

1980-4 PT3

NAVY

RELEASE & EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

# DORMANT

FOR CROSS REFERENCES SEE INSIDE COVER

PARC # A.P. 635

**"B.F." — DO NOT HOLD — THIS FILE WHEN  
LAPSES IN ACTION MAY EXCEED 48 HOURS**





~~HKQ~~. NSS. 1950-4 VOL. 3


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VOLUME 4 FOLLOWS

NO FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE TO BE PLACED ON THIS FILE



*Ch J8PA*



CSG 1601.1 (JSC)

Referred to *Staff*

DEC 27 1951

JOINT SECURITY COMMITTEE

File No.

*1550-10*

*Staff 27-12*  
21 Dec 51.

Release of Canadian Military  
Information to the Press and Radio in the U.K.

1. Attached copy of Canadian Joint Staff  
London Policy Statement No. 1 - Release of Canadian  
Military Information to the Press and Radio in the  
U.K.
2. For your information and retention,  
please.

*T. Moore*

(T. Moore) Major  
Secretary  
Joint Security Committee.

TM/5934/ab

DAI  
DNI ✓  
DMI  
DSI (Mr. C.G. Jones)  
DM (Mr. R. Lavergne)  
Director Public Relations, Mr. Dumsdy

CJS (9A)  
CJS (17-2)

7 December 1951

CANADIAN JOINT STAFF LONDON POLICY STATEMENT NUMBER 1

RELEASE OF CANADIAN MILITARY INFORMATION

TO THE PRESS AND RADIO IN THE U.K.

GENERAL

1. It has been agreed that there will be one official source of Canadian information in the U.K. This will be the Information Office, Canada House, which will assume responsibility for answering requests for military information in the United Kingdom.
2. The Director of Public Relations of the Department of National Defence, Ottawa, is including the Information Office, Canada House, in any circulation of military information by the D.P.R. In addition, the D.P.R. is keeping the Information Office, Canada House, informed, insofar as is possible, of impending visits of Senior Officers of the Services and providing covering press despatches, when applicable. Any other information which the D.P.R. considers will be of use to the Information Office, Canada House, is being forwarded.
3. Requests for military information which cannot be answered by the Information Office, Canada House, from information which it possesses, are being referred directly to the D.P.R., N.D.H.Q., unless such information is of a local and detailed nature (e.g. time of arrival in the U.K. of the Minister or Senior Officers, etc) when the information may be obtained from the Canadian Joint Staff, London.

POLICY

4. In view of the above, all requests for military information for press and radio received by any member of the Canadian Joint Staff, London, will be referred to the Information Office at Canada House. No officer or N.C.O. of the Canadian Joint Staff will give away any information for use of the press or radio.

(S) (H.E.C. Price) Lt.Col.  
Secretary,  
Canadian Joint Staff, London



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE NO. NUKC: 1950-1

Department of National Defence

NAVAL SERVICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FROM: Naval Member, Canadian Joint Staff (London),  
66, Ennismore Gardens,  
LONDON, S.W.7.

DATE: 19th December, 1951.

TO: The Naval Secretary  
Naval Headquarters,  
OTTAWA, Canada.

Referred to Staff

DEC 27 1951

1550-10

CONDITIONS OF RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Submitted for the information of Naval Headquarters, attached is a copy of Admiralty letter G.09279/51 dated 22nd November, 1951.

2. Admiralty have been informed that the phrase "Condition of release of classified information apply" will be sufficient to ensure that the full conditions are understood and followed.

*Handwritten signature and date: 12/1/51*

*Handwritten signature: R*  
(O.C.S. Robertson)  
Captain, R.C.N

Enclosure

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O P Y

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ADMIRALTY

G.09279/51.

BATH

SOMERSET.

22nd November, 1951.

*Handwritten signature/initials*

Sir,

Conditions of release of classified information

I have to inform you that official instructions rule that classified documents supplied to you must bear the "Conditions of Release" stamp which is set out below and with which you are familiar.

Conditions of Release

1. This information is disclosed only for official use by the recipient Government and such of its contractors, under seal of secrecy, as may be engaged on a defence project. Disclosure to any other Government or release to the Press or in any other way would constitute a breach of these conditions.
2. The information should be safeguarded under rules designed to give the same standard of security as maintained by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.
2. The term "documents" covers letters in which information of this nature is conveyed, but in view of the amount of correspondence from this department involving classified information of United Kingdom origin, it is proposed to omit the full conditions in such letters and substitute the phrase "Conditions of release of classified information apply". The full stamp will, however, continue to be used on other documents.
3. I have to request you to confirm that this proposed action will be sufficient to ensure your full compliance with the condition of Release, and that these conditions will be fully understood.

I am, Sir,  
Your obedient Servant.

CHL OLIVER ?

for DIRECTOR OF NAVAL ORDNANCE.




~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

11 Dec 51

TO:  V.S.

FROM:  COMMODORE RAYNER

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Note and File                  | <input type="checkbox"/> Take Appropriate Action |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Note and Return                | <input type="checkbox"/> As Requested            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Please Speak                   | <input type="checkbox"/> For Information         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Please Answer                  | <input type="checkbox"/> For Your Comments       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> For Your Approval              | <input type="checkbox"/> For Signature           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply For My Signature |  |

COMMENTS:

Copy 12 of Cabinet Document  
D-318 (item 10 on CDC agenda  
for 12 December).

*P.A.  
m/1950-13*

C.A.F.A. 1327

2M-PADS OF 100-7-50 (3527)

H.Q. 224-21-A-1327

000446

1950-12

CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET DOC. 2-318

COPY NO. 12

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE:

Policy - Release of DND Information

1. Present policy governing the release of Department of National Defence information is contained in Cabinet Document No. D-120, dated 14 May, 1947.
2. While the present policy has been enforced with considerable success, recent events have indicated that the policy is, under present conditions, too restrictive. The Chiefs of Staff have therefore reviewed the present policy, revising it to allow a more comprehensive and realistic release of DND information.
3. The attached paper "Policy - Release of DND Information" has been approved by the Chiefs of Staff.
4. Approval is sought for the adoption of the policy enunciated in this paper.

Minister of National Defence.

11 December, 1951.



CONFIDENTIAL

POLICY - RELEASE OF DND INFORMATION

Principle of the Policy

1. As a general principle, the maximum amount of Defence information, short of that which would enable foreign powers to assess Canada's preparedness for war, should be released.
2. It can be assumed that any information which is officially released from a government source will be published in some form or broadcast over the radio. Therefore the rule to be followed is that only unclassified information should be released.

Media

3. The following are the media by which Defence information is officially released:

- a) Speeches and press conferences by Ministers and officials of the Government
- b) The publication of Defence statistics in Government publications, for example:
  - i) Public Accounts of the Government of Canada.
  - ii) Estimates for the Fiscal Year.
  - iii) Reports of House of Commons Committees.
  - iv) Canada Year Book.
  - v) Canada's Defence Programme (DND White Paper).
- c) Replies to questions asked by Members in the House of Commons and by Senators.
- d) Official Department of National Defence press releases.
- e) Articles written by Government Officials and Service personnel.

4. If detailed Defence statistics are disclosed in such publications as the Public Accounts of the Government of Canada, Estimates for the Fiscal Year, etc., there is no doubt that a statistical examination of a single year's texts would provide an enemy with a valuable indication of our preparedness for war.

Policy

5. In addition to information given in confidence to Canada by Allied Countries, disclosure of information is limited by certain international agreements, whereby Canada is formally bound to protect certain information of joint or foreign ownership. Agreements governing the disclosure of this form of information include:

- a) the Security Agreement by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.
- b) the United States-Canada Security Agreement.
- c) the UK-US-Canada Tripartite Agreement.

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

6. These agreements prohibit the disclosure of information by any of the signatories concerned without the prior consent of the originator(s).

7. Purely Canadian information may be disclosed when such disclosure does not:

- a) Endanger national security.
- b) Provide information which would enable an enemy to assess Canada's preparedness for war.

8. Types of information which should not be disclosed, and information which may be released, without prior approval, are contained in Appendix "A". This list is not exhaustive but provides a guide for those concerned with the release of Defence information.

9. Classification of Defence Statistics

- a) When preparing statistical reports and estimates, the originator will classify the completed reports in relation to their contents. Where it is practicable, reports may be divided into classified and unclassified parts.
- b) The co-ordinator of these reports will approve the classifications. The appropriate Security Authorities will give security advice when requested.
- c) Such reports will bear the same security classification as the most highly classified part therein and will continue to be distributed on a very limited basis.

10. Replies to Questions in the House of in Committee

- a) Defence agencies, when preparing replies to specific questions asked by Members of the House of Commons or by Senators, will classify the information contained in the reply according to its contents.
- b) Classified information will not be disclosed unless specifically authorized.

3 Dec 51

Types of Information Which Should NOT Be Disclosed  
Unless Officially and Specifically Released

Types of Information Which May Be Released  
Without Prior Approval

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Principal Reasons Information Should NOT Be Released</u>	<u>Subject</u>
1.	<u>General</u> a) Details of operational organizations, their establishments and actual strengths, such as RCN ships, RCAF fighter groups and Army operational units. b) Future strategical and operational plans and policies including mobilization plans.	Release of information of this nature, much of which is classified by the Services as Top Secret enables the enemy to: a) produce an accurate order of battle. b) accurately forecast our intentions. It also precludes any possibility of surprise.	<u>General</u> a) General information on overall strengths and establishments, regular and reserve, for each Service. b) Publication of names of units, names of Commanding Officers and other personnel. c) Permanent location of units.
2.	<u>Operational Dispositions</u> a) Detailed information regarding operational dispositions, particularly fixed defences of all kinds, such as early warning radar networks, anti-aircraft and coastal defences b) Specific information as to operational readiness and capabilities.	a) Release of this type of information enables the enemy to accurately locate operational units without any element of doubt. It also gives the enemy an indication of the type of equipment with which the unit is supplied. b) Information released on operational readiness and capabilities enables the enemy to accurately assess our overall state of preparedness and potentiality.	<u>Locations - Training</u> a) Peacetime locations of Headquarters, units, schools of instruction, etc. b) General information on training, exercises and manoeuvres.



Serial                      Subject                      Principal Reasons Information Should  
NOT Be Released

Subject

3.

Movement

Operational moves, land, sea or air into, within, or out of an area of operations.

Disclosure of information of this nature prejudices the safety of personnel. It also gives the enemy an opportunity to prepare plans accordingly.

4.

Equipment

Information regarding:

- a) Total inventory of operational equipment in use or storage.
- b) New equipment under development.
- c) User trials of new operational equipment.
- d) Details of performance of operational equipment.

Release of information of this nature gives the enemy an indication of our mobilization potential, and future technical policy. While the enemy may know of the existence of certain equipment he may not fully understand its capability and operational deployment.

5.

Research and Development

Scientific research and development pertaining to defence.

Development of new weapons and equipment grant our forces distinct advantages only as long as they remain undisclosed. Once this information is released the enemy is able to develop counter-measures.

Movement

Details of troop movements, cruises, transport flights, search and rescue operations, etc. in non operational areas.

Equipment

General information on equipment in use by the Armed Forces, exclusive of classified equipment. As an example information that Airforce fighter squadrons are to be equipped with F86 and CF100 aircraft is releasable.

Types of Information Which Should NOT Be Disclosed  
Unless Officially and Specifically Released

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -  
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information  
Types of Information Which May Be Released  
Without Prior Approval

<u>Serial</u>	<u>S u b j e c t</u>	<u>Principal Reasons Information Should</u> <u>NOT Be Released</u>
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<u>S u b j e c t</u>
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6.

Defence Production

- a) Production schedules, future planning on production schedules or rates of delivery of operational equipment.
- b) Information on sources of supply, quantities and qualities of fissionable materials. supplies.
- c) Information on performance of operational equipment under production.
- d) Cost of individual items of operational equipment.

This type of information gives a clear indication of trends in Service policy. It also reveals the build up and potential build up of the Armed Forces.

Defence Production

- a) A statement that a contract has been let
- b) Type of items in general terms (i.e., aircraft of standard types, tanks, trucks, ammunition, clothing, etc) provided that the designation of the item or equipment itself is not classified.
- c) A statement of the quantities and values of unclassified negotiated or formally advertised contract awards.

Date Extracted 18/12/57..

*Confidential*  
*Top Secret*  
.....  
Classification

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~  
~~GABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE~~

.....  
File Reference

VCNS
CNTS
A/CNS (Plans)
A/CNS (Air)
CNP
DNPO
DNI
DWT
DN. COM
DCNP
A/CNTS (Works)
A/CNTS (Ships)
A/CNTS (Air)
DGSFA
DNPA
DGNO
DN. Inf.

The following extract from the minutes of the ...*5.1.4*..... meeting of the above committee held ..*11 Dec. 51*..... is referred for information and necessary action.

*[Signature]*  
NAVAL SECRETARY.

*Confidential m.c.c.*

I. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(TOP SECRET)

1. The Representative of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, with reference to the minutes of the 513th meeting of the Chiefs of Staff held on 28 November, 1951, suggested that for clarity the last sentence of paragraph 39 be amended to read "A Ministerial statement on this matter in Parliament would be helpful".

2. The Committee approved the minutes of the 513th meeting held on 28 November, 1951 subject to the amendment suggested by the Representative of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.



7th December 1951

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
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**SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE**  
-----

**Policy - Release of Department of  
National Defence Information**

With reference to your memorandum CSC 1602-1 of  
6th December, 1951, the paper entitled "Policy - Release  
of DND Information" forwarded under cover of your CSC 1602-1  
of 4th December, is concurred in.

(E.R. Mainguy)  
Vice-Admiral  
CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF

*to D.N.!*  
*8/12.*

Despatched by  
N. Sec.

*m.e.c.*  
Date *7/12/51*  
Time



NS 1950-13

CONFIDENTIAL  
-----

SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
-----



# Department of National Defence

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

NO. CSC 1602-1 (A/SEC

CONFIDENTIAL

6 December, 1951.

ADDRESS REPLY TO.  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

C.A.S.  
C.G.S.  
C.N.S.  
C.D.R.B.

1950-13

### Policy - Release of Department of National Defence Information

1. I refer to my letter of even file, subject above, dated 4 December, 1951 to which was attached a memorandum from the Joint Security Committee together with a proposed revision of Cabinet Document D-120 - Policy-Publication of Service Information. I have been directed to obtain the Chiefs' of Staff concurrence in, or comments on, this paper by the morning of Saturday, 8 December, 1951 to enable the Minister to present departmental recommendations regarding the release of Department of National Defence information to Cabinet at the beginning of next week.

(H.S. Rayner)  
Commodore, RCN,  
Secretary.

GJJE/3729/sjp

### File Reference

VCNS

**CNTS**

A/CNS (Plans)

A/CNS (Air)

CNP

**DNPO**

**DNI**

DWT

**DN.COM**

DCNP

A/CNTS (Works)

A/CNTS (Ships)

A/CNTS (Air)

**DGSFA**

**DNPA**

**DGNO**

DN. Inf.

The following extract from the minutes of the ...<sup>5-13-54</sup>... meeting of the above committee held ...<sup>7-8-54</sup>... is referred for information and necessary action.

NAVAL SECRETARY.

*Confidential*  
~~(TOP SECRET)~~ J1.

## VI. RELEASE OF DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE INFORMATION

36. The Committee had for consideration a paper tabled by the Deputy Minister entitled "Release of Department of National Defence Information - Parliamentary Committee on Defence" that had been prepared by the Joint Security Committee at the request of the Deputy Minister. This paper constituted the Joint Security Committee recommendations for the release of Department of National Defence information to the Parliamentary Committee.

37. The Deputy Minister said that the Parliamentary Committee on Defence would most likely commence its meetings early next week and that such meetings would be open to the public. The question of the security classification of the information provided to the Parliamentary Committee would undoubtedly arise and the paper under consideration had been prepared for guidance in the release of such information. The Joint Security Committee had listed military subjects on which detailed information should not be provided and had stated valid causes for not revealing or publishing this data as it would be prejudicial to the national interest. It was possible, however, that the Joint Security Committee's list of subjects on which information should not be provided was too restrictive and might be criticized by the Parliamentary Committee on the grounds that much of the information was obtainable from non-military sources. Perhaps the only subjects that should be considered secret by the Department of National Defence were matters relating to the air defence system, certain aspects of the fighting in Korea, new operational equipment or equipment under development, information obtained from NATO and such other information that obviously should be classified but which did not fall within the foregoing categories.

38. The Chief of the Naval Staff was of the opinion that we should not release classified information relating to war plans, weapons - new or under development, movements to and from an operational theatre and on matters which would contravene international agreements.

39. The Representative of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs suggested that the government should in the interests of national security clearly define for the Parliamentary Committee the order of questions which should not be asked. ~~Perhaps the Prime Minister might make a statement on this matter to Parliament.~~ <sup>IN</sup> ~~WOULD BE HELPFUL~~ *A MINISTER*

40. The Chairman, Defence Research Board agreed that a government policy statement along these lines would be desirable and suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should perhaps make recommendations as to the type of information that might be released.

41. The Acting Chairman said that any guide relating to the release of classified information should be practical and realistic yet based on Cabinet policy governing this subject. As it obviously was not feasible to lay down a detailed guide which would cover every aspect of the problem the provision of much of the data in reply to the inquiries made by the Parliamentary Committee undoubtedly would have to be considered on its own merits. The proposals of the Joint Security Committee did, however, appear somewhat restrictive and not entirely realistic in the light of the peacetime practice of releasing military information in quite substantial detail. Perhaps a more practical paper could be prepared by the Joint Security Committee.

42. The Chairman, Joint Security Committee pointed out that the Joint Security Committee paper under consideration was based on the decision taken on 28 May, 1947 by the Cabinet Defence Committee concerning the release of Department of National Defence information. This decision had been taken as a result of Chiefs' of Staff recommendations on the matter. Any change to the present Joint Security Committee paper along the lines suggested by the Chief of the Naval Staff or the Deputy Minister should stem from a new governmental policy.

43. The Committee, after considerable further discussion, agreed that the Joint Security Committee should examine in the light of the foregoing discussion the present Cabinet Defence Committee directive concerning the release of classified military information with a view to suggesting a revision of this policy.

*Confidential*  
Classification

URGENT - BY HAND

1602-1 of 4/12  
Reference

CHIEFS OF STAFF CTE

~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~

~~CABINET DEFENCE CTE~~

Corred :

1951

le No. 1950-13

Staff C.N.S.  
4-12-51

VCNS

(2)

ACNS

DWT

DNA

D.N.Com

DSS

DNPO

DNI

(1)

CNP

DCNP

DNR

CNTS

A/CNTS (W. & S)

A/CNTS (Ships)

A/CNTS (Air)

DGFA

DGNO

SA/CNS

Request your comments hereon for C.N.S. please,  
and return to Room 3316 by AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

*[Signature]*  
NAVAL SECRETARY

Date 4 Dec 51.....

Recommend approval

2. The original submission of this paper was discussed at the 513th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (Minutes flagged) and the Joint Security Committee was instructed to do a re-write to conform with the decisions of that meeting.

3. This paper is a suggested guide for the Parliamentary Committee on Defence.

6/12/51.

*[Signature]*  
(J.C. Pratt),  
Commander RCN,  
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.



FILE NO. CSC 1602-1 (A/SEC)

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS,  
OTTAWA

DATE: 4 Dec 51

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

C.A.S.

✓ C.N.S.

C.G.S.

C.D.R.B.

SUBJECT: Policy - Release of DND Information

1. The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

Memorandum d/3 Dec 51 from Secretary, Joint Security Committee.

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the .....  
meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to be held .....



(H.S. Rayner)  
Commodore, RCN,  
Secretary.

cc: Deputy Minister  
Secretary to the Cabinet  
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs



CANADA

# Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT SECURITY COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 1602.1 V.2 (JSC)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESS REPLY TO:  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

3 Dec 51

Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee

## Policy - Release of DND Information

1. In accordance with the direction of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as contained in the minutes of the 513 meeting, item VI, dated 28 Nov 51, the Joint Security Committee submits the attached proposed revision of Cabinet Document No. D-120 - Policy - Publication of Service Information, dated 14 May 47.

  
(T. Moore) Major

Secretary  
Joint Security Committee

TM/5934/ab

CONFIDENTIAL

## POLICY - RELEASE OF DND INFORMATION

### Principle of the Policy

1. As a general principle, the maximum amount of Defence information, short of that which would enable foreign powers to assess Canada's preparedness for war, should be released.
2. It can be assumed that any information which is officially released from a government source will be published in some form or broadcast over the radio. Therefore the rule to be followed is that only unclassified information should be released.

### Media

3. The following are the media by which Defence information is officially released:
  - a) The publication of Defence statistics in Government publications, for example:
    - i) Public Accounts of the Government of Canada.
    - ii) Estimates for the Fiscal Year.
    - iii) Reports of House of Commons Committees.
    - iv) Canada Year Book.
    - v) Canada's Defence Programme (DND White Paper).
  - b) Replies to questions asked by Members in the House of Commons and by Senators.
  - c) Official Department of National Defence press releases.
  - d) Speeches and press conferences by Government and Service Officials.
  - e) Articles written by Government Officials and Service personnel.
4. If detailed Defence statistics are disclosed in such publications as the Public Accounts of the Government of Canada, Estimates for the Fiscal Year, etc., there is no doubt that a statistical examination of a single year's texts would provide an enemy with a valuable indication of our preparedness for war.

### Policy

5. In addition to information given in confidence to Canadian Representatives by foreign powers, disclosure of information is limited to a great extent by international agreements, whereby Canada is bound to protect certain information of joint or foreign ownership. Agreements governing the disclosure of this form of information are:
  - a) the Security Agreement by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.
  - b) the United States-Canada Security Agreement.
  - c) the UK-US-Canada Tripartite Agreement.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. These agreements prohibit the disclosure of information by any of the signatories concerned without the prior consent of the originator(s).

7. Purely Canadian information may be disclosed when such disclosure does not:

- a) Endanger national security.
- b) Provide information which would enable an enemy to assess Canada's preparedness for war.

8. Types of information which should not be disclosed, and information which may be released, without prior approval, are contained in Appendix "A". This list is not exhaustive but provides a guide for those concerned with the release of Defence information.

9. Classification of Defence Statistics

- a) When preparing statistical reports and estimates, the originator will classify the completed reports in relation to their contents. Where it is practicable, reports may be divided into classified and unclassified parts.
- b) The co-ordinator of these reports will approve the classifications. The appropriate Security Authorities will give security advice when requested.
- c) Such reports will bear the same security classification as the most highly classified part therein and will continue to be distributed on a very limited basis.

10. Replies to Questions in the House of in Committee

- a) Defence agencies, when preparing replies to specific questions asked by Members of the House of Commons or by Senators, will classify the information contained in the reply according to its contents.
- b) Classified information will not be disclosed unless specifically authorized.

3 Dec 51



Types of Information Which Should NOT Be Disclosed  
Unless Officially and Specifically Released

Types of Information Which May Be Released  
Without Prior Approval

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Principal Reasons Information Should NOT Be Released</u>	<u>Subject</u>
1.	<u>General</u> a) Details of operational organizations, their establishments and actual strengths, such as RCN ships, RCAF fighter groups and Army operational units. b) Future strategical and operational plans and policies including mobilization plans.	Release of information of this nature, much of which is classified by the Services as Top Secret enables the enemy to: a) produce an accurate order of battle. b) accurately forecast our intentions. It also precludes any possibility of surprise.	<u>General</u> a) General information on overall strengths and establishments, regular and reserve, for each Service. b) Publication of names of units, names of Commanding Officers and other personnel. c) Permanent location of units.
2.	<u>Operational Dispositions</u> a) Detailed information regarding operational dispositions, particularly fixed defences of all kinds, such as early warning radar networks, anti-aircraft and coastal defences b) Specific information as to operational readiness and capabilities.	a) Release of this type of information enables the enemy to accurately locate operational units without any element of doubt. It also gives the enemy an indication of the type of equipment with which the unit is supplied. b) Information released on operational readiness and capabilities enables the enemy to accurately assess our overall state of preparedness and potentiality.	<u>Locations - Training</u> a) Peacetime locations of Headquarters, units, schools of instruction, etc. b) General information on training, exercises and manoeuvres.

Types of Information Which Should NOT Be Disclosed  
Unless Officially and Specifically Released

Types of Information Which May Be Disclosed  
Without Prior Approval

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Principal Reasons Information Should NOT Be Released</u>
---------------	----------------	---

<u>Subject</u>
----------------

3.

Movement

Operational moves, land, sea or air into, within, or out of an area of operations.

Disclosure of information of this nature prejudices the safety of personnel. It also gives the enemy an opportunity to prepare plans accordingly.

4.

Equipment

Information regarding:

- a) Total inventory of operational equipment in use or storage.
- b) New equipment under development.
- c) User trials of new operational equipment.
- d) Details of performance of operational equipment.

Release of information of this nature gives the enemy an indication of our mobilization potential, and future technical policy. While the enemy may know of the existence of certain equipment he may not fully understand its capability and operational deployment.

5.

Research and Development

Scientific research and development pertaining to defence.

Development of new weapons and equipment grant our forces distinct advantages only as long as they remain undisclosed. Once this information is released the enemy is able to develop counter-measures.

Movement

Details of troop movements, cruises, transport flights, search and rescue operations, etc. in non operational areas.

Equipment

General information on equipment in use by the Armed Forces, exclusive of classified equipment. As an example information that Airforce fighter squadrons are to be equipped with F86 and CF100 aircraft is releasable.

Types of Information Which Should NOT Be Disclosed  
Unless Officially and Specifically Released

Serial

S u b j e c t

Principal Reasons Information Should  
NOT Be Released

S u b j e c t

6.

Defence Production

- a) Production schedules, future planning on production schedules or rates of delivery of operational equipment.
- b) Information on sources of supply, quantities and qualities of strategic or critical supplies.
- c) Information on performance of operational equipment under production.
- d) Cost of individual items of operational equipment.

This type of information gives a clear indication of trends in Service policy. It also reveals the build up and potential build up of the Armed Forces.

Defence Production

- a) A statement that a contract has been let.
- b) Type of items in general terms (i.e., aircraft of standard types, tanks, trucks, ammunition, clothing, etc) provided that the designation of the item or equipment itself is not classified.
- c) A statement of the quantities and values of unclassified negotiated or formally advertised contract awards.


Let To PA

CSC 1602.1 (JSC)

JOINT SECURITY COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

7 Dec 51



Policy - Release of DND Information

1. Attached copy of the relevant extract from the minutes of the 513th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, held 28 Nov 51, in regard to the release of DND information.

JF 3/7/52

2. Action resulting from the decision of the Chiefs of Staff has been taken and a revised Cabinet Document 120 has been forwarded for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff. Copies of this paper have been forwarded to all members of the Joint Security Committee. It is understood that the paper is now being cleared secretarially by the Secretary Chiefs of Staff.

*of Moore*  
(T. Moore) Major  
Secretary  
Joint Security Committee

TM/5934/ab

DAI  
DNI  
DMI  
DSI (Mr. C.G. Jones)  
DM (Mr. R. Lavergne)

Referred to... *Staff*  
DEC 10 1951  
File No... *1950-13*  
Checked to... *Staff 2/12*

000467

Extract - 513 Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff

held 28 Nov 51

**Confidential**

- 7 -

VI. RELEASE OF DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE INFORMATION

**(TOP SECRET)**

36. The Committee had for consideration a paper tabled by the Deputy Minister entitled "Release of Department of National Defence Information - Parliamentary Committee on Defence" that had been prepared by the Joint Security Committee at the request of the Deputy Minister. This paper constituted the Joint Security Committee recommendations for the release of Department of National Defence information to the Parliamentary Committee.

37. The Deputy Minister said that the Parliamentary Committee on Defence would most likely commence its meetings early next week and that such meetings would be open to the public. The question of the security classification of the information provided to the Parliamentary Committee would undoubtedly arise and the paper under consideration had been prepared for guidance in the release of such information. The Joint Security Committee had listed military subjects on which detailed information should not be provided and had stated valid causes for not revealing or publishing this data as it would be prejudicial to the national interest. It was possible, however, that the Joint Security Committee's list of subjects on which information should not be provided was too restrictive and might be criticized by the Parliamentary Committee on the grounds that much of the information was obtainable from non-military sources. Perhaps the only subjects that should be considered secret by the Department of National Defence were matters relating to the air defence system, certain aspects of the fighting in Korea, new operational equipment or equipment under development, information obtained from NATO and such other information that obviously should be classified but which did not fall within the foregoing categories.

38. The Chief of the Naval Staff was of the opinion that we should not release classified information relating to war plans, weapons - new or under development, movements to and from an operational theatre and on matters which would contravene international agreements.

39. The Representative of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs suggested that the government should in the interests of national security clearly define for the Parliamentary Committee the order of questions which should not be asked. Perhaps the Prime Minister might make a statement on this matter to Parliament.

40. The Chairman, Defence Research Board agreed that a government policy statement along these lines would be desirable and suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should perhaps make recommendations as to the type of information that might be released.

41. The Acting Chairman said that any guide relating to the release of classified information should be practical and realistic yet based on Cabinet policy governing this subject. As it obviously was not feasible to lay down a detailed guide which would cover every aspect of the problem the provision of much of the data in reply to the inquiries made by the Parliamentary Committee undoubtedly would have to be considered on its own merits. The proposals of the Joint Security Committee did, however, appear somewhat restrictive and not entirely realistic in the light of the peacetime practice of releasing military information in quite substantial detail. Perhaps a more practical paper could be prepared by the Joint Security Committee.

42. The Chairman, Joint Security Committee pointed out that the Joint Security Committee paper under consideration was based on the decision taken on 28 May, 1947 by the Cabinet Defence Committee concerning the release of Department of National Defence information. This decision had been taken as a result of Chiefs' of Staff recommendations on the matter. Any changes to the present Joint Security Committee paper along the lines suggested by the Chief of the Naval Staff or the Deputy Minister should stem from a new governmental policy.

**(TOP SECRET)**

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**Confidential**

- 8 -

43. The Committee, after considerable further discussion, agreed that the Joint Security Committee should examine in the light of the foregoing discussion the present Cabinet Defence Committee directive concerning the release of classified military information with a view to suggesting a revision of this policy.

000469



Department of National Defence  
Naval Service

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. ....

SECRET.

5th December, 1951.

NUKS: 1480-1480-1480

DEC 11 1951

File No. 1550-10

Cord to Staff 20-11

FROM: The Naval Member Canadian Joint Staff (London),  
66, Ennismore Gardens,  
London, S.W.7.

TO : The Naval Secretary,  
Naval Headquarters,  
Ottawa, Canada.

CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION.

Submitted for the information of Naval Headquarters  
attached herewith is a statement received from Admiralty  
of Admiralty policy with regard to the release of classified  
military information of United Kingdom origin to Commonwealth  
and N.A.T.O. countries.

(O.C.S. Robertson)  
Captain R.C.N.

SECRET

POLICY FOR RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION  
OF U.K. ORIGIN

(a) OLD COMMONWEALTH NATIONS

The Old Commonwealth Nations concerned with this policy comprise Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa.

2. The Admiralty policy with regard to the release of classified information of U.K. origin to Old Commonwealth nations is:-

"It is accepted that the "Need to Know" is established for all Old Commonwealth Nations in respect of all information concerning all ships and aircraft and their equipment, of types existing, or building, or being considered for inclusion, or being modernised in or for or by their Navies and similarly for all shore installations and their equipment."

(b) N.A.T.O. NATIONS

The nations covered by this policy are Belgium; Denmark; France; Iceland; Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Norway and Portugal.

2. The Admiralty policy with regard to the release of items of classified information of U.K. origin to these nations is as follows:-

(a) it is accepted that the "Need to Know" is established for all N.A.T.O. nations in respect of all light craft used as Trade Protection Escorts, Minesweepers, Amphibious Warfare ships and craft, Coastal Forces craft and Seaward Defence craft. Also of any item of equipment of purely U.K. origin which may be fitted in these ships, or in existing ships of their Navies, which is classified SECRET or below, the prototype of which has been accepted for production;

(b) similarly, it is accepted that the "Need to Know" is established for N.A.T.O. nations in respect of Naval aircraft and equipment of purely U.K. origin which could be operated from, or fitted to, their aircraft carriers and which is classified SECRET or below, the prototype of which has been accepted for production;

(c) information concerned with Cryptography, Radio Countermeasures and Mine Assemblies is absolutely excluded from this policy;

(d) it is Admiralty policy to release any information given in (a) and (b) above to these nations, but, if the consequences of the details of any item reaching an unfriendly nation should be considered to outweigh its usefulness to ourselves, or to our potential Allies, it is the duty of the Division sponsoring it to ensure its inclusion in the list maintained by Director of Tactical and Staff Duties Division of items to be withheld. If any patent rights are involved, the Sponsoring Authority is to seek the necessary approval before making the release;

(e) drawings and specifications for ships building or projected may be released to N.A.T.O. nations who show willingness to build, provided the drawings do not show details of any equipment excluded by sub paragraphs (c) and (d) above. In the event of such drawings showing space, tonnage or

SECRET

/strengthening

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2 copies  
on one sheet.

SECRET

- 2 -

strengthening in excess of requirements of equipment shown (i.e., for equipment which is not yet releasable), it will be necessary to inform the recipients that this space or tonnage is required for equipment which it is hoped to fit at a later date but which is not yet developed.

(c) NEW COMMONWEALTH NATIONS

The New Commonwealth Nations concerned with this policy are India, Pakistan and Ceylon.

2. The Admiralty policy with regard to the release of classified information of U.K. origin to these nations is as follows:-

- (a) it is accepted that the "Need to Know" is established for all New Commonwealth nations in respect of all light craft used as Trade Protection Escorts, Minesweepers, Amphibious Warfare ships and craft, Coastal Forces craft and Seaward Defence craft. Also of any item of equipment of purely U.K. origin which may be fitted in these ships, or in existing ships of their Navies, which is classified SECRET or below, the prototype of which has been accepted for production;
- (b) similarly, it is accepted that if these nations decide to have Naval aviation the "Need to Know" is established for them in respect of Naval aircraft and equipment of purely U.K. origin which could be operated from or fitted to their aircraft carriers and which is classified SECRET or below, the prototype of which has been accepted for production;
- (c) information concerned with Cryptography, Radio Countermeasures and Mine Assemblies is absolutely excluded from this policy;
- (d) it is Admiralty policy to release any such information given in (a) and (b) above to these nations, but, if the consequences of the details of any item reaching an unfriendly nation should be considered to outweigh its usefulness to ourselves or our potential Allies, it is the duty of the Division sponsoring it to ensure its inclusion in the list maintained by D.T.S.D. of items to be withheld. If any patent rights are involved the Sponsoring Authority is to seek the necessary approval before making the release;
- (e) drawings and specifications for ships building or projected may be released to a New Commonwealth nation who shows willingness to build provided the drawings etc. do not show details of any equipment excluded by sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) above. In the event of such drawings showing space, tonnage or strengthening in excess of requirements of equipment shown, (i.e. for equipment which is not yet releasable), it will be necessary to inform the recipients that this space or tonnage is required for equipment which it is hoped to fit at a later date but which is not yet developed.

3. In the case of books the Sponsoring Division or Department should normally include New Commonwealth nations in the distribution lists for

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new C.B.'s or S.P.'s with the following exceptions:-

- (a) books containing information of combined U.K./U.S. origin and/or U.S. origin;
- (b) books containing technical information regarding material and equipment not used in the Navy of the New Commonwealth nation concerned;
- (c) books containing TOP SECRET or SECRET information regarding strategical and tactical doctrines;
- (d) books containing Research and Development information;
- (e) those S.P.'s which are Cyphers or related books, for which special arrangements already exist.

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
DEPARTMENT OF  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CANADA

SECRET

REPLY TO BE ADDRESSED TO:  
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

OTTAWA,  
November 21, 1951

File No. 50038-40



Director of Military Intelligence  
—> Director of Naval Intelligence  
Director of Air Intelligence  
Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau  
Director of Scientific Intelligence  
R.C.M.P. - Attention: Superintendent McClellan.

NOV 23 1951  
File No. 1550-10  
Chg to: [Signature]

The attached letter and document set out the most recent United Kingdom policy statement on the disclosure of military information. Some changes in the United Kingdom paper from the previous paper which we received in January 1951 are noted below.

Paragraph 4 of the paper sets out the considerations for determining release of information. Sub-paragraph (i) (b) is new and sub-paragraph (ii) contains more detail than the previous text.

The last seven lines of paragraph 5 are new.

Yugoslavia, which formerly was in the same category as Finland, has been taken off the list of satellites in paragraph 7.

There have been various changes in the procedure described in Annex I. Annex II is unchanged from the previous document. Annex III has a new provision in the terms of reference for the Military Information Policy Committee - that it is to report to the Minister of Defence. There are also some minor drafting changes.

[Signature]  
G. de T. Glazebrook

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O  
P  
Y

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER  
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

Earnscliffe, Ottawa

1085/120

S E C R E T

7th November, 1951

Dear Mr. Glazebrook,

Classified Military Information

In my letter of 26th January on this subject I enclosed a report prepared by the Exchange of Military Information Policy Committee in the United Kingdom. This report set out the policy introduced in the United Kingdom in 1950 in the light of important developments affecting military information such as the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

We have now received from London, and I have been asked to send you, a further document entitled "Statement of Policy on Disclosure of Military Information to Other Countries". This document replaces the one enclosed with my letter of the 26th January, and we should be grateful if the earlier paper could now be destroyed by fire.

Copies of the new document are also being sent to the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa for their information, with an explanation that the new paper takes account both of certain alterations in procedure and of the clarification of the position over disclosures between Commonwealth countries, on which subject Mr. Thomson wrote to you on 20th June of this year.

I should be very glad if you could let me have confirmation as soon as possible that the earlier document has been destroyed.

Yours sincerely,

Sgd: John Chadwick

(St. J. Chadwick)

G. de T. Glazebrook, Esq.,  
Department of External Affairs, OTTAWA.

000475

S E C R E T

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER  
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
EARNSCLIFFE,  
OTTAWA.

1085/120

7th November, 1951.

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Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) J. Chadwick

G de T. Glazebrook, Esq.,  
Department of External Affairs,  
O t t a w a.



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STATEMENT OF POLICY ON DISCLOSURE OF MILITARY  
INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

1. This statement, which has been revised from the previous one on this subject, covers in outline the policy and procedure adopted in the U.K. for disclosing information to other countries.

DEFINITION OF MILITARY INFORMATION

2. "Military information" is defined as information which is the property or primary concern of the Service Ministries, the Civil Defence Department of the Home Office, and the Ministry of Supply, or is of defence interest. Its disclosure may take the form of the release of documents, the supply of equipment, attendance at courses or lectures or visits to establishments. It covers:-

- (a) Information concerning the armed forces, their organisation, strategic and tactical operations, equipment, strengths, locations, movements, morale and efficiency; policy and plans for the employment of the armed forces, strategy and tactics, techniques and training methods for their employment in peace and war; information concerning the security and defences (including civil defence) of the United Kingdom and Colonies; and any publications or documents dealing with the foregoing.
- (b) Scientific information, when this has resulted from fundamental research and development carried out under Government auspices or which has been allotted a security classification.
- (c) Technical information about equipment, materials, manufacturing processes and operational techniques.
- (d) Intelligence, that is to say knowledge of foreign countries possessed by the United Kingdom that is required for defence purposes or which might be of value in time of war. This covers information in all the fields specified in (a), (b) and (c) above; also information on economic conditions, industrial structure and production capacity; communications, harbours and any other topographical information of defence value.

POLICY FOR DISCLOSURE

3. (i) to the United States

The following principles apply to the release of information to the United States:

- (a) United States personnel are treated as our own over the disclosure of military information.
- (b) Requests for information from the U.S. authorities are granted whenever possible; an exception should be made only if the collecting of the information would be excessively laborious, or if there was some other special reason.

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- (c) The necessity of keeping the U.S. authorities supplied with any military information that is likely to be of interest to them is continually borne in mind.

(ii) to other Countries

4. The policy towards other countries is that each proposed release of information is considered on its merits, bearing in mind:-

- (i) the "need to know" i.e. the advantage of disclosure, which depends on:-

- (a) the recipient country's strategic role and ability or potential ability to contribute to the common defence in the field of man-power, production, or research and development; and
- (b) the military or technical value of the information to the recipient country;

and (ii) the security risk of disclosure, which depends on:-

- (a) the chance of information in the hands of the recipient country being compromised; and
- (b) the military or technical value of the information to a potential enemy.

It is the responsibility of Ministries to strike a balance between (i) and (ii) on the best information they can obtain. Whether they are then free to release the information without further authority is discussed in the section on "Control of Disclosure" (paragraphs 9-26).

5. The Commonwealth. Our special relationship with the other countries of the Commonwealth means that we interpret their "need to know" widely, taking into account:-

- (a) the importance of keeping the Commonwealth informed of current developments so that all members can make the maximum contribution to the common defence;
- (b) the importance of our being able to make available to the other Commonwealth nations the most-up-to-date equipment issued to our own armed forces.

Restrictions on the passing of information within the Commonwealth are kept to the minimum, except for those required by our security agreement with the U.S.A. References in this statement (e.g. paras. 24 and 28(b)) to the necessity for the specific prior consent of the country of origin before information is passed on to a third country should not be taken as applying without qualification to the interchange of information within the Commonwealth.

6. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Our special relationship with the other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - and our particular ties with the Western Union countries - require us also to interpret the "need to know" principle generously in their favour. The policy is to disclose information when it can be shown that the disclosure is essential for the achieving of the defence objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty.

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7. Russia and the Satellites. No classified information is given to the following nations except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc:-

The Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Roumania, (though Finland, not being a satellite or Communist country, may on occasion be treated differently).

8. Other Countries. There may from time to time be reasons for giving special treatment, either favourable or unfavourable, to other countries. Proposals of this sort, or for any other modification of the policy laid down above, are put before the Exchange of Military Information Policy Committee.

CONTROL OF DISCLOSURE

9. No control is exercised over information passed to the U.S. nor is any record kept centrally.

10. The Exchange of Military Information Sub-Committee<sup>ø</sup> has been set up to consider and record disclosures of information to countries other than the U.S. If a Ministry is not satisfied with the Sub-Committee's decision it may appeal to the Exchange of Military Information Policy Committee<sup>ø</sup>. The following paragraphs say when Ministries may make their own decisions and when, on the other hand, reference to the Sub-Committee is necessary before the information may be disclosed.

(1) Information of U.K. Origin

11. The Ministry of Defence, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Ministry of Supply, and Civil Defence Department of the Home Office may authorize the release of information, in accordance with the policy laid down above within certain determined security limits. Any other Ministry wishing to release classified military information should normally consult one of the Ministries in the above list.

12. Any of these Ministries may also, at its own discretion, delegate the power to take decisions to Commanders-in-Chief, Heads of Service Missions and Service Liaison Staffs, and Service Attaches, within the permitted limits. (See also para.25).

13. Ministries should keep detailed records of the documentary information they release under these rules except that Restricted information released to the Commonwealth and N.A.T.O. countries need not be recorded. For this purpose the release of documentary information is defined as the release of information in the form of maps, specifications, drawings or photographs, or any written communication containing a significant disclosure of new classified information, e.g. books, pamphlets, reports, committee papers and proceedings, official or demi-official letters, memoranda or telegrams.

14. Decisions by Ministries as described in paragraph 11 normally require the appropriate authority at Headquarters to approve the release of each item of information; but there are two ways in which this rule may be modified.

ø Terms of Reference of the E.M.I. Policy Committee and E.M.I. Sub-Committee will be found in Annex III.

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(a) For the purpose of training personnel from other nations, the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry may authorise Commanding Officers to disclose classified information within the permitted limits provided that the information is a necessary part of an approved syllabus of instruction.

(b) The Joint Intelligence Bureau may (as part of the Ministry of Defence) delegate to their representatives abroad the power to make decisions within the permitted limits.

15. Any Ministry wishing to disclose information outside the permitted limits must submit a case to the E.M.I. Sub-Committee first.

16. The detailed procedure for submitting and reporting cases to the E.M.I. Sub-Committee is given in Annex I. Questions on the procedure are put to the Sub-Committee who will refer them if necessary to the E.M.I. Policy Committee.

(ii) Information of U.S. or Combined U.S./U.K. Origin

17. All possible steps must be taken to maintain the security classification of military information received from the U.S. or developed on a combined basis with them, and to safeguard the information accordingly.

18. It is a general principle that classified military information of U.S. or combined U.S./U.K. origin may be released to a third nation only with the specific consent of the U.S. This consent will be sought from the U.S. authorities by the E.M.I. Sub-Committee when a submission has been made to them on the appropriate form - see Annex I.

19. Certain exceptions to this rule have been agreed to by the U.S. and promulgated to the Ministries concerned. In these cases information may be released by a Ministry, provided that they are satisfied that it is in accordance with the policy in paragraphs 4 - 8 to do so, and that any documentary releases are recorded and where necessary reported to the Sub-Committee.

20. A special procedure has been agreed with the U.S. for declaring "projects" releasable, either to specific Commonwealth countries or to the Commonwealth as a whole. The word "project" is not defined in the agreement but is understood to include an agreed upon area of effort such as an undertaking to develop an item (a tank, an airplane, a weapon system, a radar system or a principal component thereof), a tactical or doctrinal procedure, a training programme or an intelligence study. Application for a project to be declared releasable is made through the E.M.I. Sub-Committee (see Annex I) who pass it on to the U.S. authorities. Information on a project that has been declared releasable to any country by agreement with the United States will be treated for the purpose of release to that country as if it were U.K. information. When a Ministry releases U.S. or combined U.S./U.K. information to a Commonwealth country under a releasable project, the origin of the information and the fact that the United States have approved its release are stated.

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21. For the purpose of this report combined U.S./U.K. military information is defined as follows:-

- (a) classified military information resulting or originating from projects developed on a combined basis, or
- (b) other classified military information which may from time to time be agreed to be combined on the grounds that:-
  - (i) the appropriate U.S./U.K. authorities have agreed to undertake separately different phases of a specific project, or
  - (ii) the appropriate U.S./U.K. authorities have agreed that one will assume sole project responsibility on behalf of both, or
  - (iii) the appropriate U.S./U.K. authorities have agreed at the outset of the project to adopt the best results of independent endeavours.

22. It has been agreed that information does not become combined U.S./U.K. information merely by virtue of its release by one country to the other.

23. Cases may arise where it is necessary to consult the United States and/or Canadian authorities before releasing classified military information to another country, even though this is not required by the principle laid down in paragraph 18 (e.g. under the U.S./U.K./Canadian Standardization Agreements). All such cases, unless there is a well-established channel for dealing with them (e.g. Communications-Electronics, see paragraph 26) are submitted through the E.M.I. Sub-Committee.

(iii) Information of Other Origin

24. It is a general principle that military information received from another country should retain its original security grading and should not normally be disclosed to a third country without the permission of the originating country.

(iv) Information of doubtful origin

25. When a Ministry is in doubt about the origin of information it proposes to release to another country, it applies to the E.M.I. Sub-Committee who will if necessary seek the views of the authorities in the originating country. When authority to release information of certain categories is delegated to Commanders-in-Chief etc. (see paragraph 12), the Ministry concerned will ensure that the Commander-in-Chief etc. is informed of the origin of all information which he may be likely to wish to disclose.

(v) Communications Information

26. Information on communications electronics is an exception to the rules of procedure in paragraphs 19 - 25. Proposals for the release of information in this field are handled by the British Joint Communications-Electronics Board and not by

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the E.M.I. Sub-Committee. The Board have their own arrangements for seeking U.S. approval where necessary.

INDUSTRIAL CONSIDERATIONS

27. It is important that patent rights should be safeguarded as far as possible when information is exchanged between Governments. There is a U.S./U.K. agreement covering patent rights; this and a general statement of policy governing the exchange of information with countries other than the United States will be found in Annex II.

OTHER CONDITIONS OF DISCLOSURE

28. Other countries that receive classified information from us are required to comply with the following security conditions:-

- (a) The information received should be safeguarded under rules designed to give the same standard of security as we maintain.
- (b) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient Government and for the use, under seal of secrecy, of approved contractors engaged on a relevant defence project, and should not be passed on to any other Government, released to the press or published in any other way.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

30th October, 1951.

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ANNEX 1

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORWARDING APPLICATIONS TO THE  
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION SUB-COMMITTEE

Applications are to be forwarded to the Secretary, E.M.I. Sub-Committee whenever necessary under the conditions given in the report.

In the case of the Ministry of Defence (J.I.B.), Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Ministry of Supply, and Home Office (Civil Defence Department) this will be done through the Ministry's representative on the E.M.I. Sub-Committee

2. The following forms will be used:-

E.M.I. Form "A" Application for decision as to origin (normally to be submitted simultaneously with B or C.)

E.M.I. Form "B" Application for a project to be declared releasable to specified Commonwealth countries.

E.M.I. Form "C" Application for permission to release classified information to another country (other than U.S.)

