

31/03 '95 10:44

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CANBAT 1

001

UNPROFOR



IMMEDIATE

CANADIAN CONTINGENT

CONTINGENT CANADIEN

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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T NO.	UNIT HQ #	TOT	
T 31/25			

ROUTINE PRIORITY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL UN SECRET ONLY

ORIGINATORS NO: 1 RCR 824	DTG: 31 1145 Z MAR 95
TO: HQ CANCON ZAGREB//COS//A	FROM CANBAT 1 CO
FAX NO:	FAX NO: 2513
ATTN: COS	FILE REF NO: DRAFTER: L.R. HULSMAN, ADJT SIGNATURE: <i>L.R. Hulsman</i>
	RLSE AUTH: Capt L.R. Hulsman, Adjt
INFO FAX: FAX NO:	
SUBJECT: COMMANDING OFFICER'S COMMENTS - APC ACCIDENT	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	

②
G1
Yours.

Howard
63
5/4

REVIEWED BOI

② PA

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G1
6507
14.4 95

RECEIVED
1080-1
31 MAR 1995

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Mar 1995

Commanding Officer's Comments/Recommendations

Comments

1. While the driver of the APC, Private Armstrong, reported some minor difficulty with the tiller bar, which affected his ability to control the vehicle, there is no evidence of a mechanical defect. The cause of the accident therefore appears to be driver inexperience; specifically over-correction on a wet, downhill grade while transitting a steep embankment. There is no evidence to suggest that the vehicle was travelling faster than the posted limit however it appears that it was travelling too fast for the road conditions. The crew commander, Corporal Schovanek, probably should have ordered a reduced speed under the circumstances. Private Armstrong underwent a period of re-evaluation as an APC driver and will be closely supervised for the remainder of the tour.

2. Helmets would have undoubtedly lessened the severity of Corporal Schovanek's injuries. At the time of the accident, CANBAT 1 SOPs only required helmets ^{the wearing of} inside the Zone of Separation for passengers and not at all for driver, gunners and ~~our~~ commanders who required ICS communications. Recognizing the requirement for head protection, CANBAT 1 was in the process of physically locating and assessing the servicability of our CVC helmet and Slimguard headset holdings. These helmets/headsets were not widely used in CANBAT 1 prior to our rotation due to serviceability and attendant repair/spare parts problems. As a result of this accident, I ordered that no APC would move unless all crew had head protection and ICS. A concerted effort to repair defective equipment and to locate and distribute other holdings have allowed us to provide this protection for the remainder of the tour.

3. Seatbelts might have prevented some of the injuries but in my view, this is a moot point. The operational requirement for a driver, crew commander, .50 Calibre MG gunner and a rear security man overrides the luxury of the personal safety afforded by a seat belt. The crew of the vehicle must be up, alert and acting as one entity.

4. I am satisfied that the medical support and evacuation procedures were effective.

Recommendations

5. Crew commanders must consistently monitor road conditions and order adjusted speed accordingly.

6. All crew/passengers in APCs should have adequate head protection and where appropriate ICS communications.

7. No disciplinary or administrative action against any individuals involved in this accident

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3R0

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1080-2-3127-10-95

31 March 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
CANBAT 2 VEHICLE ACCIDENT
UNPF 8723 15 JAN 95

References: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-10-95 (Adj't) 7 March 1995 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-10-95 (AO ASC) 26 February 1995 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94
D. FCPD 9 dated Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's comments, the Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report, and the Summary Investigation regarding this incident.

2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. The accident was non-preventable and no one is to blame for the resultant damage. I am convinced that negligence was not involved and that the proper procedures for recovery were followed. No disciplinary nor administrative action will be taken against any individual.

3. As willfull negligence was not a factor and the accident was unavoidable, I request that the cost of the damage be written off at Crown expense. I direct that once approval has been obtained, the Commanding Officer submit the necessary documents to have the cost of the damage be written off and have those costs recovered from the United Nations.

4. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.


N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Zagreb

1006-1 (G1)

3/March 1995


Claims, Property Survey
and Investigation Unit
United Nations
Protected Force Zagreb

REQUEST FOR PROVISION OF DAMAGE/DISCREPANCY REPORT

References: A. CANLOGBAT 1006-1 (C Clk) 22 January 1995 (enclosed)
B. UNPROFOR/BH/CAN/4/1002 6 January 95 (enclosed)
C. 550/0436/94 7 Mar 94 (enclosed)
D. 1080-1-25 (CO) 12 May 94 (enclosed)

1 In accordance with reference B, please find enclosed all the documentation pertaining to this specific case.

2. Any queries on this matter can be directed to G1 Canadian Contingent at local 6507.


I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander.

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1045-1 (G3)

01 01 310931Z MAR 95 RR UUUU

G3 219

CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//G3//

CCUNPROFOR RASTEVIC//CANBAT 1/OPS 0//

UNCLAS G3 219

SUBJ: APPRECIATION AND CONGRATULATIONS - CANBAT 1

1. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR RECENT DO. AS YOU PREPARE TO RTN TO CA WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO STATE THAT IT HAS BEEN A PLEASURE AND AN HONOUR TO WORK WITH SUCH A PROFESSIONAL GROUP OF SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS. GLAD TO HEAR THAT WE WERE OF SOME ASSISTANCE TO 1 RCR
2. BEST WISHES FOR A SAFE RTN TO CANADA AND FOR ALL FUTURE ENDEAVOURS ESPECIALLY WITH DUKES COY
3. HOWARD, LOZANSKI, GIFFORD AND PLATT SEND. PRO PATRIA

S.W. GIFFORD, CAPT, G3 PLANS


A.J. HOWARD MAJ, G3

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Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

1080-1 (G1)

30 March 1995

Claims, Property Survey
& Investigation Unit
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

PROVISION OF WRITE-OFF VOUCHER

References: Your UNPROFOR/CAN/3/1006 21 Feb 95 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed find write-off voucher as requested at reference A pertaining to Night Vision Goggles which were stolen in Ploce on 10 June 1993.
2. Any further inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.


I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosure: 1

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

1080-2-3127-13-95A

29 March 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
CANBAT 2 VEHICLE ACCIDENT
UNPF 19162 - 1 FEB 95

References: A. (enclosed)
B. (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94
D. FCPD 9 dated Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's comments, the Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report, and the Summary Investigation regarding this incident.
2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. Disciplinary action has been taken against the persons involved. I direct that the Commanding Officer submit the necessary documents to have the cost of damage to the vehicle written off at Crown expense. I support the recommendation that the cost of any claim submitted by Lt Maric Slododan as a result of this accident be honoured by UNPROFOR.
3. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'N.M. Pettis'.

N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

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Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

1080-2-3127-14-95 (DComd)

24 March 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
CANBAT 2 VEHICLE ACCIDENT UNPF 18079
CIVILIAN VEHICLE LICENSE - 21 DECEMBER 1994

References: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-14-95 (A/Ops O) 15 Mar 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-14-95 (CO) 23 Feb 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94
D. FCPD 9 dated Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's comments, the Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report, and the Summary Investigation regarding this incident.
2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. This accident could have been prevented if the driver of the UN vehicle had been more prudent and security oriented by using a ground guide.
3. I do not recommend that Mr. Skoro be reimbursed by UNPROFOR until further information clarifying his participation and responsibility in this matter have been determined by the Military Police.
4. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

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Belleville, ON
KOK 3R0

1080-2-3127-03-95 (DComd)

29 March 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
LOSS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
20MG MORPHINE AUTO INJECTOR
CANBAT 2 - 10 DECEMBER 1994

References: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-03-95 (Adj) 20 February 1995 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-03-95 (Adj) 27 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's comments, the Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report, and the Summary Investigation regarding this incident.
2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and comments of the Commanding Officer. The Commanding Officer has taken appropriate measures to ensure that the Battle Group policy regarding inspections will be tightened with respect to Morphine verification, and that these inspections should be done more frequently. Auto Injectors will be accounted for and appropriate measures are now in place to implement this procedure.
3. I direct the Commanding Officer to raise the required documentation to have the loss of public property, in the amount of \$7.50 CDN, written off at public expense.
4. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

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Belleville, ON
KOK 3R0

1080-2-3127-08-95 (DComd)

29 March 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
CANBAT 2 VEHICLE ACCIDENT UNPF 18079
CIVILIAN VEHICLE LICENSE [REDACTED] - 21 DECEMBER 1994

References: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-08-95 (TACP) 4 Mar 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-08-95 (CO) 12 Feb 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94
D. FCPD 9 dated Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's comments, the Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report, and the Summary Investigation regarding this incident.
2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. This accident could have been prevented had the driver been more prudent and had snow chains fitted to the vehicle. Disciplinary action has been taken against the CANBAT 2 driver. I am assured that the corrective and disciplinary measures taken by the Commanding Officer will prevent any recurrence of a similar case.
3. It is recommended that should there be civilian action taken against UNPROFOR by Mr Ante Pehar or his insurance company, that compensation be awarded.
4. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

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3. Questions and/or queries may be addressed to the undersigned at local 4502, Camp Primosten.


J.P.L.M. Robitaille
Captain
Adjutant

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
K0K 3R0

1080-1-3032-35-94 (CO)

21 March 1995

Distribution List

**SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE LOSS OF A
CLASSIFIED SECRET 3.5 INCH COMPUTER DISK
BETWEEN CANBAT 1 OPS OFFICE AND THE NCCIS
DETACHMENT (MESSAGE CENTRE) ON OR BEFORE
20 DECEMBER 1994 AT CAMP RESTEVIC, CROATIA**

References: A. 1080-1/3032-35/94 (Adj) 20 February 1994 (enclosed)
B. 1080-1/3032-35/94 (Adj) 29 December 1994 (enclosed)
C. FCPO NO 9
D. CCUNPROFOR DIR 605 Oct 94

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's comments and the Summary Investigation regarding the incident.
2. I have reviewed the investigation and concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. New handling procedures for message traffic have been implemented, all personnel involved have been counselled and briefed with regard to these procedures. We are confident that there will not be a recurrence of similar nature.

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3. No disciplinary or administrative action is required. This case is to be considered closed.

4. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 2

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United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3R0

1080-2-3127-04-95 (DComd)

21 March 1995

Distribution List

**SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
CANBAT 2 VEHICLE ACCIDENT
UNPF 18082 - 11 JAN 95**

References: A. 1080-2-3127-04-95 (Adj) 31 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. 1080-2-3127-04-95 (2 Tp Ldr) 31 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Feb 94

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's comments, Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report, and the Summary Investigation regarding this incident.
2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and comments of the Commanding Officer. I feel the Commanding Officer has taken appropriate disciplinary and administrative action against those responsible and that no further action is required. I direct that the Commanding Officer submit the necessary documents to have the cost of damage to the vehicle written off at Crown expense and the costs recovered from the United Nations.
3. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

1/2

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N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

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CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
K0K 3R0

1080-1/3032-01/95 (DComd)

21 March 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
FIRE AT CANBAT 1 OP SC 36
20 JANUARY 1995, CROATIA

- References: A. 1080-1/3032-01/95 (CO) 27 February 1995 (enclosed)
B. 1080-1/3032-01/95 (1 PL Comd) 14 Feb 95 (enclosed)
C. FCPO NO 9
D. CCUNPROFOR DIR 605 Oct 94

1. Enclosed are the Summary Investigation and the Commanding Officer's comments regarding the incident.
2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. I have been assured that corrective measures have been instituted and adhered to. It is recommended that fire extinguishers be available in the cooking area and their location known by all personnel at the OPs. The Commanding Officer is to submit the necessary documents to have the costs of the damaged material written-off at Crown expense and the costs recovered from the United Nations.
3. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Commanding Officer has taken the appropriate disciplinary and administrative action against the personnel responsible.

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4. Any inquiries into this matter may be addressed to G1 Canadian Contingent.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 2

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United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
K0K 3R0

1080-2-3127-07-95 (DComd)

21 March 1995

Distribution List

**SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
CANBAT 2 VEHICLE ACCIDENT
UNPF 8205 - 3 JANUARY 1995**

References: A. 1080-2-3127-07-95 (Adj) 31 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. 1080-2-3127-07-95 (Sr LO) 31 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's Comments, the Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report, and the summary investigation regarding this incident.
2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigation Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. As Canadian personnel were not at fault in this accident, I direct the cost of the damage be written off. The Commanding Officer is to submit the necessary documents to have the damage written off at public expense and costs recovered from the United Nations. Additionally, UNPROFOR should not be held responsible for any claim that may be submitted by the owner of the civilian vehicle or his insurance company.
3. The Commanding Officer is to ensure that in order to prevent further such accidents, all Battle Group personnel are to be warned to exercise extreme caution when driving in similar weather conditions, on roads of this nature.

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4. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 2

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Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

1080-1 (G1)

21 March 1995

Claims, Property Survey
& Investigation Unit
Headquarters
United Nations Protection force
Zagreb, Croatia

PROVISION OF WRITE-OFF VOUCHER

References: A. 1080-1-3032-11-94 (CO) 20 February 1995 (enclosed)
B. UNPROFOR/CAN/4/1708-A (enclosed)
C. MP Report SOUTH 549-010-94 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed find write-off voucher pertaining to the Material Loss in an Act of God at CANBAT 1 on 17 August 1994.
2. Any further inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'I.W. Anderson', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosure: 3

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CANBAT 1
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Camp Rastevic
Rastevic

10803

1080-1/3032-11/94 (CO)

24 FEB 1995

20 February 1995

G1
Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Camp Pleso
Zagreb

CANADIAN CONTINGENT	
G/A	S.W.E.

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION INTO
THE LOSS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

References: A. UNPROFOR/CAN/4/1708-A (enclosed)
B. MP Report SOUTH 549-010-94 (enclosed)
C. WOV 94229-001 (enclosed)

1. As directed in reference A, find enclosed the Write-Off Voucher 94229-002 required to recover, from the United Nations, the replacement costs of the material lost as detailed in ref B.
2. Copies of this Write-Off Voucher have been forwarded separately through our Finance Officer to the Contingent Comptroller and through our Quartermaster to G4 Supply according to the latest direction on the processing of Write-Off Vouchers as stipulated at the January 1995 Logistics Conference.
3. Note that Write-Off Voucher 94229-002 replaces Write-Off Voucher 94229-001 which was submitted by Roto 4 using a format no longer accepted by the United Nations and that steps will have to be taken to ensure that only one Write-Off Voucher on this incident is submitted to the United Nations.
4. Please contact the CANBAT 1 Quartermaster, Captain T.P. O'Shea, to inform this unit as to which Write-off Voucher on this incident is applicable and if any further action is required on our part to recover the costs associated with this accident.

M.S. Skidmore
Lieutenant-Colonel
Commanding Officer

Enclosures: 4

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WRITE-OFF VOUCHER

PART I

Unit requesting write-off: CANBAT 1

W.O.V.: 94229-002

Location: SECTOR SOUTH//RASTEVIC

Date: 17 Febuary 1994

To: UNPROFOR HQ/C.LOG.O.

This unit requests authority to temporarily adjust its unit ledger for items listed until final authorization for write-off is received from HQ UNPROFOR. The reasons for the write-off are as follows: EQUIPMENT DESTROYED BY A SEVERE WEATHER SYSTEM ON 17 AUGUST 1994. DETAILS OF THIS INCIDENT ARE FOUND IN CANBAT 1 MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORT SOUTH 549-10-94.

CATEGORY	ITEM NO	DESCRIPTION	QTY	UNIT PRICE	UN/COE	TOTAL PRICE
		SEE ATTACHED LIST				

Items have not been subj to in survey as of 17 Feb 95.

THIS WOV REPLACES WOV 94229-001!!

Signed: _____

LCol M.S. Skidmore

Commanding Officer

=====

PART II

To: Commanding Officer CANBAT 1

- Authority is granted to temporarily adjust unit ledger by the quantities of items listed.
- Further details of the loss are required as follows:

C.LOG.O.

Date

=====

PART III

To: C.LOG.O

- Write-off approved. Disposal action _____
- Item: _____ of UNPROFOR CASE NO. _____

 Secretary, UNPROFOR Property
 Survey for Chief Administrative Officer

 Date

REVIEWED 801

Unit requesting write-off: CANBAT 1

W.O.V.: 94229-002

Page: 2/2

CATEGORY	ITEM NO	DESCRIPTION	QTY	PRICE US\$	UN/COE	TOTAL US\$
H	8340-21-859-3166	MODULAR CANVASS CENTRE	20	\$298.02	COE	\$5960.31
H	8340-21-859-3161	MODULAR CANVASS FRONT	4	\$203.62	COE	\$814.47
H	8340-21-859-3164	MODULAR CANVASS REAR	1	\$202.70	COE	\$202.70
H	8340-21-859-3167	MODULAR CENTER LINER	7	\$234.81	COE	\$1643.69
H	8340-21-859-3162	MODULAR FRONT LINER	1	\$138.18	COE	\$138.18
H	8340-21-859-3213	MODULAR FRAME ARCHES	71	\$96.97	COE	\$6884.78
H	8340-21-839-3214	MODULAR PURLINS	120	\$13.50	COE	\$1620.00
E	7105-21-847-4671	TABLE 6', FOLDING	4	\$55.94	COE	\$223.75
E	7105-21-108-0544	BENCH 6', FOLDING	3	\$47.95	COE	\$143.85
A	L7310-0145-05646	HAMMER COFFEE MACHINE	1	\$781.24	COE	\$781.24
E	7110-21-878-1537	CHAIRS	6	\$24.18	COE	\$145.08
E	L7430-0145-05141	TYPERWRITER OLYMPIA	1	\$705.12	COE	\$705.12
A	L4110-1045-00807	REFRIGERATOR	2	\$591.52	COE	\$1183.03
B	5985-21-902-9575	VIXEN MAST	2	\$2246.09	COE	\$4492.19
G	5855-21-908-8956	NODLR TRIPOD	1	\$78.13	COE	\$78.13

Capt T.P. O'Shea
 Quarter Master

M.S. Skidmore
 LCol M.S. Skidmore
 Commanding Officer

REVIEWED BOI

s.19(1)

UNPROFOR



FORPRONU

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United Nations Protection Force
Force de protection des Nations Unies
Zagreb

(IF FAMILIAR)

CANBAT 1

10001-1

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

CC
ADM
OK

14/2 RW
H. J. P.

Date: 10-Feb-1995

Ref: UNPROFOR/CAN/4/1708-A

To: CO CANBAT 1
RASTEVIC CAMP

From: ^{1/301} A.T. GALINDO, Chief
Claims, Property Survey and Investigation Unit

Subject: PROVISION OF WRITE-OFF VOUCHER

Reference: FPM Report No. 549/081/94
Document/Sec No. SOUTH 549/10/94

1. From the above-referenced report, following equipment is reported lost/damaged:
- VARIOUS EQUIPMENT
Ser No./Plate No.: SERIAL NUMBERS INDICATED IN LIST
Assigned to : CANBAT 1
Involving : SGT. DAY R.P., [REDACTED]
Unit : CANBAT 1 RASTEVIC CAMP
2. To enable the Claims Unit initiate survey action in respect of the above-indicated items, it would be appreciated if you would submit a Write-off Voucher through Chief Logistics Officer for endorsement, indicating the Inventory value in US\$, Serial Number, Category and Line item as this information is required by the Local Property Survey Board when deliberating on the matter.
3. Thanking you in advance for your assistance in this matter.

cc: CLOGO/Accountancy LOG Branch

REVIEWED 801

m


CAN/4/1708

**MP COY HQ CASE REF: 549 / 081 /94.
FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
UNPROFOR HQ
ZAGREB**

DATE: 14 OCTOBER - 94

TO : DISTRIBUTION BELOW.

SUBJECT : ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE



1. Please find here in a Military Police Report in connection with above noted subject, for your information and any action you deem necessary.

[Handwritten signature]
SIGNED: _____ COL.
(CO UNPROFOR MP COY & FPM)

Distr:
COS/LOG/ADM
CGSO CLAIMS
LEG ADV
CO CANBAT 1
FILE

REVIEWED 801

s.19(1)



UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

MILITARY POLICE
PLATOON
SOUTH

CASE REF NO: SOUTH 549-010-94

DATE OF INITIAL/PRELIMINARY REPORT: N/A

INCIDENT: ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE

INVOLVING: UNID [REDACTED] SGT DAY R. PATRICK, 1 PPCLI,
MP SECTION, CANABT 1, CAMP RASTEVIC, RSK.

MP COY HQ REF NO: _____

<u>MP COY HQ USE ONLY</u>
DATE CHECKED: <u>08 OCT 1994</u>
DATE TO AFPM/FPM FOR SIGNATURE: _____
DATE DISTRIBUTED: _____
DATE FILED: _____

for L.T. SMITH CAPT
SIGNATURE OF PL COMD

DATE FILE SENT TO MP COY HQ: OCT 94

DATE FILE RECEIVED BY MP COY HQ: 08 OCT 1994

REVIEWED 801

UNPROFOR

s.19(1)

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES



**MILITARY POLICE
INVESTIGATION REPORT**

MP COY HQ CASE REF: _____
MP PL CASE REF : SOUTH 549-10-94

DATE: 17 AUG 94

SUBJECT: PUBLIC PROPERTY - DAMAGE - ACT OF GOD

1. This case involves the following persons:

- a. Military Police: [REDACTED] Sgt DAY Richard Patrick,
811 MP, Bn Military Police Section,
Camp Rastevic, Croatia; and
- [REDACTED] Cpl BOYD James Dean, 811
MP, Bn Military Police Section, Camp
Rastevic, Croatia;

2 At 2215 hrs, 17 Aug 94, a severe weather system consisting of heavy rains and extremely high winds, swept through the CANBAT 1 AOR. This weather system battered CANBAT 1 and the surrounding area for seven hours before subsiding.

3 At 0930 hrs, 18 Aug 94, Sgt DAY instructed that I report on the amount of damages sustained by CANBAT 1 as a result of the severe weather storm.

4 Between 1100 hrs and 1400 hrs, 18 Aug 94, I contacted the Coy Quartermasters (CQ) of A, C, D, ADMIN Coy's as well as AAP and 1 CER, requesting that they compile a list of all damages sustain as a direct result of the storm and to submit the lists to this Military Police Section.

5 On 25 Aug 94, I received the itemized lists of damaged equipment from C, D, and ADMIN Coy CQ's. A compiled list of all the equipment damaged and the estimated cost repair is attached as Annex A. Photographs of the damaged equipment are attached to this report as Annex B. The following is a list of how the equipment was damaged:

- a. the modular canvass centers, fronts and rears, identified in photographs 1 - 6, of Annex B, were torn in different lengths, at different locations along the seams and canvass. The lack of proper equipment and materials has made repairing even the smallest of tears impossible;

.../2

REVIEWED BOI

- b. the modular liners received similar damages as the canvass, as the modular liners are attached to the inside of the modular canvass ;
- c. the modular frame arches, identified in photographs 7 - 12, of Annex B, illustrates how the mounting plates, at the apex and elbows, where the modular purloins are attached to the modular frame arches, have been cracked open not allowing the modular purloin to be locked in place. The modular frame arches are constructed out of aluminum, and once bent or twisted can not be repaired without causing more damage;
- d. the modular purloins, identified in photographs 13 - 15, of Annex B, illustrates how the mounting bracket, that locks into the modular frame arches (mounting plates), have been bent from centre, not allowing for the purloins to be properly seated in the mounting plates. Like the modular frame arches, the modular purloins are constructed out of aluminum, any attempts to straighten the mounting brackets cause them to break off;
- e. the 6' folding tables were broken in half (length wise) and/or had the metal folding legs snapped off;
- f. the 6' folding benches had the metal legs snapped off;
- g. the "Hammer" 100 cup, coffee machine, identified in photographs 16 - 18, of Annex B, sustained electrical damage, had the glass globe smashed, a crushed spigot and smashed control switch;
- h. the assorted plastic chairs had there tube steel legs snapped off and the plastic seat ripped in two;
- i. the Olympia typewriter was crushed under a filing cabinet, that caused it's plastic case to break into pieces. The typewriter also suffered water and electrical damage;
- j. the two refrigerators, identified in photographs 19 - 21, of Annex B, were blown over, which caused the doors to be ripped off and the compressors damaged. Due to the unavailability of a qualified persons, these refrigerators can not be repaired;
- k. the Vixen mast, identified in photographs 22 - 24, of Annex B, illustrates how the Vixen mast was snapped in half at mid mast; and
- l. the NODLR tripod, identified in photographs 25 - 27, of Annex B, illustrates the damaged metal foot.

.../3

REVIEWED 801

Photographs were not obtained of the modular liners, the 6' foot tables and benches, the assorted chairs and the Olympia typewriter due to the length of time in between reports all equipment had been sent out of CANBAT 1 for repair.


6. In view of the following this report is concluded.

MP Investigator:

Signature: _____

Name: J.D. Boyd Rank: Cpl

MP Platoon Commander:

Signature: _____ 

for Name: L.T. Smith Rank: CAPTAIN

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Annex A to
 South 549-10-94
 Dated Oct 94

NSN	DESCRIPTION	AMT	VALUE	TOTAL
N8340-21-859-3166	MODULAR CANVASS CENTRE	20	381.46	7629.20
N8340-21-859-3161	MODULAR CANVASS FRONT	4	260.63	1042.52
N8340-21-859-3164	MODULAR CANVASS REAR	1	259.45	259.45
N8340-21-859-3167	MODULAR CENTRE LINER	7	300.56	2103.92
N8340-21-859-3162	MODULAR FRONT LINER	1	176.87	176.87
N8340-21-859-3213	MODULAR FRAME ARCHES	71	124.12	8812.52
N8340-21-839-3214	MODULAR PURLOINS	120	17.28	2073.60
N7105-21-847-4671	TABLE 6', FOLDING	4	71.60	286.40
N7105-21-108-0544	BENCH 6', FOLDING	3	61.37	184.11
L7310-0145-05646	HAMMER COFFEE MACHINE	1	999.99	999.99
N7110-21-878-1537	ASSORTED CHAIRS	6	30.95	185.70
L7430-0145-05141	TYPEWRITER OLYMPIA	1	902.56	902.56
L4110-1045-00807	REFRIGERATOR	2	757.14	1514.28
N5985-21-902-9575	VIXEN MAST	2	2875.00	5750.00
N5855-21-908-8956	NODLR TRIPOD	1	100.00	100.00
			TOTAL	\$32,021.12

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WRITE-OFF VOUCHER

PART I

Unit requesting write-off: CANBAT 1

W.O.V.: 94229-001

Location: SECTOR SOUTH//RASTEVIC

Date: 10 OCTOBER 1994

To: UNPROFOR HQ/C.LOG.O.

This unit requests authority to temporarily adjust its unit ledger for items listed until final authorization for write-off is received from HQ UNPROFOR. The reasons for the write-off are as follows: EQUIPMENT DESTROYED BY A SEVERE WEATHER SYSTEM ON 17 AUGUST 1994. DETAILS OF THIS INCIDENT ARE FOUND IN CANBAT 1 MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORT SOUTH 549-10-94.

CATEGORY	ITEM NO	DESCRIPTION	QTY	UNIT PRICE	UN/COE	TOTAL PRICE
		SEE ATTACHED LIST				

Ref: Last In-Survey Dated 11 April 1994

Signed: _____

LCol M.J. Diakow
Commanding Officer

PART II

To: Commanding Officer CANBAT 1

- Authority is granted to temporarily adjust unit ledger by the quantities of items listed.
- Further details of the loss are required as follows:

C.LOG.O.

Date

PART III

To: C.LOG.O

- Write-off approved. Disposal action _____
- Item: _____ of UNPROFOR CASE NO. _____

REVIEWED 001

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Secretary, UNPROFOR Property
Survey for Chief Administrative Officer

Date 10 OCTOBER 1994

Unit requesting write-off: CANBAT 1

W.O.V.: 94229-001

Page: 2/2

REVIEWED 801

CATEGORY	ITEM NO	DESCRIPTION	QTY	UNIT PRICE	UN/COE	TOTAL PRICE
	8340-21-859-3166	MODULAR CANVASS CENTRE	20	\$381.46	COE	\$7629.20
	8340-21-859-3161	MODULAR CANVASS FRONT	4	\$260.63	COE	\$1042.52
	8340-21-859-3164	MODULAR CANVASS REAR	1	\$259.45	COE	\$259.45
	8340-21-859-3167	MODULAR CENTER LINER	7	\$300.56	COE	\$2103.92
	8340-21-859-3162	MODULAR FRONT LINER	1	\$176.87	COE	\$176.87
	8340-21-859-3213	MODULAR FRAME ARCHES	71	\$124.12	COE	\$8812.52
	8340-21-839-3214	MODULAR PURLINS	120	\$17.28	COE	\$2073.60
	7105-21-847-4671	TABLE 6', FOLDING	4	\$71.60	COE	\$286.40
	7105-21-108-0544	BENCH 6', FOLDING	3	\$61.37	COE	\$184.11
	L7310-0145-05646	HAMMER COFFEE MACHINE	1	\$999.99	COE	\$999.99
	7110-21-878-1537	CHAIRS	6	\$30.95	COE	\$185.70
	L7430-0145-05141	TYPewriter OLYMPIA	1	\$902.56	COE	\$902.56
	L4110-1045-00807	REFRIGERATOR	2	\$757.14	COE	\$1514.28
	5985-21-902-9575	VIXEN MAST	2	\$2875.00	COE	\$5750.00
	5855-21-908-8956	NODLR TRIPOD	1	\$100.00	COE	\$100.00

S.T. Blair
Capt S.T. Blair
Quarter Master

M.J. Diakow
LCol M.J. Diakow
Commanding Officer



Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

1080-1 (G1)

21 March 1995

Claims, Property Survey
& Investigation Unit
Headquarters
United Nations Protection force
Zagreb, Croatia

PROVISION OF WRITE-OFF VOUCHER

References A. 1080-1-3032-10-94 (7 PI Comd) 31 July 1994
B. UNPROFOR/CAN/4/2106-A 27 January 1995 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed find write-off voucher pertaining to the Theft of Public Property in CANBAT 1 on 21 June 1994.
2. Any further inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'I.W. Anderson', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosure: 1

REVIEWED 801



Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

1080-1 (G1)

21 March 1995

Claims, Property Survey
& Investigation Unit
Headquarters
United Nations Protection force
Zagreb, Croatia

PROVISION OF WRITE-OFF VOUCHER

References: A. 1080-1-3032-11-94 (CO) 20 February 1995 (enclosed)
B. UNPROFOR/CAN/4/1708-A (enclosed)
C. MP Report SOUTH 549-010-94 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed find write-off voucher pertaining to the Material Loss in an Act of God at CANBAT 1 on 17 August 1994.
2. Any further inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'I.W. Anderson', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosure: 3

REVIEWED 801

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

1080-2-3127-05-95 (DComd)

21 March 1995

Distribution List

**SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
CANBAT 2 - 15 JANUARY 1995**

- References: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-05-95 (TACP) 13 Feb 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-05-95 (Adj) 21 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. FCPO NO 9 Sep 94
D. CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's comments, the Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report, and the Summary Investigation regarding this subject.
2. I have reviewed the investigation and concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. This was a very serious incident where innocent personnel, both civilian and UNPROFOR, could have been seriously injured or killed. It is evident that the fault lays entirely in either the hands of the pilot or some mechanical failure of the aircraft. Only France can provide an answer to that question. Although I cannot recommend disciplinary or administrative action against the pilot, I do recommend that this matter be taken up with the agency with the highest possible authority in order to provide a satisfactory answer as to why the events of that day, occurred as they did.

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3. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

ENCLOSURES: 3

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ACTION

NDHQ Export/J1 Coord
HQUNPROFOR Zagreb/CMPAO
CCUNPROFOR Canbat 2 Visoko/CO (less encls)

INFORMATION

CCUNPROFOR CANCON Primosten/G5 Legal

2/2

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REVIEWED B01



Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

1080-1 (G1)

21 March 1995

Claims, Property Survey
& Investigation Unit
Headquarters
United Nations Protection force
Zagreb, Croatia

PROVISION OF WRITE-OFF VOUCHER

Reference: 1080-1-3032-27/94 (CO)19 February 1995 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed find write-off voucher pertaining to the Vehicle accident involving CANBAT 1's ILTIS UNPF 8151/CFR 85-8702 and Serbian Checkpoint Barrier on 26 September 1994.
2. Any further inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'I.W. Anderson', written over a horizontal line.

I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosure: 1

REVIEWED 801



Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

1080-1 (G1)

26 March 1995

Claims, Property Survey
& Investigation Unit
Headquarters
United Nations Protection force
Zagreb, Croatia

PROVISION OF WRITE-OFF VOUCHER

Reference: 1080-1-3032-11-94 (CO) 20 February 1995 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed find write-off voucher pertaining to the Loss of public property in CANBAT 1 on 20 June 1994.
2. Any further inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of several loops and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosure: 1

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UNCLASSIFIED

080-1 (G1)

01 01 171535Z MAR 95 RR RR UUUU

G1 081

PA

CCUNPROFOR//G1//

UNPROFOR//CLAIMS, PROPERTY SURVEY AND INVESTIGATION

UNIT//

INFO G1

UNCLAS G1 081

SUBJ: PROVISION OF DAMAGE/DISCREPANCY REPORT

REFS: A. ADMIN 038 150924Z MAR 95

B. UNMP REP NO 1080-3032-31/94

C. YOUR UNPROFOR/CAN/4/2910 DATED 27 FEB 95

1. THIS IS A REPEAT OF REF A

2. THE VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPORTED UPON AT REF B INVOLVED AN ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIER THAT WENT OFF THE ROAD IN THE AREA OF SMILCIC ON 29 OCT 94

3. DAMAGE TO THE VEH WAS LESS THAN 20.00 CANADIAN DOLLARS AND NEITHER A PCC NOR A WOV, THEREFORE, WHERE REQUIRED

4. CANBAT 1 IS NOT SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE COST OF REPAIRS AND CONSIDER THIS MATTER CLOSED.

A. LAFLEUR, SGT, G1 ADMIN, 6506

A. Lafleur
I.W. ANDERSON, CAPT, G1/ADJT, 6507

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UNCLASSIFIED

1080-1 (G1)

01 01 171440Z MAR 95 RR RR UUUU

G1 080

PA
CCUNPROFOR//G1//

UNPROFOR//CLAIMS, PROPERTY SURVEY AND INVESTIGATION

UNIT//

INFO CCUNPROFOR RASTEVIC//OC ADMIN//

CCUNPROFOR CAMP PLESO//CLAIMS, PROPERTY SURVEY AND

INVESTIGATION UNIT//

UNCLAS G1 080

SUBJ: PROVISION OF WRITE-OFF VOUCHER

RESF: A. ADMIN 039 140945Z MAR 95 (NOTAL)

B. 1080-1/3032-32/94

C. UNPROFOR/CAN/4/0511 DATED 27 FEB 95

1. THIS IS A REPEAT OF REF A

2. CANBAT 1 HAD LOST 1 X C7 RIFLE, 1 X BOLT AND 1 X WEAPON SIGHT ON
5 NOV 95 WHICH WAS REPORTED UNDER COVER OF REF B

3. IN RESPONSE TO REF C, NO WRITE OFF VOUCHER IS REQR AS THE AS THE
WEAPON WAS RETURNED TO CANBAT 1 ON 9 DEC 94

4. CANBAT 1 INFORMED OUR CONTINGENT HEADQUARTERS IN ZAGREB AND
APOLIGIZE FOR FAILING TO INFORM YOUR SECTION. PLEASE CONSIDER THIS
MATTER CLOSED.


G1

A. LAELEUR, SGT, G1 ADMIN, 6506


A. Lafeur, SGT
I.W. ANDERSON, CAPT, G1/ADJT, 6507

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CANADIAN CONTINGENT
CONTINGENT CANADIEN
CANBAT 2



PROTECTED B

RCD BG 1080-2-3127-16-95 (Adjnt)

The Royal Canadian Dragoons
Battle Group
CANBAT 2
Visoko, B-H

17 March 1995

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE -
SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
FATAL VEHICLE ACCIDENT/CIVILIAN CASUALTY - 7 JANUARY 1995

RECEIVED

1080-1

22 MAR 1995

G/ADMIN 23/7

NTR
SI completed & forwarded CR/PA
To NDHQ. no further action.
AL 23/7/95

- References: A. MP SIR FPM CAMP PLESO 8556 071600A JAN 95
- B. QR&O Chap 21
- C. CFAO 21-9
- D. CCUNPROFOR Directive 605
- E. RCD GSO 530

1. [redacted] Capt G.H. Edwards will conduct a Summary Investigation into the vehicle accident involving a CANBAT 2 HLVW Wrecker (UNPF 8723) and a civilian vehicle on 7 January 1995, which resulted in the death of a Croatian civilian. The investigation will be conducted IAW the references.

2. The investigating officer shall obtain statements from all available witnesses and will record his findings, to include:

- a. where, when and how the accident occurred;
- b. who was involved in the accident;
- c. the conditions under which the accident occurred, to include:
 - (1) weather conditions;
 - (2) visibility;

1/3

PROTECTED B

REVIEWED 801

PROTECTED B

- (3) crew conditions and employment; and
 - (4) communications conditions;
 - d. the immediate actions of the military personnel involved in the accident;
 - e. whether a mechanical/technical defect contributed to the accident;
 - f. whether negligence was involved;
 - g. whether all documentation regarding the accident (ie. MP Report, Vehicle Accident Report) has been properly completed;
 - h. the extent and cost of the damage to both vehicles, including a claim from the civilian; and
 - i. whether anyone is to blame for the accident.
3. The investigating officer shall make recommendations as to:
- a. disciplinary/administrative action to be taken against any individual(s);
 - b. actions to be taken to cover the cost of the damage to both vehicles, and of any claims against UNPROFOR; and
 - c. measures to be taken to prevent accidents of this type in the future.
4. The investigating officer is to note that where an officer or Non-Commissioned Member is currently the subject of a criminal (police) investigation, or has been or is about to be charged with an offence under the National Defence Act or other Canadian law or has been arrested/detained in respect of any alleged act or omission which could constitute such an offence; such an officer or Non-Commissioned Member shall not be compelled to give evidence for this Summary Investigation in relation to the subject matter of the

2/3

PROTECTED B

REVIEWED B01

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PROTECTED B

police investigation, charge, arrest or detention. Where the gathering of such evidence is deemed critical to the successful completion of the investigation, the Adjutant shall be notified and the advice of the representative of the Judge Advocate General sought prior to taking any action to compel such testimony, recognizing that compelling testimony in such circumstances could have the effect of jeopardizing subsequent disciplinary proceedings.

5. This investigation is designated as PROTECTED B. The investigating officer will submit the results of this investigation to the Adjutant by 1600 hours 3 April 1995. He is not to depart the CANBAT 2 AOR on duty or leave without notifying the Adjutant.


T.S. Newton
Captain
Adjutant
for Commanding Officer

Enclosure: 1

Distribution List

External

CCUNPROFOR//Legal Officer/G1//(less enclosure)

BH Comd Forward Sarajevo//Legal Officer/G1//(less enclosure)

Internal

Capt Edwards

3/3

PROTECTED B

REVIEWED 801

001838

PROTECTED B/UN CONFIDENTIAL



Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
K0K 3R0

1080-2-3127-10-94 (DComd)

17 March 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
LOSS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
CANBAT 2 - 13 DEC 94

References: A. 1080-2-3127-10-94 (Adjtt) (enclosed)
B. CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's comments, the Contingent Board of Inquiry and the Summary Investigation regarding the incident.
2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and comments of the Commanding Officer. The Commanding Officer has taken appropriate measures to ensure that safety inspections are routinely carried out and that appropriate measures are now in place to implement them.
3. As there is no one at fault for the fire, disciplinary and administrative action is not required. I direct the Commanding Officer to raise the required documentation to have the loss of public property, in the amount of \$381.46 CDN, written off at public expense.

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4. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.


N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

Distribution List

Action

NDHQ Ottawa/J1 Coord
HQUNPROFOR Zagreb/CMPAO
CANBAT 2 Visoko/CO (less encls)

Information

CANCON Det Primosten//G5 Legal//

2/2

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001840

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3R0

1080-2-3127-02-95 (DComd)

17 March 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
INJURY TO A CIVILIAN
CANBAT 2 - 31 DEC 94

References: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-02-95 (Adj) (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-02-95 (TO) (enclosed)
C. FCPO NO 9 Sep 94
D. CCUNPROFOR DIR 605 Oct 94

1. Enclosed are the requisite unit Commanding Officer's comments, UNPROFOR Summary and the Summary Investigation into subject incident.
2. I have reviewed the investigation and concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. The incident is directly attributable to the recklessness of the cyclist. As Cpl Hall was driving IAW the road and traffic conditions, no disciplinary or administrative action will be taken.

1/2

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REVIEWED 801

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PROTECTED B/UN CONFIDENTIAL

3. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

ENCLOSURES: 2

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ACTION

NDHQ Export/J1 Coord
HQUNPROFOR Zagreb/CMPAO
CCUNPROFOR Canbat 2 Visoko/CO (less encls)

INFORMATION

CANCON Det Primosten/G5 Legal

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3R0

1080-2-3127-06-94 (DComd)

17 March 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
CANBAT 2 VEHICLE ACCIDENT
UNPF 18106/2251T 15 NOV 94

References: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-06-94 (Adj) 8 Feb 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-06-94 (J Coy) 27 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94
D. FCPD 9 dated Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Summary Investigation, the Contingent Board of Inquiry and the Commanding Officer's comments regarding the incident.

2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. Corrective measures have been taken in the form of placing a warning in unit Routine Orders. The Commanding Officer is to proceed with the proposed amendment to the MLVW Driver's Manual through the chain of command.

3. As there was no willfull negligence by any member involved, I direct that the damage to the trailer be written off at public expense. The Commanding Officer is to submit all the necessary documents to effect this write off and have the costs recovered from the United Nations.

1/2

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4. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 2

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

1080-2-3127-06-95 (DComd)

17 March 1995

Distribution List

**SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
CANBAT 2 VEHICLE ACCIDENT
UNPF 18131 - 8 JAN 95**

References: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-06-95 (Adj) 11 Feb 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-06-94 (J Coy) 8 Feb 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94
D. FCPD 9 dated Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's comments, the Contingent Board of Inquiry and the Summary Investigation regarding the incident.
2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. I am assured that corrective measures have been taken by the Commanding Officer in warning his soldiers of the dangers of driving on this stretch of road and that they should exercise extra diligence in their driving.

1/2

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001845

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3. As there was no willfull negligence by any member involved, I recommend that the cost of the claim, amounting to DM 1500.00 submitted by Mr Vajdin as a result of this accident, be honoured by UNPROFOR.

4. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ACTION

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CCUNPROFOR Visoko/CANBAT 2/CO (less encls)

INFORMATION

CANCON Det PRIMOSTEN//G5 Legal//

2/2

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3R0

1080-2-3127-09-95

17 March 1995

Distribution List

**SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
CANBAT 2 VEHICLE ACCIDENT
UNPF 25534 14 JAN 95**

References: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-09-95 (Adj) 9 Feb 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-09-95 (3 Tp Ldr) 7 Feb 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94
D. FCPD 9 dated Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's comments, the Contingent Board of Inquiry and the Summary Investigation regarding the incident.
2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer.
3. As there was no willfull negligence by the member involved and the accident was unavoidable, I direct that the damages to the vehicle be written off. The Commanding Officer is to submit the necessary documents to have the cost of the damage written off at crown expense and have those costs recovered from the United Nations.
4. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

1/2

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REVIEWED BOI

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N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

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INFORMATION

CANCON Det PRIMOSTEN//G5 Legal//

2/2

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REVIEWED BOI



Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

1080-1 (G1)

17 March 1995

Claims, Property Survey
& Investigation Unit
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

PROVISION OF WRITE-OFF VOUCHER

References: A. Your UNPROFOR/CAN/4/0302 (enclosed)
B. MP Report South 549-1-94 22 Feb 94 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed find write-off voucher as requested at reference A pertaining to the destruction of military equipment in Njegovani on 3 February 1994.
2. Any further inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.


I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosure: 2

REVIEWED BOI

PROTECTED B



Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

1080-1-3127-14-94 (DComd)

17 March 1995

Distribution List

**SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
LOSS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
CANBAT 2 - 7 NOV 94**

- References: A. 1080-2-3127-14-94 (Adj) 11 Feb 95 (enclosed)
B. 1080-2-3127-14-94 (FST) 10 Feb 95 (enclosed)
C. FCPO NO 9
D. CCUNPROFOR DIR 605 Oct 94

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's comments, the Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry report and the Summary Investigation regarding the incident.
2. I have reviewed the investigation and concur with the findings and recommendations of both the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. I am convinced the Commanding Officer has taken appropriate measures to effect stricter controls on the lending of material in the future.
3. As the material was employed in support of a UN Mission and no one is at fault, the material is to be written off and the Commanding Officer is to raise the appropriate documents to recover the costs from the United Nations.

1/2

PROTECTED B

REVIEWED BOI

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4. Any questions regarding this matter should be directed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ACTION

NDHQ Ottawa/J1 Coord
HQUNPROFOR Zagreb/CMPAO
CANBAT 1 RASTEVIC/CO (less encl 3)

INFORMATION

CANCON Det Primosten//G5 Legal//

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
K0K 3R0

1080-1-3032-29-94 (DComd)

17 March 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
VEHICLE ACCIDENT INVOLVING A
CANBAT 1 CIVILIAN PATTERN VAN
UNPF LICENSE PLATE 3862 AND A
CROATIAN CIVILIAN ON 13 OCTOBER 1994, SPLIT CROATIA

References: A. 1080-1-3032-29-94 (CO) 27 February 1995 (enclosed)
B. 1080-1-3032-29-94 (Maint O) 20 December 1994 (enclosed)
C. FCPO NO 9
D. CCUNPROFOR DIR 605 Oct 94

1. Enclosed are the Commanding Officer's Comments, the Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report, and the Summary Investigation regarding this incident.
2. I concur with the Commanding Officer's comments in that the accident was preventable. The driver, Cpl Dudek did act in a negligent and irresponsible fashion by failing to rest when given the opportunity as well as by failing to recognize and report fatigue. As an injury was sustained to a civilian and the driver was at fault, it is recommended that should there be civilian action taken against UNPROFOR, that compensation should be awarded. Accordingly, I feel the Commanding Officer has taken appropriate action.
3. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

1/2

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N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 2

2/2

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

1080-1 (G1)

16 March 1995

Director General Police Services
National Defence Headquarters
MGen George R. Pearkes Bldg
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

MILITARY POLICE - INCIDENT REPORTS

- References: A. MP Coy HQ 541/941/94 26 Oct 94 (enclosed)
B. MP Coy HQ 541/992/94 1 Nov 94 (enclosed)
C. MP Coy HQ 541/981/94 1 Nov 94 (enclosed)
D. MP Coy HQ 558/243/94 2 Nov 94 (enclosed)
E. MP Coy HQ 520/10/94 2 Nov 94 (enclosed)
F. MP Coy HQ 558/240/94 2 Nov 94 (enclosed)
G. MP Coy HQ 541/1289/94 10 Feb 95 (enclosed)
H. MP Coy HQ 541/1290/94 10 Feb 95 (enclosed)

1. In accordance with references, enclosed are Military Police Incident Reports for your information.
2. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.


I.W. Anderson
Capt
For Commander

Enclosures: 8

PROTECTED B

REVIEWED 801

MP COY HQ CASE REF: 541/ 941 /94.
FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
UNPROFOR HQ
ZAGREB

DATE: 26 October - 94

TO : DISTRIBUTION BELOW.

SUBJECT : THEFT

1. Please find here in a Military Police Report in connection with above noted subject, for your information and any action you deem necessary.

SIGNED: *for Maj. [Signature]* COL.
(CO UNPROFOR MP COY & FPM)

Distr:
COS/LOG/ADM
LEG ADV
G1 CAN CON
FILE

REVIEWED 801

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MP COY HQ CASE REF: 541 / 992 / 94
FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
UNPROFOR HQ
ZAGREB
DATE: 1 NOVEMBER -94

RECEIVED

TO : DISTRIBUTION BELOW

SUBJECT : THEFT

1080-1 19 NOV 1994

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS	
COS	19/11/94
61	19/11/94

1. Please find here in à Military Police in connection with the above noted subject, for your information and any action you deem necessary.

SIGNED *for Hajdukovic* COL
(CO UNPROFOR MP/COY & FPM)

Distr:
COS/LOG/ADM
LEG ADV
CANCON
FILE

REVIEWED 801

MP COY HQ CASE REF: 541 / 981 / 94
FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
UNPROFOR HQ
ZAGREB
DATE: 1 NOVEMBER -94

TO : DISTRIBUTION BELOW
SUBJECT : THEFT

1080-1

18 NOV 1994

CONTINGENT	
COS	19/11/94
G1	19/11/94

1. Please find here in a Military Police in connection with the above noted subject, for your information and any action you deem necessary.

SIGNED: *for Maj. [Signature]* / COL
(CO UNPROFOR MP COY & FPM)

Distr:
COS/LOG/ADM
LEG ADV
CANCON
FILE

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11

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MP COY HQ CASE REF: 558 / 243 / 94
FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
UNPROFOR HQ
ZAGREB
DATE: 2 NOVEMBER -94

RECEIVED

TO : DISTRIBUTION BELOW
SUBJECT : LOSS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

1080-1 19 NOV 1994

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS	
COS	19/11/94 [Signature]
G5 PA	19/11/94
G1	22 NOV 1994 [Signature]
CI ADM.	

- Please find here in a Military Police in connection with the above noted subject, for your information and any action you deem necessary.

~~② G5 PA / G1~~
Longo.
MM
COS
19/11/94

SIGNED: *[Signature]*
(CO UNPROFOR MP COY & FPM)

Distr:
COS/LOG/ADM
LEG ADV
CANCON
FILE

REVIEWED 801

ORIGINAL AS IS

MP COY HQ CASE REF: 520 / 10 / 94
FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
UNPROFOR HQ
ZAGREB
DATE: 2 NOVEMBER -94

RECEIVED

1080-1 19 NOV 94

SERBIAN CONTINGENT	
QUARTERS	
COS	19/11/94
G1	19/11/94

TO : DISTRIBUTION BELOW
SUBJECT : ASSAULT WITHAN OFFENSIVE WEAPON

1. Please find here in a Military Police in connection with the above noted subject, for your information and any action you deem necessary.

SIGNED: *for Maj Keygla* COL
(CO UNPROFOR MP/COY & FPM)

Distr:
COS/LOG/ADM
LEG ADV
CANCON
FILE

REVIEWED BOI

MP COY HQ CASE REF: 558 / 240 / 94
FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
UNPROFOR HQ
ZAGREB
DATE: 2 NOVEMBER -94

TO : DISTRIBUTION BELOW
SUBJECT : LOSS OF NATIONAL MILITARY PROPERTY

1. Please find here in a Military Police in connection with the above noted subject, for your information and any action you deem necessary.

SIGNED: *[Signature]* COL
(CO UNPROFOR MP COY & FPM)

Distr:
COS/LOG/ADM
LEG ADV
CANCON *Re 4 15/12 94*
FILE

REVIEWED 801

MP COY HQ CASE REF: 541/1289/94
FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
UNPROFOR HQ
ZAGREB
DATE: 10 FEBRUARY -95

TO : DISTRIBUTION BELOW

SUBJECT : THEFT

1. Please find here in a Military Police Report in connection with the above noted subject, for your information and any action you deem necessary.

SIGNED: Jon Blithwick FACOL
(CO UNPROFOR MP COY & FPM)

Distr:
COS LOG/ADM
LEG ADV
CTO
COMD CANBAT 1
FILE


REVIEWED BOI

MP COY HQ CASE REF: 541/1290/94
FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
UNPROFOR HQ
ZAGREB
DATE: 10 FEBRUARY -95

TO : DISTRIBUTION BELOW

SUBJECT : THEFT

1. Please find here in a Military Police Report in connection with the above noted subject, for your information and any action you deem necessary.

SIGNED:  COL
(CO UNPROFOR MP COY & FPM)

Distr:
COS LOG/ADM
LEG ADV
COMD CANBAT 2
FILE

REVIEWED 801

CRIPA



Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

1080-1 (G1)

16 March 1995

Claims, Property Survey
& Investigation Unit
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

PROVISION OF WRITE-OFF VOUCHER

Reference: 1080-1-3032-37/94 (CO) 28 February 1995 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed find write-off voucher requested at reference pertaining to the material lost in shooting incident at KOLARIJA, Croatia, 31 December 1994.
2. Any further inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'I.W. Anderson', written in a cursive style.

I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosure: 1

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CANBAT 1
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Camp Rastevic
Rastevic

Ad.

1080-1/3032-37/94 (CO)

28 February 1995

G1
Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Camp Pleso
Zagreb

WRITE OFF VOUCHER 95022 FOR
MATERIAL LOST IN SHOOTING INCIDENT

Reference: CANBAT 1 Summary Investigation 1080-1/3032-37/94

1. Find enclosed subject Write-Off Voucher required to recover the cost of the material listed in reference.
2. Copies of the Write-Off Voucher have been forwarded separately through our Finance Officer to the Contingent Comptroller and through our Quartermaster to G4 Supply according to the latest direction on the processing of Write-Off Vouchers as stipulated at the January 1995 Logistics Conference.
3. A damage discrepancy report has been raised on the vehicle and has been submitted to G4 Maintenance.
4. Please contact the CANBAT 1 Quartermaster, Captain T.P. O'Shea, if any further action is required on our part to recover the costs associated with this incident.

F080-1

S.G. Miller
Captain
For Commanding Officer

al 9/3 LT
G1/Adm 7.3 Lm

Enclosures: 1

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WRITE-OFF VOUCHER
 PART I

Unit requesting write-off: CANBAT 1

W.O.V.: 95022

Location: SECTOR SOUTH//RASTEVIC

Date: 27 FEBRUARY 1995

To: UNPROFOR HQ/C.LOG.O.

This unit requests authority to temporarily adjust its unit ledger for items listed until final authorization for write-off is received from HQ UNPROFOR. The reasons for the write-off are as follows: ITEMS DESTROYED IN SHOOTING INCIDENT. DETAILS OF THIS INCIDENT ARE FOUND CANBAT 1 SUMMARY INVESTIGATION 1080/3032-37/94.

CATEGORY	ITEM NO	DESCRIPTION	QTY	UNIT PRICE	UN/COE	TOTAL PRICE
		SEE ATTACHED LIST				

Signed: _____

M. Skidmore
 LCpl M.S. Skidmore
 Commanding Officer

=====

PART II

To: Commanding Officer CANBAT 1

- Authority is granted to temporarily adjust unit ledger by the quantities of items listed.
- Further details of the loss are required as follows:

C.LOG.O.

Date

=====

PART III

To: C.LOG.O

- Write-off approved. Disposal action _____
- Item: _____ of UNPROFOR CASE NO. _____

 Secretary, UNPROFOR Property
 Survey for Chief Administrative Officer

Date

REVIEWED 801

Unit requesting write-off: CANBAT 1W.O.V.: 95-022

MATERIAL IN CLASS S CONDITION ON ARRIVAL IN THEATRE OCTOBER 1994. NO YEAR OF MANUFACTURE AVAILABLE.

CATEGORY	ITEM NO	DESCRIPTION	QTY	PRICE US\$	UN/COE	TOTAL US\$
CLOTHING	UN	BALL CAP	1	\$3.32	COE	\$3.32
"	8415-21-866-1538	COMBAT SHIRT	2	\$28.30	COE	\$56.60
"	8415-21-899-2511	COMBAT PANTS	2PR	\$31.91	COE	\$63.82
"	8420-21-116-2266	COMBAT T-SHIRT	2	\$2.26	COE	\$4.52
"	8430-21-872-4291	COMBAT BOOTS	2PR	\$47.91	COE	\$95.82
"	8440-21-904-0049	WOOL SOCKS	3PR	\$1.56	COE	\$4.68
"	8455-21-102-9400	BRASSARDS	2	\$1.62	COE	\$3.24
"	8470-21-909-2984	BODY ARMOUR FRAG	2	\$292.97	COE	\$585.94
"	UN	BALACLAVA	1	\$2.54	COE	\$2.54
"	8415-21-875-7758	COMBAT GLOVE INNER	1PR	\$1.82	COE	\$1.82
"	8415-21-857-7791	COMBAT GLOVE OUTER	1PR	\$8.16	COE	\$8.16
"	8415-21-859-0726	THERMAL UNDERWEAR BOTTOM	1PR	\$5.70	COE	\$5.70
"	8415-21-905-7527	GORTEX SOCKS	1PR	\$53.88	COE	\$53.88
"	8415-21-911-8381	GORTEX JACKET	1	\$132.62	COE	\$132.62
"	8415-21-911-8396	GORTEX PANTS	1PR	\$132.62	COE	\$132.62
B	5965-21-874-9993	HANDSET H-189	1	\$171.88	COE	\$171.88
B	5995-00-258-8423	6' ANTENNA CONTROL CABLE	1	\$23.96	COE	\$23.96
B	5820-21-108-3059	SIGNAL SATCHEL	1	\$11.70	COE	\$11.70
B	5935-00-823-2726	PWR CABLE	1	\$24.91	COE	\$24.91
B	5935-00-859-8426	CONNECTOR	1	\$1.80	COE	\$1.80
B	5935-00-892-8931	ADAPTER	1	\$3.01	COE	\$3.01

REVIEWED 801

B	9905-21-872-4237	ROADSIDE WARNING KIT	1	\$6.68	COE	\$6.68
B	7240-21-899-8270	JERRY CAN GAS	1	\$14.11	COE	\$14.11
B	8470-21-909-2096	BALLISTIC BLANKET	1	\$359.53	COE	\$359.53



Capt T.P. O'Shea
Quarter Master



Lt Col M.S. Skidmore
Commanding Officer

REVIEWED BU1

RAAUZYUW RCCLNWA0005 0741453-UUUU--RCCLQBA.

ZNR UUUUU

R 140945Z MAR 95

FM CCUNPROFOR RASTEVIC//OC ADMIN//

TO CCUNPROFOR CAMP PLESO//CLAIMS, PROPERTY SURVEY AND
INVESTIGATION UNIT//



①

BT

UNCLAS ADMIN 039

SUBJ: PROVISION OF WRITE-OFF VOUCHER.

REFS: A. 1080-1/3032-32/94

B. UNPROFOR/CAN/4/0511 DATED 27 FEB 95

1. CANBAT 1 HAD LOST 1 X C7 RIFLE, 1 X BOLT AND 1 X WEAPON SIGHT ON
5 NOV 95 WHICH WAS REPORTED UNDER COVER OF REF A.

2. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REF B. NO WRITE OFF VOUCHER IS REQR AS THE
WEAPON WAS RETURNED TO CANBAT 1 ON 9 DEC 94

3. CANBAT 1 INFORMED OUR CONTINGENT HEADQUARTERS IN ZAGREB AND
APOLIGIZE FOR FAILING TO INFORM YOUR SECTION. PLEASE CONSIDER THIS
MATTER CLOSED.

RECEIVED
1080-1
16 MAR 1995

BT

#0005

② GI Admin
prep ltr to UNPROFOR/Claims properties...
restarting the above.

♥JAS049 DELIVERED 0741456 806144

dl
CAPT
GI
6507
A. S. 95

CANADIAN CONTINGENT FIELD OFFICERS		
GI		16/3 LT
GI Admin		17/3 Lt
CR PA		17/3 Pl

NTF
Answered on our
GI 080 171440Z MAR 95

Pl
Sgt
GI Admin
17/3/95

REVIEWED 801

s.19(1)

PROTECTED A

MEMORANDUM

1080-1/3029-1 (CO)

12 Mar 95

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE - SUMMARY
INVESTIGATION INTO LOSS OF
PUBLIC PROPERTY - 10 FEB 1995

1. [REDACTED] Capt J. Snyder shall conduct a Summary Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the loss of 9mm pistol, serial number 7T8962, and accompanying magazine, ammunition, holster and military clothing and equipment, belonging to B11 975 116 Capt J.F. Casault.
2. The Summary Investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of QR&O Chapter 21, 36 and 38, CFAOs 21-9, 22-10 and 38-1; CFP 181 Chapter 14, Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605, FCPD 9 and other relevant orders.
3. The Summary Investigation shall include statements from all available witnesses and will record evidence concerning the fol:
 - a. when and where the loss took place;
 - b. the circumstance surrounding the loss;
 - c. what security measures were in place at the time of the loss;
 - d. did the loss occur in a restricted area or route;
 - e. was the member informed that he was/was not permitted in the area where the loss occurred and by whom;
 - f. the NATO stock number, nomenclature, quantity and catalogue value of the lost public property;

1/2

PROTECTED A

REVIEWED B01

001870

UN RESTRICTED



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1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

12 March 1995

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 15 Feb 95 (enclosed)
B. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92 (enclosed)
C. MP Report CAN2 550-15-95 31 Jan 95 (enclosed)

1. Find references A, B and C enclosed. You will note that it concerns minor damage to one of the UN vehicles and does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR.
2. Any inquiries on this matter, may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.


I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 1

UN RESTRICTED

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CANADIAN CONTINGENT
CONTINGENT CANADIEN
CANBAT 2



RCD BG 1080-1 (Adjt)

The Royal Canadian Dragoons
Battle Group
CCUNPROFOR, CANBAT 2
Visoko, B-H

15 February 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY DISPOSAL OF INCIDENTS
WITHOUT CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

Refs: A. FCPO No (9)
B. BH Comd SOP 413

1. Enclosed is a completed Annex C to Reference A regarding a minor vehicle accident involving two CANBAT 2 vehicles.
2. Minor damage was sustained by one of the CANBAT 2 vehicles. As this accident does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR, it has been submitted as a Summary Disposal.
3. Any questions regarding this matter should be directed to the undersigned at local 5502.


T.S. Newton
Captain
Adjutant
For Commanding Officer

Enclosure: 1

Distribution List

Action

HQ CCUNPROFOR Zagreb/G1

Information

BH Command Forward Sarajevo/Legal Officer

1080-1 10 FEB 1995

CANADIAN CONTINGENT	
G/	187/ G/
6/ admin	10/5

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Annex C to
FCPD No.(9)
Dated June 1992

SUMMARY DISPOSAL OF INCIDENTS WITHOUT CONVENING A BOI

1. Reference MP Report CAN2 550-15-95
Convening Order to Investigate vehicle accident
2. As the accident is within the conditions specified in the Field Administration Handbook, I recommend that a BOI should NOT be held.
3. The following is a description of how the accident occurred:

See MP Report
4. The accident was immediately reported to C/S 0
and a MP Investigation was conducted (action taken).
5. There were no injuries to civilian or military personnel.
6. There was minor damage to Mission Vehicle No 8711.
7. There was no damage to civilian property/vehicles.
8. I recommend that the cost be written off against N/A
(State the amount if known).
9. Military Police Investigation Report is attached as Annex A.

SIGNATURE  T.S. Newton, Adjt RANK Captain CANBAT 2

DATE 14 February 1995

A-1/2

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10. I agree/~~disagree~~ with the above report.

SIGNATURE  RANK Major

NAME J.P.G. MacIntyre

APPOINTMENT/TITLE 2IC CANBAT 2

DATE 15 February 1995


If disagree, give reasons:

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MILITARY POLICE
FINAL
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
REPORT

SEC/DET CASE REF: CAN2 550-15-95
MP COY HQ CASE REF:

MP INITIAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORT DATED REFERS.

1. DATE AND TIME OF ACCIDENT: 1615 hrs, 27 Jan 95
2. DATE AND TIME REPORTED TO MP/CIVILIAN POLICE: 1725 hrs, 27 Jan 95
3. DATE AND TIME OF MP/POLICE ARRIVAL: N/A
4. LOCATION (IN DETAIL): By the south-east wall of the maintenance area of the Big 4 bldg.
5. PEDESTRIAN INVOLVEMENT: N/A
6. SUMMARY OF EXTENT OF ANY INJURIES: Nil
7. VEHICLES INVOLVED:

Veh Reg No	Make/Type	MILITARY/CIVILIAN
UNPF 18062	Iltis	Military
UNPF 8711	MLVW (MRT)	Military
TRACKED/WHEELED	OWNER/ASSIGNED TO	NO OF PASSENGERS
WHEELED	CSS Sqd, CANBAT 2	1
WHEELED	HQ Sqd, CANBAT 2	Nil

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8. DRIVERS:

Veh Reg No	Name/Rank/Title	ID No	Unit/Section/Address
UNPF 18062	BENNETT D, Cp1		CSS Sqd, CANBAT 2
UNPF 8711	BRADLEY MJ, Cp1		HQ Sqd, CANBAT 2

9: ON DUTY UN DRIVING PERMIT NO: 55474

10. PURPOSE OF TRIP: Pick up of ammunition.

11. DAMAGE TO UN VEHICLE/PROPERTY: Veh#2 obtained a triangular rip in the side of the tarp, approximately 60cm across, and 60cm down, situated in the centre of the right side of the tarp. Cost of repair is unknown at this time, as it has not been confirmed if the tarp will be replaced or repaired.

12. DAMAGE TO VEHICLE/PROPERTY OF OTHERS: Veh#1's radio antenna snapped in half. Estimated cost of replacement is negligible.

13a. ACCIDENT TYPE: 13

- | | |
|--|---------------------------|
| 01-HEAD-ON COLLISION | 17-PARKED AND ROLLED |
| 02-GLANCING COLL-OTHER VEHs HEADING SAME WAY
OVER | 18-RAN OFF ROAD WITHOUT |
| 03-GLANCING COLL-VEHs HEADING OPPOSITE WAYS
OVERTURNING | 19-OVERTURNED(WITHOUT |
| 04-GLANCING COLL-WHILE TURNING RIGHT
FIRST COLLIDING) | 20-PART OF VEHICLE CAME |
| 05-GLANCING COLL-WHILE TURNING LEFT
OFF) | 21-PART OF LOAD CAME OFF |
| 06-RIGHT ANGEL COLL WITH VEH FROM OUR LEFT | 22-FIRE |
| 07-RIGHT ANGEL COLL WITH VEH FROM OUR RIGHT | 23-HIT BY FLYING FALLING |
| 08-HIT OTHER VEH IN REAR IN TRAFFIC | 24-HIT PEDAL CYCLIST |
| 09-HIT IN REAR BY OTHER VEH IN TRAFFIC | 25-HIT A PEDESTRIAN |
| 10-BACKED ON TO OTHER VEH IN TRAFFIC | 26-HIT AN ANIMAL |
| 11-OTHER VEH BACKED ON TO US IN TRAFFIC | 27-TRAILER BECAME |
| 12-GOING FORWARD HIT STATIC OBJECT | 28-TRAILER JACK-KNIFED |
| 13-GOING FORWARD HIT PARKED VEHICLE | 29-COLLIDED WITH AIRCRAFT |
| 14-REVERSING HIT STATIC OBJECT | 30-DAMAGED IN UNKNOWN |
| 15-REVERSING HIT PARKED VEHICLE | CIRCUMSTANCES |
| 16-PARKED HIT OTHER VEHICLE | 31-OVERTAKING |
| | 32-OTHER ACCIDENT-(STATE |
| | TYPE) |

13b. PREVAILING CONDITIONS:

AREA: URBAN/RURAL

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a. CONFIGURATION 1-STRAIGHT 2-BEND 3-T-JUNCTION 4-Y-JUNCTION 5-JUNCTION 6-CROSSROADS 7-ROUNDABOUT 8-ROAD NARROWS 9-LEVEL CROSSING 1	b. ROAD SURFACE 1. CONCRETE 2. ROUGH TARMAC 3. SMOOTH TARMAC 4. COBBLES 5. WOOD BLOCKS 6. EARTH/GRAVEL etc. 6	c. WEATHER 1. CLEAR 2. FOG OR MIST 3. RAIN OR HAIL 4. SNOW OR SLEET 5. SMOKE OR DUST 6. STRONG WIND 1	d. ROAD CONDITIONS 1. DRY 2. WET 3. ICY 4. MUDDY 5. SANDED 6. GREASY 1	e. STREET LIGHT 1. BRIGHT 2. FAIR 3. DIM 4. NONE/OFF 3	f. TRAFFIC 1. NONE 2. LIGHT 3. MEDIUM 4. DENSE 1
g. GRADIENT 1. LEVEL 2. STRAIGHT SLOPE 3. STEEP HILL 4. HILL CREST 5. BRIDGE 1	h. TYPE OF ROAD 1. ONE-WAY STREET 2. TWO-WAY STREET 3. DUAL CARRIAGEWAY 4. MOTORWAY (M) /	i. PERIOD OF DAY 1. DAWN 2. DAYLIGHT 3. DUSK 4. NIGHT 2	k. TRAFFIC SIGNS 1. TRAFFIC LIGHTS 2. STOP/HALT SIGN 3. SLOW SIGN 4. GIVE WAY SIGN 5. OTHER WARNING /	. VISIBILITY 1. UP TO 25m 2. UP TO 50m 3. UP TO 75m 4. UP TO 100m 5. OVER 100m 1	. SPECIAL POINTS 1. ROAD WORKS 2. SPEED LIMIT 3. TRAM LINES 4. ILLEGAL PARKING 5. PEDESTRIAN CROSSING / /
n. SPECIFY ANY OTHER DETAILS					

14. DRIVERS CONDITIONS AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT:

- a. Physical condition: Normal
- b. Hours driven prior to the accident: 5 min
- c. Seat belts: Fitted: YES. Worn: U/K.
- d. Others:

15. ACCOUNT OF VEHICLES POSITION/MOVEMENT BEFORE ACCIDENT AND HOW THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED (INDICATE SPEED, SKID, BRAKE, MARKS):

- a. Veh#1 (UN Iltis, UNPF 8711), was driven by Cpl BENNETT. Cpl REED was the co-driver;
- b. Veh#2 (UN MLVW MRT, UNPF 18062), was parked approximately 5m, parallel to the south-east wall of the Big 4 (maintenance floor);
- c. Cpl BENNETT declined to use Cpl REED as a ground guide, and attempted to drive between the wall and Veh#2. As he was

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driving, the antenna to his vehicle swung out and pierced the right side of the veh#2's tarp;

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- d. Cpl REED exited veh#1 after hearing the antenna break, and removed the broken antenna from the cargo rack of veh#2. Cpl REED later stated that when he saw the rip in the side of the tarp, he assumed that the damage was not caused by their antenna, and returned to veh#1;
- e. Sgt BADGEROW was walking nearby and witnessed the events mentioned in subpara d. Sgt BADGEROW then yelled over to Cpl BRADLEY who was working on the opposite side of veh#2, and informed him of what happened. Cpl BRADLEY then went around to the other side of veh#2, where he saw Cpl BENNETT and Cpl REED in veh#1. Cpl BRADLEY asked them if they had ripped his tarp, to which they replied they hadn't; and
- f. Cpl BENNETT stated that upon returning to his squadron, he reported the incident to AE55229 Mcpl BOUDREAU DR. This was later confirmed by Mcpl BOUDREAU.

16. PASSENGER AND OTHER WITNESS:

NAME/RANK/TITLE	ID NO	UNIT/SECTION ADDRESS
REED JO, Cpl	[REDACTED]	CSS Sqd, CANBAT 2
BADGEROW DA, Sgt	[REDACTED]	HQ Sqd, CANBAT 2

- 17. INSURANCE DETAILS OF OTHER VEHICLE(S) INVOLVED: N/A
- 18. DETAILS OF INJURIES(REFER TO SEPARATE REPORT(S) AS REQUIRED): NIL
- 19. MP ASSESSMENT OF PROBABLE LIABILITY AND REASONS:

The accident would have been avoided if the driver of veh#1 would have used a ground guide, which is routine procedure when operating a vehicle on the maintenance floor.

- 20. SKETCH ATTACHED: N/A
- 21. STATEMENTS ATTACHED:(REFER TO SEPARATE LIST AS REQUIRED)

- Annex A - Statement of Sgt BADGEROW
- Annex B - Statement of Cpl BRADLEY
- Annex C - Statement of Cpl BENNETT
- Annex D - Statement of Cpl REED

- 22. OTHER MP INVESTIGATORS:N/A


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23. LOCAL POLICE INVOLVED: NO

24. REMARKS:

As movement within and around the maintenance floor is reduced due to the presence of modular tentage and parked vehicles, the procedure of using a ground guide must be enforced and respected in order to prevent any further accidents.

25. CONCLUSION: This report is forwarded as concluded.

REPORT SUBMITTED BY: NAME/RANK : CK McCOMB, CPL
UNIT/SECTION: CANBAT 2 MP
SIGNED : 
DATE : 31 Jan 95

REPORT REVIEWED BY: NAME/RANK : 
UNIT/SECTION: IC CANBAT 2 MP
SIGNED : _____
DATE : 31 Jan 95


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MILITARY POLICE
WITNESS STATEMENT FORM

ANNEX "A" to SEC/DET CASE REF: CAN2 550-15-95

STATEMENT OF: RCPL Sgt DA BADGEROW

SURNAME: <u>BADGEROW</u>	FIRST NAME: <u>DOUGLAS ALEXANDER</u>
RANK/TITLE: <u>Sgt</u> ID NO: <u>AESS457</u>	DATE OF BIRTH: <u>14 AUG 60</u>
UNIT ADDRESS: <u>RCO MAINT CFB Petawawa</u>	DATE OF ROTATION: <u>18 OCT 94</u>
NATIONALITY: <u>CANADIAN</u>	

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY: Sgt SAWYER DJ

NAME: <u>Sgt SAWYER DJ</u>	RANK: <u>Sgt</u>
ID NO: <u>[REDACTED]</u>	UNIT: <u>RCO MP</u>

STATEMENT BEGINS: While entering main entrance of tel's repair modular, I heard a noise, turned and observed a co-driver get out of an ILTIS and disengage the right hand antenna of the ILTIS from the cargo rack of an MKVW. The MKVW belonging to 2nd line repair section of RCO Sgt Maint. I called to Sgt Bradley who was working on the other side of the MKVW, to investigate. I then entered the tel's repair section. I did not observe the UNPF number of the ILTIS or the incident itself. This occurred at approx 1600 hrs 27 Jan 95 in the basement of the big 4 building.

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: [Signature]

SIGNED: [Signature]
PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT

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VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

ANNEX "B" to SEC/DET CASE REF: CAN2 550-15-95

STATEMENT OF: CPI BRADLEY

SURNAME: BRADLEY FIRST NAME: MIKE JOSEPH
RANK/TITLE: CPI ID NO: [REDACTED] DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
UNIT ADDRESS: HQ Sgd, Maint, CAORATA
NATIONALITY: CANADIAN DATE OF ROTATION: 19 OCT 94

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY: CPI McComb

NAME: McComb RANK: CPI
ID NO: [REDACTED] UNIT: MP Sect
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.
SIGNED (MP): N/A
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 1555 hrs., 29 JAN 95
ENDED (DATE/TIME): 1603 hrs., 29 JAN 95
PLACE RECORDED: MP SECT.

