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JANUARY 1, 1961  
to  
August 31, 1961

JIC - Soviet Union *General*

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SECRET

THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE CANADIAN DEFENCE  
OF THE JOINT SERVICE COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE ON  
August 30, 1961.

XII. THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMME

(SECRET)

21. The Committee considered CANADIAN JIC 1292(61) of 22 Aug 61 on the above subject which had been prepared by GMIWG(P&O).

(CSC 7-17 (JIC), JIR 8-29-5 of 23 Aug 61)

22. The Committee amended this paper in the light of certain minor amendments tabled by the Chairman, GMIWG(P&O) and suggested by members.

23. The Committee then:

- (a) Approved the paper as CANADIAN JIC 1292/1(61) subject to (b) below,
- (b) instructed the Secretary to obtain from appropriate members of GMIWG(S&T) verification of certain data on the numbers of missile firings; and,
- (c) authorized the following distribution:

- Chiefs of Staff Committee (to note) (9)
- J.K. Starnes
- DNI
- DMI
- DAI
- DSI
- RCMP
- JIB
- CB NRC
- JIS (m)
- JIS(JIB)
- SOJIR
- SOCI
- Chairman, GMIWG(P&O) (5)
- Secretary, GMIWG(S&T) (2)
- JICLO(W) for USIB (28)
- JICLO(L) for UK JIC (15)
- JS(DSS)

ACTION: Lt.-Col. Bourgeois  
Secretary.

SECRET



CANADA

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC 7-17 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

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25 August, 1961.

→ J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs.

- DNI
- DMI
- DAI
- DSI
- RCMP
- JIB
- CB NRC

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AUG 29 1961

## PROBABLE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CERTAIN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON THE SOVIET BLOC

Enclosure: (1) CANADIAN JIC 420 (61) dated 25 August, 1961 on the above subject.

The above enclosure will be discussed under Item 9 of the Agenda for the meeting to be held on 30 August, 1961. This paper has also been passed to EIC members for their comments.

2. JIC members are requested to table at the meeting any comments they may have on this paper.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
(R.M. Bourgeois)  
Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Acting Secretary.

Enc.

RMB/2-5459/cp

- cc: CJS
- JIS (2)
- SO/JIR
- SO/CI

(DRAFT)

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

25 AUGUST 1961

The Probable Impact of Various Economic Sanctions on the Soviet  
Bloc

COPY NO 1

OBJECT

1. The purpose of this paper is to outline in economic terms the probable impact of various economic sanctions which might be imposed on the Sino-Soviet Bloc by the NATO powers. No attempt is made to assess the political effectiveness of these measures.

DISCUSSION

2. The possible actions considered are as follows:
- a. The prohibition of the use of all financial facilities of NATO countries to carry on current transactions with the USSR, the Soviet Zone of Germany, the other Soviet Bloc members and their nationals.
  - b. The expulsion of all Soviet Bloc technical experts and foreign trade officials without diplomatic immunity from the NATO countries.
  - c. The freezing of all assets of the members of the Soviet Bloc under jurisdiction of the NATO powers.
  - d. Termination of trade agreements involving Soviet Bloc countries.
  - e. The denial of all exports to Soviet Bloc countries.
  - f. The stoppage of all imports from Soviet Bloc countries to NATO countries.
  - g. The closure of NATO ports to Soviet Bloc shipping and planes and to craft under Soviet Bloc charter.
  - h. The prevention of aircraft of Soviet Bloc countries from making transit overflights and technical stops.
  - i. The prohibition of calling at Soviet Bloc ports of vessels and planes of the NATO countries.

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The Prohibition of the Use of Financial Facilities

3. The principal communist-controlled financial institutions in the NATO area are the Moscow Narodny Bank in London and the Banque Commercial Pour L'Europe du Nord (BCEN) in Paris. The Soviet Bloc countries keep a large part of their foreign exchange balances in these banks and carry out their routine foreign exchange business, including gold sales, through them. These institutions also provide facilities for the short-term financing of Bloc commercial transactions and, on occasion, they have given longer term assistance to individual Bloc countries. The liaison between Moscow Narodny, BCEN and the Gosbank in Moscow is close and these banks, which are maintained in Europe as a bridge between the Bloc and Western nations, act as highly adaptable finance houses on behalf of the Bloc as a whole. Their importance in East-West economic relations extends beyond Soviet Bloc trade with Western Europe since they are used extensively in transactions throughout the world, including the underdeveloped areas. In addition, the Bloc countries make use of Western commercial banks and they derive indirect benefits from other financial facilities, such as the various export credit insurance services which play an important role in East-West trade.

4. The denial of all these facilities, both communist and western controlled, could only reasonably be undertaken in conjunction with a complete rupture in economic relations the effects of which would extend in some measure to Bloc economic activities throughout the world. Theoretically, in the absence of an embargo on trade, Bloc commercial transactions

could be/ ...3..

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could be continued through non-NATO banks as well as through barter and other special arrangements. Since, however, the dissolution of the institutional framework of NATO-Soviet Bloc commercial relations could logically be undertaken only in conjunction with a trade embargo, the problem of finding alternative facilities would be limited to continuing transactions with non-NATO countries. Because most Bloc trade with the underdeveloped countries is bilaterally balanced, this problem would not in general be too difficult but in some important commodities, such as rubber from Malaya, which are paid for in sterling or other convertible currencies, the loss of facilities in the NATO area would be a serious blow. However, banking services would be available in certain non-NATO countries, such as Switzerland, and the ability of the Soviet Bloc to earn foreign exchange, for example through sales of gold, would probably be sufficient to maintain imports of any commodities considered essential.

5. If the embargo were also to be applied to Communist China, the loss of financial facilities in Hong Kong would be particularly serious. The value of the colony as an entrepot for trade with the West and as China's main source of foreign exchange would be lost. This would almost certainly affect the attitude of the Chinese government toward the continued existence of the colony.

The Expulsion of Non-Diplomatic Technical Experts and Trade Officials

6. The impact of this action would be of most importance in relation to East Germany. The East German regime has organized a number of trade agencies and trade offices in the western world to further its economic and especially its political objectives. It maintains Chamber of Commerce representatives in Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland,

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Italy, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In the absence of diplomatic relations these trade agencies have a special importance and are used partly as a substitute for diplomatic establishments. Their functions greatly exceed the limits of trade policy and include such activities as propaganda, political reporting and espionage. The expulsion of East German personnel would thus be a major blow to the efforts of the East German regime to gain international recognition and would seriously hamper East German trading activities since, unlike other Bloc members, the East Germans have no diplomatic staffs who can carry on commercial work.

7. We have little information on the precise numbers of other Bloc non-diplomatic personnel in NATO countries. There are a number of organizations such as AMTORG in New York and the Czech foreign trade organization in Montreal which would be affected. However, the expulsion of non-diplomatic personnel would not necessarily or in itself have a major effect on the ability of the Bloc to continue its trading activities. If visits of Bloc technical and scientific personnel were also prohibited, the effect would be more damaging because contacts with western experts and the opportunity to observe western production techniques have undoubtedly been of considerable value in some fields.

The Freezing of Soviet Bloc Assets

8. We are unable to estimate the total size of Soviet Bloc assets in NATO countries. However, in view of the level of Bloc trade with NATO countries (over \$4.5 billion in 1960), they are probably/...5..

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probably substantial. It should be borne in mind, however, that as of 31 January 1961 outstanding credits granted by NATO countries to the Soviet Bloc, excluding China, stood at \$468 million. Since these credits would not be repaid while Bloc assets were frozen the net loss to the Bloc would be reduced by this amount. The loss of foreign exchange deposits in NATO countries would create serious difficulties for the Bloc but, as suggested above, Bloc governments would probably be able to maintain those economic activities they considered most essential in non-communist countries outside NATO.

Termination of Trade Agreements

9. Most NATO trade with the Bloc is carried out under inter-governmental trade agreements. These agreements do not, however, embody firm commitments to trade at a given level but merely specify goals which each government will seek to reach in its trade. Actual completed contracts often fall short of these goals and, conversely, contracts can be completed without any agreement. Nevertheless, the termination of the agreements would almost certainly result in a severe cutback in trade because the governments concerned would no longer be bound to "facilitate" trade and there would in practice be little point in terminating the agreements unless it were intended to curtail trade by administrative restrictions.

The Denial of Exports to the Soviet Bloc

10. East-West trade constitutes a much larger share of the total trade of the Soviet Bloc than of NATO (See Tables 1 & 2). The share of this trade in the total trade of Soviet Bloc countries ranged in 1959 from 15 to 30 per cent. NATO exports to the Bloc  
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(including China) totalled about \$1.5 billion in 1959 and increased to \$2.3 billion in 1960. Manufactured goods and machinery accounted for about two-thirds of this amount (See Table 5). These categories include complex capital goods needed for the various Bloc industrialization plans, particularly in the chemical and plastics industries to which a large number of European firms have contributed. For example, the West German firms of Krupp, Bayer, Basf, Fischer and others have supplied equipment for the manufacture of plastics, chemical fibers and polymeric articles. British firms such as Courtaulds, Sterling Moulding Materials and Rustyfa have provided equipment for the production of tires, synthetic fibers and polystyrol. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and East Germany recently signed a \$31 million polyethylene "know-how" and Machinery agreement with Imperial Chemicals Limited and another UK firm. Many other examples, in products such as chemicals, machine tools, mining machinery, steel pipes, pipelines and ships, could be quoted to illustrate the role of western industry in Bloc development plans and the denial of this trade would unquestionably retard Bloc progress in some of these fields. The loss of imports from NATO would have a particularly damaging effect in East Germany, at least in the short-term. That country would probably lose about 12 per cent of its steel supplies in the period immediately following the cut-off of NATO trade.

11. Although the main effects of an embargo would apply to industries, the loss of agricultural commodities could also be serious in some cases. Poland for example has depended on imports of grain from the West in recent years to offset shortages of food and, more recently, China has contracted to buy large quantities of grain. The denial of these food-stuffs would

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aggravate domestic problems in the countries concerned.

12. Generally speaking, however, foreign trade makes such a small contribution to Bloc national incomes that the loss of imports from NATO would not cause any major economic crisis. There would undoubtedly be delays, shortages and set-backs in some sectors of the economies of some countries, but the overall resources of the Bloc and its independence of non-communist supplies are such that these problems would at the most be a serious inconvenience, which could in part be offset by domestic readjustments and a greater dependence on non-NATO sources. However, the saving in research and development costs, which results from the purchase of advanced western capital equipment, would no longer be available and this would perhaps be the most important economic consequence of the embargo.

The Stoppage of All Imports from the Soviet Bloc

13. Soviet Bloc exports only rarely stem from genuine surpluses in the economy in the sense of an excess of supply over domestic demand. Domestic consumption in certain commodities is planned in such a way that some production is left over for export. The exports are then used to obtain foreign exchange for the purchase of western goods needed to supplement domestic economic plans. Since a NATO embargo on exports to the Bloc would itself eliminate the need for Bloc exports to NATO, Bloc domestic plans would be adjusted accordingly. Details of NATO imports from the Bloc are given in Tables 3 and 4. An indication of their general commodity structure is contained in Table 6.

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The Closure of NATO Ports to Soviet Bloc Ships and Planes (including those under charter from NATO countries)

14. We have no breakdown of total Soviet Bloc foreign trade shipments by types of transportation. However, in recent years between 40 and 50 per cent of the foreign trade of the Soviet Union has been carried by sea (only about a third in Bloc ships). Since rail shipments figure more prominently in intra-Bloc trade than in East-West trade, the proportion of Bloc trade with NATO which is carried by sea may well be higher than this. In any event, the denial of NATO ports to Bloc shipping would bring to a halt a large proportion of the trade now conducted between NATO and the Bloc. However, the denial of bunkering facilities in NATO ports, although serious, would not in itself prevent the Bloc from continuing its trade with non-NATO countries. Similarly, the denial of facilities to fishing and research ships would have only a limited effect on Bloc activities in these fields.

15. The denial of NATO airports to Bloc aircraft would eliminate all Bloc air services to NATO countries, specifically to the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Holland, Denmark and Italy.

The Prevention of Transit Overflights and Technical Stops

16. This action would create serious problems for the Bloc in re-routing flights to Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Although the TU-114 might make the flight to the Western Hemisphere, by difficult and devious routes, this would not be possible/

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be possible for other Bloc aircraft. Flights to Northwest, West and Central Africa, which now all go via Western Europe, would also be seriously hampered. The only route to Africa would be via the Adriatic (i.e. the present Aeroflot route to Cairo). Present services to the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond, which are principally Czechoslovakian, would be seriously hampered by the denial of overflight privileges in Greece and Turkey. Generally there would be a major disruption of Bloc international air services which could only be overcome with great difficulty, if at all.

The Prohibition of Calling at Soviet Bloc Ports of Vessels and Planes of NATO Countries

17. The Bloc is dependent on the West for about two-thirds of the ocean shipping used in its foreign trade. The denial of this shipping would, in addition to its effect on trade with NATO as noted above, have a serious effect on intra-Bloc (particularly Chinese) trade and on Bloc trade with countries such as Cuba. For example, about 40 per cent of the tankers used in deliveries to Cuba in 1960 were chartered from the West. The Soviet Union would not have been able to honour its commitments for oil deliveries to Cuba without these ships, unless it had seriously dislocated its trade elsewhere. The loss of NATO trade would itself reduce the Bloc requirement for ships but, even so, the Bloc would face severe problems in maintaining both trade within the Bloc and with the non-communist world outside NATO.

A prohibition on western air services to the Bloc would be reciprocal to the cancellation of Bloc air services and would affect the same countries as noted above (Para 15).

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Probable Soviet Bloc Economic Reactions to Sanctions

18. There are a number of steps which the Soviet Bloc could take to offset, at least in part, the economic effect of the measures discussed above. The most important of these would be as follows:

a. The reorientation and closer coordination of intra-bloc trade. The denial of NATO sources of supply would incidentally place a premium on the most efficient utilization of Bloc resources and would be an important stimulus to the closer coordination of Bloc economies through the more effective operation of CEMA. Furthermore, the cut-back in East-West trade would enable the Soviet Union to exercise a closer economic control over the Satellites through the allocation of Soviet resources.

b. The readjustment of domestic economic plans.

c. The cancellation of repayments on Western credits.

d. The establishment of alternative banking facilities in non-NATO countries.

e. The reorientation of trade toward non-NATO countries such as Sweden and Japan.

f. The expansion of arrangements for trading in rubles.

g. A stepped-up export drive in non-NATO countries, including perhaps disruptive sales of commodities such as oil, sugar and tin.

h. The use of third country agents to obtain essential commodities from NATO countries.

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19. These steps would not entirely eliminate the inconvenience to the Soviet Bloc of a NATO embargo but they would substantially modify its effects.

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TABLE 1

EAST-WEST TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE  
IN BLOC COUNTRIES

Country	Imports	Exports
	1959	1959
<u>A. Soviet Bloc Countries</u>		
Poland	25	31
Hungary	25*	27*
The Soviet-occupied zone of Germany (1)	21	19
Czechoslovakia	18	18
Roumania	16	16
Bulgaria	19*	10*
Soviet Union	15	16

(1) Including trade with Western Germany.

\* Estimated by the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe. Source: Economic Bulletin for Europe Vol. 11 No.2 Vol. 12 No. 2.

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TABLE 2

EAST-WEST TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE  
 IN THE EUROPEAN NATO COUNTRIES

Country	Imports		Exports	
	1959	1960	1959	1960
<u>B. NATO Countries</u>				
Belgium-Luxembourg	2.2	1.9	1.8	2.5
Denmark	4.5	4.3	4.0	3.8
France	3.1	2.5	2.8	3.2
Federal Republic of Germany (1)	6.4	6.7	5.8	6.0
Greece	7.4	12.0	16.5	22.0
Iceland	30.6	22.7	33.7	23.2
Italy	4.6	5.6	4.1	4.7
Netherlands	2.8	2.1	1.6	1.6
Norway	3.5	3.2	4.7	4.4
Turkey	9.6	9.1	11.5	12.2
Portugal	1.0	..	2.1	..
United Kingdom (2)	2.9	3.1	2.1	2.6

(1) Including interzonal trade.

(2) Excluding re-exports.

Source: Economic Bulletin for Europe Vol.11 No. 2 and Vol.12 No. 2  
 and for 1959 and 1960 : OEEC Statistical Bulletins.

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TABLE 3

NATO TRADE WITH THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

IN 1959

(to be circulated later)

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TABLE 4

NATO TRADE WITH THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

IN 1960

(to be circulated later)

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TABLE 5

THE STRUCTURE OF  
OEEC MEMBER COUNTRIES' EXPORTS TO EASTERN COUNTRIES \*  
IN 1959

<u>COMMODITY GROUP</u>	<u>AS % OF TOTAL</u>
Food, beverages & tobacco	10.6
Crude materials	11.0
Mineral fuels	0.1
Oil and fats	1.3
Chemicals	9.9
Manufactured goods	34.5
Machinery and transport equipment	29.0
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	2.8
Miscellaneous	0.8
<u>Total</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Source: OEEC Report (C(60)176) on Trade Relations in  
1959 with Monopoly State Trading Countries.

\* Including China and Yugoslavia.

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TABLE 6

THE STRUCTURE OF  
OEEC MEMBER COUNTRIES' IMPORTS FROM EASTERN COUNTRIES \*  
IN 1959

<u>COMMODITY GROUP</u>	<u>AS % OF TOTAL</u>
Food, beverages & tobacco	26.8
Crude materials	22.9
Mineral fuels	20.6
Oil and fats	0.4
Chemicals	5.8
Manufactured goods	14.8
Machinery and transport equipment	5.3
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	2.9
Miscellaneous	0.5
<u>Total</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Source: OEEC Report (C(60)176) on Trade Relations in 1959 with Monopoly State Trading Countries.

\* Including China and Yugoslavia.

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# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 1145-1 (JIC)  
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

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23 August, 1961.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES, JULY 1961

Attached for your information is a copy of a UK SIS paper on the above subject.

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*R.M. Bourgeois*  
(R.M. Bourgeois)  
Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Acting Secretary.

Att.

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CC: JIS (2)  
SO/JIR  
SO/CI

AUG 24, 1961

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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
No. CSC 9-27 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SECRET

23 August, 1961.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

MODIFICATIONS TO OLDER SURFACE VESSELS  
OF THE USSR, FOR POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT AS  
SURFACE TO AIR GUIDED MISSILE SHIPS

Enclosure: (1) DNI 61-17 dated 17 August, 1961  
on the above subject prepared by  
DNI

The above enclosure is forwarded for information.

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*[Signature]*  
(R.M. Bourgeois)  
Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Acting Secretary.

AUG 24 1961

*[Large handwritten signature]*

Enc.

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cc: JIS (2)  
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SO/CI

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S E C R E T

DNI 61-17

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary JIC

MODIFICATIONS TO OLDER SURFACE VESSELS OF THE USSR,  
FOR POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT AS SURFACE TO AIR GUIDED MISSILE SHIPS

During July of this year, the following warships of the USSR were photographed passing through Danish waters: CHAPAEV cruiser 261, and two SKORY class, numbers 964 and 910.

2. Source stated and photographs illustrate that all ships were equipped with possible missile installations in the after part, with the cruiser, having two, and the destroyers one such installation each.
3. It is noted that except for the possible missile installations on the cruiser that the electronic fittings, are identical with those of the remaining ships of the class, and it is apparent that this is the fifth and final CHAPAEV class to be electronically modernized.
4. With regard to the SKORY destroyers, number 964 electronic installations are identical with those of SKORY 207 (DNI photograph 8 f "S"/61 dated 5-4-61 refers), with this SKORY reported to be the third of the class so modified, and carrying 9 element WATCH DOG tactical intercept, DON radar, forward ASW installations, SLIM NET air warning radar, and two HAWSCREECH blind fire control radars, one either side of the after funnel. In addition, two TOP HAT type domes are carried on the bridge in lieu of the Director which has been removed, and an additional dome configuration is carried on the mainmast. These fittings were also carried in 207 above.
5. SKORY number 910, while being electronically modernized, does not carry the fittings listed in the above paragraph for 964, but is identically fitted as SKORY 524 and 539 (DNI photograph 8 e "S"/60 refers). This modernization was confined to the installations of 660 Mcs IFF transponders and interrogators, HIGH POLE and SQUARE HEAD in the main, pointing to modernization of the class generally.
6. The fittings of 964, indicate a continuation of the specialization of older ships of the USSR for specific tasks, with fitting of additional equipments not previously seen in ships of that class generally.
7. SKORYs 207, 964 (and one other reported by collateral sources) have been modernized in the following respects:
  - (1) Tactical intercept equipments, being fitted with 9 element WATCH DOG equipments
  - (2) Improved navigational capabilities, being fitted with the new DON radar, which DNI had previously stated would possibly replace NEPTUNE in warships, as it was replacing such in merchant vessels.
  - (3) Anti-submarine warfare, by having the new forward ASW equipment fitted.
  - (4) Extended warning of air targets by having SLIM NET installed to replace SEA GULL an older type air warning previously carried on the mainmast.
  - (5) Radar control and tracking of air gunnery and surface to air missiles, by having HAWKSCREECH fitted in the after portion of the ship, which, in the case of 964, is immediately adjacent to the weapon hidden under canvas.
8. It should be noted that LOW SIEVE and POST LAMP radars and bridge Director have been removed from the above ships, being replaced by 9 element WATCH DOGs, DON radar, and TOP HAT type domes. It is therefore apparent that the latter equipments perform the functions of the former, but in a more sophisticated method, with the nine element WATCH DOGs and the TOP HAT type domes requiring firm technical analysis to ascertain their definite functions.

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S E C R E T

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9. While CHAPAEV 261 carries two covered missile configurations and SKORYs 964 and 910 carry one, the electronics in all three ships are dissimilar, indicating that such missile installations are possibly false.

10. SKORY 964 could possibly carry out guidance and tracking with TOP BOW, HAWKSCREECH and/or TOP HAT type dome configurations, while SKORY 910 and CHAPAEV 261 could only employ their TOP BOW, which in both ships appears only on the foremast. It is considered that if indeed a surface to air missile is carried in these ships, radar guidance and tracking, with final infra red homing would be employed.

11. The following photographs, presently being compiled for DNI album and CBCN 6910(1) refer for ships as indicated:

4 d "C"/61 dated 17-8-61 CHAPAEV cruiser number 261  
8 h "S"/61 dated 16-8-61 SKORY number 964  
8 i "S"/61 dated 17-8-61 SKORY number 910.



(R. W. Murdoch)  
Captain, RCN,  
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

O T T A W A,  
17 August, 1961.

S E C R E T

EXCERPT FROM MINUTES OF THE 837TH MEETING  
OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE  
HELD ON AUGUST 9, 1961.

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X. ANNUAL REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES  
IN THE SOVIET NORTH  
(1 JUN 60 - 31 MAY 61)

(CONFIDENTIAL)

14. The A/Secretary informed the Committee that the Deputy Coordinator, Joint Staff had ascertained that there were no objections to the release to SAC of CANADIAN JIC 1281/1 (61) on the above subject.

(CSC 2106-1 (JIC))

ACTION: Secretary

EXCERPT FROM MINUTES OF THE 837TH MEETING  
OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE  
HELD ON AUGUST 9, 1961.

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LH	

VII. SOVIET NAVAL CRUISE TYPE MISSILES

(SECRET)

7. The Committee had for approval CANADIAN JIC 1288 (61) on the above subject.

(CSC 7-17 (JIC), JIR 8-40 of 1 Aug 61)

8. DNI explained that due to divergence of thought between DNI and DAI members of GMIWG (S&T) on the subject of Soviet Naval Cruise Type Missiles, major differences of opinion had been included in the paper as footnotes. Mr. Trotman pointed out that this paper was required as background material for the preparation of CANUS-62 and suggested that the paper be reviewed by the end of September, 1961 in the light of any new evidence which might reconcile some of the conflicting views.

9. After discussion, the Committee:

- (a) amended and approved the paper subject to certain amendments as noted by Lt.-Col. Bourgeois;
- (b) agreed that the paper should be reviewed by 25 September, 1961; and
- (c) authorized the following distribution:

Chiefs of Staff Committee (to note (9))

Mr. J.K. Starnes

DNI

for Maritime Commander Atlantic  
Maritime Commander Pacific

DMI

DAI

DSI

RCMP

JIB

CB NRC

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SO/JIR

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JICLO(W)

for USIB (28)

JICLO(L)

for UK JIC (15)

Chairman, CJS (W)

ACTION: Lt.-Col. Bourgeois  
Secretary.

S E C R E T

file  
by G.S.

Our File: 50028-B-40

55	52
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July 27, 1961

Your File: JIBS 213-2000-1

The Director,  
Joint Intelligence Bureau,  
Defence Research Board,  
Department of National Defence,  
O t t a w a

Attention: Mr. R.L. McGibbon

The Soviet North - Economic Aspects

Thank you very much indeed for the paper on this subject which you enclosed with your letter of July 20. At first glance this appears to be a very fine contribution to our documentation on the Soviet North and those concerned in its preparation should be congratulated.

We have taken up your suggestion and are sending a copy of your paper to our Ambassador in Moscow who, I am sure, will find it of considerable use, as well as the other members of the Embassy. We hope in due course to receive some comments concerning the document which we, in turn, will pass on to you promptly.

(Sgd.) G. K. GRANDE

for Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCERPT FROM 835th MEETING OF THE  
 JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE HELD  
 26 July, 1961

50028-7B-40  
 55-1 Will  
 [Signature]

VIII. ANNUAL REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES  
 IN THE SOVIET NORTH  
 (1 JUN 60 - 31 MAY 61)

(CONFIDENTIAL)

10. The Committee had for approval CANADIAN JIC 1281/1  
 (61) on the above subject.

(CSC 2106-1 (JIC), JIR 2-17-1 of 17 Jul 61)

11. After discussion, the Committee:

- (a) amended and approved the paper subject to certain additional changes to be provided by DNI and JIB;
- (b) requested the Deputy Coordinator, Joint Staff to ascertain if there were any objections to the release of this paper to SAC; and
- (c) authorized the following distribution:

IPC	Copy Nos. 1-13
J.K. Starnes	Copy No. 14
for JIC Australia	Copy Nos. 15-24
DNI	Copy No. 25
for Maritime Commander Atlantic	Copy No. 26
Maritime Commander Pacific	Copy No. 27
DMI	Copy No. 28
DAI	Copy No. 29-30
for Air Defence Command	Copy Nos. 31-33
DSI	Copy No. 34
RCMP	Copy No. 35
JIB	Copy No. 36
CB NRC	Copy Nos. 37-39
for Director,	Copy Nos. 40-42
NSA, Fort George Mead, Md USA	
- CANSLO(W), c/o DIRNSA	Copy No. 43
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- Lt.-Col. G.G. Bell, Cdn Army	Copy No. 47 (48-52
DMI LO, ACS(I), Dept of Army,	for ACOS(I))
Washington	
- CANSLO(L)	Copy No. 53
c/o GCHQ	
- CGHQ Cheltenham (for UK JIC)	Copy Nos. 54-67
- Lt.-Cdr. J.R. Johnston	Copy No. 68
Intelligence Division, Admiralty	
- S/L N. Levitin, RCAF	Copy No. 69
DAI LO, Air Ministry, London	
- Major J.F. Taylor	Copy Nos. 70-71
DMI LO, War Office London	
- Mr. E.A. Cureton,	Copy Nos. 72-73
JIBLO(L) London.	
Chairman, CJS Washington	Copy No. 74
for SACLANT	Copy No. 75
JICLO(W)	Copy No. 76
for USIB	Copy No. 77-104
JICLO(L)	Copy No. 105
NORAD	Copy No. 106
SACEUR	Copy No. 107

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: DNI  
 JIB  
 Lt.-Col. Bourgeois  
 Secretary.

001556

**SECRET**

JIBS 213-2000-1

OUR FILE REF.

**DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE  
DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD**

CANADA

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*Letter sent to A. Smith  
& Acc. to R. Gibbon,  
dtd July 27/61*

OTTAWA, Ontario.  
20 July 1961.

*[Handwritten initials]*

The Under Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
Department of External Affairs,  
East Block,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

JUL 26 1961

*file  
[Handwritten initials]*

50028-B-40
33   50

*[Handwritten initials]*

Attention: George Grande, Esq.  
Defence Liaison (2) Division

The Soviet North - Economic Aspects

I am sending you a copy of our most recent paper on  
the Soviet North - Economic Aspects (JIB(CAN) 16/61 of 30 June 1961).

This paper is a very good "wrap up" of the most up-to-date  
information on economic conditions in the Soviet North. It strikes  
us that it might be a very useful paper to send off to our Embassy  
in Moscow for their use. Officials in Moscow must find themselves  
in need of reliable information on this area, from time to time -  
for questions may have to be answered or comparisons made. In such  
cases, I think they would find this document of help.

If you decide to send the enclosed copy to the Embassy  
in Moscow, we would be grateful for any comments they may wish to  
make.

We have already sent one copy to you for use within the  
Department.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
R. L. McGibbon,  
for Director,  
Joint Intelligence Bureau.

*[Handwritten scribble]*

BEST AVAILABLE COPY DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

①

FM: MOSCOW	DATE	FILE		SECURITY
	18 JUL	50028-B-40		CONFIDENTIAL
	33	✓		
TO: TT OTTAWA	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE		COMCENTRE USE ONLY
		427	DEFERRED FROM LONDON	
INFO: WARSAW PRAGUE BELGRADE	1			
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Ref.: YRTEL D352 OF JUNE 1, OUR DESPATCH 556 OF JUNE 7 AND OURLET 604 OF JUNE 20

Subject: TERRITORIAL REORGANIZATION IN THE USSR

DATED 18 JULY - ON OCCASION OF JULY 4, RECEPTION GIVEN BY AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, U.S.A. ECONOMIC COUNSELLOR HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE PLANNED TERRITORIAL REORGANIZATION IN THE USSR WITH A.N. KOSYGIN, THE FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. YOU WILL RECALL THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME DIFFERENCE OF VIEW IN WESTERN CIRCLES AS TO WHETHER SUCH A REORGANIZATION HAD IN FACT TAKEN PLACE AND THAT WE REPORTED THAT IN OUR OPINION THE NEW TERRITORIAL SCHEME, WHILE IN THE PLANNING STAGES, WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED UNTIL THE XXII PARTY CONGRESS.

2. KOSYGIN'S REMARKS TO U.S.A. COUNSELLOR CONFIRMED THE CORRECTNESS OF OUR INTERPRETATION. HE SAID THAT THE WHOLE SCHEME IS STILL VERY MUCH IN STAGE OF FORMULATION. HE DID NOT INDICATE HOW MANY AREAS WOULD BE CREATED UNDER THE NEW REGIONALIZATION SCHEME BUT IMPLIED THAT THE NUMBER WOULD BE SLIGHTLY INCREASED FROM THE PRESENT THIRTEEN LARGE AREAS. A FINAL DECISION CANNOT BE MADE HE SAID UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK NOW BEING UNDERTAKEN IN TWO PROPOSED AREAS IS COMPLETED SOME TIME BEFORE THE FORTHCOMING

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG. <i>[Signature]</i> NAME: A.P. McLaine/an			(Signed) ARNOLD SMITH SIG. <i>[Signature]</i> NAME: A.C. Smith

CONGRE

3. WHEN QUESTIONED AS TO THE PRECISE FUNCTION AND VALUE OF SUCH A REORGANIZATION KOSYGIN REPEATED MOST OF THE POINTS ELABORATED IN OUR DESPATCH OF JUNE 7. HE CONFIRMED HOWEVER THAT THE COORDINATION AND PLANNING COUNCILS WHICH WILL BE CREATED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE REORGANIZATION WILL BE UNDER THE AEGIS OF GOSECONOMSOVIET, THE LONG TERM PLANNING AGENCY.

4. KOSYGIN REPORTED THAT THE LONG TERM PLANNING CARRIED OUT BY THESE COUNCILS WOULD BE NOT ONLY ON A TWENTY YEAR BASIS BUT ALSO ON A SHORTER TERM BASIS. THIS LATTER FACT MIGHT SUGGEST THAT THE COUNCILS WILL ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REVOLVING FIVE YEAR PLAN SCHEME ORIGINALLY ANNOUNCED BY THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON DECEMBER 24 IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE MEETING OF THE SUPREME SOVIET AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE STATE PLAN FOR 1961.

5. FROM THE FOREGOING IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE NEW TERRITORIAL REORGANIZATION SCHEME HAS NOT AS YET BEEN IMPLEMENTED BUT THAT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IS BEING FOCUSED ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF LONG TERM PLANNING. HOWEVER NO PRECISE INFORMATION IS AS YET AVAILABLE ON THE PRECISE NUMBER OF LARGE ECONOMIC AREAS NOR ON THE EXACT FUNCTIONS OF THE COORDINATION AND PLANNING COUNCILS TO BE CREATED IN EACH AREA.

ARNOLD SMITH.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
REFERENCE SLIP

SECURITY  
SECRET

Ottawa, July 6, 1961

To: Mr. J. Trotman,  
JIS

50020-B-40	
55	-

The documents described below are attached for your information:

1 document dated March 21, 1960

Also referred to:

Bob.  
This is a version of a JIC paper requested by CTS (w). When put up to JIC, it was full of ~~DA~~ ~~with issue for~~ ~~nothing else~~ has happened + CTS (w) has probably forgotten. I suggest we forget, too.

*J.K. Starnes*  
*for*  
*for*

J.K. STARNES

D.L.(2)/R.Middleton/cb

for Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

Ext. 67B (Rev. 2/54)

*M.*  
*2/2/61*

001560

*Mr Dupuis*  
*Concl. w*  
21 March 1960 *js*  
*Dis. 200*  
*9 Jan 61*

UNATTRIBUTED

Address by .....

at .....

*Lu J. T.*

1. It seems that the Soviet government aspires to the maximum extension of its wealth, influence and power consonant with the realities of the world situation. An assessment of what it will judge to be reasonable goals and what methods it will employ to achieve them is complicated by the fact that, although the Soviet Union is more powerful than ever before in its history, there are very real limitations on the use of its power. Soviet aspirations and Soviet military and economic power are guiding considerations but not definitive factors in Soviet foreign policy. They must be weighed in conjunction with a variety of other considerations including the nature of modern war; the problems of extra-territorial political control; the problem of maintaining a communist regime in an evolving society; and the Soviet image of the non-communist states and of their intentions.

2. Current Soviet courses of action are undoubtedly limited by an appreciation of the effects of modern war. It must be clear to the Soviet government that a general war would result in the devastation of the Soviet Union on a scale vastly greater than that suffered during the Second World War. Although such a global war might be resorted to in the most desperate circumstances, it cannot be considered effective as an instrument of policy nor is the Soviet Union likely to carry any of its policies to the point of limited war with its attendant risks of major conflict.

3. At the same time, Soviet possession of a deterrent has opened up new possibilities. The extent to which the Soviet government may be prepared to take bold action under the umbrella of its deterrent is a matter for conjecture. On the other hand it is clear that, with an apparently keen appreciation of the political importance of the fear of nuclear war, it has sought to establish an image of the Soviet Union as the leader in the move toward a ban on nuclear weapons. Khrushchev's disarmament speech to the UN and the unilateral Soviet declaration that the Soviet Union would not be the first to resume nuclear testing contributed to this effort.

4. It has become apparent that the establishment of new communist regimes not effectively under Soviet control may injure Soviet interests by increasing the danger of war with the western powers, by alienating important non-communist countries or by strengthening unduly the influence of non-Soviet communist groupings. Most important in this connection has been the emergence of Communist China as an independent communist country, but the failure to reach a lasting agreement with Yugoslavia and the continuing difficulties with the European satellites have also been significant.

5. Concurrently with its problems in maintaining and expanding Soviet political control abroad, the Soviet government has faced an evolving situation at home. The diminishing political returns of Stalin's policies, the facts of economic life and particularly the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union have brought changes in the social and economic structure which have led the Soviet Government to rely increasingly on incentives.

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There has also been a "return to legality" and a general internal relaxation of tensions. If a situation arose involving greatly increased international tension and requiring a very much larger military programme than could be provided for under the present Seven-Year Plan and stricter internal security, it would be difficult to continue the present economic and social trends.

6. The Soviet image of non-communist states and the effect of non-communist actions on Soviet policy are probably the most difficult to assess of all the relevant factors. Communist doctrine forms the intellectual basis of the Soviet view of the world and a guide to the political actions of the Soviet government, but the particular focus of its view and its interpretation of doctrinal precepts have varied greatly. Communist precepts are interpreted and changed in such a way as to ensure the survival of the Soviet government. Two recent modifications are particularly important. First, it has been stated that violent revolution is no longer an essential step in the creation of a communist state and secondly, the doctrine that war between the communist and capitalist states is inevitable has been abandoned. As a result of genuine achievements in selected fields of endeavour there exists in the Soviet government an apparently genuine confidence in the superiority of the communist system and in its ability to win a "peaceful competition".

7. The Soviet government is probably convinced that the United States will not deliberately initiate war against the Soviet Union within the next few years. At the same time, it must find it difficult to assess the long-term relationship between western military and political authorities and it may well be fearful that ultimately the danger of western preemptive action will become more serious. Even if it judges that the Soviet deterrent will be effective in the long-term, it is probably concerned that the elimination of all communist regimes or at least the maximum erosion of Soviet power is the ultimate western aim. It is doubtless anxious, therefore, to reduce and, if possible, eliminate those problems and weapons which could be destructive of the Soviet system and to place the emphasis in its struggle with the west on fields where its technical achievements, its increasing economic power, its better discipline and its ability to exploit major political issues can be asserted with the minimum of risk.