E.M.I. Form "D" Report by Ministry of classified information released to another country (other than U.S.)

3. Applications referring to documentary information that are submitted on Forms A, B or C should be accompanied by one copy of the document for scrutiny and return.

4. When the Sub-Committee has given a decision or considers that it is necessary to refer the matter to a U.S. or Combined authority for decision, the initiating Ministry will be sent a copy on which this fact is noted and will be sent another when the final decision has been given.

5. If the initiating Ministry wishes to appeal against a decision of the E.M.I. Sub-Committee, a copy of the form is to be returned to the Secretariat with a covering letter giving the grounds for appeal. The Secretariat will then place the matter before the E.M.I. Policy Committee.

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SECRET

ANNEX II

INDUSTRIAL CONSIDERATIONS

(See paragraph 27 of the main report)

General

1. The industrial considerations relevant to any piece of information to be exchanged will depend on the following factors:-

- (a) its origin and ownership;
- (b) its intended recipient;
- (c) its security grading (classification);
- (d) its patentability;
- (e) any agreement between countries concerning its exchange.

2. Information may be Government-owned or privately owned; it may be security classified or un-classified; and it may be wholly patentable (i.e. the whole of the information relates to an invention which can be protected by a patent specification) or wholly and unpatentable (e.g. performance data, test reports, mathematical analysis, manufacturing drawings, design data and "know-how") or it may be partly patentable and partly unpatentable.

3. The outstanding class of information of concern is classified patentable military information, and special attention requires to be paid to this class. At the present time no general agreement exists requiring the release by U.K. of information to any country other than the U.S.; in the following notes on the industrial considerations to be borne in mind in the exchange of information the U.S. has therefore been dealt with separately.

4. If information comprises manufacturing drawings and design data arising from work done under a development contract it should not be assumed without verification that this information is Government-owned, since the terms of the contract may provide that it remains the property of the contractor.

The United States

5. U.S./U.K. Agreement. The U.S. and the U.K. have agreed that each country should do everything legally possible to safeguard any patent rights in respect of such information passed to it by the other. The agreement is as follows:-

- "(a) Any rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in the recipient country in respect of the information communicated are not and will not be prejudiced by virtue of the introduction of the information into such country.

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(b) The information, so long as it remains classified, will not be used or disclosed by the recipient country in any manner likely to prejudice the rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in respect thereof, but if the recipient country desires to use or to disclose the information in any manner likely so to prejudice the rights of the originator, then the recipient country will immediately notify the country of origin of the full circumstances of such intended use or disclosure, and such use or disclosure shall not be affected until approval is given by the country of origin.

(c) Each country when so requested by the other and to the extent consistent with its laws and rules will use its best endeavours

(1) to have maintained in secrecy any patent application filed in the recipient country in respect of the information for so long as may be desired by the country of origin, and

(2) to supply reports of the manner in which the information embodied in a patent application has been used or disclosed."

6. Information received from U.S. All possible steps must be taken in the U.K. to prevent any disclosure of information of U.S. origin coming within the terms of the Agreement, whether Government-owned or privately-owned, as might prejudice patent rights therein. It is the responsibility of the U.S. originators and inventors to seek patent protection in the U.K. if they want it, it is the responsibility of the U.K. Departments to arrange that any patent application for which the U.S. authorities request secrecy shall be prohibited under Section 18 of the Patents Act, 1949. Furthermore, the information must remain classified until the U.S. authorities declassify it, and may be transmitted only to Government departments and by them to their contractors under the fullest safeguards of the Official Secrets Act with the application of Contract Conditions 21 and 59 of the standard conditions of Government contractors. The information must not be disclosed to other persons or countries without the express sanction of the originators.

7. Records. As will be seen from paragraph (c) (2) of the U.S./U.K. Agreement it is incumbent upon U.K. departments receiving classified patentable information from the U.S. to ensure that records are kept of such information and of any use of disclosure made of it.

8. Information given to the U.S. The U.S. authorities are understood to offer similar safeguards to classified military information of U.K. origin. Such information if privately-owned must not be transmitted without the owner's consent. If a U.S. Patent is sought the U.K. Department concerned will be responsible for seeking a secrecy order on the patent application.

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SECRET

9. As regards unclassified information, to which the above-mentioned agreement does not apply, the position is that the burden of seeking open patent protection lies on the inventor or owner, there being no obligation on the recipient to take special action or precautions in regard to patent rights. These observations apply whether the information passes from West to East or vice versa. It follows that any U.K. information containing a non-classified invention of Service origin likely to be patentable should where practicable be brought to the notice of the appropriate department before the information is passed to U.S. Before transmitting to U.S. unclassified information not susceptible to patenting, consideration should be given to the remarks below in respect of like information exchanged with countries other than the U.S.

10. When transmitting Government-owned information to the U.S. the need for prior patent action, while still highly desirable where time permits, is not essential. If the information is privately-owned the consent of the owner must be secured before disclosure; failure to do so may not only lay H.M. Government open to claims but also prejudice the relations between interested Departments and private patent owners and others.

Commonwealth Countries

11. For classified information security arrangements exist with certain of the countries to enable patenting action thereon. The Commonwealth countries at present having such arrangements are Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It is for the U.K. Department concerned to invoke these arrangements where necessary; elsewhere the considerations are akin to those which apply to foreign countries, as set out below,

Foreign Countries

12. No arrangements exist to enable the secure patenting of classified patentable inventions in these countries; indeed not all the Patent Offices are themselves secure. Such information transmitted from the U.K. in respect of a classified invention (normally already the subject of a prohibited U.K. Patent Application), should be dealt with as in Paragraph 14 below unless the recipient Government undertakes to keep the information secret and to grant on request secret patent protection of suitable priority. No permission can be given to private patent owners to apply for patent protection on classified inventions at present.

13. In the case of patentable unclassified information the onus of patenting falls on the U.K. owner. U.K. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents could be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions the recipient Government should be referred to the owner, to negotiate terms.

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SECRET

14. If the information is wholly unpatentable, i.e. while commercially valuable it is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent specification, Government-owned information should only be supplied if we obtain a quid pro quo - strategic, political or commercial. In the case of privately-owned information the foreign Government should merely be put in touch with the owner, but if secret, the owner should be warned he should only communicate the information to accredited representatives of the foreign Governments who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

15. Some information is partly patentable and partly unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is classified and unpatentable, e.g. the layout dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design, e.g. a magneto. The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 above, but in the case of privately-owned patentable information of this kind care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any classified information.

16. Departments who are negotiating with foreign governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

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ANNEX III

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF COMMITTEES

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION POLICY COMMITTEE

- (1) To keep under review (a) the policy for the exchange of classified military information with the United States and other nations; and (b) the policy for the release of classified military information to third nations, including the other nations of the Commonwealth.
- (2) To exercise a general supervision over the implementation by United Kingdom Departments of the rules governing the exchange and release of classified military information.
- (3) To consider on appeal individual proposals to which objections have been made on security grounds, for the release of classified military information to third nations.
- (4) To report to the Minister of Defence.

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION SUB-COMMITTEE

- (1) To consider such proposals for the release of classified military information to countries other than the United States as may be laid down by the Exchange of Military Information Policy Committee.
- (2) To determine, in cases of doubt, the origin of such information, to consider the security implications of the proposed release, and to approve such proposed release as accord in all respects with the rules laid down for the release of information to third nations.
- (3) To co-ordinate proposals for the release of classified United States or combined United Kingdom-United States military information, as necessary in the light of current procedure, and submit them to the appropriate authorities.
- (4) To keep such records as may be directed by the Exchange of Military Information Policy Committee of classified military information of United Kingdom, United States or combined United Kingdom-United States origin which is released to third nations, and to forward to the United States authorities such returns of information released as are called for by current agreements.

SECRET

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 5-11-17 (JIC)

SECRET



CANADA

## Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

ADDRESS REPLY TO.  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

9 July, 1951.

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

#### Visit of Dutch Scientists

1. In my CSC 5-11-17 (JIC) of 4 July I asked for views on the security aspects of the proposed visit of three Dutch scientists to Canada. As some discussion on this matter may be advisable, the Chairman, JIC has requested that this be included on the agenda of the meeting to be held on Wednesday, 11 July.

2. The views requested in my previous memorandum are consequently not required.

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp



CANADA

# Department of National Defence

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC 5-11-17 (JIC)

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO.  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.  
OTTAWA.

4 July, 1951

Referred to *Staff*

JUL 6 1951 50-2

File No. *1225-3*

Chg to *On PA 18-6*

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

#### Proposed Visit of Dutch Scientists

1. Attached is a copy of a letter to the Chairman, Defence Research Board from Dr. G.J. Sizoo, President of the National Research Organization in Holland, asking if he and two other members of the Dutch Defence Research Organization could visit Canada some time in December.
2. The Chairman, Defence Research Board considers that Dr. Sizoo and his colleagues should be invited to visit Canada. Dr. Solandt also points out that Dr. Mackenzie, President, NRC has agreed to invite Dr. Sizoo to visit Chalk River provided DRB accepts responsibility for his security clearance. Dr. Mackenzie emphasizes that he would do this for Dr. Sizoo personally because of his reputation as a nuclear physicist, thereby avoiding the establishment of any international precedent.
3. This matter has been referred by the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff to the Chiefs of Staff, and the concurrence of the CCOS and CAS has been received. The CNS suggests that this proposed visit be discussed by the JIC before a final decision is made on any limitations to be imposed.
4. The CGS states that the Dutch scientist cannot be permitted to visit CARDE, or similar establishments, to see Army developments which include UK and US information, without clearance from these countries. To seek clearance, more information would be required to indicate sufficient cause for such a visit. It is unlikely that items which do not contain US or UK information would be of sufficient interest to make the visit worthwhile.
5. In view of the foregoing, the JIC has been requested to consider this matter and submit, as soon as possible, their views on the security aspects of the proposed visit. May I therefore, please receive your views by 1200 hours, Tuesday, 10 July.

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

JEB/5459/fp

C O P Y

S E C R E T

National Defence Research Council T.N.O.

23rd May 1951.

Dr. O.M. Solandt,  
Chairman of the Defence Research Board,  
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Dr. Solandt:

Referring to our previous correspondence it is a pleasure for me to inform you that the National Defence Research Council has now obtained the official consent of the American authorities for the visit of a delegation of three members to the National Defence Research Organizations and Establishments in the U.S.A.

According to the present plans the delegation will consist of:

Prof. Dr. G.J. Sizoo	President of the National Defence Research Organization; Professor of Physics at the Free University in Amsterdam.
Vice-Admiral o.d. S.A. Pinke	Delegate of the Minister of the Navy to the National Defence Research Organization; Chief of the Office for Scientific Research of the Navy Staff.
Prof. Ir. J.L. van Soest	Director of the Physical Laboratory of the National Defence Research Organization; Extraordinary Professor of the Technical High School (high frequency).

These three members are cleared by the Netherlands Government for top secret and for Western Union and NATO affairs.

Admiral Pinke and Prof. van Soest intend to arrive in the U.S.A. by boat on the 11th of September.

I myself hope to arrive by plane on the 3rd or 4th of September to attend the congress of the American Chemical Society and the international Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry from the 4th-11th September.

The official visit of the delegation is projected from 11th-26th September. We would highly appreciate to combine with the visit to the U.S.A. a visit to your country from 27th September-4th October. We must return to the U.S.A. on October the 5th as we have to sail from New York on October 6th.

We should like very much to spend some days in Ottawa as suggested by you in your letter of the 5th December 1950 and one day at your Armament Research and Development Establishment near Quebec City and perhaps spend some further time in Toronto and Montreal and also to visit one of your large universities. Personally, as a nuclear physicist, I shall be very glad if it would be allowed to pay a visit to your nuclear plants at Chalk River. Would you please let me know whether the proposed visit of the

- 2 -

delegation will be allowed and whether the period suggested will be convenient to you and your staff. If it is required to ask the official consent through the intermediary of our embassy in Canada, please inform me accordingly, that I may take the necessary steps.

Thanking you very much for your assistance in this matter, I remain,

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Prof. Dr. G.J. Sizoo)  
President.



FDE:JH

NSS 1550-2


27th June 1951

SECRET

SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
-----

Proposed visit to Canada - President of the  
Defence Research Organization in Holland

With reference to your CSC 5-11-17 Vol.1(A/Sec) of  
21 June, 1951, it is suggested that the proposed visit to Canada  
of the President of the Defence Research Organization in Holland  
should be discussed by the Joint Intelligence Committee before a  
final decision is made on any limitations to be imposed.



CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF.

Despatched by  
N. Sec.

.....B.O.C.....

Date  
Time

June 28/51

000493

1950-5-2



# Department of National Defence

## Naval Service

26th June, 1951.

OUR FILE NUKS: 1480-1

**SECRET.**

YOUR FILE

FROM: The Naval Member Canadian Joint Staff (London)  
66, Ennismore Gardens,  
London, S.W.7.

TO: The Naval Secretary,  
Naval Headquarters,  
Ottawa,  
Canada.

Referred to	Staff
JUL 4 1951	
File No	1550-10
	Staff 11-6

CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION.

Submitted for the information of the Department attached herewith is a statement received from Admiralty of Admiralty policy with regard to the release of classified military information of United Kingdom origin to Commonwealth and N.A.T.O. countries.

(O.C.S. Robertson)  
Captain R.C.N.

S E C R E T.

CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION.

RELEASES TO OLD COMMONWEALTH NATIONS.

The Admiralty policy with regard to the release of classified information to Old Commonwealth nations is -

"It is accepted that the "Need to Know" is established for Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa in respect of all information of United Kingdom origin concerning all ships, and their equipment, of types existing, or building, or being considered for inclusion, or being modernised in or for or by their Navies."

RELEASES TO NEW COMMONWEALTH NATIONS.

The Admiralty policy with regard to the release of classified information of United Kingdom origin, mentioned at (a) below, to India, Pakistan and Ceylon is as follows:-

(a) It is accepted that the "Need to Know" is established for all New Commonwealth nations in respect of all light craft used as Trade Protection Escorts, Minesweepers and Seaward Defence Craft. Also of any item of equipment of purely United Kingdom origin which may be fitted in these ships, or in existing ships of their Navies, which is classified SECRET or below, the prototype of which has been accepted for production.

Information concerned with Cryptography, Radio Countermeasures and Mine Assemblies is absolutely excluded from this.

POLICY CONCERNING BOOKS.

New Commonwealth nations will normally be included in the distribution lists for new C.B.'s or S.P.'s with the following exceptions:-

- (a) Books containing information of combined U.K./U.S. origin and/or U.S. origin.
- (b) Books containing technical information regarding material and equipment not used in the Navy of the New Commonwealth nation concerned.
- (c) Books containing TOP SECRET or SECRET information regarding strategical and tactical doctrines.
- (d) Those S.P.'s which are Cyphers or related books, for which special arrangements already exist.

RELEASES TO N.A.T.O. NATIONS.

The Admiralty policy with regard to the release of items of classified information of United Kingdom origin mentioned at (a) below to N.A.T.O. nations is:-

(a) It is accepted that the "Need to Know" is established for all N.A.T.O. nations in respect of all light craft used as Trade Protection Escorts, Minesweepers and Seaward Defence Craft and of any item of equipment of purely United Kingdom origin which may be fitted therein, classified SECRET or below, the prototype of which has been accepted for production. Information concerned with Cryptography,

S E C R E T.

- 2 -

Radio Countermeasures and Mine Assemblies is absolutely excluded from the above.

(b) It is Admiralty policy to release any such information to the above nations, but, if the consequences of the details of any item reaching an unfriendly nation should be considered to outweigh its usefulness to the Allies, it is the duty of the sponsoring Division to ensure its inclusion in the list of items to be withheld. If any patent rights are involved, the sponsoring authority is to seek the necessary approval before making the release.

(c) Drawings and specifications for ships building or projected may be released to nations who show willingness to build, provided they do not show details of any equipment excluded by paragraphs (a) and (b) above. In the event of such drawings showing space, tonnage or strengthening in excess of requirements of equipment shown, i.e., for equipment which is not yet releasable, it will be necessary to inform the recipients that this space or tonnage is required for equipment which it is hoped to fit at a later date but which is not yet developed.

*DATA 13/11/51*

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 1601-1 (JIC)

SECRET


# Department of National Defence

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CANADA

ADDRESS REPLY TO:  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
OTTAWA.

9 Nov 51



### MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

Release of Classified Information File No. *1550-2*  
to India, Pakistan or Ceylon

Chgd to

1. Attached are copies of correspondence dealing with the release of classified information to India, Pakistan or Ceylon.

2. This matter will be considered at the meeting of the Committee on Monday, 12 Nov.

*T. Moore*  
(T. Moore)  
Major,  
Acting Secretary.

Encs.

TM/5934/fp

C O P Y

S E C R E T

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CANADA

OTTAWA, November 7, 1951.

The Secretary,  
Joint Intelligence Committee,  
Department of National Defence,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

I attach copies of the following letters from myself to Mr. J. Thomson, July 4; Mr. Thomson to myself, November 2. These both relate to the passing of classified information to India, Pakistan or Ceylon. The first letter was cleared with the JIC before it was sent.

Will you please bring these letters forward at the next meeting of the JIC to be noted.

(Sgd.) G. de T. Glazebrook.

C O P Y

Office of the High Commissioner  
for the United Kingdom,  
Earnscliffe,  
OTTAWA.

1085/120

November 2, 1951.

SECRET

Dear Mr. Glazebrook,

Classified Military Information

1. In your letter to Mr. Thomson of 4th July, you asked for an assurance that any military information of Canadian origin classified higher than "confidential" would not be transmitted by the United Kingdom authorities to India, Pakistan or Ceylon without prior consultation with your Government. I am sorry that it should have taken so long to answer the question which you raised. I am, however, now authorized to give you the assurance which you seek.

Yours sincerely,

John Chadwick.

G. de T. Glazebrook, Esq.,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Ottawa.

C O P Y

S E C R E T

Ottawa, July 4, 1951.

Dear Mr. Thomson,

In your letter of June 20, you explain the desire of the United Kingdom authorities that no classified military information of United Kingdom origin which has a classification higher than "confidential" should be passed to India, Pakistan or Ceylon without prior consultation with the United Kingdom authorities in each case.

Under present procedure, no military information, with any classification, of United Kingdom origin would be passed to any of these countries without prior consultation with the United Kingdom authorities. This procedure, which has been in force for some time, will continue.

May I assume that any military information of Canadian origin, classified higher than "confidential" would similarly not be transmitted by United Kingdom authorities to India, Pakistan or Ceylon without consultation with Canadian authorities?

Yours sincerely,

G. de T. Glazebrook

J. Thomson, Esq.,  
Office of the High Commissioner  
for the United Kingdom,  
Earncliffe,  
Ottawa.

*Can published  
via King*



1950-4



CANADA

# Department of National Defence

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE


IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 8-1-0 (JIC)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESS REPLY TO:  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

21 September, 1951.



### MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

#### Release of Combined Military Information

1. At the 288th meeting of the JIC on 14 August JIC 21(51) entitled "Release of Combined Military Information to NATO Countries" was approved.
2. This procedure was considered at the 18th meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff on 17 September, at which the Committee noted MIB 4/3 and concurred in JIC 21(51).

*(J.E. Beswick)*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp

Referred to	<i>Staff &amp;...</i>
SEP	24 1951
File No.	<i>1550-2</i>
Chgd to	.....

1950.4



CANADA

ADDRESS REPLY TO.  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

## Department of National Defence

### CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
No. CSC 8-1-0 (JIC)

SECRET

7 August, 1951

Referred to	Staff/DNI
AUG 8 1951	
File No.	1550-2
Chgd to	Staff 25-1

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

#### Release of Combined Military Information

1. I attach a copy of a draft paper which outlines a detailed procedure for the handling of proposals for the release of combined classified military information to NATO countries. This has been prepared in accordance with MIB 4/3 a copy of which was forwarded to the JIC on 15 June.

2. This draft has been reviewed and concurred in by the ad hoc committee consisting of representatives of DMI, DAI, DNI and DSI, with the suggestion from the DAI representative that the procedure outlined in para. 5(b) and para. 8, where Canada or one of the Canadian services receives a request, that the US and/or UK should be immediately notified of the request so that concurrent consideration may be given to the request. This would eliminate an apparently unnecessary delay in getting the information to the country which asked for it.

3. The MIB procedure (MIB 4/3) does not have such a provision and there may be some objections to its inclusion in our detailed procedure; e.g.:

- (a) When a request is passed to US and UK, Canada's recommendation for the release should accompany the request.
- (b) If Canada were to notify the US and UK the details of a request and subsequently determine that the information should not be released, confusion may result.


4. If, however, the JIC considers that it would be worthwhile to include this suggested addition, the insertion of a new paragraph after para. 8, worded along the following lines, may be appropriate:

"If the clearance of the request is likely to be delayed, those concerned should be notified of the details of the request and the action which is pending in order that consideration may be undertaken concurrently."

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

JEB/5459/fp



D R A F T

JIC 21(51)  
CSC 8-1-0 (JIC)

S E C R E T

RELEASE OF COMBINED MILITARY INFORMATION  
TO NATO COUNTRIES

The details contained in this instruction are based on and supplement, insofar as Canada is concerned, the procedure for handling proposals for the release of combined classified military information as outlined in Military Information Board document MIB 4/3 "Procedure for Handling Proposals for the Release of Combined US-UK-Canadian Classified Military Information to NATO Countries". Such proposals will be handled as follows:

A. REQUESTS ARISING IN THE MILITARY STANDARDIZATION AGENCY

1. When projects put forward in the MSA require the release of classified military information of combined US-UK-Canadian origin, the following procedure will be followed:
  - (a) The Canadian member of the MSA will refer the request, together with any comments or observations, to NDHQ through CJS, London.
  - (b) On receipt of a request the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff will refer it to the appropriate service, services, or joint committee, where the request will be processed in the same way as indicated in para. 6 below.
  - (c) When a decision has been reached the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff will forward to the Canadian member of the MSA, through CJS, London, a statement which will include:
    - (i) confirmation that the information is of combined origin, or details as to ownership; and
    - (ii) whether DND is prepared to authorize the release.
2. If after the respective governments have been consulted the MSA delegate of one owner country is unable to accept the statement produced by another owner country, the MSA delegates of US, UK and Canada will meet in an attempt to resolve the problem.
3. If agreement cannot be reached the MSA delegate of US, UK or Canada may give notice that he proposes to ask his government to refer the problem to the Military Information Board.

B. REQUESTS NOT RELATING TO NATO STANDARDIZATION

4. When either UK or US receives or initiates requests

On receiving a case for the release of information, CJS, London or CJS, Washington will forward it (together with any comments, if appropriate) to NDHQ for views.

- 2 -

5. When Canada receives or initiates a request

It is expected that requests may be received from NATO nations through CJS, London; CJS, Washington; or from the military staffs of NATO nations in Ottawa. Requests will be handled in the following manner:

- (a) When a request is received by CJS, London or CJS, Washington it will be passed to NDHQ, together with any views and/or recommendations, if appropriate.
- (b) When received direct at NDHQ, a request will be cleared internally and a case for the release will be prepared. This will be submitted to CJS, London and/or CJS, Washington for clearance with the UK and/or US authorities.
- (c) Co-ordination of requests and decisions will be effected at NDHQ. Decisions will be passed through reverse channels and the final disposal of the request will be notified to all concerned.

NOTE: All requests will be addressed to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff.

6. On receipt of a request the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff will refer it to the appropriate service, services, or joint committee where the request will be processed.

In clearing information for release the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff will refer to the following:

(a) Requests involving only one service

Navy	- DNI
Army	- DMO&P
Air Force	- DAI
Defence Research Board	- DSI.

(b) Requests involving more than one service

The Joint Staff and Secretariat will co-ordinate either by circulating the request to the services and the Defence Research Board as necessary, or by referring the request to a committee consisting of representatives of DNI, DMO&P, and DAI (together with other representatives concerned with any particular item).

7. DND recommendations on a proposed release will be co-ordinated by the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff.

If UK or US had received or initiated the request, he will notify Canadian views to CJS, London or CJS, Washington for transmission to the UK or US.

If Canada had received or initiated the request, and if Canada agrees to the release, the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff will have a case for the release of the information prepared and will transmit this to UK and/or US through CJS, London and/or CJS, Washington. On receipt of replies the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff will co-ordinate views and will notify to all concerned the final decision on the release.

- 3 -

8. When an individual service receives a request for combined information from the military staff of a NATO nation in Ottawa it will clear the request within the service, and, if in agreement with the proposed release, will forward the request, together with any views or recommendations, to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff who will take the action noted in the preceding paragraphs.
9. If agreement cannot be reached amongst the three countries, the matter can be referred to the Military Information Board for settlement.

INFORMATION OWNED BY ANOTHER COUNTRY

10. If Canada receives a request for classified military information which is owned wholly by another government, the applicant for the information will be so informed.

26 July, 1951.

1950-4

CSC 8-1-0 (JIC)

SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

27 July, 1951.

Referred to.....
JUL 30 1951
File No. 1550-2
Engd to 25-6

DMI - Attention Lt.-Col. Todd  
DAI - Attention S/L Stroud  
DMI - Attention Lt.-Cdr. Rankin R.P. 15/8/51  
DSI - Attention Mr. Jones

Release of Combined Military Information

1. On 15 June, under even file, I forwarded to the members of the JIC a copy of MIB 4/3 which is a revised procedure for handling requests for the release of combined US-UK-Canadian classified military information to NATO countries. In my memorandum I stated that the DND internal procedure would be revised and then referred to the ad hoc committee which prepared the previous internal procedure. Attached in this regard is a draft of the rewritten instructions which supplement, insofar as Canada is concerned, the procedure MIB 4/3.
2. In order that this procedure may be presented to the JIC as early as possible, I would appreciate your comments by 1200 hours, Thursday, 2 August.

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

JER/5459/fp

DRAFT

JIC 21(51)  
GSC 8-1-0(JIC)

SECRET

RELEASE OF COMBINED MILITARY INFORMATION  
TO NATO COUNTRIES

The details contained in this instruction are based on and supplement, insofar as Canada is concerned, the procedure for handling proposals for the release of combined classified military information as outlined in MIB 4/3 "Procedure for Handling Proposals for the Release of Combined US-UK-Canadian Classified Military Information to NATO Countries." Such proposals will be handled as follows:

REQUESTS ARISING IN THE MSA

1. When projects put forward in the MSA require the release of classified military information of combined US, UK, Cdn origin, the following procedure will be followed:
  - (a) Cdn member of the MSA will refer the request together with any comments or observations to NDHQ through CJS(L)
  - (b) On receipt of a request the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff will refer it to the appropriate service, services, or joint committee, where the request will be processed in the same way as indicated in para 6 below.
  - (c) When a decision has been reached, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff will forward to Cdn member of the MSA through CJS(L), a statement which will include:
    - (i) confirmation that the information is of combined origin, or details as to ownership; and
    - (ii) whether DND is prepared to authorize the release.
2. If after the respective Governments have been consulted the MSA delegate of one owner country is unable to accept the statement produced by another owner country, the MSA delegates of US, UK, and Cda will meet in an attempt to resolve the problem.
3. If agreement cannot be reached the MSA delegate of US, UK or Cda may give notice that he proposes to ask his Government to refer the problem to the MIB.

REQUESTS NOT RELATING TO NATO STANDARDIZATION

4. When either UK or US receives or initiates requests

On receiving a case for the release of information, CJS, London or CJS, Washington will forward it (together with any comments, if appropriate) to NDHQ for views.

- 2 -

5. When Canada receives or initiates a request

It is expected that requests may be received from NATO nations through CJS, London; CJS, Washington; or from the military staffs of NATO nations in Ottawa. Requests will be handled in the following manner:

- (a) When a request is received by CJS, London or CJS, Washington it will be passed to NDHQ, together with any views and/or recommendations, if appropriate.
- (b) When received direct at NDHQ, a request will be cleared internally and a case for the release will be prepared. This will be submitted to CJS, London and/or CJS, Washington for clearance with the UK and/or US authorities.
- (c) Co-ordination of requests and decisions will be effected at NDHQ. Decisions will be passed through reverse channels and the final disposal of the request will be notified to all concerned.

NOTE: All requests will be addressed to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff.

6. On receipt of a request the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff will refer it to the appropriate service, services, or joint committee where the request will be processed.

In clearing information for release the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff will refer to the following:

(a) Requests involving only one service

Navy	- DNI
Army	- DMO&P
Air Force	- DAI
Defence Research Board	- DSI.

(b) Requests involving more than one service

The Joint Staff and Secretariat will co-ordinate either by circulating the request to the services and the Defence Research Board as necessary, or by referring the request to a committee consisting of representatives of DNI, DMO&P, and DAI (together with other representatives concerned with any particular item).

7. DND recommendations on a proposed release will be co-ordinated by the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff.

If UK or US had received or initiated the request, he will notify Canadian views to CJS, London or CJS, Washington for transmission to the UK or US.

If Canada had received or initiated the request, and if Canada agrees to the release, the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff will have a case for the release of the information prepared and will transmit this to UK and/or US through CJS, London and/or CJS, Washington. On receipt of replies the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff will co-ordinate views and will notify to all concerned the final decision on the release.



- 3 -

8. When an individual service receives a request for combined information from the military staff of a NATO nation in Ottawa it will clear the request within the service, and, if in agreement with the proposed release, will forward the request, together with any views or recommendations, to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff who will take the action noted in the preceding paragraphs.
9. If agreement cannot be reached amongst the three countries, the matter can be referred to the Military Information Board for settlement.

INFORMATION OWNED BY ANOTHER COUNTRY

10. If Canada receives a request for classified military information which is owned wholly by another government, the applicant for the information will be so informed.

26 July, 1951.



CANADA

ADDRESS REPLY TO:  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

# Department of National Defence

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC 8-1-0 (JIC)

SECRET

15 June, 1951.

Referred to *leap*  
JUN 19 1951  
File No. *1550-10*  
Chgd to *Staff 11-6*

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

#### Release of Combined Military Information

1. At the 265th meeting the JIC approved a UK proposed revision of MIB 4/2 (Procedure for Handling the Release of Combined US-UK-Canadian Information). This procedure was concurred in by the Vice Chiefs of Staff, and CJS, Washington was notified accordingly. Shortly thereafter CJS, Washington notified that the US would also table a proposed revision of MIB 4/2 at the MIB meeting on 15 May (reference CSC 8-1-0 (JIC) of 12 May). No objections to the acceptance of the US proposed revision were raised.

2. The minutes of the MIB meeting on 15 May have now been received and the following extract, which notes approval of the US proposed revision of MIB 4/2, is recorded for the information of the JIC:

"Procedures for Handling Requests for the Release of Combined U.S.-U.K.-Canada Classified Military Information to NATO Countries. (Draft Procedural Papers Revising MIB 4/2 Following U.K. Proposal (JIC (W) 203, 21 February 1951))"

"It was observed by the CHAIRMAN and ADMIRAL JOHNSON that, in substance, the two draft procedural papers before the Board were almost identical. The CHAIRMAN stated that the only real difference was that the U.S. draft omitted any mention of interim statements in general terms as to a government's attitude to a standardization project proposal being made in the MSA. He understood that this had been omitted as the U.S. authorities considered that reference to the internal operation of MSA was out of place in a procedural paper on information disclosures. MR. MARGRAVE confirmed that this was so.

"THE CHAIRMAN then withdrew the U.K. proposal in favor of the U.S. draft.


"THE BOARD unanimously approved the U.S. proposed revision of MIB 4/2, subject to certain changes in the wording suggested at the meeting which were accepted by the Board."

A copy of the revised procedure (MIB 4/3) is attached.

- 2 -

3. It will be noted that this new procedure necessitates the revision of the DND internal procedure which was based on MIB 4/2. I shall therefore refer this matter to the Ad Hoc Committee which prepared the previous internal procedure. The members of this Committee are:

Lt.-Col. W.A. Todd	(DMI) (Chairman)
Lt.-Cdr. H.F. Rankin	(DNI)
S/L J.M. Stroud	(DAI)
Mr. C.G. Jones	(DRB).

  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

JEB/5459/fp

SECRET

MIB 4/3

U.S. /U.K./CANADA MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD

Note by the Secretaries

As the result of a United Kingdom proposal (JIC (W) 203 dated 21st February 1951) to revise the procedure for the release of combined U.S./U.K./Canadian classified military information to N.A.T.O. Countries, the Board, at their Meeting on 15th May 1951, approved the Procedural Document attached at Annex.

This Procedural Document as of this date supersedes the previous procedure (MIB 4/2).

R.W. SHAW  
R.H.C. BRYERS  
N.H. ROSS

Combined Secretariat  
US/UK/Canada Military  
Information Board

16th May 1951

SECRET

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MIB 4/3

PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING PROPOSALS  
FOR THE RELEASE OF COMBINED U.S./U.K./CANADIAN  
CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO NATO COUNTRIES

I. Proposals for the release of Combined Classified Military  
Information arising in the Military Standardization Agency

1. Any standardization project put forward in the M.S.A. could require the release of classified military information of U.S., U.K., Canadian and/or of combined origin.
2. Where information of combined origin is involved, the following procedure is prescribed: The delegate of each Government concerned will, when necessary, refer to his Service authorities for consideration the proposal and extent of the information desired to be released and the justification therefore. These Service authorities will forward to their MSA delegates for communication to the other owner countries, with a request for approval, a statement which includes:
  - (a) Confirmation that the information is combined or details as to ownership.
  - (b) An indication of whether the Government is prepared to authorize or acquiesce in release.
3. If, after the respective Governments have been consulted, the MSA delegate of one owner country is unable to accept the statement produced by another owner country required by paragraph 2 above, the MSA delegates concerned will come together in an attempt to resolve the problem. If the problem cannot be resolved, it will be open to the MSA delegate of the US, the UK or Canada to give notice that he proposes to ask his Government to refer the problem to the Military Information Board.

II. Proposals for the release of Combined Classified Military  
Information not relating to NATO Standardization (i.e.  
Through channels other than M.S.A.)

4. Proposals to release to NATO countries combined classified military information not relating to NATO standardization will be handled as follows:
  - (a) When the UK receives or initiates the request, the UK authorities will submit a case for the release of the information to the US and/or Canadian authorities, through BSJM Washington to the appropriate US military department and/or through the CJS (London), who will obtain their Governments' views and reply through the same channel.
  - (b) When US receives or initiates the request, the US authorities will submit a case for the release of information to the UK and/or Canadian representatives in the US (BSJM and the CJS (Washington)) who will obtain their Governments' views and reply through the same channel.
  - (c) When Canada receives or initiates a request, the Canadian authorities will submit a case for the release of information to the UK and/or US through CJS London and Washington respectively to obtain the views of the UK and US

SECRET

Governments who should reply through the same channel.

5. If agreement cannot be reached it will be open to any of the three Governments to refer the matter to the Military Information Board.

III. Classified Military Information owned wholly by a Government other than that receiving the request.

6. If a Government receiving a request determines that the information is owned wholly by another Government, the recipient Government will so inform the applicant.

SECRET



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 5-11-17 Vol. 1  
(A/SEC)

# Department of National Defence

SECRET

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

21 June, 1951.

C.A.S.  
C.N.S. ✓  
C.G.S.

### Proposed visit to Canada - President of the Defence Research Organization in Holland

1. The Chairman of the Defence Research Board has received an informal request from Professor Dr. G.J. Sizoo, President of the Defence Research Organization in Holland, asking if himself and two other members of the Dutch Defence Research Organization could visit Canada some time in September.
2. The views of the Chairman of the Defence Research Board are that Professor Sizoo and his colleagues should be invited to visit Canada. Dr. Solandt points out that Dr. Mackenzie, President of the National Research Council, has agreed to invite Dr. Sizoo himself to visit Chalk River provided the Defence Research Board accepts responsibility for his security clearance. Dr. Mackenzie emphasizes that he would do this for Dr. Sizoo personally because of his reputation as a nuclear physicist. In this way no international precedent would be established.
3. I attach herewith copy of a letter from Dr. Sizoo to the Chairman, Defence Research Board.
4. I would appreciate, please, being advised at your earliest convenience of your views concerning the above proposal.

DNI - Have you any  
Comment please *H.S. Rayner*

Enc.  
GAL/7014/dt

(H.S. Rayner)  
Comodoro, RCN,  
Secretary.

*Secrecy  
22/6*

National Defence Research Council T.N.O.

Secret

23rd May 1951.

Dr. O. M. Solandt  
Chairman of the Defence Research Board  
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Dr. Solandt:

Referring to our previous correspondence it is a pleasure for me to inform you that the National Defence Research Council has now obtained the official consent of the American authorities for the visit of a delegation of three members to the National Defence Research Organizations and Establishments in the U.S.A.

According to the present plans the delegation will consist of:

Prof. Dr. G. J. Sizoo

President of the National Defence Research Organization; Professor of Physics at the Free University in Amsterdam.

Vice-Admiral o.d. S. A. Pinke

Delegate of the Minister of the Navy to the National Defence Research Organization; Chief of the Office for Scientific Research of the Navy Staff.

Prof. Ir. J. L. van Soest

Director of the Physical Laboratory of the National Defence Research Organization; Extraordinary Professor of the Technical High School (high frequency).

These three members are cleared by the Netherlands Government for top secret and for Western Union and NATO affairs.

Admiral Pinke and Prof. van Soest intend to arrive in the U.S.A. by boat on the 11th of September.

I myself hope to arrive by plane on the 3rd or 4th of September to attend the congress of the American Chemical Society and the international Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry from the 4th-11th September.

The official visit of the delegation is projected from 11th-26th September. We would highly appreciate to combine with the visit to the U.S.A. a visit to your country from 27th September -4th October. We must return to the U.S.A. on October the 5th as we have to sail from New York on October 6th.

We should like very much to spend some days in Ottawa as suggested by you in your letter of the 5th December 1950 and one day at your Armament Research and Development Establishment near Quebec City and perhaps spend some

.....2



-2-

Secret

Further time in Toronto and Montreal and also to visit one of your large universities. Personally, as a nuclear physicist, I shall be very glad if it would be allowed to pay a visit to your nuclear plants at Chalk River. Would you please let me know whether the proposed visit of the delegation will be allowed and whether the period suggested will be convenient to you and your staff. If it is required to ask the official consent through the intermediary of our embassy in Canada, please inform me accordingly, that I may take the necessary steps.

Thanking you very much for your assistance in this matter,  
I remain,

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Prof. Dr. G. J. Sizoo)  
President

SECRET

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. NSS 1550-2



## Department of National Defence

Ottawa,


25 June, 1951.

MEMORANDUM TO: C.N.S.

PROPOSED VISIT TO CANADA OF NETHERLANDS  
NATIONAL DEFENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL MEMBERS

With reference to Secretary, CSC's memorandum .  
CSC 5-11-17 Vol. 1 (A/SEC) dated 21 June, in view of the  
close association of the Philips Organization and Military  
Research in the Netherlands and the apparent exchange of  
research information between the Netherlands and Argentina,  
it is considered that the proposals for this visit should  
be reviewed by the JIC before a final decision on the  
limitations to be imposed is made.

2. Attached for your information are relative extracts  
from reports received from our Naval Attache at The Hague,  
referring to Netherland nuclear research matters.

  
(J.C. Pratt),  
Commander, RCN,  
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET

000518

C O P Y

Grade: B.2.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Number</u>
21 May, 1951	B.2.	27/51

DUTCH ATOM SCIENTIST FLYING TO ARGENTINE

The Dutch atomic scientist, Professor C.J. Bakker, is flying to The Argentine for a study trip of unlimited duration.

2. Professor Bakker will go to the island of Huemul in the Nahuel Huapi lake near Bariloche, where Argentine's atomic research is being carried out under the guidance of Austrian born Professor Ronald Richter.
3. Professor Bakker is believed to be the first foreign atomic scientist to be admitted to Professor Richter's island "domain", which is rigidly isolated from the outside world.
4. It is understood that the Dutch scientist's trip is probably the result of talks which H.R.H. Prince Bernhard had with President Peron during his recent goodwill visit to Argentina.
5. Argentine interest in the Dutch cyclotron in Amsterdam was shown during those talks, it is learned, and Professor Bakker is taking a model of it with him.
6. Professor Bakker is director of the laboratory of the Dutch Institute for Nuclear Research. He worked at the Imperial College of Science in London in 1930 and 1931. Afterwards (until 1946) he worked for Philips of Eindhoven. Professor Bakker is also a lecturer at Amsterdam University.
7. It will be recalled that President Peron of Argentina announced a "new process" of releasing atomic energy, which had been evolved by Professor Richter, at the end of March. It was also said that Professor Richter had been able to do this without making use of the materials which, up till now, had been considered indispensable. The process developed in Argentina is claimed to be cheaper than making electricity.
8. President Peron's statement was at the time very sceptically received. It was described as very exaggerated and even "nonsensical". It was also doubted whether Argentina possessed the complex installations needed to produce atomic energy.
9. During his visit to Argentina Prince Bernhard had no (contact) with Professor Richter.

- 2 -

C O P Y

Grade: B.2.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Number</u>
2 June, 1951	B.2.	54/51

DUTCH SCIENTIST RETURNS FROM ARGENTINA

Professor C.J. Bakker, the Dutch scientist (atomic), said here to-day all reports about the arrest of Professor Ronald Richter, Austrian-born leader of atomic research in the Argentine, were "completely untrue".

2. The Dutch scientist returned here unexpectedly to-day after having left for the Argentine on a study trip of "unlimited duration" on May 18th at the request of the Dutch Government.

3. He declined to make any statement about his trip before informing the Government of his findings.

23 April, 1951 B.2.

DUTCH-NORWEGIAN ATOMIC AGREEMENT

This agreement has now been concluded between the Norwegian Technical Physics Research Council and the Netherlands Foundation for the Fundamental Study of Matter, and has the approval of both governments.

2. Holland has agreed to supply the uranium for the Norwegian atomic reactor in Kjeller and Norway the heavy-water and technical equipment.

3. The plans comprise the production of radio-active isotopes and their application, neutron research, and the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

4. The combined Dutch-Norwegian commission, under the chairmanship of Professor Svein Rosseland of Oslo University, has been formed to organize the cooperation in atomic energy research between the two countries. This commission has appointed Mr. Gunnar Randers as director of the Kjeller Institute. Other members of the Commission are:

- 3 -

C O P Y

Grade: B.2.

Mr. Odd Dahl	Christian Michelson Inst. of Bergen.
Mr. N. Stephansen	Scientific director of Norsk Hydro.
Prof. Dr. H.A. Kramers	Leyden University, deputy chairman
Prof. Dr. C.J. Bakker	Amsterdam Municipal University
Prof. Dr. J. Milatz	Utrecht University.

5. The uranium to be supplied by Holland is from a stock bought by a Dutch scientist prior to the Second World War.



CANADA

# Department of National Defence

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
NO. CSC 2-4-9 (JIC)

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO:  
SECRETARY  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

15 June, 1951.

Referred to	<i>Staff</i>
JUN 19 1951	
File No.	<i>1530-10</i>
Chgd to	<i>Staff 11-6</i>

DMI  
DAI  
DNI  
DSI

### MIB Meeting on 15 May

1. One copy of the minutes of the MIB meeting on 15 May is available for circulation. These minutes may be of interest as the following items were considered:

- (a) Revision of MIB 4/2. (See also CSC 8-1-0 (JIC) of 12 May).
- (b) The Attendance of Australian Officers at Military College of Science.

2. May these minutes please be circulated in the order noted above and returned to the Secretary, JIC.

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp



CANADA

# Department of National Defence

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 8-1 (JIC)

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO.

SECRETARY

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,  
OTTAWA.

8 June, 1951

Referred to.....
JUN 11 1951
File No. 81530-10
Chgd to.....

DMI  
DAR  
DMI  
DSI  
OI/cSB  
JIB

### UK Policy on Disclosure of Information

1. Attached is a copy of the UK statement of policy on the disclosure of information to other countries. This paper was written in September, 1950 and was only recently passed to us. It is therefore, in part, out of date especially in relation to the arrangements for the tri-partite exchange of classified military information.

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

✓  
Enc.

JEB/5459/fp

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STATEMENT OF POLICY ON DISCLOSURE OF MILITARY  
INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

1. The recent U.S./U.K. agreement on the exchange and release of military information, together with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and developments in Commonwealth relations, make it desirable to restate the policy of the United Kingdom governing the disclosure of information to other countries.

DEFINITION OF MILITARY INFORMATION

2. "Military information" is defined as information which is the property or primary concern of the Service Ministries, the Civil Defence Department of the Home Office, and the Ministry of Supply, or is of defence interest. Its disclosure may take the form of the release of documents, the supply of equipment, attendance at courses or lectures or visits to establishments. It covers:-

- (a) Information concerning the armed forces, their organisation, strategic and tactical operations, equipment, strengths, locations, movements, morale and efficiency; policy and plans for the employment of the armed forces, strategy and tactics, techniques and training methods for their employment in peace and war; information concerning the security and defences (including civil defence) of the United Kingdom and Colonies; and any publications or documents dealing with the foregoing.
- (b) Scientific information, when this has resulted from fundamental research and development carried out under Government auspices or which has been allotted a security classification.
- (c) Technical information about equipment, materials, manufacturing processes and operational techniques.
- (d) Intelligence, that is to say knowledge of foreign countries possessed by the United Kingdom that is required for defence purposes or which might be of value in time of war. This covers information in all the fields specified in (a), (b) and (c) above; also information on economic conditions, industrial structure and production capacity; communications, harbours and any other topographical information of defence value.

POLICY FOR DISCLOSURE

3. (i) to the United States

The following principles apply to the release of information to the United States:

- (a) United States personnel are treated as our own over the disclosure of military information.
- (b) Requests for information from the U.S. authorities are granted whenever possible; an exception should be made only if the collecting of the information would be excessively laborious, or if there was some other very special reason.



SECRET

- (c) The necessity of keeping the U.S. authorities supplied with any military information that is likely to be of interest to them is continually borne in mind.

(ii) to other Countries

4. The policy towards other countries is that each proposed release of information is considered on its merits, bearing in mind:-

- (i) The "need to know" of the country for the information, which must be established in the light of its strategic role and of its ability or potential ability to contribute to the common defence in the fields of manpower, production or research and development.
- (ii) The standard of security of the country and consequent risk that release of the information will lead to its being compromised.

The authority for making the decisions is discussed later (paragraphs 9 - 26).

5. The Commonwealth. Our special relationship with the other countries of the Commonwealth means that we interpret their "need to know" widely, taking into account:-

- (a) the importance of keeping the Commonwealth informed of current developments so that all members can make the maximum contribution to the common defence;
- (b) the importance of our being able to make available to other Commonwealth nations the most up-to-date equipment issued to our own armed forces.

6. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Our special relationship with the other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - and our particular ties with the Western Union countries - require us also to interpret the "need to know" principle generously in their favour. The policy is to disclose information when it can be shown that the disclosure is essential for the achieving of the defence objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty.

7. Russia and the Satellites. No classified information is given to the following nations except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc:-

The Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia, (though Finland, not being a satellite or Communist country, may on occasion be treated differently; and similarly Yugoslavia might be considered for special treatment).

8. Other Countries. There may from time to time be reasons for giving special treatment, either favourable or unfavourable, to other countries. Proposals of this sort, or for any other modification of the policy laid down above, are put before the Exchange of Military Information Policy Committee.

*DIC or Security panel*

CONTROL OF DISCLOSURE

9. No control is exercised over information passed to the U.S. nor is any record kept centrally.

SECRET

10. The Exchange of Military Information Sub-Committee<sup>Ø</sup> has been set up to consider and record disclosures of information to countries other than the U.S. If a Ministry is not satisfied with the Sub-Committee's decision it may appeal to the Exchange of Military Information Policy Committee<sup>Ø</sup>. The following paragraphs say when Ministries may make their own decisions and when, on the other hand, reference to the Sub-Committee is necessary before the information may be disclosed.

(1) Information of U.K. Origin

11. The Ministry of Defence, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Ministry of Supply, and Civil Defence Department of the Home Office may authorise the release of information, in accordance with the policy laid down above within certain determined security limits. Any other Ministry wishing to release classified military information should normally consult one of the Ministries in the above list.

12. Any of these Ministries may also, at its own discretion, delegate the power to take decisions to Commanders-in-Chief, Heads of Service Missions and Service Liaison Staffs, and Service Attaches, within the permitted limits.

13. All releases of documentary information under the above rules must be reported to the E.M.I. Sub-Committee. For this purpose the release of documentary information is defined as the release of information in the form of maps, specifications, drawings or photographs, or any written communication containing a significant disclosure of new classified information, e.g. books, pamphlets, reports, committee papers and proceedings, official or demi-official letters, memoranda or telegrams.

14. Decisions by Ministries as described in paragraph 11 normally require the appropriate authority at Headquarters to approve the release of each item of information; but there are two ways in which this rule may be modified.

