

CLASSIFIED

File No. Dossier 20-USA-1-3-USSR
Volume 25 From-De 89-07-01 To-A 90-06-15
V.A.S. ACCESSION NO. 104886



164886

20-USA-1-3-USSR
Vol 25

SEMI ACTIVE

CLOS
ER

N.A.R.C.

File No.
Storage Accession No.
Storage Location
Box Number 81
Box Series 2008 8A

THIS RED SHEET SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED
NOR SHOULD PAPERS BE PLACED BELOW IT,
EXCEPT BY RECORDS PERSONNEL.

CE CARTON ROUGE NE DOIT PAS ÊTRE
ENLEVÉ ET AUCUN DOCUMENT NE DOIT
NON PLUS ÊTRE PLACÉ SOUS CETTE
COUVERTURE EXCEPTÉ PAR LE PERSONNEL DES
ARCHIVES.

TITLE—TITRE:

POLITICAL AFFAIRS
POLICY AND BACKGROUND
FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

AFFAIRES POLITIQUES
POLITIQUE ET HISTORIQUE
TENDANCES DE LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE
USA/USSR

Retention period—Période de retention:

20Y/5A-15D/J



External Affairs and
International Trade Canada


Affaires extérieures et
Commerce extérieur Canada

2010

000530

THIS RED SHEET SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED
NOR SHOULD PAPERS BE PLACED BELOW IT,
EXCEPT BY RECORDS PERSONNEL.

CE CARTON ROUGE NE DOIT PAS ÊTRE
ENLEVÉ ET AUCUN DOCUMENT NE DOIT
PLUS ÊTRE PLACÉ SOUS CETTE
COUVERTURE EXCEPTÉ PAR LE PERSONNEL DES
ARCHIVES.



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

Dated From
À compter du

89-07-01

To
Jusqu'au

90-06-15

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE – À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS – NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE – POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

File No. – Dossier n°

20-LISA-1-3-USSR

Volume

26

SECRET

June 15, 1990

BRIEFING ALLIES ON WASHINGTON SUMMIT

BEGIN TEXT BRIEFING POINTS:

OVERVIEW

ACC	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	
LOC	
AS-WW	

A 7

O WHEN PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV MET LAST DECEMBER IN MALTA, THEY LAID OUT A BROAD AGENDA TO GUIDE THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

O MUCH OF THAT AGENDA HAS NOW BEEN COMPLETED; THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT PRODUCED SIGNIFICANT AND CONCRETE AGREEMENTS SPANNING THE RANGE OF U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES.

O IN TOTAL, THE SIDES CONCLUDED 14 AGREEMENTS AND RELEASED 11 JOINT STATEMENTS. THESE REFLECT A MATURING OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AS WE PRESS FORWARD WITH PRESIDENT BUSH'S GOAL OF CHALLENGING OUR PAST HISTORY OF CONFRONTATION AND BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP OF ENDURING COOPERATION.

O BUT SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN BETWEEN US ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. FIRST OF ALL WAS THE QUESTION OF THE BALTICS.

-- GORBACHEV EXPLAINED HIS POSITION AND THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH MOSCOW WOULD BE PREPARED TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH VILNIUS. HE SAID THE SOVIETS DID NOT INSIST THAT THE LITHUANIANS ANNUL THEIR DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, ONLY THAT THEY SUSPEND IT AND PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SOVIET LAW.

-- THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED OUR NON-RECOGNITION POLICY AND SUPPORT FOR THE BALTIC PEOPLES' STRIVINGS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION.

-- WE LEFT THE SOVIETS WITH NO DOUBTS AS TO OUR CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF DIALOGUE AND MOSCOW'S ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, AND OF THEIR EFFECT ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

O THE ATMOSPHERICS OF THE SUMMIT WERE GOOD. THE PRESIDENTS APPROACHED PROBLEMS IN A CORDIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. EVEN ON ISSUES WHERE THEY DISAGREED.

-- AS THE PRESIDENT NOTED, IT WAS A MARK OF HOW FAR THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAS COME THAT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV ON DIFFICULT ISSUES COULD BE CHARACTERIZED BY A SPIRIT OF CANDOR AND OPENNESS, WITH THE SIDES SEEKING NOT ONLY TO UNDERSTAND THE OTHER'S POSITION, BUT TO BUILD COOPERATION.

SECRET 000532

-2-

-- INDEED, GORBACHEV AT ONE POINT OBSERVED THAT, HAD U.S.-SOVIET WORKING RELATIONS NOT BEEN SO WELL DEVELOPED LAST YEAR, THE RAPID PACE OF CHANGE IN

EUROPE COULD HAVE PROVOKED A REAL CLASH OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, LIKE PUTTING A MATCH TO A BONFIRE.

O SO WE BELIEVE WE HAVE A GOOD BASIS FOR TACKLING THOSE UNRESOLVED ISSUES THAT REMAIN ON OUR AGENDA.

O THE LEADERS AGREED TO MEET ON A REGULAR BASIS WITH A FOCUS ON WORKING ENCOUNTERS. GORBACHEV INVITED THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A STATE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

GERMANY AND EUROPE

O PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV HAD AN IN-DEPTH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN EUROPE, WITH PARTICULAR FOCUS ON THE PROCESS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION.

O WHILE NO BREAKTHROUGHS WERE MADE, SOME NEW IDEAS EMERGED THAT WILL BE EXPLORED IN UPCOMING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS AND IN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR.

O THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP WAS A MATTER FOR THE GERMANS TO DECIDE, CONSISTENT WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. GORBACHEV DID NOT OBJECT.

O BUT SOVIET THINKING SEEMS STILL TO BE IN FLUX AND CHARACTERIZED BY MANY INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS.

O GORBACHEV REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF A TRANSITION PERIOD.

O IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF CHOICE MEANS IN PRACTICE.

O PRESIDENT BUSH REITERATED OUR APPROACH TO GERMAN UNIFICATION, STRESSING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATORY CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY AND NO SINGULARIZATION OF A UNITED, DEMOCRATIC GERMANY.

O HE ASSURED GORBACHEV THAT NO ONE WANTED TO ISOLATE THE SOVIETS.

-3-

O HE REVIEWED THE NINE POINTS WE HAVE DEVELOPED TO ADDRESS THE SOVIETS' LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS, AND STRESSED THAT GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WAS A FACTOR FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

O HE ALSO NOTED THE BENEFITS TO THE USSR OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE NEW GERMANY.

REGIONAL PROBLEMS

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED REGIONAL ISSUES DURING THE THIRD DAY OF THE SUMMIT AT CAMP DAVID.

O THE DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD IN AN ATMOSPHERE THAT WAS VERY RELAXED, FREE-WHEELING AND MARKED BY EXTRAORDINARY CANDOR AND OPENNESS.

O MANY IDEAS WERE EXCHANGED AND A BROADER BASIS FOR COOPERATION WAS ESTABLISHED ON SOME ISSUES. ALTHOUGH NO BREAKTHROUGHS OCCURRED.

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED AFGHANISTAN AND AGREED THAT THERE WAS A MEASURE OF COMMON GROUND IN THE APPROACHES OF THE TWO SIDES.

-- IN PARTICULAR, WE AGREE ON USING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AS A MECHANISM FOR ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT GOVERNMENT. WE ALSO AGREE THAT A TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY SHOULD PREPARE FOR AND CONDUCT ELECTIONS.

O THE CRITICAL AREA OF DIFFERENCE REMAINS THE ROLE OF NAJIBULLAH IN A TRANSITION PERIOD.

-- PRESIDENT BUSH EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT NAJIBULLAH RETAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF INCUMBENCY DURING A TRANSITION PROCESS -- A POSITION THAT MAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT TO GET SUCH A PROCESS STARTED. PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF RESISTANCE VIEWS ABOUT NAJIBULLAH.

O ON THE MIDDLE EAST, PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE RECENT ATTEMPTED PALESTINIAN TERRORIST RAID AGAINST ISRAEL, EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT YASSIR ARAFAT HAD TO CONDEMN THAT ACT, AND DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF FROM ITS SPONSORS.

O THE SOVIETS AGREED ARAFAT SHOULD CONDEMN THAT INCIDENT.

-4-

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS HAD A CANDID EXCHANGE ON THE EMIGRATION ISSUE AND THE QUESTION OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRANTS SETTLING IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

-- PRESIDENT BUSH PUSHED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AEROFLOT-EL AL DIRECT FLIGHTS AGREEMENT TO ASSIST THE PROCESS OF EMIGRATION AND TO ALLEVIATE HARDSHIPS POSED BY THE LACK OF DIRECT AIR LINKS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV.

O PRESIDENT GORBACHEV COMPLAINED ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF ISRAEL ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND URGED THE U.S. TO DO MORE IN THAT REGARD.

-- GORBACHEV NOTED THAT THE USSR HAD BEEN BOMBARDED WITH CRITICISM FROM ARAB COUNTRIES ON THE ISSUE OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION AND IMPLIED DURING HIS JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT BUSH THAT, IF SOVIET CONCERNS ARE NOT HEEDDED BY ISRAEL, HE MAY HAVE TO GIVE FURTHER THOUGHT TO ISSUING EXIT PERMITS.

-- HE STATED HIS HOPE THAT ISRAEL WOULD PROVIDE ASSURANCES AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE U.S. ON THE ISSUE OF NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

O THE SOVIETS SAID NOTHING DURING THE PRIVATE SUMMIT DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER, TO INDICATE ANY BACKSLIDING FROM THEIR COMMITMENT TO PERMIT OPEN SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION. FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED TO SECRETARY BAKER THAT SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICY WOULD NOT CHANGE.

O THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED THE VOLATILE SITUATION IN KASHMIR AGREEING TO WATCH THE SITUATION CAREFULLY AND TO URGE RESTRAINT IN CONTINUING PARALLEL APPROACHES TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

O THE TWO LEADERS REVIEWED THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND CUBA. SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE ALSO DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT.

O BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED TO SUPPORT THE ESQUIPULAS PEACE PROCESS.

O THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY URGED THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH CASTRO TO GET CUBA TO END ARMS SHIFMENTS TO THE FMLN IN EL SALVADOR AND SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE SALVADORAN CONFLICT.

-5-

-- WHILE SUGGESTING THAT THE U.S. MAKE DIRECT APPROACHES TO CUBA IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS, THE SOVIETS SAID THEY WOULD PROBE THE CUBANS ON THE ISSUE OF ARMS TO THE FMLN, AND WOULD ALSO CONTINUE ECONOMIC AID TO NICARAGUA.

O ON ASIA, PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, POINTING OUT THAT THE U.S. FULLY SUPPORTS THE JAPANESE CLAIM TO THOSE ISLANDS.

-- HE URGED PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE WITH JAPAN, SINCE THIS WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO A REDUCTION OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

-- THE SOVIET SIDE OFFERED ITS STANDARD REPLY ON THE ISSUE, THAT IT IS A BILATERAL PROBLEM TO BE SETTLED BETWEEN THE USSR AND JAPAN. GORBACHEV ALSO REFERRED TO HIS PLANNED TRIP TO JAPAN IN 1991.

O THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED CAMBODIA. THE PRESIDENT FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF JAPAN, THAILAND AND OTHER STATES TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE CAMBODIAN PARTIES.

-- THEY ALSO TOOK NOTE OF THE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR IN THE PERM FIVE MEETINGS ON THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS ALSO DISCUSSED THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

-- IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS UPCOMING MEETING WITH ROK PRESIDENT ROH TAE WOO IN SAN FRANCISCO ON JUNE 4. GORBACHEV EXPLAINED THAT THE USSR INTENDED TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND UNDERScoreD THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL TO BE GAINED FOR MOSCOW FROM BETTER TIES WITH SEOUL.

-- HE ADMITTED THAT IT WOULD COMPLICATE SOVIET RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA, BUT SAID THAT MOSCOW WOULD GO AHEAD WITH ITS PLANS NEVERTHELESS.

O PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM, EXPRESSING U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE FAILURE OF THE DPRK TO SIGN AND IMPLEMENT AN IAEA NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

-- THE U.S. NOTED THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE NORTH HAD BEEN GIVEN STANDARD NEGATIVE SECURITY

-6-

ASSURANCES FROM THE U.S.

O GORBACHEV REPLIED THAT THE USSR WAS CONCERNED AS WELL ABOUT NORTH KOREAN FAILURE TO ACT ON ITS OBLIGATIONS. HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD APPROACHED THE NORTH ON THIS ISSUE AND SUGGESTED THE U.S. CONSIDER A DIRECT APPROACH TO PYONGYANG.

O ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES WERE NOT BROUGHT UP BY EITHER SIDE.

O THE PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN AFRICA. FOCUSING ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE PROBLEMS IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA.

-- THE TWO LEADERS OFFERED THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR AN INTRA-ANGOLAN DIALOGUE AND THE CURRENT PROCESS UNDERWAY BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT.

-- ON SOUTH AFRICA, BOTH EXPRESSED OPTIMISM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT, SINCE PRESIDENT DE KLERK AND NELSON MANDELA WERE ENGAGED IN TALKS.

O AS A SYMBOL OF OUR GROWING ABILITY TO COOPERATE IN THE RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS, THE TWO PRESIDENTS ALSO ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT ON ETHIOPIA.

-- THE STATEMENT CALLS FOR A UN-LED RELIEF EFFORT THAT WOULD USE SOVIET TRANSPORT TO CARRY AMERICAN FOOD TO THOSE IN NEED IN NORTHERN ETHIOPIA. THE STATEMENT ALSO EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE PEACE EFFORTS WOULD SUCCEED.

----- ECONOMIC RELATIONS -----

O U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS ADVANCED CONSIDERABLY AT THE SUMMIT.

O THE KEY ITEM WAS THE SIGNING OF THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT WHICH -- WHEN IT GOES INTO FORCE -- WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP. THAT AGREEMENT BREAKS MUCH NEW GROUND IN DEFINING U.S. COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, PROVIDING:

-- SUBSTANTIAL GUARANTEES CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY;

-- BUSINESS FACILITATION; AND

-- GUARANTEES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS.

O THE SIGNING OF THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT IS ONE STEP TOWARD THE EXTENSION OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS (MFN); BUT TWO MORE STEPS ARE REQUIRED:

-7-

--- CONGRESS MUST APPROVE THE AGREEMENT; AND

--- THE PRESIDENT MUST WAIVE THE JACKSON-VANIK
AMENDMENT.

O PRESIDENT BUSH MADE CLEAR THAT HE WILL NEITHER WAIVE
JACKSON-VANIK NOR SUBMIT THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT TO
CONGRESS FOR APPROVAL UNTIL THE SUPREME SOVIET
PASSES THE LONG-PROMISED EMIGRATION LEGISLATION.

--- WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THIS.

O SEVERAL OTHER AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED AT THE SUMMIT
WHICH SHOULD PROMOTE COOPERATION IN KEY ECONOMIC
AREAS. THESE INCLUDE:

--- AN EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT THAT WILL
SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE AIR LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO
COUNTRIES;

--- A LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT SETTING HIGHER
BENCHMARKS FOR U.S. GRAIN SALES TO THE SOVIET
UNION; AND

--- A MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT THAT
NORMALIZES MARITIME AND SHIPPING RELATIONS.

O THE SIDES ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT ON THE BERING SEA
FISHERIES TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN ABOUT UNREGULATED
FISHING WHICH HAS SEVERELY DISRUPTED FISH STOCKS IN
THE CENTRAL BERING SEA "DONUT," THE AREA BEYOND U.S.
AND SOVIET 200-MILE ZONES.

--- THE STATEMENT SHOULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR AN
EFFORT TO MOUNT MULTILATERAL MANAGEMENT AND
CONSERVATION SCHEME FOR THE CENTRAL BERING SEA.

O THE PRESIDENTS HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON PERESTROYKA
AND ON THE PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
THAT PRESIDENT BUSH ADVANCED AT THE MALTA SUMMIT.

--- THE SIDES ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT WHICH
UNDERScores THE IMPORTANCE OF TECHNICAL
COOPERATION AS AN EXPRESSION OF U.S. AND SOVIET
COMMITMENT TO WORK TOGETHER IN SUPPORT OF
ECONOMIC PERESTROYKA.

HUMAN RIGHTS

O THE PRESIDENT PRESSED GORBACHEV FOR ACTION ON THOSE
UNRESOLVED REFUSENIK CASES ON THE LISTS PRESENTED AT
MALTA, NOTING OUR DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THESE HAD NOT
BEEN "ZEROED OUT" AND ASKING FOR THE SOVIET
PRESIDENT TO LOOK INTO THESE PERSONALLY.

O THE PRESIDENT ALSO NOTED OUR CONCERN ABOUT
INDICATIONS OF RISING ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE USSR AND
URGED GORBACHEV TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY AND FORCEFULLY
AGAINST IT.

END TEXT POINTS.

000538

SECRET

OTT/USA

June 15, 1990

BRIEFING ALLIES ON WASHINGTON SUMMIT: ARMS CONTROL

ACC	DATE
ISSUES	
654752	
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	
LOC	
WU	
CONCRETE	28-WEST-1-USA

BEGIN TEXT ARMS CONTROL BRIEFING POINTS:

O THE SUMMIT RECORDED SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL.

O MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS INCLUDED THE BILATERAL CW DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT AND VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS TO THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATIES, ALL OF WHICH WERE SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENTS ON JUNE 1.

O OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE, THE PRESIDENTS ISSUED JOINT STATEMENTS RECORDING AGREEMENTS REACHED TO DATE IN START AND COMMITTING THE SIDES TO FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS.

O THE SIDES ALSO ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT REAFFIRMING THEIR COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR, MISSILE AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION, AND A STATEMENT UNDERSCORING THEIR MALTA COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE A CFE AGREEMENT IN 1990.

(CHEMICAL WEAPONS)

O THE BILATERAL CW DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENTS IS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD, PROVIDING FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE VAST BULK OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET CW STOCKFILES. THIS SHOULD GIVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPETUS TO THE NEGOTIATION OF A MULTILATERAL CW BAN.

O THE BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT COMMITS THE U.S. AND USSR TO REDUCE THEIR DECLARED CW STOCKS TO 5000 AGENT TONS BY 2002; PRODUCTION OF CW WILL END AT ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

O THE U.S. AND USSR FURTHER AGREE THEY WILL REDUCE THEIR CW STOCKS DOWN TO 500 AGENT TONS WITHIN THE FIRST EIGHT YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION. AT THE EIGHT-YEAR POINT, THE U.S. AND USSR WILL PROPOSE TO HOLD A SPECIAL CONFERENCE FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING WHETHER PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION IS SUFFICIENT FOR PROCEEDING TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ALL REMAINING CW STOCKS OVER THE SUBSEQUENT TWO YEARS.

-- AGREEMENT REGARDING THE CONFERENCE IS REFLECTED IN ARTICLE VI AND THE AGREED STATEMENT TO THE BILATERAL DESTRUCTION ACCORD.

SECRET

SECRET

(PNET/TTBT PROTOCOLS)

O THE VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS TO THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENTS WILL ALLOW THOSE TREATIES -- CONCLUDED IN 1974 AND 1976 -- TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT AS TO RATIFICATION.

O THESE PROTOCOLS PROVIDE FOR VERIFICATION MEASURES -- SPECIFICALLY, ON-SITE HYDRODYNAMIC YIELD MEASUREMENT. ON-SITE INSPECTION AND IN-COUNTRY SEISMIC MEASUREMENT --

THAT WILL ALLOW THE SIDES TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE 150 KILTON YIELD LIMIT SET IN THE TTBT AND PNET.

(START)

O THE PRESIDENTS ISSUED TWO IMPORTANT JOINT STATEMENTS REGARDING THE STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS.

O THE JOINT STATEMENT ON THE START TREATY SUMMARIZES AND REAFFIRMS THE SUBSTANTIAL AREAS OF AGREEMENT REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS, COUNTING RULES AND VERIFICATION.

O OTHER ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED AT THE SUMMIT BUT NOT RESOLVED.

O THE FIRST WAS THE BACKFIRE BOMBER. THE SOVIETS AGREED TO MAKE A POLITICALLY-BINDING DECLARATION NOT TO GIVE INTERCONTINENTAL CAPABILITY TO BACKFIRE, INCLUDING BY AERIAL REFUELING.

-- IN RESPONSE TO A U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A NUMERICAL LIMIT, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED TO CONSTRAIN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET AIR FORCE BACKFIRES TO 400, BUT EXCLUDE THOSE ASSIGNED TO SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION (SNA). THE U.S. RESPONDED THAT EXCLUDING SNA BACKFIRES WOULD MAKE THE 400 LIMIT VIRTUALLY MEANINGLESS.

O A SECOND PROBLEM WAS HEAVY ICBMS. THE U.S. CONTINUES TO SEEK SOVIET COMMITMENT UNDER START TO LIMIT MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS.

-- THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, RESISTED ANY FURTHER CONSTRAINTS ON HEAVY ICBMS BEYOND THOSE ALREADY AGREED (I.E. REDUCTIONS DOWN TO 154 MISSILES WITH 1540 WARHEADS).

O A THIRD ISSUE WAS NON-CIRCUMVENTION. WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES OVER THE SCOPE OF THIS PROVISION.

O AT THE EXPERTS LEVEL, THE SIDES HELD DISCUSSIONS ON THE DETAILS OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING PERIMETER/PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING AND ROAD-MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION.

SECRET

SECRET

INST FOLLOW-ON TALKS)

O THE JOINT STATEMENT ON FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS AND FURTHER ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY CONTAINS A COMMITMENT TO PROMPT CONSULTATIONS AND START OF FOLLOW-ON TALKS AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICAL DATE AFTER START IS SIGNED.

O SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF THE DECLARATION INCLUDE THE SINGLING OUT OF HEAVY MISSILES AND MIRVED ICBMS FOR PARTICULAR EMPHASIS IN SUBSEQUENT START NEGOTIATIONS.

O NEGOTIATIONS ON DEFENSE AND SPACE WILL CONTINUE WITHOUT DELAY UNDER THE PRESENT FRAMEWORK.

O SIGNIFICANTLY, THE SOVIETS AGREED THE GOAL OF THE TALKS SHOULD BE AN "AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTING AN APPROPRIATE RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS. THIS NEW MANDATE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS ADVANCES U.S. INTERESTS IN DISCUSSING THE MEANS FOR A TRANSITION TO INCREASED RELIANCE ON STRATEGIC DEFENSES.

(NON-PROLIFERATION)

C THE JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE WE AND THE SOVIETS ATTACH TO PREVENTING SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MISSILES.

O THE JOINT STATEMENT REFLECTS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS HELD OVER LAST SIX MONTHS, IN WHICH EACH AREA OF PROLIFERATION WAS DISCUSSED AND MUTUAL CONCERNS IDENTIFIED. IT CONTAINS A COMMITMENT TO WORK TOGETHER TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION AND TO URGE OTHER STATES TO DO SO AS WELL.

(CFE)

O IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ON CFE, THE PRESIDENTS REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO SIGN A CFE TREATY IN 1990 AND AGREED THAT A CFE AGREEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE FUTURE SECURITY OF EUROPE.

O THE PRESIDENTS ALSO AGREED THAT A CSCE SUMMIT SHOULD NOT BE HELD BEFORE A CFE AGREEMENT IS READY FOR SIGNATURE AND THEY COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO INTENSIFYING THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA.

C AT THE EXPERTS LEVEL, THE SIDES HELD LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS ABOUT OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

O IN WASHINGTON THE SOVIETS SUGGESTED A NUMBER OF NEW IDEAS ON PRINCIPAL ISSUES THAT REMAIN REGARDING ARMOR DEFINITIONS AND CEILINGS, DESTRUCTION OF EQUIPMENT AND AERIAL INSPECTIONS. THERE WAS NO POSITIVE MOVEMENT ON AIRCRAFT.

SECRET

-4-

SECRET

O (FURTHER DETAILS ON EXPERT DISCUSSIONS WERE PROVIDED BY AME. WOOLSEY IN VIENNA.)

(OPEN SKIES)

O WE PRESSED ON OPEN SKIES, STRESSING ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO OPENNESS IN THE NEW EUROPE. GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE BOTH REITERATED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE OPEN SKIES CONCEPT AND SAID THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED FOR CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

O BUT ON SPECIFICS THE SOVIETS SHOWED LITTLE CONCRETE MOVEMENT FROM THEIR BUDAPEST POSITIONS. NEVERTHELESS, BOTH LEADERS AGREED TO RENEW EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE AN OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT. THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO THIS AGREEMENT IN HIS JUNE 3 PRESS CONFERENCE.

END TEXT ARMS CONTROL BRIEFING POINTS.

SECRET

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

JUN 14 1990

C O N F I D E N T I A L

///CORRECTED COPY///

FM WSHDC UNGR3376 07JUN90

TO EXTOTT URR RBT

DELIVER

ACC	DATE
751137	
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	
LOC	
BY 081400	35-3-2

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE ISTCOTT/JSCG

FINOTT/IER BNATO LDN PARIS BONN ROME VNACE GENEV BRU BREC MOC

SAW

TT NDHQOTT/VCDS/DM/ADMPOL/ASSOCADMPOL/DGPOLPLAN/DIPOL/ DE CAF

BH AGRICOTT/MIN/DEP MIN OFF/GRAINS/BR/GMB/ITPD DE OTT

DISTR MINA USS DMT UGB URB URD RGB RGZ RGX RBD RBR RWD RWR IFB IDD

IDA IDR CPD CPP EPD EPG TAA ESD TPS JLE

REF OURFAX 3535 06JUN

---WSHDC SUMMIT:ECONOMIC ASPECTS

SUMMARY.STATE DEPT OFFICIALS ARE GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH OUTCOME
OF GORBACHEV VISIT IN ECONOMIC FIELD.OF FOUR MAIN AGREEMENTS SIGNED,
TRADE AGMT WAS NOT PRIMARILY A USA INTEREST.ALTHOUGH ITS BENEFITS
(INCLUDING MFN FOR SOVIETS)ARE ON HOLD SINCE AGMT WILL NOT BE
SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS IN NEAR FUTURE,OFFICIALS WERE IN NO DOUBT THAT
FROM GORBACHEV STANDPOINT,AND FOR SYMBOLIC REASONS,THIS AGMT WAS
MOST SIGNIFICANT BILATERAL DOCU SOVIET LEADER WENT HOME WITH.
SIGNING OF AGREEMENT,DESPITE FACT THAT POLITICAL CONDITIONS SET
BY USA HAD NOT BEEN MET,RESULTED FROM LAST MINUTE DECISION
BY BUSH,LARGELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO APPEALS FROM GORBACHEV.ADMITTEDLY
A QUOTE CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE UNQUOTE WAS SIGNING OF NEW LONG TERM
///GRAIN///AGREEMENT,A MAJOR USA INTEREST WHICH SOVIETS TIED TO

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR3376 CONFD

SIGNING OF TRADE AGMT. INTEREST IN CIVIL AVIATION AGMT WAS PROBABLY EVENLY SHARED, WHILE MARINE TRANSPORT WAS PROBABLY PRIMARILY A SOVIT INTEREST.

2. REPRT. HERBST (DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ECONOMICS IN STATE DEPT OFFICE OF SOVIET AFFAIRS) GAVE US A POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF GORBACHEV VISIT IN ECONOMIC FIELD. OF FOUR MAIN AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN THIS AREA, TRADE AGREEMENT WAS NOT ONE ON WHICH USA WERE DEMANDEURS, ALTHOUGH THEY WELCOMED ITS MARKET ACCESS, BUSINESS FACILITATION AND (PARTICULARLY) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS. THEY GENERALLY REGARDED DOCU AS USEFUL FRAMEWORK FOR THEIR TRADE RELATIONS WITH USSR. SINCE, HOWEVER, IT WAS UNDERSTOOD ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT IN NEAR FUTURE SUBMIT AGREEMENT TO CONGRESS, NOR GRANT WAIVER TO JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT TO 1974 TRADE ACT, ANY PRACTICAL BENEFITS--FOREMOST OF WHICH WOULD BE MFN FOR SOVIETS WOULD BE WITHHELD AT PRESENT.

3. OFFICIAL DESCRIBED AS QUOTE ESSENTIALLY CORRECT UNQUOTE ACCOUNT IN 05JUN WSHDC POST ACCORDING TO WHICH, AFTER WEEKS DURING WHICH USA ADMIN HAD WARNED SOVIETS NOT TO EXPECT SIGNING OF (FULLY NEGOTIATED) TRADE AGREEMENT, PRESIDENT BUSH DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH SIGNATURE AT VERY LAST MINUTE ON 01JUN. ECHOING SECTY BAKERS SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT, HERBST UNDERLINED THAT THERE HAD NEVER BEEN QUOTE FORMAL LINK UNQUOTE WITH SOVIET POSITION ON LITHUANIA, ALTHOUGH, AS PRESIDENT BUSH HAD STATED, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR CONGRESS TO CONSIDER AGMT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. WHILE THIS POSITION ...3

PAGE THREE UNGR3376 CONFD

SEEMED TO ALLOW FOR DISTINCTION BETWEEN SIGNING AND FOLLOW-UP WITH CONGRESS, OFFICIAL APPEARED TO BE SAYING THAT BUSH HAD DECIDED TO DISREGARD NOT TWO USA CONDITIONS, BUT ONE, I.E. PASSAGE OF LIBERALIZED SOVIET EMIGRATION LAW. HERBST HAD LITTLE TO ADD TO WSH POST EXPLANATION WHY BUSH HAD DECIDED TO DO SO. GORBACHEV HAD APPARENTLY QUOTE IMPORED UNQUOTE BUSH THAT AGMT BE SIGNED. LINK WITH SIGNING OF LONG TERM GRAIN AGMT WAS QUOTE A CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE UNQUOTE. SOVIETS HAD WARNED OF LINK IM MARCH IN VIENNA, WHEN TRADE AND GRAIN AGMTS WERE DISCUSSED ON ALTERNATE DAYS BY SAME USA-USSR NEGOTIATORS (KATZ AND CHUMAKOV), AND WARNING WAS RENEWED DURING SUMMIT. HERBST WAS ALSO AWARE OF TELEPHONE CALLS TO WHITE HOUSE DURING SUMMIT FROM SENATORS FROM GRAIN-GROWING STATES.

4. FIVE-YEAR LONG-TERM GRAINS AGMT WAS UNDERTAKING OF MOST PRACTICAL INTEREST TO USA (SEE FACT SHEETS FAXED SEPARATELY (NOTAL)). AS REPORTED IN OURTEL UNTD5058 04JUL IT COMMITS USSR TO BUYING ANNUALLY, FROM 1991 TO 1995, MINIMUM 10 MILLION METRIC TONS OF GRAIN FROM USA, UP FROM NINE MILLION UNDER EXISTING 1983 AGMT (WHOSE 2 1/4 YEAR EXTENSION EXPIRES 31DEC 1990). OFFICIAL LENDING IS, OF COURSE, NOT AVAILABLE TO SOVIETS UNTIL THEY MEET CONDITIONS FOR JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER.

5. OF OTHER AGMTS SIGNED, NEW CIVIL AIR AGMT WAS ONE IN WHICH INTEREST (GIVEN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE) WAS PROBABLY EVENLY SHARED BETWEEN USA AND USSR. PASSENGER CAPACITY WOULD BE INCREASED THREEFOLD, WHILE USA AND SOVIET CARRIERS WOULD EACH GAIN RIGHTS TO ADDITIONAL SIX

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR3376 CONF

CITIES IN THE OTHER COUNTRY.(FACT SHEET INDICATES THAT WHILE USA AIRLINES CAN ONLY SELL TICKETS IN USSR IN HARD CURRENCY,SOVIET AIRLINES WOULD SELL IN RUBLES UP TO 8.5 PERCENT OF USA AIRLINES CAPACITY,BUT REMIT PROFITS IN HARD CURRENCY).

6.MARITIME TRANSPORT AGMT WAS PROBABLY MORE A SOVIET INTEREST. ALTHOUGH USA INDUSTRY HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT ABSENCE JOF CARGO-SHARING PROVISION(PRESS CLIPPINGS BY BAG TO RBT/TPS/JLE),ACCESS GAINED TO 42 PORTS IN EACH COUNTRY ON TWO-DAY PRE-NOTIFICATION WOULD BE OFF SETTING BENEFIT.AMONG OTHER AGREEMENTS STILL BEING WORKED OUT,HERBST CITED TAX TREATY WHICH MIGHT BE READY FOR SIGNING AT NEXT SUMMIT LATER THIS YEAR(ASSUMING THERE IS ONE). INVESTMENT AGREEMENT WAS SIMILARLY UNDER DISCUSSION BUT ODDS FOR EARLY COMPLETION WERE SLIMMER.

7.OVERALL,CLEAR IMPRESSION GIVEN BY OFFICIAL WAS THAT SUMMIT HAD YIELDED ALL IT COULD IN ECONOMIC FIELD(USA PRIVATE SECTOR WAS QUOTE NOT DISSATISFIED UNQUOTE)BUT NEXT STEP WAS FOR SOVIETS TO TAKE MEASURES THAT WOULD ALLOW GRANT OF JACKSON-VANIK WAIVR OEHER WITH SUBMISSION OF MFN-GRANTING TRADE AGMT TO CONGRESS.(THOSE ARE TWO DISTINCT OPERATIONS,THOUGH CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF TRADE AGREEMENT REQUIRED NON-DISAPPROVAL OF PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.BILL IS CURRENTLY IN CONFERENCE TO REMEDY SUPREME COURT INVALIDATION OF SINGLE HOUSE VETO ORIGINALLY PROVIDED FOR BY JACKSON VANIK AMENDMENT.)ON NEW EMIGRATION LAW,HERBST WAS PHILOSOPHICAL.WHEN BUSH ...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR3376 CONFD

HAD FIRST SET THIS CONDITION IN MAY 89 SPEECH IN AUSTIN, TX, USA
THOUGH THEY WERE OFFERING SOVIETS A QUOTE SOFT BALL UNQUOTE. NOW, WITH
PASSAGE OF LAW POSTPONED TO FALL, FULFILMENT OF THIS REQUIREMENT HAD
YET AGAIN RECEDED. ON RELEVANCE OF LITHUANIAN SITU, OFFICIAL THOUGHT
THAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ADMIN REQUIREMENTS (LIFTING OF ECONOMIC
BLOCKADE AND BEGINNING OF DIALOGUE) AND CONGRESSIONAL CALLS FOR
QUOTE A SOLUTION UNQUOTE WAS REALLY ONLY A MATTER OF DEGREE.

CC/085 081631Z UNGR3376

CCC/120 131647Z UNGR3376

ACC	DATE JUN 08 1990
FILE	DOSSIER
LOC A6-	

fil 6

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3376 07JUN90

TO EXTOTT URR RBT — DELIVER BY 081400

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE ISTCOTT/JSCG

FINOTT/IER BNATO LDN PARIS BONN ROME VNACE GENEV BRU BREEC MOSCO

WSAW

TT NDHQOTT/VCDS/DM/ADMPOL/ASSOCADMPOL/DGPOLPLAN/DIPOL/ DE CAF

BH AGRICOTT/MIN/DEP MIN OFF/GRAINS/BR/GMB/ITPD DE OTT

DISTR MINA USS DMT UGB URB URD RGB RGZ RGX RBD RBR RWD RWR IFB IDD

IDA IDR CPD CPP EPD EPG TAA ESD TPS JLE

REF OURFAX 3535 06JUN

---WSHDC SUMMIT:ECONOMIC ASPECTS

SUMMARY.STATE DEPT OFFICIALS ARE GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH OUTCOME OF GORBACHEV VISIT IN ECONOMIC FIELD.OF FOUR MAIN AGREEMENTS SIGNED, TRADE AGMT WAS NOT PRIMARILY A USA INTEREST.ALTHOUGH ITS BENEFITS (INCLUDING MEN FOR SOVIETS)ARE ON HOLD SINCE AGMT WILL NOT BE SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS IN NEAR FUTURE,OFFICIALS WERE IN NO DOUBT THAT FROM GORBACHEV STANDPOINT,AND FOR SYMBOLIC REASONS,THIS AGMT WAS MOST SIGNIFICANT BILATERAL DOCU SOVIET LEADER WENT HOME WITH. SIGNING OF AGREEMENT,DESPITE FACT THAT POLITICAL CONDITIONS SET BY USA HAD NOT BEEN MET,RESULTED FROM LAST MINUTE DECISION BY BUSH,LARGELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO APPEALS FROM GORBACHEV.ADMITTEDLY A QUOTE CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE UNQUOTE WAS SIGNING OF NEW LONG-TERM AGREEMENT,A MAJOR USA INTEREST WHICH SOVIETS TIED TO SIGNING OF

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR3376 CONFD

TRADE AGMT.INTEREST IN CIVIL AVIATION AGMT WAS PROBABLY EVENLY SHARED,WHILE MARINE TRANSPORT WAS PROBABLY PRIMARILY A SOVIET INTEREST.

2.REPORT.HERBST(DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ECONOMICS IN STATE DEPT OFFICE OF SOVIET AFFAIRS)GAVE US A POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF GORBACHEV VISIT IN ECONOMIC FIELD.OF FOUR MAIN AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN THIS AREA,TRADE AGREEMENT WAS NOT ONE ON WHICH USA WERE DEMANDEURS,ALTHOUGH THEY WELCOMED ITS MARKET ACCESS,BUSINESS FACILITATION AND(PARTICULARLY) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS.THEY GENERALLY REGARDED DOCU AS USEFUL FRAMEWORK FOR THEIR TRADE RELATIONS WITH USSR.SINCE,HOWEVER, IT WAS UNDERSTOOD ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT IN NEAR FUTURE SUBMIT AGREEMENT TO CONGRESS,NOR GRANT WAIVER TO JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT TO 1974 TRADE ACT,ANY PRACTICAL BENEFITS--FOREMOST OF WHICH WOULD BE MFN FOR SOVIETS--WOULD BE WITHHELD AT PRESENT.

3.OFFICIAL DESCRIBED AS QUOTE ESSENTIALLY CORRECT UNQUOTE ACCOUNT IN 05JUN WSHDC POST ACCORDING TO WHICH,AFTER WEEKS DURING WHICH USA ADMIN HAD WARNED SOVIETS NOT TO EXPECT SIGNING OF(FULLY NEGOTIATED)TRADE AGREEMENT,PRESIDENT BUSH DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH SIGNATURE AT VERY LAST MINUTE ON 01JUN.ECHOING SECTY BAKERS SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT,HERBST UNDERLINED THAT THERE HAD NEVER BEEN QUOTE FORMAL LINK UNQUOTE WITH SOVIET POSITION ON LITHUANIA, ALTHOUGH,AS PRESIDENT BUSH HAD STATED,IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR CONGRESS TO CONSIDER AGMT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.WHILE THIS POSITION

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR3376 CONF

SEEMED TO ALLOW FOR DISTINCTION BETWEEN SIGNING AND FOLLOW UP WITH CONGRESS, OFFICIAL APPEARED TO BE SAYING THAT BUSH HAD DECIDED TO DISREGARD NOT TWO USA CONDITIONS, BUT ONE, I.E. PASSAGE OF LIBERALIZED SOVIET EMIGRATION LAW. HERBST HAD LITTLE TO ADD TO WSH POST EXPLANATION WHY BUSH HAD DECIDED TO DO SO. GORBACHEV HAD APPARENTLY QUOTE IMploRED UNQUOTE BUSH THAT AGMT BE SIGNED. LINK WITH SIGNING OF LONG TERM GRAIN AGMT WAS QUOTE A CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE UNQUOTE. SOVIETS HAD WARNED OF LINK IM MARCH IN VIENNA, WHEN TRADE AND GRAIN AGMTS WERE DISCUSSED ON ALTERNATE DAYS BY SAME USA USSR NEGOTIATORS (KATZ AND CHUMAKOV), AND WARNING WAS RENEWED DURING SUMMIT. HERBST WAS ALSO AWARE OF TELEPHONE CALLS TO WHITE HOUSE DURING SUMMIT FROM SENATORS FROM GRAIN-GROWING STATES.

4. FIVE-YEAR LONG TERM GRAINS AGMT WAS UNDERTAKING OF MOST PRACTICAL INTEREST TO USA (SEE FACT SHEETS FAXED SEPARATELY (NOTAL)). AS REPORTED IN OURTEL UNTD5058 04JUL IT COMMITS USSR TO BUYING ANNUALLY, FROM 1991 TO 1995, MINIMUM 10 MILLION METRIC TONS OF GRAIN FROM USA, UP FROM NINE MILLION UNDER EXISTING 1983 AGMT (WHOSE 2 1/4 YEAR EXTENSION EXPIRES 31DEC 1990). OFFICIAL LENDING IS, OF COURSE, NOT AVAILABLE TO SOVIETS UNTIL THEY MEET CONDITIONS FOR JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER.

5. OF OTHER AGMTS SIGNED, NEW CIVIL AIR AGMT WAS ONE IN WHICH INTEREST (GIVEN HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSION) WAS PROBABLY EVENLY SHARED BETWEEN USA AND USSR. PASSENGER CAPACITY WOULD BE INCREASED THREEFOLD, WHILE USA AND SOVIET CARRIERS WOULD EACH GAIN RIGHTS TO ADDITIONAL SIX

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR3376 CONF

CITIES IN THE OTHER COUNTRY.(FACT SHEET INDICATES THAT WHILE USA AIRLINES CAN ONLY SELL TICKETS IN USSR IN HARD CURRENCY,SOVIET AIRLINES WOULD SELL IN RUBLES UP TO 8.5 PERCENT OF USA AIRLINES CAPACITY,BUT REMIT PROFITS IN HARD CURRENCY).

6.MARITIME TRANSPORT AGMT WAS PROBABLY MORE A SOVIET INTEREST. ALTHOUGH USA INDUSTRY HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT ABSENCE JOF CARGO SHARING PROVISION(PRESS CLIPPINGS BY BAG TO RBT/TPS/JLE),ACCESS GAINED TO 42 PORTS IN EACH COUNTRY ON TWO DAY PRE-NOTIFICATION WOULD BE OFF-SETTING BENEFIT.AMONG OTHER AGREEMENTS STILL BEING WORKED OUT,HERBST CITED TAX TREATY WHICH MIGHT BE READY FOR SIGNING AT NEXT SUMMIT LATER THIS YEAR(ASSUMING THERE IS ONE). INVESTMENT AGREEMENT WAS SIMILARLY UNDER DISCUSSION BUT ODDS FOR EARLY COMPLETION WERE SLIMMER.

7.OVERALL,CLEAR IMPRESSION GIVEN BY OFFICIAL WAS THAT SUMMIT HAD YIELDED ALL IT COULD IN ECONOMIC FIELD(USA PRIVATE SECTOR WAS QUOTE NOT DISSATISFIED UNQUOTE)BUT NEXT STEP WAS FOR SOVIETS TO TAKE MEASURES THAT WOULD ALLOW GRANT OF JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER TOGETHER WITH SUBMISSION OF MFN-GRANTING TRADE AGMT TO CONGRESS.(THOSE ARE TWO DISTINCT OPERATIONS,THOUGH CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF TRADE AGREEMENT REQUIRED NON-DISAPPROVAL OF PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.BILL IS CURRENTLY IN CONFERENCE TO REMEDY SUPREME COURT INVALIDATION OF SINGLE HOUSE VETO ORIGINALLY PROVIDED FOR BY JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT.)ON NEW EMIGRATION LAW,HERBST WAS PHILOSOPHICAL.WHEN BUSH

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR3376 CONF

HAD FIRST SET THIS CONDITION IN MAY 89 SPEECH IN AUSTIN, TX, USA
THOUGH THEY WERE OFFERING SOVIETS A QUOTE SOFT BALL UNQUOTE. NOW, WITH
PASSAGE OF LAW POSTPONED TO FALL, FULFILMENT OF THIS REQUIREMENT HAD
YET AGAIN RECEDED. ON RELEVANCE OF LITHUANIAN SITU, OFFICIAL THOUGHT
THAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ADMIN REQUIREMENTS (LIFTING OF ECONOMIC
BLOCKADE AND BEGINNING OF DIALOGUE) AND CONGRESSIONAL CALLS FOR
QUOTE A SOLUTION UNQUOTE WAS REALLY ONLY A MATTER OF DEGREE.

CCC/085 081631Z UNGR3376

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR2478 07JUN90

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 071200

INFO WSHDC TT NDHQOTT/DGPOLPLAN/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/DE-CAF

DISTR IDD IDA IDRL INP CPP

REF OURTEL YBGR6677 05JUN

---NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

FURTHER TO REFTEL, USA AMB TAFT AT PERMREPS LUNCH 05JUN ADDED

FOLLOWING GLOSS TO USA EVALUATION OF WSHDC SUMMIT DISCUSSIONS

ON START: (A) USA REGARDED SOVIET AGREEMENT ON START II AS HIGHLY

SIGNIFICANT; (B) USA WAS ALSO ESPECIALLY PLEASED AT CONCLUSION OF

VERIFICATION PACKAGE COVERING MOBILE MISSILES INTER ALIA; AND

(C) USA HAD PROPOSED NEW LIMITS ON TESTING OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, AS


MEANS OF LIMITING MODERNIZATION; SOVIETS HAD NOT/NOT AGREED, BUT

USA WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE.

2. AT SAME MTG, SEC GEN WOERNER ALSO NOTED THAT HE MIGHT RAISE SNF
ARMS CONTROL AT WORKING DINNER THUR IN TURNBERRY. (AMB SMITH WITH
MINDEL CAN PROVIDE CONTEXT.)

CCC/069 071635Z YBGR2478

B/C



ACC	DATE
LE	DOSS. E. I.
20-USA-1-3-USSR	
LOC	
A3-WW	cc 28-6-5-2

External Affairs
CanadaAffaires extérieures
Canada**UNCLASSIFIED**
NON CLASSIFIÉAccession/Ref: **WDC 04/6**
CANADIAN EMBASSY
File/DOSSIER: **WASHINGTON**Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow.
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

6 JUN 90 22 13 2

10

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ **UNCLASSIFIED**

FM/DE

FM WSHDC UNGR3535 06JUN90

TO/A

TO EXTOTT/URR/RBT

INFO

INFO PCOOTT/DOYLE PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER

DISTR

FINOTT/IER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DGPOLPLAN/DNATOPOL/DNACPOL

REF

AGRICOTT/GRAINS/BR/GMB/ITPD ISTCOTT/JSCG - DE OTT

SUBJ/SUJ

BY BAG MOSCO BREEC GVGAT TOKYO - DE OTT

DISTR DMT IFB IDX IDR IDA INE END INP CPD CPP CPE UFB UED UET RGB

ESD RBD RBR EED EER UFB RGX RGZ OMTN

--- WASHINGTON SUMMIT : "BUSH'S REVERSAL ON TRADE"

ARTICLE IN 05JUN WASHINGTON POST

ACC

DATE

FILE

DOSSIER

LOG

ACC

A7

(COMCENTRE PLEASE FAX ATTACHED 3 PAGES)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

GENERAL ECONOMIC

7758

SIG

JP GOMBAY

Subject: _____

Page: _____

Publication: _____

Date: _____

Behind Scenes at Summit: Bush's Reversal on Trade

Letter to Gorbachev Had Cited Lithuania

By Don Oberdorfer
and David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writers

Five weeks ago, President Bush sent Mikhail Gorbachev a confidential letter warning the Soviet leader not to expect a U.S.-Soviet trade deal when he came to Washington. Citing the public and congressional opposition to Gorbachev's economic blockade of Lithuania, Bush wrote that he would have great difficulty moving forward with a trade agreement and most-favored-nation trade status for the Soviet Union.

Secretary of State James A. Baker III repeated this message in mid-May when he visited Moscow; the same word was passed again in a diplomatic message through Soviet Ambassador Alexander Basmontov just hours before the summit began.

But last Friday night, 48 hours after Gorbachev arrived in Washington for the summit, Bush abruptly reversed himself. Pressed by Gorbachev from the moment of their first meeting to approve a trade agreement, Bush and his advisers decided—after testing the reaction of congressional leaders who also had heard Gorbachev plead for

trade deal—to do the Soviet leader the one favor he most wanted. Friday evening, a trade agreement—of marginal practical significance, since it did not immediately provide most-favored-nation status, but nevertheless a trade agreement—was signed by Bush and Gorbachev in the East Room of the White House.

Although Bush's letter to Gorbachev has not previously been made public, Bush had publicly suggested that as long as the economic blockade continued, U.S. trade benefits for Moscow would not be politically feasible. "Let's hope there's some progress on the Lithuanian question, because I think many feel there's a direct linkage there, and I must say it concerns me," Bush said May 24. His change of heart was the most significant spontaneous event at the summit; it reveals the state of mind of both presidents as they grappled with the implications of Gorbachev's domestic woes.

This was a summit of low expectations and, in the end, minimal results on German unification, arms control and other substantive issues before the two nations. The trade agreement was one of only two surprises; the other was the extraordinary personal rapport that developed between the two leaders, most dramatically displayed in an emotional exchange of toasts at a private dinner at Camp David Saturday night.

ment was one of only two surprises; the other was the extraordinary personal rapport that developed between the two leaders, most dramatically displayed in an emotional exchange of toasts at a private dinner at Camp David Saturday night.

The Lithuania Blockade

Moscow cut the flow of gas and oil to Lithuania on April 18, challenging the breakaway Lithuanian government and its supporters in the West. The Bush administration reacted with cautiously exerted pressure on Moscow to open a dialogue with the Lithuanians. But the pressure had no effect. A crisis atmosphere began to develop.

Bush scheduled a meeting of the National Security Council at which many, including administration officials, expected him to announce some form of sanctions against the Soviets. But at that meeting on April 24, Bush decided not to apply economic sanctions. His decision prompted Lithuanian President Vy-

tautas Landbergis to compare Bush to Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister who appeased Hitler at Munich. Less than a week later, without public announcement, Bush linked the trade accord with the fate of Lithuania in his private letter to Gorbachev.

A source familiar with the letter said Bush took pains to assure Gorbachev that his inability to move forward with a trade pact did not mean he had abandoned his support for perestroika. Bush indicated he was simply reflecting political reality in Congress, where outrage over the Soviet crackdown was running strong. On May 1, the day after Bush sent his letter, the Senate asked the president by a 73 to 24 vote not to send the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement to Capitol Hill while the Soviet blockade of Lithuania continued.

Just a day after Baker delivered a similar message to Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow May 16, Gorbachev raised U.S. hopes by holding an unexpected conciliatory meeting with Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene. Eight days later Gorbachev met with another delegation of Lithuanian officials, and was even more forthcoming, suggesting that independence might be possible in two or three years if the Lithuanian parliament would suspend its declaration of independence. But the full-scale dialogue sought by Washington never developed.

As the summit approached, the trade pact was in limbo. The Kremlin suddenly withdrew from consideration in the Supreme Soviet a new law codifying more liberal Soviet emigration practices. The Bush administration has insisted that such a law be passed to satisfy the Jackson-Vanik amendment tying most-favored-nation status to unrestrictive emigration policies. The Soviets seemed to be signaling that they knew there would be no trade deal at the summit.

In the days before the summit, the economic policy-makers of the administration, including Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady and Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher, sent a joint memorandum to Bush outlining the case for signing the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement and granting most-favored-nation trade status to Moscow. Among the points they made, according to official sources, was that



UNCLASSIFIED
NON CLASSIFIE

Direction des Affaires Publiques
501 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 682-1740

Subject: _____

Page: _____

Publication: _____

Date: _____

Germany's Future Alignment

In advance of the summit, U.S. officials hoped for a meeting of the minds between the two leaders on the most difficult issue arising from the revolutionary changes in Europe—the future military alignment of a united Germany. But it became clear on the first afternoon of the summit that Gorbachev was not ready to discuss practical solutions to the complex problems.

After introductory remarks by Bush, Baker reviewed the nine assurances that had been discussed with U.S. allies and previously presented to Gorbachev in the Kremlin as a way to assuage Soviet concern about a united Germany in NATO. Bush and Baker were prepared to go beyond the initial statement if Gorbachev wanted to, but the Soviet leader "did not respond" to the nine points, according to a participant in the meeting.

Gorbachev, instead, launched into a rambling and largely philosophical discourse, similar to the remarks he made publicly in the windup news conference of the summit Sunday morning. Although a written Soviet plan for a new 35-nation European security organization had been handed to the State Department on the eve of the summit, Gorbachev did not even mention it in the Cabinet Room, according to U.S. sources.

The Soviet leader had only two suggestions: that Germany have a place in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which Bush dismissed as impractical; and that a possible political relationship between the two military alliances might help resolve Germany's future. Baker said later the United States would follow up on the latter suggestion.

Gorbachev also said in passing that perhaps the Soviet Union should consider joining the NATO alliance, which had been its nemesis throughout the Cold War. Bush responded that the NATO supreme commander has always been an American, and wondered aloud how Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, an illustrious Soviet soldier who is now Gorbachev's military adviser and who sat at the table in the Cabinet Room, would like serving under an American general.

U.S. officials concluded at the end of this meeting that it will take months, perhaps many months, to

resolve the German issues in ways that are politically tolerable for the Soviet Union.

Arms Control Negotiations

Bush said last December that the Washington summit was vital to "drive the arms control agenda." But though much time was spent on arms control issues by teams of U.S. and Soviet experts who gathered here four days before Gorbachev's arrival, little progress was made on the central issues, and arms control was not a major preoccupation of the two leaders.

A Bush-Gorbachev exchange Friday morning on arms control issues led to a special afternoon negotiating session between Baker and Shevardnadze, aimed at completing as much of the agenda as possible in time for the signing ceremony. By long-standing plan, the two leaders intended to sign a statement outlining a strategic arms reduction treaty that they hope to complete and sign by year's end, and also a statement of principles guiding negotiation of a second treaty later. "I wouldn't call it disorderly, but it was intense," a senior U.S. official said of the final negotiating session.

The United States demanded that the Soviets agree now to a future ban on the largest ICBMs, known as heavy missiles, and to the eventual elimination of U.S. and Soviet land-based missiles with multiple warheads. U.S. officials say these are the most threatening weapons because they could be used in a preemptive nuclear strike.

Soviet officials responded that such constraints would eliminate their most powerful and plentiful nuclear weapons, while leaving the United States with an undiluted advantage in sea-based weapons. Such a deal would be "incomprehensible," according to Akhromeyev, speaking in an interview after the summit.

Soviet negotiators proposed that future strategic arms negotiations achieve deep, overall reductions, which the U.S. team resisted. A sticking point, eventually resolved in U.S. terms, arose over the issue of space weapons: Should there be future "negotiations," as Washington proposed, or "consultations," in the words of Moscow?

Late Friday Baker and Shevardnadze accepted vague language that incorporated some of each side's positions. The statement on future negotiations issued by the sides at the East Room signing ceremony had not even been duplicated for distribution to the press at the time it was signed.

a few weeks ago, and left Americans with the impression that "clearly his views count for very much."

Atmosphere at Camp David

From the first, Bush wanted to spend time away from Washington with Gorbachev during this summit, perhaps at his summer home in Kennebunkport, Maine. But the Soviets insisted on an all-business summit. They even resisted a visit to Camp David.

But they finally agreed, and the relaxing environment of the presidential retreat cast its spell on Mikhail and Raisa Gorbachev as it has on many foreign visitors. On the patio of Aspen Lodge, Bush, Gorbachev and just a handful of aides spent more than two hours in a globe-girdling conversation about regional hot spots. Officials said later those conversations were some of the best ever held between Soviet and American leaders, though apparently no definitive agreements were reached.

Barbara Bush and Raisa Gorbachev strolled through the grounds, often hand in hand. The tone of the discussions between their husbands notably softened as they unwound in the Catskill Mountains atmosphere, a participant said.

In mid-afternoon, Gorbachev and his wife walked past one of the horseshoe pits where Bush plays one of his favorite games. The Soviet leader tossed a ringer on his first try, to the astonishment of everyone present.

At an informal dinner that night in Laurel Lodge, Bush brought up the incident at the end of his toast to Gorbachev. As a participant recalled it, Bush said that the day at Camp David had been important to the relationship of the two men and their nations. But, Bush added, "this isn't going to be all sweetness and light. I am a sportsman, a real competitor. I like to win." And who could imagine, he went on, that "Mikhail" could score ahead of him in one of Bush's favorite pastimes. The president reached under the dinner table and presented Gorbachev with a wooden plaque on which Navy personnel had mounted the horseshoe with which he had thrown the ringer.

Gorbachev, who was described by an American participant as on "a kind of high" as a result of the day's intimacy and informality, made an emotional speech in return. "In our country, the horseshoe over the door means good luck," the Soviet

Subject: _____

Page: _____


Publication: _____

Date: _____

THE NINE POINTS

During last week's Washington summit, President Bush presented Mikhail Gorbachev with a list of nine points designed to ease Soviet concerns about a united Germany. The list indicated U.S. willingness to:

- Consider limitations on the armed forces of Germany and the other nations in central Europe in a follow-on treaty to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty now under negotiation.
- Accelerate negotiations on short-range nuclear forces in Europe after the current CFE accord is completed.
- Endorse transitional arrangements under which Soviet troops now in East Germany would remain there for a number of years.
- Reiterate pledges that a united Germany will not develop nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.
- Assure the Soviets that NATO troops will not be deployed in what is now East Germany, even after a united Germany joins the NATO alliance.
- Work to guarantee the current borders of Germany, a matter of prime importance to Poland and the Soviet Union.
- Upgrade the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) by giving the organization a permanent secretariat and improving its responsibilities and effectiveness.
- Review and revamp NATO's strategy and force structure to make the organization less menacing to the Soviet Union and more representative of new realities in Europe.
- Approve economic arrangements between West Germany and the Soviet Union, under which Bonn will pay to maintain Soviet troops in East Germany for a transitional period and will subsidize new housing for them when they return home.



Europeans and others are moving quickly into the Soviet market, leaving American business at a disadvantage. But the letter noted that the decision was a "geopolitical" one for Bush, and had become involved in domestic politics.

After a White House meeting on the subject, the decision to keep the trade agreement on the shelf was reconfirmed. The Soviets were informed through Genshchikov that the agreement would not be signed at the summit, according to a U.S. official.

Gorbachev's Persistence

Soon after Gorbachev and Bush walked through the Rose Garden to the Oval Office last Thursday morning, the Soviet leader made clear his main interest—the trade agreement. At that one-on-one meeting, he cast the issue as vitally important to his perestroika reforms. Ac-

cording to a senior U.S. official, Bush reminded Gorbachev of the political realities in Congress as long as Moscow continued to pressure Lithuania. Gorbachev pressed his case with Bush again in a private conversation at the White House State Dinner Thursday night, while other members of Gorbachev's official party lobbied administration officials intensely. Some Soviet officials were passing the word that the new five-year agreement on Soviet purchases of U.S. grain, which is of great interest to U.S. farmers, might not be signed in the absence of the trade agreement.

At the Soviet Embassy Friday morning, Gorbachev delivered a passionate appeal to congressional leaders. A favorable gesture from

Congress on trade "would open up opportunities for us and for your businessmen . . . because they've been prodding us for years to scrap those anachronisms of the Cold War." He added with disarming candor, "I think it is very important that you make this gesture, mostly from a political standpoint."

Bush was watching every word from the Oval Office on Cable News Network's live broadcast of Gorbachev's meeting with the lawmakers. "Bush heard something and was immediately responsive to it," said an administration official. Shortly thereafter, the president ordered administration aides to sound out each of the congressional leaders who had been at the Soviet Embassy about their reaction to Gorbachev's trade appeal and their probable reaction if the trade agreement were to be signed. Ten of the 12 participants were reached; some supported signing the trade deal, others expressed reservations.

There was no consensus inside the administration. Some officials worried that the concession would overshadow the strategic and chemical weapons accords being announced at the same time late Friday, or would antagonize congressional conservatives. Others asked what the United States would get in return for such a concession.

In the end, according to a Bush aide who was involved in the discussions, the president decided that he wanted to help Gorbachev. Bush was concerned about the Soviet president's domestic difficulties, recently aggravated by panic buying of food in Moscow after the announcement of price increases tied to new economic reforms. Bush also was swayed by the argument that support for Gorbachev was the right choice, because ultimately Lithuania's fate would likely be decided by him. More than anything else, Bush "was influenced by his discussions with Gorbachev," this official said.

The final arrangements for signing the trade pact took place in a flurry of last-minute conversations. The Soviet aide was notified only shortly before the East Room ceremony that Bush was prepared to go ahead, but that he also would make it clear the trade agreement would be sent to Congress only after Supreme Soviet passage of the emigration bill. The deal to be signed would not include most-favored-nation tariff status for Soviet products.

Suddenly the link between the trade deal and Lithuania disappeared from official U.S. rhetoric. An hour after the signing, Baker insisted to incredulous reporters that "we, as far as I know, have never stated an expressed linkage with respect to the question of Lithuania" in connection with the trade agreement.

upls 002/5

JUN 6 1990

PROTECTED

CC	DATE	PROTECTED
751135		
FILE	DOSSIER	
20-USA-1-3-USSR A7		
ACTION		
SUITE A DONNER		

PROTECTED
FM MNPLS XKGR2092 05JUN90
TO EXTOTT (URR)
INFO MOSCO BY BAG DE OTT
WSHDC DE MPS

ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND CNATI DALAS DTROT LNGLS CNGNY
SFRAN SEATL REGAM DE MPS
DISTR URB URD UTD UED RBR INP INE CFX

---GORBACHEV VISIT TO AMERICAN UPPER MIDWEST

SUMMARY DURING COURSE OF HIS BRIEF STOP IN "THE AMERICAN HEARTLAND" JUNE 3, IT BECAME CLEARER WHY USSR PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV ELECTED TO VISIT MINNESOTA FOLLOWING HIS SUMMIT WITH PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH. AS THE MNPLS STAR TRIBUNE STATED, HE "HAD APPEALS TO MAKE IN THE TWIN CITIES." THE MOST IMPORTANT FACET OF HIS 7-HOUR VISIT WAS A MEETING WITH 135 BUSINESS LEADERS, AT WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE TENACITY OF THOSE WHO MAINTAINED RELATIONS WITH THE USSR THROUGH THE '80'S AND ENCOURAGED ALL OF THEM TO CONSIDER HOW THEIR CORPORATIONS COULD EXPAND TRADING RELATIONS WITH HIS COUNTRY, FOR THEIR OWN BENEFIT AS WELL AS TO AID ECONOMIC RECOVERY THERE. THE VISIT ALSO GAVE THE PRESIDENT AND HIS WIFE, RAISA, AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE A BIT OF UNOFFICIAL USA FOLLOWING THE MORE INTENSE WASHINGTON AGENDA AND ALLOWED THEM TO BASK IN MORE SHOWS OF POPULARITY AMONG U.S. CITIZENS.

REPORT

FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, PEOPLE OUTSIDE MINNESOTA -- AND CERTAINLY MANY MINNESOTANS AS WELL -- WONDERED WHY USSR PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV ELECTED TO VISIT THE STATE DURING HIS SUMMIT TRIP TO THE U.S. MN GOVERNOR RUDY PERPICH INDEED HAD AGGRESSIVELY PURSUED HIS INVITATION TO THE SOVIET LEADER (FORMALLY EXTENDED IN FEBRUARY) AND WAS BOLSTERED PERHAPS BY PROMINENT MINNESOTANS WHO HAVE HAD PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET PRESIDENT, (AMONG THEM THE CEOS OF CARGILL, INC. AND ARCHER DANIELS, MIDLAND CO.). ONCE GORBACHEV DECIDED TO VISIT THE MIDWEST, MINNESOTA WAS NOT AN UNLIKELY STOP. WITH PERESTROIKA, THERE HAS BEEN AN EVER-LENGTHENING LIST OF CULTURAL, ACADEMIC, ATHLETIC AND CITIZEN

.../2

G.W.FOLEY PAO/MNPLS 612/333-4641

B.BUCKLEY/HOM

G.W. Foley

PROTECTED

B. Buckley

PROTECTED

2/5

PAGE TWO XXGR2092 PROTECTED

EXCHANGES BETWEEN MINNESOTA AND THE USSR. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, THIS WAS A GOOD PLACE IN THE MIDWEST TO DELIVER HIS MESSAGES TO CORPORATE USA TO SUPPORT HIM THROUGH HIS ECONOMIC REFORM MEASURES. BTN:2

2. MINNESOTA'S TRADE CONNECTIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN STRONGER THAN THOSE OF MOST STATES. ALONG WITH A FEW OTHERS (CALIFORNIA, COLORADO, CONNECTICUT), IT HAS TENACIOUSLY MAINTAINED TIES THROUGH FIRMS WHICH HAVE CONTINUED TO CONDUCT WHATEVER TRADE RELATIONS THEY COULD DURING THE '80'S AFGHANISTAN OCCUPATION BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SUBSEQUENT U.S.

RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE. FOR INSTANCE, CARGILL, INC., THE WORLD'S LARGEST PRIVATE GRAIN COMPANY AND THE USSR'S LARGEST NON-GOVERNMENT TRADING PARTNER (APPROX. ONE BILLION IN 1989), OBTAINED PERMISSION BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE MARKETING GRAIN. CONTROL DATA, INC. ALSO HAS LONGSTANDING TIES DATING TO THE '60'S AND RECENTLY SOLD SIX MAIN FRAME COMPUTERS TO THE SOVIETS (A SALE IT HAS SOME STRONG ASSURANCE WILL BE APPROVED SOON BY THE US GOVERNMENT). ONE OF GORBACHEV'S STOPS WAS AT THE FIRM'S HEADQUARTERS IN SUBURBAN MINNEAPOLIS AND HIS REMARKS ACKNOWLEDGED CONTROL DATA'S DILIGENCE IN MAINTAINING TIES.

3. THE MOST IMPORTANT FACET OF HIS VISIT AGENDA, THEN, WAS A MEETING WITH 135 CORPORATE CHIEFTAINS TO DELIVER MESSAGES RELATED TO HIS ECONOMIC REFORM:

-TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE FAITHFULNESS OF SOME COMPANIES ("I SEE MANY OLD FRIENDS, PEOPLE WHO EVEN IN TIMES OF DIFFICULT RELATIONS, SHOWED THEMSELVES TO BE..." PRACTICAL BUSINESS PEOPLE);

-THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR INVESTMENT IN THE USSR ("YOU WILL NOT LOSE YOUR MONEY IN THE SOVIET UNION, I WOULD LIKE TO DISPEL THOSE FEARS...");

-US FIRMS SHOULD JUMP IN NOW AND NOT WAIT TO SEE HOW PERESTROIKA WORKS OUT ("THOSE WHO ARE WITH US HAVE GOOD CHANCES OF COOPERATION IN OUR GREAT MARKET. THOSE WHO STAND ON THE SIDELINES WILL REMAIN OBSERVERS FOR YEARS TO COME. WE'LL MAKE SURE THAT IS SO.")

-THERE IS A NEED TO IMPROVE CERTAIN SECTORS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY IN PARTICULAR -- AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, FOOD

.../3

PROTECTED

PROTECTED

3/5

PAGE THREE XXGR2092 PROTECTED

PROCESSING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND COMPUTERS
-THE USSR WANTS MFN STATUS

4.MOST OF THE 135 EXECUTIVES WHO ATTENDED WERE FROM MINNESOTA AND OTHER UPPER MIDWEST FIRMS, BOTH FORTUNE 500 MULTINATIONALS AND SMALLER FIRMS, INCLUDING ABOUT 50 THAT HAVE HAD A TRADING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS. AN INVITATION TO THE EVENT WAS MUCH-COVETED; BUSINESSMEN FROM THE STATE AND NON-LOCALS ALIKE LOBBIED FEROCIOUSLY TO BE INCLUDED. THE FINAL LIST, CHOSEN BY THE SOVIETS FROM MINNESOTA SUGGESTIONS, COVERED, AS ONE COMMENTATOR SUGGESTED, "...VIRTUALLY EVERY TYPE OF ENTERPRISE THE USSR NEEDS TO STIMULATE ITS SAGGING ECONOMY." THAT INCLUDED THE NATION'S LARGEST SEED COMPANIES, GRAIN MERCHANTS, AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS, AS WELL AS COMMODITIES GROUPS AND CO-OPS WANTING TO MARKET THEIR PRODUCTS TO THE SOVIETS. IT ALSO INCLUDED HI-TECH, MED-TECH AND COMPUTER COMPANIES.

5.DURING THE MEETING, GORBACHEV ACKNOWLEDGED THE US MIDWEST'S INTEREST IN AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS AND SUGGESTED THAT IF THE SOVIETS COULD SOLVE PROBLEMS RELATED TO HARVESTING, TRANSPORTING AND PROCESSING, THE USSR COULD EXPAND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION BY 25-30% HE STATED, BY EXAMPLE, THAT THE SOVIETS EXPERIENCED GOOD RESULTS AFTER PURCHASING CANADIAN HARVESTERS. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THE USSR'S NEED FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FIBRE OPTICS TECHNOLOGY AND FOR HELP IN CONVERTING THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX.

6.THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE VISIT WERE FAIRLY STANDARD. AN AIRPORT ARRIVAL CONTINGENT INCLUDED THE MINNESOTA CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION AND STATE POLITICIANS. THE GOVERNOR HOSTED LUNCHEON AT THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCE FOR ONLY 45 PERSONS THAT INCLUDED POLITICIANS AND MOVERS-AND-SHAKERS CLOSE TO THE GOVERNOR. THE GORBACHEVS HAD REQUESTED OPPORTUNITIES TO VISIT WITH "TYPICAL AMERICANS," SO PLANNED STOPS INCLUDED A PROGRESSIVE DAIRY FARM, (LATER CANCELLED GIVEN A BACKUP IN THE AGENDA DUE TO LATE ARRIVAL IN THE TWIN CITIES AND, PERHAPS, THE INCLEMENT WEATHER). WHILE THE PRESIDENT ADDRESSED THE BUSINESS LEADERS, MRS. GORBACHEV VISITED A MINNEAPOLIS FAMILY IN THEIR HOME (THE ADOLESCENT DAUGHTER HAD PERFORMED IN MOSCOW ON A CHILDREN'S

.../4

PROTECTED

PROTECTED

4/5

PAGE FOUR XXGR2092 PROTECTED

THEATRE EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE TWO CITIES) AND ALONG THE WAY STOPPED FOR IMPROMPTU, CURIOSITY-QUENCHING CALLS AT A CHAIN DRUGSTORE OUTLET AND A MEXICAN TAKEOUT EATERY. THE TOUR ENDED WITH THE STOP AT CONTROL DATA FOR THE COMPUTER DEMONSTRATION.

7. THE GORBACHEVS SEEMED TO REVEL IN THE ENTHUSIASM OF THOUSANDS OF MINNESOTANS WHO LINED THE ROUTE OF THE 35-VEHICLE MOTORCADE AND CLUSTERED, AS CLOSELY AS THEY WERE ALLOWED, AT SITES OF THE GORBACHEV APPOINTMENTS. AS IN OTTAWA, WASHINGTON AND SAN FRANCISCO, PROTESTERS REPRESENTING THE BALTIC STATES (AS WELL AS AFGHANS AND VIETNAMESE) WERE VISIBLE ALONG THE WAY. THE

UNDAUNTED PRESIDENT JUMPED SPORADICALLY FROM THE LIMOUSINE SEVERAL TIMES AND PLUNGED INTO THE CROWDS TO SHAKE HANDS AND ACCEPT THE CHEERS, SPARKING THE CONTINGENT OF KGB, SECRET SERVICE, LOCAL POLICE AND HIGHWAY PATROL INTO HYPERACTIVITY.

8. GOVERNOR PERPICH, DUBBED "THE GOOFY GOVERNOR" BY NEWSWEEK SOME MONTHS AGO (FOR, AMONG OTHER THINGS, HAVING THE CHEEK TO INVITE THE SOVIET PRESIDENT TO MINNESOTA), SEEMED TO HAVE HIS POLITICAL DREAMS COME TRUE WITH THE VISIT; HE IS RUNNING FOR RE-ELECTION IN THE FALL. AT THE CLOSE OF THE LUNCHEON, HE HAD A SURPRISE ANNOUNCEMENT TO MAKE ABOUT THE CREATION OF A \$100 MILLION "GORBACHEV/MAXWELL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER" IN THE TWIN CITIES. PERPICH INTRODUCED BRITISH COMMUNICATIONS MAGNATE ROBERT MAXWELL (MIRROR GROUP NEWSPAPERS) WHOM HE HAS TRIED TO INTEREST IN THE IDEA FOR SOME TIME. MAXWELL, WHO HAS HIS NORTH AMERICAN HEADQUARTERS IN MINNESOTA, ANNOUNCED THAT HE WOULD COMMIT \$50 MILLION TO THE PROJECT IF MINNESOTA CAN FIND THE OTHER HALF -- NO SPECIFIC DETAILS ACCOMPANIED THE ANNOUNCEMENT EXCEPT THAT THE CENTER WOULD FOCUS ON COORDINATING RESEARCH WORK BY INTERNATIONAL SCIENTISTS IN THE AREAS OF ENVIRONMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS.

9. ALL IN ALL IT WAS A MEMORABLE AFTERNOON FOR MINNESOTANS AND THE GORBACHEVS APPEARED TO ENJOY IT AS WELL. WITH THE INVASION OF SOMETHING IN EXCESS OF 1500 MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD AND FLEETS OF SECURITY FORCES, THE VISIT WAS DESCRIBED AS HISTORIC BY LOCALS. AND NO ONE SEEMED TOO SURPRISED WHEN THE HUMID, 75-DEGREE F. WEATHER OF 36 HOURS EARLIER CHANGED IN TIME

.../5

PROTECTED

PROTECTED

5/5

PAGE FIVE XXGR2092 PROTECTED

FOR THE GORBACHEV ARRIVAL TO RAIN, ICY TEMPERATURES AND WIND
CHILL FACTORS, AFFIRMING MINNESOTA'S REPUTATION WITH EASTERN
MEDIA REPS THAT IT REALLY DOES NOT EVER WARM UP HERE. IN THE
SPIRIT OF THE VISIT, AT LEAST LOCAL WEATHERCASTERS WERE
DESCRIBING THE PHENOMENON AS A SIBERIAN RATHER THAN A CANADIAN
FRONT.

PROTECTED

ACC	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	
LCC	
AB-WMcc 28-6-5-2	

Angela J. Bogdan
IDR/ajb/992-9368
June 5, 1990

Unclassified


MEMORANDUM TO
FROM
INFORMATION
SUBJECT

IDD
IDR
MINA/USS/IFB/CPD/RGB/RWR/URD/URR
IDC/IDA/IDX/BNATO/WHSDC/MOSCO
THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT - IMPACT ON
THE START NEGOTIATIONS

Attached you will find a series of Q's and A's prepared for the SSEA which outline the START situation as a result of the Washington Summit. We have drawn heavily on the Summit "START" Declaration issued by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev and on reports from our Embassy in Washington.

While progress at the Summit was less than spectacular, it did bring both sides closer together on some of the outstanding technical points and gave the Geneva Negotiations some strong impetus. We concur with comments made by senior officials in Washington to the effect that press reports were unduly negative, not only with respect to progress in START, but on arms control in general.

The "Statement" (copy of which was carried in the June 2 edition of the NYT) also offers a concise and authoritative sitrep on START and formalizes the goal of an agreed treaty by the end of the year.



J.R.D. Fowell
Director
Defence Relations Division

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS

WASHINGTON SUMMIT OUTCOME

What progress towards the successful negotiation of a START treaty was registered at the super-power Summit?

- the Summit brought both parties much closer to achieving an agreement on strategic arms reductions;
- in an official statement, both Presidents expressed satisfaction with the great progress which has been made;
- in particular, they welcomed the mutually acceptable solutions which have been found on major issues and reaffirmed their determination to have the treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of this year;
- delegations in Geneva were instructed to accelerate their work

How will the treaty, as negotiated to date, enhance strategic stability?

- for the first time, both sides will carry out significant reductions in strategic offensive arms (up to 50% in certain categories);
- these reductions will be designed to make a first strike less plausible, the result of which will be greater stability and a lower risk of war;
- both Presidents were able to initiate a set of objectives for the next round of strategic reductions talks which commits both to pursue cutbacks in missiles carrying multiple warheads (MIRVs), thereby meeting concerns over reducing incentives for first strike weapons

What are the major agreed provisions or "ceilings" in terms of limits on nuclear launchers and warheads?

- the total number of deployed ICBMS, SLCMs and their associated launchers, and heavy bombers will be reduced to a ceiling of 1,600; a subceiling of 154 was set for deployed heavy ICBM's and their associated launchers

- 2 -

- a further ceiling of 6000 in the total number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers was set; of these, subceilings of 4,900 on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, 1,540 on heavy ICBMs and 1,100 on mobile ICBMs were also set;

- the aggregate throw-weight of the deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of each sides will be limited to an agreed level which will be approximately 50% below the existing level of the aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of the USSR as of a date to be determined. This limit will not be exceeded for the duration of the treaty;

What agreement was reached on the issue of heavy-bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)?

- heavy bombers equipped for long range ALCMs will be counted as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and shall be attributed with an agreed number of warheads against the 6000 limit;

- existing and future Soviet heavy bombers equipped for long-range ALCMs will be attributed with 8 warheads each while existing and future USA heavy bombers will be attributed with 10 warheads each;

- within the 1,600 limit on delivery vehicles, the USA may have no more than 150 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; the USSR, due to the smaller ALCM capacity of its heavy bombers, may exceed that number by 40%;

- existing and future US heavy bombers may be equipped for no more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCM; existing and future Soviet heavy bombers may be equipped for no more than 12;

- heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range ALCMs will be counted as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and will be attributed with one warhead against the 6,000 limit

- there were no limits set on production or testing.

- 3 -

How was the SLCM issue resolved and what relationship does the "agreement" have to START?

- sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will not be constrained in START;
- each side will provide the other with a unilateral declaration of its policy concerning nuclear SLCM's and annually, for the duration of the treaty, with unilateral declarations regarding its planned deployments of nuclear long-range SLCM's (ie. those with a range in excess of 600 kilometers); those declarations are to be politically binding;
- in the annual declarations, the maximum number of deployed nuclear SLCM's for each of the following five treaty years will be specified, provided that the number declared will not exceed 880;
- in the declarations of policy, it will be specified that both will not produce or deploy nuclear SLCMS with MIRV's;
- both sides reaffirmed their 1987 Washington Summit joint statement to continue to seek "mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification", a position long-espoused by Canada

Does START include any "bans" or "prohibitions"?

- START will include specific prohibitions on certain categories of strategic offensive arms, basing modes and activities. Specifically:
 - new types of heavy ICBM's
 - heavy SLBM's and their launchers
 - mobile launchers for heavy ICBM's
 - new types of ICBM's and SLBM's with more than 10 re-entry vehicles
 - rapid reload of ICBM launchers
 - long-range nuclear ALCMs equipped with MIRVs
 - flight testing and deployment of existing types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the number specified in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of December 1987

Arms Treaty: The Outlook

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty would lead to cuts of about 30 percent in the number of Soviet and American long-range nuclear arms. It would halve the number of warheads on Soviet land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, and would halve the Soviet force of 308 SS-18 missiles.

The two sides have resolved differences over cruise missiles, and are still trying to resolve a host of thorny issues before they can accomplish their goal of signing a treaty later this year.

	CURRENT FORCES		UNDER START	
	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles	2,450	6,530	1,444	3,060
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles	5,024	3,642	3,456	1,840
Short-range attack missiles	3,000	400	3,440	2,000
Air-launched cruise missiles	1,600	640	1,840	1,350
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles in overhaul			576**	528**
Submarine-launched cruise missiles	350	0	880†	880†

** Missiles in overhaul had been counted toward totals in the past.

† U.S. proposed limit is 758 or fewer.

Source: Arms Control Association

- 4 -

Can compliance with this agreement be effectively verified?

- the substantial reductions and other constraints contained in the treaty will be accompanied by the most thorough and innovative verification provisions ever negotiated;
- taken together, the treaty's comprehensive verification regime will create a degree of transparency in the military sphere which would have been unthinkable only a short time ago;
- it will not only provide for effective verification of the obligations of the treaty, but will also greatly increase the mutual confidence which is essential for a sound strategic relationship

What is Canada's reaction to the progress in START rendered in Washington by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev?

- we commend both parties in their efforts to resolve the major stumbling blocks and are confident that the Geneva Negotiations will culminate in a completed treaty on strategic arms reduction by the year-end;
- in Canada's view, this is an historic first-step towards the enhancement of strategic stability and collective security;
- we strongly support the outline set forth for START II and are particularly pleased that on the subject of nuclear SLCM limitations, both sides reaffirmed their 1987 Washington Summit commitment to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification

Angela J. Bogdan
Defence Relations
992-9368

External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

SECRET

MGTC/DIARY/CIRC/FILE
MGTC/JOURNAL/CIRC/DOSSIER

Accession/Reference

File/Dossier

20-USA-1-3-USSR

SECURE FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECRET

ACC

648424

DATE 12

FILE

20-USA-1-3-USSR

DOSSIER

LOC

A3-WW

doott

GM

FM BNATO YBGR6677 05JUN90

TO EXTOTT/ADR DELBY 051400

INFO WSHDC LDN BY FAX BONN PARIS VNACE ROME MOSCO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL

/DNACPOL PCOOTT/DOYLE DE OTT

DISTR MINA USS IPB UGB IDD IDA IDC RWR URR RBR CPP EER

---USA/USSR SUMMIT: LTR FROM PRES BUSH

USA PERM REP (TAFT) CIRCULATED ATTACHED LTR FROM PRES BUSH
TO SECGEN PROVIDING ACCOUNT OF HIS SUMMIT MTG WITH PRES GORBACHEV.
POLIT CTTEE WAS CONVENED JUN05 TO RECEIVE BRIEFING AND AMB
TAFT OFFERED SOME ADDITIONAL COMMENT AT PERM REP LUNCH SAME
DAY BUT THERE PROVIDED LITTLE BEYOND ACCOUNT GIVEN IN PRESIDENTS
LET. USA REPS INDICATED THAT SECT BAKER WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTING
PRESIDENTS REPORT IN HIS PRESENTATION TO TURNBERRY NAC. AMB
TAFT DID STATE THAT GORBACHEV WAS CONFIDENT, OPEN AND EXPRESSIVE
DURING HIS TALKS IN WSHDC AND DID NOT/NOT GIVE IMPRESSION
OF BEING BELEAGUERED LEADER. USA REP ON POLIT CTTEE COMMENTED
THAT WHILE GORBACHEV SEEMED AT EASE WITH TRADITIONAL AGENDA
ITEMS (E.G., ARMS CONTROL) HE APPEARED QUOTE MORE RIGID AND
CONSTRAINED IN WHAT HE COULD SAY UNQUOTE ON TOPICS OF GERMAN
UNIFICATION AND LITHUANIA.

2.USA REP CIRCULATED IN POLIT CTTEE TEXTS OF MAJOR STATEMENTS

LDN de NAT 002/05 ✓

...2

SECURE FAX

NAT 003/05

DRAFTER/REDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVE

P. MEYER/DGL ✓

POLITICAL

204

P. MEYER

000569

SIG

SIG

CIRC YES/NO



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

SECRET

2/5

Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

WOTDA

REMARKS A 17112

SECRET PAGE TWO YBGR6677 05JUN90

12

10

AND AGREEMENTS FROM SUMMIT WHICH WE PRESUME YOU WILL HAVE
RECEIVED DIRECTLY IN OTTAWA, IF NOT/NOT WE CAN SEND BY UNCLASS
FAX.

(COMCENTRE PLSE FAX ATTACHED 3 PAGES.)

SECRET

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1387 04JUN90

TO EXTOTT URR

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE BNATO LDN PARIS

FOON ROME VNACE GENEV BRU BREEC MOSCO WSAW

TT NDHQOTT/CDA/VCDS/DM/ADMPOL/ASSOCADMPOL/DGPOLPLAN/DIPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD RBR RWD RWR IFB IDD IDA IDR

CPD CPP

---BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT:ADM PERSPECTIVE

SUMMARY:THE ADMINISTRATION IS PLEASED WITH THE WAY THINGS WENT AT THE SUMMIT,PARTICULAR WITH THE DEGREE OF ENGAGEMENT SHOWN ON DIFFICULT ISSUES AND WITH THE RAPPORT WHICH DEVELOPED DURING THE MEETINGS. SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS WERE ALSO CONSIDERABLE FOURTEEN AGREEMENTS AND ELEVEN JOINT STATEMENTS.MOST NOTABLE OF THESE WERE TRADE AGREEMENT, NEW LONG-TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT,AIRLINE AND MARITIME TRANSPORT AGREEMENT, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR TESTING AGREEMENTS,AND JOINT STATEMENT OUTLINING MAJOR ELEMENTS OF A START AGREEMENT.IN ADDITION,TWO SIDES AGREED ON BROAD PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE NEGOTIATION OF START II FOLLOW-UP AGREEMENT.THERE ALSO APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN SOME NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES OVER AFGHANISTAN,CUBA,KOREA AND ETHIOPIA.

2.BUT THERE WAS OBVIOUS DISAPPOINTMENT AMONG ADMIN OFFICIALS WHO BRIEFED ALLIED(INCLUDING IRISH)AMBASSADOR TODAY OVER THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES AGREEMENT IN EUROPE,BECAUSE OF SOVIET POSITION ON UNIFICATION AND GERMANY.THERE WERE NO/NO SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON LITHUANIA.

...2

16

ACC	JUN 5 1990	DATE
FILE	751134	DOSSIER
LOC	20-USA-1-3-USSR	47
AG-		

PAGE TWO UNGR1387 CONF

3.REPORT:UNDERSEC FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS,BOB KIMMITT,TOLD ALLIED AMBASSADORS TODAY THAT FOUR DAY SUMMIT JUST CONCLUDED HAD FEATURED QUOTE UNPARALLELED DIRECT AND DETAILED INVOLVEMENT OF THE TWO PRESIDENTS UNQUOTE.BOTH DURING FORMAL MEETINGS AND IN INFORMAL CAMP DAVID DISCUSSIONS,KIMMITT SAID THERE HAD BEEN QUOTE A REAL ENGAGEMENT UNQUOTE AND A GOOD RAPPORT.

4.DISCUSSION,HOWEVER,HAD MADE EVIDENT A NUMBER OF CONTRADICTIONS IN SOVIET THINKING ON EUROPE,KIMMITT SAID,WHICH SUGGESTED TO ADMIN THAT ON SOME ISSUES SOVIET THINKING WAS STILL IN FORMATIVE STAGE.FOR EXAMPLE,SOVIETS HAD UNDERScoreD IMPORTANCE OF BOTH USA AND USSR NOT/ NOT BEING ISOLATED FROM DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE,BUT SHEVARDNADZE AT ONE POINT HAD ALSO ARGUED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO/NO FOREIGN TROOPS OUTSIDE HOME TERRITORY.SOVIETS HAD ALSO CONTINUED TO OPPOSE UNITED GERMANY BEING MEMBER OF NATO,WHILE ESPOUSING HELSINKI PRINCIPLES WHICH INCLUDE FREEDOM TO CHOOSE ALLIANCES.SOVIET LEADER HAD CONVEYED DEPTH OF HIS CONCERN ABOUT PACE OF GERMAN UNIFICATION AND HIS BELIEF IN NEED FOR QUOTE SYNCHRONIZATION UNQUOTE OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF ISSUE,BUT SOVIETS HAD ALSO SAID THEY DID NOT/NOT WANT TO SLOW DOWN UNIFICATION PROCESS.THEIR TALK ABOUT TRANSITION PERIOD AND POSSIBLE CONVERGENCE OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT HAD ALSO BEEN VAGUE. KIMMITT CONCLUDED BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE WOULD HAVE A LOT TO WRESTLE WITH WHEN THEY CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS IN COPENHAGEN LATER THIS WEEK.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR1387 CONFD

5.KIMMITT SAID DISCUSSION ON LITHUANIA HAD ALSO BEEN DISAPPOINTING. IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT S REITERATION OF U.S.POLICY OF NON-RECOGNITION OF INCORPORATION OF BALTIC STATES AND DIFFICULTIES WHICH SOVIET SANCTIONS AGAINST VILNIUS WERE CREATING IN U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS,GORBACHEV HAD REPEATED HIS COMMITMENT TO DIALOGUE WITHOUT PROVIDING ANY ASSURANCES ABOUT LIFTING SANCTIONS.BUSH HAD AGREED TO SIGN TRADE AGREEMENT,KIMMITT SAID,BUT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT ITS RATIFICATION WOULD BE CONTINGENT NOT/NOT JUST ON SOVIET PASSAGE OF NEW EMIGRATION LAW,BUT ALSO ON PROGRESS ON LITHUANIAN FRONT.U.S. OFFICIALS ARE OF VIEW THAT GORBACHEV S MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON LITHUANIA,RATHER THAN SOFTENING LEGISLATORS OPPOSITION TO PASSAGE OF TRADE BILL,MAY HAVE MADE PROSPECT OF PASSAGE MORE DISTANT. (OFFICIALS WERE ALSO TAKEN ABACK BY GORBACHEV S REMARK DURING CLOSING PRESS CONF THAT MOSCO MIGHT REVERSE ITS POSITION ON JEWISH EMIGRATION IF IT NOT/NOT GET SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES FROM JERUSALEM THAT IMMIGRANTS WOULD NOT/NOT BE SETTLED IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.)

6.UNDERSEC FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS,REG BARTHOLOMEW,TOOK ISSUE WITH MEDIA S RATHER NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT OF SUMMIT S ACCOMPLISHMENTS ON ARMS CONTROL.BY ANY MEASURE,HE SAID,THERE HAD BEEN A QUOTE RATHER IMPRESSIVE SET OF AGREEMENTS UNQUOTE REACHED SINCE MALTA,CITING IN PARTICULAR QUOTE VERY FAR REACHING UNQUOTE CW AGREEMENT AND U.S. SUCCESS IN GETTING SOVIETS TO SUBSCRIBE TO MISSILE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY REGIME.

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR1387 CONF

7. JOINT STATEMENT ON START (COPY FOLLOWS) SHOWED WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED, INCLUDING ENDING 8 YEAR LONG STRUGGLE OVER CRUISE MISSILES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED TWO SIDES HAD NOT/NOT MANAGED TO COME TO CLOSURE ON HEAVY MISSILES AND BACKFIRE BOMBERS, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES IN FAVOUR OF U.S. POSITIONS. OUTLINE OF FUTURE START II AGREEMENT, HE SAID, IMPARTED AN IMPORTANT SENSE OF DIRECTION TO NEGOTIATION, AND LARGELY COINCIDED WITH CONCEPTS AND IDEAS U.S. HAD FAVOURED.

8. EVEN CFE DISCUSSIONS, BARTHOLOMEW SAID, HAD PRODUCED SOME PROGRESS, NOTABLY ON ISSUES OF ARMOUR AND DESTRUCTION (WHICH HE CALLED THE HEART OF THE MATTER) BUT ALSO ON VERIFICATION. IN RESPECT OF LATER, BARTHOLOMEW SAID SOVIETS APPEARED TO BE WILLING TO GO FURTHER ON AERIAL OBSERVATION THAN DURING OPEN SKIES NEGOTIATIONS. (U.S. HAD MADE A QUOTE REAL PUSH UNQUOTE ON OPEN SKIES, HE SAID, AND HAD TRIED TO DRAW SOVIETS INTO SIGNING A JOINT STATEMENT ENDORSING PRINCIPLES AGREED TO IN BUDAPEST BY EVERYONE BUT SOVIETS. BUT U.S. HAD BEEN STONE WALLED, BOTH A KARPOV LEVEL AND GORBACHEV LEVEL). ON CFE MANPOWER LEVELS, BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT ON FIRST DAY SOVIETS SOUGHT TO GET AGREEMENT TO INCORPORATE OTTAWA CEILINGS INTO CFE TREATY AND ANNOUNCED THEY WANTED QUOTE SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS UNQUOTE ON MANPOWER CEILING OF UNITED GERMANY WHEN PRESIDENTS MET ON ISSUE. BUT SOVIETS NEVER CAME BACK TO ISSUE. BARTHOLOMEW SAID SOVIETS HAD NOT/NOT MOVED AT ALL ON AIRCRAFT ISSUE, BUT HE THOUGHT IT INTERESTING THAT THEY HAD REPEATED THEIR DESIRE TO CONCLUDE CFE THIS YEAR AND THAT THEY

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR1387 CONF

HAD AGREED IN JOINT STATEMENT THAT IT SHOULD BE QUOTE READY FOR SIGNATURE UNQUOTE BY TIME OF CSCE SUMMIT, WHICH THEY ALSO REFERRED TO REPEATEDLY AS AN OBJECTIVE FOR THIS YEAR RATHER THAN 1991.

9. DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES BROKE LITTLE NEW GROUND DURING EXPERTS MEETING, KIMMITT SAID, BUT OCCUPIED GOOD DEAL OF TIME AT CAMP DAVID AND DID ADVANCE MATTERS IN A FEW CASES. DETAILED READOUT WAS NOT/NOT YET AVAILABLE, KIMMITT SAID, BUT FOLLOWING SEEMED NOTEWORTHY TO HIM:

(A) ON AFGHANISTAN, THERE WAS QUITE A BIT OF COMMON GROUND, PARTICULARLY ON NEED TO USE ELECTORAL PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHING NEW GOVT.

(B) ON MIDEAST, SOVIETS AGREED ARAFAT SHOULD BE PREVAILED UPON TO CONDEMN MOST RECENT TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL.

(C) ON CENTRAL AMERICAN, SOVIETS SAID THEY WOULD SUPPORT NEW GOVT IN NICARAGUA AND AGREED TO QUOTE PROBE UNQUOTE CUBANS ON LENDING MILITARY SUPPLIES TO MPLA IN SALVADOR. SOVIETS SUGGESTED IN TURN THAT U.S. TRY TO UPGRADE ITS RELATIONS WITH HAVANA.

(D) ON KASHMIR, SOVIETS AGREED ON NEED TO GET TWO SIDES TO LOWER THEIR RHETORIC AND PULL BACK THEIR FORCES, BUT THEY WERE UNWILLING TO ISSUE JOINT STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT. (IT HAD BEEN AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT IF ASKED AT PRESS CONF BOTH LEADERS WOULD HAVE APPEALED TO PROTAGONISTS, BUT QUESTION NEVER CAME.)

(E) ON KOREA, SOVIETS SAID THEY WANTED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH ROK UNDERSCORING CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF SUCH COURSE. THEY CANDIDLY ADMITTED THAT THIS WOULD COMPLICATE THEIR RELATIONS WITH DPRK, BUT THEY SEEMED UNCONCERNED. GORBACHEV IN TURN ENCOURAGED U.S. TO APPROACH DPRK DIRECTLY ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR CONCERNS.

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR1387 CONFD

(F)ON ETHIOPIA, GORBACHEV BROUGHT NEWS THAT ETHIOPIAN GOVT HAD AGREED TO ALLOW U.N. TO FERRY RELIEF SUPPLIES THROUGH MASAWA. TWO SIDES ISSUED JOINT STATEMENT SUPPORTING CONVENING OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE UNDER U.N. AUSPICES TO EXAMINE ENTIRE SITUATION IN HORN OF AFRICA.

(KIMMITT WAS TO MEET WITH U.N. UNDERSEC LATER TODAY.)

10. FURTHER TELS FOLLOW ON TRADE AGREEMENT AND OPEN SKIES.

CCC/120 042244Z UNGR1387

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Bo'co A 7

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1383 04JUN90

TO EXTOTT RGE DELIVER BY 041600

ACC 852684	DATE
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR	DOSSIER
LOG A7-	NC

INFO MOSCO BNATO LDN PARIS BONN VNACE BREEC BRU WSAW BPEST PRGUE

ROME HAGUE MDRID COPEN STKHM BCRST ANKRA ATHENS PCOOTT/DOYLE

PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLPLAN/DNATOPOL/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA USS DMC DMT IFB IDX IDD IDR IDA IMD IMU IND INP CPD

CPP CPE RBR RBD RWD RWR RGX URB URD URR EFB EED EEE EER

---WASHINGTON SUMMIT:ASSESSMENT

SUMMARY:WASHINGTON SUMMIT WAS A SMOOTH EVENT WHOSE SCRIPT, LIKE
A SUCCESSFUL HOLLYWOOD BOX OFFICE HIT, CONTAINED THE PLOT OF ITS
SEQUEL PROVIDED, OF COURSE, THAT THE CONTRACTS OF ITS DRAMATIS
PERSONAE ARE EXTENDED. GORBACHEV GETS AWARD FOR BEST LEADING
ACTOR: LIKE DE GAULLE IN THE 40S HE PARLAYED HIS VERY WEAKNESS
INTO OPTICAL SUCCESS. TO MIMETAPHORS, MR BUSH RECEIVED THE
BYING TROPHY FOR MOST GENTLEMANLY PLAYER. BEST SUPPORTING
ACTRESS GOEST BY FAR TO MRS BUSH WHOSE SPEECH AT WELLESLEY COLLEGE
FOR WOMEN WAS BEST PORTRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES SINCE KENNEDY AND
WHOSE HANDLING OF MRS GORBACHEV WAS AS SENSITIVE AS IT WAS
DIGNIFIED. RAISA FAITHFULLY PLAYED OUT THE REDUCED ROLE
GIVEN HER BY THE MOSCOW SCRIPTWRITERS.

2. GORBACHEVS OBJECTIVES WERE TO PRESERVE RESPECT FOR SOVIET

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1383 CONF

DIGNITY, CONSERVE THE APPEARANCE OF SOVIET POWER AND CARRY BACK TO MOSCOW SOME SYMBOL OF U.S. ECONOMIC APPROVAL. HE ACHIEVED ALL THREE AND RENDERED LITTLE IN RETURN. NO/NO GIVE ON GERMANY (ON THE CONTRARY, HE USED OTTAWA AND WASHINGTON PRESS CONFERENCES TO GRAPHICALLY DEPICT HISTORIC SENSITIVITIES TO A MILITARISTIC GERMANY); NO/NO SOFTENING ON LITHUANIA (INDEED, A REITERATED IMAGE OF THE USSR AS THE AGGRIEVED PARTY WHO SUFFERED THIEVERY IN THE NIGHT); NO/NO CONCESSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL BEYOND A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE THAT START II SHOULD QUOTE PLACE EMPHASIS ON REMOVING INCENTIVES FOR A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE UNQUOTE (I.E. A GREATER REDUCTION OF SS 18S AND MOBILE MISSILES). GORBACHEV ALSO OUT TALKED THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP, FACED DOWN THE U.S. MEDIA AND CHARMED MOST OF THE CURIOUS ONLOOKERS WHOM HE QUOTE SPONTANEOUSLY UNQUOTE SOUGHT OUT. BUT DO THESE SUCCESSES MATTER A HILL OF BEANS BACK IN THE USSR?

3. ON USA SIDE, PRES BUSH PLAYED GRACIOUS HOST, ATTEMPTING WITH MODERATE SUCCESS TO RETAIN SOME FORM OF COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL OVER HIS ASSERTIVE GUEST, CONSCIOUSLY REFRAINING FROM REFERRING TO GORBACHEV'S WEAKNESSES WHILE TRUMPETING THE VIRTUES OF PERESTROIKA AND CONCEDING WHAT GORBACHEV NEEDED MOST: A DOZEN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WHICH WELCOMED THE FORMER QUOTE EVIL EMPIRE UNQUOTE BACK INTO A RESPECTABLE PLACE AMONG THE COMMUNITY OF

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR1383 CONFD

NATIONS.

4. BOTH SIDES REGARD SUMMIT AS PUBLIC SUCCESS. ALSO EVIDENT IS QUALITATIVE VALUE OF FACE TO FACE EXCHANGE. MAJOR DIFFERENCES REMAIN BUT AN ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST, EVEN CONVERGENCE ON SOME INTERESTS IS NOW APPARENT.

5. OF INTEREST TO CANADA WAS PRES BUSH'S DEEP APPRECIATION FOR PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY'S ASSESSMENTS OF HIS MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV CONVEYED IN THREE TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS 29-31 MAY, THE LAST INITIATED BY BUSH TO EXPLORE FURTHER THE CDN IDEA OF UTILIZING ART 2 TO MODIFY NATOS ROLE (WHICH BUSH REFERRED TO APPROVINGLY IN HIS 03 JUN PRESS CONF). OPEN SKIES WAS ALSO ALLUDED TO AS EXEMPLARY OF THE LACK OF CONSISTENT APPROACH BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND OFFICIAL LEVELS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION; GORBACHEV WAS APPARENTLY SURPRISED AT THE VEHEMENCE OF HIS OFFICIALS OPPOSITION TO THIS VERIFICATION PROPOSAL. IN SHORT, THE OTTAWA VISIT WAS A USEFUL AND INFORMATIVE OVERTURE TO THE SUMMIT.

6. THIS TEL WILL BE FOLLOWED UP BY MORE IN DEPT MESSAGES BASED ON DEBRIEFINGS BY USA OFFICIALS.

7. REPORT: GORBACHEV'S THREE AND A HALF DAY VISIT TO WSHDC 30 MAY 02 JUN INCLUDED OVER EIGHT HOURS OF MEETINGS WITH PRES BUSH, AN INFORMATL ALL DAY MEETING WITH THE PRES AND AIDES AT CAMP DAVID, A BRIEF MEETING WITH VICE PRES QUAYLE, TWO STATE DINNERS, THE

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR1383 CONFD

ACCEPTANCE OF FIVE AWARDS, A TELEVISED MEETING WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP, A JOINT PRESS CONF WITH PRES BUSH, LUNCHEON WITH PROMINENT AMERICANS AND NUMEROUS ENCOUNTERS WITH CURIOUS ONLOOKERS. THROUGHOUT THE WHIRLWIND PACE, GORBACHEV MAINTAINED A PUBLICLY CONTROLLED IMAGE OF CONFIDENCE, FRIENDLINESS, AND ASSERTIVENESS. IT IS SAID THAT IN PRIVATE HE SHOWED SOME FATIGUE, DISTRACTION, LESS INDEPTH MASTERY OF HIS BRIEFS THAN PREVIOUSLY AND AN OCCASIONAL PENCHANT FOR EMOTIONAL DISCOURSE.

8. GORBACHEVS ADAMANCY OVER LITHUANIA AND GERMANY'S PLACE IN EUROPE, WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE OTTAWA VISIT, WAS REITERATED DURING HIS WSHDC SUMMIT MEETINGS. THERE WERE NO/NO SURPRISE SOLUTION OR FURTHER CONCESSIONS. INITIALLY IT APPEARED GORBACHEV MIGHT SHOW SOME ROOM TO MANOEUVRE ON GERMANY WHEN HE INTIMATED AT THE END OF HIS FIRST MEETING WITH PRES BUSH 31 MAY THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD WORK SOMETHING OUT. SUBSEQUENTLY, IT WAS OBVIOUS SHEVARDNADZE HAD NOTHING BUT A REITERATION OF OLD FORMULAE REHEARSED IN THE OTTAWA TALKS (NEUTRAL GERMANY, GERMANY BELONGING TO TWO ALLIANCES, 4-5 YEAR TRANSITION PHASE, ETC.). BUSH REMAINED FIRM ON GERMANY WITHIN NATO BUT ATTEMPTED TO MAKE SOVIETS MORE CONFORTABLE BY OFFERING NINE POINT PLAN INCLUDING NATION NON STATIONING OF TROOPS IN EAST GERMANY TERRITORY WHILE
...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR1383 CONF

SOVIET FORCES REMAINED FINANCED BY UNITED GERMANY, GERMAN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN SETTLING SOVIET TROOPS IN USSR, REFORMING NATO DOCTRINE AND READINESS, ASSURING RAPID MOVEMENT TO CFE II TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF BUNDESWEHR LEVELS AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CSCE. MOST POSITIVE REMARK BUSH COULD OFFER ON GERMANY, DURING FINAL PRESS CONFERENCE, HOWEVER, WAS COMMENT THAT GORBACHEV HAD MADE NON EXPLICIT ADMISSION OF GERMAN RIGHT TO DECIDE ITS OWN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. BOTH LEADERS AGREED THAT GERMAN QUESTION COULD NOT/NOT BE RESOLVED AT MEETING WHERE GERMANS WERE ABSENT. CLOSE COMMUNICATION WAS MAINTAINED BETWEEN GERMAN AND U.S. LEADERSHIP THROUGHOUT SUMMIT AND CHANCELLOR KOHL IS EXPECTED IN WSHDC NEXT WEEK.

9. LITHUANIA, TOUGH ATTITUDE SHOWN IN GORBACHEV'S OTTAWA PRESS CONFERENCE PREVAILED IN HIS PUBLIC APPEARANCES IN WSHDC, PARTICULARLY DURING QUESTIONING BY CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP. GORBACHEV REITERATED WELL KNOWN LINE THAT AS PRESIDENT OF USSR, HE HAS SWORN MANDATE TO UPHOLD SOVIET CONSTITUTION: LITHUANIAN DECLARATION WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. IF ANYTHING, GORBACHEV MIGHT HAVE HARDENED POSITION SLIGHTLY FOR, IN FINAL PRESS CONFERENCE, HE REFERRED TO FIVE TO SEVEN YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD REQUIRED TO EFFECT LITHUANIA'S INDEPENDENCE.

10. PRESIDENT HAD TO DEFEND HIMSELF IN QUESTIONING BY MEDIA THAT

...6

PAGE SIX UNHR1383 CONF

SIGNING OF TRADE AGREEMENT DID NOT/NOT MEAN ANY WEAKENING OF USA COMMITMENT TO LITHUANIA.HE AFFIRMED THAT TRADE AGREEMENT WAS LINKED WITH PASSAGE OF SOVIET EMIGRATION LAW,NOT/NOT WITH LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST LITHUANIA;AGREEMENT WOULD BE SENT TO CONGRESS ONCE EMIGRATION LAW WAS APPROVED BY SUPREME SOVIET. CONGRESS,OF COURSE,IS LIKELY TO HOLD UP AGREEMENT UNTIL USSR TERMINATES EMBARGO AGAINST LITHUANIA.MEANWHILE,BUSH COULD SHOW SOME ACCOMMODATION WITH GORBACHEV IN AREA OF REAL DOMESTIC IMPORTANCE TO SOVIET PRESIDENT.

11.IT WAS EVIDENT THAT ECONOMIC LINKS WITH USA WERE MOST IMMEDIATE SOVIET OBJECTIVE IN SUMMIT.USA SOURCES HAVE SUGGESTED THAT GORBACHEVS PERSISTENT LOBBYING ON COMMERICAL FRONT SHOULD BE CREDITED WITH OBTAINING BUSH ASSENT TO TRADE AGREEMENT DESPITE LACK OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON LITHUANIA AND GERMANY AND LIKELY OPPOSITION FROM RIGHT WING REPUBLICANS.GORBACHEV MADE FREQUENT REFERENCES IN TOASTS AND MEDIA RESPONSES TO IMPORTANCE OF TRADE AGREEMENT AND HE THREATENED WITHHOLDING OF LUCRATIVE GRAIN SALES DEAL(TEN MILLION TONNES OVER FIVE YEARS)IF AGREEMENT WERE NOT/NOT SIGNED.IN FACT,AGREEMENT CONTAINS LITTLE AND COSTS BUSH EVEN LESS.

12.ACCOMPANYING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON AIR AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION,CULTURAL AND STUDENT EXCHANGES,ENVIRONMENT AND ...7

PAGE SEVEN UNGR1383 CONF

OCEAN STUDIES, CUSTOMS AND SECURITY COOPERATION AND ATOMIC ENERGY WERE ALSO SEEN BY SOVIET SIDE AS AN IMPORTANT SIGN OF THE END OF THE ERA OF USA EVIL EMPIRE RHETORIC AND RECOGNITION OF USSR ENTITLEMENT TO ACCEPTANCE AND RESPECT; POINTS WHICH MAY WEIGH MORE WITH SOVIET ELECTORATE THAN ANY PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. THESE AGREEMENTS ARE SIMILAR TO CDN ACCOMPLISHMENTS DURING PMS VISIT TO USSR LAST NOV.

13. SUMMIT ACCOMPLISHED LEAST IN AREA OF ARMS CONTROL THOUGH IT MOVED PROSPECTS OF START AGREEMENT A COUPLE OF STEPS CLOSER. AT ONE POINT, IT APPEARED THAT FAILURE OF NEGOTIATORS TO REACH AGREEMENT OVER CONTROLS ON TESTING AND PRODUCTION OF SS 18, RANGE AND USE OF SOVIET BACKFIRE BOMBER AND USA LOOSE INTERPRETATION OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION (SALES OF TRIDENT 2 TO UK) WOULD STYMIE SIGNATURE OF JOINT STATEMENT ON START. NEVERTHELESS, AFTER ONE HOUR DELAY BOTH PRESIDENTS WERE ABLE TO APPROVE MAIN POINTS OF A START AGREEMENT AS WELL AS INITIATING SET OF OBJECTIVES FOR NEXT ROUND OF STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS WHICH COMMITS BOTH TO PURSUE CUTBACKS IN MISSILES CARRYING MULTIPLE WARHEADS, THEREBY MEETING USA CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS OVER REDUCING INCENTIVES FOR FIRST STRIKE WEAPONS. AS EXPECTED, IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, NUCLEAR TESTING AND NON-PROLIFERATION. THERE WERE NO/NO BREAKTHROUGHS ON CONVENTIONAL

...8

PAGE EIGHT UNHR1383 CONFD

FORCES,ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV MAINTAINED PUBLICLY SOVIET INTENTION TO BE IN A POSITION TO SIGN CFE AGREEMENT THIS YEAR.

14.USA NEGOTIATORS OBSERVED DIFFERENT ATTITUDES BETWEEN POLITICAL LEADERS AND NEGOTIATING OFFICIALS IN ARMS CONTROL AREA, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND ALLIANCE STRUCTURES.GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE ACCEPT WITH APPARENT EQUANIMITY CONDITIONING OF CSCE SUMMIT ON PRIOR AGREEMENT ON CFE AND WERE REPORTEDLY SURPRISED TO HEAR THEIR OWN OFFICIALS LAY OUT TOUGHENED NEGATIVE STANCES ON OPEN SKIES PROPOSALS.WHEN IN FINAL PRESS CONFERENCE PRESIDENT BUSH REFERRED TO NATOS ADAPTABILITY TO POST COLD WAR EUROPE THROUGH ART II (QUOTE PUT IN BY THE LATE LESTER PEARSON UNQUOTE),GORBACHEV RESPONDED POSITIVELY THAT NEITHER USA NOR USSR SHOULD BE ISOLATED FROM EUROPE.SCOWCROFT MADE MUCH OF THIS IN PUBLIC BRIEFING,YET SOVIET OFFICIALS CONTINUED TO HARP ON NATOS OFFENSIVE MILITARY MISSION.

15.OVERHANGING SUMMIT AT ALL TIMES WAS TURBULENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN USSR.USA MEDIA COMPARED GORBACHEVS WEAKENED POSITION UNFAVOURABLY WITH HIS SITUATION SIX MONTHS AGO IN MALTA AND TO THAT OF KHRUSCHEV THIRTY YEARS AGO.GORBACHEVS HIGH VISIBILITY IN TELEVISING HIS DEBATE WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS,IN HIS UNSCHEDULED PLUNGES INTO WASHINGTON CROWDS,IN THE TELEVISING OF HIS LUNCH WITH USA OPINION FORMERS FROM

...9

PAGE NINE UNGR1383 CONF

DIVERSE SECTORS AND IN THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO HIS RECEIPT OF AWARDS(TWO MARTIN LUTHER KING MEDALS,THE ALBERT EINSTEIN PEACE PRIZE RECENTLY CONFERRED ON SAKHAROV AND THE FDR FREEDOM MEDAL) - IS ATTRIBUTED NOT/NOT TO PUBLIC RELATIONS PURPOSES TO IMPRESS AMERICANS BUT AS POPULARITY CAMPAIGN WITH AN INCREASINGLY SCEPTICAL SOVIET CITIZENRY.THROUGHOUT HIS WASHINGTON STAY GORBACHEV WAS OBLIGED TO COUNTER CONTINUOUS PRESS QUERIES(SOME OF THE MOST BLUNT COMING FROM SOVIET MEDIA)ON THE WEAKNESS OF HIS POLITICAL POSITION AT HOME.HIS COMMENTS RANGED FROM A DISMISSIVE QUOTE NOT/NOT SERIOUS UNQUOTE TO CAREFUL ASSESSMENTS THAT,IF YELTIN DEVELOPED A CLEAR POSITION FROM HIS PREVIOUS INCONSISTENCIES,SOME ACCOMMODATIONS COULD BE NEGOTIATED.BUSH HELPED GORBACHEV AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BY REFRAINING FROM COMMENTING ON THE USSR CURRENT WEAKNESSES AND BY REITERATING THAT USA QUOTE IS NOT/NOT LOOKING FOR WINNERS OR LOSERS,NOR/NOR FOR ADVANTAGE.OUR POSITION IS NOT/NOT PREDICTED ON PRIDE, HUMILIATION OR ARROGANCE UNQUOTE.

16.IN THE END,THIS HIGHLY SMOOTH,MEDIA PERFECT SUMMIT WAS SCRIPTED LIKE SO MANY SUCCESSFUL HOLLYWOOD MOVIES TO ALLOW A SEQUEL,HOPEFULLY WITH THE SAME ACTORS IF THEIR CONTRACTS CAN BE EXTENDED.THERE WAS A PARTIAL TIDYING UP OF A FEW OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE PAST,PARTICULARLY IN ARMS CONRROL.THERE THE AGREED

...10

PAGE TEN UNGR1383 CONF

SCRIPT ACTUALLY SPELLS OUT THE NEED FOR A SEQUEL IN THE SIGNING OF A START I, THE LAUNCHING OF START II AND POSSIBLY THE CONCLUSION OF A CFE. THE SUMMIT ALSO ATTEMPTED TO SET A FUTURE COURSE BY THE CONCLUSION OF RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT BILATERAL AGREEMENTS IN KEY AREAS OF CIVIL AVIATION, ENVIRONMENT AND PEOPLE TO PEOPLE EXCHANGES. YET HERE TOO, THE SCRIPT CONTAINS THE PLOT FOR A SEQUEL: NO/NO MEN WITHOUT SOVIET EMIGRATION LAW (THE PRESIDENT) AND LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST LITHUANIA (THE CONGRESS). LIKE A BOX OFFICE WINNER, THE SUMMIT WILL TAKE ITS SEQUEL TO AN EXOTIC NEW LOCATION BY PROMISING A MEDIA EXTRAVAGANZA IN THE USSR WHERE THE WORK BEGUN IN MALTA AND PERSONALIZED IN CAMP DAVID CAN BE FURTHERED.

CCC/085 041747Z UNGR1383



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
4 JUN 90 21 58z

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche.

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

S E C R E T / CDN EYES ONLY

FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDR1531 04JUN90

TO COPEN/CSCDEL/KINSMAN/MOHER ONLY

DELIVER BY 050900

INFO BNATO/SMITH ONLY

DISTR MINA USS IFB IDD

---BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT: BUSH LETTER TO PM

FOLLOWING IS MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH:

QUOTE

Comcentre: please type attached text. Thank you.

UNQUOTE.

ACC 648425	DATE
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR.	DOSSIER
LOC A3-WW	

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

D.A. SNIDER/jcf

SIG

DIVISION/DIRECTION

IDR

TELEPHONE

992-6205

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

D.A. SNIDER

SIG

000587

**Pages 588 to / à 591
are withheld pursuant to sections
sont retenues en vertu des articles**

13(1)(a), 13(1)(b)

**of the Access to Information Act
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIEL

FAX
MESSAGE

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT USS0092 30MAY90

TO/À

TO WSHDC/BURNEY

INFO

DISTR

---NOTES FOR PM/PRESIDENT BUSH DISCUSSION

REF

AS PROMISED.

SUBJ/SUJ

MARCHAND

(COMCENTRE: PLSE COPY ATTACHMENT)

ACC

DATE

FILE

DOSSIER

LOC

A6-20-USA-1-3-USA

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIEL

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

F. Taschereau

USS

990-0369

SIG

F. TASCHEREAU

000592

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIEL

2/2

NOTES FOR P.M./PRESIDENT BUSH DISCUSSION

- General impression of state of mind, overall confidence of Gorbachev.
- Clearly looking forward to a high-visibility and visibly successful Summit in Washington.
- On the whole Soviets appeared firm but not rigid on the issue of the future of Germany in NATO, underscoring our belief that the Soviets will eventually move on this issue and that the NATO Summit will be key. They simply cannot appear to be the complete loser in a one-sided victory.
- Shevardnadze pointed out that there was as yet no evidence of the transformation of NATO in spite of the radical changes to the WTO - hence no change in Soviet "reluctance" to see a unified Germany in NATO.
- Soviets are clearly putting a lot of stock in the CSCE process.
- Soviets are looking for a more institutionalized CSCE than we might prefer, but we are not too far apart.
- He welcomed, however, our indication that we were working towards a clear signal on NATO's transformation at the July NATO Summit.
- Shevardnadze was relatively upbeat on the prospects for the CFE talks and a successful conclusion by year-end. He was also relatively more positive than we would have expected on resolving the remaining differences in the Open Skies discussions.
- On Lithuania, Soviets are sensitive to western concerns, seem confident of the process of negotiations, but are insistent for reasons of precedent that constitutional provisions must be respected.
- On the economy, they clearly recognize that they must get their own house in order fast, and that the rules of the market road must be respected. They do appreciate that we are working with them to integrate them into the international economic system.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIEL

ACTION

QUI.

NER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0922 28MAY90

TO EXTOTT (RBR

DELIVER BY 281100

INFO PCOOTT/DOYLE/THOMPSON PMOOTT/HEINBECKER

DELIVER BY 281100

BNATO WSHDC GENEV PRMNY

DISTR USS DMC MINA RGB RBD RBRD RBX XDX IFB EFB CPP IDA

---MTG WITH FM SHEVARDNADZE(MAY28) USA/CDA VISIT

AT END OF MTG WITH SIX AMBASSADORS/CHARGES ON QUOTE WORLD SUMMIT
FOR CHILDREN UNQUOTE(SEPARATE REPORT FOLLOWS)SHEVARDNADZE OFFERED
OFF CUFF STATEMENT ON USA SUMMIT,FOLLOWED BY VERY BRIEF COMMENT ON
CDA VISIT ON EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE.SHEVARDNADZE OPENED BY NOTING
THAT SOVIETS SEE USA VISIT AS A QUOTE MAJOR EVENT UNQUOTE FROM
WHICH THEY EXPECT RESULTS.RE ARMS CONTROL,FIRSTLY,HE SAID QUOTE
THERE SHOULD BE NO/NO DOUBT THAT AN AGMT WILL BE REACHED ON MAJOR
POINTS TOWARD A FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN A
FUTURE TREATY UNQUOTE.SECONDLY,HE SAID,IN THE NEXT TWO DAYS A
QUOTE DOCUMENT OF INTENTION UNQUOTE WILL BE FINALIZED FOR
PRESENTATION IN WSHDC.QUOTE WE WILL SIGN A MAJOR AGMT ON NON
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS,MISSILES AND MISSILE
TECHNOLOGY UNQUOTE WHICH,HE SAID,WILL NO/NO DOUBT ELIMINATE
STOCKING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

2.ALSO,SAID SHEVARDNADZE,WE WILL SIGN SOME OTHER MAJOR AGMTS QUOTE
ON ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS,ON THE SEA,ON SPACE/OUTER
SPACE COOPERATION UNQUOTE.IN OTHER WORDS,HE SAID,WE WILL NOT/NOT

...2

FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR
20-USSR-9

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

PAGE TWO XYGR0922 CONF

ONLY HAVE GENERAL DISCUSSION BUT LOOK FOR FIRM COOPERATION (IN
AREAS) OF INTEREST TO ENTIRE WORLD COMMUNITY.

3. MOVING THEN TO CDA, SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTED THAT THEY EXPECT BOTH
POSITIVE AND PRACTICAL RESULTS FROM THEIR PRESIDENTS VISIT. HE
NOTED THAT QUOTE A GREAT DEAL HAS CHANGED FOR THE BETTER IN
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES SINCE PM MULRONEYS VISIT; A
LOT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN PRACTICAL TERMS. WE EXPECT THE SAME
RESULTS AFTER PRESIDENTS VISIT AND WE WILL ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY
FURTHER PARAMETERS FOR COOPERATION UNQUOTE. DESPITE BREVITY OF HIS
REMARKS, SHEVARDNADZES MANNER WAS CORDIAL AND INFORMAL. UNFORTUNATELY,
RAPID DEPARTURE OF DEL AT END ALLOWED NO/NO TIME FOR FOLLOWING UP
ANY OF THESE POINTS

TAYLOR

CCC/024 281610Z XYGR0922

END

WFS

1000000



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MGTC/DIARY/CHIFFRE
MGTC/JOURNAL/CHIFFRE

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

1/5

MESSAGE

+ 25

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

S E C R E T

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDA1362 25MAY90

TO/À

TO WSHDC

INFO

SFAX

DISTR

INFO BNATO VNACE PARIS BONN LDN ~~XXXX~~ NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

REF

BY BAG MOSCO DE OTT

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR IFB ~~DD~~ ~~IDR~~ ~~RBR~~ ~~URD~~ ~~URR~~ ~~RWR~~ ~~INF~~ ~~CPE~~ ~~RGX~~ ~~IDX~~ ~~IDA~~ ~~V~~

REF OURFAX IDA1360 24MAY90 (NOTAL)

---PROPOSED REPLY BY PM TO BUSH

ATTACHED ARE TALKING POINTS PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE PM IN

RESPONDING TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S MESSAGE OF 24MAY. TALKING POINTS

ADDRESS KEY ISSUES RAISED BY BUSH (CFE, OPEN SKIES, NATO, FRG,

LITHUANIA) AND SUGGEST AN ACTIVIST STANCE BY THE PM ON THESE ISSUES.

NEXT WEEK IN CONVERSATIONS WITH GORBACHEV.

THESE HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO PCO, WELCOMED BY THEM AS PROVIDING

SOLID BASIS FOR ENVISAGED PM/PRESIDENTIAL TELECON. THEY WILL BE

REVIEWED DURING BRIEFING SESSION SCHEDULED FOR LATE THIS AFTERNOON.

(ATTACHED FOUR/FOUR PAGES)

SECRET

FLASH

BH

DE OTT

25 MAY 90

ACC

FILE

LOC

A3-WW 28-WEST-1-CD

652702

20-USA-1-3-USSR

SECRET

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

G.J. COONEY/hd

SIG

DIVISION/DIRECTION

IDA

TELEPHONE

992-5039

APPROVED/APProuvé

G.J. COONEY

SIG

SECRET

2/5

SECRET

Suggested Talking Points for the Use
of the Prime Minister in his
Conversation with President Bush
May 26, 1990

- I appreciated hearing from you on Thursday regarding Jim Baker's recent talks in Moscow and your conversation last week with Helmut Kohl. We fully supported Jim's efforts in Moscow, and Joe Clark wrote him a note to that effect.
- Jim is to be congratulated on his successes. Though not as comprehensive as we all hoped, I am sure this will set the stage for further movement during your meeting with President Gorbachev. Certainly, I will be working to this goal with President Gorbachev when he visits Ottawa earlier in the week.
- I intend to raise with President Gorbachev our concern over the slowed pace of the CFE negotiation. I remain convinced of the need to reach a comprehensive CFE agreement this year if we are to move forward in our efforts to build a new and comprehensive security architecture in Europe. Like you, I am worried that increased Soviet caution in CFE is a reflection of broader Soviet concerns, especially with respect to force levels in central Europe. I will urge President Gorbachev to increased flexibility in this regard.

SECRET

SECRET

3/5

- 2 -

SECRET

- In our conversations I will also stress to President Gorbachev the importance of a CFE agreement for progress in the CSCE. I see the CFE as an essential requirement for the CSCE Summit to be as successful and forward looking as we intend.
- I will also raise with President Gorbachev my disappointment that the **Open Skies** negotiations are now deadlocked. My message will be that greater flexibility by all parties is now required, and that on the basis of use of national aircraft, plus no overflight restrictions, plus agreement on permitted sensors, the **Open Skies** negotiations can arrive at a successful conclusion in 1990. The **Open Skies** concept remains valid and worth pursuing. Together, I hope we can persuade President Gorbachev of this fact.
- I congratulate you on the successful conclusion of a **START** agreement, and intend to express the same sentiment to President Gorbachev. This is an historic first step toward ensuring security at the minimum possible level of nuclear weapons.
- I will be explaining to Gorbachev Canada's strong hope that our **NATO Summit** in July will give a powerful signal that the Alliance is positively reaching out to the USSR as a "partner in security", so as to help Gorbachev manage his domestic opinion.

SECRET

- 3 -

SECRET

4/5

SECRET

- In that context, I agree entirely that a **united Germany** should remain a member of NATO, as well as of the broader Western European and transatlantic communities. I therefore share the view expressed recently in Washington by Helmut and yourself that, upon unification, all Four-Power rights must cease. Somehow Gorbachev must be made to understand that the involvement of a united Germany in this framework is the most positive outcome in terms of Soviet security interests. I will be urging the view upon him during his visit.
- On **Lithuania**, I have the strong impression that President Gorbachev cannot make any compromises until the Lithuanians suspend their declaration of independence. It will not do much good to urge him in a direction which he cannot take. I will tell him that it was helpful that he saw Mrs. Prunskiene and that it is important to keep the dialogue between Moscow and Vilnius alive. I will also say that we must all work to prevent this issue from poisoning the well of improved East-West relations.

