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Vol 25

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OF  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINISTÈRE  
DES  
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT  
MEASURES  
PLANS AND PROPOSALS  
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION ( INITIATIVES )

DESARMEMENT  
MESURES  
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS  
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX ( INITIATIVES )

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
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# News Release

Jan. 24

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## HOWE: DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT BY THE RIGHT HON SIR GEOFFREY HOWE  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, IN THE HOUSE  
OF COMMONS ON 24 JANUARY 1984 ON THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT  
IN EUROPE (CDE):-

LAST WEEK I ATTENDED THE OPENING MEETING IN STOCKHOLM OF THE  
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND  
DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, KNOWN AS THE CDE. THIS IS THE FIRST OF THE  
FOLLOW-UP CONFERENCES AGREED AT THE CSCE REVIEW MEETING IN MADRID  
LAST SEPTEMBER., AND THE OPENING WAS ATTENDED BY THE FOREIGN  
MINISTERS OR THEIR EQUIVALENTS OF ALL 35 PARTICIPATING STATES. ON  
FRIDAY (20 JANUARY) I DELIVERED AN OPENING SPEECH ON BEHALF OF THE  
UNITED KINGDOM. A COPY HAS BEEN PLACED IN THE LIBRARY OF THE HOUSE.

THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT SO MANY STATES HAVE MET TOGETHER  
SPECIFICALLY TO TACKLE SOME VERY BASIC QUESTIONS AFFECTING THE  
SECURITY OF EUROPE. THE AIM IS TO LOWER TENSION AND REDUCE THE RISK  
OF WAR, BY FINDING PRACTICAL WAYS OF IMPROVING MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND  
TRUST.

TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES, WE ARE TODAY TABLING PROPOSALS WHICH, AS  
THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE CONFERENCE REQUIRE, ARE  
MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, POLITICALLY BINDING, VERIFIABLE AND  
APPLICABLE TO THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. WE ARE PROPOSING MEASURES  
DESIGNED: FIRSTLY, TO REDUCE SECRECY BY THE EXCHANGE OF  
INFORMATION AND BY THE OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION OF MILITARY  
ACTIVITIES.,

SECONDLY, TO MAKE CLEAR PROVISION FOR THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION AND  
REPORTING OF MILITARY ACTIVITY.,

THIRD, TO PROMOTE STABILITY AND TO INHIBIT THE USE OR THREAT OF  
FORCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.,

AND FOURTH, TO FACILITATE CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN PERIODS OF TENSION  
AND TO REDUCE THE RISK OF SURPRISE ATTACK.



IF WE CAN SECURE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES OF THIS KIND, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT EUROPE WILL BE A SAFER PLACE. WE WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION, AS I TOLD THE CONFERENCE, TO CONSIDER MOVING TO FURTHER STAGES OF NEGOTIATION, PROVIDING FOR THE RESTRICTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND FOR REDUCTIONS IN FORCE LEVELS. THE FIRST JOB MUST BE TO BUILD A BASIS OF CONFIDENCE, BY MEASURES OF THE KIND THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED.

I EMPHASISED THAT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ALONE CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT HAVE TO BEAR THE FULL WEIGHT OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST NEEDS TO BE BROADENED AND GIVEN MORE SUBSTANCE.

MY MEETING WITH MR GROMYKO ON THURSDAY (19 JANUARY) THUS GAVE ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH HIM NOT ONLY ARMS CONTROL, BUT EAST/WEST RELATIONS MORE GENERALLY, AS WELL AS THE MIDDLE EAST. I ALSO RAISED WITH HIM THE QUESTION OF SOVIET FULFILMENT OF ITS INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE AGREED THAT ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE FOR A FURTHER MEETING BETWEEN US.

THE OPENING OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE CAME AT A DIFFICULT TIME IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. THE DIFFICULTIES REMAIN. BUT I HOPE THAT I SHALL BE PROVED RIGHT IN SEEING IN THE EVENTS OF LAST WEEK SIGNS OF A NEW DETERMINATION TO TACKLE THEM. WE MUST LOOK TO THE CAUSES OF TENSION AND TRY TO REDUCE THEM. AT STOCKHOLM AND ELSEWHERE, THAT REMAINS OUR PURPOSE.

ENDS

SIR GEOFFREY HOWE'S STATEMENT SUPPLEMENTARIES  
STOCKHOLM MEETING.

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 24 JANUARY MR DENIS HEALEY SAID: 'THE FOREIGN SECRETARY MUST REALISE THAT HE HAS GIVEN US A DEPRESSING ACCOUNT OF THE RECENT MEETING IN STOCKHOLM, WHICH FORMS A STARTLING CONTRAST TO THE CLAIM OF ALL GOVERNMENT MINISTERS IN RECENT MONTHS THAT THE MOMENT THAT CRUISE AND PERSHING WERE DEPLOYED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK TO US AND MAKE CONCESSIONS ABOUT EVERYTHING.

'WHAT MUST WORRY ALL PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WESTERN WORLD IS THAT TECHNOLOGY IS NOW MOVING AT THE SPEED OF LIGHTNING AND THAT DIPLOMACY IS MOVING WITH THE STately MAJESTY OF A GLACIER. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT MUST LIE IN PART WITH WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.

'DID THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AND LEARNED GENTLEMAN DISCUSS WITH MR GROMYKO DURING HIS TALKS LAST WEEK THE CONCLUSION OF ALL THE LEADING WESTERN SCIENTISTS OF THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT IF ONLY ONE OUT OF EVERY 200 NUCLEAR WEAPONS POSSESSED BY THE SUPERPOWERS IS USED THE COUNTRY USING THAT WEAPON WILL CONDEMN ITS OWN PEOPLE TO SLOW STARVATION IN ARCTIC NIGHT? DOES THAT NOT HAVE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR ALL GOVERNMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE IRON CURTAIN, AND DOES IT NOT MAKE TOTAL NONSENSE OF THE ATTEMPT BY THE SOVIET AND WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO PILE MORE WEAPONS ON TOP OF THE TOTALLY REDUNDANT AND UNUSABLE ARMOURIES THAT THEY ALREADY POSSESS? WOULD THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AND LEARNED GENTLEMAN TELL US A LITTLE ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF HIS STATEMENT THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS EAST-WEST RELATIONS MORE GENERALLY? DOES HE REALLY BELIEVE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO HUNGARY WILL FULFIL THAT NEED? IS IT NOT RATHER LIKE VISITING THE MAYOR OF READING BECAUSE ONE DOES NOT WANT TO TALK TO THE LEADER OF THE GLC?

SIR GEOFFREY HOWE: THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN HAS REVEALED A CURIOUS INSIGHT INTO THE PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND THE PRIME MINISTER WILL VISIT HUNGARY BETWEEN 2 AND 4 FEBRUARY, AND IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNISE THAT CONTACT WITH ALL COUNTRIES IN THE SO-CALLED EASTERN BLOC HAS A PART TO PLAY IN IMPROVING RELATIONS. SUCH CONTACTS SHOULD BE LOOKED AT AND CONSIDERED SEPARATELY. CERTAINLY THEY SHOULD ALL BE UNDERTAKEN ALONGSIDE ONE ANOTHER.

I AGREE WITH THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN THAT THE SCENE WE FACED IN STOCKHOLM - INDEED, THE SCENE THAT THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD FACED - IS A DEPRESSING ONE SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY THAT HAS BEEN FACED IN SECURING PROGRESS IN THE MANY FORA FOR ARMS REDUCTION. THAT IS ONE OF THE FEATURES THAT OVERSHADOWED ALL OUR TALKS THERE. IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE, AS WE WERE ALL WELL AWARE, THAT THE USE OF ANY SINGLE NUCLEAR WEAPON IS SOMETHING THAT SHOULD BE AVOIDED AT ALL COSTS. IT SHOULD ALSO BE REMEMBERED THAT THE SURPLUS OF LONGER - RANGE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCES HELD BY THE SOVIET UNION OVERSHADOWS THAT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FIVE TO ONE, AND THAT THERE IS A NOT QUITE SO LARGE BUT SIMILARLY A DAUNTING DISPARITY IN THE POSSESSION OF STRATEGIC MISSILES ON THE SOVIET SIDE. SO IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE ARE TRYING TO GET UNDER WAY.



A GLACIER-LIKE QUALITY OF DECISION TAKING IN THE SOVIET UNION IS, UNFORTUNATELY, A FORMIDABLE FEATURE OF THE SCENE THAT WE HAVE TO FACE. WE VERY MUCH REGRET THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS WITHDRAWN FROM THE INF AND START NEGOTIATIONS. WE HOPE THAT DISCUSSION THROUGH THE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WILL LEAD TO A RESUMPTION OF THE MBFR TALKS ON 15 AND 16 MARCH. IT SHOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WAS ONLY THE PREPARATIONS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR DEPLOYMENT THAT BROUGHT THE RUSSIANS TO NEGOTIATE IN THE FIRST PLACE. IT IS ONLY BY STICKING TO NATO'S INF POLICY THAT WE SHALL SHOW THE SOVIET UNION THAT AGREEMENT ON ALL THESE MATTERS REMAINS PROFOUNDLY IN ITS INTERESTS.

MR HEALEY: THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AND LEARNED GENTLEMAN APPEARS NOT TO HAVE LISTENED TO WHAT I SAID, OR EVEN TO HAVE READ THE PAPERS THAT WERE PREPARED BY HIS OWN ADVISERS. IS IT NOT THE CASE THAT IN LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE IS NOW ROUGH PARITY BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WEST? THAT HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY ALL LEADING SPOKESMEN OF THE UNITED STATES AND, UNTIL THIS AFTERNOON, BY SPOKESMEN OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.

SECONDLY, DOES THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AND LEARNED GENTLEMAN ACCEPT THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY LEADING SCIENTISTS IN THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT TO USE EVEN ONE OUT OF 200 OF THE EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD CONDEMN THE WORLD TO THE DESTRUCTION OF HUMANITY AND THE SLOW DEATH OF OUR POPULATIONS IN ARCTIC NIGHT?

SIR GEOFFREY HOWE: I NEED NO REMINDING OF THE EMPHATIC IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF TAKING ALL THE STEPS WE ARE SEEKING TO TAKE, WHEREVER WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY, TO SECURE THEIR REDUCTION FOR PRECISELY THE REASONS OFFERED BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN IN HIS CLOSING REMARKS.

IN REPLY TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN'S FIRST QUESTION, THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF SOVIET STRATEGIC MISSILES IS MORE THAN TWICE AS GREAT AS THAT OF THE UNITED STATES; IN REGARD TO LONGER-RANGE INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES, THE RUSSIANS POSSESS A SUPERIORITY OF FIVE TO ONE. THOSE ARE THE REASONS WHY WE SHOULD BE SO CONCERNED.

DR DAVID OWEN: WILL THE FOREIGN SECRETARY ACCEPT THAT MANY COUNTRIES IN NATO NOW WANT TO SEE A MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR ANDROPOV? SINCE MR ANDROPOV'S HEALTH IS REPORTED TO BE BETTER AND HE IS LIKELY TO BE SEEN IN PUBLIC, WILL THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WISH SUCH A PUBLIC MEETING TO TAKE PLACE? IN REGARD TO THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, WILL NATO NOW PROPOSE IN STOCKHOLM A CORRIDOR IN WHICH WE WILL WITHDRAW BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH WOULD BE THE BEST CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE THAT COULD BE TAKEN AND WHICH WOULD ALLEVIATE THE CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT ANY BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WAR FIGHTING STRATEGY?

SIR GEOFFREY HOWE: AS I SAID IN MY STATEMENT, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AT THIS STAGE IS CONCERNED ONLY WITH MEASURES THAT ARISE OUT OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE THAT WERE AGREED AFTER A GREAT DEAL OF TRIBULATION AT MADRID, SO IT IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE PLACE IN WHICH TO MAKE A PROPOSAL OF THE KIND ~~PRE~~FERRED TO BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN. AS I ALSO SAID ~~IN MY~~ STATEMENT, IF WE ARE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE MEASURES ~~THAT~~ ARE WITHIN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE, WE SHALL WANT TO SEE WHETHER WE CAN GO FURTHER IN THE DIRECTION SUGGESTED BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN.

IN REGARD TO VISITS BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR ANDROPOV, I AM NOT, OF COURSE, ABLE TO GIVE ANY DEFINITE INFORMATION ABOUT MR ANDROPOV'S HEALTH, ALTHOUGH WE MUST ALL HOPE THAT IT IS IMPROVING. IT WILL BE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONSIDER THE SUGGESTION MADE BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN. CERTAINLY WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO INTENSIFY THE DIALOGUE, BOTH IN QUANTITY AND IN QUALITY, AT ALL LEVELS, REMEMBERING THAT IF THERE IS ANYTHING LESS FRUITFUL THAN THE ABSENCE OF MEETINGS AT TOP LEVEL IT IS A MEETING THAT HAS BEEN INADEQUATELY PREPARED. WE MUST TAKE ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE FACT THAT IN A SPEECH LAST WEEK PRESIDENT REAGAN OFFERED TO THE SOVIET UNION A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC WORKING RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS APPROPRIATE. ENDS



then foreign ministers adopted in the first week of the conference.

Erwin Larc, the Foreign Minister of Austria, which is closely linked to the West, made a series of statements, for

By contrast, the Swedish Foreign Minister called into question nuclear deterrence, the policy that NATO says has maintained peace in Europe since the alliance was founded.

said: "We will examine each proposal in the light of its applicability to Mediterranean security issues, especially the seriously deteriorating naval military confrontation in our region."

Stockholm helped us to document disclosed under the Access to Information Act. The Shultz-Gromyko session as well as the meetings among the foreign ministers of the 35 countries attending the meeting in the Swedish capital.

The President, marking the third anniversary of his inauguration, used some of the day's activities to underscore another theme: that his Administration's military buildup provided the best incentive in years for the Soviet Union to negotiate with the United States.

At a rally at Constitution Hall for top officials in his Administration, Mr. Reagan drew applause by boasting that the Atlantic alliance had "held firm, despite months of Soviet bluster," and permitted the beginning of the deployment of new American nuclear missiles.

"Soon or later the Soviets are going to realize that equitable and verifiable arms reductions are in their interest, too," Mr. Reagan declared. "And as I made clear in my address earlier this week, when they do, we'll be at the table, waiting for them, ready to go on negotiating real arms reductions."

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# Trudeau Encouraged on Disarmament Effort

By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada said yesterday that he was encouraged by the United States-Soviet contacts that took place this week at the European security conference in Stockholm. But he said that he hoped that more substantive steps could be taken in the context of his own effort to promote a disarmament agreement.

Mr. Trudeau listed such steps as a possible United Nations meeting of the nuclear powers, or a ban on nuclear weapons in space, or the ratification of the second strategic arms limitation treaty.

Mr. Trudeau, who is leaving next week to visit Rumania, Czechoslovakia and East Germany as part of his disarmament campaign, said in an interview with editors of The New York Times that he was gratified by what he said was the moderation in the tone of United States statements toward the Soviet Union.

He also cited what he said were the positive effects of the participation of national leaders at the security talks in Sweden.

## 'End the Megaphone Diplomacy'

"They have involved themselves now," he said. "They have decided that they would go to Stockholm at the ministerial level. The objective is to resume the dialogue, to reduce tensions, to end the megaphone diplomacy."

"And that seems to be happening," he said, at least within the Western camp.

Mr. Trudeau also said he repeatedly stressed the need to take advantage of the improved atmosphere and make progress in such substantive areas as disarmament and troop reduction.

"Now that we're using the right words, I think we must propose the right deeds," he said.

Mr. Trudeau said he looked toward a return to what he called the creative policies that preceded the period of détente of the 1970's. He cited ratification of the second strategic arms treaty, or a response to the unanswered Soviet counterproposal on force reductions in Europe, or even moves toward a general nonaggression treaty as the kind of measures that would reduce the danger of war. "At some point you have to take a leap of faith," said the Canadian leader.

Mr. Trudeau's comments coincided with reports from Stockholm suggesting that as a result of a long meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, Secretary of State George P. Shultz appeared more optimistic about the resumption of the talks in Vienna on reducing conventional forces in Europe.

## Letter From Andropov

The comments also came after Mr. Trudeau received a letter this week from Yuri V. Andropov, the Soviet leader, proposing a meeting at "a time in the not too distant future." The Canadian leader, who is considering retirement from national politics, said Mr. Andropov's letter had encouraged him to continue the disarmament efforts, in which Mr. Trudeau and his aides have consulted with more than 30 national leaders.

In a related development yesterday, Canadian diplomats in Ottawa said that in talks in Stockholm between Mr. Gromyko and Allan J. MacEachen, the Canadian Deputy Prime Minister, the Soviet official said his country was

willing to discuss claims for compensation for Canadian citizens who were killed in the downing of the South Korean jetliner by Soviet aircraft last Sept. 1. This was described by the Canadian diplomats as a possible sign of lessening intransigence in Moscow.

In his talk to the editors of The Times, Mr. Trudeau stressed his satisfaction with what he described as the moderating tone of statements from Washington. He said that when he first undertook his efforts in September to stimulate discussion and galvanize political will to deal with disarmament, the United States gave him "a reception that was rather cruel," but he added that "when I saw President Reagan in December he made all the right noises."

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
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# Sakharov Seeks Care for His Wife

STOCKHOLM, Jan. 20 (AP) — Andrei D. Sakharov, the dissident Soviet physicist who won a Nobel Peace Prize, has sent a letter to the European

with the outside world.


"I fear — and I believe the fear is justified — that if Elena were to be hospitalized" in the Soviet Union, "some

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Calder's Viewpoint:

- ① Wait for reaction from NATO.
- ② "Rein in" Geneva's enthusiasm a bit.
- ③ Christoff/Skinner discussions also important before any decision taken.

MB.  
24 Jan 84



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2. POUR CE FAIRE ENVISAGEONS RENCONTRE AVEC ANDREANI, DIR DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES AU QUAI ET/OU EVENTUELLEMENT RENCONTRE AVEC CONSEILLER A ELYSEE.

3. RECONNAISSANTS POUR VOS COMMENTAIRES A CETTE SUGGESTION AFIN QUE PUISSIONS PRENDRE DISPOSITIONS NECESSAIRES ADVENANT REponse QUE SOUHAITONS POSITIVE.

4. POUR RCR: RECONNAISSANTS PORTER PRESENT TEL A ATTENTION DE AMB DUPUY QUI VOUDRA SANS DOUTE POURSUIVRE QUESTION AVANT SON DEPART.

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Debate on Speech from Throne -  
Talking Points for DPM/SSEA

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
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Attached is a copy of the talking points we prepared yesterday evening, along the lines the Minister had suggested, for his use in the House later today. The text was delivered to him last night.



Paul Heinbecker  
Chairman  
Policy Development Secretariat

## TALKING POINTS

### INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

#### (A) BACKGROUND TO PM'S PEACE INITIATIVE

1. THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST SINCE TOWARDS THE END OF THE 1970'S. AT THAT TIME EVIDENCE BEGAN TO ACCUMULATE THAT THE USSR DID NOT CONSIDER DETENTE WITH THE WEST TO BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH (A) A CONTINUED MILITARY BUILDUP BEYOND DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS (B) USE OF ITS MILITARY POWER TO PROMOTE SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE THIRD WORLD AND (C) NO CHANGE IN ITS TREATMENT OF MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS.

2. THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN TRIGGERED A WESTERN RESPONSE WHICH INDICATED THAT THE WEST DID NOT CONSIDER DETENTE TO BE IRREVERSIBLE. THE SOVIET INSPIRED IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND SOURED RELATIONS STILL FURTHER, AS DID MORE RECENTLY THE SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER.

3. BY LAST SUMMER, RELATIONS WERE SO BAD THAT EVEN HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON HAD ALL BUT CEASED. NOT

- 2 -

EVEN DURING THE AMERICAN BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM HAD SUCH A DIALOGUE BEEN INTERRUPTED.

4. MEANWHILE, THE WEST'S NECESSARY MINIMUM RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP, IN PARTICULAR DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES TO MATCH ALREADY INSTALLED SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES, WAS ENCOUNTERING OPPOSITION FROM THOSE WORRIED THAT THE DETERIORATION IN POLITICAL RELATIONS WAS LEADING INEXORABLY TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND PERHAPS TO WAR.

(B) WILLIAMSBURG AND AFTER

5. IN RESPONSE TO THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS, THE LEADERS OF THE SEVEN SUMMIT COUNTRIES FOR THE FIRST TIME ADDRESSED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY QUESTIONS. AT CANADA'S SUGGESTION THEY ISSUED A SPECIAL DECLARATION AT THEIR MEETING IN MAY OF LAST YEAR, WHICH CONTAINED TWO PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS:

- THEY UNDERTOOK TO "MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT MILITARY STRENGTH TO DETER ANY ATTACK, TO COUNTER ANY THREAT, AND TO ENSURE THE PEACE".



- 3 -

- THEY UNDERTOOK TO DEVOTE THEIR "FULL POLITICAL RESOURCES TO REDUCING THE THREAT OF WAR".

6. THAT BASIC MESSAGE WAS ENDORSED A MONTH LATER IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN PARIS.

7. THIS DOUBLE-TRACK APPROACH ALSO INFLUENCED CANADIAN POLICY ON THE CONTROVERSIAL QUESTION OF WHETHER WE WOULD AGREE TO PERMIT TESTING OF AMERICAN AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. AS I WROTE IN MY LETTER TO SECRETARY SHULTZ ON JULY 15, WE WERE PREPARED TO APPROVE TESTING AS A CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY IN THE NEGOTIATION OF A VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT WE ALSO RECOGNIZED "AN EVEN GREATER OBLIGATION TO JOIN IN THE SEARCH FOR A SECURE PEACE". I NOTED THAT IT WAS THE GOVERNMENT'S "FIRM INTENTION TO REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS IN THE COMING MONTHS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROGRESS AND EVENTUAL SUCCESS OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS".

(C) PM'S PEACE INITIATIVE

8. IT WAS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER LAUNCHED HIS INITIATIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY, THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF WHICH WERE SKETCHED OUT IN HIS SPEECH TO THE CONFERENCE ON

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STRATEGIES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, AT GUELPH ON OCTOBER 27. IN THAT SPEECH, THE PM SUGGESTED THE NEED FOR AN INJECTION OF HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL ENERGY TO SPEED THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS: ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION, AND ON MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, HE NOTED THAT RHETORIC COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME A SUBSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY.

9. IN A FURTHER SPEECH IN MONTREAL ON NOVEMBER 13, THE PRIME MINISTER MADE FIVE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS:

- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FORUM FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF GLOBAL LIMITS ON THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THOSE FIVE STATES WHICH POSSESS THEM,
- SHORING UP OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, TO DISCOURAGE THE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- RAISING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IN EUROPE BY REACHING AGREEMENT ON A BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES (MBFR)

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- GIVING POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT, AND
- REACHING AGREEMENT ON A SERIES OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO "SUFFOCATE" THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW KINDS OF DESTABILIZING WEAPONS (SUCH AS ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO OPERATE AT HIGH ALTITUDE, HIGHLY MOBILE NEW ICBM'S, AND ANY NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WHICH CANNOT BE VERIFIED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS),

10. IN PURSUIT OF THIS INITIATIVE, THE PRIME MINISTER EMBARKED ON A COMPREHENSIVE ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WITH WORLD LEADERS, DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE THEIR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AND TO ELICIT THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE SPECIFIC MEASURES ENUMERATED.

(D) NATO COMMUNIQUE AND DECLARATION

11. THE DECEMBER MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY FURTHER TO SOUND OUT INFLUENTIAL DECISION-MAKERS AND TO TEST THEIR REACTIONS TO THE CANADIAN PROPOSALS. I FOUND ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS VERY RECEPTIVE TO MY APPEAL, ON BEHALF OF CANADA, THAT THEY INVOLVE THEMSELVES MORE DIRECTLY IN FINDING

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SOLUTIONS TO EAST/WEST PROBLEMS. THE EVIDENCE FOR THIS WAS CLEAR IN THE AGREEMENTS REACHED ON THAT OCCASION:

- MINISTERS ISSUED A SPECIAL "BRUSSELS DECLARATION" IN WHICH THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR RESPECT FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S "LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS" AND REITERATED EARLIER PLEDGES TO SEEK SECURITY "ON THE BASIS OF A BALANCE OF FORCES AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL"; BUT THEY ALSO AFFIRMED THEIR INTENTION TO DO THEIR "UTMOST TO SUSTAIN A SAFE AND PEACEFUL FUTURE" AND TO WORK WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WARSAW PACT STATES TO ACHIEVE A BALANCED AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP AND "GENUINE DETENTE". THE DECLARATION CLOSED WITH AN APPEAL FOR "AN OPEN, COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE".
- SECONDLY, MINISTERS ALSO UNDERTOOK TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE THEMSELVES IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND TO "REVIEW THE STATE OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS" TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY COULD BE MOVED FORWARD.
- THIRDLY, THEY AGREED PERSONALLY TO LEAD THEIR RESPECTIVE DELEGATIONS AT THE OPENING OF THE STOCKHOLM SECURITY CONFERENCE, AND



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FOURTHLY, THEY COMMISSIONED THE NATO COUNCIL AT THE LEVEL OF AMBASSADORS TO REVIEW THE CURRENT STATE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND TO REPORT TO THE NEXT FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON WHAT ACTIONS MIGHT BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THOSE RELATIONS.

12. SUCH A HIGH DEGREE OF CONSENSUS WAS REMARKABLE, GIVEN THE AGITATED STATE OF POLITICAL DEBATE IN EUROPE OVER THE ISSUE OF INF DEPLOYMENT. IT ATTESTS TO THE WIDESPREAD CONCERN ALLIES SHARE WITH US ABOUT EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

(E) THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

13. THE 1975 HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WHICH WAS NEGOTIATED AT GREAT LENGTH, SOUGHT TO LAY DOWN SOME BASIC GROUND RULES FOR "SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE". THESE GROUND RULES, IT IS OFTEN OVERLOOKED, RELATED NOT ONLY TO HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN CONTACTS AND COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES; BUT ALSO TO MILITARY COOPERATION. THE RULES PRESCRIBED FOR THIS LATTER CATEGORY WERE MODEST ONES, ESSENTIALLY CONFINED TO RECIPROCAL NOTIFICATION OF LARGE MILITARY MANOEUVRES. HOWEVER, AT THE MOST RECENT OF THE GENERAL CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCES IN MADRID, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED INTER ALIA TO CONVENE A SPECIAL CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM TO DEVELOP AND EXPAND ON THE REGIME OF

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MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES LAID DOWN IN 1975, AS A MEANS OF REDUCING SUSPICIONS AND MAKING ARMS REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE EASIER TO ACHIEVE.

14. WITH THE INTERRUPTION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AT THE END OF LAST YEAR, AND A SOVIET THREAT NOT TO RESUME TALKS HANGING OVER THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA, GREAT HOPES WERE BEING PLACED ON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THAT THE CONFERENCE GOT OFF TO A GOOD START, AND THE WISDOM OF THE DECISION WHICH NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS TOOK IN BRUSSELS TO MEET IN STOCKHOLM ON THE EVE OF THE CONFERENCE AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INITIAL DEBATE,

15. IT ALSO PROVIDED A RARE AND FORTUITOUS OCCASION FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS FROM EAST AND WEST TO MEET AT A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TIME IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER.

16. IN MY SPEECH AT STOCKHOLM, I MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:

- ACRIMONIOUS RHETORIC IS FUTILE, AND THERE IS A NEED TO RESTORE AND DEEPEN DIALOGUE.

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- THE SOVIET DECISION TO SUSPEND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WAS MOST REGRETTABLE AND WE URGE THEIR RESUMPTION AT THE EARLIEST MOMENT.
- THE TASK AT HAND IS "TO FIND WAYS OF REASSURING EACH OTHER ABOUT WHAT WE INTEND TO DO (AND) NOT TO DO".
- THIS REQUIRES, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE, AND THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OFFERS SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY IN AN ESPECIALLY APPROPRIATE WAY SINCE IT LINKS POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONFIDENCE BUILDING.
- ACCORDINGLY, THE CONFERENCE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO FAIL, IT MUST AVOID REHEARSING OLD GRIEVANCES, AND IT MUST ADOPT A BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON PRACTICAL MEANS OF ACHIEVING (A) "MORE OPENNESS ABOUT BASIC MILITARY INFORMATION (B) EARLIER NOTICE OF A WIDER RANGE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES (C) MANDATORY RATHER THAN VOLUNTARY EXCHANGES OF OBSERVERS AT IMPORTANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND (D) WAYS TO VERIFY ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED."

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- THE KEY TO SUCCESS IS THAT MINISTERS BE PREPARED TO INTERVENE WHENEVER NECESSARY TO ENSURE FORWARD MOVEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE.

17. WESTERN NATIONS ARE TODAY TABLING IN STOCKHOLM PROPOSALS ON A SPECIFIC PACKAGE OF "SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES", WHICH GO SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND ANYTHING FOUND IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

18. THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ALSO PROVIDED ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS FROM A NUMBER OF ALLIED, NEUTRAL AND WARSAW PACT STATES. IN ALL INSTANCES I DETECTED A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO OUR CONCERNS. FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, WITH WHOM I HAD A MEETING, PRESENTED ME WITH AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF CURRENT TENSION, MUCH OF WHICH I DISAGREED WITH. BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION WAS NOT A GOOD ONE AND HE APPLAUDED OUR EFFORTS AT CORRECTING IT.

#### RESULTS TO DATE

19. REVERSING TRENDS SET BY THE DRIFT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL EVENTS IS NOT AN OVERNIGHT PROJECT, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS OF CHANGE. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE OFFERING A FULL ACCOUNTING IN DUE COURSE, BUT THE FOLLOWING POSITIVE ELEMENTS CAN BE NOTED.



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- THE RESULTS OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING NOTED ABOVE,
- PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ HAVE EXPRESSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND ME THEIR CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE NEED TO REBUILD A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THEIR SPEECHES LAST WEEK, IN WASHINGTON AND STOCKHOLM RESPECTIVELY,
- PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HAS PUBLICLY EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEWS, NOTING IN A PRESS INTERVIEW THIS WEEKEND THE IMPORTANCE OF MORE CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND MORE AND BETTER MEASURES TO ENHANCE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE,
- OTHER NATO LEADERS HAVE VOICED SIMILAR CONCERNS,
- PREMIER ZHAO SPOKE ALONG SIMILAR LINES DURING HIS VISIT TO OTTAWA AND AGAIN ON HIS DEPARTURE FROM VANCOUVER,
- COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, IN THEIR GOA DECLARATION ON NOVEMBER 27, WELCOMED THE PRIME MINISTER'S CALL "FOR A NEW POLITICAL DIMENSION IN THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY" AND DECLARED THEIR SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORTS "TO RESTORE ACTIVE POLITICAL CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION AMONG ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS",


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## CONCLUSION

20. WE HAVE EXPENDED GREAT EFFORTS, AND WE HAVE ACHIEVED SOME PROGRESS. IT IS A QUESTION OF PERSEVERING. THE NEED NOW IS FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO RESPOND MORE POSITIVELY THAN IT HAS TO DATE, TO RECOGNIZE A GREATER SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR MOVING EAST/WEST RELATIONS ONTO A MORE COOPERATIVE PLANE, TO TONE DOWN ITS RHETORIC, AND TO RAISE ITS EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

21. TO THIS END, I REPEAT WHAT I HAVE ALREADY SAID OUTSIDE THE HOUSE. I HAVE NEVER BEEN MORE CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR WESTERN POLITICAL LEADERS TO OPEN UP NEW LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO THE EAST AND FOR SOVIET LEADERS TO DO LIKEWISE.

# NEWS RELEASE



# COMMUNIQUE

No. 9

January 24, 1984

*Mr. McMeer  
to see + file*

## YURI ANDROPOV ANSWERS «PRAVDA»

Moscow, January 24 -- TASS.

Yuri Andropov's answers to questions of the newspaper «Pravda» follow:

Q. Contentions that nothing alarming is supposedly happening in the international situation and that in general the world has become «a safer place» in the present conditions, have lately been circulated in the leading circles of the United States and NATO. Is that so?

A. There are no grounds for such a conclusion. The main causes for the dangerous tension in the world, which I have already had the opportunity to speak about, have not been removed. Has Europe acquired greater security with the commencement of the deployment of American missiles? Of course not. The nuclear danger has grown. This is not only our estimation. This is clearly indicated by the acute alarm of millions of people in Europe. Neither have the American missiles on the European continent consolidated the security of the United States itself. Having set itself the aim of tipping the military balance in its favour the United States compelled us to take reply measures.

The appearance of American missiles in Europe increased not only the military but also the political tension. The talks designed to limit and substantially reduce nuclear arms have been torpedoed. Inter-state relations are in a state of dangerous tension.

The leaders of the United States, the American administration, bear full responsibility for this turn of events. It is borne also by the governments of NATO countries who contrary to the will of their own peoples made their territory available for the American missiles.

Has the world become a safer place now that in the Middle East American soldiers have joined the Israeli aggressors in fighting against the Arabs, and United States warships and aviation are turning Lebanese towns and settlements into rubble?

The situation is tense in Central America where the United States administration is encroaching on the independence of sovereign states. Those who contend that supposedly «nothing dangerous» is happening in the world apparently want to erase

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from the memory of people also , American aggression against Grenada. For it is clear that the United States wants to break the power of the people and return by force of arms the hated dictators who are frontmen of the United States. In the White House it is a habit to call all this a «struggle for human rights». It is impossible to imagine anything more cynical.

Imperialist brigandage is perpetrated also in other areas of the world. Such is the real situation. It is acute and dangerous. It is impermissible to underestimate it.

So, one may ask, what is the reason why the present situation in the world is being deliberately distorted in the statements of American leaders? First of all to try to dispel the concern of the peoples, that has been mounting with every day, over Washington's militaristic policy and to undercut the growing resistance to this policy.

It is a fact of unquestionably great importance that people everywhere are realising better the danger to peace and from whence it emanates. The struggle of millions of people for peace is another objective reality of our time.

Q. The President of the United States recently spoke out in favour of a Soviet-American dialogue. In his speech it sounded as follows: «Strength and dialogue go hand in hand». What is your attitude to this?

A. There is no need to convince us of the usefulness and expedience of dialogue. This is our policy, but the dialogue should be conducted on an equal footing and not from a position of strength, as is proposed by Ronald Reagan. The dialogue should not be conducted for the sake of dialogue. It should be directed at the attainment of concrete accords. It should be conducted honestly and no attempts should be made to use it for selfish aims.

The American leadership, as all signs indicate, has not given up its intentions to conduct talks with us from positions of strength, from positions of threats and pressure. We resolutely reject such an approach. In general, attempts to conduct «power diplomacy» towards us are hopeless.

Our approach to the idea of conducting talks for the sake of talks is absolutely the same. Alas, we have already encountered such an approach of the present United States administration. I would like to remind about the Geneva talks on European medium-range nuclear arms. It is an open secret now that for almost two years the representatives of the United States in Geneva have been, so to say, beating the air. In the meantime the people in Washington were preparing for the practical deployment of new first-strike nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

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We warned many times what this would bring about. The American side with its own hands broke up the talks in Geneva and inflicted much damage to the dialogue between the USSR and the United States. Now the President of the United States declares that the United States supposedly is ready to resume the talks and return to Geneva.

The question arises, is it that the American side has realised what it has done and, desiring a dialogue, is prepared to change its negative approach? No, this has not happened. The president's speech does not contain a single new idea, any new proposals either on the question of limiting nuclear arms in Europe or on other questions. There is no sign of this in the American position.

I have already said and I want to emphasise again that we are prepared to use any real chance for conducting talks with the aim of attaining practical accords on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. We will not go to talks for the sake of talks and we will not pretend that in Western Europe there are no new missiles targeted on us and our allies. This game is not for us.

At the same time I want to confirm that the Soviet Union is prepared to solve the problem of nuclear arms in Europe only on a constructive, mutually acceptable basis. This requires only one thing -- before it is too late the United States and NATO should display readiness to return to the situation that existed before the commencement of the deployment of the Pershing-2s and Cruise missiles. We are raising this question before the United States and its NATO allies because we want to avoid yet another spiral of the arms race, this time on a new, still more dangerous level which leads to a growth of tension and instability in Europe.

It is by practical deeds that we will judge whether the United States has serious intentions to conduct a dialogue with us.

Q. What other problems could become a subject of the dialogue?

A. The Soviet leadership is convinced that there exist possibilities for a serious discussion of a number of problems the solution of which would undoubtedly improve the situation in the world and Soviet-American relations. We have set forth a broad complex of concrete proposals and initiatives directed at strengthening peace and international security. They remain in force.

For instance, were the United States, as the Soviet Union has done, assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons -- already this would have a substantial influence on the international climate, on the atmosphere of our relations. What would this mean in practice? That the two most powerful nuclear

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powers refuse to use nuclear arms against each other. This means that there will be neither the first nor subsequent nuclear strikes.

Were the NATO countries to consent to the proposal of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty not to use military force against each other this, too, would seriously raise the degree of trust in Europe and in the whole world. In practice this would mean that the opposing military groupings renounce the use of force for the solution of outstanding issues that arise. A broad vista for talks would be opened. Quite a lot could be done in this respect also by the conference that has just begun in Stockholm and whose first stage is precisely devoted to the drafting of confidence-building measures and measures of strengthening security.

The solution of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space should not be put off. Otherwise mankind will confront a new threat of a scope that it is even difficult to imagine now. The systems of new weapons that are being developed in the United States are making such a prospect quite real. The Soviet Union has made concrete proposals on how to ward off the danger of the use of force from outer space and in outer space, and calls on the United States to start talks on this question promptly.

Given readiness on the part of the West it is possible to commence the practical solution of the questions discussed at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. We have long placed our concrete proposals on this score on the negotiating table. They offer a quick approach to agreement given, of course, that there is a mutual striving to reach accord.

Within the complex of measures directed at lessening the war danger we offer the United States as a beginning, a simple and at the same time sufficiently effective step -- to freeze nuclear arms. Efforts directed at the speediest reaching of agreement on substantial limitations and radical reductions of these arms should be stepped up. The peoples have a right to expect of the United States government a display of common sense and realism on these questions.

What is needed first of all for the attainment of agreement on all these questions is desire and political will on the part of the United States and other NATO countries. In turn this would create a favourable situation for tackling other questions as well, moving from one to another. We see in this an earnest way to achieve success for the policy of preserving peace.

It is only advance along this road, and not hopes set on strength and not rhetorics that can make the world in which we live a really safer place. We expect of the government of the United States of America practical deeds and readiness to make precisely such a choice. This will find an appropriate response from us.

DPM/SSEA'S HSC SPEECH IN

MF

THRONE SPEECH DEBATE 24 JAN.

Malaysian  
Paper Mill

Minister Regan announced during the recent visit of the Malaysian PM that a \$144 million financing agreement had been entered into to support a sale to Malaysia of paper products. Saskatchewan Member Ray Hnatyshyn was worried about the reliability of the consortium involved; Minister Lunley assured him the EDC would not have entered into an agreement if it were not confident of the firm.

Throne  
Speech  
Debate

The DPM/SSEA spoke in the Throne Speech debate on Jan 24. His remarks dealt exclusively with peace and security and the peace initiative and in the questioning from Members Stevens, Jewett and Ogle that followed, he said he was "open to any suggestions regarding a reference on the question of East-West relations or peace, security, disarmament and peace-keeping" to SCEAND. As for an ambassador for disarmament, the DPM said the vacancy would be filled but in the meantime, it was not being neglected, indeed "it has never had the impetus it has received in the last few months." Central America was raised and the DPM said "the surest way to bring about peace and security in that part of the world is to deal with the basic economic and social problems and the political problems. For that reason we have argued against third party military intervention. I have made these points to Mr. Shultz on more than one occasion. Our policy is not identical to that of the US." The text of Mr. MacEachen's remarks follows:

DPM/SSEA  
On Peace  
Initiative

Central  
America

**Hon. Allan J. MacEachen (Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs):** Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) leaves late today to pursue his efforts for peace and security. Just over the weekend I returned from the Conference on Security and Disarmament in Stockholm. I was pleased to have associated with me at least meeting a number of my fellow parliamentarians, including the Right Hon. Member for Yellowhead (Mr. Clark), the Hon. Member for Thunder Bay-Atikokan (Mr. McRae) and the Hon. Member for New Westminster-Coquitlam (Miss Jewett). It is in the context of these events that I would like to make some comments to the House as we pursue this debate on the Address in Reply.

May I begin by drawing attention to the fact that it is well-known to all Members that since the period toward the end of the 1970s there has been a steady deterioration in what we describe as East-West relations, or the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the NATO

countries and the Warsaw Pact countries. It became obvious that quite a number of contradictions had developed within the concept of détente. On the Soviet side, that concept in its view was not incompatible with an arms build-up and with different treatment of human rights from what the West had expected. Certainly the events in Afghanistan and Poland had their own impact upon the state of East-West relations. Indeed, by last summer, relations had deteriorated so badly between the United States and the Soviet Union that high-level dialogue had virtually ceased. That had not even happened during the bombing by the United States of North Viet Nam. Meanwhile, the allies in NATO countries developed their minimum response to the Soviet military build-up, particularly the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II missiles in response to the deployment of the SS-20s by the Soviet Union. That occurred in the face of worry in many countries, a worry based upon the fear that these developments were inexorably leading to military confrontation and possibly war.

• (1700)

That is the state of affairs which is well known to us. It was addressed, for example, last May at Williamsburg by the seven leaders of the industrialized countries. I mention that meeting because it was the first time that these leaders at their summit addressed international security questions. At the summit at Williamsburg they issued a declaration which developed from a suggestion that had been made by Canada and carried through the meeting by the Prime Minister. That declaration was quite important because it contained two very important elements which have been, in a sense, the basis of policy on the part of Canada certainly and of some other countries since the Williamsburg Summit. The leaders at that time undertook to maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat and to ensure peace. That was, in a sense, the deterrent aspect of the policy.

The second aspect was that the summit leaders undertook to devote their full political resources to reducing the threat of war. That was a very important message carried from Williamsburg throughout the world, that the leaders of all these countries had determined that their full political resources were to be used in that direction. We all know that a month later that basic message was endorsed in the communiqué by the NATO foreign ministers at their meeting in Paris.

We had this double-track policy very much on our minds when we decided to accept the American request to test the Cruise missile in Canada. When we made that decision, we determined at the same time that we would carry forward as much as we possibly could the political commitment which had been made at Williamsburg. On the day we took the decision on the Cruise missile, I wrote to Secretary Shultz and said that we were prepared to approve the testing as a contribution to alliance solidarity in the negotiation of a verifiable agreement on medium-ranged nuclear weapons. We also recognized an even greater obligation to join in the search for a secure peace. I also noted in that letter to Secretary Shultz, which was made public, that it was the Government's firm intention to redouble

its efforts in the coming months to contribute to the progress and eventual success of current negotiations.

We know the series of negotiations that were under way at that time. I believe it is within that context that we can understand the Prime Minister's efforts, particularly the launching of his peace effort in his speech at Guelph on October 27. The Prime Minister made five specific proposals in that speech, but the main message, which he underlined, was the necessity for a jolt or an injection of high-level political energy to speed the course of negotiations on nuclear arms control, on conventional arms reduction and on military confidence-building measures. That was the main thrust of the Prime Minister's message, to try to get a jolt of energy into a system which had become virtually paralysed, where dialogue had virtually ceased and where rhetoric had been built up almost as the main instrument of diplomacy.

I will not mention all the elements of the Prime Minister's speech, but I will refer to two aspects of it. One concerns his suggestion of raising the nuclear threshold in Europe by reaching agreement on a balance of conventional forces in Europe. There was good reason why the Prime Minister should have referred to the Mutual Force Reduction talks, the MBFR talks as they are called. There was good reason for his mention of them because they had been ongoing for almost ten years and had not yet reached the results which had been hoped for initially. The second point in that speech which I want to mention was his desire to give additional or real political impetus to the Stockholm conference on military confidence-building measures and disarmament. I mention these two aspects of the Prime Minister's speech, namely the MBFR and the Stockholm conference, because they have a lot to do with the current political dialogue between the East and the West.



Canada-East German  
Disarmament  
Group

The Official Opposition was also troubled by the establishment of a disarmament group to meet East German officials. The DPM/SSEA told Sinclair Stevens on Thursday (Feb 2) that "any talks that now take place between the Soviet Union and the United States and Members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries would be thoroughly consistent with policy established at the December meeting of NATO" to the effect that "they were prepared for an open and comprehensive dialogue."

Canada-US  
Relations  
Niagara River

Acid Rain

Garrison  
Diversion

Water

Pacific  
Salmon

There are a number of irritants troubling Canada-US relations. Many concern environmental issues, such as pollution in the Niagara River. On Monday (Jan 23), Minister Caccia told Joe Reid that his dept was "examining the elements" of the January 10 court settlement reached between Hooker (now Occidental) Chemical and the State of New York on the S-area dumpsite. On Friday (Jan 27) the same Minister told Stan Darling that he would continue to make "representations" to the US on behalf of Canadians concerned about acid rain. The Minister said he was distressed by Pres. Reagan's announcement in the State of the Union address that the US would approve only \$55 million for further study of the issue. The following Wednesday, Minister Pepin promised Lee Clark that the only alternative in the Garrison Diversion issue was "to keep on pressing the case and trying to appeal to the intelligence, common sense, or whatever other virtue the Americans have." To forestall a water crisis, Environment Minister Caccia appointed a three-man task force headed by Peter Pearse to recommend a water strategy within 18 months. The task force will look at pollution, supply projections, flooding and drainage and the idea of exporting water to the USA. Negotiations on a Pacific Salmon Interception Agreement broke down on Jan 27. On Monday (Jan 31) Benno Friesen urged the Govt "to get serious about negotiating with the US." Fisheries Minister De Bané told a news conference "we cannot go back to the negotiating table until we receive clear evidence that the US side has decided to be practical."

CIA  
Experiments

The media, and especially the CBC's Fifth Estate, have recently highlighted the experiments, partially financed by the Central Intelligence Agency, which took place in the 1950's on Canadian citizens at Montreal's Allan Institute. Among the victims who have suffered permanent damage was the wife of Winnipeg Member David Orlikow. On Tuesday (Jan 24) he asked the DPM what the Dept was doing to seek remuneration for the victims. The DPM/SSEA advised him he had instructed officials "to pay particular attention to this problem with a view to seeking a resolution. We have already made representations to the State Dept...I think the first step is to try to seek a bilateral settlement with the US...There are certain documents that would be helpful which are not available for a number of reasons...we are certainly exploring the international law on this subject and we think there is a basis by which we might consider taking action in the International Court."

KAL  
Compensation

Another set of victims for whom Members have urged compensation are the families of those killed when the Soviets shot the KAL jetliner down in September. On Jan 23, the DPM/SSEA advised Sinclair Stevens that he had considered providing a cash advance to the families, but "for the present our main purpose is to put pressure on the Soviet Union to provide the cash." The DPM said he had discussed this subject with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm and "suggested that these matters ought to be further discussed by officials."

Canada-Japan  
Auto  
Talks

The continuing negotiations with Japan on auto imports is a continuing trade interest of Members. On Monday (Jan 23) Minister Regan told Derek Blackburn "there has been a substantial recovery in relation to the number of vehicles sold by the Canadian car industry in 1983" in part because of the Canada-Japan auto agreement. Future agreements would, in part, depend on the investment the Japanese make in the Canadian market.

Wheat  
Cartel?

Lorne Nystrom is worried about the effect of the Argentine decision to undercut our price for wheat by \$50 a tonne, and on Jan 26 he urged negotiations aimed at an international wheat agreement. Minister Whelan dismissed the idea, saying that to emulate the Argentines would mean 200% inflation and "distress selling."

The December meeting of the NATO foreign ministers held in Brussels offered an opportunity for the ministers and the governments represented there to make a response to the then current situation. Deployment had begun. The talks between the Soviet Union and the United States had been broken off or were about to be broken off, and we were meeting in that particular difficult context. It is true that a number of Parliaments in Europe had endorsed deployment very strongly, but it is also true that public opinion was greatly concerned at the difficult situation which existed. I think the NATO meeting was very important. The first thing the ministers did was to issue what was described as the Brussels Declaration. A communiqué was also issued but there was a shorter document called the Brussels Declaration which was intended to summarize the attitude of the West at the present time toward eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the Brussels Declaration the ministers acknowledged their respect for the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests and reiterated earlier pledges to seek security on the basis of a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. They also affirmed their intention to do their utmost to sustain a safe and peaceful future and to work with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states to achieve a balanced and constructive relationship based, as the

Brussels Declaration said, on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity.

• (1710)

I thought these were all very important concepts that were declared by the NATO governments to the world as the basis of a future relationship with eastern countries. The ministers closed with an appeal for an open, comprehensive, political dialogue. That is what the Prime Minister seeks, and I am sure it is sought by every Member of the House of Commons and every Canadian who is concerned about the future of the world and the necessity for asserting ourselves in the interests of peace.

The second statement that the ministers made dealt with MBFR negotiations stalled now for 10 years, with eastern proposals on the table but with no comprehensive western response as yet. The ministers agreed to review the state of negotiations and determine whether they could be moved forward. It is to be hoped they can be resumed later this year and that at that time western NATO ministers will be able to make a response to the eastern proposals that would ensure progress. At least, that is the view of Canada. It is also the view of Canada that at a certain point the ministers might consider their own presence at these talks. The circumstances would have to be right. The possibilities for some progress would have to be assured, but it seems to me this is another forum in which a jolt of political energy could usefully be made evident.

A further decision taken at the December meeting had to do with the Stockholm conference. It was agreed that the conference should be launched at the ministerial level; that politicians ought to attend; that it ought not to be left to bureaucrats and ambassadors, no matter how important they are, but that politicians ought to go in order to underline the importance they attach to a comprehensive dialogue in the interests of peace. That was decided by NATO ministers and, as a result, the eastern European ministers, including Mr. Gromyko, were present at the Stockholm conference. I may say a word about that later but I think all those present would agree that it was important that ministers attend, that politicians attend. Not only were there speeches, there were numerous bilateral dialogues that took place on the margins of the Stockholm meeting.

At NATO the fourth important decision that was taken was to conduct a review of the current state of East-West relations. That review was first suggested by the foreign minister of Belgium, Mr. Tindemans, who referred back to the Harmel report and thought the political aspects of it ought to be revisited and that NATO had to review, at least in my view he was attempting to ask NATO to update, its assessment of the current situation in view of the deployment and other developments, and to look to the future as to what ought to be on the agenda of East-West relations. That review has to be carefully conducted and it has to be done in a way that will also give a message of importance to the world.

I came away greatly encouraged by the results of the NATO meeting. NATO ministers were confident in the unity of the alliance even though they realized it had been put under great stress in the past year. The efforts to weaken the alliance had backfired and, as a result, it was stronger and more confident than ever. It was therefore in a position to give some very strong messages to the world, especially to the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, that it was prepared to engage in what I have described as an open, comprehensive political dialogue.

I will now say a word about the Stockholm conference, Mr. Speaker. It arose out of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the subsequent Madrid conference where it was agreed that it would be important to convene a special conference in Stockholm. The object of this conference would be to develop and expand on the regime of military confidence building measures laid down in 1975 as a means of reducing suspicion and making arms reductions in Europe on the conventional side easier to achieve. Stockholm was important because it occurred at a time of de-tension when all other negotiations were in suspense—START, INF and the MBFR. There was no East-West forum and Stockholm was the occasion when some sort of dialogue was to be resumed.

I do not want to bore Hon. Members by repeating the speech I gave at Stockholm but I think I should refer to one or two points.

I certainly expressed the view that acrimonious rhetoric at this time was futile and that we needed to deepen and restore civilized dialogue; that we should make every effort to ensure that this conference succeeded; that we have to avoid rehearsing old grievances; that we have to adopt a businesslike approach and we have to register some practical achievements. These practical achievements could include more openness about basic military information; earlier notice of a wider range of military activities; mandatory rather than voluntary exchanges of observers at important military activities, and ways to verify any agreements reached.

I made another point that I think is important for politicians like us, and that is, that we should not let this conference drop out of sight and leave it entirely to officials. At a certain point ministers ought to be prepared to return to the conference and to ensure that it continues to have the political momentum that I think it achieved that first week in Stockholm.

Bob Ogle  
Bill Yurko

Other Members have also spoken on foreign policy. Father Bob Ogle called for a moratorium on uranium mining in Saskatchewan because it is fueling weapons. Bill Yurko praised the PM's initiative, saying that he "is doing what destiny and geography has dictated that he do."

Sinclair  
Stevens  
And  
Peace  
Initiative

Sinclair Stevens spoke skeptically about the peace initiative, saying he would welcome hearing about the specific steps that would bring about the "miracle" of peace. He was also uncomplimentary about the Govt's effort to gain compensation for the families of the KAL victims. The Tory External Affairs critic called for a statement on Grenada and the Middle East and a revision of the foreign policy review that would bring Canada from the "silly sixties" to the "dramatic and realistic eighties." The review should include, Mr. Stevens argued, a mention of trade. In answer to questions he told Pauline Jewett that Mr. Mulroney meant "exactly what we say" about directing the SSEA to go further in the non-first-strike policy by urging consideration of such a policy by NATO "so that if non-first-strike policy is already agreed to by most nations, it can be confirmed as a policy at the NATO level." As for unilateral disarmament, Mr. Stevens said:

With respect to the question of unilateral disarmament, I think that history would show that any nation that has tended to disarm quickly in the hope that its rival or possible enemy will also disarm, has always been disappointed.

Over the Christmas period I had an opportunity to read two works of history, and I found it remarkable that at the turn of the 1800s Napoleon used exactly the same argument we often hear today, that is, "Let us lay down our arms in the name of peace". At that time Britain responded by reducing its defence budget by 70 per cent and it mothballed much of its fleet. We know what happened. It was not until Waterloo that Napoleon was eventually stopped.

Hitler used exactly the same terminology of "let us have peace". He always made it clear that he would be willing to disarm if only the other side would disarm. Unfortunately, most of the western world did exactly that, leading up to 1939, and we know the struggle that ensued.

I would say that the program which has worked for 38 years in keeping the world out of a major war should be continued at least until we have a better solution. That program consists of maintaining reasonable deterrents in the face of a militant enemy.

Pauline Jewett  
And Peace  
Initiative

The NDP foreign policy critic also spoke largely to the peace initiative. She urged Members to read a two-part series on arms control in the New Yorker by Jonathen Schell on the Fate of the Earth (Jan 2,9). Having attended the Stockholm conference, she related several conversations she had there, including those with the women from Greenham Common. Calling once again for the end of cruise testing, she claimed Canada's subservience to the US had destroyed the peace initiative.