- (a) For the purpose of training personnel from other nations, the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry may authorise Commanding Officers to disclose classified information within the permitted limits provided that the information is a necessary part of an approved syllabus of instruction.
- (b) The Joint Intelligence Bureau may (as part of the Ministry of Defence) delegate to their representatives abroad the power to make decisions within the permitted limits.

15. Any Ministry wishing to disclose information outside the permitted limits must submit a case to the E.M.I. Sub-Committee first.

16. The detailed procedure for submitting and reporting cases to the E.M.I. Sub-Committee is given in Annex I. Questions on the procedure are put to the Sub-Committee who will refer them if necessary to the E.M.I. Policy Committee.

Ø Terms of Reference of the E.M.I. Policy Committee and E.M.I. Sub-Committee will be found at Annex III.

SECRET

(ii) Information of U.S. or Combined U.S./U.K. Origin

17. All possible steps must be taken to maintain the security classification of military information received from the U.S. or developed on a combined basis with them, and to safeguard the information accordingly.

18. It is a general principle that classified military information of U.S. or combined U.S./U.K. origin may be released to a third nation only with the specific consent of the U.S. This consent will be sought from the U.S. authorities by the E.M.I. Sub-Committee when a submission has been made to them on the appropriate form - see Annex I.

19. Certain exceptions to this rule have been agreed to by the U.S. and promulgated to the Ministries concerned. In these cases information may be released by a Ministry, provided that they are satisfied that it is in accordance with the policy in paragraphs 4 - 8 to do so, and that any documentary releases are reported to the Sub-Committee.

20. A special procedure has been agreed with the U.S. for declaring "projects" releasable, either to specific Commonwealth countries or to the Commonwealth as a whole. The word "project" is not defined in the agreement but is understood to include an agreed upon area of effort such as an undertaking to develop an item (a tank, an airplane, a weapons system, a radar system or a principal component thereof), a tactical or doctrinal procedure, a training programme or an intelligence study. Application for a project to be declared releasable is made through the E.M.I. Sub-Committee (see Annex I) who pass it on to the U.S. authorities. Information on a project that has been declared releasable to any country by agreement with the United States will be treated for the purpose of release to that country as if it were U.K. information. When a Ministry releases U.S. or combined U.S./U.K. information to a Commonwealth country under a releasable project, the origin of the information and the fact that the United States have approved its release are stated.

21. When a Ministry is in doubt about the origin of information it proposes to release to another country, it applies to the E.M.I. Sub-Committee who will if necessary seek the views of the U.S. authorities. When authority to release information of certain categories is delegated to Commanders-in Chief etc. (see paragraph 12), the Ministry concerned will ensure that the Commander-in-Chief etc. is informed of the origin of all information which he may be likely to wish to disclose.

22. For the purpose of this report combined U.S./U.K. military information is defined as follows:-

- (a) classified military information resulting or originating from projects developed on a combined basis, or
- (b) other classified military information which may from time to time be agreed to be combined on the grounds that:-
  - (i) the appropriate U.S./U.K. authorities have agreed to undertake separately different phases of a specific project, or
  - (ii) the appropriate U.S./U.K. authorities have agreed that one will assume sole project responsibility on behalf of both, or

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- (iii) the appropriate U.S./U.K. authorities have agreed at the outset of the project to adopt the best results of independent endeavours.

23. It has been agreed that information does not become combined U.S./U.K. information merely by virtue of its release by one country to the other.

24. Cases may arise where it is necessary to consult the United States authorities before releasing classified military information to another country, even though this is not required by the principle laid down in paragraph 18 (e.g. under the U.S./U.K./Canadian Standardization Agreements in which case the Canadian authorities must also be consulted). All such cases, unless there is a well-established channel for dealing with them (e.g. Communications electronics - see paragraph 26) are submitted through the E.M.I. Sub-Committee.

(iv) Information of Other Origin

25. It is a general principle that military information received from another country should retain its original security grading and should not normally be disclosed to a third country without the permission of the originating country.

(v) Communications Information

26. Information on communications electronics is an exception to the rules of procedure in paragraphs 19 - 24. Proposals for the release of information in this field are handled by the British Joint Communications Board and not by the E.M.I. Sub-Committee. The Board have their own arrangements for seeking U.S. approval where necessary.

INDUSTRIAL CONSIDERATIONS

27. It is important that patent rights should be safeguarded as far as possible when information is exchanged between Governments. There is a U.S./U.K. agreement covering patent rights; this and a general statement of policy governing the exchange of information with countries other than the United States will be found at Annex II.

OTHER CONDITIONS OF DISCLOSURE

28. Other countries that receive classified information from us are required to comply with the following security conditions:-

- (a) The information received should be safeguarded under rules designed to give the same standard of security as we maintain.
- (b) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient Government and for the use, under seal of secrecy, of approved contractors engaged on a relevant defence project. Disclosure to any other Government or release to the Press or in any other way would constitute a breach of these conditions of release.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

SEPTEMBER, 1950

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ANNEX I

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORWARDING APPLICATIONS TO THE  
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION SUB-COMMITTEE

Applications are to be forwarded to the Secretary, E.M.I. Sub-Committee whenever necessary under the conditions given in the report.

In the case of the Ministry of Defence (J.I.B.), Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, Ministry of Supply, and Home Office (Civil Defence Department) this will be done through the Ministry's representative on the E.M.I. Sub-Committee.

2. The following forms will be used:-

- |                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
| <u>E.M.I. Form "A"</u> | Application for decision as to the origin of classified information (normally to be submitted simultaneously with B or C). |
| <u>E.M.I. Form "B"</u> | Application for United States to agree to a project being "releasable to specified Commonwealth nations".                  |
| <u>E.M.I. Form "C"</u> | Application for permission to release classified information to a third nation.  |
| <u>E.M.I. Form "D"</u> | Record of classified documentary information released.   |

3. Applications for the release of documentary information or Forms A, B, or C should be accompanied by one copy of the document for scrutiny and return.

4. When the Sub-Committee has given a decision the Secretariat will return a copy of the form to the initiating Ministry with the decision noted on it. Where it is necessary to refer the matter to a U.S. or Combined authority for decision, the initiating Ministry will be sent a copy on which this fact is noted and will be sent another when the final decision has been given.

5. If the initiating Ministry wishes to appeal against a decision of the E.M.I. Sub-Committee, a copy of the form is to be returned to the Secretariat with a covering letter giving the grounds for appeal. The Secretariat will then place the matter before the E.M.I. Policy Committee.

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ANNEX II

INDUSTRIAL CONSIDERATIONS

(See paragraph 27 of the main report)

General

1. The industrial considerations relevant to any piece of information to be exchanged will depend on the following factors:-

- (a) its origin and ownership;
- (b) its intended recipient;
- (c) its security grading (classification);
- (d) its patentability;
- (e) any agreement between countries concerning its exchange.

2. Information may be Government-owned or privately owned; it may be security classified or un-classified; and it may be wholly patentable (i.e. the whole of the information relates to an invention which can be protected by a patent specification) or wholly unpatentable (e.g. performance data, test reports, mathematical analysis, manufacturing drawings, design data and "know-how") or it may be partly patentable and partly unpatentable.

3. The outstanding class of information of concern is classified patentable military information, and special attention requires to be paid to this class. At the present time no general agreement exists requiring the release by U.K. of information to any country other than the U.S.; in the following notes on the industrial considerations to be borne in mind in the exchange of information the U.S. has therefore been dealt with separately.

4. If information comprises manufacturing drawings and design data arising from work done under a development contract it should not be assumed without verification that this information is Government-owned, since the terms of the contract may provide that it remains the property of the contractor.

The United States

5. U.S./U.K. Agreement. The U.S. and the U.K. have agreed that each country should do everything legally possible to safeguard any patent rights in respect of such information passed to it by the other. The agreement is as follows:-

- "(a) Any rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in the recipient country in respect of the information communicated are not and will not be prejudiced by virtue of the introduction of the information into such country.

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- (b) The information, so long as it remains classified, will not be used or disclosed by the recipient country in any manner likely to prejudice the rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in respect thereof, but if the recipient country desires to use or to disclose the information in any manner likely so to prejudice the rights of the originator, then the recipient country will immediately notify the country of origin of the full circumstances of such intended use or disclosure, and such use or disclosure shall not be effected until approval is given by the country of origin.
- (c) Each country when so requested by the other and to the extent consistent with its laws and rules will use its best endeavours
- (1) to have maintained in secrecy any patent application filed in the recipient country in respect of the information for so long as may be desired by the country of origin, and
- (2) to supply reports of the manner in which the information embodied in a patent application has been used or disclosed."

*This should be automatic*

6. Information received from U.S. All possible steps must be taken in the U.K. to prevent any disclosure of information of U.S. origin coming within the terms of the Agreement, whether Government-owned or privately-owned, as might prejudice patent rights thereon. It is the responsibility of the U.S. originators and inventors to seek patent protection in the U.K. if they want it; it is the responsibility of U.K. Departments to arrange that any patent application for which the U.S. authorities request secrecy shall be prohibited under Section 18 of the Patents Act, 1949. Furthermore, the information must remain classified until the U.S. authorities declassify it, and may be transmitted only to Government departments and by them to their contractors under the fullest safeguards of the Official Secrets Act with the application of Contract Conditions 21 and 59 of the standard conditions of Government contractors. The information must not be disclosed to other persons or countries without the express sanction of the originators.

7. Records. As will be seen from paragraph (c) (2) of the U.S./U.K. Agreement it is incumbent upon U.K. departments receiving classified patentable information from the U.S. to ensure that records are kept of such information and of any use or disclosure made of it.

8. Information given to the U.S. The U.S. authorities are understood to offer similar safeguards to classified military information of U.K. origin. Such information if privately-owned must not be transmitted without the owner's consent. If a U.S. Patent is sought the U.K. Department concerned will be responsible for seeking a secrecy order on the patent application.

9. As regards unclassified information, to which the above-mentioned agreement does not apply, the position is that the burden of seeking open patent protection lies on the inventor or owner, there being no obligation

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on the recipient to take special action or precautions in regard to patent rights. These observations apply whether the information passes from West to East or vice versa. It follows that any U.K. information containing a non-classified invention of Service origin likely to be patentable should where practicable be brought to the notice of the appropriate department before the information is passed to U.S. Before transmitting to U.S. unclassified information not susceptible to patenting, consideration should be given to the remarks below in respect of like information exchanged with countries other than the U.S.

10. When transmitting Government-owned information to the U.S. the need for prior patent action, while still highly desirable where time permits, is not essential. If the information is privately-owned the consent of the owner must be secured before disclosure; failure to do so may not only lay H.M. Government open to claims but also prejudice the relations between interested Departments and private patent owners and others.

Commonwealth Countries

11. For classified information security arrangements exist with certain of these countries to enable patenting action thereon. The Commonwealth countries at present having such arrangements are Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It is for the U.K. Department concerned to invoke these arrangements where necessary; elsewhere the considerations are akin to those which apply to foreign countries, as set out below.

Foreign Countries

12. No arrangements exist to enable the secure patenting of classified patentable inventions in these countries; indeed not all the Patent Offices are themselves secure. Such information transmitted from the U.K. in respect of a classified invention (normally already the subject of a prohibited U.K. Patent Application), should be dealt with as in Paragraph 14 below unless the recipient Government undertakes to keep the information secret and to grant on request secret patent protection of suitable priority. No permission can be given to private patent owners to apply for patent protection on classified inventions at present.

13. In the case of patentable unclassified information the onus of patenting falls on the U.K. owner. U.K. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions the recipient Government should be referred to the owner, to negotiate terms.

14. If the information is wholly unpatentable, i.e. while commercially valuable it is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent specification, Government-owned information should only be supplied if we obtain a quid pro quo strategic, political or commercial. In the case of privately-owned information the foreign Government should merely be put in touch with the Owner, but if secret, the owner should be warned he should only communicate the information to accredited representatives of the foreign Governments who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

15. Some information is partly patentable and partly unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is classified and unpatentable, e.g. the layout dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing



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the general design, e.g. a magneto. The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 above, but in the case of privately-owned patentable information of this kind care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any classified information.

16. Departments who are negotiating with foreign governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

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ANNEX III

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF COMMITTEES

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION POLICY COMMITTEE

- (1) To keep under review (a) the policy for the exchange of classified military information with the United States and other nations; and (b) the policy for the release of classified military information to third nations, including the other nations of the Commonwealth.
- (2) To exercise a general supervision over the implementation by United Kingdom Departments of the rules governing the exchange and release of classified military information.
- (3) To consider on appeal individual proposals, to which objections have been made on security grounds, for the release of classified military information to third nations.

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION SUB-COMMITTEE

- (1) To consider, subject to such exceptions as may be laid down by the Exchange of Military Information Policy Committee, all proposals for the release of classified military information of United Kingdom, United States, or combined United Kingdom-United States origin to third nations, including other nations of the Commonwealth.
- (2) To determine, in cases of doubt, the origin of such information, to consider the security implications of the proposed releases, and to approve such proposed releases as accord in all respects with the rules laid down for the release of information to third nations.
- (3) To co-ordinate proposals for the release of classified United States or combined United Kingdom-United States military information, as necessary in the light of current procedure, and submit them to the appropriate authorities.
- (4) To keep such records as may be directed by the Exchange of Military Information Policy Committee of classified military information of United Kingdom, United States or combined United Kingdom-United States origin which is released to third nations, and to forward to the United States authorities such returns of information released as are called for by current agreements.

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PROPOSED REVISION OF E.M.I. TABLE Y

Procedure for Release of United States or U.S./U.K. Combined Information to Other Nations (Notes (ii) and (iii) )

Origin of Information	For release to:-	Type of Information	Action by Ministry	Action by E.M.I. Sub-Committee	Remarks
Uncertain	Any Nation	(1) Any information, the origin (U.S., U.K. or Combined) of which is in doubt.	Applies to E.M.I.S. for clarification as to origin on E.M.I. Form A	Decides upon origin, applying to U.S. authority (Note (i) ) for Agreement if necessary, and informs Ministry.	
	(Canada	(2) Any information except that related to Western Hemisphere defence	Releases information on own responsibility.		
	(	(6) Information up to and including SECRET, but excluding intelligence and R and D, when included in U.K. Training publications and instructions.	Releases information on own responsibility reporting details to E.M.I.S. on E.M.I. Form D	Records the information released.	Actual U.S. documents may not be released without prior U.S. permission.
	(	(7) Strategic Planning or Research and Development.	Applies to E.M.I.S. for project to be made "releasable" to specific Commonwealth Nation on E.M.I. Form B.		
	(	(8) Intelligence, tactical and technical doctrine, training and material (past R and D stage).	Applies to E.M.I.S. for project to be made "releasable" to all Commonwealth Nations on E.M.I. Form B.	Applies to U.S. authority (Note (i) through B.J.S.M. for project to be made releasable and informs Ministry of decision.	
United States	(Commonwealth				
or	(Countries other				
U.S./U.K. Combined	(than Canada				
	(	(9) Projects which have been agreed by U.S. as "releasable."	Procedure determined by Table X (exactly as if the information were of U.K. origin).		E.M.I.S. forwards periodic returns to authorities of documents released

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N.A.T.O. Countries	(10) Training and maintenance publications & established and published technical and tactical training and doctrine and material where necessary for adequate use of equipment already supplied or shortly to be supplied to the nation concerned.	Releases information on own responsibility reporting any documentary information released to E.M.I.S. on E.M.I. Form D.	Records the information released
Any Nation	(11) Any information not covered above (including any information under (7) or (8) not suitable for inclusion in a "releasable" project).	Applies to E.M.I.S. for permission to release on E.M.I. Form C.	Applies to U.S. Authority (Note (i) ) for approval of release, and informs Ministry of decision.

## Notes

- (i) The U.S. authorities will be approached through B.J.S.M., Washington, except for request to release information to N.A.T.O. countries, which will be made to the Joint American Military Advisory Group - Europe.
- (ii) The same rules apply to information of U.S./U.K./Canadian origin except that E.M.I. Sub-Committee must seek Canadian approval also, through the Canadian Joint Staff (London).
- (iii) See paragraphs 25 and 26 of the report for the definition of "combined U.S./U.K. information."
- (iv) The serial numbers have been retained from an earlier version of Table Y to avoid confusion. Serials (3), and (4), and (5) have now been removed and form the basis of Table X.

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- 5 -

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1950-4

T.S./T.D.

Signature

CSC 8-1-0 (JIC)

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

12 May, 1951

Referred to *Bluff*

MAY 19 1951

1550-10

File No.

Sgd to

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

Release of Information to NATO Countries

1. Under file CSC 8-1-0 (JIC) of 9 April I forwarded a UK draft proposed revision of the procedure for handling the release of combined US-UK-Canadian information to NATO countries. The JIC approved this revision, which was later concurred in by the Vice Chiefs of Staff (meeting 20 April).

2. A letter has been received from CJS, Washington (CJS(W) 275-2-1 of 7 May) notifying that the MIB is to meet on 15 May and that one of the items on the agenda is the procedure for the release of information to NATO countries. Since receiving Canadian concurrence in the UK proposed revision, CJS, Washington has received the following, which are attached:

*Done 18/5/51*

(a) JIC(W) 437 - UK Proposed Amendment.

(b) US Proposed Revision of MIB 4/2. (MIB 4/2 is the old procedure which the procedure noted in para 1 above revised).

3. CJS, Washington notes that the US will probably table their proposed revision and recommend its adoption in place of the UK proposal. The main difference appears to be the omission of the action required by para 2(b) of the UK proposal, i.e., "a statement in general terms of the Government's attitude to the standardization project".

4. CJS, Washington comments that unless advice is received to the contrary by 15 May, the Canadian representatives will raise no objections to the acceptance of the US proposed revision as it would seem that the statement noted in para 3 above is not of sufficient importance to press for its retention in the final agreement.

5. If there are any comments on this arrangement, may I please receive them by 1500 hours, Monday, 14 May, in order that they can be communicated to CJS, Washington before the MIB meeting. //

*J.E. Deswick*  
(J.E. Deswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Encs.

JEB/5459/fp

c.c. Secretary,  
Vice Chiefs of Staff.

COPY

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JIC (W) 437

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt.-Colonel Hannum  
Lt.-Colonel Ross

Procedure for Handling Proposals for the  
Release of Combined U.S./U.K./Canadian  
Classified Military Information to NATO  
Countries.

On 6th April I forwarded to each of you twelve copies of the draft paper which our combined Working Team hatched up as a result of the proposal made in my JIC (W) 203 dated 21st February.

2. Our draft paper has been considered by the U.K. authorities concerned in London who agree with it subject to two small changes. These are -

- (a) At the end of paragraph 2(b) and within the existing sentence, add the phrase "this statement to be made to the M.S.A.".
- (b) Paragraph 5, line 1, delete "or partially owned."

(Sgd) R.H.C. Bryers,  
Lt-Colonel  
Secretary  
UK MIB

23rd April, 1951

/M

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US Proposed Revision of MIB 4/2

PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING PROPOSALS  
FOR THE RELEASE OF COMBINED U.S.-U.K.-CANADIAN  
CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO NATO COUNTRIES

I. Proposals for the release of Combined Classified Military  
Information arising in the Military Standardization Agency

1. Any standardization project put forward on the M.S.A. could require the release of classified military information of U.S., U.K., Canadian and/or of combined origin.

2. Where information of combined origin is involved, the following procedure is prescribed: The delegate of each Government concerned will, when necessary, refer to his Service authorities for consideration the proposal and extent of the information desired to be released and the justification therefor. These Service authorities will forward to their MSA delegates for communication to the other owner countries, with a request for approval, a statement which includes:

- (a) Confirmation that the information is combined or details as to ownership.
- (b) An indication of whether the Government is prepared to authorize or acquiesce in release.

If, after the respective Governments have been consulted, the MSA delegate of one owner country is unable to accept the statement produced by another owner country required by paragraph 2 above, the MSA delegates concerned will come together in an attempt to resolve the problem. If the problem cannot be resolved, it will be open to the MSA delegate of the U.S. the UK or Canada to give notice that he proposes to ask his Government to refer the problem to the Military Information Board.

II. Proposals for the release of Combined Classified Military  
Information not relating to NATO Standardization.

Proposals to release to NATO countries combined classified military information not relating to NATO standardization will be handled as follows:

- (a) When the UK receives or initiates the request, the UK authorities will submit a case for the release of the information to the US and/or Canadian authorities, through the appropriate US military department and/or the CJS (London) who will obtain their Government's views and reply through the same channel.
- (b) When US receives or initiates the request, the US authorities will submit a case for the release of information to the UK and/or Canadian representatives in the US (BJSW and the CJS (Washington) who will obtain their Governments' views and reply through the same channel.

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- 2 -

- (c) When Canada receives or initiates a request, the Canadian authorities will submit a case for the release of information to the UK and/or US through CJS London and Washington respectively to obtain the views of the UK and US Governments who should reply through the same channel.

6. If agreement cannot be reached it will be open to any of the three Governments to refer the matter to the Military Information Board.

III. Classified Military Information owned wholly by a Government other than that receiving the request.

7. If A Government receiving a request determines that the information is owned wholly by another Government, the recipient Government will so inform the applicant.

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*DNFS 29/5/51. 1780-8*  
IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

CSC 8-1 (JIC)  
No. ....

# Department of National Defence

**SECRET**

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

27 April, 1951.

Referred to	<i>Staff</i>
APR 28 1951	
File No.	<i>1550-2</i>
Chg'd to	<i>Staff 16-8</i>

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

#### Release of JIB Information

1. The JIC proposal regarding the release of JIB information was considered at the 12th meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff. This Committee approves the addition of the following statement to the procedure governing the release of information to other countries:

"In the case of the release of JIB information of Canadian origin to another country, the authority of the Joint Intelligence Committee will be sought if the classification of the material is over and above the highest classification of information normally given to that country."

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp

14-0-4

Date extracted ..... 26 Apr 51

SECRET

Classification

VICE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE NSS 1550-2  
DEFENCE COUNCIL File Reference  
CABINET-DEFENCE COMMITTEE

- VCNS
- CNTS
- ③ A/CNS (Plans) *per 9.5*
- A/CNS (Air)
- CNP
- ② DNPO *80451*
- ① DNI
- DWT
- DN. COM
- DCNP
- A/CNTS (Works)
- A/CNTS (Ships)
- A/CNTS (Air)
- DGSFA
- DNPA
- DGNO
- DN. Inf.

The following extract from the minutes of the 12th meeting of the above committee held 20 Apr 51 is referred for information and necessary action.

*[Signature]*  
NAVAL SECRETARY.

VI. RELEASE OF JIB INFORMATION (SECRET)

23. The Committee had for consideration a communication from the Joint Intelligence Committee dealing with the release of JIB information.

(CSC 8-1, (VCS) dated 16 April 1951)

24. It was agreed, after discussion, to note with approval that the procedure governing the release of information to other countries, including those of the Commonwealth, would be amended by the addition of the following statement: -

"In the case of the release of JIB information of Canadian origin to another country, the authority of the Joint Intelligence Committee will be sought if the classification of the material is over and above the highest classification of information normally given to that country."

*[Signature]*

1980-4

.....*Secret*.....  
Classification

...*NL 1550-2*.....  
Reference

URGENT - BY HAND

Vice-CHIEFS OF STAFF CTE

DEFENCE COUNCIL

~~CABINET DEFENCE CTE~~

③ VCNS  
② ACNS  
DWT  
DNA  
D.N.Com  
DSS  
DNPO  
① DNI  
CNP  
DCNP  
DNR  
CNTS  
A/CNTS (W. & S)  
A/CNTS (Ships)  
A/CNTS (Air)  
DGFA  
DGNO  
SA/CNS

Request your comments hereon for V.C.N.S. please,  
and return to Room 3346 by pm. 19 Apr 51  
3722

*J. M. Walker*  
NAVAL SECRETARY

Date 17 Apr 51.....

*Recommended approval  
of this draft* *J. M. Walker*  
17/4

FILE NO. CSC 8-1, V. 3 (VCS)


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VICE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA.

DATE: 16 April 1951

MEMORANDUM TO: ✓ V.C.N.S.  
V.C.G.S.  
A.M.A.P.  
VDG/DRB




SUBJECT: Release of JIB Information

1. The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

Memorandum CSC 8-1, (JIC) dated 12 April 1951, from the Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee.

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of ~~the~~ an early meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee, ~~to be held~~ date to be notified later.

  
(H.G. Newsome)  
Wing Commander, RCAF  
Secretary

End.

Cc: Deputy Minister,  
Secretary to the Cabinet,  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

CSC 8-1 (JIC)

S E C R E T

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA


12 April, 1951.

The Secretary,  
Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Release of JIB Information

1. The existing procedure governing the release of information to Commonwealth countries, other than the UK, is that information up to CONFIDENTIAL can be released on a "need-to-know" basis, subject to evaluation in each case as to the actual benefit, direct or indirect, to be derived by Canada as a result. Although it is not normal, SECRET or TOP SECRET information can also be released if approved by the chief of staff of the service concerned. All information that it is proposed to release is first cleared with the appropriate director of intelligence.
2. This procedure, and the special provision which is under consideration for Australia, cover the three services, but no regulation covers the release of JIB information of SECRET or TOP SECRET classification. The JIC therefore proposes that the JIC be the authority for approving the release of SECRET or TOP SECRET JIB information.
3. To effect this, the JIC invites the CSC to note that it is intended to add the following provision to the procedures governing the disclosure of information to other countries, and the release of information to Commonwealth countries:

"In the case of the release of JIB information of Canadian origin, ~~to countries~~ over and above the top classification normally permitted for that country, the authority of the JIC will be sought."

  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp



PA

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

CSC 8-1 (JIC)

No. ....  
**SECRET**  
DATE 1/15/1

# Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

27 April, 1951.

Stamp: APR 28 1951  
12-57-2  
Signature: [illegible]

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

### Release of Information to Australia

1. The JIC proposal on the upgrading of the classification of information that can be released to Australia was considered at the 12th meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff. This Committee notes with approval that the procedure governing the release of information to Commonwealth countries will be amended as follows:

"Information of Canadian origin up to and including SECRET can be released to Australia, subject to the "need-to-know" principle, and after clearance by the appropriate Director of Intelligence (DMO&P in the case of the Army.) Subject to the same provisions, TOP SECRET information can be released on the authority of the Chief of Staff of the service concerned, and in the case of the JIC, on the authority of the JIC."

(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp

*Secret*

Classification

*NH.1550-2*

Reference

URGENT - BY HAND

Vice CHIEFS OF STAFF CTE

~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~

~~CABINET DEFENCE CTE~~

③ VCNS *W. H. M. M.*  
② ACNS  
DWT  
DNA  
D.N.Com  
DSS  
DNPO  
① DNI *W. H. M. M.*  
CNP  
DCNP  
DNR  
CNTS  
A/CNTS (W. & S)  
A/CNTS (Ships)  
A/CNTS (Air)  
DGFA  
DGNO  
SA/CNS

Request your comments hereon for V.C.N.S. please,  
and return to Room 3316 by *p.m. 19 Apr 51.*  
*3122*

*W. H. M. M.*  
for NAVAL SECRETARY

Date *17 Apr 51.*

*Recommend approval of  
this revised draft JLB  
D.V.I.  
17/4.*

TO REGISTRY:

Please place on File  
Or False Docket

Charge to Staff  
Return to

VCNS

*Dr. Lagimodière*

16/4/51

000548



FILE NO. CSC 8-1, (JIC) (VCS)

SECRET

VICE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA.

DATE: 16 April 1951.

MEMORANDUM TO: ✓ V.C.N.S.  
V.C.G.S.  
A.M.A.P.  
VDG/DRB


Referred to	<i>Staff</i>
APR 1951	
The no.	<i>1550-2</i>
Chg'd to	

SUBJECT: Release of Information to Australia

1. The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

Memorandum CSC 8-1, (JIC) dated 12 April 1951, from the Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee.

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of ~~the~~ an early meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee, ~~to be held~~ date to be notified later.

  
(G.H. Newsome)  
Wing Commander, RCAF  
Secretary.

End.

Cc: Deputy Minister,  
Secretary to the Cabinet,  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

CSC 8-1 (JIC)

S E C R E T

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

12 April, 1951.

The Secretary,  
Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Release of Information to Australia

1. At the 9th meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff the JIC proposals on the release of information to Australia were considered. The Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee instructed that the JIC memorandum should be re-submitted after some amendment. This memorandum is in compliance with this instruction.
2. Under the present procedure governing the release of information, information up to CONFIDENTIAL can be released to Australia on a "need-to-know" basis, subject to evaluation in each case of the actual benefit, direct or indirect, that Canada would derive as a result. SECRET or TOP SECRET information can also be released if approved by the chief of staff of the service concerned. All information is cleared with the appropriate director of intelligence before release.
3. The JIC has considered this procedure and as the US recently raised to SECRET the security level of information that can be freely released to Australia, the JIC now proposes the amendment of our procedure to allow the release to Australia, on a "need-to-know" basis, information of Canadian origin up to and including SECRET. TOP SECRET information would be released to Australia only on the approval of the chief of staff of the service concerned or, in the case of JIB, on the approval of the JIC. All classified information would continue to be cleared with the appropriate director of intelligence before release.
4. Accordingly, the JIC invites the CSC to note that the following amendment to the procedure governing the release of information to Commonwealth countries is intended:  
  
"Information of Canadian origin up to and including SECRET can be released to Australia, subject to the "need-to-know" principle, and after clearance by the appropriate director of intelligence (DMO&P in the case of the Army). Subject to the same provisions, TOP SECRET information can be released on the authority of the chief of staff of the service concerned and, in the case of the JIB, on the authority of the JIC."
5. May this matter please be considered by the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee at an early meeting.

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp

100-4-2

Date Extracted .... 26 Apr 51 .....

SECRET

Classification

VICE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE NSS 1550-2  
DEFENCE COUNCIL File Reference  
GABINET-DEFENCE-COMMITTEE

- VCNS
- CNTS
- (3) A/CNS (Plans) *on leave 295*
- A/CNS (Air)
- CNP
- (2) DNPO *8 May 51*
- (1) DNI
- DWT
- DN. COM
- DCNP
- A/CNTS (Works)
- A/CNTS (Ships)
- A/CNTS (Air)
- DGSFA
- DNPA
- DGNO
- DN. Inf.

The following extract from the minutes of the 12th meeting of the above committee held 20 Apr 51 is referred for information and necessary action.

*[Signature]*  
NAVAL SECRETARY.

V. RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO AUSTRALIA (SECRET)

21. The Committee had for consideration a report from the Joint Intelligence Committee on the release of information to Australia. This report had been submitted in accordance with the decision taken at the 9th meeting.

(CSC 8-1, (VCS) dated 16 April 1951)

22. It was agreed, after discussion, to note with approval that the procedure governing the release of information to Commonwealth countries would be amended as follows: -

"Information of Canadian origin up to and including SECRET can be released to Australia, subject to the "need-to-know" principle, and after clearance by the appropriate Director of Intelligence (DMO&P in the case of the Army.) Subject to the same provisions, TOP SECRET information can be released on the authority of the Chief of Staff of the service concerned, and in the case of the JIB, on the authority of the JIC."

1950-4-5

SECRET

NSS 1550-2


MEMORANDUM TO: DNIRELEASE OF COMBINED US/UK/CANADIAN INFORMATION TO NATO COUNTRIES

With reference to the amended UK proposal below it would now appear that the MSA will process requests for information. This partially covers "point 1" of the proposals put forward to DN STAN (attached) as the views of DNI prior to the MSA meeting in the UK. There still remains the awkward system of direct negotiations which must be accepted.

2. It is now felt that Canada might propose the drawing up of an agreed tri-partite list of specific items in certain fields up to the classification of Confidential on which prior clearance could be given by the US, UK and Canada possibly with the blessing of the MIB (point 2 of memo attached).

3. It is further considered that the JIC might recommend that all NATO countries with the exception of US, UK and Canada should receive the same classification of information (point 3 of memo attached).

4. It is considered that the UK proposals should be concurred in generally but that this might be a convenient time to raise the questions outlined in para 3 and 4 above for tri-partite discussions.



(J.H.S. Bovey)

Lieutenant Commander, RCN,  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

O t t a w a.  
10 April, 1951.

NSS 1961-2

SECRETMEMORANDUM TO: BN STAN

With reference to our conversations 9 and 10 January, the proposals put forward by the RN (D. Stan./P.D. 088/50 dated 28 November, 1950) and the USN (Op-001F/slr Serial 0176P001 dated 13 November, 1950) have been studied and it is agreed that the most workable arrangement would be to have all requests processed through the MSA and then forwarded by the established channels to the UK, US and Canada. In the case of Canada this would be CJS(L) to CSC.

POINT  
①

2. It is further considered that an agreed tripartite list of specific items in certain fields up to the classification of Confidential should be prepared by the US, UK and Canadian standardization authorities. Such a list, after clearance by proper Service and national security authorities, would require final clearance by the MIB. As the clearance of the items on the proposed list would take place in advance of any requests this would permit the immediate release of those items to the MSA for onward transmission as soon as the request is received in the UK, US and Canada. Requests for items not appearing in these lists would receive special treatment through the normal clearance channels.

POINT  
②

3. For the purpose of these clearances it is hoped to obtain agreement in the JIC that the NATO countries with the exception of the UK, US and Canada should all receive the same classification of information and that any item cleared for release to one NATO country can be released to any other without further clearance provided the requirement exists.

POINT  
③

4. It is important that the existence of the MIB and tripartite agreements should not be disclosed to other NATO countries or the MSA.

*J.C. Pratt*  
(J.C. Pratt),  
Commander, RCN,  
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

11 January, 1951.

CSC 8-1-0 (JIC)

SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

9 April, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

Release of Information to NATO Countries


1. I refer to my CSC 8-1-0 (JIC) of 4 April, 1951, on the release of combined US-UK-Canadian information to NATO countries. The draft proposed revision of the procedure for handling the release of combined US-UK-Canadian information was given preliminary consideration by the Secretaries of the MIB at a meeting on 3 April, and attached is a copy of the rewritten paper.

2. It will be noted that the former paragraph 9 has been rewritten as paragraph 5(c) and reflects the CJS, Washington view that UK and US views should be obtained through CJS, London, and CJS, Washington. CJS, Washington notes that it is considered that as neither the UK nor US representatives in Canada have been involved in this matter, it would be more expeditious to function through channels already operating.

3. As mentioned in my memorandum of 4 April, the procedure MIB 4/2 is the procedure that was approved at a meeting of the MIB on 15 November, 1950.

4. The MIB wishes to discuss at an early meeting the procedure for handling the release of information and the forwarding of comments on the rewritten paper as soon as possible, has been requested.

5. The attached procedure is for consideration at the meeting of the JIC on Wednesday, 11 April, 1951, in addition to the documents noted on the agenda.

*JEB*  
*12/4/51*  
  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

JEB/5459/fp

C O P Y

S E C R E T

PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING PROPOSALS FOR THE  
RELEASE OF COMBINED US/UK/CANADIAN CLASSIFIED MILITARY  
INFORMATION TO NATO COUNTRIES

I. Proposals for the release of Combined Classified Military  
Information arising in the Military Standardisation Agency

1. Any standardisation project put forward on the M.S.A. may call for the release of classified military information of U.S., U.K., Canadian and combined origin.
2. Where combined information is involved, the following procedure will be followed. The delegates of each Government concerned will, when necessary, pass back to their Service authorities for consideration the question of what information should be released and the reasons to justify the release. The Service Ministries concerned in each country will prepare and send the following statements:
  - (a) Confirmation that the information is combined or details as to ownership; whether the Government is prepared to authorize or acquiesce in release: this statement to be sent to the M.S.A. delegate of the country concerned for communication to the other owner-countries, with a request for approval.
  - (b) A statement in general terms of the Government's attitude to the standardisation project.
3. If, after the respective Governments have been consulted, one M.S.A. delegate is unable to accept a statement produced by another, the M.S.A. delegates concerned will meet together in order to discuss the difficulties. They will attempt to arrive at an agreed policy for the release of combined information, making further reference to their Governments if necessary. If agreement cannot be reached, it will be open to any M.S.A. delegate to give notice that he proposes to ask his Government to refer it for tripartite discussion in Washington on the Military Information Board.
4. Statement (b) will have to include a proviso that the release of information may be subject to the agreement of the other owner-countries. In some cases, owing to the need to arrive at a general policy before any details are disclosed, the statement will have to be confined to the fact that the project for standardisation is of combined interest, and is being discussed between the Governments concerned in the ownership of the information.

II. Proposals for the release of Combined Classified Military  
Information received through channels other than M.S.A.

5. When a request for combined or partly owned information is received from a N.A.T.O. country through any channel other than M.S.A., the procedure will be as follows:
  - (a) When U.K. has received the request the U.K. authorities will submit a case for the release of information proposed to the U.S. and/or Canadian authorities, through the representatives of those countries in the U.K. (J.A.M.A.G. and C.J.S. (London) who will obtain their Governments' views and reply through the same channel.

- 2 -

- (b) When U.S. has received the request the U.S. authorities will submit a case for the proposed release of information to the U.K. and/or Canadian representatives in the U.S. (B.J.S.M. and the CJS (Washington)) who will obtain their Governments' views and reply through the same channel.
- (c) When Canada has received a request the Canadian authorities will submit a case for the proposed release of information to the U.K. and/or U.S. through the CJS London and Washington respectively to obtain the views of the U.K. and U.S. Governments who should reply through the same channel.

6. If agreement cannot be reached it will be open to any of the three Governments to refer the matter in Washington to the Military Information Board.

III. Classified Military Information owned wholly by one Government

7. If a Government receiving a request decides that the information is owned wholly by another Government, the recipient Government will so inform the applicant.



1980-4-2  
CSC 8-1 (JIC)

SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

6 April, 1951.

Referred to *Staff*

APR 7 1951

File No. *1550-2*

*Staff* 28-3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

Release of Information to Australia

1. The matter of the release of information to Australia and the establishment of a direct channel of communication between the JIB Canada and the JIB Australia, as discussed at the 250th and 259th meetings of the JIC, was considered at a recent meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee approved in principle:

- (a) the establishment of a direct channel for the exchange of information between the Canadian and Australian JIBs; and
- (b) the visit of the Director, JIB to Australia to discuss details of the exchange of information and to study the organization of the Australian JIB.

2. However, the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee considered that the remarks on the release of information to Australia required clarification and, consequently, has instructed that the memorandum be re-submitted after it has been re-worded to apply to only the release of information to Australia. In this regard, I attach for your comments or approval drafts of memoranda to the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee.

3. This subject will be included on the agenda of the next meeting of the JIC.

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Encls.

JEB/5459/fp

DRAFT

CSC 8-1 (JIC)

SECRET

The Secretary,  
Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Release of Information to Australia

1. At the 9th meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff the JIC proposals on the release of information to Australia were considered. The Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee instructed that the JIC memorandum should be re-submitted after some amendment. This memorandum is in compliance with this instruction.
2. Under the present procedure governing the release of information, information up to CONFIDENTIAL can be released to Australia on a "need-to-know" basis, subject to evaluation in each case of the actual benefit, direct or indirect, that Canada would derive as a result. SECRET or TOP SECRET information can also be released if approved by the chief of staff of the service concerned. All information is cleared with the appropriate director of intelligence before release.
3. The JIC has considered this procedure and as the US recently raised to SECRET the security level of information that can be freely released to Australia, the JIC now proposes the amendment of our procedure to allow the release to Australia, on a "need-to-know" basis, information of Canadian origin up to and including SECRET. TOP SECRET information would be released to Australia only on the approval of the chief of staff of the service concerned or, in the case of JIB, on the approval of the JIC. All classified information would continue to be cleared with the appropriate director of intelligence before release.
4. Accordingly, the JIC invites the CSC to note that the following amendment to the procedure governing the release of information to Commonwealth countries is intended:



- 2 -

"Information of Canadian origin up to and including SECRET can be released to Australia, subject to the "need-to-know" principle, and after clearance by the appropriate director of intelligence <sup>(prop in case of Army)</sup> Subject to the same provisions, TOP SECRET information can be released on the authority of the chief of staff of the service concerned, and in the case of the JIB, on the authority of the JIC."

5. May this matter please be considered by the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee at an early meeting.

(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

D R A F T

CSC 8-1 (JIC)

S E C R E T

The Secretary,  
Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Release of JIB Information

1. The existing procedure governing the release of information to Commonwealth countries, other than the UK, is that information up to CONFIDENTIAL can be released on a "need to know" basis, subject to evaluation in each case as to the actual benefit, direct or indirect, to be derived by Canada as a result. Although it is not normal, SECRET or TOP SECRET information can also be released if approved by the chief of staff of the service concerned. All information that it is proposed to release is first cleared with the appropriate director of intelligence.
2. This procedure, and the special provision which is under consideration for Australia, cover the three services, but no regulation covers the release of JIB information of SECRET or TOP SECRET classification. The JIC therefore proposes that the JIC be the authority for approving the release of SECRET or TOP SECRET JIB information.
3. To effect this, the JIC invites the CSC to note that it is intended to add the following provision to the procedures governing the disclosure of information to other countries, and the release of information to Commonwealth countries:

"In the case of the release of JIB information of Canadian origin, to countries over and above the top classification normally permitted for that country, the authority of the JIC will be sought."

(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.



1950-4-5  
CSC 8-1-0 (JIC)

SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

4 April, 1951.

APR 6 1951  
1556-2  
Cgd to Staff 288

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

Release of Combined US-UK-Canadian  
Information to NATO Countries

- DOT/12/14/51*
1. I enclose a copy of a memorandum by the UK Secretary of the MIB, received from the CJS, Washington. The memorandum has attached a draft proposing the revision of the procedure for handling the release of combined US-UK-Canadian information. In paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 reference is made to a procedure set out in MIB 4/2. It is presumed that this is the procedure that was approved at a meeting of the MIB on 15 November, 1950, and confirmation of this has been requested.
  2. In the letter dated 23 March (received 29 March), CJS Washington requested comments as this item was to be considered at an early date by the MIB. On 30 March we received a message stating that the matter has been considered by members of the CJS Washington who recommend approval of the proposals.
  3. This matter will be considered at the next meeting of the JIC.

*K. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

JEB/5459/fp

000561

COPY

JIC(W) 203

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WATTS  
LT.-COLONEL ROSS

The United Kingdom authorities in London have been considering the effect of recent changes in the military side of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on the procedure for handling proposals for the release of combined information to N.A.T.O. countries. Their views are given in the following paragraphs.

2. On 15th January, 1951, the Military Standardisation Agency (M.S.A.) of N.A.T.O. held its first meeting. The Agency consists of three Service Boards served by representatives of all the interested NATO countries, and is the first NATO Agency for implementing standardisation under the Standing Group to include U.S. representatives as full members. As standardisation will necessarily involve the exchange of military information our authorities propose that immediate use should be made of this fact to simplify the procedure for handling proposals for the release of information of combined U.S./U.K./Canadian origin which arise from standardisation projects.

3. The present instructions drawn up in Washington for handling these requests are set out in M.I.B. 4/2. These are thought to be unnecessarily elaborate in their application to requests arising on the M.S.A., and also to be out of date to the extent that they refer to the Regional Groups of NATO which are to be dissolved and their material and standardisation functions taken over by the M.S.A.

4. A revised draft statement of the procedure in handling proposals involving the release of information of combined U.S./U.K./Canadian origin has therefore been prepared and is at Annex. This draft paper deals separately with:

- (i) proposals for standardisation arising on the M.S.A.;
- (ii) proposals for the release of information arising through other channels.

5. It is recognized that the proposals for dealing with requests received through channels other than the M.S.A., differ in many ways from the procedure laid down in M.I.B. 4/2; furthermore it is realised that the channels through which the United States and Canada should obtain clearance to requests sponsored by them (See Part II of the draft paper at Annex) are primarily for them to say.

6. I have been instructed to address this letter to you with the request that the United Kingdom proposals for the adoption of a procedure on the lines of the Paper at Annex be adopted by the U.S./U.K./Canadian Military Information Board in substitution for the current M.I.B. 4/2 procedure. Before actually tabling our draft paper in the M.I.B. I would suggest that the U.S. and Canadian authorities be asked each to appoint someone who could form an Ad Hoc Committee with me, in order to give preliminary consideration to the paper.

R.H.C. Bryers, Lt.-Colonel  
Secretary  
UK MIB

21st February, 1951

SECRET

000562

COPY

SECRET

ANNEX

PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING PROPOSALS FOR THE  
RELEASE OF COMBINED U.S./U.K./CANADIAN  
INFORMATION TO N.A.T.O. COUNTRIES

I. Proposals arising in the Military Standardisation Agency

1. Any standardisation project put forward on the M.S.A. may call for the release of information of U.S., U.K., Canadian and combined origin.
2. Information owned wholly by one country will be provided by that country through its delegates on the M.S.A. as required.
3. Where combined information is involved, the following procedure will be followed. The delegates of each Government concerned will pass back to their Service authorities for consideration the question of what information should be released. The Service Ministries concerned in each country will prepare and send the following statements: -
  - (a) A detailed statement of the extent to which information owned partly or wholly by other countries is concerned and of the reasons why it is proposed to release it: this statement to be sent to the M.S.A. delegate of the country concerned for communication to the other owner-countries, with a request for approval.
  - (b) a statement in general terms of the Government's attitude to the standardisation project to be made to the M.S.A.
4. If on advice from his Government one M.S.A. delegate is unable to accept the statement (a) produced by another, or if two or more different statements (a) are produced, the M.S.A. delegates concerned will meet together in order to discuss the difficulties. They will attempt to arrive at an agreed policy for the release of combined information, making further reference to their home Governments if necessary. If agreement cannot be reached, it will be open to any M.S.A. delegate to give notice that he proposes to ask his Government to refer it for tripartite discussion in Washington on the Military Information Board.
5. Statement (b) will have to include a proviso that the release of information may be subject to the agreement of the other owner-countries. In some cases, owing to the need to arrive at a general policy before any details are disclosed, it will have to be confined to a statement that the project for standardisation is of combined interest, and is being discussed between the Governments concerned in the ownership of the information.

II. Proposals for the release of combined information received through channels other than M.S.A.

6. When a request for information is received from a N.A.T.O. country through any channel other than M.S.A., the recipient authority will determine the reply that is proposed and the extent to which information owned partly or wholly by other Governments is involved. If the country receiving the request concludes that the information which it proposes to release is entirely of its own origin, the request will be answered direct through the channel through which it was received. If any information owned partly or wholly by other Governments is involved, the procedure will be as follows: -
7. When U.K. has received the request the U.K. authorities will submit a case for the release of information proposed to the U.S. and/or Canadian

-2-

authorities, through the representatives of those countries in U.K. (J.A.M.A.G. and C.J.S. (London) ) who will obtain their Government's views and reply through the same channel.

8. When U.S. has received the request the U.S. authorities will submit a case for the proposed release of information to the U.K. and/or Canadian representatives in the U.S. (B.J.S.M. and the C.J.S. (Washington) ) who will obtain their Government's views and reply through the same channel.

9. When Canada has received a request the Canadian authorities will submit a case for the proposed release of information to the U.K. and/or U.S. representatives in Canada who will obtain their Government's views and reply through the same channel.

10. In a case of dispute the country sponsoring the proposal may give notice, through the same channels as the first approach was made, that they propose to refer the case for further consideration on the Military Information Board in Washington.



CSC 8-2 (JIC)  
CSC 5-11-1 (JIC)

CONFIDENTIAL

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

3 April, 1951.

*Noted  
JP 12/4/51*

Referred to	<i>Staff</i>
APR 4 1951	
File No.	<i>1950-13</i>
Chg'd to	

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

Civil Defence Co-ordinator  
Release of Classified Information

1. I attach a letter on the marginally-noted from DAI, together with a draft letter to the Deputy Minister of National Health.
2. This subject will be included on the agenda of the next meeting of the Committee, date to be notified later. //

*J.E. Beswick*  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Encs.

JEB/5459/fp

C O P Y

CONFIDENTIAL  
S.22-7-2 (DAI)

28 Mar 51

M E M O R A N D U M

Secretary JIC

Civil Defence Coordinator - Release of Classified Information

1. Arrangements have been made to supply the Civil Defence Coordinator with Joint Intelligence appreciations etc as required. Most of the information provided is highly classified.
2. It will be necessary for the Civil Defence Coordinator to release some of this information to other Civil Defence Agencies. Information so released must be considered to be unclassified for all practical purposes. Since the information originates within the Department of National Defence, this Department must be in a position to exercise some control over what shall be released. This is particularly important now that the Civil Defence Co-ordinator has been transferred from this Department to Health and Welfare.
3. Attached is a draft of a proposed letter to the Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare stating the problem and suggesting an approach to it.
4. It is requested that this matter be included in the agenda of the next JIC meeting.

(Sgd.) W.W. Bean

DAI

G/C

Encl.

D R A F T

C O P Y

CONFIDENTIAL  
S.22-7-2 (DAI)

OTTAWA, 28 March, 1951.