SECRET

- 4 -

SECRET

5/5

SECRET

RESPONSIVE ONLY

President Bush could mention the draft declaration text which we gave to Mrs. Prunskiene (she gave a Lithuanian redraft to Baker in Moscow). The text is a statement which Western governments might endorse, indicating that their position on Lithuanian sovereignty remains intact even if the Lithuanians agree to Soviet terms for negotiations. If this subject arises, you might note that:

- a) the document was given her unofficially in response to her request for legal advice;
- b) she was told that the Lithuanians would have to take it from there, i.e. this was not a Canadian initiative.

SECRET

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Division Phoned 3-4912

F 5HDC UNGR1358 25MAY90

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

TO EXTOTT USS DELIVER BY 251800

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER

DELIVER BY 251800

PCOOTT/DOYLE MOSCO BNATO LDN PARIS BONN

ACC 837217	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	
LOG	DD IDA IDR CPP CPD
A7-1A	

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLPLAN/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA DMC URB URD URR RGB RBD RBR IFF

---BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT U.S.OBJECTIVES(1)

SUMMARY: THE ADMINISTRATION PLANS TO PRESS AHEAD WITH ITS SOVIET AGENDA AT THE FORTHCOMING BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT, DESPITE MOUNTING CONCERNS OVER GORBACHEVS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS. THE PRESIDENTS DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TOLD BURNEY YESTERDAY THAT THE PRESIDENT SEES NO/NO ALTERNATIVE TO WORKING HARD WITH GORBACHEV TO SECURE AGREEMENTS ON MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ISSUES, AND TO TRYING LOCK IN AS MUCH OF THE POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE AS POSSIBLE. ROBERT GATES ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSITION GORBACHEV WAS TAKING ON LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE, AND HE WAS GENERALLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF GORBACHEVS REFORMS SUCCEEDING. BUT THERE WAS NO/NO ONE ELSE TO SUPPORT, SO ADMIN HAD TO KEEP UP A QUOTE BRAVE FRONT UNQUOTE AND QUOTE TO THE EXTENT WE CAN GIVE HIM A LITTLE BOOST WE WILL UNQUOTE.

2. ASSISTANT SEC OF STATE RAY SEITZ TOLD BURNEY U.S. PLANNED QUOTE NO/NO SURPRISES UNQUOTE AT THE SUMMIT. PROVIDED START

...2

MIRD
U-25
90

PAGE TWO UNGR1358 CONFD

NEGOTIATIONS BEING CONDUCTED THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON WERE SUCCESSFUL, SUMMIT WOULD BE OCCASION TO ANNOUNCE THAT MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES HAD BEEN RESOLVED AND THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE READY FOR SIGNATURE AT NEXT SUMMIT. IT MIGHT ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO ANNOUNCE PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE NEGOTIATION OF START II AGREEMENT. CHEMICAL WEAPONS, NUCLEAR TESTING AND NONPROLIFERATION AGREEMENTS SHOULD ALSO BE READY TO SIGN, ALONG WITH VARIETY OF BILATERAL ACCORD. BOTH GATES AND SEITZ TOOK ISSUE WITH RECENT SPECULATION THAT THE U.S. HAD BEEN MAKING TOO MANY CONCESSIONS. ON START. FINAL START AGREEMENT WOULD INCLUDE SOME QUOTE VERY GOOD DEALS UNQUOTE FOR THE UNITED STATES, GATES SAID.

3. SUMMIT IS EXPECTED TO FOCUS HEAVILY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES AGREEMENT, WHICH GATES AND SEITZ BOTH SAW AS INEXTRICABLY LINKED WITH QUESTION OF FUTURE SIZE OF BUNDESWEHR AND GERMANY MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. SO FAR, GORBACHEV WAS REFUSING TO BUDGE.

4. REPORT: DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAID BAKERS SPEECHES LAST FALL STILL CAPTURED ADMIN'S APPROACH TO DEALING WITH SOVIET UNION. ADMIN DID NOT/NOT KNOW HOW LONG GORBACHEV WOULD LAST OR WHETHER HIS REFORMS WOULD WORK, BUT THERE WAS REALLY NO/NO ALTERNATIVE TO WORKING WITH CURRENT LEADERSHIP IN MOSCOW AND TRYING TO GET BEST POSSIBLE HANDLE ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SITUATION. THERE HAD BEEN REAL DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS IN EASTERN EUROPE IN LAST 12/18 MONTHS, AND IT

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR1358 CONFD

WAS IN WESTERN INTEREST TO QUOTE LOCK IN UNQUOTE AS MANY OF
POSITIVE CHANGES AS POSSIBLE.

5.LITHUANIA

GATES AND SEITZ NOTED THAT LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE ISSUE WAS
GETTING IN THE WAY OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS AND POSED A SERIOUS
PROBLEM FOR THE SUMMIT.PM PRUNSKIENE HAD BEEN FAIRLY RESTRAINED
AFTER HER MEETING WITH GORBACHEV,BUT IT WAS CLEAR MOSCOW WAS
CONTINUING TO TAKE VERY HARD LINE.THOUGH LITHUANIANS WERE
PREPARED TO DO VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING EXCEPT REVOKE THEIR
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE,MOSCOW WANTED THEM TO GO FURTHER AND
UNDERMINE VERY BASIS OF THEIR AUTHORITY.GATES SAID GORBACHEV HAD
NOT/NOT BEEN SWAYED BY BAKERS ARGUMENT THAT BALTIC STATES WERE
IN DIFFERENT CATEGORY THAN OTHER SOVIET REPUBLICS WHICH MIGHT
WANT INDEPENDENCE.SEITZ SAID GORBACHEV SAW ISSUE NOT/NOT IN
LEGAL BUT IN POLITICAL TERMS;HE FEARED LOSS OF LITHUANIA WOULD
LEAD TO UNRAVELLING OF ENTIRE SOVIET STATE.

6.GERMAN UNIFICATION AND CFE

GERMAN UNIFICATION ISSUE IS ALSO GOING TO BE PROBLEM AT THE
SUMMIT.DURING QUOTE VERY TOUGH UNQUOTE MOSCOW TALKS ON THIS
SUBJECT,GATES SAID GORBACHEV HAD BEEN QUOTE HARD AS NAILS UNQUOTE
ON THE IDEA OF A UNIFIED GERMANY IN NATO.GORBACHEVS MAIN CONCERN,
GATES THOUGHT, WAS NOT/NOT HOW KOHL WOULD BEHAVE BUT HOW FUTURE
GERMAN GOVTS MIGHT APPROACH EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION.THAT WAS

...4

P 7 FOUR UNGR1358 CONF D

REASON WHY HE WANTED TO DEAL WITH QUESTION OF SIZE OF THE BUNDESWEHR
UP FRONT IN THE TWO-PLUS FOUR TALKS, AND WHY HE HAD SLOWED DOWN CFE
NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL HE GOT SATISFACTION ON THIS ISSUE. HE HAD NOT/NOT
BEEN REASSURED BY BAKERS PROMISE THAT ONCE CFE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN
CONCLUDED SIZE OF THE BUNDESWEHR WOULD BE TAKEN UP IN CFE II
NEGOTIATIONS, NOR BY BAKERS ITEMIZATION OF SECURITY STEPS U.S. AND
ITS ALLIES HAD TAKEN OR HAD IN MIND FOR AMELIORATING SECURITY
SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE E.G. REDUCTIONS IN SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR
FORCES, ADJUSTMENT IN NATO STRATEGY ETC. GORBACHEV WAS STILL INSISTING,
AS SOVIET GOVTS HAD SINCE 1952, THAT UNIFIED GERMANY BE NEUTRAL.
(GATES EXPRESSED PRIVATE VIEW THAT MAYBE GORBACHEV HAD NOT/NOT BEEN
KIDDING WHEN HE TWICE ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USSR JOINING
NATO.)

7. IN SEITZ'S VIEW, SOVIET SUSPICIONS ABOUT WEST WERE TOO DEEP TO
ACCEPT UNIFIED GERMANY IN NATO AGAINST SOME FUTURE PROMISE THAT
CFE AGREEMENT WOULD UNLOCK A WHOLE NEW SECURITY ORDER IN EUROPE
(CSCE SUMMIT, CFE II, SNF NEGOTIATIONS, ETC.). SEITZ AGREED WITH
BURNETT THAT SOVIETS WOULD NOT/NOT WANT TO GIVE UP THEIR ONLY
REMAINING CARD, THEIR FOUR POWER RIGHTS, WITHOUT SOME TANGIBLE
ASSURANCES ABOUT THEIR SECURITY. GIVEN THEIR INCREASING SENSE OF
ISOLATION FROM EUROPE AND THE FACT THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO
DESTROY THOUSANDS OF THEIR TANKS, IT WAS DIFFICULT EVEN FOR
SOVIET LEADERSHIP LET ALONE THE POPULATION TO DIGEST COURSE OF
...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR1358 CONF

ACTION BEING PROPOSED TO THEM. SEITZ NOTED THAT NOT/NOT JUST THEIR SECURITY BUT THEIR NATIONAL DIGNITY WAS AT STAKE. AS GORBACHEV HAD TOLD BAKER, USSR HAD WON THE WAR BUT QUOTE WE END UP APPEARING THE VANQUISHED UNQUOTE. THERE WAS NO/NO WAY, SEITZ SAID, QUOTE TO UNDERESTIMATE THE BITTERNESS OF THIS PILL UNQUOTE. IN FINAL ANALYSIS, SEITZ EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT QUOTE WE WILL HAVE TO BE MORE PRECISE WITH THE SOVIETS SOONER OR LATER UNQUOTE IN RESPECT OF FUTURE SECURITY GUARANTEES.

8. SINCE SOVIETS APPEARED NOT/NOT TO KNOW WHAT TO DO AND WERE PUSHING ISSUE DOWN THE ROAD HOPING SOMETHING WOULD TURN UP, BOTH GATES AND SEITZ THOUGHT MOST IMPORTANT THING NOW AS FOR ALLIES TO SHOW COMPLETE UNANIMITY ON QUESTION OF UNIFIED GERMANY IN NATO. IF ALLIES FELL OFF THEIR POSITION IN ANY WAY, IT WOULD ONLY MAKE IT TOUGHER FOR THE SOVIETS TO ACCUSTOM THEMSELVES TO FACT GERMANY COULD NOT/NOT BE NEUTRAL. SOVIETS NEEDED TO KNOW, GATES SAID, THAT IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS THEY WOULD FACE ONE PLUS FIVE SITUATION ON GERMANY IN NATO, AND THAT BEHIND THE QUOTE FIVE UNQUOTE STOOD THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE. SEITZ SAID IT WAS INCUMBENT ON ALLIES TO MAKE CONVINCING CASE TO SOVIETS THAT IT WAS IN THEIR LONG-TERM INTEREST TO ABANDON THEIR EFFORTS TO RETAIN SOME KIND OF CONTROL OVER GERMANY AFTER UNIFICATION (QUOTE THEY'RE PREPARED TO LET THEM OUT OF PRISON BUT WANT THEM ON PAROLE UNQUOTE) IF THEY WERE SERIOUS ABOUT PARTICIPATING IN THE NEW ORDER.

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR1358 CONF

9. START

ON START, SEITZ SAID ADMIN WAS WORKING ON ASSUMPTION THAT NEGOTIATIONS CURRENTLY UNDER WAY WOULD RESOLVE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES, AND THAT LEADERS WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT AT SUMMIT. AGREEMENT ITSELF WOULD BE SIGNED AT NEXT SUMMIT. WORK HAS ALSO BEEN PROCEEDING ON PRINCIPLES WHICH MIGHT GUIDE FOLLOW-ON START II NEGOTIATIONS (MIRVS, MOBILES, FUTURE REDUCTIONS, ETC.), AND SEITZ HOPED SOME KIND OF DECLARATION ABOUT THIS COULD BE ISSUED NEXT WEEK.

10. SEITZ REAFFIRMED THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGREEMENT, UNDER WHICH TWO SIDES WOULD COMMIT TO PROGRAM OF REDUCTIONS, AND LOOKED POSSIBLE. IN ADDITION, THERE WOULD BE AGREEMENTS TO SIGN ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND NON-PROLIFERATION.

11. WHEN BURNEY ASKED GATES ABOUT RECENT CRITICISM FROM RIGHT WING OF REPUBLICAN PARTY THAT ADMIN WAS MAKING TOO MANY CONCESSIONS IN START NEGOTIATIONS, GATES SAID THE CRITICISM WAS ILL INFORMED. ADMIN, IN FACT, HAD GOT SOME QUOTE VERY GOOD DEALS UNQUOTE IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ON ALCMS, LIMIT OF 150 BOMBERS AGREED TO UNDER COUNTING RULES WOULD NOT/NOT PREVENT U.S. FROM HAVING MORE BOMBERS IF IT CHOSE TO, AS LONG AS IT WAS PREPARED TO ASCRIBE HIGHER NUMBER OF ALCMS TO ADDITIONAL BOMBERS. BUT IN ANY CASE, GATES SAID, IT WAS VERY UNLIKELY ADMIN WOULD RECEIVE CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING FOR 150 NEW BOMBERS. ON SLCMS, GATES OBSERVED THAT TREATY ENTITLEMENT WOULD BE ...7

PAGE SEVEN UNGR1358 CONFD

880 THOUGH U.S.NAVYS PROGRAM WAS FOR ONLY 760.SUPPOSED CONCESSIONS
ADMIN HAD MADE ON SOVIET HEAVY MISSILES,GATES SAID,WERE NOT/NOT
IN FACT CONCESSIONS AT ALL BUT ATTEMPT TO LIMIT SS 18 MODERNIZATION;
MOREOVER,MATTER WAS STILL UNRESOLVED.

12.IN LIGHT OF GATES EARLIER OFFER TO BRIEF PM ON U.S.POLICY TOWARDS
SOVIET UNION,THIS AND COMPANION TEL SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO
BRIEFING MATERIAL BEING PREPARED FOR PM.

CCC/085 251927Z UNGR1358



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

SECRET
MESSAGE

Accession/Référence	114
File/Dossier	

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

BY SECURE FACSIMILE

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDA1360 24MAY90
TO/À TO WSHDC/COSSETTE
INFO
DISTR DISTR IEB IDD IDR URR RBR RWR INP
REF REF BARRETT/COSSETTE TELCON 24MAY
SUBJ/SUJ ---BUSH LETTER TO PM

ACC	652704	DATE	1 JUN 90
FILE	20-USA-1-3-USSR		
LOC	A3-WW		

ATTACHED IS COPY OF BUSH LETTER TO PM, WHICH WE RECEIVED AT NOON
TODAY. WE PRESUMED THAT COPY WAS DELIVERED TO YOU ALSO, BUT
REFTELCON INDICATED OTHERWISE. THIS IS BEST VERSION AVAILABLE.

(ATTACHED 3/3 PAGES)

SECRET

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

J. BARRETT/hd

SIG

DIVISION/DIRECTION

IDA

TELEPHONE

995-9282

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

G. J. COONEY

SIG

000608

CZCWAFF 3
AMZYU. EXXWHX 0337 1440302-MNSH--YFEDCAN.
Y MNSH
ZK 00 SOA DE
240302Z MAY 90 ZYE
WHITE HOUSE
OTTAWA CANADA

SECRET

2/4

M
E C R E T VIA FEDCAN CHANNELS
QQ

SSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER MULR
EY.
EASE DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS.

GIN TEXT:

AR BRIAN,

GIVEN YOUR OWN IMPENDING MEETING WITH GORBACHEV,
I WANT TO
SHARE WITH YOU THE RESULTS OF JIM BAKER'S RECENT
TALKS IN
MOSCOW. BOB GATES, WHO WAS WITH JIM IN MOSCOW, WE WILL
ALSO BE
GIVING DEREK BURNEY A DEBRIEF.

JIM HAD PRODUCTIVE -- THOUGH AT TIMES DIFFICULT -
MEETINGS WITH
SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV. THERE IS STILL WORK
TO DO, BUT WE
MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD A START AGREEMENT
I AM
ESPECIALLY PLEASED THAT WE WERE ABLE TO NAIL DOWN
A CHEMICAL
WEAPONS ACCORD AND TO FINISH THE VERIFICATION PRO
TOCOLS TO TWO
NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES.

SECRET

THE MAJOR DISAPPOINTMENT WAS CFE. SHEVARDNADZE AF
FIRMED THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S INTEREST IN AN EARLY AGREEMENT
AND ASSURED
HIM THAT THE SOVIETS VIEW COMPLETION OF THE TREATY
AS A

SECRET

PREREQUISITE FOR A SUCCESSFUL CSCE SUMMIT. HOWEV
ER, WHEN JIM
EXPLORED THE NEW IDEAS ABOUT WHICH HE WROTE TO JO
CLARK, HE WAS
UNABLE TO MAKE EVEN THE SLIGHTEST PROGRESS. THE
SOVIET

LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN INCAPABLE OF MOVING FORWARD O
CFE FOR SOME
TIME NOW, AND I WORRY THAT THE PARALYSIS ON CFE IS
JUST ONE

SYMPTOM OF GENERAL ANXIETY IN MOSCOW ABOUT THE SO
VIET POSITION
IN EUROPE. SHEVARDNADZE PROPOSED THAT THE U.S.-S
SOVIET MANPOWER

LIMITATIONS AGREED UPON AT OTTAWA BE CODIFIED AS
A SEPARATE
AGREEMENT, DISTINCT FROM THE CFE TREATY, FOR SIGN
ATURE DURING

GORBACHEV'S UPCOMING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

JIM SAID NO, EMPHASIZING

THAT FINAL AGREEMENT ON THESE U.S.-SO
MUST ACCOMPANY CONCLUSION OF THE CFE TREATY.

I AM ALSO DISAPPOINTED BY SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE ON
OPEN SKIES.

THE SUMMIT WILL BE A CRITICAL OPPORTUNITY TO DETER-
MINE WHETHER

GORBACHEV CAN SUPPORT AN OPEN SKIES REGIME THAT EMBODIES
REAL

OPENNESS. I INTEND TO RAISE IT DIRECT WITH HIM

~~PLEASE BE INTENT TO RAISE~~
AND URGE
HIM TO REVIVE OUR EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE AN AGA
YOUR OWN
COMMITMENT TO AN OPEN SKIES TREATY HAS, OF COURSE
BEEN
INDISPENSABLE AND I HOPE YOU WILL HIT GORBACHEV ~~HARD~~
HARD ON THIS.

3/4

SECRET

ON GERMANY, JIM HEARD FROM BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHE
VARDNADZE A
CONTINUATION OF THE TOUGH LINE SHEVARINADZE TOOK
IN THE TWO
PLUS FOUR MINISTERIAL PLENARY IN BONN EARLIER THI
MONTH.
GORBACHEV FLATLY REJECTED GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NA
TO, SAYING
THAT IT WOULD CONSTITUTE A SHIFT IN THE STRATEGIC
BALANCE WHICH
HE COULD NOT ALLOW. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY INTEND T
TRY TO USE THE TWO
PLUS FOUR MECHANISM TO PLACE LIMITATIONS ON THE UNITED
GERMANY. THEY
SPECIFICALLY SUGGESTED THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR AGR
EE UPON LIMITS ON
THE BUNDESWEER. JIM REFUSED TO GO ALONG, POINTIN
OUT THAT A CFE
FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATION COULD CONSIDER A RANGE OF I
SSUES, INCLUDING THE
QUESTION OF FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL F
FORCES IN A CENTRAL
REGION. SUCH LIMITS WERE NOT, HOWEVER, A MATTER
FOR NEGOTIATION IN
BE TWO PLUS FOUR.

SECRET

SECRET

HELMUT KOHL AND I HAD VERY USEFUL CONSULTATIONS O
GERMAN UNIFICATION
LAST WEEK IN WASHINGTON. WE REAFFIRMED THE WEST'
COMMON GOALS AND
APPROACHES, AS OUTLINED IN MY MAY 9 MESSAGE TO YO
WE ALSO AGREED
AND STRESSED PUBLICLY THAT, UPON UNIFICATION, FOU
-POWER RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD BE ENDED, WITHOUT ANY NEW
DISCRIMINATORY
CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY.

I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT SOVIET ANXIETY ABOUT G
GERMANY ALSO STEMS
FROM THE GENERAL BAD FOURUNE THAT GORFACHEV IS EX
PERIENCING AND HIS
CONCERNS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF PERESTROIKA. HE UND
OUTEDLY SEES
GERMANY AS A POLITICALLY EXPLOSIVE ISSUE AT HOME.

GORBACHEV'S POSITION ON LITHUANIA WAS TOUGH, THOU
GE HE EMPHASIZED HE
WAS COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISS
UE, AND I WAS
PLEASED TO SEE THAT HE AGREED TO MEET WITH LITHUA
NIAN PRIME MINISTER
PRUNSKIENE DURING HER VISIT TO MOSCOW. HE SAID H
HE HAS LITTLE ROOM
FOR MANUEVER ON LITHUANIA AND MUST INSIST ON A SU
SPENSION OF THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. YET THERE WOULD SEEM
1 TO BE ROOM FOR
COMPROMISE, AND YOU MIGHT TRY TO IMPRESS ON GOREA
CHEV THE NEED TO GET
A DIALOGUE GOING. I HAVE DONE EVERTEING THAT I CAN
CAN TO KEEP

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS ON TRACK BUT IF THERE IS NOT
SOME MOVEMENT ON
MOSCOW'S PART BEFORE THE SUMMIT, LITHUANIA WILL C
CAST A SHADOW OVER MY
MEETING WITH GORBACHEV. I KNOW YOU ARE IN MUCH T
HE SAME SITUATION.

7
SECRET 4/4

FINALLY, BRIAN, I WILL BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR ANY INSIGHTS
~~REMARKS~~ OR ADVICE
THAT YOU MIGHT HAVE AFTER YOUR MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV
BEV AND BEFORE WE
BEGIN OUR TALKS HERE ON MAY 31.

3/3

WITH MY VERY WARMEST REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

D TEXT.

337

SECRET

NN

O T E C T E D

FM WSHDC UNGR6748 24MAY90

TO EXTOTT/RBR

DELIVER BY 280900

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

INFO BNATO VNACE GENEV BONN PARIS LDN MOSCO PCOOTT/HEINBECKER

PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/ADM POL/DNACPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC URB RGB IFB URD RWD RBD URR RWR IDR RBR

RECEIVED IN

MAY 28 1990

---BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT-PUBLIC COMMENTARY

SUMMARY-INFORMED PUBLIC OPINION IS NOT SHOWING MUCH ENTHUSIASM FOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS REACHED BY BAKER IN MOSCOW,NOR MUCH INTEREST IN FORTHCOMING BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT.CONSERVATIVE COMMENTATORS HAVE FOCUSSED ON FACT THAT NO PROGRESS WAS MADE ON CFE,AND THEY HAVE ARGUED THAT ADMIN HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO LIMIT MODERNIZATION OF USSR MOST DANGEROUS FIRST STRIKE WEAPON(SS-18)WHILE CAVING IN ON ALCM AND SLCM.LIBERAL COMMETATORS HAVE CHARGED THAT ADMIN IS STILL THINKING IN A COLD WAR FRAME OF MIND,AND THAT IMPENDING START TREATY WILL NOT PRODUCE 50 PERCENT REDUCTION THAT ADMIN CLAIMS.

2.ADMIN HAS RESPONDED THAT OPPONENTS OF START ARE THOSE WHO GENERALLY HAVE REJECTED CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL.IT HAS ARGUED THAT ALTHOUGH USA HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO IMPOSE FREEZE ON SS-18 MODERNIZATION,LATTER IS NOW RESTRICTED.

3.REPORT:UPON BAKERS RETURN FROM MOSCOW,AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE WILLIAM SAFIRE IN NEW YORK TIMES,EDITORIAL BOARD OF WALL STREET JOURNAL,AND COLUMNISTS EVANS AND NOVAK ACCUSED SEC-OF-STATE-OF

...2

ACC	643991	DATE
FILE	20-USA 1-3-USSR	DOSSIER

752
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

000612

PAGE TWO UNGR6748 PROTECTED

HAVING SOLD THE FARM. UNDER TITLE QUOTE TAKING BAKER TO THE CLEANERS UNQUOTE, SAFIRE ARGUED THAT BAKERS FIRST PRIORITY HAD BEEN TO GET SOVIET ARMY OUT OF EASTERN EUROPE AND, PERHAPS THOUGH DEMOBILIZATION, MAKE PERISTROIKA IRREVERSIBLE. STRICTLY SECONDARY GOAL HE CLAIMED HAD BEEN NEW AGREEMENT LIMITING NUCLEAR MISSILES. HOWEVER, SOVIETS HAD SUCCEEDED IN REVERSING BAKERS PRIORITIES. IN PROCESS, SAFIRE BELIEVED BAKER HAD LOST EVERYTHING, LEAVING USA WITH NO/NO OPTION BUT TO OFFER TRADE AND AID, TO TURN A BLIND EYE TO REPRESSION, AND TO SAY THE COLD WAR IS OVER.

4. EDITORIAL IN WALL STREET JOURNAL AND COMMENTARY BY EVANS AND NOVAK ECHOED SAFIRS CONCERNS. WALL STREET JOURNAL CHARACTERIZED RESULTS OF DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW AS ENTIRELY NEGATIVE ARGUING THAT QUOTE THE US SEEMS TO HAVE MADE ALL THE CONCESSIONS. IT IS TOO BAD HE (BAKER) DID NOT GET ANYTHING FROM THEM UNQUOTE. EDITORIAL CONCLUDED QUOTE HE (BUSH) SHOULD ALSO REFLECT ON THE FATES OF PRESIDENTS WHO EAGERLY SIGNED ARMS CONTROL ACCORDS IN THE 1970S. IF JIMMY CARTER SIGNED THIS DEAL, HE WOULD BE HOOTED OUT OF TOWN UNQUOTE. EVANS AND NOVAK WROTE QUOTE THE QUESTION NOW IS NOT WHETHER BUSH CAN DO BETTER BUT WHETHER HE CAN KEEP WHAT LITTLE GORBACHEV GAVE UNQUOTE.

5. FROM MORE LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE, ANALYSTS HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS AS TO WHAT FORTHCOMING SUMMIT MIGHT MEAN. FOR MICHAEL MANDELBAUM OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THERE IS SOME DANGER AT THIS SUMMIT AND IN THE MONTHS AHEAD THAT THE LEADERS WILL BE ...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6748 PROTECTED

FACED WITH QUOTE A KIND OF POLITICAL TRAFFIC JAM UNQUOTE. ACCORDING TO MANDELBAUM, USA AND USSR WILL BE DEALING WITH TWO SETS OF ISSUES: ISSUES OF THE COLD WAR, WHICH INVOLVE MARGINAL ADJUSTMENTS IN CENTRAL RIVALRY BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES, AND THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED BY END OF COLD WAR AND WHICH CONCERN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF EUROPE AND VERY CHARACTER OF SOVIET UNION. MANDELBAUM BELIEVES THAT FAILURE TO RESOLVE OLD ISSUES (BASICALLY START, CFE, TRADE RELATIONS) WILL IMPEDE PROGRESS IN DEALING WITH NEW AND MORE COMPLICATED QUESTIONS (GERMANY, NATIONALITIES). MANDELBAUM THINKS THAT BUSH ADMIN SO FAR HAS REACTED CORRECTLY TO EVENTS UNFOLDING IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, IN 1990 WITH EUROPEAN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS COMPLETED, WITH USSR IN TURMOIL, AND WITH NEW POLICY DILEMMAS ARISING, WAIT-AND-SEE POLICY MAY NO LONGER BE APPROPRIATE. 6. DIMITRI SIMES FROM CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTL PEACE THINKS THAT APPROACH TAKEN BY SOME IN WHITE HOUSE WHO WANT TO GIVE GORBACHEV A HERO'S RECEPTION IS WRONG. IT WILL GIVE THE WRONG SIGNAL AT TIME WHEN THEY ARE BULLYING BALTICS HE ARGUES. SIMES BELIEVES QUOTE IT IS TIME FOR A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT, BUT A BUSINESSLIKE SUMMIT UNQUOTE. HISTORY IS ON WEST SIDE, AND USA POLICY SHOULD BE ABOUT MAKING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM EASTERN EUROPE SMOOTHER, NOT ABOUT MAKING IT POSSIBLE. SIMES ARGUES THAT CONDUCTING FOREIGN POLICY IS MORE THAN MAKING DEALS. HE CHARGES THAT ADMIN IS QUOTE SOMEWHAT EXCESSIVELY PREOCCUPIED WITH REACHING AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING AGREEMENTS ON

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6748 PROTECTED

CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AT THIS SUMMIT OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER UNQUOTE.

7. MOST POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF SUMMIT HAS COME FROM ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, WHOSE DIRECTOR SPURGEON KEENE FULLY SUPPORT FLEXIBILITY DEMONSTRATED BY USA. HE BELIEVES ON BALANCE THAT START WILL BE QUOTE EXCELLENT TREATY UNQUOTE.

8. IN RESPONSE TO CRITICS, SEC BAKER IN PRESS CONFERENCE ON MAY 23 SAID THAT ADMIN IS VERY PLEASED WITH START TREATY, WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD STRONG SUPPORT FROM MILITARY LEADERSHIP. ARGUING THAT TREATY IS VERY MUCH IN NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF USA, BAKER SAID THAT QUOTE MOST OF CRITICISM IS COMING FROM THOSE WHO IN THE PAST FROM TIME TO TIME HAVE SIMPLY REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL GENERALLY UNQUOTE. POINTING DIRECTLY TO CONSERVATIVES WHO HAVE ACCUSED ADMIN OF BEING WEAK BECAUSE IT MAKES CONCESSIONS, BAKER SAID THAT IN FACT FOR QUITE SOME TIME IT HAS BEEN USSR WHICH HAD MADE ALL CONCESSIONS. HE MENTIONED 50 PERCENT CUTS IN SS-18S, DELINKAGE OF START FROM SDI, DISMANTLING OF KRANNOYARSK RADAR, AND THE ALCM AND SLCM SETTLEMENTS WHICH MET US DEMANDS. WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN ADMITTED THAT USA HAD NOT SUCCEEDED IN ELIMINATING SS 18 MISSILES, AND THAT AGREEMENT WILL ALLOW TESTING TO PRESERVE RELIABILITY OF CURRENT SS-18. BUT IT WILL IMPOSE A CAP ON FURTHER MODERNIZATION. HE SAID QUOTE SO IT IS A WAY OF SAYING, WELL, THIS FAR AND NO FARTHER UNQUOTE.

CCC/085 260012Z UNGR6748

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSHDC UNGR6747 23MAY90

TO EXTOTT (RBR URR DLIVER BY 240830

INFO BNATO VNACE VIENN GENEV MOSCO BONN PARIS ROME VTCAN MDRIP
LSBON LDN COPEN HAGUE OSLO ATENS ANKRA BRU WSAW PRGUE BFEST
BGRAD STYHM HSNKI PMOOTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/ADM POL/DNACPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC IDX RGB UGB IFB RBD RWD URD IDD RWR IDR IDA
IDAV IDAN IDAO RGV RGZ

---SEC BAKER PRESS CONFERENCE ON UPCOMING BUSH GORBACHEV SUMMIT
SUMMARY: AT PRESS CONF TODAY AT WHITE HOUSE, BAKER PROVIDED OVERVIEW
OF DISCUSSIONS THAT WILL TAKE PLACE BETWEEN PRES BUSH AND
GORBACHEV NEXT WEEK. HE ALSO ANSWERED SOME QUESTIONS RELATED TO ACD
AGENDA AND RECENT MINISTERIAL MEETING IN MOSCOW. HE SAID THAT
SUSTAINED IMPROVEMENTS IN USSR/US RELATIONS WOULD DEPEND UPON
DEEPENING AND WIDENING OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES THROUGHOUT SOVIET
SOCIETY. ALTHOUGH SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS THE BALTICS DISTURBED USA,
BAKER CALLED FOR CONTINUED SEARCH FOR POINTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.
HE UNDERLINED IMPORTANCE OF CFE AGREEMENT AND DEFENDED HIS ACD
RECORD AT RECENT MINISTERIAL MEETING. HE EMPHASIZED THAT INTERNAL
ASPECTS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION BELONG TO GERMAN PEOPLE AND
THAT OTHER FORA THAN TWO-PLUS FOUR WERE MORE APPROPRIATE TO
DISCUSS DEFENSE ISSUES. RE SUMMIT AGENDA, BAKER SAID THAT BUSH WILL
RAISE QUESTION OF REFUSENIKS AND ANTI SEMITISM IN USSR. FAIR AMOUNT

...2

ACC	RE.	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER	
20-USA-1-3-455R		

PAGE TWO-UNGR6747 UNCLAS

OF TIME WILL BE SPENT ON SITUATION IN BALTICS AND BUSH WILL
REITERATE USA BASIC POSITION WHICH IS THAT SELF DETERMINATION
CANNOT BE DENIED. HE DID NOT GIVE CLEAR INDICATION WHETHER
COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT WILL BE SIGNED.

2. REPORT BAKER BEGAN BY SAYING THAT SINCE MALTA SUMMIT, POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN USSR HAD BECOME MORE COMPLEX AND
THAT CONSTRAINTS UPON ACTION HAD BECOME MORE PRONOUNCED. HE SAID
THAT OVER THE LONG TERM, SUSTAINED IMPROVEMENT IN USSR/USA RELATIONS
WOULD DEPEND SUBSTANTIALLY UPON DEEPENING AND WIDENING OF DEMOCRATIC
VALUES THROUGHOUT SOVIET SOCIETY. BAKER SAID QUOTE MOSCOW
WILLINGNESS TO MAKE HARD CHOICES INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY WILL
AFFECT THE COURSE AND THE FUTURE OF THIS RELATIONSHIP UNQUOTE. BAKER
SAID THAT SOVIET POLICY TOWARD LITHUANIA DISTURBED USA DEEPLY BUT
THAT THERE WAS TOO MUCH AT STAKE IN THE RELATIONSHIP TO QUOTE
DISMISS CAVALIERLY OR IMPRUDENTLY THE POTENTIAL FOR PROGRESS; WE MUST
CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR POINTS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE IN THIS
RELATIONSHIP UNQUOTE. THIS WAS REFERENCE TO SPEECH HE MADE LAST FALL
WHERE HE STRESSED IMPORTANCE FOR SUPER-POWERS TO SEEK POINTS OF
CONVERGENCE INSTEAD OF EMPHASIZING DIFFERENCES.

3. BAKER UNDERLINED IMPORTANCE OF CFE AGREEMENT AS MEANS OF LOCKING
IN MILITARY CHANGES CONSISTENT WITH POLITICAL REALITIES. HE
REITERATED TWICE, IN STATEMENT AND DURING QUESTION PERIOD, THAT CFE
AGREEMENT IS PRECONDITION TO US ATTENDANCE AT CSCE SUMMIT. WHEN

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6747 UNCLAS

ASKED CFE HAD BEEN SHOVED ASIDE, BAKER SAID THAT USA WAS ANXIOUS TO MOVE FORWARD WITH AGREEMENT BUT THAT IT WAS NOT LINKED IN ANY WAY TO START AS REWARD TO SOVIETS. RESPONDING TO QUESTION HE SAID THAT STICKING POINT IN CFE NEGOTIATIONS WAS AIRCRAFT, ALTHOUGH SOVIETS MAY HAVE HAD OTHER CONCERNS RELATED TO OTHER THINGS THAN CFE.

4. ON GERMAN QUESTION, BAKER SAID THAT BUSH WILL MAKE IT PLAIN TO THE SOVIETS THAT INTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION ARE FOR GERMAN PEOPLE ONLY. WHILE EXTERNAL ASPECTS CAN BE DISCUSSED IN TWO PLUS-FOUR, MOST ISSUES ARE BEST DECIDED IN OTHER MORE APPROPRIATE EUROPEAN FORA, SUCH AS CFE, CSBM, SNF OR CSCE. BAKER SAID THAT BUSH WILL WANT TO HEAR SOVIET VIEWS ON UNIFICATION FROM GORBACHEV.

5. ON ACD SIDE, BUSH WILL WORK TOWARD FINALIZING AND SIGNING START TREATY THIS YEAR. BOTH PRESIDENTS WILL ALSO DISCUSS OBJECTIVES FOR FOLLOW-UP NEGOTIATIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL. BOTH COUNTRIES WILL SIGN AGREEMENTS ON CW, TTBT AND PNET, AND THEY WILL ISSUE JOINT STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION. IN Q AND A PERIOD BAKER WAS PRESSED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO PROVIDE ASSESSMENT OF POSITIONS HE TOOK IN MOSCOW AND ON ACCUSATIONS THAT HE HAD SOLD THE SHOP. HE REPLIED BY SAYING QUOTE IT WOULD APPEAR TO ME AT LEAST THAT MOST OF THE CRITICISM IS COMING FROM THOSE WHO IN THE PAST FROM TIME TO TIME HAVE SIMPLY REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF ARMS CONTROL GENERALLY UNQUOTE. THE USA IS PLEASED WITH START, HE SAID. QUOTE WE THINK THAT IT IS VERY MUCH IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6747 UNCLAS

UNITED STATES UNQUOTE.USING EXAMPLES LIKE THE DELINKAGE OF START AND ABM AND 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN SS-16,BAKER SAID THAT THROUGHOUT START NEGOTIATIONS,SOVIET SIDE MAINLY HAS MADE CONCESSIONS.HE ALSO SAID THAT IN CONTEXT OF START II,HE WAS WORKING ON ASSUMPTION THAT FRENCH AND BRITISH ARSENAL WOULD NOT BE PART OF DISCUSSIONS.

6.WITH REGARD TO REGIONAL ISSUES,BAKER SAID THAT BUSH WILL RAISE ISSUES RELATED TO SEVERAL CONFLICTS BUT PARTICULARLY AFGHANISTAN.

7.ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION,BUSH WILL RAISE CONTINUING CONCERNS ABOUT REMAINING REFUGEEES AND CONVEY GROWING FEAR ABOUT ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE USSR.BAKER SAID QUOTE AT STAKE IS THE LONG-TERM POTENTIAL FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION UNQUOTE.

8.UNDOUBTEDLY,BUSH WILL SPEND SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TIME DISCUSSING SITUATION IN BALTIC STATES.BAKER SAID THAT PRES WILL STRESS USA BASIC POSITION EMPHASIZING THAT RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION CANNOT BE DENIED,AND THAT SOVIET EFFORTS AT INTIMIDATION CAN ONLY RAISE DOUBTS ABOUT INDIVISIBILITY OF PERESTROIKA,GLASNOST AND

DEMOCRATIZATION.USA BELIEVES THAT A SYSTEMATIC DIALOGUE,FREE OF COERCION OR INTIMIDATION IS ONLY PATH TO PEACEFUL RESOLUTION.


9.ON QUESTION OF SIGNATURE OF COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT,BAKER DID NOT GIVE CLEAR INDICATION WHETHER PRES BUSH WOULD GO AHEAD WITH AGREEMENT IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES.HE SAID QUOTE YOU ASKED ME WHAT PRESIDENTS DECISION WILL BE,AND I LEARNED A LONG TIME AGO NOT TO TRY AND PREJUDGE PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS UNQUOTE.HE ALSO SAID THAT

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR6747 UNCLAS

CODIFICATION OF SOVIET EMIGRATION LAW REMAINED PRE CONDITION TO
GRANTING OF MFN STATUSE AND MAY CAUSE DIFFICULTIES IF EMIGRATION
LAW IS POSTPONED.

UUU/085 241037Z UNGR6747





External Affairs Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

**ACTION
MESSAGE
SUITE A DONNER**

ACC	Accession/Reference
FILE	Filer/Dossier
LOC	Location
AC	Accession/Reference

20-USA-1-3-USSR

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

90

MAY 23 1990

47 1/2

SECURITY **PROTEGE PAR FACSIMILE CLASSIFIE**
SECURITE

FM/DE
TO/A
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

DE: WSHDC UNGR301 22MAI90

A/ URR RBR LIVRAISON 221400 - udc 3/24

INFO: PMO OTT/HART/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOTT/DOYLE - udc 1/2

DIST: MINA USS DMC URB IFB RGB XDX RBD IDD IDA IDR

REF: NOTRE FAX UNGR 277 DU 17 MAI

--- VISITE A WSHDC DU PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

VEUILLEZ TROUVER CI-JOINT POUR INFORMATION, LE PROGRAMME DE
LA VISITE AUX EU DU PRESIDENT GORDACHEV, AINSI QU'UNE COPIE
DE LA LISTE DES ACCORDS QUI SERONT SIGNES LORS DU SOMMET.

2. AUCUNE CLASSIFICATION DE SECURITE N'A ETE ATTRIBUEE A CES
DOCUMENTS. CEPENDANT ILS DEVRAIENT FAIRE L'OBJET D'UNE
DISTRIBUTION RESTREINTE POUR USAGE OFFICIEL SEULEMENT.

PROTECTED/PROTÉGÉ

CONFIDENTIAL/CONFIDENTIEL

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
G. Cossette SIG <i>[Signature]</i>	Political	7409	M. Kellogg 000621

2/12

THE STATE VISIT
TO
THE UNITED STATES
OF
HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT
OF
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AND
MRS. GORBACHEV

MAY 30 TO JUNE 4, 1990

PROTECTED/PROTÉGÉ

3/1~

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

WEDNESDAY
MAY 30

6:30 pm- Greeted by _____,
6:35 pm Chief of Protocol Reed,
and Welcoming Committee, Andrews
Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

6:35 pm- Motorcade to Soviet Embassy.
7:00 pm

Overnight: Soviet Embassy.

PROTECTED/PROTÉGÉ

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

THURSDAY
MAY 31

10:00 am- Arrival Ceremony with The
10:20 am President and Mrs. Bush, South
Lawn, The White House.

10:30 am- Coffee offered by
11:00 am Mrs. Bush in honor of
Mrs. Gorbachev, Green
Room, The White House.

10:30 am- Meeting with President Bush,
12:00 pm The White House.*

1:00 pm- Luncheon, Soviet Embassy.
2:30 pm

* Mrs. Gorbachev does not attend.

PROTECTED/PROTÉGÉ

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

THURSDAY
MAY 31
(Continued)

3:30 pm- Mrs. Gorbachev opens
5:00 pm Exhibition and tours
Library of Congress.

4:00 pm- Meeting with President Bush,
5:30 pm The White House.*

7:15 pm- Reception, State Dinner and
11:00 pm After-Dinner Entertainment
offered by The President and
Mrs. Bush in honor of President
and Mrs. Gorbachev, East Room
and State Dining Room, The White
House.

Dress: Black tie.

Overnight: Soviet Embassy.

* Mrs. Gorbachev does not attend.

-4-

PROTECTED/PROT

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

FRIDAY
JUNE 1

9:30 am- Meeting with Congressional
TBD am Leaders, Soviet Embassy.

9:30 am- Mrs. Bush and Mrs.
1:30 pm Gorbachev participate
in Commencement
Ceremony, Wellesley
College, Wellesley,
Massachusetts.

11:00 am- Meeting with President Bush,
1:00 pm The White House.*

2:00 pm- Luncheon, Soviet Embassy.
3:30 pm

3:30 pm- Award Presentation Ceremony,
4:30 pm Soviet Embassy.

5:00 pm- Agreement Signing Ceremony(?),
5:30 pm The White House.(*?)

* Mrs. Gorbachev does not attend.

PROTECTED/PROTI

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

FRIDAY
JUNE 1
(Continued)

5:30 pm- Meeting with President
6:30 pm Bush, The White House.*

7:30 pm- Dinner offered by President
TBD pm and Mrs. Gorbachev in honor of
The President and Mrs. Bush,
Soviet Embassy.

Dress: Business suit.*

Overnight: Soviet Embassy.

* Mrs. Gorbachev does not attend.

PROTECTED/P

8/12

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

SATURDAY

JUNE 2

9:30 am- United States Presidential
10:00 am Helicopters to Camp David.

10:00 am- Private time with The President
6:00 pm and Mrs. Bush, Camp David.

6:00 pm- Motorcade to Soviet Embassy(?).
7:30 pm

Overnight: Soviet Embassy.

-7-

PROTECTED/PROTÉGÉ

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

SUNDAY
JUNE 3

10:00 am- Joint Press Conference, East
11:00 am Room, The White House. (*?)

11:25 am- Motorcade to Andrews Air
11:50 am Force Base.

11:50 am- Farewell Ceremony
11:55 pm with _____, Chief of
Protocol Reed, and Farewell
Committee, Andrews Air Force
Base/Reflecting Pool.

12:00 pm Depart Andrews Air Force Base
via Soviet Special Aircraft en
route Minneapolis, Minnesota,
and resume private schedule.

* Mrs. Gorbachev does not attend.

Overnight: Soviet Embassy.

-8-

PROTECTED/PROTÉGÉ

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

SUNDAY

JUNE 3

(Continued)

2:30 pm Arrive Minneapolis-St. Paul
International/Wold-Chamberlain
Airport, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

TBD pm Luncheon offered by Governor
Perpich and local authorities
in honor of _____.

5:00 pm- Meeting with Mid-West Business
TBD pm and Agricultural Leaders.

7:00 pm Depart Minneapolis-St. Paul
International/Wold-Chamberlain
Airport via Soviet Special
Aircraft en route San Francisco,
California.

TBD pm Arrive San Francisco
International Airport, San
Francisco, California.

Overnight: _____.

PROTECTED/PROTEGE

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

MONDAY
JUNE 4

9:30 am- Breakfast Meeting with former
10:15 am President Reagan.

11:00 am- President Gorbachev addresses
1:00 pm students of Stanford University.

1:30 pm- Luncheon offered by West Coast
3:00 pm Political and Business Leaders
in honor of _____.

3:30 pm Depart San Francisco
International Airport via Soviet
Special Aircraft en route
Petropavlovsk-Kamcatski, U.S.S.R.

-10-

PROTECTED/PROTÉGÉ

PROPOSED LIST OF AGREEMENTS FOR THE SUMMIT

12/
11:

I. AGREEMENTS TO BE SIGNED OR ANNOUNCED

- o PNET/TTBT Verification Protocols
- o Bilateral Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement
- o Cultural/Information Centers Agreement
- o Long-term Grains Agreement
- o Maritime Boundary Agreement
- o Ocean Studies Agreement
- o Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Agreement
- o Joint statement on nonproliferation
- o Malta 1000-1000 student exchange initiative
- o Joint statement on environment
- o Joint statement on nuclear reactor operational safety
- o Joint statement of intent to establish Beringian International Heritage Park
- o Joint statement on International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
- o Maritime Transportation Agreement
- o Customs Cooperation Agreement

II. AGREEMENTS THAT COULD BE SIGNED OR ANNOUNCED IF POLITICAL DECISION MADE

- o Commercial Agreement

III. AGREEMENTS NOT YET FULLY NEGOTIATED

- o All major START issues resolved (perhaps joint statement)
- o Expanded Civil Aviation Agreement
- o Space cooperation initiative
- o Joint statement on opening of consulates in Kiev and NY
- o Memorandum of Understanding on increased circulation of "Amerika" magazine

SESOVFO 1315

5/21/90 1900

PROTECTED/PROTÉGÉ

SECRET

SECRET

ACC	751128	DATE
FILE	20 USA-1-3-USSR	May 21 ^R , 1990
	47	

MOSCOW MINISTERIAL, MAY 16-19, 1990

1990

2/18

OVERVIEW.

- O SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAD USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGES MAY 16-19 IN MOSCOW. THEY DISCUSSED THE FULL RANGE OF U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES AS WELL AS PREPARATIONS FOR THE UPCOMING SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV.
 - THE ATMOSPHERE WAS POSITIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE, BUT THE BARGAINING WAS AT TIMES PAINFULLY SLOW.
 - WITH THE SOVIETS PREOCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND UNEASY ABOUT THE ACCELERATING PACE OF CHANGE IN EUROPE, THEY SEEMED TO BE MORE RELUCTANT TO MAKE DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY ON ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS.
 - THE SOVIET MILITARY PLAYED A PROMINENT ROLE IN THE DISCUSSIONS, SUGGESTING INCREASED SENSITIVITY OVER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES THAT AFFECT THE DEFENSE OF THE SOVIET HOMELAND.
- O THE MINISTERS MET FOR MORE THAN 15 HOURS, INCLUDING ABOUT 5 HOURS IN A PRIVATE FORMAT. THE SECRETARY SPENT FIVE HOURS WITH GORBACHEV, INCLUDING THREE AND A HALF WITH JUST GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE.
- O GIVEN THE PROXIMITY OF THE SUMMIT, THE MINISTERIAL FOCUSED IN LARGE PART ON THE AGREEMENTS THE TWO LEADERS WANT TO BE ABLE TO SIGN OR ANNOUNCE IN WASHINGTON.
 - THE STAGE IS SET FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT THAT YIELDS CONCRETE RESULTS ON SEVERAL PARTS OF THE AGENDA. THESE INCLUDE MANY OF THE SPECIFIC GOALS THAT THE TWO PRESIDENTS AGREED UPON DURING THEIR DECEMBER MEETING IN MALTA.
 - THE LEADERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO SIGN A BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT AND VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS TO THE TWO NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES. WE HOPE THEY WILL BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE RESOLUTION OF ALL MAJOR START ISSUES; THEY HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN PUT IN A POSITION WHERE THAT IS POSSIBLE.
 - THERE ALSO SHOULD BE A NUMBER OF OTHER BILATERAL AND ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS.

SECRET

SECRET

MESSAGE

WDCC 004/21

Align first character of Security Classification under the arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous la flèche

SECRET PAR FAX CLASSIFIE

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MAY
MAY

22 1990

FM DE
TO A
INFO
DISTO
REF
SUB/SUJ

DE WSHDC UNGR298 21MAI90

A EXTOTT RBR URR IDR IDA LIVRAISON 220830

INFO BNATO VNACE BONN PARIS LDN GENEV *de OTT*

DIST IFB RGB URB IDD RWD RBD CPD CPP RWR IDAO IDAN IDAV PNR

GAA LSR GMR EER

---REUNION BAKER/SHEVARNADZE - NOTES D'INFORMATION DU DEPART
D'ETAT

VOUS FAISONS PARVENIR POUR INFORMATION, COPIE DE NOTES QUI
FURENT UTILISEES LORS DE LA SESSION D'INFORMATION DE L'OTAN LE
21 MAI, PRESIDEE PAR LE SOUS-SECRETAIRE POUR LES AFFAIRES
CANADIENNES ET EUROPEENNES RAYMOND SEITZ.

2. POUR RBR: ETAT DES NEGOCIATIONS EN CE QUI CONCERNE LES
DIFFERENTS ACCORDS QUI POURRAIENT ETRE SIGNES LORS DU SOMMET
APPARAIT PRINCIPALEMENT SOUS LA RUBRIQUE QUOTE BILATERAL
ISSUES UNQUOTE.

3. COMCENTRE PLEASE FAX ATTACHED 17 PAGES

DRAFTER/REDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVE

G. COSSETTE

POLITICAL

7409

P. CHAPIN

SIG

SIG

000634

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

- O THE MINISTERS ALSO FOCUSED ON URGENT PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE BALTIC SITUATION AND GERMAN UNIFICATION.
- O LET ME NOW TURN TO THE DETAILS OF THE MINISTERIAL.

3/18

BALTIC SITUATION

- O THE SECRETARY DEVOTED A GOOD PORTION OF HIS PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV TO THE BALTICS. IN ADDITION, HE ALSO MET WITH LITHUANIAN PRIME MINISTER PRUNSKIENE ON MAY 18, THE DAY FOLLOWING HER MEETING WITH GORBACHEV.
- O WE HAVE, OF COURSE, BEEN FOLLOWING THE SITUATION IN THE BALTICS CLOSELY AND WITH INCREASING UNEASE.
 - PARTICULARLY DISTURBING WAS MOSCOW'S HASTY REJECTION OF THE RECENT STEPS TAKEN BY LATVIA AND ESTONIA, WHICH HAD MADE CLEAR EFFORTS TO ADOPT A MORE CAUTIOUS AND NUANCED APPROACH IN RESPONSE TO THE CONCERNS MOSCOW HAD EXPRESSED ABOUT LITHUANIA'S MARCH 11 DECLARATION.
- O SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT INCREASED PLURALISM HAD NOT ONLY UNLEASHED POSITIVE FORCES SHAPED BY "NEW THINKING," BUT EXTREMIST FORCES AS WELL. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT LITHUANIA COULD SET OFF A CHAIN REACTION IF IT WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE USSR ON THE BASIS OF AN "ILLEGAL ACTION" -- THE MARCH 11 DECLARATION.
 - HE ARGUED THAT LITHUANIA SHOULD PURSUE INDEPENDENCE THROUGH THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND NOTED THAT INDEPENDENCE COULD BE AN OUTCOME OF THIS PROCESS.
- O GORBACHEV ASSERTED THAT HE WAS UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO APPLY MORE FORCEFUL MEASURES AGAINST VILNIUS, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY THE IMPOSITION OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL RULE.
- O GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD PRUNSKIENE DURING THEIR MAY 17 MEETING THAT, IF LITHUANIA SUSPENDED ITS MARCH 11 DECLARATION, MOSCOW WAS PREPARED QUICKLY TO ESTABLISH COMMITTEES TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASPECTS TO "MAKE SELF-DETERMINATION REAL."
 - HE SAID SELF-DETERMINATION DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN INDEPENDENCE, ARGUING THAT IT SHOULD BE DECIDED BY A REFERENDUM. IF THE LITHUANIANS CHOSE INDEPENDENCE IN A REFERENDUM, HE SAID, THE DETAILS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT. THE IMPORTANT POINT WAS TO HAVE MOVEMENT TOWARD INDEPENDENCE TAKE PLACE IN A PROCESS.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 3 -

- GORBACHEV STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT ASKING VILNIUS TO NULLIFY ITS DECLARATION, BUT MERELY TO SUSPEND IT. HE RECOGNIZED THAT RESCINDING THE DECLARATION WAS SOMETHING THE LITHUANIANS COULD NOT DO. 2/18
- O GORBACHEV'S DECISION TO RECEIVE PRUNSKIENE WAS, OF COURSE, A WELCOME STEP. IT REPRESENTED A QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN CONTACTS.
- IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THE SIDES' APPROACHES WERE NECESSARILY BROUGHT CLOSER, BUT THE MEETING DID HELP EACH PARTY CLARIFY THE OTHER'S POSITION.
- THE KEY THING NOW IS FOR THE TWO SIDES TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN A REAL DIALOGUE AND FOR MOSCOW TO PUT AN END TO ITS ECONOMIC BLOCKADE.
- O IN HIS MEETING WITH PRUNSKIENE, THE SECRETARY GAVE HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET APPROACH, AND THE TWO EXCHANGED VIEWS ON WHAT STEPS MIGHT OPEN THE WAY TO A DIALOGUE BETWEEN LITHUANIA AND THE SOVIETS.
- O BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ON INTERNAL QUESTIONS.
- SHEVARDNADZE DESCRIBED THE UPCOMING PARTY CONGRESS AS A WATERSHED EVENT IN DECIDING THE SOVIET UNION'S FUTURE.
- HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BEGINNING TO PREPARE THE SOVIET PUBLIC FOR A TRANSITION TO A "PLANNED MARKET." HE RULED OUT ANY ATTEMPT AT SHOCK THERAPY A LA POLAND.
- GORBACHEV EMPHASIZED THE DIFFICULTY THE SOVIETS FACED IN MAKING THIS TRANSITION, AND HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR INCREASED WESTERN INVESTMENT.

GERMAN UNIFICATION

- O THE SECRETARY DISCUSSED GERMANY WITH GORBACHEV.
- GORBACHEV WAS UNYIELDING IN HIS OBJECTION TO A UNIFIED GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, ARGUING THAT THIS WAS NOT JUST A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM, BUT A STRATEGIC ISSUE FOR THE USSR.
- THE SECRETARY REITERATED OUR VIEW THAT GERMANY'S NATO MEMBERSHIP WAS THE BEST GUARANTEE OF LONG-TERM STABILITY IN EUROPE. THE U.S. AND ALL EUROPEAN STATES WITH AN OPINION ON THE SUBJECT WERE IN AGREEMENT ON THIS.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- THE SECRETARY ARGUED THAT, CONSISTENT WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, GERMANY SHOULD BE FREE TO CHOOSE ITS ALLIANCES.
- 5/11
- O THE SECRETARY REVIEWED THE STEPS THE PRESIDENT HAD PROPOSED ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES -- INCLUDING EARLY CFE FOLLOW-ON TALKS, ACCELERATED SNF NEGOTIATIONS, A STRENGTHENED CSCE PROCESS, A REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY -- ARGUING THAT THESE ADDRESSED SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS.
 - GORBACHEV SAID THESE STEPS WERE WELCOME, BUT DID NOT ALTER HIS VIEW OF GERMAN NATO MEMBERSHIP.
 - O SHEVARDNADZE STATED THAT THE SOVIETS INTENDED TO SEEK DIRECT LIMITS ON THE BUNDESWEHR IN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR TALKS.
 - THE SECRETARY COUNTERED THAT DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCE LIMITS COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IN CFE.

ARMS CONTROL

- O WE MADE IMPORTANT PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL IN MOSCOW. WE STILL HAVE CONSIDERABLE WORK TO DO BETWEEN NOW AND THE GORBACHEV VISIT TO WASHINGTON.
 - SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS WILL COME TO WASHINGTON PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT TO CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO RESOLVE START ISSUES AS WELL AS TO CONTINUE EXCHANGES ON CFE.
- {START}
- O ON START, OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES MUST STILL BE RESOLVED IF THE PRESIDENTS ARE TO ANNOUNCE THE RESOLUTION OF ALL MAJOR ISSUES.
 - O WE SUCCEEDED IN MOSCOW IN SETTLING THE KEY QUESTIONS OF LIMITS ON AIR- AND SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES -- ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN UNRESOLVED FOR YEARS.
 - O TWO IMPORTANT ADVANCES IN MOSCOW WERE THE SOVIETS' AGREEMENT TO DROP THEIR PROPOSAL TO COUNT IN START TACTICAL AIRCRAFT WITH CONVENTIONAL ALCMS, AND TO DROP THEIR PROPOSAL TO INSPECT THE B-2. THESE WERE POTENTIAL TREATY-BLOCKERS FOR US.
 - O ON ALCMS, THE SIDES HAVE NOW AGREED TO A PACKAGE APPROACH. ITS MAIN ELEMENTS INCLUDE:

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

- THE COUNTING RULES AGREED IN FEBRUARY ARE CONFIRMED, I.E. B-52S, B-1S AND FUTURE U.S. HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED TO CARRY ALCMS WILL COUNT AS 10 IN START'S AGGREGATE WEAPON LIMIT OF 6000 AND CAN BE EQUIPPED TO CARRY NO MORE THAN 20. THE ATTRIBUTION AND MAXIMUM NUMBERS FOR BEAR-H, BLACKJACK AND FUTURE SOVIET HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS ARE 8 AND 12. 6/18
- THE ATTRIBUTION RULE WILL APPLY TO U.S. BOMBERS UP TO 150; SHOULD THE U.S. DEPLOY MORE THAN 150 ALCM BOMBERS, THOSE ADDITIONAL BOMBERS WILL BE COUNTED IN THE 6000 LIMIT AT THE NUMBER OF ALCMS FOR WHICH THEY ARE ACTUALLY EQUIPPED, NOT THE NUMBERS DERIVED BY THE ATTRIBUTION RULE.
- TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THEIR SMALLER ALCM-CARRYING CAPACITY, THE SOVIETS WILL BE ALLOWED 40 PERCENT MORE ALCM BOMBERS COUNTED AT THE ATTRIBUTED NUMBER, BEFORE THEY MUST BEGIN COUNTING EXTRA BOMBERS AT THE "AS-ACTUALLY-EQUIPPED" NUMBER OF ALCMS.
- IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE REST OF OUR PACKAGE, WE HAVE AGREED TO THE SOVIET-PROPOSED RANGE THRESHOLD OF 600 KM FOR ALCMS.
- MOVING TO 600 KM POSED ONE PROBLEM FOR US. WE AGREED IN 1988 THAT ALL EXISTING LONG-RANGE ALCMS SHOULD BE TREATED AS NUCLEAR. HOWEVER, WE SUBSEQUENTLY TESTED A CONVENTIONAL ALCM -- KNOWN AS TACIT RAINBOW -- WITH A RANGE BETWEEN 600 AND 800 KM THAT THE U.S. IN AGREEING TO A 600 KM ALCM RANGE THRESHOLD, CARE NEEDED TO BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THIS CONVENTIONAL MISSILE WAS NOT CAPTURED BY START.
- WE RESOLVED THIS BY OBTAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER TACIT RAINBOW TO BE A FUTURE COVENTIONAL ALCM, WHICH IT IS. THEREFORE, TACIT RAINBOW WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE DISTINGUISHABILITY AND EXHIBITION RULES FOR CONVENTIONAL ALCMS, BUT WILL NOT COUNT UNDER START.
- WE HAVE ALSO REACHED AGREEMENT ON A SLCM PACKAGE. THE ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS AGREED IN MOSCOW INCLUDE:
 - EACH SIDE WILL ISSUE POLITICALLY-BINDING DECLARATIONS ON NUCLEAR SLCMS; THE DECLARATIONS WILL INCLUDE A STATEMENT THAT THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR SLCMS DEPLOYED AT ANY ONE TIME SHALL NOT EXCEED 880 FOR THE DURATION OF THE TREATY.
 - THE RANGE THRESHOLD FOR NUCLEAR SLCMS THAT WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DECLARATIONS IS 600 KM.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

- IN ADDITION, THE SIDES WILL HAVE AN ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL DATA EXCHANGE ON ALL NUCLEAR SLCMS WITH RANGES IN EXCESS OF 300 KM.
- THE SOVIET SIDE DROPPED ITS DEMAND THAT NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SLCMS BE DISTINGUISHABLE, SOMETHING WE COULD NOT ACCEPT BECAUSE IT WOULD CAPTURE ALL OUR CONVENTIONAL SLCMS (DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF THE TOMAHAWK SLCM ARE INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM ONE ANOTHER). THE U.S. FEELS STRONGLY THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCES MUST NOT BE CONSTRAINED BY START.
- THE DECLARATIONS WILL, AT SOVIET REQUEST, INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO THE 1987 WASHINGTON SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT LANGUAGE ABOUT SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND EFFECTIVE METHODS TO VERIFY NUCLEAR SLCMS. WE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED.
- ON MOBILE ICBMS, WE PROPOSED A SUBLIMIT OF 800 ON THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON SUCH SYSTEMS. THE SOVIETS REDUCED THEIR PREVIOUS PROPOSAL FROM 1600 WARHEADS TO 1200, BUT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO BRING THIS TO CLOSURE.
- ON OTHER START ISSUES:
 - WE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE TREATY'S DURATION WILL BE 15 YEARS, WITH A PROVISION FOR FIVE-YEAR EXTENSIONS.
 - WE HAVE WORKED ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION LANGUAGE THAT FULLY PROTECTS OUR EXISTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM. PARTS OF THIS PACKAGE HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS AND OTHER PARTS ARE STILL BEING REVIEWED.
 - WE PROPOSED A POLITICALLY-BINDING SOVIET STATEMENT: CAPPING BACKFIRE AT A LEVEL OF 400; OBLIGING THE SOVIETS NOT TO GIVE IT AN INTERCONTINENTAL CAPABILITY; AND INCLUDING IN CFE ALL BACKFIRE IN THE ATTU AREA, INCLUDING THOSE IN NAVAL AVIATION. THE SOVIETS OPPOSED THESE LIMITS.
 - WE ALSO PROPOSED TO RELAX OUR CURRENT PROVISIONS ON HEAVY ICBMS, WHICH WOULD HAVE BANNED PRODUCTION, MODERNIZATION OR FLIGHT-TESTING, TO ALLOW PRODUCTION UNTIL 1993 AND TO PERMIT TWO FLIGHT TESTS PER YEAR. THE SOVIETS STRONGLY OPPOSED HEAVY ICBM LIMITS BEYOND THE 154 MISSILES AND 1540 WARHEADS ALREADY AGREED.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 7 -

{CFE}

- AS WE INFORMED THE ALLIES EARLY LAST WEEK, WE FLOATED SOME NEW IDEAS WITH THE SOVIETS FOR BRINGING CFE TO EARLY CLOSURE. THEY LISTENED WITH INTEREST, BUT WERE NOT READY TO ENGAGE IN A WAY THAT SUGGESTED THEY ARE NOW PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD.
- WE HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS ON CFE. (AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SEITZ WILL DISCUSS THESE IN MORE DETAIL AT THE MAY 21 NAC MEETING.)
- AS OUTLINED IN SECRETARY BAKER'S LETTER TO NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS, WE VIEWED THIS MEETING AS AN OCCASION BOTH TO STRESS TO THE SOVIETS THE CONTINUING CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF CFE AND TO MAKE CLEAR OUR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE SOVIET CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT.
- WE PUT FORWARD SOME IDEAS IN THE AREAS MENTIONED IN THE SECRETARY'S LETTER, STRESSING THAT THESE, WHILE GENERALLY GROUNDED IN AN ALLIANCE CONSENSUS, REPRESENTED U.S. IDEAS, NOT ALLIANCE POSITIONS.
 - WE STRESSED ALSO THAT WE PUT THESE IDEAS FORWARD AS A STRATEGIC WHOLE, DESIGNED TO BRING THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS TO CLOSURE.
- OUR EXPLORATIONS FOCUSED ON SEVERAL AREAS.
 - AIRCRAFT: WE SOUGHT TO IDENTIFY MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT POSITIONS. WE STRESSED THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF INCLUDING LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT, BUT SUGGESTED THAT, IF THE SOVIETS ACCOMMODATED OUR VIEWS ON THIS IMPORTANT POINT, WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND TO OUR ALLIES THAT THE WEST MOVE TOWARD THE PACT POSITION ON A SEPARATE CEILING FOR COMBAT-CAPABLE TRAINERS, ALTHOUGH NOT AT THE LEVEL THE PACT PROPOSES, AND TO ADJUST UPWARD THE NUMBER OF AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS.
 - DESTRUCTION: WE SUGGESTED THAT, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF ALL EQUIPMENT MUST BE IRREVERSIBLY ELIMINATED, THERE COULD BE POSSIBILITIES FOR SALVAGE AND CIVILIAN USE OF SOME EQUIPMENT WHOSE MILITARY CAPABILITY HAD BEEN SO ELIMINATED.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 8 -

- 9/11
- VERIFICATION: WITHOUT SACRIFICING THE PRINCIPLE OF STRINGENT VERIFICATION, WE SUGGESTED THERE MAY BE WAYS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF BASELINE AND RESIDUAL INSPECTIONS BY INCREASING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE INSPECTIONS -- POSSIBLY BY USE OF HELICOPTERS AND AIRCRAFT.
 - GROUND EQUIPMENT: HERE AGAIN WE WERE LOOKING FOR MIDDLE GROUND; THE DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN VIENNA SUGGESTED SOME OBVIOUS OUTCOMES.
 - SUFFICIENCY RULE: GIVEN THE RESERVATIONS EXPRESSED BY SEVERAL ALLIES IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY BAKER'S LETTER, WE PUT FORWARD NO IDEAS ON CHANGING THE WESTERN POSITION.
 - O THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SOME OF OUR IDEAS, BUT DID NOT GIVE US CONCRETE RESPONSES.
 - O MANPOWER WAS DISCUSSED EXTENSIVELY. THE SOVIETS MADE A THREE-FOLD PROPOSAL AT THE OUTSET THAT THEY ALMOST IMMEDIATELY MODIFIED:
 - A SEPARATE AGREEMENT EMBODYING THE OTTAWA AGREEMENT ON U.S.-SOVIET MANPOWER, TO BE SIGNED AT THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT, THAT LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER MANPOWER LIMITS. WHEN WE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE, THEY FELL BACK TO PRESSING US TO DRAFT TREATY LANGUAGE IN VIENNA. THEY WERE RELUCTANT, HOWEVER, TO AGREE TO SETTING FORTH CLEARLY THAT THE OTTAWA AGREEMENT EXHAUSTED PERSONNEL LIMITS FOR CFE I.
 - LIMITATIONS ON THE FORCES OF A FUTURE UNIFIED GERMANY TO BE RESOLVED IN TWO-PLUS-FOUR, BUT POSSIBLY EXPRESSED ULTIMATELY IN CFE. WE MADE CLEAR THERE WAS NO VENUE IN WHICH WE WERE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE LIMITATIONS ON THE BUNDESWEHR AS SUCH, THAT WE FIRMLY OPPOSED "SINGULARIZATION" OF GERMANY, AND THAT WE DID NOT INTEND TO DISCUSS CONVENTIONAL FORCES LIMITATIONS IN TWO-PLUS-FOUR.
 - PROVIDED THOSE TWO ELEMENTS WERE AGREED IN THE WAY THEY PROPOSED, THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO DEFER THE ISSUE OF BROADER MANPOWER LIMITS TO A SUBSEQUENT PHASE.
 - O WE INSISTED THAT THE OTTAWA AGREEMENT SHOULD BE THE SOLE MANPOWER LIMIT IN CFE, BUT SAID WE WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A RANGE OF ISSUES IN A CFE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATION, INCLUDING LIMITATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- 9 -

O THE SOVIETS HAD SOME OTHER PROPOSALS, WHICH THEY DID NOT PRESS:

- AIRCRAFT: CONTINUED EXCLUSION OF LAND-BASED NAVAL AIR; INCLUSION OF 500 COMBAT-CAPABLE TRAINERS IN THE MAIN CEILING WHICH WOULD BE RAISED TO 5200, AND RECATEGORIZATION OF THE REST; EITHER AN INTERCEPTOR CEILING OF 1500 OR DEFERRAL OF INTERCEPTORS UNTIL A SUBSEQUENT PHASE. WE MADE CLEAR THIS WAS A NON-STARTER.
- ZONES: ACCEPTANCE OF THE NATO PROPOSAL ON THE FLANKS BUT TRANSFER OF THE KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT TO ZONE 4.2 OR 4.3.
- ARMOR: THEY PROPOSED USING BOTH UNLADEN AND COMBAT WEIGHT IN THE ARMOR DEFINITIONS IN A WAY THAT WOULD LOWER WEIGHT PARAMETERS EVEN FURTHER (E.G. 11 AND 13 TONS FOR TRACKED TANKS; 16 AND 18 FOR WHEELED TANKS). WE MADE CLEAR WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO GO THIS LOW.

{CHEMICAL WEAPONS}

O WE ARE CLOSE TO COMPLETING AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD PROVIDE FOR DESTRUCTION OF U.S. AND SOVIET CW STOCKS DOWN TO A LEVEL OF 5000 AGENT TONS EACH. DELEGATIONS WILL MEET THIS WEEK IN NEW YORK TO RESOLVE THE FEW REMAINING ISSUES AND FINALIZE THE TEXT.

O THE DRAFT AGREEMENT CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING MAIN ELEMENTS:

- THE U.S. AND USSR SHALL COOPERATE REGARDING THE DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, INCLUDING MATTERS RELATED TO SAFE METHODS FOR DESTRUCTION. IMPLEMENTING ACTIVITIES WILL INCLUDE VISITS TO RELEVANT FACILITIES, DOCUMENT EXCHANGES AND DISCUSSIONS AMONG EXPERTS.
- THE SIDES SHALL BEGIN DESTRUCTION NO LATER THAN THE END OF 1992 AND WILL REACH THE AGREED 5000 AGENT TON LEVEL BY THE END OF 2002. THERE IS A PROVISION, HOWEVER, THAT IF A PARTY EXPERIENCES PROBLEMS THAT PREVENT IF FROM DESTROYING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT A RATE SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE BENCHMARKS CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT, IT WILL NOTIFY AND CONSULT WITH THE OTHER PARTY. THE OTHER PARTY WILL BE REQUIRED TO DESTROY ITS CW STOCKS AT A RATE NO GREATER THAN THAT OF THE PARTY EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES.
- THE SIDES SHALL NOT PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- 10 -

- THERE WILL BE INSPECTION OF CW DESTRUCTION, PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND STORAGE FACILITIES.
- THE TWO PARTIES WILL COOPERATE IN DEVELOPING, TESTING AND CARRYING OUT PROCEDURES FOR APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION, AND WILL CONDUCT TRIAL CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS TO FACILITATE ELABORATION OF THE MULTILATERAL CW CONVENTION {CWC}.
- o THE PARTIES ALSO AGREE TO JOINTLY PROPOSE IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CWC:
 - FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN CW STOCKS TO 500 AGENT TONS EIGHT YEARS AFTER THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE; AND
 - A REVIEW CONFERENCE AT THE END OF THE EIGHTH YEAR TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PARTICIPATION IN THE CONVENTION IS SUFFICIENT FOR PROCEEDING TO TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ALL REMAINING CW STOCKS OVER THE SUBSEQUENT TWO YEARS. THIS WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR ENSURING ADHERENCE TO THE CWC BY ALL CW-CAPABLE STATES.

{NUCLEAR TESTING}

- o IN NUCLEAR TESTING, WE HAVE NOW RESOLVED THE REMAINING ISSUES IN THE VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS TO THE TWO TESTING TREATIES.
 - THE PROTOCOL TO THE 1976 PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY IS COMPLETE AND THE TEXT CONFORMED. IT IS READY TO BE SIGNED.
 - OUR DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA WILL FINALIZE THE PROTOCOL TO THE 1974 THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY IN THE NEXT TEN DAYS. ALL ISSUES ARE RESOLVED; WE NEED ONLY CONFORM TEXTS.
- o THESE PROTOCOLS WILL PROVIDE EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION THROUGH A REGIME THAT INCLUDES ON-SITE HYDRODYNAMIC YIELD MEASUREMENT, ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AND IN-COUNTRY SEISMIC MEASUREMENTS.
- o THE COMPLETION OF THESE PROTOCOLS MEETS THE GOAL THE TWO PRESIDENTS SET IN MALTA OF HAVING THEM READY FOR THE SUMMIT.
 - THE TESTING TREATIES, FINISHED 15 YEARS AGO, WILL THEN BE SENT WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE PROTOCOLS TO THE SENATE FOR RATIFICATION.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- 11 -

{NON-PROLIFERATION STATEMENT}

- 12/18
- O THE SIDES HAVE NEARLY COMPLETED A JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION.
 - O THE STATEMENT CONTAINS FOUR SECTIONS:
 - A PREAMBLE DESCRIBING GENERAL OPPOSITION TO PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, MISSILES CAPABLE OF CARRYING SUCH WEAPONS, AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSILES AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGIES;
 - A SECTION ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, INCLUDING EXPRESSION OF THE SIDES' SUPPORT FOR THE NPT AND INCREASED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON SAFEGUARDS;
 - A SECTION ON MISSILE AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY NON-PROLIFERATION, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR THE OBJECTIVES OF THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME {MTCR} AND EXPORT CONTROLS TO RESTRICT MISSILE PROLIFERATION ON A WORLDWIDE BASIS; AND
 - A SECTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION, INCLUDING THE SIDES' COMMITMENT TO A GLOBAL BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL INITIATIVES, AND THE INSTITUTION OF EXPORT CONTROLS TO STEM THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

REGIONAL PROBLEMS

{AFGHANISTAN}

- O AFGHANISTAN WAS A PRIORITY ISSUE FOR SECRETARY BAKER.
- O HE URGED SHEVARDNADZE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A COMMON SET OF PRINCIPLES FOR AN AFGHAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR AN APPROPRIATE, NEUTRAL TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY AS THE SOLE REPOSITORY OF POWER. SUCH A TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY WOULD PREPARE FOR AND CONDUCT ELECTIONS IN THE AFGHAN TRADITION.
 - THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, I.E. WHERE POWER IS TRANSFERRED TO A NEUTRAL TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO NAJIBULLAH AND HIS ASSOCIATES PARTICIPATING IN THE ELECTION PROCESS.
- O SHEVARDNADZE ARGUED THAT NAJIBULLAH SHOULD NOT HAVE TO STEP DOWN, CITING ORTEGA'S ROLE IN NICARAGUA. HE ALSO SAID THAT ANY PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT INVITE OPPOSITION FROM THE AFGHAN PARTIES.

SECRET

000644

SECRET

SECRET
- 12 -

- 13/11
- THE SECRETARY DISPUTED THE ANALOGY, POINTING OUT THAT NAJIBULLAH HAD BEEN INSTALLED BY AN OUTSIDE POWER.
 - MOREOVER, HE ADDED THAT ALLOWING NAJIBULLAH TO REMAIN HEAD OF STATE DURING A TRANSITION WAS BOUND TO INVITE REJECTION FROM THE RESISTANCE, AND WOULD GUARANTEE AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF ENGAGING THE RESISTANCE IN AN ELECTORAL PROCESS.
- O FOLLOW-UP EXPERTS TALKS LED TO AGREEMENT ON SOME, BUT NOT ALL, PRINCIPLES.
- {KASHMIR}
- O THE MINISTERS DISCUSSED KASHMIR. THE U.S. NOTED THAT THE SITUATION HAD DETERIORATED SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING.
- WE INFORMED THE SOVIET SIDE THAT DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ROBERT GATES WOULD BE TRAVELING TO PAKISTAN AND INDIA AS THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL EMISSARY.
 - THE SECRETARY NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF ALL PARTIES AND URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN IN AN APPEAL TO THIS END.
 - SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT JOINT EFFORTS WOULD GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF INTERNATIONALIZING THE CONFLICT, BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. AND USSR CONTINUE THEIR RESPECTIVE EFFORTS TO URGE RESTRAINT ON BOTH SIDES.

{AFRICA}

- O THE SIDES FOCUSED THEIR DISCUSSION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN ETHIOPIA AND ANGOLA.
- ON ETHIOPIA, THE SECRETARY MADE A STRONG PLEA ON THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY AND COOPERATIVELY TO PREVENT FURTHER STARVATION, PROPOSING THAT SOVIET AIRCRAFT CARRY U.S. HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AID. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE SOON WITH THE MENGISTU GOVERNMENT AND WOULD BRIEF THE U.S. ON THE RESULTS.
 - ON ANGOLA, THE SIDES EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE BEST WAY TO DEVELOP DIRECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE MPLA AND UNITA.
 - BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA BUT AGREED THAT THIS WAS ONLY THE BEGINNING OF A LONG PROCESS TO END APARTHEID.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 13 -

{CENTRAL AMERICA}

- THE SECRETARY AND THE MINISTER REVIEWED PROGRESS IN THE REGION, INCLUDING THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE NEWLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN NICARAGUA.
- THE SECRETARY REITERATED OUR APPRECIATION FOR SOVIET SUPPORT ON NICARAGUA AND URGED THE SOVIETS TO SUPPORT A BROADER CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PROCESS BY GETTING CUBA TO END ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE FMLN IN EL SALVADOR.
- WE HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR AND NOTED THE ROLE CUBA PLAYS IN FUELING THE FMLN'S ARMED STRUGGLE.

-- THE SOVIETS AGAIN URGED US TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE CUBANS ON OUR CONCERNS, BUT STATED THEY WOULD WORK ON THE CUBANS TO SUPPORT DIALOGUE IN EL SALVADOR.

{ASIA}

- ON CAMBODIA, THE SIDES REVIEWED THEIR POSITIONS AND NOTED THAT THE BEST CHANCE FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT DEPENDED ON MAKING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AT THE NEXT PERM FIVE MEETING IN NEW YORK {MAY 25-26}.
- ON KOREA, WE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF PYONGYANG SIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING AN IAEA NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITHOUT DELAY. WE ALSO NOTED THAT SOVIET EFFORTS TO QUIETLY URGE THE DPRK TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS HAD FAILED AND REQUIRED A MORE EFFECTIVE, PUBLIC APPROACH.

-- THE SOVIETS WERE RELUCTANT TO PRESS THE NORTH KOREANS PUBLICLY AND SUGGESTED DIRECT U.S.-DPRK CONTACTS.

{MIDDLE EAST}

- THE MINISTERS DID NOT ADDRESS THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, BUT THE SOVIETS REITERATED CONCERNS ABOUT SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRANTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
- THE SECRETARY CALLED ON THE SOVIETS TO FACILITATE TRAVEL OF SOVIET JEWS TO ISRAEL.
- SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLORE WAYS TO FACILITATE TRAVEL, BUT SAID DIRECT FLIGHTS REMAINED "UNREALISTIC." HE URGED THE U.S. TO INCREASE ITS REFUGEE AND IMMIGRATION QUOTAS FOR SOVIET JEWS.
- THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE U.S. WOULD ADMIT ALMOST TWICE AS MANY SOVIET EMIGRANTS IN 1990 AS IN 1989.

SECRET

000646

SECRET

SECRET

- 14 -

15/18

BILATERAL ISSUES

- O THE BILATERAL WORKING GROUP FOCUSED ON FINALIZING AGREEMENTS FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT.
- O WE HAVE NOW AGREED ON THE SPECIFICS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MALTA INITIATIVE TO INCREASE UNIVERSITY-LEVEL STUDENT EXCHANGES BY 1000 IN EACH DIRECTION.
- O AN AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CULTURAL-INFORMATION CENTERS IN ONE ANOTHER'S CAPITALS HAS ALSO BEEN COMPLETED.
- O WE ARE CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY.
 - WE HOPE REMAINING DIFFERENCES WILL BE IRONED OUT IN TALKS THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON.
- O OTHER BILATERAL ACCORDS READY FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT INCLUDE:
 - AN AGREEMENT FIXING THE PACIFIC MARITIME BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR; AND
 - AN EXPANDED AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN OCEAN STUDIES.
- O FINALLY, WE DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS STEPS THE SIDES COULD TAKE TO IMPROVE LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS FOR ONE ANOTHER'S DIPLOMATS, JOURNALISTS AND BUSINESSMEN.
 - AMONG THE CONCRETE RESULTS WAS AN AGREEMENT TO INCREASE OUR EMBASSY STAFF CEILINGS BY 30 PEOPLE IN THREE STAGES OVER THE NEXT YEAR.

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

- O ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, THE TWO SIDES FOCUSED ON COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD OR COULD BE READY FOR SUMMIT SIGNATURE. THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENTS WILL BE READY FOR THE SUMMIT:
 - A TRADE AGREEMENT, WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR EXPANDED COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR OVER THE FOLLOWING THREE YEARS;
 - A LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT, WHICH WILL ESTABLISH MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM PARAMETERS FOR SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES FOR 5 YEARS STARTING IN JANUARY 1991; AND

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 15 -

- 16/1
- A MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT WHICH WILL ONCE AGAIN ALLOW SOVIET AND AMERICAN SHIPS TO CARRY CARGO TO AND FROM EACH OTHER'S PORTS (FOR FIVE YEARS).
 - O THE SECRETARY NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET PASSAGE OF AN EMIGRATION LAW NOW SO THAT PRESIDENT BUSH COULD WAIVE THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT. THIS WAIVER, ALONG WITH PASSAGE OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT, IS NEEDED FOR EXTENSION OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS.
 - THE SOVIETS NOTED THAT THE EMIGRATION LEGISLATION WAS SCHEDULED TO HAVE ITS SECOND READING BY THE SUPREME SOVIET ON MAY 31, WITH APPROVAL AND ENACTMENT AT THAT TIME.
 - SHEVARDNADZE WAS "CONFIDENT" THIS WOULD HAPPEN MAY 31, BUT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE IT.
 - GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL REALITIES, THE SITUATION IN THE BALTICS MAY ALSO HAVE A BEARING ON WHETHER WE SIGN THE TRADE AGREEMENT.
 - O AS A RESULT OF TALKS DURING THE WEEK OF THE MINISTERIAL, JUST ONE ISSUE REMAINS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON AN EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT, WHICH WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE U.S.-SOVIET AIR ROUTES.
 - WE AND THE SOVIETS AGREED TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE IN TIME FOR THE SUMMIT.
 - O WE ALSO REVIEWED THE STATUS OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECTS AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING ON A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, A TAX TREATY AND A FINANCIAL CLAIMS SETTLEMENT.
 - O THE SIDES NOTED WITH SATISFACTION:
 - GATT ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS;
 - THE ASSENT OF BOTH PARTIES TO THE FINAL DOCUMENT AT THE BONN CSCE ECONOMIC CONFERENCE (WITH ITS ENDORSEMENT OF MARKET PRINCIPLES);
 - SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE EBRD; AND
 - INCREASED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE OECD.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 16 -

HUMAN RIGHTS

- WE HAD A CONSTRUCTIVE REVIEW OF THE WIDE RANGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES.
- ON EMIGRATION, THE SOVIETS BRIEFED US ON THE LATEST VERSION OF THE ENTRY/EXIT LAW WHICH, AS NOTED, MAY BE ENACTED BY THE SUPREME SOVIET ON MAY 31.
- THE SOVIETS REPORTED RESOLUTION OF 12 OF THE REMAINING 79 CASES ON OUR REFUSENIK LIST.
- THERE HAD ONLY BEEN LIMITED PROGRESS, HOWEVER, ON THE LONGEST-TERM CASES THAT PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED WITH GORBACHEV IN MALTA.

-- THE SECRETARY RAISED THIS PROBLEM WITH GORBACHEV, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE THE PRESIDENT ATTACHES TO RESOLVING THESE CASES BY THE SUMMIT. HE NOTED THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS HAD NOT HAD ACCESS TO STATE SECRETS IN MORE THAN 10 YEARS.

-- GORBACHEV AGREED TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK.

- THE SECRETARY ALSO RAISED WITH SHEVARDNADZE OUR CONCERN ABOUT RISING ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE USSR, URGING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO SPEAK OUT IN CONDEMNING THIS DEVELOPMENT.
- THE SECRETARY MET WITH A GROUP OF LONG-TERM REFUSENIKS, TO UNDERScore OUR CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO SECURING THEIR RIGHT TO EMIGRATE. THERE WAS A LIVELY EXCHANGE ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW EMIGRATION LAW.
- AT THE WORKING LEVEL, THE SIDES REVIEWED DISPUTED PRISONER CASES AND AGREED TO CONTINUE THE EXCHANGE OF COURT RECORDS AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION.
- THEY ALSO REVIEWED THE EXPANDING RANGE OF EXCHANGES OF U.S. AND SOVIET SPECIALISTS IN THE AREA OF THE RULE OF LAW, AND ON SUCH HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AS PROBLEMS OF THE AGED, THE HANDICAPPED, AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY.
- THE U.S. AGREED TO RESCHEDULE THE RECENTLY POSTPONED VISIT OF SOVIET PSYCHIATRISTS TO THE UNITED STATES.
- THE SOVIETS MADE CLEAR THAT THEIR CHANGE IN DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY WILL GRADUALLY BE REFLECTED IN INCREASED COOPERATION WITH THE DEMOCRACIES ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY AS THEY ARISE IN THE UNITED NATIONS. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW MAKING DEMARCHES AGAINST THE PROPOSED EXPANSION OF THE UNHRC.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 17 -

18/18

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

- ON TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES, WE DISCUSSED SIX AREAS WHERE WE SEE AGREEMENT OR COMMON GROUND. THESE MAY BE REFLECTED IN JOINT STATEMENTS AT THE SUMMIT.
 - TERRORISM: THE USSR MOVED ANOTHER STEP TOWARD PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF STATE TERRORISM.
 - THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: THE SOVIETS AGREED TO ENCOURAGE PRACTICAL MEASURES IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, MONITORING AND RESEARCH.
 - INTERNATIONAL PARK: AS A TRIBUTE TO THE COMMON NATURAL AND CULTURAL HERITAGE OF ALASKA AND SIBERIA, THE PARK WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN 1991.
 - THE INTERNATIONAL THERMONUCLEAR EXPERIMENTAL REACTOR: JOINT STATEMENT LANGUAGE CONVEYS A POSITIVE TONE, BUT STOPS SHORT OF COMMITMENTS TO THE NEXT PHASE OF THIS IAEA ACTIVITY.
 - ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION: THIS NEW AGREEMENT IS SUBSTANTIALLY RENEGOTIATED, WHILE CARRYING OVER RESEARCH FROM ITS PREDECESSOR AGREEMENT. IT INCLUDES NEW WORK ON OPERATIONAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND STUDY OF CHERNOBYL AFTER-EFFECTS.
 - NARCOTICS: THE CUSTOMS SERVICES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE PREPARED FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT AN AGREEMENT RELATING TO CONTROL OF ILLEGAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.
- IN SUM, WE HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR GOOD AND PRODUCTIVE MEETING WHEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS MEET IN WASHINGTON IN LITTLE MORE THAN A WEEK'S TIME.
 - OF COURSE, WE WILL BE PROVIDING A DETAILED READ-OUT ON THOSE EXCHANGES.

FO1314/ST162986

SECRET

000650

Canada Canada
SECRET

MESSAGE

6020004/21

First character of Security Classification
Alphabetic le premier caractère de la Sécurité

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

SECRET PAR FAX CLASSIFIE

⑩ ③ ⑪
⑤ ④ 1/15

FM DE

DE WSHDC UNGR298 21MAI90

TO A

A EXTOTT RBR URR IDR/IDA LIVRAISON 220830

INFO

INFO BNATO VNACE BONN PARIS LDN GENEV de OTT

DISTR

DIST IFB RGB URB IDD RWD RBD CPD CPP RWR IDAO IDAN IDAV PNR

REF

GAA LSR GMR EER

SUBJ: SUJ

---REUNION BAKER/SHEVARNADZE - NOTES D'INFORMATION DU DEPART
D'ETAT

VOUS FAISONS PARVENIR POUR INFORMATION, COPIE DE NOTES QUI
FURENT UTILISEES LORS DE LA SESSION D'INFORMATION DE L'OTAN LE
21 MAI, PRESIDEE PAR LE SOUS-SECRETAIRE POUR LES AFFAIRES
CANADIENNES ET EUROPEENNES RAYMOND SEITZ.

2. POUR RBR: ETAT DES NEGOCIATIONS EN CE QUI CONCERNE LES
DIFFERENTS ACCORDS QUI POURRAIENT ETRE SIGNES LORS DU SOMMET
APPARAIT PRINCIPALEMENT SOUS LA RUBRIQUE QUOTE BILATERAL
ISSUES UNQUOTE.

3. COMCENTRE PLEASE FAX ATTACHED 17 PAGES

RETURN TO RENOYER AU	TOUR - E AU E AU PC
ACC 655485	REF DATE USSR
FILE 20-USA-1-32	
27-4-NATO	
28-COMBLOC-1	

DRAFTER-REDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVE

G. COSSET

POLITICAL

7409

P. CHAPIN

SIG

SIG

000651

SECRET

SECRET

2

May 21, 199

MOSCOW MINISTERIAL, MAY 16-19, 1990

2/

OVERVIEW

- SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAD USEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGES MAY 16-19 IN MOSCOW. THEY DISCUSSED THE FULL RANGE OF U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES AS WELL AS PREPARATIONS FOR THE UPCOMING SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV.
 - THE ATMOSPHERE WAS POSITIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE, BUT THE BARGAINING WAS AT TIMES PAINFULLY SLOW.
 - WITH THE SOVIETS PREOCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND UNEASY ABOUT THE ACCELERATING PACE OF CHANGE IN EUROPE, THEY SEEMED TO BE MORE RELUCTANT TO MAKE DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY ON ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS.
 - THE SOVIET MILITARY PLAYED A PROMINENT ROLE IN THE DISCUSSIONS, SUGGESTING INCREASED SENSITIVITY OVER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES THAT AFFECT THE DEFENSE OF THE SOVIET HOMELAND.
- THE MINISTERS MET FOR MORE THAN 15 HOURS, INCLUDING ABOUT 5 HOURS IN A PRIVATE FORMAT. THE SECRETARY SPENT FIVE HOURS WITH GORBACHEV, INCLUDING THREE AND A HALF WITH JUST GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE.
- GIVEN THE PROXIMITY OF THE SUMMIT, THE MINISTERIAL FOCUSED IN LARGE PART ON THE AGREEMENTS THE TWO LEADERS WANT TO BE ABLE TO SIGN OR ANNOUNCE IN WASHINGTON.
 - THE STAGE IS SET FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT THAT YIELDS CONCRETE RESULTS ON SEVERAL PARTS OF THE AGENDA. THESE INCLUDE MANY OF THE SPECIFIC GOALS THAT THE TWO PRESIDENTS AGREED UPON DURING THEIR DECEMBER MEETING IN MALTA.
 - THE LEADERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO SIGN A BILATERAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT AND VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS TO THE TWO NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES. WE HOPE THEY WILL BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE RESOLUTION OF ALL MAJOR START ISSUES; THEY HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN PUT IN A POSITION WHERE THAT IS POSSIBLE.
 - THERE ALSO SHOULD BE A NUMBER OF OTHER BILATERAL AND ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 2 -

3

- O THE MINISTERS ALSO FOCUSED ON URGENT PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE BALTIC SITUATION AND GERMAN UNIFICATION.
- O LET ME NOW TURN TO THE DETAILS OF THE MINISTERIAL. 3/1

BALTIC SITUATION

- O THE SECRETARY DEVOTED A GOOD PORTION OF HIS PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV TO THE BALTICS. IN ADDITION, HE ALSO MET WITH LITHUANIAN PRIME MINISTER PRUNSKIENE ON MAY 18, THE DAY FOLLOWING HER MEETING WITH GORBACHEV.
- O WE HAVE, OF COURSE, BEEN FOLLOWING THE SITUATION IN THE BALTICS CLOSELY AND WITH INCREASING UNEASE.
 - PARTICULARLY DISTURBING WAS MOSCOW'S HASTY REJECTION OF THE RECENT STEPS TAKEN BY LATVIA AND ESTONIA, WHICH HAD MADE CLEAR EFFORTS TO ADOPT A MORE CAUTIOUS AND NUANCED APPROACH IN RESPONSE TO THE CONCERNS MOSCOW HAD EXPRESSED ABOUT LITHUANIA'S MARCH 11 DECLARATION.
- O SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT INCREASED PLURALISM HAD NOT ONLY UNLEASHED POSITIVE FORCES SHAPED BY "NEW THINKING," BUT EXTREMIST FORCES AS WELL. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT LITHUANIA COULD SET OFF A CHAIN REACTION IF IT WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE USSR ON THE BASIS OF AN "ILLEGAL ACTION" -- THE MARCH 11 DECLARATION.
 - HE ARGUED THAT LITHUANIA SHOULD PURSUE INDEPENDENCE THROUGH THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND NOTED THAT INDEPENDENCE COULD BE AN OUTCOME OF THIS PROCESS.
- O GORBACHEV ASSERTED THAT HE WAS UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO APPLY MORE FORCEFUL MEASURES AGAINST VILNIUS, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY THE IMPOSITION OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL RULE.
- O GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD PRUNSKIENE DURING THEIR MAY 17 MEETING THAT, IF LITHUANIA SUSPENDED ITS MARCH 11 DECLARATION, MOSCOW WAS PREPARED QUICKLY TO ESTABLISH COMMITTEES TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASPECTS TO "MAKE SELF-DETERMINATION REAL."
 - HE SAID SELF-DETERMINATION DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN INDEPENDENCE, ARGUING THAT IT SHOULD BE DECIDED BY A REFERENDUM. IF THE LITHUANIANS CHOSE INDEPENDENCE IN A REFERENDUM, HE SAID, THE DETAILS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT. THE IMPORTANT POINT WAS TO HAVE MOVEMENT TOWARD INDEPENDENCE TAKE PLACE IN A PROCESS.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

- GORBACHEV STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT ASKING VILNIUS TO NULLIFY ITS DECLARATION, BUT MERELY TO SUSPEND IT. HE RECOGNIZED THAT RESCINDING THE DECLARATION WAS SOMETHING THE LITHUANIANS COULD NOT DO.
- o GORBACHEV'S DECISION TO RECEIVE PRUNSKIENE WAS, OF COURSE, A WELCOME STEP. IT REPRESENTED A QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN CONTACTS.
- IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THE SIDES' APPROACHES WERE NECESSARILY BROUGHT CLOSER, BUT THE MEETING DID HELP EACH PARTY CLARIFY THE OTHER'S POSITION.
- THE KEY THING NOW IS FOR THE TWO SIDES TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN A REAL DIALOGUE AND FOR MOSCOW TO PUT AN END TO ITS ECONOMIC BLOCKADE.
- o IN HIS MEETING WITH PRUNSKIENE, THE SECRETARY GAVE HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET APPROACH, AND THE TWO EXCHANGED VIEWS ON WHAT STEPS MIGHT OPEN THE WAY TO A DIALOGUE BETWEEN LITHUANIA AND THE SOVIETS.
- o BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ON INTERNAL QUESTIONS.
- SHEVARDNADZE DESCRIBED THE UPCOMING PARTY CONGRESS AS A WATERSHED EVENT IN DECIDING THE SOVIET UNION'S FUTURE.
- HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BEGINNING TO PREPARE THE SOVIET PUBLIC FOR A TRANSITION TO A "PLANNED MARKET." HE RULED OUT ANY ATTEMPT AT SHOCK THERAPY A LA POLAND.
- GORBACHEV EMPHASIZED THE DIFFICULTY THE SOVIETS FACED IN MAKING THIS TRANSITION, AND HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR INCREASED WESTERN INVESTMENT.

GERMAN UNIFICATION

- o THE SECRETARY DISCUSSED GERMANY WITH GORBACHEV.
- GORBACHEV WAS UNYIELDING IN HIS OBJECTION TO A UNIFIED GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, ARGUING THAT THIS WAS NOT JUST A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM, BUT A STRATEGIC ISSUE FOR THE USSR.
- THE SECRETARY REITERATED OUR VIEW THAT GERMANY'S NATO MEMBERSHIP WAS THE BEST GUARANTEE OF LONG-TERM STABILITY IN EUROPE. THE U.S. AND ALL EUROPEAN STATES WITH AN OPINION ON THE SUBJECT WERE IN AGREEMENT ON THIS.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

- THE SECRETARY ARGUED THAT, CONSISTENT WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, GERMANY SHOULD BE FREE TO CHOOSE ITS ALLIANCES.
- O THE SECRETARY REVIEWED THE STEPS THE PRESIDENT HAD PROPOSED ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES -- INCLUDING EARLY CFE FOLLOW-ON TALKS, ACCELERATED SNF NEGOTIATIONS, A STRENGTHENED CSCE PROCESS, A REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY -- ARGUING THAT THESE ADDRESSED SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS.
- GORBACHEV SAID THESE STEPS WERE WELCOME, BUT DID NOT ALTER HIS VIEW OF GERMAN NATO MEMBERSHIP.
- O SHEVARDNADZE STATED THAT THE SOVIETS INTENDED TO SEEK DIRECT LIMITS ON THE BUNDESWEHR IN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR TALKS.
- THE SECRETARY COUNTERED THAT DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCE LIMITS COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IN CFE.

ARMS CONTROL

- O WE MADE IMPORTANT PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL IN MOSCOW. WE STILL HAVE CONSIDERABLE WORK TO DO BETWEEN NOW AND THE GORBACHEV VISIT TO WASHINGTON.
 - SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS WILL COME TO WASHINGTON PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT TO CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO RESOLVE START ISSUES AS WELL AS TO CONTINUE EXCHANGES ON CFE.
- {START}
- O ON START, OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES MUST STILL BE RESOLVED IF THE PRESIDENTS ARE TO ANNOUNCE THE RESOLUTION OF ALL MAJOR ISSUES.
 - O WE SUCCEEDED IN MOSCOW IN SETTLING THE KEY QUESTIONS OF LIMITS ON AIR- AND SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES -- ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN UNRESOLVED FOR YEARS.
 - O TWO IMPORTANT ADVANCES IN MOSCOW WERE THE SOVIETS' AGREEMENT TO DROP THEIR PROPOSAL TO COUNT IN START TACTICAL AIRCRAFT WITH CONVENTIONAL ALCMS, AND TO DROP THEIR PROPOSAL TO INSPECT THE B-2. THESE WERE POTENTIAL TREATY-BLOCKERS FOR US.
 - O ON ALCMS, THE SIDES HAVE NOW AGREED TO A PACKAGE APPROACH. ITS MAIN ELEMENTS INCLUDE:

SECRET

SECRE

SECRET
- 5 -

- THE COUNTING RULES AGREED IN FEBRUARY ARE CONFIRMED, I.E. B-52S, B-1S AND FUTURE U.S. HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED TO CARRY ALCMS WILL COUNT AS 10 IN START'S AGGREGATE WEAPON LIMIT OF 6000 AND CAN BE EQUIPPED TO CARRY NO MORE THAN 20. THE ATTRIBUTION AND MAXIMUM NUMBERS FOR BEAR-H, BLACKJACK AND FUTURE SOVIET HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS ARE 8 AND 12.
- THE ATTRIBUTION RULE WILL APPLY TO U.S. BOMBERS UP TO 150; SHOULD THE U.S. DEPLOY MORE THAN 150 ALCM BOMBERS, THOSE ADDITIONAL BOMBERS WILL BE COUNTED IN THE 6000 LIMIT AT THE NUMBER OF ALCMS FOR WHICH THEY ARE ACTUALLY EQUIPPED, NOT THE NUMBERS DERIVED BY THE ATTRIBUTION RULE.
- TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THEIR SMALLER ALCM-CARRYING CAPACITY, THE SOVIETS WILL BE ALLOWED 40 PERCENT MORE ALCM BOMBERS COUNTED AT THE ATTRIBUTED NUMBER, BEFORE THEY MUST BEGIN COUNTING EXTRA BOMBERS AT THE "AS-ACTUALLY-EQUIPPED" NUMBER OF ALCMS.
- IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE REST OF OUR PACKAGE, WE HAVE AGREED TO THE SOVIET-PROPOSED RANGE THRESHOLD OF 600 KM FOR ALCMS.
- MOVING TO 600 KM POSED ONE PROBLEM FOR US. WE AGREED IN 1988 THAT ALL EXISTING LONG-RANGE ALCMS SHOULD BE TREATED AS NUCLEAR. HOWEVER, WE SUBSEQUENTLY TESTED A CONVENTIONAL ALCM -- KNOWN AS TACIT RAINBOW -- WITH A RANGE BETWEEN 600 AND 800 KM THAT THE U.S. IN AGREEING TO A 600 KM ALCM RANGE THRESHOLD, CARE NEEDED TO BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THIS CONVENTIONAL MISSILE WAS NOT CAPTURED BY START.
- WE RESOLVED THIS BY OBTAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER TACIT RAINBOW TO BE A FUTURE COVENTIONAL ALCM, WHICH IT IS. THEREFORE, TACIT RAINBOW WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE DISTINGUISHABILITY AND EXHIBITION RULES FOR CONVENTIONAL ALCMS, BUT WILL NOT COUNT UNDER START.
- WE HAVE ALSO REACHED AGREEMENT ON A SLCM PACKAGE. THE ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS AGREED IN MOSCOW INCLUDE:
 - EACH SIDE WILL ISSUE POLITICALLY-BINDING DECLARATIONS ON NUCLEAR SLCMS; THE DECLARATIONS WILL INCLUDE A STATEMENT THAT THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR SLCMS DEPLOYED AT ANY ONE TIME SHALL NOT EXCEED 880 FOR THE DURATION OF THE TREATY.
 - THE RANGE THRESHOLD FOR NUCLEAR SLCMS THAT WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DECLARATIONS IS 600 KM.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

- IN ADDITION, THE SIDES WILL HAVE AN ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL DATA EXCHANGE ON ALL NUCLEAR SLCMS WITH RANGES IN EXCESS OF 300 KM.
- THE SOVIET SIDE DROPPED ITS DEMAND THAT NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SLCMS BE DISTINGUISHABLE, SOMETHING WE COULD NOT ACCEPT BECAUSE IT WOULD CAPTURE ALL OUR CONVENTIONAL SLCMS (DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF THE TOMAHAWK SLCM ARE INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM ONE ANOTHER). THE U.S. FEELS STRONGLY THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCES MUST NOT BE CONSTRAINED BY START.
- THE DECLARATIONS WILL, AT SOVIET REQUEST, INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO THE 1987 WASHINGTON SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT LANGUAGE ABOUT SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND EFFECTIVE METHODS TO VERIFY NUCLEAR SLCMS. WE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED.
- ON MOBILE ICBMS, WE PROPOSED A SUBLIMIT OF 800 ON THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON SUCH SYSTEMS. THE SOVIETS REDUCED THEIR PREVIOUS PROPOSAL FROM 1600 WARHEADS TO 1200, BUT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO BRING THIS TO CLOSURE.
- ON OTHER START ISSUES:
 - WE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE TREATY'S DURATION WILL BE 15 YEARS, WITH A PROVISION FOR FIVE-YEAR EXTENSIONS.
 - WE HAVE WORKED ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION LANGUAGE THAT FULLY PROTECTS OUR EXISTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM. PARTS OF THIS PACKAGE HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS AND OTHER PARTS ARE STILL BEING REVIEWED.
 - WE PROPOSED A POLITICALLY-BINDING SOVIET STATEMENT: CAPPING BACKFIRE AT A LEVEL OF 400; OBLIGING THE SOVIETS NOT TO GIVE IT AN INTERCONTINENTAL CAPABILITY; AND INCLUDING IN CFE ALL BACKFIRE IN THE ATTU AREA, INCLUDING THOSE IN NAVAL AVIATION. THE SOVIETS OPPOSED THESE LIMITS.
 - WE ALSO PROPOSED TO RELAX OUR CURRENT PROVISIONS ON HEAVY ICBMS, WHICH WOULD HAVE BANNED PRODUCTION, MODERNIZATION OR FLIGHT-TESTING, TO ALLOW PRODUCTION UNTIL 1993 AND TO PERMIT TWO FLIGHT TESTS PER YEAR. THE SOVIETS STRONGLY OPPOSED HEAVY ICBM LIMITS BEYOND THE 154 MISSILES AND 1540 WARHEADS ALREADY AGREED.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- 7 -

{CFE}

- O AS WE INFORMED THE ALLIES EARLY LAST WEEK, WE FLOATED SOME NEW IDEAS WITH THE SOVIETS FOR BRINGING CFE TO EARLY CLOSURE. THEY LISTENED WITH INTEREST, BUT WERE NOT READY TO ENGAGE IN A WAY THAT SUGGESTED THEY ARE NOW PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD.
- O WE HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS ON CFE. (AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SEITZ WILL DISCUSS THESE IN MORE DETAIL AT THE MAY 21 NAC MEETING.)
- O AS OUTLINED IN SECRETARY BAKER'S LETTER TO NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS, WE VIEWED THIS MEETING AS AN OCCASION BOTH TO STRESS TO THE SOVIETS THE CONTINUING CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF CFE AND TO MAKE CLEAR OUR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE SOVIET CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT.
- O WE PUT FORWARD SOME IDEAS IN THE AREAS MENTIONED IN THE SECRETARY'S LETTER, STRESSING THAT THESE, WHILE GENERALLY GROUNDED IN AN ALLIANCE CONSENSUS, REPRESENTED U.S. IDEAS, NOT ALLIANCE POSITIONS.
 - WE STRESSED ALSO THAT WE PUT THESE IDEAS FORWARD AS A STRATEGIC WHOLE, DESIGNED TO BRING THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS TO CLOSURE.
- O OUR EXPLORATIONS FOCUSED ON SEVERAL AREAS.
 - AIRCRAFT: WE SOUGHT TO IDENTIFY MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT POSITIONS. WE STRESSED THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF INCLUDING LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT, BUT SUGGESTED THAT, IF THE SOVIETS ACCOMMODATED OUR VIEWS ON THIS IMPORTANT POINT, WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND TO OUR ALLIES THAT THE WEST MOVE TOWARD THE PACT POSITION ON A SEPARATE CEILING FOR COMBAT-CAPABLE TRAINERS, ALTHOUGH NOT AT THE LEVEL THE PACT PROPOSES, AND TO ADJUST UPWARD THE NUMBER OF AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS.
 - DESTRUCTION: WE SUGGESTED THAT, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF ALL EQUIPMENT MUST BE IRREVERSIBLY ELIMINATED, THERE COULD BE POSSIBILITIES FOR SALVAGE AND CIVILIAN USE OF SOME EQUIPMENT WHOSE MILITARY CAPABILITY HAD BEEN SO ELIMINATED.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- 8 -

- VERIFICATION: WITHOUT SACRIFICING THE PRINCIPLE OF STRINGENT VERIFICATION, WE SUGGESTED THERE MAY BE WAYS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF BASELINE AND RESIDUAL INSPECTIONS BY INCREASING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE INSPECTIONS -- POSSIBLY BY USE OF HELICOPTERS AND AIRCRAFT.
- GROUND EQUIPMENT: HERE AGAIN WE WERE LOOKING FOR MIDDLE GROUND; THE DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN VIENNA SUGGESTED SOME OBVIOUS OUTCOMES.
- SUFFICIENCY RULE: GIVEN THE RESERVATIONS EXPRESSED BY SEVERAL ALLIES IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY BAKER'S LETTER, WE PUT FORWARD NO IDEAS ON CHANGING THE WESTERN POSITION.
- THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SOME OF OUR IDEAS, BUT DID NOT GIVE US CONCRETE RESPONSES.
- MANPOWER WAS DISCUSSED EXTENSIVELY. THE SOVIETS MADE A THREE-FOLD PROPOSAL AT THE OUTSET THAT THEY ALMOST IMMEDIATELY MODIFIED:
 - A SEPARATE AGREEMENT EMBODYING THE OTTAWA AGREEMENT ON U.S.-SOVIET MANPOWER, TO BE SIGNED AT THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT, THAT LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER MANPOWER LIMITS. WHEN WE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE, THEY FELL BACK TO PRESSING US TO DRAFT TREATY LANGUAGE IN VIENNA. THEY WERE RELUCTANT, HOWEVER, TO AGREE TO SETTING FORTH CLEARLY THAT THE OTTAWA AGREEMENT EXHAUSTED PERSONNEL LIMITS FOR CFE I.
 - LIMITATIONS ON THE FORCES OF A FUTURE UNIFIED GERMANY TO BE RESOLVED IN TWO-PLUS-FOUR, BUT POSSIBLY EXPRESSED ULTIMATELY IN CFE. WE MADE CLEAR THERE WAS NO VENUE IN WHICH WE WERE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE LIMITATIONS ON THE BUNDESWEHR AS SUCH, THAT WE FIRMLY OPPOSED "SINGULARIZATION" OF GERMANY, AND THAT WE DID NOT INTEND TO DISCUSS CONVENTIONAL FORCES LIMITATIONS IN TWO-PLUS-FOUR.
 - PROVIDED THOSE TWO ELEMENTS WERE AGREED IN THE WAY THEY PROPOSED, THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO DEFER THE ISSUE OF BROADER MANPOWER LIMITS TO A SUBSEQUENT PHASE.
- WE INSISTED THAT THE OTTAWA AGREEMENT SHOULD BE THE SOLE MANPOWER LIMIT IN CFE, BUT SAID WE WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A RANGE OF ISSUES IN A CFE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATION, INCLUDING LIMITATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 9 -

- 0 THE SOVIETS HAD SOME OTHER PROPOSALS, WHICH THEY DID NOT
PREPARE.

-- AIRCRAFT: CONTINUED EXCLUSION OF LAND-BASED NAVAL AIR;
INCLUSION OF 500 COMBAT-CAPABLE TRAINERS IN THE MAIN
CEILING WHICH WOULD BE RAISED TO 5200, AND
RE-CATEGORIZATION OF THE REST; EITHER AN INTERCEPTOR
CEILING OF 1500 OR DEFERRAL OF INTERCEPTORS UNTIL A
SUBSEQUENT PHASE. WE MADE CLEAR THIS WAS A NON-STARTER.

-- ZONES: ACCEPTANCE OF THE NATO PROPOSAL ON THE FLANKS
BUT TRANSFER OF THE KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT TO ZONE 4.2
OR 4.3.

-- ARMOR: THEY PROPOSED USING BOTH UNLADEN AND COMBAT
WEIGHT IN THE ARMOR DEFINITIONS IN A WAY THAT WOULD
LOWER WEIGHT PARAMETERS EVEN FURTHER (E.G. 11 AND 13
TONS FOR TRACKED TANKS; 16 AND 18 FOR WHEELED TANKS).
WE MADE CLEAR WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO GO THIS LOW.

{CHEMICAL WEAPONS}

- 0 WE ARE CLOSE TO COMPLETING AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD PROVIDE
FOR DESTRUCTION OF U.S. AND SOVIET CW STOCKS DOWN TO A
LEVEL OF 5000 AGENT TONS EACH. DELEGATIONS WILL MEET THIS
WEEK IN NEW YORK TO RESOLVE THE FEW REMAINING ISSUES AND
FINALIZE THE TEXT.

- 0 THE DRAFT AGREEMENT CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING MAIN ELEMENTS:

-- THE U.S. AND USSR SHALL COOPERATE REGARDING THE
DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, INCLUDING MATTERS
RELATED TO SAFE METHODS FOR DESTRUCTION. IMPLEMENTING
ACTIVITIES WILL INCLUDE VISITS TO RELEVANT FACILITIES,
DOCUMENT EXCHANGES AND DISCUSSIONS AMONG EXPERTS.

-- THE SIDES SHALL BEGIN DESTRUCTION NO LATER THAN THE END
OF 1992 AND WILL REACH THE AGREED 5000 AGENT TON LEVEL
BY THE END OF 2002. THERE IS A PROVISION, HOWEVER,
THAT IF A PARTY EXPERIENCES PROBLEMS THAT PREVENT IT
FROM DESTROYING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT A RATE
SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE BENCHMARKS CONTAINED IN THE
AGREEMENT, IT WILL NOTIFY AND CONSULT WITH THE OTHER
PARTY. THE OTHER PARTY WILL BE REQUIRED TO DESTROY ITS
CW STOCKS AT A RATE NO GREATER THAN THAT OF THE PARTY
EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES.

-- THE SIDES SHALL NOT PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AFTER
ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 10 -

- THERE WILL BE INSPECTION OF CW DESTRUCTION, PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND STORAGE FACILITIES.
- THE TWO PARTIES WILL COOPERATE IN DEVELOPING, TESTING AND CARRYING OUT PROCEDURES FOR APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION, AND WILL CONDUCT TRIAL CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS TO FACILITATE ELABORATION OF THE MULTILATERAL CW CONVENTION {CWC}.
- o THE PARTIES ALSO AGREE TO JOINTLY PROPOSE IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CWC:
 - FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN CW STOCKS TO 500 AGENT TONS EIGHT YEARS AFTER THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE; AND
 - A REVIEW CONFERENCE AT THE END OF THE EIGHTH YEAR TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PARTICIPATION IN THE CONVENTION IS SUFFICIENT FOR PROCEEDING TO TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ALL REMAINING CW STOCKS OVER THE SUBSEQUENT TWO YEARS. THIS WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR ENSURING ADHERENCE TO THE CWC BY ALL CW-CAPABLE STATES.

{NUCLEAR TESTING}

- o IN NUCLEAR TESTING, WE HAVE NOW RESOLVED THE REMAINING ISSUES IN THE VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS TO THE TWO TESTING TREATIES.
 - THE PROTOCOL TO THE 1976 PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY IS COMPLETE AND THE TEXT CONFORMED. IT IS READY TO BE SIGNED.
 - OUR DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA WILL FINALIZE THE PROTOCOL TO THE 1974 THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY IN THE NEXT TEN DAYS. ALL ISSUES ARE RESOLVED; WE NEED ONLY CONFORM TEXTS.
- o THESE PROTOCOLS WILL PROVIDE EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION THROUGH A REGIME THAT INCLUDES ON-SITE HYDRODYNAMIC YIELD MEASUREMENT, ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AND IN-COUNTRY SEISMIC MEASUREMENTS.
- o THE COMPLETION OF THESE PROTOCOLS MEETS THE GOAL THE TWO PRESIDENTS SET IN MALTA OF HAVING THEM READY FOR THE SUMMIT.
 - THE TESTING TREATIES, FINISHED 15 YEARS AGO, WILL THEN BE SENT WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE PROTOCOLS TO THE SENATE FOR RATIFICATION.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 11 -

{NON-PROLIFERATION STATEMENT}

- O THE SIDES HAVE NEARLY COMPLETED A JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION.
- O THE STATEMENT CONTAINS FOUR SECTIONS:
 - A PREAMBLE DESCRIBING GENERAL OPPOSITION TO PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, MISSILES CAPABLE OF CARRYING SUCH WEAPONS, AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSILES AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGIES;
 - A SECTION ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, INCLUDING EXPRESSION OF THE SIDES' SUPPORT FOR THE NPT AND INCREASED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON SAFEGUARDS;
 - A SECTION ON MISSILE AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY NON-PROLIFERATION, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR THE OBJECTIVES OF THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) AND EXPORT CONTROLS TO RESTRICT MISSILE PROLIFERATION ON A WORLDWIDE BASIS; AND
 - A SECTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION, INCLUDING THE SIDES' COMMITMENT TO A GLOBAL BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL INITIATIVES, AND THE INSTITUTION OF EXPORT CONTROLS TO STEM THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

REGIONAL PROBLEMS

{AFGHANISTAN}

- O AFGHANISTAN WAS A PRIORITY ISSUE FOR SECRETARY BAKER.
- O HE URGED SHEVARDNADZE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A COMMON SET OF PRINCIPLES FOR AN AFGHAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR AN APPROPRIATE, NEUTRAL TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY AS THE SOLE REPOSITORY OF POWER. SUCH A TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY WOULD PREPARE FOR AND CONDUCT ELECTIONS IN THE AFGHAN TRADITION.
 - THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, I.E. WHERE POWER IS TRANSFERRED TO A NEUTRAL TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO NAJIBULLAH AND HIS ASSOCIATES PARTICIPATING IN THE ELECTION PROCESS.
- O SHEVARDNADZE ARGUED THAT NAJIBULLAH SHOULD NOT HAVE TO STEP DOWN, CITING ORTEGA'S ROLE IN NICARAGUA. HE ALSO SAID THAT ANY PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT INVITE OPPOSITION FROM THE AFGHAN PARTIES.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 12 -

- 13/
- THE SECRETARY DISPUTED THE ANALOGY, POINTING OUT THAT NAJIBULLAH HAD BEEN INSTALLED BY AN OUTSIDE POWER.
 - MOREOVER, HE ADDED THAT ALLOWING NAJIBULLAH TO REMAIN HEAD OF STATE DURING A TRANSITION WAS BOUND TO INVITE REJECTION FROM THE RESISTANCE, AND WOULD GUARANTEE AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF ENGAGING THE RESISTANCE IN AN ELECTORAL PROCESS.
- FOLLOW-UP EXPERTS TALKS LED TO AGREEMENT ON SOME, BUT NOT ALL, PRINCIPLES.

{KASHMIR}

- THE MINISTERS DISCUSSED KASHMIR. THE U.S. NOTED THAT THE SITUATION HAD DETERIORATED SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING.
- WE INFORMED THE SOVIET SIDE THAT DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ROBERT GATES WOULD BE TRAVELING TO PAKISTAN AND INDIA AS THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL EMISSARY.
 - THE SECRETARY NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF ALL PARTIES AND URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN IN AN APPEAL TO THIS END.
 - SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT JOINT EFFORTS WOULD GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF INTERNATIONALIZING THE CONFLICT, BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. AND USSR CONTINUE THEIR RESPECTIVE EFFORTS TO URGE RESTRAINT ON BOTH SIDES.

{AFRICA}

- THE SIDES FOCUSED THEIR DISCUSSION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN ETHIOPIA AND ANGOLA.
- ON ETHIOPIA, THE SECRETARY MADE A STRONG PLEA ON THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY AND COOPERATIVELY TO PREVENT FURTHER STARVATION, PROPOSING THAT SOVIET AIRCRAFT CARRY U.S. HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AID. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE SOON WITH THE MENGISTU GOVERNMENT AND WOULD BRIEF THE U.S. ON THE RESULTS.
 - ON ANGOLA, THE SIDES EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE BEST WAY TO DEVELOP DIRECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE MPLA AND UNITA.
 - BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA BUT AGREED THAT THIS WAS ONLY THE BEGINNING OF A LONG PROCESS TO END APARTHEID.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 13 -

14

(CENTRAL AMERICA)

- THE SECRETARY AND THE MINISTER REVIEWED PROGRESS IN THE REGION, INCLUDING THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE NEWLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN NICARAGUA.
 - THE SECRETARY REITERATED OUR APPRECIATION FOR SOVIET SUPPORT ON NICARAGUA AND URGED THE SOVIETS TO SUPPORT A BROADER CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PROCESS BY GETTING CUBA TO END ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE FMLN IN EL SALVADOR.
 - WE HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR AND NOTED THE ROLE CUBA PLAYS IN FUELING THE FMLN'S ARMED STRUGGLE.
- THE SOVIETS AGAIN URGED US TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE CUBANS ON OUR CONCERNS, BUT STATED THEY WOULD WORK ON THE CUBANS TO SUPPORT DIALOGUE IN EL SALVADOR.

(ASIA)

- ON CAMBODIA, THE SIDES REVIEWED THEIR POSITIONS AND NOTED THAT THE BEST CHANCE FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT DEPENDED ON MAKING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AT THE NEXT PERM FIVE MEETING IN NEW YORK (MAY 25-26).
 - ON KOREA, WE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF PYONGYANG SIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING AN IAEA NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITHOUT DELAY. WE ALSO NOTED THAT SOVIET EFFORTS TO QUIETLY URGE THE DPRK TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS HAD FAILED AND REQUIRED A MORE EFFECTIVE, PUBLIC APPROACH.
- THE SOVIETS WERE RELUCTANT TO PRESS THE NORTH KOREANS PUBLICLY AND SUGGESTED DIRECT U.S.-DPRK CONTACTS.

(MIDDLE EAST)

- THE MINISTERS DID NOT ADDRESS THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, BUT THE SOVIETS REITERATED CONCERNS ABOUT SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRANTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
- THE SECRETARY CALLED ON THE SOVIETS TO FACILITATE TRAVEL OF SOVIET JEWS TO ISRAEL.
- SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLORE WAYS TO FACILITATE TRAVEL, BUT SAID DIRECT FLIGHTS REMAINED "UNREALISTIC." HE URGED THE U.S. TO INCREASE ITS REFUGEE AND IMMIGRATION QUOTAS FOR SOVIET JEWS.
- THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE U.S. WOULD ADMIT ALMOST TWICE AS MANY SOVIET EMIGRANTS IN 1990 AS IN 1989.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
- 14 -

BILATERAL ISSUES

- O THE BILATERAL WORKING GROUP FOCUSED ON FINALIZING AGREEMENTS FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT.
- O WE HAVE NOW AGREED ON THE SPECIFICS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MALTA INITIATIVE TO INCREASE UNIVERSITY-LEVEL STUDENT EXCHANGES BY 1000 IN EACH DIRECTION.
- O AN AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CULTURAL-INFORMATION CENTERS IN ONE ANOTHER'S CAPITALS HAS ALSO BEEN COMPLETED.
- O WE ARE CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY.
 - WE HOPE REMAINING DIFFERENCES WILL BE IRONED OUT IN TALKS THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON.
- O OTHER BILATERAL ACCORDS READY FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT INCLUDE:
 - AN AGREEMENT FIXING THE PACIFIC MARITIME BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR; AND
 - AN EXPANDED AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN OCEAN STUDIES.
- O FINALLY, WE DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS STEPS THE SIDES COULD TAKE TO IMPROVE LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS FOR ONE ANOTHER'S DIPLOMATS, JOURNALISTS AND BUSINESSMEN.
 - AMONG THE CONCRETE RESULTS WAS AN AGREEMENT TO INCREASE OUR EMBASSY STAFF CEILINGS BY 30 PEOPLE IN THREE STAGES OVER THE NEXT YEAR.

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

- O ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, THE TWO SIDES FOCUSED ON COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD OR COULD BE READY FOR SUMMIT SIGNATURE. THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENTS WILL BE READY FOR THE SUMMIT:
 - A TRADE AGREEMENT, WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR EXPANDED COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR OVER THE FOLLOWING THREE YEARS;
 - A LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT, WHICH WILL ESTABLISH MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM PARAMETERS FOR SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES FOR 5 YEARS STARTING IN JANUARY 1991; AND

SECRET

- A MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT WHICH WILL ONCE AGAIN ALLOW SOVIET AND AMERICAN SHIPS TO CARRY CARGO TO AND FROM EACH OTHER'S PORTS {FOR FIVE YEARS}.
- O THE SECRETARY NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET PASSAGE OF AN EMIGRATION LAW NOW SO THAT PRESIDENT BUSH COULD WAIVE THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT. THIS WAIVER, ALONG WITH PASSAGE OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT, IS NEEDED FOR EXTENSION OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS.
 - THE SOVIETS NOTED THAT THE EMIGRATION LEGISLATION WAS SCHEDULED TO HAVE ITS SECOND READING BY THE SUPREME SOVIET ON MAY 31, WITH APPROVAL AND ENACTMENT AT THAT TIME.
 - SHEVARDNADZE WAS "CONFIDENT" THIS WOULD HAPPEN MAY 31, BUT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE IT.
 - GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL REALITIES, THE SITUATION IN THE BALTICS MAY ALSO HAVE A BEARING ON WHETHER WE SIGN THE TRADE AGREEMENT.
- O AS A RESULT OF TALKS DURING THE WEEK OF THE MINISTERIAL, JUST ONE ISSUE REMAINS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON AN EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT, WHICH WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE U.S.-SOVIET AIR ROUTES.
 - WE AND THE SOVIETS AGREED TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE IN TIME FOR THE SUMMIT.
- O WE ALSO REVIEWED THE STATUS OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECTS AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING ON A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, A TAX TREATY AND A FINANCIAL CLAIMS SETTLEMENT.
- O THE SIDES NOTED WITH SATISFACTION:
 - GATT ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS;
 - THE ASSENT OF BOTH PARTIES TO THE FINAL DOCUMENT AT THE BONN CSCE ECONOMIC CONFERENCE (WITH ITS ENDORSEMENT OF MARKET PRINCIPLES);
 - SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE EBRD; AND
 - INCREASED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE OECD.

