
FROM/DE FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT •
SUJET
SCRUM: November 21, 1510 -
SSEA on Prime Minister Trudeau's
Peace Plan

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	November 21, 1983
Number/Numéro	FPR-1102

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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Q. ... on the fact that the Prime Minister has apparently expressed his disappointment that the Soviet Union is not fully supporting the Peace Plan that he has projected at this point?

SSEA Well, the process of consultation with the Soviet Union has hardly begun. I understand the Prime Minister had a conversation with Mr. Arbatov, Saturday. As you know, Mr. Geoffrey Pearson is going to the Soviet Union, on behalf of the Prime Minister, and that will be an important conversation. We will see then, but I think it will be premature to describe one way or another the attitude of the Government of the Soviet Union, until we have completed, at least that first round of discussions between Mr. Pearson and his interlocutors in Moscow.

Q. You think there is still room then for optimism as far as the Soviet Union is concerned?

SSEA Well, I hesitate to use the word 'optimist' or 'pessimist', because I think this is a process that has to be pushed, and hope that it will do some good. I think it is much too early to suggest that one should be optimistic or pessimistic. I think, so far, the Prime Minister has received approval for the general thrust of his effort, and that is quite important.

Q. Both China and the Soviet Union positions are critical to the success of the new Peace Plan and their opinions are critical in themselves.

SSEA Of course they're important. As you know, Mr. Pearson is also to visit the authorities in China. These are two important conversations, and we'll see.

..2


- 2 -

Q. Mr. MacEachen, did you watch the movie last night, "The Day After"? Could we get your impressions on it? Had it any effect on you?

SSEA No, I regret I didn't have a chance to look at the movie. I read so many reviews of it beforehand, that I think I know what it was about, but I cannot register my own personal impressions.

Q. Minister, one more question please. On Friday you said something that appears to contradict something you said in the House today. You said that Canada supports arms build-up as a viable means of deterring a third-world war. On Friday that that is a deeply-held view referring to comments made out of New York, that it makes it even more urgent for the type of peace initiative Mr. Trudeau is attempting?

SSEA Well, I have to look at what I said in the House. But if I said that I was in favour of an arms build-up then I think I made an error. What I did think I was talking about was the policy of deterrence. That policy can succeed, it seems to me, without escalation in arms at the time. It could succeed, and is succeeding, with the reduction of arms. That is what the INF talks are all about. The proposal that we advanced as an alliance was that the intermediate nuclear weapons should be totally removed from Europe. So, that would be arms reductions. Therefore I don't believe that we are advocating, at all, certainly an increase in nuclear weapons, quite the contrary. It is quite the contrary, through the INF and through other efforts of START, we advocate a limit in the reduction in nuclear arms.


John J. Noble
Director

Media Relations Division

TO/A FILE
FROM/DE FPR

REFERENCE
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT
SUJET CTV National - November 18.
PM's Peace Plan - Canadian aides react to
USA remarks on Canadian NATO contribution

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	November 21, 1983
Number/Numéro	FPR-1100

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CTV The American remarks sparked a blunt response today from Prime Minister Trudeau's top Defence aide, who is with the Prime Minister in Tokyo. Brian Nelson reports.

B.N. Reaction to the American Defence experts' criticism comes from Prime Minister's top man on Foreign and Defence policy. Says he, mixing concern with contempt, "There are many groups in Washington who believe that peace is a dirty word, they believe the Commies are coming, and the only solution is more megatons". Another top official dismisses suggestions that European countries are critical of Canada's NATO contributions and, therefore, Trudeau's right to promote disarmament. He says the issue never arose ever during the Prime Minister's six-nation European pilgrimage last week. "And", he added, "it's a red herring". Neither of the Trudeau aides had ever heard of the American Society Conference on Canada, but they suspected its members are made up solely of U.S.A. Defence Hawks. Still Canadian officials have to be concerned because if those views are the official views of the Reagan Administration, the Trudeau Peace Mission may, in fact, be doomed. Brian Nelson, CTV News, Tokyo.

D. Buckley-Jones
D. Buckley-Jones
Deputy Director
Media Relations Division

FPR-D. BUCKLEY-JONES-5-1874-AH

TO/A. FILE
FROM/DE FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

CBC As it Happens - November 18 - 1845
SSEA interview re Prime Minister Trudeau's
Peace Initiative.

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	November 21, 1983
Number/Numéro	FPR-1097

ENCLOSURES
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CBC ...Endorsation by Prime Minister Nakasone, would be a major boost to the Canadian Initiative. It would counter-balance blunt criticism levelled against the Peace Plan yesterday at a Conference of top American defence experts and Government officials in New York. The officials, unnamed according to the rules of the Conference, said Trudeau's mission is a cop-out and he has little credibility because of Canada's shamefully low contribution to NATO. These remarks contrast to the American reaction relayed to Ottawa only Tuesday by United States Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth Dam. Officially, Washington has not opposed the Canadian Peace Plan despite finding problems with specific proposals. Allan MacEachen is Canadian External Affairs Minister in Ottawa.

Q. Mr. MacEachen, where would you put the Peace Initiative of Prime Minister Trudeau, in terms of Canada's foreign policy priorities? Should we see this as something that is very much his own personal initiative, or is it an indication of the direction that you would like us to take in the eighties?

SSEA It is certainly being carried forward by the Prime Minister, but it is an idea that has been developed carefully. It's a major element in our foreign policy, absolutely.

Q. All right. Why are we doing it 'solo', as it were? Why are we not doing it more in consort with other countries, other smaller nations, middle powers?

SSEA Well, I think that the Prime Minister's visit to Europe was an effort to engage the interest of the European countries, both large and small.

Q. Let me explain, precisely why I asked that question. We were speaking on this programme a few days ago to E.P. Thompson of the British Peace Movement, whose credentials in terms of searching for peace are considerable. He referred to

- 2 -

an Inter-Parliamentary Union initiative, which he said had been going on for some time from countries like Tanzania, India, Romania even. He said those countries begged Canada to join with them to put pressure on the super-powers. By going it alone, as Mr. Trudeau has done, you know, he has undermined their effort?

SSEA I don't see any direct contradiction or any opposition between the two efforts. If the parliamentarians, through their Inter-Parliamentary Union, want to proceed in this direction that is their decision. But how was the Canadian Government to launch this peace initiative. We had this in our minds, how do we get it going?

Q. Well, maybe you get it going with a group of other countries?

SSEA Well, that is what we are trying to do. The first thing the Prime Minister did was to get in touch with the leaders of these European countries, for example. There are quite a number of them who have said, at least some of them have said, "Well, yes, Prime Minister, you seem to be quite well equipped". Because he was not a European and he was not an American, and Canada had a good basis from which to begin.

Q. You know, on this question of Canada's suitability for this role. For many people in the peace movement, it would seem, we have no credibility because we are perceived as testers of the cruise, as being loyal NATO members. For others, say like the United States we are beginning to hear that, you know, we are not good enough NATO members to carry any weight. I wonder where we do have credibility?

SSEA It's astonishing to suggest that membership in NATO disqualifies a country from active pursuit of peace. because the purpose of NATO was to prevent war, through a policy of deterrence. I think our membership in NATO enhances our credibility. I pay very little attention, I must say, I pay attention to them but they don't convince me, that appear to have been made in New York yesterday, by spokesmen, middle-rank spokesmen from the United States Government, in order to seek peace, or the only way to seek peace is to build-up armaments.

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- 3 -

Q. No, it's to be a good NATO member, which is what you just said we were?

SSEA Yes, indeed we are. But the further point criticized the fact that we weren't contributing enough to the arms situation, I disagree with that. But if that is the view, then they misunderstand. We don't believe that the only way to seek peace is through arms, more arms. The initiative is to try to create an atmosphere that will bring about successful reductions in armaments.

Q. The comments in New York that you just referred to, and they have been reported on widely here, create the impression that the peace initiative is finished, as far as the U.S. is concerned. How does that compare with your impressions of American reaction so far, impressions that you gained this week from meetings with Mr. Dam and other officials?

SSEA I had the meeting on Tuesday morning with Mr. Dam. He is next to Mr. Shultz in the State Department, and I didn't get the brush-off by any means. They have already the President has replied to the Prime Minister, he has agreed to a meeting and he has expressed an interest in exploring further with the Prime Minister, his proposals.

Q. So, do you mean by that, that you are not discouraged by the fact that Mr. Dam really only seemed to be enthusiastic about one of the proposals, and that was the meeting of the Five. It wasn't a whole-hearted endorsement of those proposals?

/just SSEA No, I am not discouraged by that, because these are very intricate proposals. If they were totally opposed to any particular proposal, particularly in the arms control field, or in future technology, or in satellites, if they said, well, we can't support that, please let us know I said.

Q. Well, they don't like the anti-satellite proposal.

SSEA Well, they are ready to talk about it, to find out more about it, the anti-satellite. But my view was if you don't like any of these particular proposals, please don't brush-off the overall political objectives.

..4

- 4 -

Q. What I'd like to get to is, just for one last try here, is how this ties in with some other problems vis-a-vis the United States. We didn't like it a whole lot when we weren't consulted over Grenada. We weren't particular happy. We are having difficulties just on some trans-boundary issues, you know Acid Rain being one. Is there a risk here of this having a negative impact on Canada-U.S. relations?


SSEA We have established a pretty firm basis of consultations bilaterally and internationally as well. I don't think Grenada, for example, or indeed even less, Mr. Trudeau's peace initiative will disturb that basic foundation. I think Mr. Dam, when we talked about Grenada as we did on Tuesday, was of the same view as I was that even though we disagreed on Grenada, that we had made such progress in the last year or so, and we ought not to let Grenada interfere. So, I am not deeply worried that we are going to disturb our bilateral relationship, not at all.

Q. Mr. MacEachen, thank you.

SSEA Thank you, Goodbye.

Q. Goodbye.

CBC External Affairs Minister, Allan MacEachen, spoke to us from Ottawa.


D. Buckley-Jones
Deputy Director
Media Relations Division

TO/À • FILE
FROM/DE • FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

CBC 0800 November 21
Prime Minister's Peace Initiative Visit -
Bangladesh

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	November 21, 1983
Number/Numéro	FPR-1096

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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CBC The Prime Minister is wrapping up his official visit to Bangladesh. Today, he spoke at a News Conference and afterwards he spoke about his meeting last weekend in Tokyo with a Soviet official. Mr. Trudeau says the official was pessimistic about his peace initiative. But, he adds, that maybe he is not as pessimistic a person as the official is. Brian Kelleher reports.

B.K. Prime Minister Trudeau says the Soviet official Georgi Arbatov did not purport to speak on behalf of the Soviet leadership, but Mr. Arbatov was muted in support for Mr. Trudeau's peace initiative. Mr. Arbatov expressed the same view that the Soviets are giving in Geneva, Mr. Trudeau says, that Moscow is willing to reach agreement but there are no great hopes Mr. Trudeau can convince Washington to be more reasonable. The Prime Minister says he is now waiting for his personal emissaries, Geoffrey Pearson and Gary Smith, to report back on Chinese and Soviet attitudes. The two are in Peking now, with Moscow their next stop, and Mr. Trudeau says he just does not know if it's now more likely that he'll be going to Moscow himself.

P.M. "East-West tensions are so high and they cannot be bettered, which, as I hinted a moment ago, seemed a little bit the attitude of Mr. Arbatov - he wasn't discouraging contact but he didn't seem optimistic".

B.K. Mr. Trudeau also says he has not tried to clarify with Washington why Pentagon officials last week dismissed his peace initiative, while President Reagan has not. You can't attach too much importance to some third-rate, third-level official. Mr. Trudeau says Mr. Reagan is the right-hand, the others may be the left-toe. Brian Kelleher, CBC News, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

D. Buckley-Jones
D. Buckley-Jones
Deputy Director
Media Relations Division



TO/À • FILE

FROM/DE • RBR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCESUBJECT • Request for Interview with Geoff Pearson
SUJET in Moscow - The Journal

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
November 21, 1983
Number/Numéro
RBR-0633


ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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Patsy Pehleman (963-4741) called to ask if it would be possible to get in touch with Mr. Pearson for an interview on his discussions with Chinese and Soviet authorities. After checking with Louis Delvoie, I advised Ms Pehleman that Mr. Pearson would not be available for such interviews and that his report would be made to the Prime Minister. He was under similar strictures as the PM imposed upon himself during his recent visit to European capitals.

2. Ms Pehleman asked for the Task force telephone number in the event that someone from The Journal wished to follow-up. I gave her the number.


R.R. Halpin,
USSR and Eastern Europe
Relations Division.



TO/À *Shaila*
Pls circulate
12 IDDZ/Delvoie

FROM/DE • RBR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET • Call on Mr. Pepin by Ambassador Bulajic:
Prime Minister's Peace Initiative

Security/Sécurité

RESTRICTED

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

Date

November 21, 1983.

Number/Numéro

RBR0624

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES


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RBD

During the Yugoslav Ambassador's call on Mr. Pepin, November 18, the Minister, without too much success, tried to draw out Mr. Bulajic on his government's view of the Prime Minister's peace initiative. In response to Mr. Pepin's suggestion that Yugoslavia, along with India, could play a helpful role in enlisting support from the NNA for the initiative particularly in reaffirming the importance and goals of the NPT, Mr. Bulajic said only that, while his authorities were "very keen" about the Prime Minister's initiative, it was perhaps too early for Belgrade to provide a substantive reply.

Mr. Pepin noted that in a recent conversation he had with an Eastern European Ambassador (I think it was Ambassador Velchev of Bulgaria) the latter had thought it was somewhat "abnormal" for the Prime Minister to consult Western European countries and not do the same with Eastern European countries. Mr. Pepin told Mr. Bulajic that he thought there was some logic in this and implied, jokingly, that he might perform the role of an emissary to Belgrade.

I report this only because Mr. Bulajic and perhaps Mr. Velchev may in due course follow up Mr. Pepin's suggestion with formal proposals that he visit their capitals.


B. Mawhinney,
Director,
USSR and Eastern Europe
Relations Division.

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FM EXTOTT MGTC9187 21NOV83

TO DELHI DHAKA LDN DSLAM LAGOS CNBRA WLGTN

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REF OURTEL IDDZ0191 19NOV

---INCORRECT SYMBOLS

AMEND SYMBOLS RGP UGR IN DISTR LINE TO READ RGB/RGB UGP/UGP.

UUU/149 211943Z MGTC9187

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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INFO LDN WSHDC PARIS BONN BNATO MOSCO BPEST FUCST WSAW

PRGUE GENEV ATHNS ROME HSNKI STKHM VIENN DELHI

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---INF NEGOTIATIONS:BULGARIA

TAKING ADVANTAGE OF MY PRE-PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS
CALL ON BULG FOREIGN MIN MLADENOV NOV15,I GAVE HIM COPY
OF PM TRUDEAUS GUELPH SPEECH,OF WHICH HE WAS ALREADY
AWARE.HE HAD ALREADY BROACHED SUBJ OF EAST-WEST RELNS
AND DISARMAMENT(SAYING HE DID NOT/NOT WISH TO SPOIL
ATMOSPHERE OF OUR FIRST CONVERSATION BY MAKING TOO MUCH
OF IT)WITH STATEMENT THAT DEPLOYMENT OF EUROMISSILES
WOULD CREATE TOTALLY NEW STRATEGIC SITUATION.BULGARIA
VIEWED THIS WITH ANXIETY,BUT NOT/NOT PANIC.

2.HE NOTED THAT PM THATCHER HAD SAID SAME DAY(NOV15)
THAT INF NEGOTIATIONS COULD CONTINUE EVEN AFTER CRUISE
DEPLOYMENT HAD BEGUN-AS IT JUST HAD WITH ARRIVAL OF
FIRST CRUISE IN UK AND IMMINENT DEPLOYMENT IN SICILY.HE
WONDERED HOW ANYONE COULD THINK IT POSSIBLE THAT INF
NEGOTIATIONS COULD CARRY ON AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED.ONCE

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PAGE TWO ZLGR5132 CONF

DEPLOYMENT HAD BEGUN. THEY WERE FINISHED. NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT RESUME IN SOME OTHER FORMAT, BUT PRESENT INF TALKS IN GENEVE WOULD BE DEAD. I SAID THAT NEW STRATEGIC SITUATION, AS HE HAD DESCRIBED IT, WOULD SURELY MAKE IT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO KEEP ON WITH NEGOTIATIONS. PERHAPS NEW FORMAT MIGHT EVEN HAVE ADVANTAGES.

3. I SAID THAT HE HAD CERTAINLY HEARD NATO POSITION ON INF PUT BY THOSE MORE EXPERT AND MORE AUTHORITATIVE THAN MYSELF. I WOULD NOT/NOT IMPOSE ON HIM WITH NON-EXPERT RENDITION OF THESE ARGUMENTS BUT DID ASK HIM TO BELIEVE THAT NATO GOVTS HAD TAKEN THEIR DECISION BECAUSE OF GENUINE CONCERN ABOUT THEIR OWN SECURITY AND NOT/NOT BECAUSE ANY OF THEM WANTED WAR. MLADENOV SAID THAT HE HAD INDEED HEARD OUR CASE EXPOUNDED BY SOME IMPRESSIVE SPOKESMEN, INCLUDING LORD CARRINGTON, BUT COULD STILL NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE DID NOT/NOT ACCEPT SOVIET OFFER TO REDUCE NUMBER OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES BELOW TOTAL POSSESSED BY UK AND FRANCE. I SAID THAT IF LORD CARRINGTON HAD NOT/NOT PERSUADED HIM I WOULD NOT/NOT TRY TO DO SO. PERHAPS, SPEAKING ENTIRELY PERSONALLY, SOME NEW FORMAT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH STRATEGIC AND INF SYSTEMS COULD BOTH BE CONSIDERED WOULD MAKE PROBLEM OF BRIT AND FRENCH MISSILES EASIER TO COPE WITH.

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PAGE THREE ZLGR5132 CONF D

4. AT NATO AMBS MTG IN SOFIA NOV17, TURKISH COLLEAGUE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN TALKING TO SEVERAL BULG OFFICIALS ON THIS SUBJ RECENTLY. THEY HAD ECHOED MLADENOV'S OPINION THAT NATO DEPLOYMENT WOULD CHANGE ENTIRE STRATEGIC PICTURE AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT QUOTE BULGARIA COULD NOT/NOT FAIL TO FULFIL ITS DUTIES UNQUOTE. NO/NO ONE SEEMS QUITE SURE WHAT THESE WOULD BE (NOR/NOR DOES ANYONE DOUBT THAT BULGARIA WILL DO WHAT IT IS TOLD). MOSCO ITSELF MAY NOT/NOT YET HAVE DECIDED WHAT TO DO IN SOUTHERN TIER. USA AME AGREED THAT THERE HAD BEEN QUOTE INCREASED INTENTIONAL AMBIGUITY UNQUOTE IN BULG STATEMENTS OVER PAST TWENTY DAYS WITH CHANGE OF PUBLIC TUNE TO ALLUDE TO POSSIBILITY OF COUNTER-DEPLOYMENT ON BULG SOIL. ONE MOTIVE, OF COURSE, MIGHT BE TO ENHANCE ATTRACTIVENESS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE (NWFZ) PROPOSALS.

5. WHEN PRES ZHIVKOV WAS ASKED ABOUT COUNTER-DEPLOYMENT IN BULG AT PRESS CONF DURING VISIT OF GREEK PM, HE BRUSHED ASIDE QUESTION BY SAYING THAT DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN ABOUT NWFZ TO KEEP NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUT OF AREA. NOT/NOT ABOUT POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF NEW ONES. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, FAMILIAR LITANY THAT NATO INF DEPLOYMENT WOULD CREATE QUOTE NEW AND QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT SITUATION UNQUOTE. IT WAS PM PAPANDRAO'S IMPRESSION AFTER PRIVATE TALKS WITH ZHIVKOV; GREEK AME TOLD US, THAT ZHIVKOV BELIEVED USSR WOULD WALK

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PAGE FOUR ZLGR5132 CONFD

OUT OF GENEV AS SOON AS NATO MISSILES INSTALLED AND FELT
NATO INF WOULD NOT/NOT BE DETERRENT SINCE MOSCO WOULD BE
DETERMINED TO MATCH IT.

6.THERE IS NOTHING VERY SURPRISING IN ALL THIS,EXCEPT,
PERHAPS MLADENOV'S UNSOLICITED STATEMENT THAT END OF INF
GENEV NEGS FOLLOWING NATO DEPLOYMENT WOULD NOT/NOT PRECLUDE
CONTINUATION OF NEGS IN SOME OTHER FORM.

7.USA AMBS REF ABOVE TO AMBIGUITY OF RECENT BULG STATEMENTS
ON INF DEPLOYMENT IN BULG COINCIDES TO SOME EXTENT WITH
YUGO CONCERNS.DURING CONVERSATION 18NOV WITH MARKOVIC,
ACTING HEAD OF DEPT FOR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES IN YUGO MFA WITH EMB
OFFICER HE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM ABOUT REPORT(ATHNS
TFL ZFGR5750 16NOV)THAT ZHIVKOV HAD GIVEN ASSURANCE THAT
NO/NO SOVIET MISSILES WOULD BE DEPLOYED ON BULG SOIL,IN
SPITE OF MEDIA REPORTS TO THIS EFFECT.ALTHOUGH MFA WAS
WAITING FOR MORE INFO ON THIS REPORT,MARKOVIC INDICATED
THAT SINCE DEPLOYMENT DECISION WAS ULTIMATELY FOR MOSCO
TO MAKE,WHATEVER BULG WISHES,ZHIVKOV WAS IN PRACTICE
UNABLE TO BE CATEGORICAL ABOUT LONGER RUN PROSPECTS FOR
DEPLOYMENT.

FRASER

CCC/148 221330Z ZLGR5132

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDR4430 21NOV83

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INFO MOSCO WSHDC BONN LDN PARIS CANMILREPNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER/

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---INF:FURTHER SOVIET MESSAGE

USA/USSR POLEMIC OVER WHO MADE WHAT NON/NON-PROPOSAL TO WHOM TOOK
FURTHER BIZARRE TWIST AFTERNOON OF 21NOV WITH DELIVER BY SOVIET
CHARGE OF PIECE OF PAPER WHICH REITERATES THAT INFORMAL PROPOSAL FOR
EQUAL WARHEAD REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE WAS MADE BY USA NEGOTIATOR NITZF.
PAPER GOES ON TO ACCUSE USA OF FOUL PLAY IN FALSELY ATTRIBUTING
PROPOSAL TO USSR AND TWISTING IT TO CREATE IMPRESSION THAT USSR WAS
PREPARED TO DROP DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION FOR IRIT AND FRENCH SYSTEMS.
SOVIET FIRST SECTY EXPECTED THAT TEXT WOULD SOON BE MADE PUBLIC.

2.REPORT:SOVIET CHARGE NOVIKOV,ACCOMPANIED BY FIRST SECTY GOUSSAROV,
CALLED 21NOV PM ON FRANCIS(ACTING IDD),WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MACE
(RBR)AND HANSON(IDR).STATED PURPOSE OF VISIT WAS TO HAND OVER
FORMAL STATEMENT BY SOVIET MFA CONTAINING INFO TRANSMITTED LESS
FORMALLY LAST WEEK AND AMERICAN REACTION TO IT(REFTEL IDR4398).
TEXT(REPEATED IN CONCLUDING PARAS OF THIS TEL)IS IN FORM OF PRESS
RELEASE AND NOVIKOV CONFIRMED THAT IT WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC-EITHER
TODAY OR TONIGHT.

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PAGE TWO IDR4430 CONF

3. IN SUBSTANCE, LATEST VERSION DIFFERS FROM PREVIOUS PRESENTATION IN STATING EXPLICITLY THAT SS-20S REMAINING IN EUROPEAN USSR (122 TO 127, ACCORDING TO GOUSSAROV) QUOTE WOULD IN PRACTICE BE EQUAL TO PRESENT MISSILE ARSENALS OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE UNQUOTE. ASIDE FROM ATTRIBUTING TO USSR WHAT SOVIETS ALLEGE TO HAVE BEEN USA IDEA, MAJOR USA PERFDY IN SOVIET EYES IS SUGGESTION THAT SOVIET DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION FOR UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS HAS BEEN DROPPED.

4. ACCORDING TO NOVIKOV REASON FOR THIS VISIT WAS TO SET RECORD STRAIGHT IN LIGHT OF FACT THAT STORY HAD NOW ENTERED PUBLIC DOMAIN. QUOTE THESE THINGS JUST DONT HAPPEN LIKE THAT UNQUOTE.

5. SOVIET BEHAVIOUR, IN FIRST FLOATING PROPOSAL AND THEN ATTEMPTING TO PUT IT OFF ON USA WHEN IT WAS TURNED DOWN BY LATTER, PROBABLY INDICATES PREPLANNED DISINFORMATION EFFORT, AIMED MORE AT PUBLICS THAN AT GOVTS OF NATO COUNTRIES.

6. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SOVIET BOUT DE PAPIER: TEXT BEGINS: QUOTE

RECENTLY THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AT THE GENEVA TALKS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE P NITZE HAS INFORMED THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN AN UNOFFICIAL WAY OF A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE WAY WHICH COULD, IN HIS OPINION, RESOLVE THE ISSUES WHICH ARE SUBJECT OF THE TALKS.

AT FIRST GLANCE THE OPTION SET FORTH BY NITZE COULD SEEM TO BE A SUITABLE BASIS FOR A COMPROMISE DECISION: FOLLOWING THESE SUGGESTIONS THE USA WOULD RENOUNCE THE DEPLOYMENT OF ALL 572 MISSILES IN EUROPE.

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PAGE THREE IDR4430 CONF

WHILE THE USSR WOULD HAVE IN ITS EUROPEAN PART THE NUMBER OF SS-20 MISSILES LEFT, THAT WOULD BE IN PRACTICE EQUAL TO THE PRESENT MISSILE ARSENALS OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

THE QUESTION DID ARISE, HOWEVER, IF THOSE INFORMAL PROPOSALS OF THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION WERE, AS HAD HAPPENED IN THE PAST, MERELY A TACTICAL STEP DESIGNED FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF CREATING AN ILLUSION OF A POSSIBLE BREAKTHROUGH AT THE TALKS IN THE VERY TIME THAT THE AMERICANS STARTED BRINGING THEIR MISSILES TO EUROPE.

THEREFORE P NITZE WAS INFORMED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER THIS OPTION OF RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES (IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT), BUT ONLY IF IT IS FORMALLY TABLED BY THE US SIDE.

AND THE FOUL PLAY OF THE AMERICAN SIDE HAS IMMEDIATELY COME TO THE SURFACE. WHILE GIVING NO REPLY TO THE SOVIET SIDES REQUEST TO HAVE AN OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF THE STATEMENT BY THE HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, THE AMERICAN SIDE BEGAN TO DISSEMINATE. IN PARTICULAR AMONG ITS NATO ALLIES, ALLEGATIONS THAT IT WAS THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET AND NOT THE AMERICAN DELEGATION WHO HAD SET FORTH SOME NEW OPTION. AT THE SAME TIME WHILE ATTRIBUTING TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION THE ORIGINS OF THIS OPTION WHICH IN FACT CAME FROM THE US DELEGATION, WASHINGTON TWISTED IT IN SUCH A WAY SO THAT TO CREATE A FALSE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED NOT TO COUNT BRITISH AND FRENCH MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS.

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PAGE FOUR IDR4430 CONFD

IN ORDER TO UNMASK WASHINGTON ON THIS ISSUE THE SOVIET SIDE INFORMED ABOUT THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS THE GOVERNMENTS OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD BEEN MISLED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE.

SUCH AN APPROACH OF THE AMERICAN SIDE ON THIS MATTER WHICH CAN HARDLY BE DESCRIBED AS GENTLEMENLIKE, TO PUT IT MILDLY, IS BUT ANOTHER INDICATION THAT THE USA DOES NOT SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PREVENT A NEW AND HIGHLY DANGEROUS ROUND OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN EUROPE. UNQUOTE. TEXT ENDS.

CCC/217 212300Z IDR4430

S E C R E T

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REF WSHDC TEL UNGR2446 18NOV

---INF:MSG FROM PRES REAGAN TO PM

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRES REAGAN ON SOVIET DEMARCHE WAS
DELIVERED TO IDDZ BY USA EMF REP 19NOV.

2.TEXT BEGINS.QUOTE DEAR MR PRIME MINISTER,

AS YOU KNOW,THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECENTLY SUGGESTED IN GENEVA
THAT,IF THE US WERE TO PROPOSE EQUAL REDUCTIONS OF 572 ON EACH
SIDE,THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ACCEPT SUCH A PROPOSAL.NOW.THE
SOVIET UNION HAS BEGUN SAYING THAT THE US NEGOTIATOR,RATHER THAN
THEIR OWN,PUT FORWARD THESE SUGGESTIONS.THIS IS A TOTAL FABRICATION.

THE FACT IS THAT THE SOVIET NEGOTIATOR APPROACHED AMBASSADOR
NITZE ON INSTRUCTIONS LAST SUNDAY WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT THE US
ADVANCE A PROPOSAL FOR QUOTE EQUAL REDUCTIONS UNQUOTE WHICH WOULD
RESULT IN ZERO US DEPLOYMENTS WHILE LEAVING ABOUT 120 SS-20
MISSILES TARGETTED ON EUROPE.AMBASSADOR NITZE,ALTHOUGH AGREEING
TO FORWARD AMBASSADOR KVITSINSKYS SUGGESTIONS TO WASHINGTON,MADE
CLEAR THAT HE THOUGHT IT CERTAIN WASHINGTON,WOULD NOT CONVERT A
SOVIET PROPOSAL INTO A US PROPOSAL.

...2

001385

PAGE TWO IDR4421 SECRET

INDEED,THE SOVIET SUGGESTIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE.THEY DO NOT CHANGE THE CONSISTENT SOVIET DEMAND FOR A MONOPOLY IN LONGER-RANGE LAND-BASED INF MISSILES.UNDER THE PROPOSALS,THE SOVIET UNION WOULD RETAIN AT LEAST 360 WARHEADS TARGETTED ON EUROPE AND AN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL NUMBER TARGETTED ON ASIA.THE US WOULD HAVE ZFRO.

ALSO,ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT UNDER THEIR SUGGESTION NO SPECIFIC MENTION WOULD BE MADE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS,IN FACT THEY ARE SEEKING COMPENSATION.FIRST,THEY HAVE DEMANDED DE FACTO COMPENSATION IN THE FORM OF THEIR MONOPOLY OF 360 WARHEADS TARGETTED ON EUROPE.SECOND,THEY ARE SEEKING TO INCLUDE UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS-ALSO IN SOME OTHER ARMS CONTROL FORUM.

I GREATLY APPRECIATE AND VALUE THE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IN HANDLING THE INF ISSUE. THE ALLIANCE HAS DEMONSTRATED A TRULY EXTRAORDINARY DEPTH OF UNDERSTANDING AND COHESION IN DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES.AS YOU KNOW,I BELIEVE THAT THE LATEST PROPOSALS WE HAVE ADVANCED PROVIDE A SOUND BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT.THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE HAS PROVIDED THE ESSENTIAL FOUNDATION FOR THE NEGOTIATING EFFORT FROM THE BEGINNING.ON THIS BASIS,WE ARE CONTINUING OUR SEARCH FOR AN EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE OUTCOME IN GENEVA.
UNQUOTE.TEXT ENDS.

CCC/045 211532Z IDR4421

INFO

MF
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R E S T R I C T E D

FM MOSCO XYGR4142 21NOV83

TO PEKIN/PEARSON DELIVER BY 220900

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ TOKYO/PEARSON

---PM INITIATIVE:PEARSON VISIT TO MOSCO IN TRAVEL

2/2 SWPS AT MEZHDUNARODNAYA HOTEL FOR NOV24-26 INCLUSIVE WERE
SOUGHT LAST WEEK.CONFIRMATION NOT/NOT YET RECEIVED BUT EXPECTED
SHORTLY(ARCHDEACON TO BE IN SAME HOTEL).INVITATION FOR PEARSON
TO STAY AT OFFICIAL RESIDENCE STILL STANDS BUT WILL UNDERSTAND
IF PARTY WISHES TO STAY TOGETHER.

2.GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE INFO ON FLIGHT AND ETA MOSCO ASAP.

3.YOU SHLD KNOW THAT SOV OFFICIALS HAVE YET TO CONFIRM BY
WHOM AND WHEN PEARSON AND PARTY CLD BE RECEIVED.

CCC/144 211400Z XYGR4142

Publié: 29579 *Bégin*
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ACTION
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DE ABDJN ZAGR3275 21NOV83

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FM TOKYO UIGR2402 21NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 210900

INFO WSHEC ENATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE ERU PRMNY DELHI

PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGB RER UGE URR RCP ZSI PPR PGB PPD

REF OURTEL UIGR2401 21NOV

---TRUDEAU/NAKASONE MTG:PEACE INITIATIVE:NAKASONE/KOHL STATEMENT
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NAKASONE/KOHL QUOTE TOKYO STATEMENT UNQUOTE
OF NOV01:QUOTE

QUOTE TCKYO STATEMENT UNQUOTE

BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND THE
CHANCELLOR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

OF NOVEMBER 1, 1983

1.REAFFIRMING THE STATEMENT AT WILLIAMSBURG AS ADOPTED ON MAY 29,
1983,AND ESPECIALLY THE AGREEMENT THAT THE SECURITY OF THE
PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES IS INDIVISIBLE AND MUST BE APPROACHED ON
A GLOBAL BASIS,WE HEREBY DECLARE OUR RESOLVE TO EXERT CONTINUOUS
EFFORTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND PROTECTION OF FREEDOM,PEACE
AND STABILITY FOR THE PROSPERITY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD,IN SOLIDARITY AND UNITY AMONG
THE FREE WORLD COUNTRIES OF JAPAN,THE UNITED STATES,WEST
EUROPE AND OTHER COUNTRIES,IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF THIS
WILLIAMSBURG STATEMENT.

2.RECENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS HAVE INCLUDED,IN ADDITION TO
GROWING TENSION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS,REGIONAL CONFLICTS AS WELL AS

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PAGE TWO UIGR2402 UNCLAS

FREQUENT ACTS OF VIOLENCE IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD.THESE TRENDS,
SHOULD THEY PERSIST OR GROW WORSE,MIGHT POSE A GRAVE THREAT TO
WORLD PEACE.

3.WE BELIEVE IT IS MORE NECESSARY THAN EVER FOR THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD TO RENEW THEIR RESOLVE TO COPE WITH THIS GLOPAL SITUATION,
TO PERSERVE FREEDOM,PEACE AND STABILITY,TO REVITALIZE THE WORLD
ECONOMY,AND TO SECURE PROSPERITY FOR THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD IN
HEIGHTENED AWARENESS OF THEIR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMANITY.

4.IN COPING WITH INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS OR PENDING ISSUES,WE
BELIEVE THAT CONTINUOUS EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO ALLEVIATE
AND OVERCOME CONFLICTS OF OPINION BY SINCERELY CONSIDERING
THE OTHER PARTIES POSITIONS AND CONDUCTING RATIONAL DIALOGUE
AND NEGOTIATION AT THE MEETING TABLE.

5.WE BELIEVE THAT THE PARTIES TO A CONFLICT OR ISSUE SHOULD WORK
STEADFASTLY AND REALISTICALLY FOR FINAL AGREEMENT AND NOT/NOT
DISDAIN THE SEARCH FOR STEP BY STEP MEASURES OR GRADUALIST
SOLUTIONS IN PURSUIT OF THEIR ULTIMATE AIMS.

