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File No. Dossier 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
Volume 8 From-De 83-11-13 To-À 83-11-15

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VOLS ACCESSION NO.

19818

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT
MESURES
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

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28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

VOLUME

9

November 15/83

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Mrs. Thatcher wondered what mechanisms ought to be engaged to promote better East/West understanding. She suggested that "to suddenly go in at the top would be difficult". In the face of any initiative, the Soviets would necessarily assume that we had something to offer. Without that nothing could be accomplished, but "the determination of exactly what 'that' was would have to be very carefully prepared".

ACC	DATE
	28 OCT 86
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Mission	

Trudeau Pushes Plan For Peace on the U.S., Soviet Union, China

Personal Initiative by Canada's
Chief Took Him to Europe;
He Plans Japan Visit, Too

By JOHN URQUHART

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

OTTAWA—Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who has undertaken a personal peace mission, disclosed that he has started consultations on a Canadian peace plan with the U.S., the Soviet Union and China.

Mr. Trudeau outlined his "step-by-step" peace initiative in a speech yesterday to his ruling Liberal Party in Montreal. The speech followed consultations last week with government leaders in six European countries—West Germany, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium.

He said the European leaders supported his initiative and he intends to pursue his efforts with a trip to Tokyo next Saturday to meet with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. He didn't disclose the nature or form of his consultations with the U.S., the Soviet Union and China. But on his return from Europe Friday he said it was "much too premature" to talk of a trip by him to Washington or Moscow.

In his speech, he said "one man representing one country can't promise a miracle, let alone deliver one." But he said he believed it is imperative for government leaders to give new political direction to military matters in view of the deterioration in international relations.

Mr. Trudeau's plan has involved intense work in recent weeks by senior Canadian government officials. The initial step calls for negotiations to try to stabilize relative levels of armaments for the five nuclear-weapons countries—the U.S., the Soviet Union, France, China and Britain. Such a forum would recognize the U.S. and the Soviet Union as "strategic equals," he said.

Mr. Trudeau said his proposal is "without prejudice" to the nuclear weapons talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. "But those talks, and rightly so, don't cover British, French or Chinese nuclear forces," he said.

With a five-nation accord, he said "neither Britain nor France nor China need fear that their forces will be subject to restraints which don't recognize their own national interest."

He said such an agreement among the five nations would help to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and to forestall introduction of new weapons. Once a five-nation agreement is in place, he said "the rest of us could more easily bring good sense to bear" on those countries which haven't signed the 13-year-old nuclear nonproliferation pact.

To meet West European concerns over the heavy preponderance of Soviet conventional forces in Europe, he proposed that disarmament talks that are due to open in Stockholm in January, be given "high-level political support" at their outset.

Mr. Trudeau's plan also calls for a ban on testing and deployment of antisatellite systems designed to operate at high altitude. Such a system hasn't been launched.

The U.S. has communicated with Mr. Trudeau about his plan, but Washington hasn't commented on the specific proposals.

The prime minister's initiative is viewed by some Canadians as his last major political undertaking before retiring. He has said he won't lead his Liberal Party in another election.

Canadian officials said Mr. Trudeau's plan doesn't represent any departure of Canadian support for western defense strategy. Canada continues to support the plan of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to deploy U.S. cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in Europe starting next month if the Soviet Union doesn't withdraw the SS-20 missiles that are aimed at Western Europe.

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THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1983

The Right Honorable
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa

Dear Pierre:

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace mission

Your Embassy was kind enough to send me a copy of your address at Guelph of October 27. I recall with pleasure our conversation on the subject of East-West relations, and was most impressed by the way you had expanded these thoughts in your address.

There is a sense of tension in the world -- much of it, I believe, growing out of Soviet reluctance to adjust to a U.S. which is now more actively espousing vital free world interests. You are perfectly right in asserting that increased tension must not be allowed to choke off dialogue, and I believe it is highly useful for statesmen like yourself to work actively to see if new forms of dialogue can be developed.

Thank you very much for sharing your speech and you have my best wishes as you seek to implement its central concerns.

Sincerely,


George Bush

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
Sorry we missed
on Maine.

made F.W. S.M.T.

SECRET

November 15, 1983

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN
PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND
PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
ON NOVEMBER 11, 1983 at 12 NOON
AT 10 DOWNING STREET



BACKGROUND

Between Tuesday November 8 and Friday November 11 Prime Minister Trudeau conducted a series of consultations with European Leaders on his Peace Initiative. On November 8, he met with Prime Minister Mitterrand in Paris and Prime Minister Lubbers in The Hague. On November 9, he met with Queen Beatrix in The Hague and Prime Minister Martens and Foreign Minister Tindemans in Brussels. On November 10, he met with the Pope, with Prime Minister Craxi and Foreign Minister Andreotti in Rome and had dinner with Chancellor Kohl in Bonn. His last stop was his meeting on Friday morning with Mrs. Thatcher. There, he met en tête-à-tête with notetakers for approximately 40 minutes in advance of a working lunch. Notes on the lunch will be prepared separately.

THE MEETING

Mr. Trudeau began by thanking Mrs. Thatcher for receiving him so soon after her highly successful visit to Canada and by thanking her for inviting him to London to include her in his series of consultations on his peace initiative. Noting that he had read with interest Mrs. Thatcher's statements at the recent Conservative Party Congress to the effect that more dialogue between East and West was sorely needed, Mr. Trudeau said he was pleased that on the "generalities" of his peace initiative - on the need for that jolt of political energy along the third rail - they were on the same wave length. Trudeau said that following the invasion of Grenada, the bombings in Beirut and the shooting down of the Korean airliner, he was concerned that the climate would further deteriorate to the point where all talking stopped. This, he insisted, must not happen.

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Prior to the shoot-down of KAL 007, Mr. Trudeau had heard that the Reagan Administration had begun to plan for a possible Reagan/Andropov summit to take place in the late spring. Some of the people who had been with Carter at Vladivostock had been asked for views on mechanics and procedures. However, the KAL incident and subsequent events, and indeed Chairman Andropov's health, had put such plans into abeyance. However, he noted, that if there were no high level meeting in the next, say 6 months, no meeting would be possible for a good year and a half in view of the forthcoming presidential election. In view of the likelihood that no summit was in the offing, Mr. Trudeau wondered how the inertia in East/West relations could be broken, how the deteriorating state of super power relations could be improved?

Mr. Trudeau said he believed it was vital that respected politicians such as Mrs. Thatcher should continue to speak out publicly in favour of dialogue so as to avoid a stalemate. He reminded Mrs. Thatcher that at Williamsburg leaders had formally and publicly committed themselves to devoting their full political resources to the search for peace. This, he said, was what he was doing. This was what his current series of consultations was about.

Turning to specifics, Mr. Trudeau said he had certain proposals which, he felt, had received a far more sympathetic hearing over the past couple of days on the Continent than he could have hoped for. There were, of course, many other ideas and proposals which could and ought to be put into play. He was seeking no particular mandate nor did he wish to monopolize in any way Western efforts to ease world tensions. Rather, he said he hoped to encourage his NATO friends and allies to engage themselves in the search for a more confident peace; to apply political will across the spectrum of East/West dialogue and negotiation.

Mrs. Thatcher asked whether President Reagan was likely to see things the same way, implying that the required degree of flexibility might not be present. Mr. Trudeau said he thought that despite the fact that in the past the President had assumed extremely firm, even intractable positions on a variety of issues affecting East/West relations over the past three years, the Prime Minister had been impressed by the

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President's apparent willingness to adapt to evident pressure. In this regard Mr. Trudeau cited as examples the President's attitude on a number of North/South issues (e.g. surprising flexibility at Cancun and on the importance of the International Monetary Institutions) and the way the President had eventually bowed to opposition over his stance regarding trade and credits for the Soviet gas pipeline. In sum, Reagan as a sensitive politician was more flexible than he seemed. If his principal allies maintained pressure on Reagan regarding the importance of East/West dialogue and a high level summit, Mr. Trudeau thought the President, particularly in view of the domestic implications, would be prepared to move. However, quite aside from the President's posture, Mr. Trudeau considered Western politicians ought to be able to assure their electorates that they were discharging their duties by genuinely seeking to ease tensions and find a durable peace.

Mrs Thatcher said that in her recent consultations with the French President, Mitterrand had suggested that the timing of Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow last July had been all wrong and he had expressed the fear that we (the West) would have but "one more shot" at re-opening an effective dialogue with the Soviet Union. Returning to a theme she had played during her visit to Ottawa in September, she stressed the importance of encouraging the Soviet leaders to engage in dialogue in the West; to leave Moscow. She recalled that Brezhnev, although sick, had nevertheless agreed to travel to the West and therefore it was possible that if Andropov's illness were not too severe (or, indeed, that if he had had a kidney transplant that his condition could improve to the point where) travel might be feasible.

Commenting on the current state of East/West relations, Mrs. Thatcher said she had long been worried about the possibility that something "could go drastically wrong through misadventure". However, she insisted that strength in the Alliance and strength in our deterrence was the answer. As long as a credible deterrent was maintained, the balance would be kept.

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She wondered whether the essential problem between East and West was due to a lack of mutual understanding or whether we could ever understand their values and their system. She noted that the Soviet people through improved communications, television, and increased visits in both directions, could no longer remain hermetically sealed within a closed system. The effect on the Satellites of this Western exposure was particularly noteworthy. The Satellites, in turn, through their increasing sensitivity to Western ways and culture, could influence the structure of the Soviet system and their perceptions of the West. At a later point in the conversation, however, Mrs. Thatcher wondered aloud whether "the Bloc really had much influence on the forbidden city of Moscow". Mrs. Thatcher stressed the need to encourage many more exchanges at all levels and singled out youth exchanges. Also, she said, we must have more visits like that of Gorbachev "which you did so well". She wondered whether Romanov could be encouraged to make a similar visit to the West.

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Returning to the disarmament front she forcefully reiterated her firm belief that before anything else could be accomplished or even discussed, INF deployment would have to begin. Nothing must delay it. Strength and resolve must be demonstrated by following through with our commitment and decision. She noted that she considered President Reagan's START proposals had been constructive and imaginative but that the Soviets seemed to be exclusively preoccupied by the INF situation.

Mrs. Thatcher volunteered that with the opening of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), there would be "a new departure" which in her view "would merit watching". She allowed as how "we must get down those missile levels" but, all this, once again, after INF deployment had begun.

Turning quickly to the Prime Minister's current initiative, she said she wasn't at all sure she liked the five-power proposal in that she considered the timing was not right.

Commenting on Mrs. Thatcher's monologue, Mr. Trudeau said he was gratified to see that they shared the same general objectives but that they seemed to have different perceptions as to how to attain them. He again stressed the importance of keeping open the dialogue. Mrs. Thatcher said that was what the CDE was for. Mr. Trudeau agreed but suggested more was needed. Mrs. Thatcher noted that she considered the fact that all those meeting at Stockholm would be participating "as equals" was a significant new element. Mr. Trudeau said that he was not seeking to achieve "any big breakthrough" either in Moscow or even in Stockholm. Rather, he hoped to re-insert political will and direction into the stalemated dialogue. Politicians had to re-assert themselves throughout the negotiating process and could not leave the fate of mankind to negotiators and technicians who did not have the authority to cut a deal. For instance, were the CDE to open at the Foreign Minister level it would demonstrate to that growing number of deeply concerned citizens in the West that the politicians were prepared to stake their reputations on the search for peaceful solutions to current tensions; that they were prepared to go the extra mile.

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Noting that he had not made such a proposal to any other leader, Mr. Trudeau suggested that it might even be useful to consider having Heads of Government open the Stockholm meeting. Surely, he said, we are strong enough in our ideology and in our beliefs to make such a gesture. The presence of Heads of Government would demonstrate the seriousness with which leaders considered the meeting. Over the day or two leaders were there, commitments would be made and deadlines fixed for the negotiators. Leaders could offer to send Foreign Ministers, say in September, in order to assess progress. While he allowed that there would be many objections to such a proposal, he said it would be an effective way to force the super powers into a more open, a more public forum. It would have the advantage of providing a psychological and a political jolt to amend the downward trend in super power relations.

Mr. Trudeau stressed that he was in no way trying to interfere with the INF or START negotiations. Modest countries like Canada, he said, could only seek to effect from the margin the atmosphere within which the super powers might make their deals. Our role could assist, as she had put it, in ensuring that the other side understood our intentions. Elaborating on this theme, Mr. Trudeau suggested it would be important to demonstrate to the Soviets 'yes we have this deterrent, and yes we are prepared to use it if we have to, but we must find a way to live with the policy of mutual deterrence because it is certain that without such a way we won't live'.

Mrs. Thatcher was clearly intrigued by Mr. Trudeau's suggestion of a Head of Government quick-off to the CDE. She thought there would be many problems. She wasn't sure the timing was right. She agreed it merited further consideration and would require great preparation. She was impressed by the fact that it would allow for the kind of informal and private bilateral contacts - not only but particularly between the super powers - which had taken place at Tito's funeral. On the other hand she was worried that "people might see the hollowness of it all". Heads of Government had of course met at Helsinki but that had been painstakingly prepared. Mr. Trudeau agreed, but

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noted there was little danger that Heads would be accused of making a hollow gesture if indeed they were prepared to see the Conference achieve something; at the outset of the meeting there were few expectations which could not be met - a problem, which he acknowledged would be present were senior political leaders to involve themselves after a number of months but before a deal could be struck.

Mrs. Thatcher wondered aloud whether anything more useful could be expected from a high level super power presence at the CDE than had transpired between Shultz and Gromyko at Madrid. She recalled that Jim Callaghan had travelled to Moscow - a journey about which she had had considerable doubts - hadn't seen Andropov and the visit had been a bust. Wouldn't it be better to assemble Heads at the conclusion of the CDE as per Helsinki? Mr. Trudeau pointed out the conclusion could not reasonably be expected before '86 or '87 and allowed that current circumstancee required that positive political action be taken well before then. He recalled that very productive decade between 1962 and 1972 when so much had been achieved across the disarmament front between the super powers. He said he sought to return to that kind of an environment and recalled that while many considered détente to have begun with the Helsinki Final Act it was in fact over at just about that time.

Mrs. Thatcher asked whether he was not saying that things can only improve when the Russians wanted them to improve. She said we must be able to convince the Russians that we were prepared to make and to keep deals. Mr. Trudeau agreed saying that were such an atmosphere of trust to flourish, we in the West would have to drop theories of the imminent crumbling of the Soviet empire. Mrs. Thatcher replied that surely the Reagan Administration had by now abandoned such theories. Surely, she said, they realized they made no sense.

Mrs. Thatcher said that she had urged the President to maintain a full range of day to day contacts with the Soviet Union. Reagan had replied that he considered the ball was in the Soviet court, that, particularly after the KAL incident, it was up to the Soviet Union to demonstrate a genuine desire for an improvement in relations.

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Mr. Trudeau, referring to the KAL incident, suggested that the Soviets knew full well they had made a horrible mistake. We knew too, yet we insisted in castigating them for bestial behaviour. Surely this was not conducive to improving relations. Mrs. Thatcher agreed that the KAL incident had been extremely revealing. She and Trudeau considered it had demonstrated significant weaknesses in the Soviet capacity to defend the motherland. Mr. Trudeau said he had been impressed by the extent to which it demonstrated their abiding fear. Mrs. Thatcher said that she had taken precisely the same lesson from the incident and therefore had been particularly convinced of the vital and pressing necessity of improving procedures for crisis consultation and communication in order to, as Trudeau put it, avoid that fatal mistake.

Returning to the proposal for a CDE at Head of Government level, Mr. Trudeau said he was impressed by the extent of agreement between them. Their differences related principally to timing. He was simply not convinced that a great deal of time could safely be allowed. Mrs. Thatcher reiterated by suggesting that what Trudeau was proposing was in effect a replay of the activity which surrounded Tito's funeral, or, Trudeau added, Brezhnev's funeral. If Reagan had gone to Brezhnev's funeral it would have, Trudeau thought, been a significant gesture; not Sadat's epic voyage to Jerusalem but nevertheless important.

Mr. Trudeau said that he had specifically avoided making such a proposal to other Heads of Government until he had been able to consult Mrs. Thatcher. He said he was looking for a way to encourage bilateral meetings - above all one bilateral! Even if Heads of Government were to be present for only 24 hours this purpose would have been accomplished. What is more, real impetus would be given to the negotiators. Mrs. Thatcher wondered if the Soviets could not but decline in view of Andropov's health. To do so, Trudeau said, would put them in an extremely bad light. Almost everyone has agreed to send Foreign Ministers and while Secretary Shultz seemed unenthusiastic, Trudeau thought he would be persuaded by the presence of large numbers of his Western colleagues. Reagan would have the same kinds of objections as Shultz but might be similarly persuaded. [NOTE: clearly Mrs. Thatcher, by reiterating the extent to which such a proposal would have to be carefully prepared, found the idea both interesting and

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worthy of being taken further]. Mrs. Thatcher said she saw only two significant problems: (a) would Andropov be fit enough and (b) could the idea be sold to President Reagan?

At this point, Mrs. Thatcher suggested the discussion be pursued over the working lunch.

Robert R. Fowler
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet
Foreign and Defence Policy

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE

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28-6-1-Tyndeau Peace Mission

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SIG L.A.DELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	CONFIDENTIAL - CEO	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0148 15NOV83	<div>28.6.1 - Trudeau Peace Mushkoji</div> <div>16 NOV 83 01 34Z</div>	
TO/À	TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 1600 ¹²⁰⁰		
INFO	INFO BNATO PC00TT/FOWLER		
DISTR	DISTR DMF IDR PPR ZSI IFB		
REF			
SUBJ/SUJ	---PM INITIATIVE: VIEWS OF DR MUSHAKOJI DR KINHIDE MUSHAKOJI, VICE RECTOR REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STUDIES DIV UN UNIVERSITY IN TOKYO, WAS DUE TO BE LEAD OFF SPEAKER AT UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH CONFERENCE ON PEACE AND SECURITY OCT27-30/ MUSHAKOJI CEDED HIS POSITION TO PM TRUDEAU AND INSTEAD ADDRESSED FINAL SESSION OF CONF. AT THAT TIME HE SAID HE HAD BEEN SO IMPRESSED WITH PM QUOTE EPIC MAKING UNQUOTE SPEECH THAT HE HAD THROWN AWAY HIS OWN PREPARED REMARKS AND WISHED INSTEAD TO COMMENT ON PM CONCEPT OF QUOTE THIRD RAIL UNQUOTE. THRUST OF MUSHAKOJI REMARKS WAS THAT THERE WAS URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR THIRD RAIL OR WHAT HE HIMSELF CALLED QUOTE THIRD FORCE UNQUOTE OF COUNTRIES SUCH AS CDA, JAPAN AND SMALLER MEMBERS OF BOTH NATO AND WPO WHICH WOULD HAVE POLICY ORIEN- TATIONS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM SUPERPOWERS. 2. FOLLOWING HIS DISCOURSE, MEMBER OF TASK FORCE SOUGHT FURTHER CLARIFICATION ^{FROM} MUSHAKOJI WHO SAID HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRES- SED BY CANADAS ABILITY, AS REFLECTED IN PM SPEECH, AS A MEMBER OF NATO ALLIANCE AND NEIGHBOUR OF USA TO SPEAK OUT WITH DIFFERENT VIEWS THAN THOSE EXISTING IN WSHDC. MUSHAKOJI OPINED THAT JAPAN ...2		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIGGARY J. SMITH:pec

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L.A. DELVOIE

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PAGE TWO IDZ0142 CONFD-CEO

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HAD URGENT REQUIREMENT TO DEVELOP QUOTE POLICY SPACE UNQUOTE OF ITS
OWN SEPARATE FROM USA AND SAW CANADA AS OFFERING GOOD EXAMPLE OF
DIRECTION IN WHICH JAPAN MIGHT MOVE. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY
AWARE OF VIEWS OF PM NAKASONE, QUOTE WHO AT ONE TIME BELIEVED GAULLIST
POLICY WAS MODEL FOR JAPAN TO FOLLOW UNQUOTE, AND WAS COUSIN OF JPNSE
VICE FOREIGN MINISTER, BOTH OF WHOM HE SAID SHARED HIS OUTLOOK.

3. MUSHAKOJI WAS HIGHLY RECEPTIVE TO IDEA THAT PM MIGHT VISIT JAPAN
(THIS WAS BEFORE PM TRIP WAS AGREED)
IN NEAR FUTURE AND SAID HE WOULD RECEIVE VERY WARM WELCOME. MUSA-
KOJI SAID HE PERSONALLY WOULD BRING GUELPH SPEECH TO ATTENTION OF
SENIOR JPNSE OPINION-MAKERS.

4. YOU MIGHT FIND IT OF VALUE TO TOUCH BASE WITH MUSHAKOJI IN CON-
TEXT OF PM VISIT.

TO/A • MINA MINT MINE USS DMF DMT IFB UGB LGB PGB
FROM/DE • RGB GGB CPD
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REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Prime Minister's Initiative on East-West
SUJET Relations and International Security


Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	November 15, 1983
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0147

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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--- Attached for your information is the final
version of the speech which the Prime Minister gave
in Montreal on November 13.



L.A. Delvoie
L.A. Delvoie,
Chairman,
Task Force Working Group

TRANSCRIPT OF REMARKS BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON PEACE AND SECURITY,
MONTREAL, QUEEN ELIZABETH HOTEL, SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1983

(TRANSLATION)

Ladies and gentlemen, mesdames, messieurs, dear colleagues, dear friends,

First of all, let me thank you for your welcome. I must say that, after a trip like the one I have just made, it is good to be back among my own people, and to receive such a warm welcome.

I want to thank Marc Lalonde for having said such friendly things about me, and about the direction which, together, we have tried to give to the party. Marc is a friend, so that partly explains the nice things he said about me. He is also a great minister of Finance, a fact which sometimes requires him, too, to travel to foreign countries. Just a few months ago, he came back from the annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and from the meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers. He came back from the Caribbean. He came back from Washington. But I must say that his speeches were less interesting than the kind he gives when he comes back from Kénogami and Jonquière. If we don't watch out, he's going to become one spell-binding orator.

Well, today the roles are a bit reversed. In recent years, I have often taken advantage of these occasions to talk about Quebec, about Canada -- sometimes a bit boisterously. Today, in contrast, I would like to give you a report on the trip I have made. I would like to speak to you about peace and disarmament, and to share with you some reflections on a world in disarray.

We meet together today as part of the long-standing democratic process in this country -- a process which, as your generous presence shows, is alive and well in Canada. We take pride in the vigour and diversity of our political life, in the bright promise of our future.

If our future depended on Canadians alone, we could be confident that it was safe and sound. But no nation today holds its future securely in its own hands. We share this planet with about 160 other nations, all of whom interact with us in a global system embracing our security, our economy, the health of our environment, and the quality of our lives.

Those 160 governments are, however, by no means the only players. The stage is crowded with alliances, with regional associations, with international institutions such as the United Nations, with multinational corporations, with cartels, pressure groups and lobbies of all kinds.

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We are all of us -- you and I, our friends and families, citizens, governments and corporations -- on that crowded global stage, which is alive with our hopes and our fears, our failures and our successes. But there are today three dominant and disturbing trends which, when set side by side, threaten to bring down the curtain on our human performance.

The first trend is an increasing resort to the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. Despite the solemn affirmation of the UN Charter that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force" there have been, since 1945, approximately 130 conflicts in which 35 million human lives have been lost.

There is a habit of aggression which is gaining ground. An abdication of the political process in deference to military solutions. A coarse element of belligerence, of menacing rhetoric, of governments which rise and fall at gun-point. The trend is global -- and it is gathering speed.

This brutalization of political life takes on a particularly dangerous tone when it is driven by the clash of confrontational ideologies, and armed with sophisticated weapons. Weapons claiming an annual expenditure on the order of 600 billion dollars for nuclear and conventional arms combined. Weapons claiming too great a share of the budgets of impoverished Third World nations. Weapons which promote a rising tide of violence and engulf more peaceful ways to resolve disputes. That is the first trend: the brutalization of international relations.

The second trend is the steady unravelling of the international regime designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This proliferation has two fundamental directions. We call it vertical proliferation when we mean the development of ever-larger nuclear weapons programmes, ever more-advanced in destructive technology, by the five nuclear-weapons states: the USA, USSR, France, UK and China. We call it horizontal proliferation when we mean the potential spread of nuclear weapons to other states, especially to those who now have the capacity to produce nuclear arms, or soon will have that capacity.

We are today preoccupied mainly with the evident need to assert restraint over the arsenals of all five nuclear powers. But from a global perspective, and in the near term, the consequences of horizontal proliferation to other states, pose an equally grave threat. Perhaps more grave, since the use of nuclear weapons by other nations would be unchecked by the assurance of mutual destruction which obtains among the five powers.

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It was precisely to arrest both kinds of proliferation that a formal agreement -- the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- came into effect in 1970, and is up for review in 1985. That treaty represented an implicit covenant between those nations with nuclear weapons and those without: an undertaking by the nuclear powers that they would pursue negotiations in good faith on arms control and on limiting the spread of their weapons technology; and an undertaking by other states that they would forego the military use of nuclear energy in return for the benefits of its peaceful use, in fields such as energy, medicine, or agriculture.

But the trend is for this bargain to come unstuck. The treaty stands now at a cross-roads between peaceful aspiration and military strategy. It is the crossroads at which nuclear and non-nuclear countries -- East and West, North and South -- preoccupied with their survival, with their sovereignty, or with current conflicts, will decide whether the covenant still holds.

The third trend which threatens the global system is the worsening state of relations between East and West, particularly of relations between the two superpowers. Two weeks ago, when I spoke in Guelph, I deplored the absence of high politics in East-West relations, and the tendency for arms control negotiations to run their course outside any structure of understanding of, and respect for, each

other's security needs. I reaffirmed our fidelity to the NATO two-track decision, and declared my hope that we might add a "third rail" of political energy, of dialogue and of confidence, in order to improve the downward course of relations between East and West.

(TEXT)

So I ask you now to consider these three trends in relation to each other -- laminated together, as they are in real life. An increasing resort to the use of force. The growing reality of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And a superpower relationship charged with animosity. I believe it is evident that only a global approach to peace and security can reverse the path of this sinister, composite trend-line.

Because, as tensions build, the East-West relationship becomes particularly vulnerable to events on the periphery. An endemic instability is evident in areas largely understood to be the sphere of influence of one or the other superpower. At other flashpoints, such as the ever-volatile Middle East, we see the tinder for a spreading conflagration.

The penetration of East-West rivalry into the Third World will reach its deepest and most dangerous point if, despite the Non-Proliferation Treaty, front-line antagonists -- locked in rivalry or combat -- begin to arm themselves with nuclear weapons.

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(TRANSLATION)

As Canadians, our energies are deeply devoted to the security of the Western community, on this continent and in Europe. But our loyalties, our national and global interests, by no means end there.

Canada's place on the Pacific Rim gives us a privileged relationship with Japan, with China, and with the Association of South-East Asian Nations and, of course, with Australia and New Zealand. Our extensive programme of development assistance takes us to many parts of the world, remote in distance, but close in partnership. Our standing in the community of francophone nations, and in the Commonwealth, demands that we share the full range of political, economic and security concerns to which our national character gives us access.

That is why, in pursuing an initiative to improve the prospects for peace, I determined from the start that our approach must be global in scope and in perspective. Such an approach is dictated by the complex interlinkage of disarmament and development; of superpower animosity and Third World rivalries; of the resort to force and the availability of weapons; of nuclear balances in Europe and in Asia.

One man representing one country cannot promise a miracle, let alone deliver one. I have absolutely no illusions about the complexity of the issues in play. Nonetheless it is essential, in my judgement, to seek stability at a number of points along the downward trend-line, and to recognize that peace and security in the modern age are indivisible.

Moreover, I am not alone. Other leaders have joined their concerns with mine. There is a growing community of political leadership which is determined to subject the science of arms to the art of politics. I draw encouragement from the support of that community.

You will know that I have just returned from meetings in Europe with several leaders of the Atlantic Alliance, with His Holiness the Pope, and with Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands. I return from Europe with clear expressions of support for my initiative, confident that my sense of urgency is shared by our friends and allies. I found a particular consensus on the need to lay down a third rail of confidence and communication -- a rail charging our dealings with the other side with a current of political energy.

I took to my European colleagues for discussion, and for refinement in light of their own views, elements of a programme for political management of the current crisis. I return with the assurance of their personal attention to this programme. Let me set out some of the elements.

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The first is the need to establish, as soon as possible in the course of the coming year, a forum in which global limits might be negotiated for all five nuclear-weapons states. This proposal is without prejudice to the INF or START talks between the USA and USSR. But those talks, and rightly so, do not cover British, French or Chinese nuclear forces.

What we must seek to provide is a negotiating forum for those five states which recognizes the rights of the United States and the Soviet Union as strategic equals -- what a recent Trilateral Commission report calls "inevitable parity" between them -- and which provides a mutually acceptable and stable framework for the relationship between the forces of the other three states and those of the superpowers.

In this way neither Britain, nor France, nor China need fear that their forces will be subject to restraints which do not recognize their own national interests.

Once relative levels of armament were stabilized, I believe the five nuclear powers could begin to address the reductions called for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to consider measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic arms race.

A second element is remedial action to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself -- that covenant between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states which I mentioned a few minutes ago. The Treaty has been signed by some 119 nations. But a number of key states remain aloof, including several with the capacity now, or the potential soon, to develop their own nuclear arms.

If the five nuclear-weapons states could begin to strengthen their side of the non-proliferation bargain, then the rest of us could more easily bring good sense to bear on those who have not yet signed on. No doubt we need to increase the incentives for Third World states to forego nuclear weapons -- there must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development. And we shall also have to ensure that a full range of safeguards adequately governs the transfer, from all nuclear suppliers, of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The area of safeguards is one in which Canada has taken a leading part for many years, and will continue to do so.

Those two elements begin to address the global dimension of security in the nuclear age. But we must also recognize that there is in the heart of Europe a most dangerous concentration of forces -- conventional as well as nuclear. A war in Europe could destroy everything that each side desires to protect.

Throughout my talks with European leaders, there ran a common theme of concern at the present imbalance of conventional forces between the two sides. The Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO. There is an

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apprehension in Western Europe that the Warsaw Pact forces could be tempted to gamble on a conventionally-armed attack. They would throw down the challenge to Western leaders either of accepting defeat, or of being the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in our own defense.

As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. That is why we say that the nuclear threshold in Europe is too low. And of course we can never be certain that the use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre would not escalate rapidly to ever more-massive nuclear retaliation on an international scale. The conclusion we draw is that the best way to raise the nuclear threshold is to establish a more reasonable balance of the conventional forces on each side.

How then do we achieve this balance? This question prompts the third element of my approach. The simple, though expensive, answer is for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. I see this as a last resort. The far more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels, a task to which we have devoted the past ten years at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. There is today some sign of movement in those talks, but at far too slow a pace. Hard questions remain to be resolved. That is why I explored, with my colleagues in the Alliance, ways to break the deadlock in Vienna, ways to give fresh political impetus to the MBFR talks.

Another negotiating forum will open soon in Stockholm, this January. Its lengthy title, showing the complexity of its task, is the "Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe". It is imperative that this Conference not lose its way in litigation about procedures, or in the linguistics of technicality. In other words, we don't have to follow the same path with this conference, on disarmament in Europe, to which countries attach so much importance, as we have followed with the Vienna negotiations where, as I have said, we have talked for ten years without really arriving at an agreement. I have therefore proposed that we consider the merits of high-level political representation at the very start of the Stockholm negotiations. You see, I come back always to the notion of the third rail, the need to inject political will, and the presence of political people, into these debates. They have become debates among technicians, among weighers of balances, among nuclear accountants. These technical quarrels can harm the process, rather than giving it a real push, a political impetus, which I call the third rail.

Finally, a fourth element in my initiative flows from the strategy of suffocation which I first proposed to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. That strategy -- which still requires, and awaits, the support

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of the five nuclear powers for its implementation -- needs further elaboration to keep pace with technological advances. Arms control measures must address those new technologies which, by their very nature, would make stability a more elusive goal.

I have in mind a ban on the testing and deployment of those anti-satellite systems designed to operate at high altitude. Such weapons could attack the global communications which are of critical importance for crisis management. Destruction of the other side's command and control network, at a time of crisis, would leave him blind and mute at the very moment when stability demands awareness and response, not the panic reaction of "launch on warning."

That is the fear we have, when we think of destabilizing weapons of that kind. These are weapons or techniques which make an adversary feel unable or ill-equipped to respond to a nuclear attack from the other side. Whether the fear is that one's communication system will be disrupted, or that one's weapons will be rendered useless, the danger is that, in a moment of crisis, the side which feels threatened will launch its nuclear missiles before the other side has a chance to strike first. It is this fear which is aggravated by destabilizing technical advances such as high-altitude anti-satellite weapons.

Neither superpower has yet developed an anti-satellite system for high altitudes. An agreement not to do so is therefore still possible. No agreement means vast expenditure by both sides -- funds better spent on more worthy projects. No agreement means a further spiral of competition -- a competition particularly vulnerable to accident or miscalculation. Moreover an agreement could encourage movement toward negotiations about anti-satellite weaponry designed to operate at lower altitudes.

I am also concerned about another potentially destabilizing development, which is the possibility that new intercontinental strategic weapons may be so highly mobile as to be virtually invisible. This would call into question the ability of either side, or any international body, to verify arms control agreements. You see the paradox. These questions are so intellectually difficult that, too often, the public and their leaders are tempted to leave these problems to experts, to nuclear accountants, to the people who understand the technology, but who do not consider the political dimension of the issue. If missiles stay in one place, the enemy knows where they are, and could destroy them by launching a first strike, so that the side under attack could not respond with an attack of its own. One side would win the war simply by destroying the other's nuclear missiles.

That is why these weapons are destabilizing. You must use them or lose them. For that reason, making these missiles mobile also makes them more stabilizing weapons, in the sense that a first strike by the enemy would not destroy exactly where they are, and so he will not start a war, because the other side will

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still be able to send missiles back at him. That would assure the destruction of both sides, which is not in the interest of the side which might otherwise be tempted to launch a first strike.

But there is a farther paradox in the fact that, if these missiles are too mobile, you could not count them, even by using satellites. And if you cannot count them, neither side could verify that the other was respecting the treaties, such as SALT I, and other agreements which might be reached.

Canada continues to devote attention, and resources, to problems of verification which must be resolved if arms-control measures are to be durable and trusted. We believe that the prospects for arms control would be considerably enhanced if the verification factor were taken into account in the developmental stage of any new strategic system -- rather than leaving it to the point where systems are put on the bargaining table.

It is therefore my intention to introduce, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate disarmament forum, papers calling for (a) international agreement to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems; (b) to restrict excessive mobility of ICBMs; and (c) to require that future strategic weapon systems be fully verifiable by national technical means. That is to say that the space satellites of each side can see what is being prepared, constructed and developed on the other's territory.

These are measures of substance, often technical in their detail. But if we can generate a political impulse toward a five-power nuclear conference, toward renewed political commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, toward action at the MBFR talks to balance conventional forces and to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, toward a restriction of qualitative developments in strategic technology, and toward their verification, then we would have motivated a truly global and comprehensive approach to the crisis of peace and security.

It is essential, as I told my colleagues in Europe, that this interlocking programme, this safety net for our very survival, be guided by political leadership at the highest level. That our own consultations, and talks with others, be quickened by a jolt of political energy. That we work to identify steadily increasing areas of mutual interest, starting from our common humanity and our common fate on this earth.

(TEXT)

I return from Europe profoundly encouraged by the extent to which my purposes are shared by a community of other leaders. Therefore I would like to confirm tonight my intention to travel to Japan, to consult Prime Minister Nakasone in Tokyo next Saturday.

Japan's association with the Williamsburg Declaration last May, in which the leaders of the industrialized democracies agreed to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war, expresses both the resonance of history and the reality of the present day. My visit there will bear witness to the indivisibility of global security in the nuclear age.

I can also announce that, in addition to the consultations under way with the United States, I have initiated consultations with the Soviet Union and with China -- two nuclear powers upon which much depends.

I look forward to taking an active part in the discussion of peace and security issues at the New Delhi meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, where I will be heading after Japan. I look forward particularly to consultations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on the matter of non-proliferation, and on her perspective, as current chairman of the council of non-aligned nations, on the linkage between disarmament and development.

I am encouraged by this momentum, and heartened by the response. But I am also well aware that critics of my initiative have difficulty in grasping this step by step approach. Some would prefer the passionate embrace of an unattainable ideal. Others are paralyzed by the complexities of the issues in play. I believe that peace must be waged steadily, with caution and with realism. We must work with due respect for the fragility of political trust, for the importance of building carefully, for the need to search out common ground on which to stand.

The imperative of political action is made all the more urgent by the pace of conflict and confrontation, which threatens to overtake our ability to understand what is happening, and our capacity to manage it.

Let me remind you that when Alfred Nobel invented dynamite in 1867 he believed that the prospect of its military application was so awesome that governments would be forced to live in peace. And yet today we have long since lost the ability to comprehend the force of a nuclear blast in terms of any comparison with traditional explosives.

(TRANSLATION)

Peace and security are not cold abstractions. Their purpose is to preserve the future of mankind, the growth of the human spirit, and the patrimony of our planet.

The choice we face is clear and present. We can without effort abandon our fate to the mindless drift toward nuclear war. Or we can gather our strength, working in good company to turn aside the forces bearing down on us, on our children, on this Earth.

As for me, I choose to move forward, and I know I do so with your support.

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Le choix qui s'impose à nous est donc clair et pressant. Ou bien nous nous laissons entraîner par le courant aveugle qui nous mène à une guerre nucléaire, ou bien nous rassemblons nos énergies et nous travaillons ensemble à maîtriser les forces qui pèsent sur nous, sur nos enfants et sur le monde.

Quant à moi, j'ai fait mon choix. J'ai choisi de lutter. Je sais que je peux compter sur votre appui.

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La participation du Japon à la déclaration de Williamsburg, dans laquelle les dirigeants des pays industrialisés convenaient, en mai dernier, d'utiliser toutes leurs ressources politiques pour réduire les dangers de guerre, revêt un caractère historique et constitue un reflet du monde où nous vivons. Ma visite au Japon veut témoigner de l'indivisibilité de la sécurité universelle à l'ère atomique.

Je peux vous dire que, outre les consultations déjà en cours avec les États-Unis, j'ai pris contact avec l'Union soviétique et la Chine, deux puissances nucléaires dont tant de choses dépendent.

C'est avec empressement que je prendrai part aux discussions sur la paix et la sécurité lors de la conférence des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth, à New Delhi, où je me rendrai en quittant le Japon. Je suis particulièrement impatient de m'entretenir avec le premier ministre Indira Gandhi sur la question de la non-prolifération et de connaître ses vues, en tant que présidente du Conseil des pays non alignés, sur les liens à établir entre désarmement et développement.

Je suis satisfait des progrès accomplis et heureux de l'accueil réservé à mes propositions. Je suis néanmoins conscient des critiques que suscite chez certains commentateurs la démarche étapiste que nous favorisons. Certains lui préféreraient l'élan passionné en faveur d'un projet utopique. D'autres sont paralysés par la complexité des enjeux. Je suis d'avis qu'il faut "faire" la paix progressivement, avec prudence et réalisme. Nous devons éviter de brusquer une confiance politique des plus fragiles, et construire avec précaution en tâchant de nous retrouver sur un terrain commun et solide.

Une action politique s'impose avec d'autant plus d'urgence que la multiplication des conflits et des confrontations risque de déborder notre aptitude à comprendre ce qui se passe et notre capacité d'y remédier.

Lorsqu'il inventa la dynamite, en 1867, Alfred Nobel croyait que la perspective effarante d'une application militaire de sa découverte forcerait les nations à vivre en paix. Aujourd'hui la puissance d'une bombe nucléaire est sans commune mesure avec la force des explosifs classiques, et devant pareille démesure, notre esprit vacille.

(TEXTE)

La paix et la sécurité ne sont pas de froides abstractions. Elles sont la garantie de l'avenir de l'humanité, de l'épanouissement de l'esprit humain, de la survie de notre planète.

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Le Canada continue pour sa part à consacrer ses énergies et ses ressources à l'étude des problèmes de vérification, dont dépendent, je viens de l'expliquer, la durabilité et la crédibilité des mesures de contrôle. Et il constate comme tout le monde que la possibilité d'un contrôle véritable des armements se trouverait considérablement accrue si l'on se préoccupait des problèmes de vérification au moment de la mise au point d'un nouveau système stratégique plutôt que d'attendre l'étape des négociations.

J'ai donc l'intention de soumettre, en temps opportun et aux autorités compétentes en matière de désarmement, des documents réclamant une entente internationale en vue 1) d'interdire l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude, 2) de limiter la mobilité excessive des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux et 3) d'exiger que tout nouveau système d'armements stratégiques soit entièrement vérifiable par les moyens techniques nationaux, c'est-à-dire que les satellites qui se promènent en l'air voient ce qui se déploie, ce qui se prépare, ce qui se fabrique sur le sol de l'autre.

Il s'agit là de mesures importantes dont les détails sont souvent de nature technique. Mais, si nous parvenons à donner une impulsion politique à l'idée d'asseoir les cinq grands à une même table de négociation, si nous obtenons un nouvel engagement politique à l'égard du Traité sur la non-prolifération, si nous redonnons un élan aux négociations de Vienne sur la question de l'équilibre des forces classiques et du relèvement du seuil nucléaire en Europe, si enfin nous nous appliquons à restreindre les progrès qualitatifs dans le domaine de la technologie stratégique de façon à faciliter ou à favoriser la vérification, alors nous aurons suscité une approche vraiment globale des problèmes de paix et de sécurité.

Comme je l'ai souligné à mes collègues européens, il est essentiel que ce programme commun, ce filet de sécurité dont dépend notre survie, soit soutenu par les leaders politiques au plus haut niveau; que nos entretiens à l'échelle nationale et internationale reçoivent une véritable relance politique et que nous travaillions à définir les intérêts toujours plus nombreux qui nous rendent solidaires, à commencer par notre condition humaine et notre avenir commun sur cette planète.

(TRADUCTION)

Lors de ma tournée en Europe, j'ai été encouragé de voir à quel point mes objectifs rejoignaient ceux des leaders que j'ai rencontrés. Et j'aimerais confirmer ce soir mon intention de me rendre à Tokyo samedi prochain pour y rencontrer le premier ministre Nakasone.

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Quand nous parlons d'armes déstabilisatrices comme celles-là, c'est cela, la crainte que nous avons. Ce sont des armes ou des techniques qui font que l'ennemi se sentirait incapable ou insuffisant à répondre à une attaque atomique de l'autre camp. Et devant cette crainte, soit qu'on brise les communications, soit qu'on rende l'armement inutilisable. Le danger est que, dans un moment de tension, la partie qui se sent menacée lance ses bombes atomiques, ses engins nucléaires, avant de donner à l'autre la chance de faire un coup. Et c'est cette crainte qui est aggravée par des techniques déstabilisatrices comme celles des engins à haute altitude.

Or, aucune des superpuissances n'a encore mis au point un système anti-satellites à haute altitude. Une interdiction de le faire est donc encore possible. Sans une entente de ce genre, on devra dépenser, des deux côtés, des sommes énormes qui pourraient être employées à des fins plus constructives. Sans une entente, on se lancera dans une surenchère qui rendrait plus probables encore les accidents et les erreurs de calcul. Qui plus est, un succès à ce chapitre contribuerait à relancer les négociations sur les systèmes anti-satellites fonctionnant à basse altitude.

Une autre menace à la stabilité serait que les armes stratégiques intercontinentales deviennent tellement mobiles qu'il soit pratiquement impossible de les repérer. Cela pourrait remettre en question la capacité des deux camps, ou de tout organisme international, à vérifier l'application des ententes de limitation des armements. Vous voyez le paradoxe. C'est pourquoi ces questions sont tellement difficiles intellectuellement que trop souvent la population et les hommes politiques eux-mêmes sont tentés de les laisser à des experts, à des comptables, à des gens qui font la mesure de tout cela, mais qui n'y apportent pas cette dimension politique. Parce que si les armes sont trop fixes, évidemment l'ennemi sait où elles sont, et ces ogives nucléaires, on pourrait les détruire en commençant la guerre soi-même. On pourrait les détruire de sorte que l'autre ne pourrait pas répondre et on gagnerait la guerre contre lui en détruisant ses armes nucléaires.

C'est pourquoi ces armes sont déstabilisatrices. Il faut bien les lancer ou les perdre. "You use them or you lose them", comme dit le jargon. C'est pourquoi une certaine mobilité ramène la stabilité. Parce qu'elles sont mobiles, on sait que dans un premier coup, l'ennemi ne réussirait pas à les détruire. Il ne sait pas exactement où elles sont, et donc il ne commencerait pas une guerre, parce qu'on en aurait d'autres à lui renvoyer et que les deux pays seraient détruits, ce qui n'est pas intéressant pour celui qui commence. Mais le paradoxe intervient parce que si elles sont trop mobiles, même avec les satellites, on n'arrive plus à les compter. Et si on n'arrive plus à les compter, eh bien, on ne peut pas vérifier si l'autre respecte les traités et les ententes comme SALT I et les autres ententes qu'on pourrait conclure.

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La solution simple mais coûteuse serait d'augmenter les forces classiques des pays de l'Ouest jusqu'à ce qu'elles rejoignent celles du Pacte de Varsovie. Ce serait, bien sûr, un pis-aller. Car la façon la plus intelligente de procéder serait que les deux camps réduisent leurs forces classiques à des niveaux mutuellement acceptables. C'est précisément cet objectif que nous poursuivons depuis dix ans dans le cadre des négociations sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces, qui se déroulent à Vienne. Or, les choses avancent à un rythme beaucoup trop lent, et il reste des questions cruciales à trancher. C'est pourquoi j'ai exploré avec mes interlocuteurs les moyens de débloquent les négociations de Vienne en leur imprimant un vigoureux élan politique.

Il faut aussi savoir, à ce propos, qu'une autre négociation s'ouvrira à Stockholm bientôt, en janvier. Son seul titre de "Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe" indique la complexité des problèmes auxquels elle s'attaque. Il importe d'éviter, dès le départ, que cette conférence ne s'enlise dans les disputes de procédure ou le jargon technique. Il ne faut pas, autrement dit, que cette conférence sur le désarmement en Europe, à laquelle les pays attachent tellement d'importance, parte sur une voie qui sera celle de Vienne où, comme je viens de le dire, nous discutons depuis dix ans sans vraiment en arriver à un accord. J'ai donc proposé qu'on examine les avantages d'une présence politique à un haut niveau dès l'ouverture des discussions à Stockholm. Vous le voyez, il s'agit toujours de la troisième voie, celle qui dit qu'il faut injecter la volonté politique, la présence des hommes politiques dans ces débats, qui sont devenus des débats entre des techniciens, entre des peseurs d'équilibre, entre des comptables d'armes, et où on se perd dans les ergoteries de la technique plutôt que de vraiment donner une poussée, une impulsion politique, celle de la troisième voie.

Finalement, le quatrième élément de mon programme est lié à cette stratégie de l'asphyxie que j'ai proposée pour la première fois lors de la session extraordinaire des Nations Unies sur le désarmement, en 1978. Cette stratégie, dont la mise en oeuvre requiert et réclame toujours l'appui des cinq puissances nucléaires, doit être raffinée pour tenir compte des progrès de la technologie. Les mesures de contrôle des armements ne peuvent ignorer les nouvelles technologies qui, par leur nature même, nous éloigneraient de la stabilité que nous cherchons à établir.

Je songe donc à une entente pour interdire l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude. De telles armes, en effet, menacent l'ensemble des moyens de communication dont nous dépendons pour gérer les crises. Que -- pendant un conflit -- l'une ou l'autre des parties en présence soit privée de son réseau de commandement et de conduite des opérations, et elle se trouverait totalement démunie au moment même où le maintien de la stabilité dépendrait précisément de sa capacité de prévoir, de réagir et de ne pas céder à la panique pour riposter à l'aveuglette.

un certain nombre d'États importants n'y ont pas encore adhéré, dont plusieurs possèdent dès maintenant, ou posséderont bientôt les moyens de mettre au point leurs propres armes atomiques.

Si les cinq puissances nucléaires prenaient l'initiative de mieux respecter les obligations que leur impose le Traité sur la non-prolifération, nous, les autres signataires, pourrions plus facilement tenter de convaincre d'autres pays de signer. Il faudrait, sans aucun doute, trouver des moyens supplémentaires d'inciter les États du tiers monde à renoncer aux armes nucléaires. C'est pourquoi il nous faut établir un rapport direct entre le désarmement et le développement. Nous devons aussi veiller à ce que des garanties étendues et adéquates président à tout transfert de technologie nucléaire à des fins pacifiques, quel que soit le pays fournisseur. Le Canada, du reste, a fait un travail de pionnier dans ce domaine des garanties, et il continuera à oeuvrer à leur renforcement.

Les deux éléments du programme que je viens d'exposer portent sur la dimension planétaire de la sécurité à l'ère du nucléaire. Mais il faut aussi reconnaître qu'il y a, au coeur de l'Europe, une concentration alarmante de forces classiques aussi bien que nucléaires. Une guerre sur le vieux continent risquerait de détruire tout ce que chaque camp désire préserver.

Voilà pourquoi la question du déséquilibre actuel entre les forces classiques des deux camps est revenue fréquemment dans mes entretiens avec les dirigeants européens. Les forces classiques du Pacte de Varsovie étant nettement supérieures à celles de l'OTAN, on craint en Europe de l'Ouest que les pays du Pacte ne soient tentés de miser sur cette supériorité pour risquer une attaque. Les dirigeants occidentaux seraient alors acculés à un dilemme cornélien: ou bien accepter la défaite, ou bien être les premiers à déclencher une horrible guerre nucléaire.

Et tant que ce déséquilibre persistera, le risque d'un recours aux armes atomiques demeurera présent. C'est pourquoi nous affirmons que le seuil nucléaire est trop bas en Europe. Et, bien sûr, personne ne saurait être certain que l'utilisation d'armes atomiques sur le vieux continent ne mènerait pas à des représailles nucléaires de plus en plus massives à l'échelle internationale. Nous croyons donc que la meilleure façon de relever le seuil nucléaire, de rendre l'emploi des armes atomiques moins probable, moins proche, moins tentant, est d'établir un équilibre plus raisonnable entre les forces classiques alignées de part et d'autre.

Comment, dès lors, réaliser cet équilibre? Voilà la question à laquelle tente de répondre le troisième élément de mon programme.

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Heureusement, je ne suis pas seul à penser ainsi. D'autres dirigeants partagent ces préoccupations, et un nombre croissant d'entre eux sont décidés à subordonner la science de la guerre à l'art de la politique. Leur appui m'encourage.

Vous n'ignorez pas que je rentre d'Europe, où j'ai eu des entretiens avec les dirigeants d'un certain nombre de pays de l'Alliance atlantique, avec Sa Sainteté le Pape et avec Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas. Eh bien, je reviens au Canada avec le sentiment que nos amis et alliés appuient mon initiative de paix et partagent ma conviction quant à l'urgence de la situation. Ils sont d'accord en particulier sur la nécessité d'ajouter à notre stratégie une troisième voie pour rétablir la confiance et les communications entre les parties.

J'ai soumis à mes collègues européens, afin qu'ils puissent les étudier et les raffiner en fonction de leur propre expérience, les éléments d'un programme de gestion de la crise actuelle. Permettez-moi de vous exposer quelques-uns de ces éléments que mes interlocuteurs se sont engagés à examiner personnellement.

Le premier porte sur la nécessité de créer, aussitôt que possible au cours de l'année prochaine, une tribune pour la négociation des limites globales à fixer aux arsenaux des cinq États nucléaires. Ce projet est sans préjudice des négociations sur les forces nucléaires de portée moyenne et des pourparlers START entre les États-Unis et l'URSS, ces entretiens ne s'étendant pas, et c'est normal, aux forces nucléaires de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France et de la Chine.

Ce que nous devons rechercher pour ces cinq États, c'est une tribune de négociation qui reconnaîtrait le droit des États-Unis et de l'URSS à l'égalité stratégique, ou à ce qu'un récent rapport de la Commission trilatérale appelait "la parité inévitable". Une tribune qui fournirait un cadre stable, légitime et mutuellement acceptable où puisse s'établir un rapport entre les forces des superpuissances et celles des trois autres États dotés d'armes nucléaires.

Ainsi, ni la Grande-Bretagne, ni la France, ni la Chine n'aurait à craindre que ses forces soient soumises à des restrictions décrétées sans tenir compte de ses intérêts nationaux.