STATEMENT BEGINS: I WAS STANDING ON THE LEFT SIDE OF MY MRT WORKING ON A 5/4 TON. SGT BADGEROW YELLED AT ME FROM DOWN THE FLOOR AND POINTED TO THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE TRUCK. I WALKED AROUND THE TRUCK AND NOTICED MY TARP ON THE TRUCK WAS RIPPED. I YELLED AT THE PEOPLE IN THE ILTIS. I SAID YOU RIPPED MY TARP. THEN I WALKED BACK AROUND THE TRUCK AND WROTE DOWN THE CFR II, MJD
MY TRUCK IS A 2 1/2 TON MLVW MAINT REPAIR TRUCK. MJD
MJB

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: [Signature] SIGNED: Mike Bradley

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VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

ANNEX "C" to SEC/DET CASE REF: CAN2 550-15-95

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: BENNETT	FIRST NAME: DAVID
RANK/TITLE: CPL	DATE OF BIRTH: 18 MAY 71
UNIT ADDRESS: RCD CSS	ID NO: [REDACTED]
NATIONALITY: CAN.	DATE OF ROTATION: 29 OCT 94

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: MCCOMB	RANK: CPL
ID NO: [REDACTED]	UNIT: MP SECT B C HQ
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP): [Signature]	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 1610 hrs, 28 JAN 95	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): 1623 hrs, 28 JAN 95	
PLACE RECORDED: MP SECT, CANBAT II	

STATEMENT BEGINS: 27 JAN 95 APPROX 1620 I was driving a Jeep out of the tangle ^{owb} through a tight spot due to a swaying of the UEH. the right hand Ant. ^{Dwb} swung into the UEH beside me it caught on the metal. the Ant broke ^{owb} I stopped the UEH my Ground Guide placed the Ant into the jeep. a mech put his head around the veh. the Ant had caught on. asked if it was his tarp my ground guide look at the tarp seen a large rip figured it had been there before and said NO we carried on and finished out taskin. the next morning I found out the tarp ^{owb} rip was new and sought out the appropriate personnel. told them my name and what happened.

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

[Signature] DAVID BENNETT
 [Signature] DAVID BENNETT

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VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

ANNEX "D" to SEC/DET CASE REF: CAN2 550-15-95

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: REED	FIRST NAME: John Oliver
RANK/TITLE: CPL	DATE OF BIRTH: Feb 7 72
UNIT ADDRESS:	DATE OF ROTATION: 29 Oct 94
NATIONALITY:	

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: McComb	RANK: CPL
ID NO: [REDACTED]	UNIT: MP SECT BG HQ

WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.

SIGNED (MP):

STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 1716 hrs, 28 JAN 95

ENDED (DATE/TIME): 1730 hrs, 28 JAN 95

PLACE RECORDED: MP SECT, CANBAT IF Camp Visoko

STATEMENT BEGINS: On the 28th of Jan at 1500 I CPL REED and CPL BENNETT had to off load ammo of 56 A. CPL Bennett left to go get a jeep so it ~~was~~ would be an easier off load. He was back in about 5 min. We put the ammo in the jeep, we both they jumped in.

In the jeep I asked him if he wanted a ground guid. He said no ~~and~~ don't need one. So we put the vehical into motion. Well the jeep didn't go more then fifteen feet where the antenna got caught up in an ML VW tarp and ripped it. This was caused by going in between the wall and ML so when

BY WITNESS SIGNATURE:

REVIEWED BUT

SIGNED:

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STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

ANNEX "D" to SEC/DET CASE REF: CAN2 550-15-95

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: REES	ID NO: [REDACTED]
RANK/TITLE: CPL	

STATEMENT CONTINUES: he turned the antenna swinging out and caught the tarp, breaking the antenna.
After we heard the antenna break we stopped and I got out. Looked to see if there was any damage. I noticed the antenna and a small rip in the tarp. ^{In} One EMT from a distance of about 5 feet away from me asked if we ripped the tarp. I said I don't think so. all ML tarps have small rips. So we left. And a ground guide him out of the Garage the rest of the way.

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

[Handwritten signature]
 REVIEWED BUT

SIGNED:

[Handwritten signature]

PROTECTED A

MEMORANDUM

1080-1/3029-1 (CO)

12 Mar 95

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE - SUMMARY
INVESTIGATION INTO LOSS OF
PUBLIC PROPERTY - 10 FEB 1995

1. [REDACTED] Capt J. Snyder shall conduct a Summary Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the loss of 9mm pistol, serial number 7T8962, and accompanying magazine, ammunition, holster and military clothing and equipment, belonging to B11 975 116 Capt J.F. Casault.
2. The Summary Investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of QR&O Chapter 21, 36 and 38, CFAOs 21-9, 22-10 and 38-1; CFP 181 Chapter 14, Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605, FCPD 9 and other relevant orders.
3. The Summary Investigation shall include statements from all available witnesses and will record evidence concerning the fol:
 - a. when and where the loss took place;
 - b. the circumstance surrounding the loss;
 - c. what security measures were in place at the time of the loss;
 - d. did the loss occur in a restricted area or route;
 - e. was the member informed that he was/was not permitted in the area where the loss occurred and by whom;
 - f. the NATO stock number, nomenclature, quantity and catalogue value of the lost public property;


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- g. the remedial action taken or contemplated to correct adverse conditions which may have caused the loss.
4. Findings/recommendations should be made to determine:
- a. if theft was involved in the loss of the equipment;
 - b. was there any negligence on the part of any person(s);
 - c. action required to prevent recurrence;
 - d. administrative deduction; and
 - e. disciplinary action.
5. This investigation is designated Protected A.
6. The Summary Investigation must be delivered in triplicate to the G1 within 14 days of receipt of these terms of reference. Should it prove impossible to complete the proceeding within that time frame, a written explanation must be submitted before the due date.


C.J.R. Davis
LCol
CO

Encl: 1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

Capt Snyder
G1

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CANADIAN FORCES EUROPE

REPORT OF LOSS / DAMAGE OF MATERIEL

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1. Unit/Base CC UNPROFOR UIC 3039 Date 17 Feb 95
 Material on charge to: BN QM / Base Supply
 Coy / Base Sec Control No

Individual B11 975 116 CAPT J.M.F. CASAULT
 SIN Rank Name

MATERIAL LOST

SER	STOCK NO	NOMENCLATURE	QTY	ACCY CODE	UNIT COST	TOTAL
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	1005-21-103-5221	9mm PISTOL FT8962	1	S	234.00	234.00
2	8470-21-899-2322	FRAG JACKET	1	B	324.20	324.20
3	1005-21-103-5253	10RDs MAGAZINE	2	B	4.10	8.20
4	1095-21-889-2573	HOLSTER	1	B	7.65	7.65
5	1005-21-103-5233	CLEANING ROD	1	D	10.25	10.25
6	8125-99-961-9248	OIL BOTTLE	1	C	.72	.72
7	1305-21-116-9796	9mm ROUNDS	20	B	.63	12.60
TOTAL COST						597.62

Circumstances of loss: a. See attach document.

b. I ~~refuse~~ / refuse responsibility for the loss. My own life is worth more than the items which were taken from me.

CAPT CASAULT J.M.F. F. Casault 17 Feb 95
 SIN Rank Name and Init Signature Date

3. Unit / Base Supply certification:
- a. I certify that the prices are correct as per CF 137 as of _____;
 - b. I certify that the auditable record for the account(s) _____ has been reviewed and that the loss is not the result of any error; and
 - c. I certify that the material has been issued off charge by following CIVs and deleted from all accounting records (DND 638, CF 892A, double book, etc.): _____ to _____ inclusive.
 - d. Temporary issue authorized _____

Comments:

J.D. MacGregor Sgt [Signature] 23 Feb 95
 Name, Init & Rank Signature Date

4. Statement by PI Cgmd / Sub Section Head: Capt Casault did not make every effort to confirm his route through Visoko to Breza. He did have the opportunity at Checkpoint M, but did not. I do acknowledge that he was the senior member in the vehicle. I agree that he is partially responsible for this loss.

W.J. Natynczyk [Signature] 26 Feb 95
 PI/Sect Name, Init & Rank Signature Date

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5. Recommendations by Coy Commander / Branch Head: _____

Appointment	Name, Initial & Rank	Signature	Date
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6. Level 1. Direction of the Commanding Officer / Base Commander.

Circumstances surrounding the loss of the listed matériel have been investigated in accordance with QR&O. Under the powers granted / delegated me in QR&O Articles 36.20, I direct / recommend that the following action be taken:

- The total cost of the material be written off at Public Expense.
- The total cost of the material be written off at Public Expense and recovery action in the amount of _____
be taken against _____

SIN	Name	Rank
-----	------	------

- That recovery action be taken against _____
for the total amount of the loss. SIN Rank Name

- That a summary investigation / Board of Inquiry be ordered.

Comments: _____

Appointment	Name, Initial & Rank	Signature	Date
-------------	----------------------	-----------	------

7. Level 2. Base Commander / Formation Commander:

Comments / Decision: _____

Appointment	Name, Initial & Rank	Signature	Date
-------------	----------------------	-----------	------

8. Administrative Action

- Administrative Deduction raised _____
- Cash Debit Voucher Number _____
- Promulgated in UPDT or RPDT No _____

Appointment	Name, Initial & Rank	Signature	Date
-------------	----------------------	-----------	------

- NOTES:**
- Checklist no, CFR, Ser no of main eqpt to be shown in nomenclature column.
 - This info may be attached in this format as an annex.
 - If more than one acct involved, a separate Annex for each category of material is required.
 - Note that DA, Clothing Upkeep Allowance (CUA), and Clothing card (CF892A) matériel must be processed for write-off thru Base Supply. CFFET / SSSA matériel thru the unit.

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STATEMENT SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCE OF LOSS EQUIPMENT.

1. On the 12 Feb 95 at approximately 10:00 Hrs, we left HQ BHC Fwd Sarajevo in direction to Tuzla Base Air Field pursuing our visit to BHC AOR to meet Sector's G5. Prior our depart from Sarajevo we confirmed with BHC FWD G3 Ops Convoy if there was any problem with roads heading to Tuzla in general, the answer given was no. We proceeded to leave Sarajevo City at which time we encountered some difficulty as the direction given and detail on map were not reliable and accurate.
2. Our itinerary consisted of going through Kiseljac, Visoko, Breza, Vares, Kladanj, Zivinice and Tuzla. From Sarajevo we used Sniper alley direction West until we crossed first BiH CP proceed to next CP which was Serb and ended at the Airport. We asked direction to a French soldier who referred us to FREBAT 2 HQ. We then drove around the ring road of the Airport and asked direction again to a French Comdt who told us he had just arrive in the area but directed us to the South side of the runway. We drove to a FRE OP and again asked for direction they did not know the road to take to go to Tuzla. We continued on the south side of Airport in BiH territory following a French escort which brought us back almost to the location we previously where when we arrived Friday. The escort stopped, I spoke to a French Lt who was in charge, he indicated that the road to get out of Sarajevo and heading to Kiseljac was a gravel route just past the Serb CP on the North side of Airport. We went back to the North side of Airport and took the gravel route which lead us to Kiseljac. We did not have any problem until we reach Visoko.
3. We entered to Visoko and following map and road signs direction Breza. We drove around north side of town for a while and after having examined the 1:100000 map scale we notice that we have to drive back toward sarajevo before we could go to breza. We took the highway exchange and drove Eastward and exited to Breza and followed road signs. We went first on a route on the left side of rail road track at which end the road was blocked by iron cross. We came back to the road junction and took a route to the right side of rail track and ended at a Serb CP, we turned around again and went back to road junction. At 12:37 we drove through CANBAT 2 / Serb OP we told them we were going to Tuzla wave them and we left the CP.
4. We drove through to Ilijas waving to Serb soldiers and kids and they were waving back at us we knew we where in Serb territory and heading toward Olovo it was a different road that we have not plan to take but it was in the right direction. We drove for about 30 mains on a paved road in very good condition seeing Serb soldiers in small village and then for a long stretch where almost all building were destroyed we did not see any vehicle or soldiers we went through Srendnje, Ivancici and stopped at Grid BP 017838. I was turning the vehicle around when Maj Van der Sluis (NL) when to talk to Serbs soldiers that came from the wood and another form a building. They both took places in our vehicle with their AK 47 and we drove back to a CP location about 200 mètres from previous location. On the way to the CP location we stopped and another Serb aboard the vehicle. Once arrived to the location Maj Van der Sluis followed the three Serb to their CP (small house) a was awaiting in the vehicle until a Serb who was outside the CP with his AK 47 indicated to me by whistling to park the vehicle in the entrance and to go inside of the House. I followed his direction locked the vehicle and when to the CP.
5. When I walked inside of the CP, Maj Van der Sluis was sited at a table there was a female and two men one of which was in the car with us. Within a couple of minutes about 10 Serbs came around the CP to I think inquired about what was going on. She made coffee for all of us while we tried to explain to them that we were going to Tuzla pointing on the map. The men present at the time spoke only Serb. A Serb came in his name was Mrko he is the chief at this location then

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one of the men using field phone called somebody and I could understand he was talking about because he used the word UNPROFOR in several occasions. We spend about one hour at that location. One Serb who was outside and came in was able to speak english he told that this was normal procedures and we should not be afraid. I asked him what they where doing he replied that they were waiting for the policia to arrive. At approximately 14:00 Hrs three men in a white VW golf license number N 4154 which were policeman told us to follow them. One of the men with his weapon AK 47 came with in our vehicle.

6. We drove to Grid BP 017838 to what seems to be their CP a small house bigger than the previous one we parked the vehicle in the yard. Across the road facing this building there was a building with a big red cross on it probably a forward Medical post. In the yard where the vehicle was park adjacent to it there was also a wood mild. The three policemen had all an AK 47. The youngest one wearing the Chetnick irregular badge acted as the chief of police with him was a Serb Vojna Policia and the other one was wearing green civilian cloths. We all dismounted from our respective vehicle the chief indicated to us to move inside the CP. I add locked all doors except mine when the chief told me to leave my door open at which I refused he indicated to us by sign and some english word that he would search the vehicle. He proceeded to search the whole vehicle including looking inside rations boxes personnel effect of Maj Van der Sluis under the hood and under the vehicle itself. From his search he seized two frag jackets, motorola handset radio, camera, two 3.5 computer diskettes and all our maps. He asked us to show him everything that we have in our pockets including ID cards, and weapons. From that he retained two 9mm pistols, 60 rds 9 mm, two holsters. A list of items taken by Serbs police is attached to this statement.

7. After I locked the vehicle they indicated to us to follow them in the house in which there was three other men. They brought us in a small room where two bed, a table , refrigerator and couple of chairs were set up. The chief started to right the attached list to this statement. During this process a third men entered in the room he spoke to the Chetnik irregular and the Serb Vojna Policia. We asked if someone was speaking English, French, Dutch or German. This men said he was speaking German Maj Van der Sluis explained to him that they did not have the right to detain us or any of our equipment. He explained that it was normal procedures and orders that he received form his commandant. He talked to the Maj about his whereabouts and how he ended up there. At this point the chief indicated to us that we should sign the paper he just wrote we indicate through german language that we would not sign anything and they did not have the right to do this. They Serb speaking German acknowledged and the chief speaking in Serb was mad and called someone on the phone. He wrote and other copy of the same list and gave it to the Maj.

8. We went out into our vehicles the Vojna Policia men was with us and the other two in their vehicle VW. We drove for about 800 to 1000 meters they stopped their vehicle in front of our, we all dismounted from our respective vehicles. The Chief of police told us to go pointing in direction of Visoko. We asked to get our kit back which he refused to do and again told us to go. We left the area and drove back to Visoko and at the CANBAT OP we asked for direction to the BN HQ the Platoon Comd was present and was going back to the Bn HQ. We followed him to the HQ and reported the incident to the Ops O which reported to the chain of command and the National command.

9. The next day after we got new maps and frak jacket we drove to Tuzla using a small dirt track that was made to avoid mine field and blocked route going to Breza even when we where brief by CANBAT about the location of that route they were not sure of its location. However on the 13 Feb at about 12:30 hrs we where in Tuzla Air Base.

12.02.1995 god.

Zapisnik

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- Patrola vojne policije dana 12.02.1995 god. je pretresla vozilo unpredora TOYOTA br. 37304. Pri pretresu vozila patrola je oduzela sledece stvari:

- 1.) 2 diskeze
- 2.) fotoaparati, Belami " br 1031611
- 3.) motorola (Radius EP300) br. 174FSW1640
- 1.) pištolj GLOCK br 07323 i 2 okvira metaka gumu (po 14 komada)
- 1.) pištolj BROWNING gumu i 2 okvira metaka gumu (po 10 komada)
- br 7T 9962
- 1.) Okomada metaka gumu
- 1.) plastificirana karta SARAJEVA 1:95 000
- 2.) 2 pancira
- 1.) 19 kornata raznih oblika i ovojera

Zapisnik upravnika:
vod. Jovčević Dalibor
Jovčević Dalibor

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CANADIAN FORCES EUROPE

REPORT OF LOSS / DAMAGE OF MATERIEL

s.19(1)

1. Unit/Base CC UNPROFOR Date 17 Feb 95
 Material on charge to: BN QM / Base Supply
 Coy / Base Sec _____ Control No _____
 Individual B11 975 116 CAPT J.M.F. CASAULT
 SIN Rank Name

MATERIAL LOST

SER	STOCK NO	NOMENCLATURE	QTY	ACCY CODE	UNIT COST	TOTAL
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	8465-21-825-6079	BAG DUFFEL	1	B	19.56	19.56
2	8430-21-911-8542	BOOT GORTEX	1	B	109.45	109.45
3	8465-21-107-4616	BAG DUFFEL SLEEPING	1	B	13.22	13.22
4	8340-21-872-2082	SHEET UTILITY	1	B	46.77	46.77
5	8465-21-107-4862	MATRESS PNEUMATIC	1	B	121.65	121.65
6	8465-21-899-2406	LINER PONCHO	1	B	53.07	53.07
7	8465-21-842-6078	SLEEPING BAG OUTER	1	B	91.96	91.96
TOTAL COST						715.41

CONT'D

Circumstances of loss: a. See Military Police report SAR-541/40/95 dated 110852A Feb 95 (attached)

b. I ~~accept~~ / refuse responsibility for the loss.

CAPT CASAULT J.M.F. F. Casault 17 Feb 95
 SIN Rank Name and Init Signature Date

3. Unit / Base Supply certification:
- a. I certify that the prices are correct as per CF 137 as of _____
 - b. I certify that the auditable record for the account(s) _____ has been reviewed and that the loss is not the result of any error; and
 - c. I certify that the material has been issued off charge by following CIVs and deleted from all accounting records (DND 638, CF 892A, double book, etc.): _____ to _____ inclusive.
 - d. Temporary issue authorized _____

Comments: _____

F.D. MACTAGGART SGT. [Signature] 18 Feb 95
 Name, Init & Rank Signature Date

4. Statement by PI Comd / Sub Section Head: Capt Casault adopted appropriate measures to secure his equipment, given the circumstances. I do not find his actions negligent in the theft of this equipment.

W. Stanczyk Lt Col [Signature] 26 Feb 95
 PI/Sect Name, Init & Rank Signature Date

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CONT'D FROM PAGE ONE

8.	8465-21-842-6080	LINER SLEEPING BAG	1	B	24.38	24.38
9.	8465-21-842-6081	HOOD SLEEPING BAG	1	B	17.88	17.88
10.	8415-00-935-3130	INSECT HOODS	1	B	6.33	6.33
11.	7210-00-200-9740	INSECT BAR	1	D	16.73	16.73
12.	7240-21-809-5876	WASH BASIN	1	C	2.27	2.27
13.	8440-21-904-0049	SOCK WASH GREY	3	B	2.00	6.00
14.	7210-21-798-5084	TOWEL BATH	1	B	6.45	6.45
15.	7210-21-116-2279	TOWEL HANDS	1	B	3.08	3.08
16.	8465-21-905-7981	COVER SLEEPING BAG	1	B	93.90	93.90
17.	8415-21-899-2746	UNDERSHIRT FLYER	1	B	9.26	9.26
18.	8415-21-899-2538	SHIRT COMBAT	1	B	26.83	26.83
19.	8415-21-899-2511	TROUSERS COMBAT	1	B	40.84	40.84
20.	8420-21-116-2266	UNDERSHIRT MAN'S	2	B	2.89	5.78

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- 2 -

5. Recommendations by Coy Commander / Branch Head: _____

Appointment	Name, Initial & Rank	Signature	Date
-------------	----------------------	-----------	------

6. Level 1. Direction of the Commanding Officer / Base Commander.

Circumstances surrounding the loss of the listed materiel have been investigated in accordance with QR&O. Under the powers granted / delegated me in QR&O Articles 36.20, I direct / recommend that the following action be taken:

1. The total cost of the materiel be written off at Public Expense.
2. The total cost of the materiel be written off at Public Expense and recovery action in the amount of _____

be taken against _____

SIN	Name	Rank
-----	------	------

3. That recovery action be taken against _____
for the total amount of the loss. SIN Rank Name

4. That a summary investigation / Board of Inquiry be ordered.

Comments: _____

Appointment	Name, Initial & Rank	Signature	Date
-------------	----------------------	-----------	------

7. Level 2. Base Commander / Formation Commander:

Comments / Decision: _____

Appointment	Name, Initial & Rank	Signature	Date
-------------	----------------------	-----------	------

8. Administrative Action

- a. Administrative Deduction raised _____
- b. Cash Debit Voucher Number _____
- c. Promulgated in UPDT or RPDT No _____

Appointment	Name, Initial & Rank	Signature	Date
-------------	----------------------	-----------	------

- NOTES:
1. Checklist no, CFR, Ser no of main eqpt to be shown in nomenclature column.
 2. This info may be attached in this format as an annex.
 3. If more than one acct involved, a separate Annex for each category of materiel is required.
 4. Note that DA, Clothing Upkeep Allowance (CUA), and Clothing card (CF892A) materiel must be processed for write-off thru Base Supply, CFFET / SSSA materiel thru the unit.

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MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SQR-541/40195

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: CASALT	FIRST NAME: FRANCOIS
RANK/TITLE: CAPT	ID NO: [REDACTED]
DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]	UNIT ADDRESS: HQ UNPROFOR
NATIONALITY: CANADIAN	DATE OF ROTATION: 14 AUG 95

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: GAMAL FAWZY	RANK: CAPT.
ID NO: [REDACTED]	UNIT: MP PL SARAJEVO.
SIGNED (MP)	
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 08:52 hrs 11 Feb 95	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): 10:02 11 FEB 95	
PLACE RECORDED:	

STATEMENT BEGINS: I, B11 975116 CAPT F. CASALT REPORTS THAT AT APPROXIMATELY 18:30 hrs to 20:00 hrs WHILE UNPF 37304 UN LAND CRUISER VEHICLE PARKED IN FRONT OF MAIN GATE BHC FWD HQ WAS BROKEN INTO. DAMAGE TO VEHICLE, BROKEN WINDOW AT REAR RIGHT SIDE. PERSONNEL KIT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TWO BAGS REFER TO LIST ATTACHED WERE TAKEN. ALSO M. VAN DER SLUIS (NL) WHO IS TRAVELLING WITH ME HAS BELONGINGS STOLEN, TOO.



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MP WITNESS SIGNATURE

SIGNED: [Signature]
PERSON MAKING THIS STATEMENT

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MILITARY POLICE STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SAR 541.40.95

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: F. CASALT
RANK/TITLE: CAPT ID NO: [REDACTED] (CANADIAN)

STATEMENT CONTINUES: Situation AT 18:30h on 10 FEB 95

I PARKED VEHICLE UNPF 37304 IN FRONT ON MAIN GATE BHC FWD HQ, AFTER GUARD TOLD ME THAT I WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO ENTER INSIDE OF HQ COMPOUND. THE VEHICLE WAS PARKED ACROSS THE STREET IN FRONT MAIN GATE WHICH WAS UNDER VISUAL OBSERVATION OF GUARDS FROM MAIN GATE. I ENTERED IN THE COMPOUND ~~THE~~ TO LOOK WHERE WE WOULD BE QUARTERED DURING OUR STAY IN SARAJEVO. WE WERE DIRECTED TO SEE THE CAMP COMMANDANT WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ACCOMODATION FOR BHC FWD HQ. THE CAMP COMDT WAS NOT PRESENT AT THE TIME. WE WENT TO ~~THE~~ MESS HALL TO EAT. AT APPROX 19:15h WE WENT BACK TO CAMP COMDT OFFICE AT WHICH TIME HE WAS STILL NOT THERE. WE MET WITH ONE OF HIS ASSISTANT WHICH TOLD US THAT HE WAS ON HIS WAY BACK TO BHC FWD HQ (CAMP COMDT), AT THIS TIME THE ASST SHOWED TO US OUR ACCOMODATION FOR THE NIGHT.

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: [Signature]

SIGNED: F. Casalt

PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT



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MILITARY POLICE STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SAR.541.40.95

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: F. CASAULT RANK/TITLE: CAPT ID NO: [REDACTED] (CANADIAN)

STATEMENT CONTINUES: AT 19:30^{hrs} THE CAMP COMDT ARRIVED TO THE ~~COMPOUND~~ ^{COMPOUND} AND WE MET ~~THE~~ ^{HIM} IN OUR ROOM. I PROCEEDED AFTER HAVING MADE ARRANGEMENT WITH CAMP COMDT TO AUTHORIZE THE PARKING OF UNPF 37304 INSIDE OF COMPOUND. I WALKED TOWARD THE VEHICLE UNLOCKED THE DRIVER DOOR AND TOOK PLACE BEHIND STERLING WHEEL. AT FIRST I DID NOT NOTICE ANYTHING SPECIAL BUT IT FELT VERY COLD INSIDE VEHICLE. I LOOKED AT THE BACK OF VEHICLE AND THEN SAW THAT THE REAR WINDOW WAS BROKEN. I DISMOUNTED OF THE VEHICLE WHEN AROUND VEHICLE AND NOTICED THE DAMAGES. I NOTICED IMMEDIATELY THAT TWO OF MY BAGS WERE MISSING ONE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN. I BROUGHT THE VEHICLE INSIDE THE ~~THE~~ ^{COMPOUND} AT WHICH TIME WE DID A COMPLETE STORE VERIFICATION. MYSELF AND MAJ VANDER SLUIS NOTICED THE FOLLOWING: TWO OF MY BAGS WERE MISSING AND ONE OF THEM, ALL OUR RATIONS.

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: [REDACTED] REVIEWED BOI WERE STILL THERE AS WELL AS HELMET, FRAG JACKET AND WATER.



SIGNED: F. Casault PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT

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MILITARY POLICE STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SAR.541.40.95.

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: F. CASAVLT RANK/TITLE: CAPT ID NO: [REDACTED] (CANADIAN)

STATEMENT CONTINUES: AT 20:00hrs THE MP NCO AT BHC FWD HQ WAS NOTIFIED OF THE THEFT OF OUR KIT. HE CALLED UNMP PLATOON SECTOR SARAJEVO AFTER I PARKED THE VEHICLE INSIDE WITH ASSISTANCE OF CAMP COMDT, A PLASTIC PROTECTIVE SHEET WAS PLACED TO COVER THE OPEN AREA OF BROKEN WINDOW. I CALLED DUTY OFFICER HQ UNPROFOR TO INFORM HIM OF MY SITUATION. I CALLED ALSO THE UNMP PLATOON SECTOR SARAJEVO AND TALKED TO FRENCH NCO WHO TOLD ME TO GO TO THERE OFFICE ON 11 TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE 11 FER 95. AT 07:15 HRS I WENT BACK THE THE LOCATION WHERE THE VEHICLE WAS PARKED AND SEARCHED IN NEAR AREA TO ATTEMP TO LOCATE ANY OF THE MISSING KITS. AFTER THE MORNINGS OPS BRIEFING AT 09:00hrs I WENT TO UNMP PLATOON OFFICE TO MAKE THIS STATEMENT. THE NEXT PAGE CONTAIN THE LIST OF MY KIT WHICH IS MISSING

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: [Signature] REVIEWED BOI

SIGNED: F. Casault PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT

MILITARY KIT

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- 1 X Duffle Bag
- 1 X Pair Goretex Boot
- 1 X VALISE FOR SLEEPING BAG
- 1 X GROUND SHEET
- 1 X BLACK AIR MATTRESS
- 1 X PONCHO LINER
- 1 X OUTER SLEEPING BAG
- 1 X LINER SLEEPING BAG
- 1 X WINTER HOOD SLEEPING BAG
- 1 X MOSQUITO NET INSECT HEAD
- 1 X MOSQUITO BAR INSECT BAR
- 1 X WASHING BASSIN
- 3 X PAIRS WOOLLEN SOCKS
- 1 X GREEN TOWEL LARGE
- 1 X GREEN TOWEL SMALL
- 1 X BV BAG
- 1 X GREENSWEATER (TURTLE NECK)
- 1 X COMBAT SHIRT
- 1 X COMBAT PANT
- 2 X GREEN T-SHIRT V NECK

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s.19(1)

**CANADIAN FORCES EUROPE
REPORT OF LOSS / DAMAGE OF MATERIEL**

1. Unit / Base CC UNPROFOR Date 17 Feb 95

Material on charge to: _____ BN QM / Base Supply
Coy / Base Sec _____ Control No _____

Individual [REDACTED] CAPT J.M.F. CASAULT
SIN Rank Name

MATERIAL LOST

SER	STOCK NO	NOMENCLATURE	QTY	ACCY CODE	UNIT COST	TOTAL
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	8465-21-825-6078	BAG DUFFEL	1	B	19.56	19.56
2	8430-21-911-8542	BOOT GORTEX	1	B	109.45	109.45
3	8465-21-107-4616	BAG DUFFEL SLEEPING	1	B	13.22	13.22
4	8340-21-872-2082	SHIRT UTILITY	1	B	46.77	46.77
5	8465-21-127-4862	MATRESS PNEUMATIC	1	B	121.65	121.65
6	8405-21-899-2406	LINER PONCHO	1	B	53.07	53.07
7	8465-21-842-6078	SLEEPING BAG OUTER	1	B	91.96	91.96
TOTAL COST						715.41

CONT'D

Circumstances of loss: a. See Military Police report SAR-541/40/95 dated 110852A Feb 95 (attached)

b. I ~~accept~~ / refuse responsibility for the loss. _____

B11975116 CAPT CASAULT J.M.F. F. Casault 17 Feb 95
SIN Rank Name and Init Signature Date

3. Unit / Base Supply certification:

- a. I certify that the prices are correct as per CF 137 as of _____
- b. I certify that the auditable record for the account(s) _____ has been reviewed and that the loss is not the result of any error; and
- c. I certify that the material has been issued off charge by following CIVs and deleted from all accounting records (DND 638, CF 892A, double book, etc.): _____ to _____ inclusive.
- d. Temporary issue authorized _____

Comments: _____

F.D. MACLAGAN, SGT. [Signature] 18 Feb 95
Name, Init & Rank Signature Date

4. Statement by PI Comd / Sub Section Head: _____

PI/Sept _____ Name, Init & Rank Signature Date

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CANADIAN FORCES EUROPE
REPORT OF LOSS / DAMAGE OF MATERIEL

1. Unit/Base CC UNPROFOR UIC 3034 Date 17 Feb 95

Material on charge to: _____
Coy / Base Sec _____
DN QM / Base Supply _____
Control No _____

Individual [Redacted] CAPT J.M.F. CASAULT
SIN Rank Name

MATERIAL LOST

SER	STOCK NO	NOMENCLATURE	QTY	ACCY CODE	UNIT COST	TOTAL
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	1005-21-103-5221	9mm PISTOL TT8962	1	S	234.00	234.00
2	8470-21-889-2322	FRAG JACKET	1	B	324.20	324.20
3	1005-21-103-5253	10Rds MAGAZINE	2	B	4.10	8.20
4	1095-21-889-2573	HOLSTER	1	B	7.65	7.65
5	1005-21-103-5233	CLEANING ROD	1	D	10.25	10.25
6	8125-99-961-9748	OIL BOTTLE	1	C	.72	.72
7	1305-21-116-9794	9mm ROUNDS	20	B	.63	12.60
TOTAL COST						597.62

Circumstances of loss: a. See attach document.

b. I ~~accept~~ / refuse responsibility for the loss. My own life is worth more than the items which were taken from me.

B11975116 CAPT CASAULT J.M.F. F. Casault 17 Feb 95
SIN Rank Name and Init Signature Date

3. Unit / Base Supply certification:
- a. I certify that the prices are correct as per CF 137 as of _____
 - b. I certify that the auditable record for the account(s) _____ has been reviewed and that the loss is not the result of any error; and
 - c. I certify that the material has been issued off charge by following CIVs and deleted from all accounting records (DND 638, CF 892A, double book, etc.): _____ to _____ inclusive.
 - d. Temporary issue authorized _____

Comments: _____

Name, Init & Rank [Redacted] Signature [Signature] Date 23 Feb 95

4. Statement by PI Comd / Sub Section Head: _____

PI/Sect _____ Name, Init & Rank _____ Signature _____ Date _____

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1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

16 March 1995


Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 11 Feb 95 (enclosed)
B. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92 (enclosed)

1. Find references A and B enclosed. You will note that it does not concern damage to the UN Vehicle but rather minor damage to the civilian vehicle. It must be noted that a claim has not been received by CANBAT 2 or the UNMP Detachment at Camp Visoko.

2. Future inquiries into this matter, should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.


I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 1


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CANADIAN CONTINGENT
CONTINGENT CANADIEN
CANBAT 2



RCD BG 1080-1 (Adjt)

The Royal Canadian Dragoons
Battle Group
CCUNPROFOR, CANBAT 2
Visoko, B-H

11 February 1995

1080-1
RECEIVED
G1
14 FEB 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY DISPOSAL OF INCIDENTS
WITHOUT CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

Refs: A. FCPO No (9)
B. BH Comd SOP 413

1. Enclosed is a completed Annex C to Reference A regarding a vehicle accident on 9 February 1995 involving a CANBAT 2 AVGP Cougar (UNPF 16652) and a civilian vehicle.
2. No damage was sustained by the UN vehicle, and minor damage was sustained by the civilian vehicle; however, no claim has been received by this unit or the UNMP Detachment at Camp Visoko. Therefore, this matter is being submitted as a Summary Disposal.
3. Any questions regarding this matter should be directed to the undersigned.


T.S. Newton
Captain
Adjutant
For Commanding Officer

Enclosure: 1

Distribution List

Action

BH Command Forward Sarajevo/Legal Officer

Information

HQ CCUNPROFOR Zagreb/G1

CANADIAN CONTINGENT ADDRESS		
G1	14/2	RS
G1 Admin	14/2	20

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Annex C to
FCPD No. (9)
Dated June 1992

SUMMARY DISPOSAL OF INCIDENTS WITHOUT CONVENING A BOI

1. Reference MP Report CAN 2 550-17-95
Convening Order to Investigate vehicle accident
2. As the accident is within the conditions specified in the Field Administration Handbook, I recommend that a BOI should NOT be held.
3. The following is a description of how the accident occurred:
See MP Report
4. The accident was immediately reported to C/S 0
and an initial investigation was conducted (action taken).
5. There were no injuries to civilian or military personnel.
6. There was no damage to Mission Vehicles.
7. There was minor damage to a civilian vehicle.
8. I recommend that the cost be written off against UNPROFOR, if a claim is submitted. (State the amount if known).
9. Military Police Investigation Report is attached as Annex A.


SIGNATURE T.S. Newton, Adjt RANK Captain CANBAT 2

DATE 11 February 1995

A-1/2

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10. I agree/~~disagree~~ with the above report.

SIGNATURE *J.P.G. MacIntyre* RANK Major

NAME J.P.G. MacIntyre

APPOINTMENT/TITLE 2IC CANBAT 2

DATE 11 February 1995

If disagree, give reasons:

Five horizontal lines for providing reasons if the respondent disagrees with the report.


A-2/2

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UNPROFOR

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MILITARY POLICE
FINAL
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
REPORT

SEC/DET CASE REF:
MP COY HQ CASE REF: CAN2 550-17-95

MP INITIAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORT DATED REFERS.

1. DATE AND TIME OF ACCIDENT: 0930 HRS, 9 FEB 95
2. DATE AND TIME REPORTED TO MP/CIVILIAN POLICE: SAME AS ABOVE
3. DATE AND TIME OF MP/POLICE ARRIVAL: 0950 HRS, 9 FEB 95
4. LOCATION (IN DETAIL): CHECK POINT BRAVO
5. PEDESTRIAN INVOLVEMENT: NIL
6. SUMMARY OF EXTENT OF ANY INJURIES: NIL
7. VEHICLES INVOLVED:

Veh Reg No	Make/Type	MILITARY/CIVILIAN
UNPF 16652	AVGP-11D	MILITARY
VI10767F	MERCEDES DITNICKO	CIVILIAN
TRACKED/WHEELED	OWNER/ASSIGNED TO	NO OF PASSENGERS
WHEELED	CANBAT 2	2
WHEELED	MR SOFTIC ESAD HUSE MUZAFERTIJE 16 VISOKO, BH	NIL

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8. DRIVERS:

Vehicle Reg. No	Name/Rank/Title	ID No	Unit/Section/Address
UNPT 16652	CP. GABRIEL BUDIAM	AE55905	A SON RD BG, CANBAI 2, VISOKO
V197571	MR. R. T. SADI TAXI DRIVER	BH0030503	HOSE MUZAFERJIE 16 VISOKO, BH

9: ON DUTY UN DRIVING PERMIT NO: 55905

10 PURPOSE OF TRIP: Returning to Camp Visoko, from Check Point Bravo

11 DAMAGE TO UN VEHICLE/PROPERTY: NIL

12 DAMAGE TO VEHICLE/PROPERTY OF OTHERS: Left rear quarter panel scratched and bent, left rear taillight cover broken and left rear bumper end cover (plastic) was torn. Estimated cost of repair is about 500 DM

13a. ACCIDENT TYPE: 02

- 01-HEAD-ON COLLISION
- 02-GLANCING COLL-OTHER VEHs HEADING SAME WAY
- 03-GLANCING COLL-VEHs HEADING OPPOSITE WAYS
- 04-GLANCING COLL-WHILE TURNING RIGHT
- 05-GLANCING COLL-WHILE TURNING LEFT
- 06-RIGHT ANGEL COLL WITH VEH FROM OUR LEFT
- 07-RIGHT ANGEL COLL WITH VEH FROM OUR RIGHT
- 08-HIT OTHER
- 09-HIT IN REAR BY OTHER VEH IN TRAFFIC
- 10-BACKED ON TO OTHER VEH IN TRAFFIC
- 11-OTHER VEH BACKED ON TO US IN TRAFFIC
- 12-GOING FORWARD HIT STATIC OBJECT
- 13-GOING FORWARD HIT PARKED VEHICLE
- 14-REVERSING HIT STATIC OBJECT
- 15-REVERSING HIT PARKED VEHICLE
- 16-PARKED HIT OTHER VEHICLE
- 17-PARKED AND ROLLED OVER
- 18-RAN OFF ROAD WITHOUT OVERTURNING
- 19-OVERTURNED(WITHOUT FIRST COLLIDING)
- 20-PART OF VEHICLE CAME OFF (OR PERSON FELLOFF)
- 21-PART OF LOAD CAME OFF
- 22-FIRE
- 23-HIT BY FLYING FALLING OBJECT
- 24-HIT PEDAL CYCLIST
- 25-HIT A PEDESTRIAN
- 26-HIT AN ANIMAL
- 27-TRAILER BECAME DETACHED
- 28-TRAILER JACK-KNIFED
- 29-COLLIDED WITH AIRCRAFT
- 30-DAMAGED IN UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES
- 31-OVERTAKING
- 32-OTHER ACCIDENT-(STATE TYPE)

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PREVAILING CONDITIONS:

AREA: RURAL

a. CONFIGURATION	b. ROAD SURFACE	c. WEATHER	d. ROAD CONDITIONS	e. STREET LIGHTS	f. TRAFFIC
1-STRAIGHT	1. CONCRETE	1. CLEAR	1. DRY	1. BRIGHT	1. NONE
2-BEND	2. BRICK/ASPHALT	2. FOG OR MIST	2. WET	2. FAIR	2. LIGHT
3-DIRECTION	3. SAND/GRAVEL	3. RAIN OR HAIL	3. ICE	3. DIM	3. MEDIUM
4-INTERSECTION	4. COBBLES	4. SNOW OR SLEET	4. MUDDY	4. NONE/OFF	4. DENSE
5-JUNCTION	5. WOOD BLOCKS	5. SMOKE OR DUST	5. SANDED		
6-CROSSROADS	6. EARTH/GRAVEL	6. STRONG WIND	6. GREASY		
7-ROUNDABOUT	ETC.				
8-ROAD NARROWS					
9-LEVEL CROSSING					
	2	1	1	1	
g. GRADE	h. TYPE OF ROAD	i. PERIOD OF DAY	j. TRAFFIC SIGNS	k. VISIBILITY	l. SPECIAL POINTS
1. LEVEL	1. ONE-WAY STREET	1. DAWN	1. TRAFFIC LIGHTS	1. UP TO 25m	1. ROAD WORKS
2. STRAIGHT SLOPE	2. TWO-WAY STREET	2. DAYLIGHT	2. STOP/HALT SIGN	2. UP TO 50m	2. SPEED LIMIT
3. STEEP HILL	3. DGA	3. DUSK	3. SLOW SIGN	3. UP TO 75m	3. TRAMLINES
4. HILL CREST	4. CARRIAGEWAY	4. NIGHT	4. GIVE WAY SIGN	4. UP TO 100m	4. ILLEGAL PARKING
5. BRIDGE	4. MOTORWAY		5. OTHER WARNING	5. OVER 100m	5. PEDESTRIAN CROSSING
	2	2	5	5	

n. SPECIFY ANY OTHER DETAILS

Veh #1 was attempting to pass Veh #2 which was stopped on the right side of the road. A second unidentified vehicle was on the other (left) side of the road at the time.

14. DRIVERS CONDITIONS AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT:

- a. Physical condition: normal
- b. Hours driven prior to the accident: 1 hr
- c. Seat belts: Fitted: YES. Worn: YES.
- d. Others: Nil

15. ACCOUNT OF VEHICLES POSITION/MOVEMENT BEFORE ACCIDENT AND HOW THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED (INDICATE SPEED, SKID, BRAKE, MARKS):

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ORIGINAL AS IS

At about 0930 hrs. MCpl ALISON (A Sqn CP) contacted this office and reported that one of their call-signs was just involved in a traffic accident with a civilian vehicle at Check Point Bravo and that he wanted a MP Patrol to attend. Accompanied by MCpl LOW and Pte PERRY, I attended the aforementioned location where the following was observed, learned and noted:

(1) Veh #1 as identified above was situated about 20 feet from the IVO cross facing north-east. The right intermediate lane was in contact with the left rear quarter panel of Veh #2 (also identified above) which was facing north with both of its left wheels still on the roadway. No injuries occurred as a result of the accident. A sketch was compiled and is attached as Annex A.

(2) Both drivers were at the scene and were identified as the aforementioned;

(3) A subsequent interview with Cpl GARBUTT revealed that he had been attempting to pass through the check point and as he approached the north-east side he observed veh #2 pulling over to the right of the road to stop and a second civilian car (red in colour) approaching from the north-east. He attempted to pass between the vehicles but the right rear of his veh came into contact with the left rear quarter panel of Veh #2. Cpl GARBUTT stated that he believed that he had enough clearance to pass the vehicle as veh #2 was not visible anymore. The gunner (Cpl Sheppard) stopped him and informed him that they had just scraped the civilian vehicle. MCpl Trainor (crew commander) exited the vehicle to assess the situation;

(4) assisted by a member of the Visoko Traffic Police (BEGIC Ibro, Badge #0-0040) and a Canbat 2 Translator I attempted to speak with the driver of veh #2, but all he would state is that the UN Vehicle was at fault and that he wanted 500 DM for the damage to his vehicle. He further added that he would not go through the claim process and that he was not going to fill out the required documents for the claim. The driver further added that he would not allow the UN vehicle to leave nor would he move his vehicle; and

(5) After disengaging the vehicle in question, the crew of Veh #1 was instructed to leave the area and attend the MP Section at Camp Visoko, where further interviews could be conducted without the interference of onlookers. No further damage was caused to Veh #2 in the process.

(b) At about 1330 hrs. 9 Feb 94, both MCpl TRAINOR and Cpl Sheppard attended this section. During subsequent interviews, statements were obtained, and are attached as Annexes D and C respectively. Both statements re-iterated the information which was learned from Cpl GARBUTT. MCpl Trainor added that his vehicle had come to a full stop prior to the accident and that they only

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moved once the vehicle in front of them had been moved over by the local police controlling the check point. Neither he nor Cpl GARBUTT could observe the civilian vehicle. He (Cpl GARBUTT) stopped the vehicle after having been advised by Cpl SHEPPARD, who had a view of the civilian vehicle, that they had struck it.

16. PASSENGER AND OTHER WITNESS.

NAME/RANK/TITLE	ID NO	UNIT/SECTION ADDRESS
MCpl TRAINOR Kevin	AE55853	A Sqn, RCD BG, Canbat 2, Visoko
Cpl SHEPPARD Richard	AE55067	A Sqn, RCD BG, Canbat 2, Visoko

17. INSURANCE DETAILS OF OTHER VEHICLE(S) INVOLVED.

POLICY NO:#7015157

INSURANCE CO NAME & ADDRESS: zoi1 Ins Sarajevo18. DETAILS OF INJURIES (REFER TO SEPARATE REPORT(S) AS REQUIRED):
NIL

19. MP ASSESSMENT OF PROBABLE LIABILITY AND REASONS:

a. Assessment: Results of the investigation revealed that the traffic is basically uncontrolled at CP B, and at most times is heavy. Vehicles of all sizes are parked along the roadway in a carefree manner and small food and drink kiosks seem to pop up. Local border guards would appear they don't care where they stop vehicles crossing the border and do not pay attention to other authorized traffic who are attempting to pass. It is in the opinion of this writer that even though the driver of veh #2 should have been stopped further off the road by the Police it is also the responsibility of the driver of veh #1 who is in control of the veh to pass in safety. Only the gunner (Cpl Sheppard) could see the exact location of veh #2 prior to impact.

20. SKETCH ATTACHED: YES attached as Annex A

21. STATEMENTS ATTACHED: (REFER TO SEPARATE LIST AS REQUIRED)

Annex B - Statement of Cpl GARBUTT
Annex C - Statement of Mr SOFTIC
Annex D - Statement of MCpl TRAINOR
Annex E - Statement of Cpl Sheppard

22. OTHER MP INVESTIGATORS: NIL23. LOCAL POLICE INVOLVED: YES POLICE STATION: Visoko Police

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NAME/RANK OF CIVILIAN POLICEMAN: BEGIC Ibro Misoko Traffic
Police.

24. REMARKS: Further attempts to have the driver of veh #2 complete the required documents for a claim met with negative results. The driver was adamant that he would retaliate against the UN with a bomb should he not immediately receive compensation for the damage.

This report is to be forwarded as concluded.

REPORT SUBMITTED BY: NAME/RANK : Sgt Sawyer DJ
UNIT/SECTION: CANBAT 2 MP
SIGNED :
DATE : 10 Feb 94

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Accident Sketch


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Annex A
CAN2 550-17-95

INDEX

- Veh #1- AVGP
- Veh #2- Mercedes
- Veh #3- Rec Civ Veh
- A= 8'6"
- B= 18'
- C= 5'6"

A N I




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Answer B
550-17-95

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MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF:

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: GARBOTT
RANK/TITLE: CPL.
UNIT ADDRESS: RCD
NATIONALITY: CDN

FIRST NAME: GRAHAM
ID NO: [REDACTED] DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
DATE OF ROTATION: MAY 95

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: Perry AD RANK: AB.
ID NO: [REDACTED] UNIT: RCD BG MPS.

WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.

SIGNED (MP) *[Signature]*
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 1000hrs, 9 Feb 95.
ENDED (DATE/TIME): 1010 hrs, 9 Feb 95.
PLACE RECORDED: CPB.

STATEMENT BEGINS: *Returning to Visoko from C.P. Alpha we entered + departed CP Bravo. A small red car was sitting stationary on the left side of the road. A blue Mercedes was pulling off the road to the right. Thinking it was clear I proceeded. The Mercedes was no longer visible + I presumed it was still advancing to the side of the road. MPPl trainer, who is my crew commander halted me + informed me that we scraped the car. The red car left shortly after. Time of the occurrence approximately 0900.*

[Signature]
MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: *[Signature]*

SIGNED: *[Signature]*
PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT


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Annex 4
CAN2 550-17-95

MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

STATEMENT BEGINS: I stopped my car at the check point
Tusnjici, where a policeman should have carried out the
checking of the vehicle. At a moment the UN vehicle-
transporter appeared and brushed its right side against the
left side of my vehicle. I could not get off my vehicle so
as to let the policeman carry out the checking.


D. Sawyer Sgt
Military Police
Translated 10 Feb 95


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ANNEX 6
550-17-95

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MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF:

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: <u>SOFTIC</u>	FIRST NAME: <u>ESAD</u>
RANK/TITLE: <u>CIVIL</u>	ID NO: _____
UNIT ADDRESS: _____	DATE OF BIRTH: _____
NATIONALITY: _____	DATE OF ROTATION: _____

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: _____	RANK: _____
ID NO: _____	UNIT: _____
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) _____	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): _____	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): _____	
PLACE RECORDED: _____	

STATEMENT BEGINS: Zauštano sam vozilo na kontrolnom
punktir Tušnjići, gdje je policajac trebalo da
izvrši kontrolu vozila. U jednom momentu naišlo
je vozilo UN-a - transporter, tako da me je
zadržao svojim desnom stranom u lijevom stranu
moj vozila. Nisam uspio ni izći iz vozila
da bi policajac izvršio kontrolu.

[Handwritten Signature]
 MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

SIGNED: _____
 PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT

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MILITARY POLICE VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: CAN2 550-17-95

STATEMENT OF: MCPL TRAINOR

SURNAME: TRAINOR	FIRST NAME: KEVIN
RANK/TITLE: MCPL ID NO: [REDACTED]	DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
UNIT ADDRESS: RCD PETAWAWA	
NATIONALITY: CANADIAN	DATE OF ROTATION: MAY 95

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY: Sgt SAWYER DJ

NAME: SAWYER DJ	RANK: Sgt
ID NO: [REDACTED]	UNIT: RCD MP SECTION
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) <i>[Signature]</i>	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 1325 HRS.	
ENDED (DATE/TIME):	
PLACE RECORDED: RCD MP SECTION, UISOKO.	

STATEMENT BEGINS: AT APPROX. 0825 HRS. MY CIS WAS APPROACHING CPB IN KISELTAK ON CA FEB '95. AS WE GOT TO THE CHECKPOINT WE HAD TO STOP BECAUSE THE LOCAL POLICIA HAD TWO CARS STOPPED ON THE MAIN RTE. THROUGH CPB. THERE WAS A SMALL RED CAR PULLED OFF ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE ROAD. WE WERE MOVING NE TOWARDS UISOKO PRIOR TO STOPPING AT THE CP. THE OTHER CAR THAT WAS STOPPED WAS A BLUE MERCEDES TAXI. WE WERE AT A FULL STOP BEHIND BOTH VEHICLES. THE LOCAL POLICIA MOTIONED FOR THE TAXI TO PULL FORWARD AND OFF THE ROAD TO THE RIGHT. THERE WAS AT LEAST 5FT. OF SPACE

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: *[Signature]*

SIGNED: *[Signature]*
PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT

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MILITARY POLICE
STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF: MCPL TRAINOR

NAME: <u>TRAINOR</u>	ID NO: _____
RANK/TITLE: <u>MCPL</u>	

STATEMENT CONTINUES: TO THE RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE ROAD. WHEN THE TAXI
MOVED OFF I TOLD MY DRIVER, CPL GARBUTT TO CARRY ON. THE TAXI MOVED
FORWARD BUT DID NOT PULL TO THE RIGHT. MYSELF AND CPL GARBUTT COULD
NOT SEE THAT THE TAXI HAD STOPPED BECAUSE OF OUR POSITION IN OUR
VEHICLE. CPL SHEPPARD, WHO WAS IN THE GUNNER'S HATCH SAW THE TAXI STOP
AND CAME OVER THE IC AND TOLD CPL GARBUTT TO STOP. BY THIS TIME
THE SMALL RED CAR HAD TAKEN OFF UP THE ROAD TO THE NE AND WAS
GONE. ALSO THE COUGAR HAD MOVED FORWARD ENOUGH THAT THE INTER-
MEDIATE TIRE HAD WRAZED HIS REAR LEFT QUARTER PANEL AND BROKE HIS
REAR LEFT SIGNAL LIGHT. BEFORE WE HAD GOTTEN THE COUGAR STOPPED, I
DISMOUNTED TO ASSESS THE SITUATION. THE TAXI DRIVER WAS QUITE UPSET. SGT
MORIN OF A SQN CALLED FOR THE UN MILITARY POLICE TO COME DOWN AND
THE COUGAR POLICE WERE ALSO NOTIFIED. SGT SAWYER ARRIVED AT APPROX.
0900 AND TOOK OVER NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIS TRANSLATOR. AFTER THE
MATTER WAS SETTLED WE MOVED THE COUGAR OFF THE ACCIDENT SITE
AND HEADED BACK TOWARD VISOKO MUCH TO THE CHAGRIN OF THE TAXI
DRIVER.

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: _____

[Handwritten signature]

SIGNED: *[Handwritten signature]*
PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT

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MILITARY POLICE WITNESS STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: CAN2 550-17-95

STATEMENT OF: CPL SHEPPARD R.C

Form with fields: SURNAME: SHEPPARD, FIRST NAME: RICARD, RANK/TITLE: CPL, ID NO: [redacted], DATE OF BIRTH: [redacted], UNIT ADDRESS: RCD CFB PETAWAWA, NATIONALITY: CANADIAN, DATE OF ROTATION: MAY 95

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY: Sgt SAWYER DJ

Form with fields: NAME: SAWYER DJ, RANK: Sgt, ID NO: [redacted], UNIT: RCD MP

STATEMENT BEGINS: 1320 Hrs. Our C/S UD was passing CP'B when a red car going SW was stopped on the left side of the road and the taxi going NE in front of us pulled over to the right giving us room to pass. Once we were along side of the taxi, he decided to move a bit forward which was out of view of the driver. We rubbed our tire into his left rear quarter panel, that's when it said stop. The driver stopped, the C/C got off to look at the damage. Sgt. Moran from CP'B came out looked & went back to call the police. The police showed up, did their investigation. after the investigation, we backed off and drove back to the camp.

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

[Handwritten signature]

SIGNED:

[Handwritten signature] PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT

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1080-1/3127-01-95 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3R0

07 March 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
LOSS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
CANBAT 2 - 30 DEC 94

References: A. 1080-2-3127-01-95 (Adj) 13 Feb 95 (enclosed)
B. 1080-2-3127-01-95 (DO) 11 Feb 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94
D. FCPO No 9

1. Enclosed are the Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report, the Summary Investigation and Commanding Officer's comments regarding this incident.
2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and comments of the Commanding Officer. The Commanding Officer has taken appropriate measures to ensure that losses of this type will not reoccurr.
4. The Commanding Officer is to submit the necessary documents to have the cost of the stolen property, amounting to Cdn \$786.16 recovered from the United Nations.

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5. Any inquiries on this matter may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1: Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report
Enclosure 2: Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3: Summary Investigation

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INFORMATION

CANCON Det Primosten/G5 Legal

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Enclosure 1
To 1080-2-3127-01-95 (DComd)
Dated 1 Mar 95

UNPROFOR Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report

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ANNEX A
 TO DIRECTIVE 60.

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SEP 94

UN RESTRICTED

SUMMARY OF CONTINGENT BOARD OF INQUIRY REPORT

I.

PROCEEDING OF UNPROFOR	ASSEMBLED AT VISOKO BY ORDER OF	DATE	FILE
CANBAT 2	LCOL W.N. BROUGH	6 JAN95	RCD BG 1080-2- 3127- 01-95 (CO)

This BOI is convened pursuant to FCPD No (9) dated 27 June 1992

For the purpose of investigating the loss of public property on 30 December 1994

CONTINGENT	UNIT	CONTINGENT	DATE OF INCIDENT	PLACE	UNPROFOR VEHICLE #
CANADA	CANBAT 2	CANADA	30 DECEMBER 1994	OP CV4 NEAR VISOKO B-H	N/A

Name(s) of other party(ies) involved and address(es)

SEE ENCLOSED SUMMARY INVESTIGATION

Description of UNPROFOR loss

SEE ENCLOSED SUMMARY INVESTIGATION

UNPROFOR MEMBER(S) INVOLVED	INJURIES TO UNPROFOR MEMBER(S)	MEDICAL REPORT REF NO.
MCPI MERCER LJ CPL OWEN MT TPR FRASER JD	NIL	N/A

THIRD PARTY PROPERTY	THIRD PARTY OPERATOR	THIRD PARTY OWNER
N/A	N/A	N/A

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MP OR SIS REF NO	CONTINGENT REPORT REF #	CIV POLICE REF NO	DAMAGE/DISCREPANCY REPORT REF NO
CAN2 544-06-94	RCD BG 1080-2- 3127-01-95 (DO) 11 FEB 95	N/A	N/A

II. List of Witnesses (Attach any Statements as Annexes)

SEE ENCLOSED SUMMARY INVESTIGATION

III. Description of Circumstances

SEE ENCLOSED SUMMARY INVESTIGATION

IV. Options, findings and recommendations of the Board (Incl: arguments and motivations)

SEE ENCLOSED SUMMARY INVESTIGATION

Signed at Visoko, BH this 1ST day of February in the year 1995

	Number	Rank	Name	Initials	Decorations	Contingent
President		MAJ	MACINTYRE	J.P.G.	CD, CANBAT 2	
First Member		CAPT	NEWTON	T.S.	CD, CANBAT 2	
Second Member		LT	MARKOW	J.A.	CANBAT 2	

V. Contingent Commander's Comments/Action:

VI. UNPROFOR Headquarters Action:

Documents Attached: Summary Investigation RCD BG 1080-2-3 07-01-95 (DO)
dated 11 Feb 95

Annexes Attached:

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Enclosure 2
To 108C-2-3127-01-95 (DCOMD)
Dated 1 Mar 95

Commanding Officer's Comments

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CANADIAN CONTINGENT
CONTINGENT CANADIEN
CANBAT 2



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RCD BG 1080-2-3127-01-95 (Adj)

The Royal Canadian Dragoons
Battle Group
CCUNPROFOR, CANBAT 2
Visoko, B-H

13 February 1995

Distribution List

CANBAT 2 SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
LOSS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY - 30 DECEMBER 1994

- Refs: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-01-95 (DO)
11 Feb 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-01-95 (CO) 6 Jan 95
C. MP Report CAN2 544-06-94 1 Jan 95
D. FCPO No (9)
E. BH Comd SOP 413
F. CCUNPROFOR Dir 605

1. Enclosed is reference A, a completed Summary Investigation/Board of Inquiry regarding the loss of public property from Observation Post CV 4, near Visoko on 30 December 1994.

2. I support the recommendations of the Investigating Officer at paragraph 8 of reference A. Action has already been taken to implement the recommendations at sub-paragraph 8.c. The cost of the stolen property will be written off.

3. Any questions regarding this matter should be directed to the undersigned.


G.R. Hall
Major
Acting Commanding Officer

Enclosures: 2

Distribution List (page 2)

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Action

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Information

BH Command Forward Sarajevo/Legal Officer

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Enclosure 3
To 1080-2-3127-01-95 (DComd)
Dated 7 Mar 95

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION

PROTECTED B/UN CONFIDENTIAL

REVIEWED BOI

s.19(1)

PROTECTED B

Memorandum

1080-2-3127-01-95 (DO)

28 Jan 95

Adjt.

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
LOSS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

Ref: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-01-95 (CO) 6 Jan 95
B. MP Report (CAN 2 544-06-94)
C. QR&O Chap 21
D. CFAO 21-9

GENERAL

1. IAW Ref A., an investigation was conducted into an incident in which public property was discovered missing from OP CV 4, on 30 December 1994.

NARRATIVE

2. On the morning of 30 Dec 95 at OP CV 4, near Visoko the fire piquet [REDACTED] Cpl Fraser conducted a perimeter walk of the OP between 0400 and 0430 hrs. He did not discover any damage to any portion of the OP. Between 0615 and 0630hrs [REDACTED] Cpl Owen M.T. entered the abolition tent and discover 2 large tears in the side of the modular tentage. He immediately informed his supervisor [REDACTED] MCpl Mercer L.T. and the two inspected the area. It was determined that some person(s) had cut through the concertina and cattle wire, and then carefully tied down the trip flare wire, so it would not discharge.

3. Once inside the perimeter this person(s) use a sharp object to cut 2 large L shaped tears in the abolition tent. The person(s) then used the breach in the tent and wire to remove the supplies. The supplies taken were; 1 x Modular tent centre, 5 cartons of IMPs, and approx 20 x 2 litre bottles of fresh water. BG MPs were informed by B Sqn at 0645hrs. The breach in the wire had already been repaired and the crime scene disturbed, before BG MP were informed. BG MPs photographed the area of tent and wire, and contacted BiH MPs to advise them of the missing supplies.

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STATEMENT

4. The investigating officer talked with [REDACTED] Sgt Sawyer D.J. and discovered several contributing factors to the incident. The side of the abolition tent where the tears were found was in an unlit area of the compound, and out of observation from the place where the duty fire picket spends most of their time. The perimeter walk around, once every hour, passed by the area in question between 0400 and 0430hrs and no intrusion was noticed. The area of the breach in the wire is also out of observation of the duty pers. The noise of the OP's generator is sufficient to mask the noise of an intrusion. Sgt Sawyer, on an inspection of OP CV 4 on 29 Jan 95, found the situation much improved. The compound has been rearranged to minimize blind areas, and dark areas out of direct sight have been lit.

FINDINGS

5. The loss occurred sometime between 0430 and 0615hrs on 30 Dec 95. The responsibility for the lost items must be shared by the 3 Tp pers who were in the OP at the time

6. The OP layout, perimeter wire, and fire piquet are all intended to reduce the possibility of theft. The physical evidence demonstrates a well planned break in designed to defeat the security measures installed.

7. It is the opinion of the investigating officer that no one is to blame for the loss of the items.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

- a. no disciplinary or administrative action be taken against any individual;
- b. the loss of the stolen items be written off, and
- c. the fol measures be taken to prevent losses of this type in the future:

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- (1) all OP compounds should conduct a survey as to how, if possible, to rearrange their setups to minimize the risk of theft. This need not include major changes. Moving materials to provide better observation, keeping easily transportable or valuable goods in a more secure place are better examples;
- (2) scenes of crimes should be left intact to gain as much physical evidence as possible. This would include prompt reporting and investigation to minimize inconvenience of normal OP duty;
- (3) perimeter ptl timings should be more random; and
- (4) dark areas and blind spots should be lit; have more security than the observable areas, and the possibility of short ptls to those areas should be considered.


J.A. Markow
Lt
DO
5510

Annexes:

Annex A - RCD BG 1080-2-3127-01-95 (CO) 6 Jan 95

Annex B - BG MP Report VIS 544-06-94

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ANNEXA

RCD BG 1080-2-3127-01-95 (CO)



CANADIAN CONTINGENT
CONTINGENT CANADIEN



CANBAT 2

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RCD BG 1080-2-3127-01-95 (CO)

The Royal Canadian Dragoons
Battle Group
CANBAT 2
Visoko, B-H

January 1995

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE -
SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
LOSS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

- References: A. MP Report VIS 544-06-94 (enclosed)
B. QR&O Chap 21
C. CFAO 21-9
D. CCUNPROFOR Directive 605

1. N65 313 840 Lt J.A. Markow will conduct a Summary Investigation into the loss of public property from Observation Post CV 4, near Visoko on 30 December 1994. The investigation will be conducted IAW the references.
2. The investigating officer shall obtain statements from all available witnesses and will record his findings, to include:
 - a. where, when and how the loss occurred;
 - b. who was responsible for the items at the time of its loss;
 - c. whether theft was involved; and
 - d. whether anyone is to blame for the loss.

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3. The investigating officer shall make recommendations as to
- a. disciplinary/administrative action to be taken against any individual(s) involved;
 - b. action to be taken to recover the cost of the lost items, including write-off action; and
 - c. measures to be taken to prevent losses of this type in the future.

4. The investigating officer is to note that where an officer or Non-Commissioned Member is currently the subject of a criminal (police) investigation, or has been or is about to be charged with an offence under the National Defence Act or other Canadian law or has been arrested/detained in respect of any alleged act or omission which could constitute such an offence; such an officer or Non-Commissioned Member shall not be compelled to give evidence for this Summary Investigation in relation to the subject matter of the police investigation, charge, arrest or detention. Where the gathering of such evidence is deemed critical to the successful completion of the investigation, the Adjutant shall be notified and the advice of the representative of the Judge Advocate General sought prior to taking any action to compel such testimony, recognizing that compelling testimony in such circumstances could have the effect of jeopardizing subsequent disciplinary proceedings.

5. This investigation is designated as PROTECTED B. The investigating officer will submit the results of this investigation to the Adjutant by 1600 hours 23 January 1995. He is not to depart the CANBAT 2 AOR on duty or leave without notifying the Adjutant.


 T.S. Newton
 Captain
 Adjutant
 for Commanding Officer

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Enclosure 1

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BH Comd Forward Sarajevo//Legal Officer//(less enclosure)

Internal

I.t. Markow

2/2

PROTECTED B

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ANNEX B

RCO 86 1283-2-3127-01-95(10)

s.19(1) Feb 95

UNDP 700

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

MILITARY POLICE
INCIDENT REPORT

MP HQ COY CASE REF:
MP SECT CASE REF: 244 06 94

1. Information source:

- a. 1. URID No: [REDACTED] Rank: MP/1 Name: [REDACTED]
- 2. UNID No: [REDACTED] Rank: Cpl Name: [REDACTED]
- 3. BRID No: [REDACTED] Rank: Cpl Name: [REDACTED]

Unit: all of RCE 10, 8 Sqn. C/MPAT 11.

b. Date, Time, Group: 24 Feb 94, 0600, 11.

2. Incident Type: BREACH OF SECURITY - UNID

3. Scene: Ablution Tent located on the perimeter of OP CV 4, Loc 1, 10 Sqn, 11.

4. Date/Time (of Incident): 24 Feb 94, 0600, 11.

5. Complainant(s): as per information source.

Statement's at Annex A to C respectively

6. Property involved:

1 X Modular tent centre, UNID 2300-21-200-00, value of \$381.46 CDN;

5 X Carton of IXP's, UNID 2300-21-200-00, value of \$260.00 CDN; and

Approx 20 x 2L bottles of [REDACTED], value of [REDACTED] for an approx. total of [REDACTED].

7. Witnesses:

8. Suspect(s)/Person(s) involved: [REDACTED]

9. [REDACTED]

ablution tent supervisor, [REDACTED] **REVIEWED 801**

and Cpl OWEN it was determined that a breach in the perimeter had occurred through the connecting wire, and the remainder of the perimeter surrounding the perimeter, including the connecting wire, was carefully searched around the perimeter to find out what had happened to prevent it being discharged. Upon gaining access there was cut through the modular tenting adjacent to the breach and removed the supplies in question. Two large L shape cuts were made in the fabric to facilitate access.

The area in question is a well defined perimeter of the tenting with the fire pickets view being blocked by the roof. It is well the noise would be muffled by the structure which was running nearby. Cpl FRASER the individual who was picked up at the perimeter at approx 0430 hrs. During this walk about Cpl passed right through the area in question, and could not have missed the breach, as the lights were on and the structure would have shined out through the hole had they been cut at that time.

As the breach in the wire had been already repaired, the crime scene contaminated, before the Military Police Detachment (MPD) was informed, no physical evidence could be obtained.

10. Police Action:

a. By Military Police: MP Detachment

(1). Search

(2). Photographs of the damaged tent were taken and will be held on file at this time.

(3). Sketch

(4). Other: MP Detachment were contacted and advised of the situation and asked to look for any of their members or their soldiers in the area.

b. By Canadian Forces: Canadian Forces

11. Recommendations: All counsel files, especially those of military value should be well guarded and protected, in case they should definitely be stored within the perimeter. Further OP's should be arranged so that blind areas are eliminated.

12. Conclusion:

This report shall remain in the hands of the reporting unit should any pertinent information come to light.

REVIEWED 801

MP 11003110

Signature *Arde By*

Name [illegible]

Date 1 Jan 95

NCO 1C CARRAN 2 MP

Signature *[Signature]*

Name [illegible]

Rank Sgt

Date 1 Jan 95

REVIEWED 881

UNITED STATES

NATIONAL

s.19(1)

UNITED STATES ARMY
STATEMENT OF WITNESS FORM

STATEMENT

SURNAME: Merce LT
RANK/TITLE: Capt ID NO: [REDACTED]
UNIT ADDRESS: RCD, B Sqn
NATIONALITY: CDN

DATE OF BIRTH: 65 05 24
DATE OF REPORT: 26 01 91

RECORDED / WITNESS NAME

NAME: Perry AD
ID NO: [REDACTED]
STAT. STARTED: 0755 hrs, 30 Dec 90

DATE: AD.
TIME: 0700 1995.
LOCATION: 1010 hrs

STATEMENT REPORT: At 0615am on the 30 Dec 90, I was not. I was
that the perimeter was broken into by unknown belligerents. The
was broken into was by the avolation tent on the west side
OP's position. I immediately went to the area with Cpl [REDACTED]
following things were apparent. First the tent was cut into
along with one set of large footprints of an adult male
of the tent was cut. Along with this the wire was cut
the outside near the trip flare. The trip flare wire was
by them entering the camp. The items which were taken
Avolation was approx 5 ^{hrs} five boxes of rations and
²⁰ twenty bottles of water. No other items were taken
from this location. The trip flare wire was diligently unwrapped
the cattle wire which prevented any loose wire being taken
cattle wire.

[Signature]

IF WITNESS SIGNATURE [Signature]

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STATEMENT OF /
DECLARATION DE :

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SIXTENTH

The intention of the appeal is to have a well placed as the intention was
exactly what to be done, had the case presented the appeal
the toples which is to be done at the best

Factors that should be taken into consideration, the board should
not have anything associated with the case, it is a matter of
as less, at times, and when I can't do the best in it, it was still

1234

STATEMENT ENFIN/FIN DE LA DÉCLARATION

TÉMOIN/WITNESS

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s.19(1)

ANNEX TO

BHC/.../...

- 94

PAGE

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES



MILITARY POLICE WITNESS STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DEF CASE REF:

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: Owen
RANK/TITLE: Cpl ID NO:
UNIT ADDRESS: Petawawa Ont.
NATIONALITY: Canadian

FIRST NAME: Mark
DATE OF BIRTH: 22.03.47
DATE OF ROTATION: 2/...

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: Ellis DB
ID NO:
STAT. STARTED: October 30 1994
DATE/TIME GROUP:

RANK: CPL
UNIT: RCD MP
STAT. FINISHED: 10 Oct 1994
DATE/TIME GROUP:

STATEMENT BEGINS: We were on duty on 30 Oct 1994... To see the... I could... and the... we are... side of... that the... we noticed... clearly... had been... the snow... that... checked...

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: David Owen

SIGNED: Mark Owen

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UNITED STATES

s.19(1)

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: Fraser

RANK/TITLE: Troop

UNIT ADDRESS: RCD 06, B277, Campbell

NATIONALITY: CAN

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: Perry AD

ID NO: [REDACTED]

STAT. STARTED: 0140 hrs, 30 Dec 79

STATEMENT BEGINS:


REF CAMP... Do not walk... JACK... USUAL... THE SWIFT... AND THE TENT... THE 10K... TIME I WAS IN...

WITNESS BY:

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CANADIAN CONTINGENT
CONTINGENT CANADIEN



CANBAT 2

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1080-4

PROTECTED B

11 JAN 1995

RCD BG 1080-2-3127-01-95 (CO)

The Royal Canadian Dragoons
Battle Group
CANBAT 2
Visoko, B-H

January 1995

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE -
SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
LOSS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

- References: A. MP Report VIS 544-06-94 (enclosed)
- B. QR&O Chap 21
- C. CFAO 21-9
- D. CCUNPROFOR Directive 605

1. N65 313 840 Lt J.A. Markow will conduct a Summary Investigation into the loss of public property from Observation Post CV 4, near Visoko on 30 December 1994. The investigation will be conducted IAW the references.

2. The investigating officer shall obtain statements from all available witnesses and will record his findings, to include:

- a. where, when and how the loss occurred;
- b. who was responsible for the items at the time of its loss;
- c. whether theft was involved; and
- d. whether anyone is to blame for the loss.

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3. The investigating officer shall make recommendations as to:
- a. disciplinary/administrative action to be taken against any individual(s) involved;
 - b. action to be taken to recover the cost of the lost items, including write off action; and
 - c. measures to be taken to prevent losses of this type in the future.

4. The investigating officer is to note that where an officer or Non-Commissioned Member is currently the subject of a criminal (police) investigation, or has been or is about to be charged with an offence under the National Defence Act or other Canadian law or has been arrested/detained in respect of any alleged act or omission which could constitute such an offence; such an officer or Non-Commissioned Member shall not be compelled to give evidence for this Summary Investigation in relation to the subject matter of the police investigation, charge, arrest or detention. Where the gathering of such evidence is deemed critical to the successful completion of the investigation, the Adjutant shall be notified and the advice of the representative of the Judge Advocate General sought prior to taking any action to compel such testimony, recognizing that compelling testimony in such circumstances could have the effect of jeopardizing subsequent disciplinary proceedings.

5. This investigation is designated as PROTECTED B. The investigating officer will submit the results of this investigation to the Adjutant by 1600 hours 23 January 1995. He is not to depart the CANBAT 2 AOR on duty or leave without notifying the Adjutant.