Dear Sir:

Arrangements have been made to supply the Civil Defence Coordinator with Joint Intelligence appreciations etc as required. Most of the information provided is highly classified.

It is recognized that it will be necessary from time to time for the Civil Defence Coordinator to release certain of this information dealing with anticipated forms and scales of attack to other Civil Defence Agencies and the public. Since, however, the information originates within this Department it is felt that the form and content of such release should be agreed between the two Departments in advance.

It is suggested that preliminary discussions with a view to developing some practical working arrangement for the purpose be held between the Civil Defence Coordinator and/or his representative(s) and members of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Yours sincerely,

(C.M. Drury)  
Deputy Minister

Dr. G.D.W. Cameron,  
Deputy Minister of National Health,  
Jackson Building,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

1950-6-2

Date Extracted ..2.MAR.51.....

...~~TOP~~ SECRET.....


Classification

CSC 8-1 NATL 11550-2  
CNS 93  
File Reference

VICE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
DEFENCE COUNCIL  
CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE  
-----

VCNS	12/3
2) ACNS	10/3/51
DWT	
DNA	
D.N.Com	
DNPO	
1) DNI	7-3-51
DSS	
CNP	
DCNP	
DNR	
CNTS	
A/CNTS (W. & S)	
A/CNTS (Ships)	
A/CNTS (Air)	
DGFA	
DGNO	
SA/CNS	

The following is an extract from the minutes  
of the...9th..... Meeting of the above committee held  
24. February..51 Referred for information and necessary  
action.

  
NAVAL SECRETARY



VII RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO AUSTRALIA

(Top Secret)

20. The Committee had for consideration a memorandum from the  
Joint Intelligence Committee inviting the Committee:

(a) to note:

(i) that it is intended to upgrade the classification  
of information normally releasable to Australia  
from CONFIDENTIAL to SECRET; this information  
to be released under the same conditions as here-  
tofore, and TOP SECRET information to be released  
only with the approval of the Chief of Staff  
concerned;

(ii) that in the case of the Joint Intelligence Bureau,  
for release to any country over and above the  
normal top classification for that country, the  
authority of the Joint Intelligence Committee will  
be sought;

(b) to approve the following recommendations:

(i) that a direct channel of communication be  
established between JIB Canada and JIB  
Australia for the exchange of information  
on the basis of sub-paragraph (a) above.

(ii) that the Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau  
visit Australia to discuss details of the  
exchange of information and to study the JIB  
Australia organization.

.../000568

VII - RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO AUSTRALIA (cont'd)

- (iii) that in all cases of release to other countries, only the release of information of Canadian origin is intended.

(CSCG-1 dated 1 February, 1951)

21. The Representative of the Vice Chief of the General Staff observed that the wording of certain paragraphs of the memorandum was somewhat ambiguous. For example, it was not clear whether or not sub-paragraph 8(b)iii) referred to Commonwealth countries, apart from Australia; nor was the distinction between Australia and other Commonwealth countries clear in paragraph 3.

22. It was agreed, after further discussion:

(a) to approve in principle:

(i) the establishment of a direct channel for the exchange of information between the Canadian and Australian Joint Intelligence Bureaux.

(ii) the visit of the Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau, to Australia, to discuss details of the exchange of information and to study the organization of the Australian Joint Intelligence Bureau; and

(b) to instruct the Joint Intelligence Committee to re-submit their memorandum, amended so that it is applicable to only the release of information to Australia.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Classification

C8C 8-1 of 1 Feb/51  
Reference

**URGENT - BY HAND**

CHIEFS OF STAFF CTE  
~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~  
~~CABINET DEFENCE CTE~~

Referred to: *Staff CTS*  
FEB 5 1951  
File 1: *B11550-2*

VCNS	3
ACNS (P)	2
DWT	
DNA	
D.N.Com	
DSS	
DNP	
DNI	1
CMP	
DCNP	
DNR	
CNTS	
A/CNTS (W. & S)	
A/CNTS (Ships)	
A/CNTS (Air)	
DGFA	
DGNO	
SA/CNS	

Request your comments hereon for C.N.S. please,  
and return to Room 3316 by AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

*[Signature]*  
NAVAL SECRETARY

Date 2 Feb. 51.....

*Recommend commencement of  
amended memorandum to be  
submitted at meeting by Secretary.  
DNI & DNI Melbourne have an  
established link and therefore  
this will make little difference  
in procedure to the RCN - RAN  
interchange of information.  
Delay due to letter of 30<sup>th</sup> Jan  
(logged) being in error.*

*[Signature]*  
DNI  
19/1/51



~~TOP~~ SECRET

FILE NO. CSC CSC 8-1 (A/SEC)

~~TOP~~ SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS,  
OTTAWA.

DATE: 1 February, 1951.

MEMORANDUM TO: C.G.S.  
C.A.S.  
C.N.S. ✓  
C.D.R.B.

SUBJECT:

Release of Information to Australia

1. The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

Memorandum CSC 8-1 (JIC) dated 30 January, 1951,  
from the Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee.

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to be held. -----

*R. G. V. King*  
(H.S. Rayner) *H. G. L.*  
Commodore, RCN,  
Secretary.

Encl.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP~~ SECRET

CSC 8-1 (JIC)

~~TOP~~ SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

30 January, 1951.

The Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Release of Information to Australia

1. At the 250th meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee it was drawn to the attention of the Committee that the United States recently raised to SECRET the security level of information that can be freely released to Australia.
2. The existing procedure governing the release of information to Commonwealth countries, other than the United Kingdom, is that information up to CONFIDENTIAL can be released on a "need-to-know" basis, subject to evaluation in each case as to the actual benefit, direct or indirect, to be derived by Canada as a result. Although it is not normal, SECRET or TOP SECRET information can also be released if approved by the chief of staff of the service concerned. All information released to these Commonwealth countries is first cleared with the appropriate directorate of intelligence.
3. The Joint Intelligence Committee has discussed this procedure and, in the release of information to Australia, recommends that the procedure be amended to contain a special provision authorizing the release of Canadian information up to SECRET (and up to TOP SECRET information on the approval of the Joint Intelligence Committee), subject to the "need-to-know" principle.
4. The Joint Intelligence Committee further discussed the relationship between the Joint Intelligence Bureau, Australia, and the Joint Intelligence Bureau, Ottawa. At present we receive certain JIB Australia papers from the JIB London, but we do not pass any JIB Ottawa material to Australia either direct or through the United Kingdom, and there is no direct contact between the two JIBs.
5. The Joint Intelligence Committee is of the opinion that there would be many advantages to a direct channel between JIB Australia and JIB Ottawa. Of those discussed, the following advantages are noted:
  - (a) JIB Australia has accepted full responsibility from JIB London for all JIB-type intelligence on all parts of South and East Asia, including China and Burma, plus the Pacific Ocean area, including Indonesia. As an essential part of its organization, JIB Australia maintains a collecting agency

~~TOP~~ SECRET



- 2 -

in Singapore. The JIB Australia is consequently the principal source of JIB-type intelligence on the areas noted. Direct contact would be most desirable as it would enable us to obtain a great deal more information on this area and, in particular, to obtain quick answers to specific queries on that part of the world.

- (b) The considerable delay in receiving JIB Australia papers would be overcome.
- (c) The JIB Australia organization has a number of interesting features, and more detailed information on the working of this organization would be useful. Two of these features are:
  - (i) The military representatives attached to the JIB are also the military members of the JIS.
  - (ii) All photo interpretation work is undertaken by the JIB.

6. There is also a Joint Intelligence Office in New Zealand which is responsible for a limited area in the Southwest Pacific and which works very closely with the JIB Australia. Specific details about this office are not available, but it is assumed that their facilities would be made available if a direct channel to JIB Australia were arranged.

7. It is known that JIB London has always considered that other JIBs should have direct contacts, thus avoiding the need of carrying on liaison through London.

8. The specific recommendations, as noted below, are forwarded for the approval of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Joint Intelligence Committee recommends that:

- (a) the regulation governing the release of information to Commonwealth countries, other than the United Kingdom, be amended to contain the following special provision for Australia:

*No*  
"The release, on a 'need-to-know' basis, to Australia of Canadian information up to and including SECRET is authorized, subject to evaluation in each case of the actual benefit, direct or indirect, to be derived by Canada as a result. Information of TOP SECRET category can be released on the approval of the Joint Intelligence Committee, subject to the same provisions governing the release of SECRET information.";

- (b) approval be given to the JIB Canada establishing direct contact with the JIB Australia, thus enabling the exchange of information on the basis noted in sub-paragraph (a) above; and
- (c) when contact has been established, the Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau, visit Australia to discuss details of the exchange of information and to study the JIB Australia organization.

9. May this matter please be placed before the Chiefs of Staff Committee at an early meeting.

*R. Deswick*  
(J.E. Deswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp

000573

~~1161910-1504~~  
1950-4  
CSC 5-11-19-3

CONFIDENTIAL

JOINT SECURITY COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA.

28 Feb 51

Security-Defence Estimates

1. Forwarded herewith for your approval,  
draft letter for submission to the Minister by  
the Chairman, regarding the disclosure of  
information during the debate - Defence Estimates  
in the House.

*J Moore*  
(T. Moore) Major  
Secretary

TL/5934/ja

Joint Security Committee

DEI  
DNI  
DAI  
DSI - Mr. C.G. Jones

GSC 5-11-19-3

CONFIDENTIAL

Minister

Security-Defence Estimates

Reference your memorandum attached.

1. I have had the Joint Security Committee, on behalf of the Chiefs of Staff Committee consider the request regarding the disclosure of information in connection with the defence estimates.
2. The Joint Security Committee feels that the need for security is now greater than in past years, and suggest that Cabinet Document D-120 paras 7 and 8 be used as a general guide governing the disclosure of information. Copy of this document is attached.
3. This matter was further discussed at the 472nd Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee 30 August 1950 at which time the Chiefs agreed after discussion to recommend "that no further information concerning the location of units or special equipment such as radar installations, should be made public, and that only totals of personnel and aircraft and ships, without any breakdown by units or types, should be made known. Similarly, in the matter of production, total equipment ordered should only be related to total funds provided for such equipment, without any indication of the precise type of equipment or the present or anticipated rates of production."
4. I concur with these views.

Lieutenant-General  
Chairman

000575

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

5-11-19-4

5-11-25

Chairman,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee

February 24, 1951.

In connection with the presentation of the estimates, I would naturally like to give just as much information as I can. One difficulty, of course, is that our forces are modelled in U.K. or U.S. patterns and any information we give about ours is usually applicable to one or the other.

In the past I have been advised not to give the following information:

- (a) the establishment, strength, state of training, mobilization equipment of active force units;
- (b) the composition of a reserve force division;
- (c) the number, location and range of radar stations.

I cannot think of any other information that I have refused to give.

On several previous occasions the Chiefs of Staff have given me advice on this question.

In the Parliament at Westminster, the government has consistently refused to give all information of this class and indeed, a good deal more, including:

- (a) the number of personnel serving abroad;
- (b) the number of ships in commission;
- (c) the location of ships.

In the United States service rules are similar, but from time to time additional information is given in Congress though I do not believe that much information is given of the



character mentioned here.

I would be glad if the Chiefs would review this matter and let me have their advice.

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

5-11-19-4

5-11-25

Chairman,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee

February 24, 1951.

In connection with the presentation of the estimates, I would naturally like to give just as much information as I can. One difficulty, of course, is that our forces are modelled in U.K. or U.S. patterns and any information we give about ours is usually applicable to one or the other.

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- (a) the number of personnel serving abroad;
- (b) the number of ships in commission;
- (c) the location of ships.

In the United States service rules are similar, but from time to time additional information is given in Congress though I do not believe that much information is given of the

000578

character mentioned here.

I would be glad if the Chiefs would review this matter and let me have their advice.

Minister

Security Defence Estimates

Reference your memorandum attached.

1. I have had the Joint Security Committee, on behalf of the Chiefs of Staff Committee consider the request regarding the disclosure of information in connection with the defence estimates.
2. The Joint Security Committee feel that the need for security is <sup>now</sup> as great ~~at this time if not~~ greater than in past years, and suggest that Cabinet Document D-120 paras 7 and 8 be used as a general guide governing the disclosure of information. Copy of this document is attached.
3. In addition to the information referred to in D-120 it would appear reasonable to refuse information on such subjects as, regular and reserve unit strengths as <sup>opposed</sup> ~~approved~~ to overall Service strength figures, production figures of aircraft, ships, military vehicles, radar and the like, the capacity of training schools and the operational locations of units.
4. I concur with the views of the Joint Security Committee.

Lieutenant-General  
Chairman  
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

*2 Jan #2 / 472 minutes / PCE*



CSC 8-1 (JIC)

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

20 February, 1951.

The Secretary,  
Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Release of Information to Australia

1. Certain proposals affecting the regulations governing the release of information to Australia are contained in the letter CSC 8-1 (JIC) of 30 January, 1951. As this letter does not clearly express the recommendations of the Joint Intelligence Committee the matter was considered again at a meeting of the Committee on 19 February, and the following recommended amendments result:

Delete para 3 and substitute:

"3. The Joint Intelligence Committee now proposes to release to Australia information up to and including SECRET classification on a "need to know" basis, it being understood that as heretofore all classified information passed to other Commonwealth countries except the United Kingdom is first cleared with the appropriate directorate of intelligence. Top Secret information would continue to be released to Australia only with the approval of the Chief of Staff concerned or, in the case of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, with the approval of the Joint Intelligence Committee."

Delete para 8 and substitute:


"8. Accordingly, the Joint Intelligence Committee

- (a) invites the Chiefs of Staff Committee to take note
  - (i) that it is intended to upgrade the classification of information normally releasable to Australia from Confidential to Secret; this information to be released under the same conditions as heretofore and Top Secret information to be released only with the approval of the Chief of Staff concerned.
  - (ii) that in the case of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, for releases to any country over and above the normal top classification for that country, the authority of the JIC will be sought.

- 2 -

(b) recommends that:

- (i) approval be given to the JIB Canada establishing direct contact with the JIB Australia, thus enabling the exchange of JIB-type information on the basis noted in sub-paragraph (a) above;
- (ii) when contact has been established, the Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau, visit Australia to discuss details of the exchange of information and to study the JIB Australia organization; and
- (iii) in all cases of release to other Commonwealth countries, only the release of information of Canadian origin is intended.

  
(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp

CSC 8-1 (JIC)

~~TOP SECRET~~

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

19 February, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

Release of Information to Australia

1. I refer to the minutes of the 250th meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee on the subject of the release of information to Australia. The proposals of the Joint Intelligence Committee will be considered at the meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee on 20 February.
2. Attached at Flag A is a copy of the letter to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, outlining the recommendations of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Attention has been drawn to the need for clarification of certain portions of this letter, and attached at Flag B is a copy of a memorandum from the Director of Air Intelligence setting out amendments to the letter at Flag A.
3. This matter will be raised as an additional item for discussion at the meeting of the Committee on 19 February.

*J.E. Paswick*  
(J.E. Paswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Encs.

JEB/5459/ep

000583

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

16 Feb 51

Secretary  
Joint Intelligence Committee

Release of Information to Australia

1 Reference is made to your memorandum of 30 January, 1951 reference CSC 8-1 (JIC) addressed to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is felt that in certain respects this memorandum does not clearly reflect the decision of the Joint Intelligence Committee taken at the 250th meeting. This feeling has been expressed also by other members of the Committee.

2 It is suggested therefore that the memorandum be amended as follows:

Delete para 3 and substitute:

"3 The Joint Intelligence Committee now proposes to release to Australia information up to and including SECRET classification on a "need to know" basis, it being understood that as heretofore all classified information passed to other Commonwealth countries except the UK is first cleared with the appropriate Directorate of Intelligence. Top Secret information would continue to be released to Australia only with the approval of the Chief of Staff concerned or, in the case of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, with the approval of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Delete present para 8 and insert:

"8 Accordingly, the Joint Intelligence Committee

(a) invites the Chiefs of Staff Committee to take note

(i) that it is intended to upgrade the classification of information normally releasable to Australia from Confidential to Secret; this information to be released under the same conditions as heretofore and Top Secret information to be released only with the approval of the Chiefs of Staff concerned.

(ii) that in the case of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, releases to any country over and above the normal top classification for that country, the authority of the JIC will be sought.

(iii) *In all cases of release to Commonwealth countries only be release of C.M. Material is intended*  
(b) recommends that:

(i) approval be given to the JIB Canada establishing direct contact with the JIB Australia, thus enabling the

..... 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

exchange of information on the basis  
noted in sub-paragraph (a) above; and

- (ii) when contact has been established,  
the Director, Joint Intelligence  
Bureau, visit Australia to discuss  
details of the exchange of information  
and to study the JIB Australia  
organization.

(W W Bean) G/C  
DAI

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

A

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

30 January, 1951.

The Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee.Release of Information to Australia

1. At the 250th meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee it was drawn to the attention of the Committee that the United States recently raised to SECRET the security level of information that can be freely released to Australia.
2. The existing procedure governing the release of information to Commonwealth countries, other than the United Kingdom, is that information up to CONFIDENTIAL can be released on a "need-to-know" basis, subject to evaluation in each case as to the actual benefit, direct or indirect, to be derived by Canada as a result. Although it is not normal, SECRET or TOP SECRET information can also be released if approved by the Chief of Staff of the service concerned. All information released to these Commonwealth countries is first cleared with the appropriate directorate of intelligence.
3. The Joint Intelligence Committee has discussed this procedure and, in the release of information to Australia, recommends that the procedure be amended to contain a special provision authorizing the release of Canadian information up to SECRET (and up to TOP SECRET information on the approval of the Joint Intelligence Committee), subject to the "need-to-know" principle.
4. The Joint Intelligence Committee further discussed the relationship between the Joint Intelligence Bureau, Australia, and the Joint Intelligence Bureau, Ottawa. At present we receive certain JIB Australia papers from the JIB London, but we do not pass any JIB Ottawa material to Australia either direct or through the United Kingdom, and there is no direct contact between the two JIB's.
5. The Joint Intelligence Committee is of the opinion that there would be many advantages to a direct channel between JIB Australia and JIB Ottawa. Of those discussed, the following advantages are noted:
  - (a) JIB Australia has accepted full responsibility from JIB London for all JIB-type intelligence on all parts of South and East Asia, including China and Burma, plus the Pacific Ocean area, including Indonesia. As an essential part of its organization, JIB Australia maintains a collecting agency

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

in Singapore. The JIB Australia is consequently the principal source of JIB-type intelligence on the areas noted. Direct contact would be most desirable as it would enable us to obtain a great deal more information on this area and, in particular, to obtain quick answers to specific queries on that part of the world.

- (b) The considerable delay in receiving JIB Australia papers would be overcome.
- (c) The JIB Australia organization has a number of interesting features, and more detailed information on the working of this organization would be useful. Two of these features are:
  - (i) The military representatives attached to the JIB are also the military members of the JIS.
  - (ii) All photo interpretation work is undertaken by the JIB.

6. There is also a Joint Intelligence Office in New Zealand which is responsible for a limited area in the Southwest Pacific and which works very closely with the JIB Australia. Specific details about this office are not available, but it is assumed that their facilities would be made available if a direct channel to JIB Australia were arranged.

7. It is known that JIB London has always considered that other JIBs should have direct contacts, thus avoiding the need of carrying on liaison through London.

8. The specific recommendations, as noted below, are forwarded for the approval of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Joint Intelligence Committee recommends that:

- (a) the regulation governing the release of information to Commonwealth countries, other than the United Kingdom, be amended to contain the following special provision for Australia:

"The release, on a 'need-to-know' basis, to Australia of Canadian information up to and including SECRET is authorized, subject to evaluation in each case of the actual benefit, direct or indirect, to be derived by Canada as a result. Information of TOP SECRET category can be released on the approval of the Joint Intelligence Committee, subject to the same provisions governing the release of SECRET information.";

- (b) approval be given to the JIB Canada establishing direct contact with the JIB Australia, thus enabling the exchange of information on the basis noted in sub-paragraph (a) above; and
- (c) when contact has been established, the Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau, visit Australia to discuss details of the exchange of information and study the JIB Australia organization.

9. May this matter please be placed before the Chiefs of Staff Committee at an early meeting.

(Sgd) J.E. Beswick

(J.E. Beswick)  
Major,  
Secretary.

JEB/5459/fp

000587

.....*Secret*.....  
Classification

CSC 8-1 Vol. 3 of 19/1/51  
Reference

URGENT - BY HAND

VICE CHIEFS OF STAFF CTE

~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~

~~CABINET DEFENCE CTE~~

VCNS	3
ACNS (P)	2
DWT	
DNA	
D.N.Com	
DSS	
DNPO	
DNI	1
CNP	
DCNP	
DNR	
CNTS	
A/CNTS (W. & S)	
A/CNTS (Ships)	
A/CNTS (Air)	
DGFA	
DGNO	
SA/CNS	

Request your comments hereon for C.N.S. please,  
and return to Room 3316 by ~~16/1/51~~ - 22/1/51  
1100

*[Signature]*  
NAVAL SECRETARY

Date 20 Jan. 51.....

MEMO TO:

ACNS (P)  
VCNS

Approval of the proposed procedure for handling  
NATO requests for information is recommended.

2. From a practical point of view, almost all requests for information addressed to Canada will require concurrence of UK and US authorities particularly in view of the Tripartite Standardization Agreement. It is therefore hoped that a list of agreed standardization items up to the classification of Confidential can be prepared and cleared in advance in order to cut down the delays which will result from the necessity of obtaining UK, US and Canadian agreement on individual items.

3. Attached for information is a copy of a memorandum forwarded to DN STAN prior to his departure to the MSA conference in London.

*[Signature]*  
(J.C. Pratt)  
Commander, RCN,  
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.



NSS 1961-2

SECRETMEMORANDUM TO: IN STAN

With reference to our conversations 9 and 10 January, the proposals put forward by the RN (D. Stan./P.D. 088/50 dated 28 November, 1950) and the USN (Op-001F/slr Serial 0176P001 dated 13 November, 1950) have been studied and it is agreed that the most workable arrangement would be to have all requests processed through the MSA and then forwarded by the established channels to the UK, US and Canada. In the case of Canada this would be CJS(L) to CSC.

2. It is further considered that an agreed tripartite list of specific items in certain fields up to the classification of Confidential should be prepared by the US, UK and Canadian standardization authorities. Such a list, after clearance by proper Service and national security authorities, would require final clearance by the MIB. As the clearance of the items on the proposed list would take place in advance of any requests this would permit the immediate release of those items to the MSA for onward transmission as soon as the request is received in the UK, US and Canada. Requests for items not appearing in these lists would receive special treatment through the normal clearance channels.

3. For the purpose of these clearances it is hoped to obtain agreement in the JIC that the NATO countries with the exception of the UK, US and Canada should all receive the same classification of information and that any item cleared for release to one NATO country can be released to any other without further clearance provided the requirement exists.

4. It is important that the existence of the MIB and tripartite agreements should not be disclosed to other NATO countries or the MSA.

(J.C. Pratt),  
Commander, RCN,  
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

11 January, 1951

000589

FILE NO. CSC 8-1 Vol. 3

VICE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA.

DATE: 19th January, 1951

MEMORANDUM TO: ✓ V.C.N.S.  
V.C.G.S.  
A.M.A.P.  
VDG/DRB

SUBJECT: Release of Information to NATO Nations  
and Regional Planning Groups

1. The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

Memorandum JIC 14-2-1 dated the 15th January, 1951 and its enclosure from the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

1430 -  
22 Jan. 2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee to be held at 1000 hours on Tuesday 23rd January, 1951 in the office of the Air Member for Air Plans.



(G.H. Newsome)  
Wing Commander, RCAF,  
Acting Secretary.

End.

cc: Deputy Minister,  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
Secretary to the Cabinet.

JIC 14-2-1

S E C R E T

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

15 January, 1951.

The Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Release of Information to NATO Nations  
and Regional Planning Groups

1. I refer to the attached Appendix "A" which is a copy of the procedure for processing requests from NATO nations and Regional Planning Groups for information of combined US-UK, US-Canadian, UK-Canadian, or US-UK-Canadian origin as approved by the Military Information Board on 15 November, 1950.

2. This subject has been considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee which recommends that the Chiefs of Staff Committee:

- (a) concur in the procedure; and
- (b) approve the DND internal procedure as outlined in Appendix "B" attached.

3. To complete the necessary arrangements with the Canadian Joint Staff, London, and the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, the procedure for forwarding requests should be notified to the Canadian Joint Staff, London, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee concurrence in the procedure should be notified to the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington. Attached in this regard as Appendices "C" and "D" are draft letters to the Canadian Joint Staffs, London and Washington.

  
(J.E. Beswick)

Major,  
Secretary.

Encs.

000591

APPENDIX "A"  
to JIC 14-2-1  
d/15 January, 1951

S E C R E T

PROCEDURE FOR PROCESSING REQUESTS FROM NATO  
NATIONS AND REGIONAL PLANNING GROUPS FOR IN-  
FORMATION OF COMBINED US-UK, US-CANADIAN,  
UK-CANADIAN OR US-UK-CANADIAN ORIGIN

REQUESTS THROUGH REGIONAL PLANNING GROUPS

1. General

This paper explains the procedure to be followed when a NATO Nation desires military information for North Atlantic Treaty Organization purposes which is considered to be of combined US-UK, US-Canada, UK-Canada or US-UK-Canadian origin.

2. Action Taken on European Regional Planning Group  
Requests

A request from the Nation concerned is placed before the appropriate European Regional Planning Group. The Group will direct the request to the delegation (US, UK or Canadian) which it considers to have the information desired. The delegation receiving the request will, in all cases, furnish copies of the request to the other two delegations. Any one delegation which considers the request to be of combined origin will so inform the other two delegations and the procedures detailed below will be followed:

(a) US Action

The Director, JAMAG will forward this request with his recommendation to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army, Washington. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army will obtain the US views and co-ordinate the US views with the BJSM and the CJS(W). This co-ordination will include a determination of the Nation or Nations having ownership in the information.

(b) UK Action

The appropriate UK representative will forward this request with his recommendations to this parent Service Ministry. The Ministry will advise BJSM of their decision or views for co-ordinating action and at the same time will pass a copy to the UK delegation for the information of JAMAG and CJS (London).

(c) Canadian Action

The appropriate CJS(L) representative will forward this request with his recommendation to the Department of National Defence, Ottawa. The Department of National Defence will advise CJS(W) of their views or decision for co-ordinating action and at the same time pass a copy to CJS (London) for information of JAMAG and UK Delegation.

- 2 -

(d) MIB Action

In the event the views of one or more of the nations differ as to whether or not the subject is information of combined origin or as to whether the request should be met, the matter may be referred to the US-UK-Canadian MIB by a member for resolution.

(e) Final Action

Co-ordinated views are passed back through reverse channels to the three Delegations. The Delegation initially receiving the request will provide the appropriate European Regional Group with the release or denial of the request. If the release or denial of the information is the result of combined action (US-UK, Canada-UK, Canada-US, or UK-US-Canada), the release or denial will so state, and copies thereof will be furnished the other Delegation(s) concerned.

3. Action Taken on North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Planning Group Requests

Requests from Member nations of NAOR Planning Group or from Committees of NAOR Planning Group, will be passed to the US Navy to obtain concurrence or denial to release from the UK and Canada through the medium of the BJSM(Washington) and CJS (Washington). In the event the US, UK and Canadian views differ on the proposed release, US Navy will refer this matter to the MIB for consideration.

4. Action Taken on Requests Submitted Direct to US, UK or Canada by NATO Nations

When a request to UK, Canada or US for combined information is received direct from a NATO Nation such requests will be referred to the Delegations of US, UK and Canada to the Regional Planning Group. The procedure indicated in paragraph 2 will be followed.

5. Concurrent Action

The communication of the National views of UK and Canada to their Washington Staffs will be as nearly concurrent as is possible with JAMAG's reference of the requests to Washington.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

25 August, 1950.

APPENDIX "B"  
to JIC 14-2-1  
d/15 January, 1951

S E C R E T

REQUESTS FROM NATO NATIONS AND REGIONAL  
PLAINING GROUPS FOR INFORMATION

Department of National Defence  
Internal Procedure

1. All requests will be addressed to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, who will appoint an individual within the Joint Staff and Secretariat to be responsible for the handling of all requests.
2. The Joint Staff and Secretariat is authorized by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to represent the Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of clearing all information (including information on standardization) with the three services and the Defence Research Board.
3. For this purpose, the Joint Staff and Secretariat will deal only with the following:
  - (a) Requests involving only one service

Navy	-	DNI
Army	-	DMO & P
Air Force	-	DAI
Defence Research Board	-	DSI.
  - (b) Requests of a joint nature or requiring action by more than one service

The Joint Staff and Secretariat will co-ordinate in the manner most appropriate; namely:

    - (i) by circulating the request to the services and the Defence Research Board as necessary; or
    - (ii) by referring the request to a committee consisting of representatives of DNI, DMO & P, and DAI. Other representatives concerned with any particular item will attend as required.

Records

4. (a) The Joint Staff and Secretariat will keep only the minimum of records required to keep track of the requests.
- (b) Each service and the Defence Research Board will keep the full records concerning requests. These records should be designed to quickly reveal details of information released.

- 2 -

Procedure

5. (a) On receipt of a request in the Joint Staff and Secretariat, it will be referred immediately to the appropriate service, services (including the Defence Research Board), or joint committee.
- (b) The request will then be processed by the service or committee referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above. If this is likely to take longer than seven days, the Joint Staff and Secretariat will be notified accordingly.
- (c) Recommendations will then be passed to the Joint Staff and Secretariat which will, if necessary, co-ordinate the recommendations.
- (d) The Joint Staff and Secretariat will forward the Department of National Defence view or decision to the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, for co-ordination, with a copy to the Canadian Joint Staff, London, (for the information of JAMAG and the U.K. Delegation).
- (e) The final decision will be received by the Joint Staff and Secretariat from the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington.
- (f) The Joint Staff and Secretariat will pass the decision to the Canadian Joint Staff, London, and at the same time will notify the decision to the agency or agencies in the Department of National Defence to which the request was originally referred.

5 January, 1951.

D R A F T

APPENDIX "C"  
JIC 14-2-1  
d/15 January, 1951  
S E C R E T

The Chairman,  
Canadian Joint Staff,  
1700 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Requests from NATO Nations and Regional  
Planning Groups for Information

1. Reference your CJS 202-14 dated 17 November, 1950, and enclosed procedure for processing requests from NATO nations and Regional Planning Groups for information. The Chiefs of Staff Committee concurs in this arrangement and agrees that it should be adopted forthwith.
2. In connection with paragraph 2(d) of the procedure regarding Military Information Board action, it is presumed that all dealings with the Military Information Board will be by the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, and that the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, will notify the Department of National Defence of Military Information Board decisions.
3. All correspondence connected with these requests for information is to be directed through the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee. For your information, attached is a copy of the internal arrangements for handling requests within the Department of National Defence.
4. Also attached, for your information, is a copy of the instruction to be sent to the Canadian Joint Staff, London, in conformance with paragraph 3 of your letter referred to above.

Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Encs.



D R A F T

APPENDIX "D"

JIC 14-2-1

d/15 January, 1951.

S E C R E T

The Chairman,  
Canadian Joint Staff,  
LONDON, England.

Requests from NATO Nations and Regional  
Planning Groups for Information

1. Attached is a copy of the procedure for processing requests from NATO nations and Regional Planning Groups for information of combined US-UK, US-Canadian, UK-Canadian or US-UK-Canadian origin, as agreed upon at a meeting of the Military Information Board on 15 November, 1950. The Chiefs of Staff Committee concurs in this arrangement and agrees that it should be adopted forthwith.
2. Requests received by the Canadian Joint Staff, London, will be forwarded (in six copies) to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, and final decision on the release or denial of the requested information will be sent by the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London. For your information, attached is a copy of the internal arrangements for handling requests within the Department of National Defence.
3. Attention is drawn to the following sentence which is repeated from paragraph 2(c) of the procedure mentioned above:

"The Department of National Defence will advise the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, of their views or decision for co-ordinating action and, at the same time, pass a copy to the Canadian Joint Staff, London, for information of JAMAG and the UK Delegation."

It must be understood that the copy of the message sent to the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, is the Department of National Defence recommendation and is passed to the Canadian Joint Staff, London, for information only. It is not the final decision on the request.

Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Date Extracted ..... 3 Feb 51

SECRET

Classification

Vice-CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~

~~CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE~~

S - 1550-2

File Reference

- VCNS *See 3.2*
- CNTS
- ② A/CNS (Plans) *See 4.2*
- A/CNS (Air)
- CNP
- DNPO
- ① DNI *See 1.1/2*
- DWT
- DN. COM
- DCNP
- A/CNTS (Works)
- A/CNTS (Ships)
- A/CNTS (Air)
- DGSFA
- DNPA
- DGNO
- DN. Inf.

The following extract from the minutes of the ...7th..... meeting of the above committee held 22 Jan 51 is referred for information and necessary action.

*See Waller*  
NAVAL SECRETARY.

V RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO NATO NATIONS AND REGIONAL PLANNING GROUPS (SECRET)

16. The Committee had for consideration a memorandum from the Secretary Joint Intelligence Committee to which was attached an appendix (Appendix "A") containing the procedure for processing requests from NATO nations and Regional Planning Groups for information of combined US-UK, Canadian origin, as approved by the Military Information Board on 15th November, 1950. The Committee were asked to concur in these arrangements, and to approve the Department of National Defence internal procedure (Appendix "B") which had been prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee.

(Reference CSC 8-1 Vol. 1 dated 19th January, 1951)

17. The Air Member for Air Plans expressed the opinion that the arrangements which had been approved by the Military Information Board would prove to be most cumbersome and time-consuming.

18. The Vice Chief of the Naval Staff said that it was his understanding that this procedure was applicable only to information of combined origin. It was assumed that classified material originating entirely in a single NATO country would continue to be handled directly between the originating country and the country requesting the information.

19. The Vice Chief of the General Staff said that it should be possible to determine at National Defence Headquarters whether or not information was of combined origin.

20. Air Vice Marshal James raised the question as to how this procedure would fit into the NATO standardization arrangements which were now being worked out in London.

21. Mr. Eberts, referring to para. 2 of Appendix "A" raised the question as to whether the Canadian representative on the Western European Regional Planning Group, as the individual responsible for handling requests for Canadian information, could be expected to identify the source of classified material.

22. It was agreed, after further discussion;

- (a) to concur in the procedure for the release of information to NATO nations and Regional Planning Groups, as approved by the Military Information Board on the 15th November, 1950, recognizing that some modification of this procedure might be required, to facilitate the exchange of standardization information under the Military Standardization Agency arrangements now being worked out in London; and

- (b) -to approve the Department of National Defence internal procedure for processing requests for information from NATO nations and Regional Planning Groups, as submitted by the Joint Intelligence Committee.

S. 1320 R.  
500M-4-44-(449)  
N.S. 815-9-1320-R  
K.P. 6066

TOP SECRET  
NAVAL MESSAGE

TO:

CANAVUS

FROM:

TOP SECRET  
DEFERRED

CANAVHED

ACNS  
DNI

URMSG 181801Z. CANADIAN POLICY WILL BE REVIEWED  
ON A JOINT BASIS AND RCN AMENDMENT TO CBO FORM  
U2D(5) (48) AS SET FORTH IN NOSTS 11550-2 DATED  
4 FEBRUARY 1950 WILL BE REVISED AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE.

192106Z

NDCS AT 192139Z

NDCS CODE

19/DEC/50

RC

1474

000599

NSTS 11550-2

~~SECRET~~

COPY NO. 1

MEMORANDUM TO: ACNS(P) *ECN*

The UK proposal that the requirement for periodic reports on items exchanged under this tripartite agreement be omitted, is considered to be most desirable as it is felt that it would be extremely difficult to set out in detail a list of all items exchanged, particularly if this agreement was at any time extended to include standardization projects.

2. With reference to the amendment suggested by the United States providing that only in exceptional circumstances will information originating wholly in one country be exchanged by the other two, it is considered that the term "in exceptional circumstances" is sufficiently broad and should not undoubtedly hamper exchange of information. Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee.


*J.C. Pratt*  
(J.C. Pratt), *ltd*  
Commander, RCN,  
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

Ottawa, 4 November, 1950.

2 c.

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No. 1 - NSTS 11550-2  
2 - ACNS File



Material re  
Release of information  
to Australia  
downgraded to Secret  
& placed in

NSS 1550 - 2

MM.

17-4-51

Q.A.

NSTS 11550-2

~~TOP SECRET~~COPY NO. 2

4 November, 1950.

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee

With reference to CSC 8-1 dated 16 October, 1950, concerning alterations to the tripartite agreement for the exchange of classified military information it is agreed that the alterations suggested by the UK and US would be satisfactory to the Canadian authorities.

Despatched by  
N. Sec.....*M.G.*...Date  
Time 7-11-50

(H.T.W. Grant),  
Vice Admiral, RCN,  
CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF.

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No. 1 - Sec. CSC  
2 - NSTS 11550-2  
3 - ACNS File

*Concur*  
*RUB:**[Signature]**Concur* *[Signature]* 6/4.

27 October, 1950.

*CRP* NSC 1950-13(Staff)CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Director of Naval Intelligence,  
National Defence Headquarters,  
OTTAWA,

TO : The Staff Officer, (Intelligence & Trade),  
HMC Dockyard,  
HALIFAX, N.S.

---

RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO RCN(R) OFFICERS

---

With reference to your submission NIH 1950-1, Sub. 2, dated 30 September 1950, it is pointed out that a policy decision cannot be given through the DNI - SO (I & T) channel and it is requested that you will re-submit the matter over the Flag Officer's signature.

2. For your personal information my own view is that Reserve Officers on Special Naval duty are to be treated on the same basis as permanent force Officers for access to classified material both in ordinary employment and when on courses. I would consider that they could not be employed under any other conditions.

*Signed*

(J.C. Pratt),  
Commander, RCN,  
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

or Despatch.....

Date.....

C.N.S. ....

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC 8-1

# Department of National Defence

**SECRET**

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

16 October, 1950.

C.G.S.  
C.A.S.  
C.N.S. ✓  
C.D.R.B.

### Exchange of Classified Information U.K.-U.S.-Canada

1. Attached herewith is a letter from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs dated 13 October, together with a memorandum left with the Department of External Affairs by the Deputy High Commissioner for the United Kingdom.

2. You will recall that, when this matter was previously discussed, the proposed exchange of military information included a requirement for periodic reports, identifying specific documentary materials released by one country to the other, as per paras. 1, 2 and 3 of Annex I to Cabinet Defence Committee memorandum which was forwarded to you under cover of CSC 8-1 dated 29 May, 1950.

3. The agreements shown in these first three paragraphs were subsequently approved on behalf of Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom by service and External Affairs representation in Washington. In conformance with the arrangements for formalizing this agreement, the Minister of National Defence wrote to Mr. Johnson and Mr. Shinwell, pointing out that this exchange agreement was acceptable to the Canadian Government. It is now known that Mr. Shinwell did not reply on behalf of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence along the same lines because the U.K. authorities were endeavouring to remove the subject of periodic reports.

4. Recently the U.K. High Commissioner's Office in Ottawa have endeavoured to solicit Canadian support to this proposal to eliminate the periodic reports requirement. It was realized, however, that, to indicate any support to the U.K. proposals might influence unfavourably Canada's position vis-a-vis the United States, and accordingly it was suggested to the United Kingdom that it would be preferable to conclude the exchange agreement as previously written and, if desirable, carry out three-way discussions in Washington on this subject, with a view to the representatives there reaching agreement and forwarding recommendations to their respective governments.


(Continued)



- 2 -

5. The attachment indicates that the United States Government are now prepared to agree to omit the requirement for periodic reports but that they wish to restrict the exchange between any two governments of original documents belonging to a third government. This appears to be a very reasonable arrangement and if, at the discussions of the Military Information Board on this subject, this U.S. agreement is forthcoming, it is recommended that the Canadian representative be authorized to indicate Canada's willingness to change the terms of the agreement as indicated.

6. May I be advised, please, of your views in this matter.



(J.D.B. Smith)  
Brigadier,  
Secretary.

C  
O  
P  
Y

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CANADA

S E C R E T

Ottawa, October 13, 1950.

The Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee,  
O t t a w a.

I enclose a copy of a memorandum left with me yesterday by the Deputy High Commissioner for the United Kingdom. Paragraph 1 of this memorandum refers to the recent conversation between Mr. Shannon and his military advisers on the one hand, and Mr. Glazebrook and yourself on the other. Mr. Shannon was unable to give any further information on the reference in paragraph 2 of the memorandum to "original documents".

It would appear, however, that the alterations suggested would be satisfactory to the Canadian authorities. If you agree, I shall inform the Deputy High Commissioner that on the understanding that the United Kingdom and the United States authorities agree to the proposed changes, we would be prepared to instruct our representatives on the Military Information Board to accept the changes to the annex. I presume that your Department would, in that event, so inform the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington, and that we would similarly instruct the Embassy.

(Signed)  
G. de T. Glazebrook  
for (A.D.P. Heeney)  
Under-Secretary of State for  
External Affairs.

S E C R E T

EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION  
BETWEEN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

As the Canadian Government are aware, the United Kingdom Government are reluctant to accept, as it stands, the draft tripartite agreement which emerged from the discussions in Washington in August, on account of the provisions for periodic reports identifying the specific documentary materials released. These provisions have accordingly been further discussed with United States representatives in Washington, and they were the subject of a discussion in Ottawa with Canadian representatives on 4th October.

2. The United States Government are now prepared to agree to omit the requirement for periodic reports, but they wish to restrict the exchange between any two governments of original documents belonging to the third government. The United Kingdom Government, for their part, are willing to agree to this restriction.

3. The United States and the United Kingdom representatives have accordingly agreed on a form of words which it is intended to put forward at the next convenient opportunity in the Military Information Board for consideration by the Canadian representatives as a Joint United States/United Kingdom amendment. The joint amendment will propose the deletion of the existing provisions in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the text originally proposed by the Canadian Government, and the substitution in paragraph 1 ( and mutatis mutandis in paragraphs 2 and 3) of the following words:

"provided that only in exceptional circumstances will the United Kingdom and Canada exchange documents originating wholly in the United States."

4. The United Kingdom Government would appreciate it if the Canadian Government would consider this amendment and trust that, if they agree with it, they will feel able to authorise the Canadian representatives in the Military Information Board to accept it.

12th October, 1950.

SECRET

2-1

Following <sup>Refers to</sup> ~~is~~ Item.. IV.. of the minutes of the 22.. meeting  
of the JSC held on ..... 11 OCT. 1950.....

*Policy - Release of Service Information.*

SECRET

**CONFIDENTIAL**

From: Staff Officer (Intelligence and Trade), Halifax.

Date: 30th September, 1950.

NIH 1950-1 Sub.2.

To : Director of Naval Intelligence, Ottawa.

Release of Information to RCN(R) Officers

Referred to	OK
File	OCT 30 1950
Chg'd to	Q 1950-13

Reference (a): Canavhed's 082055Z August, 1950.

A serious question has arisen further to reference (a) as to whether RCN(R) officers entered on Special Naval Duty are to be given unrestricted access to classified information as gained through courses in N.D., TAS, and Communications.

2. The policy in this Command has been to limit, as much as possible, the amount of classified information imparted to Reserve personnel during normal periods of Naval Training and Voluntary Service.

3. It is requested that I may be advised of Headquarters policy in this regard as it may be desirable to submit security clearances for those taking specialized courses.

*John J. Coates*  
(J.J. Coates)  
Lieutenant, R.C.N.

SECRET

1950-4  
21

Refers to  
Following is Item. VIII of the minutes of the 21.. meeting  
of the JSC held on ..... 27 Sep 1950 .....

*Policy on Release of Service Information*

SECRET



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. **CSC 8-1**

# Department of National Defence

**RESTRICTED**

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

7 September, 1950.

C.G.S.  
C.A.S.  
C.N.S.  
C.D.R.B.

Referred to...	<i>[Signature]</i>
SEP 11 1950	
File No.	<i>1550210</i>
Chg'd to...	<i>Mr 2850</i>

### Release of Canadian Military Information in the United Kingdom to the Press

1. I attach herewith a copy of a letter from the Secretary, Canadian Joint Staff, London - CJS (9) dated 11 August, 1950 - together with a memorandum to the Minister - CSC 8-1 dated 17 August, 1950.

2. As the proposal contained in the letter from the Canadian Joint Staff, London, conformed to the present practice at National Defence Headquarters of all releases of military information being made through the Press Relations Office, it was not necessary to seek the approval of the Chiefs of Staff. To that end, the matter was referred to the Minister for his permission to make use of the National Defence Public Relations Office in the matter of forwarding releases of military information to the Information Officer, Canada House.

3. In short, the arrangement will now relieve the Canadian Joint Staff, London, of any problems concerning the release of military information to the United Kingdom press, as all releases will now be handled through the Information Office, Canada House, which in turn will obtain the necessary information for release from the Public Relations Office, National Defence Headquarters.

*VCAS*  
*D.M.I.*  
*D.I.N.F.*

*[Signature]*  
(J.D.B. Smith)  
Brigadier,  
Secretary.

CSC 8-1

RESTRICTED

Office of the Secretary  
National Defence Headquarters,  
OTTAWA.

17 August, 1950.

The Minister.

Release of Canadian Military Information  
in the U.K. to the Press

1. Attached herewith is a copy of a letter from the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff (London) concerning the development of closer liaison between the information office of Canada House and the Canadian Joint Staff on the subject of release of military information in the UK to the Press.
2. In brief this recommendation suggests that the Public Relations Office, National Defence Headquarters, forward to the information office of the Canadian High Commissioner in the UK such information as may be released to the UK press. This would avoid the problem of the armed services of the Canadian Joint Staff refusing interviews with representatives of the UK Press. All releases to the UK Press would be through the information office of the Canadian High Commissioner.
3. This seems like a reasonable arrangement, and as all service releases are now made through the Public Relations Officer, the proposed plan would merely be the extension of his present function.
4. May I be advised, please, of your views in this regard.

(J.D.B.Smith)  
Brigadier,  
Secretary.

Attach.

cc: CGS

000612



COPY

RESTRICTED

CJS (9)

CANADIAN JOINT STAFF, LONDON

Canada House,  
Trafalgar Square,  
London, S.W. 1

11 Aug 50

Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee,  
A Building,  
Department of National Defence,  
Ottawa, Canada

Release of Canadian Military Information in the UK to the Press

1. The Chairman of the CJS has approached the High Commissioner for Canada in the U.K. concerning closer liaison between the Information Office of Canada House and the Canadian Joint Staff on the subject of release of Canadian Military Information in the U.K. to the Press.
2. The High Commissioner has agreed, in keeping with the principle of having only one official source of Canadian information in the U.K., that the Information Office, Canada House, should assume full responsibility for answering requests for military information in the U.K.
3. To assist the Information Office, Canada House, in obtaining a background of knowledge from which to reply to routine requests for military information, it is suggested that the Press Relations Office of the Department of National Defence, in Ottawa, include the Information Office, Canada House, in any circulation of military information by the PRO. In addition, it is suggested that the Press Relations Office in Ottawa keep the Information Office, Canada House, advised, insofar as is possible, of pending visits of Senior Officers of the Services and provide covering press despatches when applicable for the use of the Information Office, Canada House, when dealing with the U.K. Press. Any other information which Press Relations Office in Ottawa consider should be of use to the Information Office should of course be forwarded for its use. It should be possible for the Information Office to determine the information which it desires to have forwarded regularly once the system is fully operative.
4. It also has been agreed by the High Commissioner and the Chairman, CJS, that requests for military information which cannot be answered by the Information Office from information which it possesses should be referred to the Canadian Joint Staff for reply; such replies to be routed through the Information Office to the enquirer.
5. The CJS consider that the above proposals are in keeping with the best interests of security within the Canadian Joint Staff. It is also considered that they comply with the policy of the Armed Services in not granting interviews or to the releasing of information to representatives of the press except through PRO.

6. Therefore, it is requested that, if necessary, the approval of the Chiefs of Staff be obtained for the proposed method of release of military information in the U.K. If approval is granted it will then be necessary to request Press Relations Office to keep the information office, Canada House, advised as suggested.

Signed.

(R.B. Ingalls) Wing Commander,  
Secretary  
Canadian Joint Staff, London.

MS 172-12

1950-4

MEMORANDUM

TS.22-1-39 (DAI)  
7 Sep 50

The Secretary,  
Joint Security Committee

Policy on the Release of Service Information

1 At the present time the Departmental policy governing the release of Service information is contained in Cabinet Document No. D.120, "Policy - Publication of Service Information", dated 14th May 1947. It is believed that this policy should be reviewed in the light of the current world situation.

2 Since C.D. No. D.120 is in the most general terms, it is necessary to supplement it, for implementation, with detailed lists of "objectionable" and "unobjectionable" matter. While such lists are per se the responsibility of the individual Services, any inconsistency between these Service lists, as to what types of information are "objectionable" and what are not, can be difficult to justify and may be embarrassing. I believe, therefore, that after each Service has prepared its lists they should be considered jointly with a view to eliminating discrepancies where possible, and justifying differences where they are found to be appropriate. In order to facilitate comparison, the individual Service lists should be prepared, as far as possible, in a standard format.