One of my hopes and expectations was not only to see some movement in thought and action toward disarmament, but also to be assured that Canada's peace efforts, which are at the moment embodied in the efforts of the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau), were known, understood and appreciated and that we would be encouraged to have the Prime Minister continue them.

• (1710)

My expectations and hopes. It was dashed. No one made any mention in the formal speeches of the Prime Minister's initiative and no one in private conversations made any mention of them either. I got wondering why this was the case since we are very interested in them and most Canadian journalists are too. I talked about this at some length with the Swedish Prime Minister and with others.

I think the reason the Prime Minister's peace initiative was not discussed, was not referred to, unless one referred to it first in private conversation, is that as far as other NATO countries are concerned they have also been taking a great many initiatives—not so well publicized in their countries as the Prime Minister's has been in Canada—a great. Indeed, the Federal Republic of Germany was the country that was chiefly responsible for the presence of political ministers at the Stockholm

conference. It was the Federal Republic of Germany which was chiefly responsible for encouraging Secretary of State Shultz to attend the conference, a very important initiative. Other members of NATO have taken other initiatives. For example, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is going to Hungary this week, which is one of the reasons our Prime Minister is not going there. I could name many more initiatives. This peace initiative is not something that is simply being carried on by the Canadian Prime Minister. On the contrary, there is a good deal of feeling that the initiatives taken by others within the NATO Alliance have been having more effect and are, therefore, the subject of more discussion.

On the part of the Warsaw Pact countries there is the fairly strong attitude, and I think a justified one as well, about Canadian policy and Canadian actions. For instance, our policy on the testing of the Cruise missile and our votes at the United Nations against nuclear freeze resolutions, and so on, all of which pretty well follow the majority of NATO countries, have placed Canada fairly clearly in the eyes of the Warsaw Pact nations on one side of the issues. This is also to some extent the attitude existing among the neutral and

MASTER

FILE

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THE APPROACH TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS

Our Ambassador in Prague, Mr. David Peel, has offered the following advice:

"It is important to deal with the Czechoslovaks in their own right, even though we know they are the most unlikely of all East Europeans to express a view that does not conform to the Moscow line. This is one of Europe's sad realities.

This will be the first time the Prime Minister has taken his initiative to a member of the opposing alliance. Czechoslovak leaders obviously do not share our underlying assumptions and perceptions, let alone our analyses of the present situation. They do, however, share some of our concerns about it and the dangers it poses. While we can attempt an objective view and see that some of the blame rests on each superpower, even that both have made mistakes, leaders here see the entire responsibility for current tension as resting with the USA and NATO. They will not be shy about saying so. Indeed, they will have to say so. It would thus be important for the Prime Minister in his opening statement to do even more than usual to focus discussion on the future.

The Prime Minister's hosts will be very pleased that he has come to Prague. They will understand why, but will derive some satisfaction from the recognition the visit gives them. This is not a fantasy; the question of the legitimacy of East Europe's Communist regimes still bothers them. They will not, however, be likely to let this satisfaction deflect them from putting their case. They will probably focus on INF and how the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles has changed the situation in Europe and on the Prague Declaration, unanswered by NATO, as the centrepiece of the Warsaw Pact's sincere efforts to improve it. I recommend that the Prime Minister mention both these subjects in his introductory remarks, as they touch the core of Czechoslovak concerns.

Both Strougal and Husak are confident and well-informed. Both will give the impression of being candid and earnest in their concerns about world problems. Initially this will be according to formula. The Prime Minister may be able to draw them out with his intellectual challenge, but it would be surprising if either were to go as far as a sophisticated Soviet interlocutor might. They have too much at stake to allow themselves to get out of line. Thus I cannot predict a very stimulating discussion, although the Prime Minister's concern and sincerity will register with feeling.

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My own and most of my colleagues' experience of talking with Husak is limited to the presentation of credentials, where he is a welcoming, warm, friendly father figure - almost enough to make one forget how he had disposed of his enemies along the way. The approach might be from the overall view of the good of populations, the preservation of nations, with historical perspective - the future of the world. Husak has long experience of the Soviet Union and was on apparently good if not close terms with Brezhnev. His relations with Andropov are problematic. As the conversation progresses he might be pleased to be asked to speculate on the thinking of the USSR, but this would depend on the atmosphere. Despite his appearance as a benevolent elder statesman, he is a very tough man and knows how to get what he wants, even in conversation.

Strougal, with whom I have a little more personal experience, is pragmatic, sensible, down-to-earth, though no less convinced of the Party line. He is interested in economics and technological developments (and hockey) and the approach to him could be along more practical lines. His illness has made him appear tired and strained but he is completely alert and very well-informed. (He spoke to Eugene Whelan for 40 minutes without interruption and without notes on Canada-Czechoslovak relations and the state of the world.) It will be important if any exchange is to develop to keep interventions as short as possible - this is stating the obvious but Strougal does tend to run on. I think the Prime Minister may quite enjoy talking to him; he is receptive to ideas and responsive, within his frame of reference.

The Prime Minister will have a brief opportunity to chat with Strougal before they meet for conversations, which will probably be with the delegations facing each other across the table, although this could be modified if the Prime Minister wishes. Strougal will be present for the much less formal talk with Husak. The Prime Minister will thus perhaps want to vary his approach.

Both Husak (a Slovak) and Strougal (a Czech) will be pleased at a recognition in the historical sense of their nations and in a political sense of their country. Patriotism is important to all Czechoslovaks. But references to the first Republic, unless very general, would not be appreciated, though they would be understood. And of course any suggestion of using their nationalism to separate them from the USSR would be counterproductive."

*The Address—Mr. MacEachen*

ed jobs for himself and three other people. That is the kind of initiative we see in Canada.

If the Department of National Revenue received any direction from this Government, its auditor would have seen the ridiculous situation in which he was placing this young man and those who work for him. He would have seen that these people were going to be put out of work and added to the unemployment insurance rolls. He could have seen the drive that this man had, the initiative he had to get his business going. He was not prepared to listen to him.

People do not want welfare or unemployment insurance. I ask Hon. Members to stop and think about this for a minute. Just think if tomorrow you were told that you were out of a job and had to go on unemployment insurance. How could you face your wife and children? Imagine how this would undermine and individual's feeling of self-worth. Imagine how it would undermine someone's confidence to have to say "Daddy hasn't got a job" or "My spouse cannot support me; he is no longer the breadwinner, he is on unemployment insurance".

No wonder child abuse is increasing, as well as marriage breakdown. This is happening at a time when we have the resources, education and wherewithal. If only people would sit down together and work out their problems. We have had a confrontational government for the past six or seven years, not government by co-operation. The Prime Minister said over national television that co-operative federalism is dead. If co-operative federalism is dead, Canada is dead. We have not seen the last of separatist movements springing up on the East Coast, West Coast of central Canada.

In some areas that I represent, people are saying that if they do not soon get a fair shake, they are going to separate. They are ready to give it another chance, but not ready to do that indefinitely. We have the resources and we have educated people. We have people with enthusiasm, initiative and energy. What we need is a government that governs in a co-operative way, not by confrontation.

**Mr. Deputy Speaker:** Questions, comments?

**Hon. Allan J. MacEachen (Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs):** Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) leaves late today to pursue his efforts for peace and security. Just over the weekend I returned from the Conference on Security and Disarmament in Stockholm. I was pleased to have associated with me at least meeting a number of my fellow parliamentarians, including the Right Hon. Member for Yellowhead (Mr. Clark), the Hon. Member for Thunder Bay-Atikokan (Mr. McRae) and the Hon. Member for New Westminster-Coquitlam (Miss Jewett). It is in the context of these events that I would like to make some comments to the House as we pursue this debate on the Address in Reply.

May I begin by drawing attention to the fact that it is well-known to all Members that since the period toward the end of the 1970s there has been a steady deterioration in what we describe as East-West relations, or the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the NATO

countries and the Warsaw Pact countries. It became obvious that quite a number of contradictions had developed within the concept of détente. On the Soviet side, that concept in its view was not incompatible with an arms build-up and with different treatment of human rights from what the West had expected. Certainly the events in Afghanistan and Poland had their own impact upon the state of East-West relations. Indeed, by last summer, relations had deteriorated so badly between the United States and the Soviet Union that high-level dialogue had virtually ceased. That had not even happened during the bombing by the United States of North Viet Nam. Meanwhile, the allies in NATO countries developed their minimum response to the Soviet military build-up, particularly the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II missiles in response to the deployment of the SS-20s by the Soviet Union. That occurred in the face of worry in many countries, a worry based upon the fear that these developments were inexorably leading to military confrontation and possibly war.

• (1700)

That is the state of affairs which is well known to us. It was addressed, for example, last May at Williamsburg by the seven leaders of the industrialized countries. I mention that meeting because it was the first time that these leaders at their summit addressed international security questions. At the summit at Williamsburg they issued a declaration which developed from a suggestion that had been made by Canada and carried through the meeting by the Prime Minister. That declaration was quite important because it contained two very important elements which have been, in a sense, the basis of policy on the part of Canada certainly and of some other countries since the Williamsburg Summit. The leaders at that time undertook to maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat and to ensure peace. That was, in a sense, the deterrent aspect of the policy.

The second aspect was that the summit leaders undertook to devote their full political resources to reducing the threat of war. That was a very important message carried from Williamsburg throughout the world, that the leaders of all these countries had determined that their full political resources were to be used in that direction. We all know that a month later that basic message was endorsed in the communiqué by the NATO foreign ministers at their meeting in Paris.

We had this double-track policy very much on our minds when we decided to accept the American request to test the Cruise missile in Canada. When we made that decision, we determined at the same time that we would carry forward as much as we possibly could the political commitment which had been made at Williamsburg. On the day we took the decision on the Cruise missile, I wrote to Secretary Shultz and said that we were prepared to approve the testing as a contribution to alliance solidarity in the negotiation of a verifiable agreement on medium-ranged nuclear weapons. We also recognized an even greater obligation to join in the search for a secure peace. I also noted in that letter to Secretary Shultz, which was made public, that it was the Government's firm intention to redouble

its efforts in the coming months to contribute to the progress and eventual success of current negotiations.

We know the series of negotiations that were under way at that time. I believe it is within that context that we can understand the Prime Minister's efforts, particularly the launching of his peace effort in his speech at Guelph on October 27. The Prime Minister made five specific proposals in that speech, but the main message, which he underlined, was the necessity for a jolt or an injection of high-level political energy to speed the course of negotiations on nuclear arms control, on conventional arms reduction and on military confidence-building measures. That was the main thrust of the Prime Minister's message, to try to get a jolt of energy into a system which had become virtually paralysed, where dialogue had virtually ceased and where rhetoric had been built up almost as the main instrument of diplomacy.

I will not mention all the elements of the Prime Minister's speech, but I will refer to two aspects of it. One concerns his suggestion of raising the nuclear threshold in Europe by reaching agreement on a balance of conventional forces in Europe. There was good reason why the Prime Minister should have referred to the Mutual Balance Force Reduction talks, the MBFR talks as they are called. There was good reason for his mention of them because they had been ongoing for almost ten years and had not yet reached the results which had been hoped for initially. The second point in that speech which I want to mention was his desire to give additional or real political impetus to the Stockholm conference on military confidence-building measures and disarmament. I mention these two aspects of the Prime Minister's speech, namely the MBFR and the Stockholm conference, because they have a lot to do with the current political dialogue between the East and the West.

The December meeting of the NATO foreign ministers held in Brussels offered an opportunity for the ministers and the governments represented there to make a response to the then current situation. Deployment had begun. The talks between the Soviet Union and the United States had been broken off or were about to be broken off, and we were meeting in that particular difficult context. It is true that a number of Parliaments in Europe had endorsed deployment very strongly, but it is also true that public opinion was greatly concerned at the difficult situation which existed. I think the NATO meeting was very important. The first thing the ministers did was to issue what was described as the Brussels Declaration. A communiqué was also issued but there was a shorter document called the Brussels Declaration which was intended to summarize the attitude of the West at the present time toward eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the Brussels Declaration the ministers acknowledged their respect for the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests and reiterated earlier pledges to seek security on the basis of a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. They also affirmed their intention to do their utmost to sustain a safe and peaceful future and to work with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states to achieve a balanced and constructive relationship based, as the

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At NATO the fourth important decision that was taken was to conduct a review of the current state of East-West relations. That review was first suggested by the foreign minister of Belgium, Mr. Tindemans, who referred back to the Harmel report and thought the political aspects of it ought to be revisited and that NATO had to review, at least in my view he was attempting to ask NATO to update, its assessment of the current situation in view of the deployment and other developments, and to look to the future as to what ought to be on the agenda of East-West relations. That review has to be carefully conducted and it has to be done in a way that will also give a message of importance to the world.



*The Address—Mr. MacEachen*

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I will now say a word about the Stockholm conference, Mr. Speaker. It arose out of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the subsequent Madrid conference where it was agreed that it would be important to convene a special conference in Stockholm. The object of this conference would be to develop and expand on the regime of military confidence building measures laid down in 1975 as a means of reducing suspicion and making arms reductions in Europe on the conventional side easier to achieve. Stockholm was important because it occurred at a time of de-tension when all other negotiations were in suspense—START, INF and the MBFR. There was no East-West forum and Stockholm was the occasion when some sort of dialogue was to be resumed.

I do not want to bore Hon. Members by repeating the speech I gave at Stockholm but I think I should refer to one or two points.

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I made another point that I think is important for politicians like us, and that is, that we should not let this conference drop out of sight and leave it entirely to officials. At a certain point ministers ought to be prepared to return to the conference and to ensure that it continues to have the political momentum that I think it achieved that first week in Stockholm.

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear!

• (1720)

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Speaker, before I begin my own remarks, I would like to put one or two questions to the Minister. First, I would ask the Minister if he has given any thought to making a reference to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence—whose illustrious Chairman is sitting almost beside the Minister—so that we may have a parliamentary discussion in that forum on the very topic to which the Minister has been referring today in his remarks. Can we have that reference at an early opportunity?

Mr. MacEachen: Well, Mr. Speaker, I am open to any suggestions regarding a reference on the question of East-West relations or peace, security, disarmament and peacekeeping. If Hon. Members are agreed on an enterprise of this kind, I certainly would co-operate. However, we would certainly have to see the terms of reference and have some discussions about it. I believe it would be a good thing for parliamentarians to keep an eye on this question of East-West relations and what ought to be done about it. It seems to me to be inconsistent to argue at Stockholm, as I did, that ministers ought to monitor the progress of that conference to ensure that every effort was expended to make it succeed, and at the same time to say there should be no opportunity for Hon. Members of the Canadian House of Commons to do similar things.

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Speaker, if the Minister would permit just a very simple follow-up question; would he assure us that any such attempt to get a reference such as I have referred to will have his support and, hopefully, with his support we will be able to get the other Hon. Members of the House to agree to it?

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to take an open attitude on that question. If we can decide on a reference which will facilitate discussion, I will look at it quite sympathetically. However, I would like to see what the reference is. I would like to talk to the Chairman of the Committee to find out what the work program of that Committee is and whether a reference would be useful at the present time.

Mr. Stevens: I can assure the Minister, Mr. Speaker, and I know the Chairman will certainly back me up on this, there is all kinds of time available to that Committee to handle the reference which might be forthcoming.

Mr. Minister, we are all deeply concerned about the tensions in the world today and, in particular, the unfortunate breakdown of negotiations between the major powers. However, something which has always startled us is the fact that there is no ambassador for disarmament, which is a role, and certainly an office, which I believe most people feel would be quite helpful at the present time. But while that office is allowed for in the structuring of the Minister's Department, it is not filled at the present time. Could the Minister indicate to the House why there is in fact no ambassador for disarmament? And may we expect not only an early appointment of such an ambassador, but also the assurance that he will have ample funding and staff to ensure he could play a truly meaningful role in this whole broad question of disarmament?

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, the Hon. Member has referred to the deep tensions which exist in the world, and I agree that they do exist. They were attested to at the Stockholm conference by the very tough speech made by Mr. Gromyko from the rostrum. It was quite tough. The substance of his analysis did not vary in what he said from the podium and what was stated to me in private, and it did reflect the tensions which the Hon. Member mentions. However, I should think it important to register what I consider to be a decided

improvement in certain quarters. The speech made by the President of the United States and the speech made by Mr. Shultz, in my opinion, were relatively moderate. And just a day or so ago, Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom expressed her view that there was a distinct change in policy from Washington and she appealed for further dialogue with the East. I believe that the more that is done, the more we will be able to influence the Soviet Union at this stage to change, possibly, its perceptions of the West and of the United States. It must work both ways. Western leaders can have an impact, and that is why I came away saying that if it were possible, it would be urgent for the Prime Minister and other leaders to go to Moscow to have discussions.

With respect to the ambassador for disarmament, Mr. Speaker, the post is vacant. However, the Hon. Member need not be worried because we have been devoting, in a sense, in the past several months the full resources of the Department and, indeed, of the Government on the question of disarmament.

Miss Jewett: Even the Prime Minister.

Mr. MacEachen: The Prime Minister, as the Hon. Member says, is a prime ambassador for disarmament. Therefore, because we have devoted so much of our resources—and the Prime Minister—to this activity, I am not apologetic about the vacancy. The vacancy will be filled. I am searching for the best possible person to fill this job, and when I conclude that I have that person, the appointment will be made. In the meantime, do not feel that disarmament is being neglected. It has never had the impetus it has received in the last several months.

Mr. Ogle: Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the Deputy Prime Minister one question, at least. He spoke about the problems of East-West. I was happy to hear his statements. The problem, I believe, between East-West many times is a misinterpretation of facts. I feel that in Central America right now there is the major problem of the traditional injustices of many kinds being called an East-West confrontation.

Has the Deputy Prime Minister talked to the American Secretary of State on his recent visit in Stockholm about that particular problem? Again, I would request the Deputy Prime Minister to seriously think of visiting that area himself so that we Canadians can have a uniquely Canadian policy on Central America. I would also like to say that I was happy that the money was released for Nicaragua and that aid has gone there.

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, I did not have an opportunity to raise the question of regional conflict with Secretary Shultz at Stockholm. We have done that in the past. We have discussed our differences on the subject of Central America. The Hon. Member is quite correct in saying that it has become a focus of East-West interest or rivalry. That is a fact. However, I certainly take the view that the surest way to bring about peace and security in that part of the world, is to deal with the basic economic and social problems and the political problems. For that reason we have argued against third-party

military intervention. I have made these points to Mr. Shultz on more than one occasion. Our policy is not identical to that of the United States.

[Translation]

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. It being 5:30 p.m., it is my duty, pursuant to Standing Order 42(4), to interrupt the proceedings and to put forthwith every question necessary to dispose of the amendment or amendments now before the House.

• (1730)

[English]

The question is on the amendment. Mr. Mulroney, seconded by Mr. Nielsen, moved:

That the Address be amended by adding the following words:

"This House regrets to inform Your Excellency that your Government is incapable of providing leadership and direction in the social and economic affairs of the nation and has lost the confidence of this House and of the Canadian people and therefore requires that an election be called in accordance with the Canadian custom, practice and tradition of holding a general election at least every four years".

All those in favour of the motion will please say yea.

Some Hon. Members: Yea.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: All those opposed will please say nay.

Some Hon. Members: Nay.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: In my opinion, the nays have it.

And more than five Members having risen:

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Call in the Members.

The House divided on the motion (Mr. Mulroney), which was negated on the following division:

(Division No. 10)

YEAS

Messrs.

Althouse	Ellis	Howie
Andre	Elzinga	Huntington
Anguish	Epp	Jarvis
Beatty	Fennell	Jelinek
Benjamin	Forrestall	Jewett (Ms.)
Blackburn	Fraser	Keeper
Blenkarn	Fretz	Kempling
Bosley	Friesen	Knowles
Cardiff	Gamble	Kristiansen
Clark	Guss	Lambert
(Yellowhead)	Gilchrist	Lawrence
Clark	Greenaway	Lewis
(Brandon-Souris)	Gurbin	Lewycky
Coates	Guatafson	MacDonald (Miss)
Cook	Halliday	(Kingston and the Islands)
Cooper	Hamilton	MacDougall
Corbett	(Qu'Appelle-Moose	Malone
Crambie	Mountain)	Mayer
Crosby	Hamilton	Mazankowski
(Halifax West)	(Swift Current-Maple	McCain
Crouse	Creek)	McCuish
Dantzer	Hargrave	McGrath
Darling	Hawkes	McKenzie
Deans	Heap	McKinnon
de Jong	Hees	McKnight
Dick	Hnatyshyn	McLean
Donm	Hovdebo	McMillan

MASTER

FILE 29010

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THE INITIATIVE IN EASTERN EUROPE

NOTES FOR A SCENARIO

Your interlocutors will have their own objectives:

- to benefit from the legitimacy and identity which your visit confers;
- to avoid complications in their relations with the USSR (although Ceausescu's intentions are not entirely clear - he is in trouble with Moscow as the Gromyko visit suggests);
- to castigate the USA as the empire of evil responsible for the present crisis;
- to demonstrate, in Prague and Berlin, that acceptance of newly counter-deployed Soviet missiles has not made them pariahs in civilized company.

You will be spending more time in Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Romania than you have in any other country in the context of your initiative. The expanded time will therefore mean that your discussions will be more extended and substantive. Because they are also Warsaw Pact countries, you will be engaged in a negotiation as well as an information process. You will also be exposed to lengthy monologues from your interlocutors.

They represent, each in his own way, a generation of leadership in Eastern Europe which has devoted - and in some instances sacrificed - their lives to compromise: between Soviet Marxism and their own European heritage; between their

... "

- 2 -

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national interests and those of Moscow; between personal allegiances and party decrees. It is a generation which read the lesson of Stalin's execution of nationalist leaders in the early fifties, and survived the turbulence of periodic popular revolt over the past 28 years.

The Czechoslovaks are stereotyped as classic survivors -- masters of acquiescence while maintaining their personality. The term is "Schweikism" after the The Good Soldier Schweik, anti-hero of Hasek's novel about getting by in a Czech regiment of the Austro-Hungarian army. But the Prague Spring of 1968 showed that Czechoslovakia, alone among Eastern European countries, had a viable democratic tradition prior to 1938.

The East Germans are a totally different genre. Prussian in character, with a tradition of pre-eminence in Central Europe, thoughtful, disciplined and efficient. They run the 10th most significant industrialized country in the world. Psychologically crippled by the division of Germany and of Berlin, and by the imposition of a Slavic system of authority, their behaviour is dominated by a pathetic thirst for recognition. They are torn by the ideological need to distance themselves from the FRG -- the "bad Germans" who started WW II and still threaten the USSR -- and by their profound affinity with all-German culture, of which they are inordinately proud.

The Romanians are in an island of Latinité in a sea of Slavs and Magyars. First colonized by the Greeks as Scythia, then by descendants of Roman legionaries, pensioned to the land and to local wives. Then, occupied by the Turks from the 15th to 19th centuries -- all this may account for their devious,

...3

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

manipulative and conspiratorial traits. A typically Romanian solution for national character is to maintain a repressive and authoritarian domestic regime, totally dominated by Ceausescu and his family, and yet conduct a vehemently independent foreign policy: e.g. consistent dealings with China and Israel; a role in the G77; resistance to the military obligations of the Warsaw Pact and to the inequities of economic agreements within the bloc.

#### TAILORING THE INITIATIVE

You might consider your themes and purposes in Eastern Europe to be the following:

- to explain the nature of your initiative -- its genesis, your actions and proposals, and results so far; to obtain their comments and perspectives on East-West relations; to present Canada's European credentials.
- to suggest a role for middle-power alliance members in creating a political environment which encourages the USA and USSR to return to constructive negotiations. A political "multiplier-effect"?
- to suggest that they moderate their own rhetoric, take their own steps to avoid isolation, understand our societies as they are, exercise political dominance over military questions.

...4

- to stress the great stake which middle-powers have in an improved super-power relationship -- vitality of CSCE process and international institutions; stability in Central Europe and in other regions of world; increased ability to work together across alliance divisions; priority of economic growth.
- to point to the Stockholm Conference as a psychological turning point in East-West relations, despite continuing hard rhetoric; to urge that FM s (a) return if Conference bogs down and (b) attend reopened MBFR apparently March 16.
- to seek support for the logic of a 5-power Conference as the obvious missing link in managing nuclear arms reduction, with strengthened NPT as an essential consequence.
- to listen to lengthy eulogies of the Prague Declaration without being drawn to open support. . Reply that Brussels Declaration was our own response. How to move from Declarations to negotiations? Sending each other interesting mail is a good start but far from enough.
- to avoid being put in position of either defending or attacking Reagan, dispute the tendentious anti-Americanism you will probably be exposed to. Perhaps challenge thesis that no progress possible until Reagan departs?
- to push for Soviets to return to INF and START talks without preconditions, as you have pushed same principle with Reagan. An essential complement to re-opened MBFR if nuclear threshold is to be raised. That threshold of particular significance to Czechoslovakia and GDR as countries of counter-deployment.

- 5 -

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- to thrum their European character without seeming to question their loyalty to the USSR; to recognize their own legitimate security interests; to refer to counter-deployment but not to presence of Soviet troops in GDR and Czechoslovakia.
- to show awareness of German problem as being at heart of European security arrangements. Détente in a sense began with inter-German arrangements developed by Willy Brandt and Walter Ulbricht in the late 1960s and with Honecker in early 1970s. But not your task to solve: your initiative is not going head-on at most difficult problems such as Berlin, Afghanistan or INF. It is directed at political leadership, dialogue, at range of points along the East-West trendline.



pm

Piero Conf, Jan 23

→ always in cards

- EAST - WEST dialogue

- exchanges on internet from  
beginning of 80s

- 2 conventions = DOLAN

FISHER.

DEMARCHES →

- see machine.

- P.

- very far table →  
contacts with of →

detente  
→

Canada

Canada

CPD/P. Heinbecker/6-5645/re

TO/A USS DMF  
FROM DE CPD

REFERENCE  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT  
SUJET

Speech: End of the Prime Minister's  
Peace Initiative?

Date  
January 24, 1984  
Number/Numéro  
CPD-0064

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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
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RBD

Attached is draft three of the speech. I have consulted inside the Department and also outside, with Jim Moore, the Prime Minister's former speech writer.

2. It has been agreed between Mr. Marchand and Mr. Fowler that a text will be available for the Prime Minister to see in Davos first thing Friday morning. We can either get it to him by telex to Berne or by using the good offices of one of the Davos delegates.

3. I would appreciate your views (and those of the other addressees) on the substance and/or the process.

  
Paul Heinbecker  
Chairman  
Policy Development Secretariat

JANUARY 24, 1984

SPEECH

WHEN THE FIRST ATOMIC BOMB EXPLODED IN A NEW MEXICO  
DESERT IN 1945, LIFE ITSELF CHANGED. MAN GAVE HIMSELF THE  
MEANS OF HIS OWN DESTRUCTION.

FROM THAT DAY ON CHILDREN WOULD NEVER AGAIN BE FREE  
FROM THE FEAR THAT BECAUSE OF THE BOMB THEY MIGHT NOT GROW  
UP. WE PARENTS WOULD NEVER AGAIN BE ABLE TO REASSURE THEM,  
NOR TO STILL OUR OWN ANXIETIES.

THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION IS PRESENT IN ALL  
OUR LIVES. IT MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN RICH OR POOR,  
BETWEEN WHICH SIDE OF THIS HOUSE WE FIND OURSELVES ON,  
BETWEEN EAST OR WEST, NORTH OR SOUTH, BETWEEN WHO IS RIGHT  
AND WHO IS WRONG.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXIST. THEY WILL PROBABLY ALWAYS  
EXIST. AND THEY WORK, WITH HORRIFIC EFFICIENCY.

WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO MANAGE THE THREAT THEY  
POSE TO US ALL. NEVER AGAIN CAN WE PUT THE TASK OUT OF OUR  
MINDS; NOR TRIVIALIZE IT; NOR MAKE IT ROUTINE.

- 2 -

NOR DARE WE LOSE HEART. IF MANKIND'S STATECRAFT FAILS TO MANAGE THIS THREAT, THERE WILL BE NO SECOND CHANCE. ALL OF MAN'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ALL OF NATURE'S BEAUTY, ALL THE HOPE WE INVEST IN OUR CHILDREN, ALL COULD BE GONE IN ONE HORRENDOUS CATACLYSM.

CANADA IS A WESTERN NATION, BY GEOGRAPHY, BY HISTORY AND BY VALUES. WE ARE NOT NEUTRAL. NOR ARE WE PACIFIST. CANADIANS HAVE FOUGHT AND DIED FOR WHAT THEY BELIEVED IN THE PAST; THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT THEY WOULD DO SO AGAIN. BUT CANADIANS ARE NOT NAIVE. THEY KNOW THAT IT WOULD BE THE ULTIMATE INSANITY TO FIGHT A WAR THAT EVERYONE WOULD LOSE.

CANADIANS ARE WORRIED. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 20 YEARS THERE ARE NO FORMAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS ON LIMITING OR REDUCING THEIR NUCLEAR ARMS. CANADIANS ARE CONCERNED THAT THE SUPERPOWERS HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FROM MANAGING THE NUCLEAR RISK. THAT THEY ARE TOO CAUGHT UP IN IMPLACABLE IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION, IN ABSTRACT THEORIES ABOUT DETERRENCE, IN ENDLESS MEASUREMENTS OF PARITY.

CANADIANS ARE TELLING US, AS PEOPLE EVERYWHERE ARE TELLING THEIR OWN LEADERS, THAT THE DANGER IS TOO NEAR. THEY WANT THEIR LEADERS TO MAKE SURE IT DOESN'T HAPPEN, TO ACCEPT

- 3 -

THEIR POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY, TO WORK TO REDUCE THE  
POSSIBILITY OF WAR BY MISCALCULATION OR ACCIDENT.

I SHARE CANADIANS WORRIES. LAST FALL I SPOKE OF AN  
OMINOUS RHYTHM OF CRISIS. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE CONFLUENCE  
OF THREE POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS TRENDS - THE RESORT TO FORCE  
TO SETTLE DISPUTES, THE RISK OF THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS AND THE WORSENING STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. I  
DECIDED TO USE CANADA'S INFLUENCE TO CALL INTERNATIONAL  
ATTENTION TO THE DANGER, TO TRY TO INJECT A JOLT OF HIGH  
LEVEL POLITICAL ENERGY INTO EAST-WEST RELATIONS, TO TURN THE  
TREND LINE OF CRISIS, TO WORK AT THE INTERSECTION OF COMMON  
INTEREST.

THE COMMON INTERESTS ARE REAL.

BOTH SIDES WISH TO BE FREE OF THE RISK OF  
ACCIDENTAL WAR OR SURPRISE ATTACK.

BOTH SIDES HAVE AN INTEREST IN INCREASING SECURITY  
WHILE REDUCING THE COST.

BOTH HAVE AN INTEREST IN AVOIDING THE SPREAD OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

- 4 -

IT IS MORE A MATTER OF COMMON INTEREST THAN OF TRUST. BUT TO BUILD ON THIS COMMON INTEREST THE MEGAPHONES MUST BE PUT AWAY, AN ARMISTICE DECLARED IN THE WAR OF IDEOLOGY, AN END MADE OF THE MANICHAISM OF BOTH SIDES.

SINCE LAST FALL I HAVE CALLED ON LEADERS IN WESTERN EUROPE. I HAVE ATTENDED THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN INDIA. I HAVE GONE TO JAPAN. I HAVE MET WITH THE LEADERS OF CHINA, WITH THE POPE AND WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. I HAVE CALLED ON PRESIDENT REAGAN. I VISITED PRAGUE, BERLIN AND BUCHAREST. (WHEN HE IS WELL ENOUGH TO RECEIVE ME, I EXPECT TO SEE PRESIDENT ANDROPOV).

MY MESSAGE IN EACH CASE WAS SIMPLE. CANADA WAS NOT LOOKING FOR A SEAT AT THE SUPERPOWER TABLE. BUT OUR LIVES AND OUR FUTURE ARE ON THAT TABLE. AND SO IS EVERYONE ELSE'S. WE ALL HAVE A RIGHT AND A RESPONSIBILITY TO INVOLVE OURSELVES, TO PRESS THOSE AT THE TABLE TO REMEMBER THEIR OWN HUMANITY, AS EINSTEIN ONCE URGED, TO MANAGE THE NUCLEAR RISK.

WE PROPOSED THAT A FORUM OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS BE ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I SUGGESTED TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL THAT HE BEGIN TO CONVENE CONFIDENTIAL MEETINGS OF THE NUCLEAR POWERS. THEY ARE THE PERMANENT

- 5 -

MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THEY HAVE  
RESPONSIBILITIES<sup>AS</sup> WELL AS VETOS.

WE PROPOSED REMEDIAL ACTION TO SHORE UP THE  
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS, ACTION THAT IS IN THE INTEREST OF SUPERPOWER MIDDLE  
POWER AND MICROSTATE ALIKE. WE PROPOSED THAT, IF PROGRESS  
COULD NOT BE MADE AT THE TALKS IN VIENNA ON THE MUTUAL AND  
BALANCED REDUCTION OF FORCES, THE WEST PUT GREATER EMPHASIS  
ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE AND LESS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE  
PROPOSED GIVING POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE  
ON MILITARY CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE.

WE PROPOSED MEASURES TO SUFFOCATE TECHNOLOGY IN THE  
LABORATORY AND TO INCREASE EVERYONE'S SECURITY - A BAN ON  
HIGH ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS, RESTRICTIONS ON THE  
MOBILITY OF ICBM'S, IMPROVEMENTS IN THE VERIFIABILITY OF  
FUTURE STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

LEADERS DECIDE ON DEFENCE BUDGETS AND RESEARCH  
BUDGETS. IN THE ABSENCE OF A CHANGE IN DIRECTION, FROM THE  
TOP, SCIENTISTS WILL BRING US FURTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
SYSTEMS, NOT FEWER, AND MORE DANGER, NOT LESS.



- 6 -

ABOVE ALL I URGED POLITICAL LEADERS TO GET INVOLVED PERSONALLY, TO PUT PEACE AT THE TOP OF THEIR AGENDAS, TO EXERCISE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THE DANGEROUS SITUATION WE FIND OURSELVES IN DEMANDS, TO RESTART THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

I BELIEVE THERE HAS BEEN SOME PROGRESS.

IN NOVEMBER, IN GOA, COMMONWEALTH LEADERS DECLARED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO WORK FOR PEACE AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR MY EFFORTS TO RESTORE POLITICAL DIALOGUE AMONG THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.

IN DECEMBER, IN BRUSSELS, NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS OFFERED THE EAST A BALANCED AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. THEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE WEST DID NOT ASPIRE TO STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, AND THAT THE WEST RESPECTED THE SOVIET UNION'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS.

THE NATO MINISTERS UNDERTOOK TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE THEMSELVES IN STIMULATING PROGRESS IN THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE THEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE AGREED ON DATES FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS.

- 7 -

IN JANUARY, IN WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT REAGAN  
SIGNALLED A NEW TONE IN AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS THE USSR. IT  
IS UP TO THE SOVIETS TO RESPOND AND FOR BOTH SIDES TO MAKE  
SURE THEIR ACTIONS SUPPORT THEIR WORDS.

IN JANUARY, IN STOCKHOLM, <sup>AT</sup> THE CONFERENCE ON  
REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR IN EUROPE, ~~RE-ESTABLISHED~~ CONTACT AT  
<sup>WAS RE-ESTABLISHED</sup> SENIOR POLITICAL LEVELS, BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF EAST AND  
WEST. AND MR. SHULTZ MET WITH MR. GROMYKO.

IT IS GOING TO BE A LONG MARCH BUT A START ON  
DEFUSING THE CRISIS HAS BEEN MADE.

I AM PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE TODAY FURTHER  
MEASURES WHICH WE WILL BE TAKING: (A) A NEW AMBASSADOR FOR  
DISARMAMENT (?) (B) SOMETHING ON VERIFICATION (?)  
(C) SOMETHING ON THE NEW CENTRE (?)

I HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE REACTION OF CANADIANS  
FROM ONE END OF THIS COUNTRY TO THE OTHER TO WHAT I HAVE BEEN  
TRYING TO DO. THEY KNOW THAT THIS IS SERIOUS BUSINESS. THEY  
KNOW THAT CANADA'S POWER IS LIMITED; THAT WE CANNOT FORCE  
OTHERS TO LISTEN TO US. THEY ALSO KNOW THAT IT ISN'T ENOUGH  
TO SIT ON THE SIDELINES, HOPING THE NUCLEAR WHISTLE WILL  
NEVER BLOW. IT IS CLEAR THAT CANADIANS WANTED THEIR

- 8 -

GOVERNMENT TO ACT, TO TAKE WHAT STEPS IT COULD, AND WE DID ACT.

THE DANGER PERSISTS. WARS ARE NOT ALWAYS A MATTER OF COLD CALCULATION, WARS ALSO START BY MISJUDGEMENTS, OR GROW FROM REGIONAL CONFLICTS. WORLD WAR I BEGAN IN SARAJEVO. THE CURRENT CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THREATENS TO DRAW THE SUPERPOWERS INTO THE FINAL IMPLOSION. BETWEEN THEM THE SUPERPOWERS STILL HAVE 50,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE SOVIET UNION HAS WITHDRAWN FROM THE INF TALKS AND THE START TALKS.

BUT I AM MORE HOPEFUL THAN I WAS WHEN I BEGAN THIS ENTREPRISE LAST SUMMER.

MY TALKS WITH THE LEADERS OF (EAST AND WEST) (THE TWO MOST POWERFUL NATIONS ON EARTH) RENEWED MY CONFIDENCE IN A PROPOSITION WE ALL KNOW IN OUR HEARTS TO BE TRUE. PEACE IS POSSIBLE IF WE HAVE THE POLITICAL WILL TO CREATE IT.

BOTH AGREE A NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT BE WON.

BOTH AGREE A NUCLEAR WAR MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT.

- 9 -

BOTH SEE THE ARGUMENTS FOR REDUCING THEIR VAST  
INVENTORIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

BUT BOTH ALSO AGREE THAT A NUCLEAR WAR IS POSSIBLE,  
NOT PROBABLE, BUT POSSIBLE.

THE OBJECTIVE FOR US ALL, THEREFORE, IS TO WORK TO  
MAKE NUCLEAR WAR <sup>R</sup> LESS PROBABLE. THE TASK MUST BE ON  
EVERYONE'S AGENDA.

~~MY GOAL HAS BEEN TO TRY TO TURN THE TREND LINE OF~~  
TENSION. I SOUGHT TO GET POLITICAL LEADERS MORE INVOLVED AND  
TO RE-ESTABLISH DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THAT IS  
HAPPENING. I SOUGHT TO PERSUADE BOTH SIDES TO TURN DOWN  
THEIR RHETORIC. I BELIEVE THAT THAT HAS NOW BEGUN TO HAPPEN,  
AS WELL. *THE TREND LINE OF CRISIS HAS, AT LEAST,*  
*LEVELLED OUT.*

I THINK I HAVE CATALYZED THE PEACE PROCESS AND  
HELPED TO MOVE IT OFF SQUARE ONE. TO THE EXTENT THAT I HAVE  
SUCCEEDED, CANADA'S ROLE BECOMES PART OF A WIDER EFFORT. IT  
IS NOT A ONE-MAN OR ONE-COUNTRY JOB. IF PEACE IS TO BE  
PRESERVED OTHER LEADERS MUST DO THEIR PART, NOW. THEIR  
RESPONSIBILITIES REQUIRE MORE OF THEM THAN ENCOURAGING WORDS.  
AND I AM GLAD TO SAY I FOUND MANY WILLING TO ACT.

- 10 -

BUT IS THE NUCLEAR POWERS, AND ABOVE ALL THE  
SUPERPOWERS, WHO BEAR THE GREATEST RESPONSIBILITY, LET IT BE  
SAID OF THEM IN THE FUTURE THAT THIS WAS THE TIME WHEN THEIR  
POLITICAL JUDGEMENT CONTROLLED THEIR TECHNOLOGICAL GENIUS,  
WHEN THEIR SELF-INTEREST EQUATED TO THE COMMON GOOD, WHEN  
THEIR HUMANITY FINALLY PREVAILED, BECAUSE IF HISTORY DOES  
NOT JUDGE THEM GENEROUSLY, THERE MAY NOT, BE ANY JUDGEMENT AT  
ALL.



MGTC M.FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

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SUBJ/SUJ

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---PM: MTG WITH AUBERT

PM WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY AMB, FOWLER, HANCOCK, SMITH. AXWORTHY IS

NOW NOT/NOT ON TRIP.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. MCNEE

IDDZ

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SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



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---PMS INITIATIVE: VISIT TO ROMANIA

SUBJ/SUJ

PM LIKELY TO USE FRENCH IN MTG WITH CEAUSESCU.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



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PCOOTT LAWLER

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RBR

---PM INITIATIVE

PLS AMEND OFFICIAL DEL LIST TO DELETE PM S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY

T.AXWORTHY WHO WILL NOT/NOT BE ON EASTERN EUROPEAN TRIP.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE





MESSAGE

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SECURITY  
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TO/À

TO PARIS

INFO

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INFO WSHDC BNATO BONN MOSCO PC00TT/FOWLER

REF

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RBR IDR IDA RCR

SUBJ/SUJ

REF YOURTEL WIGR3199 24JAN

---PM INITIATIVE

AGREE IN PRINCIPLE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION THAT MEMBER OF PM DEL STOP  
IN PARIS ON RETURN FROM EASTERN EUROPE TO BRIEF FRENCH AUTHORITIES.  
SUBJECT TO PMS CONCURRENCE AND TO PRACTICAL FEASIBILITY, RBD/HANCOCK  
MIGHT BE ABLE TO GO TO PARIS FOR BRIEFING ON MONDAY 06 FEB. (CURRENT  
PLANS CALL FOR HANCOCK TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS IN BONN ON FRIDAY 03 FEB  
IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONCLUSION OF PM VISIT TO ROMANIA.) HANCOCK WILL  
ADVISE YOU OF PLANS FROM EASTERN EUROPE.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A. Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG *L.A. Delvoie*

*file*

CONFIDENTIAL

January 24, 1984

IDDZ-0090

*See attachments in  
File Pocket.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Initiative: Visit to Eastern Europe

We attach for your consideration scenario  
briefs for your meetings in Prague, East Berlin and  
Bucharest.

You will note that the brief for Prague  
contains a full panoply of talking points covering  
all aspects of your initiative. In order to avoid  
repetitiveness and unnecessary bulk, we have not  
reproduced these basic points in the briefs for East  
Berlin and Bucharest, although you will doubtless  
wish to draw on the Prague brief in introducing your  
subject in all three capitals.

*L. A. Delvoie*

L. A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/Anderson

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RESTRICTED

January 24, 1984

IDDZ-0087

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Initiative: Visit to Eastern Europe

Attached for your consideration are three draft "toasts" for your visits to Prague, East Berlin and Bucharest.

*L. A. Delvoie*

L. A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

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PROPOSED TOAST FOR USE BY THE  
PRIME MINISTER DURING HIS VISIT TO PRAGUE  
JANUARY 1984

I wish to express my deep appreciation to you, Mr. Prime Minister, for your invitation to visit Czechoslovakia and for the warmth and hospitality with which you have greeted me here.

Mr. Prime Minister, the desire to banish war forever from human affairs is as old as war itself; and as ancient as that desire are the efforts of statesmen to find the practical means, if not to banish it, at least to reduce its likelihood.

It is fitting that we should be speaking of peace here in Prague. For this beautiful and ancient city, this historical seat of learning, of science and architecture, is a monument to what is best in European civilization. Its beauty and prosperity have long stood, against the tides of history, as a testament to the resilience of the human spirit.

President Husak and I were both in Helsinki in 1975 to sign the Final Act. At that time, he stated that Europe was at a crossroads. If I may quote him further: "for the first time in history, the nations of Europe had seized the opportunity to create the real conditions of peace, security and cooperation and that in spite of all the existing political, economic, philosophical and social differences".

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Europe is once again at the crossroads, Mr. Prime Minister. I am convinced that in the nations of East and West, thoughtful people are asking what can be done to change the course of events, events which seem to many of them to be governed by a logic, at once terrifying and ineluctable. The silence which now envelops the arms control negotiations only serves to heighten this concern, by giving the course of events a life of its own, independent of the will of statesmen.

I feel confident, Mr. Prime Minister, in saying that few issues have aroused so much anxiety, even dread, as that of nuclear war.

Nor should this anxiety be startling to us, for the hopes and fears of mankind are nowhere more clearly at stake than in the issue of war, and particularly nuclear war. Nor would it come as a surprise that the yearning for peace is acutely felt in Europe, a continent ravaged by so many wars. And Canada's history, its security and its future have been and will continue to be closely bound up with that of Europe.

We have, then, a special responsibility, indeed a duty, as statesmen to do our utmost to reduce the danger of war and the burden of the arms race. This is our duty not only to our own peoples, Czechoslovaks and Canadians, but to the whole of humanity. For in the event of a nuclear war, much of what mankind has built through centuries of labour would disappear into the long dark night of nuclear winter.

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To the generations that have bequeathed this civilization to us, to the generations who will in their turn inherit it, we must dedicate ourselves to give our full measure to the search for peace.

Czechoslovakia and Canada are not superpowers. We preside over no great arsenal of weapons, nor grand military machines. What we must do, Mr. Prime Minister, as middle powers who are also members of opposing alliances, is to find an area in which we can best make our contribution. And that area, I would suggest, is precisely the political sphere.

Statesmen must speak to each other directly. As the political leaders of our two countries, we can demonstrate by our actions that such dialogue is possible and fruitful, and counsel our friends and allies to follow a similar path. All of these are well within our power.

We have a special stake in détente, Mr. Prime Minister. Through the Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE process and meetings such as the Stockholm Conference, we have created the means to reduce tensions in Europe.

To dream of peace is not enough, Mr. Prime Minister. All too often in this century, we have seen such hopes, however noble and lofty, dashed against an ugly reality. Peace will not be built by dreams, nor will it be established by a single grand gesture. Rather, in a thousand ways, some small, others greater, confidence will be created, intentions made transparent

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and mutual understanding increased.

There has never been as great a need for high-level political dialogue as there is at this moment. The empty halls of Geneva are mute testimony to this fact.

I was therefore encouraged that the Stockholm Conference was opened at the ministerial level. This was an idea that we have been especially active in promoting with our allies. It is my firm belief that ministers must closely monitor developments in Stockholm. They must be ready to return to Stockholm to inject new energy into those talks through their direct participation.

It is vital that the now dormant arms control talks be resumed at the earliest possible moment. The decision to return to the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe is a most welcome development. I urge that the same logic which led to this decision now be applied to the negotiations in Geneva.

Modest though our influence is, Mr. Prime Minister, we are not powerless. Step by step, in visits such as this as well as in the Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm negotiations, the dialogue can be established and the search for peace advanced.

This is what I have learned over the past several months as I pursued my peace initiative. The road which has brought me to Czechoslovakia and to Eastern Europe has passed through many nations. Concern is evident everywhere,

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in both the East and West, as is the hope that the current negative trend can be reversed. Statesmen know that there are no miracles to be had in politics. I certainly have none to offer, and I would not wish to encourage unrealistic expectations.

Aristotle once wrote that politics is the master science, to which all other arts, including military art, are subordinate. He reasoned that this is so because it is the business of statesmen to set those supreme goals which are to govern all the activities of the nation.

Statesmen must assert the primacy of politics over military affairs. That is the principal purpose of my visit and the commitment I ask you to share.

I invite you, Mr. Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen, to raise your glasses in a toast to the health of President Husak, to the peace and prosperity of the Czechoslovak peoples and to continued dialogue between Canada and Czechoslovakia.



PROJET DE TOAST A L'INTENTION  
DU PREMIER MINISTRE POUR SA VISITE A BERLIN-EST  
JANVIER 1984

Je vous remercie pour votre chaleureux accueil qui me fournit l'occasion de porter le dialogue entre nos deux pays au plus haut niveau. Je vous remercie également, Monsieur le Président, de partager le sentiment d'urgence qui m'anime et de l'attention que vous portez à mon propos et à ma démarche pour la paix.

Emmanuel Kant a écrit: "Tout l'intérêt de ma raison est compris dans les trois questions suivantes: que puis-je savoir? que puis-je faire? que m'est-il permis d'espérer?" Je ne diffère pas de méthode avec ce grand maître de la pensée allemande et de la pensée universelle.

Que puis-je savoir? Je sais ce qui nous sépare. Nous sommes des membres d'alliances politiques et militaires opposées. Le Canada ne cache pas sa loyauté occidentale. Nous sommes solidaires des positions fondamentales de l'Alliance atlantique. Je connais bien nos différences. Mais tel n'est pas ce soir l'objet de mon propos.

.../2

- 2 -

Car je suis aussi bien conscient de ce qui nous réunit. Nous partageons la position enviable de puissances industrielles moyennes, ayant une population de taille comparable et ayant certes des obligations et des contraintes, mais aussi des intérêts qui coïncident et nous rapprochent. Et parmi ces préoccupations se trouve certainement au premier rang celle de la paix et de la sécurité.

La menace d'une guerre nucléaire se pose comme nulle autre question face aux espoirs des peuples. Pour vous, Allemands de l'est, à la charnière du problème, pour nous, dont la sécurité a tout au long de ce siècle été liée à celle de l'Europe, c'est une question vitale. Aussi, je ne m'étonne pas de trouver un vif et unanime désir de paix en Europe et dans mon pays.

Nous connaissons cette menace dans son détail: celle du recours croissant à la force, alors que le processus politique cède le pas aux solutions militaires; celle de l'érosion du mécanisme international nous protégeant contre la prolifération des armements nucléaires et de la croissance géométrique des arsenaux; celle enfin, particulièrement inquiétante, de la dégradation des relations est-ouest.

Resterons-nous paralysés et impuissants face à ces développements tragiques dont les conséquences touchent non seulement nos deux peuples, mais l'humanité entière? La deuxième question de Kant se pose avec acuité: que puis-je faire?

C'est justement la question de savoir ce qu'une puissance moyenne peut faire pour renverser cette tendance néfaste, la logique de la terreur et ce sentiment d'impuissance, qui m'a poussé à agir et à prendre cette initiative pour la paix.

Car le fait que nos pays ne disposent pas d'arsenaux menaçants et que nous ne sommes pas à la table des négociations sur les armes nucléaires ne nous laisse pas pour autant désarmés dans notre recherche pour la paix. Nous pouvons, et nous avons le devoir, de contribuer à donner au dialogue politique entre l'est et l'ouest une impulsion nouvelle.

Et c'est dans la sphère politique, en parlant directement l'un à l'autre, comme nous le faisons en qualité de chefs politiques de nos deux pays, que nous pourrions démontrer que le dialogue est possible, qu'il peut être pratique et constructif et qu'il porte ses fruits. Cela est en notre pouvoir. C'est là, Monsieur le Président, notre arme la plus puissante.

Nous pouvons en outre nous efforcer de donner corps et substance aux décisions de l'Acte final d'helsinki, que nous avons tous deux signé en 1975, et dont il faut franchement reconnaître que tous les vœux n'ont pas été réalisés. Ceux qui partagent un intérêt primordial pour la paix ne doivent rien ménager pour développer la coopération, accroître les échanges commerciaux et rendre enfin possible la libre circulation des personnes entre l'est et l'ouest.

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En quelques mots, il nous faut changer fondamentalement notre attitude si nous voulons contribuer à la paix. Car une paix en équilibre entre la terreur et la parité des armements est une paix bien précaire.

"Que m'est-il permis d'espérer?"

Je tiens de bonne source, Monsieur le Président, que vous ne croyez pas aux miracles. Je me suis moi-même interdit d'en promettre et encore moins d'espérer en accomplir!

Je ne me fais pas d'illusion sur la complexité des problèmes qui nous confrontent. Ce ne sont pas des miracles qu'il m'est permis d'espérer, mais puisque nous reconnaissons que la paix et la sécurité sont indissociables, je peux espérer que nous rechercherons activement et que nous trouverons sur la pente dangereuse où nous glissons, des crans d'arrêt.

Depuis plusieurs mois, j'ai consacré temps et efforts à une initiative de paix et de compréhension entre l'est et l'ouest et entre les superpuissances. Depuis octobre dernier, j'ai rencontré et j'ai discuté de cette question avec les chefs d'Etat de plusieurs pays, avec le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, avec les citoyens concernés de mon pays et je le fais maintenant en Europe de l'est.

.../5

Je puis vous assurer que partout, j'ai rencontré le même souci sur l'état inquiétant des relations internationales. Partout aussi, j'ai rencontré des gens prêts à se joindre à moi pour rechercher ce que leur gouvernement peut faire pour changer le cours des événements, qui semblent pour trop d'entre nous encore gouvernés par la logique terrifiante et implacable du conflit.

Ma rencontre et mes discussions avec vous me convainquent encore plus fermement que le dialogue est la voie que nous devons poursuivre avec vigueur entre nos deux pays, avec nos alliés et avec nos amis. Je sais, Monsieur le Président, que vous partagez ma conviction profonde. Vous le disiez à Helsinki en 1975: "La paix en Europe occidentale serait une garantie importante pour la paix du monde". Comme vous aussi, je sais le chemin qu'il nous reste à parcourir pour l'assurer.

Je vous invite à le faire avec moi et lève mon verre à ce commun effort.

PROPOSED TOAST FOR USE BY THE  
PRIME MINISTER DURING HIS VISIT TO BUCHAREST

February 1984

Mr. President, let me begin by expressing my deep appreciation for your kind invitation to visit Bucharest and for the warm welcome you have extended to me here today. Let me also take advantage of this opportunity to recognize and applaud your tireless efforts on behalf of international peace and stability.

I have travelled extensively in recent months to consult with many statesmen and world leaders, and to suggest means to alleviate current global tensions. I considered it essential to include Bucharest in my itinerary, given your own very welcome efforts to reopen the dialogue between East and West.

Nine years ago, Mr. President, we met at Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. At that time, you rightly stated:

"We should not harbour the illusion that we can now stay still and remain safe.... History is going to judge not only the documents we shall sign and the statements made, but also the way in which every one of our states, every leader and government, takes action to implement these documents."

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How prophetic those words have proven to be. The deterioration in international relations since 1975 demonstrates the vulnerability of the spirit of Helsinki to those twin demons, Fear and Suspicion.

Mr. President, our peoples are anxious about the future and, most of all, about the prospects of war in a nuclear age. I share their unease.

There was, I suppose, a time when war was seen as a noble endeavour, waged for noble purposes. Unlike our Helsinki Final Act, international law recognized only states and their interests, not individuals. As enlightened a philosopher as Jean-Jacques Rousseau could state:

"On fait la guerre aux Etats, non aux peuples."