6.WE,THE COUNTRIES SHARING COMMON POLITICAL CREED,RENEW OUR
DETERMINATION TO DEAL RESOLUTELY WITH THESE ISSUES IN SOLIDARITY
AND UNITY AMONG THE WEST IN ORDER TO PRESERVE FREEDOM AND PEACE
AND SHALL NOT/NOT SHIRK FROM MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO THIS END.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM TOKYO UIGR2401 21NOV83

TO FXTOTT LIDDZ DELIVER BY 210900

INFO PMDELDHAKA DELIVER BY 211600

WSHDC BNATO ROME LDN RONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY DELHI PEKIN/SMITH

PCOOTT/OSBADESTON NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CFP

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGB RBR UGB URR RCP ZSI PPR PGB PPD

---TRUDEAU/NAKASONE MTG:PEACE INITIATIVE

SUMMARY: MTG PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY FOR EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE. NAKASONE WAS VERY SUPPORTIVE, AT TIMES ENTHUSIASTICALLY SO, AND APPLAUDED TRUDEAU FOR TAKING SUCH TIMELY INITIATIVE. ON FIVE POWER MTG, HE SUGGESTED FIRMLY THAT INF DISCUSSIONS HELD KEY TO ITS SUCCESS BUT AGREED FIVE POWER TALKS WERE QUOTE WONDERFUL IDEA UNQUOTE WHICH HE WOULD SUPPORT AND FOR WHICH JPN WOULD EXTEND AS MUCH COOPERATION AS POSSIBLE IN QUOTE HELPING CDA FROM SIDE UNQUOTE. HOWEVER NAKASONE MADE NO/NO COMMENT OR COMMITMENT ON ANY SPECIFIC FOLLOW-UP ACTION. DURING MTG TRUDEAU ALSO ENDORSED NAKASONE/KOHL QUOTE TOKYO STATEMENT UNQUOTE OF NOV21 ON DISARMAMENT AND E/W RELATIONS, WHICH CONTAINS, IN ABBREVIATED FORM, LANGUAGE CONSISTENT WITH ELEMENTS OF TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE.

2. REPORT: TRUDEAU AND NAKASONE SPENT NEARLY 90 MINS IN SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE. AT START OF DISCUSSION, TRUDEAU OUTLINED HIS PROPOSALS PROVIDING EMPHASIS AND DETAIL TO THOSE POINTS WITH PARTICULAR RELEVANCE FOR JPN. PROPOSALS ON STRATEGY OF SUFFOCATION WERE NOT/NOT ELABORATED AS TRUDEAU INDICATED ...?

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HE WOULD PRESENT THEM IN OTHER FORA AT LATER DATE.

3. NAKASONE RESPONDED THAT, AGAINST BACKGROUND OF INCREASING USE OF FORCE, GROWING AGGRAVATION OF E/W RELATIONS AND STAGNATION OF INF TALKS. HE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO TRUDEAU PROPOSALS. HE ADMIRER TRUDEAU FOR TAKING INITIATIVE TO TRY TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES. JPN, AS ONLY COUNTRY EVER BAPTIZED BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SHARED CDN CONCERNS OVER INNATL SITU.

4. ON MBFR, NAKASONE REMARKED THAT ISSUES OF DISARMAMENT WERE TECHNICAL AND PRECISE AND REQUIRED COMPLETENESS AND VERIFIABILITY. HE AGREED THAT ISSUE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DOES HAVE LINKAGE WITH NUCLEAR ARSENALS. GIVEN SITU AT MBFR DISCUSSIONS, HE VALUED IDEA OF RAISING TALKS TO POLITICAL LEVEL IN ATTEMPT TO MAKE BREAKTHROUGH. IN HIS VIEW ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS SHOULD BE EXERTED FOR DISARMEMENT AND PEACE.

5. WITH REF TO NPT, JPN HAD GREAT INTEREST IN TREATY AND IN RESOLVING ITS SHORTCOMINGS. CDA AND JPN WERE VERY MUCH ON SAME GROUND. WHEN JPN RATIFIED NPT IT WAS ON UNDERSTANDING THAT NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD EXERISE RESTRAINT AND REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS AND THAT PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WOULD BE SHARED WITH THIRD COUNTRIES. THIS HAD NOT/NOT HAPPENED AND JPN WISHED TO SEE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES FULFILL THEIR COMMITMENTS.

6. NAKASONE SAID HE THOUGHT FIVE POWER CONF WAS QUOTE WONDERFUL IDEA UNQUOTE. GOALS PUT FORWARD BY TRUDEAU WOULD NOT/NOT BE REACHED UNLESS THERE WAS SUCH MTG. AGAINST REALITY OF STAGNATION IN START TALKS, HOWEVER, PLUS FACT THAT JPN(SIC) AND CHINA WERE NOT/NOT INVOLVED, THIS IDEA WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PUT INTO PRACTICE. NEVERTHELESS,

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NAKASONE BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT TO HAVE TARGET ON GLOBAL SCALE AND FOR THIS REASON CONSIDERED HOLDING OF FIVE POWER CONF IMPORTANT AS INTERIM MEASURE. BUT FOR SUCH CONF TO BE SUCCESSFUL, INFO TALKS WOULD HAVE TO SUCCEED. SUCCESS IN THIS FORUM WOULD PROVIDE REAL IMPETUS AND ALL EFFORTS HAD TO BE EXERTED TO MAKE INF SUCCEED.

7. NAKASONE AGREED WITH TRUDEAU THAT AS MUCH DISCUSSION ON ARMS CONTROL AS POSSIBLE MUST BE PUSHED. AS TRUDEAU HAD NOTED, MAJOR OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO STRENGTHEN NPT AND DIVERT RESOURCES TO THIRD WORLD. HE HOPED THAT TRUDEAU WOULD CARRY TO DELHI JPNS DESIRE TO SEARCH FOR PEACE AND IN PARTICULAR THAT MENTION BE MADE OF JPNS POSN THAT THERE SHOULD BE RE-ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FROM ARMS TO DEVELOPMENT. TRUDEAU INDICATED HE WOULD BE PLEASED TO TAKE THIS MSG TO DELHI.

8. AFTER TRUDEAU HAD ELABORATED ON STEPS WHICH WERE BEING TAKEN TO STIMULATE FIVE POWER PROPOSAL AND SOUGHT NAKSONES ASSISTANCE, LATTER RESPONDED AGAIN THAT IDEA OF FIVE POWER MTG WAS WONDERFUL IDEA WHICH HE SUPPORTED FULLY. JPN WOULD EXTEND AS MUCH COOPERATION AS IT COULD IN QUOTE HELPING CDA FROM SIDE UNQUOTE. HOWEVER, IMMEDIATE ISSUE CURRENTLY FACING WORLD WAS INF NEGOTIATIONS. IF THERE WERE OPENING OF BOTTLENECK IN INF TALKS IT WAS NAKSONES ASSESSMENT THAT THIS WOULD OPEN UP OTHER ARMS AREAS. OTHER FORA SHOULD NOT/NOT BE USED AS EXCUSE TO KEEP INFO STALLED. AS TRUDEAU HAD INDICATED HIS PROPOSAL WOULD NOT/NOT INTERFERE WITH GENEV TALKS, IT WAS ON THIS ASSUMPTION THAT HE SUPPORTED PROPOSALS. TRUDEAU RESPONDED INTER ALIA THAT CIA SUPPORTED ...4

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TWO TRACK DECISION, BUT THAT INF TALKS WERE NOT/NOT SUCCEEDING.
THEREFORE EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO PREVENT FURTHER
DETERIORATION OF E/W RELATIONS.

9. NAKASONE EXPRESSED SORROW THAT MISSILES WERE BEING DEPLOYED BUT
FELT THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE. IN VIEW OF THIS DEVELOPMENT
AND IN LIGHT OF SITU IN MIDEAST, HOWEVER, WORLD WAS FACED WITH
CRUCIAL SITU. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, NAKASONE NOTED HIS DEEP
RESPECT FOR TRUDEAU'S TIMELY INITIATIVE AND INDICATED THAT AT THIS
POINT IN WORLD AFFAIRS, PROPOSALS, INCLUDING FIRM MEASURES OUTLINED,
HAD HIS FULL SUPPORT. IN PARTICULAR HE AGREED WITH APPROACH IN
SEEKING FAITHFUL ADHERENCE TO NPT. INCREASE OF USA/USSR NUCLEAR
CAPACITY IN FAR EAST CAUSED JPN GREAT CONCERN. THEREFORE THEY MUST
SINCERELY AGREE TO REDUCE THEIR ARSENALS AS TRUDEAU HAD SUGGESTED.

10. NAKASONE SAID HE WOULD NOT/NOT COMMENT ON MOBILITY OF STRATEGIC
WEAPONS AT THIS TIME BUT LOOKED FORWARD TO SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE ON SUBJ.

11. AT OUTSET OF DISCUSSION, TRUDEAU REFERRED TO QUOTE TOKYO STATEMENT
UNQUOTE WHICH NAKASONE AND FRG CHANCELLOR KOHL HAD AGREED TO ON
NOV01 (TEXT IN OURTEL UIGR2402 21NOV) AND NOTED THAT POINTS IN JOINT
STATEMENT REFERRED TO PROBLEMS WHICH HE HAD DISCUSSED PREVIOUS WEEK
IN EUROPE. HE RECALLED WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT WHERE LEADERS HAD AGREED
PROBLEMS OF SECURITY WERE GLOBAL AND INDIVISIBLE, AS NOTED IN
STATEMENT. ITS REF TO NEED TO REDUCE TENSIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
ON STEP BY STEP BASIS WERE ESSENCE OF WHAT HE HAD PROPOSED. NAKASONE
SUBSEQUENTLY MENTIONED THAT PRES REAGAN HAD SUPPORTED STATEMENT AND

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REQUESTED CDN SUPPORT OR ENDORSEMENT. TRUDEAU RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH STATEMENT BECAUSE IT EXPRESSED SAME BASIC DESIRE WHICH HAD ANIMATED HIM IN PURSUING PEACE INITIATIVE AND BECAUSE ITS SPIRIT WAS MUCH ALONG LINES OF WHAT HIS INITIATIVE HAD BEEN CONCEIVED TO BE.

12. ON SUBJ OF MSG WHICH HE WOULD TAKE TO COMWEL HOGS MTG IN DELHI, TRUDEAU SAID HE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THEY JOIN AND GIVE STRENGTH TO NPT ON CONDITION THAT FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES LIVE UP TO THEIR COMMITMENTS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN POSSIBILITY OF REDUCTIONS IN ARMS EXPENDITURES BEING REDIRECTED TO THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT. IN SUBSEQUENT REF TO DELHI MTG TRUDEAU NOTED THAT NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WERE VERY SKEPTICAL ABOUT FIVE LIVING UP TO THEIR NPT COMMITMENTS. ON OTHER HAND HE WOULD SPEAK FRANKLY THERE TO SAY THAT THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES COULD NOT/NOT EXPECT MORE AID IF THEY CONTINUED TO INCREASE THEIR EXPENDITURES ON ARMS.

13. THIS TEL HAS NOT/NOT BEEN SEEN BY PMDEL WHO MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON TRUDEAU/NAKASONE MTG.

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FM EXTOTT XDV2038 21NOV83

TO LDN DELIVER BY 220800

INFO MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR IDDZ

REF OURTEL XDV2023 16NOV

---SUPJ HOTEL ACCOMMODATION

RFQUEST REPLY REFTEL DIRECT TO G SMITH IN MOSCO.

UUU/202 212014Z XDV2038

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FM EXTOTT LSR1876 21NOV83

TO BRSLA FLASH

DISTR IDDZ LSRC

REF OURTEL 1875 21NOV

---REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTARY INFO ON PMS INITIATIVE

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM PMS SPEECH IN MTL 13NOV

QUOTE WE ARE ALL OF US--YOU AND I, OUR FRIENDS AND FAMILIES, CITIZENS, GOVERNMENTS AND CORPORATIONS--ON THAT CROWDED GLOBAL STAGE, WHICH IS ALIVE WITH OUR HOPES AND OUR FEARS, OUR FAILURES AND OUR SUCCESSES. BUT THERE ARE TODAY THREE DOMINANT AND DISTURBING TRENDS WHICH, WHEN SET SIDE BY SIDE, THREATEN TO BRING DOWN THE CURTAIN ON OUR HUMAN PERFORMANCE.

THE FIRST TREND IS AN INCREASING RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. DESPITE THE SOLEMN AFFIRMATION OF THE UN CHARTER THAT QUOTE ALL MEMBERS SHALL REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE UNQUOTE THERE HAVE BEEN, SINCE 1945, APPROXIMATELY 130 CONFLICTS IN WHICH 35 MILLION HUMAN LIVES HAVE BEEN LOST.

THERE IS A HABIT OF AGGRESSION WHICH IS GAINING GROUND. AN ABDICATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN DEFERENCE TO MILITARY SOLUTIONS. A COARSE ELEMENT OF BELLIGERENCE, OF MENACING RHETORIC, OF GOVERNMENTS WHICH RISE AND FALL AT GUN-POINT. THE TREND IS GLOBAL-- AND IT IS GATHERING SPEED.

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PAGE TWO LSR1876 UNCLAS

THIS BRUTALIZATION OF POLITICAL LIFE TAKES ON A PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS TONE WHEN IT IS DRIVEN BY THE CLASH OF CONFRONTATIONAL IDEOLOGIES, AND ARMED WITH SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS. WEAPONS CLAIMING AN ANNUAL EXPENDITURE ON THE ORDER OF 600 BILLION DOLLARS FOR NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS COMBINED. WEAPONS CLAIMING TOO GREAT A SHARE OF THE BUDGETS OF IMPOVERISHED THIRD WORLD NATIONS. WEAPONS WHICH PROMOTE A RISING TIDE OF VIOLENCE AND ENGLISH MORE PEACEFUL WAYS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES. THAT IS THE FIRST TREND: THE BRUTALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

THE SECOND TREND IS THE STEADY UNRAVELLING OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THIS PROLIFERATION HAS TWO FUNDAMENTAL DIRECTIONS. WE CALL IT VERTICAL PROLIFERATION WHEN WE MEAN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVER-LARGER NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMMES, EVER MORE-ADVANCED IN DESTRUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, BY THE FIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES: THE USA, USSR, FRANCE, UK AND CHINA. WE CALL IT HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION WHEN WE MEAN THE POTENTIAL SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER STATES, ESPECIALLY TO THOSE WHO NOW HAVE THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR ARMS, OR SOON WILL HAVE THAT CAPACITY.

WE ARE TODAY PREOCCUPIED MAINLY WITH THE EVIDENT NEED TO ASSERT RESTRAINT OVER THE ARSENALS OF ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. BUT FROM A GLOEAL PERSPECTIVE, AND IN THE NEAR TERM, THE CONSEQUENCES OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION TO OTHER STATES, POSE AN EQUALLY GRAVE THREAT. PERHAPS MORE GRAVE, SINCE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY OTHER

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PAGE THREE LSR1876 UNCLAS

NATIONS WOULD BE UNCHECKED BY THE ASSURANCE OF MUTUAL DESTRUCTION WHICH OBTAINS AMONG THE FIVE POWERS.

IT WAS PRECISELY TO ARREST BOTH KINDS OF PROLIFERATION THAT A FORMAL AGREEMENT--THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY--CAME INTO EFFECT IN 1970, AND IS UP FOR REVIEW IN 1985. THAT TREATY REPRESENTED AN IMPLICIT CONVENANT BETWEEN THOSE NATIONS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THOSE WITHOUT: AN UNDERTAKING BY THE NUCLEAR POWERS THAT THEY WOULD PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON ARMS CONTROL AND ON LIMITING THE SPREAD OF THEIR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY; AND AN UNDERTAKING BY OTHER STATES THAT THEY WOULD FOREGO THE MILITARY USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN RETURN FOR THE BENEFITS OF ITS PEACEFUL USE, IN FIELDS SUCH AS ENERGY, MEDICINE, OR AGRICULTURE.

BUT THE TREND IS FOR THIS BARGAIN TO COME UNSTUCK. THE TREATY STANDS NOW AT A CROSS-ROADS BETWEEN PEACEFUL ASPIRATION AND MILITARY STRATEGY. IT IS THE CROSSROADS AT WHICH NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES--EAST AND WEST, NORTH AND SOUTH--PREOCCUPIED WITH THEIR SURVIVAL, WITH THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, OR WITH CURRENT CONFLICTS, WILL DECIDE WHETHER THE CONVENANT STILL HOLDS.

THE THIRD TREND WHICH THREATENS THE GLOBAL SYSTEM IS THE WORSENING STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, PARTICULARLY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. TWO WEEKS AGO, WHEN I SPOKE IN GUELPH, I DEPLORED THE ABSENCE OF HIGH POLITICS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. AND THE TENDENCY FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS TO RUN THEIR COURSE OUTSIDE ANY STRUCTURE OF UNDERSTANDING OF, AND

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PAGE FOUR LSR1876 UNCLAS

RESPECT FOR, EACH OTHERS SECURITY NEEDS. I REAFFIRMED OUR FIDELITY TO THE NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION, AND DECLARED MY HOPE THAT WE MIGHT ADD A QUOTE THIRD RAIL UNQUOTE OF POLITICAL ENERGY, OF DIALOGUE AND OF CONFIDENCE, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE DOWNWARD COURSE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

(TEXT)

SO I ASK YOU NOW TO CONSIDER THESE THREE TRENDS IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER--LAMINATED TOGETHER, AS THEY ARE IN REAL LIFE. AN INCREASING RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE. THE GROWING REALITY OF THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND A SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP CHARGED WITH ANIMOSITY. I BELIEVE IT IS EVIDENT THAT ONLY A GLOBAL APPROACH TO PEACE AND SECURITY CAN REVERSE THE PATH OF THIS SINISTER, COMPOSITE TREND-LINE.

BECAUSE, AS TENSIONS BUILD, THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP BECOMES PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO EVENTS ON THE PERIPHERY. AN ENDEMIC INSTABILITY IS EVIDENT IN AREAS LARGELY UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OF ONE OR THE OTHER SUPERPOWER. AT OTHER FLASHPOINTS, SUCH AS THE EVER-VOLATILE MIDDLE EAST, WE SEE THE TINDER FOR A SPREADING CONFLAGRATION.

THE PENETRATION OF EAST-WEST RIVALRY INTO THE THIRD WORLD WILL REACH ITS DEEPEST AND MOST DANGEROUS POINT IF, DESPITE THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, FRONT-LINE ANTAGONISTS--LOCKED IN RIVALRY OR COMBAT--BEGIN TO ARM THEMSELVES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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PAGE FIVE LSR1876 UNCLAS

THE FIRST IS THE NEED TO ESTABLISH, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THE COURSE OF THE COMING YEAR, A FORUM IN WHICH GLOBAL LIMITS MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED FOR ALL FIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES. THIS PROPOSAL IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE INF OR START TALKS BETWEEN THE USA AND USSR. BUT THOSE TALKS, AND RIGHTLY SO, DO NOT COVER BRITISH, FRENCH OR CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES.

WHAT WE MUST SEEK TO PROVIDE IS A NEGOTIATING FORUM FOR THOSE FIVE STATES WHICH RECOGNIZES THE RIGHTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AS STRATEGIC EQUALS--WHAT A RECENT TRILATERAL COMMISSION REPORT CALLS QUOTE INEVITABLE PARITY UNQUOTE BETWEEN THEM--AND WHICH PROVIDES A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND STABLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE OTHER THREE STATES AND THOSE OF THE SUPERPOWERS.

IN THIS WAY NEITHER BRITAIN, NOR FRANCE, NOR CHINA NEED FEAR THAT THEIR FORCES WILL BE SUBJECT TO RESTRAINTS WHICH DO NOT RECOGNIZE THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS.

ONCE RELATIVE LEVELS OF ARMAMENT WERE STABILIZED, I BELIEVE THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS COULD BEGIN TO ADDRESS THE REDUCTIONS CALLED FOR BY THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND TO CONSIDER MEASURES TO CONTROL THE QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE.

A SECOND ELEMENT IS REMEDIAL ACTION TO SHORE UP THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ITSELF--THAT COVENANT BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES WHICH I MENTIONED A FEW MINUTES AGO. THE TREATY HAS BEEN SIGNED BY SOME 119 NATIONS. BUT A NUMBER OF KEY STATES REMAIN

PAGE SIX LSR1876 UNCLAS

ALOOF, INCLUDING SEVERAL WITH THE CAPACITY NOW, OR THE POTENTIAL SOON, TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN NUCLEAR ARMS.

IF THE FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES COULD BEGIN TO STRENGTHEN THEIR SIDE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION BARGAIN, THEN THE REST OF US COULD MORE EASILY BRING GOOD SENSE TO BEAR ON THOSE WHO HAVE NOT YET SIGNED ON. NO DOUBT WE NEED TO INCREASE THE INCENTIVES FOR THIRD WORLD STATES TO FOREGO NUCLEAR WEAPONS--THERE MUST BE A DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. AND WE SHALL ALSO HAVE TO ENSURE THAT A FULL RANGE OF SAFEGUARDS ADEQUATELY GOVERNS THE TRANSFER, FROM ALL NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS, OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE AREA OF SAFEGUARDS IS ONE IN WHICH CANADA HAS TAKEN A LEADING PART FOR MANY YEARS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

JAPAN'S ASSOCIATION WITH THE WILLIAMSBURG DECLARATION LAST MAY, IN WHICH THE LEADERS OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES AGREED TO DEVOTE OUR FULL POLITICAL RESOURCES TO REDUCING THE THREAT OF WAR, EXPRESSES BOTH THE RESONANCE OF HISTORY AND THE REALITY OF THE PRESENT DAY. MY VISIT THERE WILL BEAR WITNESS TO THE INDIVISIBILITY OF GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE.

I CAN ALSO ANNOUNCE THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE CONSULTATIONS UNDER WAY WITH THE UNITED STATES, I HAVE INITIATED CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WITH CHINA--TWO NUCLEAR POWERS UPON WHICH MUCH DEPENDS.

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PAGE SEVEN LSR1876 UNCLAS

I LOOK FORWARD TO TAKING AN ACTIVE PART IN THE DISCUSSION OF PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES AT THE NEW DELHI MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, WHERE I WILL BE HEADING AFTER JAPAN. I LOOK FORWARD PARTICULARLY TO CONSULTATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI ON THE MATTER OF NON-PROLIFERATION, AND ON HER PERSPECTIVE, AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS, ON THE LINKAGE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. UNQUOTE.

UUU/045 211740Z LSR1876

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM EXTOTT LSR1875 21NOV83

TO BRSLA FLASH

DISTR IDDZ LSRC

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

---REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTARY INFO ON PMS INITIATIVE

FOLLOWING IS BRIEF PROPOSED FOR SSEA AND COPIED TO MIN PEPIN
REPORTING ON EUROPEAN VISIT AND OUTLING FOLLOWUP. ADDITIONALLY, JAPANESE
PM NAKASONE WAS VERY SUPPORTIVE OF PM INITIATIVE IN THEIR MTG IN
TOKYO. PM HAS SENT SPECIAL EMISSARY PEKIN AND MOSCO TO EXPLAIN
PURPOSES OF HIS INITIATIVE.

2. IF ASKED ABOUT USA REACTION, USA HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF
INITIATIVE, BUT HAS EXPRESSED CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT SPECIFIC ARMS
CONTROL MEASURES. PM IS NOW EN ROUTE TO CHOGM IN DELHI (BEGINNS 22NOV)
WHERE HE PLANS TO EXPAND RANGE OF HIS CONTACTS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH
COMWEL LEADERS. WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY IDDZ THAT THIS IS ONLY
INFO AVAILABLE AT PRESENT.

3. EXCERPTS FROM PMS SPEECH IN MTL 13NOV FOLLOWS BY SEPARATE TEL.

QUOTE: PMS VISIT TO EUROPE: FOLLOW-UP

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S MEETINGS IN EUROPE ON HIS INITIATIVE WENT
VERY WELL. DURING THE SHORT PERIOD OF NOVEMBER 8-11 HE HAD IN-DEPTH
CONVERSATIONS WITH SIX EUROPEAN LEADERS (PRESIDENT MITTERRAND,
CHANCELLOR KOHL, PRIME MINISTERS LUBBERS, MARTENS, CRAXI AND THATCHER),
AS WELL AS WITH THE POPE AND QUEEN BEATRIX OF THE NETHERLANDS.

THE PRIME MINISTER WAS WELL RECEIVED IN ALL CAPITALS. HIS INITIATIVE

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PAGE TWO LSR1875 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

WAS SEEN AS SERIOUS AND COMING FROM A COUNTRY WITH APPROPRIATE CREDENTIALS.(AS BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TINDEMANS PUT IT TO THE PRESS,THE PM OCCUPIES A UNIQUE PLACE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE FOR A ROLE OF THIS KIND,FEING NEITHER EUROPEAN NOR AMERICAN.)THE PM FOUND SUPPORT ALL ALONG THE WAY FOR HIS GENERAL MESSAGE OF THE NEED TO REESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH MOSCOW AND TO CREATE A QUOTE SAFETY NET UNQUOTE AROUND THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.THIS WAS PARTICULARLY THE CASE WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL,AND INDEED TO A SURPRISINGLY POSITIVE EXTENT ALSO WITH MRS THATCHER.MITTERRAND,KOHL,THATCHER AND MARTENS MENTIONED THE UNSETTLED AND UNCLEAR SITUATION AS TO WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN MOSCOW AND WHAT APPEARED SITUATION AS TO WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN MOSCOW AND WHAT APPEARED TO BE A LESSENING OF POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE KREMLIN. THEY SHARED THE PMS ANALYSIS THAT A REAGAN-ANDROPOV SUMMIT WAS DESIRABLE,IF PROPERLY PREPARED AND HELD IN AN AMICABLE ATMOSPHERE, AND MIGHT HAVE OCCURRED SOMETIME NEXT SPRING IF IT HAD NOT/NOT BEEN FOR THE KAL INCIDENT.UNLESS SOMETHING WAS DONE BY NATO LEADERS TO CHANGE THE ATMOSPHERE,HOWEVER,A SUMMIT WOULD NOT/NOT OCCUR,DUE TO THE USA PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,FOR 1 1/2-2 YEARS,TOO LENGTHY A PERIOD IN THE CURRENT UNHEALTHY AND DANGEROUS CLIMATE WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS.

ON SPECIFIC POINTS,THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS TO ATTEND THE OPENING OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON JANUARY 17.CHEYSSON SAID HE HAD INDICATIONS GROMYKO WOULD ATTEND

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PAGE THREE LSR1875 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

(UNCONFIRMED BY OTHERS) AND THAT SHULTZ, ALTHOUGH RELUCTANT, WOULD LIKELY PARTICIPATE IF EVERYONE ELSE DID. MRS THATCHER WAS HIGHLY INTERESTED IN THE IDEA OF POSSIBLY HAVING EVEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ATTEND THE STOCKHOLM OPENING, SEEING IN IT A MECHANISM BY WHICH A REAGAN-ANDROPOV MEETING MIGHT BE MORE ACCEPTABLE AND POSSIBLE.

THE FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE RECEIVED A GOOD HEARING. MITTERRANDS REACTION WAS MORE POSITIVE THAN ANTICIPATED, NOT/NOT BEING AGAINST IT PROVIDED IT DID NOT/NOT OCCUR UNTIL AFTER INF DEPLOYMENTS WERE UNDERWAY. KOHL SIMILARLY SAID HE HAD AN UNDERSTANDING WITH MITTERRAND TO THE SAME EFFECT. WHILE MRS THATCHER WAS MORE NEGATIVE SHE DID NOT/NOT HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF OUR PROPOSAL WHICH ALREADY TOOK ACCOUNT OF TWO OF THE CONCERNS SHE RAISED: (A) THE NEED NOT/NOT TO IMPEDE THE UK MODERNIZATION PROGRAMME, AND (B) NOT/NOT TO AGGREGATE UK, FRENCH AND USA NUCLEAR FORCES. THE RELATED ISSUE RAISED BY THE PM CONCERNING NPT AND HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION RECEIVED A GOOD RECEPTION, ALTHOUGH LARGELY WITHOUT COMMITMENT.

WHILE THERE WAS NO/NO IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT ACHIEVED ON HAVING MINISTERS ATTEND AN MBFR MEETING, THERE WAS SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT OF HAVING NATO RESPOND TO THE MOST RECENT EASTERN INITIATIVE..

FOLLOW-UP: DURING YOUR MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AT 1715 HOURS TODAY, HE WILL BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING FOLLOW-UP TO THE EUROPEAN TRIP AND IS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO SEEK YOUR VIEWS ON HOW TO BEST APPROACH THE DECEMBER NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON THE SUBJECTS OF THE CDE IN STOCKHOLM AND MBFR.

...4

PAGE FOUR LSR1875 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

THE PRIME MINISTER WISHES PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR TOKYO TO WRITE TO HIS NATO COLLEAGUES TO INFORM THEM OF THE RESULTS OF HIS EUROPEAN TRIP AND, WITH YOUR AGREEMENT, TO PROPOSE THAT DECISIONS BE REACHED AT THE NATO MEETING ON TWO POINTS THAT COULD FIGURE IN THE NATO COMMUNIQUE:

(A) THAT NATO MEMBERS WILL BE REPRESENTED AT A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL AT STOCKHOLM, AND

(F) THAT NATO WILL RESPOND TO THE LATEST EASTERN PROPOSAL ON MBFR AND WILL BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH THE WARSAW PACT AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN VIENNA IN ORDER TO PROVIDE POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

IN THIS REGARD, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING WHETHER YOU ARE PREPARED TO ATTEND THE STOCKHOLM OPENING JANUARY 17 AS WELL AS A POSSIBLE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON MBFR IN VIENNA SOMETIME EARLY IN THE SPRING.

FURTHER FOLLOW-UP IS INTENDED TO INCLUDE:

(A) VISITS BY GEOFFREY PEARSON (AS THE PMS PERSONAL EMISSARY) AND A MEMBER OF THE TASK FORCE TO PEKING (NOVEMBER 21) AND MOSCOW

(NOVEMBER 25) TO DISCUSS THE INITIATIVE;

(B) FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE USA, A KEY ELEMENT OF WHICH WILL BE YOUR BREAKFAST MEETING TOMORROW MORNING WITH USA DEPUTY SECRETARY KENNETH DAM;

(C) A POSSIBLE VISIT BY YOU TO EASTERN EUROPE, WHERE KEEN INTEREST IN THE INITIATIVE HAS BEEN EXPRESSED, PARTICULARLY BY PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU OF ROMANIA. UNQUOTE.

CCC/104 211742Z LSR1875

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA1315 21NOV83

TO LDN STKHM DELIVER BY 220900

INFO PMDEL/DACCA WSHDC BNATO VMBFR PRMNY PMDEL/DELHI NDHQOTT/PPP/
CORA/DSTRATA/DGINFO/DSPP

DISTR IDDZ IDAN IDAO IDR

---POST 1945 CONFLICT STATISTICS

PM DEL HAS REQUESTED IMMEDIATE INFO ON NUMBER OF MILITARY CONFLICTS SINCE 1945. CENTRE FOR DEFENSE INFO WSHDC GIVES FIGURE OF 130/130 USING CRITERIA OF INTER OR INTRA STATE SUSTAINED CONFLICT WITH ORGANIZED RESISTANCE. DND FIGURE IS 197/197 WHICH IS SIMILAR TO RESULTS OF BROOKINGS INSTITUTE.

2. GRATEFUL YOU CONTACT IISS(LONDON) AND SIPRI(STKHM) AND CONFIRM ASAP THEIR ESTIMATES FOR NUMBER OF POST-1945 MAJOR CONFLICTS, CRITERION FOR CONFLICT, AND CONFLICTS IN PROGRESS.

CCC/202 212354Z IDA1315

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MF
2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM COPEN YJGR1316 21NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 220900

DISTR RSR

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0173 17NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:LETTER TO NATO HEADS OF GOVT

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAUS LETTER OF NOV18 WAS PASSED TO PRIME MINISTER SCHLUTER THROUGH HEAD OF EASTERN EUROPEAN DIV.,VAGN EGEBJERG IN DANISH MFA.EGEBJERG INFORMED US THAT SCHLUTERS RESPONSE TO PRIME MINISTERS FIRST LETTER HAD JUST BEEN SIGNED AND WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY DANISH EMBASSY OTTAWA.HE APOLOGIZED FOR DELAY BUT POINTED OUT THAT DANISH INTERNAL POLITICAL LIFE HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT HECTIC AND PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN OTHERWISE OCCUPIED.

2.ON LETTER OF NOV18,EGEBJERG RESPONDED THAT AS TO PRIME MINISTERS FIRST PROPOSAL,FEELING AMONG EUROPEAN TEN WAS THAT IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO BE REPRESENTED AT SKHM CONFERENCE AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL.WHILE NO/NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN AS YET,IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT DENMARK WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY FOREIGN MINISTER ELLEMANN-JENSEN.ON PRIME MINISTERS PROPOSAL CONCERNING MBFR EGEBJERG DID NOT/NOT COMMENT EXCEPT TO SAY MATTER WOULD HAVE TO BE STUDIED.

CCC/237 211552Z YJGR1316

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

MF
ED

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PEKIN WJGR0867 21NOV83

TO PMDELDACCA/FCWLER ONLY FLASH

INFO EXTOTT MINA/DUDOIT ONLY PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON ONLY DELIVER
BY 210000

DISTR LIDDZ/DELVOIE ONLY DELIVER BY 210900
FROM SMITH

---PM INITIATIVE:VISIT TO MIDDLE KINGDOM

FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS THIS MORNING,PEARSON AND AME GAUVIN INFORMED
ASST FOREIGN MINISTER ZHU QIZHEN OF PMS DESIRE TO VISIT PEKIN TO
EXPLAIN PERSONALLY HIS PROPOSALS TO PREMIER ZHAO AS WELL AS DENG.
PREFERRED DATE FOR WORKING VISIT WAS ARRIVAL EARLY AM 28NOV AND
DEPARTURE BEFORE NOON 29NOV.SECOND BUT LESSER POSSIFILITY WAS
05DEC ALTHOUGH WE SAID PM WLD HAVE TO BE CONSULTED ABOUT THIS DATE.
2.AT END OF ONE HR MTG THIS AFTERNOON WITH FOREIGN MINISTER,HE
RFFERRED TO PMS DESIRE TO VISIT PEKIN MENTIONING THAT HE DID
NOT/NOT THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY PROBLEM AS CDA WAS VERY FRIENDLY
COUNTRY AND PM TRUDEAU WAS WELL KNOWN HERE.HE SAID HE WLD REPORT
INFO TO PREMIER ZHAO AND PROVIDE US WITH ANSWER AS SOON AS POSSIFLF.
UPON EXITING ZHU QIZHEN ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT NEXT WEEK WAS
POSSIBLE(THIS WAS PREFERRED OPTION)AND SAID HE WLD PROVIDE DEFINITIVF
RESPONSE DURING COURSE OF DAY TOMORROW IF NOT/NOT BEFORE PEARSONS
DEPARTURE AT 1100 HRS.

3.WILL FORWARD ANSWER ASAP WHEN RECD.BELIEVE IT WILL BE POSITIVE

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RESERVE AUX CDN
CDN EYES ONLY

PAGE TWO WJGR0867 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

SO YOU SHOULD BEGIN PROVIDING EMI PEKIN REQUIRED INFO ABOUT NAMES
OF PM PARTY, PRESS AND FLT DETAILS.

4. FYI: SENATOR AUSTIN WILL BE IN PEKIN DURING PROJECTED VISIT. MIN OF
LABOUR OUELLET WILL ALSO BE VISITING PEKIN WITH LARGE PARTY BUT
HIS ARR WILL BE DURING PM OF 29 NOV AFTER PMDEL HAS LEFT.

5. FULL REPORT ON PEARSONS DISCUSSIONS WILL FOLLOW. WE HAD GOOD
HEARING AND WARM RECEPTION. CHINESE LARGELY STUCK TO POSN AS
OUTLINED IN FMS UNGA SPEECH BUT THEY DID NOT/CLOSE DOOR ON
5-POWER IDEA AND EXPRESSED KEEN INTEREST IN REACTION OF UK, FRANCE
AND USSR. THEY SAID PMS PROPOSALS WLD BE STUDIED SERIOUSLY.