3 I therefore recommend as follows:

- (a) that Cabinet Document No. D.120 be reviewed by the JSC.
- (b) that a standard format for supplementary lists of "objectionable" and "unobjectionable" matter be produced and adopted.
- (c) that each Service produce its own lists of "objectionable" and "unobjectionable" matter.
- (d) that these lists be considered jointly with a view to either eliminating or justifying discrepancies.
- (e) that the revised policy and lists be forwarded to Chiefs of Staff Committee for approval.

GSA/JL

(W W Bean) G/C  
DAI

Serial (a) Subject (b) *Line 1 RCAF Subjects* Objectionable (c) Unobjectionable (d)

4	Intelligence	(ix) Any details of Intelligence organization, establishment, strength, training, activities.	(ix) General statement of the responsibility of Intelligence for the collection and preparation of intelligence, and for security policy.
5	Security	<p>(x) Organization, establishment, strength, special training, activities (other than in the fields of crime and discipline) of Security Service.</p> <p>(xi) Any reference to Special Branch.</p> <p>(xii) Any details of arrangements for Airfield Defence - location, strength, weapons, training, etc.</p>	<p>(x) General statements of responsibility of Air Force Security Service for physical security, security of information, control of visitors to Air Force establishments, enforcement of discipline, and prevention and detection of crimes.</p> <p>(xi) General statements of division of responsibility for <u>general security</u> between Air Force Security Service and RCMP.</p>
6	Personnel	<p>(xiii) <u>Strength</u> Over-all strength by ranks and trades.</p> <p>(xiv) Strength of any unit, station, or formation.</p> <p>(xv) <u>Movements</u> Classified movements, or movements of personnel, units, or equipment connected with deployment of forces for defensive or offensive purposes.</p>	<p>(xii) <u>Strength</u> Current over-all strength of the RCAF, and breakdown between officers and airmen, service and civilian personnel, male and female personnel.</p> <p>(xiii) <u>Movements</u> Routine movements of personnel, units, and equipment not connected with deployment of forces for defensive or offensive purposes.</p>

Serial  
(a)

Subject  
(b)

Objectionable  
(c)

Unobjectionable  
(d)

6  
(Cont'd)

Personnel  
(Cont'd)

- (xvi) Manning  
Numbers of personnel required by trades.
- (xvii) Numbers or percentages of applicants rejected by reason of failing to meet entrance qualifications.

Security Clearance of Personnel

- (xviii) Numbers or percentages of personnel cleared or uncleared.
- (xix) Clearance of individuals.
- (xx) Methods employed for clearance.
- (xxi) Agencies involved in clearance.

Personalities

- (xxii) Any reference to participation in classified activities.

Personnel Services

- (xxiii) Any information indicative of order of battle  
Low operational efficiency, low morale, accident rates, or incidence of L.M.F. (Lack of Moral Fibre) case.

- (xiv) Manning  
Entrance qualifications and conditions.
- (xv) Procedure for enlistment or appointment.
- (xvi) Location of recruiting centres.
- (xvii) Over-all numbers of personnel enlisted or appointed.
- (xviii) Trades open for enlistment or appointment.
- Security Clearance of Personnel
- (xix) General statements of Government and Departmental policy re security clearance of all personnel.

Personalities

- (xx) Unclassified aspects of movements of individuals.
- (xxi) Promotions, retirements, honours and awards, appointments, etc.
- (xxii) Biographies, excluding any specific reference to classified duties or training.

Personnel Services

- (xxiii) Details of medical, dental, religious, social, legal and other services, not otherwise excluded.

Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Objectionable (c)	Unobjectionable (d)
7	Training (unclassified / restricted)	<p>(xxiv) Details of establishments of training units, stations and formations.</p> <p>(xxv) Detailed training policy. (unclassified)</p> <p>(xxvi) Organization of training units.</p> <p>(xxvii) Detailed statements of functions and syllabus of training schools and units.</p> <p>(xxviii) Any reference to Escape and Evasion training.</p> <p>(xxix) Capacity of training schools and units.</p> <p>(xxx) Intake and output of schools and units.</p> <p>(xxxi) Complete list or photograph of trainees on any course.</p> <p>(xxxii) Length of courses.</p> <p>(xxxiii) Comprehensive flying statistics - total flying hours or air-miles in pilot training, navigation training, etc., accident rates, serviceability rates, average life of aircraft, etc.</p>	<p>(xxiv) General statements of training policy. (unclassified)</p> <p>(xxv) Organization of Training Command down to unit level.</p> <p>(xxvi) General statements of unclassified functions of training units and formations.</p> <p>(xxvii) General subjects (unclassified) included in any syllabus.</p> <p>(xxviii) Unclassified details, not given in comprehensive form, of training schools, courses, trainees, subjects taught, equipment used, etc.</p>
8	Operations	<p>(xxxiv) Details of operations policies.</p> <p>(xxxv) Details of organization and establishments of operational commands and their subordinate units.</p>	<p>(xxix) General statements of operations policies, e.g. allocation of responsibility to commands, inter service cooperation, unclassified aspects of international cooperation.</p>

Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Objectionable (c)	Unobjectionable (d)
8 (Cont'd)	Operations (Cont'd)	<p>(xxxvi) Lists of all operational units, all <sup>operational</sup> units of any type, or all <sup>operational</sup> units in any area.</p> <p>(xxxvii) Operational statistics, e.g. sorties, flying hours, accident rates, serviceability.</p> <p>(xxxviii) Tactics.</p> <p>(xxxix) Armament and equipment on <sup>operational</sup> aircraft.</p> <p>(XL) Detailed qualifications and <sup>operational</sup> duties of aircraft crew members <sup>other than transport aircraft</sup>.</p> <p>(XLI) Redeployment of operational forces for offensive or defensive purposes.</p>	<p>(xxx) Unclassified aspects of organization of operational commands and group headquarters down to branch-head level.</p> <p>(xxxi) <sup>and/or</sup> of unit or squadron Name, number, type of aircraft, name of commander of operational units.</p> <p>(xxxii) Actual location, if in a populated area.</p> <p>(xxxiii) General location only (E.G. Labrador, Yukon) if in remote area.</p> <p>(xxxiv) Number of personnel in regular aircraft crew.</p> <p>(xxxv) Unclassified aspects of operations and exercises, except as otherwise excluded.</p>
9	Technical Services (Supply, Repairs and Maintenance, Construction Engineering Development)	<p>(XLII) Comprehensive details of logistics arrangements.</p> <p>(XLIII) Establishments of AMC units and formations.</p> <p>(XLIV) Organization of AMC HQ below branch-head level and of AMC units.</p> <p>(XLV) <sup>Specific</sup> functions of <sup>specific</sup> AMC units.</p> <p>(XLVI) Specific or general functions of "X" depots.</p> <p>(XLVII) - Level of supplies maintained or planned.</p>	<p>(xxxvi) General descriptions of logistics arrangements, i.e., division of responsibility, functions of AMC, organization of AMC down to unit level (excluding "X" depots).</p> <p>(xxxvii) Name, number, location (viz. city), and name of Commanding Officer of units.</p> <p>(xxxviii) Details or photographs, not giving comprehensive coverage, of unclassified aspects of AMC units and logistics arrangements.</p> <p>(xxxix) Routine movements of equipment.</p>

Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Objectionable (c)	Unobjectionable (d)
9 (Cont'd)	Technical Services (Cont'd)	<p>(XLVIII) Special movements of equipment for classified purposes, or connected with the deployment of forces for offensive or defensive purposes.</p> <p>(XLIX) Development of classified equipment or supplies.</p> <p>(L) Any details of classified projects.</p> <p>(LI) Details of unclassified projects indicative of the rate of operational units, stations or formations, or of early warning and operational control units, of the capacity of schools, stations, depots, and runways, or of the location and capacity of communication facilities, ammunition dumps, and fuel storage.</p>	<p>(XL) Development of unclassified equipment or supplies.</p> <p>(XLI) Details of construction of unclassified projects, not otherwise excluded.</p>
10	Equipment (Including Aircraft) (See Also Technical Services)	<p>(LII) Classified details of performance specifications, and structure.</p> <p><u>NOTES:</u></p> <p>(1) When equipment is in the design, construction, and development stages, all proposed releases should be cleared through the Air Force Security authorities.</p> <p>(2) When equipment is in use, certain details of its performance, characteristics, structure, etc., may be classified. In all cases of doubt, previous clearance from the Security authorities should be obtained before release is made.</p>	<p>(XLII) Unclassified details of (performance, specifications, and structure) not otherwise excluded.</p>



Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Objectionable (c)	Unobjectionable (d)
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10  
(Cont'd)

Equipment

NOTES: (Cont'd)

(3) When AIRCRAFT are in use by squadrons, the following may be classified, and should be cleared before release:

- (a) Dimensions and weights, except length, wing span and area, height, and design gross weight.
- (b) Exact performance and characteristics data.

Other details may be released without specific clearance.

(LIII) Details of armament and <sup>ancillary / e.g. radio</sup> equipment (bombing, radar, navigational, survival) whether classified or unclassified, on operational and operational-training aircraft.

(LIV) Total inventories of equipment held.

(LV) Total quantities of equipment in use.

(LVI) Total quantities of equipment in storage

(LVII) Quantities of equipment on order or to be ordered.

(LVIII) Expected delivery rates of equipment.

(LIX) Exact or approximate costs of individual items of equipment.

(LX) Exact or approximate costs of equipment orders.

(XLIII) General approximations of total inventory held of aircraft only, giving approximate proportions of operational and non-operational aircraft.  
 XXXX XXXXX XXXXX

(XLIV) Names of firms with which orders have been or are being placed, giving in very general terms (viz. over \$2,000,000.00) total cost (no breakdown) connected with order (Note: As far as possible costs of two or more orders should be lumped together).

(XLV) // <sup>Unclassified</sup> Photographs or drawings of equipment, when such photographs or drawings do not show or permit calculation of information classed as "objectionable."

Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Objectionable (c)	Unobjectionable (d)
10 (cont'd)	Equipment (cont'd)	<p>(LXI) Photographs or drawings showing or permitting calculation of any information classed as "objectionable".</p> <p>(LXII) Classified details of depots, factories, and manufacturing methods, and unclassified details from which rate of production or plant capacity can be deduced.</p>	(XLVI) Unclassified details of depots, factories, and manufacturing methods, not otherwise excluded.
11	Telecommunications.	<p>(LXIII) Detailed statements of policy.</p> <p>(LXIV) Plans.</p> <p>(LXV) Details of telecommunications networks and locations of stations (viz. transmitters, receivers, repeaters, landline terminals, etc.)</p> <p>(LXVI) Statistics of signals traffic.</p> <p>(LXVII) Any reference to SECRET equipment.</p> <p>(LXVIII) Any unclassified details of non-secret equipment.</p> <p>(LXIX) Any details concerning RCAP units known as "Radio Stations", other than name and location.</p>	<p>(XLVII) General statements of unclassified policy.</p> <p>(XLVIII) Details of unclassified items of telecommunications equipment <u>without reference to their specific uses in the RCAP, or the extent to which they are used.</u></p> <p>(XLIX) Name and general location of RCAP units known as "Radio Stations". (Only clarification of this term should be to the effect that they are a part of the normal RCAP communications system) (See Note A)</p>

Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Objectionable (c)	Unobjectionable (d)
12	Armament and Weapons	<p>(LXI) Any reference to "X" depots in connection with weapons storage.</p> <p>(LXII) Any information about <del>SECRET</del> weapons. classified</p> <p>(LXIII) Any classified details of non-secret weapons.</p> <p>(LXIV) Any reference to the installation, in operational or operational-training aircraft, of specific armament or weapons, <u>whether classified or unclassified.</u></p> <p>(LXV) Any details of new or improved armament or weapons in the design, development, or initial production stages, i.e. before they are issued for use.</p> <p>(LXVI) Any statistics concerning the effectiveness, failure or defectiveness of armament or weapons.</p> <p>(LXVII) Any specific incidents of failure or defectiveness of armament or weapons not automatically known to the public.</p>	<p>(L) Details of unclassified armament and weapons, and general statements as to their use, <u>without reference to uses or installations in any specific RCAF operational or operational training aircraft or ground defences.</u></p> <p>(LI) General statements of the existence or development of <del>SECRET</del> weapons. (See Note "A"). classified</p> <p>(LII) General statements concerning the existence or manufacture of new weapons. (See Note "A")</p> <p>(LIII) Guarded statements regarding incidents of failure or defectiveness of armament or weapons, when such incidents are already known or are likely to be known to the public.</p>
13	Radio Warfare	<p>(LXVIII) Any details of or reference to RCAF activities in this field either current or planned.</p>	<p>(LIV) General statements on the nature of radio warfare.</p>

Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Objectionable (c)	Unobjectionable (d)
14	Early Warning and Radar Generally	<p>(LXXVIII) Any statements of classified policy.</p> <p>(LXXIX) Detailed statements of unclassified policy.</p> <p>(LXXX) Plans.   unclassified</p> <p>(LXXXI) Any classified details of <del>non-secret</del> <sup>classified</sup> equipment.</p> <p>(LXXXII) Any information about <del>SECRET</del> <sup>classified</sup> equipment.</p> <p>(LXXXIII) Any details of new or improved equipment when in the design, development, or initial production stages, i.e. before it is brought into use.   location, function</p> <p>(LXXXIV) Any reference to over-all coverage or coverage of individual early warning radar units or ground control radar units.</p>	<p>(LX) General statements of unclassified policy.</p> <p>(LXI) Details of unclassified radar equipment without reference to its uses or installation in specific RCAF aircraft.   <i>or ground units.</i></p> <p>(LXII) General statements concerning the existence or manufacture of new or improved types of radar equipment. (See Note "A")</p> <p><i>Unclassified details of <del>equipment</del> &amp; activities of reserve radar units.</i></p>
15	Psychological Warfare	<p>(LXXXV) Any details of or reference to RCAF activities in this field.</p>	<p>(LXIII) General statements on the nature of psychological warfare.</p>
16	Navigational Systems and	<p>(LXXXVI) Plans for the installation of additional navigational aids <i>for operational purposes.</i></p> <p>(LXXXVII) Any classified details of <del>non-secret</del> <sup>non-secret</sup> equipment <i>systems</i>   <del>NAV-SECRET.</del></p> <p>(LXXXVIII) Any information about secret equipment <i>or systems</i></p>	<p>(LXIV) Statements indicating that RCAF aircraft make use of civil navigation systems, e.g. radio ranges, GCA etc.</p> <p>(LXV) Details of unclassified navigation equipment   <i>carried in aircraft or used in ground installations</i> without indication of particular aircraft   <i>used by the RCAF</i></p> <p><i>show in 0000624</i></p> <p>.....11</p>

Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Objectionable (c)	Unobjectionable (d)
16 (Cont'd)	Navigational Systems and Equipment (Cont'd)	<p>(LXXXIX) Any details of new or improved equipment when in the design, development or initial production stages, i.e. before it is brought into use.</p> <p>(XC) Any indication of the location or coverage of classified navigational aids or of their exclusive employment in certain areas.</p>	<p>(LXV) Cont'd craft, <del>or location of ground installation.</del></p> <p>( ) General statements concerning the existence or manufacture of new or improved types of radar equipment (See Note "A")</p>
17	Mobilization	<p>(XCI) Detailed statements of classified policy.</p> <p>(XCII) Plans</p> <p>(XCIII) Details and rates of mobilization.</p>	<p>(LXVI) Statements of unclassified policy regarding mobilization.</p> <p>(LXVII) General statements of classified policy when specifically cleared by the appropriate security authority.</p>
18	Photographs	<p>(XCIV) Classified photographs.</p> <p>(XCV) Photographs which show or permit calculation of objectionable information, e.g.  Details of port and harbour installations.  Details of military installations.  Details of airfield facilities, i.e. runway dimensions, refuelling, aircraft control, radar installations, etc.  Details of aircraft in the design, development or initial production stages.  Details of aircraft in units which indicate their role and armament and weapons carried.  Details of RCAF installations (other than <i>portable</i>)</p>	<p>(LXVIII) Unclassified photographs when such photographs do not show or permit calculation of information classed as objectionable.</p>

**CONFIDENTIAL** (P. 12)

Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Objectionable (c)	Unobjectionable (d)
18 (Cont'd)	Photographs (Cont'd)	(XCV) Cont'd airfields) i.e. telecommunications facilities, early warning sites, navigation aids, etc. ? - Complete courses under training. Details of Northern areas (Refer to Security Panel Document SP42 June 29/49)	
19	Statistics	<p>(XCVI) Breakdown of over-all establishments or strength by trades.</p> <p>(XCVII) Establishment or strength figures for any unit, station or formation.</p> <p>(XCVIII) Details indicative of order of battle, operational efficiency, low morale, accident rates or incidence of L.M.F (Lack of Moral Fibre) cases.</p> <p>(XCIX) Numbers or percentages of personnel who have or have not been security cleared.</p> <p>(C) Comprehensive flying statistics, e.g. total flying hours or air miles in training or operations, sortie rates, accident rates, serviceability rates, average life of aircraft, etc.</p> <p>(CI) Comprehensive logistic statistics, e.g. inventories of equipment held or required, maintenance schedules, etc.</p> <p>(CII) Statistics of signals traffic.</p> <p>(CIII) Comprehensive armament or weapons statistics, e.g. inventories.</p>	<p>(LXIX) Over-all establishment and strength figures by ranks and sex.</p> <p>(LXX) Over-all establishment and strength figures for service and civilian personnel.</p> <p>(LXXI) Statistical details of medical, dental, religious, social, legal and other services not otherwise excluded. (e.g. total flying hours in training or on search and rescue)</p> <p>(LXXII) Flying statistics not comprehensive in form or otherwise excluded.</p> <p>(LXXIII) Logistic statistics not comprehensive in form or otherwise excluded.</p> <p>(LXXIV) Armament and weapons statistics not comprehensive in form or otherwise excluded.</p> <p>(LXXV) Details of unclassified weapons or armament without reference to RCAF use or installation.</p> <p>(LXXVI) Details of unclassified radar equipment without reference to RCAF use or installation.</p> <p>(LXXVII) Details of unclassified navigation equipment without reference to RCAF use or installation</p>

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(P. 13)

Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Objectionable (c)	Unobjectionable (d)
19 (Cont'd)	Statistics (Cont'd)	<p>(CIV) Details of classified weapons or armament</p> <p>(CV) Details of classified radar equipment.</p> <p>(CVI) Details of RCAF <sup>operational</sup> radar units or equipment.</p> <p>(CVII) Details of classified navigation equipment or navigation aids.</p> <p>(CVIII) Details of coverage of RCAF navigation aids.</p>	
20	Finance	<p>(CIX) Detailed breakdown of estimates or costs which indicates policy or plans the release of information on which is considered objectionable.</p> <p>(CX) Estimates or costs which indicate detailed establishment of formations or units of the RCAF.</p> <p>(CXI) Detailed estimates or costs involved in various types or phases of training.</p> <p>(CXII) Detailed figures indicating number of regular, reserve or cadet personnel undertaking special training courses and length and type of courses.</p> <p>(CXIII) Details of operational costs.</p> <p>(CXIV) Exact or approximate estimates or costs of individual items of equipment.</p> <p>(CXV) Exact or approximate estimates or costs of equipment orders.</p>	<p>(LXXVIII) Overall estimates for financing the RCAF votes to be combined where possible.</p> <p>(LXXIX) Estimates relating to pay, allowances, quartering, etc. of the RCAF.</p> <p>(LXXX) Estimates relating to civil salaries and wages.</p> <p>(LXXXI) Rates of pay and allowances all ranks and civilian personnel.</p> <p>(LXXXII) Recruiting costs.</p> <p>(LXXXIII) Overall estimates and costs of travel, transportation and freight.</p> <p>(LXXXIV) Estimates of cost of medical, dental, religious, social, legal and other personnel services.</p> <p>(LXXXV) Estimates of overall training costs.</p>

CONFIDENTIAL (P. 14)

Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Objectionable (c)	Unobjectionable (d)
20 (Cont'd)	Finance (Cont'd)	<p>(CXVI) Detailed breakdown of estimates or cost of construction, improvements or repairs of airforce properties.</p> <p>(CXVII) Details of estimates or costs for repair and maintenance of equipment.</p> <p>(CXVIII) Detailed estimates or costs of telecommunications facilities.</p> <p>(CXIX) Overall or detailed estimates or costs connected with radio or psychological warfare.</p> <p>(CXX) Overall or detailed estimates or costs of early warning system.</p>	<p>(LXXXVI) Overall estimates of equipment costs.</p> <p>(LXXXVII) Cost in general terms (viz. over \$2,000,000) of equipment orders placed with various firms, as far as possible, costs of two or more orders should be lumped together. (See Note "A")</p> <p>(LXXXVIII) Overall estimate of cost of communications facilities.</p> <p>(LXXXIX) Overall estimates for repair and maintenance of equipment.</p>

NOTES:

"A"

Such information should not be volunteered but may be given when it is considered that there has been or is likely to be a breach of security which might result in undesirable publicity and speculation. Where time permits reference should be made to the appropriate security authority.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Objectionable (c)	Unobjectionable (d)
1	Organisation	<p>(i) Comprehensive lists of units and formations in the RCAF.</p> <p>(ii) Details of headquarters organization below directorate level, or equivalent in Commands and Groups.</p> <p>(iii) Comprehensive lists of stations and units in Operational Commands and Groups.</p>	<p>(i) General organisation of RCAF, including Commands and Groups.</p> <p>(ii) Details of internal organization of headquarters formations down to directorate level at AFHQ and equivalent at Commands and Groups.</p> <p>(iii) Composition of Training Command and Air Materiel down to units, with general statements of functions (where unclassified) except "X" depots. (See (c) (iv))</p>
2	Establishments	<p>(v) Breakdown of over-all establishment by trades.</p> <p>(vi) Establishment of any unit, station or formation.</p>	<p>(iv) Over-all establishment of RCAF by ranks and sex.</p> <p>(v) Over-all establishments for Service and Civilian personnel.</p>
3	Plans and Policy	<p>(vii) Detailed statements of classified policy.</p> <p>(viii) Detailed statement of Plans.</p>	<p>(vi) Statements of unclassified policy, not otherwise excluded.</p> <p>(vii) General statements of current classified policy when specifically cleared by the requisite security authorities.</p> <p>(viii) General statements concerning plans, when unclassified or specifically cleared for publication by the requisite security authorities.</p>

CONFIDENTIAL

NSS. 1950-10

D.N.I.

Release of Information to Cadets.

Reference NIH 1950-1 Sub. 2 of 23rd August, 1950  
The policy for release of information is on a "need-to-know" basis vide K.R.C.N. 1.25 (4).

Do not consider that D.N.I. should be responsible for establishing the "need-to-know", but such decision should rest with the Commanding Officer.

Am inclined to agree with S.O. (I & T), Halifax that Cadets should not be given too much knowledge of future developments in A/S Warfare.

Request Your remarks please.

  
(H.F. Rankin),  
S.O. (Security).

7th September, 1950,  
Ottawa, Canada.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

From: Staff Officer (Intelligence and Trade), Halifax.

Date: 23rd August, 1950.

NIH 1950-1 Sub.2.

To : Director of Naval Intelligence, Naval Headquarters.

Release of Information to Cadets.

It has come to my notice that many of the Cadets who have had previous training on the West Coast were given a good knowledge of future developments in Anti-submarine warfare.

2. The policy in this Command has been that there is no need for Cadets to be given a knowledge of future developments in any school and this policy has been strictly adhered to.

3. It is requested that I may be advised of Headquarters policy on this question.

*This is an agenda for  
OIC's conference  
will get this straightened out*  
*SD(AS) DW?*  
*JS*

*J.J. Coates*  
(J.J. Coates)  
Lieutenant, R.C.N.

Reference  
OCT 6 1950  
File No. 1950-13  
Chg'd to.....

*P.A.*

Date Extracted ...14/8/50.....

Top Secret

Classification

11550-2

File Reference

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~  
~~CABINET-DEFENCE COMMITTEE~~  
-----

The following is an extract from the minutes  
of the 470.... Meeting of the above committee held  
10 Aug 50. Referred for information and necessary  
action.

  
NAVAL SECRETARY

VCNS  
③ ACNS (P) *1112318*  
DWT  
DNA  
D.N.Com  
② DNPO *See full*  
④ DNI *See full*  
DSS  
CNP  
DCNP  
DNR  
CNTS  
A/CNTS (W. & S)  
A/CNTS (Ships)  
A/CNTS (Air)  
DGFA  
DGNO  
SA/CNS

II. EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND  
RELEASE PROCEDURES - U.S.-U.K.-CANADA

(TOP SECRET)

2. The Secretary reported that at the meeting of the  
Military Information Board held 3 August, the revised M.I.B.  
Charter, giving Canada full membership, had been formally  
accepted. At this meeting it was agreed that letters would  
now be written to Mr. Claxton by the United Kingdom Minister  
of Defence and the United States Secretary for Defense,  
inviting Canada to accept the revised M.I.B. Charter.

3. The Committee noted with satisfaction the report  
of the Secretary.

Date Extracted 4/8/50.....

*Top Secret*  
Classification

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~  
~~CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE~~  
-----

File Reference

VCNS  
ACNS (P) (3)  
DWT  
DNA  
D.N.Com  
DNPO (12) (2)  
DNI (14) (2) (2)  
DSS  
CNP  
DCNP  
DNR  
CNTS  
A/CNTS (W. & S)  
A/CNTS (Ships)  
A/CNTS (Air)  
DGFA  
DGNO  
SA/CNS  
(12) (2) (2)

The following is an extract from the minutes  
of the 4.6.8..... Meeting of the above committee held  
1st. Aug. 1950. Referred for information and necessary  
action.

*[Signature]*  
NAVAL SECRETARY

Refer to.....	<i>[Signature]</i>
AUG 8 1950	
File No.	TS 114104-3
Chg'd to.....	

II. MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD

(TOP SECRET)

2. The Chief of the General Staff reported that the revised charter of the United States-United Kingdom Military Information Board had now been completed in Washington. This gave Canada full membership in the Board and conformed to the Canadian proposals which had been advanced earlier. Subsequent action would now be carried out on the Ministerial level in view of the fact that the proposed new charter had been accepted by the U.K. and U.S. military authorities.

3. The Committee noted the report of the Chief of the General Staff.

SECRET

NSTS. 11550-2

Ottawa, 14th July,


x 50.

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary,  
Joint Security Committee.

Reference your CSC 8-1 Vol. 2 of  
13th July, 1950 concerning Military Information  
Board.

It would appear that we have no alternative  
but to agree to the U.S. proposals that make our  
approach to both the U.K. and the U.S. on an identical  
basis.

Recommend concurrence in principal.

  
(L.I. Atwood),  
Captain, R.C.N.,  
Director of Naval Intelligence.


CSC 8-1  
Vol. 2

SECRET

DNI  
DMI  
DAI  
DSI  
DM(H)

Military Information Board

The attached correspondence relating to the Military Information Board has been forwarded to the JSC for immediate examination, at the request of the Chief of General Staff. Your remarks would be appreciated at your earliest possible convenience.




J. A. Campbell  
Lieut(SB) RCN(R)  
Secretary

Joint Security Committee.

JAC:JA

the JSC

It would appear that we have no alternative but to agree to the US proposals that we make our approval to both the UK and U.S. on a reciprocal Basis

  
DNI

CSC 8-1

SECRET


10 July, 1950.

MAJOR TACKABERRY:

Reference our telephone conversation enclosed herewith are copies of the following telegrams:

- (a) WA-1486 dated 6 July; WA-1487 dated 6 July; WA-1488 dated 6 July, 1950, from the Canadian Ambassador to the U.S., to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
- (b) No. 1091 dated 8 July, 1950, from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Canadian Ambassador to the United States.

(G.H. Newsome)  
Wing Commander, R.C.A.F.

Security Committee should examine the proposed security arrangement forthwith. 

Charles Foulkes  
Lieut-General  
C.G.S.



SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Message to be sent

No. 1091

July 8, 1950

Cypher Auto

Typed: P. Glazebrook  
LS

Div. Defence Liaison

Local Tel. 7051

Your WA-1486 of July 6. Military Information  
Board.

In view of your conversation with Perkins  
we shall now approach the United Kingdom on lines  
similar to my despatch No. 1867.

With reference to the specific enquiries  
in paragraph 8 of your teletype, I agree that you  
should not send a representative to this  
particular meeting of M.I.B. and that you may  
indicate to Perkins if you wish that we are  
making a parallel approach to the United  
Kingdom.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CYPHER - AUTO

S E C R E T

WA-1486

July 6, 1950.

Secret. Military Information Board.

As requested in your despatch 1867 of June 23rd, I saw Perkins, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs at the State Department, Thursday, 6th July, and gave him our views on membership in the M.I.B. and on the proposed agreements on the exchange of classified military information. A/V/M Campbell and Ignatieff were also present.

2. I chose to see Perkins as he is the official State Department representative on the M.I.B., although he does not usually attend the meetings. However, he had been fully briefed by the State Department representatives who normally attend the meetings.

3. Perkins said that he was fully in accord with the substance of the position which we were taking, namely, that we should be full members of M.I.B. As regards the annexes to your despatch, containing suggested agreements on the exchange of classified military information and terms of reference of the M.I.B., these were not, in his view, contentious issues, with one minor exception, relating to paragraphs 4 and 5 of Annex I, with which I shall deal in a separate message.

4. However, Perkins said that the United States representatives on the M.I.B. would have difficulty in accepting the procedure for negotiating the agreements which were proposed in your despatch under reference. He recalled that the United States and United Kingdom were joint partners to the M.I.B. Agreement, as well as to the agreements on the exchange of classified military information.

- 2 -

Although he could informally indicate the United States position as being favourable to our proposals, the United States could not (repeat not) undertake to make any decisions affecting their joint agreements with the United Kingdom on these matter without prior consultation with the United Kingdom. He said that is was his understanding, moreover, that the United Kingdom were to have made a simultaneous approach to us on April 24th last when General Irwin made the informal presentation at the Pentagon, as reported in my teletype WA-951 of April 26th. The next step should be, in his opinion, that we should make a parallel approach to the United Kingdom, giving them our views in the same manner as we had done with the United States authorities.

5. It was, moreover, his understanding that there had been an agreement between the United States and United Kingdom members of the M.I.B. that, following the receipt of Canadian reactions to the proposals put forward on April 24th, the Canadian position should be considered jointly by the United States and United Kingdom in the M.I.B. and that the United States, therefore, were under an obligation to put the matter on the agenda of the next meeting of the M.I.B. He was willing, however, to postpone putting this item on the agenda, pending further reaction from Ottawa to his suggestion as to the next step which should be taken.

6. Perkins was aware of the unfavourable reaction shown by the United Kingdom representatives to our claim to membership on the M.I.B., but was not aware of the assurances which Campbell tells me were given by General Slim to General Foulkes during Foulkes' recent visit to the United Kingdom. Indeed, it seems that the United Kingdom

- 3 -

representatives here, particularly Crowe, are also unaware of these assurances.

7. We suggested to Perkins that the United Kingdom authorities might find it easier to accept Canadian membership in the M.I.B. if it were sponsored by the United States rather than have an identic approach made to the United Kingdom by ourselves at this time. Perkins, however, thought that it might well prejudice our case if we did not make an identic approach to the United Kingdom before the matter was discussed in the M.I.B. as, in any case, the question of our membership and the change in the M.I.B. Charter could only be decided jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom.

8. As the next meeting of the M.I.B. is scheduled for the latter part of next week (probably Thursday), it is desirable that we should be given guidance as to whether:-

(a) You intend to make a parallel and identic approach to the United Kingdom stating our views, as suggested by Perkins

(b) Whether you would agree that, in view of the fact that Perkins has made it clear that the United States members would like to discuss our views with the United Kingdom jointly in the M.I.B., we should not (repeat not) send a representative to this meeting.

9. As the most important impediment to progress appears to be the attitude of the United Kingdom members on the M.I.B. it seems to us essential that instructions should be forthcoming from their principals in London which would facilitate our admittance to the M.I.B. since we are left in no doubt that the United States representatives entirely share our views as regards our claim to membership.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

FROM THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES  
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

CYPHER - AUTO

S E C R E T

WA-1488

July 6, 1950.

Secret. Reference my immediately preceding teletype  
WA-1487.

1. Following is the draft of a proposed Security  
Agreement between the United States and Canada:-

1. The United States Government will make every effort  
to insure that the United States will maintain the military  
security classification established by Canadian authorities  
with respect to military information of Canadian origin,  
and the military security classifications established by  
Canadian-United States Agreements with respect to military  
information of joint Canadian-United States origin or  
development; will safeguard accordingly such military  
information; will not use such information for other than  
military purposes; and, will not disclose such military  
information to a third Government without Canadian consent.  
The Canadian Government will make every effort to insure that  
Canada will maintain the military security classifications  
established by the United States authorities with respect  
to military information of United States origin, and the  
military security classifications established by Canadian-  
United States Agreements with respect to military information  
of joint Canadian-United States origin or development; will  
safeguard accordingly such military information; will not  
use such information for other than military purposes;  
and, will not disclose such military information to a  
third Government without United States consent.

- 2 -

2. The United States Government and the Canadian Government agree that, insofar as the United States and Canada are concerned, the safeguards indicated above also apply to information developed by the United States and Canada jointly in collaboration with a third Government.

3. It is agreed in respect of classified information communicated by one country to the other, that the recipient country shall use its best endeavours within the framework of its laws and rules to prevent any loss of patent rights in the information. Specifically, it is declared and agreed that:

A. Any rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in the recipient country in respect of the information communicated are not and will not be prejudiced by virtue of the introduction of the information into such country.

B. The information, so long as it remains classified will not be used or disclosed by the recipient country in any manner likely to prejudice the rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in respect thereof, but if the recipient country desires to use or to disclose the information in any manner likely so to prejudice the rights of the originator, then the recipient country will immediately notify the country of origin of the full circumstances of such intended use or disclosure, and such use or disclosure shall not be effected until approval is given by the country of origin.

C. Each country when so requested by the other and to the extent consistent with its laws and rules will use its best endeavours (1) to have maintained in secrecy any

- 3 -

patent application filed in the recipient country in respect of the information for so long as may be desired by the country of origin and (2) to supply reports of the manner in which the information embodied in a patent application has been used or disclosed.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

S E C R E T

CYPHER-AUT

July 6, 1950

WA-1487

Secret. Proposed Canada - United States Security Agreement.

1. Following the discussion with Perkins on our membership in the M.I.B., and agreements relating to the exchange of classified military information, Benninghoff, Officer-In-Charge of Dominion Affairs in the State Department, who was present at the meeting, gave Campbell and Ignatieff the revised draft of the proposed Canada/United States Security Agreement. The revised text is contained in my immediately following teletype. It has now been given clearance by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. In giving us this draft, the State Department observed that paragraphs 4 and 5 of our Annex entitled, "proposed exchange of information between the United States-United Kingdom and Canada" (Annex I) was evidently drafted with a view to incorporating the substance of the proposed Bilateral Security Agreement. The view was expressed that, while the United States, for its part, would not object if you wish to retain paragraphs 4 and 5, this might prove an unnecessary stumbling block in negotiating parallel agreements covering the disclosure of military information to fourth countries as far as the United Kingdom was concerned. The State Department, therefore, suggested that paragraphs 4 and 5 might be deleted and that the proposed Security Agreement be concluded bilaterally through an exchange



- 2 -

of letters between Mr. Claxton and Mr. Johnson. An identical Bilateral Agreement is also to be concluded between the United States and the United Kingdom.

3. The State Department would therefore like to know whether the text, as now proposed, would be approved by Canada. As soon as we signify whether it is acceptable, it is proposed that Mr. Johnson would take the next step by writing to Mr. Claxton, inviting his agreement to this text.

4. The text of the proposed agreement was, I understand, given to the Department informally by Harrington last April. Minor drafting changes have been made as follows. In place of the words "United States or Canadian Chiefs of Staff" wherever they occur, the words "Government" is now being used, to make the agreement intergovernmental. In line 9, the word "exploit" has been changed to "use"; and the words "for production", have been changed to "for other than military purposes". A similar change has been made in lines 18 and 19.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

CSC 8-1

NO. ....

# Department of National Defence

**SECRET**

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

3 July, 1950.

Referred to... *Staff*  
JUL 5 1950  
File No... *81550-10*  
Chg'd to... *Staff 272*

COS  
CAS  
CNS ✓

### Canadian Participation in Military Information Board

1. Further to my previous letters on this subject, I enclose herewith for your information a copy of each of the following messages from the Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington:

- (a) CJS 317 dated 30 June; and
- (b) CJS 318 dated 30 June.

*J.D.B. Smith*  
br. (J.D.B. Smith)  
Brigadier,  
Secretary.

*Alenst (P) MB:*  
*DNIF 10/1/50.*  
*Vens*  
*2/11*

*CR.*  
*PD*

WASHINGTON DC

301555Z JUN 50

FROM: SECRETARY CJS  
TO: SECRETARY CSC

CJS 318 30 JUNE SECRET

REF OUR CJS 317 JUNE 30.

FURTHER TO OUR REF SIGNAL A NEW RAY OF LIGHT HAS BEEN SHOWN  
AS A RESULT OF A MEETING ON THE WORKING LEVEL OF THE US MEMBERS OF THE MIB  
FOLLOWING THURSDAYS MIB MEETING THEY ARE AGAIN RECOMMENDING TO THEIR SENIORS  
THAT THE US PROPOSE FULL MEMBERSHIP FOR CANADA WITHOUT RESERVATION AND THAT  
THEY WILL STAND BY THIS RECOMMENDATION PROVIDING CANADA PUTS UP A FIRM  
STAND.

30940/MA/031259Z JULY 50

JSC 2-14

~~TOP SECRET~~

JOINT SECURITY COMMITTEE

5 Jul 50

Secretary,  
Joint Telecommunications Committee

Telecommunication Firms Security Rating

1. Your submission regarding the above mentioned subject will be discussed at the seventeenth meeting of the Joint Security Committee to be held on Monday, July 10th, at 2.00 in the Joint Secretariat Conference room. The technical members of the JTC as per your submission, are invited to attend.

(J.A. Campbell)  
Lieutenant (SB) RCN(R)  
Secretary,  
JOINT SECURITY COMMITTEE.

SECRET

JOINT TELECOMMUNICATION COMMITTEE

S E C R E T

JTC 15-13-14

3 Jul 50

The Secretary,  
Joint Security Committee


Telecommunication Firms  
Security Rating

1 It has become increasingly apparent that there is a need for a system of security ratings for firms engaged in the manufacture of telecommunication equipment together with instructions concerning the use of these gradings.

2 The lack of such a system has caused a number of administrative and security problems of which the following are examples:

- (a) Personal clearances have been approved for personnel belonging to firms whose security grading is now suspect.
- (b) Canadian firms of doubtful security rating are entering into manufacturing agreements with firms in the United States and Great Britain who are carrying out classified projects for their respective governments. Should we find it necessary to arrange for the manufacture in Canada of the equipments so developed, we would find it difficult to circumvent these agreements.

3 Because of the rather broad ramifications of this subject, it is requested that a meeting be arranged between the JSC and the technical members of the Joint Telecommunication Committee.

  
(RB Wallace) S/L  
Secretary  
JOINT TELECOMMUNICATION COMMITTEE.

CC: DN Com  
D Sigs  
DSA  
EEC  
DE&CD  
DEA  
DRB


FILE NO. JSC 2-14

JOINT SECURITY COMMITTEE

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS,  
OTTAWA, ONTARIO.

DATE: June 30, 1950

MEMORANDUM TO: DNI   
DMI  
DAI  
DSI  
DM (M)

Referred to.....
JUL 3 1950
File No. 1950-13
Chg'd to.....

SUBJECT:

RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO FOREIGN CONTROLLED FIRMS  
IN CANADA.

The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is  
forwarded for your information and retention.



(J.A. Campbell)  
Lieutenant (SB) RCN  
Secretary  
Joint Security Committee.

Encl.

000650

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

MEMORANDUM:

June 28, 1950.

SECRET

Chairman,  
Joint Security Committee

It has been suggested by the Chairman of the Joint Telecommunications Committee that enquiries should be made of the Department of Trade and Commerce as to what action they ~~would~~ propose to take to prevent classified information coming into the hands of representatives of Canadian companies which are subsidiaries of or controlled by foreign companies not of United States or United Kingdom origin.

The instance they have in mind is the possibility of classified information being provided to the Electronics Committee of the Canadian Industrial Preparedness Association of which the chairman is Mr. R.M. Brophy, President and General Manager of Rogers-Majestic, a subsidiary of Phillips of Eindhoven.

I have spoken to Mr. Low about this and he has already recognized this difficulty and stated it is not the intention to provide C.I.P.A. or its committees with classified information. General Howard, who was until recently General Manager of C.I.P.A. and is now on loan to the government, is to be asked to seek information regarding potential capacity to produce classified equipments through channels other than the C.I.P.A. where C.I.P.A. members who might be concerned have not been fully cleared for security.

Copy to:  
Chairman,  
Joint Telecommunications Committee.

SECRET

JTC 15-13-9

Department of National Defence

Ottawa, Canada,  
24 Jun 50.

Joint Telecommunications Committee

DM

Release of Classified Information  
to Commercial Companies

1 The policy covering the release of classified information to commercial companies which are capable of being infiltrated or which have undesirable connections or control has existed for some time, but in the case of certain members of the Canadian Industrial Preparedness Association, has not been applied.

2 It is considered that action should now be taken to rectify this. Accordingly, the attached letter prepared by the Joint Telecommunication Committee is forwarded for your approval and signature, please.

(EAD Hutton) G/C  
Chairman  
Joint Telecommunication Committee.



C O P Y

S E C R E T  
JTC 15-13-9

24th June, 1950.

Dear Mr. Mackenzie:

The Joint Security Committee has been considering the matter of the release of classified information to foreign or foreign controlled firms in Canada. It is their unanimous recommendation that there should be no release of such information to firms which are subsidiary to or controlled by companies located in countries other than Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, except in the case where such a firm is in a position to offer unique services which would warrant the security risk.

At the present time certain firms which would be denied classified information by this policy are members of the Canadian Industrial Preparedness Association, and, as such, may receive classified information through membership in its sub-committees. An example of this problem has occurred in the field of communications and electronics, where the chairman of the particular sub-committee of the CIPA, Mr. Brophy, is the president and general manager of Rogers-Majestic, a subsidiary of Philips of Kindhoven, and one of the firms of specific concern to the Joint Security Committee.

It is requested that this matter be brought to the attention of the Industrial Defence Board in order that it may take suitable action to eliminate the possibility of loss of security in general, and, in particular, arrange for a change in the chairmanship and membership of the CIPA Sub-committee on Communications and Electronics.

Yours sincerely,

(C.M. Drury),  
Deputy Minister.

Mr. M.W. Mackenzie,  
Deputy Minister,  
Department of Trade and Commerce,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

CC: DM  
DN Com  
D Sigs  
DSA  
File  
Orig  
DEA  
DECD  
EEC  
DRB

WASHINGTON DC

301550Z JUN 50

P R I O R I T Y

FROM: SECRETARY CJS

TO: SECRETARY CSC

CJS 317

SECRET

MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD.

YOU WILL REMEMBER DURING THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS I INDICATED THAT WE WERE LOSING THE US ACTIVE SUPPORT BY REASON OF THE TIME IT WAS TAKING TO PROCESS THIS MATTER IN OTTAWA. YOU WILL ALSO REMEMBER THAT IT WAS SUBMITTED TO YOU ON 25 APRIL 50. I AM NOW INFORMED THAT IT HAS LEFT EXTERNAL FOR WASHINGTON. AS SOON AS IT IS RECEIVED WE WILL PUT WEIGHT BEHIND IT. HOWEVER STATE DEPARTMENT HAS INDICATED TO THE EMBASSY THAT IT IS PRETTY DIFFICULT TO REFUSE THE BRITISH ARGUMENT WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY THEY WERE QUITE FIRM IN THE FACT THAT CANADA SHOULD BE A MEMBER. THIS IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION. I FELT YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF WHAT SEEMS TO BE THE PRESENT FEELING.

30938/GJC/010145Z JUL 50

MEMORANDUM

Privy Council Office

Ottawa.....

CNS

For your information, please.

J.D.B. Smith, Brigadier.

000655

VC ~~1/10~~ 28/ru  
ACNS (P) ✓ 11/13/17

1950-4  
CSC 8-1

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

27 June, 1950.

The Minister.

Canadian Participation in  
Military Information Board

Referred to...

JUN 29 1950

File No.

Chg'd to...

1. I attach herewith a copy of message CSC 302 HQ-125 Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, indicating the U.K. attitude towards Canadian participation in the Military Information Board.

2. You will recall that on 15 June the Chiefs of Staff recommendation was forwarded to you under cover of CSC 8-1 and it was requested at that time that, if you were in agreement, the Secretary of State for External Affairs might instruct the Canadian Embassy in Washington to initiate negotiations with the U.S. authorities for the development of a Canada-U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board.

3. Subsequent to this letter, the documents which had been agreed to by the Chiefs of Staff Committee as the basis of discussion by Canadian negotiators in Washington were forwarded to the Department of External Affairs for transmission to Washington. The Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, have indicated that General Irwin of the U.S. Forces, who has been very responsive to informal Canadian approaches, is shortly being moved from Washington to take up a new appointment. This, plus the fact that the chairmanship of the Military Information Board will be held by the U.K. representative during the month of July, would suggest that immediate action be taken to open negotiations with the U.S. authorities.

4. The Chiefs of Staff have directed that this matter be brought to your attention in the event that you may wish to make further representations to the Department of External Affairs to hasten this matter.

(J.D.B. Smith)  
Brigadier,  
Secretary.

CGS  
CAS  
CNS

COPY

ARMY MESSAGE

WASHINGTON, 261935Z Jun 50

PRIORITY

FROM: CHAIRMAN CJS  
TO: SECRETARY, CSC

CJS 302      SECRET

FOLLOWING IS A REPEAT OF WA 1391 FROM EMBASSY TO  
EXTERNAL DATED 24 JUNE 50.

REFERENCE MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD.

QUOTE

PARA ONE

IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS ON ANOTHER MATTER AT THE  
STATE DEPARTMENT YESTERDAY MARGRAVE RAISED INFORMALLY WITH TOME THE  
PROBLEM OF CANADAS RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES - UNITED  
KINGDOM MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD.

PARA TWO

MARGRAVE INDICATED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE  
IN WASHINGTON IS DEFINITELY OPPOSED TO CANADIAN MEMBERSHIP ON THE  
BOARD. IT WAS APPARENTLY ONLY WITH SOME DIFFICULTY THAT THE UNITED  
KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE HAD BEEN PERSUADED TO AGREE THAT CANADA  
SHOULD PARTICIPATE AS A NON-MEMBER WHEN MATTERS OF DEFINITE  
CANADIAN INTEREST ARE DISCUSSED IN THE BOARD. THIS BRITISH POSITION  
IS BASED ON THE LEGAL ARGUMENT THAT THE BOARD WAS ESTABLISHED TO  
DEAL WITH UNITED STATES - UNITED KINGDOM MILITARY INFORMATION.  
BEHIND THIS POSITION IS THE APPARENT CONVICTION THAT CANADA SHOULD  
NOT BE PLACED IN A "SPECIAL" POSITION VIS A VIS THE REST OF THE  
COMMONWEALTH PARTICULARLY AS THE BOARD WAS DESIGNED PRIMARILY  
TO OVERCOME THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH EXISTED BETWEEN THE UNITED  
STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM WITH RESPECT TO THE RELEASE AND  
EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION.

.... /2

000657

- 2 -

PARA THREE

MARGRAVE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WHILE THE UNITED STATES WOULD FAVOUR FULL CANADIAN MEMBERSHIP ON THE BOARD THEY FIND THE BRITISH ARGUMENTS DIFFICULT TO REFUTE. MARGRAVE INDICATED THAT THE UNITED STATES SECTION WERE THINKING OF SUGGESTING AS A COMPROMISE THAT CANADA SHOULD PARTICIPATE ON AN AD HOC BASIS IN EACH SEPARATE MEETING OF THE BOARD UNLESS IT WERE CLEAR FROM AN EXAMINATION OF THE AGENDA THAT CANADA WOULD HAVE NO INTEREST IN THE DISCUSSION. IN THIS WAY MARGRAVE HOPED THAT THE BRITISH WOULD ULTIMATELY AGREE TO A REVISION OF THE MIB CHARTER AND TO CANADA BECOMING A FULL AND EQUAL TRIPARTITE MEMBER.