SECRET

RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES.

- ON EMIGRATION, THE SOVIETS BRIEFED US ON THE LATEST VERSION OF THE ENTRY/EXIT LAW WHICH, AS NOTED, MAY BE ENACTED BY THE SUPREME SOVIET ON MAY 31.
- THE SOVIETS REPORTED RESOLUTION OF 12 OF THE REMAINING 79 CASES ON OUR REFUSENIK LIST.
- THERE HAD ONLY BEEN LIMITED PROGRESS, HOWEVER, ON THE LONGEST-TERM CASES THAT PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED WITH GORBACHEV IN MALTA.
 - THE SECRETARY RAISED THIS PROBLEM WITH GORBACHEV, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE THE PRESIDENT ATTACHES TO RESOLVING THESE CASES BY THE SUMMIT. HE NOTED THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS HAD NOT HAD ACCESS TO STATE SECRETS IN MORE THAN 10 YEARS.
 - GORBACHEV AGREED TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK.
- THE SECRETARY ALSO RAISED WITH SHEVARDNADZE OUR CONCERN ABOUT RISING ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE USSR, URGING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO SPEAK OUT IN CONDEMNING THIS DEVELOPMENT.
- THE SECRETARY MET WITH A GROUP OF LONG-TERM REFUSENIKS, TO UNDERScore OUR CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO SECURING THEIR RIGHT TO EMIGRATE. THERE WAS A LIVELY EXCHANGE ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW EMIGRATION LAW.
- AT THE WORKING LEVEL, THE SIDES REVIEWED DISPUTED PRISONER CASES AND AGREED TO CONTINUE THE EXCHANGE OF COURT RECORDS AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION.
- THEY ALSO REVIEWED THE EXPANDING RANGE OF EXCHANGES OF U.S. AND SOVIET SPECIALISTS IN THE AREA OF THE RULE OF LAW, AND ON SUCH HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AS PROBLEMS OF THE AGED, THE HANDICAPPED, AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY.
- THE U.S. AGREED TO RESCHEDULE THE RECENTLY POSTPONED VISIT OF SOVIET PSYCHIATRISTS TO THE UNITED STATES.
- THE SOVIETS MADE CLEAR THAT THEIR CHANGE IN DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY WILL GRADUALLY BE REFLECTED IN INCREASED COOPERATION WITH THE DEMOCRACIES ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY AS THEY ARISE IN THE UNITED NATIONS. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW MAKING DEMARCHES AGAINST THE PROPOSED EXPANSION OF THE UNHRC.

SECRET

SEE AGREEMENT OR COMMON GROUND. THESE MAY BE REFLECTED IN JOINT STATEMENTS AT THE SUMMIT.

- TERRORISM: THE USSR MOVED ANOTHER STEP TOWARD PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF STATE TERRORISM.
 - THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: THE SOVIETS AGREED TO ENCOURAGE PRACTICAL MEASURES IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, MONITORING AND RESEARCH.
 - INTERNATIONAL PARK: AS A TRIBUTE TO THE COMMON NATURAL AND CULTURAL HERITAGE OF ALASKA AND SIBERIA, THE PARK WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN 1991.
 - THE INTERNATIONAL THERMONUCLEAR EXPERIMENTAL REACTOR: JOINT STATEMENT LANGUAGE CONVEYS A POSITIVE TONE, BUT STOPS SHORT OF COMMITMENTS TO THE NEXT PHASE OF THIS IAEA ACTIVITY.
 - ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATION: THIS NEW AGREEMENT IS SUBSTANTIALLY RENEGOTIATED, WHILE CARRYING OVER RESEARCH FROM ITS PREDECESSOR AGREEMENT. IT INCLUDES NEW WORK ON OPERATIONAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND STUDY OF CHERNOBYL AFTER-EFFECTS.
 - NARCOTICS: THE CUSTOMS SERVICES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE PREPARED FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT AN AGREEMENT RELATING TO CONTROL OF ILLEGAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.
- IN SUM, WE HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR GOOD AND PRODUCTIVE MEETING WHEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS MEET IN WASHINGTON IN LITTLE MORE THAN A WEEK'S TIME.
- OF COURSE, WE WILL BE PROVIDING A DETAILED READ-OUT ON THOSE EXCHANGES.

FO1314/ST162986

SECRET

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0856 21MAY90

TO EXTOTT (RBR) DELIVER BY 211000 22 1990

TO BNATO DELIVER 211600

INFO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC BONN-PARIS-EDN-VNAGE GENEV ROME

HAGUE BRU OSLO WSAW VIENN EUCST BPEST

TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DGPOLPLAN/DGPOLOPS/DNATOPOL/DSTRATA/ DE CAF

BAG PRGUE DE OTT

DISTR MINA USS IFB RGB RWR RBR RBD RWD CPP CPD IDD IDA IDR

RGX IDX IFBS INP URR IDRL IDR URR

---BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MTGS IN MOSCOW 16 20 MAY

SUMMARY:USA SEC OF STATE JAMES BAKER GAVE A PACKED

SOVIET MFA PRESS CENTRE AUDIENCE 19MAY A GOOD NEWS/BAD NEWS

BRIEFING.THE GOOD NEWS WAS THAT SOVIETS AND AMERICANS HAD

REACHED AGREEMENT ON ALCM AND SLCM CEILINGS.FURTHER GOOD

NEWS WAS THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD ACHIEVED A BREAKTHROUGH IN CW

TALKS AND,IF ALL WENT ACCORDING TO BAKERS HOPES,WORLD STOCKS

WOULD REACH ZERO TEN YRS FROM DATE OF SIGNING OF SOVIET/USA

ACCORD.BAD NEWS WAS WHAT BAKER CALLED GRIDLOCK IN CFE DISCUSSIONS.

AUDIENCE WAS LEFT WITH CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT SOVIET MILITARY

WAS ONCE AGAIN DRAGGING ITS FEET QUOTE MIN SHEVARDNADZE

AND I WANT A CFE AGMT QUICK UNQUOTE,BAKER SAID.FACT THAT

...2

ACC 646 202 REF DATE
FILE 20-USA-1-3-455R DOSSIER

MOI/DA
REK/NO 1 A 2712

RECEIVED

PAGE TWO XYGR0856 CONFD

BAKERS TALKS IN MOSCO, INCLUDING FIVE HOURS WITH PRES GORBACHEV, WERE EXTENDED FOR A DAY WAS TAKEN AS A POSITIVE OMEN BY PRESS AND OFFICIALS ON BOTH SIDES ENCOURAGED THIS BELIEF.

2.REPORT:USA SEC OF STATE JAMES BAKER BEGAN HIS PRESS CONF AT THE MFA PRESS CENTRE 19MAY BY SAYING NEGOTIATORS HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN QUOTE SOME HEAVY LIFTING UNQUOTE TO LOCK IN AGREEMENTS BY THE TIME OF THE BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT.THIS WAS ALREADY CLEAR TO PRESS AND DIPLOMATS WHO HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR A 0900 HR PRESS CONF THAT WAS DELAYED IN ONE AND TWO-HOUR INCREMENTS TO 1800.

3.BAKER APPEARED TIRED,AS DID HIS ENTOURAGE.STRIKING AND OPTIMISTIC NOTE,HE SAID NEGOTIATIONS HAD SET STAGE FOR A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT.IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON HIS DECISION TO STAY IN MOSCO A DAY LONGER THAN PLANNED,BAKER SAID ACLMS AND SLCMS HAD BEEN THE REASON WITH MOST TIME DEVOTED TO FORMER. BILATERAL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED TO APPLY GRANDFATHERING CLAUSE TO SHORT RANGE CRUISE AND TO EXEMPT FUTURE CONVENTIONAL WARHEAD CRUISE.AS HE MOVED THROUGH ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF HIS VISIT INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON ALCM AND SLCM CEILINGS (880 NUCLEAR SLCM MISSILES FOR EACH SIDE AND A POLITICIALLY BINDING DECLARATION THAT WILL BE SEPARATE FROM START)SOME EXCITEMENT

...3

PAGE THREE XYGR0856 CONF

WAS EVIDENT IN HIS VOICE DESPITE HIS FATIGUE. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, BAKER SAID USA HAD OBTAINED COUNTING RULE IT WANTED WHILE SOVIETS GOT RANGE RULE THEY WERE AFTER. BAKER THEN EXCITEDLY ANNOUNCED A QUOTE PRECEDENT SETTING ACCORD UNQUOTE ON CW. THE QUOTE TRAIL BLAZING UNQUOTE BILATERAL AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR: A) AN IMMEDIATE END TO CW PRODUCTION, B) IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION OF 80 PERCENT OF STOCKS C) REDUCTION TO 2 PERCENT OF CURRENT LEVELS BY EIGHTH YEAR OF TREATY D) INTENTION TO DESTROY ALL REMAINING STOCKS IN FOLLOWING TWO YEARS. BAKER EMPHASIZED IN FOLLOWING Q AND A SESSION, HOWEVER, THAT DESTRUCTION OF LAST 2 PERCENT WOULD ONLY HAPPEN IF ALL CW STATES DID SAME. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION NEGOTIATED THAT WOULD PROVIDE FOR THIS. BAKER TOOK FULL CREDIT FOR PROGRESS ON CW FOR BUSH ADMINISTRATION, SAYING THE USA/SOVIET AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTED PRES BUSH'S CW INITIATIVE.

4. DOWNBEAT NOTE WAS SOUNDED ON CFE WHERE PROGRESS HAD BEEN LESS THAN HOPED. SOVIETS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO QUOTE RESPOND MEANINGFULLY UNQUOTE TO UNSPECIFIED USA IDEAS DESIGNED TO PUSH PROCESS FORWARD. BAKER IMPLIED THAT PROB DID NOT/NOT LIE IN SOVIET MFA, HOWEVER, SAYING QUOTE MIN SHEVARDNADZE AND I WANT A CFE AGREEMENT QUICK UNQUOTE. THIS WAS A PRE-CONDITION FOR A 1990 CSCE SUMMIT, HE UNDERLINED. BUT HE SAID,

...4

PAGE FOUR XYGR0856 CONFD

FATIGUE CLEARLY EVIDENT.QUOTE THERE WAS A DISTINCT LACK OF PROGRESS ON CFE.THERE IS GRIDLOCK IN VIENN UNQUOTE.

5.DURING Q AND A BAKER SAID THAT,ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NOW CONSTRAINTS ON TESTING OF HEAVY MISSILES,BACKFIRE BOMBER PRFSENTED PROBS STILL TO BE RESOLVED.BILATERAL WORKING

GRPS WERE EXPECTED TO RESUME THEIR WORK IN WSHDC THIS WEEK (23 OR 24MAY) IN AN ATTEMPT TO REACH AGREEMENT FOR THE SUMMIT.

6.ON LITHUANIA,BAKER SAID PARTIES TO DISAGREEMENT HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE FOR PEACEFUL DIALOGUE.HE THOUGHT SOVIETS AND LITH UANIANS WERE NOW SEEKING MORE ACTIVELY THAN BEFORE TO ARRIVE QUOTE AT A COMMON BASIS ON WHICH TO PROCEED UNQUOTE.

7.NOTHING/NOTHING UNEXPECTED EMERGED IN BAKERS DESCRIPTION OF TALKS ON REGIONAL ISSUES(AFGHANISTAN,CENTRAL AMERICA). ON HUMAN RIGHTS BAKER SAID HE HAD STRESSED USA CONCERN OVER REMAINING REFUSENIK CASES AS WELL AS ANTI-SEMITISM.HE CALLED ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO SPEAK OUT STRONGLY AGAINST LATTER.

8.FINALLY,BAKER DESCRIBED SEVERAL BILATERAL AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD BE BROUGHT FORWARD FOR SIGNATURE IN WSHDC:A)MARITIME BOUNDARY AGMT, B)OCEANS STUDY,C)OPENING OF CULTURAL AND INFO CENTRES IN MOSCO AND WSHDC AND,D)THE QUOTE THOUSAND-THOUSAND AGMT (A TWO-WAY EXCHANGE OF 1000 UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS).

CCC/302 211109Z XYGR0856

MESSAGE

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -

Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

File/Dossier

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

NON-CLASSIFIE PAR FACSIMILE

DE WSHDC UNGR277 17MAI90

A BH EXTOTT URR (LIVRAISON 171200)

INFO PMO OTT/HART/HEINBECKER/GRAUER LIVRAISON 171200

PCO OTT/DOYLE LIVRAISON 171200

MOSCO BNATO

DIST MINA USS DMC URB URD RGB RBD RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA

---VISITE AUX E.U. DU PRESIDENT GORBACHEV - 30 MAI AU 4 JUIN

VEUILLEZ TROUVER CI-JOINT, POUR VOTRE INFORMATION, UN PROJET

DE PROGRAMME DE LA VISITE AUX E.U. DU PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

RENDU PUBLIC PAR LA MAISON BLANCHE LE 15 MAI.

2. LES DETAILS RELATIFS A LA TENEUR DES DIFFERENTS ENTRETIENS

NE SERONT CONNUS QU'AU RETOUR DU SECRETAIRE BAKER D'UNION

SOVIETIQUE. LE PROGRAMME PRIVE DU PRESIDENT EN EST TOUJOURS

AU STADE PREPARATOIRE.

FILE

DOSSIER

20-USA-13-USSR

A7

171200

70

DRAFTER/REDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APProuvé

G. COSSETTE

POLITICAL

7409

P. CHAPIN

SIG

SIG

ADDITION
RENNOD A 3112

Visit to the USA of
President Gorbachev
May 30 to June 4, 1990

Tentative Program
(as provided by the White House
on May 15, 1990)

Wednesday, May 30

18:30 Arrival (Mr. Gorbachev will not be met by the
President upon arrival)

Thursday, May 31

10:00-10:30 Official arrival ceremonies at the White House
10:30-12:00 Meeting with President Bush at the White House
12:00-16:00 Private program
16:00-17:30 Meeting with President Bush at the White House
19:00 State Dinner at the White House

Friday, June 1

Private program until 11:00
11:00-13:00 Meeting with President Bush at the White House
13:00-17:00 Private program
17:00-18:00 Meeting with President Bush at the White House
18:00 Signature of bilateral agreements
19:30 Dinner hosted by President Gorbachev at the
Soviet Embassy

Saturday, June 2

9:30 Departure for Camp David by helicopter
Informal talks throughout the day at Camp David
Late afternoon Return to Washington

Sunday, June 3

10:00 Press Conference at the White House
11:00 Official departure
12:00 Departure for Minneapolis and San Francisco
Overnight in San Francisco (possible meeting with former President Reagan and former Secretary of State Shultz)

Monday, June 4

Departure for Soviet Union

CANADIAN CONSULATE GENERAL
1251 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS
NEW YORK, NY 10020-1175
TEL: (212)768-2400
DEX-3502
FAX: (212)768-2440

MAY 17 1990
MAY 17 1990

UNCLASSIFIED
NONCLASSIFIÉ

FACSIMILE
TRANSMISSION
fac-similé

Our File
No. Dossier

NYC 00

NO. PERPA 403

DATE: May 16, 1990

PAGES 2
(incl. cover)
(y compris
la page de
couverture)

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

FROM: Canadian Consulate General
DU : Consulat général du Canada
NEW YORK

SECTION: PERPA
Mr/Ms
M/Mad H.G. KORN

TO/A : EXTOTT/URR

PHONE/Téléphone:

Info by post:
Info via mission:

Info by Ottawa:
Info via Ottawa:

Distribution: BMM RBR

SUBJECT:

OBJECT: New York Times article: "Gorbachev's Surprise: An Extra
Day for Tours, and Breakfast With Reagan." (16MAY90)

ACC	DATE
FILE	DO
20-VSA-1-3-USSR	17
901	

by the former hard-line Communist Government 40 years ago.

...the official ties between the Vatican and all the countries that cut relations after the Communists came to power in Eastern Europe after World War II.

Pope John Paul II's native Poland, which is predominantly Roman Catholic, restored ties in July. Hungary did so in February and Czechoslovakia followed suit in April.


The Vatican reported that it had reached agreement with Romania on restoring ties two weeks ago, after a visit to the country by Archbishop Angelo Sodano, the Holy See's foreign affairs chief. Two months ago, Pope John Paul appointed 12 bishops to restore the Romanian church to the strength it enjoyed before the crack-down on religion began.

critical problems — those of property, agriculture and industry — in their rush to finish the document.

There is also the sheer problem of preparing for the elections. East Germany must reconstitute the five states it had before the Communist era, and these must elect local governments.

There is also the problem of German endorsement. The "two plus four" talks begun earlier this month between the two Germanys and the four major victors of World War II in Europe — the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France — have to resolve a host of complex issues, including the future Germany's military alignment, before unification can proceed.

Mr. Kohl, however, evidently believes that his best political path lies in doing out the bitter medicine as quickly as possible. If he succeeds, the Germanys could be one by year's end.



Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d arriving in Moscow for talks with Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze. Mr. Baker was greeted by Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, right.

on violence to exist."

The demonstration today by Soviet officers, the second in two days, shocked many Latvians.

"They are not people — they are animals," said Stanislav Ivanovsky, a 56-year-old miner, as he watched the skirmishes.

As military officers, accompanied by strong young men in street clothes, pushed and shoved their way down the narrow street, they were met by a counter-demonstration of Latvians who linked arms and sang folk songs.

Shouting matches, verging on fist-fights, broke out on the street over questions now dividing the republic's population. Roughly 50 percent of the republic's people are of Latvian descent, and they are generally the staunchest supporters of independence.

NYT 16/5/90 AP Gorbachev's Surprise: An Extra Day for Tours, and Breakfast With Reagan

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 15 — The White House disclosed a public schedule today for President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's visit to the United States that made it clear that the Soviet leader has seized control of his itinerary in a manner befitting the master showman of international politics.

As American officials tossed aside their protocol books in frustration, the man who shook hands on a Washington street corner in 1987 and stopped his limousine in the middle of Broadway in 1988 announced at the last minute that he wanted to spend an extra day in the United States after the formal summit meeting. The summit conference runs from May 30 until June 3 and consists of two days of talks in Washington, a day at Camp David and, officials hope, the signing of some agreements between the two countries.

Compounding American worries, Mr. Gorbachev said he did not want to go to the President's vacation home in Kennebunkport, Maine, or spend the weekend at Camp David, as Mr. Bush

had proposed.

Instead, Mr. Gorbachev said, he would rather talk about technology in Minnesota with a Democratic Governor, eat breakfast in California with former President Ronald Reagan and visit Stanford University, with a possible stop at the university's Hoover Institution. The institution is a citadel of anti-Soviet political thinking where Russia's first democratic leader, Alexander Kerensky, spent the waning years of his life poring through the world's largest collection of material on the 1917 Revolution in Russia.

An Extraordinary Tourist

The additional itinerary was offered to the United States only a week ago and left American officials scrambling. On Monday, Stanford University officials said the White House suggested unexpectedly that they might want to invite Mr. Gorbachev to visit, only to be told a few hours later that he had "accepted their invitation."

Mr. Gorbachev's requests presented some fine diplomatic problems. First, Mr. Gorbachev had agreed to visit the United States from May 30 until June 3.

What the Soviet chief does after the state visit 'is his business.'

Adding another day not only presented new protocol problems, but also the daunting task of providing security for his travels. Then there was the question of who would pick up the bill, officials said.

After top-level discussion that included the President, Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d and Brent Scowcroft, the President's national security adviser, a formula was struck: as soon as he takes off from Andrews Air Force Base on Sunday June 3, Mr. Gorbachev becomes a tourist, albeit an extraordinary one. The United States will pick up the protection tab, but all other expenses are on the Soviet Union's own chit.

"A state visit is a state visit," said one official. "What he wants to do after that is his business."

According to the schedule made public today, Mr. Gorbachev is to arrive at Andrews Air Force base in Maryland about 6:30 P.M. on Wednesday May 30. He will spend the two previous days in Canada, the Canadian Embassy said.

Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev, who met for the first time in Malta in December, will begin their formal schedule at the White House on the morning of May 31.

At least four meetings are scheduled over two days, a total of six hours, but if practice holds, the two leaders might spend more time together. Mr. Bush will be host at a state dinner at the White House on May 31 and Mr. Gorbachev will reciprocate at the Soviet Embassy on June 1.

Mr. Gorbachev, who turned down an offer to stay at Blair House near the White House, will stay at the Embassy, officials said. During his visit in 1987, Mr. Gorbachev stayed at the Embassy, which is downtown, several blocks from the White House.

Marlin Fitzwater, Mr. Bush's spokesman, said the formal talks would focus on pending arms-control and trade agreements.

He said the two leaders would then spend the morning and afternoon of Saturday June 2 at Camp David to take "a look at the changes in Eastern Europe, the changes in the Soviet Union, the President's interest in NATO and its goals, many of the larger political issues."

Mr. Gorbachev has set aside a lot of free time in Washington, which Administration officials said he probably will use, among other things, for a lunch for prominent Americans at the Embassy on May 31 and a breakfast with Congressional leaders the next morning.

On Sunday, after a news conference and departure formalities, Mr. Gorbachev is to fly to Minneapolis for a few hours and then to San Francisco. He will return to Moscow on Monday June 4, in the early afternoon.

In Minnesota, Mr. Gorbachev wants to have lunch with Gov. Rudy Perpich and meet with business and agricul-

ture executives, officials said. Organizers were urging Mr. Gorbachev to deliver a speech on technological cooperation.

Mr. Gorbachev has invited Mr. Reagan to breakfast on June 4 in California, and plans to visit Stanford University, where officials said they also hoped Mr. Gorbachev would give a speech. They also suggested that he might visit the Hoover Institution, which they said impressed his chief national security adviser, Sergei F. Akhromeyev, on a visit last year.

'Bigger Than the Super Bowl'

Mr. Perpich proclaimed Mr. Gorbachev's visit "bigger than the Super Bowl," which is also coming to Minneapolis, but not until 1992.

Albert A. Eisele, a Washington lobbyist who persuaded Mr. Perpich to invite Mr. Gorbachev, was delighted.

"You can fish for muskies all your life and never catch one," he said of Minnesota's muskellunge fish. "Then one day you throw your line into a patch of weeds and you catch a 500-pound monster."

ACC 750454	DATE
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR	DOSSIER A7
ACTION SUITE A DONNER	

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1323 14MAY90

TO EXTOTT/URR DELIVER BY 150800

MAY 15 1990

INFO MOSCO BNATO LDN PARIS BONN ROME TOKYO PEKIN VNACE GENEV BRU
BREC PCOOTT/DOYLE PMOOTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER
TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLPLAN/DIPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD IFB IDD IDR IDA IDX RGE RBD RBR
RGX RWD RWR CPD CPP

---US/SOVIET RELATIONS:THE ROAD TO THE SUMMIT

SUMMARY BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN MOSCOW THIS WEEK COULD BE
THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT US/SOVIET ENCOUNTER THIS YEAR.ITS
OUTCOME WILL LARGELY DETERMINE WHETHER THE BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT
AT THE END OF THE MONTH SUCCEEDS OR FAILS,AND WHETHER THE ARMS
CONTROL AGREEMENTS SO PIVOTAL TO THE FUTURE ARCHITECTURE OF
EUROPE CAN BE CONCLUDED IN 1990.

2.IN A BRIEFING FOR ALLIED AMBASSADORS TODAY,HIGH LEVEL ADMIN
OFFICIALS SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS GOING INTO THE MEETING QUOTE
READY TO DEAL UNQUOTE ON ARMS CONTROL,PREPARED TO CONCLUDE A
TRADE AGREEMENT OPENING THE WAY TO MFN TREATMENT(PROVIDED MOSCOW
TOOK NO/NO FURTHER ACTION AGAINST LITHUANIA),AND ANXIOUS TO
COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIETS ON A HOST OF REGIONAL ISSUES NOTABLY
KASHMIR,AFGHANISTAN,ANGOLA,ETHIOPIA AND THE MID-EAST.BU U.S.
OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE BALTIC SITUATION AND THE GERMAN
UNIFICATION ISSUE WERE CASTING LONG SHADOWS,AND THEY WERE

...2

NOV 1988

PAGE TWO UNGRI323 CONF

CONCERNED THAT GORBACHEVS QUOTE BELEAGUERED DOMESTIC SITUATION UNQUOTE MIGHT PREVENT SOVIETS FROM APPRECIATING HOW MUCH THEY HAD TO GAIN FROM A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT.

3.BAKER ARRIVES IN MOSCOW TUES NIGHT BUT DOES NOT/HAVE HIS FIRST MEETING UNTIL WED EVENING WHEN HE IS SCHEDULED TO HAVE A THREE-HOUR ONE-ON-ONE SESSION WITH SHEVARDNADZE.THERE WILL BE PLENARY MEETINGS THURS AND FRI,SUPPLEMENTED BY USUAL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS AS NECESSARY.VISIT CONCLUDES WITH MEETING WITH GORBACHEV AND DINNER WITH SHEVARDNADZE FRI P.M.AND PRESS CONF SAT MORING.

4.REPORT:UNDERSEC FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS,BOB KMMITT,TOLD WESTERN AMBASSADORS THIS AFTERNOON THAT U.S.OBJECTIVES IN MOSCOW ARE TO LEAVE NO/NO ISSUE UNRESOLVED BEFORE THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, AND TO NAIL DOWN FINAL TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS TO BE ISSUED AT SUMMIT.BUT IT WAS CLEAR FROM KIMMITTS REMARKS,AND THOSE OF UNDERSEC FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW AND ASSIST SEC RAYMOND SEITZ,THAT ADMIN HOLDS OUT LITTLE HOPE THAT ALL ISSUES WILL BE RESOLVED.IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD IN PARTICULAR,BARTHOLOMEW BELIEVES THERE WILL BE QUOTE SOME HEAVY LIFTING TO DO UNQUOTE.

5.ALL THREE BRIEFERS CITED GORBACHEVS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO PROGRESS,BUT EACH IMPLICITLY TOOK ISSUE WITH

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR1323 CONF D

REPORT IN SUN NEW YORK TIMES (THOMAS FRIEDMAN) THAT ADMIN WAS LOSING FAITH IN GORBACHEVS WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS. KIMMITT ARGUED (NOT/NOT ENTIRELY CONSISTENTLY) THAT GORBACHEV WAS POLITICALLY SECURE AND THAT HIS POLITICAL STANDING WOULD BE BOLSTERED BY SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT BEFORE CPSU PARTY CONGRESS IN JUL. BARTHOLOMEW THOUGHT SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD THAT A START AGREEMENT WOULD SPARE THEM A COSTLY AND HOPELESS TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION WITH THE UNITED STATES (HE CITED SHEVARDNADZES ADDRESS TO SOVIET MFA) AND THAT A CFE AGREEMENT WOULD GIVE THEM STATUS AND MILITARY GUARANTEES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH AN INEVITABLE SOVIET UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT/NOT. HE AND SEITZ ALSO NOTED THAT CFE AGREEMENT WAS FOUNDATION ON WHICH NEW EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE WOULD BE CONSTRUCTED, AND THAT CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENT WOULD THEREBY UNLOCK DOOR TO A VARIETY OF BENEFITS FOR SOVIETS.

6. BRIEFERS EMPHASIZED THAT UNITED STATES WAS GOING INTO MOSCOW MEETING DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE CLOSURE WHEREVER POSSIBLE, BUT AS KIMMITT OBSERVED QUOTE IT IS REALLY UP TO THE SOVIETS UNQUOTE.

7. ARMS CONTROL: BARTHOLOMEW SAID ADMIN WAS STILL HOPEFUL OF WRAPPING UP MAJOR START ISSUES BY SUMMIT, SO THAT TREATY COULD BE SIGNED BY THE END OF THE YEAR, AND HE SAID U.S. POSITION HAD BEEN QUOTE TAILORED UNQUOTE TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE IN MOSCOW (AND IN THE WEEKS LEADING UP TO SUMMIT) WOULD BE TO RECORD AGREEMENTS ON OUTSTANDING

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR1323 CONF

ISSUES. BARTHOLOMEW SAID U.S. SIDE WAS WORKING ON AN QUOTE ELEMENTS OF COMMON AGREEMENT UNQUOTE PAPER DEALING WITH ALCMS AND DRAFT POLITICAL DECLARATION ON SLCMS. HE SAID U.S. WAS STILL PURSUING IDEA OF A BAN ON MOBILE MIRVED MISSILES BUT WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY QUOTE GETTING AT UNQUOTE THE ISSUE WITHIN CURRENT FRAMEWORK ON START AGREEMENT.

8. U.S. WOULD MAKE MAJOR PUSH ON CFE, BARTHOLOMEW SAID, PROBING TO SEE IF ANY QUOTE BRIDGES UNQUOTE COULD BE BUILT BETWEEN NATO AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON SUCH CONTENTIOUS ISSUES AS AIRCRAFT, VERIFICATION/DESTRUCTION AND ARMOUR. BUT HE EMPHASIZED U.S. WOULD NOT/NOT BE GIVING ANYTHING AWAY ON NUMBERS. BARTHOLOMEW SAID BAKER WOULD BE WRITING TO HIS NATO COLLEAGUES THIS WEEK URGING EARLY CONCLUSION OF CFE AGREEMENT.

9. U.S. ALSO HOPED TO FINISH OFF WORK ON NUCLEAR TESTING PROTOCOLS, ON CW PACKAGE QUOTE PREDICATED ON THE TWO PERCENT SOLUTION UNQUOTE, AND ON JOINT DECLARATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION.

10. IN ADDITION, BARTHOLOMEW SAID BAKER WOULD TELL SHEVARDNADZE U.S. DID NOT/NOT THINK SOVIETS HAD BEEN NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH ON OPEN SKIES AND WANTED TO DEFER SCHEDULING ANOTHER ROUND TILL THERE WAS SOME INDICATION SOVIETS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT REACHING AN AGREEMENT.

11. US/SOVIET BILATERAL ISSUES:

SEITZ NOTED THERE WAS A LONG LIST OF US/SOVIET BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR1323 CONF

UNDER NEGOTIATION, AND A NUMBER WERE READY-OR WOULD SOON BE READY FOR SIGNING AT THE SUMMIT.

12. MAIN ONE WAS OBVIOUSLY TRADE AGREEMENT, MOST OF WHICH HAD NOW BEEN AGREED TO. SEITZ SAID THERE WERE QUOTE ONE OR TWO UNQUOTE OUTSTANDING ISSUES TO BE SETTLED, BUT THEY WERE MORE TECHNICAL THAN SUBSTANTIVE IN CHARACTER. FOR NOW, HE SAID, ADMIN WAS CARRYING ON WITH NEGOTIATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT AND WAS QUOTE WAITING TO SEE IF THE SOVIETS PRESENT A REASON FOR STOPPING UNQUOTE. SEITZ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT QUOTE LITHUANIA HANGS OVER IT ALL UNQUOTE, BUT HE LEFT CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT AS LONG AS MOSCOW IMPOSED NO/NO NEW SANCTIONS ON VILNIUS AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED. IN KEEPING WITH MALTA UNDERSTANDING, KIMMITT AND SEITZ BOTH POINTED OUT THAT AGREEMENT WAS ALSO CONTINGENT ON SUPREME SOVIET APPROVING AN ACCEPTABLE EMIGRATION LAW, WHICH WAS EXPECTED 22 MAY. (DIRECTOR OF SOVIET AFFAIRS, CURT KAMMAN, NOTED IN AN ASIDE THAT, WHATEVER ADMIN MIGHT PREFER, CONGRESS WOULD ULTIMATELY DECIDE WHETHER TRADE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO FORCE-AND ONLY THEN WOULD ROAD TO STATUS FOR SOVIETS BE OPEN.)

13. SEITZ SAID BAKER WILL NOT/NOT BE TAKING ANY NEW PROPOSALS ON LITHUANIA TO MOSCOW, BUT BAKER WILL BE TELLING SHEVARDNADZE THAT LITHUANIAN OVERTURES ON DIALOGUE SHOULD BE RECIPROCATED BY MOSCOW. MOREOVER, HE WOULD WARN BOTH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV THAT ADMIN QUOTE EXPECTED UNQUOTE DIALOGUE TO COMMENCE BEFORE THE SUMMIT

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR1323 CONF

AND THAT LITHUANIAN SITUATION QUOTE WILL HAVE A GREAT EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT UNQUOTE.

14.GERMAN UNIFICATION AND REGIONAL ISSUES

BRIEFERS EXPECTED GERMAN UNIFICATION QUESTION WOULD TAKE UP A LOT OF TIME IN MOSCOW,BUT SEITZ EMPHASIZED THAT BAKER WAS NOT/NOT INTENDING TO CONDUCT TWO-PLUS-FOUR BUSINESS OR TO EXPLORE SOVIET VIEWS ON BERLIN OR LEGAL FORM OF SETTLEMENT.RATHER,U.S. APPROACH WOULD BE QUOTE ALONG CONCEPTUAL LINES UNQUOTE I.E.UNIFICATION IS PROCEEDING IN FACT,FOUR POWERS SHOULD NOT/NOT BE CONCENTRATING ON THEIR RIGHTS BUT ON THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES,AND IT IS IN EVERYONES INTEREST FOR UNIFICATION TO TAKE PLACE IN A QUOTE RAPID, ORDERLY WAY UNQUOTE,NOT/NOT IN A WAY WHICH EXCHANGES ONE SET OF RESTRICTIONS ON GERMANY FOR ANOTHER.SEITZ SAID ADMIN HAD SENSE SOVIETS WERE UNSURE HOW TO HANDLE GERMAN UNIFICATION ISSUE AND WANTED TO DRAW OUT THE PROCESS INDEFINITELY.

15.MAIN REGIONAL ISSUE TO BE DISCUSSED,ACCORDING TO KIMMITT,IS SITUATION IN KASHMIR.BOTH U.S. AND SOVIETS WERE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER ESCALATION OF TENSION,AND EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO EXAMINE HOW THEY MIGHT COOPERATE TO REVERSE THE SITUATION(I.E. U.S.SPEAKING WITH PAKISTAN AND USSR WITH INDIA).

16.SITUATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND ANGOLA WERE ALSO RIPE FOR U.S. SOVIET COLLABORATION,KIMMITT SAID,THOUGH THERE WERE PROBLEMS IN

...?

PAGE SEVEN UNGR1323 CONF

BOTH CASES. BAKER WOULD ALSO BE EXPLORING PROSPECTS FOR
COOPERATION ON FAMINE RELIEF IN ETHIOPIA, INCLUDING POSSIBILITY
OF FERRYING U.S. RELIEF SUPPLIES ABOARD SOVIET AIRCRAFT.

17. OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES EXPECTED TO BE DISCUSSED WERE MID-EAST
SITUATION (PARTICULARLY ISSUE OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION TO
ISRAEL), CENTRAL AMERICA (CUBAN MILITARY SUPPLIES TO FMLN IN
SALVADOR), CAMBODIA AND NORTH KOREAN REFUSAL TO SIGN IAEA NUCLEAR
SAFEGUARDS.

CCC/143 142217Z UNGR1323

INSTRUCTIONS: FOR USE WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED.
À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS — AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

EXTOTT RBR MOSCO

SECURITY — SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S) NATO CONFIDENTIAL
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S) NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NO. TS-719 09MAY90

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION
	FROM USA DELEGATION USG OFFICIAL CONTACTS GUIDELINES FOR THE BALTIC STATES OURTEL YBGR6568 08MAY	

3

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

PAUL MEYER, BNATO

DATE

SIGNATURE

RECIPIENT'S COPY — COPIE DU DESTINATAIRE

000685

09/5.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

U.S. DELEGATION
MAY 08, 1990

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

USG OFFICIAL CONTACTS GUIDELINES
FOR THE BALTIC STATES

646184
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR
DOSSIER 20-20-USSR-20

SUMMARY. U.S. POLICY ON NON-RECOGNITION OF THE FORCIBLE INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC STATES INTO THE USSR REMAINS UNCHANGED. THE NEW GUIDELINES PROHIBIT TRAVEL BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW OR CABINET-LEVEL OFFICIALS TO THE BALTIC STATES. OTHERWISE, USG OFFICIALS MAY MEET WITH FIGURES OF ANY RANK FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OR POLITICAL PARTIES OF LITHUANIA, LATVIA OR ESTONIA. REQUESTS FOR NON-DIPLOMATIC U.S. VISAS BY BALTIC OFFICIALS WILL NOT/NOT BE DENIED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THEIR RANK OR OFFICE. END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND

THE RECENT SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS IN LITHUANIA, LATVIA AND ESTONIA WERE GENERALLY FREE AND FAIR. IN ALL THREE STATES, THE NEW LEGISLATURES AND GOVERNMENTS WILL BE DOMINATED BY DEMOCRATIC ADVOCATES OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION. OLD U.S. GUIDELINES RESTRICTING CONTACT WITH SENIOR BALTIC OFFICIALS, WHICH WERE WRITTEN AT A TIME WHEN SUCH OFFICERS ENJOYED NO LEGITIMACY OR POPULAR SUPPORT, ARE NO LONGER SUITABLE. THE NEW GUIDELINES PROVIDED BELOW ARE INTENDED TO SYMBOLIZE U.S. NON-RECOGNITION OF THE FORCIBLE INCORPORATION OF THE BALTICS INTO THE USSR WHILE PERMITTING WIDER INTERCHANGE WITH EMERGING DEMOCRATIC LEADERS.

OLD GUIDELINES

PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED OCTOBER 19, 1971 SET FORTH THE GUIDELINES ON CONTACTS BETWEEN U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS AND BALTIC OFFICIALS. IN 1986, IN RECOGNITION OF THE POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION UNDERWAY IN THE BALTICS, THE 1971 RULES WERE INFORMALLY MODIFIED FOLLOWING STATE-NSC CONSULTATIONS TO PERMIT A BROADER RANGE OF CONTACTS.

NEW GUIDELINES

AS UNDER THE PREVIOUS POLICY, TRAVEL BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW OR ANY CABINET-LEVEL OFFICIAL TO THE BALTIC STATES WILL BE PROHIBITED. OTHERWISE, LOW-KEY MEETINGS BETWEEN U.S. OFFICIALS AND BALTIC FIGURES OF ANY RANK OR PARTY AFFILIATION WILL BE PERMITTED.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

TRAVEL BY SENIOR BALTIC OFFICIALS TO THE U.S. ON NON-DIPLOMATIC VISAS WILL NOW BE PERMITTED (UNLESS THE APPLICANT IS OTHERWISE INELIGIBLE UNDER APPLICABLE INA PROVISIONS). DIPLOMATIC VISAS WILL BE ISSUED TO BALTIC CITIZENS ONLY IN THEIR CAPACITY AS MEMBERS OF AN OFFICIAL USSR DELEGATION. (ISSUANCE OF DIPLOMATIC VISAS HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR RECOGNITION OF THE REQUESTING GOVERNMENT.)

THESE NEW GUIDELINES ARE INTENDED TO EXPOSE THE U.S. TO A BROADER RANGE OF BALTIC OPINION AND TO PERMIT THE EMERGING DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP OF THE BALTIC STATES TO OBTAIN FIRST-HAND EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. THEY IN NO WAY REPRESENT A CHANGE IN OUR NON-RECOGNITION POLICY. THEY ALSO DO NOT IMPLY THAT THE U.S. IS CONDUCTING "DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS" WITH ANY BALTIC GOVERNMENT.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WSHDC UNGR2220 03MAY90

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

RECEIVED IN

MAY 4 1990

RBR

DELIVER BY 040830

TO EXTOTT RER BNATO/MINDEL/KINSMEN FOR SSEA
INFO BNATO MOSCO PARIS BONN LDN HAGUE OSLO BRU WSAW GOPEN STKHM
HSNKI VIENN VNACE PRGUE BPEST BUCST PCOOTT/DOYLE PMOOTT/HARTT/
HEINBECKER/GRAUER

DIST MINA USS IFB IND INP INE RGB RWR RWD RBD CPD CPP EER RGZ URR

---VISIT OF LITHUANIAN PM TO WSHDC

ACCORDING TO STATE DEPT(HOOPER,OFFICE EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS)

PM PRUNSKIENE DEMONSTRATED GOOD DEAL OF FLEXIBILITY IN HER
MTGS WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND WITH PRESIDENT BUSH
TODAY.MTG WITH EAGLEBURGER LARGELY CONSISTED OF LONG RECITATION
ON PART OF PRUNSKIENE(WHO DID MOST OF TALKING)OF LITHUANIAN VIEWS
AND POSITION ON INDEPENDENCE.IT WAS CLEAR,BOTH IN MTG WITH
EAGLEBURGER THIS MORNING AND IN THIRTY MINUTE SESSION WITH
PRESIDENT THIS AFTERNOON,THAT LITHUANIANS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT
THE KOHL/MITTERRAND FORMULA FOR LAUNCHING NEGOTIATIONS AS LONG
AS WEST DOES NOT SIMPLY LEAVE LITHUANIA ALONE AT NEGOTIATING TABLE
WITH SOVIETS.GUARANTEES WOULD BE REQUIRED BUT PRUNSKIENE DID NOT
DEFINE WHAT THESE WOULD ENTAIL AND AMERICANS DID NOT PURSUE
SUBJECT.

2.INTERLOCUTOR INDICATED THAT USA IS RATHER RELUCTANT TO GET INVOLVED
IN FORMAL GUARANTEES.USA WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONVEY MESSAGES TO
SOVIETS INFORMALLY AND MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ACT AS WITNESS TO ANY
...2

20-USE-1-3-USSR

DOSSIER

NC

10072A

1 MAR 1990 15 2702

PAGE TWO UNGR2220 CONF

FORMULA WORKED OUT TO GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. REALITY, HOWEVER, IS THAT VIOLENCE COULD BREAK OUT AT ANY TIME IN LITHUANIA AND IN THE INTEREST OF LAUNCHING NEGOTIATIONS ADMIN COULD WELL FIND ITSELF AGREEING TO ROLE IT WOULD PREFER TO AVOID.

3. PRESIDENT, IN MTG WITH PRUNSKIENE, TOOK CARE TO GET ACROSS MESSAGES THAT HE HAD NOT APPRECIATED COMPARISON LITHUANIAN PRESIDENT LANDSBERGIS HAD DRAWN BETWEEN PRESIDENTS POSITION ON LITHUANIA AND NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA (AT MUNICH). THERE IS SOME FEELING HERE THAT LITHUANIANS HAD, IN EFFECT, KICKED DOOR DOWN AND PUT PRESIDENT IN POSITION WHERE HE COULD NOT REFUSE TO RECEIVE PM PRUNSKIENE DESPITE SOME RELUCTANCE TO DO SO.

4. PM PRUNSKIENE'S VISIT IS TAKING PLACE AGAINST BACKGROUND OF GROWING UNEASINESS IN CONGRESS OVER ADMIN'S APPROACH TO LITHUANIA ISSUE. EARLIER THIS WEEK SENATE ADOPTED BY 73 TO 24 VOTE NONBINDING RESOLUTION CALLING ON PRESIDENT NOT TO SUBMIT MFN TRADE LEGISLATION TO CONGRESS UNTIL USSR LIFTED ECONOMIC EMBARGO AND BEGAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH LITHUANIA.

5. MEMBERS OF HSNKI COMMISSION (GROUP COMPOSED OF 16 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO MONITOR CSCE PROGRESS) WERE OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTIVE OF PM WHEN SHE APPEARED BEFORE THEM THIS MORNING. DOMINANT MOOD WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO USA ECONOMIC, TRADE OR TECHNOLOGICAL CONCESSIONS TO SOVIET UNION UNTIL NEGOTIATIONS ON INDEPENDENCE OF LITHUANIA WERE ENGAGED.

CCC/114 032219Z UNGR2220



TO/A

MINA/Hagen IFB EFB IDD RWD CPD URD-IND
IDR IDA RGX RWR RBR CPP RBT

FROM/DE

RGB

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

U.S. Consultations on Lithuania

Security/Sécurité CONFIDENTIAL	
AC Accession/Référence	DATE
File/Dossier FILE	DOSSIER 20-USA-1-3-USSR
LCC 90	47
Date	April 24, 1990
Number/Numéro RBR 0754	

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

RBR/Poetschke was handed the attached document by an official from the American Embassy in Ottawa on Monday, April 23. The document seeks to elicit allied reaction on the course of action the United States has under consideration over Moscow's blockade of Lithuania. US authorities are also interested in knowing about the course of action other allied and EC countries intend to take, including Canada.

I shall be chairing a meeting to discuss this question on Thursday, April 26 at 10:30 in the A-7 Boardroom, to which you are invited.

Jacques S. Roy
Assistant Deputy Minister
Europe Branch

Att.

meeting agreed
That a 90
page attitude
assessment, that
we will develop
an inventory
of our exchanges
with the USSR, and
that a common
data base be
developed with
a ~~coordinated~~ coordinated
approach to application
of measures.

Lithuania: Consultations with Allies and EC

SOVIET ACTIONS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON LITHUANIA CONTINUED TO MOUNT ON FRIDAY, APRIL 22. THE CUTOFF OF OIL AND GAS IS STILL IN FORCE AND THE LITHUANIANS CLAIM OTHER COMMODITIES ARE BEING CUT OFF AS WELL. THE PRESS HAS REPORTED A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO SEIZE A PRINTING PLANT USED BY THE LITHUANIAN PRO-INDEPENDENCE MEDIA. WE ARE FOLLOWING THESE DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY AND CONTINUE TO BE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD A PEACEFUL DIALOGUE.

WE ARE STILL CONSIDERING ACTIONS WE MAY TAKE IN RESPONSE TO THIS SITUATION, AND EXAMINING MAINLY ECONOMIC MEASURES. ESPECIALLY THOSE OF COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE TO THE SOVIETS. WE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING SUSPENSION OF OUR TECHNICAL COOPERATION EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- ALTHOUGH THESE ARE DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO PROMOTE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY.

WE ASSUME THE EC, NATO AND OTHER FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS ARE CONTINUING TO REEXAMINE THEIR OWN OPTIONS ON HOW TO REGISTER THEIR CONCERN TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE PRESUME THESE OPTIONS ARE ALSO LARGELY IN THE ECONOMIC AREA. WE EXPECT MOST GOVERNMENTS WILL PUBLICLY REGISTER A STRONG OBJECTION TO SOVIET MEASURES OF INTIMIDATION IN LITHUANIA.

WE HAVE UNDER REVIEW, INTER ALIA, ACTIONS THAT THE US MIGHT TAKE WITH REGARD TO THE FOLLOWING:

-- NEGOTIATIONS FOR A BILATERAL COMMERCIAL TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR. SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS A PREREQUISITE FOR MFN STATUS.

-- NEGOTIATIONS FOR A BILATERAL MARITIME TRANSPORT AGREEMENT.

-- NEGOTIATIONS ON THE EXPANSION OF CIVIL AVIATION ROUTES. (EXISTING ROUTES UNDER THE CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT NOW IN FORCE WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED.)

-- NEGOTIATIONS ON A TAX AGREEMENT.

-- NEGOTIATIONS ON A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY.

WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW ALLIED AND FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS WOULD REACT TO THESE MEASURES; WHAT STEPS THEY ARE CONTEMPLATING, AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS.

IN ADDITION, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR REACTION TO THE FOLLOWING MULTILATERAL OPTIONS:

CONFIDENTIAL

-- DEFERRING CONSIDERATION OF SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS IN
GATT BEYOND THE MAY ROUND. V

-- DENYING THE USSR ACCESS TO THE OECD CENTER FOR
ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION.

-- RAISING SOVIET ACTIONS IN LITHUANIA AS A BROAD HUMAN
RIGHTS ISSUE UNDER THE CDH MECHANISM OR AT THE
FORTHCOMING COPENHAGEN MEETING, INCLUDING EXAMINING
WHETHER THERE WAS

A CASE UNDER PRINCIPLES 7 AND 8 OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT,
AND ITS EFFECT ON ATTENDANCE AT THE HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING
IN MOSCOW IN 1991.

① is this imminent?

②

CONFIDENTIAL

000692

External Affairs Canada Affaires extérieures Canada

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDR/037 19 APR 90

TO/À

TO BNATO

INFO

DISTR

INFO TTNDHQOTT/CIS/DG SECUR/D NATO POL/ WSHDC MOSCO LDN BONN PARIS

REF

PILLAROTT/RCI/RCT/FEL BH SOLGENOTT/NSCC DE OTT DE CAF

SUBJ/SUJ

REF BNATO YBGR 6446 04 APR 90

---TERRORISM:US-USSR BILATERALS

REF INFORMS INTERESTED DEPARTMENTS THAT ON 12-13 APR USA HOLDING
BILATERAL TALKS WITH USSR ON TERRORISM AND THAT US AMBASSADOR BUSBY
WILL BE AVAILABLE TO BRIEF ALLIES ON THE RESULTS OF THESE TALKS, 26
APR AT NATO HEADQUARTERS.

2.REQUEST DEF COUNSELLOR ATTEND BRIEFING ON 26 APR 90 AND
COMMUNICATE RESULTS TO NDHQ CIS, ATTN:DG SECUR

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

RETURN TO

FOR FILING

REVOYER AU

POUR ETRE

PORTÉ AU DOSSIER

FILE

DOSSIER

20-USA-1-3-USSR

cc 20-22-TERRORISM.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

COL KRALL

D NATO POL

995-9155

J. FOWELL, DIRECTOR

SIG

SIG

000693



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

LASER PRINTED MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDD-0300 18 APR

TO/À

TO MOSCO WSHDC

INFO

DISTR

INFO BNATO VNACE LDN PARIS BONN ROME PRGUE WSAW BPEST GENEV PRMNY

REF

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL PCOOTT/THOMSEN

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTRIB MINA USS IFB RGB URB IDR IDA IDAN IDAV RBD RBR RWD RWR URD
URR CPD CPP IND INP *IDX*

---SOVIET VIEWS ON BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MTG

SOVIET EMB REP LIAKINE PROVIDED IDD WITH MUCH MORE ROSY ACCOUNT OF
ACD ASPECTS OF BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE DISCUSSION THAN REPORTED BY
WSHDC, BNATO, AND GENEV. FOLLOWING WERE MAIN POINTS: QUOTE COMMON
SENSE AND REALISM PREVAILED THROUGHOUT WSHDC MTGS UNQUOTE. MAJOR
ACCOMPLISHMENT HAD BEEN TO AGREE ON DATES FOR SUMMIT WHICH WLD BE
IMPORTANT EVENT WITH TANGIBLE AGMTS.

2.ON START BOTH SIDES HAD REAFFIRMED INTENTION TO SIGN AGMT BY END
OF YEAR AND SOVIETS WANT AGMT INITIALLED AT SUMMIT. THERE WERE
STILL DIFFERENCES ON SLCMS AND ALCMS AND BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED TO
INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THOSE DIFFERENCES. SOVIETS HAD ALSO
PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON FUTURE TALKS (START II) AND HAD
TABLED JOINT DRAFT STATEMENT ON START II WHICH WLD BE ADOPTED AT
SUMMIT.

3.ON CFE BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED ON DESIRABILITY OF EARLY CONCLUSION

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

J. J. J. J.
SIG

100

992-3462

J. J. J. J.
SIG

000694



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

12

10

~~PAGE TWO~~ IDD-0300 CONFIDENTIAL

THIS YEAR. SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED TO START LEGAL DRAFTING OF ALREADY AGREED PROVISIONS SUCH AS OTT AGMT ON MANPOWER CEILINGS AND HAD PUT FORWARD NEW PROPOSAL FOR EQUAL CEILINGS OF 500 US AND SOVIET AIRCRAFT STATIONED OUTSIDE NAYTIONAL TERRITORY IN EUROPE.

4. DISCUSSION ON CW WAS QUOTE USEFUL AND HELPFUL UNQUOTE. THERE WERE GOOD PROSPECTS TO SPEED UP CW CONVENTION. ELABORATION OF BILATERAL CW AGMT WLD HELP. U.S. HAD AGREED TO CEASE PRODUCTION OF CW WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF BILATERAL AGMT. (THIS CONTRADICTS WHAT LEDOGAR TOLD CD AMBS IN GENEVA).

5. 74/76 NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES WLD BE SIGNED AT SUMMIT. SOVIETS HAD REAFFIRMED GOAL OF CTB.

6. SOVIET SIDE HAD TRIED TO DISCUSS NAVAL ACD, BUT U.S. POSITION HAD BEEN QUOTE VERY NEGATIVE WITH NO/NO CHANGE IN POSITION UNQUOTE.

7. BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED TO JOINT STATEMENT ON NON PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CW AND MISSILE AND ROCKET TECHNOLOGY.

8. OPEN SKIES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AND AGMT TO QUOTE INTENSIFY WORK FOR BPEST CONF UNQUOTE HAD BEEN REACHED.

9. ON GERMAN UNIFICATION SOVIETS HAD SPOKEN IN FAVOUR OF STEP BY STEP APPROACH WITH NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT INTERESTS OF FOUR POWERS, OTHER STATES AND GERMANS THEMSELVES. ONLY THEN CLD THERE BE ASSURANCE OF SYNCHRONIZATION BETWEEN EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FACTORS AND BALANCE OF FORCES AND STABILITY IN EUROPE WHICH WLD NOT

...3



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

12

10

PAGE THREE IDD-0300 CONFIDENTIAL

BE THREATENING TO SOVIET SECURITY. SOVIET VIEW WAS THAT UNIFICATION SHLD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH AGMTS BETWEEN QUOTE TWO EQUAL ENTITIES OF INNATL LAW UNQUOTE AND NOT SIMPLY IN ACCORD WITH ARTICLE 23 OF FRG BASIC LAW. SECURITY AND POLITICAL STATUS OF UNITED GERMANY WAS CENTRAL QUESTION.

10. WHILE SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD WESTERN POSITION RE UNITED GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, SOVIETS REAFFIRMED VIEW THAT IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE NOT TO HAVE ALTERNATIVE VIEWS. SOVIETS WERE SEEKING QUANTITATIVELY NEW SYSTEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY THROUGH TRANSFORMATION OF EXISTING STRUCTURES, WHILE U.S. STATED THAT NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE SHLD BE BUILT AROUND NATO.

11. BOTH SIDES REAFFIRMED NECESSITY OF INNATL LEGAL CONFIRMATION OF GERMAN BORDERS AND STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF TWO PLUS FOUR EXERCISE FOR PURPOSES OF GERMAN UNIFICATION.


12. OVERALL ASSESSMENT WAS THAT WSHDC TALKS HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND THAT BOTH SIDES WERE ON ROAD TO SUCCESSFUL BILATERAL SUMMIT.

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCO XYGR0671 18APR90

TO EXTOTT/RBR

---USA AMB MOSCO



ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TASS STORY DATED 11APR QUOTE

- BUSH DECIDES NOT TO REPLACE AMBASSADOR TO USSR
WASHINGTON APRIL 11 TASS - AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH US
SECTY OF STATE JAMES BAKER, PRESIDENT BUSH HAS DECIDED TO
PROLONG THE TERM OF US AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION JACK
MATLOCK. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRACTICE OF THE US STATE DEPT,
THE TERM OF OFFICE OF AN AMBASSADOR IS THREE YEARS. FOR
MATLOCK IT EXPIRES AT THE END OF THE CURRENT YEAR. THERE
WAS MUCH SPECULATION IN WSHDC POLITICAL CIRCLES ABOUT WHO
WOULD REPLACE HIM AS AMBASSADOR.

THE STATE DEPT PREPARED A PRELIMINARY LIST OF POSSIBLE
CANDIDATES. ITS CONTENT WAS NOT DISCLOSED BUT ACCORDING TO
THE STATE DEPT SOURCES IT INCLUDED THE NAMES OF LEADING
CAREER DIPLOMATS.

THE WSHDC POST NEWSPAPER REPORTS THAT THE US LEADERSHIP
CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING MATLOCK WITH A WELL-
KNOWN PUBLIC FIGURE WHO WOULD SYMBOLISE US SUPPORT FOR
CHANGES IN THE USSR. THE NEWSPAPER POINTED OUT HOWEVER,
QUOTING ADMINISTRATION SOURCES, THAT BUSH AND BAKER FOUND
IT INAPPROPRIATE TO REPLACE THE AMBASSADOR RIGHT NOW AND
SAID THAT THEY WERE MORE THAN PLEASED WITH HIS PERFORMANCE.
ITEM ENDS UNQUOTE.

UUU/024 181001Z XYGR0671

ACC	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	



External Affairs Canada / Affaires extérieures Canada

9SER PRINTER MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Reference

File/Dossier

FILE FILING

POUR - ETRE
FOR - AU DOSSIER

ACC

FILE

DOSSIER

640870
27-4-NATO-11
cc 20-USA-1-3-USSR

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDR 0967 10APR90

TO/À

TO BNATO DELIVER BY 110900

NFO

DISTR

INFO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC MOSCO BONN PARIS LDN VNACE GENEV WSAW

REF

PMOOTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE

SUBJ/SUJ

TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DGPOLPLAN/DGPOLOPS/DNATOPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA USS IFB RGB RWR RBR RBD RWD CPP CPD IDD IDA RGX INP

URR IDRL IDAO

REF YOURFAX YBGR6465 10APR; WSHDCTEL UNGR1294 07APR

--- BAKER-SHEVARDNADZE MTG: PRESENTATION TO COUNCIL

CONSIDERING INTERNAL PROBLEMS FACING SOVIET LEADERSHIP, THEIR
CONCERN OVER RAPIDITY OF CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY
IN GERMANY AND PACE SET IN EARLIER WYOMING, MOSCO AND OTTAWA
ENCOUNTERS IT WAS PROBABLY INEVITABLE THAT SOVIETS WOULD WANT TO
SLOW PROCESS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THEY WERE NOT/NOT RUSHED
INTO SOMETHING THAT WOULD COME BACK TO HAUNT THEM. WHETHER QUOTE
SET-BACKS UNQUOTE WERE RESULT OF SOVIET MILITARY EXERCISING
INFLUENCE OR WERE REFLECTIVE OF USA DISAPPOINTMENT THAT EARLIER
PACE HAD NOT/NOT BEEN MAINTAINED REMAINS TO BE SEEN. HISTORY
SUGGESTS COMBINATION OF BOTH.

2. IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT SITU IN LITHUANIA WOULD INFLUENCE
BAKER-SHEVARDNADZE MTG BUT WE SEE IN KAMMON'S COMMENT LINKING
SUMMIT TO SITU IN LITHUANIA BIT OF TWO-EDGED SWORD, PARTICULARLY

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APProuvé

D.A. Snider
D.A. SNIDER

IDR

2-6205

D.A. Snider
D.A. SNIDER

SIG

SIG

000698



Canada

Canada

Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO IDR0967 CONF

12

FROM ALLIANCE PERSPECTIVE. IT IS CLEAR THAT EUROPEAN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY GERMANY HAVE DIFFERENT VIEW THAN USA ON DEGREE TO WHICH SOVIET HANDLING OF LITHUANIA SHOULD INFLUENCE EUROPEAN AGENDA. POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR SERIOUS INTRA-ALLIANCE DISAGREEMENT OVER WHAT CONSTITUTES QUOTE VIOLENCE UNQUOTE SHOULD ANYTHING OCCUR. BY PUSHING FOR EARLY FIXED DATES FOR SUMMIT, AMERICANS MAY HAVE MADE PRES. BUSH AS MUCH HOSTAGE TO LITHUANIA AS GORBACHEV. YOU MAY WISH TO SIGNAL THIS OBLIQUELY SHOULD OPPORTUNITY ARISE. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO DRAW ON RBR TEL 618 03APR FOR OTHER COMMENTS ON LITHUANIA.

3. ARMS CONTROL: A) START - WE WERE NOT/NOT CONVINCED AT TIME THAT MOST DIFFERENCES ON SLCMS AND ALCMS HAD BEEN RESOLVED AT MOSCO MTG. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO PROBE SEITZ AS TO JUST HOW FIRM AMERICANS BELIEVED MOSCO UNDERTAKINGS WERE. DIFFERENCES OVER RESPECTIVE CURRENT NEGOTIATION POSITIONS HAVE BEEN OVERSHADOWED TO CERTAIN EXTENT BY INFO LEAKED VIA MICHAEL GORDON ARTICLE IN NYT CONCERNING PROPOSAL BY PRES BUSH TO ELIMINATE ALL LAND-BASED MOBILE MIRVED MISSILES, WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN PROMPTED BY PRESSURES FROM CONGRESS. SUBJ WAS APPARENTLY NOT/NOT INCLUDED IN KAMMON BRIEFING NOR/NOR WAS IT MENTIONED IN PAPER GIVEN YOU UNLESS REF ON PAGE SIX TO FOLLOW-ON NEGS IS MEANT TO COVER ISSUE. FURTHER INFO WOULD BE WORTHWHILE, INCLUDING WHETHER PROPOSAL WAS MEANT TO BE INCLUDED IN CURRENT NEGS, POINT ON WHICH GORDON WAS NOT/NOT

...3



Canada

Canada

Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

▼ PAGE THREE IDR0967 CONFD

12

10

CLEAR. (B) CFE - SOVIET DESIRE TO CONSIDER LOWER LIMITS IN
CENTRAL ZONE REINFORCES VIEW THAT GERMAN UNIFICATION HAS CAUSED
THEM TO ASSESS EARLIER POSITION AND TO USE CFE AS ONE OF MEANS TO
OVERCOME PERCEIVED SECURITY PROBLEMS ARISING FROM UNIFICATION. ON
AIRCRAFT PROBLEM YOU COULD ADVANCE SUGGESTION THAT WE BELIEVE IT
MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE RETURNING TO ISSUE OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT WITH
VIEW OF NEGOTIATING FROM OUR BASIS TOWARD SOVIET POSITION AS IT
WAS INFORMALLY PUT TO BAKER IN MOSCO, CALLING FOR CEILING ON
AIRCRAFT IN EXCESS OF CURRENT NATO HOLDINGS (IDATEL 2356).

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I - D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1296 09APR90

TO EXTOTT URB

INFO BNATO BONN MOSCO PARIS LDN WSAW GENA VIENN TAVIV SEOUL

PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOORD/DIPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA DMC DMT USS IFB RGB EFB URD URR IDO IDR IDA RBD RWD

RBR RWR CPD CPP GGB GAA LCD LCR GAM PSR PNR PSD PND EED EEE EFBS

REF OURTELS UNGR1294 07APR VNACE TEL XTDR0601 09APR

---BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING:CFE

REGRET THAT DUE TO PRESSURE TO PRODUCE RAPID REPORT,OUR DRAFTING
MAY HAVE SOMETIMES SUFFERED FROM IMPRECISION.BY QUOTE COLLECTIVE
UNQUOTE WE HAD MEANT TO REFER ONLY TO CIELING ON USA/USSR
COMBINED FORCES,WHICH WOULD NOT/NOT INCLUDE THOSE OF OTHER
COUNTRIES.THERE WAS NEVER ANY DOUBT ARISING FROM KAMMONS
BRIEFING ON THIS POINT.

2.FURTHER ON IN OUR REFTTEL,WE SPOKE OF LIMIT OF 500 AIRCRAFT IN
CENTRAL ZONE.AS VNACE REFTTEL POINTS OUT,WE SHOULD HAVE
SPECIFIED AGAIN THAT AIRCRAFT WOULD BELONG TO USA/USSR ONLY.
OUR NOTES,HOWEVER,FOR WHAT THEY ARE WORTH,DO STATE LIMIT OF
500 WOULD BE BASED IN CENTRAL ZONE.

CCC/114 091804Z UNGR1296

RETURN TO
REMITTER AL D/100
FOR
POUR - EYRE
FICHE AU DOSSIER
REF. DATE

20-USA-1-3-USSR
9028-4-CFE A3
DOSSIER

ACTION
QUITE A DONNER

ACC	751393	DATE
FILE	20/USA-13-USSR	
LOC	28-4-CFE 13	
AG-		

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM VNACF XTDR0601 09APR00

TO EXTOTT URB DELIVER BY 091400

INFO BNATO BONN MOSCO PARIS LDN WSAW GENEV VIENN TAVIV WSHDC SEOUL

PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOORD/DIPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA DMC DMT USS IFB RGB EFB URD URR IDD IDR IDA RBD RWD RBR

RWR CPD CPP GGB GAA LCD LCR GAM PSR PNR PSD PND EED EEE EFBS

REF WSHDC TEL UNGR1294 07APR

---BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MTG:CFE

WE SYMPATHIZE WITH COLLEAGUES WHO ATTEMPT TO KEEP UP WITH
COMPLEX DETAIL OF CONSTANTLY SHIFTING POSITIONS IN CFE NEGS.
WOULD POINT OUT THAT OTT AGMT ON MANPOWER CEILINGS WOULD APPLY
ONLY TO SOVIET AND USA STATIONED FORCES AND DOES NOT/NOT INCLUDE
ANY PROVISION FOR COLLECTIVE CEILINGS AS INDICATED PARA 4
REFTEL.USSR AND SOME OF ITS ALLIES WOULD CLEARLY LIKE TO
SUPPLEMENT THIS BY COLLECTIVE CEILING IN CENTRAL ZONE.EAST
HAS MADE NO/NO FORMAL PROPOSAL TO EFFECT, HOWEVER, AND HAVE BEEN
TOLD QUITE BLUNTLY BY WESTERN REPS THAT OTT AGMT SETTLED
MANPOWER ISSUE AS FAR AS CFE-I AGMT WAS CONCERNED.

2.WE LEARNED FROM USA AMB WOOLSEY TODAY THAT USSR INDEED
ADVANCED NEW PROPOSAL ON COMBAT AIRCRAFT WHICH WOULD IMPOSE
CEILING OF 500 ON USA/USSR STATIONED AIRCRAFT ALONE.(NOT/NOT A
GENERAL CEILING NOR ONE CONFINED TO CENTRAL ZONE AS STATED
REFTEL.)BAKER REPORTEDLY DISMISSED PROPOSAL OUT OF HAND BOTH
IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND IN PRESS CONF.

CCC/258 001431Z XTDR0601

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WASHDC UNGR1298 09APR90

TO EXTOTT/UCB ^{URB} DELIVER BY 091700

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE

BNATO MOSCO WSAW LDN PARIS BONN VNAGE GENEV

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPO/CD/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC URD URR IFB IDD IDR IDA PGB

CPP

ACTION
QUITE A DONNER

ACC	DATE
705033	
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	
LOC	RWD RWR RBD RBR CPD
AS	

---BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING:BLACKWILL ASSESSMENT

BLACKWILL OF NSC TOLD BURNEY THIS MORNING THAT LAST WEEKS

BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING WAS THE LEAST PRODUCTIVE OF ANY DURING

BUSH ADMINISTRATION.HE DESCRIBED MEETING AS QUOTE QUITE

DISAPPOINTING UNQUOTE,BUT WAS UNSURE WHETHER EXPLANATION WAS

SPADOW OF LITHUANIA,PRESSURES FROM CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS IN

MOSCOW,OF CLASSIC SOVIET WAIT-AND-SEE PLOY GOING IN TO

BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT.

2.BLACKWILL SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO PROGRESS ON CFE,START OR

OPEN SKIES,AND ONLY A LITTLE MOVEMENT ON CW.NOR HAD THERE BEEN

MUCH MOVEMENT ON GERMANY.IN THIS VIEW,QUOTE AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT

OF WORK UNQUOTE REMAINED TO BE DONE BEFORE THE SUMMIT.

CCC/095 092014Z UNGR1298

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WSHDC UNGR1294 07APR90

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

TO EXTOTT(URB) DELIVER BY 090830

INFO BNATO BONN MOSCO PARIS LDN WSAW GENEV VIENN TAVIV VNACE

SEOUL PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDQHOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOORD/DIPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA DMC DMT USS IFB RGB EFB URD URR IDD IDR

RBR PWR CPD CPP GGB GAA LCD LCR GAM PSR PNR

REF OURTEL UNGR1285 04APR (NOTAL)

RETURN TO	FOR FILING
RENOYER AU	POUR - ETRE
	PORTE AU DOSSIE
ACC	REF
751398	DATE
USA RED RWD	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	
PSD PND EED EEE	A7

---BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING: ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL AND

BILATERAL ISSUES

SUMMARY: WHILE LABOURING UNDER SHADOW OF LITHUANIA AND
REGISTERING CERTAIN SET BACKS IN SOME START RELATED ARMS CONTROL
ITEMS (CRUISE MISSILES), CFE AND OPEN SKIES, BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE
ENCOUNTER MAINTAINED GOOD MOOD AND TONE AND FOUND MEETING OF
MINDS ON CERTAIN REGIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL (E.G. ENVIRONMENT) AND
BILATERAL ISSUES. BACKSLIDING ON START AND CFE WAS ATTRIBUTED BY
AMERICANS TO CONCERN BY SOVIET MILITARY AND THAT TOO MUCH MIGHT HAVE
BEEN GIVEN AWAY AT LAST FM MEETING IN MOSCO AND THAT SOME GROUND
HAD TO BE RECAPTURED. WITH GORBACHEV PREOCCUPIED BY NATIONALITY
PROBLEMS, MILITARY HAD BEEN ABLE TO QUOTE CROWD OUT UNQUOTE
CONTROL OF AGENDA. ON OTHER HAND, IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1294 CONF

TOUGHENING STANCE AT LAST MINUTE IS SOVIET TACTIC ALLOWING FOR MORE DRAMATIC APPEARANCE OF SUCCESS WHEN OBSTACLES ARE RESOLVED BY HEADS OF GOVT AT SUMMIT ITSELF. OF DIRECT CDN INTEREST, KAMMON NOTED THAT SOVIET INFLEXIBILITY ON OPEN SKIES WILL MAKE REACHING AGREEMENT AT BUDAPEST VERY HARD; HE WOULD NOT/NOT RECOMMEND MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE AT THIS TIME. SOME MOVEMENT WAS MADE ON ENVIRONMENT WITH AGREEMENT BY BOTH SIDES TO ATTEND YELLOWKNIFE CONFERENCE. DATE FOR SUMMIT WAS SET AS 30MAY-03JUN (THEREBY RATCHETING UP PRESSURE FOR SOVIET GOOD BEHAVIOUR IN LITHUANIA) WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PREPARATORY MEETING IN MOSCO 16-19MAY.

2. REPORT: WE MET TODAY WITH CURT KAMMON, DEPUTY ASSIST SECRETARY FOR EASTERN EUROPE AT STATE DEPT AND CHAIRMAN OF TRANSNATIONAL AND BILATERAL WORKING GROUPS ESTABLISHED UNDER RUBRIC OF USA-USSR FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS. THIS TEL REPORTS ON HIGHLIGHTS OF ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL, AND BILATERAL ITEMS DISCUSSED DURING BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN WSHDC 04-06APR.

3. ARMS CONTROL

IN START RELATED ITEMS, RESULTS WERE MIXED: ON SLCM AND ALCMS, FORMER MILITARY CHIEF AKROMEYEV TOOK CONTROL AND MUCH TO CONSTERNATION OF USA SIDE REOPENED ASPECTS WHICH HAD BEEN SETTLED EARLIER IN MOSCO. RE ALCMS, SOVIETS STUCK AT 600 K RANGE, WHEREAS USA DROPPED DOWN TO 800 K FROM 1500 IN EFFORT TO MEET AT

...3

LE THREE UNTR1294 CONF

ACCEPTABLE POINT. RE SLCMS, SOVIETS SEEMED TO TOUGHEN POSITION REGARDING STATUS OF DOCUMENT REQUIRING LEGALLY BINDING DECLARATION TO BE ATTACHED TO START TREATY. THERE WAS NO/NO SOVIET FLEXIBILITY OVER WHAT USA CONSIDERS UNWARRANTED DEGREE OF INTRUSIVENESS OF VERIFICATION MEASURES. NOR WAS THERE PROGRESS ON SPACE DEFENCE QUESTIONS WHICH SOVIETS INSIST ON ATTACHING TO ABM TREATY. USA CIRCULATED SOME IDEAS ON VERIFICATION (LAB INSPECTIONS AND DATA EXCHANGE) IN EFFORT TO ENHANCE PREDICTABILITY AND STABILITY OF ANY SPACE DEFENCE REGIME. ON PLUS SIDE, BOTH AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT START TREATY WOULD HAVE 15 YEAR DURATION WITH FIVE YEAR EXTENSION PERIODS. PROGRESS WAS MADE ON ISSUE OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION WHICH WOULD PROTECT PREVIOUS PATTERN OF CONSULTATIONS WHILE RULING OUT FUTURE ACTIVITIES. SOVIETS ALSO FLOATED NEW IDEAS ON MEASURES TO VERIFY MOBILE ICBMS WHICH USA SIDE WILL EXAMINE. AN AGREED WORK PROGRAM ON SOME 30 START TECHNICAL ITEMS TO BE WORKED ON IN GENEVA WAS DRAWN UP. 4. ON CFE, MANPOWER CEILINGS STILL POSE PROBLEMS WITH SOVIETS WISHING TO GO BEYOND COLLECTIVE 750,000 LEVEL AGREED UPON IN OTTAWA. TWO SIDES ARE STILL QUOTE FAR APART UNQUOTE ON AIRCRAFT AS SOVIETS PROPOSED LIMIT OF 500 IN CENTRAL ZONE REMAINS UNACCEPTABLE. SOVIETS MADE SOME PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD ENTAIL CONVERTING TO CIVILIAN USE CERTAIN BANNED MILITARY MATERIAL

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR1294 CONF

RATHER THAN TOTAL DESTRUCTION.USA EXPRESSED DOUBTS ON THIS SCORE.IT WAS REITERATED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE EXPLORING POSITIONS WHICH NEED TO BE NEGOTIATED IN MULTILATERAL CONTEXT.

5.REGARDING CW,KAMMON REPORTED THAT SOVIETS CAME SOME DISTANCE TOWARDS USA POSITION ON BANNING CURRENT STOCKS.TWO PRINCIPAL ISSUES REMAIN: (A) WHETHER SOVIETS CAN DESTROY STOCKS FAST ENOUGH AND EXTENT TO WHICH THEY WILL REQUIRE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM USA;AND (B) SOVIET POSITION THAT BAN ON FUTURE PRODUCTION SHOULD BE BILATERAL DOES NOT/NOT SQUARE WITH USA INSISTANCE ON MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT.KAMMON NOTED THAT USA MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MOVE UP DATE FOR CONCLUSION OF MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT IF SOVIETS WERE TO ABANDON IDEA OF BILATERAL ACCORD.IN CW,AS WELL NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS,THERE IS GENERAL OPTIMISM THAT PROTOCOLS MIGHT BE SIGNED BY TIME OF SUMMIT.

6.ON QUESTION OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MISSILES WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN MOSCO,BOTH SIDES TABLED DRAFT DECLARATIONS (WITH CONSIDERABLE SIMILARITIES) IN WASHINGTON.IT WAS AGREED TO WORK ON THE USA TEXT.

7.THERE WAS DISCUSSION OF RECENT REVELATION THAT SS23S HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO CZECH,GDR AND POLAND BEFORE THE INF SIGNING WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INF NEGOTIATORS.WHILE TECHNICALLY CONSISTENT ...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR1294 CONF

A THE INF AGREEMENT, BAKER RAISED CONCERNS WITH SHEVARDNADZE OVER LACK OF OPENNESS IN NEGOTIATIONS. USA WAS ASSURED THAT SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV WERE IGNORANT OF THIS EVENT. KAMMON STATED ISSUED DID RAISE PROBLEM ABOUT DEGREE OF CONTROL EXERCISED BY POLITICAL LEVEL OVER MILITARY ONCE ACD AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE. IT ALSO UNDERLINED NEED FOR COMPLIANCE WITH INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION.

B. FINALLY, ON OPEN SKIES, KAMMON REPORTED THAT WHILE SOVIETS EVIDENCED SLIGHT MOVEMENT ON SENSORS BY ACCEPTING ALL WEATHER CAPABLE EQUIPMENT, THERE WAS NO/NO PROGRESS ON QUESTION OF QUOTAS OR DATA EXCHANGE. HE COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO GET AGREEMENT IN BUDAPEST AND MINISTERS SHOULD NOT ATTEND UNLESS MORE MOVEMENT WAS EVIDENT.

C. REGIONAL QUESTIONS: THERE WAS A POSITIVE EXCHANGE ON IMPORTANCE OF FOMENTING ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN AREAS OF REGIONAL CONFLICT. IN AFGHANISTAN, USA MOVED FORWARD BY INDICATION THAT NAJIBULLA COULD PARTICIPATE IN ELECTORAL PROCESS BUT THAT HE SHOULD NOT/NOT BE ALLOWED TO BROKER ELECTIONS. ROLE OF UN IN TRANSITION/INTERIM PHASE WAS ACKNOWLEDGED. SIMILARLY FOR CAMBODIA, WHERE SOVIETS AGREED TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE THROUGH FORUM ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT MEMBERS. BOTH SIDES UNDERTOOK TO BRING ANGOLAN COMBATANTS TOGETHER: SHEVARDNADZE WAS NOT/NOT SURE THAT DOS SANTOS WAS YET READY FOR ELECTIONS.

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR1294 CONF

10. ON MIDDLE EAST, SHEVARDNADZE RECOGNIZED THAT FORMATION OF A LABOUR GOVT MIGHT GET PROCESS BACK ON TRACKS BUT DID NOT/NOT REACT WHEN BAKER SUGGESTED THAT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL BY USSR COULD GIVE PERES GOVT IMPORTANT DOMESTIC SUPPORT. SOVIETS ARE STILL PRESSING FOR UN CONF ON MIDDLE EAST WHICH USA ASSESS AS PREMATURE. PRIVATELY SHEVARDNADZE DECLINED TO ALLOW RESUMPTION OF FLIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS DIRECT TO ISRAEL. HOWEVER, IN PRESS CONF, HE STATED USSR WOULD CONSIDER FLIGHTS IF ISRAEL GUARANTEED EMIGRANTS WOULD NOT/NOT SETTLE IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND ISRAEL COMPLIED WITH CERTAIN UNSPECIFIED UN RESOLUTIONS. KAMMON DID NOT/NOT KNOW QUITE WHAT TO MAKE OF THIS.

11. ON KOREA, THERE WAS QUOTE AN AIRING OF ISSUES BJT NO/NO REAL ADVANCE UNQUOTE. SHEVARDNADZE SPOKE (SOMEWHAT IRONICALLY) OF QUOTE TEARING DOWN THE WALL UNQUOTE, WHILE USA SIDE ASSERTED THAT NORTH HAD NOT/NOT REDUCED ITS MILITARY THREAT IN ANY WAY AND HAD BROKEN OFF DIALGUE. BOTH AGREED THEY WOULD MUTUALLY SUPPORT NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAS ADMISSION IN U.N..

12. ON ETHIOPIA, SOVIETS UNDERTOOK TO PRESS MENGISTU TO ALLOW SUPPLIES THROUGH MASSAWA BUT NOTED THAT ETHIOPIAN LEADER WAS STUBBORN AND DIFFICULT. BOTH SIDES SEE IMPORTANT ROLE FOR UN AND KAMMON QUALIFIED SOVIET ATTITUDE ON ETHIOPIA AS COOPERATIVE.

13. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ON CUBAS ROLE IN HEMISPHERE WITH

...7

PAGE SEVEN UNGR1294 CONF D

EVARDNADZE URGING A LESS CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH BY USA TO ENGAGING CASTRO MORE COOPERATIVELY IN HEMISPHERE. BAKER RESPONDED THAT HAVAN MUST TAKE FIRST STEPS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIP BY MOVE TO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE REGIONAL ROLE. IN ANSWER TO USA COMPLAINT, SOVIETS STATED THAT DELIVERY OF MIG 23S TO CUBA WAS MERELY FOR QUOTE MODERNIZATION UNQUOTE WITHOUT FIXING FINITE NUMBER ON DELIVERIES.

14. BILATERAL QUESTIONS

CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WAS REGISTERED ON THE BILATERAL AGENDA. SOVIETS APPEARED FORWARD LOOKING IN COOPERATING ON ENVIRONMENT ISSUES BY AGREEING TO ATTEND PRES BUSH GLOBAL WARMING CONF 16 APR AT SENIOR LEVEL AND ACCEPTING INVITATION TO YELLOWKNIFE CONF ON ENVIRONMENT. (USA STILL DECLINES TO ENGAGE IN ANY BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH USSR ON ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT.)

15. SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO MAINTAIN PROGRESS ON CONSULTATIONS IN COUNTER TERRORISM (WHERE THEY SEEM MORE WILLING TO SPEAK OF STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM) AND IN NARCOTICS INTERDICTION (WHERE AN AGREEMENT WILL BE SIGNED AT THE SUMMIT CODIFYING GREATER CUSTOMS COOPERATION). SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO PLAY UP COOPERATION WITH USA IN SPACE RESEARCH AND EXPLORATION BUT DUE TO ONGOING NASA REVIEW AND USA BUDGETARY RESTRICTIONS, KAMMON FORESAW ONLY MODEST PROGRESS BEING AGREED UPON AT SUMMIT IN MAY. STUDENT EXCHANGES

...8

PAGE EIGHT UNGR1294 CONF D

AND CIVIL AVIATION INTERCHANGE WILL BE EXPANDED. SOVIETS HAVE AGREED (SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY) TO ESTABLISH WORKING GROUPS IN NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS TO WORK ON USA PROPOSAL MADE IN WYOMING ON QUOTE OPEN LANDS UNQUOTE. IDEA HERE IS TO OPEN UP FOREIGN ACCESS TO SUCH AREAS AS SEVASTAPOL AND VLADISVOSTOCK.

16. KAMMON NOTED THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON A MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE IN BERING STRAIT WHICH WILL RESOLVE PROBLEMS RELATING TO IMPORTANT MINERAL AND FISHING RESOURCES. THERE WILL BE AN AGREED TEXT FOR SIGNATURE AT SUMMIT.

17. ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS, FOREIGN MINISTER ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARDS A TRADE AGREEMENT WHICH COULD BE SIGNED AT THE SUMMIT PAVING WAY FOR CONFERRING MFN STATUS ON USSR AND SETTING UP WAIVER OF JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT. TWO PROBLEMS REMAINED: (A) LACK OF PROGRESS IN RESOLVING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES (QUOTE DUE TO TURBULENT STATE OF SOVIET DOMESTIC LEGISLATION UNQUOTE) AND (B) DELAY IN APPROVING EMIGRATION LAW (REQUIRED FOR JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER) SLATED FOR FINAL READING MID MAY (WHICH IS PERILOUSLY CLOSE TO SUMMIT.). ON GENERAL SITUATION, SHEVARDNADZE CONVEYED EFFORTS SOVIETS WERE MAKING TO BRING ECONOMY UP TO GATT STANDARDS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE ENTRY.

18. KAMMON NOTED THAT WORKING GROUP HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON NEW USA/USSR GRAIN AGREEMENT TO REPLACE THE ONE EXPIRING END 1990.

...^a

PAGE NINE UNGR1294 CONF

(IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER NEW AGREEMENT WILL PICK UP BEFORE EXPIRY OF ITS PREDECESSOR.) IT WAS DESCRIBED AS BEING BASED ON SIMILAR PRINCIPLES BUT WITH A HIGHER LEVEL OF PURCHASES.

10. KAMMON ENDED HIS BRIEFING BY UNDERLINING EXISTENCE OF CONTINUING EXCELLENT TONE AND MOOD BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF BOTH SIDES DEVELOPED IN WYOMING AND SUSTAINED DURING LAST MOSCO MEETING. EARLY AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH DATES OF 30MAY-03JUN FOR THE PRESIDENTS MEETING AND 16-19MAY AS THE FOREIGN MINISTER PREPARATORY MEETING HAD DISSIPATED SOME OF THE TENSION RELATED TO LITHUANIA. AT SAME TIME, UNMISTAKABLE MESSAGE SENT BY PRES BUSH AND SECRETARY BAKER OF IMPORTANCE WHICH USA ATTACHES TO PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF LITHUANIA HAS CHARACTERIZED THIS USA-USSR MEETING. KAMMON NOTED THAT FIXING OF PRECISE DATES FOR PRES MEETING HAS ALSO INCREASED PRESSURE ON SOVIET CONDUCT TOWARDS LITHUANIA; CANCELLATION OF A SUMMIT IN EVENT OF VIOLENCE WOULD CONVEY MOST SERIOUS INDICATIONS OF USA CONCERN.

CCC/095 072229Z UNGR1294

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

RETURN TO **B100** FOR FILING
RENOYER AU **B100** POUR - ETAT
POUR AU DOSSIER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/WSHDC UNGR1293 07APR90

TO EXTOTT/URB DELIVER BY 090830

INFO BNATO BONN MOSCO PARIS LDN WSAW GENEV VIENN PRMNY

PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOORD/DIPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA DMC USS IFB RGB URD URR IDD IDR IDA RBD RWD RBR RWR CPD

CPP

REF OURTEL UNGR1285 04APR

---BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING: LITHUANIA AND GERMANY

IN DEBRIEFING TODAY ON SUBJECT MEETING ZOELICK MADE FOLLOWING
POINTS TO BURNET WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN BRIEFING PM
FOR HIS MEETING WITH PRES 10APR.

2.LITHUANIA

BOTH BAKER AND PRESIDENT BUSH TRIED TO CONVEY MESSAGE TO
SHEVARDNADZE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE DANGEROUS.SITUATION SHOULD
BE AVOIDED IN WHICH ONGOING PATTERN OF ESCALATING PRESSURE AND
EXCESSIVE LEGALISMS PREVENTED RATIONAL DISCUSSION.BOTH SOUGHT TO
EMPHASIZE ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT HELP DEFUSE TENSION E.G.

REFERENDUM.HERE USA SIDE IS NOT/NOT SUPPORTING SOVIET CONCEPT OF
TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY REFERENDUM BUT RATHER STRAIGHT UP REFERENDUM

...?

MOSCOW

PAGE TWO UNGR1293 CONED

AT OUTSET WHICH WOULD SET TERMS OF SUBSEQUENT INDEPENDENCE DISCUSSIONS. USA SUGGESTED MOSCOW NEEDED TO COMMUNICATE IN SOME WAY WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SELF-DETERMINATION (AND AVOID BEING TOO LEGALISTIC ABOUT PROCESS).

3. BASIC MESSAGE FROM SHEVARDNADZE WAS THAT USSR TOO WANTED PROCESS OF DIALOGUE TO BEGIN BUT, FOR THAT TO HAPPEN LANDSBERGIS NEEDED TO COME TO MOSCOW. THIS WAS MAJOR ISSUE TO FACE FOR GORBACHEV.

4. GORBACHEV IS CLEARLY UNDER PRESSURE AT HOME AND FOR REASONS WHICH GO WELL BEYOND LITHUANIA. THERE IS SOME UNCERTAINTY THEREFORE ABOUT EXTENT TO WHICH HE IS FULLY IN CONTROL; BEING OUT OF COUNTRY, SHEVARDNADZE IS NOT/NOT CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH EVENTS, ETC AND COULD NOT/NOT ENLIGHTEN MUCH REGARDING PRESSURE ON GORBACHEV.

→ 5. ZOELLICK SUGGESTED TWO LINES FOR OTHER COUNTRIES TO PURSUE:

(A) DEVELOP A POSITION WHICH MOVES BEYOND COUNSELLING AGAINST USE OF FORCE AND HELPS GET A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE UNDERWAY. THIS WOULD HELP MAKE IT MORE LEGITIMATE FOR GORBACHEV NOT/NOT TO WALK AWAY.

(B) HELP ENCOURAGE LANDSBERGIS TO GO TO MOSCOW FOR TALKS.

6. DISCUSSION WITH SHEVARDNADZE ON LITHUANIA WAS CHARACTERIZED AS BEING QUOTE UP FRONT UNQUOTE AND WITHOUT RANCOUR. SOVIETS SAID QUOTE THE RIGHT THINGS UNQUOTE AND DID NOT/NOT TRY TO HIDE BEHIND

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR1293 CONF

RHETORIC.PROBLEM IS A TOUGH ONE.

7.GERMAN

SHEVARDNADZE HAD INVITED BODORENKO (USSR;GERMANIST) TO EXPLAIN SOVIET POSITION.HE GAVE QUOTE ANTIQUATED AND INFLEXIBLE UNQUOTE ACCOUNT.BAKER RESPONDED BY UNDERSCORING DIFFICULTY GERMANS HAD WITH QUOTE PEACE UNQUOTE TREATY OR QUOTE PEACE UNQUOTE SETTLEMENT (I.E.AFTER 45 YEARS OF PEACE).QUOTE WHO WOULD BE AT TABLE; NAMIBIA REPRESENTING PART OF SOUTH AFRICA,PARAGUAY UNQUOTE ETC. BAKER TALKED OF QUOTE LEGAL SETTLEMENT UNQUOTE OR QUOTE FINAL DETERMINATION UNQUOTE AS MORE PALATABLE.SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY ON THIS.

8.SOVIETS ARE QUOTE VERY UNCERTAIN UNQUOTE ABOUT WHAT THEY WANT. THEY SEEM TO RECOGNIZE POTENTIAL DANGER OF A QUOTE SINGULAR GERMANY UNQUOTE (I.E. A GERMANY WITHOUT ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS) BUT HAVE DIFFICULTY ACCEPTING GERMANY IN NATO.THIS LEADS NOW TO QUOTE SILLY UNQUOTE NOTIONS E.G. COMBINED MEMBERSHIP IN NATO AND WTO OR CSCE AS SUBSTITUTE FOR NATO.SOVIETS NEED QUOTE SOMETHING TO TAKE HOME UNQUOTE AND ZOELICK SAW A POSSIBLE PACKAGE INCLUDING THINGS LIKE A RENUNCIATION OF CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS,REDUCED SIZE OF BUNDERWEHR,NO/NO FORCES IN EAST GERMANY ETC.(HE REITERATED THAT GENSCHER RECOGNIZES THAT CSCE CANNOT/NOT REPLACE NATO) PREFERENCE IS FOR COMPLEMENTARY NATO/CSCE ROLE
...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR1293 CONF

WHICH RECOGNIZES LIMITS AND USE OF EACH. AFTER DISCUSSION OF NATO ROLE AND STRATEGY IN NEW EUROPE, ZOELICK SUGGESTED THAT PM MIGHT WANT TO DISCUSS WITH PRES HIS VIEW ON ROLE FOR CSCE AS FOLLOW ON ARRANGEMENT.

9. BURNEY ASKED WHAT ZOELICK HAD TO SAY ABOUT GENSCHERS PROPOSAL. HE SAID GENSCHER IS CONCERNED THAT EC INTEGRATION WILL LEAVE OUT ATLANTIC DIMENSION AND SEES A GENERAL DECLARATION (UNDEFINED) AS MAINTAINING TRANS-ATLANTIC LINK. IF PM IS INTERESTED IN PURSUING NOTION OF NORTH AMERICAN/EC LINK WITH POLITICAL/ECONOMIC FOCUS HE SHOULD DO SO. AS BUSH IS CONCERNED ABOUT QUOTE FORTRESS EUROPE UNQUOTE, HE WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THIS. INCLUSION OF SECURITY DIMENSION WOULD HOWEVER BE PROBLEMATIC (UNDERMINE NATO, ETC.).

CCC/095 072207Z UNGR1293

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WSHDC UNGR2129 05 APR 90

TO EXTOTT RBR

ACTION
QUITE A DONNER

RECEIVED IN

APR 6 1990

RBR

INFO MOSCO PARIS BONN LDN HAGUE OSLO BRU WSAW COPEN STKHM HSNKI
BNATO VNACE VIENN PRGUE BPEST BUCST PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER
PCOOTT/DOYLE

DISTR MINA USS IFB IND INP INE RGB RWR RWD RBD CPD CPP EER RGZ URR
---USA/SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE BALTICS: A TOUGH ROAD AHEAD
ADMIN CONTINUES TO TREAD SUCCESSFULLY FINE LINE ON LITHUANIA
AND BALTICS, WHICH ALLOWS BUSH AND BAKER TO MAINTAIN
RELATIONSHIP WITH GORBACHEV AND SHEVANADZE, AND TO AVOID THREAT TO
SUMMIT AND TO SOME OF GAINS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION
WHICH OPEN RUPTURE COULD ENTAIL.

2. ADMIN MUST FORMULATE POLICY ON BALTICS, HOWEVER, WITH BOTH
EYES FIXED CLEARLY ON DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION, ESPECIALLY AS
REFLECTED IN HOUSE AND SENATE. FOR THE MOMENT PRESSURE FROM
CONGRESS TO TAKE A TOUGHER LINE ON LITHUANIA APPEARS
CONTAINABLE. PRESIDENT AND OTHER SENIOR ADMIN FIGURES HAVE MADE
CONCERTED ATTEMPT TO WARN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AWAY FROM ANY
ACTION THAT COULD UNDULY INFLAME SITUATION. FEELINGS OF MEMBERS
OF CONGRESS ARE CLEAR NONETHELESS. HOUSE YESTERDAY PASSED 416-3
RESOLUTION CALLING ON ADMIN TO TAKE STEPS AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE
TIME TO NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH LITHUANIA. RESOLUTION
PARALLELED UNANIMOUS VOTE BY SENATE SEVERAL WEEKS AGO CALLING

...2

ACC	DATE
736 015	
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-455R	
LOC	
A7-	NC

PAGE TWO UNGR2129 CONF LITHUANIA
LITHUANIAN GOVTS
ON ADMIN TO CONSIDER LITHUANIAN GOVTS APPEAL FOR
RECOGNITION. NEITHER RESOLUTION HAS ANY LEGAL FORCE AND LOPSIDED
VOTES MAY REPRESENT MEMBERS DESIRE TO BE SEEN BY CONSTITUENTS
TO BE VOTING RIGHT WAY. IT IS HARD TO ESCAPE CONCLUSION, HOWEVER,
THAT SIMILAR MAJORITIES WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR RESOLUTIONS WITH
TEETH IN WAKE OF SERIOUS VIOLENCE IN BALTICS.

3. IN MEETINGS WITH SENATE MAJORITY AND MINORITY LEADERS
YESTERDAY (MITCHELL AND DOLE) SHEVARDNADZE APPEARS TO
HAVE GIVEN REASONABLE ACCOUNT OF HIMSELF. IN PRESS CONFERENCE
THIS MORNING DOLE MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT IF MILITARY FORCE
WERE USED IN LITHUANIA, ESTONIA OR SOME OTHER EAST EUROPEAN
COUNTRY, CONGRESS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY TAKE COUNTER-ACTION ON
ISSUES SUCH AS TRADE AND REPEAL OF JACKSON-VANIK. DOLE ALSO CONCEDED
THAT SOVIET CAMPAIGN OF INTIMIDATION IN LITHUANIA AMOUNTED TO
INDIRECT APPLICATION OF FORCE. IT IS UNCLEAR AT THIS TIME HOW
MANY IF ANY FURTHER MEETINGS SHEVARDNADZE WILL HAVE WITH
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS BUT HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE TOLD US
TODAY THAT ITS PLANS FOR MEETING APPEAR TO HAVE FALLEN THROUGH.

4. SEIZURE OF PROCURATORS OFFICE IN LITHUANIA BY FIFTY ARMED
SOLIDERS TODAY, AND GORBACHEV PHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT OF ESTONIA
WARNING AGAINST FOLLOWING IN LITHUANIAS FOOTSTEPS HAS RAISED
LEVEL OF CONCERN HERE. NEGATIVE REACTION TO CONCILIATORY ESTONIAN
APPROACH TO INDEPENDENCE SUGGESTS TO SOME ANALYSTS THAT MOSCOW
MAY HAVE TAKEN IRREVOCABLE DECISION TO CRUSH THROUGH INTIMIDATION
INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN ALL THREE BALTIC STATES. IF SO,
RELATIONSHIP WITH USA MAY SUFFER SERIOUS DAMAGE.

CCC/114 052244Z UNGR2129

번호 : USW(F) - 778

수신 : 장 관 (기북. 비안. 정이. ~~국남~~ : 주미대사)

제목 : 미소 외무 장관 회담 (지역 문제 등)

미국측 발표 내용
(한반도 관련 등)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

SUBJECT:

BAKER-SHEVARNADZE MINISTERIAL

ATTRIBUTION: SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

THE STATE DEPARTMENT

THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 1990

DATE	
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	
AD-A5	A-7

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, there was a fairly extensive discussion on Korea, particularly on the -- some discussion about the question of the military balance in Korea, and Secretary Baker reiterated quite strongly our concern that there has not been any reduction in North Korean forces. To the contrary, we have been seeing increases. Reiterated our concerns about North Korean nuclear developments and the North Korean refusal so far to accept IAEA safeguards which they are obligated to accept under the non-proliferation treaty; welcomed the kinds of steps the Soviets have taken for some rapprochement with South Korea. I think there was a general agreement on the desirability of searching for ways to promote confidence-building measures between North and South. I'd say that really those were the high points.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q And how was their reaction?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I -- I would -- on the -- several things -- on the question on the nuclear issue, I think there is a general agreement between both of us about the importance of North Korea accepting safeguards. The Soviets have repeated North Korea's positions about their desire to have assurances from us in return. On the question of confidence building measures, the general agreement about the desirability of promoting greater dialogue between both North and South Korea, and we've continued to reiterate our unwillingness to get in direct discussions ourselves with the North Koreans, which is -- (inaudible) --

Q To follow that up, *****, how did you discuss the kind of developments that promote relations between South Korea and Moscow, and your positions as far as North Korea?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I can't hear -- you have to speak louder.

Q To follow that up, I would like to ask you how the discussions turned out with regard to the current developments to open relations between Seoul and Moscow, whereas your position on North Korea has remained unchanged, as I understand it.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, our position continues to be that we would ourselves be prepared to open relations with North Korea if the Soviet Union opens relations with South Korea. And we reiterated that. We so far don't have that kind of response from them that would allow us to make that move.

(5)

보안	
공개	

번호 : USW(F) - 779

수신 장 관 (미국. 미안. 정이. 동서인. 연가) 발신 : 주미대사

개무 : 미소 외무 장관 회담 (지역 문제 논의) (매)

소련측 반포 내용 (한방도 관련 부분)

STATE DEPARTMENT BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY A SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIAL
CONCERNING THE BAKER-SHEVARDNADZE MINISTERIAL
FOLLOWING THE AFTERNOON SESSION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, DC

THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 1990

Q (Off mike) -- regarding Korea. The US side is talking about an issue of so-called cross recognition. You recognize --

SR. SOVIET OFFICIAL: The issue of what?

Q Cross recognition. The Soviet Union recognizing South Korea; the United States recognizing North Korea. There have been reports that the Soviet Union is preparing to recognize South Korea. Did this come up today or how did it come up today?

SR. SOVIET OFFICIAL: This term of cross -- how do you --

Q Recognition.

SR. SOVIET OFFICIAL: -- cross recognition was not used.

Q But what about the substance of it? Forget the terms.

SR. SOVIET OFFICIAL: The substance is this, that we expressed the opinion that we have now -- a better picture on the Korean Peninsula, and that we can even hope to exclude Korea from the list of original conflicts or situations which need special attention.

So -- but certain things must be done. First of all, nuclear weapons are there, and we don't think that they contribute to the stability there. Of course, they are in the South and if the country that owns these nuclear weapons thinks that she can or it can take it away, it is good. It was -- this idea was expressed. Now, there is a very big mystery potential there on the peninsula which can be deduced, of course.

(6)

We also said that we now have relations with South Korea. We have trade relations, and our trade missions. It wasn't said, but I can add the trade missions which are in Moscow and Seoul have as their representative -- have consular sections, also, and the South Koreans have sent an ambassador to head this mission, which is a sign that they want to establish diplomatic relations. We think that we can mediate here because we have relations with both South and North [Korea].

Also, Minister Shevardnadze returned to his pet idea -- he returns to it regularly -- asking the West why they ignore the appeal from the North to take down the Wall which crosses the Korean Peninsula. He says that when the Berlin Wall was coming down, everybody was cheerful, but why do you ignore this suggestion coming from the North to take down the Korean Wall?

So the end idea is that we do have a lot of possibilities to cooperate here, to bring peace to the peninsula.

Q A related question, sir. South Korea --

SR. SOVIET OFFICIAL: And -- sorry, just to end. And then, he suggested -- Mr. Shevardnadze suggested that the experts continue their work, exchange of opinion

on Korea and maybe on the Pacific region, in general. That's it. And he was encouraged by the news that South Korea is studying the experiences of Europe in terms of bringing peace to the peninsula.

Q A related question, sir. The South Korean government has been known as selling gold to pursue membership to the United Nations this fall. Has any chance -- changing idea --

SR. SOVIET OFFICIAL: This question was not discussed.

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

File

FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR #7	

APR 05 1990

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1285 04APR90

TO FXTOTT ~~CURR~~ DELIVER BY 041800

INFO MOSCO BNATO WSAW GENEV VIENN LDN PARIS BONN PMOOTT/HARTT/

HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADM POL/DGPOLCOORD/DIPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MIN USS DMC URB URD IPB IDD IDR IDA RGB RWD RWR RBD RBR

CPD CPP

---BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING: APRIL 4-6

SUMMARY: BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING BEGINS LATE THIS AFTERNOON

WITH ONE-ON-ONE, INCLUDES FULL DAY OF MEETINGS TOMORROW AND

SESSION WITH PRESIDENT FRIDAY MORNING, AND IS SCHEDULED TO WRAP

UP LATE FRI AFTERNOON. WE SHALL BE REPORTING ON RESULTS SAT P.M.

2. USUAL COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA HAS BEEN AGREED UPON, BUT THERE

WILL BE SPECIAL FOCUS ON LITHUANIAN SITUATION, GERMAN UNIFICATION

AND ENERGIZING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS SO THAT ALL MAJOR START

ISSUES WILL HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY TIME OF JUNE SUMMIT AND

CFF/OPEN SKIES AGREEMENTS READY FOR CSCE SUMMIT IN FALL. TWO

SIDES WILL ALSO TRY TO WORK OUT DATES FOR LATE JUNE BUSH/GORBACHEV

SUMMIT.

3. UNDERSEC KIMMITT TOLD NATO MISSIONS THIS AFTERNOON USA SIDE

WAS NOT/NOT ANTICIPATING DRAMATIC PROGRESS AT MEETING. HE

DESCRIBED MEETING AS STOCK-TAKING EXERCISE DESIGNED TO IDENTIFY

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1285 CONF

WORK TO BE DONE BEFORE JUNE SUMMIT. AT LEAST ONE MORE MINISTERIAL MEETING, PROBABLY IN GENEVA, IS EXPECTED BEFORE JUNE.

4. REPORT: AT STATE DEPT PRE-BRIEFING ON BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING TODAY, IT WAS CLEAR THAT SITUATION IN LITHUANIA IS GOING TO FEATURE PROMINENTLY. KIMMITT SAID IT WOULD BE AT TOP OF AGENDA IN MEETINGS WITH BOTH BAKER AND BUSH. GIST OF USA POSITION, ACCORDING TO ASSISTANT SEC SEITZ, IS THAT USA (A) VIEWS DEVELOPMENTS WITH CONSIDERABLE CONCERN; (B) BELIEVES BALTIC STATES ARE IN A UNIQUE SITUATION VIS-A-VIS USSR WHICH NEEDS TO BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF, AND (C) WISHES MOSCOW TO UNDERSTAND THAT USE OF FORCE (OR MEASURES WHICH FALL SHORT OF FORCE BUT HAVE EFFECT OF APPLYING HEAVY PRESSURE) WOULD HAVE SEVERE REPERCUSSIONS FOR USA/SOVIET RELATIONS.

5. GERMAN UNIFICATION PROCESS IS ALSO TO BE HIGH ON AGENDA. SEITZ SAID THAT AT FIRST OFFICIALS-LEVEL TWO PLUS FOUR MEETING IN MARCH NONE OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES HAD BEEN ENGAGED. AT MEETING BEGINNING TODAY, USA WOULD BE PUTTING FORWARD ITS POINT OF VIEW ON QUESTION OF GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO AND SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF CONFUSED SOVIET SIGNALS ON ISSUE. SEITZ ALSO EXPECTED DISCUSSION OF USA AND SOVIET DIFFERENCE ON SCOPE OF TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS: USA BELIEVES SCOPE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO DIVESTING FOUR POWERS OF THEIR RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, WHILE SOVIETS HAVE SAID TALKS SHOULD COVER EVERYTHING. SEITZ SAID HE EXPECTED THERE WOULD BE ...3

PAGE THREE UNGR1285 CONF

FURTHER OFFICIALS-LEVEL TWO PLUS FOUR MEETINGS THIRD WEEK OF APRIL AFTER GDR GOVT IS FORMED, AND MINISTER-LEVEL MEETING END OF APRIL OR BEGINNING OF MAY. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SEITZ SAID HE WAS SURE A NATO MINISTERIAL WOULD BE SCHEDULED IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO TWO PLUS FOUR MINISTERIAL.

6. UNDERSEC BARTHOLOMEW SAID A GOOD BASIS HAD BEEN LAID AT BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN MOSCOW FOR AGREEMENT ON MOST OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. BUT HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN A GENERAL SLOW-DOWN IN FOLLOW-THROUGH ON SOVIETS PART, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTED TO LACK OF INSTRUCTIONS RESULTING FROM EITHER LEADERSHIPS DOMESTIC PREOCCUPATIONS OR CHANGES IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE. USA OBJECTIVES AT WASHINGTON MEETING IN RESPECT OF START WOULD BE (A) TO DISPOSE OF OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES ON SLCM QUESTION; (B) FLESH OUT DETAILS ON VERIFICATION PACKAGE FOLLOWING CONCEPTUAL BREAKTHROUGH IN MOSCOW, AND (C) QUOTE PUSH USA POSITION ON DEFENCE IN SPACE UNQUOTE. ON CFE, BAKER PLANS QUOTE TO EXPOUND ON ALLIED POSITION AND PUSH SHEVARDNADZE TO GET ON WITH REACHING AGREEMENT UNQUOTE. ON OPEN SKIES, HE WILL TELL SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER QUOTE IT IS IMPERATIVE WE CONCLUDE THIS IN BUDAPEST AND THEY ARE GOING TO HAVE TO MOVE AND JOIN THE CONSENSUS FORMING AROUND THE KEY POINTS UNQUOTE

7. ACCORDING TO KIMMITT, PRINCIPAL REGIONAL ISSUES WILL BE

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR1285 CONF

AFGHANISTAN, ANGOLA AND CENTRAL NICARAGUA. LEIT MOTIF OF USA POSITION WILL BE THAT ELECTIONS SHOULD BE CENTER PIECE OF ANY PLAN FOR RESOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS. AS RESULT OF RECENT USA/SOVIET REGIONAL EXPERTS MEETING IN HELSINKI, KIMMITT EXPECTS SOVIETS TO SHOW RATHER MORE EVIDENCE THIS TIME THAT THEY HAVE BEEN THINKING SERIOUSLY ABOUT REGIONAL ISSUES.

P. BILATERAL AGENDA WILL HAVE HEAVY ECONOMIC FOCUS, TAKING STOCK OF FIRST TWO ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON COMMERCE TREATY AND REVIEWING PROGRESS OF DISCUSSIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL, SPACE AND COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION.

CCC/143 042110Z UNGR1285

RBR	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

ACTION	
ACC	SUITE A DONNER
6-366-06	
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UN3R2706 15MAR90

TO EXTOTT LRBR URR

INFO LSPON MDRID PARIS BONN BRU HAGUE LDN COPEN OSLO ROME ATHNS
ANKPA WSAW BUCST BPEST PRGUE MOSCO BNATO VIENN VNACE GENEV BREEC
PCOOTT/DOYLE TOKYO CNBRA FINOTT/DODGE PMOOTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER
TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DGPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/ DE CAF
DISTR MINA USS IFB RBG EFB RWR RWD RBD CPD URR IDD RBR CPP RBX IDA
IDAO IDAV IDR IDRL IDX UEE UED EPG EPD EEF EEA EER RBT RWT REM
---CONGRESS AND US.SOVIET RELATIONS:STRAINS AND STRESSES
SUMMARY:PRESSURES APPAR TO BE BUILDING ON BOTH SIDES OF AISLE
IN CONGRESS FOR BUSH ADMIN TO TAKE BOLD NEW INITIATIVES IN EAST-
WEST RELATIONS,PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS RELATIONSHIP WITH
SOVIETS.THERE IS A FEELING THAT ADMIN HAS TENDED TO FOLLOW
RATHER THAN LEAD ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS,AND THAT IT HAS NOT/NOT
FULLY EXPLOITED OPPORTUNITIES BEING OPENED UP BY DEMOCRATIC
DEVELOPMENTS AND ECONOMIC REFORMS TAKING PLACE IN EASTERN EUROPE
AND USSR.

2.HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER DICK GEPHARDT IS CALLING FOR DIRECT
FINANCIAL AID TO SOVIETS AND VARIETY OF NEW TRADE AND CULTURAL
INITIATIVES,BUT HAS NOT/NOT RALLIED PARTY AND LEADERSHIP BEHIND
THIS POSITION,PARTLY IN VIEW OF DEFICIT PROBLEMS HERE AND RESTRAINTS
ON FOREIGN AID BUDGET.REPUBLICANS HAVE DISPARAGED GEPHARDT APPROACH,
...?

PAGE TWO UNGR2706 CONF.

BUT SOME ARE ENCOURAGING BUSH TO SET TARGETS FOR SOVIET BEHAVIOR AS A CONDITION FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, ALONG LINES OF PROPOSAL RECENTLY PUT FORTH BY FORMER PRES NIXON. REPUBLICANS RECOGNIZE THAT, DESPITE BUSH POPULARITY, THEY NEED TO STAKE OUT AN APPROACH TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ENUNCIATE A POST-COLD WAR QUOTE VISION UNQUOTE DISTINCT FROM DEMOCRATS. HOUSTON SUMMIT OFFERS BUSH OCCASION TO ASSERT U.S. LEADERSHIP.

3. REPORT: AS WE SAW BEFORE NATO AND MALTA SUMMITS LAST YEAR, AND EARLIER THIS YEAR IN RESPECT OF CFE NEGS, DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES APPEAR TO BE BUILDING HERE FOR ADMIN TO TAKE FURTHER INITIATIVES ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS SOVIET UNION.

4. DEMOCRATS IN CONGRESS HAVE BEEN PRINCIPAL INSTIGATORS OF DEBATE. HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER DICK GEPHARDT LAST WEEK CHARGED ADMIN WITH LACK OF IMAGINATION AND INITIATIVE IN FOREIGN POLICY. GEPHARDT CALLED FOR DIRECT USA PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE AND USSR, WAIVER OF JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT, LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS OF HIGH-TECH EXPORTS TO SOVIET UNION, AND NEW TRADE AND CULTURAL INITIATIVES. HE ARGUED IT WAS IN LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AND TRADE INTERESTS OF USA TO ENCOURAGE STABILITY, DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMY IN SOVIET UNION. GEPHARDT FAVOURED ALLOWING U.S. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK AND OPIC TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO USSR, AND

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2706 CONF

CALLED FOR QUOTE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE UNQUOTE EXCHANGES WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND USSR, AS WELL AS MORE ENVIRONMENTAL, ARTISTIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION.

5. ACCORDING TO GEPHARDT, ALLIES NEED TO EXAMINE WAYS TO COORDINATE BETTER THEIR APPROACH TO REGION. HE CALLED FOR A QUOTE ECONOMIC ALLIANCE UNQUOTE ALONG LINES OF NATO WHERE LEADERS OF EC, CDA, USA, JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA WOULD DEVELOP NEW MECHANISMS TO COORDINATE POLICIES ON DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND COMPETITIVE ISSUES. GEPHARDT PREDICTED THAT ECONOMIC COOPERATION WILL BECOME AS IMPORTANT AS MILITARY AND POLITICAL DIALOGUE, AND THAT QUOTE TRADE MINISTERS WILL BECOME MORE VITAL TO THEIR NATIONS SECURITY THAN DEFENSE MINISTERS UNQUOTE.

6. GEPHARDT HAS A REPUTATION AS AN OUTSPOKEN AND PARTISAN MEMBER OF THE LIBERAL, POPULIST WING OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WHO SOME BELIEVE HARBORS AMBITIONS TO CONTEST THE PRESIDENCY AGAIN. HIS ADDRESS FOUND A MIXED REACTION, EVEN IN HIS OWN PARTY. HOUSE SPEAKER TOM FOLEY WAS CAUTIOUS IN HIS COMMENTS, WHILE SENATOR BILL BRADLEY (D-NEW JERSEY), A SENATOR WITH A SHARP MIND AND A FIRM INTEREST IN USA-SOVIET AFFAIRS (WHO MANY BELIEVE MAY ALSO RUN FOR THE PRESIDENCY), TOLD PRESS THAT GEPHARDT'S APPROACH WAS NOT/NOT CONSTRUCTIVE. BRADLEY SAID USA SHOULD NOT PROVIDE DIRECT FINANCIAL AID TO SOVIETS UNTIL THEY ADOPT WESTERN PRICING

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR2706 CONF

SYSTEM, CONVERT RUBLE AND UNDERTAKE OTHER ECONOMIC REFORMS. SEN BRATLEY HAS TOLD AMB BURNEY PRIVATELY THAT HE BELIEVES THERE IS LITTLE THAT USA CAN DO ECONOMICALLY TO HELP USSR AT THE MOMENT, AS DISTINCT FROM REST OF EASTERN EUROPE. HE FEELS THAT WESTERN GOVTS SHOULD RESIST IMPULSE TO PROVIDE MASSIVE QUOTE BAILOUT UNQUOTE OF USSR SINCE IT IS QUOTE TOO BIG, TOO FAR GONE AND TOO DIVERSE UNQUOTE.

7. PREDICTABLY, REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP IN CONGRESS HAS BEEN QUICK TO DISCREDIT GEPEARDT APPROACH, CLAIMING THAT CONGRESS DOES NOT/HAVE MEANS TO FINANCE SOVIET RECOVERY PROGRAM. SENATE MINORITY WHIP ALAN SIMPSON (R-WYOMING) TOLD PRESS THAT USA PUBLIC DISLIKES FOREIGN AID GENERALLY, AND THAT, DESPITE CHANGES IN SOVIET UNION, PUBLIC WLD BE UNLIKELY TO COUNTENANCE MASSIVE AID PROGRAM FOR QUOTE THE HATED COMMIES UNQUOTE.

8. HOWEVER, REPUBLICANS ARE SENSITIVE TO CHARGES THEY ARE DOING TOO LITTLE, AND TO POLITICAL NEED TO BE SEEN TO BE LEADING RATHER THAN FOLLOWING IN THIS CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION YEAR.

9. SEN DOMENICI (R-NEW MEXICO) TOLD AMB RECENTLY THAT HE AND SEVERAL OTHER SENATORS QUOTE WHO ENJOY THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT UNQUOTE WILL BE CALLING ON BUSH SHORTLY TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE URGENCY OF EXERCISING GREATER LEADERSHIP IN THESE QUOTE HISTORIC TIMES UNQUOTE. A SIMILAR POINT, RELATING TO THE NEED FOR

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR2706 CONF

PUSH TO DISPLAY MORE LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE, WAS MADE TO AMBURNETT LAST WEEK BY HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN ROSTENKOWSKI, WHO IS ALSO A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF BUSH. DOMENICI AND OTHER REPUBLICANS PLAN TO URGE BUSH TO SET SOME TARGETS FOR SOVIET BEHAVIOR, AS CONDITIONS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE, ALONG LINES OF IDEA PUT FORTH BY FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON WHEN HE MET WITH REPUBLICAN CAUCUS LAST WEEK. ACCORDING TO DOMENICI, NIXON WOULD HAVE SOVIETS INTER ALIA MAKE QUOTE UNDERTAKINGS UNQUOTE ON CUBA, AGREE NOT/NOT TO SUPPLY ARMS ANYWHERE IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND CEASE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA AND IRAQ. NIXON ALSO URGED THAT JACKSON-VANIK SHOULD BE WAIVED, BUT RECOMMENDED THAT MORE COMPREHENSIVE TRADE AGMT OR GRANTING OF PERMANENT MFN TREATMENT SHOULD AWAIT FURTHER SOVIET REFORMS.

10. FOR HIS PART, DOMENICI TOLD AMBV THAT PRIVATE SECTOR AND FINANCIAL LEADERSHIP IS REQUIRED INSTEAD OF DIRECT GOVT AID TO USSR. HE NOTED THAT SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN BREEDEN BELIEVES THAT CREATION OF STOCK MARKETS WOULD DO MORE THAN AID OR DIRECT GRANTS TO CREATE A QUOTE CLEARING HOUSE UNQUOTE FOR INVESTMENT.

11. COMMENT: RESURGENCE OF EAST-WEST DEBATE IN CONGRESS SUGGESTS THAT BOTH PARTIES CONTINUE TO GRAPPLE WITH APPROPRIATE U.S. RESPONSE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN USSR, EVEN THOUGH NEED FOR DEFICIT

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR2706 CONF

REDUCTION AND HEAVY DEMANDS ON FOREIGN AID BUDGET LEAVE LITTLE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE ON FISCAL SIDE.EVEN IF CONSENSUS IS NOT/NOT EASILY FOUND,ISSUE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE POLITICAL RESONANCE. DEMOCRATS,LACKING PARTY UNITY AND A VISIBLE LEADER AT A TIME WHEN BUSH IS RIDING HIGH IN OPINION POLLS,CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR ANY OPENING TO CHALLENGE PRESIDENT.THEY MAY SENSE SOME VULNERABILITY IN FOREIGN POLICY AREA,PARTICULARLY OVER QUOTE THE VISION TFING UNQUOTE.HOWEVER,AS IN THE PAST,BUSH IS NO/NO EASY TARGET AND WITH HOUSTON SUMMIT IN JULY HE HAS THE OCCASION TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP.

12.TEXT OF GEPHARDT ADDRESS TO RBR AND URR BY FAX.

CCC/143 161401Z UNGR2706



ACC.	639571	DATE
FILE	20-USA-1-3-455R	DOSSIER

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DE WSHDC UNGR6582 09MAR90

A EXTOTT RBR LIVRAISON 120830

INFO LSBON MDRID PARIS LDN BONN ROME VTCAN BRU OSLO COPEN ATHENS

ANKRA BRU NATO GENEV VNACE MOSCO PRGUE WSAW BUCST BPEST STKHM HSNKI

PCOOTT/DOYLE PMOOTT/HEINBECKER

DISTR MINA USS RGB IFB RWD RBD IDD IDR IDA IDAO IDAN IDAV RWR CPD

CPP RGX

---POLITIQUE AMERICAINE ENVERS LES ETATS BALTES

SYNOPSIS: L ADMIN AMERICAINE EST D AVIS QUE LE PROCESSUS DE
SECESSION QUI CONDUIT LENTEMENT LES ETATS BALTES VERS
L INDEPENDANCE EST IRREVERSIBLE. IL EST PEU PROBABLE QUE LES
AUTORITES CENTRALES UTILISENT LA REPRESSION VIOLENTE POUR
RALENTIR LES DEVELOPPEMENTS POLITIQUES. L ADMIN EST PLUS
PREOCCUPEE PAR LES BOULEVERSEMENTS QUI AGITENT D AUTRES
PARTIES D URSS TELLES LA GEORGIE ET LES ETATS MUSULMANS. DANS
L EVENTUALITE OU LES ETATS BALTES SE DECLARAIENT
UNILATERALEMENT INDEPENDANTS, WASHINGTON POURSUIVRAIT SA
RHETORIQUE ACTUELLE MAIS NE RECONNAITRAIT PAS FORMELLEMENT CES
ETATS AVANT D AVOIR PU JAUGER LA REACTION DE MOSCOU. CETTE
POSITION EST APPUYEE PAR LES GROUPES AMERICAINS D ORIGINE BALTE.
2. RAPPORT: DEPART D ETAT CONSIDERE QU A MOINS DE CHANGEMENTS
DRAMATIQUES DIFFICILES A CERNER POUR L INSTANT, QUATRE
TENDANCES DEVRAIENT SE MAINTENIR DANS L EVOLUTION DE LA
...2

	RBR
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

file

PAGE DEUX UNGR6582 CONFIDENTIAL

SITUATION AUX PAYS BALTES: 1) LES PERSPECTIVES SONT BONNES QUANT AUX CHANCES DE REALISER L INDEPENDANCE SELON UN PROCESSUS NON-VIOLENT, AVEC A L AVANT-SCENE LA LITHUANIE OU LE SENTIMENT SECESSIONNISTE EST MAINTENANT PARTAGE PAR LA GRANDE MAJORITE DE LA POPULATION; 2) LES PEUPLES BALTES ONT DEPASSE L ETAPE DES VOEUX PIEUX ET SONT MURS POUR L INDEPENDANCE; 3) IL EST PROBABLE QUE LA LITHUANIE DECLARE UNILATERALEMENT L INDEPENDANCE DANS UN AVENIR RAPPROCHE; 4) LA REPRESSION VIOLENTE DE LA PART DES AUTORITES CENTRALES EST TRES PEU PROBABLE COMPTE TENU DU SEUIL DE TOLERANCE DEMONTRE PAR GORBACHEV JUSQU ICI, ET DES OUTILS DONT CE DERNIER DISPOSE POUR INFLUENCER LA SITUATION. GORBACHEV N A PAS BESOIN D UTILISER LA REPRESSION. IL POURRAIT, APRES AVOIR FORMELLEMENT REFUSE DE RECONNAITRE L INDEPENDANCE, DECIDER DANS UN PREMIER TEMPS DE RALENTIR LE TRANSFERT DE CERTAINS BIENS DE PREMIERE IMPORTANCE, PUIS DANS UN SECOND TEMPS, JOUER LA CARTE DES MINORITES RUSSES ET AUTRES VIVANT DANS LES TERRITOIRES BALTES DE FACON A FORCER LES SECESSIONISTES A S ENGAGER DANS UN PROCESSUS DE NEGOCIATIONS DONT LES TERMES SERAIENT FAVORABLES A MOSCOU.

3. L ADMIN EST PREOCCUPE PRINCIPALEMENT PAR LE SYNCHRONISME ENTRE LES EXIGENCES DES PEUPLES BALTES ET LA LATITUDE DONT DISPOSE GORBACHEV POUR REpondre A CES EXIGENCES. BALTES SONT

...3

PAGE TROIS UNGR6582 CONF

MAINTENANT AU STADE OU ILS DEMANDENT LA RELAISATION DES PROMESSES ELECTORALES FAITES PAR LES PARTIS NATIONAUX, ALORS QUE GORBACHEV A BESOIN DE PLUS DE TEMPS POUR CONVAINCRE RESTE DE L UNION SOVIETIQUE QUE L INDEPENDANCE DES BALTES NE MENACE PAS LA SECURITE ET LA STABILITE DU PAYS. JUSQU A MAINTENANT, LES BALTES ONT SU JOUER INTELLIGEMMENT DE FACON A GARANTIR LA POSITION DE GORBACHEV ET PERMETTRE A CE DERNIER DE METTRE EN PLACE LES AJUSTEMENTS NECESSAIRES. SI LE RYTHME DES DEVELOPPEMENTS POLITIQUES DEVAIT S ACCELERER, GORBACHEV POURRAIT SE RETROUVER DANS UNE SITUATION OU IL LUI EST IMPOSSIBLE DE PROCEDER DE FACON ORDONNEE, SEULE GARANTE DE STABILITE.

4. ADMIN EST D AVIS QUE MALGRE L INSTABILITE CREEE PAR LES REVENDICATIONS AUTONOMISTES, MOSCOU NE SENT PAS SA SECURITE MENACEE DANS LA MESURE OU LES E.U. ET LA COMMUNAUTE INTL RECONNAISSENT LES FRONTIERES SOVIETIQUES D AVANT 1945. CE QUI INQUIETE PLUTOT LES E.U. CE SONT LES BOULEVERSEMENTS QUI AGITENT D AUTRES PARTIES D URSS TELLES LA GEORGIE ET LES ETATS MUSULMANS, ZONES OU LES METHODES DE RESOLUTION DES CONFLITS DIFFERENT DE CELLES PRATIQUEES EN OCCIDENT.

5. ADMIN CROIT QU IL EXISTE UN BESOIN POUR L OTAN DE COORDONNER SA POSITION DE FACON A PRESENTER UN FRONT COMMUN SUR LA QUESTION. IL EST IMPORTANT QUE L ALLIANCE REITERE SON

...4

PAGE QUATRE UNGR6582 CONF

OPPOSITION CONTRE L USAGE DE LA FORCE ET INDIQUE CLAIEMENT
QUE TOUTE ACTION TELLE, DE LA PART DES AUTORITES CENTRALES,
AURAIT DES REPERCUSSIONS SERIEUSES SUR LES RELATIONS ENTRE LES
PAYS DE L OUEST ET L UNION SOVIETIQUE.