6. LOCAL CTV REP WAS INFORMED BY TORONTO OF PEARSON VISIT AND FILMED
HIS ARR AT MFA FOR MTG WITH FOREIGN MINISTER.

7. FOR OSBALDESTON: GRATEFUL YOU INFORM AXWORTHY ONLY OF PMO ABOUT
ABOVE.

CCC/002 211015Z WJGR0867

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned _____

Person _____

Local Time _____

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PEKIN WJGR0865 21NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 210900

INFO PMDELDHAKA/FOWLER MOSCO DELIVER BY 220900 WSHLC BNATO

ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY TOKYO DELHI PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON

NDFQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CPP

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGE RER UCF URR RCP ZSI

---PMS MTG WITH GEORGI ARBATOV

FOLLOWING FROM PMDEL/PEKIN:

SUMMARY--PM SAW ARBATOV(DIRECTOR OF USA-CDA INSTITUTE IN MOSCO)
FOR 25 MINS IN TOKYO 19NOV.ARBATOV EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT CURRENT
SITUATION;USA DID NOT/NOT WANT AGMT;SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS AT LOSS
TO KNOW WHAT TO DO;SITU WLD GET WORSE BEFORE IT GOT BETTER.PM
INDICATED INTEREST IN VISITING MOSCO AROUND NEW YEAR.ANDROPOVS
ILLNESS WAS DESCRIBED AS QUOTE PAINFUL BUT NOT/NOT VERY SERIOUS.
IT WAS CONNECTED WITH A COLD UNQUOTE.HE WAS EXPECTED TO BE BACK
TO WORK THIS WEEK BUT IT CLD NOT/NOT BE GUARANTEED HE WLD BE ABLE
TO RECEIVE PM AROUND END OF YR.

2.REPORT:PM HAD 25 MINUTE MTG WITH GEORGI ARBATOV(DIRECTOR OF USA
AND CDA INSTITUTE IN MOSCO)IN PMS SUITE AT OKURA HOTEL IN TOKYO
IMMED FOLLOWING LUNCHEON WITH NAKASONE 19NOV.SOV EMB HAD LET IT BE
KNOWN THAT ARBATOV WAS AVAILABLE(HE HAS BEEN IN TOKYO ATTENDING
SEMINAR)AND PM TOOK UP OFFER.PM HAS T WITH ARBATOV SEVERAL
TIMES BEFORE AND MTG WAS AMIABLE.PEARSON AND SMITH WERE IN
ATTENDANCE.ARBATOV WAS ALONE.

PAGE TWO WJGR0865 CONF

3.PM OPENED SAYI HE HAD JUST HAD GOOD LUNCH WITH PM NAKASONE ON DISARMAMENT AND MENTIONED THAT PEARSON, ACCOMPANIED BY SMITH, WLD BE TRAVELLING TO PEKIN AND MOSCO IN NEXT FEW DAYS AS HIS PERSONAL EMISSARY. IT APPEARED TO BE TOO LATE FOR THERE TO BE ANY NEGOTIATED AGMT ON INF. ARBATOV ASKED ABOUT DIFFICULTIES WITH QUOTE BIG BROTHER UNQUOTE. PM QUERIED WHETHER HE MEANT QUOTE BIG EAGLE OR BIG BEAR UNQUOTE. ARBATOV COUNTERED THAT MOSCO WAS CDAS ADVERSARY BUT ONE HAD TO BE WARY OF ONES ALLIES. USSR HAD DONE EVERYTHING IT CLD TO IMPROVE CURRENT SITU AND DID NOT/NOT KNOW WHAT MORE IT CLD DO. QUOTE NO/NO ONE IN MOSCO THINKS WE CAN DO BUSINESS WITH REAGAN. HE KEEPS GOING FURTHER AND FURTHER. BIGGEST PROBLEM IS THAT REAGAN DOES NOT/NOT WANT AGMT. HE WANTS TO ARM NOT/NOT DISARM. ANY AGMT WITH USSR WLD RUIN POSN REAGAN HAS DEVELOPED IN WSHDC INCLUDING RECORD MILITARY BUDGET UNQUOTE.

4. ARBATOV ADDED THAT PERSONALLY HE DID NOT/NOT KNOW WHAT CLD BE DONE. ONLY WAY WAS FOR PRESSURE BUT HE WAS NOT/NOT SURE EUROPEANS WERE WILLING AND ABLE TO APPLY IT. ANDROPOV AND SOVIET LEADERSHIP SAW NO/NO OTHER WAY THAN TO QUOTE FULFILL THEIR PROMISES UNQUOTE. IN JPN HE HAD MET JPNSE FM AND BELIEVED JPNSE WERE READY TO IMPROVE RELNS WITH USSR. FRANCE AND ITALY HAD GIVEN INDICATIONS THEY ALSO WANTED TO BEGIN RESTORING ELEMENTS OF DETENTE. IN GENL HOWEVER EAST-WEST POLICY WAS OPERATING IN A VACUUM AND HE WAS AFRAID THAT EVENTS WLD BECOME WORSE BEFORE THEY BECAME BETTER.

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PAGE THREE WJGR0865 CONFD

5.PM AGREED WITH ARBATOVS REMARKS.UNFORTUNATELY AGMT ON INF DID NOT/NOT SEEM POSSIBLE.THAT WAS WHY HE HAD LAUNCHED HIS INITIATIVE AND WAS OPERATING ON PERIPHERY OF INF NEGNS.IT WAS WHY HE HAD AGREED TO SEE ARBATOV AND WHY HE WLD BE SEEING CHINESE PREMIER IN OTT IN JAN.IT WAS ALSO FOR THIS REASON THAT HE WAS PROPOSING: EAST-WEST MTG IN VIENNA ON MEFR AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL;MINISTFRIAL ATTENDANCE AT STOCKHOLM;AND FIVE POWER CONFERENCE.USSR HAD ALSO PROPOSED LATTER CONF BUT ON BLOC TO BLOC BASIS RATHER THAN AS SOVEREIGN NATIONS.FRENCH AND BRITISH WANTED MODERNIZATION BUT WLD STOP IF SUPERPOWERS REDUCED.PMS PURPOSE WAS NOT/NOT TO PRODUCE A BREAKTHROUGH BUT TO IMPROVE RELNS AROUND PERIPHERY.HE BELIEVED IN DIALOGUE.THAT WAS WHY HE WAS SENDING PEARSON AND SMITH TO PEKIN AND MOSCO TO SEE IF IT WLD BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO GO.ARBATOV ASKED IF THAT WAS AIM OF THEIR VISIT.PM REPLIED HE HAD ASKED THEM TO EXPLAIN PURPOSE OF CDN INITIATIVE;IE STEP BY STEP PROGRESS TO REDUCE TENSIONS AS WELL AS PRINCIPLE TOOLS HE INTENDED TO USE.THEY WLD TRY TO FIND OUT IF IT WLD BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO ACCEPT PRES ANDROPOVS INVITATION.HE HAD SEEN BRITISH AND FRENCH LEADERS; HOPED TO SEE CHINESE AND THEN TWO SUPERPOWERS.PM RECALLED THAT GORBACHEV(MEMBER OF POLITBURO)HAD RENEWED ANDROPOV INVITATION AND REITERATED THAT IF PEARSON/SMITH JUDGED IT USEFUL FOR HIM TO VISIT MOSCO FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERSHIP HE WLD GO.

6.PM CONTD THAT HE DID NOT/NOT EXPECT TO BRING ANY SOLUTIONS WITH

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PAGE FOUR WJGR0865 CONFD

HIM TO MOSCO AND WSHDC BUT RATHER TO TELL WHAT HE WAS DOING AND WHY. ESSENTIALLY HIS PURPOSE WAS TO REINJECT POLITICS INTO PROCESS RATHER THAN CONTINUE TO LET MILITARY ACCOUNTANTS CONTINUE TO COUNT BOMBS AND MISSILES LIKE IN GENEVA. KEY WAS TO UNDERSTAND INTENTIONS OF OTHER SIDE AND TO INFLUENCE THEM. THIS CLD NOT/NOT BE DONE AT LEVEL OF SUPERPOWERS. DURING HIS TOUR OF EUROPE HE HAD BEEN VERY WELL RECD AND HAD RECD GENL SUPPORT FOR HIS INITIATIVE. ARBATOV ASKED WHETHER THIS INCLUDED MRS THATCHER. PM INDICATED SHE HAD CHANGED HER VIEWS; WAS NOW CALLING FOR MORE DIALOGUE AND HAD EVEN ANNOUNCED HER FIRST VISIT TO EASTERN EUR COUNTRY (HUNGARY). REASON FOR THIS WAS THAT PEOPLE WERE BEGINNING TO BECOME WORRIED ABOUT CURRENT SITU.

7. RESPONDING TO ARBATOV'S QUERY ABOUT MITTERRAND'S POSN, PM SAID THAT SINCE WILLIAMSEER HE AND MITTERRAND HAD BEEN SAYING SAME THING ABOUT NEED FOR DIALOGUE. IT HAD BEEN TWO OF THEM THAT HAD TURNED WILLIAMSBERG'S COMMUNIQUE AROUND FROM ONE FOCUSSED ONLY ON NEED TO DEPLOY INF TO ONE WHICH INCLUDED FAMOUS PHRASE ABOUT NEED FOR SUMMIT LEADERS TO APPLY THEIR FULL POLITICAL RESOURCES IN PURSUIT OF PEACE. ARBATOV SAID MITTERRAND CLD HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN FINDING SOLUTION TO OVERCOME USA UNWILLINGNESS TO REACH AGMT. NAKASONE WAS ALSO THINKING IN SAME WAY AS WITNESS HIS TOKYO STATEMENT. AS FOR UK, IT WAS BRITISH PEOPLE THAT WERE BRINGING MRS THATCHER TO HER SENSES AS THEY HAD REASON TO BE CONCERNED.

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PAGE FIVE WJGR0865 CONF D

8.PM AGREED PUBLIC WAS WORRIED AFTER SERIES OF EVENTS INVOLVING KAL,GRENADA,MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL AMERICA.IN CDA SOME PEOPLE HAD INITIALLY BEEN AGAINST HIS INITIATIVE BUT HAD DROPPED THEIR RESERVATIONS BECAUSE THEY WERE WORRIED ABOUT CURRENT SITU.HE REALIZED HE COULD NOT/NOT PERFORM A MIRACLE BUT HAD TO TRY.IF REAGAN WAS UNWILLING TO TALK PEACE HE WLD HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND THATCHERS NEW PCSN WHICH DID.THIS WAS WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO DO IN NATO AND AT DELHI AND HOPED WSAW PACK WLD DO SAME THING.

9.ARBATOV STATED THAT SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS VERY CONCERNED.HE HAD SEEN GROMYKO TWICE JUST BEFORE AND AFTER REVOLUTION DAY(05NOV AND 09NOV)AS WELL AS GORBACHEV ON 05NOV.THERE WAS FEELING NOT/NOT ONLY OF CONCERN IN MOSCO BUT ALSO ONE OF FRUSTRATION THAT THERE WAS NOTHING USSR CLD DO TO IMPROVE SITU.THIS FEELING WAS VERY BAD AND ONE THAT COULD NOT/NOT BE DISPELLED.USSR HAD MADE ONE CONCESSION AFTER ANOTHER WITHOUT RESULT.PM SAID IT APPEARED TO BE TOO LATE TO REACH AGMT ON INF BEFORE DEPLOYMENT.WHAT WAS IMPORTANT HOWEVER WAS NOT/NOT NUMBERS INVOLVED BUT SPIRIT.ARBATOV RETORTED THAT REAGAN HAD NOT/NOT WANTED AGMT FROM THE BEGINNING; PEOPLE BEFORE REAGAN HAD ALSO WANTED DEPLOYMENT.USA WOULD NOT/NOT BE AT TABLE IN GENEV IF IT HAD NOT/NOT BEEN FOR ALLIES WHO PUSHED FOR THIS.ALL USA PROPOSALS HAD BEEN TAILORED SO THEY WLD BE TURNED DOWN.EVIDENCE OF THIS WLD COME OUT IN SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENTS.USSR HAD HOPED THAT ALLIES,PUBLIC AND CONGRESS WLD INFLUENCE

PAGE SIX WJGR0865 CONF

REAGAN BUT THIS HAD NOT/NOT REALLY WORKED.MAYBE IT WAS SOMETHING USSR HAD DONE.END RESULT HOWEVER WAS THAT EVERYONE WAS ARMING AND COSTS WERE GOING UP.

10.PM SUGGESTED THAT PART OF REASON FOR USA ATTITUDE WAS ITS DFFEAT IN VIETNAM AND IRAN.USA PUELIC HAD ELECTED PRES WITH NEW SPIRIT TO REVERSE THIS SITU.PM WAS NOT/NOT DEFENDING IT PUT RATHER POINTING OUT THAT NEW ATMOSPHERE HAD TO BE CREATED.ARBATOV POINTED OUT THAT USSR HAD NOT/NOT BEEN DEFEATED IN WAR AND SAID HE DID NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND WHY USA EXPECTED IT TO BEHAVE AS IF IT HAD LOST A WAR.REAGAN WAS ATTEMPTING TO ACT LIKE A NAPOLEON WITH HIS GREAT VICTORY IN GRENADA.

11.PM ASKED WHEN BEST TIME WLD BE TO VISIT MOSCO.AREATOV RESPONDED THAT HE COULD NOT/NOT SAY IT WLD DEPEND ON WHO PM WLD SEE.HE DID NOT/NOT KNOW WHAT SITU ANDROPOV WAS IN BUT EXPECTATION WAS THAT HE WLD RETURN TO WORK NEXT WEEK(IE WEEK OF 21NOV)PUT ONE WLD HAVE TO SEE.PM SAID THAT IF POSSIBLE,AND IF PEARSON JUDGED IT USEFUL FOR HIM TO GO.TIMING MIGHT BE JUST BEFORE OR JUST AFTER NEW YEAR.HIS HOPE WAS TO SEE LEADERS OF ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS BEFORE STOCKHCLM CONF BEGAN 17JAN.PM MENTIONED HE HAD SPOKEN ON TELEPHONE WITH PRES REAGAN 17NOV AND WHILE NO/NO DATE WAS PROPCSED FOR VISIT TO WSHDC,IF POSSIBLE HE WLD LIKE TO SEE REAGAN AND ANDROPOV AROUND SAME TIME BEFORE MID-JANUARY.

12.ARBATOV SAID HE THOUGHT ANDROPOV WLD BE ABLE TO RECEIVE PM.HIS
...7

PAGE SEVEN WJGR0265 CONF

ILLNESS WAS QUOTE PAINFUL BUT NOT/NOT VER FSERIOUS. IT WAS
CONNECTED WITH A COLD UNQUOTE. PRESIDENT HAD FELT MUCH BETTER
AFTER HIS VACATION. SITU WLD BECOME CLEAR, ARBATOV SAID, ONCE HE
RETURNED TO MOSCO. HE WLD CONSULT WITH SOVIET LEADERSHIP ABOUT
POSSIBLE PM VISIT AND DO SUPPORTING JOB TO PEARSON MISSION. PM
STATED THAT IF HE SAW ANDROPOV IT WLD BE THREE-QUARTERS SYMPO
AND ONE-QUARTER SUBSTANCE. ANDROPOV HAD INVITED HIM AND PM
WANTED TO TALK TO HIM. ARBATOV SAID THAT IF ANDROPOV WAS IN
REASONABLY GOOD HEALTH HE WLD WANT TO SEE PM; HE WAS INTERESTED
AND WLD WANT TO MAKE MTG MORE THAN SYMBOLIC. MUCH WORK AWAITED
PRESIDENT AFTER THREE MONTHS. PM REPEATED HE WLD LIKE TO SEE
ANDROPOV IF HIS HEALTH WAS ALRIGHT AND IF HE WAS NOT/NOT TOO
BUSY. ARBATOV SAID IT WAS NOT/NOT A QUESTION OF BEING BUSY. IT
WAS QUESTION OF SUITABLE TIMING. A LOT OF VISITS HAD BEEN PUT
OFF. BOTH SIDES WLD HAVE TO BE FLEXIBLE.

13. SMITH ENQUIRED WHO ELSE PM MIGHT SEE. ARBATOV RESPONDED THAT
EVEN IF IT WAS NEW YEARS VACATION THERE WLD BE NO/NO PROBLEM
WITH GORBACHEV WHO HAD VERY GOOD IMPRESSION OF HIS VISIT TO
CDA. HE WAS QUOTE YOUNGEST IN LEADERSHIP, MORE AND MORE INVOLVED
IN INTERNATL AFFAIRS AND VERY CLOSE TO ANDROPOV UNQUOTE. PM
ASKED ABOUT ROMANOV. ARBATOV SAID HE WAS QUOTE NOT/NOT VERY
USEFUL; HE ONLY DEALT WITH TECHNICAL MATTERS AND NOT/NOT INVOLVED
UNQUOTE. GROMYKO OF COURSE WOULD BE THERE. ANDROPOV AND GORBACHEV

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PAGE EIGHT WJGR0865 CONF

WLD BE GOOD COMBINATION.THERE WAS TIME TO WORK THIS OUT HOWFVER IF
VISIT WERE TO TAKE PLACE AT END OF DEC.AS FINAL POINT ARPATOV
MENTIONED THAT YAKOLEV(FORMER SOVIET AMP IN CDA FOR PAST TEN YRS)
WAS FEELING BETTER AND BETTER IN HIS NEW JOB AT IMEMO AND HE WAS
QUOTE ON THE RISE UNQUOTE.IT WAS A GREAT LOSS FOR CDN/SOVIET RELNS
TO LOSE A GOOD AMB LIKE HIM.

14.AREATCV WILL RETURN TO MOSCO 22NOV.

CCC/002 211105Z WJGR0865

MF
27

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM ROME WTGR0432 21NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO VATCN LDN BONN WSHDC HAGUE BRU MOSCO PARIS INATO

NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS IMF UGE IFB IDD IDR IDA RGB RCD RSR RDS RCR RBR

REF OURTEL WTGR0419 11NOV

---ITALYS FOREIGN POLICY AND PMS INITIATIVE

SUMMARY: ITALIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HELD A SPECIAL MTG ON 10NOV
TO IRON OUT GROWING FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCES WHICH HAVE BEEN
EMERGING OF LATE AMONG MEMBERS OF COALITION AND THUS SMOOTH WAY
FOR INF DEBATE THAT TOOK PLACE IN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 14-16NOV.

MINISTERS BROADLY AGREED TO LEND FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS IN FUTURE
A GREATER AND MORE EVIDENT DEGREE OF QUOTE COLLEGIALITY UNQUOTE.
GOVT SUBSEQUENTLY HANDSOMELY WON VOTE BY WHICH PARLIAMENT CONFIRMED
ITS DECISION OF 1979 ON DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES IN SICILY.
IN HIS INTERVENTIONS IN PARLIAMENT, PRESIDENT CRAXI PAID HEED TO PMS
INITIATIVE AND REFERRED IN POSITIVE TERMS TO SEVERAL OF IDEAS
WHICH MR TRUDEAU ADVANCED DURING HIS CONVERSATIONS IN ROME AND IN
HIS SPEECH IN MONTL.

2.REPORT: IN OUR ACCOUNT OF PMS VISIT TO ROME, WE DREW
CONCLUSION THAT APPARENT DETACHMENT AND PASSIVITY WITH WHICH CRAXI
HAD RECEIVED TRUDEAU AND RESPONDED TO HIS COMPREHENSIVE AND

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PAGE TWO WTGR0432 CONF

U.S. NA

CHALLENGING PRESENTATION WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO TWO MAIN FACTORS: A) GROWING DIVERGENCIES ON DIRECTION AND CONDUCT OF ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY WHICH WERE MANIFESTING THEMSELVES AMONG LEADING MEMBERS OF GOVT; B) IMPENDING PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON INF WHICH WAS BOUND TO BE SET IN BROADER CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND DISARMAMENT. BOTH OF THESE FACTORS HAVE NOW BEEN ELUCIDATED IN A WAY WHICH REFLECTS MOST FAVORABLY ON ATTITUDE OF ITALIAN GOVT TOWARDS PMS INITIATIVE.

3. LITTLE IS KNOWN DIRECTLY AND PRECISELY OF DELIBERATIONS OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF 10 NOV DEVOTED TO REVIEW OF ITALY'S FOREIGN POLICY. MINISTERS PRESUMABLY SPENT RELATIVELY LITTLE TIME TAKING NOTE OF ESSENTIAL CONVERGENCES AMONG THEM ON LOYALTY OF ITALY TO ATLANTIC ALLIANCE; ITS ADHERENCE TO PRECEPTS OF COLLECTIVE WESTERN SECURITY; ITS UNDYING FRIENDSHIP FOR USA; ITS DEDICATION TO EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION; ITS CONSTANT CULTIVATION OF A PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIP WITH MIDEAST; ITS MAINTENANCE OF DIALOGUE AND OF MUTUALLY PROFITABLE EXCHANGES WITH USSR AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES; ITS ATTACHMENT TO CODE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ETC. CONTROVERSY AMONG MINISTERS LAY RATHER IN RESPECT OF PROCESSES GOVERNING ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIORITIES AND MAINTENANCE OF BALANCE, DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION IN FIELD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SOME OF THEM, LED AT THIS JUNCTURE BY MINISTER OF DEFENCE SPADOLINI, GIVING PRIDE OF PLACE TO TRADITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL CONFORMITY WITH USA

...3

PAGE THREE WTGR0432 CONF

INNATL ORIENTATIONS, WHILE OTHERS, INSPIRED BY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANDREOTTI, SEEKING TO MAKE MOST OF EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO RECONCILE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE EAST-WEST POSITIONS AND INTERESTS, AND KEEP DIALOGUE OPEN BETWEEN TWO SIDES.

4. THIS DICHOTOMY IS BUT A REFLECTION OF BASIC DIFFERENCES IN PERSONAL TEMPERAMENT AND IN POLITICAL AND CULTURAL VALUES: IT EXISTS IN VARYING DEGREE IN EVERY PLURALISTIC SOCIETY OF WEST. BUT IT IS MORE EXPLOSIVE IN AN IMPETUOUS AND IMPERATE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRY, SUCH AS ITALY, THAN IN MORE PRAGMATIC AND CONCILIATORY LANDS OF NORTH. THIS IS NOTABLY SO AT PRESENT TIME WHEN ITALIAN GOVT CONSISTS OF A COALITION OF FIVE PARTIES WHOSE POLITICAL SPECTRUM RANGES FROM CENTER RIGHT TO CENTER LEFT; IS LED FOR FIRST TIME BY A SOCIALIST PM, CRAXI, WHO COMMANDS LITTLE MORE THAN 11 PERCENT IN PARLIAMENT STRENGTH; INCLUDES IN ADDITION THREE FORMER PRESIDENTS OF COUNCIL, TWO OF THEM CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS: FORLANI, DEPUTY PM AND ANDREOTTI, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND ONE REPUBLICAN, SPADOLINI, MINISTER OF DEFENCE--ALL OF WHOM HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ONE ASPECT OR ANOTHER OF ITALY'S FOREIGN POLICY. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, ONLY PRACTICAL CONCLUSION THAT MINISTERS COULD REACH ON 10 NOV TOOK IN FACT FORM OF AN EXHORTATION TO SUBJECT FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS FOR WHICH THEY WERE RESPECTIVELY RESPONSIBLE TO GREATER COORDINATION, CONCERTATION AND AGREEMENT BEFORE BEING ANNOUNCED AND CARRIED OUT. WHILE THIS SELF-INJUNCTION

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PAGE FOUR WTGR0432 CONF

SERVED PURPOSES OF GOVT WELL IN INF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE EARLY FOLLOWING WEEK, INCIDENTS THAT HAD SOWN DISSENTIONS WITHIN GOVT-- NOTABLY PARTICIPATION OF ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN RED SQUARE PARADE IN MOSCO ON 07NOV, NEGATIVE ITALIAN VOTE IN UNGA ON GRENATA, SUDDEN VISIT OF ANDREOTTI TO DAMASCUS TO DISCUSS WITH SYRIA ITALIAN ROLE IN LEBANON--ARE BOUND TO REPEAT THEMSELVES AND CONTINUE TO FESTER IN FUTURE.

5. ITALIAN GOVT HAD CONSISTENTLY STATED IN PAST THAT A RENEWED DEBATE ON INF IN PARLIAMENT, IN VIEW OF ITS DECISION OF 1979, WAS NOT/NOT NECESSARY. HOWEVER, GOVT WAS FORCED INTO CALLING ONE FOLLOWING SUBMISSION BY PCI IN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES OF TWO MOTIONS, ONE PROPOSING A POSTPONEMENT OF AT LEAST ONE YEAR IN DEPLOYMENT OF EUPOMISSILES AND OTHER ONE SUGGESTING THAT ALL MEMBERS OF NATO AND WSAW PACT BE ASSOCIATED WITH GENEV NEGOTIATIONS. IN ORDER TO PREEMPT THESE TWO COMMUNIST RESLNS, GOVT HAD NO/NO CHOICE BUT TO SUBMIT ITS OWN MOTION CONFIRMING PARLIAMENTARY DECISION OF 1979 AND TAKE INITIATIVE OF SETTING STAGE FOR A FULL-FLEDGED PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE.

6. DISCUSSION ITSELF PRESENTED NO/NO GREAT NOVELTIES OR SURPRISES. IT WAS LARGELY DOMINATED BY STATEMENTS OF SPOKESMEN FROM GOVT SUPPORTERS AND FROM PCI. IN HIS OPENING DECLARATION, CRAXI REVIEWED AT LENGTH AND IN FAMILIAR TERMS, HISTORY AND JUSTIFICATION OF NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION, OF CONDUCT OF GENEV NEGOTIATIONS, AND OF

...5

PAGE FIVE WTGR0432 CONF

PREPARATIONS FOR TIMELY AND GRADUAL DEPLOYMENT. HE RECALLED VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE FROM TIME TO TIME IN LATERAL ATTEMPTS TO UNBLOCK NEGOTIATIONS; EG BY GREECE, FOR A SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT TO FACILITATE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION; BY FINLAND, FOR UNIFICATION OF START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS; BY ROUMANIA, FOR ASSOCIATION TO GENEV NEGOTIATIONS OF MEMBERS OF NATO AND WSAW PACT; BY THE NETHERLANDS, FOR REVIVAL OF QUOTE WALK IN THE WOODS UNQUOTE PROPOSAL AS BASIS OF A REINVIGORATED NEGOTIATION. WELL-MEANING AND INTERESTING AS THESE PROPOSALS IN THEMSELVES MAY BE, THEY COULD NOT/NOT, IN OPINION OF ITALIAN GOVT REALLY CONTRIBUTE TO ADVANCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL USSR HAD DROPPED ITS TWO RIGID PRECONDITIONS CONCERNING CALCULATION OF FRENCH AND BRIT MISSILES AND EXCLUSION OF EVEN ONE SINGLE USA MISSILE ON EUROPEAN SOIL. IN CIRCUMSTANCES ITALY HAD FIRMLY ADHERED TO NATO TWO-TRACT DECISION AND WAS PREPARING ITSELF TO RECEIVE ITS AGREED ALLOTMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES IN COMISO OVER A PERIOD THAT WOULD EXTEND FROM 1984 TO 1988.

7. MAIN ADVOCATE OF PCI DURING FIRST TWO DAYS OF DEBATE WAS INGRAO WHO DEFENDED COMMUNIST MOTIONS IN ORTHODOX AND PREDICTABLE SEMANTICS. ON THIRD DAY, HOWEVER, BERLINGUER CAME FORWARD WITH A LAST MINUTE PROPOSITION WHICH HAD ALL APPEARANCES OF A GENUINE COMPROMISE. HE SUGGESTED THAT USA MISSILES TO BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE SHOULD NOT/NOT BE MADE OPERATIONAL UNTIL ALL PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR ...6

PAGE SIX WTGR0432 CONF

THEIR TRANSPORTATION, IMPLACEMENT AND INSTALLATION HAD BEEN COMPLETED. DURING THAT TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, USSR SHOULD GRADUALLY REDUCE AND DISMANTLE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF SS20S. BY IMPLICATION, BERLINGUERS PROPOSAL ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF A NECESSARY BALANCE BETWEEN NATO AND SOVIET INFOS, AND COULD NOT/NOT THEREFORE BE DISMISSED OUT OF HAND. IN HIS CLOSING REMARKS, CRAXI ACKNOWLEDGED INTEREST OF BERLINGUERS SUGGESTION; POINTED OUT THAT IN CASE OF ITALY, DEPLOYMENT WOULD NOT/NOT IN FACT BE COMPLETED FOR SOME MONTHS AND EVEN YEARS; UNDERTOOK TO DISCUSS IDEA WITH ITALYS ALLIES AND TO TRY TO ASCERTAIN ATTITUDE TOWARDS IT OF USSR. IN BRIEF, HE WELCOMED IT AS A QUOTE RECOMMENDATION UNQUOTE TO BE EXAMINED FURTHER IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS.

S. GOVT MOTION WAS FINALLY ADOPTED ON 16 NOV BY A VOTE OF 351 IN FAVOUR, 219 AGAINST AND ONE ABSTENTION. IT RECEIVED COMPACT SUPPORT OF MEMBERS OF FIVE PARTY COALITION AS WELL AS OF NEO-FASCIST MSI. 9. LOOKING BEYOND INITIATION OF EUROMISSILE DEPLOYMENT PHASE, CRAXI REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO PROPOSALS WHICH PM HAD PUT FORWARD DURING HIS VISIT TO ROME AND WHICH HE INTENDED TO SUBMIT TO FORTHCOMING MTG OF NAC IN DEC. HE RECALLED IN PARTICULAR THAT TRUDFAU HAD ENVISAGED INSTITUTION DURING FORTHCOMING YEAR OF A FORUM IN WHICH FIVE DECLARED NUCLEAR POWERS COULD CARRY OUT NEGOTIATIONS ON GLOBAL LIMITS TO ARMAMENTS. THAT QUESTION, HE SAID, COULD NOT/NOT BE IGNORED OR PUT ASIDE INDEFINITELY, AS IF IT DID ...7

PAGE SEVEN WTGR0432 CONF

NCT/NOT EXIST. IN SAME CONTEXT, CRAXI UNDERLINED DESIRABILITY OF GIVING FULL SUPPORT TO START NEGOTIATIONS AND TO THE QUOTE BUILT DOWN UNQUOTE PRINCIPLE, TO WHICH RECENT MONTELELLO DECLARATION HAD LENT EXEMPLARY CREDIBILITY. CRAXI ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE HAD AGREED WITH TRUDEAU IN ROME ON TIMELINESS AND USEFULNESS OF GIVING RENEWED POLITICAL IMPULSE TO VIENNA MBFR NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF NATO AND WSAW PACT. IN SAME SPIRIT, HE UNDERLINED THAT EDC CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM WOULD OFFER SIMILAR POSSIBILITIES OF POLITICAL ACTION. HE WARNED AGAINST DANGERS OF HORIZONTAL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. HE CONCLUDED BY ASSERTING THAT QUOTE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ITS INFLUENCE AND OF ITS CONCRETE AND EFFECTIVE POSSIBILITIES OF INITIATIVE, THE ITALIAN GOVT ACTS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO ACT, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO OVERRIDE SITUATIONS OF CRISIS, TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS OF CONFLICTS AND TO REDUCE CONFRONTATION AND TENSION. ALONG WITH THE SECURITY MEASURES WHICH GUARANTEE IT, PEACE MUST BE CONSOLIDATED THROUGH THE ORGANIZATION OF A DIFFERENT STARTHALFQUOTE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP ENDFHALFQUOTE AND A MORE INTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND OF COOPERATION IN GENERAL. UNTIL THE EMERGENCE OF DIFFICULTIES OF RECENT YEARS, ITALIAN POSITION TOWARDS THE EAST AND TOWARDS USSR IN PARTICULAR HAD ALWAYS BEEN A VERY FRIENDLY AND EVEN A PRIVILEGED ONE UNQUOTE.

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PAGE EIGHT WTGR0432 CONFD

10. IN OUR REPORT UNDER REFERENCE, WE ANTICIPATED THAT REAL ITALIAN ANSWER TO PMS PRESENTATION IN ROME WOULD BE GIVEN DURING SPECIAL MTG OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF 12 NOV AND PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON INF FOLLOWING WEEK. OUTCOME OF THESE TWO EVENTS SEEMS TO HAVE JUSTIFIED OUR ANALYSIS AND EXPECTATION

HARDY

CCC/191 220750Z WTGR0432

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT CPD0181 21NOV83

TO CHOGDELHI DELIVER BY 220800

INFO PMDELHAKA DELIVER BY 220800

DISTR DMF RBD IMD IMC PSR (IDDZ CCB

REF PMDELHAKATEL PMDL037 20NOV

---PMS PUBLIC REMARKS IN RESPONSE TO MRS GANDHI AT OPENING OF CHOG
23NOV

FOLLOWING IS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TEXT OF NOTES FOR PMS REMARKS IN
RESPONSE TO MRS GANDHI AT OPENING OF CHOGM 23NOV. FRENCH TEXT WILL
FOLLOW TOMORROW.

QUOTE:NOTES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

NEW DELHI

MADAME CHAIRMAN.ETC

THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND WORDS OF WELCOME. THIS IS THE FIRST OCCASION
ON WHICH THE LEADERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH HAVE GATHERED IN INDIA.
FOR MY PART, A RETURN TO INDIA IS ALWAYS A KIND OF PILGRIMAGE. IT IS
OVER 30 YEARS SINCE AS A YOUNG MAN I RESTED MY PACK IN THE DUST OF
A DELHI STREET. NOW-LIKE YOU-MY BURDENS ARE HEAVIER: I AM GRATEFUL FOR
THE SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF OLD FRIENDS. I AM INVIGORATED BY
THE FELLOWSHIP OF OUR COMMONWEALTH FAMILY.

TOGETHER WE ARE 46 NATIONS AND A QUARTER OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION.
THAT IS WHAT MAKES OUR BIENNIAL GATHERINGS TRULY A MEETING PLACE FOR

...2

PAGE TWO CPD0181 RESTR

MANKIND. AS MUCH AS ANY FORUM, THIS IS THE QUOTE AGORA UNQUOTE OF NORTH AND SOUTH--WHERE WE CAN TALK HONESTLY, RESPECTING OUR DIFFERENCES AND BUILDING ON OUR QUOTE COMMUNIS SENSUS UNQUOTE AS MEMBERS OF A GLOBAL SOCIETY.

THIS YEAR WE WELCOME ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, MALDIVES, AND ST CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS AS NEW MEMBERS OF OUR COMMUNITY. WE ARE ALL THE RICHER FOR THEIR PRESENCE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO THEIR FRIENDSHIP AND THEIR COUNSEL.

THERE IS A SPECIAL PERSPECTIVE THE COMMONWEALTH BRINGS TO GLOBAL ISSUES. IT IS THE UNIQUE VISION OF A COMMUNITY WHOSE VALUES AND TRADITIONS WE CONSTANTLY AFFIRM AND RENEW. THE MAGIC OF THE COMMONWEALTH LIES NOT IN OUR PARTICULAR INSTITUTIONS BUT IN OUR ATTITUDES.