PARA FOUR

THESE COMMENTS FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL WHO NORMALLY ATTENDS THE MEETINGS OF THE MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD POINTS UP THE DESIRABILITY OF PROCEEDING WITH THE FURTHER CONVERSATIONS REFERRED TO IN YOUR EX 830 OF MAY 18. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHEN WE MIGHT RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO CLEAR UP THIS MATTER.

UNQUOTE.

30840/GJC/270100Z Jun 50

TOP SECRET

NSTS.11550-2

MEMORANDUM TO: (1) DNPO  
(2) CNS

*concur* 24 June 1950.

*[Signature]*

This procedure is concurred in as it conforms to the U.S. procedure outlined in diagram Flag "A" and will fit in with our participation in the M.I.B.

*[Signature]*  
(L.L. Atwood)  
Commander, RCN,  
Director of Naval Intelligence.

O T T A W A  
24 June 1950.

*See CSC informed 16/6.*  
*Inform See CSC*

*ACNS (P) for info.*  
*WAB 577*

000659



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

CSC 8-1

No. ....

# Department of National Defence

SECRET

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

8th June, 1950.

11550-2

C.G.S.

C.A.S.


C.N.S. ✓

### Release of Classified Information

1. With reference to para. 3 of CJS(L) 123 of 5th June from the Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff, London (copy of which is attached), it would appear more appropriate that requests for release of information should be routed through the service sections of the Canadian Joint Staff, London, direct to the service headquarters in Ottawa. This arrangement would conform to that suggested in the proposed procedure for processing requests from NATO nations, as outlined in Annex III to the draft paper which was considered by the Chiefs of Staff Committee at the 464th meeting held 31st May (CSC 8-1 dated 29th May, 1950, refers).

2. If you concur in the above, it is proposed to advise the Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff, London, that requests for the release of information should be routed through the service sections of the Canadian Joint Staff, London, direct to the service headquarters in Ottawa, the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London, being kept advised.

Enc.

  
(J.D.B. Smith)  
Brigadier,  
Secretary.



FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

SECRET

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 1080

LONDON, June 5, 1950.

## ACTION COPY

Secret. Following for Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Ottawa, from Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London, Begins:

CJS(L)123.

1. Pending a decision concerning proposals for release of United Kingdom/United States/Canada information, it is desired to clarify channels with the United Kingdom on general subject of release of information.
2. At present the Army member CJS is clearing requests for release of information to Commonwealth countries received from the War Office direct with Army Headquarters, Ottawa. All Air Ministry requests go directly to AFHQ, Ottawa, or may be routed through Air member, BJSM to AFHQ. It is understood Admiralty requests also go directly to NSHQ, Ottawa. Western Union requests for release of information have been received addressed to the Chairman, CJS, and also via War Office addressed to both the Chairman and Army member, CJS.
3. In order to avoid confusion it is considered that requests for the release of information should be routed either through the Chairman, CJS, to the Chiefs of Staff Committee or through the service sections of the CJS direct to parent headquarters in Ottawa. It would be appreciated if the Chiefs of Staff would indicate which of these channels would best meet Chiefs of Staff requirements, and advise the channel or channels which they prefer should be used. Encl.

HIGH COMMISSIONER

000661

Classification

.....11550-2.....  
File Reference

**CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
DEFENCE COUNCIL  
CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE**  
-----

The following is an extract from the minutes of the 464..... Meeting of the above committee held 31 May 50..... Referred for information and necessary action.

  
NAVAL SECRETARY

VCNS

ACNS

DWT

DNA

D.N.Com/

DNPO

DNI

DSS

CNP

DCNP

DNR

CNTS

A/CNTS (W. &amp; S)

A/CNTS (Ships)

A/CNTS (Air)

DGFA

DGNO

SA/CNS

IV. EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND RELEASE PROCEDURES - UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM-CANADA (TOP SECRET)

15. The Committee had for consideration a draft memorandum to Cabinet Defence Committee, together with certain annexures which, if approved, would serve as a basis of Canadian policy in negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom in the development of an agreement for the exchange of classified information and procedures for its release to other countries.

(CSC 8-1 dated 29th May, 1950)

16. The Chief of the Air Staff stated that the draft annexures were in consonance with the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and should be used as the basis of Canadian policy in discussions with first the United States and subsequently the United Kingdom.

17. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs suggested that it might be inadvisable to seek the approval of the Cabinet Defence Committee for these documents before agreement had been reached with the United States and the United Kingdom; otherwise the Chiefs of Staff Committee might have to recommend at a later date something less than that which was included in the proposed draft annexures. It would seem more appropriate that authority be obtained to carry out negotiations on the basis of the Chiefs of Staff recommendation, approval by the Cabinet Defence Committee being sought only after agreement had been reached with the United States and the United Kingdom.

18. The Chief of the General Staff, referring to the discussion which he had had with Field Marshal Slim, suggested that the Canadian requirement concerning participation in the work of the Military Information Board might be met by an understanding that Canada would attend as a right all meetings of the U.S.-U.K.

Military Information Board which dealt with standardization matters. Canada would be invited to attend other meetings when Canadian interests were involved, which would be interpreted by the United Kingdom as a standing invitation. This might be a simpler and more acceptable proposal than the previously recommended reorganization of the M.I.B. on a tri-partite basis.

19. The Deputy Minister pointed out that the original requirement of the Committee was full membership in the Military Information Board. It was understood that this requirement had been made known informally to the U.S. military authorities, and that they had indicated that the United States would be prepared to accept Canada as a full member, with no limitations as to participation. It would seem inadvisable now to suggest an alternative course for Canadian participation in the Board.

20. General Foulkes, referring to the remarks of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, suggested that it might be appropriate to obtain the approval of the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs to commence negotiations with the United States on the basis of the chiefs of staff requirements and to use the draft annexes in the negotiations. The annexes could be discussed with the Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, during his forthcoming visit to Ottawa and any required clarifications could be made.

21. It was agreed, after further discussion, that the approval of the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs be sought to commence negotiations with the United States, with a view to obtaining U.S. and U.K. agreement to the arrangements as recommended by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Cabinet Defence Committee being asked to approve the arrangements as finally agreed to by the three countries.

000662


Date Extracted ...7/6/50.....

TOP SECRET  
Classification

11550-2  
File Reference

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~  
CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE  
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The following is an extract from the minutes  
of the 464.... Meeting of the above committee held  
31 MAY 50. Referred for information and necessary  
action.

  
NAVAL SECRETARY

VCNS  
③ ACNS (P) *VB*  
DWT  
DNA  
D.N.Com  
③ DNPO *(H)*  
① DNI  
DSS  
CNP  
DCNP  
DNR  
CNTS  
A/CNTS (W. & S)  
A/CNTS (Ships)  
A/CNTS (Air)  
DGFA  
DGNO  
SA/CNS

AMENDMENT!

II. MINUTES OF THE 461ST MEETING

Item II - Exchange of Classified Information and  
Release Procedures - Canada-U.S.-U.K.

(TOP SECRET)

5. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
observed no change had been made in the decision as recorded in  
the minutes of the 461st meeting, as recommended in his letter  
which had been tabled at the subsequent meeting. He desired to  
go on record as being opposed to the wording of the recommenda-  
tion as contained in para. 9 of the minutes of the 461st meeting.

6. The Committee noted the remarks of the Under-Secretary  
of State for External Affairs.

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE


11550 - 2

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

C.N.S.

For your information, please.



(J.D.B. Smith)  
Brigadier.

VENUS ~~10~~  
ACNS (1) ~~10B~~  
ANI ~~3~~

000664

Return to CNS  
1/2

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## MESSAGE FORM

## FOR CLASSIFIED MESSAGES ONLY

INDICATE DEGREE OF PRIORITY	FOR MESSAGE CENTRE USE ONLY		MARK X TO INDICATE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	X		TOPSEC	
PRIORITY			SECRET	X
ROUTINE			CONFID	
IF NOT MARKED WILL BE TRANSMITTED DEFERRED			RESTD	
		GR		
FROM		SECRETARY CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE OTTAWA		
ACTION ADDRESSEE/S		CHAIRMAN CANADIAN JOINT STAFF LONDON ENGLAND		
INFORMATION ADDRESSEE/S				
ORIGINATOR'S NO. CSC 1203				

REFERENCE YOUR CJS(L)112 (.)

PARA ONE

IN VIEW OF URGENCY OF THIS REQUEST CANADIAN CHIEFS OF STAFF CONCUR IN RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON GS ANTI TANK MINE, GROUND ANTI PERSONNEL MINE AND AIR BURST ANTI PERSONNEL MINE AS SHOWN IN EMIC (50) 28 DATED 3 APRIL (.)

PARA TWO

NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING CANADIAN POSITION VIS A VIS US-UK MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD HAVE NOT BEEN FINALIZED AND CHIEFS OF STAFF CONCURRENCE IN THIS PARTICULAR ITEM AND PROCEDURE IS NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE CONSTRUED AS CANADIAN AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT PROCEDURES PUT FORTH RECENTLY BY UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES FOR CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD (.) ~~REPEATED~~ CANADIAN CONCURRENCE IS GIVEN WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO CANADA'S POSITION VIS A VIS MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD (.)

PARA THREE

ABOVE HAS BEEN CONCURRED IN ON BEHALF OF ARMY BY VICE CHIEF WHO HAS SUGGESTED THAT CGS BE CONSULTED IF POSSIBLE FOR CONFIRMATION (.)

ORIGINATOR	TELEPHONE	DATE - TIME GROUP	FILE NO.
(J D B SMITH) BRIGADIER	9-4971	25 MAY 50 1030G Z	CSC 5-27-3-0



FILE NO. CSC 8-1

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS,  
OTTAWA, ONTARIO.

DATE: 23rd May, 1950.

MEMORANDUM TO: C.G.S.  
C.A.S.  
C.N.S.  
C.D.R.B.

SUBJECT:

Release of Classified Information

The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded for your information and retention.

Memorandum CJS 275-1-1 of 12th May from Washington.

- (1) ~~DNI~~ *See [unclear]*  
(2) ACNS (P)

Encl.

(J.D.B. Smith) Brigadier,  
Secretary,  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

000667

SECRET

CANADIAN JOINT STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C.

File: CJS 275-1-1

12 May 50

Secretary  
Chiefs of Staff Committee,  
Room 4444 "A" Building,  
Department of National Defence,  
OTTAWA, Ontario, Canada.

Release of Classified Information

1 Reference is made to CJS 275-1 dated  
25 April and CJS220 dated 12 May 50.

2 Please find attached:

- (a) Eight copies of a report on a meeting held  
at the State Department to discuss develop-  
ment on the exchange and disclosure of  
information.
- (b) Eight copies of a draft security agreement  
(U.S. - U.K.).

Attach

*Hugh Campbell*  
(Hugh Campbell)  
Air Vice Marshal  
Chairman  
Canadian Joint Staff.

SECRET



SECRET

Washington, D.C.  
11th May, 1950

EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION

1 At the initiative of Snow, a meeting was called in the State Department this morning to which A/V/M Campbell and Ignatieff were invited to discuss informally developments regarding the exchange and disclosure of classified military information arising out of the conference held at the Pentagon on Monday, April 24th, which was reported in my teletype 951 of April 26 and my despatch 1038 of April 26.

2 Messrs. Margrave of the Munitions Division of the State Department and Wight of the Canadian Desk were also present.

3 Our representatives were told by the State Department that there was some concern at the State Department that the procedure for following up the conference of April 24th appeared to be going awry. They recalled that it had been their understanding at the conclusion of the Pentagon meeting that an exchange of letters between the U.S. Secretary of Defence and the Canadian Minister of National Defence would be negotiated through the usual diplomatic channel. When agreement had been reached on an exchange of letters, formal correspondence would take place between Mr. Claxton and Mr. Johnson. However, without the prior knowledge of the State Department, the Pentagon had arranged for Mr. Johnson to address a letter to Mr. Claxton on May 5, formalizing the discussion which had taken place at the Pentagon meeting of April 24th. The State Department expressed the wish that any reply stating the Canadian position would be negotiated through the State Department and External Affairs channel in order that proper coordination between the civil and military authorities of the United States Government would be assured to complete this transaction between the Canadian and U.S. Governments.

4 A/V/M Campbell said that it was his understanding that the Chiefs of Staff Committee had considered the proposals put forward at the Pentagon meeting of April 24th and that a letter from the Chiefs of Staff Committee was on its way for delivery to General Irwin (Director of Military Intelligence) who has been Chairman of the meeting. The State Department reply to this information was that a further meeting at the Pentagon would probably have to follow, at which civil as well as military representatives would be present from both sides and repeated the desire that the exchange of letters should be negotiated through the diplomatic channel to ensure proper civil and military coordination on the U.S. side. In this way, the final text of any of the letters exchanged between Messrs. Claxton and Mr. Johnson would have the agreement of all senior officials concerned, civil as well as military, both on the U.S. as well as on the Canadian side; otherwise there might be a possibility of misunderstanding arising.

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-2-

5 The State Department representatives took the occasion to review the proposals arising out of the Burns-Templer discussion. Margrave, who had apparently participated in the Burns-Templer talks and had a copy of the document with him, outlined the seven parts of the Burns-Templer agreement. He explained that he could not give our representative a copy of the text as this was regarded as a U.S.-U.K. agreement. The seven parts are as follows:

DOCUMENT "A" - agreement to resume exchange of information over the whole field of guided missiles between the U.K. and the U.S., previously suspended;

DOCUMENT "B" - U.K.-U.S. bilateral security agreement;

DOCUMENT "C" - agreement on the policy to govern the disclosure of classified military information to certain Commonwealth governments;

DOCUMENT "D" - the charter of the Military Information Board;

DOCUMENT "E" - the agreements regarding the employment of foreign nationals;

DOCUMENT "F" - agreement governing the disclosure of classified military information to North Atlantic Treaty countries;

DOCUMENT "G" - agreement concerning the policy to govern the disclosure of information on the guided missiles project to Australia.

6 Margrave gave our representatives to understand that the substance of all the documents except DOCUMENT "A" "E" and "G" had been communicated to our representatives at the Pentagon meeting of April 24th. The documents most directly concerned with the proposals now before the Canadian Government, he said, were those concerned with Documents "B" "C" and "D".

7 As regards Document "B" (bilateral security agreement UK-US), Snow and Margrave explained that proposals in virtually identical terms for a bilateral security agreement had been made to the Canadian Government informally through the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa on April 23rd. For purposes of easy reference the text of the draft security agreement is contained in my immediately following teletype. The substance of the proposal, Margrave explained, merely recorded arrangements now in force governing the disclosure of military information held in common between Canada and the U.S. to third countries. Special emphasis was added to the question of patent rights which, in the view of the U.S., required more clarification than had been previously given to the problem. The U.S. Authorities had it in mind to put this proposed bilateral security agreement on the agenda of the next meeting of the P.J.B.D. to be held in Halifax at the end of May.

8 As regards Document "C", Margrave explained that, whereas the agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom provided that certain Commonwealth countries apart from Canada (and he specifically referred to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) would be given information only insofar as it was required for specific projects, Canada was being offered, without being asked for any quid pro quo, exactly the same terms in regard to the exchange of classified military information as exist between the United Kingdom and the United States.

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8 (Cont'd)

He said that there were absolutely no string attached, nor had anything been concealed from Canada, as far as the U.S. was concerned in putting forward the proposals which were forwarded to you under cover of my despatch 1038 of April 26th.

9 The Military Information Board

Margrave explained that while the charter of the MIB had been included as Document "D" of the Burns-Templer agreement, the MIB had a longer history and had been established in order to deal with the problem of disclosures to third countries of classified military information of combined U.S.-U.K. origin. The procedure of having to obtain prior consent in every case had proved too cumbersome and therefore the U.S. had readily assented to a U.K. proposal to establish joint machinery for clearances. On information originating from joint U.S.-U.K. sources, the Board had powers of decision. After the Burns-Templer talks it had been decided to extend the Board's activities to the power of discussion and recommendation with regard to:

- (a) Commonwealth projects;
- (b) information to N.A.T. countries;
- (c) tripartite problems (Canada-U.S.-U.K.)

10 As regards Canadian participation in M.I.B., Margrave said that the U.S. members would be quite prepared to propose that Canada should attend all meetings of the Board, as Canada's direct interest in most fields of U.S. military activities, and particularly standardization, was fully recognized. Margrave said that the U.S. members of the MIB had anticipated some opposition from the U.K. having Canada as a full member of the MIB, mainly on two grounds:

- (a) that the charter of the MIB envisaged a joint U.S.-U.K. enterprise and the charter would require revision to admit Canada;
- (b) the reluctance (sic) of the U.K. to admit Canada as a Commonwealth country to preferential treatment.

11 Our representatives indicated to the State Department that neither grounds for objection which had been mentioned would be regarded on our side as having sufficient validity to justify our exclusion from the Board if it were decided we should seek membership.

12 In reply, the State Department indicated that if we were to seek formal membership in the MIB, no opposition should be expected from the U.S. members.

13. This message has been prepared jointly with A/V/M Campbell. Would you please pass a copy to the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

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PROPOSED SECURITY AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff will make every effort to insure that the United States will maintain the military security classification established by Canadian authorities with respect to military information of Canadian origin, and the military security classifications established by Canadian-U.S. agreements with respect to military information of joint Canadian-U.S. origin or development; will safeguard accordingly such military information; will not exploit such information for production for other than military purposes; and, will not disclose such military information to a third government without Canadian consent. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff will make every effort to insure that Canada will maintain the military security classifications established by the U.S. authorities with respect to military information of U.S. origin, and the military security classifications established by Canadian-U.S. agreements with respect to military information of joint Canadian-U.S. origin or development; will safeguard accordingly such military information; will not exploit such information for production for other than military purposes; and, will not disclose such military information to a third government without U.S. consent.
2. The United States Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff agree that, insofar as the U.S. and Canada are concerned, the safeguards indicated above also apply to information developed by the U.S. and Canada jointly in collaboration with a third government.
3. It is agreed in respect of classified information communicated by one country to the other, that the recipient country shall use its best endeavours within the

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- 2 -

framework of its laws and rules to prevent any loss of patent rights in the information. Specifically it is declared and agreed that:

a. Any rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in the recipient country in respect of the information communicated are not and will not be prejudiced by virtue of the introduction of the information into such country.

b. The information, so long as it remains classified, will not be used or disclosed by the recipient country in any manner likely to prejudice the rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in respect thereof, but if the recipient country desires to use or to disclose the information in any manner likely so to prejudice the rights of the originator, then the recipient country will immediately notify the country of origin of the full circumstances of such intended use or disclosure, and such use or disclosure shall not be effected until approval is given by the country of origin.

c. Each country when so requested by the other and to the extent consistent with its laws and rules will use its best endeavours (1) to have maintained in secrecy any patent application filed in the recipient country in respect of the information for so long as may be desired by the country of origin and (2) to supply reports of the manner in which the information embodied in a patent application has been used or disclosed.

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Date Extracted ..... 19/5/50 .....

*Secret*  
Classification  
1950-13  
File Reference

~~CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE~~  
**DEFENCE COUNCIL**  
~~CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE~~  
-----

- ① *VGNS* ✓
- ACNS*
- DWT
- DNA
- D.N.Com
- DNPO
- ② *DNI* ✓
- DSS
- CNP
- DCNP
- DNR
- CNTS
- A/CNTS (W. & S)
- A/CNTS (Ships)
- A/CNTS (Air)
- DGFA
- DGNO
- SA/CNS
- ③ *D N Inf*

The following is an extract from the minutes of the... 47th.... Meeting of the above committee held 8 & 9 May/50. Referred for information and necessary action.

*[Signature]*  
NAVAL SECRETARY

Referred to... *Staff*  
MAY 22 1950  
11550-2  
-5

23 Release of Information

The Chairman referred to the question of the release of information on Canadian - U.S. matters. He suggested that the present practice had not been entirely satisfactory in that it took too long to clear information and consequently led to acrimony. He felt that the matter should be reviewed and to this end DPR and the Canadian Secretary P.J.B.D. would be putting forward a plan along the following general principles:

- (1) Where any long-term policy was involved information would be cleared through External Affairs as at present.
- (2) Where joint exercises were being carried out there would be special arrangements for clearance at the site of operations.
- (3) Where local operations were concerned immediate release would be made as quickly as possible. Wherever possible the information would be cleared with the senior officer of the other country present, and NDHQ kept informed.
- (4) Where general matters were concerned such as equipment, exchange of personnel, etc., clearance would be obtained direct, between NDHQ and the U.S. Defence Department.

Defence Council noted the Chairman's remarks and agreed that the proposed change in the procedure for releasing information of concern to both Canada and the United States should be placed before the Permanent Joint Board for consideration prior to submission to the Chiefs of Staff.

DM  
CGS  
CAS  
CNS  
CDR  
000674



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. **CSC 8-1**

# Department of National Defence

**TOP SECRET**

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE


OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

29th May, 1950.

C.G.S.  
C.A.S.  
C.N.S. ✓  
C.D.R.B.

### Exchange of Classified Information & Release Procedures United States-United Kingdom-Canada

1. As a result of the decision made by the Committee at its 461st meeting, the attached draft memorandum for Cabinet Defence Committee has been prepared. This memorandum includes a very brief outline of the lead-up to the Chiefs of Staff recommendations and has attached as annexes four documents which will serve as the basis for negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom.
2. In connection with Annex I, arrangements for security of exchanged classified military information have been included. Recently certain U.S. authorities, apparently working on a different level from those U.S. officers who have discussed the Burns-Templer Agreement with the Canadian Joint Staff, have put forward a proposed Canada-U.S. security agreement. It is understood that this item is on the agenda of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence but that the policy of the Canadian Section is to take no action on it. In brief, the proposed Canada-U.S. security arrangement would be in direct conflict with the U.S.-U.K.-Canada agreement to exchange information. Accordingly, it has been considered more appropriate to provide for security requirements by including these in the document relating to the proposed exchange of information.
3. In summary, these annexes, if approved and if agreed to as between the U.S., the U.K. and Canada, will constitute an arrangement for the exchange of information as between these three countries and the release of classified information which has been exchanged between these three countries to any fourth nation.
4. This item will be considered on the agenda of the 464th meeting of the Committee (Item 2).

  
(J.D.B. Smith) Brigadier,  
Secretary.

D R A F T

COPY

TOP SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE:

Exchange of Classified Information and Release Procedures  
United States-United Kingdom-Canada

1. In January of this year, a United Kingdom team headed by General Templer met in Washington with a United States team headed by General Burns. The outcome of these discussions led to what is commonly called "The Templer Agreement", which was formally approved on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom by an exchange of letters between the Secretary of Defense and the Minister of Defence during the month of February. The original approach was made by the United Kingdom because of the administrative difficulties which resulted from the requirement that the United Kingdom obtain prior consent of the United States before any classified military information of United States or combined United States-United Kingdom origin could be released to other members of the Commonwealth by the United Kingdom.
2. Although the Templer Agreement refers to arrangements for interchange and release of information of a classified nature to third nations, its basic purpose is to enable the United Kingdom to release, under the agreed procedures and without prior consent of the United States, classified information to other Commonwealth countries. Realizing the special relation which Canada has with the United States, a separate arrangement was proposed for the exchange of information by the United States and the United Kingdom with Canada. The proposed arrangement has been studied by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and while in general satisfactory, it does not adequately meet Canadian requirements.
3. To provide an organization for the proposed disclosures of combined military information to third nations (other than Canada) by either the United States or the United Kingdom, the U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board was formed. When this Board met on 10th March, 1950, Canada's special position vis-a-vis the United States and the United Kingdom was recognized and accordingly special procedures were prepared by the Board for submission to the Canadian military authorities. These procedures provided that Canada should be on an equal tri-partite basis insofar as the release of classified information on matters of standardization was concerned. However, Canada would be invited only as required by the United States and the United Kingdom on matters concerning the release of other classified information.
4. The Chiefs of Staff Committee have considered the proposals for both the exchange of classified information as between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, and Canadian participation in the U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board, and have recommended that, on the matter of exchange of information, Canada should enter into formal and identical agreements with the United States and the United Kingdom. In the matter of the U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board, the Chiefs of Staff Committee consider that, as Canada is so inextricably involved in the very nature of the work which is now being done by the Military Information Board, and as Canada only is in a position to indicate whether or not information is of Canadian origin or affects Canadian interests, Canada should seek full membership in the Board.

CHQ  
AFSA  
CBM/RC



- 2 -

5. Attached herewith are annexures which, if approved by the Cabinet Defence Committee, would give effect to the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and would serve as the basis of Canadian policy in negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom on the matter of exchange of classified information and release procedures. It has been suggested that these negotiations be carried out through diplomatic channels.

6. The Cabinet Defence Committee is asked to approve the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff that Canada should enter into a formal agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom on the exchange of classified information and that Canada should seek full partnership in the presently constituted U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board.

J.D.B. Smith,  
Brigadier,  
Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

29th May, 1950.

TOP SECRET

ANNEX I

PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN  
THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA

In order to facilitate the exchange of classified military information as between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, the following arrangements will maintain:

1. The United Kingdom and Canada may exchange freely without prior United States consent classified military information of United States origin, of combined United States-Canadian origin, or of combined United States-United Kingdom origin, except for information relating to Western Hemisphere defence, provided that:

9  
and/or  
which  
The United Kingdom and/or Canada furnish to the United States periodic reports identifying the specific documentary materials released by the one to the other, when such documents are of United States, combined United States-United Kingdom, or combined United States-Canadian origin.

2. The United States and Canada may exchange freely without prior United Kingdom consent classified military information of United Kingdom origin, of combined United Kingdom-Canadian origin, or of combined United States-United Kingdom origin, provided that:

9  
and/or  
The United States and/or Canada furnish to the United Kingdom periodic reports identifying the specific documentary materials released by the one to the other, when such documents are of United Kingdom, combined United States-United Kingdom, or combined United Kingdom-Canadian origin.

3. The United ~~States~~ and the United Kingdom may exchange freely without prior Canadian consent classified military information of Canadian origin, of combined United Kingdom-Canadian origin or of combined United States-Canadian origin, provided that:

The United States and/or the United Kingdom furnish to Canada periodic reports identifying the specific documentary materials released by the one to the other when such documents are of combined United States-Canadian or combined United Kingdom-Canadian origin.

4. The Chiefs of Staff of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada agree to maintain the security of the originator of all information so exchanged and further agree not to pass such information received to a fourth country without prior consent.

5. It is also agreed by the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada that, in respect of classified information communicated by one country to the other, the recipient country shall use its best endeavours within the framework of its laws and rules to prevent any loss of patent rights in the information. Specifically it is declared and agreed that:

a. Any rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in the recipient country in respect of the information communicated are not and will not be prejudiced by virtue of the introduction of the information into such country.

b. The information, so long as it remains classified, will not be used or disclosed by the recipient country in any manner likely to prejudice the rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in respect thereof, but if the recipient country desires to use or to disclose the information in any manner likely so to prejudice the rights of the originator, then the recipient country will immediately notify the country of origin of the full circumstances of such intended use or disclosure, and such use or disclosure shall not be effected until approval is given by the country of origin.

c. Each country when so requested by the other and to the extent consistent with its laws and rules will use its best endeavours (1) to have maintained in secrecy any patent application filed in the recipient country in respect of the information for so long as may be desired by the country of origin and (2) to supply reports of the manner in which the information embodied in a patent application has been used or disclosed.

*Commonwealth Countries?*

TOP SECRET

ANNEX II

PROPOSED CHARTER OF THE  
U.S.-U.K.-CANADA MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD

It has been agreed by the appropriate United States, United Kingdom and Canadian authorities to establish the U.S.-U.K.-Canada Military Information Board, hereinafter referred to as the "Board".

Purpose

1. The Board is established for the purpose of providing a combined body wherein proposed disclosures to fourth nations by any of the appropriate United States, United Kingdom or Canadian authorities of "combined military information", defined in (2) below may be considered. It is intended that the Board will facilitate the implementation of the agreements between the United States and Canada and the United Kingdom and Canada to exchange freely classified military information of U.S. origin, U.K. origin, Canadian origin, or of any U.S.-U.K.-Canada combined origin.

Functions and Powers

2. The Board shall decide whether disclosures to fourth nations of combined military information proposed by the United States, the United Kingdom or Canada shall be permitted. Combined military information is defined as follows:-

- (a) Classified military information resulting or originating from projects developed on a combined basis; or
- (b) Other classified military information determined by the Board from time to time to be combined military information.

The criteria upon which the Board will base its determination under paragraph 2 (b) are:

- (1) The appropriate U.S.-U.K.-Canadian authorities have agreed to undertake separately, different phases of a specific project; or
- (2) The appropriate U.S.-U.K.-Canadian authorities have agreed that one or two of the countries will assume sole project responsibility on behalf of all; or
- (3) The appropriate U.S.-U.K.-Canadian authorities have agreed at the outset of the project to adopt the best results of independent endeavours.

Membership

3. The Board shall consist of (a) an official of the U.S. Department of State, (b) an official of the U.K. Embassy in Washington, (c) an official of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, (d) an officer or official from each of the U.S. military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force), (e) an official of the U.S. Research and Development Board, (f) an officer or official from each of the offices of the U.K. Joint Services (Navy Staff, Army Staff, Air Force Staff, and Technical Services), and (g) an officer or official from each of the offices of the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington (Navy Staff, Army Staff, Air Force Staff and Defence Research Board Staff).

There may be present at meetings of the Board such U.S., U.K. or Canadian consultants or observers as desired.

Chairmanship

4. The Chairmanship of the Board shall be held on a monthly basis in succession by the representatives of the three countries.

Place of Meetings

5. Unless otherwise provided for, meetings of the Board shall be held in Washington.

6. A combined secretariat shall be established by the Board.

Decisions of Board

7. All decisions of the Board shall be taken by unanimous agreement.

Procedures

8. (a) Rules of Procedure

Except as provided in paragraph 7, the Board shall adopt its own rules of procedure for conduct of its business, including the establishment of committees.

(b) Processing of Requests

- (1) Requests normally will be processed through direct presentation to the Board by members, except that,
- (2) In the processing of requests applicable to groups or combinations of nations, or states members thereof, the Board will prescribe such special procedures as it considers desirable.

*Combined  
Complication*

TOP SECRET

ANNEX III

PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR PROCESSING REQUESTS FROM NATO  
NATIONS AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL PLANNING GROUPS FOR  
INFORMATION OF COMBINED U.S.-U.K.-CANADIAN ORIGIN  
(OTHER THAN MATTERS OF STANDARDIZATION)

REQUESTS THROUGH REGIONAL PLANNING GROUPS

1. a. General

When a request to the United States, the United Kingdom, or Canada, for the disclosure, for North Atlantic Treaty Organization purposes, of information which is of combined U.S.-U.K.-Canadian origin comes up to a Service Advisory Committee of a European Planning Group, the appropriate representative will inform the Committee that the request involves combined U.S.-U.K.-Canadian information. Copies of the request are forwarded by the Committee to the U.S. Delegation (JAMAG), to the U.K. Delegation and to the Canadian Delegation.

b. U.S. Action

A copy of the Committee request is forwarded by JAMAG with its recommendation to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army, Washington. The U.S. view is then obtained by G-2.

?  
Why army why?

c. U.K. Action

A copy of the Committee request is forwarded by the U.K. representative with his recommendation to his parent Service Department. The U.K. view is then obtained by the parent Service Department, which transmits this view in writing to the U.K. Delegation and through it to JAMAG, and to the Canadian Delegation, with a copy to the B.J.S.M. in Washington.

d. Canadian Action

A copy of the Committee request is forwarded by the Canadian Delegation with its recommendation to its parent Service ~~(Department)~~ in Ottawa. The Canadian view is then obtained by the parent Service Department, which transmits this view in writing to the Canadian Delegation and through it to the U.K. Delegation, and to JAMAG, with a copy to the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington.

e. M.I.B. Action

The Washington staff of that nation (U.S., U.K. or Canada) to whose Delegation to a Service Advisory Group a request was originally directed, has the responsibility of ascertaining the views of the other nation or nations (U.S., U.K. or Canada) through their Washington staffs. In the event the U.S., U.K. or Canadian views differ as to whether or not the subject is information of combined origin or as to whether the request should be met, the matter may be referred to the U.S.-U.K.-Canadian M.I.B. by a member.

f. Final Action

Coordinated views are passed back to the U.S., U.K. or Canadian Delegations for joint release or denial to the Service Advisory Committee through reverse channels.

ANNEX III

Page 2.

REQUESTS SUBMITTED DIRECT TO U.S., U.K. OR CANADA BY NATO NATIONS

2. When a request to the United States, the United Kingdom or Canada for such information is received direct from a NATO nation, such requests will be processed through the U.S., U.K. and Canadian Delegations to the Regional Planning Group. National views will be obtained and the procedure indicated in para. 1 will be utilized.

CONCURRENT ACTION

3. The communication of the national views of the U.K. and Canada, to their Washington staffs, will be as nearly concurrent as is possible with JAMAG's reference of the request to Washington.

TOP SECRET

ANNEX IV

PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR PROCESSING REQUESTS FROM  
MEMBER NATIONS OF THE NAORPG FOR INFORMATION OF  
COMBINED U.S.-U.K.-CANADIAN ORIGIN

When requests involving information of U.S.-U.K.-Canadian origin, emanating from member nations of the NAORPG or from Committees of the NAORPG, are received by the United States, the Department of the Navy will obtain the concurrence or denial to release from the United Kingdom and Canada through the medium of the British Joint Services Mission and Canadian Joint Staff, Washington. In the event U.S., U.K. and Canadian views differ as to the proposed release, the Navy may refer the matter to the U.S.-U.K.-Canadian M.I.B. for reconsideration.



H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. - .....

REFERRED TO	REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)
<p>ACNS (P) CNS 27/5</p> <p><i>See C.S.C. Informant 10/7/50</i></p>	<p>The remarks contained in CSC 5-27-3-0 (148) of the 22nd May, 1950 are not concurred in, particularly those in paragraph 4.</p> <p>2. It is important that we clearly state that Canada is prepared to show to members of the NATO developments of a U.K.-Canadian nature with the concurrence of the U.K. and of a U.S.-Canadian nature with the concurrence of the U.S., but that until Canada's position on the Military Information Board is approved concurrence is not to be construed as an agreement to accept the procedures put forward by the U.K. and the U.S.</p> <p><i>(L.L. Atwood)</i> Commander, RCN, DNI</p> <p>25 May 1950</p> <p><i>CNS: I am quite happy about para 4 - D.N. F's point is fully covered recommend NFA, except to tell Sec C.S.C. that you concur.</i></p> <p><i>WJB</i> 000685</p>

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 5-27-3-0 (48)

**SECRET**

# Department of National Defence

## CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

22nd May, 1950.

C.G.S.  
C.A.S.  
C.N.S. ✓  
C.D.R.B.

Referred to *PR*  
MAY 29 1950  
File *8/530-10*  
Chg'd to

### Request of U.K. Authorities to release information on anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines

1. You will recall that, during the discussion on the exchange of classified information and release procedures at the 461st meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, consideration was given to the proposed procedure for processing requests of NATO nations for classified U.S.-U.K.-Canadian information pertaining to standardization. As the decision of the Committee was that Canada should endeavour to obtain full membership in the Military Information Board, the details of the suggested procedure were not commented on as the procedure outlined placed Canada in the position of a U.S.-U.K. consultant on matters of classified information other than that on standardization.

2. I attach herewith a copy of a telegram from the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, London, in which Canada is being asked to approve an arrangement by which General de Lattre de Tassigny will be allowed to see the latest British developments on anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines. You will note that the actual letter and the EMIC form have not arrived as yet.

*1. 2. 3. (P)*  
*NR*  
*NT*  
3. In January and February of this year, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff were invited to agree to a proposal whereby NATO countries, and particularly those of the Western European Regional Planning Group, could be invited to visit engineering experimental establishments and be shown latest developments on anti-tank weapons and armoured fighting vehicles. Subsequent to the concurrence of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, a request was put forward by Canada which would permit the visit of a representative of the French Armed Forces to visit Canada and see certain developments in anti-tank weapons. In answer to this proposal, the United Kingdom pointed out that such permission should not be granted and asked the concurrence of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that information on anti-tank weapons should not be given to the French authorities. This reversal of view by the United Kingdom resulted in considerable discussions between Mr. Claxton, Mr. Shinwell and Mr. Johnson, the final result of which was that agreement was reached that a representative of the French Armed Forces should be invited to attend a demonstration in Canada where the particular anti-tank weapons would be displayed.


(Continued)

- 2 -

4. In recent weeks the Canadian authorities have been requested to concur in certain proposals which have been put forward concerning Canada's participation in the Military Information Board. A request for Canadian concurrence in the attached signal conforms to the procedures laid down for the M.I.B. It would appear that Canada should concur in the visit of General de Lattre de Tassigny to the U.K. Military Engineering Experimental Establishment, where he will be shown latest developments on anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons. However, it is recommended that, in concurring with this arrangement, it should be made clear to the U.K. and U.S. authorities that this approval is being given without prejudice to Canada's position vis-a-vis the Military Information Board and that this Canadian concurrence is not to be construed as an agreement to accept the procedures put forward by the United Kingdom and United States for Canadian participation in the Military Information Board.

5. May your concurrence or remarks concerning the above be forwarded at the earliest convenient date in order that a suitable reply may be drafted.

I concur and feel quite certain the eminent French General will visit the U.K. for this purpose whether the Canadian or whether we don't.

  
(J.D.B. Smith)  
Brigadier,  
Secretary.

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

SECRET

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 952

LONDON, May 18, 1950.

Secret. Following for Chairman Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee from Chairman Canadian Joint Staff, London, Begins:

CJS (L) 111.

1. Further to our message CJS (64) of 24th April 1950 and subsequent explanatory letter of 25th April on United Kingdom/United States proposals for Canadian participation in exchange of information further to the Templer Agreement, the following is the text of a letter addressed to the Chairman, CJS, London, from the Secretary, Exchange of Military Information Sub-Committee dated May 16th:

"The Exchange of Military Information Sub-Committee (EMIS) has been set up as the agency for transmitting requests to you on behalf of the United Kingdom Service and Supply Departments for the disclosure of classified military information of United States/United Kingdom Canadian origin to other countries, in accordance with the procedure laid down in MIB 4/1.

The Sub-Committee had intended not to submit any cases to you until the Canadian views on MIB 4/1 had been obtained; but a case of considerable urgency has now arisen and I have been instructed to submit it to you for special consideration.

The case as originally submitted is given on the attached form EMIC (50) 28 - which is a standard form in which all



- 2 -

such submissions will be made in future. A new development is that General de Lattre de Tassigny is coming on a visit to this country at the beginning of June and the War Office is very anxious to take him round the Military Engineering Experimental Establishment and show him the latest British developments on anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines. It is considered to be of the greatest importance in the interests of Western Union standardization that General de Lattre should be able to see these developments. I should be very grateful, if, in the light of this, you could let me have Canadian approval to this proposal by June 1st.

I am sorry that this first submission to you should be a matter of such urgency, but I hope you will appreciate the special circumstances of the case".

2. A copy of this letter and the attached form EMIC (50) 28 is being forwarded by diplomatic air bag this date.

3. Prior to receipt of this letter a Staff Officer of JANAG telephoned the Secretary, CJS, asking what progress was being made to clear the two papers MIB 4/1 and EMIC (50) 28.

4. It would appear possible that an attempt is being made to hasten the Canadian decision on the question of exchange of information. Consequently the Secretary of the Exchange of Military Information Sub-Committee was advised that it would not seem appropriate that the CJS should anticipate Canada's decision on the exchange of information or prejudice our position by processing this request through his Committee which has been set up specifically as the agency for transmitting requests to Canada. However, it was suggested that in view of the apparent urgency in obtaining Canadian views prior to June 1st that the War Office, who are reported by the Secretary, EMI Sub-Committee, to be the sponsor of the request, should ask the Chairman of the CJS direct to obtain

- 3 -

Canadian clearance. The Secretary of the EMI Sub-Committee agreed that this was logical and stated that he would so report to the War Office.

5. Notwithstanding these circumstances it is suggested that this request and the associated paper being forwarded be studied with a view to making the earliest possible reply to the War Office upon receipt of their enquiry by the CJS.

6. The document referred to as MIB 4/1 has not been received by the CJS London, but it is understood that the designation refers to part of the documentation of the request to Canada on the exchange of information.

7. For your information it is confirmed that no action is being taken here on the military level concerning the United Kingdom/United States proposal for the exchange of information pending receipt of Chiefs of Staff direction in the matter. Ends.

HIGH COMMISSIONER



ate Extracted 19/5/50...

*Top Secret*  
Classification

11.5.50...21.....  
File Reference

**CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
DEFENCE COUNCIL  
CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE**  
-----

VCNS  
⑤ ACNS (P)  
DWT  
DNA  
D.N.Com  
DNPO  
① DNI  
DSS  
CNP  
DCNP  
DNR  
CNTS  
A/CNTS (W. & S)  
A/CNTS (Ships)  
A/CNTS (Air)  
DGFA  
DGNO  
SA/CNS

The following is an extract from the minutes of the 463rd Meeting of the above committee held 16 MAY 1950. Referred for information and necessary action.

*[Signature]*  
NAVAL SECRETARY

**IV. EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION - CANADA-U.S.-U.K. -  
AMENDMENT TO MINUTES OF 461ST MEETING**

(TOP SECRET)

11. The Committee had for consideration a letter from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs suggesting amendments to para. 9 of the minutes of the 461st meeting. *Tab "A"*

(CSC 8-1 dated 15th May, 1950)

12. The Chief of the General Staff pointed out that there had been considerable discussion on the subject of the exchange of classified information and that, while the phrasing of the approach to the United States and the United Kingdom might be worded differently, the minutes in fact recorded the requirements which the Chiefs of Staff considered necessary from the military point of view.

13. The representative of the Department of External Affairs observed that the attitude recorded in the minutes suggested a very direct approach which might not achieve what was required. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs had indicated that the conclusions reached by the Committee did not correspond with his understanding of what had been agreed.

14. General Foulkes pointed out that recently the Minister of National Defence had received two letters from the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Louis Johnson, seeking Canadian concurrence to the proposals for Canada-U.S.-U.K. exchange of information and also for Canadian participation under certain conditions in the U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board. The Minister of National Defence had replied to these letters in general terms, indicating that the views of the Canadian Government would be forwarded at a later date. In view of the tenor of Mr. Claxton's letter, it would appear that the suggested changes to the 461st meeting minutes, which were concerned more with methods of approach than requirements, had been met. It would be necessary to consider the detailed requirements of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff now that the policy had been decided. To this end, full documentation should be prepared by the Secretary for consideration by the Committee and subsequent submission to Cabinet Defence Committee.

15. It was agreed, after further discussion, that the requirements of the Chiefs of Staff Committee were as recorded in the minutes of the 461st meeting.

000691

*Top SECRET*

Classification

*C&C 8-1 of 15/5/50*

Reference

URGENT - BY HAND

CHIEFS OF STAFF CTE #51

DEFENCE COUNCIL

CABINET DEFENCE CTE

VCNS

ACNS

DWT

DNA

D.N.Com

DSS

DNPO

DNI

CNP

DCNP

DNR

CNTS

A/CNTS (W. & S)

A/CNTS (Ships)

A/CNTS (Air)

DGFA

DGNO

SA/CNS

Request your comments hereon for C.N.S. please,  
and return to Room 3316 by 1630-15/5/50

*No distribution necessary.*

NAVAL SECRETARY

Date 15/5/50



FILE NO. CSC 8-1

**TOP SECRET**

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS,  
OTTAWA.

DATE: **15th May, 1950.**

MEMORANDUM TO: C.G.S.  
C.A.S.  
C.N.S. ✓  
C.D.R.B.


SUBJECT: **Exchange of Classified Information -  
Canada-U.S.-U.K.  
Amendment to minutes of 461st meeting**

Referred to... *10-17*  
MAY 17 1950  
File No. *75 11350-2*  
Cited to... *16-71 22-4-49*

1. The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

**Memorandum of 11th May from Under-Secretary  
of State for External Affairs.**

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the **463rd** meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to be held **Tuesday, 25th May, 1950**  
(Item 4) *16*

  
(J.D.B. Smith)  
Brigadier,  
Secretary.

Encl.

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF  
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CANADA

Ottawa, May 11th, 1950

Dear Brigadier Smith:

I have just seen the Minutes of the 461st meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee which I attended on May 3rd.

The language used in paragraph 9 concerning exchange of classified information between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom does not correspond with my understanding of what was agreed. Certainly, I did not agree that Canada should "insist on" a new agreement (sub-paragraph (a)); even less on full membership of the M.I.B.

The discussion of this whole complicated business was not, perhaps, as clear as it might have been and I am quite willing to admit that the subject confuses me greatly. Nevertheless, it would, I think, be a mistake to have the conclusion recorded in terms which are not agreed by all.

I would suggest that para 9 be amended somewhat as follows:

"9. It was agreed, after further discussion:

(a) that it was in Canada's interest that new arrangements be agreed between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom for the exchange of classified information between the three countries; such new arrangements to provide for the release of such information to fourth nations, including members of the Commonwealth and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

(b) that it was in Canada's interest to have membership on the Military Information Board established by the United States and the United Kingdom; pending membership, special arrangements should be made in relation to Canadian information coming before the Board; and,

(c) that it be recommended to the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs that the United Kingdom and United States authorities be informed in the above sense."

I see no reason to make reference to the request that I try to obtain the additional Templer papers. This was understood.

The above suggested revision is rough, but indicates the lines upon which I think an amendment should be made.

I was unable to attend the last meeting of the Chiefs but I will be grateful if my suggestions for amendment could be considered by the members of the Committee.

Yours sincerely,

Sgd.  
A. D. P. Heeney

Date Extracted 15/5/50

Classification

File Reference

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~  
~~CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE~~  
-----

The following is an extract from the minutes  
of the 462nd Meeting of the above committee held  
10 May 50. Referred for information and necessary  
action.

NAVAL SECRETARY

VCNS

ACNS

DWT

DNA

D.N.Com

DNPO

DNI

DSS

CNP

DCNP

DNR

CNTS

A/CNTS (W. & S)

A/CNTS (Ships)

A/CNTS (Air)

DGFA

DGNO

S A/CNS

I. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

1. The Chief of the Air Staff, referring to Item II of the minutes of the 461st meeting, "Exchange of Classified Information and Release Procedure - Canada-U.S.-U.K.", and in particular to para. 6 of the minutes, requested that the following amendment be made to the first sentence of para. 6:

"The Chief of the Air Staff remarked that, from discussions R.C.A.F. personnel had in Washington recently, it appeared that the U.K. representatives were working under a high level direction when opposing the inclusion of Canada as a member of such committees as, for instance, the committee which has replaced the Combined Communications Board."

2. The Committee:

- (a) agreed that para. 6 be amended as recommended by the Chief of the Air Staff; and
- (b) approved the minutes of the 461st meeting as amended.

OSD 2-1

TOP SECRET and PERSONAL

Office of the Secretary,  
National Defence Headquarters  
Ottawa.

May 15th, 1950

AC.G.S.  
AC.N.S. ✓  
AC.A.S.  
AC.D.R.B.

1. I attach herewith a memorandum from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs which is self-explanatory. This memorandum will be circulated under separate cover for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff Committee at a meeting to be held on Tuesday, 16th May, 1950.

2. The purpose of this note is to outline one of the difficulties of the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee concerning his relationship to the Committee. It has always been my impression that the Chiefs of Staff Committee consists of the Chiefs of Staff of three services and the Chairman, Defence Research Board, which is the composition laid down as a result of various authorities including the Minister of National Defence, the Defence Council, PC 1/7503 and Cabinet Defence Committee of the 31st June, 1947. The Secretary to the Cabinet and the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs and other appropriate civilian officials attend meetings when matters involving other than purely military considerations are under discussion. The fact that the Committee consists of only the three service Chiefs and the Chairman, Defence Research Board, would indicate that these four heads of service are responsible for the recommendations made by the Defence Committee in the same way that the members of any other Committee are responsible for Committee recommendations regardless of the individuals who are asked to attend or who are co-opted.

3. At the 462nd meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee the conclusions to which Mr. Heaney refers were approved by the Committee. It was my impression that the views of the three service chiefs and the Chairman, Defence Research Board, were reflected in the minutes of the 461st meeting in view of their approval of these minutes at the subsequent meeting. Based on this approval, the conclusions were forwarded to the Minister of National Defence in order that he might take any action which he thought appropriate with his other colleagues in the Cabinet Defence Committee.

4. The point that the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs makes - that he did not agree with these conclusions - would appear to be irrelevant. He was present at the discussion and undoubtedly any of the remarks which he made were given due consideration by the Chiefs of Staff in reaching their decision. I feel, however, that the decision is that of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which is in a position to accept or reject any recommendations which may be made by officials who are invited to attend the meeting or who are co-opted.