6.COMMENT WASH REPONDRA-T-ELLE A UNE PROCLAMATION
UNILATERALE D INDEPENDANCE?ADMIN N A TOUJOURS PAS ARRETE SA
DECISION QUANT AUX TERMES DEFINITIFS DE SA POLITIQUE.AU
NIVEAU OPERATIONNEL,TRAVAIL D ELABORATION PROCEDE SELON
PARAMETRES SUIVANTS:LE CONCEPT D AUTO-DETERMINATION PRONE
PAR L ADMINISTRATION EST AMBIGUE.DANS EVENTUALITE OU ETATS
BALTES SE DECLARAIENT UNILATERALEMENT INDEPENDANTS,WASH
CONTINUERAIT,DANS SA RHETORIQUE,A PROMOUVOIR
AUTO-DETERMINATION COMME OBJECTIF LOUABLE,MAIS ELLE NE
PRENDRAIT PAS DE POSITION TRANCHEE AVANT D AVOIR PU JAUGER LA
REACTION DE MOSCOU.AMERICANS ONT CLAIREMENT LAISSE
COMPRENDRE AUX SOVIETIQUES QU ILS N ENTENDAIENT PAS PROFITER
DE LA SITUATION ET QU ILS MAINTIENDRAIENT LEUR POLITIQUE DE
NON-RECONNAISSANCE.LA POLITIQUE ACTUELLE S ARTICULE AUTOUR
DES QUATRE EXIGENCES SUIVANTES:1) CHOIX POPULAIRE QUANT A L
INDEPENDANCE NATIONALE; 2) CONTROLE DE L INTEGRITE
TERRITORIALE; 3) CAPACITE DE L ETAT A REMPLIR SES OBLIGATIONS
INTERNATIONALES; 4) CAPACITE DU REGIME DE SE MAINTENIR AU
POUVOIR.DANS L EVENTUALITE OU UNE REPUBLIQUE DECLARAIT SON

...5

PAGE CINQ UNGR6582 CONF

INDEPENDANCE, TOUTES CES CONDITIONS NE SERAIENT PAS PRESENTES
ET LES EU SE VERRAIENT DANS L IMPOSSIBILITE DE RECONNAITRE
FORMELLEMENT LE NOUVEL ETAT. MALGRE LES
DEVELOPPEMENTS ACTUELS, PRESENTE POLITIQUE N EST PAS SOUS
REVISION. CEPENDANT, DIRECTIVES CONCERNANT LES CONTACTS DE
HAUT NIVEAU AVEC L APPAREIL BUREAUCRATIQUE POURRAIENT ETRE
LIBERALISES BIENTOT. CONTACTS NE SERONT PAS PERMIS AU NIVEAU
DE L AMBASSADEUR, MAIS POURRAIT ETRE ACCORDES AU NIVEAU DES
PREMIERS CONSEILLERS D AMBASSADE. ADMIN ENTEND PROFITER DES
ELECTIONS QUI AURONT LIEU DANS LES DIFFERENTS ETATS POUR
JUSTIFIER CETTE NOUVELLE OUVERTURE.

7. DEPARTEMENT D ETAT NOUS A CONFIRME QUE LES GROUPES
AMERICAINS D ORIGINE BALTE APPUIENT CETTE APPROCHE. ILS NE
SONT PAS PRETS A RECONNAITRE INDEPENDANCE DE PAYS ENCORE SOUS
LA DOMINATION MILITAIRE SOVIETIQUE. PAR AILLEURS, WASH
POURRAIT CONSIDERER LES PREROGATIVES DE MOSCOU, ENTRE AUTRES
LA PRESENCE MILITAIRE EN TERRE BALTE COMME CELLE QUI
EXISTAIT AVANT 1940.

CCC/114 100027Z UNGR6582

P R O T E C T E D

FM MOSCO XYIM4586 21FEB90

TO EXTOTT RBP

INFO TAVIV VIENN ROME WSHDC

DISTR RBR RBD JID JIP JIM JIMH

REF RBP0030 04JAN


RETURN TO RENOYER AU		FOR FILING POUR — ETRE PORTE AU DOSSIER	
ACC	REF	DATE	
FILE		DOSSIER	
20-USA-1-3- USSR			
60			

---VISIT TO USSR OF USA INS COMMISSIONER, GENE MCNARY
IN EARLY JAN YOU ASKED US TO REPORT ON INS COMMISSIONERS VISIT
TO USSR. DUE TO ABSENCE ON ANNUAL LEAVE, REQUEST FELL BETWEEN
TWO SEATS AND ACTION WAS NOT/NOTMCXVABKQFJC MOREOVER, WE HAVE
MISPLACED YRTEL, SO THAT WE DO NOT/NOT KNOW EXACT DISTRIBUTION
YOU HAD INDICATED. KINDLY EXCUSE DELAY AND SEND COPY OURTEL TO
OTHER DESTINEES IF REQUIRED.

2. WF HAVE OBTAINED FROM USA COLLEAGUES FLWG INFO ON TWO MAIN
M^{TS}GS COMMISSIONER MCNARY HELD 10 AND 11JAN WITH SOV OFFICIALS.

3. ON 10JAN MCNARY MET WITH MFA CHIEF OF CONSULAR ADMIN, VIKTOR
ZELENEV. IN DISCUSSION, MCNARY STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF CO-OP
IN CONSULAR AND IMMIG MATTERS. HE ALSO PRAISED PENDING SOV
EMIGRATION LAW AND URGED ITS SPEEDY ENACTMENT. NEAR END OF
DISCUSSION, MCNARY PRESENTED LIST OF 189 FAMILIES WHO HAVE BEEN
ABLE TO RECEIVE SOV EXIT PERMISSION AFTER HAVING BEEN APPROVED
FOR ENTRY TO USA BY INS. ZELENEV PROMISED TO STUDY LIST AND

...2



PAGE TWO XYIM4586 PROTECTED

COORDINATE ACTION WITH OVIR. ZELENEV EXPRESSED APPREC FOR
WORK OF INS IN USSR. ZELENEV SAID HE SYMPATHIZED WITH QUOTE
TENSE, OVERLOADED UNQUOTE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH INS WORKS AND
NOTED THAT RECENT ADDITIONS OF PERSONNEL MAY HELP ELIMINATE
PROBLEMS. FOR ITS PART, ZELENEV SAID, SOV UNION IS DEVOTING
MORE EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO CONSULAR SERVICES IN USA QUOTE
WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING QUOTAS UNQUOTE. ZELENEV SAID USSR
HAS UNDERTAKEN SEVERAL UNILATERAL MOVES TO IMPROVE VISA SERVICES,
INCL NEW POLICY OF ISSUING VISAS TO BUSINESSMEN WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT
HOURS. ZELENEV RAISED CONCERNS OVER DILATORY ISSUANCE OF VISAS
TO DIPLO COURIERS AND DIPLO DEPENDENTS. HE SAID USSR HAD QUOTE
HIGH HOPES UNQUOTE TO OPEN CONGEN IN NYORK. ZELENEV UNDERLINED
SOV EXPECTATIONS TO USE EXISTING BUILDING ON 91ST STREET. USA
PARTICIPANTS PROMISED TO CONVEY THESE CONCERNS AND NOTED THAT
SOME WOULD BE ON AGENDA OF BILATERAL REVIEW COMMISSION TO BE
CONVENED AT LATER DATE.

4. IN QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION AFTER MTG, MCNARY FIELDDED
QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF VARIOUS DEPTS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY
AND FROM OTHER SOV MINISTRIES, INSTITUTES, AND ORGANIZATIONS.
DURING DISCUSSIONS, USA PARTICIPANTS (A) DISPUTED CONTENTION
THAT USA REFUGEE PROCESSING IN MOSCO IS NOT/NOT IN ACCORD WITH
1951 CONVENTION DEFINITION OF QUOTE REFUGEE UNQUOTE; (B) STRESSED
...3

PAGE THREE XYIM4586 PROTECTED

THAT USA WILL COOPERATE WITH SOV AUTHORITIES ON IMMIG SUBJS
TO GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE;(C)BRIEFLY SKETCHED VARIETY OF
REFUGEE STATS;(D)DISCUSSED PENDING IMMIG LEGISLATION;(E)
DESCRIBED CERTAIN GROUPS OF QUOTE SPECIAL INTEREST UNQUOTE WHO
MAY BE ELIGIBLE FOR IMMIG IN ABSENCE OF FAMILY TIES;EG,REFUSENIKS
AND EVANGELICALS;AND(F)STATED THAT SOVS ARE FULLY ELIGIBLE
FOR THIRD AND SIXTH PREFERENCE IMMIG CATEGORIES,THOUGH SOVS
HAVE RARELY SUBSCRIBED UNDER THESE CATAGORIES IN PAST.

5.ON 11JAN MCNARY MET IN MOSCO WITH HEAD OF ALL-UNION SOV
VISA AND REGISTRATION ADMIN(OVIR),RUDOLPH KUZNETSOV.

6.SUMMARY.KUZNETSOV OUTLINED KEY PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED
NEW SOV IMMIG LAW AND DESCRIBED BRIEFLY PROPOSED LAW ON SOV
CITIZENSHIP.HE STATED THAT IMMIG LAW IS LIKELY TO BE COMPLETED
DURING FEB-APR SESSION OF SUPREME SOV.MCNARY PRESENTED KUZNETSOV
WITH LIST OF SOV FAMILIES CURRENTLY UNABLE TO OBTAIN EXIT PERMISSION.
KUZNETSOV CLAIMED THAT 1989 FIGURES FOR EXIT PERMISSION FOR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE ABROAD MORE THAN DOUBLED FROM 88.HE INDICATED
THAT SOVS WHO HAVE RECEIVED EXIT PERMISSION TO ISRAEL ARE BEING
ALLOWED TO PASS THROUGH SOV BORDER CONTROL POINTS EVEN IF THEY
ARE TICKETED TO USA.

7.(A)NEW SOV IMMIG LEGISLATION.KUZNETSOV SAID THAT MUCH WORK
HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE TOWARD COMPLETION OF NEW SOV LEGISLATION

...4

PAGE FOUR XYIM4586 PROTECTED

ON IMMIG. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT QUOTE GREAT MANY TASKS UNQUOTE
STOOD BEFORE FEB-APR SESSION OF SUPREME SOV, HE EXPECTED BILL
TO BE TAKEN UP AND POSSIBLY EVEN PASSED DURING THAT SESSION.
KUZNETSOV THEN OUTLINED MAIN PROVISIONS IN NEW BILL. HE ADMITTED
THAT PRESENT SOV PROCESS FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR IMMIG
CONTRADICTS INTNATL AGREEAKGXKTAVHWQCQVIQPZJPUOVT. UNDER PROPOSED
LEGISLATION, EVERY SOV CITIZEN WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE RIGHT TO
TRAVEL ABROAD AND THUS TO RECEIVE PPT WITH FIVE-YEAR VALIDITY
FOR INTNATL TRAVEL. KUZNETSOV ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT RIGHT
TO TRAVEL WILL STILL BE SUBJ TO LIMITATIONS IN CERTAIN CASES.
8. TWO BROAD CATEGORIES OF RESTRICTIONS TO BE RETAINED UNDER
NEW LAW, ACCORDING TO KUZNETSOV, INVOLVE ACCESS TO STATE SECRETS
AND SO-CALLED QUOTE POOR RELATIVES UNQUOTE PROVISION. KUZNETSOV
STATED THAT NEW LAW WILL LIMIT TO FIVE YEARS PERIOD FOR WHICH
ACCESS TO STATE SECRETS CAN BE USED AS JUSTIFICATION FOR REFUSING
EXIT PERMISSION. ANY FURTHER LIMITATION BEYOND THIS FIVE-YEAR
PERIOD WOULD REQUIRE APPROVAL OF COMMISSION OF SUPREME SOV.
HE THEN NOTED THAT OF OVER 500 SUCH CASES ALREADY REVIEWED BY
SUPRME SOV COMMISSION, SECRECY RULINGS WERE UPHOLD IN ONLY
46 CASES. WITH REGARD TO QUOTE POOR RELATIVES UNQUOTE PROVISION,
KUZNETSOV SAID THAT THOSE INTENDING TO LEAVE USSR PERMANENTLY
WOULD STILL BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE NOTARIZED PERMISSION OF ALL
...5

PAGE FIVE XYIM4586 PROTECTED

DEPENDENT RELATIVES. NEW LAW WILL PROVIDE INTENDING IMMIGRANT WITH LEGAL RECOURSE TO CHALLENGE CLAIM OF DEPENDENT IN COURTS. WHEN ASKED WHETHER IMMIGRANT WOULD BE ALLOWED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO DEPENDENTS BY SENDING MONEY AFTER ESTABLISHING RESIDENCE ABROAD, KUZNETSOV RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY THROUGH BILATERAL AGREEMENT SUCH AS THOSE CURRENTLY IN FORCE WITH SEVERAL EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

9. UNDER NEW LAW, KUZNETSOV CONTINUED, EXIT PERMISSION WILL BE GRANTED BASED ON WILLINGNESS OF FOREIGN COUNTRY TO ACCEPT SOV AS IMMIGRANT. THIS WOULD REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FROM CURRENT SOV PRACTICE, WHICH REQUIRES INVITATION FROM CLOSE RELATIVE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY BEFORE EXIT PERMISSION IS GRANTED FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE ABROAD. ALSO, INVITATIONS NOW REQUIRED FOR PRIVATE VISITS AND BUSINESS TRIPS ABROAD WILL NOT/NOT BE REQUIRED AFTER NEW LAW IS ADOPTED. KUZNETSOV STATED EMPHATICALLY, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WILL BE NO/NO CHANGE IN PRESENT LIMITATION ON CURRENCY EXCHANGE FOR TRAVEL ABROAD (RUBLES 200.00 PER YEAR). SOV GOVT WILL PLAY NO/NO ROLE IN FINANCING PRIVATE VISITS. USA REPS POINTED OUT THAT NEW LAW WOULD CREATE MORE WORK FOR USA CONSULAR OFFICIALS, WHO WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ASSESS FOR THEMSELVES BACKGROUND OF APPLICANTS AND THEIR ABILITY TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES WHILE TRAVELLING ABROAD.

...6

PAGE SIX XYIM4586 PROTECTED

10.(B)POLICE RECORDS FOR IMMIG APPLICANTS.USA REPS ASKED WHETHER SOVS WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE POLICE RECORDS FOR VISA APPLICANTS.KUZNETSOV RESPONDED THAT SUCH STEP WOULD REQUIRE BILATERAL AGREEMENT.AT PRESENT,SOV GOVT CANNOT/NOT RELEASE SUCH INFO TO CONSULAR OFFICIALS.

11.(C)FIGURES FOR 89 SOV EXIT PERMISSION.ACCORDING TO KUZNETSOV, 228,000 SOV CITIZENS RECEIVED EXIT PERMISSION FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE ABROAD.THIS IS MORE THAN DOUBLE TOTAL FOR 88(108,000).SOVS PROVIDED FLWG BREAKDOWN OF EXIT PERMISSION GRANTED BY COUNTRY FOR 89:TO ISRAEL,102,000;TO FRG,95,000; TO USA 14,000;TO GREECE,10,000.

12.(D)KUZNETSOV PREDICTS EMIGRATION WILL DOUBLE.IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ABOUT FUTURE TRENDS IN SOV EXTERNAL TRAVEL AND EMIGRATION, KUZNETSOV SPECULATED THAT ANNUAL DOUBLING OF NBR OF SOVS LEAVING FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE ABROAD WOULD CONTINUE,AND COULD EVEN INCREASE,IF NEW LAW IS PASSED.HE ADDED THAT OVER TWO MILLION SOVS TRAVELLED ABROAD IN 89 AND THAT THIS FIGURE COULD REACH FIVE TO EIGHT MILLION WITHIN NEXT SEVERAL YEARS.MOST OF THIS TRAVEL WAS LIMITED TO OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH WHICH USSR HAS BILATERAL TRAVEL AGREEMENTS.KUZNETSOV CAUTIONED THAT EVEN WITH PASSAGE OF NEW LAW,SOV GOVT WILL HAVE TROUBLE KEEPING PACE WITH DEMAND FOR EXTERNAL PPTS DUE TO FINANCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ...?

PAGE SEVEN XYIM4586 PROTECTED

PROBLEMS.

13.(F)KUZNETSOV CLARIFIED PROCEDURE AT BORDER POINTS.RESPONDING
TO FINAL QUESTION FROM MCNARY,KUZNETSOV STATED THAT THOSE WHO
HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED EXIT PERMISSION TO ISRAEL ARE NOW PERMITTED
TO TRAVEL TO USA IF THEY HAVE AIRLINE TICKETS FOR USA DESTINATION.
SOV BORDER GUARDS ARE QUOTE CLOSING THEIR EYES UNQUOTE TO THIS
PRACTICE.

CCC/156 220857Z XYIM4586



P R O T E C T E D

///CORRECTED COPY///

FM WSHDC UNGR1964 15FEB90

TO EXTOTT URR RBR

INFO PMOOTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE BNATO MOSCO WSAW BPEST
BUCST PRGUE LDN PARIS BONN ROME TOKYO PEKIN BREEC GENEV VNACE SJOSE
HAVAN

///TT NDFQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOL COORD/DNACPOL/CDS/ DE CAF///

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RWD RWR RBD IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD
CPP LGB LCD LCR PGB PSD PSR

---BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MTG IN MOSCOW--REPORT

FOLLOWING IS FULLER ACCOUNT OF RESULTS OF BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MTG
IN MOSCO THAN BAKER S REPORT TO NAC IN OTTAWA SUNDAY EVENING.DRAW
ADDRESSES ATTENTION TO US/SOVIET STATEMENT RELEASED FEB 10 AT
CONCLUSION MTG.

2.IN GENERAL,MAIN RESULTS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING:

- IMPORTANT PROGRESS ON OUTSTANDING START ISSUES BUT NOT/NOT COMPLETE
AGREEMENT,LEAVING OPEN POSSIBILITY THAT TWO SIDES MIGHT IN FACT BE
READY TO INITIAL START AGREEMENT BY TIME OF JUNE SUMMIT;
- DISCUSSION,FOR THE FIRST TIME,OF A POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON START II
AGREEMENT LOWERING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS LEVELS STILL FURTHER;
- SOME PROGRESS AS WELL ON LOWERING USA AND SOVIET TROOP LEVELS IN
EUROPE,BUT NO/NO AGREEMENT ON PRESIDENTS JAN 31 PROPOSAL FOR
225,000 USA CEILING AND 195,000 SOVIET CEILING(SINCE RESOLVED AT
OTTAWA MTG);
- AGREEMENT ON OUTLINE OF A BILATERAL CW TREATY PENDING CONCLUSION OF
A MULTILATERAL CW CONVENTION;

...2

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

RECEIVED IN

FEB 19 1990

RBR

ACC 63/015
DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-455R

12

file

PAGE TWO UNGR1964 PROTECTED

- NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND PROLIFERATION ISSUES;
- POSSIBILITY OF AN INFORMAL DEAL ON CENTRAL AMERICA, INVOLVING RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS IN RESPECT OF NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR;
- FURTHER PROGRESS ON STRUCTURING OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN;
- AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE OF CONVENING OF A CSCE SUMMIT AT WHICH CFE AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED;
- USEFUL DISCUSSION ON TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES (ENVIRONMENT, TERRORISM, NARCOTICS);
- COMMENCEMENT OF SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS ON BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS;
- AGREEMENT ON ANOTHER MINISTERIAL-LEVEL MTG IN WASHINGTON, BEFORE JUNE SUMMIT. SUMMIT WOULD LIKELY TAKE PLACE DURING PERIOD JUNE 12-19.

3.(A) START NEGOTIATIONS

MALTA SUMMIT HAD SET AS MAJOR TASK OF FEB MINISTERIAL RESOLUTION OF AT LEAST THREE ISSUES HOLDING UP START AGREEMENT. TWO WERE SETTLED IN MOSCOW, THE THIRD ALMOST.

4. ON THE MOST IMPORTANT OUTSTANDING ISSUE, PROBLEM OF HOW TO COUNTER AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON A QUOTE PACKAGE APPROACH UNQUOTE WHICH RESOLVED MOST ISSUES EXCEPT RANGE THRESHOLD OF MISSILES TO BE INCLUDED IN START AGREEMENT (USSR WANTS TO LIMIT ALL THOSE WHICH CAN FLY MORE THAN 600/600 MILES, WHILE USA WANTS THRESHOLD AT 1500/1500 MILES.) PACKAGE DEL INVOLVED DEEMING US BOMBERS (CAPABLE OF CARRYING 20/20 ALCMS) AS CARRYING ONLY 10/10, AND SOVIET BOMBERS

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR1964 PROTECTED

(CAPABLE OF CARRYING 10/10 ALCMS) AS CARRYING ONLY EIGHT, WHILE EXCLUDING CERTAIN TYPES OF SOVIET BOMBERS FROM THE COUNT. IN ADDITION, THERE WILL BE NO/NO LIMITS ON ALCM PRODUCTION, ONLY ON THEIR STORAGE NEAR BOMBER DEPLOYMENT AREAS.

5. ON QUESTION OF HOW TO COUNT NON-DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES, TWO SIDES AGREED THERE WOULD BE NUMERICAL LIMITS ON NON-DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES AND WARHEADS, AND A REGIME TO GOVERN THEIR LOCATION AND MOVEMENT. BUT THERE WOULD BE NO LIMITS ON NON-DEPLOYED BOMBER-CARRIED STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

6. TWO SIDES ALSO AGREED ON A REGIME TO ENSURE THAT TELEMETRY DATA EMITTED DURING FLIGHT-TESTS OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WOULD NOT/NOT BE ENCODED, IN ORDER TO EASE TASK OF VERIFICATION.

7. IN ADDITION, MOSCOW MTG SAW USA SIDE FLESH OUT ITS POSITION ON DURATION OF START TREATY, PHASING OF REDUCTIONS, COUNTING OF WARHEADS ON FUTURE TYPES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES (SHEVARDNADZE SAID SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THIS), AND VERIFICATION OF MOBILE ICBMS; SOVIETS ELABORATED ON THEIR VERIFICATION PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY AS THEY RELATE TO NON-CIRCUMVENTION.

8. ON TWO OTHER UNRESOLVED ISSUES WHICH COULD STILL HOLD UP START AGREEMENT, THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN PROGRESS ON ONLY ONE. QUESTION OF RELATIONSHIP OF A START AGREEMENT TO ABM TREATY WAS NOT/NOT SETTLED. (SHEVARDNADZE SAID SOVIET SIDE HAD QUOTE SPECIFIED SOME ASPECTS UNQUOTE OF ITS POSITION ON ISSUE BUT PROBLEM REMAINED QUOTE COMPLEX

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR1964 PROTECTED

AND DIFFICULT UNQUOTE, AND HE SAID HE THOUGHT QUOTE MUCH WORK LIES AHEAD BEFORE THIS TANGLED KNOT IS UNDONE UNQUOTE. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, GOOD PROGRESS ON SETTING ASIDE THE PERENNIALY DIFFICULT SLCMS ISSUE. WHILE NOT/NOT AGREEING, AS WITH ALCMS, ON WHICH SLCMS WOULD BE COUNTED, TWO SIDES AGREED TO EXCHANGE DATA ON SLCM PRODUCTION AND TO ISSUE PARALLEL QUOTE POLITICALLY BINDING DECLARATIONS UNQUOTE RESPECTING TOTALS.

9. ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY WAS SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT TWO SIDES BEGIN TO CONSIDER QUESTION OF A START II AGREEMENT, UNDER WHICH START I LEVELS (5000/5000 WARHEADS ON 1500/1600 LAUNCHERS) WOULD BE LOWERED AND ISSUES SUCH AS SLCMS POSSIBLY DEALT WITH MORE DIRECTLY. USA SIDE SAID IT WOULD BE READY TO LISTEN TO SOVIET PROPOSALS, BUT NO/NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON WHEN SUCH DISCUSSIONS MIGHT BEGIN OR WHAT THEIR OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE.

10. (B) CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

CFE DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON TWO MAIN ISSUES, PRESIDENTS JAN 31 PROPOSAL TO LOWER CFE MANPOWER LEVELS FROM CURRENT 275,000, AND NATOS NEW AIRCRAFT PROPOSAL.

11. THERE WAS NO/NO AGREEMENT ON BUSH PROPOSAL THAT USA WOULD CUT ITS FORCES WITHIN EUROPE TO 225,000 WITH NO/NO MORE THAN 195,000 IN CENTRAL ZONE, PROVIDED USSR CUT ITS FORCE IN EASTERN EUROPE TO 195,000. SOVIETS COUNTERED THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT EITHER 195,000 OR 225,000 ON BOTH SIDES FOR ALL OF EUROPE, BUT NOT/NOT

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR1964 PROTECTED

UNEQUAL LEVELS.TWO SIDES AGREED THEY WOULD PURSUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS ON ISSUES,WHICH THEY DID IN OTTAWA.

12.IMPORTANT FACTOR HERE WAS NOT/NOT THAT NEGOTIATORS FAILED TO AGREE ON A FIGURE,BUT THAT BOTH WERE TALKING ABOUT A RANGE WELL BELOW THEN CURRENT CFE NEGOTIATING LEVEL OF 275,000.CURIOUSLY,THOUGH, BOTH SIDES WERE LOADING UP WITH SYMBOLISM OTHER SIDES ACCEPTANCE OF LOWER LEVELS,WHICH COULD HAVE MADE EVENTUAL AGREEMENT MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE.SOVIET QUOTE ACCEPTANCE QUOTE OF USA LEVEL OF 195,000 OR 225,000 WAS BEING DESCRIBED AS FINAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY MOSCOW THAT USA HAD QUOTE RIGHT UNQUOTE TO MAINTAIN LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS WITHIN EUROPE,WHILE USA QUOTE ACCEPTANCE UNQUOTE OF SOVIET LEVEL OF EVEN 195,000 WAS BEING DESCRIBED(ESPECIALLY BY CONSERVATIVES)AS UNFORTUNATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT MOSCOW WAS QUOTE ENTITLED UNQUOTE TO LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

13.NATO PROPOSAL FOR LIMITING AIRCRAFT,WHILE DESIGNED IN PART TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS,RECEIVED FRIGID RECEPTION.DIFFERENCES REMAINED SO EXTENSIVE THAT JOINT STATEMENT NOTED ONLY THAT NATO PROPOSAL HAD BEEN DISCUSSED.SHEVARDNADZE PUT SLIGHTLY MORE POSITIVE GLOSS ON SITUATION, POINTING OUT THAT TWO SIDES NOW AT LEAST AGREED ON ESTABLISHING SEPARATE LEVEL FOR AIR DEFENCE AIRCRAFT,EVEN THOUGH THEY DIFFERED ON NUMBERS.BUT HE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT QUOTE US SIDE FLATLY OBJECTS TO DISREGARDING MARITIME AVIATION PERMANENTLY BASED ON LAND UNQUOTE.

14.(C)CHEMICAL WEAPONS

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR1964 PROTECTED

DESPITE POOR PROGNOSIS GIVEN BY USA OFFICIALS FOR CONCLUSION OF A US/SOVIET CW TREATY BY TIME OF JUNE SUMMIT, EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF ISSUE IN MOSCOW PRODUCED CONSENSUS ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES. THIS SHOULD CONSIDERABLY EASE TASK OF PREPARING JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT. AGREED FRAMEWORK IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH USA APPROACH TO MATTER, AND SHOULD LEAD TO CONCLUSION OF BILATERAL AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH (A) EVEN BEFORE CONCLUSION OF MULTILATERAL CW CONVENTION, TWO SIDES WILL DESTROY QUOTE BULK UNQUOTE OF THEIR CW STOCKS (EG 80-82 PERCENT) TO EQUAL LEVELS; (B) ONCE CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE THEY WILL FURTHER REDUCE THEIR STOCKS TO QUOTE A VERY SMALL FRACTION OF THEIR PRESENT HOLDINGS UNQUOTE (2/2 PERCENT) OVER ENSUING EIGHT YEARS, AND (C) ONCE ALL OTHER CW-CAPABLE STATES HAVE ADHERED TO CONVENTION, THEY WILL ELIMINATE ALL THEIR REMAINING STOCKS. AGREED FRAMEWORK INCLUDES STIPULATION THAT MULTILATERAL CONVENTION SHALL CONTAIN PROVISION QUOTE THAT ALL PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WILL HALT UPON ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE UNQUOTE.

15. (C) NUCLEAR TESTING AND PROLIFERATION ISSUES

AFTER YEARS OF FALSE STARTS AND SUDDEN SETBACKS, US AND USSR MAY FINALLY BE READY TO SIGN VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS TO TTBT AND PNET LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN AGREEMENTS THIS SUMMER. MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS RESOLVED NUMBER OF TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATED TO MEASURING YIELD OF PERMITTED EXPLOSIONS, AND IN SOVIET VIEW QUOTE NOTHING NOW INTERFERES ...?

PAGE SEVEN UNGR1964 PROTECTED

WITH COMPLETING WORK ON CONTROL PROTOCOLS UNQUOTE(AND HENCE RATIFICATION OF TWO TREATIES).BUT JOINT STATEMENT IS NOT/NOT QUITE SO CATEGORICAL.

16.WHAT SHOULD FOLLOW UNDER TERMS OF 1987 UNDERSTANDING,NAMELY IMMEDIATE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS TWOARDS CONCLUSION OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN,HAS ALSO BEEN BROUGHT CLOSER TO REALIZATION. BUT AMERICANS RELUCTANCE TO CONFIRM THIS EXPLICITLY IN JOINT STATEMENT(WHICH SPEAKS ONLY OF REAFFIRMING ADHERENCE TO 1987 AGREEMENT) SUGGESTS WASHINGTON MAY STILL WANT TO DELAY COMMENCEMENT OF CTB TALKS,NOTWITHSTANDING SHEVARDNADZE S CLAIM AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT QUOTE ON OUR INSISTENCE,THE US CONFIRMED AN UNDERSTANDING ACHIEVED IN 1987 ON THE NON-STOP PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS TO LIMIT FURTHER NUCLEAR DETONATION BY THEIR YIELD AND QUANTITY,HAVING IN MIND THE EVENTUAL AIM OF THEIR COMPLETE PROHIBITION UNQUOTE.

17.DISCUSSIONS TO ARREST PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TO THIRD WORLD LED TO DECISION TO PREPARE JOINT DOCUMENT OUTLINING PRINCIPLES AND QUOTE CONCRETE STEPS OF COOPERATION UNQUOTE WHICH TWO SIDES WOULD FOLLOW.

18.(F)REGIONAL CONFLICTS

REGIONAL CONFLICTS ABSORBED PREDICTABLE AMOUNT OF TIME,WITH THE MAIN FOCUS ON CENTRAL AMERICA,AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA.SITUATION ON KOREAN PENINSULA,MIDEAST DEVELOPMENTS,AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVFLOPMENTS WERE ALSO DISCUSSED.

...8

PAGE EIGHT UNGR1964 PROTECTED

19. JOINT STATEMENT'S TREATMENT OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS LEAD OFF WITH CENTRAL AMERICA AND WITH EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR ESQUIPULAS PEACE PROCESS. IT ALSO RESTATED TWO SIDES QUOTE OPPOSITION TO USE OF TERRITORY OF ANY CENTRAL AMERICAN STATE TO SUPPORT IRREGULAR FORCES UNQUOTE, SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA THAT QUOTE ALL STATES OUTSIDE REGION END MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUCH FORCES UNQUOTE, UNDERTAKING TO RESPECT RESULTS OF QUOTE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA UNQUOTE, AND SUPPORT FOR QUOTE NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SOLUTION TO CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR UNQUOTE.

20. AFTER FACT, AMERICANS MADE NO/NO EFFORT TO ACCENTUATE POSITIVE. INSTEAD BAKER INSTEAD POINTED OUT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TWO SIDES OVER SOVIET DELIVERIES OF MIG-29S TO CUBA. SHEVARDNADZE, IN CONTRAST, SAID THAT QUOTE A VERY INTERESTING SPHERE OF ACCORD IN CENTRAL AMERICAN PROBLEMS IS SHAPING UP; THIS CONCERNS, IN PARTICULAR, QUESTIONS RELATING TO NICARAGUA AND SALVADOR UNQUOTE. SOVIET SUPPLY OF MIGS TO CUBA HE DISMISSED AS QUOTE NOTHING UNUSUAL UNQUOTE, ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED QUOTE US DOES NOT/NOT WELCOME THIS MOVE UNQUOTE.

21. AFGHANISTAN DISCUSSIONS ALMOST SURELY MOVED SITUATION FORWARD, LARGELY AS RESULT OF US CONCESSION THAT MAJIBULLAH NEED NOT/NOT STEP DOWN AT COMMENCEMENT OF DISCUSSIONS OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. BUT BAKER MADE IT CLEAR NAJIBULLAH WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE AT CONCLUSION OF TALKS. JOINT STATEMENT STIPULATED THAT TRANSITION PERIOD WOULD PROVIDE FOR QUOTE AN INTRA-AFGHAN DIALOGUE, A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT ...9

PAGE NINE UNGR1964 PROTECTED

WHICH WOULD ENSURE THE PEACEFUL, INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS OF AFGHANISTAN UNQUOTE.

22. CAMBODIAN DISCUSSIONS, WHILE EXTENSIVE, APPEAR TO HAVE CONCLUDED WITH NO/NO MORE THAN JOINT DETERMINATION OF PRESS ON IN UN AND EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT FORTHCOMING JAKARTA MTG WOULD ADVANCE PEACE PROCESS.

23. (F) CSCE SUMMIT

SOVIETS EARLY ENTHUSIASM FOR A CSCE SUMMIT, AND SUPPORT PROJECT RECEIVED THROUGHOUT EUROPE, LEFT ADMIN ISOLATED IN ITS OPPOSITION TO SUMMIT. IT FINALLY STARTED TO COME AROUND A FEW WEEKS AGO, TELEGRAPHED ITS MOVEMENT ON ISSUE IN TWO RECENT SPEECHES BY BAKER, AND IN MOSCOW FINALLY AGREED-WITH TWO CONDITIONS: SUMMIT QUOTE WOULD BE OCCASION FOR SIGNING A CFE AGREEMENT UNQUOTE AND IT WOULD NOT/NOT SUPPLANT ALREADY SCHEDULED 1992 CSCE SUMMIT IN HELSINKI.

24. (G) TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A FREE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE NOW-STANDARD QUOTE TRANSNATIONAL UNQUOTE ISSUES ON US/SOVIET AGENDA: ENVIRONMENT, TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS. BUT FOR MOST PART MINISTERS ARE STILL LEAVING THE WORKING OUT OF PRACTICAL MEANS OF COOPERATION TO SUBORDINATE EXPERTS GROUPS.

25. (H) BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

AFTER SPENDING MOST OF LAST YEARS REFUSING TO ENGAGE SOVIETS IN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS, ADMIN CHANGED ITS MIND SHORTLY BEFORE MALTA SUMMIT (FOLLOWING PM S MTG WITH PRESIDENT) AND IS

...10

PAGE TEN UNGR1964 PROTECTED

NOW INVOLVED IN QUOTE EXTENSIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSIONS
UNQUOTE. JOINT STATEMENT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT QUOTE AN INFORMAL GROUP
ON ECONOMIC QUESTIONS UNQUOTE HAS NOW BEEN CREATED (PARALLELING THOSE
ON OTHER STANDARD AGENDA ITEMS), AND THAT MOSCOW MTG COVERED TRADE
RELATIONS; POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING INVESTMENT AND TAXATION
TREATIES; STATUS OF ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS ON MARITIME TRANSPORTATION,
EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION, AND GRAINS AGREEMENTS; VARIETY OF TECHNICAL
COOPERATION PROJECTS; SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS AT GATT; AND QUOTE THE
PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET COOPERATION WITH THE OECD UNQUOTE.

26. (I) FOLLOW UP MTGS

AS EXPECTED, TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED TO MEET AT LEAST ONE MORE
TIME BEFORE JUNE SUMMIT (THERE COULD BE MORE THAN ONE), THE NEXT MTG
TO BE HELD IN WASHINGTON.

27. MINS DID NOT/NOT ANNOUNCE PRECISE DATES FOR JUNE SUMMIT, BUT
WE HAVE IT ON GOOD AUTHORITY THAT SOVIETS EXPECT DATES FOR
WASHINGTON PORTION OF SUMMIT TO FALL IN PERIOD JUNE 12-19.

CCC/120 152030Z UNGR1964

NATO SECRET

3/18

NATO SECRET

U.S. DELEGATION
FEBRUARY 13, 1990

THE MOSCOW MINISTERIAL: FEBRUARY 7-10

ACC	DATE
754777	
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	
LOC	
A3-WU	

OVERVIEW

WHEN PRESIDENT BUSH AND CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV MET IN MALTA, THEY DEFINED CERTAIN GOALS AND PRIORITIES FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, WITH A PARTICULAR VIEW TOWARD THE JUNE SUMMIT. A-1

-- THE OVERARCHING AIM, IN THIS TIME OF TRANSFORMATION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, IS TO BUILD A MORE STABLE AND COOPERATIVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

THE MOSCOW MINISTERIAL WAS AN IMPORTANT AND USEFUL STEP IN LAYING THE GROUND FOR A PRODUCTIVE MEETING BETWEEN THE LEADERS IN JUNE.

THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE REVIEWED THE FULL AGENDA OF U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES.

-- WHILE NOTING THAT SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON CERTAIN ISSUES, THEY EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT THE RELATIONSHIP IS INCREASINGLY MARKED BY UNDERSTANDING, COOPERATION AND THE SEARCH FOR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

-- THEY HAD A GOOD AND WORTHWHILE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND RECORDED CONCRETE AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS ON SEVERAL QUESTIONS.

SOVIET INTERNAL SITUATION

THE MINISTERIAL FOLLOWED AN IMPORTANT EVENT IN SOVIET POLITICAL LIFE: THE FEBRUARY 5-7 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM.

-- THOUGH BESET BY DIFFICULT CHALLENGES -- A STUMBLING ECONOMY, SEPARATISM IN THE BALTICS, SHARP INTERETHNIC TENSIONS IN THE CAUCASUS -- GORBACHEV SEEMS DETERMINED TO MOVE FORWARD WITH PERESTROYKA AND INTRODUCE A NEW DYNAMISM INTO SOVIET POLITICAL LIFE.

BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT PERESTROYKA HAD REACHED A POINT REQUIRING DECISIVE ACTION, AND THEY INDICATED THAT THE PLENUM WOULD BE THE START OF A NEW PUSH TO RADICALIZE THE REFORM PROCESS.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000755

NATO SECRET

USNATO/POL/NS/90-21

4/18

NATO SECRET

-2-

-- THEY DESCRIBED A NEW FEDERAL MECHANISM THAT WILL REDEFINE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS AND THE CENTER, AND EXPLAINED THE DECISIONS TO ABOLISH THE PARTY'S MONOPOLY AND TO ESTABLISH A STRONG PRESIDENCY AS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF REFORM.

ARMS CONTROL

THE MINISTERS, ASSISTED BY EXPERTS, HAD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE ON THE FULL SPECTRUM OF ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS.

IN TWO DAYS OF VIRTUALLY ROUND-THE-CLOCK NEGOTIATIONS, WE WERE ABLE TO RESOLVE OR CLOSE WITHIN ONE OR TWO ISSUES ON SUCH MAJOR START ISSUES AS ALCMS, SLCMS, AND NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES.

THE SIDES HAVE LONG DIFFERED ON MANY ASPECTS OF THE ALCM ISSUE, INCLUDING ALCM COUNTING, RANGE THRESHOLD, AND DISTINGUISHABILITY BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ALCMS.

IN AN EFFORT TO BREAK THIS LOGJAM, THE SECRETARY TOOK TO MOSCOW A PACKAGE ON ALCMS THAT INVOLVED A NUMBER OF RESPONSES TO SOVIET CONCERNS.

-- FOR COUNTING ALCMS WITHIN THE 6000 LIMIT, OUR PREVIOUS POSITION WOULD HAVE ATTRIBUTED TEN TO EACH BOMBER EQUIPPED TO CARRY ALCMS. IN MOSCOW WE PROPOSED A DIFFERENTIATED COUNTING RULE UNDER WHICH B-52S, B-1S AND FUTURE BOMBERS EQUIPPED TO CARRY ALCMS WOULD BE ATTRIBUTED WITH TEN, WHILE TU-95 BEAR H AND TU-160 BLACKJACK BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS WOULD BE ATTRIBUTED WITH EIGHT.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO AGREE THAT NO BOMBER MAY BE CONFIGURED TO CARRY MORE THAN TWICE AS MANY ALCMS AS THE NUMBER ATTRIBUTED TO IT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE B-52 COULD CARRY NO MORE THAN 20. THIS WOULD BE VERIFIED BY ON-SITE INSPECTION AS THE SOVIETS PROPOSED.

-- WE ALSO TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WERE READY TO ACCEPT THEIR PROPOSALS TO BAN MULTIPLE WARHEAD ALCMS AND TO BAN THE CONVERSION OF AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS INTO ALCM-CARRYING BOMBERS.

-- WE PUT FORWARD NEW IDEAS ON HOW TO DISTINGUISH NUCLEAR FROM CONVENTIONAL ALCMS.

NATO SECRET

000756

NATO SECRET

5/18

NATO SECRET

-3-

-- AND WE PROPOSED TO MOVE ON THE RANGE THRESHOLD BY LOWERING OUR PROPOSAL FROM 1500 TO 1000 KILOMETERS.

IN TWO DAYS OF INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS, ALL ISSUES WERE RESOLVED EXCEPT FOR THE RANGE THRESHOLD. THIS WAS RECORDED IN A DETAILED PAPER DESCRIBING THE NEW ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND DEVELOPED AT THE MEETING. THE COUNTING RULE, WHILE COMPLEX, IS ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL TO OUR PROPOSAL AND FULLY PROTECTS OUR ABILITY TO DEPLOY ALCMS.

AS FOR SLCMS, WE GAVE THE SOVIETS A DRAFT OF THE TYPE OF SLCM DECLARATION THAT WE HAVE IN MIND, UNDER WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD ANNUALLY DECLARE ITS NUCLEAR SLCM PLANS FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

-- THE SOVIETS, IN RETURN, GAVE US A SLCM DECLARATION OF THEIR OWN. WE WERE THEN ABLE TO RESOLVE ALL ISSUES EXCEPT FOR THE RANGE THRESHOLD AND THE QUESTION WHETHER ONLY NUCLEAR OR BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SLCMS ARE INCLUDED. THIS DECLARATORY APPROACH IS BASED ON A POLITICALLY BINDING DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS IN EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSALS THAT WE FELT WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE AND UNWORKABLE.

-- THE SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS QUESTION IN GENEVA.

ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES, WE ACCEPTED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES WOULD BE PERMITTED NEAR DEPLOYMENT AREAS ONLY IN AGREED VERY SMALL NUMBERS, WITH ALL OTHERS CONFINED TO DECLARED FACILITIES SOME DISTANCE AWAY.

-- AND WE PROPOSED ADDITIONAL NUMERICAL LIMITS THAT WOULD APPLY ONLY TO NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES OF TYPES FLIGHT-TESTED FROM MOBILE LAUNCHERS: NO MORE THAN 300 NON-DEPLOYED ICBMS AND NO MORE THAN 1500 WARHEADS ATTRIBUTED TO SUCH ICBMS. THE SOVIETS AGREED TO DEAL WITH NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES AS THE U.S. PROPOSED: AGREE TO LIMITS IN PRINCIPLE, BUT TAKE MORE TIME TO WORK OUT THE EXACT NUMBERS.

THE SIDES ALSO REACHED AGREEMENT ON MAJOR ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND WITH RESPECT TO HANDLING DATA DENIAL UNDER THE START TREATY.

WE ADVANCED NEW IDEAS ON OTHER START ISSUES AS WELL (IN EACH CASE WE GAVE THE SOVIETS A DETAILED PAPER), INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000757

NATO SECRET

6/18

NATO SECRET

-4-

-- WE PROPOSED NEW ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND REGARDING MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION.

-- WE PROPOSED THE TREATY BE OF 15 YEARS DURATION WITH A REVIEW ONE YEAR BEFORE THE END OF THE PERIOD -- IF THE TREATY HAS NOT BEEN SUPERSEDED -- TO DECIDE ON ITS FUTURE.

-- WE PROPOSED THAT REDUCTIONS BE CARRIED OUT OVER FOUR PHASES OF TWO YEARS, TWO YEARS, TWO YEARS AND ONE YEAR, WITH EQUAL LEVELS AT THE END OF EACH PHASE.

-- THE SOVIETS DID NOT RESPOND IN MOSCOW TO THESE PROPOSALS; WE EXPECT TO HEAR THEIR REPLIES IN GENEVA.

WHILE COMPLEX ISSUES REMAIN, WE ARE MOVING FORWARD TOWARD OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF HAVING THE SUBSTANTIVE START ISSUES RESOLVED BY THE JUNE SUMMIT.

THE MINISTERS EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF DEFENSE AND SPACE.

-- WE REITERATED OUR BELIEF THAT THE REVISED DRAFT TREATY WE TABLED IN DECEMBER WOULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND STABILITY.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD BE INTRODUCING A NEW PROPOSAL REGARDING PREDICTABILITY MEASURES SHORTLY IN GENEVA.

-- THE SOVIETS AGAIN PRESSED THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A PROTOCOL ON PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES UNDER THE ABM TREATY. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR POSITION DOES CLARIFY WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE ALLOWED UNDER THE TREATY AND THAT WE SAW NO NEED TO GO BEYOND THAT.

-- THE SOVIETS ALSO REPEATED THEIR CALL FOR AN AGREED START STATEMENT THAT AN ABM TREATY VIOLATION WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM START. HOWEVER, IN AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT THAT CONFIRMS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DELINKED START FROM DEFENSE AND SPACE, THEY STATED THIS WAS A PREFERENCE -- NOT A PRECONDITION -- FOR A START ACCORD.

ON COMPLIANCE, WE NOTED THAT WHILE SHEVARDNADZE HAD TOLD US IN WYOMING THAT THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR WOULD BE COMPLETELY ELIMINATED, THE SOVIETS IN THE SCC DESCRIBED PROCEDURES THAT WOULD LEAVE HALF OF THE RADAR TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER BUILDINGS STANDING. SHEVARDNADZE CONFIRMED THE RADAR WOULD BE COMPLETELY ELIMINATED.

NATO SECRET

000758

NATO SECRET

7/18

-5-

NATO SECRET

WE ALSO RESPONDED TO THE SOVIET SUGGESTION IN WYOMING THAT THEY VISIT OUR EARLY-WARNING RADARS AT THULE AND FYLINGDALES.

-- THE SECRETARY TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE BRITISH AND DANISH GOVERNMENTS AND AFTER ALSO BECOMING CONVINCED THAT WE COULD PUT THAT ISSUE BEHIND US, WE WERE PREPARED TO EXCHANGE VISITS: THE SOVIETS COULD VISIT THULE AND FYLINGDALES AND WE WOULD VISIT TWO LARGE EARLY-WARNING RADARS IN THE USSR.

-- THE SOVIETS AGREED TO RECIPROCAL VISITS TO THULE AND A SOVIET RADAR AT PECHORA. THE MINISTERS WILL DISCUSS AT A LATER TIME THE DETAILS OF VISITS TO FYLINGDALES AND A SECOND SOVIET RADAR.

ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE SECRETARY PROPOSED A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE U.S. AND USSR TO MOVE FORWARD ON MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL CW ARMS CONTROL. THIS FRAMEWORK CONSISTED OF SIX ELEMENTS:

-- U.S. AND SOVIET COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE;

-- A BILATERAL ACCORD PROVIDING FOR REDUCTION OF U.S. AND SOVIET CW STOCKS TO 5000 TONS;

-- COOPERATION ON CW DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY;

-- REDUCTIONS TO 500 TONS OVER THE FIRST EIGHT YEARS OF A MULTILATERAL CW CONVENTION AND TO ZERO IN THE SUBSEQUENT TWO YEARS PROVIDED ALL CW-CAPABLE STATES ADHERE;

-- HALTING OF CW PRODUCTION AT ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION; AND

-- A JOINT STATEMENT ON COMMON EFFORTS TO PREVENT CW PROLIFERATION.

THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THIS GENERAL FRAMEWORK, PREFERRING ONLY TO USE THE PHRASES "THE BULK OF" AND "A SMALL FRACTION OF" CW STOCKS IN PLACE OF SPECIFIC NUMBERS FOR THE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS RECORDED IN A JOINT STATEMENT.

-- THIS REPRESENTS A MAJOR STEP IN U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION ON CW ARMS CONTROL, AND SHOULD GIVE A MAJOR STIMULUS TO BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

-6-

REDUCE AND ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE ARE MOVING FROM THE REALM OF WORDS TO ACTION.

WE REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE NUCLEAR TESTING TALKS AND REAFFIRMED THE GOAL OF COMPLETING THE TTBT AND PNET VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS READY FOR SIGNING AT THE SUMMIT.

-- IN THE WORKING GROUP, THE SIDES AGREED ON THE RIGHT TO SIMULTANEOUS USE OF HYDRODYNAMIC AND IN-COUNTRY SEISMIC YIELD MEASUREMENTS; RESOLVED SEVERAL LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HYDRODYNAMIC YIELD MEASUREMENT METHOD; AND IDENTIFIED THREE STATIONS IN EACH COUNTRY TO BE USED FOR IN-COUNTRY SEISMIC YIELD MEASUREMENTS.

-- THE SOVIETS RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING TALKS AFTER THE PROTOCOLS ARE SIGNED.

-- THE SECRETARY CONFIRMED U.S. ADHERENCE TO A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS TOWARD FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING, BUT EXPLAINED OUR RATIONALE FOR A PERIOD OF OBSERVATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROTOCOLS TO GAIN EXPERIENCE WITH THE NEW VERIFICATION METHODS BEFORE PROCEEDING.

ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES; WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE PLACE AMONG THE 23, THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED OUR RECENT INITIATIVES IN THE AREA OF MANPOWER AND AIRCRAFT (THIS WAS THE SAME DAY THAT THEY WERE BEING TABLED IN VIENNA).

-- HE MADE CLEAR THAT U.S. FORCE LEVELS WERE NOT LINKED TO SOVIET LEVELS, THAT 195,000 IN THE CENTRAL ZONE WAS A SUSTAINABLE LEVEL FOR THE U.S., AND THAT SOVIETS COULD WELL CHOOSE TO GO LOWER.

GORBACHEV PRESENTED THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL, OFFERING A CHOICE OF 225,000 OR 195,000 U.S. AND SOVIET STATIONED FORCES, BUT MADE CLEAR THAT IN EITHER CASE THE LIMIT WOULD APPLY TO ALL OF EUROPE.

-- SHEVARDNADZE HAD EARLIER INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS NO LONGER INSISTED ON OVERALL NATO-WARSAW PACT MANPOWER LIMITS, AND THAT THEY WOULD DROP THEIR DEMAND FOR LIMITS ON OTHER ALLIES' STATIONED FORCES.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS WE WOULD CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES ON OUR RESPONSE.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000760

ACTION
External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada
SUITE A DONNER

NATO SECRET
MESSAGE

MGTC/DIARY/CIRC/FILE
MGTC/JOURNAL/CIRC/DOSSIER
Accession/Reference
A7
File/Dossier
20-USA -1-3-USSR
Ab
HS

SECURE FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ
M/DE
O/A
VFO
DISTR
IEF
UBJ/SW

N A T O S E C R E T

FEB 13 1990

FM BNATO YBGR6199 13FEB90
TO EXTOT/URR/RBR **DELBY 131500**
INFO *DE NATY* *BAG* CANMILREPNATO WSHDC *VNACE DE OTT*
BAG MOSCO GENEV ISBAD *DE OTT*
DISTR IDD IDR IDA IDAO IDAV IDAN RBD URD IND INP ~~IND~~ RWD
~~IND~~ RWR IDX RGX CPP PSR PNR
REF IDATEL 1131 12FEB(NOTAL)
---SECRETARY BAKER VISIT TO MOSCOW 07-10FEB
ATTACHED ARE NOTES ON SUBJ MTG CIRCULATED TO POLITICAL CTTEE
BY USA DEL ON 13FEB.
(COMCENTRE PLSE FAX ATTACHED 17 PAGES.)

13 FEB 90 17:15

NATO SECRET

NAT 006/13

CHAFFER/RÉDACTEUR <i>[Signature]</i> M. GRINIUS/DGL SIG	DIVISION/DIRECTION POLITICAL	TELEPHONE 203	APPROVED/APPROUVE <i>[Signature]</i> J.A. MALONE CIRC YES/NO
--	---------------------------------	------------------	---

NATO SECRET

USNATO/POL/NS/90-21
Copy Number 10

NATO SECRET
UNITED STATES MISSION

TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
(USNATO)

ACTION

February 13, 1990

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

I enclose for your reference some materials prepared in Washington concerning the February 7-10 visit of Secretary Baker to Moscow.

I am copying this letter to the members of the Council and to the Chairman of the Military Committee.

Sincerely,

John C. Kornblum
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure: As Stated

His Excellency
Manfred Woerner,
Secretary General,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Brussels.

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 17 PAGES

THIS COVER LETTER BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ENCLOSURE IS WITHDRAWN

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

3/18

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

U.S. DELEGATION
FEBRUARY 13, 1990

THE MOSCOW MINISTERIAL: FEBRUARY 7-10

OVERVIEW

WHEN PRESIDENT BUSH AND CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV MET IN MALTA, THEY DEFINED CERTAIN GOALS AND PRIORITIES FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, WITH A PARTICULAR VIEW TOWARD THE JUNE SUMMIT.

-- THE OVERARCHING AIM, IN THIS TIME OF TRANSFORMATION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, IS TO BUILD A MORE STABLE AND COOPERATIVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

THE MOSCOW MINISTERIAL WAS AN IMPORTANT AND USEFUL STEP IN LAYING THE GROUND FOR A PRODUCTIVE MEETING BETWEEN THE LEADERS IN JUNE.

THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE REVIEWED THE FULL AGENDA OF U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES.

-- WHILE NOTING THAT SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON CERTAIN ISSUES, THEY EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT THE RELATIONSHIP IS INCREASINGLY MARKED BY UNDERSTANDING, COOPERATION AND THE SEARCH FOR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

-- THEY HAD A GOOD AND WORTHWHILE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND RECORDED CONCRETE AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS ON SEVERAL QUESTIONS.

SOVIET INTERNAL SITUATION

THE MINISTERIAL FOLLOWED AN IMPORTANT EVENT IN SOVIET POLITICAL LIFE: THE FEBRUARY 5-7 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM.

-- THOUGH BESET BY DIFFICULT CHALLENGES -- A STUMBLING ECONOMY, SEPARATISM IN THE BALTICS, SHARP INTERETHNIC TENSIONS IN THE CAUCASUS -- GORBACHEV SEEMS DETERMINED TO MOVE FORWARD WITH PERESTROYKA AND INTRODUCE A NEW DYNAMISM INTO SOVIET POLITICAL LIFE.

BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT PERESTROYKA HAD REACHED A POINT REQUIRING DECISIVE ACTION, AND THEY INDICATED THAT THE PLENUM WOULD BE THE START OF A NEW PUSH TO RADICALIZE THE REFORM PROCESS.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

USNATO/POL/NS/90-21

4/18

NATO SECRET

-2-

-- THEY DESCRIBED A NEW FEDERAL MECHANISM THAT WILL REDEFINE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS AND THE CENTER, AND EXPLAINED THE DECISIONS TO ABOLISH THE PARTY'S MONOPOLY AND TO ESTABLISH A STRONG PRESIDENCY AS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF REFORM.

ARMS CONTROL

THE MINISTERS, ASSISTED BY EXPERTS, HAD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE ON THE FULL SPECTRUM OF ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS.

IN TWO DAYS OF VIRTUALLY ROUND-THE-CLOCK NEGOTIATIONS, WE WERE ABLE TO RESOLVE OR CLOSE WITHIN ONE OR TWO ISSUES ON SUCH MAJOR START ISSUES AS ALCMS, SLCMS, AND NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES.

THE SIDES HAVE LONG DIFFERED ON MANY ASPECTS OF THE ALCM ISSUE, INCLUDING ALCM COUNTING, RANGE THRESHOLD, AND DISTINGUISHABILITY BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ALCMS.

IN AN EFFORT TO BREAK THIS LOGJAM, THE SECRETARY TOOK TO MOSCOW A PACKAGE ON ALCMS THAT INVOLVED A NUMBER OF RESPONSES TO SOVIET CONCERNS.

-- FOR COUNTING ALCMS WITHIN THE 6000 LIMIT, OUR PREVIOUS POSITION WOULD HAVE ATTRIBUTED TEN TO EACH BOMBER EQUIPPED TO CARRY ALCMS. IN MOSCOW WE PROPOSED A DIFFERENTIATED COUNTING RULE UNDER WHICH B-52S, B-1S AND FUTURE BOMBERS EQUIPPED TO CARRY ALCMS WOULD BE ATTRIBUTED WITH TEN, WHILE TU-95 BEAR H AND TU-160 BLACKJACK BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS WOULD BE ATTRIBUTED WITH EIGHT.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO AGREE THAT NO BOMBER MAY BE CONFIGURED TO CARRY MORE THAN TWICE AS MANY ALCMS AS THE NUMBER ATTRIBUTED TO IT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE B-52 COULD CARRY NO MORE THAN 20. THIS WOULD BE VERIFIED BY ON-SITE INSPECTION AS THE SOVIETS PROPOSED.

-- WE ALSO TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WERE READY TO ACCEPT THEIR PROPOSALS TO BAN MULTIPLE WARHEAD ALCMS AND TO BAN THE CONVERSION OF AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS INTO ALCM-CARRYING BOMBERS.

-- WE PUT FORWARD NEW IDEAS ON HOW TO DISTINGUISH NUCLEAR FROM CONVENTIONAL ALCMS.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000764

5/18

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

-3-

-- AND WE PROPOSED TO MOVE ON THE RANGE THRESHOLD BY LOWERING OUR PROPOSAL FROM 1500 TO 1000 KILOMETERS.

IN TWO DAYS OF INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS, ALL ISSUES WERE RESOLVED EXCEPT FOR THE RANGE THRESHOLD. THIS WAS RECORDED IN A DETAILED PAPER DESCRIBING THE NEW ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND DEVELOPED AT THE MEETING. THE COUNTING RULE, WHILE COMPLEX, IS ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL TO OUR PROPOSAL AND FULLY PROTECTS OUR ABILITY TO DEPLOY ALCMS.

AS FOR SLCMS, WE GAVE THE SOVIETS A DRAFT OF THE TYPE OF SLCM DECLARATION THAT WE HAVE IN MIND, UNDER WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD ANNUALLY DECLARE ITS NUCLEAR SLCM PLANS FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

-- THE SOVIETS, IN RETURN, GAVE US A SLCM DECLARATION OF THEIR OWN. WE WERE THEN ABLE TO RESOLVE ALL ISSUES EXCEPT FOR THE RANGE THRESHOLD AND THE QUESTION WHETHER ONLY NUCLEAR OR BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SLCMS ARE INCLUDED. THIS DECLARATORY APPROACH IS BASED ON A POLITICALLY BINDING DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS IN EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSALS THAT WE FELT WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE AND UNWORKABLE.

-- THE SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS QUESTION IN GENEVA.

ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES, WE ACCEPTED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES WOULD BE PERMITTED NEAR DEPLOYMENT AREAS ONLY IN AGREED VERY SMALL NUMBERS, WITH ALL OTHERS CONFINED TO DECLARED FACILITIES SOME DISTANCE AWAY.

-- AND WE PROPOSED ADDITIONAL NUMERICAL LIMITS THAT WOULD APPLY ONLY TO NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES OF TYPES FLIGHT-TESTED FROM MOBILE LAUNCHERS: NO MORE THAN 300 NON-DEPLOYED ICBMS AND NO MORE THAN 1500 WARHEADS ATTRIBUTED TO SUCH ICBMS. THE SOVIETS AGREED TO DEAL WITH NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES AS THE U.S. PROPOSED: AGREE TO LIMITS IN PRINCIPLE, BUT TAKE MORE TIME TO WORK OUT THE EXACT NUMBERS.

THE SIDES ALSO REACHED AGREEMENT ON MAJOR ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND WITH RESPECT TO HANDLING DATA DENIAL UNDER THE START TREATY.

WE ADVANCED NEW IDEAS ON OTHER START ISSUES AS WELL (IN EACH CASE WE GAVE THE SOVIETS A DETAILED PAPER), INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

USNATO/POL/NS/90-21

6/18

NATO SECRET

-4-

-- WE PROPOSED NEW ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND REGARDING MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION.

-- WE PROPOSED THE TREATY BE OF 15 YEARS DURATION WITH A REVIEW ONE YEAR BEFORE THE END OF THE PERIOD -- IF THE TREATY HAS NOT BEEN SUPERSEDED -- TO DECIDE ON ITS FUTURE.

-- WE PROPOSED THAT REDUCTIONS BE CARRIED OUT OVER FOUR PHASES OF TWO YEARS, TWO YEARS, TWO YEARS AND ONE YEAR, WITH EQUAL LEVELS AT THE END OF EACH PHASE.

-- THE SOVIETS DID NOT RESPOND IN MOSCOW TO THESE PROPOSALS; WE EXPECT TO HEAR THEIR REPLIES IN GENEVA.

WHILE COMPLEX ISSUES REMAIN, WE ARE MOVING FORWARD TOWARD OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF HAVING THE SUBSTANTIVE START ISSUES RESOLVED BY THE JUNE SUMMIT.

THE MINISTERS EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF DEFENSE AND SPACE.

-- WE REITERATED OUR BELIEF THAT THE REVISED DRAFT TREATY WE TABLED IN DECEMBER WOULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND STABILITY.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD BE INTRODUCING A NEW PROPOSAL REGARDING PREDICTABILITY MEASURES SHORTLY IN GENEVA.

-- THE SOVIETS AGAIN PRESSED THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A PROTOCOL ON PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES UNDER THE ABM TREATY. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR POSITION DOES CLARIFY WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE ALLOWED UNDER THE TREATY AND THAT WE SAW NO NEED TO GO BEYOND THAT.

-- THE SOVIETS ALSO REPEATED THEIR CALL FOR AN AGREED START STATEMENT THAT AN ABM TREATY VIOLATION WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM START. HOWEVER, IN AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT THAT CONFIRMS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DELINKED START FROM DEFENSE AND SPACE, THEY STATED THIS WAS A PREFERENCE -- NOT A PRECONDITION -- FOR A START ACCORD.

ON COMPLIANCE, WE NOTED THAT WHILE SHEVARNADZE HAD TOLD US IN WYOMING THAT THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR WOULD BE COMPLETELY ELIMINATED, THE SOVIETS IN THE SCC DESCRIBED PROCEDURES THAT WOULD LEAVE HALF OF THE RADAR TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER BUILDINGS STANDING. SHEVARNADZE CONFIRMED THE RADAR WOULD BE COMPLETELY ELIMINATED.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000766

NATO SECRET

7/18

-5-

NATO SECRET

WE ALSO RESPONDED TO THE SOVIET SUGGESTION IN WYOMING THAT THEY VISIT OUR EARLY-WARNING RADARS AT THULE AND FYLINGDALES.

-- THE SECRETARY TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE BRITISH AND DANISH GOVERNMENTS AND AFTER ALSO BECOMING CONVINCED THAT WE COULD PUT THAT ISSUE BEHIND US, WE WERE PREPARED TO EXCHANGE VISITS: THE SOVIETS COULD VISIT THULE AND FYLINGDALES AND WE WOULD VISIT TWO LARGE EARLY-WARNING RADARS IN THE USSR.

-- THE SOVIETS AGREED TO RECIPROCAL VISITS TO THULE AND A SOVIET RADAR AT PECHORA. THE MINISTERS WILL DISCUSS AT A LATER TIME THE DETAILS OF VISITS TO FYLINGDALES AND A SECOND SOVIET RADAR.

ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE SECRETARY PROPOSED A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE U.S. AND USSR TO MOVE FORWARD ON MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL CW ARMS CONTROL. THIS FRAMEWORK CONSISTED OF SIX ELEMENTS:

-- U.S. AND SOVIET COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE;

-- A BILATERAL ACCORD PROVIDING FOR REDUCTION OF U.S. AND SOVIET CW STOCKS TO 5000 TONS;

-- COOPERATION ON CW DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY;

-- REDUCTIONS TO 500 TONS OVER THE FIRST EIGHT YEARS OF A MULTILATERAL CW CONVENTION AND TO ZERO IN THE SUBSEQUENT TWO YEARS PROVIDED ALL CW-CAPABLE STATES ADHERE;

-- HALTING OF CW PRODUCTION AT ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION; AND

-- A JOINT STATEMENT ON COMMON EFFORTS TO PREVENT CW PROLIFERATION.

THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THIS GENERAL FRAMEWORK, PREFERRING ONLY TO USE THE PHRASES "THE BULK OF" AND "A SMALL FRACTION OF" CW STOCKS IN PLACE OF SPECIFIC NUMBERS FOR THE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS RECORDED IN A JOINT STATEMENT.

-- THIS REPRESENTS A MAJOR STEP IN U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION ON CW ARMS CONTROL, AND SHOULD GIVE A MAJOR STIMULUS TO BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000767

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

-6-

REDUCE AND ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE ARE MOVING FROM THE REALM OF WORDS TO ACTION.

WE REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE NUCLEAR TESTING TALKS AND REAFFIRMED THE GOAL OF COMPLETING THE TTBT AND PNET VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS READY FOR SIGNING AT THE SUMMIT.

-- IN THE WORKING GROUP, THE SIDES AGREED ON THE RIGHT TO SIMULTANEOUS USE OF HYDRODYNAMIC AND IN-COUNTRY SEISMIC YIELD MEASUREMENTS; RESOLVED SEVERAL LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HYDRODYNAMIC YIELD MEASUREMENT METHOD; AND IDENTIFIED THREE STATIONS IN EACH COUNTRY TO BE USED FOR IN-COUNTRY SEISMIC YIELD MEASUREMENTS.

-- THE SOVIETS RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING TALKS AFTER THE PROTOCOLS ARE SIGNED.

-- THE SECRETARY CONFIRMED U.S. ADHERENCE TO A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS TOWARD FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING, BUT EXPLAINED OUR RATIONALE FOR A PERIOD OF OBSERVATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROTOCOLS TO GAIN EXPERIENCE WITH THE NEW VERIFICATION METHODS BEFORE PROCEEDING.

ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE PLACE AMONG THE 23, THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED OUR RECENT INITIATIVES IN THE AREA OF MANPOWER AND AIRCRAFT (THIS WAS THE SAME DAY THAT THEY WERE BEING TABLED IN VIENNA).

-- HE MADE CLEAR THAT U.S. FORCE LEVELS WERE NOT LINKED TO SOVIET LEVELS, THAT 195,000 IN THE CENTRAL ZONE WAS A SUSTAINABLE LEVEL FOR THE U.S., AND THAT SOVIETS COULD WELL CHOOSE TO GO LOWER.

GORBACHEV PRESENTED THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL, OFFERING A CHOICE OF 225,000 OR 195,000 U.S. AND SOVIET STATIONED FORCES, BUT MADE CLEAR THAT IN EITHER CASE THE LIMIT WOULD APPLY TO ALL OF EUROPE.

-- SHEVARDNADZE HAD EARLIER INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS NO LONGER INSISTED ON OVERALL NATO-WARSAW PACT MANPOWER LIMITS, AND THAT THEY WOULD DROP THEIR DEMAND FOR LIMITS ON OTHER ALLIES' STATIONED FORCES.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS WE WOULD CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES ON OUR RESPONSE.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000768

USNATO/POL/NS/90-21

9/18

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

-7-

ON AIRCRAFT, THE SOVIETS AGREED TO INCLUDE MEDIUM BOMBERS (TU-22, TU-22M, TU-16) BUT NOT LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT. IN A STEP AWAY FROM OUR NEW PROPOSAL, THEY ALSO PROPOSED:

- A BASE OF 4700 COMBAT AIRCRAFT;
- PLUS A SEPARATE CEILING OF 1500 INTERCEPTORS, WITHOUT FREEDOM TO MIX;
- PLUS A SEPARATE CEILING OF 1500-1600 COMBAT-CAPABLE TRAINERS.

-- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT, THIS WOULD TOTAL MORE THAN 2000 MORE AIRCRAFT THAN NATO NOW HAS.

-- WE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS COMPLETELY OUT OF THE QUESTION.

THE SECRETARY NOTED THE UTILITY OF AN OPEN SKIES REGIME AND URGED SHEVARDNAZDE TO WORK TO MAKE THE OTTAWA CONFERENCE A SUCCESS.

-- HE BRIEFLY DESCRIBED THE RATIONALE FOR THE NATO APPROACH.

-- WE ALSO NOTED THE HUNGARIAN DESIRE TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT READY FOR SIGNING THIS SPRING. WE THINK THIS IS POSSIBLE, BUT AT THE OUTSIDE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A TREATY READY FOR SIGNATURE IN THE FALL.

THE SIDES DISCUSSED NON-PROLIFERATION QUESTIONS AND AGREED TO PREPARE FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE LEADERS A STATEMENT ON PRINCIPLES AND CONCRETE STEPS TO CONTROL CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

ON THE QUESTION OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL, THE SOVIETS, IN AN IMPORTANT NEW DEVELOPMENT, INFORMED US OF THEIR READINESS TO ADHERE TO THE GUIDELINES OF THE MTCR, SOMETHING WE HAD LONG SOUGHT.

REGIONAL ISSUES

REGIONAL ISSUES AGAIN FIGURED PROMINENTLY DURING THE SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNAZDE.

THE SECRETARY UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHED TO PROGRESS ACROSS THE BOARD ON REGIONAL ISSUES AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON KEY ISSUES.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000769

10/18

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

-8-

THE TOP ISSUE FOR THE SOVIETS REMAINS AFGHANISTAN.

THE SECRETARY LAID OUT A DETAILED THREE-PHASE PLAN INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TOWARD A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL AFGHANS AND COMPATIBLE WITH OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN REGIONAL STABILITY. THIS PROPOSAL REPRESENTS A DEVELOPMENT OF PREVIOUS U.S. IDEAS, AND AN EFFORT TO TRY TO DEFINE AT LEAST FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES, HOW A TRANSITION PROCESS MIGHT UNFOLD.

-- THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE PLAN ARE AIMED AT PROMOTING THE PROSPECT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNMENT THAT IS BROAD-BASED, NON-ALIGNED AND AT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

-- AN ESSENTIAL RESULT OF THIS PROCESS, HOWEVER, REMAINS THE DEPARTURE OF NAJIBULLAH AND HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES AT SOME POINT IN THE TRANSITION; OTHERWISE, THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANY GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION OR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT REMAINS REMOTE.

-- ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO REJECT THE NOTION THAT NAJIBULLAH'S PRESENCE REMAINS A REAL OBSTACLE TO PEACE, THEY UNDERTOOK TO EXPLORE THE U.S. PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL THROUGH EXPERTS TALKS IN THE WEEKS AHEAD.

SHEVARDNADZE EMPHASIZED NAJIBULLAH'S RECENT ELECTION PROPOSAL AS A BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT.

-- THE SOVIETS ALSO REITERATED A NUMBER OF OLD IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD AND PROPOSED A JOINT EFFORT WHEREBY THE U.S. AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS COULD BETTER INFORM THEMSELVES ABOUT THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- THE U.S. AGREED TO DISCUSS THE IDEA AT THE NEXT EXPERTS TALKS.

THE SECRETARY RAISED THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHED TO PROGRESS IN THIS REGION. HE EMPHASIZED THE U.S. DESIRE TO SEE DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS TAKE ROOT IN THE REGION.

-- IN THIS REGARD, HE HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA AND THEIR RELATION TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION. THE SOVIETS SAID THEY AGREED WITH BOTH THESE POINTS.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000770

11/18

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

-9-

-- BOTH SIDES PLEDGED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE OUTCOME OF A FREE AND FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS.

THE SOVIETS WERE CRITICAL OF THE U.S. ACTION IN PANAMA AND SECRETARY BAKER EXPLAINED THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE U.S. INVASION. HE REAFFIRMED U.S. INTENTION TO REMOVE ALL REMAINING TROOPS INTRODUCED INTO PANAMA SINCE LAST DECEMBER BY THE END OF THE MONTH. AND HE SUGGESTED THE SOVIETS SEND A FIVE-PERSON SUPREME SOVIET DELEGATION TO PANAMA TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES HOW PANAMA HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED.

ON EL SALVADOR, THE SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FMLN.

-- THE U.S. EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF ARMS REACHING THE FMLN FROM CUBA AND NICARAGUA.

-- SECRETARY BAKER HIGHLIGHTED, AND MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AGREED WITH, THE NEED FOR ALL OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO THE FMLN TO STOP IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER TO PROMOTE A LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED U.S. CONCERN WITH RECENT MILITARY SHIPMENTS TO THE REGION, INCLUDING MIG-29 AIRCRAFT TO CUBA, WHICH WE DO NOT BELIEVE ARE CONDUCTIVE TO EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS IN THE REGION.

-- SHEVARDNADZE SOUGHT TO DOWNPLAY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE DELIVERIES AND URGED THE U.S. TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CUBA.

SECRETARY BAKER SAID HE WANTED TO RAISE ASIA SINCE WE HAD NOT HAD THE TIME TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE IN MALTA.

THE DISCUSSION ON ASIA INCLUDED USEFUL EXCHANGES ON THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE REGION; THE U.S. URGED THAT THE GENERAL EASING OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS NOT BYPASS THE ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION.

THE SECRETARY POINTED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVED SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND URGED MOSCOW TO TAKE STEPS TO RESOLVE THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE WITH JAPAN -- AN ITEM WHICH REMAINS A STUMBLING BLOCK IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

-- HE SAID THE U.S. AGREED WITH JAPAN ON THIS ISSUE AND BELIEVED THAT RESOLUTION OF THE MATTER WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO LESSENERED TENSIONS IN THE REGION AT LARGE.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

USNATO/POL/NS/90-21

NATO SECRET

12/18

-10-

NATO SECRET

-- ALTHOUGH SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN "NORMALIZING" RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, HE WAS UNWILLING TO ADDRESS DIRECTLY THE ISSUE, ARGUING THAT THIS WAS A BILATERAL MATTER BETWEEN MOSCOW AND TOKYO AND THAT 98 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE OPPOSED RETURNING THE ISLANDS.

THE SIDES REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND AGREED ON THE NEED TO REDUCE TENSIONS THERE. BOTH SIDES AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT NORTH KOREA SIGN A NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT -- EVEN IF MOSCOW REMAINS SENSITIVE ABOUT PUBLIC CALLS TO THIS EFFECT.

-- SHEVARDNADZE DOWNPLAYED THE THREAT TO THE ROK FROM THE NORTH AND SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD WELCOME A REDUCTION OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTH KOREA. HE DREW ATTENTION TO NORTH KOREA'S PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE SOUTH.

-- THE SECRETARY DISAGREED WITH THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT. HE POINTED TO THE MILITARY IMBALANCE GREATLY FAVORING THE NORTH, WHILE EMPHASIZING OUR SUPPORT FOR A NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

ON CAMBODIA, THE U.S. URGED THE USSR TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE HUN SEN REGIME TO HELP CREATE A NEUTRAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH A TRANSITION PROCESS WITH AN ENHANCED UN ROLE COULD OCCUR.

-- THE SOVIETS REVEALED THAT THEY MAY SOON MEET WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK AND URGED THE U.S. TO ESTABLISH DIRECT CONTACTS WITH HUN SEN.

DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST FOCUSED ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE REGION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE.

-- THE U.S. SIDE DESCRIBED EFFORTS IT WAS TAKING TO PROMOTE SUCH A DIALOGUE AND URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS BY RESTORING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND INCREASING OTHER FORMS OF CONTACT WITH ISRAEL.

THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT OF SOVIET EMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

-- THE SECRETARY AFFIRMED THE LONGSTANDING U.S. VIEW THAT ANY SUCH SETTLEMENTS WERE NOT CONDUCTIVE TO THE

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000772

USNATO/POL/NS/90-21

13/18

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

-11-

PEACE PROCESS. THE U.S. NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT FEW SOVIET EMIGRANTS HAD, IN FACT, SETTLED IN THE TERRITORIES, AND WE SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF CHANGE IN THIS REGARD.

THE SIDES ALSO EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT AND THE TENSE SITUATION IN LEBANON.

WITH REGARD TO AFRICA, THE U.S. EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA WAS LAGGING BEHIND THAT IN NAMIBIA AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO A LASTING SETTLEMENT BASED ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

-- WE AGAIN SUGGESTED A MUTUAL CUTOFF OF U.S. AND SOVIET ARMS TO THE COMBATANTS.

AS TO THE SITUATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN ETHIOPIA, BUT CONTINUED TO DISAGREE ON THE ROLE SOVIET MILITARY AID TO MENGISTU PLAYS IN PROLONGING FIGHTING IN THAT COUNTRY.

-- IN VIEW OF THE GROWING THREAT OF FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA, THE SIDES UNDERTOOK TO CONTRIBUTE TO EFFORTS TO MINIMIZE THE RENEWED HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY FACING THE REGION.

THE SOVIETS AGAIN TRIED TO TAKE UP THE CYPRUS ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S.-SOVIET TALKS ON REGIONAL CONFLICTS. THE U.S. SIDE REITERATED ITS VIEW THAT THIS WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATE VENUE TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT AND URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO LEND ITS FULL AND UNDIVIDED SUPPORT TO THE EFFORTS OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO HELP RESOLVE THE CYPRUS QUESTION.

EUROPE

THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THE U.S. POSITION ON A CSCE SUMMIT: THAT IT SHOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR SIGNING A CFE AGREEMENT; THAT IT SHOULD BE PREPARATORY TO THE ALREADY-AGREED 1992 HELSINKI SUMMIT; AND THAT IT SHOULD HAVE AS ONE OF ITS OBJECTIVES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE ELECTIONS AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT WITHIN THE HELSINKI PROCESS.

-- THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THE FIRST TWO OF THESE PRINCIPLES, BUT DID NOT REACT TO THE SECRETARY'S FREE ELECTIONS PROPOSAL.

THE KEY EUROPEAN QUESTION OF CONCERN TO THE SOVIETS WAS, OF COURSE, GERMAN UNIFICATION. THIS WAS THE SUBJECT OF LENGTHY PRIVATE EXCHANGES WITH BOTH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000773

USXATO/POL/NS/90-21

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

-12-

-- THE SECRETARY MADE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. HAD SUPPORTED THE GOAL OF UNIFICATION FOR 40 YEARS; THAT WE SUPPORTED A UNIFIED GERMANY WITHIN NATO, BUT THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO ENSURE THAT NATO'S MILITARY PRESENCE WOULD NOT EXTEND FURTHER EASTWARD; THAT WE BELIEVED THE INTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION WERE A MATTER FOR THE TWO GERMANY'S TO ADDRESS; AND THAT THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION SHOULD BE HANDLED IN A FRAMEWORK THAT TOOK APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS AND CONCERNS OF OTHER STATES.

-- THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THEY THOUGHT MODROW'S PLAN WAS A GOOD ONE, BUT THEY MADE NO EFFORT TO PRESS THE PLAN OR ITS EMPHASIS ON A UNIFIED, NEUTRAL GERMANY. THEY LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO THE SECRETARY'S ARGUMENTS, BUT WERE NON-COMMITTAL IN RESPONSE.

HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRATIZATION

IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN OUR TRADITIONAL CONCERNS (SPECIFIC SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS) AND NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION INVOLVING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIETS REGARDING DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE RULE OF LAW AS WELL AS DIALOGUE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES.

AMONG TRADITIONAL CONCERNS:

-- WE KNOW OF NO REMAINING PURELY POLITICAL PRISONERS. WE DISCUSSED SOME DOUBTFUL CASES WITH THE SOVIETS. THERE ARE LESS THAN 30 LEFT IN THIS CATEGORY.

-- WHILE ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY AS AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT PRACTICE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ENDED, WE RAISED THOSE REMAINING CASES OF INDIVIDUALS CONCERNING WHOM WE HAVE SOME QUESTIONS. WE MADE CLEAR OUR CONCERN OVER PERSONNEL IN HIGH POSITIONS WHO WERE GUILTY OF PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE.

-- WE URGED PASSAGE OF A NEW LAW ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM TO INSTITUTIONALIZE AND EXTEND THE CONSIDERABLE LIBERALIZATION WHICH HAS OCCURED.

-- RESTRICTIONS ON EMIGRATION CONTINUE TO BE RELAXED. WE REVIEWED THE APPROXIMATELY 60 CASES ON OUR LIST OF REFUSENIKS WHO HAVE BEEN DENIED ON SECURITY GROUNDS. THERE ARE PROBABLY HUNDREDS OF CASES OF DENIALS BASED ON THE ABSENCE OF PARENTAL CONSENT TO THE EMIGRATION OF ADULTS, BUT OUR SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS REPORTED THAT THE NEW EMIGRATION LAW, EXPECTED TO PASS WITHIN THE NEXT 60 DAYS, SHOULD HELP TO RESOLVE THESE CASES.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000774

NATO SECRET

USNATO/POL/NS/90-21

NATO SECRET

15/18

-13-

WE URGED THE SOVIETS TO TAKE A FIRM STAND AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM AND TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF JEWISH CULTURE IN THE USSR.

DURING THE MINISTERIAL WE DISCUSSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR A NUMBER OF COOPERATIVE AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS INTENDED TO ASSIST IN BUILDING A CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE RULE OF LAW.

-- THERE WILL BE A SEMINAR IN MOSCOW IN MARCH FEATURING U.S. AND SOVIET LEGAL EXPERTS.

-- AS PART OF AN ONGOING EXCHANGE STARTED LAST YEAR, A DELEGATION OF SOVIET PSYCHIATRISTS WILL VISIT THE UNITED STATES IN 1990.

-- WE ALSO HOPE TO PLACE SOME 50 SOVIET LAW STUDENTS INTO POST-GRADUATE PROGRAMS AT U.S. UNIVERSITIES.

-- TEN SOVIET JUDGES WILL ATTEND JUDICIAL TRAINING COURSES IN THE UNITED STATES IN MAY.

-- OTHER PROGRAMS IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD, INCLUDING FOR THE HANDICAPPED AND WORKER SAFETY, ARE ALSO UNDER DISCUSSION.

THE SOVIETS ASSURED US OF A NEW, COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THEY SAID THEY ARE PREPARED TO DEMONSTRATE IT IN THE CSCE PROCESS AND THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.

TRANSNATIONAL MATTERS

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED MAINLY IN THE WORKING-GROUP MEETINGS.

-- WE FOCUSED ON COUNTERTERRORISM, NARCOTICS AND ENVIRONMENT.

THE SOVIETS ALSO MENTIONED SPACE COOPERATION, UN NUCLEAR COOPERATION, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, LAW OF THE SEA AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY.

COUNTERTERRORISM

ON COUNTERTERRORISM, THE SOVIETS ASSERTED INTENT TO "DE-IDEOLOGIZE" THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM.

-- THEY SAID THEY WERE CONSIDERING A JOINT SUMMIT STATEMENT CONDEMNING TERRORISM REGARDLESS OF ITS MOTIVES.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000775

NATO SECRET

USNATO/POL/NS/90-21

16/18

NATO SECRET

-14-

-- WE NOTED THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THIS IDEA, BUT
UNDERScoreD THE NEED FOR CONCRETE STEPS AT THE NEXT
ROUND OF TALKS IN MARCH.

WE FAVORABLY NOTED SOVIET CONDEMNATION OF THE FEBRUARY
4 TERRORIST ATTACK ON ISRAELI TOURISTS.

-- WE CALLED FOR SOVIET INFLUENCE ON SYRIA AND LIBYA TO
CURTAIL TERRORIST MOVEMENTS.

NARCOTICS

IN THE NARCOTICS DISCUSSIONS WE NOTED THAT SOME
PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE SINCE THE JANUARY 1989 MOU.

-- WE NOTED THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OUR CUSTOMS
SERVICES, WITH THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, AND NEW MVD
INTEREST.

-- WE CALLED FOR SOVIET INFLUENCE AGAINST DRUG
TRAFFICKING IN AFGANISTAN, BULGARIA, CUBA AND LAOS.

ENVIRONMENT

THE SOVIETS PRIMARILY RESPONDED TO U.S. PROPOSALS MADE
IN WYOMING:

-- THEY MADE CLEAR THEY WERE READY TO ESTABLISH A JOINT
PARK IN THE BERING LAND BRIDGE AREA.

-- THEY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN STARTING POLLUTION STUDIES
IN AGRICULTURAL RUN-OFF AREAS.

THE SOVIETS CLAIMED THEY HAD 20 SCIENTISTS ON CALL FOR
A UN EMERGENCY ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER, AS CALLED FOR BY
GORBACHEV. THEY ASKED US TO DO THE SAME.

WE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR EARLY PLANNING FOR THE 1992
UN CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.

BILATERAL ISSUES

OUR EMPHASIS ON THE BILATERAL SIDE HAS BEEN ON
EXPANSION OF COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, FACILITATION OF
PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS AND EASING OF LIVING/WORKING
CONDITIONS FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMATS, EXCHANGEES, JOURNALISTS AND
BUSINESSMEN.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000776

NATO SECRET

USNATO/POL/NS/90-21

17/18

NATO SECRET

-15-

IN EXPANDING COOPERATION PROGRAMS, WE HAVE FOCUSED ON BASIC SCIENCES, HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT. WE CAREFULLY AVOID AREAS THAT INVOLVE DUAL-USE OR RESTRICTED TECHNOLOGIES.

-- THE SIDES AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE NEW AGREEMENTS READY FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT ON WORLD OCEANS, PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY, AND DEMARCATION OF THE U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY.

WE ALSO HOPE TO CONCLUDE BY JUNE AN AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S. AND SOVIET CULTURAL CENTERS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON.

THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTING THE 1985 GENEVA SUMMIT DECISION TO ESTABLISH CONSULATES GENERAL IN KIEV AND NEW YORK.

-- WE AND THE SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EXCHANGE AND DECIDED DURING THE MINISTERIAL TO ACCELERATE TALKS IN ORDER TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT BY THE SUMMIT.

THE U.S. URGED THE SOVIETS TO PROVIDE AN EARLY -- AND FAVORABLE -- REPLY TO THE "OPEN LANDS" INITIATIVE ADVANCED BY THE SECRETARY IN WYOMING TO ABOLISH CLOSED AREAS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. WE HOPE THE SOVIETS WILL SOON AGREE TO EXPERTS' CONSULTATIONS ON THE SUBJECT.

AN EXTENSIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION WAS HELD ON THE QUESTIONS OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

IN THIS REGARD, THEY POINTED OUT THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT THE INITIATIVES AGREED TO AT THE MALTA MEETING.

-- THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO CONCLUDING A COMMERCIAL TRADE AGREEMENT BY THE JUNE SUMMIT, CONSISTENT WITH PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVE AT MALTA.

-- THEY HAD AN IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION OF THE ELEMENTS OF A TRADE AGREEMENT.

-- THE U.S. SIDE ALSO REAFFIRMED ITS WILLINGNESS, ONCE A JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER IS IN PLACE, TO EXPLORE WITH THE CONGRESS REMOVING THE RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. GOVERNMENT CREDITS AND CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000777

NATO SECRET

USNATO/POL/NS/90-21

18/18

NATO SECRET

-16-

-- THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED SOME OF THE PROVISIONS OF AN INVESTMENT AGREEMENT.

-- THEY LOOKED FORWARD TO THE ONSET IN THE NEAR FUTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN INVESTMENT AGREEMENT AND A TAX TREATY.

THE SIDES ALSO REVIEWED THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT, AN EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT, AND A LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT.

-- THEY NOTED THAT, SUBJECT TO CONTINUED PROGRESS, SOME OF THESE MAY BE CONCLUDED BY THE SUMMIT. THEY WOULD ENCOURAGE THIS.

THE SIDES REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECTS THAT WERE PROPOSED AT THE MALTA MEETING AND THE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR.

THEY ALSO DISCUSSED SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS IN THE GATT. THE U.S. SIDE REAFFIRMED ITS SUPPORT FOR SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND, WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION AT THE END OF 1990.

THE SIDES EXCHANGED VIEWS ON SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT BANK, AND THEY ALSO DISCUSSED THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET COOPERATION WITH THE OECD.

THEY ALSO NOTED THE OPPORTUNITIES THE BONN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE MIGHT OFFER.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

000778

VOL 25
MKRD

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

RECEIVED IN

FEB 16 1990

ACC

DATE

FILE

DOSSIER

LOC

A7-10

20-USA-1-3-USSR

A-7

SH

7

file

2010

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6207 14FEB90

TO EXTOTT URR RBR

INFO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC MOSCO VNACE GENEV LDN BONN PARIS ROME WSAW

BUCST BPEST PRGUE BGRAD

TT NTHCOTT/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/ DE CAF

DISTR IDD IDR IDA RBD URD IND INP RWD RWR IDX RGX CPP

REF OURFAX YBGR6199 13FEB(NOTAL)

---SECRETARY BAKER VISIT TO MOSCOW 07-10FEB

AT 13FEB COUNCIL MTG,USA DEPUTY PERM REP HIGHLIGHTED SEVERAL ASPECTS
OF SUBJ VISIT,DETAILS OF WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN REF FAX.

2.USA-USSR RELATIONSHIP:BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WAS IN ERA OF
TRANSITION.THERE WAS PROGRESS IN BUILDING SOLID FOUNDATION OF TRUST
AND UNDERSTANDING ALTHOUGH DIFFERENCES REMAIN.USA NOW BELIEVES THAT
IT IS MORE POSSIBLE TO HAVE USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH USSR.

3.ARMS CONTROL:(A)START:MOST MAJOR ISSUES CONCERNING START HAVE NOW
BEEN RESOLVED.ON ALCMS,ONLY RANGE THRESHOLD ISSUE REMAINS TO BE
RESOLVED.ON SLCMS,ALL ISSUES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED EXCEPT FOR RANGE
THRESHOLD AND QUESTION WHETHER ONLY NUCLEAR OF BOTH NUCLEAR AND
CONVENTIONAL SLCMS ARE INCLUDED.USA HOPES TO AVOID VERIFICATION
ISSUE BY PROPOSING ANNUAL DECLARATIONS ON NUCLEAR SLCM PLANS.OVERALL
USA ASSESSMENT ON START POINTS TO HAVING QUOTE SUBSTANTIVE OUTLINES
OF TREATY UNQUOTE IN TIME FOR JUNE SUMMIT.

(B)DEFENCE AND SPACE:USA BELIEVES THAT USSR HAS DELINKED START FROM

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR6207 CONFIDENTIAL

DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUE SINCE SOVIETS HAVE EXPRESSED QUOTE
PREFERENCE UNQUOTE (VICE PRECONDITION) FOR AN AGREED START STATEMENT
TO EFFECT THAT AN ABM TREATY VIOLATION WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR
WITHDRAWAL FROM START.

(C) CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): USSR GENERALLY AGREED WITH USA-PROPOSED
COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CW ARMS
CONTROL. FRAMEWORK CALLS FOR, INTER ALIA, BILATERAL AGMT TO REDUCE TO
5000 TONS OF CW STOCKS AND MULTILATERAL CW CONVENTION TO REDUCE TO
500 TONS AND EVENTUALLY TO ZERO, PROVIDED ALL CW-CAPABLE STATES
ADHERE TO IT.

(D) NUCLEAR TESTING: GOAL REMAINS TO COMPLETE TTBT AND PNET
VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS FOR SIGNATURE AT JUNE SUMMIT.

(E) CONVENTIONAL: USA AND USSR REVIEWED WESTERN PROPOSALS WHICH HAD
BEEN TABLED RECENTLY AT CFE NEGS.

4. KEY EUROPEAN QUESTION OF CONCERN TO SOVIETS WAS GERMAN
UNIFICATION. THIS WAS SUBJECT OF LENGTHY PRIVATE EXCHANGES WITH BOTH
SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV. SOVIETS MADE NO/NO EFFORT TO PRESS MODROW
PLAN OR ITS EMPHASIS ON UNIFIED NEUTRAL GERMANY.

5. SOVS ASSERTED INTENT TO QUOTE DE-IDEOLOGIZE UNQUOTE ISSUE OF
TERRORISM AND WERE CONSIDERING JOINT SUMMIT STATEMENT CONDEMNING
TERRORISM REGARDLESS OF ITS MOTIVES. USA UNDERSCORED NEED FOR MORE
CONCRETE SOVIET STEPS BEFORE USA WOULD AGREE TO CLOSER COOPERATION
ON COUNTER-TERRORISM.

CCC/098 142140Z YBGR6207

INSTRUCTIONS: FOR USE WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED.
À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS — AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES


TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À
EXTOTT/RBR/IDR/IDA/URR WSHDC MOSCO GENEV VNACE

SECURITY — SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S) NATO UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S) NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NO. TS-567 14FEB90

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION
		<p style="text-align: right;">20-USA-1-3-USSA</p> <p>U.S. - SOVIET MINISTERIAL: JOINT STATEMENT</p> <p>FROM USA DELEGATION</p> <p style="text-align: center;"></p>

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION	RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
<p>DATE</p> <p> SIGNATURE</p>	MARIUS GRINIUS, BNATO

RECIPIENT'S COPY — COPIE DU DESTINATAIRE

000781

EXTDIT / RBR
IDR
IDA
URR
WSHDC
MOSCO
GENEV
VNALE

U.S. DELEGATION
FEBRUARY 13, 1990

File 20-USA-1-3-USSR

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET MINISTERIAL: JOINT STATEMENT

cc Am.
M/G
13 Feb 90

SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III AND FOREIGN MINISTER EDUARD A. SHEVARDNADZE MET FEBRUARY 7-9 IN MOSCOW AS PART OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT TO BE HELD IN JUNE IN THE UNITED STATES. PROCEEDING FROM THEIR COMMON GOAL OF BUILDING A MORE STABLE, CONSTRUCTIVE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP, THEY REVIEWED THE BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES ON THE U.S.-SOVIET AGENDA. THE SECRETARY ALSO WAS RECEIVED BY CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV FOR AN OPEN, WIDE-RANGING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.


THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSED DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE THE WYOMING MINISTERIAL AND THE MALTA MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT BUSH AND CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. THEY EXAMINED THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SUMMIT, WITH THE PARTICULAR AIM OF ADVANCING THE OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES DEFINED BY THE TWO LEADERS IN MALTA.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE PROGRESS THAT IS BEING MADE IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. WHILE CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN BETWEEN THE SIDES, THEIR RELATIONSHIP IS INCREASINGLY MARKED BY UNDERSTANDING, COOPERATION AND THE SEARCH FOR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE. THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER BELIEVE THAT CANDID DIALOGUE AND CONTINUING EFFORTS AT FINDING PRACTICAL AND CONCRETE SOLUTIONS WILL FURTHER THE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN RECORDED TO DATE.

IN THIS CONTEXT, THE MOSCOW MINISTERIAL WAS A USEFUL AND IMPORTANT STEP IN PREPARING THE GROUND FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT. THE HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WERE COMPLEMENTED BY EXPERTS WORKING GROUPS ON ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, TRANSNATIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES, AS WELL AS AN INFORMAL GROUP ON ECONOMIC QUESTIONS. SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE AGENDA.

I

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER HELD A THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES. WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF RESOLVING ALL MAJOR ISSUES BY THE JUNE SUMMIT IN



NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

ORDER TO ALLOW SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY BY THE END OF THE YEAR. TO FURTHER THIS GOAL, THE SIDES REACHED AGREEMENT OR EXCHANGED NEW PROPOSALS IN A NUMBER OF AREAS.

ON AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, THE SIDES MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON A PACKAGE APPROACH, AGREEING ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RANGE THRESHOLD.

THE SIDES ALSO MADE GOOD PROGRESS ON SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. THE SIDES AGREED THAT SUCH MISSILES WOULD BE DEALT WITH BY PARALLEL, POLITICALLY BINDING DECLARATIONS FOR THE DURATION OF THE START TREATY. THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER AGREED THAT THE REMAINING ISSUES INVOLVING SLCMS WOULD BE ADDRESSED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA.

THE SIDES AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE NUMERICAL LIMITS ON NON-DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES AND THE WARHEADS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THEM FOR ALL ICBMS OF A TYPE THAT HAS BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED FROM A MOBILE LAUNCHER. OTHER NON-DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES, NON-DEPLOYED CRUISE MISSILES AND NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBER WEAPONS WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITS. THE SIDES FURTHER AGREED ON A REGIME GOVERNING THE LOCATION AND MOVEMENT OF ALL NON-DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES.

THE SIDES REACHED AGREEMENT ON MAJOR ELEMENTS OF A REGIME TO ENSURE THE NON-DENIAL OF TELEMETRY DATA DURING FLIGHT TESTS OF START-ACCOUNTABLE BALLISTIC MISSILES. THESE PROVISIONS WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE START TREATY, BUT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED EARLY, AT THE TIME OF TREATY SIGNATURE, THROUGH AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS.

THE U.S. SIDE PRESENTED NEW PROPOSALS ON VERIFICATION OF MOBILE ICBMS, DURATION OF THE TREATY, PHASING OF REDUCTIONS, AND ATTRIBUTION OF WARHEADS TO FUTURE TYPES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE SOVIET SIDE PRESENTED NEW PROPOSALS DEALING WITH NON-CIRCUMVENTION. THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER INSTRUCTED THEIR NEGOTIATORS TO DISCUSS THESE NEW PROPOSALS AND TO EXPEDITE EFFORTS ON RESOLVING REMAINING DIFFERENCES IN THE TEXT OF THE TREATY AND ITS ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS.

THE SIDES DISCUSSED THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS AND REITERATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN 1990. THE SIDES DISCUSSED PRESIDENT BUSH'S JANUARY 31 PROPOSAL ON MANPOWER WHICH WAS PRESENTED BY NATO IN VIENNA ON FEBRUARY 8, AS WELL AS NATO'S AIRCRAFT PROPOSAL PRESENTED ON THE SAME DATE. AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW, THE DIFFERENCES ON PERSONNEL WERE NARROWED. THE SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA AND AT THE MINISTERS' MEETING ON "OPEN SKIES" IN OTTAWA.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

-3-

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS ON HOW TO PROCEED TOWARD THEIR COMMON GOAL OF ACHIEVING, THROUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, A GLOBAL BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND OF THEIR DESTRUCTION. THE U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA WERE INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED WITH DEVELOPING MEANS OF PRACTICAL COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ELIMINATION. THE SIDES ISSUED A SEPARATE, MORE DETAILED STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

IN DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING, THE SIDES MADE PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE REMAINING ISSUES. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE TASK OF COMPLETING THE VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS TO THE 1974 AND 1976 THRESHOLD LIMITATION TREATIES FOR SIGNING AT THE SUMMIT IS REALISTIC. THE SIDES AGREED ON THE RIGHT TO SIMULTANEOUS USE OF HYDRODYNAMIC AND IN-COUNTRY SEISMIC YIELD MEASUREMENTS. THE SIDES ALSO RESOLVED SEVERAL LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HYDRODYNAMIC YIELD MEASUREMENT METHOD. THE SIDES IDENTIFIED THE THREE SEISMIC STATIONS IN EACH COUNTRY TO BE USED FOR IN-COUNTRY SEISMIC YIELD MEASUREMENTS. THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR ADHERENCE TO THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN SEPTEMBER 1987 WITH REGARD TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED THEIR HOPE THAT THE OTTAWA "OPEN SKIES" CONFERENCE -- WHICH THEY WILL BOTH ATTEND -- WOULD BE A SUCCESS AND LEAD TO EARLY AGREEMENT. THEY BELIEVE AN "OPEN SKIES" REGIME CAN MAKE A GENUINE CONTRIBUTION TO OPENNESS, TRANSPARENCY AND STABILITY.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THE RECENT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THEIR EXPERTS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION, MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. THEY AGREED TO PREPARE A DOCUMENT FOR CONSIDERATION BY THEIR LEADERS COVERING BOTH PRINCIPLES AND CONCRETE STEPS OF COOPERATION IN ALL AREAS OF NON-PROLIFERATION -- CHEMICAL, MISSILE AND NUCLEAR.

THE SIDES CONDUCTED A DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF MISSILES AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. THEY NOTED THAT THEY BOTH ADHERE TO THE EXPORT GUIDELINES OF THE EXISTING REGIME RELATING TO MISSILES, WHICH APPLIES TO MISSILES CAPABLE OF DELIVERING AT LEAST 500 KILOGRAMS OF PAYLOAD TO A RANGE OF AT LEAST 300 KILOMETERS. THEY FURTHER AGREED TO CONTINUE JOINT DISCUSSIONS ON THIS PROBLEM IN THE INTERIM BEFORE THE NEXT MINISTERIAL.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

-4-

II

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD A USEFUL AND DETAILED EXCHANGE ON REGIONAL ISSUES. THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS BASED ON BROAD NATIONAL RECONCILIATION THAT COULD FACILITATE THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DIFFERENCES STILL REMAINED ON SOME ISSUES BUT UNDERTOOK TO CONTINUE TO WORK ON THESE MATTERS WITH A VIEW TO NARROWING AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT. THE SIDES NOTED THE POSITIVE ROLE THE UN IS PLAYING IN THE SETTLEMENT OF SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS AND POINTED TO THE NEED FOR FURTHER INTENSIFICATION OF ITS WORK IN THAT AREA.

ON CENTRAL AMERICA, THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPLEMENTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE ESQUIPULAS TREATY AND ITS SUCCESSOR AGREEMENTS. THE SIDES AGREED THAT RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICTS IN THE REGION UNDER THE ESQUIPULAS FRAMEWORK WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A LESSENING OF TENSIONS TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL STATES. THEY REITERATED THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF TERRITORY OF ANY CENTRAL AMERICAN STATE TO SUPPORT IRREGULAR FORCES AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS' APPEAL THAT ALL STATES OUTSIDE THE REGION END MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUCH FORCES. THE SIDES NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPARTIAL AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN NICARAGUA. THEY UNDERTOOK TO RESPECT THE RESULTS OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA, AND TO SUPPORT RESPECT FOR DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT.

THE SIDES STRESSED THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR AS CALLED FOR IN THE SAN ISIDRO DECLARATION. THEY PLEDGED SUPPORT FOR THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS TO SECURE A PERMANENT CEASEFIRE AND RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS IN EL SALVADOR, AND FOR THE MORE VIGOROUS AND EFFECTIVE USE OF UN MACHINERY TO SUPERVISE COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AND FUTURE AGREEMENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

THE SIDES HAD A CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION ON THE CONDITIONS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR A TRANSITION PERIOD THAT PROVIDES FOR AN INTRA-AFGHAN DIALOGUE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD ENSURE THE PEACEFUL, INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS OF AFGHANISTAN. THEY AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON ISSUES RELATED TO AN AFGHAN SETTLEMENT AT THE EXPERTS LEVEL IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSED THE PACIFIC AND NORTHEAST ASIA. THEY AGREED TO HOLD EARLY U.S.-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON THESE SUBJECTS. THEY EXPRESSED A

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

- 5 -

DESIRE TO REDUCE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TO SUPPORT A SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE. THE SOVIET SIDE NOTED THAT THE DPRK IS CLOSE TO CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA ON NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS. THE U.S. SIDE EXPRESSED ITS DESIRE THAT THE AGREEMENT BE CONCLUDED SWIFTLY AND OBSERVED FAITHFULLY.

THE SIDES REITERATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO FACILITATE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE KEY TO A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM LIES IN ENSURING THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE THROUGH FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS UNDER UNITED NATIONS SUPERVISION. THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR AN ENHANCED UN ROLE IN CAMBODIA. THEY AGREED THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT MEMBERS SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT ON THE UN ROLE. THEY ALSO UNDERScoreD THE NEED FOR INTENSIFIED DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BY ALL PARTIES IN AN EFFORT TO SHIFT THE FOCUS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND TO PREVENT THE RETURN OF THE KHMER ROUGE TO POWER, INCLUDING THROUGH SUPPORT FOR A MORATORIUM ON OUTSIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ALL CAMBODIAN FACTIONS AS PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE FORTHCOMING INFORMAL MEETING IN JAKARTA WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN FACILITATING THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR AN ACTIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, INCLUDING EFFORTS BEING MADE TO LAUNCH A PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI DIALOGUE, LEADING TO A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN WHICH ALL RELEVANT PARTIES PARTICIPATE ON THE BASIS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THEY AGREED TO CONTINUE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON THESE ISSUES.

THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR CONVICTION ON THE NEED FOR COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAIF AGREEMENTS AND SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE. THEY AFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL UNITY AND THE LEGALLY ELECTED AUTHORITY IN LEBANON.

THE SIDES AGAIN URGED A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT BASED ON THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598, AND EXPRESSED THEIR RESOLVE TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL IN THE DISCHARGE OF HIS PEACE-MAKING MISSION.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NAMIBIA AIMED AT ESTABLISHING ITS FULL INDEPENDENCE UNDER DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONS IN PEACE AND STABILITY, AND NOTED THE IMPORTANT ROLE PLAYED BY

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

- 6 -

THE UN TO THAT END. THEY EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE PEACE PROCESS IN ANGOLA CONTINUES TO LAG AND URGED THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

THE SIDES ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN WITH THE GROWING THREAT OF FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA AND URGED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AGAIN COME TOGETHER TO ADDRESS THIS TRAGIC HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM. AT THE SAME TIME, RECOGNIZING THAT THE INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN ETHIOPIA CANNOT BE SETTLED BY MILITARY MEANS, THEY REITERATED THEIR SUPPORT FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER WELCOMED THE NEW SITUATION THAT HAS STARTED TO DEVELOP IN SOUTH AFRICA, IN PARTICULAR PRESIDENT DE KLERK'S STATEMENT ON RELEASING POLITICAL PRISONERS AND LIFTING THE BAN ON THE ACTIVITIES OF SEVERAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS. 1990 COULD BE AN IMPORTANT YEAR TO FURTHER THE DISMANTLING OF APARTHEID AND TO MOVE TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC, NON-RACIAL NATION. THEY ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS, FOR IT IS ONLY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS THAT AUTHENTIC AND IRREVERSIBLE CHANGE WILL COME TO SOUTH AFRICA.

III

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE. THEY REAFFIRMED THE KEY ROLE BEING PLAYED BY THE CSCE PROCESS IN THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW EUROPE. THEY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE ON HOLDING A SUMMIT MEETING OF THE 35 CSCE STATES IN 1990. SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR SIGNING A CFE AGREEMENT AND WOULD BE PREPARATORY TO THE PREVIOUSLY AGREED 1992 SUMMIT MEETING IN HELSINKI.

IV

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THEIR EXPERTS HELD A THOROUGH AND VERY POSITIVE DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES. THERE WAS A FULL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON ENTRY/EXIT POLICIES AND OTHER LEGAL PRACTICES. THE SOVIET SIDE REITERATED ITS INTENTION TO ENACT A NEW EMIGRATION LAW SHORTLY.

THE SIDES REVIEWED WITH APPROVAL PROGRAMS PLANNED OR UNDERWAY WHICH WILL PROMOTE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH COUNTRY'S INSTITUTIONS, LEGISLATION AND PRACTICES IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS.

THE SIDES UNDERScored THE NEED TO MAKE THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND STANDARDS IN HUMAN RIGHTS TRULY UNIVERSAL AND TO ENSURE THAT NATIONAL LAWS AND PRACTICES ARE IN CONFORMITY

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

- 7 -

WITH THEM. THEY AGREED THAT BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS CAN NOW BE WIDENED TO COOPERATION IN MULTILATERAL FORA SO AS TO ADVANCE THE HUMAN RIGHTS CAUSE WORLDWIDE. LOOKING TO THE FORTHCOMING CSCE HUMAN DIMENSION MEETING IN COPENHAGEN AND BEYOND, THE SIDES FURTHER AGREED TO EXCHANGE THOUGHTS AMONG THEMSELVES AND WITH OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES ON STEPS TO BE TAKEN TO GIVE PRACTICAL APPLICATION TO THE HUMAN DIMENSION TEXTS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND SUBSEQUENT CONCLUDING DOCUMENTS. THE SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED POLICIES TO BE ADOPTED TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODIES IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS.

V

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE EXPANDING U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE ON TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES. THE SIDES UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT TO BE HELD IN 1992, WHICH OFFERS A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER A GLOBAL PROGRAM OF ACTION IN THE FIELD OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. THE SIDES AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND ON EXAMINING CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR LONG-RANGE ECOLOGICAL AND POLLUTION MONITORING. THEY DISCUSSED NEW APPROACHES TO INTENSIFIED AND BROADENED BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL AREA, INCLUDING HIGH-LEVEL EXPERTS CONSULTATIONS. THEY ALSO ADDRESSED INCREASED COOPERATION IN ARCTIC RESEARCH AND SPACE; EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO EXPAND COOPERATION IN NATURAL HAZARDS PREDICTION AND MITIGATION; AND PROPOSED EARLY TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND RELIEF EFFORTS.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONCRETE, PRACTICAL MEASURES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM. THEY FURTHER AGREED THAT EXPERTS WOULD NEXT MEET IN MARCH TO CONTINUE THE COUNTERTERRORISM DIALOGUE AND CONSIDER, AMONG OTHER ISSUES, MUTUAL ACTION IN PREVENTING AND COMBATting TERRORIST ACTS INVOLVING AIR ROUTES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

THE SIDES NOTED THE MUTUAL DESIRABILITY OF DISCOURAGING ILLEGAL PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING IN NARCOTICS. THEY AGREED TO INTENSIFY THEIR JOINT PRACTICAL WORK IN IMPLEMENTING THE 1989 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON COMBATting DRUG TRAFFICKING. THEY ALSO EXAMINED AREAS FOR EXPANDING COOPERATION SUCH AS IN DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT AND PREVENTION. THE SIDES AGREED ON THE UTILITY OF CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION IN

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

- 8 -

THE UN ON NARCOTICS ISSUES AND INTEND TO PROMOTE THE SUCCESS OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO THE PROBLEM OF DRUGS TO BE HELD IN LATE FEBRUARY.

THE SIDES ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFORTS BY PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO REACH EARLY AGREEMENT ON MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS REGARDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE UN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.

THE SIDES EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR A CONTINUATION, ON A REGULAR BASIS, OF U.S.-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON UN ISSUES IN THE INTEREST OF SEEKING WAYS TO ENHANCE FURTHER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

VI

ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, AN EXTENSIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION WAS HELD ON THE QUESTIONS OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. IN THIS REGARD, THEY POINTED OUT THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT THE INITIATIVES AGREED TO AT THE MALTA MEETING.

THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO CONCLUDING A COMMERCIAL TRADE AGREEMENT BY THE JUNE SUMMIT, PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT AT MALTA. THE SIDES DISCUSSED PLANS TO START IN THE NEAR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY AND A TAXATION TREATY.

THE SIDES ALSO REVIEWED THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT, AN EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT AND A GRAINS AGREEMENT. THEY NOTED THAT, SUBJECT TO CONTINUED PROGRESS, SOME OF THESE MAY BE CONCLUDED BY THE SUMMIT. THEY WOULD ENCOURAGE THIS WORK.

THE SIDES REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECTS THAT WERE PROPOSED AT THE MALTA MEETING AND THE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR.

THE SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS IN THE GATT. THE U.S. SIDE REAFFIRMED ITS POSITION ON THIS ISSUE EXPRESSED AT MALTA. THE SIDES DISCUSSED THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET COOPERATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD). THEY ALSO NOTED THE OPPORTUNITIES THE BONN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE MIGHT OFFER.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER CONDUCTED A DETAILED REVIEW OF THE U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL AGENDA AND ANALYZED THE QUALITATIVE CHANGES WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE AREA OF COOPERATION. THEY HEARD THEIR EXPERTS' REPORT ON

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

- 9 -

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORK PROGRAM AGREED UPON AT THE WYOMING MINISTERIAL, AND ON THE STATUS OF ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS ON SPECIFIC BILATERAL ISSUES. THE EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES WERE INSTRUCTED TO INTENSIFY THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN ORDER TO COMPLETE NEW BILATERAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS BY THE TIME OF THE JUNE SUMMIT.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS IN DISCUSSIONS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CULTURAL CENTERS IN EACH OTHER'S CAPITAL. THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR INTENT TO IMPLEMENT IN THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR THE DECISION TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS TO EXCHANGE CONSULATES GENERAL IN KIEV AND NEW YORK.

THE SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF THE INITIATIVE PRESENTED AT THE MALTA MEETING ON EXPANDED UNIVERSITY STUDENT EXCHANGES.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER REAFFIRMED THE UTILITY OF REGULAR DIALOGUE AT ALL LEVELS -- INCLUDING THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL -- FOR CONSIDERING AND RESOLVING PROBLEMS OF U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION. IN THE CONTEXT OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE JUNE SUMMIT, THEY AGREED TO HOLD THEIR NEXT MEETING IN WASHINGTON.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO SECRET



UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

February 6, 1990

ACC	REF	DATE
631232		
FILE	DOSSIER	
20-USA-1-3-455R		

URGENT
Mr. Michael
AMB Smith
ACTION

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Enclosed for your reference are some materials prepared in Washington concerning the Secretary's February 7-10 visit to Moscow, part of which I presented at this morning's Council.

I am copying this letter to my colleagues on the Council and to the representative of the Military Committee.

Sincerely,

William H. Taft, IV

Enclosures: as stated

This document consists of 10 pages

His Excellency,
Manfred Woerner
Secretary General
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

THIS COVER LETTER BECOMES NATO UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPERATED FROM
THE ENCLOSURES.

NATO SECRET

External Affairs Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

Accession/Référence

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

File/Dossier
56-NES
20-USA-1-3-USSR

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

S E C R E T

SECURE FACSIMILE

12

10

/DE FM BNATO YBGR6155 06FEB90

/A TO EXTOTT/IDR/RBR DELIVER BY 061200

INFO ^{BAG} WSHDC LDN BONN PARIS VNACE MOSCO ^{BH2} NDHQOTT/ADM POL ^{doit} ^{207DR}

F DISTR RGB IFB IDD RBD URD CPD RGX EED IDA IDAN IDA ² RWR URR CPP

3J/SUJ EER RBP LCR

---SECT BAKER VISIT TO MOSCO FEB 7-10---

ATTACHED ARE BRIEFING NOTES CIRCULATED TODAY BY US AMB

^{OUTLINING}
~~AUTHORIZING~~ US OBJECTIVES FOR SECT BAKER VISIT TO MOSCO. WE WERE

ALSO INFORMED BY US DEL THAT DURING HIS VISIT SECT BAKER WILL

APPEAR BEFORE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF SUPREME SOVIET --

APPARENTLY FIRST TIME THAT WESTERN POLITICAL ^{FIGURE} ~~REGIME~~ HAS DONE SO. *file*

(COMCENTRE PLEASE FAX 10 ATTACHED PAGES).

SECURE FAX

NAT 003 / 06

20 FEB 8 15:47

DRAFTER/REDACTEUR

P. MEYER/gh

SIG

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

A MALONE

SIG

CIRC YES NO

000792

U.S. DELEGATION
FEBRUARY 6, 1990

3/11

VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MOSCOW
FEBRUARY 7-10

I. OVERVIEW

-- AS THE PRESIDENT REMARKED IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS EARLIER THIS WEEK, LAST YEAR SAW UNPRECEDENTED CHANGE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. 1990 OFFERS EVEN GREATER OPPORTUNITIES -- AND UNCERTAINTIES.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVES AT MALTA SET FORTH SPECIFIC GOALS ACROSS OUR BROAD AGENDA FOR THE JUNE SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON.

-- THE MOSCOW MINISTERIAL IS AN IMPORTANT STEP ON THE PATH TO THE SUMMIT.

-- THIS MEETING IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT FOR GORBACHEV, WHO IS BESET BY DOMESTIC PROBLEMS -- SPUTTERING ECONOMY, THE BALTICS, INTER-ETHNIC TENSION IN THE CAUCASUS -- AND DOUBLY IN NEED OF PROGRESS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

-- IN SPITE OF THESE DISTRACTIONS AT HOME, WE HAVE SEEN NO SIGN THAT GORBACHEV'S ABILITY TO DEAL IN THE FOREIGN ARENA HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY CONSTRAINED.

-- WE ARE NOT LOOKING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SOVIET DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, A POINT WE WILL COMMUNICATE TO MOSCOW.

-- AS THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR, WE SUPPORT PERESTROIKA AND WANT TO SEE CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV SUCCEED.

-- THE PRIORITY WILL BE KEY ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL QUESTIONS. HUMAN RIGHTS, BILATERAL ISSUES -- INCLUDING ECONOMIC RELATIONS -- AND TRANSNATIONAL QUESTIONS ROUND OUT A VERY FULL AGENDA.

-- WE WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PROBE SOVIET VIEWS, PARTICULARLY ON THE CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET DOMESTIC SITUATION.

NATO SECRET

000793

USNATO/POL/NS/90-19

NATO SECRET

-2-

II. ARMS CONTROL

ARMS CONTROL WILL BE A MAJOR FOCUS IN MOSCOW.

START

THE "BIG THREE" TOPICS:

- ALCMS. WE AIM TO SETTLE THE ENTIRE PACKAGE OF COUNTING
RULE RANGE, DISTINGUISHABILITY BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND
CONVENTIONAL ALCMS, CONVENTIONAL BOMBERS, INSPECTION, ETC.
- NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES. WE LOOK FOR A SOLUTION BETWEEN OUR
POSITION WHICH HAS NUMERICAL LIMITS ON SEVERAL DIFFERENT
TYPES OF MISSILES, AND THE SOVIET POSITION THAT HAS NO
NUMERICAL LIMITS.
- TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION. THIS IS A VERY TECHNICAL SUBJECT.
WE MADE PROGRESS LAST WEEK IN GENEVA, BUT THERE ARE STILL
SOME TOUGH PROBLEMS TO BE RESOLVED IN MOSCOW.

GAPS TO FILL IN:

- MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF COMMON
GROUND.
- PHASING OF REDUCTIONS.
- DURATION OF AGREEMENT.

HANDLING THE SOVIET AGENDA:

- DEFENSE & SPACE. NO GIVE ON PERMITTED/PROHIBITED OR ON
LINKING START WITHDRAWAL TO ABM TREATY.
- SLCMS. WE PLAN TO PUSH OUR DECLARATIONS APPROACH.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

WE WILL SEEK AGREEMENT ON A BROAD FRAMEWORK:

- COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE A CW CONVENTION AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE;
- BILATERAL REDUCTION TO 5000 TONS;
- PROPOSE COOPERATION ON CW DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY (A NEW
ELEMENT SINCE MALTA);

NATO SECRET

000794

NATO SECRET

- 3 -

- 5/11

-- REDUCTIONS TO 500 TONS OVER FIRST 8 YEARS OF A CW CONVENTION;

-- HALT CW PRODUCTION ON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A CW CONVENTION;

-- JOINT STATEMENT ON COMMON EFFORTS TO PREVENT CW PROLIFERATION.

CFE

-- WHAT WE DO DEPENDS ON THE STATUS OF CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. WE EXPECT TO HEAR SOVIET VIEWS ON THE PRESIDENT'S MANPOWER INITIATIVE.

NUCLEAR TESTING

-- NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA ARE ON TRACK FOR SIGNATURE IN JUNE, AND WE DO NOT EXPECT TO DEVOTE MUCH TIME TO THIS IN MOSCOW.

NON-PROLIFERATION

-- WE WILL DISCUSS CHEMICAL, NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION.

OPEN SKIES

-- WE WILL ADVOCATE THE NATO BASIC ELEMENTS POSITION AND URGE THAT IT BE ADOPTED IN OTTAWA.

III. REGIONAL ISSUES

-- WE WILL ENGAGE IN DETAILED REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS, POINTING OUT THAT PROGRESS IN THIS AREA LAGS BEHIND THAT IN OTHER PARTS OF OUR AGENDA.

-- THE SECRETARY WILL REVIEW THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, INCLUDING PANAMA.

-- HE WILL EXPLAIN OUR REASONS FOR USING FORCE IN PANAMA AND CAUTION THE SOVIETS NOT TO DRAW WIDER POLICY IMPLICATIONS FROM OUR ACTIONS THERE.

-- ON NICARAGUA, THE SECRETARY WILL EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR THE SOVIETS TO URGE MANAGUA TO CONDUCT A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION PROCESS.

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

-4-

-- HE WILL STATE OUR READINESS TO RESPECT THE OUTCOME OF SUCH A PROCESS AND PRESS THE USSR TO DO THE SAME.

-- WE WILL ALSO EXPRESS CONCERNS ABOUT THE INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGN PURSUED BY THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT AND THEIR REFUSAL TO ISSUE VISAS TO ELECTION OBSERVERS.

-- THE SECRETARY ALSO WILL NOTE U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT SHIPMENTS OF MI-17 HELICOPTERS TO NICARAGUA.

-- HE WILL RAISE THE QUESTION ABOUT THE SOVIET SHIPMENT OF MIG-29 AIRCRAFT TO CUBA, A COUNTRY THAT IS ACTIVELY UNDERMINING THE PEACE PROCESS.

-- WE WILL URGE THE USSR TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH HAVANA TO STOP CUBAN ACTIONS LIKE SUPPLYING ARMS TO THE FMLN IN VIOLATION OF THE TELA ACCORDS.

-- ON AFGHANISTAN, THE SECRETARY WILL MAKE A FAIRLY DETAILED PRESENTATION TO OUTLINE OUR THREE-PHASE APPROACH FOR A TRANSITION FROM THE CURRENT REGIME TO A NEW GOVERNMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

o PHASE ONE, A NEW SHURA, IS ALREADY UNDERWAY TO PRODUCE A MUCH MORE BROAD-BASED RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP.

o PHASE TWO WOULD INVOLVE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE NEW RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP AND ACCEPTABLE KABUL REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES OF POWER TRANSFER.

o NAJIBULLAH WOULD LEAVE DURING THIS STAGE AND WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE DIALOGUE.

o PHASE THREE WOULD IMPLEMENT AGREED ARRANGEMENTS USING ELECTIONS OR SOME OTHER ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION TO ENDORSE THE OUTCOME OF THE DIALOGUE.

o WE EXPECT THAT THE UN COULD PLAY A ROLE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCESS.

-- AS YOU KNOW, WE DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS ASIAN ISSUES AT MALTA. THEREFORE, THE SECRETARY WILL DEVOTE CONSIDERABLE TIME TO THEM IN MOSCOW.

-- HE WILL TALK ABOUT THE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN EUROPE AND IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, NOTING THAT THE USSR IS NOT APPLYING THE SAME HISTORIC VISION IN ASIA AS ELSEWHERE.

-- IN THAT CONTEXT, HE WILL POINT OUT STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR IMPROVED JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS.

NATO SECRET

000796

NATO SECRET

-5-

-- BETTER TIES WOULD LOWER TENSIONS AND CREATE A MORE CONDUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE FOR TRADE, ECONOMIC INVESTMENT.

-- THE SECRETARY WILL UNDERScore TO SHEVARDNADZE THAT THE KEY TO AN ENDURING POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN IS RESOLUTION OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE.

-- ON CAMBODIA, THE SECRETARY WILL REVIEW THE STATUS OF THE PERMANENT FIVE CONSULTATIONS AND PRESS THE SOVIETS TO GET THEIR FRIENDS IN PHNOM PEN AND HANOI TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE.

-- HE WILL RAISE THE ISSUE OF NORTH KOREA'S FAILURE TO SIGN AN IAEA NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND WILL SUGGEST THAT SHEVARDNADZE MAKE A PERSONAL APPEAL TO PYONGYANG.

-- THE SECRETARY WILL ALSO RECOMMEND THAT THE USSR URGE THE NORTH TO FOREGO REPROCESSING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS.

-- WE WILL ENCOURAGE CLOSER SOVIET TIES TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND OFFER TO RECIPROCATATE STEPS BY THE NORTH.

-- WE WILL ALSO EXPRESS OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF A SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE AND UN MEMBERSHIP FOR BOTH STATES.

-- IF THE SOVIETS MAKE SWEEPING PROPOSALS ON ASIAN SECURITY, SUCH AS NAVAL ARMS CONTROL OR RECIPROCAL FORCE REDUCTIONS WE WILL DISCOURAGE THEM.

-- ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WE WILL URGE THE SOVIETS TO TAKE A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH ON OUR EFFORTS TO GET AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE UNDERWAY, PARTICULARLY BY RESTORING FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

-- ON AFRICA, WE WILL PRESS FOR AN ANGOLAN CEASEFIRE AND COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO RELIEVE FAMINE IN THE HORN.

IV. EUROPEAN POLITICAL ISSUES

EASTERN EUROPE

-- WE EXPECT TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN EASTERN EUROPE.

-- WE WILL REITERATE OUR VIEW THAT WHILE WE SUPPORT THESE CHANGES, WE DO NOT SEEK TO DESTABILIZE THE AREA OR UNDERMINE SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS.

-- IN THIS VEIN, WE WILL UPDATE THE SOVIETS ON OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND ON OUR OWN CONTACTS WITH THESE GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING AN ACCOUNT OF THE SECRETARY'S MEETINGS IN PRAGUE.

NATO SECRET

000797

NATO SECRET

-6-

GERMAN ISSUES

-- WE EXPECT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION.