8. The Soviet government is undoubtedly encouraged in this choice by its consciousness of the difficulties facing the western powers in coordinating their policies and in building the kind of societies and achieving the power to which they aspire. The competition between western trading blocs, the conflict of western national aspirations, labour difficulties and periodic economic depressions limiting western economic growth, and the "over-emphasis" on consumer goods and other problems, partially understood or exaggerated in the Soviet mind, doubtless provide some encouragement. Western alliances with a variety of decadent regimes, the apparently narrow view which the west takes of its interests and the lack of social discipline in western societies must also occasion some optimism. There nevertheless remains a substantial fear in Soviet governing circles of unrestricted contact with western ideas and wealth and, although the government is probably confident of its ability to enforce the necessary restrictions, any relaxation is likely to be closely related to the growing prestige of the Soviet system. The difficulty in determining the appropriate degree of relaxation will be complicated by the partial dependence of the Soviet government, like most totalitarian regimes, upon the existence of an external enemy.

9. Apart from the foregoing considerations many developments throughout the world are to a large extent beyond the control of the Soviet government, or for that matter the control of any major power. Local forces can bring about situations which the Soviet government would wish to avoid but which oblige it to adopt some positive course of action. The Arab-Israeli conflict, the Laotian situation and the Hungarian revolution are examples of spontaneous developments of this kind which have demanded a variety of Soviet reactions.

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10. The degree to which local governments are receptive to Soviet bloc advances varies throughout the world. Receptivity to advances in the cultural, economic and political fields is often reduced by local inertia so that, in spite of Soviet willingness to act, positive achievements are difficult. In other areas where a common objective such as the elimination of western influence exists, Soviet advances are welcomed.

11. In short, the Soviet government must assert its increasing wealth and power in the face of increasingly complex problems. Like the western powers, its first requirement is to avoid a war which would destroy its achievements; its second is to create an atmosphere in which it can freely employ its political and economic strength. Against this background, the decisions it makes and its specific short-term intentions depend to a large extent upon the personality of Khrushchev.

.....

12. The Soviet government has at its disposal substantially the same means of action as the western powers. These include military forces, a diplomatic service and a propaganda machine, as well as the economic and scientific achievements of the state. However, the manner in which the Soviet government has chosen to use these instruments has in the past differed substantially from western practice. Each asset is not employed in isolation from the others. On the contrary, all means of action are closely interrelated as, for example, in Khrushchev's proposal on the diversion to underdeveloped countries of funds made available by disarmament. This proposal has strategic, economic, diplomatic and propaganda implications.

13. In the military field, the Soviet government will probably seek to avoid the overt employment of its forces or those of the European satellites in local situations where there is an inherent danger of conflict with the west. Nevertheless, circumstances could arise in which the Soviet government felt, as a result of western disinterest, indecision or weakness, that it could act with impunity. Alternatively, it might feel forced to act to defend what it considered to be vital interests in a situation where the western powers had either taken or were about to take forceful action.

14. Within bloc territory restraints on the use of Soviet force, although present especially in East Germany, will be far less strong. The Soviet government, while preferring other means, will therefore be prepared to employ the amount of force necessary to maintain pro-Soviet regimes.

15. Limitations on the actual use of force do not in any sense preclude the "political" employment of the Soviet strategic striking force. It is apparent, from statements by Khrushchev and from Soviet propaganda, that the Soviet government is seeking to reinforce the widespread belief that its forces cannot be prevented from virtually destroying western countries in the event of war. It is hopeful that the fear so created can be used to erode public support in North America for a strong and resolute foreign policy, to encourage neutralism and criticism of the United States in Europe and to increase anxiety that the United States will not be prepared to defend its allies at the risk of self-annihilation.

16. In the diplomatic field there are three approaches open to the Soviet government - conferences at the summit, public debate and traditional diplomacy. We expect that, as in the past, all three approaches will be carefully coordinated in an effort to further Soviet aims. It is apparent, however, that direct negotiation between political leaders is currently most attractive to Khrushchev. Summit conferences have obvious advantages from his point of view.

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Apart from offering increased possibilities of genuine progress, they enhance his personal position; they are easier to control since they involve no delegation of authority; they eliminate "obstructive" elements at lower levels; and they offer greater opportunities to make propaganda gains and to place the blame for failure on the west. Public diplomacy, particularly in the United Nations, offers the Soviet government the opportunity to project the desired image of itself, to marshal neutral forces behind particular Soviet positions and to develop situations which will embarrass the west. Khrushchev will also probably continue to speak freely to unofficial western visitors, as a supplementary means of publicizing Soviet "reasonableness" without any obligation to act. Traditional diplomacy is likely to be used primarily in a supporting role, in concluding agreements on marginal or highly technical problems and in supplementing the general line of Soviet foreign policy.

17. The propaganda apparatus of the Soviet government differs radically from the information services of western countries. Whereas western facilities are largely restricted to projecting a favourable image of the west and to the objective reporting of foreign news, Soviet propaganda is designed to achieve specific political results. For example propaganda recently beamed to Iran has been designed to discredit and embarrass the Shah's regime to the point where the Iranian government would be obliged to make political concessions in order to escape further attack. There are numerous other examples which lead us to expect this kind of action to continue.

18. Propaganda is used both strategically, in pursuance of broad objectives, and tactically, to achieve limited local results. It is therefore not necessarily consistent in detail, although anomalies are carefully confined to the particular languages and areas in which they are intended to be effective.

19. It is also used defensively to reduce the effect of western statements and to modify the impact of embarrassing Soviet actions. This defensive aspect includes the jamming of western broadcasts, the control of travel and restrictions on foreign correspondents. The current "softness" of Soviet propaganda in support of the co-existence lines is consistent with past Soviet use of this instrument and is not evidence of a fundamental change in its role.

20. While the Soviet Union, like any great power, is seeking to extend its influence through the employment of its economic assets, its foreign economic policy cannot be correctly described exclusively in terms of "economic penetration" or as "a Soviet economic offensive". The Soviet government probably considers that, for the present, the extension of its foreign trade and aid programmes carries the possibility of long-term and general rather than specific political advantages. These long-term advantages may even be pursued while communist influence is contracting, an outstanding example being the United Arab Republic where Soviet aid has been accompanied by the virtual elimination of communist influence. With the notable exceptions of Finland and Yugoslavia, the Soviet government has appeared to carefully avoid the application of political pressures through its economic policies. At the same time the potential for future political pressures is being built up, in countries such as Afghanistan.

21. Nevertheless, the Soviet government obviously attaches considerable importance to the extension of its trade and aid programmes. In doing so, it possesses a number of substantial advantages over the west which derive from its totalitarian political system. It can provide cheap, long-term credits;

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- 5 -

it can buy agricultural surplus; and it can mobilize its best talent in support of its efforts. It also suffers from a number of disadvantages including the lack of receptivity to Soviet offers in some countries. However, it has rapidly expanded its economic relations with western countries, both industrialized as well as underdeveloped, since 1953 and appears intent that this trend shall continue.

22. In the current phase of Soviet policy, foreign economic activity coupled with a great effort in the domestic economy will be one of the principal means by which the Soviet government will seek to extend its influence and to project a favourable image of itself. Khrushchev's references to the possible diversion to under-developed areas of funds made available through disarmament and the Soviet decision to finance the second stage of the Aswan dam indicate the importance attached to this aspect of policy.

23. Although scientific achievements are not usually regarded as a direct instrument of government, the Soviet government is keenly aware of the political advantages accruing from leadership in science. Apart from the propaganda advantages of outstanding scientific achievements, the establishment of Moscow as the centre of world science would obviously increase Soviet influence throughout the world. The Soviet government will probably make great efforts, particularly in the field of space exploration and geophysics, but also in other applied and fundamental sciences.

24. In summary, the attitude of the Soviet government toward the use of its assets will be governed by relatively narrow, but not necessarily short-term, national considerations. Any changes will therefore be dependent upon its assessment of the usefulness, in terms of Soviet interests, of new methods versus old.



# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
CSC 7-17 (JIC)  
NO. CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

<u>SECRET</u>	
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*→*

4 July, 1961.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SOVIET DEFENCE POLICY IN THE PERIOD UP TO 1970

Reference: (a) Minutes of the 828th meeting of the  
JIC - Item VIII

The following letter dated 14 June, 1961 from the Chairman, UK JIC Mr. J.K. Starnes is forwarded for your information, JUL 7 1961.

"Many thanks indeed for your letter reference CSC 7-17 (JIC) CSC 1824-1 (JIC) of the 8th June commenting on our paper on Soviet Defence Policy in the period after 1970. We were very glad indeed to have your comments."

*Jill*  
*AB*

(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: JIS (2)  
SO/JIR  
SO/CI



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
NO. CSC 9-27 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

RESTRICTED  
(Enclosure SECRET)

28 June, 1961.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT - SOVIET TRAWLER  
RIDULA AND SOVIET TUG RAMBINAS

Enclosure: (1) Merchant Ship Intelligence Report -  
Soviet Trawler RIDULA and Soviet Tug RAMBINAS.

The above enclosure is forwarded for information.

JUN 30 1961

2. Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of circulation the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs.

DNI  
JIB



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
NO. CC 1747-1 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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26 June, 1961.

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→ J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs

- DNI
- DAI
- RCMP
- JIB
- CB NRC

SOVIET BLOC MEMBERSHIP  
INDEX AND DECODES

JUN 27 1961.

Reference is made to memorandum on this file dated 19 December, 1960 on this subject.

2. Enclosed are copies of SACLANT Serial 1182/5 (60) dated 15 June, 1961. The attention of members is invited to paragraph 3. Any amendments to this publication should be forwarded to the Secretary as they become necessary.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc : DMI (no enclosure)  
DSI " "



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
No. CSC 9-27 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SECRET

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16 June, 1961.

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*33 SW*

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CB NRC

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*Owd*

### MERCHANT SHIP INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

- References:
- (a) CSC 9-27 (JIC) dated 5 May, 1961
  - (b) CSC 9-27 (JIC) dated 9 May, 1961
  - (c) CSC 9-27 (JIC) dated 16 May, 1961
  - (d) CSC 9-27 (JIC) dated 23 May, 1961.

*file*  
*Owd*

- Enclosures:
- (1) Stores Purchase List - Magnitogorsk
  - (2) Stores Purchase List - Emelian Pugachev
  - (3) Stores Purchase List - Djurma
  - (4) Stores Purchase List - Novorissisk.

JUN 21 1961

The above enclosures are forwarded for information.

*E.A. Blais*  
\* (E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

RMB/2-5459/1c

cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs.

DNI  
JIB



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
NO. CSC 9-27 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

**RESTRICTED**  
(Enclosure **SECRET**)

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12 June, 1961.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT - SOVIET TANKER  
SIGUIDA

*file*  
*aw*

Enclosure: (1) Merchant Ship Intelligence Report -  
Soviet tanker SIGUIDA

JUN 15 1961

The above enclosure is forwarded for information.

2. Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of circulation the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.

*R. A. Blais*  
(R.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: *[Handwritten mark]* J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs.

DNI  
JIB

*file  
(over)*

S E C R E T

JIB BRIEF NO: 43

COPY NO: 3 OF: 19

12 June 1961.

INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

50028-B-10  
141

PREPARED FOR: JIC

BY: JIB

SUBJECT: The Soviet Union Pledges Long-Term Aid to East Germany.

SOURCE: Press and Various

DATELINE OF REPORT: June 1961.

1. On 30 May, 1961 the Soviet Union and East Germany signed a long-term economic agreement for the period 1962-1965, providing for further co-ordination in industrial production, for deliveries of essential raw materials and machinery in addition to those stipulated in the current five-year trade agreement, and for a Soviet long-term credit of over two billion Deutsch Marks, approximately \$500 million at the official rate of exchange normally used for such transactions. Increased Soviet deliveries will include complete installations for the metallurgical, power and chemical industries; non-ferrous metals; rolling mill products; chemicals; and machine tools.

2. The \$500 million credit is the largest ever granted by the Soviet Union to any country. Since 1945 the USSR has provided, exclusive of the latest credit, economic development aid to East Germany amounting to some \$878 million, about \$664 million of which has been for commodity deliveries and economic development, and \$214 million in the form of foreign exchange. Although the form of this new credit, which East Germany is not required to repay until 1965, is not known as yet, the East German announcement implies that it is an additional credit to finance purchases of commodities. Alternatively, it may be in the form of a deferment of repayments due on previous Soviet credits. In either case the credit constitutes substantial aid and should make it possible for East Germany to adhere more closely to its original goals for investment, which were cut back last year.

3. The long term credit and trade agreements are the result of more than six months of effort by East Germany to obtain Soviet aid in carrying out its long-term economic plan, and to free itself of its substantial degree of dependence on West German trade. Since last September the head of the East German State Planning Commission has made four trips to Moscow to discuss economic matters. The first of these was in October 1960, as the result of the West German threat to cancel the interzonal trade agreement on 31 December 1960, in retaliation for East Germany's infringements of traffic guarantees in West Berlin. The move was averted and the trade agreement renewed when the threat of a West German and possibly a Nato embargo on trade with East Germany, in the absence of any immediate large-scale aid from the Soviet Union, forced East Germany to renew its guarantees of non-interference with allied access to Berlin.

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4. Many of the additional goods to be supplied by the Soviet Union, as provided for in the trade agreement, are of priority importance in East Germany's investment and industrial programme, and would considerably lessen East Germany's dependence on imports from West Germany. East Germany has relied heavily on imports of steel products and raw materials for its iron and steel industry from West Germany, which ranks second only to the Soviet Union as a supplier of these commodities, and upon imports for its chemical and other heavy industry. In 1959 West Germany supplied 21 per cent of East Germany's imports of rolled steel; 73 per cent of its imports of coking coal; and 14 per cent of its imports of metallurgical coke. West Germany is by far East Germany's most important trading partner in the Free World, is second only to the Soviet Union in East Germany's total trade, and in 1959 provided more than 11 per cent of East Germany's total imports and a little less than 11 per cent of its total exports.

5. The long-term trade and aid agreement should alleviate East Germany's economic difficulties to a substantial degree, and re-affirm continuing close Soviet interest in the viability of East Germany's economy. The assurance of large-scale supplies of goods for its key industries from the Soviet Union in the event of any interruption of intra-German trade will render East Germany less vulnerable to any imposition of economic sanctions by West Germany or the Western nations.

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# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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### INTELLIGENCE REPORT - SOVIET TANKER VYRU

Enclosure : (1) Merchant Ship Intelligence Report -  
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*Handwritten signature: E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
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# Department of National Defence

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### INTELLIGENCE REPORT - SOVIET TRAWLERS SRT 710 AND SRT 711

Enclosure: (1) Merchant Ship Intelligence Report -  
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*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/ep

cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs.  
DNI  
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June 7, 1961.

Our File: 50028-B-40

Mr. R.B. Curry,  
Director, Emergency Measures Organization,  
Privy Council Office,  
East Block,  
Ottawa.

*See Mr. J. May v6*

Dear Mr. Curry,

You will recall that I wrote to you on April 5 concerning the United Kingdom paper "Soviet and Satellite Emergency and Civil Defence Planning" which I had received from the United Kingdom Joint Intelligence Committee. At that time I regretfully had to inform you that the summary of the paper which you had prepared could not be distributed to the provincial and municipal authorities as requested by you and indeed that it would have to be destroyed. You were kind enough to acknowledge my letter and to agree to do this.

It later occurred to us that it might be possible to produce an unclassified version of the paper in question which, because its contents were corroborated from other sources, could be retained by you and circulated to the provincial and municipal authorities concerned with civil defence in Canada. Our Joint Intelligence Bureau accordingly drafted the attached statement which we hope will be of some use to you. Please do not hesitate to let me know if we can assist you further either in interpreting this document or in any other way.

Yours sincerely,

**John Starnes**

J.K. Starnes



# Department of National Defence Army

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OTTAWA, 7 Jun 61

*Handwritten initials: JS*

Department of External Affairs,  
Defence Liaison (2) Division,  
Room 247, East Block,  
OTTAWA, Ontario.

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Political Studies  
Foreign Policy of the USSR

- Attached is a translation of a paper in two parts, presented to the French Air Force Staff College on foreign policy of the USSR, for your retention.
- It is felt that this paper may be of some use to External Affairs when called upon to present similar papers.

*Mr. [Name] has to see  
file  
OWD.*

*J. R. Hogarth*  
(RE Hogarth)  
Colonel

Director of Military Intelligence

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C.E.S.A.

ECOLE SUPERIEURE DE GUERRE AERIENNE  
(FRENCH AIR FORCE STAFF COLLEGE)

18TH GRADUATING CLASS

YEAR 1959-1960

POLITICAL STUDIES

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE U.S.S.R. (1)

5301

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Mr Jean LALOY, European Director,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

10 November, 1959.

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1st Lecture

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE U.S.S.R.

The main question when we talk about Soviet foreign policy is to find out whether we are facing the traditional policy of a very great State, with its advantages and disadvantages, or whether we are facing something different.

For, if we are facing something traditional, this involves a certain number of difficulties which we know. Very powerful States are troublesome and hard to handle, because they lack flexibility, but in the final analysis, they have been in existence for a long time. If, on the other hand, we are facing something different, we are then confronted with a problem where the conventional classifications are difficult to apply. We are confronted with something new, with a discovery.

This question is illustrated by two practical examples.

In October-November, 1939, when the Soviet Union is negotiating with Finland in order to rectify the Finnish borders and thereby assure the security of Leningrad, STALIN says in substance to the Finnish statesmen: "I am not asking for anything very unusual, I am asking for what Pierre LEGRAND asked for in the past." STALIN places himself in a strictly traditional national Russian perspective. At the same time, he is preparing another policy, that which appears in December, 1939, when the Russians invade Finland, which has refused the territorial concessions demanded. At this moment, there appears behind the Soviet lines a Finnish Communist government, which announces that it is going to replace the legal Government of Finland and to establish Communism in Finland. Thus, concealed under the traditional aspect of the borders of Pierre LEGRAND there was a revolutionary aspect, the creation of a Finnish Communist government.

Similarly in 1943-45, when STALIN discusses the problem of Poland with ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL, he asks for a border, the border which he succeeded in obtaining from HITLER in 1939, passing through the Brest-Litovsk line. To support this border claim, he goes back to the reasoning outlined a few moments back: "I am not asking for anything new, he explains, I am merely asking for what CLEMENCEAU and Lord CURZON recognized as the border of Russia in 1919. Consequently I am in agreement with the more traditional and reactionary of statesmen, and I see no reason why you would refuse me this border." This line of reasoning is largely effective. At the same time, STALIN is preparing in the Soviet Union and sets up in Poland a National Committee of Liberation, formed by Polish Communists who follow the Soviet Army and establish themselves in Poland, setting up a Communist-inspired government, which will gradually take control of the whole country. Therefore we have on two occasions an extremely concrete picture of the problem raised. The form of Soviet policy often appears to be traditional, while the content of Soviet policy appears no less frequently to be ideological, in essence.

In this respect, we have to guard against a double error. The first error consists in saying that the Soviet leaders act only in terms of Marx's, in terms of the class war in the various countries. The second error would be to

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say that all of this ideology is only a pretext, that the Soviet leaders cover themselves with doctrinary formulae, but engage in nothing other than the policy of the Tsars. How are we to solve the problem? Where does the truth lie? To begin with, let us endeavour, in a first part, to isolate and explain two sorts of phenomena.

1) What is the deep-seated inspiration of the Soviet State, how does the Soviet State see itself in the world, what place does it assume for itself? If we compare the Soviet State to a ship, how it is built, what is its power, what is its capacity for movement?

2) How does this bloc, this ship act? What is its general strategy?

The characteristic feature of Soviet foreign policy, when we look at it, is that it cannot be compared to the policy of our countries.

In the Western countries, foreign policy is most often the function of diplomats, a class of men generally regarded as crafty, sometimes well brought-up and generally insignificant but whose business it is to conclude treaties. The negotiator tries, with more or less intelligence, to adapt to the situation of his opposite number. If things go well, they conclude a treaty. What happens once this treaty is made? They take a rest, offer each other mutual congratulations on their great merit, and exchange decorations. Their role is to adjust the relationships between the States in a general perspective of stability. This has been the conventional diplomacy since MACHIAVELLI. With greater or lesser degrees of astuteness, good fortune and power, the trick consists of trying not to trouble others too much, so that they in turn will not trouble you too much. It is a policy conceived within a universal Republic of States, some being monarchic, others republican, but all united by certain common principles.

Diplomacy is a minor element in Soviet policy, and Soviet diplomats have a relatively ~~xxx~~ secondary role to play. I do not mean by this that Western diplomats play a very important role. I merely point out that Soviet diplomats play a minor role, for diplomacy is only one aspect of the permanent, ceaseless activity which the Soviet Union exerts on the world. The Soviet Union acts by all sorts of means. It acts through power, by so-called subversive activity, through propaganda, through the economy, and there is little room for diplomacy in all this, that is, for discussion and negotiation. This is not the essential part of Soviet foreign policy, for Soviet foreign policy is the application to the outside world of the internal movement which animates the Soviet State itself.

How, therefore, does the Soviet State see itself? It sees itself as fundamentally different from the others, that has been its main characteristic to date. None of us knows whether this will last forever. It is not certain that this will last forever. After all, under the French Revolution, the Republic also saw itself as being basically different from the ancient monarchies which it was fighting, and it was gradually discovered that the difference was less basic than had been believed, and we finally wound up with a system of constitutional monarchy or democracy. However, in the question which concerns us, we must admit that the Soviet State considers itself as fundamentally different from the rest. The characteristic phenomenon of the Soviet State up to the present time is intolerance. This appears right at the outset. In the constitution of 1923, the Soviet Union

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is defined as the camp of Peace, you can see that the camp of peace has had a long existence, the camp where there is equality among nations, fraternal collaboration, mutual respect, just about all the positive values, and opposing it there is the camp of imperialism, wherein hatred, inequality, exploitation and chauvinism reign. The world is presented in black and white: on the one side, universal hope, and on the other, the outcasts of history. This powerful conception is the one which justifies the entire structure of the Soviet State. Why is there only one party? Why is there, at the top of the single party a very limited group of men, and generally a single man, holding in his hands all of the machinery of power in the U.S.S.R.? It is because this party and this State consider themselves to be engaged in a struggle, the party claiming to represent the working class is the expression of this struggle, and at the top of the party, the man leading it has full powers to carry on the struggle. It is a military concept. Soviet policy is a never-ending war. Intolerance is maintained through all the phases of Soviet policy. For example, during the 1941-45 war, the Soviet Union happens to be the Ally of the Americans, the English and also of other countries such as France, but it is not an Ally like the others. It is in the alliance, but not of the alliance. Within the alliance, it pursues its own private aims. This is evident in all the activities of the Soviet Union up to our time. In 1954, after the death of STALIN, when a textbook was published on Political Economy, this text contained the idea that the world is divided up into two camps, and that one of the two, the socialist camp, is constantly growing, while the other is constantly diminishing. This phenomenon of intolerance is fed by success. The more successes the Soviet leaders feel they are having, the more they tend to feel justified in their feeling of power and in the feeling that they have a unique character. For the doctrine claims that when it is all over, socialism will extend over the whole world. It has already flowed well beyond the Soviet borders since 1945. In the eyes of the leaders, this overflow, or this progress justifies their acts, whether just or unjust. They feel that they are right. Marxist (Leninist) doctrine, reduced to its most elementary essence, tells them that they are the force driving the development of humanity towards socialism, whereas we, for our failure to understand the direction of this history, are doomed to disappear.

In a society like Soviet society, which is of the modern industrial type, we may hope that the development of production (and therefore of consumption), the differentiation of standards of living, the whole set of phenomena involved in industrialization will bring about a relativity in the Soviet concept. In reality, this has not occurred to date with the Soviet leaders, just because they have had great success, and these successes have fed their deep-rooted intolerance.

The second characteristic, to which I referred a while back, is that of constant militancy. As I said a while back, in our world, we act in stages. I recall that after the 1918 war, we made peace at Versailles, then everyone wanted to return home. In fact, it was not possible to return home, because there were a great many difficulties, as everyone knows. But the ideal of politicians after 1918 was for everyone to be able to pick up where he left off.

This is not the case in the Bolshevik system. There is always some action in progress, there are even long-term preparations for action, which we generally do not discover until very late. I take as an example for current phenomena

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the policy with respect to the African and Asiatic areas, which has been developing for nearly ten years, if not longer, and whose first effects we are just now noticing. The scholarships, the training of officials intended for these countries, the universities in the Soviet Union in which the most foreign languages of Africa are taught to enable Russian technicians, speaking these tongues, to make direct contact with the most backward peoples of Africa, all of this is a very long-term preparation for an action which will only come to the surface at a certain moment and which moreover is now coming to the surface, but where the Western nations usually allow themselves to be taken by surprise, because they do not have the same conception of historical movement, they do not have the same desire at all times to change everything.

This militancy, a phenomenon which is not as specific as the other, but which is nevertheless very important, also arises out of the idea which the Soviets have of themselves. In the idea which LENIN has of Marxism, the notion of constant and concrete action is primary. I believe that it comes from two sources. The first source is Marxism itself, whose nature is to transform. In Marxism, the human mind only gains knowledge of nature by transforming it. It does not observe, it acts, it produces.

Furthermore, the Russian revolutionaries were professional revolutionaries, that is, they were people who were entirely devoted to revolutionary activity, and having nothing else to do, they always acted out of a single aim. All this has been transposed in the Soviet concept of foreign and domestic policy, and appears in the form of constant militancy. One of the forms of this militancy is action on public opinion.

I believe that it was the Soviets who first discovered how to make use of currents of public opinion in foreign policy. Naturally, we also tried, and our forebears also tried to use public opinion. We sought to finance newspapers, or to publish brochures, but the effort was limited and only reached a thin layer of the society under consideration.

For the Soviets, action on public opinion is action on the deep masses of a country. These masses, handled by Soviet propaganda, act upon their Government, which is gradually compelled to take the direction desired by the USSR. This action is all the more powerful in that the USSR enjoys superiority over us. It can act in our countries. We can do nothing in the USSR.

Just look at the trip of Mr Khrushchev to the United States in September, 1959, and the veritable thunder of propaganda with which the American press accompanied him. This was absolutely free and did not cost Mr Khrushchev a cent. In this way he had the best means of influencing American public opinion that one could imagine. What will happen when Mr Eisenhower goes to the USSR in June, 1960? He will make a speech on television which will be very important, which will have an influence on many people, since he will be listened to and looked at by 2 or 3 or perhaps by 10 million people. Some of his speeches will be reproduced in the newspapers. But that will be all. On the other hand, the Soviet State propaganda machinery will give the Soviet people the required conditioning so that these elements of novelty will be counter-balanced by a certain number of orders, repeated and hammered indefinitely to the farthest workshop in the remotest factory, to the remotest kolkhoze. Similarly, our radio does not reach Soviet ears, for it is jammed in most cases, our newspapers do not get in, and few of our books are allowed in. In this field of militancy, of ideological struggle, the picture to bear in mind is that of the Soviet Union, like a high citadel overlooking the

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plain in which we are more or less assembled, generally speaking our armies are not very well assembled, I mean the ideological armies, there is a good deal of disorder, and the man in the citadel dominates all that and acts on it, and we only make a weak reply, for we are in a basic position of inferiority.

These two elements of intolerance and militancy are corrected by a third element which is none the less important, none the less derived from Marxism and not always clearly perceived, an element which we may call by the name of rationality. This great passionate and violent movement of intolerance and militancy is corrected to a certain extent by a rational phenomenon which is also largely derived from Marxism in its positive form. What is positive in Marxism is precisely a philosophical reflection in the Western manner. This type of thought was introduced into ~~the~~ Russia, where rationalism had not developed to the same extent as in the West. It brought on this phenomenon which is characteristic of our societies, reflection, calculation, analysis, reduction of events to an intelligible structure.

In foreign policy, this is translated by the fact that the Soviets generally do not underrate their adversary. They know how to assess him for what he is. They do not have the Hitlerian concept of the adversary, which is pure nihilism: to destroy that which displeases you. They have a concrete sense of the economic, ideological, military and political strength or weakness of the adversary. This is expressed by the successive curves, the sinusoid of Soviet policy between periods of toughness and periods of relative flexibility. Soviet foreign policy is modified or adapted in accordance with the assessment which the Soviet leaders make of the foreign countries.

The classic example is that period commencing in 1925 and known as the period of peaceful co-existence.

In 1925, after the first revolutionary uprisings, the Soviets, that is STALIN, for he started coming into power in 1924, took some time for thought. After an economic and political analysis, they discovered that the so-called capitalism, or society of the liberal type, had become stabilized, and that in consequence a world-wide revolution could not be expected within a short time. They came to the conclusion that it was necessary to enter upon a phase of peaceful co-existence. In the final analysis, this phase lasted for quite a long time, since it went on until 1939, with highs and lows and many modifications. The interesting feature to bear in mind in all this is that it is this characteristic of rationality on which we can act. Depending on what we do, in the deepest meaning of the term, that is, depending on what practical, concrete or moral values our society secretes, we can indirectly influence the idea which the Soviets create for themselves of the movement of their State in the world. Naturally, we cannot influence it as they do by acting on the masses, because there is no French party or American party in the Soviet Union, but we can nevertheless act on the leaders, who generally speaking, up to the present, have not been devoid of this capacity for rational analysis. STALIN had nothing in common with a romantic revolutionary, nor was he an anarchist of the year 1848; he was a crafty, calculating, cautious and distrustful man, and all of these qualities (or defects, if you will) are intellectual or rational characteristics. With STALIN, we had a policy which changed frequently, depending on how the world progressed.

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angles.

These therefore are the three/from which we can try to pin down the Soviet phenomenon as such: intolerance, militancy, rationality. If we consider it as a motionless mountain, we have missed, for it is difficult to pin down anything that vast, but now we have it at least roughly staked out. These are the three points within which we can try to describe this circle.

All that remains to be done to obtain a more concrete idea of this phenomenon is to examine where it fits into the historical movement, how it acts in the historical movement and what STALIN's peculiar influence was in this historical movement.

To do this, I believe we may take the words of STALIN himself, in a 1924 document "The problems of Leninism". There was a quarrel at that time in the Soviet Union, between TROTSKI and STALIN. STALIN defined for the first time the idea of Socialism in a single country. TROTSKI was the theorist of permanent revolution.

In the course of this dispute, which was mainly a struggle for power, STALIN was led to make his thinking clear. This is what he wrote at that time on the role of the USSR in the world.

"A new factor has appeared in historical development: the immense Soviet Union, situated between the West and the East, between the centre of financial exploitation and the area of colonial domination. The Soviet Union, which, by the mere fact of its existence, revolutionizes the entire world."

What does this mean? It means that the Soviet Union is the hinge between two worlds; it is a geographical location, of fact, and which, unfortunately, we can do nothing about. It lies astride Europe and Asia. Asia is the area of colonial domination, particularly in 1924. Europe is the so-called great capitalistic system of monopolies.

However, what is important is the idea that through internal strengthening, the Soviet Union revolutionizes the universe. The more powerful the centre is, the better it will be able to act on the two outside zones, and finally win out once this action is sufficiently effective. In other words, as early as that STALIN (faithful to the teaching of LENIN, who had said in statements that were famous in 1923: "The fate of the Russian revolution depends in the final analysis on India and China, and whether or not those two countries will be caught up in the revolutionary movement.").

Well, STALIN feels that it will first be necessary to strengthen the Soviet Union as much as possible, that is, build up a heavy industry and an Army, and collectivize the farms in order to do so, to have the required agricultural resources. Furthermore, he is thinking of a system in which, instead of being subjected to the uprisings of this or that revolution occurring in one country or another through the play of social forces, it would be advisable to control the whole worldwide Communist movement. And his whole work consists of creating a tremendous force in the centre, a tremendous power which takes control of all world Communist movements, which he subjects to absolute dictatorship, and we finally arrive at the idea of the revolution from above. While Trotski was thinking - and while many Soviet Bolshevik militants were thinking - of a revolution arising out of the populace, STALIN gradually, and perhaps without fully realising it, ended up with the idea of revolution directed by the

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Soviet Government, by the Soviet Communist Party, that is, by STALIN himself.

In a small publication devoted to the problems of linguistics, STALIN made it clear in 1950 that the revolution "from above" is that which is carried out by military power and the power of the intelligence services. Accordingly, he left little doubt as to the nature of the action he was conducting.

Socialism in a single country is not therefore the abandonment of the revolutionary idea under the control of an organization founded on power. What is the result of this? The result is that the objective is always worldwide, but that since progress towards this objective is always controlled by a firm grip, it is a slow progress. And if STALIN advances towards the ultimate aim, which remains on the horizon, and which is the triumph of socialism in the world, he advances carefully, cautiously, prudently, striving to maintain control at all times.

During all of the Stalin period, we are faced with an ambiguous phenomenon. There is a certain drive with a universal tendency, but at the same time there is an element of holding back, of control, of slowing down, which means that the Soviet Union starts by acting to defend itself, and acts to advance only with a measure of caution.

This is approximately the theory we have to establish before we go into some analysis of the facts.

We can distinguish two broad periods, one extending from 1917 to 1939 and the other commencing with the war and ending with the death of the 'Father of the People'.

The first period itself may be divided into two. From 1917 to 1927, elements of revolutionary expansion, which exist in Soviet policy; starting in 1925-27, the period of peaceful co-existence, stabilization and the withdrawal of the Soviet Union to itself, which extends to 1939.

The first phase extends from 1917 to 1927 (from 1917 to 1924 for Europe and from 1917 to 1927 for Asia). The difficulty arises from the fact that first, the periods overlap, and second, the countries are not all included in the same chronological sectors). From 1917 to 1924 for Europe, this is quite clear: during the whole period 1918-1920 there were a series of attempted Putschs in Germany, not only in Berlin, but even as far away as Bavaria, where a Soviet Bavarian Republic was to be created briefly in 1919. Similarly in Hungary, the Communist regime lasted for a few months in 1920. Finally, there were coups d'Etat and uprisings in Bulgaria in 1923 and in the Baltic countries, in Estonia, in 1924.

At that time, Soviet policy was conceived as giving assistance to the revolutionary forces of the West so that a worldwide revolution would break out. You can see just how different a period we are in. The Leninist idea is that if a revolution breaks out in Germany, it will invade the whole world, an idea which would no longer be acceptable today.

Also under this heading we can classify the war of Poland in 1920, in which the Russians seek, by driving back the Poles, to lend a hand to the German revolution, and thereby to achieve worldwide revolution.

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This fails completely, due to the fact that the proletariat, or working class in the Western countries does not have the revolutionary enthusiasm which Lenin imagined it had. Neither in Germany, nor in the Balkans, nor in France, nor in Italy, where troubles are very considerable during this period, does any proletarian revolution occur. Lenin dies in January, 1924. His famous prophesy to the effect that the revolution depends on the entry of India and China into the great revolutionary current, a prophesy made at the end of 1923, is in the main a disillusioned judgment on European events and an effort to find some consolation for a failure. This did not prevent this prophesy from having a tremendous influence, both on minds in the Soviet Union and on the world, because this is in fact what later occurred. But at that time, when the already ailing Lenin tried to reassure his followers who were beginning to have doubts, he told them that while they had failed in Europe, they could still succeed, for the undeveloped masses of Asia would finally rally to their cause.

This prophesy was to be the object of a second attempt at a revolution from below, of a revolution by the direct action of the masses, and that is the Chinese experiment from 1923 to 1927.

From 1923 to 1927, the Chinese Communist Party, which was associated with the Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang, tried to carry out a policy tending to revolutionize China progressively and to detach China from the Western world. It is in fact a good idea to bear in mind that at that time ~~General~~ Marshal Chang-Kai-Shek, supported by the USSR, was considered by the West as a formidable enemy.

This policy also failed, for the time came when Marshal Chang-Kai-Shek decided to get rid of the Communists. It was the coup d'Etat of Shanghai in April, 1927, which marked the definite failure of this policy of revolutionary expansion, a failure which was to provoke violent repercussions in the USSR. This failure was at the origin of the final break between STALIN and TROTSKI, the exile of TROTSKI and the complete triumph of Stalinism in the Soviet Union commencing in 1928. STALIN, secretly furious at having been wrong, for he had been counting on the agreement between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists for a long time, became increasingly pitiless towards his foes. One of the reasons for his fierce and increasingly terrible dictatorship lies in this error and this disillusionment.

In any event, it was after this period, when the Soviet Union experienced the danger of an action conducted in liaison with foreign movements which were often uncontrolled and at times difficult to control, there was a withdrawal. This withdrawal, this peaceful co-existence was used ~~by~~ by STALIN to strengthen the Soviet Union in three areas: industry, agriculture, Army.

The first Five-Year Plan for industry was proclaimed in 1928 and in force in 1929. In agriculture, compulsory collective farming started in 1930 and was implemented with pitiless force. STALIN, talking to CHURCHILL in Moscow in August, 1942, one evening when Churchill and Stalin, tired of arguing, were recalling memories of their lives, STALIN confided to Churchill, the latter states in his Memoirs, that the struggle against the peasants was tougher for him than the worst moments of the war against the Germans.

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This merciless policy which threw Russia into confusion from 1929 to 1933 nevertheless provided Stalin with the basis for an industrial establishment. Soviet industry was financed by the compulsory rent imposed on the peasants, grouped in collective organizations and producing at extremely low cost. The State resold the proceeds to the peasants at extremely high prices. The difference between the two made possible the accumulation of the capital required for industrial investments. That is the Soviet recipe for industrial development. It is no less merciless than the recipe of capitalism in Manchester in the 1850's.

During this period, Stalin finally discovers the need for a powerful military force. It is the period when the Soviet Army, which is by nature equalitarian and revolutionary, in which the officers have no titles and scarcely any ranks, once again becomes an Army divided into grades. The restoration of discipline and of numerous privileges in favour of the officers gradually reestablishes a powerful and massive military force.

During this time, the URSS follows the conventional foreign policy of division of the outside world. It is a matter of preventing the outside world, that is Europe, and later on America and Japan, from uniting against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union considers itself to be an island, isolated in a capitalistic universe. To prevent this universe from joining hands against her, she divides it, by leaning on the weakest.

In a first period, The Soviet Union leans on Germany; this is the period extending from 1922-23, and particularly after 24-25, treaty of neutrality between Germany and the Soviet Union, to 1933. During this period, the Soviet Union considers that the main enemy in the universe is France. This once again shows the shift in comparison to the present time. In 1930, Stalin declares that "of all the militarist and imperialist States, the most militarist and imperialist is France". This is the period when French policy with respect to Germany, and French policy in Europe in general is considered by Stalin as the firmest policy, and therefore the most opposed to his own policy, which is a policy of support to Germany to break down the structure of the Treaty of Versailles. Why break up the Treaty of Versailles? To restore mobility in Europe and ~~xxx~~ recreate trouble zones from which new progress can come for the USSR.

After 1931-32, Stalin having some slight weaknesses despite his genial character, failed to appreciate the new happenings in Germany, and particularly the phenomenon of Hitler. He was therefore caught short in 1932-33 when Hitler came to power. Soviet policy was gradually transformed in the two years from 1933 to 1935. In 1934, the pendulum of Soviet policy rests in future on France or England. The Soviet Union joins the League of Nations in 1934, concludes an alliance with France in 1935 and conducts a policy of "collective security" until 1939.

This policy mainly consists of trying to stop the rush of a Germany which suddenly turns out to be different than what Stalin had imagined. The same policy is applied in the Far East; from the moment when Japan becomes an expansionist power, the Soviet Union carries out with respect to Japan a policy of extreme caution and seeks the support of the United States.

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From this stems the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States in 1953 and the policy seeking to establish between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Far East, not an alliance, which is out of the question, but at least a certain parallelism of action in order to contain Japan.

This dual policy of reinsurance fails, the Far-Eastern policy at Shanghai in 1937 and the Western policy at Munich in 1938. The essential thing that Stalin saw in the Munich agreement was the formation of what he most abhorred, an understanding between England, France, Italy and Germany. There was one real nightmare for Stalin throughout the whole period before the war, and that was the idea of a four-power grouping, the four great Western powers of Germany, France, England and Italy. He saw this at Munich, at Munich whence he was chased, he was not even admitted to the discussion, when it concerned Czechoslovakia, which was his ally. He drew the most radical of conclusions from this failure.

Similarly, his policy failed in the Far East, when in 1937 Japan commenced its great offensive in China, which led to the occupation of a major part of Chinese territory, and where the United States failed to react and allowed Japan to pursue its action.

From this moment on, a profound upheaval took place in Stalin's thinking. He thought that he had become strong enough to count only on himself in future. Moreover, he thought that alliances founded solely on legal bases were not substantial, and played no part in time of danger. Third and last, he felt that he had been betrayed. He considered Munich to be treachery. He saw in it not only what it really was, that is a sort of admission of weakness on the part of the Western powers, who did not dare to take action against Hitler at Munich, but much more than that, he saw in it the deep-seated treachery of capitalism against the Soviet Union.

A Russian national government in a crisis like that of Munich would have thought: "my allies are really not very strong, in fact they are pitiful", and would have found reasons in this to be on guard. Stalin on the other hand saw the fact that the "capitalistic" world was once again in league against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union should henceforth carry out a policy devoid of any scruples in respect of this universe, which was fundamentally bad. The result was the tremendous shake-ups of 1939. For Stalin was wrong. He wanted to use his most dangerous adversary, Hitler, in order to gain territories, and at the same time wear Hitler down in a war against the Western coalition. In this manner, he would have gradually achieved the ideal result. All of Europe would be exhausted, while he would continue to dominate it from his central citadel. This was Stalin's reckoning, which was largely facilitated by Mr Chamberlain's policy of panic in March, 1939. England gave its guarantee, its alliance to Poland, before consulting the USSR. Once Chamberlain had given his undertaking to Poland, and thereby had given Poland the choice between war and peace, and once Hitler had gone to war against Poland in a fairly obvious manner, Stalin held all the cards. He knew that there would be war in the West in any event, and that the Allies could no longer get out of it. Therefore he was not obliged to support them; he was not compelled to make them any pledges.

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Stalin, considering the whole world to be hostile, joined Hitler in order to use Hitler against the Western imperialists. This is where we see calculation of an ideological nature, and how it falsified a reasonable, national Russian policy. I feel that the head of a national Russian State, faced with the situation of 1939, would have tried to avoid war, and in any event would have avoided throwing his lot in on one side. The Soviet Union ~~XXXX~~<sup>did not</sup> not have given Hitler the promises given to him in 1939, and accordingly Hitler might have been more hesitant. The crisis might have lasted longer. Russia might have intervened in some other way, and a number of new elements might have occurred which might have prevented a development as radical as the one we lived through.

This is a typical example of the action of ideology on the thinking of the Soviet leaders. It gives them great strength, but it also gives them a considerable capacity for error, and we should be aware of this dual aspect.

After 1939, we therefore have a Soviet policy, if I dare use the Italian expression, of FARA DA SE (do-it-yourself). The Soviet Union acts independently of the whole world. She has definitely abandoned the system of alliance which she used from 1917 to 1939, and which failed everywhere. She becomes a power on her own, acting according to her own criteria. When involved in a war, she conducts an action which I cannot analyse here, as it would take too long, but an extremely methodical action which consists of acting as though she were in the alliance, but not of it. The Russians are not Allies as we understand the term, that is they do not put all of their activity in the alliance to the service of a common cause; there is the Soviet cause, and there is the cause of the other allies.

Why are there any allies in Soviet theory? Here again we encounter the ideology; it is because, and KOLOTOV will say this in 1943, the Americans and the English were forced by events to be the allies of the ~~XXXX~~ USSR. And thus is developed this strange theory of the USSR, that there are really no allies except those that are forced to be allies. Why were they forced to be allies? Because they were already at war when the Soviet Union was attacked, and accordingly Churchill, who was then anti-Soviet, had no other course open in this death struggle he was engaged in against Hitler but to support the USSR, because the USSR had arranged it not to leave him any choice. All of this is constructed after the fact. It is not really what happened. After all, Churchill might have elected, particularly at the end of the war, to turn against the Russians.

In Soviet theory, since the Soviet Union is a phenomenon in itself, and since it fights for aims which are not the same as the aims of the Western powers, the latter are only her allies because they are constrained to it, and not because they have a common objective with her. This is marked throughout the whole war, by all the friction of the war, both on the level of the famous problem of the second front and on the level of concrete negotiations for the extension of the area of Soviet domination in France and in Asia.

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POLITICAL STUDIES

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR (II)

5302

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Mr Jean LALOY, European Director,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

10 November, 1959.

2nd Lecture

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE U.S.S.R.

How can we state the problems of Soviet policy after 1945? I believe that we have a picture of it which is not very different from that which I defined for the policy of Stalin, but which has become much more clear: a territorial drive in Europe and Asia is being developed with a high degree of methodicalness, very great power, and it finally completely upsets not only what remained of the wartime alliances, but also international relationships, for a lengthy period. It is only after the death of Stalin that we are to see these international relationships, which have always been highly troubled, subjected to various manoeuvres, either to stabilize them a bit or to modify certain data inherited from Stalin.

As for Stalin's drive on Europe and Asia, this is all very clear. I mentioned Asia just a while ago, but for Europe, it seems to me that if we go back to an event which is now public knowledge, the Franco-Soviet negotiation of 1944, recounted at great length in the Memoirs of General de Gaulle, we see the Soviet views on Europe at that time quite clearly defined.

The discussion of the Franco-Soviet Pact was a discussion on Poland. The Soviet Union wanted to obtain France's support for the installation in Poland of a Communist-inspired regime. It did not obtain this support from France, but continuing to make progress in Poland, through its armies, and later, through the end-of-war negotiations from Yalta to Potsdam, having obtained complete domination over Poland, it achieved this paradoxical result just the same, which consists of annexing part of the territory of one of its allies. It was quite a simple matter for the USSR to impose on enemy countries such as Rumania and Hungary a regime of constraint, and to fix their borders in accordance with her wishes, but it was much more difficult for an ally; it is quite rare in an alliance for one ally to ask another ally to give up part of its territory, and to accept a regime imposed from the outside. Well, the USSR managed to do this in Poland; she obtained the border that she wanted in the East, that is, the famous Curzon line, which was the Molotov-Ribbentrop line of 1939. She imposed the Oder-Neisse border in the West, and inside Poland, she imposed a national front regime which speedily became a regime of Communist dictatorship.

This policy, having succeeded in Poland, later succeeded in all the other Balkan states which were either weaker or less poorly disposed towards Russia than Poland, Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary or Finland. With the exception of Finland, which is a special case, the Soviet Union succeeded in creating for herself an absolutely exclusive zone of influence, which is the first zone of Europe in which she acts and where she reigns alone.

Two other zones then appear through the Franco-Soviet negotiations of 1944: the German zone and the Western European zone.

As regards the German zone, General de Gaulle's Memoirs show that Stalin refused to modify a policy which would have consisted of depriving Germany of a certain number of her territories in the West.

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As regards the Western zone, it appears from the text (and particularly from the reports of conversations published as annexes) that Stalin showed his worry over the creation of a WESTERN BLOC. What conclusion should we draw from these two elements? If Stalin remains very reserved on his German policy, if he distrusts any system of western organization, it is because he considers at the time that all of EUROPE should normally fall under Soviet influence. I do not know whether he wanted to make all Europe Communist, I do not think he did, but he felt that Europe would probably fall under his influence. Exclusive influence over the countries of the East, a predominant influence over Germany through the occupation and through economic demands (10 billion dollars in reparations) and political demands (control of the Ruhr, democratization, etc). If the Soviet Union had controlled the Ruhr basin and obtained a credit of 10 billion dollars on current German production, the whole industrial structure of Germany would have been progressively attached to the Soviet Union, as in Finland. The USSR would have obtained very complete control over German policy.

Finally, in the West, Stalin wanted to maintain sufficient fluidity to prevent any regrouping. This is Stalin's approximate view in 1945. It is a view which corresponds exactly to our characteristics: dynamic, expansionist but calculated. And why did Stalin have this view? Why can we say that this was his idea? First, because of his statements, and then because of the fact that he was absolutely convinced at that time that the Americans would evacuate Europe. Roosevelt had told him at Yalta that he would have a great deal of difficulty in keeping American troops in Europe for more than two years. Stalin was counting on the withdrawal of the American troops, on an extremely weakened England, on a France which he considered to be very unstable. Add to this the implantation of Communist machinery in Eastern Europe, in a large part of Germany, the economic domination of West Germany through its demands, and you will discover a latent but characteristic drive, not only in Asia but also in Europe, at the end of the war.

At the same time, there are elements of a thrust towards the Mediterranean, but very weak elements. Stalin claims for himself military bases on the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and he also has claims on the Turkish border between Turkey, Armenia and Georgia. To the astonishment and fury of Churchill, he demands a mandate over Libya - we see quite clearly the line cutting the Mediterranean in two - and finally, he takes a keen interest in the status of Tangiers.

Thus there is a minor drive for the Mediterranean, just as there is a drive in the direction of the Persian Gulf through the occupation of Azerbaijan in the north of Iran, until 1946.

However, this drive is not kept up. The policy of Stalin at that time is a landlocked policy. It is aimed, in the West, at Continental Europe, and in the East, at the confines of Siberia, Manchuria and the approaches to Japan, but it has not yet assumed a worldwide direction. It does not develop on the zone of the hot countries which is now the major zone of action of the principal powers of the world: Africa and Asia. It is still mainly directed towards the western and eastern fringes of the Soviet Union, fringes which are quite wide notwithstanding, since they extend from the Pacific to the Atlantic. We can be certain that this conception was firmly planted in Soviet minds, since in 1955, that is 4 years ago, and two years after the death of Stalin, Molotov stated in a speech: "The Soviet Union, which already extends from the

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shores of the Pacific almost to the shores of the Atlantic". All we have to do is suppress the "almost" to see the Soviet Union extending from the Pacific to the Atlantic. There is no doubt that Molotov inherited Stalin's thinking.

Thus, there was a profound shake-up of the structure of international relationships through this thrust, which is only progressively revealed, but which appears in all its clarity at the time of the two great post-war crises: the Berlin crisis of 1948-49, and the Korean crisis of 1950-52 (since after 1951-52 the Korean war was gradually limited); both of these crises, Berlin and Korea, tended towards the domination of two former enemies: Germany and Japan. I do not think we can explain the Korean crisis in any other way than as an attempt to prevent Japan from signing a treaty with the United States permanently establishing the American forces on the Japanese islands. If the North Koreans had succeeded in taking South Korea in two weeks, as everything indicated they would at the outset, the effect on Japanese opinion would have been powerful, and from the strategic standpoint, the occupation of Tsushima Strait by a power allied with Russia, for practical purposes by the Soviet Union, would have blocked Japan from both north and south, and would probably have compelled a speedy realignment of her positions. Similarly for Germany, the fall of Berlin in 1948-49 would have implied such a defeat for the Allies that West Germany would never have thought of linking her fate with that of the Western Allies, and accordingly all of Germany would have been gradually drawn into the political sphere of the USSR. The reckoning of 1945 would have been proved accurate.

Thus, Stalin shook everything up, and did it so thoroughly that there was a reaction, and the Western powers started to react. Their reaction was to resist in Berlin, to resist in Korea, and the organization of a system for defence of the West, not only by an agreement (the 1949 Atlantic Treaty), but by a military organization whose formation started in the Fall of 1950, just at the time when the Korean war made it obvious that there might still be limited wars.

In the face of this, there is a progressive awareness on the Western side of the nature of the problems being caused, as well as some timid attempts at stabilization. In seeking to fix responsibilities, which is not my field, there is however one event which shows that the Western powers did seek to stabilize in the Far East, in an experiment which is quite extraordinary when we think about it today, and that is the mission of General Marshall who, in China in 1946, sought to form a National Front Government between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists. He was the mediator between Chou-en-lai and Chang-kai-shek. It is quite a curious phenomenon just the same to think that the future Secretary of State of the United States spent a year trying to establish a government in which Chinese Communists would participate on an equal footing with the others. It was an attempt to avoid civil war and to avoid the Chinese internal crisis. There was also an attempt at stabilization in Germany when the US Secretary of State, Mr Byrnes, proposed a permanent treaty for demilitarization of Germany in 1946, a treaty which the Russians rejected.

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There was an attempt at stabilization in the matter of atomic weapons when the Americans proposed, in 1945, an international control over atomic weapons and their progressive destruction once control had been implemented. However, we are forced to admit that this American control was so vast that it was difficult for the Soviets to accept it. Finally, there was one of the most classic examples of an attempt at stabilization, the Marshall Plan of 1947, under which American credits were offered not only to West European countries, but to East European countries as well. Would it have been easy to have credits to Communist States voted by the US Congress? No, it certainly would have been very difficult. Nevertheless, the offer was made and the position of Europe was transformed by the Soviet rejection.

At the origin of the current crisis, there is therefore a special element, which is the stand of the USSR and the views of Stalin. In this connection, we always talk about zones of influence. According to some people, Stalin, in trying to create a zone of influence, compromised the peace, and according to others, he created a misunderstanding with the United States. However, what we have to consider is the nature of the zone which he reserves for himself. Not all influence is alike. The influence which Stalin establishes is exclusive of all others. It is exercised by governments under the orders of the USSR, and accordingly it rests on force. There is another type of influence, that which is exercised naturally in relations between a large State and its neighbours, but which does not tend to make satellites of the latter. The only place where Stalin used this sort of influence was in Finland. And, in Finland, Soviet influence is wielded more easily than in Poland or Hungary.

Poland and Hungary are always threatened with an explosion, whereas Finland is not. This Stalinian phenomenon, which is essentially ideological in origin, and barely compatible with the national Russian idea, was the essential factor in the crisis which the world faces, and which in my opinion is a crisis of a growing awareness by the West of the nature of Soviet policy.

There are always two types of explanation in the West in this respect. There are people who believe and continue to believe that all the drama of the years 1945-53 resulted from a Western error. We failed to understand Soviet policy, we opposed it when it was strictly defensive, the Russians were acting solely out of fear of Germany. If this were true, we would obviously be in a very difficult position, because we would have aroused a crisis through our own stupidity. In fact, while the Russians did fear Germany a little, their main consideration was to make use of Germany. In 1946, when Byrnes proposed to them a treaty for permanent demilitarization of Germany for 40 years, they turned it down brutally, suddenly, saying that they were not interested. Why were they not interested? Because a treaty of such a nature would deprive them of all means of internal influence, that is, domination of the German Communist party, use of this Communist party for the creation of mass movements, use of such mass movements to favour Soviet policy in West Germany, thereby progressively attaching Germany as a whole by concrete pledges to the whole movement of Soviet policy. Thus this first interpretation appears to be inaccurate, and the second appears to be correct, and that is the interpretation of the progressive awareness of the nature of the Soviet drive and of its danger.

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These are the years 1945-53; I shall not go into the Far East, as this would take us too far afield.

Just one word about it, and that is that it does not appear, to the extent that we are in a position to know what went on, that Stalin insisted too much on the triumph of Communism in the whole of China. From numerous observations which it would be difficult to give in detail here, it would appear that Stalin conceived of the Soviet triumph of the Far East as a triumph of the Communists in the northern half of China. He probably would have been willing to leave the southern half to the Nationalists or to the Americans. He would then have been in a situation strictly parallel to the European situation, except that the cut-off line would have been between north and south instead of between east and west. However, the Nationalists went under; the Communists were more powerful, more dynamic than Stalin believed, and this Communist Chinese movement, which was an immense triumph in 1949, was nevertheless accompanied for Stalin, as a Russian, by certain drawbacks, because it obliged him to revise his Treaty of 1945 with China, under which Nationalist China conceded to the Russians what Roosevelt had allowed them at Yalta. Roosevelt had made a gift to the Russians of Chinese territories, administered by the Japanese. China had ratified these "gifts" in August, 1945 and had granted the Russians a military base at Port Arthur, the trading port of Dairen and the East Chinese or Trans-Manchurian railway.

In 1949, when Mao-Tse-Tung came to power, his most urgent task was to come to Moscow to sign a Treaty with the Russians, and they took almost four months to reach an agreement (Mao arrived in December, 1949 and the treaty was signed in February, 1950). In this treaty, we note that Stalin is obliged to return to Communist China what he had taken from Nationalist China, and he does so with poor grace, for he gives in with conditions as to time, with delays, he endeavours to hang on to Port Arthur as a common base in the event of war with Japan. There are a great many reticences in the agreement between Communist Russia and Communist China (1950), which is a clear indication that the total triumph of Communist China raised a problem for Communist Russia. I am saying this merely to qualify what we shall say about the Russian-Chinese problem in the contemporary period. At the origin of present relations between the two great Communist countries, there is a degree of misunderstanding, because Russia did not really press for the triumph of Communism in China, and would certainly have been content with a China divided in two, in which Communist China would have been obliged to seek the support of the USSR.

This is the general aspect of Stalin's post-war drive, which I believe to be a real drive, not something invented by the West, and of its consequences.

If we take as a picture of international relations a picture of large territories animated by great movements, there occurs in the period 1945-53 an underground shake-up, barely visible on the outside, a lack of stability in international relations which is the result of this East-West drive and of the consequences drawn therefrom in the minds of a certain number of people.

Then, we come to 1953, when two events take place: Stalin dies on 6 March, 1953, and after that date, the USSR gradually becomes a thermonuclear power. We are therefore embarking upon a new period. This period is characterized from the outset by the notion of relaxation. From the moment when Stalin was buried, Malenkov spoke in a speech of a lasting period of peaceful co-existence, and in May, 1953, and still again in

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August, Malenkov indicated in his speeches that he was seeking to achieve a new balance in relations between the Soviet Union and the outside world. A new balance, which was particularly characterized by the stoppage of the wars in progress, in Korea in July, 1953, and in Indo-China in 1954, with the attendant advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages are very obvious, but the war was finally ended just the same. There was a period of relaxation and other no less characteristic phenomena, progressive reconciliation with Yugoslavia, commencing in 1953, and so on...

Thus, there was a reassessment of the problems inside the Soviet Union, and from this moment on, people started asking themselves questions. The West arrived at two basic ideas regarding the relaxation.

Some said: the relaxation is irreversible, it is a phenomenon which reflects not so much the will of the leaders as it does the new structure of Soviet society, development of industry, development of a progressively middle-class society, or of a society which in any event is undergoing many changes, the structures have become complex, a number of industrial leaders and directors are people who are seeking their own profit above all else, and accordingly we shall see a gradual stabilization of Soviet society and policy. All we have to do is go along with and even encourage this relaxation.

There were other people who said: That is not it at all. The Russians are engaging in a policy of relaxation to deceive us more completely, and in fact this is something extremely dangerous. We must continue to maintain by all possible means the barriers we have built up.

As subsequent events proved, both of these theories were extreme, and did not reflect reality. The relaxation as it has existed since 1953 and as it still exists today cannot be classified as purely fictitious, it has a certain reality, but on the other hand, it cannot be classified as irreversible. It is something more complex than that, something which we can only analyse if we classify it according to the geographical zones to which it is applied.

Therefore, if we look at the relaxation not as a phenomenon by itself, but as a more or less authentic phenomenon, depending on the territories on which it took shape, I believe that we manage to see it for just about what it is. And we can distinguish four main zones in the Soviet policy of relaxation.

First, there is the USSR itself. In the USSR, the relaxation is to a large extent authentic, for there has been a profound change in the standard of living. It is not as marvellous as they claim, but it is better, notwithstanding. There has been a change in the life of the peasants, who have finally been admitted to have an existence of their own, they have been given relatively reasonable cost prices, their income tax has been reduced, certain restrictions imposed upon them have been removed. Similarly in industry, decentralization is both a feature of political relaxation, since it assures a little more respect for local interests, and a feature of adaptation to an increasingly diversified industrial structure, which implies that bureaucratic direction of industry from Moscow is no longer possible. Finally, there is a relaxation of internal discipline in the extent in which the police have seen their powers reduced since the fall of Beria and even the replacement of his successor, General Serof, by a civilian, Mr Chelepine, in 1959. The average Soviet citizen, while still subject to very firm Party control, is no longer exposed to arbitrary arrest by the police to the

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point where, in the time of the great purges, an author whose name I do not recall said that the Soviet citizen was not only afraid to think for himself, he was even afraid to dream at night. Thus, there has been a real and profound change, which does not mean that the reign of freedom has arrived, because the Party remains extremely powerful. Nevertheless, there has been a change.

In the second zone, which is that of the allies of the USSR, or the European satellites and China, there has also been a change, which very nearly went a long way, but stopped on the way, because there were dangers.

What took place? After 1955, Khrushchev thought that it was not possible to continue the policy of exploitation of the satellite countries which Stalin had conceived, and which operated by large-scale removals, mainly by the core of mixed firms, as for example, for bauxite in Hungary, for aeronautics in various countries, for oil in Rumania, for mines in Rumania and Hungary Bulgaria - mixed firms to which the Soviet made a 50% contribution, generally consisting of German assets in the satellite countries and confiscated by the USSR, and therefore costing nothing, and the country made a 50% contribution that is, of its own installations. The Director was from the Soviet and the Assistant Director was a national, and the company was made strictly extra-territorial, meaning that its revenue and taxes were not included in the revenue and taxes of the territory on which it was located.

In the Fall of 1954, all of these firms disappeared, from Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland and China, where three of them had been formed a few months before the death of Stalin. In the Fall of 1954, when Khrushchev and Bulganin went to China, one of the main agreements was for the liquidation of the mixed aeronautics firm and the mixed firms for the development of oil and mineral resources in Chinese Turkestan. Accordingly, there was a reassessment of relations within the satellite zone, greater balance and greater autonomy.

In 1956 - the Poles and Hungarians took all this very seriously - they thought that they could go farther and the explosion occurred in Hungary. From this time forward, the USSR applied the brakes, and with order restored in 1957, the situation became stabilized.

Nevertheless, relations between the USSR and her allies were changed.

In the third zone, that of the Afro-Asiatic countries symbolized by Egypt and India, whereas in the Stalin era these countries were considered to be enemies, after the end of Stalin and particularly after 1955, the Soviet Union recognized their positive character. Mr Shepilov went to Egypt in 1955, Mr Nehru visited Moscow, Messrs Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India in 1955. There was gradually established what the Soviets called the "Zone of Peace", that is, the countries which are not Communist, but which are attached to the Soviet Union by a common idea on 'peace', and thus progressively separated from the West.

In the fourth zone, there is no true relaxation. Relations with the Western countries are marked by a curious phenomenon which is not yet over: any reconciliation of views is followed by a divergence, like the teeth of a saw.

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Crises, failures, troubles

Relaxation, agreements, etc..

1954

January. Berlin Conference  
(Germany)

April. Geneva Conference  
July. (Indo-China)

1955

January - Threats over  
February Paris agreements

July - Summit Conference

November- Conference of  
Foreign Affairs  
Ministers in Geneva  
(Germany)

1956

March - Trip by Bulganin and  
Khrushchev to London

May - Trip by G. Mollet to  
Moscow.

December - Suez and Budapest  
crises.

1957

March - Disarmament talks in  
August London.

October - in the UNO, the USSR  
breaks up Sub-Committee  
on Disarmament

- USSR denounces Turkish  
aims on Syria - Crisis

1958

January - Negotiations for a  
summit conference.

May - Stoppage of negotiations.  
July - Crisis over Iraq-Lebanon.  
August - Quemoy and Matsu Crisis.

August - Talks for summit  
negotiations.

November - Ultimatum on Berlin.

1959

February - MacMillan visits  
Moscow.

May-August - Geneva Conference  
(Berlin)

September - Khrushchev's trip  
to United States.

How are we to explain this phenomenon?

It arises out of the fact that the Russians and the West do not succeed in coming very close together, for if the Soviet Union seriously approaches the West, this then raises a problem which is very serious for the Soviet Union itself: precisely the problem of that fundamental intolerance.

If we can arrive at a regime of true peace with the so-called imperialist Western countries, this means that the basic theories are ill-founded, that these countries are not as bad as they are made out to be, that they do contain some positive forces, and accordingly the division of the world into two camps is not realistic. If the division of the world into two camps is not a realistic division, this means that Leninist socialism is only an arguable theory. From this point on, we enter the path of what the Soviets call "revisionism" or reformism, which is basically that of social democracy.

If the Russians go too far, the relaxation strikes them in their vitals. If we let them go too far in our system, it hits us in our vitals as well, because after a certain point in the relaxation, it is extremely difficult to maintain military machinery.

Thus there is a very interesting feature to relaxation, and that is that both systems take risks. The Soviet Union is taking risks if it goes too far; the West is taking risks if it allows the development, not of relaxation, but of certain features of ~~xxx~~ relaxation as conceived by the Soviet Union.

This leads us to classify the way in which Khrushchev has tried to limit the risks as far as he is concerned. These were the ideas which he exposed at the XXth Congress of the Communist Party in the USSR in 1956. You know about this Congress where, in a ~~xxx~~ secret speech, Khrushchev stated that Stalin was a criminal. I was in Moscow at the time. The Congress ended on February 26th or 27th, and it was on about March 19th that the first rumors were heard that in a secret speech, Khrushchev had declared that Stalin had assassinated millions of Russians. We had a great deal of difficulty in believing it at first.

When these rumors were proved correct, everyone wondered what had happened. Why had Khrushchev done this? An effort was made to relate this speech to the public views of the XXth Congress, and I believe that here we arrive at quite a clear idea of what Khrushchev wanted at the time.

What were the publicly expressed themes of the XXth Congress in foreign policy? All three were modest in scope, but symbolically interesting.

The first was that wars are no longer "inevitable", the second that revolutions may be bloodless, and the third that there are various paths leading to socialism.

This means that Khrushchev is in the process of building a theory to justify his action as he conceives it - this zone of peace in particular - and at the same time to prevent such action from going too far. He has a limited conception of "relaxation". Listening to him, why have wars ceased to be inevitable? This does not mean that capitalism has become inoffensive - far from it - capitalism remains what it was, but socialism has become extremely strong. And accordingly, if we wish to try to limit the danger of war - and if we can even say that there will be no war - this is not because the other world has become good, but because socialism has become extremely strong. You see here how he avoids the danger of the "revisionism" which I mentioned. He is not obliged to recognize any significance or worth in the West; he acknowledges greater strength in the USSR and China.

Similarly, while revolutions may be bloodless, it is because the bourgeoisie has become very weak, and accordingly it is no longer necessary to cut its throat. It is sufficient to

- 10 -

another it. This is what he is saying, since he chooses as an example the coup d'Etat of Prague in 1948.

It is a technique of revolution which is more subtle but none the less effective, for it avoids a good many troubles.

Finally, why does he admit that there are various paths leading to socialism? It is because there is the problem of Tito, because he is attempting a reconciliation with Tito, and because Tito has a theory to the effect that socialism spreads throughout the world by various methods; however Khrushchev is careful to say - and he will make this very clear in 1957 - that while it is admitted for a certain time that socialism may act along varied lines in the different countries, all of these lines must converge at the end of the historical development towards a single destiny on a regime identical to the Soviet regime, and accordingly this is a temporary tolerance, it is not the recognition of fundamental freedom for all States.

What is at the origin of the Soviet theory of relaxation? It is the notion that this relaxation results from the might of the Soviet Union, and must not culminate in a sort of general freedom for everyone, but in a strengthening of the Soviet Communist Party. At least, this is the only reasonable explanation we can find for the anti-Stalinist speech of 1956. Why did Khrushchev make this speech, which really came very close to overthrowing Soviet power? Khrushchev took tremendous risks. Why did he take them? Because the Soviet Communist Party in the Stalin regime was completely ossified, sclerosed, sterile. People had ceased to take an interest in the Soviet reality. The country was run via circulars, years in prison, blows. Khrushchev's regime is not like this at all. As I have said, he is trying to make it more flexible, in agriculture, in industry and outside, but he is doing so in order to regain a greater influence, to act more powerfully on the world, to develop the action of the Soviet Union beyond the territories where Stalin had confined it. Consequently, this authentic relaxation represents something real, it results in risks which the Soviet regime takes, but it tends to develop new successes, and basically, what it represents, if we wish to sum it up in a formula, it represents in Khrushchev the notion that now the Soviet Union can have a world policy, that it is not limited in a world policy, that it is not confined to a policy of conquest of new Communist nations, that it must go farther than that, and in order to go farther, it must moderate, for a time at least, the doctrinaire strictness of its views, accept the fact that in the world there black zones, white zones, gray zones, zones of varying shades of gray... and that the world is much more complex than in the original Stalinist theory, but that, all of this notwithstanding, it must end in an increase in Soviet influence, and through such increased influence, in a strengthening of the Soviet regime. Regardless of how real it is in Khrushchev's thinking, the relaxation is not intended to culminate in the stabilization and general pacification of the world which we plan, but in something dynamic which will bring further victories to the Soviet Union.

I believe that this is the phase in which we find ourselves at present, and this would explain why on the one hand Mr Khrushchev is trying in 1959 to show a good deal of goodwill, to the extent that, after sending us horrible threats over the Berlin affair, he did not withdraw them, but he postponed them - after all, it is better than nothing that he postponed them! - and on the other hand, since the Fall of 1959, he has been making all sorts of kind gestures in all directions. All of this is to a large degree authentic, because he is in no hurry

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to develop a crisis, he ~~insists~~<sup>is aware</sup> that it is very risky to provoke a crisis at the present time, however there has not been sufficient stability to date in Khrushchev's policy towards us for us to be able to say that we have entered a really new phase. We are in a transition period. It is possible that we may arrive at better relations in the new year. It is possible for us to arrive at improved relations, but this supposes a change in Soviet mentality, which may be in progress - in some circles certainly, in Soviet intellectual circles there is no doubt of it - but not in the leaders until further notice, for the risk of "revisionism" remains very serious for the moment, and in my opinion this prevents the leaders from going too far in the direction of final reconciliation. Therefore, we shall be confronted for a long time by this relaxation, which is at once a recognition of the impossibility of making war and at the same time a recognition of the fact that while we can no longer go to war with the USSR, she can act with all the countless means at her disposal: psychological, political, diplomatic, economic, with far greater impunity than ever before. The relaxation is a mixture of courtesies and threats, in the Berlin affair in particular, which occupied us throughout all of 1959 and which unfortunately threatens to occupy many more people in 1960... There is an element of hostile pressure: for what the Soviet Union is seeking in Berlin is to force one of the basic locks in Western European policy. If Berlin blows up - we said this for the 48-49 crisis and we may repeat it for the 59-60 crisis - if Berlin blows up, all of West Germany will doubt the ability of the Allies to defend Europe in general and Germany in particular. The position of Germany in the Western alliance becomes very poor and we may fear that Germany will grow away from the West. The day when West Germany detaches herself from the West, much as Communist Germany disappeared in the East, all of Europe will be thrown completely out of balance, and successes and powers for the Soviet Union will develop in series. We risk seeing the failure of a possible real relaxation, which can be achieved if we hold on.

On the other hand, all sorts of elements enter into Soviet policy towards under-developed countries. In the East, the Russians more or less succeeded in gaining the friendship of the Iraqis, but they immediately harvested the hostility of the Egyptians, and accordingly Soviet policy towards the under-developed world is faced with complex problems, and not only in that area; it is also encountering complex problems in the Asiatic zone, where the Indians are engaged with an extremely violent phase of Chinese policy, which is finally bringing the Indians closer to the West.

This is something entirely new for the Soviet Union. Finally, in general in this whole area of under-developed countries, the Russians are running into a phenomenon which they are having an extremely hard time in pinning down, analysing and stopping: the nationalistic phenomenon. In Soviet theory, nations are temporary things arising out of the development of bourgeois capitalism, and in socialism, they are gradually absorbed into a unified humanity which is completely reconciled with itself. There will no longer be any difference, no more French, or Germans or Russians, only a liberated humanity. Well, it turns out that, despite this myth, a nation strenuously resists such absorption into a liberated humanity, and that in

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under-developed countries in particular, the nationalistic phenomenon - we are in a splendid position to know - is quite vigorous. The Soviet Union is also faced with mass movements which she has difficulty in understanding and in controlling.

It seems to me that this dictates the stand which we should adopt towards the Soviet Union in the period of relaxation. I feel that we should ~~xxx~~ take the stand that the Soviet Union is also divided up into zones. In the zones where there is direct mass Soviet pressure, which is at once military, political and economical, in other words in Continental Europe, we should continue with a policy of resistance which is at once military, political, economic and psychological - our own policy; on the other hand, in the zone of the new countries, where the Soviet Union does not intervene directly, or where in order to intervene she is compelled to employ the nationalist relay with a greater or lesser degree of skill and good luck but with a great deal of method (and where there are a great many dangers), here the policy of the Western countries should be adapted to the situation and should endeavour to find solutions which will block the Soviet drive, not always through military force, but through action of the social, economic or political type...

On the one hand, we have to conduct a policy of stiff resistance, a trench war, and on the other hand, a war of movement infinitely exceeding the strictly military field. A fighting spirit is required, without however provoking a military crisis. This is the great difficulty of the current situation.

Because there is no war in prospect, we have to mobilize energies much more than ever and in all fields, and there is nothing more difficult than to mobilize energies in time of peace. This is the situation in which we are placed, and it will last for a long time. It is a situation in which there are mutual risks, much greater for us than for the Russians, for our systems are much less controlled than the Soviet systems.

Therefore, there are considerable risks, but there is a way out. There is a new element in the present situation just the same, provided our countries are sufficiently intelligent. There is a prospect which did not exist during the 1945-53 period under Stalin. At that time, we held on, now knowing too well why we did so. We merely resisted, hoping to avoid the worst, that was all. Now we know that inside the Soviet countries, in Europe and even in China - we also know it because of the troubles which occurred in China when the Chinese tried to relax pressure in 1957 - public opinion is not completely won over and naturally tends towards revisionism. The possible way out of the crisis is the entrance of the Soviet Union (likely before China) into a system of real mutual tolerance, that is of recognition of the Western countries as countries having valid social, economic, moral and intellectual structures. Once this is achieved, we enter into a phase of arrangement, of adjustment of interests, which is still difficult, but possible, whereas in the present world, the slightest mistake on our part threatens to wind up in tremendous gains for the other side, which still considers us as doomed to destruction. This means that there is a difficult period to get through, particularly for France, which is located just about at the crossroads of all the current drives. France has a tremendous effort to make, from the standpoint of European policy and African policy both. All that remains for me to do is to hope that we make it.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador,  
Moscow.

Reference: .....

Subject: Soviet Missile Programme

Security: ..... SECRET

No: ..... 545

Date: ..... June 6, 1961

Enclosures: ..... 3

Air or Surface Mail: ..... Airbag

Post File No: .....

Ottawa File No.	
50028-B-40	
55	5U

References

Dr. Graham Odgers, the astronomer from British Columbia who is in the Soviet Union under the N.R.C.-Academy of Sciences exchange programme, recently visited the chief satellite tracking station in the Soviet Union, near Moscow, and spoke there with scientists on the staff. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum which Mr. Seaborn prepared for Col. Webb based on a conversation with Dr. Odgers after his visit.

*File*  
*[Signature]*


2. Subsequently, at Mr. Seaborn's suggestion, Dr. Odgers called on my Military Attaché to give him further details. I am enclosing copies of two reports prepared by Col. Webb based on his conversation with Dr. Odgers.

3. As these several memoranda cover fully the two conversations with Dr. Odgers, there is no need for me to comment on them here. I think, however, that they will be of considerable interest to those members of the Department who are concerned with the Soviet missile programme. None of us here feel in a position to evaluate these reports: we would be interested in receiving in due course any comments of our experts.

Internal Circulation

*[Signature]*

Ambassador.



Distribution to Posts

**SECRET**

**CLASSIFICATION**

**JOINT INTELLIGENCE  
BUREAU**

**DATE** NOV 27 1961

*Mr. Canfield*  
*2 Mr. [unclear] - I had not seen this  
by [unclear]. You will note that comments  
were [unclear] by [unclear].*  
*Mr. [unclear] # 73-2000 -*

001603

SECRET

(No further distribution)

June 2, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. WEBB

cc: For the Ambassador

Dr. Graham Odgers, an astronomer from British Columbia who is at present in the Soviet Union under the N.R.C.-Academy of Sciences exchange agreement, spoke to me on May 27 concerning a visit he had paid a few days previously to a satellite tracking station in the vicinity of Moscow, somewhere near Zvenigorod. I urged him to visit yourself, C/C Smith or S/L Elliott to give you what information he had gleaned, but meanwhile you may be interested in this brief report of what he told me.

Dr. Odgers said he could find his way again to the tracking station and may be able to locate it on a map for you.

While Dr. Odgers was at the station, the word came through from Jodrell Bank that they had picked up signals which they thought might emanate from the Soviet Venus probe.

During his visit, Dr. Odgers spoke at some length with one of the scientists working at the station. The latter volunteered the information that the Gagarin space capsule had been launched from a mountainous area in the south of the Altai Kray. This is quite contrary to the information contained in Red Star of May 31 and June 1 about the location of the launching site. It may, however, fit with information from a German engineer which I obtained in October 1960, in Barnaul, about sightings of rocket-launchings to the south of that city.

The Soviet scientist, who had witnessed at least one launching, volunteered the information that the method of launching was that of a long ramp (I believe Dr. Odgers said 13 Km. in length) which first descended into a valley and then led up a mountain-slop on the other side, gravity on the descent providing part of the force to overcome inertia and to help launch the rocket. Dr. Odgers can give you some additional figures. This description fits with some conjecture which appeared in the Western press a week or two ago. Dr. Odgers says it also fits with what we know about the angle of launch.

Dr. Odgers asked the Soviet scientist whether the Soviets had booster rockets of significantly greater size and thrust than those currently employed by the Americans. The Soviet scientist said they had not, hence the launching method which they used. There was some concern, he said, among some Soviet scientists that the United States might before long get ahead of the USSR in the matter of booster rockets.

I consider Dr. Odgers a reliable source insofar as these matters are concerned as he has visited Western tracking stations. I cannot of course vouch for the primary Soviet source other than to say that he is a scientist working at the tracking station.

I have mentioned Dr. Odgers' report briefly to Col. Dulacki of the United States Embassy, whom Dr. Odgers had met and spoken with at some length on a previous occasion. I have also mentioned it to Mr. Haining of the British Embassy who loaned us a long report he had prepared on the information available from public sources on the Gagarin flight.

J. Blair Seaborn.

S E C R E T

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

From: MA Moscow	RR No 15/61	Date: 5 Jun 61
Area and Subject: Soviet Missile Tracking Station		File: MAR/21-1
Source: Visiting Canadian Scientist	Evaluation: B 2	Date of Info: 2 Jun 61
Distr: DMI (4), DNI, <del>DAI, JIB, DSI, USMA</del> , UKMA, FrMA, USJIBC, UKJIBC(3) Embassy (2), External Affairs-DL2		

1. A Canadian astronomer, who is also a Reserve Naval Officer, has been visiting several observatories in the Soviet Union.
2. He recently visited what he says is the main Soviet Missile Tracking Station. He was shown two separate maps with different scales and detail by the Canadian MA and on both placed the location of this Tracking Station just North of ZVENIGOROD at 36° 46' East 55° 45' North.
3. It is just South of a woods and will soon be moved North of the woods for security reasons to make observation of its activities more difficult.
4. In addition to being the main Satellite Tracking Station in the Soviet Union, this station is also a training station.
5. There are a total of 26 primary tracking stations and 70 secondary stations in the Soviet Union.
6. Technical details have been forwarded separately to the National Research Council in Ottawa.

*E. H. Webb*

(E H Webb)  
Colonel  
Military Attache

JIB  
OTTAWA  
DEC 22 1961  
SOURCE  
CARD NO. 12345

FOR NDHQ USE

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
S E C R E T

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

From: MA Moscow	RR No 17/61	Date: 5 Jun 61
Area and Subject: USSR - Soviet Missile Programme		File: MAR/21-2
Source: Canadian Visitor	Evaluation F-3	Date of Info: Recent
Distr: DMI (10), DNI, DAI, DSI, JIB, Embassy (2), <u>EADL 2</u> , UKMA, UKJIBC (3), USMA, USJIBC, Fr MA		

SUMMARY

1. A reliable source who has had conversations with a number of Soviet scientists connected with the Soviet missile programme, and in particular one with whom he strolled in a garden, reports the following. Since there is no way of evaluating the truth of what the Soviet scientist told him, this report is evaluated F-3.
2. The main Soviet satellite launching site is in ALTAI KRAY.
3. GAGARIN was launched from this site. (This is quite contrary to the Soviet newspaper reports of 31 May and 1 Jun).
4. The Soviet scientist had witnessed at least one launching and this method of launching was sketched in the dust to illustrate it to the source and then obliterated. Source's memory sketch is shown below.



5. The launchings take place in a valley in ALTAI KRAY. The valley floor is 9000 ft above sea level and the rocket is actually launched at 15,000 feet above sea level.
6. The method used is to mount the rocket on a sled, which moves on skids across the valley floor. Inertia is overcome and initial velocity gained through gravity assisted by electric motors.
7. On the final up slope, before the rocket is launched, the sled is parachute braked and there is a superstructure supporting a tube through which the rocket passes. This tube is to prevent shimmy, oscillation etc before launching.
8. After each launching considerable time is required for reconstruction of track etc at the site.
9. There are a number of German scientists as well as Russian scientists at this location. Both nationalities are under very severe security restrictions and are not allowed to leave the site.

S E C R E T

PAGE 1 OF 2

S E C R E T

10. The source's informant told him that scientists engaged in any aspect of the Soviet Missile programme were very unhappy about the restrictions put on their movements. They are also very much afraid that the American missile programme may be further advanced than the Soviet Programme. Certainly within a year they expect it to be quite apparent that the Americans are ahead and they fear the repercussions upon the Academy of Sciences which may result from the Party's anger when this becomes apparent.


11. The Russians are very suspicious of ECHO. They will not believe what they have been told about ECHO or what they have read in newspapers, magazines, etc. Their astronomers see ECHO and are impressed by its size. They wonder how the US managed to get anything so big in orbit and if perhaps the US is already ahead of them. The number and variety of American satellites now in orbit impresses them.

12. The source asked whether the Soviet booster rockets were of significantly greater size and thrust than those currently employed by the Americans. The informant said that they were not, and hence the method of launching used by the Soviets. The West he thought must know all about this from the angle of launch, the long waits between launchings, etc.

COMMENT

13. While it is impossible to evaluate the truth of these statements, the remarkable similarity between the method of launching described by the Soviet Scientist and that shown on pages 30 and 31 of the French publication "L'Auto Journal" of 20 Apr 61 should be pointed out. Either the French journalist had access to some good information or the Soviet scientist was adding evidence to an "inspired leak".

14. Please note also the information received by Mr Blair Seaborn of the Canadian Embassy in BARNAUL in October 1960 and reported in his telegram 529 of 31 Oct 60.

  
(E H Webb)  
Colonel  
Military Attaché

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For NDHQ Use Only

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Attachments: DMI - Photostatic copy of article in "L'Auto Journal" of 20 Apr  
UKMA, USMA, UKJIBC - Photostatic copy of sketch in the article  
showing method of launching.

S E C R E T

PAGE 2 OF 2

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S E C R E T

*file out*

DNI Brief # 61-12

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary JIC

50028-B-10	
4	H

POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR TO SOVIET KRUPNY DESTROYER

The unidentified hull which has been under construction in the Zhdanov Yard, Leningrad, since June 1960 has been launched and is currently fitting out in the Zhdanov Basin. A reliable observer reports that it has an installation on the forecastle which appears to be a missile launcher.

2. This hull was launched from the open way between 29 March and 6 April 1961. The report of a possible missile installation is another indication that this new design may be a successor to the "Krupny" Class DDG, two of which are now in more advanced stages of fitting out in the Zhdanov basin.

3. There are currently estimated to be nine operational destroyers (DDG) with a surface-to-surface missile launching capability. The maximum range of the missile is believed to be 150 n.m. but this is subject to the following guidance limitations when fired against mobile targets:

- (a) Firing ships' radar - 30 n.m.
- (b) Tracking ships in forward position - 80 n.m.
- (c) Tracking aircraft in forward position - 130 n.m.

4. Krupny destroyers with missile launchers fore and aft and Kildin destroyers with launchers aft are presently distributed amongst Soviet Fleets as follows:

	<u>NORTH</u>	<u>BALTIC</u>	<u>BLACK</u>	<u>PACIFIC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KRUPNY	2	-	2	1	5
KILDIN	-	1	2	1	4

*L.L. Atwood*

(L.L. Atwood),  
Captain, RCN,  
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

O T T A W A,  
6 June, 1961.

S E C R E T

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

		DATE	FILE	SECURITY
FM:	EXTERNAL	JUNE 1	50028-B-10 14 50	RESTRICTED
		NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY
TO:	MOSCOW	DS-52	IMPORTANT	
INFO:				

Ref.:

Subject:

A TAS REPORT OF MAY28 REFERS TO AN ARTICLE IN THE ECONOMIC GAZETTE ANNOUNCING THE DIVISION OF THE USSR INTO " A NEW NETWORK OF LARGE ECONOMIC AREAS - 17 IN ALL". PLEASE SEND A COPY OF THIS ISSUE OF THE ECONOMIC GAZETTE BY THE NEXT BAG MARKED FOR THE ATTENTION OF DL2.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

DONE BY DL(2): JIB (ATTN. R.L. MCGIBBON)  
 EUROPEAN (MR. ROBERTS)

ORIGINATOR

DIVISION

PHONE

APPROVED BY

SIG. NAME G.K. Grande/jrc

D.L. (2) DIVISION

6391

SIG. NAME J.K. STARNES

(580) G.K. GRANDE

File on 50028 - B - 40

EXTRACT:

SECRET

MINUTES of 827th MEETING of JIC  
31 May 1961

X. SOVIET INTERDICTION OF ALLIED COMMUNICATIONS

The Committee had for consideration the revised draft of UK JIC (59) of 10 May, 1961, PART III, Deployment and Use of Soviet Capabilities.

(CSC 1860-a, CSC 1824-1 (JIC) of 25 May 61)

The Committee took note of this paper.



33150  
IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
No. CSC 9-27 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

J 53

SECRET

30 May, 1961.

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file (aw)

DMI  
DAI  
DSI  
RCMP  
CB NRC

MAY 31 1961.

### INTELLIGENCE REPORT - RUSSIAN TANKER VAILLANT CUTURIER

Enclosure: (1) Merchant Ship Intelligence Report -  
Russian Tanker VAILLANT CUTURIER

The above enclosure is forwarded for information:

2. Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of circulation the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/cp

- 7cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs.  
DNI  
JIB

50028-B-40  
3.3 | 50

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
No. CSC 7-17 (JIC)  
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)



# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

f 51

29 May, 1961.

D-2  
[Handwritten initials and signatures]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

USSR: THE NEW STATE COMMITTEE FOR CO-ORDINATION  
OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Reference: (a) CSC 7-17, CSC 1825-1 (JIC) of 10 May, 1961. MAY 30 1961

Enclosure: (1) Canadian JIC comments on UK JIC (61)35 dated 1 May, 1961, on the above subject.

The above enclosure is forwarded for your information.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: JIS (2)  
SO/JIR  
SO/CI  
JICLO(L) (for personal information only)

CSC 7-17 (JIC)  
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)

CONFIDENTIAL

29 May 1961.

Comments on UK JIC(61)35 of 1 May, 1961  
"USSR: The New State Committee for Coordination of  
Scientific Research"

DNI: DNI notes that Research and Development with intent to advance in the usually spectacular fields of Space and Electronics is certainly evident today in the USSR. This new Committee apparently does not detract from the Research into defence systems as paragraph 8 of this paper would seem to imply.

JIB: While JIB agrees that the change is chiefly aimed at helping the national economy to benefit from scientific research, it may also be that one aim of the reorganization is to bring scientific research to bear more effectively on the USSR's military needs.

XA, DMI, DAI, DSI, CB NRC, RCMP: Nil returns.

Note: Circulated for information.

RESTRICTED  
JIBS 213-2000-1

OUR FILE REF.



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE  
DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD

50028-B-40	
33	50

Ottawa, Ontario,  
May 26, 1961.

Mr. J.K. Starnes,  
Defence Liaison (2) Division,  
Department of External Affairs,  
East Block,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

*J* 52

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Dear *John,*

I refer to your letter of April 20, in which you agreed that an unclassified treatment of the subject of Soviet Civil Defence Planning would be useful to the Emergency Measures Organization. We have produced such a statement, which you may wish to forward to Mr. Curry.

MAY 31 1961

Yours sincerely,

I. Bowen,  
Director,  
Joint Intelligence Bureau.

*Att: 2*  
*Mr. Curry*  
*sent June 7*  
*White*  
*to (now 14)*

Att: 2

## SOVIET CIVIL DEFENCE PLANNING

### Assumptions

1. The possibility of a surprise attack is admitted by the Soviet authorities, however they think that actual hostilities will be preceded by a period of growing tension. This period would, in effect, serve as a warning and provide time for defensive preparations such as mobilization of civil defence units and evacuation of probable target areas.
2. Attack would involve the use of nuclear weapons.
3. After an "all clear"/<sup>the</sup>public stays under cover until advised otherwise.
4. The post-attack period would last about 2 or 3 days during which rescue, first aid and firefighting measures would be carried out. The period of restoration follows.
5. Non-target areas will provide material aid in the post-attack period.

### Organization

6. The central responsibility for civil defence was until January 1960 the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior which was abolished at that time. It has not been announced who will assume this responsibility henceforth.
7. The ex-officio head of municipal civil defence is the Chairman of the (elected) Town Executive Committee. Actual planning is carried out by the town civil defence staff. The nucleus of civil defence services are the existing peacetime services such as fire, health, etc. These are supplemented by trained members of the public.
8. Industrial civil defence which is subordinate to the municipal civil defence organization is organized along the same line as that of the town.
9. Residential areas and educational establishments organize 'self defence groups' (45 to 73 people). Groups are formed for administratively convenient units, varying from 200 persons in rural areas to 700 in densely populated urban ones. Each group consists of leaders and six teams - preservation of order, fire, decontamination, rescue, medical and shelters. In rural areas a seventh team - veterinary - is added. Educational establishments are also responsible for organizing and training stretcher bearers.

### Training

10. Civil Defence schools are in existence throughout the USSR. They are responsible for training instructors for mass training programmes.
11. Instruction for the public is conducted by DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Co-operation with the Army, Aviation and Navy).
12. Instruction about the capabilities of nuclear weapons started in 1955 with a 10-hour lecture course. It is claimed that 85 per cent of the adult population had taken the course. In 1957, a 22-hour course was started. A third course of 14 hours began in 1959. In 1960, a fourth course of 18 hours was started.

- 2 -

13. The latest course (18 hours), for the first time, introduces information about fallout. This course also places considerable emphasis on pre-attack evacuation - this is a change in policy.

14. Self defence group training is distinct from the mass education programme. The former is related to the tasks of the group; the latter is related to personal survival.

15. Some Civil Defence training is given to university students, and in high schools.

#### Shelters and Evacuation

16. Shelters against blast, fire, radiation, biological and chemical agents have been incorporating in basements of new buildings. Basement shelter construction started to diminish in 1955 and seems to have been abandoned in major urban centres since 1959.

17. Pre-attack evacuation is receiving considerable emphasis but at the same time, there has been an increase of "free standing" shelters which indicates a combined shelter-evacuation policy.

18. Although the shelter programme has been modified, there is probably enough shelter accommodation for a substantial portion of the population of the major centres.

#### Urban Planning

19. There is evidence that civil defence considerations relating to the siting of some types of buildings, e.g., transportation facilities, factories, etc are applied.

20. Soviet building regulations lay down fairly strict regulations with regard to spacing between new buildings (twice their height), and fire resistant materials.

#### Effectiveness of Programme

21. The mass training programme is the best known. There is sufficient equipment, e.g., anti-gas, radiation detection, protective clothing, for training.

22. It is probable that about 80 million adults have received training since 1955. One quarter of these can be said to have a good grounding and are ready for the more advanced training. (See para. 13).

23. Although the civil defence organization is "not ready for war" its progress is greater than that of any other major power.

#### The Satellites

24. They follow the general lead of the USSR. The amount of basement shelter construction is not as great as in the USSR mainly because they have not had as much housing development.

25. Mass training has been negligible in Albania and Rumania; in Poland it has been mainly limited to industrial workers; in Bulgaria, although great claims are made there is little evidence that the programme is effective; Czechoslovakia, which started mass training in 1959, claims over 1,200,000 have been trained; East Germany started its programme in 1958.

50028-13-40	
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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE CSC 9-27 (JIC)	



# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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*J.S.D.*

23 May, 1961.

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### INTELLIGENCE REPORT - RUSSIAN FREIGHTER NOVOROSSISK

- Enclosures: (1) Boarding Report and Boarding Officers comments.
- (2) Crew list
- (3) Photograph of ship

Enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are forwarded for information.

2. Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of circulation the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais) -  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: *J.K. Starnes, Esq.,*  
Dept. of External Affairs.

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EXCERPT OF THE MINUTES OF THE 823rd  
MEETING OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE  
HELD ON MAY 17, 1961

50028-B-10	
14	—

XVI. THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS DISARMAMENT (CONFIDENTIAL)

29. The Chairman read a further message (WX 2040 of 5 May 61) from the JICLO(W) regarding the previous decision of the Committee that CANADIAN JIC 353/2 (60) of 24 February, 1960 on the above subject might be released by the US Department of State to the Institute of Defence Analysis (IDA) providing there was no attribution to the JIC and the contents were not interpreted as representing official Canadian view.

(CSC 1644-8 (JIC))

30. The Committee instructed the Secretary to inform the JICLO(W) that the JIC accepts the wording contained in his message to the effect that: "This is an intelligence research paper produced in Canada in 1960. As an intelligence study it does not, however, necessarily reflect Official Canadian Government views".

ACTION: Secretary



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
No. CSC 9-27 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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11 May, 1961.

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REPORT ON SECOND VISIT OF SOVIET TANKER ALITUS  
TO HALIFAX, N.S. 29 APRIL - 1 MAY 61

Reference: (a) CSC 9-27 (JIC) dated 28 Apr 61 on  
the above subject.

MAY 17 1961

Enclosure: (1) 14 photographs of Soviet tanker ALITUS.

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded for the information of members.
2. Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of circulation the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.


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cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs.  
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# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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### INTELLIGENCE REPORT - RUSSIAN FREIGHTER EMELIAN PUGACHEV

Reference: (a) CSC 9-27 (JIC) dated 13 April, 1961 **MAY 10 1961**  
on the above subject.

Enclosures: (1) Merchant Ship Intelligence Report - Russian  
freighter EMELIAN PUGACHEV

*File*  
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- One complete copy of the above report is forwarded for information.
- Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of circulation the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: *J.K. Starnes, Esq.,*  
Dept. of External Affairs.  
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# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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### INTELLIGENCE REPORT - POLISH FISH FACTORY TRAWLER "DALMOR"

MAY 10 1961

Enclosure: (1) Merchant Ship Intelligence Report - Polish  
Fish Factory Trawler DALMOR

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1. One complete copy of the above report is forwarded for information.
2. Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of circulation the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: *J.K. Starnes, Esq.,*  
Dept. of External Affairs.  
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NO. CSC 9-27 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT - SOVIET MERCHANT SHIP "USSURIJSK

MAY 5 1961

Enclosure: (1) Merchant Ship Intelligence Report - Russian Freighter USSURIJSK

1. One complete copy of the above report is forwarded for information.

2. Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of this circulation the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.

*8 file ml*

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: *J.K. Starnes, Esq.,*  
Dept. of External Affairs.

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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 9-27 (JIC)



# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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### SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS TIKSI AND ALEXANDER NEVSKY

- References: (a) CSC 9-27 (JIC) dated 24 April, 1961  
"Soviet Freighter TISKI"  
(b) CSC 9-27 (JIC) dated 24 April, 1961  
"Soviet Freighter ALEXANDER NEVSKY"

MAY 5 1961

*J. H. W.*

- Enclosures: (1) Stores Purchase List (3 pages) - S.S. TIKSI  
(2) 2 Air Photographs - S.S. TISKI  
(3) Stores Purchase List (3 pages) - S.S. ALEXANDER NEVSKY  
(4) 1 Air Photograph - S.S. ALEXANDER NEVSKY

The above enclosures are forwarded for information.

2. Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of circulation the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.


*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs  
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EXCERPT OF THE MINUTES OF THE 822nd  
MEETING OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE HELD  
ON MAY 3, 1961



XVI. THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS DISARMAMENT

(CONFIDENTIAL)

25. The Secretary tabled a message from the JICLO(W) (WX 2036 of 28 Apr) which requested JIC approval for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the US Department of State to make available a copy of CANADIAN JIC 353/2 (60) of 24 February, 1960 on the above subject to a private research organization, the Institute of Defence Analysis (IDA). The Disarmament Administration has recently contracted with the IDA for research work in the field of disarmament and under the terms of US contracts of this nature, selected classified materials are made available to assist in this work.

(GSC 1644-8 (JIC))

26. After discussion, Mr. Bowen proposed and the Committee agreed that the Secretary reply to this request informing the JICLO(W) that the JIC has no objection to the contents of this paper being released to this civilian organization providing that there is no attribution to the Canadian JIC and the contents are not interpreted as representing an official Canadian view.

ACTION: Secretary



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
No. GSC 7-17 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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3 May, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

THE SOVIET MOOD

Enclosure: (1) Telegram 231 dated 28 April, 1961 from Canadian Ambassador in Moscow to the Department of External Affairs.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.

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*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

MAY 2 1961  
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Enc.  
EAB/2-5459/ep  
cc: JIS (2)  
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S E C R E T

FM MOSCOW APR 28/61 SECRET

TO TT EXTERNAL 231 FM LDN

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THE SOVIET MOOD

DATED APR 26. INsofar AS WORLD POLITICS ARE CONCERNED, SOVIET LEADERS ARE IN A SLIGHTLY DISQUIETING BUT NOT RPT NOT, I THINK, SURPRISING MOOD. ITS MOST STRIKING ASPECT IS AN UNDERSTANDABLE, IF PERHAPS EXAGGERATED, SELF-CONFIDENCE. I HOPE IN DUE COURSE TO FIND AN OPPORTUNITY OF RECORDING MY IMPRESSIONS OF THE CHANGES IN THIS COUNTRY SINCE I LEFT FIFTEEN YEARS AGO, AND THE MARKED PROGRESS - NOT RPT NOT ONLY MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL, BUT ALSO CULTURAL, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL - WHICH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. BASICALLY, I THINK SOVIET LEADERS FEEL NOT RPT NOT ONLY THAT THEIR SYSTEM HAS ON THE WHOLE BEEN SERVING THEM WELL: BUT ALSO FEEL THAT WESTERN SYSTEM IS NOW SHOWING INCREASING SIGNS OF SERVING WEST BADLY. I THINK THEY REALLY BELIEVE THAT MOST BROAD HISTORICAL FORCES ARE GOING THEIR WAY. IT NO RPT NO LONGER SEEMS TO TAKE SUCH A STRENUOUS ACT OF FAITH AS IT DID SOME YEARS AGO TO BELIEVE THIS. THE MOOD OF INEVITABLE EXPANSION AND PROGRESS IS THUS PERHAPS COMPARABLE TO THAT OF ENGLISH AT THE END OF THE VICTORIAN ERA.

2. RUSSIAN LEADERS AS WELL AS RUSSIAN PEOPLE WHO ARE MUCH MORE MODEST, ARE I THINK GENUINELY AND DEEPLY CONCERNED LEST A MAJOR WAR NOT RPT NOT ONLY INTERRUPT THESE TRENDS BUT DESTROY THE WHOLE PROCESS. I THINK THE LEADERS ARE RESPONSIBLY CONCERNED TO AVOID THIS BY MINIMISING THE DANGERS AS THEY SEE THEM. BUT THEY DO FEEL THAT THEY ARE ON THE CREST OF THE WAVE. FROM TALKS I HAVE HAD THUS FAR WITH A FEW MEMBERS OF THE PRAESIDIUM AND WITH VARIOUS MINISTERS, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS CONFIDENCE IS BASED NOT RPT NOT MERELY ON THE KNOWLEDGE THAT DESPITE REAL PROBLEMS THEIR OWN PROGRESS IS SOLID AND BRADLY-BASED, BUT ALSO ON VARIOUS DIFFICULTIES FACED BY WEST, TO WHICH THEY OBVIOUSLY ATTACH CONFIRMATORY IMPORTANCE FOR THEIR BELIEFS.

3. PROMINENT AMONG THESE FACTORS IN THEIR MINDS IS THE HIGH RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AT PRESENT IN USA AND CDA. I THINK COMMUNIST LEADERS GENUINELY BELIEVE THAT,

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PROVIDING PEACE CAN BE MAINTAINED, THE AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WASTE CAUSED BY UNEMPLOYMENT AND OTHER UNPRODUCTIVE FEATURES OF WESTERN SOCIETY MAKE IT INEVITABLE THAT WITHIN FIFTEEN YEARS OR SO THE COMMUNIST WORLD WILL BECOME DOMINANT IN PRODUCTIVITY AND STANDARD OF LIVING AS WELL AS IN OTHER WAYS.

4. ANOTHER FACTOR THAT THEY CONSIDER HAPPILY SIGNIFICANT IS THE FAILURE IN MANY COUNTRIES OF WESTERN SUPPORTED ANTI-COMMUNIST REGIMES TO WIN STRONG POPULAR SUPPORT, AS EVIDENCE BY POPULAR RISINGS AGAINST SYNGHMAN RHEE IN KOREA AND DIEM IN SOUTHVIETNAM. THEY EXPECT FURTHER SUCH DIFFICULTIES FOR PRO-WESTERN REGIMES NOT RPT NOT ONLY IN THOSE COUNTRIES BUT IN IRAN, THAILAND AND ELSEWHERE IN ASIA, AND IN MANY COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA. THE ATTEMPTED REBELLION BY FRENCH OFFICERS IN ALGERIA AGAINST GEN DE GAULLE IS REGARDED AS YET FURTHER EVIDENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTIONS IN WESTERN SOCIETY FROM WHICH THEY CAN, IF THEY PLAY THEIR CARDS CAREFULLY, BENEFIT IMPORTANTLY IN EUROPE AND AFRICA.

5. THE APPARENT FIASCO OF AMERICAN-INSPIRED INVASION ATTEMPT AGAINST CUBA HAS OF COURSE GIVEN THIS FEELING OF CONFIDENCE HERE STILL ANOTHER BOOST, AND PROVIDED STILL ANOTHER GIFT FOR SOVIET COLD-WAR EXPLOITATION NOT RPT NOT ONLY AMONG LATIN AMERICANS, BUT AMONG AFRO-ASIAN NEUTRALISTS AND WITHIN WESTERN ALLIANCE ITSELF. RUSSIAN LEADERS HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN SLOW TO EXPLOIT IT. AT THE SEVERAL RECEPTIONS AT THE KREMLIN AND THE GOVT RECEPTION CENTRE ON LENIN HILLS DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS FOR SOUVANNA PHOUMA, FOR THE VISITING BURMESE COS, IN REPLY TO THE INEVITABLE TOASTS AT AFRICA DAY RECEPTION, ETC, VICE-PREMIER KOSYGIN, IN KHRUSHCHOVS ABSENCE, HAS SEIZED EVERY OCCASION TO PONTIFICATE NO RPT NO LESS PONDEROUSLY ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS INVASION THRUST AND THEN FLOP THAN HE DID DURING THE PREVIOUS WEEKS CEREMONIES ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIETS SPACE ACHIEVEMENTS AND THE TRIUMPHS OF YURI GAGARIN.

6. KHRUSHCHOVS MSG OF APR 22 TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON CUBA, WHILE LESS THREATENING THAN THAT OF APR 18 (WHICH IN ITSELF WAS MUCH LESS SPECIFIC, IN ITS PROMISES OF QUOTE ALL NECESSARY AID UNQUOTE, THAN LAST SUMMERS RATTLING OF ROCKETS) WAS CERTAINLY TOUGH AND MUCH MORE THOUGHTFUL.

7. I DID NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT SOVIET GOVT COULD OR WOULD HAVE INTERVENED MILITARILY IN CUBA HOWEVER WELL THE INVADERS HAD DONE. I AM SURE THEY APPRECIATED THE LOGISTIC DIFFICULTIES OF SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET SUPPORT IN CARIBBEAN, AS THEY DID IN CONGO, AND WERE PLANNING ON LATIN AMERICAN AND WORLD REACTION AGAINST USA AS THE CHIEF

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BENEFIT TO BE DERIVED BY USSR FROM THE AFFAIR. SOVIET PROMISES OF SUPPORT WHICH (GIVEN PREVIOUS SOVIET COMMITMENTS TO CASTRO) PERHAPS SEEMED THE LEAST THEY COULD DO, MAY HAVE BEEN BASED ON CONFIDENCE THAT THE BLUFF WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE CALLED, DERIVED FROM SOURCES OF INFO ON THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF CUBAN REGIME AND THE INSURGENTS BETTER THAN THOSE OF CIA. BUT IF THE INVASION HAD SUCCEEDED, OR BEEN FOLLOWED BY DIRECT AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION, USSR WOULD NOT RPT NOT I THINK HAVE DARED INTERVENE MILITARILY IN THAT THEATRE. ON THE OTHER HAND, I THINK THEY MIGHT HAVE TRIED TO BALANCE A DEFEAT IN CUBA BY INCREASED PATHET LAO ACTIVITY IN LAOS. I THINK IT IS AT LEAST VERY POSSIBLE NOW THAT THEY WILL IN ANY CASE TRY TO MAKE AMERICANS PAY FOR THE UNSUCCESSFUL INITIATIVE IN CUBA AND THE CONSEQUENT LOSS OF PRESTIGE BY INCREASED PATHET LAO INTRANSIGENCE IN LAOS, AT LEAST IN THE POLITICAL FIELD, FIRST IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASE FIRE AND A COALITION GOVT.

8. MOREOVER, THE FACT THAT KHRUSHCHOV WROTE SUCH A SEVERE THOUGH NOT RPT NOT BELLIGERENT LET TO USA PRESIDENT, LECTURING HIM LIKE A STERN UNCLE ABOUT THE DANGERS OF KENNEDYS IMPLICATION THAT DIRECT USA INTERVENTION IN CUBA MIGHT UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES BE NECESSARY, IS I THINK SIGNIFICANT. KHRUSHCHOV IN EFFECT PURPORTED TO BRUSH ASIDE THE MONROE DOCTRINE BY REFS TO THE POSSIBLE APPLICATION BY USSR OF A SIMILAR POINT OF VIEW APPLIED TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES WHERE ANTI-SOVIET BASES EXIST. THIS IS NOT RPT NOT ONLY GOOD DEBATING, BUT I THINK THOUGHT-PROVOKING AND DISQUIETING. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE TO READ THIS IMPORTANT SECTION OF KHRUSHCHOVS MSG TO MEAN THAT HE DOES NOT RPT NOT WANT TO PLAY THE GOLD-WAR GAME IN QUITE THAT WAY BECAUSE HE IS AWARE OF THE DANGERS. THIS READING WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH SOVIET DESIRE TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL RATHER THAN A MILITARY SETTLEMENT IN LAOS, AND WITH LIPPMANNS APPRECIATION OF SOVIET POLICIES FOLLOWING HIS RECENT TALK WITH KHRUSHCHOV IN SOCHI. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS I THINK QUITE ARGUABLE THAT SOVIET LEADERS CONCEPT OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE MEANS NOT RPT NOT THE DESIRABILITY OF A DETENTE AND AN OVERALL AGREEMENT WITH WEST, BUT RATHER A TWOFOLD POLICY OF (A) AVOIDING ACTUAL MILITARY ADVENTURES INVOLVING DIRECT GREAT POWER ACTIVITY, SINCE A LIMITED WAR COULD TOO EASILY ESCALATE TO A GLOBAL WAR, BUT NEVERTHELESS (B) AN INCREASE IN GOLD-WAR ACTIVITY BY POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND IN CERTAIN AREAS WHERE IT SEEMS SAFE BY PARAMILITARY MEANS, SO THAT USSR MAY EXPLOIT THOSE QUOTE BROAD HISTORICAL FORCES UNQUOTE WHICH I THINK THEY GENUINELY BELIEVE ARE GOING THEIR WAY.

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SECRET

9. I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO THINK THAT SOVIET LEADERS REALLY WANT DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AT PRESENT ON THE TERMS WHICH THEY MUST KNOW THEY WOULD HAVE TO PAY TO GET THEM. SHORTLY AFTER MY ARRIVAL HERE I CALLED ON TSARAPKIN, AN OLD ACQUAINTANCE, AND HAD AN HOURS TALK WITH HIM BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR GENEVA NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TALKS. ALTHOUGH HE REPEATEDLY ASSURED ME THAT HIS GOVT REALLY DID WANT AN AGREEMENT, I FORMED THE VERY STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THEY DID NOT RPT NOT AND THAT HE DID NOT RPT NOT EXPECT TO ACHIEVE ONE. HE STRUCK ME AS A DISAPPOINTED AND DISILLUSIONED MAN, NATURALLY PREPARED TO OBEY HIS ORDERS LIKE A GOOD SOLDIER. HE TOLD ME SADLY AND I THOUGHT RATHER POINTEDLY, THAT HE HAD SPENT SEVERAL YEARS ALREADY NOW IN FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS ON DISARMAMENT, WHEREAS HE HAD A MUCH MORE INTERESTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE JOB TO DO AS HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. AT THE TIME I DICTATED A REPORT SUGGESTING THAT USSR HAD ABANDONED FOR THE TIME BEING ITS DESIRE FOR A TEST-BAN AGREEMENT, BUT I DECIDED NOT RPT NOT TO SEND IT SINCE IT SEEMED, IN THE FACE OF HIS WORDS, TOO SWEEPING A CONCLUSION FOR ME TO REACH AFTER ONLY A FEW WEEKS IN USSR. HOWEVER, SUBSEQUENT EVENTS SEEM TO ME TO CONFIRM THAT THIS MELANCHOLY IMPRESSION WAS FOR THE TIME BEING SOUND. 11

10. THE TONE OF KHRUSHCHOV'S APR 22 MSG TO KENNEDY ON CUBA COMBINED WITH SOVIET BEHAVIOUR AT THE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN CONFERENCE, SEEM TO CAST DOUBT ON THE OPTIMISTIC HYPOTHESIS THAT SOVIET LEADERS REALLY SEEK AT PRESENT IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH USA OR ANY DETENTE OR AGREEMENT WITH WEST. THEY MAY AND I HOPE WILL DESIRE THIS LATER. MEANWHILE, WHILE THEY DO NOT RPT NOT WANT INCREASING RISKS, THEY SEEM DETERMINED TO EXPLOIT SUCH COLD-WAR OPPORTUNITIES AS COME THEIR WAY. H

11. ON THE OTHER HAND, I THINK IT WOULD BE WRONG TO BE TOO GLOOMY ABOUT THE PROSPECT. IT IS, I THINK, CERTAINLY DESIRABLE AND INDEED ESSENTIAL THAT WEST MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT BOTH TO REMEDY THE WEAKNESSES IN OUR OWN SOCIETY (UNEMPLOYMENT, WASTE AND DISUNITY) AND TO IMPROVE THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION WITHIN OUR CIVILIZATION. SITTING IN MOSCOW, AT THE HEART OF THIS HUGE LAND EMPIRE, IT IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND THE LATENT AND STILL ALMOST SUB-CONSCIOUS ASSUMPTION OF MANY RUSSIANS THAT BOTH EUROPE AND MUCH OF ASIA ARE IN A SENSE MERELY SUBURBS, OF SECONDARY LONG TERM IMPORTANCE. IT IS, I THINK, IMPORTANT THAT WESTERN EUROPE SHOULD DRAW CLOSER TOGETHER, AND SUBMERGE ITS DIFFERENCES IN A LARGER EFFORT AT COOPERATION. IT MAY BE DESIRABLE THAT NORTH AMERICA SHOULD NOT RPT NOT MERELY SUPPORT BUT JOIN IN THIS TASK. THE DIFFICULTIES ARE

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OF COURSE FORMIDABLE, BUT THE DANGERS IF WE DO NOT RPT NOT ARE I THINK STILL MORE FAR-REACHING, FOR SOVIET SELF-CONFIDENCE IS NEITHER SUPERFICIAL NOR BASED ENTIRELY ON A CHIMERA.

12. THERE ARE OF COURSE CONTRADICTIONS APLENTY WITHIN COMMUNIST BLOC, AND PROCESSES AT WORK HERE WHICH OFFER US GROUND FOR HOPE. THE MOST OBVIOUS CONTRADICTIONS ARE NO RPT NO DOUBT RELATED TO PROBLEMS BETWEEN RUSSIANS AND CHINESE, AND BETWEEN RUSSIANS AND THE MORE OR LESS SUBJECT PEOPLES ON THEIR WESTERN FRONTIER IN EASTERN EUROPE, INCLUDING THE BALTIC STATES. THERE ARE ALSO DIFFICULTIES AND SERIOUS WASTE IN SOVIET SYSTEM, CAUSED CHIEFLY BY BUREAUCRACY. I SUSPECT THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR MAY TURN OUT TO BE THE CHANGING ATTITUDES OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS, THOUGH I HAVE CERTAINLY NOT RPT NOT BEEN HERE SUFFICIENTLY LONG TO ATTEMPT TO REPORT ON THESE ATTITUDES.

13. I AM AWARE ALSO THAT JUST AT THE MOMENT SEVERAL THINGS HAVE GONE VERY WELL FOR USSR. BUT I DO NOT RPT NOT THINK I AM EXAGGERATING THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS SENSE OF SELF-CONFIDENCE. THE FACT THAT THEY OVERREACHED THEMSELVES IN CONGO, AND THUS FAR AT LEAST ON THE QUESTION OF UN STRUCTURE, IN A SENSE ALSO SUPPORTS THIS THESIS. THIS POTENTIALLY DISTURBING SELF-CONFIDENCE MAY CONCEIVABLY MAKE ITSELF FELT IN THEIR ATTITUDE TO BERLIN QUESTION AND GERMAN PROBLEM, AS WELL AS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA.

ARNOLD SMITH



# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. **CSC 2106-1 (JIC)**

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1 May, 1961.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

ANNUAL REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES IN  
THE SOVIET NORTH

Reference: (a) Appendix "A" to JIC Work Programme, CSC  
2-1-3-1, CSC 2-1-3-6 (JIC) of 14 December, 1960.

Serial 11 of above reference covers the preparation of a paper on this subject with a cut-off date of 1 June, 1961 and with contributions to reach the Secretary by 8 June, 1961.

2. The preparation of a paper on this subject will be considered at the meeting of the Committee to be held on 10 May, 1961.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: CJS  
JIS (2)  
SO/JIR  
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May 1961

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**JOINT INTELLIGENCE BUREAU**  
**Ottawa**

THE ECONOMIES OF SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES - 1960

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Joint Intelligence Bureau  
Department of National Defence  
OTTAWA, CANADA

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THE ECONOMIES OF SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES - 1960

Ottawa, Canada  
May 1961

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THE ECONOMIES OF SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES - 1960

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THE ECONOMIES OF SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES - 1960

A. USSR

Introduction

1. Most of the goals set for the second year of the Seven Year Plan appear to have been fulfilled. Agriculture was the area of major failure judging from the reported harvests. The work week has been reduced to just under 40 hours for all state employees. Administrative changes designed to improve the functioning of various levels of local authority were also made during the year.

Economic Planning and Administration

2. In mid-1960 Republican Economic Councils were created to administer industrial management in Republics where numerous regional economic councils (Sovnarkhoz) existed. The Republics included were the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Kazakh SSR; in the Uzbek SSR the existing regional economic councils were amalgamated to form a single organization. This development modifies the decentralized system which was introduced in 1957; it results from recognition of the need for more centralized control in the allocation of resources. By reducing the tendency of local officials to further regional interests at the expense of those of the state and other regions, the Republican Economic Councils may well effect greater efficiency in the administration of industry.

3. As part of the overall effort to improve economic administration, adjustments were also made in the organization of economic planning. In April 1960, long-term and current planning, previously concentrated in the USSR Gosplan, were divided between the State Scientific-Economic Council (Gosekonomsovet) and Gosplan. With the transfer of planning duties, Gosplan's scientific research institutes also became the responsibility of the Gosekonomsovet. At the Republican level, duties previously exercised by Republican Gosplans were to some extent transferred to the Republican Economic Councils leaving the former to deal mainly with planning problems.

National Income

4. A preliminary estimate of the Soviet national income<sup>1</sup> for 1960 places the total at 144 billion roubles,<sup>2</sup> or some 160 billion Canadian dollars when the official Soviet exchange rate is applied. This figure is higher by 11 billion roubles (\$12.1 billion Canadian) than last year's national income total and constitutes growth at the rate of 8 percent.

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<sup>1</sup> The method of computing national income in the Soviet Union is different from that employed in a non-communist country. Among the more important values excluded in the Soviet compilation are the wages and salaries paid in return for the services of people in governmental, educational and medical institutions and organizations. This exclusion of services results in a measure of deflation which may or may not be offset by a measure of inflation introduced by the Soviet method of accounting for the value of industrial production.

<sup>2</sup> New roubles are used throughout this report.

5. Agriculture and industry continue to generate the bulk of national income in the U.S.S.R. and major real increases in national income can normally be traced to rising output in these two sectors. Since there has been no significant improvement in agricultural output, industry must be the source of most of the additional output responsible for swelling the national income in 1960.

#### State Budget

6. A preliminary assessment of income and revenue data indicates that the revenue estimate will be over-fulfilled by 0.1 percent, while the expenditure estimate will be under-fulfilled by 0.3 percent. On the basis of the figures released on 31 October 1959 and contained in the final budget draft ratified by the Supreme Soviet, total revenues for 1960 are tentatively accepted as 77.4 billion roubles and total expenditures 74.4 billion roubles. The excess of revenue over expenditure amounted to 3.1 billion roubles (rather than the 2.7 billion roubles originally forecast). In keeping with normal Soviet practice, few details of last year's budgeting operation have been released. The "national economy" category of the budget, out of which comes the bulk of funds for new capital development and formation of new circulatory accounts, received a total of 31 billion roubles. "Industry" as one of the sectors of the latter category got slightly more than half of the total, namely 15.6 billion roubles, the rest being distributed among agriculture, local government and a catch-all sector, including transport, communications and trade.

7. No statistics have been published relating to the deficit on the foreign trading account or to state subsidies for industrial and other enterprises.

8. On 5 May 1960 the Soviet Premier made much of government plans to abolish direct taxes on incomes. From October 1960, direct taxes were not to be levied on incomes of 500 roubles and less per month, while the deductions on incomes in the range 500/600 roubles per month were to be cut by 40 percent. The official preliminary release on the sources of revenue noted only that receipts accruing to the budget from the population would total 6.9 billion roubles in 1961 and account for only 8.8 percent of budgetary revenue as against 15.6 percent in 1955.

#### Defence Expenditures

9. The figures in the table below relate to the explicit defence vote as officially reported for the years 1956-1960:

TABLE I

#### Billions of current roubles

(a) Budgetary allocations for defence	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>
	9.7	9.7	9.4	9.4	9.6
(b) Total budgetary expenditures	56.4	59.8	64.3	70.0	74.4

10. Published defence expenditures have hovered at or near the same point for the past five years. As a proportion of total budgetary expenditures they have declined. Explicit defence expenditures do not, however, constitute total spending for military purposes.

Expenditures to finance military research and development, testing and evaluation, as well as the nuclear programme, are thought to be included in part in the totals voted for educational and social welfare purposes and for capital development. There may be other expenditures for armaments and military services outside the budget.

11. Budgetary defence expenditures provide an inadequate check on Soviet claims concerning reductions in military manpower levels. There may have been a saving of pay and wages (for both servicemen and civilian workers assisting them) and also of allocations for rations, clothing, equipment and barrack facilities resulting from a reduction in manpower and the resultant savings used to procure additional armaments and auxiliary equipment.

#### Investment

12. The annual plan for 1960 called for the spending of 30.5 billion roubles by State and Cooperative organizations (excluding Collective Farms) for capital development. At the official Soviet rate of exchange, the U.S.S.R. apparently invested a sum of money which, inclusive of Collective Farm Investments (assumed to be about 4 billion roubles) was somewhat more than the Canadian gross national product for 1959 - \$34.59 billion. Total state investment was larger by an unknown fraction than that originally programmed by the Seven Year Plan control figures - the average annual expenditure implicit in the latter being 27.7 to 28.1 billion roubles. Actual fulfillment of the annual plan was reported to be 3 percent less than the target. The immediate sources of underfulfillment were the programmes for purchases of equipment (5 percent less than planned) and building and installation work (1 percent less than planned).

13. State investments in the chemical, metallurgical, oil and gas, engineering, light and food industry and agriculture were claimed to have exceeded the levels of previous years by 33, 12, 10, 23, 15 and 19 percent respectively. Investment projects initiated in various periods, but brought to fruition in the past year, provided the economy with 1000 new state industrial enterprises, plus a large number of new shops erected as part of the internal expansion plans of operative enterprises. Among the other assets added last year to the country's fixed capital stock were over 2000 kilometres of electrified rail facilities, nearly 5000 kilometres of new gas pipeline and what is claimed to be the largest blast furnace in the world, a part of the development scheme at the Krivoi Rog Metallurgical Plant.

#### Industry

14. All of the major raw material targets outlined by the draft plan for 1960 are reported to have been achieved. Output of some important commodities is given in the following table:

TABLE II

	<u>Output in 1960</u>	<u>Increase over 1959</u>
pig iron (million metric tons)	46.8	9
steel ( " " " )	65.3	9
rolled products ( " " " )	50.9	8
oil ( " " " )	148.	14
coal ( " " " )	513.	1
gas (billion cubic metres)	47.	27

The slender margin of overfulfillment for coal probably reflects the reduced emphasis on coal as one of the major pillars upon which industrial development takes place. Until very recently, coal was perhaps the chief index of industrial progress since it was the prime energy factor. While it is true that coal remains and will continue for some time to be a major constituent of the energy balance, its weight in the balance is declining. Many of the chief manufactures of the engineering industry are also reported to have shown growth over last year, although the relation of actual production in 1960 to planned production is not specified. Among the products of the engineering industry reported as showing growth in output compared with 1959 were: petroleum equipment 92,800 tons (21 percent higher); diesel locomotives 1,303 units (30 percent higher); electrically powered buses 605,000 units (6 percent higher); trucks, diesel and gas buses 385,000 units (4 percent higher); passenger cars 139,000 (11 percent higher); tractors 238,500 (12 percent higher); and finally self-propelled grain combines 58,900 units (10 percent higher). Output of trolley buses at an annual rate of 605,000 units would seem to suggest that a very significant effort is being made to provide more adequate public transport facilities.

15. The output of some engineering items was less in 1960 than in 1959, for example: electrically powered locomotives, 9 percent less; tractor-drawn plows, 4 percent less; tractor-drawn sowers, 10 percent less; and finally, tractor-drawn cultivators 31 percent less.

16. The value of chemical equipment produced in 1960 was reported as 224 million roubles, which was said to be 129 percent of the value of output in 1959. The degree of fulfillment implied in the latter rouble figure also remains unknown.

17. It is quite clear from Soviet sources that many of the outputs for 1960, while they exceeded those for 1959, did not constitute 100 percent of the target planned for the year. Production of equipment in 1960 for the oil industry was 2 percent above 1959 output, but was also reported to be one of numerous unfulfilled indices in the 1960 plan. Extraction of gas, certain construction materials, chemical equipment and turbine generators were other items in the same class.

18. The problem of articulating semi-and fully automatic production processes remains an area of difficulty for Soviet industry. Partly this arises from lack of proper liaison between research and design specialists and industrial management and partly it is a question of the inherent difficulty of coping on the job with manufacturing processes which involve a complex of mechanical and electronic devices and facilities. While few areas of production are fully automatic, those that are, namely the petro-chemical and wood-chemical industries, are of great current importance and their malfunction may be having undesirable consequences in a varied field--for example, in agriculture and the textile industry.

19. In search of more efficient means of production, Soviet industry has perhaps been guilty of trying to solve all its problems at once. Highly efficient machinery has often been used in conjunction with quite primitive servicing or auxiliary implements. The consequences of this are output levels which accord more with the weakest or least efficient link in the chain of production than with the strongest or more efficient. The problem of rationalizing existing production methods is compounded by the need for management and planning organs to take advantage of the latest developments in the electrical and mechanical engineering fields. In essence, the net problem is to correlate the introduction of more efficient servicing devices with the application of semi- and fully automatic processes which in many cases radically alter the basic terms of production.

#### Selected non-ferrous metals

20. Nickel. It is estimated that Soviet nickel production totalled between 70,000 and 75,000 metric tons in 1960. The annual plan was fulfilled ahead of schedule, and if the progress made on the expansion of the northern metallurgical plants is indicative of national progress, then the Seven Year Plan goals for nickel may be met as early as 1963. Eighty percent of all nickel consumed in the country is reported to have been used to produce alloy steel. It would appear that Soviet production of nickel both at present and in the foreseeable future should more than satisfy requirements in the Soviet Union. Soviet stocks do not, however, appear to be sufficient to supply the requirements of the Satellites and Communist China.

21. Gold. Soviet gold production in 1960 is estimated at about 4 million ounces. By 1965 production will probably total 5 million ounces. Gold production plans in the Northeast are being fulfilled ahead of schedule. It would appear that this area, which produces about 40 percent of total gold mined, has doubled its production goal for 1965.

#### Agriculture

22. A combination of adverse weather and poor administration led to a failure of 1960 gross agricultural production to expand. The Soviet grain crop probably was about 110 million metric tons, although the official claim was 133 million tons. Both are considerably lower than the unrealistic, planned production of 152 million tons. Unsatisfactory grain yields in areas such as the Ukraine, where spring growing conditions were particularly bad, were offset by modest success in yields and harvest operations in Kazakhstan and particularly good results in parts of the Volga, Ural and Western Siberian regions. State procurement of grain in 1960 was only slightly higher than in 1959 and in some major grain growing areas the procurement plan was appreciably under-fulfilled. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which met in Moscow in January 1961 demonstrated considerable concern over the inadequate rate of growth in grain production and among other things called for measures aimed at increasing the cultivated area, concentrating on high yield grains and expanding irrigated acreage.

S E C R E T

- 6 -

23. In 1960 the Soviet livestock industry experienced considerable difficulty. Instead of increasing meat and milk production to 10.6 and 72 million metric tons, 1960 production actually fell below the 1959 levels of 8.6 and 62 million tons respectively. The January Plenum revealed that part of the problem lay in unwise practices in animal husbandry in 1959, but another major reason was the shortage of animal feed during 1960.

24. The output of many industrial crops was good in 1960. Sugar beet and sunflower seed production rose considerably from the poor totals of last year, with sugar beets increasing by some 8.2 million tons to a total production of over 48 million tons. The important cotton crop, however, declined by 7 percent over the record 1959 output. At the January Plenum the speaker for the important cotton producing area of the Turkmen SSR attributed the poor showing in cotton output to lack of labour organization and bad farm practices.

25. The regime's displeasure with the results of 1960 agriculture was registered in the removal in December of V.V. Matskevich from the post of Soviet Minister of Agriculture and in the subsequent dismissal of at least fourteen senior officials from other posts in the Soviet Union. Matskevich was appointed chairman of the newly organized Virgin Lands Kray, which is made up of a number of oblasts, some of which seriously underfulfilled their agricultural goals in 1960. Dissatisfaction with the performance of the Union Ministry of Agriculture led to a revision in its responsibilities early in 1961, and it is now charged principally with carrying out practical research and facilitating its more rapid application in Soviet agriculture.

#### Forest Products

26. In 1960 the Soviet goals for timber and paper were slightly exceeded. The relatively low priority of the paper industry continued to make plan fulfillment in all categories difficult and the goal for certain papers such as printing paper and newsprint were not met. Some newspapers were even required to reduce issues during the year. The production of viscose cellulose also failed to reach the planned total. The target for capital construction in the pulp and paper industry was only 78.5 percent fulfilled, the worst percentage showing since at least 1952. In an effort to remedy production problems in the pulp and paper industry the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers early in April 1960 recommended an investment increase of 26.5 percent over that originally planned for this industry in the Seven Year Plan.

#### Labour

27. The average number of workers (wage and salary) employed during 1960 in state enterprises was about 62 million. This represented an increase of 10 percent compared with 1959. The U.S.S.R. last year supplemented its socialized working population with a number of persons equivalent to 90 percent of Canada's total current labour force. The addition of 5.5 million persons to the state labour sector did not, however, constitute a net addition to the national labour force which includes not only the state or socialized work group but also non-socialized labour. Much of the increase in the state labour sector consisted of persons transferred from non-socialized work groups to the state labour force.

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28. Slightly more than 25 percent of the total number of persons added to the state labour force in fact consisted of persons formerly employed in cooperative industrial workshops. This group of people, numbering 1.4 million, represented the last significant vestige of private enterprise in urban areas in the U.S.S.R. (ice cream pedlars and such persons are still privately occupied in many areas). Their continued existence had long been considered something of a reproach to the social and economic system based as it is on state ownership. The immediate reason for the change probably lay in the desire of the state to be rid of the burden of supervising non-socialized manufacturing.

29. A further 25 percent of the total increment to the state labour force consisted of collective farmers who were transformed into state farmers. These workers will now presumably received a fixed daily income for the first time in their working lives.

30. If the persons transferred to the state labour force from the non-socialized sector are subtracted from the total increment to the state labour force, it appears that the net increase is of the order of 2.5 million. This net figure is made up of persons who are recent school leavers, housewives and demobilized servicemen. The exact contribution to the total net figure from each of these sources is not known.

31. During 1960 all state workers apparently became subject to the new six or seven hour day in accordance with the provisions applying to their particular occupations. Persons with arduous conditions of labour have normally been allotted the shortest work day, while clerical staff and so forth have the longer work day. The average work week in the U.S.S.R. is now reported to be 39.4 hours.

32. Not much has been said in the press about the effect of shortened hours of work on production. On the basis of past history it is a fair assumption that production has suffered qualitatively, if not quantitatively.

#### Housing

33. Planned increases in the residential dwelling area were not fulfilled in 1960. Construction of state owned residential buildings and homes financed by state credits was, however, up 9 percent compared with 1959. A total of 85 million square metres of living space was newly built and presumably occupied in 1960. This area was said to represent the equivalent of 2.4 million apartments or flats which implies an average area per flat of about 35 square metres. Personnel of collective farms and members of the rural intelligentsia (includes agronomists, collective farm managers, local party bosses, etc) are reported to have been responsible for construction of an additional 625,000 houses.

34. The shortfall in home construction targets, including state and private (other than farm), was the result of a government decision to curtail extension of credits to private home builders.

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S E C R E TConsumer Goods

35. State retail trade in food and non-food items is officially reported to have increased 11 percent compared with 1959. State retail trade consists of the commercial operations of both government retail stores and consumer cooperative organizations exclusive of the so-called "commission trade" of the cooperatives. Commission trade is an operation whereby consumer cooperatives are permitted to procure supplies (foods) directly from collective farms at preferred purchase prices (higher than normal state procurement prices). Total sales through all retail outlets (other than those operated privately by farmers) amounted to about 78.5 billion roubles. Converted to Canadian dollars, these sales amount to roughly \$86.5 billion. Total sales through recognized retail outlets in Canada in 1960 amounted to \$16.4 billion. In per capita terms, each Canadian bought consumers goods worth \$911, compared with a Soviet figure of \$400. It is true, of course, that direct sales by collective farmers through private market stalls are not included in the Soviet total, but these latter would not significantly affect the per capita figures, since in recent years direct sales through private stalls are reported to amount to slightly less than 5 percent of the total value of trade. This latter percentage does constitute an oversight, however, but this is more than compensated for by the fact that the per capita figure in Canada does not include retail sales effected through vending machines, door to door selling or retail selling by wholesalers. Actually, the Soviet per capita figure ought probably to be deflated in order to account for the relatively higher prices of consumers durables compared with Canada.

36. While it is probably true to say that the supplies of consumers goods are increasing in the U.S.S.R., it is probably equally true to say that in the past year the increase in per capita terms has been minute. This largely results from the failure of agriculture to turn out significantly increased supplies of non-processed goods which remain items of salient importance in the living standard of the average Soviet consumer.

B. THE EUROPEAN SATELLITESIntroduction

37. During 1960 economic growth in the Satellites is believed to have slowed somewhat. Preliminary US estimates of the gross national products (GNP) of the countries of Eastern Europe place growth in the range of 4 to 6 percent. If this estimate is correct, growth rates in the European Satellites for the first time since 1956 fell below the general rate of growth experienced by the rapidly expanding economies of Western Europe which in 1960 achieved an increase in GNP of 7 percent.

Industrial Production

38. The European Satellites are reported by the Russians to have turned out more than 25 percent of the total industrial production of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1960. While it is not possible to verify this figure, it is probably approximately correct and reflects the relative importance of Satellite industrial output.

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S E C R E T

39. Satellite rates of growth in industrial production last year averaged better than 10 percent or about the same as in the more developed and booming economies of the European Community. East Germany and Bulgaria did not quite meet their planned goals for industrial output. In the case of the former, useful progress was achieved in spite of the handicaps of inadequate procurement and distribution of industrial supplies and the large scale exodus of workers to West Germany. In the case of the latter it must be remembered that Bulgaria is already well ahead of its schedule as outlined in its 1958-62 plan.

40. Growth in heavy industry continued to account for the major share of satellite industrial expansion in 1960. Rumanian iron and steel along with the engineering and metal-processing industries, for example, contributed over 40 percent of the growth in output, and production increases in Czech engineering, chemical and building materials industries represented more than half of that country's total increase in industrial production.

#### Labour

41. Increases in the size of the labour force undoubtedly contributed to the expansion of industrial production in most of the Satellites. In the case of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria it is ~~known~~ that the labour force increased by from 4 to 5 and 5 to 6 percent respectively. Poland, however, claimed increased productivity with no increase in industrial employment and in view of what is known about industrial under-employment in Poland, this claim may indeed be valid.

#### Investment

42. In 1960 Satellite investment declined somewhat and, as in recent years, most countries did not fulfill their investment plans. The largest percentage increase was in Rumania where a 27 percent growth was claimed. Bulgaria and probably Hungary, however, made smaller increases than in 1959 and East German investment expanded by only 9 percent as compared with the 14.5 percent implied by the Seven Year Plan. East Germany's investment problems along with such factors as increased emigration appear to seriously reduce prospects for achieving 1965 production goals in such key commodities as chemicals.

#### Agriculture

43. Gross agriculture production expanded marginally in the European Satellites but failed to approach growth rates called for in various national plans. Probably the widest discrepancies between actual and planned production occurred in Albania and Bulgaria where output levels were 25 percent or more below announced targets. Poland claimed to have exceeded the plan with an increase of 5.4 percent but because of poor fall sowing conditions, winter-kill, spring drought and severe flooding it is difficult to believe that Polish agriculture grew by much more than half the amount claimed. A gross increase of 7 percent was reported by Czechoslovakia but the net output may have been no greater than in 1958. Part of the problem of increasing agricultural production springs from the policy of rapid collectivization. This has tended to lower peasant moral, present problems of labour control and in general disrupt the agricultural effort. East Germany although it did not quite meet its agricultural goal for 1960 did claim

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achieved full collectivization of the land. Rumania and Hungary also made considerable progress in land collectivization and with the exception of Poland all the countries of eastern Europe have attained the socializing of well over 80 percent of the agricultural land.

Standard of Living.

44. Small gains were made in the level of living in most of the Satellite countries in 1960. A notable exception was Poland where no increase occurred probably because of the poor performance of agriculture and a cut in industrial wages. It appears that with the emphasis on expanding capital investments in industry and agriculture in the 1961-65 period significant increases in personal consumption in Poland may be delayed until the middle of the decade. East Germany experienced some gain in levels of living but was forced to admit that it had no chance of making good its boast of catching up with West Germany in per capita consumption of major consumer goods by the end of 1961.

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

45. Efforts to achieve greater progress in Bloc specialization were continued during the year through the various commissions of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. While advances in this area have been understandably slow, some progress has been made. In industry agreement has been reached to date on the specialization of certain countries on such things as diesel locomotives, rail refrigerator cars, medium-size ships, some types of machine tools and certain equipment in the chemical, electrical and food processing industries. Agriculture co-operation has thus far been confined largely to the exchange of technical information. During the year there were several references to CEMA planning on a 20-year basis.



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 9-27 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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28 April, 1961.

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MAY 1 1961

REPORT OF VISIT OF SOVIET TANKER 'ALITUS' TO HALIFAX  
18-19 APRIL 1961

*file out*

Enclosure: (1) Merchant Ship Intelligence Report -  
Russian tanker ALITUS

1. One complete copy of the above report is forwarded for information.
2. Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of circulation the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs  
DNI  
JIB

*Not Document*

50028-B-40

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NO. CC 1374-1 (JIC)



# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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26 April, 1961.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

### SOVIET LIQUID PROPELLANTS

Enclosure: (1) SHAPE 0470.2/17 of 13 April, 1961.

APR 27 1961

Enclosure (1) requests comments on this paper.

2. It is requested that members give consideration to the preparation of suitable comments in reply to this request to reach the Secretary by 11 May 61.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/lc

cc: RCMP (no enclosure)  
JIS "

IN REPLY, PLEASE QUOTE

NO. CSC 9-27 (JIC).....



# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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25 April, 1961.

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### RUSSIAN ICG "INDIGIRKA"

Enclosure: (1) Photocopy of press photograph of ICG  
INDIGIRKA (UWEP), 7661 GRT.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for information.

2. Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the  
order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of circulation  
on the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.

APR 27 1961

*file (aw)*

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/cp

→ cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq., *No enclosure*  
Dept. of External Affairs  
DNI  
JIB

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NO. CSC 9-27 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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24 April, 1961.

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APR 25 1961

### INTELLIGENCE REPORT - RUSSIAN FREIGHTER TIKSI

Enclosure: (1) Merchant Ship Intelligence Report -  
Russian Freighter TIKSI

1. One complete copy of the above report is forwarded for information.
2. Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of circulation the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq., *no enclosure*  
Dept. of External Affairs  
DNI  
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No. CSC 9-27 (JIC)



CANADA

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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24 April, 1961.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT - RUSSIAN  
FREIGHTER ALEXANDER NEVSKY

APR 25 1961  
*[Signature]*

Enclosure: (1) Merchant Ship Intelligence Report -  
Russian Freighter ALEXANDER NEVSKY

1. One complete copy of the above report is forwarded for information.
2. Addressees are requested to circulate this document in the order shown on the temporary docket. On completion of circulation the document should be returned to Secretary, JIC.

*[Signature]*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq., *no enclosure*  
Dept. of External Affairs  
DNI  
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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
No. GSC 1145-1 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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US AND CANADIAN OFFICIALS ONLY

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14 April, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

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REPORT ON A CHINESE COMMUNIST DOCUMENT  
PRESENTED TO THE CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST  
PARTIES FROM TWENTY-ONE NATIONS IN THE USSR

Enclosure: (1) Report on the above subject from the CIA which outlines the contents of the Chinese circular letter to Communist parties on the Sino-Soviet Dispute.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for the information of the JIC.

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APR 1961  
*9/16*  
*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*  
for  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/ep

cc: JIS (2)  
SO/JIR  
SO/CI



## INSTRUCTIONS

1. This form may be used in sending material for informational purposes from the Department to posts abroad and vice versa.
2. This form should *NOT* be used to cover documents requiring action.
3. The name of the person responsible for authorizing the despatch of the material should be shown opposite the words "Despatching Authority". This may be done by signature, name stamp or by any other suitable means.
4. The form should bear the security classification of the material it covers.
5. The column for "Copies" should indicate the number of copies of each document transmitted. The space for "No. of Enclosures" should show the total number of copies of all documents covered by the transmittal slip. This will facilitate checking on despatch and receipt of mail.

SECRET

Moscow  
7 April, 1961

Memorandum for G/C Mitchell

1 There was very little on my recent trip to SOCHI-SUKHUMI-TBILISI (March 23-30) which will be of special interest to the Intelligence world, but I shall give you this brief note on a couple of items:

(a) 927 Km. LOZOVAYA (on rail line MOSCOW-ROSTOV)

A new bridge over the rail lines is being built just to the north of the station. It is of reinforced concrete construction. The main work has been completed on the 10 central spans, each of them about 40 feet long. The approach spans at either end are scarcely started, but there will probably be about three at each end. From approximately the centre of the bridge, there is a bridge-ramp, not quite completed, leading down between the rail lines almost to the station itself. When completed, the whole structure will therefore be T-shaped, the upright part of the T running parallel to the tracks and the elongated horizontal part of the T running over the rails.

(b) 1032 Km. SLAVYANSK

In the rail yards at SLAVYANSK, I noted  $1\frac{1}{2}$  flat-cars full of metal piping, black in colour. Each pipe was approximately 6" in diameter and 40' long. There were approximately 125 pipes on the full flat car. Factory markings, as closely as I could distinguish, were as follows:


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(c) Approximately 2271 Km. PH of railway, between SOUKHUMI and TBILISI (which is single-track electrified the whole way)

Airfield  $\frac{1}{2}$  to 1 Km from railway line. Radar in operation; STRIKE OUT, BAR LOCK or CROSS OUT type. Runway appears to run approximately parallel to railway. Tank farm, about  $\frac{1}{2}$  Km east of radar and closer to track, consisting of approximately 100 smallish tanks, cylinders lying horizontally. Very approximate size: 10' diameter and 20' in length. As we passed in the train, we saw one jet fighter plane land and another take off. Type probably FACEPLATE.

(d) 2291.5 Km. LH side of railway. Small hydro-electric power station, 4 flues, approximately 3' - 4' diameter.

2 Unrelated to the trip I actually took, but possibly of interest, you will recall that the Foreign Ministry would not register for me a trip by train from Moscow to Tashkent, scheduled to leave Moscow on the evening of March 18. Protocol Division were at pains to assure me that this was for "purely temporary reasons".

  
(J. Blair Seaborn)

cc; Ambassador

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IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
No. CSC 1126-5 (JIC)  
CSC 1824-1 (JIC)



# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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7 April, 1961.

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APR 10 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SOVIET AND SATELLITE EMERGENCY  
AND CIVIL DEFENCE PLANNING

- Reference: (a) Minutes of the 817th meeting of the JIC - Item XII
- Enclosure: (1) letter to Mr. R.B. Curry, Director of EMO from Mr. J.K. Starnes dated 5 April, 1961 on the above subject.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for the information of members.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/cp

cc: JIS (2)  
SO/JIR  
SO/CI

C O P Y

SECRET

April 5, 1961.

Mr. R.B. Curry,  
Director, Emergency Measures Organization,  
Privy Council Office,  
East Block,  
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Curry,

I was glad to learn of your interest in the paper on "Soviet and Satellite Emergency and Civil Defence Planning" which was recently passed on to us by the United Kingdom Joint Intelligence Committee. The Canadian J.I.C. recently examined this paper and it was decided that I should forward to you the Committee's brief comments which I am attaching. You will note that we are substantially in agreement with the U.K. paper.

I note that you have asked for my comments on a proposal to circulate a summary of this paper to the provincial and municipal authorities concerned with civil defence in Canada. I very much regret to inform you that the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee is not in a position to authorize any circulation of the paper, even in a summarized form, under the very strict security rules which govern the handling and distribution of United Kingdom intelligence papers. Indeed, I regret that I must ask you to destroy the summaries which you have prepared.

These documents and their contents remain the property of the United Kingdom Government, even after their transmission to us. The United Kingdom intelligence authorities have repeatedly requested that the circulation of their papers be restricted to Ministers and senior officials in Ottawa who are dealing with some aspects of intelligence work or foreign affairs and that the documents be retained in special registries. I might add that the U.K. study on civil defence in the Soviet Bloc contains very sensitive information as it is largely based on reports collected from delicate sources. A

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) John Starnes

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30 March, 1961

Canadian JIC Comments on UK JIC (61) 12 (Final) of 27 Feb 61  
"Soviet and Satellite Emergency and Civil Defence Planning"

1. This paper contains an accurate and straightforward account of Soviet Bloc emergency and civil defence planning measures as they are known. We have no additional information on this subject. On the basis of our own reading of Soviet published material, we prefer the UK treatment of the re-emergence of the doctrine of long-term pre-attack evacuation of "non-effective" (paras 24,30) to that of other papers which have tended to dramatize this aspect. We agree with the assessment in para 37 that, "it cannot be said that the Soviet Union's Civil Defence Organization is 'ready for war', but it can be considered to have made more progress in terms of shelters built and personnel trained than that of any other major power".

EXCERPT OF THE MINUTES OF  
THE 817TH MEETING OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE  
COMMITTEE HELD ON APRIL 5, 1961

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X X. SOVIET LIKELY COURSES OF ACTION (CONFIDENTIAL)

14. The Committee considered a memorandum from the Secretary covering the preparation of the annual paper on "Soviet Likely Courses of Action Up to Five Years Ahead" (to include the Likelihood of War) (Serial 5 of the JIC Work Programme).

(CSC 7-17 (JIC) of 29 Mar 61)

15. The Committee agreed to the preparation of this paper with contributions in the form of amendments to the existing paper, CANADIAN JIC 354/2 (60), to reach the Secretary by 15 May, 1961.

ACTION: Chairman  
Members  
Secretary.

c.c. Major Blais, JIC

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SECRET

April 5, 1961.

Mr. R.B. Curry,  
Director, Emergency Measures Organization,  
Privy Council Office,  
East Block,  
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Curry,

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Yours sincerely,

John Starnes

J.K. Starnes.

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CSC 7-41-1 (JIC)

30 March, 1961.

Canadian JIC Comments on UK JIC(61) 12(Final) of 27  
Feb 61 "Soviet and Satellite Emergency and Civil  
Defence Planning"

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1. This paper contains an accurate and straightforward account of Soviet Bloc emergency and civil defence planning measures as they are known. We have no additional information on this subject. On the basis of our own reading of Soviet published material, we prefer the UK treatment of the re-emergence of the doctrine of long-term pre-attack evacuation of "non-effective" (paras 24,30) to that of other papers which have tended to dramatize this aspect. We agree with the assessment in para 37 that, "it cannot be said that the Soviet Union's Civil Defence Organization is 'ready for war', but it can be considered to have made more progress in terms of shelters built and personnel trained than that of any other major power".

*Duplicate*

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. GSC 7-4-1 (JIC).....

**Department of National Defence**

**SECRET**

**JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE**



30 March, 1961.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:**

**SOVIET AND SATELLITE EMERGENCY  
AND CIVIL DEFENCE PLANNING**

Attached are comments on the above-mentioned UK JIC paper (UK JIC(61)12). It has been suggested that the JIC may wish to draw the attention of the Emergency Measures Organization to this paper and to the JIC's comments upon it.

2. This subject will be considered under "Other Business" at the JIC meeting to be held on 5 April 1961.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

RAB/2-5459/1e

cc: CJS  
JIB (2)  
SQ/JIR  
SQ/CI

001662

SECRET

CSC 7-4-1 (JIC)  
30 March, 1961.

Canadian JIC Comments on UK JIC(61)12(Final) of 27 Feb 61  
"Soviet and Satellite Emergency and Civil Defence Planning"

1. This paper contains an accurate and straightforward account of Soviet Bloc emergency and civil defence planning measures as they are known. We have no additional information on this subject. On the basis of our own reading of Soviet published material, we prefer the UK treatment of the re-emergence of the doctrine of long-term pre-attack evacuation of "non-effectives" (paras 24,30) to that of other papers which have tended to dramatize this aspect. We agree with the assessment in para 37 that, "it cannot be said that the Soviet Unions' Civil Defence Organisation is 'ready for war', but it can be considered to have made more progress in terms of shelters built and personnel trained than that of any other major power".

50028-B-40
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SECRET

April 5, 1961.

Major E.A. Blais,  
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee,  
Department of National Defence,  
Room 4441, "A" Building,  
Ottawa.

Attached is a copy of my letter of today's date to Mr. R.B. Curry, the Director of the Emergency Measures Organization. You will recall that we discussed this U.K. paper at this morning's JIC meeting and that it was decided that I should forward the Committee's comments to Mr. Curry.

I should be grateful if you would send copies of my letter to Mr. Curry to the Members of the JIC.

John Starnes

J.K. Starnes.



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

NO. GSC 7-17 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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SECRET

30 March, 1961.

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APR 4 1961

*J. J. Blais*  
*ML*

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CB NRC

### REPORTS ON USSR

- Enclosures: (1) External Affairs' Message No. 147 dated 24 Mar 61.  
 (2) Report on visit to Altai Kray dated 9 Nov 60  
 (3) Report on visit to Kazakhstan dated 9 Nov 60  
 (4) Dept. of External Affairs Numbered letter No. 1199 dated Nov 16, 1960.

Enclosures (1) to (4) are forwarded for information of members.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Encs.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs. (no enclosure)

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SO/JIR " "  
SO/CI " "

*Nato Document*

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NO. CC 1747-1 (JIC)



# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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21 March, 1961.

*DZ*  
*[Signature]*

→ J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs.

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CB NRC

SOVIET BLOC MERSHIP  
INDEX AND DECODE

MAR 22 1961  
*[Signature]*

1. Reference is made to memorandum on this file dated 27 January, 1961, on this subject.
2. Enclosed are copies of SACLANF Serial 1182/3(61) dated 9 March, 1961. The attention of members is invited to paragraph 2. Any amendments to this publication should be forwarded to the Secretary as they become necessary.

*[Signature]*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: DMI (no enclosure)  
DSI "

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CONFIDENTIAL

OTTAWA, Ontario  
16 March 1961

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OP

AMENDMENT  
JIB(CAN)

J 28

MAR 22 1961

1. Reference our JIB(CAN) publication entitled EXTRACTS FROM THE SOVIET PRESS ON THE SOVIET NORTH,
2. The copy dated January/February 1961 was inadvertently numbered JIB(CAN) 3/61, which is the number of the November/December issue.
3. Would you please correct the January/February issue to number JIB(CAN) 5/61.

✓ file  
OP

*R. L. McGibbon*

(R.L. McGibbon)  
for Director  
Joint Intelligence Bureau

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NO. CC 1747-1 (JIC)



# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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1 March, 1961.

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MAR 2 1961

→ J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
 Dept. of External Affairs.  
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SOVIET BLOC MERSHIP  
INDEX AND DECODE

*file and.*

Reference: (a) CC 1747-1 (JIC) of 19 December, 1960.

Enclosure: (1) Change 2/61 to SACLANT Serial 1182 of December, 1960.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information. The attention of members is invited to paragraph 2. Any amendments to this publication should be forwarded to the Secretary as they become necessary.

*E.A. Blais*  
 (E.A. Blais)  
 Major,  
 Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/lc

cc. DMI (no enclosure)  
DSI

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NO. CSC 2133-2 (JIC)



# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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20 February, 1961.

*J25*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SINCE MAY

Enclosure: (1) Document No. A-25/60 dated 16 Dec 60 -  
Soviet Foreign Policy produced by  
External Affairs Sino-Soviet Study Group.

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.
2. It is realized that some members may have received copies of this paper in a previous distribution.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: J.K. Starnes, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs (no enclosure)  
JIS (1) (w/enclosure)



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
NO. CSC 1779-1 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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15 February, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

*g24*

SUGGESTED AUSTRALIAN - USSR  
CO-OPERATION IN SPACE RESEARCH

Enclosure: (1) Department of External Affairs  
Numbered Letter No. 31 dated  
23-January, 1961 from the Office  
of the High Commissioner for Canada,  
Canberra, Australia.

Enclosure (1) is forwarded for your information.

D-2
(3) <i>Q.S.F.</i>

FEB 16 1961  
*g f w*

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

Enc.

EAB/2-5459/1c

cc: CJS  
JIS(2)  
SO/JIR  
SO/CI



(2)

5. The Australians are studying the Soviet proposals closely and at this stage, at least, are prepared to keep the exchange of correspondence with the U.S.S.R. in scientific channels. To the best of their knowledge it appears that the Soviet suggestions are the first to have been made to a Western country.

High Commissioner

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50028-B-40  
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Copy No 2

JIB(CAN) 5/61

Date January/February

~~927~~ 927

**JOINT INTELLIGENCE BUREAU**  
**Ottawa**

EXTRACTS FROM THE SOVIET PRESS  
ON THE SOVIET NORTH

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MAR 17 1961

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**Joint Intelligence Bureau**  
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GLOSSARY

ASSE	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
kolkhoz	Collective farm
NP	North Pole
oblast'	Administrative region
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republics
Severnaya	Northern
sovkhos	State farm (enterprise)
SYP	Seven Year Plan
Vorkutaugol'	Vorkuta Coal

SOURCES

Daily Review of Soviet Press  
Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta  
Gudok  
Komsomolskaya Pravda  
Krasnaya Zvezda  
Kryl'ya Rodiny  
Literatura i Zhizn  
Meteorologiya i Gidrologiya  
Moskovskiy Komsomolets  
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Rechnoy Transport  
Sovetskaya Rossiya  
Soviet Union Today  
Sovetskaya Torgovlya  
Stroitel'naya Gazeta  
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Vodnyy Transport

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## AGRICULTURE & FISHERIES

### Russian Salmon

"Russian salmon" is the name given by Norwegians to the species of Far East Salmon that has now appeared in great numbers in the rivers of Norway and the U.S.S.R.

Many experiments have been made in acclimatizing Pacific Ocean salmon in Atlantic waters. The first of them were made at the end of the last century by the Americans, who for several years transported salmon from Californian and Alaskan rivers to waters in the Hawaiian Islands, Tasmania, New Zealand, Chile, Argentina, the eastern coast of North America, England, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Finland.

But the Americans succeeded in creating salmon shoals in three instances only. After down stream migration and the feeding period, salmon began entering the rivers of New Zealand, Chile (Terra del Fuego region) and the region of the Great Lakes (U.S.A.). In all other instances the experiment, organized on a big scale, ended in failure.

In the U.S.S.R. the acclimatization not only of fish but also of invertebrates for feed is widely practiced. In the last 10 years over one million fecundated roe-corns and about one million larvae, fry and yearlings were transported to different basins.

The acclimatization of Far East salmon in the North began in 1933 in MURMANSK region. In 7 years 9 million larvae were let out, after which the work had to be interrupted owing to the beginning of World War II.

Experiments were renewed in 1956. Fecundated pink salmon roe in the "eye" stage (most stable in transportation) was brought every year from the Far East to the MURMANSK fish breeding stations. In that time 11 million larvae and more than 36 million sufficiently grown and strong fry of chum and pink salmon were let out in the rivers of the MURMANSK region.

What does the name Pacific Ocean salmon, or Far East salmon stand for? It is a general name for many varieties. So far fish breeders have begun to acclimatize chum and pink salmon.

The average length of an adult pink salmon is 47cm, and its weight 1.4 kg. Specimens 68 cm long, weighing 3 kg. are sometimes found.

Chum, pink salmon and other salmon species ripen in the second year of their life and spawn only once, after which they perish. But there is a very fecund species of Far East salmon, called king salmon, which is very big (up to 1 m. long and weighing up to 25 kg.) and spawns several times. It resembles European salmon and holds out the best prospect of acclimatization in northern waters.

The first return of pink salmon was expected in 1958, but neither that year nor the next did it enter the rivers of the North.

- 2 -

It was then decided to let out strong fry, that had already started actively feeding, instead of salmon larvae, and to experiment in the acclimatization of salmon on a much bigger scale.

In 1960 some good results were obtained. The first specimens of pink salmon were caught in traps in several northern rivers. Several thousand catches were registered on the MURMANSK coast.

The scale of the work done by MURMANSK fish breeders and scientists exceeds all the acclimatization work ever done before in the USSR or other countries. This has been a big victory for Soviet fish breeders.

But the pink salmon whose roe was incubated in the MURMANSK fish breeding stations had partly lost the homing instinct. Not all of these fish returned to the rivers from which they had been released.

The area over which pink salmon spread proved unusually wide. Besides MURMANSK rivers, pink salmon went into most of the rivers of the White Sea and CHESHA Bay, it was found in the PECHORA and two specimens were caught in KOROTAIKHA river. It also spread far beyond the borders of the USSR: information about pink salmon catches was received from Iceland, Scotland and Norway.

The total quantity of pink salmon registered in the rivers of ARKHANGEL'SK region is not big: a little over 2,000 specimens. Here pink salmon appeared somewhat later than in MURMANSK region. In the White Sea pink salmon migrations were most intense in August and in the CHESHA Bay they began in the middle of July and went on until the end of September.

As has been said, Pacific Ocean salmon spawns only once in a lifetime and perishes after spawning. Pink salmon has retained this property in its new abode. But there are some differences: the pink salmon of the North is much fatter than its Far East relative, somewhat bigger and heavier and more fecund (has a greater quantity of roe).

A conference of the acclimatization of Far East salmon was held in MURMANSK at the end of October. The conference summarized the results of work already done in this direction and unanimously agreed that the acclimatization of pink salmon, chum and king salmon must be continued on a growing scale.

Research conducted by the biological station of the Karelian branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR has given additional proof that the White Sea rivers are suitable natural spawning grounds for pink salmon. The same can evidently be said of the CHESHA Bay rivers where, according to observations made by workers of the Department of Northern Fish Breeding, pink salmon has also been spawning (the rivers VOLONGA, CHERNAYA and others).

- 3 -

In order to create salmon suitable for fishing in the North shoals of the Far East the Department of the Fish Industry of the ARKHANGEL'SK Economic Council has proposed several measures for the acclimatization of this valuable species. In 1961 four million fecundated roe-corns are to be brought from the Far East and incubated in the SOYANY and ONEGA fish breeding stations. The incubation section of the ONEGA station will be expanded so that at least five million roe-corns can be incubated there every year.

The result of artificial pink salmon breeding in the ONEGA fish breeding station and the fish breeding stations of the Karelian Republic will be the formation of salmon shoals in the White Sea. It is most important also to create shoals of Pacific Ocean salmon for fishing in the CHESHA Bay: the 32 rivers falling into it are for the most part very poor in fish and so, naturally, is the bay itself.

In the course of this SYP the Department of the Fishing Industry proposes to build two fish breeding stations in the CHESHA Bay, with a capacity of 10-15 million roe-corns each. These stations will mainly incubate pink salmon roe and partly roe from salmon of the North of the USSR. Since salmon bred in artificial conditions partly retains the homing instinct, these measures will result in the formation, within the next 5-7 years, of shoals of Pacific Ocean salmon for fishing. The revival of the KANINO-TIMANSKIY fishing district will bring new industries to life. Hundreds of tons of delicate new fish and scores of tons of red caviar -- such will be the results of the experiment, if successful.

But salmon must also be safeguarded against poachers. With the exception of sires for selection, catching Pacific Ocean salmon will be prohibited everywhere until they are bred in quantities sufficient for fishing.

Pravda Severa,  
27 November 1960  
Reprinted in Daily  
Review of Soviet Press.

#### Vegetable Growing in the North

Visitors to the Sovkhoz Teplichnyy of the Vorkutaugol' Combine are amazed to see such vegetables as tomatoes, cucumbers, onions and radishes being grown in an area of permafrost. The personnel of this sovkhov have been encouraged by their results and every year they are increasing the area of their hot houses, and have now six and a half thousand sq metres. This year the sovkhov produced approximately 250 tons of fresh vegetables.

Trud, 15 December 1960  
Page 2 (Abridged).

- 4 -

## ANTARCTIC

### News from the Antarctic

Great activity is reigning among Soviet polar personnel on Queen Maud Land. The construction of the new scientific research base at the Oasis Shirmakher, located 80 km from the shore of Princess Astrid is proceeding rapidly. This new station was given the name NOVOLAZAREVSKAYA. This new station will replace the former LAZAREV station which was located on the shelf glacier.

With the help of aviation, geologists and geographers are carrying out research work in the mountains which were discovered by Soviet scientists at the beginning of last year. This group of mountains has been named RUSSIAN. It is proposed to survey an area of 30,000 sq km in this region.

The diesel-electric vessel OB1 continues its journey in south polar waters along the coastline of eastern Antarctica. The crew members and personnel of the Sixth Antarctic Expedition are making preparations for the forthcoming unloading operations at MIRNYY observatory.

Vodnyy Transport,  
29 December 1960  
Page 4 (Full text).

### Spitsbergen

A photograph in this paper shows a young woman and what appears to be a large crane in the background. The following is the caption. Far in the north on the cold rocky Spitsbergen, LENINGRAD port workers are celebrating the New Year together with miners. A large group of young women and young men have arrived last summer to work on this Arctic island. The woman represented on the photograph is a despatcher and she sent messages of good will to LENINGRAD by wireless.

Vodnyy Transport,  
1 January 1961  
Page 3 (Abridged).

### MIRNYY

Five years ago to-day Soviet scientists and seamen arrived for the first time at the shores of Antarctica. On 5 January 1956, members of the First Soviet Antarctic Expedition arrived on the diesel-electric vessel OB1 in the base depot. That was a starting point for the search of a suitable location for the Soviet scientific research base. A month later the MIRNYY observatory was established on the shore of Davis Sea.

Soviet scientists in cooperation with those of other countries undertook the exploration of the ice continent and the surrounding seas.

- 5 -

M. M. Somov, the head of the First Soviet Expedition and now the Deputy Director of the Arctic and Antarctic Institute had the following to say:

"Thanks to the large scale work which was performed by Soviet personnel at eight static research stations, during the tractor sled marches and the many trips by aircraft, have been able to gather valuable scientific data. It is now possible to state that Antarctica is a continent and not a group of Islands."

"Explorations by sea were made in the south polar waters nearly around the entire continent of Antarctica."

Members of the Sixth Soviet Antarctic Expedition have just arrived. They will continue the work of their predecessors. The remainder of the article relates the personal experiences of a pilot of the polar aviation.

Vodnyy Transport,  
5 January 1961  
Page 4 (Abridged).

#### Heroic Deed of Antarctic Explorers

A terse radiogram reached Moscow the other day from the Antarctic. The Soviet explorers who are building the NOVOLAZAREVSKAYA scientific station in the vicinity of the Sheermacher Antarctic oasis reported:

"Water spouting from glacier, endangering building site. We are fighting flood..."

Shortly afterwards, another wire came through, this from the chief of the Antarctic station, Gerbovich: "The danger of inundation has lifted. The construction of NOVOLAZAREVSKAYA continues..."

Exactly what had happened there in the Antarctic? What new surprise had that treacherous continent pulled on the handful of intrepid Soviet heroes working there?

Yesterday I called on Y.I. Tolstikov, Deputy Chief of the Northern Sea Route Administration, and himself a holder of the Hero of the Soviet Union title. He was already in possession of the latest reports from the Antarctic, giving all the details of the incident.

"You know, of course," said Y.I. Tolstikov, "that it is now polar summer at the Southern tip of the globe. Our Antarctic explorers have decided to take advantage of the good weather (the temperature is quite high now, fluctuating from about minus 6 to zero degrees Centigrade), to build a new station, NOVOLAZAREVSKAYA, on more dependable rocky substrata. You may have heard that the LAZAREV station in use until now stands on a shelf glacier from which huge icebergs may break off at any moment."

- 6 -

"The meteorological station, living quarters for the men, mess-rooms and electric station at NOVOLAZAREVSKAYA are almost finished. Engineer G. Uvarov is in charge of the construction, and all the builders are working enthusiastically."

"The unit in charge of transportation has to make some really heroic trips to bring in material. Under the direction of mechanic Z. Teplinsky, the drivers of four tractors are bringing in freights to our oasis from an intermediary base near the LENINGRADSKIY Gulf, where the diesel electric ship OB' recently unloaded over 800 tons of all kinds of equipment."

"There were absolutely no signs of trouble, until, suddenly, during the night of January 12, a glacier situated about 400 metres from the camp began to spout rivers of water. The snow had begun to melt in the mountains, and the lake in the nearby hollow above the camp quickly filled. Before long, the level of the lake rose several metres. The water reached the glaciologist's post and inundated it. Something urgent had to be done to stop the flood and keep the water from inundating the building site and washing away the unfinished structures."

"V.I. Gerbovich, the young but experienced chief of the station, who has wintered at the North Pole-4 Station, made a daring decision. On investigating the flood area with some of the men, he came upon a place where they could hack out a canal in the frozen bank of the lake. The excess water in the lake would thus flow off through the canal, instead of flowing onto the building grounds. One emergency party gave all its attention to that job, while a second began to move property and building materials quickly from the camp grounds to a safer place. Meanwhile, a third party began to dig a bed right on the building grounds to keep the water in there, instead of overflowing the camp."

"Although the icy streams, plunged on with tremendous speed, no great harm was worked, because of this foresight in preparing a bed for the flood water."

"The men hacking away at the side of the lake had the hardest time of all; they had to use axes and picks and mechanical saws to cut a ditch 130 metres long and 2 metres deep. To make sure that the overflow water poured into it from the lake, the men also built a dam with big boulders where the water was already filtering through onto the camp grounds."

And so the cryptic lines of the radiogram concealed much heroism and stamina on the part of ordinary Soviet people working far from their homeland. Y.I. Tolstikov gave me the names of some of the heroic conquerors of the Antarctic, among them — scientist A. Semochkin, driver A. Zhandarmov, radio operator I. Panchenko, building worker Yu. Vereshchagin.

No matter how hard the cold winds may blow, the jagged icebergs roar, and the subglacial waters thrash and churn, the NOVOLAZAREVSKAYA Station will soon be finished and in the middle of February the red flag of the Soviet Union will fly over it.

Trud, 25 January 1961  
(In full) Reprinted in  
Daily Review of Soviet  
Press.

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ARCTIC

Meteorology and Hydrology

The November (No.11) issue of the above mentioned publication published by Gidrometoizdat, Moscow 1960, contains the following articles:

Liquid-water content and turbulent régime of the Arctic layering clouds. A.I. Voskresenskiy,  
L.T. Matveyev.

On the methodics of forecasting of ice appearance in the rivers of the Severnaya Dvina Basin. E.G. Antspova.

Meteorologiya i Gidrologiya,  
No. 11 1960.

Christmas Trees for the Arctic

A IL-14 aircraft of the Polar Aviation has made a special flight from Moscow to the central Arctic. This aircraft was bringing scientific instruments, mail and New Year's presents including Christmas trees to personnel of stations NP-8 and NP-9.

Vodnyy Transport,  
24 December 1960  
Page 4 (Full text).

Drift Stations

The ice mass which carries Station NP-8, has covered 4,550 km in twenty months. It is now located 1,450 km to the north of the nearest Soviet scientific station which is located on WRANGEL Island. NP-8 is only 650 km from the North Pole. For the last five days, however, the ice has made no progress and seems to remain at the one place. The temperature reaches  $-40^{\circ}$ . The other station NP-9 is located 550 km from the pole. It is 900 km to the north of HENRIETTA Island.

This latter station which was established during the spring of 1960 has covered more than 2,100 km in nine months. This station is slowly drifting to the north and on the 6 January its position was  $85^{\circ} 24'$  North,  $165^{\circ} 2'$  East.

Vodnyy Transport,  
7 January 1961  
Page 4 (Abridged).

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### Outposts in the Arctic

Far in the Arctic, on islands lost in the Arctic Ocean and along the entire polar sea route there are dozens of polar stations. Personnel at these stations carry out weather observations, determine ice conditions and carry out research in the ocean depths. Data thus received helps them to compile weather forecasts and their radio signals assist passing vessels.

This newspaper interviewed by radio, personnel of some of these stations and asked them to describe their work, their life and their plans for the future.

Our station is located at RAU-CHUA. It is similar to the many stations that are spread along the Northern Sea Route. It consists of a few snow-covered huts, meteorological facilities, a radio antenna array which is located on the very edge of the East Siberian Sea. To the south the area is bounded by mountains. Our station is manned by seven people all of whom have been trained at the Leningrad Arctic Institute.

Once a month mail is dropped from an aircraft. The only visitors are local hunters who come for a short visit on their dog sleds.

BUKHTA VUOR-KHAYA on the Island MOSTAKH has a polar station on a narrow strip of land stretching from north to south. Climatic conditions are difficult in this area of the Sea of LAPTEV. The remaining part of this section describes the daily activities of this polar station.

There is also a station on the Island VIKTORIYA. This station had an active programme last year, particularly in guiding vessels and aircraft during the Arctic navigation. A second house was built ahead of schedule. Notwithstanding the low temperatures and winds, the construction of a power generating station is progressing well. At the present time preparations are being made for the next navigation season.

Vodnyy Transport.  
10 January 1961  
Page 4 (Abridged).

### In the Extreme North

At the northernmost tip of Asia, at Cape CHELYUSKIN it is still dark and blizzards are raging. Such is the weather in the VIL'KITSKIY Straits.

Knowing that the climate of the north is hazardous the personnel of the radio-meteorological center at Cape CHELYUSKIN is on the alert. They are making preparations for the fourth-coming Arctic navigation.

The personnel of this station are making preparations to install new wireless transmitters. By the beginning of the Arctic navigation they will have completed the installation of special sets for the transmission by wireless of charts showing ice conditions. These transmissions are intended for vessels navigating the Northern Sea Route and also for aircraft of the Polar Aviation.

Vodnyy Transport.  
9 February 1961  
Page 4 (Abridged).

## ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

### Gold of the YAKUT ASSR

Together with diamonds and the fur industry, gold is the pride of the YAKUT ASSR. To-day there are three gold producing areas in the YAKUT ASSR. In the south, the ALDAN; OYMYAKON located beyond the Arctic circle; and the UST'-MAYA in the south-east of the Republic.

Reports mention that workers of the gold mines have produced considerably more gold during the nine months of the present year than during the similar period in 1959. It must be noted that the gold mine in YNYKCHAN of the UST'-MAYA region has become the leading enterprise. Its personnel has exceeded the yearly plan.

Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,  
4 November 1960  
Page 4 (Abridged).

### A New Mine Beyond the Arctic Circle

On 3 November 1960, work was started in a new mine of the combine Vorkutugol' in VORKUTA. This mine which was allotted the number 20 will have an output of half a million tons of coal per year. The personnel of this mine has been provided with excellent services. A settlement has been built nearby in the tundra. It includes an inhalation centre, a laundry with a pressing room and other facilities.

Sovetskaya Rossiya,  
5 November 1960  
Page 4 (Full text).

### Gas Pipeline in Perma-frost

A project of a major pipeline in the YAKUT ASSR has been developed by the Institute Gipropudzemgaz. This will be the most northern pipeline on perma-frost. This major pipeline will supply gas to YAKUTSK and adjoining industrial centres. It will carry up to one million cubic metres of gas per year from the new area which has been recently discovered at the junction of the rivers VILYUY and LENA.

The new gas pipeline will be 365 km long. It will be built according to new methods which thus far have never been used anywhere in the world. For instance the pipes will not be buried in the frozen soil as low temperatures will adversely affect the metal. They will be suspended on piles. This pipeline will be built within three years.

Stroitel'naya Gazeta,  
13 November 1960  
Page 1 (Abridged).

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### The Rich Earth in the Extreme North

The KOLA Peninsula, MURMANSK Oblast'. Nearly all of this area lies beyond the Arctic circle. It is a land of winter nights and northern lights. Before the revolution there was not a single developed agricultural centre. For centuries it was believed that agriculture could not be contemplated in this cold northern land.

The development of these northern areas may be considered as one of the most important achievements of socialism. During the years of Soviet rule the population of MURMANSK Oblast' has increased 25-fold, and the output of gross production has risen more than 20 fold. The agricultural drive in the north has produced 6,000 hectares of cultivated land, 13,000 head of cattle, nearly an equal number of hogs, and well-run chicken farms and reindeer breeding kolkhozes. During the last year this Oblast' produced 202 centners of potatoes from every hectare and 300 centners of vegetables. The milk yield was 3,429 kilograms of milk per cow.

Although a gigantic progress has been achieved the production of the Oblast' is not sufficient to meet requirements. Vegetable and meat requirements are only met to 5% and there is only 1/3 of the total requirement in milk.

Reindeer breeding and fishing kolkhozes have been established during the period of collectivization. These are developing well. However these have not reached a stage of development which would meet all the requirements of the fast growing population of new towns.

Instead of concentrating the productive resources in the realm of agriculture and animal husbandry, these have been dealt with on a regional basis. That is, individual concerns, industries etc, had their own auxiliary organizations which were responsible to produce food stuffs, i.e., meat, vegetables, milk, etc. This de-centralization of agriculture led to unnecessary expenses as the enterprises lacked specialized machinery and overheads were high. The cost of their produce was also high. For example, the cost price of milk and potatoes in the MURMANSK independent enterprises was nearly twice as high as in the Sovkhozos of the RSFSR. Meat was three times as high as elsewhere. The remainder of the article suggests various methods to achieve a centralized effort in agriculture and animal husbandry which would allow a greater output at lower costs.

Sovetskaya Rossiya,  
17 November 1960  
Page 1 (Abridged).

### The Climate of the USSR

The personnel of the main geophysical observatory named after A.I. Voyeykov have decided to issue a series of publications entitled, "The Climate of the USSR."

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These publications will contain various data on the climatic resources of the USSR. The work will be divided by the physical geographic areas of the country. All this data will have the most important value for construction purposes, planning new enterprises, agriculture and other purposes.

The publication of this work will be completed in 1962.

Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,  
18 November 1960  
Page 4 (Full text).

#### A New Kimberlite Pipe

The chief geologists of the 213th party of the Amakimskaya Expedition, V. Izarov has discovered a new kimberlite pipe in Eastern YAKUTIYA. This is considered to be a very rich diamond deposit area.

Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,  
19 November 1960  
Page 3 (Full text).

#### A Valuable Discovery

The KOLA Peninsula has always attracted Soviet geologists. Recently, the Northwestern Geological Administration announced that the Kovdor Party led by V. Ternova, discovered that at great depths the vermiculite mica changes into the more precious phlogopite.

This discovery is of great importance for the development of the mica industry which in turn supports the development of Soviet radio electronics.

Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,  
19 November 1960  
Page 3 (Full text).

#### Food Production in KAMCHATSKAYA Oblast'

The Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes of the KAMCHATSKAYA Oblast' have fulfilled on time the yearly plan of sale of the following articles to the state:

Meat	...	115%
Milk	...	123%
Eggs	...	156%
Potatoes	...	102%

The sale of meat, milk and eggs exceeded by 25%, 36% and 58% respectively the amounts registered for the same period last year.

Sovetskaya Rossiya,  
20 November 1960  
Page 1 (Full text).

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### New Institute in NORIL'SK

A photograph shows three students at work at NORIL'SK evening courses at the branch of the KRASNOYARSK Institute of Non-Ferrous Metals named after M.I. Kalinin. These evening courses have been set up quite recently.

Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,  
20 November 1960  
Page 3

### Cement Production in NORIL'SK

News has been received from NORIL'SK that the personnel of the cement factory have completed the year's plan one month ahead of schedule.

This achievement was not accidental. At the time when the year's production was being planned the production capacity of the machinery and equipment was taken into account. However, it was difficult to estimate the capability of workers and gauge their enthusiasm for raising production. This latter factor was mainly responsible for the present success.

Stroitel'naya Gazeta,  
14 December 1960  
Page 2 (Full text)

### Hot Springs in KAMCHATKA

On the slope of a hill known as ZERKAL'TSE, deep in the KAMCHATKA Peninsula, construction has been completed on the first three hot houses of the MACHIKINSKIY vegetable-growing Sovkhoz. By their outward appearance they do not differ from other hot houses with the exception that there is no boiler system. However, the inside temperature reaches 30° to 40° degrees. These hot houses are heated by harnessing the heat of the local hot springs. From one of these springs a hot water conduit has been laid to the hot house. Water to the temperature of 90° degrees flows through and is then diverted into the river. Soon during the severe KAMCHATKA winter one will be able to cultivate cucumbers and tomatoes on an area of 1,000 sq. metres.

In the near future similar hot houses will be built in other areas of the KAMCHATKA Peninsula, including the localities of PARATUNKA and OZERNOVSKIY.

Stroitel'naya Gazeta,  
14 December 1960  
Page 4 (Full text).

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### Harnessing the Tide

Man has for long been using the energy of coal, oil, and finally that of the wind. Lately, man has harnessed the atom. Hydraulic power is however most widespread. Hundreds of hydropower stations starting with small collective farm stations and ending with such giants as the Volga and Stalingrad Hydropower Station, have been put into operation in our country.

Scientists consider that the energy of the rivers in the European part of the Soviet Union will be made full use of within the coming 10-15 years.

But why should not such an inexhaustible source of energy as the mighty movement of the Ocean be used?

The high tide sets in every six hours and then ebbs. At some places of the ocean coast the tide is up to 18.5 metres high. In our country it is from 9 to 11 metres high in the Sea of OKHOTSK and 8 metres in the White Sea.

For thousands of years a problem which engaged the human mind was that of harnessing the tide. The remains of mills have been preserved in France which were operated by the energy of the sea. Centuries have passed, but the Ocean has until recently not been used for the large scale generation of electricity.

Research was conducted on the KOLA Peninsula and on the White Sea coast in our country on the eve of the Patriotic War. The results showed that it was possible to build tidal electric stations (TES) in those districts.

Until recently the places where TESs could be erected were far away from enterprises using electric power. But today, with the development of the country's northern and eastern areas, the question arose of supplying them with electricity. A group of engineers of the Gidroenergoproekt Institute under L.B. Bernstein, M.Sc. (Engineering) is preparing the designs of TESs on the MURMANSK coast and on the White Sea.

How will a tidal electric station operate? A bay connected with the sea by a bottleneck is selected. This bottleneck is blocked by a dam. Thus the bay will be transformed into a TES reservoir. By opening the gates during high tide, the water level in the reservoir will rise to its maximum point. When the gates are closed, different water levels are obtained in the reservoir and the sea. By releasing the water into the sea through a turbine, the latter is set in motion. The turbine's generator starts producing electricity. The water level in the reservoir drops to that of the sea. When the next high tide begins the reservoir is again under the pressure of the sea.

When studying the operation cycles of a TES, some shortcomings are revealed. A large amount of electricity is produced within a short period; but the consumer requires a steady supply. When a TES becomes part of a large power system we can make the turbine work as a water pump creating additional pressure to be used when necessary.

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Today, when a single power system of the European part of the USSR is being set up it has become possible to build tidal electric stations.

Within the next three years commercial current will be produced by our country's first tidal electric station built at KISLAYA GUBA on the MURMANSK coast. This will be a 1,200 kilowatt experimental station with a 30-metre dam. During the construction and operation of this station, scientists will study the main problems connected with erection of tidal electric stations.

A new technical solution has been found for the KISLAYA GUBA TES. L. Bernstein proposed that the main parts of the station be assembled from thin-walled reinforced concrete panels similar to floating docks and transported by sea to the place where they will be set up. There the block units will be filled with ballast and submerged. The dam is thus assembled rapidly and reliably blocks the bay.

The erection of tidal electric stations is no longer a dream. The LUMBOVSKAYA TES with a capacity of several hundreds of thousands of kilowatts and with a 5 kilometre dam is being designed. The use of tidal energy in the MEZEN Bay is being studied. It is planned to build an even more powerful TES there. The designs of a gigantic White Sea TES are being prepared. The stations's 100-kilometre dam which will separate part of the MEZEN Bay from the White Sea will have 2,000 turbine units with a total capacity of several million kilowatts. They will annually supply the single power system of the European part of the USSR with tens of thousands of millions of kilowatt hours of electricity. The present level of engineering makes this project quite feasible.

Moskovskiy Komsomolets,  
22 December 1960  
Reprinted in Daily Review  
of Soviet Press.

#### If Northern Rivers were Turned Southward

Great construction projects are in full swing on the VOLGA -- the great Russian river.

The VOLGA is no longer the "calm beauty", as A.P. Chekhov used to call it. It isn't a river any more, as it were, but almost an uninterrupted chain of great lakes -- water reservoirs -- resembling real seas. The Moscow, RYBINSK, GORKY, KULBYSHEV, STALINGRAD seas...

Before long the still virgin stretches of the majestic river will also be turned into seas: the SARATOV and the CHEBOKSARY.

The people have long been dreaming of seeing this river transformed. These dreams are coming true now. Giant vessels are plying the eternal river; and its waters have become deeper.

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But the amazing transformations are sometimes clouded by annoying drawbacks, we are sorry to say. One often hears: "The waters of the KAMA and VOLGA are polluted by industrial refuses and waste waters to such an extent that it causes the mass destruction of fish." Others are justly concerned by the fact that many tributaries of the VOLGA and KAMA, polluted by waste waters, have become unfit as water supply sources.

Isn't there anything that can be done about it? Is it really inevitable that man's useful activity should mar nature? Of course not. Our country's planned economy--the building of towns, industrial enterprises, the reconstruction of rivers--can and must make nature still more beautiful and majestic. With a rational approach to the issue there won't be any deforestation, diminution of fish or depletion of natural resources in general,

One often hears appeals to restore the gifts of nature. Let's consider these words a little deeper and ask ourselves the question: should we really recreate the spontaneous, frequently quite inefficient reproduction processes of nature itself? We are of the opinion that it isn't this at all that is needed. Modern science and engineering permit us to raise the problem in an entirely new light, on a much broader scale and with greater foresight.

Do you know, for example, that the taiga forests in their natural state produce but some eighty cubic metres of wood per hectare? A cultivated forest, on the other hand, which is ruled by man's rational mind rather than by the elemental forces of nature, can yield as much as eight hundred cubic metres of first-rate wood.

Here is another example: in its natural condition one sturgeon spawns about 200,000 roes, but the number of fishes that grow up from them comes barely to ten sturgeons. When sturgeons are bred in fish ponds, the same number of roes yields six thousand grown-up fishes, instead of ten. This is borne out by many years' experience gained by fish-breeding establishments in AZERBAIDZHAN.

It is also a well-known fact that the bulk of the valuable silver fox furs produced are obtained at special fox farms and not by trappers in the taiga. Good results, much better than those obtained in natural conditions, are produced by breeding enterprises at the mouth of the ILA river in KAZAKHSTAN.

Man is placing under his control many of the processes that have for thousands of years been going on spontaneously, and he controls them quite reliably.

What is the cause of the sharp diminution of fish catch on the VOLGA? Of course, both the pollution of the river by industrial waste waters and the changed river conditions due to the creation of vast water reservoirs have played their negative role. But it is the natural lowering of the water level in the Caspian Sea that has played the main part in this.

The point is that the fish which is caught in the VOLGA spends most of its life in the Caspian Sea. The drop of the Caspian

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sea level has led to the decrease of food for the fish, has affected the natural spawning grounds of some fish species, and has made it more difficult for the fish to enter the river by their habitual ways.

The water level of the Caspian Sea has come down by more than two metres in the past thirty years. The sea level variations have had an adverse effect on navigation, off-shore oil production and the economic activity of the ports and maritime cities. The total damage due to the change of the Caspian Sea level in the last decade has been estimated at more than 500 million roubles a year.

Isn't it possible to raise the Caspian Sea and to stabilize it at the desired level? Yes, it's possible, though rather difficult.

What are the main difficulties involved?

All that is being done on the VOLGA and in the VOLGA region is bound to affect the Caspian Sea level - be it snow retention, autumn ploughing, construction of new water reservoirs, or irrigation of crop lands. All these quite progressive agricultural techniques will, of course, be steadily developing in the future too.

So, what is the way out, if any?

This question is on the minds of millions of people populating the VOLGA basin, all people whose vital interests are closely connected with the future of the Caspian Sea - collective farmers, seamen, fishers, oil workers. For several decades scientists have been trying to solve the Caspian problem. Men of science and practical workers have been suggesting a broad variety of solutions, among them the erection of a dam which would partition the northern part of the sea from the southern, the construction of a canal.

It is however the project that has been elaborated by the engineers of the "Hydroproject" Institute that seems to give the best answer to the question of the fate of the Caspian Sea. True, not all the elements of the project have been fully worked out and completely studied yet, but the principle underlying the solution of this problem does not evoke any doubts; the replenishing of the water balance of the VOLGA and the Caspian Sea calls for the delivery of great masses of water from without: by using the water runoffs of the northern rivers PECHORA and VYCHEGDA.

How can this be done?

It has been found that if a 80 metre high dam is built on the PECHORA, a 34 metre high dam on the VYCHEGDA, and another 30 metre high dam on the Upper KAMA, then three vast water reservoirs will form with a total volume of over 230 cubic kilometres of water. In this case the water level will be in the three reservoirs approximately the same.

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If these water reservoirs are then connected by canals, a common basin will be formed, in which the water from the upper reaches of the three rivers -- the PEGHORA, VYCHEGDA and KAMA -- will accumulate.

The project also provides for the construction of a hydropower station and spillway at the KAMA dam. All the water accumulated may then be directed from the united water reservoir into the KAMA and thence to the VOLGA and the Caspian Sea.

In all the northern rivers will add about forty cubic kilometres of water to the KAMA and VOLGA every year. This will also add approximately another 11 billion kilowatt hours of electric power annually to the output of the VOLGA and KAMA Hydropower stations.

The realization of this project will, of course, require a considerable amount of work. About 700 million cubic metres of earth have to be dug and filled into embankments, over a million cubic metres of concrete have to be placed, some 50 thousand tons of mechanisms and metal structures assembled. By way of comparison, the volume of earth-work to be done here is almost five times greater than carried out in the construction of the STALINGRAD Hydropower Plant.

But engineering does not remain at a standstill, either! The "Hydroproject" Institute is designing new, highly efficient machines that will help to speed up the work. Thus, they have devised a powerful hydraulic dredge with a suspended spoil pipeline, a hydraulic dredge for heavy soils, a cutterhead earth-moving machine of great capacity -- 3,000 cubic metres of soil per hour.

These machines will both speed up and make cheaper construction work. For instance, the digging out of a cubic metre of ground with ordinary power shovels in the conditions of the project will cost about 30 copecks, while the same work, if done with the dredge with a suspended spoil pipeline, will cost 13 copecks per cubic metre.

Apart from stabilizing the level of the Caspian Sea, the diversion water from the northern rivers southwards will solve a number of other very important problems as well. Let's consider some of them.

At one time it was planned to turn the Trans-VOLGA area into a major wheat-producing region. Even work was started to this end. But it was stopped, as practice had shown that the grain problem could be solved by other means, in particular, by developing virgin and long-fallow lands. That was both cheaper and simpler. Now, the agriculture of the Trans-VOLGA area is to specialize in livestock breeding. The irrigated lands will be sown to maize, perennial grasses, and other feed crops.

A total of two million hectares of land can be irrigated in this area embracing the KULBYSHEV, SARATOV and STALINGRAD regions. As has been estimated, this will make it possible to produce there over a million tons of meat alone a year.

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If the progressive sprinkling method is employed there it will reduce sharply labour requirements which are rather high with the obsolete watering--ditch method. Two men operating a sprinkling plant will be able to water 150 to 200 hectares of land per day. Labour-consuming operations on ranches can also be mechanized as well.

Agriculture in the Trans-VOLGA area will become a well paying industry. Its output will amount to no less than 600 million roubles worth a year. This means that all capital investments into the irrigation schemes, pumping stations, water distributing network sheds, machinery, dwellings, roads, etc. will be repayed quite soon -- in three or four years.

The VOLGA-AKHTUBA flood-lands have recently been much written about. The "Literatura i Zhizn" (Literature and Life) newspaper also carried an article on this subject.

Farming in the VOLGA-AKHTUBA flood-lands today has an extensive character, and this causes it to be rather unstable. Its chief line is animal farming. The favourable opportunities for developing vegetable gardening, melon growing, rice sowing, fruit gardening and vine raising are still made little use of. Only a little over 5 per cent of the farm land in the flood-lands and the delta is being tilled, the remaining land being used for pastures and hay-making. The total value of the commodity output of agriculture and of other sources amounts to not over 50 million roubles at present.

Projects are now under way, providing for the complete damming up of the flood-lands and reconstruction of farming in the VOLGA-AKHTUBA area, as well as for the reorganization of fishery in the lower reaches of the VOLGA. The flood-lands, once they are protected by the dams from spontaneous floods, will be provided with artificial irrigation and will be well drained by the AKHTUBA river. The damming up of the flood-lands will make it possible to put about a half a million hectares of land under melon crops, vegetables, orchards, vine-yards and fodder crops, and to organize artificial spawning grounds and fish farms on the AKHTUBA river. At the same time the optimum water conditions will be created on the AKHTUBA, so as to increase the stocks of valuable sturgeon.

The development of the VOLGA-AKHTUBA flood-lands and the VOLGA delta will result in the output of 350 million roubles worth of farm products (instead of the 50 millions' worth produced now) per year. The annual catch of sturgeon after the first part of the work is completed, will increase to 200 thousand metrik centners; when the second part of the project has been completed, the fish catch will double.

At first sight it might seem that the diversion of the northern rivers into the VOLGA has nothing to do with water pollution control. But actually it has. The major hydrotechnical projects are designed as complex works, i.e., they will provide enough water to replenish the VOLGA-Caspian basin, to generate electric power, to irrigate crop fields, to improve fishing industry etc. The river pollution issue is also to be taken care of.

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True, water purification involves the construction of complex structures and considerable capital investment. However, these expenses will pay at a fast rate. For instance, the purification of waste waters from wood-pulp and paper factories would require 50 million roubles of capital investment. But, on the other hand, the processing of waste waters would yield a profit of over 80 million roubles a year.

At present everybody is anxious to get the greatest possible results at the lowest possible cost. The estimates made by designing and research institutions have shown that the expenses involved in the diversion of northern rivers into the KAMA and VOLGA, in the irrigation of the arid lands of the Trans-VOLGA area and of the AKHTUBA flood-lands, in the reconstruction of fisheries in the lower reaches of the VOLGA, will be fully repaid in the course of five or six years.

Thus, if part of the runoff of the northern rivers is turned southward, the age-old situation when the VOLGA and the Caspian sea are only replenished by rainfalls in the basin, will change. This will in turn lead to great improvements in the natural conditions of the great Russian river.

Literatura i Zhizn,  
8 January 1961  
(In full)  
Reprinted in Daily  
Review of Soviet Press.

#### A New Housing Project in the City of YAKUTSK

Lake SAYSAR constitutes the south-western boundary of YAKUTSK. Waste land stretches all around this lake. On the example of Moscow this area will become a self-contained housing project.

Construction work is in full progress and the first street has already been built and one hundred families have moved into their new apartment houses.

This sub-division will be known as the 96th area. This is the first self-contained sub-division (Mikrorayon) in the Extreme North. Every family in this new sub-division will be given a separate apartment consisting of two to three rooms. The area will be provided with all the necessary facilities such as a shopping center, schools, etc. A new highway has been built which links the sub-division with the center of the town.

Other sub-divisions are being planned at the present time. These projects will considerably increase the territory of the town.

Trud, 8 January 1961  
Page 2 (Abridged).

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### The Diamond Pipe "AIKHAL"

The diamond pipe "Peace." Who has not heard of the diamond wonder of YAKUTIA?!

Lacking power supply and hindered by tremendous difficulties caused by the absence of roads and eternal congelation the working people of YAKUTIA already in the second year of the SYP period managed to increase the output of diamonds nearly 10-fold as compared with 1957 and 3.5 times as compared with 1958.

Now the opportunities for increasing the yield are much broader. The First Secretary of the YAKUTSK Regional Committee of the Party S. Z. Borisov reported to the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. that new diamond deposits have been discovered. In this connection the working people of YAKUTIA revised their earlier obligations: they have decided to step up the extraction of diamonds in the present SYP period not 20-fold, but 25-fold.

Under the direction of the Lenin Prize Winner V. Shchukin prospecting group No. 167 has completed the detailed prospection of the kimberlite pipe "Udachnaya" — "Successful." At the moment the prospective value of the deposits is being counted up. Two other groups were engaged in prospecting the placer accumulation of diamonds in Northern YAKUTIA. The aeromagnetic survey of the territory of the republic is near completion.

However, the most remarkable discovery is the pipe "AIKHAL". Its prospective value is far greater than that of the world famous pipe "Peace." The industrial exploitation of these vast deposits will be commenced this year.

"Our 'winner' the geologist Vladimir Timefeyevich Izarev will give you the details of the discovery of the "AIKHAL" diamond pipe. He was in charge of the prospecting there," concluded the chief of the Amakinsk geological expedition Mikhail Alexandrovich Chumak.

The 'winner' proved to be a very bashful person. He graduated from Dniepropetrovsk Institute in 1955 and immediately upon graduation went to YAKUTIA. All these years Vladimir Izarev tirelessly roamed through the taiga in search of diamonds. And he got his due. In the end of January 1960 his group reported: "Kimberlite pipe of immense prospective value discovered. Have given it the name "AIKHAL" — 'Glory'."

The treasures of "AIKHAL" were discovered somewhat unexpectedly. As early as in 1956 in the proximity of the rivulet SOHSOLOKH a geological survey group headed by Lupeichuk revealed an area rich in accessory minerals of diamonds.

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However, a later check made by other geologists failed to confirm these deductions. It appeared that Lupeichuk and his group were wrong. However, the geologists Vladimir Izarev, Yevgeny Cherny, Alexei Kharkiv, Boris Afanasyev and Oleg Kruchik were of a different opinion. They maintained that the work of the groups that visited the area of the SOHSOLOOKH should be subjected to a thorough check. They were advised to use a new method of prospecting of diamond deposits following accessory minerals which had not lost their original shell. The geologists asserted that olivine, ilmenite and pyrope were the "foster-brothers" of the diamond and, provided they retained their original shell they could exactly indicate the location of their older brother. The leadership of the expedition adopted this proposal.

And so in 1959 a group of enthusiasts headed by the geologists Oleg Kruchik and Alexei Makevkin was sent for a second try. The courageous efforts of the young people were crowned with success. In two of the samples taken in a tributary of the SOHSOLOOKH diamonds were found. That meant that somewhere in the immediate proximity the main pipe was situated. But where exactly? By applying new methods Vladimir Izarev and his comrades arrived at the conclusion that the main source was on the left slope of the upper reaches of the stream.

In spite of the severe frosts and remoteness from Nyurba a team of drifters headed by the geologist Boris Afanasyev went to the spot. The laboratory forecast was fully confirmed. On January 26, 1960, one of the prospect holes led to the body of the kimberlite pipe. That was the day when the pipe "AIKHAL" was discovered.

Less than a year has elapsed. And far beyond the Arctic Circle a small settlement has appeared where a concentration plant is now in operation. Here many are working tirelessly—the drifters Alexander Likhnev, Alexei Rukavishnikov and Sergei Starichenkov, the driller Ivan Gul, the driver Afanasi Bocharov, the turner Valentin Konovalov, the tractor driver Konstantin Mishurin, and the mining foreman Vladimir Malin, etc.

Soon we are expecting the arrival of the motor transport column from MIRNYI separated from us by hundreds of miles. The envoys of the diamond capital will give a hearty handshake to their fellow comrades. They will say: "Thank you, discoverers of "AIKHAL", founders of the new diamond town."

Sovetskaya Rossiya,  
11 January 1961  
(Abridged).  
Reprinted in Daily  
Review of Soviet Press.

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### Instead of 12,000 Navvies

Digging into the sandy bank of the river BODAIBINKA is a placer dredge. A chain of buckets is running over the ladder, carrying the gold-bearing rock inside the hull. The screens separate clay, sand and gravel, and a special conveyor takes the spoil away. Tiny specks of gold remain in the catchers.

Gold, as a rule, occurs in various rocks. To find it, the dredge has sometimes to dig as deep as five to thirty metres. The amount of rock it can handle a year runs into 1.5 million cubic metres. The operators have had a good reason to call this giant machine a "gold factory."

A medium-size dredge weighing up to 1,400 tons and can be the height of a four-storeyed house. When taken apart, its units and assemblies load a hundred railway cars or even more. Such "gold factories" are manufactured by the KUIBYSHEV Engineering Works in IRKUTSK.

The Works turned out the first dredge some thirty years ago. Its bucket would scoop just 150 litres of sand. All the same, it was a good machine--for its time. As time passed, new dredges had to be made.

The new dredges arrived at the gold fields four years ago. Every bucket of theirs could hold 250 litres of sand. Although they are efficient at work, the designers are in search for further improvements.

Work is well ahead on a dredge in which every bucket will pick 600 litres of sand at a time. This will be the world's only dredge of that size. The dredge will be 230 metres long, 50 metres wide, and 40 metres high. A total of over 300 electric motors will be installed on the dredge to drive its machines and mechanisms. Their aggregate power will amount to 7,500 kilowatts. The dredge will be able to work over 2 million cubic metres of rock a season. For the first time in gold-mining practice, closed-circuit TV and suitable instruments will be employed on the dredge to supervise and control its operation. A wide range of mechanical and automatic facilities will make its control an easy job for a crew of nine.

The new dredge will, the designers believe, supplant 12,000 navvies.

Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,  
24 January 1961  
(In full)  
Reprinted in Daily  
Review of Soviet Press.

### To Raise the Level of the Caspian Sea

This is a report of an interview with M. Ragimov, head of the Caspian Shipping Agency.

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The problem of the Caspian Sea is very acute. For many years now the level of the Caspian Sea has been dropping. During the last thirty years it decreased by nearly two metres. This had a very detrimental effect on navigation, port facilities and industry. At the present time freight vessels are able to approach ports only along channels the length of which in the Caspian Sea total about 300 km. These channels require constant maintenance work and major dredging at the rate of ten million cubic metres per year. This work is costing the state about forty million roubles per year taken at the old rate of the rouble.

Moreover the drop in the water level caused large scale and costly work to be performed in ports, factory wharves, etc., and any further dredging operations at quays and wharves could cause their deterioration. This, in turn forced the authorities to build shallow draft vessels of low carrying capacity which, from an economic point of view was an unsound policy. And even then certain of these shallow draft vessels had too great a displacement under the existing conditions and could only be loaded to about 70 or 80% of their total capacities.

The dropping of the water level in the Caspian Sea had adverse effects on other branches of industry such as fishing, oil. It has been computed that a decrease of one metre in the water level of the Caspian Sea causes the government an overall loss of hundreds of millions of roubles.

If the level of the Sea could be raised it would allow a sharp decrease in costs for the maintenance of channels, ports, quays and wharves. It would also allow the employment of the fleet to its full load carrying capacity.

It is our considered opinion that even now one should consider the problem of designing new types of vessels which would be used on the Caspian Sea, the VOLGA, its reservoir and exits therefrom to Baltic ports and those of northern seas. Then transshipment from sea-going vessels to river boats would no longer be necessary.

The redirection of the waters of northern rivers into the Caspian Sea will have, apart from hydro power benefits, a great effect on the national economy of the country as a whole.

Vodnyy Transport,  
26 January 1961  
Page 3 (Full text).

#### For National Economy

This is a report with an interview with A. Ryaboshapko, director of the VOLGA Hydro Electric Power station, named after Lenin.

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The capacity of the projected PECHORA - VYCHEGDA - KAMA reservoir will be about two and half times larger than the capacity of the KUYBYSHEV reservoir on the VOLGA. About forty million cubic metres of water will be directed along the KAMA incline; these waters will pass through the turbines of the VOLGA - KAMA rapids. Due to this, hydroelectric power stations which are now in existence, those that are being built or being planned, will be able to produce an additional eleven milliard kilowatt hours of electric power per year.

The direct effect of this project on the VOLGA hydroelectric power station will be as follows: with an average pressure of 22,5 metres and the expenditure of about 18 cubic metres of water per one kilowatt hour will allow the power station to generate an additional 2,2 milliard kilowatt hours per year. As this project will not require any additional work to be performed at the power station the electricity generated will be about 20% cheaper.

The redirection of the flow of northern rivers will allow an equal distribution of load on all components of our electric power station and work it to full capacity. It will be able to satisfy the requirements of enterprises of the Moscow, Urals, GOR'KIY and other economic regions.

Vodnyy Transport,  
26 January 1961  
Page 3 (Full text).

#### The Project is Approved

On the 24 January the Technical Council of the Ministry of Power Station Construction discussed the project of redirecting the flow of the northern rivers PECHORA and VYCHEGDA through the KAMA into the basin of the VOLGA river. The report was presented by G.L. Sarukhanov, chief engineer of the project.

The leading Soviet hydro-technical experts, hydrologists, hydro designers, and specialists of the water transport were present at these discussions. Having approved the project they have recommended a detailed study to be made.

Vodnyy Transport,  
26 January 1961  
Page 3 (Full text).

#### A New Waterway

This is a report of an interview with S. Kuchkin, Minister of the River Fleet RSFSR. The question of artificial irrigation and inundation of millions of hectares of land was given priority at the Plenary Meeting of Central Committee of the Communist Party. As pointed out by Khrushchev the first step

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towards this achievement would be to make use of the waters of such rivers as the PECHORA and VYCHEGDA.

As a result of the redirection of these two rivers through the KAMA and VOLGA into the Caspian Sea, a new economically advantageous water route will be created from the north of the country to the south. The construction of the UST'-VOYA dam on the PECHORA, a dam at UST'-KULOM on the VYCHEGDA, the hydro power centre on the upper KAMA near the town of BOROVS'K, the creation of the huge KAMA - VYCHEGDA - PECHORA reservoir will allow to attain depths exceeding three metres along the entire new water route. This will open new possibilities for navigation. In areas where up till now navigation was limited the new project will allow the use of modern large freighters.

Hydro-technical construction will raise the water levels of the river VISHERA, as the head of water of the SOLIKAMSK hydro centre will extend beyond KRASNOVISHERSK. The water level of the river KOLVA will also rise.

The new waterway will allow the river transport to handle nine million tons of the PECHORA coals which will be moved by rail and water to enterprises of the Western Urals and also about 1,600,000 tons of timber from the area of the VYCHEGDA and PECHORA to the VOLGA and DON. Moreover within the confines of the reservoir about 3.5 million tons of various freights will be transported.

The tourist trade will be considerably increased as modern passenger vessels and hydrofoil fast cruising boats will be able to ply along this new water route.

When working out details of this project it is imperative to take into account the navigation possibilities along the rivers PECHORA and VYCHEGDA both in the upper and lower reaches in order that deep channels should reach from the Caspian Sea to the Arctic Ocean.

The new water route will be an important complement to the water transport system of the European part of the USSR. It will make a large contribution to the development of the productive forces of northern areas.

Vodnyy Transport,  
26 January 1961  
(Bridged).

#### The PECHORA will Flow to the Caspian Sea

Take for instance the problem of the redirection of the flow of the rivers PECHORA and VYCHEGDA through the KAMA to the VOLGA. That is grandiose task, gentlemen. Our famous scientist and designer S. Ya. Zhuk once reported to me that the waters of these rivers which are flowing to the Arctic Ocean can be diverted in such a manner as to flow to the Caspian Sea.

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Having accomplished this, we will be able to generate the same amount of electric energy at locations on the KAMA and VOLGA as that produced at the Volga Hydro Electric Power station. The construction of the Volga Hydro Electric Power station cost the government, as you remember, 12 milliard roubles. The cost of construction work connected with the redirection of the waters of the PECHORA and VYCHEGDA will, according to the calculations of specialists, constitute about 6 - 7 milliard roubles. This means that we will be able to produce electric energy twice as cheaply as before even with existing hydro power stations.

In addition, with the completion of this project there will be a possibility of regulating the level of the Caspian Sea which has been dropping all this time. It has also been noted that with the creation of this new water route from the north to the south we will be able to transport timber from the rich northern timber land to the southern areas of the country. With the solution of this problem we will have other benefits as, for example, in the realm of navigation. Then, southern seas will be linked with the Arctic Ocean.


These are the wide horizons that are opening before us. And all this is now within our reach. Construction work of this nature will not require that much metal because it will mostly concern earth works and even not so much concrete. With modern equipment large scale earth-moving projects are within our scope.

All this of course must be well analyzed, both from the economic and engineering points of view.

—Extract from the Speech made by  
Khrushchev at the Plenary Meeting  
of the Central Committee of the  
Communist Party.

For centuries the northern rivers PECHORA and VYCHEGDA flowed into the Arctic Ocean without bringing any specific benefits to mankind. The first project of reversing the flow of these rivers was born about thirty years ago, since then many such plans were made. It is only now that this project has become a possibility. Now we can even talk of how it is going to be done. This article describes this project as worked out by the specialists of the Gidroyekt named after S. Ya. Zhuk.

The course of the river PECHORA will be barred by an 80 metre thick dam 12 km long. It will form the PECHORA reservoir. On the VYCHEGDA there will also be a dam but only 3½ metres long. Thus the second VYCHEGDA reservoir will be formed. On the KAMA near BOROVSK it is planned to establish the upper KAMA Hydro Power center, which will hold back the waters of the lower reaches of the river. This center will consist of a power station of 700,000 kilowatt capacity, an overflow weir, locks and an earth dam.



LEGEND

1. UST' - USA
2. UST' - IZHMA Hydro Complex
3. UST' - VOYA Dam
4. NIBEL' - IZHMA Dam
5. UKHTA
6. PECHORA - VYCHEGDA Canal
7. UST' - KULOM Hydro Complex
8. VYCHEGDA - KAMA Canal
9. SYKTYVKAR
10. Upper KAMA Hydro Power Station
11. BOROVSOK

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The PECHORA and VYCHEGDA reservoirs will be linked by a south flowing canal 60 km long. This canal will be located in the watershed of the rivers North and South MYLVA. The width of the canal will be 250 metres, the depth 30 metres; this will allow any vessel to navigate this artificial water artery.

Another canal 100 km long will connect the reservoir of the two northern rivers with the KAMA. The water level of all three reservoirs will be the same.

Thus will be formed the combined PECHORA - VYCHEGDA - KAMA reservoir which will be the largest artificial sea in the world. The total area covered by water will amount 15,5 thousand sq. km. This will be  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times larger than the area covered by the KUYBYSHEV reservoir and by the capacity it will be four times larger than the KUYBYSHEV Sea. Water reserve in this reservoir will reach 236 cubic km. Five years will be required to fill this reservoir to its average level.

After the establishment of this united reservoir about 40 cubic km of water will be flowing every year into the KAMA and through it into the VOLGA. This will represent about the sixth part of the amount of water that the VOLGA carries per year into the Caspian Sea.

What possibilities will be opened for national economy by creation of this huge reservoir? This was the question we put to the chief engineer of this project.

First of all water will be available to dry areas beyond the VOLGA where the climate is favourable for the development of agriculture.

Of course we can be given the question of why the waters of the VOLGA alone are not used for this purpose. This would seem nearer and cheaper. The many dams on the VOLGA, KURA, TEREK, as it is, curtail the flow of water into the Caspian Sea, the level of which is decreasing with every passing year. This factor has an adverse effect on fishing and navigation. Should we take water from the VOLGA for irrigation purposes in areas beyond the river we will deprive to a greater extent the Caspian basin and at the same time affect this waterway from a navigational point of view. With the reversal of the northern rivers the area in question will flourish and will become one of the richest and most suitable areas for animal husbandry in the USSR.

However, it is not only in agriculture that these northern waters will bring us prosperity. This flow of water will activate existing power stations and those under construction. This will give an additional 11 milliard kilowatt hours of cheap electricity. This is equal to the amount generated by the VOLGA Hydro Electric station named after Lenin. This additional electric power will be used not only for industry in the north, in the Western Urals, and in the central areas of the country, but also for the electrification of industry as a whole and also for the daily needs of agricultural areas.

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It is interesting to note that the creation of these new reservoirs will have very little adverse affect on northern areas, because those lands which will be flooded have not been developed, are marshy and covered by forest. The costs of the construction of this gigantic united reservoir will be less than the construction of the VOLGA reservoir.

The region in which the future reservoirs will be located is rich in mineral resources, coal, peat, potassium salts, gypsum, lime and common salt. The main item in this area, however, is timber. Reserves of timber here exceed 800 million cubic metres. Due to the absence of roads, limited navigation on small rivers, the production of timber was not fully developed. The new waterway will allow unlimited quantities of timber to be floated to points where it will be processed or utilized. At the VYCHEGDA Hydro power center there will be a special timber passageway made in order that the timber may be floated down river. By the end of the construction period, when hydro installations will be completed in the north, the yearly timber production will then reach five million cubic metres per year, on the VYCHEGDA about two million and in the upper KAMA up to nine million. In the cities of PECHORA and TROITSK-PECHORSK, two large industrial timber complexes will be set up. These enterprises will provide timber and saw-mill products to the KRASNOVISHERSK, SOLIKAMSK, BEREZNIKOV Industrial Centers, the KOMI ASSR, and to areas of the lower VOLGA. For southern regions timber will be despatched through the ports of UST'-DONETSK and TSIMLYANSK. A base will be created in the north that will include all branches of the timber and timber-processing industries.

On the PECHORA it has been decided to create specialized timber industrial enterprises with a yearly output of about 300,000 cubic metres of various timber products. Settlements, workshops, and various services will be built in this location. The reserves of hard coal in the PECHORA basin are great. However, to the present time these reserves are not being fully developed as the coal has to be moved by the only railway in this area which is already heavily overloaded. Now with the creation of deep water routes millions of tons of hard coal will be directed to the southern areas of the country.

Fishing in the areas of VYCHEGDA and upper KAMA up till now could not be considerate on a commercial scale; however, on the PECHORA alone about 18 thousand centners of fish were obtained per year. However, this cannot be considered as being of commercial quantities. The new reservoirs will also become new fishing grounds, and the yearly catch will reach 77.7 thousand centners per year.

With the creation of the PECHORA - VYCHEGDA - KAMA reservoirs a thousand-km deep-water waterway will be thus created. It will link into one common system the north with the south and will allow the direct shipment of coal and timber of the northern areas to the south. It is known that the PECHORA at the present time is navigable on a distance of less than 1,500 km. From YAKSHI to the town of PECHORA navigation is not regular especially during the spring high-water season. It often happens that water

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drops to a depth of 30 centimetres. From PECHORA up to UST'-VOYA there are many shallows and rapids. Notwithstanding large scale dredgings of the river bed guaranteed depths along the river are not being maintained. The situation is rendered more difficult by the fact that a dam on the PECHORA cuts off all the waters in the upper part of the river. That is why it is intended to build here three dams which will guarantee sufficient depths along the entire course of the route. The project documentation shows that the most practical action will be to establish the UST'-IZHMA Hydro Power center with a powerful electric station. This station will generate milliards of kilowatt hours per year.

This will allow the electrification of the KOMI ASSR and of the PECHORA railway. This electric station will also raise the level of the water and improve navigation from the port of PECHORA to NAR'YAN-MAR.

A grandiose task is facing construction workers. The entire complex of the hydro scheme will require the moving of 700,000,000 cubic metres of earth, more than one million cubic metres of concrete, to assemble 50,000 tons of metal constructions, and handle 80,000,000 cubic metres of timber. This colossal volume of work will be carried out in the severe climatic conditions of the north. In order to complete this task successfully and within a reasonable period of time, new equipment will be required. New timber combines and powerful earth suction equipment will be the first machines on the priority list. Such equipment is now being produced by Gidroyekt. The new earth suction machine with a suspended pipe line 110 metres long will allow to excavate in the future canal and deposit the earth directly onto the bank. This machine will be able to transfer up to 3,000 cubic metres of soil per hour. This is three times as much as produced by any modern machine now in existence.

A great deal of time will be required to clear the area of the future reservoir of all the timber. To this end, a new floating timber combine has been designed. It is a large vessel with a powerful steam-operated generating unit. Electric power thus generated will be used to work a series of different machines. The combine will be provided with machinery for the underwater cutting of trees and their processing.

Within the next few years survey work will be completed and plans made for the future construction work. This will be followed by the actual construction of transshipment bases, settlements and various workshops. The construction work, the filling of the reservoirs and the organization of the new waterway will take seven years.

The transfer of the waters of the PECHORA and VYCHEGDA to the VOLGA is a task of a national magnitude. We have related here how this will solve many problems related to agriculture, electric power, river transport and fishing. One must not forget that the cost price of electric energy produced by the new power stations will be 0.4 kopeks for each kilowatt hours.

Vodnyy Transport,  
26 January 1961  
(Abridged).

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### Construction Materials in the North

Large reserves of various building raw materials have been discovered in the Extreme North. Limestone is obtained from open quarries located at ALDAN, MUKHTUYA and BESTYAKH. Deposits of this same material were found around the diamond town of MIRNYIY in the Arctic Foothills of the VERKHNOYANSK ridge and also within the basin of the lower reaches of the river OLEN'KA. Gypsum is produced in the area of OLEKMINSK. Outcrops of marble have been discovered on the banks of the rivers LIS'YA, SELENNYAKH and AGADAY-SALATA. Refractory clays are being worked at the deposit areas of KANGALASSY, and SYRSKIY. Gravel and sands are available in the basins of the Arctic rivers YANA, KOLYMA and INDIGIRKA.

Production of porous concrete has been successfully developed in the Arctic settlement DEPUTATSKIY. This type of concrete is also manufactured at the port city of TIKSI. The first plant to produce keramzite has been set up in TIKSI. During the last year and a half the production capacity of the mechanized plant of wall blocks established in the area of OYMYAKON has been doubled. Recently, the Trust Yakutalmaz started production of large wall blocks from local raw materials. The POKROVSKIY brick factory is being reconstructed. After additional equipment has been installed this enterprise will produce over 20 million bricks per year.

Trud, 28 January 1961  
Page 4 (Full text).

### Lighter than Cork

This article describes the uses for obsidian or rather, as it is known, volcanic glass. If this material is heated, it becomes five times lighter than cork. Until recently, it was not used for any specific purpose. However, as geologists of KAMCHATKA have discovered large amounts of obsidian beyond the village of NACHIKI, an industrial use has been found for this new material. In places, layers are from 20 to 30 metres thick and the general known reserves exceed one million cubic metres.

In the KAMCHATKA, housing developments are built on an ever increasing scale. That is why the question of a cheap and solid local building material has been worrying geologists and constructors. It was a question whether this new material could be used in construction work. In the USSR, experiments have been made to find out whether material such as perlite and keramzite, which are very close to obsidian, could be used for industrial purposes. As a result of these experiments not far from IRKUTSK, for instance, a whole settlement has been built out of perlite. The Trust Kamchatrybstroy tested the possibilities of obsidian. Their labour became successful. A few days ago the first equipment was installed for the heating of volcanic glass. Obsidian in this form can be used as an insulation material and when mixed with cement it produces a particularly light concrete with

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insulating properties. It is noteworthy that one cubic metre of concrete that contains obsidian produces a wall surface two and a half times larger than when using other materials. This new material will now be used by the trust to produce light and solid wall blocks and wall panels.

At the present time construction workers of this Trust have laid the foundation of the first four-storey dwelling-house using this local material.

Trud, 29 January 1961  
Page 4 (Abridged).

#### Permafrost Research

The mine reaches a depth of 30 metres through permafrost. Instruments have been installed at the bottom. These record subterranean tremors.

The seismic station Yakutsk is one of the newest in the Soviet Union. Here, scientists are studying the seismic regime of the Arctic. Within the next few years several other such stations will be opened in the YAKUT ASSR. One of these will be located in the OYMYAKON region. Preparatory work for the establishment of this station has been completed.

A careful study of the permafrost soil will allow the compilation of an accurate chart showing the seismic characteristics of the Extreme North. The knowledge of the limits of areas most likely to be affected by tremors will allow to correctly select future construction sites.

Trud, 11 February 1961  
Page 4 (Full text).

#### The First in the KOMI Republic

Darkness is falling. Lights are going up in the dining-room. The number of clients is diminishing. At 7 o'clock when the dining-room is empty of diners, it is filled with young people, the same ones that a few hours back stood at the cooking range. These are students of the first restaurant school in the KOMI ASSR.

For a long time public feeding establishments of UKHTA were lacking in qualified personnel. With the individual method of tuition students in this field were not receiving the necessary theoretical knowledge. That is why this school was opened.

The curriculum covers nine months. During four evening sessions per week, the students are being instructed by professional cooks and are taught the technical aspects of preparing food, the organization of the establishments, use of kitchen equipment and various aspects of safety in handling the kitchen machinery. During the day the students undergo a three-hour practical phase of their work.

Sovetskaya Torgovlya,

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### Gas in the Permafrost Zone

A 300 kilometre gas main will be laid in YAKUTIA (Siberia) in the zone of eternal frost. It will stretch across the taiga from a large deposit by the VILYUI river to the Republic's capital, YAKUTSK.

The 40,000 ton steel line will be placed above ground on light supports which will not be affected by soil subsidence during the summer months. Some of the supports will stand on eternally frozen ground.

The project will be completed by 1963.



Soviet Union Today,  
February 1961  
No. 2 (72).

### Treasure Peninsula

KOLA Peninsula may well be called a land of youth. Everything you see there was built recently by young people - entire towns, plants and electric power stations.

"Several years ago this place was covered with taiga, and now there is a town standing here," one hears local people saying often.

KIROVSK is one of the new large cities of the Soviet Arctic, and is a center of industry. Local people hold that the town was conceived on the night of January 1, 1930, when S. Kirov, one of the outstanding leaders of the Soviet state, sat in conference with KOLA leading workers. The conference decided to build an industrial town among the formidable Arctic mountains.

In 1929, a geological expedition headed by Alexander Fersman, the remarkable Soviet mineralogist, arrived in the area adjoining Lake Imandra.

It soon became clear to the scientists that expeditions and periodic investigations would manage to investigate properly this territory which was aptly called a "treasure house of natural resources," and boasted of great deposits of apatite, iron and mica.

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With the purpose of rendering maximum aid to the newly born industry in studying ores and the methods of their processing, an alpine research station of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR was opened in summer 1930 in the Khibiny Mountains. The construction of this little house in the mountains marked the beginning of wide-scale research on KOLA Peninsula. In 1934, the station was reorganized into a KOLA Scientific Research Base. And after that the KOLA Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences was formed.

Thus we see that KOLA scientific organizations are only 30 years old, and yet they have made a great contribution to the development of the peninsula's productive forces. Researchers have discovered many deposits of different ores. These deposits served as a foundation for the development of a mighty local ore mining and metallurgical industry.

When one looks at the big well-lit houses of this science town and visits its laboratories, one sees the tremendous strides taken by science on the KOLA Peninsula. Originally a lonely research station lost in the mountains, it now boasts a mighty science centre.

#### "APATITY" seismic station

One of the buildings in AKADEMGORODOK accommodates the world's northernmost seismic station. When you come inside, you immediately find yourself in a world of high-precision instruments which automatically record even the slightest tremors of the earth crust occurring at a distance of many thousands of miles from APATITY.

Dr. Sidorenko, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Chairman of the presidium of the KOLA Branch, says that this seismic station has a great future. The remarkable feature about it is that its instruments come into contact with "tune into," the life of the crystal foundation of mountains. No other station in the world has this advantage which helps to register, with great accuracy, the tremors of the earth's crust.

The fact that the station is situated beyond the Arctic Circle combined with the latest methods of earthquake research developed in recent years opens great prospects for seismology on the KOLA Peninsula.

#### "settling" fish

In one of the laboratories of PINRO, which is a Polar Research and Planning Institute of Fish-Breeding and Oceanography in MURMANSK, I saw some "resettled" fish. Such were the first results of settling Far Eastern humpback in the rivers of KOLA Peninsula. We learned all this from Viktor Azbel, laboratory chief and a great enthusiast of this undertaking.

Attempts to settle Far Eastern varieties of sturgeon in our rivers, he said, were made several times in the past, but produced no results. However, this year fishermen started catching some of the "new settlers" from the Far East, and there were some specimens that reached 15 to 17 inches in length.

Scientists, fishermen and administrative workers want to supply the KOLA population with high quality and tasty fish caught locally.

Soviet Union Today,  
February 1961  
No. 2 (72).

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RESEARCH HYDROGRAPHIC VESSELS

The Scientific research Vessel CHERSKIY

The following is a caption to a photograph showing N.E. Ivanov. For 30 years, he has been in charge of vessels on Lake BAYKAL. At the present time he is the captain of the scientific research vessel CHERSKIY. Due to his very wide experience he is able to give assistance to scientists and researchers aboard the vessel.

Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,

23 October 1960  
Page 1 (Full text).

The Submarine SEVERYANKA

The submarine SEVERYANKA has been cruising in the North Atlantic for the last two weeks. This is the area of operations of the Soviet herring fleet.

Scientists aboard this submarine are carrying out observations of the density of herring at the bottom, are measuring the transparency and luminosity of the water in this area of the Atlantic and are making a photographic record of their activities.

Vodnyy Transport,

29 December 1960  
Page 4 (Full text).

New Expedition Vessels

The two new vessels of the Academy of Sciences USSR, the PETR LEBLDEV and the SERGEY VAVILOV have gone out to sea on their first cruise. Members of the expedition will carry out research work in the temperate and tropical zones of the Atlantic Ocean. With the addition of these new research vessels, Soviet oceanographic research capabilities have been greatly increased. There are only two other research vessels of this kind; these are the VITYAZ' and the MIKHAIL LOMONOSOV.

Recently oceanographic research has been intensified to study the physical processes in the seas. The two new vessels are equipped with the latest instrumentation for carrying out such research work. In particular, acoustical methods will be employed to a greater extent in order to study the density of water at the surface and at the bottom. Scientific work will be performed in the realms of biology, geology of the sea, hydrology, and hydrochemistry.

The crews of the vessels consist of personnel from the Baltic Shipping Agency. The expedition is headed by L. Brekhovskikh, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences USSR. A photograph of this article shows the two new vessels at anchor.

Vodnyy Transport,  
31 December 1960  
Page 4 (Full text).

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### Crisscrossing the Oceans

This article describes the various cruises of the expedition vessel VITYAZ'. Mention is made of the various countries and ports that this vessel has visited and describes the reception given to Soviet scientists and seamen.

At the present time VITYAZ' is operating in the Indian Ocean where it is carrying out research work together with vessels of other nations.

Vodnyy Transport,  
3 January 1961  
Page 3 (Summary).

### The Research Vessel ZARYA

The research vessel ZARYA arrived in Wellington from Australia. Now the vessel is in the high seas again. It will have to cross the Pacific Ocean to the shores of South America. Making a crossing of 5,000 miles it will dock in Valparaise.

ZARYA is not the only Soviet scientific vessel on the high seas at the present time. The AKADEMIK S. VAVILOV and the AKADEMIK A. KOVALEVSKIY are now located in the Mediterranean.

Twelve days ago the expedition vessel OB' arrived to the shores of PRVDA in the Antarctic. It is making slow progress towards the observatory of MIRNYI. Members of the Sixth Antarctic Expedition reached the settlement by means of aircraft. Many of them set out for the interior of the Antarctic in order to relieve the personnel at stations KOMSOMOL'SKAYA and VOSTOK.

Vodnyy Transport,  
12 January 1961  
Page 4 (Abridged).

### A Newly Discovered Submarine Mountain

The Soviet expedition vessel VITYAZ' continues research work in the Indian Ocean.

Five hundred fifty miles to the southeast from Ceylon a submarine mountain of volcanic origin has been surveyed. **It** has been discovered by the expedition on board the VITYAZ' that carried out research work in the same area last year. It has been found that it is 3,000 metres above the level of the ocean bed. The minimum depth above the peaks equal 1,550 metres. This submarine mountain is in the form of a cone with several peaks. Members of the expedition on board the VITYAZ' have suggested to name the new mountain in honour of PAN'SII NIKITIN; this was the first Russian traveller to India.

Vodnyy Transport,  
31 January 1961  
Page 4 (Full text).

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### The Expedition Vessel VITYAZ'

After the vessel left India, we spent 38 days in the central part of the Indian Ocean. From Bombay the course lay to the south along the 71st parallel and then north along the 83rd meridian. Members of the expedition carried out research work relating to currents, their boundaries and speed, during the start ~~and~~ in the course of the winter monsoon.

The VITYAZ' again crossed the Arabian - Indian and central Indian submarine mountain ridges. In the southern part, the course crossed an area which was shown as blanks on all navigation charts. At the present time completely new data was obtained about the relief of the ocean bottom. During various stops research was carried out at depths from 4,000 to 5,000 metres. Asdic research was carried out to determine the thickness of bottom deposits and of the earth's crust. In the central areas of the Indian Ocean these bottom deposits amount to several hundred metres while in the northern part of the Arabian Sea it reaches 2,500 metres. The thickness of the earth's crust in the central part of the ocean has been established as being 80,000 metres. It is known that under continental areas it often reaches 40,000 to 60,000 metres.

After cruising in the central part of the Indian Ocean the vessel arrived in Colombo. After the stay of five days the VITYAZ' left Colombo and is now located in the northwestern part of the Bengal Bay not far from the shores of India.

Vodnyy Transport,  
2 February 1961  
Page 4 (Abridged).

### In the Sea of Davis

The OB' took 20 days to fight its way through the ice of the Sea of Davis to reach the shores of PRAVDA. During that period it covered only 22 km. At last the unloading point was reached. This year, contrary to previous years, the crew had no assistance for unloading operations. Part of the expedition members stayed to build the new scientific station, and to carry out field research on Queen Maud Land. The remaining personnel were busy at MIRNYI.

Unloading operations took 9 days. About 2,400 tons of various freight was delivered to MIRNYI for the use of the Sixth Antarctic Expedition.

Having remained in the ice of the Sea of Davis for one month, the OB' left MIRNYI on the 30 January. Apart from the crew the OB' was carrying a group of scientists and airmen, including the head of the Fifth Antarctic Expedition. The oceanographic section was headed by V. Ledenev. They will carry out complex research work in the southern part of the Indian Ocean. The polar expedition members have two aircraft at their disposal, one an AN-6 and also a MI-4 helicopter. It is possible that the OB' will visit foreign scientific stations - Mawson and Siova.

By the time the vessel will make its second visit to the shore of Princess Astrid where station LAZAREV is still in operation, members of the Soviet Expedition will have completed their work and will embark. The vessel will then return to the Soviet Union via MIRNYI.

Vodnyy Transport,  
2 February 1961  
Page 4 (Abridged).

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The VITYAZ' in Ceylon

The expedition vessel VITYAZ' has arrived at Colombo after a journey of forty days. After its departure from Bombay the VITYAZ' made two crossings of the equator. During that time about 55 stops were made for oceanographic studies and the distance covered reached about 7,000 nautical miles.

Having taken on the necessary supplies the VITYAZ' again went out into the Indian Ocean. Its present task is a comprehensive study of the Bengal Bay. It will remain there for a month after which it will proceed to Calcutta.

Trud., 5 February 1961  
Page 4 (Abridged).

TRANSPORT AIR

MIRNYY Airfield YAKUT ASSR

The airfield at MIRNYY has been established on reclaimed land, which formerly was part of the swampy taiga. A photograph shows the general view of the airfield with its air terminal building and settlement for air service personnel. The field is active from dawn to dusk. Various freight is being brought in including animals for a Sovkhoz that is being set up in the area.

Kryl'ya Rodiny,  
No. 12, 1960 (Abridged).

To MAGADAN over the Arctic

Last week the turbo-prop airline IL-18 made a flight from Moscow over the Arctic to MAGADAN.

At present this comfortable air ship is back in Moscow after its trans-Arctic flight. Thus the crew of the IL-18 have inaugurated the new high latitude line linking Moscow with MAGADAN. This new air service follows the route through AMDERMA, TIKSI, along the coastline of the Arctic Ocean over the river INDIGIRKA.

The new route is 2,000 km shorter than the existing one via OMSK, IRKUTSK, KHABAROVSK, and OKHOTSK.

Two hours after leaving MAGADAN the aircraft was flying in the darkness over the Arctic. The whole flight took only 12 hours of flying time. During this first flight the aircraft carried about 100 passengers and mail.

In the near future there will be a regular route established on the line MAGADAN - Moscow serviced by the IL-18 aircraft which will be piloted by personnel of the polar aviation, Aeroflot.

Vodnyy Transport,  
27 December 1960  
Page 4 (Full text).

The First Flight

The gigantic turbo-prop airliner AN-10A left the SHEREMET'VEV Airport and set course to the northeast.

The aircraft carrying 100 passengers is making its first flight to NORIL'SK. A pamphlet available to passengers mentions that the distance from Moscow to NORIL'SK is 6,000 km. However, the navigator states that it is only 3,160 km, the difference being that previously the route lay through KRASNOYARSK while at present it follows a straight line.

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An announcement is made that the intermediate point of the journey is being reached. After two hours of flight the aircraft lands on the airfield having covered 1,200 km of the journey. After a short rest the flight is resumed. Yesterday the AN-10A returned to Moscow and a new line has thus **been** officially opened.

A photograph shows the AN-10A at an airfield.

Krasnaya Zvezda,  
7 February 1961  
Page 3 (Abridged).

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## TRANSPORT RAIL

### New Railway Line

The new railway line VYKHODNOY - PECHENGA has just been completed. It crosses the KOLA Peninsula.

This railway line was built in very difficult climatic conditions and over terrain which concealed many marshes and rocky areas. More than four and a half million cubic metres of earth had to be moved, bridges built, various buildings constructed and adequate stations provided.

Many of the construction workers have applied to remain with this railway line as servicing personnel.

The new line which is the most northern one in the world has an important role to play in the industrial development of the KOLA Peninsula and also of the entire northwest of the RSFSR.

Sovetskaya Rossiya,  
20 November 1960  
Page 4 (Full text).

### The Railway Line MURMANSK - PECHENGA

The railway line MURMANSK - PECHENGA has been officially opened. It stretches to a total of 166.4 km.

This new railway line has opened the way to the area of nickel ores. A new town is being built which will be known as ZAPOLYARNYY and which will have a new mining combine.

Gudok, 15 December 1960  
Page 1 (Abridged).

### Northernmost Railway is Opened

A new railway, 167 km long, has been built and put into operation beyond the Arctic Circle from MURMANSK to PECHENGA. Except for low, weak trees and thin Karelian pines in some places, the territory through which the new steel artery runs consists of bleak tundra, marshes and small lakes. This is an austere region; the winter is dark and freezing with fogs alternating with blizzards, while the summer is windy, short and deceptive.

Many railway engineers, even those with great experience, believed that it would be impossible to build a railway here.

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"The main thing," they said, "is that there is no land. The place is full of swamps, and rock soils lie next to quagmires."

It was hard to raise objection to this, but it was decided to build the road just the same. It was needed to develop this area of vast natural wealth. And now the northernmost railway in the world has gone into operation in this territory which had remained silent for centuries.

Many of the first passengers to travel on this line took part in building it throughout the long Arctic night lit up by powerful searchlights and by the merry dancers of the Aurora Borealis.

When the surveyors reached the site of the future station of MURMASHI, they stood for a long time at the foot of a mighty cedar tree, wondering how it ever got there. A legend about this beautiful tree said that it had been planted by the first man to explore this area. Railway tracks now run near this cedar tree. Man has planted firm roots in this land just as the legendary explorer from the Siberian taiga. Railway stations have sprung up here as well as expanding communities with stores, hospitals, schools, and workshops.

The new railway was built chiefly by members of the Young Communist League. More than a thousand young men and women displayed real heroism in this work. In the very beginning of construction the youth met another enemy besides the grim nature of the Arctic. When steel pegs were driven into the ground to hold up the tents they struck metal. The young builders cautiously dug up the ground and discovered mine detonators. Army sappers, called to the scene, dug up a mine dump. They moved on and came upon buried bombs, artillery shells, and handgrenades as well as big mine fields. The retreating fascists had left all this after fierce fighting in the last war.

And that was the way the railroad was built: the sappers moved in front to clear the way with the builders following.

The MURMANSK-PECHENGA line and the spur-line to NIKEL' represented an intricate engineering job. No less than 340 bridges and overpasses were built. More than half of the railroad keeps twisting and turning as it crosses dozens of rivers, swamps and lakes. It passes over a water storage body in one place which is more than half a kilometer long.

This job called for the removal of more than 3.5 million cu.m. of earth from quarries to fill up the embankments. It would have required 250,000 flatcars to deliver this amount from the quarries which were dozens of kilometers away. All in all, close to seven million cu. m of earth were removed, one million cu.m. consisting of rock. Drillers and blasting teams had a great deal to do.

All the main construction jobs were mechanized. Hundreds of workhands were replaced by excavators, bulldozers, compressors, and track and ballast laying machines.

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Besides the railroad from MURMANSK to PECHENGA, these young workers from LENINGRAD, BRYANSK, VOLOGDA and other regions also built a motor road, 46 km long, from NIKEL' to PRIRECHENSK. This road runs through places hitherto impassable.

Komsomolskaya Pravda,  
18 December 1960  
Reprinted in Daily Review  
of Soviet Press.

The Railway Line MIKUN' - SYKTYVKAR

These days the personnel of PECHORSTROY is completing the construction of the 100 km railway line MIKUN' - SYKTYVKAR. This line will link the capital of the KOMI ASSR with the northern line. The new line has already been opened for freight service. Timber-loaded trains are leaving SYKTYVKAR daily for various construction sites of the SYP. Passenger service will be started soon.

Stroitel'naya Gazeta,  
30 December 1960  
Page 1 (Full text).

Rail Service to SYKTYVKAR

Passenger service has been opened on the new railway line which connects SYKTYVKAR with the Northern Railway which runs to the northern city of VORKUTA. This railway line 96 km long linking SYKTYVKAR with MIKUN' was completed prior to the new year. This railway line carries saw-mill products, prefabricated houses and timber from SYKTYVKAR for various constructions under the SYP. Building materials and equipment are being brought into SYKTYVKAR for the establishment of one of the largest timber industrial complexes of the USSR.

Gudok, 25 January 1961  
Page 1 (Full text).

New Railway Line

Passenger service has been started on the new railway line linking SYKTYVKAR with the Northern Line to VORKUTA. The construction of this line (SYKTYVKAR - MIKUN') which is 96 km long, was completed before the New Year. Now the line serves to bring in building materials for the establishment of the SYKTYVKAR Timber Industrial Complex, to be located on the banks of the VYCHEGDA. This will be the largest enterprise of its kind in the USSR.

Trud, 25 January 1961  
Page 1 (Full text).

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The Railway Line IVDEL'-OB'

This article describes the personal experiences of workers engaged on the construction of the railway line IVDEL'-OB'. This railway line, mainly for the transportation of timber, will be 446 km long, and will cross the territories of the SVERDLOVSK and TYUMEN Oblasts'. The new line will assist in the rapid development of the timber and timber chemical industries in these areas. The line will also have considerable influence on the TOMSK Oblasts'. Timber will be floated down the river from northern areas to the large timber transshipment center which will be created at the place where the new railway line will meet the river OB'.

The workers have now reached the 127th km where the station NERP'YA will be located.

Gudok, 2 February 1961  
Page 3 (Extract).

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TRANSPORT ROAD

Ice Roads

The many rivers and marshes of the YAKUT ASSR have been transformed into wide highways. Powerful trucks are now able to reach the most remote areas.

Two MAZ vehicles loaded with building materials have left the settlement MUKHTUYA which is located on the left bank of the river LEN. These vehicles were on their way to the VILYUY, the construction site of the hydro-electric power station.

Notwithstanding, the rough terrain and climatic conditions, the trucks reached their destination covering 200 km in 31 hours. Two more trucks made the same journey later.

Vehicles made the trip along the ice of the river YANA from BETAGAY in the VERKHOYANSK foothills to the coast of the Sea of LAPTEV. These vehicles were carrying food supplies and equipment to various polar outstations.

A winter road has been established from DEPUTATSKIY to KUYGA to bring out tin mined in the Arctic.

Great activity may be noticed at the ARTYK motor vehicle park which has been set up in the OYMYAKON area. Winter roads leading in many directions have been established in this area. Vehicles proceed to VERKHOYAN'YE, KHANDYGA and to MIRNYI.

A winter road 200 km long has been established from EL'DIKAN to YNYKCHAN.

Trud, 11 January 1961,  
Page 2 (Full Text).

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### TRANSPORT WATER

#### A Floating POL Station

A photograph in this newspaper shows a floating petrol, oil and lubricant station in the port of PECHORA. Various vessels navigating the river PECHORA and its tributaries tie up at the station for refuelling.

Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,  
6 October 1960  
Page 2 (Full text).

#### Through the Ice

Ice-breaking operations have been started in the sea port of ARKHANGEL'SK. Notwithstanding the fact that the North DVINA is still in the grip of ice, twenty-seven ships from the Soviet Union and abroad are moored at the quays of the timber combines. They are loading northern timber for domestic consumption and for export. Another ten vessels are on their way to ARKHANGEL'SK.

The diesel-electric vessel KAPITAN MELEKHOV is leading foreign vessels through the ice of the White Sea.

Sovetskaya Rossiya,  
20 November 1960  
Page 4 (Full text).

#### New River Tanker

Experimental production of a new and powerful river tanker with a load carrying capacity of 5,000 tons is being started at the STALINGRAD Shipyards. This tanker is for service on the BOL'SHAYA VOLGA, and lakes ONEGA and LADOGA. The vessel will be 132 metres long, 16.5 metres wide and the sides will be 5.5 metres high. Each of its two main engines will develop 1,000 h.p. The planned speed will equal 19.5 km per hour.

Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,  
22 November 1960  
Page 2 (Full text).

#### The New Port of YAKUTSK

Construction work of the new river port on the river LENA in YAKUTSK was started during the summer of 1960.

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The river port will consist of two adjoining sections, one for freight and the other one for passenger service.

Specific amounts of freight in the overall load turnover of the port will be as follows: gravel and other mineral building freight 44%, timber in vessels 11%, machinery, food and industrial freight 4%, metal and metal scrap 4%. Bulk chemical and oil loads, fruits and vegetables, salt and other such loads take up only a very negligible percentage.

The site for the construction of the YAKUTSK port was selected on the left bank of that part of the river that flows through the town and is lower than the YAKUTSK Electric Power Station. The overall length of the quay side in the freight section will amount to 460 metres.

In the freight section there will be a total of six wharves. Two wharves will handle unitary loads and there will be one wharf for each of the following materials: mineral building loads and cement, timber, building materials and coal. In addition there will be one wharf provided with bunker facilities. The port will be provided with ten cranes with a lifting capacity varying from five to fifteen tons. There will also be a five-ton crane in the rear area of the port. Rear loading areas and in storage places, autoloading with lifting capacities varying from 0.5 to 3 tons and accumulator operated loaders with load capacity from 0.75 to 1.5 tons will be used.

Two ferro-concrete storage buildings, each about 2,500 metres sq. will be built for the storage of unitary and valuable freight. The freight section will also be provided with auxiliary services such as, repair workshops, a garage, transformer substations, a building for the port administration, a regional office, an equipment storage place, a fire hall and other buildings.

The passenger station will be provided with two wharves and with a station capable of handling 200 passengers.

The port of YAKUTSK will be provided with electric power from the city power station. This will require the building of suspended transmission lines, two transformer substations and the laying of feeder networks. Water will be provided from the city water supply. The port's sewage system will be linked with the city sewers which will be built shortly.

The various buildings of the port will have the most modern means of communication. There will be a highway 750 metres long which will link the new port with the town.

Apart from the various buildings in the freight and passenger sections of the port, it is also intended to build a protective breakwater, establish an approach channel and create the necessary depth of water in the port itself. The protective dam or breakwater will be one of the most important items in the construction of this port. This dam will protect the vessels during the winter from moving ice. It will also protect the water approaches to the port and especially will prevent the silting of the channel. This dam will consist of two parts and its overall length will be 2,600 metres.

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An approach channel will be built; it will be 3 km long and about 40 metres wide. Its main purpose will be to provide an approach route to the port especially in summer when the water level is extremely low.

The building of the port of YAKUTSK was started by the construction of the protective dam and the establishment of the necessary construction base.

The new port on the LENA will have a great effect on the further development of this rich area located in the extreme part of the northeast of our country.

Rechnoy Transport,  
No. 11 1960  
(Abridged).

#### Winter Navigation in ARKH NGEL'SK

About 575 foreign vessels visited northern ports.

The export of timber from ARKH NGEL'SK continues even during the winter. The diesel-electric vessel INDIGIRKA left this port with a load of cellulose for England and France. The holds of this vessel contain about 4,000 tons of high quality production of the paper industry of ARKH NGEL'SK. With this trip the INDIGIRKA completes the yearly transportation plan on time.

Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,  
17 December 1960  
Page 1 (Full text).

#### Shipping in the North

The waves of the Bering Sea are breaking in the bays and inlets of CHULOTSK Peninsula. The steamship VALERIY CHEKALOV was straining at its anchors in the UGOL'NAYA Bay. Small tugs towing barges loaded with coal were plying between the vessel and the shore.

This is an episode in the daily toil of the crew of this vessel. It was the first to open the navigation season to the port of NAGAYEV. Having broken through the ice, the vessel brought in the necessary technical materials for the various enterprises of the MAGADAN Oblast'. The crew of the VALERIY CHEKALOV have transported several thousand tons of freight which was scheduled to be handled during the next navigation season. They have over fulfilled the assignments of 1960 by  $1\frac{1}{2}$  times. At the present moment this vessel is en route to the Black Sea.

Vodnyy Transport,  
24 December 1960  
Page 1 (Abridged).

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### The OB' at MIRNYI

The journey from Station ~~LENINGRAD~~ to the observatory of MIRNYI took the diesel-electric vessel OB' 12 days. During this trip the vessel met all kinds of obstacles, icebergs, floating ice, fog and snow storms. As the vessel was proceeding forward, new coordinates were marked down in the log. Locations such as the COOK Peninsula, PRINCE ULF shore, the LENA Bay (this was the name given by Soviet seamen in honour of the expedition vessel LENA) Mac-Robertson land, and the MIKELAYLOV Island were all noted.

On the 1 January at 1115 hours Moscow time, the OB' approached the shores of PRUDA. The vessel cut into the shore ice which was barring the way to the unloading point. The vessel was separated from MIRNYI by 18 km of ice.

The OB' brought the relief personnel and supplies. More than 2,000 tons of various equipment will be unloaded.

Vodnyy Transport,  
3 January 1961  
Page 4 (Abridged).

### A Requirement for a Coal Wharf

From year to year more and more coal is being transported in the northern river basin. It is carried by rail and water from VORUTA to ARKHANGEL'SK via KOTLAS. The transshipment of coal from rail to water transport in ARKHANGEL'SK is made at the wharves of the sea port. That is why the relationship between the river shipping and the railroad is complicated.

Statistics showing the time wasted by barges with a coal load having to wait for unloading operations, are as follows:

1958	---1,376,000 ton/days (24 hrs)
1959	---1,430,000 ton/days
1960	---about 1,000,000 tons/days

The latter figure (1960) represents eight to six barges with a load capacity of 1,000 tons each in the course of the entire navigation season. The maintenance of dumb vessels which have stood awaiting unloading, costs the shipping agency about 600 - 700 roubles per year.

Thus, the question arises why the Northern River Shipping Agency, which handles a large volume of coal, does not have its own wharf facilities. It is our considered opinion that if the shipping agency were to acquire the coal sector on the left bank of the North DVINA, then the two other coal sectors, that is, EKONOMIYA and MOSALEV OSTROV, would be sufficient to meet the requirements for the transshipment of coal for local organizations in ARKHANGEL'SK.

The transfer of the coal sector (wharf) to the Northern River Shipping Agency will increase the effective use of the fleet, as there are possibilities of loading dumb tonnage with sawmill products from ARKHANGEL'SK to KOTLAS. This will require a quicker method of handling barges that bring in coal. This may be achieved by the full use of wharf facilities on the coal sector of the left bank, the clearance of the storage space of coal for sea-going vessels and enterprises of the ARKHANGEL'SK Industrial Centre.

This article was written by G. Koryakin, senior engineer of the Northern River Shipping Agency.

Vodnyy Transport,  
5 January 1961 (Full text). 001726

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### Krasnaya Kuznitsa Shipyards

This short article written by a workman at the Krasnaya Kuznitsa Shipyards in REKHA'NCEL'SK, describes the reaction of workmen to the results of the XXII Congress of the CPSU. Working conditions have improved through the introduction of mechanization and automation; working hours are shorter and wages higher. Mention is made of the dredger KOLYMA undergoing repairs at the above yards.

Vodnyy Transport,  
19 January 1961  
Page 1 (Abridged).

### Containers Remain on Shore

It's a long way to YAKUTSK. Freight for the latter city is first transported by railway to the port of OSETROVO on the LENA where a large transshipment point has been established. Thereafter, it is transported by water. As an overall estimate freight takes about 3 to 4 months to reach its destination. That is why handling of loads is of utmost importance during that time.

Unfortunately, the Lena River Shipping Agency does not take this into account. In the port of YAKUTSK there is no special area and containers are unloaded directly onto the shore. During the 1960 navigation up to 1,000 containers stood on the bare ground, so close to the water that they were washed over by waves. Another factor which must be considered is rain. Gradually water seeps into the containers. When these containers were opened up it was found that 30% to 40% of the contents were wet and covered with mold. Certain loads were considered a complete loss.

Trade organizations of the city of YAKUTSK requested on many occasions that the River Shipping Agency do something about the situation regarding the unloading and **storing** of the containers and also that these could be opened up in port for checking. However, the Shipping Agency up till now refused to do this and only obliged by opening up the containers which were obviously damaged; however, the Agency would not accept any responsibility for this damage.

It would be desirable that the Lena Shipping Agency would provide suitable unloading points in the port, unloading machinery, storage areas and also would **improve** the containers themselves. If rubber linings were adopted these would **prevent** water from seeping inside.

Sovetskaya Torgovlya,  
28 January 1961 (Full text).

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Sea Transportation Statistics

The January freight transportation plan for the shipping agencies of the Ministry of the Sea Fleet, (coastal and overseas) shows the following results in percentages:

Shipping Agency	total in tons	<u>Coastal Service</u>		Overseas Transportation Net figures
		Including Transport Fleet	Total in ton/miles	
Northern	--	--	--	113.4
Murmansk	131.1	120.8	106.3	116.7
Baltic	123.6	--	--	109.7
Latvian	252.9	--	--	111.4
Estonian	140.0	140.0	170.6	87.4
Black Sea	120.5	130.1	123.5	103.9
Caspian	103.7	103.6	101.3	157.5
Far Eastern	111.0	111.0	131.9	92.6
Sakhalin	108.3	105.7	135.7	164.9
Kamchatka	90.0	116.3	77.9	--
Danube	141.1	141.1	--	110.9
Result for the Ministry of the Sea Fleet				
	110.1	112.6	119.6	105.5
Including:				
Dry freight	122.0	132.0	133.9	
Liquids	103.8	104.0	114.0	
In addition:				
Middle eastern general cargo	145.8	145.8	131.4	

Vodnyy Transport.  
9 February 1961  
Page 1 (Full text).

Through Northern Seas to Siberian Rivers

Hundreds of river vessels have completed in 1960 the journey from shipbuilding yards to the new home ports. Their routes lay through the Black, Azov and Baltic Seas, via internal waterways and through the ice of the Arctic Ocean, in order to reach the rivers VOLGA, KAMA, OB', YENISEY, LENA, and the KOLYMA. Powerful ice-breakers led by the flagship LENIN assisted these river crafts to negotiate the straits of VIL'KITSKIY.

The correspondent of this newspaper asked the head of the expedition of special sea transfers of river craft about their present activity.

In ARKHANGEL'SK, LENINGRAD, IZMAIL, KHERSON and other points where vessels are being concentrated, crews are being assembled. At these same locations courses to improve qualifications have been set up and are attended by more than three hundred people.

Vessels that will be transferred to Siberian rivers via the north are now being readied. The hulls are being reinforced and the vessels themselves are being converted. High superstructures are being dismantled and all openings are being tightly closed.

Vodnyy Transport,  
9 February 1961  
Page 3 (Abridged).

#### New Vessels

The steamship VEL'SK, built in Poland on order from the Soviet Union, has arrived in Riga.

This vessel will join the merchant fleet of the Northern Shipping Agency. This vessel is 108 metres long, has a load carrying capacity of 5,150 tons and a speed of 13.5 knots. At the present moment the VEL'SK is on its way to MURMANSK to load apatite for Denmark.

Vodnyy Transport,  
11 February 1961  
Page 2 (Abridged).

*Refer to*

*Executive (See Crowe)*

*European (See Roberts)*

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RESTRICTED

JIB BRIEF NO: 7

COPY NO: 3 OF 19

30 January 1961.

INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

50028	B-40
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PREPARED FOR:

J.I.C.

BY:

J.I.B.

SUBJECT:

Estimated Exports of Petroleum by the Soviet Union to the Free World in 1960 and 1961.

SOURCE:

Press and Various.

DATELINE OF REPORT:

January 1961.

1. On the basis of information on oil quotas provided for in trade agreements, partial trade data for 1960, and Soviet exports of oil to various countries of the Free World in recent years, it is provisionally estimated that Soviet exports of crude oil and petroleum products to the Free World in 1960 amounted to 21-22 million tons, and in 1961 may reach 29-30 million tons. A country-by-country analysis is given in the table below.

2. Although the 1960 estimated exports arrived at in the analysis amount to 22.5 million tons, actual shipments may have fallen short of this. The Soviet-West German trade agreement for 1960 provided for Soviet exports of 1.5 million tons of crude oil, but it is probable that actual sales did not exceed 500,000 tons. Allowing for a greater expansion of the markets for oil in Italy and in the underdeveloped countries in 1961, it is possible that Soviet exports of oil in 1961 may exceed the estimate of 28.9 million tons.

3. Employing the lesser figure of 21 million tons for 1960, Soviet exports of oil and petroleum products to the Free World increased by almost 43 per cent as against comparable exports in 1959, crude oil by 77 per cent and oil products by 22 per cent. Sales to Western Europe appear to have increased by 30 per cent, shipments to Italy accounting for the major portion of the increase. Japan increased its purchases of crude oil ten-fold, and Cuba provided a new market for 2 million tons of crude oil and 500,000 tons of petroleum products.

Quantity in '000 metric tons

	1960		1961	
	<u>Crude</u>	<u>Products</u>	<u>Crude</u>	<u>Products</u>
Total	12,525	9,975	15,700	13,186
Austria	500	60	500	81
United Kingdom		200		300
Belgium		250		300
Holland		50		75
Greece	300	200	450	200
Denmark		200		250
Iceland		400		

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 JIB BRIEF NO: 7  
 30 January 1961.

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	1960		1961	
	<u>Crude</u>	<u>Products</u>	<u>Crude</u>	<u>Products</u>
Italy	3,500	1,000	4,000	1,000
Norway		300		350
West Germany	1,500	700	1,500	800
Finland	1,200	1,200	1,400	1,400
Franco	150	700	200	800
Switzerland		50		50
Sweden		1,800		2,000
Yugoslavia	300		150	
Japan	1,100	50	1,400	100
Afghanistan		60		100
Lebanon		75		75
Algeria		25		50
Ghana				100
Guinea		30		300
Morocco	75		100	200
Tunisia		25		50
UAR (Egypt) (Syria)	1,400	900 600	1,500	1,000 700
Argentina	100	300	200	300
Brazil	300	50	300	50
Uruguay	100	200	500	200
Cuba	2,000	500	3,500	950
India		50		700
Ceylon				130
Indonesia				150

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

50029-B-40

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No: .../61

To: JIC

Source: Departmental Memorandum Date: January 16, 1961

Subject: 22nd Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

It has been announced that the 22nd Congress of the CPSU will meet beginning October 17, 1961. The Congress is, according to the party rules, the "supreme organ" of the Communist Party, and has the last word on all Party matters. In fact, the Party Congress has had no real authority since about 1925. But even after 1925, and especially since Stalin's death, Party Congresses have been made the occasions for policy pronouncements of the greatest importance. Thus at the regular 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchov made his secret speech denouncing Stalin, and at the extraordinary 21st Party Congress in 1959 the objectives of the Seven-Year Plan were announced.

2. Khrushchov has also made use of Party Congresses as a mark of the greater democracy which he claims to have (and to some extent really has) introduced into party affairs. Between the 18th Party Congress in 1939 and Stalin's death in 1953, there took place only one Party Congress (the 19th in 1952) despite the fact that party rules call for a regular Congress not less often than every four years. Khrushchov has been punctilious about summoning Congresses as prescribed by the rules.

3. Khrushchov is, of course, to make the two most important reports to the Congress, one a report of the Central Committee, and the other a report on the new party programme which was ordered by the 21st Congress and is now being drafted. The party programme is a statement of long-term communist objectives and intentions, and since the existing party programme was adopted in 1919 and is largely irrelevant in contemporary conditions, the new programme may be an interesting document. It is also noteworthy that a report on amendments to the party rules is to be made by Frol Kozlov, member of the party Praesidium and Secretariat. The party rules were last amended at the 19th Congress in 1952, when Khrushchov made the report. Moreover, since April when changes in party leadership made Kozlov the most influential figure in the Secretariat after Khrushchov, it has been thought that he had been selected to succeed Khrushchov as Party First Secretary and probably as government head as well. This speculation was confirmed by Mr. Khrushchov himself in a conversation with Mr. Averell Harriman. It may be that the 22nd Party Congress has been selected as an appropriate time to bring Kozlov forward publicly as the next First Secretary of the Communist Party.

4. It seems likely that among the most important business of the Congress will be foreign affairs. Khrushchov is reported to have said at a recent Moscow reception that the Congress had been postponed (it was to have taken place early in 1961) because it had taken longer than expected to make contact with the Kennedy Administration. This report, if it is true, would suggest that by October Khrushchov expects to know the nature of his relations with the new United States government, and may therefore have important policy statements to make at that time.

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NO. GSC 1797-4 (JIC)

# Department of National Defence

## JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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50028-B-40  
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J21

6 January, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

NATO CONSULTATION ON ATTENDANCE  
AT SOVIET BLOC FUNCTIONS

Enclosure: (1) Department of External Affairs  
CIRCULAR DOCUMENT NO. A-24/60,  
dated 13 December, 1960.

The above enclosure is forwarded for your information.

*E.A. Blais*  
(E.A. Blais)  
Major,  
Secretary.

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*Fac. 2. Intelligence Staff  
Mun. Bertrand - Refs Secy V. I. C.*



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CANADA

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, December 13, 1960.

CIRCULAR DOCUMENT

NO. A -24/60.

NATO Consultation on Attendance  
at Soviet Bloc Functions

A thorough discussion was held recently in the Political Advisers Committee of NATO about the coordination of NATO attendance at social and ceremonial functions sponsored by Soviet bloc governments. It was realized that this subject creates problems when there are specific political reasons why one or another member of the NATO alliance might wish to avoid attendance. Moreover, such events occur more often at posts in the Soviet bloc than elsewhere in the world. The instance which gave rise to the discussion in Paris was the Grunewald anniversary celebration in Poland. There had been discussion among the NATO missions in Warsaw and a difference of view had been evident as to whether the NATO Ambassadors should accept the Polish Government's invitation to attend the ceremony. Following discussion in Paris and further consultation in Warsaw, a solution agreeable to all was reached.

2. These discussions showed the need for a generally acceptable procedure for dealing with such questions in future, even though disagreement will presumably be infrequent. While it would be the intention to reach as wide agreement as possible, it is recognized that consultation will not necessarily always lead to uniformity of practice. The purpose will be to ensure that each government is aware of special reasons another might have for reacting differently. "Coordination" of attendance may on occasion mean a recognition that responses will vary.

3. The proposed procedure, which was given general agreement in the Political Advisers Committee, was the following:

- (a) Responsibility for any coordination among NATO missions on this subject rests with NATO Ambassadors in the field.
- (b) Consultations to this end should be undertaken in time to permit discussion at NATO if serious disagreement develops.
- (c) The senior NATO Ambassador at the post should normally initiate the discussion, if one is considered necessary, although the initiative can be taken by other NATO Ambassadors should this be appropriate in existing local circumstances.

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- 2 -

4. Instructions have been sent to our posts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where this problem is more likely to arise, asking them to consult with their NATO colleagues as appropriate in accordance with this agreed procedure. If on occasion consultation is initiated at other posts, you will now be aware of the background and may act accordingly. Provision for informal NATO consultation has already, of course, been made in the general instructions you have on social relations with representatives of communist states (Circular Document A-9/60), which continue to be valid.

*file*  
*Henry J. Davis*  
Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

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Copy No

JIB(CAN) 2/61

Date 5 January 1961.

*J22*

**JOINT INTELLIGENCE BUREAU  
Ottawa**

Bloc Sales of Civil Aircraft in 1960

*Copy No 1*

*Copy No 2*

*To All Parties  
Economic*

*Mr. Robert T. Fish  
Registrar  
N.W. M.L.*

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S E C R E T  
JIB(CAN) 2/61

5 January 1961.

Bloc Sales of Civil Aircraft in 1960

1. Four countries in the Bloc manufacture civil aircraft for export (the USSR, Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia). The types of aircraft produced in the USSR include modern jet and turbo-prop as well as piston-engine airliners and transports, light aircraft and helicopters. Versions of the Soviet IL-14 (twin-engined piston passenger and transport aircraft) were manufactured in Czechoslovakia and East Germany but have now been phased out of production. East Germany is planning to manufacture twin-jet airliners but these will not be available for export for a number of years. Czechoslovakia has no plans for producing jet airliners but has a fast growing industry in the manufacture of light aircraft and helicopters. Poland produces aircraft similar to those manufactured in Czechoslovakia.

2. Only a few of the types manufactured have figured prominently in Bloc sales and offers in 1960 to countries of the free world. These are:

- (a) the IL-18: a four-engined turboprop aircraft, seating 75-100 passengers with a cruising speed of 340 knots and a range of 2330 n. miles.
- (b) the AN-12: a four-engined turboprop which is primarily a military transport, but is also employed on civil tasks, capable of landing on dirt airstrips and of "straight-in" loading.
- (c) the IL-14: a twin-engined piston aircraft seating up to 30 passengers with a cruising speed of 165 knots and a range of 1400 n. miles.
- (d) the MI-4 (HOUND) helicopter: similar to the Sikorsky 55 but has a better payload; range of 240 n. miles carrying payload of 3,200 pounds or 6,200 pounds for 210 n. miles.

3. At present the aircraft which the Soviet Union is most actively trying to sell abroad is the IL-18. This aircraft is broadly comparable with the Vanguard and the Electra in range and capacity. Recently Ghana contracted to purchase four IL-18's and may have agreed to buy two more in 1961, reportedly at a cost of \$840,000.00 per aircraft. The sales agreement calls for Soviet flight and ground crews to operate the aircraft until Ghanaian crews can be trained. A Ghanaian official has stated that the aircraft would be paid for out of a \$40 million economic credit which the Soviet Union extended to Ghana a few months ago but this has not been confirmed. Another report suggests that the aircraft were purchased under a separate contract calling for a ten percent down-payment with full payment over seven years at 2.5 percent interest.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T  
JIB(CAN) 2/61

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4. The IL-18 has also been offered to India, the UAR, Iraq, Guinea, Ceylon and Afghanistan and there is some evidence that the UAR and Guinea may be negotiating purchases of this aircraft. Offers to these countries have been accompanied by a wide variety of prices. The price quoted to Iraq was about \$1.7 million, to India and the UAR about \$1.9 million and to Ceylon about \$2 million.

5. Recent information indicates that India has purchased 8 AN-12's (a turboprop transport used by the Soviet Air Force). There is no information available regarding unit price or payment terms but it can be assumed that they were offered at a low price in rupees with payment over a long period. The deal for the sale of the AN-12's includes training for 40 Indian Air Force personnel in operation and maintenance, but there is no information concerning spare parts. Although these aircraft will be flown by the Indian Air Force, the fact that they have been purchased for India's Department of Transport suggests that they will be employed, at least in part, for non-military purposes.

6. Of the other aircraft listed in para 1, the IL-14 was taken out of production in the USSR in 1958, and recently was phased out of production in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. A great number of these aircraft have been sold mainly to the UAR, Indonesia and Afghanistan but none has ever been in regular use on scheduled civil air services of the above named countries. Most of them were supplied as military transports and the sales were made under military aid agreements. Guinea, however, recently ordered 4 IL-14's from Czechoslovakia to form the nucleus of her national airline and they are expected to be delivered shortly. Czechoslovakia has also undertaken to organize Guinea's airline and to operate it until the Guineans can take over. The price paid by Guinea for the IL-14's is unknown but the Czech advertised price per unit has been quoted at \$350,000, although this aircraft has been offered to some countries for \$210,000. Guinea probably purchased them at a lower price with attractive payment terms.

7. Several countries have purchased the Soviet manufactured MI-4 (HOUND) helicopter, among them being Indonesia, the UAR, Iraq, Afghanistan and Cuba. Recent reports indicate that India may purchase 15-20 of them from the USSR because of the attractive price and payment terms offered - approximately \$150,000.00 per unit (including a 25 percent rebate on a purchase of 20) with payment in rupees spread over a long period. Some time ago India purchased two Sikorsky S-62 helicopters from the USA, but the current deal for HOUNDs would appear to rule out further sales of this helicopter.

8. So far in 1960 Bloc sales of civil aircraft have not been spectacular despite the offers that have been made. The only ones accepted to date have been four IL-18's to Ghana, four IL-14's to Guinea and eight AN-12's to India. Cuba has purchased some helicopters (HOUNDs) and it is believed that India is negotiating a purchase for 15-20 HOUNDs.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T  
JIB(CAN) 2/61

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9. The price and repayment terms appear to have been the decisive factors, at least in the sales to Ghana and India. Guinea's purchase of Bloc aircraft is in keeping with its policy of establishing closer political and economic ties with the Bloc. In the case of Ghana, western civil aircraft comparable to the IL-18 are the Lockheed Electra and the Vickers Vanguard which are priced at \$2.1 million and \$2.8 million respectively. Ghana's IL-18's were purchased for about \$840,000.00 per unit with extremely attractive payment arrangements. The fact that the price paid by Ghana for an IL-18 is considerably lower than that quoted by the USSR in offers to other less developed countries suggests a particular Soviet interest in the development of Ghana's civil airlines.

10. The price paid by India for the AN-12 turboprop transport is unknown but presumably it was cheaper than similar western manufactured transports. A comparable western aircraft is the Lockheed C-130 freighter which was sold to the RCAF for \$2.55 million. For nearly a year India has been urgently seeking aircraft to supply troops in the remote areas near the Chinese frontier and to transport men and heavy machinery to help develop her northern communications. The AN-12 is a cargo transport reported to be capable of landing on dirt airstrips. It is estimated that it can carry a payload of about 40,000 pounds to a distance of 1,000 n. miles or 20,000 pounds to a distance of 2,000 n. miles. In place of purchasing aircraft similar to the Canadian Caribou, which can carry a payload of about 7,000 pounds for a distance of 200 miles, it is believed that India intends to use helicopters, possibly HOUNDs, to ferry freight and personnel to areas not accessible to AN-12's.

11. The willingness of the Soviet Union to adjust its prices to fit the customer's pocket-book, particularly if the customer is also interested in western aircraft, suggest that its sales of civil and military aircraft are regarded as an instrument of national policy rather than as economic transactions.

S E C R E T