...../2


000696

- 2 -

5. I realize that over a period of years the Secretary to the Cabinet and the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs have come to consider themselves as full members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Recently at a discussion of the German paper these two officials offered advice which resulted in the Committee withdrawing recommendations to the Government. As the Chiefs of Staff are responsible to advise the Minister of National Defence and the Cabinet Defence Committee on matters of defence policy, it would seem that this situation should now be clarified. If the views of officials who are not members of the Defence Committee are not accepted by the Chiefs of Staff, for justifiable military reasons, after being given due consideration, any differences should be resolved between the Minister of National Defence and his cabinet colleagues. In any event the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff Committee should reflect the views of the members of that Committee.

6. There is no difficulty in the matter of amending minutes. It is annoying, however, that minutes should have to be amended after they have been previously approved by the Committee. If the practice whereby officials who attend meetings of the Chiefs of Staff are permitted to amend recommendations of that Committee or, as sometimes happens, attempt to influence the writing of minutes of that Committee, it might logically follow that these officials be made permanent members of the Committee. It is presumed that this latter course is not desirable, as it would make these officials responsible for assisting in advising the Minister of National Defence on matters of defence policy. *is allowed to continue*

7. I have been fortunate through various ways and means of maintaining reasonably cordial relations with officials outside the Department of National Defence on these matters, and I feel that it is most important to ensure that good co-operative relationships continue on all levels. However, in order to assist individuals who from time to time will be posted to the Chiefs of Staff organization, it might be appropriate to clarify on a very frank basis the present situation. Otherwise the authority of the Chiefs of Staff may well be assumed in part by officials who logically cannot be held responsible for recommendations on defence policy.

  
(J.D.B. Smith)  
Brigadier,  
Secretary.

Attach.

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF  
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CANADA

Ottawa, May 11th, 1950

Dear Brigadier Smith:

I have just seen the Minutes of the 461st meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee which I attended on May 3rd.

The language used in paragraph 9 concerning exchange of classified information between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom does not correspond with my understanding of what was agreed. Certainly, I did not agree that Canada should "insist on" a new agreement (sub-paragraph (a); even less on full membership of the M.I.B.

The discussion of this whole complicated business was not, perhaps, as clear as it might have been and I am quite willing to admit that the subject confuses me greatly. Nevertheless, it would, I think, be a mistake to have the conclusion recorded in terms which are not agreed by all.

I would suggest that para 9 be amended somewhat as follows:

"9. It was agreed, after further discussion:

(a) that it was in Canada's interest that new arrangements be agreed between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom for the exchange of classified information between the three countries; such new arrangements to provide for the release of such information to fourth nations, including members of the Commonwealth and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

(b) that it was in Canada's interest to have membership on the Military Information Board established by the United States and the United Kingdom; pending membership, special arrangements should be made in relation to Canadian information coming before the Board; and,

(c) that it be recommended to the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs that the United Kingdom and United States authorities be informed in the above sense."

I see no reason to make reference to the request that I try to obtain the additional Templer papers. This was understood.

The above suggested revision is rough, but indicates the lines upon which I think an amendment should be made.

I was unable to attend the last meeting of the Chiefs but I will be grateful if my suggestions for amendment could be considered by the members of the Committee.

Yours sincerely,

Sgd.  
A. D. P. Heeney

Date Extracted 10/5/50.....

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
DEFENCE COUNCIL  
~~CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE~~  
-----

File Reference

VCNZ  
① ACNS (P) *W.B.*  
DWT  
DNA  
D.N.Com  
DNPO  
② DNI  
DSS  
CNP  
DCNP  
DNR  
CNTS  
A/CNTS (W. & S)  
A/CNTS (Ships)  
A/CNTS (Air)  
DGFA  
DGNO  
SA/CNS

The following is an extract from the minutes of the 461st Meeting of the above committee held 3rd May 1950 Referred for information and necessary action.

*[Signature]*  
NAVAL SECRETARY

II. EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND  
RELEASE PROCEDURE - CANADA-U.S.-U.K.

3. The Committee had for consideration a report by the Secretary, together with reports from the Canadian Joint Staff, London, and the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington.

(CSC 8-1 dated 1st May, 1950).

4. The Chief of the General Staff pointed out that the Templer Agreement had two objectives; first, the release of joint classified military information to members of the Commonwealth, and secondly, the disclosure of joint and tri-partite information to NATO countries. Canada's special position had been recognized by the inclusion of a separate arrangement for the exchange of joint classified information as between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Similarly, in the matter of the disclosure of joint tri-partite information to NATO countries, separate procedures had been proposed for Canadian participation. Canada had not been asked to comment on the Templer Agreement as such as this had already been agreed to by the Ministers of Defence of the United Kingdom and the United States. However, Canadian concurrence was being sought regarding the special procedures which had been devised to take care of Canada's special position vis-a-vis the United States and the United Kingdom. It was noted that no provision for the exchange as between the United Kingdom and the United States of information of Canadian origin or combined Canadian-U.S. origin or of combined Canadian-U.K. origin had been included in the special arrangements concerning Canada's participation.

There appeared to be two courses of action which might be recommended as the basis of Canadian policy. The first course was to accept the proposed procedures for Canadian participation in the U.S.-U.K. arrangements for the release of information, with suitable changes being made for the exchange of information of Canadian origin or Canada-U.S. or Canada-U.K. origin as between the United Kingdom and the United States. This tri-partite arrangement, however, would still form a part of the overall U.S.-U.K. agreement which had already been formally approved. The second course was to develop a separate tri-partite arrangement which would provide for the exchange of classified information between the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada and would provide for the release of such information to fourth nations, which would include other members of the Commonwealth and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Concerning the U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board, special procedures had been prepared which, because of Canada's special position vis-a-vis the United States and the United Kingdom, provided that Canada would be on an equal tri-partite basis insofar as the release of classified information on matters of standardization was concerned. On matters concerning the release of other classified information, however, Canada would be invited to attend as U.S.-U.K. consultants. The Canadian authorities had been requested to indicate their concurrence in the arrangements for Canadian participation in the U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board.

It was pointed out that, to accept the proposed procedure concerning the release of classified information other than that of standardization, would mean that Canada was in fact delegating to the United States and the United Kingdom authority to determine whether classified information which the Military Information Board proposed to release had any Canadian implication or was of Canadian origin. Despite the fact that Canadian authorities might be given

agendas and indicate their desire to attend meetings when subjects of particular Canadian interest were being discussed, the proposed procedure still provided for Canada's attendance only on an invitation basis. One course of action might be to amend the proposed procedures so that Canada would have the right to attend meetings when matters of Canadian interest were being discussed rather than by invitation. This arrangement, however, would still leave the responsibility of determining whether or not Canadian interests were involved to the United Kingdom and the United States. Canada was so inextricably involved in the very nature of the work which was being done by the U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board that it was essential that Canada be a full member of the Military Information Board on equal status with that of the United Kingdom and the United States. The reconstitution of the Board on a tri-partite basis would simplify many of its procedures for the release of classified information.

The Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, had reported that the U.S. military authorities had indicated that a separate Canada-U.S.-U.K. formal agreement similar to the U.S.-U.K. Templer Agreement would be acceptable to them and that they would also welcome Canada as a full member of the Military Information Board.

5. The Secretary to the Cabinet suggested that the language of the proposed procedures to which Canada had been asked to agree was defensible in view of the position of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis other countries of the Commonwealth, and in particular Australia. It would be politically difficult for the United Kingdom to suggest that Canada become a full member in a tri-partite agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom to the exclusion of other Commonwealth countries. Therefore it had become necessary for the United Kingdom to propose such ad hoc working arrangements.

6. The Chief of the Air Staff reported that, during recent discussions in Washington, R.C.A.F. personnel had been informed that it was not possible for U.K. Service personnel to disclose certain U.S.-U.K. information as Canada was not a party to the Templer Agreement or a member of the Military Information Board. The United Kingdom was still adhering to the policy of according equality of treatment to all members of the Commonwealth, regardless of any special military arrangements which had been made on a Canada-U.S.-U.K. basis.

7. The Chairman, Defence Research Board, reported that the full text of the Templer Agreement had been shown to him informally during his recent visit to Washington. The papers which the Committee now had for consideration lacked several documents which formed part of the Templer Agreement and covered such important aspects as the agreement to exchange information freely other than that prohibited by the laws of the respective countries, the arrangements for the protection of public and private information in the matter of patents, and various important definitions. Before being able to accept the proposed arrangements or before drafting a new agreement, it was essential that these documents be made available to Canada. If it were agreed that a new tri-partite arrangement was the Canadian requirement, consideration would have to be given to the inclusion of these items in any exchange of letters of agreement. While it would not be necessary for Canada to reserve any special rights concerning the release of classified information of a combined origin, Canada should retain the right to release information of solely Canadian origin directly to Commonwealth and NATO countries.



Concerning participation in the Military Information Board, the Canadian claim could be based on the fact that there are only three teams concerned with standardization development. While the U.K. position regarding equality of treatment to Commonwealth countries was defensible, Canadian membership in the Board could be justified to the other Commonwealth countries on the basis that Canada had made a direct approach for full membership based on her position vis-a-vis the United States and the United Kingdom in the field of standardization. It had been suggested informally by the U.K. authorities in Washington that Canada should accept the procedure for participation in the Military Information Board. All agendas would be made available to the Canadian representative, who could indicate a desire to attend when matters of Canadian interest were being discussed. It was to be noted that present U.S.-U.K. members of the Military Information Board were given full plenary powers and that, although information might be sought by these members from their respective governments, they were empowered to make decisions on matters coming within the charter of the Board. The Canadian representative on the Board would have to be given the same plenary powers as the U.S.-U.K. members.

There was some suggestion that the reconstitution of the Board to include Canada as a full member might result in retarding the work of the Board as presently constituted. As it was known that the Board was faced with a very heavy backlog of work, it might be possible to accept, as a temporary measure, the arrangements suggested by the United States and the United Kingdom pending the re-arrangement of the Military Information Board on a Canada-U.S.-U.K. basis.

8. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs observed that any arrangements which might be made between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom would constitute a separate agreement and accordingly could not be considered as part of an already-approved bilateral arrangement. The proposed annexures concerning the exchange of information and also the release of information could be replaced by arrangements more suitable to Canada. The acceptance of these new arrangements by the United States and the United Kingdom would constitute separate tri-partite agreements. It was evident that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. authorities had made available all the relevant parts of the Agreement, and before Canada's views were forwarded, the U.K. and U.S. authorities should be requested to submit for examination the full text of the Agreement.

9. It was agreed, after further discussion, to recommend:

- (a) that Canada insist on the development of a new Canada-U.S.-U.K. agreement for the exchange of classified information between the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, which would provide for the release of such information to fourth nations, including members of the Commonwealth and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
- (b) that Canada should insist on full membership with the United States and the United Kingdom in a Canada-U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board; and
- (c) that the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs would endeavour to obtain the full text of the Templer Agreement.

*Top SECRET*

Classification

*C.S.C. 8-1 of 1st May*  
Reference

URGENT - BY HAND

CHIEFS OF STAFF CTE

~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~

~~CABINET DEFENCE CTE~~

VCNS

ACNS

DWT

DNA

D.N.Com

DSS

*(2)* ~~DNP~~

*(1)* DNI

CNP

DCNP

DNR

CNTS

A/CNTS (W. & S)

A/CNTS (Ships)

A/CNTS (Air)

DGFA

DGNO

SA/CNS

Request your comments hereon for C.N.S. please,  
and return to Room 3316 by 1630 - 1st May

*G. J. Dillon*  
NAVAL SECRETARY

Date 1st May 1950

Concur in the recommendation  
of Sec C.S.C.  
If we accept the Temple  
Agreement and there is a leak  
we are likely to be blamed  
for poor security

*Handwritten signature*  
D.N.I.

CSC 8-1

TOP SECRET

NC 04

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

1st May, 1950.

C.G.S.  
C.A.S.  
C.N.S. ✓  
C.D.R.B.  
Deputy Minister  
Secretary to the Cabinet  
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Exchange of Classified Information and Release Procedure  
Canada-United States-United Kingdom

1. Since early in 1947, the exchange of classified information on defence subjects between the United States and the United Kingdom has been subject to the condition that neither could transmit to the third nations information of combined origin or originating in one country without the specific consent of the other country. For this purpose, it was specifically laid down by the United States that the other countries of the Commonwealth were "third nations".
2. On 24th February, 1950, the U.K. High Commissioner's office in Ottawa delivered to the Department of External Affairs a document entitled "Exchange of Classified Military Information". This document outlined the arrangements that had been made and agreed to by the United States and the United Kingdom for the exchange of classified military information. An annexure to the main document provided for the special position of Canada vis-a-vis the United States. The purpose of this presentation was to obtain Canadian Government concurrence in the proposals which had been made jointly between the United States and the United Kingdom governing arrangements by which exchange of information could be made by either or both of these countries with Canada. On 23rd March the U.K. High Commissioner's office requested that action on these documents be postponed since they would probably be replaced by other documents at a later date.
3. On 24th April, the United States military authorities requested the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, to attend a meeting to discuss the exchange of classified military information and the problem of its re-disclosure to third nations. On the same day, the Canadian Joint Staff, London, was requested to attend a meeting with U.K. military authorities for the same purpose. At the meeting in London, the Canadian Joint Staff was advised that the United Kingdom High Commissioner and the United States Ambassador to Canada would approach the Canadian Government on this subject. Attached is a copy of a report by the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, on the meeting with the United States military authorities - CJS 275-1 dated 25th April, 1950. The **report of the Canadian Joint Staff**, London, is also attached.

### The Templer Agreement

4. In January of this year, a United Kingdom team headed by General Templer met in Washington with a United States team headed by General Burns. The outcome of these discussions led to what is **commonly** called "The Templer Agreement", which was formally approved on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom by an exchange of letters between the Minister of Defence and the Secretary of Defense during the month of February. The original approach was made by the United Kingdom because of the administrative difficulties which resulted from the requirement that the United Kingdom obtain prior consent of the United States before any classified military information of United States or combined United States-United Kingdom origin could be released to other members of the Commonwealth by the United Kingdom. It is known that the United States was aware of certain U.K. breaches of the "Sinclair-Bissell Agreement" under which these two countries had exchanged classified military information during and since World War II. As a result, the United States welcomed the U.K. approach for an improvement in procedure for release of classified information to third nations. The "Sinclair-Bissell Agreement" and the Templer Agreement are objectively comparable, the latter providing improved facilities for release to third nations. It is of importance to note that the former agreement was interpreted during World War II by the U.S. authorities as requiring them to process through the British Army Staff, Washington, any information which they were transmitting to Canada.

5. Although the Templer Agreement refers to arrangements for interchange and release of information of a classified nature to third nations, its basic purpose is to enable the United Kingdom to release, under the agreed procedures and without prior consent of the United States, classified information to the Commonwealth countries. Realizing the special position which Canada has with the United States, a special arrangement within the Templer Agreement was developed. The details of this proposed arrangement are shown in Appendix "C" to CJS 275-1 dated 25th April, 1950, attached herewith.

6. The situation, therefore, is that the United States and the United Kingdom have concluded an agreement which has been officially endorsed by the heads of the respective departments of defence and which contains a special arrangement to which the Canadian Government is now asked to be a party. Canada has not been shown the complete document, nor has she been invited to comment on or to agree to the Templer Agreement as such. Canada has been requested, however, to approve an **annexure** which has been prepared and developed by the United States and the United Kingdom without Canadian participation.

7. The Templer Agreement undoubtedly is of great value to the United Kingdom as regards her position vis-a-vis the United States and the other Commonwealth countries. Many of the administrative difficulties in obtaining the necessary clearance will now be eliminated by the agreement. As it does not affect Canada's position vis-a-vis the United States and as it is an agreement concluded by the United Kingdom and the United States without prior reference to Canada, Canada cannot be expected to give "de post facto" approval to a part of this agreement or to participate in the Templer Agreement arrangements as such. It should be made clear to both the United States and the United Kingdom that any reference concerning agreement as between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom on the exchange of classified information **cannot** appropriately be included in the bilateral Templer Agreement.

8. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as a partner in the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group, as a partner in the Canada-U.S.-U.K. Standardization Organization, and as a partner in the tri-partite intelligence discussions which have taken place since 1948, Canada's position is somewhat different from that of other Commonwealth countries. Again, her full participation in certain Canada-U.S.-U.K. arrangements concerning atomic developments and the collection of classified information renders the suggested half-way position between third nations (other Commonwealth countries) and the United Kingdom-United States position unacceptable.

9. In 1946 the U.S. military authorities agreed to an exchange of intelligence with Canada on all matters affecting the security of the United States and Canada. This agreement was reached only after certain objections which had been advanced by the U.K. authorities had been overcome. The U.K. authorities had expressed the desire that the United Kingdom should act as a channel for all U.S. intelligence going to Commonwealth countries. The exchange of classified information, which was a natural consequence of the Ogdensburg Treaty, and which was established in 1946, has continued uninterruptedly since then. In fact at that time the then Chief of the U.S. Military Intelligence, General Vandenberg, suggested that this channel of communication between Canada and the United States might be used to transmit U.S. intelligence and classified information to the United Kingdom in the event that U.S. Government policy might make close intelligence relations between the United Kingdom and the United States too difficult. At General Vandenberg's request, no written record of the agreement was kept, and since that time no approach has been made either by the United States or by Canada to formalize this agreement as the resultant arrangements have been most satisfactory.

10. However, in view of the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom have agreed formally on arrangements for the interchange of classified information and the procedures for its release to third-party nations, and as this information has been made public, it is considered that Canada's position vis-a-vis the United States and the United Kingdom must now be defined by way of a formal agreement which it is understood would be acceptable to the U.S. military authorities. To this end it is recommended that Canada should insist on the development of a separate Canada-U.S.-U.K. agreement which would cover the exchange of classified information as between these three countries and the release of classified information to any fourth nation.

#### The U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board

11. The Military Information Board was established for the purpose of providing a combined body wherein proposed disclosures of combined military information to third nations by either the United States or the United Kingdom might be considered. The charter of the U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board is attached as Appendix "J" to CJS 275-1 dated 25th April, 1950. When the Board met on 28th February, 1950, Canada's special position vis-a-vis the U.S. and the U.K. was recognized and accordingly special procedures were prepared by the Board for submission to the Canadian military authorities. These procedures provide that Canada should be on an equal tri-partite basis insofar as the release of classified information on matters of standardization is concerned. However, Canada would be invited only as required by the U.S. and the U.K. on matters concerning the release of other classified information. This proposed procedure is tantamount to relegating to the United States and the United Kingdom the authority to decide on behalf of Canada whether classified information is of interest to Canada or is in

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part or in whole of Canadian origin. As Canada is so inexplicably involved in the very nature of the work which is now being done by the U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board and as Canada only is in a position to indicate whether or not information is of Canadian origin or affects Canadian interests, it is essential that Canada be a full member of the Military Information Board on a completely equal status with that of the United Kingdom and the United States.


12. The United States military authorities have indicated to the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, that they would welcome Canada as a full member of the Military Information Board. It is recommended, therefore, that Canada insist on full and equal membership with the United States and United Kingdom on a Canada-U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board.

Summary

13. In view of the above, it is recommended that the Chiefs of Staff concur in the proposal that Canada should insist on a separate formal agreement as between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom for the exchange and handling of classified information and also in the proposal that they have full and equal status with the United Kingdom and the United States on a Canada-U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board.

.....

14. This subject will be considered as Item 2 on the Agenda for the 461st meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, to be held Tuesday, 2nd May, 1950.



(J.D.B. Smith)  
Brigadier,  
Secretary.

  
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CANADIAN JOINT STAFF

**SECRET**

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CJS 275-1

Washington 6, D.C.

25 April, 1950.

Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee,  
East Block, Parliament Bldgs.,  
OTTAWA, Ont. Canada.

RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THIRD PARTY NATIONS

1 Reference is made to CJS 196 dated 26 Apr 50 with copy attached as Appendix "A".

Release of Information Between US-UK-Canada

2 In the not too distant past there has been reason to consider Canada's position in respect to the Combined Communications Board and the apparent desire of the UK to speak for Canada where matters of Canadian interest in the field of communications were being discussed with the US.

3 A somewhat similar situation has now arisen with respect to the release of military information. A copy of a signal which records the manner in which this matter first came to the attention of the CJS(W) and the discussions in which the officers of the Embassy and the CJS(W) took part is attached as Appendix "A".

4 At the meeting on 24 Apr 50, at which the above referenced discussions took place, the Canadian delegation was briefed by the US on certain actions arising from a US-UK agreement with regard to the exchange of classified military information. Notes on this briefing are set out in the attached Appendix "B". (for US-Canadian eyes only, this report which was read to the Canadian delegation at the meeting was procured informally subsequent to the meeting from the Secretary of the MIB).

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5       The US and UK are proposing that providing  
Canada agrees, there be an exchange of classified mili-  
tary information among the three countries with a proviso  
in the case of information relating to the Western Hemis-  
phere. The proposal in detail is shown at Appendix "C".

6       It will be noted that the exchange of informa-  
tion covered by this proposed agreement is not a complete  
tripartite exchange of information. In order to provide  
for such a third paragraph would have to be added to the  
statement shown at Appendix "C" and which it is suggested  
could read as follows:

"3. The U.S. and U.K. may exchange freely without  
prior Canadian consent classified military informa-  
tion of Canadian origin, combined U.K.-Canadian  
origin, or of combined U.S.-Canadian origin, except  
for information relating to Western Hemisphere  
defence, provided that:

The U.K. and/or U.S. furnish to Canada periodic  
reports identifying the specific documentary mater-  
ials released by the one to the other when such  
documents are of Canadian, combined U.K.-Canadian  
or combined U.S.-Canadian origin".

7       During the meeting it was intimated that such a  
paragraph would be very acceptable to the U.S. Services.

8       This additional paragraph to the proposed agree-  
ment would enable U.K. liaison officers in the U.S.  
and U.S. liaison officers in the U.K. to pass to Canad-  
ian liaison officers and vice-versa information as pro-  
cured by these officers and which is not now available.

9       These proposals as presented by the U.S. would  
appear to be part of or excerpts from the Templer-Burns  
agreement and as such would be beneficial to Canada over



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and above the present arrangement. Nevertheless they would appear to be objectionable in that Canada should be a full tripartite member.

10 Since the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the U.K. Minister of Defence and also the Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the British Joint Chiefs of Staff have been advised by the Canadian Minister of National Defence and Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee respectively to the effect that Canada would consider such an arrangement acceptable only when it was on a full tripartite basis, it is recommended that the U.S. services should now be informed officially to this effect in response to their request at this meeting.

RELEASE OF COMBINED CANADA-US-UK CLASSIFIED  
INFORMATION TO NATO COUNTRIES

11 US policy on disclosures of classified information to North Atlantic Treaty nations is attached at Appendix "D" and is for Canada-United States eyes only.

US-UK Policy for Release of Classified Information to  
NATO Countries

12 The US-UK policy regarding the disclosure of classified military information to NATO nations is shown at Appendix "E" and is for Canada-United States eyes only.

Release of US-UK-Canadian Classified Information to  
NATO Countries

13 A procedure for processing requests from NATO nations for classified information pertaining to standardization suggested by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee and forwarded through the CJS(W) on 28 Feb 50 was considered by the recently formed Military Information Board, (a US-UK organization). A charter of the US-UK Military Information Board is attached as Appendix "J". As a result of the Canadian suggestion the

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Board prepared procedures which are outlined in Annexures I to IV inclusive of Appendix "F". These procedures were submitted for Canadian concurrence.

14           It will be noted that Annex I of Appendix "F" provides that Canada should be on an equal tripartite basis insofar as the release of classified information on matters of standardization are concerned, whereas Annex II invites Canadian participation only as required by US and UK on matters concerning the release of information other than matters of standardization. Annex III dealing with requests for information from members of the Ocean Group, similarly places Canada on an invitation basis. Annex IV shows the method by which Canadian representation will participate in matters considered by the UK-US Military Information Board which in effect is on an invitation basis.

15           It would appear that since Canada is so inextricably involved in the workings of the UK-US Military Information Board the same principles should apply, that is, that she should be a member on a full tripartite basis. Assuming that you will take this course of action Annexures II and III of Appendix "F" have been rewritten and are shown as Appendices "H" and "I" respectively. Annex IV would no longer be required. A chart showing how requests would flow under Annex I has been prepared by the CJS and is attached as Appendix "G".

16           The other alternative for Canada to achieve an equal status would appear to be to negotiate new agreements which in substance would appear to be the same as the Templar-Burns agreement in the case of release of informa-

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tion to commonwealth countries and the MIB in the case of NATO countries.

17 General Irwin, the Chairman of the meeting, asked that the US Services be advised of Canada's concurrence, reaction or otherwise to these two proposals. It is, therefore, requested that the CJS be given the Chiefs of Staff point of view for onward transmission.

*Hugh Campbell*  
(Hugh Campbell)  
Air Vice-Marshal  
Chairman  
Canadian Joint Staff.

APPENDICES

Appendix "A" Message CJS 196 dated 26 Apr 50

- " "B" Notes on Canadian Briefing on Results of Templer Mission
- " "C" US and UK Proposals re US-UK Exchange of Information
- " "D" US Policy re Disclosure of Classified Information to NATO Nations
- " "E" US-UK Policy Regarding Disclosure of Classified Information to NATO Nations
- " "F" A paper presented to the Canadian Delegation which includes a request by the MIB for approval of procedures shown in Annexures I to IV which are included
- " "G" Flow Chart for NATO Requests
- " "H" Suggested tripartite amendments to Appendix "C"
- " "I" Suggested tripartite amendments to Appendix "F".
- " "J" Charter of the US-UK Military Information Board.

APPENDIX "A" to  
CJS 275-1  
Dated 26 Apr 50

PRIORITY

SECRET

FROM CHAIRMAN CJS  
TO SECRETARY CSC  
CJS 196 26 APR 50

THE CANADIAN EMBASSY WAS APPROACHED BY THE MUNITIONS DIVISION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT LAST WEEK WITH A SUGGESTION THAT CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC SHOULD ATTEND A CONFERENCE CALLED AT THE PENTAGON FOR MONDAY APRIL 24TH TO DISCUSS THE EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION AND THE PROBLEM OF ITS RE-DISCLOSURE TO THIRD NATIONS(.) WE WERE GIVEN NO ADVANCE INFORMATION ON THE AGENDA OR WHO WAS TO ATTEND THE MEETING FROM THE U.S. SIDE(.) WE WERE TOLD ON THE MORNING OF THE MEETING THAT THE U.S. GROUP WOULD INCLUDE AS CHAIRMAN THE HEAD OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE(.) IT WAS ARRANGED THAT A/V/M CAMPBELL BRIGADIER TABER AND MESSRS IGNATIEFF AND TONE WOULD ATTEND ON OUR SIDE(.) ON THE U.S. SIDE THERE WERE GENERAL IRWIN (DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE) ADMIRAL JOHNSON COLONEL ALLEN LT-COL DAWSON AND CAPTAIN HYLANT FROM THE PENTAGON AND MESSRS MARGRAVE WIGHT AND WATTS FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT(.)

PARA TWO(.) DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING CENTRED AROUND TWO RELATED SUBJECTS (A) THE RESULTS OF THE MISSION TO WASHINGTON OF GENERAL TEMPLAR IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR ON RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES (B) THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMBINED U.S. - U.K. MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD(,)

PARA THREE(.) THE TEMPLAR MISSION(.) THE CHAIRMAN GAVE A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE VISIT OF GENERAL TEMPLAR TO WASHINGTON EARLY THIS YEAR(.) U.S. - U.K. AGREEMENTS FOR GIVING INFORMATION TO THIRD COUNTRIES (INCLUDING COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES) HAD CAUSED THE UNITED KINGDOM A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTY AS IT HAD BEEN

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APPENDIX "A" to  
CJS 275-1  
dated 25 Apr 50

NECESSARY FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM TO OBTAIN THE PRIOR CONSENT OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE ANY CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION OF U.S. OR COMBINED U.S. - U.K. ORIGIN COULD BE RELEASED TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH(.) THE UNITED STATES WAS AWARE OF CERTAIN BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM WHICH HAD GIVEN THEM CONCERN BUT IT WAS THE UNITED KINGDOM WHICH HAS SUGGESTED THE JOINT MEETING TO REVIEW AND IF POSSIBLE MODIFY THE EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS(.)

PARA FOUR(.) GENERAL TEMPLAR WITH OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR FOR DISCUSSIONS ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION OF U.S. OR COMBINED U.S. - U.K. ORIGIN(.) THE UNITED STATES TEAM HEADED BY GENERAL BURNS HAD NOT EXPECTED THAT QUESTIONS DIRECTLY AFFECTING CANADA WOULD BE DISCUSSED(.) AS A RESULT OF THE BURNS-TEMPLAR DISCUSSIONS A NEW AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE PROCEDURE GOVERNING THE EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WITH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES(.) THE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS TO WHICH CANADA IS BEING ASKED TO AGREE BY THE U.S. AND U.K. AS GOVERNING THE EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION BETWEEN THE THREE COUNTRIES ARE AS FOLLOWS (A) THE U.K. AND CANADA MAY EXCHANGE FREELY WITHOUT PRIOR U.S. CONSENT CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION OF U.S. ORIGIN OF COMBINED U.S. - CANADIAN ORIGIN EXCEPT FOR INFORMATION RELATING TO WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PROVIDED THAT THE U.K. AND/OR CANADA FURNISH TO THE U.S. PERIODIC REPORTS IDENTIFYING THE SPECIFIC DOCUMENTARY MATERIALS RELEASED BY THE ONE TO THE OTHER WHEN SUCH DOCUMENTS ARE OF U.S. COMBINED U.S.-U.K. OR COMBINES U.S.-CANADIAN ORIGIN (B) THE U.S. AND CANADA MAY EXCHANGE FREELY WITHOUT PRIOR U.K. CONSENT CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION OF U.K. ORIGIN OF COMBINED U.K.-CANADIAN ORIGIN OR OF COMBINED U.K.-U.S. ORIGIN PROVIDED THAT THE U.S. AND/OR CANADA FURNISH TO THE U.K. PERIODIC REPORTS IDENTIFYING THE SPECIFIC DOCUMENTARY MATERIALS RELEASED BY THE ONE TO THE OTHER WHEN SUCH DOCUMENTS

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APPENDIX "A" to  
CJS 275-1  
Dated 25 Apr 50

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ARE OF U.K. COMBINED U.K. - U.S. OR COMBINED U.K.-CANADIAN  
ORIGIN(.)

PARA FIVE(.) YOU WILL NOTE THERE IS NO PROVISION IN THE ABOVE  
TEXT FOR THE EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE U.K. OF CLASSI-  
FIED MILITARY INFORMATION OF CANADIAN ORIGIN OR OF COMBINED U.K.  
AND CANADIAN ORIGIN OR OF COMBINED U.S. AND CANADIAN ORIGIN(.)  
IF THE ABOVE TWO PARAGRAPHS HOWEVER ARE AGREED TO YOU MAY WISH  
TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO ADDING A THIRD PARAGRAPHE DRAWN UP IN  
SIMILAR TERMS TO COVER CANADIAN CONSENT TO THE EXCHANGE OF  
SIMILAR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND  
THE UNITED STATES(.)

PARA SIX(.) OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES (AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND  
AND SOUTH AFRICA) WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE INFORMED OF THE SPECIAL  
ARRANGEMENTS SET OUT ABOVE(.) THEY WILL HOWEVER BE INFORMED IN  
GENERAL TERMS OF THE RESULTS OF THE TEMPLAR MISSION AND OF THE  
PROCEDURES AGREED TO BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE U.K. ON THE DIS-  
CLOSURE TO COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFOR-  
MATION(.)

PARA SEVEN(.) MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD(.) WE WERE ALSO  
INFORMED THAT A COMBINED US/UK MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD HAD  
BEEF ESTABLISHED TO CONSIDER PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE RELEASE  
OF U.S. - U.K. CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO THIRD  
COUNTRIES(.) THIS IS THE FIRST OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION WHICH WE  
HAVE HAD THAT AN ORGANIZATION OF THIS KIND WAS CONTEMPLATED(.)  
THE BOARD IS COMPOSED OF BOTH DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY PERSONNEL  
(PERKINS ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE IS THE NOMINAL STATE  
DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BOARD)(.) THE BOARD HAS HELD  
ONLY TWO OR THREE MEETINGS AND TO DATE ONLY PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS  
HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED(.) IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT AT THE LAST MEET-  
ING OF THE BOARD THE MEMBERS AGREED THAT ANY SOLUTION OF THE  
U.S. - U.K. PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED  
MILITARY INFORMATION WOULD HAVE TO TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF CANADIAN  
INTERESTS(.)

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THE BOARD HAS THEREFORE PROVIDED FOR CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WORK OF THE BOARD WHEN MATTERS AFFECTING CANADA'S INTERESTS ARE BEING DISCUSSED(.) CANADA COULD ALSO PLACE ANY MATTER IT SAW FIT ON THE AGENDA/OF THE BOARD FOR DISCUSSION(.) GENERAL IRWIN EXPLAINED THAT IT HAD TAKEN A YEAR TO CONCLUDE THE BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE U.K. TO SET UP THE BOARD AND THE DRAFT PROCEDURES FOR CANADIAN PARTICIPATION WOULD SEEM TO MEET THE CANADIAN POSITION AT LEAST UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION HAD TAKEN PLACE BY THE BOARD(.)

PARA EIGHT(.) THE DRAFT PROCEDURES OF THE BOARD FOR PROCESSING REQUESTS FROM NATO NATIONS AND REGIONAL PLANNING GROUPS FOR INFORMATION OF COMBINED U.S.-U.K.-CANADIAN ORIGIN PERTAINING TO STANDARDIZATION FOR INFORMATION OF COMBINED U.S.-U.K.-CANADIAN ORIGIN OTHER THAN STANDARDIZATION AND FOR CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN ALL ACTIONS OF THE U.S.-U.K. MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD ON MATTERS OF U.S.-U.K. INFORMATION ARE BEING SENT TO YOU BY BAG(.)

PARA NINE(.) GENERAL IRWIN ALSO FURNISHED US WITH A STATEMENT OF QUOTE U.S. POLICY AFFECTING DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENCE OBJECTIVES UNQUOTE AND A STATEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE U.K. ON QUOTE POLICY REGARDING THE DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY NATIONS UNQUOTE(.)

PARA TEN(.) OUR REPRESENTATIVES AT THE MEETING UNDERTOOK TO REFER THE INFORMATION AND PROPOSALS WHICH HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT(.) AT THE SAME TIME THEY RECALLED THAT THE EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION HAD QUITE A LONG HISTORY BOTH BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM INCLUDED AND THAT THE PROPOSALS EMANATING FROM THE TEMIER MISSION AS WELL AS OUR RELATIONSHIP TO THE MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD WOULD NO DOUBT BE CONSIDERED IN THAT LIGHT(.)

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PARA ELEVEN(.) INFORMALLY AFTER THE MEETING OUR REPRESENTATIVES WERE GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTIONS TO CANADA BECOMING A FULL TRIPARTITE MEMBER OF BOTH THE TEMPLER BURNS AGREEMENT AND THE MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD(.)

PARA TWELVE(.) THE EMBASSY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE TEMPLER REPORT AND THE CONSEQUENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN MR LOUIS JOHNSON AND MR SHINWELL EXCEPT THAT GENERAL FOULKES HAD TOLD ME SOMETHING OF THE CANADIAN OBJECTIONS WHEN HE WAS IN WASHINGTON A FORTNIGHT AGO(.)

PARA THIRTEEN(.) A MESSAGE ON SIMILAR LINES IS BEING SENT FROM THE JOINT STAFF MISSION TO THE SECRETARY CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE(.)

(Hugh Campbell)  
Air Vice Marshal  
Chairman  
Canadian Joint Staff

TOD 261630Z



# For Canada - U.S. Eyes Only

S E C R E T

APPENDIX "B" TO  
CJS 275-1  
Dated 25 Apr 50

## CANADIAN BRIEFING ON THE RESULTS OF THE TEMPLAR MISSION

The exchange of classified military information between the U.S. and the U.K. is subject to the condition that information of combined U.S.-U.K. origin or of U.S. origin may not be disclosed by the U.K. to third nations without the prior consent of the U.S., and conversely, that information of combined U.S.-U.K. origin or of U.K. origin, may not be disclosed by the U.S. to third nations without the prior consent of the U.K. This condition carries with it the specific understanding that other Commonwealth countries are third nations.

2 Because of its close cooperation in defence matters with the rest of the Commonwealth, the U.K. has found that the strict application of the above conditions has led to severe administrative inconvenience, as it has required the U.K. to obtain prior consent of the U.S. to release to Commonwealth countries information on each individual item of classified military information which originated in whole or in part in the U.S. This led to the U.K.-U.S. discussions in January of this year. The U.K. delegation was led by General Templar, and the U.S. delegation by General Burns.

3. During the discussions the U.S. recognized the special U.K.-Commonwealth relationships by agreeing to the following:

- (1) The U.K. and Canada may exchange freely without prior U.S. consent classified military information of U.S. origin or combined U.S.-Canada origin, or of combined U.S.-U.K. origin, except information relating to Western hemisphere defence, provided that:

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Appendix "B" to  
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- (a) the Canadian Government agrees to the above proposal.
  - (b) the U.K. and/or Canada furnish the U.S. periodic reports of specific documentary material released by one to the other when documents are of U.S., joint U.S.-U.K., or of combined U.S.-Canadian origin.
- (2) The U.K. may at its discretion exchange with remaining Commonwealth countries without prior U.S. consent classified military information of a U.S. or of combined U.S.-U.K. origin provided that:
- (a) with respect to information in the fields of strategic planning and research and development such information falls within the content and scope of specific projects agreed to by the U.S. and U.K. as being releasable projects in respect of a specified Commonwealth country or countries.
  - (b) With respect to information in the field of intelligence, tactical and technical doctrine, training and materiel (military equipment which has passed the research and development stage) such information falls within the content and scope of specific projects agreed to by the U.S. and U.K. as being releasable projects in respect of any Commonwealth country.
  - (c) At the time of disclosure by the U.K. to any Commonwealth country of sole or partial U.S. origin, the recipient Commonwealth

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country will be informed by the U.K. that the U.S. has agreed to the disclosure.

- (d) The U.K. will inform the U.S. periodically of the specific U.S. or combined U.S.-U.K. documentary materials released to any other Commonwealth country; the U.K. and/or the other Commonwealth country concerned will report to the U.S. when requested on the progress and results of the specific projects referred to above.
- (e) The procedure contemplated for the establishment of whether a particular project is "releasable" in order that the U.K. may exercise its discretion within the agreed limits, is for the U.K. to propose certain fields or projects for acceptance or rejection by the U.S.

4. While the U.S. recognizes the special relationship between the U.K. and other Commonwealth countries and the desirability in practice for the U.K. to initiate and effect the disclosures provided for, it was agreed as a matter of principle, that the U.S. (on conditions similar to those provided for above) at its discretion may exchange with other Commonwealth nations without prior U.K. consent, classified military information of U.K. or of combined U.S.-U.K. origin.

5. Although the special U.K.-Commonwealth relationship is recognized, the U.S. prefers to release information of sole U.S. origin directly to other Commonwealth countries.

6. The above decision represents a formal agreement

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which has been "ratified by exchanges of letters between the U.S. Secretary of Defence and the U.K. Minister of Defence.

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APPENDIX "C" to  
CJTS 245-2  
Dated 25 Apr 50

PAPER TO BE PRESENTED  
TO THE CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES.

During the course of recent discussions between the U.S. and the U.K. concerning the exchange of classified military information and the problem of its redisclosure to third nations, there arose the question of the desirability of facilitating the exchange of such information as between the U.S., the U.K. and Canada. To this end, the U.S. and the U.K. propose that, provided Canada agrees, the following arrangements should govern the exchange of classified military information between the three nations:

1. The U.K. and Canada may exchange freely without prior U.S. consent classified military information of U.S. origin, of combined U.S.-Canadian origin, or of combined U.S.-U.K. origin, except for information relating to Western Hemisphere defense, provided that:

The U.K. and/or Canada furnish to the U.S. periodic reports identifying the specific documentary materials released by the one to the other, when such documents are of U.S., combined U.S.-U.K., or combined U.S.-Canadian origin.

2. The U.S. and Canada may exchange freely without prior U.K. consent classified military information of U.K. origin, of combined U.K.-Canadian origin, or of combined U.K.-U.S. origin, provided that:

The U.S. and/or Canada furnish to the U.K. periodic reports identifying the specific documentary materials released by the one to the other, when such documents are of U.K., combined U.K.-U.S., or combined U.K.-Canadian origin.

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(For Canada - US  
Eyes ONLY)

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APPENDIX "D" to  
CJS 275-1  
Dated 25 Apr 50

UNITED STATES POLICY AFFECTING DISCLOSURES  
OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO FOREIGN  
GOVERNMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACHIEVEMENT  
OF NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENCE OBJECTIVES.

The following classified military information, except for that in a few exempted fields, may be disclosed to North Atlantic Treaty nations in connection with North Atlantic Defense objectives:

Military information of all classifications through TOP SECRET, including catalogue and program type information and information relating to new equipment which has reached the engineering test (pilot model) stage of development, but excluding military intelligence estimates and studies which have not been jointly approved, provided that such information has been recommended for release by the Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other duly designated officer for North Atlantic Treaty matters as essential to the achievement of North Atlantic defense objectives.

SECRET

(For Canada - US  
Eyes ONLY)

(For Canada - US  
Eyes ONLY)

APPENDIX "E" to  
CJS 275-1  
Dated 25 Apr 50  
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POLICY REGARDING THE DISCLOSURE OF  
CERTAIN CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION  
TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY NATIONS.

The U.S. and the U.K. have agreed that each has discretion to release classified combined U.S.-U.K. information in the fields of established and published technical and tactical doctrine and materiel to the North Atlantic Treaty nations in order to permit the adequate use of equipment and material furnished to them by either the U.S. or the U.K.

(For Canada - US  
Eyes ONLY)

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PAPER TO BE PRESENTED      Appendix "F" to  
   CJS 275-1 dated  
TO THE CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES      25 Apr 50

Reference is made to the TOP SECRET letter from the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJS 275-1, dated 28 February 1950, in which Air Vice Marshal Campbell requested United States concurrence in a suggested procedure for processing requests from North Atlantic Treaty nations for classified information pertaining to standardization. (Similar letter received by the UK from the CJS on this subject is to be cited in the UK approach.)

At the time this request was received, a similar problem pertaining to information of combined U.S.-U.K. origin was being considered by the United States - United Kingdom Military Information Board, a body whose establishment has been under consideration for approximately a year, but which has only recently been constituted officially.

The substance of the Canadian letter, referenced above, was discussed at the first meeting of that Board on 10 March 1950. It was recognized by the Members that any solution of the U.S.-U.K. problem must also take into account Canadian interests. Accordingly the Board has drafted procedures for processing requests from NATO nations and Regional Planning Groups for information of combined U.S.-U.K.-Canadian origin pertaining to standardization, for information of combined U.S.-U.K.-Canadian origin other than standardization, and for Canadian participation in all actions of the U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board on matters of U.S.-U.K.-Canadian information. Details of these draft procedures are contained in the four attached annexes.

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Appendix "F" (Page 2)  
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It is believed that the procedures set forth therein, providing for three-way coordination at various levels, will insure a satisfactory system for dealing with the release of tripartite military information to NATO nations and Regional Planning Groups.

If the Canadian Government concurs in these procedures, it is suggested that this concurrence be recorded by means of an exchange of letters between the Canadian Minister of Defence and the U.S. Secretary of Defence and the Canadian Minister of Defence and the U.K. Minister of Defence.

Four enclosures:

Annexes I to IV inclusive.

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Procedure for Processing Requests of NATO Nations  
or European Regional Planning Groups for Classified US-UK  
-Canadian information Pertaining to Standardization.

REQUESTS THROUGH REGIONAL PLANNING GROUPS

1. a. General

When a request to UK, Canada or U.S. for the disclosure for NATO purposes of combined information which is a subject of US-UK-Canadian standardization comes up to a Service Advisory Committee of an European Regional Planning Group the appropriate representative will inform the Committee that the request pertains to combined US-UK-Canadian information. Copies of the request are forwarded by the Committee to the UK Delegation, the US Delegation (JAMAG) and the Canadian Delegation to the Regional Planning Group.

b. U.K. Action

A copy of the Committee request is forwarded by the UK representative to his parent Service Department. The UK view is then obtained by the parent Service Department and it notifies the UK Delegation, JAMAG and the Canadian Delegation, with a copy to the BJSM in Washington.

c. Canadian Action

The Canadian Delegation forwards its copy of the request to the Canadian Department of Defence in Ottawa for determination of Canadian views with its recommendation. The Canadian view is then obtained by the parent Service Department which transmits this view in writing to the Canadian Delegation, to JAMAG, and to the U.K Delegation, with a copy to the CJS in Washington.

d. U.S. Action

JAMAG will forward the request with its recommendations thereon and any information it may have as to

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ANNEX C to App "F"  
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the UK and Canadian views, as a result of coordination with those Delegations, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U. S. Army, Washington.

AC of S, G-2, U.S. Army will forward the request to the Tripartite Standardization Office (AC of S, G-4, U.S. Army) to obtain a coordinated tripartite view, if the request is for Army information. If the request is for Navy or Air Force information, it will be referred to the appropriate Service Department by AC of S, G-2, to obtain a coordinated tripartite view.

e. M.I.B. Action

In the event US, UK or Canadian views differ either as to whether or not the subject is included in the standardization program or as to meeting the request, the matter may be referred to the MIB by a US or UK member or by the CJS, Washington.

f. Final Action

Coordinated views are passed back to the US-UK-Canadian Delegations for joint release or denial to the Service Advisory Committee through reverse channels.

REQUESTS SUBMITTED DIRECT TO U.S., U.K. OR CANADA  
BY NATO NATIONS

2. When a request to UK, Canada or US for such information is received direct from a NATO nation, such requests will be processed through the US, UK and Canadian Delegations to the Regional Planning Group. National views will be obtained and the procedure indicated in para 1 will be utilized.

CONCURRENT ACTION

3. The communication of the national views of Canada and UK to their Washington staffs will be as nearly concurrent as is possible with JAMAG's reference of the request to Washington.

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ANNEX III to App "F"

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Procedure for Processing Requests from NATO Nations and European Regional Planning Groups for Information of Combined US-UK or US-UK-Canadian Origin (Other than Matters of Standardization).

REQUESTS THROUGH REGIONAL PLANNING GROUPS

1. a. General

When a request to the UK, the US, or, if applicable Canada, for the disclosure, for North Atlantic Treaty Organization purposes, of information which is of combined US-UK or US-UK-Canadian origin comes up to a Service Advisory Committee of a European Planning Group, the appropriate representative will inform the Committee that the request involves combined US-UK or US-UK-Canadian information. Copies of the request are forwarded by the Committee to the UK Delegation, to the US Delegation (JAMAG) and, if applicable, to the Canadian Delegation

b. U.K. Action

A copy of the Committee request is forwarded by the UK representative with his recommendation to his parent Service Department. The UK view is then obtained by the parent Service Department which transmits this view in writing to the UK Delegation, to JAMAG, and, if applicable, to the Canadian Delegation with a copy to the BJSM in Washington.

c. Canadian Action

A copy of the Committee request is forwarded by the Canadian Delegation with its recommendation to its parent Service Department in Ottawa. The Canadian view is then obtained by the parent Service Department which transmits this view in writing to the Canadian Delegation,

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to the UK Delegation, and to JAMAG, with a copy to the CJS in Washington.

d. U.S. Action

A copy of the Committee request is forwarded by JAMAG with its recommendation to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army, Washington. The U.S. view is then obtained by G-2.

e. M.I.B. Action

The Washington staff of that Nation (US, UK or Canada) to whose Delegation to a Service Advisory Group a request was originally directed, has the responsibility of ascertaining the views of the other nation or nations (US, UK or Canada) through their Washington staffs. In the event the US, UK or, if applicable, Canadian views differ as to whether or not the subject is information of combined origin or as to whether the request should be met, the matter may be referred to the MIB by a US or UK member, or by the CJS, Washington.

f. Final Action

Coordinated views are passed back to the US, UK, or if applicable, Canadian Delegations for joint release or denial to the Service Advisory Committee through reverse channels.

REQUESTS SUBMITTED DIRECT TO US, UK OR CANADA BY NATO NATIONS

2. When a request to US, to UK or, if appropriate, to Canada for such information is received direct from a NATO nation, such requests will be processed through the US, UK, and Canadian Delegations to the Regional Planning Group. National views will be obtained and the procedure indicated in para. 1 will be utilized.

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CONCURRENT ACTION

ANNEX J.I to App "F"  
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3. The communication of the national views of the UK and, if appropriate, Canada, to their Washington staffs will be as nearly concurrent as is possible with JAMAG's reference of the request to Washington.

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ANNEX III to App "F"

Procedure for Processing Requests from Member Nations of the NAORPG for Information of Combined US-UK - Canadian Origin.