-- OUR POSITION ON THIS ISSUE IS WELL KNOWN AND WE WILL REITERATE OUR SUPPORT FOR GERMAN SELF-DETERMINATION CONSISTENT WITH LEGITIMACY, SECURITY AND STABILITY ON THE CONTINENT.

CSCE SUMMIT

-- WE WILL TELL THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF A CSCE SUMMIT AND ITS AGENDA WITH OUR NATO ALLIES.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS

-- OVERALL, WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS BUT PROBLEMS REMAIN. WE INTEND TO TELL THE SOVIETS IN MOSCOW:

o THE U.S. IS INTERESTED IN THE NEW DECADE IN MOVING FORWARD ON A NEW HUMAN RIGHTS RELATIONSHIP -- AWAY FROM CONFRONTATION AND TOWARD COOPERATION.

o WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN MAKING PROGRESS ON EXCHANGES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO AID SOVIET EFFORTS IN INSTITUTIONALIZING THE RULE OF LAW.

-- AS AT PRIOR MINISTERIAL MEETINGS WE WILL CONTINUE TO RAISE WITH THE SOVIETS OUR TRADITIONAL AGENDA OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS, SUCH AS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, AND POLITICAL PRISONERS.

-- WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY ON THE "REFUSENIK" PROBLEM, WITH FEWER THAN 135 CASES REMAINING.

-- ONLY 16 BILATERAL CASES OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION OR DUAL NATIONALS REMAIN. THIS IS DOWN FROM OVER 150.

-- WHILE WE KNOW OF NO CURRENT PRISONERS CONVICTED SOLELY UNDER "POLITICAL" ARTICLES IN THE CRIMINAL CODE, WE ARE PURSUING ABOUT 60 CASES WHERE CONVICTION OR SENTENCE MAY HAVE BEEN LINKED TO POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

-- IN ORDER TO SOLIDIFY HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS ALREADY MADE AND TO ENSURE FUTURE PROGRESS, THE UNITED STATES HAS UNDERTAKEN A SERIES OF PROGRAMS WITH THE SOVIETS UNDER THE RUBRIC OF "RULE OF LAW." WE WILL DISCUSS WITH SOVIETS SPECIFIC PROJECTS:

000798

9/11

NATO SECRET

-7-

- o MOSCOW LEGAL SEMINARS - LED BY 5-7 SENIOR U.S. LEGAL EXPERTS - FOR SOVIET ATTORNEYS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, THE FIRST OF THESE TO TAKE PLACE IN MARCH;
- o VISITS BY SENIOR SOVIET LEGAL EXPERTS FOR 4-6 WEEKS TO STUDY THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM;
- o TRAINING FOR SOVIET JUDGES AT THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE IN RENO, NEVADA;
- o PLACEMENT OF SOVIET POST-GRADUATE STUDENTS IN LEGAL STUDIES WITH U.S. LAW SCHOOLS.
- o OTHER PROGRAMS IN THE HUMANITARIAN AND SOCIAL FIELD INCLUDE:
 - o SHARING OF EXPERTISE ON REHABILITATION AND INTEGRATION OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES INTO MAINSTREAM SOCIETY;
 - o MINE SAFETY PROGRAM WITH SOVIET COAL MINISTRY AND U.S. MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION;
 - o PSYCHIATRIC STANDARDS PROGRAM WITH THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH;
 - o HEALTH AND SAFETY CONCERNS OF THE WORKPLACE WITH THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION.
- WE WILL SEEK TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A DISCUSSION ON NATIONALITIES PROBLEMS TO LEARN THEIR VIEWS ON HOW THEY PLAN TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES;
- o WE WILL UNDERSCORE U.S. POLICY OF NON-RECOGNITION OF THE FORCIBLE INCORPORATION OF THE BALTIC STATES INTO THE USSR;
- o WE WILL STRESS THAT USE OF FORCE SHOULD BE A LAST RESORT. FORCE IN OUR VIEW CAN ONLY BE USED TO PREVENT EXTREME CIVIL STRIFE AND VIOLENCE AND MUST NOT BE USED AS A SCREEN FOR SUPPRESSION OF POLITICAL DISSENT.

VI. BILATERAL ISSUES

- WE WILL PRESS FOR A RESPONSE TO OUR OPEN LANDS PROPOSAL FOR THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF CLOSED AREAS WHICH THE SECRETARY MADE IN WYOMING.
- WE WILL DISCUSS OUR INTEREST IN OPENING A CONSULATE IN KIEV AND FOR THE OPENING OF THE FIRST AMERICAN CULTURAL CENTERS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

NATO SECRET

000799

USNATO/PO1/NS/90-19

NATO SECRET

-8-

-- WE WILL CONTINUE OUR DIALOGUE ON SEEKING WAYS TO EASE LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS FOR OUR DIPLOMATS AND JOURNALISTS IN THE USSR.

-- WE WILL OPEN DISCUSSION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S CALL AT MALTA TO INCREASE UNIVERSITY EXCHANGES BY 1000 STUDENTS IN EACH DIRECTION.

-- WE WILL TIE DOWN COMMITMENTS TO SIGN NEW AGREEMENTS IN PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND OCEAN STUDIES BY THE JUNE SUMMIT.

-- WE WILL PURSUE INTENSIFIED COOPERATION IN OPERATIONAL SAFETY OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.

VII. ECONOMIC ISSUES

-- THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVES AT MALTA HAVE OPENED THE WAY TO CLOSER ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

-- THE KEY IS TO IMPLEMENT THEM IN THE COURSE OF PREPARATION FOR THE JUNE SUMMIT.

-- THE MINISTERIAL WILL PROVIDE A GOOD OCCASION TO TAKE STOCK OF PROGRESS MADE ON THESE INITIATIVES, WHICH INCLUDE:

o NEGOTIATIONS OF A COMMERCIAL TRADE AGREEMENT AND A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY;

o USG SUPPORT FOR SOVIET OBSERVERSHIP IN THE GATT AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND;

o THE LIST OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECTS THAT THE PRESIDENT GAVE TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV AT MALTA.

-- THE SECRETARY WILL STRESS OUR INTEREST IN COMPLETING BY THE JUNE SUMMIT A COMMERCIAL TRADE AGREEMENT GRANTING RECIPROCAL MOST-FAVORED-NATION (MFN) STATUS.

-- THE SECRETARY WILL REMIND THE SOVIETS THAT IN ORDER FOR THE PRESIDENT TO WAIVE THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT -- WHICH IS NEEDED FOR GRANTING MFN -- THE SOVIETS MUST PASS AND IMPLEMENT A SUITABLE EMIGRATION LAW.

-- A PRELIMINARY ROUND OF COMMERCIAL TRADE AGREEMENT TALKS WILL BEGIN FEBRUARY 9 IN WASHINGTON.

-- WE INTEND TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION OF PERESTROIKA AT THE MINISTERIAL.

NATO SECRET

000800

NATO SECRET

-9-

-- WE WILL OUTLINE TO THE SOVIETS OUR VIEW THAT DEREGULATING THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND OPENING IT UP TO THE WORLD ECONOMY WILL PROVIDE A BETTER LIFE FOR SOVIET CITIZENS AND GREATER OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACEFUL ECONOMIC INTERACTION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

-- WE WILL ALSO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN WITH THE APPARENT SHIFT IN SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY IN RECENT MONTHS, EVIDENT IN THE RYZHKOV PLAN.

-- WE WILL REMIND THE SOVIETS OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN TECHNICAL COOPERATION AS THEY REFORM THEIR ECONOMY, AND ASK FOR A FORMAL RESPONSE TO THE MALTA LIST OF PROPOSALS.

VIII. TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

ENVIRONMENT

-- AS INTRODUCED AT THE WYOMING MINISTERIAL, WE WILL CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE BILATERAL COOPERATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS OF GLOBAL IMPORTANCE.

-- SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN A FRAMEWORK GLOBAL CLIMATE CONVENTION IS CRUCIAL; AT MALTA, THE PRESIDENT OFFERED THE U.S. AS VENUE FOR INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS OF SUCH A CONVENTION.

-- SOVIETS HAVE BEEN RESPONSIVE TO PROPOSALS FOR EXPANDED RESEARCH IN THE ARCTIC. THEY APPEAR RECEPTIVE TO COOPERATION IN LONG-RANGE ECOLOGICAL AND POLLUTION MONITORING PROPOSED IN WYOMING.

-- WE WILL NOTE OUR READINESS TO EXPAND COOPERATION IN NATURAL HAZARDS PREDICTION/MITIGATION AND DISASTER RELIEF.

COUNTERTERRORISM

-- WE WILL URGE THE SOVIETS TO FOCUS THE COUNTERTERRORISM DIALOGUE ON CONCRETE, PRACTICAL MEASURES.

-- IN PARTICULAR, WE WANT TO FOCUS ON STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM.

-- WE WILL ASK THE SOVIETS TO EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE IN SPECIFIC, SELECTED CASES.

NARCOTICS

-- WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY OUR COOPERATION ON NARCOTICS MATTERS OVER THE PAST YEAR.

-- WE WILL DISCUSS RESPECTIVE EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE THIRD COUNTRIES TO COOPERATE IN CUTTING DOWN NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING.

NATO SECRET

000801

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

ACC	636862	DATE	4
FILE	20-USA-1-3-455R		
DOSSIER			

file

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM WSHDC UNGR0464 31JAN90

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 010900

INFO MOSCO PRGUE WSAW BPEST BNATO PARIS BONN LDN VNACE BUCST BRU
HAGUE GENEV PRMNY PCOOTT/DOYLE/THOMSEN GERVOIS PMOOTT/HEINBECKER/
GRAUER

TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL DM DNACPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINS USS DMC RBG RBD RWD RWP CPD CPP CPE IFB IDD IDR IDA IND
INP INE LGB LCD LCR PGB PSD PSR

---BAKER VISIT TO MOSCO:FIRST BRIEFING

WE LUNCHEd TODAY WITH STATE DEPARTMENT DEPTUY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR SOVIET AFFAIRS KURT KAMMON TO RECEIVE QUOTE SNEAK PREVIEW
UNQUOTE OF MORE FORMAL BRIEFING SCHEDULED FEBRUARY 2 OF NATO
AMBASSADORS ON EVE OF SECRETARY BAKER S TRIP TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND
USSR.BAKER LEAVES LATE FEBRUARY 5 FOR PRAGUE AND ARRIVES MOSCOW
FEBRUARY 7.IT IS NOT CLEAR YET WHERE BAKER WILL GO AFTER LEAVING
MOSCOW FEBRUARY 9.KAMMON WAS GENERALLY CAUTIOUS AND NON-SPECULATIVE
IN HIS COMMENTS,LEAVING US WITH MORE PROCESS THAN SUBSTANCE.

HIGHLIGHTS FOLLOW:

1)PROCESS:USING JACKSON HOLE FORMULA,WORKING GROUPS MADE UP OF
APPROX 40 OFFICIALS ACCOMPANYING BAKER WILL ADDRESS DISCRETE AGENDA
ITEMS.HOWEVER,ONLY QUOTE MUNDANE UNQUOTE ITEMS(E.G.HOUSING,
BILATERAL TECHNICAL ITEMS)WILL BE SUBJECT OF ADVANCE TEAMS EFFORTS
(LEAVING WASHINGTON JANUARY 31).MORE DIFFICULT ISSUES(E.G.ACD AND
...?

PAGE TWO UNGR0046 CONF CDN--EYES ONLY

REGIONAL MATTERS) WILL BE DISCUSSED FIRST BY BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE DIRECTLY AND WORKING GROUPS ESTABLISHED AS NEED ARISES.

2) AGENDA: KAMMON FELT REGIONAL ISSUES (E.G. CUBA AND AFGHANISTAN) WILL BE MORE QUOTE INTELLECTUALLY INTRANSIGENT UNQUOTE THAN ACD BECAUSE OF COMPLICATING ELEMENT IMPOSED BY INDEPENDENT WILLS OF RESPECTIVE REGIONAL PARTNERS (CUBA, NICARAGUA, MUJAHADEEN, ETC). ACD PROBLEM AREAS (E.G. START/ABM LINK, CRUISE MISSILES AND NUCLEAR TESTING) ARE LESS COMPLEX BY BEING SUBJECT MORE DIRECTLY TO POLITICAL AUTHORITY OF TWO NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. KAMMON WOULD NOT BE DRAWN TO MAKE ANY ASSESSMENTS REGARDING ANTICIPATED AREAS OF SUCCESS/FAILURE.

3) STABILITY OF GORBACHEV: KAMMON NOTED HE HAD SPENT MOST OF PREVIOUS NIGHT QUOTE KNOCKING DOWN UNQUOTE CNN STORY (OBTAINED FROM UNAUTHORIZED INTELLIGENCE SPECULATION) THAT GORBACHEV WAS ABOUT TO RESIGN FROM LEADERSHIP OF PARTY. KAMMON UNDERLINED THERE IS NO PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE FOR THIS RUMOUR. (THIS CONFLICTS WITH MOSCO TEL XYGR0180 31 JAN.)

4) NATIONALITIES QUESTION: KAMMON NOTED LENIN'S 1921 DECLARATION OF PERPETUAL SOVEREIGNTY OF BALTIC STATES AND MORE RECENT DENUNCIATION BY GORBACHEV OF PROTOCOL TO 1939 MOLOTOV/RIBBENTROP PACT. HE OPINED THAT GORBACHEV WAS LIKELY TO SHOW INCREASING FLEXIBILITY TOWARDS BALTIC REPUBLICS WHILE MAINTAINING TOUGH APPROACH TO CAUCASUS. HE NOTED THAT GORBACHEV LIKELY ENJOYED GOOD SUPPORT FROM POLITBURO ON CAUCASUS QUESTION. KAMMON IMPLIED THAT U.S. DEGREE OF TOLERANCE HERE WAS ALSO RELATIVELY HIGH.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR0046 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

5)RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE:KAMMON REFLECTED DEEP IRRITATION IN STATE DEPARTMENT WITH EC DECISION LAST WEEK TO SUPPORT INFORMALLY GORBACHEV CSCE SUMMIT PROPOSAL.REVEALINGLY,HE STATED THAT IRRITATION WAS MORE WITH LACK OF CONSULTATION,THAN WITH DECISION ITSELF.HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER MITTERAND AND QUOTE OTHERS UNQUOTE RUNNING OUT AHEAD NOW THAT NEED FOR U.S.SECURITY SUPPORT OF EUROPE QUOTE APPEARS TO BE LESSENING UNQUOTE(PLS PROTECT).HE WARMLY REFERRED TO CANADIAN MACDONALDS LAUDABLE PATIENCE IN NEGOTIATING MOSCOW OUTLET.HE IMPLIED THAT USA FIRMS NEEDED TO DEVELOP EQUAL PATIENCE.ON POLAND,KANON NOTED THAT RESPONSE BY USA PRIVATE SECTOR TO URGINGS TO INVEST WAS QUOTE NOT OVERWHELMING UNQUOTE,AND CONTRASTED MARKEDLY WITH INTEREST IN HUNGARY.

6)JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT:IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS OVER REPEAL OF AMENDMENT,HE DREW OUR ATTENTION TO CONDITIONAL CLAUSE WHICH WOULD INVALIDATE FOR ONE YEAR DECISION TO LIFT JACKSON-VANIK IF SOVIETS DID NOT HONOUR COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN JEWISH EMIGRATION. HE UNDERScoreD DEVELOPING TENSIONS BETWEEN USSR AND ARABS ON ONE PAND AND USA AND ISRAEL,ON OTHER,DUE TO SHAMIR S POLICY OF SETTling SOVIET EMIGRES ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

7)VISITS:CZECH PRES HAVEL WILL VISIT WASHINGTON,FEB 21;-POLISH PM MAZOWIECKI WILL VISIT MID-MARCH;-BAKER INTENDS TO MAKE A MAJOR SPEECH IN PRAGUE ON GUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY ADDRESSING EASTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION IN A GENERAL CONTEXT.TEXT FROM POLICY

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR0046 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

PLANNING GROUP IN STATE HAS PROVEN CONTROVERSIAL AND IS UNDERGOING REVISIONS.

2.ABOVE INFO WAS RECEIVED IN CONFIDENCE FROM USA OFFICIAL AND SHOULD BE PROTECTED.

CCC/120 312146Z UNGR0464

SECRET

6/12

CONFIDENTIAL

COM EYES ONLY

ENTRE COMS SEULEMENT

FM WSHDC UNGR0319 29JAN90

TO EXTOTT IFB RGB DELIVER BY 291630

INFO LDN MOSCO BNATO PARIS BONN ROME WSAW PRGUE BREEC PRMNY GENEV

PMOOTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE

DISTR MINA USS DMC EFB CPD RBD RWD RWR URB IFB

NOT/NOT FOR TELEGRAM SUMMARY

---BRZEZINSKI S VIEWS

ACC	DATE
	900129
LOC	DOSSIER
AS-	20-USA-1-3-48R
	(Vd 25/m.rn)

2.IGNIFW BRZEZINSKI IS MUCH IN DEMAND THESE DAYS AND HE IS MAKING FULL USE OF EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO TRANSMIT WHETHER BY SPEECHES, ARTICLES OR MEDIA INTERVIEWS. WHILE HARD CORE OF BREZEZINSKI S VIEWS REMAIN CONSTANT (ESPECIALLY DANGERS OF ETHNIC TENSIONS IN USSR) VIGNETTES OCCASIONALLY VARY, DEPENDING ON THE AUDIENCE. HE INVITED ME TO LUNCH LAST FRIDAY, AND GAVE A FLURRY OF THE LATTER. WHAT FOLLOWS IS A QUICK SUMMARY.

2. BREZEZINSKI REMAINS SKEPTICAL ABOUT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN USSR AND CONCERNED ABOUT REFORM PROSPECTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. HE SEES 1990 AS MAKE OR BREAK YEAR FOR LATTER, REGARDS POLAND AND HUNGARY AS PIVOTAL TO BROADER SUCCESS (AND HAVING AT LEAST SOME CHANCE FOR SUCCESS) AND IS VERY CRITICAL OF ASSISTANCE EFFORTS BY U.S. AND CDA TO DATE. HE COMPLAINED ABOUT COMPLETE ABSENCE OF STRATEGIC THINKING BY QUOTE ANYONE EXCEPT POSSIBLY MITTERRAND UNQUOTE AND VIEWED BRITISH (THATCHER) PENCHANT TO CONCENTRATE EXCLUSIVELY ON PRIVATE SECTOR AS QUOTE SILLY UNQUOTE, ESPECIALLY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA ...2.

SECRET

COM EYES ONLY

ENTRE COMS SEULEMENT

SECRET

CDN EYES ONLY
ENTRE CONS SEULEMENT

7/12

PAGE TWO UNGR0319 CONF

WHERE STATE CONTROL IS HIGHER(97/97 PERCENT)EVEN THAN IN
USSR.HE CONSIDERED CDA S ECONOMIC PACKAGE FOR POLAND AND
HUNGARY TO BE QUOTE PUNY UNQUOTE RANKING QUOTE SOMEWHERE CLOSE
TO AUSTRIA UNQUOTE.

3.AS YOU MAY KNOW BREZEEZINSKI HAS PROPOSED A FEDERATION OF
SORTS FOR CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES,AS A CHECK AGAINST GERMAN
AND/OR RUSSIAN DOMINANCE AND AS A CATALYST FOR INTERNAL REFORM.
HE SUGGESTED THAT,AS POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD CREATED A MESS
IN SILESIA,THEY SHOULD MOVE JOINTLY TO CLEAN IT UP,USING COAL
AND STEEL FORMULA APPLIED EARLIER ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE.
ALTHOUGH HIS PROPOSAL PLAYED TO MIXED REVIEWS INITIALLY,HE BELIEVES
POLES AND CZECHS IN PARTICULAR ARE NOW WARMING TO IDEA.(HE HAS
BEEN INVITED TO PRAGUE BY HAVEL TO PARTICIPATE IN AN QUOTE IDEA
EXCHANGE UNQUOTE.NOT/NOT SURPRISINGLY BREZEEZINSKI HAS HIGH
REGARD FOR HAVEL WHO HE SEES AS A QUOTE MAN OF IDEAS UNQUOTE.)
HE SAW SMALLER FEDERATION AS MORE REALISTIC THAN VARIOUS
APPROACHES FOR QUOTE COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE UNQUOTE WHICH,IN
HIS VIEW,WOULD INEVITABLY SEPARATE OUT INTO DIFFERENT GROUPINGS,
BASED ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE.

4.BREZEEZINSKI PREDICTED A POWER PLAY UNFOLDING IN WARSAW WITH
WALESA MOVING TO TAKE PRESIDENCY.(INCIDENTALLY WALESA TOLD
BREZEEZINSKI THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY SURPRISED BY ACIMONY BETWEEN
LABOUR HOSTS AND GOVT DURING HIS VISIT TO CDA.CONFLICT HAD
BEEN QUOTE MUCH WORSE THAN THAT IN U.S.UNQUOTE).

...3

SECRET

CDN EYES ONLY
ENTRE CONS SEULEMENT

SECRET

CDN EYES ONLY 8/12
ENTRE CONS SEULEMENT

PAGE THREE UNGR0319 CONF D

5. BRZEZINSKI ATTRIBUTED LACK OF VISION IN WSHDC TO BAKER, WHOM HE BELIEVES IS TOO CONCERNED WITH U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICS TO ENGAGE PROPERLY ON INTERNATIONAL AGENDA AND TO MANNER IN WHICH SCOWCROFT HAS DEFINED HIS ROLE AS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR. (WHEREAS KISSINGER AND BRZEZINSKI USED OFFICE TO INTEGRATE AND DIRECT POLICY, SCOWCROFT OPERATES MORE AS QUINTESSENTIAL AIDE TO PRESIDENT).

6. BRZEZINSKI HAD KINDER, GENTLER ASSESSMENT OF KOHL AND WAS ESPECIALLY PRAISEWORTHY OF KOHL'S TEN POINT SPEECH, FULL TEXT OF WHICH HE ASSURED ME WAS MORE PROFOUND THAN NEWS SUMMARIES.

7. WHILE GLOOMY ABOUT LONG TERM PROSPECTS FOR PERESTROIKA BRZEZINSKI SEES WEST'S BEST OPTION AS PRESERVING PROCESS QUOTE FOR AS LONG AS WE CAN UNQUOTE AND EMBRACING GORBACHEV QUOTE FOR OUR REASONS NOT/NOT HIS UNQUOTE. HE IS CONVINCED SOVIET FEDERATION WILL UNRAVEL OVER TIME, PREDICTED THAT FERMENT WOULD SURFACE SOON IN UKRAINE AND CLAIMED THAT NEITHER GORBACHEV NOR YAKOVLEV HAD MUCH APPRECIATION OF DEPTH OF ANTI-RUSSIAN SENTIMENTS OUTSIDE INNER CORE.

8. BRZEZINSKI DREW MY ATTENTION TO RECENT EVANS/NOVAK COLUMN REFLECTING NEWS REPORTS (ACTUALLY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS HE CLAIMED TO HAVE PROVIDED THEM) OF ANTI-GORBACHEV SENTIMENTS REGISTERED IN RECENT PARTY CONFERENCE IN TALLIN, HINTS THAT GORBACHEV MAY BE A CIA AGENT, ETC. GIVEN CHANGES OCCURRING, IT IS NOT/NOT

...4

SECRET

CDN EYES ONLY
ENTRE CONS SEULEMENT

SECRET

CDN EYES ONLY
ENTRE CONS SEULEMENT

9/12

PAGE FOUR UNGR0319 CONF

SURPRISING THAT STUFF OF CARTOONS TAKES ON SEMBLANCE OF REALITY, EVEN
IN USSR!

9. BRZEZINSKI FAVOURS PROMPT MOVEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL I.E. IS NOT/NOT
AS DUBIOUS AS SOME AMERICAN HAWKS ABOUT VIABILITY OF SUCH ACCORDS
BUT SUGGESTED THAT, WITH DEFENCE SPENDING SPIRALLING DOWNWARDS AND
TROOPS BEING WITHDRAWN UNILATERALLY, NEED FOR AGREEMENTS WAS PERHAPS
LESS URGENT (AND LESS RELEVANT). HE NOTED HOWEVER THAT RICK BURT HAD
TOLD HIM THAT A START AGREEMENT WAS LIKELY BY END OF YEAR NOT/NOT BY
QUOTE UNREALISTIC UNQUOTE JUNE DEADLINE. ACCORDING TO BRZEZINSKI
MORE EFFORT SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON SETTLING REGIONAL CONFLICTS,
ESPECIALLY AFGHANISTAN.

10. FINALLY, IN A LIGHTER VEIN, BRZEZINSKI HAS HIS OWN THEORY
ON AUTHORSHIP OF QUOTE Z UNQUOTE ARTICLE. HE SAYS HE IS NOT
QUOTE Z UNQUOTE AND ON THE BASIS OF THE SOURCE MATERIAL
PRIMARILY AMERICAN AND SOVIET), USE OF QUOTE NON-AMERICAN ENGLISH
(E.G. QUOTE SPANKING NEW UNQUOTE), AND PROCESS OF ELIMINATION
BRZEZINSKI HAS CONCLUDED THAT AUTHOR IS EITHER BRITISH OR
CANADIAN! ANY VOLUNTEERS?

BURNEY

CCC/120 292046Z UNGR0319

SECRET

CDN EYES ONLY
ENTRE CONS SEULEMENT

ACTION

MESSAGE

NOTE A DONNER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Référence

CLC/OTT/002/26

File/Dossier

Bico A-7

PAGE 1 OF 4

RITY
SITE

UNCLASSIFIED

12

10

CLVND

YGGR 0168

26JAN90

EXTOTT RGB RBT RBR RBP

FILE

DOSSIER

20-USA-1-3-USSR

SUJ

---SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ'S SPEECH TO OHIO GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE

I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT FIND THE ATTACHED USEFUL. HEAD OF OUR SATELLITE
OFFICE IN DAYTON (WRIGHT PATTERSON AIRBASE) PREPARED IT.

DRAFTER/REDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVE

L.D. LEDERMAN

SIG

HOM

216/
771-0130

SIG L.D. LEDERMAN

A. F. CAMPBELL

TIME: 1500

DATE: 25 JAN 90

ADIAN GOVERNMENT DEFENCE TRADE OFFICE
DDP, AREA B, WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OH 45433
ONE: (513) 255-4382 FAX: (513) 255-1821
THIE F. CAMPBELL, CONSUL & TRADE COMMISSIONER

JAN 25 1990

CLVND (LEDERMAN)

PHONE:

INFO: EAITC/URR/UTD/TDD DE DAYTN

INFO: WSHDC (R. W. CRAIG); CNATI DE DAYTN

SD #0, #10; #9; #5; #4

AGES: (INCLUDING THIS PAGE) 3/3

TIONS TO COMCENTRE: UTD FAX OPERATOR - PLEASE MAKE COPY

ACT	INFO
IDL	
JP	
IC	
JL	
JM	
OW	
MM	
AC	
LT	
SG	
DS	
CINCI	
DAYTN	

RTD 0629

SUBJECT: SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ'S SPEECH TO OHIO GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE ON
ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS FOR OHIO'S SMALL BUSINESS DEFENCE CONTRACTORS

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR DUBININ WAS THE LUNCHEON SPEAKER ON THE FINAL DAY OF THIS
CONFERENCE AND USED OCCASION TO OUTLINE USSR PLANS FOR DEFENCE BUDGET REDUCTION
AND CONVERSION OF INDUSTRY TO PRODUCING CONSUMER GOODS. KEY FIGURES WERE
40.2/40.2 PERCENT REDUCTION IN USSR DEFENCE BUDGET IN 1990 AND FORCE REDUCTION
OF 300,000 MEN. OVER THE PERIOD 1991-1995 THEY PLAN TO CUT MILITARY EQUIPMENT
PRODUCTION BY 51 PERCENT INCLUDING CUTS OF 60 PERCENT IN HELICOPTER PRODUCTION,
20 PERCENT IN AMMUNITION, 12 PERCENT IN COMBAT AIRCRAFT BUT NO/NO NAVAL CUTS. IN
1990 500,000 DEFENCE WORKERS WILL CONVERT TO CONSUMER PRODUCTS SUCH AS
WASHING MACHINES, STEREOS, CD PLAYERS, HE SAID. IN ADDITION A NEW LEGAL
ENVIRONMENT WILL BE CREATED CONDUCIVE TO ECONOMIC CONVERSION ALSO PLANS TO CONVERT
EASTERN EUROPE TO HARD CURRENCY BASIS. ACTIONS ARE ALSO UNDERWAY TO CHANGE
USSR BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT TO ENCOURAGE US/USSR BUSINESS, JOINT VENTURES AND
GORBACHEV WANTS TO SIGN TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS VISIT
THIS JUNE.

REPORT: THE OHIO GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE AIMED AT ASSISTING U.S. DEFENCE
SUBCONTRACTORS TO TRANSMITION TO COMMERCIAL BUSINESS WAS HELD JAN 23 AND 24 IN
COLUMBUS. THIS WAS THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF ITS TYPE ORGANIZED BY STATE OR
FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS AND HENCE ATTRACTED OBSERVERS FROM SEVERAL OTHER STATES AND
WSHDC AS WELL AS PRESIDENTS OF 200 SMALL OHIO DEFENCE CONTRACTORS.

- 2 -

THE SUBJECT OF THE CONFERENCE THUS OFFERED AN IDEAL FORUM FOR THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO DESCRIBE USSR PLANS FOR DEFENCE BUDGET CUTS AND CONVERSION FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN PRODUCTION. IN HIS REMARKS, THE AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT USSR IS KEEN TO EXPAND TRADE AND JOINT VENTURES WITH THE USA AND NOTED THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING CHANGES IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM, ARE BEING PLANNED TO FACILITATE TRADE AND JV. HE SAID SOVIET AUTHORITIES RECOGNIZE THAT CURRENT PRACTICES ARE THE MAIN REASON THAT ONLY 23 JV HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED ALTHOUGH 1300 HAVE BEEN ASSESSED.

THE AMBASSADOR ALSO ACCEPTED SOME QUESTIONS AFTER HIS SPEECH, WHICH BROUGHT FORTH SOME OTHER INTERESTING COMMENTS:

(A) IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THE DEFENCE BUDGET CUTS WERE CONTINGENT ON RECIPROCAL CUTS BY THE USA THE AMBASSADOR HEDGED ON SPECIFICS BUT INDICATED ALTHOUGH RECIPROCAL CUTS WERE NOT REQUIRED IN CERTAIN AREAS BY START, HE HOPED THAT THE SPIRIT OF THE MALTA TALKS WOULD LEAD TO RECIPROCAL CUTS, SO BOTH NATIONS WOULD QUOTE STOP WASTING MONEY ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES UNQUOTE OTHERWISE QUOTE THE U.S. WOULD GET LEFT BEHIND AS SOVIET COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS INCREASE UNQUOTE.

(B) WITH REFERENCE TO STUDENT EXCHANGES ANNOUNCED FOLLOWING THE MALTA TALKS, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD SOON BE COMPLETED FOR THE EXCHANGE OF 1000 USSR AND 1000 USA STUDENTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR, AS A FOLLOW ON TO GOVERNOR CELESTE'S AG/TRADE MISSION TO USSR IN FEBRUARY.

(C) IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION IF THE IMPACT OF RECENT PROBLEMS IN AZERBAIJAN AND LITHUANIA WOULD DELAY THE DEFENCE CONVERSION PLANS DESCRIBED BY THE AMBASSADOR, HE DID NOT ANSWER YES OR NO (UNDERSTANDABLY) BUT DID SAY THAT THE USSR WILL BE IMPLEMENTING NEW POLICIES FOR MODERNIZATION AND LEGISLATION TO ACCOMMODATE CHANGES IN THE USSR, AZERBAIJAN AND LITHUANIA.

THE AMBASSADOR'S SPEECH AND WILLINGNESS TO ANSWER QUESTIONS WERE WELL RECEIVED BY THE AUDIENCE, PARTICULARLY AS DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER AND HIGH TECH EXPORTS TO, AND JV IN, EASTERN EUROPE HAD BEEN RECOMMENDED BY SOME EARLIER SPEAKER AS PROMISING NEW MARKETS FOR U.S. MANUFACTURERS.

Archie F. Campbell
ARCHIE F. CAMPBELL

AFC/br

JAN 26 1980 15:41 CANADIAN CONSULATE, CLEVELAND, OH

CLE / OTT / 002 / 26

F-4



Dispatch photo by Mike Menden

Visit from an ambassador

Yuri V. Dubinin, left, Soviet ambassador to the United States, and Karl Graff, right, executive director of the Edison Welding Institute, talk with an employee at the institute, 1100

Kinncar Rd., yesterday. Dubinin also toured Pook Fine Cast, 340 Kinncar Rd., and Daninger Medical Technology, 300 Kinncar Rd., as part of his interest in the transfer of knowl-

edge from university to commercial applications. Today, Dubinin is to address the Conference on Economic Transitions for Ohio's Defense Contractors at the Parke Hotel.

ACTION

NOTE A DONNER

P R O T E C T E D

FM MOSCO XYGR2228 22DEC89

TC EXTOTT (LCR) DELIVER BY 220900

INFO WSHDC PRMNY SJOSE GTMLA CRCAS BGOTA BAIRS STAGO LIMA BRSLA

HAVAN PRNCE PSPAN KNGTN BDGTN GRGTN MXICO HAGUE BRU MDRID BONN

LDM BREEC PARIS ROME TOKYO PCOOTT/BRADLEY PMOOTT/HARTT

DISTR MINA USS DMC LGX LGB LCD LCR LGP BMM UGB URD URR MINP CPD

CPP IND INP IFB LSD LSR RBD RBR RWD RWR RGB

REF YOURTEL LCR2169 21DEC

---PANAMA:USSR REACTION

SUMMARY:SOVIET OFFICIAL REACTION TO USA ACTIONS IN PANAMA HAS BEEN PREDICTABLY NEGATIVE,BUT EVENTS THERE HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN GIVEN PARTICULARLY HIGH PROFILE IN SOVIET MEDIA.COMMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS SPOKESMAN EARLIER THIS WEEK SUGGESTS SOVIET GOVT IS ATTEMPTING TO DISSOCIATE USAS PANAMA ACTION AND USSR REACTION TO IT FROM ONGOING COURSE OF USA-SOVIET RELATIONS IN GENERAL.

2.REPORT:BEGINNING WITH COMMENT AT MFA NEWS BRIEFING 20DEC THAT USA ACTIONS QUOTE NO/NO MATTER WHAT THE REASONS CITED...PROVOKED A FEELING OF SERIOUS CONCERN IN THE SOVIET UNION UNQUOTE,AND THAT SUCH ACTIONS WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE UN CHARTER,SHOULD BE CONDEMNED BY INNATL COMMUNITY AND SHOULD CEASE AT ONCE,SOVIET OFFICIAL REACTION TO USA ACTION IN PANAMA HAS BEEN UNEQUIVOCALLY NEGATIVE.SUPREME SOVIET SPOKESMAN SAME DAY SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS,AS DID SOVIET UN AMBASSADOR,AS REPORTED BY TASS FOLLOWING DAY.LATTER SUGGESTED ROLE OF WORLD POLICEMAN QUOTE NO/NO MATTER WHO ASSUMES IT,IS A DANGEROUS

...2

625 344
21-3-Panama
20-USA-1-3-USSR

A.7

PAGE TWO XYGR2228 PROTECTED

ANACRONISM UNQUOTE.OFFICIAL GOVT STATEMENT 21DEC EMPHASIZED CHALLENGE TO PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND CONTRADICTION OF USA ACTION TO CURRENT QUOTE POSITIVE TENDENCIES UNQUOTE IN WORLD POLITICS.

3.STATEMENT ITSELF HOWEVER WAS BRIEF,AS WAS LACONIC TASS REPORT OF CALL BY USA AMBASSADOR TO USSR MATLOCK ON FIRST DEPUTY FM BESSMERTNYKH 20DEC TO PRESENT USA STATEMENT TO LATTER.WHILE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY TASS HAS NOT/NOT RESISTED A CERTAIN SCHADENFREUDE IN REPORTING ON WIDESPREAD NEGATIVE REACTION ELSEWHERE IN WORLD TO USA ACTIONS IN PANAMA,COVERAGE IN OFFICIAL SOVIET PRESS AND TELEVISION HAS BEEN RESTRAINED.PANAMA EVENTS WERE CLOSE TO BACK PAGE ITEMS IN YESTERDAYS PRAVDA AND IZVESTIA.TODAYS EDITIONS REPRINT GOVT STATEMENT ON FRONT PAGE BUT WITHOUT EMBELLISHMENT.NIGHTLY TV NEWS VREMYA SITUATED COVERAGE OF PANAMA WELL BEHIND NOT/NOT ONLY KEY DOMESTIC NEWS AND NEWS FROM ROMANIA BUT ALSO AFTER COVERAGE OF VISIT TO USSR OF CZECH PM.

4.AT REGULAR PRESS BRIEFING 20DEC,MFA SPOKESMAN PERFILIYEV WAS ASKED WHETHER PANAMA EVENTS WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON SOVIET-USA RELATIONSHIP.HIS RESPONSE WAS UNEQUIVOCAL:TIME HAD COME,HE SAID, TO GET USED TO IDEA THAT EVENTS ELSEWHERE IN WORLD NEED NOT/NOT BE SEEN IN COLD WAR CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION.THIS REACTION AND RELATIVELY MEASURED OFFICIAL USSR RESPONSE TO USA ACTIONS,SUGGEST ACTIVE SOVIET GOVT INTENTION NOT/NOT TO LET PANAMA EVENTS HAVE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

...3

PAGE THREE XYGR2228 PROTECTED

5. THAT IS NOT/NOT TO SAY, OF COURSE, THAT SOVIETS WILL NOT/NOT USE
FACT OF USA INTERVENTION AS USEFUL EVIDENCE WHEN REQUIRED THAT
QUOTE AGGRESSION UNQUOTE IS STILL SEEN BY USA GOVT AS MEANS TO
DEFEND NATIONAL INTERESTS. MOREOVER IN LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS IN
EASTERN EUROPE THERE MAY BE SOME IN SOVIET PARTY AND MILITARY WHO
MAY BE TEMPTED TO COMPARE APPROACHES TO DEFENCE OF QUOTE NATIONAL
INTERESTS UNQUOTE BY USA AND USSR LEADERSHIPS, NOT/NOT NECESSARILY
TO ADVANTAGE OF LATTER.

CCC/198 221029Z XYGR2228

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

DEC 27 1989

///CORRECTED COPY///

FM WSHDC UNGR6965 21DEC89

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

TO EXTOTT URR

INFO PMOOTT PCOOTT FINOTT BNATO MOSCO WSAW VNACE GENEV LDN PARIS

BONN ROME TOKYO /// TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOORD/ DE CAF 1/1

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD IWB IDD IDR IDA CPD CPP RGB RWD RWR

RPR EFB EED EER EEA

REF OURTEL UNGR6964 21DEC89

---US/SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER MALTA-ECONOMIC RELATIONS(II)

DECISION AT MALTA TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON US/SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT
WAS PROMPTED BY PRESIDENT S DESIRE TO START PROCESS OF NORMALIZING
US/SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ITS OUTCOME. IF ALL
GOES WELL, IT IS EXPECTED TO LEAD TO MFN STATUS, WAIVER OF JACKSON-
FANIK, REPEAL OF STEVENSON AMENDMENT ON EXPORT CREDITS, AND EVENTUAL
USSR OBSERVER STATUS AT GATT. BUT ADMIN WILL INSIST, AS PROCESS UNFOLDS,
THAT SOVIET DOMESTIC BEHAVIOUR EVOLVE IN PARALLEL. LIFTING OF SOME
COCOM RESTRICTIONS IS ALSO ANTICIPATED. PRESIDENT HOPES PROCESSES
WILL MERGE BY TIME OF SUMMER SUMMIT.

(A) TRADE AGREEMENT

ACCORDING TO ASSISTANT SEC FOR EUROPE, ON WHOM BURNEY CALLED YESTERDAY,
PRESIDENT WAS DISAPPOINTED AT SOVIET FAILURE TO PASS NEW EMIGRATION
LAW BY TIME OF MALTA MTG; BUT HE HAD NOT WANTED WHAT APPEARED TO BE
TEMPORARY DELAY OF PASSAGE INTO LAW OF GOOD LEGISLATION TO HOLD UP
ENTIRE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC NORMALIZATION. SEITZ DESCRIBED EMIGRATION

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR6965 CONF

BILL GIVEN SECOND READING IN SUPREME SOVIET AS QUOTE SATISFACTORY UNQUOTE. HENCE DECISION AT LEAST TO QUOTE START DOWN THE ROAD UNQUOTE BY COMMENCING NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD IN ANY CASE BE NECESSARY BEFORE RECORDING MFN STATUS. BUT IMPLICIT WAS THAT SOVIETS WOULD DISCHARGE THEIR SIDE OF BARGAIN AND PASS EMIGRATION LAW IN SPRING.

3. SEITZ SAID NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN IN JANUARY. THEY WOULD BE LED BY STATE DEPT, BUT WOULD LARGELY BE CONDUCTED BY DEPT OF COMMERCE. SEITZ THOUGHT IT WOULD BE QUOTE A STANDARD UNQUOTE AGREEMENT.

4. (B) NEXT STEPS

SEITZ SAID PRESIDENT HAD QUOTE WANTED TO DO SOMETHING ON JACKSON-VANIK UNQUOTE BEFORE MALTA, AND HE LEFT US WITH IMPRESSION ADMIN WOULD SEEK WAIVER AS SOON AS TRADE AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED AND SOVIET EMIGRATION LAW PASSED. IN ADDITION, SEITZ EXPECTED PRESIDENT QUOTE WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS WITH CONGRESS UNQUOTE QUESTION OF REPEALING STEVENSON AMENDMENT PROHIBITING EXTENDING OF EXPORT CREDITS. BAKER WAS OPPOSED TO SUCH STEP, AS LONG AS SOVIETS CONTINUED TO PUMP MONEY INTO PLACES LIKE CUBA AND NICARAGUA, BUT SEITZ SAID HE HAD BEEN OVERRULED BY BUSH. PRESIDENT TOLD GORBACHEV HE WAS QUOTE ANXIOUS UNQUOTE TO HELP AND QUOTE WOULD UNQUOTE, WHILE NOTING THE SOVIET ACTIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA MADE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT ALL AROUND.

6. LIKEWISE ON GATT STATUS, PRESIDENT HAD BEEN COUNSELLED TO APPLY SOME CONDITIONALITY TO US SUPPORT, BUT HE HAD DECIDED AGAINST

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6965 CONF

DOING SO EXPLICITLY.(CDN EMPHASIS HERE UNDOUBTEDLY HELPED).

INSTEAD,HE TOLD GORBACHEV US WOULD SUPPORT SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS ONCE URUGUAY ROUND WAS OVER,WHILE NOTING THAT SUCCESSFUL SOVIET INTFGRATION INTO WORLD ECONOMY WOULD REQUIRE SOVIET ECONOMY TO BECOME MORE COMPATIBLE WITH THOSE OF WEST,INCLUDING IN AREA OF PRICES.

7.(C)COCOM RESTRICTIONS

IN RESPONDING TO BURNEY S QUERY WHETHER COCOM RESTRICTIONS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT MALTA,SEITZ SAID THEY HAD NOT/BUT US ATTITUDE WAS THAT QUOTE THERE ARE AREAS WHICH LEND THEMSELVES TO GREATER STREAMLINING UNQUOTE.

8.IN ADMIN S VIEW,COCOM REAMINED VITAL TO WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS, BUT TO PRESERVE ITS INTEGRITY IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL CONSENSUS.IF THIS FAILED,WHOLE ORGANIZATION WOULD COLLAPSE.

ACCORDINGLY,US PLANNED TO WORK THROUGH HIGH-LEVEL GROUPS WHICH WOULD BE MEETING OVER NEXT FEW MONTHS TO INSTITUTE SOME REVISIONS,WITH VIEW TO QUOTE GETTING RID OF THE GARBAGE UNQUOTE.SEITZ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT COMMERCE SECRETARY MOSBACHER WAS NOT ONLY LEADING THE WAY,BUT THAT HE WAS QUOTE RATHER FAR AHEAD OF EVERYBODY UNQUOTE.

9.BURNEY REMINDED SEITZ OF THE CLOSE LINKAGES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN US AND CDN ECONOMIES,AND OF OUR OBVIOUS INTEREST IN STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ADMIN ON THIS ISSUE.SEITZ TOOK THE POINT.

10.(D)ECONOMIC SUMMIT

BURNEY ASKED WHETHER BUSH HAD RAISED WITH GORBACHEV PRIME MINISTER S PROPOSAL THAT CHAIRMAN OF ECONOMIC SUMMIT BRIEF GORBACHEV ON SUMMIT S

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6965 CONFD

CONCLUSION. SEITZ SAID HE COULD NOT RECALL ISSUE ARISING AT MALTA.

IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER PROBING, HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE THERE WAS ANY
US POSITION ON THE PROPOSAL, BUT HE WOULD ASK BAKER. SEITZ EXPECTED US
POSITION MIGHT BE COOL.

CCC/120 212311Z UNGR6965

DEC 27 1989

Handwritten initials and signature

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6965 21DEC89

TO EXTOTT(CURR

INFO PMOOTT PCOOTT FINOTT BNATO MOSCO WSAW VNACE GENEV LDN PARIS
BONN ROME TOKYO

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD IWB IDD IDR IDA CPD CPP RGB RWD RWR
RRR FFB EFD EER EEA

REF OURTEL UNGR6964 21DEC89

---US/SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER MALTA-ECONOMIC RELATIONS(II)

DECISION AT MALTA TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON US/SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT
WAS PROMPTED BY PRESIDENT S DESIRE TO START PROCESS OF NORMALIZING
US/SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ITS OUTCOME. IF ALL
GOES WELL, IT IS EXPECTED TO LEAD TO MFN STATUS, WAIVER OF JACKSON-
FANIK, REPEAL OF STEVENSON AMENDMENT ON EXPORT CREDITS, AND EVENTUAL
USSR OBSERVER STATUS AT GATT. BUT ADMIN WILL INSIST, AS PROCESS UNFOLDS,
THAT SOVIET DOMESTIC BEHAVIOUR EVOLVE IN PARALLEL. LIFTING OF SOME
COCOM RESTRICTIONS IS ALSO ANTICIPATED. PRESIDENT HOPES PROCESSES
WILL MERGE BY TIME OF SUMMER SUMMIT.

(A) TRADE AGREEMENT

ACCORDING TO ASSISTANT SEC FOR EUROPE, ON WHOM BURNEY CALLED YESTERDAY,
PRESIDENT WAS DISAPPOINTED AT SOVIET FAILURE TO PASS NEW EMIGRATION
LAW BY TIME OF MALTA MTG; BUT HE HAD NOT WANTED WHAT APPEARED TO BE
TEMPORARY DELAY OF PASSAGE INTO LAW OF GOOD LEGISLATION TO HOLD UP
ENTIRE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC NORMALIZATION. SEITZ DESCRIBED EMIGRATION

...2

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

PAGE TWO UNGR6965 CONF

BILL GIVEN SECOND READING IN SUPREME SOVIET AS QUOTE SATISFACTORY UNQUOTE. HENCE DECISION AT LEAST TO QUOTE START DOWN THE ROAD UNQUOTE BY COMMENCING NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD IN ANY CASE BE NECESSARY BEFORE RECORDING MFN STATUS. BUT IMPLICIT WAS THAT SOVIETS WOULD DISCHARGE THEIR SIDE OF BARGAIN AND PASS EMIGRATION LAW IN SPRING.

3. SEITZ SAID NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN IN JANUARY. THEY WOULD BE LED BY STATE DEPT, BUT WOULD LARGELY BE CONDUCTED BY DEPT OF COMMERCE. SEITZ THOUGHT IT WOULD BE QUOTE A STANDARD UNQUOTE AGREEMENT.

4. (B) NEXT STEPS

SEITZ SAID PRESIDENT HAD QUOTE WANTED TO DO SOMETHING ON JACKSON-VANIK UNQUOTE BEFORE MALTA, AND HE LEFT US WITH IMPRESSION ADMIN WOULD SEEK WAIVER AS SOON AS TRADE AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED AND SOVIET EMIGRATION LAW PASSED. IN ADDITION, SEITZ EXPECTED PRESIDENT QUOTE WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS WITH CONGRESS UNQUOTE QUESTION OF REPEALING STEVENSON AMENDMENT PROHIBITING EXTENDING OF EXPORT CREDITS. BAKER WAS OPPOSED TO SUCH STEP, AS LONG AS SOVIETS CONTINUED TO PUMP MONEY INTO PLACES LIKE CUBA AND NICARAGUA, BUT SEITZ SAID HE HAD BEEN OVERRULED BY BUSH. PRESIDENT TOLD GORBACHEV HE WAS QUOTE ANXIOUS UNQUOTE TO HELP AND QUOTE WOULD UNQUOTE, WHILE NOTING THE SOVIET ACTIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA MADE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT ALL AROUND.

6. LIKEWISE ON GATT STATUS, PRESIDENT HAD BEEN COUNSELLED TO APPLY SOME CONDITIONALITY TO US SUPPORT, BUT HE HAD DECIDED AGAINST

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6965 CONF

DOING SO EXPLICITLY.(CDN EMPHASIS HERE UNDOUBTEDLY HELPED).

INSTEAD,HE TOLD GORBACHEV US WOULD SUPPORT SOVIET OBSERVER STATUS
ONCE URUGUAY ROUND WAS OVER,WHILE NOTING THAT SUCCESSFUL SOVIET
INTEGRATION INTO WORLD ECONOMY WOULD REQUIRE SOVIET ECONOMY TO BECOME
MORE COMPATIBLE WITH THOSE OF WEST,INCLUDING IN AREA OF PRICES.

7.(C)COCOM RESTRICTIONS

IN RESPONDING TO BURNEY S QUERY WHETHER COCOM RESTRICTIONS HAD BEEN
DISCUSSED AT MALTA,SEITZ SAID THEY HAD NOT/BUT US ATTITUDE WAS THAT
QUOTE THERE ARE AREAS WHICH LEND THEMSELVES TO GREATER STREAMLINING
UNQUOTE.

8.IN ADMIN S VIEW,COCOM REMAINED VITAL TO WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS,
BUT TO PRESERVE ITS INTEGRITY IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL
CONSENSUS.IF THIS FAILED,WHOLE ORGANIZATION WOULD COLLAPSE.

ACCORDINGLY,US PLANNED TO WORK THROUGH HIGH-LEVEL GROUPS WHICH WOULD
BE MEETING OVER NEXT FEW MONTHS TO INSTITUTE SOME REVISIONS,WITH
VIEW TO QUOTE GETTING RID OF THE GARBAGE UNQUOTE.SEITZ ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT COMMERCE SECRETARY MOSBACHER WAS NOT ONLY LEADING THE WAY,BUT
THAT HE WAS QUOTE RATHER FAR AHEAD OF EVERYBODY UNQUOTE.

9.BURNEY REMINDED SEITZ OF THE CLOSE LINKAGES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN US
AND CDN ECONOMIES,AND OF OUR OBVIOUS INTEREST IN STAYING IN CLOSE
TOUCH WITH ADMIN ON THIS ISSUE.SEITZ TOOK THE POINT.

10.(D)ECONOMIC SUMMIT

BURNEY ASKED WHETHER BUSH HAD RAISED WITH GORBACHEV PRIME MINISTER S
PROPOSAL THAT CHAIRMAN OF ECONOMIC SUMMIT BRIEF GORBACHEV ON SUMMIT S

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6965 CONFD

CONCLUSION. SEITZ SAID HE COULD NOT RECALL ISSUE ARISING AT MALTA.

IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER PROBING, HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE THERE WAS ANY
US POSITION ON THE PROPOSAL, BUT HE WOULD ASK BAKER. SEITZ EXPECTED US
POSITION MIGHT BE COOL.

CCC/120 212311Z UNGR6965

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1 WSHDC UNGR6964 21DEC89

TO EXTOTT URR IDA

INFO PMOOTT PCOOTT FINOTT BNATO MOSCO WSAW VNA GENEV LDN PARIS

BONN ROME TOKYO

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

ACC	DEC 27 1989	711856
FILE	20-USA-1-3-USSR	DOSSIER
	28- West-1-USA	

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DQ_OLCOORD/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD CPP RGE RWD RWR

RPR EFB EED EER EEA

---US/SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER MALTA-ARMS CONTROL(1)

SUMMARY:

ADMIN PROPOSED PACKAGE OF SPECIFIC MEASURES AT MALTA TO IMPROVE US/SOVIET RELATIONS, AND IT EXPECTS DISCUSSIONS OF THOSE MEASURES TO BE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF RELATIONS IN LEAD-UP TO SUMMIT IN JUN. 2. PRESIDENTS PUBLICLY EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR CONCLUSION OF START, CW AND CFE AGREEMENTS IN 1990 IS SPURRING BUREAUCRACY TO CONSIDER TRADE-OFFS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS. IN VIEW OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, A START AGREEMENT IS ACHIEVABLE BY TIME OF OR AT SUMMIT, THOUGH ITS SIGNATURE MAY HAVE TO FOLLOW SUMMIT. BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MTG IN EARLY FEB WILL ATTEMPT TO CUT DEALS ON SOME OF MOST DIFFICULT OUTSTANDING ISSUES. CW AGREEMENT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT PROPOSITION, BUT IS NOT OUT OF QUESTION.

3. NEGOTIATIONS WILL ALSO BEGIN IN JANUARY ON US/SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT THOUGH ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE WILL BE CONTINGENT ON

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR6964 CONF

SUPREME SOVIET PASSING-FREEDOM OF-EMIGRATION LEGISLATION.ADMIN
EXPECTS THIS TO BE FOLLOWED BY US ACCORDING USSR MFN STATUS,
WAIVER OF JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT,POSSIBLE LIFTING OF STEVENSON
PROHIBITION ON EXPORT CREDITS,AND GRANTING USSR OBSERVER STATUS
AT GATT AFTER CONCLUSION OF URUGUAY ROUND.SOME LIBERALIZATION
OF COCOM RESTRICTIONS IS ALSO EXPECTED.

4.BALANCE OF THIS TEL REPORTS ON ARMS CONTROL AGENDA.SEE FOLLOWING
TEL ON US/SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

REPORT:

5.IN FOLLOW-UP TO HIS MTGS WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS IMMED AFTER AMLTA,
BURNET CALLED YESTERDAY ON ASSISTANT SEC OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND
CDN AFFAIRS,RAY SEITZ,FOR ASSESSMENT OF HOW ADMIN IS APPROACHING
ITS RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW OVER NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

6.ACCORDING TO SEITZ,THE QUOTE VERY STARCHY MENU UNQUOTE WHICH
PRESIDENT PROPOSED AT MALTA WILL DICTATE AGENDA FOR SOME TIME TO
COME.BUSH'S GOAL WAS TO SEE NUMBER OF SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES REACHED BY
TIME OF HIS FULL SUMMIT MTG WITH GORBACHEV IN UNITED STATES IN
SECOND HALF OF JUNE,AND HIS PUBLIC ENUMERATION OF THESE WAS INTENDED
TO ENSURE BUREAUCRACY GOT MESSAGE.

7.(A)START

ON ARMS CONTROL FRONT,BUSH WANTS ALL MAJOR ISSUES RESOLVED BY TIME
OF HIS NEXT MTG WITH GORBACHEV.SEITZ THOUGHT THIS WAS POSSIBLE,
THOUGH IT WAS UNLIKELY TREATY WOULD ACTUALLY BE READY TO BE SIGNED

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6964 CONF

AT SUMMIT. ALL OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN THOROUGHLY EXPLORED, AND IT WAS NOW ESSENTIALLY A MATTER OF QUOTE GETTING OF THE DIME UNQUOTE AND MAKING TRADE-OFFS NECESSARY FOR AN AGREEMENT.

2. PRESIDENT HAD LAID DOWN AN AGENDA FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS MTG (IN FIRST WK OF FEB) WITH EXPRESS PURPOSE OF DISPOSING QUICKLY OF THREE ISSUES MOST SUBJECT TO QUOTE BUREAUCRATIC DEADLOCK UNQUOTE (ALCMS, SLCMS AND MISSILE ENCRYPTION). AIM WAS ALSO TO QUOTE FILL IN GAPS UNQUOTE IN US POSITION, IN SOME CASES ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. WITH ONLY A FEW WEEKS TO GO BEFORE MTG, SEITZ EXPECTED A LOT OF INTER-AGENCY WORK WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE IN SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, IF US IS TO HAVE NEGOTIABLE POSITION READY BY BEGINNING OF FEB. NSC WILL BE CHAIRING MTGS ALMOST EVERYDAY BEGINNING IN NEW YEAR.

3. (B) CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SEITZ WAS LESS SURE AGREEMENT WOULD BE READY BY SUMMER. UNLIKE START, THERE WAS A LOT OF NEW GROUND TO BE COVERED. GOOD PART OF US PROPOSAL MADE AT MALTA (FOR AN INTERIM US/SOVIET CW AGREEMENT PENDING CONCLUSION OF A MULTILATERAL CW CONVENTION) STILL HAD TO BE FILLED OUT, WHILE SOVIETS SEEMED TO BE STARTING ALMOST FROM ZERO. ACCORDING TO SEITZ, IT WAS CLEAR FROM EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS AT MALTA THAT SOVIETS HAD NOT FOCUSED ON PRESIDENTS UN SPEECH (WHEN HIS BILATERAL CW PROPOSAL WAS FIRST LAUNCHED) AND MUCH OF TIME ON FIRST DAY OF SUMMIT WAS SPENT RESPONDING TO WHAT SEEMED TO BE GENUINE SOVIET QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. ONLY ON SECOND DAY DID GORBACHEV ANNOUNCE

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6964 CONF

HIMSELF INTERESTED IN US PROPOSAL.

12.(C)OPEN SKIES

ON OPEN SKIES,SEITZ SAID SOVIETS HAD QUOTE ENDORSED THE CONCEPT UNQUOTE(WHICH US TOOK AS POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT)AND AGREED TO ATTEND CONFERENCE.BUT US STILL DID NOT KNOW WHAT SOVIETS WANTED OR HOW THEY WOULD RESPOND TO NATO POSITION.

11.IN AN ASIDE,SEITZ SAID PRESENCE OF 23 AT OTTAWA MTG WAS OPPORTUNITY TO INJECT IMPULSE INTO CFE NEGOTIATIONS,BUT US WAS WONDERING HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED.US WAS NOT KEEN ON HAVING SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO CFE IF ALL THAT HAPPENED WAS THAT FOREIGN MINS,HAVING ALREADY MADE INDIVIDUAL PRESENTATIONS ON OPEN SKIES,LAUNCHED INTO SECOND SERIES OF SET-PIECES ON CFE.SEITZ INQUIRED INTO OUR THINKING ON ISSUE,AND WE TOLD HIM IDEA OF WORKING LUNCHEON DEVOTED TO CFE WAS ONE OF NUMBER BEING LOOKED AT.HE SEEMED INTERESTED.

12.(D)NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

SEITZ SAID GORBACHEV HAD MADE A GOOD PRESENTATION ON ARMS CONTROL, ON SECOND DAY OF MALTA SUMMIT,NOTING AS THE QUOTE ONE GLARING EXCEPTION UNQUOTE ON AGENDA ANY DISCUSSION OF NAVAL ARMS CONTROL. DISPLAYING MAP OF USSR SURROUNDED BY US BASES,HE SAID SOVIETS SIMPLY COULD NOT/NOT HELP COUNTING THE 1500 AIRCRAFT WHICH THESE BASES SUPPORTED.LATER IN PRESENTATION,HE REPEATED SOVIET INTEREST IN PURSUING TALKS ON NAVAL TACTICAL NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS,WHICH HE SAID

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR6964 CONFD

COULD HELP ARREST SLCM PROLIFERATION AND EASE TASK OF SLCM
VERIFICATION. BUT ACCORDING TO SEITZ, QUOTE THE PRESIDENT DID NOT
EXACTLY TAKE THIS UP UNQUOTE.

CCC/085 212311Z UNGR6964

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

ACC DATE
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR DOSSIER
LOC A3- (A-7)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYSV0062 12DEC89

TO EXTOTT PNR

INFO TOKYO BNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME GENEV BONN STKHM HSNKI
PEKIN HAVAN POECD BGRAD BPEST BUCST PRGUE WSAW PRMNY PCOOTT/
DOYLE/IAC PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER SEOUL SPORE BNGKK JKRTA
KLMPR

TT NDHQOTT/CIS/DIPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA MINP BMM USS RGB PGB GGR LGB RGX GMR PSR PND PSD

RBD RBR RBT RBRD IFB IMD IMH IMU CPD CPP IND INP INE RWD

REF XYGR2183 11DEC

---USS MTG AT SOVIET MFA:KOREA AND PRC

AT ORIGINATORS REQUEST PLS NOTE CORRECTION TO REFTTEL PAGE ONE
PARA TWO AS FOLLOWS

QUOTE 2.ROGACHEV SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE A GENERAL REMARK FIRST
ABOUT ///NEGS ON/// SOVIET/CHINESE TROOP REDUCTIONS WHICH HAD
STARTED TWO DAYS BEFORE.UNQUOTE

CCC/156 121025Z XYSV0062

CDN EYES ONLY
ENTRE CONS SEULEMENT

ACTION

ITE A

ACC	DATE
837229	
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	
LOC	
A7-#	A-6
A7-# OR DMC/CHRETIEN	

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM WSHDC UNGR6952 09DEC89

TO EXTOTT/US DELIVER BY 100900(D.O. PHONE USS OR DMC/CHRETIEN)
INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE
BNATO MOSCO LDN PARIS BONN ROME TOKYO WSAW BREEC
DISTR MINA UGB URB URD URR RGB RWD RWR RBR IFD IDD IDR IDA CPD CPP
EED

---THE MALTA SUMMIT-IMPLICATIONS(IV)

AT MALTA SUMMIT ONE SENSED THAT NEITHER SIDE THOUGHT THEY HAD THE
SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE UNDER CONTROL.THE RISKS LOOMED LARGER
THAN THE OPPORTUNITIES,AND BOTH SEEMED MORE PREOCCUPIED WITH
SAFELY MANAGING DAILY CRISES THAN CHARTING A PARTICULAR COURSE
FOR FUTURE.HENCE THE CARE WHICH CHARACTERIZED THEIR RESPECTIVE
PERFORMANCES,EXEMPLIFIED BY UNPRECEDENTED JOINT PRESS CONF,
CAUTIOUS LANGUAGE,NOTABLE ABSENCE OF ONE-UP-MANSHIP,AND FOCUS
ON CURRENT ARMS CONTROL AGENDA.AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT WAS
FORWARD MOVEMENT ON ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.IN LONG
TERM,IT COULD TRANSFORM USA/SOVIET RELATIONS;BUT IN THE SHORT
TERM IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH BOTH SIDES
SEEM TO PREFER.

2.HEAD OF STATES POLICY PLANNING OFFICE DENNIS ROSS HAS DESCRIBED
GORBACHEV AS A MAN IN A HURRY WITH NO/NO STRATEGY.ONE COULD AS
ACCURATELY DESCRIBE BUSH AS A MAN NOT/NOT IN A HURRY WITH NO/NO
STRATEGY.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR6952 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

3. PROBLEM IS THAT SITUATION MAY NOT/NOT AWAIT ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT OF EITHER SIDES POSITION. ADMIN HAS ALREADY FOUND ITSELF FORCED BY EVENTS AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES TO TAKE FORWARD POSITIONS OF CFE, AID TO POLAND AND HUNGARY, ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH USSR, AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION (SEE OURTEL UNGR6955 09DEC).

4. JUST AS IN IMMEDIATE POST-WAR YEARS, WHEN WE RECOGNIZED THAT CDN INTERESTS WERE AT STAKE IN EUROPE, SO TODAY OUR FUTURE WILL BE PROFOUNDLY AFFECTED NOT/NOT JUST BY WHETHER THERE IS A PEACEFUL TRANSITION IN EUROPE TO NEW POST-COLD-WAR ARRANGEMENTS, BUT ALSO BY WHAT THOSE ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE. AND JUST AS IN 1945, CDA IS AN IMPORTANT PLAYER, AS THE PRIME MINISTERS RECENT ACTIVITIES ATTEST. WE ARE IN NATO, WHERE MOST OF KEY ISSUES ARE GOING TO BE LOOKED AT OVER NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, AND WE WILL BE AT ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN JULY AND CFE SUMMIT IN FALL WHERE CRITICAL DECISIONS MIGHT BE MADE.

5. THE USA ROLE WILL BE A VERY LARGE, IF NOT/NOT DETERMINANT, FACTOR IN HOW SITUATION IN EUROPE EVOLVES. BUT THE USA HAS NO/NO BETTER COMPASS THAN ANYONE ELSE FOR SAFELY TRAVERSING UNFAMILIAR TERRAIN. SIGNIFICANTLY, THIS ADMIN HAS NOT/NOT BARRELLED AHEAD --AS SO MANY OF ITS PREDECESSORS HAVE-- LEAVING ITS ALLIES TO FOLLOW AND GRUMBLE. INSTEAD IT IS MOVING SLOWLY AND SOLICITING IDEAS AS IT GOES, IN PARTICULAR CDAS AS ZOELICK MADE CLEAR TO ME YESTERDAY.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6952 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

6. AMERICANS HAVE ASKED EXPLICITLY FOR A MESSAGE OF ASSURANCE THAT PM ENDORSES POSITION ARTICULATED BY BUSH AT NATO SUMMIT (IN PART BECAUSE OF ROW THIS CAUSED IN LDN). IF THIS HAS NOT/NOT BEEN DONE BY PHONE, I SUGGEST A LETTER BE SENT ASAP PREFERABLY MONDAY WHICH ALSO OFFERS A CDN INTERPRETATION. (DRAFT TEXT IN SEPARATE TEL).

7. WE SHOULD ALSO SEIZE OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO ACT AND TO EXERCISE OUR INFLUENCE. THE MOMENTUM GENERATED BY PMS VISIT TO USSR, WHICH SECURELY ESTABLISHED HIS CREDENTIALS ON EAST/WEST ISSUES, AND HIS STRONG PERFORMANCES AT BUSH DINNER AND NATO SUMMIT, SHOULD BE USED TO MAXIMUM EFFECT. AS I SEE IT, THIS WOULD INVOLVE THE FOLLOWING:

-ON PROCESS, WE SHOULD ENSURE CONTINUED CLOSE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PM AND PRESIDENT, AND BETWEEN SSEA AND BAKER. CONSULTATIONS AT PERSONAL LEVEL WILL REMAIN KEY.

-ON SUBSTANCE, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONVEY VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS ON THE CENTRAL ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION, WHERE WE HAVE SOMETHING TO CONTRIBUTE, AND DEVELOP CONTINGENCY PLANS/OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH FAST MOVING DEVELOPMENTS.

-IN ECONOMIC FIELD, WHERE PMS INFLUENCE HAS SO FAR BEEN GREATEST, WE SHOULD FOLLOW-UP WITH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR ADVANCING PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON. (DEPUTY PM SHOULD DISCUSS POLAND WITH YEUTTER, WHEN HE VISITS WSHDC 18/19DEC). WE ARE LIKELY TO FIND COMMON GROUND OF CONCERN WITH USA AND PROBABLY JPN ON SOME ASPECTS OF FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR BANK OF EUROPE (E.G. THAT WE CAN CONTRIBUTE BUT CANNOT/NOT VOTE).

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6952 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

-IN ARMS CONTROL FIELD, WHERE OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE OFFERS HOST OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR INFLUENCING AGENDA, WE SHOULD LOOK AT HOW CONF MIGHT BE USED TO ADVANCE OUR VIEWS BEYOND IMMEDIATE SUBJECT OF MTG. PM SHOULD CONSIDER SPEAKING TO CONFERENCE, AND BILATERALS WITH SOME OF PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE SCHEDULED.

-NEWLY NAMED USA SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR ON OPEN SKIES, AMB BOB BARRY, HAS ASKED TO MEET ME NEXT WEEK TO GET A FIRST-HAND BRIEF ON CDN OBJECTIVES. I WOULD WELCOME SOME FIRST-CLASS BRIEFING MATERIAL TO ENSURE HE REALLY GETS OUR MESSAGE.

-ON QUESTION OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND FUTURE OF EUROPE, WE NEED TO BE CLEAR IN OUR MINDS WHETHER BUSH'S FOUR POINTS ARE SUFFICIENT FOR CURRENT PURPOSES, WHETHER WE WANT GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND IF SO WHAT KIND, WHAT OUR PREFERRED OUTCOME FOR FUTURE OF EUROPE WOULD BE, AND WHAT KIND OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WE WOULD WANT TO HAVE WITH IT.

-IN GENERAL POLITICAL AREA, WITH SO MUCH FOCUS ON EUROPE AT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, WE SHOULD BE DEVELOPING A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR OUR FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE CONTINENT AND FOR THE PRIORITIES WE WANT TO SET FOR CDN FOREIGN POLICY IN MEDIUM TO LONG TERM. AS KENNAN, BRZEZINSKI AND OTHERS HAVE POINTED OUT, WE ARE ON THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW WORLD ORDER. WE SHOULD HAVE SOME IDEA OF WHERE AND HOW WE WANT TO FIT INTO THE PICTURE.

BURNEY

CCC/114 100141Z UNGR6952

RETURN TO REVOYER AU	FOR FILING POUR - ETRE POUR AU DOSSIER
ACC 625418	REF. DATE
FILE	DOSSIER

DEC 7 1989

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WSHDC UNGR6950 06DEC89

USS ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

TO EXTOTT/URR DELIVER BY 070800
INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE FINOTT/DODGE/SMEE/
IFD BNATO MOSCO VNACE GENEV LDN PARIS BONN ROME TOKYO HKONG PEKIN
CNBRA WSAW BPEST PRAGUE PRMNY BREEC POECD
BH BOFCOTT DE OTT
TT NDHQOTT/MND/DM/CDS/VCDS/ADMPOL/ DE CAF
DISTR MINA USS DMC DMT URB URD URR RGB RWD RWR RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA
CPD CPP FED EFB EEE EER

---THE MALTA SUMMIT-ARMS CONTROL(II)

RUSH MATCHED HIS SIX ECONOMIC PROPOSALS WITH SIX PROPOSALS ON ARMS
CONTROL.BARTHOLOMEW DESCRIBED POINTS AS A COHERENT PROGRAM FOR
ADVANCING ARMS CONTROL IN SHORT TERM.THEIR ACCEPTANCE,HE SAID,WOULD
LEAD TO A NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT WHICH WAS CONSISTENT WITH AND
SUPPORTED EVENTS IN EUROPE.GENERAL SOVIET RESPONSE WAS POSITIVE.
AMERICANS BELIEVE GORBACHEV IS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN EARLY AND
DEEP CUTS IN BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARSENALS,AND SHARES
PRESIDENTS DETERMINATION TO QUOTE KICK SOME REAR ENDS UNQUOTE TO
ENSURE AGREEMENTS CAN BE CONCLUDED IN 1990.

2.BARTHOLOMEW SAID BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE SPOKE OF LATTER
ATTENDING OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE IN OTTAWA IN FEBRUARY.

3.(A)START AND NAVAL ARMS CONTROL:PRESIDENT PROPOSED ACCELERATING
START PROCESS,WITH AIM OF RESOLVING ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES PRIOR TO

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR6950 CONF

OR AT 1990 SUMMIT, SO THAT AGREEMENT ITSELF COULD BE CONCLUDED IN 1990. TO THIS END, PRESIDENT SUGGESTED (AND GORBACHEV AGREED) THAT BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE BE TASKED WITH RESOLVING QUOTE THREE OF THE TOUGHEST OUTSTANDING ISSUES UNQUOTE (ALCAMS, NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES AND ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY) BY TIME OF OR AT THEIR MEETING IN USSR IN JANUARY.

4. SOVIETS PREDICTABLY CONTINUE TO ARGUE THEIR VIEW OF START/SDI LINKAGE, ALCM/HEAVY BOMBER COUNTING RULES, AND CONTROL OF SLCMS.

THEY ALSO PRESSED THEIR ARGUMENT FOR NAVAL ARMS CONTROL, HANDING OVER KGB MAP DISPLAYING EVERY KNOWN U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATION IN WORLD TO UNDERSCORE THEIR CONCERN OVER ENCIRCLEMENT BY U.S. NAVY. THEY PROPOSED COMPLETE DENUCLEARIZATION OF NAVIES EXCEPT FOR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES. IN THEIR VIEW, SUCH APPROACH WOULD SOLVE SLCMS VERIFICATION PROBLEMS. AMERICANS ACCORDING TO BATHOLOMEW, GAVE SOVIETS NO/NO REASON TO BELIEVE U.S. WOULD ALTER ITS OPPOSITION TO NAVAL ARMS CONTROL.

5. (B) CONVENTIONAL FORCES: TO DRAMATIZE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO EARLY CONCLUSION OF CFE AGREEMENT, PRESIDENT SUGGESTED USA AND SOVIET UNION JOINTLY EXPRESS THEIR SUPPORT NOT ONLY FOR CONCLUSION OF A CFE AGREEMENT IN 1990, BUT ALSO FOR ITS SIGNATURE AT A CFE SUMMIT BEFORE THE END OF 1990. SOVIETS, WHOSE IDEA THIS HAD BEEN, AGREED.

6. ON SUBSTANCE, BARTHOLOMEW SAID SOVIETS GENERALLY RECAPITULATED THEIR POSITIONS. HE CITED AS NOTEWORTHY SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR 1.3 MILLION MANPOWER CEILING ON BOTH SIDES, FOR STANDING FORCE CEILING OF 300,000 TO INCLUDE ALL STATIONED FORCES, AND FOR OFFENSIVE AIRCRAFT CEILING OF

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6950 CONF D

4700 LEAVING AIR DEFENCE AIRCRAFT TO BE SUBJECT TO SEPARATE LIMIT.

7.(C)CHEMICAL WEAPONS:PRESIDENT SUGGESTED SOVIETS JOIN WITH AMERICANS IN WORKING TOWARDS EARLY CONCLUSION OF A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION BARRING CHEMICAL WEAPONS,UNDER WHICH TWO SIDES WOULD DESTROY 98 PERCENT OF THEIR HOLDINGS BY EIGHTH YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENT AND PROCEED WITH REMAINDER ONLY IF ALL OTHER CW COUNTRIES HAD DESTROYED THEIR STOCKS.IF SOVIETS ACCEPT,U.S.WOULD ALSO AGREE TO END PRODUCTION OF BINARY WEAPONS QUOTE WHEN CONVENTION ENTERS INTO FORCE UNQUOTE (PRESUMABLY AT BEGINNING,RATHER THAN END,OF 8 YEAR IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD).

8.SECONDLY,PRESIDENT PROPOSED THAT TWO SIDES AGREE BILATERALLY TO REDUCE THEIR CW STOCKS DOWN TO 20 PERCENT OF CURRENT HOLDINGS EVEN BEFORE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION COMES INTO EFFECT,AND HE SUGGESTED SUCH AGREEMENT BE SIGNED AT 1990 SUMMIT.

9.ACCORDING TO BARTHOLOMEW,U.S.PROPOSALS WERE NOT MUCH DISCUSSED AT MALTA,BUT AMERICANS HAD IMPRESSION SOVIETS WERE RECEPTIVE TO THEM PARTICULARLY TO CONCEPT OF PHASING REDUCTIONS AND NEGOTIATING BILATERAL INTERIM AGREEMENT.SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE RECOGNIZED THE QUOTE POSITIVE MEANING UNQUOTE OF THE U.S.OFFER ON BINARY WEAPONS.

10.(D)NUCLEAR TEST BAN:PRESIDENT PROPOSED TWO SIDES COMPLETE WORK ON THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY(TTBT)AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY (PNET),SO THAT VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS ON THESE COULD BE SIGNED AT 1990 SUMMIT.THIS WOULD,IN TURN,PERMIT ADMIN FINALLY TO SUBMIT TREATIES TO SENATE FOR RATIFICATION.

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6950 CONF

11.(E)MISSILE PROLIFERATION:PRESIDENT INVITED SOVIETS TO ANNOUNCE THAT THEY WOULD JOIN WESTERN EFFORTS TO CONSTRAIN MISSILE PROLIFERATION MORE EFFECTIVELY BY OBSERVING LIMITS DEVELOPED BY U.S.AND ITS ALLIES IN THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.(BATHOLOMEW DID NOT SAY HOW SOVIETS RESPONDED.)

12.(F)MILITARY GLASNOST:WITH A VIEW TO INCREASING CONFIDENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN MILITARY DOMAINE,PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT SOVIETS MAKE PUBLIC MORE INFORMATION ON THEIR MILITARY PROGRAMS,INCLUDING DETAILS ON THEIR MILITARY BUDGET,FORCE POSTURE,AND WEAPONS PRODUCTION FIGURES, AS USA NOW DOES.FOR DRAMATIC EFFECT,BAKER PUSHED HEAVY SET OF U.S. BUDGET DOCS ACROSS TABLE AT SHEVARDNADZE.(BARTHOLOMEW REMARKED THAT WHEN BAKER HAD TOLD SHEVARDNADZE AT WYOMING USA WANTED TO GET ACCURATE PICTURE OF SOVIET DEFENCE BUDGET,LATTER HAD REPLIED QUOTE SO DO WE UNQUOTE.

CCC/120 070035Z UNGR6950

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

RETURN TO RENNVOYER AU	BIG 3	FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORTE AU DOSSIER
ACC	712072	REF DATE
FILE	20-USA-1-3-1989	DOSSIER

KS
File
A7

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6951 06DEC89

TO EXTOTT/URR DELIVER BY 070800

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE FINOTT/DODGE/SMEE/IFD
BNATO MOSCO VNACE GENEV LDN PARIS BONN ROME TOKYO HKONG PEKIN CNBRA
WSAW BPEST PRAGUE PRMNY BREEC POECD WDOAS
PH BOFCOTT DE OTT

TT NDHQOTT/MND/DM/CDS/VCDS/ADMPOL/ DE CAF


DISTR MINA USS DMC DMT URB URD RGB RWD RWR RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD
CPP EFD EFB EEE EER EEF EEA UEE GGB GMD GMR PSD PSR LGB LSD LSR LCD
LCR LGX

---THE MALTA SUMMIT:REGIONAL ISSUES(III)

PRIOR TO SUMMIT,BUSH AND BAKER SAID THAT U.S.SIDE WOULD PLACE HEAVY
EMPHASIS AT MALTA ON SOVIET BEHAVIOUR IN THIRD WORLD.ACCORDING TO ROSS,
AT MEETING PRESIDENT AND SEC OF STATE TOLD SOVIETS THAT THE ONE AREA
WHERE SOVIET QUOTE NEW THINKING UNQUOTE SEEMED NOT/NOT TO APPLY WAS
IN REGIONS.U.S.WAS CONCERNED ABOUT GENERAL PATTERN OF SUPPORT WHICH
USSR ACCORDED SUBVERSIVE FORCES IN THIRD WORLD,THROUGH SUPPLIES OF ARMS
AND SUBSIDIES,AND ABOUT PARTICULAR SUPPORT USSR EXTENDED TO SANDINISTAS
AND FMLN GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR.

2.ROSS SAID U.S.SIDE MADE TWO MAIN POINTS.FIRST,U.S.COULD
NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND HOW SOVIETS COULD FIND DLRS 15 BILLION A YEAR
TO UNDERWRITE COMBATTING OF DEMOCRACY IN SEVEN COUNTRIES ABROAD,WHEN
SOVIET ECONOMY WAS STRUGGLING AND SOVIET LEADERS WERE ESPOUSING

...2



PAGE TWO UNGR6951 CONF

OF DEMOCRACY IN SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. SECONDLY, MOSCOW HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT SOVIET ACTIONS, ESPECIALLY IN CENTRAL AMERICA, WERE NOTED IN CONGRESS AND POSED SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR ADMIN IN FORGING BETTER TIES WITH USSR.

3. AMERICANS WERE SINGULARLY UNIMPRESSED, ROSS SAID, WITH GLIB AND CURSORY REPLIES THEY RECEIVED FROM SOVIETS ON CENTRAL AMERICA, PARTICULARLY CUBA.

4. CENTRAL AMERICA

U.S. SIDE TOLD SOVIETS THERE WAS IRREFUTABLE AND UNAMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE THAT FMLN GUERRILLAS HAD BEEN ABLE TO MOUNT THEIR RECENT ATTACK AS A DIRECT RESULT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES THEY HAD RECEIVED FROM SANDINISTAS, AND THAT SANDINISTAS IN TURN HAD GOT THEM FROM CUBA. CUBA HAD ORIGINALLY ACQUIRED THEM FROM SOURCES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET UNION. IN ADDITION

FMLN HAD RECEIVED COMMAND AND CONTROL ASSISTANCE.

5. IN LIGHT OF THIS, AMERICANS WONDERED ABOUT ASSURANCES THEY HAD RECEIVED AT WYOMING THAT SOVIET SUPPLIES TO CENTRAL AMERICA HAD CEASED AND THAT SOVIETS HAD BEEN PROMISED BY NICARAGUA THAT IT WOULD CEASE ITS SUPPLIES TO FMLN. PRESIDENT SAID HE WAS NOT/NOT ACCUSING SOVIETS, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT COMMITMENT MADE BY SANDINISTAS WAS NOT/NOT BEING UPHOLD. SOVIETS, HOWEVER, COULD NOT/NOT ESCAPE RESPONSIBILITY. THEY HAD EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT OF ESQUIPULAS AGREEMENT AND SANDINISTAS WERE IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF IT. PRESIDENT NOTED HE HAD RECEIVED CALLS FROM TWO CENTRAL AMERICAN LEADERS (ARIAS AND PERES) URGING HIM TO PASS ON

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6951 CONF

THEIR REQUEST THAT GORBACHEV USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH CUBA AND NICARAGUA TO END THEIR DESTABILIZING ACTIVITIES IN REGION.

6. GORBACHEV REPLIED THAT SOVIETS WERE NOT/NOT PROVIDING ARMS, THAT THEY HAD GONE TO BOTH CUBA AND NICARAGUA TO ASK ABOUT CHARGES THESE COUNTRIES WERE AIDING FMLN, AND THAT BOTH HAD DENIED DOING SO. HE SAID AIRCRAFT LIKE CESSNAS AND ARMS LIKE AK-47 RIFLES WERE WIDELY AVAILABLE, AND THERE WAS NO/NO SPECIAL REASON THESE SHOULD HAVE COME FROM CUBA OR NICARAGUA. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, NO/NO ONE CONTROLS CASTRO (A TELLING NON-SEQUITUR). HE INVITED AMERICANS TO TALK TO CASTRO DIRECTLY.

7. MIDDLE EAST

DISCUSSION ON MIDEAST, ACCORDING TO ROSS, WAS RELATIVELY BRIEF.

8. IT OPENED WITH GORBACHEV ASKING QUOTE SO WHAT ARE WE GOING TO DO ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST? UNQUOTE AND BUSH ANSWERING QUOTE IT S NOT/NOT UP TO US (I.E. USSR AND USA) UNQUOTE. GORBACHEV SAID THAT PROSPECTS FOR MIDEAST SETTLEMENT NONETHELESS LOOKED BETTER THAN THEY HAD FOR LONG TIME, AND USSR WAS PREPARED TO HELP. BUT HE SAID HE HOPED USA WOULD CONSULT MORE WITH USSR ON SUBJECT. MOSCOW THOUGHT BAKERS FIVE POINTS WERE QUOTE OKAY UNQUOTE, BUT IT WOULD HAVE WELCOMED DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THEM BEFORE THEY WERE ENNOUNCED. ROSS COMMENTED THAT WHAT SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY WANTED WAS TO BE CONSULTED AS U.S. DEVELOPED ITS PLANS NOT/NOT AFTERWARDS (NO/NO AMBASSADOR AT BRIEFING CHALLENGED SUCH AN IDEA.)

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6951 CONF

9. BUSH SAID HE WELCOMED SOVIET OFFER TO HELP AND HE SUGGESTED ONE THING SOVIETS COULD DO WAS TO RESTORE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. SOVIET LEADER SAID THAT PROCESS WAS ALREADY UNDERWAY (SHEVARDNADZE NOTED THAT ISRAELIS HAD CONSULAR MISSION IN MOSCOW AND THAT HE HAD MET SIX TIMES WITH ISRAELI FM). ONLY SOVIET QUALIFIER TO RECOGNITION, ROSS NOTED, WAS THAT IT WOULD COME QUOTE AS PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT UNQUOTE. IN ROSS VIEW, WHILE SOVIETS HAD MADE NO/NO FORMAL COMMITMENT AND SPECIFIED NO/NO TIMETABLE, THEY HAD NOT/NOT AS IN EARLIER TIMES SPECIFIED ANY PARTICULAR OBSTACLES EITHER.

10. BOTH SIDES RAISED ISSUE OF LEBANON AT DIFFERENT TIMES IN PROCEEDINGS, AND EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR ONGOING POLITICAL PROCESS AND FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT. U.S. EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT BUILDUP OF SYRIAN FORCES AND ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF SYRIAN ASSAULT ON AOUN. SOVIETS SAID THEY WERE NOT/NOT AWARE OF ANY SPECIAL SYRIAN BUILDUP OF FORCES, AND SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE THOUGHT SYRIANS DID NOT/NOT WANT TO STAY FOREVER IN LEBANON. HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE PEACEFUL OUTCOME TO CURRENT CRISIS, BUT HE NO/NO SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE AS TO HOW THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED.

11. THEY AGREED TO ISSUE A JOINT APPEAL.

12. AFGHANISTAN

OF THE THREE REGIONAL ISSUES DISCUSSED, AFGHANISTAN WAS MOST UPBEAT ACCORDING TO ROSS. WHILE TWO SIDES GENERALLY REHEARSED THEIR POSITIONS, AMERICANS THOUGHT THEY DETECTED MOVEMENT IN SOVIET POSITION. SOVIETS PLACED SOME EMPHASIS ON IMPORTANCE OF QUOTE TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR6951 CONF

UNQUOTE, WHICH AMERICANS TOOK TO MEAN THAT SOVIETS MIGHT FINALLY HAVE STARTED TO THINK ABOUT TRANSFER OF POWER FROM NAJIBULLAH TO MORE REPRESENTATIVE GROUP. ROSS SAID IT WAS TOO EARLY TO DRAW ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS, BUT AMERICANS WOULD BE PROBING IN NEXT FEW WEEKS TO SEE IF SOVIETS REALLY WERE WILLING AT LAST TO DISCUSS U.S. IDEAS.

13. (WE MIGHT NOTE THAT SHEVARDNADZE'S MEETING WITH FORMER KING OF AFGHANISTAN IN ROME PRIOR TO MALTA SUMMIT IS CONSISTENT WITH POSSIBILITY SOVIETS ARE EXAMINING TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MAY NOT/NOT INVOLVE NAJIBULLAH.)

14. OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES

ROSS SAID CAMBODIA AND NORTH KOREA (NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ISSUE) WERE TOUCHED ON BRIEFLY, BUT WITHOUT CONSEQUENCE. THERE WAS NO/NO DISCUSSION OF GULF.

CCC/120 070035Z UNGR6951

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

7
DEC 7 1989

file

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6933 06DEC89

TO EXTOTT LURR DELIVER BY 070800

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE FINOTT/DODGE/SMEE/IFD

BNATO MOSCO VNACE GENEV LDN PARIS BONN ROME TOKYO HONG KONG PEKIN - ETRE

CNBRA WSAW BPEST PRAGUE PRMNY BREEC POECD

TT NDHQOTT/MND/DM/CDS/VCDS/ADMPOL/ DE CAF

BH BOFCOTT DE OTT

DISTR MINA USS DMC DMT URB URD URR RGB RWD RWR RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD

CPP CPE EED EFB EEE EER EEF EEA UEE

---THE MALTA SUMMIT: U.S./SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS (I)

SUMMARY: THIS IS FIRST OF FOUR TELS REPORTING ON MALTA SUMMIT.

SECOND TEL DEALS WITH MILITARY AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, THIRD

WITH REGIONAL ISSUES, AND FOURTH DRAWS SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR

CANADA.

2. SUMMIT WAS SUCCESS FROM SEVERAL PERSPECTIVES, DESPITE TIME

LOST BECAUSE OF STORM WHICH FORCED CANCELLATION OF SATURDAY

AFTERNOON SESSION AND WORKING DINNER THAT NIGHT. THERE WAS GOOD

RAPPORT ESTABLISHED BETWEEN LEADERS AND MEETING OF MINDS ON

PROCESS FOR ADVANCING EAST/WEST AGENDA OVER NEXT SIX MONTHS, WITH

VIEW TO CONCLUDING ECONOMIC AND ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AT JUNE

SUMMIT. PRESIDENTS ECONOMIC OVERTURES WERE IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE

DEVELOPMENT WITH LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS, FOR WHICH PRIME MINISTER

MULRONEY CAN TAKE MUCH OF CREDIT BECAUSE OF HIS FORCEFUL INTERVENTION

ON ISSUE DURING PRIVATE DINNER WITH BUSH BEFORE SUMMIT. PMS SUBSEQUENT

PRESENTATION AT NATO SUMMIT WAS COMMENDED BY UNDERSEC OF STATE

BARTHOLOMEW AS QUOTE EXTREMELY WELL DONE AND VERY INTERESTING UNQUOTE

...

RETURN TO		FOR FILING	
ACC		REF DATE	
625421			
FILE		DOSSIER	
20-USA-1-3-USA			

PAGE TWO UNGR6933 CONFD

FOR HAVING PULLED TOGETHER ISSUES AND POLICES IN HIGHLY REFLECTIVE AND PERSONAL MANNER. NOT/NOT FOR LONG TIME HAS CANADIAN INFLUENCE ON MATTERS OF SUCH HIGH POLICY BEEN SO EVIDENT.

3. ON CENTRAL QUESTIONS OF REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION, LEADERS AT MALTA APPEAR TO HAVE AGREED ON MODUS VIVENDI UNDER WHICH REFORMS WILL BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED, SOVIETS WILL NOT/NOT USE FORCE TO ARREST THEM, AMERICANS WILL NOT/NOT SEEK UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM THEM, AND TWO SIDES WILL MOVE CAUTIOUSLY ON SUBJECT OF INTER-GERMAN RELATIONS. WHILE BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO AGREE THAT GERMAN QUOTE SELF-DETERMINATION UNQUOTE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO GO FORWARD, AMERICANS SEEM TO WANT TO KICK QUESTION OF POSSIBLE GERMAN REUNIFICATION FAR DOWN ROAD AND SOVIETS WANT TO RULE IT OUT ALL TOGETHER. IT IS NOTEWORTHY, THEREFORE, THAT BUSH REFERRED AT NATO SUMMIT TO HELSINKI PRINCIPLES AND FOUR POWER RIGHTS. IT IS POSSIBLE SUMMITTEERS SETTLED ON THESE AT MALTA TO CARRY THEM THROUGH NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

4. WE DRAW THESE CONCLUSIONS LARGELY FROM PUBLIC RECORD, SINCE DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN LARGELY CONFINED TO ONE-ON-ONE SESSIONS BETWEEN BUSH AND GORBACHEV AND OFFICIALS ARE RELUCTANT TO DIVULGE CONTENTS EVEN TO ALLIES. WHEN SENIOR STATE DEPT OFFICERS BRIEFED ALLIED AMBASSADORS YESTERDAY, THEY AVOIDED ALL MENTION OF GERMAN QUESTION (AND AMBASSADORS THOUGHT BETTER THAN TO ASK).

5. BRIEFERS WERE BOB ZOELLICK (COUNSELLOR OF DEPT), REGINALD

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6933 CONF

BARTHOLOMEW (UNDERSEC FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS), AND
DENNIS ROSS (HEAD OF POLICY PLANNING STAFF).

6. U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS

PRESIDENT LED OFF THE MEETING SAYING HE WANTED TO COMMUNICATE TO
GORBACHEV PERSONALLY HIS RESPECT AND ADMIRATION FOR PERESTROIKA,
AND HIS DESIRE THAT IT SUCCEED. HE SAID HE HOPED THEIR MEETING
COULD GO BEYOND PHRASEOLOGY, GIVE POSITIVE IMPETUS TO BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP, AND HELP IN SEARCH FOR POINTS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.
HE WAS NOT/NOT IN MALTA TO NEGOTIATE, BUT HE WANTED TO SET A
PROCESS IN TRAIN THAT WOULD LEAD TO AGREEMENTS AT A SUMMIT NEXT
YEAR. IN LIGHT OF EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE, THERE WAS NEED FOR
CAUTION THOUGH NOT/NOT TIMIDITY. THAT WAS ONE REASON HE HAD
NOT/NOT GONE TO BERLIN, AS SOME SUGGESTED HE DO. (IT HAS SINCE
BEEN ANNOUNCED BAKER WILL GO NEXT WEEK.)

7. IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, GORBACHEV SAID HE WANTED TO
CONVEY SOME GENERAL IMPRESSIONS ABOUT THE WORLD AND U.S. SOVIET
RELATIONS. THE WORLD WAS AT AN HISTORICAL WATERSHED. GORBACHEV
KNEW HE WOULD HAVE PROBLEMS TO DEAL WITH, BUT HE HAD NOT/NOT
ANTICIPATED THAT THEY WOULD BE SO ACUTE. POLICIES NEEDED TO BE
BASED ON THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. HE FAVOURED WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN
EASTERN EUROPE, BUT THERE WAS ALSO NEED FOR STABILITY IN REGION
AND IT WAS INCUMBENT ON BOTH SIDES TO FIND WAY TO ENSURE THIS
USA AND USSR, HE SAID, WERE QUOTE DOOMED UNQUOTE TO COOPERATE.

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6933 CONF

HE SAID HE APPRECIATED CAUTIOUS APPROACH PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN ON EASTERN EUROPE. MAINTENANCE OF TWO ALLIANCES WAS IMPORTANT, AS WAS CONTINUED ROLES FOR UNITED STATES AND CANADA IN AFFAIRS OF EUROPE.

8. (WHEN HE WAS PROBABLY GONE TO BERLIN, AS SOME SUGGESTED HE DO. (IT HAS SINCE

BEEN ANNOUNCED BAKER WILL GO NEXT WEEK.)

7. IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, GORBACHEV SAID HE WANTED TO CONVEY SOME GENERAL IMPRESSIONS ABOUT THE WORLD AND U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS. THE WORLD WAS D LATER ON ABOUT HIS VIEWS OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT, GORBACHEV SAID THAT, AS EUROPE UNDERWENT GREAT CHANGE, ALLIANCES COULD SERVE USEFUL PURPOSE IN ENSURING CHANGE WAS PEACEFUL. IN CONTRAST TO VIEWS HE HAD EXPRESSED UP TO SIX MONTHS AGO, GORBACHEV NO LONGER BELIEVED THAT ALLIANCES COULD BE QUOTE DISPENSED WITH UNQUOTE. RATHER THEY SHOULD SHIFT FROM BEING MILITARY TO POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS.)

9. PRESIDENT THEN PROCEEDED TO LIST 21 QUOTE IDEAS UNQUOTE FOR POSSIBLE DISCUSSION AT MALTA AND FOLLOW-UP AFTERWARDS, BEGINNING WITH PROPOSALS THAT SUMMER SUMMIT BE HELD IN LAST TWO WEEKS OF JUNE AND THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET IN USSR IN JANUARY TO BEGIN PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE SUMMIT.

10. BALANCE OF PLENARY DISCUSSIONS AT MALTA SEEM TO HAVE BEEN DEVOTED TO EXAMINATION OF U.S. QUOTE IDEAS UNQUOTE, WHICH COVERED ALL MAJOR SUBJECT AREAS OF U.S./SOVIET AGENDA EXCEPT EASTERN EUROPE. AMERICANS BELIEVED SOVIETS WERE A LITTLE SURPRISED BY U.S. QUOTE IDEAS UNQUOTE BUT DID NOT/NOT FEEL SCOOPED BY THEM. IN CONTRAST, AND DESPITE EXPECTATIONS, THERE WERE NO/NO GORBACHEV QUOTE LONG BOMBS UNQUOTE. SOVIET PRESIDENT WAS APPARENTLY CONTENT

PAGE FIVE UNGR6933 CONF

TO KEEP DISCUSSIONS AT LEVEL OF PRINCIPLES. EXTRAORDINARILY,
HOWEVER, A LARGE AMOUNT OF TIME WAS DEVOTED TO ECONOMIC ISSUES.

11. ONE-ON-ONE SESSION SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN OCCASION FOR MOST OF
DISCUSSION ABOUT EASTERN EUROPE, ABOUT WHICH LITTLE IS KNOWN SO
FAR. SESSION DID, HOWEVER, TOUCH ON SITUATION IN BALTICS AND
PROVIDED PRESIDENT OPPORTUNITY TO TELL GORBACHEV THAT USE OF
FORCE TO ARREST REFORM PROCESS WOULD HAVE QUOTE TERRIBLE
REPERCUSSIONS UNQUOTE.

12. ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

BUSH SAID THAT PERESTROIKAS SUCCESS WOULD ULTIMATELY DEPEND ON
SOVIETS THEMSELVES, BUT HE BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR U.S.
ACTIVELY TO ENCOURAGE REFORM OF SOVIET ECONOMY AND TO QUOTE STAY
INVOLVED UNQUOTE IN PROCESS. FOR THIS REASON THERE WERE SIX
MEASURES WHICH HE PROPOSED TO TAKE. THESE WERE:

(A) TARGETING THE 1990 SUMMIT FOR COMPLETION OF A TRADE AGREEMENT
GRANTING MOST FAVOURED NATION STATUS TO THE SOVIET UNION, SO THAT
THE PRESIDENT COULD GRANT A JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER AT THAT TIME. TO
REACH THAT GOAL, THE PRESIDENT URGED THAT SUPREME SOVIET COMPLETE
ACTION ON ITS EMIGRATION LEGISLATION EARLY NEXT YEAR.

(B) SUPPORTING OBSERVER STATUS FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN GATT AFTER
THE URUGUAY ROUND IS COMPLETED NEXT YEAR. THE PRESIDENT URGED THE
SOVIET UNION TO USE THE INTERVENING TIME TO MOVE TOWARD MARKET

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR6933 CONF

PRICES AT THE WHOLESALE LEVEL SO ITS ECONOMY WILL BECOME MORE COMPATIBLE WITH THE GATT SYSTEM.

(C) EXPANDING U.S./SOVIET TECHNICAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION. THE PRESIDENT PRESENTED A PAPER PROPOSING SPECIFIC ECONOMIC PROJECTS, COVERING TOPICS SUCH AS FINANCE, AGRICULTURE, STATISTICS, SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, BUDGETARY AND TAX POLICY, A STOCK EXCHANGE, AND ANTI-MONOPOLY POLICY.

(D) EXPLORING WITH CONGRESS THE LIFTING OF STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORT CREDITS AND GUARANTEES AFTER A JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER.

(E) BEGINNING DISCUSSION OF A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY THAT WOULD PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS PEOPLE WHO WANT TO INVEST IN THE SOVIET UNION.

(F) IMPROVING TIES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND OECD, AND EAST/WEST ECONOMIC COOPERATION THROUGH THE ECONOMIC BASKET OF THE CSCE PROCESS.

13. GORBACHEV REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOTED IN PAST PRESIDENTS EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR PERESTROIKA, WHICH WAS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE FOR SOVIET UNION. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN GOING TO ASK WHAT SPECIFIC STEPS PRESIDENT HAD IN MIND. QUOTE BUT NOW I DON'T HAVE TO DO SO UNQUOTE.

14. AMERICANS DREW CONCLUSION THAT GORBACHEV WAS VERY PLEASED WITH BUSH ECONOMIC PROPOSALS. IN THEIR VIEW, PRESIDENT'S EARLY

...7

PAGE SEVEN UNGR6933 CONFD

FOCUS AT MALTA ON BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND IN PARTICULAR ON BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS CORRESPONDED WITH GORBACHEVS MAIN PREOCCUPATION AT PRESENT, NAMELY STATE OF SOVIET ECONOMY.

ZOELLICK SAID THAT GORBACHEV APPEARED RESOLUTE AND DETERMINED BUT HE NEEDED TO SHOW SKEPTICS AT HOME THAT WEST HAS FAITH IN PERESTROIKA AND THAT IT IS PREPARED TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO SUPPORT IT. PRESIDENTS SIX MEASURES WOULD THEREFORE BE OF IMMEDIATE BENEFIT TO HIM.

15. BUT AMERICANS WERE STRUCK BY FACT GORBACHEV SEEMED TO HAVE ONLY A VERY GENERAL IDEA OF HOW TO ACHIEVE HIS ECONOMIC GOALS. ROSS DESCRIBED AS A MAN IN A HURRY WITHOUT A STRATEGIC PLAN. HE SEEMED, IN U.S. VIEW, RATHER TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH STRUCTURE AND NOT/NOT ENOUGH WITH ECONOMIC CONCEPTS. THERE WAS A LOT ABOUT DEVELOPING FREE MARKETS THAT HE DID NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND. HE DISPLAYED A DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF LEGISLATION BEING CONSIDERED BY SUPREME SOVIET, BUT SEEMED ONLY VAGUELY AWARE OF HOW PIECES OF ECONOMIC PICTURE FITTED TOGETHER. ACCORDING TO ZOELLICK, HIS RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT MONETARY POLICY IN PARTICULAR WERE CONFUSED. (WE SHOULD REMEMBER, HOWEVER, THAT GORBACHEV WAS TALKING TO SEVERAL EX-TREASURY OFFICIALS - NOTABLY BAKER AND ZOELLICK - AND THEIR INTEREST IN THE PROBLEMS OF QUOTE RUBLE OVERHANG UNQUOTE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY EXCEED HIS OWN.) BUT AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT GORBACHEV HAD BEEN QUOTE RADICALIZED UNQUOTE AS HE ...8

PAGE EIGHT UNGR6933 CONFD

WENT ALONG AND THAT HE HAD BEEN PREPARED TO CHANGE COURSE AS
PREFERRED SOLUTIONS FAILED TO ACHIEVE EXPECTED RESULTS. NEW
ABALKIN PLAN SUGGESTED SOVIETS WERE BECOMING MORE REALISTIC ALL
THE TIME ABOUT WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE.

16. ZOELLICK AND ROSS ALSO BELIEVED GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO
EFFECT FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN SOVIET SOCIETY WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING
THAT SHIFT WAS TOWARDS WEST. HE ARGUED THAT NEW FORMS OF
OWNERSHIP BEING CONTEMPLATED WERE NOT/NOT QUOTE CAPITALIST
UNQUOTE (ZOELLICK SAID HE HAD IMPRESSION GORBACHEV BELIEVED THAT
AS LONG AS AN ENTERPRISE HAD MORE THAN ONE OWNER IT WAS NOT
PRIVATE), AND HE CHALLENGED ASSERTIONS THAT HE WAS ADOPTING
WESTERN VALUES. HE PREFERRED TO DESCRIBE THEM AS UNIVERSAL OR
DEMOCRATIC VALUES.

17. ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS

ZOELLICK SAID PRESIDENT HAD TWO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO MAKE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL FRONT, AND THAT GORBACHEV AGREED TO BOTH.

18. FIRST WAS U.S. PROPOSAL TO HOST A CONFERENCE NEXT FALL TO
NEGOTIATE A FRAMEWORK TREATY ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE. ZOELLICK
NOTED THAT U.S., U.K. AND USSR WERE CHAIRING WORKING GROUPS OF
U.N.-SPONSORED INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC),
WHICH WERE DUE TO SUBMIT FINAL REPORTS BY END OF THIS YEAR.

19. SECOND WAS PLAN TO CONVENE AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING AT WHITE

...9

PAGE NINE UNGR6933 CONF D

HOUSE NEXT SPRING FOR TOP LEVEL SCIENTIFIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES. PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HOPE THAT SOVIETS WOULD SEND THEIR TOP OFFICIALS IN FIELD.

20. HUMAN RIGHTS

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, WHICH HAVE OFTEN TAKEN UP LARGE AMOUNTS OF TIME AT U.S./SOVIET MEETINGS IN PAST, WERE DISPOSED OF RELATIVELY QUICKLY AT MALTA. THERE WAS BRIEF DISCUSSIONS OF STATUS OF SEVERAL PIECES OF LEGISLATION UNDER CONSIDERATION IN SUPREME SOVIET WHICH WOULD HELP INSTITUTIONALIZE CHANGES WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE IN SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, WITH AMERICANS URGING EARLY APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION.

21. PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ALL DIVIDED FAMILY ISSUES COULD BE RESOLVED BY TIME OF 1990 SUMMIT, AND HANDED OVER LIST OF THOSE WISHING TO EMIGRATE TO USA. BAKER PROVIDED SEPARATE LIST.

22. SOVIETS COUNTERED BY HANDING AMERICANS LONGER LIST OF THEIR OWN OF SOVIET CITIZENS WHOSE EMIGRATION REQUESTS AMERICANS HAD NOT/NOT YET ACTED ON (AN EXTRAORDINARY EXAMPLE OF CHANGES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD IN JUST LAST YEAR).

23. STUDENT EXCHANGES

PRESIDENT PROPOSED INCREASING SIGNIFICANTLY UNIVERSITY EXCHANGES, SO THAT AN ADDITIONAL ONE THOUSAND AMERICAN AND ONE THOUSAND

...10

PAGE TEN UNGR6933 CONFD

SOVIET COLLEGE STUDENTS WOULD BE STUDYING IN EACH OTHERS COUNTRY
BY BEGINNING OF 1991 SCHOOL YEAR.

24.SOVIETS RESPONDED POSITIVELY.

25.BERLIN OLYMPICS

AMERICAN SIDE SUGGESTED THAT U.S. AND USSR JOINTLY SPONSOR BERLIN
AS SITE OF OLYMPIC GAMES IN 2004.ZOELICK SAID PROPOSAL HAD BEEN
MADE TO SYMBOLIZE CHANGES WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN BERLIN.

CCC/095 070035Z UNGR6933



1 Dec 89 - 21:50 Issue n. 2
Cook notified

DA

DEC 4 1989

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE WSHDC UNGR2374 01DEC89

AC EXTOTT/URR DELIVER BY 040900 011800

AINFO PCOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE LDN PARIS BONN HAGUE
BVRU VNACE BVNATO BUCST WSAW PRGUE VATCN MDRID LSBON PRMNY GENEV
ROME MOSCO

DISTR MINA MINP USS IFB RGB URB UGB LGB CPD CPP RBD RWD RBR RWR LCD

LCR IDD DIR IDA

REF BNATO YGBR7277 30NOV

~~---SOMMET DE MALTE-APPROCHE AMERICAINE~~

ACC	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	A-7

RESUME: AVEC EN FILIGRAMME CE QUI A ETE RAPPORTE PAR L AMBASSADEUR
AMERICAIN A BRUXELLES, ROBERT KIMMIT, SOUS-SECRETAIRE POUR LES
AFFAIRES POLITIQUES AU DEPT D ETAT, A PASSE RAPIDEMENT EN REVUE LES
OBJECTIFS AMERICAINS POUR REUNION DE MALTE. CE QUI SUIT FAIT ETAT
DES ELEMENTS ORIGINAUX RELEVES AU COURS SESSION D INFORMATION. IL
EST A NOTER CONSISTENCE ET COHERENCE DANS L APPROCHE AMERICAINE
ALORS QUE DIFFERNTES DECLARATIONS FAITES PAR OFFICIELS AMERICAINS
ET SEC BAKER (VOIR NOTRE TEL UNGR6931 29NOV) FONT CONSTAMMENT ETAT
DES MEMES CONSIDERATIONS. IL S AGIT DES QUESTIONS RELATIVES AUX
CONFLITS REGIONAUX, PARTICULIEREMENT L AMERIQUE CENTRALE; LES
DISCUSSIONS ECONOMIQUES ET LES CHANCES DE REUSSITE DE LA PERESTROIKA;
ET LA NATURE BILATERALE DES DISCUSSIONS SUR LE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS.
2. RAPPORT: CONFLITS REGIONAUX: KIMMIT A REITERE AVEC GRAVITE,

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2374 CONF

IMPORTANCE PRIMORDIALE QU ACCORDERA PRES BUSH AUX CONFLITS REGIONAUX ET PARTICULIEREMENT L AMERIQUE CENTRALE. PRES METTRA L EMPHASE SUR LES CONTRADICTIONS DE L APPROCHE SOVIETIQUE DIT DU CIT NEW THINKING FINCIT APPLIQUEE D UNE FACON EN EUROPE DE L EST, D UNE AUTRE DANS LES CONFLITS REGIONAUX. ALORS QUE GORBACHEV RECONNAIT QUE STABILITE INTERNATIONALE DOIT SE FONDER SUR NON-INGERENCE EN EUROPE DE L EST, SOVIETIQUES SE REFUSENT A AGIR DE MEME FACON DANS CONFLITS REGIONAUX. DANS CAS DE L AMERIQUE CENTRALE, URSS, QUI S EST ENGAGE A TRAVAILLER A DIMINUER TENSIONS QUI MINENT STABILITE REGIONALE, NE REMPLIT PAS SES ENGAGEMENTS. COMPTE TENU DE L AIDE MILITAIRE ET ECONOMIQUE QU ELLE APPORTE AU NICARAGUA ET CUBA, URSS EST EN MESURE D INFLUENCER SIGNIFICATIVEMENT ACTIONS PRISES PAR CES DEUX REGIMES, CE QU ELLE SE REFUSE TOUJOURS A FAIRE. D AUTRE PART, UNE AUTRE ECOLE DE Pensee AU SEIN DE L ADMINISTRATION DEFEND LA THESE QUE CASTRO ET ORGEA POURSUIVENT LEUR INDEPENDANCE PAR RAPPORT AUX POLITIQUES DES DEUX SUPER-PUISSANCES. KIMMIT A EGALEMENT FAIT ETAT DU CAMBODGE, DU MOYEN-ORIENT ET DE L AFGHANISTAN. CEPENDANT, IL A UTILISE L AFRIQUE COMME EXEMPLE DE COOPERATION.

3. QUESTIONS ECONOMIQUES: MALTE DEVRAIT SERVIR A OBTENIR, DANS SES PROPRES MOTS, L INTERPRETATION QUE FAIT GORBACHEV DE LA SITUATION ECONOMIQUE EN URSS, SES PLANS DE DEVELOPPEMENTS ET LES CHANCES DE SUCCES DE LA PERESTROIKA. LES ETATS UNIS NE SERONT EN MESURE

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2374 CONFD

D AJUSTER LEURS PROPRES RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES AVEC L URSS QU UNE
FOIS CETTE QUESTION CLARIFIEE.BUSH REITERERA SON APPUI ET L ESPOIR
QUE LE PROGRAMME DE RESTRUCTURATION ECONOMIQUE REUSSIRA.COMPTE TENU
DU FAIT QUE L ABOLITION DE CLAUSE JACKSON-VANIK EST SUJETTE A
L ADOPTION PAR L UNION SOVIETIQUE D UNE NOUVELLE LOI SUR
L IMMIGRATION,PRES EXPRIMERA SES REGRETS QUE NOUVELLE LEGISLATION
N AIT PU ETRE ADOPTEE AVANT LA FIN DU CALANDRIER LEGISLATIF.IL
INVITERA GORBACHEV A ACCORDER A CETTE LEGISLATION LA PREMIERE
IMPORTANCE LORS DE L OUVERTURE DE LA PROCHAINE SESSION.EN REPONSE
A UNE QUESTION,KIMMIT A INDIQUE QUE RESERVES AMERICAINES QUANT A
LA PARTICIPATION SOVIETIQUE AUX INSTITUTIONS INTERNATIONALES
ECONOMIQUES ETAIENT DE NATURE STRICTEMENT ECONOMIQUE PLUTOT QUE
POLITIQUE,PUISQUE LES ECONOMIES PLANIFIEES ET CENTRALISEES
PEUVENT DIFFICILEMENT S ADAPTER AUX STRUCTURES INSTITUTIONNELLES
D ORGANISATIONS DU GATT,DU FMI OU DE LA BANQUE INTL DE DEVELOPPEMENT.
4.CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS:QUOIQ IL NE SERAIT PAS SURPRENANT QUE
GORBVACHEV SOUMETTE DE NOUVELLES PROPOSITIONS,LES E.U.N ONT PAS
L INTENTION D ARRIVER A UN ACCORD SANS CONSULTATION PREALABLE AVEC
LES ALLIES.L ADMINISTRATION EST D AVIS QUE QUESTIONS MULTILATERALES
SERONT DE SECONDE IMPORTANCE.MALTE SERA PLUTOT UTILISEE COMME UNE
SESSION PREPARATOIRE POUR LE PROCHAIN SOMMET OU ON ETABLIRA LES
GRANDS PARAMETRES EN CE QUI CONCERNE QUESTIONS.

...4

LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES
INFORMATION CENTRE

LIGUJ IS ETATS ARABES
CENTRE D'INFORMATION



جامعة الدول العربية
مكتب - أوتاوا - كندا

No.:

Date:

الرقم:

التاريخ:

Date: 30/11/1989

To: Mr. Percy Sherwood GMD

Fax No: 952-3904

Firm: External Affairs

From: Ambassador A. Adam

City: Ottawa


No. Pages

(incl. cover): 4

RECEIVED IN GMD

DEC 04 1989

File
Copied to GMR-1-2-3



If you do not receive
all pages, please call us
back as soon as possible

Our Fax No. 238- 5076

**MESSAGE FROM THE LEAGUE OF
ARAB STATES COUNCIL TO THE U.S. - SOVIET
SUMMIT - MEETING OF MALTA**

(Tunis, 30/11/1989)

The league of Arab States Council convened in an Extraordinary Session at the League Headquarters on 29/11/1989 in Tunis, expresses the hope that the Summit-Meeting of the U.S. and Soviet Presidents, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, will mark an epoch-making date in the history of mankind and a decisive move toward a world in which peace and detente shall prevail.

This meeting which takes place in the proximity of Arab countries' shores in the Mediterranean sea, assumes special importance due to the massive waves of change affecting the world today, whether in the area of disarmament and the reduction of military forces deployed in Europe or in that of growing democratization and detente, or again in respect to the settlement of regional conflicts through peaceful means and on the basis of peoples' inalienable rights to freedom, sovereignty and independence.

The League of Arab States Council looks forward to this Super-power Summit as an opportunity for bolstering these changes and for addressing among its major agenda-items the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict in an effort to end Israeli occupation of the Palestinian and Arab Territories Occupied since 1967, knowing that this occupation stands as a roadblock along the way to peace and security in the region and in the world at large.

The Palestinian peace-initiative, supported by the Arab Casablanca Summit, provides the bases for a just and global solution of the Palestinian problem.

The responsibility of the two superpowers is all the greater in view of their paramount role in the search for solutions to regional conflicts and for the elimination of hotbeds of tension and war. And no hotbed of tension is more menacing and more dangerous to world peace than the Middle East region, due to the continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab Lands and the denial of the Palestinian people's national rights, foremost of which their right to self-determination.

The League of Arab States Council appeals to the two Presidents to bring their common concern for the building of world peace to bear on our region, through an effort to solve the Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 and other international resolutions calling for:

- Israeli withdrawal from all the 1967 - Occupied Palestinian and Arab Territories, including Arab Jerusalem.

- Enabling the Palestinian people to restore its national rights, including the rights to self-determination, return and independent statehood on its national soil in accordance with international legality and the U.N. resolutions.

- The right of all the States of the region to live in peace and security.

- Convening the International Conference on Peace in the Middle East, under the sponsorship of the United Nations and with the participation of the five Permanent Member-Nations of the Security Council and all parties to the conflict, including the PLO.

As the holding and eventual success of the International Conference require a number of preliminary steps in preparation for a suitable climate, the League of Arab States Council stresses the need for the PLO's participation in such steps and in the Conference itself, in its capacity of representative of the Palestinian people and full partner in the just and global peace-process in the Middle East.

The League of Arab States Council calls the United States and the Soviet Union to give the Palestinian issue, during the talks of Malta, the priority that the gravity of the situation in the Middle East dictates, to try and get rapidly the peace process relative to this issue out of the deadlock to which the negative and obstinate stance of the Israeli government has led and to initiate what efforts are needed for holding the International Conference on Peace in the Middle East - a Conference supported by the United Nations and all parties concerned with the exception of Israel.

In this respect, the model used in the solution of the Namibian problem, under the supervision of the U.N., could serve as a valid example in the quest for a global and just settlement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Any procrastination in the quest for a just and global settlement of the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict can only lead to further violations of Palestinian human rights, make the spectre of war loom larger in the region, kill all hope of stability for all the States of this region and pose a direct threat to world security at large, especially as Israel is the exclusive owner of nuclear weaponry in this area.

=====

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

RECEIVED IN GMR

NOV 21 1989

A-3

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2342 20NOV89

TO EXTOTT GMR

INFO CAIRO TAVIV DMCUS BGHDD RYADH AMMAN KWAIT TUNIS RABAT VATCN

ALGER LDN PARIS ROME MOSCO PRMNY BONN TOKYO BNATO ATHNS STKHM

ANKPA PCOOTT/DOYLE/IAC PMOOTT PILLAROTT/FPL CIDA HULL/MINE

TT NDHQOTT/CIS/CSA/DIPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC IFB GGB GMD IMU IND INF GGB GMRD GMT URR UGB URD

CPP ISD ISE ISEO JLE

---USA/USSR MIDEAST DIALOGUE

USSR SPECIAL ENVOY FOR MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS MET LAST WEEK WITH

OFFICIALS HERE. T³PRASOV WAS CARRYING MESSAGE FROM SHEVARDNADZE TO

BAKER INDICATING SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH DEGREE OF BILATERAL

CONSULTATIONS AND FACT SOVIETS DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE THEY HAD BEEN

KEPT ADEQUATELY INFORMED. USSR UNDERSTANDING OF PEACE PROCESS

DIFFERED FROM THAT OF USA IN THREE PARTICULAR AREAS OF CONCERN.

MOSCOW BELIEVED THAT:

-PLO S ROLE NEEDED TO BE OPENLY RECOGNIZED;

-AGENDA FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE HAD TO ENCOMPASS MORE

THAN JUST ELECTIONS; AND

-INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES AND PARTICIPATION FOR DIALOGUE WOULD BE
DESIRABLE.

2. AMERICANS BELIEVE THEY HAD USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS MAKING
POINT IN PARTICULAR THAT GIVING PLO PUBLIC ROLE AT THIS

...2

ACC	DATE
697683	
FILE	DOSSIER
21-12-156	ABAC
LOC	20-USA-1-3-USA

PAGE TWO UNGR2342 CONF

TIME WAS A NON-STARTER AS ISRAELIS WOULD SIMPLY WALK AWAY FROM DIALOGUE BUT THAT WAY COULD BE FOUND TO REASSURE PLO. SIMILARLY ANY MEETING UNDER AUSPICES OF MAJOR POWERS WOULD SCARE OFF ISRAELIS ALTHOUGH BROADER INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE WAS NOT/NOT TO BE EXCLUDED.

3. DIALOGUE ALSO PROVIDED USA SIDE WITH OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS REPORTS THAT PLO WAS CONCERNED ABOUT SECRET AMERICAN GUARANTEES TO ISRAEL. WASHINGTON BELIEVES THAT MOSCOW HAS BEEN CONVEYING THAT IDEA TO PLO AND USA SIDE TOOK ISSUE DENYING THAT SUCH REPORTS WERE TRUE. AMERICANS SUGGESTED TO TERASOV THAT ISSUE AND SOVIET REPORTS OF SECRET AGREEMENT TO PLO RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS AND ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. IN USA VIEW SOVIET ACTIONS RAISED SPECTOR OF 1985 WHEN MOSCOW WORKED TO SABOTAGE JORDANIAN/PLO AGREEMENT ON APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

4. CLEARLY NO EFFORT IS BEING MADE BY AMERICANS TO EXCLUDE RUSSIANS FROM PEACE PROCESS. RATHER WASHINGTON IS SIGNALLING THAT MOSCOW HAS A ROLE TO PLAY AND SHOULD EXERCISE IT CONSTRUCTIVELY. AMERICANS THINK THAT PURSUIT OF SHAMIR ELECTION PROPOSAL IS VIABLE APPROACH AND SOVIETS ARE WELCOME TO HELP. THERE IS SOME ENCOURAGEMENT DERIVED HERE FROM FACT THAT IF SOVIETS HAVE NOT SHOWN OVERTWHELMING ENTHUSIASMS, AT SAME TIME THEY HAVE NOT GIVEN TRADITIONAL RESPONSE THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN IT FOR THEM.

CCC/120 202237Z UNGR2342

ACC	DATE
FILE	891114
LOG	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	(A-6)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6916

TO EXTOTT RGB IFB DELIVER BY 150900

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE BNATO MOSCO BONN WSAW

TT NDHQOTT/DM/CDS/ADMPOL/ASSOC ADMPOL/DGPOL COOR/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA VSS DMC RBRRWDRWRIDD IDA IDR CPD CPP

---MALTA SUMMIT-DEFENCE DEPT VIEWS

SUMMARY:UNDERSEC OF DEFENCE FOR POLICY TOLD AMB TODAY THAT PENTAGON PREPARATIONS FOR MALTA SUMMIT DO NOT/NOT INCLUDE ANY MAJOR CHANGES IN US DEFENCE OR ARMS CONTROL POLICY.WOLFOWITZ SAID THAT EVENT IN EAST EUROPE,WHILE VERY POSITIVE,WERE SUFFICIENTLY UNCERTAIN THAT USA AND WEST NEEDED TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT CHANGING COURSE.CFE NEGOTIATIONS ARE ON RIGHT TRACK AND SHOWING PROMISE OF COMING THROUGH WITH RIGHT RESULT.NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS STILL CONFRON SERIOUS PROBLEMS,BUT HERE TOO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION CAN BE EXPECTED IF SOVIETS REALLY WANT AN AGREEMENT.

2.WOLFOWITZ TOLD BURNEY PENTAGON WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER GORBACHEV SURPRISE AT MALTA,BUT WAS COMFORTABLE WITH PRESIDENTS ABILITY TO HANDLE ANY.ONE SUGGESTION GAINING CURRENCY IS THAT GORBACHEV MIGHT PROPOSE MUTUAL MILITARY WITHDRAWALS FROM GERMANY,BUT WOLFOWITZ EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT THIS MIGHT CREATE MORE PROBLEMS FOR GORBACHEV THAN IT WOULD SOLVE.

IN FINAL ANALYSIS,SOVIETS WANT TO MAINTAIN THEIR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IS EAST EUROPE,AND WOULD PROBABLY PREFER THAT SOME US FORCES REMAIN IN FRG.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR6916 CONF

3.REPORT:IN COURSE OF WIDERANGING DISCUSSION THIS MORNING, WOLFOWITZ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME PEOPLE WERE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH NOTION OF AN UNSTRUCTURED US/SOVIET SUMMIT.BUT HE NOTED THAT REYKJAVIK WAS NOT/NOT THE ONLY PRECEDENT.FIRST REAGAN/GORBACHEV MTG IN GENEVA HAD ALSO BEEN WITHOUT FORMAL AGENDA AND HAD SERVED VERY USEFUL PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING MTG OF MINDS WHICH LATER PAID HANDSOME DIVIDENDS.GIVEN MUCH MORE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THAT TIME,WOLFOWITZ HAD NO/NO DOUBT AS TO VALUE OF BUSH SEEKING TO ESTABLISH RAPPORT WITH INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS SO INFLUENTIAL ON SOVIET POLICY.

4.WOLFOWITZ THOUGH GORBACHEVS STRATEGY AT MALTA WOULD BE TO TRY TO INVOLVE USA IN SOLVING SOVIET PROBLEMS,BUT US RESPONSE WOULD BE CAUTIOUS ONE.SOVIET MILTIARY RECORD TO DATE HAD BEEN MIXED. THERE HAD BEEN LOTS OF POSITIVE ELEMENTS,BUT ALSO SOME VERY DISTURBING ONES:TANK PRODUCTION RATES HAD REACHED RECORD LEVELS THIS YEAR AND SOVIETS WERE PROVIDING VERY EXTENSIVE MILITARY SUPPORT TO QUOTE STALINIST REGIMES UNQUOTE IN SEVERAL REGIONS OF WORLD(HE MENTIONED CUBA,VIETNAM,AFGHANISTAN,NICARAGUA AND SALVADOR GUERILLAS).AMERICANS WOULD MAKE THE POINT(AND WOLFOWITZ ENCOURAGED CDA TO DO SO ALSO IN MOSCOW)THAT IT WAS HARD TO UNDERSTAND HOW SOVIETS WHO WERE SO STRAPPED FOR FUNDS COULD JUSTIFY SPENDING HUGE AMOUNTS PROPPING UP SYSTEMS WHICH THEY HAD ACKNOWLEDGED WERE FAILURES IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY.IN RESPONSE TO BURNEY QUESTION,

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6916 CONF

WOLFOWITZ ACKNOWLEDGED INERTIA PROBABLY ACCOUNTED FOR SOME OF QUOTE BUSINESS AS USUAL UNQUOTE OF SOVIET BEHAVIOUR IN THIRD WORLD, AND HE THOUGHT SOVIETS NEEDED TO BE PRESSURED TO CHANGE(HE SAID CHINESE HAD SUCCESSFULLY PRESSURED SOVIETS ON CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM).