THE WORLD NEEDS OUR GENEROSITY OF SPIRIT, OUR SENSE OF COMMON PURPOSE. LAST SEPTEMBER IN NEW YORK, MADAME CHAIRMAN, YOU MADE A BEGINNING. YOU BROUGHT OUR COMMONWEALTH INFORMALITY AND STRAIGHT TALK INTO THE TROUBLED ATMOSPHERE OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

OVER THE PAST YEAR, YOU HAVE LED THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WITH MODERATION AND REALISM, AND A READINESS TO TAKE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION. THESE QUALITIES WILL SERVE US ALL WELL AS INDIA TAKES HER PLACE IN JANUARY ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

WE WISH YOU WELL. FOR WE ARE UNITED IN OUR BELIEF THAT GLOBAL SECURITY IS A COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY. TODAY, THE MENACING PROSPECT

...3

PAGE THREE CPD0181 RESTR

OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION THREATENS ALL NATIONS.YET HOW ARE WE--
WHO DO NOT SPEAK FOR SUPERPOWERS--TO RESPOND?LIKE HARDYS TESS
WE FEEL OURSELVES IMPELLED ALONG A DANGEROUS PATH THAT IS NOT
OF OUR CHOOSING.

IF WE ARE TO SET OURSELVES ON THE RIGHT COURSE,IF WE ARE TO ALTFP
THIS CLIMATE OF HOSTILITY,OUR STARTING POINT MUST BE COMMUNICATION.
WITHOUT COMMUNICATION THERE CAN BE NO UNDERSTANDING,NO MEANINGFUL
NEGOTIATION,NO LASTING SECURITY FOR OUR PEOPLES.

AS LEADERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH,WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY--AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY--TO ENCOURAGE POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

WE CAN TRY TO CHANGE THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE OF SUSPICION AND
CONFRONTATION IN WORLD AFFAIRS.WE CAN PROCLAIM THE LEGITIMATE
STAKE OF ALL NATIONS IN GLOEAL SECURITY.WE CAN COUNSEL
MODERATION AND COMPASSION.WE CAN WORK TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

WE SHOULD NOT BE UNREALISTIC.THERE IS A LIMIT TO WHAT WE CAN
ACHIEVE HERE IN NEW DELHI.WHAT WE CAN DO IS BEGIN TO ALTER THE
TREND LINE OF MOUNTING UNCERTAINTY AND ACCUMULATING DANGERS.IT
IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I APPROACH OUR MEETING THIS WEEK.I LOOK
FORWARD TO OUR DISCUSSIONS.

UNQUOTE

CCC/217 220156Z CPD0181

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PMDELDHAKA PMDL0040 21NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ DELIVER BY 210900

INFO CHOGMDELHI/SHENSTONE

DISTR DMF IDA MRCP URR

---PM INITIATIVE:ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENCE INFO

PM HAS ASKED TO HAVE AVAILABLE IN ADVANCE OF HIS CHOGM

INTERVENTION ON WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY ITEM(NOV23)

FOLLOWING INFO:(A)GROSS STATS ON WORLD ARMS TRADE BROKEN

OUT INTO(I)TOTAL COST OF ALL ARMS PRODUCED EACH YEAR

WHETHER FOR NATIONAL USE OR FOR TRADE, (II) VALUE OF ARMS

TRADED-PARTICULARLY TRADED TO,OR ACQUIRED BY,THIRD WORLD

(III) VALUE PER ANNUM OF NUCLEAR ARMS PRODUCED AS OPPOSED

CONVENTIONAL ARMS. (IV) ANY INFO YOU CAN EASILY PROVIDE ON RATE

OF GROWTH OF ARMS TRADE (AGAIN PARTICULARLY TO THIRD WORLD), SAY.

OVER PAST 10 TO 20 YEARS. (B) OUR MOST ACCURATE RULE OF THUMB

STATISTIC ON NUMBER OF CONVENTIONAL WARS SINCE WWII (WE SEEM TO

VARIOUSLY QUOTE BETWEEN ONE HUNDRED AND TWO HUNDRED. THE

NOV13 MONTREAL SPEECH USED, I BELIEVE, 120 OR 130. IS THIS THE

INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED AND ACCURATE FIGURE? (C) LIST BY YEAR AND

TITLE (PROVIDING SUCH VERY BRIEF EXPLANATORY INFO AS NECESSARY-

PARTICULARLY REGARDING ACCEPTANCE, NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES OR

RATIFICATION) OF PRINCIPAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS SINCE WWII

(COMMENT: WHILE PM IS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO HAVE AT HIS FINGER-

TIPS DATA RELATING TO QUOTE THAT PARTICULARLY FERTILE DECADE

BETWEEN 1962 AND 1972 UNQUOTE, A FULLER LIST, WITH EMPHASIS ON

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SUPER POWERS, WOULD BE USEFUL).

CCC/090 210720Z PMDL0040

*Mr. Caron
Understand you
are following up
hid*

CDN EYES ONLY RESERVE AUX CDNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELHAKA PMDL039 20NOV83

TO EXTOTT PSR

INFO LDN LAGOS WLGTH CNRRA DSLA LSAKA DELHI SPORE

DISTR LDLZ IF RPD ETD CPD IMC IFF DMF IMD FPR

REF OURTEL PMDL038

---PM VISIT TO BDESH:LUNCH WITH ERSHAD AND KAUNDA

IN ADDITION TO PEACE INITIATIVE REPTED IN REFTEL,FOLLOWING
SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED DURING TRUDEAU/ERSHAD PRE-LUNCHEON MTG
AND TRUDEAU/ERSHAD/KAUNDA LUNCHEON.

2.PAKISTAN AND CMWLTH:WHILE THREE LEADERS SUPPORT CONCEPT OF
PAKISTAN REENTRY IT WAS DECIDD THAT TIME WAS NOT/NOT RIHT FR
SPECIFIC INITIATIVE AT DELHI.BDESH FOREIGN MINISTER DOHA POINTED
OUT THAT HE HAD RAISED ISSUE WITH INDIANS AND HAD BEEN TOLD THAT
NTHING COULD BE ACHIEVED CONCERNING REENTRY AT CHOGM.

3.OTHER ISSUES COVERED DURING LUNCHEO INCLUDED GENERAL
DISCUSSION OF MIDEAST AND BDESH EXPECTATIONS RE FORTHCOMING
ORGANIZATION OF ISLMIC COERECE FMS MTG.NEITHER DISCUSSION
COVERED ANY SIGNIFICANT NEW GROUND.ERSHAD TALKED ABOUT HIS PLANS
FOR THREE TIERS OF ELECTIONS BY NOV84.THERE WAS INTERESTING
DISCUSSION ON PROBLEMS DEVELOPING IN BDESH BECAUSE OF FUNDAMENT-
ALIST MUSLIM ACTIVITIES ENCOURAGED BY LIBYA AND IRAN.FM DOHA
INDICATEI THAT EDESH GOVT WAS ANXIOUS TO AVOID SITUATION WHEREBY
COFESION OF BDESH SOCIETY WOULD BE DAMAGED BY ISLAMIC FUNDAMENT-
ALISTS.

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PAGE TWO PMDL039 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

4. PRIOR TO LUNCHEON ERSHAD DESCRIBED SOME OF HIS DOMSTIC DEVELOPMENTAL OBJECTIVES AND EXPLAINED BDESH GOVT PROGRAM FOR MONITORING SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC AND SOCA TRENDS SO THAT REMEDIAL ACTION COULD BE TAKEN IF PROBLEMS DEVELOPED.

5. DURING AFTERNOON M ATTENDED COLOURFUL CEREMONY AT BANGLADESH RAILWAYS DIESEL WORKSHOP. VISIT CONTINUES WITH STATE DINNER TONIGHT AND STRUCTURED CDA/BDESH DISCUSSIONS TOMORROW.

CCC/090 202305Z PMDL0039

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELDHAKA PMDL038 20NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 210900

INFO CHOGMDELHI DELIVER BY 210900

LDN LAGOS WLGTN CNBRA DSLAM LSAKA DELHI SPORE MOSCO/ARCHDEACON

PEKIN/PEARSON/SMITH PMOOTT/PRESS OFFICE

DISTR PSR IFB RPD ETD CPD IMC IFF DMF IMD FPR

---PM VISIT TO BDESH:DISCUSSION OF PEACE INITIATIVE

PM TRUDEAU ATTENDED LUNCHEON TODAY GIVEN BY CMLA ERSHAD AND ALSO
ATTENDED BY PRES KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA.ALSO AT LUNCHEON WERE BDESH AND
ZAMBIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AND USSEA.

2.DURING COURSE OF LUNCHEON PM DISCUSSED HIS PEACE INITIATIVE IN
GENERAL TERMS.HE REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER STATEMENTS RE INITIATIVE
AND SOUGHT VIEWS FROM ERSHAD AND KAUNDA AS TO HOW ISSUE MIGHT
DEVELOP AT DELHI CHOGM.BOTH LEADERS EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR INITIATIVE.
PM DID NOT/NOT GO INTO DETAIL ON TEXT OF POSSIBLE CHOGM DECLARATION
BUT DID DISCUSS HIS CONCERNS RE VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION.PM INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE FOLLOWING UP HIS
DISCUSSIONS WITH ERSHAD AND KAUNDA ON PEACE INITIATIVE AT CHOGM BUT
DID NOT/NOT DISCUSS IN ANY DETAIL HOW HE WOULD PROCEED.

3.SUBSEQUENT TO MTG.USSEA GAVE BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO PRESS IN
WHICH HE INDICATED SUBJECT OF PEACE INITIATIVE HAD ARISEN AND THAT
DOHA AND ERSHAD APPEARED TO SUPPORT CONCEPT.PRESS REPS WERE QUICK
TO TAKE UP SUBJECT AND ASKED A NUMBER OF PRObing QUESTIONS AS TO
INTENTIONS OF PM AT CHOGM.WHILE USSEA AVOIDED GIVING ANY PRECISE

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MOITDA
RENNOD A ETIUS
SUITE A DONNER

PAGE TWO PMDL038 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

INFO ON POSSIBLE CDN TACTICS, NUMBER OF MEDIA REPS ASKED WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE A DECLARATION FROM CHOGM ON PEACE INITIATIVE. WHEN ASKED IF THATCHER AND GANDHI WOULD PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN CONSIDERATION OF PEACE INITIATIVE CONCEPT AT CHOGM, USSEA SAID THAT OBVIOUSLY THESE TWO WOULD BE MAJOR PLAYERS IF THERE WERE TO BE ANY CONSIDERATION OF SUBJECT. IN ANSWER TO DIRECT QUESTION, HE SAID THAT CDA WAS NOT/NOT YET READY TO LOBBY FOR PEACE INITIATIVE AT CHOGM.

4. OVERALL IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PM ACHIEVED USEFUL IF SOMEWHAT IMPRECISE PACKING FROM ERSHAD AND KAUNDA FOR PEACE INITIATIVE CONCEPT. ALTHOUGH MEDIA APPEARED TO BE ZEROING IN ON CONCEPT OF A CDN INITIATIVE, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE TO DOWNPLAY THIS INTERPRETATION. AS SUBJECT DEVELOPS, WE WOULD HOPE THAT SUPPORT OF OTHER LEADERS WOULD CONVEY IMAGE OF MORE GENERAL RANGE OF SUPPORT.

CCC/090 202330Z PMDL0038

R F S T R I C T E D

PM PMDEDHAKA PMDL037 20NOV83

TO EXTOTT DMF DELIVER BY 210800

INFO CHOGDELHI/SHENSTONE PMOOTT/MOORE

DISTR CPD RBD MC PSR UDDZ

---PMS PUBLIC REMARKS IN RESPONSE TO MRS GANDHI AT OPENING OF
CHOG 23NOV

PM HAD FIRST OPPORTUNITY OF LOOKING AT DRAFT REMARKS DURING
TOKYO/DHAKA FLIGHT. HERE REPORTS HE DID NOT/NOT FIND TEXT INSPIRING-
HE LIKED END MUCH BETTER THAN BEGINNING BUT NEVERTHELESS SAID
NOTE ITS A PITY THAT SAME ATTENTION HAD NOT/NOT BEEN APPLIED TO
PREPARATION THESE REMARKS AS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO MUCH LONGER GUELPH
AND MONTREAL SPEECHES. HE THOUGHT THAT HE, OF COURSE, COULD AD LIB
SUCH A FIVE MINUTE STATEMENT IF HE HAD NO/NO OTHER CHOICE BUT
NOTED NINETY MINUTES WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT ASIDE WED MORNING TO
ALLOW HIM TO COLLECT HIS THOUGHTS-TIME WHEN HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED
TO HAVE BEEN PREPARING FOR HIS IN CAMERA INTERVIEW ON PEACE AND
SECURITY. WHILE PM WAS NOT/NOT SPECIFIC REGARDING LACUNAE OF CURRENT
DRAFT, HE SEEMED TO REGRET ITS GENERAL LACK OF HIGH TONE AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE WHICH, HE AGAIN REMINDED US HE HAD BEEN SO PLEASED TO
FIND PRESENT IN HIS TWO CDN SPEECHES.

2. REGRET WE DO NOT/NOT HAVE TIME OR INDEED CAPACITY IN PMDELHAKA
TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS. IF ANYONE ELSE DOES, COMMENTS MIGHT
BE FORWARDED TO CHOGMDELHI. IF SO, PLEASE BEAR IN MIND NEED FOR
TRANSLATION.

CCC/090 201345Z PMDL0037

Mr. McMeey
Mr. Cylone
This is being taken care
of by Waneff & Mitchell
W.D.

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

Sam Tong of
Feb 1 PD
This is the
authored

PSR	
1	
2	
3	<i>PDR</i>
4	
5	
6	

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELHAKA PMDL038 20NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 210900

INFO CHOGMDELHI DELIVER BY 210900

LDN LAGOS WLGTH CNBRA DSLAM LSACA DELHI SPORE MOSCO/ARCHDEACON

PEKIN/PEARSON/SMITH PMOOTT/PRESS OFFICE

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INTENTIONS OF PM AT CHOGM.WHILE USSEA AVOIDED GIVING ANY PRECISE

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DATE	
28-6-1-TRUDEAU	
PEACE MISSION	

PAGE TWO PMDL038 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

INFO ON POSSIBLE CDN TACTICS, NUMBER OF MEDIA REPS ASKED WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE A DECLARATION FROM CHOGM ON PEACE INITIATIVE. WHEN ASKED IF THATCHER AND GANDHI WOULD PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN CONSIDERATION OF PEACE INITIATIVE CONCEPT AT CHOGM, USSEA SAID THAT OBVIOUSLY THESE TWO WOULD BE MAJOR PLAYERS IF THERE WERE TO BE ANY CONSIDERATION OF SUBJECT. IN ANSWER TO DIRECT QUESTION, HE SAID THAT CDA WAS NOT/NOT YET READY TO LOBBY FOR PEACE INITIATIVE AT CHOGM.

4. OVERALL IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PM ACHIEVED USEFUL IF SOMEWHAT IMPRECISE PACKING FROM ERSHAD AND KAUNDA FOR PEACE INITIATIVE CONCEPT. ALTHOUGH MEDIA APPEARED TO BE ZEROING IN ON CONCEPT OF A CDN INITIATIVE, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE TO DOWNPLAY THIS INTERPRETATION. AS SUBJECT DEVELOPS, WE WOULD HOPE THAT SUPPORT OF OTHER LEADERS WOULD CONVEY IMAGE OF MORE GENERAL RANGE OF SUPPORT.

CCC/090 202330Z PMDL0038

MF
20

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMDELHAKA PMDL036 20NOV83

TO TOKYO MOSCO/ARCHDEACON PEKIN/PEARSON/SMITH PMOOTT/HUDON

INFC EXTOTT LIDDZ CHOGMDELHI WSHDC/GOSSAGE

DISTR FPR

FROM COLEMAN

---PMS INITIATIVE

WE CONFIRMED TO PRESS TODAY THAT PM MET WITH GEORGI ARPATOV AT
OKURA HOTEL 19NOV FOR HALF HOUR TO DISCUSS THE INITIATIVE. WE HAVE
ALSO CONFIRMED STORY LEAKED IN CDA THAT GEOFFREY PEARSON IS EMISSARY
FOR PM AND CURRENTLY VISITING PEKIN AND MOSCO TO DISCUSS THE
INITIATIVE.

UUU/090 201204Z PMDL0036

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
12

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELDHAKA PMDL034 20NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 210800

INFO WASHDC LDN PEKING/PEARSON/SMITH PCOOTT/CARON CHOGMDELHI/
OSPALDESTN/SHENSTONE

DISTR MIN USS DMF IDA IDR UGB URR

---PMS INITIATIVE:TELECON WITH PRES REAGAN 17NOV

BACKGROUND:ON NOV15 AND FOLLOWING DPM/SSEA CONVERSATION WITH KEN
DAM AT WHICH POSSIBILITY OF TELECON WITH PRESIDENT WAS RAISED,PM
DECIDED HE WOULD TRY TO TALK TO REAGAN PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FOR
JAPAN,CHOGM DELHI AND GULF IN ORDER TO SPEAK OF LAST WEEKS
CONSULTATIONS IN EUROPE,HIS SUGGESTION REGARDING HIGH LEVEL
REPRESENTATION AT CDE STKHM AND,ABOVE ALL,TO KEEP CPN DIALOGUE.
CONTACT BETWEEN PMO AND PRESIDENTS OFFICE OFFERED SPECIFIC
POSSIBILITIES FOR CALL ON NOV16 AND 17 UP TO 11AM.MINUTES
BEFORE PM WAS TO LEAVE FOR AIRCRAFT PRESIDENT RETURNED CALL.PM
PROVIDED FOLLOWING DEBRIEFING ON AIRCRAFT BETWEEN ALASKA AND TOKYO.
2.REPORT:FOLLOWING EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES,PM INDICATED HE WOULD
BE WRITING TO PRESIDENT TO REPORT ON LAST WEEKS CONSULTATIONS IN
EUROPE(LETTERS WERE IN FACT SIGNED IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO DEPARTURE OF
AIRCRAFT AND,WE UNDERSTAND,TEXT WAS TO BE FORWARDED TO ALL NATC
ADDRESSEES-BOTH IN ENGLISH SIGNED VERSIONS,FURTHER TO FOWLER/
ARCHDEACON TELECON FROM ELMENDORFF,AND IN BURELLE TRANSLATED
UNSIGNED FRENCH VERSIONS-IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER.FRENCH LANGUAGE LETTERS
SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR PMS FORMAL SIGNATURE ON RETURN DEC5).

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MOITDA
RENNOD A ETI02

PAGE TWO PMDL034 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

TRUDEAU NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS AN ISSUE HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WHICH HE WOULD NOT/NOT PUT IN LETTER. THAT WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT HEADS OF STATE AND GOVT MIGHT CONSIDER PARTICIPATING AT EARLY STAGES OF CDE- EITHER AT OPENING OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

3. TRUDEAU SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT TIMING OF OPENING OF CDE MIGHT WELL BE INCONVENIENT FOR REAGAN IN VIEW OF WHAT PM UNDERSTOOD TO BE SCHEDULING DIFFICULTIES RELATING PRINCIPALLY TO STATE OF UNION ADDRESS. THERE WAS ALSO MAJOR UNCERTAINTY OF ANDROPOVS HEALTH. NEVERTHELESS, PM STRESSED THAT HIS INTEREST IN SEEING HEADS OF STATE AND GOVT PARTICIPATE IN CDE WAS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THAT INJECTION OF POLITICAL IMPETUS ABOUT WHICH HE HAD WRITTEN AND SPOKEN PUBLICLY IN CDA AND PRIVATELY LAST WEEK IN EUROPE. WHETHER AT THE OUTSET OR A FEW WEEKS LATER, THE PRESENCE OF LEADERS WOULD ALLOW IMPORTANT FILATERIALS TO TAKE PLACE AS WELL AS INDICATE TO INCREASINGLY CONCERNED POPULATIONS THAT POLITICAL LEADERS WERE INDEED AS COMMITTED TO THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AS THE WILLIAMSBURG DECLARATION ON PEACE AND SECURITY HAD STATED. THE PM TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED SUCH A PROPOSAL ONLY WITH MRS THATCHER WHO HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND RATHER INTRIGUED AND WHO HAD AGREED WITH TRUDEAU THAT IF LEADERS TO PARTICIPATE THERE WOULD BE NEED FOR MUCH PREPARATION. MR TRUDEAU SAID HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR REAGAN'S VIEWS.

4. PRESIDENT HAD CLEARLY BEEN BRIEFED FOLLOWING THE MACEACHEN/DAM MEETING IN OTTAWA NOV 15. REAGAN SAID HE WAS GLAD TRUDEAU APPRECIATED THE DIFFICULTIES FOR USA PRESIDENT INHERENT IN ANY MID-JAN TIMING. HE AGREED SOVIET PRESIDENT'S HEALTH WAS PROBLEMATIC.

...3

PAGE THREE PMDL034 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WOULD QUOTE HAVE MY PEOPLE LOOK AT IT UNQUOTE
AND SEEMED TO CONSIDER A LATER GATHERING OF LEADERS IN STKHM
HAD POSSIBILITIES. WHILE PM EXPECTS REAGAN WILL INDEED GIVE
PROPOSAL SOME THOUGHT, AND THAT THE BALL IS CLEARLY IN REAGAN'S
COURT, HE DOES NOT/NOT EXPECT REAGAN TO REACT IN ADVANCE OF THEIR
MEETING WHICH BOTH AGREED-WITHOUT SPEAKING OF SPECIFIC TIMING-
WOULD BE DESIRABLE AND USEFUL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PMS
INITIATIVE. IN PRESENTING PROPOSAL, TRUDEAU STRESSED SYMBOLIC VALUE
OF SUCH A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING WHICH WOULD NOT/NOT BE AS DRAMATIC AS,
SAY, SADAT'S FAMOUS VOYAGE TO JERUSALEM, BUT WOULD HAVE, IN CURRENT
CIRCUMSTANCES, SOME OF SAME IMPACT. REAGAN AGREED THAT IMPORTANT
SYMBOLIC GESTURE TOWARDS DIALOGUE AND PEACE WOULD BE USEFUL. ON THIS
NOTE THE CONVERSATION ENDED.

CCC/090 200959Z PMDL0034

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

M. J. Carad
Pierre ne parler
Mexico 21-09

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELHAKA PMDL033 20NOV83

TO EXTOTT (DDZ) DELIVER BY 210800

INFO CHOGMDELHI/OSBALDESTON/SHENSTONE PEKIN/PEARSON/SMITH

MOSCO/ARCHDEACON

FROM FOWLER

---PMS INITIATIVE:IVAN HEADS WILSON HOUSE PROPOSALS

ON FLIGHT FROM TOKYO TO DHAKA PM AGAIN ASKED WHETHER WE HAD BEEN
ABLE TO FLESH OUT HEADS PROPOSALS AT WILSON HOUSE WHEREBY FOLLOWING
RETURN FROM MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON TRUDEAU MIGHT INDICATE/ANNOUNCE
A CATALOGUE/LIST OF PRINCIPLES OR UNDERTAKINGS TO WHICH SUPER
POWERS HAD OR MIGHT EVENTUALLY COMMIT THEMSELVES.PURPOSE OF SUCH
AN INITIATIVE WOULD,OF COURSE,BE CONFIDENCE BUILDING,ABOVE ALL,
TO ASSURE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED POPULATIONS THAT VITUPERATIVE
RHETORIC BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON DID NOT/NOT MEAN CONFLICT
WAS INEVITABLETHAT DIALOGUE AND AGREEMENT WERE POSSIBLE,THAT THAT
OLD TREND LINE COULD INDEED BE CHANGED.PM SUGGESTED SUCH A LIST
MIGHT INCLUDE A CALL FOR CONSIDERABLY INCREASED EXCHANGES OF ALL
KINDS AT ALL LEVELS BETWEEN SUPER POWERS AND,MORE BROADLY,BETWEEN
EAST AND WEST(THIS MIGHT EASILY EARN THATCHERS APPROVAL-SEE NOTES
OF NOV11 MEETING AT 10 DOWNING STREET).PM ALSO CONSIDERED
ENCOURAGING EACH SIDE TO MAKE AVAILABLE SIGNIFICANT RADIO AND
TELEVISION TIME TO LEADERS FROM OTHER SIDE TO EXPOSE POPULATIONS
OF BOTH EAST AND WEST TO THINKING ON BROAD RANGE OF SUBJECTS NOT/NOT
JUST ON POLITICAL OR SECURITY ISSUES:IE MORE DIALOGUE,MORE
SHARING OF INFO COULD QUAL MORE UNDERSTANDING.

...2

NOITDA
RENNOD A ETIUS

PAGETWO PMDEL033 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

2. AS YOU ARE AWARE, PM HAS ASKED FOR PROGRESS REPORTS ON THIS FRONT BEFORE. HE IS ANXIOUS THAT THIS PROPOSAL BE GIVEN URGENT PRIORITY AND LOOKS FORWARD TO RECEIVING ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL ON RETURN TO OTTAWA IF NOT/NOT BY TELEX BEFORE.

3. ON QUITE SEPARATE BUT RELATED SUBJECT, GRATEFUL YOU ASK CARON/PCO (TO RETRIEVE FROM ARCHDEACONS SAFE) OR HANCOCK FOR TEXT OF DRAFT SPEECH PREPARED BY IVAN HEAD AND FORWARDED TO PCO A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO AND SEND SAME BY TELEX TO ME IN DELHI ALONG WITH REPEAT OF YOUR ANALYSIS WHICH YOU TELEXED TO EUROPE LAST WEEK.

CCC/090 200930Z PMDL0033



MGTC M. FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Nov 19

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12

8312

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FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0192 19NOV83

TO/À

TO BNATO/TAYLOR DE DELVOIE DELIVER BY 210900

INFO

DISTR

REF YOURTEL YBGR8131 OF NOV18

REF

---PM INITIATIVE:LET TO NATO HEADS OF GOVT.

SUBJ/SUJ

IN RECENT WEEKS PM HAS SEEMED TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO PERSONAL NATURE OF HIS COMMUNICATIONS WITH OTHER LEADERS ON THIS SUBJECT. AM THEREFORE RELUCTANT TO AGREE TO YOUR CIRCULATING TEXT OF LET TO YOUR COLLEAGUES, IN ABSENCE FROM OTT OF BOTH PM AND HIS CLOSEST FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS. AS COMPROMISE, WLD SUGGEST YOU ADVISE YOUR COLLEAGUES ORALLY OF CONTENTS OF LET AS IT RELATES TO MBFR AND CDE, AND TO IDEAS WHICH DPM/SSEA WILL BE PUTTING FORWARD AT NAC MINISTERIAL MTG. REGARDS.

19 NOV 83 21 13Z

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE/cf

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

19 Nov 83 -20 -142¹²

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FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0191 19NOV83

TO/À

TO DELHI DHAKA DELIVER BY 200800

INFO

DISTR

LDN DSLAM LAGOS CNBRA WLGTN DELIVER BY 210800

REF

INFO BNATO PRMNY PCOOTT/CARON WSHDC

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IMD IMD UGB UGR RGP PPR PSR GGB RGB RCR GAA

REF OURTEL IDDZ0190 OF NOV 19 (NOTAL)

---CHOGM:PM INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATL SECURITY.

AS YOU KNOW,PM INITIATIVE IS PRIMARILY GEARED TO POLITICAL ASPECTS
OF CURRENT STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS,WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON
SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP.IN SIMPLEST TERMS,IT INVOLVES ENDEAVOUR TO
REESTABLISH SOME MEASURE OF CONFIDENCE AND HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL
DIALOGUE BETWEEN TWO SIDES,IN VARIETY OF SPHERES INCLUDING ARMS
CONTROL.

2.IN HIS APPROACH,HOWEVER,PM HAS ADDRESSED MORE GLOBAL INTERCONNEC-
TION OF (A) EAST-WEST RELATIONS (B) VERTICAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
ARSENALS OF FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AND (C) RISKS OF HORIZONTAL
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO STATES THAT DO NOT/NOW
POSESS THEM.IN THIS REGARD,HE HAS STRESSED OBLIGATIONS INCUMBENT
ON ALL NATIONS TO COME TO GRIPS WITH DANGEROUS SITUATION CREATED BY
BOTH VERTICAL PROLIFERATION AND THREAT OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION.

3.IT IS THIS GLOBAL INTERCONNECTION WHICH PM INTENDS TO ADDRESS IN
HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVT LEADERS AT CHOGM.HE WILL BE PUTTING

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

L.A.DELVOIE/CF

IDDZ

995-5912

SIG

L.A.DELVOIE



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

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PAGE TWO IDDZ0191 CONFIDENTIAL

FORWARD FOR CONSIDERATION CERTAIN PROPOSALS, INCLUDING DRAFT TEXT OR WORDING FOR POSSIBLE CHOGM DECLARATION, WHICH WOULD BE PROBABLY VERY SHORT (E.G. LESS THAN ONE PAGE) AND WOULD RELATE DIRECTLY TO SOME OF CONCERNS HE HAS DISCUSSED IN HIS CURRENT INITIATIVE.

4 FOR ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES:

PLS CONVEY INFO IN PARAS 2 AND 3 TO MFA OF HOST GOVT WITH REQUEST IT THAT IT BE CONVEYED ASAP TO HEAD OF DEL TO CHOGM. YOU SHLD INDICATE THAT PM PROPOSES TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH HEAD OF HOST COUNTRY DEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN DELHI.

5 FOR DELHI:

PLS ADVISE MFA THAT PM TRUDEAU WISHES TO DISCUSS HIS PROPOSALS AND DRAFT DECLARATION WITH PM GANDHI PRIOR TO SEEKING REACTIONS OF OTHER LEADERS. PLS ALSO ADVISE SEC GEN RAMPHAL OF PM S INTENTIONS AND OF HIS WISH TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH HIM AFTER ARRIVAL DELHI.

6 FOR LDN AND INFO ADDRESSEES:

REFTEL PROVIDED EXTRACTS OF PM S MONTREAL SPEECH OF NOV 13 FOR BACKGROUND INFO OF POSTS WHICH HAD NOT/NOT YET RECEIVED IT.



7 FOR CNBRA AND WLGTN:

INFO IN THIS TEL GIVEN TO AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMS WHEN THEY CALLED ON IDDZ THIS MORNING.

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	19 Nov 83 17 10 Z	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0190 19NOV83		
TO/À	TO DELHI DHAKA <u>DELIVER BY 200800</u>		
INFO			
DISTR	DSLAM SPORE WLG TN CNBRA LAGOS <u>DELIVER BY 210800</u>		
REF	---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATL SECURITY:		
SUBJ/SUJ	CHOGM		
<p>AS BACKGROUND TO INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TEL, WE REPRODUCE BELOW EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH WHICH PM GAVE IN MONTREAL ON NOV 13.</p> <p>(COMCENTRE PLSE COPY EXTRACTS MARKED IN ATTACHED TEXT).</p>			

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  J. McNEE	IDDZ	995-5912	SIG  L.A. DELVOIE

TRANSCRIPT OF REMARKS BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON PEACE AND SECURITY,
MONTREAL, QUEEN ELIZABETH HOTEL, SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1983

(TRANSLATION)

Ladies and gentlemen, mesdames, messieurs, dear colleagues, dear friends,

First of all, let me thank you for your welcome. I must say that, after a trip like the one I have just made, it is good to be back among my own people, and to receive such a warm welcome.

I want to thank Marc Lalonde for having said such friendly things about me, and about the direction which, together, we have tried to give to the party. Marc is a friend, so that partly explains the nice things he said about me. He is also a great minister of Finance, a fact which sometimes requires him, too, to travel to foreign countries. Just a few months ago, he came back from the annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and from the meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers. He came back from the Caribbean. He came back from Washington. But I must say that his speeches were less interesting than the kind he gives when he comes back from Kénogami and Jonquière. If we don't watch out, he's going to become one spell-binding orator.

Well, today the roles are a bit reversed. In recent years, I have often taken advantage of these occasions to talk about Quebec, about Canada -- sometimes a bit boisterously. Today, in contrast, I would like to give you a report on the trip I have made. I would like to speak to you about peace and disarmament, and to share with you some reflections on a world in disarray.

We meet together today as part of the long-standing democratic process in this country -- a process which, as your generous presence shows, is alive and well in Canada. We take pride in the vigour and diversity of our political life, in the bright promise of our future.

If our future depended on Canadians alone, we could be confident that it was safe and sound. But no nation today holds its future securely in its own hands. We share this planet with about 160 other nations, all of whom interact with us in a global system embracing our security, our economy, the health of our environment, and the quality of our lives.

Those 160 governments are, however, by no means the only players. The stage is crowded with alliances, with regional associations, with international institutions such as the United Nations, with multinational corporations, with cartels, pressure groups and lobbies of all kinds.

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QUOTE We are all of us -- you and I, our friends and families, citizens, governments and corporations -- on that crowded global stage, which is alive with our hopes and our fears, our failures and our successes. But there are today three dominant and disturbing trends which, when set side by side, threaten to bring down the curtain on our human performance.

The first trend is an increasing resort to the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. Despite the solemn affirmation of the UN Charter that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force" there have been, since 1945, approximately 130 conflicts in which 35 million human lives have been lost.

There is a habit of aggression which is gaining ground. An abdication of the political process in deference to military solutions. A coarse element of belligerence, of menacing rhetoric, of governments which rise and fall at gun-point. The trend is global -- and it is gathering speed.

R2 This brutalization of political life takes on a particularly dangerous tone when it is driven by the clash of confrontational ideologies, and armed with sophisticated weapons. Weapons claiming an annual expenditure on the order of 600 billion dollars for nuclear and conventional arms combined. Weapons claiming too great a share of the budgets of impoverished Third World nations. Weapons which promote a rising tide of violence and engulf more peaceful ways to resolve disputes. That is the first trend: the brutalization of international relations.

The second trend is the steady unravelling of the international regime designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This proliferation has two fundamental directions. We call it vertical proliferation when we mean the development of ever-larger nuclear weapons programmes, ever more-advanced in destructive technology, by the five nuclear-weapons states: the USA, USSR, France, UK and China. We call it horizontal proliferation when we mean the potential spread of nuclear weapons to other states, especially to those who now have the capacity to produce nuclear arms, or soon will have that capacity.

We are today preoccupied mainly with the evident need to assert restraint over the arsenals of all five nuclear powers. But from a global perspective, and in the near term, the consequences of horizontal proliferation to other states, pose an equally grave threat. Perhaps more grave, since the use of nuclear weapons by other nations would be unchecked by the assurance of mutual destruction which obtains among the five powers.

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- 3 -

It was precisely to arrest both kinds of proliferation that a formal agreement -- the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- came into effect in 1970, and is up for review in 1985. That treaty represented an implicit covenant between those nations with nuclear weapons and those without: an undertaking by the nuclear powers that they would pursue negotiations in good faith on arms control and on limiting the spread of their weapons technology; and an undertaking by other states that they would forego the military use of nuclear energy in return for the benefits of its peaceful use, in fields such as energy, medicine, or agriculture.

But the trend is for this bargain to come unstuck. The treaty stands now at a cross-roads between peaceful aspiration and military strategy. It is the crossroads at which nuclear and non-nuclear countries -- East and West, North and South -- preoccupied with their survival, with their sovereignty, or with current conflicts, will decide whether the covenant still holds.

P4 The third trend which threatens the global system is the worsening state of relations between East and West, particularly of relations between the two superpowers. Two weeks ago, when I spoke in Guelph, I deplored the absence of high politics in East-West relations, and [the tendency for arms control negotiations to run their course outside any structure of understanding of, and respect for, each

other's security needs. I reaffirmed our fidelity to the NATO two-track decision, and declared my hope that we might add a "third rail" of political energy, of dialogue and of confidence, in order to improve the downward course of relations between East and West.

(TEXT)

So I ask you now to consider these three trends in relation to each other -- laminated together, as they are in real life. An increasing resort to the use of force. The growing reality of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And a superpower relationship charged with animosity. I believe it is evident that only a global approach to peace and security can reverse the path of this sinister, composite trend-line.

Because, as tensions build, the East-West relationship becomes particularly vulnerable to events on the periphery. An endemic instability is evident in areas largely understood to be the sphere of influence of one or the other superpower. At other flashpoints, such as the ever-volatile Middle East, we see the tinder for a spreading conflagration.