But whatever we might have believed in the past, we recognize now that wars are waged on people, civilian populations as well as combatants, and not on inanimate states.

Nor does it make sense, in a nuclear age, to debate strategies for victory, since there is little possibility any victor will emerge from the ashes of the next global conflict. The vocabulary of victor and vanquished has been emptied of all meaning. If our

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efforts to safeguard peace are not successful, there will be no winners, only losers.

There is a well-known Latin maxim that states:

"Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum."

"Let he who desires peace, prepare for war."

(Vegetius, 4th C. A.D.)

The principle of nuclear deterrence is founded upon that maxim. But is there not a danger of becoming so prepared for war, psychologically as well as militarily, that we lose sight of the prospects for peace?

Faced with the fearful realities of the nuclear arms race, it is easy enough for leaders to become paralyzed, or to hide behind political bombast, or rote repetition of familiar positions.

Granted, the problems we confront are complex. But if we, today's leaders, do not confront them, then history may not provide a second chance.

Either this generation of leaders takes effective action to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and prevent their spread, or we bequeath to our children a future where the chances of global destruction increase every day.



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Mr. President, we cannot pretend that no differences exist between our two countries. We embrace different political and economic ideologies, and we are committed members of different alliances.

Nor, as medium-sized powers, are we the key players in the disarmament debate. The two superpowers are primarily responsible for the current arms race and have the means, if they choose to use them, to negotiate a reversal.

In coming to Bucharest and other European capitals, my purpose is to build upon and reinforce an established tradition of consultation on European security concerns. The process has been going on for some time now, particularly through such fora as the CSCE.

But I sense that the momentum of consultation has been lost. It is my hope that, through direct personal contact, the leaders of East and West can once again bring direction and determination to the consultative process.

We need to make a determined effort to give substance to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act calling for increased personal contacts and freedom of movement, for nothing breeds mutual fear and suspicion as much as isolation.

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We must, in short, bring about a fundamental change in attitudes and intentions, because peace cannot be based exclusively on numerical or technical adjustments, however significant, to military stockpiles. Such a peace would be precarious indeed.

Mr. President, I am pleased to note that Canada and Romania have a history of cooperation, and not only in bilateral fields. We have also worked together on international issues of peace, security, and disarmament through such fora as the U.N. General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament, and the CSCE.

I am heartened, Mr. President, by the fact that, although our approaches are different, our objectives are similar: to reduce international tension, particularly between East and West, and to create an international climate of peace in which security and prosperity for all nations becomes an attainable goal.

Permit me to propose a toast, Mr. President, to you, to increased efforts for global peace, and to continued friendship and cooperation between the Canadian and Romanian peoples.

Canada

Canada

IDA/S.UYEVAMA/6-1082/mq

*Smith* *q/R*

*MAJOR FILE*

TO/À The Disarmament Fund Contributions Committee

FROM/DE • IDA

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Disarmament Fund Class Contributions  
SUJET • Committee Special Meeting, 24 January 1984

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	5-1-3-IDA ccl-11-IDA-1-lcc
Date	24 January, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDA-0100

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

The following special application for financial assistance is submitted for consideration by the Committee:

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) has submitted a proposal to undertake a series of seminars, culminating in an international symposium relating arms control and disarmament verification procedures and methodologies to current arms control negotiating processes in the regional context of Europe. This proposal which was originally conceived as a contribution request was revised to the contract format in view of the considerable amount involved and our desire to ensure that contributions from the Disarmament Fund were, to the extent possible, spread out among a large number of groups. In processing the request as a contract, problems were encountered with Financial guidelines which call for Treasury Board approval of government sponsorship of conferences exceeding \$20,000. In view of the time constraints involved in carrying out its programme, a contribution is being sought for the three seminars. We will be preparing a submission to Treasury Board for the symposium. While the Disarmament Fund does not normally cover administrative items, this proposal, which will promote a balanced international discussion of arms control and disarmament issues and possibly assist the Department achieve certain operational objectives, can be considered an exceptional case. The contribution to the CIIA for the organization of last year's Consultative Group meeting has already established the precedent for such financial assistance

(including symposium)	Total Budget	\$53,655
	Request	\$18,720
	Recommendation	\$18,720

*Shig. Uyeyama*  
Shig. Uyeyama  
Arms Control and  
Disarmament Division

Canada • Canada

CPD/P. Chapin/6-5803/re

TO/À DMF  
FROM/DE • CPD

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •  
SUJET

Debate on Speech from Throne -  
Talking Points for DPM/SSEA


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ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

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Attached is a copy of the talking points we prepared yesterday evening, along the lines the Minister had suggested, for his use in the House later today. The text was delivered to him last night.



Paul Heinbecker  
Chairman  
Policy Development Secretariat

## TALKING POINTS

### INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

#### (A) BACKGROUND TO PM'S PEACE INITIATIVE

1. THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST SINCE TOWARDS THE END OF THE 1970'S. AT THAT TIME EVIDENCE BEGAN TO ACCUMULATE THAT THE USSR DID NOT CONSIDER DETENTE WITH THE WEST TO BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH (A) A CONTINUED MILITARY BUILDUP BEYOND DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS (B) USE OF ITS MILITARY POWER TO PROMOTE SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE THIRD WORLD AND (C) NO CHANGE IN ITS TREATMENT OF MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS.
2. THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN TRIGGERED A WESTERN RESPONSE WHICH INDICATED THAT THE WEST DID NOT CONSIDER DETENTE TO BE IRREVERSIBLE. THE SOVIET INSPIRED IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND SOURED RELATIONS STILL FURTHER, AS DID MORE RECENTLY THE SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER.
3. BY LAST SUMMER, RELATIONS WERE SO BAD THAT EVEN HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON HAD ALL BUT CEASED. NOT

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EVEN DURING THE AMERICAN BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM HAD SUCH A DIALOGUE BEEN INTERRUPTED.

4. MEANWHILE, THE WEST'S NECESSARY MINIMUM RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP, IN PARTICULAR DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES TO MATCH ALREADY INSTALLED SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES, WAS ENCOUNTERING OPPOSITION FROM THOSE WORRIED THAT THE DETERIORATION IN POLITICAL RELATIONS WAS LEADING INEXORABLY TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND PERHAPS TO WAR.

(B) WILLIAMSBURG AND AFTER

5. IN RESPONSE TO THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS, THE LEADERS OF THE SEVEN SUMMIT COUNTRIES FOR THE FIRST TIME ADDRESSED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY QUESTIONS. AT CANADA'S SUGGESTION THEY ISSUED A SPECIAL DECLARATION AT THEIR MEETING IN MAY OF LAST YEAR, WHICH CONTAINED TWO PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS:

- THEY UNDERTOOK TO "MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT MILITARY STRENGTH TO DETER ANY ATTACK, TO COUNTER ANY THREAT, AND TO ENSURE THE PEACE".

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- THEY UNDERTOOK TO DEVOTE THEIR "FULL POLITICAL RESOURCES .  
TO REDUCING THE THREAT OF WAR".

6. THAT BASIC MESSAGE WAS ENDORSED A MONTH LATER IN THE  
COMMUNIQUE OF THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN PARIS.

7. THIS DOUBLE-TRACK APPROACH ALSO INFLUENCED CANADIAN POLICY ON  
THE CONTROVERSIAL QUESTION OF WHETHER WE WOULD AGREE TO PERMIT  
TESTING OF AMERICAN AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. AS I WROTE IN  
MY LETTER TO SECRETARY SHULTZ ON JULY 15, WE WERE PREPARED TO  
APPROVE TESTING AS A CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY IN THE  
NEGOTIATION OF A VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS. BUT WE ALSO RECOGNIZED "AN EVEN GREATER OBLIGATION TO  
JOIN IN THE SEARCH FOR A SECURE PEACE". I NOTED THAT IT WAS THE  
GOVERNMENT'S "FIRM INTENTION TO REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS IN THE COMING  
MONTHS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROGRESS AND EVENTUAL SUCCESS OF  
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS".

(C) PM'S PEACE INITIATIVE

8. IT WAS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT THE PRIME MINISTER  
LAUNCHED HIS INITIATIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY, THE BASIC ELEMENTS  
OF WHICH WERE SKETCHED OUT IN HIS SPEECH TO THE CONFERENCE ON

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STRATEGIES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, AT GUELPH ON OCTOBER 27. IN THAT SPEECH, THE PM SUGGESTED THE NEED FOR AN INJECTION OF HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL ENERGY TO SPEED THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS: ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION, AND ON MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, HE NOTED THAT RHETORIC COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME A SUBSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY.

9. IN A FURTHER SPEECH IN MONTREAL ON NOVEMBER 13, THE PRIME MINISTER MADE FIVE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS:

- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FORUM FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF GLOBAL LIMITS ON THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THOSE FIVE STATES WHICH POSSESS THEM.
- SHORING UP OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, TO DISCOURAGE THE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- RAISING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IN EUROPE BY REACHING AGREEMENT ON A BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES (MBFR)



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- GIVING POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT, AND
- REACHING AGREEMENT ON A SERIES OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO "SUFFOCATE" THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW KINDS OF DESTABILIZING WEAPONS (SUCH AS ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO OPERATE AT HIGH ALTITUDE, HIGHLY MOBILE NEW ICBM'S, AND ANY NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WHICH CANNOT BE VERIFIED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS),

10. IN PURSUIT OF THIS INITIATIVE, THE PRIME MINISTER EMBARKED ON A COMPREHENSIVE ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WITH WORLD LEADERS, DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE THEIR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AND TO ELICIT THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE SPECIFIC MEASURES ENUMERATED.

(D) NATO COMMUNIQUE AND DECLARATION

11. THE DECEMBER MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY FURTHER TO SOUND OUT INFLUENTIAL DECISION-MAKERS AND TO TEST THEIR REACTIONS TO THE CANADIAN PROPOSALS. I FOUND ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS VERY RECEPTIVE TO MY APPEAL, ON BEHALF OF CANADA, THAT THEY INVOLVE THEMSELVES MORE DIRECTLY IN FINDING

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SOLUTIONS TO EAST/WEST PROBLEMS. THE EVIDENCE FOR THIS WAS CLEAR IN THE AGREEMENTS REACHED ON THAT OCCASION:

- MINISTERS ISSUED A SPECIAL "BRUSSELS DECLARATION" IN WHICH THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR RESPECT FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S "LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS" AND REITERATED EARLIER PLEDGES TO SEEK SECURITY "ON THE BASIS OF A BALANCE OF FORCES AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL"; BUT THEY ALSO AFFIRMED THEIR INTENTION TO DO THEIR "UTMOST TO SUSTAIN A SAFE AND PEACEFUL FUTURE" AND TO WORK WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WARSAW PACT STATES TO ACHIEVE A BALANCED AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP AND "GENUINE DETENTE". THE DECLARATION CLOSED WITH AN APPEAL FOR "AN OPEN, COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE".
- SECONDLY, MINISTERS ALSO UNDERTOOK TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE THEMSELVES IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND TO "REVIEW THE STATE OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS" TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY COULD BE MOVED FORWARD.
- THIRDLY, THEY AGREED PERSONALLY TO LEAD THEIR RESPECTIVE DELEGATIONS AT THE OPENING OF THE STOCKHOLM SECURITY CONFERENCE, AND

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- FOURTHLY, THEY COMMISSIONED THE NATO COUNCIL AT THE LEVEL OF AMBASSADORS TO REVIEW THE CURRENT STATE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND TO REPORT TO THE NEXT FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON WHAT ACTIONS MIGHT BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THOSE RELATIONS.

12. SUCH A HIGH DEGREE OF CONSENSUS WAS REMARKABLE, GIVEN THE AGITATED STATE OF POLITICAL DEBATE IN EUROPE OVER THE ISSUE OF INF DEPLOYMENT. IT ATTESTS TO THE WIDESPREAD CONCERN ALLIES SHARE WITH US ABOUT EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

(E) THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

13. THE 1975 HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WHICH WAS NEGOTIATED AT GREAT LENGTH, SOUGHT TO LAY DOWN SOME BASIC GROUND RULES FOR "SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE". THESE GROUND RULES, IT IS OFTEN OVERLOOKED, RELATED NOT ONLY TO HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN CONTACTS AND COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES; BUT ALSO TO MILITARY COOPERATION. THE RULES PRESCRIBED FOR THIS LATTER CATEGORY WERE MODEST ONES, ESSENTIALLY CONFINED TO RECIPROCAL NOTIFICATION OF LARGE MILITARY MANOEUVRES. HOWEVER, AT THE MOST RECENT OF THE GENERAL CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCES IN MADRID, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED INTER ALIA TO CONVENE A SPECIAL CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM TO DEVELOP AND EXPAND ON THE REGIME OF

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MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES LAID DOWN IN 1975, AS A MEANS OF REDUCING SUSPICIONS AND MAKING ARMS REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE EASIER TO ACHIEVE.

14. WITH THE INTERRUPTION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AT THE END OF LAST YEAR, AND A SOVIET THREAT NOT TO RESUME TALKS HANGING OVER THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA, GREAT HOPES WERE BEING PLACED ON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THAT THE CONFERENCE GOT OFF TO A GOOD START, AND THE WISDOM OF THE DECISION WHICH NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS TOOK IN BRUSSELS TO MEET IN STOCKHOLM ON THE EVE OF THE CONFERENCE AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INITIAL DEBATE.

15. IT ALSO PROVIDED A RARE AND FORTUITOUS OCCASION FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS FROM EAST AND WEST TO MEET AT A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TIME IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER.

16. IN MY SPEECH AT STOCKHOLM, I MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:

- ACRIMONIOUS RHETORIC IS FUTILE, AND THERE IS A NEED TO RESTORE AND DEEPEN DIALOGUE.

- 9 -

- THE SOVIET DECISION TO SUSPEND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WAS MOST REGRETTABLE AND WE URGE THEIR RESUMPTION AT THE EARLIEST MOMENT.
  
- THE TASK AT HAND IS "TO FIND WAYS OF REASSURING EACH OTHER ABOUT WHAT WE INTEND TO DO (AND) NOT TO DO".
  
- THIS REQUIRES, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE, AND THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OFFERS SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY IN AN ESPECIALLY APPROPRIATE WAY SINCE IT LINKS POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONFIDENCE BUILDING.
  
- ACCORDINGLY, THE CONFERENCE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO FAIL, IT MUST AVOID REHEARSING OLD GRIEVANCES, AND IT MUST ADOPT A BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON PRACTICAL MEANS OF ACHIEVING (A) "MORE OPENNESS ABOUT BASIC MILITARY INFORMATION (B) EARLIER NOTICE OF A WIDER RANGE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES (C) MANDATORY RATHER THAN VOLUNTARY EXCHANGES OF OBSERVERS AT IMPORTANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND (D) WAYS TO VERIFY ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED."

- 10 -

- THE KEY TO SUCCESS IS THAT MINISTERS BE PREPARED TO INTERVENE WHENEVER NECESSARY TO ENSURE FORWARD MOVEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE.

17. WESTERN NATIONS ARE TODAY TABLING IN STOCKHOLM PROPOSALS ON A SPECIFIC PACKAGE OF "SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES", WHICH GO SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND ANYTHING FOUND IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT,

18. THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ALSO PROVIDED ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS FROM A NUMBER OF ALLIED, NEUTRAL AND WARSAW PACT STATES. IN ALL INSTANCES I DETECTED A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO OUR CONCERNS. FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, WITH WHOM I HAD A MEETING, PRESENTED ME WITH AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF CURRENT TENSION, MUCH OF WHICH I DISAGREED WITH. BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION WAS NOT A GOOD ONE AND HE APPLAUDED OUR EFFORTS AT CORRECTING IT.

#### RESULTS TO DATE

19. REVERSING TRENDS SET BY THE DRIFT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL EVENTS IS NOT AN OVERNIGHT PROJECT, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS OF CHANGE. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE OFFERING A FULL ACCOUNTING IN DUE COURSE, BUT THE FOLLOWING POSITIVE ELEMENTS CAN BE NOTED,

- 11 -

- THE RESULTS OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING NOTED ABOVE,
- PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ HAVE EXPRESSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND ME THEIR CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE NEED TO REBUILD A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THEIR SPEECHES LAST WEEK, IN WASHINGTON AND STOCKHOLM RESPECTIVELY,
- PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HAS PUBLICLY EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEWS, NOTING IN A PRESS INTERVIEW THIS WEEKEND THE IMPORTANCE OF MORE CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND MORE AND BETTER MEASURES TO ENHANCE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE,
- OTHER NATO LEADERS HAVE VOICED SIMILAR CONCERNS,
- PREMIER ZHAO SPOKE ALONG SIMILAR LINES DURING HIS VISIT TO OTTAWA AND AGAIN ON HIS DEPARTURE FROM VANCOUVER,
- COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, IN THEIR GOA DECLARATION ON NOVEMBER 27, WELCOMED THE PRIME MINISTER'S CALL "FOR A NEW POLITICAL DIMENSION IN THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY" AND DECLARED THEIR SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORTS "TO RESTORE ACTIVE POLITICAL CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION AMONG ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS",

- 12 -

## CONCLUSION

20. WE HAVE EXPENDED GREAT EFFORTS, AND WE HAVE ACHIEVED SOME PROGRESS. IT IS A QUESTION OF PERSEVERING. THE NEED NOW IS FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO RESPOND MORE POSITIVELY THAN IT HAS TO DATE, TO RECOGNIZE A GREATER SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR MOVING EAST/WEST RELATIONS ONTO A MORE COOPERATIVE PLANE, TO TONE DOWN ITS RHETORIC, AND TO RAISE ITS EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

21. TO THIS END, I REPEAT WHAT I HAVE ALREADY SAID OUTSIDE THE HOUSE. I HAVE NEVER BEEN MORE CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR WESTERN POLITICAL LEADERS TO OPEN UP NEW LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO THE EAST AND FOR SOVIET LEADERS TO DO LIKEWISE.



TELEGRAM RETRANSMIT FORM

CONCENTRE:

Please repeat telegram number UNFC 8922

FROM WSHDC DATED 24JAN84

Classification UNCLASSIFIED (copy attached)


Action TO BNATO (DELIVER BY 27 0900) LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON

BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE WSHDC MSCO

~~INFO~~ WRSWA PRGUE PEKIN PRMNY

INFO: DMF CPD IDA IDR

DISTR \_\_\_\_\_

  
S. McNeel  
Authorizing Officer

IDDZ 5-5912 26JAN84  
Division Phone Date

NOTE: It is the responsibility of the authorizing officer to  
attach a copy of telegram to be repeated to this form.

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSHDC UNFC8922 24JAN84

TO ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS NRLNS

PHILA SFRAN SEATL CNGNY EXTOTT LIDDZ

DISTR UGP FPR

---PM INITIATIVE-NYT INTERVIEW

FOLLOWING ARE USABLE EXCERPTS FROM WIDE RANGING SESSION PM HAD  
WITH NYT EDITORIAL BOARD FRIDAY 20JAN.

1)MOSCOW VISIT TIMING.PM QUOTE PRESIDENT ANDROPOV SAYS THAT HE IS  
SUPPORTIVE AND ENCOURAGES ME TO PURSUE AND THAT THEY ARE IN GENERAL  
AGREEMENT WITH THE THRUST OF MY INITIATIVE...HE ANSWERED:QUOTE  
NO/NO,I WOULD RATHER NOT/NOT SEE ANYONE ELSE,BUT I WANT TO BE  
DISCUSSING DATES FOR SEEING YOU IN THE NOT/NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE  
UNQUOTE.I DO NOT/NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE RUSSIAN MEANS.IS IT IN  
A FEW WEEKS?WE HAD OUR SOVIET EXPERTS TRY AND GUESS WHAT THE  
EXPRESSION MEANS IN TERMS OF WEEKS.UNQUOTE

2)ASSESSMENT OF US AND RUSSIAN POSITION ON INITIATIVE.

PM QUOTE AT THE OUTSET,THERE SEEMED TO BE A RATHER COOL RECEPTION,  
BUT I HAVE TO SAY HONESTLY THAT WHEN I SAW PRESIDENT REAGAN IN  
DECEMBER HE MADE ALL THE RIGHT NOISES AND,INDEED,HE HAD AUTHORIZED  
SHULTZ IN BRUSSELS TEN DAYS BEFORE TO SIGN A DECLARATION,AS YOU  
KNOW,WHICH WAS USING A NEW LANGUAGE,A LANGUAGE OF EQUALITY RATHER  
THAN SUPERIORITY,A LANGUAGE OF RESPECTING THE OTHER SIDES SECURITY  
INTERESTS JUST AS WE WANT THEM TO RESPECT OURS,LEGITIMATE SECURITY

...2

PAGE TWO UNFC8922 UNCLAS

INTERESTS I BELIEVE WAS THE EXPRESSION:AND HIS STATEMENT THIS WEEK TALKING ABOUT COOPERATIVE EFFORTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION I THINK WITH THE SOVIETS WAS THE EXPRESSION...PRESIDENT REAGAN SEEMS DETERMINED TO MAKE SURE THAT HIS PEACEFUL INTENTIONS ARE WELL KNOWN AND UNDERSTOOD...I THINK IT IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT THE SOVIET PEOPLE DO NOT/NOT WANT WAR ANYMORE THAN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANT WAR.INDEED THEY ARE PROBABLY MORE AFRAID OF WAR THAN WE ARE OVER ON THIS SIDE AND THEREFORE THERE IS A REAL CONSTITUENCY FOR PEACE IN THE SOVIET UNION.UNQUOTE

3)ASSESSMENT OF INITIATIVE-SUCCESS OR FAILURE PM QUOTE I THINK THERE ARE STAGES OF SUCCESS...THE FIRST STAGE IF GETTING POLITICAL LEADERS INVOLVED...THE OBSESSION OF OUR SIDE HAS BEEN,I GUESS IN THE LAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS,TO MAKE SURE THAT WE DID NOT/NOT RENEGE ON OUR ULTIMATUM OF DECEMBER 1979,THE TWO-TRACK DECISION,THAT IF WE HAVE NOT/NOT MADE PROGRESS WE WILL DEPLOY...FOR THAT REASON,THE POLITICIANS WERE RELUCTANT TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES.WELL,THEY HAVE INVOLVED THEMSELVES NOW.THEY HAVE DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD GO TO STOCKHOLM AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL.SO THAT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IS A SUCCESS.THEN,OF COURSE,THE OBJECTIVE OF THAT IS,AS YOU PUT IT,TO RESUME THE DIALOGUE,TO REDUCE THE TENSIONS...SO THATS THE SECOND STAGE FOR MEASURING SUCCESS.THE THIRD AND REAL STAGE IS WHETHER THE ACTIONS OR THE DEEDS FOLLOW THE WORDS...THERE WILL BE VARIOUS TESTS OF SUCCESS...THOSE INDIVIDUAL THINGS THAT ARE ...3

PAGE THREE UNFC8922 UNCLAS

ENCOURAGING LIKE THE CHINESE CHANGED THEIR STANCE EVEN TOWARDS ME, BETWEEN WHAT THEY WERE TELLING ME IN PEKING IN NOVEMBER AND WHAT THEY WERE TELLING ME THIS WEEK IN OTTAWA--FIVE POWERS, THEY HAD A VERY FIRM LINE ON IT IN PEKING, BUT NOW THEY ARE NOT/NOT REJECTING THE POSSIBILITY THAT IF, AS MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THEY ARE INVITED TO BE PRESENT OR TO JOIN IN SOME GROUP, THEY WOULD CONSIDER JOINING, OR ACCEPTING THE INVITATION. UNQUOTE.

4) LIKELIHOOD OF WAR--NOW GREATER OR LESS.

PM QUOTE... WHEN TWO SIDES IN A DISPUTE HATE EACH OTHER, INSULT EACH OTHER AND SHOUT AT EACH OTHER, AND WHEN THEIR TECHNOLOGY IS VERY, VERY HIGHLY DEVELOPED, I WOULD SAY THE DANGER IS GREATER THAN WHEN THEY ARE SITTING DOWN, TALKING, PROGRESSING, KEEPING THEIR GUARD UP BY TRYING TO PROBE THE MOVEMENT AND TRYING TO ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT ... (PM REVIEWS ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF PERIOD OF DETENTE)... THAT IS WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO SEE OUT OF OUR SIDE, OUT OF THE UNITED STATES PARTICULARLY. THEY HAVE THE BRAINS, THEY HAVE THE GENIUS, THEY HAVE THE INVENTIVENESS AND IF THEY STOPPED BEING SO BLOODY SUSPICIOUS THEY WOULD BE TOSSING OUT SUGGESTIONS FOR PROGRESS RATHER THAN SAYING: WELL, WE HAVE GOT TO CONTINUE TO BUILD UP AND ONCE WE ARE VERY STRONG AND SUPERIOR TO YOU, THEN WE CAN TALK IN CONFIDENCE. THIS IS THE STUFF OF WHICH WARS ARE MADE. UNQUOTE.

5) NEED FOR INVOLVEMENT OF NON/ NON SUPERPOWERS.

PM QUOTE... THERE WAS A LONG PERIOD OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ...4

PAGE FOUR UNFC8922 UNCLAS

ALLIANCE,BUT IF AFTER A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME,THERE ARE NO/NO RESULTS,I THINK IT IS THE DUTY OF THE LEADERS OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO SAY:HEY,HEY,OUR PEOPLE ARE CONCERNED WITH THIS AND THEREFORE I WANT TO BE INVOLVED IN SOME WAY.NOW,WHAT DOES QUOTE IN SOME WAY UNQUOTE MEAN AND WHAT KIND OF PRESSURE DO YOU EXERCISE SINCE YOU CAN ONLY EXERCISE ON YOUR SIDE AND NOT/NOT ON THE OTHER,IS THE KIND OF QUESTION I HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO SOLVE WITH OTHERS IN THE PAST CONSIDERABLE TIME...TAKE THE MBFR TALKS IN VIENNA,THEY HAVE BEEN GOING ON SINCE 1971.WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR NO/NO PROGRESS THERE?I THINK WE ARE ALL PARTICIPANTS.WE ALL HAVE AMBASSADORS THERE WORKING AT THEM...AT SOME POINT,IT IS NOT/NOT JUST THE SUPER POWERS WHO CALL THE SHOTS...IF THERE IS SOME WAY IN WHICH WE CAN GET GREATER RESULTS BY A GREATER PARTICIPATION,I THINK YOU CAN AS WE DID IN GETTING MOVEMENT IN BRUSSELS AND HOPEFULLY BY GETTING MOVEMENT IN VIENNA,BUT ALSO I THINK THAT THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS WHO-AND IT IS NOT/NOT A COINCIDENCE-HAPPEN TO BE THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN PUT PRESSURE ON EACH OTHER UNQUOTE.

6)BREAKING ARMS NEGOTIATIONS DEADLOCK.

PM QUOTE...ONE IS TO SDAY,LETS ESCALATE BY ANOTHER STEP AND MEANWHILE DISCUSS SINCERELY WHICH IS A TWO TRACK DECISION.OR, TO DEESCALATE BY ANOTHER STEP AND THEN SEE IF THE OTHER SIDE WILL DEESCALATE.WHEN WE GO UP,THEY GO UP.AND WHEN THEY GO UP,WE GO UP ...5

PAGE FIVE UNFC8922 UNCLAS

AND SO ON.LET US SEE IF WHEN WE GO DOWN,THEY GO DOWN.AND NATO TOOK SUCH A DECISION IN ITS MEETING AT THE END OF OCTOBER WHEN IT DECIDED TO WITHDRAW 1,500 WAR-HEADS FROM EUROPE.IT HAD MADE THE SAME DECISION IN 1979 WHEN IT REDUCED 1,000 IN 1979.THESE ARE GOOD STEPS...THERE WILL HAVE TO BE SOME SPECIFIC INITIATIVES TAKEN.IT MIGHT BE A RATIFICATION OF SALT II,IT MIGHT BE A GENERAL TREATY OF NON/NON-AGGRESSION--AND I AM NOT/NOT A BELIEVER OF JUST GENERAL STATEMENTS OF DISARMAMENT--BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE TO AND THAT WAS MY ARGUMENT ABOUT THE PERIOD BETWEEN 62 AND 75.WE HAVE TO PUT PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE.THERE ARE CERTAIN TREATIES OF 1970S--74 AND 76--WHICH HAVENT BEEN RATIFIED.THERE IS THE SALT II THAT HASNT BEEN RATIFIED.THERE IS THE ANSWER TO THE MBFR SOVIET POSITION WHICH WAS BROUGHT OUT LAST JUNE OR JULY WHICH WE HAVENT ANSWERED YET.THERE ARE SEVERAL STEPS WE CAN TAKE WITHOUT LOWERING OUR GUARD...NOW THAT WE ARE USING THE RIGHT WORDS,I THINK WE MUST PROPOSE THE RIGHT DEEDS.  
UNQUOTE

7)SUFFOCIATION PROPOSAL

PM QUOTE...I AM VERY MUCH CONCERNED,NOT/NOT SO MUCH ABOUT THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR ARMS AS I AM ABOUT THE WILL BEHIND THEM,BUT I AM ALSO CONCERNED THAT THAT WILL WILL TRANSLATE ITSELF INTO NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USE OF ARMS IN OUTER SPACE.WE HAVENT TALKED ABOUT THAT BUT I THINK WE HAVE TO BE MUCH MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THAT THAN THE LITTLE MOVES ON THE CHESS BOARD NOW.I THINK ANY SIDE  
...6

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THAT IS PREPARED TO SAY THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PROHIBIT THE USE OF THE ASATS, THE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS IT WILL TAKE A LOT OF COURAGE TO DO SO BECAUSE I THINK THE AMERICANS THINK THAT THEY CAN MAKE A TECHNOLOGICAL END-RUN THERE AND I AM NOT/NOT SURE THE SOVIETS ARE TERRIFIED OF IT IN TERMS OF EXPENSE BUT THEY KNOW THAT THEY CAN EVENTUALLY CATCH UP IF WE DO SO AND I THINK THAT IS A QUANTUM LEAP INTO A MUCH MORE TERRIFYING STATE OF THE WORLD.UNQUOTE.

8)POSTS NOTE-PLEASE PASS TO PAOS.

9)IDDZ NOTE-THIS MAY BE USEFUL FOR OTHER NON/NON-US POSTS.

UUU/241 251655Z UNFC8922

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE PARIS WIFC6035 24JAN34

A EXTOTT(IDDZ

INFO BONN LDN WSHDC PRGUE WSAW STKHM/SCDEL/DELVOIE MOSCO BNATO

BPEST BGRAD BUCST NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/CPP PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/  
COLEMAN

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR RBD RBP XDV

REF VOTRETEL IDDZ0057 18JAN

---MISSION DE PAIX PAR PM: PRESSE FRANCAISE

DEPUIS LA PARUTION DE L EDITORIAL DE JACQUES AMALRIC EN PREMIERE  
PAGE DU MONDE EN NOVEMBRE DERNIER, LA PRESSE FRANCAISE N A FAIT  
MENTION DE L INITIATIVE DE PAIX DU PM QUE DANS CERTAINS ENTREFILETS  
RELATANT SON SEJOUR EN CHINE LORS DE LA CONFERENCE DU COMMONWEALTH.  
2. LA RECENTE RENCONTRE AVEC PEREZ DE CUELLAR A SUSCITE PAR AILLEURS  
QUELQUES MENTIONS DANS LES QUOTIDIENS ET A ETE EVOQUE BRIEVEMENT  
AU JOURNAL TELEVISE.

3. C EST SANS DOUTE LE MONDE QUI A DONNE LE TON A CETTE ATTITUDE DES  
MEDIA FRANCAIS. DE MANIERE GENERALE, LES JOURNALISTES QUE NOUS AVONS  
RENCONTRES VOIENT D UN OEIL SYMPATHIQUE LA MISSION DE PAIX MAIS  
N Y PRETENT GUERE DE CHANCE DE REUSSITE. LA CREDIBILITE FINALE DE  
L OPERATION SERA POUR EUX CONFIRMEE QUAND ANDROPOV DAIGNERA OU  
POURRA ACCUEILLIR TRUDEAU. SON PASSAGE ACTUEL DANS LES TROIS PAYS  
SATELLITE APPARAIT COMME UN RAJOUT A L ITINERAIRE INITIAL ET COMME

...2



PAGE DEUX WIFC6035 CONFD

UN MOYEN DE GAGNER DU TEMPS ET AINSI GARDER EN VIE LA FINALITE DE  
L INITIATIVE.

4.NOUS NE RATONS AUCUNE OCCASION POUR SOULIGNER A NOS CONTACTS DE  
PRESSE PRINCIPAUX NOUVEL OBS, LE MONDE, AFP ETC. QUE CANADA ENTEND  
MENER A BIEN CETTE INITIATIVE MEME SI LES EMBUCHES SONT PLUS  
NOMBREUSES QUE PREVUES. MAINTIENDRONS LE CONTACT AVEC NOS PRINCIPAUX  
INTERLOCUTEURS ET VOUS TIENDRONS AU COURANT DE TOUTE RETOMBEE SIGNI-  
FICATIVE QU AURAIT PU PROVOQUER NOUVELLE PHASE DU PELERINAGE DE PAIX  
DU PM.

CCC/193 241416Z WIFC6035

mf

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5148 24JAN84

TO EXTOTT/XDV JOHNSTONE PMOOTT/DURDIN DELIVER BY 240900

INFO PCOOTT/COLEMAN

TT CANDEL DAVOS/VAN TIGHEM DE BRN

DISTR (IDDZ MINA MINT RGBD RGB RSD FFR SCS MGT

---DAVOS 84 - PMS VISIT

WE ARE INFORMED BY VARIOUS DAVOS CONTACTS THAT SOMEONE FROM OTT HAS BEEN TELEPHONING HOTELS IN DAVOS AND KLOSTERS DIRECTLY AND GIVING INSTRUCTIONS RE PMS AND MEDIA VISIT. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THIS IS CAUSING CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION IN MINDS OF DAVOS HOTELS, INTERCONVENTION, EMF AND NOT/NOT LEAST OF WHICH, CANADIAN EMBASSY.

2. ALL PARTIES MOST GRATEFUL IF OTT WOULD CEASE THIS PRACTICE FORTHWITH AND ROUTE ALL REQUESTS VIA EMB OR VIA CANDEL DAVOS COORDINATOR ROGER BULL. BOTH OF US REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH ALL DAVOS PARTIES AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU.

UUU/205 241300Z ZNTD5148

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I E L

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -  
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M F

DE PARIS WIGR3199 24JAN84

A EXTOTT/IDIZ/RCR LIVRAISON 240900

INFO WSHDC BNATO BONN MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RBR IDR IDA

--- INITIATIVE DU PM

AU DOUBLE TITRE DE INTERET EXPRIME PAR PRES MITTERRAND DANS SA DERNIERE LETTRE AU PM CONCERNANT INITIATIVE MAIS AUSSI EN TANT QUE FRANCE ASSUME PRESIDENCE DE COMMUNAUTE (ET DONC DU COMITE POLITIQUE), IL SERAIT UTILE D'EXPLORER POSSIBILITE QU'AU TERME DU PROCHAIN PERIPLE EN EUROPE DE L'EST, MEMBRE DE DELCAN PUISSE AU RETOUR FAIRE ARRET A PARIS POUR PRESENTER CIT DEBRIEFING FINCIT SUR PRINCIPAUX RESULTATS DE CETTE PHASE. ADVENANT QUE CELA PUISSE SE CONCRETISER, COMPRENDREZ QUE TELLE OPERATION AURAIT DOUBLE AVANTAGE IE DEMONTRER NOTRE SOUCI A MAINTENIR LA FRANCE PLEINEMENT INFORMEE IE EVOLUTION DE INITIATIVE DE MEME QUE DE PERMETTRE QUE RESULTATS DE CETTE PHASE ET ETAT D'AVANCEMENT DE INITIATIVE SOIENT REPERCUTES AUPRES AUTRES PAYS DE COMMUNAUTE.

2. POUR CE FAIRE ENVISAGEONS RENCONTRE AVEC ANDREANI, DIR DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES AU QUAI ET/OU EVENTUELLEMENT RENCONTRE AVEC CONSEILLER A ELYSEE.

3. RECONNAISSANTS POUR VOS COMMENTAIRES A CETTE SUGGESTION AFIN QUE PUISSIONS PRENDRE DISPOSITIONS NECESSAIRES ADVENANT REPONSE QUE SOUHAITONS POSITIVE.

4. POUR RCR: RECONNAISSANTS PORTER PRESENT TEL A ATTENTION DE AMB DUPUY QUI VOUDRA SANS DOUTE POURSUIVRE QUESTION AVANT SON DEPART.

CCC/035 241200Z WIGR3199

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person M 2  
Local Time 11.52

*Mr. Calder*

Division Phoned 5 5917  
Person LC  
Local Time 15/12  
1630T

MF

CTION

UITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FM WSHDC UNGR1075 24JAN84  
TO EXTOTT(1DDZ) F L A S H

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ANDERSON PMDEL/PRGUE  
DISTR MINA UDD DMF UGB IDR URR RGB IFB CCB

---PEACE INITIATIVE:SELECTIVE FREEZE PROPOSAL  
WE HAVE HAD BRIEF OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK AT PROPOSAL MADE TO PM ON  
THIS TOPIC BUT HAVE NOT/HAD OCCASION TO STUDY IT IN DEPTH  
IN LIGHT OF ALL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AVAILABLE TO YOU.HOWEVER,  
WE HAVE SOME FUNDAMENTAL OBSERVATIONS TO MAKE ON PROPOSAL, BEARING  
INMIND THEY MAY ALREADY BE ASSUMED. IN LIGHT, IN PARTICULAR, OF  
DPM/SSEAS HIS WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH SHULTZ, WE TRUST THEY CAN  
BE FLAGGED FOR HIS ATTENTION.

2.WE CAN UNDERSTAND ATTRACTIVENESS OF IDEA OF FREEZE ON DEVELOPING,  
BUILDING AND DEPLOYING CERTAIN STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS.IT IS A  
FIRST STEP, A CHANGE IN THE TREND LINE, EVEN BRIEFLY, WHICH CLD IMPROVE  
POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGS.(YOU WILL RECALL GOTLIEB DEVELOPED  
IDEA ALONG THESE LINES AT AUTUMN CONSULTATIONS, TO A GENERALLY  
NEGATIVE RECEPTION).

3.BUT THERE ARE SOME BASIC PRESENTATIONAL POINTS TO BE MADE.TO  
THE ADMIN, A FREEZE, EVEN SELECTIVE, IS NOT/NOTAT THIS TIME SYNONOMOUS  
WITH DETERRENCE FOR A GREAT MANY REASONS WE HAVE DESCRIBED.IT WLD  
ALSO CUT RIGHT INTO THEIR START POSITIONS, SOMETHING WE HAVE SAID  
FROM OUTSET PM PEACE INITIATIVE WLD NOT/NOT DO.

PAGE TWO UNGR1075 CONF

4. ADMIN SHOULD THEREFORE BE CONSULTED ON THIS ISSUE, AND IN OUR VIEW, IT WLD BE GRAVE MISTAKE NOT/NOT TO DO SO. (A) IT IS USA HARDWARE THAT IS BEING FROZEN AND USA NEGS THAT WLD BE AFFECTED; (B) WE INSIST THAT USA CONSULT CDA ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS AND THEY HAVE A REASONABLE TRACK RECORD ON BOTH INF AND START; (C) IF PURPOSE OF ANY SUCH CDN PROPOSAL IS TO HAVE PRACTICAL RESULTS IT MUST INFLUENCE ADMIN BEHAVIOUR. TO INFLUENCE ADMIN BEHAVIOUR, WE MUST CONSULT. IF PURPOSE OF PROPOSAL IS NOT/NOT TO INFLUENCE ADMIN POSITION, OR BEHAVIOUR, THEN WE SHLD NOT/NOT PUT IT FORWARD.

5. MOREOVER, IF WE DID DECIDE TO CONSULT WITH USA ON THIS PROPOSAL, WE SHLD DO SO ON BASIS OF PROPERTIES OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THEMSELVES, NOT/NOT AS PART 1 OF SOME QUOTE FREEZE UNQUOTE. BAN ON ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS HAS OBJECTIVE MERIT AND SOME URGENCY AND WE SHLD PRESS IT. BUT TO DESCRIBE IT AS A FREEZE DETRACTS FROM OUR CASE AND FROM OUR SERIOUSNESS.

6. TERM HAS BECOME A CATCHALL WHOSE OWN ORIGINAL PROPONENTS USE IT PRIMARILY FOR DRAMATIC EFFECTS. THEY HAVE BY NOW SO SHADED AND QUALIFIED TERM TO HAVE CLOUDED OVER ANY SPECIFIC MEANING IT ORIGINALLY HAD, AT LEAST IN VIEW OF ARMS CONTROL COMMUNITY. TERM HAS INSTEAD BECOME SYNONYMOUS WITH ANTI-ADMIN MOVEMENT AND IS CONSEQUENTLY LOADED POLITICALLY. ADMIN WLD DEFINITELY EXPECT CDN GOVT TO KNOW THAT AND TO PLAY MATTER ACCORDINGLY.

CCC/241 241952Z UNGR1075

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM GENEV YTGR0438 24JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDA

DISTR IDAO IDAN IDR IDDZ

REF YOURTEL IDA0094 23JAN OURTEL YTGR0392 20JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:MEASURES

ASSUME YOU HAVE RECEIVED OUR REFTEL AND RELATED CORRESPONDENCE.

2.AISO TRUST THAT YOU ARE PREPARING INTRODUCTORY TEXT FOR  
DELIVERY AT TIME OF PRESENTATION OF PAPERS,SUITABLY GEARED TO  
LEVEL OF CDN SPEAKER AS WELL AS TO SUBSTANTIVE MATERIAL.

CCC/198 231215Z YTGR0438



External Affairs Affaires extérieures  
Canada Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

ACSIMILE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

TOR/TOR  
COMMUNICATIONS

1/2

SECURITY  
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

JAN 25 1 51 PM '84  
CANADIAN EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON

FM/DE

WSHDC PA280 24JAN84

TO/A

EXTOFF/IDDZ

INFO

UGP FPR

DISTR

3# FMO/OTT/COLEMAN DE OTT

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

NEWSPAPER CLIPPING: ZHAO

COMCENTRE: PLEASE FAX ATTACHED.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

P. GOSSAGE/AM

PUB AFF

X207

P. GOSSAGE

SIG

SIG

*CF Initiative*  
*Plan*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

*2/2* *A9*

Subject  
Sujet

Date *24/January/84* Publication *Washington Post*

## Zhao: Trudeau's Plan Helps Ease World Tensions

VANCOUVER, Canada, Jan. 23 (UPI)—Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang ended an arduous North American tour and left for Peking today after saying that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's peace initiative appears to be helping ease international tensions.

Zhao was in Vancouver on the final leg of the 16-day tour that took him to Washington and Ottawa among other cities.

In a interview broadcast on CTV's Canada-AM, Zhao was asked if he was prepared to commit China to "active participation," as one of the five nuclear powers, in multinational talks to curb the arms race.

"In Peking, we had useful discussions and in Ottawa we again discussed this question," he said. "Prime Minister Trudeau briefed me on the progress that he has made on his peace initiative since his visit to Peking.

"Since the visit, some signs of a relaxation of international tensions have begun to appear and of course this is only the beginning."

Trudeau leaves Wednesday for a tour of Eastern European nations to promote his plan to reduce nuclear tensions. It centers on a summit of the five major nuclear powers: the United States, Soviet Union, China, Britain and France.



INFO

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BUCST UYGR0179 24JAN84

TO PMOOTT/DURDIN DELIVER BY 240900

INFO EXTOTT (IDDZ PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR XDV

REF YOURTEL YIGR0010 20JAN YIGR0012 20JAN

---PMS VISIT-MEDIA

COMPLETED ALL PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEDIA.GRATEFUL FOR  
COMMENTS ON FOLLOWING:

2.ON ARRIVAL PRESS WILL DEPLANE BEFORE PM.SHORT QUOTE SCUM  
UNQUOTE AFTER OFFICIAL CEREMONY POSSIBLE.SEPARATE TRUCK WILL TAKE  
LUGGAGE TO INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL,DLRS 82 INSTEAD OF NORMAL 95  
CDN A NIGHT INCLUDES BREAKFAST(PHONE 13-70-40).(USED LAST  
WEEKEND TO EXAMINE TWO HOTELS SUGGESTED AND INTERCONTINENTAL ONLY  
ONELWITH AMENITIES AND FACILITIES REQUIRED.)ARE NOW TRYING TO  
ARRANGE TWO SMALLER BUSES ALONG WITH EMB MINI-VAN THAT WILL BE  
MADE AVAILABLE TO MEDIA.TWO CARS AND DRIVERS FOR COLEMAN AND  
DURDIN.LARGE BUS COSTS DLRS CDN 155 FOR TEN HRS AND MINI VAN  
COSTS DLRS CDN 7.50 AN HR.

3.SEPARATE MEDIA ROOM AVAILABLE IN INTERCONTINENTAL AT DLRS  
525 A DAY.ROOM HAS SPACE FOR ALL JOURNALISTS,TELEX ETC.OFF MAIN  
ROOM IS SMALLER ENTERTAINMENT SUITE WITH BAR.BAR CAN BE STOCKED  
BY EMB AND/OR HOTEL.WOULD YOU STILL REQUIRE HOSPITALITY SUITE?  
PHONES CAN BE INSTALLED MORNING 01FEB AND DISMANTLED EVFNING

...2

*Mr. Smith*

MAJOR FILE

PAGE TWO UYGR0179 RESTR

02FEB.DO YOU WANT ALL PHONES IN MEDIA CENTRE OR DO YOU WISH TO  
USE 8 SEPARATE BOOTHS FOR PHONES LOCATED JUST OUTSIDE ENTRANCE  
TO CENTRE?IF BOOTHS USED ONLY TWO PHONES NEED BE PLACED IN  
CENTRE ITSELF.COST FOR MEDIA CENTRE AS FOLLOWS:

TWO DAYS RENT 1050

TWO TELEX,TEN PHONES 1575

TOTAL CDN 2625

HOTEL CAN SUPPLY TABLES FOR CENTRE IN 40 CM X 120 CM OR 80 CM X  
120 CM.TO YOU HAVE PREFERENCE OR MINIMUM AMOUNT REQUIRED?

4.WITH MEDIA AND CREW HAVE TENTATIVELY RESERVED TWO FLOORS OF  
HOTEL.

5.FOR XDV:ASSUME ROMS OFFER TO COVER COSTS OF CREW WILL BE  
DECLINED AS RECIPROCAL COSTS WILL BE MUCH HIGHER WHEN PRES  
CEAUSESCU MAKES VISIT TO CDA.REQUIRE NAMES OF CREW BY RETURN TEL.

6.FOR IDDZ:WEATHER HAS BEEN UNSEASONABLY MILD THIS YEAR.FOR LAST  
FEW DAYS LOWS HAVE BEEN MINUS ONE TO PLUS ONE DEGREE AND HIGHS  
SIX TO TEN DEGREES CELSIUS LIGHT RAIN FALLING EVERY SECOND DAY.AS  
MOST OF COUNTRY NOW HAS SOME SNOW COVER WEATHER SHOULD BE LIKE  
LATE FALL IN TOR.NORMAL TEMP FOR THIS TIME OF YEAR IS LOW MINUS  
FOUR AND HIGHS ONE TO FIVE DEGREES CELSIUS.LONG RANGE FORECAST  
IS FOR FOGGY CONDITIONS,RAIN MIXED SNOW.GENERALLY COLD WITH  
STRONG WIND GUSTS.WARMING AND CLEARING TRAVEL TO BEGIN FEB 2 OR 3.

7.AS FINAL POINT OF DISCUSSION,MEDIA REPS IN MFA HAVE AGREED TO

...3

PAGE THREE UYGR0179 RESTR

HELP SET UP PROGRAMS FOR MEDIA NOT/NOT FULLY OCCUPIED IN VISIT  
AND FOR THOSE WISHING TO STAY LONGER.TO BE OF SERVICE HOWEVER  
THEY MUST KNOW BEFORE END OF THIS WEEK.GRATEFUL ANY GUIDANCE YOU  
CAN PROVIDE.

8.MFA HAVE JUST LOOKED OVER LIST AND OUR SUGGESTIONS AND PROVIDED  
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:A)MEDIA WILL NOT/NOT NEED TO EXCHANGE MONEY AT  
AIRPORT.IF THEY WISH,FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT HOTEL.B)WHAT COLOUR  
WILL BAGGAGE TAGS BE FOR MEDIA?C)WILL QUOTE SCUMS UNQUOTE TAKE  
PLACE JUST OUTSIDE MTG ROOMS IN HAPHAZARD FASHION OR INSIDE ROOM  
AT PREARRANGED TIME WITH MICROPHONES SET UP IN ADVANCE?

CCC/181 241240Z UYGR0179

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time 1330 NEW

*MASTER FILE*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0184 24JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 241400

INFO PRGUE WSAW BONN MOSCO WSHDC LDN PARIS BNATO BPEST BGRAD

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/DURDIN/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

DISTR XDV MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR RBD RBP

FROM SIMARD

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0082 23JAN

---PM VISIT TO ROMANIA:PROGRAM

A)ARRIVAL:BY END OF THIS WORKING DAY ROM AUTHORITIES WERE NOT/NOT YET IN POSN TO CONFIRM AGMT FOR ARRIVAL AT 1315.I SHOULD, HOWEVER RECEIVE ANSWER THIS EVENING ONCE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL COMES BACK FROM SNAGOV WHERE HE IS CONSULTING WITH PRES.I WILL PHONE IDDZ LATER TODAY.

B)LUNCHEON:UNLESS ROMS COME UP WITH BETTER SUGGESTION,I WILL OFFER PRIVATE LUNCH AS SUGGESTED FOR PM AND IMMED PARTY(8 PERSONS INCLUDING PM).

C)FIRST SESSION WITH PRES CEAUSESCU:TOLD ROM AUTHORITIES THAT FIRST SESSION WITH PRES CEAUSESCU COULD REMAIN,IN SPITE OF EARLIER ARRIVAL, SCHEDULED FOR 1600 PM.THIS SESSION WOULD PROBABLY EXTEND UP TO TIME OF OFFICIAL DINNER.

D)OFFICIAL DINNER:OFFICIAL DINNER IS SLATED FOR 2000 HRS(17 HRS IN REFTTEL WAS MISTAKE).PROTOCOL HAS ASKED FOR OUR SUGGESTION FOR INVITATIONS.SHOULD I GIVE NAMES CONTAINED IN YOURTEL XDV0045 22JAN

...2

PAGE TWO UYGR0184 CONF

(EVERYBODY LESS SUPPORT STAFF) PLUS TWO OFFICERS AT POST, DN GORESKY  
AND T MARR?

02FEB: HAVE INFORMED ROMS THAT WE DO NOT/NOT WISH WREATH-LAYING  
CEREMONY, GIVING RATIONALE AND PRECEDENTS. DO NOT/NOT KNOW YET IF  
SECOND SESSION WITH PRES CEAUSESCU WILL START AS A CONSEQUENCE AT  
0900 OR STILL SCHEDULED FOR 0930.

1230 OR 1300: MTG WITH PRESS. HAVE EXPLAINED KIND OF ENCOUNTERS WE  
DESIRE WITH PRESS, SCRUM FORMAT. THIS IS NOT/NOT USUAL IN ROMANIA.

1300 04 1330: LUNCHEONS. SEE SEPARATE TEL.

1530: DEPARTURE.

CCC/181 241615Z UYGR0184

MASTER FILE

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person CF  
Local Time 10h47

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0182 24JAN84

TO EXTOTT(1DDZ DELIVER BY 241000

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR XDV RGB RBR RBD

REF YOURTEL 1DDZ0083 23JAN

---PM VISIT TO ROMANIA

HAVE INFORMED ROMS THAT PM WOULD PROBABLY PREFER PRIVATE LUNCH ON  
02FEB, MENTIONING OTHERWISE HEAVY OFFICIAL SCHEDULE DURING PREVIOUS  
DAYS. BELIEVE THEY WERE NOT/NOT ENTIRELY HAPPY WITH THIS IDEA BUT  
EXPECT THEY WILL GIVE AGMT WHEN PROGRAM IS CONFIRMED, HOPEFULLY  
LATER TODAY.

2. SUGGEST BUCURESTI RESTAURANT BETTER KNOWN UNDER OLD NAME OF  
CAPSA (PHONETIC CAPSHA). FOOD IS NOT/NOT GREAT BUT IS IS AMONG  
BEST BY BUCST STANDARDS AND RESTAURANT HAS A LOT OF ATMOSPHERE.  
IT WAS FOUNDED IN 1952 AND HAS BEEN FOR OVER CENTURY RENDEZVOUS  
OF ROM INTELLIGENTSIA. AS USUAL IN RESTAURANTS, SERVICE IS ALWAYS  
BETTER IF PARTY IS SMALL. IF YOU AGREE, MAYBE WE SHOULD RESTRICT IT  
TO SIX PERSONS.

CCC/181 241350Z UYGR0182

*master FILE*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0181 24JAN84

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 241200

INFO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

DISTR RBP RBT RBD RBRD ZSI \ YDDZ

REF OURTEL UYGR0165 23JAN

---VISIT OF PM TRUDEAU TO BUCST:ROMANIAN PM BIOGRAPHY

FOLLOWING IS BIOGRAPHY OF CONSTANTIN DASCALESCU (PHONETIC DAHSKAH  
LESS KOO), PM SINCE MAY 1982:

PARA A CAREER FUNCTIONARY OF ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCR),  
CONSTANTIN DASCALESCU IS INVOLVED PRIMARILY IN DOMESTIC ECONOMIC  
MATTERS. HE IS CURRENTLY FIRST VICE CHRMN OF SUPREME COUNCIL OF  
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, A PARTY-STATE BODY THAT COORDINATES  
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PLANNING. BEFORE HE WAS NAMED TO HIS CURRENT POST,  
DASCALESCU HAD SERVED SINCE 1976 AS A MEMBER OF PCR SECRETARIAT.  
HIS INITIAL RESPONSIBILITIES THERE WERE FOR AGRIC, AND HE SERVED  
CONCURRENTLY AS CHRMN OF NATL UNION OF AGRIC PRODUCTION  
COOPERATIVES. DURING HIS LAST TWO YRS ON SECRETARIAT, HE WAS PARTY  
SECTY FOR ORGANIZATIONAL AFFAIRS. ALTHO HE LEFT SECRETARIAT WHEN HE  
BECAME PM, HE RETAINS TWO MAJOR PARTY POSTS: HE IS A MEMBER OF  
POLITICAL EXEC CTTEE, PCRS LEADING BODY, AND OF THAT CTTEES ELITE  
PERMANENT BUREAU.