Une fois établis les rapports entre les niveaux d'armements des cinq puissances nucléaires, elles pourraient commencer à discuter des réductions prévues dans le Traité sur la non-prolifération, ainsi que des mesures pour contrôler l'aspect qualitatif de la course aux armes stratégiques.

Le deuxième élément du programme serait de renforcer le Traité sur la non-prolifération, ce pacte dont je vous ai déjà parlé entre les pays dotés d'armes nucléaires et ceux qui n'en ont pas. Quelque 119 nations ont signé ce Traité, mais

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Avec la montée de la tension, en effet, les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest sont particulièrement sensibles aux événements survenant à la périphérie. On constate une instabilité endémique dans des régions généralement reconnues comme faisant partie de la sphère d'influence de l'une ou de l'autre superpuissance. Dans d'autres points volatiles du globe, le Moyen-Orient en est l'exemple patent, tous les éléments d'une conflagration se trouvent réunis.

Et l'extension au tiers monde des rivalités entre l'Est et l'Ouest atteindra son point culminant et le plus dangereux si, malgré le Traité sur la non-prolifération, les forces en présence -- belligérants ou simples antagonistes -- commencent à se doter d'armes nucléaires.

(TEXTE)

Certes, en tant que Canadiens, nous sommes avant tout attachés à la communauté occidentale; nous recherchons d'abord la sécurité sur ce continent et en Europe. Mais notre loyauté, nos intérêts nationaux et internationaux, ne s'arrêtent pas là.

Notre ouverture sur le Pacifique nous assure des relations privilégiées avec le Japon, la Chine, l'Association des Nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est et, bien entendu, l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande. Notre vaste programme d'aide au développement s'étend à de nombreux pays éloignés géographiquement sans doute, mais rapprochés par les liens étroits qu'ils entretiennent avec le Canada. Notre place au sein de la francophonie et du Commonwealth nous invite à partager les préoccupations politiques et économiques et les besoins de sécurité des pays que nous y côtoyons.

C'est pourquoi, avant même de tenter un geste pour améliorer les perspectives de paix, j'ai décidé que notre démarche devait adopter une perspective globale. Une telle approche nous est dictée par l'interaction complexe entre le désarmement et le développement, entre l'animosité des superpuissances et leurs rivalités au sein du tiers monde, entre le recours à la force et la disponibilité des armes, entre l'équilibre nucléaire en Europe et celui en Asie.

Il est certain, mes chers amis, que le représentant d'un seul pays ne peut promettre de miracle, et encore moins en accomplir. Je ne me fais aucune illusion sur la complexité des problèmes en cause. J'estime toutefois essentiel de rechercher des crans d'arrêt sur la pente descendante où nous sommes engagés, de reconnaître qu'à notre époque, la paix et la sécurité sont indissociables, et de constater que sur ce point aussi nos pays sont interdépendants.

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Notre principale préoccupation aujourd'hui est évidemment de limiter les arsenaux des cinq puissances nucléaires. Mais, d'un point de vue mondial et à court terme, les conséquences de la prolifération horizontale, celle qui s'étendrait à d'autres États, apparaissent tout aussi graves. En fait, elles le sont peut-être davantage, car les petites puissances nucléaires ne seraient pas retenues, comme le sont les cinq grandes, par la certitude d'une destruction mutuelle et finale si elles avaient recours à leurs armes nucléaires.

La conclusion du Traité sur la non-prolifération, qui est entré en vigueur en 1970 et qui doit être révisé en 1985, visait précisément à empêcher la prolifération horizontale aussi bien que verticale. Ce traité était en fait un pacte implicite entre les États dotés d'armes nucléaires et ceux qui n'en ont pas. D'un côté, les puissances nucléaires s'engageaient à négocier de bonne foi des limites sur le nombre et la diffusion de leurs armes nucléaires. De leur côté, les autres États convenaient de renoncer à l'emploi du nucléaire à des fins militaires, à condition de pouvoir en bénéficier dans des secteurs pacifiques comme ceux de l'énergie, de la médecine, de l'agriculture.

Mais tiraillé entre les exigences de la paix et les impératifs de la guerre, ce pacte, qui remonte encore une fois à 1970, est bien près de se rompre. Les États tant nucléaires que non nucléaires, ceux de l'Est comme de l'Ouest, ceux du Nord comme du Sud, en sont maintenant au point où ils doivent décider si le pacte tient toujours, si leur besoin de survivre doit primer sur l'idée qu'ils se font de leur souveraineté.

La troisième des tendances qui comportent un danger pour l'ensemble de la planète est la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest, plus particulièrement des rapports entre les deux superpuissances. Dans un discours prononcé à Guelph, il y a deux semaines, je déplorais l'absence de haute politique dans les relations Est-Ouest, et la tendance de chacune des parties à négocier la limitation des armements sans faire d'effort pour comprendre les besoins de sécurité de l'autre. J'ai réaffirmé notre adhésion à la stratégie à deux voies de l'OTAN et exprimé l'espoir qu'on en ajoute une troisième, la voie de la volonté politique, du dialogue et de la confiance, afin de contrer cette dégradation dans les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

(TRADUCTION)

Si l'on examine ensemble les trois tendances que je viens de mentionner, recours accru à la force, risque grandissant de prolifération des armes nucléaires et rapports imprégnés d'animosité entre les superpuissances, on s'aperçoit qu'elles convergent et nous mènent à la catastrophe. Il devient dès lors évident que seule une approche globale des problèmes de paix et de sécurité peut renverser le cours sinistre de ces tendances.

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Mais les gouvernements de ces 160 pays sont loin d'être les seuls protagonistes sur la scène mondiale. Une multitude d'alliances, d'associations régionales, d'institutions internationales comme les Nations Unies, de sociétés multinationales, de cartels, de groupes de pression de toute sorte veulent avoir leur mot à dire.

En fait, nous voulons tous, vous, moi, nos amis, nos familles, nos compatriotes, les gouvernements et les entreprises, nous voulons avoir notre part de bonheur sur cette planète où se jouent nos espoirs et nos angoisses, nos échecs et nos réussites. Mais trois grandes tendances se profilent à l'horizon qui risquent, en se conjuguant, de provoquer une chute de rideau sur ce que Balzac appelait la comédie humaine.

La première de ces tendances est le recours croissant à la force pour régler les différends internationaux. Malgré la déclaration solennelle de la Charte des Nations Unies, demandant que "les membres de l'Organisation s'abstiennent, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force", nous avons connu, depuis 1945, quelque 130 conflits qui ont entraîné la perte de quelque 35 millions de vies humaines.

L'habitude de l'agression se répand et de plus en plus le processus politique cède la place aux solutions militaires. La belligérance et les propos menaçants font florès et les gouvernements naissent et tombent par les armes. La tendance est universelle, et elle va en s'accroissant.

Cette brutalisation de la vie politique devient particulièrement inquiétante lorsqu'elle s'enracine dans des conflits entre idéologies irréconciliables et qu'elle est soutenue par des armes sophistiquées, nucléaires ou classiques, dont la fabrication absorbe annuellement quelque 600 milliards de dollars. Des armes qui engloutissent une tranche beaucoup trop importante des budgets des pays du tiers monde et qui, par leur nature même, incitent à la violence plutôt qu'au règlement pacifique, c'est-à-dire politique, des conflits. C'est la première tendance, celle de la brutalisation des rapports internationaux.

La deuxième tendance est l'effritement accéléré du régime international destiné à prévenir la prolifération des armes nucléaires.

Cette prolifération revêt une double dimension. Nous l'appelons verticale pour désigner la mise sur pied, par les cinq États nucléaires, États-Unis, URSS, France, Royaume-Uni et Chine, de programmes d'armement nucléaire toujours plus ambitieux, toujours plus perfectionnés dans leur puissance de destruction. Et nous parlons de prolifération horizontale pour caractériser la propagation des armes nucléaires dans les autres États, surtout ceux qui sont sur le point d'en fabriquer ou qui auront bientôt la capacité de le faire.

**TRANSCRIPTION DE L'ALLOCUTION PRONONCÉE PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE SUR LA PAIX ET LE
DÉSARMEMENT, À L'HÔTEL REINE ÉLIZABETH, MONTRÉAL, LE DIMANCHE 13 NOVEMBRE 1983**

(TEXTE)

Mesdames, Messieurs, ladies and gentlemen, mes chers collègues, mes chers amis,

Je voudrais tout d'abord vous remercier de votre accueil. Je dois dire qu'après un voyage comme celui que j'ai fait, c'est réconfortant de se retrouver parmi les siens et de recevoir un tel accueil.

Je remercie aussi Marc Lalonde d'avoir dit des choses aimables à mon égard et de la direction qu'ensemble nous avons essayé de donner au parti. Marc est un ami, alors ça explique en partie les belles choses qu'il a dites de moi. C'est également un grand ministre des Finances, qui est parfois lui aussi appelé à voyager à l'étranger. Il y a à peine quelques mois, il nous revenait des sommets de la Banque mondiale et du Fonds monétaire international et des réunions des ministres des Finances du Commonwealth. Il revenait des Caraïbes, il revenait de Washington et je dois dire que ses discours étaient alors moins intéressants que quand il revient de Kénogami et de Jonquière. Si on ne fait pas attention, ce ministre va se transformer en tribun.

Eh bien, aujourd'hui les rôles sont un peu renversés parce qu'au cours des dernières années, j'ai souvent profité de ces rencontres pour faire le point sur le Québec, sur le Canada -- parfois d'une façon un peu tapageuse. Aujourd'hui, au contraire, je voudrais vous faire un certain rapport du voyage que j'ai fait. Je voudrais vous parler de paix et de désarmement et vous amener à réfléchir comme habitants d'un monde en désarroi.


Cette rencontre d'aujourd'hui s'inscrit dans la longue tradition démocratique de notre pays, et votre présence ici témoigne de la vigueur de ces traditions de liberté dans la diversité -- traditions qui font notre force et nous donnent confiance en l'avenir.

Si cet avenir ne dépendait que de nous, nous pourrions dormir en paix. Mais de nos jours, aucun État ne peut se targuer d'être seul maître de son destin. Nous partageons cette terre avec quelque 160 autres pays, et cette cohabitation entraîne une interaction à l'échelle planétaire qui influe sur notre sécurité et sur notre économie, comme sur la qualité de notre environnement et de notre vie.

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Insert for Speech - 15 November, Montreal

MBFR - Conventional Dual Track



How then can we start to restore confidence to our peoples, to assure them that events are not out of our control, to show them that though the climate is sombre now, there is considerable hope for the future? There is no single answer to this question, no "quick fix". But there are several areas where a start could be made. I referred to some of these two week ago in Guelph, and I have discussed them with our allies since then. I would like to share some of these ideas with you tonight.

The forces facing each other in Europe today are almost unbelievably powerful. Both sides' conventional forces are armed with modern highly accurate and sophisticated weapons which would cause terrible destruction if they were ever used. And, beyond that, both sides have thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal. A war in Europe - if each side used all their available weapons - would destroy everything that each side wished to protect.

NATO was formed to prevent such a war occurring, and that, of course, is still our goal. But in the age of nuclear weapons, we must try not only to prevent all war, we must also take what measures we can to prevent a war which does start from escalating to a devastating nuclear exchange.

- 2 -

Modern conventional war would be terrible beyond any previous human experience - but it would be, conceptually, containable; talks to end the fighting could still take place; it would be devastating but there would still be hope, and there would still be the prospect that with the end of hostilities recovery would be possible.

Therefore, while seeking to prevent all war we must also continue to try to make nuclear war totally unthinkable.

The danger in Europe at present is that the forces of the two sides are not in balance. The Warsaw Pact's conventional forces are considerably stronger than NATO's forces. If - by some tragic accident or misjudgement - if Warsaw Pact forces advanced into Western Europe, NATO forces could not resist for long without using nuclear weapons. The choice would be to accept defeat or to use nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe.

In other words, at present the nuclear threshold is very low, frighteningly low. The only way to raise that threshold is to have a better balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. If we could arrive at a reasonably close balance between the two sides' conventional forces we would simultaneously achieve several very worthwhile objectives:

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- we would raise the nuclear threshold - should war occur - because we would be capable of defending ourselves without resorting to nuclear weapons.
- We would considerably reduce the possibility of any war because the Warsaw Pact could not possibly be tempted to gamble - as they could now - that we would accept defeat rather than be the first to use nuclear weapons. A conventional force balance between East and West would substantially reduce the temptation for either side to use force.
- NATO would be able to re-examine the utility of its current nuclear strategy. A strategy that is becoming less militarily credible with each passing year.

How then do we achieve a better balance? The simple though expensive answer is for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. I see this as a last resort. The sane approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed equal levels.

This is the objective of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction - the MBFR - talks that have been going on between the two sides in Vienna since 1973. I am proposing to our allies that we make a determined effort to get these talks off dead-centre, to inject political will into talks that have degenerated into arcane discussions between experts - with no end in sight.

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Both sides have everything to gain and nothing to lose from an agreement to reduce their forces to equal and verifiable levels. The numbers now being discussed are less than a million men on each side. The Warsaw Pact agrees that they would have to reduce more than NATO. It has agreed also that there must be verification measures put in place to prevent either side from secretly strengthening its forces.

In other words, both sides agree in principle on what must be done. This does not mean that we are on the verge of an agreement; a detailed treaty will still be difficult to write so as to satisfy both sides. But it does mean that the prospects for agreement are sufficiently realistic to make it worthwhile for leaders in both East and West to devote their personal attention to the MBFR talks.

Even if an agreement is reached at MBFR, the major disagreement between the Super powers about nuclear weapons will remain to be resolved, and that will not be easy. But even a minor agreement at the MBFR talks should help to change the climate somewhat, to prove that East and West know they must live together on this planet, and to show the peoples of the world that dialogue - fruitful dialogue - is still possible between East and West.


It is with that aim in mind: the re-establishment of fruitful dialogue that I am also proposing...



THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1983

The Right Honorable
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa



Dear Pierre:

Your Embassy was kind enough to send me a copy of your address at Guelph of October 27. I recall with pleasure our conversation on the subject of East-West relations, and was most impressed by the way you had expanded these thoughts in your address.

There is a sense of tension in the world -- much of it, I believe, growing out of Soviet reluctance to adjust to a U.S. which is now more actively espousing vital free world interests. You are perfectly right in asserting that increased tension must not be allowed to choke off dialogue, and I believe it is highly useful for statesmen like yourself to work actively to see if new forms of dialogue can be developed.

Thank you very much for sharing your speech and you have my best wishes as you seek to implement its central concerns.

Sincerely,

George Bush

P3

Sorry we missed
on Maine.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MGTC N. FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	121	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0146 15NOV83	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> <p>28-6-1-Thudreau Place Mission</p> <p>DELIVER BY 160900</p> </div>	
TO/A	TO BNATO ANKRA ATHNS MDRID OSLO COPEN LISBON		
INFO	INFO VMBFR GENEV WSHDC, PARIS, BONN, ROME, BRU, HAGUE		
DISTR	DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA RPR		
REF			
SUBJ/SUJ	<p>---PM INITIATIVE</p> <p>COPIED BELOW IS FIVE POWER BACKGROUND PAPER ALREADY PASSED TO AUTHORITIES OF USA, UK, FRANCE, ITALY, NETHS, BELGIUM, FRG. YOU MAY PASS TO AUTHORITIES TO WHOM YOU ARE ACCREDITED.</p> <p>2. DEFINITIVE VERSION OF NOV13 SPEECH WILL FOLLOW ASAP.</p> <p>3. FOR BNATO: YOU MAY DISTRIBUTE IN NAC.</p> <p>4. SPEECH WILL FOLLOW ASAP.</p> <p>(COMCENTRE PLSE COPY ATTACHED DOCUMENT).</p>		

16 NOV 83 01 35Z

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

K. CALDER

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

001016

FIVE POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCEI Subject:

This paper describes the substance of an initiative which could result in a structure of arms limitation for the five declared nuclear weapons states.

II Background

Arms control negotiations designed to limit strategic nuclear weapons have thus far only taken place between the Superpowers. The other three declared nuclear weapons states (France, Great Britain and China) have not been involved, and their arsenals remain unconstrained by international agreement.

III The Proposal

A framework for the regulation of nuclear forces would lend overall predictability to the strategic balance, thereby reducing incentives to increase deterrent forces. Should negotiations produce a ratio of allowed strategic forces as between the parties, the expansion of forces beyond these mutually agreed levels would be constrained. This predictability, and the quantitative ceiling on national forces, would in turn increase the chances for meaningful arms reductions.

This initiative is designed to avoid the serious pitfalls contained in other proposals of this type. These include: the unacceptable aggregation of British, French and U.S. forces; the discussion of the forces of other states in bilateral fora; and unwarranted and unacceptable restraints on national deterrents in the absence of significant reductions in Superpower forces.

The following are designed to serve as general guidelines and considerations bearing upon the substance and process for negotiations designed to create an agreement on global nuclear arms limitation.

Process

- (a) Formal negotiations should be preceded by working-group consultations designed to set the agenda, terms of reference, and guiding principles of subsequent talks.
- (b) These initial meetings should be convened without substantive preconditions except for agreement as to the overall purpose of the process. Preconditions as to substance are to be avoided since these may well decrease incentives to participate.

- 2 -

- (c) Talks should not be conducted on a bloc-to-bloc basis, but on the basis of individual state participation. Each state would retain a veto on the substance of any agreements.

Substance

- (a) The overall purpose of the negotiations would be to reach agreement on fixed ratios of national strategic forces.
- (b) In order to secure Superpower agreement, those ratios would have to reflect Superpower de jure equality, thereby avoiding the deficiencies of such approaches as the current Soviet INF proposals.
- (c) Actual ratios should be the subject of negotiations.
- (d) The unit of account should be left open to negotiation, but agreement would be most likely if "warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles" were to be adopted as the unit of measurement. This would have the virtue of corresponding to Western and Soviet principles in the INF and START negotiations; of encouraging a move towards less vulnerable, single-warhead systems and away from vulnerable and destabilizing MIRVed systems; of preventing circumvention of the intent of the agreement through placing a larger number of warheads on a fixed number of launchers; and of not "handicapping" British, French, and Chinese forces which generally have less MIRV potential.
- (e) Currently planned modernization programs would have to be accommodated within the negotiated ratios, in order to secure agreement.
- (f) These negotiations and the resulting agreement should not be a substitute for ongoing START and INF talks, or their successors, but rather a complement. Should circumstances dictate, the agreement could be renegotiated to reflect the outcome of these other negotiations. These other agreements could not, however, violate the agreed limits contained in the global accord. They might, however, result in additional constraints and measures designed to reduce weaponry beyond those measures agreed to in the five-power agreement.
- (g) Parties should be entitled to withdraw from the agreement given adequate notification (to be negotiated) in situations of perceived threat to their national security.

- 3 -

- (h) Qualitative modernization programs which did not violate the agreed ratios should be allowed, subject to the other arms control agreements.
- (i) All air, land, and sea-based systems deemed through negotiations to be strategic in nature should be included.
- (j) If forces of less than intercontinental range were deemed to be strategic by the participants, they could be aggregated with those of intercontinental range with a freedom to deploy systems wherever this was deemed desirable by the parties, subject to the restrictions of other arms control agreements. (This could force a tradeoff between Superpower intercontinental and theatre forces which could both dampen incentives for an arms race in the European theatre, and at the same time allow some asymmetries in the theatre deployments which could solve some of the problems arising in the current INF negotiations in Geneva).
- (k) It would probably be necessary (and desirable) to attach specific numerical totals to the agreed ratios, thereby precluding quantitative increases beyond the agreed ratios which would legitimize proportional increases in the size of the forces of other parties.
- (l) In order to accomodate ongoing arms control efforts, the establishment of precise ratios may have to await the outcome of the START and INF negotiations. These negotiations will provide the necessary predictability for the establishment of realistic ratios. In order to provide incentives for agreement in START and the INF talks, it would be desirable if the Superpowers committed themselves to global talks as part of these other agreements, should they be negotiated.
- (m) Other agreed qualitative restraints could be negotiated as desired by the parties, as could collateral measures designed to enhance crisis management and increase confidence between the parties. These might include:
 - (i) a ban on high altitude ASAT systems.
 - (ii) a requirement for verifiability by National Technical Means
 - (iii) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

UNQUOTE



MGTC FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0145 15NOV83	<div>28-6-1-Hudson Peace Mission</div> <div>NOV 83 0135Z</div>	
TO/À	TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 160000		
INFO	INFO PC00TT/FOWLER/DURAND PM00TT/DURDIN/SMITH RCMPOTT/VIP5		
DISTR	DISTR USS DMF PGB PPD PPR IDD XDV MGT IFB		
REF	REF YOURTEL UIGR2231 NOV 15		
SUBJ/SUJ	---PM S INITIATIVE: MTG WITH PM NAKASONE DISCUSSION WITH PM NAKASONE IS INTENDED TO RELATE TO PM S INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. AS WAS CASE IN EUROPE IT IS NOT/NOT PM S INTENTION TO DISCUSS BILATERAL ISSUES. 2. PM S PERSONAL REP FOR INITIATIVE, GEOFFREY PEARSON AND MEMBER OF TASK ^{FORCE} GARY SMITH (DIRECTOR IDA) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO PM S DELEGATION AND WILL ^{TRAVELLING} BE ONWARD SEPARATELY TO PEKING AND MOSCOW AFTER MTGS IN TOKYO. 3. YOU SHD ACCORDINGLY BOOK APPROPRIATE ROOMS AT OKURA FOR PEARSON AND SMITH, WHO WILL ARRIVE WITH PM, FOR NIGHTS NOV 18 AND 19. THEY WILL DEPART FOR PEKING NOV 20 AT 1000 HRS ON JAL 781. 4. WE CONCUR WITH NEW JPNSE PROPOSAL OF ATTENDANCE AT MTG OF SEVEN PLUS INTERPRETER. CDN SIDE AT MTG SHD INCLUDE: PM TRUDEAU; AMB STEERS; MR. M. MASSE; MR. G. PEARSON; MR. R. R. FOWLER; MR. J. A. WHITTLETON; AND MR. ^G SMITH. EIGHTH PERSON ADDED TO LUNCH SHD BE PM S EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT MR J. E. JOHNSON. PLS NOTE THAT MR. T. AXWORTHY NOW WILL NOT/NOT BE ACCOMPANYING PM ON TRIP.		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G. SMITH

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L. A. BELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flècheSECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ
CONFIDENTIAL

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0142 15NOV83

TO/À TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 180900

INFO INFO PC00TT/FOWLER

REF DISTR RBD IFB

SUBJ/SUJ REF: OURTEL 1DDZ 0123 NOV 12/83
---PM INITIATIVE

PEARSON WILL BE ACCOMPANIED TO MOSCO BY GARY J SMITH (DIRECTOR OF IDA AND MEMBER OF TASK FORCE WHO ACCOMPANIED PM ON EUROPEAN TRIP) AND BY BGEN MAURICE ARCHDEACON (MEMBER OF TASK FORCE AND NUMBER 2 OFFICIAL IN PCO FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE SECRETARIAT).

2. ETA TO BE CONFIRMED SUBSEQUENTLY BUT PEARSON AND SMITH WILL LIKELY ARRIVE FROM TOKYO ON 24NOV AFTER HAVING BEEN IN PEKING.

ARCHDEACON WILL ARRIVE SEPARATELY FROM WESTERN EUROPE EITHER 23 OR 24-NOV. GIVEN SENSITIVITY OF HIS PREVIOUS POSITION(UNTIL JULY 1983 CHEF DE CABINET OF CHAIRMAN OF NATO MILITARY CTTEE) GRATEFUL HE BE MET AT AIRPORT.

3. ETD TO BE ADVISED BUT WE ARE LOOKING AT DEPARTURES LATE AFTERNOON OF 26NOV OR 27NOV IF POSSIBLE.

4. GRATEFUL YOU MAKE APPROPRIATE ACCOMMODATION ARRANGEMENTS.

28-6-1-140000 Peace mission

12 16 NOV 83 0134Z 10

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG GARY J. SMITH:pec

IDDZ

55912

SIG L.A.DELVOIE



MF

TO/À The Canadian Embassy,
 WASHINGTON

FROM/DE • Under-Secretary of State for External
 Affairs, OTTAWA

REFERENCE • Lysyshyn/Delvoie telecon of November 15.
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Initiative: Discussion Papers
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL-CDN EYES ONLY
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
November 15, 1983
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0143

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

w/o attach

IFB
IDA
IDR
URR

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

--- We attach for your information four background discussion papers prepared in connection with the Prime Minister's Initiative on East-West Relations and International Security.

2. For the time being, these papers are for your information only. The three 'suffocation strategy' papers may eventually be introduced into an appropriate UN disarmament forum but no decision has yet been made as to when this will be done or in what form these papers will eventually be presented.

402 *Paul H. Delvoie*
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flècheSECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0142 15NOV83

TO/À TO PEKIN DELIVER BY 16¹²00

INFO PC00TT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPY TOKYO

REF DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB PGB PED PER PPR RGB RCD RBR IDR IDA CPC

SUBJ/SUJ REF YOURTEL WJGR0844 14NOV

---PM INITIATIVE

AMB PEARSON WILL BE ACCOMPANIED TO PEKIN BY GARY J SMITH, DIRECTOR
IDA AND MEMBER OF TASK FORCE WHO ACCOMPANIED PM TO EUROPE).

2. ETA PEKIN 1310 HOURS SUNDAY 20NOV EX TOKYO ON FLIGHT JAL781.

ETD YET TO BE DETERMINED BUT PLAN ON DEPARTING PEKING, IF POSSIBLE,

LATE AFTERNOON TUES 22NOV PROVIDING THIS DOES NOT/NOT CONFLICT

WITH MTG WITH MIN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHICH IS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT

OF VISIT.

28-6-1-*Hydram*
Peace
Mission

16 NOV 83 0135Z

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDDZ

55912

SIG L.A. DELVOIE

MF

TO/A
FROM/DE
REFERENCE
SUBJECT

MPD (Mme. Despard)
IDDZ
Visas for USSR - PM Special Task Force

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

Security/Sécurité	RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	15 November 1983
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0141

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

Attached are completed visa forms for travel to the Soviet Union by members of the Prime Minister's Special Task Force, as follows:

Mr. G.A.H. Pearson) passports forwarded to you
Mr. G.J. Smith) earlier today

and

BGen M.D. Archdeacon (of the Privy Council Office whose travel arrangements are being made by PMO)

2. Also attached is BGen Archdeacon's passport. (DD026867 2).

L.A. Delvoie
L.A. Delvoie,
Chairman,
Task Force Working Group

КОНСУЛЬСТВО (консульский отдел посольства) СССР в _____

страна _____

Дата начала действия визы: _____

Дата окончания действия визы: _____

Place for
photograph

Questionnaire

ВИЗОВАЯ АНКЕТА

Full answers to all questions should be typed or clearly written in ink
Писать четко. Обязательное требование: все ответы должны быть записаны для заполнения графы

Nationality	CANADIAN	Национальность	
Present citizenship (if you had USSR citizenship when and why you lost it)	CANADIAN	Гражданство (если Вы имели гражданство СССР, то когда и в связи с чем его утратили)	
Surname (in capital Letters) (if you changed your surname what was it before the change)	ARCHDEACON	Фамилия (если изменяли, то Ваша фамилия до изменения)	
First name, patronymic (if you changed your name and patronymic what were they before the change)	MAURICE DUNSTAN	Имя, отчество (имена) (если изменяли, то Ваше имя и отчество до изменения)	
Day, month, year of birth	8.1.34	Sex	M
Object of journey, to the USSR	Consultations with Soviet Government	Цель поездки в СССР	
USSR, department, organizations proposed to be visited	Foreign Ministry	В какое учреждение	
Route of journey (points of destination)	Zurich-Moscow-Delhi	Маршрут следования (в пункты)	
Date of entry	22.11.83	Date of departure	26/27.11.83
Profession	Member of Prime Minister's Task Force	Профессия	
Position	Privy Council Office	Должность	
Place of birth (if you were born in the USSR, when, where and from what place you emigrated)	Liverpool, UK	Место рождения (если Вы родились в СССР, то когда, куда и из какого населенного пункта эмигрировали)	
Passport №		Паспорт №	
Maiden name		Девичья фамилия	
Husband's name		Фамилия мужа	
Index and name of the tourist group		Индекс, наименование туристской группы	
Date of the last visit to the USSR	Never	Когда были в СССР последний раз	
Place of work	Privy Council Office	Место работы	
Permanent address	Langevin Building, Ottawa	Адрес постоянного местожительства	

	Surname Фамилия	First name, patronymic Имя, отчество (имена)	Date of birth Дата рождения	Permanent address Адрес места жительства
Children under 16 years travelling with you				
Дети до 16 лет, сле- дующие с вами				
Relatives in the USSR				
Ваши родственники в СССР				

I declare that the data given in the Questionnaire are correct
Я заявляю, что данные, указанные в анкете, являются правильными

Date 15.11.83
Дата

[Signature]
Personal signature
Личная подпись

КОМПЕТЕНТНОСТЬ (консульский отдел посольства) СССР в _____

страна _____

Дата начала действия визы: _____

Дата окончания действия визы: _____

Place for
photograph

Questionnaire

ВИЗОВАЯ АНКЕТА

Full answers to all questions should be typed or clearly written in ink Писать четко, обязательно черными или синими чернилами или на машинке в прописных или заглавных буквах	Nationality	CANADIAN	Национальность			
	Present citizenship (if you had USSR citizenship when and why you lost it)	CANADIAN	Гражданство (если Вы имели гражданство СССР, то когда и в связи с чем его утратили)			
	Surname (in capital letters) (if you changed your surname what was it before the change)	SMITH	Фамилия (если изменили, то Ваша фамилия до изменения)			
	First name, patronymic (if you changed your name and patronymic what were they before the change)	GARY JAMES	Имя, отчество (имена) (если изменили, то Ваше имя и отчество до изменения)			
	Day, month, year of birth	8.10.83	Sex	M	Дата рождения	Пол
	Object of journey, to the USSR	Consultations with Soviet Government	Цель поездки в СССР			
	USSR, department, organisations proposed to be visited	Foreign Ministry	В какое учреждение			
	Route of journey (points of destination)	Ottawa-Tokyo-Moscow	Маршрут следования (в пункты)			
	Date of entry	24.11.83	Date of departure	26/27.11.83	Дата въезда	Дата выезда
	Profession	Diplomat	Профессия			
	Position	Member of Prime Minister's Task Force	Должность			
	Place of birth (if you were born in the USSR, when, where and from what place you emigrated)	Toronto, Ontario, Canada	Место рождения (если Вы родились в СССР, то когда и из какого населенного пункта эмигрировали)			
	Passport №		Паспорт №			
	Maiden name		Девичья фамилия			
Husband's name		Фамилия мужа				
Index and name of the tourist group		Индекс, наименование туристской группы				
Date of the last visit to the USSR	1974	Когда были в СССР последний раз				
Place of work	Department of External Affairs	Место работы				
Permanent address	125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Canada	Адрес постоянного местожительства				

	Surname Фамилия	First name, patronymic Имя, отчество (имена)	Date of birth Дата рождения	Permanent address Адрес места жительства
Children under 16 years travelling with you Дети до 16 лет, сле- дующие с вами				
Relatives in the USSR Ваши родственники в СССР				

I declare that the data given in the Questionnaire are correct
Я заявляю, что данные, указанные в анкете, являются правильными

Date 15 April 88
Дата

Personal signature
Личная подпись

КОНСУЛЬСТВО (консульский отдел посольства) СССР в _____

страна _____

Дата начала действия визы: _____

Дата окончания действия визы: _____

Place for
photograph

Questionnaire

ВИЗОВАЯ АНКЕТА

Full answers to all questions should be typed or clearly written in ink
Писать четко, обязательно печатать или на машинке в предписанных для заполнения графах

Nationality	CANADIAN	Национальность	
Present citizenship (if you had USSR citizenship when and why you lost it)	CANADIAN	Гражданство (если Вы имели гражданство СССР, то когда и в связи с чем его утратили)	
Surname (in capital Letters) (if you changed your surname what was it before the change)	PEARSON	Фамилия (если изменяли, то Ваша фамилия до изменения)	
First name, patronymic (if you changed your name and patronymic what were they before the change)	GEOFFREY A.H.	Имя, отчество (имена) (если изменяли, то Ваше имя и отчество до изменения)	
Day, month, year of birth	25.12.27	Sex	M
Object of journey, to the USSR	Consultations with Soviet Government	Цель поездки в СССР	
USSR, department, organisations proposed to be visited	Foreign Ministry	В какое учреждение	
Route of journey (points of destination)	Ottawa-Tokyo-Moscow	Маршрут следования (в пункты)	
Date of entry	24.11.83	Date of departure	26/27.11.83
Profession	Diplomat	Профессия	
Position	Prime Minister's Personal Representative	Должность	
Place of birth (if you were born in the USSR, when, where and from what place you emigrated)	TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA	Место рождения (если Вы родились в СССР, то когда, куда и из какого населенного пункта эмигрировали)	
Passport №		Паспорт №	
Maiden name		Девичья фамилия	
Husband's name		Фамилия мужа	
Index and name of the tourist group		Индекс, наименование туристской группы	
Date of the last visit to the USSR	September 1983	Когда были в СССР последний раз	
Place of work	Department of External Affairs	Место работы	
Permanent address	125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa	Адрес постоянного местожительства	

	Surname Фамилия	First name, patronymic Имя, отчество (имена)	Date of birth Дата рождения	Permanent address Адрес место жительства
Children under 16 years travelling with you Дети до 16 лет, сле- дующие с вами				
Relatives in the USSR Ваши родственники в СССР				

I declare that the data given in the Questionnaire are correct
Я заявляю, что данные, указанные в анкете, являются правильными

Date 12/11/83
Дата

Personal signature
Личная подпись



External Affairs
Canada



Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	112	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0138 15NOV83	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; transform: rotate(-15deg);"> 28-6-1-Hudson Peace mission </div> <div style="position: absolute; right: 0; top: 0; transform: rotate(90deg);"> 16 NOV 83 01 31Z </div>	
TO/À	TO CLVND IMMEDIATE		
INFO			
DISTR	INFO ATNTA BOSTN BUFLO CHCGO DALAS DETROT-ENGLS MNPLS CNGNY PHILA		
REF	SFRAN SEATL WSHDC		
SUBJ/SUJ	REF YOURTEL 0966 14NOV		
<p>---PM MONTREAL SPEECH</p> <p>REGRET THAT MTL SPEECH WAS NOT/NOT PUT ON WORD PROCESSOR</p> <p>2. IF COPIES CANT BE MADE OF TELEX, ONLY OPTION IS RE-TYPING BY POST</p> <p>PENDING ARRIVAL OF PRINTED TEXT WHICH MAY WELL TAKE SOME TIME.</p>			

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  M. MCNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG  L.A. DELVOIE



2-6172 FILE DIARY DIV CIRC

MEMORANDUM

TO/À
FROM/DE
•

IDDZ
URR

REFERENCE
•
RÉFÉRENCE

IDDZ memorandum 0134 Nov. 14

SUBJECT
•
SUJET

P.M. Initiative on East-West
Relations: USA Response

Security/Sécurité	<u>SECRET</u>
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	November 15/83
Number/Numéro	URR-972

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

MINA
USS
DMF
IFB
UGB
RGB
RSD
RBD
RCD
IDR
IDA
CPD

President Reagan's reply makes three main points in a somewhat haughty and defensive fashion:

- (1) It is the USSR not the USA that is responsible for the deterioration of East/West Relations. The militarization of Soviet society is a factor. The Soviets are using their increasing military power in a destabilizing and irresponsible fashion. The Soviets continue to evade full compliance with past arms control agreements. The Soviets refuse to provide essential data on their Warsaw Pact troop levels.

President Reagan's message to the P.M. is that before any progress can be made Soviet behaviour must be modified. There is no justification for anyone to take issue with the American approach. Accordingly it is essential from the Reagan perspective not to place the USA on the same level of responsibility with the USSR for the East-West impasse.

- (2) It is clear that President Reagan opposes the convening of a five-power nuclear conference. The fact that this particular proposal was singled out in the reply underlines the concerns already expressed by the State Department in Washington's telegram 2428 of 14 November. The Americans still seem to be worried that a five-power conference proposal "as soon as possible in the course of the coming year" could be used by the opponents of INF deployment to press for delays and that a five-power conference could needlessly complicate the START negotiations. It is also noteworthy that President Reagan is claiming that the British, French and Chinese are not interested in the proposal at this time. It can be assumed that the Reagan

- 2 -

SECRET

Administration has already done some lobbying to this effect in the three capitals.

- (3) President Reagan is expressing worry that the P.M.'s initiative will precipitate disunity within the Alliance. He emphasizes that the strength and unity of the North Atlantic Alliance are essential if the Soviets are to be convinced that a reduction of arms and of international tensions is in their interest and that discussions within the Alliance should not mislead the Kremlin regarding our total commitment to preserving our way of life.

In other words President Reagan is making a plea that the P.M.'s initiative should not deviate from agreed alliance positions, a course of action which would only be to Moscow's benefit. We would suggest that this is the primary concern to be addressed if we are to (a) improve communication with the USA on the initiative and (b) to elicit a more positive response from the USA.

2. In light of this rather unreceptive Presidential reaction to the P.M.'s initiative it is even more important than ever to sustain high-level consultations with the Americans in order to enlist the Reagan Administration's support. As the Embassy in Washington has already pointed out the consultations prior to the Montreal speech were inadequate and that Assistant Secretary Burt had complained. Henceforth we should not give pieces of paper on the initiative to the American Embassy while leaving our Embassy in Washington (and the USA Branch) uninformed. We can have much more impact on the key players in the Reagan Administration if our representations are made by the Ambassador in Washington. Early action on technical consultations between Ottawa and Washington experts is one productive route. A telephone call from the Prime Minister to President Reagan this week should be considered an important priority. Most importantly we believe that every effort should be made to pick up on the DPM/SSEA's discussion with Deputy Secretary Dam to pin down a meeting with the President as soon as possible after December 5.



M.G. Nostitz
Director

U.S. General Relations Division



Government
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du Canada

REQUISITION FOR PAYMENT (CANADIAN FUNDS)
DEMANDE DE PAIEMENT (EN DOLLARS CANADIENS)

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
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MP

Department — Ministère EXTER AFFAIRS		Dept. No. N° de min. 05	Branch, Division or Unit — Direction, division ou service ABRT		Source 572
Type 2	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 20px; text-align: center;">G.A.H. PEARSON</div> <p>Name and Address of Payee — Nom et adresse du bénéficiaire</p> <p>Correspondence relating to this remittance should be directed to the Department indicated above quoting the cheque number.</p> <p>La correspondance afférente à cette remise peut être adressée au ministère précité; prière d'indiquer le numéro du chèque.</p>			Due Date d'échéance Y-A M D-J	Batch
3A. Document No. — N° du document 2126					
Date of Requisition — Date de la demande NOV 15/83					
4. Payment Number and Date Numéro du paiement et date					
Type 3	PARTICULARS — DÉTAILS		Invoice No. N° de la facture	Canadian Amount Montant canadien	CR CT
<p>Accountable advance on td to TOKYO</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; transform: rotate(-15deg); display: inline-block;">29-6-1-TPM</div> <p>DEP: NOV 17 RET: DEC 02</p> <p>Cheque required Nov 16 (ASAP)</p>				\$3200 00	
			TOTAL	\$3200 00	

RETURN TO ABRT/D MOSKALUK

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2 SERVICES OFFICE
BUREAU DES SERVICES



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of Canada

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du Canada

REQUISITION FOR PAYMENT (CANADIAN FUNDS)
DEMANDE DE PAIEMENT (EN DOLLARS CANADIENS)

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Department — Ministère EXTER AFFAIRS		Dept. No. N° de min. 05	Branch, Division or Unit — Direction, division ou service ABRT		Source 572
Type 2	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 20px; text-align: center;">G.J. SMITH</div> <p>Name and Address of Payee — Nom et adresse du bénéficiaire</p> <p>Correspondence relating to this remittance should be directed to the Department indicated above quoting the cheque number.</p> <p>La correspondance afférente à cette remise peut être adressée au ministère précité; prière d'indiquer le numéro du chèque.</p>			Due Date d'échéance Y-A M D-J	Batch
				3A. Document No. — N° du document 2127	
				Date of Requisition — Date de la demande NOV 15/83	
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RET: NOV 17 DEC 17 02					
Cheque required Nov 16 (ASAP)					
RETURN TO ABRT/D MOSKALUK			TOTAL	\$3200 00	



TO/À

IDDZ (through PGB)

FROM/DE

PPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT
TO JAPAN

DMC
MAF
28-6-1- Trudeau
Peace Mission

Security/Sécurité CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date November 15, 1983
Number/Numéro PPR-0447

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

PPD

PPT

PPP

... Attached, as requested, are the following briefs to be included in the Prime Minister's briefing book for the Japan leg of the initiative on East/West relations and international security:

1. Security and Disarmament -
Japanese Concerns and Policies
2. Japanese Domestic Political Situation
(this is update of a memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister on November 4)
3. Biography of Prime Minister Nakasone.
Biography of Foreign Affairs Minister Abe (Mr. Abe's biography is included as it is very likely he will join Nakasone for the discussions with Prime Minister Trudeau)
4. A briefing note on main bilateral issues - Canada/Japan. The last paragraph in this brief though not of direct bilateral concern, is included at the request of PCO/Durand and EER.

Philip Slyfield
P. Slyfield
Director
Pacific Relations Division

CONFIDENTIAL

SHINTARO ABE

FOREIGN MINISTER

Despite his unsuccessful challenge in November 1983 to Prime Minister Nakasone in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) primary, Mr. Abe is still considered a very serious future leadership contender. Through his participation in the LDP Presidential contest he has identified himself as a credible candidate and in all probability now stands ahead of the other so-called "new leaders". Following his defeat in the primary, he, along with other candidates, stated publicly their intention not to seek Cabinet office at the time. Why he changed his mind is open to interpretation, although clearly the highly visible position of Foreign Minister has not hurt his leadership ambitions. Some speculate that former Prime Minister Tanaka saw a Cabinet position for Mr. Abe as a way to weaken further former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, the leader of Abe's LDP faction and an opponent of Tanaka. In the portfolio Abe has shown himself to be an adept, competent consensus builder and a determined promoter of the more outward-looking foreign policy of Nakasone. In personal encounters, however, he presents a less than dynamic profile.

Mr. Abe is a member of the Japan-Canada Parliamentarians' League, but he has never visited Canada. His most significant direct link with Canada stems from automobile export restraint negotiations as MITI Minister.

MF

TO/À

IDBZ SCR RBP

FROM/DE

RBR

*No difficulty with
this from point of view of
Task Force*
hpd

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

Draft letter to be signed by the PM

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	November 15, 1983
Number/Numéro	RBR-0567

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

*28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission*

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Attached is a draft letter for eventual signature by the PM, if he agrees. Before forwarding the draft to PCO, we should be grateful for any comments you may have. We would appreciate a reply by November 17.

USSR and Eastern Europe
Relations Division

DRAFT LETTER TO PAUL M. AUSTIN

Dear Professor Austin,

Thank you for your letter of October 27 concerning the role of academic exchanges in improving dialogue between East and West.

I am heartened that my remarks on reviving the impulse for dialogue struck a welcome chord with those having a special interest in Soviet and Slavic affairs. Certainly, academic exchanges are a vital component in the process of creating and institutionalizing such contacts. In this context, I am persuaded that they will contribute to greater civility and stability in our international relations.

Notwithstanding these convictions, there are obstacles to a full resumption of contacts. And it is clear that these are borne of major differences between Canada and the USSR over the content and management of the entire exchanges relationship governed by the General Exchanges

.../2

- 2 -

Agreement. You are no doubt aware that the Canadian interest in social sciences and humanities and the Soviet focus on applied sciences are not matched by the corresponding state and academic institutions on either side. The conclusion is inescapable that, until the Canadian scientific and the Soviet humanities communities develop a fundamental stake in exchange programs, there will continue to be uneven and slow progress.

Canada has in fact offered to resume academic exchanges with the USSR, but the Soviet Government has to date not agreed to proceed on this basis. It continues to seek a full resumption of official exchanges. Unfortunately, there is little interest outside the Soviet and Slavic Studies community in Canada for such a resumption. We are looking for a way out of this apparent impasse, but it is clear that it will be a difficult process.

I regret that I cannot be more forthcoming, particularly since I support your goals and the underlying philosophy. Rest assured, however, that the resumption of academic exchanges with the USSR is a bilateral priority and will be pursued.

Yours sincerely,

P. E. Trudeau



Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0A3

Date: 7 novembre '83

rec'd
Nov 9

NOTE POUR:

- ① Mr. Matheson
- ② Mr. Macle

..... E.A. R.B.R

Lettre adressée au Premier ministre de:

Paul Austin (m. 2.11)

CPM numéro de dossier: ... 330.6... 00.8...

Nous avons convenu avec le bureau du Sous-secrétaire que les services du Ministère soient mis à contribution pour préparer les réponses aux lettres sur les affaires étrangères adressées au Premier ministre.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de vouloir rédiger un projet de réponse à la lettre ci-jointe et de me l'envoyer avant le 21 novembre '83, et d'en faire parvenir une copie à CMR/Johnston. Vous devez la rédiger comme si le Premier ministre allait la signer; toutefois, j'accueillerai avec plaisir toute suggestion pertinente sur d'autres façons de procéder.

Si vous avez des questions, n'hésitez pas à m'appeler au 593-6068.

Pierre S. Pettigrew

Pierre S. Pettigrew
Secrétariat de la politique étrangère
et de la défense

c.c. CPM/Correspondance (Nicole Fournier)
BCP/Judy Cameron
AE/CMR/Ted Johnston

ps. You will want to coordinate with 1002 and SCB
P. S.

Canada



McGill
University

Department of Russian and Slavic Studies

REC'D. / REÇU

NOV 4 1983

Coordination

3306 008

27th October, 1983.

The Right Honourable P.E. Trudeau,
Prime Minister,
Office of the Prime Minister,
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0A2

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Your numerous remarks in recent weeks about the need for sensible dialogue between the West and the countries of the Socialist Bloc will be welcomed, I am sure, by many people in the academic world who have special interests in Russian and Soviet affairs. The calls for reasonable discussions with the Soviet Union will sound hollow, however, if we do not maintain at least the same degree of normal relations with the USSR as the other members of the Atlantic alliance. As you no doubt are aware, the Academic Exchange between Canada and the USSR is still under suspension, so it would seem that from the Soviet point of view, Canada is continuing to take a much harsher line than other members of NATO like Great Britain, the United States and West Germany who have continued to maintain their academic and scholarly contacts with the USSR. As long as we refuse to facilitate scholarly exchange between our two countries, the Soviet authorities may well doubt our good faith in calling for moderation and mutual understanding. Such a consideration is of course quite apart from the damage which this suspension is doing to scholarly research in the Russian and Soviet field. Our own graduate students are prevented from carrying out their research in the USSR, while older scholars are denied access to Soviet libraries, archives and institutions of advanced study and research. Both these groups watch with growing frustration as their colleagues in the United States and Great Britain as well as other countries in Europe continue to spend the necessary time in the Soviet Union to do their research in spite, one might note, of the rather bellicose words of some political leaders in these countries.

I do sincerely hope, Mr. Prime Minister, that the Government will soon move to an agreement with the Soviet Union in the academic field which

/2.

Postal address: 1001 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, PQ, Canada H3A 1G5

R. Fowler (19)
ORIGINAL ENVOYÉ À

C.C. P.M.O. FILE


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- 2 -

will allow Canada to speak with a confident voice in the international community and to permit particularly our graduate students, the scholars of the future, access to the facilities they need for the furtherance of scholarly research on Russia and the Soviet Union.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Paul M. Austin". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Paul" being the most prominent. It is written on a white background.

Paul M. Austin
Chairman

PMA/vh

c.c. Professor Nicholas Žekulin, President,
Canadian Association of Slavists

Professor Norman Pereira, Past President,
Canadian Association of Slavists

Professor Gleb Žekulin, Chairman of the
Committee on Academic Exchanges with the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
with the Canadian Association of Slavists

PAGE: 1
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 22 SCG MEETING

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. PLEASE INFORM SCG REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE NEXT SCG MEETING WILL BE HELD AT NATO HEADQUARTERS IN BRUSSELS ON NOVEMBER 22. THE MEETING IS SCHEDULED FROM 1400 TO 1700 AND WILL BE PRECEDED BY A HEADS OF DELEGATION LUNCHEON FOR REPRESENTATIVES FROM CAPITALS AT 14:30 HOSTED BY DCM LEDOGAR.

3. ALSO PLEASE INFORM SCG REPRESENTATIVES THAT WE PROPOSE FOLLOWING ;GENDA FOR THE MEETING.

-- OPENING REMARKS

-- STATUS REPORT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS

-- DRAFT SCG PROGRESS REPORT TO MINISTERS

-- DRAFT NAC COMMUNIQUE

-- PRESS STATEMENT AND PUBLIC HANDLING

-- FUTURE WORK

4. PLEASE INFORM SCG REPS THAT SINCE WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY COMMENTS SINCE THE ROME MEETING FROM SCG REPRESENTATIVES ON THE SCG PROGRESS REPORT, WE ASSUME THERE IS GENERAL SATISFACTION WITH THE DOCUMENT. THEREFORE, THERE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TIME IN THE ABOVE SCHEDULE TO COMPLETE REVIEW OF THE REPORT.

SCHULTZ

BT

#6598

NNNN

S E C R E T

STATE 326598

SECRET

PUBLIC HANDLING OF SOVIET MOVE

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THERE FOLLOW CONTINGENCY PUBLIC HANDLING THEMES AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR SOVIET INF MOVE INFORMALLY PRESENTED TO AMBASSADOR NITZE ON NOVEMBER 12 (REFTEL). NATO CAPITAL POSTS SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION AS SOON ;S PRACTICABLE TO SCG REPRESENTATIVES; PARIS AND EA POSTS SHOULD PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION TO APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. PLEASE STRESS THAT THE USG DOES NOT INTEND TO PURSUE A PUBLIC DEBATE OF THE MERITS O THE SOVIET REDUCTION PROPOSAL. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED THE PROPOSAL AT THE TABLE IN GENEVA, AND THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THEY INTEND TO DO SO. THESE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AND PUBLIC HANDLING THEMES ARE PRESENTED IN AN EFFORT TO COORDINATE THE ALLIED RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL.

3. GENERAL PUBLIC HANDLING THEMES:

Q. WH;T CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE REPORTS OF A NEW SOVIET MOVE?

A. 1. THERE HAS NOT BEEN A NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL. THEY HAVE INVITED US TO ADVANCE A SUGGESTION.

2. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE ONLY A SLIGHT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF SS-20S DEPLOYED IN THE WESTERN SOVIET UNION FROM THE NUMBER SE; FORTH IN THE OCTOBER 26 ANDROPOV INTERVIEW. THIS WOULD STILL GIVE THE SOVIETS A LARGE MONOPOLY, WITH APPROXIMATELY THE SAME NUMBER OF SS-20S AS THEY HAD

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DEPLOYED WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN.

3. THIS SUGGESTION IS IN EFFECT WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS CALLED THE "HALF-ZERO" OPTION, UNDER WHICH THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS LARGE FORCES, BUT THE US CANNOT DEPLOY A SINGLE SYSTEM. THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE OVER 700 WARHEADS TO ZERO FOR THE US.

4. WE HAVE PUT FORWARD AN IMPORTANT PROPOSAL, WHICH AS YOU KNOW CALLS FOR AN EQUAL GLOBAL WARHEAD LEVEL, AT 420 WARHEADS; WE HAVE REITERATED OUR READINESS TO DEPLOY LESS THAN OUR GLOBAL ENTITLEMENT IN EUROPE AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO APPORTION REDUCTIONS APPROPRIATELY BETWEEN P II AND GLCM. WE THINK THAT THESE PROPOSALS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT.

5. WE HAVE NEGOTIATED FOR TWO YEARS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENTS. WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE AFTER DEPLOYMENTS BEGIN. AND, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR, WE ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ANY SYSTEMS UNDER AN AGREEMENT AFTER DEPLOYMENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

4. FURTHER QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

Q: CAN YOU CONFIRM THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE A NEW NEGOTIATING MOVE IN GENEVA? WHAT ARE THE SPECIFICS?