The penetration of East-West rivalry into the Third World will reach its deepest and most dangerous point if, despite the Non-Proliferation Treaty, front-line antagonists -- locked in rivalry or combat -- begin to arm themselves with nuclear weapons. UNQUOTE

(TRANSLATION)

As Canadians, our energies are deeply devoted to the security of the Western community, on this continent and in Europe. But our loyalties, our national and global interests, by no means end there.

Canada's place on the Pacific Rim gives us a privileged relationship with Japan, with China, and with the Association of South-East Asian Nations and, of course, with Australia and New Zealand. Our extensive programme of development assistance takes us to many parts of the world, remote in distance, but close in partnership. Our standing in the community of francophone nations, and in the Commonwealth, demands that we share the full range of political, economic and security concerns to which our national character gives us access.

That is why, in pursuing an initiative to improve the prospects for peace, I determined from the start that our approach must be global in scope and in perspective. Such an approach is dictated by the complex interlinkage of disarmament and development; of superpower animosity and Third World rivalries; of the resort to force and the availability of weapons; of nuclear balances in Europe and in Asia.

One man representing one country cannot promise a miracle, let alone deliver one. I have absolutely no illusions about the complexity of the issues in play. Nonetheless it is essential, in my judgement, to seek stability at a number of points along the downward trend-line, and to recognize that peace and security in the modern age are indivisible.

Moreover, I am not alone. Other leaders have joined their concerns with mine. There is a growing community of political leadership which is determined to subject the science of arms to the art of politics. I draw encouragement from the support of that community.

You will know that I have just returned from meetings in Europe with several leaders of the Atlantic Alliance, with His Holiness the Pope, and with Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands. I return from Europe with clear expressions of support for my initiative, confident that my sense of urgency is shared by our friends and allies. I found a particular consensus on the need to lay down a third rail of confidence and communication -- a rail charging our dealings with the other side with a current of political energy.

QUOTE I took to my European colleagues for discussion, and for refinement in light of their own views, elements of a programme for political management of the current crisis. I return with the assurance of their personal attention to this programme. Let me set out some of the elements.

- 5 -

The first is the need to establish, as soon as possible in the course of the coming year, a forum in which global limits might be negotiated for all five nuclear-weapons states. This proposal is without prejudice to the INF or START talks between the USA and USSR. But those talks, and rightly so, do not cover British, French or Chinese nuclear forces.

What we must seek to provide is a negotiating forum for those five states which recognizes the rights of the United States and the Soviet Union as strategic equals -- what a recent Trilateral Commission report calls "inevitable parity" between them -- and which provides a mutually acceptable and stable framework for the relationship between the forces of the other three states and those of the superpowers.

In this way neither Britain, nor France, nor China need fear that their forces will be subject to restraints which do not recognize their own national interests.

Pf [Once relative levels of armament were stabilized, I believe the five nuclear powers could begin to address the reductions called for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to consider measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic arms race.

A second element is remedial action to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself -- that covenant between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states which I mentioned a few minutes ago. The Treaty has been signed by some 119 nations. But a number of key states remain aloof, including several with the capacity now, or the potential soon, to develop their own nuclear arms.

If the five nuclear-weapons states could begin to strengthen their side of the non-proliferation bargain, then the rest of us could more easily bring good sense to bear on those who have not yet signed on. No doubt we need to increase the incentives for Third World states to forego nuclear weapons -- there must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development. And we shall also have to ensure that a full range of safeguards adequately governs the transfer, from all nuclear suppliers, of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The area of safeguards is one in which Canada has taken a leading part for many years, and will continue to do so. *UNQUOTE*

~~Those two elements begin to address the global dimension of security in the nuclear age. But we must also recognize that there is in the heart of Europe a most dangerous concentration of forces -- conventional as well as nuclear. A war in Europe could destroy everything that each side desires to protect.~~

~~Throughout my talks with European leaders, there ran a common theme of concern at the present imbalance of conventional forces between the two sides. The Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO. There is an~~

apprehension in Western Europe that the Warsaw Pact forces could be tempted to gamble on a conventionally-armed attack. They would throw down the challenge to Western leaders either of accepting defeat, or of being the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in our own defense.

As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. That is why we say that the nuclear threshold in Europe is too low. And of course we can never be certain that the use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre would not escalate rapidly to ever more-massive nuclear retaliation on an international scale. The conclusion we draw is that the best way to raise the nuclear threshold is to establish a more reasonable balance of the conventional forces on each side.

How then do we achieve this balance? This question prompts the third element of my approach. The simple, though expensive, answer is for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. I see this as a last resort. The far more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels, a task to which we have devoted the past ten years at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. There is today some sign of movement in those talks, but at far too slow a pace. Hard questions remain to be resolved. That is why I explored, with my colleagues in the Alliance, ways to break the deadlock in Vienna, ways to give fresh political impetus to the MBFR talks.

Another negotiating forum will open soon in Stockholm, this January. Its lengthy title, showing the complexity of its task, is the "Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe". It is imperative that this Conference not lose its way in litigation about procedures, or in the linguistics of technicality. In other words, we don't have to follow the same path with this conference, on disarmament in Europe, to which countries attach so much importance, as we have followed with the Vienna negotiations where, as I have said, we have talked for ten years without really arriving at an agreement. I have therefore proposed that we consider the merits of high-level political representation at the very start of the Stockholm negotiations. You see, I come back always to the notion of the third rail, the need to inject political will, and the presence of political people, into these debates. They have become debates among technicians, among weighers of balances, among nuclear accountants. These technical quarrels can harm the process, rather than giving it a real push, a political impetus, which I call the third rail.

Finally, a fourth element in my initiative flows from the strategy of suffocation which I first proposed to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. That strategy -- which still requires, and awaits, the support

-8-

still be able to send missiles back at him. That would assure the destruction of both sides, which is not in the interest of the side which might otherwise be tempted to launch a first strike.

But there is a farther paradox in the fact that, if these missiles are too mobile, you could not count them, even by using satellites. And if you cannot count them, neither side could verify that the other was respecting the treaties, such as SALT I, and other agreements which might be reached.

Canada continues to devote attention, and resources, to problems of verification which must be resolved if arms-control measures are to be durable and trusted. We believe that the prospects for arms control would be considerably enhanced if the verification factor were taken into account in the developmental stage of any new strategic system -- rather than leaving it to the point where systems are put on the bargaining table.

It is therefore my intention to introduce, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate disarmament forum, papers calling for (a) international agreement to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems; (b) to restrict excessive mobility of ICBMs; and (c) to require that future strategic weapon systems be fully verifiable by national technical means. That is to say that the space satellites of each side can see what is being prepared, constructed and developed on the other's territory.

These are measures of substance, often technical in their detail. But if we can generate a political impulse toward a five-power nuclear conference, toward renewed political commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, toward action at the MBFR talks to balance conventional forces and to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, toward a restriction of qualitative developments in strategic technology, and toward their verification, then we would have motivated a truly global and comprehensive approach to the crisis of peace and security.

It is essential, as I told my colleagues in Europe, that this interlocking programme, this safety net for our very survival, be guided by political leadership at the highest level. That our own consultations, and talks with others, be quickened by a jolt of political energy. That we work to identify steadily increasing areas of mutual interest, starting from our common humanity and our common fate on this earth.

(TEXT)

QUOTE I return from Europe profoundly encouraged by the extent to which my purposes are shared by a community of other leaders. Therefore I would like to confirm tonight my intention to travel to Japan, to consult Prime Minister Nakasone in Tokyo next Saturday.

• 204/9

001455

of the five nuclear powers for its implementation -- needs further elaboration to keep pace with technological advances. Arms control measures must address those new technologies which, by their very nature, would make stability a more elusive goal.

I have in mind a ban on the testing and deployment of those anti-satellite systems designed to operate at high altitude. Such weapons could attack the global communications which are of critical importance for crisis management. Destruction of the other side's command and control network, at a time of crisis, would leave him blind and mute at the very moment when stability demands awareness and response, not the panic reaction of "launch on warning."

That is the fear we have, when we think of destabilizing weapons of that kind. These are weapons or techniques which make an adversary feel unable or ill-equipped to respond to a nuclear attack from the other side. Whether the fear is that one's communication system will be disrupted, or that one's weapons will be rendered useless, the danger is that, in a moment of crisis, the side which feels threatened will launch its nuclear missiles before the other side has a chance to strike first. It is this fear which is aggravated by destabilizing technical advances such as high-altitude anti-satellite weapons.

Neither superpower has yet developed an anti-satellite system for high altitudes. An agreement not to do so is therefore still possible. No agreement means vast expenditure by both sides -- funds better spent on more worthy projects. No agreement means a further spiral of competition -- a competition particularly vulnerable to accident or miscalculation. Moreover an agreement could encourage movement toward negotiations about anti-satellite weaponry designed to operate at lower altitudes.

I am also concerned about another potentially destabilizing development, which is the possibility that new intercontinental strategic weapons may be so highly mobile as to be virtually invisible. This would call into question the ability of either side, or any international body, to verify arms control agreements. You see the paradox. These questions are so intellectually difficult that, too often, the public and their leaders are tempted to leave these problems to experts, to nuclear accountants, to the people who understand the technology, but who do not consider the political dimension of the issue. If missiles stay in one place, the enemy knows where they are, and could destroy them by launching a first strike, so that the side under attack could not respond with an attack of its own. One side would win the war simply by destroying the other's nuclear missiles.

That is why these weapons are destabilizing. You must use them or lose them. For that reason, making these missiles mobile also makes them more stabilizing weapons, in the sense that a first strike by the enemy would not destroy exactly where they are, and so he will not start a war, because the other side will

Japan's association with the Williamsburg Declaration last May, in which the leaders of the industrialized democracies agreed to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war, expresses both the resonance of history and the reality of the present day. My visit there will bear witness to the indivisibility of global security in the nuclear age.

I can also announce that, in addition to the consultations under way with the United States, I have initiated consultations with the Soviet Union and with China -- two nuclear powers upon which much depends.

I look forward to taking an active part in the discussion of peace and security issues at the New Delhi meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, where I will be heading after Japan. I look forward particularly to consultations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on the matter of non-proliferation, and on her perspective, as current chairman of the council of non-aligned nations, on the linkage between disarmament and development. UNQUOTE

~~I am encouraged by this momentum, and heartened by the response. But I am also well aware that critics of my initiative have difficulty in grasping this step by step approach. Some would prefer the passionate embrace of an unattainable ideal. Others are paralyzed by the complexities of the issues in play. I believe that peace must be waged steadily, with caution and with realism. We must work with due respect for the fragility of political trust, for the importance of building carefully, for the need to search out common ground on which to stand.~~

~~The imperative of political action is made all the more urgent by the pace of conflict and confrontation, which threatens to overtake our ability to understand what is happening, and our capacity to manage it.~~

~~Let me remind you that when Alfred Nobel invented dynamite in 1867 he believed that the prospect of its military application was so awesome that governments would be forced to live in peace. And yet today we have long since lost the ability to comprehend the force of a nuclear blast in terms of any comparison with traditional explosives.~~

(TRANSLATION)

~~Peace and security are not cold abstractions. Their purpose is to preserve the future of mankind, the growth of the human spirit, and the patrimony of our planet.~~

~~The choice we face is clear and present. We can without effort abandon our fate to the mindless drift toward nuclear war. Or we can gather our strength, working in good company to turn aside the forces bearing down on us, on our children, on this Earth.~~

~~As for me, I choose to move forward, and I know I do so with your support.~~

~~11~~

~~Le choix qui s'impose à nous est donc clair et pressant. Ou bien nous nous laissons entraîner par le courant aveugle qui nous mène à une guerre nucléaire, ou bien nous rassemblons nos énergies et nous travaillons ensemble à maîtriser les forces qui pèsent sur nous, sur nos enfants et sur le monde.~~

~~Quant à moi, j'ai fait mon choix. J'ai choisi de lutter. Je sais que je peux compter sur votre appui.~~

~~30~~

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ACTION
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S E C R E T

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INFO PCOOTT/CARON

---CHOGM-PMS INTERVENTION ON WORLD POLITICAL SITUATION
CONCISE POINT BY POINT SUMMARY OF PMS INTERVENTION WAS TO BE
PREPOARED PRIOR TO CHOGM.GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD FORWARD IT BY
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S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

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TO EXTOTT IEDZ DELIVER BY 190900

INFO DHAKA/PMDEL DELHI DELIVER BY 191200

PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON

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REF YOURTEL IFB0107 18NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:POSSIBLE CHOGM DECLARATION

AGREE YOUR POINT RE NEED TO ENSURE NATURE OF PM INITIATIVE IS UNDERSTOOD BY COMWEL LEADERS WE CONTACT PRIOR TO CHOGM.HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MISTAKE TO PRESENT DRAFT TEXT WHICH WOULD LIKELY LEAD TO PLETHORA OF DRAFTING PROPOSALS FROM DIFFERENT COMWEL GOVTS.SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT LDN,CNRA,WELLINGTON,DSLAM, LAGOS AND SPORE BE INSTRUCTED TO INFORM HOST GOVTS THAT PM IS DEVELOPING PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION AT CHOGM.POSTS SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO DESCRIBE ORALLY NATURE OF PM INITIATIVE AS SET OUT IN TEXT OF OUR REFTEL.HOWEVER TEXT ITSELF SHOULD NOT/NOT BE PROVIDED.IT SHOULD SIMPLY BE REQUESTED THAT HOGS(THATCHER,HAWK, SHIGARI,NYERERE,MULDOON,LEE KWAN YEW)BE INFORMED PM HOPES TO HAVE OPPORTUNITY AT CHOGM TO EXCHANGE IDEAS ON POSSIBLE DECLARATION. HOWEVER,IT MUST BE STRESSED THAT PM DOES NOT/NOT WISH SERIES OF FORMAL BILATERALS TARGETTED TOWARDS NEGOTIATING TEXT.POSTS SHOULD THEREFORE MAKE POINT THAT PM HOPES TO EXCHANGE IDEAS ON POSSIBLE DECLARATION AS OPPORTUNITIES PRESENT THEMSELVES DURING COURSE OF CONTACTS AT CHOGM.

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PAGE TWO PMDL0009 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

2. RE RAMPHAL, WE AGREE THAT HE BE ALERTED TO NATURE OF PM INITIATIVE AND TOLD THAT PM WILL DISCUSS MATTER WITH HIM DURING MTG FOLLOWING ARRIVAL DELHI NOV22. HOWEVER, AS WITH HOGS, NO/NO TEXT SHOULD BE PROVIDED.

3. RE MRS GANDHI WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT FOR BOTH TACTICAL AND PRESENTATIONAL REASONS, SHE SHOULD BE FIRST HOG TO RECEIVE ACTUAL COPY OF PROPOSED TEXT. THIS WOULD BE DONE BY PM AT FIRST CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY. DELHI SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO INFORM MFA AS OUTLINED IN OUR REFTEL.

4. WE MUST AVOID COMPLEX DRAFTING EXERCISE IN WHICH PM WILL NOT/NOT INVOLVE HIMSELF. THIS OBJECTIVE IS REASON FOR SHORT AND SIMPLE NATURE OF PROPOSED DECLARATION. TEXT OF COURSE WILL EVOLVE ON BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS, AND INDEED MAY ALREADY HAVE BEEN CHANGED BY TIME PM FIRST PRESENTS IT TO MRS GANDHI.

5. PLEASE ENSURE DELHI AND DHAKA HAVE TEXTS OF REFTELS AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT TELS ON THIS SUBJ.

6. OBVIOUSLY URGENT TO PROCEED ASAP WITH INFORMING HOGS. CONSEQUENTLY, UNLESS YOU HAVE MAJOR RESERVATIONS, YOU SHOULD PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO ISSUE APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS.

7. DUTY OFFICER PLEASE ENSURE THIS MESSAGE CONVEYED IMMEDIATELY TO IDDZ. REPLY SHOULD GO TO PMDEL DHAKA.

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INFO

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---PM INITIATIVE

PLEASE NOTE PEARSON AND SMITH WILL ARRIVE JAL781 ETA LISTED

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MF

Can you prepare a
brief response to Asselin's
questions on a piece of paper.
It will be read tomorrow
tomorrow.

Colin McKenna
Prime Minister 57646

with the
compliments of

avec les
hommages du

The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen



Deputy Prime Minister

Vice-premier ministre

Secretary of State
for External Affairs,

Secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures,

Lester B. Pearson Building,
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0G2

Édifice Lester B. Pearson,
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0G2

001463

November 17, 1983

SENATE DEBATES

6191

bill does not have to be passed this week or next week, we do have to consider the problem we encountered last year, namely, that now is the time for printing forms so that taxpayers all across the country can have them available. In many cases, taxpayers will get refunds, which is an important factor. To have them ready early in January is a high priority with the government. It would assist me and my colleagues a great deal if the Leader of the Opposition could give his support to having the bill passed in time for the forms to be printed and mailed, to enable those who expect refunds—and there are hundreds of thousands of such people—to receive them. That is why this is particularly important.

• (1410)

The other matter that requires attention before we adjourn or prorogue—it may be a combination of those two—is the time required for the allocation of supply. I understand that the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance has now completed its consideration of supplementary estimates (A) and (B) and, therefore, I do not anticipate any difficulty. However, I believe that several more opposition days are obligatory before those estimates can be passed. Therefore, it may be the latter part of next week, or even shortly thereafter, before all of those matters can be dealt with. We could then adjourn and have the Speech from the Throne fairly soon afterwards.

Senator Asselin: Honourable senators, the Leader of the Government is asking for our co-operation in order to have those bills passed by the Senate. As usual, we on this side of the house cannot commit ourselves until we have seen the implications of those bills. We shall, as usual, co-operate with the government in getting those bills passed, but we must study them before making any decision, since we have to fulfil our sovereign mandate.

[Translation]

DISARMAMENT

THE PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVES

Hon. Martial Asselin (Acting Leader of the Opposition): In another context, it has been reported that the Prime Minister is leaving today on another peace mission. Our party would like to wish him well on his undertaking. However, we are somewhat concerned about the attitude of the United States towards this peace mission. The American Under-Secretary of State visited Canada recently and met the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs. Apparently, they talked about this peace mission. It would seem that the Americans were not overly enthusiastic about the mission of our Prime Minister. Can the Leader of the Government tell us about it and give us a brief report on this recent visit?

[English]

Hon. H. A. Olson (Leader of the Government): Honourable senators, in response to the Acting Leader of the Opposition, we on this side of the house are indeed happy to receive the best wishes of his party for the success of the Prime Minister's overseas visit last week and also for his current visit to the

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in New Delhi. The opposition's good wishes for that undertaking are appreciated.

The United States government has had discussions with our Secretary of State for External Affairs, but I have not yet received a report on the results of those discussions, although I can say that the United States has indicated a cautious—perhaps “approval” is not the right word—wish that the initiatives of the Prime Minister be successful. But for reasons that they have expressed, they would like to see the results of some other aspects because, of course, other people are involved in the determination of whether there will be some positive steps forward. They want to know what the Prime Minister's initiative involves. Therefore, I think it is understandable that everybody is a bit cautious at this point in time. I shall refer the question to the Secretary of State for External Affairs and ask him whether he can give us a more precise indication of the results of the consultations that he had with the Under Secretary of State of the United States.

[Translation]

Senator Asselin: On a supplementary, after his visit to the Commonwealth countries, does the Prime Minister plan a meeting with the President of the United States or the Chairman of the USSR, before Christmas, to discuss his peace mission?

[English]

Senator Olson: I do not believe that a specific date has been set for either of the suggested meetings at this point in time.

SOLICITOR GENERAL

COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT OF DONALD MARSHALL

Hon. Robert Muir: Honourable senators, I have a question for the Leader of the Government in the Senate. Can he advise this chamber whether or not any consideration is being given, or has been given, by the government to the provision of compensation to Donald Marshall, who was wrongfully convicted of first degree murder and who spent 11 years of his life in Dorchester Penitentiary? I realize that, no matter what compensation this man may receive, it will not make up for those 11 years of imprisonment for a crime he did not commit.

Hon. H. A. Olson (Leader of the Government): I shall ask the Solicitor General to provide a reply to the question, particularly as to whether any consideration has been given, or is being given, to the matter.

Senator Muir: Donald Marshall, a Micmac Indian, faces a legal bill of \$82,000. Would the leader ask of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the Honourable John Munro, who was quoted as saying that he would try his damndest to get the department to cover the legal expenses, whether he has had any success in having those legal bills paid by the department?

Senator Olson: I shall take that question as notice as well.

Royce Frith (Deputy Leader of the Government): Honorable senators, it appears on the order paper in the name of Senator Nurgitz knows, as an "S-" bill received by the Senate. The honourable senator already has that bill.

With respect to where it stands in terms of priorities, I would like to make an up-to-date inquiry in order to have an answer by next week.

TRANSPORT

AIRPORT FIREFIGHTERS—HOURS OF DUTY

Jack Marshall: Honourable senators, I would like the Government to take a question as notice for the House of Transport. It has to do with Transport Canada's regulations with respect to the number of hours firefighters work protecting airports. The hours have been reduced from 16 to 12 hours. This situation is in effect at the Miramichi airport in western Newfoundland.

I do not understand the justification with respect to reducing hours or the savings that might accrue, since Transport Canada has announced as an alternative that these firefighters be called out on overtime, if necessary. In light of the danger with respect to reducing firefighters' hours, would the Leader determine from the Minister of Transport the reason for such a change in the regulations?

H. A. Olson (Leader of the Government): Yes, I will take the question as notice.

(Continued)

SENATE REFORM

REPORT OF SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE—DELAY IN TABLING

Jean-Paul Deschatelets: Honourable senators, I would like to ask the Deputy Leader of the Government a question. I have liked to put it to Senator Molgat in his capacity of member of the Special Joint Committee on Senate Reform. I understand that this committee was to table its report on December 1, 1983.

Do we expect this report to be tabled on December 1 or will the committee ask for an extension because its report will not be completed by that date?

Royce Frith (Deputy Leader of the Government): Honorable senators, we have already discussed this problem with Senator Molgat who is the co-chairman of the committee.

It is that the Committee is not ready to table its report. Senator Molgat has raised the possibility of asking for an extension.

We are preparing a motion to this effect. He has told me that it would be better to move a joint motion in both Houses of Parliament. I hope that you will realize that this is what we intend to do. This motion will be introduced next week to provide for an extension of January, 1984.

[English]

DISARMAMENT

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVES

Hon. Martial Asselin (Acting Leader of the Opposition): Considering the fact that the Senate will not reconvene until next week, I think it would be appropriate for us to know something of the peace mission to Asia of the Prime Minister and his retinue. We have been told that in Japan the Prime Minister met a very important and distinguished emissary from the Soviet Union and—

• (1500)

Hon. Royce Frith (Deputy Leader of the Government): If the meeting had not been unfavourable, you would not think that he was so distinguished.

Senator Asselin: It has been said that this emissary from the Soviet Union was not too encouraging about the peace mission of the Prime Minister of Canada. We have been told also that the Prime Minister sent an ambassador, Mr. Geoffrey Pearson, to China and to the Soviet Union to find out whether the Prime Minister's goals and objectives with respect to this peace mission would be well received in those two countries.

My question is: Can the Leader of the Government give us a report on what the cabinet knows regarding the achievement of the Prime Minister with respect to this peace mission?

Hon. H. A. Olson (Leader of the Government): I have already replied on one or two occasions with respect to the meeting between the Prime Minister and the senior official from the Politburo of the Soviet Union, Mr. Arbatov—a 30-minute meeting which took place, I think, in Tokyo. The Prime Minister has indicated that Mr. Arbatov said that he was not optimistic that the Prime Minister of Canada could be successful in modifying the views of the United States. That, of course, is not the total requirement. The Prime Minister's objective is to have all the nuclear powers raise their level of consultation and discussion on nuclear weapons in order to avoid an escalation of any series of events that would lead to the use of those weapons.

At the moment, I am unable to give a report of the mission of Ambassador Pearson. I think he is still in Peking, although today he may be flying back to Tokyo before proceeding to Moscow. I think that his first report of those meetings would be to the person who sent him, namely, the Prime Minister of Canada, so I am sure that Mr. Pearson will report to the Prime Minister first.

Hon. Eric Cook: Perhaps the Leader of the Government would tell us which Liberal rally we should attend in order to find out the details of those meetings.

Senator Olson: I was referring to the ambassador's report, and that would be to the Prime Minister, in the first instance. As soon as I hear the details of that report, I shall report to Senator Asselin and to this chamber the results of those preliminary discussions.

Hon. Joseph-Philippe Guay: I am sure that all senators are hoping that the Prime Minister will be successful in his mission.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
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FOR YOUR INFORMATION, SEISOMOLOGICAL EXPERT IN OTT CONSIDERS THAT
FRENCH FM CHEYSSON'S DEFENCE OF FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING IN SOUTH PACIFIC
BY IMPLYING NECESSITY TO TEST IN BASALT FORMATIONS IS TOTALLY ~~MIS-~~
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SIG M.R. GRINIS/PEC

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MESSAGE

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FILE/DOSSIER

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE
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HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK - BRIEFING NOTE
LIVRE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES - NOTES D'INFORMATION

Section

20-1-1

Subject/Highlights Sujet/Points saillants

Canadian Defence and Prime Minister's Initiative

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

Source

CBC Radio, Ottawa Citizen

Assessment Évaluation

Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

CBC Radio and the Ottawa Citizen today report a vigorous attack on Canada's defence spending and on the Prime Minister's initiative at a conference sponsored yesterday in New York by the Americas Society on Canada-United States Security Options for the 1980s in NATO and the Defence of North America. The conference was open to the press on a "deep background" basis, according to which reporters could not attribute remarks to individuals.

Those USA officials joining the attack included: Ronald Lauder, Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defence; George Bader, Deputy Principal Director, Europe Policy, Dept. of Defence; Bob Montgomery, Deputy Director, Office of Canadian Affairs, State Dept., and Dr. Kenneth Myers, Chairman of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In what appeared to be a spontaneous rather than a deliberately concerted attack on Canadian policy, these middle ranking officials made a number of points:

- Canadian defence policy since 1968 had gone from undesirable to regrettable, to indefensible
- Canada's contribution to NATO vied with Denmark's (or Luxembourg's) for bottom place, and was coming under criticism from European allies as well as the United States
- the problem lay not only with the low percentage of GNP being spent but on neglect of specific roles

~~Suggested Reply~~ ~~Reponse suggerée~~

- USA was under pressure from European allies to reduce defence purchases from Canada in view of our minimal contribution to collective defence, and found Canada's privileged position in the American market increasingly difficult to justify
- Mr. Lauder predicted there would be more "arm twisting" in the future; the Senate staff member noted that Congress would provide the political context for this, but the administration would apply the pressure. One DOD official noted pressure was already being applied
- the State Department representative said European diplomats in Washington were coming to the State Dept. to ask what the Prime Minister was up to and to express their surprise. He concluded the initiative was not being received well. Others suggested that a country which contributed as little as Canada did not have the weight to take the lead in this way
- Several participants appeared to believe that Canadian voters were willing to attach greater weight to defence than the government, and that for the first time since 1963, defence could be a major issue in the next election. They dismissed opposition from the other side to cruise missile testing as irrelevant
- Although Mr. Blais did not attend the closed morning session at which the attacks took place, he delivered a public keynote speech at lunch time, and dealt with many of these issues. In addition, he held a press conference at which he vigorously rebutted the attacks, which were relayed to him by reporters. National Defence and External Affairs officials who attended the conference also explained and defended the Government's position.

ANSWER

Mr. Blais' office expects that he will arrive back from New York in time for Question Period. In view of his role at the conference they expect he will wish to deal with questions on it. You could, however, make the following points:

- The views attributed to anonymous middle ranking officials do not correspond to those being expressed directly to us by responsible United States Ministers;
- During the Prime Minister's tour of Europe, he received a very favourable hearing from the leaders he met. The skeptical views attributed to "Europeans" by an anonymous middle level State Dept. official do not correspond to the facts.

Prepared by Préparé par

J.R.Francis

Division Direction

~~INT~~ IDR

Date

Nov. 18/83

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MESSAGE

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---PM INITIATIVE

GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD PROVIDE US WITH SHORT ACCOUNT OF PM TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION WITH PRES REAGAN NOV17.

28-6-1-Thudau Peace Mission

19 NOV 83 03 11Z

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

L.A.Delvoie/sc
SIG

IDDZ

5-5912

L.A. Delvoie
SIG L.A.Delvoie



MGTC M. FILE DIARY

FILE/DOSSIER

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

12

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FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0188 18NOV83

TO/À

TO PMDEL/DACCA

DELIVER BY 200900

INFO

INFO PC00TT/ARCHDEACON COPEN

DISTR

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
DISTR MINA DMF RSR RSD RGB

SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE

FLWG IS REPLY FROM DANISH PM SCHLUETER TO PM S 250CT LET.

2.(COMCENTRE PLSE COPY ATTACHED TEXT : QUOTE TO UNQUOTE)



19 NOV 83 03 12Z

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

M. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

COPY

ROYAL DANISH EMBASSY

File No. 105. I. 1.

NO. 39

~~The Embassy of Denmark presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to convey to the Department the following message, which the Prime Minister of Denmark has sent to The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada:~~

"My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you so much for your message concerning the present state of east-west relations which I have read with the utmost attention and interest. Having considered it in detail, allow me, Mr. Prime Minister, to advance a few comments in the following.

First of all, I would like to stress the fact that I fully share your assessment of the disturbing difficulties to which east-west relations have been exposed over the past few years. Indeed, since the late 1970's a growing atmosphere of distrust and lack of confidence has gradually replaced the climate of detente. You name but a few of the most essential reasons for this unfortunate development, inter alia the receding high-level political dialogue between east and west, the implications of the leadership change in the Soviet Union and the tragic shooting-down of a South Korean civilian airliner. I could add the continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and the attitude of the Soviet Union towards events in Poland. And the list probably continues even further.

These developments have had an adverse effect on east-west-relations in general leading to the present deep trough you refer to. They have also caused sincere and deep concern in the populations of our two countries.

././.

Department of External Affairs,
O t t a w a .

- 2 -

We as politicians therefore carry a heavy responsibility which, in my view, impels us to work actively towards the restoration of a stable east-west-relationship. As a European country, history has told us that security in Europe is indivisible. That is why we strongly believe that east and west share a fundamental interest in the avoidance of war. Thus, Danish governments have been consistent proponents for the necessity of continuing and expanding the dialogue as the only way to alleviate misconceptions and misunderstandings between east and west and to achieve tangible and balanced results. The visit to Moscow two weeks ago by our foreign minister, Mr. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, should be seen in this context.

Against this background the Danish government warmly welcomes your initiative to reinstitute the high-level political dialogue between east and west. We share your view that it is of paramount importance that such an approach gains momentum. We would further be prepared to consider favourably your concrete proposals to initiate negotiations among all five nuclear weapon states on the establishment of global limits on their strategic nuclear arms, to contain horizontal proliferation as well as to inject new impetus to the MBFR-negotiations in Vienna which have now lasted for 10 years. It is beyond any doubt that progress in one or all of these fields could constitute an important step along the road towards lasting peace.

I am looking forward to learn more about your considerations on these matters.

Yours sincerely

(signed)


Poul Schlüter

UNQUOTE

The Embassy has been advised by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen that the letter signed by Prime Minister Poul Schlüter on November 16, 1983, has been sent by special courier to this Embassy. As soon as it is received in Ottawa, the message will be brought to the Department of External Affairs for delivery to the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada.

The Embassy of Denmark avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, November 18, 1983.



Original sent on
request of Joseph Caron
PCO for transmission to
PM.

Dec. 8, 1983

001473

ROYAL DANISH EMBASSY

File No. 105. I. 1.

MF
12

NO. 39.

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Department of External Affairs,
O t t a w a .

- 2 -

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
Yours sincerely

(signed) Poul Schlüter"

The Embassy has been advised by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen that the letter signed by Prime Minister Poul Schlüter on November 16, 1983, has been sent by special courier to this Embassy. As soon as it is received in Ottawa, the message will be brought to the Department of External Affairs for delivery to the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada.

The Embassy of Denmark avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, November 18, 1983.



001475



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0187 18NOV83

TO/À

PMDEL
TO ADACCA

DELIVER BY 200900

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission

INFO

INFO PC00TT/ARCHDEACON MDRID

DISTR

DISTR MINA DMF RCR RCD RGB

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE

FLWG IS TEXT OF LET FM SPANISH PRESIDENT FELIPE GONZALEZ IN REPLY
TO PM S OCT 25 LET.

2. (COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED TEXT : QUOTE TO UNQUOTE.)

19 NOV 83 03 12Z

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE
J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. Delvoie
L.A. DELVOIE



Embajada de España

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

TEXT OF LETTER ADDRESSED TO PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have read with great interest your letter of 25 October as well as the important lecture you gave at Guelph University.

I share, in its broad outlines, the concern you express about the alarming present situation of international tension. Unfortunately, the symptoms of deterioration have multiplied lately. Because of the possible general consequences of such deterioration, it affects not only the superpowers, but all the peace-loving peoples and their leaders. I feel, as you do, that it is imperative to surmount this climate of mistrust and confrontation, and that to this effect, it is necessary to exert imagination, courage and political decisions.

. / .



Embajada de España

. / 2

The steps you propose seem to me to be in principle appropriate, although, needless to say, their implementation will encounter, at least initially, considerable difficulties and serious resistance.

Certainly, political dialogue at the highest level must be promoted as a means of breaking the vicious circle of a militarism which breeds on mutual suspicion. This is essentially the scope of your bold and generous initiative, to urge a collective act of political will. I assure you that I personally sympathize with this initiative and I wish you the greatest success in the contacts you have initiated with several western leaders. You can count on the goodwill of the Government of Spain and our willingness to cooperate.

Our peoples must not surrender to discouragement and inertia, particularly in such difficult times. We, in Government, cannot evade the responsibilities incumbent on us. The possibility for future generations to have a more propitious, free and peaceful outlook depends ultimately on us, on our ability to collectively overcome the greatest

. / .



Embajada de España

. / 3

of threats, the obliteration of any future.

I hope, Mr. Prime Minister, to keep
in contact with you and look forward to encouraging
news about the initiatives you have had the valor
to undertake.

I send you my most cordial greetings,

Felipe González Marquez

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'F. GONZÁLEZ MARQUEZ', with a large, sweeping flourish underneath.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

12

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FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0186 18NOV83

TO ANKRA

PRIORITY

INFO PC00TT/FOWLER

DISTR RSR

REF YOURTEL ZEGR1649 OF 18NOV

---PM INITIATIVE.

AGREE WITH APPROACH SUGGESTED IN REFTEL. FOR LETS TO HEAD OF ~~GOVT~~

2.DUE TO PM S ABSENCE FROM CDA ORIGINALS WILL BE DELAYED FOR SOME
TIME.

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

19 NOV 83 03 11Z
GOVT.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I E L	12	10
FM/DE	DE EXTOTT IDDZ0185 18NOV83	<div>28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission</div>	
TO/À	A BRU LIVRAISON LE 190900		
INFO	INFO BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPP		
DISTR	DISTR MINA DMF IFB RGG RCD RCR RSD RSR IDD IDR IDA		
REF	REF NOTRE TEL A BONN IDDZ0167 DU 17NOV		
SUBJ/SUJ	---INITIATIVE DU PM SUR LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST. SUITE A NOTRE TELEGRAMME EN REFERENCE,VEUILLEZ SVP TRANSMETTRE AUS- SITOT QUE POSSIBLE LE MESSAGE SUIVANT DU PM AU CHEF DE GOUVERNEMENT DU LUXEMBOURG. 2.ORIGINAL SIGNE PAR LE PM SERA TRANSMIS PAR COURRIER DIPLOMATIQUE A VOTRE AMBASSADE. 3.CIT (CENTRE DES TELECOMMUNICATIONS,VEUILLEZ RETRANSMETTRE LE TEX- TE SUIVANT) FINCIT.		
19 NOV 83 03 11Z			

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. CARON

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

le 17 novembre 1983

900TE

Dans ma lettre du 25 octobre, je vous ai fait part des inquiétudes que m'inspire le piètre état des relations Est-Ouest et de la sécurité internationale, et je vous ai annoncé mon intention de travailler à l'amélioration de cet état de choses.