5.WOLFOWITZ DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE THERE WERE ANY COMPELLING REASONS FOR MAJOR ADJUSTMENTS IN ALLIANCE STRATEGY.WITH EVENTS SO DIFFICULT TO PREDICT,COURSE OF PRUDENCE WAS TO PRESS ON WITH ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ALONG AGREED PATH.CFE NEGOTIATIONS WERE QUOTE ON THE RIGHT TRACK UNQUOTE AND SHOEING PROMISE OF ACHIVING DESIRED RESULTS, THOUGH WOLFOWITZ DID NOT/NOT RULE OUT SOME SLIPPAGE IN TIMETABLE. GORBACHEV,HE THOUGHT,HAD A VESTED INTEREST IN SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME, NOT/NOT LEAST BECAUSE THERE WERE SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL SAVINGS TO BE HAD.WOLFOWITZ THOUGHT THERE WAS QUOTE EVEN UNQUOTE A PROSPECT OF AN EARLY START AGEEMENT,BUT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT SLCMS AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE ISSUES BE BROUGHT INTO NEGOTIATIONS.IF THEY WERE PREPARED TO LET THESE DROP OUT,WOLFOWITZ BELIEVED REMAINING OUTSTANDING ISSUES(ALCM COUNTING RULES AND MOBILE VERIFICATION)COULD BE RESOLVED.

WOLFOWITZ LEFT CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT MALTA SUMMIT WAS VIEWED BY ADMIN AS POTENTIALLY USEFUL SPUR TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIAITONS, BUT NOT AS OCCASION FOR CONCLUDING AGREEMENTS.

6.WITHIN ADMIN WOLFOWITZ SAID THERE WAS A LOT OF THINKING BEING DONE ABOUT POSSIBLE GORBACHEV QUOTE SURPRISES UNQUOTE AT THE SUMMIT,

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6916 CONF

AND THE POSSIBLE SURPRISE BEING ACCORDED GREATEST ATTENTION WAS A CALL FOR MUTUAL US AND SOVIET MILITARY WITHDRAWALS FROM GERMANY. WOLFOWITZ DID NOT/NOT DISMISS THE POSSIBLITY,BUT HE DOUBTED GORBACHEV WOULD REALLY SEE IT IN SOVIET INTEREST TO TAKE RED ARMY OUT OF GDR.SOVIETS COULD ACCEPT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN EAST EUROPE,BUT NOT/NOT CHANGES TO EXISTING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. SOVIETS DID NOT/NOT LIKE TALK OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION,BUT THAT WOULD BECOME MUCH EASIER ONCE SOVIET FORCES HAD GONE FROM GDR.

7.WOLFOWITZ SAID HE WAS A LITTLE CONCERNED ABOUT BRAVE TALK OF DISSOLUTION OF TWO ALLIANCES.NATO AND WARSAW PACT WERE NOT/NOT COMPARABLE.MOREOVER,NATO HAD PROVIDED IMPORTANT MEASURE OF POLITICAL STABILITY TO EUROPE,AND THAT WAS MORE NECESSARY TODAY THAN EVER. IN ADDITION,IT PROVIDED COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENT AND RATIONALE FOR SUCH ARRANGEMENT WOULD NOT/NOT DISAPPEAR WITH CONVENTIONAL REDUCUTIONS.

CCC/143 142308Z UNGR6916

RETURN TO RENDRE AL	FOR FILING POUR - ETRE POUR AU DOSSIER
REC	REF DATE
FILE	OTHER
20-USA-1-3-USSR	
CONFIDENTIAL	

DA
and file
@

993-7960

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned URR
Person _____
Local Time 1731

FM WSHDC UNGR6920 15NOV89

TO EXTOTT URR RBR DELIVER BY 151630

INFO PMOCTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE BNATO MOSCO BONN WSAW
GENEV VNACE ROME TT NDHQOTT/MMD/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/CDS/CSDS/ DE CAF
DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RWD RWR CPD CPP

---MALTA SUMMIT-SCENARIO

NSC CONFIRMED THIS MORNING THAT US PLANS FOR MALTA SUMMIT CALL
FOR PRESIDENT TO LEAVE WASHINGTON SHORTLY BEFORE THE SUMMIT AND
TO TRAVEL DIRECTLY TO MALTA TO PERMIT MEETING TO BEGIN SATURDAY
MORNING DEC 2. MTG WOULD CONCLUDE SUNDAY AFTERNOON, FOLLOWING
WHICH PRESIDENT CURRENTLY PLANS TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON. THERE
ARE NO/NO PLANS FOR PRESIDENT TO VISIT BERLIN.

2. SUMMIT WOULD QUOTE VERY LEKELY UNQUOTE BE HELD ON FIRST DAY ABOARD
SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER SLAVA, AND ON SECOND ABOARD US GUIDED
MISSILE CRUISER BELKNAP WHICH IS FLAGSHIP OF US SIXTH FLEET.

SHIPS WOULD BE ANCHORED IN MARSAXLOKK BAY, WITHIN EYESIGHT
(500-600 YRDS) OF LAND. TIME WOULD BE SET ASIDE ON BOTH DAYS
FOR PRIVATE MTGS BETWEEN PRINCIPALS. TEAMS ON BOTH SIDES WOULD
BE SMALL (US SIDE LIKELY TO INCLUDE BAKER, SUNUNU AND SCOWCROFT).

3. NSC CONTACT TOLD US TO EXPECT ANNOUNCEMENT ALONG THESE LINES
WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS, ONCE GENERAL MODALITIES HAVE BEEN AGREED TO
WITH SOVIETS.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR6920 CONF D

4. CONTACT TOLD US THERE WAS SUBSTANCE TO RUMOURS WHICH HAVE BEGUN TO CIRCULATE HERE THAT ADMIN IS GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO EITHER BUSH OR BAKER BRIEFING ALLIED LEADERS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING SUMMIT PROBABLY IN BRUSSELS. (BURNEY QUERIED SCOWCROFT ON THIS VERY ISSUE WHEN HE CALLED ON HIM MONDAY MORNING, AND ACCORDING TO WASHINGTON POST IT WAS SCOWCROFT WHO PUT IDEA TO PRESIDENT).

ACCORDING TO WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN, ADMIN IS QUOTE LOOKING FOR A WAY TO BRIEF THE ALLIES UNQUOTE BUT NO/NO DECISIONS ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE HAVE YET BEEN MADE.

5. IN HIS PRESS BRIEFING, YESTERDAY, FITZWATER ALSO NOTED FOLLOWING:

-PRESIDENT HAS BEEN QUOTE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH FRANCE UNQUOTE RECENTLY (BAKER APPEARS ALSO TO HAVE TAKEN A CALL FROM F.M. DUMAS YESTERDAY, PRESUMABLY FOLLOWING LATTERS MTGS IN MOSCOW WITH GOBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE)

-PRESIDENT SPOKE WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL BY PHONE LAST WEEK

-PRESIDENT WILL BE MEETING WITH THATCHER AT CAMP DAVID FOR QUOTE A COUPLE OF HOURS UNQUOTE ON 24 NOV.

CCC/143 152111Z UNGR6920

Bio A-7

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

ACC	REF	DATE
622668		
FILE	DOSSIER	
20-45A-1-3-45518		

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6911 13NOV89

TO EXTOTT RGB DELIVER BY 140800

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE MOSCO BNATO BONN WSAW
LDN PARIS ROME TOKYO

DISTR MINA USS DMC RBR RWD RWR CPD CPP URB DMT

---MALTA SUMMIT-US OBJECTIVES


SUMMARY: NSC ADVISOR TOLD BURNEY THIS MORNING THAT PRESIDENT HAD FIRST STARTED THINKING ABOUT MTG WITH GORBACHEV AFTER VISITS TO POLAND AND HUNGARY, BUT THAT DECISION TO HOLD MTG BEFORE END OF THIS YEAR WAS RELATIVELY RECENT ONE BASED ON PACE OF EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. PRESIDENT HAD NOT/NOT WANTED TO WAIT UNTIL SPRING BEFORE TALKING WITH GORBACHEV.

2. SCOWCROFT DESCRIBED MALTA SUMMIT AS OCCASION FOR A QUOTE PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS UNQUOTE. IT WAS NOT DESIGNED FOR ANY PARTICULAR OUTCOME. PRESIDENT WILL TAKE VERY SMALL GROUP WITH HIM, AND HAS NO/NO SPECIFIC AGENDA IN MIND. SCOWCROFT DENIED ADMIN HAD ANY INTENTION OF QUOTE PROPPING UP UNQUOTE GORBACHEV IE THROUGH OFFERING HIM ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. ON OTHER HAND, SCOWCROFT HINTED PRESIDENT WOULD WARN GORBACHEV ABOUT CRACKING DOWN ON DISSENT. ADMIN DID NOT RULE OUT POSSIBLE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION.

3. SCOWCROFT SAID PRESIDENT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED TO LEARN WHAT APPROACH GORBACHEV TOOK ON ECONOMIC AND GERMAN QUESTIONS DURING PMS VISIT TO MOSCOW.

...2

31 A J	124	324
		321



PAGE TWO UNGR6911 CONF

4.REPORT:AMB CALLED ON PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,BRENT SCOWCROFT,TODAY TO BRIEF HIM ON PMS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO USSR AND TO REVIEW PREPARATIONS FOR BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT IN MALTA WHICH FOLLOWS SHORTLY AFTER.

5.SCOWCROFT SAID BUSH HAD BEGUN THINKING IN JULY THAT HE OUGHT TO TALK TO GORBACHEV,BUT THAT ADMIN HAD WANTED TO PREPARE CAREFULLY FOR MTG TO AVOID PUBLIC SPECULATION ABOUT QUOTE WHO HAD WON AND WHO HAD LOST UNQUOTE AT MTG.SEVERAL POSSIBLE DATES HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED RANGING UP TO LATE SPRING AND EARLY SUMMER.IN LIGHT OF EVENTS,HOWEVER,PRESIDENT DECIDED HE COULD NOT WAIT THAT LONG WITHOUT SPEAKING WITH SOVIET LEADER.

6.MALTA SUMMIT WOULD BE A PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS,PERMITTING SHARING OF PERSPECTIVES ON FAST MOVING EVENTS AND AVOIDING POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS.IT WAS NOT DESIGNED WITH PARTICULAR OUTCOME IN MIND,AND PRESIDENT WAS CONSCIOUSLY NOT ORGANIZING A FIXED AGENDA.BOTH SIDES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE THINGS TO BRING UP,BUT SCOWCROFT EXPECTED MAINLY QUOTE THE STANDARD RANGE OF THINGS UNQUOTE IT THE WORLD SITUATION,EAST/WEST RELATIONS,AND BILATERAL QUESTIONS.

7.SCOWCROFT ACKNOWLEDGED THINGS WERE NOT GOING WELL FOR GORBACHEV (GLASNOST,HE SAID,HAD BEEN ALMOST TOO SUCCESSFUL AND PERESTROIKA NOT SUCCESSFUL ENOUGH).SOVIETS HAD LIFTED ENOUGH CENTRAL CONTROL ON ECONOMY TO CREATE CHAOS,AND NOT ENOUGH TO GENERATE LOCAL INITIATIVE. BUT HE DENIED PRESIDENT HAD ANY INTENTION OF TRYING TO PROP UP

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6911 CONF

GORBACHEV REGIME OR OF DOING SOVIET LEADER A FAVOUR.

8. WHAT COULD USA REALISTICALLY DO IN ANY CASE, SCOWCROFT ASKED? WHAT GOOD WOULD AID DO? SOVIETS HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT JOINT VENTURES FOR 18 MONTHS, BUT NONE HAD GOT OFF THE GROUND. UNTIL MOSCOW INSTITUTED FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS EG OF PRICING SYSTEM, THERE WAS REALLY NO EFFECTIVE WAY SOVIETS COULD JOIN GATT OR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. BEST USA COULD DO WAS TO OFFER ADVICE ON ESTABLISHING SUCH THINGS AS MARKET SYSTEM AND CENTRAL BANKING SYSTEM, OR PROVIDE MANAGERIAL TRAINING. SCOWCROFT SAID ADMIN WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED TO LEARN WHAT APPROACH TO ECONOMIC RELATIONS GORBACHEV TOOK DURING PMS VISIT.

9. IN RESPONSE TO BURNEY'S QUESTION, SCOWCROFT SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO HINT OF POSSIBLE GORBACHEV CRACK-DOWN ON DISSENT, AND HE DOUBTED THERE WOULD BE ONE. GORBACHEV LIKED USA SUPPORT FOR HIS PROGRAMS AND KNEW USA WOULD REACT VERY NEGATIVELY TO CRACKDOWN. QUOTE WE WOULD NOT BE AS RESTRAINED UNQUOTE AS AFTER TIANANMEN SQUARE.

10. SCOWCROFT SAID ADMIN BELIEVED GORBACHEV'S PRIORITIES WERE SOVIET ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. IN LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS IN GDR, HE WAS BEING FORCED TO LOOK AT EASTERN EUROPE IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT. UP UNTIL NOW, EVENTS IN PLACES LIKE POLAND AND HUNGARY COULD BE VIEWED AS SOMEWHAT PERIPHERAL THOUGH SUPPORTIVE OF HIS OWN DOMESTIC EFFORTS. BUT GDR WAS LYNCHPIN OF SOVIET PRESENCE IN WHOLE REGION AND WOULD DEMAND GOOD DEAL MORE CAREFUL HANDLING. SOVIETS WERE NOT GOING

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6911 CONF

TO HELP KRENZ DEAL WITH OPPOSITION(SCOWCROFT SAID KRENZ HAD SOUGHT SUCH SUPPORT DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW AND HAD BEEN TOLD SOVIET FORCES WOULD REMAIN IN THEIR BARRACKS),BUT THEY WERE GOING TO HAVE TO SLOW MOMENTUM TOWARDS REUNIFICATION BECAUSE OF ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR WARSAW PACT AND SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS IN REGION.SCOWCROFT THOUGHT SITUATION COULD STILL QUOTE REALLY GET OUT OF HAND UNQUOTE. HOW GORBACHEV HANDLED GERMAN QUESTION DURING PMS VISIT WOULD BE OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO PRESIDENT.

11.OFFICIAL US POSITION ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION,SCOWCROFT SAID,WAS THAT USA WAS IN FAVOUR OF IT BUT FOCUS FOR NOW SHOULD BE ON LIBERALIZING REFORM IN GDR.USA BELIEVED IN QUOTE SELF-DETERMINATION ON AN INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC EAST GERMANY UNQUOTE.(THERE IS,THEREFORE, A COINCIDENCE OF SOVIET AND USA VIEWS ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION AT LEAST IN SHORT TERM).

12.WHEN BURNEY ASKED IF USA WAS EXPECTING A GORBACHEV INITIATIVE ON GDR,SCOWCROFT SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE.HIS QUOTE HUNCH UNQUOTE WAS THAT GORBACHEV MIGHT PROPOSE SOME KIND OF GRAND EUROPEAN TREATY.ADMIN WOULD NOT RESPOND WITH GREAT WARMTH TO SUCH AN IDEA,BELIEVING THAT RESOLUTION OF GERMAN QUESTION OUGHT TO BE AT END OF PROCESS OF EAST EUROPEAN LIBERALIZATION,NOT AT BEGINNING.BUT HE SAID USA COULD NOT IGNORE SOVIET PARANOIA ABOUT GERMAN REUNIFICATION.

13.DISCUSSION CONCLUDED WITH SCOWCROFT SUGGESTING THAT RECENT EVENTS HAD RAISED A LOT OF QUESTIONS(ABOUT SOVIET THREAT,ABOUT

...5

000872

PAGE FIVE UNGR6911 CONFD

NATO AND WARSAW PACT,ABOUT CFE NEGOTIATIONS)WHICH NEEDED TO BE DEALT
WITH A LOT SOONER THAN WE HAD THOUGHT.ALLIES NEEDED TO SIT DOWN
SOON AND DECIDE WHAT TO DO.

CCC/085 140001Z UNGR6911





External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

MGTC/DIARY/CIRC/FILE
MGTC/JOURNAL/CIRC/DOSSIER

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier
20-USA-1-3-USSR
NOV - 8 1989

MESSAGE

SECURE FACSIMILE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

ACTION 12 10
SUITE A DONNER

SECURE FAX

FM/DE FM BNATO YBGR2484 06NOV89

TO/À TO EXTOTT/IDR

NFO INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONNYVNACE DE NAT

DISTR BY BAG MOSCO PRGUE WSAW BUCST BPEST DE NAT

REF

OBJ/SUJ DISTR IFB IDD IDA RGB RBD RBR RBT RGX RGZ CPD CPP CPE INP INE

EER EEE EED

---BUSH/GORBACHEV NON-SUMMIT

FOLLOWING SPEAKING NOTES CIRCULATED(WITHOUT OPPORTUNITY FOR
DISCUSSION/COMMENT)BY US DEL AT NATO POL CTTEE MTG 06NOV.
(COMCENTRE PLSE FAX ATTACHED PAGE.)

RETURN TO RENVoyer AU

FOR FILING POUR ÉTRE FOR. AU DOSSIER

ACC REF DATE

FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR
A-7

OCT 6 1989
DOSSIER 17:43

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

LDN - 001/06
PAR - 001/06
BON - 001/06

OTT - NAT 007/06

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
E. PUXLEY/DGL SIG	POLITICAL	205	J. A. MALONE SIG 000874

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

U.S. Delegation
November 3, 1989

06 Nov.
2/2

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S MEDITERRANEAN MEETING WITH GORBACHEV

-- AT U.S. INITIATIVE, PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV WILL MEET DECEMBER 2-3 ABOARD NAVAL VESSELS IN THE WATERS NEAR MALTA.

-- THE PRESIDENT FIRST PROPOSED THE IDEA OF THIS MEETING IN JULY AND MR. GORBACHEV READILY AGREED. THE TWO SIDES HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THAT TIME TO FIND A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME AND VENUE.

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH MR. GORBACHEV SINCE ASSUMING THE PRESIDENCY IN JANUARY. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE WRITTEN TO EACH OTHER ON A REGULAR BASIS, PRESIDENT BUSH BELIEVES THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR A FACE-TO-FACE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

-- THERE WILL BE A FULL-SCALE SUMMIT IN THE UNITED STATES NEXT YEAR DURING THE LATE SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER. BUT THAT IS SOME TIME DISTANT AND THE TWO LEADERS AGREED THAT AN EARLIER INFORMAL MEETING TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WOULD BE USEFUL.

-- THERE WILL BE NO FORMAL AGENDA FOR THIS MEETING AND THE TALKS WILL BE WIDE-RANGING. THE LEADERS WILL BE ABLE TO SET PRIORITIES IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND TO NARROW AND MORE PRECISELY DEFINE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THIS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ASSIST PREPARATIONS FOR NEXT YEAR'S FORMAL SUMMIT IN THE UNITED STATES.

-- NEITHER SIDE EXPECTS TO ENGAGE IN A FORMAL NEGOTIATING SESSION OR TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS.

-- THIS IS A TIME OF DYNAMIC AND HISTORIC CHANGE IN THE WORLD. THERE ARE EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES IN U.S.-SOVIET AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE PRESIDENT IS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO ADVANCE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW, TO MOVE BEYOND CONTAINMENT. WE WANT TO INCREASE COOPERATION, FOSTER GREATER OPENNESS AND SEARCH FOR POINTS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

-- THE PRESIDENT IS ALSO LOOKING FORWARD TO HEARING MR. GORBACHEV'S INSIGHTS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF PERESTROYKA.

- THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR HIS VIEW THAT, ALTHOUGH THE SUCCESS OF PERESTROYKA DEPENDS FIRST AND FOREMOST ON THE USSR ITSELF, PERESTROYKA IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

ATION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6898 01NOV89

TO EXTOTT URR RBR DELIVER BY 010930

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/DAVID PCOOTT/DOYLE

DISTR MINA USS PMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD IFB IDD IDR IDA

REF OURTEL UNGR6897 31OCT

---BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT

WE SPOKE WITH BASORA OF NSC AND KAMMON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS (USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE) 31OCT WHO CONFIRMED THAT DECISION ON 02-03DEC DATES FOR BUSH MTG WITH GORBACHEV CAME TOGETHER ONLY VERY RECENTLY AND WAS HELD IN QUOTE VERY TIGHT CIRCLE OF SEVERAL OFFICIALS UNQUOTE. LEAK TO WASHINGTON POST 30OCT WAS QUOTE APPALLING UNQUOTE. WHEN ADMINISTRATION S EFFORTS TO KILL STORY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL, LETTERS WERE RAPIDLY DRAFTED TO ALLIES LATE 30OCT INFORMING OF PRESIDENT S DECISION TO MEET GORBACHEV. IN THIS REGARD, KAMMON ALLOWED AS TO HOW TIME ZONES FAVOURED EUROPEANS WHO WOULD HAVE RECEIVED LETTER SOONER THAN PM MULRONEY.

2. IN PRESS CONFERENCE 31OCT PRESIDENT BUSH STATED THAT DECISION RE MTG WITH GORBACHEV HAD BEEN TAKEN QUOTE IN CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES UNQUOTE. NSC CLARIFIED TO US THAT THIS OF COURSE REFERRED TO CONSULTATIONS REGARDING IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING EARLY FACE TO FACE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN TWO LEADERS; OBVIOUSLY NOT TO TIMING OR VENUE OF SUCH A MTG. IN THE CANADIAN CASE, SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED

...2

ACC	FILE	DOSSIER	
	20-USA-1-3-USSR		522
		1	
		2	
		3	
		4	
		5	
		6	
		7	
		8	
		9	
		10	

PAGE TWO UNGR6898 CONFD

DURING PM S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AT KENNEBUNKPORT.

3. IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTION REGARDING POST SUMMIT BRIEFINGS, KAMMON INDICATED THAT CURRENT PLANNING SUGGESTED DEBRIEFING IN BRU SHORTLY AFTER 03DEC AND WELL IN ADVANCE OF NATO MINISTERIAL. HE UNDERTOOK TO ADVISE US AS SOON AS SPECIFIC DECISION ON LEVEL, DATE AND PLACE WAS TAKEN.

4. IN OUR DEALINGS WITH STATE AND NSC IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO BE ADVISED REGARDING ANY COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND PM AFFECTING TOPICAL PUBLIC NEWS. WE WERE NOT/NOT AWARE OF EXISTENCE OF PRESIDENT BUSH ADVISORY LETTER ON GORBACHEV MTG UNTIL LATE 31OCT.

CCC/120 011345Z UNGR6898

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6897 31OCT89

TO EXTOTT URR RBR DELIVER BY 010800

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/DAVIS PCOOTT/DOYLE

DISTR MINA USS PMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD IFB IDD IDR IDA

---BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT

PRES BUSH CONFIRMED TODAY THAT HE WILL MEET WITH SEC GEN GORBACHEV
DEC 2-3 ON USA AND SOVIET WARSHIPS IN MEDITERRANEAN.

2. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH MTG AFTER QUOTE
CONSULTATIONS UNQUOTE WITH ALLIES ON DEVELOPMENTS NOW TAKING PLACE IN
EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET UNION. BUSH SAID THAT HE DID NOT/NOT WANT TO
MISS OPPORTUNITY WHICH DEVELOPMENTS PRESENTED. HE SAID HIS MTG WITH
GORBACHEV WOULD PROVIDE HIM WITH FIRST HAND VIEW OF SOVIETS
PERCEPTIONS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD FIRST PROPOSED MTG TO SOVIETS AFTER
HIS VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE LAST SUMMER.

3. BUSH REITERATED THAT HE HAS POSITIVE VIEW OF GORBACHEV AND THAT HIS
PERCEPTION OF THE MAN HAD NOT/NOT CHANGED. QUOTE I THINK HE IS
COMMITTED TO REFORM, ABSOLUTELY UNQUOTE. BUSH SAID THAT ALTHOUGH USA/
USSR RELATIONSHIP IS MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION, USA STILL HAS TO BE
CAUTIOUS AND PRUDENT AND THAT HE WILL EXPLAIN THAT TO MR. GORBACHEV.
HE RECOGNIZED THAT PERESTROIKA IS TIED TO PERSONAL SUCCESS OF SEC GEN
BUT THAT FOREIGN POLICY OF LARGE POWER LIKE USA COULD NOT/NOT BE
BASED ON ONE MAN.

4. BUSH EMPHASIZED THAT MTG IS NOT/NOT A QUOTE SUMMIT UNQUOTE WITH
ALL THAT LATTER INVOLVES IN TERMS OF EXPECTATIONS AND GRAND DESIGN.

...2

ACC	REF	DATE
622655		
FILE	20-USA-1-3-4-5-6	
ACTION		
SUTER		
DONNER		
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		

PAGE TWO UNGR6897 CONF

HE INDICATED THERE WOULD BE NO/NO AGENDA AND THAT DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE WIDE OPEN. MAIN PURPOSE IS TO DISCUSS, IN BROAD SENSE, DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET UNION. IT IS NOT/NOT AN ARMS CONTROL MTG EITHER MR. BUSH SAID. PRESIDENT SAID RESTRICTED NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS ON BOTH SIDES SHOULD FAVOR GOOD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT DATES FOR FULL-SCALE SUMMIT IN SPRING OR SUMMER COULD BE DISCUSSED. HE STRESSED FACT THAT USA HAS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE IN SOVIETS AND THAT SUCH MTG COULD PLAY POSITIVE ROLE. BUSH INDICATED THAT AT THIS POINT IN TIME THERE ARE NO/NO PLANS TO DEBRIEF ALLIES ON HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SEC GEN GORBACHEV.

5. COMMENTARY: MTG WILL BE FIRST BETWEEN BUSH AND GORBACHEV SINCE BUSH BECAME PRESIDENT. DESPITE OFFICIAL RATIONALE (I.E. GETTING VIEWS DIRECT FROM GORBACHEV ON RECENT EVENTS IN SOVIET BLOC), IT IS CLEAR MTG ALSO RESPONDS TO BUSH DOMESTIC POLITICAL AGENDA. HE IS MOST SIGNIFICANTLY DEPARTING FROM HIS OWN PREVIOUS SCRIPT IN WHICH HE SAID HE WLD MEET WHEN THERE WERE AGREEMENTS TO SIGN. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, HE IS UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO BE MORE PROACTIVE IN RESPECT OF CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE, AND MTG WITH GORBACHEV WILL GO SOME WAY TO DEFUSING CRITICISM. IN LIGHT OF CONFLICTING SIGNALS EMANATING FROM HIS ADMIN ON HOW ADMIN INTENDS TO PROCEED (OUR REFTELS UNGR6885 AND UNGR6890) MTG WILL ALSO HELP TO ESTABLISH QUOTE THE LINE UNQUOTE AND BRING GREATER DISCIPLINE TO USA POLICY ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6897 CONFD

6. IT HAS OCCURRED TO SOME HERE THAT PRECIPITATE AND USUAL VENUE OF FORTHCOMING MTG IS REMINISCENT OF REYKJAVIK SUMMIT WHICH DID SO MUCH TO ADVANCE ARMS CONTROL BUT IN PROCESS ALSO PLAYED FAST AND LOOSE WITH LONGSTANDING ALLIANCE POSITIONS ON DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE. BUSH ADMIN WILL BE SENSITIVE TO CONCERNS ABOUT A REPEAT PERFORMANCE, AND WE CAN EXPECT IT TO PREPARE RATHER BETTER FOR MEDITERRANEAN MTG THAN IT DID FOR REYKJAVIK. FROM THOSE PREPARATIONS WILL TAKE IS TOO EARLY TO SPECULATE ABOUT, BUT WE SHOULD NOT/RULE OUT POSSIBILITY THAT BUSH WILL WANT TO MAKE SOME OFFERS TO GORBACHEV, IN EITHER ECONOMIC OR ARMS CONTROL FIELD.

7. IN LIGHT OF PM'S IMPENDING VISIT TO MOSCO SHORTLY BEFORE DEC 2-3 EVENT, WE WILL NEED TO KEEP IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH WITH ADMIN IN WEEKS AHEAD. IF THERE IS NOT/NOT TO BE A GENERAL ALLIED BRIEFING BEFOREHAND, WE SHOULD INSIST ON ONE FOR CDA.

BURNEY

CCC/114 312320Z UNGR6897

NATO SECRET

RETURN TO Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
REINVOYER À DOCUMENT DIVULGUÉ EN VERTU DE LA LOI SUR L'ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION
MGTC/JOURNAL/CIRC/DOSSIER DOSSIER

External Affairs Canada / Affaires extérieures Canada

SEP 28 1989
MESSAGE

SECURE FACSIMILE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

ACC	Accession/Reference
FILE	File/Dossier
20-USA-1-3-USSR	

22

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

S E C R E T

SECURE FAX

FM/UE
TO/A
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM BNATO YBGR6996 27SEP89
TO EXTOTT/IDR
DISTR IDD IDA
REF SNIDER/MEYER TELECON 26SEP
---USA BRIEFING NOTE ON BAKER-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING
ATTACHED AS REQUESTED IS DOCUMENT CIRCULATED BY USA AMBASSADOR
AT PERMREPS LUNCH 26SEP.

(COMCENTRE PLS FAX ATTACHED 20 PAGES)

20 SEP 27 13:46

NATO SECRET

NAT004/27

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
PAUL MEYER		204	A MALONE

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6845 28SEP89

TO EXTOTT/LIDA DELIVER BY 281730

INFO PRMNY/IFB DELIVER BY 281730

LDN PARIS BONN ROME GENEV VNACE BNATO MOSCO

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/ASSOCADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/DIPOL/DNACPOL/DNATOPOL/
DE CAF

DISTR MINA MINP USS DMC IFB IDD IDR URB URD URR CPD CPP RGB RBD RBR

---USA/SOVIET RELATIONS:ARMS CONTROL AFTER WYOMING

SUMMARY:SEILE THE DEBRIEFING OF ALLIES HAS BEEN SKETCHY TO DATE ON THE
DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON AND WYOMING WHICH PRODUCED THE 23SEP89 USA/
SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL,DISCUSSIONS WITH UNDERSEC OF
STATE BARTHOLOMEW,ACDA DIRECTOR LEHMAN,AND PENTAGON S DIRECTOR OF
STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND SPACE ARMS POLICY STANSBERRY PRODUCES FOLLOWING
BACKGROUND PICTURE:

2.ON START,THERE WAS MOVEMENT ON UNIT OF ACCOUNT,MOBILE MISSILES,ALCM/
BOMBER COUNTING RULES,AND STABILITY MEASURES;BUT SLCMS REMAINED A
SERIOUS PROBLEM.

3.ON DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUES,SOVIETS QUOTE DROPPED QUOTE THEIR
INSISTENCE ON A LINK BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE AGREEMENTS,BUT
AT SAME TIME SAID THEY WOULD INSIST ON RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM START
AGREEMENT IF USA QUOTE VIOLATED UNQUOTE ABM TREATY.IT WAS NOT/NOT
CLEAR WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION,AND USA WAS NOT/NOT KEEN ON
CLEARING UP QUESTION.SIMILARLY SOVIETS SAID THEY WOULD DISMANTLE

...2

RETURN TO RENOYER AU		FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORTE AU DOSSIER	
ACC 623412	REF	DATE	
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR		DOSSIER cc 28-WEST-1-USA	

PAGE TWO UNGR6845 CONF

KRASNOYARSK RADAR, BUT WANTED USA TO RECOGNIZE THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT
THULE AND FYLINGDALES RADARS.

4. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE ON OPEN SKIES, BUT
UNCERTAINTY OVER WHETHER TWO SIDES HAD SAME CONCEPT OF QUOTE OPEN
SKIES UNQUOTE. NO DISCERNIBLE PROGRESS WAS MADE ON CFE OR PROLIFERATION,
BUT THERE WAS IMPORTANT MOVEMENT ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND CHEMICAL
WEAPONS.

5. START ISSUES: THE TWO SIDES SETTLED THE LONGSTANDING ISSUE OF THE
UNIT OF ACCOUNT FOR THE START AGREEMENT. THEY AGREED THAT IT WOULD
BE QUOTE A DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILE AND ITS ASSOCIATED LAUNCHER
UNQUOTE.

6. THE USA SAID IT WAS DROPPING ITS INSISTENCE ON A BAN ON MOBILE
MISSILES, PROVIDING THE U.S. CONGRESS AGREED TO FUND U.S. MOBILE
MISSILES (RAIL-MOBILE MX AND MIDGETMAN).

7. THE TWO SIDES DISCUSSED FURTHER MEASURES BEYOND THOSE AGREED AT THE
MOSCOW SOVIET IN 1988, DEALING WITH MOBILE VERIFICATION. THEY AGREED
THAT:

(A) UPON RETURN TO GARRISON FOLLOWING DISPERSAL, RAIL MOBILE AND ICBMS
WOULD BE SUBJECT TO ENHANCED NTM MEASURES (NATURE AND SCOPE TO BE
AGREED UPON).

(B) NO/NO MORE THAN TEN ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS MAY BE BASED IN A
RESTRICTED AREA

(C) NTM ENHANCEMENT MEASURES WOULD INVOLVE EITHER MOVING ROAD-MOBILE
LAUNCHERS HALFWAY OUT OF THEIR STRUCTURES OR DISPLAYING

...3

have
seen
Soviet
ideas?
cf.
p. 6

PAGE THREE UNGR6845 CONF

THEM NEXT TO THEIR STRUCTURES WITH THE ROOFS OPEN

(D)RAIL GARRISONS WOULD BE LIMITED IN SIZE.

8.THE TWO SIDES MOVED CLOSER TO AGREEMENT ON COUNTING RULES FOR ALCMS AND HEAVY BOMBERS,BUT THEY STILL DISAGREE ON HOW ALCMS SHOULD BE COUNTED AND ON THE PERMISSIBLE RANGES FOR ALCMS AND BOMBERS.

9.THE SOVIETS INSISTED THERE WAS A NEED FOR AGREED LIMITS ON SLCMS AND THAT SUCH LIMITS COULD BE VERIFIED,BUT THEY SUGGESTED THAT SLCMS COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON NAVAL NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS,WHICH COULD EITHER EVENTUALLY FORM PART OF A START TREATY OR STAND ON ITS OWN.THE USA SAID THAT MOVING SLCMS OUT OF START MIGHT BE QUOTE A STEP IN RESOLVING THE PROBLEM UNQUOTE AND THAT THE SUGGESTION WOULD BE STUDIED.BUT THE USA ARGUED THAT QUOTE YEARS OF STUDY UNQUOTE HAD FAILED TO SHOW THAT THERE WERE WAYS IN WHICH SLCMS COULD BE EFFECTIVELY VERIFIED,AND THAT THEREFORE A NON-BINDING DECLARATION WAS STILL THE BEST WAY OF COPING WITH THE PROBLEM.

have we
seen USA
research on
SLCM
verifier?

10.THE SOVIETS RESPONDED POSTIVIELY TO THE USA IDEA THAT CERTAIN VERIFICATION AND QUOTE STABILITY MEASURES UNQUOTE SHOULD BEGIN EVEN BEFORE A START AGREEMENT HAD BEEN CONCLUDED,AND THEY AGREED TO WORK ON THESE OVER THE COURSE OF NEXT FEW MONTHS.(ONE AMERICAN MOTIVE FOR THIS APPROACH IS TO QUOTE TEST UNQUOTE CERTAIN MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS IN ADVANCE OF HAVING TO PRESENT A TREATY TO CONGRESS,IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THEIR RELIABILITY AND THEREBY CONVINCE CONGRESSIONAL SKEPTICS THAT A START AGREEMENT IS INDEED VERIFIABLE.)

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6845 CONF D

11. DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUES: SHEVARDNADZE SAID SOVIETS WERE DROPPING THEIR INSISTENCE ON A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN START AND CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON SPACE/DEFENCE ISSUES, QUOTE PROVIDED THE ABM TREATY IS COMPLIED WITH UNQUOTE. BAKER WELCOMED THAT NEWS, BUT EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT/NOT CREATE QUOTE ALTERNATIVE UNQUOTE FORMS OF LINKAGES, SUCH AS THREATS TO WITHDRAW FROM START IF THE ABM TREATY WERE VIOLATED. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, COUNTERED THAT VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY WOULD INDEED BE GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM START. BAKER RESPONDED THAT THE USA REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE SDI PROGRAM, AND THAT WHEN SDI RESEARCH PROVED THAT BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES WERE FEASIBLE QUOTE WE WILL DEPLOY UNQUOTE.

12. THERE WAS THEN SOME DISCUSSION OF REVISITING A 1987 SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN AGREEMENT, POSSIBLY IN THE FORM OF A PROTOCOL TO THE ABM TREATY, WHICH WOULD SPECIFY WHAT WAS PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED UNDER THE ABM TREATY. THE USA SIDE REMINDED THE SOVIETS OF AMERICAN CONCERNS ABOUT SUCH A PROTOCOL, PARTICULARLY THAT WHAT THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED WOULD BE BOTH INCONSISTENT WITH THE TREATY (SIC) AND THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH AN AGREED LIST OF ACTIVITIES AND COMPONENTS WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUCTED/TESTED IN SPACE (LASERS OF CERTAIN POWER, MIRRORS OF CERTAIN DIMENSION, ETC.). BUT THE U.S. SAID IT WOULD STUDY THE SITUATION AGAIN AND RESPOND IN GENEVA. (THE NEXT ROUND OF THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS BEGINS SEPT 29.)

13. THE SOVIETS DROPPED THEIR INSISTENCE ON A FIXED PERIOD FOR NON-

...5

has USA
done
much on
launch
side
inspections?

PAGE FIVE UNGR6845 CONF D

WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY.

14. THE SOVIETS ALSO SAID THEY WOULD COMPLETELY DISMANTLE THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR STATION QUOTE WITHOUT PRECONDITION UNQUOTE. BUT THEY ASKED THAT THE AMERICANS RECOGNIZE SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. RADARS AT THULE IN GREENLAND AND FLYINGDALES IN SCOTLAND. THE U.S. QUOTE PROMISED TO CONSIDER THESE CONCERNS, IN CONSULTATION WITH ITS ALLIES UNQUOTE, BUT REMINDED THE SOVIETS OF THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE RADARS HAD BEEN QUOTE GRANDFATHERED UNQUOTE UNDER THE ABM TREATY IN 1972 AND THAT THEIR MODERNIZATION WAS LEGAL. U.S. OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET POSITION ON KRASNOYARSK WILL NOT/NOT BE AFFECTED IF SOVIET QUOTE CONCERNS UNQUOTE ARE NOT/NOT MET.

15. AS A QUOTE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE UNQUOTE, (AND IN ORDER TO GET THE SOVIETS TO QUOTE THINK POSITIVELY UNQUOTE ABOUT SDI RESEARCH AND TESTING) THE U.S. INVITED THE SOVIETS TO VISIT TWO U.S. FACILITIES INVOLVED IN STRATEGIC DEFENCE RESEARCH: THE BEAR (BEAM EXPERIMENT ABOARD ROCKET) NEUTRAL PARTICLE BEAM LABORATORY AT LOS ALAMOS, AND THE ALPHA HIGH ENERGY LASER PROGRAM AT SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO IN CALIFORNIA (WHERE ZENITH STAR SPACE-BASED LASER IS BEING DEVELOPED).

16. OPEN SKIES: THE TWO SIDES AGREED QUOTE IN PRINCIPLE UNQUOTE TO THE OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL ANNOUNCED BY PRESIDENT BUSH IN HIS TEXAS A/M AND MAINZ SPEECHES, AND THEY SAID THEY WOULD BOTH BE PREPARED TO ATTEND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE SUBJECT.

17. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, NOTED THAT THEIR QUOTE CONCEPT UNQUOTE OF AN

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR6845 CONF D

X | OPEN SKIES REGIME WAS NOT/NOT EXACTLY LIKE THAT OF THE USA, AND THEY
WERE CAREFUL TO UNDERLINE THAT QUOTE THIS IS ALL SUBJECT FOR FURTHER
DISCUSSION UNQUOTE. THE SOVIETS NOTED THAT WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND WAS A
REGIME INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL AIRCRAFT WITH INTERNATIONAL CREWS AND
MONITORING EQUIPMENT. THEY WERE NOT/NOT CLEAR WHAT THEY MEANT BY QUOTE
INTERNATIONAL UNQUOTE, BUT APPEARED TO BE REFERRING TO THE POSSIBILITY
OF A JOINT NATO-WARSAW PACT ENTERPRISE.

18. CONVENTIONAL FORCE NEGOTIATIONS (CFE): IN HIS LETTER TO BUSH, GORBACHEV
AGREED TO TRY TO CONCLUDE A CFE AGREEMENT WITHIN THE 6/12 MONTHS
TIMETABLE SPECIFIED BY THE PRESIDENT, AND PROPOSED SETTING A DATE IN
1990 ON WHICH A SUMMIT COULD BE CONVENED TO SIGN A CFE AGREEMENT WITH
MINISTERIAL-LEVEL MEETINGS SCHEDULED IN THE INTERIM. BAKER TOLD
SHEVARDNADZE THAT SETTING A DATE WAS PREMATURE, AND THAT WHAT WAS
REALLY NEEDED WAS A QUICK RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIETS TO THE NATO
PACKAGE TABLED EARLIER IN SEPT.

19. SHEVARDNADZE PRESSED ON THE ISSUE OF AIRCRAFT, RECOMMENDING THAT
ONLY QUOTE HOMELAND AIR DEFENCE AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE BE EXCLUDED FROM THE
TREATY. HE PROPOSED A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON THESE AND SUGGESTED THE
NUMBER OF 1500. THE USA RESPONDED THAT THIS PROPOSAL STILL DID NOT/
NOT DISPOSE OF THE PROBLEM OF THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF AIRCRAFT
AND THAT THE USA STILL THOUGHT THE CONCEPT OF LAND-BASED COMBAT
AIRCRAFT WAS BETTER. SHEVARDNADZE DID NOT/NOT PRESS ON THE MANPOWER
QUESTION.

...7

PAGE SEVEN UNGR6845 CONF

20. PROLIFERATION: SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE MOST URGENT PROLIFERATION ISSUE WAS NUCLEAR, BUT HE SAID THE SOVIETS QUOTE WANTED TO BE HELPFUL UNQUOTE ON THE MISSILE QUESTION AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THIS. THEY AGREED EXPERTS WOULD MEET IN DECEMBER TO PURSUE DISCUSSIONS.

22. NUCLEAR TESTING: AFTER AN INITIAL IMPASSE, THE SOVIETS CAME AROUND TO USA POSITION AND AGREED TO INCORPORATE BOTH HYDRODYNAMIC AND SEISMIC MONITORING, AS WELL AS ON-SITE INSPECTION, INTO THE PNET VERIFICATION PROTOCOL. THEY AGREED ON TRIGGER LEVELS OF 50 KTS AND 25 KTS RESPECTIVELY, AND ON MINIMUM NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD TAKE.

23. IN THE U.S. VIEW, THERE IS NOW A BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR AN AGREEMENT, AND IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER AN AGREEMENT IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1990. NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO RESUME IN GENEVA 02 OCT.

24. CHEMICAL WEAPONS: THE TWO SIDES REACHED AGREEMENT ON MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON A BILATERAL VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AND DATA EXCHANGE. CRITICAL TO REACHING THE AGREEMENT WAS THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED CW INSPECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY UNQUOTE.

CCC/120 282106Z UNGR6845

Confidentiality?

**ACTION
JITE A DONNER**

ACG 648492	DATE
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR	DOSSIER SEP 26 1989
28-6-14-2-USA-USSR	

C O N F I D E N T I A L

READDRESSED FM WSHDC 25SEP89 TO INFO EFB EED EER

///CORRECTED COPY TO OTHERS///

FM WSHDC JNGR6839 21SEP89

TO EXTOTT URR

INFO MOSCO WSAW LDN PARIS BONN ROME PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA BNATO VNACE
GENEV PRMNY PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/DIRNATOPOL/DNACPOL/DCPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD CPP

---USA/SOVIET RELATIONS:THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA(3)?

SUMMARY;ARMS CONTROL IS NOT/NOT DOMINATING USA/SOVIET AGENDA AS
IT DID IN LATTER YEARS OF REAGAN ADMIN AND USA OFFICIALS DO
NOT/NOT HAVE HIGH EXPECTATIONS FOR MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS ON CENTRAL
ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AT BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING.ADMIN ITSELF
SEEMS NOT/NOT TO BE INCLINED TO STIMULATE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.
THOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS USA OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN WORKING ON SOME
NEW PROPOSALS IN EVENT SHEVARDNADZE BRINGS SOME SOVIET PROPOSALS TO
TABLE THIS WEEK.IN BRIEFING OF NATO MISSIONS THIS WEEK,UNDERSECTY
FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS,REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW,SAID USA WOULD BE TRYING
TO QUOTE DRAW OUT UNQUOTE SOVIETS.USA WOULD QUOTE DECIDE ON ITS
REACTION IN LIGHT OF WHAT IT SEES UNQUOTE.

2.THERE ARE NUMBVER OF DIFFICULT SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES STILL TO BE
SETTLED IN NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS,NOTABLE QUESTIONS OF MOBILE
//MISSILES/MISSILES//(BAKERS ANNOUNCEMENT ON TUES CONFIRMS EASING OF
USA POSITION ON THIS),COUNTING RULES FOR AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES,
USA REFUSAL TO INCLUDE SLCMS IN AGMT,AND DEFENCE/SPACE QUESTIONS(SDI).

...2

008 98 112

PAGE TWO UNGR6839 CONF

USA EXPECTS TO PRESS ON ABM TREATY COMPLIANCE ISSUES(KRASNOZASK)
BUT ITS FOCUS IS LIKELY TO BE ON VERIFICATION/STABILITY MEASURES
PROPOSED BY US DURING SUMMER.

3.CFE IS EXPECTED TO BE DISCUSSED,BUT USA EXPRESSES NO/NO
PARTICULAR INTEREST IN NEGOTIATING THIS ISSUE OUTSIDE OF VIENNA.
ADMIN HOPES FOR SOME MOVEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR
TESTING ISSUES,AND FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION ON NON-PROLIFERATION
ISSUES(NUCLEAR,CW AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY).

4.THERE IS EXPECTATION MOSCOWS QUOTE INITIAL POSITIVE UNQUOTE
RESPONSE TO OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL WILL BE TRANSLATED AT MTG INTO AGMT
TO ATTEND CDA-SPONSORED CONFERENCE IN NOV.

5.REPORT:START TREATY IS WELL ADVANCED,AND ONE HAS IMPRESSION IT
WOULD NOT/NOT TAKE MUCH EFFORT FOR TWO SIDES TO REMOVE SQUARE
BRACKETS ON 450-PAGE JOINT TEXT THEY ARE WORKING FROM.BUT WILL TO CUT
A DEAL SOON IS CLEARLY LACKING ON USA SIDE.

6.ADMIN IS HAMPERED IN SOME RESPECTS BY UNCERTAINTY OVER WHICH
STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM CONGRESS WOULD BE WILLING TO
FUND.NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOW UNDERWAY BETWEEN EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
BRANCHES ON APPROPRIATIONS FOR FY90(WHICH BEGINS 01OCT89).

7.PARTICULAR PROBLEM IS FUNDING FOR RAIL-MOBILE VERSION OF MULTIPLE
WARHEAD MX AND FOR ROAD-MOBILE SINGLE WARHEAD MIDGETMAN MISSILE.
THERE IS OPPOSITION IN CONGRESS TO BOTH OF THESE,AND UNTIL IT IS
CLEAR THERE WILL BE MONEY FOR ONE OR BOTH ADMIN WILL FORMALLY STICK

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6839 CONF

TO ITS POSITION THAT NO/NO MOBILES SHOULD BE ALLOWED UNDER START TREATY.(SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE TWO VERSIONS:NEW RAIL-MOBILE 10 WARHEAD SS-24S,OF WHICH APPROX 40 HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED,AND NEW ROAD-//SS-25S OF WHICH 170 HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED).HOWEVER ADMIN ITSELF WANTS MOBILE MISSILES,//BELIEVING THEY ARE LESS DESTABLIZING THAN FIXED MOBILE MISSILES,BELIEVING THEY ARE LESS DESTABILIZING THAN FIXED SYSTEMS,AND EXPECTS IT WILL GET AT LEAST SOME FUNDING FOR EITHER MX OR MIDGETMAN(SENATE APPEARS READY TO GRANT THIS WISH BUT HOUSE DEMOCRATS ARE POSING A REAL PROBLEM).IN THAT EVENTUALITY,BAKER CONFIRMED THIS WEEK EARLIER INDICATIONS THAT USA IS PREPARED TO TALK TO SOVIETS IN WYOMING ABOUT INCLUDING MOBILES IN START AGMT PROVIDED ADEQUATE VERIFICATION REGIME COULD BE DEvised.

8.FUNDING FOR B-1B AND B-2 BOMBERS IS ALSO CAUSING ADMIN SOME TROUBLE, AND MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO COME TO CLOSURE WITH SOVIETS ON BomBER/ACLMS COUNTING RULES.WITHOUT KNOWING NUMBER OF PENETRATING BOMBERS THAT WILL BE FUNDED,USA IS RELUCTANT TO AGREE TO ANY PARTICULAR FORMULA FOR DETERMINE WHAT NUMBER OF ACLMS EACH BomBER WILL BE QUOTE DEEMED UNQUOTE TO BE ABLE TO CARRY.(WIDESPREAD ASSUMPTION IS THAT TWO SIDES WILL EVENTUALLY AGREE TO COUNT ACTUAL NUMBERS).

9.SLCMS IS A PROBLEM FOR ANOTHER REASON.HISTORICALLY,USA NAVY HAS REFUSED EVEN TO DISCUSS NOTION THAT IT MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO ARMS- CONTROL AS OTHER SERVICES ARE.NAVY HAS ARGUED IT NEEDS COMPLETE FREEDOM TO OPERATE IF IT IS TO PROVIDE NUCLEAR DETERRENT OF LAST RESORT(ITS SSBNS)AND BE ABLE TO REINFORCE EUROPE IN TIME OF CRISIS.

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6839 CONF

SINCE PLACING CONSTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS WOULD REQUIRE SOME ON-SITE MONITORING OF VESSELS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE, USA NAVY HAS BAULKED AT WHOLE IDEA OF CONSTRAINING SLCMS IN START AGMT. BUT IT IS NOT/NOT IN USA(OR CDN)INTEREST TO ALLOW SOVIET NAVY TO HAVE AS MANY SLCMS AS IT WANTS. SOVIET POPULATION CENTERS ARE AT CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM SEA, WHILE MANY NORTH AMERICAN POPULATION CENTERS ARE HIGHLY EXPOSED TO CLOSE-IN SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY. AS STUDY PROCEEDS, SOME OF IT IN PRIVATE SECTOR, INTO POSSIBLE MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT NOT/NOT BE OVERLY INTRUSIVE, ADMIN WILL BE UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE TO BEGIN TO DISCUSS SLCM CONSTRAINTS IN START. (IN ADDITION TO DEVISING ACCEPTABLE MEANS FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONALLY ARMED SLCMS, OTHER OPTIONS ARE NOT/NOT TO TRY TO DISTINGUISH AT ALL AND SIMPLY TO SET CEILING FOR ALL SLCMS, OR TO BAN THIS ENTIRE CATEGORY OF WEAPON).

10. UNTIL A DEAL IS READY TO BE CONCLUDED ON EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, THERE IS NOT/NOT LIKELY TO BE MUCH PROGRESS ON DEFENSE/SPACE ISSUES. BUT IF SOVIETS CONTINUE TO INSIST THERE CAN BE NO/NO AGMT ON //OFFENSIVE//SYSTEMS WITHOUT PARALLEL AGMT ON DEFENSIVE ONES, ISSUE WILL BE BROUGHT TO A HEAD.

11. ADMIN IS PRESSING AHEAD ON SDI RESEARCH AND IS RECEIVING IN ORDER OF 3 TO 4 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR FROM CONGRESS TO DO SO. THERE IS STRONG SUPPORT IN THIS COUNTRY FOR IDEA OF BEING ABLE TO DEFEND THE UNITED STATES FROM MISSILE ATTACK (USA CANNOT/NOT NOW SHOOT DOWN

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR6839 CONFD

EVEN ONE MISSILE, INCLUDING ERRANT ONE OF ITS OWN), AND CORRESPONDING SUPPORT FOR FUNDING RESEARCH. WHERE ADMIN AND CONGRESS BEGIN TO PART COMPANY IS ON IDEA THAT AS SOON AS RESEARCH PROVES AN ADEQUATE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE CAN BE MOUNTED, IT SHOULD BE DEPLOYED. BUSH IS INCAPABLE OF PUBLICLY ABANDONING THIS IDEA BECAUSE OF OUTCRY IT WOULD CAUSE WITHIN CONSERVATIVE CIRCLES, BUT HE IS FINDING HIS POLICY ON DEPLOYMENT EFFECTIVELY CONSTRAINED BY CONGRESSIONAL RIDERS TO SDI FUNDING WHICH WOULD PREVENT DEPLOYMENT IN THE NEAR TERM (I.E. BY MID 1990S). ASSUMING START AGMT IS READY FOR SIGNATURE BEFORE THEN, THESE CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD ALLOW USA TO CONCLUDE AGMT WITH SOVIETS ON DEFENCE/SPACE ISSUES WHICH CORRESPONDS TO POLITICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL REALITIES.

12. IN MEANTIME, WHILE ADMIN IS ESPOUSING SDI RESEARCH AND DEPLOYMENT IN MANNER WHICH WOULD BRING IT INTO CONFLICT WITH ABM TREATY, IT CONTINUES TO CHARGE SOVIETS (WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION) WITH NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ABM TREATY AS RESULT OF ACTIVATION OF KRASNOYARSK RADAR. BARTHOLOMEW SAYS SOVIETS WILL BE REMAINDERED OF THIS AT WYOMING.

13. FINALLY, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE SOME MOVEMENT ON SECOND-LEVEL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AT MINISTERIAL, POSSIBLY INCLUDING CONCLUSION OF A MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING ON CW BILATERAL VERIFICATION EXPERIMENTS AND DATA EXCHANGE AS CONTRIBUTION TO EVENTUAL AGMT ON CW CONVENTION. TWO SIDES PATHS ARE ALSO CONVERGING ON NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUE, THOUGH ADMIN SPOKESMEN SAY THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO PREDICT THAT AGMT CAN BE

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR6839 CONFD

REACHED IN WYOMING ON MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD ALLOW
USA FINALLY TO RATIFY TTBT AND PNET TREATIES. USA AND SOVIET OFFICIALS
WILL ALSO BE QUOTE EXCHANGING VIEWS UNQUOTE ON HOW THEY MIGHT
COOPERATE BETTER IN PREVENTING PROLIFERATION NOT/NOT JUST OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY BUT ALSO CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC AND
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY.

CC/143 212053Z UNGR6839

CCC/095 250105Z UNGR6839

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER
MESSAGEMGTC/DIARY/CIRC
MGTC/JOURNAL/CIRC/DOSSIERAccession/Référence
File/DossierAlign first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flècheSECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED FACSIMILE

FM/DE

FM WSHDC POL0540, 25SEP89

TO/A

TO EXTOTT URR - FLASH

INFO

INFO MOSCO WSAW LDN PARIS BONN ROME PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA BNATO VNACE

DISTR

GENEV PRMNY PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

BY NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/DNATOPOL/DNACPOL/DCPOL DE CAF
DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD
OPP GMD GMR

---USA/SOVIET RELATIONS: JOINT STATEMENT

ATTACHED IS COPY OF JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT CONCLUSION OF
BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN WYOMING 23SEP89.2. ALSO ATTACHED ARE COPIES OF SEPARATE STATEMENTS DEALING WITH
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND LEBANON.

ACC 648582	DATE
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR	DOSSIER
LOC C3-	

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

P. CHAPIN

/bmq

POL

7405

SIG

PAUL CHAPIN

000895

URGENT

2/12

COVER FAX SHEET

TO: Paul Chapin, Canadian Embassy (POL) Fax # 682-7792
FROM: EUR/CAN - Phil Drouin Tel. 647-3135
SUBJECT: Baker - Shevardnadze Joint Statement

MESSAGE/REMARKS: Copy of the statement
attached, as requested. Regards.

FOR: Clearance ☐ Information ☒ Per request ☒ Comment ☐
No. of pages to follow 10

3/12

September 23, 1989

JOINT STATEMENT

Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze met September 22-23 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming for discussions on the entire spectrum of U.S.-Soviet relations, in the course of the Foreign Minister's official visit to the United States.

The Foreign Minister also had a discussion with President Bush on September 21 at the White House, where he delivered a letter from Chairman Gorbachev which contained new ideas and proposals on security questions. They had a wide-ranging exchange of views on the overall direction and prospects for development of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The two sides attach great significance to contacts between U.S. and Soviet leaders in the development of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue at this important and promising point in U.S.-Soviet relations. Based on earlier understandings between President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev, the sides agreed that the next U.S.-Soviet summit meeting will take place in the United States in late spring-early summer 1990.

Both sides agree that their common goal is to build a more stable, constructive and sustainable relationship, one in which openness and cooperation increasingly replace mistrust and competition. While significant differences remain on certain issues, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister believe that -- with continuing efforts and shared commitment to a candid dialogue aimed at finding practical and concrete solutions -- it will be possible to further and broaden the progress that has been made in recent years in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Toward this end, the discussions in Jackson Hole were productive and serious. They were complemented by the efforts of experts working groups on all parts of the five-part agenda, both in Wyoming and preceding the ministerial in Washington. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reached specific agreements in several areas, and defined new directions for work in other areas.

I

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister held a thorough and productive review on the range of arms control and disarmament issues. They noted with satisfaction that, since their May meeting in Moscow, the Nuclear and Space Talks, Nuclear Testing Talks, and bilateral consultations on chemical weapons have resumed.

4/12

- 2 -

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a detailed discussion of nuclear and space issues, including the ideas contained in the letters exchanged by President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev.

Regarding ABM and space, the Soviet side introduced a new approach aimed at resolving this significant issue. Both sides agree that the Soviet approach opens the way to achieving and implementing a START Treaty without reaching a Defense and Space agreement. The sides agreed to drop the approach of a nonwithdrawal commitment while continuing to discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The U.S. side said it would consider carefully the other aspects of the overall Soviet approach. Both sides agreed that their negotiators would consider these issues in Geneva. They also agreed that the negotiators would discuss the U.S. invitation for Soviet Government experts to visit two U.S. facilities involved in strategic defense research.

The Soviet side stated that, guided by its long-standing goal of strengthening the ABM Treaty regime, it had decided to completely dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station. The U.S. side expressed satisfaction with this announcement.

At the same time, the Soviet side stressed again the necessity of removing its concerns about the U.S. radar stations in Greenland and Great Britain. The U.S. side promised to consider these concerns, in consultation with its Allies.

In the interest of promoting progress in the negotiations, the Secretary announced that the U.S. side was withdrawing its proposal to ban mobile ICBMs in START, contingent on the funding by the U.S. Congress of U.S. mobile ICBMs. The Soviet side expressed satisfaction with this announcement and the two sides agreed on the need further to develop provisions for effective verification for limits on mobile ICBMs. In this connection, they also reached agreement on additional elements of common ground regarding the verification of mobile ICBMs, building on the elements agreed at the Moscow summit and subsequent work in Geneva.

Both sides noted the need to resolve the ALCM and SLCM issues. On ALCMs, the Soviet side put forward a new idea concerning its approach on how to deal with ALCMs and heavy bombers.

On SLCMs, the Soviet side offered new approaches for dealing with this difficult problem. The Soviet side raised the possibility of dealing with SLCMs in a broader naval arms context. As for the Nuclear and Space Talks, the Soviet side appealed to the American side to concentrate on verification and

- 3 -

5/12

said that in the context of a verification system for SLCMs, these weapons could be limited outside of the text of a START treaty on the basis of reciprocal obligations. While reiterating its willingness to study the Soviet ideas, the U.S. side for its part emphasized its doubts about the feasibility of a workable verification system for SLCMs, and noted its long-standing view that there are serious problems involved in any discussion of the limitation of naval arms.

The Soviet side responded positively to President Bush's June initiative on verification and stability measures. In this regard, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a thorough exchange on the details of the initiative, and signed an agreement encouraging the development of such measures and outlining principles for implementing them. They also completed an agreement on the advance notification of major strategic exercises. The sides examined the other verification and stability measures and agreed to explore these further in Geneva.

The sides also agreed that, for purposes of the 1600 START limit, ballistic missiles will be defined in terms of missiles and their associated launchers, thus resolving a long-standing issue.

New instructions will be issued to negotiators to take account of the exchanges on these and other START issues.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reaffirmed the objective of early conclusion of a comprehensive, verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. To intensify efforts toward this goal, and to enhance openness and confidence between the two countries, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. The MOU provides for an exchange of data on U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons stockpiles, and for visits and inspections of chemical weapons sites.

The sides adopted a special joint statement on chemical weapons in which they stressed the need to conclude a chemical weapons ban and underscored their concern about the problem posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister examined the status of the nuclear testing negotiations. They noted that the verification protocol for the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty has been agreed ad referendum by their negotiators, and reached agreement to incorporate hydrodynamic and seismic monitoring, as well as on-site inspection, into the verification protocol for the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, as well as the levels above which these measurements would occur. In order to obtain a statistically significant number of data points to improve the national technical means of each side, each side will guarantee the other side the right to make on-site

- 4 -

6/12

hydrodynamic yield measurements of at least two tests per year during the first five years following ratification of this treaty. After five years, each side shall guarantee one such hydrodynamic measurement a year thereafter unless otherwise agreed by the two sides. These agreements provide a framework for conclusion of the verification protocols, completing a process that began fifteen years ago. They instructed their delegations to continue intensive work to resolve all remaining issues so that these two documents can be submitted for ratification as quickly as possible.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister noted with approval the work being done in the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe, and called for rapid conclusion of an agreement.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed in principle to the "Open Skies" concept proposed by President Bush in May, which could make a genuine contribution to openness and confidence-building. They noted their willingness to attend an international conference on the subject.

The sides noted the importance of joint efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent the proliferation of missiles and missile technology and agreed to activate bilateral consultations on this pressing problem.

II

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a thorough and frank exchange on regional issues. The sides reaffirmed their belief that active U.S. and Soviet support for political solutions that are comprehensive and based on broad national reconciliation could facilitate the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts around the world. They noted that the two sides continue to differ on some specific aspects of the question of arms supplies and their effect on the possibility of political settlements.

They noted that a cycle of regional experts discussions had been held on Central America, Afghanistan, Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Both sides found these discussions useful for understanding one another's views, and agreed to continue experts meetings in the future.

The sides expressed their support for efforts by the Central American countries to establish a lasting peace in that region on the basis of the Esquipulas Treaty and subsequent agreements, which include a commitment not to permit the use of their territory to support those seeking to destabilize other Central American countries. While noting their differences on certain questions, including the level of arms flows to the region, they called on all interested parties to support this process actively by respecting in full the letter and spirit of the

7/12

- 5 -

accords signed by the leaders of the five Central American countries. They also called upon all states outside the region to respect the request by the Central American countries to end all military assistance to irregular or insurgent forces.

The two sides agreed on the need for a political settlement in Afghanistan on the basis of national reconciliation, one that ensures the peaceful, independent and non-aligned status of Afghanistan. While their approaches differ over how to translate these principles into reality, they nevertheless agreed that a transition period is required as well as an appropriate mechanism to establish a broad-based government. The sides reaffirmed their commitment to the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan.

The sides reaffirmed their support for an active Middle East peace process. Among other issues, they also exchanged views on the place in that process of an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue leading to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in which all relevant parties will participate.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister expressed in a separate joint statement their strong support for the Arab League Tripartite Committee plan on Lebanon to bring about a ceasefire, a lifting of the blockade and a dialogue among the Lebanese parties aimed at achieving a political settlement. They condemned the taking of hostages and called for the immediate release of all hostages.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister advocated a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia and a continuation of the negotiation process toward this end. At this stage, they feel it is most important to take efforts to avert intensification of the civil war and the return of the Pol Pot regime to power. The sides declared their readiness to announce, together with other states, a moratorium on military assistance to all Cambodian factions as part of a comprehensive settlement.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed on the need to implement fully and on schedule the UN plan for the granting of independence to Namibia, including the holding of free and fair elections. They expressed their support for the national reconciliation process in Angola and for efforts to secure peace and stability in Mozambique. The sides also advocated a peaceful, political solution to the internal conflicts in Ethiopia and supported the negotiation process underway between the Ethiopian Government and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front.

- 6 -

III

Within the framework of the on-going U.S.-Soviet dialogue on human rights and humanitarian affairs, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister held a constructive discussion of a broad range of human rights and humanitarian issues, including the role of international accords and generally accepted standards in the field of human rights and of the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE agreements. Specific reference was made to policies and cases of exit and entry, freedom of conscience, criminal practices concerning which questions had been raised and on which information will be exchanged. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed to work to move forward on a range of programs that will promote a better understanding of each other's institutions, legislation and practices which affect human rights and humanitarian issues.

IV

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister discussed a range of questions related to the other two parts of the agenda, bilateral and transnational issues. They signed two agreements: the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Mutual Visits between Inhabitants of the Bering Straits Region and the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the Bering Straits Regional Commission.

A U.S.-USSR joint statement was also signed on a uniform interpretation of rules of international law governing innocent passage through territorial waters, which removes a potential source of friction in the relationship between the two countries. They endorsed a working paper containing proposals for extending the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. In furtherance of this, the sides have agreed to approach the three other Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council with a proposal to discuss this question.

U.S. and Soviet experts together elaborated an approach for resolution of the Northern Pacific Maritime Boundary issue. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister directed the experts to meet again soon to complete their work on this basis.

The two sides agreed to start talks regarding the possible expansion of air routes between the two countries.

In connection with the virtually completed agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy it was decided to accelerate completion of proposals aimed at drawing up a new agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Nuclear Energy.

- 7 -

9/12

The sides reached agreement in principle that U.S. and Soviet Cultural and Information Centers would be opened in Moscow and Washington, respectively.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister approved a bilateral work program.

The sides also discussed matters connected with implementation of the U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding signed in January 1989 regarding cooperation in combatting the flow of illegal narcotics. They expressed readiness to consider new ideas for bilateral and international cooperation in this field. They agreed that experts from both sides would meet in Moscow before the end of 1989 to discuss concrete proposals.

The two sides conducted an extensive discussion on the problem of combatting international terrorism and agreed in principle that experts would meet again in early 1990.

The two sides underscored the desirability of intensifying contacts between high-level elected and appointed officials in a variety of areas.

They devoted special attention to continued and new cooperation on a range of bilateral and international environmental problems, including global and climate change, as well as the problem of various sources of pollution.

The two sides confirmed their intent to conclude an agreement on cooperation on study of the world oceans by the end of this year, and to continue their work of preparing an agreement on cooperation in the field of housing and other types of construction.

The two sides agreed to consult and cooperate with the goal of increasing the effectiveness of the UN.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed on the necessity of continuing the search for new spheres of joint action directed at qualitative movement on bilateral and transnational issues in U.S.-Soviet relations.

A detailed discussion took place, including with the participation of experts, on a range of economic questions. It was agreed that these useful discussions will be continued.

* * *

Both sides confirmed the utility of conducting regular meetings at the ministerial level for considering and resolving major problems of U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

10/12

September 23, 1989

**JOINT STATEMENT
ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS**

During their September 22-23 meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze reaffirmed the commitment of the United States and the USSR to pursue aggressively the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons on the basis of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban. Both sides consider the early conclusion and entry into force of a convention to this effect to be one of the highest priorities for the international community. They believe that with the active and constructive participation of all states it will be possible to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date, and call upon all parties to the negotiations to join them in achieving this objective.

The two sides also believe that greater openness between them and among others could contribute to the prospects for reaching an early agreement on an effective ban on chemical weapons. As a concrete expression of the commitment of their two countries toward this end, the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. The steps agreed upon in the Memorandum are intended to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

The verification experiment and data exchange will be conducted in two phases. Phase I involves the exchange of general data on the sides' chemical weapons capabilities and a series of visits to relevant military and civil facilities on their respective territories. In Phase II the sides will exchange detailed data and permit on-site inspections to verify the accuracy of the information exchanged.

The sides also agreed to undertake a cooperative effort with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons. They agreed to reciprocal visits to monitor destruction operations of the other side, and to the exchange of information on past, current and planned destruction activities and procedures.

- 2 -

11/12

The sides noted their agreement on some procedures for conducting challenge inspections and on the provisions governing the order of destruction of chemical weapons and of chemical weapons production facilities. These two approaches will be introduced into the multilateral negotiations in Geneva in an effort to contribute to those negotiations. They also stressed the need to concentrate in the near future on resolving remaining verification-related issues. The two sides intend to pursue intensively their bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban with the view to help achieve further progress in the multilateral negotiations.

The Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister expressed their grave concern about the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the illegal use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons exist and are spread. They reaffirmed the importance of and their commitment to the final declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons held earlier this year as well as their commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The two sides emphasized the obligation of all states not to use chemical weapons in violation of international law and urged that prompt and effective measures be taken by the international community if that obligation is violated. In this regard, they underscored their support for the UN Secretary-General in investigating reports of violations of the Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law.

The sides welcomed Australia's convening of a Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons, which has just concluded in Canberra. They noted that this conference provided an important opportunity for serious discussion between government and industry representatives from around the world. The sides expressed satisfaction with the extensive and productive work accomplished at the conference and the positive results reflected in the Chairman's final summary statement.

Finally, the sides expressed the view that a truly global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons is the best means to address the threat posed by the spread of chemical weapons on a durable long term basis. In the meantime, the sides emphasized their readiness to attempt to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. They intend to continue consultations on this issue.

12/12

September 23, 1

JOINT STATEMENT ON LEBANON

While expressing their deep concern over the absence of peace and a settlement in Lebanon, the United States and the Soviet Union reaffirm their urgent appeal to take all necessary measures to bring to an end the sufferings of the Lebanese people, and urge a continued search for a political solution of the Lebanese crisis. They reaffirm the assumption that there is no military solution to the problems of that country. A constructive dialogue between Lebanese who themselves must reach lasting agreements on peaceful arrangements in Lebanon on the basis of a balance of interests is the only rational path towards national reconciliation.

The United States and the Soviet Union welcome the resumption of the peacemaking mission of the Tripartite Committee of the Arab League on Lebanon in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it by the Casablanca Arab summit and the Committee's efforts aimed at a cease-fire, the lifting of blockades, and initiation of the process of political settlement. They call upon all the parties involved in Lebanese affairs to respond positively to these efforts and to do their utmost to support the Tripartite Committee's action to complete its work successfully. They also note the importance of extending strong international support for the activities of the Tripartite Committee and for their own part intend to proceed further in this direction. Both sides reaffirm their resolute position in favor of preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Lebanese state.

The United States and the Soviet Union condemn any acts of taking hostages and demand that they be set free no matter where or by whom they are held captive.

SEP 26 1989

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

648583		DATE 10/2
FILE	DOSSIER	
20-USA-1-3-455R		
LOC		
C3-		

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6844 25SEP89

TO EXTOTT URR DELIVER BY 260800

INFO PRMNY/MINDER DELIVER BY 260800

MOSCO WSAW LDN PARIS BONN ROME PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA BNATO VNACE

GENV PRMNY PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/DNATOPOL/DNACPOL/DCPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD

CPP GMD GMR

---USA/SOVIET RELATIONS: IMPRESSIONS OF WYOMING MEETING

SENIOR US OFFICIALS EXPRESSED GOOD DEAL OF SATISFACTION TODAY WITH OUTCOME OF BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MTG IN WYOMING LAST WEEK. AT BRIEFING, UNDERSECRETARIES KIMMITT AND BARTOLOMEW CITED THE EXTENSIVE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE END OF THE MTG (OUR FAX NBR POL0540 25SEP) AS EVIDENCE OF BOTH WIDERANGING AND PRODUCTIVE NATURE OF THE TALKS. SPIRIT OF QUOTE OPENNESS UNQUOTE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WAS EVIDENT BOTH IN THE SELECTION OF THE LOCATION FOR THE MTG, AND IN SUBJECTS DISCUSSED.

2. ARMS CONTROL INEVITABLY TOOK UP A LOT OF THE TIME IN WYOMING, BUT CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF AGREEMENTS ACTUALLY REACHED IN THIS AREA BELIEVE EFFORTS WHICH BOTH AMERICANS AND SOVIETS HAVE MADE TO CHARACTERIZE AGREEMENTS AS BREAKTHROUGHTS. IN FACT, WHAT SEEMS TO BE HAPPENING IS THAT TWO SIDES ARE ACCENTVATING THE POSITIVE (ONE

...2

as 742

PAGE TWO UNGR6844 CONF

SUSPECTS FOR A VARIETY OF DOMESTIC REASONS ON BOTH SIDES) AND AGREEING TO KICK DOWN THE ROAD ISSUES THAT ARE SIMPLY NOT READY FOR RESOLUTION. THIS RAISES THE POSSIBILITY, ADMITTEDLY A SMALL ONE AT PRESENT, THAT A START TREATY COULD BE READY FOR SIGNATURE BY NEXT SUMMER - WHEN A SUMMIT MTG IS TO BE HELD. BUT IF SO, IT WILL BE A TREATY OF MORE LIMITED SCOPE THAT WE HAVE BEEN USED TO THINKING ABOUT, WHICH DOES NOT/NOT DEAL WITH SOME STRATEGIC WEAPONS (EG SLCMS) AND TRIES TO FINESSE THE CRITICAL ISSUES OF STRATEGIC DEFENCES.

3. ON LATTER ISSUE, ONE HAS TO WONDER WHETHER A FINESSE WOULD WORK. UNDER THE DEAL STRUCK IN WYOMING, TWO SIDE WOULD BE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO A TREATY REQUIRING THEM TO UNDERTAKE MAJOR CUTS IN THEIR OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, WHICH ONE SIDE OR OTHER COULD SUBSEQUENTLY RENOUNCE ALMOST AT WILL IF IT BELIEVED (OR CHOSE TO BELIEVE) THAT THE OTHER WAS ENGAGED IN IMPERMISSIBLE ABM ACTIVITY. IT IS OPEN QUESTION WHETHER JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OR US SENATE WOULD AGREE TO SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, CONSIDERING USSRS SUPERIOR ABILITY TO QUOTE BREAK OUT UNQUOTE PRODUCE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN A HURRY.

4. STILL, ONE SHOULD NOT/NOT DISMISS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SMALL ARMS CONTROL ADVANCES MADE AT WYOMING: AGREEMENT ON UNIT OF ACCOUNT FOR START (QUOTE A DEPLOYABLE BALLISTIC MISSILE AND ITS ...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6844 CONFD

ASSOCIATED LAUNCHER UNQUOTE),ADVANCES IN VERIFICATION, DISPOSAL OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR CONTROVERSY, CW PLANT INSPECTION, OPEN SKIES AND COOPERATION ON NON/PROLIFERATION. THESE ALL HELP TO ADVANCE PROCESS.

5. THE REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS WERE ALSO FAR FROM PRODUCING LANDMARK AGREEMENTS, BUT THEY MAY HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IN A COUPLE OF CASES. FOR INSTANCE, SOVIETS SAID THEY WERE REFRAINING FROM BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT MILITARY SUPPLIES TO NICARAGURA, AND THEY SAID THEY WOULD PRESS CUBA AND NICARAGURA TO STOP PROMOTING SUBVERSION IN REGION. THE TWO SIDES DISCUSSED, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE POSSIBILITY OF QUOTE TRANSNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS UNQUOTE IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THEY ISSUED A JOINT APPEAL IN SUPPORT OF THE ARAB LEAGUES EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION IN LEBANON.

6. THERE WAS ALSO CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE US/SOVIET COOPERATION ON THE ENVIRONMENT, TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, AND AGREEMENT TO SEEK A COMMON APPROACH AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE JURISDICTION OF IJC.

7. HISTORIANS ARE LIKELY TO JUDGE THIS PAST WEEK IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS, NOT AS A DECISIVE TURNING POINT (ON START OR ANYTHING ELSE), BUT AS ANOTHER LANDMARK ON THE LONG ROAD FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION.

CCC/095 252246Z UNGR6844

SUITE A DONNER

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

RETURN TO ENVOYER AU	011	PCUT - ETRE DOSSIER
620468 SEP 26 1989		
FILE	20-USA-1-3-USSR cc 28-WEST-1-USA	

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CORRECTED COPY(AT ORIGINATORS REQUEST)

FM PRMNY WKGR2362 25SEP89

TO EXTOTT(1DD

INFO MOSCO WSAW LDN PARIS BONN ROME PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA BNATO

VNACE GENEV PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/DIRNATOPOL/DNACPOL/DCPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD RBR IFB IDA IDR URR CPD CPP

DE BILD

---USA/SOVIET RELATIONS:WYOMIN MTG

SUMMARY:IN LUNCH FOR NATO FMS (PLUS KOREA AND JAPAN) PRES BUSH
AND SEC BAKER WERE FULSOME IN THEIR EXPRESSIONS OF OPTIMISM ABOUT
CURRENT AND FUTURE DIALOGUE WITH USSR.WYOMING MTG HAD REVEALED
ONCE AGAIN THAT QUOTE EVEN WHILE DIFFERENCES REMAIN,THERE WAS A
WILLINGNES TO TACKLE THEM IN A GENUINE SPIRIT OF FRANKNESS AND
COOPERATION UNQUOTE.BAKER APPLAUDED ACROSS-BOARD PROGRESS ACHIEVED
ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES,INCLUDING:(1)AGREEMENT TO US/USSR SUMMIT
IN LATE SPRING/EARLY SUMMER 1990;(2)DELINKING OF SPACE/DEFENCE
FROM START;(3)DISMANTLING KRASNOYARSK;(4)SETTLING THRESHHOLD AND
PEACEFUL N-EXPLOSIONS TEST BANS;(5)PROGRESS ON START VERIF AND
STABILITY MEASURES;(6)OPEN SKIES,ON WHICH BOTH SIDES HAD
DELIBERATELY WITHHELD ANNOUNCING CONF PENDING CDN ANNOUNCEMENT.
TALKS HAD APPARENTLY BEEN LESS CONCLUSIVE ON MATTERS OF TRADE AND
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN USSR,ALTHOUGH THEY DISCUSSED INTERNAL SOVIET
DEVELOPMENTS AT SOME LENGTE.

...2

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

PAGE TWO WKGR2362 CONFD

2.REPORT: PRES BUSH INTRODUCED BAKER BRIEFING BY RE-UNDERLINING OPTIMISTIC NOTE HE HAD SOUNDED EARLIER IN HIS ADDRESS TO UNGA. NO/NO ONE COULD HAVE PREDICTED ONE YEAR AGO, HE SAID, THE INTENSITY AND PACE OF CURRENT CHANGES IN EAST BLOC AND SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO FULFILL THEIR ARMS CONTROL AGENDA. QUOTE WE ARE DETERMINED TO MEET THEM HALF WAY UNQUOTE, HE PROMISED. QUOTE WE WANT GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED UNQUOTE. HE STRESSED THAT OPENESS HAD ALWAYS BEEN RECIPROCATED BY AMERICANS AND POINTED TO WAY BORIS YELTSIN HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN USA; WITH OPENESS BUT CARE TAKEN NOT/NOT TO UPSET SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

3. BAKER GAVE FULL CREDIT TO NATO PARTNERS FOR ALLOWING AGREED NATO POSITION IN CFE TO BE TABLED PRIOR TO WYOMING MTG. HE ATTRIBUTED SOVIET GOOD DISPOSITION TO THIS SIGN OF WESTERN POLITICAL WILL. BAKER INSISTED THERE WAS GENUINE DESIRE ON PART OF SOVIET UNION TO INCREASE COOPERATION WITH USA ON ALL PARTS OF WHAT HAS NOW BECOME STANDARD US/USSR FIVE PART AGENDA (ARMS CONTROL, HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL TENSIONS, BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND GLOBAL PROBLEMS).

4. IN ADDITION TO ABOVE AGENDA, BAKER-SHEVARDNADZE TALKS HAD ALSO FEATURED QUOTE IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION UNQUOTE ON INTERNAL SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS. SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN EXTREMELY CANDID IN DESCRIBING DRAMATIC SITUATION USSR FACED ON DOMESTIC FRONT. HE HAD LISTED MAJOR CRISES IN ORDER OF GRAVITY AS (1) PROBLEM OF NATIONALITIES (WHICH THEY HOPED TO ALLEVIATE THROUGH INCREASING POLITICAL AND

...3

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

PAGE THREE WKGR2362 CONFD

ECONOMIC AUTONOMY);(2)THE ENTIRE ECONOMY (ON WHICH SHEVARDNADZE HAD SPELLED OUT NO/NO PROGRAM BUT HAD ASKED MANY SEARCHING QUESTIONS, E.G.HOW TO OPERATE CONVERSION TO MARKET ORIENTATION,HOW TO CONTROL PACE OF CHANGE,AND HOW TO PROGRESS TOWARDS CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY); (3)BUREAUCRATIC FOOT-DRAGGING (ON WHICH SHEVARDNADZE SEEMS NOT/NOT TO HAVE EXPANDED.)

5.ON ARMS CONTROL BAKER CONSIDERED THERE HAD BEEN CONCRETE RESULTS ACROSS WHOLE SPECTRUM.HE LISTED AS PARTICULAR ACHIEVEMENTS THE SOVIET DROPPING QUOTE UNCONDITIONALLY UNQUOTE THE LINKAGE BETWEEN SPACE/DEFENCE AND START AND SOVIET OFFER TO DISMANTLE KRASNOYARSK WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS (ALTHOUGH THEY DID REFER TO THE US THULE AND FYLINGDALES INSTALLATIONS WITHOUT ANY CONCLUSIONS THEREON). BAKER CREDITS USAS EASING OF ITS POSITIONS ON MOBILE MISSILES AS HAVING MADE POSSIBLE FURTHER PROGRESS ON VERIFICATION MEASURES, IN PARTICULAR SOVIET AGREEMENT TO TRY OUT VERIFICATION STEPS PRIOR TO SIGNING AGREEMENT.

6.OPEN SKIES:US WAS PLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY FORTHCOMING SOVIET ATTITUDE AND WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A CONFERENCE,AS WELL AS AGREEING TO DELAY ANNOUNCEMENT TO ALLOW FOR CANADIANS TO DO SO FIRST (SIC).

7.SLCMS AND ALCMS:BAKER THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN GOOD PROGRESS, ESPECIALLY ON SLCMS SINCE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO REMOVE THEM FROM

...4

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

PAGE FOUR WKGR2362 CONF

START AGREEMENT. UNFORTUNATELY, SHEVARDNADZE HAD ALSO PROPOSED SLCMS BE TAKEN UP IN WIDER NAVAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION; FOR THE MOMENT THIS WAS OF COURSE NOT/NOT IN THE CARDS. ON ALCMS IT SEEMS, SOVIETS HAD SIMPLY PROPOSED OWN COUNTING RULES; IT WAS NOT/NOT CLEAR WHETHER ANY AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THIS SCORE.

8. ON PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, SHEVARDNADZE AGREED THAT N. KOREA COULD BECOME A PROBLEM; USSR, HE SAID, WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO ENCOURAGE N. KOREA TO ADHERE TO IAEA.

9. ABM: WHILE DELINKING WITH START HAD BEEN EXPLICIT, SOVIET UNION RETAINED ITS POSITION THAT IT CONSIDERED ITSELF FREE TO WITHDRAW FROM A START AGREEMENT SHOULD USA CONTRAVENE ABM TREATY. USA CONSIDERED THAT BY VIRTUE OF QUOTE NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS UNQUOTE CLAUSE WHICH REMAINS IN START TO ALLOW EITHER SIDE TO WITHDRAW SHOULD IT PERCEIVE SERIOUS THREAT TO ITS SECURITY, THERE WAS NO/NO HARM IN ACCEPTING THIS SOVIET STAND.

10. DURING LUNCH I HAD SEPARATE DISCUSSION WITH RAY SEITZ (ASST USS FOR CANADA AND EUROPE). HE INDICATED THAT US SIDE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY SHEVARDNADZE DETERMINATION TO ADVANCE START AT CONSIDERABLE COST TO PREVIOUS SOVIET POSITIONS. WHILE SHEVARDNADZE HAD GIVEN NO/NO EXPLANATION OF REASONING BEHIND DELINKAGE OF ABM AND START, HE HAD LEFT NO/NO DOUBT ABOUT FACT THAT SOVIETS CONSIDER

...5

PAGE FIVE WKGR2362 CONFD

DELINKAGE TO BE COMPLETE. WHILE SOVIETS STILL WISHED TO SEE SDI
DISAPPEAR, THERE WAS NOW AT LEAST CONSIDERABLE SIMILARITY BETWEEN
SOVIET AND AMERICAN POSITIONS ON SPACE/DEFENCE IN
NEGOTIATIONS, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD NOT/NOT REALLY BROACHED ISSUE
OF RESTRICTIVE VERSUS LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF ABMT. SEITZ
CONSIDERED CONCESSIONS ON SLCMS TO BE AN IMPORTANT PART OF PACKAGE
WHICH NOW CLEARED WAY FOR SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF START
NEGOTIATIONS (NEXT SPRING AT LATEST.

C/157 252310Z WKGR2362

CCC/043 261425Z WKGR2362

ACC 653622	DATE
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USA	DOSSIER SEP 25 1989
LOC A6-	

file

[Signature]

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1242 22SEP89

TO EXTOTT (URR)

INFO MOSCO WSWA LDN PARIS BONN ROME PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA BNATO VNACT
GENEV PRMNY PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE RCMPOTT/DED/NFID/
NCIB TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/DNATOPOL/DNACPOL/DCPOL/ DE CAF
BH ENVHULL/MJN/DM/ADMPOL/PID DE OCI

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD
CPP LCD LCR PSD PSR GMD GMR PND PNR

---USA/SOVIET RELATIONS:TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES (6)

SUMMARY:THERE ARE ANTECEDENTS TO FORMALIZATION THIS YEAR OF
USA/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON QUOTE TRANSNATIONAL UNQUOTE ISSUES
(ENVIRONMENT,NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM).BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MTG
WILL ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS IN THESE AREAS AND STATEMENT WILL
LIKELY BE ISSUED AT CONCLUSION OF MTG ANTICIPATING FUTURE
DISCUSSIONS.TO DATE,HOWEVER,ACTIVITY HAS PRODUCED LITTLE
PRACTICAL RESULT.

2.IN ENVIRONMENTAL FIELD,USA WILL BE PROPOSING SOME IDEAS FOR
COOPERATION ON ECOLOGICAL RESEARCH,ESPECIALLY GLOBAL WARMING,
AND WILL BE RAISING DRIFTNET FISHING AS QUOTE ENVIRONMENTAL
UNQUOTE ISSUE.USA/SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSION,HEADED ON USA
SIDE BY ADMINISTRATOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,WILL
MEET IN JANUARY.

3.NARCOTICS COOP MAY HAVE BEEN OF MOST PRACTICAL BENEFIT TO
SOVIETS UP UNTIL NOW TEROUGH USA TRAINING OF SOVIET DRUG

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1242 CONF

ENFORCEMENT AGENTS. BUT USA IS HOPING FOR DIVIDENDS FROM ENHANCED COOP IN FUTURE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CUSTOMS AREAS.

4. TERRORISM DISCUSSIONS HAVE SO FAR BEEN CONFINED TO SHARING ASSESSMENTS OF SITUATION IN VARIOUS REGIONS, BUT THESE HAVE BEEN HAMPERED BY FAILURE TO AGREE ON DEFINITION OF TERRORISM. USA WILL TRY TO OVERCOME SOVIET RESISTANCE TO ACTUALLY ENGAGING IN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS, AND WILL URGE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH IRANIANS AND SYRIANS ON HOSTAGE ISSUE.

5. (A) ENVIRONMENT

USA OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT SPECTACULAR SETTING OF GRAND TETON MOUNTAINS FOR MINISTERIAL WILL STIMULATE GOOD EXCHANGES ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES.

6. USA OBJECTIVE IS TO INSTITUTIONALIZE DIALOGUE ON SPECIFIC ECOLOGICAL CONCERNS, BOTH OF REGIONAL AND BROAD INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER. USSR IS EXPECTED TO BE INTERESTED IN BOTH. USA OFFICIALS CLAIM SOVIET UKRAINE PRODUCES EIGHT TIMES AS MUCH INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION AS ALL OF USA, AND SOVIETS HAVE SPOKEN WITH SOME CONCERN OF GLOBAL WARMING PHENOMENON. AMERICANS WILL BE MAKING SOME SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO SOVIET AT WYOMING FOR MEANS OF EXPANDING OPERATIONAL COOPERATION, WITH VIEW TO FULLER DISCUSSIONS OF THESE AT USA/SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITTEE MTG SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY. TWO POSSIBLE AREAS ARE IMPROVEMENTS IN MONITORING OF POLLUTION AND PREVENTION OF DRIFTNET FISHING.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR1242 CONF D

7.(B)NARCOTICS

IT APPEARS SOVIETS FIRST APPROACHED USA ON NARCOTICS ISSUE AT UN MTG IN GENEVA IN OCT 87, AND FOLLOWING APRIL AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF INFO, TRAINING, AND CONSULTATIONS ON MULTILATERAL NARCOTICS ISSUES WAS CONCLUDED IN MOSCOW. SINCE THERE IS LITTLE DRUG TRAFFICKING BETWEEN USA AND USSR, PRACTICAL EFFECT OF AGREEMENT HAS BEEN THAT SOVIETS HAVE USED IT TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN RUDIMENTARY CAPACITY TO COMBAT DOMESTIC PROBLEM BY SECURING TRAINING FOR SOVIET AGENTS AT USA DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION. AT MINISTERIAL, TWO SIDES ARE EXPECTED TO AGREE ON ENHANCED COOPERATION BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND ON NEGOTIATING A CUSTOMS AGREEMENT. IN LONGER TERM, SOVIETS APPEAR KEEN ON DRAWING ON USA EXPERIENCE IN TREATING ADDICTIONS, WHILE AMERICANS WANT SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN CURTAILING NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING OUT OF VIETNAM, LAOS AND PERU.

8.(C)TERRORISM

USA BELIEVES SOVIETS HAVE IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, AND MOSCO HAS IMPROVED ITS POSTURE ON ISSUE, E.G. KUWAITI AIR HIJACKING AND MORE RESPONSIBLE STANCE IN INNATL ORGANIZATIONS. AMERICANS BELIEVE SOVIET NOT/NOT ONLY WANT TO CUT A BETTER INNATL FIGURE BUT ALSO FIND THEMSELVES FACING AN INCREASED THREAT. IN A VERY REAL SENSE, THE NATL LIBERATION PHILOSOPHY THEY HAVE PREACHED FOR SO LONG IS NOW COMING HOME TO ROOST, WITH INCREASED INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM OR TERRORIST TYPE

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR1242 CONF

TACTICS BY NATIONALITIES WITHIN USSR. SOVIETS ALSO APPEAR TO APPRECIATE THAT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES DO NOT/NOT CONTRIBUTE TO LESSENING OF REGIONAL TENSIONS IN WHICH MOSCO HAS AN INTEREST. 9. BILATERAL TALKS SO FAR HAVE BEEN LITTLE MORE THAN PRO FORMA EXCHANGES OF ASSESSMENTS, AND TWO SIDES REMAIN VERY FAR FROM A TRUSTING RELATIONSHIP. IN PARTICULAR THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE WITH SOVIETS AND NO/NO TALK ABOUT JOINT OPERATIONS. REASON IS THAT USA AND USSR APPROACHES TO TERRORISM COOPERATION ARE QUITE DIFFERENT. USA IS INTERESTED IN MEANINGFUL BILATERAL COOPERATION, WHILE SOVIETS TAKE A MORE LEGALISTIC APPROACH PREFERRING TO TALK ABOUT AGREEMENTS, TREATIES AND ACTION IN UN. THERE IS SOME SCOPE FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION IN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES SUCH AS ICAO, HOWEVER, AND USA IS ENCOURAGING SOVIETS TO DIRECT ENERGIES TO THEM.

10. KEY AMERICAN CONCERN IS SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO DEAL WITH ISSUE OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM. BY USA RECKONING, SIX OF SEVEN MAJOR INNATL CULPRITS ARE SOVIET CLIENTS OR QUASI CLIENTS (NICARAGUA, NORTH KOREA, CUBA, PDRY, SYRIA AND LIBYA) AND SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO DEVELOP RELATIONSHIP WITH SEVENTH (IRAN). SOVIET COMMENTS ON TOPIC TEND TO BE VERY HEAVILY ADVANCED, WITH SOVIET INDICATING THEY WANT AMERICANS TO UNDERSTAND THEY ARE SENSITIVE TO USA CONCERNS BUT UNABLE TO RESPOND POSITIVELY BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL COST TO THEIR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH STATES IN QUESTION.

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR1242 CONFD

11. IN PART BECAUSE OF THIS, SOVIETS HAVE BEEN VERY RELUCTANT TO RESPOND TO AMERICANS URGINGS THAT THEY COME UP WITH AGREED DEFINITION OF TERRORISM. TO DATE, TWO SIDES HAVE ONLY BEEN ABLE TO AGREE THAT CERTAIN ACTIONS SUCH AS HIJACKING ARE TO BE CONDEMNED, BUT THEY ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY WHEN IT COMES TO GRAPPLING WITH ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY NATL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.

CCC/114 222306Z UNGR1242

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1243 22SEP89

TO EXTOTT URR

ACTION SUITE A DONNER	
ACC 653628	DATE SEP 25 1989
FILE 20-USA-1-3-US82	DOSSIER
LOC AG-	

INFO MOSCO WSAW LDN PARIS BONN ROME PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA BNATO VNACE
GENEV PRMNY PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/DNATOPOL/DNACPOL/DCPOL/ DE CAF
DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD
CPP LCD LCR PSD PSR GMD GMR PND PNR JFB JLE EED EER

---USA/SOVIET RELATIONS:BILATERAL ISSUES (7)

BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MTG IS EXPECTED TO CONCLUDE WITH ANNOUNCEMENT
OF AGREEMENTS,OR INTENTION TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS,ON FOUR
ISSUES:

(A)VISA-FREE TRAVEL BETWEEN CONTIGUOUS AREAS OF BERING STRAITS,
ALLOWING INDIVIDUALS TO TRAVEL UNDER A LESS CUMBERSOME REGIME.USA
OFFICIALS CONSIDER AGREEMENT OF LARGELY SYMBOLIC NATURE.

(B)CREATION OF ARCTIC REGIONAL COMMISSION TO DEAL WITH BORDER/
TRAVEL PROBLEMS IN AREA.

(C)JOINT STATEMENT ON KINDS OF LEGAL ISSUES WHICH TWO SIDES WOULD BE
PREPARED TO REFER TO INNATL COURT OF JUSTICE.

(D)AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL INTERPRETATION OF INNOCENT PASSAGE OF WARSHIPS.

2.SOVIETS HAVE PUT USA ON NOTICE THEY ALSO WISH TO DISCUSS BILATERAL
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AT MINISTERIAL.BUT SUBJECT IS ONE AMERICAN SIDE
HAS BEEN RESISTING DISCUSSING ON GROUNDS(ACCORDING TO UNDERSEC
KIMMITT)THAT SOVIETS WANT THESE DISCUSSIONS AS A QUOTE BACKDOOR TO

...2

PAGE TWO, UNGR1243 CONF

MORE EXCHANGES UNQUOTE AND USA QUOTE IS NOT/NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF
FINANCING PERESTROIKA UNQUOTE. USA POSITION ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION
IS THAT ADMIN FAVOURS EXPANDING TRADE QUOTE ON SOUND COMMERCIAL
TERMS UNQUOTE, AND THAT FULLER SOVIET INTEGRATION INTO WESTERN
ECONOMY IS CONTINGENT ON FUNDAMENTAL SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORMS
INCLUDING PRICE REFORMS.

CCC/114 222306Z UNGR1243

ACTION
SUITE A CONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1241 22SEP89 ?

TO EXTOTT/URR

INFO MOSCO WSAW LDN PARIS BONN ROME PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA BNATO VNACE

GENEV PRMNY PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/DNATOPOL/DNACPOL/DCPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD

CPP LCD LCR PSD PSR GMD GMR PND PNR

REF OURTEL UNGR6840 21SEP

---USA/SOVIET RELATIONS:HUMAN RIGHTS (5) ?

USA/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS AREA ARE MOVING BEYOND

EXCHANGES ON SPECIFIC CASES(REFUSENIKS,DIVIDED FAMILIES)INTO

REALM OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS.JOINT STATEMENT IS TO
BE ISSUED IN WYOMING ON NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION.

2.USA WILL FOCUS ON THREE SUBJECTS AT MINISTERIAL:

(A)INAUGURATION OF EXCHANGES OF INFO ABOUT POLITICAL PRISONERS
WHO HAVE BEEN INCARCERATED FOR CRIMINAL REASONS;

(B)FOLLOW-UP ON PREVIOUS EXCHANGES ABOUT DETENTION OF POLITICAL
MALCONTENTS IN PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTIONS;AND

(C)EXPANSION OF DISCUSSIONS ON ROLE OF LAW AS INSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS.THIS WILL INVOLVE USA OFFERING
TRAINING TO SOVIET JUDGES AND LAWYERS ON DUE PROCESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS LEGISLATION.

...2

ACC	653621	DATE	
FILE	20-USA-1-3-USSR		
LOC	45-USSR-13		
A3-	A7		

SEP 25 1989

PAGE TWO UNGR1241 CONF

3.ACCORDING TO STATE DEPT,BAKER WILL ALSO BROACH WITH SHEVARDNADZE,USA CONCERNS ABOUT GROWING INDICATIONS OF RE-EMERGENCE OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN SOVIET (PARTICULARLY RUSSIAN) SOCIETY.FOCUS OF USA CONCERN IS PAMYAT SOCIETY.WHILE ADMIN IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT ONE CONSEQUENCE OF GLASNOST IS INEVITABLY HIGHER PROFILE FOR FRINGE GROUPS,IT IS SEEKING REASSURANCE THAT SOVIET GOVT WILL NOT/NOT BE INDIFFERENT AND WILL EXERT PRESSURE ON REGIONAL/LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH MAY BE SANCTIONING ANTI-SEMITISM.

CCC/114 221450Z UNGR1241

Distribution: MINA/A-10 (original + 10 copies)
MINP/A-10 (1)
USS/A-8 (1)
DMC/A-8 (1)
DMT/A-8 (1)
BMD/A-6 (1)
BMM/C-5 (1)
BFD/C-2 (1)

HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK — BRIEFING NOTE

LIVRE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES — NOTES D'INFORMATION

URR CDP IFB IDD IDA RBR File Dairy Circ W/F
DNACPOL DNATOPOL DIPOL

Section

IDR-2614

Subject/Highlights / Sujet/Points saillants

Baker/Schevardnadze meetings in Wyoming yields Substantial
Progress towards a Strategic Arms Agreement, hopefully by
Summer 1990.

FC, FILMS
REVOYER AU POUR — ETRE
ROUTE AU DOSSIER
ACC DEE DATE

Source

Globe & Mail - Sept. 25/89

FILE DOSSIER

20-USA-1-3-USSR

Assessment / Évaluation

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

In a long joint statement detailing the weekend talks between USA Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Schevardnadze, the two sides cited a number of significant arms control agreements.

- Moscow's prior insistence on linking offensive and defensive weapons has been dropped. The Soviets are now displaying a willingness to sign a Strategic Weapons Treaty (START) without having its concerns about the USA SDI program settled as a precondition.
- The USSR in what has been described as a move towards the American position, has also offered new thoughts on sea and air launched cruise missiles, heretofore two of the major unresolved issues within START context.
- An agreement in principle to pursue research into verification and confidence building measures has been reached which will allow both sides to enforce a START agreement. The precise mechanics have yet to be worked out.

The weekend meeting also produced an agreement on the provisions for mobile missile verification, and a Soviet announcement that they would dismantle a controversial radar at Kransnoyarsk, allegedly a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Suggested Reply:

- Canada is delighted to see that further progress towards a superpower agreement to achieve substantial reductions in Strategic Nuclear Weapons has been reached.
- The attainment of the earliest possible START accord has, and will continue to be one of Canada's most important arms control priorities.
- Canada has supported the USA SDI research program as being prudent in light of similar Soviet activity; as such, we warmly welcome the Soviet decision to drop Moscow's prior insistence on linking offensive and defensive weapons.
- Non-compliance of arms control agreements has been a matter of great concern to Canada. We, therefore, welcome the Soviet decision to dismantle the radar facility at Kransnoyarsk, allaying concerns that it appeared to violate the terms of the ABM Treaty.
- Lack of progress in cruise missile counting rules and verification has also been a concern for Canada. We thus welcome the indications of apparent progress on this issue.

Prepared by / Préparé par

Angela Bogdan/kl

Division / Direction

IDR

Date

25 Sept./89

Tel. no. / No de tél.

992-9368 000924

New spirit of co-operation marks arms-control talks

BY COLIN MacKENZIE
Globe and Mail Correspondent

JACKSON, Wyo.

With a summit set for next year, substantial arms-control progress in the bag and a new co-operative spirit in the air, the two superpower foreign ministers left here yesterday to trumpet their success at the United Nations.

Two days of meetings at this western resort area gave rise to six separate agreements and a variety of proposals that hold the promise of rapid progress in negotiations for treaties limiting both nuclear and conventional weapons.

Foremost among these was a Soviet shift that effectively uncouples its concerns about the U.S. Star Wars program from the talks aimed at reducing long-range nuclear weapons by almost half.

This gives rise to the possibility that a treaty could be ready for President George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to initial when they meet for a summit in the United States in the late spring or early summer.

But beyond the formal progress, both sides said, the most important development from the Wyoming meetings was a new sense of the Soviet-U.S.

relationship. After months of cautious reassessment, the U.S. side has clearly decided to continue the East-West rapprochement and has found a willing partner.

"I will say, without any exaggeration, these talks have placed Soviet-American dialogue to a new stage," Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said at his closing press conference on Saturday.

He was echoed by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, who talked of a "fresh phase" in the relationship.

What characterized the

NEW — Page A4

New spirit at meetings

• From Page A1

change, officials said, was the willingness on both sides to move away from posturing to genuine dialogue.

"In every single case, the discussions were involved, were detailed, were serious and there was a kind of constant search for ideas, and there was a constant search to thinking about, all right, if there are problems, how do you narrow the gaps in those problems?" said a senior State Department official who briefed reporters.

This has translated to a co-operative pattern across the agenda.

Even on issues such as Afghanistan and Central America, the two sides simply noted their differences without the traditional accusations of bad faith.

One example came when Mr. Baker was invited at his press conference to criticize Soviet involvement in Nicaragua.

"Let me say that we are not challenging the statement of the Soviet Union that they themselves have ceased shipping weapons to Nicaragua," he said, brushing off further questions by noting that the Soviets have "indicated to us that they support democracy in Nicaragua."

The meetings, which took place at a lakeside lodge and a nearby ranch, also ranged over areas never before touched by the two nations. There were extensive conversations about the restructuring of the Soviet economy and the independence movements in several Soviet republics. There was even a conversation about the future of Germany, one of the most sensitive issues in Europe today.

While those new areas offer the promise of greater superpower co-operation, arms control remains pre-eminent in talks between the two countries.

In addition to the Soviet shift on strategic defence, a letter from Mr. Gorbachev to Mr. Bush that was delivered by Mr. Shevardnadze also offered new thoughts on sea and air-launched cruise missiles, which now emerge as the most difficult issues to be resolved before completing the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty. Both require further negotiation at the Geneva talks that are set to resume on Thursday, but both represent moves toward the U.S. position, officials said.

Moreover, the Soviets outlined a new definition of combat aircraft that is designed to bridge one of the major differences in the Vienna round of negotiations aimed at reducing the huge conventional armies arrayed against each other in Europe.

Mr. Shevardnadze embraced Mr. Bush's call for rapid conclusion of those talks, which include Canada along with 22 other nations. On Saturday, he suggested that a super-summit of the leaders of all those nations be convened in the second half of next year to sign a conventional forces treaty. The U.S. side responded that scheduling such a gathering was perhaps premature.

The Soviets also announced that they would dismantle a controversial radar facility in western Siberia. The United States has long argued that the radar at Krasnoyarsk was a violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.

Even without a START treaty to sign, Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev will be able to finally conclude two leftover nuclear testing agreements from the 1970s that have been left unratified because of disputes over verification that were settled here.

Mr. Gorbachev is expected to take advantage of that summit, which is likely to be held in several U.S. locations, for an extended visit to this country. He has conditionally accepted an offer to speak at Harvard University and has long expressed a desire to visit both California and the U.S. Midwestern farm belt.

Representative of the progress of the week of meetings was the range of agreement worked out by the two sides.

- A memorandum of understanding on chemical weapons, which was signed on Saturday, calls for an exchange of information about

stockpiles by Dec. 31. By next June 30, the two sides will have started visits to each other's production facilities and industrial chemical plants.

In a second phase, to begin when the 40-nation disarmament conference seems ready to reach a treaty within four months, the two superpowers have agreed to press for detailed swaps of data and more on-site inspections, including "challenge" visits in which the inspecting nation gets to choose which locations it wants to see.

- An agreement in principle on verification will let the two sides try to find effective means of enforcing a START treaty, a process also designed to boost each nation's trust in the other. Still to be worked out are precisely which mechanisms will be tried. Along with conventional verification techniques, these could also include such esoteric experiments as "tagging" of missiles to ensure that only a given number are deployed and ending the use of codes in missile tests so that neither side can hide a rocket's capabilities.

- To ease the task of mobile missile verification the two sides agreed here either to park such weapons outside the buildings where they now are stored or open the roofs after they return from exercises. This will permit satellites, and ultimately aircraft, to determine how many such weapons are deployed.

- The Soviets accepted the U.S. resurrection of the mid-1950s "Open Skies" concept that involves opening airspace to unarmed reconnaissance flights. A conference of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact countries will be held in Canada sometime in the next year to develop procedures for such overflights, which are considered much more useful than satellite surveillance.

- The two sides agreed to explore an end to restrictions on travel by diplomats and journalists, which is now severely limited.

- Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze issued a joint statement endorsing an expansion of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. They also proposed that they seek support for this from the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

- The two ministers signed a pair of agreements to permit Eskimos in the Aleutian Islands and Siberia to visit each other without visas and to create a regional commission to resolve local issues.

- An agreement permitting freer passage of vessels within the 12-mile territorial limit was signed.

- The United States also invited the Soviets to visit Star Wars research labs and sought increased Soviet co-operation on environmental issues.

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

SEP 22 1989

STX to note for file

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6839 21SEP89

TO EXTOTT *URR*

ACC 648492	DATE
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR	DOSSIER
LOC C3-	

INFO MOSCO WSAW LDN PARIS BONN ROME PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA BNATO VNACE
GENEV PRMNY PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE
TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/DIRNATOPOL/DNACPOL/DCPOL/ DE CAF
DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD CPP
---USA/SOVIET RELATIONS:THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA(3)

SUMMARY;ARMS CONTROL IS NOT/NOT DOMINATING USA?SOVIET AGENDA AS
IT DID IN LATTER YEARS OF REAGAN ADMIN<AND USA OFFICIALS DO
NOT/NOT HAVE HIGH EXPECTATIONS FOR MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS ON CENTRAL
ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AT BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING.ADMIN ITSELF
SEEMS NOT/NOT TO BE INCLINED TO STIMULATE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.
THOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS USA OFFICIALSHAVE BEEN WORKING ON SOME
NEW PROPOSALS IN EVENT SHEVARDNADZE BRINGS SOME SOVIET PROPOSALS TO
TABLE THIS WEEK.IN BRIEFING OF NATO MISSIONS THIS WEEK,UNDERSECTY
FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS,REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW,SAID USA WOULD BE TRYING
TO QUOTE DRAW OUT UNQUOTE SOVIETS.USA WOULD QUOTE DECIDE ON ITS
REACTION IN LIGHT OF WHAT IT SEES UNQUOTE.

2.THERE ARE NUMBVER OF DIFFICULT SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES STILL TO BE
SETTLED INNUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS,NOTABLE QUESTIONS OF MOBILE
MISSELES(BAKERS ANNOUNCEMENT ON TUES CONFIRMS EASING OF USA POSITION
ON THIS),COUNTING RULES FOR AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES,USA REFUSAL
TO INCLUDE SLCMS IN AGMT,AND DEFENCE/SPACE QUESTIONS(SDI).

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2839 CONF

USA EXPECTS TO PRESS ON ABM TREATY COMPLIANCE ISSUES (KRASNOZASK)
BUT ITS FOCUS IS LIKELY TO BE ON VERIFICATION/STABILITY MEASURES
PROPOSED BY US DURING SUMMER.

3. CFE IS EXPECTED TO BE DISCUSSED, BUT USA EXPRESSES NO/NO
PARTICULAR INTEREST IN NEGOTIATING THIS ISSUE OUTSIDE OF VIENNA.
ADMIN HOPES FOR SOME MOVEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR
TESTING ISSUES, AND FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION ON NON-PROLIFERATION
ISSUES (NUCLEAR, CW AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY).

4. THERE IS EXPECTATION MOSCOWS QUOTE INITIAL POSITIVE UNQUOTE
RESPONSE TO OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL WILL BE TRANSLATED AT MTG INTO AGMT
TO ATTEND CDA-SPONSORED CONFERENCE IN NOV.

5. REPORT: START TREATY IS WELL ADVANCED, AND ONE HAS IMPRESSION IT
WOULD NOT/TAKE MUCH EFFORT FOR TWO SIDES TO REMOVE SQUARE
BRACKETS ON 450-PAGE JOINT TEXT THEY ARE WORKING FROM. BUT WILL CUT
A DEAL SOON IS CLEARLY LACKING ON USA SIDE.

6. ADMIN IS HAMPERED IN SOME RESPECTS BY UNCERTAINTY OVER WHICH
STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM CONGRESS WOULD BE WILLING TO
FUND. NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOW UNDERWAY BETWEEN EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
BRANCHES ON APPROPRIATIONS FOR FY90 (WHICH BEGINS 01 OCT 89).

7. PARTICULAR PROBLEM IS FUNDING FOR RAIL-MOBILE VERSION OF MULTIPLE
WARHEAD MX AND FOR ROAD-MOBILE SINGLE WARHEAD MIDGETMAN MISSILE.
THERE IS OPPOSITION IN CONGRESS TO BOTH OF THESE, AND UNTIL IT IS
CLEAR THERE WILL BE MONEY FOR ONE OR BOTH ADMIN WILL FORMALLY STICK

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6839 CONF

TO ITS POSITION THAT NO/NO MOBILES SHOULD BE ALLOWED UNDER START TREATY.(SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE TWO VERSIONS:NEW RAIL-MOBILE 10 WARHEAD SS-24S,OF WHICH APPROX40 HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED,AND NEW ROAD-MOBILE MISSILES,BELIEVING THEY ARE LESS DESTABILIZING THAN FIXED SYSTEMS,AND EXPECTS IT WILL GET AT LEAST SOME FUNDING FOR EITHER MX OR MIDGETMAN(SENATE APPEARS READY TO GRANT THIS WISH BUT HOUSE DEMOCRATS ARE POSING A REAL PROBLEM).IN THAT EVENTUALITY,BAKER CONFIRMED THIS WEEK EARLIER INDICATIONS THAT USA IS PREPARED TO TALK TO SOVIETS IN WYOMING ABOUT INCLUDING MOBILES IN START AGMT PROVIDED ADEQUATE VERIFICATION REGIME COULD BE DEvised.

8.FUNDING FOR B-1B AND B-2 BOMBERS IS ALSO CAUSING ADMIN SOME TROUBLE, AND MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO COME TO CLOSURE WITH SOVIETS ON Bomber/ACLMS COUNTING RULES.WITHOUT KNOWING NUMBER OF PENETRATING BOMBERS THAT WILL BE FUNDED,USA IS RELUCTANT TO AGREE TO ANY PARTICULAR FORMULA FOR DETERMINE WHAT NUMBER OF CLMS EACH BomBER WILL BE QUOTE DEEMED UNQUOTE TO BE ABLE TO CARRY.(WIDESPREAD ASSUMPTION IS THAT TWO SIDES WILL EVENTUALLY AGREE TO COUNT ACTUAL NUMBERS).

9.SLCMS IS A PROBLEM FOR ANOTHER REASON.HISTORICALLY,USA NAVY HAS REFUSED EVEN TO DISCUSS NOTION THAT IT MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO ARMS CONTROL AS OTHER SERVICES ARE.NAVY HAS ARGUED IT NEEDS COMPLETE FREEDOM TO OPERATE IF IT IS TO PROVIDE NUCLEAR DETERRENT OF LAST RESORT(ITS SSBNS)AND BE ABLE TO REINFORCE EUROPE IN TIME OF CRISIS.

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6839 CONF

SINCE PLACING CONSTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS WOULD REQUIRE SOME ON-SITE MONITORING OF VESSELS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE, USA NAVY HAS BAULKED AT WHOLE IDEA OF CONSTRAINING SLCMS IN START AGMT. BUT IT IS NOT/NOT IN USA(OR CDN)INTEREST TO ALLOW SOVIET NAVY TO HAVE AS MANY SLCMS AS IT WANTS. SOVIET POPULATION CENTERS ARE AT CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM SEA, WHILE MANY NORTH AMERICAN POPULATION CENTERS ARE HIGHLY EXPOSED TO CLOSE-IN SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY. AS STUDY PROCEEDS, SOME OF IT IN PRIVATE SECTOR, INTO POSSIBLE MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT NOT/NOT BE OVERLY INTRUSIVE, ADMIN WILL BE UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE TO BEGIN TO DISCUSS SLCM CONSTRAINTS IN START. (IN ADDITION TO DEVISING ACCEPTABLE MEANS FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONALLY ARMED SLCMS, OTHER OPTIONS ARE NOT/NOT TO TRY TO DISTINGUISH AT ALL AND SIMPLY TO SET CEILING FOR ALL SLCMS, OR TO BAN THIS ENTIRE CATEGORY OF WEAPON).

10. UNTIL A DEAL IS READY TO BE CONCLUDED ON EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, THERE IS NOT/NOT LIKELY TO BE MUCH PROGRESS ON DEFENSE/SPACE ISSUES.. BUT IF SOVIETS CONTINUE TO INSIST THERE CAN BE NO/NO AGMT ON EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS WITHOUT PARALLEL AGMT ON DEFENSIVE ONES, ISSUE WILL BE BROUGHT TO A HEAD.

11. ADMIN IS PRESSING AHEAD ON SDI RESEARCH AND IS RECEIVING IN ORDER OF 3 TO 4 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR FROM CONGRESS TO DO SO. THERE IS STRONG SUPPORT IN THIS COUNTRY FOR IDEA OF BEING ABLE TO DEFEND THE UNITED STATES FROM MISSILE ATTACK (USA CANNOT/NOT NOW SHOOT DOWN ...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR6839 CONF

EVEN ONE MISSILE, INCLUDING ERRANT ONE OF ITS OWN), AND CORRESPONDING SUPPORT FOR FUNDING RESEARCH. WHERE ADMIN AND CONGRESS BEGIN TO PART COMPANY IS ON IDEA THAT AS SOON AS RESEARCH PROVES AND ADEQUATE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE CAN BE MOUNTED, IT SHOULD BE DEPLOYED. BUSH IS INCAPABLE OF PUBLICLY ABANDONING THIS IDEA BECAUSE OF OUTCRY IT WOULD CAUSE WITHIN CONSERVATIVE CIRCLES, BUT HE IS FINDING HIS POLICY ON DEPLOYMENT EFFECTIVELY CONSTRAINED BY CONGRESSIONAL RIDERS TO SDI FUNDING WHICH WOULD PREVENT DEPLOYMENT IN THE NEAR TERM (I.E. BY MID 1990S). ASSUMING START AGMT IS READY FOR SIGNATURE BEFORE THEN, THESE CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD ALLOW USA TO CONCLUDE AGMT WITH SOVIETS ON DEFENCE/SPACE ISSUES WHICH CORRESPONDS TO POLITICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL REALITIES.

12. IN MEANTIME, WHILE ADMIN IS ESPOUSING SDI RESEARCH AND DEPLOYMENT IN MANNER WHICH WOULD BRING IT INTO CONFLICT WITH ABM TREATY, IT CONTINUES TO CHARGE SOVIETS (WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION) WITH NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ABM TREATY AS RESULT OF ACTIVATION OF KRASNOYARSK RADAR. BARTHOLOMEW SAYS SOVIETS WILL BE REMAINDERED OF THIS AT WYOMING.

13. FINALLY, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE SOME MOVEMENT ON SECOND-LEVEL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AT MINISTERIAL, POSSIBLY INCLUDING CONCLUSION OF A MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING ON CW BILATERAL VERIFICATION EXPERIMENTS AND DATA EXCHANGE AS CONTRIBUTION TO EVENTUAL AGMT ON CW CONVENTION. TWO SIDES PATHS ARE ALSO CONVERGING ON NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUE, THOUGH ADMIN SPOKESMEN SAY THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO PREDICT THAT AGMT CAN BE

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR6839 CONF

REACHED IN WYOMING ON MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD ALLOW
USA FINALLY TO RATIFY TTBT AND PNET TREATIES. USA AND SOVIET OFFICIALS
WILL ALSO BE QUOTE EXCHANGING VIEWS UNQUOTE ON HOW THEYU MIGHT
COOPERATE BETTER IN PREVENTING PROLIFERATION NOT/NOT JUST OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY BUT ALSO CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC AND
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY.

CCC/143 212053Z UNGR6839



ACTION
WHITE A DONNER

P R O T E C T E D

FM BNATO YBGR8842 20SEP89

TO EXTOTT (IDR IMMED

INFO LDN BONN PARIS WSHDC PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DGPOLPLAN/DNATOPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR IFB IDD CPP IDA URR RBR EER

REF OURTEL YBGR8837 15SEP

---BAKER-SHEVARDNADZE MTG IN WYOMING

FOLLOWING INFO ON WYOMING MTG WAS PROVIDED AT 19SEP PERMREPS LUNCH.

2.USA PERMREP TAFT SAID THAT USA WOULD EMPHASIZE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION ON GLOBAL,TRANSNATIONAL,ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREATER OPENNESS IN USSR.SPECIFIC SUBJS OF DISCUSSION WOULD INCLUDE OPEN SKIES,CW VERIFICATION,NST AND REGIONAL ISSUES.USA WOULD NOT/NOT INITIATE DISCUSSION OF CFE,ONLY RESPOND.

3.SMITH ASKED TAFT ABOUT USA THINKING ON A BUSH-GORBACHEV SUMMIT. SMITH REMARKED THAT IF USA DID NOT/NOT FAVOUR SETTING DATE FOR A SUMMIT AND USSR WAS PRESSING FOR ONE,QUESTIONS WOULD BE PUT TO ALLIED GOVTS.TAFT SAID HE WOULD ENQUIRE.

4.UK PERMREP ALEXANDER ASKED WHETHER USA ANTICIPATED A SOVIET ACD INITIATIVE.TAFT SAID THEY EXPECTED LET FROM GORBACHEV TO BUSH BUT DID NOT/NOT KNOW WHAT ITS SUBSTANCE WOULD BE.

5.TAFT NOTED PENTAGON WOULD PUBLISH QUOTE SOVIET MILITARY POWER UNQUOTE ON 27SEP.TAFTS REMARK IN CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION OF WYOMING MTG IMPLIED PUBLICATION WOULD BE CORRECTIVE TO ANY EXCESSIVE UHORIA ABOUT EVOLUTION OF USSR.

CCC/191 201112Z YBGR8842

Reçu / P
Affaires e
Extern
ad
Jes
irs

SEP 21 1989

RETURN TO **IDR** FOR FILING
RENNYER AU **IDR** POUR - EIRE
ACC REF DATE
FILE **20-USA-1-3-USSR**
cc 27-4-NATO-11

BIC

**Pages 934 to / à 936
are withheld pursuant to sections
sont retenues en vertu des articles**

13(1)(a), 13(1)(b)

**of the Access to Information Act
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

UNCLASSIFIED
NON CLASSIFIE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6818 18SEP89

TO EXTOTT (URR

INFO MOSCO WSAW LDN PARIS BONN ROME PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA BNATO VNACE

GENEV PRMNY PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE

BH NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/DIRNATOPOL/DNACPOL/DCPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD RBR

---USA/SOVIET RELATIONS:THE WEEK AHEAD (I) ?

USA AND SOVIET GOVTS HAVE BEGUN INTENSIVE WEEK-LONG REVIEW OF THEIR BILATERAL AGENDA.WITH ARRIVAL ON WEEKEND AT ANDREWS AFB OF PLANELOAD OF SOVIET OFFICIALS,STAGE WAS SET FOR COMMENCEMENT YESTERDAY OF HIGH-LEVEL CONSIDERATION OF ARMS CONTROL,REGIONAL DISPUTES,HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION AND QUOTE TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES UNQUOTE(BILATERAL ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED LAST WEEK).

2.WORKING GROUPS WILL BE MEETING ON THESE ISSUES MONDAY AND TUESDAY AT STATE DEPT AND ARE HEADED IN SOME CASES BY UNDER SECRETARIES AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINS.NOTICEABLY ABSENT IS SOVIET CHIEF ARMS NEGOTIATOR VIKTOR KARPOV,WHO HAS DELAYED HIS ARRIVAL UNTIL WEDNESDAY FOR REASONS WHICH ARE OBSCURE.WG LEADERS WILL REPORT TO THEIR PRINCIPALS ON WEDNESDAY,WHEN SHEVARDNADZE IS DUE TO ARRIVE FROM MOSCO.

3.AT 1100 HOURS ON THURSDAY,SOVIET FOREIGN MIN IS TO CALL ON PRESIDENT AT WHITE HOUSE,WHEN HE IS EXPECTED TO DELIVER A LETTER FROM GORBACHEV WHICH SOME BELIEVE MAY CONTAIN IMPORTANT NEW PROPOSALS IN ARMS CONTROL FIELD.

...2

ACC	DATE
653443	SEP 25 1989
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USBK	
LOC	
A6-	

PAGE TWO UNGR6818 CONFD

4.ON FRIDAY AND SATURDAY,BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE ALONG WITH HOST OF OFFICIALS WILL MEET AT SCENIC JACKSON LAKE LODGE OUTSIDE OF JACKSON HOLE,WYOMING.VENUE WAS PROPOSED BY BAKER TO BREAK USUAL PATTERN OF USA/SOVIET ENCOUNTER AND TO INTRODUCE NEW ELEMENT OF INFORMALITY INTO PROCEEDINGS.BAKER SPENT HIS YOUTH IN REGION OF GRAND TETON MOUNTAINS AND ANNUALLY VACATIONS THERE IN AUGUST WITH DICK CHENEY,SEC OF DEFENCE.MEETING WILL CLOSE WITH SATURDAY EVENING BARBECUE AT NEARBY AMK RANCH AND SUNDAY MORNING TROUT FISHING TRIP TO SNAKE RIVER.

5.BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE WILL THEN BOTH FLY TO NEW YORK SUNDAY AFTERNOON,WHERE THEY WILL SPEND FOLLOWING WEEK AT UNGA. PRESIDENT IS DUE TO SPEAK TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY MONDAY MORNING,AND WILL THEN CONVENE WORKING LUNCHEON WITH NATO FOREIGN MINS TO DEBRIEF ON USA/SOVIET MEETINGS.SHEVARDNADZE WILL ADDRESS U.N. ON TUESDAY.

CCC/114 192213Z UNGR6818

TAVIV 20-MIDEAST

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

ACC A-7 TS-9
FILE POSSIBLE
20-USA-1-3-USSR

U.S. DELEGATION
SEPTEMBER 15, 1989

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

-- U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS MET FOR 5-1/2 HOURS SEPT. 7 IN VIENNA TO CONTINUE ONGOING CONSULTATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND LEBANON.

-- MFA SPECIAL ENVOY TARASOV, WHO LED THE SOVIET SIDE, BRIEFED ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE REGION WHICH FOCUSSED PRIMARILY ON LEBANON. SOVIETS INDICATED VERY STRONG SUPPORT FOR RECONSTITUTING THE ARAB LEAGUE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE AND FOR ESTABLISHING AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. SOVIETS ALSO PROPOSED A MECHANISM TO ENFORCE AN ARMS EMBARGO.

-- S/P DIRECTOR ROSS, WHO LED THE U.S. SIDE, WELCOMED SOVIET ENGAGEMENT IN HELPING TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN LEBANON. ROSS SAID WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL FROM BEIRUT WAS A REACTION TO THE GROWING THREAT TO THEIR MISSION AND THE NEAR IMPOSSIBILITY OF THEIR CONDUCTING DIPLOMACY; IT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS A DIMINUTION OF U.S. INTEREST IN LEBANON.

-- ROSS SAID U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS RECONVENING THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE, AND WE HAD HEARD GROWING INDICATIONS FROM THE ARAB LEAGUE THAT THIS WOULD BE DONE (IN FACT THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE ANNOUNCED AFTER THE BELGRADE NAM SUMMIT THAT IT WAS RESUMING ITS MISSION).

-- ROSS SAID U.S. ALSO SUPPORTED AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE BUT CAUTIONED AGAINST TOO CLOSE A LINKAGE TO AN ARMS EMBARGO MECHANISM, GIVEN THE BASIC ASYMMETRY BETWEEN THE WARRING FACTIONS IN LEBANON AND THEIR SOURCES OF SUPPLY, AND THE FACT THAT AN ARMS SUPPLY MECHANISM MIGHT TAKE A LONG TIME TO DEVELOP. ROSS SUGGESTED THAT THE PARTIES START WITH AN EMBARGO ON EASILY VERIFIABLE AND LARGE WEAPONS SYSTEMS LIKE MISSILES AND ATTACK HELICOPTORS; SOVIETS DID NOT RESPOND.