PARA DASCALESCU BEGAN HIS PARTY CAREER IN THE PROVINCES AND GRADUALLY  
WORKED HIS WAY UP IN BOTH PARTY AND STATE HIERARCHY. SINCE 1965 HIS

...2

PAGE TWO UYGRØ181 CONFD

CAREER IN BOTH HIERARCHIES HAS BEEN CENTERED IN BUC T.DASCALESCU IS KNOWN TO BE A STRONG SUPPORTER OF PRES CEAUSESCU AND DOES NOT/NOT SHOW ANY DESIRE TO CLIMB ANY HIGHER IN EITHER HIERARCHY.HE LACKS A STRONG POWER BASE OF HIS OWN AND IS NOT/NOT A STRONG PERSONAL FIGURE SUCH AS FM STEFAN ANDREI.DASCALESCU HAS TRAVELLED TO WESTERN EUR FOUR TIMES WITH PARTY DELS AND ACCOMPANIED PRES CEAUSESCU TO BREZHNEVS FUNERAL IN 1982.

DASCALESCU,AGED 63,SPEAKS NO/NO ENGLISH OR FRENCH.

CCC/181 241345Z UYGRØ181



MASTER FILE

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person EF  
Local Time 10h29

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0180 24JAN84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ DELIVER BY 241200  
INFO PRGUE

DISTR XDV RBD RBR

---PMS INITIATIVE:VISIT TO ROMANIA

DISCUSSED QUESTION OF VISAS WITH MFA.ROMS WOULD PREFER ALL CREW,MEDIA  
ETC TO HAVE VISAS AND HAVE INSTRUCTED THEIR EMB IN PRGUE TO ISSUE  
VISAS ON 25JAN.

2.ON SEPARATE POINT,ROMS WISH TO KNOW WHAT LANGUAGE PM TRUDEAU LIKELY  
TO USE AS ONLY ONE INTERPRETER WILL BE WITH PRES CE USESCU AND HE  
DOES NOT/HAVE ONE WHO IS FLUENT IN BOTH ENGLISH AND FRENCH  
(REF OURTEL UYGR0174 23JAN TO XDV).

CCC/181 241335Z UYGR0180

ACT ON  
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRGUE WOGRO165 24JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ XDV

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

DISTR RBD

---PMS VISIT TO PRGUE

HAVE ADVISED OFFICIALS OF YOUR 20:45 DEPARTURE. THEY  
HAVE DECIDED TO HOLD PROGRAM TO ANTICIPATED ARRIVAL OF  
10:30 AM HERE WITH UNDERSTANDING YOU MAY BE A BIT LATER.

2. WERE HANDED PROGRAM WHICH MET EXPECTATIONS WITH  
EXCEPTION OF CALL ON PRESIDENT HUSAK. ITEM READS QUOTE  
PE TRUDEAU RECEIVED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK  
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AT THE PRGUE CASTLE. PRESENT WILL  
BE L STROUGAL, HD PEEL AND INTERPRETER. UNQUOTE. WE HAVE  
FORCEFULLY MADE POINT THAT WE CONSIDER THESE TALKS  
BETWEEN THE TWO POLITICAL LEADERS TO BE OF PRIMARY  
IMPORTANCE AND WANT NO/NO MISUNDERSTANDING THAT CALL  
ON PRESIDENT IS ANYTHING BUT FULL WORKING SESSION.  
POINT TAKEN. DISAGREEMENT ON SIZE OF PARTY ACCOMPANYING  
PM TRUDEAU ON HUSAK CALL REMAINS. WE OFFERED NO/NO  
CONCESSION FROM ONE/ONE PLUS FOUR/FOUR PRESUMING THEY  
WERE NOT/NOT ENTITLED TO NEGOTIATE. ITEM WILL REQUIRE  
RESOLUTION PRESUMABLY WHEN PMS DISCUSS PROGRAM ON ARRIVAL  
AT GOVT VILLA.

...2

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PAGE TWO WOGRO165 CONFID

3. PM WILL BE MET ON ARRIVAL BY PM STROUGAL; DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT OF THE CZECH SOCIALIST REPUBLIC (CSR) JOSEF KORCAK; CZECHOSLOVAK DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS LADISLAV GERLE, KAROL LACO, AND MATEJ LUCAN; DEPUTY PM AND STATE PLANNING COMMISSION CHAIRMAN SVATOPLUK POTAC; FOREIGN MINISTER BOHUMIL CHNOUPEK; DEFENCE MINISTER MARTIN DZUR; INTERIOR VICE MINISTER JAN KOVAC; PRGUE MAYOR FRANTISEK STAFKA; AUGUSTIN HUBKA, CHIEF OF STAFF TO PM STROUGAL; AND JAROMIR JOHANES, VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

4. CARS FOR CONVOY WILL BE NUMBERED. DELEGATION WILL BE HANDED A CAR SPECIFYING CAR AND ACCOMMODATION ASSIGNMENTS ON ARRIVAL (PREPARED BY HOSTS). PLEASE DISREGARD THEIR CAR ASSIGNMENTS AND EXECUTE FOLLOWING: IN ZIL, PM TRUDEAU, AND PM STROUGAL; SECURITY CAR, CARTER; CAR 2 (EMBASSY VEHICLE) HD PEEL, JE JOHNSON PLUS PMS BAGGAGE; CAR 4 T AXWORTHY, R FOWLER; CAR 5 P HANCOCK, C VIAU; CAR 6 GJ SMITH, R COLEMAN, CAR 7 M DURDIN, J HUDON, T PRUSAKOWSKI; CAR 8 R COOPER, C CARDINAL, J MAILHOT, CAR 9 EXTRA (OR FOR DESCHAMBAULT TO FOLLOW BAGGAGE TRUCKS).

8. AS INSTRUCTED MADE POINT THAT HOSTS GENEROSITY OF HANDLING EXPENSES WAS MORE THAN COULD BE RECIPROCATED. WE MADE OFFER TO COVER COSTS ABOVE OUR NORMAL LEVELS.

...3

PAGE THREE WOGR0165 CONF

REPLY WAS THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT PM AND DELEGATION WERE GUESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NO/NO FURTHER REFERENCE TO THIS POINT WAS NECESSARY.

6.TOASTS WILL BE MADE AT START OF DINNER.

THEY EXPECT OUR TOAST ON ARRIVAL(JOHNSTONE TO MACKENZIE PLEASE).HOSTS HAD UNDERTAKEN TO PROVIDE ROSE REQUIREMENTS ONLY TO ANNOUNCE AT THIS LATE DATE THAT THEY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.WE ARE SCRAMBLING BUT IF YOU COULD BRING REQUIREMENTS AS BACK UP,WE WOULD APPRECIATE.

7.WEATHER FORECAST ON ARRIVAL IS CLOUDS WITH POSSIBILITY OF LIGHT SNOW,TEMP -3 DEGREES C.NOW ABOUT 2 CM OF SNOW ON GROUND.

8.BON VOYAGE/STATSNOU CESTU/GUTE REISE/DRUM BUN.

CCC/175 240740Z WOGR0165

A TION  
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNCR0160 24JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO WSHDC MOSCO BNATO ROME PARIS BONN VMBFR HAGUE PEKIN TOKYO

PRMNY CANMILREPNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS

GENEV OSLO COPEN ATHNS

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBD ZSI MINE MINT UGB IDD RBR RCR

RSR RCD RSD CPD ZSP URT URE LCD LSD

REF WSHDCTEL UNGR1070 23JAN OURTEL XNCR0414 20JAN

---USA/USSR RELATIONS:FCO VIEWS

WSHDC<sup>2</sup> REFTEL PROVIDES USEFUL COUNTERPOINT TO WHAT IS INDEED  
INCREASINGLY POPULAR MEDIA VIEW HERE.WE MIGHT HOWEVER CLARIFY  
THAT CONVERSATIONS REPORTED OURTEL WITH FCO DEFENCE AND SOVIET  
DEPTS WERE INTENDED PRIMARILY TO SEEK FRANK ASSESSMENT OF THEIR  
THINKING ON ROLE OF CDN INITIATIVE.COMMENTS CONCERNING REAGAN  
SPEECH WERE MADE IN PASSING TO ILLUSTRATE VARIETY OF REASONS  
WHICH HAVE INFLUENCED RECENT CHANGES IN EMPHASIS IN EAST/WEST  
RELATIONS,AND SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS REPRESENTING CONSIDERED  
FCO VIEW ON MOTIVATIONS BEHIND PRESIDENTS SPEECH.THIS COMMENT  
LIKE OTHERS OUR REFTEL SHOULD BE PROTECTED,HENCE CEO  
CLASSIFICATION.

CCC/253 241423Z XNCR0160

Division Phoned.....  
Person PF  
Local Time 10L47

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRGUE WOGRO158 24JAN84

TO EXTOTT(1DDZ DELIVER BY 240900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN WSAW BUCST

DISTR XDV MINA USS IFB RGB RBD RBR RBP

REF YOURTEL 1DDZ0086 23JAN

---PMS VISIT PROGRAMME

WE HAVE PRESSED AND SHALL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR PM PLUS  
FOUR AT MTG WITH PRES HUSAK.WE FEEL SURE THEY WILL  
ACCEPT PM PLUS TWO,MAYBE MORE.WE HAVE EMPHASIZED FROM  
OUTSET THAT WE WANTED THIS MTG(QUOTE CALL UNQUOTE,WE  
THINK,HAS SIMPLY BECOME CONVENIENT SHORTHAND)TO BE THE  
MAJOR ONE OF VISIT AND TO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR  
SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSION OF PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE BY THE  
SENIOR POLITICAL FIGURES OF BOTH COUNTRIES.WE MAKE CLEAR  
THAT IT WAS FOCUS OF HIS VISIT.

2.FOR REASONS OF THEIR OWN,CZECHOSLOVAKS HAVE DECIDED  
PM STROUGAL WILL BE HOST AND ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN HANDS  
OF HIS OFFICE.PROTOCOL ALONE PROVIDES SUFFICIENT  
RATIONALE FOR THIS.IT IS HARD TO TELL WHETHER IT ALSO  
REFLECTS DEVELOPING CHANGES IN IN THE INTERNAL POWER STRUCTURE  
BUT OUR IMPRESSION REMAINS THAT HUSAK(NOW 71)IS STILL  
IN CONTROL OF THE PARTY STRUCTURE AND WITHOUT DOUBT THE  
NUMBER ONE LEADER.AS COMPENSATION,WE WOULD NOTE THAT ANY  
SHIFT IN BALANCE FAVOURING STROUGAL WOULD ALSO FAVOUR MORE

...2

MASTER FILE

PAGE TWO WOGRO158 CONF

MODERATE, PRAGMATIC POLICIES. POWER WITHIN THE PARTY IS MORE BROADLY SHARED HERE THAN IN SOME OTHER COUNTRIES IN EAST EUROPE.

3. CZECHOSLOVAKS, AND PERHAPS HUSAK HIMSELF, MAY BE A LITTLE NERVOUS ABOUT HUSAKS ABILITY TO HOLD UP HIS SIDE IN SERIOUS CONVERSATION WITH PM TRUDEAU. AFTER ALL, MOST OF HIS MTGS WITH NON-COMMUNIST FOREIGNERS ARE PRO FORMA AND LACKING IN SUBSTANCE AND HE HAS ALMOST NO/NO EXPERIENCIE WITH WESTERN, ESPECIALLY NATO LEADERS. PM TRUDEAUS REPUTATION IS VERY HIGH HERE. THEY MAY THUS INDEED BE TRYING TO SQUEEZE US A LITTLE ON TIME. THEIR INSISTENCE ON BEGINNING AT 1030 MAY BE PLOY TO LEAVE LENGTH OF MTG TO CDN SIDE, KNOWING THAT PM HAS HIS OWN INTEREST IN GETTING AWAY. EVENTS SCHEDULED FOR PERIOD FROM 1200 ON CAN HOWEVER EASILY BE DELAYED IF PM DOES NOT/NOT APPEAR AND SCHEDULE NEED NOT/NOT BE ITEM OF PARTICULAR CONSIDERATION. WE HAVE SAID MTG SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO LAST TWO/TWO HOURS AND THEY HAVE AGREED IT IS OPEN ENDED BUT THEY MAY NEVERTHELESS BE AIMING AT HAVING PM TRUDEAU SHORTEN IT HIMSELF. ON OTHER HAND, THEY COULD SIMPLY BE TRYING TO ACCOMMODATE WISHES OF THEIR PRES AND OUR PM, GIVEN INFLEXIBILITY OF DARKNESS AND DEPARTURE TIME.

4. YOUR ARE, OF COURSE, RIGHT TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS MTG. I THINK STRUCTURE WILL BE WORKED OUT BUT SUBSTANCE IS

...3

PAGE THREE WOGR0158 CONF

LIKELY TO BE A PROBLEM. CZECHOSLOVAKS, PARTICULARLY PRES,  
MAY NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO BREAK OUT OF STANDARD FORMULAS.  
THEY ARE STUCK WITH SOVIET LINE AND MAY BE MORE INFLEXIBLE  
IN EXPRESSING IT THAN SOVIET LEADERS WOULD BE. (SEE OURTEL  
WOGR0142 20JAN). WE CANNOT/NOT RULE OUT BUT CANNOT/NOT  
EXPECT ANY ORIGINAL THINKING OR SPONTANEOUS REACTION.  
OFFICIALS WILL NOW BE BUSY OUTLINING THE LIMITS TO WHICH  
CONVERSATION AT THESE MTGS CAN GO AND THEY ARE SURE TO HAVE  
SOUGHT SOVIET ADVICE (WHAT IS SAID HERE WILL ALSO BE PASSED  
TO MOSCO). I AM AFRAID PM MUST EXPECT CERTAIN AMOUNT  
OF FRUSTRATION, DEPENDING, OF COURSE, ON JUST WHAT IT IS HE  
EXPECTS FROM VISIT. I DO NOT/NOT THINK EXPECTATIONS SHOULD  
BE SET VERY HIGH IN TERMS OF ACTUALLY INFLUENCING LEADERS  
TO DO SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE ABOUT STATE OF EAST/WEST  
RELATIONS, BUT YOU WERE AWARE OF THIS BEFORE DECIDING ON  
VISIT. IN TERMS OF REGISTERING PMS OWN CONCERN AND VIEWS,  
AND OF RAISING LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF OUR OWN AND WESTERN  
POSITIONS, EXPECTATIONS CAN BE HIGHER. IT SHOULD ALSO BE  
USEFUL, AND UNUSUAL FOR THEM, SIMPLY TO INVOLVE CZECHOSLOVAK  
LEADERS IN THIS KIND OF SERIOUS GLOBAL DISCUSSION.

5. ON OTHER POINTS, PRESS ENCOUNTER FOLLOWING MTG WITH  
STROUGAL CAN BE DESCRIBED SIMPLY AS BRIEFING WITH NO/NO  
REF TO PMS PRESENCE. NOTE THAT IT WILL TAKE PLACE IN PM

...4



PAGE FOUR WOGR0158 CONFD

STROUGALS OFFICIAL PALACE AND THAT HE IS PREPARED TO TAKE  
PART.

6.ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH ROMANIAN AND GDR  
EMBASSIES TO ISSUE ANY NECESSARY VISAS HERE;BOTH HAVE BEEN  
VERY COOPERATIVE.

7.WE HAVE FINAL MTG WITH PM STROUGALS OFFICIALS AT 1730  
(IE 1130 OTT TIME)TODAY AND WILL REPORT FOLLOWING IT.  
YOU COULD,IF NECESSARY,TELEPHONE US PRIOR TO MTG.

CCC/175 241420Z WOGR0158

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSAW UMAG0126 24JAN84

TO PMOOTT IMMED

INFO EXTOTT XDV LIDDZ PCOOTT/FOWLER

REF YOURTEL PM00056

---PMS VISIT-MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

THERE IS NO/NO PROBLEM FOR THEM TO CROSS OVER FROM EAST TO WEST  
BERLIN. HOWEVER, UNLESS THEY HAVE A MULTI-ENTRANCE GDR VISA, THEY  
WILL BE UNABLE TO CROSS BACK INTO EAST BERLIN IF THEY WISHED TO  
DO SO. THERE IS THE RUB.

UUU/235 241430Z UMAG0126

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT MGTC0106 24JAN84

TO PRGUE DELIVER BY 250600

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

DISTR LIDDZ XDV RBD

REF YOURTEL WOGR0165 24JAN

---PMS VISIT TO PRGUE

PLEASE INFORM ORIGINATOR REFTEL NOT/NOT SEEN BY ACTION

ADDRESSEES TODAY AS COPIES PROCESSED DUPE ROOM MGTC AT APPROX  
1930 LOCAL TIME.(NOTE THAT ACTION LINE DID NOT/NOT CONTAIN  
DELIVER BY INSTRUCTIONS, THEREFORE TREATED AS ROUTINE TRAFFIC).

2.HAVE CONTACTED DESK OFFICER AND HE REQUESTS THAT GJ SMITH BE  
ADVISED OF REFTEL IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL PRGUE

CCC/081 250230Z MGTC0106

MF

A ION  
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I E L

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_

Person \_\_\_\_\_

Local Time 241330 DUN

DE BERN ZNGR0066 24JAN84

A EXTOTT/IDDZ LIVRAISON 241400

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTRGRBD RSR RGB MINA

REF NOTRETEL ZNGR0065 24JAN

---RENCONTRE PM-AUBERT

AFIN D EVITER D ETRE BOUSCULE SUR LE PLAN DU TEMPS, JACCARD PROPOSE  
DE COMMENCER RENCONTRE AVEC AUBERT A 11H00 A ZURICY. LIEU SERA LE  
GRAND HOTEL DOLDER.

2. HORAIRES DU LUN 30JAN SERAIT DONC LE SUIVANT:

08H15: DEPART DE DAVOS

11H10/ARRIVEE ZURICH, GRAND HOTEL DOLDER

11H00-12H00: ENTRETIEN AVEC CONSEILLER FEDERAL AUBERT

12H00: APERTIFS

12H30: DEJEUNER

14H15: DEPART POUR L AEROPORT DE ZURICH. VOITURE SE RENDRONT A L AVION.

3. ARRANGEMENTS DE PRESSE DEVRONT ETRE COORDONNES AVEC CHEF DE PRESSE  
DU DEPT DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES. MLE DUMOULIN ASSURERA LE SUIVI. EN  
PRINCIPE SUISSSES PREVOIENT QUELLES JOURNALISTES POURRONT PRENDRE DES  
PHOTOS AU DEBUT DE L ENTRETIEN. IL NE SERAIT PAS/PAS PREVU QUE PM OU  
AUBERT PARLE DIRECTEMENT A LA PRESSE A L ISSUE DE L ENTRETIEN, CETTE  
TACHE POUVANT ETRE REMPLIE DE PART ET D AUTRE PAR UN PORTE-PAROLE

4. AVISEZ.

CCC/205 241725Z ZNGR0066

Division Phoned.....

Person..... CF

Local Time..... 10h05

**A NION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BERN ZNGR0065 24JAN84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ LIVRAISON 240900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RGB RGBD RSR MINA

REF VOTRETEL IDDZ0072 21JAN NOTRETEL ZNGR0064 23JAN

---PM RENCONTRE AVEC AUBERT

JACCARD A CONFIRME AUJOURD HUI LE DEJEUNER A ZURICH A UN RESTAURNAT  
QUI RESTE ENCORE A ETRE DETEMRINE SELON CE QUI CONVIENDRA LE MIEUX AUX  
DEPLACEMENTS DU PM.

2.LES SUISSSES PROPOSENT QUE QUATRE PERSONNES ACCOMPAGNENT LES  
PRINCIPAUX.M AUBERT SERA VRAISEMBLABLEMENT ACCOMPAGNE DE RAYMOND  
PROBST,SECRETAIRE D ETAT;AMBASSADEUR EDOUARD BRUNNER,DIRECTEUR DES  
ORGANISATIONS INTERNATLES ET SECRETAIRE D ETAT DESIGNE;AMBASSADEUR  
FRANZ MUHEIM,SOUS-DIRECTEUR DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATLES ET  
PHILIPPE JACCARD,DIRECTEUR DE CABINET.

3.SUR LA BASE DE LA LISTE DE DELEGATION VOUS NOUS AVEZ FAIT PARVENIR,  
J AI MENTIONNE QUE PM SERAIT VRAISEMBLABLEMENT ACCOMPAGNE,A PART DE  
MOI-MEME,PAR AXWORTHY,FOWLER ET PEUT ETRE D UN RESPONSABLE DES  
AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SUR LES QUESTIONS DE SECURITE INTERNATLE.DOIT  
CONFIRMER LA LISTE DQP.

4.AUBERT SERA ACCOMPAGNE DE SES PRINCIPAUX CONSEILLERS QUI FORMENT  
EGALEMENT L EQUIPE DIRIGEANTE DE SON DEPARTEMENT.PROBST EST UN ANCIEN  
AMBASSADEUR A WSHDC.SON POSTI<sup>1</sup> EST A PEU PRES L EQUIVALENT DU SOUS-

...2

PAGE TWO ZNGR0065 CONFD

SECRETAIRE D ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES CHEZ NOUS.IL A PARTICIPE  
A LA CONFERENCE DE BILDERBERG AU CDA L AN DERNIER.BRUNNER EST SON  
SUCCESSEUR DESIGNE PAR PROBST PREND SA RETRAITE EN AVR.IL A ETE LE  
MAITRE D OEUVRE DE LA PARTICIPATION SUISSE A LA CSCE.C EST LE  
CERVEAU POLITIQUE DU DEPARTEMENT QUI ACCEDE A CES FONCTIONS  
RELATIVEMENT JEUNE(49 ANS)ET SANS AVOIR OCCUPE DE GRAND POSTE A  
L ETRANGER,CHOSE INOUIE EN SUISSE.MUHEIM,ANCIEN MINISTERE A WSHDC  
SUCCEDERA AUX FONCTIONS ACTUELLES DE BRUNNER.IL COORDONNE LA  
POSITION SUISSE A LA CONFERENCE DE STKHM.JACCARD EST UN DIPLOMATE  
DE CARRIERE INTERMEDIAIRE AU DEPT.TOUS SONT DES INTERLOCUTEURS  
FREQUENTS,AVISES ET PARTICULIEREMENT INTERESSES AU CDA

M DE GOUMOIS

CCC/205 241330Z ZNGR0065

NEO

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PMOOTT PM00059 24JAN84

TO BUCST IMMED

INFO EXTOTT XDV IDDZ PCOOTT/FOWLER  
FROM DURDIN

REF YOURTEL UYGR0179 24JAN

---PMS VISIT--MEDIA

PARA 2:PM WILL NOT/NOT QUOTE SCRUM UNQUOTE WITH PRESS ON ARRIVAL.

PARA 3:WOULD PREFER THAT SMALL SUITE ADJOINING  
PRESS CENTRE BE USED AS BRIEFING ROOM.

HUDON STILL REQUIRES SUITE STOCKED BY EMB.

PHONES SHOULD BE INSTALLED IN PRESS CENTRE.

WORKING SPACE(TABLES)FOR 20 JOURNALISTS

ADEQUATE IN PRESS CENTRE.

PARA 7:ONLY PAUL KORING,CHRIS YOUNG WILL REMAIN

IN BUCST AFTER PMS DEPARTURE.BOTH

ARE BASED IN LDN AND EXPECT THEY WILL

DEPART NEXT AVAILABLE FLIGHT.

PARA 8:MEDIA BAGGAGE TABS ARE LIGHT GREEN.

PLEASE ADVISE HOTEL THAT MEDIA TRAVEL WITH

LARGE AMOUNT OF HEAVY EQUIPMENT(TV

EDITING SUITES).HOTEL SHOULD HAVE

ADDITIONAL STAFF TO ASSURE PROMPT

DISTRIBUTION ON ARRIVAL.PMS MEETINGS

WITH PRESS WILL BE PREARRANGED WITH MIKES

AND SOUND SYSTEM.

CCC/001 241910Z PM00059

MF

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

READDRESSSED FM PRGUE 24JAN84 TO WSAW IMMED  
FM PMOOTT PM00056 23JAN84

TO PRGUE IMMED

INFO EXTOTT XDV LIDDZ PCOOTT/FOWLER

---PMS VISIT-MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

CP AND UPC PHOTOGRAPHERS WONDERING WHETHER THEY CAN  
TRAVEL TO WEST BERLIN TO FILE THROUGH AP AND UPI  
OFFICES. IS THIS PRACTICAL?

UUU/175 240850Z PM00056



UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT XDV0053 24JAN84

TO PRGUE WSAW BUCST BERN CANDELDAVOS

DISTR UDDZ

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE

FOLLOWING ARE DEL DETAILS READ IN COLUMNS NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, PLACE  
OF BIRTH, HOME ADDRESS, PASSPORT NO, DATE AND PLACE OF ISSUE.

2. PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU, 18 OCT 19, MONTL, 24 SUSSEX DRIVE, OTT, DD-26383,  
13 MAR 80, OTT.

3. ROBERT R. FOWLER, 18 AUG 44, OTT, 216 HOLMWOOD AV. OTT, DD-028714, 27 AUG 81,  
OTT.

4. J. EDWARD JOHNSON, 01 FEB 46, LONDON, ONT., 2-188 GLEBE AV. OTT, DD-030864,  
30 NOV 82, HULL.

5. P. HANCOCK, 16 MAR 38, STOKESBY, U.K., 121 WAVERLEY ST. OTT, DD-25442,  
12 JUN 79, OTT.

6. G. H. SMITH, 08 AUG 44, TORONTO, ONT., 367 HURON, OTT., DD-026927, 15 JUN 81,  
BRUSSELS.

7. RALPH COLEMAN, 27 MAY 45, TORONTO, ONT., 2784 SPRINGLAND, OTT., DD-030568,  
22 SEP 82, OTT.

8. BENSON VAUGHAN JOHNSTONE, 19 DEC 34, BOSTON, USA, 4-292 DALY AVENUE, OTT.  
DD-34390, 19 JAN 84, HULL.

9. CECILE VIAU, 28 NOV 21, HULL, 110 DU CHATEAU, APP. 509, HULL, DD-02687,  
11 JUN 80, OTT.

10. MARTHA DURDIN, 03 DEC 55, OTTAWA, 216 RIDEAU TERRACE, APPT. 4, OTT,

...2

PAGE TWO XDV0053 UNCLAS

DD-030901,17DEC82,HULL.

11.JACQUES HUDON,07JUN51,AMOS,QUE.,88 NEVERS,GATINEAU,FS-82355,  
19AUG83,HULL.

12.GEORGE MIFFLIN CARTER,11DEC35,FORT UNION,NEWFOUNDLAND,184-C WOOD-  
RIDGE CRES.,NEPEAN,DD-028685,22AUG81,OTT.

13.ROBERT COOPER,25JUL50,NIAGARA FALLS,ONT.,RIVER ROAD,MANOTICK,ONT,  
SS-73440,16DEC80,OTT.

14.T. PRUSAKOWSKI,09NOV59,WINNIPEG,MAN.,3-376 BELISLE,VANIER,FS-  
83567,24JAN84,HULL.

15.COLETTE CARDINAL,02JUL42,OTTAWA,960 TELFORD AV.,OTT,SS-082997,  
02NOV83,HULL.

16.E.HORNER,10FEB26,DARTMOUTH,N.S., CANADIAN EMBASSY,WSHDC,  
DD-031338,28OCT83,WSHDC.

17.J.MAILHOT,30OCT42,GATINEAU,QUE,75 BERARD,GATINEAU,DD-028826,  
18SEP81,OTTAWA.

18.J.DESCHAMBAULT,25JUL46,OTTAWA,10SUSSEX DRIVE,OTT,SS-080299,  
17DEC82,OTT.

UUU/131 242357Z XDV0053

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT XDV0053 24JAN84

TO PRGUE WSAW BUCST IMMED

DISTR LIDDZ RBD RBR XDX

---VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER OUTSIDE CANADA

AUTHORIZED GUIDELINES WHICH HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THE HOSTING OF VISITS TO CANADA BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HOSPITALITY TO A MAXIMUM OF 10/10 PERSONS. THIS NUMBER CAN BE INCREASED WHEN THE VISITOR MAKES OFFICIAL VISITS OUTSIDE OF OTTAWA TO INCLUDE VISITORS HEAD OF POST AND SPOUSE.

2. THE HOSPITALITY OFFERED INCLUDES THE PROVISION OF ACCOMMODATION (GUEST HOUSE OR HOTEL) AND TRANSPORTATION. PROVISION IS ALSO MADE ON ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT TO TRANSPORT ALL MEMBERS OF DELEGATION FROM AND TO THE AIRPORT. BAGGAGE VEHICLES ARE ALSO PROVIDED TO TRANSPORT THE DELEGATION AND ACCOMPANYING MEDIAS BAGGAGE TO AND FROM THE AIRPORT AND THEIR HOTELS. GR UND TRANSPORTATION IS PROVIDED TO ACCOMPANYING MEDIA DURING OFFICIAL PROGRAM EVENTS ONLY INCLUDING TO AND FROM AIRPORTS.

3. THESE FACTS SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED WHEN PLANNING FOR THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER. SHOULD THERE BE ANY INSISTANCE THAT HOSPITALITY BE EXTENDED TO MORE THAN 10/10 PERSONS HOSTING OFFICIALS SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT RECIPROCITY DURING A VISIT TO OTTAWA OF THEIR HEAD OF GOVERNMENT WILL NOT/NOT BE CONSIDERED.

UUU/272 242241Z XDV0053

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT XDV0053 24JAN84

TO PRGUE BERN CANDEL/DAVOS WSAW BCST DELIVER BY 250800

DISTR IDDZ

REF OURTEL XDV0045 JAN22

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE

BE ADVISED THAT T.AXWORTHY WILL NOT/NOT ACCOMPANY PM ON THIS VISIT.

HIS NAME SHOULD THEREFORE BE TAKEN OFF DEL LIST.

UUU/258 242240Z XDV0053

MF

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PRGUE WOTD0050 24JAN84

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 241100

INFO PCOOTT/JOHNSON PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN WSAW BUCST

DISTR IDDZ RBD

---PMS VISIT-VISAS

EAST GERMANS WILL ISSUE VISAS IN PRGUE BUT TO COMPLY WITH  
THEIR CONDITIONS, WE NEED TO IDENTIFY PERSONNEL REQUIRING  
VISAS BY NAME, FUNCTION, PPT TYPE AND NBR. WE HAVE  
INFOR FOR MEDIA AND HAVE REQUESTED 437 TRENTON TO SUPPLY  
FOR CREW. REQUEST YOUR PROVIDE PASSPORT DATA (NUMBER AND  
TYPE) FOR DELEGATION. IF DATA NOT/NOT AVAILABLE, WE COULD  
WORK OFF LIST HANDED TO US O/R. ADVISE.

UUU/175 241500Z WOTD0050

Not sent or superseded by Bern's

Tel 628 23 883

SWITZERLAND  
FOREIGN POLICY - SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

Foreign Policy

Switzerland occupies in the center of Europe a privileged geographic situation. It has gradually developed a policy of neutrality which has in time of war or peace served it well. It is a member of the Neutrals and Non-Aligned (NNA). Its voice carries weight in international technical and regional political fora (i.e. the CSCE and the Council of Europe). However, its absence from major fora, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, NATO, etc. where decisions which affect the political, economic and defence future of Europe and the world, and which have implications for Switzerland, is being more and more questioned by its parliamentarians. Switzerland has therefore embarked on a policy of "ouverture" to ensure that its interests are well understood and taken into consideration on the international scene. The federal Government is planning to hold a referendum on the adhesion of Switzerland to the United Nations and its accession to the World Bank. These changes in Switzerland's foreign policy would have been unthinkable as recently as the last decade.

Participation in the Stockholm Security Conference

The Swiss consider participation in the Stockholm Conference as a new step in their policy of supporting multilateral efforts to diminish tension and to limit the arms build-up. Since the end of the second world war, the Swiss have adhered almost without exception to all of the arms control agreements concluded within the context of the U.N. even though they did not always have a direct involvement in their formulation. The Stockholm Conference provides for the first time the possibility for the Swiss to fully contribute of a European forum on disarmament.

The Swiss Delegation's views on the Conference can be summarized along the following lines:

- A) The CDE must remain within the framework of the CSCE. The Swiss stress that their participation in the CDE stems from their overall participation in the CSCE process;
- B) The measures envisaged must be compatible with the neutrality and the national defence of Switzerland, and;
- C) The measures must conform with the criteria which were outlined in the Madrid Agreement.

- 2 -

On the question of national defence, the Swiss have stated that they cannot accept proposals which would call for the complete withdrawal of armed forces from state borders, pointing out that this would not make sense for a small country like Switzerland.

The Swiss are particularly interested in the Prime Minister's initiative in the context of how it might serve to advance the process of formal peace negotiations. The Swiss Foreign Minister, Mr. Aubert has stated that it is necessary to establish confidence and increase security before the question of disarmament can be tackled.

TO/À • CMD (through IDDZ)

FROM/DE • IDD

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •  
SUJET • IDD Requirements for Temporary  
Help Services

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
January 23, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDD-0005

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION


✓ IFB  
✓ IDDZ  
CMA  
CCB

File  
Diary  
Circ  
WF(2)

... We understand by informal channels that our request for temporary help assistance (copy attached) has been approved. However, only \$8500 of a total request of \$39,800 has been authorized. We have also been informed that all the funds in the initial departmental allocation of \$300,000 have been expended and that if this bureau is to receive any funds for temporary assistance the department will have to approach Treasury Board with a submission.

2. As you will see from our submission, this bureau will be virtually paralysed if we do not receive supplementary funding in CV012 (Temporary Assistance) to carry us to the end of the fiscal year.

3. We would greatly appreciate your assistance in facilitating this request.



J.R. Francis  
Acting Director General  
Bureau of International Security  
and Arms Control

N.B. You will appreciate that most of the additional requirements for both the Special Task Force and the Brueau stem from the Prime Minister's Initiative.





External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

IDR/S.L. Johnston/2-1706/jas

TO/A • IAM

FROM/DE • IDD

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Temporary Help Services  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
January 11, 198
Number/Numéro
IDR-0078

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

File  
Diary  
Circ  
WF(2)

We anticipate that IDD will have the following requirements for temporary assistance to the end of the fiscal year.

IDR - One typist from Kelly Management Services - \$4,000

- Two secretaries for Exercise Bold Step - \$5,000

- Two secretaries for Exercise Hilex - \$1,000

IDDZ - OCE-2 Operator from Quantum Management Services - \$6,000

- SCY-2 from Barbara Personnel Inc. - \$4,000

IDA - One CR-2 from Barbara Personnel Inc. - \$7,500 (\$6,000 already authorized by MFR)

- OCE-2 Operator from Bradson Personnel Services Inc. - \$5,300

- One CR-4 (financial clerk) - \$7,000

J.R. Francis  
Acting Director General  
Bureau of International Security  
and Arms Control

SUBJECT

The continued requirement for the services of a clerk-typist in IDA for the public information programme.

PURPOSE: To enable IDA to respond to requests for information and to provide general clerical assistance to IDA.

COST - \$7,500 (\$6,000 already provided by MFR) for 14 weeks.

JUSTIFICATION:

The continued services of a clerk-typist are required to assist the public information/liaison programme of IDA, especially at a time when there is increasing interest in arms control and disarmament issues. There will be three major conferences within the next three months for which IDA will be preparing disarmament information kits/packages.

The clerk-typist will prepare routine letters, memoranda, itineraries, travel authorization requests, and miscellaneous correspondence as required. The clerk will also undertake research of files, act as messenger between the Task Force on East-West Relations and IDA, coordinate photocopying requests, liaise with DSSP and Translation Services, and to help maintain working files and the control system on correspondence. The clerk-typist will also provide pre- and post-moving day assistance.

REALLOCATION: We are unable to reallocate \$1,500 from within the IDD budget. There are also no personnel resources available within this Bureau to provide the necessary clerical duties.

SUBJECT

To hire a financial clerk (CR-4) to assist IDA.

PURPOSE: To provide financial clerical support to IDA to manage its recently increased budget.

COST - \$7,000 (10 weeks)

JUSTIFICATION:

IDA anticipates that its budget will increase from its present \$408,960 (operating budget of \$228,900 including the \$158,000 contract component of the Disarmament Fund and \$180,000 for class contributions) to approximately \$1,900,00 within the next three months. Considerable financial control will be required to monitor grants and contributions from the expanded Disarmament Fund, administer contracts, control funds for the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE) and manage the regular Divisional budget.

REALLOCATION: Treasury Board has authorized over \$400,000 for IDA's operational budget for the new Verification Programme for 1983-84. At present, Treasury Board authority is being sought for \$312,000 for the Disarmament Fund (bringing the total amount of the Fund to about \$650,000 for 1983/84) over \$500,000 for the CCSBMDE in 1983/84, \$100,000 for the Canadian Centre on Arms Control & Disarmament and \$100,000 for the World Disarmament Campaign. IDA is seeking over \$120,000 from the Executive Committee to cover

.....2

- 2 -

its present operational budget deficit. There are no personnel resources in the Department at this time to assist the Division. IDA is seeking two person years from Treasury Board in view of the considerable growth of its budget.

SUBJECT

To hire one (OCE-2) Word Processor Operator to assist IDA.

PURPOSE: A Word Processor Operator is required to provide word processing support for the arms control & disarmament verification programme. The operator will prepare contracts, manuscripts for the new publication series (research papers and studies), and speech texts for officers in the Division.

COST - \$5,300 (10 weeks)

JUSTIFICATION:

IDA has now received the funds allocated to the Arms Control & Disarmament Verification Programme. Numerous contracts will have to be prepared. As well, a new publications series related to this programme is being launched. Considerable work on the word processor will be required as texts are edited, proofread and prepared for publication. The operator will also provide word processing support for the Division's Public Information Programme. The duties include the preparation of articles for the Disarmament Bulletin newsletter, speeches and research papers for public speaking engagements and press releases.

REALLOCATION: We are unable to reallocate funds from within the IDD budget. Although a SCY position has been approved for this Division this fiscal year for the Verification Programme, authority to hire has been deferred until FY1984/85.

SUBJECT

To hire two secretaries for Exercise Bold Step.

Cost: \$9.70 X 30 X 8 X 2 = \$5,000.00

Fiscal Year: 1983-84

Justification: The Department of External Affairs will participate in Exercise Bold Step 84 and will require two secretaries to assist the Operations Centre Task Force. Exercise Bold Step 84 is a national mobilization and crisis management exercise which will test and evaluate the Government's new Civil Alert System and the role of the Department in that system.

The secretaries will work in two shifts each day from January 31 to February 29, 1984 including weekends.

Reallocation: We are unable to reallocate funds from within the IDD Bureau Budget which is taxed to the limit.

SUBJECT

To hire two secretaries for Exercise Hilex 11.

Cost: \$9.87 X 8 X 5 X 2 = \$1,000

Fiscal Year: 1983-84

Justification: Exercise Hilex 11 is an annual NATO Crisis Management Exercise which tests alliance procedures for consular in a simulated crisis. Two secretaries are required to assist the External Affairs Operations Centre Task Force from February 20-24, 1984.

Reallocation: We are unable to reallocate from the IDD budget.

SUBJECT

To hire one (OCE-2) Word Processor Operator to assist IDDZ.

Purpose: The Word Processor Operator has been hired to provide word processing support for the preparation of speech texts by IDDZ.

Cost: \$6,000

Justification: The IDDZ Task Force requires word processing support services to assist with development of speech texts and other documents relative to the Prime Ministerial Initiative on Disarmament.



SUBJECT

To hire one temporary clerk-typist to process responses to cruise missile letters.

Purpose: To enable IDR to cope with the backlog of letters from the public on the issue of cruise missile testing in Canada.

Cost: \$4,000

Justification: The services of a temporary clerk-typist are required to deal with the supplementary workload imposed by the instruction to respond to letters from the public on the testing in Canada of unarmed, air-launched cruise missiles. Since the workload is entirely responsive in nature, it is impossible to accurately anticipate how the proposal will be implemented and what the stages and timing would be. The volume of incoming mail has varied from a high of 120 per week to a low of 10. The total to date (rounded) is 2,600 letters and 100 telegrams.

It is anticipated that the clerk-typist will be required for approximately six weeks per quarter to enable us to maintain our present 12 day turn-around on letters received.

Reallocation: We are unable to reallocate funds from within the IDD budget.

SUBJECT

To hire one secretary (SCY-2) to assist IDDZ.

Purpose: To provide clerical support to IDDZ, the Task Force on the Prime Ministerial Disarmament Initiative.

Cost: \$4,000

Justification: The Task Force on the Prime Minister's "peace initiative" requires secretarial support. Secretaries are not available within departmental resources.

Reallocation: We are unable to reallocate resources from within the IDD Bureau Budget.

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE  
20-1-1-1 MISSION  
44

To see: Mr. Dufour  
20-1-1-1

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_

Person \_\_\_\_\_

Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WSAW UMGR0123 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT (RBR) DELIVER BY 231500

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RBD RBRD IDDZ

REF OURTEL UMGR0102 19JAN

---PMS INITIATIVE:VISIT TO GDR-PERSONALITIES

PLEASE AMEND TITLE OF WILLI STOPH IN PART (A) ON PAGE ONE OF OUR  
REFTEL TO READ QUOTE CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS UNQUOTE  
RATHER THAN QUOTE PRESIDENT OF STATE COUNCIL UNQUOTE. STOPH HELD  
LATTER CAPACITY UNTIL 1976 WHEN HE RETURNED TO POSITION OF  
CHAIRMAN (OR PRIME MINISTER).

CCC/127 231515Z UMGR0123

	RBI
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
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9	
10	

I don't believe this  
affects us.

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN ZQGR0030 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDBZ DELIVER BY 230900

24

INFO PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU LIN CANDELNATO WSHDC MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RCR RBD RBR UGB URR CPD IDR IDA  
REF OURTEL ZQGR1015 18JAN

---PM INITIATIVE-FRG VIEWS:EAST BERLIN

SUMMARY:CHANCELLORS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER HAS URGED,IN  
CONNECTION WITH PMS VISIT TO EAST BERLIN,THAT WE UNDERTAKE  
FOLLOWING THREE STEPS:

- (A)SOME FORMAL ADVANCE INDICATION TO FRG OF WHAT THEY OF COURSE  
KNOW TO BE PMS OBJECTIVES;(B)SOME REFERENE TO GDR OF DEGREE  
OF IDENTITY BETWEEN CDN AND FRG POINTS OF VIEW ON INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED;AND(C)SOME PROMPT,REASONABLY  
THOROUGH INDICATION TO FRG OF WHAT TRANSPIRES WITH GDR.FRG  
WOULD WANT TO BE ABLE LATER TO REFER PUBLICLY TO THESE STEPS IN  
ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR CONCURRENCE IN WHOLE PROCESS.MORE  
BASICALLY,HOWEVER,THEIR OBJECTIVE IS ALSO TO ADD TO WEIGHT OF  
PMS INITIATIVE(IE BY GIVING EVIDENCE OF FRG AND OTHER  
ALLIANCE ENDORSEMENT OF COMPONENT VISITS)SINCE PM IS QUOTE IN  
BEST POSITION OF ALL WESTERN LEADERS TO PERSUADE USSR THEY CAN  
RETURN TO NEGOTIATION TABLE WITHOUT LOSING FACE UNQUOTE.  
2.REPORT:AT HIS INSTIGATION,TELTSCHIK(CHANCELLOR KOHLS  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER)SOUGHT ME OUT FOLLOWING A DINNER FRI FOR  
...2

message de 1002  
demain

HAWCOCK  
avant d'avoir  
reçu le message

PAGE TWO ZQGR0030 CONF

EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF PMS VISIT TO EAST BERLIN. HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) AT MTG IN CHANCELLORS OFFICE FRI THERE HAD BEEN LIVELY DISCUSSION AMONG OFFICIALS REGARDING PM VISIT TO EAST BERLIN; IT WAS SUGGESTED SOME PROTEST SHOULD BE MADE TO CDN GOVT OVER THIS BERLIN VISIT, FIRST BY A NATO HEAD OF GOVT; AND TELTSCHIK, WHOM WE SUSPECT USUALLY DOMINATES SUCH DEBATES, DISAGREED FIRST BECAUSE THIS COULD CREATE APPEARANCE OF DISSENSION AMONG ALLIES AND SECOND, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, BECAUSE PMS OBJECTIVES WERE PRECISELY THOSE OF FRG GOVT;

(B) NEVERTHELESS, IN ORDER TO LEAVE UNDISTURBED GOOD ATMOSPHERE PREVAILING SINCE PM-KOHL DISCUSSION IN NOV, PERHAPS WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO USE CHANNELS SIMPLY TO OUTLINE PMS OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO VISIT TAKING PLACE (HE MADE CLEAR ANY NEGATIVE NOISES ARE IN FRG FOREIGN MINISTRY OR POSSIBLE FRG EMB OTT, BUT CERTAINLY NOT/NOT IN KOHL'S OFFICE).

(C) AS TO SUBSTANCE OF DISCUSSION WITH EAST EUROPEANS-

(1) WITH GDR, HE HOPED PM WOULD FIND OCCASION TO PUT ACROSS EXTENT TO WHICH FRG AND CDN POSITIONS WERE ALIKE (AS WERE THOSE OF OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS); IN RESPONSE TO REMINDER HE HAD EARLIER SAID FRG MIGHT HAVE SOME COMMENT TO MAKE ON SUBSTANCE PRIOR TO VISIT TO MOSCO, HE SAID THAT VIS-A-VIS GDR EARLIER POINTS IN PMS INITIATIVE CONTINUED TO BE RIGHT ONES IN HIS VIEW;

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PAGE THREE ZQGR0030 CONF

N (11) WITH CZECHS, HE HOPED PM WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INSISTENT ON NEED FOR THEM TO DISPLAY SOME, EVEN MODEST, INITIATIVE-EG THIRD HIGH LEVEL HUNGARIAN VISITOR IN AS MANY WEEKS HAD COME TO BONN DISPLAYING CONCERN OVER SITU; DISCUSSIONS WITH GDR SHOWED THEIR CONCERN; BUT CZECHS WERE TOTALLY PASSIVE. (TELTSCHIK, WHO IS CZECH-BORN, SAID HE HAD REMONSTRATED IN THIS VEIN WITH CZECH AMB TODAY); WE NEEDED TO PUT HEAT ON EVERYWHERE IN THE EAST TO REINFORCE PRESSURE ON SOVIETS WITHOUT, OF COURSE, PRETENDING WE COULD SOMEHOW ISOLATE THEM;

(111) WITH USSR, IN DUE COURSE, HE CONTINUED TO HOPE PM WOULD GO WITH SOME PRECISE AND PRE-DISCUSSED QUOTE SECRETE UNQUOTE IDEAS AS HE HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED; CLEARLY USA COULD NOT/NOT NOW BE INTERLOCUTOR, THOUGH HIS REPORTS ON STKHM SCHULTZ-GROMYKO DISCUSSIONS SUGGESTED IT HAD GONE BETTER THAN ANYONE COULD HAVE HOPED FOR; AND SIMILARLY, UK AND FRENCH COULD IN NO/NO WAY AT PRESENT BE INTERLOCUTORS FOR REASONS OF NUCLEAR NUMBERS; BUT PM-NOT/NOT LEAST BECAUSE WE HAVE NO/NO NUCLEAR NUMBERS-WAS BEST PERSON IN WEST TO TALK TO USSR, AND SOVIETS COULD BE SEEN TO MAKE MOVE TOWARDS HIM WITHOUT FACE LOSS INVOLVED IN MOVEMENT TOWARDS OTHERS (TELTSCHIK REPEATED HIS RATIONALIZATION OF GERMAN POSITION-USSR HAD MADE, OR TRIED TO MAKE, FRG SCAPEGOAT FOR INF FAILURE BY EXPLANATION IT WAS FRG NOT/NOT EG NUCLEAR UK OR FRANCE, WHICH SOMEHOW INDUCED USA TO FAIL TO NEGOTIATE AS USSR WOULD HAVE WISHED. HENCE, HE ALLEGED, FRG WAS EVEN LESS A POTENTIAL

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PAGE FOUR ZQGR0030 CONF

INTERLOCUTOR AT THIS STAGE). HE HAD EARLIER HEARD FRI OF ANDROPOV-  
TRUDEAU LET WHICH HE FOUND MOST INTERESTING AND FURTHER PROOF OF  
HIS CONTENTION: LET WAS INTERESTING BECAUSE, HE FELT, IT PROBABLY  
WAS EVIDENCE ANDROPOV IS STILL IN CONTROL (AND, MOREOVER, THAT  
SOMEONE IS); AND, IT SUGGESTS CLEARLY, USSR ACCEPTS BONA FIDES OF  
PM IN THIS MATTER, BY SUGGESTING HIS VISIT AWAIT AVAILABILITY OF  
ANDROPOV.

(D) FOLLOWING VISIT TO EAST BERLIN, TELTSCHIK URGED WE PROVIDE FRG  
WITH INFO ON PMS DISCUSSION, ESSENTIALLY SO KOHL MAY STATE PUBLICLY  
THAT HE WAS AWARE OF WHAT PM WOULD DO AND WHY/KNEW OF OUTCOME;  
AND WAS SUPPORTIVE.

3. DURING DISCUSSION, I MADE FOLLOWING POINTS ON PERSONAL BASIS, IN  
CONTEXT OF TELTSCHIKS URGING: (A) I WAS CONCERNED THAT REAL  
SIGNIFICANCE AND SUBSTANTIVE NATURE OF PMS FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH  
WERE NOT/NOT CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD IN EUROPE AS FAR AS I COULD TELL  
BEYOND CONFINES OF EG CHANCELLORS OFFICER HERE: HENCE I HAD  
THOUGHT NOT/NOT OF PRE-INFO THROUGH CHANNELS HE HAD MENTIONED  
(POINT(A) ABOVE), BUT RATHER CORRESPONDENCE WITH EG CHANCELLOR  
THAT MIGHT BE MADE PUBLIC. I SAID IT WAS CONTEMPLATING RECOMMENDING  
THIS (AS IS DONE IN SEPARATE TEL) AND ASKED WOULD THIS NOT/NOT BE  
PREFERABLE. HE AGREED THIS WOULD INDEED SERVE NEED TO EDUCATION FRG  
OFFICIALS, BUT FELT FM FRG GOVT VIEWPOINT VIS-A-VIS PUBLIC THAT  
TEXTS AS SUCH MIGHT NOT/NOT BE NEEDED, AND INSTED PUBLIC REFS TO  
SATISFACTORY EXCHANGES MIGHT SUFFICE.

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PAGE FIVE ZQGR0030 CONF

5. I ALSO NOTED THAT OUR RESPONSE MIGHT BE AFFECTED BY FACT THAT, OR SO IT SEEMED TO ME, THERE WERE TWO FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PMS AND CHANCELLORS POSITIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR DISCUSSION IN NOV IF I RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD; AND IT WAS IMPORTANT AT THIS STAGE NOT/NOT TO IGNORE SUCH DIFFERENCES IF THIS WERE SO-IE WHILD BOTH AGREED ON NEED FOR DIALOGUE, PMS INITIATIVE PRESUMED IT IS POSSIBLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH USSR WHILE FRG HAD SEEMED TO SAY THERE IS NO/NO ONE HOME IN MOSCO; AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS TO FORUM, PMS INITIATIVE PRESUMED SOME IMPETUS IN FROM OF DIALOGUE WAS REQUIRED TO INDUCE USSR TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE FRG SEMENDD TO SAY INEVITABLY IN ITS OWN INTEREST USSR WOULD SOMEHOW BE FORCED TO RETURN TO A TABLE. TELTSCHIK SAW SITUATION DIFFERENTLY, IN LESS LINEAR FASHION, AND PERHAPS MORE DYNAMICLLY. HIS POINT WAS THAT PM HAS BONA FIES AND BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE, SO WE MUST GO AHEAD; AND, ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT, THE WEST MUST KEEP TRYING, MUST KEEP THE INITIATIVE: EAST AND WST WERE REALLY FIGHTING FOR THE SAME (WESTERN) PUBLIC OPINION; STKHM WAS ALREADY A PLU-FORMINS HAD BEEN THERE; SCHULTZ HAD QUOTE HAD UNQUOTE TO GO "GROMYKO, LIKEWISE; ONCE THERE THEY COULD NOT/NOT FAIL TO MEET. IT WAS IN THIS VEIN THAT HE CHARACTERIZED PMS VISIT.

5. I TOLD TELTSCHIK WE WOULD REACT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. TELTSCHIK UNDOUBTEDLY HAS THE SAME ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE AS WE DO, TO ARRIVE AT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS; BUT HE MADE VIEW PMS INITIATIVE

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LESS ON ITS INTRINSIC MERITS AND MORE AS A KIND OF CATALYST, WHICH WILL MAKE POSSIBLE THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY HE BELIEVES REQUIRED TO PERMIT ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE.

HOWEVER, TO SERVE FULLY OUR PURPOSES AS WELL, IT SEEMS TO ME WE ARE ENTITLED TO MORE PUBLIC BACKING BY FRG. HENCE I SUGGEST TELTSCHIKS FIRST POINT BE MET BY A LET FM PM TO KOHL THAT WILL BE MADE PUBLIC AND WHICH WOULD BY PRIOR UNDERSTANDING RECEIVED GENERAL FRG ENDORSEMENT.

MCPHAIL

000386



RCR/L. Mader/3-5382/PP

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

TO/À

NOTE TO FILE

FROM/DE

RCR

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •  
SUJET

PM's Initiative: Briefing for UK and  
French Officials

Security/Sécurité

RESTRICTED

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

Date

January 23, 1984

Number/Numéro

RCR-0111

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

IDDZ

On January 19, Mr. Smith briefed Mr. Richard Baker, UK Deputy High Commissioner and M. Lequertier (First Counsellor) of the Embassy of France on the next steps in the Prime Minister's Initiative. Mssrs. Crête and Mader of this Division also attended the meeting.

2. Mr. Smith's briefing covered Mr. Andropov's letter to the Prime Minister in which Mr. Andropov said he hoped to see the Prime Minister "in the not too distant future" and the Prime Minister's decision to visit Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Romania. He noted that the Bonn group on Berlin had been informed. He further noted that it had been decided deliberately not to go to Poland or Hungary, in the case of the latter because of PM Thatcher's imminent visit there.

3. Mr. Smith also noted that the Chinese PM Zhao had been "rather positive" in private about a five-power meeting under the auspices of the UN Secretary General.