A: THE SOVIETS HAVE INFORMALLY PRESENTED IDEAS REGARDING AN AGREEMENT. THEY HAVE NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED A NEW OFFER, NOR HAVE THEY INDICATED THEY WOULD COME FORWARD WITH ONE. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT IF THE U.S. WERE TO PROPOSE REDUCTIONS ELIMINATING THE ENTIRE U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES -- I.E., 572 WARHEADS, THEY WOULD AGREE TO REDUCE BY THE SAME NUMBER IN

EUROPE. THEY HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THIS WOULD LEAVE AT LEAST 120 SOVIET SS-20 MISSILE SYSTEMS, WITH 360 WARHEADS, IN EUROPE, AND ZERO U.S. LRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS. SOVIET SS-20S IN THE EASTERN USSR WOULD REMAIN UNTOUCHED. THESE SUGGESTIONS DO NOT INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL SOVIET GOAL OF MAINTAINING A SIZABLE MONOPOLY OF LRINF MISSILES.

Q: WHAT'S GOING TO BE THE U.S. POSITION? ARE YOU GOING TO ACCEPT OR REJECT THE NEW SOVIET IDEAS?

A: THE U.S. AND ITS NATO ALLIES ARE ALWAYS PREPARED TO STUDY CAREFULLY ANY PROPOSAL THE SOVIET SIDE MAY WISH TO PUT FORWARD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE U.S. IS NOT GOING TO ACCEPT ANY AGREEMENT THAT LEGITIMIZES A SOVIET MONOPOLY IN LRINF MISSILES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK

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SECRET

IN GENEVA TOWARDS AN EQUITABLE, EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT.

Q: IS IT TRUE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED A LEVEL OF 120 MISSILES IN EUROPE? WHAT ABOUT SS-20S IN THE EASTERN USSR?

A: THE SOVIETS INDICATED THEY MIGHT ACCEPT A LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 120 SS-20 MISSILE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, THE RESULT FOR THE U.S. WOULD BE THE SAME; THE U.S. WOULD BE PERMITTED NO LRINF MISSILES. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT SPECIFIED A LEVEL AT WHICH THEIR SS-20 FORCES IN THE EASTERN USSR WOULD BE LIMITED. OTHER THAN TO REAFFIRM ANDROPOV'S OCTOBER 26 STATEMENTS.

Q: HOW WOULD THESE REDUCTIONS BE ACHIEVED?

A: THE SOVIETS HAVE SUGGESTED "EQUAL REDUCTIONS" OF 572 WARHEADS ON BOTH SIDES, LEAVING THEM WITH APPROXIMATELY 120 MISSILES (AND 360 WARHEADS) IN EUROPE, AND THE U.S. WITH NONE.

Q: "EQUAL REDUCTIONS" SOUNDS FAIR. WHY CAN'T YOU BARGAIN ON THAT BASIS?

A: IT'S NOT FAIR -- IT WOULD PRODUCE AN UNEQUAL RESULT IN WHICH THE SOVIETS RETAINED A SIZABLE MONOPOLY OF LRINF MISSILES. IN EFFECT, IT WOULD REWARD THE SOVIETS FOR HAVING UNDERTAKEN A MASSIVE BUILD-UP IN SS-20 MISSILES OVER THE LAST SIX YEARS, A BUILD-UP WHICH HAS CONTINUED THROUGH TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND NOW STANDS AT SOME 1300 LRINF MISSILE WARHEADS -- MORE THAN TWICE THE NUMBER OF NATO'S PLANNED DEPLOYMENTS.

Q: IT SEEMS THE TWO SIDES ARE GETTING CLOSE -- THE U.S. IS TALKING ABOUT 140 MISSILES WORLDWIDE, THE SOVIETS ARE THINKING ABOUT 120 MISSILES IN EUROPE. WHY NOT DELAY U.S. DEPLOYMENTS TO SEE IF YOU CAN WORK OUT A DEAL?

A: WE AND THE ALLIES REPEATEDLY HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT U.S. DEPLOYMENTS WILL BEGIN ON SCHEDULE ABSENT CONCRETE RESULTS IN GENEVA THAT WOULD ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR DEPLOYMENTS. UNFORTUNATELY, SUCH A CONCRETE RESULT HAS NOT YET BEEN OBTAINED, AND THE LATEST SOVIET IDEAS DO NOT REPRESENT ANY CHANGE IN THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR A MONOPOLY OF LRINF MISSILES.

THE LATEST SOVIET IDEAS, LIKE ALL OTHER PREVIOUS SOVIET PROPOSALS, WOULD REQUIRE THE U.S. TO CANCEL ITS PLANNED DEPLOYMENTS ENTIRELY WHILE THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO RETAIN A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF SS-20 MISSILES IN EUROPE AND AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER IN THE EASTERN USSR.

OF COURSE, THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR THAT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO HALT, MODIFY, OR REVERSE OUR DEPLOYMENTS --- INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL

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MISSILES ALREADY DEPLOYED -- UNDER THE TERMS OF AN
EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT.

Q: WHAT WAS THE TIMING OF ALL THIS? DID THE SOVIETS
PRESENT THEIR IDEAS BEFORE OR AFTER THE U.S. PROPOSAL
FOR A GLOBAL LEVEL OF 420 WARHEADS? IS THE U.S. OFFER
A RESPONSE TO THE NEW SOVIET IDEAS?

A: WE HAVE FORMALLY PRESENTED OUR INITIATIVE IN
GENEVA. THE SOVIETS HAVE NO, FORMALLY PRESENTED ANY
NEW OFFERS IN GENEVA, THEY INFORMALLY RAISED THEIR NEW
IDEAS TWO DAYS BEFORE THE U.S. OFFER WAS FORMALLY
TABLED.

Q: SOME MAY SUGGEST THAT A SOVIET MOVE WOULD BE GROUNDS
FOR A DELAY IN NATO DEPLOYMENTS. DO YOU EXPECT TO GET
MUCH PRESSURE FOR A DELAY?

A: NO. WE AND THE ALLIES HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT
DEPLOYMENTS WILL BEGIN ON SCHEDULE ABSENT CONCRETE
RESULTS ELIMINATING THE NEED FOR U.S. DEPLOYMENTS.

Q: ARE THE NEW SOVIET IDEAS THE LAST GASP AT GENEVA;
WITH MISSILES NOW IN THE UK, DO YOU EXPECT THE SOVIETS
TO WALK OUT OF THE TALKS?

A: WE REPEATEDLY HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR WILLINGNESS TO
CONTINUE NEGOTIATING AND BELIEVE THE SOVIETS SHOULD MAKE
A SIMILAR UNEQUIVOCAL COMMITMENT. THERE WOULD BE NO
JUSTIFICATION WHATEVER FOR A SOVIET INTERRUPTION OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
Division Phoned *MF*

Person

Local Time

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BNATO YBGR8653 15NOV83

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REF YOURTEL IDDZ0128 12NOV

---PM MONTREAL SPEECH


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*B. Laddone
for 15*

*28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission*

INFO



UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSHDC UNFC8100 15NOV83

TO ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS ARLNS

PHILA SFRAN SEATL CNGNY

INFO EXTCTT LIDDZ UGP

---PRESS GUIDANCE:PM MONTREAL SPEECH FOLLOW-UP

YOU WILL ALL NOW HAVE RECEIVED THE UNCLASSIFIED TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTERS MONTREAL SPEECH FOR DISTRIBUTION TO KEY PRESS CONTACTS. EMPHASIZE THAT WHAT WE ARE LOOKING FOR NOW IS FAVOURABLE COMMENT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE IDEAS ELABORATED ON IN THE SPEECH EITHER IN EDITORIALS OR BY REPUTABLE COLUMNISTS.HIS SPEECH IS SELF-CONTAINED. BUT THE FOLLOWING POINTS CAN BE MADE TO YOUR CONTACTS IN TERMS OF THE PRIME MINIATERS FUTURE PLANS:

A)WHILE WE ARE NCT/NOT,AND WILL NOT/NOT,CHARACTERIZE THE RESPONSF OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES TO HIS PROPOSALS,THE PRIME MINISTER,AS HE SAYS IN HIS SPEECH,OBVIOUSLY RETURNS FROM HIS EUROPEAN TOUR ENCOURAGED TPAT THE LEADERS HE VISITED SHARE HIS BASIC CONCERNS AND THAT HF WAS HEARTENED BY THEIR RESPONSE;

B)THE PRIME MINISTER,AS YOU KNOW,HAD WRITTEN TO PRES REAGAN ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGC AND RECEIVED THE PRESIDENTS REPLY YESTERDAY.WHILE WF ARE NOT/NOT REVEALING ANY DETAILS OF THE REPLY,WE ARE USING THE LINE THAT THE PRESIDENT IS OPEN TO A VISIT BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO DISCUSS HIS INITIATIVE,BUT THAT WE HAVE NO/NO TIMING ON SUCH A VISIT AT THIS POINT.REMARKS MADE YESTERDAY AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT BRIFFING IN RES-

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PAGE TWO UNFC8100 UNCLAS

PONSE TO QUESTIONS ON A REACTION TO THE PRIME MINISTERS SPEECH WERE MODERATE, BUT THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THEY SUPPORTED ANY INITIATIVE WHICH IMPROVES THE PROSPECT OF PEACE. THEY SAID, QUOTE WE SHARE PM TRUDEAU'S DESIRE TO SEEK PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND THE CREATION OF A MORE STABLE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP...WE ARE OF COURSE LOOKING CAREFULLY AT THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY PM TRUDEAU, WHO HAS ALSO WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT ON THESE ISSUES. UNQUOTE.

C) THE NEXT STEPS ARE TO BRING HIS IDEAS TO THE PM OF JAPAN, AND TO ACTIVELY DISCUSS PEACE AND SECURITY AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MTG IN NEW DELHI NEXT WEEK. OBVIOUSLY THESE MTGS WILL CONSIDERABLY WIDEN HIS CONSULTATIONS, AND CHOGM WILL PROVIDE AN IDEAL FORUM IN WHICH TO EXPLORE NON-PROLIFERATION;

D) ITS UNWISE TO SPECULATE AS TO FURTHER STEPS. CLEARLY HE STILL HAS AN OPEN INVITATION TO VISIT MOSCOW. BUT IT IS STILL FAR TOO EARLY TO SPECULATE ON HOW USEFUL THIS WOULD BE. DISCUSSIONS THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS HAVE NOW OPENED WITH PEKING.

E) EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS AN ONGOING PROCESS AND THAT THE PM IS DETERMINED TO IMPROVE THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE IN A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE FORA - THE FIVE POWER IDEA JUST ONE POSSIBILITY.

F) JAMES RESTON HAD POSITIVE THINGS TO SAY ABOUT THE INITIATIVE IN SUNDAYS NYT AND COVERAGE OF THE SPEECH WAS FRONT PAGE MONDAY. MOMENTUM IS PICKING UP HERE (DALLAS TIMES HEARLL ACTUALLY HAD AN EDITORIAL) BUT WE NEED YOUR CONTINUED HELP.

UUU/086 152212Z UNFC8100

h2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM FNATC YBGR7103 15NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER FY 151400

INFO PRMNY GENEV VIENN NDHQOTT/CPD/DIPOL/DGINFO/DNACPOL

DISTR SCI SCI RBR CPD IMU IDA LIDDZ

REF OURTEL YBGR8123 10NOV

28-6-1-Tyuduan
Peace
Mission

---CIRCULATION OF MONTEBELLO DECISION AT UN

TAYLOR RAISED AGAIN AT PERMREPS LUNCH NOV15 PROPOSAL FOR CDA

TO CIRCULATE AT UN TEXT OF MONTEBELLO DECISION.THERE WERE

NO/NO OBJECTIONS TO CIRCULATING UNDER BRIEF COVERING LET.

ENTIRE DOCU(INCL FOOTNOTE)ON BEHALF OF NPG MEMFERS.(IN

THIS REGARD,IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO MAKE CLEAR LIMITED

MEMBERSHIP OF NPG:IE,FRANCE,ICELAND AND SPAIN EXCLUDED).

CCC/298 151557Z YBGR7103



External Affairs Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

57-7-1 AND 57-7-5

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ UNCLASSIFIED

FM/DE SEATL UAGR 5844 15 NOV83
TO/A EXTOTT IDD SEA 002/15
INFO SPAX WSHDC DE SEA 0002/15
DISTR AIR MAIL ALL USA CONGENS DE SEA
REF IDR IDA FPR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RCD UGP
SURJ/SUJ YRTEL IDDZ 0129 OF 13NOV83
---PM PEACE AND SECURITY INITIATIVE

ATTACHED IS POSITIVE EDITORIAL REACTION FROM SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER OF 15NOV83.

2.AWARENESS OF THIS SUBJECT ALSO EVIDENT DURING DISCUSSION PERIOD
IN OLYMPIA EVENING OF 14NOV WHEN WE PARTICIPATED IN A SEMINAR ON
CDA-USA RELATIONS AT THE ANNUAL PACIFIC NORTHWEST CONFERENCE OF THE
US NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FOREIGN STUDENT AFFAIRS. UNIVERSITY AND
COLLEGE PARTICIPANTS HAD LEARNED OF CDN INITIATIVE FROM LOCAL RADIO
AND TELEVISION REFERENCES TO PM TRUDEAU'S EUROPEAN TRIP.

28-6-1-Trudeau
Peace
Mission

Repeat Nov 17
at OTT.
request

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

STG ALAN D. ROWE/cn

GENERAL RELATIONS

(206) 223-1777

SIG J. E. COOPER

001053

SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER

NOVEMBER 15, 1983

202

Trudeau proposal on arms welcome

With U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear arms control and reduction seemingly nearing an impasse, efforts by third parties to get superpower talks off dead center are welcome. Canada's Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau currently is taking such an initiative.


Trudeau returned last week from a five-day European trip to claim broad support for his proposal that nuclear arms limitation talks be expanded to include all five nations possessing nuclear weapons — Britain, China and France, as well as the United States and Soviet Union. Without pointing any fingers directly, Trudeau says he is motivated by what he sees as a global trend toward the use of force and "an abdication of the political process in deference to military solutions."

One need look no farther to validate Trudeau's contention than the impending deployment of U.S. Pershing and cruise medium-range missiles in Western Europe and the Soviets' announced determination to respond by deploying their SS-20 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, as arms control talks in Geneva grind toward disintegration. The first cruise missiles, to be deployed next month, arrived yesterday in Britain.

Trudeau's proposal envisions arms talks on a state-to-state rather than bloc-to-bloc basis, independent of existing negotiations between the two superpowers, while recognizing the nuclear pre-eminence of the latter in the quest for any agreements.

The Soviet Union has threatened to abandon arms negotiations if new American missiles are deployed in Europe. If that should occur, Trudeau's efforts could become, as one of the prime minister's aides has put it, "the only game in town."

Trudeau is expected to confer on his proposals this week with representatives of the Reagan administration. He deserves an attentive ear.



*Mr. Smith
for info*

*I discussed this to
Ron at some length.
Assurances of those
I sought*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDR4354 15NOV83

TO CANDELNY DELIVER BY 160900

INFO WSHDC

DISTR IDA UDD2 IFE IMU UGE URR

REF YOURTEL WKGR2526 15NOV

---UNGA38:WESTERN DRAFT INF RESOLUTION

WE AGREE YOU MAY TABLE RESOLUTION ON BEHALF OF COSPONSORS. WE HAVE
PFEN CONCERNED USA ADMIN MIGHT SEE OUR BECOMING FORMAL PRESENTER
OF RESOLUTION AS MEDDLING. IN VIEW OF YOUR ASSURANCE THAT: (A) USA
SUPPORTS TEXT AND WILL VOTE FOR IT; (F) HAS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED US
TO TABLE IT; (C) HAS CLEARED THIS LINE WITH WSHDC, OUR FEARS HAVE BEEN
OVERCOME.

CCC/026 152343Z IDR4354

MF

To: RBR/Mace
Over to you for *done*
action as agreed
✓

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4131 15NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

DISTR RBR IMU JLO

REF YOUR MEMO 02NOV TO RER

---PM INITIATIVE AND KAL INCIDENT

APPRECIATED RECEIVING INFO COPY OF REF MEMO GIVING ACCOUNT OF
SMITH-PODLESNY CONVERSATION IN GUELPH. SURPRIZED, HOWEVER, TO
NOTE RAISING OF KAL INCIDENT IN CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION OF PMS
INITIATIVE, SINCE WE HAVE ASSUMED YOU WLD WANT THESE TWO
SUBJS TO BE KEPT DISTINCT AND SEPARATE IN ANY DISCUSSIONS
WITH SOVIET AUTHORITIES. ARE WE WRONG?

2. SINCE WE ARE LIKELY TO BE ENGAGED IN DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET
OFFICIALS ON ALL ASPECTS OF FOLLOWUP TO KAL INCIDENT, GRATEFUL
TO RECEIVE ASAP FULL COPY OF CHICAGO CONVENTION.

CCC/144 160715Z XYGR4131

28-6-1 *Trudeau Peace Mission*

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

*Nora - this is incorrectly addressed
should go to Louis Delva
and Peter Hancock*
**IDD 2.
C5**

Division Phoned.....

Person.....

Local Time.....

R E S T R I C T E D

FM MOSCO XYGR4126 15NOV83

TO EXTOTTEED **IDD 2** DELIVER BY 161030

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MDN/CDS/ADMPOL/
CPP/CIS LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO PRU
HAGUE BNATO PRMNY CNGNY WSHDC GENEV TOKYO

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR
FPR RBR

REF OURTEL 4099 04NOV

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS: SOV MEDIA REACTION
TASS REPORT OF 14NOV ON PMS MONTL SPEACH APPEARED (IN PART) IN PRAVDA
15NOV AND WAS COMMENTED ON 14NOV ON SOV TV. ARTICLE, DATE LINED
OTTAWA, WAS RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD MENTIONING THREE TRENDS
DESCRIBED AS HEIGHTENING RISK OF EAST/WEST CONFRONTATION AS
WELL AS SEVERAL OF PMS PROPOSALS FOR ACTION.

2. PMS SUGGESTION CONCERNING ESTABLISHMENT OF FORUM FOR
NEGOTIATION OF GLOBAL LIMITS AMONG ALL FIVE DECLARED NUCLEAR POWERS
WAS DESCRIBED BY TASS AS PROPOSAL QUOTE FOR EXPANDING FRAMEWORK OF
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS QUESTION BY INCLUDING OTHER NUCLEAR
POWERS IN THEM UNQUOTE. HOWEVER THIS COMMENT SEEMS NOT/NOT
INTENDED TO SUGGEST ANY SOV DESIRE TO SEE EXPANSION OF CURRENT
INF OR START TALKS TO INCLUDE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS; LATER
REF IN SAME ARTICLE TO CONVENING OF QUOTE AUTHORITATIVE
INNATL FORUM UNQUOTE FOR THIS PURPOSE SUGGESTS UNDERSTANDING

...2

*28-6-1 - Hudson Peace
Mission*

PAGE TWO XYGR4126 RESTR

OF PMS INTENT THAT THIS PROPOSAL BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO CURRENT BILATERAL USA-USSR NEGOTIATIONS.

3. ONLY PROPOSALS BY PM NOT/NOT TO RECEIVE MENTION IN TASS
ARTICLE WERE THOSE CONCERNING RESTRICTIONS ON EXCESSIVE MOBILITY
OF ICFMS AND REQUIREMENT THAT FUTURE STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS BE
VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. ALSO NO/NO MENTION WAS
MADE OF REACTION OF OTHER WESTERN LEADERS TO PMS INITIATIVE
(ALTHOUGH PMS TRAVELS IN EUROPE HAVE BEEN BRIEFLY NOTED BY SOV
PRESS ON OTHER OCCASIONS) OR OF PMS NEXT MOVEMENTS. ARTICLE
DID NOT/NOT EXPRESS ANY VIEWS ON PMS APPROACH AND QUESTION OF
CONSULTATIONS WITH USSR MENTIONED IN PMS SPEECH WAS NOT/NOT
REMARKED UPON.

4. NEUTRAL, RELATIVELY LOW-KEYED TREATMENT OF PMS GUELPH AND
MONTL SPEECHES SUGGESTS DEFINITE SOVIET INTEREST COMBINED
WITH CAUTIOUS WAIT-AND-SEE STANCE UNTIL PURPORTED OF PMS PROPOSALS
AND DEGREE OF SUPPORT FROM OTHER QUARTERS BECOME CLEARER TO THEM.

CCC/144 151400Z XYGR4126

Gen Childs
His Fowler produced
something yet?
hd

28-6-1-1
Tucson
Peace
Mission

CCC/041 150948Z XNGR4094

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MT
PD
Division Phoned 1002
Person PC
Local Time 1035

19-6-1-1
Trudeau
Peace
Mission

NONCLASSIFIE

DE ENATO YFGR2464 15NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ

LIVRAISON 150900

INFO LDN BONN ANKRA COPEN OSLO HAGUE WSHDC TOKYO PEKIN CNGNY PRMNY

MOSCO DELHI BRU VMBFR MDRID PARIS LSBON ROME ATHNS

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA RPR

REF VOTRETELS IDD0128 0124 12NOV

---DISCOURS DU PM

AVONS L INTENTION DE DISTRIBUER AUX MEMBRES DU CONSEIL LE TEXTE DU DISCOURS DU PM TRUDEAU A MONTL.DEVONS TOUTEFOIS ETRE ASSURES QUE LE TEXTE EN FRANCAIS(ADRESSE A BRU ET NON/NON A NOUS)ET LE TEXTE EN ANGLAIS(TEL IDDZ0128 12NOV ADRESSE A NOUS ET NON/NON A BRU)SONT LES VERSIONS DEFINITIVES DISTRIBUABLES.

2.IL SEMBLE QUE LE CIT BACKGROUND PAPER ON FIVE POWER CONFERENCE FINCIT SOIT ENTRE LES MAINS D UNE DEMI-DOUZAIN DE MEMBRES DE L ALLIANCE ET IL Y AURAIT LIEU DE SONGER A L OPPORTUNITE DE COMPLETER LA DIFFUSION A TOUS LES MEMBRES DE L ALLIANCE.LES REACTIONS MITIGEEES VOIRE NEGATIVES,COMME CELLE DES ETATS-UNIS RAPPORTEE PAR WSHDC(TEL UNGR2428 14NOV),MILITENT EN FAVEUR D UNE INFORMATION DE LA PLUS HAUTE QUALITE ET LA PLUS SOUTENUE POSSIELE SUR L INITIATIVE DU PM. ON POURRAIT ENVISAGER LA COMMUNICATION DE CE TEXTE AU CONSEIL EN MEME TEMPS QU UN BILAN PRELIMINAIRE QUE VOUS NOUS TRANSMETTRIEZ SUR LES CONCLUSIONS DEGAGEES DES ENTRETIENS DU PM EN EUROPE.

3.PAR AILLEURS,TAYLOR ASSISTERA 22NOV A DINER PRIVE CHEZ SON

...2

220176 2 301

PAGE DEUX YBGR2464 NONCLAS

HOMOLOGUE NORVEGIEN AUQUEL PARTICIPE PREMIER MINISTRE DE LA NORVEGE.
APPRECIERIONS TOUTE INSTRUCTION/DIRECTIVE/COMMENTAIRE UTILE POUR
CETTE OCCASION ET COPIE DU TEXTE DE LA LETTRE DU M TRUDEAU AU PM
NORVEGIEN.

UUU/054 151139Z YBGR2464

R E S T R I C T E D

FM TOKYO UIFC2228 15NOV83

TO PMOOTT/DURDIN DELIVER BY 150800

INFO PMOOTT/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER EXTOTT PPR

DISTR (IDDL) *APL*

REF DURDIN/JONES TELCON 15NOV


---PMS VISIT:MEDIA

MFA HAVE SUGGESTED TENTATIVE PROPOSAL THAT THERE WOULD BE TWO
PHOTO OPPORTUNITIES:

(A)PM NAKASONE GREETING PM TRUDEAU UPON HIS ARR AT IKURA HOUSE;
AND(B)FIRST TWO TO THREE MINUTES OF ACTUAL MTG.PHOTOS TAKEN AT
LUNCHFON WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THOSE TAKEN BY OFFICIAL PHOTO-
GRAPHERS OF BOTH PMS.

2.UNDER MFA PROPOSAL POOL.WHICH WOULD BE LIMITED TO TWO STILL
CAMERAPERSONS AND EIGHT TV PERSONS PLUS POSSIBLY TWO WRITERS.
WOULD BE SPLIT INTO TWO SMALLER POOLS,EACH OF WHICH WOULD COVER
ONE PHOTO OPPORTUNITY.WE HAVE ADVISED MFA OF PROBLEMS THAT THIS
WOULD CAUSE CDN SIDE AND HAVE REQUESTED THAT POOLS BE EXPANDED
TO ENSURE THAT AT LEAST REPS FROM EACH OF TV COMPANIES WILL BE
INCLUDED IN EACH OF QUOTE MINI UNQUOTE POOLS.WILL ADVISF.

CCC/195 150910Z UIFC2228



R E S T R I C T E D

FM TOKYO UIGR2214 15NOV83

TO FXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 150900

INFO PMOOTT/DURDIN/SMITH DELIVER BY 150900

PCOOTT/DURAND RCMPOTT/VIP5 NDHQOTT/DAOT3-3

DISTR USS DMF PGF PPD PPR IDD *LIDEZ MGT*

REF OURTEL UIGR2115 11NOV

---PMS VISIT TO JPN:MEDIA ACCOMMODATION

ON ASSUMPTION IT IS ACCEPTABLE THAT MEDIA ROOMS BE LOCATED ON
DIFFERENT FLOOR THAN SUITE(SEE PARA TWO(B) OUR REFTEL).OKURA
HAS ALLOCATED ROOMS ON THIRD FLOOR,SOUTH WING.WE ARE FORWARDING
FLOOR PLAN BY FAX(TO XDV, PMOOTT ONLY).

2.FOLLOWING ARE ROOM ASSIGNMENTS FOR MEDIA.GRATEFUL YOU CONFIRM
WHETHER GWYNS REQUIRE ONE OR TWO ROOMS.ROOMS ARE ALL SAME PRICE
(CDN DLRS 110.00)REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE REGULAR TWIN
ROOM(TWS),DELUXE TWIN ROOM(DXS)OR DOUBLE BED ROOM(DAS).

S-302 JOHN FERGUSON

S-304 EDISON STEWART

S-306 SANDRA GWYN,RICHARD GWYN

S-308 ANDREW CLARK


S-310 JOHN HAY

S-312 ANDREW HUTTON

S-314 FRANCINE BASTIEN

S-318 WAYNE BROWN

...2



PAGE TWO UIGR2214 RESTR

S-322 JOHN MACKAY

S-324 BRIAN KELLEHER

S-326 KATHIE LYNAS

S-328 DANIEL LESSARD

S-334 DAVID HALTON

S-336 BRIAN NELSON

S-338 MARC ALLARD

S-340 CARLOS SCHONFELDT

S-342 GASTON CHARPENTIER

S-344 NICK HARAMIS

S-346 GERRY BEAUCHAMP

S-348 FARRY BARNETT

S-350 STEVE LONIEWSKI

S-352 ALAN STEPHENS

S-354 WILLIAM GRIMSHAW

CCC/195 150825Z UIGR2214

Mr. Mc Nee
for action with
Press office pls
ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

28.6.1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

R E S T R I C T E D

FM HAGUE YWGR0761 15NOV83

TO EXTOTT *(IEDZ IMMED)*

INFO PARIS BONN BRU ROME LDN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RCR RCD RSR XDV

---PMS INITIATIVE:MTG WITH QUEEN BEATRIX

IN PRESSCAN FPR1047 DATED 10NOV83 IT WAS INDICATED THAT
IN HIS MTG WITH QUEEN BEATRIX, PM TRUDEAU HAD CONVINCED
HER MAJESTY QUOTE DE PRECHER OCCASIONNELLEMENT EN FAVEUR
DE SON PLAN DE PAIX UNQUOTE.PRESSCAN SEEMS TO SUGGEST
COMMENT CAME FROM QUEENS SPOKESMAN.CONVERSATIONS WITH
QUEEN ARE NOT/NOT USUALLY DISCUSSED WITH PRESS AND NOTHING
APPEARED IN DUTCH MEDIA WHICH WOULD REFLECT WHAT WAS
REPORTED IN PRESSCAN.

2.AS WE HAVE NO/NOT YET RECEIVED ANY LEBRIEFING FROM YOU
OF THAT MTG. GRATEFUL TO LEARN WHERE COMMENT IN PRESSCAN
ORIGINATED.

CCC/029 151544Z YWGR0761

CP, AFP, Reuters

Le Avoin

Rome

MOF
16
From O/DMF
for info

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM EXTOTT ETN0386 15NOV83

TO DELHI/HOP ONLY DELIVER BY 160900

INFO ISBAD/HOP ONLY VIAEA/HOP ONLY

DISTR MINA DMT DMF EFB ETD PSD PSR JCD JLE

REF YOURTEL WIGR2654 11NOV

---NUCLEAR DISCUSSIONS

FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFO ONLY QUESTION OF HOW TO BRIEF PM TRUDEAU
FOR CHOGM WAS SUBJECT OF MTG THIS AM INVOLVING ETD AND PSD.MTG
AGREED WE SHOULD DO BEST TO:(1)EXPEDITE DPM/SSEAS CONSIDERATION OF
MFMO THAT OUTLINES RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND RECOMMENDS WE EITHER
FISH OR CUT BAIT;AND(2)AVOID SITUATION WHERE PEACE INITIATIVE
STRONGLY ENDORSING NPT AND NUCLEAR DISCUSSIONS WITH COUNTRY THAT WILL
NOT/NOT ACCEPT EXISTING CDN POLICY REQUIREMENTS WHOULD BE AT CROSS-
PURPOSES.REQUEST YOU THEREFORE TAKE SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY TO ADVISE
INDIAN MFA CONTACTS IN WAY YOU CONSIDER MOST APPROPRIATE THAT WE DO
NOT/NOT BELIEVE CHOGM WOULD BE DESIRABLE OCCASION FOR MRS GANDHI TO
RAISE RESUMED NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH MP TRUDEAU.

CCC/026 152230Z ETN0386

28-6-1 Trudeau
Peace
Mission

Division Phoned

Person

Local Time

*Slug handling
for Regg*

External Affairs
Canada

Allegation, non-accusation,
complainte

MESSAGE

FILE DOSSIER

ACTION

SUITE A DONNER

Aligner les messages de sécurité (dans l'attente de la décision)
Aligner le premier caractère de la Sécurité (dans l'attente de la décision)

*Miss Cochran
Pls ask info
dir to meet this
request*

10

*28-6-17 Thursday
Peace
Mission*

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

R E S T R I C T E D

FM/DE

LNGLS XOGR 341 NOV 15/83 DELIVER BY 14:00 NOV 15/83

TO/A

EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO

WSHDC BY POST (AIR MAIL)

DISTR

MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA

REF

YOURTEL IDZ0129 NOV 13

SUBJ/SUJ

---P.M.'S INITIATIVE - DEMAND FOR TEXT OF NOV 13 SPEECH.

1. AT SEMINAR (ENTITLED "POLITICS OF ARMS CONTROL"), NOV 14 BY BARRY BLECHMAN, FORMER ASST DIRECTOR OF ACDA, WE TOOK OCCASION TO BRING PM'S INITIATIVE TO ATTENTION OF PARTICIPANTS. TEN OUT OF 30 OF APPARENTLY HIGH CALIBRE ATTENDEES (UCLA FACULTY, RAND CORP STAFF, INDIVIDUAL ACD RESEARCHERS) EXPRESSED STRONG INTEREST IN NOV 13 SPEECH, WHICH WE ARE SATISFYING WITH PHOTOCOPIES OF TIMELY TELEX UNDER REF. DIRECTOR OF UCLA CISA (CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC AFFAIRS) AND BLECHMAN, AFTER LECTURE, WERE KEEN TO STUDY IDEAS IN SPEECH. (FOR IDA: DIRECTOR CISA MOST GRATEFUL FOR VERIFICATION MATERIAL YOU SUPPLIED US.)

2. WE WILL BE ATTENDING WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL LUNCHEON NOV 17 WHERE GUEST SPEAKER WILL BE KEN ADELMAN, AND WISH TO USE OCCASION TO PROMOTE FURTHER INTEREST IN AND SUPPORT FOR PM'S INITIATIVE. PREDICT STRONG INTEREST CAN BE GENERATED AMONG UNDOUBTEDLY LARGE AUDIENCE.

3. REQUEST 60 COPIES OF SPEECH IN PRINTED FORM BY OVERNIGHT EXPRESS.

DIVISION DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES

DIVISION DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES

DIVISION DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES

APPROVED/APProuvé

[Signature]

001068

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSHDC UNSV0284 15NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ IMMED

INFO MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN

NDHQOTT/MND/CES/ADMPOL/CP


REF MGTC9055 14NOV OURTEL UNGR2429 14NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:USA PRESS GUIDANCE

AMEND DISTR LINE TO READ QUOTE

MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGE RER IDD IDR IDA UNQUOTE.

UUU/230 151427Z UNSV0284



C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM VMEFR XTDR0205 15NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO PNATO CANMILREPNATO LDN BONN WSHDC MOSCO GENEV PRMNY STKHM
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/CIS/CORAE/ENACPOL/DISTRATA/DIPOL

DISTR IMF IFB IDC ADDZ IDRA IDRL RGX RBD RCD RCR RSR RSRD CPD

REF OURTEL XTDR0178 17OCT83

---MPFR:INF LINKAGE

SUMMARY:IN HIS 10NOV PLENARY STATEMENT SOVIET REP DEVOTED FIRST TWO
PAGES TO ASSERTION OF LINKAGE BETWEEN IMPENDING INF DEPLOYMENT AND
MPFR TALKS.SOVIET REP STATED THAT DEPLOYMENT QUOTE WILL HAVE
NEGATIVE EFFECT ON OUR NEGS...IF IT DOES NOT/NOT BLOCK THEM
ALTOGETHER UNQUOTE.OPINIONS REMAIN DIVIDED IN WESTERN AD HOC GROUP
(AEG)ON WHETHER THIS IMPLIED THREAT TO THESE TALKS IS MERE BLUFF.
AT ANY RATE EAST NOW SEEMS TO BE SYSTEMATICALLY SETTING STAGE FOR
POSSIBLE EASTERN BREAK OFF.

2.REPORT:IN HIS PREAMBLE,AMB MIKHAILOV STATED QUOTE THAT IF IN
THEIR STATEMENTS,REPS OF SOCIALIST STATES SAY THAT WHOLLY
UNJUSTIFIED PLANS FOR DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE OF NEW USA
NUCLEAR MISSILES WILL HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON OUR NEGS.THERE IS
NOTHING POLEMICAL IN THIS UNQUOTE.HE ARGUED THAT USA INF DEPLOYMENT
WOULD SERIOUSLY UPSET EXISTING PALANCE IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE AND IN
AGREED AREA OF REDUCTIONS.HE CONTINUED,QUOTE IT WOULD THEREFORE
BE AN ERROR TO THINK THAT REALISATION OF PLANS TO UPGRADE NATO
ARMAMENTS,WHICH DESTROY FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AND STABILITY COULD

...2

PAGE TWO XTDR0205 CONFD

LEAVE US INDIFFERENT HERE IN VIENN, ESPECIALLY AS MANDATE OF VIENN NEGS ITSELF SPEAKS OF NEED TO REDUCE NOT/NOT ONLY PERSONNEL OF ARMED FORCES BUT ALSO THEIR ARMAMENTS UNQUOTE. HE WENT ON TO STATE QUOTE FURTHER AGGRAVATION OF TENSION IN INNATL SITU WILL INEVITABLY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO TAKE MEASURES TO LOWER LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN CENTRE OF EUROPE. IF IT DOES NOT/NOT BLOCK IT ALTOGETHER UNQUOTE.

3. REST OF EASTERN STATEMENT CONTAINED HARDBITTING COMPARISON OF EACH SIDES APPROACH TO NEGS ENDING WITH CLAIM THAT QUOTE THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THIS DECISIVE YEAR HAVE MADE A MAJOR PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS THE SOLUTION OF TASK OF OVERCOMING THE IMPASSE IN VIENN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE TACTIC OF NATO COUNTRIES GOES CONTRARY TO INTERESTS OF THAT LONG URGENT TASK. IT CANNOT/NOT DISGUISE THE IMMIBILITY OF THE POSITION OF THE WEST ON BASIC ISSUES, AND THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO PROCEED TO WORK OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDINGS UNQUOTE. IN HIS FINAL PARA SOVIET AME CALLED ON WESTERN SIDE TO QUOTE CONSIDER ONCE AGAIN WHAT CONSEQUENCES COULD ARISE FROM THE ABSENCE OF CONSTRUCTIVENESS IN WESTERN POSITION UNQUOTE.

4. EASTERN PRESS BRIEFING FOLLOWING PLENARY REITERATED INF LINKAGE THEME AND DECLARED QUOTE IF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE US NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE TAKES PLACE, THIS WILL FORCE THE COUNTRIES OF THE WSAW TREATY TO REVIEW THE SITU, INCLUDING THE VIENN NEGS, AND TO TAKE THE CORRESPONDING DECISIONS UNQUOTE.

...3

PAGE THREE XTDR0205 CONF

5.MOST MEMBERS OF AHG ARE OF VIEW THAT NO/NO EASTERN DECISION HAS YET BEEN TAKEN ON A BREAKOFF AND THAT OUR EASTERN COLLEAGUES KNOW LITTLE MORE OF WHAT DECISION IS LIKELY TO BE THAN DO WE.THERE HAVE BEEN EASTERN SUGGESTIONS THAT DECISION WILL BE TAKEN AT WPO MINISTERIAL OR EVEN SUMMIT MTG IN NEAR FUTURE,SOME SAY AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK.WHILE MOST MEMBERS OF AHG,INCLUDING USA AND FRG AMBASSADORS,STILL BELIEVE THAT EAST IS BLUFFING,SOME KIND OF EASTERN BREAKOFF,SUSPENSION OR DELAY NOW SEEMS DISTINCT POSSIBILITY AND ONE FOR WHICH EAST HAS BEEN CAREFULLY PREPARING GROUND THROUGHOUT THIS ROUND.

CCC/076 151357Z XTDR0205


99

BURROUGHS DEX 3500

P. 1

DEX-3502
(212) 246-7424

UNCLASSIFIED
NONCLASSIFIÉ



Facsimile

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FROM: Canadian Consulate General
DU : Consulat général du Canada
NEW YORK

SECTION:

GRPA

Mr. ~~XXX~~

M./Mad.

MALCOLM MCKECHNIE

TO : Mr./Ms.

A : M./Mad.

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Subject :

Objet :

Article of the W.S.J., 14/11/83

"Trudeau pushes plan for peace on the U.S.,
Soviet Union, China"

1 Trudeau Pushes Plan For Peace on the U.S., Soviet Union, China

Personal Initiative by Canada's
Chief Took Him to Europe;
He Plans Japan Visit, Too

By JOHN URQUHART

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

OTTAWA—Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who has undertaken a personal peace mission, disclosed that he has started consultations on a Canadian peace plan with the U.S., the Soviet Union and China.

Mr. Trudeau outlined his "step-by-step" peace initiative in a speech yesterday to his ruling Liberal Party in Montreal. The speech followed consultations last week with government leaders in six European countries—West Germany, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium.

He said the European leaders supported his initiative and he intends to pursue his efforts with a trip to Tokyo next Saturday to meet with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. He didn't disclose the nature or form of his consultations with the U.S., the Soviet Union and China. But on his return from Europe Friday he said it was "much too premature" to talk of a trip by him to Washington or Moscow.

In his speech, he said "one man representing one country can't promise a miracle, let alone deliver one." But he said he believed it is imperative for government leaders to give new political direction to military matters in view of the deterioration in international relations.

Mr. Trudeau's plan has involved intense work in recent weeks by senior Canadian government officials. The initial step calls for negotiations to try to stabilize relative levels of armaments for the five nuclear-weapon countries—the U.S., the Soviet Union, France, China and Britain. Such a forum would recognize the U.S. and the Soviet Union as "strategic equals," he said.

Mr. Trudeau said his proposal is "without prejudice" to the nuclear weapons talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. "But those talks, and rightly so, don't cover British, French or Chinese nuclear forces," he said.

With a five-nation accord, he said "neither Britain nor France nor China need fear that their forces will be subject to restraints which don't recognize their own national interest."

He said such an agreement among the five nations would help to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and to forestall introduction of new weapons. Once a five-nation agreement is in place, he said "the rest of us could more easily bring good sense to bear" on those countries which haven't signed the 13-year-old nuclear nonproliferation pact.

To meet West European concerns over the heavy preponderance of Soviet conventional forces in Europe, he proposed that disarmament talks that are due to open in Stockholm in January, be given "high-level political support" at their outset.

Mr. Trudeau's plan also calls for a ban on testing and deployment of antisatellite systems designed to operate at high altitude. Such a system hasn't been launched.

The U.S. has communicated with Mr. Trudeau about his plan, but Washington hasn't commented on the specific proposals.

The prime minister's initiative is viewed by some Canadians as his last major political undertaking before retiring. He has said he won't lead his Liberal Party in another election.

Canadian officials said Mr. Trudeau's plan doesn't represent any departure of Canadian support for western defense strategy. Canada continues to support the plan of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to deploy U.S. cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in Europe starting next month if the Soviet Union doesn't withdraw the SS-20 missiles that are aimed at Western Europe.

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TO/À	TO ROME		
INFO	INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP		
DISTR	DISTR RCR IDR		
REF			
SUBJ/SUJ	---PM INITIATIVE: ITALIAN BILATERAL ISSUES.		
<p>FOLLOWING LUNCH WITH PM CRAXI ON NOV 10, CRAXI S FOREIGN AFFAIRS AD- VISER HANDED OUR NOTE TO TED JOHNSTON (PM TRUDEAU S EXECUTIVE ASSIS- TANT) DEALING WITH ITALIAN DESIRE TO SUPPLY GAS TURBINE ENGINES FOR NEW CDN FR¹GATES. LETTER, IN ITALIAN, HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO RCR FOR ACTION AND FORWARD TRANSMISSION TO APPROPRIATE DEPTS AND DIVS.</p> <p>2. ROUGH ENGLISH TRANSLATION ON NOTE AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE THE PRIME MINIS- TER WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONSIDERING THE ITALIAN FIRMS EXPECTATIONS FOR BEING ASSIGNED THE SUPPLY OF TURBINES FOR 6/6 FR¹GATES DESTINED TO THE CDN NAVY. IT IS A VERY IMPORTANT SUPPLY, WELL KNOWN TO THE CDN AUTHORITIES. MANY STEPS HAVE BEEN DONE OVER THE LAST PERIOD. APART FROM TURBINES (FIAT) THERE ^{IS} ARE OTHER EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH ITALIAN FIRMS HAVE BID UNQUOTE.</p> <p>3. AS YOU KNOW BILATERAL ISSUES WERE ^{WERE} NOT RAISED IN MTG WITH CRAXI NOR AT LUNCHEON.</p>			

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November 14, 1983

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PEACE MISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R.Fowler)

Initiative - Statement at CHOGM

We attach for your consideration a draft statement for your intervention at the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, under the agenda item "World Political Scene - Global Trends and Prospects".

You will note that this statement does not advocate any specific course of action by Commonwealth leaders on the central themes of East-West relations, arms control and especially nuclear non-proliferation. As indicated in our earlier discussions, we believe such action might take one of the following forms:

- (a) a short declaration to be issued by the CHOGM, dealing with current dangers and embodying a commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; or
- (b) an undertaking by the Commonwealth countries to give new momentum to diplomatic efforts to increase the number of countries adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in the run-up period to the 1985 NPT Review Conference.

If you agree, we would propose to discuss these options with you when we meet on Wednesday, November 16: We would then adapt the draft statement accordingly, and abstract from it brief speaking notes for your intervention in New Delhi.



L. A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

PMO/Mr. Axworthy
cc: PCO/Mr. Osbaldeston
EA/Mr. Shenstone
DND/Mr. Anderson

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE WORLD POLITICAL
SCENE - GLOBAL TRENDS AND PROSPECTS
CHOGM - NEW DELHI - 1983

The Secretary-General has asked me to open the discussion on the global political situation with my own view of the state of East/West relations and disarmament, not because these are the only issues that matter, but because the most immediate dangers to the world community are along the razor's edge of East/West relations.

Since I have been coming to these Heads of Government meetings it seems that each time we speak with greater or lesser conviction of ever darker prospects and sharper world tensions. I am not persuaded that absolute catastrophe is imminent. I do not bring a counsel of despair, but I am deeply troubled by the worsening trend in relations between East and West, by a superpower relationship of escalating confrontation, by a high level of tension and all this against the backdrop of nuclear weapons arsenals whose destructive power we can scarcely understand.

The Commonwealth gives us a unique opportunity to exchange ideas freely as politician to politician without bureaucratic filters. I have always highly valued the opportunities for mutual education which it provides. But it can do more. As it has been put so well before, I believe that the Commonwealth cannot pretend to negotiate for the world, but it can help the world to negotiate.

- 2 -

In the eighties it would be quixotic for any state to think it could take effective initiatives on its own for the betterment of the world community, but in this Commonwealth forum we can seek reinforcement for our individual efforts.

I come today to ask you to join me in trying to improve the poisoned climate between East and West and to find ways to reverse the momentum of the arms race. Commonwealth states, aligned and non-aligned, belong to a myriad of groups and regions. They can give great momentum to any idea; what better or more urgent cause is there for us to address than that of working to make the world a safer place?

Some have argued that we have in the last few years returned to the Cold War between East and West; but the world is more complicated today than it was twenty-five years ago. The relationship between the superpowers is surely as dominant and crucial as it was then, but now we live in a multi-polar world, one which limits even the superpowers' room for manoeuvre. The consequences of inter-dependence are frequently unforeseen and often beyond control. At times it appears that the superpowers are not mindful of the full consequences of their actions. We must impress on the superpowers that their size and might confer on them grave responsibilities to each other and to the world community; that they each hold in their hands the security of the other, and of the world at large.

- 3 -

Yet the superpowers appear to have lost sight of their overarching political relationship and responsibilities. East/West relations have been uneven and unsteady for the last few years. Acrimony, antipathy and distrust have increasingly characterized their relations. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan relations have been deteriorating and with the destruction of the KAL airliner in September there are few immediate prospects of improvement. The impulse to confrontation informs their relationship. Their exchanges are vituperative and more often public than private.

The USA and USSR are increasingly isolated from each other, separated by a widening gulf of suspicion. The consequence of poor communication between East and West and the existing high level of tension is an increased risk of accident. This adds up to a volatile and dangerous situation in which neither has the least faith in the other's intentions and, hence, is prepared to believe the worst of its opponent's motives.

It is not so much that there are more or new individual hostilities at the present than previously, though from the Falklands to Chad we have seen a depressing tendency to resort to force to try to settle territorial disputes. And the old areas of trouble remain. Cambodia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, El Salvador, southern Africa, the Middle East and deepening civil war in Lebanon, war between Iran and Iraq in the Gulf - all are sources of danger. Each is an area of continuing concern to us all.

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- 4 -

What makes the current situation so serious is the superpowers' response to local and regional crises. By insisting on viewing events, whether in southern Africa or Central America, in terms of their global rivalry, the superpowers tend to magnify individual conflicts and make them threaten wider East/West stability.

We can acknowledge that the superpowers do have global security interests, but in the depth of their mutual mistrust they can produce something close to global insecurity.

Recent months have seen a troubling accumulation of crises. From the KAL downing to attacks on peacekeepers in Lebanon to the invasion of Grenada, one crisis seems to build and play upon the next. The Commonwealth Secretary-General and the U.N. Secretary-General have drawn our attention to the erosion of the UN's effectiveness in providing collective security and heading off conflicts. This is disturbing as it is another factor which pushes almost any international conflict into the arena of East/West relations. The danger is that superpower force, or the threat of its use, tends increasingly to become the ultimate arbiter.

How have we come to such a pass? In the early seventies détente had brought the promise of a real political dialogue between East and West that could have led to an easing of tensions. Détente brought genuine achievements and understandings

- 5 -

on the limitation of strategic arms, on political relations and human rights in Europe, on China's role in the world, on co-operation in outer space. But detente's back was broken when the Soviets demonstrated that they considered it divisible. 1975 marked a watershed, with both the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and the beginning of the East/West confrontation in Angola.

What is missing today is genuine political dialogue, a framework of shared political objectives, and the minimum degree of mutual trust required to achieve them. There is an absence of high politics between East and West, a recognition that ideology must occasionally take a backseat when the survival of mankind is at stake.

This context serves as a backdrop for the continuing nuclear arms race. The juxtaposition of the two has frightened public opinion throughout the world. People everywhere are frightened by technological advances in nuclear weapons systems and discussions of military strategies which appear to contemplate their use.

The public is questioning the capacity of its political leaders to understand an entirely new era in East/West relations. Our citizens are challenging politicians to lower tensions and to bend their efforts to reversing the arms race.

- 6 -

At the Williamsburg Summit, I was one of seven leaders who pledged to devote "our full political resources to reducing the threat of war". I have since then been preoccupied with what Canada and I personally could do to make good that commitment. While recognizing that no single country and no single leader could single-handedly come to grips with the multitude of problems confronting us, I have endeavoured to evolve a course of action geared to calling for the exercise of political leadership at the highest level by countries and governments that share my concerns.

My purpose over the past weeks has been to signal publicly my grave preoccupations and to develop a series of proposals which might help to halt and eventually reverse the downward trend in East-West relations and in the international security situation.

I have so far held consultations with a number of European leaders and would like to take advantage of this meeting in New Delhi to expand the range of my contacts.

One of my central points is that there must be a truly global approach to the limitation of nuclear weapons. This requires limiting and eventually reducing the arsenals of all five nuclear weapons states, i.e. halting "vertical proliferation". It also requires facing up squarely to the dangers posed by the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states, i.e. "horizontal proliferation".

001084

- 7 -

With reference to vertical proliferation, I have proposed the calling, in the course of next year, of a conference of the five nuclear powers. The primary aim of such a conference would be the establishment of global limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of all five countries, according to fixed national ratios, and allowing for parity between the USA and the USSR. Such negotiations should be based on the following principles:

- (a) They should not be conducted on a bloc-to-bloc basis.
- (b) No superpower has the right to a preeminent nuclear position.
- (c) Under the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty all nuclear weapons states have an obligation to reduce their nuclear armaments.

Such a conference could also address strategic nuclear confidence-building measures, measures for crisis management and measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic nuclear arms race.

The natural complement to this approach is a renewed effort to halt the risks of horizontal proliferation, to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT risks at this stage becoming irrelevant to its central purpose because a significant number of "near-nuclear" states do not adhere to it, and this despite the fact that 119 nations do.

- 8 -

The NPT is a controversial document and the arguments against its régime are well known. It is, however, "the only game in town" and adherence to it is the only option open to those genuinely concerned to stop the dangers of proliferation.

There is a vital necessity to reverse the spiral of both vertical and horizontal proliferation. There is, of course, a massive range of issues and national concerns which relate to all aspects of disarmament. When we come to the nub, however, we must face one salient reality -- either this generation of world leaders must reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, and prevent their spread, or we bequeath to our peoples a future where the chances of global destruction increase every day.

I believe that all Commonwealth members can make a contribution to world peace, either by adhering or strengthening their commitment to the NPT. Both individually and collectively we can bring to bear our influence on the "near-nuclear" to espouse the non-proliferation régime as the surest means of avoiding regional conflicts taking on cataclysmic proportions.

Just as the superpowers have the capacity to imperil human survival, so too do many other countries in a world which is highly interdependent both for better and for worse.

- 9 -

By their own action and their moral suasion the countries of the Commonwealth can help to arrest horizontal proliferation; they can also play a significant part in attenuating the confrontation between the superpowers. The Third World in particular can bring more than moral authority and exhortation to this debate. The countries of the Third World should inject these concerns to any calculation of their immediate interests in dealing with the superpowers. While it is clear the Third World nations have a direct security interest in this, since nuclear war would destroy North and South alike, they must also bring to the fore the practical economic elements of an arms race whose consequences fall severely on the developing world.

Nowhere does the world seem more out of joint than when we see how continuing worldwide armament thwarts development. The enormous expenditures on arms by both North and South represent a huge misappropriation of resources which might otherwise be devoted to development. A fortnight ago I discussed with President Mitterrand his ideas relating to the eventual creation of a Disarmament Fund for Development and I indicated Canada's willingness to pursue with France and other interested countries bringing these ideas to fruition.

But the burden here cannot rest on developed countries alone. If developing nations do attach importance to aid flows from the North, should they not show the way by decreasing their vast expenditures on military hardware? Should they not turn away

- 10 -

from the perilous and terribly costly path of developing their own nuclear weapons? The way for them to convince the North of their seriousness about disarmament and development is to shift more of their own resources to development.

As I said earlier, I believe that we must adopt a truly global approach to arms control. I have advanced to the superpowers and to a number of European leaders my proposals for the restoration of a climate of political confidence in East-West relations and for attenuating the risk of conflict presented by the policies of both East and West. Today I invite you as members of the Commonwealth representing both North and South to envisage complementary action on other fronts.

I challenge the Commonwealth nations to accept their responsibilities and bend their efforts to the cause of peace.

If ever there were a cause of the Commonwealth, surely this is it.

If ever there should be a "Commonwealth position", it should be on this issue.

If ever the Commonwealth had an opportunity to set an example and to take a stand, surely it is now.

MF

TO/À • MGTC/MGIK

FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Our memo of October 17, 1983.
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Prime Minister's Task Force on East-West
SUJET Relations & International Security.

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

Security/Sécurité	RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence	
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Date	November 14, 1983.
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L. R. Delvo
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

TO/À • MINA
FROM/DE • IDDZ/L.A. Delvoie

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Initiative on East-West Relations -
SUJET USA Response.

28-6-1-1 Trudeau
Peace
Mission

Security/Sécurité	SECRET
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	November 14, 1983.
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We attach for your consideration a copy
of President Reagan's reply to Prime Minister Trudeau's
letter of October 22. We would suggest that you bring
this text to the Minister's attention prior to his meeting
with the Prime Minister this afternoon.

L.A. Delvoie
L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

November 14, 1983

Mr. R. R. Fowler
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet
Privy Council Office
Langevin Block
Ottawa

Dear Mr. Fowler:

As the Ambassador is temporarily out of Ottawa, I am enclosing the text of a letter from the President in reply to the Prime Minister's letter of October 25. The text was received telegraphically. The signed original will be forwarded shortly.

I would appreciate it if you would have the President's letter brought to the Prime Minister's attention as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

John H. Rouse
Minister

Enclosure:
As stated

DEAR PIERRE:

I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFUL LETTER REGARDING THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE LEVEL OF TENSION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION INDEED MERIT OUR ATTENTION, AND THE QUESTION WHETHER YURI ANDROPOV HAS SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE USSR BEARS OUR CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. MUCH ATTENTION HAS ALSO BEEN

DRAWN TO THE MILITARIZATION OF THAT SOCIETY, A DEVELOPMENT THAT MAY BE A FACTOR IN THE DETERIORATION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS MUST SUSTAIN THEIR EFFORTS TO PLACE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON A MORE STABLE FOOTING. AS YOU SUGGESTED, I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO MEET TO EXAMINE THE LONG-TERM STRATEGY WE IN THE WEST OUGHT TO PURSUE TO BRING THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES INTO A MORE STABLE AND PREDICTABLE PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

THERE ARE THREE BROAD ASPECTS OF WORLD SECURITY WHICH DESERVE OUR CONCERTED ATTENTION: FIRST, THE STEADY GROWTH IN SOVIET MILITARY POWER -- FAR BEYOND LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE NEEDS -- AND THE GROWING PROPENSITY OF THE SOVIETS TO USE IT, BOTH DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY, IN DESTABILIZING FASHION; SECOND, THE HIGH LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS IN GENERAL, WHICH MAKE THE WORLD MORE DANGEROUS THAN EVER; AND THIRD, THE VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF TRUST IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP, WHICH UNDERMINES OUR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN THE FIRST TWO AREAS. WE CERTAINLY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PUT ALL THESE PROBLEMS TO REST AT ONCE, BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST PURSUE A STRATEGY WHICH ADDRESSES ALL OF THEM SIMULTANEOUSLY, SINCE THEY ARE LINKED IN IMPORTANT WAYS.

PROGRESS IN ARMS REDUCTION, FOR EXAMPLE, WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT IF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO USE ITS MILITARY POWER IRRESPONSIBLY, AND IF SOVIET AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO EVADE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH PAST AGREEMENTS. SUCH ACTIONS UNDERMINE THE MINIMAL FOUNDATION OF CONFIDENCE ON WHICH ANY AGREEMENT MUST REST AND UNDERSCORE THE NECESSITY OF PROCEEDING WITH OUR PROGRAM OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE MODERNIZATION.

WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF YOUR EAST-WEST AGENDA, LET ME SAY THAT I FULLY SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO SEE MORE PROGRESS IN ALL OF THESE AREAS. IN THE MBFR TALKS, WE CONTINUE TO BE FRUSTRATED BY THE SOVIET REFUSAL TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL DATA ON THEIR TROOP LEVELS. BUT WE ARE BEGINNING TO MAKE LIMITED PROGRESS ON VERIFICATION.

AT THE STOCKHOLM CDE, WE WILL BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AIMED AT REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR IN EUROPE. WHILE WE IN THE WEST APPROACH THIS FORUM WITH SINCERE INTEREST IN

ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL PROGRESS, THE REAL QUESTION IS WHETHER OR NOT THE USSR WILL ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS OR CONTINUE TO PROMOTE HOLLOW, BUT SUPERFICIALLY ATTRACTIVE, PROPOSALS.

. YOUR EMPHASIS ON COMBATTING HORIZONTAL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS FULLY SHARED HERE IN WASHINGTON AND IS A CONCERN ABOUT WHICH WE HAVE COMMUNICATED RECENTLY. PROGRESS ON THIS FRONT COULD SERVE AS THE FIRST STEP IN SECURING AGREEMENT IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL FORA. GIVEN THE CONVERGENCE OF WESTERN AND SOVIET INTERESTS IN NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION THERE IS REASON FOR OPTIMISM HERE.

. AS FOR THE CONVENING OF A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE ON REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, WE HAVE NO FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIONS TO SUCH A DEVELOPMENT AT SOME POINT. I AM CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE REAL FOCUS OF OUR ATTENTION SHOULD BE ON ACHIEVING VERIFIABLE AND SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS, PARTICULARLY AT THE INF AND START TALKS. IT DOES NOT SEEM LIKELY THAT OPENING UP YET ANOTHER FORUM AT THIS TIME WOULD IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS OR THE POLITICAL CLIMATE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. I WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT BOTH OUR BRITISH AND FRENCH ALLIES, AS WELL AS THE CHINESE, HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO RECONSIDER THEIR CURRENT ATTITUDE TOWARD ARMS CONTROL LIMITATIONS ON THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES ONLY UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH DO NOT SEEM LIKELY TO BE MET IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE RESPECT THE REASONS WHICH HAVE LED THESE GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE THIS POSITION, AND FEEL IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IF THE IMPRESSION WERE TO BE CREATED THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THIS ISSUE.

. ~~THESE ARE ALL MATTERS WHICH WE CAN DISCUSS FURTHER WHEN WE MEET. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR US TO FIND A~~ WAY TO PERSUADE MOSCOW THAT WE ARE RESOLUTE IN DEFENDING THE VALUES OF OUR SOCIETIES. AT THE SAME TIME, WE AND OUR ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE AND SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT REDUCING TENSIONS AND THREATS TO PEACE. AS WE GO FORWARD IN THIS EFFORT, I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE MUST NOT ALLOW THE OPEN AND FRANK DISCUSSION, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE ALLIANCE, TO MISLEAD THE KREMLIN REGARDING OUR TOTAL COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING OUR WAY OF LIFE. THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ARE ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO CONVINCE OUR ADVERSARIES THAT A REDUCTION OF ARMS AND OF

INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS IS IN THEIR INTEREST.

. PIERRE, I FOUND BOTH YOUR LETTER AND YOUR SPEECH IN GUELPH INSIGHTFUL AND THOUGHT-PROVOKING. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU FOR A DETAILED DISCUSSION.

SINCERELY,

RON

MF

SECRET

November 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
c.c. Mr. Osbaldeston

28-6-83 - Trudeau Peace Mission

Letter from President Reagan/The Initiative

President Reagan's response to your letter on the initiative has at last arrived. As you will be meeting Mr. MacEachen very shortly, we thought it appropriate to provide you with a copy immediately. The Task Force will be analyzing the text and will provide you with their views in the very near future.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
ORIGINAL SIGNÉ PAR
Robert R. Fowler

R.R.F.

S E C R E T

DEAR PIERRE:

. I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFUL LETTER REGARDING THE STATUS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE LEVEL OF TENSION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION INDEED MERIT OUR ATTENTION, AND THE QUESTION WHETHER YURI ANDROPOV HAS SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE USSR BEARS OUR CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. MUCH ATTENTION HAS ALSO BEEN

DRAWN TO THE MILITARIZATION OF THAT SOCIETY, A DEVELOPMENT THAT MAY BE A FACTOR IN THE DETERIORATION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

. I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS MUST SUSTAIN THEIR EFFORTS TO PLACE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON A MORE STABLE FOOTING. AS YOU SUGGESTED, I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO MEET TO EXAMINE THE LONG-TERM STRATEGY WE IN THE WEST OUGHT TO PURSUE TO BRING THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES INTO A MORE STABLE AND PREDICTABLE PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

. THERE ARE THREE BROAD ASPECTS OF WORLD SECURITY WHICH DESERVE OUR CONCERTED ATTENTION: FIRST, THE STEADY GROWTH IN SOVIET MILITARY POWER -- FAR BEYOND LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE NEEDS -- AND THE GROWING PROPENSITY OF THE SOVIETS TO USE IT, BOTH DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY, IN DESTABILIZING FASHION; SECOND, THE HIGH LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS IN GENERAL, WHICH MAKE THE WORLD MORE DANGEROUS THAN EVER; AND THIRD, THE VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF TRUST IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP, WHICH UNDERMINES OUR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN THE FIRST TWO AREAS. WE CERTAINLY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PUT ALL THESE PROBLEMS TO REST AT ONCE, BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST PURSUE A STRATEGY WHICH ADDRESSES ALL OF THEM SIMULTANEOUSLY, SINCE THEY ARE LINKED IN IMPORTANT WAYS.

. PROGRESS IN ARMS REDUCTION, FOR EXAMPLE, WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT IF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO USE ITS MILITARY POWER IRRESPONSIBLY, AND IF SOVIET AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO EVADE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH PAST AGREEMENTS. SUCH ACTIONS UNDERMINE THE MINIMAL FOUNDATION OF CONFIDENCE ON WHICH ANY AGREEMENT MUST REST AND UNDERSCORE THE NECESSITY OF PROCEEDING WITH OUR PROGRAM OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE MODERNIZATION.

. WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF YOUR EAST-WEST AGENDA, LET ME SAY THAT I FULLY SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO SEE MORE PROGRESS IN ALL OF THESE AREAS. IN THE MBFR TALKS, WE CONTINUE TO BE FRUSTRATED BY THE SOVIET REFUSAL TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL DATA ON THEIR TROOP LEVELS. BUT WE ARE BEGINNING TO MAKE LIMITED PROGRESS ON VERIFICATION.

. AT THE STOCKHOLM CDE, WE WILL BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AIMED AT REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR IN EUROPE. WHILE WE IN THE WEST APPROACH THIS FORUM WITH SINCERE INTEREST IN

ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL PROGRESS, THE REAL QUESTION IS WHETHER OR NOT THE USSR WILL ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS OR CONTINUE TO PROMOTE HOLLOW, BUT SUPERFICIALLY ATTRACTIVE, PROPOSALS.

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. PIERRE, I FOUND BOTH YOUR LETTER AND YOUR SPEECH IN GUELPH INSIGHTFUL AND THOUGHT-PROVOKING. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU FOR A DETAILED DISCUSSION.

SINCERELY,

RON

THE
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CABINET
DU
SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT
AUX
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO/A: IDDZ

Date 17/11/83

FROM/DE: MINA/Dudoit

REFERENCE / RÉFÉRENCE:

IDDZ-0133

SUBJECT 'SUJET' Minister's decision / Decision du Ministre

Seen by the SSEA.

G. J. Smith
Prime Minister's Task Force on
East-West Relations &
International Security
5-5912

JS

CONFIDENTIAL - CANADIAN EYES ONLY

IDDZ-0133

November 14, 1983

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister
and Secretary of State for External Affairs

cc: Minister of State (International Trade)
cc: Minister of State (External Relations)

*28-6-1-1 Trudeau
Peace
Mission*

Subject: PM's Visit to Europe: Follow-Up

Prime Minister Trudeau's meetings in Europe on his initiative went very well. During the short period of November 8-11 he had in-depth conversations with six European leaders (President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, Prime Ministers Lubbers, Martens, Craxi and Thatcher), as well as with the Pope and Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands.

The Prime Minister was well received in all capitals. His initiative was seen as serious and coming from a country with appropriate credentials. (As Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans put it to the press, the PM occupies a unique place within the Alliance for a role of this kind, being neither European nor American.) The PM found support all along the way for his general message of the need to reestablish a dialogue with Moscow and to create a "safety net" around the INF negotiations. This was particularly the case with Chancellor Kohl, and indeed to a surprisingly positive extent also with Mrs. Thatcher. Mitterrand, Kohl, Thatcher and Martens mentioned the unsettled and unclear situation as to what was happening in Moscow and what appeared to be a lessening of political control in the Kremlin. They shared the PM's analysis that a Reagan-Andropov summit was desirable, if properly prepared and held in an amicable atmosphere, and might have occurred sometime next spring if it had not been for the KAL incident. Unless something was done by NATO leaders to change the atmosphere, however, a summit would not occur, due to the USA presidential election, for 1 1/2 - 2 years, too lengthy a period in the current unhealthy and dangerous climate which exists between the two superpowers.

...2

- 2 - CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

On specific points, there was general agreement on the need for Foreign Ministers to attend the opening of the Stockholm Conference on January 17. Cheysson said he had indications Gromyko would attend (unconfirmed by others) and that Shultz, although reluctant, would likely participate if everyone else did. Mrs. Thatcher was highly interested in the idea of possibly having even Heads of Government attend the Stockholm opening, seeing in it a mechanism by which a Reagan-Andropov meeting might be more acceptable and possible.

The Five-Power Nuclear Conference received a good hearing. Mitterrand's reaction was more positive than anticipated, not being against it provided it did not occur until after INF deployments were underway. Kohl similarly said he had an understanding with Mitterrand to the same effect. While Mrs. Thatcher was more negative she did not have a clear understanding of our proposal which already took account of two of the concerns she raised: (a) the need not to impede the UK modernization programme, and (b) not to aggregate UK, French and USA nuclear forces. The related issue raised by the PM concerning NPT and horizontal proliferation received a good reception, although largely without commitment.

While there was no immediate agreement achieved on having Ministers attend an MBFR meeting, there was support for the concept of having NATO respond to the most recent Eastern initiative.

Follow-up: During your meeting with the Prime Minister at 1715 hours today, he will be interested in discussing follow-up to the European trip and is particularly anxious to seek your views on how to best approach the December NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on the subjects of the CDE in Stockholm and MBFR.

The Prime Minister wishes prior to his departure for Tokyo to write to his NATO colleagues to inform them of the results of his European trip and, with your agreement, to propose that decisions be reached at the NATO meeting on two points that could figure in the NATO communiqué:

- (a) that NATO members will be represented at a high political level at Stockholm, and
- (b) that NATO will respond to the latest Eastern proposal on MBFR and will be prepared to meet with the Warsaw Pact at ministerial level in Vienna in order to provide political impetus to these negotiations.

...3


- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

In this regard, the Prime Minister will be interested in learning whether you are prepared to attend the Stockholm opening January 17 as well as a possible Foreign Ministers meeting on MBFR in Vienna sometime early in the spring.

Further follow-up is intended to include:

- (a) visits by Geoffrey Pearson (as the PM's personal emissary) and a member of the Task Force to Peking (November 21) and Moscow (November 25) to discuss the initiative;
- (b) further consultations with the USA, a key element of which will be your breakfast meeting tomorrow morning with USA Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam;
- (c) a possible visit by you to Eastern Europe, where keen interest in the initiative has been expressed, particularly by President Ceausescu of Romania.



L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

W.R.
**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

ACC 309699	DATE NOV 14 1983
FILE 20-1-1-1	SERIAL 20-1-1-1
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	
Division Phoned	P.S.
Person	1302
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2428 14NOV83

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---PMS INITIATIVE:USA REACTION

**SUMMARY:ADMIN REACTION TO PM PEACE INITIATIVE REMAINS PUBLICLY
POSITIVE ON GENERALITIES BUT CLD WELL BE NEGATIVE ON MOST SPECIFICS.
PRESS TREATMENT IS GOOD, HOWEVER, EVEN IF THERE IS INEVITABLE
ATTENTION GIVEN TO ASSUMED CDN DOMESTIC MOTIVES. DAM VISIT SHLD BE
OCCASION FOR BRINGING USA CLOSER TO PM PURPOSES BUT MUCH MORE
EMPHASIS HAS TO BE PLACED ON CONNECTING WITH USA ON SPECIFIC SUB-
STANTIVE CONTENT OR THESE PROPOSALS WILL JUST ATROPHY.**

**2.REPORT:PRESS COVERAGE OF SPEECH IS GOOD:NY TIMES PAGE 1 STORY
TODAY IS POSITIVE EXCEPT FOR INEVITABLE ASSESSMENT OF INITIATIVE
IN TERMS OF POSSIBILITY OF REVIVING SAGGING POLITICAL FORTUNES OF
LIBERAL PARTY.RESTON COLUMN YESTERDAY WAS HELPFUL.WASH POST GAVE
COVERAGE LESS PROMINENT BUT FAIRLY THOROUGH.ADMIN PRESS GUIDANCE
TODAY IS TO BE POSITIVE OF PM EFFORTS BUT TO SAY ADMIN HAS NO
COMMENT ON SPECIFICS UNTIL AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH CDA AND ALLIES.**

**3.HOWEVER,DISCREET ADMIN REACTION IS LESS POSITIVE.BURT TOLD GOTLIEB
SUNDAY NIGHT REAGAN RETURN LET IS NOW SIGNED.IT REFLECTS BROADLY**

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2428 CONF

POSITIVE REACTION TO NOTION OF PM INITIATIVE. HOWEVER, BURT SAID USA WILL HAVE TO OPPOSE SPECIFICS. HE MENTIONED (A) FIVE POWER CONFERENCE (P) BAN ON DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS (C) OBLIGATION TO MAKE FUTURE WEAPONS SYSTEMS VERIFIABLE BY MEANS OTHER THAN ON-SITE INSPECTION. HE SAID HE DOUBTED ADMIN WLD EVER COME RIGHT OUT AND REJECT THESE PROPOSALS. THEY WLD JUST BE LEFT TO WITHER.

4. BURT REACTION WAS PERSONAL. INDEED, BURT CAN BE EXPECTED TO OBJECT TO PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED PROPOSALS AND FORMULAE CUTTING ACROSS USA MANAGEMENT OF ITS KEY FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS. HE MAY HIMSELF BE TOO CLOSE TO EVENTS FOR COMPLETE OBJECTIVITY. BUT WHILE WE MAY EXPECT COSMETICALLY MORE GENEROUS RESPONSE FROM POLITICAL LEVEL, IN TONE CLOSER TO WHAT EAGLEBURGER TOLD MARCHAND, WE DOUBT IT WILL BE ANY MORE ENCOURAGING ON SUBSTANCE.

5. THIS IS PORNE OUT BY EARLIER CONSULTATIONS GOTLIEB HAD WITH DAM ON SAT WHEN WE WERE ABLE TO CONTACT STATE DEPT ON LIKELY SUBSTANCE OF SPEECH ON BASIS TELS RECD THAT DAY. DAM TOLD GOTLIEB THAT USA WAS CONCERNED CDN PROPOSALS A) FOR 5-POWER CONF WLD BE USED BY OPPONENTS OF INF DEPLOYMENT TO PRESS FOR DELAYS AND B) FOR 5-POWER CONF AT SAME TIME AS START NEGS WLD COMPLICATE THEM. DURING COURSE OF DAY GOTLIEB WAS ABLE TO CLARIFY INTENTIONS ON THESE 2 POINTS TO SOME EXTENT WHICH DAM WELCOMED. HOWEVER, HE REMAINED GUARDED IN HIS REACTION TO PROPOSALS OVERALL.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2428 CONF D

6. BURT ALSO LAMENTED LACK OF ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS WHICH GOTLIEB POINTED OUT IS APPARENTLY BELIED BY COMMUNICATION OF BACKGROUND PAPER ON FIVE POWER CONF TO USA EMB IN OTT ON 08NOV. HOWEVER, WE MUST EMPHASIZE TO YOU THIS IS FOR CDN PURPOSES COMPLETELY INADEQUATE APPROACH TO ADMIN. FOR MORE THAN 40 YRS THIS EMB HAS BEEN USED TO CONVEY SUCH DOCS AND THEIR CONTENT TO SENIOR USA OFFICIALS BECAUSE THAT IS THE EFFECTIVE WAY TO REACH THEM. IT IS MOST UNFORTUNATE THIS WAS NOT/NOT CASE FOR THIS DOC, WHICH WAS NOT/NOT EVEN CONVEYED TO EMB UNTIL SAT NIGHT. NOR, OF COURSE, WAS NEWS THIS WAS TO BE A HIGHLY SUBSTANTIVE SPEECH.

7. OVERALL, OUR CONCERN IS THAT PM INITIATIVE RUNS RISK OF BEING SEEN IN WSHDC AS LITTLE MORE THAN THOUGHTFUL SPEECHES UNLESS WE MAKE HARD CONSULTATIVE EFFORT TO BRING ADMIN ONSIDE. WE GATHER TALKS IN EUROPE WERE POSITIVE ON SUBSTANCE THOUGH SOME TELS ON SUBJ HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN SENT HERE. BUT UNLESS USA IS COOPERATIVE ON SUBSTANCE, INITIATIVE IS STALLED.

8. POSSIBLY FROM OTT VIEW THERE IS PRESENTATIONAL DOWNSIDE TO CONSULTING WITH USA ON PURPOSES OF INITIATIVE IN ADVANCE OF CONSULTATIONS WITH USSR. BUT THIS SCHEMATIC EVEN-HANDEDNESS HAS TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST DAMAGE IF USA SIMPLY LETS PROPOSALS IN CONSEQUENCE ATROPHY. SINCE WE HAVE ADVANCED THEM IN NO/NO MULTILATERAL FORUM WE HAVE LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR PRACTICAL FOLLOW-UP OR MAINTAINING PRESSURE TO OVERCOME THIS.

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR2428 CONF

9.THERE WAS ALWAYS DANGER THAT CONCENTRATING PM INITIATIVE ON POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR EAST-WEST ACCOMMODATION WLD INVITE CRITICISM THERE WAS NO/NO SUBSTANCE IN PROPOSALS.BUT WE MUST NOW AVOID EXCESSIVE EMPHASIS ON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AND FORMULAE WHICH IF LEFT UNANSWERED CAN BE SEEN TO MAKE THE PROPOSAL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE POLITICAL UNDERSTANDINGS SEEM A FAILURE AS WELL.YOU ARE OBVIOUSLY AWARE THAT PLACING 5 POWER CONF PROPOSAL ENTIRELY IN CONTEXT OF NATIONAL STRATEGIC FORCES AND RATIOS(RATHER,FOR EXAMPLE,THAN PROLIFERATION),MAKES IT HIGHLY START-SPECIFIC AND SUBJECT TO GRAVEST AMERICAN RESERVATIONS.START TALKS ARE ADMIN A)HIGHEST NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITY B)HIGHEST FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITY AND C)IN CONSEQUENCE HIGHEST DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRIORITY.ALL OF THIS ARGUES FOR CLOSER CONTACT WITH THIS ADMIN.YOU SHLD USE DAM VISIT FOR THAT PURPOSE AS WELL AS BLAIS MTG WITH WEINBURGER THIS WEEK,AND MAXIMIZE USE OF THIS EMP AND ITS VERY EXTENSIVE CONTACTS ON ARMS CONTROL AND EAST-WEST RELS AT ALL LEVELS OF ADMIN.

GOTLIEB

CCC/059 141740Z UNGR2428

TO/A • FILE TRANSCRIPT

FROM/DE • FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCESUBJECT • CTV CANADA A.M.: Trudeau Visit -
SUJET Chinese Reaction
Ambassador Yu Zhan

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
November 14, 1983
Number/Numéro
FPR-1051

cc. Laking Done 16 Nov 83
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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
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cc 28-6-1

ENCLOSURES
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FILE

CIRC

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CTV: The People's Republic of China has appointed a new Ambassador to Canada. We spoke with the Ambassador, Yu Zhan, about China's perception of growing East-West tensions. Joining us is Mr. Yu's translator. Prime Minister Trudeau has just completed his peace mission to talk with European leaders in the hope of easing East-West tensions. Does China think this mission is a realistic one?

Translator: China is always looking for a peaceful environment so that it can carry out its development and construction of its own country. And we have noticed the efforts put forward by Prime Minister Trudeau. But what will be the result of this effort? It will depend on the attitude and response by those countries. Also, it will depend on how things develop.

CTV: What can Prime Minister Trudeau do that others have been unable to do?

Translator: The response from different angles or directions of the world, the efforts made by Prime Minister Trudeau is well received but how things will develop will mainly depend on the attitudes or positions adopted by the two superpowers.

CTV: What does China see as the main cause of East-West tension?

Translator: We think the main cause for tension is due to the struggle and striving of the two superpowers for world hegemonism.

CTV: Do you think any progress is possible at the Geneva disarmament talks?

Translator: From our side we think it will be very difficult to make any progress because the two superpowers have no sincerity in their talks.

.../2

FPR-1051

- 2 -

November 14, 1983

CTV: Does China think that the Soviet Union and the United States are equally guilty?

Translator: We always think that both the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. should reduce their nuclear powers or armed forces.

CTV: China, of course, is also a nuclear power. What would it take to get China to the disarmament negotiations?

Translator: In comparison, China has very few nuclear arms, very, very few, compared with the two superpowers. And from the very beginning, when we possessed the nuclear arms, from the very beginning, we have stated that in any circumstances or at any time, China will never be the first to use nuclear arms. The purpose of our producing, our developing nuclear arms, is to deal with blackmail from those superpowers with nuclear arms.

CTV: Does China still see the Soviet Union as a major threat to its security, to China's security?

Translator: We think that the main threat to our security comes from that country, not only to us but also to the whole Asia.

CTV: How do the Chinese now view American President Ronald Reagan?

Translator: Well, perhaps it would be much better for Canadians to answer the question because you know Mr. Reagan much better than we do. And people in the world know him quite well. And recently there has been some improvement in the relations between China and America, but there's still a major obstacle for the development of the relations, that is the Taiwan issue.

CTV: Do the Chinese believe that President Reagan is a man who sincerely wants peace?

Translator: It's very hard to say.

.../3

FPR-1051


- 3 -

November 14, 1983

CTV: Mr. Ambassador, thank you for talking with us.

Ambassador Yu: (in Chinese).

CTV: Mr. Yu Zhan is the new Chinese Ambassador to
Canada. Joining us, of course, was the Ambassador's
translator.


John J. Noble
Director
Media Relations

TO/À MPD (Mme. Despard)

FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Despard/Cocker telecon November 14
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Up-dating of Mr. G.A.H. Pearson's
SUJET Diplomatic Passport.

28-6-1-1 Pearson
Peace
Mission

Security/Sécurité
RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
November 14, 1983
Number/Numéro
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ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

Attached is Diplomatic Passport DD027296 for updating. Mr. Pearson will be travelling to Tokyo, Peking, Delhi and Moscow in connection with the Prime Minister's Task Force on International Security Initiatives (see attached travel authority).

2. Upon receipt of the application for Soviet visa forms these will be completed by Mr. Pearson (and Mr. Gary J. Smith, who will be travelling with Mr. Pearson) and returned to you as quickly as possible.

L. A. Delvoie

L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

Chinese PM arrives 16 January.

- 2 -

F. Visit to Moscow - Should the visit other Pact Capitals ?

G. Letter to Dutch - Sorry about Groesbeek (Done)

H. Lunches with experts (3 hours). Bring them in from all
one the world if necessary. Pay their way.

J. Jow do we go about arranging for Heads of Government to attend
CDS. Through Mrs Thatcher ? Otherwise ?

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FACSIMILE
MESSAGE

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FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0132 14NOV83

TO/À TO WSHDC

INFO

DISTR ---TEXT OF A LETTER FM THE PRESIDENT OF US TO THE PM S LETTER OF

REF OCTOBER 25.

SUBJ/SUJ (COMCENTRE: PLEASE FAX ATTACHED TEXT)

28-6-1-Thudon
Peace
mission

BCA

Back to you we spoke Doug Jacobs

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

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MESSAGE**

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FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	S E C R E T	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0132 16NOV83		
TO/A	TO USMDC		
INFO	---		
DISTR	TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF US TO THE PR S LETTER OF		
REF	OCTOBER 25.		
SUBJ/SUJ	(CONCENTRE: PLEASE FAX ATTACHED TEXT)		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <i>[Signature]</i> K. GILDER	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG L.A. DELVOIE



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

November 14, 1983

Mr. R. R. Fowler
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet
Privy Council Office
Langevin Block
Ottawa

Dear Mr. Fowler:

As the Ambassador is temporarily out of Ottawa, I am enclosing the text of a letter from the President in reply to the Prime Minister's letter of October 25. The text was received telegraphically. The signed original will be forwarded shortly.

I would appreciate it if you would have the President's letter brought to the Prime Minister's attention as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

John H. Rouse
Minister

Enclosure:
As stated

MR PIERRE:

S E C R E T

I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFUL LETTER REGARDING THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE LEVEL OF TENSION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION INDEED MERIT OUR ATTENTION, AND THE QUESTION WHETHER YURI ANDROPOV HAS SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE USSR BEARS OUR CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. MUCH ATTENTION HAS ALSO BEEN

DRAWN TO THE MILITARIZATION OF THAT SOCIETY, A DEVELOPMENT THAT MAY BE A FACTOR IN THE DETERIORATION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS MUST SUSTAIN THEIR EFFORTS TO PLACE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON A MORE STABLE FOOTING. AS YOU SUGGESTED, I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO MEET TO EXAMINE THE LONG-TERM STRATEGY WE IN THE WEST OUGHT TO PURSUE TO BRING THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES INTO A MORE STABLE AND PREDICTABLE PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

THERE ARE THREE BROAD ASPECTS OF WORLD SECURITY WHICH DESERVE OUR CONCERTED ATTENTION: FIRST, THE STEADY GROWTH IN SOVIET MILITARY POWER -- FAR BEYOND LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE NEEDS -- AND THE GROWING PROPENSITY OF THE SOVIETS TO USE IT, BOTH DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY, IN DESTABILIZING FASHION; SECOND, THE HIGH LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS IN GENERAL, WHICH MAKE THE WORLD MORE DANGEROUS THAN EVER; AND THIRD, THE VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF TRUST IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP, WHICH UNDERMINES OUR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN THE FIRST TWO AREAS. WE CERTAINLY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PUT ALL THESE PROBLEMS TO REST AT ONCE, BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST PURSUE A STRATEGY WHICH ADDRESSES ALL OF THEM SIMULTANEOUSLY, SINCE THEY ARE LINKED IN IMPORTANT WAYS.

PROGRESS IN ARMS REDUCTION, FOR EXAMPLE, WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT IF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO USE ITS MILITARY POWER IRRESPONSIBLY, AND IF SOVIET AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO EVADE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH PAST AGREEMENTS. SUCH ACTIONS UNDERMINE THE MINIMAL FOUNDATION OF CONFIDENCE ON WHICH ANY AGREEMENT MUST REST AND UNDERSCORE THE NECESSITY OF PROCEEDING WITH OUR PROGRAM OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE MODERNIZATION.

WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF YOUR EAST-WEST AGENDA, LET ME SAY THAT I FULLY SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO SEE MORE PROGRESS IN ALL OF THESE AREAS. IN THE MBFR TALKS, WE CONTINUE TO BE FRUSTRATED BY THE SOVIET REFUSAL TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL DATA ON THEIR TROOP LEVELS. BUT WE ARE BEGINNING TO MAKE LIMITED PROGRESS ON VERIFICATION.

AT THE STOCKHOLM CDE, WE WILL BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AIMED AT REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR IN EUROPE. WHILE WE IN THE WEST APPROACH THIS FORUM WITH SINCERE INTEREST IN

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. PIERRE, I FOUND BOTH YOUR LETTER AND YOUR SPEECH IN GUELPH INSIGHTFUL AND THOUGHT-PROVOKING. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU FOR A DETAILED DISCUSSION.

SINCERELY,

RON

UUR
DMF
IFB
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IDA
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RSR
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RETURN TO RENOYER AU		BICO		FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORTE AU DOSSIER	
ACC	REF	DATE			
FILE		DOSSIER			
28-6-1 - TRUDEAU		PEACE MISSION			

G. J. Smith

Prime Minister's Task Force on
East-West Relations &
International Security
5-5912

CONFIDENTIAL - CANADIAN EYES ONLY

IDDZ-0133

November 14, 1983

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister
and Secretary of State for External Affairs

cc: Minister of State (International Trade)
cc: Minister of State (External Relations)

Subject: PM's Visit to Europe: Follow-Up

Prime Minister Trudeau's meetings in Europe on his initiative went very well. During the short period of November 8-11 he had in-depth conversations with six European leaders (President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, Prime Ministers Lubbers, Martens, Craxi and Thatcher), as well as with the Pope and Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands.

The Prime Minister was well received in all capitals. His initiative was seen as serious and coming from a country with appropriate credentials. (As Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans put it to the press, the PM occupies a unique place within the Alliance for a role of this kind, being neither European nor American.) The PM found support all along the way for his general message of the need to reestablish a dialogue with Moscow and to create a "safety net" around the INF negotiations. This was particularly the case with Chancellor Kohl, and indeed to a surprisingly positive extent also with Mrs. Thatcher. Mitterrand, Kohl, Thatcher and Martens mentioned the unsettled and unclear situation as to what was happening in Moscow and what appeared to be a lessening of political control in the Kremlin. They shared the PM's analysis that a Reagan-Andropov summit was desirable, if properly prepared and held in an amicable atmosphere, and might have occurred sometime next spring if it had not been for the KAL incident. Unless something was done by NATO leaders to change the atmosphere, however, a summit would not occur, due to the USA presidential election, for 1 1/2 - 2 years, too lengthy a period in the current unhealthy and dangerous climate which exists between the two superpowers.

...2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

On specific points, there was general agreement on the need for Foreign Ministers to attend the opening of the Stockholm Conference on January 17. Cheysson said he had indications Gromyko would attend (unconfirmed by others) and that Shultz, although reluctant, would likely participate if everyone else did. Mrs. Thatcher was highly interested in the idea of possibly having even Heads of Government attend the Stockholm opening, seeing in it a mechanism by which a Reagan-Andropov meeting might be more acceptable and possible.

The Five-Power Nuclear Conference received a good hearing. Mitterrand's reaction was more positive than anticipated, not being against it provided it did not occur until after INF deployments were underway. Kohl similarly said he had an understanding with Mitterrand to the same effect. While Mrs. Thatcher was more negative she did not have a clear understanding of our proposal which already took account of two of the concerns she raised: (a) the need not to impede the UK modernization programme, and (b) not to aggregate UK, French and USA nuclear forces. The related issue raised by the PM concerning NPT and horizontal proliferation received a good reception, although largely without commitment.

While there was no immediate agreement achieved on having Ministers attend an MBFR meeting, there was support for the concept of having NATO respond to the most recent Eastern initiative.

Follow-up: During your meeting with the Prime Minister at 1715 hours today, he will be interested in discussing follow-up to the European trip and is particularly anxious to seek your views on how to best approach the December NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on the subjects of the CDE in Stockholm and MBFR.

The Prime Minister wishes prior to his departure for Tokyo to write to his NATO colleagues to inform them of the results of his European trip and, with your agreement, to propose that decisions be reached at the NATO meeting on two points that could figure in the NATO communiqué:

- (a) that NATO members will be represented at a high political level at Stockholm, and
- (b) that NATO will respond to the latest Eastern proposal on MBFR and will be prepared to meet with the Warsaw Pact at ministerial level in Vienna in order to provide political impetus to these negotiations.

...3


- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

In this regard, the Prime Minister will be interested in learning whether you are prepared to attend the Stockholm opening January 17 as well as a possible Foreign Ministers meeting on MBFR in Vienna sometime early in the spring.

Further follow-up is intended to include:

- (a) visits by Geoffrey Pearson (as the PM's personal emissary) and a member of the Task Force to Peking (November 21) and Moscow (November 25) to discuss the initiative;
- (b) further consultations with the USA, a key element of which will be your breakfast meeting tomorrow morning with USA Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam;
- (c) a possible visit by you to Eastern Europe, where keen interest in the initiative has been expressed, particularly by President Ceausescu of Romania.



L. A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0131 14NOV83	
TO/À	TO BNATO	
INFO		
DISTR	INFO LBN BONN WSHDC PARIS HAGUE BRU ROME LSEON MDRID ANKRA OSLO COPEN ATHNS MOSCO	
REF	PCOOTT/FOULER NDHQOTT/ADMPO/CPD/DM	
SUBJ/SUJ	DISTR MINA USS DDF IFB IDR IDA RBD RBR RCR UGB URR REF YOURTEL YBGR8122 10NOV ---PM/LORD CARRINGTON TELECON 11NOV PM TRUDEAU INITIATED SHORT TELECON WITH LORD CARRINGTON 11NOV JUST PRIOR TO PM LUNCHEON MTG WITH MRS THATCHER. PM SAID HE HAD JUST LEARNED (REFTEL) THAT LAST OBSTACLE HAD BEEN CLEARED FOR CARRINGTON TO REPLACE LUNS AS NATO SEC GEN AND HE WISHED TO PASS ON HIS CON- GRATULATIONS. 2. CARRINGTON APPOINTMENT WAS QUOTE GREAT TIMING FOR US IN NATO UNQUOTE. IT FIT SO WELL INTO CONCERNS PM HAD BEEN RECEIVING IN EUROPE AND REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW EFFORTS AT POLITICAL LEVEL. CARRINGTON SPEECH ON QUOTE MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY UNQUOTE CHARACTERIZED CURRENT SITUATION ACCURATELY AND IT WAS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE THAT HE BE TAKING OVER NATO POSITION AT THIS TIME. AT SOME POINT, ONCE CARRINGTON WAS APPOINTED, PM SAID TWO SHOULD MEET EITHER IN OTT OR ELSEWHERE. DURING PERIOD OF TRANSITION BETWEEN BEING NAMED IN DEC AND TAKING UP HIS DUTIES IN SPRING, PM EXPRESSED HOPE THAT CARRINGTON WOULD TALK TO ALL NATO LEADERS AND QUOTE MAYBE THERE SHOULD BE SOME ATTEMPT BY YOU, AS PETER CARRINGTON, TO SEE MARSAN ...2	

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
G.J. Smith/sc	IDDZ		
SIG			SIG U.A. Delveio

MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSIDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and ' (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et ' (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quand il comporte une signature.



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

12

10

~~PAGE TWO~~ IDDZ0131 CONFD

PACT COUNTRIES UNQUOTE. HE HAVE TO SHOW HE ARE READY TO TALK TO
OTHER SIDE; IF THEY HAVE NOTHING TO SAY OR SLAM DOOR, OK, ^{THEN} ~~THE~~ ONUS
LIES WITH THEM AND AT LEAST WE KNOW WE'VE TRIED. HE SHOULD QUOTE
CONGRATULATE OURSELVES AS NATO LEADERS RATHER THAN YOU THAT HE
HAVE MADE SUCH A WISE CHOICE UNQUOTE. PM CLOSED CONVERSATION WITH
REITERATION THAT CARRINGTON SHOULD COME SEE HIM IN OTTAWA OR IF IT
WERE EASIER PM WOULD SEE HIM IN EUROPE AT SOME POINT IN FUTURE.
3. CARRINGTON WAS VERY PLEASED TO RECEIVE CALL, HAVING INTERRUPTED
BOARD MTG TO TAKE IT. HE WAS SUPPORTIVE FULLY OF WHAT PM WAS ATTEMPT-
ING TO DO AND AGREED ON NEED TO TALK TO EAST EUROPEANS. AS MATTER OF
FACT HE HAD ONLY BEEN RECENTLY IN BUDAPEST AND ^{So FIA} ~~So FIA~~ ON BUSINESS
DEALS. HE HAD TO TEST WILLINGNESS OF SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES TO
MEET AND TALK AND PUT ONUS ON THEM TO BE NEGATIVE. HE WOULD TRY TO
COME ^{TO OTTAWA} AND SEE PM AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

Page two and succeeding pages are to be identified as per the following examples:

PAGE TWO MGT0159 UNCLAS
PAGE THREE AP00012 CONFD PERS INFO
PAGE FOUR FP01469 RESTR
PAGE FIVE GP00036 SECRET

NOTE: Classifications on page two and succeeding pages are abbreviated (except SECRET) and not spaced out.

La page deux et les pages suivantes seront identifiées conformément aux exemples suivants:


PAGE DEUX MGT0159 NONCLAS
PAGE TROIS AP00012 CONFD RENS PERS
PAGE QUATRE FP01469 RESTR
PAGE CINQ GP00036 SECRET

NOTE: Les cotes de sécurité sont abrégées (à l'exception de SECRET) et non espacées à partir de la page deux.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

November 14, 1983



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Enclosure:
As stated

SECRET

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
RON



Office of the
Prime Minister

Cabinet du
Premier ministre

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0A2



14 November, 1983

The following is the U.S. State Department's press line in response to media queries regarding the Prime Minister's Montreal speech on his peace initiative (as communicated to this office by Pat Gossage):


"1. The U.S. government supports the goals of the Prime Minister.

2. They confirm that the Prime Minister has written to the President, and that Mr. Reagan has replied (Gossage's intelligence indicates that the letter has been delivered to the Embassy in Ottawa, and that the Embassy will indicate that it is up to the Canadian government what it wishes to reveal of the letter's contents).

3. It is too early to comment on the specifics of the speech until the United States has discussed them with Canada and the other allies."

Brian Smith
Press Office

Louis



I would propose tomorrow to prepare a telex for major NATO posts which would urge on them a wider communications role now that we have something to talk about:

- 1.) Seek out one forum during next two weeks for HOP speech on PM initiative
- 2.) Very targetted briefings to elicit favourable comment from most respected foreign affairs commentators - either daily press or magazine
- 3.) Personal letters from HOP to heads of major peace/disarmament groups enclosing last speech.
- 4.) every possible attempt to get last speech or summary reprinted in newspapers, appropriate journals etc.
- 5.) Work up further press lines during week for them on such matters as (and subject to highest level approval, of course)
 - .other forums in which we are working to have ideas discussed (NATO?)
 - .putting the Chinese business into context the moment it gets out
 - .U.S. response.

Lets discuss this telephonically tomorrow.

P.

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CABINET DU
SECRETAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES

To
A The Office of the Under-Secretary

From
De MINA

Security
Sécurité UNCLASSIFIED

Reference
Référence

Date November 14, 1983

Subject
Sujet Parliamentary Report - November 14

USS
DPM/SSEA (2)
MINA (10)
MINE/Jalbert/
Laverdure
MINT/Burbridge
PMO/Fairbairn
PCO/Adam/Fadden

ON THE HILL

The House met at 11:00, the first day back after a week in adjournment. Hon. Walter Baker died last evening and after a series of tributes from, among others Brian Mulroney, Ian Dean and Minister Pinard, the House adjourned until 2 p.m. (It will not meet on Wednesday in order to permit Members to attend Mr. Baker's funeral)

The House will vote at 5:45 p.m. on third reading for Bill C-155 (Western Transportation Initiative).

Questions of Departmental interest:
P.M. PEACE MISSION; POLISH HUNGER STRIKES IN TORONTO;
US INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA; CDN MIDDLE-EAST POLICY.

Member statements of Departmental interest:
Bud Cullen complimented the Prime Minister on his recent peace initiative; Lee Clark urged that a Parliamentary Commission to reassess Canada's peacekeeping role in Cyprus be appointed; Pauline Jewett claimed that the Government's policy supported the nuclear arms race despite the PM's peace initiative; Stan Darling advocated more stringent control on lead emissions from automobiles; Joe Reid, wanted the Govt to strengthen the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.

SENSE OF THE HOUSE

Despite a week's respite Members were no less partisan in their questioning. Both Opposition Leaders led for their respective parties on the subject of the PM's peace initiative. While generally in support of his efforts, they sought elaboration on its substance.

In other debates, Walter McLean sought revisions to Bill C-150 such that support for students would not be reduced from present funding levels. Tom Siddon and Nelson Riis claimed the govt's economic programs had not created enough jobs; the NDP finance critic was especially critical of the govt's emphasis on fighting inflation, he argued job creation should be the highest priority. Minister Hervieux-Payette advised Irénée Pelletier that Canadian athletes participating in the 1986 Sarajevo and Los Angeles Olympics would be subject to mandatory drug tests before being allowed to participate in the sport events.

P.M. PEACE MISSION

Opposition Leader Brian Mulroney and NDP Leader Ed Broadbent spoke in general support of the P.M.'s peace initiative although they were critical of the form in which he made its Montreal speech claiming that the effort took on a partisan flavor. They also wanted the Ministry to table the P.M.'s correspondence with foreign leaders on the subject. In the absence of the Prime Minister, the DPM advised Mr. Mulroney "that the PM did correspond or was in touch with the President with respect to a conversation on a future meeting on the questions of East-West relations." The Minister suggested such a meeting would take place following the President's return from his trip abroad.

GMR
LCR
LCD
IDR
IDA
IDDZ
URR
UGB
RBP
RBR

The DPM said that the "same substance of the PM concern has been conveyed to the President" as was discussed in the conversations "in the past weeks with European leaders". The DPM said that while he did not have the correspondence with him "or do I have access to it" the PM would be in the House tomorrow to provide further details on his discussions. Mr. Mulroney wanted information on any letters sent to the Chinese and Soviet leaders; the DPM said he would draw these requests to the attention of the PM but that it was up to the PM to determine if he wanted to make them available, especially as "it is not usual to table communications of this type. In fact, it would be quite unusual."

Commenting on the PM's discussions with the French President, the DPM said that the initiative had received "a very positive response" and that Mr. Mitterrand was "greatly interested and supportive of the thrust of the PM's proposals", as were the other European leaders.

When the Opposition Leader asked for a fuller statement the DPM stated that "the practice of giving statements in the House on foreign policy has fallen into disuse... because what ought to be serious discussions on foreign policy usually become rather intense political brawls." The DPM suggested that perhaps Mr. Mulroney could change that practice and "bring back a system that prevailed in the House for quite a long time which was to have the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister make statements in the House on foreign policy questions following their trips abroad and then to have serious discussions in the House rather than the partisan, political attacks which we have seen in the House for quite a long time."

The DPM told Mr. Broadbent that what was urgently required at the disarmament talks, whether MBFR or INF "is some improvement that would enable the INF talks and talks in other fora to proceed in a better political atmosphere."

POLISH HUNGER STRIKERS IN TORONTO

Toronto Member Michael Wilson was told by the DPM that six of the ten hunger strikers' cases had been settled and that he was hopeful that the four remaining cases would also meet with success. The DPM announced that he had this day "instructed the officials in our embassy to make further representations with respect to these four remaining... and we are also drawing to the attention of the Polish authorities additional family reunification cases that are a matter of concern to the Government."

When Mr. Wilson claimed that the Immigration Dept. had been thwarting the efforts "of literally hundreds of Cdns of Polish origin" who are seeking to have their families come to Canada on a vacation, the DPM said that he would have to examine the details of these cases but that such matters should be raised directly with the Immigration Minister.

US INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA


Mr. Broadbent was fearful of American armed intervention in Central America and he claimed that during the week-end the President's National Security Advisor and his Special Emissary to the region had both hinted at an American invasion of Nicaragua. The DPM repeated the Ministry's policy of opposition to any military solution of the problems in Central America. The DPM said he had made it clear to Secretary Schultz and others that intervention of a military nature would not receive Canadian support, rather "we support the efforts of the Contadora group... the essence of that plan is demilitarization". The DPM said "our views have been made and would be made again" and he pointed out that he would be meeting tomorrow with Messrs. Dam, Burt and Medas from the US State Dept.

- 3 -

CANADIAN MIDDLE-EAST POLICY

it

With the Opposition shouting "straighten out Allan... give us the Syrian speech, Allan" the DPM responded to Jim Peterson's question regarding Canadian Policy in the Middle-East particularly concerning recognition of the PLO. The DPM said that "in the course of my very useful visit to five Middle East countries, I have stated Canadian policy, as it has been stated in the House of Commons, before the Senate Committee and in various speeches I have made as long as I have been Foreign Minister". With respect to the upgrading of contact with the PLO, the DPM reminded the House "that on Feb 17, I indicated that there was no intention on the part of the Govt of Cda of recognizing the PLO. That policy still stands. I did say that Cdn Govt officials had contacts from time to time with PLO representatives and that I was considering the possibility of upgrading those contacts... I repeated that statement in reply to a question from a journalist in Damascus.", but, "and this is very important-that any such upgrading would depend upon the circumstances and the requirements." Continuing the DPM said "It is rather self-evident, with the struggle which is currently going on within the PLO, that the time is not quite propitious to give implementation to that particular policy question".



D.C. Robertson
Departmental Assistant

TO/A

FILE

FROM/DE

FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

SCRUM: DPM/SSEA - PM's Initiative/Grenada

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	November 14, 1983
Number/Numéro	FPR-1056

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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FILE

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Q. Has President Reagan invited Prime Minister Trudeau to Washington?

SSEA I have no comments on that at the moment. I gave all the information I had in the House.

Q I understood you to say that the President wanted to arrange a meeting with the Prime Minister?

SSEA What I said in the House is my answer.

Q. Has there been a letter from the President to the Prime Minister?

SSEA I'd like the Prime Minister to deal with those questions tomorrow.

Q. Mr. MacEachen there was a report that the Government is investigating a charge that the American Government blocked the LIAT flight, which was to take the Canadians from Grenada before the Grenadian invasion. Is that true, and if so, what are the results of your investigation?

SSEA Well, I don't know whether I'd describe it as an investigation, or not. You know perfectly well, that we had asked for a clearance to permit a flight to come in to Grenada to take out Canadians. That was delayed by the owners of LIAT until it was too late. The decision was taken by the authorities in those countries - Antigua, and one or two other countries, who own LIAT. Therefore, except that they have said the reason that they didn't give clearance in the first place, was because there was an overall embargo, they hadn't understood there was an exception for humanitarian purposes, and when that became known to them, they permitted... they gave clearance. That is the explanation that we have from them. It seems to me that/they had another reason for doing it, they ought to tell us, or tell the public.

Q. Are you accepting that?

SSEA Yes, I'm accepting that explanation. I have no evidence to the contrary.

- 2 -

Q. So, you have no evidence that the Americans...

SSEA I have absolutely no evidence, if I get the evidence it will be a different matter. But it seems to me that it is a responsibility for the authorities in those countries

...

Q. Will you be raising this with Mr. Dam tomorrow?

SSEA No, I won't be raising this.

Q. Do you feel the Caribbean leaders misled you Mr. MacEachen? Some of them were involved...?

SSEA I don't think that there is anything on our record that says that they misled us. At least, when I returned and looked at the record, it was an on and off situation. But finally clearance was given, and it was too late. Clearance was delayed because there was an understanding that the embargo was total and it didn't make an exception for humanitarian flights. That is the situation, the explanation, we have had from the authorities in these countries. I have no evidence that the Americans twisted their arms, and it seems to me the ball is in the court of the countries who made the decision.

Q. So we are not investigating, or looking into that any further?

SSEA No, I am not investigating that any further.

Q. The cameras were not looking at you... the cameras would like to get you... we didn't see any of that.

SSEA (Laughter) I am not going to do it twice. I'm sorry.

Q. One more question, Sir. On the question of the Trudeau proposal for peace initiative. You mentioned that you thought there might be... there was a suggestion of a meeting with President Reagan, can you give us any specifics on that, has such a meeting been proposed, if so, by whom, and when?

SSEA Well, it's obvious that the Prime Minister has been conducting a series of meetings with leaders. It would be most natural to have a meeting with the President of the United States. I understand, I said in the House, that such a meeting was in the offing. I do not have the details as to when, but I understand it to be in the offing, which I think would be a very natural development.

- 3 -

Q. Can you describe the tone of the American reaction?

SSEA No. I think the reaction to the Prime Minister's proposal, generally, has been very positive. The Prime Minister has explained his views and his purposes to the European leaders, I believe their reception has been good. It remains now for him to complete his conversations. Generally I think the reaction has been quite positive.

Q. What about a meeting in Moscow. Is it possible the Prime Minister may go to Moscow. What about yourself, you have an open invitation still standing from Gromyko?


SSEA I am not proposing, personally, to go to Moscow at the present time.

Q. What about the Prime Minister?

SSEA Well, that is something that he will have to answer himself. I'm not speaking about his trip, anywhere.

Q. What about Nicaragua, Mr. MacEachen, will you be sure to renew Canadian concerns tomorrow?

SSEA Oh, we have made our concerns known, frequently. It might be repetitive to do it again tomorrow.



John J. Noble
Director
Media Relations Division



TO
À

P. Charette ABRT

File No. (originator) - Dossier n° (source)

FROM
DE

J. McNeil - CPD

File No. (addressee) - Dossier n° (destinataire)

Subject - Objet

TRAVEL AUTHORITY - P. Gossage

Please note that (2) Division & The coding (19) ARE
suppose to match. (4) This should be your telephone
NO. (16) Please print as well as sign your name
in case ABRT wishes to contact you.

(17) All Travel Authority forms require the
signature of the Director General
see attached for details

Signature

J. P. Charette

Date

J. P. Charette / 593-6035
14 Nov

Reply - Réponse

7540-21-0290717

GC 59

Signature

Date

D. V. Johnstone
November 14, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT PROGRAMME 01
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
IN DELHI 1983

OTTAWA

Thursday, November 17

Local Time

1200 hours - Departure from Ottawa

ANCHORAGE

Thursday, November 17

Local Time

1400 hours - Arrival in Anchorage
Elmendorf (?) Airport

1500 hours - Departure from Anchorage

TOKYO


Friday, November 18

Local Time

1730 hours - Arrival Tokyo
Haneda International Airport

- Arrival Okura Hotel

- Evening free



- 2 -

TOKYO

Saturday, November 19

Local Time

- hours - Depart Okura Hotel for Akasaka Palace
- 1000 hours - Meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone
Akasaka Palace
- Luncheon with Prime Minister Nakasone
- 1730 hours - Departure from Tokyo
Haneda International Airport

DHAKA

Saturday, November 19, 1983

Local Time

- 2300 hours - Arrival in Dhaka
Zia International Airport
- Arrival Ceremonies
- 2315 hours - Depart for Padma Guest House
- 2340 hours - Arrival at Padma Guest House

Sunday, November 20, 1983

- 1130 hours - Depart Guest House to old airport
- 1140 hours - Arrival at old airport
- 1145 hours - Departure by Helicopter for Savar
- 1155 hours - Arrival at Savar National Monument;
- Lay wreath
- Plant Sapling
- 1210 hours - Depart Savar for old airport
- 1220 hours - Arrival at old airport; Departure by car for
Army HQ

- 3 -

TOKYO

Sunday, November 20, 1983

- 1230 hours - Arrival at Army HQ (Sena Sadar);
Courtesy call on CMLA
- 1250 hours - Walk to Army Mess
- 1300 hours - Luncheon with President Kaunda and CMLA

DHAKA

Sunday, November 20, 1983

Local Time

- 1430 hours - Depart Army Mess
- 1450 hours - Arrive CIDA Railway Re-engining Project at Dhaka
Diesel Workshop, Kamalpur
- 1520 hours - Depart for Padma Guest House
- 1530 hours - Arrival at Padma Guest House
- 1920 hours - Depart Padma Guest House for Bangabhaban
- 1927 hours - State Banquet and Mini-Cultural Show
- 2200 hours - Depart Bangabhaban
- 2207 hours - Arrival at Padma Guest House

Monday, November 21, 1983

- 1005 hours - Depart Padma guest House for Sonargon Hotel
- 1015 hours - Meeting with Canadian businessmen
- 1120 hours - Depart for Bangabhaban
- 1130 hours - Arrival at Bangabhaban
Call on Hon. President
- 1200 hours - Depart Bangabhaban for Official Residence
- 1220 hours - Arrival at Official Residence
- 1230 hours - Informal Luncheon with selected invitees

- 4 -

DHAKA

Monday, November 21, 1983

- 1410 hours - Depart for Bangabhaban
- 1430 hours - Arrive at Bangabhaban
Tête-à-tête with CMLA
Expanded formal talks
- 1630 hours - Signing of MOUs
- 1640 hours - Meeting with press at Bangabhaban
- 1655 hours - Depart Bangabhaban for Padma Guest House
- 1700 hours - Arrival at Padma Guest House
- 1910 hours - Depart Padma Guest House for Official Residence
- 1930 hours - Arrival at Official Residence
- 2000 hours - Depart Official Residence for Padma Guest House
- 2020 hours - Arrival at Padma Guest House

Tuesday, November 22, 1983

- 0800 hours - Depart Padma Guest House for
Zia International Airport
- 0820 hours - Arrival at Zia International Airport
- 0830 hours - Departure for Chittagong on Biman Special
Flight
- 0916 hours - Arrival at Chittagong
- 0925 hours - Departure for Diang Ashram by helicopter
- 0940 hours - Arrival at Diang Ashram
Lay wreath; Father Flavian's house; Refreshments
in schoolyard; Nuns' residence (PM only) for
talks with fathers and sisters
- 1040 hours - Depart Diang Ashram for Mondakini Char
- 1110 hours - Arrival at Mondakini Char
Visit small scale water project
- 1140 hours - Depart for Kaptai
- 1210 hours - Arrival at Kaptai
Lunch at Rest House

- 5 -

DHAKA

Tuesday, November 22, 1983

- 1320 hours - Depart Kaptai
- 1405 hours - Arrive Chittagong Airport
- 1415 hours - Depart for Dhaka on Biman Special Flight
- 1500 hours - Arrival at Zia International Airport
Farewell Ceremonies
- 1530 hours - Departure for Delhi
- 1715 hours - Arrival in Delhi

INDIA

Wednesday, November 23, 1983

Local Time

- 0900 - 0920 hours - Heads of Delegation arrive and are received by Commonwealth Secretary General in Lounge
- 0925 hours - Heads of Delegation and Commonwealth Secretary General move from lounge to rostrum in main conference hall
- 0943 hours - Indian National Anthem
- 0945 hours - Ceremonial opening
 - Welcome by Prime Minister Gandhi and Secretary General Ramphal
 - Five replies to address of welcome
 - Group photo on rostrum
- 1100 hours - Executive Session (Heads of Delegation only)
- 1230 hours - Reception for Heads of Delegation by Commonwealth Secretary General at Vigyan Bhavan
lunch - free
- 1500 hours - Executive session

- 6 -

INDIA

Wednesday, November 23, 1983

Local Time

- 1730 hours - Reception for Heads of Delegation by President of India at Rashtrapati Bhavan
- 2000 hours - Queens banquet (for Heads of Delegation) (Black Tie or National dress and Decorations)

Thursday, November 24, 1983

- 0930 hours - Executive Session
- 1215 hours - visit to Trade Fair Authority Exhibition followed by lunch for Heads of Delegation) Working lunch
- 1500 hours - Executive Session
- 2030 hours - Dinner for Heads of Delegation by Prime Minister Gandhi at Ashok Hotel followed by Cultural Programme (Lounge Suit)

Friday, November 25, 1983

- 0930 - 1200 hours - Executive Session
- 1230 hours - Departure of Heads of Delegation for Goa on three special flights

Saturday, November 26, 1983

- Goa Programme

Sunday, November 27, 1983

- 1830 - 2000 hours - Sepcial Flights from Goa arrive Delhi

Monday, November 28, 1983

- 0930 - 1200 hours - Executive Session
- 1500 hours - Executive Session

- 7 -

INDIA

Tuesday, November 29, 1983

- 0930 hours - Executive Session
- 1500 hours - Executive Session
- 1700 hours - Closing Press Conference by Prime Minister
Gandhi and Commonwealth Secretary General
Release of Communique (Time to be determined)

ABU DHABI

Wednesday, November 30, 1983

Local Time

- 1030 hours - Arrival at Abu Dhabi Military Airport
Ceremonial Greeting by Sheikh Hamdan Bin
Mohammad (Deputy PM)
- 1100 hours - Departure for Hotel Intercontinental
- 1115 hours - Arrival Hotel Intercontinental
- 1145 hours - departure for Audience with Sheikh Zayed
President of United Arab Emirates and Emir of
Abu Dhabi
- 1200 hours - Audience with Sheikh Zayed
or
1215 hours
- 1245 - 1300 hours - Departure for Intercontinental Hotel
Private Luncheon
- 1330 - 1430 hours - Round Table meeting with Canadian Businessmen
Intercontinental Hotel

OPTION A

- 1445 hours - Motorcade to Abu Dhabi Military/VIP Airport
- 1500 hours - Departure by helicopter to Dugas-Jebel Ali
- 1540 hours - Arrival at Dugas. Brief tour hosted by Scimtar
Oil. Meet personnel and families.
- 1615 - 1620 hours - Departure by helicopter to Abu Dhabi

- 8 -

ABU DHABI

OPTION A

- 1720 hours - Arrival Abu Dhabi Airport
Motorcade to Intercontinental Hotel
- 1800 - 1815 hours - Press Conference (15 minutes)
- 2000 hours - Official Banquet offered by DPM Sheikh Hamdan

OPTION B

- 1445 hours - Motorcade from Intercontinental Hotel to Airport
- 1500 hours - Departure by helicopter for Dubai
- 1545 hours - Arrival at Dubai (helicopter to be determined)
- 1600 hours - Possible meeting with Sheikh Mohammed, Minister of Defence, United Arab Emirates, in council setting with attendance of approximately 8 businessmen and leading personalities; Dubai time arrival Dubai for 1645 hours meeting with Acting Ruler Dubai and Deputy Premier Sheikh Maktoum
- 1715 hours - Return to Heliport
- 1815 hours - Arrival at Abu Dhabi Airport
Motorcade to Intercontinental Hotel
- 1830 - 1845 hours - Press Conference (15 minutes)
- 2000 hours - Official Banquet offered by DPM Sheikh Hamdan at Intercon

NOTES:

Dubai Option means that press pool covering PM Visit will miss press conference in Abu Dhabi

- 9 -

ABU DHABI

Thursday, December 1, 1983

Local Time

- 0915 hours - Departure for Airport
- 0930 hours - Arrival at Airport
- Departure ceremonies
- 0945 hours - Departure for Muscat

MUSCAT

Thursday, December 1, 1983

Local Time

- 1100 hours - Arrival at Muscat
Seeb International Airport
Ceremonial Greeting
- 1120 hours - Departure for Ghobra Guest House
- 1130 hours - Arrival Ghobra Guest House
- 1245 hours - Departure for audience with HM Qaboos Bin Said,
Sultan of Oman
- 1300 hours - Audience with Sultan Qaboos
- 1345 hours - Departure for Guest House
- 1400 hours - Private Luncheon with Deputy Prime Minister at
Guest House (to be confirmed)
- 1630 hours - Meeting with ministers at Guest House. Will
probably include Deputy PM, FIN & ECON, Minister
of Staff for Foreign Affairs, Minister of
Commerce & Industry)
- 2000 hours - Banquet hosted by Deputy Prime Minister at
Ghubra Guest House (to be confirmed)

- 10 -

ABU DHABI

Friday, December 2, 1983

Local Time

- 1000 hours - Sightseeing trip to Nizwa (by helicopter) and Jebel Akhdar
- 1800 hours - Meeting with Canadian Businessmen at Ghobra Guest House
- 2000 hours - Private Dinner at Guest House

Saturday, December 3, 1983

- 0800 hours - Departure for Guest House Airport
- 0900 - 0845 hours - Departure from Oman for Bahrain

BAHRAIN

Saturday, December 3, 1983

Local Time

- 0900 hours - Arrival at Muharraq International Airport, Bahrain Ceremonial greeting by PM Sheikh Khalifa Bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
- 0915 hours - Departure for Ghudaibia Palace
- 0930 hours - Audience with HH Sheikh Isa Bin Salman Al Khalifa, Emir of Bahrain. Also in attendance may be Sheikh Hamid Bin Isa al Khalifa, Heir Apparent and Defence Minister
- 1000 hours - Meeting with Sheikh Khalifa and ministers (e.g., Foreign Affairs, Development & Industry) (to be arranged)
- 1100 hours - Departure for Airport
- 1115 hours - Arrive Airport
- Departure ceremonies
- 1130 hours - Departure for Kuwait

- 11 -

KUWAIT

Saturday, December 3, 1983

Local Time

- 1230 hours - Arrival at Kuwait International Airport
Ceremonial Greeting by HH Crown Prince Sheikh
Saad Al-Abdullah
- 1320 hours - Departure for Salaam Palace (Guest House)
- 1340 hours - Arrival at Salaam Palace
accompanied by Crown Prince
- 1350 hours - Crown Prince takes leave of PM
- 1400 hours - Private Luncheon with Ministers
Salaam Palace
- 1530 hours - Meeting with Canadian Businessmen
- 1615 hours - Departure for Sief Palace
- 1630 hours - Joint meeting with CP/PM Deputy Prime Minister,
Foregin & Info Minister Sheikh Sabah, Ministers
of Communications Al Mazidi, Speaker of the
National Assembly and Minister of Commerce
Jassim Khalid Sief Palace (?)
- 1715 - 1730 hours - Press conference (15 minutes)
Sief Palace (in Ante Room to PM's office)
- 1730 hours - Return to Salaam Palace
- 1940 hours - Head of Mission of Honour (TBA) arrives to
escort PM to Shaab Palace
- 2000 hours - State Banquet, Shaab Palace.
Offered by CP/PM Shaikh Said
- 2130 hours - Return to Salaam Palace

Sunday, December 4, 1983

- 0840 hours - Head of Mission arrives to escort PM to Seif
Palace
- 0900 hours - Audience with HH The Emir Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmed

- 12 -

KUWAIT

Sunday, December 4, 1983

- 0945 - 1000 hours - Return to Salaam Palace
- 1000 - 1030 hours - Meeting with Executive of Kuwait Chamber of Commerce or similar select group of business/finance community at Chamber of Commerce offices
- 1120 hours - III The Crown Prince arrives at Salaam Palace
- 1130 hours - Departure for the airport
- 1150 hours - Leave taking with Crown Prince Sheikh Saad
- 1200 hours - Depart Kuwait

LONDON

Sunday, December 4, 1983

Local Time

- 1700 hours - Arrival at London

Monday, December 5, 1983

- 0900 hours - Depart London

OTTAWA

Monday, December 5, 1983

Local Time

- 1145 hours - Arrival Ottawa

ITINERARY - ITINÉRAIRE

014-186-186-000-0901

PREPARED FOR: - DESTINÉ À:

G Smith

NOTE: AS TIMETABLES ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE PLEASE VERIFY SCHEDULE BEFORE DEPARTURE.

NOTE: LES HORAIRES ÉTANT SUSCEPTIBLES DE CHANGEMENTS SANS PRÉAVIS, VEUILLEZ VÉRIFIER CE TABLEAU AVANT VOTRE DÉPART.

4-5

File/Dossier: XA-2620-KA Date 16-11-83

City - Endroit		Day and Date Jour, date	Time - Heure	Via - Vol	Remarks - Commentaires
Tokyo	LV-D	SUN Nov 20	1030	JL	787 (Y)
	AR-A		1415		
Peking	LV-D	Tue. Nov 22	1100	PA	16 J
	AR-A		1655		Hotel
Tokyo	LV-D	THUR Nov 24	1200	JL	441 (C)
	AR-A		1615		
Moscow	LV-D	SAT Nov 26	1850	SU	582 (Y)
	AR-A		1945		Hotel
London	LV-D	SUN Nov 27	0935	A-1-	112 (C)
	AR-A		2355		Hotel TAJ MAHAL
Delhi	LV-D	Tue Nov 29	0320	LH	663 (C) TEL 386 162
	AR-A		0750		
Frankfurt	LV-D		0915	LH	100 (C)
	AR-A		1015		Hotel ROYAL WINDSOR
Brussels	LV-D	THUR DEC 1	1130	H.M	384 (Y) TEL 511-4215
	AR-A		1210		
Amsterdam	LV-D		1310	KL	677 (C)
	AR-A		1440		
Montreal	LV-D		1730	HF	305 (Y)
	AR-A		1805		
Ottawa	LV-D				
	AR-A				
	LV-D				
	AR-A				
	LV-D				
	AR-A				
	LV-D				
	AR-A				

001147

ITINERARY - ITINÉRAIRE

014-176-176-002-0401

PREPARED - R - DESTINÉ À: London

CA Pearson Smith

NOTE: AS TIMETABLES ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE PLEASE VERIFY SCHEDULE BEFORE DEPARTURE.

NOTE: LES HORAIRES ÉTANT SUSCEPTIBLES DE CHANGEMENTS SANS PRÉAVIS, VEUILLEZ VÉRIFIER CE TABLEAU AVANT VOTRE DÉPART.

4-5

File/Dossier: XA-2630-KA Date 16-11-73

City - Endroit		Day and Date Jour, date	Time - Heure	Via - Vol	Remarks - Commentaires
Tokyo	LV-D	SUN Nov 20	10 30	JL	701 (V)
	AR-A		14 15		
Peking	LV-D	Tue Nov 22	11 00	CA	16 J
	AR-A		16 55		Hotel
Tokyo	LV-D	Thurs Nov 24	12 00	JL	441 (C)
	AR-A		16 15		Hotel - MEZH DUNARODNAYA
Moscow	LV-D	SAT Nov 26	10 50	SU	582 (V)
	AR-A		19 45		Hotel -
London	LV-D	SUN Nov 27	09 35	A1-	112 (C)
	AR-A		23 55		Hotel Raj. Mahal
Melbri	LV-D	Tue Nov 29	03 20	LH	663 (E)
	AR-A		07 50		
Frankfurt	LV-D		09 15	LH	109 (F)
	AR-A		16 15		Hotel - Royal Windsor
Brussels	LV-D	Thu Dec 1	11 30	HM	354 (E)
	AR-A		12 10		
Amsterdam	LV-D		13 10	KL	607 (C)
	AR-A		14 40		
Montreal	LV-D		17 30	HF	305 (V)
	AR-A		17 05		
Ottawa	LV-D				
	AR-A				
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	AR-A				
	LV-D				
	AR-A				
	LV-D				
	AR-A				

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PARIS WIAF8820 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR *[Handwritten signature]* IDDE MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD MFFP

REF YOURTEL XDV1049 31OCT


--- PMS INITIATIVE - VISIT TO EUROPE : NOV 83

REFTEL.SPECIFIES HOSPITALITY COSTS NOT/NCT TO BE INCLUDED IN CODING PROVIDED. WE ARE NOW IN RECEIPT OF BILL FOR LUNCH OFFERED TO JOURNALISTS. PLEASE ADVISE CODING FOR THIS EXPENDITURE.

2. WE HAVE ALSO RECD BILLING FM INTERCONTINENTAL FOR HOTEL CHARGES FOR ONE JOURNALIST. (P KORING). CAN THIS BE CODED TO

014-760-760-014-0901 ?

UUU/272 141642Z WIAF8820



**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSHDC UNFC8098 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT UDDZ

INFO MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT, FOWLER CANPASSMONTL/COLEMAN
NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFF URGI URR RGV UED RER IED IDR IDA

---PM INITIATIVE-STATE DEPT RESPONSE

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF STATE DEPT NOON PRESS BRIEFING TODAY
IN RESPONSE TO PMS PEACE PROPOSALS WHICH WE GOT FROM CTV TAPING.
QUESTION:QUOTE HAS THE DEPT ANY COMMENT ON PROPOSALS BY PM TRUDEAU
TO OPEN UP NEW PROGRESS OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN WESTERN LEADERS,
PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR ARMED.

ANSWER:WE SHARE PM TRUDEAU'S DESIRE TO SEEK PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL
AND THE CREATION OF A MORE STABLE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP.THE ADMIN
HAS PUT FORWARD A NUMBER OF POSITIVE PROPOSALS ON STRATEGIC ARMS.
INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE AND
IN OTHER AREAS IN PURSUIT OF THESE OBJECTIVES.WE ATTACH A HIGH
PRIORITY TO MOVE THESE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.WE ARE OF COURSE
LOOKING CAREFULLY AT THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY PM TRUDEAU,WHO HAS
ALSO WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT ON THESE ISSUES.PRESIDENT REAGAN
HAS RESPONDED TO THAT LETTER ALONG THE LINES INDICATED ABOVE.
I MIGHT NOTE THAT DEPUTY SECY DAM WILL BE DELIVERING THAT RESPONSE
WHEN HE TRAVELS TO CANADA.IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO COMMENT ON ANY
SPECIFICS UNTIL WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO STUDY PM TRUDEAU'S IDEAS

...2

PAGE TWO UNFC8098 UNCLAS

FURTHER, AND TO DISCUSS THEM BOTH WITH CANADIANS AND WITH INTERESTED ALLIES.

QUESTION: ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY MECHANISM FOR ANY MEETING BEING SET UP BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND PM TRUDEAU.

ANSWER: I WOULD HAVE TO ASK YOU TO CHECK WITH THE WHITE HOUSE ON THAT.

QUESTION: IS THERE ANY CONCERN THAT THIS KIND OF INITIATIVE BY THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER INTERFERES WITH CAREFULLY DEVELOPED INF NEGOTIATING STRATEGY.

ANSWER: I WOULD REFER YOU TO WHAT I HAVE SAID ON THAT UNQUOTE.

UUU/241 14220Z UNFC8098

28-6-1 - Hussein
Peace
mission

001152

PAGE DEUX WIGR5292 CONF CDNS SEUL

NATURE DE INITIATIVE AVEC ACCENT PARTICULIER SUR EVENTUALITE QUE PM CDN POURSUIVE SES CONSULTATIONS LORS DU CHOQM AVEC AUTRES PAYS DONT N-Z. SUR CE AVONS INDIQUE QUE RENCONTRE DE DELHI A FIN DE CE MOIS APPARAISSAIT COMME PROCHAINE ETAPE ET OCCASION DE POURSUIVRE CONSULTATIONS EN COURS. RETENONS PAR AILLEURS IMPRESSION QUE SI INITIATIVE DU PM PRESENTE INTERET CERTAIN POUR N-Z, SENSIBILITE PARTICULIERE EXISTE POUR QUESTION DE PROLIFERATION NUCLEAIRE (RE ESSAIS FRANCAIS A MUROROA).

4. CES MEMES PREOCCUPATIONS ETAIENT EGALEMENT PARTAGEES PAR REP AUSTRALIEN QUI A SOULIGNE INTERET SUSCITE, NOTAMMENT DANS PRESSE LOCALE, A EGARD DE INITIATIVE CDNNE. REACTIONS FRANCAISES ETAIENT PERCUES COMME IMPORTANTES PUISQUE MRE CHEYSSON ENTREPREND A COMPTER DU 15NOV VISITE OFFICIELLE EN AUSTRALIE ET SUJET RELATIF AUX ESSAIS NUCLEAIRES FRANCAIS DANS PACIFIQUE SERA A ORDRE DU JOUR DES ENTRETIENS POLITIQUES.

5. POUR NOTRE PART CONSIDERONS COMME SIGNIFICATIF QUE AUTRALIE ET N-Z AIENT RECHERCHE INFOS ADDITIONNELLES SUR INITIATIVE DU PM. IL VA DE SOI QUE SOUCI PREMIER EST DE S ASSURER QU ILS SERONT A LEUR TOUR CONSULTES PARTICULIEREMENT A DELHI.

6. VOUS SIGNALONS ENFIN QUE RENCONTRONS A SA DEMANDE 15NOV REP DE AMB DE URSS. VOUS AVISERONS.

CCC/272 141642Z WIGR5292

Mr. Pearson
Mr. Smith

28-6-14 Trudeau
Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4125 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT RER

INFO WSHLC LDN PARIS BNATO BUCST BPEST PRGUE WSAW BGRAD PMOOTT/
FOWLER NHHQOTT/ADMPO

DISTR MINA MINE MINT SID RED RET RERD RBP ZSI CPS DMF IFB IDD IDDZ
---MTG WITH FORMER AMBASSADOR YAKOVLEV

I SPENT HOUR WITH YAKOVLEV ON 10NOV IN HIS OFFICE AT INSTITUTE
OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INNATL RELATIONS, IN SOUTHERN

SUPURFS OF MOSCO. I HAD KNOWN HIM IN OTT. HE WAS ALONE AND SO WAS
8 (PUT HIS OFFICE PHONED IN ADVANCE TO CHECK THIS POINT).

IT IS FIRST TIME IN SOME TEN YEARS OF SERVICE IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
THAT I HAVE BEEN ALONE WITH AN OFFICIAL IN HIS OFFICE.

2. YAKOVLEV ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS KINDEST REGARDS TO PM TRUDEAU.

I PASS THIS ON AS POINT OF SOME IMPORTANCE BECAUSE I SUSPECT THAT IF
PEARSON MISSION COMES OFF, YAKOVLEV WILL BE INVOLVED.

3. IN PRELIMINARY CHAT YAKOVLEV SAID HE HAD LEFT CDA WITH REGRET.

ONE ALWAYS LIKES TO COME HOME, BUT IN TEN YEARS IN CDA HE HAD
PERSONALLY BEEN TREATED WITH NOTHING BUT KINDNESS AND COURTESY. EVEN
WINNIPEG UKRAINIANS AND CDN JEWISH CONGRESS HAD GIVEN HIM DECENT
HEARING. OCCASIONAL TIFFS WITH PRESS WERE OF NO/NO IMPORTANCE. HE
LOVED CDA, AND WOULD ALWAYS.

4. ON QUESTIONS OF DAY, YAKOVLEV PROVED HIMSELF TO BE SKILFUL APOLOGIST
FOR ESTABLISHED SOVIET POSITIONS THAT HE ALWAYS WAS IN OTT. I ASKED
WHAT HE THOUGHT OF PMS GUELPH SPEECH (OF WHICH I HAD SENT HIM COPY).
HE THOUGHT IT USEFUL AND PROMISING, AND HOPED IT WOULD LEAD SOMEWHERE.

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR4125 CONFD

THERE WERE SOME DETAILS ABOUT SOVIET INTERNAL MATTERS THAT HE COULD NOT/NOT ACCEPT, SUCH AS IDEA THAT MILITARY WERE GAINING CONTROL. BUT THAT AND SOME SMALL POINTS ASIDE, HE LIKED IDEAS IN SPEECH. HE HOPED ONE RESULT OF SPEECH WOULD BE VISIT BY PM TO MOSCO. WHATEVER PMS STANDING IN CDN POLLS, HE HAD SOLID REPUTATION ABROAD. HIS VISIT TO THIS COUNTRY WOULD HELP IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, EVEN IF THERE WERE NO/NO SUBSEQUENT SPECIFIC DOCUMENT OR AGREEMENT TO PUBLISH. HAD I NOTICED SOVIET PRESS COVERAGE OF SPEECH? I HAD. (OURTEL XYGR4099 04NOV). THIS DID NOT/NOT HAPPEN EVERY DAY AND MEANT USSR WAS READING SPEECH POSITIVELY.

5. WE TURNED TO INF. YAKOVLEV MADE TWO POINTS NEW TO ME, TOGETHER WITH FAMILIAR ONES. FIRST WAS THAT DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE AND PERSHING 2 WOULD DO SERIOUS HARM TO STKHM CDE. HE DID NOT/NOT AMPLIFY, BUT I HEAR ON PEC THAT SOVS HAVE BEEN SAYING SAME THING IN VIEN, ABOUT MBFR. SECOND POINT CONCERNED ORIGINAL IMPULSE BEHIND CRUISE AND PERSHING 2 DEPLOYMENT. YAKOVLEV REFERRED ME TO ARTICLE IN LDN OBSERVER OF 16OCT BY PETER PRINGLE. ACCORDING TO YAKOVLEVS SOMEWHAT TENDENTIOUS SUMMARY, ARTICLE (WHICH I HAVE SINCE READ) QUOTE PROVED UNQUOTE (ON BASIS OF SECRET DOCUS) THAT NATO DECISION TO DEPLOY WAS A PLANNED MODERNIZATION, ORIGINALLY UNRELATED TO EXISTENCE OF SS20S. QUOTE SECOND TRACK UNQUOTE WAS INVENTED LATER AND WAS CLEARLY A PROPAGANDA DEVICE. ORIGINAL DECISION TO MODERNIZE WAS TAKEN BY LEADERS OF 4 NATO NUCLEAR POWERS ON GUADALOUPE IN JAN 1979. BRIT PM WAS THEN CALLAGHAN WHO, YAKOVLEV WENT ON TO SAY, WAS IN MOSCO FEW WEEKS AGO, HAD CALLED ON

...3

PAGE THREE XYGR4125 CONF

YAKOVLEV AND HAD, IN EFFECT, QUOTE SITTING WHERE YOU ARE SITTING NOW UNQUOTE, CONFIRMED PRINGLE STORY, I.E. THAT CONNECTION BETWEEN NATO MODERNIZATION AND SS20S WAS MADE WELL AFTER GUADALOUPE DECISION WAS TAKEN. UNLESS I HAVE VERY FAULTY MEMORY THIS MUST BE NONSENSE, AND IS IN ANY CASE ACADEMIC. BUT SINCE YAKOVLEV IS ALLEGED TO BE ACADEMIC I WILL PURSUE MATTER, ESPECIALLY HELMUT SCHMIDT'S EARLY SPEECHES ON QUOTE DECOUPLING UNQUOTE EFFECT OF SS20 DEPLOYMENT. ALL OTHER POINTS ON INF WERE FAMILIAR, ALTHOUGH YAKOVLEV WAS ESPECIALLY GRAVE IN TALKING ABOUT DESTABILIZING EFFECT OF PERSHING 2 DEPLOYMENT, WHICH WOULD, HE SAID, REQUIRE SOVS TO ADOPT QUOTE LAUNCH ON WARNING UNQUOTE STRATEGY SINCE QUOTE THERE WOULD BE NO/NO TIME TO CHECK ACCURACY OF WARNING SIGNALS UNQUOTE. THIS IS NOT/NOT NEW, BUT SINCE SOVS FIRST SAID IT, YEAR OR SO AGO, THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR DISPOSITION TO SHOOT FIRST AND ASK QUESTIONS AFTER.

6. YAKOVLEV SPOKE OF SOV-USA RELATIONS. UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND SEEMED TO BE PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS, WHAT HE CALLED INSULTS TO SOVIET PEOPLE OFFERED DAILY NOT/NOT BY AMERICAN PRESS BUT BY PRES REAGAN AND OTHER MEMBERS OF ADMIN. HE THOUGHT THIS VERY SERIOUS MISTAKE. PERHAPS MANY SOVS WERE QUOTE GODLESS COMMUNISTS UNQUOTE. BUT THEY WERE NOT/NOT ASHAMED OF IT AND RESENTED BEING CLASSIFIED BY REAGAN AS LOWER ORDER OF HUMANITY. QUOTE REAGAN SMILES A LOT. HERE WE DO NOT/NOT SMILE. WE ARE SERIOUS UNQUOTE.

7. I HAD INTENDED NOT/NOT TO RAISE KAL INCIDENT WITH YAKOVLEV, BECAUSE HE WAS WRONG PERSON. BUT INEVITABLY IT CAME UP. LIKE DEPUTY FORMIN

...4

PAGE FOUR XYGR4125 CONFD

RYSHOV, HE SAID THAT TRUTH ABOUT FLIGHT WOULD COME OUT SOONER OR LATER. HE MENTIONED INNATL EVENTS (CHILE WAS MAIN ONE) WHERE CIA HAD AT FIRST DENIED ANY INVOLVEMENT, THEN LATER COME CLEAN. WHAT DIFFERENCE WOULD IT MAKE TO CDA, HE ASKED, IF CLEAR EVIDENCE APPEARED THAT PLAN WAS ON SPY MISSION? WHY, HE ASKED, HAD PLANE CREW OF 29 INSTEAD OF USUAL 15, AND WHY HAD IT FLOWN DIRECTLY OVER TWO MOST SENSITIVE BASES IN USSR? I SAID (FOR TENTH TIME AT LEAST SINCE I HAVE BEEN HERE) THAT IT MADE NO/NO DIFFERENCE AT ALL WHY PLANE WAS OFF COURSE. I THOUGHT THERE WAS NAVIGATIONAL ERROR. BUT TEN CDN CIVILIANS HAD BEEN KILLED ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT BY SOV MILITARY ATTACK. THERE WAS SOME RECKONING TO DO. WHY THE FLIGHT WAS OFF COURSE WAS UNKNOWN AND AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED IRRELEVANT TO CENTRAL QUESTION OF LOSS OF LIVES, PARTICULARLY FOR US, CDN LIVES.

8. WE PARTIED ON GOOD TERMS AND WILL KEEP IN TOUCH

ROBERTS

CCC/144 151130Z XYGR4125

MF
H

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR4090 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR IDR IDA

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0125 12NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:5 POWER PROPOSAL

COPIES OF PAPER GIVEN TO FCO DEFENCE DEPT UNDER SECRETARY
CARTLEDGE AS WELL AS ACLAND AND COLES. IN VIEW OF GENERAL
PREOCCUPATION HERE WITH IMMINENT ANNOUNCEMENT IN HOUSE OF
COMMONS OF ARRIVAL TODAY OF CRUISE MISSILES, WE HAVE BEEN
ASKED TO PUT OFF FULLER DISCUSSION OF PRIME MINISTERS
INITIATIVE UNTIL LATER IN WEEK.

CCC/170 141635Z XNGR4090

28.6.1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
id

28.6.1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BONN ZQGR4089 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

INFO WSHCC LDN MOSCO PARIS BNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPF/CIS ADM
PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA MINE DMF RGB RCR IFB IDD IDA IDR ZSP RSD RBR RCD

REF OURTEL ZQGR4087 11NOV

---PM INITIATIVE-SPD INF POSITION

YOU MIGHT BE INTERESTED TO LEARN THAT HELMUT

SCHMIDTS PERSONAL ASSISTANT HAS CONTACTED US TO REQUEST

COPIES OF PMS GUELPH AND MONTREAL SPEECHES.HE SAID

SCHMIDT WANTED TO DRAW ON THEM FOR HIS OWN ADDRESS TO SPD

PARTY CONGRESS 18-19NOV.AS YOU KNOW WE REPORTED IN

REFTEL THAT VOGEL HAS SAID SCHMIDT WOULD SUPPORT

STATIONING IN THE ABSENCE OF GENEV RESULT,BUT WOULD AT

SAME TIME BE CRITICAL OF EFFORTS MADE TO AVOID NEED TO

STATION.

CCC/242 141055Z ZQGR4089

002/15

1/2

Mr. Gossage *gr*

UNCLASSIFIED

CHCGO YFGR2893 14NOV83

EXTOTT LDDZ

WSHDC

001/15

UGP URR IDA SCS ZSP ZSI

OUR TELEX YFGR2889 14NOV83

---PMS INITIATIVE: MONTL PRESS CONFERENCE

ATTACHED IS ARTICLE ENTITLED QUOTE TRUDEAU SEEKS NUCLEAR SUMMIT

UNQUOTE REFERRED TO IN OUR YFGR2889.

28-6-1-1
Trudeau
Peace
mission

[Handwritten signature]

- General Relations

(312)
427-1031

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

[Handwritten signature]

David E. Iyane

001160

2/2

Chicago Tribune
Nov. 14/83

Trudeau seeks nuclear summit

MONTREAL (Reuters)—Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, back from a whirlwind peace crusade around Western Europe, called Sunday for a conference of the world's five nuclear powers and said he has started consultations with Peking and Moscow.

Trudeau, who toured six capitals in four days to sound out fellow NATO leaders on his disarmament initiatives, also proposed an international agreement to ban high-altitude antisatellite systems.

He said the proposed five-nation nuclear conference would not prejudice the Geneva arms talks between U.S. and Soviet officials. The other nuclear powers are Britain, France and China.

Trudeau also suggested that an international effort be made to get

more countries to sign the 1970 nuclear nonproliferation treaty because "a number of key states remain aloof."

HE ALSO SAID all future strategic weapons should have built-in verification systems and called on the superpowers to restrict the excessive mobility of their intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Canadian officials, briefing reporters on Trudeau's speech to a Liberal Party rally, said the conference could explore the idea of "superpower parity and fixed ratios for the others."

Trudeau, who has an open invitation from Soviet leader Yuri Andropov to visit Moscow, said he has opened consultations with both the Soviet Union and China at foreign ministry level.

Mr. Gossage
MF
ED

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM CHCGO YFGR2889 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO WSHLC


DISTR URR IDA SCS ZSP ZSI UGP

---PMS INITIATIVE: MONTL PRESS CONFERENCE

14NOV83 ISSUE CHCGO TRIBUNE PICKED UP REUTERS DISPATCH ON PM
PRESS CONFERENCE IN MONTL ON SUN 13NOV83.

2. TITLE OF TWO COLUMNED ARTICLE IS QUOTE TRUDEAU SEEKS NUCLEAR
SUMMIT UNQUOTE. ARTICLE BEING FAXED.

UUU/845 142000Z YFGR2889



S E C R E T

FM WSHDC UNGR2431 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT URR DELIVER BY 150830

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA FPR LIDZ

REF YOURTEL URR0979 14NOV

---LET FROM PRES REAGAN TO PM TRUDEAU

WE DO NOT/HAVE ANY SPECIAL INSIGHTS INTO TEST AND COMMENTS WE
COULD MAKE ARE ONES WHICH WILL OCCUR TO YOU.


2.CLEARLY LET IS AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE SOVIET UNION AS ADVERSARY AND
TO REIN IN CDN EFFORTS TO ENGAGE IN WHAT USA SEES AS POSITION TOO
EVEN-HANDED TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS DEFINITION AND WITH NEED FOR
UNIFIED ALLIED APPROACH.

3.IN EFFECT,LET SUGGESTS MOST WORTHWHILE OBJECTIVE AT THIS TIME
SHOULD BE TO BRING USSR TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WEST
CONSIDERS PRE-CONDITIONS FOR PEACE AND OF NEED TO MODIFY THEIR OWN
BEHAVIOUR ACCORDINGLY.LET IS STRUCTURED TO AVOID ANY POSSIBILITY OF
IMPLICIT MENTION USA PARTICULARLY AND WEST MORE GENERALLY ARE IN ANY
WAY RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESENT SITUATION.

4.INDEED,LET TENDS TO REFLECT VIEW IN WSHDC THAT TENSION BETWEEN USA
AND USSR IS NOT/NOT AT LEVELS WHICH ALARMS ADMIN AND IN ANY CASE IS
ALTERABLE ONLY BY ALTERATIONS IN USSR BEHAVIOUR.IT ALSO REFLECTS
THEME THAT PRIMARY REQUIREMENT AT THIS TIME IS SHOW OF UNITY.

5.ON FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE,YOU CAN ASSUME USA EMPASSIES IN LDN AND
PARIS HAVE SPOKEN TO THEIR INTERLOCUTORS ABOUT DISCUSSIONS THERE WITH
PM TRUDEAU.WE WOULD PRESUME USA HAS MADE ITS OWN POSITION OF DEEP

...2



PAGE TWO UNGR2431 SECRET

RESERVATION CLEAR.WE ARE TOLD IN STATE DEPT THAT USA VIEWS ARE SHARED IN THOSE CAPITALS.

6.ONE IS TEMPTED TO SEE IN THIS TEXT AN ALMOST DELIBERATE EFFORT TO AVOID GRASPING WHAT THE PM WAS WRITING ABOUT BUT WE URGE YOU TO RECOGNIZE THAT SOME OF ITS SIMPLISTIC AND COMPLETELY ONE-SIDED LANGUAGE IS A PRODUCT OF BUREAUCRATIC RIVALRIES HERE WHICH WILL ALWAYS RESULT IN HARD-LINE COMMUNICATIONS WHEN COMMUNICATING WITH ALLIES ABOUT THE USSR.


7.IT IS IN THE NATURE OF THE USA AS SUPER-POWER TO TRY ABOVE ALL TO KEEP ALLIES IN LINE.

8.IT IS IN THE NATURE OF THIS ADMIN IN PARTICULAR TO WISH TO DO SO WHEN IT COMES TO RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.THE LETTER IS,IN ANY EVENT,A REFLECTION OF THE WAY THE PRESIDENT AND HIS KEY ADVISERS THINK:OF THAT THERE CAN BE NO/NO DOUBT.

9.LET MAKES IT ALL THE MORE NECESSARY FOR EXTRA EFFORTS TO INFORM UPPER LEVELS OF ADMIN AS FULLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE ABOUT ANALYSIS BY PM OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND OF HIS PROPOSALS.ABOVE ALL, THIS REPLY SHOULD NOT/NOT IMPEDE MOMENTUM OF PM'S EFFORTS.INDEED,IT SHOWS HOW GREATLY GENUINE USA-USSR DIALOGUE IS NEEDED AND IT SHOWS HOW MUCH EFFORT WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR PART TO BRING USA INTO MORE SYMPATHETIC POSTURE.ALL OF THIS ARGUES FOR TRUDEAU-REAGAN PERSONAL MTG BEFORE LONG.LAST LINE OF LET PROVIDES OPENING FOR SEEKING SUCH A MTG WHICH WE PRESUME WILL BE IN JAN AS INDICATED BY DARMAN TO GOTLIEB.PLEASE INDICATE WHEN WE SHOULD FOLLOW UP.

CCC/086 150022Z UNGR2431

Division Phoned _____
Person L.C.
Local Time 1150



C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2429 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ FLASH

INFO MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN

NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB URGB URR RGV UBD RBR IDD IDR IDA

---PM INITIATIVE:USA PRESS GUIDANCE

FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF DRAFT PRESS GUIDANCE USA HAS PREPARED FOR USE BY PRESS OFFICE IN RESPONSE TO QUERIES ABOUT PMS SPEECH.

(PLEASE NOTE THIS IS INTENDED AS GUIDE FOR RESPONSES, IT IS NOT/NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION. ALSO NOTE THAT AS OF THIS TIME (11:00 AM) THIS GUIDANCE IS STILL A DRAFT. IT HAS NOT/NOT BEEN FULLY CLEARED).

-USA SUPPORTS PMS INITIATIVE AND SHARES HIS DESIRE TO SEE PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELS.

-USA HAS PUT FORWARD A NUMBER OF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS WHICH IT IS PURSUING VIGOROUSLY.

-USA IS LOOKING CAREFULLY AT PROPOSALS WHICH PM HAS PUT FORWARD PUBLICLY AND ABOUT WHICH HE HAS WRITTEN TO PRES REAGAN. PRES REAGAN HAS RESPONDED.

-IT WLD BE PREMATURE TO COMMENT ON SPECIFICS UNTIL USA HAS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSALS FURTHER WITH CDA AND OTHER INTERESTED ALLIES.

CCC/230 141627Z UNGR2429

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2428 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ UGB F L A S H

INFO MOSCO BNATO PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPP

PARIS BONN LDN ROME PEKIN TOKYO

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB URR RGB UBD RBR IDD IDR IDA

---PMS INITIATIVE:USA REACTION

SUMMARY:ADMIN REACTION TO PM PEACE INITIATIVE REMAINS PUBLICLY POSITIVE ON GENERALITIES BUT CLD WELL BE NEGATIVE ON MOST SPECIFICS. PRESS TREATMENT IS GOOD, HOWEVER, EVEN IF THERE IS INEVITABLE ATTENTION GIVEN TO ASSUMED CDN DOMESTIC MOTIVES. DAM VISIT SHLD BE OCCASION FOR BRINGING USA CLOSER TO PM PURPOSES BUT MUCH MORE EMPHASIS HAS TO BE PLACED ON CONNECTING WITH USA ON SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OR THESE PROPOSALS WILL JUST ATROPHY.

2.REPORT:PRESS COVERAGE OF SPEECH IS GOOD:NY TIMES PAGE 1 STORY TODAY IS POSITIVE EXCEPT FOR INEVITABLE ASSESSMENT OF INITIATIVE IN TERMS OF POSSIBILITY OF REVIVING SAGGING POLITICAL FORTUNES OF LIBERAL PARTY.RESTON COLUMN YESTERDAY WAS HELPFUL.WASH POST GAVE COVERAGE LESS PROMINENT BUT FAIRLY THOROUGH.ADMIN PRESS GUIDANCE TODAY IS TO BE POSITIVE OF PM EFFORTS BUT TO SAY ADMIN HAS NO COMMENT ON SPECIFICS UNTIL AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH CDA AND ALLIES.

3.HOWEVER,DISCREET ADMIN REACTION IS LESS POSITIVE.BURT TOLD GOTLIEB SUNDAY NIGHT REAGAN RETURN LET IS NOW SIGNED.IT REFLECTS BROADLY

...2

28-6-1. <i>Tuesday</i>		Division Phoned
Peace		Person
Mission		Local Time

PAGE TWO UNGR2428 CONF

POSITIVE REACTION TO NOTION OF PM INITIATIVE. HOWEVER, BURT SAID USA WILL HAVE TO OPPOSE SPECIFICS. HE MENTIONED (A) FIVE POWER CONFERENCE (P) BAN ON DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS (C) OBLIGATION TO MAKE FUTURE WEAPONS SYSTEMS VERIFIABLE BY MEANS OTHER THAN ON-SITE INSPECTION. HE SAID HE DOUBTED ADMIN WLD EVER COME RIGHT OUT AND REJECT THESE PROPOSALS. THEY WLD JUST BE LEFT TO WITHER.

4. BURT REACTION WAS PERSONAL. INDEED, BURT CAN BE EXPECTED TO OBJECT TO PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED PROPOSALS AND FORMULAE CUTTING ACROSS USA MANAGEMENT OF ITS KEY FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS. HE MAY HIMSELF BE TOO CLOSE TO EVENTS FOR COMPLETE OBJECTIVITY. BUT WHILE WE MAY EXPECT COSMETICALLY MORE GENEROUS RESPONSE FROM POLITICAL LEVEL, IN TONE CLOSER TO WHAT EAGLEBURGER TOLD MARCHAND, WE DOUBT IT WILL BE ANY MORE ENCOURAGING ON SUBSTANCE.

5. THIS IS PORNE OUT BY EARLIER CONSULTATIONS GOTLIEB HAD WITH DAM ON SAT WHEN WE WERE ABLE TO CONTACT STATE DEPT ON LIKELY SUBSTANCE OF SPEECH ON BASIS TELS RECD THAT DAY. DAM TOLD GOTLIEB THAT USA WAS CONCERNED CDN PROPOSALS A) FOR 5-POWER CONF WLD BE USED BY OPPONENTS OF INF DEPLOYMENT TO PRESS FOR DELAYS AND B) FOR 5-POWER CONF AT SAME TIME AS START NEGS WLD COMPLICATE THEM. DURING COURSE OF DAY GOTLIEB WAS ABLE TO CLARIFY INTENTIONS ON THESE 2 POINTS TO SOME EXTENT WHICH DAM WELCOMED. HOWEVER, HE REMAINED GUARDED IN HIS REACTION TO PROPOSALS OVERALL.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2428 CONF

6. BURT ALSO LAMENTED LACK OF ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS WHICH GOTLIEB POINTED OUT IS APPARENTLY BELIED BY COMMUNICATION OF BACKGROUND PAPER ON FIVE POWER CONF TO USA EMB IN OTT ON 08NOV. HOWEVER, WE MUST EMPHASIZE TO YOU THIS IS FOR CDN PURPOSES COMPLETELY INADEQUATE APPROACH TO ADMIN. FOR MORE THAN 40 YRS THIS EMB HAS BEEN USED TO CONVEY SUCH DOCS AND THEIR CONTENT TO SENIOR USA OFFICIALS BECAUSE THAT IS THE EFFECTIVE WAY TO REACH THEM. IT IS MOST UNFORTUNATE THIS WAS NOT/NOT CASE FOR THIS DOC, WHICH WAS NOT/NOT EVEN CONVEYED TO EMB UNTIL SAT NIGHT. NOR, OF COURSE, WAS NEWS THIS WAS TO BE A HIGHLY SUBSTANTIVE SPEECH.

7. OVERALL, OUR CONCERN IS THAT PM INITIATIVE RUNS RISK OF BEING SEEN IN WSHDC AS LITTLE MORE THAN THOUGHTFUL SPEECHES UNLESS WE MAKE HARD CONSULTATIVE EFFORT TO BRING ADMIN ONSIDE. WE GATHER TALKS IN EUROPE WERE POSITIVE ON SUBSTANCE THOUGH SOME TELS ON SUBJ HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN SENT HERE. BUT UNLESS USA IS COOPERATIVE ON SUBSTANCE, INITIATIVE IS STALLED.

8. POSSIBLY FROM OTT VIEW THERE IS PRESENTATIONAL DOWNSIDE TO CONSULTING WITH USA ON PURPOSES OF INITIATIVE IN ADVANCE OF CONSULTATIONS WITH USSR. BUT THIS SCHEMATIC EVEN-HANDEDNESS HAS TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST DAMAGE IF USA SIMPLY LETS PROPOSALS IN CONSEQUENCE ATROPHY. SINCE WE HAVE ADVANCED THEM IN NO/NO MULTILATERAL FORUM WE HAVE LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR PRACTICAL FOLLOW-UP OR MAINTAINING PRESSURE TO OVERCOME THIS.

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR2428 CONF

9.THERE WAS ALWAYS DANGER THAT CONCENTRATING PM INITIATIVE ON POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR EAST-WEST ACCOMMODATION WLD INVITE CRITICISM THERE WAS NO/NO SUBSTANCE IN PROPOSALS.BUT WE MUST NOW AVOID EXCESSIVE EMPHASIS ON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AND FORMULAE WHICH IF LEFT UNANSWERED CAN BE SEEN TO MAKE THE PROPOSAL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE POLITICAL UNDERSTANDINGS SEEM A FAILURE AS WELL.YOU ARE OBVIOUSLY AWARE THAT PLACING 5 POWER CONF PROPOSAL ENTIRELY IN CONTEXT OF NATIONAL STRATEGIC FORCES AND RATIOS(RATHER.FOR EXAMPLE,THAN PROLIFERATION),MAKES IT HIGHLY START-SPECIFIC AND SUBJECT TO GRAVEST AMERICAN RESERVATIONS.START TALKS ARE ADMIN A)HIGHEST NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITY B)HIGHEST FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITY AND C)IN CONSEQUENCE HIGHEST DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRIORITY.ALL OF THIS ARGUES FOR CLOSER CONTACT WITH THIS ADMIN.YOU SHLD USE DAM VISIT FOR THAT PURPOSE AS WELL AS BLAIS MTG WITH WEINBURGER THIS WEEK,AND MAXIMIZE USE OF THIS EMF AND ITS VERY EXTENSIVE CONTACTS ON ARMS CONTROL AND EAST-WEST RELS AT ALL LEVELS OF ADMIN.

GOTLIEB

CCC/059 141740Z UNGR2428

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM TOKYO UIGR2172 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 140900

INFO PCOOTT/DURAND PMOOTT/DURDIN/SMITH RCMPOTT/VIP5 NDHQOTT/DAOT3-3

TT ATOC TRENTON 437 SQN DE CAF

DISTR USS DMF PGB PPD PPR IDD IDDZ MGT

REF OURTEL UIGR2115 11NOV

---PMS VISIT:PROGRAM AND SCENARIOS

FOLLOWING ARE DRAFT DETAILED PROGRAM AND SCENARIOS.YOU WILL NOTE THERE ARE STILL A NUMBER OF BLANKS TO BE FILLED IN AND THERE MAY BE OTHER CHANGES EG.WHO WILL OFFICIALLY GREET PM ON ARRIVAL; WHO WILL SEE HIM OFF.SEE FOLLOWING TEL RE CDN ATTENDANCE AT TRUDEAU/NAKASONE MTG 19NOV AND SUBSEQUENT LUNCH.

2.PROGRAM AND SCENARIOS:

TOKYO - FRIDAY NOVEMBER 18. 1983

LOCAL TIME

17:30 HOURS-ARRIVAL AT HANEDA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT


GREETINGS BY: MR KIYOSHI SUMIYA, CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

MR BARRY CONNELL STEERS,AMBASSADOR OF CANADA

SCENARIO:

AMBASSADOR STEERS WILL ASCEND THE FRONT RAMP AND ENTER THE AIRCRAFT TO GREET THE PRIME MINISTER.THE AMBASSADOR AND THE PRIME MINISTER DESCEND THE RAMP WHERE MR SUMIYA THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL WILL OFFICIALLY GREET THE PRIME MINISTER AND WELCOME HIM TO JAPAN. (PHOTO OPPORTUNITY).OTHER MEMBERS OF THE OFFICIAL DELEGATION

...2



PAGE TWO UIGR2172 CONFD

DESCEND THE RAMP AFTER THE PRIME MINISTER AND PROCEED DIRECTLY TO THEIR ASSIGNED CARS IN THE MOTORCADE. AMBASSADOR STEERS WILL INTRODUCE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CANADIAN EMBASSY TO THE PRIME MINISTER. AFTER THE INTRODUCTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE, AMBASSADOR STEERS WILL ESCORT THE PRIME MINISTER TO HIS CAR (CAR NO. 1). THE MOTORCADE, WITH FULL ESCORT, WILL THEN LEAVE FOR THE HOTEL OKURA.

17:30 HOURS- PRIME MINISTERS PLANE ARRIVES AT SPOT 22.

17:35 HOURS- AMBASSADOR STEERS ASCENDS THE FRONT RAMP AND ENTERS THE AIRCRAFT TO GREET THE PRIME MINISTER.

17:40 HOURS- THE PRIME MINISTER DESCENDS THE RAMP TO BE OFFICIALLY WELCOMED TO JAPAN BY MR SUMIYA, THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL. AMBASSADOR STEERS WILL THEN INTRODUCE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, TOKYO.

17:50 HOURS- THE MOTORCADE DEPARTS FOR THE HOTEL OKURA.

(MOTORCADE)

PILOT CAR

CAR 1: PRIME MINISTER/AMBASSADOR STEERS/MR JOHNSON/INSPECTOR CARTER
ESCORT CAR

CAR 2: MR MASSE/MR AXWORTHY/MR COOPER

CAR 3: MR FOWLER/MR WRIGHT/MR WHITTLETON

CAR 4: MR GLORIEUX/MR DRAKE/MR BLUM

CAR 5: MR COLEMAN/MR DURAND/MS KONDO

CAR 6: MR VINCENT/MR KAWASHIMA

CAR 7: MISS VIAU/MR ISHIDA/MR GILLET

CAR 8: MR BOURQUE/MR HORNER/MS CARDINAL/MR ROFILLARD

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PAGE THREE UIGR2172 CONFD

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1983

18:15 HOURS- THE MOTORCADE ARRIVES AT THE HOTEL OKURA.

SCENARIO:

THE PRIME MINISTER IS WELCOMED BY MR TATSURO GOTO, PRESIDENT AND
GENERAL MANAGER OF THE HOTEL OKURA. THE PRIME MINISTER IS ESCORTED
TO HIS SUITE BY MR GOTO AND AMBASSADOR STEERS.

EVENING FREE.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1983

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE AND LUNCH AT THE JAPANFSE
ANNEX OF THE AKASAKA PALACE

10:55 HOURS- ALL OFFICIALS ATTENDING THE MEETING AND LUNCH ENTER
THE MOTORCADE VEHICLES AT THE ENTRANCE OF THE MAIN
BUILDING, HOTEL OKURA, AND AWAIT THE PRIME MINISTER.

(MOTORCADE)

PILOT CAR

CAR 1: PRIME MINISTER/AMBASSADOR STEERS/MR JOHNSON/INSPECTOR CARTER
ESCORT CAR

CAR 2: MR MASSE/MR AXWORTHY/MR FOWLER

CAR 3: MR WHITTLETON/MS KONDO

10:55 HOURS- AMBASSADOR STEERS ESCORTS THE PRIME MINISTER FROM
HIS SUITE TO THE ENTRANCE OF THE MAIN BUILDING,
HOTEL OKURA, WHERE THE MOTORCADE IS WAITING.

11:00 HOURS- THE MOTORCADE DEPARTS FOR THE AKASAKA PALACE.

11.15 HOURS- THE MOTORCADE ARRIVES AT THE AKASAKA PALACE.

SCENARIO:

(BLANK) AND (BLANK) MEET THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE ENTRANCE OF THE

...4

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PAGE FOUR UIGR2172 CONF D

JAPANESE ANNEX OF THE AKASAKA PALACE AND ESCORT HIM TO (BLANK)
TO MEET PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE. THE ACCOMPANYING DELEGATION ALSO
PROCEEDS TO THE (BLANK) AND JOINS THE JAPANESE DELEGATION TO WITNESS
THE INITIAL GREETING. (PHOTO OPPORTUNITY). THE PRIME MINISTER,
ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR STEERS, (BLANK) AND MS KONDO THEN PROCEED
WITH PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE AND THE RESTRICTED JAPANESE DELEGATION
TO THE JAPANESE TEA CEREMONY ROOM FOR THEIR MEETING. THE REST OF
THE CANADIAN AND JAPANESE DELEGATIONS PROCEED TO (BLANK) WHERE
PRE-LUNCHEON DRINKS WILL BE SERVED.

11:20 HOURS-THE PRIME MINISTER OF ESCORTED TO THE (BLANK) TO MEET
PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE (PHOTO OPPORTUNITY).

11:25 HOURS-THE PRIME MINISTERS ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR RESTRICTED
DELEGATIONS/INTERPRETERS PROCEED TO THE JAPANESE TEA CEREMONY ROOM
FOR THEIR MEETING.

APPROX 12:25 HOURS-THE MEETING ENDS. THE PRIME MINISTERS PROCEED
TO (BLANK) FOR THE LUNCHEON.

APPROX 12:30 HOURS-LUNCHEON

SCENARIO:

AFTER THE MEETING THE PRIME MINISTERS PROCEED TO (BLANK).
THE PRIME MINISTER PRESENTS THE CANADIAN DELEGATION MEMBERS WHO
WERE NOT/NOT AT THE MEETING TO PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE, WHO, IN TURN,
INTRODUCES THE OTHER JAPANESE DELEGATION MEMBERS TO PRIME MINISTER
TRUDEAU. ALL ARE SEATED AND THE LUNCHEON COMMENCES.

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SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1983

LUNCHEON-HOST: PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE

JAPANESE GUESTS:

MR GOTODA, CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY OR/OR

MR FUJINAMI, DEPUTY CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY

MR T NAKAJIMA, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MFA

MR H KITAMURA, DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU, MFA

MR Y KATO, DIRECTOR-GENERAL, EUROPEAN AND OCEANIC AFFAIRS BUREAU, MFA

MR S KADOTA, DIRECTOR-GENERAL, UNITED NATIONS BUREAU, MFA OR/OR

MR T TAKANO, DIRECTOR, DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, UN BUREAU, MFA

MR HASEGAWA, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MR Y KAWASHIMA, DIRECTOR, FIRST NORTH AMERICAN DIVISION, NORTH
AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU, MFA

CANADIAN GUESTS:

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU

AMBASSADOR STEERS

MR M MASSE, UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MR T AXWORTHY, PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE

MR R FOWLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY TO THE CABINET, (FOREIGN AND DEFENSE
POLICY), PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

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MR JE JOHNSON, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

MP J WHITTLETON, (NOTETAKER), MINISTER, CANADIAN EMBASSY, TOKYO

MS M KONDO, INTERPRETER

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1983

SEATING PLAN FOR LUNCHEON

(BLANK)

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1983

APPROX 14:30 HOURS-AT THE END OF THE LUNCHEON THE PRIME MINISTER
AND THE CANADIAN GUESTS PROCEED TO THE MOTORCADE.

APPROX 14:35 HOURS-THE MOTORCADE DEPARTS.

APPROX 14:55 HOURS-THE MOTORCADE ARRIVES AT THE HOTEL OKURA.

(MOTORCADE)

PILOT CAR

CAR 1: PRIME MINISTER/AMBASSADOR STEERS/MR JOHNSON/INSPECTOR CARTER
ESCORT CAR

CAR 2: MR MASSE/MR AXWORTHY/MR FOWLER

CAR 3: MR WHITTLETON/MS KONDO

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1983

16:50 HOURS-ALL MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION ENTER THE MOTORCADE
VEHICLES AT THE ENTRANCE OF THE MAIN BUILDING, HOTEL OKURA, AND
AWAIT THE PRIME MINISTER.

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PAGE SEVEN UIGR2172 CONFD

(MOTORCADE)

PILOT CAR

CAR 1: PRIME MINISTER/AMBASSADOR STEERS/MR JOHNSON/INSPECTOR CARTER

ESCORT CAR

CAR 2: MR MASSE/MR AXWORTHY/MR COOPER

CAR 3: MR FOWLER/MR WRIGHT/MR WHITTLETON

CAR 4: MR DRAKE/MR GLORIEUX/MR ELUM

CAR 5: MR COLEMAN/MR DURAND/MR VINCENT

CAR 6: MISS VIAU/MS KONDO/MR GILLET

CAR 7: MR POURQUE/MR HORNER/MS CARDINAL/MR ROBILLARD

16:50 HOURS-AMBASSADOR STEERS ESCORTS THE PRIME MINISTER FROM HIS SUITE TO THE ENTRANCE OF THE MAIN BUILDING, HOTEL OKURA, WHERE THE MOTORCADE IS WAITING.

16:55 HOURS-THE MOTORCADE DEPARTS.

17:20 HOURS-THE MOTORCADE ARRIVES AT HANEDA AIRPORT.

SCENARIO:

THE PRIME MINISTER IS MET BY MR SUMIYA, THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL.

(FLANK).

FAREWELLS ARE EXCHANGED. THE MEMBERS OF THE OFFICIAL PARTY WILL PROCEED DIRECTLY ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT. ONCE EVERYONE ELSE IS ABOARD, AMBASSADOR STEERS WILL ESCORT THE PRIME MINISTER UP THE RAMP TO BOARD THE AIRCRAFT.

17:30 HOURS-THE AIRCRAFT DEPARTS.

CCC/195 140905Z UIGR2172

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM HAGUE YWFC1790 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO LEN PARIS MERID LSPON FONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU
WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV TOKYO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN
NDFQOTT/MND/CIS/ADM POL/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGE URR RGE RSD RCR IDD IDA IDR FPR

---PM INITIATIVE-NETHS PRESS COMMENTARY

ALL MAJOR NEWSPAPERS GAVE CONSIDERABLE COVERAGE TO PMS VISIT
NOV08-09. MOST HEADLINES WERE ALONG LINES OF MASS-CIRCULATION
NATIONAL DAILY QUOTE TELEGRAAF UNQUOTE WHICH SAID NEUTRALLY QUOTE
CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER VISITS NETHERLANDS UNQUOTE. OTHER PAPERS.
SUCH AS LEFTIST AMSTERDAM DAILY QUOTE PAROOL UNQUOTE RAN ARTICLES
HEADLINED QUOTE TRUDEAU IN SEARCH OF DETENTE UNQUOTE.

2. IN ITS ARTICLE PUBLISHED NOV08, TELEGRAAF CALLED THE PMS VISIT
AND MEETING WITH NETHS PM LUIJERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK QUOTE PART
OF THE CANADIAN PMS PILGRIMAGE THROUGH EUROPE IN AN EFFORT TO
DIMINISH TENSION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND TO IMPROVE RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION UNQUOTE. PM TRUDEAU
IS QUOTED AS SAYING JUST AS WAR IS TOO IMPORTANT TO LEAVE TO
GENERALS, SO IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST SO FRAUGHT
WITH ANIMOSITY THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP CAN NO/NO LONGER BE LEFT
SOLELY TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITY. TELEGRAAF REPORTED THAT QUOTE WITH
HIS INITIATIVE, THE CDN PM HOPES TO DE-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE

...2

PAGE TWO YWFC1790 UNCLAS

PUT BY THE SUPERPOWERS ON THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH AND TO ACHIEVE
A NORMALIZED AND PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO WHICH WOULD
BE MORE FITTING TO THEIR POSITION AS SUPER POWERS UNQUOTE.LOCAL
HAGUE PAPER QUOTE HAAGSCHE COURANT RAN ARTICLE WITH SIMILAR
CONTENT NOV08 BUT CONCLUDED BY SPECULATING THAT PERHAPS THE CDN
PM WOULD HIMSELF BE WILLING TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARY IN HIS
PROPOSED DIALOGUE.HAAGSCHE COURANT RAN EDITORIAL OCT28 ON GUELPH
SPEECH WHICH WAS ALREADY REPORTED TO YOU IN OURTEL YWFC1770 28OCT
AND WHICH NOTED THE CENTRAL GEOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL POSITION
CANADA HOLDS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS.THE SUGGESTION WAS THEN
MADE THAT THE CDN PM EVIDENTLY FEELS THIS RESPONSIBILITY VERY
SERIOUSLY AND THAT THERE IS EVERY REASON TO LISTEN SERIOUSLY TO
THE MESSAGE HE BRINGS TO EUROPE.

3.ON NOV09,CENTRE-LEFT NRC/HANDELSBLAD PUBLISHED PHOTO OF PM
TRUDEAU BEING WELCOMED ON ARRIVAL BY NETHS PM LUEFFERS AND HEADLINED
ARTICLE ON VISIT QUOTE GOVERNMENT ATTACHES VALUE TO TRUDEAUS
INITIATIVE UNQUOTE.IN A QUOTATION FROM THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT
STATEMENT ISSUED CONSEQUENT TO PMS DEPARTURE FOR BONN,PAPER WROTE
THAT QUOTE THE TALKS WERE A USEFUL EXCHANGE OF THOUGHTS WITH A
MAJOR EMPHASIS GIVEN THE PROBLEMS OF ARMS LIMITATION AND THE
IMPROVEMENT OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.ON SAME DAY,
TELEGRAAF PUBLISHED A LARGE PHOTO OF MEETING BETWEEN HM QUEEN
PATRIX AND PM TRUDEAU.

...3

PAGE THREE YWFC1790 UNCLAS

4.COMMENTS FROM DUTCH ELECTRONIC MEDIA TO FOLLOW.

5.CONSIDERING THAT PM DID NOT/NOT MEET PRESS,WITH EXCEPTION OF
PHOTO SESSION,AND THAT LITTLE INFO WAS AVAILABLE ON TALKS HE HAD
WITH PM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK COVERAGE GIVEN TO HIS VISIT
IN THE NETHS CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE MORE THAN ADEQUATE AND
REFLECTS THE INTEREST SHOWN IN THIS COUNTRY FOR THE FMS INITIATIVE.

UUU/155 141621Z YWFC1790

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PMOOTT PM01297 14NOV83

TO TOKYO IMMED

INFO EXTOTT/XDV PCOOTT/DURAND

DISTR PPR *IEDZ*

REF YOURTEL UIFC2132 11NOV

---PMS VISIT--MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

NOT/NOT ANTICIPATING ANY BRIEFINGS REGARDING

PMS INITIATIVE.ACCREDITATION ONLY REQUIRED

FOR PHOTO OPPORTUNITY OF PMS MEETING WITH

PM NAKASCNE.

2.BUSES REQUESTED REQUIRED TO MOVE MEDIA TO AND


FROM AIRPORT AND PHOTO OPPORTUNITIES.

CCC/001 141836Z PM01297



28-6-1 - Tusseau
Peace
mission

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER



UNCLASSIFIED

FM CLVND YGPA0966 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO ATNTA BOSTN BUFLO CHCGO DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS CNGNY

PHILA SFRAN SEATL WSHDC

REF YOUR TEL IDDZ0129 OF 13NOV83

---PM MONTREAL SPEECH

WE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD SEND PM'S MONTREAL
SPEECH TO POST ON THE WORD PROCESSOR. WE FEEL MEDIA SHOULD HAVE COPY
OF SPEECH ASAP AND WE HAVE CONSIDERED SENDING PHOTO COPIES OF TELEX
BUT OUR TELEX MACHINE HAS PRINTING PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD MAKE COPIES
DIFFICULT TO READ. ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE NO AVAILABLE SUPPORT STAFF
TO TYPE THIS MESSAGE. REQUEST REPLY ASAP.

UUU/855 141153Z YGPA0966

Division Phoned

Person

Local Time

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Mr. Smith

*28-6-1-1 Hudson Peace
Mission*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PEKIN WJGR0844 14NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 150900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD TOKYO

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFF PGE PED PER PPR RGB RCD RBR IDR IDA CPC

REF OURTEL WJGR0841 11NOV

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELNS AND INNATL SECURITY

ZHU QIZHEN INFORMED AME THAT AME PEARSON AND ASSOC WOULD BE GUESTS OF CHINESE WHILE IN PEKIN AND THAT THEY WOULD MAKE NECESSARY HOTEL RESERVATIONS. HE ALSO INTENDS TO GIVE DINNER IN THEIR HONOUR. PEARSON WILL BE MEETING WITH ZHU FIRST AND WILL THEN BE RECEIVED BY MIN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PERHAPS FOLLOWING DAY. INSTRUCTIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENT TO CHINESE EME TOKYO TO ISSUE VISAS IN CASE THEY HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN OBTAINED IN OTT.

2. PLS ADVISE ASAP ETA PEKIN.

3. PMS SPEECH IN MTL DELIVERED TODAY TO ZHU.

CCC/002 140850Z WJGR0844

Mr. Smith
Mr. Buchanan
Mr. Pearson

28-6-1-Tudor
Peace
mission

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE VATCN XAGR0507 14NOV83

A EXTOTT RCR

INFO ROME PONN LEN PARIS HAGUE BRU MOSCO BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA MINE MINT DMF LIDDZ RGB RCD USS

---VISITE DU PREMIER MINISTER AU PAPE

LE SECRETAIRE D ETAT POUR LES AFFAIRES PUBLIQUES, MGR ACHILLE SILVESTRINI, EST VENU ME VOIR PENDANT UNE REUNION AU VATCN LE 12NOV, POUR M ASSURER QUE LA VISITE DU PM DEUX JOURS PLUS TOT AVAIT EU AU SAINT-SIEGE UN EXCELLENT EFFET ET SUSCITE DES REACTIONS TRES FAVORABLES. LE PAPE, M A-T-IL AFFIRME, S EN EST DIT FORT HEUREUX ET A SOUHAITE QU UNE TOURNEE AUSSI OPPORTUNE EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE OBTIENNE DES RESULTATS POSITIFS. IL EST DISPOSE, QUANT A LUI, A APPUYER TOUTE INITIATIVE TENDANT A RELANCER ET A FAIRE PROGRESSER UN DIALOGUE EN VUE DE LA PAIX

BEAULNE

CCC/191 150909Z XAGR0507

BURROUGHS DEX 3500

Mr. Gossage Jr
& file MF.1
MD

1/3

DEX-3502
(212) 246-7424

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

UNCLASSIFIED
NONCLASSIFIE

Facsimile

TRANSMISSION

fac-similé

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
mission

Our file/no. dossier:

NYC

29

NO.

GRPA 107

DATE

14 NOVEMBER 83

PAGES

3

(incl. cover)

(y compris la page
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General
DU : Consulat général du Canada
NEW YORK

SECTION:
Mr. ~~XXX~~
M./Mad.

GRPA

MALCOLM MCKECHNIE

TO : Mr./Ms.
A : M./Mad.

Department: EXTOTT/URR/MINA/IDDZ

Service : BH PCOOTT/FOWLER/LORTIE (DISTR BY OTTAWA) DE OTT

Phone :
Téléphone :

Subject :
Objet : Article of the N.Y.T., 14 November 83, page A1

"Trudeau Says Allies support plan to end impasse over arms"

2/3

Trudeau Says Allies Support Plan to End Impasse Over Arms

By DOUGLAS MARTIN

Special to The New York Times

TORONTO, Nov. 13 — Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau said today that Western European leaders had expressed broad support for his proposals to end the impasse between Moscow and Washington over arms control.

"I am encouraged by this momentum and heartened by the response," Mr. Trudeau told 4,000 guests at a Liberal Party fund-raising gathering in Montreal.

Mr. Trudeau is urging that talks on nuclear arms limitation be expanded to all five countries possessing nuclear weapons, that safeguards be made more stringent and that tighter controls be imposed on the development of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Trudeau returned to Ottawa on Friday from a five-day European trip during which he visited the leaders of France, the Netherlands, Italy, West Germany, Belgium and Britain, as well as the Pope.

Aides said the 64-year-old Prime Minister found unexpected support for his initiative in some European capitals. The aides declined to be more specific, so as not to jeopardize what Mr. Trudeau called "the fragility of political trust."

The Prime Minister said he is moti-

Continued on Page A3, Column 1

Once-Hostile Vatican Forges Close Links With Scientists

By PHILIP M. BOFFEY

Special to The New York Times

ROME, Nov. 13 — The Roman Catholic Church, once a symbol of dogmatic opposition to modern science, is moving into its closest collaboration with scientists in at least a century.

On issues ranging from nuclear war to test-tube babies to the evolution of human life, the Vatican is soliciting technical advice from hundreds of the

Catholic women's representatives and bishops met to discuss women's role in the church. Page B7.

world's leading scientists, including Nobel Prize winners, experts in esoteric fields and technical leaders from developing nations.

Most of these experts are not Catholics, and many do not even believe in God or in organized religion.

Pontifical Academy Meets

The chief mechanism for this wide-ranging effort is the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, which is now holding its biennial plenary session and three related scientific meetings at a magnificent Renaissance villa on the grounds of the Vatican. This is the group the Pope addressed Saturday when he called on scientists to shun "laboratories and factories of death," apparently meaning military weapons projects.

The Pope's address, a major dis-

course on science and peace, drew heavily from materials supplied by the academy in calling for an end to "technological colonialism" and wasteful military expenditures. But its major theme, that scientists should abandon research that can be used for war, seems to have been formulated by the Pope himself.

Some 115 scientists are attending the Pontifical Academy's sessions to discuss four major topics: chemical events that threaten to disrupt the environment, interactions between complex biological molecules like proteins and nucleic acids, modern biological techniques for improving agriculture, and science in the service of peace.

How profound the academy's influence on church thinking will ultimately be is open to question. One observer,

Continued on Page B7, Column 1

attacks on American a matter of policy, or some other coun

[In Tripoli, Le continued to end t Palestinian factio fat, the P.L.O. lea had been holding tured Israeli sold has been under Palestinian rival days.]

[Lebanese offic nounced tonight t Gemayel would n mascus on Mond cause Syria's Pr Assad, had sudd United Press In from Damascus Assad had been t with an inflamed a

Mr. McFarlane, CBS News progra tion," gave no spe question, "Are we at the Syrians now? Mr. McFarlane

Continued on Pa

Grenada Invasion: A

By B. DRUMMOND AYRES Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 — Sgt. Tom Wilburn was hanging in his parachute, 400 feet above the island of Grenada, when he concluded that the United States invasion of that small, lush dot in the Caribbean was not going to be the pushover that he had expected.

"When I went out the door," the 23-year-old Ranger later recalled, "I could see the tracers coming up at me in a great long curve, getting bigger and bigger, until they looked like oranges. Then — blit! — they'd be past."

Sergeant Wilburn landed safely. But once on the ground, he recalled, there was more fire to contend with, steady and well-aimed, from positions that were cleverly placed in the surrounding hills. Whoever was up there, Grenadian or Cuban or both, knew how to fight, the sergeant recalled thinking.

Before Sergeant Wilburn would return to his base outside Savannah, Ga.,

fellow troopers wo would fall, burning, call would go out for

Nearly three wee troops invaded Gre commanders call " still envelopes the op code-named Urgen still continue over t of the defending for soldiers and civilia whether the invasio undertaken in the fir

3 Tasks for Inv

None of this much Wilburn and the ot vaded Grenada. Th Operation, Urgent



001186

Order to Reimprison Woman Is Fought With Petition Drive

By LENA WILLIAMS

In the last year, Bernice Lane has had three raises in her job as a rental agent's assistant. She has a neat two-bedroom apartment, takes care of her invalid mother, attends college three nights a week and, in her spare time, delivers meals to homebound elderly people. She is also on the board of directors of a center for the aged.

To scores of acquaintances, fellow workers and those she has helped, the 54-year-old Miss Lane is a conscientious and caring person.

But by 5 P.M. today, she must go back to prison.

"It's going to be hard to give up my freedom, but I'm not going to let this

turn me into a bitter person," she said the other day as she cleaned her Bronx apartment. Her biggest fear, she said, is the effect her return to prison will have on her 80-year-old mother.

Miss Lane's plight, which has stirred a flurry of petitions and protests from friends and political figures, stems from her conviction in 1977 on a charge of selling 2.9 ounces of heroin. The case was brought by the special state narcotics prosecutor and the conviction, following two mistrials, came under tough Rockefeller drug laws that imposed heavy mandatory sentences, up to life, for the sale or possession of drugs.

INSIDE

Dam's Pluses and Minuses Brazil and Paraguay are finishing the world's biggest power project. The

3/3

Associated Press

A water-cannon truck moves past a line of voters in Lima, Peru, who were taking part in municipal elections.

Trudeau Presses Arms Control Plans

Continued From Page A1

vated by what he sees as a global trend toward the use of force. He said 35 million lives had been lost in 130 conflicts since 1945. His solution is a return to what he terms "high politics," in the face of "an abdication of the political process in deference to military solutions."

Next Saturday Mr. Trudeau will take his initiative to Japan, where he will confer with Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. The next day he will go on to India to meet Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and to attend the annual Commonwealth meeting.

Mr. Trudeau, who has been criticized in Canada for using the arm-control issue as a means of shoring up the Liberals' dramatic slippage in recent Gallup polls, added a number of specifics to his two-week-old initiative.

"You have to push as many buttons as you can, hoping one works," an aide explained.

U.S. Urges Caution

The Prime Minister called for the expansion of arms talks between the Soviet Union and the United States to include the other nations possessing strategic arms — Britain, China and France. Aides explained that Mr. Trudeau wants these talks to be state-to-state, rather than bloc-to-bloc; to recognize the pre-eminence of Moscow and Washington, perhaps through a system of fixed ratios, and to be conducted independently of existing negotiations between the superpowers.

Aides said that in these points the Prime Minister was trying to meet a key concern expressed by a number of allies: that deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Europe not be delayed beyond this year. The Reagan Administration, which is expected to confer with Mr. Trudeau this week over his proposals, was said to have cautioned against any statement that would detract from allied solidarity as deployment nears.

Mr. Trudeau also urged that steps be taken to tie aid to underdeveloped nations to assurances that they will not develop nuclear weapons. "There must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development," he said.

He said he will raise this proposal next week with Prime Minister Gandhi. Mr. Trudeau will also deliver the Commonwealth Conference's opening speech, which will be on arms control.

The Canadian leader proposed sev-

eral steps to make future arms development safer, a reiteration of ideas he first expressed in a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1978. He called for a ban on testing and deployment of high-altitude antisatellite weapons, an international agreement to restrict "excessive mobility" of intercontinental missiles, and a requirement that all future strategic weapons be verifiable by means other than onsite inspection.

Canadian experts consider these ideas the most likely to be adopted, because they concern expenditures of effort and money not yet made. In particular, they suggest that the limitations on antisatellite weapons at high altitudes — as opposed to those for lower altitudes, which are already in development — might be attractive to the superpowers.

Mr. Trudeau pressed his view that meetings between East and West

should be encouraged. He urged that the coming Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament scheduled for Stockholm in January be raised to ministerial level from deputy minister status.

Planners suggest that the next item on Mr. Trudeau's agenda may involve China, although no sidetrips to Peking are planned for the coming Asian trip. The idea would be to gather support for broadening strategic weapons talks from Britain, France and China before approaching the superpowers.

Only as the final step — probably not until next year — would Washington and Moscow be brought into the process. If by that time the Soviet Union has abandoned negotiations as it has threatened to do if American missiles are deployed, Canadians see Mr. Trudeau's effort gaining in prominence.

"There may be nothing going," a aide said. "We'd be the only game in town."

Alfonso Barrantes, the Mayor of Lima for the coalition, was running well against opponents for that post. Schwab acknowledged expected victory.

With about 60 percent counted, Peruvian Public Opinion polling showed Mr. Barrantes won 51 percent of the vote in Lima and 48 percent in other areas with 38 percent.

Official results in the some 1,600 mayors in Peru expected for 10 days.

Ruling Party Runs

According to the unofficial Social Democrat Mayor of Lima, Alfonso Barrantes, the results of the vote, the Conservative Party, Ricardo Amiel, and the Popular Action Party, Alfonso Grados, had only 1 percent.

Voting in Peru is mandatory by law, and Peruvians turn out in large numbers despite threats to disrupt the voting of the million eligible voters.

Police carrying guns, and soldiers guarding the more than 100 polling places.

Twelve hours before the election, leftist guerrillas opened, leftists guerrillas, and a dozen bombs in an attempt to warn voters away.

Defense Official Faults Congress on Sal

By SETH S. KING

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 — A top Administration official said today that El Salvador's armed forces need more mobility to counter recent guerrilla attacks, but Congress has not appropriated enough money to provide this.

The official, Fred C. Iklé, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said of the Salvadoran armed forces that even "with the \$64.8 million appropriated for 1984, we can't do enough to improve their ability to respond quickly."

Mr. Iklé returned Friday from a tour of Central American countries. He was accompanied by Elliott Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

Concern Over Death Squads

The tour included talks with leaders of El Salvador and Guatemala in which reported violations of human rights in the two countries were discussed.

"I weighed in with Mr. Abrams on this subject," Mr. Iklé said. "There are different problems in the two countries and different abuses, which we raised with those leaders."

The State Department, in particular, has been increasingly concerned about the recent activities of right-wing death squads in El Salvador. These activities include attacks on the country's highest church officials as well as on

labor union leaders. The attacks have been stepped up, according to officials at the United States Embassy, as United States has increased pressure for the Salvador Government to carry out land redistribution programs.

The United States Embassy, in the past two weeks, has also been pressing the Salvadoran Government to take action against a number of army and security officers who are suspected of involvement in the death squads, officials at the embassy have said.

On the subject of the Salvadoran Government's efforts against Salvadoran guerrillas, Mr. Iklé said: "We came away with the impression that in El Salvador particularly, the Government needs much more mobility, both in providing reinforcements when guerrillas attack and in evacuating the wounded from those attacks."

Aid Request Cut by Congress

On Friday, Congress approved spending \$64.8 million for aid to El Salvador in fiscal 1984, which began Oct. 1, but stipulated that 30 percent of the money could not be used until verdicts are returned in cases involving the killing of four United States churchwomen in that country. President Reagan had requested \$96.3 million for El Salvador.

Last year Congress cut the Administration's requests for El Salvador aid by half and this year by 25 percent.

"We are concerned both about the

spond to renewed guerrilla efforts to evacuate wounded and civilians," Mr. Iklé said.

"Not much can be done with the capacity of Government to respond quickly unless more helicopters and more helicopters and more helicopters."

Many improvements in evacuation and care with the help of United States, Mr. Iklé said.

"But more equipment, especially to prolong the evacuation, is needed."

Mr. Iklé said the aid appropriated was not as much as needed, but it was what we can do.

Mr. Iklé also noted that the United States was sending military aid to Costa Rica to perform road construction in that country. These engineers, while as many as 1,000, would States military personnel in America to nearly 5,000, almost 4,000 already in six-month-long exercises.

United States military would then be on either side, but Mr. Iklé stressed going to Costa Rica to combat troops but not to fight.

MEET PHILIP

001187

~~L.A. DELVOYE~~
~~M. ARCHDEACON~~

~~G. MITT~~

~~K. A. CALDER~~

~~L. HAGEN~~

~~J. MCNEE~~

001188

~~MA. HANCOCK~~

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130 SLATER ST.
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1P 5H6
PHONE 236-0841

15 November 1983

Not read
With the Compliments

by MS

of the

Australian High Commission

OTTAWA

John Bailey

(J.S. Bailey)
Deputy High Commissioner

Worth reading

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R E S T R I C T E D

UNITED STATES/SOVIET RELATIONS : MR TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE

THE FOLLOWING IS A NOTE ON A BRIEF CONVERSATION WHICH TOOK PLACE SOCIALLY WITH MR SEYMOUR TOPPING, MANAGING EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES.

2. TOPPING SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE SUPER POWER RELATIONSHIP WAS IN SERIOUS TROUBLE. IT WAS AS BAD AS AT ANY TIME HE COULD RECALL SINCE THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS IN OCTOBER 1962. HE THOUGHT THE RHETORIC HAD GOT OUT OF HAND, THE ARMS CONTROL TALKS WERE FAILING, AND THERE WERE TWO OF THREE PRESSURE POINTS IN THE WORLD, IN PARTICULAR THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL AMERICA WHERE EVENTS COULD TAKE PLACE WHICH COULD LEAD TO SUPER POWER CONFLICT. SYRIA AND NICARAGUA WERE PARTICULAR DANGER POINTS AT PRESENT.

3. TOPPING BELIEVED THAT URGENT STEPS WERE NEEDED TO STOP THE RISING TENSION AND FIND A NEW BASIS OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN THIS CONTEXT HE SAID HE HAD READ MR TRUDEAU'S GUELPH SPEECH. HE THOUGHT IT WAS A FINE PIECE OF WORK WHICH WAS ON THE RIGHT TRACK. HE DID NOT KNOW HOW IT HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON BUT THOUGHT, PROBABLY PRETTY POORLY. NEVERTHELESS HE THOUGHT MR TRUDEAU SHOULD PUSH ON AND OTHERS SHOULD ADD THEIR VOICE TO THE SAME KIND OF INITIATIVE

4. WE ASKED TOPPING HOW HE THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT WOULD HANDLE THE ISSUE OF UNITED STATES/SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS DURING THE FORTHCOMING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN - WOULD HE TOUGHEN UP THE RHETORIC IN THE BELIEF THAT THE KEY TO WINNING THE ELECTION WAS TO KICK THE RUSSIANS OR WOULD HE MAKE THE OPPOSITE JUDGEMENT, NAMELY THAT THE KEY WAS TO SHOW HIMSELF WILLING AND ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

5. TOPPING SAID HE HAD A DEFINITE VIEW ON THAT IMPORTANT QUESTION. HE BELIEVED FIRMLY THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD WANT TO CHARACTERISE HIMSELF AS BEING ABLE TO MAKE AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT THEREFORE HIS SIDE OF THE CAMPAIGN SHOULD SEE A WINDING DOWN OF

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WHAT HAD BEEN PRETTY HEAVY RHETORIC IN THE RECENT PAST. HE AGREED THAT THIS MIGHT THEN CONSTITUTE AN OPPORTUNE TIME FOR SOME PROGRESS TO BE MADE TOWARDS CHANGING THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE SUPER POWER RELATIONSHIP.

6. IT STRUCK US THAT THIS EXPRESSION OF VIEWS WAS INTERESTING PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THE VERY SIGNIFICANT POSITION THAT TOPPING HOLDS IN UNITED STATES JOURNALISM. (TOPPING HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN POSTED IN BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA AS A SENIOR CORRESPONDENT FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES).

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CM.

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SECRET
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Ottawa

MT

November 13, 1983

Mr. R. R. Fowler
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet
Privy Council Office
Langevin Block
Ottawa

Dear Mr. Fowler:

Enclosed is the text of a letter from President Reagan to Prime Minister Trudeau which was received by the Embassy telegraphically. It would be appreciated if you could have the letter delivered to the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

Sincerely,


John H. Rouse
Minister

Enclosure

SECRET

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SECRET

TEXT OF LETTER RECEIVED TELEGRAPHICALLY

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I believe the strong support received from allied governments and publics for our negotiating position was instrumental in producing the limited movement in the Soviet position outlined by General Secretary Andropov October 26.

Clearly, however, that Soviet position fails to meet our criteria for an acceptable agreement. It would preserve a substantial and threatening Soviet monopoly in LRINF missiles, bar NATO deployments, demand compensation for the independent nuclear forces of third countries, and rejects equal global limits on LRINF missiles. Ambassador Nitze is pressing his Soviet counterpart to explain other important ambiguities and apparent shortcomings in the Soviet position.

Despite the failure of the Soviet Union to move on the crucial issues in the negotiation, I know you share my belief that we should make every reasonable effort to achieve an agreement this year. Based on my own review of the situation, the results of our most recent NATO Ministerials and last week's special consultative group meeting, I have concluded that it would be useful in the near future to elaborate further on my September initiatives by indicating to the Soviet Union and our own publics a specific equal level of global LRINF deployments which would be acceptable to us.

I have in mind informing the Soviet negotiators that while the U.S. continues to prefer the complete elimination of the entire class of land-based, LRINF missiles, and while we remain prepared to discuss other interim global ceilings on such missiles, the U.S. would be prepared to accept an equal global ceiling of 420 LRINF missile warheads. This would equate to a global limit of 140 of the Soviet three-warhead SS-20 missiles, which is, as you will recall, the number to which they have proposed to limit their SS-20 force in Europe. The U.S. would reiterate its willingness, under such a ceiling, not to offset the entire Soviet global LRINF missile deployment by U.S. deployments of LRINF missiles in Europe. We would also reiterate our willingness to distribute the reductions to be made from planned levels of forces between both the Pershing II ballistic missile and GLCM deployments, in an appropriate manner.

I believe such an elaboration of our proposal would be a further demonstration of allied flexibility and would be an integral part of the framework set out in the March proposal for an interim agreement involving reductions to equal global ceilings of warheads on LRINF missile launchers.

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2.

I intend to authorize Paul Nitze to propose this new figure for a global ceiling of 420 warheads at his next meeting with the Soviet negotiator, which will occur early this week. I am not planning to give this move any early publicity.

The readiness of the West to continue negotiating, and to advance constructive new proposals, stands in sharp contrast to the crude threats from the Soviet Union to break off the talks. We must not be distracted by such threats, and we must ensure that our publics understand the efforts we are making to achieve a more stable and secure peace. However, we must be equally clear to all concerned that in the absence of an agreement which meets our criteria, NATO will deploy its LRINF missiles as planned and on schedule. Any delay at this time would undercut the proposals for such an agreement.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ronald Reagan

SECRET

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SECRET

Q. HAS THE UNITED STATES MADE A NEW MOVE IN THE INF
NEGOTIATIONS?

A. THE UNITED STATES, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH ITS
ALLIES, HAS DECIDED TO ELABORATE FURTHER ON ITS
POSITION AND ON THE INITIATIVES ANNOUNCED BY THE
PRESIDENT IN SEPTEMBER, BY INDICATING TO THE SOVIET
UNION THAT:

. --WHILE WE CONTINUE TO PREFER THE COMPLETE
ELIMINATION OF THE ENTIRE CLASS OF LAND-BASED LRINF
MISSILES, AND

. --WHILE WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS OTHER
INTERIM GLOBAL CEILINGS ON SUCH MISSILES,

. --THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN INTERIM
EQUAL GLOBAL CEILING OF 420 WARHEADS ON LRINF

MISSILES. THIS WOULD EQUATE TO A GLOBAL LIMIT OF 140
OF THE SOVIET THREE-WARHEAD SS-20 MISSILES, WHICH IS,
AS YOU RECALL, THE NUMBER TO WHICH THEY HAVE PROPOSED
TO LIMIT THEIR SS-20 FORCE IN RANGE OF EUROPE.

Q. WHY IS THE U.S. PROPOSING AN EQUAL GLOBAL LIMIT OF
4,0 WARHEADS?

A. THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED THAT THEY BE PERMITTED
UNDER AN AGREEMENT TO DEPLOY 140 SS-20 MISSILES, WITH
420 WARHEADS, IN OR WITHIN RANGE OF EUROPE. WE ARE
ATTEMPTING TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE SOVIETS BY ACCEPTING
THIS LEVEL OF DEPLOYMENT, WHILE, CONSISTENT WITH OUR
OWN CRITERIA FOR AN AGREEMENT, PROPOSING IT AS AN EQUAL
GLOBAL LIMIT.

Q. WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER INITIATIVES ANNOUNCED IN
SEPTEMBER BY THE PRESIDENT?

A. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THESE IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS. THIS ELABORATION OF THE U.S. POSITION IS
FULLY CONSISTENT WITH ALL OF THE INITIATIVES ANNOUNCED
IN SEPTEMBER.

SECRET

TO/À IFB/Shenstone

IMC/Armstrong

FROM/DE • IDDZ/Delvoie


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SUJET on the World Political Scene28-6-1-Tudor Peace
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Security/Sécurité
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Date
November 13, 1983
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ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES1
DISTRIBUTION

Attached for your consideration and comments is a draft statement. You will note that it is rather vague on the question of specific action which the Commonwealth leaders might take on the issues raised (e.g. issue a declaration, undertake concerted political action, etc.). The reason for this is that the PM seems to be of two minds as to how far he wishes to go on this score. We hope that when discussing the text with us the PM will give us the benefit of his current thinking, especially in light of his recent consultations with European leaders.

2. I should appreciate receiving your comments by noon on Monday, November 14, since we propose to forward a draft text to the PM by 1800 hours that day.


L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE WORLD POLITICAL
SCENE - GLOBAL TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

CHOGM - NEW DELHI - 1983

The Secretary-General has asked me to open the discussion on the global political situation with my own view of the state of East/West relations and disarmament, not, ~~I presume~~, because these are the only issues that matter, but because the most immediate dangers to the world community are along the razor's edge of East/West relations.

Since I have been coming to these Heads of Government meetings it seems that each time we speak with greater or lesser conviction of ever darker prospects and sharper world tensions. I am not persuaded that absolute catastrophe is imminent. I do not bring a counsel of despair, but I am deeply troubled by the worsening trend in relations between East and West, by a superpower relationship of escalating confrontation, by a high level of tension and all this against the backdrop of nuclear weapons arsenals whose destructive power we can scarcely understand.

The Commonwealth gives us a unique opportunity to exchange ideas freely as politician to politician without bureaucratic filters. I have always highly valued the opportunities for mutual education which it provides. But it can do more. I believe that the Commonwealth cannot pretend to negotiate for the world, but it can help the world to negotiate.

- 2 -

In the eighties it would be quixotic for any state to think it could take effective initiatives on its own for the betterment of the world community, but in this Commonwealth forum we can seek reinforcement for our individual efforts.

I come today to ask you to join me in trying to improve the poisoned climate between East and West and to find ways to reverse the momentum of the arms race. Commonwealth states, aligned and non-aligned, belong to a myriad of groups and regions. They can give great momentum to any idea; what better or more urgent cause is there for us to address than that of working to make the world a safer place?

Some have argued that we have in the last few years returned to the Cold War between East and West; but the world is more complicated today than it was twenty-five years ago. The relationship between the superpowers is surely as dominant and crucial as it was then, but now we live in a multi-polar world, one which limits even the superpowers' room for manoeuvre. The consequences of inter-dependence are frequently unforeseen and often beyond control. At times it appears that the superpowers are not mindful of the full consequences of their actions. We must impress on the superpowers that their size and might confer ^{on them} grave responsibilities to each other and to the world community; that they each hold in their hands the security of the other, and of the world at large.

- 3 -

Yet the superpowers appear to have lost sight of their overarching political relationship and responsibilities. Acrimony, antipathy and distrust have increasingly characterized their relations. Events in Afghanistan, Poland, Central America, the Middle East and Grenada have all contributed to this or are symptomatic of it. The impulse to confrontation informs the relationship. Their exchanges are vituperative and more often public than private.

The USA and USSR are increasingly isolated from each other, separated by a widening gulf of suspicion. The consequence of poor communication between East and West and the existing high level of tension is an increased risk of accident. This adds up to a volatile and dangerous situation in which neither side fully understands the other's intentions and, hence, is prepared to believe the worst.

It is not so much that there are more or new individual hostilities at the present than previously, though from the Falklands to Chad we have seen a depressing tendency to resort to force to try to settle territorial disputes. And the old areas of trouble remain. Cambodia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, El Salvador, southern Africa, deepening civil war in Lebanon, war between Iran and Iraq in the Gulf - all are sources of danger. Each is an area of continuing concern to us all.

- 4 -

What makes the current situation so serious is the superpowers' response to local and regional crises. By insisting on viewing events, whether in southern Africa or Central America, in terms of their global rivalry, the superpowers tend to magnify individual conflicts and make them threaten wider East/West stability.

We ^{can} would acknowledge that the superpowers do have global security interests, but in the depth of their mutual mistrust they can ^{produce} ~~reveal~~ something close to global insecurity.

Recent months have seen a troubling accumulation of crises. From the KAL downing to attacks on peacekeepers in Lebanon to the invasion of Grenada, one crisis seems to build and play upon the next. ~~In the absence of a broader perspective of how crises should be managed, individual crises loom and threaten to overwhelm.~~

The Commonwealth Secretary-General and the U.N. Secretary-General have drawn our attention to the erosion of the UN's effectiveness in providing collective security and heading off conflicts. This, too, is disturbing as it is another factor which pushes almost any international conflict into the arena of East/West relations. The danger is that superpower force, or the threat of its use, tends increasingly to become the ultimate arbiter.

- 5 -

How have we come to such a pass? In the early seventies détente had brought the promise of a real political dialogue between East and West that could have led to an easing of tensions. Détente brought genuine achievements and understandings on the limitation of strategic arms, on political relations and human rights in Europe, on China's role in the world, on co-operation in outer space. But détente's back was broken when the Soviets demonstrated that they considered it divisible. 1975 marked a watershed, with both the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and the beginning of the East/West confrontation *in Angola*.

What is missing today is genuine political dialogue, a framework of shared political objectives, and the minimum degree of mutual trust required to achieve them. There is an absence of high politics between East and West.

This context serves as a backdrop for the continuing nuclear arms race. The juxtaposition of the two has frightened public opinion throughout the world. People everywhere are frightened by technological advances in nuclear weapons systems and discussions of military strategies which appear to contemplate their use.

The public is questioning the capacity of its political leaders to understand an entirely new era in East/West relations.

- 6 -

Our citizens are challenging politicians to lower tensions and to bend their efforts to reversing the arms race.

At the Williamsburg Summit, I was one of seven leaders who pledged to devote "our full political resources to reducing the threat of war". I have since then been pre-occupied with what Canada and I personally could do to make good that commitment. While recognizing that no single country and no single leader could single-handedly come to grips with the multitude of problems confronting us, I have endeavoured to evolve a course of action geared to calling ~~upon~~ the exercise of political leadership at the highest level by countries and governments that share my concerns.

My purpose over the past weeks has been to signal publicly my grave preoccupations and to develop a series of proposals which might help to halt and eventually reverse the downward trend in East-West relations and in the international security situation.

I have so far held consultations with a number of European leaders and would like to take advantage of this meeting in New Delhi to expand the range of my contacts.

One of my central points of ~~departure~~ is that there must be a truly global approach to the limitation of

- 7 -

nuclear weapons. This requires limiting and ^{essentially} reducing the arsenals of all five nuclear weapons states, i.e. halting "vertical proliferation". It also requires facing up squarely to the dangers posed by the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states, i.e. "horizontal proliferation".

With reference to vertical proliferation, I have proposed the calling, in the course of next year, of a conference of the five nuclear powers. The primary aim of such a conference would be the establishment of global limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of all five countries, according to fixed national ratios, and allowing for parity between the USA and the USSR. Such negotiations should be based on the following principles:

- (a) They should not be conducted on a bloc-to-bloc basis.
- (b) No superpower has the right to a preeminent nuclear position.
- (c) Under the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty all nuclear weapons states have an obligation to reduce their nuclear armaments.

Such a conference could also address strategic nuclear confidence-building measures, measures for crisis management and measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic nuclear arms race.

- 8 -

The natural complement to this approach is a renewed effort to halt the risks of horizontal proliferation, to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT risks at this stage becoming irrelevant to its central purpose because a significant number of "near-nuclear" states do not adhere to it, *and this despite the fact that 119 nations do.*

The NPT is a controversial document and the arguments against its régime are well known. It is, however, "the only game in town" and adherence to it is the only option open to those genuinely concerned to stop the dangers of proliferation.

There is a vital necessity to reverse the spiral of both vertical and horizontal proliferation. There is, of course, a massive range of issues and national concerns which relate to all aspects of disarmament. When we come to the nub, however, we must face one salient reality -- either this generation of world leaders must reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, and prevent their spread, or we bequeath to our peoples a future where the chances of global destruction increase every day.

I believe that all Commonwealth members can make a contribution to world peace, either by adhering or strengthening their commitment to the NPT. Both individually and

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collectively we can bring to bear our influence on the "near-nuclear" to espouse the non-proliferation régime as the surest means ~~of~~ avoiding regional conflicts taking on cataclysmic proportions.

Just as the superpowers have the capacity to imperil human survival, so too do many other countries in a world which is highly interdependent both for better and for worse.

By their own action and their moral suasion the countries of the Commonwealth can help to arrest horizontal proliferation; they can also play a significant part in attenuating the confrontation between the superpowers. The Third World in particular can bring more than moral authority and exhortation to this debate. The countries of the Third World should inject these concerns into any calculation of their immediate interests in dealing with the superpowers. While it is clear that Third World nations have a direct security interest in this, since nuclear war would destroy North and South alike, they must also bring to the fore the ~~practical economic consequences for themselves of an arms race,~~ the practical economic elements of an arms race whose consequences fall severely on the developing world.

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Nowhere does the world seem more out of joint than when we see how continuing worldwide armament thwarts development. The enormous expenditures on arms by both North and South represents a huge misappropriation of resources which might otherwise be devoted to development. A fortnight ago I discussed with President Mitterrand his ideas relating to the eventual creation of a Disarmament Fund for Development and I indicated Canada's willingness to pursue with France and other interested countries bringing these ideas to fruition.

But the burden here cannot rest on developed countries alone. If developing nations do attach importance to aid flows from the North, should they not show the way by decreasing their vast expenditures on military hardware? Should they not turn away from the perilous and terribly costly path of developing their own nuclear weapons? The way for them to convince the North of their seriousness about disarmament and development is to shift more of their own resources to development.

As I said earlier, I believe that we must adopt a truly global approach to arms control. I have advanced to the superpowers and to a number of European leaders my proposals for the restoration of a climate of political confidence in East-West relations and for attenuating the risk of conflict presented by the policies of both East and

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West. Today I invite you as members of the Commonwealth representing both North and South to envisage complementary action on other fronts.

I challenge the Commonwealth nations to accept their responsibilities and bend their efforts to the cause of peace.

If ever there were a cause for the Commonwealth, surely this is it.

If ever there should be a "Commonwealth position", it should be on this issue.

If ever the Commonwealth had an opportunity to set an example and to take a stand, surely it is now.



MESSAGE

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Statements and Speeches

No 83/20

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace mission

A GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

Address by the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister, Queen Elizabeth Hotel, Montreal, November 13, 1983.

... If our future depended on Canadians alone, we could be confident that it was safe and sound. But no nation today holds its future securely in its own hands. We share this planet with about 160 other nations, all of whom interact with us in a global system embracing our security, our economy, the health of our environment, and the quality of our lives.

Those 160 governments are, however, by no means the only players. The stage is crowded with alliances, with regional associations, with international institutions such as the United Nations, with multinational corporations, with cartels, pressure groups and lobbies of all kinds.

We are all of us — you and I, our friends and families, citizens, governments and corporations — on that crowded global stage, which is alive with our hopes and our fears, our failures and our successes. But there are today three dominant and disturbing trends which, when set side by side, threaten to bring down the curtain on our human performance.

The first trend is an increasing resort to the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. Despite the solemn affirmation of the UN Charter that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force" there have been, since 1945, approximately 130 conflicts in which 35 million human lives have been lost.

There is a habit of aggression which is gaining ground: an abdication of the political process in deference to military solutions; a coarse element of belligerence, of menacing rhetoric, of governments which rise and fall at gun-point. The trend is global — and it is gathering speed.

This brutalization of political life takes on a particularly dangerous tone when it is driven by the clash of confrontational ideologies, and armed with sophisticated weapons, which claim an annual expenditure in the order of \$600 billion of nuclear and conventional arms combined. These weapons which claim too great a share of the budgets of impoverished Third World nations, promote a rising tide of violence and engulf more peaceful ways to resolve disputes. That is the first trend: the brutalization of international relations.

The second trend is the steady unravelling of the international regime designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This proliferation has two fundamental directions. We call it vertical proliferation when we mean the development of ever-larger nuclear weapons programs, ever more-advanced in destructive technology, by the five nuclear-weapons states: the USA, USSR, France, the United Kingdom and China. We call

it horizontal proliferation when we mean the potential spread of nuclear weapons to other states, especially to those who now have the capacity to produce nuclear arms, or soon will have that capacity.

We are today preoccupied mainly with the evident need to assert restraint over the arsenals of all five nuclear powers. But from a global perspective, and in the near term, the consequences of horizontal proliferation to other states pose an equally grave threat. Perhaps more grave, since the use of nuclear weapons by other nations would be unchecked by the assurance of mutual destruction which obtains among the five powers.

It was precisely to arrest both kinds of proliferation that a formal agreement — the Non-Proliferation Treaty — came into effect in 1970, and is up for review in 1985. That treaty represented an implicit covenant between those nations with nuclear weapons and those without: an undertaking by the nuclear powers that they would pursue negotiations in good faith on arms control and on limiting the spread of their weapons technology; and an undertaking by other states that they would forego the military use of nuclear energy in return for the benefits of its peaceful use, in fields such as energy, medicine, or agriculture.

But the trend is for this bargain to come unstruck. The treaty stands now at a crossroads between peaceful aspiration and military strategy. It is the crossroads at which nuclear and non-nuclear countries — East and West, North and South — preoccupied with their survival, with their sovereignty, or with current conflicts, will decide whether the covenant still holds.

The third trend which threatens the global system is the worsening state of relations between East and West, particularly of relations between the two superpowers. Two weeks ago, when I spoke in Guelph, I deplored the absence of high politics in East-West relations, and the tendency for arms control negotiations to run their course outside any structure of understanding of, and respect for, each other's security needs. I reaffirmed our fidelity to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization "two-track" decision, and declared my hope that we might add a "third rail" of political energy, of dialogue and of confidence, in order to improve the downward course of relations between East and West.

So I ask you now to consider these three trends in relation to each other — laminated together, as they are in real life: an increasing resort to the use of force; the growing reality of the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and a superpower relationship charged with animosity. I believe it is evident that only a global approach to peace and security can reverse the path of this sinister, composite trend-line.

Because, as tensions build, the East-West relationship becomes particularly vulnerable to events on the periphery. An endemic instability is evident in areas largely understood to be the sphere of influence of one or the other superpower. At other flashpoints, such as the ever-volatile Middle East, we see the tinder for a spreading conflagration.

The penetration of East-West rivalry into the Third World will reach its deepest and most dangerous point if, despite the Non-Proliferation Treaty, front-line antagonists — locked in rivalry or combat — begin to arm themselves with nuclear weapons.

As Canadians, our energies are deeply devoted to the security of the Western community, on this continent and in Europe. But our loyalties, our national and global interests, by no means end there.

Canada's place on the Pacific Rim gives us a privileged relationship with Japan, with China, and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and, of course, with Australia and New Zealand. Our extensive program of development assistance takes us to many parts of the world, remote in distance, but close in partnership. Our standing in the community of francophone nations, and in the Commonwealth, demands that we share the full range of political, economic and security concerns to which our national character gives us access.

That is why, in pursuing an initiative to improve the prospects for peace, I determined from the start that our approach must be global in scope and in perspective. Such an approach is dictated by the complex interlinkage of disarmament and development; of superpower animosity and Third World rivalries; of the resort to force and the availability of weapons; of nuclear balances in Europe and in Asia.

One man representing one country cannot promise a miracle, let alone deliver one. I have absolutely no illusions about the complexity of the issues in play. Nonetheless it is essential, in my judgment, to seek stability at a number of points along the downward trend-line, and to recognize that peace and security in the modern age are indivisible.

Moreover, I am not alone. Other leaders have joined their concerns with mine. There is a growing community of political leadership which is determined to subject the science of arms to the art of politics. I draw encouragement from the support of that community.

You will know that I have just returned from meetings in Europe with several leaders of the Atlantic Alliance, with His Holiness the Pope, and with Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands. I return from Europe with clear expressions of support for my initiative, confident that my sense of urgency is shared by our friends and allies. I found a particular consensus of the need to lay down a third rail of confidence and communication — a rail charging our dealings with the other side with a current of political energy.

I took to my European colleagues for discussions, and for refinement in light of their own views, elements of a program for political management of the current crisis. I return with the assurance of their personal attention to this program. Let me set out some of the elements.

The first is the need to establish, as soon as possible in the course of the coming year, a forum in which global limits might be negotiated for all five nuclear-weapons states. This proposal is without prejudice to the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] or START [Strategic Arms Reductions Talks] talks between the USA and USSR. But those talks, and rightly so, do not cover British, French or Chinese nuclear forces.

What we must seek to provide is a negotiating forum for those five states which recognizes the right of the United States and the Soviet Union as strategic equals — what a recent Trilateral Commission report calls "inevitable parity" between them — and which provides a mutually acceptable and stable

framework for the relationship between the forces of the other three states and those of the superpowers.

In this way neither Britain, nor France, nor China need fear that their forces will be subject to restraints which do not recognize their own national interests.

Once relative levels of armament were stabilized, I believe the five nuclear powers could begin to address the reductions called for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to consider measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic arms race.

A second element is remedial action to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself — that covenant between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states which I mentioned a few minutes ago. The Treaty has been signed by some 119 nations. But a number of key states remain aloof, including several with the capacity now, or the potential soon, to develop their own nuclear arms.

If the five nuclear-weapons states could begin to strengthen their side of the non-proliferation bargain, then the rest of us could more easily bring good sense to bear on those who have not yet signed on. No doubt we need to increase the incentives for Third World states to forego nuclear weapons — there must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development. And we shall also have to ensure that a full range of safeguards adequately governs the transfer, from all nuclear suppliers, of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The area of safeguards is one in which Canada has taken a leading part for many years, and will continue to do so.

Those two elements begin to address the global dimension of security in the nuclear age. But we must also recognize that there is in the heart of Europe a most dangerous concentration of forces — conventional as well as nuclear. A war in Europe could destroy everything that each side desires to protect.

Throughout my talks with European leaders, there ran a common theme of concern at the present imbalance of conventional forces between the two sides. The Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO. There is an apprehension in Western Europe that the Warsaw Pact forces could be tempted to gamble on a conventionally-armed attack. They would throw down the challenge to Western leaders either of accepting defeat, or of being the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. That is why we say that the nuclear threshold in Europe is too low. And of course we can never be certain that the use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre would not escalate rapidly to ever more-massive nuclear retaliation on an international scale. The conclusion we draw is that the best way to raise the nuclear threshold is to establish a more reasonable balance of the conventional forces on each side.

How then do we achieve this balance? This question prompts the third element of my approach, The simple, though expensive, answer is for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. I see this as a last resort. The far more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels, a task to which we have devoted

the past ten years at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. There is today some sign of movement in those talks, but at far too slow a pace. Hard questions remain to be resolved. That is why I explored, with my colleagues in the Alliance, ways to break the deadlock in Vienna, ways to give fresh political impetus to the MBFR talks.

Another negotiating forum will open soon in Stockholm, this January. Its lengthy title, showing the complexity of its task, is the "Conference in Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe". It is imperative that this conference not lose its way in litigation about procedures, or in the linguistics of technicality. In other words, we don't have to follow the same path with this conference, on disarmament in Europe, to which countries attach so much importance, as we have followed in the Vienna negotiations where, as I have said, we have talked for ten years without really arriving at an agreement. I have therefore proposed that we consider the merits of high-level political representation at the very start of the Stockholm negotiations. You see, I come back always to the notion of the third rail, the need to inject political will, and the presence of political people, into these debates. They have become debates among technicians, among weighers of balances, among nuclear accountants. These technical quarrels can harm the process, rather than giving it a real push, a political impetus, which I call the third rail.

Finally, a fourth element in my initiative flows from the strategy of suffocation which I first proposed to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. That strategy — which still requires, and awaits, the support of the five nuclear powers for its implementation — needs further elaboration to keep pace with technological advances. Arms control measures must address those new technologies which, by their very nature, would make stability a more elusive goal.

I have in mind a ban on the testing and deployment of those anti-satellite systems designed to operate at high altitude. Such weapons could attack the global communications which are of critical importance for crisis management. Destruction of the other side's command and control network, at a time of crisis, would leave him blind and mute at the very moment when stability demands awareness and response, not the panic reaction of "launch on warning".

That is the fear we have, when we think of destabilizing weapons of that kind. These are weapons or techniques which make an adversary feel unable or ill-equipped to respond to a nuclear attack from the other side. Whether the fear is that one's communications system will be disrupted, or that one's weapons will be rendered useless, the danger is that, in a moment of crisis, the side which feels threatened will launch its nuclear missiles before the other side has a chance to strike first. It is this fear which is aggravated by destabilizing technical advances such as high-altitude anti-satellite weapons.

Neither superpower has yet developed an anti-satellite system for high altitudes. An agreement not to do so is, therefore, still possible. No agreement means vast expenditure by both sides — funds better spent on more worthy projects. No agreement means a further spiral of competition — a competition particularly vulnerable to accident or miscalculation. Moreover, an agreement could encourage movement toward negotiations about anti-satellite weaponry designed to operate at lower altitudes.

I am also concerned about another potentially destabilizing development, which is the possibility that

new intercontinental strategic weapons may be so highly mobile as to be virtually invisible. This would call into question the ability of either side, or any international body, to verify arms control agreements. You see the paradox. These questions are so intellectually difficult that, too often, the public and their leaders are tempted to leave these problems to experts, to nuclear accountants, to the people who understand the technology, but who do not consider the political dimension of the issue. If missiles stay in one place, the enemy knows where they are, and could destroy them by launching a first strike, so that the side under attack could not respond with an attack of its own. One side would win the war simply by destroying the other's nuclear missiles.

That is why these weapons are destabilizing. You must use them or lose them. For that reason, making these missiles mobile also make them more stabilizing weapons, in the sense that a first strike by the enemy would not destroy them. He would not know exactly where they were and, therefore, he would not start a war, because the other side would still be able to send missiles back at him. That would assure the destruction of both sides, which is not in the interest of the side which might otherwise be tempted to launch a first strike.

But there is a further paradox in the fact that, if these missiles are too mobile, you could not count them, even by using satellites. And if you cannot count them, neither side could verify that the other was respecting the treaties, such as SALT I, and other agreements which might be reached.

Canada continues to devote attention, and resources, to problems of verification which must be resolved if arms-control measures are to be durable and trusted. We believe that the prospects for arms control would be considerably enhanced if the verification factor were taken into account in the developmental stage of any new strategic system — rather than leaving it to the point where systems are put on the bargaining table.

It is therefore my intention to introduce, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate disarmament forum, papers calling for: (a) international agreement to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems; (b) to restrict excessive mobility of intercontinental ballistic missiles; and (c) to require that future strategic weapons systems be fully verifiable by national technical means. That is to say that the space satellites of each side can see what is being prepared, constructed and developed on the other's territory.

These are measures of substance, often technical in their detail. But if we can generate a political impulse toward a five-power nuclear conference, toward renewed political commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, toward action at the MBFR talks to balance conventional forces and to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, toward a restriction of qualitative developments in strategic technology, and toward their verification, then we would have motivated a truly global and comprehensive approach to the crisis of peace and security.

It is essential, as I told my colleagues in Europe, that this interlocking program, this safety net for our very survival, be guided by political leadership at the highest level. That our own consultations, and talks with others, be quickened by a jolt of political energy. That we work to identify steadily increasing areas of mutual interest, starting from our common humanity and our common fate on this earth.

I return from Europe profoundly encouraged by the extent to which my purposes are shared by a community of other leaders. Therefore I would like to confirm tonight my intention to travel to Japan, to consult Prime Minister Nakasone in Tokyo next Saturday.

Japan's association with the Williamsburg Declaration last May, in which the leaders of the industrialized democracies agreed to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war, expresses both the resonance of history and the reality of the present day. My visit there will bear witness to the indivisibility of global security in the nuclear age.

I can also announce that, in addition to the consultations under way with the United States, I have initiated consultations with the Soviet Union and with China — two nuclear powers upon which much depends.

I look forward to taking an active part in the discussion of peace and security issues at the New Delhi meeting of Commonwealth heads of government, where I will be heading after Japan. I look forward particularly to consultations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on the matter of non-proliferation, and on her perspective, as current chairman of the council of non-aligned nations, on the linkage between disarmament and development.

I am encouraged by this momentum, and heartened by the response. But I am also well aware that critics of my initiative have difficulty in grasping this step-by-step approach. Some would prefer the passionate embrace of an unattainable ideal. Others are paralyzed by the complexities of the issues in play. I believe that peace must be waged steadily, with caution and with realism. We must work with due respect for the fragility of political trust, for the importance of building carefully, for the need to search out common ground on which to stand.

The imperative of political action is made all the more urgent by the pace of conflict and confrontation, which threatens to overtake our ability to understand what is happening, and our capacity to manage it.

Let me remind you that when Alfred Nobel invented dynamite in 1867 he believed that the prospect of its military application was so awesome that governments would be forced to live in peace. And yet today we have long since lost the ability to comprehend the force of a nuclear blast in terms of any comparison with traditional explosives.

Peace and security are not cold abstractions. Their purpose is to preserve the future of mankind, the growth of the human spirit, and the patrimony of our planet.

The choice we face is clear and pressing. We can without effort abandon our fate to the mindless drift toward nuclear war. Or we can gather our strength, working in good company to turn aside the forces bearing down on us, on our children, on this Earth.

As for me, I choose to move forward, and I know I do so with your support.

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SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER

ON PEACE AND DISARMAMENT

MONTREAL, NOVEMBER 13, 1983

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Deciding between war and peace has, from time immemorial, been one of the highest of political functions. But since the invention of nuclear arms, which have enough destructive power to cause a universal holocaust, the prerogative of deciding between war and peace has been transformed into the power of life and death over the entire planet. Would that we could take this excessive power away from man and return it to God!

Unfortunately, we cannot erase from the memory of man the secret of the atom, which his genius has unlocked. What we can do is find within ourselves the wisdom and the political will to control the situation and to dedicate the atom's potential to the service of life.

With their nuclear rockets trained on those of the other side, the countries of the Atlantic alliance, like those of the Eastern bloc, hold the key to their adversaries' destiny - and their own. Any mistake in judging the other's intentions could result in mutual extermination. It is therefore in the interests of all that we keep talking, that we use the language of reason rather than that of emotion.

In point of fact, the use of nuclear arms is such an insane idea that it forces us to be rational. This urgent need for rationality and political leadership to escape catastrophe is what I would like to speak to you about this evening.

The ancient Greeks defined man as a rational animal. Yet we all know how easily emotion can override reason within ourselves, and how difficult it is to live up to the responsibilities of being rational human beings.

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Fear, anxiety, anger, resentment and the will to power are blind forces that can stifle the voice of reason; when we face a prospect as terrifying as nuclear war, these emotions arouse an irrationality that only adds to the danger.

It may be, as the proverb says, that fear is the beginning of wisdom; however, it is certain that fear and anxiety make poor counsellors. They prevent us from seeing reality accurately, and condemn us to helplessness.

Therein lies the weakness of a certain kind of pacifism. To frighten people with visions of the apocalypse is no doubt an effective means of getting them into the streets to protest nuclear folly. Yet, standing firm against irrationality is not the same as restoring the reign of reason: until we have formulated our own conception of security and peace, based on reality rather than on wishful thinking, we are out of the debate, and have ordained our own powerlessness.

Nor are anger, resentment and the will to power any better counsellors than fear. Those who dream of settling matters with the Soviet Union militarily are just as out of touch with reality.

The days are gone when the United States held a monopoly in nuclear weapons. The USSR has also entered the atomic age, and is now a superpower with a nuclear capability equal to that of the United States. Any recourse to military force to settle our conflicts with the Soviet Union today could end in nuclear catastrophe.

In fact, the solution to our problems of coexistence with the Eastern bloc does not lie in submission born of fear, nor in war brought about by anger, resentment or a desire to dominate.

Only lucid courage and rational negotiation can truly lead to peace and security based on respect for our own reality, and for the Soviet reality as well.

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To say this is to call upon our political leaders to accept their highest responsibility, and to work for a radical change in the atmosphere currently prevailing in their discussions.

In simple terms, this means putting an end as soon as possible to the diplomacy of distrust and bravado between East and West; it means stopping the propaganda and name-calling at press conferences. It means sitting down at the same table to talk in the language of reason.

This is easier said than done, I know. Yet statesmen have a duty to keep a cool head, especially in time of crisis. If lucid courage precludes naivete, it also requires leaders to take the risk of keeping the bridges intact and of finding in mutual respect the basis for coexistence.

This respect, however, must be earned. When doubt and distrust are so deeply entrenched on both sides, words alone are not enough. What is needed are concrete gestures, however modest, that rebuild - stone by stone - the battered confidence between East and West.

It was for the purpose of doing what I could to contribute to this rebuilding that I contacted all NATO heads of government two weeks ago, and have just returned from meeting with His Holiness The Pope, with Mr. Mitterrand, Mr. Kohl and the prime ministers of Belgium, Holland, Italy and Great Britain.

My objective is to shore up the West's will to live and its solidarity, for only an unshakeable faith in ourselves will give us the strength to trust the Soviet Union enough to negotiate peace and disarmament rationally.

I have said it time and time again. The democracies of the Atlantic alliance cannot afford to fail the test of political will represented by the deployment of Euromissiles, if the Soviet Union does not agree to reduce very substantially the number of SS20s it has aimed at Western Europe.

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In 1979, all the NATO countries freely decided that the fall of 1983 would be the deadline for that test. To back down now would signal the breaking up of the alliance.

At the same time, we must think of what will happen after the deployment if, God forbid, it ever takes place. We must consider opening a wider front so that we can resume our march toward peace in a spirit of trust.

The Soviets must understand that we are willing to pay any price to defend the future of our democracies, but that we also want to work with them to build a more stable peace based on fewer weapons. But to do this, our democracies must once again form a common front, and concentrate our political energy on a few realistic, clear objectives, that we can together present to the rest of the world. I have proposed the following four objectives to our allies.

First, I suggest a broader negotiating framework for the strategic arms limitation talks, to include not only the United States and the USSR, but also France, the United Kingdom and China, because they also have strategic nuclear weapons.

That is not to suggest that this wider forum should replace the talks between the two superpowers. On the contrary, Canada feels that these bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR must continue. We believe that the most recent American START proposals show real flexibility and could produce an agreement to balance forces at a lower level of armaments. The problem is that the START talks do not cover the arsenals of the other three members of the strategic nuclear weapons club. At the moment, these weapons are subject to neither negotiations nor controls.

I believe that the time has come for negotiations leading to limitations on all strategic nuclear weapons. Such negotiations should be based on the following principles:

- 1) they should not be conducted on a bloc to bloc basis;
- 2) no superpower has the right to a preeminent nuclear position; and
- 3) under the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, all nuclear weapons states have an obligation to reduce their nuclear armaments.

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Were such principles to find general acceptance, I could envisage the eventual calling of a five power nuclear conference. The primary aim of such a conference could be the establishment of global limits on all existing strategic nuclear weapons according to fixed national ratios, allowing for parity between the USA and USSR.

By formally recognizing the rights of both the United States and the Soviet Union as strategic equals, neither superpower need fear that its equality with the other is in jeopardy. By relating the forces of the other nuclear powers to those of the superpowers, no state need fear that its security is threatened by the unlimited development of other arsenals. By establishing a framework which would formalize the relationship of superpower forces to those of the other three members of the nuclear club, neither Britain nor France nor China need fear that its forces will be subject to unreasonable restraints, imposed without their consent, or without their legitimate interests in mind.

Such a conference could also address strategic nuclear confidence-building measures, measures for crisis management and measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic nuclear arms race.

Our second objective would be to strengthen the non-proliferation regime so that no new members join the nuclear arms club.

Because we ourselves forswore the manufacture of atomic weapons, even though we were capable of producing them, and because we have always insisted on formal guarantees that our Candu reactors will be put to peaceful use, we have the moral right, as Canadians, to call for a strengthening of the controls designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world.

The international community took a significant step forward when it developed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was regarded as, and continues to be, the major control device on horizontal proliferation. With 119 signatory countries, it is one of the more important achievements of multilateral diplomacy in the post-war period.

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The heart of the Treaty is the covenant between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. The latter, agreeing not to acquire nuclear weapons, received the former's pledge to good-faith negotiations of nuclear arms control measures and the right of full access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

Leaders must therefore summon the political will and good faith to satisfy their part of the covenant by stopping the nuclear arms race, if they want to contain horizontal proliferation -- that is to say, the multiplication of the number of countries armed with nuclear weapons in conditions of political instability which increase the risk of war.

One way of pushing the nuclear powers toward greater respect for their part of the covenant would be for Third World countries, and especially near-nuclear countries, to reaffirm the basic logic of the non-proliferation treaty by signing it conditionally. The express condition would be that the five nuclear weapons states would negotiate among themselves a ceiling on weapons production, and that they would offer to all signatory countries generous access to nuclear technology.

Such a return to the spirit and the letter of the non-proliferation treaty could very well give it new life.

Our third objective must be to delay NATO use of nuclear weapons to the last conceivable moment by making an all-out effort to negotiate a balanced reduction of the conventional forces that face each other in Europe.

Those forces are extremely powerful. Both sides are armed with modern, highly accurate and sophisticated conventional weapons which would cause terrible destruction if they were ever used.

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The danger at present is that the forces of the two sides are not in balance in Europe. The Warsaw Pact's conventional forces are stronger than NATO's forces. If, by reason of some tragic accident or misjudgment, Warsaw Pact troops advanced into Western Europe, NATO forces might have to choose between defeat and the use of nuclear weapons.

In other words, the present level of the nuclear threshold in Europe is too low. The only way to raise that threshold is to re-establish a better balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. If we could achieve a reasonable balance, we would simultaneously achieve two other very worthwhile objectives:

- 1) we would raise the nuclear threshold - should war occur - because we would be better able to defend ourselves without resorting to nuclear weapons;
- 2) we would reduce considerably the possibility of any war because the Warsaw Pact could not gamble - as they could now - that we would accept defeat rather than be the first to use nuclear weapons.

How then do we achieve a better balance? The simple, though expensive, answer would be for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. I consider that to be a last resort. The most intelligent approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually acceptable levels.

That is the objective of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks that have been going on between the two sides in Vienna since 1973. I am proposing that we make a deliberate and concerted effort to get these talks off dead-centre, that we apply a jolt of political energy to move the negotiations away from petty arguments and sterile paralysis.

Both sides have everything to gain and nothing to lose from an agreement to reduce their forces to equal and verifiable levels. The numbers now being discussed are less than a million men on each side in central Europe. The Warsaw Pact has agreed to the target numbers, and has also agreed that there must be verification measures put in place to prevent either side from secretly strengthening its forces.

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In other words, both sides agree in principle on what must be done. This does not mean that we are on the verge of a formal agreement; a detailed treaty will still be difficult to write in a way which satisfies both sides. But it does mean that the prospects for agreement are sufficiently realistic to make it worthwhile for leaders in both East and West to give new political impetus to the MBFR talks.

Our fourth and final objective should be to apply the strategy of suffocation; that is, to smother any development of destabilizing weapons, which make your adversary's deterrent forces more vulnerable, which make him feel less secure, and which therefore provoke a renewal of the arms race.

In this respect, there are a number of conceivable developments which are of particular concern to me. I am worried about the development of anti-satellite systems, particularly those which would operate at high altitudes, because they could threaten the global communications systems upon which crisis management depends.

I am also concerned about the absence of limits on the mobility of strategic missiles. I recognize that the deployment of mobile Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) will enhance stability by decreasing fears of a disarming first strike. But, totally unrestricted mobility would make verification more difficult, and would thus become destabilizing.

Finally, I am concerned about the tendency to design strategic nuclear systems without taking into account, from the very beginning, the need for verification. The prospects for arms control would be considerably enhanced if the verification factor was addressed at the development stage of any new strategic system, rather than at the negotiation stage.

In the light of these concerns, it is my intention to introduce, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate disarmament forum, papers calling for international agreement on the following measures:

- 1) a ban on the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems;

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- 2) the imposition of certain limits on the mobility of ICBMs, to enhance verification; and
- 3) a requirement that all new strategic weapons systems be verifiable by national technical means.

These are measures of substance. They are designed to restrict those future qualitative developments in strategic technology which are likely, if unconstrained, to prove most destabilizing in the future. They would have the effect of closing off dangerous options in the arms race. They are achievable, because they are of equal value to both superpowers and manifestly in the interest of all.

In brief, then, these are my objectives:

- 1) to persuade the five principal members of the nuclear club to gather around the same negotiating table and place controls on all strategic nuclear weapons, not only on those of the two superpowers;
- 2) to prevent other countries from joining the club by strengthening the non-proliferation regime;
- 3) to delay the possible use of nuclear weapons by NATO in time of war, by negotiating a balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe; and
- 4) to prevent the development of new, destabilizing weapons. In my opinion, this global approach to the problems of peace and disarmament would have a good chance of restoring trust, and of giving new political impetus to the sectoral negotiations presently under way.

If the people negotiating the reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe know that the French and British arsenals will be taken into consideration during negotiations involving the five principal nuclear powers, they will be less inclined to block the discussions by trying to settle all of the problems at once.

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If there is real progress at the talks on mutual reduction of the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, East-West relations as a whole would be improved.

Finally, if there is confidence that a stronger non-proliferation regime and a ban on the development of new, destabilizing weapons will help us avoid an even more precarious peace, then that confidence should encourage all parties to look more seriously for solutions to present problems.

These are the common-sense objectives for which I am trying to gain our allies' support before I submit them to the other countries involved.

Although I want to give my hosts time to consider these proposals undisturbed, I can tell you that they have been given a favourable reception up to now. They are perceived as measures which could no doubt be improved, but which could restore the voice of political leadership in a debate which now seems dominated by suspicious nuclear accountants.

Nevertheless, there are some commentators who consider me presumptuous for advocating common sense in a world gripped by nuclear madness.

To them I repeat the words of William of Orange, who said: "One does not need guarantees in order to undertake a venture, nor quick success in order to persevere."

I firmly believe that giving up in the face of madness means refusing to accept our responsibility as human beings.

When I spoke to you last year, I read to you the laudable words of Georges Bernanos, who said: "The highest form of hope is the conquest of despair." It is that kind of hope that we must bring to life in the hearts of men, women and children today.

I am determined that it will not be said of me that I did not try.

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CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY - UNDER EMBARGO UNTIL 1300 HRS

Notes For Remarks By The Prime Minister
On Peace And Security
Montreal, November 13, 1983

(TRANSLATION)

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace mission

On previous occasions, I have taken the opportunity of these events to discuss the future of Quebec and of Canada. Broadening our horizons today, I would like to speak to you about peace, about disarmament, and about our future as inhabitants of a world in disarray.

We meet together as part of the long-standing democratic process in this country -- a process which, as your generous presence shows, is alive and well in Canada. We take pride in the vigour and diversity of our political life, in the bright promise of our future.

If our future depended on Canadians alone, we could be confident that it was safe and sound. But no nation today holds its future securely in its own hands. We share this planet with about 160 other nations, all of whom interact with us in a global system embracing our security, our economy, the health of our environment, and the quality of our lives.

Those 160 governments are, however, by no means the only players. The stage is crowded with alliances, with regional associations, with international institutions such as the United Nations, with multinational corporations, with cartels, pressure groups and lobbies of all kinds.

We are all of us -- you and I and our families, citizens, governments and corporations -- on that crowded global stage, which is alive with our hopes and our fears, our failures and our successes. But there are today three dominant and disturbing trends which, when set side by side, threaten to bring down the curtain on our human performance.

The first trend is an increasing resort to the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. Despite the solemn affirmation of the UN Charter that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force" there have been, since 1945, approximately 130 conflicts in which 35 million human lives have been lost.

There is a habit of aggression which is gaining ground. An abdication of the political process in deference to military solutions. A coarse element of belligerence, of menacing rhetoric, of governments which rise and fall at gun-point. The trend is global -- and it is gathering speed.

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(TEXTE)

La paix et la sécurité ne sont pas de froides abstractions. Elles sont la garantie de l'avenir de l'humanité, de l'épanouissement de l'esprit humain et de la survie de notre planète.

Le choix qui s'impose à nous est donc clair et pressant. Ou bien nous nous laissons entraîner par le courant aveugle qui nous mène à la guerre nucléaire, ou bien nous rassemblons nos énergies et nous travaillons ensemble à maîtriser les forces qui pèsent sur nous, sur nos enfants et sur le monde.

Quant à moi, j'ai fait mon choix. J'ai choisi de lutter, et je sais que je peux compter sur votre appui.

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This brutalization of political life takes on a particularly dangerous tone when it is driven by the clash of confrontational ideologies, and armed with sophisticated weapons. Weapons claiming an annual expenditure on the order of 600 billion dollars for nuclear and conventional arms combined. Weapons claiming too great a share of the budgets of impoverished Third World nations. Weapons which promote a rising tide of violence and engulf more peaceful ways to resolve disputes.

The second trend is the steady unravelling of the international regime designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This proliferation has two fundamental directions. We call it vertical proliferation when we mean the development of ever-larger nuclear weapons programmes, ever more-advanced in destructive technology, by the five nuclear-weapons states: the USA, USSR, France, UK and China. We call it horizontal proliferation when we mean the potential spread of nuclear weapons to other states. Some of these other nations have the capacity now to produce nuclear arms. Some are on the verge of doing so.

We are today preoccupied mainly with the evident need to assert restraint over the arsenals of all five nuclear powers. But from a global perspective, and in the near term, the consequences of horizontal proliferation pose an equally grave threat. Perhaps more grave, since the use of nuclear weapons by other nations would be unchecked by the assurance of mutual destruction which obtains among the five powers.

It was precisely to arrest both kinds of proliferation that a formal agreement -- the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- came into effect in 1970, and is up for review in 1985. That treaty represented an implicit covenant between those nations with nuclear weapons and those without: an undertaking by the nuclear powers that they would pursue negotiations in good faith on arms control and on limiting the spread of their weapons technology; and an undertaking by other states that they would forego the military use of nuclear energy in return for the benefits of its peaceful use, in fields such as energy, medicine, or agriculture.

But the trend is for this bargain to come unstuck. The treaty stands now at a cross-roads between peaceful aspiration and military strategy. It is the crossroads at which nuclear and non-nuclear countries -- East and West, North and South -- preoccupied with their survival, with their sovereignty, or with current conflicts, will decide whether the covenant still holds.

The third trend which threatens the global system is the worsening state of relations between East and West, particularly of relations between the two superpowers. Two weeks ago, when I spoke in Guelph, I deplored the absence of high politics in East-West relations, and the tendency for arms control negotiations to run their course outside any structure of understanding of, and respect for, each

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(TRADUCTION)

Lors de ma tournée en Europe, j'ai été encouragé de voir à quel point mes objectifs rejoignent ceux des leaders que j'ai rencontrés. Et j'aimerais confirmer ce soir mon intention de me rendre à Tokyo samedi prochain pour y rencontrer le premier ministre Nakasone.

La participation du Japon à la déclaration de Williamsburg, dans laquelle les dirigeants des pays industrialisés convenaient, en mai dernier, d'utiliser toutes leurs ressources politiques pour réduire les dangers de guerre, revêt un caractère historique et constitue un reflet du monde où nous vivons. Ma visite au Japon veut témoigner de l'indivisibilité de la sécurité universelle à l'ère atomique.

Je peux vous dire que, outre les consultations déjà en cours avec les États-Unis, j'ai pris contact avec l'Union soviétique et la Chine, deux puissances nucléaires dont tant de choses dépendent.

C'est avec empressement que je prendrai part aux discussions sur la paix et la sécurité lors de la conférence des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth, à New Delhi, où je me rendrai en quittant le Japon. Je suis particulièrement impatient de m'entretenir avec le premier ministre Indira Gandhi sur la question de la non-prolifération et de connaître ses vues, en tant que présidente du Conseil des pays non alignés, sur les liens à établir entre désarmement et développement.

Je suis satisfait des progrès accomplis et heureux de l'accueil réservé à mes propositions. Je suis néanmoins conscient des critiques que suscite chez certains commentateurs la démarche étapiste que nous favorisons. Certains lui préféreraient l'élan passionné en faveur d'un projet utopique. D'autres sont paralysés par la complexité des enjeux. Je suis d'avis qu'il faut "faire" la paix progressivement, avec prudence et réalisme. Nous devons éviter de brusquer une confiance politique des plus fragiles, et construire avec précaution en tâchant de nous retrouver sur un terrain commun et solide.

Une action politique s'impose avec d'autant plus d'urgence que la multiplication des conflits et des confrontations risque de déborder notre aptitude à comprendre ce qui se passe et notre capacité d'y remédier.

Lorsqu'il inventa la dynamite, en 1867, Alfred Nobel croyait que la perspective effarante d'une application militaire de sa découverte forcerait les nations à vivre en paix. Aujourd'hui la puissance d'une bombe nucléaire est sans commune mesure avec la force des explosifs classiques, et devant pareille démesure, notre esprit vacille.

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other's security needs. I reaffirmed our fidelity to the NATO two-track decision, and declared my hope that we might add a "third rail" of political energy, of dialogue and of confidence, in order to improve the downward course of relations between East and West.

(TEXT)

I ask you now to consider these three trends in relation to each other -- laminated together, as they are in life. An increasing resort to the use of force. The growing reality of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And a superpower relationship which is charged with animosity. I believe it is evident that only a global approach to peace and security can reverse the path of this sinister, composite trend-line.

Because, as tensions build, the East-West relationship becomes particularly vulnerable to events on the periphery. An endemic instability is evident in areas largely understood to be the sphere of influence of one or the other superpower. At other flashpoints, such as the ever-volatile Middle East, we see the tinder for a spreading conflagration.

The penetration of East-West rivalry into the Third World will reach its deepest and most dangerous point if, despite the Non-Proliferation Treaty, front-line antagonists -- locked in rivalry or combat -- begin to arm themselves with nuclear weapons.

(TRANSLATION)

As Canadians, our energies are deeply devoted to the security of the Western community, on this continent and in Europe. But our loyalties, our national and global interests, by no means end there.

Canada's place on the Pacific Rim gives us a privileged relationship with Japan, with China, and with the Association of South-East Asian Nations and, of course, with Australia and New Zealand. Our extensive programme of development assistance takes us to many parts of the world, remote in distance, but close in partnership. Our standing in the community of francophone nations, and in the Commonwealth, demands that we share the full range of political, economic and security concerns to which our national character gives us access.

That is why, in pursuing an initiative to improve the prospects for peace, I determined from the start that our approach must be global in scope and in perspective. Such an approach is dictated by the complex interlinkage of disarmament and development; of superpower animosity and Third World rivalries; of the resort to force and the availability of weapons; of nuclear balances in Europe and in Asia.

One man representing one country cannot promise a miracle, let alone deliver one. I have absolutely no illusions about the complexity of the issues in play. Nonetheless it is essential, in my judgement, to seek stability at a number of points along the downward trend-line, and to recognize that peace and security in the modern age are indivisible.

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Aucune des superpuissances n'a encore mis au point un système anti-satellites à haute altitude. Une interdiction de le faire est donc encore possible. Sans une entente de ce genre, on devra dépenser, des deux côtés, des sommes énormes qui pourraient être employées à des fins plus constructives. Sans une entente, on se lancera dans une surenchère qui rendrait plus probables encore les accidents et les erreurs de calcul. Qui plus est, un succès à ce chapitre contribuerait à relancer les négociations sur les systèmes anti-satellites fonctionnant à basse altitude.

Une autre menace à la stabilité serait que les armes stratégiques intercontinentales deviennent tellement mobiles qu'il soit pratiquement impossible de les repérer. Cela pourrait remettre en question la capacité des deux camps, ou de tout organisme international, à vérifier l'application des ententes de limitation des armements.

Le Canada continue pour sa part à consacrer ses énergies et ses ressources à l'étude des problèmes de vérification, dont dépendront la durabilité et la crédibilité des mesures de contrôle. Et il constate comme tout le monde que la possibilité d'un contrôle véritable des armements se trouverait considérablement accrue si l'on se préoccupait des problèmes de vérification au moment de la mise au point d'un nouveau système stratégique plutôt que d'attendre l'étape des négociations.

J'ai donc l'intention de soumettre, en temps opportun et aux autorités compétentes en matière de désarmement, des documents réclamant une entente internationale en vue 1) d'interdire l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude, 2) de limiter la mobilité excessive des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux et 3) d'exiger que tout nouveau système d'armements stratégiques soit entièrement vérifiable par les moyens techniques nationaux.

Il s'agit là de mesures importantes dont les détails sont souvent de nature technique. Mais, si nous parvenons à donner une impulsion politique à l'idée d'asseoir les cinq grands à une même table de négociation, si nous obtenons un nouvel engagement politique à l'égard du Traité sur la non-prolifération, si nous redonnons un élan aux négociations de Vienne sur la question de l'équilibre des forces classiques et du relèvement du seuil nucléaire en Europe, si enfin nous nous appliquons à restreindre les progrès qualitatifs dans le domaine de la technologie stratégique de façon à favoriser la vérification, alors nous aurons suscité une approche vraiment globale des problèmes de paix et de sécurité.

Comme je l'ai souligné à mes collègues européens, il est essentiel que ce programme commun, ce filet de sécurité dont dépend notre survie, soit soutenu par les leaders politiques au plus haut niveau; que nos entretiens à l'échelle nationale et internationale reçoivent une véritable relance politique et que nous travaillions à définir les intérêts toujours plus nombreux qui nous rendent solidaires, à commencer par notre condition humaine et notre avenir commun sur cette planète.

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Moreover, I am not alone. Other leaders have joined their concerns with mine. There is a growing community of political leadership which is determined to subject the science of arms to the art of politics. I draw encouragement from the support of that community.

You will know that I have just returned from meetings in Europe with several leaders of the Atlantic Alliance, with His Holiness the Pope, and with Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands. I return from Europe with clear expressions of support for my initiative, confident that my sense of urgency is shared by our friends and allies. I found a particular consensus on the need to lay down a third rail of confidence and communication -- a rail charging our dealings with the other side with a current of political energy. ~~UNQUOTE~~

I took to my European colleagues for discussion, and for refinement in light of their own views, elements of a programme for political management of the current crisis. I return with the assurance of their personal attention to this programme. Let me set out some of the elements.

The first is the need to establish, as soon as possible in the course of the coming year, a forum in which global limits might be negotiated for all five nuclear-weapons states. This proposal is without prejudice to the INF or START talks between the USA and USSR. But those talks, and rightly so, do not cover British, French or Chinese nuclear forces.

What we must seek to provide is a negotiating forum for those five states which recognizes the rights of the United States and the Soviet Union as strategic equals -- what a recent Trilateral Commission report calls "inevitable parity" between them -- and which provides a mutually acceptable and stable framework for the relationship between the forces of the other three states and those of the superpowers.

In this way neither Britain, nor France, nor China need fear that their forces will be subject to restraints which do not recognize their own national interests.

Once relative levels of armament were stabilized, I believe the five nuclear powers could begin to address the reductions called for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to consider measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic arms race.

A second element is remedial action to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself -- that covenant between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states which I mentioned a few minutes ago. The Treaty has been signed by some 119 nations. But a number of key states remain aloof, including several with the capacity now, or the potential soon, to develop their own nuclear arms.

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Tant que ce déséquilibre persistera, le risque d'un recours aux armes atomiques demeurera présent. C'est pourquoi nous affirmons que le seuil nucléaire est trop bas en Europe. Et, bien sûr, personne ne saurait être certain que l'utilisation d'armes atomiques sur le vieux continent ne mènerait pas à des représailles nucléaires de plus en plus massives à l'échelle intercontinentale. Nous croyons donc que la meilleure façon de relever le seuil nucléaire est d'établir un équilibre plus raisonnable entre les forces classiques.

Comment, dès lors, réaliser cet équilibre? Voilà la question à laquelle tente de répondre le troisième élément de mon programme.

La solution simple mais coûteuse serait d'augmenter les forces classiques des pays de l'Ouest jusqu'à ce qu'elles rejoignent celles du Pacte de Varsovie. Ce serait un pis-aller. Car la façon la plus intelligente de procéder serait que les deux camps réduisent leurs forces classiques à des niveaux mutuellement acceptables. C'est précisément cet objectif que nous poursuivons depuis dix ans dans le cadre des négociations sur les réductions mutuelles et équilibrées des forces, qui se déroulent à Vienne. Or, les choses avancent à un rythme beaucoup trop lent, et il reste des questions cruciales à trancher. C'est pourquoi j'ai exploré avec mes interlocuteurs les moyens de débloquer les négociations de Vienne en leur imprimant un vigoureux élan politique.

Il faut aussi savoir, à ce propos, qu'une autre négociation s'ouvrira en janvier à Stockholm. Son seul titre de "Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe" indique la complexité des problèmes auxquels elle s'attaque. Il importe d'éviter, dès le départ, que cette conférence ne s'enlise dans les disputes de procédure ou le jargon technique. J'ai donc proposé qu'on examine les avantages d'une présence politique à un haut niveau dès l'ouverture des discussions.

Le quatrième élément de mon programme est lié à cette stratégie de l'asphyxie que j'ai proposée pour la première fois lors de la session extraordinaire des Nations Unies sur le désarmement, en 1978. Cette stratégie, dont la mise en oeuvre requiert et réclame toujours l'appui des cinq puissances nucléaires, doit être raffinée pour tenir compte des progrès de la technologie. Les mesures de contrôle des armements ne peuvent ignorer les nouvelles technologies qui, par leur nature même, nous éloigneraient de la stabilité que nous cherchons à établir.

Je songe donc à une entente pour interdire l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude. De telles armes menacent, en effet, l'ensemble des moyens de communication dont nous dépendons pour gérer les crises. Que -- pendant un conflit -- l'une ou l'autre des parties en présence soit privée de son réseau de commandement et de conduite des opérations, et elle se trouverait totalement démunie au moment même où le maintien de la stabilité dépendrait précisément de sa capacité de prévoir, de réagir et de ne pas céder à la panique pour riposter à l'aveuglette.

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If the five nuclear-weapons states could begin to strengthen their side of the non-proliferation bargain, then the rest of us could more easily bring good sense to bear on those who have not yet signed on. No doubt we need to increase the incentives for Third World states to forego nuclear weapons -- there must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development. And we shall also have to ensure that a full range of safeguards adequately governs the transfer, from all nuclear suppliers, of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The area of safeguards is one in which Canada has taken a leading part for many years, and will continue to do so. -

Those two elements begin to address the global dimension of security in the nuclear age. But we must also recognize that there is in the heart of Europe a most dangerous concentration of forces -- conventional as well as nuclear. A war in Europe could destroy everything that each side desires to protect.

Throughout my talks with European leaders, there ran a common theme of concern at the present imbalance of conventional forces between the two sides. The Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO. There is an apprehension in Western Europe that the Warsaw Pact forces could be tempted to gamble on a conventionally-armed attack. They would throw down the challenge to Western leaders either of accepting defeat, or of being the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in our own defense.

As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. That is why we say that the nuclear threshold in Europe is too low. And of course we can never be certain that the use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre would not escalate rapidly to ever more-massive nuclear retaliation on an intercontinental scale. The conclusion we draw is that the best way to raise the nuclear threshold is to establish a more reasonable balance of conventional forces.

How then do we achieve this balance? This question prompts the third element of my approach. The simple, though expensive, answer is for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. I see this as a last resort. The far more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels, a task to which we have devoted the past ten years at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. There is today some sign of movement in those talks, but at far too slow a pace. Hard questions remain to be resolved. That is why I explored, with my colleagues in the Alliance, ways to break the deadlock in Vienna, ways to give fresh political impetus to the MBFR talks.

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Ce que nous devons rechercher pour ces cinq États, c'est une tribune de négociation qui reconnaîtrait le droit des États-Unis et de l'URSS à l'égalité stratégique, ou à ce qu'un récent rapport de la Commission trilatérale appelait "la parité inévitable". Une tribune qui fournirait un cadre stable, légitime et mutuellement acceptable où puisse s'établir un rapport entre les forces des superpuissances et celles des trois autres États dotés d'armes nucléaires.

Ainsi, ni la Grande-Bretagne, ni la France, ni la Chine n'aurait à craindre que ses forces soient soumises à des restrictions décrétées sans tenir compte de ses intérêts nationaux.

Une fois établis les rapports entre les niveaux d'armements des cinq puissances nucléaires, elles pourraient commencer à discuter des réductions prévues dans le Traité sur la non-prolifération, ainsi que des mesures pour contrôler l'aspect qualitatif de la course aux armes stratégiques.

Le deuxième élément du programme serait de renforcer le Traité sur la non-prolifération, ce pacte dont je vous ai déjà parlé entre les pays dotés d'armes nucléaires et ceux qui n'en ont pas. Quelque 119 nations ont signé ce Traité, mais un certain nombre d'États importants n'y ont pas encore adhéré, dont plusieurs possèdent dès maintenant, ou posséderont bientôt les moyens de mettre au point leurs propres armes atomiques.

Si les cinq puissances nucléaires prenaient l'initiative de mieux respecter les obligations que leur impose le Traité sur la non-prolifération, nous, les autres signataires, pourrions plus facilement tenter de convaincre d'autres pays de signer. Il faudrait, sans aucun doute, trouver des moyens supplémentaires d'inciter les États du tiers monde à renoncer aux armes nucléaires. C'est pourquoi il nous faut établir un rapport direct entre le désarmement et le développement. Nous devons aussi veiller à ce que des garanties étendues et adéquates président à tout transfert de technologie nucléaire à des fins pacifiques, quel que soit le pays fournisseur. Le Canada a fait un travail de pionnier dans ce domaine des garanties, et il continuera à oeuvrer à leur renforcement.

Les deux éléments du programme que je viens d'exposer portent sur la dimension planétaire de la sécurité à l'ère nucléaire. Mais il faut aussi reconnaître qu'il y a, au coeur de l'Europe, une concentration alarmante de forces classiques aussi bien que nucléaires. Une guerre sur le vieux continent risquerait de détruire tout ce que chaque camp désire préserver.

Voilà pourquoi la question du déséquilibre actuel entre les forces classiques des deux camps est revenue fréquemment dans mes entretiens avec les dirigeants européens. Les forces classiques du Pacte de Varsovie étant nettement supérieures à celles des pays de l'OTAN, on craint en Europe de l'Ouest que les pays du Pacte ne soient tentés de miser sur cette supériorité pour risquer une attaque. Les dirigeants occidentaux seraient alors acculés à un dilemme cornélien: 001236 ou bien accepter la défaite, ou bien déclencher la guerre nucléaire.

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Another negotiating forum will open in Stockholm this January. Its lengthy title, showing the complexity of its task, is the "Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe". It is imperative that this Conference not lose its way in litigation about procedures, or in the linguistics of technicality. I have therefore proposed that we consider the merits of high-level political representation at the very start of the Stockholm negotiations.

A fourth element in my initiative flows from the strategy of suffocation which I first proposed to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. That strategy -- which still requires, and awaits, the support of the five nuclear powers for its implementation -- needs further elaboration to keep pace with technological advances. Arms control measures must address those new technologies which, by their very nature, would make stability a more elusive goal.

I have in mind a ban on the testing and deployment of those anti-satellite systems designed to operate at high altitude. Such weapons could attack the global communications which are of critical importance for crisis management. Destruction of the other side's command and control network, at a time of crisis, would leave him blind and mute at the very moment when stability demands awareness and response, not the panic reaction of "launch on warning."

Neither superpower has yet developed an anti-satellite system for high altitudes. An agreement not to do so is therefore still possible. No agreement means vast expenditure by both sides -- funds better spent on more worthy projects. No agreement means a further spiral of competition -- a competition particularly vulnerable to accident or miscalculation. Moreover an agreement could encourage movement toward negotiations about anti-satellite weaponry designed to operate at lower altitudes.

I am also concerned about another potentially destabilizing development, which is the possibility that new intercontinental strategic weapons may be so highly mobile as to be virtually invisible. This would call into question the ability of either side, or any international body, to verify arms control agreements.

Canada continues to devote attention, and resources, to problems of verification which must be resolved if arms-control measures are to be durable and trusted. We believe that the prospects for arms control would be considerably enhanced if the verification factor were taken into account in the developmental stage of any new strategic system -- rather than leaving it to the point where systems are put on the bargaining table.

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Notre ouverture sur le Pacifique nous assure des relations privilégiée avec le Japon, la Chine, l'Association des Nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est et, bien entendu, l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande. Notre vaste programme d'aide au développement s'étend à de nombreux pays éloignés géographiquement, mais rapprochés par les liens étroits qu'ils entretiennent avec le Canada. Notre place au sein de la francophonie et du Commonwealth nous invite à partager les préoccupations politiques et économiques et le besoin de sécurité des pays que nous y côtoyons.

C'est pourquoi, avant même de tenter un geste pour améliorer les perspectives de paix, j'ai décidé que notre démarche devait adopter une perspective globale. Une telle approche nous est dictée par l'interaction complexe entre le désarmement et le développement, entre l'animosité des superpuissances et les rivalités au sein du tiers monde, entre le recours à la force et la disponibilité des armes, entre l'équilibre nucléaire en Europe et celui en Asie.

Il est certain que le représentant d'un seul pays ne peut promettre de miracle, et encore moins en accomplir. Je ne me fais aucune illusion sur la complexité des problèmes en cause. J'estime toutefois essentiel de rechercher des crans d'arrêt sur la pente descendante où nous sommes engagés, de reconnaître qu'à notre époque, la paix et la sécurité sont indissociables, et de constater que sur ce point aussi nos pays sont interdépendants.

Heureusement, je ne suis pas seul à penser ainsi. D'autres dirigeants partagent mes préoccupations, et un nombre croissant d'entre eux sont décidés à subordonner la science de la guerre à l'art de la politique. Leur appui m'encourage.

Vous n'ignorez pas que je rentre d'Europe, où j'ai eu des entretiens avec les dirigeants d'un certain nombre de pays de l'Alliance atlantique, avec Sa Sainteté le Pape et avec Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas. Je reviens au pays avec le sentiment que nos amis et alliés appuient mon initiative de paix et partagent ma conviction quant à l'urgence de la situation. Ils sont d'accord en particulier sur la nécessité d'ajouter à notre stratégie une troisième voie pour rétablir la confiance et les communications entre les parties.

J'ai soumis à mes collègues européens, afin qu'ils puissent les étudier et les raffiner en fonction de leur propre expérience, les éléments d'un programme de gestion de la crise actuelle. Permettez-moi de vous exposer quelques-uns de ces éléments que mes interlocuteurs se sont engagés à examiner personnellement.

Le premier porte sur la nécessité de créer, aussitôt que possible au cours de l'année prochaine, une tribune pour la négociation des limites globales à fixer aux arsenaux des cinq États nucléaires. Ce projet est sans préjudice des négociations sur les forces nucléaires de portée moyenne et des pourparlers START entre les États-Unis et l'URSS, ces entretiens ne s'étendant pas, et c'est normal, aux forces nucléaires de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France et de la Chine.

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It is therefore my intention to introduce, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate disarmament forum, papers calling for (a) international agreement to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems; (b) to restrict excessive mobility of ICBMs; and (c) to require that future strategic weapon systems be fully verifiable by national technical means.

These are measures of substance, often technical in their detail. But if we can generate a political impulse toward a five-power nuclear conference, toward renewed political commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, toward action at the MBFR talks to balance conventional forces and to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, toward a restriction of qualitative developments in strategic technology, and toward their verification, then we would have motivated a truly global and comprehensive approach to the crisis of peace and security.

It is essential, as I told my colleagues in Europe, that this interlocking programme, this safety net for our very survival, be guided by political leadership at the highest level. That our own consultations, and talks with others, be quickened by a jolt of political energy. That we work to identify steadily increasing areas of mutual interest, starting from our common humanity and our common fate on this earth.

(TEXT)

I return from Europe profoundly encouraged by the extent to which my purposes are shared by a community of other leaders. Therefore I would like to confirm tonight my intention to travel to Japan, to consult Prime Minister Nakasone in Tokyo next Saturday.

Japan's association with the Williamsburg Declaration last May, in which the leaders of the industrialized democracies agreed to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war, expresses both the resonance of history and the reality of the present day. My visit there will bear witness to the indivisibility of global security in the nuclear age.

I can also announce that, in addition to the consultations under way with the United States, I have initiated consultations with the Soviet Union and with China -- two nuclear powers on whom much depends.

I look forward to taking an active part in the discussion of peace and security issues at the New Delhi meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, where I will be heading after Japan. I look forward particularly to consultations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on the matter of non-proliferation, and on her perspective, as current chairman of the council of non-aligned nations, on the linkage between disarmament and development.

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nombre et la diffusion de leurs armes nucléaires. De leur côté, les autres États convenaient de renoncer à l'emploi du nucléaire à des fins militaires, à condition de pouvoir en bénéficier dans des secteurs pacifiques comme ceux de l'énergie, de la médecine ou de l'agriculture.

Mais tiraillé entre les exigences de la paix et les impératifs de la guerre, ce pacte est bien près de se rompre. Les États tant nucléaires que non nucléaires, ceux de l'Est comme de l'Ouest, ceux du Nord comme du Sud, en sont maintenant au point où ils doivent décider si le pacte tient toujours, si leur besoin de survivre doit primer sur l'idée qu'ils se font de leur souveraineté.

La troisième des tendances qui comportent un danger pour l'ensemble de la planète est la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest, plus particulièrement des rapports entre les deux superpuissances. Dans un discours prononcé à Guelph, il y a deux semaines, je déplorais l'absence de haute politique dans les relations Est-Ouest, et la tendance de chacune des parties à négocier la limitation des armements sans faire effort pour comprendre les besoins de sécurité de l'autre. J'ai réaffirmé notre adhésion à la stratégie à deux voies de l'OTAN et exprimé l'espoir qu'on en ajoute une troisième, la voie de la volonté politique, du dialogue et de la confiance, afin de contrer la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

(TRADUCTION)

Si l'on examine ensemble les trois tendances que je viens de mentionner, recours accru à la force, risque grandissant de prolifération des armes nucléaires et rapports imprégnés d'animosité entre les superpuissances, on s'aperçoit qu'elles convergent et nous mènent à la catastrophe. Il devient dès lors évident que seule une approche globale des problèmes de paix et de sécurité peut renverser le cours sinistre de ces tendances.

Avec la montée de la tension, en effet, les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest sont particulièrement sensibles aux événements survenant à la périphérie. On constate une instabilité endémique dans des régions généralement reconnues comme faisant partie de la sphère d'influence de l'une ou de l'autre superpuissance. Dans d'autres points volatiles du globe, le Moyen-Orient en est l'exemple patent, tous les éléments d'une conflagration se trouvent réunis.

Et l'extension au tiers monde des rivalités entre l'Est et l'Ouest atteindra son point culminant et le plus dangereux si, malgré le Traité sur la non-prolifération, les forces en présence -- belligérants ou simples antagonistes -- commencent à se doter d'armes nucléaires.

(TEXTE)

Certes, en tant que Canadiens, nous sommes avant tout attachés à la communauté occidentale; nous recherchons d'abord la sécurité sur ce continent et en Europe. Mais notre loyauté, nos intérêts nationaux et internationaux, ne s'arrêtent pas là.

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I am encouraged by this momentum, and heartened by the response. But I am also well aware that critics of my initiative have difficulty in grasping this step by step approach. Some would prefer the passionate embrace of an unattainable ideal. Others are paralyzed by the complexities of the issues in play. I believe that peace must be waged steadily, with caution and with realism. We must work with due respect for the fragility of political trust, for the importance of building carefully, for the need to search out common ground on which to stand.

The imperative of political action is made all the more urgent by the pace of conflict and confrontation, which threatens to overtake our ability to understand what is happening, and our capacity to manage it.

Let me remind you that when Alfred Nobel invented dynamite in 1867 he believed that the prospect of its military application was so awesome that governments would be forced to live in peace. And yet today we have long since lost the ability to comprehend the force of a nuclear blast in terms of any comparison with traditional explosives.

(TRANSLATION)

Peace and security are not cold abstractions. Their purpose is to preserve the future of mankind, the growth of the human spirit, and the patrimony of our planet.

The choice we face is clear and present. We can without effort abandon our fate to the mindless drift toward nuclear war. Or we can gather our strength, working in good company to turn aside the forces bearing down on us, on our children, on this Earth.

As for me, I choose to move forward, and I know I do so with your support.

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La première est le recours croissant à la force pour régler les différends internationaux. Malgré la déclaration solennelle de la Charte des Nations Unies demandant que "les membres de l'Organisation s'abstiennent, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force", nous avons connu, depuis 1945, quelque 130 conflits qui ont entraîné la perte de 35 millions de vies humaines.

L'habitude de l'agression se répand et de plus en plus le processus politique cède la place aux solutions militaires. La belligérance et les propos menaçants font florès et les gouvernements naissent et tombent par les armes. La tendance est universelle, et elle va en s'accroissant.

Cette brutalisation de la vie politique devient particulièrement inquiétante lorsqu'elle s'enracine dans des conflits entre idéologies irréconciliables et qu'elle est soutenue par des armes sophistiquées, nucléaires ou classiques, dont la fabrication absorbe annuellement quelque 600 milliards de dollars. Des armes qui engloutissent une tranche beaucoup trop importante des budgets des pays du tiers monde et qui, par leur nature même, incitent à la violence plutôt qu'au règlement pacifique des différends.

La deuxième tendance est l'effritement accéléré du régime international destiné à prévenir la prolifération des armes nucléaires.

Cette prolifération revêt une double dimension. Nous l'appelons verticale pour désigner la mise sur pied, par les cinq États nucléaires, États-Unis, URSS, France, Royaume-Uni et Chine, de programmes d'armement nucléaire toujours plus ambitieux et toujours plus perfectionnés dans leur puissance de destruction. Et nous parlons de prolifération horizontale pour caractériser la propagation des armes nucléaires dans d'autres États qui sont sur le point d'en fabriquer ou qui auront bientôt la capacité de le faire.

Notre principale préoccupation aujourd'hui est évidemment de limiter les arsenaux des cinq puissances nucléaires. Mais, d'un point de vue mondial et à court terme, les conséquences de la prolifération horizontale apparaissent tout aussi graves. En fait, elles le sont peut-être davantage, car les petites puissances nucléaires ne seraient pas retenues, comme le sont les cinq grandes, par la certitude d'une destruction mutuelle et finale si elles avaient recours aux armes nucléaires.

La conclusion du Traité sur la non-prolifération, entré en vigueur en 1970 et qui doit être révisé en 1985, visait précisément à empêcher la prolifération horizontale aussi bien que verticale. Ce traité était en fait un pacte implicite entre les États dotés d'armes nucléaires et ceux qui n'en ont pas. D'un côté, les puissances nucléaires s'engageaient à négocier de bonne foi des limites sur le

À VÉRIFIER AU MOMENT DE L'ALLOCUTION - SOUS EMBARGO JUSQU'À 13 H

NOTES POUR UNE ALLOCUTION DU PREMIER MINISTRE
SUR LA PAIX ET LE DÉSARMEMENT
MONTREAL, LE 13 NOVEMBRE 1983

(TEXTE)

Au cours des dernières années, j'ai profité de ces rencontres pour faire le point sur l'avenir du Québec et du Canada. Élargissant aujourd'hui notre horizon, j'aimerais vous parler de paix, de désarmement et de notre avenir comme habitants d'un monde en désarroi.

Notre rencontre s'inscrit dans la longue tradition démocratique de notre pays, et votre présence ici témoigne de la vigueur de cette tradition de liberté dans la diversité qui fait notre force et nous donne foi en l'avenir.

Si cet avenir ne dépendait que de nous, nous pourrions dormir en paix. Mais de nos jours, aucun État ne peut se targuer d'être seul maître de son destin. Nous partageons cette terre avec quelque 160 autres pays, et cette cohabitation entraîne une interaction à l'échelle planétaire qui influe sur notre sécurité et notre économie, comme sur la qualité de notre environnement et de notre vie.

Mais les gouvernements de ces 160 pays sont loin d'être les seuls protagonistes sur la scène mondiale. Une multitude d'alliances, d'associations régionales, d'institutions internationales comme les Nations Unies, de sociétés multinationales, de cartels et de groupes de pression de tout genre veulent avoir leur mot à dire.

En fait, nous voulons tous, vous, moi, nos familles, nos compatriotes, les gouvernements et les entreprises, avoir notre part de bonheur sur cette planète où se jouent nos espoirs, nos angoisses, nos échecs et nos réussites. Mais trois grandes tendances se profilent à l'horizon qui risquent, en se conjuguant, de provoquer une chute de rideau sur ce que Balzac appelait la comédie humaine.

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corrections du P.M.

PROJET DE DISCOURS DU PREMIER MINISTRE
SUR LA PAIX ET LE DÉSARMEMENT
À MONTRÉAL, LE 13 NOVEMBRE 1983

Mesdames,
Messieurs,
Chers amis,

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

[Je vous remercie d'être venus de nouveau si nombreux à ce déjeuner-bénéfice du Parti libéral du Canada.

Au cours des dernières années, j'ai profité de ces rencontres pour faire le point sur l'avenir du Québec et du Canada. Élargissant ce soir notre horizon, j'aimerais vous parler de paix, de désarmement et de notre avenir comme habitants d'un monde en désarroi.]

Décider de la guerre et de la paix a toujours été, de temps immémorial, l'une des plus hautes fonctions de la politique. Mais avec l'invention de l'arme nucléaire, dont la puissance de destruction peut nous mener à l'holocauste universel, cette prérogative de guerre et de paix s'est transformée aujourd'hui en pouvoir de vie et de mort sur l'ensemble de la planète. Si bien qu'on souhaiterait retirer aux humains un pouvoir aussi exorbitant pour le remettre à Dieu.

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Hélas, personne ne saurait effacer de la mémoire de l'homme le secret de l'atome que son génie a déchiffré. Il nous reste donc à trouver en nous la sagesse et la volonté politique qui nous permettront de dominer la matière et de mettre les forces de l'atome au service de la vie.

Avec leurs fusées nucléaires braquées sur celles de l'autre camp, les pays de l'Alliance atlantique, tout comme ceux du bloc de l'Est, tiennent aujourd'hui entre leurs mains le sort de l'adversaire, mais aussi leur propre sort. Et toute erreur sur les intentions de l'autre pourrait nous mener à l'extermination mutuelle. Si bien qu'il est dans l'intérêt de tous de se parler et de se tenir le langage de la raison plutôt que celui de la passion.

En vérité, les armes nucléaires sont tellement démentiellles qu'elles nous obligent à la rationalité. Et c'est de ce besoin urgent de rationalité et de leadership politique pour échapper à la catastrophe que je veux d'abord vous parler ce soir.

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Les Grecs définissaient l'homme comme un animal raisonnable. Mais nous savons tous combien, en chacun de nous, la passion parle souvent plus fort que la raison et à quel point le métier d'homme est difficile à exercer.

La peur, l'angoisse, la colère, la rancœur, la volonté de puissance sont autant de forces aveugles qui viennent bloquer en nous la voix de la raison. Et devant un phénomène aussi terrifiant que la guerre nucléaire, ces passions soulèvent en nous un fond d'irrationalité qui ne fait qu'ajouter au danger.

Si, comme le veut le proverbe, la crainte est le début de la sagesse, la peur et l'angoisse sont par contre mauvaises conseillères. Elles nous empêchent de voir la réalité dans toute sa vérité et nous condamnent à l'impuissance.

Là réside d'ailleurs la faiblesse d'un certain pacifisme. Apeurer les gens par des visions d'apocalypse est sans doute une façon efficace de les faire descendre dans la rue pour dire non à la folie nucléaire. Mais dire non à la déraison, ce n'est pas

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restaurer pour autant le règne de la raison. Tant qu'on n'a pas formulé soi-même sa propre conception de la sécurité et de la paix, en partant non pas de ses désirs mais de la réalité telle qu'elle est, on se situe hors du débat et on se condamne à l'impuissance.

De leur côté, la colère, la rancœur et la volonté de puissance ne sont pas meilleures conseillères que la peur. Et ceux qui rêvent d'en découdre avec l'Union soviétique se situent eux aussi hors de la réalité.

Le temps n'est plus où les États-Unis jouissaient du monopole de l'arme nucléaire. L'URSS s'est mise elle aussi à l'heure de l'atome. Elle est désormais une superpuissance qui jouit de la parité nucléaire avec les États-Unis. Tout recours à la force militaire pour régler nos problèmes avec l'Union soviétique risquerait donc aujourd'hui de nous mener à la catastrophe nucléaire.

À vrai dire, la solution à nos problèmes de coexistence avec le bloc de l'Est ne réside ni dans la soumission inspirée par la peur, ni dans la guerre inspirée par la colère, la rancœur ou l'esprit de domination.

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Seuls le courage lucide et la négociation rationnelle peuvent nous conduire véritablement à la paix et à la sécurité fondées sur le respect de notre réalité aussi bien que de la réalité soviétique.

Dire cela, c'est renvoyer les dirigeants politiques d'aujourd'hui à leur plus haute responsabilité et demander un changement radical de l'atmosphère qui préside actuellement à leurs échanges.

En clair, cela veut dire mettre un terme au plus tôt à la diplomatie de la méfiance et de la bravade entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Cesser de faire de la propagande et de se crier des noms en conférence de presse pour s'asseoir à une même table et se tenir le langage de la raison.

La chose est plus facile à prêcher qu'à pratiquer, j'en suis tout à fait conscient. Mais les hommes d'État ont le devoir de garder leur-sang froid, surtout en temps de crise. Et si le courage lucide exclut alors la naïveté, il demande qu'on prenne le risque de maintenir les ponts et de rechercher la coexistence dans le respect de l'autre.

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Mais le respect doit, bien sûr, se mériter. Et lorsque le doute et la méfiance se sont installés aussi profondément entre deux camps, les mots seuls ne sauraient suffire. Ce qu'il faut, ce sont des gestes concrets, si humbles soient-ils, qui rebâtissent, pierre par pierre, la confiance effondrée entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

C'est pour tenter, dans la mesure de mes moyens, de contribuer à cette oeuvre de reconstruction que j'ai pris contact, il y a deux semaines, avec tous les chefs de gouvernement de l'Alliance atlantique, et que je viens de rencontrer Sa Sainteté le pape Jean-Paul II, M. Mitterrand, M. Kohl et les premiers ministres de la Belgique, de la Hollande, de l'Italie et de la Grande-Bretagne.

Mon objectif est de renforcer la volonté de vivre et la solidarité du camp occidental, car seule une foi inébranlable en nous-mêmes nous donnera la force de faire suffisamment confiance à l'Union soviétique pour négocier rationnellement la paix et le désarmement.

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Je l'ai répété maintes et maintes fois. Les démocraties de l'Alliance atlantique ne peuvent se permettre de rater le test de volonté politique posé par le déploiement des euromissiles si l'Union soviétique ne consentait pas à réduire très substantiellement le nombre de ses SS-20 pointés vers l'Europe. En 1979, tous les pays de l'OTAN ont librement fixé à l'automne de 1983 l'échéance de ce test. Se défilier maintenant signifierait l'effondrement de l'Alliance.

Mais en même temps, il importe de penser à l'après-déploiement si, à Dieu ne plaise, nous devons en venir là. Il nous faut songer à l'ouverture d'un front plus large pour repartir à la conquête de la paix dans la confiance.

Il faut que l'URSS comprenne notre volonté de défendre à tout prix l'avenir des démocraties en même temps que notre désir de bâtir avec elle une paix moins précaire parce que moins armée. Mais pour cela, il nous faut d'abord refaire l'union vitale des démocraties et galvaniser nos énergies politiques autour de quelques objectifs clairs et réalistes que nous pourrons ensuite présenter solidairement au reste du monde. J'ai proposé à nos alliés les quatre objectifs suivants.

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Je suggère d'abord la création d'un cadre de négociation plus large sur la limitation des armes stratégiques en convoquant autour d'une même table non plus seulement les États-Unis et l'URSS, mais aussi la France, l'Angleterre et la Chine, qui détiennent elles aussi des armes nucléaires stratégiques.

Cet élargissement ne vise pas à remplacer les pourparlers entre les deux superpuissances. Le Canada soutient au contraire que ces négociations bilatérales entre les États-Unis et l'URSS doivent se poursuivre, et que les dernières propositions américaines, dans le cadre des entretiens START, font preuve d'une véritable souplesse capable d'inspirer une entente sur un équilibre des forces à un niveau moins élevé d'armements. Le problème est que les discussions START ne couvrent pas les arsenaux des trois autres puissances dotées d'armes nucléaires stratégiques, qui ne font actuellement l'objet d'aucune négociation et d'aucun contrôle.

Le temps est donc venu, je crois, de nous donner un cadre de négociation visant à limiter toutes les armes nucléaires stratégiques. Les pourparlers s'y tiendraient sur la base suivante:

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- 1) ce serait une négociation non pas entre deux camps mais entre cinq pays;
- 2) elle supposerait qu'aucune superpuissance n'a le droit à une prééminence nucléaire; et
- 3) elle réaffirmerait qu'en vertu du Traité de non-prolifération, les États dotés d'armes nucléaires sont tenus, de réduire leurs arsenaux nucléaires.

Si toutes les parties s'entendaient sur ces grands principes, j'envisagerais la convocation éventuelle d'une conférence des cinq puissances nucléaires. Le premier objectif de cette conférence pourrait être la fixation d'une limite globale pour toutes les armes stratégiques existantes selon des proportions nationales fixes prévoyant la parité entre les États-Unis et l'URSS.

En reconnaissant formellement le droit des États-Unis et de l'Union soviétique à la parité stratégique, ni l'une ni l'autre des superpuissances n'aurait à craindre une remise en question de son égalité. En reliant les forces des autres puissances nucléaires à celles des superpuissances, aucun État n'aurait à craindre une croissance illimitée

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des autres arsenaux. Enfin, en créant un cadre de travail qui donne un caractère formel au rapport entre les forces des superpuissances et celles des trois autres membres du club nucléaire, ni la Grande-Bretagne, ni la France, ni la Chine n'aurait à craindre que ses forces soient soumises à des restrictions arbitraires décrétées sans son consentement et sans tenir compte de ses intérêts légitimes.

Cette conférence pourrait aussi étudier les moyens de raffermir la confiance en matière de stratégie nucléaire et les mesures à prendre pour gérer les crises et pour assurer un véritable contrôle de la course aux armements nucléaires du point de vue qualitatif.

Voilà pour notre premier objectif. Le deuxième serait de renforcer le régime de non-prolifération de façon à ce qu'il ne s'ajoute plus de nouveaux membres au club des puissances nucléaires.

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Ayant nous-mêmes renoncé à fabriquer des armes atomiques alors que nous en avions parfaitement les moyens, et parce que nous avons toujours insisté sur l'obtention de garanties formelles quant à l'usage pacifique de nos réacteurs Candu, nous avons le droit moral, comme Canadiens, de réclamer un renforcement des mesures de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires dans le monde.

La communauté internationale a franchi une étape décisive lorsqu'elle a réussi à mettre au point le Traité de non-prolifération. Ce traité a été et continue d'être notre principal instrument pour contenir la prolifération horizontale des armes nucléaires. Et avec 119 pays signataires, il constitue l'une des grandes réussites de la diplomatie multilatérale de l'après-guerre.

Ce traité est essentiellement un pacte entre les pays dotés d'armes nucléaires et ceux qui en sont dépourvus. En renonçant aux armes nucléaires, ces derniers ont reçu des puissances atomiques l'engagement qu'elles négocieraient de bonne foi des mesures de contrôle des armements nucléaires et qu'elles accorderaient à toutes les nations signataires un droit d'accès aux applications pacifiques de l'énergie nucléaire.

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Il importe donc que les leaders des puissances nucléaires mettent toute leur bonne foi et leur volonté politique à satisfaire leur partie du contrat en stoppant la course aux armements atomiques, s'ils veulent contenir la prolifération horizontale, c'est-à-dire la multiplication des pays dotés d'armes nucléaires dans des conditions d'instabilité politique qui décuplent les risques de guerre.

Et une façon de pousser les puissances nucléaires à respecter leur partie du contrat serait, pour les pays du tiers monde et ceux qui se tiennent au seuil du nucléaire, de se réclamer de la logique même du Traité de non-prolifération pour le signer conditionnellement. La condition expresse étant que les pays dotés d'armes atomiques en plafonnent la production par négociation entre les cinq grands, et qu'ils offrent à tous les pays signataires un accès généreux à la technologie nucléaire.

Ce retour à l'esprit et à la lettre du Traité de non-prolifération pourrait même lui donner un second souffle.

- 13 -

Le troisième de nos grands objectifs doit être de retarder au maximum le recours par l'OTAN à l'arme nucléaire en négociant avec la dernière énergie une réduction équilibrée des forces classiques qui se font face en Europe.

Elles sont à l'heure actuelle d'une extrême puissance. Les deux camps disposent de forces classiques dotées d'armes modernes très sophistiquées et très précises dont l'emploi sèmerait la dévastation.

Le danger est que l'équilibre de ces forces est actuellement rompu en Europe. Les forces classiques du Pacte de Varsovie sont supérieures à celles de l'OTAN. Et si, par quelque accident tragique ou erreur de jugement, les troupes du Pacte de Varsovie pénétraient en Europe de l'Ouest, celles de l'OTAN pourraient être obligées de choisir entre la défaite ou le recours aux armes nucléaires.

En d'autres termes, le seuil nucléaire en Europe est actuellement trop bas. Et la seule façon de le relever est de rétablir un meilleur équilibre entre les forces classiques de l'OTAN et celles du Pacte de Varsovie.

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Si nous pouvions en arriver à un équilibre raisonnable des forces classiques des deux camps, nous atteindrions du même coup deux objectifs des plus souhaitables:

- 1) le seuil nucléaire s'en trouverait relevé, si par malheur une guerre éclatait, car nous serions mieux placés pour nous défendre sans recourir aux armes nucléaires; et
- 2) la possibilité qu'éclate une guerre s'en trouverait considérablement réduite, car le Pacte de Varsovie ne pourrait plus, comme à l'heure actuelle, prendre le risque de nous attaquer en faisant l'hypothèse que nous accepterions la défaite plutôt que de recourir les premiers aux armes nucléaires.

Comment, dès lors, rétablir un meilleur équilibre? La réponse simple mais coûteuse serait d'augmenter les forces classiques de l'OTAN jusqu'à ce qu'elles rejoignent celles du Pacte de Varsovie. Je considère cela comme un dernier recours. La façon la plus intelligente de procéder serait que les deux camps réduisent leurs forces classiques à des niveaux mutuellement acceptables.

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C'est là précisément l'objectif des négociations sur une réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces en Europe qui se tiennent depuis 1973 à Vienne. Je propose que nous fassions un effort délibéré et concerté pour remettre ces négociations sur rails et que nous leur donnions une impulsion politique pour les sortir des avocasseries et de la paralysie.

D'un côté comme de l'autre, nous avons tout à gagner et rien à perdre à nous entendre pour réduire nos forces classiques à des niveaux égaux et vérifiables. Les chiffres discutés à l'heure actuelle sont de moins d'un million d'hommes de chaque côté en Europe centrale. Le Pacte de Varsovie est d'accord avec nous sur les nombres à atteindre et sur la nécessité de mettre en place des mesures de vérification pour empêcher que l'un ou l'autre camp ne renforce secrètement ses effectifs.

En d'autres mots, les deux camps s'entendent en principe sur les choses à faire. Cela ne veut pas dire que nous sommes pour autant à la veille de signer un traité, car les détails pourraient s'avérer difficiles à rédiger à la satisfaction des parties.

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Mais les chances d'en arriver à un accord sont suffisamment réelles pour que les leaders de l'Ouest et ceux de l'Est prennent la peine de donner un nouvel élan politique aux négociations de Vienne.

Enfin, notre quatrième objectif devrait être de pratiquer la stratégie de l'asphyxie et d'étouffer dans l'oeuf la mise au point d'armes déstabilisatrices qui rendent vulnérables les forces de dissuasion de l'adversaire, le plongent dans l'insécurité et provoquent la reprise de la course aux armements.

Je suis inquiet en particulier d'un certain nombre d'inventions qui se profilent à l'horizon. La mise au point de systèmes anti-satellites, spécialement ceux qui opèrent à haute altitude, pourrait menacer les systèmes de communication dont nous dépendons pour gérer les crises.

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Je suis également préoccupé par l'absence de limites au déploiement de missiles stratégiques mobiles. Je reconnais que le déploiement de missiles balistiques intercontinentaux mobiles accroîtra la stabilité en diminuant les craintes d'une attaque préventive qui nous laisserait sans défense. Mais à l'extrême, une mobilité absolument illimitée rendrait la vérification plus difficile et deviendrait donc déstabilisatrice.

Enfin, je m'inquiète d'une certaine tendance à concevoir des systèmes nucléaires stratégiques sans tenir compte au départ du besoin de vérification. Les chances d'en arriver à un contrôle des armements seraient considérablement accrues si l'on se préoccupait des problèmes de vérification au moment de la mise au point d'un nouveau système stratégique plutôt qu'à l'étape des négociations.

Compte tenu de ces préoccupations, j'ai l'intention de soumettre, en temps opportun et aux organismes de désarmement compétents, des documents réclamant une entente internationale pour

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- 1) bannir la mise au point et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude;
- 2) imposer certaines limites à la mobilité des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux afin de favoriser la vérification; et
- 3) exiger que tout nouveau système d'armements stratégiques soit vérifiable par les moyens techniques nationaux.

Ce sont là des mesures importantes. Elles visent à restreindre, dans le domaine de la technologie stratégique, les progrès qualitatifs qui pourraient se révéler déstabilisateurs dans l'avenir s'ils n'étaient pas contenus. Elles auraient pour effet d'éliminer des options dangereuses dans la course aux armements. Enfin, chose très importante, ces mesures sont réalisables, car elles répondent aux besoins des deux superpuissances et sont manifestement dans l'intérêt de tous.

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Voilà donc, en gros, mes suggestions: faire asseoir les cinq grands du club atomique à une même table de négociation pour mettre sous contrôle toutes les armes nucléaires stratégiques et non plus seulement celles des deux superpuissances; empêcher que d'autres pays viennent grossir ce club en renforçant le régime de non-prolifération; retarder au maximum le recours par l'OTAN aux armes nucléaires, en négociant une réduction équilibrée des forces classiques en Europe; enfin, prévenir la mise au point de nouvelles armes déstabilisatrices.

Une telle approche globale des problèmes de paix et de désarmement me semble susceptible de recréer la confiance et de redonner une impulsion politique aux négociations sectorielles en cours.

Si, à la table où se négocie la réduction des armes nucléaires de moyenne portée en Europe, on sait que les forces de frappe française et anglaise seront éventuellement prises en considération lors d'une négociation à cinq sur les arsenaux nucléaires stratégiques, on sera moins porté à bloquer les discussions en voulant régler tous les problèmes à la fois.

- 20 -

Et si les négociations sur une réduction mutuelle des forces classiques de l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie débloquaient, c'est toute l'atmosphère des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest qui s'en trouverait allégée.

Enfin, savoir qu'en renforçant le régime de non-prolifération et en interdisant la mise au point de nouvelles armes déstabilisatrices, on évite de rendre la paix plus précaire, devrait encourager toutes les parties à rechercher avec plus de conviction une solution aux problèmes existants.

Ce sont là les quelques objectifs de bon sens auxquels je tente actuellement de rallier nos alliés avant de les soumettre aux autres pays intéressés. Et même si je désire éviter tout commentaire pour laisser à mes hôtes le temps de réfléchir en paix, je peux vous dire que mes propositions ont reçu jusqu'à présent un accueil favorable. Elles sont perçues comme des techniques perfectibles sans doute, mais susceptibles de redonner voix à la politique dans un secteur où ne semble jouer que la comptabilité méfiante.

- 21 -

Pourtant, il ne manque pas de gens pour trouver présomptueuse pareille action en faveur du bon sens dans un monde en proie à la folie nucléaire. À ceux-là, je rappelle le mot de Guillaume d'Orange: "Point n'est besoin d'espérer pour entreprendre ni de réussir pour persévérer."


Quant à moi, j'ai la conviction profonde que baisser les bras face à la déraison serait refuser de faire notre métier d'homme.

Je vous citais l'an dernier cette parole admirable de Georges Bernanos: "La plus haute forme de l'espérance est le désespoir surmonté." C'est cette espérance-là qu'il nous est demandé de faire vivre dans le coeur des hommes, des femmes et des enfants d'aujourd'hui.

Et il ne sera pas dit que je n'aurai pas essayé.

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phonod _____
Person _____
Local Time _____



Shirley
Did you pls have
concrete repeat copy
of French text to
Permy. Thanks
[Signature]

NONCLASSIFIE

DE PRMNY WKGR2511 14NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ FLASH

---DISCOURS DU PM MONTL

NOUS NOUS TROUVONS DANS SITUATION BIZARRE AUPRES INTERLOCUTEURS
FRANCOPHONES INTERESSES DE NE POSSEDER A PRMNY QUE TRADUCTION
ANGLAISE DE DISCOURS PRONONCE EN FRANCAIS A MTL. EST-CE INTENTIONNEL
DE VOTRE PART? AVEC QUEL RETARD DEVONS-NOUS COMPTER QUE TEXTE
ORIGINAL NOUS PARVIENDRA?

PELLETIER

UUU/119 141722Z WKGR2511

SECRET

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ottawa

MF
JD

November 13, 1983

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

Mr. R. R. Fowler
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet
Privy Council Office
Langevin Block
Ottawa

Dear Mr. Fowler:

Enclosed is the text of a letter from President Reagan to Prime Minister Trudeau which was received by the Embassy telegraphically. It would be appreciated if you could have the letter delivered to the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

John H. Rouse
John H. Rouse
Minister

Enclosure

SECRET

001266

SECRET

TEXT OF LETTER RECEIVED TELEGRAPHICALLY

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I believe the strong support received from allied governments and publics for our negotiating position was instrumental in producing the limited movement in the Soviet position outlined by General Secretary Andropov October 26.

Clearly, however, that Soviet position fails to meet our criteria for an acceptable agreement. It would preserve a substantial and threatening Soviet monopoly in LRINF missiles, bar NATO deployments, demand compensation for the independent nuclear forces of third countries, and rejects equal global limits on LRINF missiles. Ambassador Nitze is pressing his Soviet counterpart to explain other important ambiguities and apparent shortcomings in the Soviet position.

Despite the failure of the Soviet Union to move on the crucial issues in the negotiation, I know you share my belief that we should make every reasonable effort to achieve an agreement this year. Based on my own review of the situation, the results of our most recent NATO Ministerials and last week's special consultative group meeting, I have concluded that it would be useful in the near future to elaborate further on my September initiatives by indicating to the Soviet Union and our own publics a specific equal level of global LRINF deployments which would be acceptable to us.

I have in mind informing the Soviet negotiators that while the U.S. continues to prefer the complete elimination of the entire class of land-based, LRINF missiles, and while we remain prepared to discuss other interim global ceilings on such missiles, the U.S. would be prepared to accept an equal global ceiling of 420 LRINF missile warheads. This would equate to a global limit of 140 of the Soviet three-warhead SS-20 missiles, which is, as you will recall, the number to which they have proposed to limit their SS-20 force in Europe. The U.S. would reiterate its willingness, under such a ceiling, not to offset the entire Soviet global LRINF missile deployment by U.S. deployments of LRINF missiles in Europe. We would also reiterate our willingness to distribute the reductions to be made from planned levels of forces between both the Pershing II ballistic missile and GLCM deployments, in an appropriate manner.

I believe such an elaboration of our proposal would be a further demonstration of allied flexibility and would be an integral part of the framework set out in the March proposal for an interim agreement involving reductions to equal global ceilings of warheads on LRINF missile launchers.

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2.

I intend to authorize Paul Nitze to propose this new figure for a global ceiling of 420 warheads at his next meeting with the Soviet negotiator, which will occur early this week. I am not planning to give this move any early publicity.

The readiness of the West to continue negotiating, and to advance constructive new proposals, stands in sharp contrast to the crude threats from the Soviet Union to break off the talks. We must not be distracted by such threats, and we must ensure that our publics understand the efforts we are making to achieve a more stable and secure peace. However, we must be equally clear to all concerned that in the absence of an agreement which meets our criteria, NATO will deploy its LRINF missiles as planned and on schedule. Any delay at this time would undercut the proposals for such an agreement.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ronald Reagan

SECRET

001268

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

Q. HAS THE UNITED STATES MADE A NEW MOVE IN THE INF
NEGOTIATIONS?

A. THE UNITED STATES, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH ITS
ALLIES, HAS DECIDED TO ELABORATE FURTHER ON ITS
POSITION AND ON THE INITIATIVES ANNOUNCED BY THE
PRESIDENT IN SEPTEMBER, BY INDICATING TO THE SOVIET
UNION THAT:

. --WHILE WE CONTINUE TO PREFER THE COMPLETE
ELIMINATION OF THE ENTIRE CLASS OF LAND-BASED LRINF
MISSILES, AND

. --WHILE WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS OTHER
INTERIM GLOBAL CEILINGS ON SUCH MISSILES,

. --THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN INTERIM
EQUAL GLOBAL CEILING OF 420 WARHEADS ON LRINF

MISSILES. THIS WOULD EQUATE TO A GLOBAL LIMIT OF 140
OF THE SOVIET THREE-WARHEAD SS-20 MISSILES, WHICH IS,
AS YOU RECALL, THE NUMBER TO WHICH THEY HAVE PROPOSED
TO LIMIT THEIR SS-20 FORCE IN RANGE OF EUROPE.

Q. WHY IS THE U.S. PROPOSING AN EQUAL GLOBAL LIMIT OF
4,0 WARHEADS?

A. THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED THAT THEY BE PERMITTED
UNDER AN AGREEMENT TO DEPLOY 140 SS-20 MISSILES. WITH
420 WARHEADS, IN OR WITHIN RANGE OF EUROPE. WE ARE
ATTEMPTING TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE SOVIETS BY ACCEPTING
THIS LEVEL OF DEPLOYMENT, WHILE, CONSISTENT WITH OUR
OWN CRITERIA FOR AN AGREEMENT, PROPOSING IT AS AN EQUAL
GLOBAL LIMIT.

Q. WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER INITIATIVES ANNOUNCED IN
SEPTEMBER BY THE PRESIDENT?


A. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THESE IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS. THIS ELABORATION OF THE U.S. POSITION IS
FULLY CONSISTENT WITH ALL OF THE INITIATIVES ANNOUNCED
IN SEPTEMBER.

SECRET

C11
À VÉRIFIER AU MOMENT DE L'ALLOCUTION - SOUS EMBARGO JUSQU'À 13 H

NOTES POUR UNE ALLOCUTION DU PREMIER MINISTRE
SUR LA PAIX ET LE DÉSARMEMENT
MONTREAL, LE 13 NOVEMBRE 1983

(TEXTES)



Au cours des dernières années, j'ai profité de ces rencontres pour faire le point sur l'avenir du Québec et du Canada. Élargissant aujourd'hui notre horizon, j'aimerais vous parler de paix, de désarmement et de notre avenir comme habitants d'un monde en désarroi.

Notre rencontre s'inscrit dans la longue tradition démocratique de notre pays, et votre présence ici témoigne de la vigueur de cette tradition de liberté dans la diversité qui fait notre force et nous donne foi en l'avenir.

Si cet avenir ne dépendait que de nous, nous pourrions dormir en paix. Mais de nos jours, aucun État ne peut se targuer d'être seul maître de son destin. Nous partageons cette terre avec quelque 160 autres pays, et cette cohabitation entraîne une interaction à l'échelle planétaire qui influe sur notre sécurité et notre économie, comme sur la qualité de notre environnement et de notre vie.

Mais les gouvernements de ces 160 pays sont loin d'être les seuls protagonistes sur la scène mondiale. Une multitude d'alliances, d'associations régionales, d'institutions internationales comme les Nations Unies, de sociétés multinationales, de cartels et de groupes de pression de tout genre veulent avoir leur mot à dire.

En fait, nous voulons tous, vous, moi, nos familles, nos compatriotes, les gouvernements et les entreprises, avoir notre part de bonheur sur cette planète où se jouent nos espoirs, nos angoisses, nos échecs et nos réussites. Mais trois grandes tendances se profilent à l'horizon qui risquent, en se conjuguant, de provoquer une chute de rideau sur ce que Balzac appelait la comédie humaine.

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La première est le recours croissant à la force pour régler les différends internationaux. Malgré la déclaration solennelle de la Charte des Nations Unies demandant que "les membres de l'Organisation s'abstiennent, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force", nous avons connu, depuis 1945, quelque 130 conflits qui ont entraîné la perte de 35 millions de vies humaines.

L'habitude de l'agression se répand et de plus en plus le processus politique cède la place aux solutions militaires. La belligérance et les propos menaçants font florès et les gouvernements naissent et tombent par les armes. La tendance est universelle, et elle va en s'accroissant.

Cette brutalisation de la vie politique devient particulièrement inquiétante lorsqu'elle s'enracine dans des conflits entre idéologies irréconciliables et qu'elle est soutenue par des armes sophistiquées, nucléaires ou classiques, dont la fabrication absorbe annuellement quelque 600 milliards de dollars. Des armes qui engloutissent une tranche beaucoup trop importante des budgets des pays du tiers monde et qui, par leur nature même, incitent à la violence plutôt qu'au règlement pacifique des différends.

La deuxième tendance est l'effritement accéléré du régime international destiné à prévenir la prolifération des armes nucléaires.

Cette prolifération revêt une double dimension. Nous l'appelons verticale pour désigner la mise sur pied, par les cinq États nucléaires, États-Unis, URSS, France, Royaume-Uni et Chine, de programmes d'armement nucléaire toujours plus ambitieux et toujours plus perfectionnés dans leur puissance de destruction. Et nous parlons de prolifération horizontale pour caractériser la propagation des armes nucléaires dans d'autres États qui sont sur le point d'en fabriquer ou qui auront bientôt la capacité de le faire.

Notre principale préoccupation aujourd'hui est évidemment de limiter les arsenaux des cinq puissances nucléaires. Mais, d'un point de vue mondial et à court terme, les conséquences de la prolifération horizontale apparaissent tout aussi graves. En fait, elles le sont peut-être davantage, car les petites puissances nucléaires ne seraient pas retenues, comme le sont les cinq grandes, par la certitude d'une destruction mutuelle et finale si elles avaient recours aux armes nucléaires.

La conclusion du Traité sur la non-prolifération, entré en vigueur en 1970 et qui doit être révisé en 1985, visait précisément à empêcher la prolifération horizontale aussi bien que verticale. Ce traité était en fait un pacte implicite entre les États dotés d'armes nucléaires et ceux qui n'en ont pas. D'un côté, les puissances nucléaires s'engageaient à négocier de bonne foi des limites sur le

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nombre et la diffusion de leurs armes nucléaires. De leur côté, les autres États convenaient de renoncer à l'emploi du nucléaire à des fins militaires, à condition de pouvoir en bénéficier dans des secteurs pacifiques comme ceux de l'énergie, de la médecine ou de l'agriculture.

Mais tiraillé entre les exigences de la paix et les impératifs de la guerre, ce pacte est bien près de se rompre. Les États tant nucléaires que non nucléaires, ceux de l'Est comme de l'Ouest, ceux du Nord comme du Sud, en sont maintenant au point où ils doivent décider si le pacte tient toujours, si leur besoin de survivre doit primer sur l'idée qu'ils se font de leur souveraineté.

La troisième des tendances qui comportent un danger pour l'ensemble de la planète est la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest, plus particulièrement des rapports entre les deux superpuissances. Dans un discours prononcé à Guelph, il y a deux semaines, je déplorais l'absence de haute politique dans les relations Est-Ouest, et la tendance de chacune des parties à négocier la limitation des armements sans faire effort pour comprendre les besoins de sécurité de l'autre. J'ai réaffirmé notre adhésion à la stratégie à deux voies de l'OTAN et exprimé l'espoir qu'on en ajoute une troisième, la voie de la volonté politique, du dialogue et de la confiance, afin de contrer la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

(TRADUCTION)

Si l'on examine ensemble les trois tendances que je viens de mentionner, recours accru à la force, risque grandissant de prolifération des armes nucléaires et rapports imprégnés d'animosité entre les superpuissances, on s'aperçoit qu'elles convergent et nous mènent à la catastrophe. Il devient dès lors évident que seule une approche globale des problèmes de paix et de sécurité peut renverser le cours sinistre de ces tendances.

Avec la montée de la tension, en effet, les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest sont particulièrement sensibles aux événements survenant à la périphérie. On constate une instabilité endémique dans des régions généralement reconnues comme faisant partie de la sphère d'influence de l'une ou de l'autre superpuissance. Dans d'autres points volatiles du globe, le Moyen-Orient en est l'exemple patent, tous les éléments d'une conflagration se trouvent réunis.

Et l'extension au tiers monde des rivalités entre l'Est et l'Ouest atteindra son point culminant et le plus dangereux si, malgré le Traité sur la non-prolifération, les forces en présence -- belligérants ou simples antagonistes -- commencent à se doter d'armes nucléaires.

(TEXTE)

Certes, en tant que Canadiens, nous sommes avant tout attachés à la communauté occidentale; nous recherchons d'abord la sécurité sur ce continent et en Europe. Mais notre loyauté, nos intérêts nationaux et internationaux, ne s'arrêtent pas là.

Notre ouverture sur le Pacifique nous assure des relations privilégiées avec le Japon, la Chine, l'Association des Nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est et, bien entendu, l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande. Notre vaste programme d'aide au développement s'étend à de nombreux pays éloignés géographiquement, mais rapprochés par les liens étroits qu'ils entretiennent avec le Canada. Notre place au sein de la francophonie et du Commonwealth nous invite à partager les préoccupations politiques et économiques et le besoin de sécurité des pays que nous y côtoyons.

C'est pourquoi, avant même de tenter un geste pour améliorer les perspectives de paix, j'ai décidé que notre démarche devait adopter une perspective globale. Une telle approche nous est dictée par l'interaction complexe entre le désarmement et le développement, entre l'animosité des superpuissances et les rivalités au sein du tiers monde, entre le recours à la force et la disponibilité des armes, entre l'équilibre nucléaire en Europe et celui en Asie.

Il est certain que le représentant d'un seul pays ne peut promettre de miracle, et encore moins en accomplir. Je ne me fais aucune illusion sur la complexité des problèmes en cause. J'estime toutefois essentiel de rechercher des crans d'arrêt sur la pente descendante où nous sommes engagés, de reconnaître qu'à notre époque, la paix et la sécurité sont indissociables, et de constater que sur ce point aussi nos pays sont interdépendants.

Heureusement, je ne suis pas seul à penser ainsi. D'autres dirigeants partagent mes préoccupations, et un nombre croissant d'entre eux sont décidés à subordonner la science de la guerre à l'art de la politique. Leur appui m'encourage.

Vous n'ignorez pas que je rentre d'Europe, où j'ai eu des entretiens avec les dirigeants d'un certain nombre de pays de l'Alliance atlantique, avec Sa Sainteté le Pape et avec Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas. Je reviens au pays avec le sentiment que nos amis et alliés appuient mon initiative de paix et partagent ma conviction quant à l'urgence de la situation. Ils sont d'accord en particulier sur la nécessité d'ajouter à notre stratégie une troisième voie pour rétablir la confiance et les communications entre les parties.

J'ai soumis à mes collègues européens, afin qu'ils puissent les étudier et les raffiner en fonction de leur propre expérience, les éléments d'un programme de gestion de la crise actuelle. Permettez-moi de vous exposer quelques-uns de ces éléments que mes interlocuteurs se sont engagés à examiner personnellement.

Le premier porte sur la nécessité de créer, aussitôt que possible au cours de l'année prochaine, une tribune pour la négociation des limites globales à fixer aux arsenaux des cinq États nucléaires. Ce projet est sans préjudice des négociations sur les forces nucléaires de portée moyenne et des pourparlers START entre les États-Unis et l'URSS, ces entretiens ne s'étendant pas, et c'est normal, aux forces nucléaires de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France et de la Chine.

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Ce que nous devons rechercher pour ces cinq États, c'est une tribune de négociation qui reconnaîtrait le droit des États-Unis et de l'URSS à l'égalité stratégique, ou à ce qu'un récent rapport de la Commission trilatérale appelait "la parité inévitable". Une tribune qui fournirait un cadre stable, légitime et mutuellement acceptable où puisse s'établir un rapport entre les forces des superpuissances et celles des trois autres États dotés d'armes nucléaires.

Ainsi, ni la Grande-Bretagne, ni la France, ni la Chine n'aurait à craindre que ses forces soient soumises à des restrictions décrétées sans tenir compte de ses intérêts nationaux.

Une fois établis les rapports entre les niveaux d'armements des cinq puissances nucléaires, elles pourraient commencer à discuter des réductions prévues dans le Traité sur la non-prolifération, ainsi que des mesures pour contrôler l'aspect qualitatif de la course aux armes stratégiques.

Le deuxième élément du programme serait de renforcer le Traité sur la non-prolifération, ce pacte dont je vous ai déjà parlé entre les pays dotés d'armes nucléaires et ceux qui n'en ont pas. Quelque 119 nations ont signé ce Traité, mais un certain nombre d'États importants n'y ont pas encore adhéré, dont plusieurs possèdent dès maintenant, ou posséderont bientôt les moyens de mettre au point leurs propres armes atomiques.

Si les cinq puissances nucléaires prenaient l'initiative de mieux respecter les obligations que leur impose le Traité sur la non-prolifération, nous, les autres signataires, pourrions plus facilement tenter de convaincre d'autres pays de signer. Il faudrait, sans aucun doute, trouver des moyens supplémentaires d'inciter les États du tiers monde à renoncer aux armes nucléaires. C'est pourquoi il nous faut établir un rapport direct entre le désarmement et le développement. Nous devons aussi veiller à ce que des garanties étendues et adéquates président à tout transfert de technologie nucléaire à des fins pacifiques, quel que soit le pays fournisseur. Le Canada a fait un travail de pionnier dans ce domaine des garanties, et il continuera à oeuvrer à leur renforcement.

Les deux éléments du programme que je viens d'exposer portent sur la dimension planétaire de la sécurité à l'ère nucléaire. Mais il faut aussi reconnaître qu'il y a, au coeur de l'Europe, une concentration alarmante de forces classiques aussi bien que nucléaires. Une guerre sur le vieux continent risquerait de détruire tout ce que chaque camp désire préserver.

Voilà pourquoi la question du déséquilibre actuel entre les forces classiques des deux camps est revenue fréquemment dans mes entretiens avec les dirigeants européens. Les forces classiques du Pacte de Varsovie étant nettement supérieures à celles des pays de l'OTAN, on craint en Europe de l'Ouest que les pays du Pacte ne soient tentés de miser sur cette supériorité pour risquer une attaque. Les dirigeants occidentaux seraient alors acculés à un dilemme cornélien: 001274 ou bien accepter la défaite, ou bien déclencher la guerre nucléaire.

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Tant que ce déséquilibre persistera, le risque d'un recours aux armes atomiques demeurera présent. C'est pourquoi nous affirmons que le seuil nucléaire est trop bas en Europe. Et, bien sûr, personne ne saurait être certain que l'utilisation d'armes atomiques sur le vieux continent ne mènerait pas à des représailles nucléaires de plus en plus massives à l'échelle intercontinentale. Nous croyons donc que la meilleure façon de relever le seuil nucléaire est d'établir un équilibre plus raisonnable entre les forces classiques.

Comment, dès lors, réaliser cet équilibre? Voilà la question à laquelle tente de répondre le troisième élément de mon programme.

La solution simple mais coûteuse serait d'augmenter les forces classiques des pays de l'Ouest jusqu'à ce qu'elles rejoignent celles du Pacte de Varsovie. Ce serait un pis-aller. Car la façon la plus intelligente de procéder serait que les deux camps réduisent leurs forces classiques à des niveaux mutuellement acceptables. C'est précisément cet objectif que nous poursuivons depuis dix ans dans le cadre des négociations sur les réductions mutuelles et équilibrées des forces, qui se déroulent à Vienne. Or, les choses avancent à un rythme beaucoup trop lent, et il reste des questions cruciales à trancher. C'est pourquoi j'ai exploré avec mes interlocuteurs les moyens de débloquent les négociations de Vienne en leur imprimant un vigoureux élan politique.

Il faut aussi savoir, à ce propos, qu'une autre négociation s'ouvrira en janvier à Stockholm. Son seul titre de "Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe" indique la complexité des problèmes auxquels elle s'attaque. Il importe d'éviter, dès le départ, que cette conférence ne s'enlise dans les disputes de procédure ou le jargon technique. J'ai donc proposé qu'on examine les avantages d'une présence politique à un haut niveau dès l'ouverture des discussions.

Le quatrième élément de mon programme est lié à cette stratégie de l'asphyxie que j'ai proposée pour la première fois lors de la session extraordinaire des Nations Unies sur le désarmement, en 1978. Cette stratégie, dont la mise en oeuvre requiert et réclame toujours l'appui des cinq puissances nucléaires, doit être raffinée pour tenir compte des progrès de la technologie. Les mesures de contrôle des armements ne peuvent ignorer les nouvelles technologies qui, par leur nature même, nous éloigneraient de la stabilité que nous cherchons à établir.

Je songe donc à une entente pour interdire l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude. De telles armes menacent, en effet, l'ensemble des moyens de communication dont nous dépendons pour gérer les crises. Que -- pendant un conflit -- l'une ou l'autre des parties en présence soit privée de son réseau de commandement et de conduite des opérations, et elle se trouverait totalement démunie au moment même où le maintien de la stabilité dépendrait précisément de sa capacité de prévoir, de réagir et de ne pas céder à la panique pour riposter à l'aveuglette.

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Aucune des superpuissances n'a encore mis au point un système anti-satellites à haute altitude. Une interdiction de le faire est donc encore possible. Sans une entente de ce genre, on devra dépenser, des deux côtés, des sommes énormes qui pourraient être employées à des fins plus constructives. Sans une entente, on se lancera dans une surenchère qui rendrait plus probables encore les accidents et les erreurs de calcul. Qui plus est, un succès à ce chapitre contribuerait à relancer les négociations sur les systèmes anti-satellites fonctionnant à basse altitude.

Une autre menace à la stabilité serait que les armes stratégiques intercontinentales deviennent tellement mobiles qu'il soit pratiquement impossible de les repérer. Cela pourrait remettre en question la capacité des deux camps, ou de tout organisme international, à vérifier l'application des ententes de limitation des armements.

Le Canada continue pour sa part à consacrer ses énergies et ses ressources à l'étude des problèmes de vérification, dont dépendront la durabilité et la crédibilité des mesures de contrôle. Et il constate comme tout le monde que la possibilité d'un contrôle véritable des armements se trouverait considérablement accrue si l'on se préoccupait des problèmes de vérification au moment de la mise au point d'un nouveau système stratégique plutôt que d'attendre l'étape des négociations.

J'ai donc l'intention de soumettre, en temps opportun et aux autorités compétentes en matière de désarmement, des documents réclamant une entente internationale en vue 1) d'interdire l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude, 2) de limiter la mobilité excessive des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux et 3) d'exiger que tout nouveau système d'armements stratégiques soit entièrement vérifiable par les moyens techniques nationaux.

Il s'agit là de mesures importantes dont les détails sont souvent de nature technique. Mais, si nous parvenons à donner une impulsion politique à l'idée d'asseoir les cinq grands à une même table de négociation, si nous obtenons un nouvel engagement politique à l'égard du Traité sur la non-prolifération, si nous redonnons un élan aux négociations de Vienne sur la question de l'équilibre des forces classiques et du relèvement du seuil nucléaire en Europe, si enfin nous nous appliquons à restreindre les progrès qualitatifs dans le domaine de la technologie stratégique de façon à favoriser la vérification, alors nous aurons suscité une approche vraiment globale des problèmes de paix et de sécurité.

Comme je l'ai souligné à mes collègues européens, il est essentiel que ce programme commun, ce filet de sécurité dont dépend notre survie, soit soutenu par les leaders politiques au plus haut niveau; que nos entretiens à l'échelle nationale et internationale reçoivent une véritable relance politique et que nous travaillions à définir les intérêts toujours plus nombreux qui nous rendent solidaires, à commencer par notre condition humaine et notre avenir commun sur cette planète.

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Lors de ma tournée en Europe, j'ai été encouragé de voir à quel point mes objectifs rejoignent ceux des leaders que j'ai rencontrés. Et j'aimerais confirmer ce soir mon intention de me rendre à Tokyo samedi prochain pour y rencontrer le premier ministre Nakasone.

La participation du Japon à la déclaration de Williamsburg, dans laquelle les dirigeants des pays industrialisés convenaient, en mai dernier, d'utiliser toutes leurs ressources politiques pour réduire les dangers de guerre, revêt un caractère historique et constitue un reflet du monde où nous vivons. Ma visite au Japon veut témoigner de l'indivisibilité de la sécurité universelle à l'ère atomique.

Je peux vous dire que, outre les consultations déjà en cours avec les États-Unis, j'ai pris contact avec l'Union soviétique et la Chine, deux puissances nucléaires dont tant de choses dépendent.

C'est avec empressement que je prendrai part aux discussions sur la paix et la sécurité lors de la conférence des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth, à New Delhi, où je me rendrai en quittant le Japon. Je suis particulièrement impatient de m'entretenir avec le premier ministre Indira Gandhi sur la question de la non-prolifération et de connaître ses vues, en tant que présidente du Conseil des pays non alignés, sur les liens à établir entre désarmement et développement.

Je suis satisfait des progrès accomplis et heureux de l'accueil réservé à mes propositions. Je suis néanmoins conscient des critiques que suscite chez certains commentateurs la démarche étapiste que nous favorisons. Certains lui préféreraient l'élan passionné en faveur d'un projet utopique. D'autres sont paralysés par la complexité des enjeux. Je suis d'avis qu'il faut "faire" la paix progressivement, avec prudence et réalisme. Nous devons éviter de brusquer une confiance politique des plus fragiles, et construire avec précaution en tâchant de nous retrouver sur un terrain commun et solide.

Une action politique s'impose avec d'autant plus d'urgence que la multiplication des conflits et des confrontations risque de déborder notre aptitude à comprendre ce qui se passe et notre capacité d'y remédier.

Lorsqu'il inventa la dynamite, en 1867, Alfred Nobel croyait que la perspective effarante d'une application militaire de sa découverte forcerait les nations à vivre en paix. Aujourd'hui la puissance d'une bombe nucléaire est sans commune mesure avec la force des explosifs classiques, et devant pareille démesure, notre esprit vacille.

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