-- U.S. ALSO PROPOSED THAT SYRIA BE ASKED TO CURB USE OF 240MM MORTARS, WHICH HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY DEVASTATING AGAINST BEIRUT; SOVIETS SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT DECISION BY IRAQ NOT TO SHIP SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES TO THE CHRISTIANS.

-- THE SOVIETS URGED THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE COMMITTEE PROCEED STEP-BY-STEP AND NOT TO TRY TO SINGLE OUT OR ISOLATE SYRIA. THE U.S. RESPONDED THAT, WHILE IT WAS TRUE THE COMMITTEE'S WORK COULD NOT SUCCEED WITHOUT SYRIAN COOPERATION, IT WAS ALSO TRUE THAT SYRIA MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO BLOCK THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE OR ATTEMPT TO DICTATE THE OUTCOME IN LEBANON. THE U.S. SIDE REPEATED THE NEED FOR SYRIA TO CURB THE SHELLING AND TO CHANGE THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE WHICH THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE HAD ENCOUNTERED. THE U.S. SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL ALSO FOR THE SYRIANS TO COMMIT TO A WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

-- ON THE BROADER ARAB-ISRAEL PEACE PROCESS, THE SOVIETS COMPLAINED ON BEHALF OF THE PLO ABOUT THE SLOW PACE OF THE U.S.-PLO DIALOGUE. SOVIETS SAID THE U.S. APPEARS ONLY TO SEEK A GREEN LIGHT FOR ELECTIONS, WITHOUT PROVIDING ASSURANCES TO THE PLO REGARDING ITS OWN ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE SOVIETS SAID THE PLO BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. IS STALLING IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE INTIFADA TO WIND DOWN.

-- USDEL REPLIED THAT THE KEY TO U.S. EFFORTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS IS TO AVOID STERILE DEBATES ON PRINCIPLES OR SYMBOLS, WHILE FOCUSING ON WHAT IS POSSIBLE AND ATTAINABLE. WELL-KNOWN PRINCIPLES UNDERPIN U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT THESE ALONE WILL NOT PRODUCE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS A PROCESS WHICH STARTS WITH ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE AND MOVES THROUGH ELECTIONS TO NEGOTIATIONS.

-- U.S. OFFICIALS SAID THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS FOUGHT HARD TO DEFEND THE U.S.-PLO DIALOGUE AGAINST THOSE WHO WOULD SEEK TO CURTAIL IT. THIS DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. CAN OR WILL PROVIDE ASSURANCES TO THE PLO REGARDING ITS OWN ROLE OR THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT. THE PLO MUST REACH OUT AND CONVINCE ISRAEL THAT IT DESERVES A ROLE; AND IT CAN SEEK TO ACHIEVE ITS PREFERRED OUTCOMES THROUGH THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS.

-- TARASOV SUGGESTED AGAIN THAT THE U.S. CONSIDER PARALLEL DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE FIVE PERMREPS TO THE UNSC AND/OR A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ISSUED BY THE TWO BIG POWERS OR THE FIVE. ROSS REPLIED THAT STATEMENTS PER SE ARE LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE PROCESS THEY ARE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT. IT WAS THEREFORE HARD TO ENVISAGE A STATEMENT THAT DID NOT UNDERCUT THE VERY PROCESS OF DIALOGUE, ELECTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS TO WHICH THIS PROCESS SHOULD BE HEADING.

-- WITH REGARD TO PERMREP CONSULTATIONS, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT A FORUM NOT BE CREATED IN WHICH DISCUSSION WILL DIVERGE FROM THE CENTRAL OBJECTIVE OF GETTING TO NEGOTIATIONS.

-- U.S. SIDE CONTINUED TO PRESS THE SOVIETS TO MANIFEST SIGNS OF SERIOUSNESS IN THE REGION BY REESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. THIS STEP WOULD DISPEL DOUBTS ABOUT THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO A FAIR SETTLEMENT. THE SOVIETS REPLIED THAT SUCH A STEP SHOULD SUPPORT PEACEFUL MOVES BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT; THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED THAT OPPONENTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN ISRAEL WOULD SEE THE RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AS JUSTIFYING INACTION. U.S. SIDE RESPONDED BY SAYING THE MAIN PERCEPTION OF A SOVIET MOVE TO RESTORE TIES WOULD BE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOW PREPARED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

-- SOVIETS MADE MENTION OF THE NEED TO CONSIDER AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, BUT THEY DID NOT PRESS THE POINT. SIGNIFICANTLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE SOVIETS DID EXPRESS INTEREST IN SOME OF THE DETAILS OF THE ELECTIONS PROPOSAL AND A PRE-ELECTION DIALOGUE; E.G., HOW IS THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION TO BE SELECTED AND WHAT IS ITS SOURCE OF AUTHORITY.

-- IN RESPONSE TO A SOVIET QUERY ON U.S.-SYRIAN RELATIONS, THE U.S. SIDE NOTED WE WANT BETTER RELATIONS WITH SYRIA BUT CANNOT TOLERATE CONTINUED SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST GROUPS LIKE PFLP-GC AND SYRIAN DRUG ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON.

-- IN GENERAL, THIS SESSION OF U.S.-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS WAS SERIOUS AND USEFUL, WITH THE SOVIETS PREPARED TO DELVE SOMEWHAT MORE DEEPLY INTO SOME ISSUES RELATED TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS NEGOTIATIONS. THE U.S. SIDE WAS ALSO ENCOURAGED BY SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT ARAB LEAGUE EFFORTS IN LEBANON AND TO SUPPORT AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE THERE. MORE WORK WILL BE NEEDED HOWEVER IN PROMOTING SYRIAN RESTRAINT AND MODERATION.

-- ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-ON TALKS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THE MINISTERIAL REGIONAL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON AND WYOMING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 18.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL



Government
of Canada

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
ACTION REQUEST FICHE DE SERVICE

To - À

USC

RBD
Alan McLane

Date

Time - Heure

From - De

EFB

This is the
George Brennan
article mentioned
in the
passage

Telephone No. - No. de téléphone

Extension - Poste

The outlined
day is the I had in
mind on Friday
parallel between
the set up
Calgary

☐ Please Call ☐ Returned your call ☐ Will call again ☐ Wants to see you
Prière d'appeler Vous a rappelé Vous rappellera Désire vous voir

☐ Action ☐ Approved ☐ Note and return
Donner suite Approbation Noter et retourner
☐ Comments ☐ Draft reply ☐ Note and forward
Commentaires Projet de réponse Noter et faire suivre
☐ As requested ☐ Signature ☐ Note and file
Comme demandé Noter et classer

File no. - N° de dossier

Message taken - Message reçu

Speech
& Kennedy
article
JFK
I think it
is very
important

S1/ FYI -
IN EVENT
MISSED

Ya
17.

a Cold War
to say this
sort of thing.

IR.

000942

AFTER THE COLD WAR

16 Oct 89
20-USA-1-3-45SR
A7

America's leading Sovietologist
looks at past U.S.-Russian relations
—and where to go from here.

BY GEORGE F. KENNAN

IS THE COLD WAR OVER? AND, IF SO, what does this mean for American policy toward the Soviet Union?

This is not a bad time, at the beginning of a new year and of a new administration, to stand off for a moment and to look at these questions from a longer historical perspective.

It might be worth recalling that, traditionally, Russia was never seen by Americans as an enemy of the United States. The czarist autocracy,

to be sure, was distasteful to most Americans as a form of government. But we were prepared to take it as it was, to maintain normal relations with it, and to make the best of these relations so long as Russia posed no threat to our national security.

All this changed with the Russian Revolution in 1917. There seems to be a widespread impression in this country that the cold war, as something signifying a state of sharp conflict and tension between the two governments, began only in 1945, after World War II. The impression is erroneous.

Never were American relations with Russia at a lower ebb than in the first 16 years after the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917. Americans were deeply shocked by the violence of the revolution, by the fanaticism and cruelty of the new rulers, by their refusal to recognize the debts and claims arising out of the recent war, and above all by the brazen world-revolutionary propaganda they put out and the efforts they mounted to promote Communist seizures of power in other countries.

Over all those 16 years, as many of us can today recall, we had no official relations whatsoever with the Soviet regime. Even after the exchange of diplomatic relations at the end of 1933, the relationship remained, during the rest

of the 1930's, a distant and troubled one. The Stalinist tyranny was after all not a form of government with which it was easy for anybody to coexist. And the cynicism of Stalin's pact with Hitler, at the outset of World War II, did nothing to improve the attitudes of most Americans toward the Soviet regime.

From 1941 to 1945, when both the Soviet Union and the United States were at war with Germany, the mutual antagonism of the two political systems was muted in the interests of their military collaboration. But this outwardly professed friendship never went very deep on either side; and no sooner were hostilities over than new and serious sources of friction began to emerge.

The war, after all, had wrought fundamental changes in the entire background of the relationship. The interest in world revolution, which had long been fading even before the war, had almost totally disappeared as a feature of Soviet policy and rhetoric. But new sources of difficulty had arisen to replace it.



ASSOCIATED PRESS

Yalta, 1945: Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Josef Stalin. The postwar era that they ushered in has ended, the author argues.



question." For years he'd felt drawn to writers like Frank Conroy and Harry Crews, "people willing to confront their past and the truth of what it's like to grow up in this country, wanting a piece of the action, and what it costs you. That kind of honesty was to me inspirational — that sense of people meeting themselves head on, not just themselves but the place they live in, the world they dream of belonging to."

Then, in 1977, while teaching at Goddard College, he renewed his friendship with Raymond Carver, whom he'd met when they were both teaching at Stanford: "I was already pretty much writing the way I write. But reading Ray's work gave me a sense of confirmation about what I was doing. I felt an immediate affinity for his standards of honesty and exactness, his refusal to do anything cheap in a story, to destroy his characters with irony that proved his own virtue."

Everywhere Wolff turns, he sees evidence of his friend, who died last year. "Ray found this house for us and told me about this job. He was the one who gave me the message that my first son had been born prematurely; he and Tess Gallagher [the writer who was Carver's wife] sat up with that boy when my other son was born. He was completely honest, so you tended to be that way with him."

THIS BOY'S LIFE" reads like the work of a writer who has long understood himself to be "surrounded by stories." Its strategy is novelistic; details have been altered, events ordered and edited, to give Wolff's memoir the shape of fiction. Much of the book is written in scenes and, surprisingly, in dialogue. "I have a good memory," Tobias says. "And I was lucky — most of the people I lived with repeated themselves a lot."

Wolff's method is entirely different from his brother's in "The Duke of Deception," which takes adult understanding as one of its subjects and works — biographically, analytically — at fathoming the truth. "I felt that events did not speak well enough for themselves," Geoffrey says, "especially in the presence of a systematic liar. I wanted to say — at the few moments I could say it — how I felt about all this now."

Reading "The Duke of Deception" and "This Boy's Life" in tandem is fascinating and uncanny. What fasci-

nates are the differences — how dissimilar two childhoods could be at a period in our history when, according to the prevailing myth, the whole country was middle class. The eeriness comes from the almost preternatural family resemblances that cannot in this case be explained by environment and exposure.

It's one thing for Geoffrey to nearly repeat Duke's checkered high school career, another for Tobias — 3,000 miles away and barely knowing his father — to invent fictitious personae, write a bad check, pad his boarding school application with forged recommendations. Few memoirs are as much about self-creation. At the start of "This Boy's Life," Arthur Duke Saunders Ansell Wolff's son Tobias rechristens himself Jack, for Jack London:

"I didn't come to Utah to be the same boy I'd been before. I had my own dreams of transformation, Western dreams, dreams of freedom and dominion and taciturn self-sufficiency. The first thing I wanted to do was change my name. A girl named Toby had joined my class before I left Florida, and this had caused both of us scalding humiliation."

Finally, of course, there is that most obvious likeness, that particular consonance of character and talent, the fact that Geoffrey and Tobias Wolff could, like brothers in fairy tales, grow up virtual strangers and somehow come through it all with remarkably similar goals: to reach the truth through memory and transform it into art. "Memory is the story," Tobias says. "Our memories are what make us." At once ironic and genuinely proud, he relates the following incident. Not long ago, Tobias's mother heard him read from "This Boy's Life" at the University of Florida. Afterward, at a reception, he overheard a faculty member ask her how much her son had remembered correctly — that is, how much was true. She thought for a moment, then smiled and said, "About 85 percent."

Though clearly pleased with such high marks for accuracy, Tobias Wolff admits to having omitted things from "This Boy's Life" — real events he chose to leave out lest the true account of his life seem too markedly patterned and shaped. "It would have seemed too contrived," he says. "Too much like a novel." ■

PERFECT.
But not to Leona Helmsley.
Can you see why?

When we set up a bathroom with two glasses it's for two people. One of the complimentary toothbrushes is missing. Being perfect is what our hotel is all about.

Leona M. Helmsley, President

THE NEW YORK HELMSLEY HOTEL
212 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017
For reservations call toll-free: 800/221-4982 in NY, 212/888-1624.
TELEX: 640-543. Or call your travel agent.



KEN JARECKE/CONTACT

George Bush, Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev in New York last December. President Bush's challenge is to deal with a "new Russia."

The outcome of the hostilities had placed the Soviet Union in military and political control of most of the eastern half of the European continent. This constituted a major displacement of the balance of power in Europe. Alone, this was bound to be disturbing for the Western allies. But the seriousness of the change was magnified by several other factors. One was the failure of the Soviet Government to match, by any extensive demobilization of its own forces in Europe, the extensive demobilizations promptly carried out there by the Western powers. Another was the cruel suppression at the hands of Soviet police and party authorities of every trace of independent democratic government in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe the Soviet forces had overrun.

On top of this, it soon became evident that the Soviet leaders were trying to take advantage of the war-shocked, exhausted, and confused state of several of the Western European

peoples with a view to fastening upon them Communist minority regimes similar to those Moscow was already busy installing in the part of Europe under its authority.

And finally, there was injected into all of this a new and highly confusing factor — a factor without precedent in human history, overthrowing all traditional military concepts and inflaming all military fears and ambitions: the nuclear weapon and its introduction into the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.

IT WAS OUT OF THIS WITCHES' BREW that the cold war emerged, as the symbolic expression of a new, highly antagonistic Soviet-American relationship. It represented, at the outset, a curious realization of Trotsky's famous formula of "no war, no peace." Diplomatic relations were to be continued, to be sure; and the guns, including the nuclear ones, were for the moment to remain silent.

But the threshold of actual hostilities was, at that time, never remote. Many people, including Stalin himself, thought it likely, if not inevitable, that this threshold would soon be passed. On both sides, great military establishments began to be trained, and taught to think, as though war, or some form of military showdown, was the way the conflict was bound ultimately to end. In many (*Continued on Page 38*)

George F. Kennan, during his long diplomatic career, served many times in Moscow, including as a member of the first American delegation to the Soviet Union, in 1933-1934; as minister-counselor in 1944, and as Ambassador in 1952. In 1947, he devised the "containment" strategy that was to underlie postwar American policy toward the Soviet Union. From 1961 to 1963, he was Ambassador to Yugoslavia. He is now Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J.

THE LESSONS OF ST. JOE'S

Although fond of his own Catholic schooling, the author hesitates to make the same choice for his own children.

By Anthony DePalma

AT FIRST, IT RAN like other Montessori schools: my daughter, Laura, and the other little ones playing with paints and blocks and learning to learn. Classes met in the pastel-colored basement of The Living Church, a born-again congregation in the old railroad suburb in which we live; but there was no mention of Jesus.

Then, about two years ago, Lois Babcock, the pastor's wife and administrator of the school, sent home a note with Laura saying that because the church ran the school, classes ought to bear a touch of faith. She planned to read Bible stories for 10 minutes a day.

Mrs. Babcock knew that by embracing her Bible she might bankrupt her school, but she went ahead and sided with the Scriptures. Most families, as well as the key teachers, threatened to leave. Eventually, she closed the school.

I respect what she did, standing up for her beliefs. I also learned how my view about religion in the classroom differs from other people's; although I could understand how the others felt, I had planned to keep Laura in the school. I didn't see anything wrong with reading the Bible to 3-year-olds.

By the time I graduated from college, I had never attended a class at public school, having spent 18 years under the wing of the nuns, brothers and priests of Catholic schools. At the time, I didn't think much about it at all. In the profile of Catholic school students, I suppose I was typical, the fourth son of an Italian-American longshoreman living in a crowded city of the Northeast. The Catholic schools were as much a part of our lives as stickball and the crucifix on our bedroom wall.

My wife, Miriam, also spent many years with the nuns, both here and in Cuba, where she was born. And yet, when it came time to find another school for Laura, we chose the local public school. We already had one son enrolled there. And we have a 3-year-old still at home who most likely will join them.

Anthony DePalma is a reporter for *The Times*.



Above: The Rev. John Biermann, a chemistry teacher, one of only two priests at St. Joseph of the Palisades High School, which became coed in 1972. The school, staffed until 1975 by the Christian Brothers, now has a mostly lay faculty. Right: St. Joe's students today.

It was not a decision we made lightly. Miriam and I respect the Catholic schools' discipline and high standards, and we value the religious instruction the students receive, especially now that the rote catechism and other pious excesses we endured are gone.

But we both also remembered the limitations of the schools. There were no black faces at Our Lady of Grace, my grammar school in Hoboken. No Cohens, either. We lived with threadbare budgets: ancient books and parking-lot playgrounds.

Despite that, the schools did right by me, helping when I needed it most. Not so Miriam. She remembers that when she arrived in New York from Cuba, a mostly Spanish-speaking 8-year-old, the grammar-school nuns force-fed her English and cracked her hands with a ruler when she mispronounced words. She is a teacher now and, like thousands of other Catholic-school graduates, she resents the nuns, especially the way they sometimes made the girls in high school feel inferior to the boys across the hall. She won't risk repeating any of that with our children.

WHEN WE MOVED TO MONTCLAIR, IN SUB-urban New Jersey, five years ago, it was partly for the wonderful mix of people we expected to find

here and partly for the public schools, known for their integration and innovation. The community's values, much like our own, are reflected in the local schools, which helped us decide against Catholic school. If we lived in the city, it would be different: There, the Jewish schools have become buffers against chaotic public schools where guards stand in the hallways.

But at a recent parents' night, my son's second-grade teacher, a young black woman who looks like Whitney Houston and is just as high-spirited, stressed the importance of doing homework, being self-disciplined and holding moral values. She could have been teaching at Our Lady of Grace.

For now, we intend to replace in our home what our kids might have seen in class in a Catholic school. We are careful to discuss whatever issues of right and wrong a 7-year-old can understand, and hope the younger ones at least listen. We pray together at night. We send the oldest for religion classes at our parish school. We expose all of them to the needs of others.

And yet, it is obvious that something is missing. This became startlingly clear not long ago when my older son asked me, innocently, what a nun is. He had seen one in a picture book and just didn't know. It was the kind of question that stops you cold. I realized then how much he would not know.

For some reason, I feel guilty when I say my children are in public school. A friend tells me that is generic Catholic guilt. Maybe. Or maybe it is because I broke with my own past and turned on tradition. There's worry involved, too. In time, as our children get older and their need for guidance and moral training outstrips our capacity to provide it at home, I may suggest they consider Catholic schools, knowing how much the people at my school helped me. I'm worried that if they and my wife agree, they may not be able to find one Catholic enough to give them what they need.

Over the last 20 years, nationwide, nearly 4,000 Catholic schools have closed or merged, and enrollment has dropped by almost half. I know that I, and Catholics like me, are a big reason for the decline.

Today, according to an estimate by a national education group, only 10 percent of school-age Roman Catholics attend parochial schools. Many schools now charge nearly the equivalent of my

COLD WAR

Continued from Page 33

ways, in everything except the silence of the weapons, war already became a reality in the minds of millions of men, military and civilian.

Although there were to be successive later crises, the high point of the cold war was probably reached during the Korean War. And we all know the further course of events. Fortunately, for all of us, war between the United States and the Soviet Union did not break out. The crisis was surmounted.

And in the ensuing four decades, down to the middle of the 1980's, each of these components of the cold war, while often retaining its initial validity in the perceptions of people in both countries, diminished in sharpness, and often in reality. The peoples of Western Europe soon recovered their political balance, their prosperity, and their self-confidence. After the success of the Marshall Plan, there could no longer be any question of dangerous Communist penetration in that region.

Both sides, furthermore, soon began to learn to live, after a fashion, with the nuclear weapon, at least in the sense that they came to recognize that this was a suicidal weapon that must never be used — that any attempt to use it would lead only to a disaster — which all concepts of victory or defeat would become meaningless. And as for the relationship of conventional military forces in Europe: not only did the development of the NATO alliance restore an approximate military balance in the heart of the European continent, but — more important still — it became increasingly clear with the passage of the years that neither side had either the incentive or the desire to unleash even a conventional war, much less a nuclear one, in that region.

One might have thought that in the light of these changes, the highly militarized view of East-West relations that the term "cold war" signified might have faded. But military preparations and weapons races are stubborn things. They engender their own patterns of habit and suspicion. These ride along on their own intrinsic vitality even when the original reasons for them have largely faded.

So in this sense the cold war

lived on in the minds of many people through the 1960's, and 70's, even after most of the justification for it had faded. And it was only in the middle of the 1980's, with the emergence of a Russian leader intelligent enough to recognize that the rationale of the cold war was largely unreal, and bold enough to declare this publicly and to act accordingly, that the world was brought to realize that one epoch — the epoch of recovery from the enormous dislocation of World War II — had passed; and that a new one was beginning — an age that would, to be sure, create new problems, as all great changes in international life are bound to do, but would at the same time also present new possibilities.

THIS IS THE POINT at which we now find ourselves. The initial sources of contention between the two governments — the prewar ones, that is — no longer have serious significance. The ones flowing from the outcome of World War II have been extensively moderated and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, has shown every evidence of an intention to see them substantially eliminated. Where do we go from here?

The Russia we confront today is in many respects like nothing we have known before. The last vestiges of the unique and nightmarish system of rule known as Stalinism are now disappearing. What we have before us is in many respects the freest period Russia has ever known, except perhaps for the few years of feverish change that just preceded the outbreak of World War I in 1914.

But we must be careful when we use this term "freedom." This does not mean that Russia is becoming like us. This it is not doing, could not do, and should not be expected to do. Forms of government and the habits of governments tend over the long run to reflect the understandings and expectations of their peoples. The Russian people, like a number of other peoples of the Soviet Union, have never known democracy as we understand it. They have experienced next to nothing of the centuries-long development of the disci-

(Continued on Page 58)

is Jewish. They can discuss birth control, abortion, estrangement from the church in ways the brothers could not.

But those same real concerns draw the lay teachers away from the school to their own families and lives. I can't help but think of what might have happened if Brother David had to take his own child to soccer practice instead of sticking around the school to try to reach me.

The priest who has been longest at St. Joe's, the Rev. John Biermann, concedes that, at times, he feels like a token, a black suit dragged out for various school functions. Until last October, there had been another, but on the night St. Joe's held an open house to recruit new students, the Rev. Joseph P. LoCigno was killed in an auto accident. In the days following the accident, students and teachers held special masses and tried to make sense of what had happened. It came up in senior religion class, which is taught by Philip Azoon, 50, who had once studied for the priesthood. Mr. Azoon's classes are much more firmly rooted in Catholic theology than were the ones I took in the late 1960's, in which we analyzed "West Side Story" and studied "The Death of Ivan Ilych." Mr. Azoon's senior students read the New Testament and study church history.

A few days after Father LoCigno's death, Mr. Azoon lectured about using prayer to deal with a seemingly random universe. At the end of the class, Dilys Vazquez, a 12th-grader who had followed his words intently, said that coming to grips with Father LoCigno's death was tough, "but religion makes it easier to understand."

A few weeks later, my son Aahren asked me to sign a waiver so he could attend a tree-planting memorial at his school for a classmate who had died of cancer. I was struck by how forced it seemed, how much more rigid and unnatural than what had been done for Father LoCigno at St. Joe's.

For all the studies and comparisons, all the elevated debate, this is the true value of a Catholic school. Even without the brothers, they can fuse what goes on inside the soul with what happens on the streets and in homes, offices and schools. In the end, it is what gives St. Joe's a reason for being, and for continuing to struggle against all odds to survive. ■

"I tried
True

T
A taste

SURGEON GENERAL
Smoke Contains

COLD WAR

Continued from Page 38

pline of self-government out of which our own political culture has evolved. If you presented them tomorrow with our political system, most of them would not know what to do with it; and what they did do might be far from our expectations.

It is clear, then, that whatever happens, and whatever may be the fate of Gorbachev's efforts at the restructuring of Soviet society, Russia is, and is going to remain, a country very different from our own. We should not look for this difference to be overcome in any short space of time.

Beyond which, Russia, as a great modern country in a unique geographic position, and the heir to extensive involvements flowing from that position, is bound to have political interests quite different from our own. These are, fortunately, for the most part, not ones that conflict seriously with ours. Such differences as remain are not ones that should preclude a normal relationship, particularly when leadership on the Russian side is in the hands of a man such as Gorbachev. But this disparity does mean that one should not look, over the long term, for quite the same sort of political intimacy with Russian regimes that we might expect from a country that had inherited more of our own legacy of political outlooks and institutions.

All that being said, we are faced with the fact that Gorbachev has given every evidence, for his part, of an intention to remove as many as possible of the factors that have hampered Soviet-American relations in the past; and a number of bold steps he has taken in that direction do testimony to the sincerity of his effort. To the extent he is able to carry these efforts to conclusion (and that depends to some extent on the response from our side), they present the most favorable opportunity the United States has had in the last 70 years to develop a normal, constructive and hopeful relationship with the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev's position is obviously an extremely difficult one. The burdens he has assumed are almost superhuman. His efforts at internal economic reform have served, thus far, mainly to reveal that the damages done to

Soviet society, economically, socially and spiritually, by 50 years of Stalinist terror and Brezhnevist corruption and stagnation are greater than any of us had supposed. It is going to take longer than anyone had realized to repair those damages and build a healthy society.

Whether Gorbachev will be given the time to do this, no one can say. His difficulties are heightened by the fact that his reforms have had the unintended and unexpected effect of inflaming nationalistic feelings in several of the non-Russian ethnic communities of the Soviet Union, thus rendering acute a political problem — namely the relations of the non-Russian periphery to the Russian center — which many of us had thought was only a problem of the more distant future. Particularly in the case of the three Baltic countries this has led to a situation of great potential instability; for what goes on in those parts of the Soviet Union interacts with what goes on in the so-called "satellite" countries of Eastern and Central Europe, farther afield; and if things get farther out of hand in this entire region, situations could be produced that would appear to threaten not just the political but also the strictly defensive military interests of the Soviet Union, which could have serious consequences.

How long Gorbachev will be able, or permitted by his colleagues, to bear these burdens, no one can say. His position has important elements of strength: his great reputation as a statesman, plus the fact that whoever might succeed to his powers would also have to succeed to his problems, something of which all his opponents must be painfully aware. The pressures, on the other hand, are cruel.

It is equally impossible to make predictions about what, were Gorbachev to be removed, would follow. That conditions could not revert to what they were before he took power is one of the few things on which almost everyone agrees. The intellectuals have been given their head; and it is unthinkable that this generation of them should ever again be bottled up as they were before. Not only that, but the Gorbachev economic reforms, unproductive as they

may have been to date, have been formally accepted by the highest bodies of party and government; and this stamp of approval is not apt to be withdrawn until and unless someone can come up with a better alternative, which no one, as yet, has shown any sign of doing.

One must suppose, therefore, that whoever might replace Gorbachev would have to follow extensively in his footsteps, though possibly at a slower speed and without his boldness of leadership.

Particularly is this true in the field of foreign policy, which should be of greatest interest to us. Within Russia, this has been the least controversial of Gorbachev's fields of activity. Hard-liners, military and civilian, might like to retract, if they could, some of the more conciliatory steps he has taken in the area of arms control; but they would soon find that they faced the same financial stringencies he has been attempting to master, and they would presumably have little room, here too, to maneuver.

One must suppose, therefore, that a good portion of what Gorbachev represents would survive him, even if he were to be removed at an early date. Meanwhile, to our good fortune, he hangs on, suspended precariously in midair, to be sure, supported mainly by his incomparable qualities of insight, imagination and courage, and by the relative mediocrity and intellectual poverty of most of his opponents.

TO THE POLICY makers of a new administration, the Russian scene of this particular moment presents, then, a series of tremendous uncertainties — uncertainties greater than Russia has ever known since the fateful year of 1917. If one were to be asked, What is it that is most likely to happen in the coming period, one could say only — the unexpected.

These uncertainties are unquestionably reasons for great alertness, caution and prudence in American policy toward that country. They are not, however, reasons for neglecting the opportunities offered by Gorbachev's policies for the easing of military tensions and for improving the atmosphere of East-West relations generally. If realistic and solid agreements are made now, while the iron is hot; if these agreements, as is to be expected, are seen in Moscow as being in Soviet interest; if they are, as they

should be, inherently self-enforcing; if, as is to be expected, they are sealed in formal undertakings — then they are not apt to be undone simply by changes in the Soviet leadership.

WHAT, THEN, should be the objectives of American policy toward the sort of international partner Gorbachev is trying to make out of Russia? What could we, from our side, do to promote the normalization of this relationship and to shape its future in a manner commensurate with its positive possibilities?

It would seem obvious, to this writer at least, that our first concern should be to remove, insofar as it lies within our power to do so, those features of American policy and practice that have their origins and their continuing rationale in outdated cold war assumptions and lack serious current justification.

To some extent, this has already been done. Cultural exchanges and people-to-people contacts are proceeding briskly, no longer seriously impeded from either side. The same may be said of scholarly exchanges. In all these areas, the initiative has normally and properly to come from private parties. The government's task is primarily not to stand in the way, but to lend its support wherever this is really needed. That things have gone as well as they recently have in these forms of contact is encouraging testimony to the private demand for them and to their usefulness as components of normal relations between two great peoples.

In the commercial field, too, progress has been made; but here obstacles remain — obstacles for which there is no present justification and the removal of which should present no problems.

One hears a certain amount of discussion about whether we should not give aid to Gorbachev. The entire question is misconceived. One must bear in mind the difference between trade and aid. Gorbachev has not asked us for anything in the nature of loans or special credits or other abnormal forms of assistance; he is most unlikely to do so; and we would be ill advised to give it even if he did.

What the Russians are asking for, and deserve to be given, are only the normal facilities for trade, facilities that include of course the extension of the usual commer-

(Continued on Page 64)

SALVADOR

Continued from Page 55

might survive. But now, she says, she has lost all hope. She no longer even listens to the endless promises of President Duarte. In the slums and villages, it is a common refrain.

"For me, Duarte did nothing for us. I leave him to God," Mrs. Alfaro said as gravediggers pushed her husband and son back underground.

ON THE NARROW dirt lane leading to the killing site in San Francisco, the guerrillas who dominate the area had scattered dozens of leaflets. The message was simple.

"Everyone come together to demand punishment for the repression of the army that is guilty of thousands of murders, corruption and death squads," the leaflets read. "Everyone take up arms! F.M.L.N."

Though the guerrillas do not appear to be gaining much in popularity, they retain enough committed support to keep the war going indefinitely.

The guerrillas are the shadow government in a third of the country. In those areas, they expel peasants who oppose them, but work hard to provide security, schools, clinics and a sense of participation to their supporters. They have developed an effective tax-collection system, produce light weapons in their own factories, and maintain an extensive communications and spy network. So far, they have survived everything the army and its American advisers have thrown at them.

Now the rebels have made an offer to take part in the electoral process. If nothing else, they have made the Government look intransigent in rejecting it. The Government, however, has reason to doubt their sincerity. In the rebel documents captured by the army, the guerrillas detailed their strategy: "In a dialogue we must have as our central objective keeping the enemy tied at the table with a view of his strategic weakening... dialogue is one of the forms of conspiratorial struggle..."

It is likely the guerrillas have offered to talk because they are confident they can fight. Now, if their proposal comes to nothing, some commanders are reported to support a Tet-style offensive to

break American and Government morale.

AT THE ARMY'S Third Brigade, the main combat headquarters in the war zone in the east, Huey helicopters wobble overhead like obscene armored insects. Col. René Emilio Ponce, the Third Brigade commander who has since become Army Chief of Staff, spoke soberly of the war, which he said would go on for years. He spoke of his frustration with civilian officials who, the colonel said, have failed to administer programs for the peasantry.

"We aren't going to win the war with rifles and bullets," he said. "We can only win with the support of the people."

Few would dispute that point; and yet the colonel himself served in the feared Treasury Police at a time when it was little more than an official assassination agency. The army he now leads is on the defensive, continuing to fight in large units that the rebels easily avoid.

After eight years of war, officers are still promoted almost solely on the basis of the time they have served, rather than on proven command ability. In a study last year that blasted the incompetence of the Salvadoran commanders and their American advisers, four American Army colonels wrote: "By most estimates, the war in El Salvador is stuck. Unhappily, the United States finds itself stuck with the war."

AS THE MARCH elections approach, Duarte and his ruling Christian Democrats are in decline, victims of their own corruption and internecine squabbles. The extreme right-wing Arena party, having crushed Duarte's party in the last municipal and legislative elections, looks likely to win the presidency.

It is uncertain whether Arena can provide a credible government. When it was founded in 1981 by D'Aubuisson, according to several Salvadoran politicians and army officers, Arena ran a network of death squads. According to a businessman friend of mine, his teen-aged son once murdered people during midnight joyrides with an Arena squad that fueled itself, his father said, on hate, cocaine and whiskey. D'Aubuisson, a for-

mer Army intelligence officer, denies any involvement in death squads — and remains perhaps the single most popular politician in El Salvador.

Arena is now offering voters a more presentable leader, Alfredo Cristiani, as its presidential candidate. A wealthy, squeaky clean businessman, Mr. Cristiani projects a well-meaning naivete. At 41, he has no political experience and it remains to be seen whether he can handle D'Aubuisson and the party gunmen, whose glandular politics have relied more on bullets than ballots.

"Cristiani is the manager of the firm," a senior right-wing political leader told me. "But the shareholders of Arena are the same people — the most intransigent members of the oligarchy. They hope to have control of everything."

Cristiani strongly denied this in an interview. He said he was confident that his "conservative ideas... generate jobs and wealth; the leftists distribute poverty."

If fairly elected, he presumably will have the chance to prove that. But if Arena, or the Christian Democrats, for that matter, win the election and then fail to halt the country's slide, only the army — and the American Embassy — will remain to hold the government together.

SALVADORAN LEADERS secretly believe their country has become the Israel of Central America — a country no American President can afford not to support. And yet it is hard to see why El Salvador is ultimately "vital" to the United States, and hard to answer the argument that if Salvadoran leaders will not reform, they should be left to reap what they have sown.

The decision on whether to stay on and press for that reform now falls to President Bush. A serious policy would mean supporting the programs that benefit the needy and give them political power, forcing the army to fight the war without murdering civilians, and naming the officers responsible for human rights abuses and, if necessary, publicly cutting aid until they are punished.

A serious policy will also mean exploring negotiations with the guerrillas. Whether or not the rebels' proposal last month was made in good faith, they remain an undeniable part of the organized left, which expresses some of the most essential demands of the majority of Salvadorans.

Some rebels are fanatics and will never compromise their goal of total victory. But among the many fine people I met in El Salvador, some were guerrillas, men and women who chose to fight because they were sick of seeing friends murdered and because they wanted their people, especially the most humble, to have a sense of their own dignity.

It may be possible to reach these rebels by exploring negotiations and perhaps by using the Democratic Convergence to bring them into the political process. But for that to happen, their security must be guaranteed, which can only come about if notorious extremists are removed from power. The United States alone has the clout to accomplish this.

Forcing such a political solution is likely to prove impossible, because hard-liners run both the army and the guerrillas. But opening the political process to the left, while excluding the violent men on both sides, is probably the only way to bring an end to this American-funded war — short of an American withdrawal that would leave Salvadorans to fight it out among themselves.

AS I WAS PACKING to leave El Salvador, I went to say goodbye to Abraham Rodriguez, an aging founder of the Christian Democratic Party known for his wit and humanity. Despite having been abused by a succession of army dictators, Rodriguez worked for two decades to convince the officers and the oligarchs that civilian government was a better idea.

Several of today's senior guerrilla officials worked to support his reform efforts back when they were student and peasant leaders. When those efforts failed, they picked up guns. Today, Rodriguez still believes people should be convinced, rather than killed. And he believes, despite all the setbacks, that a slow process of improvement is under way in El Salvador — because the Salvadoran people have died for it and are still dying struggling to achieve it.

"The country, our people, have advanced more than their political parties," he told me as we bid goodbye.

"It anguishes me, all this bloodshed, all this suffering," he added with a slow shake of his head, as if tallying the decades of hatred, greed and fratricide. "Our people deserve better." ■

COLD WAR

Continued from Page 58

cial credits by both parties in specific business deals. Here, two needless obstructions persist, both dating from the 1970's, in the form of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments to the 1974 Trade Act, which in effect deny to the Soviet Union normal customs treatment and restrict the facilities for commercial credit. For these restrictions, which proved to be of little or no benefit to anyone at the time, there is no longer any justification at all; and the sooner Congress removes them, the better.

For the rest, once minimum security precautions have been observed, let Soviet-American trade proceed as it will. The prospects for it are not open-ended. The Soviet side has at this time little to offer in export items, and has sharply limited amounts of foreign exchange available for imports. But these prospects are also not insignificant; and they should not be curtailed by unnecessary official restrictions.

THE MOST SERIOUS OF THE factors weighing on the Soviet-American relationship is unquestionably the problem of arms control, including the continuing competition in the development of strategic nuclear weapons and the standoff in conventional forces in Central Europe. This exorbitant confrontation of military strength, out of all reasonable proportion to the political differences that are supposed to justify it, constitutes an inexhaustible source of mistrust and suspicion between the two parties, distracts public opinion from more serious aspects of the relationship, and pre-emptes vast quantities of resources that could well be used for more creative purposes.

What can be done about it?

Obviously, not everything depends on us. It takes two, at every point, to perform this tango. But since Gorbachev has given impressive signs of his intention to do his best in this respect, and has taken a number of conciliatory and even unilateral steps in that direction, this would be a good time for us to review our own record and to see whether it could not be improved.

We have, of course, had one significant success in recent years: the so-called I.N.F. (Intermediate Nuclear Force) agreement, eliminating intermediate-range nuclear weapons from the forces of both sides stationed in Central Europe. This success was made possible by the willingness of both Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev to override all the intricacies of negotiation at the technical-military level and to take the bold steps, each giving reasonable credit to the good faith of the other side. But it has carried us only a small distance along the path of general arms reduction. For the rest, our record may well stand questioning.

We could certainly have had by this time, had we wished to have it, a comprehensive nuclear test ban; and nothing, surely, could have gone farther to assure extensive, if gradual, reductions in nuclear weaponry. We do not have it.

We could in all probability have had by this time, had we wanted to, the 50 percent reduction in long-range nuclear missiles which both Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev recognized as desirable and which, once achieved, would presumably have changed the whole climate of the arms control problem. We do not have it. We chose to give higher priority to the Strategic Defense Initiative, and to the modernization and consequent buildup of our strategic nuclear arsenals.

The maintenance of the present American conventional deployments in West Germany absorbs, we are told, some 40 percent of our great military budget. Nothing within the realm of practical possibility could have contributed more directly and importantly to the reduction of the Federal budget than a significant reduction in these expenditures. For years we have been toying timidly with negotiations over the possible reductions of these forces, and have gotten nowhere. These negotiations having now been moved to a much wider forum (that of the Atlantic-to-Urals talks in Vienna, embracing a greatly expanded number of participants), the prospects for any success in the coming period would seem to have been diminished rather than improved.

Gorbachev, in the meantime, has announced important changes in Soviet doctrine affecting the mission and the composition of the Soviet forces in this region, changes envisaging in particular the removal from the forward positions of forms of weaponry that would lend themselves to employment for sudden aggressive purposes. This change of doctrine has been accompanied by a number of specific suggestions from the Soviet or Warsaw Pact side for confidence-building measures of one sort or another, and by extensive unilateral Soviet measures of restraint.

The responses by which these initiatives have been met on our side have been, for the most part, reluctant, embarrassed, and occasionally even surly. These responses have caused a great many people elsewhere in the world to wonder whether we really have any serious interest in arms control at all.

Can we not do better than that?

The hesitations that have underlain these unenthusiastic responses seem to have been largely connected with the impression, so frequently propounded and supported in official American circles, that there has been an "overwhelming" Soviet superiority in conventional forces in the

Both firms already share a tradition of unsurpassed integrity, quality & service, and together provide truly distinguished, comprehensive and unique coverage of Manhattan's finest cooperatives, condominiums and townhouses.



Stribling & Associates Ltd.

340 WEST 23RD STREET, N.Y., N.Y. 10011 • 212-243-4000

MADELEINE SHIPLEY 570-
Res: (212) 693-9926



Stribling & Associates

924 Madison Ave,
N.Y., N.Y. 10021
212-570-2440

[illegible]

The GRAMONT
In The Wonderful W, 90's

Another fine property owned & managed by WEINREB MANAGEMENT
See offering plan for full terms

The New York Times
is read in nearly 11,000 American
cities and towns and in 87 foreign countries

Central European theater and that this situation would continue to prevail even after completion of the unilateral Soviet withdrawals Gorbachev has announced. There are many of us who would strongly dispute that thesis, and dispute it on the basis of statistics fully available to, and even recognized by, official Washington circles.

The confusion seems to arise from several more fundamental miscalculations. There has been the use of unrealistic and seriously misleading NATO-versus-Warsaw Pact comparisons for measuring Soviet and American forces in Central Europe. There has been the persistent assumption that the American tactical and short-range nuclear weapons in West Germany are an essential element of "deterrence," without which there would be serious danger of a Soviet attack in that region. Finally, and in close connection with this assumption of aggressive Soviet designs, there has been the insistence of our military authorities that the extent of the "threat" presented to us by any foreign power must be measured solely by our estimate of that power's capabilities, ignoring its interests and intentions.

A new administration in Washington owes it to itself to re-examine these assumptions, and others like them, and to ask itself whether, considering both the dangers and the expense of the maintenance by both parties of these enormous and inordinate arsenals, we could not find more realistic means of measuring the problem and more hopeful ways of promoting its solution.

IF, IN THIS WAY, SOME OF THE more obvious and extensive impediments to a better relationship with the Soviet Union could be overcome, the greater part of what needs to be done would have been accomplished. Bilateral relations between sovereign governments are not the area in which greater positive things are to be achieved, rather a way in which conflicts of interest are to be composed and negative things are to be avoided. If we succeeded in doing no more than to eliminate the greatest sources of conflict prevailing between these two governments, this alone would have been a great accomplishment.

But this would not be the end of the story. There are limited possibilities for useful collaboration even between governments so different in traditional and in ideological inspiration as the Soviet and American ones. These possibilities relate to a number of fields; but the greatest and most important of these, without question, is that of environmental protection and improvement on the planetary scale.

The dangers now beginning to overshadow us all in this respect are confirmed for us not only by many of the findings of the scientists but in some instances by our own perceptions. The greater part of what we could and should be doing to ward off this

disaster has to be done within the national framework; and here both the Russians and ourselves have a great deal to catch up on before we can say that we have done all that lay within our power to do. But environment recognizes no national boundaries, and to achieve their maximum effectiveness the national efforts have to be supplemented by international ones. This fact is now coming to be widely recognized in Russia as well as here; and environmental movements are springing up all over the Soviet Union.

There are no two countries that could, if they wanted to, contribute more by joint effort in this field than the United States and the Soviet Union. The same applies to the area of space research. If we could get over the idea that outer space is there primarily to be exploited by us for our military advantage, there would clearly be important possibilities for collaboration with the Soviet Union in the whole great field of space research.

All this collaboration would be justified if only by the direct effects it was designed to achieve. But the probability ought to be recognized that to the extent the two countries could join their efforts in this manner, the remaining impediments to a firm and useful relationship between them would be the more easily overcome; because in the very process of collaboration in a necessary and peaceful process, useful to all humanity, the neurotic impulses of military and political rivalry would be bound to be overshadowed; and the peoples might find, in the intermingling of their own creative efforts, a firmness of association which no other intergovernmental relationships could ever assure.

WHAT WE ARE SEEING today is, in effect, the final overcoming of the Russian Revolution of 1917. The present Soviet leaders are the first of that sort who, in trying to shape the society of their country, will have to relate themselves not just to the post-1917 revolutionary period but to the entire span of Russian history. What they are creating, and what we must now face, is another Russia, entirely identifiable neither with the revolutionary period nor with the centuries of czarist power that preceded it.

Just as the designing of this new Russia calls for innovation on the part of those in Moscow who are responsible for it, so it calls for innovation on the part of an American government that, more importantly perhaps than in the case of any other of the world's governments, has to relate to it.

This is the challenge those in the Bush Administration will have to meet. In their attempt to meet it, they will not be able to ignore the immediate past — but they cannot be successful if they allow themselves to be the captives of all its emotional traumas. ■

Luxury Home

Unparalleled Visions of Lake Sunapee

Each of the limited number of parcels at Browns Hill Farm presents a different view of the lake as it weaves its way around and between the bordering mountains. And as the seasons pass, your enchantment with that vista will grow. With prices ranging from \$150,000 to \$260,000, each hilltop home-site includes undivided ownership in 90+ acres of conservation land and use of the private boathouse, beach, pool and tennis courts. Please call or write for a descriptive brochure today.



603/526-2020
P.O. Box 1113
Main Street
New London, NH 03257

This offering is not registered in the State of N.Y. and is not available to N.Y. State residents. Equal Housing Opportunity.


GOVERNORS LANE

The grand townhouses of Princeton, built around elegant landscaped greens. Prices from \$415,000. Visit Governors Lane off Terhune Road, Princeton. Sales office open from noon to 4 pm every day. Call for brochure and map.

Peyton

PEYTON ASSOCIATES, REALTORS


343 Nassau St., Princeton, NJ
(609) 921-1550 or (609) 921-8558



This offering is not registered in the State of New York and is not available to New York State residents.

NEW CITY

50 Min to Midtown NYC



FABULOUS ARCHITECT DESIGNED CONTEMPORARY

This clear cedar, 5000 sq. ft., 5 bedroom, 4 1/2 bath tri-level custom contemporary is nestled on 2 very private acres backing on to parklands in one of New City's most in-demand communities in the top rated Clarkstown School District. It features 2 fireplaces (1 in full-finished basement), air cond., alarms, a home office, walls of Pella glass windows and doors, a 40' spine roof skylight, beautiful flooring and a super sophisticated neutral decor. A truly dramatic winner combining a unique blend of hi-tech design, rooms bathed in sunlight, soaring ceiling heights, curved walls and floating stairs.

\$1,100,000

SHOWN EXCLUSIVELY BY

ELEGANT HOMES



914-638-1585

50's EAST Sutton Place Area

UNIQUE LIVE/WORK

A rare opportunity to acquire in Manhattan's most prestigious area features 16' high ceilings, ideal for art or photography company, or any professional apartment delivered vacant sensational triplex. Additional significant income.

Exclusively with DELL BRENNER
Office: (212) 644-0800 • Real Estate

LYONS & ASSOCIATES
645 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10022

The New York Times

is read in nearly 11,000 American cities and towns and in 87 foreign countries

000954

INSTRUCTIONS: FOR USE WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED.
À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS — AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

SMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

SECURITY — SÉCURITÉ	
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)	
NATO UNCLASSIFIED	
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)	

NO. TS-911 30 Aug 89

EXTOTT/RBR By Ott: INP, **IDR**
MOSCOW

TO
A

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION						
	Paper circulated by USA Delegation 28Aug89 "Policy toward the Baltic States"	<div data-bbox="1122 359 1511 653" data-label="Text"> <p>Reçu / Received Affaires extérieures External Affairs SEP 12 1989 IDR</p> </div> <div data-bbox="886 737 1438 957" data-label="Text"> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>ACC</td> <td>REF</td> <td>DATE</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3">FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR</td> </tr> </table> </div>	ACC	REF	DATE	FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR		
ACC	REF	DATE						
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USSR								
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À						
DATE		P Meyer, BNATO						
SIGNATURE								

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR — SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

EXT 34/BIL

MOSCO

TS-911

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

U.S. Delegation
August 28, 1989

SUBJECT: POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES

- SINCE 1922 THE U.S. HAS CONTINUOUSLY RECOGNIZED THE INDEPENDENCE OF ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA. THE THREE BALTIC STATES WERE FULLY INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND WERE FORCED INTO THE USSR AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT. OUR DE JURE RECOGNITION OF THE BALTIC STATES RESPECTS THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE BALTIC PEOPLES.
- THE U.S. DOES NOT RECOGNIZE ANY OTHER STATES WITHIN THE PRESENT SOVIET UNION, NOR DO WE ENCOURAGE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS. WE HOPE THAT THE DIVERSE NATIONALITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION CAN LIVE TOGETHER ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL TOLERANCE AND RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S NATIONAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITIES.
- WE HOPE THAT THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE SOVIET UNION WILL LEAD TO A CLIMATE IN WHICH EACH NATIONALITY AND NATIONAL MINORITY WILL FEEL SECURE THAT ITS HUMAN, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE FULLY PROTECTED.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED.
À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS — AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
A

EXTOTT/URR By Ott: RBR, ~~PSR~~, GMR
WSHDC MOSCO ISBAD TERAN

SECURITY — SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. TS-893 09 August 1989

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION															
	<p>USA Delegation paper dated 03 August, 1989</p> <p>Subj: USA-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN, 31 JULY - 01 AUGUST, 1989</p>	<p><i>Handwritten:</i> USA <i>Handwritten:</i> BC <i>Handwritten:</i> file</p> <div data-bbox="803 630 1318 982" data-label="Form"> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>RETURN TO RENNOVER AU</td> <td>0190</td> <td>FOR FILING POUR — ETRE POSE AU DOSSIER</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ACC</td> <td colspan="2">REF. DATE</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FILE</td> <td colspan="2">DOSSIER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3">20-USA-1-3-USSR</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="3">20-AFGHAN-1-3</td> </tr> </table> <p><i>Handwritten:</i> copies given to URR/GMR/RBR;</p> </div>	RETURN TO RENNOVER AU	0190	FOR FILING POUR — ETRE POSE AU DOSSIER	ACC	REF. DATE		FILE	DOSSIER		20-USA-1-3-USSR			20-AFGHAN-1-3		
RETURN TO RENNOVER AU	0190	FOR FILING POUR — ETRE POSE AU DOSSIER															
ACC	REF. DATE																
FILE	DOSSIER																
20-USA-1-3-USSR																	
20-AFGHAN-1-3																	

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
		Marius Grinius BNATO
DATE	SIGNATURE	

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR — SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

EXT 34/BIL

000957

TS 893

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

EXTOTT / URR
RBR
PSR
GMR

WSHDC
MOSCO
ISBAD
TERAN

U.S. Delegation
August 3, 1989

File 20-USA-1-3-USSR.

MG
Aug 89

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN
JULY 31, 1989 - AUGUST 1, 1989

--U.S.-SOVIET EXPERTS CONSULTATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN WERE HELD IN STOCKHOLM JULY 31-AUGUST 1. THE U.S. SIDE ALSO RAISED IRAN.

SOVIET POSITION

-- THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS LED BY AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE KOZYREV, WHILE THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS KELLY.

-- THE SOVIET SIDE RECITED STANDARD POSITIONS ON AFGHANISTAN.

-- THEY CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE AND AN INTRA-AFGHAN DIALOGUE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE NAJIBULLAH AND THE PDPA.

-- THE SOVIETS AGAIN PROPOSED THAT THE U.S. AND USSR END THE FLOW OF ARMS TO THE OPPOSING SIDES--NEGATIVE SYMMETRY-- AND SUPPORT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE MADE UP OF ALL AFGHAN FACTIONS AS WELL AS THE U.S., USSR, PAKISTAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES AS APPROPRIATE.

-- THEY ALSO MADE A PERFUNCTORY CALL FOR AN ACTIVE UNITED NATIONS ROLE, THE RETURN OF ALL POW'S AND ASSISTANCE FOR REFUGEES AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS.

-- THE ONLY NEW ELEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THE SUGGESTION THAT A WEST EUROPEAN LEADER UNDERTAKE A MEDIATION EFFORT IN THE AFGHAN CONFLICT.

U.S.-SOVIET COMMON GROUND

-- BOTH SIDES AGREED TO WORK FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT, NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN WHICH HAS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBORS.

-- THE TWO SIDES ALSO RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN, WHILE DIFFERING SHARPLY ON HOW TO INITIATE SUCH A PROCESS.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

-- IN ADDITION, U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEWS ON THE NEED TO SUPPORT SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, HELPING TO RESETTLE THE LARGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES AND PROVIDING ASSISTANCE FOR A RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT FOLLOWING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

U.S. POSITION

-- ASSISTANT SECRETARY KELLY STATED THAT THE TRANSFER OF POWER, NOT THE SHARING OF POWER, WAS THE KEY TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

-- THE REALITY IS THAT THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE AFGHAN REGIME.

-- THE U.S. EMPHASIZED THAT ITS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDIN WOULD NOT DIMINISH.

-- MOREOVER, THE U.S. STRESSED THE UNITY OF PURPOSE ON AFGHANISTAN THAT WAS EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO IN JUNE AND WARNED THE SOVIETS ABOUT THE DANGER OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST PAKISTAN.

-- THE SOVIETS COULD END THE BLOODSHED BY REMOVING NAJIBULLAH AND ALLOWING A POLITICAL PROCESS TO BEGIN.

-- THE U.S. POINTED OUT THAT MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPLY EFFORTS OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO THE AFGHAN REGIME WAS CONTRARY TO THE WORK OF GENEVA AND ONLY PROLONGED THE CONFLICT.

-- ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, THE U.S. AGREED TO HELP ON THE QUESTION OF SOVIET POW'S AND TO ASSIST IN RECOMMENDING TO THE RESISTANCE THEIR EARLY RETURN.

-- THE U.S. EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PROVIDING ENOUGH FOOD FOR THE LARGE NUMBERS OF AFGHAN REFUGEES WHO WOULD EVENTUALLY BE RETURNING.

-- WE ALSO URGED THE SOVIETS ONCE AGAIN TO PROVIDE MAPS AND ALL OTHER ASSISTANCE IN U.N. MINECLEARING EFFORTS.

-- KOZYREV PROPOSED A COMMON PRESS LINE WHICH WOULD HAVE STATED THAT THERE WAS "PROGRESS TOWARD DEFINING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT" . THE U.S. REFUSED.

-- ASSISTANT SECRETARY KELLY TOLD REPORTERS THAT MAJOR DIFFERENCES REMAIN BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON AFGHANISTAN.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

-- THE SOVIET PROPOSED PRESS LINE WAS A TRANSPARENT ATTEMPT TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN/AFGHAN RESISTANCE.

IRAN

--U.S. SIDE RAISED THE ISSUE OF IRAN AT THE RECENT EXPERTS TALKS IN STOCKHOLM, ASKING FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION ABOUT SOVIET ARMS SALES TO IRAN AND URGING THE SOVIETS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES OF TERRORISM AND HOSTAGE TAKING WITH IRAN.

--THE SOVIETS, WHO STATED THEY WERE SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, INDICATED THAT COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE USSR WAS NOT NEW, THAT IT HAD BEEN SUSPENDED IN 1982 DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THAT SOVIET SALES HAD ALWAYS BEEN DEFENSIVE IN NATURE.

--THE U.S. URGED THE SOVIETS TO SPEAK FURTHER TO THE IRANIANS ABOUT TERRORISM AND HOSTAGE TAKING, EMPHASIZING THAT SOVIET STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM (E.G. THEIR ABHORRENCE OF IT) SHOULD BE MATCHED BY A WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE THE IRANIANS ON THE SUBJECT.

REGIONAL EXPERTS TALKS

-- THIS MEETING WITH THE USSR COMPLETES THE LATEST CYCLE OF REGIONAL EXPERTS MEETINGS THAT BEGAN AFTER THE MAY MEETING IN MOSCOW BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE.

-- WE FIND THESE CONTACTS USEFUL AND WORTHWHILE TO EXPLAIN OUR POSITIONS TO EACH OTHER AND TO EXPLORE WAYS TO EXPAND AREAS OF COMMON GROUND.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

External Affairs Canada / Affaires extérieures Canada

ACTION
MESSAGE
SUITE A DONNEE

Accession/Reference

611713

20-USA-1-3-USSR

FACSIMILE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow.
 Aligner le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
 SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

12

10

FM/DE

FM BNATO YBGR6824 02AUG89

TO/A

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO

INFO BAG LDN BONN PARIS MOSCO VNACE GENEV DE NAT

DISTR

BAG WSHDC M DE OTT

REF

BH NDHQOTT/ADPOL DE OTT

SUBJ/SUJ

34 PCOOTT/HEBERT DE OTT

NATO SECRET	
NAT	RBR
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

DISTR RGB IFB UGB RBD IDD URD PND IDR IDA RWR PNR PSR GNR URR

EER RGX CPP INP

---NATO BRIEFING ON BAKER-SHEVARDNADZE MTG 29JUL

POL CTTEE WAS CONVENED THIS MORNING AT USA REQUEST TO RECEIVE BRIEFING ON SUBJ MTC FROM DAS FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS CURT KAMMAN. KAMMANS PRESENTATION ESSENTIALLY FOLLOWED ATTACHED BRIEFING NOTES. HE DID COMMENT THAT SOVIET PAPER ON CW ISSUES THAT WAS HANDED OVER AT MTG WAS SYNTHESIS OF RESPECTIVE POSITIONS FROM LAST BILATERAL EXPERTS SESSION AND DID NOT/NOT ADVANCE BEYOND THERE. HE ALSO REMARKED ON BASIS OF CORRIDOR CONVERSATION THAT SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS WERE EVIDENTLY PROUD OF QUOTE HIGH APPROVAL RATING UNQUOTE GIVEN SHEVARDNADZE BY SUPREME SOVIET COMMISSION WHICH ATTESTED TO SOVIET PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY.

2. IN Q AND A SESSION WE ASKED ABOUT FOLLOW-UP BEING GIVEN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WHICH WAS ONE AREA IN WHICH USA AND USSR HAD AGREED

.....2

NAT 004/02

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

PAUL MEYER

204

SIG

A MALONE 000961



NATO CONFIDENTIAL

2/7

Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Aligner le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

CONFIDENTIAL PAGE TWO YBGR6824 02AUG89

121

10

AT MAY MINISTERIAL MTG IN MOSCO TO SUBSTANTIAL COOP. KAMMAN
SAID VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN HAD JUST VISITED WSHDC
TO PURSUE HUMAN AND LEGAL RIGHTS ISSUES AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD
DIC
INITIATED INTEREST IN HAVING BILATERAL WORKING GROUP DRAW UP
PAPER THAT WOULD NOTE PROGRESS ACHIEVED TO DATE IN HUMAN RIGHTS
FIELD. KAMMAN EXPECTED THIS AND OTHER WORKING GROUPS TO MEET
IN WSHDC EARLY IN SEPT TO PREPARE FURTHER FOR 19-20SEPT MINISTERIAL.

(COMCENTRE PLEASE FAX ATTACHED FIVE PAGES)

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

U.S. Delegation
August 2, 1989

3/7

SUBJECT: BRIEFING POINTS ON JULY 29 BAKER-SHEVARDNADZE BILATERAL MEETING

-- SECRETARY BAKER AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE MET JULY 29 FOR OVER THREE HOURS IN PARIS, WHERE THEY BOTH WERE TO ATTEND THE OPENING OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA.

-- AS WITH THEIR PREVIOUS MEETINGS, THE DIALOGUE WAS CANDID BUT CORDIAL.

-- ALTHOUGH THE BRIEF TIME AVAILABLE PRECLUDED AN EXHAUSTIVE REVIEW OF THE U.S.-SOVIET AGENDA, THE MINISTERS HAD A USEFUL EXCHANGE ON REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES, WITH BRIEF REFERENCES TO ARMS CONTROL TOPICS.

-- THE MEETING BEGAN WITH A LENGTHY ONE-ONE-ONE SESSION DURING WHICH THE MINISTERS AGREED TO SCHEDULE THEIR NEXT MEETING IN THE U.S. SEPTEMBER 19-20.

-- THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT THE MEETING TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE WASHINGTON, POSSIBLY IN WYOMING, TO ALLOW THE SOVIET SIDE TO SEE A DIFFERENT PART OF THE U.S. SHEVARDNADZE WAS RECEPTIVE TO THIS SUGGESTION.

-- MOST OF THE ONE-ON-ONE SESSION WAS DEVOTED TO A DISCUSSION OF SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS. SHEVARDNADZE CANDIDLY DESCRIBED THE PROBLEMS FACING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, BUT UNDERScoreD MOSCOW'S DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THE DIRECTION AND MOMENTUM REQUIRED TO MAKE PERESTROYKA A SUCCESS.

-- THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTED THE REFORM EFFORTS UNDERWAY IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE BUT THAT THE SUCCESS OF THESE REFORMS WOULD ULTIMATELY DEPEND ON DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE COUNTRIES THEMSELVES.

- DURING A GROUP SESSION FOLLOWING THE ONE-ONE-ONE, SHEVARDNADZE SUGGESTED THAT BOTH SIDES INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE BILATERAL PROBLEMS.

-- THE SECRETARY AGREED, ADDING THAT HE HOPED RAPID PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON THE REMAINING HUMAN RIGHTS CASES PREVIOUSLY RAISED BY THE U.S., AS WELL AS ON EMBASSY MANAGEMENT ISSUES WHICH HAD BEEN PENDING FOR A LONG TIME.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

-- SHEVARDNADZE PROVIDED THE SECRETARY A LIST SUMMARIZING BILATERAL ISSUES CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION WITH A VIEW TOWARD MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS IN THESE AREAS IN TIME FOR THEIR NEXT MEETING IN SEPTEMBER.

-- LEADING OFF THE DISCUSSION ON REGIONAL ISSUES, THE SECRETARY REITERATED U.S. CONCERN ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO THAT REGION.

-- HE UNDERScoreD THE NEED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND PASSED A LETTER DESCRIBING IN GREATER DETAIL U.S. CONCERNS.

-- SHEVARDNADZE AGREED THAT CENTRAL AMERICA WAS AN ACUTE PROBLEM AND NOTED HIS READINESS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE IN GREATER DETAIL AT THEIR NEXT MEETING. HE ALSO NOTED

SOVIET READINESS TO DISCUSS CENTRAL AMERICA AT THE UPCOMING U.S.-SOVIET EXPERTS TALKS.

-- THE SECRETARY SAID WE WELCOMED SOVIET STATEMENTS REGARDING THE CESSATION OF ARMS SHIPMENTS TO NICARAGUA, BUT THAT WE REMAINED CONCERNED ABOUT THE INCREASING LEVELS OF ARMS BEING PROVIDED BY SOVIET ALLIES AND FRIENDS TO THE COUNTRY.

-- SHEVARDNADZE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MOSCOW HAD CEASED SHIPPING ARMS TO NICARAGUA, BUT THAT IT HAD NOT CANCELED ITS COMMITMENTS TO MANAGUA.

-- SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT WHILE THE USSR WAS NOT INDIFFERENT TO U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA, SOVIET SENSITIVITY WAS MORE PRONOUNCED ON THE ISSUE OF AFGHANISTAN.

-- HE DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY, HIGHLIGHTING THE CAPABILITIES BEING DISPLAYED BY THE KABUL REGIME.

-- SHEVARDNADZE COMPLAINED ABOUT U.S. ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE MUJAHIDIN AND ACCUSED PAKISTAN OF VIOLATING THE GENEVA ACCORDS. HE CALLED FOR A SOLUTION THAT WOULD SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

-- THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. WAS NOT INDIFFERENT TO THE PROBLEM IN AFGHANISTAN. WE WERE GLAD THAT SOVIET TROOPS WERE GONE.

-- THE U.S. REMAINED COMMITTED TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, BUT DID NOT BELIEVE SUCH A SETTLEMENT COULD OCCUR WHILE NAJIBULLAH REMAINED A SYMBOL OF POWER. THIS WAS A REFLECTION OF THE FACT THAT THE MUJAHIDIN WOULD NEVER ACCEPT NAJIBULLAH.

-- THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT COULD NOT EXCLUDE ANY PARTY AND THAT ALL ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN A

000964

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

REGIME HOSTILE TO THE USSR NOR ONE THAT WAS BENT ON EXPORTING ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM.

-- THE U.S. POSITION IN THIS REGARD WAS UNCHANGED: WE WANTED A NON-ALIGNED, INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT WITH GOOD RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

-- THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD THE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE TRANSFER OF POWER THAT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ANY SOLUTION AND TO ENABLE SELF-DETERMINATION TO OCCUR IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- SHEVARDNADZE ALSO RAISED THE FATE OF SOVIET POW'S, SOME OF WHOM HE CLAIMED WERE IN PAKISTAN AND OTHERS BEING HELD BY THE MUJAHIDIN IN AFGHANISTAN. HE ASKED THE U.S. TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO LEARN OF THEIR WHEREABOUTS AND TO HELP RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THEIR RETURN. THE SECRETARY AGREED TO SEE WHAT WE COULD DO.

-- BEFORE PROCEEDING TO OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES, SECRETARY BAKER SAID THE U.S. WOULD APPRECIATE SOVIET HELP WITH BULGARIAN AUTHORITIES TO IMPROVE THE TREATMENT OF THE TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA.

-- SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE USSR HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH BOTH ANKARA AND SOFIA. THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN PROMOTING A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING AND HAD BEEN ACTING AS AN INTERMEDIARY. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO HELP THE SIDES FIND COMMON LANGUAGE.

-- TURNING TO THE MIDDLE EAST, SHEVARDNADZE WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BEGIN CONSULTATIONS AT THE EXPERT LEVEL AMONG THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

-- HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT DISCUSS ELECTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS ONE PHASE IN ARRANGING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

- SECRETARY BAKER SAID HIS FRANK OPINION WAS THAT SUCH A STEP WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. IF THE UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERS TRIED TO GET INVOLVED AT THIS JUNCTURE, IT COULD WELL RESULT IN DERAILING ANY MOVEMENT TOWARD ELECTIONS.

-- HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD HELP BY INTERVENING WITH THE PLO AND SYRIA TO CONVINCE THEM TO GIVE THE GREEN LIGHT TO PALESTINIANS IN THE TERRITORIES TO ACCEPT ELECTIONS.

-- THE SECRETARY REITERATED THE U.S. VIEW THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE MIGHT BE USEFUL IF IT WERE WELL STRUCTURED AND HELD AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. BUT WE HAD TO GET THE PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS ENGAGED FIRST BEFORE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS UNDER A CONFERENCE MIGHT TAKE PLACE.

000965

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

-- SHEVARDNADZE SUGGESTED THAT THE MINISTERS HAVE THEIR RESPECTIVE AIDES FOLLOWING THE SUBJECT MEET SOON. HE

ARGUED THAT THERE COULD BE NO MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT WITHOUT U.S. AND SOVIET HELP.

-- THE SECRETARY AGREED, BUT CAUTIONED THAT ONLY THE ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM, OUR ROLE WAS TO HELP THEM.

-- IN THEIR EXCHANGE ON CAMBODIA, SHEVARDNADZE NOTED THAT THE U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT WERE VERY CLOSE.

-- IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY BAKER'S QUESTION WHETHER THE USSR FAVORED USING THE UN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING EFFORT, SHEVARDNADZE SAID A UN ROLE, WHILE IMPORTANT, STILL NEEDED TO BE DISCUSSED.

-- SHEVARDNADZE DESCRIBED HIS CONTACTS WITH OTHER STATES ON THE SUBJECT AND NOTED THAT THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL MONITORING STILL HAD TO BE RESOLVED.

-- THE SECRETARY UNDERScoreD THAT THE U.S. STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT THE UN WAS THE ONLY ORGANIZATION WITH THE EXPERIENCE AND CREDIBILITY TO TAKE ON THE VERY BIG JOB OF MONITORING. SHEVARDNADZE AGREED AND SAID WE NEEDED TO FIND A WAY TO GET THE UN INVOLVED.

-- THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT TO THE INTERNAL AS WELL AS THE EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD RISK PRODUCING A TRAGIC CIVIL WAR.

-- SHEVARDNADZE INDICATED THE USSR ALSO FAVORED A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, BUT THAT IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE KHMER TO DECIDE HOW BEST TO SHARE POWER.

-- THE SECRETARY SAID THE SOVIET UNION COULD INFLUENCE ITS FRIENDS AND THUS BE HELPFUL: HUN SEN NEEDED TO RECOGNIZE THAT POWER SHARING WAS ESSENTIAL FOR A SETTLEMENT.

- SHEVARDNAZE SUGGESTED THAT SIHANOUK WAS NOW BLOCKING PROGRESS BY REJECTING MANY OF THE POINTS AGREED TO AT HIS MEETING WITH HUN SEN IN JAKARTA. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO CONTACT WITH OR INFLUENCE ON SIHANOUK AND URGED THE U.S. TO BRING SIHANOUK BACK TO ACCEPT THE JAKARTA POSITIONS.

-- NOTING THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH SIHANOUK THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE SECRETARY SAID BOTH SIDES SHOULD USE

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

ALL AVAILABLE CONTACTS WITH THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO PRESS FOR SOME KIND OF INTERNAL SOLUTION. THIS WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL.

-- SHEVARDNADZE CONCLUDED THAT THE USSR WANTED TO PREVENT A CIVIL WAR IN CAMBODIA AFTER THE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL. HE CLAIMED THAT SOME ASEAN COUNTRIES WERE EVEN SAYING THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER FOR THE VIETNAMESE TO STAY IN CAMBODIA. HE ALSO NOTED THAT CHINA WOULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE SINCE IT WOULD AFFECT THE DIFFICULT QUESTION OF THE ROLE OF THE KHMER ROUGE.

-- THE SECRETARY SAID WE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION IN WHICH THE KHMER ROUGE HAD A DOMINANT ROLE.

-- IN THE REMAINING TIME, THE MINISTERS HAD A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

-- SHEVARDNADZE PASSED A PAPER DEALING WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS ISSUES AND SAID HE THOUGHT THE TIME WAS RIPE FOR MAJOR PROGRESS.

-- THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN PLEASED TO LEARN OF THE POSITIVE RESPONSE BY CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL IN CFE. HE FORESAW A CHANCE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS.

-- THE SECRETARY ALSO NOTED THE POSITIVE SOVIET REACTION TO THE U.S. VERIFICATION PROPOSALS IN START.

-- THESE HAD BEEN PUT FORTH NOT AS A MEANS OF FOOT-DRAGGING, BUT IN AN EFFORT TO ADDRESS REAL PROBLEMS THAT AROSE IN VERIFICATION. WE DID NOT WANT TO REPEAT THE RATIFICATION PROBLEMS OF SALT II.

-- THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH AN AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS IN SEPTEMBER THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT.

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

RETURN TO RECEIVED AU	DI 103	FOR F
ACC	649497	POUR - E
FILE	20-USA-1-3-USSR	POUR ADD
	20-USA-1-3	AF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR0414 01AUG89

TO EXTOTT UGB DELIVER BY 020900

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/TRBOVICH/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/TELLIER BNATO BONN LDN
PARIS TOKYO MOSCO

TT NDHQOTT/FOWLER/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC DMT EFB JFB URB UFB URD URR PGB RGB GGB LGB

---LUNCH WITH BOB ZOELICK

NOT/NCT FOR TEL SUMMARY DISTRIBUTION

OVER LUNCH, STATE DEPARTMENT COUNSELLOR BOB ZOELICK GAVE ME
ESSENTIALLY IMPRESSIONISTIC ACCOUNT OF BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MTG, AS
WELL AS TIDBITS ON US/PRC RELATIONS AND LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN
MIDEAST

2. WHILE EMPHASIZING CLOSE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RAPPORT BETWEEN BAKER
AND SHEVARDNADZE, ZOELICK SAID HE AND STATE DEPTS CHIEF POLICY
PLANNER DENNIS ROSS SENSED THAT SHEVARDNADZE WAS DISTRACTED BY
INTERNAL USSR EVENTS (COAL MINERS STRIKES, ETHNIC UNREST,
UNEXPECTEDLY ASSERTIVE SUPREME SOVIET), AND WAS MORE CAUTIOUS
THAN AMBITIOUS ABOUT DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ISSUES.

3. SHEVARDNADZE ACKNOWLEDGED SOME HEADWAY WAS BEING REGISTERED IN
USSR ECONOMY, ESPECIALLY IN LARGE STATES (KAZAKHSTAN), BUT HE WAS
NOT/NOT NEARLY AS UPBEAT AS MARSHALL AKHROMYEV HAD BEEN WITH USA
CONGRESS LAST WEEK ON DEGREE TO WHICH MILITARY SAVINGS WERE ALREADY
BEING TRANSFORMED INTO MORE PRODUCTIVE ECONOMY. AMERICANS REMAIN
SKEPTICAL ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE, ESPECIALLY IN ABSENCE OF

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR0414 CONF

FUNDAMENTAL REFORM, E.G. ON PRICE BASE.

4. SHEVARDNADZE DESCRIBED PERISTROIKA PROCESS AS MORE REVOLUTIONARY THAN REFORM-ORIENTED, BUT HE WAS CLEARLY WARY THAT EVENTS COULD SPIN OUT OF CONTROL, EITHER IN USSR OR EAST EUROPE, AND HE WAS RESPONDING POSITIVELY BUT CAUTIOUSLY TO ACTIONS OF U.S.

5. ZOELICK CONFIRMED USA HAD NO/NO INTENTION FOR BOLD OR DRAMATIC MOVES ON ECONOMIC OR ANY OTHER FRONT. BAKER SOUGHT BROAD-GUAGED DIALOGUE WITH HIS COUNTERPART, IN PART TO DE-EMPHASIZE CENTRALITY OF ARMS CONTROL BUT ALSO TO PROBE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT BY USSR ON REGIONAL ISSUES (AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, MIDEAST, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA) AS WELL AS TO ENCOURAGE PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND COOPERATION ON QUOTE TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES UNQUOTE, NOTABLY ENVIRONMENT, ON WHICH, HE ADDED, USA DETECTED ESCALATING SOVIET CONCERN AND INTEREST. PROGRESS ON BROADER AGENDA WOULD BE HELPFUL TO BAKER WHEN IT COMES TIME TO SEEK SENATE SUPPORT FOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT. WHEREAS SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD TENDED TO READ LENGTHY ARMS CONTROL PAPERS TO ONE ANOTHER, BAKER WAS ESTABLISHING MORE PERSONAL AS WELL AS BROADER DIALOGUE.

6. BAKER SERVED NOTICE OF GREATER USA FLEXIBILITY FOR EMERGENCE OF GOVT IN AFTHAN MINUS NAJIBULLAH BUT NON-HOSTILE TO USSR. USA HAD NO/NO INTEREST IN RADICAL MUSLIM GROUP ASSUMING POWER.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2414 CONF

7. CN CENTRAL AMERICA, BAKER PRESSED FOR STRONGER USSR COMMITMENT RE ACTIVITIES BY THIRD PARTIES, NAMELY CASTRO WHO IS ACTIVELY SUPPLYING FIMN IN EL SALVADOR WITH RUSSIAN WEAPONRY. NORIEGA IS NEW WILD CARD IN THIS SCENARIO.

8. ZOELICK DID NOT/NOT SUBSCRIBE TO ANY QUOTE SINGLE MAN UNQUOTE THEORIES RE GORBACHEV. RATHER HE SEES SOVIET LEADER IN MORE HISTORICAL CONTEXT (ALEXANDER II), REACTING IN UTILITARIAN FASHION TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVENTS, ALL OF WHICH SHOW USSR FALLING BEHIND ECONOMICALLY AND, EVENTUALLY, IN SECURITY TERMS AS WELL. IN OTHER WORDS, REFORMS ARE DRIVEN BY PRACTICAL NOT/NOT PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS. IF REVOLUTIONARY REFORMS DO NOT/NOT GEL, ZOELICK SEES GORBACHEV CLAMPING DOWN AT HOME AND PRESERVING POWER BASE AS BEST HE CAN. (BAKER APPARENTLY SERVED NOTICE THAT SEVERE CLAMP-DOWN BY SSR WOULD EVOKE REACTIONS IN US SIMILAR TO THOSE MANIFESTED AGAINST PRC).

9. SHEVARDNADZE REACTED EXTREMELY POSITIVELY TO WYOMING VENUE AS LOCALE FOR SEPT 19/20 SESSION, VIEWING MOVE TO AMERICAS HEARTLAND AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF NEW INTIMACY. NONETHELESS ZOELICK SUGGESTED USA WOULD NOT/NOT BE SURPRISED IF SHEVARDNADZE WERE TO MOVE FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY TO ASSUME DOMESTIC RESPONSIBILITIES. AS ONLY NON-RUSSIAN INNER CIRCLES, HIS TALENTS MAY BE NEEDED MORE ON HOMEFRONT. USA WILL PRESS VIGOROUSLY FOR MOVEMENT ON

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR2414 CONF

CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN AT SEPT SESSION.

12.WHILE USSR IS CLEARLY ANXIOUS FOR EARLY BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT,ZOELICK INDICATED THAT USA IS STILL AIMING AT QUOTE EARLY 1990 UNQUOTE (SEE SEPARATE TEL).

11.ON RELATIONS WITH PRC,ZOELICK INSISTED THAT BAKERS BILATERAL WITH PRC FOREIGN MINISTER WAS WITHIN GUIDELINES.HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PRES HAD UNUSUALLY ACUTE INTEREST IN THIS FILE AND WAS,ABOVE ALL,ANXIOUS TO AVOID ISOLATING PRC FURTHER. BAKERS MESSAGE,THEREFORE,WAS THAT CHINESE LEADERSHIP SHOULD AVOID ACTIONS WHICH WOULD ONLY SERVE TO ISOLATE THEM FURTHER. (ZOELICK SAID PRC HAD PLAYED USEFUL ROLE IN CAMBODIA DISCUSSIONS).

12.ON MIDEAST,ZOELICK HAD LITTLE TO ADD.HE PERSONALLY SUSPECTED HIGGINS HAD BEEN EXECUTED MUCH EARLIER,WAS WELL AWARE OF PRESSURES MOUNTING ON PRESIDENT TO ACT,AND WAS EQUALLY COGNISCENT OF CONSTRAINTS.QUOTE WHEN YOU SIT DOWN IN THE SITUATION ROOM,THE REALISTIC OPTIONS DISAPPEAR UNQUOTE.

13.I REMINDED ZOELICK OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT OPEN SKIES AND GAVE FAMILIAR MESSAGE RE ACID RAIN ACCORD (ON WHICH HE HAS A KEEN INTEREST) AND ON USUAL RANGE OF TRADE ISSUES.

BURNEY

CCC/295 012319Z UNGR0414

Pages 972 to / à 977
are withheld pursuant to sections
sont retenues en vertu des articles

13(1)(a), 13(1)(b)

of the Access to Information Act
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

TS 893

EXTOTT

URR
RBR
PSR
GMR

WSHDC
MOSCO
ISBAD
TERAN

ACC NATO CONFIDENTIAL	
890803	
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3	USSR
LOC	
A6-	90

U.S. Delegation
August 3, 1989

File 20-USA-1-3-USSR.

MG
Aug 89

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN
JULY 31, 1989 - AUGUST 1, 1989

--U.S.-SOVIET EXPERTS CONSULTATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN WERE HELD IN STOCKHOLM JULY 31-AUGUST 1. THE U.S. SIDE ALSO RAISED IRAN.

SOVIET POSITION

-- THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS LED BY AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE KOZYREV, WHILE THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS KELLY.

-- THE SOVIET SIDE RECITED STANDARD POSITIONS ON AFGHANISTAN.

-- THEY CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE AND AN INTRA-AFGHAN DIALOGUE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE NAJIBULLAH AND THE PDPA.

-- THE SOVIETS AGAIN PROPOSED THAT THE U.S. AND USSR END THE FLOW OF ARMS TO THE OPPOSING SIDES--NEGATIVE SYMMETRY-- AND SUPPORT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE MADE UP OF ALL AFGHAN FACTIONS AS WELL AS THE U.S., USSR, PAKISTAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES AS APPROPRIATE.

-- THEY ALSO MADE A PERFUNCTORY CALL FOR AN ACTIVE UNITED NATIONS ROLE, THE RETURN OF ALL POW'S AND ASSISTANCE FOR REFUGEES AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS.

-- THE ONLY NEW ELEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THE SUGGESTION THAT A WEST EUROPEAN LEADER UNDERTAKE A MEDIATION EFFORT IN THE AFGHAN CONFLICT.

U.S.-SOVIET COMMON GROUND

-- BOTH SIDES AGREED TO WORK FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT, NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN WHICH HAS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBORS.

-- THE TWO SIDES ALSO RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN, WHILE DIFFERING SHARPLY ON HOW TO INITIATE SUCH A PROCESS.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

-- IN ADDITION, U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEWS ON THE NEED TO SUPPORT SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, HELPING TO RESETTLE THE LARGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES AND PROVIDING ASSISTANCE FOR A RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT FOLLOWING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

U.S. POSITION

-- ASSISTANT SECRETARY KELLY STATED THAT THE TRANSFER OF POWER, NOT THE SHARING OF POWER, WAS THE KEY TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

-- THE REALITY IS THAT THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE AFGHAN REGIME.

-- THE U.S. EMPHASIZED THAT ITS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDIN WOULD NOT DIMINISH.

-- MOREOVER, THE U.S. STRESSED THE UNITY OF PURPOSE ON AFGHANISTAN THAT WAS EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO IN JUNE AND WARNED THE SOVIETS ABOUT THE DANGER OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST PAKISTAN.

-- THE SOVIETS COULD END THE BLOODSHED BY REMOVING NAJIBULLAH AND ALLOWING A POLITICAL PROCESS TO BEGIN.

-- THE U.S. POINTED OUT THAT MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPLY EFFORTS OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO THE AFGHAN REGIME WAS CONTRARY TO THE WORK OF GENEVA AND ONLY PROLONGED THE CONFLICT.

-- ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, THE U.S. AGREED TO HELP ON THE QUESTION OF SOVIET POW'S AND TO ASSIST IN RECOMMENDING TO THE RESISTANCE THEIR EARLY RETURN.

-- THE U.S. EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PROVIDING ENOUGH FOOD FOR THE LARGE NUMBERS OF AFGHAN REFUGEES WHO WOULD EVENTUALLY BE RETURNING.

-- WE ALSO URGED THE SOVIETS ONCE AGAIN TO PROVIDE MAPS AND ALL OTHER ASSISTANCE IN U.N. MINECLEARING EFFORTS.

-- KOZYREV PROPOSED A COMMON PRESS LINE WHICH WOULD HAVE STATED THAT THERE WAS "PROGRESS TOWARD DEFINING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT" . THE U.S. REFUSED.

-- ASSISTANT SECRETARY KELLY TOLD REPORTERS THAT MAJOR DIFFERENCES REMAIN BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON AFGHANISTAN.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

-- THE SOVIET PROPOSED PRESS LINE WAS A TRANSPARENT ATTEMPT TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN/AFGHAN RESISTANCE.

IRAN

--U.S. SIDE RAISED THE ISSUE OF IRAN AT THE RECENT EXPERTS TALKS IN STOCKHOLM, ASKING FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION ABOUT SOVIET ARMS SALES TO IRAN AND URGING THE SOVIETS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES OF TERRORISM AND HOSTAGE TAKING WITH IRAN.

--THE SOVIETS, WHO STATED THEY WERE SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, INDICATED THAT COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE USSR WAS NOT NEW, THAT IT HAD BEEN SUSPENDED IN 1982 DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THAT SOVIET SALES HAD ALWAYS BEEN DEFENSIVE IN NATURE.

--THE U.S. URGED THE SOVIETS TO SPEAK FURTHER TO THE IRANIANS ABOUT TERRORISM AND HOSTAGE TAKING, EMPHASIZING THAT SOVIET STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM (E.G. THEIR ABHORRENCE OF IT) SHOULD BE MATCHED BY A WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE THE IRANIANS ON THE SUBJECT.

REGIONAL EXPERTS TALKS

-- THIS MEETING WITH THE USSR COMPLETES THE LATEST CYCLE OF REGIONAL EXPERTS MEETINGS THAT BEGAN AFTER THE MAY MEETING IN MOSCOW BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE.

-- WE FIND THESE CONTACTS USEFUL AND WORTHWHILE TO EXPLAIN OUR POSITIONS TO EACH OTHER AND TO EXPLORE WAYS TO EXPAND AREAS OF COMMON GROUND.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS: FOR USE WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED.
À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS — AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

RANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

EXTOTT/URR By Ott: RBR, PSR, GMR
WSHDC MOSCO ISBAD TERAN

SECURITY — SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. TS-893 09 August 1989

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION
		<p>USA Delegation paper dated 03 August, 1989</p> <p>Subj: USA-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN, 31 JULY - 01 AUGUST, 1989</p> <p><i>1</i></p> <p><i>we have those intended for others as well - note to Hs</i></p> <p><i>JR</i></p>
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE		Marius Grinius BNATO
SIGNATURE		

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR — SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

INSTRUCTIONS: FOR USE WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED.
À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS — AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
A

EXTOTT/URR By Ott: RBR, PSR, GMR
WSHDC MOSCO ISBAD TERAN

SECURITY — SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. TS-893 09 August 1989

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION
	USA Delegation paper dated 03 August, 1989 Subj: USA-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN, 31 JULY - 01 AUGUST, 1989	<p><i>whole we have</i></p> <p><i>done</i></p> <p><i>for filing</i></p> <p><i>or add</i></p> <p><i>well</i></p> <p><i>32</i></p> <p><i>5/12/89</i></p> <p>RETURN TO / Renvoyer à: BNATO</p> <p>FOR FILING / À ÉTRE PORTÉ AU DOSSIER</p> <p>ACC REF DATE</p> <p>FILE AUG 16 1989</p> <p><i>32</i></p> <p><i>5/12/89</i></p>

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

Marius Grinius
BNATO

DATE

SIGNATURE

RECIPIENT'S COPY — COPIE DU DESTINATAIRE

000982

VOL 25

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

ACC

89 09 21 A 6
SEP 22 1989

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6838 21SEP89

TO EXTOTT(CURR) DELIVER BY 221100

INFO MOSCO WSAW LDN PARIS BONN ROME PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA BNATO VNACE

GENEV PRMNY PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/DNATOPOL/DNACPOL/DCPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD CPP

---USA/SOVIET RELATIONS:THE STATE OF THE RELATIONSHIP(2)

SUMMARY:AS USA AND SOVIET UNION ENTER WHAT COULD BE A WATERSHED

IN THEIR RELATIONS,ADMIN IS ADOPTING GENERALLY PASSIVE ROLE.IT

SEEMS CONTENT TO ALLOW ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED AT

BUREAUCRATIC PACE,IT IS SHOWING LITTLE AMBITION TO ENGAGE

SOVIETS SERIOUSLY IN SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL DISPUTES,

AND PRESIDENT IS IN QUOTE NO/NO RUSH UNQUOTE TO MEET WITH

GORBACHEV.WHETHER THIS REFLECTS ABSENCE OF POLICY OR IS

MANIFESTATION OF CAREFUL LONG-TERM STRATEGY REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

2.ONE HAS IMPRESSION THAT ADMIN BELIEVES HISTORY IS ON ITS SIDE,

AND THAT NO/NO SPECIAL EFFORT IS NEEDED TO ENSURE WORLD UNFOLDS

AS IT SHOULD.BUT ONE SENSES ALSO THAT ADMIN IS FEELING

CONSTRAINTS ON U.S.POWER AS NO/NO OTHER POST-WAR ADMIN HAS,AND

THAT IT IS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH TAKING

INITIATIVE THAN IT IS ABOUT HAZARDS OF GOING SLOW.FACED WITH

REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN USSR AND UNCERTAINTY

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR6838 CCNFD

SURROUNDING FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS THERE, DECISION MAKERS APPEAR TO FEAR MAKING QUOTE HISTORIC MISTAKE UNQUOTE BY HELPING MOSCOW EITHER TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE. RESULT IS IMMOBILITY AND SOME NOSTALGIA FOR MORE PREDICTABLE IF NOT/NOT ALWAYS STABLE COLD WAR YEARS.

3. GENERALLY PASSIVE APPROACH IS ONE THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH PRAGMATIC AND LARGELY NON-IDEOLOGICAL NATURE OF BUSH ADMIN, AND FOR TIME BEING IT SUITS ADMIN'S POLITICAL TIMETABLE. CONCLUDING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, FOR INSTANCE, WOULD BE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS SHORTLY BEFORE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN NOV 1992. BUT ONE WONDERS HOW LONG APPROACH COULD BE SUSTAINED IN FACE OF DOMESTIC CRITICISM OR DRAMATIC NEW SOVIET ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE OF KIND SOME EXPECT SHORTLY. ADMIN IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF ITS PUBLIC IMAGE AND LOATH TO APPEAR ON DEFENSIVE, AS IT DID PRIOR TO PRESIDENT'S CFE PROPOSAL AT NATO SUMMIT. SENATE DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY LEADERS CHARGE THAT ADMIN IS QUOTE TIMID UNQUOTE HAD ALREADY PROVOKED SEC OF STATE INTO HIS FIRST NEWS CONFERENCE AT STATE DEPT. IF GORBACHEV LET CARRIES PROPOSAL FOR MAJOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS CUTS, ADMIN WILL FIND ITSELF SCRAMBLING ONCE AGAIN.

4. REPORT: SENIOR STATE OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZING FORTHCOMING BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING AS QUOTE REACTIVATION UNQUOTE OF USA/SOVIET AGENDA, NOTING SHEVARDNADZE WILL BE MAKING

...2

PAGE THREE UNGR6838 CONFD

HIS FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON THIS WEEK SINCE ADVENT OF BUSH ADMIN. BUT THE TWO THEMES WHICH THEY ARE PROMOTING FOR MEETING, NEW SPIRIT OF QUOTE OPENNESS UNQUOTE IN USA/SOVIET DIALOGUE AND ADDITIONAL FOCUS BEING PLACED ON QUOTE GLOBAL PROBLEMS UNQUOTE, DO NOT/NOT SUGGEST ADMIN IS INTENT ON BREAKING MUCH NEW GROUND IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW.

5. QUITE OPPOSITE SEEMING TO BE CASE. WHILE PRESIDENT HAS SAID PUBLICLY THAT OPPORTUNITY NOW EXISTS TO END POST-WAR DIVISION OF EUROPE ON TERMS FAVOURABLE TO WEST, BUSH, BAKER AND CHENEY HAVE ALL CAUTIONED AGAINST UNITED STATES PLAYING A VERY ACTIVE ROLE IN ENCOURAGING REFORMIST TRENDS IN SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE.

6. IN SPEECH LAST WEEK AT GEORGETOWN UNIV INSTITUTE FOR STUDY OF DIPLOMACY, DEPUTY SEC OF STATE EAGLEBURGER SAID POINTEDLY THAT ADMIN DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE IT WAS TASK OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TO TRY TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF GORBACHEV'S REFORMS. RATHER IT WAS QUOTE TO DEVISE POLICIES WHICH WILL SERVE OUR INTERESTS, WHETHER MR GORBACHEV SUCCEEDS OR FAILS UNQUOTE AND TO MAINTAIN QUOTE SECURITY CONSENSUS WHICH HAS SERVED WEST SO WELL OVER PAST FORTY YEARS UNTIL PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN EAST HAS TRULY BECOME IRREVERSIBLE UNQUOTE. HE DID NOT/NOT DEAL WITH QUESTION OF WHETHER GORBACHEV'S SUCCESS WAS IN WESTERN INTEREST OR WHETHER SUCH SUCCESS WAS CONTINGENT ON WESTERN SUPPORT. INSTEAD, HE

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6838 CONF

WARNED ALLIES QUOTE TO AVOID BANKROLLING MERELY COSMETIC SOVIET REFORMS AND TO REACH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WHICH UNDERMINE NATO S ABILITY TO DETER AGGRESSION UNQUOTE.

7.SEC OF DEFENCE WAS STILL MORE DIRECT IN A SPEECH HE GAVE LAST WEEK.HE SAID IT WAS QUOTE EXACTLY WRONG TIME FOR THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES TO ALTER THE STRATEGY THAT WE VE PURSUED SO SUCCESSFULLY DURING THE POST-WAR PERIOD UNQUOTE.HE EXPRESSED QUOTE PERSONAL VIEW UNQUOTE THAT EFFECT OF PERESTROIKA WOULD LIKELY BE QUOTE A LEANER AND MEANER SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT,ONE THAT IS VERY BIT AS CAPABLE AS THEIR CURRENT FORCES UNQUOTE.

8.REACTIVE MODE IN WHICH ADMIN HAS CAST ITSELF CAN BE ASCRIBED TO SEVERAL POSSIBLE CAUSES:(A)CONFIDENCE THAT EVENTS WILL UNFOLD IN BENIGN AND FAVOURABLE MANNER(QUOTE VICTORY OF DEMOCRACY UNQUOTE THESIS COMMONLY PROPOUNDED BY REPUBLICANS AND PROVIDED INTELLECTUAL UNDERPINNINGS BY FRANK FUKUYAMA S QUOTE END OF HISTORY UNQUOTE ARTICLE)(B)RESIGNATION IN FACE OF CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS ON USA ABILITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS (ACCOMPANIED BY COMPLAINT THAT EUROPEANS AND JAPANESE OUGHT TO BE PULLING MORE WEIGHT),AND/OR(C)FEAR THAT TAKING WRONG STEP AT TIME OF GREAT UNCERTAINTY COULD HAVE CATASTROPHIC EFFECTS(COMMON BROOKINGS ANALYSIS OF WHAT AILS ADMIN).

9.THERE ARE PROBABLY ELEMENTS OF ALL THESE BEHIND USA POSITION

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR6838 CONFID

(A GREAT POWER CAN BE SCHIZOPHRENIC TOO).THERE IS CERTAINLY PALPABLE FEELING WITHIN ADMIN THAT LIFE IS GOOD DEAL MORE COMPLICATED AND HAZARDOUS THAN EXPECTED,AND EVIDENT NOSTALGIA IN SOME QUARTERS FOR BIPOLAR WORLD OF POST-WAR ERA.AS EAGLEBURGER NOTED,COLD WAR WAS CHARACTERIZED BY QUOTE A REMARKABLY STABLE AND PREDICTABLE SET OF RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GREAT POWERS UNQUOTE, AND NEW MULTIPOLAR WORLD IS NOT/NOT QUOTE NECESSARILY GOING TO BE A SAFER PLACE UNQUOTE.CONFRONTED WITH UNFAMILIAR CIRCUMSTANCES, ADMIN S BLUE-RIBBON FOREIGN POLICY TEAM SEEMS TO BE FOLLOWING COURSE WHICH NSC DIRECTOR SCOWCROFT PREDICTED IT WOULD(BEFORE HE WAS APPOINTED):QUOTE MAINSTREAM AND UNIMAGINATIVE UNQUOTE. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF PRIVATE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION HAD MORE GRAPHIC DESCRIPTION:QUOTE PRUDENCE AND PRUNE JUICE UNQUOTE. 10.GOING SLOW AND STAYING OUT OF TROUBLE ARE HALLMARKS OF BUSH/BAKER STYLE OF GOVERNMENT.A DECISION NOT/NOT TAKEN IS USUALLY A POLITICAL PROBLEM NOT/NOT CREATED.NOT/NOT FOR THEM THEIR PREDECESSORS PREFERENCE FOR BEING RIGHT OVER BEING EFFECTIVE.SUCH APPROACH ALSO RESPONDS TO ADMIN S POLITICAL CALENDAR,WHICH DISCOUNTS SUCCESS THIS YEAR AND NEXT,AND PLACED PREMIUM ON SUCCESSES IN TWO FOLLOWING YEARS BEFORE COUNTRY GOES TO POLLS AGAIN.WHILE START AGREEMENT WOULD BE OF POLITICAL VALUE ANY TIME,IT WOULD NEVER BE MORE SO THAN IF CONCLUDED IN ...6

PAGE SIX UNGR6838 CONF

1991 AND RATIFIED IN 1992. SO ALSO CONVENTIONAL FORCES AGREEMENT IN EUROPE, FOR WHICH THERE WOULD BE BONUS OF SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS IN DEFENCE COSTS (APPROX 80 PERCENT OF DOD BUDGET IS DEVOTED TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THAT IS COMMITTED TO EUROPEAN DEFENSES).

11. HENCE ADMIN'S PREFERRED COURSE NOW WOULD SEEM TO BE TO MAINTAIN ITS ARMS CONTROL CREDENTIALS IN SHORT-TERM, WITH DEALS IF POSSIBLE ON SECOND-LEVEL ISSUES SUCH AS CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR TESTING, TO GET CFE NEGOTIATIONS SAFELY LAUNCHED, AND TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS USING A CONVENIENT -AND NOT/NOT ALTOGETHER UNREASONABLE-EXCUSE THAT ADMIN CANNOT/NOT NEGOTIATE EFFECTIVELY ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS UNTIL IT KNOWS WHICH SYSTEM CONGRESS WILL FUND. PROBLEM IS THAT ADMIN IS EASILY STUNG BY DOMESTIC CRITICISM (REAGAN'S IDEOLOGY BRED A SELF-CONFIDENCE THAT BUSH'S PRAGMATISM DOES NOT/NOT), AND IT IS VERY SENSITIVE TO CHARGE THAT MOSCOW IS THE MORE ADEPT AT CAPTURING HIGH GROUND. PRESIDENT DISPLAYED THIS PROPENSITY IN PRESS ENCOUNTER THIS WEEK, WHEN HE SAID IT WAS UNFAIR TO SUGGEST HIS APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL WOULD QUOTE MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT IN THE NEXT THREE AND A HALF YEARS UNQUOTE. THE SAME DAY, SENATE MAJORITY LEADER GEORGE MITCHELL CHARGED ADMIN WITH QUOTE TIMIDITY UNQUOTE AND QUOTE STATUS QUO THINKING ...7

GR6838 CONF

ITS DEALINGS WITH CHANGES IN USSR, TO WHICH BAKER
TH INDIGNATION (AND ANNOUNCEMENT, NOT/NOT ALTOGETHER
MIN WAS MOVING OFF ITS START POSITION OF WANTING BAN
MISSILES). SIMILARLY, SHEVARDNADZE'S COMPLAINT IN
HAT USA WAS DELAYING PROGRESS ON START PROMPTED STRONG
FROM BOTH WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPT, AND COUNTER
THAT SOVIETS WERE REVERTING TO BREZHNEV-ERA PUBLIC
S TACTICS.

WHICH HERALDED GORBACHEV LET, WHICH SHEVARDNADZE IS
G WITH HIM (AND WHICH ADMIN SPOKESMEN HAVE ARGUED SHOULD
BEEN DELIVERED IN ADVANCE OF MINISTERIAL), CARRIES NO/NO
IC NEW SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS, ADMIN CAN COAST IN
ST/WEST POLICY FOR SEVERAL MORE MONTHS. BUT IF LETTER DOES
SUCH PROPOSALS, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TEAM MAY BE PROVOKED
TO MORE EXHAUSTING FORMS OF LEADERSHIP.

0 221326Z UNGR6838

ACC	DATE
FILE	890922
LOC	DOSSIER
A6	20-USA-1-3-USA

(Vol 25/Mix 1)

SEP 22 1989

ACTION
QUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6840 21SEP89

TO EXTOTT **CURR**

INFO MOSCO WSAW LDN PARIS BONN ROME PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA BNATO VNACE

GENEV PRMNY PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGPOLCOOR/DNATOPOL/DNACPOL/DCPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD RBR IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD

CPP LCD LCR PSD PSR GMD GMR PND PNR

---USA/SOVIET RELS:EUROPEAN AND REGIONAL ISSUES(4)

WHILE DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE DO NOT/NOT NORMALLY FORM PART OF
USA/SOVIET REGIONAL ISSUES AGENDA,USA EXPECTS THERE MAY BE GOOD DEAL
OF QUOTE INFORMAL UNQUOTE DISCUSSION OF EUROPE AT BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE
MTG IN WYOMING.MAIN FOCUS WILL BE ON EVENTS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY,
BERLIN INITIATIVE,AND BULGARIAN REFUGEE SITUATION.DISCUSSION OF
THIRD WORLD ISSUES WILL CONCENTRATE MAINLY ON CENTRAL AMERICA AND
AFGHANISTAN.USA APPROACH WILL BE TO CHIDE SOVIETS FOR NOT/NOT
TRANSLATING QUOTE NEW THINKING UNQUOTE INTO ACTION,IN PARTICULAR
FOR NOT/NOT ELIMINATING FLOW OF ARMS TO SANDINISTA REGIME IN MANAGUA
AND TO NAJIBULLAH REGIME IN KABUL.USA WILL TRY TO QUOTE DRAW OUT
UNQUOTE SOVIETS ON MIDEAST ISSUES,NOTABLE ELECTIONS IN ISRAELI-
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,SITUATION IN LEBANON,AND USSR RELATIONS WITH
IRAN.MTG IS ALSO EXPECTED TO COVER CAMBODIA.BUT CONSENSUS IS THAT
LITTLE WILL EMERGE FROM THESE TALKS.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR6840 CONFD

(A) EUROPE: ACCORDING TO BOB KIMMITT, UNDERSEC FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE ARE EXPECTED TO DEVOTE SOME TIME DURING THEIR MTG TO EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICULARLY CENTRAL EUROPE. IN BRIEFING NATO MISSIONS EARLIER THIS WEEK, KIMMITT SAID USA PROPOSALS TO ASSIST POLAND AND HUNGARY ARE LIKELY TO ATTRACT SOME ATTENTION. SO WOULD WESTERN INITIATIVE TO SECURE GREATER ACCESS TO BERLIN, ESPECIALLY INCREASES IN AIR ROUTES INTO CITY. THIRDLY, USA WILL RAISE ISSUE OF BULGARIAN REFUGEES FLEEING TO TURKEY, HOPING SOVIETS WILL EXERCISE THEIR INFLUENCE ON SOFIA TO STEM FLOW (THOUGH KIMMITT DID NOT/NOT HOLD OUT MUCH HOPE IN THIS REGARD).

(B) CENTRAL AMERICA: ON CENTRAL AMERICA, USA OBJECTIVE AT MTG WILL BE TO ENCOURAGE SOVIETS TO TERMINATE EAST BLOCK WEAPONS SUPPLIES TO NICARAGUA. BY USA CALCULATIONS, SOVIET SUPPLIES HAVE ENDED BUT OVERALL EAST BLOCK LEVELS ARE HIGHER THAN EVER, IN RANGE OF DLRS 500 MILLION WORTH PER YEAR. KIMMITT SAID BAKER WILL ASK SHEVARDNADZE HOW THIS SQUARED WITH QUOTE NEW SOVIET THINKING UNQUOTE. SEC OF STATE WILL CITE USA QUOTE SHIFT IN EMPHASIS UNQUOTE TO DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, AND WILL ARGUE THAT QUOTE ALL EXTERNAL POWERS SHOULD BE SUPPORTING THE REGIONAL PEACE PROCESS UNQUOTE. WHILE MOSCOW HAS APPLAUDED USA SHIFT AND HAS TERMINATED ITS ARMS SUPPLIES, CUBAN AND EAST EUROPEAN SHIPMENTS HAD ENSURED TOTAL FLOWS REMAINED UNDEMINISHED.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6840 CONF

2.KIMMITT SAID ADMIN WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROACHING NATO ALLIES SHORTLY FOR SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICA PEACE PROCESS, IN PARTICULAR QUOTE RHETORICAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE UNQUOTE IN FEB ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA.

(C)AFGHANISTAN:ADMIN IS CONCERNED AT HIGH LEVEL OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NAJIBULLAH IN AFGHANISTAN(APPROX 250 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH PER YEAR),AND WILL TELL SHEVARDNADZE THIS IS INCONSISTENT WITH SOVIET CALLS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS.IN USA VIEW,SOVIETS ARE INEVITABLY GOING TO FEEL THAT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COSTS OF SUPPORTING THEIR CLIENTS IS NOT/NOT WORTH THE CANDLE,AND BAKER WILL SUGGEST TIME IS RIGHT TO STOP THINKING OF ARMS AS MEANS OF RESOLVING CONFLICT.ACCORDING TO KIMMITT,USA HAS QUOTE REACHED OUT UNQUOTE TO AFGHAN PARTIES,IS CONVINCED THEY ARE ALL OPPOSED TO JANIBULLAH REGIME,AND WILL TELL SOVIETS HIS DEPARTURE WOULD OPEN DOOR TO NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO AFGHAN RUNNING THEIR OWN AFFAIRS.

(D)MIDEAST:KIMMITT SAYS BAKER WILL TRY TO DRAW OUT SHEVARDNADZE ON SOVIET THINKING ON ISRAELI PLAN FOR ELECTIONS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,AND ON SYRIAN APPROACH TO ARAB/ISRAELI DISPUTE.

3.BOTH USA AND USSR HAVE SUPPORTED RENEWED EFFORT OF ARAB LEAGUE TO FIND SOLUTION TO LEBANESE CRISIS,AND THEY WILL DISCUSS PROSPECTS FOR CEASE-FIRE,LIFTING OF BLOCKADE AND IMPOSITION OF EMBARGO ON WEAPONS SUPPLIES.

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6840 CONF

4.USA IS CONCERNED ABOUT DEVELOPING SOVIET RELATIONS WITH IRAN, ESPECIALLY ABOUT SOVIET SUPPLIES OF ARMS AT TIME WHEN IRAN IS STILL SUPPORTING TERRORISM.

(E)CAMBODIA:KIMMITT NOTED THAT VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA IS DUE TO BE COMPLETED NEXT WEEK,BUT THAT HANOI AND P/P WERE UNYIELDING IN PARIS ON POWER-SHARING.IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT, THEREFORE,FOR USA AND SOVIETS TO AGREE THAT CAMBODIANS NOT/NOT BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO BATTLEFIELD.USA WAS LOOKING TO POSSIBILITY OF RECONVENING PARIS CONF IN SPRING,AND WOULD SEEK SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN ENCOURAGING POLITICAL PROCESS IN INTERIM.

CCC/143 212311Z UNGR6840

Tracer
VOL 27

BICO

RECEIVED IN

OCT 11 1991

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WSHDC UNGR2529A 09 OCT 91 RBR

TO EXTOTT (RBR)

INFO LDN PARIS BONN ROME VATCN TOKYO HAGUE BRU LISBON MDRID BNATO

ATHNS COPEN OSLO HSNKI STKHM VIENN VNACE WSAW PRGHE BPEST BUCST

ANKRA CNBRA MOSCO PRMNY

DISTR MINA USS RGB IFB CPD CPP RBD IND RBT RBRD INP JLA URR RWD RWR

REF YOURTEL RBR2160 030CT

---USA POLICY ON RECOGNITION OF UKRAINE

SUMMARY:USA POSITION ON RECOGNITION OF UKRAINE STILL HAS TO

CRYSTALLIZE. HOWEVER,CURRENT THINKING IS BASED ON SIX

MAIN ELEMENTS:1) WESTERN FOCUS SHOULD BE ON PROCESS NOT/NOT SIMPLY

ON OUTCOME OF NATIONAL REFERENDUM;2) WEST SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT

IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES WILL GARANTEE LONG TERM

MINORITY RIGHTS UNDER NEW CONSTITUTED REPUBLIC;3) WEST

SHOULD REQUEST REPUBLICS UNCONDITIONAL COMMITMENT TO CENTRAL

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS;4) WEST SHOULD ADOPT

POSITION THAT WILL NOT/NOT UNDERMINE CENTER IN ITS EFFORT TO

DEVELOP ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK; 5) NEED FOR WEST TO ADOPT COMMON

POSITION ON RECOGNITION; 6) NEED FOR WEST TO APPLY TO ALL

REPUBLICS CRITERIA DEVELOPED FOR UKRAINE.

2.REPORT:ACCORDING TO POLICY PLANNING STAFF CONTACT AT STATE

DEPT,NO/NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN TAKEN ON ISSUE OF

RECOGNITION.ADMIN IS CURRENTLY WORKING ON DEVELOPMENT OF

...2

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

ACC 803460	DATE
FILE 20-14	DOSSIER
LOC A7-20	20-USA-1.3-VS.K

A6

PAGE TWO UNGR2529 C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRAMEWORK THAT WOULD ADDRESS GLOBAL ISSUES BEYOND SPECIFIC CASE OF UKRAINE. APPROACH UNDER CONSIDERATION IS INCREMENTAL, A KIND OF QUOTE EARNED RECOGNITION UNQUOTE BASED ON SERIES OF STEPS TO BE COMPLETED. ADMIN BELIVES THAT WHATEVER HAPPENS AFTER DEC REFERENDUM WILL CARRY UNCERTAINTY. THEREFORE, INTEREST FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT/NOT BE OUTCOME ITSELF BUT PROCESS OF TRANSITION. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THAT REALITY IS AT GENESIS OF BAKERS FIVE PRINCIPLES AND WILL REMAIN CORNERSTONE OF US POLICY. PROVIDED THAT REFERENDUM IS FAIR AND GARANTEES RIGHTS OF ALL GROUPS, USA WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT FIRST STEP TOWARD INDEPENDENCE HAS BEEN COMPLETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BAKERS PRINCIPLE. NEVETHELESS POSITIVE VOTE WOULD NOT/NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO RECOGNITION. UKRAINE WOULD HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT HAS IMPLEMENTED MECHANISMS TO PROTECT MINORITY RIGHTS AS REQUESTED UNDER CSCE PRINCIPLES. RHETORICAL COMMITMENT IS NO/NO LONGER SUFFICIENT AND USA IS CALLING FOR ACTION. STATE DEPT CONTACT ARGUED THAT IF WEST HAD REQUESTED GARANTEE FOR SERBIAN MINORITY IN CROATIA BEFORE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, IT COULD HAVE PROVIDED STABILIZATING FACTOR IN ETHNIC EQUATION.

3. ISSUE OF CONTROL OF NUCLEAR ARSENAL IS ALSO CENTRAL TO USA POLICY ON RECOGNITION. CONTACT INDICATED THAT CONTROL AND COMMAND OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER UNIFIED COMMAND WILL SOON BECOME

...3-

PAGE THREE UNGR2529 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SIXTH PRINCIPLE IN BAKERS FRAMEWORK. QUESTION IS NOT/NOT SHOULD IT
BE THERE BUT HOW TO FORMULATE POLICY IN UNEQUIVOCAL LANGUAGES.
ADMIN BELIEVES THAT THERE IS REAL NEED FOR NATO COUNTRIES TO PUT
PRESSURE ON UKRAINE AND RUSSIA TO ENGAGE NOW/NOW IN DIALOGUE
ON CONTROL AND COMMAND OF NUCLEAR ARSENAL. REPUBLICS SHOULD
NOT/NOT BE FREE TO ASSERT THEIR INDEPENDENCE ON GROUND
LIABLE TO LEAD TO INSTABILITY.

4. ADMIN CONSIDERS STRONGLY THAT THERE IS NEED FOR WEST TO AVOID
TAKING POSITION THAT COULD UNDERMINE CURRENT EFFORT MADE BY CENTRE
TO DEVELOP ECON FRAMEWORK. EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO PROVIDE
INCENTIVES FOR REPUBLICS TO WORK DIFFERENCES IN COOPERATIVE
MANNER.

5. ALTHOUGH ABILITY OF NATO COUNTRIES TO AFFECT OUTCOME OF
REFERENDUM AND PROCESS OF TRANSITION IS LIMITED, USA MAINTAINS
THAT OUR INFLUENCE WILL NEVER BE GREATER THAN NOW. BEFORE WE
TAKE DECISION ON INDEPENDENCE, WE HAVE TO MAKE REPUBLICS
AWARE OF CRITERIA. RECOGNITION WILL NOT/NOT BE RESULT OF ONE
STEP CALLED REFERENDUM BUT REWARD FOR DEVELOPMENT OF
DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES. RECOGNITION SHOULD BE PRESENTED AS
ULTIMATE GOAL, NOT/NOT AS FIRST INCENTIVE. USA URGES
COORDINATION OF WESTERN POSITION. ON ISSUE.

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR2529 C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONTACT INDICATED THAT US MISSIONS IN NATO CAPITALS COULD BE REQUESTED TO UNDERTAKE DEMARCHE. PRES BUSH MAY ALSO START CALLING COUNTERPARTS SHORTLY.

6. USA BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE ADVISABLE TO USE DOUBLE STANDARD IN TERMS OF RECOGNITION OF SOVEREIGN REPUBLICS. ONCE FRAMEWORK ADOPTED, ADMIN WILL USE IT AS INSTRUMENT TO ASSESS TRANSITION PROCESS OF ALL REPUBLICS.

7. WITH REFERENCE TO RECENT VISIT OF KRAVCHUK TO WSHDC, CONTACT INDICATED THAT PRES WAS NOT/NOT READY TO SEE HIM. ADMIN REMAINS UNHAPPY WITH UKRAINIAN POLICIES AND MTG WITH BAKER REQUESTED BY UKRAINE FOREIGN MINISTER MAY BE TAKEN UP BY DEPUTY SECT EAGLEBURGER WHO WILL HAVE TASK OF EXPLAINING IN PLAIN LANGUAGE USA RESERVATIONS REGARDING RECOGNITION.

CCC/114 101852Z UNGR2529



United States Embassy
Ottawa, Canada, K1P 5T1

891103 TEXT

DOSSIER (Vol 25/MIRD)
(55-69)
(11-03-89)
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USA (Vol 25/MIRD)
LOC 20-1-1-1 (Vol 42/MIRD)
AG 20-1-1-1 (Vol 42/MIRD)
"U.S., USSR CAN WORK TO REDUCE REGIONAL CONFLICTS"

Remarks by Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy at the Chautauqua Conference on U.S.-Soviet Relations
November 2, 1989

Pittsburg, Pennsylvania--It is a distinct honor to address this conference. There's a continuing need for dialogue between our two countries and our two peoples and there is no more important topic than that of the superpowers and their role in regional conflicts.

Today, regional conflicts remain one of the most important issues on the superpower agenda. Working toward solutions to regional problems of all types -- political, economic, environmental and military -- will be critical to stability and the reduction of tension worldwide. This subject occupies as important a place on the East-West agenda as nuclear arms control. Indeed, the two subjects are intimately connected.

Finding solutions to regional conflicts is an essential part of the all-important task of preventing nuclear war. The disturbing frequency with which small wars have become big wars in the past gives caution to us all.

As President Bush has said: "The threats to peace that nations face may today be changing, but they've not vanished. In fact, in a number of regions around the world, a dangerous combination is now emerging -- regimes armed with old and unappeasable animosities -- and modern weapons of mass destruction. This development will raise the stakes whenever war breaks out. Regional conflict may well threaten world peace as never before."

This is not to suggest that regional conflicts should be settled by the dictate of the superpowers or to deny that the people with the greatest stake in the settlement of regional conflicts are the participants themselves. Indeed, it is our belief that solutions to regional conflicts will only be viable when they reflect the will and desires of the people who must live with those solutions.

But the existence of nuclear weapons makes it important for the whole world, and particularly for the United States and the Soviet Union, to work to prevent those small conflicts that can contain the seeds of larger ones.

Moreover, the record shows that regional conflicts played a great part in the development of the Cold War and, more recently, in the demise of detente and the downturn in our relationship in the mid-seventies.

As President Carter's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has frequently said, SALT II was buried in the sands of the Ogaden...whether it happened there or in the mountains of Afghanistan, in either case the basic point is the same: even more than the massive build-up of Soviet military power under Brezhnev, it was the use of that military power directly in Afghanistan and indirectly in support of military interventions by Soviet allies in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, El Salvador and elsewhere, that spelled the end of detente. To put U.S.-Soviet relations on a more stable long-term basis, we need to find solutions to those problems and prevent new ones from developing.

We have seen dramatic progress in arms control and in human rights in the Soviet Union. We are hopeful -- as are the Soviet people -- that perestroika and glasnost will succeed in the long-term.

In the area of Soviet policy toward regional conflicts, there have also been some dramatic positive developments. However, I would be less than frank if I said that we were satisfied with what we see today.

It is true that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan,

Branch press offices -- c/o U.S. Consulates General in Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver

-2-

as well as Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and Cubans from Angola, offers real promise of a more cooperative approach to these problems. Moreover, we have seen much evidence of progressive "new thinking" on the issue of regional conflicts. Key Soviet officials are repudiating past "adventures" -- like the invasion of Afghanistan -- and raising serious questions about Soviet interests in the Third World and the utility of military power there. Other Soviet authors have contrasted their own social progress with the repressive policies being followed by some of their friends who proclaim a "socialist orientation." All of this -- I hope -- will bear fruit in the future.

However, amidst all the "new thinking" in the Soviet Union, there's a lot of "old policy" on regional conflicts. Some of the same areas that were problems in the 1970s -- Afghanistan in particular -- remain significant sore points today. The Soviet Union and its allies continue to supply large amounts of sophisticated military equipment to countries like North Korea, Nicaragua and Libya which threaten their neighbors and support international terrorism.

-- In Afghanistan, Soviet military aid is pouring in to the Najibullah regime at rate of more than 250 million dollars per month, dwarfing all the assistance received by the mujahidin from all sources. New weapons systems -- like the powerful SCUD missile -- have been transferred to that regime in the largest airlift of arms and materiel in Soviet history. The whole world, including the United States, applauds Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's condemnation of the war and of the secrecy of the decision-making process that brought it about; yet, at the same time, the details of this massive on-going Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan remain unpublicized in the U.S.S.R. While the foreign minister criticizes the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet military aid furthers the same objective of imposing an unwanted regime on the people of that country.

-- In Nicaragua, while we have been assured that direct Soviet military aid has stopped, East bloc and Cuban military aid continues at an annual rate of a half a billion dollars per year, even though the U.S. has long since ceased its much smaller military aid to the resistance forces. In all, since 1980, Soviet bloc military aid to Nicaragua has totaled more than three billion dollars, permitting that country to become the most thoroughly militarized country in Central America.

Indeed, while the military capability of the resistance is receding, Nicaragua maintains a military force much larger than the armies of all of the Central American democracies combined. Nicaragua continues its support for insurgents in Honduras and El Salvador -- despite Ortega's promise to stop shipping arms to the FMLN. For example, on October 18, Honduran authorities captured a truckload of assault rifles, grenades and explosives from Nicaragua that were destined for the Salvadoran guerrillas. President Ortega yesterday announced that he was suspending the cease-fire, despite restraint by the United States and by Nicaragua's neighbors. In sum, the backing that Soviet bloc military assistance provide for Nicaraguan policy remains a serious impediment to peace in the Western hemisphere and the resolution of conflicts there.

North Korea provides a less-publicized but, perhaps even more dangerous story. North Korea has repeatedly demonstrated flagrant disregard for commonly accepted norms of international behavior and the continuing provision of modern weaponry by the Soviet Union only increases the military capabilities of this irresponsible regime.

Recent Soviet arms deliveries have included advanced fighter aircraft and advanced surface-to-air missiles and radars. The range of these aircraft and missiles extends well south of Seoul and threatens both civilian airliners and U.S. reconnaissance flights that monitor North Korean compliance with the armistice agreement that halted the fighting on the Korean peninsula 36 years ago. Soviet deliveries of less sophisticated military equipment such as artillery, trucks and armored personnel carriers over the last two decades has helped maintain North Korea's significant military advantage over the south and contributed to the continued tension in Korea. There are disturbing signs that North Korea may be in the process of developing

-3-

a nuclear weapons capability, raising even more questions about the purpose of Soviet military support to this irresponsible government.

This pattern of behavior raises some fundamental questions about the extent to which "new thinking" truly guides the Soviet approach to regional conflicts. Does the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and other countries reflect a recognition that the peoples of these countries are entitled to governments of their own choosing? Or does it simply reflect a decision to pursue the same ends by different, less costly, and less controversial means?

Unfortunately, today the weight of evidence still appears to support the latter conclusion, which is all the more ironic at a time when the Soviet Union is facing up to the need to bring greater openness and democracy into the political process at home, with a boldness that has captured the world's imagination.

It is our belief that the solution of many regional problems would benefit from a greater infusion of glasnost, if it is fair to interpret that term as implying outcomes that are based, as far as possible, on the desires of the peoples involved, expressed freely through open political processes. This is true for several reasons:

-- First, because it is right. People should have a right to determine their own destinies, not to have them imposed by one superpower or another, or even by both acting in concert. Having been involved in formulating U.S. policy toward the Philippines during the last years of the Marcos regime, I can say from my own personal experience that the commitment of the United States to democratic solutions runs very deep. We have supported such outcomes, even at some risk, not only in the Philippines but elsewhere in Asia, in Latin America and throughout the world.

-- A second reason we favor democratic outcomes is that we believe that governments that enjoy true popular support are less likely, in the long run, to provide opportunities for outside military intervention, and that governments that are genuinely open to popular criticism are less likely to engage in military aggression. It is no accident, I believe, that two of the Soviet allies whose foreign behavior cause us the most concern today -- North Korea and Cuba -- have perhaps the most unreconstructed Stalinist regimes in the world today and most decisively reject the ideas of glasnost and perestroika.

We hope -- and indeed we believe -- that this apparent contradiction between the new principles that the Soviet Union is applying at home and some of the regimes that it is supporting abroad can best be resolved through more open debate about foreign policy.

For example, it will be a very positive development if public scrutiny in the U.S.S.R. of Soviet arms transfers and military assistance increases. As Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has noted: "The shortage of democratic culture, vestiges of an elitist awareness have given rise to a certain "silent zone" around our nation's diplomatic center. The caste-like exclusiveness of some of its workers, false defensiveness and excessive secrecy, the complete absence of information about its inner life and the artificially implanted assumption of infallibility have contributed greatly during the years of stagnation to the alienating of people from foreign policy and foreign policy from the people.

In all, we're still awaiting a new Soviet policy toward regional conflicts that fully complements its new thinking...a new policy that shows the same flexibility and good sense as their recent Soviet arms control efforts...a new policy that is prepared to apply abroad some of the very principles with which the Soviet government has been pioneering at home.

We must act quickly and comprehensively. As Secretary Baker reminded us in his recent speech to the Foreign Policy Association: with the spread of missiles and chemical weapons throughout volatile regions, conflicts in the Third World are likely to take on a more dangerous character. Regional conflicts are likely to be more difficult to contain, more likely to engulf more countries, and more susceptible to escalation.

-4-

For stability and the sake of a more cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship, the superpowers must put the same emphasis and expend the same energy on solving regional conflicts as they have toward arms control.

Where do we go from here?

The first step in dealing with regional conflicts is for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to recognize each others common interest in the solution of these conflicts by peaceful means, as well as the basic principles on which we believe regional conflicts should be solved.

For our part -- as an island nation whose markets and resources are often found overseas -- we believe that we have important and growing interests abroad. These interests include alliances with more than 40 nations and strong bonds with many others. Regional conflicts threaten these friends and allies and hold an unhealthy possibility for escalation.

The United States believes that regional conflicts should be resolved on the basis of self-determination, independence and democracy. We believe that by promoting freedom and self-determination, we build what is ultimately the most secure foundation for peace as well. Ultimately, peace and freedom are inseparable.

We do not favor any sort of spheres of influence schemes that some armchair strategists espouse. Dividing the world into spheres of influence won't end superpower competition; the dividing line itself would become the crucial point of contention. "Swapping" influence in one country for advantage in another is as illegitimate as it is impractical...and impossible. We think the Soviet Union would agree with us on that point.

Second, all industrialized nations should join together in taking precautions not to export materials or technologies that will facilitate the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or missile-delivered weapons. The proliferation of these weapons and technologies has already progressed to a dangerous level. By the year 2000 it is anticipated that over a dozen Third World countries may be able to deploy nuclear weapons. Many more nations will have chemical weapons, like those used in the Iran-Iraq war, and a dozen developing nations will have a ballistic missile delivery capability. Together, the United States and the Soviet Union must work toward correcting or reducing the scope of this challenge to peace.

Finally, and in my view most important, we have to realize that the superpowers are not the primary cause of regional conflicts. Such conflicts arise out of ethnic strife, historic animosities, poverty, famine and uneven levels of political and economic development. Thus, the fundamental solutions to regional conflicts won't be found in armaments or even in arms control. To dampen regional conflicts, we must ultimately deal with their causes, most importantly through efforts to promote economic and political development.

There are a broad range of actions that we can and do take to achieve those purposes. One is through bilateral and multilateral economic assistance to developing countries. We and our allies provide massive amounts of such assistance and we would welcome the Soviet Union joining that effort. Even more important are the markets that we provide for the new products of developing countries and we would hope, as Soviet economic restructuring succeeds, to see the Soviet Union play a greater role as well.

But the most important thing we have to contribute, I believe, are two basic ideas. One is that the route to economic development lies not through government control of economic activity but through freeing the creative energies of individuals. The second idea is that democracy and openness are not obstacles to economic development -- as was once commonly argued -- but, to the contrary, often necessary for it. Those countries that in the past gave up fundamental freedoms in the belief that they would develop faster most often ended up with neither freedom nor prosperity. When the government controls the

-5-

economy and the government is not open to criticism, the economy does not work.