  
Leonard Mader

*do ssier.*

*28-6-1-TRANDEAU PEACE*  
*20-1-1-1 MISSION*

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR0030 23JAN84

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INFO PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU LDN CANDELNATO WSHDC MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RCR RBD RBR UGB URR CPD IDR IDA  
REF OURTEL ZQGR1015 18JAN

---PM INITIATIVE-FRG VIEWS:EAST BERLIN

SUMMARY:CHANCELLORS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER HAS URGED,IN  
CONNECTION WITH PMS VISIT TO EAST BERLIN,THAT WE UNDERTAKE  
FOLLOWING THREE STEPS:

(A)SOME FORMAL ADVANCE INDICATION TO FRG OF WHAT THEY OF COURSE  
KNOW TO BE PMS OBJECTIVES;(B)SOME REFERENE TO GDR OF DEGREE  
OF IDENTITY BETWEEN CDN AND FRG POINTS OF VIEW ON INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED;AND(C)SOME PROMPT,REASONABLY  
THOROUGH INDICATION TO FRG OF WHAT TRANSPIRES WITH GDR.FRG  
WOULD WANT TO BE ABLE LATER TO REFER PUBLICLY TO THESE STEPS IN  
ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR CONCURRENCE IN WHOLE PROCESS.MORE  
BASICALLY,HOWEVER,THEIR OBJECTIVE IS ALSO TO ADD TO WEIGHT OF  
PMS INITIATIVE(IE BY GIVING EVIDENCE OF FRG AND OTHER  
ALLIANCE ENDORSEMENT OF COMPONENT VISITS)SINCE PM IS QUOTE IN  
BEST POSITION OF ALL WESTERN LEADERS TO PERSUADE USSR THEY CAN  
RETURN TO NEGOTIATION TABLE WITHOUT LOSING FACE UNQUOTE.

2.REPORT:AT HIS INSTIGATION,TELTSCHIK(CHANCELLOR KOHLS  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER)SOUGHT ME OUT FOLLOWING A DINNER FRI FOR  
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PAGE TWO ZQGR0030 CONF

EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF PMS VISIT TO EAST BERLIN. HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) AT MTG IN CHANCELLORS OFFICE FRI THERE HAD BEEN LIVELY DISCUSSION AMONG OFFICIALS REGARDING PM VISIT TO EAST BERLIN; IT WAS SUGGESTED SOME PROTEST SHOULD BE MADE TO CDN GOVT OVER THIS BERLIN VISIT, FIRST BY A NATO HEAD OF GOVT; AND TELTSCHIK, WHOM WE SUSPECT USUALLY DOMINATES SUCH DEBATES, DISAGREED FIRST BECAUSE THIS COULD CREATE APPEARANCE OF DISSENSION AMONG ALLIES AND SECOND, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, BECAUSE PMS OBJECTIVES WERE PRECISELY THOSE OF FRG GOVT;

(B) NEVERTHELESS, IN ORDER TO LEAVE UNDISTURBED GOOD ATMOSPHERE PREVAILING SINCE PM-KOHL DISCUSSION IN NOV, PERHAPS WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO USE CHANNELS SIMPLY TO OUTLINE PMS OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO VISIT TAKING PLACE (HE MADE CLEAR ANY NEGATIVE NOISES ARE IN FRG FOREIGN MINISTRY OR POSSIBLE FRG EMB OTT, BUT CERTAINLY NOT/NOT IN KOHL'S OFFICE).

(C) AS TO SUBSTANCE OF DISCUSSION WITH EAST EUROPEANS-

(1) WITH GDR, HE HOPED PM WOULD FIND OCCASION TO PUT ACROSS EXTENT TO WHICH FRG AND CDN POSITIONS WERE ALIKE (AS WERE THOSE OF OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS); IN RESPONSE TO REMINDER HE HAD EARLIER SAID FRG MIGHT HAVE SOME COMMENT TO MAKE ON SUBSTANCE PRIOR TO VISIT TO MOSCO, HE SAID THAT VIS-A-VIS GDR EARLIER POINTS IN PMS INITIATIVE CONTINUED TO BE RIGHT ONES IN HIS VIEW;

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PAGE THREE ZQGR0030 CONF

(11) WITH CZECHS, HE HOPED PM WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INSISTENT ON NEED FOR THEM TO DISPLAY SOME, EVEN MODEST, INITIATIVE-EG THIRD HIGH LEVEL HUNGARIAN VISITOR IN AS MANY WEEKS HAD COME TO BONN DISPLAYING CONCERN OVER SITU; DISCUSSIONS WITH GDR SHOWED THEIR CONCERN; BUT CZECHS WERE TOTALLY PASSIVE. (TELTSCHIK, WHO IS CZECH-BORN, SAID HE HAD REMONSTRATED IN THIS VEIN WITH CZECH AMB TODAY); WE NEEDED TO PUT HEAT ON EVERYWHERE IN THE EAST TO REINFORCE PRESSURE ON SOVIETS WITHOUT, OF COURSE, PRETENDING WE COULD SOMEHOW ISOLATE THEM;

(111) WITH USSR, IN DUE COURSE, HE CONTINUED TO HOPE PM WOULD GO WITH SOME PRECISE AND PRE-DISCUSSED QUOTE SECRETE UNQUOTE IDEAS AS HE HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED; CLEARLY USA COULD NOT/NOT NOW BE INTERLOCUTOR, THOUGH HIS REPORTS ON STKHM SCHULTZ-GROMYKO DISCUSSIONS SUGGESTED IT HAD GONE BETTER THAN ANYONE COULD HAVE HOPED FOR; AND SIMILARLY, UK AND FRENCH COULD IN NO/NO WAY AT PRESENT BE INTERLOCUTORS FOR REASONS OF NUCLEAR NUMBERS; BUT PM-NOT/NOT LEAST BECAUSE WE HAVE NO/NO NUCLEAR NUMBERS-WAS BEST PERSON IN WEST TO TALK TO USSR, AND SOVIETS COULD BE SEEN TO MAKE MOVE TOWARDS HIM WITHOUT FACE LOSS INVOLVED IN MOVEMENT TOWARDS OTHERS (TELTSCHIK REPEATED HIS RATIONALIZATION OF GERMAN POSITION-USSR HAD MADE, OR TRIED TO MAKE, FRG SCAPEGOAT FOR INF FAILURE BY EXPLANATION IT WAS FRG NOT/NOT EG NUCLEAR UK OR FRANCE, WHICH SOMEHOW INDUCED USA TO FAIL TO NEGOTIATE AS USSR WOULD HAVE WISHED. HENCE, HE ALLEGED, FRG WAS EVEN LESS A POTENTIAL

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PAGE FOUR ZQGR0030 CONF

INTERLOCUTOR AT THIS STAGE). HE HAD EARLIER HEARD FRI OF ANDROPOV-TRUDEAU LET WHICH HE FOUND MOST INTERESTING AND FURTHER PROOF OF HIS CONTENTION: LET WAS INTERESTING BECAUSE, HE FELT, IT PROBABLY WAS EVIDENCE ANDROPOV IS STILL IN CONTROL (AND, MOREOVER, THAT SOMEONE IS); AND, IT SUGGESTS CLEARLY, USSR ACCEPTS BONA FIDES OF PM IN THIS MATTER, BY SUGGESTING HIS VISIT AWAIT AVAILABILITY OF ANDROPOV.

(D) FOLLOWING VISIT TO EAST BERLIN, TELTSCHIK URGED WE PROVIDE FRG WITH INFO ON PMS DISCUSSION, ESSENTIALLY SO KOHL MAY STATE PUBLICLY THAT HE WAS AWARE OF WHAT PM WOULD DO AND WHY/KNEW OF OUTCOME; AND WAS SUPPORTIVE.

3. DURING DISCUSSION, I MADE FOLLOWING POINTS ON PERSONAL BASIS, IN CONTEXT OF TELTSCHIKS URGING: (A) I WAS CONCERNED THAT REAL SIGNIFICANCE AND SUBSTANTIVE NATURE OF PMS FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH WERE NOT/NOT CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD IN EUROPE AS FAR AS I COULD TELL BEYOND CONFINES OF EG CHANCELLORS OFFICER HERE: HENCE I HAD THOUGHT NOT/NOT OF PRE-INFO THROUGH CHANNELS HE HAD MENTIONED (POINT(A) ABOVE), BUT RATHER CORRESPONDENCE WITH EG CHANCELLOR THAT MIGHT BE MADE PUBLIC. I SAID IT WAS CONTEMPLATING RECOMMENDING THIS (AS IS DONE IN SEPARATE TEL) AND ASKED WOULD THIS NOT/NOT BE PREFERABLE. HE AGREED THIS WOULD INDEED SERVE NEED TO EDUCATION FRG OFFICIALS, BUT FELT FM FRG GOVT VIEWPOINT VIS-A-VIS PUBLIC THAT TEXTS AS SUCH MIGHT NOT/NOT BE NEEDED, AND INSTEAD PUBLIC REFS TO SATISFACTORY EXCHANGES MIGHT SUFFICE.

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PAGE FIVE ZQGR0030 CONF

5. I ALSO NOTED THAT OUR RESPONSE MIGHT BE AFFECTED BY FACT THAT, OR SO IT SEEMED TO ME, THERE WERE TWO FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PMS AND CHANCELLORS POSITIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR DISCUSSION IN NOV IF I RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD; AND IT WAS IMPORTANT AT THIS STAGE NOT/NOT TO IGNORE SUCH DIFFERENCES IF THIS WERE SO-IE WHILD BOTH AGREED ON NEED FOR DIALOGUE, PMS INITIATIVE PRESUMED IT IS POSSIBLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH USSR WHILE FRG HAD SEEMED TO SAY THERE IS NO/NO ONE HOME IN MOSCO; AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS TO FORUM, PMS INITIATIVE PRESUMED SOME IMPETUS IN FROM OF DIALOGUE WAS REQUIRED TO INDUCE USSR TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE FRG SEMENDD TO SAY INEVITABLY IN ITS OWN INTEREST USSR WOULD SOMEHOW BE FORCED TO RETURN TO A TABLE. TELTSCHIK SAW SITUATION DIFFERENTLY, IN LESS LINEAR FASHION, AND PERHAPS MORE DYNAMICLLY. HIS POINT WAS THAT PM HAS BONA FIES AND BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE'S, SO WE MUST GO AHEAD; AND, ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT, THE WEST MUST KEEP TRYING, MUST KEEP THE INITIATIVE: EAST AND WST WERE REALLY FIGHTING FOR THE SAME (WESTERN) PUBLIC OPINION; STKHM WAS ALREADY A PLU-FORMINS HAD BEEN THERE; SCHULTZ HAD QUOTE HAD UNQUOTE TO GO "GROMYKO, LIKEWISE; ONCE THERE THEY COULD NOT/NOT FAIL TO MEET. IT WAS IN THIS VEIN THAT HE CHARACTERIZED PMS VISIT.

5. I TOLD TELTSCHIK WE WOULD REACT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. TELTSCHIK UNDOUBTEDLY HAS THE SAME ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE AS WE DO, TO ARRIVE AT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS; BUT HE MADE VIEW PMS INITIATIVE

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PAGE SIX ZQGR0030 CONFD

LESS ON ITS INTRINSIC MERITS AND MORE AS A KIND OF CATALYST, WHICH WILL MAKE POSSIBLE THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY HE BELIEVES REQUIRED TO PERMIT ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE.

7. WHETHER IN FACT THERE IS ANY DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH, IT SEEMS TO ME IN OUR INTERESTS TO MEET FRG ON ALL THREE POINTS ABOVE.

HOWEVER, TO SERVE FULLY OUR PURPOSES AS WELL, IT SEEMS TO ME WE ARE ENTITLED TO MORE PUBLIC BACKING BY FRG. HENCE I SUGGEST TELTSCHIKS FIRST POINT BE MET BY A LET FM PM TO KOHL THAT WILL BE MADE PUBLIC AND WHICH WOULD BY PRIOR UNDERSTANDING RECEIVED GENERAL FRG ENDORSEMENT.

8. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EARLY VIEWS

MCPHAIL

CCC/005 231315Z ZQGR0030





MGTC FILE CIRC CHRON DIARY

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/  
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CONFIDENTIAL

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
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---INITIATIVE DU PM-VUES DE RFA:BERLIN-EST

SUBJ/SUJ

MESSAGE DE IDDZ EN REPONSE A VOTRE REFTEL PARTIRA 24JAN. POUR  
L INSTANT, AVISONS QUE REFTEL ARRIVE AVANT QU IDDZ AIT PU VOUS  
AVISER DE VISITE RBD/HANCOCK A BONN POUR DEBRIEFING AUX AUTORITES  
DE RFA SUR VISITES, EN PARTICULIER A BERLIN-EST.  
2. RBD PREVOIT SE RENDRE A BONN JEUDI 2FEV: SA 463 EX BUCST 1550,  
ZURICH 1710, ENSUITE LH 239 EX ZURICH 1800. COLOGNE 1900. CONFIR-  
MERONS DQP.

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE



DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

F. NADEAU/PP

RCR

6-8782

SIG

LOUISE PRÉCHETTE



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

MESSAGE

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION  
FILE/DOSSIER

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---PM INITIATIVE  
  
WE ARE TRANSMITTING SEPARATELY BY CLASSIFIED FAX COVER NOTE AND  
THREE SLIGHTLY REVISED DISCUSSION PAPERS. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PASS  
COPIES TO OTHER NATO DELS ASAP INDICATING THAT IT IS OUR INTENTION  
TO CIRCULATE PAPERS TO CD DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA AT BEGINNING OF CD  
SESSION. AS CD STARTS 07FEB, ANY COMMENTS BY DELEGATIONS BY 01FEB  
WOULD BE WELCOMED.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

O.A.CHISTOFF/PEC

IDA

2-5039

SIG

O.A.CHISTOFF

000395

IDA/F.R.CLEMINSON/2-1892/pec

External Affairs    Affaires extérieures  
Canada                Canada

TO/À                •    IDDZ/Delvoie

FROM/DE           •    IDA

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT           •    USSR Ambassador's Visit: Soviet Position  
SUJET                on Arms Control and Outer Space in the  
CD in 1984. (January 26, 1984.)

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
20-1-1-1; 28-7-1
Date
January 23, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDA-0096

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

The Soviet Union sponsored a resolution at UNGA 37 proposing a ban on weapons in space. It specifically implied that the United States shuttle was such a weapons system but omitted reference to its own already tested ground-based system. For this reason the West found no problem in voting against the Soviet resolution.

2. The Soviet proposal of August 1983 was more comprehensive and business-like and included a proposal "not to test or develop new anti-satellite systems and to eliminate such systems already in their possession". This latter point, apparently covering its ground-based system, was a "disarmament" as compared to an "arms control" feature. As such it would have been difficult to oppose.

3. Early in the 1983 session of the CD, the Soviet Union initially held up the reconstitution of existing ad hoc working groups on technical grounds for a two-month period. Subsequently, the USSR supported the NNA proposal for a new working group on outer space. The CD held discussions on the subject in plenary sessions but could not move on the establishment of an Outer Space working group due basically to the United States' (and therefore the Western Group's) opposition.

4. During the early summer session, the majority of Western allies pressed the United States to become more forthcoming.

5. In August of 1983, apparently at the personal insistence of Ambassador Fields, the Administration agreed to an authorized submission of a proposal to establish an ad hoc group with a restricted mandate and no authority to negotiate. The NNA reluctantly agreed to the restricted mandate but the USSR referred it to Moscow, thus, for all practical purposes, eliminating it from the 1983 summer session. The USA gained PR advantage by fingering the USSR as the country responsible for not setting up an ad hoc working group.

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CONFIDENTIAL

6. At UNGA38 three resolutions were submitted, one Eastern, one NNA and one Western. The NNA modified theirs sufficiently to gain the support of the East, who withdrew their resolution, and of the West, who withdrew theirs. There were a few rancorous moments when the USA announced that had the Western resolution remained they would have voted against it as well even though they were one of the main drafters. The NNA resolution received overwhelming endorsement with the USA voting against and the UK abstaining.

7. As the 1984 CD session approaches, it appears that the Western proposal with reluctant NNA support remains alive. In spite of its negative vote at UNGA38, the USA appears prepared to stand by its commitment in the 1983 CD. Assuming that the NNA remain positive, it will be up to the USSR to declare itself after consideration in Moscow since August 1983.

8. It would be useful therefore in discussion with the USSR Ambassador on the Outer Space issue to:

- (a) ask him to summarize the issue from the USSR standpoint both in the context of the UNGA resolution and the 1983 CD;
- (b) inquire whether the Soviet Union is now prepared to agree to the mandate which already has been accepted by the West and the NNA;
- (c) indicate whether or not the USSR is in favour of the immediate establishment of the working group as soon as possible after recommencement of the CD on February 7, 1984 and
- (d) whether the USSR plans to submit working papers in this regard.

9. You will note from Geneva message YTGR342 of 19 January 1984 that the USA will remain "rigid" in its opposition to any substantial treatment of the outer space issue in the CD this year.

*O.A. Chistoff*  
O.A. Chistoff.

(JN)

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE  
MISSION

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CDN EYES ONLY  
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REF YOURTEL IDDZ0039 AND RELATED CORRESPONDENCE

---PM INITIATIVE:MEASURES

PRESENTATION OF THREE DISCUSSION PAPERS YOUR REFTELS IS, FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, BOTH TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE. BESIDES INTRINSIC MERIT DISCUSSION PAPERS REPRESENT, CHOICE OF CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AS FORUM TO INTRODUCE THEM HAS SYMBOLIC VALUE OF ITS OWN, SERVING TO UNDERLINE CDN COMMITMENT TO MULTILATERALISM AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATING PROCESS AS INTEGRAL-AND ESSENTIAL-COMPONENT OF INTL SECURITY DIALOGUE. IN THIS SENSE THEREFORE PRESENTATION OF THREE PAPERS YOUR REFTEL IN THIS BODY WILL BE SEEN BOTH BY PARTICIPANTS IN CD AND THOSE OUTSIDE IT CERTAINLY IN CONTEXT OF PMS INITIATIVE AND ALSO AS LOGICAL AND PRACTICAL NEGOTIATING CONSEQUENCE OF PMS APPEARANCES BEFORE UNSSOD I AND II.

2. IN SEPARATE COMMUNICATION WE WILL BE ADDRESSING QUESTION OF MODALITIES OF PRESENTATION, INCLUDING LEVEL OF CDN REPRESENTATION, OF THESE PROPOSALS BEFORE CONF. IN MEANTIME, AS YOU WILL HAVE ANTICIPATED, QUESTION WE WILL BE ASKED EARLY ON IS PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THESE DISCUSSION PAPERS/PROPOSALS ON ONGOING WORK OF CONF.

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PAGE TWO YTGR0342 CONF D CEO

AND OUR PLANS FOR FOLLOW THROUGH. AS DISCUSSION PAPERS SAY OF COURSE IT WOULD BE UP TO PARTIES THEMSELVES (MAINLY THE SUPERPOWERS) TO TAKE UP IDEAS CONTAINED IN PAPERS AND TO PURSUE THEM. IN TERMS OF DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITIES IN CD HOWEVER MANY MAY ANTICIPATE CHANGES IN CDN POSITIONS ON ONGOING SUBJECTS UNDER DEBATE, IN CONSEQUENCE OF PRESENTATION THESE PAPERS. YOU ARE AWARE OF DETAILS. IN BROADER, AND PERHAPS MORE IMMEDIATE TERMS, WE SHOULD BE ABLE BOTH HERE AND ELSEWHERE TO RELATE THESE DISCUSSION PAPERS/PROPOSALS, ONCE THEY ARE TABLED, IN COHERENT AND INTEGRATED FASHION TO OVERALL THRUST OF PMS INITIATIVE-AND PARTICULARLY TO MEANS AND TIMING BY WHICH THEY WILL BE PURSUED. VISIBLE AND COORDINATED PLAN OF ACTION AND FOLLOW-THROUGH-ESPECIALLY AS RELATED TO ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS- WOULD SEEM DESIRABLE SO THAT PRACTICAL AS WELL AS PUBLIC IMPACT CAN BE FULLY EXPLOITED.

3. COMMENTS WHICH FOLLOW DO NOT/NOT SEEK TO EXAMINE IN ANY DETAILED TECHNICAL SENSE THESE DISCUSSION PAPERS, BUT IN LINE WITH INTENT REQUEST YOUR REFTELS, SEEK TO ANTICIPATE HOW THESE DISCUSSION PAPERS/PROPOSALS WILL BE READ IN CD AND IN CAPITALS, ALSO INCLUDING NATO. AS A GENERAL COMMENT, THINK THAT ALL THREE PAPERS STRIKE RIGHT NOTE FROM DRAFTING POINT OF VIEW IN THAT THEY ARE CONSTRUCTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE COMPREHENSIBLE TO THE LAYMAN (AT THE INEVITABLE RISK OF SOME SIMPLIFICATION) BUT ARE

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PAGE THREE YTGR0342 CONF D CEO

SOPHISTICATED ENOUGH TO HOLD SERIOUS ATTENTION OF EXPERTS.

4. BACKGROUND PAPER: WHILE FROM ALLIANCE POINT OF VIEW, REF TO  
QUOTE DETERRENCE UNQUOTE IS BOTH CORRECT AND DESIRABLE, YOU ARE  
AWARE THAT DETERRENCE AS A CONCEPT AND PRACTICE HAS BEEN CONDEMNED  
(MAINLY FOR POLITICAL AS OPPOSED TO STRATEGIC REASONS) BY  
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WITHIN AND OUTSIDE CD. SIMILARLY, PHRASE  
QUOTE STABILITY OF DETERRENCE UNQUOTE (AS OPPOSED TO A PHRASE  
SUCH AS QUOTE STRATEGIC STABILITY UNQUOTE OR MUTUAL SECURITY SUGGESTS  
THAT TWO SUPERPOWERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES HAVE ADOPTED  
MIRROR IMAGE DETERRENCE DOCTRINES AND PRACTICES. THIS MAY BE ONE OF  
HOARIER AREAS OF STRATEGIC DEBATE IN WEST; BUT MATTER HAS NOT/NOT  
BEEN RESOLVED BY WESTERN ANALYSTS WHETHER OR NOT/NOT SOVIET  
STRATEGIC PLANNERS THINK IN DETERRENCE TERMS THEMSELVES, AND IF SO TO  
WHAT DEGREE. THERE IS EVIDENCE ON BOTH SIDES. SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT  
TERM QUOTE STABILITY OF DETERRENCE UNQUOTE COULD BE AVOIDED WITHOUT  
DOING VIOLENCE TO UNDERLYING RATIONALE OF BACKGROUND PAPER WITH  
WHICH WE OTHERWISE FULLY AGREE, NAMELY, IMPORTANCE OF MUTUAL SECURITY  
AND REJECTION OF CONCEPT OF WINNABLE NUCLEAR WAR.

5. MEASURE I-BAN ON TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH ALTITUDE  
ASAT SYSTEMS. COMPLICATING FACTORS TO PROPOSALS WHICH PAPER MAY  
NOT/NOT SUFFICIENTLY HIGHLIGHT (BUT WHICH ASAT TREATY PAPER  
REPORT NO 234 PRODUCED BY DND/ORAE DOES) IS GREAT DIFFICULTY, FIRST  
IN COMING TO GRIPS WITH VERIFYING DISTINCTION THAT ANY BAN WOULD BE  
REQUIRED TO IMPOSE ON DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HIGH ALTITUDE AND LOW

PAGE FOUR YTGGR0342 CONFD CEO

ALTITUDE SYSTEMS;AND SECOND COMPLEX QUESTION RELATED TO SCOPE OF BAN AS APPLIED TO LARGE GREY AREA BETWEEN QUOTE PURE UNQUOTE ASAT HIGH ALTITUDE SYSTEMS AND POSSIBLE DUAL PURPOSE SPACE-BASED ANTI-ABM SYSTEMS,NOW IN RESEARCH PHASE IN USA,AND IT SEEMS,IN USSR AS WELL.

6.ON POLITICAL LEVEL YOU ARE OF COURSE FULLY AU COURANT WITH USA POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES ON MATTERS RELATED TO OUTER SPACE,AND WE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN TOLD BY USA COLLEAGUES THAT USA WILL REMAIN QUOTE RIGID UNQUOTE IN ITS OPPOSITION TO ANY SUBSTANTIVE TREATMENT

OF OUTER SPACE ISSUE IN CD THIS YEAR.YOU WILL ALSO RECALL SINGLE USA NEGATIVE VOTE ON OUTER SPACE AT LAST UNGA,AND DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE HAD IN PAST IN GETTING USA AGREEMENT ON TEXT OF CDN OUTER SPACE PAPERS BEFORE THEY WERE TABLED IN CD.THEREFORE PRESUME THAT DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO PART COMPANY WITH USA ON MATTER.

7.MEASURE II-AGREEMENT ON VERIFIABILITY OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS.IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO SPELL OUT IN MORE DETAIL(IF THIS IS CASE)THAT PROPOSAL REFERS TO CENTRAL/CENTRAL SYST-3.,IE ICBM SYSTEMS;OR IF IT DOES NOT/NOT,THAT IT SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE SO CALLED THEATRE SYSTEMS(IE THOSE OF THE INF/PII VARIETY).

IT MIGHT ALSO BE WORTHWHILE TO DEFINE MORE PRECISELY WHAT IS MEANT BY QUOTE NEW UNQUOTE.SEE COMMENTS ABOVE ON USE OF TERM QUOTE DETERRENCE STABILITY UNQUOTE.IN CASE OF THIS PAPER

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PAGE FIVE YTGR0342 CONFD CEO

PRESUMABLY WHAT IS MEANT IS NOT/NOT SO MUCH DETERRENCE STABILITY AS DETERRENCE CREDIBILITY/CREDIBILITY.

8. MEASURE III-RESTRICTING ICBM MOBILITY. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, USA IS NOW INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPMENT OF QUOTE MIDGET MAN UNQUOTE SINGLE WARHEAD MOBILE ICBM SYSTEM WHICH AS THOSE IN FAVOUR ARGUE, WOULD BE MORE STABLE THAN EXISTING MIRVED SYSTEMS IN THAT THEY WOULD BE MORE READILY VERIFIABLE BY NTMS (IE ONE DELIVERY VEHICLE EQUALS ONE WARHEAD) BUT RETAIN ENHANCED SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY-AND CREDIBILITY-BECAUSE OF THEIR MOBILITY. THIS WOULD BE VERSION OF SHELL GAME STRATEGY ONCE PROPOSED FOR MX BASING SYSTEM. SOPHISTICATION OF PROPOSAL III, WE THINK HOWEVER, IS PRECISELY WHAT IS NEEDED TO ADD SERIOUSNESS TO SUBSTANCE OF DEBATE WHICH OFTEN IN THE CD AND CERTAINLY ELSEWHERE IS ALL TOO FREQUENTLY BOGGED DOWN IN POSTURING AS OPPOSED TO FOCUSING ON A DIALOGUE AIMED AT THE TECHNOLOGIES OF SOLUTION.

9. COMMENTS ON DISCUSSION PAPERS GIVEN ABOVE ARE MERELY RELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS WHICH FROM OUR LOCAL VIEWPOINT AND PARTICULAR NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENT OF GENEVA WOULD ASSIST IN MAXIMIZING IMPACT.

DO NOT/NOT CONSIDER ANY OF SUGGESTIONS CRITICAL TO SUCCESS OF THIS OPERATION. AS NOTED ABOVE, WILL FOLLOW UP ON SUGGESTIONS ON MODALITIES OF PRESENTATION THESE THREE DISCUSSION PAPERS.

CCC/221 191800Z YTGR0342

GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
38th Session, 1983  
First Committee  
Agenda Items 55, 62(g), 141

RESTRICTED  
D.A. Snider  
IDA/6-1251  
October 7, 1983

ITEM 55: PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE:  
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT  
(RESOLUTION 37/83)

ITEM 62(g) PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE  
AND PROHIBITION OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS:  
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT  
(RESOLUTION 37/99D)

ITEM 141 CONCLUSION OF A TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF  
THE USE OF FORCE IN OUTER SPACE AND FROM  
SPACE AGAINST THE EARTH

#### ISSUE

How to contribute to an issue to which Canada attaches considerable importance and on which there are a number of Western and Eastern sensitivities.

#### BACKGROUND

The subject of arms control and outer space has received increased attention in recent years. It appears that without some sort of agreement the USA and the USSR are moving inexorably toward a full-scale arms race in space.

There are already two treaties to which Canada is a signatory which impinge upon certain aspects of the problem. These are the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons in Outer Space and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. As well, the stalled bilateral anti-satellite talks (ASAT) begun in Helsinki in June 1978 are directly relevant, as is the treaty between the USA and the USSR concerning anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM), which is subject to review soon. Canada favours a continuation of the ABM treaty and its protocol, as well as a resumption of the bilateral ASAT negotiations.

In August 1981, in a letter to the Secretary-General, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, requested the inclusion in the agenda of UNGA 36 of an item entitled, "Conclusion of a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of any Kind in Outer Space". The letter attached the draft text of such a treaty, including reference to "reusable manned space vehicles of an existing type".

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UNITED  
NATIONS

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## General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/38/633  
10 December 1983  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

Thirty-eighth session  
Agenda item 55

### PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

#### Report of the First Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Humberto Y. GOYEN-ALVEZ (Uruguay)

#### I. INTRODUCTION

1. The item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space: report of the Committee on Disarmament" was included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-eighth session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 37/83 of 9 December 1982.
2. At its 3rd plenary meeting, on 23 September 1983, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda. At its 4th plenary meeting, on the same day, the Assembly decided to allocate the item to the First Committee.
3. At its 2nd meeting, on 11 October, the First Committee decided to hold a general debate followed by an exchange of views on the disarmament items allocated to it, namely, items 43 to 63, 139 and 141. The deliberations on these items, and on items 143 and 144 which were allocated to the First Committee by the General Assembly at its 28th plenary meeting, on 11 October 1983, took place between the 3rd and 31st meetings, from 17 October to 11 November (see A/C.1/38/PV.3-31).
4. In connection with item 55, the First Committee had before it the following documents:
  - (a) Report of the Committee on Disarmament; 1/

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27).

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## General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/38/194\*  
23 August 1983  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

Thirty-eighth session

### REQUEST FOR THE INCLUSION OF A SUPPLEMENTARY ITEM IN THE AGENDA OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

#### CONCLUSION OF A TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF FORCE IN OUTER SPACE AND FROM SPACE AGAINST THE EARTH

Letter dated 19 August 1983 from the First Vice-Chairman of  
the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR,  
to the Secretary-General

The Soviet Union requests the inclusion in the agenda of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth".


In proposing this item, the Soviet Union is seeking to avoid the militarization of outer space. Of particular danger in this respect are the plans to create and deploy various space-weapons systems capable of destroying targets both in space and on the Earth.

The Soviet Union considers it most imperative to have a reliable means of counteracting these plans to make space a source of mortal danger to all mankind, by taking urgent and effective measures to prevent the arms race from spreading to outer space, which it has not yet penetrated.

To this end, in 1981 at the United Nations the Soviet Union submitted a proposal concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. That proposal was approved by the General Assembly. However, for well-known reasons, the drafting of that treaty has not yet actually begun.

~~Re-issued for technical reasons.~~

28-6-1 - TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION



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---PM INITIATIVE-MEASURES TO RESTRICT DESTABILIZATION

WE WLD OFFER FOLLOWING COMMENT FROM ADMITTEDLY INEXPERT AND  
NON-TECHNICAL VIEWPOINT ON THREE MEASURES OUTLINED IN WORKING PAPER  
ENTITLED QUOTE RESTRAINING STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY UNQUOTE.COMMENTS  
ARE NOT/NOT MEANT TO DETRACT IN ANY WAY FROM PAPERS LAUDABLE  
OBJECTIVE TO INJECT SOME MEASURE OF RELATIVE STABILITY IN ARMS RACE  
BY LIMITING DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING WEAPONS SYSTEMS  
AND BY ASSURING THEIR ACCESSIBILITY TO VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL  
TECHNICAL MEANS.RATHER WE PLEAD THE DEFENCE OF THE CRITIC WHO,WHILE  
NOT/NOT SUFFICIENTLY TALENTED TO CREATE THE PIECE,IMMODESTLY CLAIMS  
SOME EXPERTISE TO ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE IT THROUGH HIS CRITICISM.

2.FIRST MEASURE TO BANK HIGH ALTITUDE ASATS:THIS MEASURE AS ARMS  
CONTROL MECHANISM DEPENDS UPON EASILY DEFINABLE AND WIDELY ACCEPTED  
DISTINCTION BETWEEN LOW AND HIGH ALTITUDE SATELLITES.WHILE ACCEPTING  
THIS,ASSUMPTION,WE WLD NOT/NOT,HOWEVER,SHARE JUDGEMENT CONTAINED IN  
PART II SUB SECTION 5 AND TAKEN UP LATER IN SENTENCE IN PART III  
(A):QUOTE IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT LOW ALTITUDE SATELLITES,THOUGH  
IMPORTANT FOR ARMS CONTROL AND VERIFICATION,ARE NOT/NOT GENERALLY  
CONSIDERED TO BE CRITICAL TO THE STABLE FUNCTIONING OF DETERRENCE

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PAGE TWO WKGR0143 CONFD

UNQUOTE.LOWER LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE/VERIFICATION SATELLITES ARE PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE,WHILE HIGH ALTITUDE COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS MAY BE SAID TO BE SATELLITES IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS.IN OUR VIEW,ASATS WHICH BLIND RECONNAISSANCE(IE LOW LEVEL)SATELLITES WLD BE EQUALLY(IF NOT/NOT MORE)DESTABILIZING THAN THOSE ASAT WHICH WLD RENDER INOPERATIVE THE HIGH LEVEL SATELLITES REQUIRED TO COMMAND AND QUIDE ICMS AND SLBMS.

3.FURTHERMORE IT IS NOT/NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT HOSTILE NUCLEAR POWER DURING AN ADVANCED STATE OF HOSTILITIES MIGHT BE SO DETERMINED TO DESTROY HIGH ALTITUDE SATELLITE SYSTEMS THAT ITS PLANS WLD INCLUDE EXPLODING AN UPPER ATMOSPHERE NUCLEAR DEVICE THUS RELYING ON ELECTRO MAGNETIC IMPULSE(EMI)TO BALCK OUT COMMUNICATIONS.THIS THINKING MIGHT SUGGEST THAT THE PRIORITY TO DEVELOP A COSTLY AND SOPHISTICATED HIGH LEVEL ASAT SYSTEM MIGHT NOT/NOT BE SO GREAT AS DEV OF LOWER LEVEL SYSTEM.(IT WOULD SEEM QUESTIONABLE THAT SAME POWER WLD USE EMI TO BLIND LOW LEVEL SATELLITES AT EARLIER STAGE IN HOSTILITIFS BECAUSE OF THE TREMENDOUSLY INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS WHICH WLD BE CAUSED BY EMI).

4.TECHNICALLY,WE WONDER WHETHER IT WLD BE POSSIBLE TO EASILY DISTINGUISH DIFFERENT WEAPONS EHICH MIGHT BE USED IN ATTACKS AGAINST LOW AND HIGH LEVEL ALTITUDE SYSTEMS-IS NOT/NOT TECHNOLOGY SOMEWHAT INTERCHANGEABLE BETWEEN LOW AND HIGH LEVEL ASAT SYSTEMS?(EG BY

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ADDING BOOSTER SECTION TO GROUND OR AIRLAUNCHED ASAT ROCKET).

5. IN SUMMARY, OUR CONCERN REGARDING MEASURE ONE IS WHETHER IT IS WORTHWHILE FROM ARMS CONTROL AND TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE TO DRAW DISTINCTION BETWEEN AGREEMENTS DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE HIGH AS OPPOSED TO LOW LEVEL ASAT SYSTEMS. WE RECOGNISE THAT WE MUST BEGIN SOMEWHERE AND ABSENCE OF TECHNOLOGY REGARDING DEV OF HIGH LEVEL ASATS ARGUES IN FAVOUR OF MEASURE ONE. HOWEVER, OVER LONGER TERM SHOULD NOT/NOT CDN EMPHASIS BE PLACED ON DEVELOPING ELEMENTS FOR CONVENTION INCLUDING ALL ASAT SYSTEMS (IE BANNING OF FURTHER TESTING AND ANY DEPLOYMENT) WHETHER HIGH OR LOW?

6. SECOND MEASURE: OUR BASIC CONCERN WITH THIS MEASURE WHOSE EXCELLENT OBJECTIVE IS TO SEEK QUOTE AN AGREEMENT THAT STATES HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO DEMONSTRATE AND ENSURE THE VERIFIABILITY OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS UNQUOTE IS THAT IT SEEMS TO RUN SO COUNTER TO THE TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY PROCESS. SUCH LARGE PERCENTAGES OF R AND D ARE SPENT TO IMPROVE THE INVULNERABILITY OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO DETECTION (EG SUB-MARINES ABILITY TO ESCAPE SONAR DETECTION AND MAINTAIN SECRET COMMUNICATIONS) THAT IT WOULD SEEM ALMOST CONTRARY TO HUMAN NATURE TO EXPECT STATES TO REQUIRE THEIR SCIENTIFIC ESTABLISHMENTS QUOTE TO DESIGN WEAPONS WHICH WERE VERIFIABLE BY NATL TECHNICAL MEANS UNQUOTE AS PROVIDED FOR IN PART III(A). WHILE AGREEING IN THEORY WITH GENERAL PRINCIPLE AS STATED IN THIS SECTION: QUOTE VERIFIABILITY IS NECESSARY FOR

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MUTUAL CONFIDENCE UNQUOTE, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE IN PRACTICE THAT GOVTS WLD FIND POLITICAL WILL OR MOTIVATION, OR HAVE ABILITY TO ENSURE THAT THEIR MILITARY/INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX WLD SUBORDINATE OBJECTIVE OF THEIR RESEARCH (IE IMPROVEMENT OF STEALTH OF THEIR WEAPONS SYSTEMS) TO THE GREATER GOAL OF VERIFICATION.

7. TO SUCCEED EFFECTIVELY, THIS MEASURE WLD ALSO REQUIRE THAT ALL NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS SHLD BE DEVELOPED OPENLY. BUT IT IS NOT/NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT ONE PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENT WLD DEVELOP COVERTLY A NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHOSE VERY EXISTENCE MIGHT REMAIN UNKNOWN AND SO CLD ESCAPE THE PROVISION CONTAINED IN PART II(5) THAT QUOTE PARTY DEPLOYING A GIVEN WEAPON SYSTEM IS REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SYSTEM IS INDEED VERIFIABLE BY NTMS UNQUOTE.

8. WE WONDER WHETHER THIS MEASURE MIGHT NOT/NOT BE RENDERED MORE REALISTIC IF IT CONCENTRATED ON MORE MODEST OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING THAT WHERE NTMS HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED AS AGREED METHOD OF VERIFICATION, ANY TECHNIQUES DESIGNED TO AVOID DETECTION (EG CONCEALMENT, ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES, BLINDING ETC.) BE PROSCRIBED AND COMPLAINTS SETTLED THROUGH STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSIONS AS SUGGESTED IN YOUR SECTION V.

9. THIRD MEASURE: IN OUR VIEW THIS APPEARS TO BE MOST PROMISING AND POSSIBLY MOST PRACTICAL OF THREE MEASURES PROPOSED. SHLD EVER AGREEMENT BE REACHED BETWEEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES TO CONVERT MULTIHEADED MX QUOTE PEACEKEEPER UNQUOTE TYPE MISSILES INTO MOBILE

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SINGLE WARHEAD MISSILES(QUOTE MIDGET MAN UNQUOTE)ALONG LINES OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF SCOWCROFT COMMISSION REPORT,IT WLD SEEM POLITICALLY FEASIBLE TO EXPECT THAT THIS AGREEMENT WLD BE ACCOMPANIED BY EXCHANGE OF PLANS REGARDING GENERAL DEPLOYMENT AREAS AND SCHEDULES AS SUGGESTED BY THIS MEASURE.INEVITABLY DEPLOYMENT OF THESE MOBILE SINGLE HEADED WEAPONS WLD HAVE TO BE IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS AND IN A SUFFICIENTLY COMPLEX GEOGRAPHIC CONFIGURATION TO PRECLUDE FIRST PREEMPTIVE STRIKE ONCE PLANS HAD BEEN EXCHANGED.OTHERWISE CONCEPT WLD BE EQUIVALENT TO PROVIDING YOUR ENEMY WITH MAP OF YOUR MINEFIELD.HOWEVER AS DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE MISSILES WLD NO/NO DOUBT BE IN SUFFICIENT CO PLEXITY AND QUANTITIES TO DEFY ANY FIRST NUCLEAR STRIKE(EVEN OF CELAN SURGICAL NATURE),THIS MEASURE INDEED HAS PRACTICAL MERIT.MEASURE WLD SEEM, HOWEVER,TO BE CONDITIONAL UPON NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES HAVING PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO CONVERT THEIR MULTIHEADED ICBMS INTO MORE SIMPLE MOBILE WEAPONS.

10.REGARDING QUESTION OF SUBMITTING MEASURES FOR INNATL CONSIDERATION, FOLLOWING CONSULTATION WITH NATO ALLIES,PROPOSALS ONCE MODIFIED CLD BE INITIATED SOON IN FORUM OF CD IN GENEV AS OUTLINED BY PM. FIRST MEASURE MIGHT BE GIVEN GREATER PROMINENCE AS CONTAINED CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF FUTURE TREATY ON ASATS,WHILE SECOND AND THIRD MEASURES MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS VALUABLE WORKING PAPER CONTRIBUTIONS TO BODY OF EXPERT KNOWLEDGE ON VERIFICATION AS MAIN STAY OF ALL

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PAGE SIX WKGR0143 CONF

ACD AGREEMENTS. IN OUR VIEW FIRST CTTEE OF UNGA PROVIDES NEITHER  
SUFFICIENT TECHNICAL EXPERTISE NOR FOCUS TO BE CONSIDERED  
APPROPRIATE FOR INITIATING PROPOSALS, THOUGH IT CLD E USEFUL AT  
SOME STAGE TO DISCUSS THEM AS PART OF GROUP OF IDEAS FOR CERTAIN  
WESTERN INITIATIVES AT UNGA 39.

CCC/085 232306Z WKGR0143

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

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Référence

SUBJECT  
Sujet

DME/RGB IDR/Francis IDDZ/Delvoie/Smith

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January 23, 1984

RBD0012

The Prime Minister's Initiative: Visit  
to Eastern Europe, January-February 1984

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ENCLOSURES  
Annexes

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
PCO/Fowler

Attached for your perusal are draft texts of  
toasts for use by the Prime Minister at official dinners  
hosted by Czechoslovak Prime Minister Strougal, GDR  
President Honecker and Romanian President Ceausescu.  
Please note that these texts are still in draft; further  
work on them is going forward. Any comments you might  
wish to make would be welcomed.

David  
Smith  
Hawth

Peter J.A. Hancock,  
Director General,  
USSR and Eastern Europe Bureau.

Free Drafts comment  
+ deleted  
CH



23.1.15/051

D R A F T

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED TOAST FOR USE BY THE  
PRIME MINISTER DURING HIS VISIT TO PRAGUE  
JANUARY 1984

I wish to express my deep appreciation to you, Mr. Prime Minister, for your invitation to visit Czechoslovakia and for the warmth and hospitality with which you have greeted me here.

Mr. Prime Minister, the desire to banish war forever from human affairs is as old as war itself; and as ancient as that desire are the efforts of statesmen to find the practical means, if not to banish it, at least to reduce its likelihood.

It is fitting that we should be speaking of peace here in Prague. For this beautiful and ancient city, this historical seat of learning, of science and architecture, is a monument to what is best in European civilization. Its beauty and prosperity have long stood, against the tides of history, as a testament to the resilience of the human spirit.

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CONFIDENTIAL

President Husak and I were both in Helsinki in 1975 to sign the Final Act. At that time, he stated that Europe was at a crossroads. If I may quote him further: "for the first time in history, the nations of Europe had seized the opportunity to create the real conditions of peace, security and cooperation and that in spite of all the existing political, economic, philosophical and social differences".

Europe is once again at the crossroads, Mr. Prime Minister. I am convinced that in the nations of East and West, thoughtful people are asking what can be done to change the course of events, events which seem to many of them to be governed by a logic, at once terrifying and ineluctable. The silence which now envelops the arms controls negotiations only serves to heighten this concern, by giving to the course of events a life of its own, independent of the will of statesmen.

I feel confident, Mr. Prime Minister, in saying that few issues have aroused so much anxiety, even dread, as that of nuclear war.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Nor should this anxiety be startling to us, for the hopes and fears of mankind are nowhere more clearly at stake than in the issue of war, and particularly nuclear war. Nor should it come as a surprise that the yearning for peace is acutely felt in Europe, a continent ravaged by so many wars. And Canada's history, its security and its future have been and will continue to be closely bound up with that of Europe.

We have, then, a special responsibility, indeed a duty, as statesmen to do our utmost to reduce the danger of war and the burden of the arms race. This is our duty not only to our own peoples, Czechoslovaks and Canadians, but to the whole of humanity. For in the event of a nuclear war, much of what mankind has built through centuries of labour would disappear into the long dark night of nuclear winter.

To the generations that have bequeathed this civilization to us, to the generations who will in their turn inherit it, we must dedicate ourselves to give our full measure to the search for peace.

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- 4 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Czechoslovakia and Canada are not superpowers. We preside over no great arsenal of weapons, nor grand military machines. What we must do, Mr. Prime Minister, as middle powers who are also members of opposing alliances, is to find an area in which we can best make our contribution. And that area, I would suggest, is precisely the political sphere.

Statesmen must speak to each other directly. As the political leaders of our two countries, we can demonstrate by our actions that such dialogue is possible and fruitful, and counsel our friends and allies to follow a similar path. All of these are well within our power.

We meet here in Prague, Mr. Prime Minister, as the leaders of middle powers, both of us European in our heritage and international in our natures. The United States and the Soviet Union, for their part, have a relationship shaped by the central position they occupy on the world stage. Canada and Czechoslovakia, although cast in more modest roles, share a common interest in peace and increased cooperation.

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CONFIDENTIAL

We have a special stake in détente, Mr. Prime Minister. Through the Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE process and meetings such as the Stockholm Conference, we have created the means to reduce tensions in Europe.

It is no paradox to say that the situation in Europe is now both better and worse than in the past. It is better because over the course of the past decade a framework for the discussion of arms control, security and humanitarian issues has been put in place. The way has been marked out to create a commonality of interests between East and West which would make war less likely. All of the nations of Europe benefit from peace and security and none more so than the middle powers.

It is worse, Mr. Prime Minister, because the great hopes to which the 1975 Helsinki Final Act gave voice have not been realized. Its promises of a decade ago have yet to be redeemed. There is much progress still to be made on such questions as enhanced cooperation across the inter-bloc divide, of increased commercial activity, of the freer movement of people and of security against the threat of war.

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- 6 -

CONFIDENTIAL

We who have such an overwhelming stake in peace and cooperation must redouble our efforts to give this promise a concrete form.

The situation in which we find ourselves, Mr. Prime Minister, is made worse by the increasing tendency to use force to resolve disputes. Weapons in growing numbers are being stationed on European soil, East and West. Czechoslovakia itself is now the site of one such deployment. And with this heightened danger has come not the thoughtful, purposeful dialogue which the times demand. Bitter recrimination has to a large extent, replaced reasoned statesmanship.

It was with the intention of helping to arrest this trend that I undertook my initiative last October.

To dream of peace is not enough, Mr. Prime Minister. All too often in this century, we have seen such hopes, however noble and lofty, dashed against an ugly reality. Peace will not be built by dreams, nor will it be established by a single grand gesture. Rather, in a thousand ways, some small, others greater, confidence will be created, intentions made transparent and mutual understanding increased.

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- 7 -

CONFIDENTIAL

There has never been as great a need for high-level political dialogue as there is at this moment. The empty halls of Geneva and Vienna are mute testimony to this fact.

I was therefore encouraged that the Stockholm Conference was held at the ministerial level. This was an idea that we have been especially active in promoting with our allies. It is my firm belief that ministers must closely monitor developments in Stockholm. They must be ready to return to Stockholm to inject new energy into those talks through their direct participation.

It is vital that the now dormant arms control talks be resumed at the earliest possible moment. The decision to return to the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe is a most welcome development. I urge that the same logic which led to this decision now be applied to the negotiations in Geneva.

Modest though our influence is, Mr. Prime Minister, we are not powerless. Step by step, in visits such as this as well as in the Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm negotiations, the dialogue can be established and the search for peace advanced.

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CONFIDENTIAL

This is what I have learned over the past several months as I pursued my peace initiative. The road which has brought me to Czechoslovakia and to Eastern Europe has passed through many nations. Concern is evident everywhere, in both the East and West, as is the hope that the current negative trend can be reversed. Statesmen know that there are no miracles to be had in politics. I certainly have none to offer, and I would not wish to encourage unrealistic expectations.

Aristotle once wrote that politics is the master science, to which all other arts, including the military art, are subordinate. He reasoned that this is so because it is the business of statesmen to set those supreme goals which are to govern all the activities of the nation.

Statesmen must assert the primacy of politics over military affairs. That is the principal purpose of my visit. and the commitment I ask you to share.

I invite you, Mr. Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen to raise your glasses in a toast to the health of President Husak, to the peace and prosperity of the Czechoslovak peoples and to continued dialogue between Canada and Czechoslovakia.

PROJET

CONFIDENTIEL

PROJET DE TOAST A L'INTENTION  
DU PREMIER MINISTRE POUR SA VISITE A BERLIN-EST  
JANVIER 1984

Je vous remercie pour votre chaleureux accueil en terre allemande où j'ai l'honneur de porter le dialogue entre nos deux pays au plus haut niveau. Je vous remercie également, Monsieur le Président, de partager le sentiment d'urgence qui m'anime et de l'attention que vous portez à mon propos et à ma démarche pour la paix.

<sup>I</sup>  
Emmanuel Kant a écrit: "Tout l'intérêt de ma raison est compris dans les trois questions suivantes: que puis-je savoir? que puis-je faire? que m'est-il permis d'espérer?" Je ne diffère pas de méthode avec ce grand maître de la pensée allemande et de la pensée universelle.

Que puis-je savoir? Je sais ce qui nous sépare. Nous sommes des membres d'alliances politiques et militaires opposées. Le Canada ne cache pas sa loyauté occidentale. Nous sommes solidaires des positions fondamentales de l'Alliance atlantique qui regroupe seize pays.

Je sais que vous avez la même loyauté envers le Pacte de Varsovie et que la République démocratique d'Allemagne

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIEL

est l'un des sites du contre-déploiement de missiles en Europe de l'est. Oui, je connais bien nos différences. Mais tel n'est pas ce soir l'objet de mon propos.

Car je suis aussi bien conscient de ce qui nous réunit. Nous partageons la position enviable de puissances industrielles moyennes, ayant une population de taille comparable et ayant certes des obligations et des contraintes, mais aussi des intérêts qui coïncident et nous rapprochent. Et parmi ces préoccupations se trouve certainement au premier rang celle de la paix et de la sécurité.

La menace d'une guerre nucléaire se pose comme nulle autre question face aux espoirs des peuples. Pour vous, Allemands de l'est, à la charnière du problème, pour nous, dont la sécurité a tout au long de ce siècle été liée à celle de l'Europe, c'est une question vitale. Aussi, je ne m'étonne pas de trouver un vif et unanime désir de paix en Europe et dans mon pays.

Nous connaissons cette menace dans son détail: celle du recours croissant à la force, alors que le processus politique cède le pas aux solutions militaires; celle de l'érosion du mécanisme international nous protégeant contre la prolifération des armements nucléaires et de la

.../3

croissance géométrique des arsenaux; celle enfin, particulièrement inquiétante, de la dégradation des relations est-ouest.

Resterons-nous paralysés et impuissants face à ces développements tragiques dont les conséquences touchent non seulement nos deux peuples, mais l'humanité entière? La deuxième question de Kant se pose avec acuité: que puis-je faire?

C'est justement la question de savoir ce qu'une puissance moyenne peut faire pour renverser cette tendance néfaste, la logique de la terreur et ce sentiment d'impuissance, qui m'a poussé à agir et à prendre cette initiative pour la paix.

Car le fait que nos pays ne disposent pas d'arsenaux menaçants et que nous ne sommes pas à la table des négociations sur les armes nucléaires ne nous laisse pas pour autant désarmés dans notre recherche pour la paix. Nous pouvons, et nous avons le devoir, de contribuer à donner au dialogue politique entre l'est et l'ouest une impulsion nouvelle.

Et c'est dans la sphère politique, en parlant directement l'un à l'autre, comme nous le faisons en qualité de chefs politiques de nos deux pays, que nous pourrons

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démontrer que le dialogue est possible, qu'il peut être pratique et constructif et qu'il porte ses fruits. Cela est en notre pouvoir. C'est là, Monsieur le Président, notre arme la plus puissante.

C'est pourquoi vous me voyez convaincu de la possibilité et de la nécessité d'agir. Et nous le pouvons de façon déterminante par une action exceptionnelle, en sortant des sentiers battus.

Certes, les deux superpuissances peuvent accélérer la course aux armements mais elles disposent aussi des forums nécessaires pour négocier la décélération. Aussi, je ne peux ni ne souhaite m'immiscer dans la négociation sur la limitation des armements stratégiques ou dans celle sur les armes nucléaires à moyenne portée.

Mais au moment où les discussions sont en suspens, toutes les nations et tous les chefs politiques doivent rappeler aux superpuissances combien nous sommes concernés au premier chef par ces négociations et quels risques inacceptables leur suspension fait courir à l'humanité.

Nous pouvons aussi insuffler, à la tradition déjà bien établie des consultations sur la coopération et la

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CONFIDENTIEL

sécurité en Europe, un nouvel optimisme et une nouvelle détermination. Le temps est venu de raviver ces consultations par des contacts personnels entre les chefs politiques de l'Europe et de l'Amérique du Nord.

Il faut, Monsieur le Président, réaffirmer notre volonté politique si nous voulons vaincre l'inertie des généraux et des technocrates.

Et cela est possible, en nous engageant à retourner à Stockholm au niveau ministériel si la Conférence sur la sécurité et les mesures de confiance en Europe est menacée de piétiner.

Nous pouvons en outre nous efforcer de donner corps et substance aux décisions de l'Acte final d'Helsinki, que nous avons tous deux signé en 1975, et dont il faut franchement reconnaître que tous les vœux n'ont pas été réalisés. Ceux qui partagent un intérêt primordial pour la paix ne doivent rien ménager pour développer la coopération, accroître les échanges commerciaux et rendre enfin possible la libre circulation des personnes entre l'est et l'ouest.

En quelques mots, il nous faut changer fondamentalement notre attitude si nous voulons contribuer à la paix. Car une

.../6



paix en équilibre entre la terreur et la parité des armements est une paix bien précaire.

"Que m'est-il permis d'espérer?"

Je tiens de bonne source, Monsieur le Président, que vous ne croyez pas aux miracles. Je me suis moi-même interdit d'en promettre et encore moins d'espérer en accomplir!

Je ne me fais pas d'illusion sur la complexité des problèmes qui nous confrontent. Ce ne sont pas des miracles qu'il m'est permis d'espérer, mais puisque nous reconnaissons que la paix et la sécurité sont indissociables, je peux espérer que nous rechercherons activement et que nous trouverons sur la pente dangereuse où nous glissons, des crans d'arrêt.

Depuis plusieurs mois, j'ai consacré temps et efforts à une initiative de paix et de compréhension entre l'est et l'ouest et entre les superpuissances. Depuis octobre dernier, j'ai rencontré et j'ai discuté de cette question avec les chefs d'Etat de plusieurs pays, avec le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, avec les citoyens concernés de mon pays et je le fais maintenant en Europe de l'est.

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Je puis vous assurer que partout, j'ai rencontré le même souci sur l'état inquiétant des relations internationales. Partout aussi, j'ai rencontré des gens prêts à se joindre à moi pour rechercher ce que leur gouvernement peut faire pour changer le cours des événements, qui semblent pour trop d'entre nous encore gouvernés par la logique terrifiante et implacable du conflit.

Ma rencontre et mes discussions avec vous me convainquent encore plus fermement que le dialogue est la voie que nous devons poursuivre avec vigueur entre nos deux pays, avec nos alliés et avec nos amis. Je sais, Monsieur le Président, que vous partagez ma conviction profonde. Vous le disiez à Helsinki en 1975: "La paix en Europe occidentale serait une garantie importante pour la paix du monde". Comme vous aussi, je sais le chemin qu'il nous reste à parcourir pour l'assurer.

Je vous invite à le faire avec moi et lève mon verre à ce commun effort.

D R A F T

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED TOAST FOR USE BY THE  
PRIME MINISTER DURING HIS VISIT TO BUCHAREST  
FEBRUARY 1984

Mr. President, let me begin by expressing my deep appreciation for your kind invitation to visit Bucharest and for the warm welcome you have extended to me here today. Let me also take advantage of this opportunity to recognize and applaud your tireless efforts on behalf of international peace and stability.

I have travelled extensively in recent months to consult with many statesmen and world leaders, and to suggest means to alleviate current global tensions. I considered it essential to include Bucharest in my itinerary, given your own very welcome efforts to reopen the dialogue between East and West.

Nine years ago, Mr. President, we met at Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. At that time, you rightly stated:

...2

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CONFIDENTIAL

"We should not harbour the illusion that we can now stay still and remain safe.... History is going to judge not only the documents we shall sign and the statements made, but also the way in which every one of our states, every leader and government, takes action to implement these documents."

How prophetic those words have proven to be. The deterioration in international relations since 1975 demonstrates the vulnerability of the spirit of Helsinki to those twin demons, Fear and Suspicion.

Mr. President, our peoples are anxious about the future and, most of all, about the prospects of war in a nuclear age. I share their unease.

There was, I suppose a time when war was seen as a noble endeavour, waged for noble purposes. Unlike our Helsinki Final Act, international law recognized only states and their interests, not individuals. As enlightened a philosopher as Jean-Jacques Rousseau could state:

"On fait la guerre aux Etats, non aux peuples."

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- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

But whatever we might have believed in the past, we recognize now that wars are waged on people, civilian populations as well as combatants, and not on inanimate states.

Nor does it make sense, in a nuclear age, to debate strategies for victory, since there is little possibility any victor will emerge from the ashes of the next global conflict. The vocabulary of victor and vanquished has been emptied of all meaning. If our efforts to safeguard peace are not successful, there will be no winners, only losers.

There is a well-known Latin maxim that states:

"Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum."

"Let he who desires peace, prepare for war."

(Vegetius, 4th C. A.D.)

The principle of nuclear deterrence is founded upon that maxim. But is there not a danger of becoming so prepared for war, psychologically as well as militarily, that we lose sight of the prospects for peace?

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- 4 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Faced with the fearful realities of the nuclear arms race, it is easy enough for leaders to become paralyzed, or to hide behind political bombast, or rote repetition of familiar positions.

Granted, the problems we confront are complex. But if we, today's leaders, do not confront them, then history may not provide a second chance.

Either this generation of leaders takes effective action to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and prevent their spread, or we bequeath to our children a future where the chances of global destruction increase every day.

Mr. President, we cannot pretend that no differences exist between our two countries. We embrace different political and economic ideologies, and we are committed members of different alliances.

Nor, as medium-sized powers, are we the key players in the disarmament debate. The two superpowers are primarily responsible for the current arms race and have the means, if they choose to use them, to negotiate a reversal.

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- 5 -

CONFIDENTIAL

I have no desire to interfere with such fora as the INF and START talks. But at a time when virtually all arms control negotiations have broken down, and when all mankind is subjected to an unacceptable menace, no leader can stand silent. We dare not.

More than four-fifths of the world's population live outside the borders of the United States and the Soviet Union. The collective voices of leaders from the smaller and middle powers must be brought to bear against the folly of superpower confrontationalism.

In coming to Bucharest and other European capitals, my purpose is to build upon and reinforce an established tradition of consultation on European security concerns. The process has been going on for some time now, particularly through such fora as the CSCE.

But I sense that the momentum of consultation has been lost. It is my hope that, through direct personal contact, the leaders of East and West can once again bring direction and determination to the consultative process.

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- 6 -

CONFIDENTIAL

We need to reassert our political will in order to overcome the inertia of the generals and the technocrats. We need to make a commitment to send our foreign ministers back to Stockholm if the search for security and confidence should falter.

We need to make a determined effort to give substance to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act calling for increased personal contacts and freedom of movement, for nothing breeds mutual fear and suspicion as much as isolation.

We must, in short, bring about a fundamental change in attitudes and intentions. Because peace cannot be based exclusively on numerical or technical adjustments, however significant, to military stockpiles. Such a peace would be precarious indeed.

Mr. President, I am pleased to note that Canada and Romania have a history of cooperation, and not only in bilateral fields. We have also worked together on international issues of peace, security, and disarmament through such fora as the U.N. General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament, and the CSCE.

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- 7 -

CONFIDENTIAL

I am grateful for the support you have voiced, not only for the general thrust of the present peace initiative upon which I am embarked, but also for the Strategy of Suffocation which I advanced during the first Special Session on Disarmament in 1978.

I know too that we share a grave concern for the plight of the developing nations, whose economic progress and development cannot be divorced from progress in curbing the arms race. As a member of the Group of 77, Romania has many times spoken out against the expenditure of vast sums of money on armaments -- conventional as well as nuclear -- while millions live in poverty.

I am heartened, Mr. President, by the fact that although our approaches are different, our objectives are similar: to reduce international tension, particularly between East and West, and to create an international climate of peace in which security and prosperity for all nations becomes an attainable goal.

Permit me to propose a toast, Mr. President, to you, to increased efforts for global peace, and to continued friendship and cooperation between the Canadian and Romanian peoples.



External Affairs  
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Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

FILE MGTC CIRC DIARY

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 7.4 JAN 84 06 01 212 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0086 23JAN84  
TO/A TO PRGUE /DELBY 240830/  
INFO INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN WSAW BUCST  
DISTR DISTR XDV MINA USS IFB RGB RBD RBR RBP  
REF REF YOURTEL WOGR 0256 23JAN  
SUBJ/SUJ

---PMS VISIT PROGRAMME

MOST GRATEFUL FOR RECAP OF PROGRAMME, AND PROGRESS MADE. FOLLOWING  
ARE FEW COMMENTS:

JANUARY 25

(A) 1100 REVIEW OF PROGRAMME BY PMS: WE WISH YOU TO CONTINUE TO  
PRESS FOR PM PLUS 4. FYI ABSOLUTE MINIMUM ON CDN SIDE FOR HUSAK  
DISCUSSIONS IS PM, AMB AND FOWLER BUT PLUS FOUR STILL PREFERRED.  
PM WILL BE SO BRIEFED FOR PROGRAMME REVIEW WITH STROUGAL FOLLOWING  
ARRIVAL. PROPOSED LIMITED ATTENDANCE AND REPEATED USE OF QUOTE  
CALL UNQUOTE ON HUSAK SUGGEST TO US THAT CZECHOS SEE THIS MTG  
AS LESS A ROUND OF THOROUGH DISCUSSIONS THAN A FORMAL CALL ON  
PRESIDENT DURING WHICH SELECTED SUBSTANTIVE SUBJECTS CAN BE  
BROACHED. IS THERE SOME CURVE BALL HERE? HOW LONG IS MTG INTENDED?  
IF HOUR AND A HALF, IS NOT/NOT THIS SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL FOR GOVT  
**PLUS ONE**  
~~PERS OWN~~ FORMULA? GRATEFUL YOUR APPRECIATION OF SITUATION SOONEST.  
OUR DEPARTURE FROM OTT IS 242030 HRS LOCAL.

(B) PRESS ENCOUNTER FOLLOWING MTG WITH STROUGAL. IT HAS NOT/NOT  
YET BEEN DECIDED WHETHER THIS WILL BE SCRUM IN WHICH PM WILL

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

M. Fairweather/sk

RBR

2-6225

G. Smith



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PAGE 2 IDDZ0086 CONFD

12

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TAKE PART OR RATHER BRIEFING OF PRESS BY OFFICIALS WITH PM  
SCRUM RESERVED TO FOLLOW HUSAK MTG NEXT DAY.NO/NO REF TO PM  
ENCOUNTER WITH PRESS JAN 25 SHOULD THEREFORE BE MADE IN PROGRAM.  
JANUARY 26

(C)GRATEFUL YOUR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN EARLIER MTG WITH HUSAK AND  
FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION IN ACCEPTING 1030.

(D)1300 WORKING LUNCHEON AT AMB RESIDENCE:APPROX 6 FROM DEL,  
WILL CONFIRM ON ARRIVAL.

2.WE CAN CONFIRM COMPOSITION OF DEL AS PROVIDED BY XDV.

3.LIST OF <sup>PRESS</sup>~~PERS~~ TO FOLLOW <sup>A</sup>~~ASP~~.THERE WILL BE 22 ON AIRCRAFT  
JOINED BY 3 IN PRAGUE.



External Affairs Canada  
Affaires extérieures Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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24 JAN 84 06 00 Z

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ / C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY/ 12 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0085 23JAN84  
TO/A TO WSAW DELBY 240830  
INFO  
DISTR INFO PRGUE BUCST LDN BONN PARIS MOSCO STKHM/SCDEL BGRAD  
REF WSHDC BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/  
SUBJ/SUJ CPP  
  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR RBD XDV  
  
REF YOURTEL UMGRO122 23JAN ~~REDACTED~~ WADE/HANCOCK TELECON 23JAN  
  
---PMS INITIATIVE:VISIT TO GDR  
  
FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS BY PARA ON POINTS RAISED REFTEL AS WELL  
AS ON SUBJECTS DISCUSSED REFTTELECON:  
  
PARA 4 - AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED WE WOULD HOPE THAT WADE COULD  
REDUCE PROFILE OF ARRIVAL CEREMONY AT SCHOENFELD,PARTICULARLY  
21-GUN SALUTE.  
  
PARA 5 - ARRANGEMENTS AGREEABLE.  
  
PARAS 6-8 - AS PM IS FIRST NATO HEAD OF GOVT TO VISIT BERLIN EAST  
HIS ACTIVITIES ARE LIKELY TO ATTRACT MORE ATTENTION THAN THOSE  
OF WESTERN FMS.WE MUST THEREFORE AVOID ENTIRELY WREATH-LAYING  
CEREMONY AS WELL AS VISIT TO CITY HALL/GOLDEN BOOK SIGNING.  
  
PARA 9 - WALK PREFERRED.PURSUE PERGAMON,RE FIRST EVENING IS THERE  
OPTION OF CULTURAL EVENT?ADVISE WITHOUT CONSULTING GDR OR  
COMMITMENT.  
  
PARA 10 - BRIEF TETE A TETE ACCEPTABLE IF STIPULATED BY HONECKER,  
BUT AMB MUST BE PRESENT.CDN SIDE FOR CONSULTATIONS:PM,AMB,FOWLER  
  
...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

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RBR

2-6225

SIG G. Smith



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PAGE 2 IDDZ0085 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

12

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HANCOCK, SMITH, JOHNSON, COLEMAN, AXWORTHY/ALTERNATE WADE FOR TOTAL  
OF EIGHT. AGREE OF COURSE THAT WADES NAME BE ADDED TO DEL LIST  
PROVIDED BY XDV, WHICH IS NOW CONFIRMED.

PARA 11 - TWO TWO-HOUR SESSIONS WITH HONECKER AGREEABLE. ENGLISH  
WILL BE WORKING LANGUAGE FOR PM.

PARA 12 - LUNCHEON SHOULD BE PRIVATE FOR PM DEL ONLY, IF  
POSSIBLE AT GUEST HOUSE.

PARA 13 - OFFICIAL DINNER AT 2000 AGREEABLE. TOAST PREPARED FOR  
PM IS IN FRENCH AND LIKELY TO BE SO DELIVERED.

PARA 14 - LOW PROFILE DEPARTURE CEREMONIES PREFERRED. YOU WILL  
NOTE FROM OURTEL IDDZ0082 23JAN TO BUCST THAT DEPARTURE FROM  
BERLIN DELAY<sup>ED</sup> UNTIL 1000 FEB 1.

2. FOLLOWING ARE RESPONSES TO SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS RAISED BY  
WADE REFTELECON:

(A) AGREE TO INCLUSION OF THREE CDN JOURNALISTS IN OFFICIAL DINNER;

(B) NO/NO PHOTOCOPIER BROUGHT BY PM DEL.

(C) AGREE ENCOUNTER WITH PRESS AT PRESS CENTRE BUT ALONG LINES  
OURTEL IDDZ0084 23JAN.

(D) CDN PRESS OFFICE MUST BE ESTABLISHED IN HOTEL IN WHICH PRESS  
ACCOMMODATED, NOT/NOT IN GOVT PRESS CENTRE.

(E) NO/NO MTG WITH GDR SPORTS FIGURES.



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

MESSAGE

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ C O N F I D E N T I A L 24 JAN 84 05 59Z 12 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0084 23JAN84  
TO/À TO PRGUE BUCST WSAW / DELBY 240830  
INFO INFO PMOOTT/DURDIN/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER  
DISTR DISTR XDV RGB RBR RBD  
REF  
SUBJ/SUJ ---PMS INITIATIVE:MTGS WITH PRESS

WE RECOGNIZE THAT IN SOME CASES IT WILL NOT/NOT BE POSSIBLE TO  
ARRANGE MTGS WITH PRESS PRECISELY IN CDN FASHION(E.G.ON EMERGING  
FROM MTG WITH PRESIDENT HUSAK)AND THAT GOVT PRESS CENTRE OR MFA  
FACILITIES WILL BE OFFERED INSTEAD.HOWEVER,WE DO WISH TO ENSURE  
THAT SCRUM FORMAT IS FOLLOWED,OF RELATIVELY BRIEF MTGS BETWEEN  
PM AND PRESS(I.E. 15-20 MUNUTES);THEY SHOULD BE INFORMAL STAND-UP  
ENCOUNTERS. AND NOT/NOT ELABORATE(AND LONG)SET PIECES IN AN  
AUDITORIUM WITH INTERPRETERS.DURDIN WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU  
UPON ARRIVAL TO WORK OUT DETAILS.GOOD LUCK.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG M. Fairweather/sk

RBR

2-6225

SIG G. Smith



MESSAGE

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	<div>24 JAN 84 05 59Z 12 10</div> <div>C O N F I D E N T I A L</div>
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TO/À	TO BUCST/AMB ONLY DELBY 240800 !
INFO	INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR	DISTR XDV RGB RBR RBD
REF	REF OURTEL IDDZ0082 23JAN <del>AND</del> YOURTEL UYGR0175 23JAN
SUBJ/SUJ	---PM VISIT TO ROMANIA
	WITH REGARD TO LUNCHEON FEB 2, WE BELIEVE PM WOULD PREFER PRIVATE LUNCH WITH LIMITED CDN ATTENDANCE AT INTERESTING BUCHAREST RESTAURANT. WE WOULD NOT/NOT HOWEVER WISH TO HAVE ROM SECURITY OR OTHER AUTHORITIES, OR RESTAURANT, WARNED MUCH IN ADVANCE WITH RESULTANT IMPORT OF SPECIAL FOOD AND EXPORT OF NORMAL RESTAURANT PATRONS. SUGGEST THAT ROM SECURITY PEOPLE COULD BE GIVEN ABOUT ONE HOUR WARNING AT MOST. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS BY 241400 HRS WHICH SHOULD NOT/NOT BE GIVEN WIDER DISTRIBUTION THAN THIS TEL.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG MFairweather/sk

RBR

2-6225

SIG G. Smith



External Affairs Affaires extérieures  
Canada Canada

MESSAGE

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24 JAN 84 06 02Z

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	CONFIDENTIAL	12	10
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FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0082 23JAN84

TO/A TO BUCST DELBY 240800

INFO INFO PRGUE WSAW BONN MOSCO WSHDC LDN PARIS BNATO BPEST BGRAD

REF NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/BURDIN/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

SUBJ/SUJ DISTR XDV MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR RBD RBP

REF/OURTEL UYGR0175 23JAN

---PM VISIT TO ROMANIA:PROGRAM

FOLLOWING ARE OUR COMMENTS ON OUTLINE OF PROGRAM GIVEN REFTEL:

FEBRUARY 1

(A)ARRIVAL:PM WILL NOW DEPART BERLIN 1000 HRS FEB 1 ARRIVING BUCST 1315 HRS.(FYI,WE DO NOT/NOT,FOR POLITICAL REASONS WISH TO PROLONG STAY IN BERLIN ANY FURTHER.)GRATEFUL YOU SOUND OUT ROMS WHETHER THIS OVERLAP WITH GROMYKO,WITH WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO LIVE,WOULD CAUSE THEM INSUPERABLE DIFFICULTIES.IN DOING SO YOU MIGHT NOTE THAT WE FOR OUR PART HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE ADJUSTMENTS ALREADY TO FACILITATE AS PRODUCTIVE A SOJOURN IN BUCST AS POSSIBLE.

(B)LUNCHEON:WE ASSUME THAT CEAUSESCU WILL BE TIED UP WITH GROMYKO UNTIL LATTERS DEPARTURE AT 1500 HRS.IF YOU ARE AGREEABLE THERE MIGHT THEREFORE BE PRIVATE LUNCH FOR PM AND IMMEDIATE PARTY(APPROX 8) AT OR,DURING WHICH AMB AND STAFF COULD OFFER INFORMAL BRIEFING.REST OF AFTERNOON COULD BE PRIVATE TIME AND/OR SETTLING INTO GUEST HOUSE IF THIS IS NOT/NOT POSSIBLE EARLIER

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DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

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2-6225

SIG G. Smith





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PAGE 2 IDDZ0082    CONFD

12

10

BECAUSE OF GROMYKO.

(C) DINNER: IN REFTEL OFFICIAL DINNER IS SLATED FOR 1700 HRS.  
IS THIS CORRECT OR SHOULD TEL READ 1900 HRS? IF 1900, DINNER  
MIGHT BE PRECEDED BY TETE-A-TETE BETWEEN PM AND CEAUSESCU,  
ALTHOUGH YOU SHOULD LEAVE THIS TO THE ROMS TO SUGGEST. PM WILL  
HAVE PREPARED TOAST WHICH WE WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY MAKE AVAILABLE  
TO PRESS.

FEBRUARY 2

(D) YOU SHOULD RESIST WREATH-LAYING CEREMONY ON GROUNDS THAT  
PMS VISIT IS NOT/NOT OFFICIAL BILATERAL VISIT BUT ONE DEVOTED  
ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO DISCUSSION OF INITIATIVE AND EAST-WEST  
RELATIONS. WREATH-LAYING WAS NOT/NOT FEATURE OF WEST EUROPEAN  
VISITS (WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGE ARE DIFFERENT) NOR/NOR OF CZECHO  
VISIT. IN ADDITION, WE PARTICULARLY WISH TO AVOID A ROM WREATH-LAYING  
WHICH COULD SERVE AS REINFORCEMENT FOR GDR REQUEST FOR WREATH-LAYING  
IN BERLIN-EAST WHICH IS NOT/NOT POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE.

(E) 0900 MTG WITH PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU ACCEPTABLE SHD ROMS WISH  
TO MOVE START TIME UP FROM 0930.

(F) 1300 MTG WITH PRESS; TIMING ACCEPTABLE BUT SEE OUR TEL IDDZ0084  
23JAN ON THESE ENCOUNTERS.

(G) 1330 LUNCHEON - SEE SEPARATE TEL.

(H) DEPARTURE: WE WOULD PREFER TO ADHERE TO 1500 DEPARTURE TIME,  
ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT BE FLEXIBILITY TO 1530 IF MORNING MTG WITH

...3

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External Affairs Affaires extérieures  
Canada Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

FILE MGTC CIRC DIARY

81

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	CONFIDENTIAL			24 JAN 84	06 022	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT <del>RBR0154</del> 23JAN84						
TO/A	TO BUCST DELBY 240800						
INFO	INFO PRGUE WSAW						
DISTR	DISTR XDV RBD RBRX						
REF							
SUBJ/SUJ	<p>---PMS INITIATIVE: VISIT TO ROMANIA</p> <p>ROM VISAS FOR PM DEL AND ACCOMPANYING PERS ARE BEING SOUGHT IN OTT. UNFORTUNATELY, FOR TECHNICAL REASONS, <del>ARVINEW</del> <sup>AIRCREW</sup> WILL NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN VISAS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CONFIRM WITH MFA THAT VISAS COULD BE ISSUED TO <del>ARVINEW</del> <sup>AIRCREW</sup> ON ARRIVAL AIRPORT BUCHAREST. (CREW WILL ARRIVE WITH COMPLETED APPLICATIONS.) WE HAVE CONSULTED ROM EMB/PITIGOI WHO BELIEVES THAT ISSUANCE AT AIRPORT WILL NOT/NOT PRESENT PROBLEMS BUT HE IS UNABLE TO CONFIRM. PLSE REPLY IF POSSIBLE FOR DELBY 240900. 2. IF ROMS CANNOT AGREE TO ISSUE VISAS ON ARRIVAL, ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE ISSUANCE BY ROM EMB PRGUE JAN 25-26.</p>						

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG M. Fairweather/sk

RBR

2-6225

SIG Gary Smith


## TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO  
AThe Canadian Embassy  
BUDAPEST, Hungary

NO. IDDZ0080 DATE Jan. 23, 84

CONFIDENTIAL

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>Please find attached the background briefing book for the PM's visit to Eastern Europe, January 25 - February 2, 1984.</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em;"><del>TO</del></p>	REF. IDDZ-0073
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION FEB 7 1984 DATE BUDAPEST	 SIGNATURE	RETURN TO / RETOURNER À IDDZ/EXTOTT

## TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

TO  
A**The Canadian Embassy  
APEST, Hungary**NO. **IDDZ0080**DATE **Jan. 23, 84**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	Please find attached the background briefing book for the PM's visit to Eastern Europe, January 25 - February 2, 1984.	REF. IDDZ-0073
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À <b>IDDZ/EXTOTT</b>
DATE	SIGNATURE	

## TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO **Th. Canadian Embassy**  
A **Bo. , FRG**

WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. **IDDZ-00 79** DATE **Jan. 23, 84**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>Please find attached the background briefing book for the PM's visit to Eastern Europe, January 25 - February 2, 1984.</p>	<p>Ref. IDDZ-0073</p>

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

**IDDZ/EXTOTT**

DATE

SIGNATURE

## TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO  
À  
THE CANADIAN EMBASSY  
MC DW, USSR

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. **IDDZ0078** DATE **Jan. 23, 84**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	Please find attached the background briefing book for the PM's visit to Eastern Europe, January 25 - February 2, 1984.	Ref. IDDZ-0073
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
		<b>IDDZ/EXTOTT</b>
DATE	SIGNATURE	

RESTRICTED


January 23, 1984

IDDZ-0077

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Eastern Europe: Proposed Delegation List

The proposed delegation list of those who would accompany you on your trip to Eastern Europe is attached for your consideration and approval.

  
Gary J. Smith  
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/Anderson

DEA/MINA USS DMF IFB RBR IDR



Canadian Delegation

Prime Minister Trudeau

PMO

T. Axworthy

J.E. Johnson

R. Coleman

C. Viau

M. Durdin

J. Hudon

G. Carter (RCMP)

PCO

R. Fowler

External

P. Hancock

G. Smith

B.V. Johnstone

Support Staff

R. Cooper - official photographer - PMO

T. Prusagowski - technician - PCO

C. Cardinal - secretary - PCO

W. Horner - security guard - EA

J. Mailhot - communicator - EA

J. Deschambault - luggage assistant - PMO

mf

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5139 23JAN84

TO PRMNY/PMDEL/DURDIN/JOHNSTONE DELIVER BY 231200

INFO EXTOTT/XDV PCOOTT/COLEMAN/COPELAND

TT CANDEL DAVOS/VAN TICHEM DE BRN

DISTR (IDDZ MINA MINT RGBD RGB RSD EER SCS MGT

REF OURTEL ZNTD5138 23JAN

---DAVOS 84 - PMS VISIT-MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

EMF ORIGINALLY INVITED TWO CDNS AS REPORTERS TO COVER DAVOS SYMPOSIUM,  
NAMELY:MICHEL NADEAU,LE DEVOIR;AND CHIRSTOPHER YOUNG,SOUTHERN NEWS  
SERVICES LONDON.NEITHER RESPONDED.

2.AS PART OF SYMPOSIUM ACTIVITEIS,EMF HAS ORGANIZED QUOTE INFORMAL  
GATHERING OF WORLD MEDIA LEADERS UNQUOTE JAN27 TO 29.GROUP OF  
PARTICIPANTS WAS PUT TOGETHER BY EMF INVITATION AND AS OF 03JAN  
FOLLOWING INVITEES WERE CONFIRMED.

MANFRED LAHSTEIN:MEMBER OF THE BOARD,BERTELSMANN AG,GERMANY;FORMER  
MINISTER OF FINANCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF  
GERMANY

GRAHAM ALLISON :DEAN,JOHN F KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT,HARVAR  
UNIVERSITY,USA

KARL AHLENIUS :EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,VECKANS AFFAERER,STOCKHOLM

JEAN BOISSONNAT :REDACTEUR EN CHEF,L EXPANSION PARIS

WILLIAM BROYLES :EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,NEWSWEEK,NEW YORK

JEAN-MARIE CAVADA:MANAGING DIRECTOR,PARAFRANCE FILMS,PARIS

ALBERTO CAVALLARI:IL DIRETTORE,CORRIERE DELLA SERA,MILAN

...2

PAGE TWO ZNTD5139 UNCLAS

CHEONG YIP SENG :EDITOR,THE STRAITS TIMES,SINGAPORE

BASIL A CORONAKIS:PUBLISHER,GREECES WEEKLY BUSINESS AND FINANCE ATHENS

JAN CORTZEN :EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,BOERSEN,COPENHAGEN

FRITZ ULLRICH FACK:HERAUSGEBER,FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG,  
FRANKFURT

DUDLEY FISHBURN :EXECUTIVE EDITOR,THE ECONOMIST,LONDON

EARL W FOEL :EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,BOSTON

ROBERT GOTTLIEBSEN:EDITOR,BUSINESS REVIEW WEEKLY,MELBOURNE

JOHN W HUEY :EDITOR,THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE,BRUSSELS

KYN HAENG LEE :PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER,THE KOREA ECONOMIC DAILY,  
SEOUL

FRANCO RICARDO LEVI:COLUMNIST,IL SOLE - 24 ORE,MILAN

ROY MACKIE :EDITOR,BUSINESS TIMES,SINGAPORE

NEVILLE J NANKIVELL:EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,THE FINANCIAL POST,TORONTO

DAVID PALMER :GENERAL MANAGER,THE FINANCIAL TIMES,LONDON

NARESH PANDE :EDITOR,INDO-EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,NEW DELHI

RICHARD W PURDY :EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,THE MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGGEST,  
LONDON

TRYGVE RAMBERG :EDITOR-IN-CHIEF AFTENPOSTEN,OSLO

PETER ROBBS :EDITOR,AFRICA ECONOMIST DIGEST,LONDON

PIERRE SALINGER :BUREAU CHIEF,ABC NEWS PARIS

CLAUDE SMADJA :CHEF DE LA RUBRIQUE INTERNATIONALE,RADIO-TELEVISION  
SUISSE ROMANDE,GENEVA

THEO SOMMER :PUBLISEHR,DIE ZEIT,HAMBURG

...3

PAGE THREE ZNTD5139 UNCLAS

SIEGFRIED STERNER:EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,BLICK DURCH WIRTSCHAFT,FRANKFURT

HEIKKI TIKKANEN :EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,HELSINGIN SANOMAT,HELSINKI

ARTO TUOMINEN :EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,AND MANAGING DIRECTOR,KAUPPALEHTI,  
HELSINKI

MARTIN UNGERER :EDITOR-IN-CHIEF HANDELSZEITUNG,ZURICH

JERRY VAN WATERSCHOOT:EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,DE FINANCIEEL EKONOMISCHE TIJD

NORMAN WEBSTER :EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,THE GLOBE AND MAIL,TORONTO

GRAHAM WILDE :PUBLISHER,ASIAN BANKING,HONG KONG

WOUT WOLTZ :EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,NRC HANDELSBLAD ROTTERDAM

3.FOUR CDNS WERE ORIGINALLY INVITED TO MEDIA LEADERS GATHERING NAMELY:

LISE BISSONETTE,LE DEVOIR;NEVILLE NANKIVELL,FINANCIAL POST;NORMAN

WEBSTER,GLOBE AND MAIL;AND NORMAN GERARD,LE JOURNAL DE MONTREAL.YOU

WILL NOTE FROM PARA TWO ABOVE THAT WEBSTER AND NANKIVELL HAVE

CONFIRMED THEIR PARTICIPATION.

UUU/205 231530Z ZNTD5139

MF

CLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5136 23JAN84

TO PRMNY/PMDEL/DURDIN/JOHNSTONE DELIVER BY 231200

INFO EXTOTT/XDV PCOOTT/COLEMAN/COPELAND

TT CANDELDAVOS/VAN TIGHEN DE BRN

DISTR/IDDZ MINA MINT RGBD RGB RSD EER SCS MGT

---DAVOS 84 - PMS VISIT-ACCREDITATION TO EMF SYMPOSIUM

FOLLOWING ACCREDITATION CATEGORIES EXIST AT DAVOS SYMPOSIUM:

A)WHITE BADGE-FULL ACCESS;BADGE IS GENERALLY RESTRICTED TO WORLD LEADERS, INFORMAL GATHERING MEMBERS, AND REGISTERED BUSINESS PARTICIPANTS;

B)BLUE BADGE-RESTRICTED ACCESS TO PLENARY HALL MAIN FLOOR BUT FREE ACCESS TO PLENARY HALL BALCONY;ACCESS TO WORKSHOPS AND BRIEFINGS ONLY WITH PERMISSION OF SESSIONS CHAIRMAN;FREE ACCESS TO ALL GROUP EVENTS(BUFFET RECEPTION TO MEET THE OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS SPONSORED BY CANADA,EMF SYMPOSIUM SOIREE(BLACK TIE EVENT)ETC);BADGE IS ALSO FOR QUOTE ACCOMPANYING PERSONS UNQUOTE;

C)GREEN BADGE-FOR PERMANENT BUT NON-EMF STAFF AT THE SYMPOSIUM;FULL ACCESS TO THE PREMISES BUT NOT/NOT TO PLENARY SESSION;WEARER IS QUOTE DISSUADE UNQUOTE FROM ATTENDING GROUP ACTIVITIES;

D)RED BADGE-INTENDED FOR MEDIA MEMBERS;ACCESS AS PER BLUE BADGE.

2.WE HAVE PROPOSED AND EMF HAS APPROVED FOLLOWING ACCREDITATION BADGES FOR PM DEL MEMBERS:

A)WHITE-PM,CARTER,JOHNSON,AXWORTHY,FOWLER AND COLEMAN,

B)BLUE-VIAU AND JOHNSTONE

C)RED:COPELAND,DURDIN,HUDON,AND PRUSAKOWSKI PLUS ALL CDN MEDIA MEMBERS.

...2

PAGE TWO ZNTD5136 UNCLAS

3.DO YOU FORESEE NEED FOR ACCREDITATION FOR ANY MEMBERS OF PM DEL  
SUPPORT GROUP:DESCHAMBAULT,SMITH,HANCOCK,CARDINAL,COOPER AND MAILHOT.

4.GRATEFUL YOUR COMMENTS.

UUU/205 231530Z ZNTD5136

mf

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5134 23JAN84

TO PRMNY/PMDEL/DURDIN/JOHNSTONE DELIVER BY 231200

INFO EXTOTT/XDV PCOOTT/COLEMAN/COPELAND

TT CANDEL DAVOS/VAN TIGHEM DE BRN

DISTR LIDDZ MINA MINT RGBD RGB RSD EER SCS MGT

REF OURTEL TO EXTOTT/RGBD ZNTD6313 22DEC

---DAVOS 84 - PMS VISIT-PLENARY SESSION INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

PARTICIPANTS FOR SUBJECT SESSION HAVE CHANGED SINCE REFTTEL.

2.AMB JEANNE KIRPATRICK,USA,HAS BEEN REPLACED BY USA DEPUTY

SECRETARY OF STATE DAM.GERMAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE HAS WITHDRAWN.

TURKISH PRIME MINISTER T OZAL HAS BEEN ADDED TO GROUP.SWEDISH

MINISTER O PALME REMAINS TO BE CONFIRMED.MALAYSIAN PRIME MINISTER

MAHATHIR WILL PARTICIPATE AS SCHEDULED.

3.PM TRUDEAU HAS BEEN INVITED AS PER REFTTEL TO OPEN THE PLENARY

SESSION WITH SHORT MESSAGE(7 MINUTES)THAT COULD CONCENTRATE ON:

CONCRETE PROPOSALS TO UNBLOCK THE SITUATION.

UUU/205 231530Z ZNTD5134

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER  
NONCLASSIFIE

DE BNATO YBGR2025 23JAN84

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO CNGNY

DISTR FPR IDR

REF CNGNY TEL YIGR0035 20JAN

---RENCONTRE DU PM AVEC LA REDACTION DU NEW YORK TIMES

L EXCELLENT RESUME FOURNI DANS TEL EN REF SUR A RENCONTRE DU PM  
AVEC LE CONSEIL DE REDACTION DU NEW YORK TIMES NOUS INCITE A VOUS  
DEMANDER DE BIEN VOULOIR NOUS TRANSMETTRE PAR TELEX LA  
RETRANSCRIPTION COMPLETE DE CETTE ENTREVUE POUR QUE NOUS PUISSIONS  
LA DIFFUSER ICI A L OTAN, AU CONSEIL ET AUX COMITES SUBSIDIAIRES. IL  
S AGIT EN EFFET DE A MISE A JOUR LA PLUS COMPLETE ET PAR L AUTEUR  
MEME DE L INITIATIVE DE PAIX CANADIENNE. SA DIFFUSION PERMETTRAIT  
DE COMBLER UN VIDE ENTRE D UNE PART DES CONSULTATIONS INTENSES  
BILATERALES ENTRE LE CANADA ET SES ALLIES ET D AUTRE PART UNE  
CERTAINE CARENCE AU NIVEAU DE L INSTITUTION MULTILATERALE  
CORRESPONDANTE QU EST L OTAN.

UUU/054 231426Z YBGR2025

MF  
Mr. J. Mac  
Done 26.1 Pls see if FPR  
would be willing to  
do this - It seems a  
bit much to me - Bag?  
RD



mf

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1071 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO BNATO VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DNACPOL MOSCO

LDN BONN GENEV

DISTR MINA MINE USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBR (IDDZ IDA IDRA IDRL FPR

REF BNATO TEL YBGR0987 21JAN

---MBFR:RESUMPTION OF NEGS

WASH POST TODAY CARRIES A STORY THAT USA HAS AGREED TO SOV SUGGESTED RESUMPTION OF MBFR TALKS ON 16MAR. STORY GOES ON TO SAY THAT PRES REAGAN HAS REFUSED TO ADOPT A NEW APPROACH AT THE OUTSET OF THE RESUMED MBFR. STORY SAYS THAT OFFICIALS OF STATE DEPT AND ACDA HAVE BEEN PUSHING FOR A CHANGE TO USA APPROACH WHEREAS PENTAGON OFFICIALS ARE FIGHTING ANY MBFR CHANGE. PRES, THE STORY REPORTS, HAS DECIDED TO FOLLOW THE PENTAGON APPROACH OF MANDATING AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS TO CONTINUE TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON DATA WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PRESSING TO EXPAND THE ON-SITE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES.

2. OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN MBFR TELL US THAT DECISION REACHED BY PRES HAD CONSIDERABLE QUOTE GRAYNESS UNQUOTE ABOUT IT AND THAT IT DID HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY. IT IS NOT AS INFLEXIBLE AS PRESS HAS REPORTED HOWEVER THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE PRES IS HARD TO CHARACTERIZE. THOSE WHO WANTED CONSIDERABLY MORE EMPHASIS ON THE VERIFICATION ISSUE WITH A STRONG DEGRADING OF THE DATA PROBLEM CLEARLY DID NOT/NOT GET THEIR WAY. AT THE SAME TIME THOSE WHO SAW MBFR AS A QUOTE FLAWED NEGOTIATION ...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1071 CONF

UNQUOTE WHICH SHLD THEREFORE BE STONEWALLED HAVE ALSO FAILED TO  
GET THEIR WAY.

3.OFFICIALS SAY THAT MUCH WORK WILL HAVE TO BE DONE BETWEEN NOW AND  
16MAR NOT/NOT ONLY TO DEFINE ALLIANCE POSITION BUT TO CLEARLY DEFINE  
USA POSITION.THE CHALLENGE WILL BE TO FIND DIFFERENT WAYS OF GETTING  
AT THE DATA PROBLEM.THE USA REALIZES THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO KEEP  
MBFR PROCESS GOING.FOR THIS REASON USA APPROACH TO THE MBFR NEGS  
WILL BE THAT THE NEGS SHOULD BE A DYNAMIC PROCESS.

4.IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON THE DATA/VERIFICATION PROBLEM ON TV  
YESTERDAY SEC SHULTZ REFLECTED USA UNCERTAINTY. HEN ASKED IF USA  
WLD BE PREPARED TO DROP THE DATA REQUIREMENT IF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION  
CLD BE ACHIEVED SHULTZ AT FIRST SEEMED TO LEAN TOWARDS THIS VIEW BY  
SAYING THAT KEY TO NEGS IS ADEQUATE MEASURES TO VERIFY WHAT HAS  
TAKEN PLACE.HOWEVER AT THE END OF HIS RESPONSE HE ADDED THE RIDER  
THAT THIS WAS LINKED TO THE ABILITY TO DETERMINE WHAT IS ACTUALLY  
IN PLACE:THAT IS THE DATA QUESTION.

CCC/059 232328Z UNGR1071

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1070 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT LDDZ URR PCOOTT/FOWLER DELIVER BY 240900  
INFO MOSCO BNATO LDN ROME PARIS BONN VMBFR HAGUE PEKIN TOKYO  
PRMNY CANMILREPNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DACPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/  
CIS GENEV OSLO COPEN ATHNS

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBD ZSI MINE MINT UGB IDD RBR  
RCR RSR RCD RSD CPD ZSP URT URE LCD LSD

---USA-USSR RELATIONS

WE HAVE NOTICED PARTICULARLY IN EUROPEAN PRESS AND OPINION VIEW  
EMERGING THAT RECENT ADMIN EFFORTS TO CHANGE ORATORICAL TREND LINE  
ON SOVIET UNION IS DUE PRIMARILY TO AMERICAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL  
CONSIDERATIONS(EG, APPRAISAL ATTRIBUTED TO FCO IN LDN TEL 0141  
20JAN). EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO US INDICATES THAT REAGAN SPEECH LAST  
WEEK AND OTHER EVENTS WERE IN FACT VERY MUCH DIRECTED TOWARD  
SENDING RIGHT SIGNALS AT THIS TIME TO USSR. THERE WAS NOT/NOT MUCH  
EXPECTATION USSR LEADERSHIP WOULD BE ABLE OR WILLING TO RESPOND  
TO SIGNALS BUT NECESSITY OF SENDING THEM AT THIS TIME HAS BEEN  
SEEN AS AN IMPERATIVE TO USA FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS.

2. OF COURSE, IT IS ALSO TRUE ADMIN POLITICAL MANAGERS ARE ANXIOUS  
TO PROJECT REAGAN TO ELECTORATE AS BEING MAN OF PEACE. THEY ALSO  
WISH TO REASSURE PUBLIC HERE THAT SIT WITH USSR IS NOT/NOT  
DANGEROUS DESPITE INTERRUPTION OF ARMS CONTROL NEGS. GREAT EFFORT  
HAS BEEN PUT INTO COMMUNICATING EXTENT TO WHICH BILATERAL CONTACTS

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PAGE TWO UNGR1070 CONF

ON VARIETY OF SUBJECTS CONTINUES. DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ELECTION YEAR NATURALLY INFLUENCE ENORMOUSLY WHAT IS DONE PUBLICLY BY ADMIN, PARTICULARLY FOR ADMIN FOR WHICH PUBLIC ANGLE IS SO MUCH PART OF ISSUE MANAGEMENT, EVEN IN INNATL AFFAIRS. BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO CONSIDER AS REFLEX THAT DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE MOSTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT EVENTS SINCE THIS TENDS PREEMPTIVELY TO DIMINISH POTENTIAL OF THEIR SIGNIFICANCE INNATLY, WHEN INDEED SOME SIGNIFICANCE IS INTENDED.

3. FACT IS THAT THIS ADMIN NOW RECOGNIZES NEED TO REACH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH USSR FOR SUBSTANTIVE AS WELL AS PRESENTATIONAL REASONS.

CCC/241 232328Z UNGR1070

MF

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNTD5138 23JAN84

TO PRMNY/PMDEL/DURDIN/JOHNSTONE DELIVER BY 231200

INFO EXTOTT/XDV PCOOTT/COLEMAN/COPELAND

TT CANDELDAVOS/VAN TICHEM DE BRN

TT EMF FOUNDATION COLOGNY TLX 27047 DE BRN

ATTN F HERREN AND MME MATHUR

DISTR (IDDZ MINA MINT RGBD RGB RSD EER SCS MGT

REF YOURTEL WIGR0563 19JAN

---DAVOS 84 - PMS VISIT-MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

YOU WILL BE AWARE FROM OURTEL ZNGR0055 21JAN THAT MEDIA AND PM DEL MEDIA STAFF WILL BE LODGED IN TWO SEPARATE HOTELS IN VILLAGE OF KLOSTERS WHILE PM DEL AND SUPPORT GROUP WILL BE IN THREE SEPARATE HOTELS IN DAVOS VILLAGE.

2.WE ASSUME FIRST OF ALL THAT YOU WOULD PREFER TO LOCATE MEDIA WORKING ROOM NOT/NOT IN KLOSTERS BUT IN DAVOS WHERE PM DEL LOCATED AND WHERE EMF SYMPOSIUM TAKES PLACE.CONFIRM.

3.WE FIRST ENDEAVOURED TO LOCATE MEDIA WORKING ROOM IN BELVEDERE HOTEL WHERE PM,DPM/SSEA MACEACHEN AND MINISTER REGAN ARE ALL LODGED.AT THIS STAGE,NO/NO SUITABLE ROOM APPEARS TO BE AVAILABLE IN THE HOTEL.

4.AFTER INVESTIGATING DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES AND DISCUSSING MATTER WITH EMF STAFF,WE WOULD PROPOSE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENT:

A)ACCREDITATION:ALL CDN MEDIA REPS WOULD OF COURSE BE ACCREDITED TO EMF SYMPOSIUM WITH RED PRESS BADGE WHICH PROVIDES ACCESS TO KONGRESS HOUSE AND SYMPOSIUM EVENTS AS PER OURTEL ZNTD5136 23JAN:

...2

PAGE TWO ZNTD5138 UNCLAS

B) MEDIA BRIEFING ROOM-CAN BE ARRANGED BY EMF IN THE KONGRESS HOUSE ON AN REQUIRED BASIS; IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL IF EMF (MME MATHUR SEE PARA 7 BELOW) COULD BE ADVISED IN ADVANCE OF BRIEFING ROOM REQUIREMENTS; BLACKBOARD OR FLIP CHART NO/NO PROBLEM;

C) MEDIA WORKING SPACE-ALL CDN PRESS WOULD BE GIVEN COMPLETE ACCESS TO AND USE OF FACILITIES IN EMF PRESS ROOM IN BASEMENT OF KONGRESS HOUSE; ROOM IS NOT/NOT SPACIOUS GIVEN ALREADY TIGHT SPACE LIMITATION IN KONGRESS HOUSE AND IS ALREADY SCHEDULED TO SERVICE SOME 100 OTHER JOURNALISTS ACCREDITED TO SYMPOSIUM; IT IS EQUIPPED WITH (1) 6 TO 8 TELEX MACHINES WITH ENGLISH/FRENCH SPEAKING OPERATORS ON SHIFT DUTY AS REQUIRED; (2) TYPEWRITERS; (3) TWO LONG DISTANCE PHONES PLUS EMERGENCY ACCESS TO 3 EMF SECRETARIAT PHONES PLUS ACCESS TO SOME 8 PUBLIC PAY PHONES IN KONGRESS HOUSE; (4) 2 TELEFAX MACHINES.

5. LONG DISTANCE CALLS-CALLS MAY BE MADE FROM HOTEL ROOMS USUALLY ON DIRECT DIAL BASIS. BELL INTERNATL CREDIT CARDS GENERALLY NOT/NOT ACCEPTED IN SWITZERLAND. HOTELS DO ACCEPT INTERNATL CREDITCARDS FOR ALL HOTEL CHARGES AS PER OURTEL ZNGR0055 JAN21. CALLS MADE FROM EMF PRESS ROOM IN KONGRESS HOSE ARE TOTALLED AND PRESENTED FOR CASH PAYMENT. WITH DIRECT DIALING, IT NORMALLY TAKES ONLY MATTER OF SECONDS TO PLACE CALL TO CDA. CONNECTIONS ARE GENERALLY GOOD AND AVAILABILITY OF INTERNATL LINES FROM SWITZ DOES NOT/NOT PRESENT A PROBLEM.

6. TELEXES-EMF WILL SEND OUT MEDIA TELEXES FREE OF CHARGE. ALL DAVOS/KLOSTER HOTELS EQUIPPED WITH TELEXES AS PER OURTEL ZNGR0055 21JAN. DAVOS PTT OFFICE IS 10 MINUTES WALK FROM KONGRESS HOUSE. ITU TELEGRAPH CARD IS NOT/NOT UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED IN SWITZERLAND.

...3

PAGE THREE ZNTD5138 UNCLAS

7. EMF CONTACT-PM DEL MEDIA STAFF WILL WISH TO LIAISE CLOSELY WITH EMF REP IN CHARGE OF MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS NAMELY MME MATHUR, DIRECTOR, PUBLIC RELATIONS. MATHUR IS ALREADY ON DUTY IN SYMPOSIUM PRESS ROOM IN BASEMENT OF KONGRESS HOUSE AND MAY BE REACHED BY PHONE AT 033/3.48.94 OR 033/3.32.27 OR BY TELEXING EMF FOUNDATION, KONGRESS HOUSE DAVOS TLX 74608. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT MICHAEL COPELAND CONTACT MME MATHUR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN DAVOS TUE 24 JAN TO DISCUSS MEDIA, BRIEFING ROOM, WORKING ROOM, ETC.

8. MEDIA ITINERARY AND PMS MEDIA CONTACTS-AWAITING PRELIM MEDIA PROGRAMME FROM EMF. EXPECT TO BE IN POSITION TO TELEX DRAFT ITINERARY FROM CDN MEDIA BY TUES OR WED. IN INTERIM, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT EMF HAS BOOKED ROTARY ROOM IN BELVEDERE HOTEL FROM 18H30 TO 19H30 ON SAT 28 JAN FOR PRESS CONFERENCE FOR PM IF REQUIRED. CONFIRM.

9. THIS SEPARATE PRESS CONFERENCE WOULD BE OPEN TO ALL JOURNALISTS ACCREDITED TO SYMPOSIUM AND WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO: (A) QUOTE INFORMAL GET-TOGETHER UNQUOTE WITH ALL ACCREDITED JOURNALISTS, 11H15 TO 12H15 SAT 28 JAN SCHEDULED FOR ALL INFORMAL GATHERING MEMBERS INCL PM; AND (B) BUFFET DINNER AT 19H15 SAT 28 JAN RESERVED FOR MEMBERS OF THE INFORMAL GATHERING (INCL PM), THEIR SPOUSES, AND QUOTE MEDIA LEADERS UNQUOTE (SEE FURTHER DETAILS AND COMPLETE LISTS IN SEPARATE TEL TO FOLLOW). CDN MEDIA ARE ALSO OF COURSE INVITED TO ATTEND SYMPOSIUM SOIREE AT 21H00 ON SAT 28 JAN WHICH IS BLACK TIE EVENT.

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PAGE FOUR ZNTD5138 UNCLAS

10. EMF/MATHUR IS ALSO TENTATIVELY PLANNING A PRESS CONFERENCE FOR 16H00 ON SUN 29JAN FOR FOUR OR FIVE SELECTED WORLD GATHERING MEMBERS WITH ALL ACCREDITED PRESS. PM MAY BE INVITED TO TAKE PART BUT THIS REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED. IN ANY EVENT, SHOULD YOU CONFIRM PMS OWN PRESS CONF ON SAT 28JAN, HIS EVENTUAL PARTICIPATION ON SUN WILL HAVE TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT.

11. AND AT 17H30 ON SUN 29JAN, EMF/MATHUR IS SCHEDULING PRESS MTG TO ALLOW TCW CHAIRPERSONS FROM WORLD MEDIA LEADERS GROUP TO BRIEF ALL ACCREDITED JOURNALISTS ON OUTCOME OF MEDIA LEADER DISCUSSIONS.

12. ALL THESE EVENTS WILL BE INCLUDED IN OUR EVENTUAL DRAFTING OF ITINERARY FOR CDN MEDIA.

13. PRESS SERVICES REPRESENTED AT DAVOS INCLUDE AFP, REUTERS, AP. ATS BUT NOT UPI NOR CP.

UUU/205 231555Z ZNTD5138



*action*

NONCLASSIFIE

DE BNATO YBGR2025 23JAN84

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO CNGNY

DISTR FPR IDR

REF CNGNY TEL YIGR0035 20JAN

*SVP*

---RENCONTRE DU PM AVEC LA REDACTION DU NEW YORK TIMES

L EXCELLENT RESUME FOURNI DANS TEL EN REF SUR A RENCONTRE DU PM

AVEC LE CONSEIL DE REDACTION DU NEW YORK TIMES NOUS INCITE A VOUS

DEMANDER DE BIEN VOULOIR NOUS TRANSMETTRE PAR TELEX LA

RETRANSCRIPTION COMPLETE DE CETTE ENTREVUE POUR QUE NOUS PUISSIONS

LA DIFFUSER ICI A L OTAN, AU CONSEIL ET AUX COMITES SUBSIDIAIRES. IL

S AGIT EN EFFET DE A MISE A JOUR LA PLUS COMPLETE ET PAR L AUTEUR

MEME DE L INITIATIVE DE PAIX CANADIENNE. SA DIFFUSION PERMETTRAIT

DE COMBLER UN VIDE ENTRE D UNE PART DES CONSULTATIONS INTENSES

BILATERALES ENTRE LE CANADA ET SES ALLIES ET D AUTRE PART UNE

CERTAIN CARENCE AU NIVEAU DE L INSTITUTION MULTILATERALE

CORRESPONDANTE QU EST L OTAN.

UUU/054 231426Z YBGR2025



**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

P R 262115Z JAN 84

FM NDHQ OTTAWA

TO ZEN/CDLS LONDON ENG //COMD//

INFO RCCPJSZ/EXTOTT //IDDZ/IDD/IDR/PED/PER/ZSI//

RCCPJSZ/BNATO

RCCPJSZ/STKHM //SCDEL//

RCCPJSZ/PEKIN

RCCPJSZ/LDN

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAN EYES ONLY CPP 378

SUBJ: CONTACT WITH CHINESE DEFENCE ATTACHE

REF: A. YOURTEL COMD 0005 231040Z JAN(NOTAL)

1. WE WERE INTERESTED TO LEARN OF APPROACH TO YOU BY NEW CHINESE DEFENCE ATTACHE REPORTED REFTTEL.CURIOSITY ON PART OF ANY CHINESE ATTACHE IN ALL THINGS SOVIET IS HARDLY SURPRISING,BUT APPARENT DESIRE OF YOUR COLLEAGUE IN LDN TO ESTABLISH DIALOGUE WITH YOU ON STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS,IN PARTICULAR ON CURRENT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST. WHILE RECENT VISIT OF ZHAO MAY HAVE PROVIDED USEFUL PRETEXT FOR CALL,WE WOULD BE INCLINED TO THINK IT MORE LIKELY THAT PMS PFACE INITIATIVE WHICH IDENTIFIES NEED TO

PAGE 02 RCCPJCR3051 C O N F I D E N T I A L CAN EYES ONLY CPP 379

STIMULATE POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ON MATTERS AFFECTING SECURITY IN TIME OF WORSENING TREND IN RELATIONSHIP IS AT ROOT.

2. WHEN OPPORTUNITY NEXT PRESENTS ITSELF YOU MAY WISH, WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILS OF WESTERN POSITION OR CANADIAN AIMS, TO REVIEW WESTERN OBJECTIVES AT STKHM IN GENERAL TERMS. FIRST PHASE OF CONFERENCE IS CONCERNED WITH CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMS). AIM OF CSBMS IS TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE IN ORDER TO PAVE WAY TO DISARMAMENT IN CONVENTIONAL AND, ULTIMATELY, NUCLEAR FORCES. ANY FORCE REDUCTIONS, HOWEVER, WOULD BE SUBJECT OF A SECOND PHASE OF CDE. POSITED ON THEORY THAT NUCLEAR WAR IS MOST LIKELY TO ARISE OUT OF ESCALATION OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT, WEST INTENDS THAT CSBMS SHOULD DEAL WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES. TO ACHIEVE GOALS, CANADA AND ALLIES ARE PRESENTING COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE OF MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE CSBMS WHICH, IF ADOPTED AND IMPLEMENTED, COULD SET STAGE FOR REDUCTIONS. WPO AND NNA, HOWEVER, MAY WISH TO TALK ABOUT NUCLEAR FORCES AS WELL, OR IN LIEU. WPO CAN BE EXPECTED TO PUT UP STIFF OPPOSITION TO ADOPTION OF WESTERN PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO LEAD ULTIMATELY TO GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WITH DIAMETRICAL DIFFERENCE IN PHILOSOPHY AND OBJECTIVES, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT FIRST PHASE OF CONFERENCE WILL BE LONG, SOMETIMES ACRIMONIOUS, AND DIFFICULT.

PAGE 03 RCCPJCR3051 C O N F I D E N T I A L CAN EYES ONLY CPP 378  
SUCCESS WILL COME SLOWLY. WE WILL BE INTERESTED TO RECEIVE VIEW OF  
CHINESE ON WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND AIMS, AND SOVIET APPROACH TO  
CONFERENCE.

3. ON PROPOSED FIVE POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE AIM OF PM WILL BE KNOWN  
TO YOU FROM HIS 13 NOV SPEECH IN MONTREAL. BACKGROUND PAPER UPON  
WHICH PROPOSAL WAS BASED IS AVAILABLE THROUGH HICOM/BEATTIE. PURPOSE  
IN PROPOSING THAT ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ENGAGE IN DISCUSSIONS WAS  
TO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE  
LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN LIMITATIONS ON EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILI-  
TIES OF OTHER THREE NUCLEAR POWERS, AS WELL AS TO BRING PRESSURE TO  
BEAR ON USA AND USSR TO REACH AGREEMENT IN START. WE RECOGNIZE THAT  
CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES IN ABSENCE OF SIGNIFICANT RE-  
DUCTIONS IN SUPERPOWER ARSENALS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO CHINA (AND UK  
AND FRANCE), BUT HOLD VIEW THAT OBJECTIVE OF CHINESE WHICH IS THAT TWO  
PRINCIPAL PLAYERS SHOULD FIRST BE PERSUADED TO MAKE CHANGES IN THEIR  
NUCLEAR POLICIES (REFTEL) IS MORE LIKELY TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IF USA AND  
USSR ARE JOINED IN DISCUSSIONS BY OTHER THREE. INTERESTINGLY, SOME MOVE-  
MENT FROM EARLIER, RIGID, CHINESE POSITION WAS EVIDENT WHEN ZHAO, DURING  
RECENT VISIT, INDICATED THAT CHINESE WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY MEETING  
OF AMBASSADORS TO UN OF FIVE POWERS WITHOUT INSISTING ON PRECONDITIONS.

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WE WILL BE INTERESTED TO LEARN WHETHER YOUR INTERLOCUTOR ALSO SHOWS  
GREATER FLEXIBILITY NEXT TIME ROUND.

4. YOU SHOULD OF COURSE CONSULT CLOSELY WITH HICOM ON MATTER.

5. CIS CONCURS.

BT

CCC/253 262315Z PJCR3051

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*Ms. Smith*  
Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

*master  
FILE*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0175 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT (DDZ) DELIVER BY 231400

INFO PRGUE WSAW BONN MOSCO WSHDC LDN PARIS BNATO BPEST BGRAD

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/DURDIN/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

DISTR XDV MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR RBD RBP

REF OURTEL UYGR0174 23JAN

---PM VISIT TO ROMANIA:PROGRAM

WAS CALLED IN LATE TODAY BY FM STEFAN ANDREI WHO HAD JUST DISCUSSED  
PMS VISIT WITH PRES CEAUSESCU. FOLLOWING IS PROGRAM ROM AUTHORITIES  
ARE NOW SUGGESTING:

01FEB, 1600, PMS ARRIVAL. (FM GROMYKO WILL DEPART ONLY AT 1500, 01FEB,  
AND YOU SUGGESTED AN HOUR INTERVAL BETWEEN HIS DEPARTURE AND PM  
TRUDEAU'S ARRIVAL. STEFAN ANDREI POINTED OUT THAT THIS LATE  
DEPARTURE CAUSES SOME INCONVENIENCE BUT FROM POINT OF VIEW OF  
SUBSTANCE PM DISCUSSION WITH PRES CEAUSESCU SHOULD BENEFIT  
CONSIDERABLY FROM PRINT ROM MTGS WITH GROMYKO.)

01FEB, 1700, OFFICIAL DINNER. ANDREI TOLD ME THAT A NON-WRITTEN TOAST  
WOULD BE PRONOUNCED. (HE ALSO STATED THAT SINCE PM WOULD BE SITTING  
NEXT TO PRES CEAUSESCU, ONGOING DISCUSSIONS COULD BE PURSUED.)

02FEB, 0900, WREATH-LAYING CEREMONY.

02FEB, 0930, MTG WITH PRES CEAUSESCU.

02FEB, 1300, PRESS CONF

02FEB, 1330, RESTRICTED LUNCHEON WHICH COULD BE OFFERED BY ROM PM OR,

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PAGE TWO UYGR0175 CONFD

IT WAS SUGGESTED,BY AMB WITH ROM PM AS GUEST.DO YOU HAVE ANY  
PREFERENCE?THERE MIGHT BE HINT WE SHOULD OFFER LUNCH.

02FEB.AROUND 1530,DEPARTURE.

CCC/181 231645Z UYGR0175

*maxim f1w*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0174 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 231200

INFO PMOOTT/DURDIN/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN PRGUE WSAW BONN MOSCO WSHDC LDN  
PARIS BNATO BPEST BGRAD NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP PCOOTT/FOWLER  
DISTR (IDDZ MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR RBD RBP  
REF CNGNY TEL 0013 20JAN PM DEL NYC 0012 20JAN

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO ROMANIA

DISCUSSED REFTELS WITH ROMS WHO HAVE GONE ALONG WITH SUGGESTIONS MADE.  
COP UNABLE TO GIVE AS YET FIRM PROGRAM AS IT MUST BE DISCUSSED WITH  
PRES CEAUSESCU.FOLLOWING IS GIST OF DISCUSSIONS AND OUTSTANDING  
QUESTIONS.

2.MEDIA WILL DEPLANE AHEAD OF PM.NORMAL PRACTICE IS TO HAVE AMB AND  
COP TO MEET PM AND ESCORT DOWN STEPS WHERE ROM PM WOULD HEAD  
OFFICIAL GREETING PARTY.AFTER SHORT GUARD OF HONOUR CEREMONY,PMS  
PROCEED TO GUEST HOUSE,DEL TO PARTY HOTEL(USED ONLY FOR OFFICIAL  
GUESTS),AND MEDIA TO INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL(MUCH PREFERABLE TO  
BUCHARST HOTEL)(OURTEL UYGR0157 20JAN).ALL FORMALITIES REQUESTED  
BY US WILL BE MET IN AIRPORT.WE INTEND TO INVITE CDN STAFF TO AIRPORT  
TO GREET PM AS THIS ONLY CHANCE MOST WILL HAVE TO MEET HIM.

3.IN OFFICIAL GUEST HOUSE THERE IS ROOM FOR PM PLUS 4 IN GOOD ROOMS  
AND THREE QUOTE MODEST UNQUOTE ROOMS ALSO EXIST(USUALLY FOR SECURITY  
PEOPLE).DO YOU WISH TO USE THESE THREE MODEST ROOMS?WHO WILL BE  
IN GUEST HOUSE?ROMS CONTEND THAT NO/NO PRESS CONF AT AIRPORT

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PAGE TWO UYGR0174 CONFD

PLANNED.

4.ROMS ARE PREPARED TO COVER ALL COSTS OF CREW AS WELL ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS.IF YOU SO WISH,CREW WILL STAY AT SAME HOTEL AS OFFICIAL DEL.DO YOU WANT THEM TO HAVE COSTS COVERED OR DO YOU WISH THEM TO PAY OWN WAY?IF THEY COVER THEIR OWN COSTS THEY WILL BE HOUSED AT INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL ON SAME FLOOR AS MEDIA.

5.FOR OFFICIAL MTGS WE PROPOSED

PM PLUS 7,INCLUDING EMBASSY OFFICER).MTG WILL PROBABLY BEGIN WITH PRES CEAUSESCU AND PM TRUDEAU EXCHANGING PERSONAL GREETINGS ALONE THEN JOINING REST OF DEL.AFTER MTGS DEL WILL ADJOURN TO ROOMS AND MEET AT OFFICIAL DINNER HOSTED BY ROM PRES.DO YOU HAVE ANY PREFERENCES FOR NUMBER?REST OF DEL AND CREW AND MEDIA COULD MEET FOR FUNCTION AT EMB RESIDENCE.

6.(REFRIGERATOR AND FRESH ROSES ETC ALL ARRANGED.)FEB2 BREAKFAST FREE.SECOND MTG SHOULD TAKE MORNING AND END AT LUNCHEON.WE UNDERSTAND THAT OFFICIAL RESTRICTED LUNCH MIGHT BE OFFERED.

7.ROMS HAVE VOLUNTEERED ONE MEMBER OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE BUREAU,MFA, TO STAY AT GUEST HOUSE AND ANOTHER AT HOTEL FOR DEL TO ASSIST AS REQUIRED.OFFICE WILL BE PROVIDED IN HOTEL.

8.GIFTS WILL BE OF QUOTE SYMBOLIC UNQUOTE NATURE.ROM PRACTICE IS TO

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PAGE THREE UYGR0174 CONF

GIVE GIFT PRES TO PM. IF PM WANTS TO GIVE OTHER GIFTS ROMS WILL ALSO RESPOND BUT WILL WANT TO KNOW NUMBER OF GIFTS TO EXPECT.

9. ROMS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT PRACTICE IS FOR FULL PRESS CONF AT END. SHORT ONE COULD BE ORGANIZED AT PMS RESIDENCE BEFORE OR AFTER LUNCH. DO YOU WISH TO EXPLORE.

10. PRESS WILL HAVE LARGE WORKING ROOM WITH HOSPITALITY SUITE OFF IT. ROOM CAN BE USED FOR OTHER PURPOSES IF REQUIRED.

11. LANGUAGE-DO YOU INTEND TO USE ENGLISH OR FRENCH DURING OFFICIAL MTGS?

12. GRATEFUL YOUR RESPONSE BY 240900.

CCC/181 231630Z UYGR0174

*marker* *FILE*  
C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0165 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 230900

INFO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

DISTR RBP RBT RBD RBRD ZSI IDDZ

REF YOURTEL 0092 13JAN

---PM VISIT TO ROM AND VISIT OF STEFAN ANDREI-BIOGRAPHIES

FOLLOWING ARE BIOGRAPHIES OF FM STEFAN ANDREI, ION BESTELIU, DIR OF AMERICAS, MIRCEA RACEANU, DEPUTY DIR AND PETRE SANDULESCU, CHIEF OF PROTOCOL. THESE HAVE BEEN REQUESTED AMONG BRIEFS FOR FM STEFAN ANDREI'S VISIT TO OTT FEB6-9 BUT THEY MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL IN CONTEXT OF PM TRUDEAU'S VISIT TO BUCST SINCE THESE PEOPLE WILL PROBABLY BE INVOLVED IN SOME CAPACITY IN VISIT.

2. STEFAN ANDREI (AHNDRAI), MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (APPOINTED MAR78) PARA STEFAN ANDREI IS PRES NICOLAE CEAUSESCU'S TOP ADVISOR ON AND CHIEF EXECUTOR OF FOREIGN POLICY. SINCE PRES MAKES ALL FINAL FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS, ANDREI OFTEN MEETS WITH PRES DAILY. WE BELIEVE HIS INFLUENCE ON PRES IS NOW SECOND ONLY THAT OF V PUNGAN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE. ANDREI IS HIGHLY ARTICULATE AND HAS GAINED MUCH OF HIS EXPERIENCE THROUGH FREQUENT TRAVEL ABROAD.

PARA ANDREI ABLY REPRESENTS ROMANIA'S WELL-KNOWN POLICIES ADVOCATING DISARMAMENT, LIQUIDATION OF MILITARY BLOCs, INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY OF ALL COMMUNIST PARTIES, AND NONINTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. HE HAS STRONGLY SUPPORTED ROMANIA'S ATTEMPTS TO IDENTIFY WITH THIRD WORLD AND HAS CONSISTENTLY WORKED TO IMPROVE

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PAGE TWO UYGR0165 CONF

RELNS WITH THE WEST,PARTICULARLY WITH THE FRG AND USA.

PARA ANDREI HAS A REPUTATION IN INNATL DIPLO CIRCLES FOR BEING A THOROUGHLY PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATOR WHO PREFERS BUSINESS TO CEREMONY AND DOES NOT/NOT SUFFER FOOLS GLADLY.HE IS DIRECT AND FORCEFUL DURING NEGS.ALTHO USUALLY SELF-POSSESSED,HE HAS BECOME AGITATED OR LOUD ON RARE OCCASIONS WHEN HE WAS UNDER PRESSURE.

PARA TRAINED AS AN ENGINEER,ANDREI HAS RISEN SWIFTLY TO PRESTIGIOUS POSNS WITHIN ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY(PCR)APPARATUS.DURING 1960S HE WORKED WITH PCR CENTRAL CTTEE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECTION,AND IN 1972 HE BECAME PCR SECTY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,A POST HE HELD UNTIL HE RECD HIS CURRENT POSN.HE IS A CANDIDATE MEMBER OF PCRS LEADING BODY, POLITICAL EXECUTIVE CTTEE,AND A MEMBER OF CTTEES ELITE PERMANENT BUREAU.

PARA ANDREI,AGED 52,IS WITTY,FRIENDLY AND OUTGOING IN SOCIAL SITUS. HE HAS MOST OF THE HABITS OF A MIDDLE-CLASS WEST EUROPEAN-HE LIKES TO DRESS AND EAT WELL(SEA FOOD IN PARTICULAR)AND HE COLLECTS GOOD WINE. HE ALSO HAS SOMEWHAT OF A REPUTATION AS A WOMANIZER.ANDREI SPEAKS FRENCH AND ENGLISH(FORMER MUCH BETTER THAN LATTER)BUT PREFERS TO USE AN INTERPRETER IN OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS IN ENGLISH.HE SUFFERED A HEART ATTACK IN 1973 AND WOULD HAVE EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO RETIRE FROM STRENUOUS PUBLIC LIFE BY AGE 55.ANDREI IS MARRIED TO AN ACTRESS WHOSE CAREER HAS BENEFITTED FROM HER HUSBANDS HIGH POSN.COUPLE HAS A SON.

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PAGE THREE UYGR0155 CONFD

ION BESTELIU(BESTELY00),DIR,DIRECTORATE V(WESTERN HEMISPHERE),  
APPOINTED APR83.

PARA ION BESTELIU IS ONE OF THE RANKING OFFICERS ON USA AFFAIRS IN  
FOREIGN MINISTRY.DURING HIS SEVEN YRS IN WSHDC(73-80)AND TIME SPENT  
AT UN IN MID-1960S,HE HAS ALSO DEVELOPED EXPERTISE ON CDA.ALTHO  
SOMEWHAT LACKLUSTRE,ESPECIALLY IN COMPARISON TO HIS PREDECESSOR AMB  
BOGDAN,HE IS WELL INFORMED ON A WIDE RANGE OF BILATERAL ISSUES.  
DURING HIS LAST POSTING HE SPENT TIME ON TRADE AND FINANCE AS WELL AS  
POLITICAL MATTERS.AS DIR OF DIRECTORATE V HE HAS IF ANYTHING EXPANDED  
HIS KNOWLEDGE IN THESE FIELDS.

PARA BESTELIU IS KNOWN TO BE CALM,DECISIVE AND FAIR IN DEALING WITH  
HIS COLLEAGUES.HE IS HONEST AND IS A LOYAL ROM ALTHO HE ALSO KNOWS  
SYSTEMS WEAKNESSES.IN CONFIDENCE HE CAN BE QUITE CYNICAL TOWARDS  
REGIME.HE WILL NOT/NOT TRY TO OVER SELL ROM POSN HE KNOWS IS ON  
SHAKY FOOTING.AFTER WATCHING BESTELIU IN ACTION ONE FINDS THAT HE  
IS SMART WITHOUT BEING AGGRESSIVE AND CAN EFFECTIVELY HANDLE STICKY  
PROBLEMS.HE IS SELF-ASSURED WITHOUT BEING BOISTEROUS.

PARA BESTELIU IS KNOWN TO HAVE ENJOYED LIVING IN USA.BESTELIU IS  
GRADUATE OF FACULTY OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES OF UNIV OF BUCST.BECAUSE OF  
HIS TRAINING HE SPENT A NBR OF YRS WORKING AS A ROM DELEGATE TO  
UNCTAD AND UNESCO AND WHILE IN WSHDC HE PARTICIPATED IN ANNUAL MTGS  
OF IMF.

PARA BESTELIU,54 YRS OF AGE,IS MARRIED AND SPEAKS EXCELLENT ENGLISH.

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PAGE FOUR UYGR0165 CONF

MIRCEA RACEANU (RUHGHAHNOO), COUNSELLOR AND DEPUTY DIR OF DIRECTORATE  
V (WESTERN HEMISPHERE, MFA)

PARA MIRCEA RACEANU IS ONE OF MFAS LEADING EXPERTS ON USA AFFAIRS  
HAVING SPENT TWO TOURS OF DUTY IN USA, LAST FOR ALMOST NINE YRS. DURING  
HIS STAY IN NORTH AMERICA AND TWO STINTS IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE  
DIRECTORATE HE HAS ALSO ACQUIRED AN EXCELLENT KNOWLEDGE OF CDA AND  
CDN POLICIES. OVER LAST FEW YRS HE HAS BEEN ONE OF PRINCIPAL INVOLVED  
IN DEVELOPMENTS OF OUR RELNS AND HAS WORKED CONSISTENTLY TOWARDS THIS  
END.

PARA RACEANU IS INTELLIGENT, OPEN-MINDED AND LOW KEY IN DISCUSSIONS  
WITH WESTERNERS. ALTHO NOT/NOT HUMOURLESS, HE DOES NOT/NOT DISPLAY  
SAME EASYGOING MANNER COMMON TO MANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES. OUR  
IMPRESSION OF HIM IS THAT HE IS ALWAYS WORKING AND RELUCTANT TO PUT  
DOWN HIS GUARD. HE IS NOT/NOT A REFORMER AND UNLIKE HIS COLLEAGUES  
WILL NEVER CRACK A JOKE AT EXPENSE OF PRES CEAUSESCU. AT TIMES HE  
APPEARS TO BEHAVE LIKE A USED CAR SALESMAN WITH A LOT FULL OF LEMONS.  
HE IS HOWEVER VERY SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING RID OF THE LEMONS. RACEANU  
DEFENDS LEADERSHIP AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO ACCURATELY CONVEY OFFICIAL  
LINE ACCORDING TO PRES CEAUSESCU AND MIN ANDREI. HE WAS ONE OF THE  
HIGHLY VISIBLE PROTEGE OF AMB BOGDAN.

PARA RACEANU WAS BORN IN BUCST. HIS MOTHER WAS ONE OF BETTER KNOWN  
PRE-WAR JEWISH ACTIVISTS. IN 1950S RACEANU SPENT A FEW YRS IN MOSCO  
WHERE HE STUDIED POLITICS AND LEARNED ENGLISH. AFTER GRADUATING FROM  
...5

PAGE FIVE UYGR0165 CONFID

INSTITUTE OF INNATL RELNS HE JOINED MFA IN LATE 1950S AND WAS POSTED TO USA.

PARA RACEANU, AGED 47, IS POISED, CONFIDENT AND CAN BE VERY CANDID. HE SPEAKS FLUENT ENGLISH AND OFTEN ACTS AS ANDREIS INTERPRETER IN THIS LANGUAGE. HE IS MARRIED AND HAS A SON AND DAUGHTER.

PETRE SANDULESCU (SANDOOLESKOO), MIN COUNSELLOR (DIR PROTOCOL, MFA) PARA SANDULESCU WAS APPOINTED DEPUTY CHIEF OF PROTOCOL IN NOV 78. LAST YEAR HE BECAME DIR OF PROTOCOL OFFICE.

PARA LITTLE IS KNOWN OF SANDULESCUS COMMON INTERESTS ETC. LOCAL CONTACTS ARE CONVINCED THAT HE IS A MEMBER OF SECURITY FORCES. HE IS BIG, CLUMSY AND APPEARS TO BE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL PRESSURE WHEN ATTEMPTING TO BE SOCIABLE. HE IS QUICK TEMPERED AND IS NOT/NOT ADVERSE TO USING THREATS TO ACHIEVE HIS ENDS. FOR THIS REASON HE HAS REPUTATION OF BEING SOMETHING OF A GOON. HE IS HOWEVER CREDITED AS DOING MUCH BETTER JOB THAN HIS PREDECESSOR WHO HAS BEEN SENT LAST YR TO KNSHA AFTER SOME FIGHTING WITH PERUVIAN DEAN OF DIPLO CORPS. HE IS SOMEWHAT AUTHORITARIAN AND TENDS TO TREAT DIPLO CORPS AS A SCHOOL MASTER. ONE MUST ADMIT THAT IT IS SOMETIMES NEEDED IN A COUNTRY WHERE THIS CORPS IS REQUESTED TO PARTICIPATE IN SO MANY MANIFESTATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL CULT WITHOUT MUCH ENTHUSIASM.

PARA SANDULESCU SPEAKS LIMITED ENGLISH BUT IS VERY COMFORTABLE IN FRENCH.

CCC/181 231125Z UYGR0165

INFO

WJ

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PRGUE WOGR0157 23JAN84

TO PMOOTT/DURDIN DELIVER BY 231300

INFO BUCST WSAW PMDELNY PCOOTT/FOWLER EXTOTT XDV CDDZ

REF YOURTEL YIGR0563 19JAN HIGR0012 0013 20JAN OURTEL WOGR0143 20JAN

---MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

ACCREDITATION. URGENTLY/URGENLY REQUIRE LIST OF MEDIA

NAMES, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, NEWSPAPER AFFILIATION AND

PPT NERS. MEDIA WILL RECEIVE TEMPORARY CSSR ACCREDITATION.

RE VISAS: NO/NO FEE FOR VISAS BUT JOURNALISTS WILL BE

REQUIRED TO MAKE COMPULSORY EXCHANGE OF CURRENCY-DLRS15/15

USA PER DAY.

2. ACCOMMODATION-HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL-SWB DLRS95 CDN

PER DAY INCLUDES BREAKFAST.

3. WORKING ROOM-HOTEL WILL PROVIDE ROOM, TABLES,

10/10 TELEPHONES (INCL STANDARD TELEPHONES FOR RADIO

JOURNALISTS) AND 2/2 TELEXES WITH OPERATORS AS REQUESTED.

4. TRANSPORT-WE HAVE BOOKED 1/1 LARGE BUS, 2/2 MINI VANS

AND 2/2 CARS WITH DRIVERS AS REQUESTED. REF YIGR0013,

PARA 12-TRUCK WILL BE AVAILABLE TO TRANSPORT MEDIA

EQUIPMENT/LUGGAGE FROM AIRPORT TO HOTEL.

5. PRESS SCRUMS: HAVE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL PRESS SCRUMS. AS

PER OURTEL, CZECHOSLOVAKS AGREE TO POOLED ACCESS BEFORE

OFFICIAL MTGS. THEY WILL ACCEPT POOL OF 10/10 CDNS,

APROX 3-35 CZECHOSLOVAK JOURNALISTS (REF YIGR0012, PARA 5)

...2



PAGE TWO WOGR0157 UNCLAS

FROM CSSR PRESS AGENCY CTK AND SOME REPS FROM ACCREDITED AGENCIES(EG AFP,REUTERS).

6.SCRUM WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER PM 25TH MTG WITH PM STRUGAL IN HRZANSKY PALACE(WHERE TALKS WILL TAKE PLACE).PM STRUGAL WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS SESSION.HOST WILL PROVIDE INTERPRETORS.SCRUM WILL BE HELD ON 26TH AFTER MTG WITH PRES HUSAK AT HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL(APROX 5 MINS BY CAR FROM CASTEL).ON BOTH OCCASIONS MICROPHONES WILL BE PROVIDED AND THERE WILL ALSO BE NEARBY POWER SOURCE AVAILABLE IF REQUIRED.

7.HOST WILL PROVIDE LOCAL LIAISON OFFICERS TO ACCOMPANY PRESS TO EVENTS.EMB WILL ALSO PROVIDE LES RESOURCE PERSON IN ADDITION TO LES SECTY.

8.REF YIGR0013,PARA15-REAR A/C DOOR WILL BE RAMPED FIRST AND JOURNALISTS PREPOSITIONED PRIOR TO PM DISEMBARKING.

9.HOSTS ARE WILLING TO PROVIDE BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS BY REPS OF MFA,MFT,STATE PLANNING COMMISSION,ETC DURING AFTERNOON 25TH AND 26TH.THEY ALSO PROPOSED SIGHTSEEING TOUR FOR 26TH.ADO YOU THINK THIS WOULD BE USEFUL/WELCOMED BY MEDIA?

10.RE DINNER-GRATEFUL YOU ADVISE IF DEL MEDIA PERSONNEL (IE DURDIN,HUDON,PRUSAKOWSKI)WILL BE PARTICIPATING IN OFFICIAL DINNER ON 25TH OR MEDIA DINNER.

11.HOSTS ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO RECEIVE LIST OF JOURNALISTS AS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREPARE ACCREDITATION LISTS WITHOUT DETAILS.GRATEFUL THEREFORE LIST,EVEN IF PRELIMINARY,BY 240900.

UUU/175 231740Z WOGR0157

ACTION  
SITE A DONNER

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PRGUE WOGR0156 23JAN84

TC EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 231400

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN WSAW BUCST

DISTR XDV MINA USS IFB RGB RED RBR RBP

REF MACKENZIE/JOHNSTONE TELECON 23JAN, YOURTEL IDDZ0076 21JAN

---PMS VISIT:PROGRAM

PROGRAM STANDING AS FOLLOWS:

JAN2 :

10:30-ARRIVAL OLD PRGUE AIRPORT

HOP(PEEL)ONLY WILL BOARD PLANE.PM STROUGAL TO GREET.

LIST OF STROUGAL DELEGATION ANTICIPATED 24JAN.STROUGAL

TC INTRODUCE PM TO HIS DELEGATION THEN AMB TO INTRODUCE PM

TO SMALL EMB DELEGATION-MRS PEEL,COL AND MRS GRANT,MR

AND MRS THORPE AND MRS MACKENZIE.NEARBY WILL BE OTHER EMB

CDNS AND LES PLUS DEPENDANTS(APROX 30)WHO WOULD HOPE TO

WELCOME PM.NO/NO OTHER DEL MEMBERS TO BE INTRODUCED TO

STROUGAL PARTY.MACKENZIE-(LOGISTICS),SINCLAIR-(MEDIA)

WILL BE AT REAR OF PLANE.

10:45-PMS AND STROUGAL DEPART AIRPORT FOR GOVT

VILLA.FULL DELEGATION TO FOLLOW.CAR ASSIGNMENTS BY HOST

TO BE COMPLETED BY 24JAN.

10:50-PRESS DEPARTS FOR HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL.

10:50-LOADING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL INTO PASSAT DRIVEN BY

RG L BLANC.BAGGAGED LOADING,INSTRUCTIONS NOTED.SGT D HASLIP

...2

*Mr. Smith*  
Division Phoned IDDZ  
Person Sheila  
Local Time 231600

PAGE TWO WOGR0156 RESTR

TO REMAIN TO ASSIST FLIGHT CREW.

11:00-DISCUSSION BETWEEN PMS TO REVIEW PROGRAM. AT THIS TIME IT APPEARS IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CLARIFY THE NUMBER ATTENDING PM TRUDEAU ON HIS CALL ON PRESIDENT HUSAK. THEY HAVE NOW REQUESTED THAT ONLY THE AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANY. ONLY STROUGAL WILL ACCOMPANY HUSAK. WE HAVE AGAIN STATED PREFERENCE THAT FOUR ACCOMPANY. THEY SUGGEST WE LEAVE STALEMATE FOR PMS TO RESOLVE. YOUR COMMENTS REQUESTED.

11:15-DELEGATION NOT/NOT STAYING AT GUEST HOUSE WILL DEPART TO HOTEL PRAHA. HAVE INCLUDED T AXWORTHY IN HOTEL PRAHA ACCOMMODATION.

13:00-PRIVATE LUNCH AT GUEST HOUSE FOR PM, PEEL, AXWORTHY, FOWLER, JOHNSON, HANCOCK, SMITH, COLEMAN, VIAU, CARTER, MACKENZIE, GRANT AND THORPE.

15:00-CONSULTATIONS WITH PM STROUGAL AT HRZANSKY PALACE. SHORT PRESS SCRUM FOLLOWING MTG TO TAKE PLACE IN ROOM AT HRZANSKY.

19:00-DINNER HOSTED BY PM STROUGAL IN CERNIN PALACE FOR FULL DELEGATION. EXCLUDES SUPPORT STAFF EXCEPT COOPER. ASSUME DURDIN, HUDON AND COLEMAN WILL BE AT PM DINNER.

JAN2 :

10:30-CALL ON PRESIDENT HUSAK. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAS ADVISED THAT THIS TIME HAS NOW BEEN CONFIRMED AS THE PRESIDENT'S PREFERENCE. WE HAVE ACCEPTED, HAVING IN THE END NO/NO CHOICE.

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PAGE THREE WOGR0156 RESTR

12:00-PRESS WILL ASSEMBLE AT HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL

TO AWAIT ARRIVAL OF PM ON CONCLUSION OF MTG WITH PRESIDENT HUSAK.

12:30-13:00-PM DEPART FROM HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL.PRIVATE PROGRAM.

13:00-WORKING LUNCH AT AMB RESIDENCE.ADVISE APPROX NUMBER.

15:00-CALL BY HANCOCK TO MFA.

17:00-ARRIVE AT AIRPORT FOR DEPARTURE.

18:00-DEPART PRGUE FOR ZURICH.

ROMANIAN AND GDR AMBS HAVE BEEN REACHED AND HAVE PROMISED FULL  
COOPERATION ON VISAS.

CCC/175 241715Z WOGR0156

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

MAJOR FILE

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PRGUE WOGR0150 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 231200

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN WSAW BUCST  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBR RBP XDV SIO

---PMS VISIT:SOME POSSIBLY HELPFUL HINTS

A FEW POINTS OCCUR TO US THAT MIGHT BE OF USE TO MEMBERS  
OF VISITING PARTY.

2.THIS COUNTRY HAS CZECH AND SLOVAK REPUBLICS,LANGUAGES  
(MUTUALLY INTELLIGIBLE),INSTITUTIONS UBD RIVALRIES.BUT  
COLLECTIVELY THE PEOPLE,AND CERTAINLY THE FED GOVT,ARE  
CZECHOSLOVAK.THE ADJECTIVE SHOULD NOT/NOT BE ABBREVIATED TO  
QUOTE CZECH UNQUOTE.TO DO SO IN INSENSITIVE,MISLEADING AND  
OFTEN WRONG,EG THERE IS A CZECH PM BUT HIS NAME IS  
JOSEF KORCAK AND HE IS NOT/NOT OUR PMS HOST.

2.THE CZECH LANGUAGE,WHICH YOU WILL HEAR IN PRGUE,HAS MANY  
TRAPS FOR THOSE WHO KNOW NO/NO OTHER SLAV TONGUE AND SOME EVEN  
FOR THOSE WHO DO.EMB STAFF WILL HELP WITH PRONUNCIATION OF  
NAMES.THERE WILL BE A FEW INTERPRETERS AROUND.ENGLISH AND  
FRENCH ARE NOT/NOT WIDELY UNDERSTOOD BUT GERMAN IS.RUSSIAN  
SPEAKERS SHOULD USE THE LANGUAGE ONLY AS ABSOLUTELY LAST RESORT;  
WHILE IT IS COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD IT IS NOT/NOT AT ALL POPULAR.

3.CARELESS INTERPRETERS OR QUICK EARS FOR CZECH MAY LEAVE  
IMPRESSION PM STROUGAL IS CALLED QUOTE MR(OR COMRADE)PRESIDENT  
UNQUOTE.IN CZECH,HE IS,BECAUSE HIS TITLE IS QUOTE PRESIDENT

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PAGE TWO WOGR0150 CONFD

OF THE GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE.

4. ANYONE WHO IS IN MAIN HOTELS OR ON SHOPPING STREETS IS LIKELY TO BE APPROACHED TO CHANGE MONEY. YOU WILL HAVE LITTLE USE FOR CROWNS ANYWAY BUT MUST AVOID THE TEMPTATION. DO NOT/NOT BRING CROWNS INTO COUNTRY OR TAKE THEM OUT; EXCHANGE ONLY AT BANK OR HOTEL DESK. EMBS INFO SHEET FOR TOURISTS (OUR LET TO EXTOTT/MSO (NOW SIO) DATED 01SEP83) WOULD BE USEFUL ADVANCE READING.

5. THIS IS A COUNTRY AWARE OF ITS HISTORY AND ITS LOCATION IN CENTRAL (NOT/NOT EASTERN) EUROPE. REFS TO RECENT HISTORY ARE PROBABLY BEST AVOIDED EXCEPT TO MAKE A POLITICAL POINT BUT ANYTHING BEFORE 1910 IS SAFE. FORTTEENTH CENTURY HEROES SUCH AS EMPEROR CHARLES IV OR PROTESTANT REFORMER JAN HUS ARE MUCH IN FAVOUR. PRGUE IS OLD AND BEAUTIFUL (IF A BIT SHABBY) AND HAS MUCH TO OFFER ANYONE WITH A LITTLE FREE TIME. THE RIVER THAT RUNS THROUGH THE CITY IS THE VLTAVA; IT SHOULD NOT/NOT BE CALLED BY ITS GERMAN NAME, THE MOLDAU, BY WHICH IT IS BETTER KNOWN TO US.

6. THERE ARE MANY SOVIET TROOPS IN AND AROUND PRGUE AND YOU WILL LIKELY SEE SOME. THEY ARE NOT/NOT POPULAR BUT CZECHOSLOVAK OFFICIALS WILL OF COURSE DEFEND THEIR PRESENCE AND DESCRIBE THEIR FRATERNAL ASSISTANCE IN 1968. IN GENERAL, SUBJ MIGHT BETTER BE AVOIDED.

CCC/175 230955Z WOGR0150

*Mr. Calder*  
*Re: our tel 1PP2 0096*  
*26 JAN 84*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRMNY WKGR0143 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 240900

INFO GENEV

DISTR ~~1202~~ IDR IDD IMU IMD

---PM INITIATIVE-MEASURES TO RESTRICT DESTABILIZATION

WE WLD OFFER FOLLOWING COMMENT FROM ADMITTEDLY INEXPERT AND  
NON-TECHNICAL VIEWPOINT ON THREE MEASURES OUTLINED IN WORKING PAPER  
ENTITLED QUOTE RESTRAINING STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY UNQUOTE.COMMENTS  
ARE NOT/NOT MEANT TO DETRACT IN ANY WAY FROM PAPERS LAUDABLE  
OBJECTIVE TO INJECT SOME MEASURE OF RELATIVE STABILITY IN ARMS RACE  
BY LIMITING DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING WEAPONS SYSTEMS  
AND BY ASSURING THEIR ACCESSIBILITY TO VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL  
TECHNICAL MEANS.RATHER WE PLEAD THE DEFENCE OF THE CRITIC WHO,WHILE  
NOT/NOT SUFFICIENTLY TALENTED TO CREATE THE PIECE,IMMODESTLY CLAIMS  
SOME EXPERTISE TO ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE IT THROUGH HIS CRITICISM.

2.FIRST MEASURE TO BANK HIGH ALTITUDE ASATS:THIS MEASURE AS ARMS  
CONTROL MECHANISM DEPENDS UPON EASILY DEFINABLE AND WIDELY ACCEPTED  
DISTINCTION BETWEEN LOW AND HIGH ALTITUDE SATELLITES.WHILE ACCEPTING  
THIS ASSUMPTION,WE WLD NOT/NOT,HOWEVER,SHARE JUDGEMENT CONTAINED IN  
PART II SUB SECTION 5 AND TAKEN UP LATER IN SENTENCE IN PART III  
(A):QUOTE IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT LOW ALTITUDE SATELLITES,THOUGH  
IMPORTANT FOR ARMS CONTROL AND VERIFICATION,ARE NOT/NOT GENERALLY  
CONSIDERED TO BE CRITICAL TO THE STABLE FUNCTIONING OF DETERRENCE

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000488

PAGE TWO WKGR0143 CONFD

UNQUOTE.LOWER LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE/VERIFICATION SATELLITES ARE PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE,WHILE HIGH ALTITUDE COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS MAY BE SAID TO BE SATELLITES IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS.IN OUR VIEW,ASATS WHICH BLIND RECONNAISSANCE(IE LOW LEVEL)SATELLITES WLD BE EQUALLY(IF NOT/MORE)DESTABILIZING THAN THOSE ASAT WHICH WLD RENDER INOPERATIVE THE HIGH LEVEL SATELLITES REQUIRED TO COMMAND AND GUIDE ICMS AND SLBMS.

3.FURTHERMORE IT IS NOT/NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT HOSTILE NUCLEAR POWER DURING AN ADVANCED STATE OF HOSTILITIES MIGHT BE SO DETERMINED TO DESTROY HIGH ALTITUDE SATELLITE SYSTEMS THAT ITS PLANS WLD INCLUDE EXPLODING AN UPPER ATMOSPHERE NUCLEAR DEVICE THUS RELYING ON ELECTRO MAGNETIC IMPULSE(EMI)TO BALCK OUT COMMUNICATIONS.THIS THINKING MIGHT SUGGEST THAT THE PRIORITY TO DEVELOP A COSTLY AND SOPHISTICATED HIGH LEVEL ASAT SYSTEM MIGHT NOT/NOT BE SO GREAT AS DEV OF LOWER LEVEL SYSTEM.(IT WOULD SEEM QUESTIONABLE THAT SAME POWER WLD USE EMI TO BLIND LOW LEVEL SATELLITES AT EARLIER STAGE IN HOSTILITIES BECAUSE OF THE TREMENDOUSLY INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS WHICH WLD BE CAUSED BY EMI).

4.TECHNICALLY,WE WONDER WHETHER IT WLD BE POSSIBLE TO EASILY DISTINGUISH DIFFERENT WEAPONS WHICH MIGHT BE USED IN ATTACKS AGAINST LOW AND HIGH LEVEL ALTITUDE SYSTEMS-IS NOT/NOT TECHNOLOGY SOMEWHAT INTERCHANGEABLE BETWEEN LOW AND HIGH LEVEL ASAT SYSTEMS?(EG BY

...3



PAGE THREE WKGR0143 CONFD

ADDING BOOSTER SECTION TO GROUND OR AIRLAUNCHED ASAT ROCKET).

5. IN SUMMARY, OUR CONCERN REGARDING MEASURE ONE IS WHETHER IT IS WORTHWHILE FROM ARMS CONTROL AND TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE TO DRAW DISTINCTION BETWEEN AGREEMENTS DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE HIGH AS OPPOSED TO LOW LEVEL ASAT SYSTEMS. WE RECOGNISE THAT WE MUST BEGIN SOMEWHERE AND ABSENCE OF TECHNOLOGY REGARDING DEV OF HIGH LEVEL ASATS ARGUES IN FAVOUR OF MEASURE ONE. HOWEVER, OVER LONGER TERM SHOULD NOT/NOT CDN EMPHASIS BE PLACED ON DEVELOPING ELEMENTS FOR CONVENTION INCLUDING ALL ASAT SYSTEMS (IE BANNING OF FURTHER TESTING AND ANY DEPLOYMENT) WHETHER HIGH OR LOW?

6. SECOND MEASURE: OUR BASIC CONCERN WITH THIS MEASURE WHOSE EXCELLENT OBJECTIVE IS TO SEEK QUOTE AN AGREEMENT THAT STATES HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO DEMONSTRATE AND ENSURE THE VERIFIABILITY OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS UNQUOTE IS THAT IT SEEMS TO RUN SO COUNTER TO THE TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY PROCESS. SUCH LARGE PERCENTAGES OF R AND D ARE SPENT TO IMPROVE THE INVULNERABILITY OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO DETECTION (EG SUB-MARINES ABILITY TO ESCAPE SONAR DETECTION AND MAINTAIN SECRET COMMUNICATIONS) THAT IT WOULD SEEM ALMOST CONTRARY TO HUMAN NATURE TO EXPECT STATES TO REQUIRE THEIR SCIENTIFIC ESTABLISHMENTS QUOTE TO DESIGN WEAPONS WHICH WERE VERIFIABLE BY NATL TECHNICAL MEANS UNQUOTE AS PROVIDED FOR IN PART III (A). WHILE AGREEING IN THEORY WITH GENERAL PRINCIPLE AS STATED IN THIS SECTION: QUOTE VERIFIABILITY IS NECESSARY FOR

...4

PAGE FOUR WKGR0143 CONF D

MUTUAL CONFIDENCE UNQUOTE, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE IN PRACTICE THAT GOVTS WLD FIND POLITICAL WILL OR MOTIVATION, OR HAVE ABILITY TO ENSURE THAT THEIR MILITARY/INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX WLD SUBORDINATE OBJECTIVE OF THEIR RESEARCH (IE IMPROVEMENT OF STEALTH OF THEIR WEAPONS SYSTEMS) TO THE GREATER GOAL OF VERIFICATION.

7. TO SUCCEED EFFECTIVELY, THIS MEASURE WLD ALSO REQUIRE THAT ALL NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS SHLD BE DEVELOPED OPENLY. BUT IT IS NOT/NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT ONE PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENT WLD DEVELOP COVERTLY A NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHOSE VERY EXISTENCE MIGHT REMAIN UNKNOWN AND SO CLD ESCAPE THE PROVISION CONTAINED IN PART II(5) THAT QUOTE PARTY DEPLOYING A GIVEN WEAPON SYSTEM IS REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SYSTEM IS INDEED VERIFIABLE BY NTMS UNQUOTE.

8. WE WONDER WHETHER THIS MEASURE MIGHT NOT/NOT BE RENDERED MORE REALISTIC IF IT CONCENTRATED ON MORE MODEST OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING THAT WHERE NTMS HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED AS AGREED METHOD OF VERIFICATION, ANY TECHNIQUES DESIGNED TO AVOID DETECTION (EG CONCEALMENT, ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES, BLINDING ETC.) BE PROSCRIBED AND COMPLAINTS SETTLED THROUGH STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSIONS AS SUGGESTED IN YOUR SECTION V.

9. THIRD MEASURE: IN OUR VIEW THIS APPEARS TO BE MOST PROMISING AND POSSIBLY MOST PRACTICAL OF THREE MEASURES PROPOSED. SHLD EVER AGREEMENT BE REACHED BETWEEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES TO CONVERT MULTIHEADED MX QUOTE PEACEKEEPER UNQUOTE TYPE MISSILES INTO MOBILE

...5

PAGE FIVE WKGR0143 CONF

SINGLE WARHEAD MISSILES(QUOTE MIDGET MAN UNQUOTE)ALONG LINES OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF SCOWCROFT COMMISSION REPORT,IT WLD SEEM POLITICALLY FEASIBLE TO EXPECT THAT THIS AGREEMENT WLD BE ACCOMPANIED BY EXCHANGE OF PLANS REGARDING GENERAL DEPLOYMENT AREAS AND SCHEDULES AS SUGGESTED BY THIS MEASURE.INEVITABLY DEPLOYMENT OF THESE MOBILE SINGLE HEADED WEAPONS WLD HAVE TO BE IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS AND IN A SUFFICIENTLY COMPLEX GEOGRAPHIC CONFIGURATION TO PRECLUDE FIRST PREEMPTIVE STRIKE ONCE PLANS HAD BEEN EXCHANGED.OTHERWISE CONCEPT WLD BE EQUIVALENT TO PROVIDING YOUR ENEMY WITH MAP OF YOUR MINEFIELD.HOWEVER AS DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE MISSILES WLD NO/NO DOUBT BE IN SUFFICIENT CO PLEXITY AND QUANTITIES TO DEFY ANY FIRST NUCLEAR STRIKE(EVEN OF CELAN SURGICAL NATURE),THIS MEASURE INDEED HAS PRACTICAL MERIT.MEASURE WLD SEEM, HOWEVER,TO BE CONDITIONAL UPON NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES HAVING PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT TO CONVERT THEIR MULTIHEADED ICBMS INTO MORE SIMPLE MOBILE WEAPONS.

10.REGARDING QUESTION OF SUBMITTING MEASURES FOR INNATL CONSIDERATION, FOLLOWING CONSULTATION WITH NATO ALLIES,PROPOSALS ONCE MODIFIED CLD BE INITIATED SOON IN FORUM OF CD IN GENEV AS OUTLINED BY PM. FIRST MEASURE MIGHT BE GIVEN GREATER PROMINENCE AS CONTAINED CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF FUTURE TREATY ON ASATS,WHILE SECOND AND THIRD MEASURES MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS VALUABLE WORKING PAPER CONTRIBUTIONS TO BODY OF EXPERT KNOWLEDGE ON VERIFICATION AS MAIN STAY OF ALL

...6

PAGE SIX WKGR0143 CONF

ACD AGREEMENTS. IN OUR VIEW FIRST CTTEE OF UNGA PROVIDES NEITHER  
SUFFICIENT TECHNICAL EXPERTISE NOR FOCUS TO BE CONSIDERED  
APPROPRIATE FOR INITIATING PROPOSALS, THOUGH IT CLD E USEFUL AT  
SOME STAGE TO DISCUSS THEM AS PART OF GROUP OF IDEAS FOR CERTAIN  
WESTERN INITIATIVES AT UNGA 39.

CCC/085 232306Z WKGR0143

MASTER FILE

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**  
**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS**

Division Phoned 1DDZ  
Person Shelley  
Local Time 1020

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM WSAW UMGR0122 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 230900

INFO PRGUE BUCST LDN BONN PARIS MOSCO STKHM/SCDEL BGRAD WSHDC BNATO

PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN NDHQOTT/ADMPO/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR RBD XDV

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0069 20JAN

---PMS INITIATIVE:VISIT TO GDR

AS REQUESTED I TRAVELLED TO BRLIN WITH WADE ON SHORT NOTICE FORH  
DISCUSSIONS 20JAN WITH GDR OFFICIALS AND OTHERS ON PMS INITIATIVE  
AND PROPOSED VISIT.WAY HAD BEEN CONVENIENTLY PAVED BY DPM/SSEAS  
DISCUSSIONS WITH GDR FORMIN FISCHER IN STKHM AND FACT THAT HONECKERS  
AGMT TO PMS VISIT HAD ALREADY BEEN OBTAINED.CALLS WERE ARRANGED ON  
VICE FORMIN KOENIG(SUBSTITUTING FOR NIER);CHIFF OF PROTOCOL FRANZ  
JAHNSOWSKI;DENIS RUH OF PRESS DEPT AND HERBERT BARTH,DIRECTOR OF MFA  
DEPT RESPONSIBLE FOR CDA.ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS WERE WITH DANISH AMB  
ON PROTOCOL SENSITIVITIES SURROUNDING VISIT TO BURLIN AND GEOFF  
CHARLEBOIS ON LOGISTICS AND ADMIN SUPPORT WE COULD EXPECT FROM MILITARY  
MISSION IN WEST BRLIN.

2.FROM OUTSET IT WAS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT GDR AUTHORITIES WERE  
EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH PROSPECT OF VISIT BY PM AND PREPARED TO DO  
EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO ENSURE VISITS SUCCESS.AS REPORTED OURTEL  
UMGR0104 19JAN,GDR AUTHORITIES ARE GENERALLY RECEPTIVE TO PMS  
INITIATIVE AND QUITE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IT.FACT THAT VISIT ALSO

...2

PAGE TWO UMGR0122 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

MARKS FIRST SUCH VISIT TO BRLIN BY NATO HEAD OF GOVT IS NOT/NOT LOST ON THEM AND THEY ARE CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO EXTRACT WHAT SUPPORT AND RECOGNITION THEY CAN FOR BRLIN AS CAPITAL OF GDR.IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION OF SUCH FUNCTIONS AS WREATH-LAYING AND SIGNING OF QUOTE GOLDEN BOOK UNQUOTE DURING SUGGESTED CALL ON MAYOR WERE PLAYED IN LOW KEY WITH ULTIMATE DECISION LEFT TO CDN SIDE.

3. IN INITIAL CALL ON KOENIG WE TRACED HISTORY OF PMS INITIATIVE, OUTLINED PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH GDR LEADERS, EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR RAPID AND FAVOURABLE RESPONSE ON PROPOSED VISIT, AND ROUGHLY OUTLINED ITINERARY FOR PMS FORTHCOMING TRIP. AN EARLY HICCUP EMERGED WHEN KOENIG SAID HIS INFO ON TIMING OF VISIT DIFFERED FROM THAT WE HAD OUTLINED. WHEREAS WE INDICATED VISIT WOULD COMMENCE WITH ARRIVAL AFTERNOON OF 30JAN AND DEPARTURE MORNING OF 10FEB, KOENIG SAID HIS INFO FROM GDR AMB IN WSHDC WAS THAT VISIT WOULD COMMENCE AT NOON 30JAN WITH DEPARTURE AT NOON 31JAN. DISCREPANCY HAS SINCE BEEN CLEARED UP AND INFO AS PROVIDED BY US CONFIRMED.

4. PROGRAM FOR VISIT WAS ROUGHED OUT WITH KOENIG AND JAHNSOWSKI. PM WOULD BE MET AT SCHOENFELD AIRPORT BY HONECKER, PM STOPH, A NBR OF MINISTERS, PARTY DIGNITARIES AND SENIOR OFFICIALS. WELCOMING PARTY WILL BE NAMED AND REPORTED AS SOON AS AVAILABLE. JAHNSOWSKI INITIALLY INDICATED ARRIVAL CEREMONIES WOULD BE FOR THOSE ACCORDED HEAD OF STATE INCL NATL ANTHEMS, HONOUR GUARD AND TWENTY-ONE GUN SALUTE. WADE

...3

PAGE THREE UMGR0122 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE PROFILE OF ARRIVAL CEREMONY AS  
REQUESTED YOUR REFTEL.

5.HONECKER WILL ACCOMPANY PM TO GOVT GUESTHOUSE WHERE HE WILL BID  
FAREWELL.GUESTHOUSE AND ANNEX SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO HOUSE OFFICIAL  
DEL MINUS THREE OFFICIALS FROM PMO STAYING AT PALAST WITH MEDIA.  
WADE WILL BE TOURING GUESTHOUSE FACILITIES TODAY OR TOMORROW AND WILL  
RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE ROOM ASSIGNMENTS.

6.JAHNSOWSKI ORIGINALLY RECOMMENDED LAYING OF WREATH AT MONUMENT OF  
VICITIMS OF NAZI AGGRESSION AND CALL ON MAYOR TO SIGN QUOTE GOLDEN  
BOOK UNQUOTE ENROUTE TO FIRST SESSION WITH HONECKER WHICH WOULD BE  
SCHEDULED FOR 1000 HRS 31JAN.IN LIGHT OF SENSITIVITIES SURROUNDING  
SUCH ACTIVITIES WE TOOK SUGGESTION UNDER ADVISEMENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY  
CALLED ON DANISH AMB FOR GUIDANCE GIVEN FACT HIS FORMIN HAD BEEN  
RECENT VISITOR TO BRLIN.

7.AMB INFORMED US THAT HIS FORMIN DID LAY WREATH AND MADE CALL ON  
MAYOR.HOWEVER AT MONUMENT THERE WAS NO/NO GUARD OF HONOUR NOR MILITARY  
BAND WITH GDR MILITARY PRESENCE CONFINED TO TWO OR THREE GUARDS ON  
DUTY.WREATH WAS LAID BY EMB STAFF MEMBERS WHILE FORMIN WATCHED.CALL  
ON MAYOR WAS PRO FORMA BUT THERE WAS NO/NO SIGNING OF QUOTE GOLDEN  
BOOK UNQUOTE WHICH WAS NOT/NOT IN EVIDENCE.ACCORDING TO AMB,FORMAT  
PROVOKED NO/NO OBJECTIONS FROM GDR AUTHORITIES NOR DID IT RAISE  
POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES AMONG BONN GROUP.

8.YOUR REFTEL INDICATES PM WOULD PREFER TO AVOID BOTH CEREMONIES

...4

PAGE FOUR UMGR0122 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

AND GDR AUTHORITIES ARE LIKELY TO AGREE. HOWEVER THERE IS ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE ESPECIALLY RE WREATH LAYING WHICH YOU MAY/MAY WISH TO CONSIDER IN CONTEXT OF PEACE INITIATIVE. GRATEFUL YOUR EARLY VIEWS.

9. COP ALSO OFFERED CITY TOUR WHICH WE PROMISED TO REFER TO YOU. VIEWS AS CONTAINED YOUR REFTEL ARE LIKELY TO BE FULLY ACCEPTABLE AND ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE BY WADE FOR GUIDE/INTERPRETER FOR ANY WALK. POSSIBILITY OF VISIT TO PERGAMON MUSEUM WILL ALSO BE PURSUED ON CHANGE IT MIGHT TAKE PLACE EVEN AT SHORT NOTICE.

10. MTG WITH HONECKER LIKELY TO BE PRECEDED BY BRIEF TETE-A-TETE AT WHICH I SHALL ASK TO BE PRESENT. SIZE OF DELS FOR TALKS WILL BE DISCUSSED. PRESENT PLANS ARE FOR ROUNDTABLE WITH SEVEN ON EACH SIDE WITH GDR MATCHING COMPOSITION OF CDN DEL. THEY ARE PREPARED TO EXPAND DELS IF YOU INSIST. GRATEFUL YOUR VIEWS WHETHER CDN DEL SHOULD BE INCREASED TO NINE TO INCLUDE COLEMAN AND WADE. LATTER SHOULD OF COURSE BE ADDED TO LIST OF DEL CONTAINED YOURTEL SDV0045 22JAN.

11. MORNING AND AFTERNOON SESSIONS ARE LIKELY TO LAST TWO HOURS OR MORE DEPENDING ON PMS WISHES. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT HONECKER IS PREPARED TO MAKE AS MUCH TIME AVAILABLE AS NECESSARY. HE WILL HOST THROUGHOUT AND IS LIKELY TO BE ONLY SPOKESMAN. WE ARE WORKING ON ASSUMPTION THAT PM WILL USE ENGLISH FOR DISCUSSIONS. PLEASE CONFIRM.

12. GDR AUTHORITIES HAVE MARKED PREFERENCE THAT OFFICIAL RETURN HOSPITALITY NOT/NOT BE EXTENDED THUS LEAVING LUNCH ON 31JAN OPEN. WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO APRANGE LUNCHEON IN ACCORDANCE WITH PMS

...559



PAGE FIVE UMGR0122 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

WISHES EITHER DOWNTOWN OR AT GUESTHOUSE. WE ARE VERY MUCH ATTRACTED TO SUGGESTION OF INCL TWO OR THREE LEADING GDR JOURNALISTS AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL YOUR ADVICE IN THIS REGARD. GRATEFUL ALSO FOR INDICATION AS TO CDNS PM WOULD WANT TO LUNCH.

13. HONECKER WILL HOST DINNER AT 2000 HRS AT WHICH TOASTS WILL BE EXCHANGED. GRATEFUL FOR INDICATION AS TO LANGUAGE(S) PM INTENDS TO USE SO INTERPRETERS WILL BE AVAILABLE.

14. DEPARTURE CEREMONIES HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BUT THEY ARE LIKELY TO PARALLEL THOSE ON ARRIVAL.

15. SUBSEQUENT DETAILS ON MEDIA COVERAGE, FLIGHT CLEARANCES AND OTHER ADMIN AND LOGISTIC MATTERS WILL FOLLOW ASAP AT UNCLAS LEVEL WHERE POSSIBLE SO THAT WADE CAN BE COPIED. YOUR COMMENTS ON QUESTIONS POSED ABOVE BY 240900 WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

16. MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE BUT MATTERS ARE BEGINNING TO FALL INTO PLACE. GRATEFUL YOUR SUPPORT

MCLAINE

CCC/127 231230Z UMGR0122

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

MASTER

FILE

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSAW UMGR0119 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 230900

INFO BRLIN PRGUE BUCST BERN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN  
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP ZEN/SIMON WADE HOTEL METROPOL BRLIN

DISTR RBD RBR RBRD XDV IDR IDA

---PM VISIT TO GDR:LOGISTICS AND ADMIN-STAFFING

WHILE NON-RESIDENT STATUS IN BRLIN POSES PREDICTABLE PROBLEMS IN  
TERMS OF ADMIN AND LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS FOR PMS VISIT, WE BELIEVE  
STAFFING STEPS HAVE NOW BEEN TAKEN TO EXPEDITE MATTERS.

2.SIMON WADE IS IN BRLIN(HOTEL METROPOLE -ROOM 930)PHONE 22040,TFLEX  
114141)AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ON SITE ARRANGEMENTS UNTIL AFTER  
VISIT.

3.HENRY KOTATACZ(FS)WILL BE TRAVELLING TO BRLIN FROM WSAW 23JAN TO  
ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS AS REQUESTED BY PMO/  
DURDIN.HE WILL BE ASSISTED BY JANET STEVENSON(SCY)AND BOTH WILL BE  
STAYING AT METROPOL HOTEL JAN26-30 WHEN THEY MOVE TO PALAST HOTEL  
WHERE MEDIA WILL BE HOUSED.

4.MARGARET CORKERY(SCY)WILL BE AVAILABLE BRLIN JAN26-30 FOR  
PREPARATIONS FOR VISIT AND WILL BE AVAILABLE TO PM DEL AS NEEDED.  
SHE TOO IS AT METROPOL.

5.GEOFF CHARLEBOIS(TEL 261-1161 AND TELEX 185487)AND HIS STAFF AT  
CONSULATE IN WEST BRLIN WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR BACKUP SUPPORT AS  
NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE.

...2

2370001 11/11/12

PAGE TWO UMGR0119 UNCLAS

6.THIS EMB WILL HAVE TWO CARS IN BRLIN FOR DURATION OF VISIT AND WILL HIRE MORE IF REQUIRED.GDR AUTHORITIES,HOWEVER,ARE LIKELY TO MEET TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS.

7.PMS PARTY AND OFFICIAL DEL WILL BE HOUSED IN GOVT GUEST HOUSE AND ANNEX WITH EXCEPTION OF HUDON,DURDIN AND TECH WHO WILL BE WITH MEDIA AT PALAST HOTEL WHERE THIRTY-FIVE ROOMS HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY BOOKED. SEVENTEEN SWBS HAVE BEEN RESERVED FOR AIRCREW AT METROPOL.

8.I RETURNED TO WSAW 21JAN AND WILL RETURN TO BRLIN(HOTEL METROPOL) 26JAN.IN MEANTIME I AM IN TOUCH WITH WADE BY TELEPHONE ON TWICE DAILY BASIS.MOST GRATEFUL IF PERTINENT UNCLAS MSGES COULD BE PASSED TO WADE IN BRLIN AS WELL AS TO WSAW UNTIL CONCLUSION OF VISIT.

9.COMMENTS ON DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WILL FOLLOW

MCLAINE

UUU/127 230930Z UMGR0119

mf

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE EXTOTT RCR0116 23JAN84

A BONN DELIVER BY 240900

DISTR RBD (IDDZ

REF VOTRE TEL ZQGR0030 23JAN

---INITIATIVE DU PM-VUES DE RFA:BERLIN-EST

MESSAGE DE IDDZ. EN REPONSE A VOTRE REFTEL PARTIRA 24JAN. POUR

L INSTANT, AVISONS QUE REFTEL ARRIVE AVANT QU IDDZ AIT PU VOUS

AVISER DE VISITE RBD/HANCOCK A BONN POUR DEBRIEFING AUX AUTORITES

DE RFA SUR VISITES, EN PARTICULIER A BERLIN-EST.

2. RBD PREVOIT SE RENDRE A BONN JEUDI 2FEV: SA 463 EX BUCST 1550,

ZURICH 1710, ENSUITE LH 239 EX ZURICH 1800. COLOGNE 1900. CONFIR-

MERONS DQP.

CCC/272 232345Z RCR0116

EX-3502  
(222) 246-7424

UNCLASSIFIED  
NONCLASSIFIÉ

Facsimile

TRANSMISSION

fac-similé

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

Our file/no. dossier:

NYC

59

NO.

GRPA - 106

DATE 23 JANUARY 1984

PAGES TWO

(incl. cover)

(y compris la page  
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General  
DU : Consulat général du Canada  
NEW YORK

SECTION: General Relations & Public  
Affairs  
Mr./Ms. BRADY/  
M./Mad. Weatherup

TO : Mr./Ms.  
A : M./Mad.

Department:  
Service : EXTOTT: LIDDZ MINA URR UGB

Phone :  
Téléphone :

Subject : NEW YORK TIMES 21 JANUARY 1984 (A-4)  
Objet :

"TRUDEAU ENCOURAGED ON DISARMAMENT EFFORT"

MINA  
URR  
UGB

2/2  
41-y

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, JANUARY 21, 1984

# Trudeau Encouraged on Disarmament Effor

By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada said yesterday that he was encouraged by the United States-Soviet contacts that took place this week at the European security conference in Stockholm. But he said that he hoped that more substantive steps could be taken in the context of his own effort to promote a disarmament agreement.

Mr. Trudeau listed such steps as a possible United Nations meeting of the nuclear powers, or a ban on nuclear weapons in space, or the ratification of the second strategic arms limitation treaty.

Mr. Trudeau, who is leaving next week to visit Rumania, Czechoslovakia and East Germany as part of his disarmament campaign, said in an interview with editors of The New York Times that he was gratified by what he said was the moderation in the tone of United States statements toward the Soviet Union.

He also cited what he said were the positive effects of the participation of national leaders at the security talks in Sweden.

## 'End the Megaphone Diplomacy'

"They have involved themselves now," he said. "They have decided that they would go to Stockholm at the ministerial level. The objective is to resume the dialogue, to reduce tensions, to end the megaphone diplomacy."

"And that seems to be happening," he said, at least within the Western camp.

Mr. Trudeau also said he repeatedly stressed the need to take advantage of the improved atmosphere and make progress in such substantive areas as disarmament and troop reduction.

"Now that we're using the right words, I think we must propose the right deeds," he said.

Mr. Trudeau said he looked toward a return to what he called the creative policies that preceded the period of détente of the 1970's. He cited ratification of the second strategic arms treaty, or a response to the unanswered Soviet counterproposal on force reductions in Europe, or even moves toward a general nonaggression treaty as the kind of measures that would reduce the danger of war. "At some point you have to take a leap of faith," said the Canadian leader.

Mr. Trudeau's comments coincided with reports from Stockholm suggesting that as a result of a long meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, Secretary of State George P. Shultz appeared more optimistic about the resumption of the talks in Vienna on reducing conventional forces in Europe.

## Letter From Andropov

The comments also came after Mr. Trudeau received a letter this week from Yuri V. Andropov, the Soviet leader, proposing a meeting at "a time in the not too distant future." The Canadian leader, who is considering retirement from national politics, said Mr. Andropov's letter had encouraged him to continue the disarmament efforts, in which Mr. Trudeau and his aides have consulted with more than 30 national leaders.

In a related development yesterday, Canadian diplomats in Ottawa said that in talks in Stockholm between Mr. Gromyko and Allan J. MacEachen, the Canadian Deputy Prime Minister, the Soviet official said his country was

willing to discuss claims for compensation for Canadian citizens who were killed in the downing of the South Korean jetliner by Soviet aircraft in Sept. 1. This was described by Canadian diplomats as a possible sign of lessening intransigence in Moscow.

In his talk to the editors of The Times, Mr. Trudeau stressed his satisfaction with what he described as a moderating tone of statements from Washington. He said that when he first undertook his efforts in September to stimulate discussion and galvanize political will to deal with disarmament the United States gave him "a reaction that was rather cruel," but he added that "when I saw President Reagan in December he made all the right noises."

MF

2

C O N F I D N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA0094 23JAN84

TO BNATO DELIVER BY 241200

INFO GENEV PRMNY WSHDC NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DNACPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR IDAO IDAN IDR (IDDZ

REF OURTELS IDDZ0039,0041,0042 16JAN OUR FAX IDA0095 23JAN

---PM INITIATIVE

WE ARE TRANSMITTING SEPARATELY BY CLASSIFIED FAX COVER NOTE AND  
THREE SLIGHTLY REVISED DISCUSSION PAPERS. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PASS  
COPIES TO OTHER NATO DELS ASAP INDICATING THAT IT IS OUR INTENTION  
TO CIRCULATE PAPERS TO CD DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA AT BEGINNING OF CD  
SESSION. AS CD STARTS 07FEB, ANY COMMENTS BY DELEGATIONS BY 01FEB  
WOULD BE WELCOMED.

CCC/272 232326Z IDA0094

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

*made File*  
*Mr. Smith*  
Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BERN ZNGR0064 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 231400

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RGBD RSR

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0072 21JAN

---:M MTG WITH AUBERT

OHOUGH JACCARD HAD AS YET NO/NO TIME TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH  
AUBERT,WHO HAS BEEN ALL DAY WITH PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION,HE  
TOLD ME WE COULD TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT AUBERT WILL BE ABLE TO  
MEET PM FOR LUNCH ON MON 30JAN IN ZURICH.HE WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH  
ME TOMORROW TO CONFIRM AND DETERMINE ARRANGEMENTS  
(TIMING,LOCAL,ETC)

DE GOUMOIS

CCC/205 231715Z ZNGR0064



*M. White*

Division Phoned.....

Person .....

Local Time 13h 35

*MF*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BERN ZNGR0062 23JAN84

A EXTOTT/IDDZ LIVRAISON 231300

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER STKHM/SCDEL

DISTR RGBD RGB RSR RSD IDA IDR

REF NOTRETEL ZNGR0059 23JAN,VOSTELS IDDZ0065 20JAN,IDDZ0072 21JAN

---INITIATIVE PM-RENCONTRE AUBERT

LA SUISSE, QUI NE FAIT PAS/PAS PARTIE DES GRANDES INSTANCES INTERNATIONALES  
OU REGIONALES (L ONU, L OTAN, ETC) ATTACHE UNE IMPORTANCE PARTICULIERE A LA  
CSCE ET EST TRES ENGAGEE DANS LA CONFERENCE DE STKHM. M AUBERT  
SOUSHAITERA VRAISEMBLABLEMENT, LORSQU IL RENCONTRERA LE PM, EN SAVOIR  
DAVANTAGE NOTAMMENT SUR CIT LA PROPOSITION DE CINQ PUISSANCES FINCIT  
ET SUR LES LIENS POSSIBLES ENTRE LA MISSION DE PAIX DU PM ET LE  
DEROULEMENT DU PROCESSUS DE STKHM.

2. LA CSCE, QUI PERMET A LA SUISSE DE FAIRE VALOIR SES INTERETS  
POLITIQUES ET MILITAIRES, ET D Y DEFENDRE SES VALEURS SOCIALES SANS  
EVEILLER DE SOUPCON DE PARTIALITE NI TRAHIR SA NEUTRALITE, OCCUPE DANS  
LA DIPLOMATIE HELVETIQUE UNE PLACE PREPONDERANTE. TOUTE SA DIPLOMATIE  
A ETE ORIENTEE EN VUE D EN FACILITER L AVANCEMENT ET NOTAMMENT LE  
COMMENCEMENT DE L ETAPE DE STKHM.

3. PETIT PAYS STRATEGIQUEMENT SITUE AU COEUR DE L EUROPE, LA SUISSE EST  
PARTICULIEREMENT SENSIBLE A TOUS LES ASPECTS DE LA SECURITE EUROPEENNE.  
ELLE CONSACRE UNE PART IMPORTANTE DE SON BUDGET A LA DEFENSE NATIONALE,  
ELLE MAINTIENT PAR L ENTREPRISE DU SERVICE MILITAIRE OBLIGATOIRE, UNE

...2

PAGE TWO ZNGR0062 CONFD

ARMEE DE MILICE DE 625,000/625,000 HOMMES MOBILISABLES EN 48 HEURES.  
ELLE CONSIDERE QUE SES INTERETS VITAUX SONT LIES A LA SECURITE  
EUROPEENNE ET A UNE DECRISPATION ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST.

4.LA SUISSE EST DONC CONSCIENTE DE DEFENDRE SES PROPRES INTERETS A  
STKHM.SI ELLE NE REFUSERA PAS/PAS EVENTUELLEMENT DE JOUER UN ROLE DE  
MEDIATION COMME ELLE L A FAIT A MDRID,ELLE VOUDRA D ABORD METTRE DE  
L AVANT SES PROPRES POSITIONS.SI ELLE N EN A PAS/PAS ENCORE DEVOILE  
LE DETAIL,IL EST CLAIR QUE SON APPROCHE REPOSE SUR LES MEMES PRINCIPES  
QUE LA NOTRE.ELLE S EN TIENT FERMEMENT AU QUATRE CRITERES ADOPTES A  
MDRID QUI SPECIFIENT QUE LES MESURES DE CONFIANCE ET DE SECURITE  
DEVRONT ETRE:

A)POLITIQUEMENT CONTRAIGNANTES;B)MILITAIREMENT SIGNIFICATIVES;  
C)VERIFIABLES ET D)S APPLIQUER A L ENSEMBLE DU TERRITOIRE EUROPEEN TEL  
QUE DEFINIES A MDRID.DE PLUS ELLE ESTIME COMME NOUS QUE LE PREMIER  
STADE CONSACRE AUX MESURES DESTINEES A RETABLIR LA CONFIANCE ET LA  
SECURITE DOIT SE DISTINGUER NETTEMENT DU DEUXIEME STADE CONSACRE  
AUX MESURES DE DESARMEMENT.

5.SI STKHM EST POUR EUX LA CONFERENCE LA PLUS IMPORTANTE,ILS N EN  
CONSIDERENT PAS/PAS MOINS QU ELLE N EST QU UN VOLET DU PROCESSUS DE LA  
CSCE,L AUTRE ETANT LES DROITS DE L HOMME ET LES CONTACTS HUMAINS,QUI  
DOIVENT ETRE TRAITES ULTERIEUREME A OTT ET A BERNE.ILS JUGENT D AUTANT  
PLUS IMPORTANT D APPUYER LE PROCESSUS DE LA CSCE QUE C EST LE SEUL  
DANS LEQUEL L URSS SE SENT POLITIQUEMENT ET JURIDIQUEMENT LIEE DANS  
LA SUITE DES ACCORDS D HSNKI.CECI ETANT DIT,LES SUISSSES NE SE FONT

...3

PAGE THREE ZNGR0062 CONF

AUCUNE ILLUSION SUR LA RAPIDITE DES PROGRES QUE L ON PEUT EN  
ATTENDRE ET ACCUEILLEN FAVORABLEMENT TOUT CE QUI PEUT AMENER UN  
DEBLOCAGE ET NOTAMMENT L INITIATIVE DU PM.

5.IL SERAIT DONC UTILE QUE LE PM REITERE NOTRE APPUI ET NOTRE  
ENGAGEMENT A L EGARD DE LA CSCE,AINSI QUE NOTRE SOUHAIT DE  
POURSUIVRE NOS CONSULTATIONS BILATERALES DANS CE CADRE.

CCC/205 231815Z ZNGR0062

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

NONCLASSIFIE

DE BERN ZNGR0061 23JAN84

A EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 230900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RGBD RSR

REF VOTRETEL IDDZ0072 21JAN ET NOTRETEL ZNGR0059 23JAN

---NOTES BIOGRAPHIQUES PIERRE AUBERT

NOTES BIOGRAPHIQUES

CHEF DU DEPARTEMENT DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

NE A LA CHAUX-DE-FONDS LE 03MAR1927.

ORIGINAIRE DE SAVAGNIER NE.LICENCIE EN DROIT DE L UNIVERSITE DE  
NEUCHATEL.AVOCAT A LA CHAUX-DE-FONDS DES 1953.

DE 1960 A 1968,CONSEILLER COMMUNAL DE LA VILLE DE LA CHAUX-DE-  
FONDS(PRESIDENT EN 1967/1968).

DE 1961 A 1975,DEPUTE AU GRAND CONSEIL(PARLEMENT CANTONAL)  
NEUCHATELOIS(PRESIDENT EN 1969/70).

DE 1971 A 1977,PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL DE L UNIVERSITE DE  
NEUCHATEL.

DES 1971,DEPUTE AU CONSEIL DES ETATS(SENAT FEDERAL).RAPPORTEUR  
GENERAL DE LA COMMISSION POLITIQUE DU CONSEIL DE L EUROPE,EN  
MAI 1981.

ELU CONSEILLER FEDERAL LE 07 DECEMBRE 1977,REELU EN 1979 ET 1983.  
CHEF DU DEPARTEMENT DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DEPUIS LE 01 FEVRIER 1978.  
PRESIDENT DE LA CONFEDERATION EN 1983.

IL VISITA LE CANADA DU 25AVR AU 03MAI83.FINCIT.

UUU/205 231230Z ZNGR0061

Division Phoned.....  
Person .....  
Local Time .....

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE BERN ZNGR0060 23JAN84

A EXTOTT/RSR IMMED

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR(CIDDZ RGB

REF NOS TELX ZNGR0018 11JAN(STKHM-REUNION BILATERALE) ZNGR0059 23JAN

---CRISE AU SEIN DU PARTI SOCIALISTE

LA REMISE EN QUESTION DE LA PARTICIPATION SOCIALISTE A LA COALITION  
GOVTALE RISQUE DE CREER UNE SITUATION GRAVE SUSCEPTIBLE DE MENACER  
L EQUILIBRE CONFEDERAL QUI REPOSE SUR LA CIT CO-RESPONSABILITE  
FINCIT DES PARTIS.

2.LE PARTI SOCIALISTE,QUI EST DEPUIS 1931 LE PREMIER PARTI SUISSE PAR  
LE NOMBRE DES ELECTEURS,N EST ENTRE AU CONSEIL FEDERAL QU EN 1943.IL  
LE QUITTAIT DIX ANS PLUS TARD,LE PARTI RADICAL S ETANT OPPOSE A  
L OBSTENTION DU SECOND SIEGE QU IL SOLLICITAIT.IL Y REVINT EN 1959,  
LORS DE L ADOPTION DE LA FORMULE MAGIQUE DE REPRESENTATION  
PROPORTIONNELLE DES PARTIS:DEUX RADICAUX,DEUX DEMONCRATES-CHRETIENS,  
DEUX SOCIALISTES ET UN AGRARIEN(OU DEMOCRATE DU CENTRE).

3.SA PARTICIPATION AU GOVT NE POSA PAS DE PROBLEME JUSQU EN 1972.A  
PARTIR DE CETTE DATE,L AILE GAUCHE DU PARTI ADOPTE DE PLUS EN PLUS  
DES POSITIONS RADICALES(ETATISME,PACIFISME,ETC)ET COMMENCE A FAIRE DU  
RETRAIT DU GOVT SON CHEVAL DE BATAILLE.DISSENSIONS NE CESSENT PAR  
AILLEURS DE S ACCUMULER ENTRE PARTIS PARTENAIRES A LA COALITION  
GOVTALE.

...2

PAGE DEUX ZNGR0060 RESTR

4. L'ECHEC DE L'ELECTION, LE 7 DEC, DE LILIAN UCHTENHAGEN AU CONSEIL FEDERAL (CANDIDATE OFFICIELLE DU PARTI) A LAQUELLE LES CONSEILLERS NATIONAUX ONT PREFERE M OTTO STICH, JUGE PLUS MODERE, A JOUER LE ROLE DE REVELATEUR ET DE CATALYSEUR. IL A DECHAINÉ DES REMOUS QUI, ALLANT S'AMPLIFIANT, ONT NECESSITE LA CONVOCATION LES 11 ET 12 FEV PROCHAIN D'UN CONGRES EXTRAORDINAIRE OU POURRAIT SE DEGAGER UNE MAJORITE EN FAVEUR DU RETRAIT. TROIS OPTIONS SERONT ALORS PROPOSEES: 1) LE STATU QUO 2) LE RETRAIT IMMEDIAT DU GOUV; 3) LA POURSUITE DU STATU QUO JUSQU'EN 1987, AFIN DE LAISSER LE TEMPS DE NEGOCIER LES CONDITIONS D'UNE PARTICIPATION, OU SI CELA SE REVELE IMPOSSIBLE, DE PREPARER LE PARTI A SON ROLE DE PARTI D'OPPOSITION.

5. IL EST DIFFICILE DE FAIRE DES PREVISIONS, LES OPINIONS SEMBLANT, POUR LE MOMENT, PARTAGER A PEU PRES EGALEMENT ENTRE LE MAINTIEN ET LE RETRAIT; LA TROISIEME OPTION N'ETANT PAS TELLEMENT PRISE AU SERIEUX. SI UNE NETTE MAJORITE NE SE DEGAGE PAS LES 11/12 FEV, LE PARTI POURRAIT ETRE AMENE A CONSULTER PAR REFERENDUM SES 50,000 MILITANTS. LES DEUX SOCIALISTES DU GOVT (M AUBERT ET STICH) ONT AFFIRME QU'ILS SE PLIERAIENT A LA DECISION QUI SERA PRISE ET QUITTERAIENT LE CONSEIL FEDERAL, SI LE RETRAIT ETAIT DECIDE.

6. L'ESPRIT DE SOLIDARITE NATIONALE SUR LEQUEL REPOSE LA STABILITE DU PAYS S'EN TROUVERAIT EBRANLE. LE PARTI SOCIALISTE, HORS DU GOVT, DEVIENT DRAIT UNE VERITABLE OPPOSITION QUI EXERCERAIT UN CONTREPOIDS AU POUVOIR EN PLACE.

CCC/205 231300Z ZNGR0060

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BERN ZNGR0059 23JAN84

A EXTOTT/IDDZ LIVRAISON 230900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RGBD RSR

REF VOTRETEL IDDZ0072 21JAN

---RENCONTRE PM-AUBERT

NOUS REPETONS PAR TELEGRAMME SEPARÉ NOTES BIOGRAPHIQUES D AUBERT.

2. POINT A RETENIR EST QU AUBERT A UNE FORMATION JURIDIQUE, QUI PARAÎT  
NETTEMENT DANS SA FAÇON D ANALYSER LES QUESTIONS ET DE LES PRÉSENTER.

IL A COMMENCÉ TRÈS TÔT UNE CARRIÈRE POLITIQUE AU SEIN DU PARTI  
SOCIALISTE, FRANCHISSANT TOUTES LES ÉTAPES PASSANT DE LA COMMUNE AU  
PARLEMENT CANTONAL ET AU SÉNAT FÉDÉRAL, D OÙ IL A ÉTÉ ÉLU CONSEILLER  
FÉDÉRAL EN 1977. CE GENRE DE CARRIÈRE EST ASSEZ COURANT EN SUISSE, CAR  
DANS CE SYSTÈME TRÈS POUSSÉ DE SCRUTIN PROPORTIONNEL, LES PARTIS SONT  
À TOUS LES NIVEAUX L AXE DE LA VIE POLITIQUE.

3. AUBERT EST LE PRINCIPAL ARCHITECTE D UNE PRÉSENCE PLUS ACTIVE DE LA  
SUISSE DANS LES INSTANCES INTERNATIONALES, ET D UNE INTERPRÉTATION PLUS  
OUVERTE ET PLUS POSITIVE DE LA NEUTRALITÉ, QUI S EST TRADUITE NOTAMMENT  
PAR LA PROMOTION DE L ENTRÉE DE LA SUISSE AUX NATIONS UNIES, PAR LES  
PRISES DE POSITION DE LA SUISSE SUR LA POLOGNE, L ABATTAGE DE L AVION  
SUD CORÉEN, LE RÔLE ACTIF QUE JOUE LA SUISSE DANS LE PROCESSUS DE  
LA CSCE ET AU SEIN DES NNA. CELA NE LUI A PAS/PAS VALU QUE DES ÉLOGES  
DE LA PART DES MILIEUX PLUS TRADITIONNELS ET CONSERVATEURS,  
NOTAMMENT EN SUISSE ALÉMANIQUE OÙ IL N A PAS/PAS TRÈS BIEN PASSÉ  
LA RAMPE, SURTOUT EN DÉBUT DE SON MANDAT.

...2

PAGE DEUX ZNGR0059 CONF

4. SUR LE PLAN DE LA PERSONNALITE, IL EST PLUTOT TIMIDE ET D'ALLURE CONTRAINTE LORSQU'IL S'EXPRIME EN PUBLIC OU EN FONCTION OFFICIELLE. PAR AILLEURS EN PETIT GROUPE, LORSQUE LA GLACE EST ROMPUE, IL DEVIENT CHALEUREUX, D'ABORD FACILE ET AGREABLE. IL EST FERME MEME TENACE DANS SES IDEES ET N'HESITERA PAS/PAS LE CAS ECHEANT A EXPRIMER UN DESACORD OU UN POINT DE VUE DIVERGENT.

5. AUBERT ATTACHE UNE IMPORTANCE MAJEURE AU PROCESSUS DE LA CSCE ET SURTOUT A LA CONFERENCE DE STKHM, LE SEUL AUQUEL LA SUISSE ET TOUS LES ETATS EUROPEENS PARTICIPENT. POUR CETTE RAISON, IL S'INTERESSE PARTICULIEREMENT A L'INITIATIVE DE PAIX DU PM ET VOUDRA EN CONNAITRE D'AVANTAGE AFIN DE DETERMINER COMMENT ELLE POURRA SERVIR LE PROCESSUS FORMEL DE NEGOTIATIONS. AUBERT AFFIRME QU'IL FAUT D'ABORD RETABLIR LA CONFIANCE ET AUGMENTER LA SECURITE AVANT D'ABORDER LE DESARMEMENT COMME TEL. DANS CETTE PERSPECTIVE, ILS PERCOIVENT UNE COMPLEMENTARITE POSSIBLE DANS L'IMPULSION POLITIQUE QUE VEUT DONNER LE PM. LES PROPOSITIONS SUBSTANTIVES DU PM LEUR PARAISSENT INTERESSANTES MAIS A PLUS LONG TERME. ILS VOUDRONT CONNAITRE SON ANALYSE A PARTIR DES DIVERSES RENCONTRES QU'IL A EUES.

6. POUR PLUS DE RENSEIGNEMENTS SUR L'ARRIERE PLAN VOUS REFERONS A NOTRE TEL ZNGR0018 DU 11 JAN SUR LA POSITIONS SUISSE A STKHM ET AUX TELX ZNGR 0018 DU 11 JAN (SUJ: STKHM-REUNION BILATERALE) ZNGR0060 23 JAN, PORTANT SUR LA QUESTION QUE POSE ACTUELLEMENT LE PARTI SOCIALISTE A L'EGARD DE SA PARTICIPATION AU GOUVERNEMENT

DE GOUMOIS

CCC/205 231030Z ZNGR0059



BIOGRAPHY OF HIS EXCELLENCY  
PIERRE AUBERT

Born on March 3, 1927 at Chaux-de-Fonds,  
Neuchatel canton.

He studied at the University of Neuchatel where  
he graduated as Bachelor of Law and continued his studies  
at the University of Heidelberg.

He started a legal practice in Chaux-de-Fonds in  
1953. Elected General Counsellor of the city of Chaux-de-Fonds  
from 1960 to 1968. Elected Deputy to the cantonal Parliament  
of Neuchatel from 1961 to 1975. Elected President of the  
Neuchatel cantonal Parliament in 1969 to 1970. Since 1971,  
member of the State Council (Federal Senate). Served as  
Chairman of the Political Commission of the Council of Europe  
from May 16, 1981 under the Council's rotational system.  
President of the Swiss-Israel Association.

Elected Federal Counsellor on December 7, 1977 and  
re-elected in December 1979.

Appointed Minister of the Department of Foreign  
Affairs since February 1, 1978.

President of the Swiss Confederation from January 1  
to December 31, 1983.

He visited Canada as Minister of Foreign Affairs  
from April 25 to May 3, 1981 when he met the then Secretary  
of State for External Affairs, Dr. Mark MacGuigan.

Mr. Aubert speaks French but understands a little  
English.

Mr. Aubert is married and has two children.

MF

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FM PMOOTT PM00056 23JAN84

TO PRGUE IMMED

INFO EXTOTT XDV CIDDZ PCOOTT/FOWLER

---PMS VISIT-MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

CP AND UPC PHOTOGRAPHERS WONDERING WHETHER THEY CAN

TRAVEL TO WEST BERLIN TO FILE THROUGH AP AND UPI

OFFICES. IS THIS PRACTICAL?

UUU/204 232325Z PM00056

NEO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM00051 23JAN84

TO WARSAW BERN PRGUE BUCST IMMED

INFO EXTOTT/IDDZ XDV PCOOTT/FOWLER

---PMS VISIT-MEDIA

THE FOLLOWING IS LIST OF JOURNALISTS ACCOMPANYING PM  
NAME, AFFILIATION, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, PASSPORT  
NUMBER, ISSUED AT, DATE OF EXPIRY.

PLEASE NOTE THAT KORING, LAVOIE AND YOUNG WILL JOIN  
GROUP IN PRGUE.

- 1 BELLEY, PIERRE, RADIO-CANADA, 1952-10-05, BOISCHATEL,  
QUEBEC, JC248222, OTTAWA, 1987-03-02.
- 2 BOLAND, TERRY CKO INCORPORATED, 1953-05-22, OTTAWA,  
ONTARIO, JC355003, OTTAWA, 1987-04-20.
- 3 BREGG, PETER, CANADIAN PRESS, 1948-10-02, HULL,  
QUEBEC, ZL024318, OTTAWA, 1986-06-18.
- 4 CLARK, ANDREW, UNITED PRESS CANADA, 1952-08-17,  
TORONTO, ONTARIO, MA109973, VANCOUVER, 1985-01-18.
- 5 CLOUTIER, DANIELLE, RADIO-CANADA, 1951-03-31,  
MONTREAL, QUEBEC, FB461636, OTTAWA, 1986-07-30.
- 6 CONWAY, FIONA, CTV TELEVISION NETWORK, 1954-06-14,  
DUBLIN, IRELAND, MA192222, OTTAWA, 1985-02-06.
- 7 CHAMPAGNE, JEAN-PIERRE, RADIO-CANADA-CBC,  
1950-03-30, OTTAWA, ONTARIO, PD637846, HULL, 1988-07-12.

...2

PAGE TWO PM02051 UNCLAS

- 8 EVANS, BOB, CTV TELEVISION NETWORK, 1928-12-28,  
LONDON, ONTARIO, PD474899, HULL, 1988-04-26.
- 9 GAYNOR, CHRISTINE, STANDARD BROADCAST NEWS,  
1956-06-24, OTTAWA, ONTARIO, CK569902, TORONTO,  
1984-08-01.
- 10 GOAR, CAROL, MACLEAN-HUNTER LTD, 1951-12-30,  
HAMILTON, ONTARIO, CK429217, OTTAWA, 1984-05-01.
- 11 GREENOUGH, WAYNE, RADIO-CANADA, 1941-12-13, HALIFAX,  
NOVA-SCOTIA, FB565795, OTTAWA, 1986-10-01.
- 12 HALTON, DAVID, CBC, 1940-05-28, BEACONSFIELD,  
ENGLAND, EM104749, OTTAWA, 1987-08-30.
- 13 HEPBURN, ROBERT, TORONTO STAR, 1946-06-26, OSHAWA,  
ONTARIO, MA543526, OTTAWA, 1985-07-09.
- 14 KELLEHER, BRIAN, CBC, 1940-05-11, SYDNEY, NOVA  
SCOTIA, EM104024, OTTAWA, 1987-07-29.
- 15 KORING, PAUL, CANADIAN PRESS, (DETAILS TO FOLLOW).
- 16 LAVOIE, GILBERT, LA PRESSE, 1948-05-03, RIMOUSKI,  
QUEBEC, MA715850, OTTAWA, 1985-12-17.
- 17 LEPRINCE, JEAN-MICHEL, RADIO-CANADA, 1950-07-11, LA  
GARENNE-COLOMBES, FRANCE, CK448015, MONTREAL,  
1984-06-19.
- 18 MASSE, MIRFILLE, RADIO-CANADA, 1949-09-03,  
SHERBROOKE, QUEBEC, GE184404, HULL, 1988-11-02.

...3

PAGE THREE PM00051 UNCLAS

19 MONTGOMERY, CHARLOTTE, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 1950-04-08,

NIAGARA FALLS, ONTARIO, FB468267, TORONTO,

1986-08-25.

20 PARSONS, MICHAEL, CTV, 1950-03-02, ROCHFORD, ENGLAND,

MA675968, OTTAWA, 1985-11-07.

21 ROBITAILLE, GASTON, RADIO-CANADA, 1950-06-05,

BUCKINGHAM, QUEBEC, MA320797, OTTAWA, 1985-04-02.

22 SINCLAIR, MARGOT, BROADCAST NEWS/CANADIAN PRESS,

1953-04-19, VANCOUVER, BC, FB553427, VICTORIA.

1986-12-02.

23 SPARLING, ANDREW, NEWSRADIO, 1954-07-09, STRATHROY,

ONTARIO, FB664171, OTTAWA, 1986-12-30.

24 TRUDEL, CHRISTIAN, CTV, 1955-02-08, HEARST, ONTARIO,

JC197526, OTTAWA, 1987-02-11.

25 YOUNG, CHRISTOPHER, SOUTHAM NEWS, 1926-07-09, ACCRA,

GHANA, FB445959, OTTAWA, 1986-07-13.

UUU/001 231642Z PM00051

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

FM BONN ZQGR0030 23JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 230900

INFO PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU LDN CANDELNATO WSHDC MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RCR RBD RBR UGB URR CPD IDR IDA  
REF COURTEL ZQGR1015 18JAN

---PM INITIATIVE-FRG VIEWS:EAST BERLIN

SUMMARY:CHANCELLORS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER HAS URGED,IN  
CONNECTION WITH PMS VISIT TO EAST BERLIN,THAT WE UNDERTAKE  
FOLLOWING THREE STEPS:

(A)SOME FORMAL ADVANCE INDICATION TO FRG OF WHAT THEY OF COURSE  
KNOW TO BE PMS OBJECTIVES;(B)SOME REFERENE TO GDR OF DEGREE  
OF IDENTITY BETWEEN CDN AND FRG POINTS OF VIEW ON INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED;AND(C)SOME PROMPT,REASONABLY  
THOROUGH INDICATION TO FRG OF WHAT TRANSPIRES WITH GDR.FRG  
WOULD WANT TO BE ABLE LATER TO REFER PUBLICLY TO THESE STEPS IN  
ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR CONCURRENCE IN WHOLE PROCESS.MORE  
BASICALLY,HOWEVER,THEIR OBJECTIVE IS ALSO TO ADD TO WEIGHT OF  
PMS INITIATIVE(IE BY GIVING EVIDENCE OF FRG AND OTHER  
ALLIANCE ENDORSEMENT OF COMPONENT VISITS)SINCE PM IS QUOTE IN  
BEST POSITION OF ALL WESTERN LEADERS TO PERSUADE USSR THEY CAN  
RETURN TO NEGOTIATION TABLE WITHOUT LOSING FACE UNQUOTE.

2.REPORT:AT HIS INSTIGATION,TELTSCHIK(CHANCELLOR KOHLS  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER)SOUGHT ME OUT FOLLOWING A DINNER FRI FOR  
...2

*Mr. Smith*  
Division Phenod

Person

Local Time

*MASTER*  
*FILE*

PAGE TWO ZQGR0030 CONF

EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF PMS VISIT TO EAST BERLIN. HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) AT MTG IN CHANCELLORS OFFICE FRI THERE HAD BEEN LIVELY DISCUSSION AMONG OFFICIALS REGARDING PM VISIT TO EAST BERLIN; IT WAS SUGGESTED SOME PROTEST SHOULD BE MADE TO CDN GOVT OVER THIS BERLIN VISIT, FIRST BY A NATO HEAD OF GOVT; AND TELTSCHIK, WHOM WE SUSPECT USUALLY DOMINATES SUCH DEBATES, DISAGREED FIRST BECAUSE THIS COULD CREATE APPEARANCE OF DISSENSION AMONG ALLIES AND SECOND, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, BECAUSE PMS OBJECTIVES WERE PRECISELY THOSE OF FRG GOVT;

(B) NEVERTHELESS, IN ORDER TO LEAVE UNDISTURBED GOOD ATMOSPHERE PREVAILING SINCE PM-KOHL DISCUSSION IN NOV, PERHAPS WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO USE CHANNELS SIMPLY TO OUTLINE PMS OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO VISIT TAKING PLACE (HE MADE CLEAR ANY NEGATIVE NOISES ARE IN FRG FOREIGN MINISTRY OR POSSIBLE FRG EMB OTT, BUT CERTAINLY NOT/NOT IN KOHL'S OFFICE).

(C) AS TO SUBSTANCE OF DISCUSSION WITH EAST EUROPEANS-

(1) WITH GDR, HE HOPED PM WOULD FIND OCCASION TO PUT ACROSS EXTENT TO WHICH FRG AND CDN POSITIONS WERE ALIKE (AS WERE THOSE OF OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS); IN RESPONSE TO REMINDER HE HAD EARLIER SAID FRG MIGHT HAVE SOME COMMENT TO MAKE ON SUBSTANCE PRIOR TO VISIT TO MOSCO, HE SAID THAT VIS-A-VIS GDR EARLIER POINTS IN PMS INITIATIVE CONTINUED TO BE RIGHT ONES IN HIS VIEW;

...3

PAGE THREE ZQGR0030 CONF

(11)WITH CZECHS,HE HOPED PM WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INSISTENT ON NEED FOR THEM TO DISPLAY SOME,EVEN MODEST,INITIATIVE-EG THIRD HIGH LEVEL HUNGARIAN VISITOR IN AS MANY WEEKS HAD COME TO BONN DISPLAYING CONCERN OVER SITU;DISCUSSIONS WITH GDR SHOWED THEIR CONCERN;BUT CZECHS WERE TOTALLY PASSIVE.(TELTSCHIK,WHO IS CZECH-BORN,SAID HE HAD REMONSTRATED IN THIS VEIN WITH CZECH AMB TODAY);WE NEEDED TO PUT HEAT ON EVERYWHERE IN THE EAST TO REINFORCE PRESSURE ON SOVIETS WITHOUT,OF COURSE,PRETENDING WE COULD SOMEHOW ISOLATE THEM;

(111)WITH USSR,IN DUE COURSE,HE CONTINUED TO HOPE PM WOULD GO WITH SOME PRECISE AND PRE-DISCUSSED QUOTE SECRETE UNQUOTE IDEAS AS HE HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED;CLEARLY USA COULD NOT/NOT NOW BE INTERLOCUTOR, THOUGH HIS REPORTS ON STKHM SCHULTZ-GROMYKO DISCUSSIONS SUGGESTED IT HAD GONE BETTER THAN ANYONE COULD HAVE HOPED FOR;AND SIMILARLY,UK AND FRENCH COULD IN NO/NO WAY AT PRESENT BE INTERLOCUTORS FOR REASONS OF NUCLEAR NUMBERS;BUT PM-NOT/NOT LEAST BECAUSE WE HAVE NO/NO NUCLEAR NUMBERS-WAS BEST PERSON IN WEST TO TALK TO USSR,AND SOVIETS COULD BE SEEN TO MAKE MOVE TOWARDS HIM WITHOUT FACE LOSS INVOLVED IN MOVEMENT TOWARDS OTHERS(TELTSCHIK REPEATED HIS RATIONALIZATION OF GERMAN POSITION-USSR HAD MADE,OR TRIED TO MAKE,FRG SCAPEGOAT FOR INF FAILURE BY EXPLANATION IT WAS FRG NOT/NOT EG NUCLEAR UK OR FRANCE,WHICH SOMEHOW INDUCED USA TO FAIL TO NEGOTIATE AS USSR WOULD HAVE WISHED.HENCE,HE ALLEGED,FRG WAS EVEN LESS A POTENTIAL

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PAGE FOUR ZQGR0030 CONF

INTERLOCUTOR AT THIS STAGE).HE HAD EARLIER HEARD FRI OF ANDROPOV-  
TRUDEAU LET WHICH HE FOUND MOST INTERESTING AND FURTHER PROOF OF  
HIS CONTENTION:LET WAS INTERESTING BECAUSE,HE FELT,IT PROBABLY  
WAS EVIDENCE ANDROPOV IS STILL IN CONTROL(AND,MOREOVER,THAT  
SOMEONE IS);AND,IT SUGGESTS CLEARLY,USSR ACCEPTS BONA FIDES OF  
PM IN THIS MATTER,BY SUGGESTING HIS VISIT AWAIT AVAILABILITY OF  
ANDROPOV.

(D)FOLLOWING VISIT TO EAST BERLIN,TELTSCHIK URGED WE PROVIDE FRG  
WITH INFO ON PMS DISCUSSION,ESSENTIALLY SO KOHL MAY STATE PUBLICLY  
THAT HE WAS AWARE OF WHAT PM WOULD DO AND WHY/KNEW OF OUTCOME;  
AND WAS SUPPORTIVE.

3.DURING DISCUSSION,I MADE FOLLOWING POINTS ON PERSONAL BASIS,IN  
CONTEXT OF TELTSCHIKS URGING:(A)I WAS CONCERNED THAT REAL  
SIGNIFICANCE AND SUBSTANTIVE NATURE OF PMS FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH  
WERE NOT/NOT CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD IN EUROPE AS FAR AS I COULD TELL  
BEYOND CONFINES OF EG CHANCELLORS OFFICER HERE:HENCE I HAD  
THOUGHT NOT/NOT OF PRE-INFO THROUGH CHANNELS HE HAD MENTIONED  
(POINT(A)ABOVE),BUT RATHER CORRESPONDENCE WITH EG CHANCELLOR  
THAT MIGHT BE MADE PUBLIC.I SAID IT WAS CONTEMPLATING RECOMMENDING  
THIS(AS IS DONE IN SEPARATE TEL)AND ASKED WOULD THIS NOT/NOT BE  
PREFERABLE.HE AGREED THIS WOULD INDEED SERVE NEED TO EDUCATION FRG  
OFFICIALS,BUT FELT FM FRG GOVT VIEWPOINT VIS-A-VIS PUBLIC THAT  
TEXTS AS SUCH MIGHT NOT/NOT BE NEEDED,AND INSTEAD PUBLIC REFS TO  
SATISFACTORY EXCHANGES MIGHT SUFFICE.

...5

PAGE FIVE ZQGR0030 CONF

5.I ALSO NOTED THAT OUR RESPONSE MIGHT BE AFFECTED BY FACT THAT, OR SO IT SEEMED TO ME, THERE WERE TWO FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PMS AND CHANCELLORS POSITIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR DISCUSSION IN NOV IF I RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD; AND IT WAS IMPORTANT AT THIS STAGE NOT/NOT TO IGNORE SUCH DIFFERENCES IF THIS WERE SO-IE WHILD BOTH AGREED ON NEED FOR DIALOGUE, PMS INITIATIVE PRESUMED IT IS POSSIBLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH USSR WHILE FRG HAD SEEMED TO SAY THERE IS NO/NO ONE HOME IN MOSCO; AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS TO FORUM, PMS INITIATIVE PRESUMED SOME IMPETUS IN FROM OF DIALOGUE WAS REQUIRED TO INDUCE USSR TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE FRG SEMENDD TO SAY INEVITABLY IN ITS OWN INTEREST USSR WOULD SOMEHOW BE FORCED TO RETURN TO A TABLE. TELTSCHIK SAW SITUATION DIFFERENTLY, IN LESS LINEAR FASHION, AND PERHAPS MORE DYNAMICCLY. HIS POINT WAS THAT PM HAS BONA FIES AND BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE'S, SO WE MUST GO AHEAD; AND, ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT, THE WEST MUST KEEP TRYING, MUST KEEP THE INITIATIVE: EAST AND WST WERE REALLY FIGHTING FOR THE SAME (WESTERN) PUBLIC OPINION; STKHM WAS ALREADY A PLU-FORMINS HAD BEEN THERE; SCHULTZ HAD QUOTE HAD UNQUOTE TO GO "GROMYKO, LIKEWISE; ONCE THERE THEY COULD NOT/NOT FAIL TO MEET. IT WAS IN THIS VEIN THAT HE CHARACTERIZED PMS VISIT.

5.I TOLD TELTSCHIK WE WOULD REACT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. TELTSCHIK UNDOUBTEDLY HAS THE SAME ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE AS WE DO, TO ARRIVE AT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS; BUT HE MADE VIEW PMS INITIATIVE

...6

2 QGR0027 Jan 23  
Letto Kohl

*in DELETED for ACTION  
master, FILE*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR0027 23JAN83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PMOOTT/CLEARY PCOOTT/FCWLER

DISTR XDV RGB IFB IDA IDR RCR RCD

REF OURTEL ZQGR0022 16JAN XDV TEL 0037 12JAN

---PM LET TO KOHL

IN CONTEXT OF PRESENT PHASE OF PMS INITIATIVE, WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED THAT PUBLICS IN EUROPE (AND PERSONS IN GOVTS EXCEPT FOR THOSE IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED, EG ONLY CHANCELLORS OFFICER HERE) DO NOT/NOT KNOW WHAT SETS PMS INITIATIVE APART FROM OTHER CALLS FOR NEW DIALOGURE, NOR WHAT, IN BROADEST TERMS, GREATER SUBSTANCE IS INVOLVED. ACCORDINGLY, WE HAD INTENDED TO ASK WHETHER YOU HAD CONSIDERED FURTHER EXCHANGES OF LETS WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHER HOGS THAT MIGHT BE MADE PUBLIC. IN CASE OF FRG, WE NOW HAVE READY OPPORTUNITY TO EMPLOY SUCH COURSE IF DESIRED.

2. LET FROM PM TO KOHL DATED 11JAN ARRIVED HERE WITH ESKIMO CARVING GIFT FOR KOHL ON 16JAN. UNFORTUNATELY LET WAS PHOTO-COPY, NOT/NOT ORIGINAL (OUR REFTEL TO XDV). IN CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD SUGGEST NEW LET BE DRAFTED IN PART AS CONTENT OF 11JAN LET HAS LARGELY BEEN OVERTAKEN BY IMPORTANT SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. SUGGEST SOMETHING ALONG FOLLOWING LINES FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. (WE FELT GIVEN OTHER CONSTRAINTS ON YOU, IT MIGHT HELP TO OFFER TEXT). NOTE IN PARTICULAR SECTION ON FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONF.

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PAGE TWO ZQGR0027 CONF

THIS IS AREA IN WHICH WE BELIEVE FRG COULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PLAY MORE PUBLICLY ACTIVE ROLE. BONN IS CLEARLY MAJOR BEHIND-THE-SCENES PLAYER IN EAST-WEST DISARMAMENT ISSUES BUT HAS NOT/NOT PLAYED PUBLIC POLITICAL ROLE ITS IMPORTANCE MAKES US BELIEVE IT COULD. BY EVENTUALLY PUTTING LET INTO PUBLIC REALM AND OBTAINING PUBLIC FRG SUPPORT FOR IT, WE MIGHT ADVANCE THIS CAUSE.

2. FIRST PARA-SAME AS 11JAN LET.

SECOND PARA-QUOTE THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING IN DECEMBER WAS A LANDMARK, LARGELY DUE TO THE FRG PROPOSED DECLARATION WHICH CANADA HEARTILY SUPPORTED. THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE THAT BEGAN LAST WEEK IN STOCKHOLM OPENED ON A HOPEFUL NOTE AND I TRUST IT WILL BE SIMILARLY SUCCESSFUL. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE CONFERENCE, MR GEVSCHER MADE AN ACTIVE AND POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO INSERTING APPROPRIATE POLITICAL SUBSTANCE TO THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. I AM ENCOURAGED THAT THE EAST HAS AGREED TO A DATE FOR RESUMING THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE MBFR PROPOSALS WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN TO BRING FORWARD. AS YOU ARE AWARE, ON THE BASIS OF WHAT WE NOW KNOW OF THESE PROPOSALS, THEY TOO WILL RECEIVE OUR FULL SUPPORT. I AM ALSO ENCOURAGED THAT THE USA HAS NOW UNDERTAKEN TO PROVIDE A DRAFT CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD. UNQUOTE.

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PAGE THREE ZQGR0027 CONF

THIRD PARA-ADD FOLLOWING AT END OF PARA.QUOTE YOU WILL BY NOW  
KNOIW OF THE VISITS I PLAN TO MAKE SHORTLY TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA,  
ROMANIA AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.I DECIDED TO UNDERTAKE  
THIS TRIP IN AN EFFORT TO CONTINUE THE BRIDGE-BUILDING PROCESS,  
IN PARTICULAR WITH TWO WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WHICH ARE RECEIVING  
INF MISSILES AND WITH PRESIDENT CEAUCEASCU WHO HAS VOICED HIS  
CONCERNS ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION.UNQUOTE.

FOURTH PARA-QUOTE WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS I  
RAISED WITH YOU AND WITH OTHER LEADERS,REACTION TO THE QUESTION  
OF A CONFERENCE OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING.  
NONE OF THE LEADERS CONCERNED WITH WHOM I HAVE SPOKEN HAS  
REJECTED THE IDEA,ALTHOUGH SOME HAVE HAD QUESTIONS CONCERNING  
MODALITIES AND TIMING.THE ATTITUDE OF THE UK,FRANCE AND CHINA  
ARE CRITICAL AND I APPRECIATE THEIR HESTIATION.NEVERTHELESS,  
WE MUST ENCOURAGE THEM TO OVERCOME THESE;AND I BELIEVE THAT OUR  
MUTUAL DESIRE FOR SUCH A MEETING,AND OUR REASONS FOR THIS  
POSITION,CAN BE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR THINKING.I AM  
INCREASINGLY CONVINCED THAT BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT EXISTS FOR  
IMAGINATIVE RESPONSES TO THE CURRENT SITUATION.UNQUOTE  
FINAL PARA-SAME AS IN 11JANLET.

CCC/005 231423Z ZQGR0027



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
January 23, 1984

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS  
OF THE  
DEPARTMENT  
OF  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AVEC LES HOMMAGES  
DU  
MINISTÈRE  
DES  
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

IDDZ -

R.P. McDougall  
East Asia Relations Division/PER

CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM CDLS LDN COMD0005 231040Z JAN 84

TO NDHQOTT//ADM POL/PPP/DNACPOL/CIS// PRIORITY

EXTOTT DFR PED (PER ZSI PRIORITY

INFO BNATO PEKIN

---CONTACT WITH CHINESE DEFENCE ATTACHE

1. MR NING WENYAN NEW DEFENCE ATTACHE FOR CHINA TO BRITAIN PAID  
CALL ON ME 20JAN, ALSO HAS INVITED MYSELF AND MRS SNIDER TO DINNER  
AT HIS RESIDENCE LATER THIS MONTH

2. IT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO NOTE CDN/CHINESE CONTACT WHICH  
HERETOFORE HAS BEEN PRIMARILY AT ANNUAL RECEPTIONS OR AT THIRD  
PARTY EVENTS HAS RECENTLY SHOWN WHAT APPEARS TO BE DELIBERATE  
INCREASE ON SIDE OF CHINESE

3. MR NING WHO SPEAKS CAPABLE ENGLISH AND FRENCH AS WELL AS FLUENT  
RUSSIAN, WAS PREVIOUSLY MILITARY ATTACHE AT BRUSSELS, WSAW AND PRGUE.  
HE IS 53 YEARS OF AGE, ENROLLED IN CHINESE FORCES AS INFANTRYMAN IN  
1948 AND ROSE TO BE DEPUTY DIVISIONAL COMD BY 1975 BEFORE COMMENCING  
ATTACHE DUTIES. STATED THAT BEST OF HIS PERSONAL FRIENDS WHO STAYED  
WITH QUOTE ARMY DUTIES UNQUOTE ARE NOW CORPS COMDS

4. HE STATES THAT SINCE HE HAS DEPUTIES TO HANDLE ARMY, NAVY AND  
AIR MATTERS HIS MAIN INTEREST IS REST OF WORLD'S VIEW OF SOVIET  
UNION AND POSSIBLE ACTIONS AT VARIOUS DISARMAMENT CONFS. HE IS  
PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN STKHM MEETINGS AND SEEMED VERY CURRENT.

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PAGE TWO COMD0005 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

HE ASKED IF CDA IS OPTIMISTIC OR OTHERWISE OF MAIN MEETING AND OF SHULTZ/GROMYKO ONE ON ONE IN PARTICULAR

5. HE SPOKE VERY HIGHLY OF TRUDEAU INITIATIVE AND STATED HE KNEW CHINAS ATTITUDE WAS VERY FAVOURABLE. HE ALSO SAID CHINA BELIEVED US/USSR MUST REACH INITIAL ACCORD ON NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS FOLLOWING WHICH ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS COULD SIT IN A UN SPONSORED CONFERENCE TO REACH A BROADER AGREEMENT. HE SAW LITTLE SENSE IN ALL NUCLEAR POWERS SITTING DOWN INITIALLY UNLESS THE TWO PRINCIPAL PLAYERS WERE PREPARED TO MAKE CHANGES TO CURRENT POLICY

6. MR NING SPOKE WARMLY OF VISIT PM TRUDEAU TO CHINA AND RETURN VISIT TO CDA OF CHINESE LEADER. HE THOUGHT CDA HAD A GREAT ROLE TO PLAY IN LESSENING INNATL TENSION

7. MR NING WAS NOT INTERESTED IN TALKING OUTSIDE REPORTED SUBJECT MATTER AS HE REITERATED THAT HIS PRINCIPAL STUDY AND INTEREST WAS SOVIET UNION AND HOW OTHERS REGARD ITS ACTIONS

CCC/102 231050Z COMD0005