T.S. Newton
Captain
Adjutant
for Commanding Officer

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BH Comd Forward Sarajevo//Legal Officer//(less enclosure)

Internal

Lt Markow

2/2

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001944

s.19(1)

PROTECTED A

MEMORANDUM

1080-1/3029-1 (CO)

65 Mar 95

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE - SUMMARY
INVESTIGATION INTO LOSS OF
PUBLIC-PROPERTY - 10 FEB 1995

1. [REDACTED] Capt D.A. Yost shall conduct a Summary Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the loss of 9mm pistol, serial number 7T8962, and accompanying magazine, ammunition, holster and military clothing and equipment, belonging to [REDACTED] Capt J.F. Casault.
2. The Summary Investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of QR&O Chapter 21, 36 and 38, CFAOs 21-9, 22-10 and 38-1; CFP 181 Chapter 14, Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605, FCPD 9 and other relevant orders.
3. The Summary Investigation shall include statements from all available witnesses and will record evidence concerning the fol:
 - a. when and where the loss took place;
 - b. the circumstance surrounding the loss;
 - c. what security measures were in place at the time of the loss;
 - d. did the loss occur in a restricted area or route;
 - e. was the member informed that he was/was not permitted in the area where the loss occurred and by whom;
 - f. the NATO stock number, nomenclature, quantity and catalogue value of the lost public property;

1/2

PROTECTED A

REVIEWED 801

PROTECTED A

- g. the remedial action taken or contemplated to correct adverse conditions which may have caused the loss.
4. Findings/recommendations should be made to determine:
 - a. if theft was involved in the loss of the equipment;
 - b. was there any negligence on the part of any person(s);
 - c. action required to prevent recurrence;
 - d. administrative deduction; and
 - e. disciplinary action.
 5. This investigation is designated Protected A.
 6. The Summary Investigation must be delivered in triplicate to the G1 within 14 days of receipt of these terms of reference. Should it prove impossible to complete the proceeding within that time frame, a written explanation must be submitted before the due date.


C.J.R. Davis
LCol
CO

Encl: 1

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Action

Capt Yost
G1

2/2

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1080-1
15 MAR 1995



1080-1 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso
Zagreb, Croatia

3 March 1995

Distribution List

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS			
AI		15/3	LP
PA		15.3	J

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② ATR
talked w Adjt
CANBAT 2
they have their
copy
of
COP
COP
GSO
15.3.95

TERMS OF REFERENCE - BOARD OF INQUIRY
CHANGE OF COMMAND CANBAT 2 - VISOKO

- References:
- A. QR&O 21.07
 - B. CFAO 21-9
 - C. UNPROFOR FCPD 9

1. A Board of Inquiry, composed as hereunder, shall assemble at the call of the President no later than 15 March 1995, to investigate and report on activities associated with the Change of Command of CANBAT 2:

- a. President - [redacted] Maj G.R. Hall;
- b. Member - [redacted] Maj J.P.G. MacIntyre;
- c. Member - [redacted] Capt R.K. Burke; and
- d. Member - [redacted] Capt J.E. King.

2. The Board shall investigate, report, and take any other measures deemed necessary to determine and record the state of CANBAT 2 with regards to:

- a. operations and training;

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PROTECTED A

PROTECTED A

- b. logistics;
- c. maintenance;
- d. personnel;
- e. administration;
- f. public funds and property; and,
- g. non-public funds and property.

3. The investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of QR&O Chapter 21 and CFAO 21-9.

4. Where appropriate, the Board is to identify and indicate applicable reference documents rather than include copies in the report.

5. Findings shall be promulgated at the discretion of the President to meet local requirements. The Board's reports on operations and training, personnel, administration, and non-public funds and property are to be in such a degree of detail that ensures an accurate record of both operational and administrative information. The Board's report on public funds, stores and equipment will be produced in the form of a detailed written report.

6. The Board will determine whether a report is required IAW reference C and prepare such report.


7. Recommendations will be made in regards to any outstanding issues that will require specific action on the part of either the departing or in-coming Commanding Officer.

8. This investigation will be classified as deemed appropriate by the President.

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PROTECTED A

9. The minutes of the proceeding shall be delivered to the undersigned no later than 15 May 1995. Should it prove impossible to complete the proceedings by that time, an extension may be granted with a reasonable explanation.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

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Action

CANBAT 2//CO//

Information

Comd
COS
G1

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso
Zagreb, Croatia

1080-1 (DComd)

3 March 1995

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE - BOARD OF INQUIRY -
CHANGE OF COMMAND CANBAT 1 - RASTEVIC

References: A. DCO 080 231400Z FEB 95
B. QR&O 21.07
C. CFAO 21-9
D. UNPROFOR FCPD 9

1. A Board of Inquiry, composed as hereunder, shall assemble at the call of the President no later than 15 March 1995, to investigate and report on activities associated with the Change of Command of CANBAT 1 RASTEVIC:

- a. President - [REDACTED] Maj M.P. Jorgensen;
- b. Member - [REDACTED] Maj P.H. McAdam;
- c. Member - [REDACTED] Maj J.H. Vance;
- d. Member - [REDACTED] Capt L.R. Hulsman;
- e. Member - [REDACTED] Capt T.P. O Shea;

1/3

PROTECTED A

REVIEWED BOI

PROTECTED A

f. Member - [REDACTED] Lt R.A. Stringer;

g. Member - TBC, ADMIN LO, 2 R22ER; and

h. Member - [REDACTED] Capt D.N. Attfield.

2. The Board shall investigate, report, and take any other measures deemed necessary to determine and record the state of CANBAT 1 with regards to:

- a. operations and training;
- b. logistics;
- c. maintenance;
- d. personnel;
- e. administration;
- f. public funds and property; and,
- g. non-public funds and property.

3. The investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of QR&O Chapter 21 and CFAO 21-9.

4. Where appropriate, the Board is to identify and indicate applicable reference documents rather than include copies in the report.

5. Findings shall be promulgated at the discretion of the President to meet local requirements. The Board's reports on operations and training, personnel, administration, and non-public funds and property are to be in such a degree of detail that ensures an accurate record of both operational and administrative information. The Board's report on public funds, stores and equipment will be produced in the form of a detailed written report.

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
PROTECTED A

6. The Board will determine whether a report is required IAW reference D and prepare such report.

7. Recommendations will be made in regards to any outstanding issues that will require specific action on the part of either the departing or in-coming Commanding Officer.

8. This investigation will be classified as deemed appropriate by the President.

9. The minutes of the proceeding shall be delivered to the undersigned no later than 15 April 1995. Should it prove impossible to complete the proceedings by that time, an extension may be granted with a reasonable explanation.


N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

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Action

External

CANBAT 1//CO//

Information

Internal

Comd

COS

G1

3/3

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1080-1 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso
Zagreb, Croatia

3 March 1995

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE - BOARD OF INQUIRY -
CHANGE OF COMMAND CANBAT 2 - VISOKO

References: A. QR&O 21.07
B. CFAO 21-9
C. UNPROFOR FCPD 9

1. A Board of Inquiry, composed as hereunder, shall assemble at the call of the President no later than 15 March 1995, to investigate and report on activities associated with the Change of Command of CANBAT 2:

- a. President - [REDACTED] Maj G.R. Hall;
- b. Member - [REDACTED] Maj J.P.G. MacIntyre;
- c. Member - [REDACTED] Capt R.K. Burke; and
- d. Member - [REDACTED] Capt J.E. King.

2. The Board shall investigate, report, and take any other measures deemed necessary to determine and record the state of CANBAT 2 with regards to:

- a. operations and training;

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PROTECTED A **REVIEWED BOI**

PROTECTED A

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- b. logistics;
- c. maintenance;
- d. personnel;
- e. administration;
- f. public funds and property; and,
- g. non-public funds and property.

3. The investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of QR&O Chapter 21 and CFAO 21-9.

4. Where appropriate, the Board is to identify and indicate applicable reference documents rather than include copies in the report.

5. Findings shall be promulgated at the discretion of the President to meet local requirements. The Board's reports on operations and training, personnel, administration, and non-public funds and property are to be in such a degree of detail that ensures an accurate record of both operational and administrative information. The Board's report on public funds, stores and equipment will be produced in the form of a detailed written report.

6. The Board will determine whether a report is required IAW reference C and prepare such report.

7. Recommendations will be made in regards to any outstanding issues that will require specific action on the part of either the departing or in-coming Commanding Officer.

8. This investigation will be classified as deemed appropriate by the President.

2/3


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PROTECTED A

9. The minutes of the proceeding shall be delivered to the undersigned no later than 15 May 1995. Should it prove impossible to complete the proceedings by that time, an extension may be granted with a reasonable explanation.


N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

CANBAT 2//CO//

Information

Comd
COS
G1

REVIEWED 801

PROTECTED A

PRIORITY

UNPROFOR



CANADIAN CONTINGENT

CONTINGENT CANADIEN

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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T NO.	UNIT HQ #	TOT
102/27		

ROUTINE PRIORITY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL UN SECRET ONLY

ORIGINATORS NO: RCR 852	DTG: 02 1405B MAR 95
TO: GA CANCON ZAGREB	FROM CANBAT 1 RASTEVIC
FAX NO:	FAX NO:
ATTN: G1	FILE REF NO: DRAFTER: RLSE AUTH: SIGNATURE: <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO FAX: FAX NO:	
SUBJECT: CO's comments - APC	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION	

MESSAGE

RECEIVED
1080-1
02 APR 1995

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS		
G1	2/4	LT
CR/PA	1254	SG

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9 Mar 1995

Commanding Officer's Comments/RecommendationsComments

1. While the driver of the APC, Private Armstrong, reported some minor difficulty with the tiller bar, which affected his ability to control the vehicle, there is no evidence of a mechanical defect. The cause of the accident therefore appears to be driver inexperience; specifically over-correction on a wet, downhill grade while transitting a steep embankment. The investigating officer states at para 4 of the SI, quote, the vehicle was travelling between 25 and 30 kilometres per hour; not an excessive speed for road conditions, unquote. While there is no evidence to suggest that the vehicle was travelling faster than the posted speed limit, it is my opinion that the vehicle was travelling too fast for the road conditions given the inexperience of the driver. A driver with more experience may have been able to properly handle the vehicle at this speed. The crew commander, Corporal Schovanek, probably should have ordered a reduced speed under the circumstances. Private Armstrong underwent a period of re-evaluation as an APC driver and will be closely supervised for the remainder of the tour.
2. Helmets would have undoubtedly lessened the severity of Corporal Schovanek's injuries. At the time of the accident, CANBAT 1 SOPs only required the wearing of helmets inside the Zone of Separation for passengers and not at all for drivers, gunners and crew commanders who required ICS communications. Recognizing the requirement for head protection, CANBAT 1 was in the process of physically locating and assessing the servicability of our CVC helmet and Slimguard headset holdings. These helmets/headsets were not widely used in CANBAT 1 prior to our rotation due to serviceability and attendant repair/spare parts problems. As a result of this accident, I ordered that no APC would move unless all crew had head protection and ICS. A concerted effort to repair defective equipment and to locate and distribute other holdings have allowed us to provide this protection for the remainder of the tour.
3. Seatbelts might have prevented some of the injuries but in my view, this is a moot point. The operational requirement for a driver, crew commander, .50 Calibre MG gunner and a rear security man overrides the luxury of the personal safety afforded by a seat belt. The crew of the vehicle must be up, alert and acting as one entity.
4. I am satisfied that the medical support and evacuation procedures were effective.

1/2

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Recommendations

5. Crew commanders must consistently monitor road conditions and order adjusted speed accordingly.
6. All crew/passengers in APCs should have adequate head protection and where appropriate ICS communications.
7. No disciplinary or administrative action against any individuals involved in this accident is deemed appropriate.

M.S. Skidmore

M.S. Skidmore
Lieutenant-Colonel
Commanding Officer

2/2

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①



Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville On KOK 3RO

② G-1
7 Feb as file.
Ltd
eos
2 Mar 95

1080-1 (Comd)

28 February 1995

Distribution List

POWER OF COMMANDING OFFICER

Reference: CF00 1.325 dated 15 October 1992

1. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of reference, I hereby designate Lieutenant-Colonel C.J.R. Davis to be a Commanding Officer with respect to all officers below the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and all non-commissioned members of the Canadian Forces assigned temporarily or otherwise to the Headquarters, Canadian Contingent Support Element (UIC 3029) and to the Canadian Contingent Support Element (UIC 3307) and employed in the special duty area of the former Yugoslavia. This designation is effective 22 February 1995.

2. In accordance with paragraph 11 of reference, disciplinary matters beyond your authority shall be referred to the Deputy Commander or the undersigned who have been designated as officers having the power and jurisdiction of a superior commander.

R.R. Crabbe

R.R. Crabbe
Major-General
Commander

DISTRIBUTION LIST (See page 2)

1/2

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DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

CANCONHQ/LCol C.J.R. Davis

Information

External

NDHQ Ottawa/DCDS/J3 Ops/J1 Coord

Internal

DComd

G1

G5 Legal

2/2

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TO: D13-LIST-H
MSG: HQ 38809 148

FROM: G1 MILITARY ZAGREB
LIST J UNCON

UNPROFOR ON 17 FEB 1995

PRIORITY

UNPROFOR

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Page 1 of 1

ROUTINE **PRIORITY** IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL UN SECRET ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO:	DATE/TIME: 271300 A FEB 95
TO: LIST H	FROM: HQ UNPROFOR CMPAO/G 1 COL H CARGNELUTTI <i>Handwritten initials</i>
FAX NO:	FAX: ZAGREB 38 51 170 199 VSAT 2948
ATTN.:	FILE REF. NO.: <i>Handwritten</i> DRAFTER : LTCOL HARSIA
INFO:	
FAX NO.:	
SUBJECT: REQUIREMENT FOR BOARDS OF INQUIRY TO BE CONVENED UNDER FORCE COMMANDERS'S POLICY DIRECTIVE NO 9.	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: COS, COS (L/A), CAO, SLA, FPM	

1080 / 28 FEB 1995

MESSAGE:

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS		
<i>G1</i>		<i>Handwritten initials</i>
<i>G1 Admin</i>		<i>Handwritten initials</i>

- As stated in Force Commander's Policy Directive No 9 all serious accidents and incidents are to be investigated by a Contingent Board of Inquiry.
- After listing only all the accidents/incidents, involving death of serious injury which have occurred after 1 January 1994 we have found more than 100 cases when there is no Board of Inquiry report submitted to this office.
- Therefore you are required to prepare and submit your contingent reports to this office not later than 20 March 1995.
- In case you do not have the MP Investigation Report concerning the accident/incident you are advised to contact UNPROFOR MP.

② *G1 Admin*

③ *CRPA*

See me ref para 3.
J. M. Leonard
W/S
A/G1
2/2

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PRIORITY **PROTECTED B** ¹

PAAKZYUW RCCRKVA0046 0551900-KKKK--RCCLPZB RCCLQBA.

ZNY KKKKK

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P 241830Z FEB *

FM 2 SVC BN PETAWAWA

TO RCCLQBA/CCUNPROFOR PRIMOSTEN//CO//

RCCLPZB/CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//COS// **4**

ZEN/HQ SSF PETAWAWA//COMD//

ZEN/CFB PETAWAWA//BCOMD//

ZEN/2 MP PL PETAWAWA//CO//

BT

PROTECTED B BN HQ 053

SUBJ: SIR - THEFT OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - UPDATE

REF: A. TELECON SGT LONG (2 MP PL)/MAJ TIGHE (CO 2 SVC BN)

24 FEB 95

B. CCUNPROFOR PRIMOSTEN OR 170 231533Z FEB 95

1. CPL RISEBOROUGH SURRENDERED TO 2 MP PL THIS DATE, ADMITTING TO THEFT OF DRUGS. A NUMBER OF CAPSULES HAVE BEEN RETURNED AND MBR STATES THAT SHE DISPOSED OF THE REMAINDER

2. DISCIPLINARY ACTION PENDING

BT

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JAS049 DELIVERED 0551957 110327

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RECEIVED*

25 FEB 1995

*②G1
Please see me within an.*

*CG
LGR
COS
25 Feb 95*

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REVIEWED B01

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PAAKZYUW RCCLQBA0008 0601612-KKKK--RCCLPZB.

ZNY KKKKK

P 241725Z FEB 95

FM CCUNPROFOR CAMP PRIMOSTEN//CO//

TO RCCLPZB/HQCCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//COMD/COS/G3/G1/G5 PA// ←

RCCPJSA/NDOC OTTAWA

RCCPJSA/NDHQ OTTAWA//J3 PK//

RCESCGA/LFCHQ ST HUBERT//G3//

INFO RCCPJSA/NDHQ OTTAWA//DGPA/DGCMS/D PER A// (1)

RCCRKVA/2 SVC BN PETAWAWA//CO//

ZEN/CCUNPROFOR PRIMOSTEN//LEGAL O//

P 241830Z FEB 95

TO RCCLQBA/CCUNPROFOR PRIMOSTEN//CO//

RCCLPZB/CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//COS// ←

ZEN/HQ SSF PETAWAWA//COMD//

ZEN/CFB PETAWAWA//BCOMD//

ZEN/2 MP PL PETAWAWA//CO//

BT

PROTECTED B BN HQ 053

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2. DISCIPLINARY ACTION PENDING

BT

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1080-1
02 MAR 1995

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1080-1 (ADJT)

01 02 241725Z FEB 95 PP PP KKKK

OR 172

CCUNPROFOR BATLOGCAN PRIMOSTEN//CO//

HQCCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//COMD/COS/G3/G1/G5 PA//

NDOC OTTAWA

NDHQ OTTAWA//J3 PK//

LFCHQ ST-HUBERT//G3//

INFO NDHQ OTTAWA//DGPA/DGCMS/D PER A//

2 SVC BN PETAWAWA//CO//

CCUNPROFOR PRIMOSTEN//LEGAL O// ZEN

(2)
GR
PA
Howard
63
1/3

PROTECTED B OR 172

SUBJ: SIR - THEFT OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE

REF: A. TELECON MCPL NEWTON/CPL BEAUCLAIRE 22 FEB 95

B. TELECON MAJ ELVISH/MAJ TIGHE 22 FEB 95

C. TELECON MAJ MARTEL/MAJ TIGHE 25 FEB 95

1. AS INDICATED AT REFS A AND B THEFT OF QTY 200 - 300 20MG CAPSULES OF PROZAC IN 100 CAPSULE BOTTLES DISCOVERED THIS LOC 21 FEB 95.

INITIAL INVESTIGATION INDICATES THAT THEFT TOOK PLACE SOMETIME DURING PREVIOUS WEEK

2. DRUGS WERE LOC IN CANLOGBAT FMED. ALL MEMBERS OF FMED THAT HAD ACCESS HAVE BEEN QUESTIONNED EXCEPT FOR CPL RISEBROUGH, HEATHER L, SN

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REVIEWED BOI

PROTECTED B

1080-1 (ADJT)

s.19(1)

02

KKKK

OR 172

[REDACTED] SHE RETURNED TO PETAWAWA ON FIRST ROTATION FLIGHT 20 FEB 95. SHE IS A MEMBER OF 2 SVC BN AND IS CURRENTLY RESIDING IN SINGLE QTRS IN CFB PETAWAWA

3. AS A RESULT OF INFO OBTAINED INITIAL INVESTIGATION CANLOGBAT MP BELIEVES CPL RISEBROUGH MAY BE INVOLVED IN SOME ASPECT OF THIS THEFT

4. IAW REF C, CPL RISEBROUGH DECIDED TO TURN HERSELF IN AND MAKE CONFESSION. PART OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE MISSING WAS FOUND IN HER LUGGAGE. A MSG FROM CFB PETAWAWA TO THAT EFFECT IS SOON TO BE RECEIVED

5. FINALLY, THIS UNIT REQ CONFIRMATION THAT THE FACTS DEPICTED ABOVE BE THE NEC AUTH TO WRITE-OFF DISCREPANCIES HERE ABOVE MENTIONED

6. ACK

MP

J.P.L.M. ROBITAILLE, CAPT ADJT

J.A.M. Bouliot
J.A.M. BOULIOT, CO

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REVIEWED 801

CANLOGBAT CAMP PRIMOSTEN PHONE No. : 011 385 59 70121

1000-1

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PROTECTED B

1080-1 (ADJT)

01 02 24/7557 FEB 95 PP PP KKKK

OR 172

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CCUNPROFOR BATLOGCAN PRIMOSTEN//CO//
HQCCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//COMD/COS/G3/G1/G5 PA//
NDOC OTTAWA
NDHQ OTTAWA//J3 PK//
LFCHQ ST-HUBERT//G3//
INFO NDHQ OTTAWA//DCPA/DGMS/D PER A//
2 SVC BN PETAWAWA//CO//
CCUNPROFOR PRIMOSTEN//LEGAL O// ZEN

② DFC
G3 is verifying if they have found the rest of the missing substances or not.
RBE
26 Feb 95

PROTECTED B OR 172

SUBJ: SIR - THEFT OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE

REF: A. TELECON MCPL NEWTON/CPL BEAUCLAIRE 22 FEB 95

B. TELECON MAJ ELVISH/MAJ TIGHE 22 FEB 95

C. TELECON MAJ MARTEL/MAJ TIGHE 25 FEB 95

1. AS INDICATED AT REFS A AND B THEFT OF QTY 200 - 300 20MG CAPSULES OF PROZAC IN 100 CAPSULE BOTTLES DISCOVERED ^{MISSING FROM} THIS LOC 21 FEB 95. INITIAL INVESTIGATION INDICATES THAT THEFT TOOK PLACE SOMETIME DURING PREVIOUS WEEK

2. DRUGS WERE LOC IN CANLOGBAT FMED. ALL MEMBERS OF FMED THAT HAD ACCESS HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED EXCEPT FOR CPL RISEBROUGH, HEATHER L, SN

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④ CC
PA
RBE

BAC
③ DFC
Further to admit ②, she has admitted to "disposing" of the rest of the drugs. Not sure what "disposing" means (selling, taking, throwing out).
RBE
Feb 95
2001967

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From : CANLOGBAT CAMP PRIMOSTEN

PHONE No. : 011 385 59 70121

Feb. 25 1995 6:34PM PMS

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1080-1 (ADJT)

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02

KKKK

OR 172

F30 155 566. SHE RETURNED TO PETAWAWA ON FIRST ROTATION FLIGHT 20 FEB 95. SHE IS A MEMBER OF 2 SVC BN AND IS CURRENTLY RESIDING IN SINGLE QTRS IN CFB PETAWAWA

3. AS A RESULT OF INFO OBTAINED INITIAL INVESTIGATION CANLOGBAT MP BELIEVES CPL RISEBROUGH MAY BE INVOLVED IN SOME ASPECT OF THIS THEFT

4. IAW REF C, CPL RISEBROUGH DECIDED TO TURN HERSELF IN AND MAKE CONFESSION. PART OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE MISSING WAS FOUND IN HER LUGGAGE. A MSG FROM CFB PETAWAWA TO THAT EFFECT IS SOON TO BE RECEIVED

5. FINALLY, THIS UNIT REQ CONFIRMATION THAT THE FACTS DEPICTED ABOVE BE THE NEC AUTH TO WRITE-OFF DISCREPANCIES HERE ABOVE MENTIONED

6. ACK

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MP

J.P.L.M. ROBITAILLE, CAPT ADJT

J.A.M. Bouliot
J.A.M. BOULIOT, CO

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FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

National Defence Headquarters
Maj- Gen George R. Pearkes Bldg
101 Col By Drive, Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0K2



**J3 OPERATIONS (INTERNATIONAL)
J3 Opérations (international)**

February 24, 1996

To: LCol C. Davis
Dep't: COS CCUNPROFOR
Telephone - Fax: 011-385-41-815-191

PROTECTED B

From: CAPT PJ FLEURY
Dep't: J3 OPS 3-6 COORD
Telephone - Fax: (613) 992-8812 Voice: 995-0848

Subject: S.I. - CCUNPROFOR M113 VEHICLE ACCIDENT, 29 OCT 94

- Refs: A. Telecon J3 Ops 7/COS CCUNPROFOR
- B. 3451-4 COS J3/DGMPO, 24 Feb 95 (encl)
- C. 1080-1 DCDS, 14 Feb 95 (encl)
- D. Notes on Equipment Aspects DLR, 17 Nov 94 (encl)

Remarks:

1. Ref A advised that ref B was enroute with an advance copy by FAX.
2. The briefing note at Ref C identifies a number of flags. For clarification they refer to:
 - a. Green flag - 1080-1/3032-26/94 DComd 30 Nov 94;
 - b. Orange flag - CCUNPROFOR Zagreb Comd 064 101230Z Feb 95; and
 - c. Red flag - ref D.

No. of pages Incl cover page: 8

SENDER
COMM. FACILITY NDHQ
DEPT NATIONAL DEFENCE
OTTAWA, CANADA
STU III/TEMPEST FAX
GPCSN -996-8828
OR 1-613-996-8828

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DATE: 24/6/27
CONTROL NO. 7028
PAGES: 8

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National Defence

Défense nationale

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2Quartier général de la Défense nationale
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

3451-4 (COS J3/DGMPO)

24 February 1995

Deputy Commander
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection ForceCCUNPROFOR M113 VEHICLE
ACCIDENT, 29 OCTOBER 1994References: A. 1080-1/3032-26/94 DComd 30 Nov 94
B. CCUNPROFOR Zagreb Comd 064 101230Z Feb 95

1. A review of the Summary Investigation into the subject accident, reference A, has a number of significant inaccuracies when compared to the information provided at reference B. Particular areas of concern are the battalion helmet policy and the availability of helmet and headsets both in theatre and to the crew at the time of the accident.
2. Therefore, it is requested that reference A be reviewed with respect to the findings and recommendations of the investigating officer. This will provide the opportunity for the Commanding Officer CANBAT 1 and Commander CCUNPROFOR to confirm their comments and recommendations before the summary investigation is reviewed by the DCDS.

Ashton
cal

B.W. Ashton
Brigadier-General
Chief of Staff J3/Director General
Military Plans and Operations
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Canada
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Memorandum

1080-1 (DCDS)

14 Feb 95

CDS (through VCDS)

CANBAT 1 VEHICLE ACCIDENT
INJURIES TO CPL SCHOVANEK

(3)

RECEIVED
DCDS OBJECT SR
FEB 13 1995
950827
1080-1

Ref: 1080-1/3032-26/94 DComd CCUNPROFOR 30 Nov 94

1. A Briefing Note on the subject vehicle accident, with supporting documentation, is enclosed. Cpl Schovanek remains in NDMC, conscious but barely responsive.

2. The Briefing Note concludes that:

a. there were sufficient quantities of suitable helmets and compatible communications headsets in CANBAT 1 but these had not been distributed to the APC;

b. the crew members were not wearing helmets at the time of the accident; and,

c. the crew was following the battalion helmet policy in effect at the time, which required the wearing of helmets only inside the Zone of Separation.

3. The distribution problem has been rectified and CCUNPROFOR now requires that all personnel in an APC/AVGP wear a helmet at all times.

L.G. Mason
VAdm
992-3355

Encl: 1

[Handwritten Signature]
 B.W. Ashton
 BGen
 COS J3/DGMPO
 13 Feb 95

[Handwritten Signature]
 H.C. Ross
 Col
 J3 Ops

Maj TW Melnyk, J3 Coord, 992-5601, ops/schoivanek.mem
Distr: circ, file

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BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE CDS

CCUNPROFOR M113 VEHICLE ACCIDENT, 29 OCTOBER 1994ISSUE

- * whether suitable head protection was available to the crew members involved in the accident, particularly in view of the serious head injuries sustained by Cpl MJ Schovanek.

BACKGROUND

- * this briefing note is based on the Summary Investigation into subject accident (Green flag)
- * in the early morning of 29 Oct 94, the vehicle was travelling from B Coy HQ (Y2) to OP SC38 to change shift
- * the driver lost control of the vehicle on a long down grade
- * the vehicle possibly made contact with the soft shoulder on the right side of the road, left the road embankment and dropped 28 feet before striking the bottom of a ravine
- * the frontal armour bore the brunt of the impact, however the vehicle remained in an upright position
- * although external damage was minimal, the internal effects were much more serious as much equipment was torn free and thrown within the vehicle

CAUSE

- * a combination of speed, driver inexperience and wet road conditions caused the accident

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INJURIES

- * Cpl Schovanek (Vehicle Commander) - serious head injuries (minimally responsive, remains at NDMC)

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- * Pte Wales (Passenger) - broken femur
- * Pte Armstrong (Driver) - minor injuries
- * Pte Rogers (Gunner) - minor injuries
- * none of the individuals in the vehicle were wearing helmets

DISCIPLINARY/ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

- * none taken
- * the driver will undergo a re-evaluation period of driving under close supervision prior to being authorized to carry passengers

FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER

- * road conditions and driver inexperience were the main factors in the accident
- * had seatbelts been available, they would not have been used as each crew member was employed in an operational task which required them to stand
- * none of the personnel were wearing CVC helmets or slim guard communication headsets as they were not available in sufficient quantities at the time of the accident. *Further investigation (Orange flag) has revealed that sufficient quantities of CVC helmets and SLIM GUARD headsets were held in CANBAT 1 at the time of the accident*
- * the M113 suffered minor damage and is currently operational
- * Pte Wales was not wearing a helmet but should have been according to the Battalion helmet policy. *Further investigation (Orange flag) indicates that Pte Wales was following the Battalion helmet policy at the time of the accident*
- * the head wound of Cpl Shovanek can be attributed to the

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lack of a radio headset that can be worn under the helmet. Further investigation at (Orange flag) has revealed that sufficient quantities of CVC helmets or SLINGUARD headsets were available in CANBAT 1 at the time of the accident, but were not distributed to the rifle companies and support platoons

- * the head injury of Pte Wales is attributable to his negligence and the negligence of Cpl Shovanek in not telling him to put on a helmet. Further investigation (Orange flag) has revealed that the helmet policy in place was followed at the time of the accident. The M113 was operating in an area where the wearing of helmets was not required
- * loosely stowed equipment was responsible for some of the injuries
- * difficulties were experienced fitting neckbraces to casualties wearing flak vests
- * all individuals in the vehicle were on duty
- * not all models of in service communications headgear will fit inside the US PASGT helmet and there are not sufficient CVC helmets available in theatre to equip all personnel. Further investigation (Orange flag) has revealed that there were sufficient numbers of SLINGUARD headsets (to be worn with the US PASGT helmet) and CVC helmets for all vehicle crew members in CANBAT 1 at the time of the accident

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER

- * provision of additional Combat Vehicle Crew (CVC) helmets
- * SLINGUARD headset to be modified for wear under a helmet prior to full scale procurement
- * internal rigging/cargo straps be developed for the M113

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BOY

3/4

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- to retain cargo firmly in place
- * a neck brace be developed for casualties wearing flak jackets
- * COs of all Canadian units be ordered to ensure all personnel in APCs/AVGPs wear either their standard issued helmets or a CVC helmet

CONCLUSION

- * (Red and Orange flags) have confirmed that there were sufficient numbers of SLIMGUARD headsets/US PASGT helmets and/or CVC helmets available to equip all CANBAT 1 vehicle crews at the time of the accident. However, sufficient quantities were not distributed to the rifle companies or support platoons
- * SLIMGUARD headsets do not fit under the smaller sized US PASGT helmet
- * CANBAT 1 direction existed at the time of the accident stating that helmets must be worn in APCs/AVGPs at all times (both inside and outside of vehicles) within the Zone of Separation (ZOS) only. The accident occurred outside the ZOS where the wearing of helmets was not required. Comd CCUNPROFOR has ordered (Orange flag) COs to ensure all personnel in APCs/AVGPs wear either their standard issued helmets or a CVC helmet in an M113 or AVGP (Comd CCUNPROFOR will issue a directive

REVIEWED BOJ
(shortly)

Responsible Group Principal: VAdm L.G. Mason, DCDS
 Responsible Division Head: BGen B.W. Ashton, COS J3/DGMPO
 Responsible Director: Col H.C. Ross, J3 Ops
 Prepared by: Capt P.J. Fleury J3 Ops 3-6
 Date prepared: 13 Feb 95

4/4

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(8)

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NOTES ON EQUIPMENT ASPECTS -
M113 INCIDENT IN CCUNPROFOR -
HEAD INJURIES TO CPL SCHOVANEK

Refs: A. Article: "Soldier wasn't wearing helmet: Family",
The Edmonton Sun, November 1, 1994
B. Note EA\DCDS to EA\VCDS 4 Nov 94

1. Sufficient modern US PASGT non metallic helmets have been procured to allow a helmet that provides effective ballistic and shock protection to be issued to all personnel deployed with CCUNPROFOR.

2. In order to allow M113 APC crews (driver, commander and one rear deck observer/gunner) to communicate while wearing the PASGT helmet, 800 state of the art SLIMGARD and SECRETEE headsets have been provided to CCUNPROFOR (photographs enclosed). These headsets are designed to be worn under the PASGT helmet.

3. In addition, over 200 ballistic protective shells have been provided to CCUNPROFOR for use with the current AVGP crew helmet, that has built in headsets.

4. Therefore, sufficient helmets with ballistic and shock protection, with compatible communications headsets, have been provided for all personnel in CCUNPROFOR, including AFV crews.

5. Information on the use of these equipments in-theatre and the circumstances surrounding the injuries to Cpl Schovaneck is available only from CCUNPROFOR.

*Note. PASGT Helmets have been in-theatre since Spring 93.
Headsets (SLIMGARD + SECRETEE) in theatre since last May.*

HL
USA 17/11

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REVIEWED 801

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RAAGZYUW RCCLNWA0005 0541415-GGGG--RCCLQBA.

RECEIVED

ZNR GGGGG

24 FEB 1995

R 231400Z FEB 95

FM CCUNPROFOR RASTEVIC//CANBAT 1/DCO//

TO CCUNPROFOR CAMP PLESO//COS// 4

BT

PROTECTED A DCO 080

SUBJ: CANBAT 1 CH OF COMD BOI - PARTICIPANTS

REF: TELECON DCO CANBAT 1/COS CANCON UNPROFOR 21 FEB 95

1. IAW REF THE FOL PERS WILL BE MBRS ON THE CANBAT 1 CH-OF COMD BOI.

READ IN SIX COLMS, (SN, NAME, INITS, RK, POSN, PARENT UNIT):

1080-1

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS			
G1		24/10	JA
G-1 adm		24/12	PA
G-3		2/3	O
CRIPA			

- A. [REDACTED], JORGENSEN, M.P., MAJ, DCO/CANBAT 1, 1 RCR
- B. [REDACTED] MC ADAM, P.H., MAJ, OC ADMIN/CANBAT 1, 1 RCR
- C. [REDACTED] VANCE, J.H., MAJ, OPS O/CANBAT 1, 1 RCR
- D. [REDACTED] HULSMAN, L.R., CAPT, ADJT/CANBAT 1, 1 RCR
- E. [REDACTED], O SHEA, T.P., CAPT, QM/CANBAT 1, 1 RCR
- F. [REDACTED] STRINGER, R.A., LT, FIN O/CANBAT 1, 1 RCR
- G. TBC CAPT, ADMIN LO, 2 R22ER
- H. [REDACTED], ATTFIELD, D.N., CAPT, AO CANBAT 1, 1 RCR

2. CHAIRMAN OF BOI IS MAJ M.P. JORGENSEN

BT

#0005

♥JAS045 DELIVERED 0541419 023648

② G-1 adm
Prepare Letter for
Closure of Command BOI.
A. [REDACTED] 24/10
S. [REDACTED]

REVIEWED BO PROTECTED A

PROTECTED A

PA
MEMORANDUM

1080-1/3029-1 (CO)

23 Feb 95

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE - SUMMARY
INVESTIGATION INTO LOSS OF
PUBLIC PROPERTY - 10 FEB 95

1. [REDACTED] Capt Miller WE shall conduct a Summary Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the loss of a 9mm pistol, serial number 7T8962, and accompanying magazine, ammunition, holster and military clothing and equipment, belonging to B11 975 116 Capt J.M.F. Casault.
2. The Summary Investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of QR&O Chapter 21, 36 and 38, CFAOs 21-9, 22-10 and 38-1; CFP 181 Chapter 14, Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605, FCPD 9 and other relevant orders.
3. The Summary Investigation shall include statements from all available witnesses and will record evidence concerning the fol:
 - a. when the loss took place;
 - b. the circumstance surrounding the loss;
 - c. what security measures (ie did the loss occur in a restricted area) were in place at the time of the loss;
 - d. did the loss occur in an area or on a route that his supervisor told him not to go;
 - e. the NATO stock number, nomenclature, quantity and catalogue value of the lost public property;
 - f. the remedial action taken or contemplated to correct adverse conditions which may have caused the loss.
4. Findings/recommendations should be made to determine:

1/2

PROTECTED A

REVIEWED BOI

PROTECTED A

- a. if theft was involved in the loss of the equipment;
 - b. was there any negligence on the part of any person (s);
 - c. action required to prevent recurrence;
 - d. administrative deduction; and
 - e. disciplinary action.
5. This investigation is designated Protected A.
6. The summary investigation must be delivered in triplicate to the undersigned within 14 days of receipt of these terms of reference. Should it prove impossible to complete the proceeding within that time frame, a written explanation must be submitted before the due date.


C.J.R. Davis
LCol
CO

Encl: 1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

Capt Miller
G1

2/2

PROTECTED A

RESTRICTED
CANADIAN FORCES EUROPE
REPORT OF LOSS / DAMAGE OF MATERIEL

1. Unit / Base CC UNPROFOR Date 17 Feb 95
 Material on charge to: _____ BN QM / Base Supply _____
 Coy / Base Sec _____ Control No _____
 Individual B11 975 116 CAPT J.M.F. CASAULT
 SIN Rank Name

MATERIAL LOST

SER	STOCK NO	NOMENCLATURE	QTY	ACCY CODE	UNIT COST	TOTAL
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	8465-21-825-6074	BAG DUFFEL	1	B	19.56	19.56
2	8430-21-911-8542	BOOT GORTEX	1	B	109.45	109.45
3	8465-21-107-4616	BAG DUFFEL SLEEPING	1	B	13.22	13.22
4	8340-21-872-2082	SHOET UTILITY	1	B	46.77	46.77
5	8465-21-107-4802	MATRESS PNEUMATIC	1	B	121.65	121.65
6	8465-21-889-2406	LINER PONCHO	1	B	53.07	53.07
7	8465-21-842-6078	SLEEPING BAG OUTER	1	B	91.96	91.96
TOTAL COST						715.41

Circumstances of loss: a. See Military Police report SAR-541/40/95 dated 110852A Feb 95 (attached)

b. I ~~accept~~ / refuse responsibility for the loss. _____

SIN _____ Rank CAPT Name and Init CASAULT J.M.F. Signature F. Casault Date 17 Feb 95

3 Unit / Base Supply certification:
 a. I certify that the prices are correct as per CF 137 as of _____
 b. I certify that the auditable record for the account(s) _____ has been reviewed and that the loss is not the result of any error; and
 c. I certify that the material has been issued off charge by following CIVs and deleted from all accounting records (DND 638, CF 892A, double book, etc.): _____ to _____ inclusive.
 d. Temporary issue authorized _____

Comments: _____

 Name, Init & Rank _____ Signature _____ Date 18 Feb 95

Statement by PI Comd / Sub Section Head: _____

Sect _____ Name, Init & Rank _____ Signature _____ Date _____

REVIEWED ROI

RESTRICTED

s.19(1)

RESTRICTED

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**CANADIAN FORCES EUROPE
REPORT OF LOSS / DAMAGE OF MATERIEL**

1. Unit/Base CC UNPROFOR UIC 3034 Date 17 Feb 95
 Material on charge to: _____ BN QM / Base Supply _____
 Coy / Base Sec _____ Control No _____
 Individual [Redacted] CAPT J.M.F. CASAULT
 SIN _____ Rank _____ Name _____

MATERIAL LOST

SER	STOCK NO	NOMENCLATURE	QTY	ACCY CODE	UNIT COST	TOTAL
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	1005-21-103-5221	9mm PISTOL FT 8962	1	B	234.00	234.00
2	8470-21-899-2322	FRAG JACKET	1	B	324.20	324.20
3	1005-21-103-5253	10Rds MAGAZINE	2	B	4.10	8.20
4	1095-21-889-2573	HOLSTER	1	B	7.65	7.65
5	1005-21-103-5233	CLEANING ROD	1	B	10.25	10.25
6	8135-99-961-9248	OIL BOTTLE	1	C	.72	.72
7	1305-21-116-9794	9mm ROUNDS	20	B	.63	12.60
TOTAL COST						597.62

Circumstances of loss: a. See attach document.

b. I ~~accept~~ / refuse responsibility for the loss. My own life is worth more than the items which were taken from me.

B11975116 CAPT CASAULT J.M.F. F. Casault 17 Feb 95
 SIN Rank Name and Init Signature Date

3. Unit / Base Supply certification:
 a. I certify that the prices are correct as per CF 137 as of _____
 b. I certify that the auditable record for the account(s) _____ has been reviewed and that the loss is not the result of any error; and
 c. I certify that the material has been issued off charge by following CIVs and deleted from all accounting records (DND 638, CF 892A, double book, etc.): _____ to _____ inclusive.
 d. Temporary issue authorized _____

Comments: _____

 Name, Init & Rank Signature Date

4. Statement by PI Comd / Sub Section Head: _____

 PI/Sect Name, Init & Rank Signature Date

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PA Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

1080-1 (G1)

20 February 1995

Distribution List

MILITARY POLICE - INVESTIGATION REPORT

Reference: MP Coy HQ Case Ref 586/024/94 10 Feb 94

1. In accordance with reference, enclosed is the Military Police Investigation Report for your information.
2. Any inquiries on this matter, may be addressed to the G1 Canadian Contingent.


A.J. Howard
Major
for Commander

Enclosure: 1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

NDHQ Ottawa/DG Police Services
CANCON Primosten/G5 Legal Officer

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
K0K 3R0

1080-1 (G3)

18 February 1995

Distribution List

BALLISTIC PROTECTION - PHOTOS

Find enclosed a covering letter and several photos of the flak jackets and the ballistic blanket that were involved in the 31 December 1994 shooting in CANBAT 1. Actual kit is on the way via a sustainment flight. Please pass info to appropriate staff.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "A.J. Howard".

A.J. Howard
Major
for Chief of Staff

Enclosure: Ballistic Personnel Protection 3120-1 (Ops 0) - Dated 12
February 1995

Distribution List

External

NDHQ OTTAWA/J3 OPS 3-3

CANBAT 1/OPS 0 (without enclosure)

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PA 1080-1 (G1)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
KOK 3RO

17 February 1994

Distribution List

STATUE LAW (CUSTOMS ACT)

References: A. POLICE 5039 061900Z FEB 95
B. BN MP 920-1-94 dated 28 January 1995 (Enclosed)

1. Subject investigation commenced 14 Jun 1994, following the discovery of an unauthorized item amongst the unaccompanied baggage of 1 R22ER, who were in the process of returning to Canada after a six-month rotation in Croatia. The investigation was completed at the unit level on 28 January 1995 and the Military Police report is enclosed at reference B.
2. As yet, to my knowledge, no person has been held accountable. I am aware that all materials and contraband have been returned or disposed of as appropriate. I am somewhat concerned, however, as to what appears to be lacking in the investigation; specifically, I would suggest that the following actions should be taken:
 - a. Captain Lafault should be interviewed, seeing as he, apparently, was the last person to actually have possession of the Czech 9mm pistol found among the tri-walls of 1 R22ER:
 - b. the Cpls/MCpls who packed the tri-walls have not as yet been interviewed, only the WO/CQs have been questioned; I feel that the Cpls/MCpls could clearly help shed light on the case; and
 - c. the investigation, albeit voluminous, has as yet not determined under what instructions the materials (\$44,128.41) were illegally packed; clearly, this is a key aspect of the investigation.

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3. I raise these concerns primarily in a bid to assist the investigators: however as the Chief of Staff of CCUNPROFOR, I also feel that I need to draw your attention to the sheer lengthiness of the investigation and my impression overall that we have so/or failed to hold accountable those responsible for such a significant violation. I would appreciate if you would consider my observations above and arrange to have this HQ kept informed as to the status of the investigation. The possibility of withdrawal of CANBAT 1 in the near future and thus having to close the accounts adds even more impetus to resolving this investigation.

M.G. Macdonald
M.G. Macdonald
Lieutenant Colonel
Chief of Staff
for Commander

Enclosure: 1

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

Action

External:

NDHQ/DGPO

Information

External:

NDHQ/J3 Ops

Internal (less enclosure):

CANBAT 1/CO

2/2

PROTECTED B

PA

01 01 161405Z FEB 95 RR RR UUUU

G1 052

CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB/G1//

NDHQ SEC OTTAWA//D POLICE SVCS//

INFO LFCHQ ST HUBERT//PM//

NDHQ OTTAWA//J3 OPS 3//

UNCLAS G1 052

SUBJ: UPDATE ON MP INVEST - STATUTE LAW - CUSTOMS ACT

REF: A. YOUR POLICE 5039 061900Z FEB 95

B. MP REPORT (UNPROFOR) BN MP 920-1-94 DATED 28 JAN 95

REF B IS A FOLLOW UP MP REPORT RECD AT THIS HQ THIS DATE. IT WILL BE

FWD TO YOUR HQ BY MAIL ON 17 FEB 95 AS REQ AT REF A

N. GAGNON, MWO, SUPT CLK


N. GAGNON, MWO, SUPT CLK

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UNCLASSIFIED

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RAAKZYUW RCCLQBA0005 0471217-KKKK--RCCLPZB.

ZNY KKKKK

R 160838Z FEB 95

FM CCUNPROFOR PRIMOSTEN//ADJT//

TO RCCLPZB/CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//G1//

RCCRKVA/2 SVC BN PETAWAWA//ADJT//

BT

PROTECTED B OR 164

SUBJ:ALLEGED ASSAULT

REFS: A.MP PL SPLIT 521-002-95 15 FEB 95

B.OR 052 110610Z FEB 95

1. AT REF B CANLOGBAT IDENTIFIED A POSSIBLE ASSAULT/ATTACK CONCERNING

██████████ SGT BROWN ME

2. THE INVESTIGATION AT REF B HAS QUOTE FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANYONE WITH A MEANS MOTIVE OR APPORTUNITY TO ASSAULT SGT MICHAEL BROWN UNQUOTE.

THE INVESTIGATOR HAS CONCLUDED THAT IT IS HIGHLY LIKELY SGT BROWN STRUCK HIS HEAD AND PASSED OUT ON THE METAL BEAM OF HIS ISO

3. NO FURTHER ACTION WILL BE TAKEN CONCERNING THIS MATTER

BT

#0005

♥JAS046 DELIVERED 0471221 804248

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1080-1
RECORDED

16 FEB 1995

cos / mm
cl / ds.

REVIEWED B01

PROTECTED B/UN CONFIDENTIAL



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PA
1080-1/3032-27/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

12 February 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
INTO VEHICLE ACCIDENT
INVOLVING CANBAT 1 ILTIS
UNPF 8151/CFR 85-87202
AND SERBIAN CHECKPOINT BARRIER

References: A. 1080-1/3032-27/94 (CO) 7 Dec 94 (enclosed)
B. 1080-1/3032-27/94 (DComd) 20 Nov 94 (enclosed)
C. CANBAT 1 1080-1/3032-27/94 (CO) 6 Oct 94 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed are the Summary Investigation, the Contingent Board of Inquiry and the Commanding Officer's comments regarding the incident.
2. I concur with the Commanding Officer's comments in that the Safety Supervisor's report clearly indicates that MCpl Stout was travelling too quickly to react to an obstacle on the road, and was therefore responsible for the accident. I also agree, sole responsibility of the accident not only lies with MCpl Stout but also with Lt Moran, who, as senior passenger in the vehicle remains responsible for the safety of all personnel.
3. Accordingly, the Commanding Officer has taken appropriate disciplinary action against both MCpl Stout, and the senior passenger, Lt Moran.

1/2

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4. The Commanding Officer, CANBAT 1 is to submit the necessary documents to recover the vehicle repair costs from the United Nations.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1 - 1 PPCLI Commanding Officer's Letter
Enclosure 2 - CCUNPROFOR DComd's Letter
Enclosure 3 - Summary Investigation

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ACTION

NDHQ Ottawa/J1 Coord
HQUNPROFOR Zagreb/CMPAO
CANBAT 1 RASTEVIC/CO (less encl 3)

INFORMATION

CANCON Det Primosten//G5 Legal//

2/2

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1080-1 (COS)

01 05 101230Z FEB 95 PP PP KKKK

COMD 064

CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//COMD//

NDHQ OTTAWA//COS J3//

INFO NDHQ OTTAWA//J3 OPS//

CCUNPROFOR RASTEVIC//CANBAT 1//CO//

PROTECTED B COMD 064

SUBJ: BOI - CCUNPROFOR M113 VEH ACCIDENT 29 OCT 94

REFS: A. NDHQ J3 OPS 3026 032146Z FEB 95

B. CANBAT 1 1080-1/3032-31/9444 (5 PL COMD) 16 NOV 94

1. REF A DIRECTS CCUNPROFOR TO RESPOND TO SERIES OF DETAILED QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ACCIDENT AT REF B. THE CCUNPROFOR RESPONSE TO EA QUESTION IS AS FOL

2. A. WHAT WAS THE BN HELMET POLICY FOR APCS/AVGPS AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT (BE SPECIFIC IN DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN IN/OUTSIDE OF THE ZONE OF SEPERATION (ZOS))

B. THE BN HELMET POLICY, AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, WAS THAT HELMETS WERE TO BE WORN BY ALL PERS INSIDE THE ZOS. HELMETS WERE NOT REQUIRED OUTSIDE THE ZONE. CONTINGENT POLICY HAS NOW BEEN AMENDED, ALL PERS WEAR PROTECTIVE HEADGEAR AT ALL TIMES WHEN IN AN M113 OR AVGP VARIANT

PROTECTED B

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PROTECTED B

1080-1 (COS)

02

KKKK

COMD 064

3. A. DID THE VEH ACCIDENT OCCUR INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE ZOS
B. OUTSIDE THE ZOS
4. A. PARA 15.J.(3) OF REF D IS INCORRECT IF THE LOCAL COMD DID NOT
ISSUE INSTR FOR WEARING OF HEADGEAR OUTSIDE THE ZOS. CLARIFICATION
REQR
B. PARA 15.J.(3) OF REF D IS INCORRECT. THE HEAD INJURY WAS NOT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO PERS NEGLECT BY PTE WALES OR CPL SCHOVANEK. THE
HELMET POLICY AT THAT TIME WAS FOLLOWED
5. A. DOES CCUNPROFOR CURRENTLY HAVE APPROPRIATE DIRS IN PLACE
CONCERNING THE WEARING OF HEADGEAR IN APCS/AVGPS AT REF D
B. YES. SHORTLY AFTER THE ACC CANBAT 1 ADOPTED QUOTE HELMETS ALWAYS
UNQUOTE POLICY. CCUNPROFOR ISSUED MSG COS 057 040804Z FEB 95 WHICH
DIR UNITS TO ENSURE ALL PERS WEAR A HELMET WHILE IN A M113 OR AVGP
VARIANT. A COMD DIR IS BEING PREP AND WILL BE PROMUGATED SHORTLY.
6. A. PARA 15.G. AND 16.A. OF REF D REQR CLARIFICATION. DLR AND CO
CANBAT 1 HAVE BOTH CFM THAT SUFFICIENT QTYS OF BALLISTIC/COMMS
HEADGEAR WERE AVAL FOR ALL CREWS IN THE UNIT AT THE TIME OF THE
ACCIDENT
B. THE CVC HELMETS WERE NOT AVAL IN SUFFICIENT QTY TO THE RIFLE COYS

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PROTECTED B

PROTECTED B

1080-1 (COS)

03

KKKK

COMD 064

AND SP PLS AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT DUE TO CANBAT 1 EFFORTS DURING THE INITIAL TWO WKS OF THE TOUR TO REPAIR, CFM STOCKS AND REDISTR HOLDINGS. THERE APPEARED TO BE SUFFICIENT STOCKS AT THE TIME TO EQUIP SOME OF THE VEH CREWS, BUT STOCKS WERE NOT FULLY ISSUED DUE TO POOR REPAIR AND SIGNIFICANT ACCT DIFFICULTIES. THE INTENTION OF THE UNIT WAS TO ISSUE ALL STOCKS ASAP TO ALLOW CREWS TO BE FULLY PROTECTED AT ALL TIMES. AT THE TIME OF WRITING THE SI IT WAS UNCLEAR AS TO THE ACTUAL SIT REGARDING STOCK HOLDINGS AND SVC OF CVC HELMETS/HEADSETS. MANY OF THE CVC HELMETS HAD BEEN STORED IN SEA CONTS FOR OVER A YR NECESSATING THE UNIT TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE STOCK ISSUING PROBLEM. THE RECOMMENDATION TO ISSUE MORE STOCK NO LONGER APPLIES GIVEN RECENT DECISIONS MADE AS A RESULT OF THE J6 SAV AND CANBAT 1 EFFORTS TO REPAIR EXISTING CVC STOCK

7. A. IF SUFFICIENT NUMBERS BALLISTIC/HEADGEAR WERE AVAL TO CANBAT 1 WHY WERE THERE INSUFFICIENT QTYS IN THE SUBJ APC AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT

B. ALTHOUGH SUFFICIENT QTYS APPEARED TO BE HELD BY THE BN THE STOCK WAS DISORG AND IN POOR REPAIR. AS THE UNIT HAD ONLY BEEN ON THE GROUND FOR TWO WEEKS THE FULL STOCKCHECK, REPAIR AND ASSESSMENT WAS

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1080-1 (COS)

04

KKKK

COMD 064

INCOMPLETE. THE FULL INTENT WAS TO ISSUE SUFFICIENT QTY TO SUB-UNITS
ASAP

8. A. WAS THIS THE NORMAL CREW OF THE VEH, IF SO WHY DID THEY NOT
HAVE COMPATIBLE HEADGEAR

B. THE MBRS IN QUESTION WERE PART OF THE NORMAL VEH CREW. THE
REASONS FOR WHY THE EQPT WAS NOT ISSUED CAN BE FOUND AT PARA 6 AND 7

9. A. IF THIS WAS NOT THE NORMAL CREW DID THEY HAVE THE ABILITY TO
ACQUIRE SUITABLE HEADGEAR PRIOR TO THE VEH DEPARTURE

B. N/A

10. A. DO/DID VEH CREW MBRS SIGN FOR AND RETAIN THEIR OWN
BALLISTIC/COMMS HEADGEAR OR WERE THEY PROVIDED TO EA VEH RESPECTIVELY

B. BALLISTIC HEADGEAR IS PART OF THE VEH EIS AND IS NOT ISSUED TO
INDIVIDUAL CREWMBRS AS INSUFFICIENT QTY EXISTS TO ALLOW ISSUE TO ALL
POTENTIAL DVRS, CO-DVRS AND GNRS. THE ISSUED HEADSETS WERE
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CVC HELMET OR WERE NOT THE SLINGED TYPE.

SLINGED TYPE HEADSETS WERE BEING EXAMINED AS PART OF PARAS 6 AND 7

11. A. CLARIFY WHETHER PTE WALES WAS WEARING A HELMET AT THE TIME
OF THE ACCIDENT. THE INVESTIGATING PROVIDES CONFLICTING STATEMENTS
IN PARA 2 AND 7 OF REF D

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PROTECTED B

PROTECTED B

1080-1 (COS)

05

KKKK

COMD 064

B. PTE WALES WAS NOT WEARING A HELMET AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT

COMD
DCOMD
G3
G1

I.W. ANDERSON, CAPT, G1

for
Admiral Mij
R.R. CRABBE, MGEN, COMD

PROTECTED B

REVIEWED BOI

Blom
15/2

MP COY HQ CASE REF: 586/024/94

FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL

UNPROFOR HQ

ZAGREB

DATE: 10 FEBRUARY -95

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TO : DISTRIBUTION BELOW

SUBJECT : ATTEMPTED MURDER

1. Please find here in a Military Police Report in connection with the above noted subject, for your information and any action you deem necessary.

SIGNED: *[Signature]* FRCOL
(CO UNPROFOR MP COY & FPM)

Distr:
COS LOG/ADM
COMD CANBAT 1
SEC COMD SEC SOUTH
LEG ADV
FILE

REVIEWED BOI

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UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES



UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

MILITARY POLICE
PLATOON
SOUTH

CASE REF NO: SOUTH 586-016-94

DATE OF INITIAL/PRELIMINARY REPORT: 31 DEC 94

INCIDENT: OTHER INCIDENT - ATTEMPTED MURDER

INVOLVING: ██████████ PTE BADANAI P.M., 031 INFMN, AND ██████████
PTE TESCIONE J.J., R031 INFMN, BOTH MEMBERS OF C COY,
CANBAT 1, CAMP RASTEVIC, RSK.

MP COY HQ REF NO: _____

<u>MP COY HQ USE ONLY</u>
DATE CHECKED: <u>18 JAN 1995</u>
DATE TO AFPM/FPM FOR SIGNATURE: _____
DATE DISTRIBUTED: _____
DATE FILED: _____

REVIEWED 801

L.T. Smith
L.T. SMITH CAPT
SIGNATURE OF PL COMD

DATE FILE SENT TO MP COY HQ: 6 JAN 95

DATE FILE RECEIVED BY MP COY HQ: 16 JAN 1995

UNPROFOR



UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

s.19(1)

MILITARY POLICE
INVESTIGATION REPORT

MP COY HQ CASE REF: _____

MP PL CASE REF : SOUTH 586-16-94

DATE: 2 JAN 1995

SUBJECT: OTHER INCIDENT - ATTEMPTED MURDER

1. This report involves the following persons:

a. Complainant:

██████████ MCpl TESHIER Ronald
James, 811 MP, CANBAT 1
Military Police, Camp
Rastevic, RSK.

b. Victims:

██████████ Pte BADANAI Phillip
Matthew, 031 Infmn, C Coy,
CANBAT 1, Camp Rastevic,
RSK, (DOB ██████████); and

██████████ Pte TESCIONE John
Jerry, R031 Infmn, C Coy,
CANBAT 1, Camp Rastevic,
RSK, (DOB ██████████).

c. Military Police:

AD23444 Sgt CROWE Joseph
Robert, MP 811, CANBAT 1
Military Police, Camp
Rastevic, RSK;

AC20090 Sgt LALONDE Gary,
MP 811, IC Investigations
Section, UN MP PL, SSHQ,
KNIN, RSK;

AD23503 Cpl CRISPIN Thomas
Allen, MP 811, CANBAT 1
Military Police, Camp
Rastevic, RSK; and

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.../2

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██████████ Pte BACON Alison
Diane, MP 811, CANBAT 1
Military Police, Camp
Rastevic, RSK;

██████████ MCpl BLACKBURN
Joseph Michael, 811 MP, UN
MP PL, SSHQ, KNIN, RSK;

d. Others:

██████████ LCmdr TAYLOR James
Scott, MO 55 B, Unit
Medical Station, CANBAT 1,
Camp Rastevic, RSK;

██████████ Capt KONWAY Desmond
Christoph, 55 A, Unit
Medical Station, CANBAT 1,
Camp Rastevic, RSK;

██████████ Capt TIEN Homer
Chin-Nan, 55 U, Unit
Medical Station, CANBAT 1,
Camp Rastevic, RSK;

██████████ Capt COOMBS
Harward, Inf 23, Duty
Officer, CANBAT 1, Camp
Rastevic, RSK;

██████████ Sgt BUCCI John
Gerald, Med A 711, Unit
Medical Station, CANBAT 1,
Camp Rastevic, RSK;

██████████ MCpl DOUPE William
Francies, 711 Med A, Unit
Medical Station, CANBAT 1,
Camp Rastevic, RSK;

██████████ MCpl TIBBITTS
Raymond Lawrence, Med A
711, Unit Medical Station,
CANBAT 1, Camp Rastevic,
RSK;

██████████ Cpl FOWLER Brad
Joseph, Med A 711, Unit
Medical Station, CANBAT 1,
Camp Rastevic, RSK; and

██████████ AB THIBOUTOT Erick
Mark, Med A 711, Unit
Medical Station, CANBAT 1,
Camp Rastevic, RSK.

REV. 11/11/88

REV. 11/11/88

.../3

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-3-

2. At about 1832 hrs, 31 Dec 94, MCpl TESHIER contacted this UN MP PL Office and reported the apparent shooting of two, (2), Canadian soldiers (CANBAT 1), by a group of approximately 20 (SVK), Serbian soldiers. It was later learned that they were proceeding to C Company Command Post, Y 3, near Miranje, RSK, Grid 472 710, from OP, (Observation Post), SC 54, near Kolarina, RSK, Grid 550 690, where upon driving through the town of Kolarina, RSK, they were ambushed. The first victim was identified as Pte BADANAI, (Driver) and the second Pte TESCIONE, (Passenger). He further indicated that both soldiers had suffered what appeared to be multiple, serious gun shot wounds and were presently being treated at the Unit Medical Station, (UMS), CANBAT 1, Camp Rastevic, RSK.

3. At about 2130 hrs, 31 Dec 94, MCpl TESHIER conducted a brief preliminary verbal interview with Pte BADANAI. As a result, Pte BADANAI related the following information:

- a. Pte TESCIONE and he had been detailed to escort Engineers to OP, SC 54, from C Coy CP, Y 3;
- b. upon completing the escort, Pte TESCIONE and he departed SC 54, to return to Y 3;
- c. as they travelled towards the town limits of Kolarina, RSK, he negotiated a 90 degree right hand turn. Upon completing this manoeuvre, he noticed an obstruction of approximately 20 Serbian Soldiers, (SVK), walking on the road, approximately 50 yards ahead of his position;
- d. as his vehicle approached the Serbian Soldiers, several of these soldiers, began making hand motions for him to slow his vehicle down. He slowed his vehicle from 50 to approximately 25 km/h;
- e. upon driving up to the Serbian Soldiers, he noticed a safe path on the left side of the road and began to manoeuvre his vehicle past these Serbian Soldiers; and
- f. at approximately one vehicle length past the Serbian Soldiers, they, (Serbian Soldiers), began to shoot at them from behind his vehicle.

Due to Pte BADANAI's physical condition, a more detailed interview was not conducted and no written statement was obtained. Also, Pte TESCIONE was not spoken to due to his aggravated condition.

4. At about 0927 hrs, 1 Jan 95, accompanied by Sgt LALONDE, we proceeded to the Military Police Section, CANBAT 1, where I met with MCpl TESHIER. At this time, I was briefed on the extent of his, (TESHIERS), investigation. In addition, he provided me with written statements which were obtained, commencing at 16 hrs, 31 Dec 94, of MCpl DOUPE, MCpl TIBBITTS, Cpl FOWLER and AB THIBOUTOT. A review of all four,

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(4), statements was conducted and the following pertinent points were gleaned:

- a. at about 1813 hrs, 31 Dec 94, MCpl's DOUPE, TIBBITTS, Cpl FOWLER and AB THIBOUTOT, were all on duty at the UMS;
- b. during this time, MCpl DOUPE observed a UN Iltis moving quickly towards the Main Entrance of the UMS;
- c. MCpl DOUPE proceeded outside and discovered that both the driver and passenger of the Iltis had been injured; and
- d. assisted by MCpl TIBBITTS, Cpl FOWLER and AB THIBOUTOT, MCpl DOUPE began to move the injured persons into the treatment room for examination and while doing so, he immediately summoned the duty Medical Officer to the UMS.

All four, (4), statements corroborate each other and copies of these documents are attached to this report as Annex A, B, C and D, respectively.

5. At about 0016 hrs, 1 Jan 95, Capt TIEN was questioned by MCpl TESHIER, in regards to this incident and as a result he provided the following salient points:

- a. at about 1815 hrs, 31 Dec 94, Capt KONWAY approached and advised him (TIEN), that the UMS had received casualties and his immediate assistance was required;
- b. accompanied by Capt KONWAY, they proceeded directly to the UMS, where upon their arrival, they were apprised of both casualties. At that time, he indicated that Capt KONWAY attended to Pte TESCIONE and he, (TIEN), attended to Pte BADANAI;
- c. upon completing his examination of Pte BADANAI, he noted that he, (BADANAI), was conscious and alert but appeared to have suffered what he, (TIEN), believed to be a gun shot wound to the Mid-Line Lower Back. He also noted that there was no exit point to this gun shot wound; and
- d. Pte BADANAI's lower back was X-rayed, the results of which revealed, a metal object, with characteristics to that of a bullet fragmentation, found lodged in his Sacrum, (Tail Bone).

After completing his initial examination, Pte BADANAI was transferred to LCdr TAYLOR's care. A written statement was obtained from Capt TIEN, a copy of which is attached to this report as Annex E.

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6. At about 1009 hrs, 1 Jan 95, MCpl TESHIER conducted an interview with Capt KONWAY. He provided a written statement which is attached to this report as Annex F. The following are the salient points of this statement:

- a. at 1815 hrs, 31 Dec 94, he was contacted from the UMS by phone, of a possible gunshot victim;
- b. at 1818 hrs, 31 Dec 94, accompanied by Capt TIEN and LCdr TAYLOR, he arrived at the UMS. After being apprised of the situation, he attended to Pte TESCIONE; and
- c. upon completing his examination of Pte TESCIONE, he noted the following:
 1. Pte TESCIONE was conscious, alert and able to answer all questions;
 2. a gun shot entry and exit wound was found on his left Trapezius, (upper left shoulder muscle);
 3. a gun shot entry and exit wound was found on his left Occiput (back of the head);
 4. a gun shot entry wound was found behind his left ear and a foreign object believed to be a bullet, was found lodged above his left Zygoma (cheekbone);
 5. a large gash was found on his right side Deltoid muscle; and
 6. a laceration on the left index and middle finger.

During this examination, Pte TESCIONE made spontaneous utterances to the effect that, "they had shot at us as we were driving by". After stabilizing Pte TESCIONE, he was X-rayed and transferred to LCdr TAYLOR, care.

7. At about 1100 hrs, 1 Jan 95, I met LCdr TAYLOR. He verbally stated that he was the attending Surgeon that treated Pte's BADANAI and TESCIONE. He further related that he performed a surgical procedure on Pte BADANAI's lower back and as a result, he, (TAYLOR), had extracted a fragmented metal object from his Sacrum, (Tail Bone). This metal fragmented object, had characteristics to that of a bullet. After his brief examination of the bullet, it was sealed in a clear plastic cylindrical medical container, then turned over to Military Police as evidence. In Pte TESCIONE's case, LCdr TAYLOR conducted a surgical procedure, removing a metal object from his Zygoma, (Cheek Bone), that had all the characteristics of a bullet. This item was then secured in a small clear plastic cylindrical medical container and later

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turned over to Military Police as evidence. In conclusion, he indicated that both were in stable condition and could be transported to more suitable medical facilities at any given time.

8. At approximately 1135 hrs, 1 Jan 95, I met Cpl CRISPIN. He verbally stated the following;

- a. at about 1810 hrs, 31 Dec 94, he was informed by Pte BACON, that two serviceman had been the victims of a shooting and that both were presently being treated at the UMS;
- b. he proceeded to the UMS and secured the Iltis (UNPF #16505), that had been involved in the incident. While doing so, Sgt CROWE, conducted an initial cursory evidentiary inspection of numerous bullet holes and damage caused to the vehicle;
- c. at 1906 hrs, 31 Dec 94, he was given custody of two, (2), Canadian Forces Canadienne, C-7, 5.56 m, rifles, serial #'s 85AA09835 and 86AA09812, by Sgt BUCCI. Upon receipt of these weapons, he observed that both rifles flash suppressors were covered by a, (Manufacturer Dust Cover), constructed of black flexible plastic, identified as a "CAPLUGS, RCL-10";
- d. included with these weapons were a total of nine (9), C7, metal magazines, which had a confirmed count of 30, 5.56 mm rounds in each magazine;
- e. both rifles, ammunition and magazines are being retained and are kept in the Military Police evidence room, CANBAT 1, Camp Rastevic, RSK; and
- f. at 1936 hrs, 31 Dec 94, he retrieved Pte's BADANAI and TESCIONE's personal belongings, which consisted of the following:
 1. 2 X Body Armour Fragmentation Protective Vest, NATO Stock # 8470-21-899-2329;
 2. 2 X combat shirts, pants and boots;
 3. 2 X UNICOR Kevlar Helmets, NATO Stock # 8470-01-092-7526;
 4. ID disc, CAFIB 20, UN ID Card and Wallet in favor of Pte TESCIONE; and
 5. ID disc, CAFIB 20 and UN ID Card in favor of Pte BADANAI.

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9. At approximately 0940 hrs, 2 Jan 95, MCpl TESHIER re-interviewed Pte BADANAI at the UMS, CANBAT 1, in reference to this incident. He provided a written statement which iterated his initial verbal statement, however, added the following important facts:

- a. upon observing the Serbian Soldiers, they, (Serbs), made hand motions directing them to stop;
- b. having been instructed in the past not to stop, he accelerated. As he was driving by he heard the soldiers cocking their weapons;
- c. the soldiers opened fire and he felt him-self being hit;
- d. he attempted to radio for assistance but was unable to do so as the radio was not functioning; and
- e. he did not, nor did Pte TESCIONE fired their weapons.

A copy of this statement is attached to this report as Annex G. Also, upon completion of his written statement, Pte BADANAI verbally indicated that he had in no way, provoked the group of Soldiers prior to the incident.

10. At about 1820 hrs, 2 Jan 95, Sgt BUCCI was interviewed at the Military Police Section, CANBAT 1, by Cpl CRISPIN, in regards to this incident. As a result, he, (BUCCI), provided the following salient points:

- a. at about 1900 hrs, 31 Dec 94, he removed two, (2), C-7, rifles from the weapons rack, located in the UMS. He then proceeded outside in order to clear the weapons, (Safety Precaution), at the weapons clearing point;
- b. he noticed that both rifles flash surpressors were covered by a Manufacturer Dust Cover;
- c. he removed the magazines and handed them to MCpl BUTLER;
- d. in the presence of MCpl BUTLER, he then cleared both weapons, noticing that there were no rounds in the chambers, or any rounds being ejected from the weapons when clearing them; and
- e. he handed over both weapons to Cpl CRISPIN at approximately 1909 hrs, 31 Dec 94.

A written statement was obtained from Sgt BUCCI, a copy of which is attached to this report as Annex H.

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11. This investigation is being actively pursued and a further report will be submitted at a later date. This report is considered Pending.

Pending

Attachments:

- Annex A - statement of MCpl DOUPE
- Appendix 1 - typed statement of MCpl DOUPE
- Annex B - statement of MCpl TIBBITTS
- Appendix 1 - typed statement of MCpl TIBBITTS
- Annex C - statement of Cpl FOWLER
- Appendix 1 - typed statement of Cpl FOWLER
- Annex D - statement of AB THIBOUTOT
- Appendix 1 - typed statement of AB THIBOUTOT
- Annex E - statement of Capt TIEN
- Appendix 1 - typed statement of Capt TIEN
- Annex F - statement of Capt KONWAY
- Appendix 1 - typed statement of Capt KONWAY
- Annex G - statement of Pte BADANAI
- Appendix 1 - typed statement of Pte BADANAI
- Annex H - statement of Sgt BUCCI
- Appendix 1 - typed statement of Sgt BUCCI

MP Investigator:

Signature: _____

Name: BLACKBURN Rank: MCpl

MP Platoon Commander:

Signature: 

Name: L.T. SMITH Rank: CAPTAIN

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ANNEX "A" TO
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MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: <u>Doupe</u>	FIRST NAME: <u>WILLIAM FRANCIES</u>
RANK/TITLE: <u>MajL</u>	ID NO: <u>AD23701</u> DATE OF BIRTH: _____
UNIT ADDRESS: <u>UNIT MEDICAL STATION, Camp KASTERIC, COMBAT I</u>	
NATIONALITY: <u>CANADIAN</u>	DATE OF ROTATION: <u>2 OCT 94</u>

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: <u>TESHICK RONALD James</u>	RANK: <u>MajL</u>
ID NO: _____	UNIT: <u>Military Police, Camp KASTERIC, COMBAT I</u>
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) <u>[Signature]</u>	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): <u>2046 HRS, 31 Dec 94</u>	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): <u>2140 HRS, 31 Dec 94</u>	
PLACE RECORDED: <u>UNIT MEDICAL STATION, Camp KASTERIC, COMBAT I</u>	

STATEMENT BEGINS: AT APPROX 1800 HRS 31 Dec 94 I WAS SITTING AT THE DESK IN THE FRONT OFFICE OF THE UMS. DOING PAPER WORK / EATING SUPPER. I HEARD AN UNUSUAL NOISE FROM OUTSIDE, I LOOKED OUTSIDE BUT SAW NOTHING, WHEN I LOOKED THE SECOND TIME I SAW AN ILTIS MAKING THE NOISE AND MOVING QUICKLY TOWARDS THE UMS. IT WAS TILTED TO THE RIGHT SIDE. I PROCEEDED TO GO OUTSIDE TO INVESTIGATE CALLING TO MY ASSOCIATES TO ASSIST ME. ONCE OUTSIDE I SAW A SOLDIER TRYING TO GET OUT OF THE VEHICLE

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE [Signature] REVIEWED BOI

SIGNED: [Signature] 002005

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STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: Doupe William Francis	ED NO: [REDACTED]
RANK/TITLE: M/Plt	

STATEMENT CONTINUES: HE APPEARED TO BE INJURED, AS HE WAS COVERED WITH BLOOD. I ASSISTED HIM OUT OF THE ILTIS AND INTO THE UMS. ON THE WAY TO THE TREATMENT I DIRECTED ONE OF MY ASSOCIATES TO CALL THE M.O. AND FOR SOME EXTRA HANDS. WE THEN WORKED ON THE CASUALTY (MYSELF AND PTE THIBOUTOT) DR KONWAY THEN ARRIVED TO ASSIST US. THE CASUALTY WAS CONSCIOUS. HIS WOUNDS INCLUDED POSSIBLE GUN SHOT WOUND X 2 TO HIS HEAD, POSSIBLE GUN SHOT WOUND X 1 TO HIS LEFT CLAVICLE REGION AND A POSSIBLE GUN SHOT WOUND TO HIS RIGHT UPPER ARM. HE WAS TAKEN TO X-RAY THEN TO THE OPERATING ROOM. IN REF TO THE PARAGRAPH IN WHICH I WAS ASSISTING THE CASUALTY FROM THE

BY WITNESS SIGNATURE:

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SIGNED [Signature] PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT

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MILITARY POLICE
STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DEP CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: Doupe William Francis	ID NO: [REDACTED]
RANK/TITLE: M/SGT	

STATEMENT CONTINUES: I WAS PTE BADANI ASSISTED ^{WFO} ME. WHEN WE WERE MOVING TOWARDS THE UMS PTE BADANI STATED THAT HE HAD ALSO BEEN SHOT. HE WAS ASSISTED BY CPL FOWLER AND MCP TIBBITT'S. ^{WFO}

[Large diagonal line across the page]

^{WFO}

^{WFO}

IF WITNESS SIGNATURE:

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SIGNED: *[Signature]*
PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT 002007

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MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SOUTH 586-16-94

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: DOUPE FIRST NAME: WILLIAM FRANCIES
RANK/TITLE: MCPL ID NO: [REDACTED] DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
UNIT: UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1
NATIONALITY: CANADIAN DATE OF ROTATION: 2 OCT 94

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: TESHIER RONALD JAMES RANK: MCPL
ID NO: [REDACTED] UNIT: MILITARY POLICE, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT
OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IN DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN
DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.
SIGNED (MP) _____
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 2046 HRS, 31 DEC 94
ENDED (DATE/TIME): 2140 HRS, 31 DEC 94
PLACE RECORDED: UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1

STATEMENT BEGINS: AT APPROX 1800 HRS, 31 DEC 94 I WAS SITTING
AT THE DESK IN THE FRONT OFFICE OF THE UMS-DOING PAPERWORK/EAT-
ING SUPPER. I HEARD AN UNUSUAL NOISE FROM OUTSIDE, I LOOKED
OUTSIDE BUT SAW NOTHING, WHEN I LOOKED THE SECOND TIME I SAW AN
ILTIS MAKING THE NOISE AND MOVING QUICKLY TOWARDS THE UMS. IT
WAS TILTED TO THE RIGHT SIDE. I PROCEEDED TO GO OUTSIDE TO IN-
VESTIGATE CALLING TO MY ASSOCIATES TO ASSIST ME. ONCE OUTSIDE
I SAW A SOLDIER TRYING TO GET OUT OF THE VEHICLE. HE APPEARED
TO BE INJURED, AS HE WAS COVERED WITH BLOOD. I ASSISTED HIM
OUT OF THE ILTIS AND INTO THE UMS. ON THE WAY TO THE TREATMENT
I DIRECTED ONE OF MY ASSOCIATES TO CALL THE M.O. AND FOR SOME
EXTRA HANDS. WE THEN WORKED ON THE CASUALTY (MYSELF AND PTE

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

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PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: <u>TIBBITTS Raymond Lawrence</u>	ID NO: <u>[REDACTED]</u>
RANK/TITLE: <u>MCPL</u>	

STATEMENT CONTINUES: I went to assist Cpl Fowler on ~~PT~~ the condition of Pte Badarai. Dr Conway arrived ~~PT~~ and informed his that the worse casualty was ~~PT~~ Pte Tesconi. Pte Badarai was lying ~~PT~~ prone position I observed what appeared to be ~~PT~~ two bullet wounds, one to lower back & one to ~~PT~~ upper back. ~~PT~~ During this procedure Pte ~~PT~~ Banarai was fully alert & aware of his surroundings. Dr Tim had arrive I passed on my observations to him. He ~~PT~~ ordered me to start an IV. ~~PT~~ My first attempt failed due to poor veins to his ~~PT~~ left hand. My second attempt was @ Brachial ~~PT~~ artery. Pte Banarai tolerated this procedure well. ~~PT~~ All during his treatment he remained fully ~~PT~~ conscious & aware of his surroundings. ~~PT~~

IF WITNESS SIGNATURE:

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SIGNED

[Handwritten Signature]

PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT

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SEC/DET CASE REF: SOUTH 586-16-94

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: TIBBITTS	FIRST NAME: RAYMOND LAWRENCE
RANK/TITLE: MCPL ID NO: [REDACTED]	DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
UNIT: UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1	
NATIONALITY: CANADIAN	DATE OF ROTATION: 10 OCT 94

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: TESHIER RONALD JAMES	RANK: MCPL
ID NO: [REDACTED]	UNIT: MILITARY POLICE, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IN DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) _____	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 1110 HRS, 31 DEC 94.	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): 1146 HRS, 31 DEC 94.	
PLACE RECORDED: UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1	

STATEMENT BEGINS: I WAS SITTING IN THE PATIENT LOUNGE WHEN I HEARD SOMEONE CALL FOR MEDIC. MCPL DOUPE AND PTE THIBOULT RESPONDED. IT WAS SHORTLY FOLLOWED BY A CALL FOR HELP. CPL FOWLER AND I RESPONDED. MCPL DOUPE AND PTE THIBOULT WHERE BRING IN THE FIRST CASUALTY. I IMMEDIATELY PHONE FOR THE MEDICAL OFFICER DR. KONWAY. I REPORTED INTO THE TREATMENT ROOM. I QUICKLY ACCESSED PTE TESCONI PLACED A DRY DRESSING OVER HIS RIGHT UPPER ARM AND ORDERED TO HAVE AN IV STARTED AND OBTAIN VITAL SIGNS. WELL THIS WAS BEING DONE. I WENT TO ASSIST CPL FOWLER ON THE CONDITION OF PTE BADANIC. DR KONWAY ARRIVED AND INFORMED HIM THAT THE WORSE CASUALTY WAS PTE TESCONI. PTE BADANAC

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 PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: FOWLER PAAD JOSEPH	ED NO: [REDACTED]
RANK/TITLE: CPL	

STATEMENT CONTINUES: ON HIS CBT PANTS BELOW THE BOTTOM OF HIS FLAK VEST. I GUIDED HIM TO THE TREATMENT ROOM INTO THE STALL NEXT TO PTE TESCOMI. I ASKED HIM TO REMOVE HIS VEST & CLOTHING. I ~~REPAI~~ LOOKED AT THE BACK OF HIS VEST BUT ~~REPAI~~ DID NOT NOTICE ANYTHING. HE WAS ~~REPAI~~ UN DRESSING WITH HIS BACK TO ME AND ~~REPAI~~ HE STOPPED AT HIS T-SHIRT. I NOTICED ~~REPAI~~ A DISTINCT HOLE ABOUT 2/3'S DOWN HIS BACK (FROM THE TOP) AND SLIGHTLY RIGHT ~~REPAI~~ OF MID-LINE. I ASKED HIM TO TAKE OFF HIS T-SHIRT AND SAW A PENETRATING ~~REPAI~~ WOUND ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF CENTER ABOUT 2/3'S DOWN HIS BACK. (THERE WAS NO ~~REPAI~~ BLOOD AROUND THE HOLE OF THE T-SHIRT.) I ASKED HIM TO ~~REPAI~~ ^(10/8/2) LIE DOWN AND REMOVE HIS

BY WITNESS SIGNATURE:

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SIGNED: P. J. John
PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT

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SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: FOWLER BRAD FOWLER	ID NO: [REDACTED]
RANK/TITLE: CPL	

STATEMENT CONTINUES: PANTS. UNDER-NEATH THE ~~FRAG~~
 BLOOD SOAKED PANTS WAS A 4-5mm ROUND
 PENETRATING WOUND WITH A PEICE OF FABRIC
 STICKING OUT FROM IT. I WAS STILL ~~FRAG~~
 ATTEMPTING TO UNDRESS THE CASUALTY
 WHEN THE M.O. CAME IN AND WANTED
 AN I.V. STARTED. (I TOOK AN INITIAL PULSE
 ON THE CASUALTY PRIOR TO THE SECONDARY ~~FRAG~~
 EXAM.) M.C.P. TIBBIT ~~(S)~~ & THE NURSE LOOKED ~~FRAG~~
 FOR I.V. SITES AS I PREPARED THE SOLUTION &
 TUBING, WE ALSO NOTICED THE CASUALTY HAD ~~FRAG~~
 A LACERATION TO THE RIGHT SIDE OF HIS HEAD
 ABOUT 1 cm LONG & 5mm WIDE AS WELL AS ~~FRAG~~
 FRAG ~~(??)~~ TO HIS RIGHT UPPER ARM. ~~FRAG~~

~~FRAG~~

~~FRAG~~

IF WITNESS SIGNATURE:

SIGNED:
PERSON MAKING
THE STATEMENT

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX "C"
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VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

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SEC/DET CASE REF: SOUTH 586-16-94

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: FOWLER	FIRST NAME: BRAD JOSEPH
RANK/TITLE: CPL	ID NO: [REDACTED] DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
UNIT: UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1	
NATIONALITY: CANADIAN	DATE OF ROTATION: 13 OCT 94

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: TESHIER RONALD JAMES	RANK: MCPL
ID NO: [REDACTED]	UNIT: MILITARY POLICE, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IN DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) _____	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 2155 HRS, 31 DEC 94.	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): 2309 HRS, 31 DEC 94.	
PLACE RECORDED: UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1	

STATEMENT BEGINS: I WAS WATCHING A MOVIE WITH MCPL TIBBITTS
IN THE PT. LOUNGE WHEN WE SOMEONE CALL "HEY GUYS!" (PROBABLY
MCPL DOUPE). WE MOVED INTO THE HALL TO SEE MCPL DOUPE ESCORT-
ING A BLOOD DRENCHED SOLDIER INTO THE BUILDING. HE SAID "CALL
THE DOCTOR!" MCPL TIBBITTS WENT INTO THE OFFICE TO CALL THE M.
O. PTE BADANAI WAS WALKING IN THROUGH THE DOOR AS I APPROACHED
HE SAID "I THINK I'M SHOT?" I GUESS I GOT BEHIND HIM AND SAW
BLOOD ON HIS CBT PANTS BELOW THE BOTTOM OF HIS FLAK VEST. I
GUIDED HIM TO THE TREATMENT ROOM INTO THE STALL NEXT TO PTE
TESCONI. I ASKED HIM TO REMOVE HIS VEST AND CLOTHING. I LOOK-
ED AT THE BACK OF HIS VEST BUT DID NOT NOTICE ANYTHING. HE WAS
UNDRESSING WITH HIS BACK TO ME AND HE STOPPED AT HIS T-SHIRT.

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

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SIGNATURE:

PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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MILITARY POLICE
STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SOUTH 586-16-94

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: FOWLER BRAD JOSEPH	UNID# [REDACTED]
RANK/TITLE: CPL	

STATEMENT CONTINUES: I NOTICED A DISTINCT HOLE ABOUT 2/3'S
DOWN HIS BACK (FROM THE TOP) AND SLIGHTLY RIGHT OF MID-LINE. I
ASKED HIM TO TAKE OFF HIS T-SHIRT AND SAW A PENETRATING WOUND
ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF CENTER ABOUT 2/3'S DOWN HIS BACK. (THERE
WAS NO BLOOD AROUND THE HOLE OF THE T-SHIRT.) I ASKED HIM TO
LIE DOWN AND REMOVE HIS PANTS. UNDER-NEATH THE BLOOD SOAKED
PANTS WAS A 4-5MM ROUND PENETRATING WOUND WITH A PIECE OF
FABRIC STICKING OUT FROM IT. I WAS STILL ATTEMPTING TO UNDRRESS
THE CASUALTY WHEN THE M.O. CAME IN AND WANTED AN I.V. STARTED.
(I TOOK AN INITIAL PULSE ON THE CASUALTY PRIOR TO THE SECONDARY
EXAM.) MCPL TIBBIT AND THE NURSE LOOKED FOR I.V. SITES AS I
PREPARED THE SOLUTION AND TUBING. WE ALSO NOTICED THE CASUALTY
HAD A LACERATION TO THE RIGHT SIDE OF HIS HEAD ABOUT 1CM LONG
AND 5MM WIDE AS WELL AS FRAGMENTS(??) TO HIS RIGHT UPPER ARM.

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

SIGNED:
PERSON MAKING
THE STATEMENT

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VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: <u>THIBOUTOT</u>	FIRST NAME: <u>ERIC MARK Joseph</u>
RANK/TITLE: <u>AB</u>	ID NO: <u>AD23626</u> DATE OF BIRTH: <u>[REDACTED]</u>
UNIT ADDRESS: <u>UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTVIC, COMBAT 1</u>	
NATIONALITY: <u>Canadian</u>	DATE OF ROTATION: <u>12 Oct 94 / 2 Nov 94</u>

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: <u>TESITON RONALD James</u>	RANK: <u>MP/PL</u>
ID NO: <u>[REDACTED]</u>	UNIT: <u>Military Police, Camp RASTVIC, COMBAT 1</u>
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) <u>[Signature]</u>	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): <u>1946 HRS, 31 Dec 94</u>	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): <u>2014 HRS, 31 Dec 94</u>	
PLACE RECORDED: <u>UNIT MEDICAL STATION, Camp RASTVIC, COMBAT 1</u>	

STATEMENT BEGINS: Dec 31 94 During the duty Med A for the Ward at the hospital around 1915 approx. quietly sitting in the coffee room heard someone yell "MED A" rushed outside to see the matter, saw someone standing by an IHS with blood on his flux jacket, someone said that there was a choking incident, immediately brought the man standing closest to be inside for medical ~~at~~ his attention he ^{up to 3ms} ~~checked~~ ^{striped} of his clothing to investigate all of his injuries upon ~~an~~ ^{all} ~~the~~ ^{shoulder} injuries was ~~discovered~~ ^{discovered} with ~~what~~ ^{what} looks like a ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~out~~ ^{out} lacerations around the (B) ear, a laceration between his index and thumb to the (D) hand, a laceration on his (D) hand to the index finger, ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~injury~~ ^{injury} to the (B) ~~area~~ ^{area} upon

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: [Signature]

SIGNED: Ab Thiboutot

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX "D"
SOUTH 586-16-94
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MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SOUTH 586-16-94

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: THIBOUTOT	FIRST NAME: ERIC MARK JOSEPH
RANK/TITLE: AB/MED A ID NO: [REDACTED]	DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
UNIT: UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1	
NATIONALITY: CANADIAN	DATE OF ROTATION: 12 NOV 94

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: TESHIER RONALD JAMES	RANK: MCPL
ID NO: [REDACTED]	UNIT: MILITARY POLICE, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IN DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) _____	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 1946 HRS, 31 DEC 94	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): 2014 HRS, 31 DEC 94	
PLACE RECORDED: UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1	

STATEMENT BEGINS: DEC 31 94 BEING THE DUTY MED A FOR THE WARD
AT THE HOSPITAL AROUND 1815 APPROX. QUIETLY SITING IN THE COF-
FEE ROOM HEARD SOMEONE YELL "MED A" RUSHED OUTSIDE TO SEE THE
MATTER, SAW SOMEONE STANDING BY AN ILTIS WITH BLOOD ON HIS FLAX
JACKET, SOMEONE SAID THAT THERE WAS A SHOOTING INCIDENT, IMMED-
IATELY BROUGHT THE MAN STANDING CLOSEST TO BE INSIDE FOR MEDIC-
AL ATTENTION, HE WAS STRPED OF HIS CLOTHING TO INVESTIGATE ALL
OF HIS INJURIES UPON SO A SHOULDER INJURIES WAS DISCOVERED WITH
WHAT LOOKED LIKE A IN AND OUT. LACERATIONS AROUND THE LEFT
EAR, A LACERATION BETWEEN HIS INDEX AND THUMB TO THE LEFT HAND,
A LACERATION ON HIS LEFT HAND TO THE INDEX FINGER, AND ALSO AN
INJURY TO THE RIGHT UPPER ARM. HE WAS TREATED FOR ALL INJURIES

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

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SIGNATURE:

PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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ANNEX "E" TO
SOUTH 586-16-94
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MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: <u>Tied</u>	FIRST NAME: <u>HoMER CHIN-NAN</u>
RANK/TITLE: <u>CAPT</u>	ID NO: _____ DATE OF BIRTH: _____
UNIT ADDRESS: <u>UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP KOSTEVIC, CANCAT 1</u>	
NATIONALITY: <u>CANADIAN</u>	DATE OF ROTATION: <u>2 OCT 94</u>

RECORDED WITNESSED BY:

NAME: <u>TESTER RONALD JAMES</u>	RANK: <u>MAJ CPL</u>
ID NO: _____	UNIT: <u>MILITARY POLICE, CAMP KOSTEVIC, CANCAT 1</u>
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP): <u>[Signature]</u>	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): <u>0016 HRS, 15 JAN 95</u>	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): <u>0109 HRS, 15 JAN 95</u>	
PLACE RECORDED: <u>UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP KOSTEVIC, CANCAT 1</u>	

STATEMENT BEGINS: I was eating supper in the officer's mess ~~at~~ at
when Capt Conway told me that there were casualties in ~~the~~ the
the mess. I am unsure at what time this happened. ~~at~~ at
Capt Conway & I both went back to the mess. Both ~~at~~ at
casualties were already in the treatment room. Capt ~~at~~ at
Conway started working on Tesconi, & I started working
on Pte Badanai. Pte Badanai was lying on his stomach,
skipped from the waist up. His pants were still on ~~(the)~~ (the)
but his left boot was off. He ~~(hand)~~ (hand) was alert & ~~at~~ at
conscious, & was able to respond appropriately to all ~~at~~ at
my questions. Pte Badanai had an entrance wound in

WITNESS SIGNATURE:

[Signature]

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SIGNED: [Signature]
PERSON MAKING

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MILITARY POLICE
STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: TIEN HOMICK CHIN-NAN	ID NO: [REDACTED]
RANK/TITLE: Capt	

STATEMENT CONTINUES: his Rt upper arm. He also had
 an entrance wound in the midline, upper back &
 midline, lower back. He had no obvious exit wounds.
 I began working on his emergency stabilization. After
 the patient was stabilized, we began working the patient.
 There was no bullet in his Rt upper arm. There
 was no bullet in his chest, & his lungs were well
 inflated. X-ray did reveal one bullet that was
 lodged in his sacrum. The patient was otherwise
 stable, & was cleaned up. At the time of writing
 this statement, he is lying in ICU, awaiting
 surgery to remove the bullet.

~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

WITNESS SIGNATURE:

SIGNED:
 PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT

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MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SOUTH 586-16-94

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: TIEN	FIRST NAME: HOMER
RANK/TITLE: CAPT/MO ID NO: [REDACTED]	DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
UNIT: UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1.	
NATIONALITY: CANADIAN	DATE OF ROTATION: 2 OCT 94

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: TESHIER RONALD JAMES	RANK: MCPL
ID NO: [REDACTED]	UNIT: MILITARY POLICE, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IN DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) _____	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 0016 HRS, 1 JAN 95.	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): 0109 HRS, 1 JAN 95.	
PLACE RECORDED: UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1	

STATEMENT BEGINS: I WAS EATING SUPPER IN THE OFFICER'S MESS
WHEN CAPT KONWAY TOLD ME THAT THERE WERE CASUALTIES IN THE UMS.
I AM UNSURE AT WHAT TIME THIS HAPPENED. CAPT KONWAY & I BOTH
RAN BACK TO THE UMS. BOTH CASUALTIES WERE ALREADY IN THE
TREATMENT ROOM. CAPT KONWAY STARTED WORKING ON TESCONI, & I
STARTED WORKING ON PTE BADANAI. PTE BADANAI WAS LYING ON HIS
STOMACH, STRIPPED FROM THE WAIST UP. HIS PANTS WERE STILL ON
BUT HIS LEFT BOOT WAS OFF. HE WAS ALERT AND CONSCIOUS, & WAS
ABLE TO RESPOND APPROPRIATELY TO ALL MY QUESTIONS. PTE BADANAI
HAD AN ENTRANCE WOUND IN HIS RT UPPER ARM. HE ALSO HAD AN
ENTRANCE WOUND IN THE MIDLINE, UPPER BACK, AND MIDLINE, LOWER
BACK. HE HAD NO OBVIOUS EXIT WOUNDS. I BEGAN ORGANIZING HIS
EMERGENCY STABILIZATION. AFTER THE PATIENT WAS STABILIZED, WE

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

SIGNATURE:
PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SOUTH 586-16-94

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: TIEN HOMER CHIN-NAN	UNID#
RANK/TITLE: CAPT/MO	[REDACTED]

STATEMENT CONTINUES: BEGAN X-RAYING THE PATIENT. THERE WAS NO
BULLET IN HIS RT UPPER ARM. THERE WAS NO BULLET IN HIS CHEST,
& HIS LUNGS WERE WELL INFLATED. X-RAY DID REVEAL ONE BULLET
THAT WAS LODGED IN HIS SACRUM. THE PATIENT WAS OTHERWISE
STABLE, & WAS CLEANED UP. AT THE TIME OF WRITING THIS
STATEMENT, HE IS LYING IN ICU, AWAITING SURGERY TO REMOVE THE
BULLET.

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MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: _____

SIGNED:

PERSON MAKING
THE STATEMENT

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ANNEX "F" TO
SOUTH 586-16-94
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MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: <u>Kenway</u>	FIRST NAME: <u>Desmond Christoph</u>
RANK/TITLE: <u>CAPT</u>	ID NO: _____ DATE OF BIRTH: _____
UNIT ADDRESS: <u>UNIT MEDICAL STATION, Camp Rastovic, CANBAT 1</u>	
NATIONALITY: <u>CANADIAN</u>	DATE OF ROTATION: <u>9 OCT 94</u>

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: <u>Tescione Ronald James</u>	RANK: <u>MP CPL</u>
ID NO: _____	UNIT: <u>MILITARY POLICE, Camp Rastovic, CANBAT 1</u>
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) <u>[Signature]</u>	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): <u>1630 HRS, 15 JAN 95</u>	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): <u>1656 HRS, 15 JAN 95</u>	
PLACE RECORDED: <u>UNIT MEDICAL STATION, Camp Rastovic, CANBAT 1</u>	

STATEMENT BEGINS: I received the phone call at the officers mess at 18:15. I informed Dr. Taylor that there was a possible gunshot wound victim, & also told Dr. Tien to come along. The call was from MCpl Tibbitts. I arrived at the UMS at about 18:18, by which time both patients were in the treatment room. Treatment had already been started by the UMS Med As. I went to the patient (Tescione) who I was told was more seriously injured. Tescione was conscious, alert, able to answer any questions, moving all limbs & head.

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: [Signature] SIGNED: [Signature]

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STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DEP CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: KONWAY DESMOND CHRISTOPH
RANK/TITLE: CAPT/MO
ID NO: [REDACTED]

STATEMENT CONTINUES: The patient was frequently complaining of pain to the left side of the head, & difficulty hearing on the left side. MCpl Kaye started an IV in each arm. Cpl Mignault assisted with the IV & B.P. AB Thiboutot assisted with the B.P. removing clothing & dressings for the wounds. I assessed the patient. There was no lung, heart, abdomen injury. He had slight nerve injury left arm which is likely due to shock damage from a bullet.

These were 3 or 4 bullet wounds. There was an entry & exit wound left trapezius. This bullet could have caused another entry & exit wound left occiput (back of head). There was an entry wound behind the left ear & this bullet lodged above the left zygoma (or

WITNESS SIGNATURE: [Signature]

SIGNED: [Signature]
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM THE PERSON MAKING THIS STATEMENT

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STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: KONWAY, DESMOND CHRISTOPH
RANK/TITLE: CAPT /M.O. ID NO: AD 23631

STATEMENT CONTINUES: (cheekbone) This bullet may have damaged the left ear. The final bullet was through the deltoid muscle on the right side. He also had lacerations on the left index + middle fingers. At surgery he had a metal fragment in the right middle finger probably from the I.L.H. After stabilization with IV fluids + wound dressings, X-rays were done of each injured area. Care was then transferred to Dr. Taylor. During his assessment, the patient said "They had shot at us as we were driving by" but this statement is not verbatim.

WITNESS SIGNATURE: _____

[Handwritten signature]

SIGNED: _____
PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT

[Handwritten signature]

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MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SOUTH 586-16-94

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: KONWAY	FIRST NAME: DESMOND CHRISTOPH
RANK/TITLE: CAPT/MO ID NO: [REDACTED]	DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
UNIT: UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1	
NATIONALITY: CANADIAN	DATE OF ROTATION: 9 OCT 94

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: TESHIER RONALD JAMES	RANK: MCPL
ID NO: [REDACTED] UNIT: MILITARY POLICE, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1	
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IN DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) _____	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 1032 HRS, 1 JAN 95	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): 1056 HRS, 1 JAN 95	
PLACE RECORDED: UNIT MEDICAL STATION, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1	

STATEMENT BEGINS: I RECEIVED THE PHONE CALL AT THE OFFICER'S MESS AT 18:15. I INFORMED DR. TAYLOR THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBLE GUNSHOT WOUND VICTIM, AND ALSO TOLD DR. TIEN TO COME ALONG. THE CALL WAS FROM MCPL TIBBITTS. I ARRIVED AT THE UMS AT ABOUT 18:18, BY WHICH TIME BOTH PATIENTS WERE IN THE TREATMENT ROOM. TREATMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN STARTED BY THE UMS MED A'S. I WENT TO THE PATIENT (TESCIONE) WHO I WAS TOLD WAS MORE SERIOUSLY INJURED. TESCIONE WAS CONSCIOUS, ALERT, ABLE TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS, MOVING ALL LIMBS AND HEAD. THE PATIENT WAS FREQUENTLY COMPLAINING OF PAIN TO THE LEFT SIDE OF THE HEAD, AND DIFFICULTY HEARING ON THE LEFT SIDE. MCPL KAYE STARTED AN IV IN EACH ARM. CPL MIGNEAULT ASSISTED WITH THE IV

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

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SIGNATURE:

PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
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STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SOUTH 586-16-94

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: KONWAY DESMOND CHRISTOPH	UNID#
RANK/TITLE: CAPT/MO	

STATEMENT CONTINUES: AND B.P. AB THIBOTOUT ASSISTED WITH THE
B.P., REMOVING CLOTHING AND DRESSING FOR THE WOUNDS. I ASSESS-
ED THE PATIENT. THERE WAS NO LUNG, HEART ABDOMEN INJURY. HE
HAD SLIGHT NERVE INJURY LEFT ARM WHICH IS LIKELY DUE TO SHOCK
DAMAGE FROM A BULLET.

THERE WERE 3 OR 4 BULLET WOUNDS. THERE WAS AN ENTRY AND
EXIT WOUND LEFT TRAPEZIUS. THIS BULLET COULD HAVE CAUSED AN-
OTHER ENTRY AND EXIT WOUND LEFT OCCIPUT (BACK OF HEAD). THERE
WAS AN ENTRY WOUND BEHIND THE LEFT EAR AND THIS BULLET LODGED
ABOVE THE LEFT ZYGOMA (OR CHEEKBONE). THIS BULLET MAY HAVE
DAMAGED THE LEFT EAR. THE FINAL BULLET WAS THROUGH THE DELTOID
MUSCLE ON THE RIGHT SIDE. HE ALSO HAD LACERATIONS ON THE LEFT
INDEX AND MIDDLE FINGERS. AT SURGERY HE HAD A METAL FRAGMENT
IN THE RIGHT MIDDLE FINGERS PROBABLY FROM THE ILLTIS. AFTER
STABILIZATION WITH IV FLUIDS AND WOUND DRESSINGS, X-RAYS WERE
DONE OF EACH INJURED AREA. CASE WAS THEN TRANSFERRED TO DR.
TAYLOR. DURING THIS ASSESSMENT, THE PATIENT HAD SAID "THEY
HAD SHOT AT US AS WE WERE DRIVING BY" BUT THIS STATEMENT IS NO
VERBATUM.

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MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

SIGNED:

PERSON MAKING
THE STATEMENT

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ANNEX-G TO
SOUTH 596-16-94
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SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: <u>BADANAI</u>	FIRST NAME: <u>Phillip Matthew</u>
RANK/TITLE: <u>PTE</u>	ID NO: [REDACTED] DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
UNIT ADDRESS: <u>C Coy, Y3, CANBAT1</u>	
NATIONALITY: <u>CANADIAN</u>	DATE OF ROTATION: <u>20JUN94</u>

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: <u>TESTIER RONALD James</u>	RANK: <u>Maj CPL</u>
ID NO: [REDACTED]	UNIT: <u>MILITARY POLICE, Camp Kostevec, CANBAT1</u>
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) <u>[Signature]</u>	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): <u>0944 hrs, 2 Jan 95</u>	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): <u>1015 hrs, 2 Jan 95</u>	
PLACE RECORDED: <u>UMS Camp Kostevec, CANBAT1</u>	

STATEMENT BEGINS: I pick up holdfast call signs at The Train Station in Ban Kovac and headed SC 54 by the track route the goods by Kanbat HQ. As we turn onto the road to SC 54 noticed two Serbs fixing the land mine. When we reached SC 54 we stopped to talk with the troops before we left. On our way back on the wheeled route. After the bend in the road in Kolarina there was approx. 20 plus ARSK soldiers on the road trying to wave us down and stop us. Being told not to stop in the past. I looked for an opening as I found an opening I (PT PM) stopped on the gas when

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

SIGNED: Phil [Signature]
PERSON MAKING

[Signature]

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ANNEX C TO
SOUTH 586-16-07
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STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: <u>Baldani</u>	ID NO: _____
RANK/TITLE: <u>PTC</u>	

STATEMENT CONTINUES: I passed them I heard their weapons
 cooked. We both ducked and the next thing we know
 they opened up. I felt myself getting hit. After they
 stopped firing I called my partner's name. When
 I got no response I gave him a shake and he
 responded. I tried to use the radio but the radio
 was shot up. I told my partner the radio was
 down and I was heading straight to Retiua to
 the Base hospital. He told me to drive faster.
 I knew one of the tires was gone. The front right
 which made steering difficult. By the time we
 got passed the Serb Barracks in Benkovic the
 other tire ^(the) was flat making it so fast we
 gate opened up and we went straight to
 the hospital. Told someone ^(the) we just to get
 a medic. I stop and parked in front of the
 hospital and behind _____

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ANNEX C TO
SOUTH 586-16-94
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MILITARY POLICE
STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: <i>Badawi</i>	ED NO: _____
RANK/TITLE: <i>PTE</i>	

STATEMENT CONTINUES: *They and the medics took over
in helping us. Just to note we did not
force our weapons since ^(MPT) ~~(MPT)~~ was ^(MPT) ~~(MPT)~~ unable
to get at them and the main thing was to get
to Restoval *PT PB**

PT PB

PT PB

WITNESS SIGNATURE:

[Signature]

SIGNED: *[Signature]*

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G
SOUTH 586-16-94
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VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SOUTH 589-16-94

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: BADANAI FIRST NAME: PHILLIP MATHEW
RANK/TITLE: PTE ID NO: [REDACTED] DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
UNIT: C COY, Y3, CANBAT 1
NATIONALITY: CANADIAN DATE OF ROTATION: 2 OCT 94

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: TESHIER RONALD JAMES RANK: MCPL
ID NO: [REDACTED] UNIT: MILITARY POLICE, CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT
OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IN DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN
DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.
SIGNED (MP) _____
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 0944 HRS, 2 JAN 95.
ENDED (DATE/TIME): 1015 HRS, 2 JAN 94.
PLACE RECORDED: UMS CAMP RASTEVIC, CANBAT 1

STATEMENT BEGINS: I PICK UP HOLDFAST CALLSIGNS AT THE TRAIN
STATION IN BENKOVAC AND HEADED SC 54 BY THE TRACK ROAD THAT
GOES BY KENBAT HO. AS WE TURN ONTO THE ROAD TO SC-54 I NOTICED
TWO SERBS FIXING THE LAND LINE. WHEN WE REACHED SC54 WE STOP-
PED TO TALK WITH THE TROOPS BEFORE WE LEFT. ON OUR WAY BACK ON
THE WHEELED ROUTE. AFTER THE BEND IN THE ROAD IN KOLARINA
THERE WAS APPROX. 20 PLUS ARSK SOLDIERS ON THE ROAD TRYING TO
WAVE US DOWN AND STOP US. BEING TOLD NOT TO STOP IN THE PAST
I LOOKED FOR AN OPENING I STEPPED ON THE GAS WHEN I PASTED THEM
I HEARD THEIR WEAPONS COCKED. WE BOTH DUCKED AND THE NEXT
THING WE KNEW THEY OPENED UP. I FELT MYSELF GETTING HIT.
AFTER THEY STOPPED FIRING I CALLED MY PARTNERS NAME. WHEN I

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G
SOUTH 586-16-94
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STATEMENT CONTINUATION FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SOUTH 589-16-94

STATEMENT OF:

NAME: BADANAI	UNID#
RANK/TITLE: PTE	[REDACTED]

STATEMENT CONTINUES: GOT NO RESPONSE I GAVE HIM A SHAKE AND HE
RESPONDED. I TRYED TO USE THE RADIO BUT THE RADIO WAS SHOT UP.
I TOLD MY PARTNER THE RADIO WAS DOWN AND I WAS HEADING STRAIGHT
TO RASTIVAC TO THE BASE HOSPITAL. HE TOLD ME TO DRIVE FASTER.
I KNEW ONE OF THE TIRES WAS GONE. THE FRONT, RIGHT WHICH MADE
STEERING DIFFICULT. BY THE TIME WE GOT PASTED THE SERB BAR-
RACKS IN BENKOVAC THE OTHER TIRE WENT MAKING IT TO RASTIVAC THE
MAIN GATE OPENED UP AND WE WENT STRAIGHT TO THE HOSPITAL. TOLD
SOMEONE WE PAST TO GET A MEDIC. I STOP AND PARKED IN FRONT OF
THE HOSPITAL AND HELPED MY PARTNER OUT OF THE ILTIS AND THE
MEDICS TOOK OVER IN HELPING US. JUST TO NOTE WE DID NOT FIRE
OUR WEAPONS SINCE UNABLE TO GET AT THEM AND THE MAIN THING WAS
TO GET TO RASTIVAC.

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MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: _____

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: <i>BUCCI</i>	FIRST NAME: <i>John Gerald</i>
RANK/TITLE: <i>Sgt, WCO/UMSID NO:</i> _____	DATE OF BIRTH: _____
UNIT ADDRESS: <i>UMS, CANBAT1</i>	
NATIONALITY: <i>CANADIAN</i>	DATE OF ROTATION: <i>2 Oct 94</i>

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: <i>CRISPIN Thomas Allen</i>	RANK: <i>Cpl</i>
ID NO: _____	UNIT: <i>CANBAT1 Military Police</i>
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IF DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) _____	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): <i>1828 hrs, 2 Jan 95</i>	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): <i>1839 hrs</i>	
PLACE RECORDED: <i>Military Police Section CANBAT1</i>	

STATEMENT BEGINS: *Q4 ABOUT 1900^HZ NOTICE 2 WEAPONS*

(C7.) IN THE WEAPONS RACK IN THE HALLWAY OF THE UMS. MAGS WERE ON THE WEAPONS. I TOOK THE WEAPONS OUT SIDE TO THE CLEARING BAY AND PROCEEDED TO CLEAR THE WEAPONS. I NOTICED THE PLASTIC DUST COVERS ON THE SPOUT OF THE WEAPONS THEY WERE STILL INTACT. I REMOVED THE MAGS PASSED THEM TO M/CL BUTLER AND TOLD HIM TO COUNT THE ROUNDS IN THE MAGS. I CLEARED BOTH WEAPONS, THERE WERE NO

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE: _____

SIGNED: *J. Abu*
PERSON MAKING

1/2

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UNPROFOR

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s.19(1)

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

MILITARY POLICE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

SEC/DET CASE REF: SOUTH 586-16-94

STATEMENT OF:

SURNAME: BUCCI	FIRST NAME: JOHN GERALD
RANK/TITLE:SGT/IC UMS ID NO: AD 23644	DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
UNIT: UMS, CANBAT 1	
NATIONALITY: CANADIAN	DATE OF ROTATION: 2 OCT 94

RECORDED/WITNESSED BY:

NAME: CRISPIN THOMAS ALLEN	RANK: CPL
ID NO: [REDACTED]	UNIT: CANBAT 1, MILITARY POLICE
WHO CERTIFIES: THE QUESTIONED HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT HE IS NOT OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, BUT IN DOING SO, IT WILL BE TAKEN DOWN IN WRITING AND MAY BE GIVEN IN EVIDENCE.	
SIGNED (MP) _____	
STATEMENT COMMENCED (DATE/TIME): 1828 HRS, 2 JAN 95.	
ENDED (DATE/TIME): 1839 HRS.	
PLACE RECORDED: MILITARY POLICE SECTION, CANBAT 1	

STATEMENT BEGINS: AT ABOUT 1900 HR 31 DEC 94 I NOTICE 2 WEAPONS (C7) IN THE WEAPONS RACK IN THE HALLWAY OF THE UMS. MAGS WERE ON THE WEAPONS. I TOOK THE WEAPONS OUTSIDE TO THE CLEARING BAY AND PROCEEDED TO CLEAR THE WEAPONS. I NOTICED THE PLASTIC DUST COVERS ON THE SPOUT OF THE WEAPONS THEY WERE STILL INTACT. I REMOVED THE MAGS PASSED THEM TO M/CPL BUTLER AND TOLD HIM TO COUNT THE ROUNDS IN THE MAGS. I CLEARED BOTH WEAPONS, THERE WERE NO ROUNDS IN THE CHAMBER WHEN I INITIALLY CHECKED. AFTER CLEARING BOTH WEAPONS I PASSED THEM TO CPL CRISPIN.

MP WITNESS SIGNATURE:

SIGNATURE:
PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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PA 1080-1/3127-09/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

10 February 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
LOSS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
DUE TO FIRE ON 29 NOV 94

References: A. 1080-2-3127-09-94 (Adj) 25 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. 1080-2-3127-08-94 7 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Feb 94

1. Enclosed are the Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report, the Summary Investigation and Commanding Officer's comments regarding this incident.

2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and comments of the Commanding Officer. The Commanding Officer has taken appropriate measures to ensure that safety inspections are routinely carried out and that appropriate measures are now in place to implement them.

4. I recommend that the cost of public property amounting to Cdn \$8653.19 to be written off at public expense and I direct that the Commanding Officer submit the necessary documents to have the personnel involved re-imbursed for the cost of lost property due to the fire.

1/2

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5. Any further inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1: Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report
Enclosure 2: Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3: Summary Investigation

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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INFORMATION

CANCON Det Primosten/G5 Legal

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1080-1/3032-34/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

10 February 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE MINE STRIKE INVOLVING
CANBAT 1 PERSONNEL AND A UN VEHICLE
UNPF 18739 ON 26 DECEMBER 94

References: A. 1080-1/3032-34/94 (Engr Offr) 30 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Oct 94

1. Enclosed are the Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report, the Summary Investigation and Commanding Officer's comments regarding this incident.

2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer. The Wolf mine-protected vehicle saved the lives and prevented very serious injury to two CANBAT 1 soldiers. The vehicle's ability to sustain a direct mine blast was certainly proven in this incident. However, it must be noted that the WOLF vehicle is designed for reconnaissance and is too lightly armoured for route proving. Preferable for this type of operation would be a specific mission-oriented Engineer vehicle. Not only would the operation be carried out as intended but the safety of our personnel would be greatly enhanced.

3. The Commanding Officer has addressed the communications concerns as well as taken appropriate measures in dealing with overall safety procedures with regards to helmet use, safety equipment and driver maintenance.

4. The Commanding Officer is to raise all pertinent documents to have the vehicle repaired at United Nations expense. Also, I direct that the Commanding Officer raise the necessary documents to have a replacement vehicle in CANBAT 1's location as soon as administratively possible.


1/2

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4. Any further inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.


N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1: Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report
Enclosure 2: Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3: Summary Investigation

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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INFORMATION

CANCON Det Primosten//G5 Legal//

2/2

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FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

National Defence Headquarters
Maj- Gen George R. Pearkes Bldg
101 Col By Drive, Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0K2



J3 OPERATIONS 3 (INTERNATIONAL) J3 Opérations 3 (Internationale) RECEIVED

February 9, 1995

①

1080-1 10 FEB 1995

To: G1
Dep't: CCUNPROFOR
Telephone - Fax: #13

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS			
G1		10 Feb	JL
PA		83	JL

From: CAPT PROVOST
Dep't: J3 Ops 3-3-2
Telephone - Fax: (613) 992-8812 Voice: 995-9829

Subject: SI - LOSS OF NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICE

Ref:

Remarks:

- PLEASE, CFM THAT COMD CCUNPROFOR HAS AUTHORIZED WRITE-OFF, PARA 4 IS NOT CLEAR. WAITING YOUR REPLY. THANK YOU.

No. of pages including cover: 2

② NTF

J3 ops notified yes he has auto write off - to do up papers to have cost recovered

JL
CAPT
G1
6507
18.2.95
ASLOP

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1080-1(DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

24 January 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
LOSS OF NIGHT OBSERVATION
DEVICE - SERIAL NUMBER 0759

References: A. 1080-1 (CO) 16 Dec 94 (enclosed)
B. 1080-1 (OIC Sup) 24 Oct 94 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed are the Summary Investigation and Commanding Officer's comments regarding the above incident.
2. I support the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer as amended by the Commanding Officer. I am convinced that he has taken appropriate measures to correct the situation and prevent re-occurrence.
4. The Commanding Officer CANLOGBAT is to submit the necessary documents so that the loss can be written off at public expense.
5. Any further inquiries into this matter, contact the G1, Canadian Contingent.




N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1 - Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry
Enclosure 2 - Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3 - Summary Investigation

Distribution List (see page 2)

1/2



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1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia


08 February 1995

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 31 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 31 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92

1. Find references enclosed. You will note that these concerns minor theft of private and public property which does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR.
2. Future inquiries into this matter, should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.


I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 2

UN RESTRICTED

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UN RESTRICTED



PA
1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia


07 February 1995

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 28 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 29 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92

1. Find reference A enclosed. You will note that this incident involves damage to private property in the village of Proboj and no claim has been received.
2. Also find reference B enclosed. You will note that this incident does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR.
3. Future inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.


I. W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 2

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PA 1080-1/3127-08/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

of February 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
INTO VEHICLE ACCIDENT
UNPF 18091 ON 18 NOV 94

References: A. 1080-2-3127-08-94 (Adj) 26 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. 1080-2-3127-08-94 (FST) 24 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Feb 94

1. Enclosed are the Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report, the Summary Investigation and Commanding Officer's comments regarding this incident.

2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and comments of the Commanding Officer. I fully believe that due to the circumstances present, the accident was unavoidable and that no one person is to blame. The Commanding Officer has taken appropriate measures to ensure that all drivers are informed of the hazards of driving in this theatre of operations.

4. I recommend that the claim submitted by Mr Peric be honoured by HQ UNPROFOR.

5. Any further inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'N.M. Pettis'.

N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

1/2

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Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1: Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report
Enclosure 2: Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3: Summary Investigation

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ACTION

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HQUNPROFOR Zagreb/CMPAO/
CANBAT 2 Visoko/CO/ (less encls)

INFORMATION

CANCON Det Primosten//G5 Legal//

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RAAUZYUW RCCPJAQ1184 0372049-UUUU--RCCLQBA.

ZNR UUUUU

R 061950Z FEB 95

RECORDED

FM NDHQ OTTAWA//COS J3//

07 FEB 1995

TO RCESCGA/LFCHQ ST HUBERT//COS//

RCCLQBA/CCUNPROFOR CAMP PLESO//COS//

INFO RCESBFA/QG SQFT MONTREAL//CEM//

BT

UNCLAS COS J3 206

BILINGUAL MESSAGE/MESSAGE BILINGUE

SUBJ: CCUNPROFOR STOLEN LICENSE PLATES

REF: A. NDHQ 3451-9-034/352 (CEM J3/DGEMO) 11 AUG 94

B. LFCHQ 1500-1 (CEM) 20 JAN 95

1080-1

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS			
93		07/21/95	J
G1		7/2	ABA
G1 Admin	Closure	7.2	J
CR	PA	7/2	J

1. REF A ADVISED THAT 98 UNPROFOR LICENSE PLATES WERE DISCOVERED MISSING FROM CANBAT 1 IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE REPATRIATION OF 1 R22ER TO CA. REF A FURTHER INDICATED THAT LFC WAS TO INVESTIGATE AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO DISCIPLINARY ACTION
2. AT REF B, LFCHQ INDICATED THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO WHEN THE LICENSE PLATES WENT MISSING. ALTHOUGH THE LOSS WAS DISCOVERED IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE REPATRIATION OF 1 R22ER, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT LOSSES MAY HAVE OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF 1 R22ER
3. DUE TO THE TIME THAT HAS ELAPSED SINCE SUBJ PLATES WERE DISCOVERED

REVIEWED BOI

PAGE 2 RCCPJAQ1184 UNCLAS

MISSING AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT SEVERAL UNITS MAY BE INVOLVED, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT FURTHER INVESTIGATION WOULD SHED MORE LIGHT ON THE ISSUE. AS SUCH, THE MATTER IS TO BE CONSIDERED CLOSED FROM A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

END OF ENGLISH TEXT/DEBUT DU TEXTE FRANCAIS

1. LA REF A INDIQUAIT QUE 98 PLAQUES D IMMATRICULATION DE LA FORPRONU ONT DISPARU DE CANBAT 1 JUSTE AVANT LE RAPATRIEMENT DU 1 R22ER AU CA. DE PLUS, LA REF A INDIQUAIT QUE LE CFT DEVAIT ENQUETER ET FAIRE SES RECOMMANDATIONS EN CE QUI A TRAIT AUX MESURES DISCIPLINAIRES

2. A LA REF B, LE QG CFT A INDIQUE QU IL Y A DES DOUTES SUR LE MOMENT DE LA DISPARITION DES PLAQUES D IMMATRICULATION. BIEN QUE LA PERTE FUT IDENTIFIEE JUSTE AVANT LE RAPATRIEMENT DU 1 R22ER, IL EST POSSIBLE QUE CES PERTES SOIENT SURVENUES AVANT L ARRIVEE DU 1 R22ER

3. DU AU TEMPS ECOULE DEPUIS LA DISPARITION DES PLAQUES ET LA POSSIBILITE QUE PLUSIEURS UNITES EN SOIENT RESPONSABLES, IL EST DOUTEUX QU UNE ENQUETE ADD PUISSE ECLAIRER DAVANTAGE CETTE QUESTION. CONSEQUEMMENT, LE DOSSIER EST CONSIDERE COMME CLOS AU POINT DE VUE NATIONAL

FIN DU TEXTE FRANCAIS

BT

#1184

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RAAKZYUW RCESCGA0014 0391613-KKKK--RCCLPZB RCCLQBA.

ZNY KKKKK

R 061618Z FEV 95

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FM BFC MONTREAL//0 SURETE 8//

09 FEB 1995

TO RCCPDMA/NDHQ SEC OTTAWA//D POLLCE SVC//

INFO RCESBFA/QG SQFT MONTREAL//GP//

RCCLQBA/CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM//CAN LOG BAT CO//

RCCLPZB/CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//G 1// ←

BT

PROTEGE B SEPM 016

SUJET: MTL 865-10-94

REF: A. PPM 164 211804Z APR 94

B. D POLICE SVC, POLICE 4182 091300Z MAR 94

C. CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM//CANLOGBAT CO// MSG OR 68 311840Z JAN 94

1. (PB) POUR FAIRE SUITE AUX REFERENCES, VERS 13 H 05, LE 19 JANV
95, LE B77 212 442 CPLC (R) BOUCHARD MARC, DDN 15 AVRIL 71, HUSSARDS
DE SHERBROOKE, QC, FUT INTERVIEWE CONCERNANT LA PERTE D UNE PALRE DE
LUNETTE DE VISION DE NULT. LORS DE CET LNTERVIEW, CE DERNLER DECLARA
VERBALEMENT QU IL N AVAIT PAS APERCU LADLTE LUNETTE LORS DE SON QUART
DE GARDE LE 10 JULN 93 ET QU IL NE SE SOUVENAIT PAS SI LE CPL BARNES
LUL A MENTIONNE L EMPLACEMENT DE CELLE-CI. DE PLUS, LE CPLC (R)
BOUCHARD ACCEPTA DE SE SOUMETTRE A UN EXAMEN POLYGRAPHIQUE A UNE DATE

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PAGE 2 RCESCGA0014 PROTEGE B

ULTERIEURE.

2.(SC) LORSQUE CONNUS, LES RESULTATS DE CET EXAMEN VOUS SERONT
ACHEMINES.

3.(SC) POUR DE PLUS AMPLES INFORMATIONS, CONTACTEZ LE MATC
CARBONNEAU AU 462-7103.

BT

#0014

♥JAS044 DELIVERED 0391612 428041

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United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

06 February 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
INTO THE VEHICLE ACCIDENT
UNPF 36685 ON 6 DEC 94

References: A. 1080-1/3032-33/94 (CO) 30 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. 1080-1/3032-33/94 (QM) 18 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605 Feb 94

1. Enclosed are the Summary of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report, the Summary Investigation and Commanding Officer's comments regarding this incident.
2. I concur with the findings of the Investigating Officer and the recommendations and comments of the Commanding Officer. The Commanding Officer has taken appropriate measures to ensure that corrective action has been taken. Disciplinary action has been taken against the driver Cpl Elson.
3. The Commanding Officer CANBAT 1 is to submit the necessary documents to recover all costs of repairs/remuneration from the United Nations.
5. Any further inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'N.M. Pettis', written in a cursive style.

N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

1/2

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Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1: Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report
Enclosure 2: Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3: Summary Investigation

DISTRIBUTION LIST.

ACTION

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HQUNPROFOR Zagreb/CMPAO/
CANBAT 1 Rastevic/CO/ (less encls)

INFORMATION

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Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3R0

06 February 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
INTO VEHICLE ACCIDENT
INVOLVING UNPF 19149 AND
CIVILIAN VEH - 31 OCT 94

- References: A. 1080-1/3307/94 (CO) Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. 1080-1/3307-06/94 (G2 Ops) 3 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605
D. FCPD 9 dated Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Summary Investigation and Commanding Officer's comments into a vehicle accident involving UNPF 19149 and a civilian vehicle on 31 Oct 94.

2. I concur with the findings of the Investigating Officer and the recommendation of the Commanding Officer. The driver of the military vehicle MCpl Baker was to some extent at fault, for failing to yield priority to the civilian vehicle. However it must be noted that the civilian driver contributed significantly to the accident in that he did not obey the posted speed limit.

3. There was no willfull negligence on MCpl Baker's part and I direct that the necessary documents be submitted by CANLOGBAT Maintenance to recover the full cost of repairs from the United Nations.

4. Any further inquires into this matter, should be directed to the G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.


N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

1/2

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Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1 Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report
Enclosure 2 Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation

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CANLOGBAT Primosten/CO

INFORMATION

CANCON PRIMOSTEN//G5 Legal//

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CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//COS//

CCUNPROFOR RASTEVIC//CANBAT 1/CO//

PROTECTED B COS 059

SUBJ: BOI - CCUNPROFOR M113 VEH ACCIDENT 29 OCT 94

REFS: A. NDHQ J3 OPS 3026 0332146Z FEB 95

B. CANBAT 1 1080-1/3032-31/9444 (5 PL COMD) 16 NOV 94

1. AT REF A NDHQ DIRECTED CCUNPROFOR TO RESPOND TO A SERIES OF DETAILED QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ACCIDENT AT REF B AND THE POLICY REGARDING THE USE OF HELMETS IN APCS/AVGPS IN THE UNPROFOR THEATRE OF OPS. IN ORDER TO GIVE THE CDS A DETAILED BRIEF ON THE BACKGROUND AND SUBSEQUENT ACTION TAKEN WRT THE ACCIDENT AS WELL AS RESPOND TO A MINISTERIAL INQUIRY LAUNCHED BY THE FAMILY OF CPL SHOIVANEK ANSWERS ARE REQUIRED TO THE FOL QUESTIONS IN DETAIL. AS THIS CASE HAS GENERATED A GREAT DEAL OF PUBLIC CONCERN AT HOME, THE COMD WILL REVIEW THE ANSWERS TO THIS INQUIRY PERSONALLY BEFORE THEY ARE FORWARDED TO NDHQ. REQUIRE YOU PROVIDE RESPONSE TO COS BY MSG OR FAX LTR NLT 9 FEB 95.

2. QUESTIONS

A. WHAT WAS THE BN HELMET POLICY FOR APCS/AVGPS AT THE TIME OF THE

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1080-1

02

KKKK

COS 059

ACCIDENT (BE SPECIFIC IN DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN INSIDE/OUTSIDE OF THE ZONE OF SEPERATION)

B. DID THE VEHICLE ACCIDENT OCCUR INSIDE OR OUTSIDE OF THE ZONE OF SEPERATION

C. PARA 15.J.(3) OF REF B IS INCORRECT IF THE LOCAL COMMANDER DID NOT ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE WEARING OF HEADGEAR OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF SEPERATION. CLARIFICATION REQ

D. DOES CCUNPROFOR CURRENTLY HAVE APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES IN PLACE CONCERNING THE WEARING OF HEADGEAR IN APCS/AVGPS AS RECOMMENDED AT REF B (YES. COS 057 040804Z FEB 95 REFERS)

E. PARA 15.G. AND 16.A. OF REF B REQ CLARIFICATION. DLR AND CO CANBAT 1 HAVE BOTH CONFIRMED THAT SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES OF BALLISTIC/COMMUNICATIONS HEADGEAR WERE AVAILABLE FOR ALL CREWS IN THE UNIT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT

F. IF SUFFICIENT NUMBERS OF BALLISTIC/COMMUNICATIONS HEADGEAR WERE AVAILABLE IN CANBAT 1, WHY WERE THERE INSUFFICIENT QUANTITIES IN THE SUBJ APC AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT

G. WAS THIS THE NORMAL CREW OF THE VEHICLE, IF SO, WHY DID THEY NOT HAVE COMPATIBLE HEADGEAR

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1080-1

03

KKKK


COS 059

H. IF THIS WAS NOT THE NORMAL CREW, DID THEY HAVE THE ABILITY TO ACQUIRE SUITABLE HEADGEAR PRIOR TO THE VEHICLES DEPARTURE

I. DO/DID VEHICLE CREWMEMBERS SIGN FOR AND RETAIN THEIR OWN BALLISTIC/COMMUNICATIONS HEADGEAR OR WERE THEY PROVIDED TO EACH VEHICLE RESPECTIVELY

J. CLARIFY WHETHER PTE WALES WAS WEARING A HELMET AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER PROVIDES CONFLICTING STATEMENTS IN PARAS 2 AND 7 OF REF B

COMD
DCOMD
G3
G1

CAPT IW ANDERSON
G1

MAJ AJ HOWARD
ACOS

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PA
1080-2-3127-13/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

4 February 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
VEHICLE ACCIDENT 21 DEC 94
UNPF 19164/UNPF 19163

References: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-13-94 (Adj) 14 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-13-94 (TACP) 12 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605
D. FCPD 9 dated Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Summary Investigation and Commanding Officer's comments into a vehicle accident involving UNPF 19164 and UNPF 19163 on 31 Oct 94.

2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments of the Commanding Officer.

3. As there was no willfull negligence by any member involved I direct that the Commanding Officer submit the proper documents to have the cost of the damage, amounting to Cdn \$3335.58, written off at public expense.

4. Any further inquires into this matter, should be directed to the G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'N.M. Pettis'.

N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

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Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1 Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report
Enclosure 2 Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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CCUNPROFOR Visoko/CANBAT 2/CO (less encls)

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1080-2-3127-11/94 (DCOMD)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations.
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3R0

4 February 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
LOSS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
17 DEC 94

References: A. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-11-94 (Adj) 21 Jan 95
(enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-2-3127-11-94 (BSqn) 11 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605
D. FCPD 9 dated Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Summary Investigation and Commanding Officer's comments into a loss of public property due to a fire at Observation Post CV2 on 17 Dec 94.

2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the corrective measures that the Commanding Officer has instituted.

3. As there was no willfull negligence by any members involved I direct that the cost of the public property amounting to Cdn \$867.71 be written at public expense.

4. Any further inquires into this matter, should be directed to the G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.

N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

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Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1 Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry Report
Enclosure 2 Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation

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1080-1 (G1)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

23 February 1995


Major Harsia
Legal Officer
Headquarters
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

OUTSTANDING CLAIM - VEHICLE ACCIDENT
UNPF 8668 AND BIH MILITARY POLICE MOPED
ON 9 APR 94

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 20 Jan 95
B. 1080-1 (DComd) 21 Aug 94

1. Enclosed is Reference A, a claim and the supporting translated documents, pertaining to a vehicle accident which occurred in the CANBAT 2 Area of Responsibility on 9 Apr 94. The completed Summary Investigation, Reference B was forwarded to CMPAO on the 21 Aug 94.

2. For your information and action as deemed necessary.


I.W. Anderson
Capt
G1

Enclosure: 1

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1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia


2 February 1995

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 21 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 22 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 23 Jan 95 (enclosed)
D. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92

1. Find references A, B and C enclosed. You will note that these incidents do not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR.
2. Future inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.


I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 3

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PA
1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia


03 February 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 25 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 25 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. MP COY HQ CASE REF: 550/2334/94 16 Dec 94 (enclosed)
D. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92

1. Find reference A enclosed. You will note that this incident does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR.
2. Also find references B and C enclosed. You will note that this accident occurred during the CANBAT 2's Apr 94 - Oct 94 rotation and no claim has been received by the unit. According to CANBAT 2 records no disciplinary action was taken against the member.
3. Future inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.


J.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 3

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PA
1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

31 January 1995

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 20 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92 (enclosed)

1. Find references A and B enclosed. You will note that it concerns a minor injury by a CANBAT 2 soldier which does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR.
2. Future inquiries into this matter, should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.


I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 2

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1080-1/3032-37/94 (CO)

30 January 1995

Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
CANBAT 1
Camp RASTEVIC
RASTEVIC

G1
Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Camp Pleso
Zagreb

④
MA
Thomx. Lets get copy to
Cos J3 once we get comments
from G1.
RAC

⑤
ce
PA
JMA
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SUMMARY INVESTIGATION INTO THE 31 DECEMBER 1994
SHOOTING OF TWO CANBAT 1 SOLDIERS
IN THE VICINITY OF GRID WJ5370, KOLARINA, CROATIA

Reference: Commander CCUNPROFOR Directive 605 February 1994

Find enclosed three copies of the completed Summary Investigation into the 31 December 1994 shooting of two CANBAT 1 soldiers in the vicinity of grid WJ5370, KOLARINA, CROATIA. The appropriate United Nations summary sheet has been completed in accordance with the reference and has been attached to each copy.

J.C. Tarzwell
J.C. Tarzwell
Captain
Acting Adjutant

②
COMO
G1 is in the process
of drafting comments for
your signature.

Enclosures: 3

③
DFC
Commanding Officer's
comments at Red PLAC

Howard
G3
30/1

JMA/DA
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SUMMARY OF CONTINGENT BOARD OF INQUIRY REPORT

I.

Proceeding of UNPROFOR	Assembled at RASTEVIC, Croatia by order of CO	Date 29 Jan 95	File 1080- 1/3032- 37/94.
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This BOI is convened pursuant to FCPD no (9) dated 27 June, 1992

For the purpose of

Contingent CANADIAN	Unit CANBAT 1	Canadian Contingent	Date of Incident 31 Dec 94	Place KOLARINA Croatia	UNPROFOR Vehicle No N/A
----------------------------	----------------------	------------------------	-------------------------------------	------------------------------	----------------------------------

Name(s) of other party(ies) involved and address(es) - N/A

Description of UNPROFOR loss - See Annex U.

UNPROFOR Member(s) Involved	Injuries to UNPROFOR Member(s)	Medical Report Ref No
██████████ Pte P.M. Badanai	2*gun shot wounds.	See Annex X.
██████████ Pte J.J. Tescione	6*gun shot wounds.	See Annex Y.

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Third Party Property	Third Party Operator	Third Party Owner
N/A	N/A	N/A

Particulars of Third Party Claims and Insurance Coverage.

MP or SIS Ref No	Contingent Report Ref No	Civ Police Ref No	Damage/discrepancy Report Ref No
South 589-16-94	1080-1/3032-37/94	N/A	See Annex U.

List of Witnesses - ANNEXES C-P OF INVESTIGATION.

II. Description of Circumstances
 SEE PARAGRAPHS 2-4 OF INVESTIGATION.

III. Options, findings and recommendations of the Board (Incl: arguments and motivations)
 SEE COMMANDING OFFICER'S COMMENTS AND PARAGRAPHS 5-23 OF INVESTIGATION.

Signed at Rastević, Croatia this 30th day of January in the year 1995

Number Rank Name Initials Decorations and Contingent

President   MAJ JORGENSEN M.P., CD

First Member   CAPT TARKWELL J.C.

Second Member   2LT SCOTT P.K.

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IV. Contingent Commander's Comments/Action:

V. UNPROFOR Headquarters Action:

Documents Attached: SUMMARY INVESTIGATION 1080-1/3032-37/94

Annexes Attached:

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COMMANDING OFFICER'S COMMENTS

1. I agree with the findings and the recommendations of the Investigating Officer. I would however highlight the following:
 - a. the potential threat to CANBAT 1 soldiers was clearly recognized and appropriate unit measures were ordered to minimize the risk. However in retrospect, it was wrong to dispatch two private soldiers on an escort mission under such volatile conditions. The escort patrol (Badanai and Tescione) lacked a trained junior leader, did not receive a thorough briefing nor, and more appropriately, did they receive a proper set of orders. The unescorted movement of this single vehicle, having recognized the need to escort the electrician in the first place, also causes me concern. As Commanding Officer, I assume full responsibility for the failure to ensure that the patrol had proper leadership, conducted complete battle procedure and had adequate security. Corrective action for the subordinate officers who failed to recognize and address these deficiencies will follow; and
 - b. clearly, this was a criminal act for which the ARSK authorities must be held responsible. Both the United Nations and Canada should resolutely pursue this matter until a satisfactory explanation and appropriate corrective action is taken. The intransigence of the RSK authorities should not deter us from a vigorous and persistent follow-up.


M.S. Skidmore
Lieutenant-Colonel
Commanding Officer

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Memorandum

1080-1/3032-37/94 (OPs O C Coy)

29 January 1995

Commanding Officer

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION INTO THE 31 DECEMBER 1994
SHOOTING OF TWO CANBAT 1 SOLDIERS
IN THE VICINITY OF GRID WJ5370, KOLARINA, CROATIA

References: A. 1080-1/3032-37/94 (Adj), Terms of Reference dated
3 Jan 95
B. QR&O Chapter 21, 36 and 38;
C. CFAO 21-9, 22-10, 38-1 and 59-3; and
D. Annex A to FCPD Number (9).

General

1. By the terms of reference dated 3 January 1995 (Reference A), a summary investigation was ordered into the 31 December 1994 shooting of two CANBAT 1 soldiers (B71 248 335 Pte P.M. Badanai and R51 806 977 Pte J.J. Tescione) in the area of grid WJ 5370, KOLARINA, Croatia.

Narrative

2. At 1650 hours 31 December 1994 Pte Badanai was ordered by Capt McArthur (C Coy Ops O) to conduct an escort task (statement of Capt McArthur - Annex E). At 1701 hours the Iltis (C/S 33W) departed C company camp (Y3) with Pte Badanai as the driver and Pte Tescione as the co-driver to commence their task. At 1718 hours they met at the BENKOVAC train station with the engineer vehicle (C/S E31I2) and began escorting them to the C Company observation post(OP), SC 54 (map routes - Annex T, blue route).

3. At 1748 hours Ptes Badanai and Tescione had completed their task and departed SC 54 to return to Y3 (map routes - Annex T,

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yellow route). As they entered the town of KOLARINA (diagram of incident site - Annex R) they came upon a group of approximately 20 Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina (ARSK) soldiers on the road, approximately 50 yards ahead of them. Pte Badanai began to slow his vehicle down. As they approached, the ARSK soldiers began to wave them down and attempted to stop them. Pte Badanai was concerned with the situation and looked for an opening, finding one, he then sped up. As Ptes Badanai and Tescione passed the ARSK soldiers they heard them cock their weapons. The ARSK soldiers opened fire on the Iltis (from behind) with an undetermined amount of rounds (57 rounds hit the Iltis) striking Ptes Badanai and Tescione several times.

4. Pte Badanai attempted to contact the C Company command post (C/S 3) via the radio but could not. He realized Pte Tescione was seriously injured and drove directly to Camp RASTEVIC as fast as possible (map routes - Annex T, yellow route). At approximately 1810 hours they arrived at the gate at Camp RASTEVIC and proceeded to the Unit Medical Station (UMS). Pte Badanai called for a medic and was attended to by MCpl Doupe the duty Medical Assistant (statement MCpl Doupe - Annex K). Ptes Badanai and Tescione were taken into care where their injuries were assessed and treated. Details of the injuries sustained by Ptes Badanai and Tescione are covered in the findings below.

Findings

5. Synopsis. Because of the hostile reaction of the ARSK soldiers on the afternoon of 31 December 1994 it was assessed that the perimeter lighting for SC 54 should be connected to assist in the security of the OP. A request was made by C Coy to have the perimeter lighting for SC 54 connected as soon as possible. This was approved by the CANBAT 1 Operations Officer (Ops O) (C/S 0 Logs - Annex W). The engineers (C/S E31) requested an escort for their personnel (C/S E31I2) as they had never been to SC 54. The request was approved by Capt McArthur, C Company Ops O. At 1650 hours 31 December 1994 Pte Badanai was briefed by Lt Graham, C Company duty officer, to escort the electricians (C/S E31I2) to SC 54 so they could install the perimeter lighting

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system for the OP (statement of Lt Graham- Annex F). Pte Tescione was asked by Pte Badanai to accompany him on his task (CANBAT 1 policy required a minimum of two persons per wheeled vehicle). Ptes Badanai and Tescione had completed their task and headed for Y3 through the town of KOLARINA (map routes - Annex T, yellow route). This was contrary to the direction issued by Lt Graham (statement Lt Graham - Annex F). They were heading in a north-westerly direction. The speed of the vehicle when approaching the ARSK soldiers was approximately 40 km/h. On nearing the location of the ARSK soldiers the vehicle slowed to approximately 15 km/h. Immediately after the shooting began Pte Badanai sped up to approximately 60 km/h and drove directly to Y0 (statements Pte Badanai - Annex G and Pte Tescione - Annex H). Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 above address the events which then transpired.

6. Time and Location. The exact location of the shooting incident can be narrowed to a 100 metre area (diagram of incident site - Annex R) as grid WJ 534 693. No exact time of the incident can be fixed; however, it has been estimated, based on the timings provided in several statements (statements of Capt Coombs - Annex J, Cpl McLean - Annex I, Sgt Elliott - Annex L, MCpl Doupe - Annex K and C/S 3 Logs - Annex Q), the speed of the vehicle and the distance from the incident site to Camp RASTEVIC (Y0) that the shooting took place between 1752 and 1803 hours, 31 December 1994 (map routes - Annex T). Annex R provides a diagrammatic sketch of the area where the incident took place and is supported by photos in Annex S. The exact location of the shooting was narrowed down to a 100 metre area. The positioning of the ARSK soldiers is uncertain; however, they were grouped within the area depicted, positioned on and off the road on either side (statements Pte Badanai - Annex G and Pte Tescione - Annex H).

7. Contributing Circumstances. The events that took place during the day of 31 December 1994 started at approximately 0900 hours when C Company commenced the operation to remove the United Nations (UN) ISO trailers from SC 54, 55, 56 and 57 (authorized by CANBAT 1 HQ). These ISO trailers were no longer required in location by CANBAT 1 and the ARSK soldiers were using them as

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shelters and bunkers. This use of UN equipment by ARSK soldiers could not be permitted to continue, thus requiring their removal. By 1330 hours the ISO trailers from SC 56 and 57 were removed without incident. At 1340 hours the engineers began to remove the first of three ISO trailers from SC 54. The first two ISO trailers were removed without problem. The third ISO was occupied by ARSK soldiers. The on-site commander, Lt Robertson, coordinated and directed the removal of all occupants and equipment from the ISO and in turn confiscated a variety of items. This action took approximately 10 minutes to complete and caused only a minor problem with the four ARSK occupants. The engineers and their equipment departed the area and moved to SC 55 to remove its ISO trailer.

8. At 1530 hours a group of six local ARSK soldiers approached SC 54. The commander of the group (Sergeant Drca Vasilj) was extremely upset and irate when he discovered that the self-proclaimed ARSK ISO was gone. He proceeded to make threats to Lt Robertson, stating he would attack SC 54 and mine the cleared route to the OP. These kinds of threats were common; however, they were not taken lightly. C/S 3 deployed an additional section (C/S 12A) to the OP and made arrangements to have perimeter lighting installed immediately for additional security. At 1554 hours the ARSK soldiers departed the area and shortly thereafter Lt Robertson returned to Y3 with the remainder of his platoon (statements of Lt Robertson - Annex C, Major Jorgensen - Annex D and C/S 3 Logs - Annex Q). Very clearly, increased tensions, stemming from the ISO removal could be seen as possibly contributing to the shooting.

9. Precautions. The following precautions were taken by CANBAT 1:

- a. the regular patrol routine for the night of 31 December 1994/1 January 1995 was cancelled as Saturday nights in the area normally see an increase of tensions because of the excessive consumption of alcohol by the locals. As well, the acting CO and the OPs O had determined that the events of New Years Eve day would further

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aggravate the situation. This was directed and confirmed at 0900 hours 31 December 1994 during the morning brief by the CANBAT 1 Ops O;

- b. in support of the ISO trailer removal, elements from Recce platoon (C/S 6) and Bravo Company (C/S 2) were made available, if required;
- c. C/S 3 deployed an additional section to SC 54 as a result of the threats uttered by the ARSK local commander that afternoon (C/S 3 Logs- Annex Q); and
- d. the route through KOLARINA was restricted and not to be used due to these threats; however, normal vehicle movement remained the same IAW Alert State GREEN movement policy (CANBAT 1 SOP 3/4/26 Annex A - Annex Z). Single vehicle movement was therefore permitted but all vehicles were to ensure that they had communications capability and two personnel in the vehicle. These requirements were fulfilled by Ptes Badanai and Tescione.

10. Responsibility for shooting/motives. Although individuals cannot be physically, individually identified, Ptes Badanai and Tescione clearly identified the persons firing at them as uniformed ARSK personnel.

11. Based on the following evidence it is clear that Ptes Badanai and Tescione did not fire their weapons:

- a. statements (statements Pte Badanai- Annex G, Pte Tescione- Annex H and Sgt Bucci- Annex P);
- b. no empty 5.56 mm casings were found at the site or in the vehicle. A detailed search of the area was conducted by the CANBAT 1 Military Police (statement Sgt Crowe - Annex N) on 2 Jan 95, and another by the Investigating Officer 16 Jan 95. As well, firing from

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inside the Iltis due to the design of the vehicle doors and the type of ejection port on the C7 rifle the empty casings would undoubtedly have flown back into the vehicle;

- c. both of Pte Badanai's and Pte Tescione's weapons were found to be loaded but not readied (magazine on - no round chambered) in accordance with CANBAT 1 SOPs and all ammunition issued to them was accounted for and recovered (statements of Sgt Bucci - Annex P and MCpl Butler - Annex M);
- d. the plastic dust caps which cover the muzzle of the weapon were still on the weapons and undamaged; and
- e. neither Pte Badanai nor Tescione reported pointing their weapons at the ARSK soldiers. Pte Badanai's weapon was stored between the driver's seat and the inner wall of the Iltis, while Pte Tescione's weapon was lying across his lap (statements Pte Badanai - Annex G and Pte Tescione - Annex H).

12. If either Pte Badanai or Tescione had fired their weapon after being wounded, they would have had to clear their weapons, reload their magazine, put dust caps back on their weapons, clean their weapons, and then drive to Y0 in under 20 minutes. In light of this evidence it is highly unlikely that Ptes Badanai and Tescione discharged their weapons during or after the incident.

13. This was an unprovoked and malicious attack on UN soldiers and must be viewed as a criminal act. It is unclear why the ARSK soldiers fired on Ptes Badanai and Tescione; however, the following reasons are offered:

- a. in retaliation for the events at SC 54, described in the paragraph 7 above and Ptes Badanai and Tescione were targets of opportunity and it is possible that had they not passed through KOLARINA then another target would have been selected; and

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- b. the ARSK soldiers were upset because the Iltis did not halt when expected to do so. When the Iltis moved past they may have viewed this as an aggressive act provoking them in to firing upon the UN vehicle.

14. Equipment and Damage. Damage to public and civilian property during the incident is summarized in Annex U. There was minimum damage to any UN property. All other damage was sustained by Canadian-owned equipment in addition to missing personal kit belonging to Pte Tescione. The stock numbers, nomenclature, quantity and catalogue value of the damaged or missing property is contained in Annex U. The total cost of all damaged items/equipment, not including labour is approximately \$9,500.00. However, it is considered that several parts of the Iltis have only been damaged not destroyed and can be repaired; thus reducing the total repair cost. A third line inspection team is required to provide a more accurate assessment of the cost of parts and labour. After careful inspection of the incident area no evidence of any damage to civilian personnel, property or equipment could be determined and no other claims have been brought to the attention of CANBAT 1.

15. Injuries to Persons. The extent of injuries to Ptes Badanai and Tescione is as follows (statement LCdr Taylor - Annex O, CF 98 - Annex X and Annex Y);

- a. Pte Badanai- two x gun shot wounds. First gun shot wound to his mid sacrum. Bullet was removed no permanent damage expected. A second gun shot wound to his right upper arm. Superficial wound no permanent damage. Another bullet did hit Pte Badanai in the back however, only penetrated the body armour and caused minor bruising; and
- b. Pte Tescione- six x gun shot wounds. three x gun shot wounds to his left parieto - occipital skull. No permanent damage. one x gun shot wound to his left shoulder. Moderate muscle loss and minimal skin loss. one x gun shot wound (bullet fragments) to his left

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hand. A laceration to his index finger to thumb. one x
gun shot wound to his right arm. A 7 x 7 cm diameter
skin loss and a loss of some distal deltoid muscle.

16. The injuries incurred by Ptes Badanai and Tescione were
attributable to military service in that they were returning from
conducting an authorized escort task during OP HARMONY.

17. Protective equipment. The correct use of protective
equipment and clothing is difficult to assess. Both Ptes Badanai
and Tescione were wearing their body armour in the correct
manner. Neither had their helmets on; however, they were outside
the Zone of Separation (ZOS) and IAW the CANBAT 1 policy, helmets
were not required to be worn outside the ZOS under normal
operational circumstances. The Iltis was equipped with a
ballistic blanket rolled up in the back of the Iltis across the
back seats. This was not in the manner directed by CANBAT 1.
Ballistic blankets are intended for blast purposes and should be
spread out over an area of the vehicle, preferably the front
floor of the Iltis. However, in this case the manner in which
this blanket was used may have saved the lives of Ptes Badanai or
Tescione. The ballistic blanket in the Iltis was struck by a
round that penetrated 2 1/2 layers of the rolled up blanket
stopping the round from going into the front of the vehicle.
Subsequently stopping it from potentially hitting Ptes Badanai
and/or Tescione (photographs - Annex V).

Recommendations

18. The policies used by CANBAT 1 with regard to vehicle
movement are adequate and should for the most part continue to be
used. CANBAT 1 must continue to operate in the face of
intimidation; however, when threats are made by belligerents the
following enhanced security measures should be considered:

- a. wheeled vehicle travel should be conducted in pairs at
night;

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- b. route restriction, must be implemented and emphasized as to the number and type of vehicles permitted through that particular area; and
- c. persons required to move through that area must receive a complete briefing as to why there are restrictions and ensure they know the restricted routes.

19. The attack on Ptes Badanai and Tescione is deemed a criminal act and should be aggressively pursued through legal means.

20. Both Pte Badanai's and Pte Tescione's personal kit should be replaced at public expense (Annex U). Their clothing was destroyed as biologically hazardous material by CANBAT 1 ASC personnel immediately after the incident.

21. Based on the statements of Lts Robertson and Graham Pte Badanai should have known not to take the route through KOLARINA. However, neither officer stated that the route was restricted and not to be used. As well, as a QL 3/QL 4 soldier it cannot be assumed that he had a complete understanding of the situation and its significance. Pte Badanai stated that he was not aware of any restrictions on the KOLARINA route and that he understood the reason he was to use the indicated route to SC 54 was only due to his task. After completing the task he was under the impression he could make his own way back to Y3. Based on this information it is recommended that no disciplinary and/or administrative action be taken against either Ptes Badanai or Tescione.

22. The policy with regard to the use of protective equipment is adequate and no change is recommended.

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
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23. The injuries sustained by Ptes Badanai and Tescione should be reviewed and determined if a Canadian and/or UN pension is merited.


S.R.A. McArthur
Capt
Investigating Officer

Annexes

Annex A Terms of Reference
Annex B Request for Extension
Annex C Statement of Lt Robertson
Annex D Statement of Maj Jorgensen
Annex E Statement of Capt McArthur
Annex F Statement of Lt Graham
Annex G Statement of Pte Badanai
Annex H Statement of Pte Tescione
Annex I Statement of Cpl McLean
Annex J Statement of Capt Coombs
Annex K Statement of Mcpl Doupe
Annex L Statement of Sgt Elliott
Annex M Statement of Mcpl Butler
Annex N Statement of Sgt Crowe
Annex O Statement of Lcdr Taylor
Annex P Statement of Sgt Bucci
Annex Q C/S 3 Logs
Annex R Diagram of incident site
Annex S Photographs of incident site
Annex T Map routes
Annex U List of damaged/destroyed/missing items
Annex V Photographs of vehicle and protective kit
Annex W C/S 0 Logs
Annex X CF 98 Pte Badanai
Annex Y CF 98 Pte Tescione
Annex Z CANBAT 1 SOP 3/4/26 Annex A

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CCUNPROFOR CANBAT 1
CAMP Rastevic, Croatia

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1080-1/3032-37/94 (Adjt)

03 January 1995

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Annex A
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE - SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
INTO THE 31 DECEMBER 1994
SHOOTING OF TWO CANBAT 1 SOLDIERS
IN THE VICINITY OF GRID WJ 5370, KOLARINA, CROATIA

References: A. QR&O Chapters 21, 36 and 38;
B. CFAO 21-9, 22-10, 38-1 and 59-3; and
C. Annex A to FCPD Number (9).

1. [REDACTED] Capt S.R.A. McArthur shall conduct a Summary Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the shooting incident which occurred on 31 December 1994 involving [REDACTED] Pte P.M. Badanai, [REDACTED] Pte J.J. Tescione and a 1/4 ton Iltis UNPF 16505.
2. The Summary Investigation shall include statements from all available witnesses and any other relevant orders, except where an officer or non-commissioned member is:
 - a. currently the subject of a criminal (police) investigation;
 - b. has been or is about to be charged with an offence under the National Defence Act or other Canadian law; or
 - c. has been arrested/detained in respect of any alleged act or omission which could constitute such an offence.
3. Subject to the exceptions listed from witnesses mentioned in paragraph 2, such an officer or non-commissioned member shall not be compelled to give evidence before the Summary Investigation in relation to the subject of the police investigation, charges, arrest or detention. Where the gathering of such evidence is deemed critical to the successful completion of the investigation the authority which ordered the investigation shall be notified and the advice of the representative of the Deputy Judge Advocate General shall be sought prior to taking any action to compel such testimony, recognizing that compelling testimony in such circumstances could have the effect of jeopardizing subsequent disciplinary proceedings.
4. The Summary Investigation shall obtain statements from all available witnesses and in particular shall record full particulars with respect to:

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- a. the exact location and time of the shooting;
- b. the nature of the task being conducted;
- c. who is responsible for the shooting;
- d. the speed of the vehicle, direction of travel and driving conditions;
- e. which party opened fire first and for what reason;
- f. did CANBAT 1 pers at any time open fire, return fire, point their weapons or take any aggressive action;
- g. plans or sketches indicating how the incident occurred;
- h. events or occurrences immediately before and after the accident up until their arrival at the ASC;
- i. what task was Ptes Badanai and Tescione involved in at the time of the accident, by whose authority, and why;
- j. orders given for the movement of these personnel, by whom and for what purpose;
- k. the events that took place in the vicinity of Kolarina and SC 54 during the afternoon of 31 December 1994; what effects these events had or may have had on the incident with the specific reference to any threats made by SVK personnel;
- l. what CANBAT 1 tactical and safety precautions were taken on the evening of 31 December 1994 due to SVK/HV New Year celebrations;
- m. what damages were incurred during the incident including UN owned and Canadian owned equipment;
- n. the stock numbers, nomenclature, quantity and catalogue value of damaged Canadian public property;
- o. any damage to public or civilian owned property and equipment; and if so what is the extent and value of the damages;
- p. the use of protective equipment and clothing in the vehicle; was it used correctly and was the equipment effective;
- q. the extent of the injuries to Ptes Badanai and Pte Tescione; and

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r. are their injuries attributable to military service.

5. If there is damage to personal or civilian property from which a claim against the UN or the crown may arise, the investigation shall establish an estimate of the claim, based on the information available, together with a statement as to whether the claimant is likely to suffer financial hardship by reason of the fact that he/she will not receive payment until the amount of the claim can be ascertained.

6. Findings shall be made where applicable and appropriate on:


- a. each of the points in paragraph 5:
- b. any other significant contributing factor to the shooting; the degree of responsibility or liability on the part of any officer, man or civilian employee;
- c. any liability on behalf of CANBAT 1 or the UN for injury or damages to civilian personnel, property or equipment or to ARSK personnel, property or equipment; and
- d. action to be taken to repair or compensate for damaged public property.

7. Recommendations shall be made on:

- a. action required to prevent reoccurrence;
- b. each of the points in paragraph 4 and 5; and
- c. on any disciplinary and/or administrative action to be taken.

8. This investigation shall be classified as PROTECTED B.

9. The minutes and proceedings shall be delivered in one copy to the undersigned within fourteen days of the receipt of these Terms of Reference. Should it be impossible to complete the proceedings within that time, a written explanation shall be submitted at least four days before the due date.



M.P. Jorgensen
Major
Acting Commanding Officer

Distribution List

Internal

Action

Capt McArthur

Info

OC C

OC F

Adj

External

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CCUNPROFOR Legal Advisor

Memorandum

PROTECTED B

1080 - 1 (C Coy)

Annex B
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

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7 Jan 95

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
EXTENSION OF DUE DATE
OF SUMMARY INVESTIGATION

Ref: Terms of Reference - Summary Investigation 1080-1/3032-37/94

1. IAW the ref the Summary Investigation I have been assigned is due 17 Jan 95. It has become very evident that due to several factors I will be unable to meet that date. The reasons are as follows;

- a. several of the witnesses I reqr to get statements from are either on leave (96 hour) or have returned to Canada and getting their signed statements will be difficult given the time frame. As well, in the case of Pte Tesicone, he cannot give a statement until he is off of medication. He is now presently in Canada at NDMC making it difficult to get a statement; and
- b. I am departing for 96 hour leave to Buda Pest from 10 - 14 Jan 95. During this period I will not be able to fully continue with the investigation. Further more, I am to go in to the MASH unit in ZAGREB 14 Jan 95 to have minor surgery on my knee. This will extend my absence for another 3 days making my expected return, not before 17 Jan 95.

2. I believe the above mentioned reasons justify my req for an extension to the due date of this investigation. For your consideration.



S.R.A. McArthur

Capt

Ops O C Coy

PROTECTED B

REVIEWED 801

Annex C
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

Statement of Lt C.S. Robertson [REDACTED]

1. 311330 hours dec 94, grid 5488 6832.
2. Having removed ISO trailers from SC57, 56 and 54 proper, Sunray 33 and 9 Platoon Head Quarters moved on foot to the ARSK occupied ISO trailer. 33C was deployed as cut off at grid 544 687 on obvious track under Sgt Murphy's command. 33B was deployed approximately 30m W of the ARSK occupied ISO trailer on high ground. 33B dismounted the section under MCpl Higgin's command to accompany Sunray 33. The ISO trailer was cordoned by 33B and Sunray 33 entered with 9 Platoon Head Quarters, Pte's Leclair and Badanai. 4 x ARSK belligerents were escorted from the ISO trailer, 1 belligerent had an AK-47 and a handful of small calibre rockets. Sunray 33 had stated that if all weapons were turned over they would be returned upon removal of the ISO trailer, however, as 1 x ARSK belligerent would not give up his arms 3 x AK47 with ammo, some machine gun EIS, and 4 x helmets were confiscated. A field phone, pocket radio, binos, mirror, and all furnishings were returned to the ARSK undamaged. A field engineer section quickly surveyed the area for mines and pronounced the area clear. Heavy equipment proceeded to remove the ISO trailer and load it on an HLVW. The HLVW departed escorted by the field engineer section. 9A observed the operation from shortly after entry until the departure of the HLVW and field engineer section. An attempt was made to get an ARSK signature on weapons confiscation forms. This delayed ARSK belligerents in the area while 12W, under command of Sunray 12, and heavy equipment removed an ISO trailer from SC55. No signature was received from the ARSK.
3. At some point during the negotiations reference the confiscation forms, I ordered half of 33B to place their weapons back at the load as I had ordered them made ready when the ARSK belligerent failed to surrender his arms and the state of his weapon was unknown. This belligerent began to level his weapon which I had ordered him to keep slung. Pte Leclair stepped forward but was pushed back by this individual. The belligerent proceeded to cock his weapon at which point several soldiers, including myself, aimed readied weapons at him. As it became clear he was clearing and unloading his weapon, the situation de-escalated. CANBAT-weapons remained at the ready. ARSK cooperation improved at this point.

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4. At approximately 1530 hours, a second group of 6 x ARSK belligerents with 2 x AK-47's in a military pattern vehicle were stopped by 33C. I moved to this location and met an ARSK belligerent who claimed to be the commander in Kolarina. He stated he was the ultimate commander of the area. This individual was approximately 6' tall and 175 lbs. he appeared quite gaunt. His hair was dark and cut short so it stood up on his head. His teeth were unevenly spaced and obviously in poor condition even by ARSK standards. His behaviour was quite erratic passing very quickly between rage and calm states. This ARSK commander threatened to attack SC54 and mine the cleared route to the Observation Post but backed down when I asked him to confirm his intentions stating "Nema Problem". I escorted this commander to the former site of the ARSK occupied ISO trailer where he briefly conferred with his personnel and then all ARSK belligerents were escorted from the Zone of Separation. As he departed from the Zone of Separation, the Kolarina commander said he would "blow up" SC54 to members of 33C but I was unable to confirm this with him. I informed C/S 3 that the Kolarina commander had said some disturbing things and that I would conduct a meeting with the local ARSK Battalion commander as soon as possible. I confirmed that SC54 would be reinforced by a section from C/S 12 and departed SC54 with 33B and 83C to return via the APC route which does not pass through Kolarina. En route, I met up with Sunray 12, heavy equipment and an HLWV proceeding via the wheeled route to C/S 0 which passes through Kolarina. I stopped these vehicles and had them follow me as I did not think Kolarina was safe. I expressed these sentiments to Sunray 12, Lt Reintjes, and Ptes Badanai and Leclair. At 1611 hours, C/S 3 inquired if the area was safe for CE vehicles with escort. I responded "yes, but use APC." All vehicles returned to their base camps and I ordered Pte Leclair to get my APC ready to go. Alert state red and the incident which caused it prevented any further activity by myself. At no time during the day did the situation become untenable and the task itself was completed without major difficulty.

5. The commander for Kolarina was visibly upset that his line to ARSK positions inside the Zone of Separation had been cut. This was done to prevent a crowd situation at SC54 while ISO trailer removal was in progress. Sunray 33 informed the Kolarina commander that line had been cut by the movement of heavy equipment in area. He was further upset by the confiscation of weapons and refused to sign any receipt. In response to his last unconfirmed threat, I issued direction to 33C in case of an attack by indirect fire. Aside from the commander, however, the ARSK belligerents seemed unconcerned and cooperated as they departed the Zone of Separation.

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6. Communications with C/S 3 were maintained throughout the day. 12A moved to reinforce SC54 with instructions that they would remain the night. It was my intention to meet with Capt Matchik (ARSK Battalion Commander) at approximately 2000 hours, however, the move to alert state red prevented the meeting.

7. This incident is closed but is directly related to further events in the Kolarina area.

8. When Capt Mathcik was mentioned the Kolarina commander said he did not take orders from him although Capt Matchik informed Sunray 33 that Kolarina was under his command. The ARSK belligerents at the occupied Iso trailer seemed legitimately fearful to take action without approval from Kolarina. This commander refused to identify himself but was later confirmed as Vodnik (Sergeant) Drca Vasilj. Further information on this belligerent is held by C/S 3.



C.S. Robertson
Lt
9 Pl Comd
Jan 95

3/3

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STATEMENT MAJOR M.P. JORGENSEN
IN SUPPORT OF SI NO 96 DATED 8 JANUARY 1995

1. On Saturday, 31 December 1994, at approximately 1400 hrs, I was present and observing an operation underway at SC 54, in the area of GR WJ 551 682. In charge of the operation was Lt C. Robertson, 9 Pl C Coy. Assisting Lt Robertson were elements of Engineer Field Troop, led by Sgt Butler.
2. Prior to my arrival, Lt Robertson had positioned his troops in such a manner that the ISO trailer and the four ARSK soldiers inside the trailer were isolated and fully covered by observation from all sides. Cut-off elements had been positioned at the main crossroads also. Troops were clearly well briefed, appeared calm, and proceeded professionally. A safe lane to the ISO trailer had been determined.
3. Previous to the operation being authorized by CANBAT 1 Headquarters, negotiations had been completed by the CANBAT 1 Operations Officer, Officer Commanding C Coy, and Commander 3 Brigade ARSK. These negotiations had served to clarify that the operation would be proceeding as ARSK forces were in obvious violation of the Cease Fire Agreement.
4. Shortly after 1400 hrs on 31 December 1994, having isolated the ISO trailer, troops of 9 Platoon opened the door to the trailer and entered. Within minutes ARSK soldiers were escorted out, while three rifles and four helmets were seized and brought to the rear of one of the supporting APCs. One ARSK soldier retained his weapon throughout. The ARSK soldiers were then kept away from the trailer by one CANBAT 1 NCO, while the remainder of the Canadian troops proceeded to remove the contents of the ISO trailer to an area adjacent to it. At no time did Canadian troops use force or coercion; the ARSK troops, however, were extremely indignant, belligerent and vocal.
5. After the ISO trailer had been emptied of its contents, engineers proceeded to remove the ISO, using a ZETTLEMAYER Forklift to place it on a low-bed trailer for subsequent removal to Camp Rastevic. This part of the operation took about 10 minutes, and went without incident.
6. Following the loading of the ISO trailer, Lt Robertson completed the administrative activities associated with weapons confiscations. At this point in time I departed the area, having spoken to Lt Reintjes, 2 Pl, A Coy who would be undertaking a similar operation at SC 56 shortly after the situation at SC 54 had been settled. I left around 1445 hours.



M.P. Jorgensen
Major
Deputy Commanding Officer
12 January 1995

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
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Annex E
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

STATEMENT OF CAPT SRA McARTHUR [REDACTED]

At approximately 311650 hours Dec 94 I had just completed handing over to Lt Graham (the on coming Duty Officer): I gave him the normal brief on the days/shift activities in the Coy AOR (including the at situation at SC 54). I told him that a tasking was reqr to escort an CE C/S to SC 54 to install the perimeter lights for additional security. I told Lt Graham that since 33W is available and knows the area, he (Pte Badanai) would do the task. I explained (using the map) the route 33W was to take to SC 54 and departed the CP moments later. On my way out I ran into Pte Badanai, I told him that I had a task for him and that he was to go to the CP and get the details from Lt Graham (the Duty Offr). He ack and went into the CP for his brief. I never spoke or saw Pte Badanai again prior to the shooting.


S.R.A. McArthur
Capt
OPs O C Coy

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
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Annex F
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

STATEMENT OF LT J.D. GRAHAM

1. On the afternoon of 31 Dec 94 I was Duty Officer in the C/S 3 Command Post. Capt McArthur the Operations Officer said there was an escort task to accompany the Civil Engineers out to SC54 to hook up their lights for the observation post.
2. There were few personnel familiar with the area and Pte Badanai was selected as he was just returning from that area. He was instructed by Capt McArthur to use an Iltis with a co-driver to carry out the task.
3. I briefed him on the route to take using the operations map in the Command Post. I remember pointing out the route telling Pte Badanai to go via Benkovac grid 4975, Bulic grid 584 683, Vuksie grid 580 661 and into the observation post avoiding the town of Kolarina. While I do remember being specific about the route into SC54, I don't know if I was specific about the return route. I think that by saying not to go through Kolarina on the route there that it was implied not to go through there on the return route. I cannot be sure, after the fact, that Pte Badanai understood what I had meant.


J. Graham
Lt
7 Pl Comd
C Coy

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Annex G
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(Ops O C Coy)

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January 20, 1995

Statement

Re: Care of 2Lt. Nadrofsky
From: Pte. Badanai P.M.

On the night of December 31, 1994 Charles Company Ops officer called me into the Cp. He wanted me to escort the engineers to SC54 so they could work on the generator.

Pte. Tescione and I left to meet up with the engineers at the train station in Benkovac. When we joined up with the engineers we made our way to SC54. Just before the turn off to SC54 we noticed two ARSK soldiers fixing the land line that was cut earlier that day. When we arrived at SC54, we got out and talked to the boys there and as ordered if the engineers could make it back on their own we were to head back to Y-3. As we left SC54 I called call sign 3 and told them the task was complete and we were heading back to Y-3. Time was about 1800 hrs..

We were going through the town of Kolazina, about 200 m in the town, as we rounded the bend in the road we saw 20 plus ARSK soldiers pointing their weapons at us, waving us down to stop. As we were ordered in the past not to stop for anyone trying to stop you, we did not stop. The Serb soldiers were standing on the road and off to both sides of the road. As I slowed down, the soldiers moved away from the front of the jeep. Since they made a hole in front of the jeep, I dropped the gear and stepped on the gas. As we passed them we heard their weapons cocked, AK47's and light machine guns. The next thing we ducked and they began to fire.

I got hit twice and Tescione was hit five times. I looked over at Tescione and called out his name, he did not answer. I reached over and gave him a shake, then he answered. I tried the radio and it was all shot up. The front right tire was going, I told Tescione that the radio was gone and both the right tires were gone. I also told him we are going to Rastivac and to keep calm and keep talking. As I was driving I was also trying to stop Tescione from bleeding.

I drove for 15 km and averaging a speed of 60 km/hr. When we arrived at Rastivac I yelled at a bystander to get the medics. I stopped in front of the UMS and I got out, grabbed my rifle and went over and helped Tescione out of the jeep. The medic came out and helped Tescione and I walked in after them with both rifles. When we got in the UMS, the medics treated us.

Pte. Badanai
PTE Badanai P.M.
871 248 338

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Annex H
18 51-1080-
1/3032-37/94
(Ops O C Coy)

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Attention: Lt. Nadrofsky

January 23, 1999

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Pte. Tesclione J.

IRCR CHARLES COY 9 pl

Statement of Incident
of December 31, 1994

On the evening of December 31, 1994 Pte. Badanai and I were escorting some engineers to one of our Platoon O.P.'s. After we dropped off the engineers we decided to return to Y3, Charles Coy's main camp. As we approached the town of Koleraine we received a message over our radio. It stated that there would be much partying by belligerent Forces due to New Year's Eve, and to expect many shots to be fired by them.

Pte. Badanai and I then approached a bend in the road and when we rounded it we saw a crowd of people. The group was roughly 20 - 25 large and most of the people were carrying small arms rifles. The crowd of belligerents at this point were roughly 50 - 100m away and they began to spill on to the road. I removed my weapon from the rack but laid it across my lap as I did not want to agitate the belligerents. Pte. Badanai slowed the iltis so we could observe the belligerents and so we would not hit anyone.

At this point the crowd began to wave their hands in an attempt to flag us down. As we slowed down the crowd made a break and began to split to either side of the vehicle. Pte. Badanai being aware of our orders not to stop for roadblocks, proceeded through the break in the crowd. When the belligerents realized that we outsmarted them and would not stop they cocked their weapons. When the vehicle was slightly less than one car space away the belligerents opened fire on us. Our immediate reaction was that we were shocked and angered.

Pte. Badanai, feeling each round entering him proceeded on at a high rate of speed with the iltis. Before I had a chance to return fire I was stunned by one of the rounds that had hit me. Possibly being one of the three rounds to my head, I was knocked over to my right side. Pte. Badanai, driving on only two good tires began to check me and the equipment to see what state we were in. He concluded that the radio was down and he received no response from. Pte. Badanai reached over and put his hand on my arm then gave me a shake. I came to and told him that I had been hit. He then explained to me the damage to the radio and vehicle. Pte. Badanai explained to me that we would be going to Rastevic to receive medical attention. Throughout the whole ride he comforted me with his hand on my shoulder. When we arrived to Rastevic we drove to the medical buildings. He stopped in front got out and helped me out of the iltis and into the building. This was the last I remembered of the incident.

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Annex I
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

STATEMENT OF CPL MCLEAN [REDACTED]

On December 31 94 at approximately 1810 hours Sgt Green, Cpl Murphy, Cpl Belanger and I observed a 33W C/S heading toward C/S 0 (Rastevic). We first observed the jeep at the intersection just prior to the water station in Benkovac grid WJ 491 753. At that time we realized it had a rear right flat. We did not assume there was any other problems at that time. As the 33W C/S pulled into C/S 0 we then realized the front right tire was flat. At this time we still didn't assume any other problems because the driver had used his left flasher while turning into C/S 0. The 33W C/S pulled into C/S 0 faster than us and when we saw it again it had already pulled up to the UMS.

CA McLean

A. McLean
Cpl
Dukes Coy

PROTECTED B

REVIEWED 801

Ø4 Jan 95

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] CAPT COOMBS HG

At approximately 311820A Dec 94 I was returning the from Camp Rastevic laundry, which is located near the main gates of Camp Rastevic, when an Iltis entered the Camp at high speed. This immediately attracted my attention as the vehicle was not only speeding but was moving erratically, i.e. not in a straight line, and there was a considerable amount of noise, as if the muffler was broken.

I started to move quickly towards the Iltis when it suddenly made a U-turn and stopped near the main entrance to the Unit Medical Station (UMS). Approaching the vehicle I realized that there were many bullet holes in the Iltis, in fact, the windshield was "starred" by numerous holes and almost impossible to see through. Both occupants were obviously wounded. The passenger, slumped in his seat, appeared semi-conscious or unconscious. The driver appeared alert and in control of himself. (At no time did he exhibit signs of undue fear or panic). He called for help. Several medical personnel exited the UMS. The driver said words to the effect that his passenger was wounded and directed their attention to the other man. They were assisted from the vehicle. The passenger was semi - carried inside the UMS. I noticed the driver had a pronounced limp. As he moved toward the UMS he was asked if he was OK and he replied "I'm wounded too," and entered the UMS. I noted the callsign on the Iltis was 33W and

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as I was the Duty Officer returned to the Command Post and commenced the appropriate procedures. Also a witness to this incident was [REDACTED] Sgt Elliot TC, CANBAT 1 Information Section Sgt.



H.G. Coombs

Capt

SDO

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Annex K
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

STATEMENT OF MCPL DOUPE [REDACTED]

I [REDACTED] Mcpl Doupe WF was the duty Med A on the 31 Dec 94. At approximately 1800 hour that evening I could hear in the distance, what sounded like a labouring vehicle. I looked outside but could not see anything. The sounds became louder so I looked outside again (second time). I saw an iltis pull up to the UMS and someone was calling for a medic. When I went outside to investigate, I noticed that the vehicle had suffered extensive damage. Several bullet holes through the windshield and the side of the vehicle, as well it had two flat tires on the right side. I saw Pte Badanai immediately move to the right hand side of the vehicle and begin assisting the casualty (Pte Tescione) out of the vehicle. Pte Badanai was continually reassuring him he was going to be alright. I assisted Pte Badanai in getting Pte Tescione out of the vehicle and into the UMS. Once inside the UMS Pte Badanai informed me that he too had been shot. This was a surprise to me, as he had been calm and helpful while we got Pte Tescione into the UMS. His only concern at the time was to get Pte Tescione into the UMS and get him cared for. Pte Badanai stated to me that they had been ambushed and had driven from SC 54 to here (Camp Rastevic). He stated to me that when they got shot he knew he had to get medical help fast and the only thing he thought about was getting Pte Tescione here.

W.F. Doupe

W.F. Doupe
Mcpl
C Coy Med A

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
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Annex L
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

STATEMENT OF SGT ELLIOTT TC [REDACTED]

On the night of 31 Dec 94 at approximately 1815 hours I was the back up duty Sgt for Camp Rastevic. At the time the vehicle came through the gate I was walking towards the MIR by the laundry building. I heard a vehicle coming and stopped to see what was wrong. It sounded like it had blown a muffler. The vehicle came into my sight by the MP building and I immediately saw the bullet holes as it turned towards me. As it drove past me, the driver called to me to get a medic. I immediately ran to the MIR and opened the door and shouted for the medics. They immediately came out with me as the vehicle stopped at the front of the MIR. The driver got out and walked around the vehicle and assisted the medics in getting the passenger out. He then stated that he was shot too. The driver had his own weapon in his hands. I do not remember seeing the passengers weapon. Capt Coombs was also present and said he had seen what was going on and went to C/S 0 to report the incident. I left the area to inform the MP section. By this time the medics had both persons inside the MIR.


T.C. Elliott
Sgt
MIO/Tpt Sgt

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
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Annex M
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

STATEMENT MCPL BUTLER CG [REDACTED]

On the evening of 31 Dec 94 at around 1900 hours I assisted Sgt Bucci with the clearance of the two casualties weapons and the counting of their ammunition. Sgt Bucci asked me to count the ammunition while he cleared the weapons. I confirmed that five of the magazines had 30 rounds each. This was varified by WO Fontaine. There were no other loose round nor did any eject from the weapons. I then gave the magazines to Cpl Crispin.



C.G. Butler
Mcpl
Med A

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PROTECTED B

Annex N
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

STATEMENT SGT CROWE JR [REDACTED]

At approximately 1330 hours 2 Jan 95 myself, members of my MP section and other MPs from Sector South (KNIN) commenced a sweep/search of the incident area along the main route through the village of KOLARINA. We were searching for parts of an iltis, empty casings and any other evidence to support and confirm the location of the shooting. We found nothing of that nature throughout the entire 4 KM route.


J.R. Crowe
Sgt
MP Sect

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STATEMENT OF: [REDACTED] LCDR TAYLOR, J. E. S., MD, FRCSC
20 JAN 1995

This statement is made with regards to the surgical assessment and treatment of wounds for two patients admitted to the ASC(-), CANBAT 1 on the evening of 31 Dec 94. The patients are Pt John Tescione and Pt Phillip Badanai. Both patients were admitted for surgical care in stable condition, following initial assessment and management by the staff of CANBAT 1 UMS. This statement is prepared from the original operative notes.

The first patient taken to surgery was Tescione. He had a total of six significant gunshot or fragment wounds. There were 3 wounds to the left occipito-parietal area of the head. One was a superficial scalp wound. The second wound involved a punctate 1.5 cm diam fracture of both tables, exposing dura but with no dural tear. The third wound entered over the left mastoid and tracked subcutaneously under the upper ear to the temporal area. There was a small laceration to the external ear canal. All wounds were thoroughly irrigated and debrided, including removal of a deformed bullet from the left temporal area, and several small fragments from the other wounds. Wound extensions were closed loosely over drains and the remainder were left open. The next wound was a large, approx 7x15 cm wound to the posterior left shoulder with trapezius and supraspinatus injury, and minimal skin loss. It was irrigated, debrided and dressed open. Next were two small fragment wounds to the left hand. These were a small clean laceration of cutaneous tissues at the 2nd (index) MCP joint, debrided and closed, and a small cutaneous laceration middle phalanx 3rd finger with imbedded fragment, debrided and left open. His final wound was a 7x7 cm diam wound on the upper right arm with loss of skin and some distal deltoid muscle. This was debrided and dressed open. There were no complications during the procedure and further blood loss was moderate.

The second patient to surgery was Badanai. His principle wound was a penetrating fragment wound to the mid left sacrum. The wound was extended, irrigated and debrided including removal of the ballistic fragment from the sacral bone. Only the outer cortex was penetrated and no neural injury was seen. The wound extensions were closed and the

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remainder left open with a drain. He also had a contusion/abrasion on the right upper back, presumably from a projectile which had not completely penetrated his Kevlar vest. There were several small fragment punctures to the right upper arm. These latter wound required only superficial scrub and dressing. There were no complications during the procedure and further blood loss was minimal.

Both patients will require further follow-up to determine any persistent disability. It would be expected however that Pt Badanai will recover fully, while Pt Tescione may have some mild weakness related to his muscular injuries, the functional significance of which should be minimal at most.



J. E. Scott Taylor, MD, FRCSC
Lieutenant-Commander
Orthopaedic Surgeon
CANBAT 1 ASC(-)

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Annex P
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

STATEMENT OF SGT BUCCI J.G. A80010836

At about 1900 hour 31 Dec 94 I notice 2 weapons (C7) in the weapons rack in the hallway of the UMS. Mags were on the weapons. I took the weapons outside to the clearing bay and proceeded to clear the weapons. I noticed the plastic dust covers on the spout of the weapons they were still intact. I removed the mags passed them to M/Cpl Butler and told him to count the rounds in the mags. I cleared both weapons. There were no rounds in the chamber when I initially checked. After clearing both weapons I passed them to Cpl Crispin

J.G. Bucci
J.G. Bucci
Sgt
Med A

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Annex Q
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

FACTS FROM C/S 3 LOG

1. The log from C/S 3 support and confirm the activities, decisions and timing which occurred during the day of 31 Dec 94.
2. There are 8 pages in particular that make reference to the activities. These pages and serials are as follows;
 - a. C/S 3 Log- page 380, 31 Dec 94, serial 3734;
 - b. C/S 3 Log- page 383, 31 Dec 94, serial 3920;
 - c. C/S 3 Log- page 384, 31 Dec 94, serials 3924 and 3926;
 - d. C/S 3 Log- page 385, 31 Dec 94, serial 3935;
 - e. C/S 3 Log- page 389, 31 Dec 94, serials 3962, 3963 and 3964;
 - f. C/S 3 Log- page 390, 31 Dec 94, serial 3964 continued;
 - g. C/S 3 Log- page 391, 31 Dec 94, serials 3978, 3981 and 3986; and
 - h. C/S 3 Log- page 393, 31 Dec 94, serial 3997.

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393

UNIT OR FORMATION/UNITÉ OU FORMATION				LOG/JOURNAL	DATE		
SER. SÉQ.	TIME HEURE	FROM DE	TO A	DETAILS/DÉTAILS	ACTION/EXÉCUTION	INITIALS	
3996				D. S.A. 3x 600 Buresst Susst H.V e. OBSV f. OUTSIDE ZOS			
3997	1747	33W	3	AT 5054 RYKRN FO V3	ACK		
3998	1748	12W	3	BIL 4-12 PWD	ACK		
3999	1753	4504	3	Silentic B 1738 C. GR 5800m 800m GR 580684 D. SPORADIC FIRE 10 min 1 UNIT EXPL. EST. 25 BBS. E. OBS F. OUTSIDE ZOS			
4000	1755	33W	ALL S/C	for 3100 Reps! ONLY REPORT 50cm2 And Above, Any Thing Crossing Zone Particularly with Responses.			
4001	1820	39B	ALL S/C	We are going state Red Now, all S/C ACK!! Roger out	ACK		
4002	1830	33W	3	R/C, nothing heard out	ACK		
4003	1833	E31	3	R/C, permit join net, cont all of our E	ACK		

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FEUILLE DE JOURNAL

UNIT OR FORMATION/UNITÉ OU FORMATION				LOG/JOURNAL	DATE		
1RCN C-CCM				CIS 3	31 DEC 94		
SER. SÉQ.	TIME HEURE	FROM DE	TO À	DETAILS/DÉTAILS	ACTION/EXÉCUTION	INITIALS	
3975	1639	5556	3	WE ARE AWARE OF EVENTS AT 5554 AND will continue to monitor	ACK	Jm	
3976	1640	8300	3	CO RTG TO RASCVIC CTA D30	ACK	Jm	
3977	1647	33B	3	BIL PED	} ACK	Jm	
3978	1647	3300	3	BIL PED		Jm	
3979	1647	3901	3	BIL PED		Jm	
3980	1655	1200	3	IN LCC PED	ACK	Jm	
3981	1700	3300	3	R/C MC	ACK	Jm	
3982	1701	3300	3	DFI	ACK	Jm	
3983	1706	1200	3	IN LCC 5554	ACK	Jm	
3984	1706	3200	3	BIL PED	ACK	Jm	
3985	1707	3	3200	Do You Get 10 Allies I move back to 4-12	ACK	Jm	
3986	1718	3300	3	R/C's with 5-12 CO RTG TO TASKING	ACK	Jm	
3987	1718	8300	3	BIL PED	ACK	Jm	
3988	1720	5554	3	FOR 12A Forward 5554	ACK	Jm	
3989	1731	31	3	R/C LCC	ACK	Jm	
3990	1735	5559	3	same Rep. @ 1120	ACK	Jm	

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OEM DE RELEVÉ (INITIALES)

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UNIT OR FORMATION/UNITÉ OU FORMATION				LOG/JOURNAL	DATE	
12A C-CCM				C/S 3	31 Dec. 94	
SER. SÉQ.	TIME HEURE	FROM DE	TO A	DETAILS/DÉTAILS	ACTION/EXÉCUTION	INITIALS
3964	(CONT)			Be instructed to move to SC54. on APR		
				inform this C/S of 12A Relief. Advise		
				12A to remain in loc all night	ACK	
3965	1602	31W	3	PJW RLC LAC DFIT	ACK	
3966	1605	3	12A	Did you Bell w/12/463	ACK	
3968	1607	12A	3	LEAV FOR TASK	ACK	
3969	1611	3968	SR 33	NAIC CG DS. At φ Return to hook up		
				LIGHTING AT SC 54 IS IT CLEAR ENOUGH//YES		
				BUT US APC.	ACK	
3970						
3970	1615	12A	3	Do you WANT. Me to spot 4-3 on RLC//no		
				DO I TAKE. APC RLC OR QUICKESS//APC	ACK	
3971	1626	3	33	SEND GTA //20 MIN	ACK	
3972	1632	3	SC50	HAS PTL RETN'D FM Bomb Rep//no	ACK	
3973	1635	SC44M	3	SITREP KAMA Pump House 2 x Per CIV 1 AK-47		
				PTL RETN'D 1 Per fm Pump House		
3974				ALL CALM	ACK	
3974	1635	SC50	3	PTL RETN'D NOTHING FOUND	ACK	

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UNIT OR FORMATION/UNITÉ OU FORMATION				LOG/JOURNAL	DATE	
12CM C-COM				C/S 3	31 DEC 94	
SER. SEQ.	TIME HEURE	FROM DE	TO À	DETAILS/DÉTAILS	ACTION/EXÉCUTION	INITS.
3961	(CONT)			You go go INVESTIGATE	ACK	fm
3962	1554	33	3	SITREP - ALL ARSII ARE DEP 203 33c Mov BACK 54 33c 83c on Rte TO 43 I want 12B TO REMAIN IN LOC LOC ARSII COMD THE STATED HE WILL USE SAME TYPE OF MANS TO ASSAULT UNPROFM PERS		
3963	1555	3910	33	HAVE STATION TO 9A // YES HE WAS IN LOC. DEP BEFORE GRP ARSII ARR // DID YOU PASS THREATS TO 9A // NO MURPHY DEP // WERE MIND THREATS // COMD FOR COLARINI POODC SAY // PLSR 33- ONCE HE DEP'S C/S 12B WILL REM FOR SHORT TIME AT SCSS // TO 12 - DEP A C/S TO REL 12B AND BE PREPARED TO STAY NIGHT // 12B IS AT 5 MIN NTM FROM DEP'D TO COMD OUT TABX		
3964	1557	3915	350	Do you have comms w/ 12A // YES // RELAY -	(CONT)	fm

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DUTY OFFICER/OFFICIER DE SERVICE

LT. GRAHAM

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UNIT OR FORMATION/UNITÉ OU FORMATION				LOG/JOURNAL	DATE	ACTION/EXÉCUTION	INITS.
1 RCR C-COY				C/S 3	31 DEC 94		
SER. SÉQ.	TIME HEURE	FROM DE	TO A	DETAILS/DÉTAILS			
3929	1349	12C	3	DEP 4-3 CONTINUING w/TASK		ACK	gm
3930	1352	31W	3	BIL PCID		ACK	gm
3931	1355	5054M	3	R/K L+C		ACK	gm
3932	1400	12C	3	DO YOU WANT US TO RETURN TO 4-3/0414			
				IF SOMETHING			
3933	1401	12C 12B	3	ON COMP. OF TASK REPORT TO 4-3		ACK	gm
3934	1402	3	12C	REMAIN IN LOC UNTIL C/S 33 HAS COMP.			
				TAX		BEW ACK	gm
3935	1404	33	3	MOVING TO 150 03		ACK	gm
3936	1410	31W	3	DFT		ACK	gm
3937	1439	32W	3	RDW R/K L+C DFT.		ACK	gm
3938	1445	5043	3	SIRIP GUBAVICA			
				4x PERS SEEN 3 INSIDE BUNK TENTS			
				ALL CIV ALLOWED INSIDE ACCOMMODATION			
				BUNKER NOT SLEEP BUNKER SILENT			
				IMPROBABILITY OF A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE LIGHT			
				SLOW TONIGHT.			
3939	1451	5056	3	R/K L+C		ACK	gm

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ON COMING DO (INITIAL)
DEPARTER DE BELLEVILLE (INITIALS)



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LT. GRAHAM

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FEUILLE DE JOURNAL

UNIT OR FORMATION/UNITÉ OU FORMATION				LOG/JOURNAL	DATE		
1 RCR C-COM				C/S 3	31 DEC 94		
SER. SÉQ.	TIME HEURE	FROM DE	TO A	DETAILS/DÉTAILS	ACTION/EXÉCUTION	INITS.	
3921	(cont)			THE ITEMS IS UNRECOVERABLE IT IS TO BE DESTROYED// IF UNRECOVERABLE, THEY ARE TO BE LEFT IN PLACE.	ACK	RM	
3922	1323	33	33	R/C L/C	ACK	RM	
3923	1340	12w	3	DEP 4-3 rd ON RTO SC54	ACK	RM	
3924	1340	33	3	2 nd ISO BONE PLACED ON ISO CONT. OF DEP. 15 MIN.	ACK	RM	
3925	1342	33	3	R/C L/C	ACK	RM	
3926	1343	3	33	FYI - 9A ON RTO TO YOUR LOC. 3927 WOULD YOU STAY IN LOC. TO BRIEF 39 WOULD STAY ROOM/DINING C/S'S + TPT IN LOC. 2 nd ISO ON TPT READY TO DEP LOC. THERE 4 ARSIC 3 x ALL-47A. I WILL ALSO BE SC54 UNTIL 9A. ACK	ACK	RM	
						REVIEWED 801	
3927	1346	31w	3	B7L PCD	ACK	RM	
3928	1348	3	33	FOR 39 - WHEN DO YOU ANTICIPATE REMOVAL OF 3 rd CONTAINER//SCANNING// YOU DO NOT NEED TO WAIT FOR 9A TO ARR TO BEGIN	ACK	RM	

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CAPT. McARTHUR

LOG SHEET

FEUILLE DE JOURNAL

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UNIT OR FORMATION/UNITÉ OU FORMATION				LOG/JOURNAL	DATE		
RCR C-004				cls 3	31 DEC. 94		
SER. SEQ.	TIME HEURE	FROM DE	TO A	DETAILS/DÉTAILS	ACTION/EXÉCUTION	INITIALS	
3808	1201	12C	12C	EXPEND TASKING UNTIL 1430 HRS	ACK	JA	
3809	1201	12B	12B	EXTEND TASKING UNTIL 1430 HRS	ACK	JA	
3810	1202	12	12	390 WILL EXPLAIN LATER	ACK	JA	
3911	1210	3	SC54	CONFIRM E-31D IS IN YOUR LOG	ACK	JA	
3912	1213	SC54	3	R/C L+C	ACK	JA	
3913	1229	320	3	BIL PED	ACK	JA	
3914	1230	390	33	SEND SIT REP / NO CHG STILL AWAITING TPT. // WILL CONT HIGHOR // AFTER UNLOADED	ACK	JA	
		3	4	HEADFAST STILL TO REM TO COMPLETE TASK			
				CAN YOU SEND ET			
3915	1232	33	3	SM TO ATTEND D'GRP // HEMAY Bg DEL			
				HAY BOXES // SR MAN ON GRD.			
3916	1235	SC44	3	OFF MCMNS SMAN RAD MAINT			
3917	1249	SC44	3	BARR ON MCMNS R/C L+C	ACK	JA	
3918	1255	11	3	LEAV AOR PED	ACK	JA	
3919	1259	33	3	SIT REP. NO CHG	ACK	JA	
3920	1307	33W	3	TRAILER TPT AGR AT SC54	ACK	JA	
3921	1312	33	3	ACT'S PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY. CONFIRM IF ON G OF	ACK (CONT)	JA	

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ON COMING DO (INITIAL)
OEM DE RELEVÉ (INITIALES)

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UNIT OR FORMATION/UNITÉ OU FORMATION				LOG/JOURNAL	DATE	
1RLCR, CCOY				C/S 3	31 DEC 94	
SER. SEQ.	TIME HEURE	FROM DE	TO A	DETAILS/DÉTAILS	ACTION/EXÉCUTION	INITS.
3731	0834	39	3	ETA	ACK	JM
3732	0835	39D	3	0 0	ACK	JM
3733	0837	39	3	CONFIRM BAS IS IN RTE TO 54	ACK FM 03 ETA	JM
3734	0854	39	3	FOR SUNRAY 33 E/C/S REQD TO DO CLEARANCE AT SC 54, SUNRAY 33 IS TO MAKE THE CALL ON GROUND IF ST BECOMES TENABLE, HE WILL HAVE ELEMENTS FROM C/S 6 0 AND 2 TO SUPPORT IF REQD	ACK	JM
3735	0900	39A	3	3 BDE HQ ETA 1000	ACK	JM
3736	0907	12B	3	SIT CALAN AT SC 57 MOVING TO SC 55	ACK	JM
3737	0909	33	3	HAS BAS LEFT 0, YES FM 03	ACK	JM
3737A	0940	39D	3	HOLDFAST C/S TELL THEM THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO TAKE EQUIPT UNTIL 9B OF MEETING	ACK	JM
3738	0929	12C	3	SC 44	ACK	JM

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
DIAGRAM OF INCIDENT SITE VILLAGE OF KOLARINA

Annex R
TO 1080-1/3032-
37/94
(OPSO C Coy)

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UNPROFOR 100Z
520-1
EDITION UNPROFOR 1
1:50,000
AREA GRID 5369

BUILDING □
STONE FENCE x-x-x
PWR line - - -



INCIDENT OCCURRED WITHIN THIS 100M AREA. X MARKS THE SPOT WHERE PTE BADAWAI FIRST REALIZED HIS LOCATION AFTER THE SHOOTING

PROTECTED B

Annex S
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

INCIDENT SITE PHOTOGRAPHS

In order to orient the observer, the photographs are used to enhance the diagram (Annex S). The photographs are numbered 1 to 6 and are explained as follows.

VIEW OF
END OF
100M
AREA
FROM
DIAGRAM



4

Photo No# 4- is a view of the end of the 100m zone and the pwr sub station mentioned by Pte Badanai

Photo No# 3- is a view of the location of the suspected shooting site

INCIDENT
AREA




Photo No# 2- is a view of approximately the halfway point of the 100m zone

AREA
SHOWN
ON THE
DIAGRAM



Photo No# 1- is a view of the start of the suspected shooting area (ref Annex S)

VIEW OF
APPROACH
FM SC54
INTO
KOLARINA

START
OF 100M
AREA
INDICATED
ON THE
DIAGRAM



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Annex S
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)


Photo No# 5- is a view of the Pwr sub station near the incident site

Photo No# 6- is an opposite view of the incident site as if heading towards SC 54

PWR SUB STATION


5

A VERBAL COMMENT
BY PTE BADANAI .
THIS WAS THE 1ST
THING HE NOTICED
AFTER THE SHOOTING.
HE SAID HE WAS
50 M AWAY FM
IT.



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ANNEX T
TO 1080-1/3032-
37/94
(OPS O C COY)



REVIEWED
POI

RTE TAKEN BY PTE
BADANAI FM Y3
TO SC54 FOR ESCORT
TASK

YELLOW RTE TAKEN BY PTE
BADANAI FM SC54
AND SUBSEQUENTLY
TO Y0 (ASC).

APPROXIMATELY 10 KM FM
SHOOTING SITE TO Y0 (ASC)

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Annex U
 To SI- 1080-
 1/3032-37/94
 (OPs O C Coy)

ILTIS PARTS DAMAGED/DESTROYED

DOOR ASSY RT/FRT	2510-21-896-8957	339.00
DOOR ASSY RT/REAR	2510-21-896-8958	292.00
DOOR ASSY LT/FRT	2510-21-896-8956	322.00
DOOR ASSY LT/REAR	2510-21-896-8959	209.00
SEAT ASSY FRT/RIGHT	B183881042A	429.00
SEAT ASSY FRT/LEFT	B183881041A	453.00
SEAT ASSY REAR/LEFT	B183885033A	386.00
SEAT ASSY REAR/RT	B183885033A	386.00
MIRROR ASS RT SIDE	2540-12-174-5457	28.00
WINDSHIELD	2510-12-173-8573	31.00
SPARE TIRE ASSY	B183601011D	186.00
TAIL LIGHT ASSY RT/REAR	6220-01-093-4439	31.00
2 X TIRES	2610-12-177-6850	197.00
WHEEL RIM	2530-12-178-4160	88.00
GAS TANK	2910-21-896-1137	623.00
EXHAUST TAIL PIPE	2990-21-896-1145	80.00
EXHAUST MUFFLER	2990-21-911-1748	250.00
EXHAUST TAIL PIPE	2990-21-904-5315	124.00
ROLL CAGE	2510-21-899-5922	1070.00
TARP 504340	2540-21-899-5853	85.00

1/3

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TARP FRAME 503930	B183898007607	450.00
DASH ASSY	6695-12-173-3416	255.00
WINDSHIELD FRAME	2510-12-173-8571	152.00
WINDSHIELD FRAME	2510-12-173-8572	45.00
BUMPER LF/REAR	2540-21-896-4528	85.00
BUMPER RT/REAR	2540-21-896-4529	96.00
MANIFOLD INTAKE	2805-12-175-1915	172.00
MANIFOLD EXHAUST	2805-21-896-1466	95.00

SIGNALS EQPT DAMAGED/DESTROYED

HANDSET H-189	5965-21-874-9993	220.00
6' ANTENNA CONTROL CABLE	5995-00-258-8423	30.67
TA43	5805-00-503-2775	415.00
SIGNAL SACHEL	5820-21-108-3059	14.98
PWR CABLE	5995-00-823-2762	These three
CONNECTOR	5935-00-856-8426	items total
ADAPTER	5935-00-892-8931	38.03

UNIFORM/PROTECTIVE EQPT DAMAGED/DESTROYED

2 X BODY ARMOUR FRAG	8470-21-909-2984	375.00 (EA)
2 X T SHIRT OD	8420-21-116-2266	2.89 (EA)
2 X CBT SHIRT	8415-211-866-1538	36.22 (EA)
2 X CBT PANTS	8415-21-899-2511	40.84
1 X ROADSIDE WARNING KIT	9905-21-872-4237	8.55
1 X JERRY CAN (GAS)	7240-21-899-8270	18.06
1 X BLANKET BALLISTIC	8470-21-909-2096	460.20

COMBAT BOOT X 2 PR	8430-21-872-4291	61.32 EA
WOOL SOCK X 2 PR	8440-21-904-0049	2.00 EA
UN BALL CAP	NPN	4.25 EA
BRISSARD X 3	8455-21-102-9400	1.62 EA
GORTEX JACKET	8415-21-911-8381	169.75
GORTEX PANTS	8415-21-911-8396	169.75
COMBAT GLOVES OUTER	8415-21-857-7791	10.44
COMBAT GLOVES INNER	8415-21-857-7758	2.33
THERMAL BOTTOMS	8415-21-859-0726	7.29
UN BLUE TOUQE	NPN	3.25

PERSONAL KIT DAMAGED OR DESTROYED

1 x wrist watch Pte Tescione	?	?


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PROTECTED B

Annex V
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(Ops O C Coy)

PHOTOGRAPHS OF VEHICLE AND PROTECTIVE EQPT

The 6 photographs consist of 2 vehicle, 2 ballistic blanket and 2 flak vest



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Annex W
To SI- 1080-
1/3032-37/94
(OPs O C Coy)

FACTS FROM C/S 0 LOG

1. The log from C/S 0 support and confirm the decision and timing which was made ref CE task on 31 Dec 94.
2. There is 1 page in particular that make reference to the decision. The page and serials were C/S 0 Log- page 158, 31 Dec 94, serial 644 and 645.

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REVIEWED BOI

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION/COTE DE SÉCURITÉ
U.N. RESTRICTED

DUTY OFFICER/OFFICIER DE SERVICE
CAPT. M. BARTON

PAGE
158

LOG SHEET BEST AVAILABLE COPY

FEUILLE DE JOURNAL

UNIT OR FORMATION/UNITÉ OU FORMATION				LOG/JOURNAL	DATE		
1001 CCOY				C/S 4	31 Dec 94		
SER. SÉQ.	TIME HEURE	FROM DE	TO A	DETAILS/DÉTAILS	ACTION/EXÉCUTION	INITS.	
641	1604			ALL ELEMENTS TODAY RECD // 1001 SR 3 BDE GET INVOLVED // NO. // CAN OFFER 456 ASSETS ALSO IF REQ'D // WILL WAIT FOR SR 33 TO RECD. AND DEVELOPE FURTHER PLAN FOR TMOZ.	ACK	jm	
642	1604	915	3	W/4 EX IN BORCA EMPLOYED // 1639 DROPP IN THIS C/S TO SPEAK TO HON	ACK	jm	
643	1612	83	4	REF EC C/S - SHOULD AVOID GRUSIC AND COLARINA. THROUGH BENKOVAC -> MSR -> VOLIC -> SC // ANY SET TIMING // ASAP DUE TO BELL THREATS.	ACK	jm	
644	1618	80	90	3 CAN W/45 CE C/S DO ELECTRICAL AT SESV FOR C/S 3 // 463	3 ACK	jm	
645	1624	3	4	HAVE EC C/S R.V. AT BENKOVAC TRAIN STA. FOR ESCORT. INFORM US OF THAT C/S 'S ETA. // LOGED W/C/S 2 ON ADM NET	ACK	jm	
646	1629	2	3	HOLDFAST DOES NOT KNOW BENKOVAC // 1043	ACK	jm	

REVIEWED BY

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION/COTE DE SÉCURITÉ

ON COMING DO (INITIAL)
OEM DE RELEVE (INITIALES)



REPORT ON INJURIES OR IMMEDIATE DEATH THEREFROM - RAPPORT EN CAS DE BLESSURE OU DE MORT SUBITE P/

To SI-1080-
1/3032-37/94
(Ops O C Coy)

1. (TO BE COMPLETED AND FORWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CFAO 24-2 WITHIN 7 DAYS OF INJURY OR DEATH)
1. (REMPLIR ET EXPÉDIER EN CONFORMITÉ AVEC L'OAFIC 24-2, DANS LES 7 JOURS DE L'ACCIDENT OU DU DÉCÈS)

SIN - NAS B71 248 335		SURNAME - NOM DE FAMILLE BADANAI		GIVEN NAMES - PRÉNOMS PHILIP MATTHEW	
RANK - GRADE Pte.		REGULAR RÉGULIÈRE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RESERVE RÉSERVE	DATE OF BIRTH DATE DE NAISSANCE 11 AUG 73	MOC - CEM 031	UNIT - UNITÉ 1RCR. CANBAT 1
DATE AND TIME OF ACCIDENT DATE ET HEURE DE L'ACCIDENT 31/12/94 1800HRS.			PLACE OF ACCIDENT - LIEU DE L'ACCIDENT KOLARINA, CROATIA - CANBAT 1 OP HARMONY		

2. INJURED PERSON'S STATEMENT OF CIRCUMSTANCES OF INJURY (WHEN PRACTICABLE)
2. DÉCLARATION DE LA VICTIME SUR LES CIRCONSTANCES DES BLESSURES (SI PRATICABLE)

Driving this back from SC54 when we were turning the corner
approx 20 SEBS facing us with weapons tried to wave
us down to stop if SEBS tried waving us
down so we drove through, they opened fire on us
hitting us both. I then drove directly to the
hospital approx 15 or 30 min
written by R70 009 947 MEX1 BUTLER
FOR PTE BADANAI P/

I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE STATEMENT OF HOW THE INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED
J'ATTESTE PAR LES PRÉSENTES QUE L'EXPOSÉ CI-DESSUS DÉCRIT EXACTEMENT COMMENT J'AI SUBI MES BLESSURES

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS TO THE STATEMENT SIGNATURE DU TÉMOIN DE LA DÉCLARATION	DATE	SIGNATURE
<i>[Signature]</i>	01-01-95	<i>[Signature]</i>

3. MEDICAL OFFICER'S STATEMENT - DÉCLARATION DU MÉDECIN

A. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INJURIES OR CAUSE OF DEATH - DESCRIPTION DÉTAILLÉE DES BLESSURES OU LA CAUSE DE LA MORT

- ① GSW ④ Sacrum, inner cortex not penetrated - Debrided
- ② Abrasion ⑥ upper back - cleaned & dressed.
- ③ Minor shrapnel (fragments) wounds ⑧ arm, superficial only.

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B. 1. ARE THE INJURIES SERIOUS? YES NO
ES-CE-QUE LES BLESSURES SONT GRAVES? OUI NON

OR 2. LIKELY TO CAUSE A PERMANENT DISABILITY? YES NO
OU SUSCEPTIBLES DE CAUSER UNE INVALIDITÉ PERMANENTE? OUI NON

C. IF DISABILITY NOT DETERMINABLE AT THIS TIME FURTHER REPORT WILL BE MADE WITHIN 60 DAYS (NOT LONGER THAN 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF INJURY).
INVALIDITÉ IMPOSSIBLE À DÉTERMINER: UN AUTRE RAPPORT SERA PRÉPARÉ DANS 60 JOURS. (AU PLUS TARD 60 JOURS, À COMPTER DE LA DATE DE L'ACCIDENT).

IF ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL; STATE NAME AND ADDRESS - EN CAS D'ADMISSION À L'HÔPITAL, EN PRÉCISER LE NOM ET L'ADRESSE
CANBAT 1 ASC, RASTIJEVIC SECTOR SOUTH, CROATIA

MEDICAL UNIT - UNITÉ MÉDICALE CANBAT 1 ASC	DATE 01 Jan 95.	SIGNATURE (OVER TYPEWRITTEN NAME, RANK AND APPOINTMENT) SIGNATURE (AU-DESSUS DU NOM, GRADE ET NIVEAU DACTYLOGRAPHIES) <i>[Signature]</i>
---	--------------------	--

REPORT ON INJURIES OR IMMEDIATE DEATH - RAPPOR EN CAS DE BLESSURE OU DE MORT SUBITE I

1. (TO BE COMPLETED AND FORWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CFAO 24-2 WITHIN 7 DAYS OF INJURY OR DEATH)
 (REMPILIR ET EXPÉDIER EN CONFORMITÉ AVEC L'OAFC 24-2, DANS LES 7 JOURS DE L'ACCIDENT OU DU DÉCÈS)

SIN - NAS RSI 806977		SURNAME - NOM DE FAMILLE TESCIONE		GIVEN NAMES - PRÉNOMS JOHN JERRY	
RANK - GRADE PLC		REGULAR / RÉGULIÈRE	DATE OF BIRTH / DATE DE NAISSANCE 18 JUL 71	MOC - CEM R 031	UNIT - UNITÉ 48 Highlanders C Coy CANBAT 1.
DATE AND TIME OF ACCIDENT / DATE ET HEURE DE L'ACCIDENT 18:00 31 DEC 94		PLACE OF ACCIDENT - LIEU DE L'ACCIDENT KOLARINA, CROATIA - CANBAT1 OPHERMUNY			

2. INJURED PERSON'S STATEMENT OF CIRCUMSTANCES OF INJURY (WHEN PRACTICABLE)
 DÉCLARATION DE LA VICTIME SUR LES CIRCONSTANCES DES BLESSURES (SI PRATICABLE)

DRIVING THIS BACK FROM SC54 when we were turning the corner approx 200m facing us with weapons trying to wrap us down. told not to stop if snipers tryed having us down so we drove through, they opened fire on us hitting us both at BADASS point directly. to the hospital approx 15 at 20 min.
 WRITTEN BY R 031 809-977 MJP BUTLER FOR PTE TESCIONE

I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE STATEMENT OF HOW THE INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED
 J'ATTESTE PAR LES PRÉSENTES QUE L'EXPOSÉ CI-DESSUS DÉCRIT EXACTEMENT COMMENT J'AI SUBI MES BLESSURES

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS TO THE STATEMENT / SIGNATURE DU TÉMOIN DE LA DÉCLARATION	DATE	SIGNATURE
<i>[Signature]</i>	01-01-95	<i>[Signature]</i>

3. MEDICAL OFFICER'S STATEMENT - DÉCLARATION DU MÉDECIN

A. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INJURIES OR CAUSE OF DEATH - DESCRIPTION DÉTAILLÉE DES BLESSURES OU LA CAUSE DE LA MORT
 Gunshot wounds x 4 possibly 5
 1x entry + exit (L) side of head
 1x entry (R) side of head + lodged above (L) zygoma.
 1x entry + exit (L) trapezius
 1x entry + exit (R) deltoid.
 possibly 1x (L) 2nd + 3rd finger
 For surgical debridement

REVIEWED BOI

B. 1. ARE THE INJURIES SERIOUS? / ES-CE-QUE LES BLESSURES SONT GRAVES? YES NO
 OR 2. LIKELY TO CAUSE A PERMANENT DISABILITY? / OU SUSCEPTIBLES DE CAUSER UNE INVALIDITÉ PERMANENTE? YES NO

C. IF DISABILITY NOT DETERMINABLE AT THIS TIME FURTHER REPORT WILL BE MADE WITHIN 60 DAYS (NOT LONGER THAN 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF INJURY).
 INVALIDITÉ IMPOSSIBLE À DÉTERMINER: UN AUTRE RAPPORT SERA PRÉPARÉ DANS 60 JOURS. (AU PLUS TARD 60 JOURS, À COMPTER DE LA DATE DE L'ACCIDENT).

IF ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL; STATE NAME AND ADDRESS - EN CAS D'ADMISSION À L'HÔPITAL, EN PRÉCISER LE NOM ET L'ADRESSE
 CANBAT 1 US & 5th FLEET MAR 4 ZHERETS

MEDICAL UNIT - UNITÉ MÉDICALE CANBAT 1 RCR US	DATE 31 DEC 94	SIGNATURE (OVER TYPEWRITTEN NAME, RANK AND APPOINTMENT) SIGNATURE (AU-DESSUS DU NOM, GRADE ET NIVEAU DACTYLOGRAPHIES) CAPT Conway D.C.
---	-------------------	--

To SI 1080-
 1/3032-37/94
 (Ops O C Coy)

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ALERT MEASURES MATRIX

ALERT STATE	SITUATION	MEASURES TO BE IMPLEMENTED	
GREEN	Normal situation. Only incidental hostile acts to be expected against UNPROFOR personnel. This alert state is aimed at the protection of UNPROFOR personnel and installations and the execution of peacekeeping tasks.	101	Self protection procedures as appropriate including wearing of fragmentation vests and helmets.
		102	Review and exercise of measures required for states of ORANGE and RED.
		103	Alert warning lists maintained for personnel living outside of United Nations installations.
		104	Identification checks conducted.
ORANGE	Rising tensions locally or across the mission area. Hostile acts are to be expected against UNPROFOR personnel on a regular basis. This alert state is aimed at the protection of UNPROFOR personnel and installations and the execution of peacekeeping tasks in a more guarded posture.	201	Double manning of all Observation Posts and Checkpoints.
		202	Closing of non-essential Observation Posts and Checkpoints.
		203	Establish Identification Checkpoints within area of responsibility.
		204	Cancellation of leave.
		205	Submission of SITREPs to higher Headquarters every two hours.
		206	Reserves to be placed on Enhanced State of Readiness. Time to be detailed.
		207	Increased patrolling of United Nations installations.
		208	Essential movement only permitted outside of United Nations installations.
		209	All personnel moving outside of United Nations installations to be wearing protective clothing and to be armed (less ammunition).
		210	Area wardens to alert isolated personnel.
		211	Isolated positions to be recalled.

A-1/2

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(1)

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RAAKZYUW RCCLHBF2062 0310214-KKKK--RCCLPZB RCCLQBA.

1080-1
RECEIVED

ZNY KKKKK

31 JAN 1995

R 301350Z JAN 95

FM NDHQ EXPORT OTTAWA

TO RCCLQBA/CCUNPROFOR CAMP PRIMOSTEN//CANLOGBAT//

(2) NTF
out of our hands now
COS is aware of sit
Nothing further to deal
with at this time

RCCRKVA/HQ SSF PETAWAWA//G1//

RCCRKVA/2 SVC BN PETAWAWA//ADJT//

INFO RCCLPZB/CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//G1// ←

[Signature]
CPT
G1
6507
2.2.95
17

BT

PROTECTED B D PERS A 007

SUBJ: CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (CHRC)

REFS: A: YOUR OR 175 291326Z DEC 94 - NOT RECEIVED - DO YOU REQUIRE

B. CHRC COMPLAINT FORM FILE NO H33435

1. YOUR CONCERNS AT REF A NOTED. HOWEVER ARISE FROM MISUNDERSTANDING OF PROCESS. IN COMPLAINTS AGAINST SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS NAMED AS RESPONDENTS CHRC DEALS DIRECTLY. THERE IS NO OBLIGATION ON CHRC TO DEAL THROUGH CHAIN OF COMMAND.
2. ALSO, CHRC NOT BOUND BY FINDINGS OF B OF I, BUT MAY USE AS EVIDENCE IN INVESTIGATION. FURTHER, STANDARDS OF PROOF USED BY CHRC MAY BE SOMEWHAT BROADER THAN THOSE OF B OF I
3. PTE TOBIN, AS RESPONDENT, SHOULD REPLY DIRECTLY TO CHRC HONESTLY AND FORTHRIGHTLY, TO THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY. JAG STAFF MAY PROVIDE

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PROTECTED B

PAGE 2 RCCLHBF2062 PROTECTED B

ADVICE, BUT DO NOT GENERALLY ACT AS COUNSEL IN SUCH CASES

BT

#2062

♥JAS021 DELIVERED 0310312 117243

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
K0K 3R0

1080-1 (COMD) ← PA

27 January 1995

Distribution List

CANCON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. Find enclosed new CANCONUNPROFOR Rules of Engagement (ROE) which are to be considered as orders.
2. One of the major changes from the previous ROE is the stated use of deadly force under specified circumstances. It is to be noted that this type of force is not permitted to defend property. Abbreviated unit ROEs (ie. rifle butt cards) are allowed as long as they comply with CANCONUNPROFOR Rules of Engagement.

RR Crabbe

R.R. Crabbe
Major-General
Commander

Enclosure: CANCONUNPROFOR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1/2 --

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Distribution List

External

CANBAT 1/CO
CANBAT 2/CO
CANLOGBAT/CO

Internal

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G4
G5 PA
G5 Legal

2/2

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CANCONUNPROFOR
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT



AUTHORITY

1. CANCONUNPROFOR PERSONNEL MAY USE DEADLY FORCE:
 - A. TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, OTHER UN PERSONNEL OR PERSONS AND AREAS UNDER THEIR PROTECTION AGAINST DIRECT ATTACK, ACTING UNDER THE ORDER OF THE SENIOR RANK AT THE SCENE;
 - B. TO RESIST ATTEMPTS BY FORCE TO PREVENT CANCONUNPROFOR FROM DISCHARGING ITS DUTIES.

2. STATUS FOR PD FROM _____ TO _____
 - A. RULE NO ONE _____
 - B. RULE NO TWO _____
 - C. RULE NO THREE _____
 - D. RULE NO FOUR _____
 - E. RULE NO FIVE _____
 - F. RULE NO SIX _____
 - G. RULE NO SEVEN _____

3. CHALLENGING
 - A. CHALLENGE IN ENGLISH BY SHOUTING:
UN! - STOP OR I WILL FIRE!
 - B. CHALLENGE IN SERBO-CROAT BY SHOUTING:
UJEDINJENE NACIJE! - STANI ILI PUCAM!
(U: YEDINYENE NATSIYE! - STANI ILI PUTSAM!)

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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. **RULE NUMBER ONE: **AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS****
 - A. OPTION A: NO AUTHORITY
 - B. OPTION B: AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS
 2. **RULE NUMBER TWO: **STATUS OF WEAPONS****
 - A. OPTION A: WEAPONS CARRIED WITH LOADED MAGAZINES
 - B. OPTION B: WEAPONS CARRIED CHARGED AND MADE SAFE
 3. **RULE NUMBER THREE: **RESPONSE TO HOSTILE INTENT WITHOUT USE OF DEADLY FORCE****
 - A. OPTION A: OBSERVE AND REPORT, WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OWN FORCE
 - B. OPTION B: OBSERVE AND REPORT. STAY IN PLACE. MAKE CONTACT AND ESTABLISH LIASON WITH OPPOSING FORCES AND/OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED
 - C. OPTION C: OBSERVE AND REPORT. STAY IN PLACE. WARN AGGRESSOR OF INTENT TO USE FORCE AND DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE BY APPROPRIATE MEANS WITHOUT OPENING FIRE. (COCK WEAPONS, DEPLOY TROOPS ETC.)
 4. **RULE NUMBER FOUR: **RESPONSE TO A HOSTILE ACT WITH THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE****
 - A. OPTION A: TAKE IMMEDIATE PROTECTION MEASURES. OBSERVE AND REPORT. WARN AGGRESSOR OF INTENT TO USE DEADLY FORCE AND DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE. WARNING SHOTS ARE AUTHORIZED. REPORT ACTION TAKEN. IF HOSTILE ACT DOES NOT CEASE AND LIFE IS THREATENED OPTION B CAN BE ORDERED BY SENIOR RANK PRESENT.
 - B. OPTION B: ON ORDER, OPEN FIRE. REPORT ACTION TAKEN
- NOTE:** IN THE EVENT OF OPTION A OR B THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ARE AUTHORIZED
- A. WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OWN FORCE;
 - B. REMAIN IN PLACE AND DEFEND, OR
 - C. MOVE THROUGH TO ESCAPE AND PRESERVE OWN FORCE.

2/4

REVIEWED 801

5. RULE NUMBER FIVE: **RESPONSE TO HOSTILE ACT (SELF DEFENCE)**

ANYTIME IN A SITUATION OF SELF-DEFENCE, TAKE IMMEDIATE PROTECTION MEASURES AND/OR RETURN FIRE WITHOUT CHALLENGING. REPORT ACTION TAKEN.

6. RULE NUMBER SIX: **DISARMAMENT OF PARAMILITARY, CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS**

A. OPTION A: NO AUTHORITY GRANTED

B. OPTION B: AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED. IN DOING SO, USE THE MINIMUM AND PROPORTIONAL FORCE NECESSARY UP TO AND INCLUDING THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE IF HOSTILE INTENT SO WARRANTS OR A HOSTILE ACT IS COMMITTED. HAND OVER TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

NOTE: THE SELECTION OF OPTION A OR B IS BASED UPON THE ASSIGNED TASK OF THE UNIT. (IE. OPTION B WOULD BE APPLICABLE FOR ELEMENTS OPERATING IN THE ZONE OF SEPARATION IN THE UNPAs)

7. RULE NUMBER SEVEN: **CONTROL OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS**

A. OPTION A: MANNING, PREPARATION, MOVEMENT AND FIRING OF WEAPONS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PROHIBITED.

B. OPTION B: DESIGNATED ACTIVITY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PERMITTED TO INCLUDE:

- (1) OVERT MANNING OF WEAPONS
- (2) MOVEMENT OF WEAPONS
- (3) FIRING OF WEAPONS
- (4) OTHERS TO BE SPECIFIED

8. DURING NORMAL DAY-TO-DAY SITUATIONS THE FOLLOWING STATUS APPLIES:

RULE NUMBER ONE	OPTION B
RULE NUMBER TWO	OPTION A
RULE NUMBER THREE	OPTION B
RULE NUMBER FOUR	OPTION A
RULE NUMBER FIVE	PERMANENT
RULE NUMBER SIX	OPTION A OR B
RULE NUMBER SEVEN	OPTION A

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT GUIDELINES

FOR ISSUE TO ALL PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED TO CARRY ARMS AND AMMUNITION IN UNPROFOR

GENERAL RULES

1. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE IN SELF DEFENCE.
2. IN ALL SITUATIONS YOU ARE TO USE THE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY. FIRE ARMS MUST ONLY BE USED AS A LAST RESORT.

OPENING FIRE

3. YOU MAY ONLY OPEN FIRE AGAINST A PERSON IF HE/SHE IS COMMITTING OR ABOUT TO COMMIT AN ACT LIKELY TO ENDANGER LIFE AND THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO STOP THE HOSTILE ACT. DEPENDENT ALWAYS ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF SUCH ACTS:
 - A. FIRING OR BEING ABOUT TO FIRE A WEAPON;
 - B. PLANTING, DETONATING OR THROWING EXPLOSIVE DEVICES; AND
 - C. DELIBERATELY DRIVING A VEHICLE AT A PERSON, WHERE THERE IS NO OTHER WAY OF STOPPING HIM/HER.
4. IF YOU HAVE TO OPEN FIRE YOU SHOULD:
 - A. FIRE ONLY AIMED SHOTS (UNLESS THEY ARE WARNING SHOTS IN THE AIR);
 - B. FIRE NO MORE ROUNDS THAN NECESSARY; AND
 - C. TAKE ALL REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS NOT TO INJURE ANYONE OTHER THAN YOUR TARGET.

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RA

1080-1(DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3R0

24 January 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
LOSS OF NIGHT OBSERVATION
DEVICE - SERIAL NUMBER 0759

References: A. 1080-1 (CO) 16 Dec 94 (enclosed)
B. 1080-1 (OIC Sup) 24 Oct 94 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed are the Summary Investigation and Commanding Officer's comments regarding the above incident.
2. I support the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer as amended by the Commanding Officer. I am convinced that he has taken appropriate measures to correct the situation and prevent re-occurrence.
4. The Commanding Officer CANLOGBAT is to submit the necessary documents so that the loss can be written off at public expense.
5. Any further inquiries into this matter, contact the G1, Canadian Contingent.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

- Enclosure 1 - Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry
- Enclosure 2 - Commanding Officer's Comments
- Enclosure 3 - Summary Investigation

Distribution List (see page 2)

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Enclosures: 3

- Enclosure 1 - Summary Of Contingent Board Of Inquiry
- Enclosure 2 - Commanding Officer's Comments
- Enclosure 3 - Summary Investigation

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ACTION

NDHQ Ottawa//J1 Coord//
HQUNPROFOR Zagreb//CMPAO//
CCUNPROFOR CANLOGBAT Primosten//CO// (less encls)

INFORMATION

CANCON Det Primosten//G5 Legal//

2/2

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PA
1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

24 January 1995


Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 16 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92 (enclosed)

1. Find references A and B enclosed. You will note that it concerns damage to private property belonging to two civilians in the village of Han Ivica in the municipality of Kiseljak in April 94. CAMBAT 2 recommends that this claim be honoured by UNPROFOR.

2. Any further inquiries into this matter, should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.


I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosure: 1

UN RESTRICTED **REVIEWED 801**



Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia



MEMORANDUM

File Number: 1080-1

Date: 23 JAN 95

Subject: BOI

Refs: FAX J3OPS

1. Answer to questions:

a. All SMP vels have chains (or should have) as a checklist item.

b. Winter driving tests are taught as part of FAAC Driv Wheeled Use and units are responsible to conduct lectures and refresher trg for winter driving.

c. Units will have to provide that info. I believe this trg is done back in Canada and may have been part of pre deployment trg. Unit TO's are responsible for vel safety / trg.

2. Yours

REVIEWED BOI

[Signature]
GAT
GAT

002140

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PA

1080-1 (G1)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
KOK 3RO

22 January 1995

Distribution List

PROVISION OF WRITE-OFF VOUCHER
9 PLATOON HOUSE FIRE - CANBAT 1
3 FEBRUARY 1994

References: A. Annex A to Log Dir 205 Dated Jun 92 (enclosed)

A. UNPROFOR/CAN/4/0302 6 Jan 95 (enclosed)

B. 1080-1 (G1) 16 Aug 94

B. MP Report South 549/001/94 22 Feb 94

C. MP Report South 549/018/94 22 Mar 94

1. Enclosed find the Write-Off Voucher regarding the Summary Investigation into 9 Platoon House Fire, CANBAT 1 on 3 February 1994 which you have requested at reference B.

2. Any further inquiries into this matter, should be directed to the G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'I.W. Anderson', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosure 1 UNPROFOR/CAN/4/0302 6 JAN 95

Enclosure 2 Write-Off Voucher

1/2

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DISTRIBUTION LIST

Claims, Property Survey & Investigation Unit (thru
Chief Logistics Officer)

2/2

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PA
1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

22 January 1995

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 10 Jan 95 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 14 Jan 95 (enclosed)
C. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92

1. Find references A and B enclosed. You will note that it concerns minor theft which does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR.
2. Future inquiries into this matter, should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'I.W. Anderson', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 2

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19 JAN 1995

OAAKZYUW RCCLNWA0006 0182032-KKKK--RCCLQBA.

ZNY KKKKK

①

1080-1

O 182025Z JAN 95

FM CCUNPROFOR RASTEVIC//CANBAT 1/OPS O//
TO RCCLQBA/CCUNPROFOR CAMP PLESO//COMD/CQS/G3/PAFFO//

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

RCCPJSA/NDOC OTTAWA

RCCPJSA/NDHQ OTTAWA//J3 OPS//

RCESCGA/LFCHQ ST HUBERT//G3//

RCCPJSA/NDHQ OTTAWA//DGPA/DGCMS/D PER A//

③ PA

RCCRKVA/1 RCR PETAWAWA//OC REAR PARTY//

RCCRKVA/HQ SSF PETAWAWA//COMD//

RCCBJQA/LFCAHQ TORONTO//G3//

BT

PROTECTED B OPS O 439

SUBJ: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT REPORT

REF: CFAO 4-13

1. AT APPROX 1900 HRS, 18 JAN 95, AREA OF NOVIGRAD, CROATIA UTM GRID
WJ 445 915

2. 5-7 RDS OF MG FIRE WAS OBSV BY CANBAT 1 OP SC 38 AT GRID WJ 445
915 APPROX 2-3 RDS LANDED WITHIN 15-20M OF SC 38. THIS INCIDENT IS
BEING CONSIDERED AS POTENTIAL DIRECT TARGETING OF UNPROFOR. CANBAT 1
IS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION, IN ADDITION A REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE

① NTE
Rec'd at 22:15
Called B-3, no action
till AM. For copy to PFC
in AM.

Mon
64
18 Jan 95 6520

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PAGE 2 RCCLNWA0006 PROTECTED B

TO THE CROATIAN ARMY LO TO INVESTIGATE THIS INCIDENT FURTHER

3. B COY, 1 RCR

4. TBC

5. TBC

6. NO MEDIA INVOLVEMENT AT PRESENT TIME

7. CAPT WC DESJARDINS, DO, CANBAT 1, 2208

BT

#0006

♥JAS092 DELIVERED 0182049 704852

PROTECTED B

REVIEWED BOI

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UNPROFOR


PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

1080-6

FOR COMMCEN USE ONLY		
T NO.	UNIT HQ #	TOT
717/33		

ROUTINE PRIORITY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL UN SECRET ONLY

ORIGINATORS NO: OPS 1336	DTG: 171535A JAN 95
TO: CROATIAN COMMAND UNPROFOR ZAGREB	FROM: CANBAT 1 RASTEVIC
FAX NO: VSAT 2436	FAX NO:
ATTN: DEPUTY COMMANDER	FILE REF NO: 3120-1 (OPS) DRAFTER: J.H. VANCE, MAJ, OPS O, 2204 SIGNATURE: 
INFO:	
FAX NO:	
SUBJECT: VIDEO CAMERA CONFISCATION	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	

MESSAGE

AS ATTACHED.

REVIEWED 801

212

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SUMMARY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING THE CONFISCATION
OF A VIDEO CAMERA IN THE ZOS 16 JAN 95

1. At 161147A Jan 95, MCpl Charlebois, J.E. was commanding a B Coy CANBAT 1 patrol that consisted of two M 113 APCs which sighted two ARSK pers in uniform inside the ZOS near KASIC WJ 384 880. One of the ARSK pers was armed with a M-70 rifle and fled the scene. The patrol comd dismounted with one C-9 gunner and one rifleman to follow the fleeing ARSK pers, but stopped due to a lack of clear routes in the area. MCpl Charlebois left the remainder of the patrol mounted with the two HMG gunners providing local security to keep tensions at a low level.
2. The second ARSK pers was observed to have a video camera. MCpl Charlebois contacted the B Coy duty officer and was told to confiscate the camera. MCpl Charlebois asked the ARSK pers if he could see the camera. The ARSK pers gave the camera to MCpl Charlebois, who viewed a portion of the video tape to confirm that the ARSK pers had been filming inside the ZOS. MCpl Charlebois kept the camera. The ARSK pers refused to leave the ZOS without the camera. At this point it was noted that the ARSK pers was armed with a type 52 P3 grenade (number 8730). The grenade was confiscated without incident for the safety of the CANBAT 1 patrol.
3. UNCIVPOL and militia were contacted and attended the scene to escort the ARSK pers from the ZOS. The camera (Panasonic X8 serial number D2WA11252) and two 8mm tapes were taken to CANBAT 1 HQ on 17 Jan 95.

REVIEWED BOI

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PAGE 2 RCCPJAD3058 PROTECTED B

1. REFS A AND B DIRECTED THAT QUOTE ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE LOCAL COMD AND HIS ENGR ADVISOR REGARDING THE LEVEL OF RISK WILL BE REFERRED TO THE NEXT HIGHER CDN LEVEL OF COMD UNQUOTE. REF B FURTHER STATED THAT QUOTE SHOULD THE CO AND ENGR ADVISOR OF A PARTICULAR UNIT DISAGREE ON WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF RISK, THE MATTER IS TO BE REFERRED TO THE CONTINGENT COMD UNQUOTE. THIS DIRECTION RESULTED PRIMARILY FROM THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE MINE RELATED DEATH OF A CCUNPROFOR ENGR IN JUN 94 AND THE ASSOCIATED CORRESPONDENCE AT REFS C TO G
2. REF H REQ THAT REFS A AND B BE RESCINDED AND THAT IT BE RECOGNIZED THAT CO S ARE EMPOWERED TO TAKE ALL OP DECISIONS ON THE GROUND
3. CONCERNS RAISED AT REF H ARE CLEARLY VALID. IT IS FULLY AGREED THAT UNIT CO S HAVE AND MUST CONTINUE TO HAVE THE LATITUDE TO TAKE ALL OP DECISIONS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR ASSIGNED TASKS. ACCORDINGLY, REFS A AND B ARE RESCINDED
4. PARA 5 OF THE COMMENTS BY THE COMMANDER OF A COMMAND DATED 25 OCT 94 ON THE BOARD OF INQUIRY AT REF C WILL BE AMENDED TO REFLECT PARA 2 AND 3 ABOVE

BT

#3058

♥JAS090 DELIVERED 0132113 500537

PROTEC 101

REVIEWED BOI

PROTECTED B (UNCLAS less enclosure)

National Defence

Défense nationale

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

Quartier général de la Défense nationale
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

3451-9-034/352-3 (J3 Ops)

12 January 1995

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
DAMAGE TO AIRPORT PALACE HOTEL

References: A. Summary Investigation 1080-2-3127-05-94 (CANBAT 2
Maint O) 8 July 94

B. Comments of the Commander of a Command 5 December 1994
(enclosed)

1. Reference A was a summary investigation concerning an individual assigned to the CANBAT 2 (12 RBC) Battle Group who became intoxicated and damaged a hotel while on leave.

2. While the details of the specific investigation are no longer an issue, reference B is being forwarded for your information in dealing with future cases. Specifically, paragraph 2 of reference B outlines an option for dealing with incidents involving compensation in NATO countries.

For 
H.C. Ross
Colonel
J3 Operations
for Chief of Defence Staff

Distribution List

Action

CCUNPROFOR COS/G1

Information

LFCHQ G1
NDHQ D Law/A


NTF
Noted by COS and G1
Howard
63
2/11

REVIEWED B01

PROTECTED B (UNCLAS less enclosure)

PROTECTED B

Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff




Sous-chef d'état-major de la Défense

05 December 1994

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION -
 DAMAGE TO AIRPORT PALACE HOTEL
COMMENTS OF THE COMMANDER OF A COMMAND

1. I have reviewed this Summary Investigation and fully support the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the comments and actions of the Commanding Officer and the Deputy Commander CCUNPROFOR.

2. This investigation discusses two methods by which Gunner Strahl could pay for the damages he caused to the hotel; one of which was selected. A third option for compensation is available but was not mentioned. In that the damage occurred in a NATO country, application for damages by the injured party, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 6 to NATO SOFA QR&O Appendix XVI, could be made. Although I believe that in this case the proper action has been taken, Comd CCUNPROFOR has been advised of this additional method of compensation.


 L.G. Mason
 VAdm

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15 JAN 1995

Headquarters
The Canadian Logistics Battalion
Primosten, Croatia

② GS / ABA
64 /
Pls spk.
not
COS
19/1/95

1901-1

CONTINGENT			
INTER			
COS	PA	15 Jan	ABA
CR		25/1	

1901-1 (CO)

17 January 1995

CANLOGBAT ROTO 4 END TOUR PROJECTS

Ref: A. 1901-1 (DCO) 20 Oct 94

1. Ref A, establ priorities to help CANLOGBAT to develop respective Coy work plans. Priorities were divided into two groups. Pri One, those forecast day to day activities in "direct" support to our mission to maintain CANCON and second, those projects that were generally in "indirect" support of our mission. To date, most deadlines set by Ref A have been met. The following is a revised list of both CANLOGBAT and Joint CANLOGBAT and CANCONHQ projects:

2. CANLOGBAT ongoing ops:

SER (a)	ITEM (b)	DEADLINE (c)	OPI/OCI (d)
1.	Replen Ops		Ops O OC S&T
2.	Admin sp to replen ops		OC Admin
3.	Maint sp to replen ops		OC Maint
4.	Camp Security Primosten Camp Security LUKA		OC Admin OC S&T
5.	Fire and Safety Prevention		OC Admin
6.	Pers admin and wel		All OCs

3. CANLOGBAT projects:

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	CANLOGBAT Roto Instr and Handover week itinerary	27 Jan 95	DCO Ops O & Adj
2.	1st Line stocktaking finalization	03 Feb 95	OC Admin
3.	2nd line stocktaking finalization	03 Feb 95	OC S&T

⑤ A/COS
do you want to discuss any pts. by 24/1/95

③ on loop
did you discuss this

④ GS
no We did not speak about it
24/1/95

REVIEWED BY 80405 ? 15/01/95

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
4.	Scaling Review ETV & Engr eqpt	20 Jan 95	OC Meint OIC Sup
5.	CANLOGBAT technical library	30 Jan 95	OC Maint
6.	CANCON reefer sea container redistribr	30 Jan 95	Ops
7.	CANLOGBAT ADP redistribr	20 Jan 95	Sig O
8.	CANLOGBAT LAN	20 Feb 95	Sig O
9.	CANLOGBAT proposed Sibenik consolidation plan	20 Feb 95	DCO
10.	Re-whse 2nd line into Sea Containers and tear down of Sprung Shelter	10 Feb 95	OC S&T Engr O
11.	Replen and Maint Concept PHI	20 Feb 95	DCO
12.	Replen and Maint Concept PH II implementation proposal	20 Feb 95	DCO

4. The fol is a list of those joint CANLOGBAT and CANCON HQ projects currently underway with proposed deadlines:

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	CODAN radio redistribr and purchase incl ident and demand of 1st line spares	20 Feb 95	G6 Sig O Maint O(a)
2.	Proposed maint sp plan for the rep & refurb of non tac amenity comm eqpt	10 Feb 95	OC Maint CC Wel Compt G4
3.	Estbl CANCON ETV and Engr spare parts scaling and unit holding policy	20 Feb 95	G4 OC S&T OC Maint
4.	Estbl CANCON EMAS and spare parts scaling and holding policy	20 Feb 95	G4 OC S&T OC Maint
5.	Re-estbl LOA for Spare Parts, G&T, Optronics, wpns and med sup	ASAP	Compt G4 OC S&T OIC F Med

REVIEWED BOI

5. We will provide an update as part of the Change of Command Board of Inquiry.



A.F. Stephen
Lieutenant-Colonel
Commanding Officer

Distribution List

External

✓
CCUNPROFOR HQ//COS/G3/G4/G6/Compt/Wel O

Internal

DCO
Ops O
OC S&T
OC Maint
OC Admin
Sig O
EngrO
OIC F Med

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PA
1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia


// January 1995

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 28 Dec 94 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 30 Dec 94 (enclosed)
B. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92

1. Find references A and B enclosed. You will note that it concerns accidents which does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR.
2. Future inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.


I.W. Anderson
Captain
for Commander

Enclosure: 2

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REVIEWED BOI

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

s.19(1)

UNPROFOR

INITIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT

MP HQ CASE REF NO:
MP PL CASE REF NO:HQ MP PL 554/58/94

To : Distr below

Subject:IMPAIRED/DRUNK DRIVING

1. Date/Time Occurred:31/12/94 AT 0.40 HRS

2. Place:CAMP PLESO, MAINGATE

3. DTG Reported to MP:N/A

4. To Whom Reported:N/A

5. Complainant:SGT SCHILLING, UN MP COY, HQ PLATOON

6. INJ/PROP/VHE/DAM involved:VEH NISSAN, UNPF 35274

7. Witnesses: /

8. Suspect(s):GAUTHIER JOSEPH, SERGEANT, [REDACTED] CANCON CAMP
PLESO ZAGREB

9. Brief Circumstances:AT 00.35 HRS, 31/12/94, CONDUCTING A ROUTINE CONTROL AT THE MAIN GATE OF PLESO CAMP, WE CONTROLLED THE DRIVER OF THE A/M VEHICLE GOING OUTSIDE. DURING THIS CONTROL, WE COULD SMELL ALCOHOL EMITTING FROM HIS BREATH. THE FIRST BREATHTEST AT 0.40 GAVE A RESULT OF 1,35 o/oo AND THE SECOND ONE AT 01.10, 1,50 o/oo. A BLOODSAMPLE WAS CARRIED OUT AT THE MASH AT 01.40. AFTER THAT, THE A/M PERSON WAS DRIVEN TO THE HOTEL NOVOGRADNA BY THE CANADIAN DUTY OFFICER.

10. MP Investigator:SGT SCHILLING

11. Other Investigator:SGT DAHLBORN

12. Final Report Due:14/01/95

Platoon Commander:

REVIEWED BOI

Signature: *[Handwritten Signature]*
Name/Rank: *GRAND ALOISRE FURIE / MAJOR*
Pl Comd: *HQ MP RANGON*
Date: *030195*

Force Provost Marshal:

Signature: _____
Name/Rank:
Date:

Distribution:

FC	
DFC	
ACOS P&L	
CPM (BH COMD)	
COO	
CMPAO	
CSIU (CAO)	
CSGO CLAIMS	
CTO	
S MAINT O	
F ENG	
LEG ADV	
UNIT	
COMD SECTOR	
FILE	

REVIEWED 30.

UMTF

: HQ40195
 : Jan 03 1995
 : Vlatka Jug
 : 01 (9410)

1 - RF : 1.1317
 2 - RF : 1.1660
 STI SE PROSJEK OBJE KALIBRACIJE : 1.1489

Promila
 Etanola
 Ered.vr.
 paralela

Broj
 viestacenja
 Prezime i Ime

Kalibracija	FRV	FRV/PAR.	Devijacija
01 - BAUTHIER JOSEPH	1.8271	1.9595	1.99 %
02 - BAUTHIER JOSEPH	2.2850	2.2400	
Standard x (2.2 promila)	1.7700		1.217



Mathe

UN RESTRICTED



Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso
Zagreb, Croatia

PA 1080-1 (G1)

2 January 1995

Chief Logistics Officer
Headquarters
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

LOSS OF PHOENIX DIGITAL
IMAGE TRANSMITTER

Reference: A. HQ CCUNPROFOR 1080-1 (G1) 21 Jun 94

1. Find enclosed a request from SMPAO to request a Write-Off Voucher in respect to the above indicated item.
2. Enclosed are completed copies of the Write-Off Voucher, Board of Survey, and MP Report on the loss of Phoenix Digital Image Transmitter.
3. Regret the delay in forwarding these documents. Any inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.

Wayne C Desjardins

W.C. Desjardins
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 5

- Enclosure 1 1080-1 (G1) 10 Oct 94
- Enclosure 2 SMPAO UNPROFOR/CAN/4/1402 15 Jul 94
- Enclosure 3 Annex A to LOG Dir June 92
- Enclosure 4 Annex B to LOG Dir June 92
- Enclosure 5 UNPROFOR MP Report 541/168/94

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OAAKZYUW RCCLNWA0002 0011032-KKKK--RCCLQBA.

ZNY KKKKK

O 011108Z JAN 95

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FM CCUNPROFOR RASTEVIC//CANBAT 1//ADJT//

↓

TO RCCLQBA/CCUNPROFOR CAMP PLESO//COMD/COS/G3/PAFFO// ←

RCCPJSA/NDOC OTTAWA

RCCPJSA/NDHQ OTTAWA//J3 OPS//

RCESCGA/LFCHQ ST HUBERT//G3//

INFO RCCPLVA/NDHQ EXPORT OTTAWA//D PERS A//

② MA.

RCCPJSA/NDHQ OTTAWA//DGPA/DGCMS//

RCCRKVA/1 RCR PETAWAWA//OC REAR PARTY//

RCCRKVA/HQ SSF PETAWAWA//G3//

RCCBJQA/LFCAHQ TORONTO//G3//

RCCLQBA/CCUNPROFOR CAMP PRIMOSTEN//LEGAL ADVISOR//

BT

PROTECTED B ADJT 834

SUBJ: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT REPORT - SHOOTING UPDATE NO 2

REFS: A. CANBAT 1 ADJT 831 010008Z JAN 95

B. CANBAT 1 ADJT 833 3120000Z DEC 94

C. CFAO 24-1

1. FURTHER TO REF A IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT:

A. PTES BADANAI AND TESCIONE WERE RETURNING FROM SC 54 TO Y13 BY

REVIEWED 801

PROTECTED B

Amend to Cont
of 1281 cont 3/1
002162

PROTECTED B

PAGE 2 RCCLNWA0002 PROTECTED B

ILTIS. AS THEY ROUNDED A CORNER IN THE AREA OF KOLARINA, WJ 5370, THEY ENCOUNTERED APPROX 20 ARSK SOLDIERS BLOCKING THE RD WITH WPNS POINTED AT THEM, MOTIONING FOR THEM TO SLOW DOWN

B. PTE BADANAI SLOWED THE VEH TO 25 KM/HR AND MOVED THROUGH AN OPENING IN THE CROWD. WHEN THE ILTIS WAS APPROX 3 METRES AWAY FROM THE CROWD THEY BEGAN RECV AUTOMATIC SA FIRE INTO THE REAR OF THE VEH

C. DESPITE BOTH PERS HAVING FRAG VESTS ON PTE BADANAI RECV TWO ROUNDS IN HIS LOWER BACK. HIS PASSENGER, PTE TESCIONE RECVD FOUR OR FIVE RDS: TWO, POSS THREE RDS IN THE HEAD, ONE IN THE LEFT SHOULDER, ONE IN THE RT UPPER ARM AND ONE THROUGH THE MIDDLE FINGER OF HIS LEFT HAND

D. DESPITE INJURIES PTE BADANAI WAS ABLE TO DRIVE THE ILTIS SOME 15 KM TO MED ATTN. BOTH CAS WERE CONSCIOUS UPON ARR AT ADV SURG CENTRE

E. INITIAL MP INVESTIGATION REVEALS 54 BULLET ENTRY HOLES (7.62MM) IN THE REAR AND SIDES OF THE VEH

2. RDS PENETRATED THE REAR OF VEH AND PASSED THROUGH SEATS AND EQPT WITH MANY LODGING IN THE FRONT TOOL COMPARTMENT. BOTH SOLDIERS WERE WEARING FRAG VESTS AND ALTHOUGH THE VESTS DID NOT STOP THE RDS THEY CERTAINLY MINIMIZED DAMAGE

3. CANBAT 1 IN CONJUNCTION WITH SEC SOUTH HQ IS STILL TRYING TO CFM

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PROTECTED B

PROTECTED B

PAGE 3 RCCLNWA0002 PROTECTED B

MEETING WITH NORTH DALMATION CORPS COMD (ARSK) AND 3 BDE COMD (ARSK)
FOR 1 JAN 95

4. MED CONDITION:

A. PTES BADANAI AND TESCIONE REMAIN IN STABLE CONDITION, PRI 3. ALL
BULLETS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM BOTH PERS. DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS
HELEVAC MAY NOT BE AFFECTED UNTIL 2 JAN. THIS IS NOT DEEMED CRITICAL
AT THIS TIME PROVIDED EVAC OCCURS WITHIN NEXT 24 TO 48 HRS.

B. MED ASSESSMENT. BOTH PERS REQ TREATMENT AT 6TH FLEET MASH ZAGREB.
PTE TESCIONE MAY REQ EAR, NOSE AND THROAT SURGERY AS WELL AS SKIN
GRAFTING. PTE BADANAI WILL REQ CLOSE ATTN DUE TO POSS BONEY TYPE
INFECTION IN LOWER BACK

C. DUE TO NATURE OF INJURIES BOTH MBRS WILL BE UNFIT DUTY FOR MIN 60
DAYS AND WILL REQ FOL UP AT NDMC. MED REPAT TO CA NECESSARY. REPL
REQ MSG TO FOL

5. MEDIA INTEREST REMAINS HIGH

6. CAPT L.R. HULSMAN, ADJT CANBAT 1, 2202

BT

#0002

♥JAS017 DELIVERED 0011048 012682

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PROTECTED B

PROTECTED A

MEMORANDUM

PA

1080-1/3029-1 (CO)

31 Dec 94

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE - SUMMARY
INVESTIGATION INTO LOSS OF
EQUIPMENT - 9 DEC 94

Refs: A. QR&O Chapter 21
B. CFAO 21-9
C. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605
D. FCPD 9 Dated Jul 92

1. [REDACTED] Capt Patchett R.W. will conduct a Summary Investigation into the loss of one ballistic jacket and one pair of binoculars on 9 Dec 94, belonging to [REDACTED] Capt P.A. Rechner.
2. The investigation will be conducted in accordance with the references and any other relevant orders or instructions.
3. The investigating officer will obtain statements from all aval witnesses and will record evidence concerning the fol:
 - a. the circumstance surrounding the loss;
 - b. when the loss took place;
 - c. when the loss was discovered;
 - d. why the loss was not noticed;
 - e. what security measures were in place;
 - f. what measures were taken to recover the loss;
 - g. who authorized the placement of the lost equipment in its location and for how long; and
 - h. the value of the lost equipment.
4. Findings/recommendations should be made to determine:
 - a. if theft was involved in the loss of the equipment;
 - b. was there any negligence on the part of any person (s);

1/2

PROTECTED A

REVIEWED BOI

PROTECTED A

- c. the administrative measures to be taken to recover the loss, and to avoid incidents of the same nature from re-occurring; and
 - d. any recommended disciplinary measures.
5. This investigation is designated Protected A.
6. The summary investigation must be delivered in triplicate to the undersigned within 14 days of receipt of these terms of reference. Should it prove impossible to complete the proceedings within that timeframe, a written explanation must be submitted before the due date.

M.G. Macdonald
M.G. Macdonald
LCol
CO

Encl: 1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ACTION

CAPT PATCHETT
G1

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2/2

PROTECTED A

s.19(1) PROTECTED B



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PA

1080-2/3032-32/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, Ontario
K0K 3R0

30 December 1994

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION - LOSS
OF C7 RIFLE - 93AA02624 CANBAT 1

References: A. CCUNPROFOR Directive 605 Oct 94
B. UNPROFOR FC Directive no 9 Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report, the Commanding Officer's Comments, and the Summary Investigation into the loss of C7 Rifle Ser 93AA02624, bolt and scope Ser 08417 on charge to [REDACTED] Cpl Foucault, KJ, a member of the engineer troop employed with CANBAT 1 on duty in Croatia.
2. I concur with both the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the Commanding Officer's recommendations. The individual was negligent in this incident as he did not provide adequate security of his weapon.
3. The soldiers involved in the loss of this weapon have been dealt with in an appropriate manner with both receiving Severe Reprimands and warned administratively for their ineffective performance as junior Non-Commissioned Officers. Additionally IAW QR&O 38.03 (4) (b) (4) Cpl Foucault will also be administered an Administrative Deduction for one-fifth the amount of the weapon amounting to \$ 414.51Cdn should the weapon not be recovered. A claim in the amount of \$2051.54 Cdn is to be raised with the United Nations to recover the cost of the rifle.

1/2

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REVIEWED BOI

002167

PROTECTED B

4. On the 8 Nov 94 the CANBAT 1 Military Police were notified that the weapon had been recovered and could be retrieved from the BENKOVAC Milicijia Detachment (Serbian Civilian Police), Inspector Milorad Kuzet stated that the rifle would be returned on 9 Nov 94 upon completion of his investigation. Several attempts have been made to recover the weapon, to date the rifle has not been returned. I wish to solicit the support of the Force Provost Marshall's Office and CIVPOL in recovering this rifle from the BENKOVAC Milicijia/Civilian Police. If the rifle is subsequently retrieved, the right of ownership is still vested in Canada and should it be returned. Any inquiries into this case should be forwarded to the G1, Canadian Contingent.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

- Enclosure 1 Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report
- Enclosure 2 Commanding Officer's Comments
- Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation 1080-1-3032-32-94 (HQ Coy) 19 Nov 94

Distribution List

Action

NDHQ Ottawa/J1 Coord
CANBAT 1 Rastevic/CO (Less Encls)
HQ UNPROFOR Zagreb/CMPAO
HQ UNPROFOR Zagreb/FPM

Information

CCHQ Det Primosten/G5 Legal

REVIEWED 001

2/2

PROTECTED B

UN RESTRICTED



AA
1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

28 December 1994

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

- References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 9 Dec 94 (enclosed)
B. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 14 Dec 94 (enclosed)
C. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 14 Dec 94 (enclosed)
D. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 14 Dec 94 (enclosed)
E. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92

1. Find references enclosed. You will note that these concerns accidents which does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR.
2. Future inquiries into this matter, should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.

Wayne Desjardins
W.C. Desjardins
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 4

UN RESTRICTED

REVIEWED 801

s.19(1)

PROTECTED A

MEMORANDUM

PA

~~1080-1/3307-06/94 (CO)~~

27 Dec 94

TERMS OF REFERENCE - SUMMARY
INVESTIGATION INTO TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
INVOLVING UNPF 19149 WITH A CIVILIAN
- 31 OCT 94

Refs: A. QR&O Chapter 21
B. QR&O Chapter 36
C. QR&O Chapter 38
D. CFAO 21-9
E. CFAO 22-10
F. CFAO 24-1
G. CFAO 38-1
H. CFAO 59-3
J. Comd CCUNPROFOR Dir 605
K. FCPD 9 Dated Jul 92

1. [REDACTED] Capt WE Miller will conduct a Summary Investigation into the events surrounding the vehicle accident on 31 Oct 94 involving a CCUNPROFOR HQ and Sp Elm Veh, UNPF 19149 and a civilian vehicle.

2. The investigation will be conducted in accordance with Refs A to K and any other relevant order or instructions.

3. The Summary Investigation shall include statements from all available witnesses, except where an officer or non-commissioned member is:

- a. currently the subject of a criminal (police) investigation;
- b. has been or is about to be charged with an offence under the National Defence Act or other Canadian Law; or
- c. has been arrested/detained in respect of any alleged act or omission which could constitute such an offence.

4. Subject to the exceptions listed for witnesses mentioned in paragraph 3, such an officer or non-commissioned member shall not be compelled to give evidence before the Summary Investigation in relation to the subject matter of the police investigation, charges, arrest or detention. Where the gathering of such evidence is deemed critical to the successful completion of the investigation, the authority

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PROTECTED A

which ordered the investigation shall be notified and the advice of the representative of the Judge Advocate General sought prior to taking any action to compel such testimony, recognizing that compelling testimony in such circumstances could have the effect of jeopardizing subsequent disciplinary proceedings.

5. The Summary Investigation shall:

- a. provide, if the incident has been investigated by the UN or Regimental Military Police, the name and address of the agency involved and identify any officers involved in the investigation. If a police report is available, it shall be forwarded with, but separate from, the investigation;
- b. obtain statements from all available witnesses to include time, date, place and details of the incident;
- c. include plans or sketches indicating how the incident occurred and the extent of any damage;
- d. provide the NATO or UN stock number, nomenclature, quantity and certified catalogue value of damaged public property;
- e. record full particulars as to how the damage occurred, the cause of the accident and any responsibility for the accident;
- f. provide information as to whether any person has or intends to make a claim against the United Nations or the Crown;
- g. provide invoices of the actual cost or estimates to support a claim for the repairs to or replacement of property, either personal, contingent or United Nations owned; and
- h. record the cause, nature and extent of all injuries sustained.

6. Findings shall be made into the following:

- a. circumstances leading to the accident;
- b. time, date and place of the accident;
- c. identification of personnel involved in the accident;
- d. the cause of the accident;

2/4

PROTECTED A

REVIEWED 801

PROTECTED A

- e. whether there was negligence on the part of anyone involved in the accident;
 - f. identification of the person(s) responsible for the accident;
 - g. the nomenclature, quantity and certified true value of any lost or damaged equipment;
 - h. whether the lost or damaged equipment was contingent owned or United Nations provided;
 - j. whether or not the personnel were on duty at the time of the accident;
 - k. whether any Canadian or United Nations rules, orders or instructions were contravened; and
 - m. action taken to repair or replace damaged public property.
7. Recommendations shall be made on:
- a. action required to prevent reoccurrence;
 - b. any of the findings in paragraph 5 or 6 where applicable and appropriate; and
 - c. any administration or disciplinary action to be taken.
8. This investigation shall be classified as deemed necessary by the Investigating Officer, but not less than PROTECTED A/UN RESTRICTED.
9. If for any reason the investigation cannot be completed and delivered to the undersigned by 15 Jan 95, the Investigating Officer will notify the Commanding Officer through the Adjutant, in writing, stating the cause of the delay and the estimated date of completion.

M.G. Macdonald
M.G. Macdonald
LCol
CO

Distribution List (Page 4)

3/4
PROTECTED A

REVIEWED BOI

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DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

Capt Miller
G1

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4/4

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s.19(1)

Headquarters Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
K0K 3R0

PA

1080-1 (DCOMD)

23 December 1994

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE - BOARD OF INQUIRY
CHANGE OF COMMAND CANADIAN LOGISTICS BATTALION

References: A. QR&O 21
B. CFAO 21-9
C. UNPROFOR FCPD 9 27 Jun 92
D. 1080-1 (COS) Nov 93

1. A board of inquiry, composed as hereunder, shall assemble at the call of the President, but not later than 30 January 1995, to investigate and report on activities associated with the Change of Command of CANLOGBAT:

- a. President - [REDACTED] Maj Elvish, CANLOGBAT Primosten;
- b. Member - [REDACTED] Maj Fitzsimmons, CANLOGBAT Primosten; and
- c. Member - [REDACTED] Capt O'Neil, CANLOGBAT Primosten.

2. The board shall investigate and report on operations and training, logistic, maintenance, personnel, administration, public funds and property, and non-public funds and property of CANLOGBAT.

3. The investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of QR&O, Chapter 21, CFAO 21-9.

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REVIEWED BOI

Protected A

4. The Board shall examine documents, and take any other measures deemed necessary, in order to determine and record the state of CANLOGBAT as to:

- a. operations and training;
- b. personnel;
- c. administration;
- d. public funds and property; and
- e. non-public funds and property.

5. The Board is asked to identify applicable reference documents and indicate where they are available to the unit, rather than include copies in the report.

6. Findings shall be promulgated at the discretion of the President to meet the local requirements. The Board's reports on operations and training, personnel, administration, and non-public funds and property are to be in a degree of detail that ensures an accurate record of operational and administrative information. The Board's reports on public funds, stores and equipment must be produced in the form of a detailed written report.

7. The Board will determine whether a report is required in accordance with reference C and prepare such report if applicable.

8. Recommendations will be made in regards to any outstanding issue(s) that will require specific action on the part of either the departing or in-coming Commanding Officer.

9. This investigation will be classified as deemed appropriate

REVIEWED 801

Protected A

10. The minutes of the proceeding shall be delivered to the undersigned no later than 1 March 1994. Should it prove impossible to complete the proceedings by that time, an explanation must be submitted before the due date.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Distribution List

Action

External

CANLOGBAT//CO

Information

Comd

3/3

Protected A

REVIEWED BOI

s.19(1)

PROTECTED B

1080-1 (G1)

01 01 191610Z DEC 94 PP PP KKKK

COS 364

CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//COS//
LFWAHQ EDMONTON//G1 SCS//
INFO NDHQ OTTAWA//J1/J3 OPS//
LFCA ST HUBERT//G1/G3 OPS//
DISTHQ REGINA//G1//
2 PPCLI WINNIPEG//CO//
R REGINA RIF REGINA//CO//

PROTECTED B COS 364

SUBJ: BOI - DEATH - ██████████ CAPT JP DESCOSTE - 2 PPCLI

REFS: A. LFWAHQ G1 SCS 3756 132039Z DEC 94

B. CCUNPROFOR BOI 1080-1 (G1) 29 MARCH 1994

1. WRT PARA FIVE OF REF A, THIS HQ PLANS NO FURTHER ACTION
2. AT REF B COMD DIRECTION IS QUITE CLEAR, QUOTE ALTHOUGH CPL BOUCKS POOR JUDGEMENT WAS THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, I AGREE THAT ANY DISCIPLINARY ACTION WOULD, AT THIS TIME, SERVE NO PURPOSE. UNQUOTE
3. ANY FURTHER INQUIRIES INTO THIS CASE SHOULD BE DIRECTED THROUGH YOUR CHAIN OF COMD TO CCUNPROFOR G1

W.C. DESJARDINS, CAPT, G1, 6507

M.G. MacDonald
M.G. MACDONALD, LCOL, COS, 6501

REVIEWED 801

PROTECTED B

002177

Maj Burns
22 Dec
Afternoon

7240

UN RESTRICTED



1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

16 December 1994

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 30 Nov 94 (enclosed)
B. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92

1. Find reference A enclosed. You will note that it concerns an accident which does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR.
2. Future inquiries into this matter, should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.

Wayne C Desjardins

W.C. Desjardins
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 1

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CANADIAN CONTINGENT
CONTINGENT CANADIEN
CANBAT 2

RECEIVED

12 DEC 1994

RCD BG 1080-1 (Adjt)

The Royal Canadian Dragoons
Battle Group
CCUNPROFOR, CANBAT 2
Visoko, B-H

1080-4
CONTINGENT
QUARTERS
5/ ADM ACTION RD


30 November 1994

Distribution List

SUMMARY DISPOSAL OF INCIDENTS
WITHOUT CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

- Refs: A. FCPO No (9)
- B. BH Comd SOP 413

1. Enclosed is a completed Annex C to Reference A regarding a vehicle accident involving two CANBAT 2 vehicles.
2. Major damage was sustained by the CANBAT 2 vehicles, and one CANBAT 2 soldier sustained a very minor injury. As this accident does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR, it has been submitted as a Summary Disposal.
3. Any questions regarding this matter should be directed to the undersigned at local 5502.


T.S. Newton
Captain
Adjutant
For Commanding Officer

Enclosure: 1

Distribution List

Action

BH Command Rear/CAO

Information

HQ CCUNPROFOR Zagreb/G1

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Annex C to
FCPD No.(9)
Dated June 1992

SUMMARY DISPOSAL OF INCIDENTS WITHOUT CONVENING A BOI

1. Reference CANBAT 2 MP Report VIS 550-95-94
Convening Order to Investigate vehicle accident.
2. As the accident is within the conditions specified in the Field Administration Handbook, I recommend that a BOI should NOT be held.
3. The following is a description of how the accident occurred:
See MP Report
4. The accident was immediately reported to C/S 0 and a MP Investigation was conducted (action taken).
5. There was a minor injury to military personnel.
6. There was major damage to Mission Vehicles No 25567 and 15792.
7. There was no damage to civilian property/vehicles.
8. I recommend that the cost be written off against N/A (State the amount if known).
9. Military Police Investigation Report is attached as Annex A.

SIGNATURE T.S. Newton, Adjt RANK Captain CANBAT 2

DATE November 1994

A-1/2

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10. I agree/disagree with the above report.

SIGNATURE *J.P.G. MacIntyre* RANK Major

NAME J.P.G. MacIntyre

APPOINTMENT/TITLE OC HQ Sqn CANBAT 2

DATE 30 November 1994

If disagree, give reasons:

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A-2/2

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UN RESTRICTED



PF

1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia

16 December 1994

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

References: A. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) 30 Nov 94 (enclosed)
B. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92

1. Find reference A enclosed. You will note that it concerns an accident which does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR.
2. Future inquiries into this matter, should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.

Wayne C Desjardins
W.C. Desjardins
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 1

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REVIEWED BOI

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PA

1080-2/4271-012/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, Ontario
K0K 3R0

15 December 1994

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION - LOSS
OF C7 RIFLE - 93AA03030 CANBAT 2

References: A. CCUNPROFOR Directive 605 Oct 94
B. UNPROFOR FC Directive no 9 Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report, the Commanding Officer's Comments, and the Summary Investigation into the loss of C7 Rifle Ser 93AA03030, bolt and scope Ser 19746 on charge to [REDACTED] Cpl Beck, RG, 711 Med Assist, a member of the Forward Surgical Team (FST) deployed with CANBAT 2 on duty in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2. I concur with both the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the Commanding Officer's recommendations. The individual was not negligent in this incident as normal and appropriate safety precautions had been followed.
3. The soldier involved in the loss of the weapon could not handle the weapon and treat the casualty at the same time. However, all contingent Commanding Officers are hereby directed to ensure that appropriate procedures are in place to ensure the weapons of medical assistants are properly stowed and secured in the ambulances should a similar situation arise in the future. No disciplinary or administrative action has been taken against any of the soldiers involved. The C7 rifle, bolt and scope are to be written off in accordance with QR&O 36.20 (3)(b)(i). A claim in the amount of \$2051.54 Cdn will be raised with the United Nations to recover the cost of the rifle. CF152 write-off report is to be staffed by the CANBAT2 through CANLOBAT.

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REVIEWED BOI

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4. On the 15 Sep 94 the BiH MP stated that the rifle had been recovered and would be returned. To date the rifle has not been returned. I wish to solicit the support of the Force Provost Marshall's Office and CIVPOL in recovering this rifle from the BiH MP's/Civilian Police. If the rifle is subsequently retrieved, the right of ownership is still vested in Canada and should it be returned. Any inquiries into this case should be forwarded to the G1, Canadian Contingent.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1 Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report
Enclosure 2 Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation 1080-2-4271-012-94 (FST) 15 Oct 94

Distribution List

Action

NDHQ Ottawa/J1 Coord
CANBAT 2 Visoko/CO
HQ UNPROFOR Zagreb/CMPAO
HQ UNPROFOR Zagreb/FPM

Information

LdSH (RC) Calgary/CO (less enclosures)
CANBAT 1 Rastevic/CO (less enclosures)
CANBAT 2 Visoko/CO (less enclosures)
CANLOGBAT Primosten/CO (less enclosures)
CCHQ Det Primosten/G5 Legal

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PA 1080-1/3128-NN/94

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, Ontario
K0K 3R0

15 December 1994

Distribution List

BOARD OF INQUIRY - FIRE
CANLOGBAT JUNIOR RANKS MESS

References: A. CCUNPROFOR Directive 605 Oct 94
B. UNPROFOR FC Directive no 9 Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Contingent Board of Inquiry Report, the Acting Commanding Officer's Comments and the Summary Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the Junior Ranks Mess fire, which occurred on 23 October 1994 at CANLOGBAT camp Primosten. Negligence was not a contributing factor in this fire; a faulty electrical sub-panel is suspected to have been the cause of the fire.
2. I concur with both the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer, and the Acting Commanding Officer's recommendations. No disciplinary or administrative action have been taken against any of the soldiers involved. As stated, it would appear that poor local electrical services were the cause, and as such a claim in the amount of \$8160.80 Cdn will be raised with the United Nations to recover the cost of the equipment lost. In addition, as a preventive measure, I order that all electrical services within Camp Primosten be inspected for serviceability and, that if not done so already, that electrical service equipment be added to the Fire Marshals routine inspections.

REVIEWED BOI

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3. Any inquiries into this case should be forwarded to the G1, Canadian Contingent.


N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

- Enclosure 1 Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report
Enclosure 2 CANLOGBAT 1080-1 (CO) 23 November 1994
Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation 1080-1 (BOI) 20 Nov 94

Distribution List

Action

NDHQ Ottawa/J1 Coord
CANLOGBAT Primosten/CO
HQ UNPROFOR Zagreb/CMPAO
HQ UNPROFOR Zagreb/FPM (*less encls*)

Information

CCHQ Det Primosten/G5 Legal

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PA

1080-1/3307-04/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
KOK 3RO

15 December 1994

Distribution List (page 2)

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION
DAMAGE TO CCUNPROFOR VEHICLE UNPF 8606
AND A CIVILIAN TRACTOR

References: A. CCUNPROFOR Directive 605 Oct 94
B. UNPROFOR FC Directive no 9 Jul 92

1. Enclosed are the Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report, the Commanding Officer's comments, Summary Investigation, and the Military Police Report into the accident involving a CCUNPROFOR vehicle UNPF 8606 and a civilian tractor.
2. I concur with both the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and the Commanding Officer's recommendations. The United Nations is clearly not at fault in this matter and appropriate safety precautions had been taken. No disciplinary or administrative action has been taken against any of the soldiers involved. A claim will be raised with the United Nations to recover the certified true value of the vehicle according to the Insurvey Report.
3. Any further inquiries into this matter should be directed to the G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.

N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

1/2

REVIEWED BOI

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Enclosures: 4

- Enclosure 1 Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry Report
- Enclosure 2 Commanding Officer's Comments 1080-1/3307-04/94 (CO) 15 Dec 94
- Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation 1080-1-3307-04-94 (G4 TN) 15 Oct 94
- Enclosure 4 Military Police Report 27 Oct 94

Distribution List

Action

NDHQ Ottawa/J1 Coord
HQ CCUNPROFOR /CO
HQ UNPROFOR Zagreb/CMPAO
HQ UNPROFOR Zagreb/FPM

Information

CCHQ Det Primosten/G5 Legal

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2 2

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PAGE 2 RCWPDRA0015 PROTECTED B

FURTHERMORE, IN PARA 7 OF REF C CO 2 PPCLI QUITE CORRECTLY POINTS OUT THAT THE TERMS OF REF UTILIZED IN THE BOI REQOR ANSWERS WRT DISCIPLINARY ACTION. THIS IS CONTRARY TO RECENT DIRECTION WRT COMD INFLUENCE

3. THE UNCERTAINTY EXPERIENCED BY CPL BOUCK IS UNNECESSARY. REQS FOR INFO ON BEHALF OF CPL BOUCK WRT POSSIBLE DISCIPLINARY ACTION HAVE RESULTED IN REF D IN WHICH 2 PPCLI STATES THEY ARE NOT GOING TO CHARGE HER BUT INDICATING THAT CCUNPROFOR MAY

4. IT APPEARS THAT THE INTEREST IN PURSUING THIS IS AS A DIRECT RESULT OF UNPROFOR REFUSAL TO PAY FOR THE DAMAGED ILTIS. REF A, CFM IN REF C, STATES THAT THERE WAS NO GROSS NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF CPL BOUCK, FURTHER, REF E, ON INDEMNIFICATION OF SERVANTS OF THE CROWN, PRECLUDES RECOVERY ACTION AGAINST A MBR IF THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF DISHONESTY OF MALICIOUSNESS ON THEIR PART

5. CLARIFICATION OF CCUNPROFOR INTENT IS REQ. THIS HQ DOES NOT SP ANY FURTHER ACTION AGAINST CPL BOUCK

BT

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REVIEWED BOI

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ROUTINE

* PROTECTED A *

RAAGZYUW RCCPJBF1083 2641703-GGGG--RCESYGO.

ZNR GGGGG

R 211418Z SEP 93

FM NDHQ EXPORT OTTAWA//DPLS//

TO RCCPJSA/NDHQ OTTAWA//DCDS GP COORD//

INFO RCESYGO/CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM/(G1)//CO CCSG//2PPCLI//

RCESYGO/CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//COS//~~S~~

BT

PROTECTED A DPLS 0599

SUBJ: INVESTIGATION - DEATH H51 606 602 CAPT DECOSTE JP, INF 23,
2PPCLI, INJURIES TO [REDACTED] LT TURNER RC INF 23 2PPCLI AND C55
834 109 CPL BOUCK SM, ADM CLK R831, R REGINA RIF (PA)

REF: A.CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM/2PPCLI/ ADJT 174 181826Z SEP 93

B. CFAO 21-9 PARA 36

C. CFAO 56-18

1. (U) PURSUANT TO QR AND O 21.46, THE DEATH OF CAPT DECOSTE AND INJURIES TO LT TURNER AND CPL BOUCK ON 18 SEP 93 SHALL BE INVESTIGATED. ONE INVESTIGATION WILL SUFFICE AND THE MINUTES OF THE BOARD OF INQUIRY OR THE REPORT OF A SUMMARY INVESTIGATION SHALL BE FORWARDED THRU NDHQ DCDS GP COORD TO NDHQ/DPLS FOR APPROVAL BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE CDS
2. (U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF B THE DUE DATE FOR RECEIPT OF THE

* PROTECTED A *

REVIEWED BOI

* PROTECTED A *

PAGE 2 RCCPJBF1083 PROTECTED A

MINUTES OR REPORT AT NDHQ IS 25 OCT 93

3. (U) IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO MEET THE ABOVE DATE, NDHQ/DPLS SHALL BE ADVISED OF THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY AND THE EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

4. (U) AN APPLICATION FOR PENSION UNDER THE PENSION ACT WILL BE MADE ON BEHALF OF THE WIDOW OF CAPT DECOSTE. THE PENSIONS ADVOCATE IN WINNIPEG HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE INJURIES TO LT TURNER AND WILL PROCEED WITH AN APPLICATION IF SO REQUESTED BY LT TURNER. THE TELEPHONE NUMBER OF THE ADVOCATE IN WINNIPEG IS (204) 983-5598. THE PENSIONS ADVOCATE IN REGINA HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE INJURIES TO CPL BOUCK AND WILL PROCEED WITH AN APPLICATION IF SO REQUESTED BY CPL BOUCK. THE TELEPHONE NUMBER OF THE ADVOCATE IN REGINA IS (306) 780-5231

BT

#1083

JAS076 DELIVERED 2641704 306040

* PROTECTED A *

REVIEWED BOI



Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
K0K 3R0

1080-1 (COS)

10 December 1994

Distribution List

PROPOSED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- References: A. CCUNPROFOR CANBAT 1 3120-12 (CO) 20 Jul 94
B. CCUNPROFOR CANBAT 1 3120-1 (Ops O) 9 Nov 94
C. CCUNPROFOR 3350-1 (Comd) 13 Sep 94
D. FCPD (No 13) revised 17 Jun 94
E. CCUNPROFOR 3350-1 (Legal) 10 Nov 94

1. Refs A and B outlined the concerns held by Commanding Officers regarding ROE. These concerns are real and justified and were addressed in ref C. Although it would be ideal to have one standard to follow, the reality is that the UNPROFOR Rules of Engagement outlined in ref D are not as restrictive as the Canadian Law that our soldiers could ultimately be called to answer to. This implies that Canada, like other nations, must adhere to two standards of ROE.

2. As outlined in ref E, there are two areas where there is a possible conflict between Canadian Law and the UNPROFOR ROE. The first is with respect to the defence of the Zone of Separation. In ref C the Commander clearly stated that the use of deadly force is authorized to protect the lives of our soldiers if OPs are under direct attack. Should withdrawal of our personnel be impossible or undesirable in light of the tactical situation, then those in the OP could return fire in self-defense, if they were directly threatened. Further, ref D does not intend that UNPROFOR inter-position forces in such a manner as to provoke a direct attack by one of the belligerents. The sudden and unexpected appearance of UN forces blocking an axis of advance of one party or the other may precipitate direct hostile action by that attacker when none was originally intended. Therefore, any action on the part of units to conduct such an operation would have to be the result of specific orders from your superiors and not the result of a routine contingency plan.

1/2

REVIEWED BOI

3. The second area of conflict between Canadian law and ref D involves the use of deadly force when defending property or equipment. Canadian soldiers could be held liable under Canadian Criminal Law if they were to use deadly force to protect property. However, the right to self-defense is a well recognized principal. Therefore, if soldiers through the act of self-defense or the defense of other UN personnel or persons and areas under their protection were to use deadly and proportional force against a direct attack, this would be considered to be a lawful act.

4. In summary, Canadian troops serving in the FRY must adhere ultimately to the standard of Canadian Criminal law. Accordingly, find attached the draft CANCONUNPROFOR ROE Card which will fit the current four page format as shown in Annex B and addresses the concerns raised by Commanding Officers.

5. You are asked to review the proposed ROE in detail and forward any comments to this Headquarters by 05 January 1995.

M.G. Macdonald

M.G. Macdonald
Lieutenant-Colonel
Chief of Staff

Annexes

Annex A - CANCONUNPROFOR Draft - Rules of Engagement
Annex B - CCUNPROFOR Rules of Engagement Card

Distribution List

Action

CANBAT 1/CO
CANBAT 2/CO
CANLOGBAT/CO
CANCONUNPROFOR Legal O

Information

Commander
Deputy Commander

2/2

REVIEWED BOI

Annex A
To 1080-1 (COS)
Dated Dec 94

CANCONUNPROFOR
DRAFT - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

AUTHORITY

1. CANCONUNPROFOR PERSONNEL MAY USE THEIR WEAPONS:
 - A. TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, OTHER UN PERSONNEL OR PERSONS AND AREAS UNDER THEIR PROTECTION AGAINST DIRECT ATTACK, ACTING UNDER THE ORDER OF THE SENIOR RANK AT THE SCENE;
 - B. TO RESIST ATTEMPTS BY FORCE TO PREVENT CANCONUNPROFOR FROM DISCHARGING ITS DUTIES.

2. STATUS FOR PD FROM _____ TO _____
 - A. RULE NO ONE _____
 - B. RULE NO TWO _____
 - C. RULE NO THREE _____
 - D. RULE NO FOUR _____
 - E. RULE NO FIVE _____
 - F. RULE NO SIX _____
 - G. RULE NO SEVEN _____

3. CHALLENGING
 - A. CHALLENGE IN ENGLISH BY SHOUTING:
UN! - STOP OR I WILL FIRE!
 - B. CHALLENGE IN SERBO-CROAT BY SHOUTING:
UJEDINJENE NACIJE! - STANI ILI PUCAM!
(U: YEDINYENE NATSIYE! - STANI ILI PUTSAM!)

A - 1/5

REVIEWED BOI

Annex A
To 1080-1 (COS)
Dated Dec 94

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. **RULE NUMBER ONE:** **AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS**
 - A. OPTION A: NO AUTHORITY
 - B. OPTION B: AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS

2. **RULE NUMBER TWO:** **STATUS OF WEAPONS**
 - A. OPTION A: WEAPONS CARRIED WITH LOADED MAGAZINES
 - B. OPTION B: WEAPONS CARRIED CHARGED AND MADE SAFE

3. **RULE NUMBER THREE:** **RESPONSE TO HOSTILE INTENT WITHOUT USE OF FIRE**
 - A. OPTION A: OBSERVE AND REPORT, WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OWN FORCE
 - B. OPTION B: OBSERVE AND REPORT. STAY IN PLACE. MAKE CONTACT AND ESTABLISH LIASON WITH OPPOSING FORCES AND/OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED
 - C. OPTION C: OBSERVE AND REPORT. STAY IN PLACE. WARN AGGRESSOR OF INTENT TO USE FORCE AND DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE BY APPROPRIATE MEANS WITHOUT OPENNING FIRE. (COCK WEAPONS, DEPLOY TROOPS ETC.)

4. **RULE NUMBER FOUR:** **RESPONSE TO A HOSTILE ACT WITH THE USE OF FIRE**
 - A. OPTION A: TAKE IMMEDIATE PROTECTION MEASURES. OBSERVE AND REPORT. WARN AGGRESSOR OF INTENT TO USE FORCE AND DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE. WARNING SHOTS ARE AUTHORIZED. REPORT ACTION TAKEN. IF HOSTILE ACT DOES NOT CEASE AND LIFE IS THREATENED OPTION B CAN BE ORDERED BY SENIOR RANK PRESENT.

A - 2/5

REVIEWED BOI

Annex A
To 1080-1 (COS)
Dated Dec 94

B. OPTION B: ON ORDER, OPEN FIRE. REPORT ACTION TAKEN

NOTE: IN THE EVENT OF OPTION A OR B THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ARE AUTHORIZED

- A. WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OWN FORCE;
- B. REMAIN IN PLACE AND DEFEND, OR
- C. MOVE THROUGH TO ESCAPE AND PRESERVE OWN FORCE.

5. RULE NUMBER FIVE: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE ACT (SELF DEFENCE)

ANYTIME IN A SITUATION OF SELF-DEFENCE - TAKE IMMEDIATE PROTECTION MEASURES AND/OR RETURN FIRE WITHOUT CHALLENGING. REPORT ACTION TAKEN.

6. RULE NUMBER SIX: DISARMAMENT OF PARAMILITARY, CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS

- A. OPTION A: NO AUTHORITY GRANTED
- B. OPTION B: AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED. IN DOING SO, USE THE MINIMUM AND PROPORTIONAL FORCE NECESSARY UP TO AND INCLUDING THE USE OF FIRE IF HOSTILE INTENT SO WARRANTS OR A HOSTILE ACT IS COMMITTED. HAND OVER TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

NOTE: THE SELECTION OF OPTION A OR B IS BASED UPON THE ASSIGNED TASK OF THE UNIT. (IE. OPTION B WOULD BE APPLICABLE FOR ELEMENTS OPERATING IN THE ZONE OF SEPARATION IN THE UNPAs)

7. RULE NUMBER SEVEN: CONTROL OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS

- A. OPTION A: MANNING, PREPARATION, MOVEMENT AND FIRING OF WEAPONS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PERMITTED

A - 3/5

REVIEWED BOI

Annex A
To 1080-1 (COS)
Dated Dec 94

- B. OPTION B: DESIGNATED ACTIVITY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PERMITTED TO INCLUDE:
- (1) OVERT MANNING OF WEAPONS
 - (2) MOVEMENT OF WEAPONS
 - (3) FIRING OF WEAPONS
 - (4) OTHERS TO BE SPECIFIED
8. DURING NORMAL DAY-TO-DAY SITUATIONS THE FOLLOWING STATUS APPLIES:
- RULE NUMBER ONE OPTION B
 - RULE NUMBER TWO OPTION A
 - RULE NUMBER THREE OPTION B
 - RULE NUMBER FOUR OPTION A
 - RULE NUMBER FIVE PERMANENT
 - RULE NUMBER SIX OPTION A OR B
 - RULE NUMBER SEVEN OPTION A

A - 4/5

REVIEWED BOI

Annex A
To 1080-1 (COS)
Dated Dec 94

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT GUIDELINES

FOR ISSUE TO ALL PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED TO CARRY ARMS AND AMMUNITION IN UNPROFOR

GENERAL RULES

1. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE IN SELF DEFENCE.
2. IN ALL SITUATIONS YOU ARE TO USE THE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY. FIRE ARMS MUST ONLY BE USED AS A LAST RESORT.

OPENNING FIRE

3. YOU MAY ONLY OPEN FIRE AGAINST A PERSON IF HE/SHE IS COMMITTING OR ABOUT TO COMMIT AN ACT LIKELY TO ENDANGER LIFE AND THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO STOP THE HOSTILE ACT. DEPENDENT ALWAYS ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME-EXAMPLES OF SUCH ACTS:
 - A. FIRING OR BEING ABOUT TO FIRE A WEAPON;
 - B. PLANTING, DETONATING OR THROWING EXPLOSIVE DEVICES; AND
 - C. DELIBERATELY DRIVING A VEHICLE AT A PERSON, WHERE THERE IS NO OTHER WAY OF STOPPING HIM/HER.
4. IF YOU HAVE TO OPEN FIRE YOU SHOULD:
 - A. FIRE ONLY AIMED SHOTS (UNLESS THEY ARE WARNING SHOTS IN THE AIR);
 - B. FIRE NO MORE ROUNDS THAN NECESSARY; AND
 - C. TAKE ALL REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS NOT TO INJURE ANYONE OTHER THAN YOUR TARGET.

A - 5/5

REVIEWED 801

ANNEX B
TO 1080-1 (COS)
DATED DEC 94

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. RULE NUMBER ONE: AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS
- A. OPTION A: NO AUTHORITY
- B. OPTION B: AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS
2. RULE NUMBER TWO: STATUS OF WEAPONS
- A. OPTION A: WEAPONS CARRIED WITH LOADED MAGAZINES
- B. OPTION B: WEAPONS CARRIED CHARGED AND MADE SAFE
3. RULE NUMBER THREE: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE INTENT WITHOUT USE OF FIRE
- A. OPTION A: OBSERVE AND REPORT, WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OWN FORCE
- B. OPTION B: OBSERVE AND REPORT, STAY IN PLACE, MAKE CONTACT AND ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH OPPOSING FORCES AND/OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED
- C. OPTION C: OBSERVE AND REPORT, STAY IN PLACE, WARN AGGRESSOR OF INTENT TO USE FORCE AND DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE BY APPROPRIATE MEANS WITHOUT OPENING FIRE. (COCK WEAPONS, DEPLOY TROOPS, ETC)
4. RULE NUMBER FOUR: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE ACT WITH USE OF FIRE
- A. OPTION A: TAKE IMMEDIATE PROTECTION MEASURES, OBSERVE AND REPORT, WARN AGGRESSOR OF INTENT TO USE FORCE, AND DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE. WARNING SHOTS ARE AUTHORIZED. REPORT ACTION TAKEN IF HOSTILE ACT DOES NOT CEASE AND THERE IS THREATENED OPTION B CAN BE ORDERED BY SENIOR RANK PRESENT
- B. OPTION B: ON ORDER OPEN FIRE. REPORT ACTION TAKEN
- NOTE: IN EVENT OF OPTION A OR B THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ARE AUTHORIZED:
- A. WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OWN FORCE;
B. REMAIN IN PLACE AND DEFEND; OR
C. MOVE THROUGH TO ESCAPE AND PRESERVE OWN FORCE.

5. RULE NUMBER FIVE: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE ACT WITH DEFENCE

ANYTIME IN A SELF DEFENCE SITUATION, TAKE IMMEDIATE PROTECTION MEASURES AND OR RETURN FIRE WITHOUT CHALLENGING. REPORT ACTION TAKEN

6. RULE NUMBER SIX: DISARMAMENT OF PARAMILITARY, CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS

- A. OPTION A: NO AUTHORITY GRANTED
- B. OPTION B: AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED IF FAILURE TO DO SO PREVENTS CCUNPROFOR FROM CARRYING OUT ITS TASK. USE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONAL FORCE NECESSARY UP TO AND INCLUDING THE USE OF FIRE IF HOSTILE INTENT SO WARRANTS OR A HOSTILE ACT IS COMMITTED. HAND OVER TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY

NOTE: THE SELECTION OF OPTION A OR B IS BASED UPON THE ASSIGNED TASK OF THE UNIT

7. RULE NUMBER SEVEN: CONTROL OF WEAPONS SYSTEM

- A. OPTION A: MANNING, PREPARATION, MOVEMENT AND FIRING OF WEAPONS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PROHIBITED
- B. OPTION B: DESIGNATED ACTIVITY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PERMITTED
- (1) OVERT MANNING OF WEAPONS
(2) MOVEMENT OF WEAPONS
(3) FIRING OF WEAPONS

8. DURING NORMAL DAY TO DAY SITUATIONS FOLLOWING STATUS APPLIES


RULE NUMBER ONE: OPTION B
RULE NUMBER TWO: OPTION A
RULE NUMBER THREE: OPTION B
RULE NUMBER FOUR: OPTION A
RULE NUMBER FIVE: PERMANENT
RULE NUMBER SIX: OPTION A OR B
RULE NUMBER SEVEN: OPTION A

REVIEWED
B01

ANNEX B
 TO 1080-1 (COS)
 DATED DEC 94

REVIEWED B01

RANGE CARD



WEAPON NAME	LOCATION	EMPLACEMENT	
DATE	PREPARED BY		
	PEOPLE PAR		
	DESCRIPTION	DISTANCE	BEARING
FEATURE 1			
FEATURE 2			
FEATURE 3			
FEATURE 4			
FEATURE 5			

NOTE: PROMINENT FEATURES SHOULD BE RECORDED TO INCLUDE DESCRIPTION, DISTANCE AND BEARING



CCUNPROFOR
 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT



AUTHORITY

1. CCUNPROFOR PERSONNEL MAY USE THEIR WEAPONS
 - A. TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, OTHER UN PERSONNEL OR PERSONS AND AREAS UNDER THEIR PROTECTION AGAINST DIRECT ATTACK ACTING UNDER THE ORDER OF THE SENIOR RANK AT THE SCENE.
 - B. TO RESIST ATTEMPTS BY FORCE TO PREVENT CCUNPROFOR FROM DISCHARGING ITS DUTIES; OR
 - C. TO RESIST DELIBERATE MILITARY OR PARA-MILITANT INCRUSIONS INTO THE UN PROTECTED AREAS OR SAFE AREAS.
2. STATUS FOR PD FROM _____ TO _____
 - A. RULE NO ONE _____
 - B. RULE NO TWO _____
 - C. RULE NO THREE _____
 - D. RULE NO FOUR _____
 - E. RULE NO FIVE _____
 - F. RULE NO SIX _____
 - G. RULE NO SEVEN _____
3. CHALLENGING
 - A. CHALLENGE IN ENGLISH BY SHOUTING:
 UN! - STOP OR I FIRE!
 - B. CHALLENGE IN SERBO-CROAT BY SHOUTING:
 UJEDINJENE NACIJE! - STANI IJI PUCAM!
 (U: YEDINYENE NATSIYE! - STANI IJI PUTSAM!)

PROTECTED B

PAGE 2 RCEVCHA0021 PROTEGE B

F. OAFIC 19-36

1. SUITE AUX REFS A ET B, AUCUNE MESURE DISCIPLINAIRE ET/OU

ADMINISTRATIVE NE SERONT PRISES CONTRE LE CPL LENTZ

2. LE DOSSIER EST CONSIDERE CLOS

BT


#0021

♥JAS031 DELIVERED 3441355 318524

- 1. FOL REF A + B, NO DISCIPLINARY AND/OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
WILL BE TAKEN ON CPL LENTZ
- 2. THIS FILE CONSIDERED CLOSED

REVIEWED BOI

PROTECTED B



UNCLAS/PROT A/PROT B/CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/FLASH

HQ CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB

FAX/VOICE NO: INTL # 011-385-41-815-196(FAX)

-193-191 EXT 6506 (VOICE)

FILE NO: ~~1080-1~~ (G1 Admin) PA

DATE: 7 Dec 94

FROM: HQ CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//G1 ADMIN//

TO: NDHQ OTTAWA//J3 OPS 3-3-2//CAPT PROVOST

FAX TEL NO: 613 992 8812 (996-6628 Secure)

FAX NO: VOICE 995-9829

PAGE: 01 OF 06

SUBJECT: SUMMARY INVESTIGATION HOUSE FIRE CANBAT 1/SITREP OF SUMMARY INVESTIGATIONS

REFERENCES: A. YOUR FAX 5 DEC 94

B. YOUR FAX 6 DEC 94

C. 1080-3128-22 (CFFM) 1 NOV 94 (ENCLOSED)

D. 1080-1 (G1) 23 OCT 94 (ENCLOSED)

E. 3451-9-034/352-2 (COS J3/DGMPO) 7 OCT 94

1. IAW REF A RE - SUMMARY INVESTIGATION HOUSE FIRE CANBAT 1. A COPY OF CO'S COMMENTS ARE ENCLOSED. REF C IS LETTER STATING THAT THIS SI IS APPROVED. ALL ENCLOSED FOR YOUR INFO/ACTION.

2. IAW REF B RE - SITREP OF SUMMARY INVESTIGATIONS. ENCLOSED REF D IS REPLY TO REF E. FOR YOUR INFO/ACTION.

RELEASING AUTH SIGNATURE:

[Handwritten Signature]

UNCLAS/PROT A/PROT B/CONFIDENTIAL

REVIEWED BOI

R061336



FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

National Defence Headquarters
Maj- Gen George R. Parkes Bldg
101 Col By Drive, Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0K2



RECEIVED

J3 OPERATIONS 3 (INTERNATIONAL)

J3 Opérations 3 (Internationale) 1080-1 07 DEC 1994

December 8, 1994

To: CAPT DESJARDINS
Dep't: CCUNPROFOR//G1//
Telephone - Fax: #13

From: Capt Provost
Dep't: J3 Ops 3-3-2
Telephone - Fax: (613) 992-8812 Voice: 995-9829

Subject: SITREP OF SUMMARY INVESTIGATION

Ref: 3451-9-034/352-2 (COS J3/DGMPO) DATED 7 OCT 94

Remarks:

- SEE COVER PAGE ENCLOSED. PLEASE, ADVISE US IF THESE SUMMARY INVESTIGATIONS HAVE BEEN SENT FOR OUR HQ OR IF THERE IS ANY PROBLEM IN YOUR REVIEW. THANK YOU.

No. of pages including cover: 2

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS			
G1		670	WJ
G1 ADMIN	ADVISE	070	WJ
G1	500 attach	720	WJ

REVIEWED B01

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PROTECTED B (UNCLAS less enclosures)Rec'd 20 Oct 94
61 1080-1

3451-9-034/352-2 (COS J3/DGMPO)

7 Oct 94

CCUNPROFOR/COS

SUMMARY INVESTIGATIONS

References: A. CANLOGBAT 1080-3128/003 (CO) 9 Jun 94 (enclosed)
 B. CANLOGBAT 1080-3128/006 (CO) 9 Jun 94 (enclosed)
 C. CANLOGBAT 1080-3128/008 (CO) 9 Jun 94 (enclosed)

1. The enclosed summary investigations, which involve members of CANLOGBAT, are being returned for further staffing. All require Comd CCUNPROFOR's comments prior to drafting of the DCDS' comments.
2. It is requested that the enclosed investigations be reviewed and returned for finalization by 1 Dec 94.

SSB

B.W. Ashton
 Brigadier-General
 Chief of Staff J3/
 Director General Military Plans and Operations
 for Chief of Defence Staff

Enclosures: 3

REVIEWED BOI

PROTECTED B (UNCLAS less enclosures)



1080-1(G1)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, Ontario
K0K 3R0

23 October 1994

COS J3
National Defence Headquarters
Maj-General George R. Pearkes Bldg
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

RETURNED SUMMARY INVESTIGATIONS

- References: A. NDHQ 3451-9-034/352-2 (COS J3/DGMPO) 7 October 1994
B. CANLOGBAT 1080-3128/005 (CO) 9 June 1994
C. CANLOGBAT 1080-3128/006 (CO) 9 June 1994
D. CANLOGBAT 1080-3128/008 (CO) 9 June 1994
E. CCUNPROFOR 1080-1(G1) 29 August 1994 (enclosed)
F. CANLOGBAT 1080-3128/001 (CO) 9 June 1994
G. CANLOGBAT 1080-3128/003 (CO) 9 June 1994
H. CANLOGBAT 1080-3128/004 (CO) 9 June 1994
I. CANLOGBAT 1080-3128/007 (CO) 9 June 1994
J. Force Commanders Policy Directive 9 Dated June 1992

1. The investigations returned under cover of Reference A, References B through D, were originally despatched under cover of Reference E and also included References F to I. Further staffing is not required in accordance with Reference J, a local UNPROFOR policy directive.

2. The documents which you received were information copies of an internal UNPROFOR process of summarily disposing of minor incidents, such as traffic accidents, which involve a maximum of \$500.00 property damage and/or only minor injuries to UN personnel. They are to be staffed by the responsible Battalion to G1 UNPROFOR through their sector Headquarters. Copies are reviewed at sector headquarters and filed at UNPROFOR in case of future claims.

1/2

REVIEWED BOI

3. As CANLOGBAT does not have a sector headquarters, CCUNPROFORHQ acts on their behalf in the staffing process. Information copies were despatched to NDHQ for your records and no further action was required.

4. We regret the confusion this may have caused and I have directed that copies will only be held at this headquarters.

M.G. Macdonald

M.G. Macdonald
Lieutenant-Colonel
Chief of Staff

REVIEWED B01

UN RESTRICTED

Annex C to
FCPD No. (9)
Dated June 1992

SUMMARY DISPOSAL OF INCIDENTS WITHOUT CONVENING A BOI

1. Reference CANBAT 2 MP Report CAN 541-32-94

Convening Order to Investigate attempted theft

2. As the incident is within the conditions specified in the Field Administration Handbook, I recommend that a BOI should NOT be held.

3. The following is a description of how the incident occurred:

See MP Report

4. The incident was immediately reported to C/S 0 and a MP Investigation was conducted (action taken).

5. There were no injuries to civilian or military personnel.

6. There was no damage to Mission Vehicles.

7. There was no damage to civilian property/vehicles.

8. I recommend that the cost be written off against N/A (State the amount if known).

9. Military Police Investigation Report is attached as Annex A.

SIGNATURE  T.S. Newton, Adjt RANK Captain CANBAT 2

DATE 3 December 1994


A-1/2

UN RESTRICTED

REVIEWED BOI

UN RESTRICTED

10. I agree/~~disagree~~ with the above report.

SIGNATURE  RANK Major

NAME G.R. Hall

APPOINTMENT/TITLE 2IC CANBAT 2

DATE 3 December 1994

If disagree, give reasons:

A-2/2

UN RESTRICTED

REVIEWED BOI

(1)

DESIGNATION -- DESIGNATION
FILE NO - N° DE DOSSIER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - COTE DE SECURITE

MINUTE SHEET - NOTE

SUBJECT - SUJET: LESSONS LEARNED - ISFELD DEATH. DATED: DATE: 19/11/94

(5) 63 Enon.

REFERRED TO TRANSMISE A

REMARKS - REMARQUES
(To be signed in full showing appointment, telephone number and date)
(Attaché de signature, fonction, numéro de téléphone et date)

Pise speak Approved
63
20/11

Comd
(5) 63 summary Army & CD's visit - Steve
CD's visit - Steve
14/11/94
(3) Seen PRC
COS implement 26/11/94
others as we can
MCC

1. We are in the process of determining if we can find any engr offsets in theatre. I spoke to Maj Steve Allen in Viseko last week and we both agree that there are no posss suitable for conversion in either CANBAT 1 or 2.
 2. Both Steve and G3 Eng here will review CANLOGBAT Eng structure to see if there are any construction engr posss we can convert to field engs.
 - 3 Will keep you inf'd.
- MCC
COS
15/11/94

REVIEWED BOI

Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force Headquarters
Zagreb, Croatia

1080-1 (G3 Engr)

01 December 1994

Distribution List

DEATH OF CPL ISFELD
FINAL REPORT OF LESSONS LEARNED

Enclosed is the subject report which is being distributed to all Canadian Military Engineer officers in theatre. Many of the recommendations made have already been implemented.

David Platt.

D.K.B. Platt
Captain
For Chief of Staff


DISTRIBUTION LIST

Force Engineer - Col Simpson
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FE Reqs - Maj Clark
FE Ops - Maj Paulus
FE Reqs 2 - Capt Courbould
BH Comd Res O - Maj Leblanc
BH Comd Ops - Maj MacCulloch
Sec NE SE - Maj Hampson
Sec SW Res O - Maj Fortin
Sec SW CANBAT 2 - Maj Allan
Sec N SE - Maj Gartner
Sec S SE - Capt Henderson
Sec S CANBAT 1 - Capt Rettie
Sec W SE - Capt Bourassa
CANLOGBAT Engr Primosten - Capt Patriquin

REVIEWED BOI

Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff

Sous-chef d'état-major de la Défense



3451-9-034/352-2 (DCDS)

26 October 1994

3350 04

Distribution List

CANBAT 1 MINE INCIDENT -
FINAL REPORT OF LESSONS LEARNED

COS

CSM J.

Refs: A. 3201/FE 17 Jun 94, Force Engineer UNPROFOR
B. 3350-1 (COS J3) 16 August 94

1. At ref A Colonel M. Gauthier, UNPROFOR Force Engineer, provided comments and recommendations based on his review of the CANBAT 1 Mine Incident Board of Inquiry. These were staffed as Lessons Learned (ref B) to ensure appropriate follow-up action would be taken.
2. Col Gauthier pointed out several contributing factors to this tragic incident in which one life was lost and two others sustained injury. These factors included insufficient troop manning, unsatisfactory risk assessment procedures, the Troop Commander's overextended span of control and the lack of an engineer command and control/staff element at contingent level. Equipment concerns were also discussed.
3. The above factors have been addressed and detailed comments on their current status have been included in Annex A. The following is a summary of the resulting action:
 - a. Troop Manning (Ser 1). An increase in both section size and number within the Engineer Troop is required. These increases could be sustained by LFC but maximum use of in-theatre resources through restructure and redistribution warrant investigation. However, any increase will not negate the CCUNPROFOR requirement to schedule work and prioritize tasks to help alleviate complacency or fatigue problems;
 - b. Risk Assessments (Ser 2). The chain of command must be involved in the risk analysis process. Direction on this issue will be set at the Battle Group Headquarters;
 - c. Battalion Engineer Organization (Ser 3). Two extra positions for the CANBAT 1 Engineer Troop have been approved to allow for an increased level of supervision and advice, and to coordinate engineer resources;

1/2

National Defence Headquarters Quartier général de la Défense nationale
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2

REVIEWED BOI

002215

- d. Engineer Advice at Contingent Level (Ser 4). OC CANBAT 2 Engr Sqn has been appointed as the Contingent Engineer. With assistance from the DCO as Senior Engineer in CANBAT 1, the CF Troop Commander in CANLOGBAT and the G3 Engr/Eqpt in HQ CCUNPROFOR, control of resources will be better coordinated; and
- e. Equipment Concerns (Ser 5). D Mil E staff will continue to investigate mine clearance technologies.

4. In summary, although an increase in the level of field engineer support to CANBAT 1 can be sustained, CCUNPROFOR will be required to find internal offsets in order to take advantage of this fact. The proper use of mine clearance procedures (which includes a careful risk analysis) along with the most efficient employment of available resources should help to reduce the chance of further incidents.



L.G. Mason
Vice Admiral
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Annex:

Annex A Lessons Learned - CANBAT 1 Mine Incident

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

Information

External

Commander Canadian
Contingent UNPROFOR
CFPO 5003
Belleville, Ontario
KOK 3R0

Commander
Land Forces Command Headquarters
St Hubert, Quebec
J3Y 5T5

Internal

J3 Engr

COS J3
J3 Ops
J3 Plans
J3 Doc
EA/CDS

2/2

REVIEWED 801

Annex A
 3451-9-034/352-2 (DCDS)
 24 October 1994

LESSONS LEARNED - CANBAT 1 MINE INCIDENT

SER	SUBJECT	OBSERVATION	RECOMMENDATION	OPI	OCI	STATUS
1	Troop Manning	<p>The output of those involved in the incident under very hazardous, stressful and tiring conditions for weeks on end, was all out of proportion to their capabilities (in personnel terms). In order to avoid complacency and fatigue, the troops must be sufficiently manned to give everyone regular breaks, including the Section Commanders and 2ICs. With CANBAT 1's three section troop (rather than the standard four sections), there was no opportunity to do so. This organizational flaw was a contributing factor to the incident.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">REVIEWED BOI</p>	<p>In order to avoid complacency and fatigue, engineer Troops must be sufficiently manned to give everyone regular breaks, including the Section Commanders and 2ICs.</p>	J3 Engr	<p>LFC CCC UNPROFOR</p>	<p><u>J3 Engr.</u> It is imperative that the mandated tasks coincide with the available troop strength. Either the tasks must be reduced or the number of troops increased. An increase in manning to the UNPROFOR recommended level would increase the capability of the contingent engineers but must be weighed against the ability of the CF to mount and sustain any increase. Any increase in engineer personnel manning before the proposed Peacekeeping Credit positions come on line raises the possibility of further sustainment problems. Either an increase in CCUNPROFOR manning levels or offsets within theatre will be required. LFC and CCUNPROFOR must provide input before any increase.</p> <p><u>CCUNPROFOR.</u> Agree that sections should be 10 men vice eight and there should be four sects instead of three. However, also understand constraints on LFC in terms of finding and sustaining Fd Engrs to fill all posns. Until manpower situation improves will have to make do at current levels. Scheduling work and prioritizing tasks better will help to alleviate some of the problems.</p> <p><u>LFC.</u> It has been determined that complacency and fatigue were contributing factors to the accident. The UNPROFOR Guidelines for Troop Contributing Nations calls for a 126 man engineer squadron to</p>

Annex A
3451-9-034/352-2 (DCDS)
26 October 1994

SER	SUBJECT	OBSERVATION	RECOMMENDATION	OPI	OCI	STATUS
1 cont						support a peacekeeping battalion. Current manning levels within LFC would not permit the sustainment of such squadrons with both OP CANALIE and OP HARMONY. However, an increase in the section size to both CANBAT 1 and CANBAT 2 engineer organizations would be sustainable from LFC's perspective and could "possibly" be done through restructure and redistribution of in-theatre resources.

REVIEWED BOI

Annex A
 3451-9-034/352-2 (DCDS)
 26 October 1994

SER	SUBJECT	OBSERVATION	RECOMMENDATION	OPI	OCI	STATUS
2	Risk Assessments REVIEWED BOI	If a site is deemed to dangerous to clear by hand, then higher confirmation of the necessity to clear it should be sought. Flaws in this regard were a major contributing factor in this incident. Previously, with 4 CER, it was the squadron and troop commander's responsibility to conduct risk assessments for each and every site to be cleared, and when warranted, to convince the infantry battalion, company or platoon commander to adjust the siting of the position to minimize the risk in clearing the area. In the CANBAT 1 context, it is expected that risk assessments would be done routinely at the infantry company commander/ engineer troop commander level, with periodic involvement by the battalion commander. In this incident, the decision to clear the top of an embankment, covered in chest high vegetation, simply to get a better view was made by a tired engineer <u>section</u> commander in discussion with an infantry <u>section</u> commander. That the troop commander (and by extension the battalion commander) was not routinely involved in the risk assessment process, nor had he specifically seen the areas to be cleared as part of this important operation is worrisome, and clearly points to another organizational flaw.	Troop commanders should be routinely involved in the risk assessment process, and when warranted, the infantry battalion, company or platoon commander must be convinced to adjust the siting of the position to minimize the risk in clearing the area.	J3 Engr	LFC CCC UNPROFOR	<p>J3 Engr. The BG Comd and Engr Tp Comd must be involved in the risk analysis process. While neither the BG Comd nor the Engr Tp Comd can be physically at all locations, concept and preliminary direction of risk assessment must be set at the BG HQ level. It cannot rest solely with isolated coy/detachment positions for normal mandated activities. However, the structure must ensure that the Tp Comd is free to directly influence risk assessments conducted in high risk areas.</p> <p>CCCUNPROFOR. Agree. Clearly chain of command must be involved up to the appropriate level in the decision making process. If the risk analysis cannot be satisfactory completed at one level, it must be referred to a higher level for resolution.</p>

Annex A
 3451-9-034/352-2 (DCDS)
 26 October 1994

SER	SUBJECT	OBSERVATION	RECOMMENDATION	OPI	OCI	STATUS
3	Battalion Engineer Organization	<p>Owing to the Troop Commander's unreasonable span of control, he was clearly not in a position to provide the direct leadership to and supervision of his section commanders that this dangerous work warranted. In this operational environment, in which the engineer role figures prominently, it is unreasonable to expect that a troop HQ can provide engineer advise and staff assistance to the battalion commander and his staff, plan and coordinate field engineer, heavy eqpt and infrastructure work throughout the AOR, and undertake negotiations with the warring parties and local authorities in a number of areas, all simultaneously. This serious flaw in the engineer command and control structure, together with the shortage of field engineers, needs to be redressed.</p>	<p>The UNPROFOR Guidelines for Troop Contributing Nations calls for a <u>126-man engineer</u> squadron to support a peacekeeping battalion. Deviations from this proposed structure should only be made with a <u>conscious acceptance of the risks which such sort cuts will entail.</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">REVIEWED B01</p>	J3 Engr	LFC	<p><u>J3 Engr.</u> Revision of the engineer organization in support of the BG goes with Serials 1 and 2 above. An increase in engineer personnel is required to address the Fd Engr shortfall. It also allows the engineer C² structure enough personnel to provide advice to the BG Comd and staff on engineer matters (fd engr, hy eqpt, infrastructure and gen engr sp) as well as direct supervision of high risk tasks. Support and direction to increase the engineer C² on CANBAT 1 with an additional officer and NCO position has been provided.</p> <p><u>CCCUNPROFOR.</u> Level of engr support to CANBAT 1 would ideally be significantly increased if the resources were available. Given that these resources are not available and that the T O and E is unlikely to change in the near term, CCUNPROFOR has req two addl posns for CANBAT 1 engr troop. Proposal is to have the DCO of the deploying engr regt become the senior engr in CANBAT 1. He will deploy with one addl Sgt who will be the resources NCO. This is a minor increase but one that should produce positive results in the area of command and control and risk analysis.</p>

SER	SUBJECT	OBSERVATION	RECOMMENDATION	OPI	OCI	STATUS
4	Engineer Advice at Contingent Level	Again, given the magnitude and scope of engineer operations in this mission, and with too few engineers within the contingent as a whole, the need to shift priorities to suit changes in the mission, to allocate resources consistent with these changes, and to provide a level of technical supervision over the battalion engineers to avoid incidents such as this one, there is a need for an engineer command and control/staff element at the contingent level.	<p>Since within each rotation, the better part of a CER is dispersed amongst the three Canadian units, with the CO commanding the largest of these elements (with CANBAT 2), it should be a relatively simple matter to shift the CO and a small staff to a more central position within the contingent. These contingent wide requirements should also be addressed as part of the suggested structural review.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">REVIEWED BOI</p>	CCC UNPROFOR	J3 Engr LFC	<p>CCUNPROFOR. The OC of the Engrs with CANBAT 2 will be appointed. Contingent Engr. No need for, no are resources available to form a separate engr HQ staff at this time. He will continue to command his Sqn in Visoko but will be available as reqr to provide advice and if necessary coordinate resources. CCUNPROFOR currently attempting to determine best method of grouping engr assets and resources for task Engrs as part of the CANBATs are OPCON to BH and Croatia commands therefore some mechanism must be in place if resources are to be shifted between commands for limited periods of time. NDHQ had proposed a G3 Eqpt for CCUNPROFOR and this has asked that it be an Engr Capt who can be doublehatted as G3 Engr Eqpt. With the OC of the deployed Sqn as Contingent Engr, his DCO as Senior Engr in CANBAT 1, the CF TQ Comd in CANLOGBAT and the G3 Engr/ Eqpt HQ CCUNPROFOR, control of resources can be better coordinated should the need arise.</p> <p>J3 Engr. NDHQ supports CCUNPROFOR recommendations and has offered assistance in formulating a rationalized and consolidated Contingent Engr structure. CCUNPROFOR recommendations are being implemented by appointing OC CANBAT 2 Engr Sqn, the senior CCUNPROFOR engr officer, as the CCUNPROFOR Contingent Engr. The ability to control and direct scarce engr assets to meet contingent priorities is essential to ease the effects of the shortage of engr resources.</p>

Annex A
 3451-9-034/352-2 (DCDS)
 24 October 1994

SER	SUBJECT	OBSERVATION	RECOMMENDATION	OPI	OCI	STATUS
5	Equipment Concerns	<p>In the final analysis, the Cpl was killed because he (on foot) was leading an APC into an uncleared area, something he clearly should not have been doing. Likewise two Sgts were injured because they were standing, fully exposed and without wearing the proper protective equipment (which was readily available within the troop), within the danger radius of any Yugoslav mine, adjacent to an area that was about to be cleared.</p> <p>Having walked the ground, I am unaware of any fielded mine clearance equipment anywhere in the world that could have been used successfully in this instance. Neither ploughs, rollers nor flails could have made their way up to or manoeuvred along the narrow dyke where the accident occurred. Not even dogs would have been of much value in the very dense, waist high vegetation in the area, with trip wires in their path.</p> <p>UNPROFOR has for some months been working on its mine clearance and detection capabilities. Its initiatives have included procuring mine clearing tanks and rollers from Slovakia and mine sniffing dogs from commercial contractors in South Africa.</p>	<p>Based on the advice of the UNNY Demining Expert, the acquisition of flails will not be pursued on behalf of UNPROFOR. No such system has been fielded successfully for commercial use (by those in the mine clearance business) anywhere in the world.</p> <p>The surest mine clearance technology today is a man equipped with a prodder, protective clothing, 20/20 vision, and sensitive fingers, and another equipped with an effective mine detector (the Canadian model is the best in the mission area). The key factor in conducting UN mine clearance operations is the decision, on a case by case basis, to commit these resources to a task which is always life-threatening.</p>	J3 Engr	LFC CCC UNPROFOR	<p>J3 Engr. D Mil E staff continue to monitor and pursue mine clearance technologies. Personal and vehicular protection along with mechanical, electro-optic, remotely operated and canine methods of detection and disposal are being investigated. As indicated by CCUNPROFOR, the trained soldier is still and will remain the surest method of mine clearance for the foreseeable future. Strict adherence to proven procedures along with careful risk analysis will continue as the primary ways to reduce the possibility of further casualties.</p> <p>CCUNPROFOR. Agree. Risk analysis must be conducted in each case before committing engr to mine clearing operations. Engr structure review within CCUNPROFOR will be limited to how to best use resources available within theatre. Should the situation arise whereby additional Fd Engrs were available from LFC for tasking to this theatre, it would be appropriate to, as a minimum, upgrade the field sections from eight men to 10 and then if possible add a fourth section to each of the field troops.</p>

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CANADIAN CONTINGENT
CONTINGENT CANADIEN
CANBAT 2



RCD BG 1080-1 (Adjt)

The Royal Canadian Dragoons
Battle Group
CCUNPROFOR, CANBAT 2
Visoko, B-H

30 November 1994

Distribution List

SUMMARY DISPOSAL OF INCIDENTS
WITHOUT CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

Refs: A. FCPO No (9)
B. BH Comd SOP 413

1. Enclosed is a completed Annex C to Reference A regarding an incident of theft from the compound at Camp Visoko on 25 Nov 94.
2. As this incident does not involve a claim or recovery action through UNPROFOR, it has been submitted as a Summary Disposal.
3. Any questions regarding this matter should be directed to the undersigned at local 5502.


T.S. Newton
Captain
Adjutant
For Commanding Officer

Enclosure: 1

Distribution List

Action

BH Command Rear/CAO

Information

HQ CCUNPROFOR Zagreb/G1

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Annex C to
FCPD No. (9)
Dated June 1992

SUMMARY DISPOSAL OF INCIDENTS WITHOUT CONVENING A BOI

1. Reference CANBAT 2 MP Report VIS 541-31-94

Convening Order to Investigate theft of public/private
property

2. As the incident is within the conditions specified in the
Field Administration Handbook, I recommend that a BOI should
NOT be held.

3. The following is a description of how the incident
occurred:

See MP Report

4. The incident was immediately reported to C/S 0
and a MP Investigation was conducted (action taken).

5. There were no injuries to civilian or military personnel.

6. There was no damage to Mission Vehicles.

7. There was no damage to civilian property/vehicles.

8. I recommend that the cost be written off against N/A
(State the amount if known).

9. Military Police Investigation Report is attached as Annex
A.

SIGNATURE  T.S. Newton, Adj. RANK Captain CANBAT 2

DATE 30 November 1994

A-1/2

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10. I agree/~~disagree~~ with the above report.

SIGNATURE _____

RANK Major

NAME G.R. Hall

APPOINTMENT/TITLE 2IC CANBAT 2

DATE 30 November 1994

If disagree, give reasons:

A-2/2

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1080-1/3032-26/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
KOK 3RO

30 November 1994

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION INTO CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
THE M113 VEHICLE ACCIDENT ON 29 OCTOBER 1994 AT SMILCIC, CROATIA

References: A. UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent BOI (enclosed)
B. CB1 1080-1/3032-31/94 (CO) 16 November 94 (enclosed)
C. CB1 1080-1/3032-31/94 (5 Pl Comd) 16 November 1994 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed are the requisite UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry, the Summary Investigation and the Commanding Officer's comments into subject event.

2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and support both the Commanding Officer's recommendations and actions on this matter. My own comments are enclosed. The accident in part was caused by a United Nations soldier on an operational mission. Negligence was not involved and no disciplinary action will be taken against the soldiers involved as they reacted professionally, properly and promptly.

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3. Any further inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 5

Enclosure 1 UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry
Enclosure 2 Deputy Commanders Comments
Enclosure 3 Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 4 Summary Investigation 1080-1/3032-26/94
Enclosure 5 DND 462 Analysis of Mobile Support Equip Accident
Distribution List

Action:

NDHQ Ottawa//J1 Coord//
HQ UNPROFOR//CMPAO//

Information

CCUNPROFOR RASTEVIC//CO//
CANCON Det Primosten//G5 Legal//

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CCUNPROFOR CANBAT 1 RASTEVIC

FAX NO: 613-996-7811-2173-2260



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FAX COVER SHEET
PAGE 1 OF 1

1080-1 19 NOV 1995

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS			
G1			19/Nov/95

ORIGINATOR NO: RCR 595

TO: CAN CON UNPROFOR ZAGREB

ATTN: G1

INFO: _____

FAX NO: _____

SUBJECT: BOIs / SI's

REF: Your 61 802
1616002 Nov 94

DTG: 181500Z Nov 94

FROM: PA

CCUNPROFOR CANBAT 1
RASTEVIC SECTOR SOUTH

OR _____

CFPO 5006
BELLEVILLE, ON
KOK 3RD

PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE PRIORITY

IMMEDIATE FLASH

THIS UNIT SUBMITS A NIL RETURN

REVIEWED 801

DRAFTER: _____

RELEASING AUTHORITY: E.D. Beaupain, wd
bn ch

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PA

1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
KOK 3RO

28 November 1994

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

SUMMARY DISPOSAL WITHOUT
CONVENING A BOARD OF INQUIRY

1. Enclosed are information copies of 4 Summary Disposal of Incidents without convening a Board of Inquiry. As there is no administrative action required by this headquarters, they are passed to your office to assist you in tracking.
2. Future inquiries into this matter, should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNNPROFOR.

Wayne C Desjardins
W.C. Desjardins
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 4

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CCUNPROFOR CANBAT 1 RASTEVIC

FAX NO: 613-996-7811-2173-2260



IMMEDIATE

RECEIVED

27 NOV 1995

T 26/28

FAX COVER SHEET
PAGE 1 OF 50

ORIGINATOR NO: 1RCR 620

DTG: 261355 NOV94

TO: CANCON UNPROFOR ZAGREB
ATTN: G2

FROM:
CCUNPROFOR CANBAT 1
RASTEVIC SECTOR SOUTH
OR
CFPO 5006
BELLEVILLE, ON
KOK 3RO

INFO: _____

FAX NO: _____

SUBJECT: SI - M113 ACCIDENT

PRECEDENCE

REF: _____

ROUTINE PRIORITY

IMMEDIATE FLASH

ORIGINAL TO BE FWD BY MAIL

PLEASE ACK RECEIPT AT LOC

2306 OR 2305 BN OR

1080-1

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS		
<u>B1</u>	<u>29100</u>	<u>PA</u>

REVIEWED BOI

DRAFTER: _____

RELEASING AUTHORITY: J. D. BENOIN
WO

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1081-1/3032-31/94 (CO)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
CANBAT 1
RASTEVIC

2

25 November 1994

GI
Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Camp PLESO
ZAGREBSUMMARY INVESTIGATION
M113 ACCIDENT 24 OCTOBER 1994Reference: 1080-1/3032-31/94 (CO) 16 November 1994 (enclosed)

Find enclosed, at reference, three copies of the completed Summary Investigation into the circumstances surrounding an M113 vehicle accident involving a CANBAT 1 M113 at SMILCIC, CROATIA. The requisite United Nations Board of Inquiry cover sheet has been included.

Handwritten signature of M.A. Osborne in cursive.

M.A. Osborne
Captain
for Commanding Officer

Enclosures: 3

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SUMMARY OF CONTINGENT BOARD OF INQUIRY REPORT

Proceeding of UNPROFOR	Assembled at Rastevic, Croatia by order CO, CANBAT 1	Date 16 Nov 94	File 1080-1/3032-31/94
------------------------	--	----------------	------------------------

This BOI is convened pursuant to FCPD no (9) dated 27 June, 1992

For the purpose of

Contingent	Unit	Canadian Contingent	Date of Accident	Place Smilcic, Croatia	UNPROFOR Vehicle No
CANADIAN	CANBAT 1		29 Oct 94		UNPF 7418

Name(s) of other party(ies) involved and address(es) - N/A

Description of UNPROFOR loss N/A

UNPROFOR Member(s) Involved	Injuries to UNPROFOR Member(s)	Medical Report Ref No
Cpl Schovaneck M.J. UNID AD [redacted]	Serious head injury	N/A
Pte Armstrong G.R. UNID AD [redacted]	Minor injuries	N/A
Pte Rogers K.W. UNID AD [redacted]	Minor injuries	N/A
Pte Wales R.J. UNID AD [redacted]	Broken femur	N/A

Third Party Property	Third Party Operator	Third Party Owner
N/A	N/A	N/A

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Particulars of Third Party Claims and Insurance Coverage.

MP or SIS Ref No	Contingent Report Ref No	Civ Police Ref No	Dammage/discrepancy Report Ref No
South 550-347-94	CANSAT 1 1080-1/3032-31/94	N/A	N/A

List of Witnesses (Attach at Statements as Annexes)

II. Description of Circumstances

SEE PARAGRAPH 2 THROUGH 14 OF ATTACHED INVESTIGATION

III. Options, findings and recommendations of the Board (incl: arguments and motivations)

SEE COMMANDING OFFICERS COMMENTS AND PARAGRAPH 16, THROUGH 18 OF ATTACHED INVESTIGATION.

Signed at RASTEVIC, CROATIA this SEVENTEENTH day of NOVEMBER in the year 1994

	Number	Rank	Name	Initials	Decorations and Contingent
President			CAPT M.A. OSBORNE	<i>[Signature]</i>	
First Member			LT J.C. TARZWELL	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Second Member			CAPT S.G. MILLER	<i>[Signature]</i>	

IV. Contingent Commander's Comments/Action:

V. UNPROFOR Headquarters Action:

Documents Attached: CANSAT 1 SUMMARY INVESTIGATION 1080-1/3032-27/94 (CO)

Annexes Attached:

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Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Camp RASTEVIC
CANBAT 1
RASTEVIC

24 November 1994

G1
Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Camp PLESO
ZAGREB

COMMANDING OFFICERS' COMMENTS
SUMMARY INVESTIGATION INTO CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
THE M113 VEHICLE ACCIDENT ON 29 OCTOBER 1994 AT SMILCIC, CROATIA

References: 1080-1/3032-31/94(CO) 16 November 1994 (enclosed)

1. Find enclosed the subject Summary Investigation for review by the Commander Canadian Contingent United Nations Protection Force. I have reviewed the enclosed investigation and concur with the findings and recommendations of the investigating officer.
2. The cause of the accident appears to have been a combination of speed, driver inexperience and wet road conditions. The driver of the Armoured Personnel Carrier, Private Armstrong, reported some minor difficulty with the tiller bar which affected his ability to control the vehicle comfortably but there is no evidence of a mechanical defect. It is possible and likely that the vehicle was travelling too fast for the conditions and the crew commander should have ordered reduced speed, especially while transiting a steep embankment.
3. Helmets would have undoubtedly lessened the severity of the injuries. CANBAT 1 was in the process of assessing the extent of and redistributing our limited supply of serviceable CVC helmets and Slinguard headsets when this accident occurred. I have now ordered that no APC will move unless all personnel are wearing helmets and the driver/crew commander have ICS communications. This order has maximized safety but at the expense of operational flexibility. Maintenance support for our CVC helmets and Slinguard headsets must become a priority.
4. Seatbelts might have prevented some of the injuries but in my view, this is a moot point. The operational requirement for a driver, crew commander, .50 calibre MG gunner and a rear security man overrides the luxury of the personal safety afforded by a seat belt. The crew of the vehicle must be up, alert and acting as one entity.

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5. I am satisfied that the medical support and evacuation procedures were effective. 6

6. No disciplinary or administrative action against any of the individuals directly involved in the accident is deemed necessary. Pte Armstrong will undergo a re-evaluation period of driving under close supervision prior to being authorized to carry passengers.

M. S. Skidmore

M.S. Skidmore
Lieutenant-Colonel
Commanding Officer

Enclosure: 1

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PROTECTED BMEMORANDUM

1080-1/3032-31/94 (5 Pl Comd)

16 November 1994

Commanding Officer

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A VEHICLE ACCIDENT INVOLVING A CANBAT I ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIER-UNPF 7418 AND THE INJURY OF FOUR CANBAT I PERSONNEL ON 29 OCTOBER 1994 AT GRID WJ 448-865 APPROXIMATELY FOUR KMS EAST OF SMILCIC, CROATIA

References: A. QR&O Chapter 21 Sect 3,4 and 6;
B. QR&O Chapters 36 and 38;
C. CFAO 21-9, 22-10, 24-6, 38-1, 59-3 and 2110-29; and
D. Annex A to FCPD Number (9).

General

1. By the Terms of Reference (Annex A) dated 31 October 1994, a Summary Investigation was ordered into the circumstances surrounding a vehicle accident in which a CANBAT I Armoured Personnel Carrier was damaged and four CANBAT I personnel were injured four kilometres east of Smilcic, Croatia on 29 Oct 1994.

Narrative

2. On 29 Oct 94 at approximately 0800 the Armoured Personnel Carrier call-sign 21B, UNPF 7418, departed Bravo Company Headquarters (Y2) travelling east to SC 38 where there was to be an Observation Post shift change. The vehicle was in very good mechanical condition except it had a known tendency to pull to the left, the right hand tiller bar lock was broken and the gunners headset was not functioning (Annexes C and P). The vehicle crew consisted of; Cpl Schovanek, M.J., the crew commander, Pte Armstrong G.R., the driver, Pte Rogers K.W., the .50 Cal Gunner and Pte Wales R.J., a passenger. None of the individuals in the vehicle were wearing helmets. The driver, gunner and crew commander were unable to don helmets because of the incompatibility of the headsets with their helmets. The remaining passenger put on a helmet after giving his headset to Pte Rogers whose headset was not functioning. As such Pte Wales was not following the Battalion Helmet Policy for Armoured Personnel Carriers and had not been ordered to do so by the crew commander (Annex D).

3. The driver, Pte Armstrong, was a relatively inexperienced M113 driver. He had completed

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his Light Driver Track Course in March 94 but drove only sixteen of his required twenty hours. Subsequently, he did not drive an M113 again until July 94 when UN work-up training began. During this period of training, Pte Armstrong filled the role of primary section driver. He did not drive during all of the training but did complete his twenty hours required to be qualified for the Light Driver Track Course. His time driving on the Driver Track Course, Work-up training and driving since in theatre combine for a total of approximately forty hours.

4. It had been raining the night before and intermittently during the morning, leaving the roads somewhat wet. Despite the weather conditions, neither driver nor gunner noticed a problem with traction on the road and were not overly concerned about the road conditions. On the main supply route approximately four kilometres east of Smilcic, Croatia at approximately 0815, 21B began descending a long down grade. The vehicle was travelling at approximately 30 mph, not an excessive speed by CANBAT I SOP's or for the road conditions(Annexes C and D). At Grid WJ 448 865 the driver lost control of the vehicle. What occurred exactly to make the M113 leave the road is unclear. In the description of the incident offered by personnel witnessing the scene of the accident, the vehicle hit the soft shoulder and the driver appeared to over-correct to the left then to the right. This theory was put forth due to the presence of dirt and debris on the road suggesting the track had hit the shoulder and made a sudden, violent correction throwing dirt on the road(Annexes I and K). Another scenario suggests the track suddenly pulled hard right for no apparent reason and skidded sideways down the road as Pte Armstrong fought for control for approximately 30 metres. This theory was proposed by the driver and gunner of the vehicle who have the only eye witness accounts of the accident(Annexes C and D). The M113 made contact with the soft shoulder on the south side of the road, left the road embankment and dropped 28 feet before striking the bottom of the ravine. The frontal bottom armour bore the brunt of the impact stopping the vehicle very abruptly and dropping it on its tracks(Annex M).

5. The effects of the impact on the exterior of the M113 were minimal. The .50 Cal machine gun and its mount ripped off the top of the carrier due to the shearing of all of the retaining pins. The machine gun continued forward and came to rest against the drivers hatch wedging Pte Armstrong inside(Annex D).

6. The internal effects on 21B were far more catastrophic. Due to the force of the impact and the weight of the equipment lining the walls of the M113, the retaining cords along the sides of the carrier snapped. This allowed the majority of the equipment in the vehicle to tumble free from the walls into the passenger compartment of the carrier. This action damaged two M72's, shattered a lantern glass halo and one .50 Cal round was lost and one was damaged. The 17/80 and 22/98 radio sets and wires were torn from the hull leaving much of the carriers communications inoperable. The weapons in the carrier were also tossed around doing slight damage to one C-9 and two C-7's. Lastly, the Tiller Bar Bracket Assembly was sheered apart likely due to the driver applying most of his weight on them during the impact(Annexes L and P).

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7. The most serious consequence of the accident was undoubtedly the injuries sustained by the passengers inside 21B. Cpl Schovanek, the crew commander who was standing in the cargo hatch, was the most seriously injured. He did not have a helmet on due to the incompatibility with the radio headset he was wearing. It is believed that the force of the impact smashed his forehead into the lip of the rear cargo hatch fracturing his skull. Pte Wales, the passenger sitting on the left rear bench, was also severely hurt. He was not wearing a helmet and either the impact or the initial swerving on the road caused his head to strike the radios mounted on the left side of the carrier resulting in a concussion. Pte Wales also sustained a fractured left femur. Pte Armstrong, the driver, received several minor injuries. His left shin was punctured and he received several facial lacerations. The individual who was least injured in the crash was Pte Rogers who sprained his wrist and suffered an abrasion to his left, front thigh(Annexes E and O).

8. Upon impact the only person conscious and immediately capable of action was Pte Rogers. He quickly moved from the gunners hatch position and hit the engine kill switch as the motor was racing, for an unknown reason. He then moved to the radio and called for assistance from the Company Command Post, C/S 2 and informed them of the situation. After ensuring help was on its way he moved to the back of the carrier to give first aid to the injured. He moved to the closest person, Cpl Schovanek, and began treating him. After searching for and eventually finding vital signs he placed a field dressing on the open wound on Cpl Schovanek's forehead. Seeing there was nothing more he could do he moved to the next man, Pte Wales, in the back of the carrier. Pte Wales was semi-conscious and screaming. Pte Wales' left leg was twisted in an unnatural position and he had a large cut on his head. Due to the position of Pte Wales and the fact he was tangled up with equipment, Pte Rogers elected to treat the open head wound. While applying another field dressing to Pte Wales, Pte Rogers heard Pte Armstrong calling from the driver's hatch to help him out. After telling Pte Wales to apply pressure to his head wound, Pte Rogers moved to Pte Armstrong's location(Annex D).

9. Pte Rogers noticed that Pte Armstrong was struggling to get out of the drivers hatch but was pinned in by the .50 Cal machine gun. Pte Rogers threw the machine gun off the side of the carrier and helped Pte Armstrong out of the driver's hatch. He told Pte Armstrong to stay on the top of the carrier and then moved back inside the M113. He attempted to drop the back ramp of the carrier but was unable to as it was stuck. As he abandoned his efforts to do this the first responding vehicle arrived on the scene(Annex D).

10. The first vehicle to arrive on the scene was an MLVW containing Cpl Hummer, Pte Lockwood and Pte Graham, all 031 Infantrymen. The MLVW had been enroute to do a shift change at Observation Post SC-36 and had departed shortly after 21B left Y2. Cpl Hummer remained with the MLVW initially and notified C/S 2 of the nature of the injuries. Pte Lockwood moved to treat Cpl Schovanek and Pte Rogers applied first aid to Pte Wales. The members of the MLVW treated Pte Wales and Cpl Schovanek as best they could but were largely unable to do anything beyond basic first aid due to the severity of the injuries. They also checked on Pte Armstrong and Pte

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Rogers and tried to drop the back ramp, however it remained jammed(Annexes D and F).

11. The next vehicle to arrive on the scene was call sign 21A containing Cpl Mizen, Pte Cahill and Pte Jackman. This vehicle was on its way for the shift change at Observation Post SC-40. This vehicle had been ordered to the accident site by C/S 2. The members of 21A assisted until the box ambulance, C/S 83B2, containing Pte Simons and Pte MacDonald arrived shortly after. Pte Simons quickly began stabilizing Pte Wales followed by Cpl Schovanek due to their position within the M113. The OC's ILTIS containing OC B, Maj Smith, and CSM B, MWO Bradley, arrived shortly there after. Both assisted in the stabilization and evacuation of the casualties. Cpl Mizen and the CSM finally succeeded in opening the back ramp by kicking it down. The tracked ambulance, C/S 83B, arrived shortly thereafter with MCpl Bruyns and Cpl Esson. MCpl Bruyns and Pte Simons prepared and began evacuating Pte Wales and Cpl Schovanek. It was noted during this period that great difficulties were experienced fitting casualties wearing flack vests with the neck brace(Annexes G, H, I and J).

12. C/S 2B arrived at the accident scene to act as traffic control and command post to relay any necessary information regarding the casualties. C/S 21 arrived on the scene with Lt Nolan, WO Stevens and Sgt Lair; they assisted in the treatment and evacuation of the casualties. Capt Tien the MO arrived shortly there after and took over the treatment of the more serious casualties as MCpl Bruyn and Pte Simons began treating Pte Armstrong and Pte Rogers(Annexes J, K and L).

13. As the casualties were evacuated back to Camp Rastevic by ambulance, the equipment in 21B was loaded in the MLVW and accounted for. Elements of the CANBAT I Military Police arrived on the scene and began their investigation which included questioning witnesses still at the scene. The B Coy MRT's arrived in C/S 88B and checked out the M113 as did the B Coy Transport Sgt. MCpl Rumbolt, the Coy Veh Tech, found nothing wrong with the vehicle and requested Engineer support to clear a route out of the ravine. Engineers arrived, cleared a safe lane for 21B and 88B and scraped all the debris off the road. 21B was towed out of the ravine and taken to C/S 8's location at Camp Rastevic(Annexes K, L and N).

14. All other vehicles and personnel moved back to Y2. The shift changes for SC-36, SC-38 and SC-40 were cancelled for the day. All personnel involved in the incident were given Critical Incident Stress debriefs that afternoon(Annexes K and L).

Findings

15. The Summary Investigation produced the following findings:
- a. the incident was investigated by MP Section of CANBAT I, investigating MP MCpl Teshier R.J., Sec/Dct Case Ref: 550-347-94;

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b. the following pers were directly or indirectly involved;(Read in seven columns; Service Number, Rank, Name, UN ID number, related position and statement(if applicable)):

- (1) [REDACTED] Maj Smith J.D., UNID# [REDACTED] OC B;
- (2) [REDACTED] Capt Luckhurst S.B., UNID# [REDACTED] Ops O B, (Annex K);
- (3) [REDACTED] Capt Tien H.C., UNID# [REDACTED] Snr MO, (Annex O);
- (4) [REDACTED] Lt Nolan S.J.V., UNID# [REDACTED] 4 Pl Comd;
- (5) [REDACTED] MWO Bradley D.R., UNID# [REDACTED] CSM B, (Annex I);
- (6) [REDACTED] WO Stevens S.F., UNID# [REDACTED] 4 Pl 2IC;
- (7) [REDACTED] Sgt Lair A.R., UNID# AD [REDACTED], 2 Sec Comd, 4 Pl, (Annex L);
- (8) [REDACTED] Sgt McComb J.A., UNID# [REDACTED] Tpt Sgt B, (Annex M);
- (9) [REDACTED] MCpl Bruyns R.F., UNID# [REDACTED] MA 83B, (Annex J);
- (10) [REDACTED] MCpl Rumbolt O.L., UNID# [REDACTED] MRT B, (Annex N);
- (11) [REDACTED] Cpl Doucet J.A., UNID# [REDACTED] driver 88B.
- (12) [REDACTED] Cpl Esson D.S., UNID# [REDACTED] driver 83B;
- (13) [REDACTED] Cpl Hummer S.R., UNID# [REDACTED] MLVW driver, (Annex F);
- (14) [REDACTED] Cpl Mizen G.R., UNID# [REDACTED] 21A;
- (15) [REDACTED] Cpl Schovanek M.J., UNID# A [REDACTED] veh commander;
- (16) [REDACTED] Pte Armstrong G.R., UNID# [REDACTED] driver, (Annex C);
- (17) [REDACTED] Pte Cahill J.L., UNID# [REDACTED] 21A;
- (18) [REDACTED] Pte Graham M.W., UNID# [REDACTED] MLVW passenger;

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- (19) [REDACTED] Pte Jackman D., UNID# AD [REDACTED] 21A, (Annex G);
- (20) [REDACTED] Pte Lockwood B.A., UNID# AD [REDACTED] MLVW passenger;
- (21) [REDACTED] Pte MacDonald M.A., UNID# AD [REDACTED] driver 83B2;
- (22) [REDACTED] Pte Rogers K.W., UNID# AD [REDACTED] .50 Cal Gunner, (Annex D);
- (23) [REDACTED] Pte Simons M.G., UNID# AD [REDACTED] (Annex H);
and
- (24) [REDACTED] Pte Wales R.J., UNID# AD [REDACTED] passenger, (Annex E);
- c. the accident took place at approximately 0815 hrs on 29 Oct 94 at GR WJ 448 865 on the south side of the road along the Main Supply Route approximately four kilometres east of Smilcic, Croatia;
- d. the accident occurred on a slight downhill grade. The roads were wet although not noticeably slippery (Annex C). The M113 was not speeding as it was not capable of more than 30 mph (Annexes C, D and L). The vehicle itself was in good operating condition although possessing some minor problems with the steering mechanism; thus there was no mechanical reason for the accident (Annex C). The driver, Pte Armstrong, although cautious, was a relatively inexperienced track driver (Annexes C and L). It remains unclear what caused 21B to begin swerving and sliding down the road for 30 metres as the driver fought for control. The vehicle may have hit the soft shoulder and Pte Armstrong over-corrected or the carrier may have pulled hard to the right and the driver was unable to correct the problem (Annexes C, D, I and K). The road conditions undoubtedly were a minor factor in causing the accident but the driver's inexperience was unquestionably the major reason for his inability to regain control;
- e. seatbelts were not installed in the M113 and therefore none of the passengers in the back of the vehicle had access to seat restraints. The original stock seating which includes seatbelts, has not been installed in most Cdn M113s for many years. The operational requirement for extra storage space has resulted in most vehicles carrying a locally-produced, plywood, combination seat and storage box. Had seatbelts been available in this vehicle, they would not have been used as each crew member was employed in a higher priority operational security task which required them to stand;
- f. it is a Unit SOP for the crew commander to stand in the rear cargo hatch to

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command the vehicle while another soldier operates the machine gun from the cupola. This allows the vehicle commander the flexibility to navigate, control the vehicle and to dismount to conduct negotiations while the gunner is left to operate the .50 cal machine gun should the vehicle or dismounted commander become engaged. A fourth soldier may or may not stand in the cargo hatch observing rearward; depending on Coy SOP. In this instance, Pte Rogers was employed in the gunners position, in the cupola. Cpl Schovaneck, the crew commander, was standing in the cargo hatch. Pte Wales was initially standing in the cargo hatch providing security rearward but subsequently sat in the left rear of the carrier;

- g. none of the personnel were wearing CVC helmets or Slim Guard communication headsets as they were not available in sufficient quantities at the time of the accident;
- h. there is no known mechanical fault that could have caused the accident(Annex P);
- i. the damage to Canadian and UNPROFOR equipment in monetary terms was minimal consisting of:

- (i) .50 Cal machine gun and mount required minor repairs consisting of replacing the mounting pins and fixing the machine gun's spade grip,
- (ii) Steering Control Bracket (NSN S340 00-999 2333) was replaced at a cost of under \$20 Cdn(Annex P),
- (iii) one C9 and two C7's which received minor damage, were repaired locally and deemed operational soon after,
- (iv) damage to two M72's,
- (v) loss of one .50 Cal round and damage of another,
- (vi) communications equipment in the carrier was ripped off the walls and rewired and made operational in under 30 minutes through Coy resources, and
- (vii) shattering of an inexpensive glass globe for a naphtha lantern.

All of these items have been repaired and 21B is operational once again;

- j. the responsibility for the injuries can be attributed to the impact of the carrier at the bottom of the ravine and subsequent impact of those in the carrier with the internal

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surfaces of the M113 itself. In particular:

- (1) Many of the head wounds could have been prevented or minimized had those in the vehicle been wearing some form of helmet. Cpl Schovanek, Pte Rogers and Pte Armstrong were not able to wear a helmet because of the radio headsets they were wearing. Pte Wales was not wearing a helmet but should have been in accordance with Battalion policy.
- (2) The head wound of Cpl Schovanek can be attributed to the lack of a radio headset that can be worn under the helmet.
- (3) The head injury of Pte Wales is attributable to his own negligence in not putting a helmet on and the negligence of the crew commander, Cpl Schovanek, in not telling him to do so.
- (4) The equipment carried internally in the carrier and thrown forward by the sudden deceleration undoubtedly was responsible for some of the wounds. The remainder of the injuries may be blamed on the impact of the carrier and the equipment being tossed forward.

k. the injuries received were as follows:

- (1) Cpl Schovanek smashed his head on the lip of the back hatch opening a deep cut in his forehead and causing a depressed frontal skull fracture. This caused bruising in the frontal lobe of his brain with raised pressure in his skull due to the trauma. He was operated on by a neurosurgeon in Zagreb and as of yet has not regained consciousness. The likelihood of permanent disability due to brain damage is likely but the degree is unknown (Annex O).
- (2) Pte Wales received an injury to his head either during or before the vehicle impacted at the bottom of the ravine. The smash to the head caused a concussion and resulted in a loss of consciousness for approximately 20 minutes. Subsequent scans showed no further injury. In the impact or during the subsequent tangle of equipment and bodies, the bone in Pte Wales' left thigh was fractured. It was operated on and repaired with a plate and screws. No permanent disability is expected (Annex O).
- (3) Pte Armstrong suffered a puncture wound on his left shin and several facial cuts. These injuries occurred when 21B hit the ground and he was thrown

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against the interior of the carrier. No permanent disability is anticipated (Annex O).

(4) Pte Rogers received a scratch on his left thigh and sprained his right wrist. These injuries were caused by the carriers impact and the flying equipment. He has returned to normal duties and no permanent disability is anticipated(Annex O).

- l. a great amount of difficulty was experienced fitting casualties with neckbraces due to the flak vests they wore;
- m. all of the individuals in 21B were on duty at the time of the accident; and
- n. not all models of in service communication headsets will fit inside a Kevlar helmet and there are not sufficient CVC helmets available in theatre to equip all personnel.

Recommendations

16. In order to prevent recurrence, I recommend the following actions be implemented:
- a. sufficient quantities of CVC helmets be acquired to equip all personnel required to operate a radio in a carrier;
 - b. a more secure form of rigging be developed for the interior of the M113 to prevent equipment from coming loose when the vehicles are involved in violent impacts; and
 - c. an investigation be made by the medical staff into the possibility of creating a neckbrace that could be easily placed on an individual wearing a flak vest or have medical staff train in immobilizing the spine and neck using the flak vest itself.
17. Pte Armstrong is not recommended for disciplinary action.
- a. The accident occurred due to the driver's lack of experience with the contributing factor of less than ideal road conditions. Pte Armstrong was not negligent but more simply lost control of his vehicle and was unable to regain it; and
 - b. It is recommended that Pte Armstrong be returned his 404's as soon as possible and begin driving without passengers under maximum supervision. Once he is comfortable driving again, he should be retested on the M113, appropriate corrective training should take place and he returns to normal driving duties.

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18. Cpl Schovanek is not recommended for disciplinary action.

- a. The vehicle was not speeding and was going an appropriate speed for the weather and road conditions.
- b. He was, however, negligent in that he failed to ensure Pte Wales was wearing a helmet in the carrier which could have helped avoid a needless head injury.

G.R. Smith

G.R. Smith

Lt

Investigating Officer

Annexes

- Annex A Terms of Reference
- Annex B Sketch of Accident Site
- Annex C Witness Statement of D50 009 901 Pte Armstrong G.R.
- Annex D Witness Statement of F49 703 723 Pte Rogers K.W. and Sketch
- Annex E Witness Statement of F71 806 637 Pte Wales R.J.
- Annex F Witness Statement of K49 268 545 Cpl Hummer S.R.
- Annex G Witness Statement of D65 503 830 Pte Jackman D.
- Annex H Witness Statement of K49 911 319 Pte Simons M.
- Annex I Witness Statement of D12 280 313 MWO Bradley D.R. and Sketch
- Annex J Witness Statement of A33 860 231 MCpl Bruyns R.F.
- Annex K Witness Statement of K45 539 996 Capt Luckhurst S.B. and Sketch
- Annex L Witness Statement of V43 860 238 Sgt Lair A.R.
- Annex M Witness Statement of V61 988 479 Sgt McComb J.A.
- Annex N Witness Statement of R65 003 555 MCpl Rumbolt O.L.
- Annex O Witness Statement of H71 541 323 Capt Tien H.C.
CF 98: Cpl Schovanek
CF 98: Pte Armstrong
CF 98: Pte Rogers
CF 98: Pte Wales
- Annex P Memorandum: Technical Inspection APC Accident and Diagram

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TO 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 NOV 94CCUNPROFOR CANBAT 1
Camp RASTEVIC, CROATIA

1080-1/3032-31/94 (Adjt)

1 October 1994

Distribution List

TERMS OF REFERENCE - SUMMARY INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING A VEHICLE ACCIDENT INVOLVING A CANBAT 1 ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIER-UNPF 7418 AND THE INJURY OF FOUR CANBAT 1 PERSONNEL ON 29 OCTOBER 1994 APPROXIMATELY FOUR KILOMETRES EAST OF SMILICIC, CROATIA.

References: A. QR&O Chapter 21 Sect 3,4 and 6;
B. QR&O Chapters 36 and 38;
C. CPAO 21-9, 22-10, 24-6,38-1, 59-3 and 210-29; and
D. Annex A to FCPD Number (9).

1. [REDACTED] Lt Smith G. R. shall conduct a Summary Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the vehicle accident involving a CANBAT 1 APC-UNPF 7418 and the injuries to the following CANBAT 1 personnel:

- a. [REDACTED] Cpl. Schovanek M. J.;
- b. [REDACTED] Pte Armstrong G. R.;
- c. [REDACTED] Pte Rogers K. W.; and
- d. [REDACTED] Pte Wales R.J.

2. The Summary Investigation shall include statements from all available witnesses including all CF 98 forms and any other relevant orders, except where an officer or non-commissioned member is:

- a. currently the subject of a criminal (police) investigation;
- b. has been or is about to be charged with an offence under the National Defence Act or other Canadian law; or
- c. has been arrested/detained in respect of any alleged act or omission which could constitute such an offence.

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3. Subject to the exceptions listed from witnesses mentioned in paragraph 2, such an officer or non-commissioned member shall not be compelled to give evidence before the Summary Investigation in relation to the subject matter of the police investigation, charges, arrest or detention. Where the gathering of such evidence is deemed critical to the successful completion of the investigation the authority which ordered the investigation shall be notified and the advice of the representative of the Deputy Judge Advocate General shall be sought prior to taking any action to compel such testimony, recognizing that compelling testimony in such circumstances could have the effect of jeopardizing subsequent disciplinary proceedings.
4. The Summary Investigation shall record in the minutes of the proceedings:

- a. the place the accident occurred;
 - b. the date the accident occurred;
 - c. full particulars as to how the accident occurred, the cause of the accident and responsibility for the accident;
 - d. statements from all available witnesses to include time, date, place and details of the accident;
 - e. include plans or sketches indicating how the accident occurred and the extent of damages to UNPROFOR or Canadian owned equipment;
 - f. how the injuries occurred so that the Canadian Pension Commission and the United Nations may determine pension entitlement;
 - g. the nature and extent of the injuries and the likelihood of permanent disabilities;
 - h. responsibility for the injury;
 - i. provide the stock number, nomenclature, quantity and catalogue value of damaged public property; and
 - j. report the interim remedial action taken or contemplated to correct adverse conditions which may have caused the accident;
5. Findings shall be made where applicable and appropriate on:
- a. each of the points in paragraph 4;
 - b. the cause of accident;
 - c. the cause of the injuries;
 - d. whether the injured men were on duty at the time of the accident;
 - e. whether the injured men or any other person were to blame for the injuries;
 - f. action to be taken to repair or replace damaged public property.
6. Recommendations shall be made on:
- a. action required to prevent reoccurrence;
 - b. each of the points in paragraph 4 and 5; and
 - c. on any disciplinary and/or administrative action to be taken.

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8. This investigation shall be classified as PROTECTED B.

9. The minutes and proceedings shall be delivered in one copy to the undersigned within fourteen days of the receipt of these Terms of Reference. Should it prove impossible to complete the proceedings within that time, a written explanation shall be submitted at least four days prior to the due date.

M.S. Skidmore

M.S. Skidmore
Lieutenant-Colonel
Commanding Officer

Distribution List

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Action

Lt G. R. Smith

Info

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
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Annex B
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94

Sketch of Accident Site



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PROTECTED BAnnex C
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94Witness Statement of [REDACTED] Pte Armstrong G.R., Driver.

We had a pay parade that morning at approx. 0700 hrs on 29 October 1994. Because of this, we were running a bit late on our OP change around. I gathered my gear for driving the shift out and headed for the track to wait for the guys I was taking out.

We got the track ready to go by securing all the hatches and doing a first parade. Once everyone was ready we joined the net and did an ICS check to insure we could communicate within the track. Pte Rogers' headset did not work. He was in the gunners hatch so he took Pte Wales' headset to communicate with Cpl Schovanek and myself. Cpl Schovanek was the crew commander at that time.

We pulled out of the gate and headed towards Smilcic. There were a few minor obstacles on the side of the road in Smilcic that I avoided. I did not notice anything abnormal with the track at that time. The track always pulled to the left so I counter steered with the right as I always do. Anyone who has driven the track has done the same.

We got about 2 km out of Smilcic when the track did a hard right turn and I lost control. The next thing I remember is asking Pte Rogers to lift off whatever was pinning me in the hatch so I could get out. I didn't recall what happened, I believe I was either knocked out when I hit my head or blacked out from shock. I am unsure. After I got out of the hatch I heard Pte Rogers asking how the other guys were. He also got on the radio with C/S 2 and asked for help as we had seriously wounded people in the back.

I heard Pte Wales screaming and I noticed he was under Cpl Schovanek. I observed that Pte Wales had a head wound and that I was unable to see his leg because they were covered by someone elses body and kit. He believed his legs were broken and was screaming in pain. I saw that Cpl Schovanek had a head wound and that he appeared to be unconscious or dead, I was unsure. After that I observed Pte Rogers attempting to apply first aid to Schovanek and Wales. He told me to stay put as help was on the way and there wasn't anything I could do.

I then saw a MLVW with Cpl Hummer, Pte Lockwood and Pte Graham arrive on the scene. I believe Cpl Hummer was calling C/S 2 to report injuries as Pte Lockwood and Pte Graham yelled up to him on what they saw in the back of the track. Lockwood and Graham asked us how we were. I think I was dazed and am unsure of some things. I do remember other vehicles approaching and people coming down to help us as well as vehicles being posted to warn oncoming traffic of the accident. I remember Pte Rogers attempting to lower the ramp unsuccessfully due to a wrist injury. Cpl Mizen lowered the ramp to allow the people in the back to get in at Schovanek and Wales and to provide more space for first aid.

Cpl ? and someone else then applied a splint to my lower left leg after checking for any other wounds. They performed first aid and kept me talking to prevent me from blacking out. I am

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unable to recall who worked on who in the back of the track as there were people everywhere doing whatever they could to help. Pte Rogers got out of the track and walked up the hill, with or without assistance. Pte Wales and Cpl Schovanek were carried up the hill on stretchers followed by myself.

We were then put in to a waiting ambulance. MCpl Bruin attended to me along with someone else as the vehicle drove to Rastovic where we were rushed to the battalion UMS.

Supplementary Questions

Q: How long have you been Driver Track qualified? When did you do your course? How did you place? Did you have sufficient hours?

A: I did my track course in March but didn't drive again until July; I was AVGP driver both before and after. I placed in the middle third on my course. I completed 14 hours of driving on the course but completed my full 40 hours during the work-up training.

Q: You say in your statement the track pulled to the left?

A: All tracks normally pull to the right (because of the weight of the engine), this one pulled to the left. The right hand tiller bar lock was broken before the accident but it did not affect the steering I think. I was aware of this problem and compensated for it.

Q: Describe the road conditions on the day of the accident. Was it slippery?

A: It rained the night before, there were wet and dry patches. I didn't notice it being slippery when I weaved through the obstacles on the road in Smileic.

Q: How fast were you going just before the accident?


A: There was a downhill grade in the area, I was going maybe 30 mph maximum. The carrier won't go any faster than that.

Q: Were you driving too fast for the weather conditions?

A: I had driven in the rain before, I didn't think there was anything out of the ordinary.

Q: What caused the vehicle to leave the road or, as you say in your statement: "[You] lost control."

A: I'm not sure. The veh pulled hard right. Pte Rogers said I might have tried to counter-steer but I don't remember. Once it pulled hard right there was nothing I could do to keep it on the road.



G.R. Armstrong

Pte

2 Sec, 4 Pl

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PROTECTED BPROTECTED BAnnex D
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94Witness Statement of [REDACTED] Pte Rogers K.W., .50 Cal Gunner

I had just finished getting paid at the Post Office and then headed over to 21B. I looked over the HMG before my team went out for OP shift change. Once everybody was ready to go I backed Pte Armstrong out of the parking spot and walked the track to the front gate to go over to SC-38. I climbed up on the track and got into the gunners hatch and loaded the .50 Cal and put on my headset and gave Cpl Schovanek the thumbs up indicating I was ready to go.

As we were driving towards Smilcic we proceeded to do an ICS check. My headset was NS so Pte Wales in the back standing up with Cpl Schovanek gave me his head set and sat down. He sat on the starboard side of the track about three feet away from the ramp. Everything was going normal until we got about a kilometre or so past Smilcic. The track without any warning what-so-ever turned sideways to the right. The track start sliding down the road and going towards the ditch so I got down into the track and braced for an impact.

When we hit it sounded like the world blew up. I was covered in a lot of gear so I extricated myself from under the pile. I took a second or two to shake my head clear. The first thing I did was pull the kill switch because the engine was screaming and I didn't want it to blow up on us. To get to the kill switch I had to push past Pte Armstrong. He had been hit in the head and kept asking what happened over and over. There was a small gash over his left eye. Next I moved my way towards the radio to try and call for help. I started searching for a headset but they were all torn out of their mounts. I then grabbed the handset and called into C/S 2 for help. The transmission went something like this:

ME: 2 this is 21B we just got in an accident, we are past Smilcic on our way to SC-38. I think we broke a track we have two severely injured personnel and require medical assistance right fucking now - OUT!

2: 21B this is 2 can you give us an approximate grid - OVER.

ME: I don't have time for this fucking shit, get out here right fucking now - OUT!

I put down the hand set and took a look at Cpl Schovanek and Pte Wales. Pte Wales was trying to sit up and was screaming that he was hurt. His legs were under Cpl Schovanek who was unconscious. I began working on Schovanek first. I tried to find his pulse and if he was breathing. The first time I checked I couldn't find any vitals on him, I checked again and for a few seconds there wasn't anything there. All of a sudden he started to breath and had a strong but erratic pulse. I placed a field dressing on his head; there wasn't anything I could do for him after that so I turned my attention to Pte Wales.

Pte Wales was conscious but twisted up pretty bad and screaming about how he couldn't feel

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his legs. He asked me to straighten his legs but they were under Cpl Schovanek so I told him to stay still. Pte Armstrong at the time was telling me that he was pinned by the .50 Cal and that he wanted me to get it off of him. I tried to have Pte Wales hold a bandage to his head but I don't think he understood me and dropped it. I climbed out of the gunners hatch and saw the .50 Cal laying across the drivers hatch. Pte Armstrong was try to climb out so I threw the .50 Cal off of the track and helped Pte Armstrong out of the driver's hatch. He sat down on top of the track and asked how the others were and what happened. I told him to stay there and not look in the track. He looked at me again and started asking what happened. I told him to shut up and that not to worry help was on the way. I tried to drop the ramp but it wouldn't go down.

I started to climb down into the track again when a MLVW pulled up with Cpl Hummer, Pte Lockwood and Pte Graham. Lockwood and Graham came down the hill to see what was up. Pte Lockwood told Cpl Hummer the injuries of Cpl Schovanek and Pte Wales. Lockwood climbed in the track and started to look over Cpl Schovanek. Pte Graham came in and went to Pte Wales. I gave Pte Graham a field dressing and told him to put it on Pte Wales head for the bleeding. I stayed down in the track talking to Pte Wales and holding his hand. I was talking to Cpl Schovanek when I told him to grab onto my hand. He reached out and grabbed on pretty tight.

After a short while the Medics showed up and the OC and CSM. By this time I was in some pain and I figured I had better get out of the way before they had to carry me out on a stretcher. I called up to Cpl Hummer who was on top of the embankment to give me a hand getting out of the ditch. He came down to help me out. By this time someone had got the ramp down. Cpl Hummer got me off the track and helped me up the hill. About half way up Pte Cahill came down to give me a hand. I called down to Pte Graham and told him if he needed any more help that I was right there on top of the embankment. A few minutes later they pulled Pte Wales out of the track. They had to walk him 100 metres to the East to where the embankment wasn't as steep. Pte Cahill got in the ambulance and drove it to where they could carry Pte Wales. They then loaded him in the ambulance.

They then brought Pte Armstrong up to the ambulance and shortly thereafter Pte Cahill put a splint on my arm. They then brought Cpl Schovanek up and strapped me and him in the ambulance. We were then driven to Rastevic

Supplementary Questions

Q: Describe the road conditions and the weather on the day of the accident.

A: It had drizzled on and off the night before. It had rained 15 minutes before we left and the roads were damp.

Q: How fast were you travelling at the time of the accident?

A: We were going about 25 km/h, the track doesn't go very fast anyways. Despite the hill we were going at a conservative speed.

Q: You say in your statement you were sliding down the road to the right?

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
A: Yes, I felt the track turn sideways to the right and begin sliding down the road. As the track travelled at almost a right angle to the direction it was pointing it was also sliding towards the ditch. I can remember looking over the side of the deck down the road. It started sliding back and forth as if Pte Armstrong was trying to correct it before it hit the ditch. I thought afterwards a drive belt might have snapped on one side because it turned so sharply to the right. Maybe it locked up on one side or we threw a track, I've never seen a track do that before. It slid at least 30 ft down the road; I wouldn't have had time otherwise to see the ditch and get down.

Q: Was Pte Armstrong driving too fast for the weather conditions?

A: No. I had no reason to worry until the track went sideways.

Q: Did Pte Wales put a helmet on after he gave you his headset? Did Cpl Schovanek tell him to put one on?

A: No he did not have a helmet on the best I remember. No I don't think so, as Pte Wales didn't have a helmet on.



K.W. Rogers

Pte

2. Sec, 4 Pl

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
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Annex D
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94

Sketch by Pte Rogers



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Annex E
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94

Witness Statement of [REDACTED] Pte Wales R.J., Rifleman

I was riding inside of the APC when the accident happened. All I remember of the accident is that we were driving down the road and hit a small bump and then we turned quickly. I was thrown against the radio, hitting my head. When I awoke my fellow soldiers were pulling me from the APC and giving me first aid.

Lt Doug Smith
For
R.J. Wales
Pte
2 Sec, 4 Pl

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STATEMENT

Nov 5/94

I [REDACTED] PTE WALES RS was
 riding inside of the APC when the accident
 happened. All I remember of the accident
 is that we were driving down the road
 and hit a small bump and then we turned
 quickly. I was thrown against the sides, hitting
 my head. When I awoke, my fellow soldiers
 were pulling me from the APC and giving me
 first-aid.

PTE WALES RS
 B Coy 1RCR
 Reg Wales

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
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Annex F
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94Witness Statement of [REDACTED] Cpl Hummer S.R., Rifleman.

On 29 Oct 94 Pte Lockwood, Pte Graham and myself were going to SC-36 for OP shift change around in an ML. Along the way we found 21B in a deep ditch where it had gone off the road. We immediately stopped. Pte Lockwood and Pte Graham immediately went down the ditch to provide assistance to the injured. I radioed in to C/S 2 telling them we were on the scene. Then I proceeded down the ditch to help out.

On top of the carrier was Pte Armstrong and Pte Rogers, inside the carrier was Cpl Schovanek and Pte Wales; they were both badly hurt. Cpl Schovanek was unconscious but he had a pulse and was breathing fine. He had a field dressing on his forehead which I didn't remove because I was told he had a large cut. Pte Wales was lying on his back in a wierd angle so we did not move him. He was conscious but complained he couldn't feel anything. I then told Pte Lockwood and Pte Graham to keep an eye on them. I then asked Pte Armstrong and Pte Rogers if they were okay. They both said they were fine but Pte Rogers said his wrist was probably broken. Pte Armstrong said he thought his leg was broken. I felt they were in no immediate danger so I proceeded back up the hill to radio in some of the injuries. After I radioed in, Pte Lockwood called up saying that Pte Wales had probably broken both his legs and Cpl Schovanek was getting worse. I waited up there until the medics arrived. Then I helped out where I was needed. After everyone was taken away, I helped out cleaning out the carrier.


S.R. Hummer
Cpl
3 Sec, 4 PL

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To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94Witness Statement of [REDACTED] Pte Jackman D., Rifleman.

At about 0815 on 29 Oct 94, Cpl Mizen, Pte Cahill and myself left our camp, C/S Y2, for our OP SC-40 in 21A. Our normal OP switch around was usually at 0730 or there about but it was delayed because of pay parade at Y2. When we were approaching Smilcic with the intention of us just travelling to the OP, we heard Pte Rogers, 2 Sec, 4 Pl come over the radio in a panic. He was saying that their APC, 21B had thrown a track and that they had gone off the road 2 kilometres east of Smilcic. He also said that their were guys badly hurt.

Hearing this we stopped in Smilcic and called C/S 2 on the radio and asked if they wanted 21A to assist. We were told by C/S 2 to assist at the scene. Heading towards the accident site, the first thing I saw was the MLVW which was being driven by Cpl Hummer, Pte Lockwood and Pte Graham. The MLVW was the first vehicle on the scene and 21A was the second vehicle there.

I noticed the APC 21B in the ditch on the right hand side of the road with the driver, Pte Armstrong sitting on top looking pretty banged up. Cpl Mizen and myself went into the ditch leaving Pte Cahill in the vehicle to monitor the radio. We assisted Pte Lockwood and Pte Graham in giving first aid to the guys involved in the accident. We assisted in helping as much as possible. I asked the driver what happened but he couldn't remember.

The medics arrived just after 21A so the guys received medical attention pretty fast. Once the four guys involved in the accident: Cpl Schovanek, Pte Armstrong, Pte Rogers and Pte Wales; were taken away in the ambulances, the guys from 4 Platoon that were there started to clean up the scene. Making sure all the kit was there and making a list of it all. Once that was done, 21A and its occupance returned to Y2. At 1300 that afternoon we were given a stress debrief and throughout the day we were given info on the condition of the guys involved in the accident.

D. Jackman
D. Jackman
Pte
1 Sec, 4 Pl

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To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94Witness Statement of [REDACTED] Pte Simons M., B Coy MA

On 29 October 94 at about 0830 a person informed me that there was an accident. I did not know the nature of the accident but I was told it was serious. I already was prepared to go for an Echo C/S task so I was able to respond first. At the same time, Pte MacDonald, the driver, was notified. We were told the accident was at Smileic, not an exact location, so we took a chance and headed straight through the town. We saw a M113 down the road so we followed it to the site.

Arriving at the site we saw a M113 down in the bottom of a 20-30 ft cliff. I use the term because the grade was that of a cliff, probably 60 to 70 degrees. The vehicle was upright. I took 10 seconds to get myself sorted out before entering the scene. While I was doing this I received a briefing on the situation by a person already at the scene. Once fully and quickly briefed I proceeded down the slope. I called for a KED and a spine board immediately. The scene in the M113 was chaotic. My memory is cloudy due to the stream of events, however, as I recall I knew that I had to treat Pte Wales first to get to Cpl Schovanek. Pte Wales was lying across the carrier and Cpl Schovanek was behind him on the other side. Both had nasty head wounds.

I did a primary survey on both. They were both breathing and had a radial pulse. Pte Wales at this time was unresponsive to verbal stimulus but positive on painful stimulus. Cpl Schovanek was unconscious and had "Raccoon Eyes". He was unresponsive to all stimulus. Both other casualties were alert and helpful. I then sent a message through Pte MacDonald that there were two Priority One's and two Priority Three's. At this time the CSM arrived and cleared the ramp and dropped it. The KED's had arrived at this time so I started to prepare for extrication. Pte Wales then came to and complained of pain in his back, neck and legs. I suspected C-spine. We then put a cervical collar on him the best we could due to the flak vest.

The CSM in the mean time was holding Cpl Schovanek's head while applying gentle pressure to his head wound to slow bleeding. I had assistance from a bystander on the collar on Pte Wales. We then proceeded to start a KED on Pte Wales. MCpl Bruyns then arrived. We put on the KED together and with four people moved Pte Wales onto a spine board for evacuation. With Pte Wales out of the way we had a path to Cpl Schovanek. A secondary examination showed no response initially. He then squeezed a hand but it is unknown if that was a response or a reaction to convulsive action. We got a collar on him and his vital signs were good, however, his pupils were unresponsive. He showed no injuries other than his head. Once again we had to work around the flak vest but were ultimately successful in getting on the KED. We moved him onto a spine board and readjusted the KED. Cpl Schovanek was on a box or something so that working on him or proper application of the KED was impossible. He had to be moved with the application of the KED as it was. Once it was properly on we applied the spineboard and then evacuated him on a stretcher. I took over the Priority 4 cases at this time.

One was on the carrier and had his left leg splinted. We put him on a stretcher after a thorough secondary examination. Once all the casualties were gone I packed up my medical equipment and

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
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with some help proceeded to move three jump bags and other stuff up the slope. The MO was now on the scene with MCpl Mercer and LS Wiseman. I helped out with the scene there and then was informed of the other Priority 4 in the track ambulance. He was sitting up smoking so I figured he was in good shape. He had an arm sling so I looked at his wrist. It was not broken as suspected but did have a scrape. I laid him down and did a secondary examination. His leg had a large swelling on it and was splinted with the assistance of LS Wiseman using a blanket. I then picked up the kit remaining behind and evacuated the patient to Rastevic.



M. Simons

Pte

B Coy MA



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To 1080-1/3032-1/94.
11 Nov 94Witness Statement of [REDACTED] MWO Bradley D.R., CSM.

On 29 Oct 94 at approximately 0835 as the OC and I were preparing to depart to BHQ, we were informed that one of our vehicles had had an accident while on route to an OP for change over. An ambulance was dispatched from our location and the OC and I followed closely behind in the ILTIS.

Upon arriving at the scene I noticed that an APC was already there and there was another at the bottom of the hill. The medic, Pte Simons, moved to the veh involved and entered it through the combat door. Several minutes later I too moved to the vehicle and entered. Inside I noticed Cpl Schovanek lying on the APC bench with several field dressings on his forehead. On the right side of the carrier was Pte Wales who was being attended to by the medic. Between the two casualties was Pte Rogers. At that time Pte Rogers was holding the hands of both Cpl Schovanek and Pte Wales and was talking and encouraging both casualties. I asked who had radioed the CP and was informed that Rogers had. At the time I assumed that Rogers began first aid treatment on the casualties and I have not been told otherwise. Rogers, although injured himself, remained in the carrier with the casualties until I told him to leave and get himself looked at.

I do not, at this time, know what happened prior to my arrival. It would look as if Pte Rogers contacted the CP and begin first aid on his own while he himself was injured. He did not panic but remained in the carrier while talking to and encouraging the two casualties and I believe he deserves some form of recognition.

Supplementary Question

Q: Was there any evidence on the road when you arrived to indicate what had happened to 21B to make it drive off the road.

A: Yes. There was gravel, stones and dirt thrown up on the road roughly 20 - 30 metres behind where 21B was. This would lead me to believe a violent correction of steering caused the gravel and debris to be thrown on the road. I think the track hit the soft shoulder, tried to correct and threw gravel on the road. The driver then over-corrected to the left then the right and drove off the road. To my knowledge it was not caused by later vehicles turning on the road.

D.R. Bradley
D.R. Bradley
MWO
CSM B.Coy

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
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Annex I
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94

Sketch by MWO Bradley



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Annex J
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94Witness Statement of [REDACTED] MCpl Bruyns R.F., B Coy MA.

On 29 Oct 94 at approximately 0830 I received a call from B Coy CP stating there was a MVA on the main supply route in Smilcic involving three seriously injured casualties. I immediately dispatched an ambulance detachment of Pte Simons and Pte MacDonald who were already prepared to leave for a tasking with the engineers. Cpl Esson and myself gathered our kit, brought it to the track ambulance and left shortly after the first ambulance detachment.

When we arrived on the scene we found out an APC had left the road, travelled down a 20 ft embankment and four people had been injured. After proceeding down the slope I arrived at the vehicle where Pte Simons was already administering medical aid. There were two unconscious casualties amongst kit and equipment lying in the back of the carrier. The third casualty was conscious sitting on top of the carrier and the fourth was sitting off to the side of the scene, conscious and alert.

One of the casualties, a Pte Wales was lying in the back of the APC blocking access to the other casualty, a Cpl Schovanek. Therefore, Pte Wales had to be evacuated from the APC first. At this time, I requested that the MO be called and meet us at our location due to the seriousness of injuries.

Pte Simons had already fitted a cervical collar on to Pte Wales and he regained consciousness while we were preparing the KED. He complained of neck, back and leg pain. Pte Simons and myself applied the KED and prepared to move him to a long spine board. His vital signs were stable and there was very little blood loss. With the help of other first aiders at the scene we carefully moved Pte Wales as a stationary unit, extracting him from the vehicle and strapping him onto a long spine board. His left leg was fastened to his right leg as a quick splint and kept in the same position as it was found in the APC because any movement caused great pain. Pte Wales was then carried by stretcher to the top of the slope and his vital signs were monitored by Cpl Esson.

Cpl Schovanek had still not regained consciousness. He had signs of major head trauma, but the bleeding from a deep laceration to his forehead was not controlled by direct pressure applied by CSM Bradley. Secondary assessment showed no sign of additional major injuries other than head trauma. His vital signs were stable and pupils equal but unresponsive to light. Pte Simons and I applied a KED at which time Cpl Schovanek started vomiting profusely. His airway was cleared and he then uttered a few words but never gained consciousness. When the KED was fastened we lifted him as a unit onto a long spine board. Cpl Schovanek was then strapped to the spine board and was carried away from the vehicle.

Next a quick assessment of Pte Armstrong was done. He was alert and sitting on top of the APC. He had a laceration/possible open fracture of the left leg and was complaining of left sided pain. I determined there was no serious injury to his back or abdomen and instructed a first aider to splint his left leg.

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I then proceeded up the slope to further monitor the litter patients and prepare for evacuation from the scene. At this time Capt. Tien and two additional medics arrived on the scene. The MO then took over Cpl Schovanek's care. Pte Simons continued caring for Pte Armstrong and Pte Rogers. I worked on Pte Wales.

Pte Wales' vital signs remained stable but he was complaining of difficulty breathing. I used a Kreamer wire splint to better immobilize his left leg, started a 1000 cc ringers lactate IV with 16 g cathelon, and supplied oxygen by mask. He had breathing sounds bilaterally and good air entry. Pte Wales was now ready for transport back to the UMS. Pte Armstrong was also loaded in the ambulance with Pte Wales for transport. During transport Pte Wales lost consciousness briefly on three occasions but was easily aroused, vital signs remained strong. Pte Armstrong remained conscious, alert and calm.

At the UMS all four patients were further stabilized and transported to Zagreb via helicopter with the MO and MCpl Tibbits escorting.

R. Bruyns
R. Bruyns
MCpl
B Coy MA

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To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94Witness Statement of [REDACTED] Capt Luckhurst S.B., B Coy Ops O.

On 29 Oct 94 at approx 0810 I was working on the Ops computer and monitoring C/S 0 and C/S 2 nets. A hysterical transmission from 21B broke the air stating that they had had a vehicle accident east of Smilcic, people were injured and they required assistance immediately.

I ran into the CP and confirmed with the signaller that the accident was east of Smilcic. I ran to the camp courtyard where the soldiers were queuing to be paid. I called for a medic and driver and told them that a track had had an accident and to leave immediately. Cpl Mio and Cpl Esson ran to get their flak vests and departed. I ran back to the CP to get more details. It was reported that one person had broken legs and one had a head injury. I ordered the signaller to contact C/S 0 and have Sunray 83 on standby because of the accident.

C/S 29 and 29C left camp in an ILTIS approximately 8-10 minutes after the ambulance. I had the signaller, MCpl Cushman, get the KL-43 and the Coy nominal role with position numbers. I told Cpl Northwood to mount-up in C/S 2B. I went back to the pay parade and told MCpl Farrow (OC's Signaller) to go into the CP to man radios. WO Harrington (Ops WO) met me while I got my flak jacket on; I briefed him and told him to remain in the CP to monitor and control the nets.

I departed camp to the accident scene. On my arrival I noticed one APC on the road, an ambulance and the OC's ILTIS. I pulled 2B on the far end (east) of the accident site to slow traffic through the accident area. The APC in the accident was at the bottom of a 20 ft embankment on the right side of the road still facing east and on both of its track.

I left MCpl Cushman to monitor the nets and went down the embankment to lend assistance. MCpl Bruin and Pte Simons, both MA's, were administering aid. The CSM was applying dressings to Cpl Schovanek's wound. I cleared the rear of the APC and readied a backboard. Pte Wales was the first casualty removed. I assisted in carrying the stretcher up to the road and loading it into the ambulance. I returned to ensure that 2B was relaying the necessary information and gave the signaller more details. I returned to the APC and assisted with the backboard and moving Cpl Schovanek into the stretcher. I assisted in carrying him to the road where the MO had arrived. I checked with 2B and returned to the APC to assist in carrying Pte Armstrong by stretcher to the ambulance. I then assisted the MO to comfort and apply a new dressing to Cpl Schovanek. We then lifted him into an ambulance and all casualties departed.

I then went to the 2B track and confirmed that all necessary particulars had been sent. The OC deemed me as site commander. I gave a brief statement to the Military Police. The MRT's arrived and surveyed the scene so as to recover 21B. Engineer assistance was requested to clear a route and clear debris (rocks and dirt) from the road. Once WO Stevens had confirmed to me that all the kit was off loaded from the APC, I dispatched all the personnel present to return to Y2.

Prior to leaving I ordered WO Stevens to assemble the soldiers involved back at Y2 and have Platoon peer counsellors conduct a Critical Incident Stress debrief.

Once the Engineers arrived and began to clean-up and clear the route, I ensured the MRT was

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comfortable with the recovery task and departed to Y2.

At 1300 that afternoon, I gave a quick brief to the soldiers assembled on why they were together and left, allowing them to continue with the peer debrief. I returned to my office to continue my computer work.

Supplementary Questions

Q: Would you describe the road around the accident site?

A: There was dirt and rocks sprayed up on the road approximately 30 metres from the accident site. I would say the track (21B) hit the side of the road, pulled hard left and pulled too hard right to correct sending it off the road.

S.B. Luckhurst
S.B. Luckhurst
Capt.
B Coy Ops O

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
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Annex K
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94

Sketch by Capt Luckhurst



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Annex I
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94Witness Statement of [REDACTED] Sgt A.R. Lair, Section Commander.

On about 0830 hrs on 29 October 1994 I was standing in the pay line at Y-2 when I heard that 21A was involved in an accident involving some locals. Then, shortly after I heard that it was 21B and that the vehicle had lost a track and one man had two broken legs and another had a severe head injury.

So WO Stevens, Lt Nolan and myself jumped into C/S 21 and proceeded to the scene of the accident. It was only about 5 km from camp. On arriving at the accident site I saw my veh 20 ft down a hill to the right. I ran down the hill and tore off my flak vest and ran to the vehicle. They were trying to put Pte Wales on a back board in the rear of the track. I assisted in removing Pte Wales from the track and then looked in the back of the vehicle itself.

I saw that Cpl Schovanek was laying in the track with his head on CSM Bradley's lap and with Cpl Lockwood holding his legs. Suddenly he started to vomit. I jumped into the back and helped the CSM and Cpl Lockwood to turn him on his side. We had to remove ammo cans and kit from off him to do this. Once we turned him on his side I did a finger sweep. The CSM then indicated we should change the bandages on Cpl Schovanek's head. We remove the old shell dressings and replaced them with two new ones.

I looked to my left and saw that they were ready to carry Pte Wales up the hill so I grabbed the right end of the stretcher. We carried Pte Wales to the box ambulance and helped the medic work on him. Lt Nolan jumped in the back and helped to reassure the casualties. Then the CSM told me to go down to the vehicle and account for the kit in the track and let the medics do their work. Once this was done Capt Luckhurst said to have all the personnel involved in the accident to get together for a Critical Incident Stress-Debrief.

Supplementary Questions

Q: Is 21B a fast track?

A: No, it's a pig. We did alot of maintenance on it because it was so slow. Maximum speed was about 25 mph, 26 mph downhill.

Q: Did Pte Armstrong have a tendency to speed?

A: No, he has always been a cautious driver; sometimes too cautious. He was also very conscious about track maintenance.

Q: As you have travelled the area of the accident, did 21B generally pick-up speed due to the grade?

A: Nothing out of the ordinary. I notice other tracks doing speed wobbles there afterwards.

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Q: How long has Pte Armstrong been a track driver in the section? When did he do his Track Driver Course?

A: He did his track course in March. He was an AVGP driver before that. When he was done the course, he became main driver in the section and did most of the work-up training as driver.

Q: Was there any damage to the kit in the track itself?

A: Yes, after the impact all the kit stored in the sides of the carrier ripped the bungee cords out and flew like shrapnel throughout the carrier; fortunately most of the heavy items were stored on the floor. A C-9 was slightly damaged as were two C-7's, the spade grip on the .50 Cal MG was damaged, two M72's were damaged, a .50 Cal round was damaged and one was lost, a 17/80 box and a 22/98 box were ripped off the wall and a lantern halo was smashed.



A.R. Lair

Sgt

2 Sec, 4 Pl

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
42

Annex M
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94Witness Statement of Sgt J.A. McComb, B Coy Tpt Sgt.

On 29 Oct 94 I arrived at the accident site approximately 45 minutes after the accident occurred. I noted from the position of the carrier that it had taken a sharp and fast turn into the gulley. It had been going fast enough to have actually left the ground before it hit the bottom and that a lot of the impact was taken by the mid-front portion of the body. It was obvious it did not hit track first as this would have caused major suspension and track damage. Only the tiller bar lock was broken and this occurred as a result of the accident according to the investigation team from Maintenance Platoon. In my opinion, either the weather caused Pte Armstrong to lose control or given his lack of experience on the M-113, he may have been driving with his thumbs up on the tiller bar buttons and accidentally pushed one down causing the track to lock.

Q: Would you consider someone with forty hours of track driving an experienced driver?

A: No, I would not say someone with forty hours of driving to be an experienced driver.



J.A. McComb

Sgt

B Coy Tpt

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M1/1

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
43

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Annex N
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94

Witness Statement of [REDACTED] MCpl Rumbolt O.L., B Coy MRT.

On 29 Oct 94 I was called to recover an APC, CFR 65-35047, which had been involved in an accident. Upon my arrival at the scene, I examined the vehicle and found it to be in a serviceable condition. The only damage to the veh that I could find was the tiller bar lock on the floor of the driver's compartment was broken. I found no more damage to the rest of the vehicle. I then called for the engineers to clear a path for me to drive the veh upon the paved road. I recovered the vehicle to C/S 8's location. I could not find anything mechanical wrong with the vehicle to cause the accident.



O.L. Rumbolt
MCpl
B Coy MRT

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N1/1

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44

PROTECTED BAnnex O
To 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 Nov 94Witness Statement of Capt H.C. Tien, Sr MO


The following is a list of injuries caused in the vch accident on 29 Oct 94:

Cpl Schovanek had an open, depressed skull fracture over his frontal area. This resulted in several small intracerebral hematomas and raised intracranial pressure from cerebral edema. He was flown to Zagreb for neurosurgery and we are awaiting reports as to post-operative recovery.

Pte Wales had a non-displaced, non-comminuted closed fracture of the mid-shaft of his left humerus. This was fixed surgically with a plate and screws. He also suffered a concussion, with loss of consciousness for about 20 minutes, but pre-operative CT scan was normal.

Pte Armstrong suffered a puncture wound over the left tibia, mid-shaft; X-rays revealed no fracture. He also suffered multiple facial abrasions. He has been returned to his unit.

Pte Rogers suffered abrasions over his left lateral thigh and sprained his right wrist. He was X-rayed for a possible right scaphid fracture but this was negative. He has been returned to his unit.

H.C. Tien
Capt
Sr MO**PROTECTED B**PROTECTED B

01/5

REVIEWED BOI

002274

National Défense / Défense nationale

PROTECTED B

1080-1/3032-1/94
11 NOV 94

45

REPORT ON INJURIES OR IMMEDIATE DEATH THEREFROM - RAPPORT EN CAS DE BLESSURE OU DE MORT SUBITE PAR SUITE DE BLESSURES

1. (TO BE COMPLETED AND FORWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CFAO 24-1 WITHIN 7 DAYS OF INJURY OR DEATH) / (REMPLIR ET EXPÉDIER EN CONFORMITÉ AVEC L'OAFC 24-1, DANS LES 7 JOURS DE L'ACCIDENT OU DU DÉCÈS)

OR - HAS	SURNAME - NOM DE FAMILLE <i>Peters</i>	GIVEN NAMES - PRÉNOMS <i>KEVIN</i>		
REGULAR / RÉGULIÈRE	DATE OF BIRTH / DATE DE NAISSANCE	MOC - CEM <i>031</i>	UNIT - UNITÉ <i>1RBR</i>	
RESERVE / RÉSERVÉ				
DATE AND TIME OF ACCIDENT / DATE ET HEURE DE L'ACCIDENT <i>04/21/94 21:10:49</i>		PLACE OF ACCIDENT - LIEU DE L'ACCIDENT <i>YUSSALVIC</i>		

2. DECLARATION OF THE VICTIM ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF INJURY (WHEN PRACTICABLE) / DÉCLARATION DE LA VICTIME SUR LES CIRCONSTANCES DES BLESSURES (SI PRATICABLE)

[Empty space for victim's statement]

I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE STATEMENT OF HOW THE INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED / J'ATTIRIE PAR LES PRÉSENTES QUE L'EXPOSÉ CI-DESSUS DÉCRIT EXACTEMENT COMMENT J'AI SUBI MES BLESSURES

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS TO THE STATEMENT / SIGNATURE DU TÉMOIN DE LA DÉCLARATION	DATE	SIGNATURE
---	------	-----------

3. MEDICAL OFFICER'S STATEMENT - DÉCLARATION DU MÉDECIN

A. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INJURIES OR CAUSE OF DEATH - DESCRIPTION DÉTAILLÉE DES BLESSURES OU LA CAUSE DE LA MORT

*Passenger APC which went off road
- abrasions (L) lateral thigh
possible scapular H.P. wound*

B. 1. ARE THE INJURIES SERIOUS? / 1. LES BLESSURES SONT GRAVES? YES NO OR 2. LIKELY TO CAUSE A PERMANENT DISABILITY? / 2. SUSCEPTIBLES DE CAUSER UNE INVALIDITÉ PERMANENTE? YES NO

C. IF DISABILITY NOT DETERMINABLE AT THIS TIME FURTHER REPORT WILL BE MADE WITHIN _____ DAYS (NOT LONGER THAN 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF INJURY) / SI L'INVALIDITÉ IMPOSSIBLE À DÉTERMINER, UN AUTRE RAPPORT SERA PRÉPARÉ DANS _____ JOURS. (AU PLUS TARD 60 JOURS, À COMPTER DE LA DATE DE L'ACCIDENT)

IF ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL: STATE NAME AND ADDRESS - EN CAS D'ADMISSION À L'HÔPITAL, EN PRÉCISER LE NOM ET L'ADRESSE

MEDICAL UNIT - UNITÉ MÉDICALE <i>CANRAT 1</i>	DATE	SIGNATURE (OVER TYPEWRITTEN NAME, RANK AND APPOINTMENT) / SIGNATURE (AU-DESSUS DU NOM, GRADE ET NIVEAU DACTYLOGRAPHIQUES)
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PROTECTED B

REVIEWED BOI

National Defence / Défense nationale

PROTECTED B

ANNEX 0 TO 1080-1/3032-1/94 47 11 NOV 94

REPORT ON INJURIES OR IMMEDIATE DEATH THEREFROM - RAPPORT EN CAS DE BLESSURE OU DE MORT SUBITE PAR SUITE DE BLESSURES

s.19(1)

(TO BE COMPLETED AND FORWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CFAO 24-2 WITHIN 7 DAYS OF INJURY OR DEATH) / (À COMPLÉTER ET À RENDRE CONFORMÉMENT AVEC L'OAFC 24.2, DANS LES 7 JOURS DE L'ACCIDENT OU DU DÉCÈS)

SURNAME - NOM DE FAMILLE <i>WILCOX</i>		GIVEN NAMES - PRÉNOMS <i>REG.</i>	
REGULAR MEMBER / MEMBRE RÉGULIER	DATE OF BIRTH / DATE DE NAISSANCE	MOB - CEM <i>031</i>	UNIT - UNITÉ <i>1001</i>
PLACE OF ACCIDENT - LIEU DE L'ACCIDENT <i>YOCOSUVA</i>			
STATEMENT OF CIRCUMSTANCES OF INJURY (WHEN PRACTICABLE) / ÉNONCÉ DES CIRCONSTANCES DES BLESSURES (SI PRATICABLE)			

STATE THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCIDENT OR DEATH / ÉNONCER QUE LE PRÉCÉDENT EST UN VRAI ÉTAT DES FAITS ET DES CIRCONSTANCES DE L'ACCIDENT OU DE LA DÉCÈS

INDIVIDUAL CASE / CAS INDIVIDUEL

DESCRIPTION OF INJURIES OR CAUSE OF DEATH / DÉCRIRE LES BLESSURES OU LA CAUSE DE LA MORT

Passenger of APC which went off road.

(1) clinically closed # (2) femur, midshaft, 30° angulation

(2) facial lacerations, mild decrease in level of consciousness but still Glasgow 15

[Signature]

IS THE INJURY OR DEATH OF A SERIOUS NATURE? / EST-CE QUE LES BLESSURES SONT GRAVES? YES / OUI NO / NON

IS IT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT OR DEATH WITHIN 7 DAYS OF THE ACCIDENT OR DEATH? / EST-CE QU'IL EST POSSIBLE DE DÉTERMINER LA CAUSE DE L'ACCIDENT OU DE LA MORT DANS LES 7 JOURS (AU PLUS TARD 90 JOURS, À COMPTER DE LA DATE DE L'ACCIDENT OU DU DÉCÈS)? YES / OUI NO / NON

IF ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL, STATE NAME AND ADDRESS - EN CAS D'ADMISSION À L'HÔPITAL, EN PRÉCISER LE NOM ET L'ADRESSE

MEDICAL UNIT / UNITÉ MÉDICALE REVIEWED 	DATE BOI	SIGNATURE (OVER TYPEWRITTEN NAME, RANK AND ASSIGNMENT) / SIGNATURE (AU DESSUS DU NOM, GRADE ET NIVEAU DACTYLOGRAPHIÉ)
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PROTECTED B

ARR National Defence / Défense nationale

PROTECTED B

ANNEX O TO 1080-1/3032-1/94

11 NOV 94

REPORT ON INJURIES OR IMMEDIATE DEATH THEREFROM - RAPPORT EN CAS DE BLESSURE OU DE MORT SUBITE PAR SUITE DE BLESSURES

(TO BE COMPLETED AND FORWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CFAO 24-2 WITHIN 7 DAYS OF INJURY OR DEATH) / (À COMPLÉTER ET À FAIRE PARVENIR EN CONFORMITÉ AVEC L'OCFC 24-2, DANS LES 7 JOURS DE L'ACCIDENT OU DU DÉCÈS)

UNIT / UNITE	SURNAME - NOM DE FAMILLE SKIRVINEK	GIVEN NAMES - PRÉNOMS MILLEW
GRADE / GRADE	REGULAR / RESERVE / RESERVE REGULIERE / RESERVE	DATE OF BIRTH / DATE DE NAISSANCE [REDACTED]
MOB - CEM 031	UNIT - UNITE 10301	
PLACE OF ACCIDENT - LIEU DE L'ACCIDENT YVESVILLE		

STATEMENT OF CIRCUMSTANCES OF INJURY (WHEN PRACTICABLE) / ÉTAT DES CIRCONSTANCES DES BLESSURES (SI PRATICABLE)

STATEMENT OF THE PERSON WHO IS A WITNESS TO THE ACCIDENT / ÉTAT DES CIRCONSTANCES DE L'ACCIDENT (SI PRATICABLE)

MEDICAL OPINION / OPINION MÉDICALE

DESCRIPTION OF INJURIES OR CAUSE OF DEATH / DESCRIPTION DES BLESSURES OU LA CAUSE DE LA MORT

passenger of APC that went off road, struck (R) frontal area, clinically depressed skull fracture with a Glasgow of 11-12, no other injury

[Signature] TIEU

1. WERE THE INJURIES SERIOUS? / LES BLESSURES SONT-ELLES SÉRIEUSES? YES / OUI [] NO / NON [x]

2. WOULD YOU CHOOSE A FURTHER INVESTIGATION? / PRÉFÉRERIEZ-VOUS FAIRE UNE ENQUÊTE SUPPLÉMENTAIRE? YES / OUI [] NO / NON [x]

3. IF THE PERSON IS RESPONSIBLE AT THE TIME, FURTHER REPORT WILL BE MADE WITHIN [] DAYS (NOT EXCEEDING 90 DAYS FROM DATE OF ACCIDENT) / SI LA PERSONNE EST RESPONSABLE À DÉTERMINER, UN AUTRE RAPPORT SERA PRÉPARÉ DANS [] JOURS (AU PLUS TARD 90 JOURS À COMPTER DE LA DATE DE L'ACCIDENT)

4. NUMBER OF HOSPITAL, STATE NAME AND ADDRESS - EN CAS D'ADMISSION À L'HÔPITAL, EN PRÉCISER LE NOM ET L'ADRESSE

MEDICAL UNIT / UNITÉ MÉDICALE ANBA 1	DATE	SIGNATURE (OVER TYPEWRITTEN NAME, RANK AND APPOINTMENT) / SIGNATURE (AU DESSUS DU NOM, GRADE ET NIVEAU D'ACTIVITÉ)
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ANNEX P
TO 1080-1/3032-1/94
11 NOV 94

MEMORANDUM

12300-8 (Maint)

30 Oct 94


OC Adm Coy

TECHNICAL INSPECTION APC ACCIDENT - 29 OCT 94

1. A detailed insp of C/S 21B, UNPF 7418 was conducted on the 30 Oct 94. The insp covered the track, suspension and steering mechanisms. In addition the veh was extensively test driven to confirm if there were any other unseen problems.

2. The insp showed no problems with either the track or the suspension. There was however a problem with the steering control bracket, as shown in Anx A. This bracket holds the steering control levers/assembly in place. The bracket had been exposed to a high localised stress and it sheered. This fracture of the steering control bracket indicates a rapid deceleration of veh, with sufficient force being applied forward on the tiller bars. The veh was test driven with the bracket broken and it had no steering problems.

3. In my view there were no mechanical failures that caused this accident. The steering control bracket sheered due to the accident and was not the cause.


J. Gibbons
Capt
Maint O
2379


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- 5 F10730
- 6 F10730
- 7 F10850
- 8 F10090
- 9 F10830
- 10 F10770
- 11 F10910
- 12 F10730
- 13 F10800
- 14 F10600



- 23 F10780
- 24 F10310
- 25 F10840
- 26 F10610
- 27 F10860
- 28 F10870
- 29 F10830
- 30 F10640
- 31 F10700
- 32 F10650
- 33 F10680

F55

STEERING CONTROL LEVERS

Steering Control Bracket
USN 3340400-999-233

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ANNEX E
TO 1080-2/3032-1/94
11 NOV 94
70 050/NA-000

50

002280

NOV-26-1994 15:35 FROM STU.3 FAX TO [01] RS232 P.05

TOTAL P.05

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PA 1080-1/3032-24/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
KOK 3RO

26 November 1994

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION - LOSS
OF 9MM PISTOL - 6T4973 CANBAT 1

- References: A. CB1 1080-1/3032-24/94 (CO) 27 September 1994
(enclosure 1)
B. CB1 1080-1/3032-24/94 (2IC Admin Coy) 27 September 1994
(enclosure 2)
C. CCUNPROFOR Directive 605

1. Enclosed is the Summary Investigation into the loss of a 9mm pistol Serial Number 6T4973 on charge to K62 216 871 Capt R.J. Fitzgerald, 23A Inf, a member of Administration Company, First Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry on duty in Sector South, Croatia Command as CANBAT 1.

2. The events surrounding this case have been dealt with summarily by the Commander to his satisfaction. Captain Fitzgerald was charged, found guilty and sentenced to a \$250.00 fine. He was negligent in the loss of his weapon and I am satisfied with the Commanding Officer's decision to hold him responsible for the full amount of the loss. An administrative deduction for the full amount of \$242.29 is being staffed by the member's unit.

1/2

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3. Any inquiries into this case should be forwarded to the G1, Canadian Contingent.


N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1 UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry
Enclosure 2 Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation 1080-1/3032-24/94

Distribution List

Action

NDHQ Ottawa//J1 Coord//
1 PPCLI Calgary/CO

Information (less enclosures)

CCUNPROFOR Rastevic//CANBAT 1/CO//
CCHQ Det Primosten//G5 Legal//

REVIEWED 801

2/2

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PAGE 2 RCCPJAQ1210 UNCLAS

THIS ACTION TO PERMIT A FULL AND PUBLIC AIRING OF THE OUTSTANDING
ISSUES SURROUNDING THAT PARTICIPATION

2. MR COLLENETTE HAS ASKED ME TO PASS ON THAT HIS DECISION TO ORDER
A CIVILIAN INQUIRY IS NOT A REFLECTION ON THE WORK OF THE JOINT
MILITARY/CIVILIAN BOARD WHICH CONDUCTED THE INITIAL INVESTIGATION
INTO THESE EVENTS, NOR ON THE EXCELLENT WORK OF THE MEN AND WOMEN
OF CANADA S ARMED FORCES, BOTH HERE AT HOME AND IN DIFFICULT AND
DANGEROUS MISSIONS OVERSEAS

3. THE MINISTER HAS ASSURED ME OF HIS CONTINUING CONFIDENCE IN THE
DEDICATION AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CANADIAN
FORCES. I SHARE THE MINISTER S SENTIMENTS FULLY AND I WOULD ASK
THAT YOU MAKE THEM KNOWN TO ALL UNDER YOUR COMMAND. SIGNED GENERAL
JOHN DE CHASTELAIN, CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

ENGLISH TEXT ENDS/TEXTE FRANCAIS SUIT

OBJET: ENQUETE SUR LA SOMALIE

1. VOUS SAVEZ QUE LE MINISTRE A ORDONNE QU UNE COMMISSION D ENQUETE
CIVILE SOIT MISE SUR PIED EN VUE DE FAIRE LA LUNIERE SUR LA
PARTICIPATION DES FORCES CANADIENNES A LA MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES
EN SOMALIE. LE MINISTRE A PRIS CETTE DECISION AFIN QU UNE
DISCUSSION FRANCHE ET OUVERTE AIT LIEU SUR LES QUESTIONS ENCORE EN

REVIEWED 801

PAGE 3 RCCPJAQ1210 UNCLAS

SUSPENS A PROPOS DE CETTE PARTICIPATION

2. LE MINISTRE ME PRIE DE VOUS SOULIGNER QU EN PRENANT CETTE
DECISION, IL NE POSE NULLEMENT UN JUGEMENT DE VALEUR SUR L EXAMEN
EFFECTUE PAR LA COMMISSION D ENQUETE CIVILE ET MILITAIRE QUE S EST
DEJA PENCHEE SUR LE SUJET NI SUR L EXCELLENT TRAVAIL ACCOMPLI PAR
LES HOMMES ET LES FEMMES DES FORCES CANADIENNES AU PAYS ET AU COURS
DE MISSIONS DIFFICILES ET DANGEREUSES A L ETRANGER

3. LE MINISTRE M A REPETE QU IL CONTINUAIT DE CROIRE AU DEVOUEMENT
ET AU PROFESSIONNALISME DES MEMBRES DES FORCES CANADIENNES. JE
PARTAGE CE SENTIMENT ET VOUS DEMANDE DE TRANSMETTRE NOTRE APPUI A
TOUS CEUX QUI RELEVANT DE VOUS. LE GENERAL JOHN DE CHASTELAIN,
CHEF D ETAT-MAJOR DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

BT

#1210

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REVIEWED BOI

PRIORITY

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ZNR UUUUU

P 242230Z NOV 94

FM NDHQ OTTAWA//CDS//

TO RCWBOCA/AIRCOM WINNIPEG

RCESCGA/LFCHQ ST HUBERT

RCEOCEA/MARCOMHQ HALIFAX

RCFPSBA/NMR SHAPE CA

RCCELDN/CDLS LONDON UK

RCCBLSA/CDLS WASHINGTON DC

RCWPQHA/CFNAHQ YELLOWKNIFE

RUWTNOK/CINC NORAD PETERSON AFB CO

RCCLPZB/CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB ←

BT

UNCLAS CDS 110

SIC A2A

BILINGUAL MESSAGE/MESSAGE BILINGUE

(FOR COMMANDERS) (AUX COMMANDANTS)

SUBJ: SOMALIA AFFAIR - DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION AND OPINION

1. THE MND HAS DIRECTED THAT A BOARD OF INQUIRY WILL LOOK INTO THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES RESPECTING THE ALLEGATIONS OF WRONG DOING CONCERNING THE CF S PARTICIPATION IN SOMALIA

RECEIVED

1080-1 25 NOV 1994

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS			
63		25/11	GA
GI		25/11	GA
GI ADM	(3)	25/11	GI
GA	GA	26/11	GA

(2)
GI

Repeat to units
info Comd and Dcom.

Howard
63
25/11

(3) GI ADM

1. REPEAT MSG USE THIS MSG AS REF, AND STATE WIDEST DISTR. POSSIBLE.

WCD
GI
25 NOV 94

(4) NTF
copy sent to Comd/DCmd
for their info. iaw min 2.
DGS/SA
GI Admin
25/Nov 94

(5) NTF
Min 2 actioned
DGS/SA
26/Nov 94

REVIEWED BOI

PAGE 3 RCCPJAQ1035 UNCLAS

LES ORFC 4.02(E) ET 5.01(E) EN FOURNISSANT AUX MEMBRES DE LA
COMMISSION CIVILE CHARGES DE CETTE ENQUETE TOUS LES FAITS QUI
PEUVENT LES ECLAIRER

3. VOUS DEVEZ EGALEMENT VOUS ASSURER QUE TOUS LES MILITAIRES SOUS
VO5 ORRES RESPECTENT LES DISPOSITIONS DES ORFC 19.36, 19.37 ET
19.375 CONCERNANT LA DIVULGATION DE RENSEIGNEMENTS ET D OPINIONS AU
PUBLIC

4. IL EST IMPORTANT, POUR LE CANADA ET LES FC, QUE RIEN NE VIENNE
GENER LE DEROULEMENT DE CETTE ENQUETE

BT

#1035

♥JAS015 DELIVERED 3290114 720233

REVIEWED BOI

PAGE 2 RCCPJAQ1035 UNCLAS

2. IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE MND S INQUIRY YOU ARE TO ENSURE THAT ALL CF MEMBERS UNDER YOUR COMMAND FOLLOW AND COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF QR AND O 4.02(E) AND 5.01(E) BY BRINGING FORWARD ANY EVIDENCE THAT MAY ASSIST THE CIVILIAN INQUIRY INTO EVENTS IN SOMALIA

3. YOU ARE TO ALSO ENSURE THAT ALL CF MEMBERS UNDER YOUR COMMAND FOLLOW AND COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF QR AND O 19.36 (DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION OR OPINION), 19.37 (PERMISSION TO COMMUNICATE INFORMATION) AND 19.375 (COMMUNICATIONS TO NEWS AGENCIES)

4. IT IS IMPORTANT TO CANADA AND TO THE CF, NOW THAT THE INQUIRY HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED, THAT ITS PROCESS NOT BE COMPROMISED

ENGLISH TEXT ENDS/TEXTE FRANCAIS SUIT

OBJET: SOMALIE - DIVULGATION DE RENSEIGNEMENTS ET D OPINIONS

1. LE MINISTRE DE LA DN A ORDONNE QU UNE COMMISSION D ENQUETE SOIT MISE SUR PIED AFIN D EXAMINER LES POINTS ENCORE EN LITIGE RELATIFS AUX ALLEGATIONS D INCONDUITE QUI ONT FAIT SUITE A LA PARTICIPATION DES FC EN SOMALIE

2. EN VUE D ASSURER L INTEGRITE DE L ENQUETE ORDONNEE PAR LE MINISTRE, VEILLEZ-VOUS ASSURER QUE TOUS LES MEMBRES QUI RELEVANT DE VOTRE COMMANDEMENT SE CONFORMENT AUX DISPOSITIONS CONTENUES DANS

REVIEWED 801

M₂₉ Readdressed

~~CANBAT 1/CO~~

CCUNPROFOR RASTEVIC//CANBAT 1/CO//

CCUNPROFOR VISOKO//CANBAT 2/CO//

CCUNPROFOR ~~PA~~ ^{PAT}MOSTEN//CANLOGBAT/CO//65690//

~~CCUNPROFOR~~

REVIEWED BOI

Dave

DA, JFA
26 NOV 54

DA, JFA

DA, JFA

002289



UNCLAS/PROT A/PROT B/CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/FLASH



HQ CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB

FAX/VOICE NO: INTL # 011-385-41-815-191(FAX)

-191 EXT 6506 (VOICE)

FILE NO: 1080-1 (G1 ADMIN)

DATE: 26 NOV 94

FROM: HQ CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//G1 ADMIN//
TO: BH COMD REAR SPLIT//MAJ DONOVAN//
SECTOR SOUTH KNIN//MAJ STEWART//
SECTOR SOUTH WEST//GORNI VAKEF//
HQUNPROFOR ZAGREB//FORCE ENGR O/COL SIMPSON/
HQUNPROFOR ZAGREB//G3/COL TREPANIER//
BIHAC COMD//COL LEMIEUX//

FAX TEL NO:


FAX NO:

PAGE: 01 OF 04

SUBJECT: SOMALIA AFFAIR - DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION AND OPINION

REFERENCE: CDS 110 242230Z NOV 94 (ENCLOSED)

SEE ENCL FOR INFO REGARDING SUBJ HEADING.

RELEASING AUTH SIGNATURE:  D. HEALEY, SGT G1 ADMIN

UNCLAS/PROT A/PROT B/CONFIDENTIAL

REVIEWED 801

PROTECTED A

1080-1 (G1 ADMIN)

01 01 241112Z NOV 94 PP GGGG

G1 813

CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//G1 ADMIN//

CCUNPROFOR VISOKO//UMS/MO/FST//

PROTECTED A G1 813

SUBJ: FORWARD SURGICAL TEAMS SOPS

REF: 1080-2-4271-012-94(ADJT)

1. REF WAS SUMMARY INVESTIGATION INTO LOSS OF C7 RIFLE. IN SI IT STATED THAT MEMBER WAS FOLLOWING THE FST SOPS WHEN LEAVING HIS WEAPON BEHIND IN THE VEHICLE.
2. REQUEST A COPY OF FST SOP DEALING WITH THIS.
3. PLEASE FAX TO CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB ATTN G1 ADMIN AT 041-815-196 SOONEST.
4. THANKING YOU IN ADVANCE FOR YOUR COOPERATION ON THIS MATTER.

per 12
D. HEALEY, SGT, G1 ADMIN

W.C. Desjardins
W.C. DESJARDINS, CAPT, G1

PROTECTED A

REVIEWED BOI

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
K0K 3R0

1080-1 (COS)

22 November 1994

Distribution List

BOARD OF INQUIRY - CANBAT 1
HQ CCUNPROFOR COMMENTS

Reference: CCUNPROFOR CANBAT 1 1080-1 (CO) 10 October 1994

1. Reference has been reviewed by this Headquarters.
2. Find attached this HQ's comments and proposed action. If any issues have been omitted they should be identified to the G3 - Maj A.J. Howard local 6513.

M.G. Macdonald
M.G. Macdonald
Lieutenant Colonel
Chief of Staff

Annexes

Annex A - HQ CCUNPROFOR COMMENTS ON CANBAT 1
BOI DATED 10 OCTOBER 1994

Distribution List

Action

CANBAT 1/CO

Information

G1
G2
G3

REVIEWED BOI

HQ CCUNPROFOR COMMENTS ON CANBAT 1
 BOI DATED 10 OCTOBER 1994

Annex A to
 1080-1 (COS)
 DATED 22 NOV 94

SER	CANBAT 1 BOI REF	CANBAT 1 OBSN	HQ CCUNPROFOR COMMENTS
1	Annex B - Appx 1	CANBAT 1 wishes to provide input into the revision of the TO and E.	During last visit to CANBAT 1 by G3 draft TO and E was given to unit for revision. CANBAT 1 has forwarded their response to this HQ for consideration.
	Annex B - Appx 5	CCUNPROFOR ROE are not worded in such a way as to be easily understood by soldiers.	G3 will examine with all CCUNPROFOR units current CCUNPROFOR ROE to determine the way ahead for this issue.
3	Annex E	A/G/A Rads. CANBAT 1 only holds AN/PRC 66B radios for UHF A/G/A comms and attempts to acquire AN/PRC 113 radios have not been successful.	HQ CCUNPROFOR has staffed the requirement for three AN/ARC 113 radios for CANBAT 1 but NDHQ J3 Ops replied that the Op reqr for CANBAT 1 is not approved (there are limited holdings of these radios in the CF and first line reallocation is required to provide sufficient quantity for CANBAT 2 for whom J3 approved for their Op reqr.)
4	Annex E	Motorola Rads. Programming software and cable are required to reprogram Motorola radios that are currently inoperable.	NDHQ J6 has acquired the programming eqpt and is presently proving it. The G6 is expediting the delivery of the programming eqpt through direct discussion with NDHQ J6 staff. Once the eqpt arrives in-theatre, NCCIS Tp techs will report to CANBAT 1 to perform the reprogramming function in situ.
5	Annex E	TELEDATA. Since CANBAT 1's move from Gracac to Rastevic, it has been without a TELEDATA system which would be available as a backup to VSAT.	Despite numerous efforts, G6 CCUNPROFOR has been unable to persuade HQ UNPROFOR to provide the TELEDATA system for CANBAT 1. The G6 will elevate the issue by presenting a formal request to HQ UNPROFOR as a Comd CCUNPROFOR request.
6	Annex E	Request for VCC-2 system. VCC-2 or an alternate system will address the lack of a tele extension system to remote coys for operational and welfare calls.	Comd CCUNPROFOR has approved the use of contingent reserve funds for the purchase of tele extension systems for the contingent. G6 is currently coordinating field trials of two candidate tele extension systems with the aim that a decision to purchase will be made by 15 Nov 94. The intent is to acquire tele extension systems for six CANBAT 1 remote locations.

REVIEWED
 BOI

7	Annex E	UPS for ADP. Uninterrupted Power Sources (UPS) are necessary to ensure reliable operation of ADP given the electrical power fluctuations and surges. More are required to outfit all ADP systems.	Previously, NCCIS Tp coordinated the purchase of UPS eqpt along with purchases of ADP eqpt along with purchases of ADP eqpt. Given the current freeze on the purchase of additional ADP eqpt, G6 is investigating alternative sources for acquiring UPS including normal supply system or LPO through CANLOGBAT.
8	Annex E	ADP Software. The BOI states that most software within CANBAT 1 is not properly licensed.	The ADP eqpt and software furnished by CCUNPROFOR which occurred in the last six months were purchased legally as complete packages of hardware and software and without préjudice to any licenses. There is no record of licenses for software purchased prior to the recent purchases, nor will it prove to be a productive exercise to do so. Support documents for software application is a problem but without immediate solution given the current freeze on the ADP and ADP related purchases as the allotted budget has been expended by 150%. G6 is discussing with contingent Comptroller to set aside funds to allow for purchases of ADP-related resources. This is expected to be resolved by end Nov 94.
9	Annex E	ADP Eqpt. The BOI states that much of the ADP eqpt in use at CANBAT 1 is considered to be approaching the end of its life cycle and expected to require replacing in the next year.	The G6 will initiate a survey of all contingent ADP eqpt with a view of determining the requirements for replacements. This will occur by end Nov 94. (It should be noted that CANBAT 1 allocation of computers is 29 which is very close to the unit holdings if it were in Canada.) The G6 is aware of the current difficulty with printers and the consumable supplies being experienced by CANBAT 1. The G6 will outline procedures for first and second line support for ADP consumable which will be in place by end Nov 94.
10	Annex E	COMSEC Material. The BOI states that the NCCIS det cannot release keying material without authorization from Comd CCUNPROFOR and this decision should be delegated to the CO CANBAT 1.	The NCCIS detachment holds the COMSEC material in use by itself as well as the material for CANBAT 1. There is no restriction to issuing COMSEC material to users of CANBAT as to require explicit Comd CCUNPROFOR approval. The COMSEC material is available to any member of CANBAT 1 provided that there is an operational need and the member has a valid security clearance. Aside from this point, the G6 is seriously considering having CANBAT 1 hold its own COMSEC account as CANBAT 2 currently holds its own.

REVIEWED BOI

11	Annex I para 6 and 7	Shelter and hard standing problem.	The problem of shelter and hard standing has been addressed by this HQ and CANBAT 1. They now have the use of two Rubb Hall tents as the PES team completed work in their loc on 1 Nov 94. There are two CA sprung shelters aval at CANBAT 1, it is just a matter, as the CO of CANBAT 1 mentions, of getting the erection kit from CANLOGBAT and putting them up. It is my understanding that a number of hard stands have been poured recently and it is a matter of CANBAT 1 allocating the ones which are nec to Maint Pl.
12	Appx 1 to Annex I para 6a and b		Addressed at para 1g and h.
13	Appx 1 to Annex I para 6c	The rotation of 5/4T with LSVW and Iltis.	The rotation of 5/4T with LSVW cannot be expedited in the near future. Extra 5/4T are being shipped from CA on ship arr in Dec 94. Units will have to use controlled cannibalization of existing vehs for body parts and the process of shipping extra 5/4Ts will have to continue as required. The problem of Iltis is understood by the G4 Maint cell and the solution we have recommended is to rotate the entire fleet over the next year. This process has already commenced.
14	Appx 2 to Annex I para 8	Problems with the third line facilities.	The problems with the third line facilities are mainly due to UN budget shortfalls and the fact they cannot stock parts for all the different types of vehs held by UNPROFOR units. Since the renewal of the UNPROFOR mandate, the workshop's budget has been brought back up and parts are starting to arrive. We do not use this facility for any of our F vehs, but will continue to use it for B vehs provided the workshops has the ability and parts will arrive in a reasonable amount of time.
15	Appx 2 to Annex I para 9	Replacement of sewing machine with a new sewing machine on order.	The sewing machine has been ordered and the demand approved. This HQ currently waiting shipping details from CFB Shearwater. Msg G4 Sup 2 795 241500Z Oct 94 refers.
16	Appx 2 to Annex I para 10	Replacement of welding machine on order.	Welding machine CANBAT 1 req is not in system yet. Unit to order replacement parts for present machine. Unit will be advised when new eqpt becomes aval. Msg G4 Sup 2 700 101420Z Oct 94 refers.

REVIEWED 36

17	Appx 3 to Annex I para 6	Requirement of a Tech LPO posn.	Problems identified are valid. CANLOGBAT is reviewing a system to recommend solutions for improving it. CANLOGBAT does not have the manpower resources of a fully staff a Tech LPO posn to source parts for all three units as outlined in para 8.
18	Appx 3 to Annex I para 7	Stock repair parts for engr eqpt.	Currently units cannot stock repair parts for Engr eqpt due to the small number of vehs, diverse variants and high cost of parts. G4 Maint supports recommendation at para 9 that units be allowed to scale certain fast moving parts and will pursue this matter.
19	Appx 1 to Annex J	Ration Control Procedures	<p>The UNPROFOR mission is very large comprising of over 35,000 multinational personnel. Accordingly, it is difficult to please such a divergent combination of contingents. Further to this is UNPROFOR's inexperience in managing such an immense and complex food procurement system. The combination of these two crucial factors has allowed annoying problems to fester and go unresolved for long periods of time.</p> <p>The only procedures recognized by UNPROFOR HQ for communicating disturbing shortcomings of the UN ration scale is to document the fault and submit it through the chain of command for action. We understand this procedure is slow by Canadian standards and doesn't always provide a fully satisfactory reply. Notwithstanding the maze of bureaucracy associated with such a complicated procurement system, we have made progress in redressing some of the most critical problems identified by the CANBAT 1 Chief Cook.</p>

REVIEWED BOI

20	Appx 2 to Annex J	Ration Resupply System	<p>One of the major obstacles that has confronted CANBAT 1 in the past has been the unexpected and untimely delay of the UNPROFOR resupply lines. Through no fault of our own UNPROFOR re-supply has been interrupted by the hostile acts of aggression carried out by the belligerents. The most striking example of these hindrances was the three week blockade of Sector South this past summer. This occurred when refugee and anti-government radicals demonstrated their displeasure with UNPROFOR as to what they perceived was a absence of enforcing the UN mandate.</p> <p>CANCON HQ kept in close daily contact with CANBAT 1 to ensure that Canadian personnel did not needlessly suffer. During the road block crisis UNPROFOR HQ made the Sector Administration Officer responsible to initiate local procurement action and to replenish CANBAT 1 food stocks. This was done, but immediately locating suitable alternatives for all UN food items was not always successful.</p>
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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON
K0K 3R0

1080-1 (COS)

November 1994
~~Nov '92~~

Distribution List

BOARD OF INQUIRY - CANBAT 1
HO CCUNPROFOR COMMENTS

Reference: CCUNPROFOR CANBAT 1, 1080-1 (CO) 10 October 1994

1. Reference has been reviewed by this Headquarters.
2. Find attached this HQ's ^{S'} comments and proposed action. If any issues have been omitted they should be identified to the G3 - Maj A.J. Howard local 8513.

M.G. Macdonald
LCol → *in full*
COS → *in full*

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL

Annexes

Annex A - HQ CCUNPROFOR COMMENTS ON CANBAT 1
BOI DATED 10 OCTOBER 1994

Distribution List

Action

~~CO CANBAT 1~~
~~CCUNPROFOR CANBAT 1/CO/~~

Information

G1
G2
G3

REVIEWED BOI

Annex A
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HQ CCUNPROFOR COMMENTS ON CANBAT 1
 BOI DATED 10 OCTOBER 1994

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REVIEWED BOI

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REVIEWED BOI

①

PROTECTED B
(With enclosures)



Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Camp RASTEVIC
CANBAT 1
RASTEVIC

1080-1/3032-32/94 (Adjt)

21 November 1994

1080-31
RECEIVED

02 DEC 1994

G-1
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Camp PLESO
ZAGREB

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION INTO
THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE LOSS OF
C7 RIFLE 5 NOVEMBER 1994, KOKA, CROATIA

Please find enclosed three copies of the Summary Investigation complete with Commanding Officer's Recommendations. The requisite United Nations Board of Inquiry cover sheet has been included.


M.A. Osborne
Captain
for Commanding Officer

Enclosures: 3

② NTF
1. PRG COMPLETED AND
FWD TO COS/DCOMD
FOR SIGN.
WCD
GJ
31 DEC 94

REVIEWED BOI

PROTECTED B
(With enclosures)

UN RESTRICTED



PA 1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
KOK 3RO

21 November 1994

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

REPATRIATION ON MEDICAL GROUNDS
CPL SCHOVANEK MJ
PTE WALES RJG

References: A. CANBAT 1 5715-1 (Adj) 7 Nov 94
B. COMD CCUNPROFOR Dir 614 Feb 94
C. UNPROFOR FC Dir 5 May 94
D. Annex A to MATI 4 6 Jan 94

1. In accordance with references the appropriate documentation required for the medical repatriation of subject members are enclosed.

2. Any questions are to be addressed to the G1, Canadian Contingent.

Wayne C Desjardins

W.C. Desjardins
Captain
for Commander

Enclosure: 1

UN RESTRICTED

REVIEWED BOI

PROTECTED A

s.19(1)



5715-1 (Adjt)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
CANBAT 1
RASTEVIC

7 November 1994

G1
Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Camp PLESO
ZAGREB

REPATRIATION ON MEDICAL GROUNDS
CPL SCHOVANEK M.J.
PTE WALES R.J.G.

Reference: Comd CCUNPROFOR Directive 614 February 1994


1. In accordance with reference find enclosed appropriate documentation required for subject repatriation.
2. Advise.

RECEIVED

5715-1 4 NOV 1994

CANADIAN CONTINGENT
HEADQUARTERS

G1		11/16/94
	(2)	


M.A. Osborne
Captain
for Commanding Officer

Enclosures: 4

① G1 4 lines
7. Shred can be sent to C.A.S. of unit

REVIEWED BOI

PROTECTED A

s.19(1)

MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE

ANNEX A to MATI 4
(CHANGE 1) 6 JAN 94

FMEDO HQ UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

FROM: CANBAT 1 UMS RASIEVK

REPORT FOR MEDICAL REPATRIATION

DATE: 6.11.94

1. UNID: AD [REDACTED] RANK: CPL
SURNAME: SCHOVANEK INITIALS: M.J.
UNIT: IRCA SECTOR/LOCATION SOUTH RASIEVK

2. DATE OF ONSET OF ILLNESS/INJURY: 21.10.94
Location: SMILCIC CANBAT 1

3. DIAGNOSIS: E 819, 800.3, 851.1, 854.1, 348.5

4. TREATMENT: SURGICAL DRIF + DEBRIDEMENT
OF FRONTAL SKULL FRACTURE

5. INITIAL TREATMENT FACILITY: CANBAT 1 UMS

6. EVACUATION TO: ZAGREB

Date/time: 21.10.94 1230hrs Mode: Helo

7. REPATRIATION TO: NDMC, OTTAWA, ONT.

Date/time: 8 NOV 94 16:00 Mode: MEDEVAC AIRCRAFT


8. STATUS: LYING / SITTING / WHEELCHAIR

9. MOVEMENT PRIORITY: Immediate / 24 hours / 72 hours

10. TREATMENT REQUIRED ENROUTE: IV fluid + medication,
possibly ventilator assistance

11. MEDICAL ATTENDANT: NURSE, ANAESTHETIST, RESP. TECH., ^{MED. ASSISTANT}
Justification: possibly requires ventilator assistance

12. FURTHER TREATMENT REQUIRED: Neurology Rehabilitation
possibly ICU

Signature of MO: 
Name/Rank: CAPT KONWAY D.C.
Unit: IRCA CANBAT 1

REVIEWED BOI

s.19(1)

MEDICAL IN CONFIDENCE

ANNEX A TO MATI 4
(CHANGE 1) 6 JAN 94

FMEDO HQ UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

FROM: CANBAT 1 UMS RASTEVIC

REPORT FOR MEDICAL REPATRIATION

DATE: 6.11.94

1. UNID: AD [REDACTED] RANK: Pte
 SURNAME: WALES INITIALS: P.J.
 UNIT: 1ACB SECTOR/LOCATION SOUTH BASTEVIC
2. DATE OF ONSET OF ILLNESS/INJURY: 29.10.94
 Location: SMILCIC CANBAT 1
3. DIAGNOSIS: E819, 821.0, 873.0, 873.4, 921.1
4. TREATMENT: SURGICAL ORIF FEMUR FRACTURE
5. INITIAL TREATMENT FACILITY: CANBAT 1 UMS
6. EVACUATION TO: ZAGREB
 Date/time: 29.10.94 1230HRS Mode: HELO
7. REPATRIATION TO: NDMC OTTAWA ONT
 Date/time: 29NOV 94 16:00 Mode: MEDICAL AIRCRAFT
8. STATUS: LYING / SITTING / WHEELCHAIR
9. MOVEMENT PRIORITY: Immediate / 24 hours / 72 hours
10. TREATMENT REQUIRED ENROUTE: ORAL MEDICATION PFA
11. MEDICAL ATTENDANT: MEDICAL ASSISTANT
 Justification: ASSIST MOBILIZATION
12. FURTHER TREATMENT REQUIRED: Rehabilitation

Signature of MO: 
 Name/Rank: CAPT KONWAY D.C.
 Unit: 1RCR CANBAT 1

REVIEWED 801

s.19(1)

UN RESTRICTED

ANNEX A
TO DIRECTIVE 614
FEB 94

REPATRIATION ON MEDICAL GROUNDS

PART I

To: Contingent/Unit Commanding Officer CANBAT 1

1. It is recommended that:
Pte WALES REGINALD AD [REDACTED] IRCP
(Rank) (Last Name) (First Name) (UN ID Card No.) (Unit)

be repatriated as soon as possible for the following reason(s): *

- (a) he is unlikely to be fit for full duty within 21 days (minimum) to 30 days (maximum);
- b. he requires treatment in a national institution; and
- (c) he requires treatment which is not available in the Mission Area.

2. Diagnosis: (Including date of accident if applicable.) 29.10.94
E819, 821.0, 873.0, 873.4, 921.1

3. Recommend that the patient travel as a lying/sitting case.*

4. An escort is/~~is not~~ required.

6 Nov 94
(Date)

[Signature]
(Medical Officer) CAAT KONWAY

PART II

To: Force Medical Officer

- 5. Request repatriation be considered for the reasons stated.
- 6. Relevant medical documents are attached under "Medical in Confidence".
- 7. Escort details (if required).

(Rank)	(Name)	(UN ID Card No.)
<u>17 Nov 94</u>		<u>M.S. Skidmore, LCol, CO CANBAT 1</u>
(Date)		(Contingent/Unit CO)

REVIEWED BOI

UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

ANNEX A
TO DIRECTIVE 614
FEB 94

PART III

To: Chief Personnel and Administration Officer

8. Repatriation is RECOMMENDED/NOT RECOMMENDED for the following reasons: _____

9. The patient will travel as a sitting/lying case.*

10. A medical escort IS/IS NOT required.*

11. The details of the escort are as outlined in paragraph 4 above (or) as detailed below:*

(Rank)	(Name)	(UN ID Card No.)
(Date)		(Force Medical Officer)

PART IV

12. Repatriation is/is not recommended for approval.

13. Recommended expenses be borne by the UN/National Government.

(Date)		(CMPAO)

PART V

14. Repatriation at UN expense approved.

(Date)		(CAO)

PART VI

15. I approve/do not approve the repatriation request.

16. Repatriation expenses should be pair by UN/ National Government.

(Date)		(Force Commander)

UN RESTRICTED

REVIEWED BOI

s.19(1)

ANNEX A
TO DIRECTIVE 614
FEB 94

REPATRIATION ON MEDICAL GROUNDS

PART I

To: Contingent/Unit Commanding Officer CANBAT 1

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CPL SCHOVANEK MATTHEW AD [REDACTED] IRCA
(Rank) (Last Name) (First Name) (UN ID Card No.) (Unit)

be repatriated as soon as possible for the following reason(s): *

- a. he is unlikely to be fit for full duty within 21 days (minimum) to 30 days (maximum);
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2. Diagnosis: (Including date of accident if applicable.) 29.10.94
E019 , 000.3 , 051.1 , 059.1 , 348.5

3. Recommend that the patient travel as a lying/sitting case.*

4. An escort is/~~is not~~ required.

6 Nov 94
(Date)

[Signature]
CAPT KONWAY
(Medical Officer)

PART II

To: Force Medical Officer

5. Request repatriation be considered for the reasons stated.

6. Relevant medical documents are attached under "Medical in Confidence"..

7. Escort details (if required).

(Rank)	(Name)	(UN ID Card No.)
<u>07 Nov 94</u>		<u>[Signature]</u>
(Date)		M.S. Skidmore, LCol, CO CANBAT 1.
		(Contingent/Unit CO)

UN RESTRICTED

REVIEWED

UN RESTRICTED

ANNEX A
TO DIRECTIVE 614
FEB 94

PART III

To: Chief Personnel and Administration Officer

8. Repatriation is RECOMMENDED/NOT RECOMMENDED for the following reasons: _____

9. The patient will travel as a sitting/lying case.*

10. A medical escort IS/IS NOT required.*

11. The details of the escort are as outlined in paragraph 4 above (or) as detailed below:*

(Rank)

(Name)

(UN ID Card No.)

(Date)

(Force Medical Officer)

PART IV

12. Repatriation is/is not recommended for approval.

13. Recommended expenses be borne by the UN/National Government.

(Date)

(CMPAO)

PART V

14. Repatriation at UN expense approved.

(Date)

(CAO)

PART VI

15. I approve/do not approve the repatriation request.

16. Repatriation expenses should be pair by UN/ National Government.

(Date)

(Force Commander)

UN RESTRICTED

REVIEWED BOI

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PA

1080-1/3032-17/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
KOK 3RO

20 November 1994

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION - CANBAT 1
VEHICLE ACCIDENT UNPF 16563/CFR 85-87296

References: A. UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent BOI (enclosed)
B. CB1 1080-1/3032-19/94 (CO) 3 October 1994 (enclosed)
C. CB1 1080-1/3032-19/94 25 September 1994 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed are the Summary Investigation, UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry and the Commanding Officer's comments into subject accident.
2. I have reviewed this case and support the findings of the Investigating Officer as well as the Commanding Officer's recommendations and actions. The driver, Corporal Currie was responsible for the accident. This single vehicle accident is the result of several contributing factors and although Corporal Currie is responsible for it, there is no evidence of negligence on his part. No disciplinary or administrative action will be taken against the soldiers involved.
3. The vehicle is to be repaired or replaced and a claim raised with the United Nations. Documentation has been initiated under separate cover by the unit to both National and UNPROFOR Headquarters.

1/2

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REVIEWED BOI

PROTECTED B/UN CONFIDENTIAL

4. Any further inquiries into this matter should be addressed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.

N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1 UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry
Enclosure 2 Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation 1080-1/3032-17/94

Distribution List

Action

NDHQ Ottawa//J1 Coord//
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Information

CANBAT 1 Rastevic//CO// (less enclosures)
1 PPCLI Calgary//CO// (less enclosures)
CCUNPROFOR Primosten//G5 Legal//

2/2

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002314

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PA

1080-1/3032-27/94

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
KOK 3RO

20 November 1994

Commanding Officer
First Battalion
Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry
Canadian Forces Base
Calgary, AB

COMMANDERS COMMENTS - SUMMARY
INVESTIGATION INTO VEHICLE ACCIDENT
INVOLVING CANBAT 1 ILTIS UNPF 8151/CFR
85-87202 AND SERBIAN CHECKPOINT BARRIER

Refs: A. CANBAT 1 1080-1/3032-27/94 (CO) 6 October 1994
(enclosed)
B. CANBAT 1 1080-1/3032-27/94 (10 Pl Comd) 30 September 1994
(enclosed)
C. Safety Supervisor's Accident Report (enclosed)

1. Enclosed are references for further staffing by 1 PPCLI.

2. Although your unit has repatriated and is no longer serving as CANBAT 1, I cannot accept that this accident occurred solely through the misjudgement of the Master Corporal driver without some responsibility on the part of the senior passenger in the vehicle, Lt Moran. At the last senior Canadians Conference in September I recall discussing the unacceptable amount of vehicle accidents and that we must deal with them.

3. Further, there is a discrepancy between the Summary Investigation and the Safety Supervisors report which can only be resolved at unit level. Please review and return to HQ CCUNPROFOR at your earliest convenience.

1/2

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PROTECTED B

4. Once again, I wish to thank you and your Battalion for the excellent job you accomplished in Sector South and your AOR. I am very proud of the efforts which were put forth on behalf of the United Nations and Canada.

5. I would ask that you reply at the earliest opportunity.


N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 4

Enclosure 1 Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 2 Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry
Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation 1080-1/3032-27/94
Enclosure 4 Safety Supervisor's Accident Report 31/3032/94

2/2

PROTECTED B

REVIEWED BOI



CANADIAN CONTINGENT
CONTINGENT CANADIEN



Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Primošten
Primošten, Croatia

①

1080-1 (Legal)

18 November 1994

A.T. Galindo, Chief
Claims, Property Survey
and Investigation Unit
United Nations
Protection Force
ZAGREB, Croatia

INFORMATION ON CANCON VEHICLE ACCIDENT

- References: A. 1080-1 (DComd) 20 August 1994 (Enclosed)
- B. UNPROFOR ATG/LIB Dated 3 November 1994

Enclosed please find the Summary Investigation and related documents, which contain the information requested at reference B. I trust it will satisfy your requirements in terms of recommendations to the Property Survey board.

L.P. Maybee
Major
Legal Officer
CCUNPROFOR

Enclosure: 1

② GI
A copy of the
responses for your
information.

12/11/94

PA

NTF
④ Min. 3 attached

③ CR
1. PA ONE COPY TO FILE
2. GIVE ONE COPY TO GI ADM
TO PUT ON SF FILE.

WCD
CART
GI
21 NOV 94

REVIEWED
GI Admin
20 Nov 94

UNPROFOR - FORPRONU

United Nations Protection Force
Trinao de proteccion das Naciones Unidas
Zagreb

①

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Our Ref: UNPROFOR/CAN/4/1901

To: CO CANCON
SECTOR WEST

Date: 3 November 1994
ATG/LJB

From: *For* A.T. Galindo, Chief
Claims, Property Survey
and Investigation Unit

Subject: REMINDER: Contingent Board of Inquiry Proceedings

1. We do not seem to have received a reply to our memorandum of 23 May 1994 on above. It would be appreciated if the following information is made available to enable us process the case for the local Property Survey Board action:

- UNPROFOR property (UN or contingent-owned) : UNPF-8146 & UNPF-7394, 10 TON TRUCKS ASSIGNED TO CCSG CAMP POLOM
- Name/contingent or UN party (if civilian, indicate station) : CPL. PARENT, ID No. AD 13556. NEWMAN ID NO. AD 13641
- Civilian (outside) party : NONE
- Accident/incident nature : TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
- Place of accident/incident : PAKOVO SFLD
- Date of accident/incident : 19 JANUARY 1994
- UNPROFOR MP report : 550/0191/94

2. Failure to receive the Report within two weeks from today, we will assume that it is not forthcoming, and would proceed with the submission of our recommendations to the Property Survey Board based solely on the MP investigation report.

REVIEWED *nn*

② *Soyez gentils
Please advise any
information you have
on this, and info
on the status.*

10/11/94

UN RESTRICTED



PA

1080-1 (G1)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Pleso, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
KOK 3RO

20 November 1994

Chief Military Personnel
Administrative Officer
Headquarters
United Nations Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia

INVESTIGATION OF
VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

References: A. Annex C to FCPD No 9 CANLOGBAT 16 Oct 94
B. 1080-1 (Adj) Canbat 2 17 Oct 94 (enclosed)
C. 1080-1 (Adj) Canbat 2 17 Oct 94 (enclosed)
D. 1080-1 (Adj) Canbat 2 20 Oct 94 (enclosed)
E. 1080-1 (Adj) Canbat 2 20 Oct 94 (enclosed)
F. 1080-2 (Adj) Canbat 2 23 Oct 94 (enclosed)
G. RCD BG 1080-1 (Adj) Canbat 2 3 Nov 94 (enclosed)
H. Annex C to FCPD dated 9 Jun 92

1. Enclosed are the investigations into the vehicle accidents at references A through G which have been completed in accordance with Annex C of reference H.
2. The Commanding Officer has agreed with the documentary and physical evidence. Any cost associated with these accidents is to be written-off against the United Nations.
3. Any questions are to be addressed to the G1, Canadian Contingent.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Wayne C Desjardins".

W.C. Desjardins
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 7

UN RESTRICTED

REVIEWED B01

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PA

1080-1/3032-25/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
KOK 3RO

17 November 1994

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION - INJURIES
SUSTAINED BY D20 076 130 PTE RW VISSCHER

References: A. UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent BOI (enclosed)
B. CB1 1080-1/3032-25/94 (CO) 30 September 94 (enclosed)
C. CB1 1080-1/3032-25/94 (11 Pl Comd) 29 September 1994
(enclosed)


1. Enclosed are the Summary Investigation, the UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry and the Commanding Officer's comments into subject accident.
2. I have reviewed this report and support the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer as well as the Commanding Officers comments and action.
3. The injuries are attributable to military service and Private Visscher was on duty at the time of the incident. No disciplinary or administrative action will be taken in this matter.

1/2

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PROTECTED B/UN CONFIDENTIAL

4. Any further inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.


N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1 UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry
Enclosure 2 Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation 1080-1/3032-25/94

Distribution List

Action

NDHQ Ottawa//J1 Coord//
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CANCON Det Primosten//G5 Legal//
1 PPCLI Calgary//CO// (less enclosures)

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PA

1080-1/3032-16/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
KOK 3RO

19 November 1994

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION - CANBAT 1 -
DAMAGE TO GUARDRAIL BY CFR 65-35119/UNPF 7435

References: A. UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent BOI (enclosed)
B. CB1 1080-1/3032-16/94 (CO) 4 October 94 (enclosed)
C. CB1 1080-1/3032-16/94 (1 Pl Comd) 1 September 1994
(enclosed)

1. Enclosed are the Summary Investigation, the requisite UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry and the Commanding Officer's comments into subject accident.
2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and support the Commanding Officer's recommendations and actions on this matter. Private Greenlaw was responsible for the accident, but was not wilfully negligent nor careless. The damage was caused by the United Nations and is the result of apparent mechanical failure. No disciplinary action will be taken against any of the CANBAT 1 soldiers involved. Administrative action in the form of a thirty day suspension of Private Greenlaw's driver's permit has been taken.
3. I recommend that if the Krajina Roads Department or other official agency present a claim for damages to the United Nations, that it be honoured.

1/2

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~~REVIEWED BUT~~

002323

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4. I am very concerned that a similar accident has occurred following the rotation of First Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment into this sector. Four soldiers were injured, two of them very seriously when an APC veered off of an embankment. As it is still under investigation, I will refrain from commenting further. A copy of this report is being forwarded to the Commanding Officer for his comments and action as deemed appropriate.

5. Any further inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.



N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1 UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry
Enclosure 2 Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation 1080-1/3032-16/94

Distribution List

Action

NDHQ Ottawa//J1 Coord//
HQ UNPROFOR//CMPAO//
CCUNPROFOR Rastevic//CO//


Information

1 PPCLI Calgary//CO// (less enclosures)
CANCON Det Primosten//G5 Legal//

2/2

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CANADIAN CONTINGENT
CONTINGENT CANADIEN



Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Camp Primošten
Primošten, Croatia

1080-1 (Legal)

18 November 1994

A.T. Galindo, Chief
Claims, Property Survey
and Investigation Unit
United Nations
Protection Force
ZAGREB, Croatia

INFORMATION ON CANCON VEHICLE ACCIDENT

- References: A. 1080-1 (DComd) 20 August 1994 (Enclosed)
- B. UNPROFOR ATG/LIB Dated 3 November 1994

Enclosed please find the Summary Investigation and related documents, which contain the information requested at reference B. I trust it will satisfy your requirements in terms of recommendations to the Property Survey board.

L.P. Maybee
Major
Legal Officer
CCUNPROFOR

Enclosure: 1

② CI
A copy of the
response for your
information.

WCD
12/11/94

- ③ CR
- 1. PA ONE COPY TO FILE
- 2. GIVE ONE COPY TO GI ADM
TO PUT ON SF FILE.

WCD
CART
GI
21 NOV 94

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PRIORITY

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FAX SHEET



NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
MAJ GEN GEORGE R. PEARKES BLDG
OTTAWA, CANADA

J3 OPERATIONS 3 (INTERNATIONAL) /J3 OPS 3

TO : NAME: CCUNPROFOR PLESO//G1//
FACSIMILE: 011-385-41-815-191 OR
011-385-41-815-193

17 NOV 94

1080-1
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18 NOV 1995

FROM: NAME : MAJ PF WYNNYK
DEPARTMENT: J3 OPS 3-3
TELEPHONE : 1 613 995-3307

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

SUBJECT: MISC POINTS CONCERNING SIs

1. CANBAT 1 ACCIDENT INVOLVING CPL SCHOVANEK. AS IT WILL LIKELY BE AT LEAST ONE MONTH BEFORE WE RECV THIS SI (TWO WEEKS FOR YOUR REVIEW AND TWO WEEKS TRANSIT TIME), J3 OPS HAS REQ A SHORT MSG UPDATE OUTLINING UNIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. THIS INCIDENT HAS BEEN RECEIVING A LOT OF PRESS AND THERE IS A NEED TO CONFIRM FACTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. RECENT THEFT OF CANBAT 1 RIFLE. THANKS FOR THE INFO CONCERNING WHEN THE SI WILL BE SUBMITTED. I NOW NEED ONE MORE ADD PIECE OF INFO BEFORE THE FILE IS FWD TO THE CDS. SPECIFICALLY, HAVE CHARGES BEEN LAID AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL(S) INVOLVED? IF SO, NEED DETAILS.

3. WILL CALL TOMORROW...

② NTF
1. INFO PASSED TO HIS
VOICE MAIL 19 Nov 94.
WED
CAPT
G1
19 Nov 94

ACC	70
TX	
CK	
SVC	

SENDER
COMM. FACILITY NDHQ
DEPT NATIONAL DEFENCE
OTTAWA, CANADA
STU III/TEMPEST FAX
GPCSN -996-8828
OR 1-613-996-6828

DATE: 17 NOV 94

CONTROL NO. 7021

PAGES: 1

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TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET : 1 / 1

If you having difficulties receiving this transmission, please call ASAP
FACSIMILE Number: 011-613-992-8812, GP 842-812, NTAS 262-8812
CONFIRMATION Number: 011-613-995-1600, GP 845-1600, NTAS 265-1600

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1080-1 (G1)

01 01 16 1600 Z NOV 94 PP UUUU

G1 802

CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//G1//

CCUNPROFOR RASTEVIC//CANBAT 1/ADJT/MP DET//

CCUNPROFOR VISOKO//CANBAT 2/ADJT/MP DET//

CCUNPROFOR PRIMOSTEN//CANLOGBAT/ADJT/MP DET//

UNCLAS G1 802

SUBJ: BOARD OF INQUIRY - SUMMARY INVESTIGATION

REFS: A. UNPROFOR DIR NO 9 JUN 92

B. COMD CCUNPROFOR DIR 605 SEP 94

1. I WILL BE ATTENDING A MTG WITH G5 LEGAL OFFICER AT HQUNPROFOR ON THE 23 NOV 94 WITH REGARDS TO SUBJ HEADING.

2. REQUEST YOU PERUSE REFS AND ADVISE BY MSG/FAX BY 21 NOV 94 OF ANY CONCERNS/ QUESTIONS OR POINTS THAT YOU MAY WANT DISCUSSED AT THIS MTG.

3. NIL RETURNS ARE REQUESTED.

D. Healey
D. HEALEY, SGT G1 ADMIN

Wayne Desjardins
W.C. DESJARDINS, CAPT, G1

REVIEWED BOI

UNCLASSIFIED

REVIEWE)

Wally

UNCLASSIFIED

1080-1 (G1)

01 01 16¹⁶⁰⁶ Z NOV 94 PP UUUU

G1 802

CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//G1//

CCUNPROFOR RASTEVIC//CANBAT 1/ADJT/MP DET//

CCUNPROFOR VISOKO//CANBAT 2/ADJT/MP DET//

CCUNPROFOR PRIMOSTEN//CANLOGBAT/ADJT/MP DET//

UNCLAS G1 802

SUBJ: BOARD OF INQUIRY - SUMMARY INVESTIGATION

REFS: A. UNPROFOR DIR NO 9 JUN 92

B. COMD CCUNPROFOR DIR 605 SEP 94

1. I WILL BE ATTENDING A MTG WITH G5 LEGAL OFFICER AT HQUNPROFOR ON THE 23 NOV 94 WITH REGARDS TO SUBJ HEADING.

2. REQUEST YOU PERUSE REFS AND ADVISE BY MSG/FAX BY 21 NOV 94 OF ANY CONCERNS/ QUESTIONS OR POINTS THAT YOU MAY WANT DISCUSSED AT THIS MTG.

3. NIL RETURNS ARE REQUESTED.

D. Healey
D. HEALEY, SGT G1 ADMIN

Wayne C. Desjardins
W.C. DESJARDINS, CAPT, G1

UNCLASSIFIED

REVIEWED BOI

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UNPROFOR - FORPRONU COMMUNICATIONS

United Nations Protection Force / Force de protection des Nations Unies

Zagreb

UNPROFOR

5 R. R. 19

94 NOV 15 17 00

Page 1 of 3

Outgoing Fax Number: 815-196	Date: 15 NOVEMBER 1994
To: CCUNPROFOR/GL PLESO	From: M. UUSITALO, CHIEF GENERAL SERVICES
Attn:	Fax No. VSAT 2503 OR 170-199 170-155 <i>2566 2696</i>
Info:	Ref: UNPROFOR/CRB/428 Originator: SASI/GALINDO, CPSIU
Subject: <u>DAMAGE TO QUARTERS AT COMMAND POST (CP) 9, C COY, CAMP GRACAC, CROATIA, CAUSED BY FIRE (CRB/428)</u>	

PLEASE FIND ATTACHED THE EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE CLAIMS UNIT AND CANBAT SECTOR COMMANDERS'S OFFICE, SECTOR SOUTH, ON THE ABOVE-MENTIONED SUBJECT. SINCE WE ARE ADVISED TO CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR THE INVESTIGATION REPORT, APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING US THE SAME. REGARDS.

2) GI ADM
1. ACTION AS REQUESTED.
*WED
CAPT
GI
16 NOV 94*

RECEIVED

16 NOV 1994

1080-1

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS	
SI	<i>16 Nov 94</i>
GI ADM	
PA	<i>18 Nov 94</i>

3) NTF
Called CGS and passed on that complete SI was sent to CMPAD on 16 Aug 94 they will question them tomorrow unless there is a problem they will call me back.

REVIEWED 801

*0014
GI Admin.
8506
18 NOV 94*

page 2 of 3

Sasi
2/3

120



1080-1 (Adjt)

Canadian Contingent
United Nations Protection Force
Camp RASTEVIC
CANBAT 1

2 November 1994

Clawson

Distribution List

DAMAGE TO QUARTERS AT
COMMAND POST (CP) 9 PLATOON, C COY
CAMP GRACAC, CAUSED BY FIRE

- References:
- A. UNPROFOR Fax No. (41) 170-199/No. (41) 170-155
27 October 1994
 - B. 1er Battalion Royal 22ieme Regiment/CANBAT 1
1080-1 (Adjt) 22 March 1994

1. As requested at reference A the information is contained in the Summary Investigation conducted at reference B. Reference B was forwarded to the G1 CCUNPROFOR on 22 March 1994.
2. Inquiries should be directed to the G1 CCUNPROFOR for any further information.

*ACTING TO REPLY
WED
15/11/94*

M.A. Osborne
M.A. Osborne
Captain
for Commanding Officer

G1 ADM

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Action

Information

UNPROFOR HQ ZAGREB//
Chief General Services

CCUNPROFOR HQ ZAGREB//G1

815-191

C.G.S.

14 -11- 1994

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REVIEWED BOI

UNPROFOR CLAIMS OFFICE
15 -11- 1994
Receive

002330

page 3 of 3

3/3

UNPROFOR - FORPRONU

120

United Nations Protection Force
Force de protection des Nations Unies

Zagreb

Page 1 of 1

Outgoing Fax Number:	Date: 10 JUNE 1994
To: CANBAT SECTOR COMMANDER SECTOR SOUTH	From: M. UUSITALO, OIC GENERAL SERVICES
Attn:	Fax No. 170-199 170-155
Info:	Ref: UNPROFOR/CRB/428 Originator: SASI/GALINDO, CPSIU
Subject: <u>DAMAGE TO QUARTERS AT COMMAND POST (CP) 9, C COY, CAMP GRACAC, CROATIA, CAUSED BY FIRE (CRB/428)</u>	

AAA AN MP INVESTIGATION REPORT REGARDING DAMAGE CAUSED TO THE CANBAT 1 SLEEPING QUARTERS AT COMMAND POST (CP) 9, C COY, CAMP NJEGOVANI, CROATIA, CAUSED BY FIRE ON 3 FEBRUARY 1994 HAS BEEN RECEIVED. THE REPORT INDICATED THAT EXTENSIVE DAMAGES SUSTAINED TO BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTIES IN ADDITION TO THE PREMISES.

BBB THE FORCE COMMANDER'S POLICY DIRECTIVE NUMBER (9) REQUIRES A CONTINGENT BOARD OF INQUIRY (BOI) WHERE INTER ALIA THERE HAS BEEN MAJOR PROPERTY LOSS OR DAMAGE.

CCC IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO CONVENE THE REQUISITE BOI AND ENSURE THAT THE FINAL REPORT IS FORWARDED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DDD THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND CO-OPERATION IN THIS REGARD.

COPY TO:
CMPAO
MS. M. MACDONALD, LEGAL ADVISER

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PA

1080-1/3032-26/94 (DComd)

Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, On
KOK 3RO

14 November 1994

Distribution List

SUMMARY INVESTIGATION INTO DAMAGE TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY BY A CANBAT 1 APC CFR 65-36015/UNPF 7458

- References: A. UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent BOI (enclosed)
- B. CB1 1080-1/3032-26/94 (CO) 4 October 94 (enclosed)
- C. CB1 1080-1/3032-26/94 (7 Pl Comd) 4 October 1994 (enclosed)

1. Enclosed are the requisite UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry, the Summary Investigation and the Commanding Officer's comments into subject event.

2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer and support both the Commanding Officer's recommendations and actions on this matter. The damage was caused by United Nations soldiers on an operational mission. Negligence was not involved and no disciplinary action will be taken against the soldiers as they reacted properly and promptly.

3. I recommend that should the rightful owner of the land raise a claim against the United Nations for the damages sustained, that it be honoured, based on a fair and reasonable estimate. The cost has been estimated by Canadian Engineers to be approximately \$100.00 for the irrigation pipe at Annex I to Reference C (enclosure 3) and that it is impossible to fairly determine the damage done to the crops.

1/2

PROTECTED B/UN CONFIDENTIAL

REVIEWED BOI

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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4. Any further inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent, UNPROFOR.


N.M. Pettis
Colonel
Deputy Commander

Enclosures: 3

Enclosure 1 UNPROFOR Summary of Contingent Board of Inquiry
Enclosure 2 Commanding Officer's Comments
Enclosure 3 Summary Investigation 1080-1/3032-26/94

Distribution List

Action

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PA

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Headquarters
Canadian Contingent
United Nations
Protection Force
Zagreb, Croatia
CFPO 5003
Belleville, ON KOK 3R0

1080-1 (G1)


4 November 1994

Director Police Services
National Defence Headquarters
MGen George R. Pearkes Bldg
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

MILITARY POLICE - INCIDENT REPORTS

References: A. MP Coy HQ 541/1980/94 25 October 1994 (enclosed)
B. MP Coy HQ 550/1980/94 25 October 1994 (enclosed)
C. MP Coy 550/2160/94 27 October 1994 (enclosed)

1. In accordance with references, enclosed are Military Police Incident Reports for your information.
2. Any inquiries into this matter should be directed to G1, Canadian Contingent UNPROFOR.


J.B. Page
Captain
for Commander

Enclosures: 3

PROTECTED B

REVIEWED B01

RAAUZYUW RCCPJAQ1137 3061438-UUUU--RCCLPZB.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

ZNR UUUUU

R 011906Z NOV 94

FM NDHQ SEC OTTAWA//D POLICE SVCS//

TO RCCLPZB/CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB//DCOMD//

INFO RCESYGO/CCUNPROFOR VISOKO//MP//

ZEN/NDHQ OTTAWA//J3 OPS 3//

RCESCGA/LFCHQ ST HUBERT//PM//

BT

UNCLAS SIFIED POLICE 4376

SUBJ: STATUS OF MP INVESTIGATION

REFS: A. MPUIR SECUR 004 122125Z DEC 93 (NOTAL)

B. A-SJ-100-004/AG-000

1. REF A ADVISES OF THE THEFT OF A CAL .50 HEAVY MACHINE GUN AND A BOX OF ONE HUNDRED ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION BETWEEN 2130 AND 2215 HRS 11 DEC 93 FROM THE HOSPITAL AT BAKOVICI, B-H

2. SINCE RECEIPT OF REF A NO FURTHER MP REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AT THIS HQ DETAILING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE THEFT NOR DETAILS OF THE MP INVESTIGATION

3. ADVISE

BT

#1137

♥JAS046 DELIVERED 3061502 901858

DComd/COs
RECEIVED
1080-1
03 NOV 1994

③ NTF
X Ref telecom May/Wyomark / Carl Pyle
DComd / COs 1080-1

- 1. Do not answer these direct queries
- 2. They are to come through the J3 Ops
- 3. A copy of the report will be fwd by Mail.
- 4. PA Rls.

CANADIAN CONTINGENT HEAD QUARTERS	
DComd	
COs	3/11/94
CRIPA	5/11/94

② 61
3

MP
COs
3/11/94

REVIEWED 801

5/11/94