These two ideas are old and familiar ones to the Western democracies and they seem to be borne out by the experience of the newly developing countries. If I understand the terms correctly, the words perestroika and glasnost incorporate a Soviet recognition of these two fundamental truths. When, in the past, we have suggested to developing countries that we believe they can find useful lessons in our experience, we were often accused of ethnocentrism and parochialism. If today, in fact, the United States and the Soviet Union can agree in broad terms about what works, that is bound to have a positive effect on the rest of the world.

I believe there is a connection, for example, between the declining support for violent revolution in the Philippines and the awareness in that country of the abandonment of classical Marxism in the Soviet Union.

Ladies and gentlemen, the future is fraught with difficult problems requiring increased U.S.-Soviet cooperation on issues from arms control to air pollution. To solve them, we must not let the current improvement in our relations be again buried in the quicksand of regional conflicts. We must instead pursue dialogue, the kind of dialogue that this conference is working to promote, the kind of dialogue to which President Gorbachev referred when he said: Dialogue between people "from different worlds," people of different walks of life and with different views, is especially important. If they are united by a common concern for humankind's future, the disputes and numerous controversies between them do not prevent them from finding points of contact and coming to terms on the main issues. This is a good example for the whole world.

#####

100-25

RETURN TO REVENIR AU			BIC		
ACC	REF	DATE	891103		
FILE	20-USA-1-3-488		DOSSIER		

Min (A7)

NOV 6 1989

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

P R O T E G E

DE WSHDC UNGR6903 03NOV89

A EXTOTT/URR

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/DAVIS PCOOTT/DOYLE


DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD RGB RBD IFB IDD IDR IDA RBR

---SOMMET BUSH/GORBACHEV-PREMIERES REACTIONS

RESUME:ANNONCE OFFICIELLE PAR PRES BUSH DE SA RENCONTRE AVEC
SECR GEN GORBACHEV LES 2-3DEC N'A PAS SUSCITE,DE LA PART DES
CONGRESSISTES,ANALYSTES ET MEDIA,DEBAT ANIME SUR NATURE ET
BIEN-FONDE DE REUNION.OBJECTIFS ET RESULTATS ANTICIPES TELS
QU'EXPRIMES PAR BUSH ONT ETE REPRIS PAR MAJORITE DES
COMMENTATEURS QUI SUPPORTENT UNANIMEMENT INITIATIVE.TOUS
RECONNAISSENT DESIR DU PRES DE MAINTENIR CARACTERE INFORMEL DE LA
REUNION MAIS ONT DES RESERVES QUANT A LA POSSIBILITE DE LE FAIRE.
SOMMET RESTE ENCORE LE TERME LE PLUS APPROPRIE POUR DECRIRE CETTE
RENCONTRE.ILS RECONNAISSENT HABILITES DU PRESIDENT A DISCUTER
QUESTIONS POLITIQUE ETRANGERE,MAIS SOULIGNENT NECESSITE D'AVOIR
UNE IDEE CLAIRE DES OBJECTIFS AMERICAINS FACE A UN GORBACHEV
TOUJOURS PRET A TIRER DE SON CHAPEAU QUELQUE PROPOSITION
INATTENDUE.

2.RAPPORT:MALGRE LE FAIT QUE LES DEMOCRATES ONT ATTAQUE
L'ADMINISTRATION SUR SA CIT TIMIDITE FINCIT ET SA LENTEUR A
REAGIR AUX ENVENEMENTS IMPORTANTS AYANT COURS EN EUROPE DE L'EST
REP FOLEY ET SEN NUNN ONT EXPRIME SUPPORT POUR INITIATIVE ET NE

...2



PAGE DEUX UNGR6903 PROTEGE

CONSIDERENT PAS DECISION PRESIDENTELLE COMME TACTIQUE POUR FAIRE TAIRE LES CRITIQUES. PARVENUE A UN CAREFOUR IMPORTANT, POLITIQUE ETRANGERE AMERICAINE NE DOIT PAS ETRE DEBATTUE DANS DES TERMES PARTISANS. COMPTE TENU DE RAPIDITE ET PROFONDEUR DES CHANGEMENTS AFFECTANT EUROPE DE L'EST, CONGRESSISTES RECONNAISSENT BIEN-FONDE APPROCHE BUSH QUI VEUT, DANS ENVIRONNEMENT DEGAGE DE LA FANFARE DES SOMMETS, DISCUTER AVEC HOMOLOGUE SOVIETIQUE DES GRANDES QUESTIONS ET LEUR INCIDENCES SUR AVENIR DES RELATIONS BILATERALES.

3. SEN NUNN A EXPRIME NECESSITE POUR BUSH DE SE PRESENTER A RENCONTRE AVEC IDEE CLAIRE DES OBJECTIFS AMERCAINS. IL A EGALEMENT INDIGUE QUE RENCONTRE DEVRAIT ETRE PREPAREE EN COORDINATION AVEC ALLIES, PARTICULIEREMENT LA RFA. RENCONTRE BILATERALE N'EST PAS UN SUBSTITUT AU MANQUE DE VISION DEMONTRE PAR ADMINISTRATION, RAISON DE PLUS POUR S'ASSURER QUE PRES EST OUTILLE POUR FAIRE FACE A GORBACHEV.

4. ANALYSTES DE LA POLITIQUE AMERICAINE, ANCIENS DIPLOMATES ET UNIVERSITAIRES ACCEPTENT EXPLICATION DU PRESIDENT LORSQU'IL JUSTIFIE NECESSITE D'UNE RENCONTRE A CE MOMENT-CI, PAR RAPIDITE DES CHANGEMENTS POLITIQUES EN EUROPE DE L'EST ET EN URSS. ILS VONT PLUS LOIN CEPENDANT LORSQU'ILS SUGGERENT QUE RENCONTRE SERA UTILISEE POUR DISCUTER NON SEULEMENT TRANSFORMATIONS INTERNES QUI AFFECTENT REGIMES COMMUNISTES, MAIS AUSSI ET PEUT-ETRE SURTOUT, INCIDENCES DRAMATIQUES QUE CES CHANGEMENTS AURONT A MOYEN TERME

...3

PAGE TROIS UNGR6909 PROTEGE

SUR ARRANGEMENTS POLITIQUES QUI ONT GARANTE STABILITE EUROPEENNE DEPUIS DEUXIEME CONFLIT MONDIAL.Z. BRZEZINSKI ABONDEH DANS LE MEME SENS QUE BAKER LA FAIT DANS RECENTS DISCOURS ET SOULIGNE NECESSITE POUR DEUX LEADERS DE TRAVAILLER A IDENTIFIER CHAMPS D'INTERET COMMUN.EXPERT DE L'UNIVERSITE DUKE,JERRY HOUGH,CROIT QUE GORBACHEV ET BUSH RECONNAISSENT PROFONDEUR DES CHANGEMENTS ET DESIRONT COMMENCER,HORS DE LA SURVEILLANCE DES OBSERVATEURS,UN DIALOGUE SUR L'AVENIR DE L'EUROPE ET LA FACON DE RALENTIR DEVELOPPEMENTS POLITIQUES.

5.TOUS LES ANALYSTES S'ENTENDENT POUR DIRE QUE BUSH EST PLUS APTE QUE REAGAN L'ETAIT POUR PARTICIPER A UN TETE-A-TETE AVEC GORBACHEV.ILS EXPRIMENT CEPENDANT CRAINTE QUE GORBACHEV SOIT TENTE CIT COMME IL SAIT SI BIEN LE FAIRE FINCIT,DE SUGGERER QUELQUES INITIATIVES POUR LESQUELLES BUSH NE SERA PAS UN MESURE DE REpondre.

6.MEDIA JUSQU'A MAINTENANT SONT AVARES DE COMMENTAIRES ORIGINAUX.ILS ONT REPRIS GRANDS THEMES DEVELOPPES PAR BUSH AU COURS CONFERENCE DE PRESSE DU 31OCT ET APPUYE SUR PERSONNALITE DU PRES QUI AFFECTINNE APPROCHE INFORMELLE ET PERSONNALISEE.PRESSE ECRITE NE S'EST PAS ATTARDEE SPECIFIQUEMENT AU SOMMET.ELLE CONTINUE DE METTRE L'ACCENT SUR LE MANQUE DE COHESION ET DE COORDINATION QUI SEMBLE PERDURER AU SEIN DE L'ADMINISTRATION.SI EDITORIALISTE DU NEW YORK TIMES ANNONCE QUE CIT THE MEETING ALSO

...4

PAGE QUATRE UNGR6903 PROTEGE

REPRESENTS A TRIUMPH FOR SEC OF STATE JAMES BAKER FINCIT,
JOURNALISTES DU MEME JOURNAL ET AUTRES QUOTIDIENS CONTINUENT DE
RELEVER DIFFERENCES DANS LE TON ET L'APPROCHE MANIFESTES PAR
DIFFERENTS HAUTS-FONCTIONNAIRES DE L'ADMINISTRATION. ILS FONT
REFERENCE ENTRE AUTRES AU RECENT DISCOURS DE PAUL WOLFOWITZ,
SOUS-SECRETAIRE DE LA DEFENCE POUR LES POLITIQUES OU, D'UN TON
CIT ACCUSATEUR FINCIT, IL PEINGNAIT MOSCO COMME UNE SOURCE DE
DIFFICULTES POLENTIELLES.

CCC/114 032335Z UNGR6903

NOV 13 '89 16:49 POL SEC CDN EMB

P.2

POSTED BY THE-UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND	
REGIONAL CONFLICTS	DATE 891102
ACC	DOSSIER
FILE 20-USA-1-3-USA	
LOC 18	(Vol 25/MIRD)

REMARKS BY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PAUL WOLFOVITZ
AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE FIFTH CHAUTAUQUA CONFERENCE
ON U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS

HOSTED BY
THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

NOVEMBER 2, 1989

2/47

NOV 13 '89 16:49 POL SEC CDN EMB

External Affairs Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

MGTC/DIARY/CIRC/FILE P. 1
MGTC/JOURNAL/CIRC/DOSSIER

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

NOV 14 1989

12

10

FM/DE

FM WSHDC UNGRO585 13NOV89

TO/A

TO EXTOTT/URR/ANGELL DELIVER BY 140830

INFO

DISTR

REF: COSSETTE/ANGEL TELECON OF NOV.9

REF

---BUSH-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

SUBJ/SUJ

AS REQUESTED, PLEASE FIND ATTACHED COPY OF SPEECHES
GIVEN BY QUAYLE AND WORFOWITZ, AND PRESS CLIPPINGS
ON US/USSR RELATIONS.

COMCENTRE PLS FAX 47 PAGES COVERSHEET INCLUDED

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

NOV 14 1989

1/47

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APProuvé

G. COSSETTE
SIG

POLITICAL

EXT. 7409 SIG

G. COSSETTE

EXT 818-1 (89/11)

NOV 13 '89 16:49 POL SEC CDN EMB

1

- IT IS A DISTINCT HONOR TO ADDRESS THIS CONFERENCE. THERE'S A CONTINUING NEED FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND OUR TWO PEOPLES AND THERE IS NO MORE IMPORTANT TOPIC THAN THAT OF THE SUPERPOWERS AND THEIR ROLE IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS.
- TODAY, REGIONAL CONFLICTS REMAIN ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES ON THE SUPERPOWER AGENDA. WORKING TOWARD SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL PROBLEMS OF ALL TYPES -- POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND MILITARY -- WILL BE CRITICAL TO STABILITY AND THE REDUCTION OF TENSION WORLDWIDE. THIS SUBJECT OCCUPIES AS IMPORTANT A PLACE ON THE EAST-WEST AGENDA AS NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. INDEED, THE TWO SUBJECTS ARE INTIMATELY CONNECTED. FINDING SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE ALL-IMPORTANT TASK OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR. THE DISTURBING FREQUENCY WITH WHICH SMALL WARS HAVE BECOME BIG WARS IN THE PAST GIVES CAUTION TO US ALL. AS PRESIDENT BUSH HAS SAID:

THE THREATS TO PEACE THAT NATIONS FACE MAY TODAY BE CHANGING, BUT THEY'VE NOT VANISHED. IN FACT, IN A NUMBER OF REGIONS AROUND THE WORLD, A DANGEROUS COMBINATION IS NOW EMERGING -- REGIMES ARMED WITH OLD AND UNAPPEASABLE ANIMOSITIES -- AND MODERN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THIS DEVELOPMENT WILL RAISE THE STAKES WHENEVER WAR BREAKS OUT. REGIONAL CONFLICT MAY WELL THREATEN WORLD PEACE AS NEVER BEFORE.

3/47

NOV 13 '89 16:50 POL SEC CDN EMB

P.4

2

- THIS IS NOT TO SUGGEST THAT REGIONAL CONFLICTS SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THE DICTATE OF THE SUPERPOWERS OR TO DENY THAT THE PEOPLE WITH THE GREATEST STAKE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS ARE THE PARTICIPANTS THEMSELVES. INDEED, IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS WILL ONLY BE VIABLE WHEN THEY REFLECT THE WILL AND DESIRES OF THE PEOPLE WHO MUST LIVE WITH THOSE SOLUTIONS.
- BUT THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAKES IT IMPORTANT FOR THE WHOLE WORLD, AND PARTICULARLY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, TO WORK TO PREVENT THOSE SMALL CONFLICTS THAT CAN CONTAIN THE SEEDS OF LARGER ONES.
- MOREOVER, THE RECORD SHOWS THAT REGIONAL CONFLICTS PLAYED A GREAT PART IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLD WAR AND, MORE RECENTLY, IN THE DEMISE OF DETENTE AND THE DOWNTURN IN OUR RELATIONSHIP IN THE MID-SEVENTIES. AS PRESIDENT CARTER'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, HAS FREQUENTLY SAID, SALT II WAS BURIED IN THE SANDS OF THE OGADEN...WHETHER IT HAPPENED THERE OR IN THE MOUNTAINS OF AFGHANISTAN, IN EITHER CASE THE BASIC POINT IS THE SAME: EVEN MORE THAN THE MASSIVE BUILD-UP OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER UNDER BREZHNEV, IT WAS THE USE OF THAT MILITARY POWER DIRECTLY IN AFGHANISTAN AND INDIRECTLY IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS BY SOVIET ALLIES IN ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA, CAMBODIA, EL SALVADOR AND ELSEWHERE, THAT SPELLED THE END OF DETENTE. TO PUT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS ON A MORE STABLE LONG-TERM BASIS, WE NEED TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO THOSE PROBLEMS AND PREVENT NEW ONES FROM DEVELOPING.

4/47

NOV 13 '89 16:50 POL SEC CDN EMB

P.5

3

- WE HAVE SEEN DRAMATIC PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL, AND IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE HOPEFUL -- AS ARE THE SOVIET PEOPLE -- THAT PERESTROIKA AND GLASNOST WILL SUCCEED IN THE LONG-TERM. IN THE AREA OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARD REGIONAL CONFLICTS, THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN SOME DRAMATIC POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS. HOWEVER, I WOULD BE LESS THAN FRANK, IF I SAID THAT WE WERE SATISFIED WITH WHAT WE SEE TODAY.
- IT IS TRUE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN, AS WELL AS VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA AND CUBANS FROM ANGOLA, OFFERS REAL PROMISE OF A MORE COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS. MOREOVER, WE HAVE SEEN MUCH EVIDENCE OF PROGRESSIVE "NEW THINKING" ON THE ISSUE OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS. KEY SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE REPUDIATING PAST "ADVENTURES" -- LIKE THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN -- AND RAISING SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE THIRD WORLD AND THE UTILITY OF MILITARY POWER THERE. OTHER SOVIET AUTHORS HAVE CONTRASTED THEIR OWN SOCIAL PROGRESS WITH THE REPRESSIVE POLICIES BEING FOLLOWED BY SOME OF THEIR FRIENDS WHO PROCLAIM A "SOCIALIST ORIENTATION." ALL OF THIS -- I HOPE -- WILL BEAR FRUIT IN THE FUTURE...
- HOWEVER, AMIDST ALL THE "NEW THINKING" IN THE SOVIET UNION, THERE'S A LOT OF "OLD POLICY" ON REGIONAL CONFLICTS. SOME OF THE SAME AREAS THAT WERE PROBLEMS IN THE SEVENTIES -- AFGHANISTAN IN PARTICULAR -- REMAIN SIGNIFICANT SORE POINTS TODAY. THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES CONTINUE TO SUPPLY LARGE AMOUNTS OF SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO

5/47

NOV 13 '89 16:51 POL SEC CDN EMB

P.6

4

COUNTRIES LIKE NORTH KOREA, NICARAGUA AND LIBYA WHICH THREATEN THEIR NEIGHBORS AND SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

-- IN AFGHANISTAN, SOVIET MILITARY AID IS POURING IN TO THE NAJIBULLAH REGIME AT RATE OF MORE THAN \$250 MILLION PER MONTH, DWARFING ALL THE ASSISTANCE RECEIVED BY THE MUJAHIDIN FROM ALL SOURCES. NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS -- LIKE THE POWERFUL SCUD MISSILE -- HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THAT REGIME IN THE LARGEST AIRLIFT OF ARMS AND MATERIEL IN SOVIET HISTORY. THE WHOLE WORLD, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, APPLAUDS FOREIGN MINISTER SHEYARDNADZE'S CONDEMNATION OF THE WAR AND OF THE SECRECY OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS THAT BROUGHT IT ABOUT; YET, AT THE SAME TIME, THE DETAILS OF THIS MASSIVE ON-GOING SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN REMAIN UNPUBLICIZED IN THE USSR. WHILE THE FOREIGN MINISTER CRITICIZES THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, SOVIET MILITARY AID FURTHERS THE SAME OBJECTIVE OF IMPOSING AN UNWANTED REGIME ON THE PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY.

-- IN NICARAGUA, WHILE WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY AID HAS STOPPED, EAST BLOC AND CUBAN MILITARY AID CONTINUES AT AN ANNUAL RATE OF A HALF A BILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR, EVEN THOUGH THE U.S. HAS LONG SINCE CEASED ITS MUCH SMALLER MILITARY AID TO THE RESISTANCE FORCES. IN ALL, SINCE 1980, SOVIET BLOC MILITARY AID TO NICARAGUA HAS TOTALED MORE THAN \$3

6/47

NOV 13 '89 16:51 POL SEC CDN EMB

P.7

5

BILLION, PERMITTING THAT COUNTRY TO BECOME THE MOST THOROUGHLY MILITARIZED COUNTRY IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

- INDEED, WHILE THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE RESISTANCE IS RECEDING, NICARAGUA MAINTAINS A MILITARY FORCE MUCH LARGER THAN THE ARMIES OF ALL OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES COMBINED. NICARAGUA CONTINUES ITS SUPPORT FOR INSURGENTS IN HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR -- DESPITE ORTEGA'S PROMISE TO STOP SHIPPING ARMS TO THE FMLN. FOR EXAMPLE, ON OCTOBER 18, HONDURAN AUTHORITIES CAPTURED A TRUCKLOAD OF ASSAULT RIFLES, GRENADES, AND EXPLOSIVES FROM NICARAGUA THAT WERE DESTINED FOR THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS. PRESIDENT ORTEGA YESTERDAY ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS SUSPENDING THE CEASEFIRE, DESPITE RESTRAINT BY THE UNITED STATES AND BY NICARAGUA'S NEIGHBORS. IN SUM, THE BACKING THAT SOVIET BLOC MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROVIDE FOR NICARAGUAN POLICY REMAINS A SERIOUS IMPEDIMENT TO PEACE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS THERE.
- NORTH KOREA PROVIDES A LESS-PUBLICIZED BUT, PERHAPS EVEN MORE DANGEROUS STORY.
- NORTH KOREA HAS REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED FLAGRANT DISREGARD FOR COMMONLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND THE CONTINUING PROVISION OF MODERN WEAPONRY BY THE SOVIET UNION ONLY INCREASES THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THIS IRRESPONSIBLE REGIME. RECENT SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES HAVE INCLUDED ADVANCED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AND ADVANCED SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES AND RADARS. THE RANGE OF THESE AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES EXTENDS WELL SOUTH OF SEOUL AND THREATENS BOTH

7/47

NOV 13 '89 16:52 POL SEC CDN EMB

P.8

6

CIVILIAN AIRLINERS AND US RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS THAT MONITOR NORTH KOREAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT THAT HALTED THE FIGHTING ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 36 YEARS AGO. SOVIET DELIVERIES OF LESS SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUCH AS ARTILLERY, TRUCKS AND ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS OVER THE LAST TWO DECADES HAS HELPED MAINTAIN NORTH KOREA'S SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ADVANTAGE OVER THE SOUTH AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE CONTINUED TENSION IN KOREA. THERE ARE DISTURBING SIGNS THAT NORTH KOREA MAY BE IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY, RAISING EVEN MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT TO THIS IRRESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT.

- THIS PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR RAISES SOME FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH "NEW THINKING" TRULY GUIDES THE SOVIET APPROACH TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS. DOES THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES REFLECT A RECOGNITION THAT THE PEOPLES OF THESE COUNTRIES ARE ENTITLED TO GOVERNMENTS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING? OR DOES IT SIMPLY REFLECT A DECISION TO PURSUE THE SAME ENDS BY DIFFERENT, LESS COSTLY, AND LESS CONTROVERSIAL MEANS?
- UNFORTUNATELY, TODAY THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE STILL APPEARS TO SUPPORT THE LATTER CONCLUSION, WHICH IS ALL THE MORE IRONIC AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIET UNION IS FACING UP TO THE NEED TO BRING GREATER OPENNESS AND DEMOCRACY INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS AT HOME, WITH A BOLDNESS THAT HAS CAPTURED THE WORLD'S IMAGINATION.

8/47

NOV 13 '89 16:52 POL SEC CDN EMB

P.9

7

- IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THE SOLUTION OF MANY REGIONAL PROBLEMS WOULD BENEFIT FROM A GREATER INFUSION OF GLASNOST, IF IT IS FAIR TO INTERPRET THAT TERM AS IMPLYING OUTCOMES THAT ARE BASED, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, ON THE DESIRES OF THE PEOPLES INVOLVED, EXPRESSED FREELY THROUGH OPEN POLITICAL PROCESSES. THIS IS TRUE FOR SEVERAL REASONS.
- FIRST, BECAUSE IT IS RIGHT, PEOPLE SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN DESTINIES, NOT TO HAVE THEM IMPOSED BY ONE SUPERPOWER OR ANOTHER, OR EVEN BY BOTH ACTING IN CONCERT. HAVING BEEN INVOLVED IN FORMULATING U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PHILIPPINES DURING THE LAST YEARS OF THE MARCOS REGIME, I CAN SAY FROM MY OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCE THAT THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO DEMOCRATIC SOLUTIONS RUNS VERY DEEP. WE HAVE SUPPORTED SUCH OUTCOMES, EVEN AT SOME RISK, NOT ONLY IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT ELSEWHERE IN ASIA, IN LATIN AMERICA AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.
- A SECOND REASON WE FAVOR DEMOCRATIC OUTCOMES IS THAT WE BELIEVE THAT GOVERNMENTS THAT ENJOY TRUE POPULAR SUPPORT ARE LESS LIKELY, IN THE LONG RUN, TO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUTSIDE MILITARY INTERVENTION, AND THAT GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE GENUINELY OPEN TO POPULAR CRITICISM ARE LESS LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN MILITARY AGGRESSION. IT IS NO ACCIDENT, I BELIEVE, THAT TWO OF THE SOVIET ALLIES WHOSE FOREIGN BEHAVIOR CAUSE US THE MOST CONCERN TODAY -- NORTH KOREA AND CUBA -- HAVE PERHAPS THE MOST UNRECONSTRUCTED STALINIST REGIMES IN THE WORLD TODAY AND MOST DECISIVELY REJECT THE IDEAS OF GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA.

9/47

NOV 13 '89 16:53 POL SEC CDN EMB

P.10

8

- WE HOPE -- AND INDEED WE BELIEVE -- THAT THIS APPARENT CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE NEW PRINCIPLES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS APPLYING AT HOME AND SOME OF THE REGIMES THAT IT IS SUPPORTING ABROAD CAN BEST BE RESOLVED THROUGH MORE OPEN DEBATE ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WILL BE A VERY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IF PUBLIC SCRUTINY IN THE USSR OF SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE INCREASES. AS FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAS NOTED:

THE SHORTAGE OF DEMOCRATIC CULTURE, VESTIGES OF AN ELITIST AWARENESS HAVE GIVEN RISE TO A CERTAIN "SILENT ZONE" AROUND OUR NATION'S DIPLOMATIC CENTER. THE CASTE-LIKE EXCLUSIVENESS OF SOME OF ITS WORKERS, FALSE DEFENSIVENESS AND EXCESSIVE SECRECY, THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT ITS INNER LIFE AND THE ARTIFICIALLY IMPLANTED ASSUMPTION OF INFALLIBILITY HAVE CONTRIBUTED GREATLY DURING THE YEARS OF STAGNATION TO THE ALIENATING OF PEOPLE FROM FOREIGN POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE PEOPLE.

- IN ALL, WE'RE STILL AWAITING A NEW SOVIET POLICY TOWARD REGIONAL CONFLICTS THAT FULLY COMPLEMENTS ITS NEW THINKING...A NEW POLICY THAT SHOWS THE SAME FLEXIBILITY AND GOOD SENSE AS RECENT SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS...A NEW POLICY THAT IS PREPARED TO APPLY ABROAD SOME OF THE VERY PRINCIPLES WITH WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN PIONEERING AT HOME.

10/47

NOV 13 '89 16:53 POL SEC CDN EMB

P.11

9

- WE MUST ACT QUICKLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY. AS SECRETARY BAKER REMINDED US IN HIS RECENT SPEECH TO THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION:

WITH THE SPREAD OF MISSILES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS THROUGHOUT VOLATILE REGIONS, CONFLICTS IN THE THIRD WORLD ARE LIKELY TO TAKE ON A MORE DANGEROUS CHARACTER. REGIONAL CONFLICTS ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE DIFFICULT TO CONTAIN, MORE LIKELY TO ENGULF MORE COUNTRIES, AND MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO ESCALATION.

- FOR STABILITY AND THE SAKE OF A MORE COOPERATIVE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP, THE SUPERPOWERS MUST PUT THE SAME EMPHASIS AND EXPEND THE SAME ENERGY ON SOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS AS THEY HAVE TOWARD ARMS CONTROL. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
- THE FIRST STEP IN DEALING WITH REGIONAL CONFLICTS IS FOR BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION TO RECOGNIZE EACH OTHERS COMMON INTEREST IN THE SOLUTION OF THESE CONFLICTS BY PEACEFUL MEANS, AS WELL AS THE BASIC PRINCIPLES ON WHICH WE BELIEVE REGIONAL CONFLICTS SHOULD BE SOLVED.
- FOR OUR PART -- AS AN ISLAND NATION WHOSE MARKETS AND RESOURCES ARE OFTEN FOUND OVERSEAS -- WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE IMPORTANT AND GROWING INTERESTS ABROAD. THESE INTERESTS INCLUDE ALLIANCES WITH MORE THAN 40 NATIONS AND STRONG BONDS WITH MANY OTHERS. REGIONAL CONFLICTS THREATEN THESE FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND HOLD AN UNHEALTHY POSSIBILITY FOR ESCALATION.

11/47

NOV 13 '89 16:54 POL SEC CDN EMB

P.12

10

- THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT REGIONAL CONFLICTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF SELF-DETERMINATION, INDEPENDENCE, AND DEMOCRACY. WE BELIEVE THAT BY PROMOTING FREEDOM AND SELF-DETERMINATION, WE BUILD WHAT IS ULTIMATELY THE MOST SECURE FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AS WELL. ULTIMATELY, PEACE AND FREEDOM ARE INSEPARABLE.
- WE DO NOT FAVOR ANY SORT OF SPHERES OF INFLUENCE SCHEMES THAT SOME ARMCHAIR STRATEGISTS ESPOUSE. DIVIDING THE WORLD INTO SPHERES OF INFLUENCE WON'T END SUPERPOWER COMPETITION; THE DIVIDING LINE ITSELF WOULD BECOME THE CRUCIAL POINT OF CONTENTION. "SWAPPING" INFLUENCE IN ONE COUNTRY FOR ADVANTAGE IN ANOTHER IS AS ILLEGITIMATE AS IT IS IMPRACTICAL ... AND IMPOSSIBLE. WE THINK THE SOVIET UNION WOULD AGREE WITH US ON THAT POINT.
- SECOND, ALL INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS SHOULD JOIN TOGETHER IN TAKING PRECAUTIONS NOT TO EXPORT MATERIALS OR TECHNOLOGIES THAT WILL FACILITATE THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, OR MISSILE-DELIVERED WEAPONS. THE PROLIFERATION OF THESE WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGIES HAS ALREADY PROGRESSED TO A DANGEROUS LEVEL. BY THE YEAR 2000 IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT OVER A DOZEN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES MAY BE ABLE TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MANY MORE NATIONS WILL HAVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, LIKE THOSE USED IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, AND A DOZEN DEVELOPING NATIONS WILL HAVE A BALLISTIC MISSILE DELIVERY CAPABILITY. TOGETHER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST WORK TOWARD CORRECTING OR REDUCING THE SCOPE OF THIS CHALLENGE TO PEACE.

12/47

NOV 13 '89 16:54 POL SEC CDN EMB

P.13

11

- FINALLY, AND IN MY VIEW MOST IMPORTANT, WE HAVE TO REALIZE THAT THE SUPERPOWERS ARE NOT THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS. SUCH CONFLICTS ARISE OUT OF ETHNIC STRIFE, HISTORIC ANIMOSITIES, POVERTY, FAMINE, AND UNEVEN LEVELS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THUS, THE FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS WON'T BE FOUND IN ARMAMENTS OR EVEN IN ARMS CONTROL. TO DAMPEN REGIONAL CONFLICTS, WE MUST ULTIMATELY DEAL WITH THEIR CAUSES, MOST IMPORTANTLY THROUGH EFFORTS TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT.
- THERE ARE A BROAD RANGE OF ACTIONS THAT WE CAN AND DO TAKE TO ACHIEVE THOSE PURPOSES. ONE IS THROUGH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. WE AND OUR ALLIES PROVIDE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF SUCH ASSISTANCE AND WE WOULD WELCOME THE SOVIET UNION JOINING THAT EFFORT. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT ARE THE MARKETS THAT WE PROVIDE FOR THE NEW PRODUCTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND WE WOULD HOPE, AS SOVIET ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING SUCCEEDS, TO SEE THE SOVIET UNION PLAY A GREATER ROLE AS WELL.
- BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WE HAVE TO CONTRIBUTE, I BELIEVE, ARE TWO BASIC IDEAS. ONE IS THAT THE ROUTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LIES NOT THROUGH GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY BUT THROUGH FREEING THE CREATIVE ENERGIES OF INDIVIDUALS. THE SECOND IDEA IS THAT DEMOCRACY AND OPENNESS ARE NOT OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -- AS WAS ONCE COMMONLY ARGUED -- BUT, TO THE CONTRARY, OFTEN NECESSARY FOR IT. THOSE COUNTRIES THAT IN THE PAST GAVE UP

13/47

NOV 13 '89 16:55 POL SEC CDN EMB

P..

12

FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN THE BELIEF THAT THEY WOULD DEVELOP FASTER MOST OFTEN ENDED UP WITH NEITHER FREEDOM NOR PROSPERITY. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT CONTROLS THE ECONOMY AND THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT OPEN TO CRITICISM, THE ECONOMY DOES NOT WORK.

- THESE TWO IDEAS ARE OLD AND FAMILIAR ONES TO THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND THEY SEEM TO BE BORNE OUT BY THE EXPERIENCE OF THE NEWLY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. IF I UNDERSTAND THE TERMS CORRECTLY, THE WORDS PERESTROIKA AND GLASNOST INCORPORATE A SOVIET RECOGNITION OF THESE TWO FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS. WHEN, IN THE PAST, WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAT WE BELIEVE THEY CAN FIND USEFUL LESSONS IN OUR EXPERIENCE, WE WERE OFTEN ACCUSED OF ETHNOCENTRISM AND PAROCHIALISM. IF TODAY, IN FACT, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION CAN AGREE IN BROAD TERMS ABOUT WHAT WORKS, THAT IS BOUND TO HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE REST OF THE WORLD. I BELIEVE THERE IS A CONNECTION, FOR EXAMPLE, BETWEEN THE DECLINING SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE AWARENESS IN THAT COUNTRY OF THE ABANDONMENT OF CLASSICAL MARXISM IN THE SOVIET UNION.
- LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE FUTURE IS FRAUGHT WITH DIFFICULT PROBLEMS REQUIRING INCREASED US-SOVIET COOPERATION ON ISSUES FROM ARMS CONTROL TO AIR POLLUTION. TO SOLVE THEM, WE MUST NOT LET THE CURRENT IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS BE AGAIN BURIED IN THE QUICKSAND OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS. WE MUST INSTEAD PURSUE DIALOGUE, THE KIND OF DIALOGUE THAT THIS

141

NOV 13 '89 16:55 POL SEC CDN EMB

P.15

13

CONFERENCE IS WORKING TO PROMOTE, THE KIND OF DIALOGUE TO WHICH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV REFERRED WHEN HE SAID:

DIALOGUE BETWEEN PEOPLE "FROM DIFFERENT WORLDS," PEOPLE OF DIFFERENT WALKS OF LIFE AND WITH DIFFERENT VIEWS, IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT. IF THEY ARE UNITED BY A COMMON CONCERN FOR HUMANKIND'S FUTURE, THE DISPUTES AND NUMEROUS CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN THEM DO NOT PREVENT THEM FROM FINDING POINTS OF CONTACT AND COMING TO TERMS ON THE MAIN ISSUES. THIS IS A GOOD EXAMPLE FOR THE WHOLE WORLD.

15/47

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

RETURN TO
RENOYER AU

0103

FOR FILING

POUR - FILING
PORTAL AD JUSAR

ACC

REF

DATE

891114

FILE

20-USA-1-3-USSR

NOV 15 1989

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la loi sur l'accès à l'information

1007
A-7
VOL 25
MKRD

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR6916

TO EXTOTT RGB IFB DELIVER BY 150900

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER PCOOTT/DOYLE BNATO MOSCO BONN WSAW

TT NDHQOTT/DM/CDS/ADMPOL/ASSOC ADMPOL/DGPOL COOR/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA VSS DMC RBRRWDRWRIDD IDA IDR CPD CPP

---MALTA SUMMIT-DEFENCE DEPT VIEWS

SUMMARY:UNDERSEC OF DEFENCE FOR POLICY TOLD AMB TODAY THAT PENTAGON PREPARATIONS FOR MALTA SUMMIT DO NOT/NOT INCLUDE ANY MAJOR CHANGES IN US DEFENCE OR ARMS CONTROL POLICY.WOLFOWITZ SAID THAT EVENT IN EAST EUROPE,WHILE VERY POSITIVE,WERE SUFFICIENTLY UNCERTAIN THAT USA AND WEST NEEDED TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT CHANGING COURSE.CFE NEGOTIATIONS ARE ON RIGHT TRACK AND SHOWING PROMISE OF COMING THROUGH WITH RIGHT RESULT.NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS STILL CONFRON SERIOUS PROBLEMS,BUT HERE TOO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION CAN BE EXPECTED IF SOVIETS REALLY WANT AN AGREEMENT.

2.WOLFOWITZ TOLD BURNEY PENTAGON WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER GORBACHEV SURPRISE AT MALTA,BUT WAS COMFORTABLE WITH PRESIDENTS ABILITY TO HANDLE ANY.ONE SUGGESTION GAINING CURRENCY IS THAT GORBACHEV MIGHT PROPOSE MUTUAL MILITARY WITHDRAWALS FROM GERMANY,BUT WOLFOWITZ EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT THIS MIGHT CREATE MORE PROBLEMS FOR GORBACHEV THAN IT WOULD SOLVE.

IN FINAL ANALYSIS,SOVIETS WANT TO MAINTAIN THEIR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IS EAST EUROPE,AND WOULD PROBABLY PREFER THAT SOME US FORCES REMAIN IN FRG.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR6916 CONF

3.REPORT:IN COURSE OF WIDERANGING DISCUSSION THIS MORNING,
WOLFOWITZ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME PEOPLE WERE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH
NOTION OF AN UNSTRUCTURED US/SOVIET SUMMIT.BUT HE NOTED THAT
REYKJAVIK WAS NOT/NOT THE ONLY PRECEDENT.FIRST REAGAN/GORBACHEV MTG
IN GENEVA HAD ALSO BEEN WITHOUT FORMAL AGENDA AND HAD SERVED VERY
USEFUL PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING MTG OF MINDS WHICH LATER PAID
HANDSOME DIVIDENDS.GIVEN MUCH MORE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING
AT THAT TIME,WOLFOWITZ HAD NO/NO DOUBT AS TO VALUE OF BUSH SEEKING
TO ESTABLISH RAPPORT WITH INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS SO INFLUENTIAL ON
SOVIET POLICY.

4.WOLFOWITZ THOUGH GORBACHEVS STRATEGY AT MALTA WOULD BE TO TRY
TO INVOLVE USA IN SOLVING SOVIET PROBLEMS,BUT US RESPONSE WOULD
BE CAUTIOUS ONE.SOVIET MILTIARY RECORD TO DATE HAD BEEN MIXED.
THERE HAD BEEN LOTS OF POSITIVE ELEMENTS,BUT ALSO SOME VERY
DISTURBING ONES:TANK PRODUCTION RATES HAD REACHED RECORD LEVELS
THIS YEAR AND SOVIETS WERE PROVIDING VERY EXTENSIVE MILITARY
SUPPORT TO QUOTE STALINIST REGIMES UNQUOTE IN SEVERAL REGIONS OF
WORLD(HE MENTIONED CUBA,VIETNAM,AFGHANISTAN,NICARAGUA AND
SALVADOR GUERILLAS).AMERICANS WOULD MAKE THE POINT(AND WOLFOWITZ
ENCOURAGED CDA TO DO SO ALSO IN MOSCOW)THAT IT WAS HARD TO UNDERSTAND
HOW SOVIETS WHO WERE SO STRAPPED FOR FUNDS COULD JUSTIFY SPENDING
HUGE AMOUNTS PROPPING UP SYSTEMS WHICH THEY HAD ACKNOWLEDGED WERE
FAILURES IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY.IN RESPONSE TO BURNEY QUESTION,

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6916 CONF

WOLFOWITZ ACKNOWLEDGED INERTIA PROBABLY ACCOUNTED FOR SOME OF
QUOTE BUSINESS AS USUAL UNQUOTE OF SOVIET BEHAVIOUR IN THIRD WORLD,
AND HE THOUGHT SOVIETS NEEDED TO BE PRESSURED TO CHANGE(HE SAID
CHINESE HAD SUCCESSFULLY PRESSURED SOVIETS ON CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM).
5.WOLFOWITZ DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE THERE WERE ANY COMPELLING REASONS
FOR MAJOR ADJUSTMENTS IN ALLIANCE STRATEGY.WITH EVENTS SO DIFFICULT
TO PREDICT,COURSE OF PRUDENCE WAS TO PRESS ON WITH ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATIONS ALONG AGREED PATH.CFE NEGOTIATIONS WERE QUOTE ON THE
RIGHT TRACK UNQUOTE AND SHOEING PROMISE OF ACHIVING DESIRED RESULTS,
THOUGH WOLFOWITZ DID NOT/NOT RULE OUT SOME SLIPPAGE IN TIMETABLE.
GORBACHEV,HE THOUGHT,HAD A VESTED INTEREST IN SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME,
NOT/NOT LEAST BECAUSE THERE WERE SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL SAVINGS TO
BE HAD.WOLFOWITZ THOUGHT THERE WAS QUOTE EVEN UNQUOTE A PROSPECT
OF AN EARLY START AGEEMENT,BUT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER SOVIETS
WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT SLCMS AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE ISSUES
BE BROUGHT INTO NEGOTIATIONS.IF THEY WERE PREPARED TO LET THESE
DROP OUT,WOLFOWITZ BELIEVED REMAINING OUTSTANDING ISSUES(ALCM
COUNTING RULES AND MOBILE VERIFICATION)COULD BE RESOLVED.
WOLFOWITZ LEFT CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT MALTA SUMMIT WAS VIEWED BY
ADMIN AS POTENTIALLY USEFUL SPUR TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIAITONS,
BUT NOT AS OCCASION FOR CONCLUDING AGREEMENTS.
6.WITHIN ADMIN WOLFOWITZ SAID THERE WAS A LOT OF THINKING BEING
DONE ABOUT POSSIBLE GORBACHEV QUOTE SURPRISES UNQUOTE AT THE SUMMIT,
...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6916 CONF

AND THE POSSIBLE SURPRISE BEING ACCORDED GREATEST ATTENTION WAS A CALL FOR MUTUAL US AND SOVIET MILITARY WITHDRAWALS FROM GERMANY. WOLFOWITZ DID NOT/NOT DISMISS THE POSSIBILITY, BUT HE DOUBTED GORBACHEV WOULD REALLY SEE IT IN SOVIET INTEREST TO TAKE RED ARMY OUT OF GDR. SOVIETS COULD ACCEPT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN EAST EUROPE, BUT NOT/NOT CHANGES TO EXISTING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. SOVIETS DID NOT/NOT LIKE TALK OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION, BUT THAT WOULD BECOME MUCH EASIER ONCE SOVIET FORCES HAD GONE FROM GDR.

7. WOLFOWITZ SAID HE WAS A LITTLE CONCERNED ABOUT BRAVE TALK OF DISSOLUTION OF TWO ALLIANCES. NATO AND WARSAW PACT WERE NOT/NOT COMPARABLE. MOREOVER, NATO HAD PROVIDED IMPORTANT MEASURE OF POLITICAL STABILITY TO EUROPE, AND THAT WAS MORE NECESSARY TODAY THAN EVER. IN ADDITION, IT PROVIDED COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENT AND RATIONALE FOR SUCH ARRANGEMENT WOULD NOT/NOT DISAPPEAR WITH CONVENTIONAL REDUCUTIONS.

CCC/143 142308Z UNGR6916

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

URR m plus

8600

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WHSDC UNGR6922 16NOV89

TO EXTOTT URB DELIVER BY 170800

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE DELIVER BY 170800

PNATO MOSCO BONN WSAW LDN PARIS ROME GENEV VNACE TOKYO

TT NDHQOTT/MND/DM/ADMPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC URD RGB RBR IFB IDD CPD CPP DMT EFB

---US/SOVIET RELATIONS AND MALTA SUMMIT

SUMMARY:

THE ADMINISTRATION IS HAVING REAL DIFFICULTY RESPONDING TO THE
BREATHTAKING CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. THE
OFFICIAL LINE IS QUOTE PRUDENCE AND IMAGINATION UNQUOTE, BUT SO FAR
THE ADMINISTRATION HAS PREFERRED TO TALK RATHER THAN ACT. THE REASON
IS AN ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON WHAT TO DO.

2. OPINION IS DIVIDED AS TO THE FACTS AND THERE IS NO/NO CONSENSUS
ON WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS. THERE IS A RECOGNITION THAT WESTERN VALUES
ARE IN THE ASCENDENCE, BUT ASSESSMENTS OF GORBACHEV'S PROSPECTS (AND
HENCE OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE) RANGE FROM BLEAK TO
PESSIMISTIC. ADMIN IS NOT/NOT ONE WHICH IS COMFORTABLE STRIKING OUT
IN BOLD NEW DIRECTIONS, BUT ANY IMPULSES TO DO SO ARE CONSTRAINED BY
PUBLICS AMBIVALENCE. CONGRESSIONAL DEMOCRATS AND LIBERAL PAPERS ARE
ENCOURAGING ADMIN TO BE LESS CAUTIOUS, WHILE CONSERVATIVE OPINION
IS EITHER SILENT OR COUNSELLING PRUDENCE. THE CLOSEST ADMIN HAS COME TO
...2

RETURN TO	FOR FILING
RENOUVER AU	POUR - ETRE
ACC	REF DATE
891116	
20-USA-1-3-4882	
AF	

PAGE TWO UNGR6922 CONF

ENUNCIATING A POLICY ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS IS BAKERS QUOTE POINTS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE UNQUOTE SPEECH; BUT THAT SPEECH DID A BETTER JOB OF IDENTIFYING AREAS OF POSSIBLE COOPERATION THAN PROPOSING PRACTICAL MEANS OF COOPERATION.

3. FOR BUSH, OVERTURE WHICH MALTA SUMMIT REPRESENTS IS A HUMAN AND PERSONAL RESPONSE TO EVENTS. HE WANTS TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM GORBACHEV, AND GET MEASURE OF THE MAN. BUT IT IS NOT/NOT YET BEGINNING OF AN AMERICAN MASTERPLAN FOR CONTROLLING AND DIRECTING EVENTS. THERE ARE NO/NO KISSINGERS OR BRZEZINSKIS IN THIS ADMIN. PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, WILL BE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO DEMONSTRATE IN SOME TANGIBLE WAY THAT SUMMIT HAS MATERIALLY ADVANCED SITUATION AND THAT HE IS CAPABLE NOT/NOT JUST OF PRESIDING OVER VANISHING STATUS QUO BUT OF LEADING INTO NEW FORMS OF STABILITY. SO WE CAN EXPECT HIM TO BE MAKING SOME OFFERS TO SOVIETS IN RESPONSE TO INEVITABLE INITIATIVES WHICH GORBACHEV WILL BE LAUNCHING.

4. WHILE THERE IS TALK OF EVERYTHING FROM MUTUAL MILITARY WITHDRAWALS FROM EUROPE TO CONVENING OF SECOND CONGRESS OF VIENNA ADMIN IS, SO FAR AT LEAST, AT PAINS TO DE-EMPHASIZE SCOPE OF DISCUSSIONS, IS LOOKING FOR CUES FROM KEY ALLIANCE PLAYERS AND IS RAPIDLY TRYING TO GAIN CONTROL OF NEW AGENDA. IN THIS ATMOSPHERE PMS VISIT AND SOUNDINGS HE IS ABLE TO TAKE IN MOSCOW WILL BE OF CRITICAL VALUE TO BUSH AS HE PREPARES FOR HIS ENCOUNTER.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6922 CONF D

THE CHALLENGE:

5. HENRY KISSINGER BELIEVES THAT THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY IS NOW INEVITABLE, THAT THE SOVIETS WILL TRY TO PREVENT IT, AND THAT THEIR PRICE FOR ALLOWING IT WILL BE THAT EAST AND WEST GERMANY MUST LEAVE THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO RESPECTIVELY. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AGREES THAT THE CURRENT CRISIS HAS REOPENED THE GERMAN QUESTION AND THAT THE ENTIRE FUTURE OF CENTRAL EUROPE IS AT STAKE. WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS CONSTRUCTED AFTER 1945 QUOTE CLEARLY COMING TO AN END UNQUOTE, THE QUESTION FOR HIM IS WHETHER THE INEVITABLE CHANGES WILL BE PEACEFUL OR VIOLENT. GEORGE KENNAN THINKS THERE IS A SHORT-TERM PROBLEM OF PRESERVING STABILITY IN EUROPE, AND A VAST MANY-SIDED LONGER TERM PROBLEM OF QUOTE DESIGNING A NEW STATUS QUO FOR EUROPE UNQUOTE.

6. THESE ARE APOCALYPTIC PRONOUNCEMENTS, BUT THEY DO NOT/NOT COME FROM MINOR PROFESSORS OF GOVERNMENT AT MID-WESTERN UNIVERSITIES.

KISSINGER, BRZEZINSKI AND KENNAN ARE ARGUABLY AMONG THE WEST'S LEADING AUTHORITIES ON DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE.

AND THEIR MESSAGE IS THAT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION CONFRONTS A GREATER CHALLENGE THAN ANY SINCE ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL FASHIONED

THE POST-WAR WORLD. THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR WAR AND NONE FOR PEACE, IN THE WORDS OF TED SORFENSEN.

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6922 CONF

THE ADMINISTRATIONS RESPONSE:

7. SO FAR, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS REACTED WITH GREAT QUOTE PRUDENCE UNQUOTE, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT QUOTE IMAGINATION UNQUOTE WILL ALSO BE REQUIRED. ITS RESPONSE TO EVENTS IN EAST GERMANY AND BERLIN HAS BEEN VERY CAUTIOUS, WITH ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN CALIBRATING THEIR REMARKS CAREFULLY TO TRY TO KEEP THEM IN THE MAINSTREAM OF NATIONAL OPINION.

8. ON NOV 9, FOR INSTANCE THE PRESIDENT QUOTE WELCOMED UNQUOTE THE DECISION OF THE EAST GERMAN LEADERSHIP TO OPEN THE GDRS BORDERS. IT WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, HE SAID. HIS REACTION WAS SO LACONIC AND PRUDENT THAT, IN THE EYES OF MANY HE HAD FAILED TO REFLECT THE JUBILATION OF HIS OWN PUBLIC IN WITNESSING APPARENT TRIUMPH OF WESTERN VALUES. COLUMNIST MARY MCGRORY ASKED QUOTE WHY DID THE ELADER OF THE WESTERN WORLD LOOK AS THOUGH HE HAD LOST HIS LAST FRIEND THE DAY THEY BROUGHT HIM THE NEWS OF THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL? UNQUOTE.

9. THE NEXT DAY, BAKER BLITZED THE NETWORKS CONVEYING A MUCH MORE FORTHCOMING POSITION. HE WAS CONVINCED, HE SAID, THAT THE EAST GERMANS REALLY DID INTEND TO MAKE SERIOUS AND PERMANENT CHANGES. BY NOV 12, BAKER WAS DESCRIBING EVENTS AS QUOTE DRAMATIC AND SIGNIFICANT UNQUOTE, THE ADMINISTRATION WAS QUOTE VERY ENTHUSIASTIC UNQUOTE, AND ITS POLICY WAS TO QUOTE ENCOURAGE AND HELP UNQUOTE THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN THE REGION. ON NOV 14, THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF SAID HE WAS QUOTE DELIGHTED UNQUOTE WITH THE COURSE OF EVENTS.

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR6922 CONF

10. THE RHETORICAL TONE HAS CHANGED, BUT IT HAS NOT/NOT BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY ANY DISCERNIBLE SIGNS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS PREPARING TO ADJUST ITS POLICY IN ANY SUBSTANTIAL FASHION. THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS, AND PROBABLY SOME TRUTH TO ALL OF THEM.

11. THE FIRST IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT/NOT YET AGREED INTERNALLY ON A PICTURE OF EVENTS AND HOW THEY ARE LIKELY TO UNFOLD. INSTITUTIONAL BIASES AND INERTIA ARE STILL PRODUCING CONFLICTING ASSESSMENTS OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE SOVIET BLOC. A CLASSIC EXAMPLE WAS EVIDENT THIS WEEK WHEN IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE CIAS LATEST FIGURES ON SOVIET DEFENCE SPENDING INDICATED IT HAD DECLINED DESPITE DEPT OF DEFENCE ASSERTIONS IN RECENT DAYS THAT SPENDING HAD CONTINUED TO INCREASE IN EACH OF THE LAST FOUR YEARS.

12. THE CRITICAL QUESTION ON WHICH CONSENSUS IS LACKING IS WHETHER GORBACHEV WILL LONG SURVIVE POLITICALLY. IN RECENT WEEKS, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DISGUISE THE DISAGREEMENT WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN SCOWCROFT, GATES, CHENEY AND QUAYLE ON THE ONE HAND, AND BAKER AND WEBSTER ON OTHER HAND. WHILE THE FIRST GROUP BELIEVES HIS PROSPECTS ARE BLEAK, CITING THE COUNTRY'S ENORMOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND NATIONALITIES DISPUTES, THE SECOND GIVES HIM A FIGHTING CHANCE, ARGUING THAT PERESTROIKA MAY BE AILING BUT THAT THERE ARE NO/NO POLITICAL RIVALS IN THE WINGS READY TO ASSUME HIS MANTLE.

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR6922 CONF

13. UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE FACTS AND THE FUTURE IS COMPOUNDED BY THIS ADMINISTRATION'S DISINCLINATION TO ADOPT POLITICALLY RISKY COURSES OF ACTION. WHILE IT IS COMPRISED OF VERY ABLE INDIVIDUALS WHO WORK WELL TOGETHER, THEY ARE NEITHER IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED NOR/NOR DRIVEN BY ANY DESIRE TO REMAKE THE WORLD AND LEAVE THEIR MARK ON IT. RATHER THAN DEFINE STRATEGIES OR TAKE THE INITIATIVE, THEY WOULD PREFER TO MANAGE CRISES. THEY ARE MOST COMFORTABLE WITH PRUDENCE AND PRAGMATISM, THOUGH THEY ARE SENSITIVE ENOUGH TO THE PULSE OF THE NATION TO KNOW WHEN TO ADJUST THEIR POSITION.

14. THE PROBLEM IS THAT IT IS HARD TO DETERMINE WHAT QUOTE MAINSTREAM UNQUOTE PUBLIC OPINION NOW IS. THE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP IN CONGRESS HAS URGED THE PRESIDENT TO BE MORE PROACTIVE. SENATOR MITCHELL THIS WEEK RENEWED HIS ATTACK ON THE PRESIDENT'S QUOTE TIMIDITY UNQUOTE, URGED HIM TO GO TO BERLIN, AND SUGGESTED HE QUOTE NORMALIZE UNQUOTE TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. LIBERAL COLUMNISTS AND COMMENTATORS HAVE DECRIED THE PRESIDENT'S ABSENCE OF QUOTE VISION UNQUOTE. ON THE OTHER HAND, REPUBLICANS AND THE CONSERVATIVE MEDIA HAVE WARNED THAT THE QUOTE DESTALINIZATION UNQUOTE OF THE SOVIET UNION IS FAR FROM COMPLETE AND THAT THERE IS A RISK OF A SOVIET CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT. BUT THEY HAVE MADE LITTLE PUBLIC EFFORT TO MOVE THE ADMINISTRATION IN ONE DIRECTION OR ANOTHER.
...7

PAGE SEVEN UNGR6922 CONFD

15. TO THE EXTENT THERE IS A POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, IT IS BAKERS QUOTE POINTS OF MUTAL ADVANTAGE UNQUOTE SPEECH IN NEW YORK ON OCTOBER 16. THAT SPEECH WAS AN IMPORTANT ONE, BUT IT WAS DEVOTED LARGELY TO IDENTIFYING THE POLICY AREAS WHERE THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE ABLE TO COOPERATE. IT DID NOT/NOT ADVANCE COOPERATION ITSELF. THE MALTA SUMMIT:

16. GOING TO MALTA AND QUOTE PUTTING HIS FEET UP UNQUOTE WITH GORBACHEV IS A REFLECTION BUSH'S PREFERENCE FOR PERSONAL DIPLOMACY. HE SEEMS GENUINELY TO BELIEVE THAT BY TAKING PERSONAL STOCK OF THE SITUATION HE WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO CONDUCT POLICY THEREAFTER. THE PACE OF EVENTS, AND PROBABLY SOME MEASURE OF ALARM ABOUT THE FUTURE, DROVE HIM TO AN EARLIER MEETING THAN HE HAD PLANNED. AND HE UNDOUBTEDLY HAS SOME MESSAGES HE WANTS TO CONVEY DIRECTLY BEFORE EVENTS MOVE TOO FAR DOWN THE ROAD: THAT GORBACHEV CAN COUNT ON US SUPPORT FOR PERESTROIKA AND THAT THE US WILL NOT/NOT SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE, BUT THAT GORBACHEV MUST REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE AND LEAVE EASTERN EUROPE TO GO ITS OWN WAY.

17. BUT THERE IS NO/NO EVIDENCE (AT LEAST YET) THAT BUSH IS SURE WHERE HE WANTS TO GO AFTER MALTA, OTHER THAN TO CONDUCT BUSINESS AS USUAL ON ARMS CONTROL (NO/NO SMALL ACHIEVEMENT ADMITTEDLY), TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SOVIETS TO IMPROVE THEIR BEHAVIOUR IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND TO WAIT UNTIL SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORMS HAVE BEEN INSTITUTED

...8

PAGE EIGHT UNGR6922 CONF D

WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE US TO BRING USSR INTO WESTERN TRADE AND PAYMENTS SYSTEM. WHILE STAFF WORK IS BEING DONE ON WHAT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GDR AND ELSEWHERE COULD MEAN FOR LONGER TERM, THERE SEEMS LITTLE INCLINATION AT SENIOR LEVELS OF ADMIN TO ENGAGE IN ANY FUNDAMENTAL RETHINKING OF EXISTING SECURITY STRUCTURES OR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS. THERE ARE NO/NO KISSINGERS OR BRZEZINSKIS WITHIN ADMIN THINKING ABOUT THE QUOTE NEW STATUS QUO UNQUOTE CITED BY KENNAN. 18. IT IS CONCEIVABLE, INDEED LIKELY, THAT GORBACHEV WILL TRY TO ENGAGE PRESIDENT ON YALTA-LIKE THEMES, AND THAT IN TURN MAY STIMULATE USA THINKING ALONG THESE LINES. BUT FOR NOW, THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO IS THAT GORBACHEV WILL WANT TO FOCUS BUSH'S ATTENTION ON MORE IMMEDIATE ISSUES, PARTICULARLY ONES WHICH COULD BEAR ON GORBACHEV'S OWN POLITICAL FUTURE. IN RESPONSE, WE WOULD NOT/NOT BE SURPRISED IF PRESIDENT SHOWS SOME FLEXIBILITY ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC ISSUES, AND PERHAPS ON ARMS CONTROL AS WELL.

19. ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC FRONT, ANNOUNCEMENT THIS WEEK OF SOVIET PROGRAM TO SHIFT COUNTRY TO MORE MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY INCLUDING QUOTE CONTROLLED REFORM UNQUOTE OF PRICES, AND FIRST READING IN SUPREME SOVIET OF NEW EMIGRATION LAW, COULD SERVE AS SIGNAL FOR ADMIN TO WAIVE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT (FORMER CONGRESSMAN VANIK HAS HIMSELF SUGGESTED THIS) AND GRANT USSR MFN STATUS. IT COULD ALSO STIMULATE ADMIN INTO CONSIDERING OBSERVER STATUS FOR SOVIETS AT GATT AND OTHER WESTERN INSTITUTIONS (AS MITCHELL HAS RECOMMENDED). ON ARMS CONTROL

...9

PAGE NINE UNGR6922 CONFD

FRONT, THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE SCOPE FOR ADVANCING NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL, STRATEGIC AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS REDUCTIONS.

CONCLUSION:

20. IN POLITICS A WEEK CAN BE A LIFETIME, AND IN WSHDC TIME MOVES VERY QUICKLY. PRESIDENT, AS ALWAYS, WILL BE EXPECTED TO HIT A HOME RUN ON SHORES OF MALTA. PROBLEM FOR GEORGE BUSH IS THAT THEY KEEP MOVING THE FENCES. WHILE IT IS TOO SOON TO PREDICT WHAT WILL TRANSPIRE, IT IS EVIDENT THERE IS LITTLE CONCERN HERE OR IN THE ALLIANCE ABOUT A SECOND REYKJAVIK. WHAT IS LESS CERTAIN IS WHETHER BUSH WILL HAVE SOMETHING DRAMATIC TO PROPOSE. AT THE MOMENT THIS SEEMS UNLIKELY, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY DONE IT ONCE THIS YEAR. IF IT HAPPENS, WE WON'T LIKELY KNOW UNTIL THE EVE OF THE MEETING.

21. IN THIS ATMOSPHERE, KEY QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO AMERICANS DURING PMS VISIT WOULD BE:

- AGORACHEVS DOMESTIC PRIORITIES
- PROSPECTS FOR FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC REFORM (ESPECIALLY ASSESSMENTS OF HOW OUR OWN BUSINESSMEN VIEW PROSPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS UNDER PERESTROIKA.)
- GORBACHEVS VIEWS ON EVENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, PARTICULARLY IN THE GDR, AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE TWO ALLIANCES.
- SOVIET ATTITUDES ON REGIONAL CONFLICTS; AND
- GORBACHEVS EXPECTATIONS FOR HIS MTG WITH BUSH.

BURNEY

CCC/143 162308Z UNGR6922

05 DIC. '89 15:43 CDN EMBASSY ROME, 39-6-8848752

External Affairs Canada
Affaires extérieures Canada

P.1/13

UNCLASSIFIED

Rom 1/5

Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

UNCLASSIFIED

FAX PAGE 1 OF 13

FM ROME WTGR 0888 05DEC89

TO EXTOTT/URR RBR

---JOINT STATEMENT AND PRESS CONFERENCE BY PRES BUSH AND
CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV

DEC 8 1989

(COMCENTRE PLS FAX ATTACHED).

ACC	DATE
	891205
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USA R	voir 25
LOC	
16-	90

UNCLASSIFIED

D. GREGOIRE DE BLOIS/fm

EXT 516-2

For Immediate Release

December 3, 1989

JOINT STATEMENT AND PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
PRESIDENT BUSH AND CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV

Aboard the Maxim Gorky
Marsaxlokk Harbor, Malta

UNCLASSIFIED

1:20 P.M. (L)

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, President Gorbachev has graciously suggested I go first. And I don't think anyone can say that the salt water get-together was anything other than adventure -- at least out in the harbor here.

First, I want to thank Prime Minister Adami and the people of Malta and others for their warm and gracious hospitality. I want to thank the Captain and crew of Belknap for the great support that they have given us. I think they were wondering if I was about to become a permanent guest. And a special thanks to the Captain and crew of Gorky for their hospitality and also thanks to the Captain and crew of Slava, who have been so hospitable to many on the American side.

I first approached Chairman Gorbachev about an informal meeting of this kind after my trip to Europe last July. Amazing changes that I witnessed in Poland and in Hungary -- hopeful changes -- led me to believe that it was time to sit down with Chairman Gorbachev face-to-face to see what he and I could do to seize the opportunities before us to move this relationship forward.

We agreed with that concept of a meeting. And so we got rapid agreement, and I think that the extraordinary developments in Europe since the time that the meeting was proposed only reinforce the importance of our getting together.

And so I'm especially glad we had this meeting. And we did gain a deeper understanding of each other's views. We set the stage for progress across a broad range of issues. And while it is not for the United States and the Soviet Union to design the future for Europe -- for our mutual people, I am convinced that a cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship can indeed make the future safer and brighter.

And there is virtually no problem in the world -- and certainly no problem in Europe -- that improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship will not help to ameliorate. A better U.S.-Soviet relationship is to be valued in and of itself, but it also should be an instrument of positive change for the world.

For 40 years, the Western Alliance has stood together in the cause of freedom. And now, with reform underway in the Soviet Union, we stand at the threshold of a brand new era of U.S.-Soviet relations. And it is within our grasp to contribute, each in our own way, to overcoming the division of Europe and ending the military confrontation there. We've got to do more to ameliorate the violence and suffering that afflicts so many regions in the world and to remove common threats to our future -- the deterioration of the environment, the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons, ballistic missile technology, the narcotics trade -- and our discussions here will give greater impetus to make real progress in these areas.

MORE

UNCLASSIFIED

26 DEC. '89 11:43 CDN EMBASSY ROME 39-6-8848752

PAGE 3 OF 13

UNCLASSIFIED

There's also a great potential to develop common opportunities. For example, the Soviet Union now seeks greater engagement with the international market economy, a step that certainly I'm prepared to encourage in every way I can.

As I leave Malta for Brussels and a meeting with our NATO allies, I am optimistic that as the West works patiently together and increasingly cooperates with the Soviet Union, we can realize a lasting peace and transform the East-West relationship to one of enduring cooperation. And that is a future that's worthy of our peoples and that's the future that I want to help in creating, and that's the future that Chairman Gorbachev and I began right here in Malta.

Thank you, sir, for your hospitality.

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: Ladies and gentlemen, comrades, there are many symbolic things about this meeting and one of them -- it has never been in the history that the leaders of our two countries hold a joint press conference. This is also an important symbol. I share the view voiced by President Bush that we are satisfied, in general, with the results of the meeting.

We regard this informal meeting -- the idea of it was an informal meeting and the idea belongs to President Bush, and I supported it -- that we would have this informal meeting without restricting it to any formal agenda, to have a free exchange of views, because the time makes great demands to our countries and this increases the responsibility and the role of our two countries. And I can assure you that in all our discussions -- and our discussions lasted for eight hours, in general -- this responsibility on both sides was present.

Our meeting was characterized by openness by a full scope of the exchange of views. Today it is even difficult and perhaps there is no sense to explain the entire range of issues that we have discussed. I wish to say right away, nevertheless, that on all the major issues we attempted in a frank manner using each side's arguments to explain our own positions, both with regard to the assessment of the situation and the current changes in the world and Europe and as it regards disarmament issues.

We addressed the Geneva negotiating process, the Vienna process and also negotiations on the elaboration of the convention on chemical weapons ban. All those questions were considered thoroughly.

The President and I, myself, also felt it necessary to exchange views on our perception, both from Moscow and Washington, of the hot points on our planet. And this exchange of views was very significant and thorough. We reaffirmed our former positions that all those issues -- acute issues -- must be resolved by political methods. And I consider that this was a very important statement of fact.

We not only discussed problems and explained our positions. I think that both sides had many elements which, if they are taken into account in our future activities -- activities of both governments -- then we can count on progress. This concerns the subject of the reduction of strategic offensive arms by 50 percent, and we have an optimistic assessment of the possibility to move even next year to the conclusion of the Vienna treaty. We both are in favor, and this is our position -- naturally, we can be responsible only for our position -- we are in favor of signing this document at the summit meeting.

This time we discussed much bilateral relations, and I, on my part, would like to note many positive elements and points which were contained in statements and words by President Bush. Thus, I would say that in all directions of the political dialogue of

UNCLASSIFIED

06 DEC. '89 11:44 CDN EMBASSY ROME 39-6-8848752

PAGE 4 OF 13

P.4/14

our discussion, including bilateral relations, we not only confirmed the consistency of our political course, the continuity of our political course -- and I should say it -- although we had an informal meeting, we met only for the first time with President Bush in his capacity, and the confirmation of the continuity of the course is an important element.

What is also important is that during this informal meeting, we have laid the foundation for increasing this capital. And I believe that, in the first place, it serves the interests of our both countries and also the interests of the entire world community.

Well, we have made our contact, a good contact. The atmosphere was friendly, straightforward, open, and this enabled us to make good work. In our position, the most dangerous thing is to exaggerate. And it is always that we should preserve elements of cautiousness, and I use the favorite word by President Bush. (Laughter.)

Our world and our relations are at a crucial juncture. We should be highly responsible to face up to the challenges of today's world. And the leaders of our two countries cannot act as a fire brigade, although fire brigades are very useful. We have to keep it in mind also. This element was also present.

I would like once again to thank the President for the idea of holding this meeting with which we are satisfied, I hope. And I would like to thank the people and the government of Malta and to express the words of appreciation and gratitude for the hospitality. Thank you, Mr. President, for your cooperation. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

Q Chairman Gorbachev, President Bush called on you to end the Cold War once and for all. Do you think that has been done now?

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: In the first place, I assured the President of the United States that the Soviet Union would never start hot war against the United States of America. And we would like our relations to develop in such a way that they would open greater possibilities for cooperation. Naturally, the President and I had a wide discussion -- rather, we sought the answer to the question where we stand now. We stated, both of us, that the world leaves one epoch of cold war and enters another epoch. This is just the beginning. We're just at the very beginning of our road -- long road to a long-lasting peaceful period.

Thus we were unanimous in concluding about the special responsibility of such countries as the United States and the Soviet Union. Naturally, we had a rather long discussion, but this is not for the press conference -- that is, we shouldn't explain that discussion regarding the fact that the new era calls for a new approach. And thus many things that were characteristic of the Cold War should be abandoned, both the -- (inaudible) in force, the arms race, mistrust, psychological and ideological struggle and all that. All that should be things of the past.

Q President Gorbachev -- what are the hot spots, President Gorbachev, that you spoke about? There's El Salvador. Were you able to assure President Bush that the Soviet Union would use its influence on either Cuba or Nicaragua to stop the arms shipments? And President Bush, were you satisfied with President Gorbachev's response?

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: This question is addressed to me? This subject has been thoroughly discussed. We have reaffirmed once again to the President that we have ceased arms shipment to Central

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

26 DEC. '89 11:46 CDN EMBASSY ROME 39-6-2848752 PAGE 6 OF 13

UNCLASSIFIED
methods which would be adequate to our contemporary life.

Well, as to the future course of this process, this will depend on the Soviet actions, whether legal or economic. You understand that today we tried to turn drastically our economy towards cooperation with other countries so that it will be part and parcel of the world economic system. Therefore, we think and hope that that which has happened during the meeting on this subject of the agenda -- well, let's call it the agenda -- these are of principal importance.

Q With the tense situation in Lebanon -- how did you discuss the military option in Lebanon? And what have you decided on the Middle East in general? How did you discuss it? The question is both President Bush and President Gorbachev.

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: We couldn't address this Lebanese conflict because both the U.S. and the Soviet people are sympathetic with the grave situation and sufferings of that people. We explained our views -- we shared our views and assessments in this respect and agreed to continue the exchange of views so that each, according to its possibilities -- and I think that everyone has its own possibilities -- well, President Bush thought that we had more possibilities and I thought that we had equal possibilities, in order to resolve positively this conflict.

PRESIDENT BUSH: -- and our aspirations shared in by President Gorbachev is to see a peaceful resolution to the question regarding Lebanon. We support the tripartite agreement. He has supported it very actively. We do not want to see any more killing in Lebanon. The Chairman agrees with us. We're in total agreement on that. And so Lebanon was discussed in detail and we would like to see a return to a peaceful, democratic Lebanon. And everybody in the United States, I think, share the agony that I feel about the turmoil in Lebanon. But we're going to try to help. We're trying any way we can to help.

Q My question is to President Bush. You, as President of the United States, participate for the first time at the summit meeting, but you were the Vice President of the previous administration that took part in forming foreign policies. So what is your assessment of the course that our two countries have passed since Geneva to Malta?

PRESIDENT BUSH: That's what we call a slow ball in the trade. (Laughter.) It's an easy question because I really think they are improving dramatically. There is enormous support in our country for what Chairman Gorbachev is doing inside the Soviet Union. There is enormous respect and support for the way he has advocated peaceful change in Europe. And so this meeting accomplished everything that I had hoped it would. It was a no-agenda meeting and yet it was a meeting where we discussed, as the Chairman said, many, many subjects. So I think, if a meeting can improve relations, I think this one has.

Q Did you reach any actual understandings on instructions or timetables or deadlines to negotiators on chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, conventional arms?

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: Well, we devoted much time to the discussion of concrete issues related to disarmament negotiations on different types of arms. And just as an example, to show you that this was a substantive discussion, I'll tell you that in the near future, our foreign ministers will meet, which have been instructed to do some specific work to move the positions closer.

In connection with new interesting proposals by President Bush regarding chemical weapons, which have the goal of a global ban and provides for certain phases and movement towards this global ban, then we have the possibility of a rapid movement towards it.

MORE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

As to strategic offensive arms, the analysis of the situation and the instructions that have been given regarding the preparation of that treaty demonstrate that we may be able by the second half of June -- and we agreed on the formal meeting at that time -- to do the necessary work to agree on the basic provisions of this treaty, which there later in the coming months would be ready for signature.

Therefore, I highly assess and evaluate what we have done here. Well, of course, there are questions which would require detailed discussion, so that there will be no concerns on both sides. As to our concerns, they are -- as regards to strategic offensive arms and the preparation of the treaty on the 50 percent cuts of such weapons, they concern SLCMs. Well, and in general, we raised a question with the President that when we have events along different directions on the reduction of nuclear arms and conventional forces, when we move towards defensive doctrines -- that is, we, the Soviet Union -- we are interested in having new elements in the military doctrines of the NATO countries. And therefore the time has come when we should begin discussing naval forces. We should discuss this problem also.

Thus, I would also like to confirm -- and I think that the President would confirm it -- that our discussions were very thorough, which encourages, and therefore we can count on success. This was a salute.

Q Can I ask you a question? Mr. President, will you tell us President Gorbachev, will you tell us why you were so cautious at the beginning of the negotiations? The Soviet side was very optimistic and now you voice certain optimistic elements. What is the reason for it? Maybe that optimism was not justified.

This is Portuguese television to President Gorbachev.

THE PRESIDENT: This is for you. Go ahead.

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: Well, I would say that there were elements of optimism and pessimism here and I wouldn't dwell into the details.

Q Could you just --

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: Well, the core of the question is that -- if I read you correctly -- is that to what degree we can speak of optimism or pessimism regarding the results of this meeting. Or perhaps I didn't understand you correctly. Did I get you right? Yes. Well, you know, on the eve of the meeting, both sides were restrained and had a well-balanced position, a cautious one. I would say it again. This did not mean, however, that we were pessimists. That meant that we were highly responsible. Today, now that the meeting has taken place and we have summed up the results together with the President, I can tell you that I am optimistic about the results and the prospects that are open now. This is dialectics.

Q President Bush, may I refer to the question of naval forces, please, that President Gorbachev raised just a moment ago? Can you respond to your feeling and exactly what you've told President Gorbachev about your disposition toward reducing naval forces, NATO's disposition on that regard. And if in fact the Soviets are prepared to move to a defensive posture, is not it time to consider some cuts in this regard?

THE PRESIDENT: The answer is that this is not an arms control meeting in the sense of trying to hammer out details. We still have differences with the Soviet Union -- he knows it and I know it -- as it relates to naval forces. But the point, is we could discuss these things in a very constructive environment and I certainly -- the Chairman knows that I could not come here and make

MORE

UNCLASSIFIED

06 DEC. '89 11:48 CDN EMBASSY ROME 39-6-3848752

PAGE 8 OF 13

P.7/14

deals in arms control, and I'm disinclined to think that that is an area where we will have immediate progress.

But we talked about a wide array of these issues, but we have no agreement at all on that particular question of naval arms control. But the point is, he knows that and I know that. The point is, he had an opportunity to let me know how important it is. And I can, as a part of an alliance, have an opportunity to discuss a wide array of armament questions -- disarmament questions with our allies. So it's exactly the kind of climate for a meeting that I had envisioned and that he had envisioned. We can sit there and talk about issues of which we've had divisions over the years, try to find ways to narrow them. And we did narrow them in some important areas. And there are still some differences that exist. There's no point covering that over.

Q Did you discuss the Soviet proposal on Helsinki III? And an adjoining question, are you prepared to take a joint initiative with Soviet Union about the Middle East crisis?

CHAIRMAN GORDACHEV: The first question is regarding Helsinki II. I think that we have found during this meeting, we have come to a common understanding of the extreme importance of the CSCE process and have noted the positive results of the CSCE process -- the results that have made it possible to proceed with deep changes in Europe and in the world as well, as Europe has a great influence on the world due to certain reasons.

Both the President and myself are in favor of developing the CSCE process in accordance with the new requirements that are required by our times so that we would think of and build a new Europe on the basis of common elements among the European countries.

We reaffirmed that this is a common affair for all the European countries that signed the Helsinki Act, including the whole EC. And it was -- this element was present everywhere whenever we discussed Europe and other parts of the world with the active and constructive participation of the United States and Canada.

Thus, we are in favor of the process gaining in strength and in force.

The transformation of the CSCE-Helsinki institutions at this stage should be such that their nature would change, or rather would be adequate to the current changes. Take, for example, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They should not remain military alliances, but rather military-political alliances and later on, just political alliances. So that their nature would change in accordance with the changes on the continent.

We are also entitled to expect that the relations -- that when the Common Market and the CMSC would also change in respect of greater openness, with the active participation in economic processes of the United States. Thus, we think that the time has come for us to act step by step, in a thorough manner, in accordance with the requirements of the times, taking full responsibility without damaging the balance and security. We should act in a way that we would improve the situation, stability, and security. We will strengthen security in this way.

This was the manner of our discussion. And I believe that the President can only nod and say that we have coincidence of views on this. (Laughter.)

Q President Gorbachev, did you assure President Bush that you will not --

U Mr. Gorbachev -- a question to Chairman Gorbachev.

Q The meeting took place at the center of the

WORK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Mediterranean. How did you discuss the problem of the reduction of the military presence of the size in the Mediterranean?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Is this to me? Well, first on the reduction, we did not have specific figures in mind. The Chairman raised the questions of naval arms control, and I was not particularly positive in responding on naval arms control. But we agree that we want to move forward and bring to completion the CFE that does affect Italy and other countries in a sense of -- they're part of -- a strong part of our NATO Alliance. So we didn't get agreements, crossing the t's, dotting the i's on some of these issues, but that's not what we were trying to do.

May I respond to this gentleman's last half. The question was Soviet and U.S. --

Q Joint initiative.

PRESIDENT BUSH: It doesn't require joint initiatives to solve the Middle East question. But we have found that the Soviet Union is playing a constructive role in Lebanon and trying throughout the Middle East to give their support for the tripartite agreement, which clearly the U.S. has supported. And so there's common ground there. That may not always have been the case in history. And that may not always have been the way the United States looked at it as to whether -- how constructive the role the Soviets might play.

But I can tell you that after these discussions and after the discussions between Jim Baker and Shevardnadze, there is a constructive role that the Soviets are implementing. And again, I cite the tripartite agreement. I'm sure that they share our view after these talks, in terms of peaceful resolution to these questions in the Middle East, be it Lebanon or on the -- in West Bank questions. So I don't think we're very far apart on this.

Q President Gorbachev, did you assure President Bush that the Soviet Union will --

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: Well, my opinion on the Middle East in terms of discussions at the meeting, I can only add to what President Bush has said, that we have just discussed very thoroughly, rather thoroughly, this subject. And I believe that we have come to an understanding that we should use our possibilities and interact in order to promote solution to this protracted conflict, which affects negatively the entire world situation.

As it seemed to me, we also agreed that, as a result of the side's progress, we have approached the point when we have a realistic chance to start the settlement process. Therefore, it is important not to lose this chance because the situation is changing very rapidly. Therefore, we think we will contribute to this.

Q I'm from the group of Czechoslovak journalists. President Gorbachev, did you assure President Bush that the changes in Eastern Europe are irreversible and that the Soviet Union has forsaken the right to intervene there militarily? And President Bush, similarly, as a result of this meeting, are you now more trusting that the Soviets have indeed renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine?

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: I wouldn't like you to consider me here or to regard me as a full-fledged representative of all European countries. This wouldn't be true. We are a part of Eastern Europe, of Europe. We interact with our allies in all areas and our ties are deep. However, every nation is an independent entity in world politics and every people has the right to choose its own destiny, the destiny of its own state. And I can only explain my own attitude.

I believe that those changes, both in the Soviet Union

MORE

UNCLASSIFIED

06 DEC. '89 11:50 CDN EMBASSY ROME 39-6-8848752

PAGE 10 OF 13

P.9/14

and in the countries of Eastern Europe, have been prepared by the course of the historic evolution itself. No one can avoid this evolutionary process, and those problems should be resolved on a new basis, taking into account the experience and the potential of those countries, opening up possibilities for utilizing anything positive that has been accumulated by mankind. And I believe that we should welcome the thrust of those processes because they are related to the desire of the people to make those societies more democratic, more humane and to face the world. Therefore, I'm encouraged by the thrust of those processes and I believe that this is highly assisted by other countries.

I also see deep, profound changes in other countries including Western European countries, and this is also very important because this is a reciprocal movement so that the people will become more close around the continent; and preserving at the same time the identity of one's own people. This is very important for us to understand.

Q I ask a question on the part of the Czechoslovak journalists. We are discussing the future of Europe --

PRESIDENT BUSH: May I just respond briefly? There is no question that there is dramatic change. Nobody can question it. And as President Gorbachev talks about democratic change and peaceful, that certainly lays to rest previous doctrines that may have had a different approach. And so we are -- he knows that not just the President, but all the people in the United States would like to see this peaceful democratic evolution continue. And so I think that's the best way to answer the question because the change is so dramatic and so obvious to people.

But I will say, we had a very good chance to discuss it in considerably more detail than I think would be appropriate to discuss it here.

Q President Bush, you have accused the Soviet Union for sending arms to El Salvador -- to Central America -- and President Gorbachev, you have denied those charges. Now both of you sit here together. Who is right? (Laughter.)

PRESIDENT BUSH: Maybe I ought to take the first shot at that one. I don't think we accused the Soviet Union of that. What we did say is arms were going in there in an unsatisfactory way. My view is that not only did the Nicaraguans acquiesce in it, but they encouraged that to happen. And the evidence is demonstrable. But I'm not challenging whether -- the word of the Foreign Minister. He and Jim Baker talked about that, and President Gorbachev and I talked about it.

All I know is that -- and he said it earlier -- elections, free elections should be the mode. And I also reported to him what Mr. Oscar Arias called me about, blaming Castro and the Sandinistas for exporting revolution and for tearing things up there in Central America.

So we may have a difference on that one, but I want to be careful when you say I accused them of sending these weapons. I did not, because Mr. Shevardnadze made a direct representation to Mr. Baker. And everyone knows that there's a wide international arms flow out there. But whatever it is, however it comes, it is unsatisfactory for countries in the region that want to see the evolution toward democracy continue.

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: The President explained correctly the discussion on the subject. We were never accused, and we didn't have to accept or reject anything. We informed the President that we had firm assurances from Nicaragua that no arms including those aircraft are being used. And the President took our arguments and agreed to them. As regard the fact of principle -- I have mentioned

MORE

UNCLASSIFIED

26 DEC. '89 11:51, CDN EMBASSY ROME 39-6-8848752

PAGE 11 OF 13

it -- is that we are for free elections so that this conflict would be resolved by political means and the situation was kept normal.

PRESIDENT BUSH: well, that's what we agreed on. I agree that that's the assessment. I still feel that arms are going into El Salvador. We've seen clear evidence of it. But I can't argue with the factual presentation made here.

But we have a difference. I don't believe that the Sandinistas have told the truth to our Soviet friends. And why? Because we know for fact certain that arms have gone in there. I'm not saying they're Soviet arms. They've said they aren't shipping arms and I'm accepting that. But they're going in there. And I am saying that they have misled Mr. Shevardnadze when they gave a specific representation that no arms were going from Nicaragua into El Salvador. So we have some differences in how we look at this key question. And the best way to have those differences ameliorated is to have these certifiably free elections in Nicaragua. And Castro -- I have no influence with him whatsoever and maybe somebody is yelling that question at President Gorbachev. But look, we've got some differences in different places around the world.

Q -- what about Cuba?

Q Question to both Presidents.

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: What do you mean?

Q Oscar Arias apparently called President Bush and told him that Cuba was really creating the situation in the region by commenting --

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: We discussed the situation in Latin America and Central America, and explained our assessments. On the basis of our analysis, on our own analysis, and our assessment, I told the President that there were conditions emerging for improving the situation for the better, as different countries had the desire to change the situation and normalize the situation, both in the United States and in other countries.

Q Will you give, Mr. President, an answer?

THE PRESIDENT: I'd be glad to. Somebody better tell me what the question was then if I'm going to answer. The question of Germany?

Q Whether the German question was discussed and your attitude toward the Kohl plan.

THE PRESIDENT: The United States as part of NATO has had a long-standing position. Helsinki spells out a concept of permanent borders. I made clear to President Gorbachev that we for our part do not want to do anything that is unrealistic and causes any country to end up going backwards or end up having its own people in military conflict -- one with the other. And so I think we have tried to act with the word that President Gorbachev has used to -- and that is with caution -- not to go demonstrating on top of the Berlin Wall to show how happy we are about the change. We are happy about the change.

And the German question is -- I've heard many leaders speak about the German question. And I don't think it is a role of the United States to dictate the rapidity of change in any country. It's a matter for the people to determine themselves. So that's our position. And the last word goes to the Chairman on this.

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: Yes, and the President wrote a note to me in English. I don't read English, but I answered in Russian -- he doesn't read Russian. But we agreed on it anyway. (Laughter.)

MOB

UNCLASSIFIED

06 DEC. '89 11:52 CDN EMBASSY ROME 39-2-8848752

PAGE 12 OF 13

P.11/14

UNCLASSIFIED

I'll be brief. In the past few days I already answered a few times on the question. I can only confirm what I said before, but as we have discussed with the President this question, I can say that we approach this subject on the basis of the Helsinki process, which summed up the results of the Second World War and consolidated the results of the war. And those are realities. And the reality is such that we have today's Europe with two German states -- the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic -- which are both members of the United Nations and sovereign states.

This was the decision of history. And I always revert to this subject or thesis which saves me. Indeed, in order to remain realists, we should say that history itself decides the processes and fates on the European continent and also the fates of those two states. I think this is a common understanding shared by anyone. And any artificial acceleration of the process would only exacerbate and make it more difficult to change in many European countries those changes that are now taking place now in Europe.

Thus, we wouldn't serve that process by an artificial acceleration or prompting of the processes that are going on in those two countries.

I think we can thank the media for their cooperation. We are not yet aware of what they will write about us.

THE PRESIDENT: -- right to thank them afterward you mean? (Laughter.) After they've written?

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: We should thank them in advance and, therefore, they will do better in the future.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for your cooperation.

THE PRESIDENT: We're going to have to leave at 1:20 p.m. Should we each take one more question or not?

Last one to me, right here. No rebuttal. No back-up questions. Last one.

Q What's your personal relationship now between you two leaders? And would regular contacts that would perhaps no longer be called summits be helpful?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I had known President Gorbachev before, and I'd let him speak for himself, but I think we have a good personal relationship and I believe that helps each side be frank -- point out the differences, as well as the areas we agree on. And that is a very, very important ingredient, I think, because of the standing of the two powers and because of the dramatic change that is taking place.

And I am not saying that if he likes me, he is going to change long-held policies. And I am going to say that if I like him, we're not going to change long-held policies. But what we've been able to do here is to get together and talk about the differences without rankor and frankly as possible. And I think it's been very constructive. So I couldn't have asked for a better result out of this non-summit summit. (Laughter.)

The question is regular meetings. I'm open for -- to see him as much as it requires to keep things moving forward. We've already set a summit meeting. That summit meeting will drive the arms control agenda. And that's a good thing, because I represented to him that we wanted to see a START agreement, a CFE agreement, and hopefully, a chemical agreement. That's a very ambitious agenda. But I think if we hadn't sat here and talked, we might not have understood how each other feels on these important questions.

UNCL

UNCLASSIFIED

05 DEC '89 11:53 CDN EMBASSY ROME 39-6-8848752

PAGE 13 OF 13

- 13 -

UNCLASSIFIED

CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV: I would like to confirm what President Bush has said -- that we have known each other for a long time. But I would also add -- and I have not agreed on it with the President in advance, but this is no secret that we have had considerable exchanges of views in previous contacts and we had an understanding of the positions of each other. And we would only mention the Governors Island or our discussion in the car and then we would understand what we are talking about.

Then we exchanged letters and today's meeting boosts our contacts to a higher level. I'm satisfied with the discussions and meetings we had, including our two private discussions. I share the view of the President that personal contacts are a very important element in the relations between leaders of state, the more so we are talking about the leaders of such countries as the United States and the Soviet Union. And I welcome those personal relations.

And the President was quite correct in saying that this didn't mean that we would sacrifice our long-held positions at the expense of our personal ties or that we forget our responsibility. I think our personal contacts help us implement our responsibilities and help us better interact in the interests of our two nations and in the interests of the entire world community. And I, myself, would like to thank the President for cooperation for this meeting, for the cooperation in a very important joint Soviet-U.S. endeavor. And our share is 50-50.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I guess we're going to fly away to Brussels. (Applause.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

2:32 P.M. (L)

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTIO
SUITE A BONNER

DA/KP O/R

DA/KP
Pls keep track of

reports from
Consulates
(let me know who is local pt)

UNCLASSIFIED

FM SEATL UAGR1185 08DEC89

DEC 12 1989

TO EXTOTT URR

INFO WSHDC ATNTA BSTN BFLO CHCGO CLVND DTROT DALAS INGLS MINN CONGNY
SFRAN

DIST URB URD RBD RBR

REF YOUR TEL URR 2491 6 DEC

---REGIONAL U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR AND
EASTERN EUROPE

GENERAL REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN USSR AND EASTERN EURO
EUROPE OVERWHELMINGLY POSITIVE.

STORIES FEATURED IN BOTH PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA

BEYOND WIRESERVICE AND NATIONAL FEED MATERIAL. LOCAL REPORTING/NEWS
BROADCASTS BESIDES TAKING NATIONAL MATERIAL HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN
GIVING IT LOCAL FLAVOUR WITH COMMENTS/VIEWS OF EX-INHABITANTS OF
AREA, KNOWLEDGEABLE AMERICANS LIVING IN PACIFIC
NORTHWEST AND OF FAMILY REUNIONS. ADDITIONALLY, SOME LOCAL OUTLETS
HAVE SENT THEIR OWN REPORTERS TO COVER EVENTS.

2. REGIONAL POLITICAL FIGURES REACTIONS THAT HAVE COME TO OUR
ATTENTION RUN FROM VERY POSITIVE TO ECSTATIC. GOVERNOR GARDNER OF
WASHINGTON FALLS INTO THIS LATTER CATEGORY. INDEED FOR OVER YEAR
PUGET SOUND AREA AND CITY OF SEATTLE IN PARTICULAR HAVE BEEN
CONDUCTING A PUBLIC LOVE AFFAIR WITH USSR. THIS HAS BEEN TRIGGERED

../2

ACC
FILE
DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-URR (vol 25/mind)
LOC
A6

PAGE TWO UAGR1185 UNCLAS

RY, BUT NOT/NOT LIMITED TO, 1990 GOODWILL GAMES WHICH WILL BE HELD IN WASHINGTON IN SEVERAL VENUES. FOCUS OF ATTN FOR GAMES AND ACCOMPANYING TRADE, CULTURAL AND EXHIBITION EVENTS IS OVERWHELMING FOCUSSED ON USSR PARTICIPATION.

OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WILL SEND ATHLETES, CULTURAL GROUPS, ETC. RECEIVE SHORT SHIFT AND CDA BARELY A MENTION. ALASKA, AS WE HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY, IS HAVING ITS OWN LOVE AFFAIR WITH THE USSR WITH AN EASTERN SIBERIAN FOCUS. IT IS CUTTING ACROSS ALL SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY.

3. THERE IS AT THE POLITICAL/DEFENCE LEVEL A RECOGNITION THAT USA NEEDS TO REMAIN STRONG MILITARILY AND BE CAUTIOUS IN RESPONDING TO USSR/EASTERN EUROPE DEVELOPMENTS. THIS SENTIMENT WOULD BE STRONGEST IN IDAHO AND ALASKA. VOICES OF THOSE LOOKING FORWARD TO CUTS IN DEFENCE SPENDING ARE STRONGER IN OREGON AND WASHINGTON AND OFTEN EXPRESS, AS WELL, IDEAS AS TO WHAT COULD BE DONE WITH MONIES NOT/NOT SPENT ON DEFENCE. THERE IS ALSO A STRONG CURRENT OF NOW WE MAY NOT/NOT NEED ANYTHING MORE THAN TOKEN MILITARY FORCES. THIS IS NO/NO MERE IMPRESSION ON OUR PART. IT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED TO US BY A LT. GEN. WHO HOLDS ONE OF AREA'S SENIOR COMMANDS.

4. EXCEPT IN WASHINGTON DEFENCE INDUSTRIES ARE NOT A MAJOR EMPLOYER IN OUR TERRITORY. BOEING HAS IMPORTANT DEFENCE CONTRACTS BUT THE MAJORITY OF ITS DEFENCE WORK IS DONE OUTSIDE THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST. BESIDES BOEING HAS AN ENORMOUS BACKLOG ON THE COMMERCIAL AIRLINE SIDE AND THE STATE OF WASHINGTON UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IS DOWN TO 5.2%.

../2

PAGE THREE UAGR1185 UNCLAS

5. MILITARY INSTALLATION CLOSURES WOULD BE OF CONCERN ALTHOUGH THE REGION GOT OFF COMPARATIVELY LIGHTLY ON THIS YEAR'S ROUND OF CLOSURES. THE MILITARY BASE BUSINESS IS VERY IMPORTANT TO ALASKA'S ECONOMY AND ITS IMPORTANCE HAS GROWN WITH OIL SLUMP AND EXPANSION AT WAINWRIGHT NEAR FAIRBANKS. ANY SIGNIFICANT CUTBACKS WOULD HURT THE STATE. WASHINGTON HAS A WIDE RANGE OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS - AIR, SEA AND LAND. WITH ONE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION MAJOR CUTBACKS IN THIS LARGE ESTABLISHMENT MAY BE UNLIKELY GIVEN THE TYPE OF UNITS INVOLVED. THE EXCEPTION COULD BE THE 9TH DIVISION AT FT. LEWIS WHICH COMPRISES ABOUT HALF THE BASE'S PERSONNEL. IDAHO'S INSTALLATIONS SEEM IN GOOD SHAPE TO WITHSTAND CUTS. OREGON HAS NO/NO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR DEFENCE INDUSTRIES. IN SHORT WE DOUBT EVENTUAL USA DEFENCE EXPENDITURE CUTBACKS WOULD BE A REALLY MAJOR ISSUE IN OUR AREA UNLESS THEY HIT ALASKA. THIS IS NOT/NOT TO SAY THE AREA'S CONGRESSIONAL DELS WILL CONCEDE ANYTHING WITHOUT A FIGHT.

UUU/810 082218Z UAGR1185

09:45/R. Chretien
contacted

CDN EYES ONLY

~~ENTRE-CONS~~ SEULEMENT
ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

ACC	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-USSA	
LOC	
A7- mu	20-1-2-USA

VDL.25
MIRD

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM WSHDC UNGR0261 09DEC89

TO EXTOTT (USS) DELIVER BY 100900(D.O. PHONE USS OR DMC(CHRETIEN)

INFO PMOOTT/HARTT/HEINBECKER/GRAUER PCOOTT/DOYLE

DISTR MINA UGB RGB

REF OURTEL UNGR6952 09DEC

---THE MALTA SUMMIT-PM LET TO BUSH

FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED TEXT OF LET FROM PM TO BUSH REFERRED TO IN
REFTEL:BEGINS:

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

1.I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR THE INVITATION TO DINE AT THE WHITE
HOUSE.LET ME ALSO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR SUCCESSFUL MEETING
WITH MR. GORBACHEV. I HAD NO/NO DOUBT THAT THE MEETING WOULD GO
WELL, BUT I EXPECT THAT IN YEARS TO COME PEOPLE MAY LOOK BACK
ON IT AS A SEMINAL MOMENT IN POST-WAR HISTORY.

2.THE NATO SUMMIT WAS A FITTING SEQUEL. YOUR LEADERSHIP WAS
VERY EVIDENT, AND THE DISCUSSIONS I WOULD JUDGE TO HAVE BEEN
THE BEST OF ANY ALLIANCE MEETING I HAVE ATTENDED.

3.I WANT TO UNDERScore MY SUPPORT FOR THE BALANCED POSITION YOU
OUTLINED FOR HANDLING THE GERMAN QUESTION. THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA HAVE LONG ESPOUSED BOTH THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY IN
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY,AND THE CLOSE INTEGRATION OF
EUROPE. AS EVENTS BRING BOTH CLOSER TO REALITY, WE MUST OF COURSE
BE SENSITIVE TO THE CONFLICTING PRESSURES AT PLAY. THE GOAL MUST BE
AN INTEGRATED DEMOCRATIC GERMANY IN AN INTEGRATED DEMOCRATIC EUROPE.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR0261 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

4.THERE IS NO/NO GUARANTEE THAT EVENTS WILL AWAIT THE ORDERLY UNFOLDING OF YOUR FOUR POINT PLAN, OR OF KOHLS TEN POINTS. IT IS NOT/NOT HARD TO IMAGINE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE DRIVE TOWARDS GERMAN REUNIFICATION COULD, IN THE SHORT-TERM, ENCOUNTER RESISTANCE FROM SOME OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND INJECT HEAVY STRAIN ON NATO. NO/NO OTHER ISSUE HAS SUCH POTENTIAL FOR DESTROYING THE POLITICAL CONSENSUS ON WHICH THE ALLIANCE IS FOUNDED.

5.JIM BAKERS VISIT TO BERLIN IS MOST TIMELY,AND I WOULD URGE THAT NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS THEY CAN AT THEIR MEETING THIS WEEK TO THE GERMAN ISSUE. OPERATING WITHIN YOUR AND HELMUT KOHLS FRAMEWORK, MINISTERS SHOULD, I BELIEVE, STRIVE FOR A CONSENSUS ON A GAME PLAN FOR HANDLING THE GERMAN QUESTION IN A MANNER THAT WILL SUSTAIN THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF EUROPE. IF NECESSSARY, THEY SHOULD COMMISSION A SENIOR GROUP TO CONTINUE THE EFFORT IN SUBSEQUENT WEEKS.

6.FOR THIS OR ANY SIMILAR INITIATIVES TO BE SUCCESSFUL, I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IS ESSENTIAL.

YOURS SINCERELY,

BRIAN MULRONEY

ENDS.

CCC/114 100141Z UNGR0261

CONFIDENTIAL

WM WSHDC UNGR6964 21DEC89

DEC 27 1989

DA/ JK
retain
D auf

TO EXTOTT URR IDA

INFO PMOOTT PCOOTT FINOTT BNATO MOSCO WSAW VNACE GENEV LDN PARIS

BONN ROME TOKYO

TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DQ_OLCOORD/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC UGB URB URD IFB IDD IDR IDA CPD CPP RGE RWD RWR

RPR EFB EED EER EEA

---US/SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER MALTA-ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY:

ADMIN PROPOSED PACKAGE OF SPECIFIC MEASURES AT MALTA TO IMPROVE

US/SOVIET RELATIONS, AND IT EXPECTS DISCUSSIONS OF THOSE MEASURES

TO BE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF RELATIONS IN LEAD-UP TO SUMMIT IN JUN.

2. PRESIDENTS PUBLICLY EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR CONCLUSION OF START,

CW AND CFE AGREEMENTS IN 1990 IS SPURRING BUREAUCRACY TO CONSIDER

TRADE-OFFS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

IN VIEW OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, A

START AGREEMENT IS ACHIEVABLE BY TIME OF OR AT SUMMIT, THOUGH ITS

SIGNATURE MAY HAVE TO FOLLOW SUMMIT. BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MTG IN

EARLY FEB WILL ATTEMPT TO CUT DEALS ON SOME OF MOST DIFFICULT

OUTSTANDING ISSUES. CW AGREEMENT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT PROPOSITION,

PUT IS NOT OUT OF QUESTION.

3. NEGOTIATIONS WILL ALSO BEGIN IN JANUARY ON US/SOVIET TRADE

AGREEMENT THOUGH ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE WILL BE CONTINGENT ON

...2

891221
FILE
20-USA-1-3-USA
LOC
Dun
DOSSIER
A7
Vol. 25
MIRD
cl 90 0615

JE TWO UNGR6964 CONF

SUPREME SOVIET PASSING FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION LEGISLATION. ADMIN EXPECTS THIS TO BE FOLLOWED BY US ACCORDING USSR MFN STATUS, WAIVER OF JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT, POSSIBLE LIFTING OF STEVENSON PROHIBITION ON EXPORT CREDITS, AND GRANTING USSR OBSERVER STATUS AT GATT AFTER CONCLUSION OF URUGUAY ROUND. SOME LIBERALIZATION OF COCOM RESTRICTIONS IS ALSO EXPECTED.

4. BALANCE OF THIS TEL REPORTS ON ARMS CONTROL AGENDA. SEE FOLLOWING TEL ON US/SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

REPORT:

5. IN FOLLOW-UP TO HIS MTGS WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS IMMEDIATELY AFTER AMLTA, BURNETT CALLED YESTERDAY ON ASSISTANT SEC OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CDN AFFAIRS, RAY SEITZ, FOR ASSESSMENT OF HOW ADMIN IS APPROACHING ITS RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW OVER NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

6. ACCORDING TO SEITZ, THE QUOTE VERY STARCHY MENU UNQUOTE WHICH PRESIDENT PROPOSED AT MALTA WILL DICTATE AGENDA FOR SOME TIME TO COME. BUSH'S GOAL WAS TO SEE NUMBER OF SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES REACHED BY TIME OF HIS FULL SUMMIT MTG WITH GORBACHEV IN UNITED STATES IN SECOND HALF OF JUNE, AND HIS PUBLIC ENUMERATION OF THESE WAS INTENDED TO ENSURE BUREAUCRACY GOT MESSAGE.

7. (A) START

ON ARMS CONTROL FRONT, BUSH WANTS ALL MAJOR ISSUES RESOLVED BY TIME OF HIS NEXT MTG WITH GORBACHEV. SEITZ THOUGHT THIS WAS POSSIBLE, THOUGH IT WAS UNLIKELY TREATY WOULD ACTUALLY BE READY TO BE SIGNED

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR6964 CONFID

AT SUMMIT. ALL OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN THOROUGHLY EXPLORED, AND IT WAS NOW ESSENTIALLY A MATTER OF QUOTE GETTING OF THE DIME UNQUOTE AND MAKING TRADE-OFFS NECESSARY FOR AN AGREEMENT.

P. PRESIDENT HAD LAID DOWN AN AGENDA FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS MTG (IN FIRST WK OF FEB) WITH EXPRESS PURPOSE OF DISPOSING QUICKLY OF THREE ISSUES MOST SUBJECT TO QUOTE BUREAUCRATIC DEADLOCK UNQUOTE (ALCMS, SLCMS AND MISSILE ENCRYPTION). AIM WAS ALSO TO QUOTE FILL IN GAPS UNQUOTE IN US POSITION, IN SOME CASES ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. WITH ONLY A FEW WEEKS TO GO BEFORE MTG, SEITZ EXPECTED A LOT OF INTER-AGENCY WORK WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE IN SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, IF US IS TO HAVE NEGOTIABLE POSITION READY BY BEGINNING OF FEB. NSC WILL BE CHAIRING MTGS ALMOST EVERYDAY BEGINNING IN NEW YEAR.

Q. (R) CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SEITZ WAS LESS SURE AGREEMENT WOULD BE READY BY SUMMER. UNLIKE START, THERE WAS A LOT OF NEW GROUND TO BE COVERED. GOOD PART OF US PROPOSAL MADE AT MALTA (FOR AN INTERIM US/SOVIET CW AGREEMENT PENDING CONCLUSION OF A MULTILATERAL CW CONVENTION) STILL HAD TO BE FILLED OUT, WHILE SOVIETS SEEMED TO BE STARTING ALMOST FROM ZERO. ACCORDING TO SEITZ, IT WAS CLEAR FROM EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS AT MALTA THAT SOVIETS HAD NOT FOCUSED ON PRESIDENTS UN SPEECH (WHEN HIS BILATERAL CW PROPOSAL WAS FIRST LAUNCHED) AND MUCH OF TIME ON FIRST DAY OF SUMMIT WAS SPENT RESPONDING TO WHAT SEEMED TO BE GENUINE SOVIET QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. ONLY ON SECOND DAY DID GORBACHEV ANNOUNCE

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR6964 CONF D

HIMSELF INTERESTED IN US PROPOSAL.

12.(C)OPEN SKIES

ON OPEN SKIES,SEITZ SAID SOVIETS HAD QUOTE ENDORSED THE CONCEPT UNQUOTE(WHICH US TOOK AS POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT)AND AGREED TO ATTEND CONFERENCE.BUT US STILL DID NOT KNOW WHAT SOVIETS WANTED OR HOW THEY WOULD RESPOND TO NATO POSITION.

11.IN AN ASIDE,SEITZ SAID PRESENCE OF 23 AT OTTAWA MTG WAS OPPORTUNITY TO INJECT IMPULSE INTO CFE NEGOTIATIONS,BUT US WAS WONDERING HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED.US WAS NOT KEEN ON PAVING SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO CFE IF ALL THAT HAPPENED WAS THAT FOREIGN MINS,HAVING ALREADY MADE INDIVIDUAL PRESENTATIONS ON OPEN SKIES,LAUNCHED INTO SECOND SERIES OF SET-PIECES ON CFE.SEITZ INQUIRED INTO OUR THINKING ON ISSUE,AND WE TOLD HIM IDEA OF WORKING LUNCHEON DEVOTED TO CFE WAS ONE OF NUMBER BEING LOOKED AT.HE SEEMED INTERESTED.

12.(D)NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

SEITZ SAID GORBACHEV HAD MADE A GOOD PRESENTATION ON ARMS CONTROL, ON SECOND DAY OF MALTA SUMMIT,NOTING AS THE QUOTE ONE GLARING EXCEPTION UNQUOTE ON AGENDA ANY DISCUSSION OF NAVAL ARMS CONTROL. DISPLAYING MAP OF USSR SURROUNDED BY US BASES,HE SAID SOVIETS SIMPLY COULD NOT/NOT HELP COUNTING THE 1500 AIRCRAFT WHICH THESE BASES SUPPORTED.LATER IN PRESENTATION,HE REPEATED SOVIET INTEREST IN PURSUING TALKS ON NAVAL TACTICAL NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS,WHICH HE SAID ...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR6964 CONFD

COULD HELP ARREST SLCM PROLIFERATION AND EASE TASK OF SLCM
VERIFICATION. BUT ACCORDING TO SEITZ, QUOTE THE PRESIDENT DID NOT
EXACTLY TAKE THIS UP UNQUOTE.

CCC/085 212311Z UNGR6964

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM COPEN/CSCE CSCE0009 06JUN90

TO EXTOTT L URR DELIVER BY 061200

INFO WSHDC MOSCO TAVIV PONN LDN PARIS BNATO PRMNY PCOOTT/DOYLE

WSAW PRGUE PPEST TT NDHQOTT/ADMPO/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC IFB GGB RGB CPD CPP RBR RWR GAM IDD IDR IDA IDC

---BAKER SHEVARDNADZE MTG IN COPEN

SEITZ GAVE IFB GIST OF BILATERAL 05JUN AT CSCE BETWEEN 2 MINS TO
FOLLOW UP WSHDC MTGS.

2.SHEVARDNADZE CLARIFIED GORBACHEV WSHDC THREAT TO BLOCK JEWISH
EMIGRATION IF ISRAELI PRACTICES ON SETTLEMENT DID NOT/NOT CHANGE.
USSR ACCORDING TO SOVIET FM HAD NO/NO INTENTION OF BLOCKING EMIGRATION
THOUGH THIS DID NOT/NOT DIMINISH SERIOUSNESS FOR USSR OF ISRAELI
PRACTICES.

3.ON EUROPE,BAKER TOOK UP GORBACHEV PROPOSAL FROM WSHDC THURSDAY
SESSION THAT NATO AND WTO INSTITUTIONALIZE COOPERATION.BAKER SOUGHT
SPECIFIC IDEAS.SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT ESSENTIAL IS TO CONVERT
RELATIONSHIP FROM ADVERSARY ONE TO COOPERATIVE ONE.USA IS INTERESTED
IN USSR PROPOSAL TO CONVERT RELATIONSHIP TO POSITIVE ONE,BUT IS WARY
OF DOING THIS IN A WAY WHICH PROLONGS LIFE OF WTO ARTIFICIALLY.
SO BAIL IN RETURNED TO SOVIET COURT.(INCIDENTALLY CZECH DEL TELLS US
THAT CONVERSION OF WTO IS BASIC SUBJECT OF WTO MTG 07JUN).

4.SHEVARDNADZE ALSO TOLD BAKER THAT USSR WOULD NOW DROP ITS

...2

ACC	DATE
831431	900606
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-4SR	
LOC	
AG- <u>du-</u>	<u>AA</u>

PAGE TWO CSCE0009 CONFD

PREOCCUPATION WITH SIZE OF BUNDESWEHR UNTIL THE NEXT ROUND OF CFE.
USSR WILL WRAP UP CFE 1 WITH WHAT IS NOW ON THE TABLE, PUTTING OFF
AIRCRAFT TILL LATER.

5. BAKER WILL DEBRIEF ON ALL DISCUSSIONS WITH USSR AT NAC TOMORROW.

CCC/062 061410Z CSCE0009



ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

[Handwritten signature]

1500

P R O T E C T E D

FM WSHDC UNGR2757 07JUN90

TO EXTOTT URR

DATE	8 1990
FILE	831428
DOSSIER	20-USA-1-3-USSR
LOC	A6-CR
	(A-7)

INFO MOSCO BNATO LDN PARIS BONN VNACE BREEC BRU WSAW BPEST PRGUE
ROME HAGUE MDRID COPEN STKHM BUCST ANKRA ATHNS PEKIN PCOOTT/DOYLE
PMOOTT/HART/HEINBECKER/GRAUER

TT NDHOTT/DM/ADM POL/DGPOLPLAN/DNATOPOL/DNACPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC DMT IFB IDX IDD IDR IDA IMD IMU IND INP CPD CPP
CPE RBR RBD RWD RWR RGX URB URD RGB EFB EED EEE EER

---WASHINGTON SUMMIT:GORBACHEV MTG WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP
SUMMARY:BASED ON GORBACHEV MTG WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND
COMMENTS MADE BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN SUBSEQUENT DAYS,IT WOULD
APPEAR THAT USA-SOVIET BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL AGENDA FACES BETTER
PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS ON CAPITOL HILL THAN DOES PROPOSED TRADE DEAL.
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE GENERALLY BEEN LAUDATORY IN COMMENTS ON
PROGRESS MADE ON START,AND ON SUMMIT AGREEMENTS ON CW AND NUCLEAR
TESTING,WITH ONLY SIGNIFICANT EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ON START COMING
FROM REPUBLICAN RIGHT WING.

2.ON TRADE DEAL,ON OTHER HAND,SENATE MAJORITY LEADER MITCHELL HAS
CALLED FOR MODERATION IN SOVIET ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST LITHUANIA,
SOVIET-LITHUANIAN DISCUSSIONS ON FUTURE STATUS OF LITHUANIA,AND QUOTE
IMPLICIT UNQUOTE SOVIET RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIAN RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE
AS PREREQUISITE TO SENATE PASSAGE OF BILL AND ANY SEPARATE REQUEST
FOR SOVIET MFN STATUS.REPUBLICAN LEADER DOLE AND OTHERS HAVE SUGGESTED
THAT EVEN IF SOVIETS WERE TO CODIFY EMIGRATION LAW,TRADE BILL IS

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2757 PROTECTED

UNLIKELY TO WIN APPROVAL IN CONGRESS UNTIL SOVIET-BALTIC TENSIONS ARE RESOLVED.

3.REPORT:AT THIS JUNCTURE,PROSPECTS FOR USA SOVIET ARMS CONTROL AGENDA ON CAPITOL HILL APPEAR BETTER THAN THEY DO FOR BILATERAL TRADE DEAL,IF CONGRESSIONAL MTG WITH GORBACHEV LAST WEEK AND COMMENTS MADE BY CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP SINCE ARE ANY INDICATION.GORBACHEV MADE HIS PITCH TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON ARMS CONTROL,SITN IN LITHUANIA, SOVIET ECONOMY AND USA-SOVIET TRADE RELATIONS,DURING MTG THAT WAS TELEVISED LIVE ON QUOTE CNN UNQUOTE TELEVISION AND WHICH PRESIDENT BUSH HIMSELF REPORTEDLY WATCHED ON TELEVISION.IN INTERESTING REVERSAL OF ROLES FOR MANY MEMBERS,CONGRESSIONAL SIDE BASICALLY SAT AND LISTENED, AND WATCHED GORBACHEV RUN CLOCK OUT,INCLUDING 20-MINUTE DISSERTATION ON STATE OF SOVIET ECONOMY IN RESPONSE TO LEAD QUESTION FROM SENATOR MITCHELL.(IN DISCUSSING MTG AFTERWARDS,SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER BOB DOLE REMARKED THAT GORBACHEV QUOTE DOES HAVE LONG ANSWERS.HE D FIT RIGHT IN THE SENATE UNQUOTE.)

4.START:GORBACHEV MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR SENATE APPROVAL OF START TREATY.HE TOLD HIS INTERLOCUTORS THAT HE WANTED USA AND USSR TO MOVE QUICKLY ON EARLY RATIFICATION,WHICH HE SAID WAS IN MUTUAL INTEREST OF BOTH COUNTRIES.HE SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF SUMMIT,USA AND SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO SIGN A GENERAL ACCORD ON MAIN PARAMETERS OF FUTURE TREATY,WITH QUOTE CERTAIN MATTERS UNQUOTE LEFT FOR NEGOTIATORS TO WORK ON.AFTER MTG,SENATE MAJORITY LEADER GEORGE MITCHELL SAID HE ...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2757 PROTECTED

FELT THAT GOOD PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON ARMS CONTROL AT SUMMIT GENERALLY, AND THAT IT WAS NOW TIME TO MOVE QUOTE FURTHER AND FASTER UNQUOTE ON START AND CFE. HOWEVER, NOTE OF CAUTION WAS MADE BY SENATE MAJORITY WHIP ALAN CRANSTON, WHO TOLD PRESS 05JUN THAT HE HAD WARNED GORBACHEV DURING LATTER S VISIT TO CALIFORNIA, THAT QUOTE ANY VIOLENCE ON LITHUANIA UNQUOTE WOULD QUOTE TORPEDO START UNQUOTE JUST AS SOVIET 1979 INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN HAD HELPED KILL SALT II TREATY. CRANSTON SAID GORBACHEV HAD ASSURED HIM THAT QUOTE THIS WOULD NOT/NOT OCCUR UNQUOTE. SENATOR SAM NUNN ALSO TOLD PRESS THAT THERE WERE NO/NO OBSTACLES TO SENATE RATIFICATION OF TWO TESTING TREATIES (TTB AND PNET) SINCE VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY SOVIETS.

5. OUR SENSE AT THIS EARLY JUNCTURE IS THAT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON START COMMANDS CONSIDERABLE BIPARTISAN SUPPORT ON HILL, ALTHOUGH RIGHT WING OF REPUBLICAN PARTY WILL CERTAINLY CHALLENGE IT. WE WERE TOLD THAT SENATOR NUNN, AT PRIVATE BREAKFAST MTG THIS MORNING, OPINED THAT BUSH ADMIN WAS NOT/NOT TAKING ADVANTAGE OF NEGOTIATING OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED BY NEW SPIRIT OF COOPERATION WITH SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY IN REGARDS TO MOBILE MISSILE BAN STRONGLY FAVOURED BY NUNN. NUNN SAID ADMIN SHOULD TAKE MORE TIME QUOTE UP TO A YEAR UNQUOTE, TO NAIL DOWN INCLUSION OF MOBILE MISSILES IN START, BEFORE PRESENTING TREATY TO SENATE. HE APPARENTLY EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT MOBILES WOULD BE PUSHED OFF TO START II, A TREATY WHICH HE PREDICTED MIGHT NOT/NOT BE READY FOR FOUR

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR2757 PROTECTED

OR FIVE YEARS. WE WERE TOLD THAT NUNN DID, HOWEVER, POINT OUT THAT HE WOULD NOT/NOT OPPOSE START IF MOBILE BAN IS NOT/NOT INCLUDED. SENATE STAFFERS HAVE SUGGESTED TO US THAT THERE MIGHT BE 20/20 VOTES AGAINST START IN SENATE AT THIS JUNCTURE, CERTAINLY NOT/NOT ENOUGH TO DERAIL IT.

6. STAFF CONTACTS HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT SIGNIFICANCE OF HILL TESTIMONY 06JUN OF AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF LARRY WELCH, WHO TOLD SENATE ARMED SERVICES CTTEE THAT IF B-2 PGM IS ENDED AFTER 15/15 AIRCRAFT ALREADY FUNDED ARE PROCURED, THIS WOULD CAUSE JOINT CHIEFS TO REASSESS MILITARY SUFFICIENCY OF START S FAVOURABLE COUNTING RULE. HE SAID THAT WITHOUT B-2, START QUOTE PRESENTS US WITH A MORE SIGNIFICANT RISK UNQUOTE. (AIR FORCE WANTS TO CUT B 2 BUY TO 75/75 AIRCRAFT, WHILE NUNN AND OTHERS ARE LOOKING AT A FIGURE CLOSER TO 50/50). WE WERE TOLD THAT IF WELCH AND OTHERS COME OUT PUBLICLY AGAINST START BECAUSE OF A FURTHER REDUCTION IN B-2 PROCUREMENT DOWN ROAD, THEN NUMBERS OF THOSE WHO MIGHT GO AGAINST TREATY MIGHT RISE, WHICH WOULD MAKE SENATE RATIFICATION PROCESS QUOTE MORE INTERESTING UNQUOTE.

7. GERMAN REUNIFICATION: GORBACHEV TOLD MEMBERS OF CONGRESS THAT THE QUOTE RATHER RIGID POSITION UNQUOTE OF BUSH ADMIN ON UNITED GERMANY WITHIN NATO WAS UNHELPFUL, AND THAT HE FELT USA WAS TAKING THIS POSITION MAINLY BECAUSE IT WOULD QUOTE LIKE TO ASSURE ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, INCLUDING ITS STRATEGIC ROLE AND

...5

PA FIVE UNGR2757 PROTECTED

THE ROLE FOR STABILITY UNQUOTE.GORBACHEV SAID USSR WAS LEFT WITH FEELING THAT IT WAS BEING QUOTE SQUEEZED OUT UNQUOTE ON THIS ISSUE, THAT QUOTE PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED ON US FOR A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE OF THE OTHER SIDE UNQUOTE.HE REMINDED MEMBERS THAT QUOTE NO ONE CAN REALLY SCARE US OR SCARE YOU.WE SHOULD FEAR OURSELVES,IN A SENSE UNQUOTE.GORBACHEV SAID SOVIETS DID NOT/NOT WANT TO SEE USA OUT OF EUROPE,AND THAT WHAT IT WANTED WAS QUOTE STABILITY UNQUOTE IN EUROPE.HE WARNED THAT QUOTE IF WE FAIL TO DEVELOP THIS PROCESS IN EUROPE AND IF WE HAVE CONCERN ON BOTH SIDES,THEN IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO MOVE FORWARD IN OUR RELATIONSHIP UNQUOTE.CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS APPEARED UNMOVED.

8.TRADE:GORBACHEV DISCUSSED TRADE RELATIONS WITH MEMBERS ON A VERY FRANK,POLITICAL LEVEL.HE SAID USSR WAS NOT/NOT QUOTE ASKING FOR A FREE RIDE UNQUOTE ON TRADE.IN REFERRING TO HIS DOMESTIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, HE WARNED THAT IT WOULD BE QUOTE BAD POLITICS UNQUOTE FOR EITHER TO COUNTRY TO TRY TO CAPITALIZE ON PROBLEMS IN EITHER COUNTRY FOR ELECTORAL GAIN UNQUOTE.GORBACHEV FELT THAT A QUOTE FAVOURABLE GESTURE UNQUOTE FROM USA CONGRESS ON TRADE WOULD BE QUOTE VERY HELPFUL,MOSTLY I WOULD SAY,POLITICALLY UNQUOTE.HE ARGUED THAT MFN GESTURE WOULD OPEN UP OPPORTUNITIES FOR USA AND SOVIET BUSINESS SECTOR,AND HE SAID SOVIETS ARE ANXIOUS TO OPEN UP CREDIT AGREEMENTS WITH USA AND OTHER COUNTRIES DURING DIFFICULT PERIOD OF ECONOMIC REFORMS.GORBACHEV WONDERED WHY USA COULD GIVE MFN TREATMENT TO CHINA QUOTE AFTER TIENAMEN UNQUOTE AND NOT/NOT TO USSR.

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR2757 PROTECTED

9. IN EXPECTATION THAT CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS WOULD LINK TRADE TO LITHUANIAN SITUATION, GORBACHEV SPENT OVER TEN MINUTES EXPLAINING HISTORY OF SOVIET-LITHUANIAN RELATIONS (PRESS REPORTS TALKED ABOUT MEMBERS EYES GLAZING OVER). HE SAID HE WANTED A QUOTE SOLUTION WITHOUT EXTREME MEASURES, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS UNQUOTE. HE ACCUSED USA AND FRANCE OF EMPLOYING DOUBLE STANDARDS, ARGUING THAT IN CASE OF PANAMA, USA HAD INVADED A SOVEREIGN NATION, WHILE FRANCE TOOK TEN YEARS TO DECIDE A SIMILAR QUESTION REGARDING NEW CALEDONIA. (USA SIDE RATHER PREDICTABLY DID NOT/NOT ACCEPT PARALLEL WITH PANAMA.)

10. AT PRESS BRIEFING AFTER MTG, SENATOR MITCHELL SAID HE STILL BELIEVED THAT BUSH SHOULD NOT SEND MFN REQUEST TO CONGRESS UNTIL THERE IS CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY WITH RESPECT TO LITHUANIA. MITCHELL SAID MOST PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT ADVANCED BY GORBACHEV TURNED OUT TO BE DIRECTED AGAINST MFN STATUS FOR CHINA. HE SAID SOVIET LEADER HAD INADVERTENTLY EXPOSED QUOTE TOTAL INCONSISTENCY UNQUOTE OF ADMIN POSITION OF WANTING TO DENY MFN STATUS TO SOVIETS, BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT/NOT CODIFIED INTO LAW THEIR EMIGRATION PRACTICES, WHILE GRANTING MFN STATUS TO CHINA DESPITE MASSACRE IN TIENAMEN SQUARE.

11. SINCE MTG WITH GORBACHEV, AND FOLLOWING BUSH DECISION TO INITIAL TRADE AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS AND MAKE IT CONDITIONAL ON PASSAGE OF NEW EMIGRATION LEGISLATION IN USSR, MITCHELL, HOUSE SPEAKER TOM FOLEY AND OTHERS HAVE CHARGED ADMIN WITH ABANDONING LITHUANIA, BY FAILING

...7

PAGE SEVEN UNGR2757 PROTECTED

TO TIE MFN STATUS TO LIFTING OF LITHUANIAN BLOCKADE. MITCHELL HAS CALLED FOR MODERATION OF SOVIET ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST LITHUANIA, NEGOTIATIONS ON FUTURE STATUS OF LITHUANIA, AND AN IMPLICIT UNQUOTE RECOGNITION BY GORBACHEV OF RIGHT OF LITHUANIA TO INDEPENDENCE, BEFORE CONGRESS WILL AGREE TO ACT ON TRADE BILL. HE HAS ALSO MADE POINT THAT CENTRAL REQUIREMENT FOR INCREASED SOVIET-U.S. TRADE (WHICH HE PERSONALLY SUPPORTS, INCLUDING LIFTING OF JACKSON VANIK, A POSITION HE ADOPTED OVER A YEAR AGO) IS REFORM OF SOVIET ECONOMY. MITCHELL ARGUES THAT GRANTING MFN STATUS IN ITSELF WOULD NOT/NOT INCREASE SALE OF SOVIET GOODS IN USA BY INCREASING DEMAND FOR SOVIET PRODUCTS. QUOTE I THINK IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT, UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION UNDERTAKES THE ECONOMIC REFORMS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A COMPETITIVE FREE MARKET ECONOMY, THAT YOU WILL THEN HAVE THE KIND OF SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN TRADE UNQUOTE.

12. CONCERN IS NOT/NOT FELT SOLELY AMONG MAJORITY DEMOCRATS IN CONGRESS. REPUBLICAN SPOKESMEN SUCH AS DOLE HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT EVEN IF SOVIETS CODIFY EMIGRATION POLICIES, IF PROBLEM OF LITHUANIA AND OTHER BALTIC STATES IS NOT/NOT RESOLVED, THEN QUOTE IT WILL BE A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN IN THE CONGRESS UNQUOTE. THIS ISSUE ALSO PLAYS INTO HANDS OF THOSE ON REPUBLICAN RIGHT WING, WHO SEE OPPORTUNITY TO SEIZE ON QUOTE CAPTIVE NATIONS UNQUOTE ISSUE AT A TIME WHEN FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN TENOR AND SUBSTANCE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS LEAVES RIGHT WING GROPING FOR TOUCHSTONE ISSUE AROUND WHICH IT CAN RALLY ITS FORCES.

CCC/120 072256Z UNGR2757

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PARIS WIGR9584 11JUN90

TO EXTOTT (RGB IDD WSHDC

INFO MOSCO BNATO

DISTR USS IFB IDA RWD RBD

FROM WRIGHT

REF WSHDC UNGR1383, 6755 04JUN AND IDD0347 04JUN

---GORBACHEV IN WSHDC: OPEN SKIES

IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION ON MARGIN OF INSTITUTE FOR EAST WEST SECURITY STUDIES CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM LAST WEEK, ROBERT BLACKWILL SPOKE TO ME ABOUT GORBACHEV BUSH EXCHANGE ON OPEN SKIES. AS HIS COMMENTS ADD A BIT OF FLAVOUR TO REPORTS IN REFTELS I PASS THEM ON FOR USE AS YOU SEE FIT.

2. BUSH BEGAN BY OUTLINING USA POSITION ON OPEN SKIES. GORBACHEV RESPONDED THAT USA POSITION SEEMED VERY MUCH LIKE SOVIET POSITION. WHEN GORBACHEV ASKED HIS OFFICIALS FOR CLARIFICATION, OFFICIAL SOVIET LINE WAS TROTTEED OUT. GORBACHEV SEEMED TO BE HEARING OR ABSORBING THIS LINE FOR THE FIRST TIME. PRESIDENT BUSH URGED GORBACHEV TO HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT OPEN SKIES ISSUE AND BLACKWILL, WHO ATTENDED MTG, HAD IMPRESSION THAT THIS WAS PRECISELY WHAT GORBACHEV INTENDED TO DO.

CCC/230 111606Z WIGR9584

2010
v25
mird
164 886
B'cu A 7
vof 21
**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

900611

20-USA-1-3-USSR