Lors de mon passage en Europe, la semaine dernière, j'ai eu l'occasion de m'entretenir personnellement de ce sujet avec six collègues de l'OTAN, et l'accueil qu'ils m'ont réservé m'a encouragé. Je les ai trouvés unanimement d'accord sur l'urgente nécessité de rétablir un climat de confiance et de jeter les bases d'un dialogue suivi et concerté entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Indépendamment de leur valeur intrinsèque à plus long terme, un tel climat et un tel réseau de contacts constitueraient un filet de sécurité qui pourrait se révéler indispensable au cours de la prochaine année.

Ma tournée européenne m'a permis aussi de discuter en détail certaines propositions plus précises avancées dans ma dernière lettre, dont le besoin d'une tribune où pourraient se négocier des limites globales aux arsenaux des cinq puissances nucléaires; la nécessité de réaffirmer avec plus de force les principes de non-prolifération, et celle non moins grande de donner, au plus haut niveau politique, une impulsion aux négociations sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces de même qu'à la "Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe", qui s'ouvrira prochainement à Stockholm.

Son Excellence Monsieur Pierre Werner
Premier ministre du Luxembourg
Luxembourg

- 2 -

Mon collègue, M. Allan MacEachen, a l'intention de soulever ce dernier point à la réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays de l'OTAN le 8 décembre, à Bruxelles, et j'aimerais solliciter votre appui personnel pour que soit prise à cette occasion une décision sur les deux propositions suivantes:

a) que tous les membres de l'OTAN soient représentés à un haut niveau politique lors de la séance inaugurale de la conférence de Stockholm, le 17 janvier; et

b) que l'OTAN réponde aux propositions de l'Est sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces tôt l'an prochain et se tienne prête à faire suivre sa réponse d'une réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères à Vienne.

Je suis convaincu qu'une entente sur ces deux points démontrerait avec force aux pays de l'Est comme à la population de nos propres pays notre volonté, en tant que dirigeants politiques, d'accomplir des progrès significatifs dans le domaine du contrôle des armements, de façon à réduire l'état de tension actuel.

Je tiens aussi à vous informer que j'ai écrit aux dirigeants de la Chine et de l'Union soviétique et que j'enverrai sous peu un émissaire personnel à Pékin et à Moscou pour y exprimer mes inquiétudes au sujet de la situation internationale actuelle. Je vous tiendrai au courant des résultats de ces rencontres.

J'apprécierais recevoir tout commentaire que vous inspirerait ma démarche et je compte, à ce sujet, rester en contact étroit avec vous au cours des mois à venir.

UN9007E


MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0184 18NOV83	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> 28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission </div> <div style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg);"> 18 NOV 83 03 11Z </div>	
TO/A	TO WSHDC		
INFO			
DISTR	INFO BNATO LDN PARIS BONN ROME HAGUE BRU NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/ORAT		
REF	PMDEL/DHAKA		
SUBJ/SUJ	DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDR IDA RGB UGB URR		
<p>---PM INITIATIVE:FOLLOW-UP TO SSEA/DAM MTG</p> <p>IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN DPM/SSEA AND DEPUTY SECTY STATE DAM ON NOV15,IT WAS AGREED THAT CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE PURSUED ON ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS OF PM INITIATIVE.WE WOULD THEREFORE PROPOSE TO SEND TWO EXPERTS TO WSHDC TO EXPLAIN AND DISCUSS TECHNICAL ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY PM TO APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS IN STATE,ACDA, ETC.</p> <p>2.PROPOSALS WE WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS ARE THOSE RELATING TO (A) HIGH ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS (B) MOBILITY OF ICBMS (C) VERIFICATION OF NEW SYSTEMS BY NATL TECHNICAL MEANS.WE BELIEVE HOWEVER THAT CLEAR DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN THESE PROPOSALS AND MAIN BODY OF PM INITIATIVE.THESE THREE ARE ONES WHICH PM AND WE BELIEVE HAVE SUBSTANTIVE MERIT,AND WHICH PM WANTED TO OUTLINE IN HIS MTL SPEECH,BUT WHICH HE DID NOT/NOT WISH TO PURSUE IN HIS CONTACTS WITH LEADERS BECAUSE SOMEWHAT TOO TECHNICAL TO BE DISCUSSED AT HEAD OF GOVT LEVEL.AS INDICATED IN MTL SPEECH,INTENTION IS TO INTRODUCE THESE THREE PROPOSALS INTO APPROPRIATE DISARMAMENT FORUM (E.G. CTTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEV) IN DUE COURSE.</p>			

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
L.A.Delvoie/sc SIG	IDDZ	5-5912	<div style="text-align: center;">  L.A.Delvoie </div>



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0184 CONFD

12

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3.WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT CDN EXPERTS VISIT WSHDC MONDAY,NOV28 AND BE
ACCOMPANIED DURING THEIR CONSULTATIONS BY EMB REP.ADVISE WHETHER
THIS SUITABLE TO USA AUTHORITIES CONCERNED AND,IF SO,PROVIDE US
WITH PROGRAM OF APPOINTMENTS.

4.CDN TEAM WOULD CONSIST OF DR K J CALDER(MEMBER OF PM TASK FORCE
AND DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AT DND) AND MR LAWRENCE HAGEN
(DIRECTORATE OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AT DND).

5.SHOULD USA AUTHORITIES EXPRESS INTEREST,DELVOIE (HEAD OF PM TASK
FORCE) WOULD BE PREPARED TO VISIT WSHDC TO DISCUSS PM PROPOSAL ON
FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR CONF AT SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I E L

12

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FM/DE

DE EXTOTT IDDZ0183 18NOV83

TO/À

A BRU

LIVRAISON LE 190900

INFO

DISTR

~~INFO BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADM POL/CP~~

REF

~~DISTR MINA DMF IFB RGB RCD RCR RSD RSR IDD IDR IDA~~

SUBJ/SUJ

REF NOTRE TEL A BONN IDDZ0167 DU 17NOV

---INITIATIVE DU PM SUR LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST.

SUITE A NOTRE TELEGRAMME EN REFERENCE,VEUILLEZ SVP TRANSMETTRE CE
JOUR-MEME LE MESSAGE SUIVANT DU PM AU CHEF DE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA
BELGIQUE.

2.L'ORIGINAL SIGNE PAR LE PM SERA TRANSMIS PAR COURRIER DIPLOMATI-
QUE A VOTRE AMBASSADE.

3.CIT (CENTRE DES TELECOMMUNICATIONS,VEUILLEZ RETRANSMETTRE LE TEX-
TE SUIVANT) FINCIT.

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

19 NOV 83 03 11Z

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. CARON

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



9007 E

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

le 17 novembre 1983

Dans ma lettre du 25 octobre, je vous ai fait part des inquiétudes que m'inspire le piètre état des relations Est-Ouest et de la sécurité internationale, et je vous ai annoncé mon intention de travailler à l'amélioration de cet état de choses.

Lors de mon passage en Europe, la semaine dernière, j'ai eu l'occasion de m'entretenir personnellement de ce sujet avec six collègues de l'OTAN (dont vous-même, lors de notre fructueuse rencontre du 9 novembre au palais d'Egmont), et l'accueil qu'ils m'ont réservé m'a encouragé. Je les ai trouvés unanimement d'accord sur l'urgente nécessité de rétablir un climat de confiance et de jeter les bases d'un dialogue suivi et concerté entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Indépendamment de leur valeur intrinsèque à plus long terme, un tel climat et un tel réseau de contacts constitueraient un filet de sécurité qui pourrait se révéler indispensable au cours de la prochaine année.

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Son Excellence Monsieur Wilfrid Martens
Premier ministre de la Belgique
Bruxelles (Belgique)

- 2 -

Mon collègue, M. Allan MacEachen, a l'intention de soulever ce dernier point à la réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays de l'OTAN le 8 décembre, à Bruxelles, et j'aimerais solliciter votre appui personnel pour que soit prise à cette occasion une décision sur les deux propositions suivantes:

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J'apprécierais recevoir tout commentaire que vous inspirerait ma démarche et je compte, à ce sujet, rester en contact étroit avec vous au cours des mois à venir.

Je vous remercie d'avoir trouvé le temps de me recevoir la semaine dernière malgré votre horaire chargé et ma demande de dernière minute. Merci également de votre généreuse hospitalité.

UNQUOTE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I E L

FM/DE

DE EXTOTT IDDZ0182 18NOV83

TO/À

A PARIS LIVRAISON LE 190900

INFO

DISTR

~~INFO BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD~~

REF

~~DISTR MINA DMF IFB RGB RGD RGR~~

SUBJ/SUJ

REF NOTRE TEL A BONN IDDZ0167 DU 17NOV

---INITIATIVE DU PM SUR LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST.

SUITE A NOTRE TELEGRAMME EN REFERENCE, VEUILLEZ SVP TRANSMETTRE CE
JOUR-MEME LE MESSAGE SUIVANT DU PM AU ~~CHEF DE GOUVERNEMENT~~ *PIRES MITTERRAND*

2. L'ORIGINAL SIGNE PAR LE PM SERA TRANSMIS PAR COURRIER DIPLOMATIQUE
A VOTRE AMBASSADE.

3. CIT (CENTRE DES TELECOMMUNICATIONS, VEUILLEZ RETRANSMETTRE LE TEX-
TE SUIVANT) FINCIT.

19NOV 83 03 12Z

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG J. CARON

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. Delvoie
L.A. DELVOIE



CANADA

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

le 17 novembre 1983

QUOTE

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Lors de mon passage en Europe, la semaine dernière, j'ai eu l'occasion de m'entretenir personnellement de ce sujet avec six collègues de l'OTAN (dont vous-même, lors de notre fructueuse rencontre du 8 novembre à l'Elysée), et l'accueil qu'ils m'ont réservé m'a encouragé. Je les ai trouvés unanimement d'accord sur l'urgente nécessité de rétablir un climat de confiance et de jeter les bases d'un dialogue suivi et concerté entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Indépendamment de leur valeur intrinsèque à plus long terme, un tel climat et un tel réseau de contacts constitueraient un filet de sécurité qui pourrait se révéler indispensable au cours de la prochaine année.

Ma tournée européenne m'a permis aussi de discuter en détail certaines propositions plus précises avancées dans ma dernière lettre, dont le besoin d'une tribune où pourraient se négocier des limites globales aux arsenaux des cinq puissances nucléaires; la nécessité de réaffirmer avec plus de force les principes de non-prolifération, et celle non moins grande de donner, au plus haut niveau politique, une impulsion aux négociations sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces de même qu'à la "Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe", qui s'ouvrira prochainement à Stockholm.

Son Excellence
Monsieur François Mitterrand
Président de la République française
Paris (France)

- 2 -

Mon collègue, M. Allan MacEachen, a l'intention de soulever ce dernier point à la réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays de l'OTAN le 8 décembre, à Bruxelles, et j'aimerais solliciter votre appui personnel pour que soit prise à cette occasion une décision sur les deux propositions suivantes:

a) que tous les membres de l'OTAN soient représentés à un haut niveau politique lors de la séance inaugurale de la conférence de Stockholm, le 17 janvier; et

b) que l'OTAN réponde aux propositions de l'Est sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces tôt l'an prochain et se tienne prête à faire suivre sa réponse d'une réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères à Vienne.

Je suis convaincu qu'une entente sur ces deux points démontrerait avec force aux pays de l'Est comme à la population de nos propres pays notre volonté, en tant que dirigeants politiques, d'accomplir des progrès significatifs dans le domaine du contrôle des armements, de façon à réduire l'état de tension actuel.

Je tiens aussi à vous informer que j'ai écrit aux dirigeants de la Chine et de l'Union soviétique et que j'enverrai sous peu un émissaire personnel à Pékin et à Moscou pour y exprimer mes inquiétudes au sujet de la situation internationale actuelle. Je vous tiendrai au courant des résultats de ces rencontres.

J'apprécierais recevoir tout commentaire que vous inspirerait ma démarche et je compte, à ce sujet, rester en contact étroit avec vous au cours des mois à venir.

Je vous remercie d'avoir trouvé le temps de me recevoir la semaine dernière malgré votre horaire chargé et ma demande de dernière minute. Merci également de votre généreuse hospitalité.

UNQUOTE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I E L	12)	10
FM/DE	DE EXTOTT IDDZ0181 18NOV83	<i>28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission</i>	
TO/À	A ROME <u>LIVRAISON A 190900</u>		
INFO			
DISTR	INFO BNATO PC00TT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD		
REF	DISTR MINA DMF IFB RGB RSD RCD RSR RCR IDD IDR IDA		
SUBJ/SUJ	REF NOTRE TEL A BONN IDDZ0167 DU 17NOV ---INITIATIVE DU PM SUR LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST. SUITE A'NOTRE TELEGRAMME EN REFERENCE,VEUILLEZ SVP TRANSMETTRE CE JOUR-MEME LE MESSAGE SUIVANT DU PM AU CHEF DE GOUVERNEMENT. 2.L'ORIGINAL SIGNE PAR LE PM SERA TRANSMIS PAR COURRIER DIPLOMATIQUE A VOTRE AMBASSADE. 3.CIT (CENTRE DES TELECOMMUNICATIONS,VEUILLEZ RETRANSMETTRE LE TEXTE SUIVANT) FINCIT.		

19 NOV 83 03 12Z

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG J. CARON	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> SIG L.A. DELVOIE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

le 17 novembre 1983

QUOTE

Dans ma lettre du 25 octobre, je vous ai fait part des inquiétudes que m'inspire le piètre état des relations Est-Ouest et de la sécurité internationale, et je vous ai annoncé mon intention de travailler à l'amélioration de cet état de choses.

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L'honorable Bettino Craxi
Président du Conseil des ministres
Rome (Italie)

- 2 -

Mon collègue, M. Allan MacEachen, a l'intention de soulever ce dernier point à la réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays de l'OTAN le 8 décembre, à Bruxelles, et j'aimerais solliciter votre appui personnel pour que soit prise à cette occasion une décision sur les deux propositions suivantes:

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J'apprécierais recevoir tout commentaire que vous inspirerait ma démarche et je compte, à ce sujet, rester en contact étroit avec vous au cours des mois à venir.

Je vous remercie de votre réponse fort encourageante à ma lettre du 25 octobre. Merci également d'avoir trouvé le temps de me recevoir la semaine dernière malgré votre horaire chargé et ma demande de dernière minute. J'ai fort apprécié votre généreuse hospitalité.

UNQ00TE

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

18 Nov 83 171202 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0180 18NOV 83

TO/À TO PMDEL/TOKYO

DELIVER BY 190700

INFO INFO WSHDC PC00TT/OSBALDESTON

REF DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RCR IDR IDA FPR

SUBJ/SUJ REF OURTEL IDDZ0178 18NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:USA CRITICISM

FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF EVALUATION AND SUGGESTED ANSWER FORWARDED TO
SSEA AT 1030 HRS 18NOV:

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

28-6-1-Hudon Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A.Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG *L.A. Delvoie*
L.A. Delvoie

001495



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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12

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ **UNCLASSIFIED**

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ00179 08NOV85

TO/À

TO PEDEL/TOKYO

DELIVER BY 190700

INFO

INFO USHDC PC00TT/OSBALDESTON/ARCHDEACON

DISTR

REF

DISTR NINA USS DLF IFB UGB URR IDR

SUBJ/SUJ

^{S IN}
---PM ~~DIS~~ INITIATIVE

FLUG EDITORIAL ENTITLED QUOTE PASSENGERS NEEDED UNQUOTE IN 18NOV

GLOBE AND MAIL ON PM INITIATIVE.

2.CONCENTRE PLSE COPY ATTACHED TEXT.(QUOTE TO UNQUOTE)

28-6-1-*Thudreau Peace Mission*

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG *J.A.A. McNEE*

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG *L.A. McNEE*

MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSIDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and " (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et " (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quant il comporte une signature.

The subject who is truly loyal to the Chief Magistrate will not

The Globe and Mail

CANADA'S NATIONAL NEWSPAPER

Proprietor — The Globe and Mail Division of Canadian Newspapers Company Limited

444 Front St. W., Toronto M5V 2S9

Telephone 585-5000

The Globe founded 1844

The Mail founded 1872

R. HOWARD WEBSTER, Honorary Chairman

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NORMAN WEBSTER, Editor-in-chief

GEOFFREY STEVENS, Managing Editor

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RICHARD J. DOYLE, Editor Emeritus

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1983

Passengers needed

Peace must be waged steadily, with caution and with realism," Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau said upon returning from his four-day, six-nation tour of Western European capitals. So far, his own peace initiative has met those tests. But as the Prime Minister travels his "third rail" onward to Tokyo and New Delhi, he will need to take on some influential passengers if he hopes to reach his final destination.

Mr. Trudeau was realistic in realizing that "one man representing one country cannot promise a miracle, let alone deliver one." He has, therefore, tried to recruit the European leaders to increase his own leverage upon the super-powers. He has also taken care to make specific proposals, rather than only generalized exhortations to reasonableness.

The Prime Minister's caution was also evident: he aired his proposals with the Europeans in private and aimed those proposals not at preventing or retarding the imminent missile deployment in Europe, but at issues with a longer lead time. He thus avoided the risk that the Soviet Union might exploit his initiative to delay the missile deployment.

Mr. Trudeau deserves to be commended on all these counts. But hold the Nobel Peace Prize. The Europeans' praise has been polite, not profuse. What enthusiasm they did show came mainly from Holland and Belgium, which was predictable, and not from Britain and West Germany, which was vital. The "jolt of political energy" that Mr. Trudeau hopes to impart to arms control still lacks critical mass. Can the Japanese or the Commonwealth leaders help build it? Will the consultations which Mr. Trudeau has initiated with China and the Soviet Union contribute?

There is, admittedly, cause for skepticism about his propos-

al for a five-corner parley of the nuclear powers. Such a forum might yield no more than a multiple of the present two-way impasse at Geneva. But Mr. Trudeau should be roundly cheered for urging mutual cuts in conventional armed forces in Europe, a bolstering of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a ban on anti-satellite weapons.

Instead, a senior U.S. State Department official, on a recent visit to Ottawa, damned the proposals with faint praise and restated U.S. objections to a ban on anti-satellite weapons. His remarks stopped short of a pre-emptive strike against Mr. Trudeau's planned visit to Washington, but they indicated the Reagan Administration is ready to "launch on warning" against him.

If the "third rail" is not to reach a dead end, it will have to entice the President of the United States aboard. Yet the U.S. under Ronald Reagan seems disinclined to pay what the Declaration of Independence called a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind," let alone to the counsel of its nearest neighbor (witness Grenada).

Surely, Canada deserves better from the nation with which it has shared a continent and a culture, fought and won two world wars and worked to create the institutions that would avert a third. If Canadian-American friendship is not merely the longest undefended cliché between two peoples, then Mr. Trudeau's peace plan is entitled to a fair hearing in Washington.

What is at issue is not how the U.S. regards us, but how Canadians regard the U.S. Many Canadians, and not just Canadians, need to be shown that what Franklin Roosevelt said almost half a century ago is equally true today: "America hates war, America loves peace. Therefore America actively engages in the search for peace."



'He hasn't been the same
Heston

Out of the

Thanks to the technological ingenuity of man, football fans in southern Ontario will be able to pick from a wide range of television diversions in their living rooms on Sunday afternoon, among them a Channel 2 movie entitled Planet of the Apes, based on the premise that humans are dumber than monkeys. For confirmation of the theory, Channel 29 offers the movie Bikini Beach.

For those who crave more intellectual fare, the problems of the Canadian meat-packing industry are reviewed on Country Canada (Channel 5), while Channel 11 is showing The Great Debate.

If, however, you insist on watching football, the Minnesota Vikings meet the Pittsburgh Steelers (live) on Channels 4, 6 and 22. Which, if you live within a 120-kilometre radius of Toronto, is about as near as you will be allowed to the Eastern Division final of the Canadian Football League, featuring a clash between those old rivals, the Toronto Argonauts and the Hamilton Tiger-Cats.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flècheSECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

18 NOV 83 16 22Z 10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0178 18NOV83

TO/À

TO PMDEL/TOKYO

DELIVER BY 190700

INFO

INFO WSHDC

DISTR

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR IDR

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE:CBC RADIO REPORT 18NOV

FLWG REPORT CARRIED BY CBC RADIO 180800; QUOTE SEVERAL HIGH-LEVEL AMERICAN OFFICIALS SAY PM TRUDEAU'S PEACE PLAN IS DOOMED BECAUSE CDA HAS BEEN A WEAK LINK IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. THE OFFICIALS FROM THE DEFENSE AND STATE DEPARTMENTS SAY THIS COUNTRY HAS VIRTUALLY NO CREDIBILITY ON DEFENCE MATTERS DUE TO ITS FAILURE TO CONTRIBUTE ENOUGH TO NATO. BECAUSE OF THIS THEY SAY THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE IS GOING NOWHERE.

HAL JONES: THE OCCASION WAS AN OFF THE RECORD MTG SPONSORED BY THE AMERICAN SOCIETY TO DISCUSS DEFENCE RELATIONS AND FUTURE TRENDS WITHIN NORAD AND NATO. UNDER A GUARANTEE OF ANONYMITY, USA OFFICIALS WERE MORE THAN CANDID IN THEIR OPINIONS OF CDA'S SHORTCOMINGS AS A DEFENCE PARTNER. ONE OF THEM SUGGESTED CDA'S SOMEWHAT STINGY ATTITUDE UNDERCUTS WHATEVER MORAL AUTHORITY CDA THINKS IT HAS, WHILE MR TRUDEAU'S PROPOSALS ARE NOT VERY FEASIBLE. QUOTE ITS A COP-OUT, UNQUOTE SAID ONE USA OFFICIAL OF THE PLAN. EVEN THE EUROPEANS WHO ARE NOT AS CRASS AS WE ARE, THINK THAT CDA SHOULD PUT ITS MONEY WHERE ITS MOUTH IS. OTTAWA'S VIEW IS THAT THE EUROPEANS ARE IN FAVOUR OF PM TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE, BUT THE AMERICANS SAY THE EUROPEANS THEY

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
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PAGE TWO IDDZ0178 UNCLASSIFIED

12

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HAVE SPOKEN ^{TO} ~~THE~~ ARE PUZZLED BY IT AND DO NOT, IN FACT, VIEW IT POSITIVELY. VARIOUS OFFICIALS WARN THAT EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE COMPLAINING THAT CDA IS BENEFITTING TOO MUCH FROM USA DEFENSE CONTRACTS FOR A COUNTRY THAT CONTRIBUTES SO LITTLE TO NATO. ONE OFFICIAL SAID CDA IS COMPETING WITH DENMARK TO SEE WHICH CAN CONTRIBUTE THE SMALLEST AMOUNT AND DESCRIBED THAT AS SHAMEFUL.

HAL JONES CBC NEW, NEW YORK. UNQUOTE.

2. ABOVE REPORT WAS FOLLOWED BY FLWG REPORT FM CBC REPORTER ON PM S TOUR. ~~0800 NOV 18~~. QUOTE MR. TRUDEAU IS PRESSING ON WITH PEACE PROPOSALS IN SPITE OF AMERICAN CRITICISM. HE IS NOW IN JAPAN AT THE START OF AN 18 DAY TOUR OF ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. AIDES TRAVELLING WITH THE PM INSIST THAT THE PEACE INITIATIVE DID ~~GET~~ A WARM RESPONSE IN EUROPE AND THAT USA OFFICIALS ARE WRONG.

BRIAN KELLEHER: PM TRUDEAU ARRIVED IN TOKYO TODAY TO BRIEF PM NAKASONE ON HIS PEACE PLAN AND WHILE MR. TRUDEAU HAS NOT BEEN AVAILABLE FOR COMMENT HIS AIDES SAY THAT CONTRARY TO WHAT THE USA OFFICIALS ARE QUOTED AS SAYING, EUROPEAN LEADERS WERE GENERALLY FAVOURABLE TO MR. TRUDEAU S PEACE INITIATIVE AND CDA S CONTRIBUTION TO NATO WAS NOT A BIG TOPIC WHEN MR. TRUDEAU TOURED EUROPE LAST WEEK. ONE SPOKESMAN FOR MR. TRUDEAU SAYS IT WOULD BE ~~ADD~~ LOGIC ANYWAY TO ARGUE THAT BECAUSE CDA HAD NOT BEEN SPENDING ENOUGH FOR WAR THAT IT SHOULD NOT TALK ABOUT PEACE. MR. TRUDEAU S AIDE WOULD NOT SAY IF SOME EUROPEAN LEADERS WERE MORE FAVOURABLE THAN OTHERS TO MR. TRUDEAU S INITIATIVE

...3



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
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PAGE THREE IDDZ0178 UNCLASSIFIED

12

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BECAUSE THEY SAY THE PM HIMSELF HAS NOT BEEN WILLING TO GET INTO
THAT. THE AIDES SAY FURTHER THAT MR. TRUDEAU IS NOT DISCOURAGED BY
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND OF FRANCE SAYING THAT HE WONT COME TO A FIVE
NATION NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE WITH CHINA, BRITAIN, THE USA
AND THE SOVIET UNION UNLESS THE TWO SUPERPOWERS FIRST REDUCE THEIR
OWN NUCLEAR STOCK PILES. MR. TRUDEAU S^{OFFICIALS SAY IT WAS ALWAYS EXPECTED} THAT COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE
CONDITIONS FOR ATTENDING SUCH A MTG, BUT THE MAIN THING IS TO KEEP
WORKING TOWARD IT. MR. TRUDEAU MEETS PM NAKASONE TOMORROW HERE IN
TOKYO TO DISCUSS HIS PEACE INITIATIVE, A MTG THAT ^{CDN} OFFICIALS SAY
WAS REQUESTED BY THE JPNSE. MR. TRUDEAU ARRIVED HERE TODAY AT THE
START OF AN 18 DAYS~~S~~ ASIAN AND MIDDLE EAST TOUR THAT INCLUDES THE
COMWEL CONFERENCE IN INDIA NEXT WEEK.
BRIAN KELLEHER IN TOKYO. UNQUOTE.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0177 18NOV83

TO/À

TO PARIS

DELIVER BY 181600

INFO

DISTR

INFO PMDEL/TOKYO PMDEL/DACCA

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RCR IDR IDA FPR-

---PM INITIATIVE:MITTERRAND REMARKS ON FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR CONF

SEVERAL CDN NEWSPAPERS HAVE PICKED UP AFP REPORT OF COMMENTS MADE

WITHIN LAST 48HRS BY PRES MITTERRAND RE FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR CONF.

QUESTIONS ON SUBJ HAVE BEEN PUT TO DEPT AND TO PMDEL TOKYO BY CDN JOURNALISTS.

2.GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PROVIDE ALL ADDRESSEES OF THIS TEL WITH TEXT OR PRECIS OF MITTERRAND REMARKS BY RETURN TEL.

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

L.A.Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

SIG

L.A.Delvoie

MESSAGE

MF

ALL INFORMATION

SECURITY SECURITE

18 Nov 83 16 11z

SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

DEPT. OF PLACED
FM EXTOTT IFB0107 18NOV83

PREFERENCE

TO PMDEL/TOKYO

PMDEL/DHAKA

INFO DELHI

DISTR RBD ETD CPD IDDZ IMC IFB DMF IMD

REF YOURTEL PMDEL0004 18 NOV

---PRIME MINISTER INITIATIVE: POSSIBLE DECLARATION BY CHOGM

WE FULLY AGREE WITH REVISED TEXT OF DECLARATION AS APPROVED BY
PRIME MINISTER.

2. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY
TO TRY TO BRING SEVERAL KEY CHOGM PARTICIPANTS ON BOARD RE
DECLARATION BY MEANS OF PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM. WE THEREFORE
AGREE WITH GENERAL OUTLINE OF STRATEGY CONTAINED IN YOUR REFTEL.
TO LIST OF LEADERS YOU SUGGEST WE WOULD PROPOSE ADDING LEE KUAN YEW.
AND SEC GEN RAMPHAL (NOW IN DELHI). WE ALSO FULLY AGREE THAT PRIME
MINISTER TAKE UP QUESTION WITH KAUNDA AND ERSHAD DURING VISIT TO
DHAKA.

3. AS TO CONTENT OF DEMARCHE, WE BELIEVE THAT NON-SPECIFIC APPROACH
YOU SUGGEST IS LIABLE TO GIVE RISE TO CONSIDERABLE MISAPPREHENSION
AS TO SCOPE OF DECLARATION PRIME MINISTER HAS IN MIND. ON BASIS
OF GUELPH AND MTL SPEECHES, CWLTH LEADERS APPROACHED MIGHT WELL BE
LED TO BELIEVE THAT PRIME MINISTER INTENDS TO PUT FORWARD HIGHLY
ELABORATE PLAN AND DECLARATION RELATING TO SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS TO

...2

DELVOIE/SMITH/JPT

IDDZ/IMC

5-5912

MICHAEL SHENSTONE

001503

PAGE NO. ORIG. NO. 42 D'ORIG

PAGE 2 IFB0107 18NOV83 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

NPT. ALTERNATIVELY, ON BASIS OF AUSTRLN IDEAS ALREADY CURRENT IN
CWLTH CIRCLES (YOU WILL RECALL REPORTS OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN
RAMPHAL AND AUSTRLN AMB FOR DISARMAMENT BUTLER) CWLTH LEADERS MIGHT
BE LED TO BELIEVE THAT PRIME MINISTER HAS IN MIND LONG AND COMPLEX
DECLARATION COVERING NUMEROUS ELEMENTS OF CURRENT DISARMAMENT DEBATE
NEXUS.
AND DISARMAMENT DEVELOPMENT / FURTHERMORE THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER
IDEAS CIRCULATING WHICH MIGHT BLUR ESSENTIAL MSG OF PRIME MINISTER
INITIATIVE, BUT WHICH MIGHT GELL IN NEXT FEW DAYS. WE THEREFORE
BELIEVE THAT AT THIS RELATIVELY LATE DATE IT WOULD BE MOST
DESIRABLE TO PROVIDE CWLTH LEADERS CONCERNED WITH TEXT OF
DECLARATION, WHILE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THIS IS DRAFT ON WHICH
PRIME MINISTER WOULD WISH TO SEEK THEIR VIEWS UPON ARRIVAL IN
DELHI.

4. GRATEFUL YOUR IMMEDIATE REACTION/CONCURRENCE TO THIS APPROACH.

ADDRESS REPLY TO IDDZ AS SHENSTONE LEAVES FOR DELHI TODAY.



TO/A

FILE

FROM/DE

FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

(2) SCRUM: SSEA Nov 18, 1205 As it Happens
(Questions not taped)

Security / Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession / Référence
File / Dossier
Date
November 18, 1983
Number / Numéro
FPR-1090

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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Q. ...

SSEA It's certainly being carried forward by the Prime Minister, but it is an idea that has been under discussion for some time. We have been aware, within the Government, for some months about the deep anxiety, not only in Canada, but in the Western world about the nuclear subject, about arms build-up and this proposal, these ideas that the Prime Minister is putting forward have been developed carefully, basically within my Department, through a specialized group of people. It's just not an overnight effort, it has been carefully thought out and carefully planned and it's a major element in our foreign policy, absolutely.

Q. ...

SSEA Well, I think that the Prime Minister's visit to Europe was an effort to engage the interests of the European countries, both large and small. We know perfectly well, I know perfectly well, that to succeed one has to engage the interest and support of the Europeans, and ultimately, the United States and the super-powers, but the effort is, basically, to change the atmosphere, ever so slightly, to improve the political situation.

Q. ...

SSEA Well, I think that their effort can still go right ahead. It's an inter-Parliamentary Union. It's an effort that can be sponsored by parliamentarians, and whatever attitude was taken by the parliamentarians is a matter for them. I don't see any direct contradiction or any opposition between the two efforts.

..2

- 2 -

Q. ...

SSEA No, I think that he mis-construed, or misunderstood the situation. If the parliamentarians, through their inter-parliamentary union want to proceed in this direction, that is their decision. But how was the Canadian Government to launch this peace initiative? We had it in our minds, how do we get it going? It seemed to me the most (interruption)... Well, that is what we are trying to do. The first thing the Prime Minister did, was to get in touch with the leaders of these European countries, for example. He had written to them, and he had expressed willingness to discuss these matters with them, and they responded. He has had these discussions, so they know we have been painstaking in telling all of them what we propose to do. and quite a number of them have said, at least some of them have said, "Well, yes, Prime Minister, you seem to be quite well equipped". The Foreign Minister of Belgium, for example, Mr. Tindermanns, a former prime minister, said at the press conference that the Prime Minister was uniquely suited, because he was not a European, and he was not an American, and Canada had a good basis from which to begin. So, I would agree a 100% with you that Canada cannot do this alone, and that somebody has to start, and the Prime Minister started and now he is trying to enlist the cooperation of others. If they don't "come aboard", well obviously we cannot do it on our own.

Q. ...

SSEA It seems to me that it is astonishing, to suggest that membership in NATO disqualifies a country from active pursuit of peace. Because the purpose of NATO was to prevent war, through a policy of deterrence, and it has succeeded in that. So, to suggest that there is some contradiction, seems to me is quite mistaken. That is self-evident to me, so I think that our membership in NATO gives us a credibility to talk to the Europeans, all of whom are members of NATO, who share the same values and who share the same democratic system. So I think that enhances our credibility. I pay very little attention, I must say, to the comments, (I pay attention to them, but they don't convince me, they appear to have been made in New York yesterday by middle-rank spokesmen from the United States Government), to suggest that one, (interruption)... No, No, ... They were.. You know... Right. Well, If they were reported accurately, their views seem to be, that in order to play a credible role in the peace movement, the only way to seek peace is to build up armaments. The further point was made - they criticized the fact that we weren't contributing enough to the arms situation. I didn't agree with that. But if that is their view, they misunderstand. We don't believe that the only way to seek peace is through more arms. The purpose of the initiative is to try to create an atmosphere that will bring about successful

- 3 -

reductions in armaments. What is blocking success at the present time, in the various fora; well, there may be many reasons, but certainly a big reason is the very bad atmosphere that exists politically, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Q.

SSEA I had the meeting on Tuesday morning with Mr. Dam, he is a high official. He is next to Mr. Shultz in the State Department, and I didn't get the brush-off, by any means. They have already - the President has replied to the Prime Minister, he has agreed to a meeting, and he has expressed an interest in exploring further with the Prime Minister, his proposals. So that's the President. Now Mr. Dam, on the overall peace initiative, which is the main objective to improve the atmosphere, I found no brush-off at all! There was considerable interest in discussing further specific proposals, in fact we did agree, that we would at an early date, both our countries discuss some of the specifics of the Prime Minister's proposal. But I have taken the view, from the beginning, that specific proposals are a good thing to make at the present time, particularly those that would have the effect in implementing and improving the political atmosphere. But this idea of improving dialogue is a bit bigger than any of the specific proposals that the Prime Minister has put out.

Q.

SSEA I don't think that we are home-free by any means. I don't think that we have had a home-run, but we are trying. The process hasn't been completed, by any means.

Q.

SSEA No, I am not discouraged at that. Because these are very intricate proposals, and they want to examine them further with us. Fine. I wanted to make a point with them that if they were totally opposed to any particular proposal, particularly in the arms-control field, or in future technology, or in satellites, if they had said, "Well, we just can't support that". "Please-let us know" I said. But they are ready to talk about it and find out more about it (the anti-satellite) but my view was that if you don't like any of these particular proposals, please don't brush-off the overall political objective that the

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- 4 -

Prime Minister has in mind; which is more important than any of the particulars.

Q. ...

SSEA I am sure that there is truth in that. No American administration, no president of the United States, no leader at the present time in the Western world, can afford to turn his back on any possible move that might have the effect of improving the political atmosphere. I think that it is quite unlikely that you will find the American administration at any point saying, "No, we think the Prime Minister ought to abandon this". That just won't happen.

Q. ...

SSEA It seems to me they ought to find it a very possible in any electoral campaign. That they are working for a better atmosphere and arms reduction. Remember that at the Williamsburg Summit, the Summit leaders, including the President, said we intend to devote all our political resources in an attempt to bring about solutions, in the way of implementation of the two-track decision, but we would attempt to devote all our political resources to negotiations, and improving the political atmosphere so that we could have some success with the Soviet Union. So, you know the Prime Minister, I think, can say, "Look, we all agreed at the Summit, to devote all our political resources. If we meant that, did we mean it, or was it just words; and if we mean it then I am trying to implement it, and why don't you come aboard and help".

Q. ...

SSEA Well, megaphone diplomacy was Lord Carrington's expression, wasn't it?

Q. ...

SSEA Yes, but I don't think the Americans dislike him for saying that, do they?

Q. ...

SSEA All right.

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
- 5 -

Q.

SSEA Well, my attitude about it is as follows:
we have established a pretty firm basis of consultation
bilaterally and internationally, as well, with the
administration, with Mr. Shultz. and as far as I am concerned
the basis is pretty strong. I don't think that Grenada,
for example, or indeed even less that Mr. Trudeau's peace
initiative will disturb that basic foundation. I think
that Mr. Dam, when we talked about Grenada, as we did on
Tuesday, was of the same view as I was, that even though
we disagreed and may disagree on Grenada, that we had made
such progress in the last year or so, that we ought not to
let Grenada interfere with that consultative progress.
So I am not deeply worried that we are going to disturb
our bilateral relationship, not at all.

Q.

SSEA Thank you, 'bye.


John J. Noble
Director
Media Relations Division



J. Quinn/FPR- 5-1874-jf

TO/À FILE

FROM/DE • FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • CBC News 0800 Nov18 - Prime Minister
SUJET • Trudeau's peace plan

Security/Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

Date

18 November 1983

Number/Numéro

FPR-1086

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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FILE
DIARY
CIRC EXT 407

/several high- level American officials say P.M. Trudeau's peace plan is doomed/ because Canada has been a weak link in the Western alliance. The officials from the Defence and State Department say this country has virtually no credibility on defence matters due to its failure to contribute enough to NATO. Because of this they say the Trudeau initiative is going nowhere.

H. Jones: The occasion was an off the record meeting sponsored by the America society to discuss defence relations and future trends within NORAD and NATO. Under a guarantee of anonymity, USA officials were more than candid in their opinion of Canada's shortcomings as a defence partner. One of them suggested Canada's somewhat stingy attitude undercuts whatever moral authority Canada thinks it has while Mr. Trudeau's proposals are not very feasible. "It's a cop out" said one USA official of the plan. Even the Europeans who are not as cross as we are think that Canada should put its money where its mouth is. Ottawa's view is that the Europeans are in favour of PM Trudeau's initiative but the Americans say the Europeans they have spoken to are puzzled by it and do not in fact view it positively. Various officials warn that European allies are complaining that Canada is benefiting too much from USA defence contracts for a country that contributes so little to NATO. One official said Canada is competing with Denmark to see which can contribute the smallest amount and described that as shameful.

Hal Jones, CBC news New York.

S. Buckley Jones
John J. Noble
Director
Media Relations



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IDDZ

HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK - BRIEFING NOTE
LIVRE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES - NOTES D'INFORMATION

Section

Subject/Highlights Sujet/Points saillants

Canadian Defence and Prime Minister's Initiative

Source

CBC Radio, Ottawa Citizen

Assessment Évaluation

Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

CBC Radio and the Ottawa Citizen today report a vigorous attack on Canada's defence spending and on the Prime Minister's initiative at a conference sponsored yesterday in New York by the Americas Society on Canada-United States Security Options for the 1980s in NATO and the Defence of North America. The conference was open to the press on a "deep background" basis, according to which reporters could not attribute remarks to individuals.

Those USA officials joining the attack included: Ronald Lauder, Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defence; George Bader, Deputy Principal Director, Europe Policy, Dept. of Defence; Bob Montgomery, Deputy Director, Office of Canadian Affairs, State Dept., and Dr. Kenneth Myers, Chairman of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In what appeared to be a spontaneous rather than a deliberately concerted attack on Canadian policy, these middle ranking officials made a number of points:

- Canadian defence policy since 1968 had gone from undesirable to regrettable, to indefensible
- Canada's contribution to NATO vied with Denmark's (or Luxembourg's) for bottom place, and was coming under criticism from European allies as well as the United States
- the problem lay not only with the low percentage of GNP being spent but on neglect of specific roles

~~Suggested Reply~~ Réponse suggérée

- USA was under pressure from European allies to reduce defence purchases from Canada in view of our minimal contribution to collective defence, and found Canada's privileged position in the American market increasingly difficult to justify
- Mr. Lauder predicted there would be more "arm twisting" in the future; the Senate staff member noted that Congress would provide the political context for this, but the administration would apply the pressure. One DOD official noted pressure was already being applied
- the State Department representative said European diplomats in Washington were coming to the State Dept. to ask what the Prime Minister was up to and to express their surprise. He concluded the initiative was not being received well. Others suggested that a country which contributed as little as Canada did not have the weight to take the lead in this way
- Several participants appeared to believe that Canadian voters were willing to attach greater weight to defence than the government, and that for the first time since 1963, defence could be a major issue in the next election. They dismissed opposition from the other side to cruise missile testing as irrelevant
- Although Mr. Blais did not attend the closed morning session at which the attacks took place, he delivered a public keynote speech at lunch time, and dealt with many of these issues. In addition, he held a press conference at which he vigorously rebutted the attacks, which were relayed to him by reporters. National Defence and External Affairs officials who attended the conference also explained and defended the Government's position.

ANSWER

Mr. Blais' office expects that he will arrive back from New York in time for Question Period. In view of his role at the conference they expect he will wish to deal with questions on it. You could, however, make the following points:

- The views attributed to anonymous middle ranking officials do not correspond to those being expressed directly to us by responsible United States Ministers;
- During the Prime Minister's tour of Europe, he received a very favourable hearing from the leaders he met. The skeptical views attributed to "Europeans" by an anonymous middle level State Dept. official do not correspond to the facts.

Prepared by / Préparé par
J.R.Francis

Division Direction

~~idr~~ IDR

Date
Nov. 18/83

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001511

CONFIDENTIAL

November 18, 1983

ME
2

MEMORANDUM FOR: G. Osbaldeston/PCO
T. Axworthy/PMO
A. Darling/PCO
M. Archdeacon/PCO
N. D'Ombraire/PCO
L. Delvoie/Initiative Task Force

Secure Telephone

The Prime Minister's delegation is carrying with it a new special telephone which will permit secure conversations. The mate to the telephone has been set up in Bob Fowler's office (room 202-B Langevin Block).

The telephone is transportable (the whole system fits into and resembles a regular briefcase) and could be set up elsewhere if necessary.

During regular office hours the telephone will be in "a readiness mode" in Fowler's office. At other times it will be locked in a safe in his office, and a technician must be called to set it up.

We have made arrangements to have a technician who is fully conversant with the operation of the telephone available during the Prime Minister's trip to assist with the operation of the telephone. During regular hours (Monday to Friday 8:00 to 17:00) it should not be necessary, but the technician may be reached at 593-5597. At other times the technician may be reached through the Prime Minister's switchboard or his pager. To reach the pager simply dial 598-5540 and wait for the multiple tones to stop. You will then have 15 second to leave a message.

Patricia A. Lortie

Patricia A. Lortie
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PCO/Technical Services/R.S. Wedekamm



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of Canada

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R. FOWLER
RCO

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001513



TO/À Ambassador (through J. Whittleton)

FROM/DE D.G. Longmuir

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Prime Minister's Peace Initiative: Meeting
SUJET with Prime Minister Nakasone

Security/Sécurité CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier 20-JPN-1-3-EUR/W
Date November 18, 1983
Number/Numéro

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Massé
Mr. Fowler
Mr. Pearson
Mr. Smith
Mr. Whittleton

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has informed us that they have today briefed Prime Minister Nakasone on Mr. Trudeau's initiative. Mr. Nakasone asked that a copy of the "Tokyo Statement", of November 1, announced jointly during the visit of Chancellor Kohl, be delivered to Mr. Trudeau before tomorrow's meeting. Mr. Nakasone wished especially to draw Mr. Trudeau's attention to the passage in the statement (paragraph 4) which stresses the need for rational dialogue and negotiation between East and West. President Reagan last week endorsed the Tokyo Statement and it is Mr. Nakasone's hope that Prime Minister Trudeau will also give it his support, since it is entirely consistent with his peace initiative. A copy is attached.

2. The impression of MFA officials is that, given the short time available, Prime Minister Nakasone will have few concrete comments on specific proposals in Prime Minister Trudeau's speech. He can, however, be expected to give wholehearted general support to the initiative.


D.G.L.

File
h

(Unofficial Translation)

"Tokyo Statement"
by the Prime Minister of Japan and
the Chancellor of the Federal Republic
of Germany of November 1, 1983

1. Reaffirming the Statement at Williamsburg as adopted on May 29, 1983, and especially the agreement that the security of the participating countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis, we hereby declare our resolve to exert continuous efforts for the maintenance and protection of freedom, peace and stability for the prosperity of the world economy and the development of the Third World, in solidarity and unity among the free world countries of Japan, the United States, West Europe and other countries, in keeping with the spirit of this Williamsburg Statement.
2. Recent international developments have included, in addition to growing tension in East-West relations, regional conflicts as well as frequent acts of violence in various parts of the world. These trends, should they persist or grow worse, might pose a grave threat to world peace.
3. We believe it is more necessary than ever for the countries of the world to renew their resolve to cope with this global situation, to preserve freedom, peace and stability, to revitalize the world economy, and to secure prosperity

- 2 -

prosperity for the peoples of the world in heightened awareness of their shared responsibility for humanity.

4. In coping with international conflicts or pending issues, we believe that continuous efforts should be made to alleviate and overcome conflicts of opinion by sincerely considering the other parties' positions and conducting rational dialogue and negotiation at the meeting table.

5. We believe that the parties to a conflict or issue should work steadfastly and realistically for final agreement and not disdain the search for step by step measures or gradualist solutions in pursuit of their ultimate aims.

6. We, the countries sharing common political creed, renew our determination to deal resolutely with these issues in solidarity and unity among the West in order to preserve freedom and peace and shall not shirk from making every effort to this end.

**ACTION
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*Mr. Gossage O/R
& file*

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--- INF:MESSSAGE FROM USSR TO PM:PRESS GUIDANCE

QUOTE

WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS INDICATED IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS THAT THE USA NEGOTIATOR IN THE INF TALKS, AMEASSADOR NITZE, HAD RECENTLY PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO RETAIN A LARGE INF FORCE WHILE PROVIDING FOR ZERO US DEPLOYMENTS. THERE IS NO/NO FOUNDATION WHATSOEVER TO THIS SOVIET ASSERTION. LAST WFEKEND SOVIET NEGOTIATOR AMBASSADOR KVITZINKIY CONTACTED AMBASSADOR NITZE TO SAY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED URGENT INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY MOYYOWWO INFORM NITZE THAT IF THE U.S.A. GOVERNMENT WERE TO PROPOSE EQUAL REDUCTIONS OF 572 ON EACH SIDE, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD ACCEPT THAT PROPOSAL. AMEASSADOR KVITSINKIY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WOULD ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO RETAIN AT LEAST 120 SS-20S WITH 360 WARHEADS TARGETTED ON EUROPE, PLUS A COMPARABLE NUMBER IN THE FAR EAST, WHILE THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO FOREGO DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS ALTOGETHER. AMEASSADOR NITZE RESPONDED THAT HE THOUGHT IT CERTAIN THAT WASHINGTON WOULD NOT/NOT CON-
...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2447 SECRET

VEFT A SOVIET PROPOSAL INTO A U.S.A. PROPOSAL. HE UNDERTOOK, HOWEVER, TO COMMUNICATE KVITSINSKIYS STATEMENT TO WASHINGTON.

THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THESE SUGGESTIONS WOULD BE ONLY A SLIGHT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF SS-20S DEPLOYED IN THE WESTERN SOVIET UNION FROM THE NUMBER SET FORTH IN THE OCTOBER 28 ANDROPOV INTERVIEW. THIS WOULD STILL GIVE THE SOVIETS A LARGE MONOPOLY, WITH APPROXIMATELY THE SAME NUMBER OF SS-20S AS THEY HAD DEPLOYED WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN.

THIS SUGGESTION IS IN EFFECT WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS CALLED THE ONE HALF-ZERO UNQUOTE OPTION, UNDER WHICH THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS LARGE FORCES, BUT THE USA CANNOT/NOT DEPLOY A SINGLE SYSTEM. THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE OVER 700 WARHEADS TO ZERO FOR THE USA.

THE SOVIETS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED NOT/NOT TO REQUIRE EXPLICIT COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THE CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THE SOVIET HINT ARE, HOWEVER, UNACCEPTABLE. THE SOVIETS INSISTS ON RETAINING THEIR MONOPOLY ON LONGER-RANGE, LAND-BASED INF MISSILES, WITH SOME 360 SS-20 WARHEADS THREATENING WESTERN EUROPE AND AN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL NUMBER TARGETTED ON THEIR ASIAN NEIGHBORS. THE SOVIETS SAY THAT THEY WILL DEMAND COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES IN SOME OTHER NEGOTIATING FORUM. THIS ESSENTIALLY AMOUNTS TO A CLAIM FOR DOUBLE COMPENSATION IN VIEW OF THEIR DETERMINATION TO RECEIVE DE FACTO COMPENSATION BY MAINTAINING AN LRINF MONOPOLY.

...3

001519

PAGE THREE UNGR2447 SECRET

WE HAVE PUT FORWARD AN IMPORTANT PROPOSAL WHICH AS YOU KNOW CALLS FOR AN EQUAL GLOBAL WARHEAD LEVEL AT 420 WARHEADS; WE HAVE REITERATED OUR READINESS TO DEPLOY LESS THAN OUR GLOBAL QUOTA IN EUROPE AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO APPORTION REDUCTIONS APPROPRIATELY BETWEEN F-II AND GLCM. WE THINK THAT THESE PROPOSALS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT.

WE WOULD NEGOTIATE FOR TWO YEARS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENTS. WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE AFTER DEPLOYMENTS BEGIN. AND, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR, WE ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ANY SYSTEMS UNDER AN AGREEMENT AFTER DEPLOYMENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

UNQUOTE.

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**ACTION
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—EDITORIAL MILWAUKEE JOURNAL 04NOV83: PMS INITIATIVE

POST IS PLEASED TO FAX EDITORIAL QUOTE SOME HELP FROM AN OLD FRIEND
UNQUOTE WHICH APPEARED IN THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL ON 04NOV83 FOLLOWING
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2. THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL (CIRC 310,000) IS THE FOREMOST PAPER IN
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SUCH AS THIS. WE CONTINUE TO SUPPLY BACKGROUND TO THE EDITORIAL
STAFF OF THIS AND OTHER PAPERS.

file
copy given to Mr. Gange

W. Hornby
E.W. Hornby

Public Affairs

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W. Lysne
D.E. Lysne

2/2
ACTION
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Some help from an old friend

Milner June
4 Nov

Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau wants to help close the deep and dangerous gap between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control. By reason of his long, distinctive experience, Trudeau is richly qualified for the task.

It is certainly a job that needs to be done by somebody. Many Americans are genuinely and justifiably frightened by the bitter hatred and distrust that has developed between Washington and Moscow, particularly in the last few years.

It's a terrifying state of affairs. In the nuclear age, there is simply no rational alternative for the two sides but to accommodate to each other — if not out of love, then out of necessity.

Unfortunately, Presidents Reagan and Andropov are hardly on speaking terms, much less on the same wave length. Reagan sees Soviet villainy nearly everywhere, most recently in Lebanon and Grenada. And the Russian shootdown of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 showed anew that the Soviet leadership is inflexible, frightened and capable of gross crimes.

US and Soviet negotiations on strategic (that is, long-range) nuclear weapons and on intermediate-range missiles in Europe are bogged down and may well be suspended in a few weeks. That mutual rigidity lends credence to Trudeau's recent assertion that "the relationship between the superpow-

ers may have become too charged with animosity for East-West relations to be entrusted to them alone."

Trudeau plans to visit five European countries beginning next week to build support for new arms-control proposals. He would like to see an expansion of strategic nuclear arms talks to include all countries that possess such weapons.

Trudeau is an experienced national leader and world statesman. Except for a nine-month period in 1979 and '80, he has been Canada's prime minister since 1968. He has been in office longer, by far, than any other major world leader.

He also knows something about bridging gaps. As prime minister, he has sought to reconcile Canada's French- and English-speaking cultures and to ease the divisions between Canada's often quarrelsome provinces.

Trudeau recently turned 64 and has said he will resign as prime minister before the next election, probably next year. If he can cleanse the polluted atmosphere of East-West nuclear diplomacy and help achieve a new arms agreement, he will end his career with a magnificent flourish.

What do you think?

The Journal invites you to join the debate of public issues. Letters to the editor should be under 200 words. Contributions to the "In my opinion" column should be between 500 and 600 words.

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT FPR1093 18NOV83

TO PMDELDHAKA DELIVER BY 190900

INFO TOKYO PEKIN WSHDC BNATO BREEC BRU LDN PARIS GENEV PRMNY CNGNY
COPEN STKHM LNGLS CHCGO SFRAN DELHI MOSCO ROME EONN PCOOTT/CARON
PMOOTT/SMITH NDHQOTT/DIPOL/DINFO

DISTR MINA MINE MINT DMF IDDZ UGB IFB IDD IDA IDR URR PGB PED

PET PER

---DPM/SSEA INTERVIEW QUOTE AS IT HAPPENS UNQUOTE ON PMS INITIATIVE
18NOV

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF SSEAS INTERVIEW WITH QUOTE AS IT HAPPENS
UNQUOTE TO BE BROADCAST LATER TODAY. WE WERE NOT/NCT ABLE TO RECORD
QUESTIONS OF ELIZABETH GRAY WHICH WILL FOLLOW IN LATER TEL.QUOTE:

Q:...

SSEA: ITS CERTAINLY BEING CARRIED FORWARD BY THE PRIME MINISTER,
BUT IT IS AN IDEA THAT HAS BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION FOR SOME TIME.
WE HAVE BEEN AWARE, WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, FOR SOME MONTHS ABOUT THE
DEEP ANXIETY, NOT/NOT ONLY IN CANADA, BUT IN THE WESTERN WORLD ABOUT
THE NUCLEAR SUBJECT, ABOUT ARMS BUILD-UP AND THIS PROPOSAL, THESE
IDEAS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS PUTTING FORWARD HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED
CAREFULLY, BASICALLY WITHIN MY DEPARTMENT, THROUGH A SPECIALIZED
GROUP OF PEOPLE. ITS JUST NOT/NOT AN OVERNIGHT EFFORT, IT HAS BEEN
CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT AND CAREFULLY PLANNED AND ITS A MAJOR ELEMENT
IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY, ABSOLUTELY.

...2

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Q:...

SSEA:WELL,I THINK THAT THE PRIME MINISTERS VISIT TO EUROPE WAS AN EFFORT TO ENGAGE THE INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES,BOTH LARGE AND SMALL.WE KNOW PERFECTLY WELL,I KNOW PERFECTLY WELL,THAT TO SUCCEED ONE HAS TO ENGAGE THE INTEREST AND SUPPORT OF THE EUROPEANS, AND ULTIMATELY,THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUPER-POWERS,BUT THE EFFORT IS,BASICALLY,TO CHANGE THE ATMOSPHERE,EVER SO SLIGHTLY,TO IMPROVE THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

Q:...

SSEA:WELL,I THINK THAT THEIR EFFORT CAN STILL GO RIGHT AHEAD.ITS AN INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION.ITS AN EFFORT THAT CAN BE SPONSORED BY PARLIAMENTARIANS,AND WHATEVER ATTITUDE WAS TAKEN BY THE PARLIAMENTARIANS IS A MATTER FOR THEM.I DONT SEE ANY DIRECT CONTRADICTION OR ANY OPPOSITION BETWEEN THE TWO EFFORTS.

Q:...

SSEA:NO/NO,I THINK THAT HE MIS-CONSTRUED,OR MISUNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION.IF THE PARLIAMENTARIANS,THROUGH THEIR INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION WANT TO PROCEED IN THIS DIRECTION,THAT IS THEIR DECISION. BUT HOW WAS THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT TO LAUNCH THIS PEACE INITIATIVE? WE HAD IT IN OUR MINDS,HOW DO WE GET IT GOING?IT SEEMED TO ME THE MOST(INTERRUPTION)...

WELL,THAT IS WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO.THE FIRST THING THE PRIME MINISTER DID,WAS TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE LEADERS OF THESE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES,FOR EXAMPLE.HE HAD WRITTEN TO THEM,AND HE HAD EXPRESSED

...3

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WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH THEM, AND THEY RESPONDED. HE HAS HAD THESE DISCUSSIONS, SO THEY KNOW WE HAVE BEEN PAINSTAKING IN TELLING ALL OF THEM WHAT WE PROPOSE TO DO, AND QUITE A NUMBER OF THEM HAVE SAID, AT LEAST SOME OF THEM HAVE SAID, QUOTE WELL, YES, PRIME MINISTER, YOU SEEM TO BE QUITE WELL EQUIPPED UNQUOTE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF BELGIUM, FOR EXAMPLE, MR TINERMANN, A FORMER PRIME MINISTER, SAID AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS UNIQUELY SUITED, BECAUSE HE WAS NOT/NOT A EUROPEAN, AND HE WAS NOT/NOT AN AMERICAN, AND CANADA HAD A GOOD BASIS FROM WHICH TO BEGIN. SO, I WOULD AGREE A 100 PERCENT WITH YOU THAT CANADA CANNOT/NOT DO THIS ALONE, AND THAT SOMEBODY HAS TO START, AND THE PRIME MINISTER STARTED AND NOW HE IS TRYING TO ENLIST THE COOPERATION OF OTHERS. IF THEY DON'T QUOTE COME ABOARD UNQUOTE, WELL OBVIOUSLY WE CANNOT/NOT DO IT ON OUR OWN.

Q:...

SSEA: IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT IS ASTONISHING, TO SUGGEST THAT MEMBERSHIP IN NATO DISQUALIFIES A COUNTRY FROM ACTIVE PURSUIT OF PEACE. BECAUSE THE PURPOSE OF NATO WAS TO PREVENT WAR, THROUGH A POLICY OF DETERRENCE, AND IT HAS SUCCEEDED IN THAT. SO, TO SUGGEST THAT THERE IS SOME CONTRADICTION, SEEMS TO ME IS QUITE MISTAKEN. THAT IS SELF-EVIDENT TO ME, SO I THINK THAT OUR MEMBERSHIP IN NATO GIVES US A CREDIBILITY TO TALK TO THE EUROPEANS, ALL OF WHOM ARE MEMBERS OF NATO, WHO SHARE THE SAME VALUES AND WHO SHARE THE SAME DEMOCRATIC

...4

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SYSTEM.SO I THINK THAT ENHANCES OUR CREDIBILITY.I PAY VERY LITTLE ATTENTION,I MUST SAY,TO THE COMMENTS,I PAY ATTENTION TO THEM,BUT THEY DONT CONVINCE ME,THEY APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN MADE IN NEW YORK YESTERDAY BY MIDDLE-RANK SPOKESMEN FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,TO SUGGEST THAT ONE,(INTERRUPTION)...

NO,NO,...THEY WERE..YOU KNOW...RIGHT.WELL,IF THEY WERE REPORTED ACCURATELY,THEIR VIEWS SEEM TO BE,THAT IN ORDER TO PLAY A CREDIBLE ROLE IN THE PEACE MOVEMENT,THE ONLY WAY TO SEEK PEACE IS TO BUILD UP ARMAMENTS.THE FURTHER POINT WAS MADE-THEY CRITICIZED THE FACT THAT WE WERENT CONTRIBUTING ENOUGH TO THE ARMS SITUATION.I DIDNT AGREE WITH THAT.BUT IF THAT IS THEIR VIEW,THEY MISUNDERSTAND. WE DONT BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY WAY TO SEEK PEACE IS THROUGH MORE ARMS.THE PURPOSE OF THE INITIATIVE IS TO TRY TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE THAT WILL BRING ABOUT SUCCESSFUL REDUCTIONS IN ARMAMENTS.WHAT IS BLOCKING SUCCESS AT THE PRESENT TIME,IN THE VARIOUS FORA;WELL,THERE MAY BE MANY REASONS,BUT CERTAINLY A BIG REASON IS THE VERY BAD ATMOSPHERE THAT EXISTS POLITICALLY,PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

Q:...

SSEA:I HAD THE MEETING ON TUESDAY MORNING WITH MR DAM.HE IS A HIGH OFFICIAL.HE IS NEXT TO MR SHULTZ IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT,AND I DIDNT GET THE BRUSH-OFF,BY ANY MEANS.THEY HAVE ALREADY-THE PRESIDENT HAS REPLIED TO THE PRIME MINISTER,HE HAS AGREED TO A MEETING,AND ...5

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HE HAS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN EXPLORING FURTHER WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, HIS PROPOSALS. SO THATS THE PRESIDENT. NOW MR DAM, ON THE OVERALL PEACE INITIATIVE, WHICH IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE, I FOUND NO/NO FRUSH-OFF AT ALL. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN DISCUSSING FURTHER SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, IN FACT WE DID AGREE, THAT WE WOULD AT AN EARLY DATE, BOTH OUR COUNTRIES DISCUSS SOME OF THE SPECIFICS OF THE PRIME MINISTERS PROPOSAL. BUT I HAVE TAKEN THE VIEW, FROM THE BEGINNING, THAT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ARE A GOOD THING TO MAKE AT THE PRESENT TIME, PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT IN IMPLEMENTING AND IMPROVING THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE. BUT THIS IDEA OF IMPROVING DIALOGUE IS A BIT BIGGER THAN ANY OF THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS PUT OUT.

1:...

SSEA: I DONT THINK THAT WE ARE HOME-FREE BY ANY MEANS. I DONT THINK THAT WE HAVE HAD A HOME-RUN, BUT WE ARE TRYING. THE PROCESS HASNT BEEN COMPLETED, BY ANY MEANS.

Q:...

NO/NO, I AM NOT/NOT DISCOURAGED AT THAT. BECAUSE THESE ARE VERY INTRICATE PROPOSALS, AND THEY WANT TO EXAMINE THEM FURTHER WITH US. FINE. I WANTED TO MAKE A POINT WITH THEM THAT IF THEY WERE TOTALLY OPPOSED TO ANY PARTICULAR PROPOSAL, PARTICULARLY IN THE ARMS-CONTROL FIELD, OR IN FUTURE TECHNOLOGY, OR IN SATELLITES, IF THEY HAD SAID, QUOTE WELL, WE JUST CANT SUPPORT THAT UNQUOTE. QUOTE PLEASE LET US

...6

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KNOW UNQUOTE I SAID.BUT THEY ARE READY TO TALK ABOUT IT AND FIND OUT MORE ABOUT IT(THE ANTI-SATELLITE)EUT MY VIEW WAS THAT IF YOU DONT LIKE ANY OF THESE PARTICULAR PROPOSALS,PLEASE DONT BRUSH-OFF THE OVERALL POLITICAL OBJECTIVE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS IN MIND; WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANY OF THE PARTICULARS.

Q:...

SSEA:I AM SURE THAT THERE IS TRUTH IN THAT.NO/NO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION,NO/NO PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,NO/NO LEADER AT THE PRESENT TIME IN THE WESTERN WORLD,CAN AFFORD TO TURN HIS BACK ON ANY POSSIBLE MOVE THAT MIGHT HAVE THE EFFECT OF IMPROVING THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE.I THINK THAT IT IS QUITE UNLIKELY THAT YOU WILL FIND THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION AT ANY POINT SAYING,QUOTE NO/NO,WE THINK THE PRIME MINISTER OUGHT TO ABANDON THIS UNQUOTE. THAT JUST WONT HAPPEN.

Q:...

SSEA:IT SEAMS TO ME THEY OUGHT TO FIND IT A VERY POSSIBLE IN ANY ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN.THAT THEY ARE WORKING FOR A BETTER ATMOSPHERE AND ARMS REDUCTION.REMEMBER THAT AT THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT,THE SUMMIT LEADERS,INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT,SAID WE INTEND TO DEVOTE ALL OUR POLITICAL RESOURCES IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT SOLUTIONS,IN THE WAY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TWO-TRACK DECISION,BUT WE WOULD ATTEMPT TO DEVOTE ALL OUR POLITICAL RESOURCES TO NEGOTIATIONS,AND IMPROVING THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE SO THAT WE COULD HAVE SOME

...7

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SUCCESS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SO, YOU KNOW THE PRIME MINISTER, I THINK, CAN SAY, QUOTE LOOK, WE ALL AGREED AT THE SUMMIT, TO DEVOTE ALL OUR POLITICAL RESOURCES. IF WE MEANT THAT, DID WE MEAN IT, OR WAS IT JUST WORDS; AND IF WE MEAN IT THEN I AM TRYING TO IMPLEMENT IT, AND WHY DONT YOU COME ABOARD AND HELP UNQUOTE.

Q:...

SSEA: WELL, MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY WAS LORD CARRINGTONS EXPRESSION, WASNT IT?

Q:...

SSFA: YES, BUT I DONT THINK THE AMERICANS DISLIKE HIM FOR SAYING THAT, DO THEY?

Q:...

SSEA: ALL RIGHT.

Q:...

SSEA: WELL, MY ATTITUDE ABOUT IT IS AS FOLLOWS: WE HAVE ESTABLISHED 1 PRETTY FIRM BASIS OF CONSULTATION BILATERALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, AS WELL, WITH THE ADMINISTRATION, WITH MR SHULTZ. AND AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED THE BASIS IS PRETTY STRONG. I DONT THINK THAT GRENADA, FOR EXAMPLE, OR INDEED EVEN LESS THAT MR TRUDEAUS PEACE INITIATIVE WILL DISTURB THAT BASIC FOUNDATION. I THINK THAT MR DAM, WHEN WE TALKED ABOUT GRENADA, AS WE DID ON TUESDAY, WAS OF THE SAME VIEW AS I WAS, THAT EVEN THOUGH WE DISAGREED IN THE LAST YEAR OR SO, THAT WE OUGHT NOT/NOT TO LET GRENADA INTERFERE WITH THAT CONSULTATIVE PROGRESS.

...8

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SO I AM NOT/NOT DEEPLY WORRIED THAT WE ARE GOING TO DISTURB OUR
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP,NOT/NOT AT ALL.

Q:...

SSEA:THANK YOU,BYE.UNQUOTE.

2.FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF 18NOV DPM/SSEA SCRUM AFTER QUESTION
PERIOD RE SAME ISSUE.QUOTE:

Q:THE FRENCH PRESIDENT HAS SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT/NOT WANT TO TAKE
PART IN THE FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE,UNTIL THE USSR AND THE
USA HAVE REACHED SOME KIND OF ARMS LIMITATION.DO YOU THINK THIS IS
A SET-BACK FOR MR TRUDEAUS PEACE PLAN,OR DOES IT MATTER?

SSEA:I AM NOT/NOT AWARE THAT M.MITTERAND MADE THIS COMMENT,BUT IF
YOU TELL ME HE DID,THEN I ACCEPT YOUR WORD FOR IT.I HAD THE
IMPRESSION FROM THE DISCUSSION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD WITH
THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE,THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO ENTERTAIN,REFLECT
UPON AT LEAST,THESE NOTIONS,INCLUDING THE FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE.
BUT I HAVE TAKEN THE VIEW FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE PRIME MINISTERS
OVERALL INITIATIVE,WHICH IS POLITICAL IN NATURE DOES NOT/NOT
NECESSARILY REST FOR ITS SUCCESS UPON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY
PARTICULAR SPECIFIC PROPOSAL.WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS INTENDING
TO DO,IS IMPROVE THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE,TO TRY TO IMPROVE THE
DIALOGUE,TO CHANGE THE RHETORIC AND IS MAKING SOME SUGGESTIONS.
WHY DONT WE TRY THE CDE;WHY DONT WE LOOK AT THE MEFR;MAYBE WE CAN
GET THE DIALOGUE GOING IN THESE PARTICULAR INSTITUTIONS,OR FORUMS.

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SO I AM PERSONALLY OF THE VIEW THAT THE PEACE INITIATIVE IS BROADER AND DEEFER AND DOESNT REST FOR ITS SUCCESS ON THE IMPLFMENT-ATION OF ANY OF THESE PARTICULAR GOOD IDEAS IMMEDIATELY.

Q: THERE WAS ALSO A REPORT OUT OF NEW YORK THAT SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS SAID THAT MR TRUDEAU HAD NO/NO MORAL RIGHT, OR NO/NO PARTICULAR MORAL RIGHT TO PROMOTE PEACE WHEN CANADA WAS LAGGING IN ITS EXPENDITURES IN NATO AND MUTUAL DEFENCE. DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO THAT?

SSEA: WELL, I THINK IF THAT IS A DEEPLY HELD VIEW, THEN IT MAKES EVEN MORE URGENT THE TYPE OF THING MR TRUDEAU IS ATTEMPTING. BUT THAT MISCONCEPTION WOULD SEEM TO REST ON THE IDEA, THAT THE ONLY WAY, THE SOLE WAY OF PROMOTING PEACE IS THROUGH ARMS BUILD-UP. THAT IS NCT/NOT THE ONLY WAY.

Q: IS THAT THE ONLY RECEPTION THAT YOU GOT THIS WEEK, THOUGH, WHEN YOU TALKED TO THE AMERICAN OFFICIALS? OR WHY HAS THIS CONTRADICTION BEEN ALLOWED TO ARISE? BECAUSE YOU SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTERS PROPOSALS DID MEET WITH SUCCESS IN EUROPE.

SSEA: THE PROPOSALS WHICH HE HAS MADE ARE QUITE SPECIFIC. FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOMETHING POLITICAL BE DONE AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, THAT IT SHOULD BE LAUNCHED IN A POLITICAL WAY AND HOPE THAT THAT CAN BE USED TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE. WELL, THAT IDFA REMAINS FOR THE FUTURE, AND WE HOPE WE CAN MAKE SOME PROGRESS WITH IT. SO I THNK IT WOULD BE A BAD APPROACH TO SAY: QUOTE WELL EACH ...10

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SPECIFIC, IF THERE IS SOME NEGATIVE REACTION TO IT, THEREFORE THE INITIATIVE IS DERAILED UNQUOTE. I THINK THE INITIATIVE IS MUCH BIGGER THAN THAT.

Q: MR MACEACHEN, ANOTHER QUICK MATTER. THIS WEEK THERE HAS BEEN A TRADE DELEGATION FROM TAIWAN IN CANADA. THEY SAY THAT THERE HAVE BEEN MANY OBSTACLES PLACED IN THE WAY OF THE TAIWANESE AND CANADIAN BUSINESSMEN TO DEAL WITH ONE ANOTHER. IS THERE ANY PLAN ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT TO OPEN SOME KIND OF TRADE MISSION IN TAIWAN? OTHER COUNTRIES, APPARENTLY THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN DO SO UNDER SOME OTHER NAME, OTHER THAN THEIR GOVERNMENT?

SSFA: NO/NO, WE DONT INTEND TO OPEN AN OFFICIAL TRADE MISSION OR CENTRE IN TAIWAN, BECAUSE WE HAVE MADE THAT DECISION A LONG TIME AGO, WHEN WE OPENED OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA. WE RECOGNIZE THAT GOVERNMENT, AND THAT MEANT WE COULDN'T HAVE A DUAL-CHINA POLICY. IT IS A SINGLE CHINA POLICY, AND WE HAVE OUR OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE P.R.C. IF THE CANADIAN BUSINESSMEN, AS THEY DO, PROMOTE TRADE WITH TAIWAN, THEN THAT IS THEIR BUSINESS AND IT IS AN ACTIVITY THAT WE DONT OPPOSE, THAT WE DONT OBJECT TO. BUT ITS NOT/NOT OFFICIAL, ITS NOT/NOT A WAY OF RECOGNIZING TAIWAN IN A POLITICAL WAY. UNQUOTE.

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MESSAGE

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Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

CURITY
SECURITE

UNCLASSIFIED

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PMOOTT/COLEMAN

PCOOTT/FOWLER

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JB/SUJ

TRUDEAU MAY HAVE SOMETHING

COMCENTRE: PLS COPY ATTACHED TEXT.

file
Mr. Gossage
copy given to

FOR TOP
COMMUNICATIONS
NOV 18 23 07 '83
CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

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F. Gossage

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

2/2
Editorial
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Subject
Sujet

MOITIE
SUITE A DOMMER

Date 15 November 1983 Publication La Presse

Trudeau May Have Something

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada, convinced that an atmosphere of mutual animosity is getting in the way of nuclear-arms agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, has embarked on an ambitious diplomatic effort to defuse tensions by creating a new international forum for arms-control discussions. From what is known of the Trudeau plan, it is unlikely to do any harm and might do a great deal of good.

Trudeau tested European reactions in quick visits to seven capitals last week. This week he plans to touch base with Washington before going on to Tokyo next weekend.

Details of the Canadian leader's plan are still vague. But his main proposal is to broaden arms-control talks to include France, Great Britain and China, along with the United States and the Soviet Union.

Asides to Trudeau say that such talks would be independent of existing negotiations between the superpowers. But the prime minister obviously believes that an enlarged forum of the sort that he proposes will become especially important if the Soviets walk out of the Euro-missile negotiations in Geneva, as they have threatened to do if U.S.-supplied cruise and Pershing 2 missiles are deployed in Western Europe.

President Reagan made still another effort Monday to avert a collapse of the talks. U.S. negotiators handed the Soviets a new proposal that would limit each side to 420 warheads on medium-range nuclear missiles worldwide. Since the Soviet SS-20 missiles have three warheads each, that would require the Russians to reduce their SS-20 force from 360 in the European and Asian parts of the Soviet Union to 140. Washington made it clear that it would not insist on matching the Russians warhead-for-warhead in Europe.

Soviet leader Yuri V. Andropov himself has offered to reduce the SS-20 force deployed against Western Europe to 140 missiles, but only if no U.S.-supplied missiles are deployed in Western Europe by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Even before the amended Reagan offer was made

official, Moscow dismissed it as "patently unacceptable." Meanwhile, cruise missiles already have begun to arrive in Britain for deployment before the year is out.

Thus the stage may be set for a Soviet walkout not only from the Euro-missile talks but also, if past threats are to be believed, from the strategic arms negotiations and the long-running talks on mutual troop reductions in Central Europe.

Whether or not the Soviets carry their war of nerves that far, the Trudeau plan is worth consideration.

Arms-control negotiations are awfully complex even when only two parties are talking. They become much more so when the circle is expanded. It is not very realistic, therefore, to think that the nuts and bolts of U.S.-Soviet nuclear-arms reductions can be worked out in a multilateral setting. Furthermore, it is far from clear—despite the friendly reception that Trudeau got in Europe last week—that the Chinese or even the British and the French are ready to throw their own nuclear forces onto the bargaining table.

What five-power talks might be able to do, however, is to provide a forum in which U.S. and Soviet diplomats could talk without losing face. This is especially important with regard to Moscow, given all the doors that the Russians have slammed behind them.

The Trudeau proposal comes at a time of uncertainty over Andropov's health and speculation that Soviet policies—in arms control and other areas—may be on hold until the leadership situation is clarified. The West cannot affect the power struggle, if one is indeed under way, but it is important to keep the lines to Moscow open just in case an opportunity for better relations does arise.

In sum, an enlarged forum of the sort proposed by the Canadian leader is no magic solution; certainly it is no substitute for direct talks between the great powers. But as a way of keeping the East-West political dialogue going when bilateral contacts between Moscow and Washington have turned sour, it is well worth considering.

Mr. Delors

Why not? If you agree, OK do easy.

John

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR8131 18NOV83

TO EXTOTT IIDZ

INFO BONN VMBFR PEKIN MOSCO LDM PARIS BRU HAGUE OSLO COPEN
LSPON MBRID ATHNS ANKRA ROME WSHDC GENEV NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/AIMPOL/
CPP PCOOTT/FOWLER PRMNY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFF RGF RCR RCD RSR UGB URR IID IDA DMEX
RFF YOURTEL 0167 17NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:LET TO HEADS OF NATO GOVTS

MAY I HAVE YOUR PERMISSION TO CIRCULATE TEXT IN RFFTEL TO
MY COLLEAGUES HERE, WITH SUITABLE MINOR EDITING? ALL OF THEM
COULD OF COURSE ASK FOR LETTER FROM THEIR CAPITALS? BUT
EASIEST WAY TO BRING THEM INTO PICTURE IS TO CIRCULATE TEXT
HFFE, IF POSSIBLE BEFORE AMBASSADORS WEEKLY LUNCH ON 22NOV,
AND THEN DRAW ATTENTION TO IT AS REQUIRED IN COUNCIL AND IN
COMMITTEES. IN PARTICULAR TO REFERENCE TO INITIATIVE ON CDE
AND MFR DPM WOULD BE TAKING AT DEC MINISTERIAL

TAYLOR

CCC/298 181441Z YBGR8131

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned _____

Person _____

Local Time _____

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE PARIS WIGR5337 18NOV83

A EXOTTT LIDDZ LIVRAISON 181300

INFO TOKYO/PMDEL DHAAA/PMDEL

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RCR IDR IDA FPP

REF NOSTELS WIGR5327 5330 17NOV VOTRETEL IDIZ0177 18NOV

---INITIATIVE DU PM - PROPOS DU PRES FRANCAIS SUR CONF DES CING
NUCLEAIRES

SOMMAIREMENT. PRES FRANCAIS A INDIQUE CIT QU IL FAUT COMPARER
CE QUI EST COMPARABLE FINCIT ET A RAPPELE TROIS CONDITIONS CIT
QUI DOIVENT ETRE RETENUES AVANT QUE FRANCE PUISSE SONGER A
S ENGAGER DANS UNE NEGOCIATION FINCIT AVEC QUATRE AUTRES PUISSANCES
NUCLEAIRES I.E. (A) REDUCTION CIT CONSIDERABLE FINCIT PAR DEUX
GRANDS DE LEURS PROPRES ARSENAUX NUCLEAIRES; (B) REDUCTION CIT DU
NIVEAU DES ARMES CLASSIQUES FINCIT; (C) INTERDICTION DES ARMES
BIOLOGIQUES, CHIMIQUES ET DES ARMEMENTS ANTI-SOUS-MARINS, ANTI-
MISSILES ET ANTISATELLITES..A-T-IL AJOUTE CIT CES CONDITIONS SONT
DIFFICILES MAIS ESSENTIELLES FINCIT (RE PARA 6 NOTRETEL 5327).

2. POUR CONTEXTE NE POUVONS QUE NOUS REFERER AU COMPTE-RENDU
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FINCIT DU 18NOV ET QUI EST LE PLUS COMPLET DONT DISPOSONS A DATE.

3. PROPOS DE MITTERRAND SONT DONC PRESQUE MOT A MOT LES MEMES QUE
CEUX ENONCES DANS SON DISCOURS DU 28SEP DEVANT AGNU SUR CE SUJET.
SANS AUCUNE NOUVEAUTE.

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ACTION
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM WSPDC UNGR2449 16NOV83

TO EXTOTT LDDZ DELIVER BY 190900

INFO MOSCO BNATO PRMNY PEKIN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN ROME
HAGUE BONN PARIS LDN BRU PMDELTOKYO NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPCL/CP
DISTR MINA USS IMF IFF URGE URR RGF UGE RBR IDD IDR IDA URR
REF YOURTEL IIDZ0176 17NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE:LET TO PRES REAGAN AND USA REACTIONS

SUMMARY:MTG WITH STATE DEPT OFFICIALS REVEALED THAT IT IS ADMIN
POLICY TO BE PUBLICLY POSITIVE IN GENERAL WAY ABOUT PM TRUDEAU
EFFORTS BUT THAT THERE ARE QUARTERS IN ADMIN,NOTABLY DOD,WHICH
WOULD HAVE WISHED ADMIN TO OBJECT TO TRUDEAU EFFORTS AT OUTSET.
MOREOVER,ADMIN DOES FIND ITSELF UNABLE TO AGREE TO VIRTUALLY ANY
OF THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.IT IS USA POLICY THAT STATE OF EAST-
WEST RELATIONS IS NOT/NOT DANGEROUS,BUT THERE IS GRUDGING PRIVATE
ADMISSION THAT,OF COURSE,SUCH RELATIONS COULD AND SHOULD BE
IMPROVED IN DIRECTION PM TRUDEAU IS AIMING AT,EVEN IF SUCH EFFORTS
ARE FELT TO BE BOTHERSOME.

2.REPORT:WE MET JOINTLY THIS AFTERNOON WITH DEPUTY ASST SECTY OF
STATE FROM MULTILATERAL(DOBBINS)AND BILATERAL(MEDAS)SILES,IOTH
TO TURN OVER MOST RECENT LET FROM PM TRUDEAU TO REAGAN AND TO TRY
TO MAKE EMPHATICALLY SOME BASIC POINTS ABOUT PM INITIATIVE,IN VIFW
OF CRITICAL ANONYMOUS COMMENTS EMERGING FROM AMERICAS SOCIETY MTG
ON DEFENCE HELD YESTERDAY IN NYORK.

...2

NOTED
DATE 10/10/81
BY 10173

PAGE TWO UNGR2449 CONFID CEO

3.WE SAID THAT ANONYMOUS COMMENTS THAT WERE MADE WHICH WERE CRITICAL OF CREDIBILITY OF PMS EFFORTS WERE OBVIOUSLY CONTRADICTIONARY TO WHAT HAS BEEN SAID BY DAM AND BY EAGLEBURGER.WE URGED DOEBINS AND MEDAS TO BE SURE THAT CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS OF KIND MADE IN NYORK DID NOT/NOT PASS INTERDEPARTMENTALLY WITHOUT IT BEING STRESSED THAT PMS EFFORTS ARE AIMED AT IMPROVING EAST-WEST CLIMATE SO THAT ARMS CONTROL NEGOS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL,NOT/NOT AT ANY COST BUT ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO USA.PM WAS MAKING HIMSELF AVAILABLE AS A RESOURCE TO ASSIST OUR COMMON PURPOSE.HE WAS NOT/NOT DOING SO IN ANY POLITICALLY EQUIDISTANT POSTURE BETWEEN WSHDC AND MOSCO BUT CONSIDERED HIS EFFORTS CLD BE USEFUL TO ALL CONCERNED.IN ANY EVENT, WE AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT PM WOULD NOT/NOT DO ANYTHING TO INTERFERE IN USA-USSR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS OR DETRACT FROM ALLIED UNITY ON INF DEPLOYMENT.

4.DOEINS SAID THAT SUCH PRESS COMMENTS AS WERE MADE IN NYORK REFLECTED VIEWS IN DEPT OF DEFENSE WHICH HAD ARGUED FOR NEGATIVE REPLY TO PMS LET.HE SAID THAT USA HAS BEEN REMARKABLY POSITIVE IN RESPONDING THUS FAR TO THE PMS INITIATIVE BOTH PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY.ADMIN HAS GONE OUT OF ITS WAY TO TRY TO EMPHASIZE THE POSITIVE.HOWEVER,IF USA IS PRESSED TOO HARD BY PEOPLE LOOKING FOR COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ADMIN SPOKESMEN MAY WELL HAVE TO SAY WHAT THEY THINK.THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS SPECIFICS IS NOT/NOT POSITIVE.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2449 CONF D CEO

5. DOBBINS ALSO MADE POINT THAT IT IS USA QUOTE POLICY UNQUOTE THAT EAST-WEST RELATIONS ARE NOT/NOT IN A DANGEROUS STATE. USA HAS BEEN EMPHASIZING THAT COMMUNICATION IN FACT IS GOING ON. HE ARGUED THAT IT IS A SOVIET PLOY TO DEPICT THE CURRENT WORLD SIT IN AS SERIOUS A MANNER AS POSSIBLE. USA IS TRYING TO CONVINCE PUBLIC THAT THERE IS NO/NO REASON FOR EXTRAVAGANT FEAR. SITUATION IS IN CONTROL.

6. WE SAID THAT WE RECOGNIZED WHY IT WAS USA POLICY TO TAKE THIS LINE. HOWEVER, IN MAKING OBSERVATION AT BASIS OF HIS ANALYSIS THAT USA-USSR RELATIONS HAD DETERIORATED AND THAT CRISIS COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT COULD STAND IMPROVEMENT AS COULD OVERALL EAST-WEST POLITICAL CLIMATE. PM WAS STATING OPINION THAT WAS VIRTUALLY UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED IN WEST. IT WAS IMPLICIT (ALTHOUGH NOT/NOT SPOKEN) THAT DOBBINS AND HIS COLLEAGUES AGREED WITH POINT AND WERE NOT/NOT IN FACT ARGUING WITH VALIDITY OF THE CONCERN BEHIND THE PMS INITIATIVE.

7. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION HE SOUGHT FOLLOWING MTG. MELAS GAVE ANOTHER GLOSS TO COMMENTS. HE SAID THERE WERE POLITICAL ARGUMENTS THAT USA SHOULD NOT/NOT BE SEEN TO DISAGREE WITH CDA AT THIS TIME WHICH MADE REAGAN LET AS POSITIVE AS IT WAS. NEVERTHELESS THERE WAS A CLEAR PUSH-PULL IN THE ARMS CONTROL AREA. HE CONFIRMED PENTAGON HAD MADE A REAL RUN AT TRYING TO TURN OFF PMS INITIATIVE AND HAD TRIED TO ENSURE A VERY NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO LET. THIS SEEMED TO US TO BE MEDAS WAY OF EXPLAINING VERY NEGATIVE DOD COMMENTS THAT ...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR2449 CONFID CEO

WERE REPORTED OUT OF NYORK SEMINAR. MEDAS SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY AND OTHER USA OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN PRESSED VERY HARD TO NAY-SAY THE PMS INITIATIVE BY CDN JOURNALISTS. ACCORDING TO MEDAS, THEY HAVE AVOIDED SUCCUMING BUT MEDAS IMPLIED THAT IT IS NOT/NOT ALWAYS EASY TO DO SO NOR/NOR CAN ONE ACCOUNT FOR HOW JOURNALISTS PLAY THE ISSUE. MEDAS SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY SEES THIS INITIATIVE IN TERMS OF CDAS REAL AND LEGITIMATE NATIONAL INTERESTS, IE MAIN THREAT TO CDAS SECURITY IS A WAR BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. THEREFORE EVERYTHING PM DOES TO MAKE SUCH A WAR LESS LIKELY IS IN RESPONSE TO A PRIMARY NATIONAL INTEREST, THOUGH OF COURSE EVERYBODY SHARED IT. WE TOLD MEDAS THAT THIS SEEMED REASONABLE APPROACH FOR DEALING WITH ISSUE WITH PRESS AND WAS NOT/NOT ONE THAT WE WLD CONTRADICT.

8. IN A THIRD CONVERSATION, RICHARD HAASS, DEPT. IN EUROPEAN BUREAU FOR POLICY PLANNING AND PERSON IN STATE DEPT CLOSEST TO RICHARD BURT (WHO IS AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE PRIVATELY NEGATIVE IN HIS RESPONSES TO THIS INITIATIVE), SPOKE NEGATIVELY ABOUT PROPOSAL FOR REINVIGORATING MEFR AND ALSO FOR CDE HIGH LEVEL MTG. LIKE DOBBINS HE SAID THAT SEC SHULTZ WLD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO ATTEND SUCH A CDE MTG BECAUSE OF VISIT OF CHINESE PM SAME WEEK AS WELL AS OTHER HIGH PRESSURE ACTIVITIES IN WSHDC INCLUDING STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS. BUT HE INDICATED THERE WAS PERSISTENT LACK OF ENTHUSIASM ON CDE PER SE. ON MBFR HAASS WAS EVEN MORE NEGATIVE ARGUING

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR2449 CONFD CEO

BASICALLY THAT MBFR WAS NOT/NOT A PROCESS THAT SOME ON STRATEGIC SIDE IN ADMIN WOULD LIKE TO SEE FURTHERED. IN HIS VIEW THESE TALKS ARE NO/NO LONGER EVEN A GOOD IDEA. WE HAD DIFFICULTY DRAWING HIM ON THIS POINT OF VIEW BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE TALKS WERE STRATEGIC AND MILITARY RATHER THAN POLITICAL. HE REFUSED TO ATTRIBUTE POSITIVE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE TO A POSSIBLE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THESE TALKS OR TO PROGRESS IN THEM, SAYING THE LAST THING WE WANT IS PROGRESS IN MBFR.

9. OVERALL, HAASS REFLECTS VIEW THAT IS STILL CURRENT IN THIS ADMIN THAT IMPROVED POLITICAL CLIMATE CAN BEST RESULT FROM PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL TALKS WHICH SUCCEED, RATHER THAN BEING PREREQUISITE FOR SUCH SUCCESS.

10. FIRST THING NEXT WEEK EMB SHALL ADDRESS BEST NEXT MOVES AND EMPHASES IN HOW ISSUES INVOLVED CAN BEST BE MANAGED IN USA VIA PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGIES.

CCC/241 190010Z UNGR2449

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MF
h2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM CNBRA YAGR1813 18NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ DELIVER BY 180900

INFO PARIS LDN WSHDC BONN ROME MOSCO WLGTN BRU BNATO DELHI

PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR DMF IFB UGE RGB RSD RCD IBD IDR IDA FPR PPD FPR URP

RFF OURTEL YAGR1796 16NOV

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE

WE WOULD ADD FOLLOWING NUANCE TO FM CHEYSSONS RELUCTANCE
TO ENGAGE IN FIVE POWER TALKS. CHEYSSON NOTED THAT IN ADDITION
TO NUMEERS OF ARMS, FRENCH NUCLEAR WARHEADS WERE
QUANTATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF USA AND USSR. IN
TERMS OF QUOTE BETTER COMPARISON UNQUOTE OF ARMAMENTS AS
PRECONDITION FOR FRANCE ENGAGING IN TALKS, FRANCE WOULD WISH
TO NEGOTIATE ONLY OVER ARMS OF A KIND SIMILAR TO ITS OWN.

CCC/276 180432Z YAGR1813

MF
28

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

R E S T R I C T E D

FM CNBRA YAGR1812 18NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 180900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER/JOHNSON DELHI

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB PGB PPD PPR IMC IDD IDA

RFF YOURTFL IDDZ0162 17NOV

---PM INITIATIVE

PM HAWKE LEFT CNBRA FOR DARWIN YESTERDAY ON FIRST LEG OF
TRIP TO BNGKK-DELHI. WE PROVIDED TEXT OF LETTER TO
CONYBFARE (FIRST ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL
DIVISION, DEPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET) WHO LEAVE
CNBRA THIS AFTERNOON TO JOIN PM AND PARTY. THUS PM SHOULD
HAVE TEXT BY THIS EVENING.

CCC/276 180339Z YAGR1812

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA1809 18NOV83

TO CNERA

INFO PARIS LDN WSHDC BONN ROME MOSCO BRU BNATO DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR ADDZ DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCE IBD IDR IDAO IDAN FPR PPD PPR
URR

REF YOURTEL YAGR1796 16NOV

---PM INITIATIVE

FOR YOUR INFO, SEISMOLOGICAL EXPERT IN OTT CONSIDERS THAT FRENCH
FM CHEYSSONS DEFENCE OF FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING IN SOUTH PACIFIC BY
IMPLYING NECESSITY TO TEST IN BASALT FORMATIONS IS TOTALLY UNFOUNDED.
DURING 1960S FRANCE DID ITS TESTING IN SAHARAS GRANITE FORMATIONS
UNTIL ASKED TO CEASE BY ALGERIA. AS BASALT IS NOT/NOT SOLE GEOLOGICAL
FORMATION THAT IS SUITABLE FOR NUCLEAR TESTING CONSIDER CHEYSSON
EXPLANATION MISLEADING.

CCC/234 190009Z IDA1809

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM ANKRA ZEGR1649 18NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 181100

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RSE

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0028 25OCT, YOURTEL IDDZ0170 17NOV

PARA 1 YOUR REFTEL IDDZ0028 ASKED POSTS TO DELIVER TEXT OF PMS
LET TO QUOTE HEADS OF GOVT UNQUOTE. PARA 2 OF SAME REFTEL INDICATED
CLEARLY THAT LET WAS INTENDED FOR QUOTE MY DEAR PM UNQUOTE. ON BASIS
THESE INSTRUCTIONS EMB DELIVERED NOTE TO MFA REQUESTING TEXT OF PM
LET BE TRANSMITTED TO PM ULUSU, WHO IS TURKEYS HEAD OF GOVT. HOWEVER,
EMB RECEIVED TODAY ORIGINAL LET FM PM DATED 25OCT ADDRESSED TO PRES
EVREN RATHER THAN PM ULUSU. IN ADDITION, EMB ALSO RECEIVED YOURTEL
IDDZ0170 TODAY PROVIDING TEXT OF LET FM PM TO PRES EVREN REFERRING TO
PMS LET DATED 25OCT.

2. INASMUCH AS UNDER TURKISH PRACTICE PM ULUSU IS HEAD OF GOVT. PM LET
ACTUALLY SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO ULUSU NOT/NOT TO PRES EVREN. UNDER
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND TO AVOID ANY EMBARRASSMENT RE CORRECT PROTOCOL
RECOMMEND YOU FORWARD NEW SIGNED LET FM PM TRUDEAU TO PM ULUSU DATED
25OCT ALONG WITH SIMILAR LET BASED ON TEXT CONTAINED YOUR 17NOV TEL.
IN MEANTIME, EMB CLD SEND TEST OF FOLLOW UP LET IN DIP NOTE TO MFA FOR
TRANSMITTAL TO ULUSU. PMS SIGNED LETS CLD BE SENT LATER UPON RECEIPT.
DELAY IN TRANSMITTING SIGNED LETS WILL NOT/NOT JEOPARDIZE REPLY TO
EITHER LET FROM PM ULUSU AS REPLY TO FIRST LET IS ALREADY UNDER
PREPARATION AND DOES NOT/NOT REQUIRE ORIGINALS TO IF COMPLETED.
3. PSE CONFIRM THIS IS SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT.

CCC/244 181429Z ZEGR1649

Division Phoned 1002

Person CF

Local Time 1042

MF

R E S T R I C T E D

FM DELHI WBAG1550 18NOV83

TO FXTOTT XDV IMMED

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMDEL/TTOKYO/JOHNSTONE

DISTR UDDZ

REF YOURTEL XDV2028 17NOV

---HOTEL ACCOMMODATION

THREE SWB RESERVED AT TAJ MAHAL FOR NIGHTS 27 AND 28NOV.

PLEASE PROVIDE TRAVEL DETAILS WHEN KNOWN.

CCC/068 180725Z WBAG1550

MF
h8

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM COPEN YJGR1308 18NOV93

TO FXTOTT IEDZ

INFO OSLO

REF YOURTEL IEDZ0173 17NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE: LETTER TO NATO HEADS OF GOVT

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ICELAND RESTS WITH OSLO. WE HAVE FORWARDED TEXT OF
PM TRUDEAUS LETTER TO PM HERMANSSON TO OSLO FOR THEIR ACTION.

CCC/237 181459Z YJGR1308

INFC

MF
hs

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM COPEN YJGR1307 18NOV83

TO OSLO DELIVER BY 181600

INFO EXTOTT LIEDZ

REF IDDZ TFL 0173 17NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE: LETTERS TO NATO HEADS OF GOVT

WE RECEIVED BY MISTAKE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM IDDZ WITH REQUEST

THAT WE FORWARD LETTER FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PM HERMANSSON (ICELAND).

WE ARE FORWARDING IT TO YOU FOR NECESSARY ACTION. IDDZ TELS BEGINS..

QUOTE

REF OURTEL IDDZ0167 17NOV

---PM INITIATIVE: LETTER TO NATO HEADS OF GOVT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF IDENTICAL LETS FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PM SCHLEUTER

AND PM HERMANSSON (ICELAND) FOR TRANSMISSION ASAP.

ORIGINALS FOLLOW BY PAG EX OTTL18NOV.

2. TEXT BEGINS:

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

IN MY LETTER OF OCTOBER 25 I EXPRESSED TO YOU MY CONCERN ABOUT THE
CURRENT UNSATISFACTORY STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND STATED MY INTENTION TO WORK TO AMELIORATE THIS
SITUATION.

IN EUROPE LAST WEEK I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH SIX
OF OUR NATO COLLEAGUES TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT AND WAS HEARTENED
BY THE RECEPTION I RECEIVED. I FOUND THAT A GENERAL CONSENSUS EXISTED

...2

PAGE TWO YJGR1307 CONFD

ON THE URGENT NEED TO RE-ESTABLISH A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE AND TO
BUILT TOWARD A CONCERTED AND SUSTAINED DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND
WEST.BEYOND ITS OWN INTRINSIC LONG-TERM MERITS,SUCH A CLIMATE AND
WEB OF CONTACTS COULD ACT AS QUOTE SAFETY NET UNQUOTE WHICH COULD
WELL BE REQUIRED IN THE NEW YEAR.

MY VISIT TO EUROPE ALSO PROVIDED ME WITH A VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO
TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL SOME OF THE MORE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS MENTIONED
IN MY EARLIER LETTER INCLUDING THE NEED FOR: A FORUM IN WHICH GLOBAL
LIMITS MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED FOR ALL FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES;
FURTHER EFFORTS TO REAFFIRM THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-PROLIFERATION;
AND A HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL IMPETUS TO BE GIVEN TO THE MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS AND TO THE FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM ON
QUOTE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT
IN EUROPE UNQUOTE.

MY COLLEAGUE,ALLAN MACEACHEN,INTENDS TO RAISE THE LATTER SUBJECT
AT THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 8
AND I WOULD LIKE TO SEEK YOUR PERSONAL SUPPORT SO THAT A DECISION
CAN BE REACHED IN BRUSSELS ON THE FOLLOWING TWO PROPOSALS:

- (A) THAT ALL NATO MEMBERS WILL BE REPRESENTED AT AT HIGH
POLITICAL LEVEL AT THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE STOCKHOLM
CONFERENCE ON JANUARY 17; AND
- (F) THAT NATO WILL RESPOND TO THE LATEST EASTERN PROPOSALS ON MBFR
EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR AND WILL BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW-UP ITS

...3

PAGE THREE YJGR1307 CONF

RESPONSE WITH A MEETING IN VIENNA AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER
LEVEL.

I AM CONVINCED THAT AGREEMENT ON THESE TWO PROPOSALS WOULD GO A
CONSIDERABLE WAY TO DEMONSTRATING TO THE EAST AND TO OUR OWN
PUBLICS OUR DESIRE AT A POLITICAL LEVEL TO MAKE MEANINGFUL
PROGRESS IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD AIMED AT REDUCING THE CURRENT
LEVEL OF TENSION.

I ALSO WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT I HAVE WRITTEN TO BOTH THE CHINESE
AND SOVIET LEADERSHIPS AND SHORTLY WILL BE SENDING A PERSONAL
EMISSARY TO PEKING AND MOSCOW TO EXPRESS MY CONCERNS ABOUT THE
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF THE
RESULTS OF THESE MEETINGS.

I WOULD WELCOME ANY COMMENTS YOU MIGHT HAVE AND LOOK FORWARD TO
MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACT ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

P E TRUDEAU,
TEXT ENDS.

UNQUOTE.

CCC/237 181459Z YJGR1307

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

ME
h

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DF BRU ZVGR0533 18NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS MDRID LSEON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO
HAGUE TOKYO PEKIN CNGNY PRMNY MOSCO DELHI BNATO GENEV PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB UGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA FPR URR

---INITIATIVE DU PM:DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS

DEPUIS LA VISITE DU PM,DEMANDE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS

DEPUIS LA VISITE DU PM,NOUS AVONS RECU DES DEMANDES D EXPLICA-
TION DE L INITIATIVE DU PM DE LA PART DES AMPASSADEURS DE
L AUSTRALIE ET DE LA NOUVELLE-ZELANDE ET DES REPS DES AMBS DE
LA RFA,URSS,DE LA BULGARIE ET DU JAPON.NOUS AVONS DONNE UN
COMPTE RENDU ASSEZ COMPLET DES MOBILES DE L INITIATIVE DU PM
AUX AMBRS D AUSTRALIE ET DE NOUVELLE-ZELANDE,LE REP DE LA RFA.

A EU DROIT A UNE EXPLICATION GENERALE DE L INITIATIVE AFIN DE LAISSER
LA PRIMEUR A PM LORS DE SON PASSAGE A BONN.LES RUSSES ET LES
BULGARES ONT RECU DES COPIES DES DISCOURS.EN COMMENTANT LE PASSAGE
CONTENU DANS LE PREMIER DISCOURS DU PM SUR LES RAISONS POUR LA MORT
DE LA DETENTE ET EN PARTICULIER LA REFERENCE A L AFGHANISTAN,
LE REP SOVIET OBSERVA CIT NOUS AVONS FAIT QUELQUES ERREURS
FINCIT.IL S INTERESSA AVANT TOUT A UN LIEN POSSIBLE ENTRE
L INITIATIVE DU PM ET LA POSITION DU CDA SUR L INSTALLATION
DES EUROMISSILES.LE REP BULGARE VOULAIT SAVOIR.SI LE PM TRUDEAU
AVAIT TENU DES CONSULTATIONS DETAILLES AVEC LES ETATS-UNIS
AVANT D ENTREPRENDRE L INITIATIVE.

CCC/133 181610Z ZVGR0533

ACTION
UITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LAGOS XKGR0246 18NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 180900

INFO PMOOTT

DISTR IDR GAA GAAD GAD GGB IMC DMF MINA MINE IFE

---PM TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE:NIGERIAN QUERY

DURING CALL TODAY BY HICOMMER ON PRESIDENTIAL POLITICAL ADVISOR

(A CABINET POSITION)ALHAJI SULEMAN TAKUMA,HOST REQUESTED INFO ON

DETAILS OF PM TRUDEAUS CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVES.TAKUMA WILL

ACCOMPANY PRES SHAGARI TO DELHI CHOGM NEXT WEEK AND INDICATED

NIGERIANS WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING MORE FROM CANDEL ON THIS

SUBJ.WE HAVE PROVIDED GENERAL OUTLINES ON BASIS OF PUBLIC INFO

AVAILABLE AT POST,BUT WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER GUIDANCE/

BACKGROUND YOU MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE FOR USE IN BRIEFING NIGERIANS

BEFORE DEPARTURE FOR DELHI.THIS WOULD NECESSITATE REPLY BY 210800

LATEST.

CCC/203 181247Z XKGR0246

Division Phoned..... 1 DA
Person..... DJ
Local Time: 95-9

MF
LS

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0150 18NOV83

TO EXTOTT(IDDZ

REF YRTEL IDDZ0163 NOV17

---PM INITIATIVE:LETTER TO NATO HEADS OF GOVT

TEXT OF LET FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PM LUBBERS TRANSMITTED TODAY.

CCC/029 181118Z YWGR0150

MF

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM TOKYO PMDL0004 18NOV83

TO EXTOTT IFB DELIVER BY 180900

DISTR RBD ETD CPD ADDZ DELIVER BY 180900

---PM INITIATIVE:POSSIBLE DECLARATION BY CHOGM

PM HAS APPROVED FOLLOWING TEXT AS INITIAL CDN PROPOSAL FOR POSSIBLE
DECLARATION BY CHOGM:QUOTE WE,THE HEADS OF GOVT OF COMMONWEALTH,
DRAWN FROM FIVE CONTINENTS AND REPRESENTING A QUARTER OF THE
WORLDS POPULATION:(1)ARE DEEPLY TROUELED BY THE DANGEROUS STATE
OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS;BY THE HIGH LEVEL OF INNATL TENSION;BY
GRAVE INSTABILITY IN THE INNATL SECURITY SITUATION;BY THE
CONTINUING ARMS RACE;AND ABOVE ALL BY THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR
WHICH THREATEN THE SURVIVAL OF HUMANITY.(2)ARE CONVINCED THAT THE
INNATL COMMUNITY MUST WORK TO ACHIEVE GREATER INNATL SECURITY AT
SIGNIFICANTLY LCWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENT.(3)PLEDGE TO WORK FOR THE
RFSTORATION OF ACLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS.
(4)URGE THE USA AND USSR TO ESTABLISH A GENUINE POLITICAL DIALOGUE.
IN THE INTERESTS OF WORLD PEACE.(5)URGE THE FIVE NUCLEAR WFAPONS
STATES TO AGREE TO PLACE LIMITS UPON AND THEN REDUCE THEIR
STRETEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS.(6)URGE ALL NON-NUCLEAR(ALTERNATIVE
FOR NON-NUCLEAR MIGHT BE QUOTE OTHER UNQUOTE)STATES TO RENOUNCE
THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.UNQUOTE.

2.REQUIREMENT NOW IS TO WORF OUT STRATEGY FOR PRESENTING THIS
PROPOSAL IN MANNER WHICH IS MOST LIKELY TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE
BY CHOGM.OPVIOUSLY AT LEAST ACQUIESCENCE BY MRS GANDHI AS CHAIRMAN

...2

PAGE TWO PMDL0004 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

WILL BE CRUCIAL. UNDOUBTEDLY ALSO ASPECTS OF PROPOSED DECLARATION. PARTICULARLY WORDING OF POINT SIX MAY NOT/NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO HER IN THEIR EXISTING FORM. HOWEVER, WE WOULD HOPE THAT IN GIVE-AND-TAKE CONTEXT OF COMMONWEALTH MTG IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO GAIN HER SUPPORT FOR WORDING WHICH RETAINS ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF ABOVE TEXT. HER OWN CALL AT UNGA FOR NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION COULD BE INVOKED IN THIS CONTEXT.

3. OUR SUGGESTION IS THAT STRATEGY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) CERTAIN KEY COMMONWEALTH LEADERS (EG THATCHER, HAWK, NYERERE, MULDOON, SHAGARI) BE INFORMED THAT PM PROPOSES TO PRESENT FOR DISCUSSION AT CHOGM TEXT OR WORDING (ON WHICH HE IS STILL WORKING) FOR DECLARATION WHICH WOULD RELATE TO SOME OF CONCERNS HE HAS DISCUSSED IN CONTEXT OF HIS CURRENT INITIATIVE. THEY COULD BE TOLD THAT HE PROPOSES TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN DELHI. (2) HIGHCOM IN DELHI WOULD REQUEST INDIAN EXTAFF MINISTRY TO INFORM PM GANDHI THAT PM TRUDEAU WILL HAVE PROPOSALS RE HIS INITIATIVE WHICH HE WISHED TO SHOW TO HER AND DISCUSS WITH HER PRIOR TO SEEKING REACTIONS OF OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS. THEREFORE HE LOOKS FORWARD TO OPPORTUNITY OF EARLY DISCUSSION WITH HER FOLLOWING HIS ARRIVAL IN DELHI. (3) PM WOULD ALSO TAKE OPPORTUNITY OF HIS MTG WITH KAUNDA AND ERSHAD IN DHAKA TO DISCUSS PROPOSAL IN GEN TERMS WITH THEM WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILS OF TEXT.

4. GRATEFUL FOR IMMEDIATE REACTION/SUGGESTIONS RE THIS PROPOSED SCENARIO.

CCC/195 171125Z PMDL0004