When requests involving information of US-UK, or US-UK-Canadian origin, emanating from member Nations of the NAORPG or from Committees of the NAORPG, are received by the United States, the Department of the Navy will obtain the concurrence or denial to release from the United Kingdom and/or Canada through the medium of the British Joint Services Mission and/or Canadian Joint Staff, Washington. In the event US, UK and/or Canadian views differ as to the proposed release, the Navy may refer the matter to MIB for reconsideration.

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ANNEX IV to App "F"

S E C R E T

Canadian Participation in Actions of US-UK Military Information Board on Matters of US-UK-Canadian Information.

1. In order to provide for Canadian concurrence in taking action on all matters in which US-UK-Canadian information is involved, Canadian representatives from the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, will be invited to attend meetings as US-UK consultants. It is understood that no action will be taken by the Board in such matters without Canadian concurrence. Invitations to attend the particular meetings will be extended by the Board Secretariat.


2. Whenever Canada considers that any matter involves US-UK-Canadian information, it may make its position known by initiating a request to the Secretariat, Military Information Board to place the matter upon the agenda for discussion and determination.

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- (d) Request
- (b) Transmittal for national views
- (c) Passing on national views for coordination
- (d) Channel if not army matter
- (e) Passing for resolution of differences by MIB if required.
- (f) Should be nearly concurrent.
- (g) Standardization matters only.

NOTE: This chart is clearly applicable only in respect to the procedure set forth in Annexures I and II of Appendix "F"

APPENDIX "H" to  
CJS 815-1 d/25 APR.  
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PROPOSED REVISION OF  
ANNEX 2 OF APPENDIX "F"

Procedure for Processing Requests from NATO Nations and  
European Regional Planning Groups for Information of Combined  
US-UK-Canadian Origin (Other than Matters of Standardization).

REQUESTS THROUGH REGIONAL PLANNING GROUPS

1. a. General

When a request to the UK, the US, or Canada, for the disclosure, for North Atlantic Treaty Organisation purposes, of information which is of combined US-UK-Canadian origin comes up to a Service Advisory Committee of a European Planning Group, the appropriate representative will inform the Committee that the request involves combined US-UK-Canadian information. Copies of the request are forwarded by the Committee to the UK Delegation, to the US Delegation (JAMAG) and to the Canadian Delegation.

b. U.K. Action

A copy of the Committee request is forwarded by the UK representative with his recommendation to his parent Service Department. The UK view is then obtained by the parent Service Department which transmits this view in writing to the UK Delegation, to JAMAG, and to the Canadian Delegation with a copy to the BJSM in Washington.

c. Canadian Action

A copy of the Committee request is forwarded by the Canadian Delegation with its recommendation to its parent Service Department in Ottawa. The Canadian view is then obtained by the parent Service Department which transmits this view in writing to the Canadian Delegation, to the UK Delegation, and to JAMAG, with a copy to the CJS in Washington.

d. U.S. Action

A copy of the Committee request is forwarded by JAMAG with its recommendation to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army, Washington. The U.S. view is then obtained by G-2.

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APPENDIX "H"

e. M.I.B. Action

The Washington staff of that Nation (US, UK or Canada) to whose Delegation to a Service Advisory Group a request was originally directed, has the responsibility of ascertaining the views of the other nation or nations (US, UK or Canada) through their Washington staffs. In the event the US, UK or Canadian views differ as to whether or not the subject is information of combined origin or as to whether the request should be met, the matter may be referred to the US/UK/Cdn MIB by a member.

f. Final Action

Coordinated views are passed back to the US, UK, or Canadian Delegations for joint release or denial to the Service Advisory Committee through reverse channels.

REQUESTS SUBMITTED DIRECT TO US, UK OR CANADA BY NATO NATIONS

2. When a request to US, to UK or to Canada for such information is received direct from a NATO Nation, such requests will be processed through the US, UK, and Canadian Delegations to the Regional Planning Group. National views will be obtained and the procedure indicated in para. 1 will be utilized.

CONCURRENT ACTION

3. The communication of the national views of the UK and Canada, to their Washington staffs will be as nearly concurrent as is possible with JAWAG's reference of the request to Washington.

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CJS 275-1  
Dated 25 April 1950  
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PROPOSED REVISION OF  
ANNEX 3 OF APPENDIX "F"  
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Procedure for Processing Requests from Member Nations of  
the NAORPG for Information of Combined US-UK-Canadian Origin.

When requests involving information of US-UK-Canadian origin, emanating from member Nations of the NAORPG or from Committees of the NAORPG, are received by the United States, the Department of the Navy will obtain the concurrence or denial to release from the United Kingdom and Canada through the medium of the British Joint Services Mission and Canadian Joint Staff, Washington. In the event US, UK and Canadian views differ as to the proposed release, the Navy may refer the matter to US/UK/Cdn MIB for reconsideration.

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Appendix "J" to  
CJS 275-1 dated  
25 April, 1950

CHARTER OF THE U.S.-U.K. MILITARY INFORMATION BOARD

It has been agreed by the appropriate United States and United Kingdom authorities to establish the U.S.-U.K. Military Information Board (MIB), hereinafter referred to as the "Board".

Purpose

1. The Board is established for the purpose of providing a combined body wherein proposed disclosures to third nations by either the appropriate United States or United Kingdom authorities of "combined military information", defined in (2) below, may be considered. It is intended that the Board will facilitate the implementation of the Security Agreement approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in August 1948, insofar as "military information of joint (combined) "U.S.-U.K. origin or development" is concerned.

Functions and Powers

2. The Board shall decide whether disclosures to third nations of combined military information proposed either by the U.S. or the U.K. shall be permitted. Combined military information is defined as follows:-

(a) Classified military information resulting or originating from projects developed on a combined basis; or

(b) Other classified military information determined by the Board from time to time to be combined military information.

The criteria

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The criteria upon which the Board will base its determination under paragraph 2(b) are:

(1) The appropriate U.S.-U.K. authorities have agreed to undertake separately, different phases of a specific project; or

(2) The appropriate U.S.-U.K. authorities have agreed that one will assume sole project responsibility on behalf of both; or

(3) The appropriate U.S.-U.K. authorities have agreed at the outset of the project to adopt the best results of independent endeavours.

#### Membership

3. The Board shall consist of (a) an official of the U.S. Department of State, (b) an official of the British Embassy in Washington, (c) an officer or official from each of the U.S. military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force), (d) an official of the U.S. Research and Development Board, (e) an officer or official from each of the offices of the British Joint Services (Navy Staff, Army Staff, Air Force Staff, and Technical Services).

There may be present at meetings of the Board such U.S. or U.K. consultants or observers as desired.

#### Chairmanship

4. The Chairmanship of the Board shall rotate monthly between the U.S. and U.K. Representatives. The U.K. shall hold the chairmanship during the first calendar month the Board meets.

#### Place of Meetings

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Appendix "J" to  
CJS 275-1 dated  
25 April 1950

Place of Meetings

5.. Unless otherwise provided for, meetings of the Board shall be held in Washington..

6. A combined Secretariat shall be established by the Board.

Decisions of Board

7.. All decisions of the Board shall be taken by unanimous agreement..

Procedures

8.

(a) Rules of Procedure

Except as provided in paragraph 7, the Board shall adopt its own rules of procedure for conduct of its business, including the establishment of committees..

(b) Processing of Requests

(1) Requests normally will be processed through direct presentation to the Board by members, except that,

(2) In the processing of requests applicable to groups or combinations of nations, or states members thereof, the Board will prescribe such special procedures as it considers desirable..

SECRET

BY DIPLOMATIC AIR BAG

30/1

CANADIAN JOINT STAFF, LONDON

SECRET

Canada House,  
London, S.W.1

Chairman,  
Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee,  
"A" Building,  
Department of National Defence,  
OTTAWA, Ontario, Canada.

U.K., U.S. Proposals of 24 Apr 50 respecting  
Canadian Participation in Exchanges of  
Information further to the Templer Agreement

Further to our message, CJS(64) of 24 Apr 50,  
paragraph 4, forwarded herewith are duplicate copies of the  
documents given to the Acting Chairman by Rear Admiral  
Longley-Cook at 1330 GMT, 24 Apr 50.

2. Also enclosed, for your information, is a brief  
report of the meeting which took place with Rear Admiral  
Longley-Cook, which may be of interest to you.

3. It would be appreciated if the Chairman, C.J.S.,  
London, could be advised, in due course, if the papers  
received from Rear Admiral Longley-Cook correspond to those  
to be handed the Canadian authorities by the U.K. High  
Commissioner in Ottawa. It would also be appreciated if  
the views of the Chiefs of Staff on the acceptability of  
these proposals to Canada might be forwarded as soon as  
possible for our information.

(J.L. Hurley) Air Commodore,  
Acting Chairman,  
Canadian Joint Staff, London.

Encs.  
RBI/EB.



24th April, 1950

SECRET

1. The Acting Chairman, C.J.S., was invited to call on Rear Admiral Longley-Cook, Director of Naval Intelligence, to discuss the Templer agreement. The appointment was arranged last Friday by a Mr. Montgomery, working secretary to several of the technical committees in the Ministry of Defence, for 1430 hours today. Further discussion between Mr. Montgomery and the Secretary, C.J.S., this morning, elicited the information that it was proposed on the part of the U.K. to brief the Senior Canadian Military Representative in London simultaneously with the U.K. High Commissioner's, Ottawa, approach to the Canadian authorities on the same subject.
2. The Acting Chairman and the Secretary, C.J.S., met Rear Admiral Longley-Cook and Mr. Montgomery in the office of the D.N.I. in the Admiralty, as arranged. After the usual pleasantries, Rear Admiral Longley-Cook went on to explain that an ex-member of the Templer mission, as was Mr. Montgomery, he had been directed to pass on copies of the procedure proposed to implement the Templer agreement, together with a word of explanation.
3. He briefly reviewed the background somewhat as follows: Up until last Autumn the U.K. was in the invidious position of having to clear all items of U.S. and/or U.K.-U.S. information which the U.K. desired to pass to third parties, with the U.S. authorities. From the U.K. point of view this was unnecessarily onerous in her relationship with the balance of the Commonwealth, particularly because of the long history of close relationship between members of the Commonwealth. As a result, the U.K. approached the U.S. with the aim of achieving relaxation of this control of information going to members of the Commonwealth.
4. The U.K. Delegation sat down with a larger U.S. delegation, headed by General Burns (retired), and after a period covering three or four weeks last January and February, evolved an agreement satisfactory to both Delegations. After the return of the U.K. Delegation, the agreement was ratified by an exchange of letters between the Minister of Defence, U.K., and the Secretary for Defence, U.S. It is understood that no changes were made in the wording of the actual agreement.
5. It is understood from what Rear Admiral Longley-Cook said that because of Canada's favoured position vis-a-vis the U.K. and the U.S., that the section of the agreement concerning Canada is only to be operative if

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agreed to by Canada. As well, in the U.S. view Canada is the best security risk of the remaining members of the Commonwealth. Consequently, the U.S. propose to agree that so long as they are informed of the items of U.S. or joint U.S./U.K. information passed to Canada by the U.K., and of items of U.S. or joint U.S./Canadian information passed to the U.K. by Canada, their requirements would be met. It should be noted that U.S./Canadian information on Western Hemisphere defence was specifically omitted.

6. In so far as the remaining members of the Commonwealth are concerned, according to Rear Admiral Longley-Cook they are to receive through the U.K. items of joint information of the most secret nature on U.S./U.K. defence planning and research and development ONLY if they are "specified subjects for release", and in addition the country be specified; less highly classified information such as technical intelligence, operational procedure, training manuals, etc., might be passed so long as a normal record was kept for the information of the U.S.

7. Rear Admiral Longley-Cook stated that it was the U.S. desire, in the normal course of events, to pass on their own classified information to third parties, including members of the Commonwealth for obvious reasons.

8. It is understood that the U.S. Ambassador to Canada is making a parallel approach to the Canadian authorities in Ottawa at approximately the same time as the U.K. High Commissioner.

9. Part way through the briefing, Rear Admiral Longley-Cook mentioned that the reason for keeping the agreement and its ratification on other than top level, was to avoid the necessity of submitting it to the record of the United Nations Secretariat in accordance with the United Nations Charter, Chapter 16, Article 102.

10. The Rear Admiral was hard put to it to explain the delay in approaching Canada to obtain Canadian concurrence to the procedure outlined.

11. No further comment on the method of dissemination of information to third parties, not members of the Commonwealth, was made.

12. The foregoing report has been made from memory of the conversation which took place in the office of the D.N.I., and before reference was made to the documents turned over to the Acting Chairman, C.J.S. The only query put to Rear Admiral Longley-Cook was whether the question of exchange of information on standardization was covered in the documents on procedure. The answer was, of course, affirmative.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

File 1950-4

Following is Item.....of the minutes of the.....<sup>27</sup>  
meeting of the.....<sup>SP</sup>.....held on.....<sup>27 Apr 50</sup>.....

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

17. The Secretary submitted a document outlining the procedures to be followed with regard to disclosure of information to other governments, or their representatives, whether civilian or military.

This had been approved the Chiefs of Staff Committee, with one minor amendment, and had been forwarded to the Security Panel with the recommendation that it be approved as a formal statement of the procedure to be followed in dealing with information in any of the specified categories.

The paper had been circulated.

(Panel Document SP-56 of 17th January, 1950)

18. The Panel, after discussion, approved the paper entitled "Disclosure of Information to Other Countries" as a statement of the procedure to be followed by Canadian authorities, and agreed that it be issued for the information and guidance of all concerned.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

File 1950-4

Following is Item.....of the minutes of the.....<sup>27</sup>  
meeting of the.....<sup>SP</sup>.....held on.....<sup>27 Apr 50</sup>.....

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES:  
U.S.S.R. AND SATELLITES

24. The Panel had before them a document analyzing the flow of official information between Canada, on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries, on the other, based on a review of such exchanges for the 8 months' period from July, 1949, to February, 1950.

(Panel Document SP-64 of April 12, 1950).

25. It was observed that information sent from Canada, while of an official nature, was invariably unclassified, and that the figures shown in the report, while indicating an adverse balance in so far as Canada was concerned, had very little bearing on the security aspects of the situation. There was the consideration that general information on Canadian affairs and conditions might filter through the official controls in the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries with encouraging results.

26. The Chairman remarked that it would be very difficult to control the situation effectively and to maintain the flow of information strictly on a quid pro quo basis. He suggested that the

departments and agencies concerned be made aware of the necessity for exercising such controls as might be convenient and expedient. It might also be helpful if External Affairs kept a tabulated record of refusals in cases where departments and agencies had asked for specific items in return.

The Panel noted the Chairman's remarks.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY  
PANEL  
DOCUMENT

SP-64

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECURITY PANEL:

Exchange of Information with Foreign Countries:  
U.S.S.R. and Satellites

The Security Panel, at its 23rd Meeting, considered a proposal by External Affairs designed to regulate the exchange of information with the Soviet Union and satellite countries on a quid pro quo basis, and also discussed the necessity for more careful vetting of certain categories of information passed through official channels to foreign countries. It was observed that much of the material in question was being sent forward automatically by departments and agencies, and a tabulation of current exchanges indicated an adverse balance in so far as Canada was concerned. For example, in June, 1949, Canada sent official publications to 97 addressees in the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries, but publications were received from only 2 addressees in these countries during the same period.

It was agreed that External Affairs would continue to co-ordinate the despatch of official information from Canada to the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries, and that a serious effort would be made to regulate the exchanges on a quid pro quo basis. It was further agreed that any items, the security value of which might be open to question, should be referred to the Security Panel for assessment, in consultation with the departments or agencies concerned. Future action in the matter was to be governed by periodic review of the quid pro quo policy, as revealed in the monthly tabulation of exchanges prepared by External Affairs.

The following tables show (a) the number of addressees involved in exchanges of official information between July, 1949, and February, 1950, and (b) the actual number of items exchanged during the period in question:

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TABLE I

<u>MONTH</u>		<u>Sent to USSR and Satellites (No. of addressees)</u>	<u>Rec'd. from USSR and Satellites (No. of addressees)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
July,	1949	59	--	59
August,	"	22	9	31
September,	"	8	4	12
October,	"	15	1	16
November,	"	22	2	24
December,	"	18	2	20
January,	1950	12	2	14
February,	"	22	2	24
		<u>178</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>200</u>

TABLE II

<u>MONTH</u>		<u>Sent to USSR and Satellites (No. of items)</u>	<u>Rec'd. from USSR and Satellites (No. of items)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
July,	1949	329	--	329
August,	"	98	67	165
September,	"	26	29	55
October,	"	224	20	244
November,	"	98	62	160
December,	"	73	37	110
January,	1950	58	49	107
February,	"	110	90	200
		<u>1016</u>	<u>354</u>	<u>1370</u>

The following table lists the countries to which items of official information were despatched during the period in question, and also those countries from which items were received in return:

TABLE III

<u>Items despatched to:</u>	<u>Items received from:</u>
U.S.S.R.	U.S.S.R.
Czechoslovakia	Hungary
Hungary	Germany
Poland	
Germany	
China	

No attempt has been made to break down the various types of official publications included in these exchanges, but it should be mentioned that only items of a more or less routine character have been despatched from Canada. For example, releases to the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia included many publications dealing with social

..... 3

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welfare problems and agricultural matters. Items received from the countries listed in Table III included reports (some scientific), public statements and press summaries, and scarcely anything which might be considered of more than ordinary informative value.

On balance, it would appear that a satisfactory degree of reciprocity has not yet been achieved, and it is for consideration whether steps should now be taken to tighten the controls in an effort to correct the adverse balance indicated by the statistics given in the Tables.

E.F. Gaskell,  
Secretary,  
Security Panel.

Privy Council Office,  
April 12th, 1950.

CSC 14-2-1

SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
OTTAWA

March 11th, 1950.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

Exchange of Classified Military Information

Referred to: *Staff*  
MAR 13 1950  
File # *1550-10*  
Ck'd to: *Staff*

1. Attached herewith is a copy of a self-explanatory letter from the Department of External Affairs enclosing a document entitled "Exchange of Classified Military Information" which was received from the U.K. High Commissioner's Office.
2. It will be noted that the concurrence of the Canadian Government is being sought on that portion of the document which deals with the procedure that should govern the exchange of information with Canada (Annex C).
3. The Chiefs of Staff have requested that the Joint Intelligence Committee consider this question as a matter of urgency and submit their views as to the acceptability of the proposal, together with their recommendation as to the most expedient action the Canadian military authorities should take in this connection.
4. In order to expedite consideration of this matter by the Joint Intelligence Committee, I have discussed the document concerned in some detail with the three Service Directors of Intelligence with the object of preparing some sort of draft report which would serve as a basis for discussion at the next meeting of the Committee. Accordingly, I am enclosing a very rough draft which, I believe, includes most of the points raised by the Service Directors of Intelligence.
5. This matter will be included as an item on the agenda for the next meeting of the Committee, to be held on Wednesday, March 15th.

*G.H. Newsome*

(G.H. Newsome)  
Wing Commander, R.C.A.F.,  
Secretary.

Encs.

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D R A F T

CSC 14-2-1

S E C R E T

EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION

Present Arrangements

1. From the standpoint of the Canadian Services, the field of exchange of classified military information with the Services of the UK and the US can be divided broadly as follows:

- (a) Plans.
- (b) Intelligence.
- (c) Standardization.

2. With regard to the exchange of classified information in the planning and intelligence fields, the present arrangement is that Canada may exchange such information freely with the UK and the US. This is done on an informal (no written agreement) joint Service and Service-to-Service basis, on the understanding that such information will not be released to a third country without the consent of the originating country.

3. The standardization agreement between Canada, the UK and the US, which covers a very broad field, provides for a direct and free exchange of classified information on all aspects of standardization on a reciprocal basis. Moreover, there is no procedure laid down requiring that any of the countries concerned need furnish periodic reports identifying the specific documentary materials exchanged under this agreement.

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Comment on Present Arrangements

4. The following are the main advantages of the present system:
- (a) In the case of exchange of information in the planning and intelligence fields, it permits the greatest measure of freedom in the exchange of information since it is not confined to a precise definition of the kind and scope of information that may be exchanged. In this connection it is considered that there is an inherent danger in attempting to formalize these arrangements, even to the extent of laying them down in the most general terms, since this might lead ultimately to a desire on the part of one country or another to define the exact terms of the agreement. This in turn would tend to restrict the flow of information between the countries concerned and could very well jeopardize the present satisfactory arrangements for the exchange of information between the Services of the three countries.
  - (b) It is simple, direct and rapid since none of the countries concerned is required to employ a complicated clearance procedure probably involving other government agencies.
  - (c) The standardization agreement already permits full and free exchange of military information in a broad field between the three countries concerned.

Comment on the United Kingdom Document Entitled  
"Exchange of Classified Military Information"

5. While Annex C might appear to provide Canada a better basis for the exchange of information with the UK and the US than is at present the case, it does, in fact, represent a written agreement in which the Canadian Services are involved (despite the fact that it is the expressed intention of the UK Government that it should not amount to a formal agreement). As such, it would be objectionable to the Canadian Services for the reasons stated in paragraph 4(a) above.

6. Since it is doubtful whether the UK and the US, in framing this agreement, had in mind the promotion of greater freedom in the flow of military information to Canada, it is difficult to believe that the mere

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signing of this agreement would, in fact, materially improve Canada's position in this respect. On the contrary, since the security risk would presumably be increased by permitting what would amount to an almost unrestricted flow of information between the three countries, it would be expected that the overall effect of the agreement would be to tend to restrict the present flow of information from the main originating countries (the UK and the US).

7. If the Canadian Government does not concur in Annex C, the alternative courses open to the UK and the US would appear to be either:

- (a) To conclude the agreement without a Canadian annex; or
- (b) To negotiate a Canadian annex on a bilateral (UK-US) basis.

8. In the event that course (a) above were selected, the alternatives would appear to be either the continuation of the present informal (unwritten) arrangements, or the refusal on the part of the US and the UK to continue on this basis. In the unlikely event of the latter, there would be some danger that UK-US objection might take an indirect form, such as a gradual reduction in the flow of UK and US information to Canada, or a withdrawal of our privileges of having Canadian Service officers integrated into the staffs of the UK and US intelligence organizations, on the grounds of this would prejudice the successful implementation of the UK-US agreement.

9. In the event that course (b) above were selected (the most likely choice), it would seem that, from the Canadian standpoint, there would be no objection to this since the terms of such an agreement would not likely be less favourable to Canada than the terms set out in Annex C.

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Recommendations

9. On balance, it would appear to be in the Canadian interest to continue the present informal (unwritten) Service-to-Service arrangements for the exchange of classified military information with the UK and the US. It is recommended, therefore, that the reply to the UK Government should indicate that, while the Canadian Government is in accord with the spirit of the agreement set out in Annex C, it would prefer not to be party to a written agreement of this kind.

10. Should this be not acceptable to the UK and the US, it is recommended that the Canadian Government indicate its willingness to agree to the terms of Annex C but preferably on the basis of separate Canadian agreements with the UK and the US, and with a reservation as to the impracticability of implementing the procedure requiring that each country furnish periodic reports indicating the documentary materials exchanged under the agreement.

C O P Y

S E C R E T

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OTTAWA, February 24, 1950.

Brigadier J.D. Smith,  
Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee,  
Department of National Defence,  
O t t a w a, Ontario.

I enclose a copy of a document entitled "Exchange of Classified Military Information" left with Mr. MacKay of this Department today by Mr. Shannon of the United Kingdom High Commissioner's Office.

The document is self-explanatory, but in presenting it Mr. Shannon explained its origin and purpose in some detail. He said that the United Kingdom had found the previous arrangement for the exchange with Commonwealth countries of information derived from joint U.S. - U.K. sources or from U.S. sources rather restrictive, and that they had approached the U.S. for a revision of the understanding. It is understood that special annexes have been worked out to provide for exchange of such information with various commonwealth countries. Annex C provides for exchange of information with Canada. This annex only was left with this Department.

Mr. Shannon said further that it had been the intention of the United Kingdom to consult Canada after a draft had been worked out with the U.S. authorities, but that to the surprise of the U.K. authorities the U.S. had agreed promptly to accept the draft understanding. Under these circumstances the U.K. accordingly decided it was desirable also to approve the draft, subject to revision later if the terms were not satisfactory to the Commonwealth countries concerned. The text has therefore been approved subject to this understanding. Mr. Shannon hoped that we could give him our views at an early date.

It would be appreciated if you would place this document before the appropriate military authorities.

(Sgd.)      ?

for Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

SECRET

EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION

Since early in 1947, the exchange of classified information on defence subjects between the United States and the United Kingdom has been subject to the condition that neither could transmit to third nations information of combined origin or originating in the other country without the specific consent of the other country. For this purpose it was specifically laid down by the United States that the other countries of the Commonwealth were "third nations".

2. This condition led to increasing difficulties, since it proved in practice to be impossible for the United Kingdom Government to observe it strictly whilst at the same time co-operating fully in defence matters with other Governments of the Commonwealth or of Western Union. It was accordingly agreed by the two Governments that the whole question should be discussed in Washington in January of this year between delegations headed by Lieutenant-General Templer, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, and General Burns of the United States Department of Defence.

3. Full and friendly discussions were held on all aspects of the interchange of information between the United States and the United Kingdom and on the transmission of the information to third countries, including other countries of the Commonwealth. A series of documents governing future policy were provisionally agreed between the two delegations, subject to Ministerial approval on both sides. In the United Kingdom view, these documents mark a definite and substantial step forward and, provided that the new arrangements are carried out in the spirit of the discussions, much benefit will be felt in the defence arrangements not only of the United Kingdom, but also of the other Commonwealth countries and of Western Union countries. In order to avoid the conclusion of a formal Agreement which would need to be registered with the United Nations, it was contemplated that the series of documents should be ratified by an exchange of letters between the United States Secretary for Defence and the United Kingdom Minister of Defence, each indicating his intention to implement in his own country the agreements contained in the documents. There would also be separate letters from the United States Secretary of State to the United Kingdom Ambassador and from the Foreign Secretary to the United States

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Ambassador saying that they knew and approved the outcome of the discussions.

4. In view of the special position of Canada vis-a-vis the United States, a section of one document has been devoted entirely to the procedure which should govern the exchange of information with Canada; this section, of which a copy is attached, was naturally made subject to the concurrence of the Canadian Government, which it was contemplated, would be sought by both the United States and the United Kingdom Governments once they had approved the documents.

5. The High Commissioner has been asked to enquire informally whether it is agreeable to the Canadian authorities that the concurrence of the Canadian Government should be officially requested by the United Kingdom Government, at the appropriate time, according to the following procedure. It is suggested that the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom should communicate to the Canadian authorities a report of the outcome of the discussions between the United States and the United Kingdom Governments, together with a copy of the Section relating specifically to Canada, and should enquire whether the Canadian Government concur in these arrangements so far as Canada is concerned. If the Canadian Government do in fact concur, they could reply that they have no objection to the arrangements proposed. It is not suggested that there should be any more formal exchange between the Canadian and the United Kingdom Governments, which might in itself amount to a formal agreement, since, for the reasons given above, it is not the intention to conclude a formal agreement between the United States and United Kingdom Governments, and it is thought preferable, given that the United States-United Kingdom arrangement is not to be registered with the United Nations, that the correspondence between the Canadian and the United Kingdom Governments arising out of it, should similarly not be registered.

23rd February, 1950.

SECRET

ANNEX

Document C

EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION WITH CANADA

*and Canada*  
The United Kingdom ~~may exchange freely with Canada~~ without prior United States consent classified military information of United States origin, of combined United States-Canada origin, or of combined United States-United Kingdom origin except for information relating to Western Hemisphere defence and provided that:

(a) The Canadian Government concurs in this position.

(b) The United Kingdom and/or Canada furnish to the United States periodic reports identifying the specific documentary materials released by the one to the other when such documents are of United States, combined United States/United Kingdom, or combined United States/Canadian origin.

2. *and Canada*  
The United States ~~may exchange freely with Canada~~ without prior United Kingdom consent classified military information of United Kingdom origin, of combined United Kingdom-Canadian origin or of combined United Kingdom-United States origin provided.

(a) The Canadian Government concur in this position.

(b) The United States and/or Canada furnish to the United Kingdom periodic reports identifying the specific documentary materials released by the one to the other when such documents are of United Kingdom, combined United Kingdom-United States, or combined United Kingdom-Canadian origin.

3. *The United States and United Kingdom*



RWT/gfp

NSS 1950-13 Vol. 1  
(STAFF).

MEMORANDUM TO: DNI  
DNPO &  
VCNS

SECRET.

*Amr 5*

SECURITY - NEW WEAPONS, DETECTORS ETC.

At the outbreak of World War II the Royal Navy were able to gain the upper hand of the Anti-Submarine war due solely to the fact that the German Navy had no knowledge of the capabilities of the ship borne submarine detector - the Asdic.

2. The security of the Asdic was of the paramount importance to the Royal Navy and only by strict enforcement were they able to withhold the secret from the potential enemy.
3. It is considered that in respect to the new Anti-Submarine weapons, detectors and radar sets the Royal Canadian Navy are in a similar position as to that the Royal Navy were prior to September 1939.
4. Therefore, it is considered that in view of the installation of new equipment in ships of the Royal Canadian Navy and the adoption of new tactics it would be of paramount importance to inform all Naval personnel and those connected with the Navy of the security requirements together with its strict enforcement at all times.

*E.P. Tisdall*  
(E.P. Tisdall),  
CAPTAIN, R.C.N.,  
DIRECTOR OF WEAPONS AND TACTICS.

OTTAWA, 8th April, 1950.

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE:

Exchange of Classified Military Information -  
Canada-U.S.-U.K.

1. The exchange of classified information on defence subjects between the United States and the United Kingdom has been subject to the condition that neither country could transmit to third nations information of combined origin or originating in the other country without specific consent of the other country. For this purpose, it was specifically laid down by the United States that the other countries of the Commonwealth were third nations.
2. This condition led to increasing difficulties since it proved, in practice, to be impossible for the United Kingdom to observe it strictly while, at the same time, co-operating fully in defence matters with other governments of the Commonwealth.
3. Accordingly, Service representatives of the two countries held discussions in Washington in January this year, at which a series of documents governing future policy were provisionally agreed subject to ministerial approval on both sides.
4. In order to avoid the conclusion of a formal agreement which would need to be registered with the United Nations, it was contemplated that the series of documents would be ratified by an exchange of letters between the appropriate representatives of the two countries.
5. In view of the special position of Canada, vis a vis the United States, a section of one document, a copy of which is attached (Appendix "A"), was devoted entirely to the procedure which should govern the exchange of information with Canada. This section was made subject to concurrence of the Canadian Government which it was contemplated would be sought by both the United States and United Kingdom Governments.
6. The United Kingdom High Commissioner has enquired as to whether the Canadian Government concur in these arrangements so far as Canada is concerned.
7. Under present arrangements, Canada exchanges classified information on defence subjects with both the United States and the United Kingdom but on the understanding that information of combined (Canada-United States or Canada-United Kingdom) origin or originating either in the United States or the United Kingdom will not be transmitted to a third country without the consent of the originating country.
8. From the Canadian standpoint, therefore, the proposed United States-United Kingdom arrangement provides a new basis for the exchange of information with these two countries since it will remove certain existing restrictions on the exchange of information between the three countries. Nevertheless, there are some features of the United States-United Kingdom proposal which are considered objectionable insofar as Canada is concerned. These are:

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- (a) That it does not provide protection for information of Canadian origin commensurate with that of United States and United Kingdom origin.
- (b) That the condition requiring that the originating country be furnished with periodic reports of its material which is transmitted between the other two countries under this arrangement may be difficult to implement.
- (c) That Annex Document C (Appendix "A") does not appear to make specific provision for Canada to transmit to the United Kingdom and the United States information that originates in either of those countries.
- (d) That a written agreement of this kind might tend to restrict rather than to extend the exchange of intelligence information.
- (e) That it would be more appropriate for Canada to assume the status of an equal member in any arrangement for the exchange of information involving Canada.

9. It is felt that most of these objections could best be met by the conclusion of a new tri-partite agreement rather than by Canadian concurrence in the present document. It is felt also that it would be difficult to take the position that no agreement should be concluded. It is therefore recommended that:

- (a) the United Kingdom and the United States be informed that we should prefer to conclude a tri-partite agreement in lieu of the present annex (Appendix "A") insofar as Canadian interest is concerned; and
- (b) this agreement be along the lines of attached Appendix "B".

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

March 21st, 1950.

APPENDIX "A"

S E C R E T

ANNEX

Document C

EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION WITH CANADA

1. The United Kingdom may exchange freely with Canada without prior United States consent classified military information of United States origin, of combined United States-Canada origin, or of combined United States-United Kingdom origin except for information relating to Western Hemisphere defence and provided that:

- (a) The Canadian Government concurs in this position.
- (b) The United Kingdom and/or Canada furnish to the United States periodic reports identifying the specific documentary materials released by the one to the other when such documents are of United States, combined United States-United Kingdom, or combined United States-Canadian origin.

2. The United States may exchange freely with Canada without prior United Kingdom consent classified military information of United Kingdom origin, of combined United Kingdom-Canadian origin, or of combined United Kingdom-United States origin provided:

- (a) The Canadian Government concur in this position.
- (b) The United States and/or Canada furnish to the United Kingdom periodic reports identifying the specific documentary materials released by the one to the other when such documents are of United Kingdom, combined United Kingdom-United States, or combined United Kingdom-Canadian origin.

APPENDIX "B"

S E C R E T

EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION -  
CANADA-U.S.-U.K.

1. The United Kingdom and Canada may exchange freely, without prior United States consent, classified military information of United States origin, of combined United States-Canada origin, or of combined United States-United Kingdom origin except for information relating to Western Hemisphere defence.
2. The United States and Canada may exchange freely, without prior United Kingdom consent, classified military information of United Kingdom origin, of combined United Kingdom-Canadian origin or of combined United Kingdom-United States origin.
3. The United States and the United Kingdom may exchange freely, without prior Canadian consent, classified military information of Canadian origin, of combined United States-Canadian origin, or of combined United Kingdom-Canadian origin except for information relating to Western Hemisphere defence.

H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. - .....

REFERRED TO	REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)
<p><del>Souter</del></p> <p><u>DNI</u></p>	<p>Ln actw</p> <p><i>[Signature]</i></p> <p>DNI</p> <p>This memo is on fly leaf of L Bo Form 420(5) (48)</p> <p><i>[Signature]</i></p> <p><i>[Signature]</i> 28/4</p>

Note 1: Naval Headquarters Memorandum attached to be pasted inside front cover of your copy of C.B.O. Form U2D(5)(1948) next to NSTS 11550-2 of 6th May, 1949.

Note 2: In addition to the signing of the Receipt Note the fact that the memorandum has been affixed inside the book is to be certified by signing the following certificate

"This is to certify that a copy of NSTS 11550-2 of 4th February, 1950, has been pasted inside front cover of Copy No. .... of C.B.O. Form U2D(5)(1948)"

SIGNATURE.....

RANK.....

Note 3: Provided the above action has been taken and Receipt Note returned no further accounting for attached memorandum is required.

Director of Publications  
and Printing  
NAVAL SERVICE  
FEB 11 1950  
Dep't National Defence  
OTTAWA, CANADA

N.S.T.S.11550-2  
TOP SECRET

LIST OF HOLDERS OF MEMO N.S.T.S.11550-2  
of 4th February, 1950.

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O/C Gloucester Radio Station	1
S.N.L.O. Ottawa	1
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NAVAL SERVICE

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OTTAWA, CANADA



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H.S.T.C. 11550-2

*Appendix I*

~~MEMORANDUM TO: All Canadian Holders of C.B.O. Form U2D(5) (1948)~~

Reference: Page 10 - Paragraph 65A

The R.C.N. has categorized Commonwealth Nations to receive classified information as follows:

Commonwealth Countries	British Information	United States Information	Canadian Information	C - Confidential U - Unclassified R - Restricted
AUSTRALIA	C <sup>1</sup>	U	C	
NEW ZEALAND	C <sup>1</sup>	U	C	
SOUTH AFRICA	C	U	R <sup>2</sup>	
INDIA	C <sup>2</sup>	U	R <sup>2</sup>	
PAKISTAN	C <sup>2</sup>	U	R <sup>2</sup>	

NOTE 1 This may be extended to include Secret subjects which are known to be common to both parties.

NOTE 2 Excluding communication and electronic subjects except where equipment is known to be common to both parties.

NOTE 3 Attention is drawn to release of information from U.S. or U.K. sources which may not be released to a third party.

United States Information

U.S. classified information or material held by or on loan to the R.C.N. shall not be released, discussed with or shown to any Commonwealth Nations or representative. Requests for classified U.S. information or material received by C.O.'s shall be forwarded to CANAVIBD. H.M.C. ships away from home waters shall rigidly adhere to C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1948) with special reference to this amendment.

*C. J. Buller*  
NAVAL SECRETARY.

Ottawa, Canada.  
4th February, 1950.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H.Q. 24

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. - NSTS 11550-2...

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

~~D.N.I.~~  
~~ACNS(P)~~  
~~N. EEC.~~

*Secy*  
*msd.*

RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED  
INFORMATION TO COMMONWEALTH  
NATIONS.

Attached proposed  
Memorandum for approval and  
signature please.

This Memorandum is  
considered necessary in order  
for the R.C.N. to implement policy  
outlined in Flags A and B.

*H.F. Rankin*  
(H.F. Rankin),  
S.O. (Security).

30th January, 1950,  
Ottawa, Canada.

*DPL*

*For necessary action refer  
our telephone conversation*  
*[Signature]*

000766

TOP SECRET

N.S.T.S. 11550-2

MEMORANDUM TO: All Canadian Holders of C.B.O. Form U2D(5) (1948)

Reference: Page 10 - Paragraph 65A

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Commonwealth Countries	British Information	United States Information	Canadian Information	C - Confidential U - Unclassified R - Restricted
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NEW ZEALAND	C <sup>1</sup>	U	C	
SOUTH AFRICA	C	U	R <sup>2</sup>	
INDIA	C <sup>2</sup>	U	R <sup>2</sup>	
PAKISTAN	C <sup>2</sup>	U	R <sup>2</sup>	

NOTE 1 This may be extended to include Secret subjects which are known to be common to both parties.

NOTE 2 Excluding communication and electronic subjects except where equipment is known to be common to both parties.

NOTE 3 Attention is drawn to release of information from U.S. or U.K. sources which may not be released to a third party.

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NAVAL SECRETARY.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
DBN1  
2/2

DRAFT

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: All Canadian Holders of C.B.O. Form U2D(5) (1948)

Reference: Page 10 - Paragraph 65A

The R.C.N. has categorized Commonwealth Nations to receive classified information as follows:

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NEW ZEALAND	C <sup>1</sup>	U	C	
SOUTH AFRICA	C	U	R <sup>2</sup>	
INDIA	C <sup>2</sup>	U	R <sup>2</sup>	
PAKISTAN	C <sup>2</sup>	U	R <sup>2</sup>	

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11250  
CSC 14-2-1

TOP SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

16th January, 1950.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Disclosure of Information

1. I enclose herewith for your information and retention, extract from the minutes of the 455th meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee held 11th January, 1950, concerning the above-noted subject.

DNI

Enc.



(G.H. Newsome)  
Wing Commander, R.C.A.F.,  
Secretary.

VI. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

Extract from minutes of 455th meeting of  
Chiefs of Staff Committee held 11th Jan/50

20. The Committee had for consideration two papers which had been prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee:- "Disclosure of Information to Other Countries" and "Release of Information to Commonwealth Countries". The former paper included a categorization of nations for disclosure purposes, and also a system for the protection of information of wholly patentable and wholly un-patentable nature. The latter paper was a review of the present practices employed by the individual Services and the Defence Research Board with respect to the release of information to Commonwealth countries.

TOP SECRET

(Memorandum CSC 14-2-1 of 22nd November, 1949, from Secretary,  
Joint Intelligence Committee - CSC 8-1 of 23rd November)

21. Mr. Gill observed that, as the disclosure of information to ~~foreign~~ countries was made on a reciprocal basis, it would seem appropriate that the authorities who could best assess the value of the information obtained from a foreign country should be made responsible for ensuring that reciprocity was carried out. It might be advisable to amend the paper in order to give this effect.

22. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs pointed out that the departments of government concerned should consult, where necessary, the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Security Panel on matters of reciprocity in the exchange of information.

23. The Committee, after further discussion:

- (a) approved the paper on "Disclosure of Information to Other Countries" subject to the following amendment:-

para. 5 - Delete last sentence and substitute:

"The responsibility for applying the principles of reciprocity will be assumed by the departments concerned and departmental security officers will consult the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Security Panel as appropriate"; and

- (b) noted the report of the Joint Intelligence Committee on "Release of Information to Commonwealth Countries".

Extracted 1.6/1.1.50.....

...*Top Secret*...  
Classification

...11.550-2...  
File Reference

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~  
~~CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE~~  
-----

VCNS  
① ACNS (Plan) *W.B.*  
DWT  
DNA  
D.N.Com  
DNPO  
② DNI  
DSS  
CNP  
DCNP  
DNR  
CNTS  
A/CNTS (W. & S)  
A/CNTS (Ships)  
A/CNTS (Air)  
DGFA  
DGNO  
SA/CNS

The following is an extract from the minutes of the 455.711 Meeting of the above committee held 1.1.11.50. Referred for information and necessary action.

*E. J. Dellen*  
NAVAL SECRETARY

VI. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

20. The Committee had for consideration two papers which had been prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee:- "Disclosure of Information to Other Countries" and "Release of Information to Commonwealth Countries". The former paper included a categorization of nations for disclosure purposes, and also a system for the protection of information of wholly patentable and wholly un-patentable nature. The latter paper was a review of the present practices employed by the individual Services and the Defence Research Board with respect to the release of information to Commonwealth countries.

(Memorandum CSC 14-2-1 of 22nd November, 1949, from Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee - CSC 8-1 of 23rd November)

21. Mr. Gill observed that, as the disclosure of information to foreign countries was made on a reciprocal basis, it would seem appropriate that the authorities who could best assess the value of the information obtained from a foreign country should be made responsible for ensuring that reciprocity was carried out. It might be advisable to amend the paper in order to give this effect.

22. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs pointed out that the departments of government concerned should consult, where necessary, the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Security Panel on matters of reciprocity in the exchange of information.

23. The Committee, after further discussion:

(a) approved the paper on "Disclosure of Information to Other Countries" subject to the following amendment:-

para. 5 - Delete last sentence and substitute:

"The responsibility for applying the principles of reciprocity will be assumed by the departments concerned and departmental security officers will consult the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Security Panel as appropriate"; and

(b) noted the report of the Joint Intelligence Committee on "Release of Information to Commonwealth Countries".

000771



FILE NUMBER

NSTC 11550 - 2

Vol. "2"

TO BE PASSED BY HAND OF OFFICER ONLY

# TOP SECRET SERIES

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL MILITARY INFORMATION

WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

FOR CROSS REFERENCES SEE INSIDE COVER

REFERRED

FOR REMARKS

DATE OF  
PASS

INITIALS

DATE OF  
P.A.

INITIALS

DATE OF  
B.F.

CENTRAL REGISTRY

INSPECTED  
IN C.R.  
By

To be combined with  
1950-4  
Miss Wells of the Guinea  
informed  
R. Bouché 27/7/55

000772





SECURITY PANEL  
DOCUMENT

SP-56

1750-4 13  
CSC 8-1

TOP SECRET

2-1-1

17th January, 1950.

The Secretary,  
Security Panel.


Disclosure of Information to Other Countries

1. The attached paper on the "Disclosure of Information to Other Countries" was approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee at their 455th meeting on 11th January, 1950, with the following amendment:

para. 5 - Delete last sentence and substitute the following:-

"The responsibility for applying the principles of reciprocity will be assumed by the departments concerned and departmental security officers will consult the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Security Panel as appropriate".

2. The Chiefs of Staff Committee recommend that this paper, with the amendment set out above, be approved by the Security Panel.

  
Br. (J.D.B. Smith)  
Brigadier,  
Secretary.

TOP SECRET

## DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

### GENERAL

1. The policy described hereunder should be observed with regard to the disclosure of information to other governments, or their representatives, whether civilian or military. It should be borne in mind; however, that, under this policy, information will only be disclosed when appropriate authority has been obtained for such disclosure. The policy in no way relieves officials of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act.

### DEFINITION

2. The term "information" is taken to refer to information which is the property of or the primary concern of the Canadian Government. It covers:

- (a) Information - that is to say knowledge of Canadian forces, equipment, research and development, etc. This is further sub-divided into:
  - (i) Scientific information, when this has resulted from fundamental research and development carried out under government auspices or which is allotted a security classification.
  - (ii) Technical information about equipment, manufacturing processes and operational technique.
  - (iii) Non-technical information, such as orders of battle, strengths, locations, operations, training methods, plans, organization and publications.
- (b) Intelligence - that is to say knowledge of foreign countries in all the fields listed in (a) above, possessed by Canada.

### CATEGORIZATION OF NATIONS FOR DISCLOSURE PURPOSES

3. In the light of the above, a standard policy has been prepared by which foreign nations are categorized as described below for disclosure purposes. (See Appendix "A" attached) In each of the first four categories, foreign nations may receive, at the discretion of the Canadian Government, information up to and including classification for that category.

*spend most of the time*  
Category 1 - Nations who <sup>what</sup> may be given up to and including Top Secret military information.

Category 2 - Nations who, though normally given no higher information than Confidential, may, in the interests of Canadian strategic policy, receive information up to and including Top Secret under special security arrangements such as those devised for the North Atlantic Treaty.

Category 3 - Nations who <sup>what</sup> may be given up to and including Confidential information.

Category 4 - Nations who may be given up to and including Restricted information.

Category 5 - Nations who must be given no classified information except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc., and never higher than Restricted.

- 2 -

4. It is emphasized that the rules for disclosure of classified information under each of the categories are permissive. No nation should be given any information unless Canada thereby derives some political, military or economic benefits.

#### RECIPROCITY

5. It is important that the disclosure of information shall be on a reciprocal basis. With some nations Canadian relations are so close that reciprocity is implicit, while other nations may have nothing to offer that Canada needs, though it may, for instance, be possible to ask for "intelligence" in exchange for "equipment". With the low category nations, reciprocity is essential as a weapon should it be desired to stave off an awkward request by making a counter-request known to be impossible of fulfilment. The counter-request need not necessarily be confined to the requirements of one department. It is considered that the reciprocity rule should be maintained. The responsibility for applying the principles of reciprocity will be assumed by departmental security officers ~~who will, in doubt,~~ <sup>THE DEPARTMENTS CONCERNED AND</sup> consult the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Security Panel ~~AS APPROPRIATE.~~

#### INDUSTRIAL PATENTS

6. In order to safeguard industrial interests, information of concern to manufacturers, whether government-owned or privately-owned, will be dealt with in the following manner:

- (a) Wholly Patentable, i.e., the whole of the information can be protected by a patent specification.

If secret, consideration will be given to the possibility of acquiring a secret patent in Canada and disclosure to a foreign government should, as far as possible, be made on the following conditions:

That the information is kept secret and the government of that country will grant to Canada, on request, patent protection of suitable priority.

If not secret, i.e., such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions, the recipient government should be referred to the owner to negotiate terms.

- (b) Wholly Unpatentable, i.e., the information, while commercially valuable, is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent specification.

Government-owned information should only be supplied if a quid pro quo is obtained - strategic, political or commercial - worth the value of the information.

In the case of privately-owned information, the foreign government should merely be put in touch with the owner, but if the nature of the information is secret, the owner should be warned that he should communicate the information only to accredited representatives of the foreign government who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

- 3 -

- (c) Partly Patentable and Partly Unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is secret and unpatentable, e.g., the layout, dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design, e.g., a magneto.

The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but, in the case of privately-owned patentable information, care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- (d) Departments which are negotiating with foreign governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

#### CONDITIONS FOR DISCLOSURE

7. The following conditions should be laid down and agreed to by all nations to whom information is disclosed:

- (a) The information received should be safeguarded under substantially the same rules of security as the Canadian authorities themselves impose.
- (b) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient government and such of its contractors, under seal of secrecy, as it may notify to the Canadian Government in writing. Disclosure to any other government or publication to the press or in any other way, would constitute a breach of the agreement.

November 18th, 1949.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

CATEGORIZATION OF FOREIGN NATIONS

1. Foreign nations have been placed in the following categories for the purpose of receiving information:

Category 1 - Nations who may be given up to and including Top Secret information:

United States of America.

Category 2 - Nations who, though normally given no higher information than Confidential, may, in the interest of Canadian strategic policy, receive information up to and including Top Secret under special security arrangements such as those devised for the North Atlantic Treaty:

Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal.

Category 3 - Nations who may be given up to and including Confidential information:

Greece, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.

Category 4 - Nations who may be given up to and including Restricted information:

All foreign nations not included in the other four categories.

Category 5 - Nations who must be given no classified information except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc., and in no case higher than Restricted:

The Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia.