

2922-B-GL-300-000/FP-000 vol. 2

VOL. 2

FILE NUMBER/DOSSIER 2922-B-GL-300-000/FP-000

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

NATIONAL DEFENCE PUBLICATIONS - OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL ORDERS
THE ARMY (CFP 300)

[illegible]

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FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

2910-CFP300

VOLUME

3



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Défense nationale

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

Quartier général de la Défense nationale
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

2910-CFP 300
~~2910-2 (D Log-Ops-4-3)~~

28 February 1983

Mobile Command Headquarters
St. Hubert, Quebec
J3Y 5T5

Attention: Secretary ADT3

CFP 300 - THE ARMY

Reference: FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD) 12 January 1983


1. CFP 300 The Army has been reviewed by D Log Ops and our comments follow:

a. Page 5-14 Para 515.1. Logistics

The definition of logistics contained in the NATO Glossary (AAP 6) and the Army Glossary CFP 303(2) Sup 3 is different than that expressed in this paragraph. It is important to be constant in the definition of logistics to ensure that there is no conflict between the Command and Control Study; the Combat Service Support Study and this manual.

b. Page 8-14 Para 2.e. Access

This paragraph does not follow the diagram on page 8-13 Figure 8-2. The assistant chief of staff must have direct access to be commander. The importance of logistics in operations has been debated hard and long. It is suggested that it is time to accept that direct access to the commander is the only way to ensure that logistics conforms to the operational requirements.


D.G. Lewis
Colonel
Director Logistics Operations
for Chief of the Defence Staff

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National Défense
Defence nationale

2910-CFP 300 (DMOT 2)

23 February 1983


Mobile Command Headquarters
St. Hubert, P.Q.
J3Y 5T5

Attention: Secretary ADTB

CFP 300 (SECOND DRAFT) - THE ARMY

References: A. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD) 12 Jan 83
B. NDHQ 3189-3-4 TD 0212 (DMOT 2) 12 Jan 83 (enclosed)

1. Further to Reference A, the subject manual has been reviewed by this Directorate and the attached unsolicited comments are submitted for consideration.


P.R. Morisset
Colonel

Director of Medical Operations and Training
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Enclosure: 1

Attachment:

Annex A - Comment Sheet

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National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

Quartier Général de la Défense Nationale
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0K2

001526

TO 2910-CFP 300 (DMOT 2)

DATED 23 FEB 83

DMOT COMMENTS

CFP 300 (SECOND DRAFT) - THE ARMY

SERIAL (a)	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF (b)	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,) (c)	COMMENTS (d)	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR (e)	DECISION (f)
1	DMOT 2	Page 1-7 Article 109.8	Suggest substitution of the word "shall" by the word "may" in the last sentence.		
2	DMOT 2	Page 3-6 Article 307.2.d.	Suggest addition of the phrase; "and not hazard them capriciously".		
3	DMOT 2	Page 3-7 Article 307.4 line 10	Suggest addition of the words "and for Canada" following "for his home and his family..."		
4	DMOT 2	Page 3-8 Article 307.9	Suggest addition of the phrase "provided for materially" after "The soldier expects that his family will be..."		
5	DMOT 2	Page 3-9 Article 310.2 line 2	Suggest deletion of the word "receiving" and substitution of the word "incurring".		
6	DMOT 2	Page 3-10 Article 311.5 Line 2	Suggest this sentence be revised to read: "To do so he must be physically and mentally tough".		
7	DMOT 2	Page 3-11 Article 311.9 Line 4	Suggest the sentence be revised to read: "The leader must place needs of his men ahead of his own".		
8	DMOT 2	Page 4-3 Article 404.4	Suggest this paragraph be revised to read: "The characteristics of the terrain, the endemicity of militarily significant diseases		

ANNEX A

TO 2910-CFP 300 (DMOT 2)

DATED 23 FEB 83

SERIAL (a)	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF (b)	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,) (c)	COMMENTS (d)	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR (e)	DECISION (f)
9	DMOT 2	Page 4-6 Article 406.3.b. Line 4	and the extent and type of vegetation...etc" If there appears to be any possible chance that BW weapons may confront us, we must be prepared to deal with them. Suggest this be dis- cussed with NDHQ/CIS/DNBCC authorities to determine specifi- cally what should be stated in this publication.		
10	DMOT 2	Page 5-14 Article 516	This article should be revised as follows: "516. MEDICAL 1. <u>Role.</u> The role of the Canadian Forces Medical Services is to conserve manpower. 2. <u>Responsibilities.</u> Unit and formation commanders are responsible for the provision of medical care. The medical services is responsible to the commanders for: a. Advice on measures to maintain a high standard of health and to prevent disease in the troops under their command;		

ANNEX A

TO 2910-CFP 300 (DMOT 2)

DATED 23 FEB 83

SERIAL (a)	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF (b)	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,) (c)	COMMENTS (d)	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR (e)	DECISION (f)
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> b. collection of patients from units and their evacuation and treatment with a view to their early return to duty; c. procurement, storage and distribution of medical supplies; d. maintenance of complete medical records on all patients; and e. training of medical personnel and supervising such medical training for other personnel as the commander directs. 		
11	DMOT 2	Page 5-19 Article 523.2.e.	Suggest revision to read "determine manpower and equipment wastage/attrition rates and replacement needs"		
12	DMOT 2	Page 6-6 Fig 6-1	To conform to the terminology shown under ACLANT and ACCHAN it is suggested that "(SACEUR)" should be shown under ACE.		

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TO 2910-CFP 300 (DMOT 2)
DATED 23 FEB 83

SERIAL (a)	SOURCE OF COMMENT & FILE REF (b)	REFERENCE IN DRAFT (page, art, etc.,) (c)	COMMENTS (d)	OPINION OF THE AUTHOR (e)	DECISION (f)
13	DMOT 2	Page 6-8 Article 609.5 Line 2	Squadrons is misspelled.		
14	DMOT 2	Page 8-9 Article 811.1.c.	See enclosed copy of Ref A which elaborates how a formation surgeon staff is conceptualized. (3189-3-4 TD 0212 (DMOT 2)) 12 Jan 83		
15	DMOT 2	Page 8-10 Article 811.1.d.(2)	As above		
16	DMOT 2	Page 9-7 Article 911.1.c.	This item is a personnel NOT a logistical factor in Canadian Doctrine and hence should be included as a new sub-para 908.1.d on page 9-5.		
17	DMOT 2	Page 9-11 Article 918.1 Line 5	Suggest inclusion of "medical infrastructure" on line five following "transportation and communication facilities,"		

PA

MEMORANDUM

2910-CFP300 (D) Stdzn C)


21 Feb 83

DMPC 2

THE ARMY - CFP300

Ref: 2910-CFP300 (DMPC) 15 Feb 83

1. As requested, Chapters 11 and 12 have been reviewed and detailed comments are enclosed on the proforma provided.
2. It is assumed that the writing team has complied with the many STANAGs, QSTAGs and Air Standards which pertain and no attempt has been made to verify such compliance for reasons of time.


J.C. Berezowski
LCol
D Stdzn C
2-1774

Encl: 1

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1	D Stdzn C	Pl1-2/1103.1 line 2	after "tasks", delete semicolon insert: colon		
2	D Stdzn C	Pl2-2/1204.1 line 2	after "terms of", delete semicolon insert: colon		
3	D Stdzn C	Pl2-4/1206.1 line 7	after "aircraft", delete (.) insert: "and suppressive artillery fires to neutralized active air defences."		
4	D Stdzn C	Pl2-4/1206.2 line 3	after "range finding" insert: "and designation"		
5	D Stdzn C	Pl2-5/1209 line 4	after "warheads" delete semicolon insert: colon		
6	D Stdzn C	Pl2-5/1210 line 1	after "aircraft" insert: "and remotely piloted vehicles"		
7	D Stdzn C	Pl2-7/1212.4 line 9	clarify responsibility for ADOLT. Who is responsible for its estab- lishment and who owns it?		
8	D Stdzn C	Pl2-11/1215.3 line 3	delete "Nike Hercules" insert: "PATRIOT" (Note: The new Patriot system is being phased in slowly as replace- ment to Nike Hercules at theatre level and will be eventually the primary AD system for a long time to come.)		

- 2 -

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9	D Stdzn C	Pl2-14/1219.2.e	delete: "provision" insert: "deception by means"		
10	D Stdzn C	Pl2-16/1223.2 line 5	after "zone and" insert: "naval" (Note: AAP-6(0) applies term to a naval force at sea and this should be made clear.)		
11	D Stdzn C	Pl2-18/1224.2 line 1	after "intercepts" delete: "from" insert: "by" or "for" (Note: intention here requires clarification.)		
12	D Stdzn C	Pl2-18/1225.1.a	"Weapons' status" in text is in possessive tense but not in heading or elsewhere - standardize please.		
13	D Stdzn C	Pl2-19/1225.1.b(2) last sentence	spelling of "weapon".		

MEMORANDUM

2910-CFP 300 (DMPC)

15 Feb 83

Distribution List

THE ARMY - CFP 300

Ref: FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD) 12 Jan 83

1. DGMPO has been asked to comment upon the Ref document. Since there is little time to do so and as comments are to come from the "experts" within DGMPO, the document has been divided for comment as follows:

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Commentator</u>
1	LCol Bland
2 and 3	Maj Charrier
4	Maj Seeley
5	Col Geddry
6	LCol Bland
7 and 8	Col Calnan
9	Col Wellsman
10	LCol Bland
11 and 12	LCol Berezowski
13	Maj Scott
14 and 16	LCol Bewick

2. Enclosed for your use are the relevant chapters plus a "Comments" sheet. The document itself is held by DMPC 2 and may be read in situ. Additional comments sheets should be locally reproduced if necessary. You are requested to pass your completed comments to DMPC 2 by 1 Mar 83.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
W. D. WELLSMAN, COL.

W.D. Wellsman
Col
DMPC
2-3400

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BT

①

R E S T R I C T E D DCOS CD 8015

SUBJ: TANK DESTROYER SQUADRONS

REF: SYSTEM STUDY

1. THE SYSTEM STUDY CALLS FOR EIGHT TANK DESTROYER
SQUADRONS IN CORPS 86. THE CORPS AFFILIATION OF THESE
UNITS HAS NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED

2. SINCE THIS DECISION IS REQUIRED TO ALLOW WORK ON THE
ORGANIZATIONAL CHAPTERS OF CFP 300 - THE ARMY (FIRST
DRAFT) TO PROCEED, IT IS REQUESTED THAT CDC DIRECTION
BE OBTAINED ON THIS MATTER

BT

#0116

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② DLCD

I think I can answer
this: the TD Sgns
are Armd.

④ NTF

No further
action required
PA.

JF
13 Dec 82

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Anti-Armour Bn - Inf.
Correct??

③ COORD

Correct. We
can answer at WL.
em
Dec 82

JF
20 Nov 82

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Canadian Armed Forces
Mobile Command

Forces armées canadiennes
Force mobile



FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD)

Mobile Command Headquarters

St Hubert, Quebec / 5600 3-3-2

J3Y 5T5

Referred to 3/ May 82 transmis à DARTY

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JUN 11 1982

CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT) - THE ARMY
COMMENTS

File No. 2910-CFP 300
Dossier No.

Charged to / Chargé à

1. Enclosed is the first draft of CFP 300 - The Army. As explained in the foreword this is the first of the two keystone manuals for the Army. The second publication, CFP 301 - Land Formations in Battle, should be available in first draft form early in 1983.

2. CFP 300 and CFP 301 are complementary volumes. CFP 300 deals with general subjects such as the political-military relationship, the profession of arms, etc. It also deals with tactical systems such as air defence, air space control, tactical air support to land operations, etc which operate on a theatre-wide basis. CFP 301 will present the doctrine for the tactical handling of land formations. All lower level manuals will ultimately be based on the two keystone manuals.

3. Addressees are requested to restrict their comments to matters of substance and organization of material. Minor editorial problems such as word choice, punctuation, etc will be corrected in a subsequent draft. It is suggested that this first draft be reviewed by staff officers as in the final draft comments will be solicited directly from members of the Combat Development Committee.

4. Please offer comments/recommendations on the attached comment sheet. Replies should be sent to this headquarters c/o Secretary ADTB no later than 20 Aug 82.

② Action taken
on DUCD photo print
PA.

K.J. Holmes

Lieutenant-Colonel

Action Chief of Staff Combat Development
for Commander Mobile Command

DUCD 4-2
14 Jun

Attachment

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
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CFP 300
THE ARMY

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Canadian Armed Forces
Mobile Command

Forces armées canadiennes
Force mobile



From Major R.J.M. Selman, CD

Mobile Command Headquarters
St Hubert, Quebec
J3V 5T5

10 June 1982

Dear Sir

I am sending up an extra copy of CFP 300 The Army which you may retain. It was distributed yesterday to the Army Doctrine and Tactics Board meeting.

Lieutenant-Colonel Schrader asked me to send it on to you on his behalf. He said that it had been a useful meeting and that they are looking forward to an interesting seminar at Fort Leavenworth.

Yours sincerely,

R.J.M. Selman

✓ Colonel H.R. Wheatley, CD
Director of Artillery
National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2


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CFP 300

B-GL-300-000/FP-000

FIRST DRAFT

FIRST DRAFT



CFP 300
THE ARMY

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FOREWORD

Jun 82

GENERAL

1. CFP 300, The Army, is issued on the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff. It is effective on receipt and supercedes CFP 165, Conduct of Land Operations, dated 30 October 1973 and CFP 300 (Interim), Conduct of Land Operations, dated 1 December 1978.
2. Any loss or suspected compromise of this publication, or portions thereof, shall be reported in accordance with CFP 128(1), Chap 60.
3. Suggestions for amendment should be forwarded through normal command channels to the Secretary of the Army Doctrine Tactics Board, c/o HQ Mobile Command.

AIM

4. The aim of CFP 300 is to provide guidance on operations by the Army in the field.

SCOPE

5. The guidance provided in CFP 300 is applicable to all levels of conflict and to all levels of command within a theatre of operations. In the first part of the publication the chapters treat general subjects such as the political-military relationship and the profession of arms. These are designed to set the stage for more tactically oriented doctrine. In the second part of the text the chapters deal with military systems such as air defence and tactical air that usually operate on a theatre-wide basis.

CONTEXT

6. CFP 300, The Army and CFP 301, Land Formations in Battle, are the two doctrinal keystone manuals of the Canadian Army. They are complementary manuals. CFP 300 deals with general subjects and military systems which are more appropriately discussed on a theatre-wide basis. CFP 301 deals with more specific matters and doctrine appropriate to the tactical handling of formations in battle. The distinction is arbitrary and some overlap is inevitable. An effort has been made to reduce redundancy, consistent with the requirement to maintain manual cohesiveness. All other Army doctrinal publications will be based on these two manuals.

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7. Primary references for the preparation of CFP 300 were:
 - a. Land Force Combat Development Guide;
 - b. Land Force Branch and System Studies;
 - c. ABCA Combat Development Guide (2000);
 - d. CFP 300 (Interim), Conduct of Land Operations; and
 - e. Command and Staff College Manuals 201, Land Operations, and 202, The Theatre of Operations.

TERMINOLOGY

8. The terminology used in this manual is consistent with that of CFP 303(2) Supplement 3, Army Glossary, and AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. Where a choice of terms is offered the most commonly used term within NATO is employed.

CFP 300

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RECORD OF CHANGES

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CFP 300

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CHAPTER 1

CANADA AND ITS ARMED FORCES

Section 1 - National Objectives and Strategy

101. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

1. Each nation-state establishes broad objectives with a view to furthering its national interests. These objectives serve as the basis for the formulation of policies designed to guide governmental action, including internal functions and external relationships.
2. No two nations have precisely the same objectives and consequently this dissimilarity may lead to conflict. Conversely, those countries with similar aims may form alliances.
3. Canada's national objectives are: (underlining indicates direct military connotation)
 - a. that Canada will continue secure as an independent political entity;
 - b. that Canada and all Canadians will enjoy enlarging prosperity in the widest possible sense; and
 - c. that all Canadians will see in the life they have and the contribution they make to humanity something worthwhile preserving in identity and purpose.

102. NATIONAL POLICY

1. National policies are broad courses of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. They are normally consistent over time.
2. The themes of Canada's national policy are defined as seeking to:
 - a. foster economic growth;
 - b. safeguard sovereignty and independence;

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- c. work for peace and security;
- d. promote social justice;
- e. enhance the quality of life; and
- f. ensure a harmonious natural environment.

103. FOREIGN/DEFENCE POLICY

1. The first concern of defence policy is the national aim of ensuring that Canada should continue secure as an independent political entity - an objective basic to the attainment of the other two national aims. In the policy themes flowing from the national aims, the Canadian Forces have a major part to play in the search for peace and security and the role of safeguarding sovereignty and independence. Defence policy is also relevant to the other national policy themes.

2. The priorities for Canadian defence policy are:

- a. the surveillance of our own territory and coastlines, ie., the protection of our sovereignty;
- b. the defence of North America in cooperation with US forces;
- c. the fulfilment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon;
and
- d. the performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume.

104. GRAND STRATEGY

1. Grand strategy is in part synonymous with national strategy. This is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its defence forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.

2. Grand strategy is also in part synonymous with allied military strategy. Used in this context, its role is the selection and allotment of priorities and resources to theatres of operations.

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105. MILITARY STRATEGY

1. Military strategy is a component of grand strategy. It is the art and science of using a nation's armed forces to secure the objectives of national policy by applying force or the threat of force.
2. Military strategy directs the development and use of military means to further grand strategy through the direct or indirect application of military power. In consequence, military operations must be subordinate to, and consistent with, national objectives.
3. The higher direction of operations in the field is military strategy in a classic sense, or, in other words, "generalship". It comprises the military judgement and decision-making concerning the deployment of forces within the theatre of operations and the assignment of tasks to them. It aims to ensure that when one's forces meet the enemy on the battlefield they will do so at an advantage.

106. TACTICS

1. Tactics deals with the employment, grouping and cooperation of arms and services for a military operation. Considerations include; the state of training, climatic and geographic conditions, the scale and type of equipment and characteristics of the enemy. These lead to the development of battle plans encompassing such elements as fire plans, tactical grouping, manoeuvre of units and combat service support. The aim of tactics is to achieve mastery of the enemy on the battlefield.
2. "As regards the relationship of strategy to tactics, while in execution the borderline is often shadowy, and it is difficult to decide exactly where a strategical movement ends and a tactical movement begins, yet in conception the two are distinct. Tactics lies in and fills the province of fighting. Strategy not only stops on the frontier, but has for

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its purpose the reduction of fighting to the slenderest possible proportions." (B.H. Liddell - Hart)

Section 2 - The Army

107. LEGAL BASIS

1. In accordance with the National Defence Act the Canadian Forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces. The policy of the government that the three Services of the Canadian Forces be unified was stated in the 1964 White Paper on Defence. In consequence, on 1 February 1968, the Canadian Army ceased to be a legal entity.

2. Although lacking a statutory basis, the Army is nevertheless an organization by convention. In general terms, the Army consists of Mobile Command, 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and the Chief of Land Doctrine Operations staff at NDHQ. Regular and reserve units are complementary components of the "total force" Army.

108. THE ARMY ROLE/MISSION

1. The Army's roles and missions are as follows:

<u>Role</u>	<u>Mission</u>
a. To defend, in conjunction with other NATO forces, against Warsaw Pact aggression in NATO Europe.	a. To conduct land operations outside Canada, in conjunction with NATO forces, against modern enemy forces.
b. To cooperate with US forces in deterring a Soviet attack on North America.	b. To conduct land operations anywhere within Canada or North America, independently

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or in conjunction with US forces, against seaborne or airborne incursions.

c. To contribute military forces and skills to the resolution of conflict outside of the NATO area.

c. To conduct international peacekeeping operations and other unforeseen military contingency operations outside of Canada and to provide training assistance to developing nations.

d. To support civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order.

d. (1) To conduct internal security operations in Canada in support of civil law enforcement agencies.
(2) To assist civil authorities in responding to emergency situations and to support tasks relating to national development.

2. Inherent in the above roles is the professional responsibility of the Army to maintain a general purpose combat capability. This responsibility is endorsed by the government in the White Paper, "Defence in the 70s", dated August 1971.

109. THE ORGANIZATION FOR CONTROL

1. Parliament and National Defence. The Governor-General of Canada, as the Sovereign's representative, is Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Armed

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Forces. Parliament, through the National Defence Act, created the Department of National Defence, which is headed by its appointed Minister.

2. The Minister, specifically, and the cabinet generally, are accountable to Parliament for all matters relating to national defence. The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence assists Parliament by deliberating and making recommendations on such matters as external relations, aid, and policies and programmes involving the Department of National Defence.

3. National Defence Headquarters. National Defence Headquarters is organized so as to integrate civilian employees and military members. The Canadian Armed Forces component of the Department is lead by the Chief of the Defence Staff who is responsible for the effective conduct of military operations and the readiness of the Service to meet the commitments assigned by the Government.

4. Functional/Regional Commands. The Canadian Armed Forces are organized into functional commands such as Mobile Command. Most of these commands have regional responsibilities as well their functional responsibilities. Regional responsibilities include the provision of assistance to civil authorities.

5. Command and Staff. By convention, Commander Mobile Command is Commander of the Army. The Chief of Land Doctrine Operations is the principal Army staff officer at National Defence Headquarters. Staffs at national and command levels are theoretically unified, but in practice, positions are normally manned by officers with the service background that the position requires. In other words "Army" positions are filled by Army officers.

NOTE: The Canadian Armed Forces do not have a combat-tested staff system.

The current posture has evolved slowly since unification of the three

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services in 1968. Continued evolution is likely. As the present approach is unproven in war, the advent of hostilities may necessitate major revision. The Canadian Army staff system is explained in subsequent chapters.

6. Commands Abroad. A national command will normally be established in each theatre of operations. These national commands, such as Canadian Forces Europe, are not in an allied chain of command; they report directly to National Defence Headquarters.

7. Formations of a national command may be assigned for operations to an allied command. Such an assignment would occur at an appropriate stage of military alert. This is the situation with 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. Command and control arrangements will vary, but the national command will retain a degree of administrative control to cater to such matters as pay, promotions and logistical support.

8. As a fundamental principle, Canadian troops will only fight under Canadian command. For this reason Canadian formations shall be assigned under "operational control" to higher allied formations, or under "operational command" with the proviso that components of the formation cannot be separately tasked or regrouped.

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CHAPTER 2

THE NATURE OF WAR

Section 1 - Conflict

201. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONFLICT

Conflicts between nations may vary from mere disagreements and conflicts of interest to basic and irreconcilable differences in national ideologies and objectives. The former are often subject to resolution by arbitration and concession and do not necessarily result in hostilities. The latter are more serious and often lead to war or a significant application of national power short of military force.

202. THE SCALE OF CONFLICT

1. The scale of military operations will vary in proportion to the conflict of interest. The scope, intensity and duration of war also depends upon the extent to which a country is prepared to make sacrifices to achieve its national objectives. The scales of conflict are as follows:

- a. High Intensity Operations. These are conflicts in which both sides are prepared to employ the full range of weapons and resources available to them. In such a conflict conventional, chemical, or nuclear weapons could be used from the outset.
- b. Mid Intensity Operations. These are conflicts fought with limited objectives under definite policy limitations as to the extent of destructive power that can be employed, or the extent of geographical area, or both.
- c. Low Intensity Operations. There are two types of low intensity operations:

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- (1) Type A. This is conflict aimed at the internal seizure of power, or changes to established order by illegal forceful means. This includes guerrilla actions, insurgency, rebellion, dissidence, communal violence, civil disturbance, or other tactics.
- (2) Type B. These are operations in which the aim is to maintain peace in an area of political or armed conflict other than by the use of force.

203. CONTEMPORARY PEACE (DETENTE/COLD WAR)

1. Today the world is in a state of international tension wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary and military measures short of overt armed conflict are employed to achieve national objectives. The two super powers have achieved a rough strategic parity resulting in a delicate balance of power. Although East and West coalitions continue, neither coalition is monolithic. Moreover, the world is no longer bi-polar as so-called third world nations achieve technological and industrial maturity thereby significantly enhancing their power base.
2. Detente, or Cold War, is a moot question. On one hand, there appears to be a genuine interest in easing tensions by limiting arms and restricting the employment of nuclear weapons. Indeed some countries have come under strong domestic social pressures in these matters. On the other hand, the recent spate of mid and low intensity conflicts and the high degree of military posturing suggest that armed conflict will be a feature of human existence for the foreseeable future.

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Section 2 - Military Power

204. GENERAL

Military power is only one element of national strength. It is designed to threaten or apply the use of force when the government decides that there is no other way in which national objectives may be attained. It also exerts a stabilizing influence in the maintenance of law and order and in the deterrence of aggression. The measure of its effectiveness is the degree to which it can support national strategy.

205. CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY FORCES

Defence forces are the operative elements of military power. They reflect the objectives of a nation, the shape of the threats that face it and the range of its international commitments. It follows that defence forces are national in character, reflecting the aims and problems of the countries which raise them. Even where standardization is practised between allies, this rarely has a profound effect on the national character of the forces.

206. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES

1. General. Military force may be employed in any form of conflict. The type and degree of force available must be compatible with the nature and the setting of the conflict at hand and the objectives sought. A force's strategy, doctrine and weapons should possess flexibility that enables it to serve national policy in any contingency. However, limitations on the degree of force applied should not diminish the vigour with which military operations are prosecuted.

2. Tasks. Military forces have the potential to further national objectives by:

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- a. waging war;
- b. deterring aggression;
- c. peacekeeping;
- d. conducting internal security operations; and
- e. participating in nation building at home and abroad.

207. OPERATIONAL READINESS

1. The destructive power of modern weapons and the speed with which they can be employed have increased the importance of readiness. Accurate, strategic intelligence is required to maintain operational readiness and assure success in operations. Detailed intelligence on actual or potential theatres of operation must be available to commanders at all levels and must include data on enemy dispositions, composition, strength, recent and current significant activities, peculiarities and weaknesses, capabilities and probable courses of action.
2. Timely and thorough assessment of these factors are of particular importance. It is essential to avoid surprise by sudden changes in the scope, type, or intensity of conflict. Contingency planning should be complete and current. Special attention should be given to developing plans for likely contingency areas.

Section 3 - Principles of War (Canada)

208. GENERAL

1. Attempts have often been made to reduce military experience to rules of action which may help to produce success in war. These rules are known as the "Principles of War".
2. The Principles of War, properly considered, are permanent and universal elements in warfare. Though their application alters with changes

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in weapons and tactics, the principles themselves are as applicable to ancient as to modern campaigns. Moreover, although these principles are often thought of as primarily strategical they apply equally well in the field of tactics. Broadly speaking, these general rules are as applicable to the operations of an infantry section as they are to those of an army group.

3. The mere application of the Principles of War does not guarantee victory. Circumstances will dictate the relative importance of each principle and in some cases a commander will be unable to fully adhere to one principle except at the expense of another. The commander's challenge will be to know where to place the emphasis at any given moment. Canada espouses ten Principles of War; Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, Maintenance of Morale, Offensive Action, Security, Surprise, Concentration of Force, Economy of Effort, Flexibility, Cooperation and Administration.

209. PRINCIPLES

1. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. This is the "master" principle. In every operation of war it is essential to select and clearly define the aim. The ultimate aim is to impose one's will upon the enemy. Subordinate aims must be directed toward this supreme aim. The aim must also be simple, direct and precise. Every plan or action must be tested by its bearing on the chosen aim.
2. Maintenance of Morale. Success in war depends more on moral than on physical qualities. Numbers, armament and resources cannot compensate for lack of courage, energy, skill and bold offensive spirit. Morale is closely akin to combat motivation. It is therefore imperative that it be developed and maintained. High morale is reflected in a confident, resolute, willing and often self-sacrificing attitude.
3. Offensive Action. Offensive action is the necessary forerunner of victory. By wresting the initiative from the enemy, one acquires freedom of

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action and a distinct psychological advantage. The fight must be taken to the enemy; a commander must act, not react. An offensive, aggressive spirit must pervade in all types of operations.

4. Security. A degree of security sufficient to obtain freedom of action to execute one's plans in fulfilment of the aim is essential. To achieve security the commander must have accurate intelligence on the enemy while at the same time denying the enemy information as to his location, strength and plans. Security does not imply undue caution and avoidance of risk, for bold action is a prerequisite to success in war; on the contrary, with security provided for, unexpected developments are unlikely to seriously interfere with intended operations.

5. Surprise. Surprise is a very effective and powerful influence in war; its effect on morale can be great. It can confer the initiative, threaten enemy morale, reduce own casualties and often give material advantages similar to a superior concentration of force. When other factors are equal or unfavourable, success may depend entirely upon surprise. This principle can be achieved strategically, tactically, or by exploiting new equipment and techniques. Its elements are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity and speed.

6. Concentration of Force. The commander must strive to concentrate combat power superior to that of the enemy at the decisive time and place. Concentration does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather having them so disposed as to be able to unite to deliver a crushing blow when and where required. Concentration is a matter more of time than of space.

7. Economy of Effort. Economy of effort implies a balanced employment of forces and a judicious expenditure of resources consistent with achieving the aim. Concentration of combat power at the point of main effort will often require the acceptance of risks elsewhere.

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8. Flexibility. War demands a high degree of flexibility to enable plans to be altered to meet changing situations and unexpected developments. This entails good training, organization, discipline and staff work, and above all, that flexibility of mind and rapidity of decision-making on the part of the commander and his subordinates which ensures that time is never lost. It also calls for mobility of a high order so that forces can be concentrated and dispersed rapidly and economically.
9. Cooperation. Military operations involve cooperation between the arms and services in the Army, between the three fighting services, between the armed forces and civil authorities, and, in a combined force, between allies. It is based on team spirit and training and entails the coordination of all activities so as to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole. Effective cooperation can be achieved if goodwill and the desire to work are fostered at all levels.
10. Administration. Administrative arrangements must be designed to give commanders maximum freedom of action. Every administrative organization must be simple. Each commander must have a degree of control over the administrative plan within his sphere of command corresponding to the scope of his responsibilities for the operational plan.

Section 4 - Principles of War (Other)

210. GENERAL

1. Attached as Annex A is a comparative chart of the Principles of War of the major powers.
2. In addition to Canada's ten Principles of War, NATO recognizes an additional five "fundamentals"; freedom of action, mobility, intelligence, simplicity and maintenance of forces.

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211. NATO - ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF WAR

1. Freedom of Action. This principle is an extension of the human ability to use initiative. A commander requires the authority to exploit an opportunity or favourable situation on the battlefield with energy and boldness. He must have the freedom of action to act independently within the framework of his mission. This freedom of action is important as command communications in battle may be limited by circumstances or enemy action and at times they may only be intermittent and at crucial times non-existent.

2. Mobility. Mobility is necessary to achieve a concentration of combat power. Mobility is also necessary to rapidly deploy weapons into range to engage the enemy or to move friendly forces out of range of enemy fire. A high degree of mobility will enhance surprise and facilitate freedom of action. In planning the moves of forces account must be taken of their varying degrees of mobility.

3. Intelligence. A commander requires, in an easily comprehensible form, background intelligence about the terrain, climate and the enemy. Current intelligence is also required to provide the commander with an up-to-date assessment of enemy capabilities and intentions.

4. Simplicity. In future conflicts, the speed of events and the complexity of war could well lead to considerable confusion unless plans are kept as simple and as straightforward as possible. Any plan based on complex groupings and/or tightly scheduled timings may contribute to failure of an operation. Simple and logical plans are best and stand more chance of success.

5. Maintenance of Forces. Commanders must make every effort to maintain the combat effectiveness of their forces. The commander must try to accomplish his aim with minimum losses. Hard fighting over long periods in

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difficult terrain with bad weather will quickly diminish a unit's combat effectiveness. Opportunities must be taken for rest and to provide adequate combat service support. The relief of battle-worn units and the replacement of men and equipment are important when restoring the combat effectiveness of a unit.

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CHAPTER 3

THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

Section 1 - The Nature of the Profession

301. GENERAL

"The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man". (Huntington). To be a profession the military must satisfy certain criteria. As well, the function of the profession of arms and its unique character must be understood and articulated. These issues are fundamental to the *raison d'être* of the Army and its relationship to the society that it serves.

302. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROFESSION

1. General. Sociologists have established various criteria by which professions are distinguished from occupations, trades, or crafts. Professor S.P. Huntington in his now classical work on the subject, The Soldier and the State, identifies expertise, responsibility and corporateness as being the hallmarks of a profession.
2. Expertise. The military encompasses a vast body of ever-expanding technical or intellectual knowledge. To acquire mastery of this knowledge demands specialized training, prolonged education and above all actual experience. Although the field of endeavour is broad, its central theme is the skill of waging war. It is this unique expertise which distinguishes the military from any other vocation.
3. Responsibility. "The essential and general character of his service and his monopoly of his skill impose upon the professional man the responsibility to perform the service when required by society." (Huntington). Responsibility entails primarily the concept of service,

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hence the designation serviceman, rather than employee. The professional is not motivated by self-interest or economic incentive, but rather he is motivated by his perceived obligation to society and his love of the military "way of life". His responsibility to the state also entails the rendering of specialist advice regardless of how disturbing it might be. Although this advice may not always be followed, as the state receives a variety of inputs when formulating policy, the professional military man is responsible for loyally implementing the decisions taken.

4. Corporateness. The military is a public, collective body providing a unique and essential service to the state. Members of the profession are legally "licensed" by the granting of a Queen's Commission. The corporate structure encompasses more than just the official bureaucracy, it includes societies, associations, educational institutions, journals, customs and traditions. The military professional tends to be a member of a society within a society. He normally lives and works apart from the greater society and his social contacts tend to be with his own kind. Moreover, the military body is self-regulating; that is, it sets and maintains standards and disciplines itself from within. Thus membership in the military profession is aptly described as a way of life.

303. FUNCTION OF THE PROFESSION

1. Harold Lasswell has described the role of the profession of arms as "the management of violence". Perhaps a more useful description of the role is that offered by Sir John Hackett, "the function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem".

2. Although armed forces and armies have been assigned a variety of roles ranging from peacekeeping to national development and from aid of the civil power to the conduct of high intensity combat, the pre-eminent purpose of the military is to win battles. "The truth is that what bonds and marks

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the true military professional is the art of war, the skills of combat, the willingness to face death, the martial values. In this lies the unique corpus, the core of military professionalism. It is not the love of war, but the awareness of war's imminence and the need to be ready for it, which gives meaning to, and justification for, military professionalism". (Dr F.F. Thompson)

304. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE PROFESSION

The military is an unique profession by virtue of its expertise. No other profession or collectivity can perform the role of the military. The military also has a distinctive manner of handling life and death situations. Professions such as medicine and the divinity attempt to preserve, sustain, or enhance the quality of life. While this is also true for the military professional he alone must be prepared to sacrifice life, including his own, to achieve his mission. No other vocation makes this demand upon its members. It is this feature of service life, what Hackett terms, "the contract of unlimited liability", which makes the military a most singular calling.

Section 2 - Ethos of the Army

305. GENERAL

1. Ethos Defined. The characteristic spirit of community in which professional military men live is considerably different from that of other professions. It is important to articulate this ethos if for no other reason than to properly socialize new members of the profession. Without a benchmark of moral values or ethics, novices of the profession will be unaware of what is expected of them. In its simplest form ethos is said to be a value system.

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2. Basis of an Ethos. The military value system must be based on the Army's role, to win battles. In consequence, the ethos of the military is warrior-oriented. Managerial skills, although important, are subordinate to the dictates of leadership and the requirement to impose one's will on the enemy. The warrior-orientation of the military ethos must remain paramount at all times.

306. THE MILITARY ETHOS

1. General. The fundamental theme of the military professional ethos is mission before self. This theme encompasses:

- a. service, through duty and responsibility;
- b. discipline, through obedience and loyalty; and
- c. honour, through justice and integrity.

2. Service. In the broadest sense the military professional serves Canada and the society at large. Within the military sphere his duty is to perform to the best of his ability to achieve his mission. He does not work for himself or promote his own comfort and safety at the expense of his comrades. He must work to improve his unit and enhance the welfare of his peers and subordinates. Most crucially, he is at the service of, as well as responsible for, the development and well-being of his men.

3. Discipline. Discipline provides a sense of order to military life and thus it is essential to combat effectiveness. There are two interdependent elements of discipline: collective discipline and self-discipline.

- a. Collective Discipline. Collective discipline is that discipline established by the Army as an organization. It ensures the obedience of each soldier to the direction of properly established authority. It is instilled through the realistic practice of battle drills and the provision of a common framework

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of routines. In battle, discipline enables soldiers to overcome fear and to react quickly and accurately to the word of command. Discipline is never imposed in a primitive sense, although regulations must be enforced if discipline is to be maintained. Rather, commanders must carefully cultivate a system of order in which high morale and efficiency will flourish.

- b. Self-Discipline. Self-discipline comes from within the individual soldier. Self-discipline exists when soldiers act in accordance with the wishes of a superior without direction or supervision. Self-discipline is fostered through sound training, strong leadership and good morale. Self-discipline entails the obedient support of superiors, peers and subordinates. Loyalty is also a factor, but it is a condition that must be earned through effective leadership, it cannot be taken for granted. Decisions of a superior, once rendered, must be faithfully adopted and implemented by subordinates, regardless of personal feelings. However, subordinates shall not obey unlawful commands. If the commands' legality is in doubt, or the law is not known, the subordinate shall obey the command, unless it is manifestly unlawful. Situations involving a moral dilemma must be resolved by the individual or referred to higher authority.

4. Honour. Honour is adherence to that which is deemed correct or perhaps in simpler language, standing by one's principles, regardless of personal or career consequences. It implies honesty and integrity in word and in action. Soldiers in battle are dependent upon their leaders and comrades for life itself. The will to win rests on the trust that they have in their leaders and the confidence they have in their comrades. Leaders

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must apply justice fairly and equitably. It is imperative to dispense rewards and punishments impartially and without favour.

307. THE FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY ETHOS

1. General. Many factors contribute to the formation of military ethos. The pillars of this ethos are;

- a. sound leadership,
- b. a dynamic regimental system, and
- c. an adequate cultural backdrop.

2. Leadership. Leadership will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. Suffice it to say at this point that the military leader, regardless of rank, is always responsible for his men to:

- a. train them for battle;
- b. equip them for battle;
- c. lead them in battle; and
- d. supply them physical and mental support, before, during and after battle.

3. Regimental System. In the Army, the organization which has evolved over the centuries to enable soldiers to cope with terror, loneliness and the natural fear of death while, at the same time, offering the basis for aggressive battlefield action, is the Regiment. The place of the Regiment in military culture was neither contrived nor conceived by anyone skilled in organizational science, rather it was "quilted" and made a functioning cohesive unit by human beings in battle. Through long and painful experience - by trial and error in war - people evolved the Regiment, a group of men engaged in a common cause of defeating the enemy. It is a natural organization which historically has worked.

4. Briefly, the soldier must want his Regiment, the men of it, and those around him to survive. The Regiment is his family, where he is not alone.

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It provides a situation wherein his human needs can be met and it is therefore very dear to him. As a consequence, the peril to the Regiment's survival from an attacking enemy becomes so threatening that the soldier's natural fear of loneliness and death, as well as his disinclination to take life, is less than his fear of losing those who provide him safety, security, a firm sense of belonging, affection, status and prestige, order, system and structure. The Regiment provides the opportunity to become the best soldier in the world; he fights for something more than himself; he fights for The Regiment, his home and his family.

5. The regimental system enhances social cohesion thus promoting a military ethos. "The esprit de corps fostered by the regimental system is a compound of its unique characteristics, among which may be included;

- a. tradition,
- b. territoriality and/or parochialism,
- c. historicity, and
- d. a proximate focus of loyalty and competition." (N.A. Kellett).

6. As S.L. Marshall expressed it, "I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing that enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or presumed presence of a comrade". This is the heart of the regimental system.

7. In a garrison situation, unit officers remain responsible for the administration and welfare of their men. Specialist staff on base are employed in a consultant role and assist unit officers in fulfilling their responsibilities.

8. Cultural Backdrop. The soldier expects his leader to supply him with his needs; adequate food, clothing, quarters, medical services, spiritual guidance and justice, along with weapons and equipment, that, as a minimum, are equal in quality to those of the potential enemy. The soldier looks to

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his leader for training, education and simulation of the battle in order to gain the knowledge, skills and experience he needs to live and fight and win under any conditions anywhere, anytime.

9. The soldier expects that his family will be treated with understanding, dignity and kindness by a designated cadre during extended absence on duty. He trusts that his family will be supplied with the same daily protection and help from this cadre as they would from him.

10. Finally, the soldier expects fundamental moral protection in the performance of his duties, particularly if such entail the application of lethal power. This involves a clear and unobstructed chain of military command. The military acts of any member of the Canadian Forces shall not be set in motion by persons who are not accountable to the code of service discipline and who are not serving within the spirit of the military ethos.

Section 3 - Leadership

308. GENERAL

1. Definition. Leadership has been defined as the art of influencing human behaviour so as to accomplish a mission in the manner desired by the leader. Persuasion is a key element in leadership. A soldier can be coerced into taking battle risks, but leadership aims to have him take these risks willing. Montgomery endorsed this assertion when he said of leadership, "it is the capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose, and the character which inspires confidence".

2. Role. The primary role of leadership is to motivate, particularly in combat.

3. Principles. Various principles of leadership have been enunciated over time; they can be summarized as;

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- a. accomplishment of the mission, and
- b. concern for one's men.

309. RESPONSIBILITIES OF LEADERSHIP

- 1. It is the responsibility of any military leader to:
 - a. Firstly;
 - (1) know, discipline and develop himself,
 - (2) know, discipline and develop his subordinates,
 - (3) know his objectives and be able to state them in terms that his men can understand,
 - (4) know of and know how to deploy his resources, and
 - (5) know the arena of conflict, then
 - b. Secondly; know the enemy leaders, their men, resources and goals;
 - c. Thirdly; defeat the enemy; and
 - d. Lastly;
 - (1) remember those who fell in battle, and
 - (2) assure the continuity, safety and practice of traditions, symbols, customs and ceremonies and protect the military heritage which has been entrusted to him.

310. THE LEADER AND HIS MISSION

- 1. Inevitably the leader will be confronted with the dilemma of choosing between achieving the mission and his concern for his men. In all situations his mission must come first - this is the awesome responsibility which is inherent in command.
- 2. A leader who believes that he has insufficient resources or that the risk of receiving large numbers of casualties is unacceptably high, in terms of achieving his mission, should first attempt to acquire additional resources from his superior commander. Failing this he should attempt to

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have his mission modified or a new mission assigned. Ultimately he may have to carry out the mission regardless. In each case he should achieve his aim with the minimum loss of life.

311. THE LEADER AND HIS MEN

1. General. Many qualities have been ascribed to leaders; the following characteristics are representative; knowledge, decisiveness, calmness, robustness, initiative, control, example, paternalism and courage.
2. Knowledge. Men respect and will follow leaders who inspire confidence. No man can inspire confidence in others who is not confident in himself and this self-confidence is largely based on knowledge. A thorough understanding of doctrine, tactics, weapons, and equipment, relevant to his rank, must be acquired by every leader.
3. Decisiveness. In combat, fear is an ever present enemy and fear makes men sluggish and indecisive. The leader's influence on his men is realized through his ability to cut through this "fear paralysis" by acting decisively.
4. Calmness. In the heat of battle, the commander must control his own fear and the fear of others. His power of decision results from his ability to remain imperturbable in a crisis.
5. Robustness. A leader must be fully prepared to share the hardships of his men. To do so he must be physically fit and strong. He must also be mentally acute if he is to make sound decisions whilst under severe stress. Although these qualities are to a degree inherent in each leader's makeup, they can and must be developed through intensive training.
6. Initiative. The leader should display initiative and encourage it in his subordinates. Initiative implies the exercise of responsibility by acting without, or, with a minimum of direction. In order to apply initiative the leader must have a firm grasp of the higher commander's concept of operation. Improvisation is the key to initiative.

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7. Control. Leaders must impress their will on their subordinates in order to influence the outcome of the battle. Men in fear situations look for positive direction; the leader who retains control will inspire confidence in his men.

8. Example. Leaders by their actions must offer positive models of courage, fitness and discipline which soldiers would hope to emulate. Personal example, particularly under fire, is a most effective leadership technique.

9. Paternalism. Leaders must be interested in their men and attempt to help them whenever possible. This truth is equally applicable to the non-military situation as it is to a military situation. The leader must place the welfare of his men ahead of his own.

10. Courage. Courage is a moral quality that soldiers demand in their leaders. Courage entails bravery in battle and the moral conviction to stand by one's principles.

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CHAPTER 4

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Section 1 - Introduction

401. GENERAL

This chapter deals with the operational environment confronting military forces in a theatre (area) of operations and the elements that shape and influence it. These include; war aims, physical features, local government and population, opposing forces and the laws of war on land.

402. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of military forces and that bear on the decisions of the commander. Major elements of the operational environment include:

- a. the war aims sought through the conduct of operations and the supporting national policy considerations that influence the manner of achieving these aims;
- b. the physical features of the theatre of operations;
- c. the nature of the indigenous government and people;
- d. the characteristics, composition, and missions of the opposing forces; and
- e. the dictates of the laws of war on land.

2. The operational environment influences the employment of military forces. For example, forces operating in the Federal Republic of Germany would be employed differently from those in Norway. The environment also influences the size, composition, command and control, and administration of these forces.

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3. The elements comprising the operational environment involve a wide range of conditions and circumstances in which military force must be capable of operating effectively. It is these variables that make it impossible to reduce the conduct of military operations to a series of precise axioms and simple directions.

4. The operational environment imposes certain limitations on the freedom of action of commanders at all levels. These restrictions are normal and occur in all forms of military operations. The restraints imposed in high intensity conflicts however, are less frequent and specific than those imposed in low or mid intensity conflict.

Section 2 - Elements of the Operational Environment

403. WAR AIMS

1. Nation-states wage war in order to further national objectives. It is therefore imperative that the political aims of any war be clearly established and that they be consistent with the national interest.

Military objectives are not an end in themselves, but they provide direction to military forces through which national war aims can be achieved.

2. In a democracy, such as Canada, war aims should enjoy the support of a significant majority of the population. Even in a situation where the public is apathetic to the war effort, military operations may still be successfully conducted. However, should the population, or a major segment thereof, be opposed to the war, its continued prosecution would be difficult, particularly in a protracted situation and/or where casualties were relatively high. Moreover, it is morally arguable that widespread opposition to a war indicates that it no longer serves the perceived national interest.

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3. National policy translates war aims into broad courses of action.

This involves the assignment of objectives to military forces, the size and composition of the forces, the resources with which the forces are provided, and the manner in which they are employed, to include the constraints within which they must operate.

4. The national policies arising from war aims are frequently tempered by international coalitions, alliances, agreements, and by the additional influence of opinions and attitudes of neutral nations. The influence of these factors may be reflected in confinement of the theatre of operations, limitations in military objectives, or restrictions in the employment of certain weapons.

404. PHYSICAL FEATURES

1. The physical features of a theatre of operations include topography, population density and distribution, climate and weather. These factors will affect the composition of forces allotted to a theatre and the manner in which the forces are employed.

2. The size and structure of a theatre of operations may vary from an island or archipelago to a large continental land mass. Closely allied to size and structure are the resources available in the theatre, the existing communications network and port facilities, and the length of the lines of communication.

3. Other important factors include the distribution and density of the population and the number and location of critical areas that must be held to ensure control of the theatre. These interrelated factors determine the number of troops that can be employed and sustained. This in turn affects the organizational and command structure.

4. The characteristics of the terrain and the extent and type of vegetation influence the type of forces assigned, especially where these

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factors present difficulties in the operation, support, and maintenance of heavy equipment or require that special equipment be issued. Such factors as natural obstacles and extreme conditions of weather and climate reduce the operational capability of troops and increase the difficulties of supporting them.

5. The degree of urbanization may have a major impact on military operations. Widespread urbanization provides good cover and concealment and towns and villages are natural strong points which can be incorporated into barrier plans. On the other hand urbanization restricts visibility and fields of fire and can hamper manoeuvre.

405. LOCAL POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT

1. The attitude and condition of the local population and government will influence operations in two main ways:

- a. first, it may be necessary to detach major forces to maintain security if the populace is actively hostile; and
- b. second, a major effort may be needed to assist the population in the establishment or rehabilitation of local services including medical support, utilities and other services.

406. OPPOSING FORCES

1. Missions. The missions assigned to the opposing belligerents may be similar or widely divergent. Each may seek the ultimate subjugation of the other and the destruction of his war-making potential. In high intensity conflict there is relatively little restraint on the means employed by the antagonists. Short of high intensity conflicts, one belligerent may seek the destruction of the other, or seek to restore some prior situation, such as the location of an international boundary, or each belligerent may seek to gain control of a limited area or to deny the area to the other. In other situations, where dissident elements in a country are supported

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covertly by an external power in their attempts to overthrow the government, military forces may be employed to maintain internal security and to help eliminate the root causes of dissatisfaction among the population. The threatened government may seek military assistance from other nations and this assistance may be provided unilaterally or by an international organization. In every situation, the means employed by military forces and the manner of conducting operations are influenced by the missions assigned the opposing forces.

2. Strength and Composition. The strength and composition of opposing forces will also influence the operational environment.

a. Enemy forces may consist of loosely organized bands of irregular forces, massive formations of para-military forces provided with minimal equipment and marginal combat and combat service support, well organized forces with the full range of combat, combat support and combat service support or combinations of any of these. To operate effectively against the specific enemy force encountered, friendly forces must have a high degree of flexibility to permit changes in tactics, organization and procedures.

b. Friendly forces assigned to an area may vary from relatively small advisory organizations to task forces of large naval, army, and air forces. The army component may vary from a division or less to one or more corps or an army group. The command and organizational structure will vary directly in complexity with the size of the force and the extent of participation by other components and allied forces.

3. Weapons. Mass effect weapon systems such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons will have a marked influence on the operational

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environment. Restrictions on their use will be controlled at the highest political level.

- a. Nuclear. Nuclear weapons have immense destructive power. Their effects include blast, heat, radiation and electro-magnetic pulse. Employment of nuclear weapons will result in high casualty and damage rates, add to the complexity of the battlefield, and may cause unpredictable psychological effects.
- b. Biological. In 1972, Canada and 85 other nations signed the Biological Convention, agreeing to cease development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and to destroy existing stockpiles. Although there is little evidence of the likelihood of the potential enemy making use of these weapons (their effects are widespread, indiscriminate and difficult to predict or contain), it is prudent to appreciate their hazards.
- c. Chemical. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 has been signed and ratified by 92 nations, including Canada and all of the major world powers. It is a pledge against initiating the use of chemical agents in war, though it does not prevent nations from developing agents or maintaining a retaliatory chemical warfare capability. The potential enemy possesses both offensive and defensive equipment and considers chemical weapons a part of the conventional weapon spectrum.

4. Air. The ease with which land operations are conducted and the results they obtain will depend in large measure upon the effective use of air power. Operations by major forces, especially mechanized ones, will succeed only if enemy air forces are prevented from interfering with them.

407. THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND

1. There exist certain rules which are applicable to the conduct of war between civilized states. Most of these rules have been embodied in

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international conventions; the others are based on custom and usage. These rules form a part of international law and as such are legally binding on neutrals and belligerents alike. The four major conventions are:

- a. Convention I. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (the Wounded Convention).
- b. Convention II. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (the Maritime Convention)
- c. Convention III. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (the Prisoner of War Convention)
- d. Convention IV. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (the Civilian Convention)

2. The laws of war must be obeyed by all personnel engaged in hostilities. Commanders shall ensure adherence to these regulations or they may otherwise be liable to prosecution by international tribunal.

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CHAPTER 5

ORGANIZATION AND ROLES OF THE ARMY IN THE FIELD

Section 1 - Formation Organization

501. GENERAL

1. Land forces assigned to a theatre of operations include the appropriate command and control headquarters and required combat arms, combat support arms and combat support services. These forces are combined in accordance with the requirements of the tasks or missions and the nature of the operation.

2. In most situations Canada will establish a national command with one or more subordinate operational commands. In smaller theatres of operation and/or where Canadian operational formations are assigned under the operational command/control of allied formations, the operational commander may also be vested with national command.

502. ASSIGNMENT OF FORCES

1. The numbers and types of formations or units assigned to subordinate formation commanders in the theatre are dependent upon their tasks or missions. Forces for which there is a continuing demand are usually placed under operational command. Forces required for specific tasks or for a limited period of time are normally retained at national or higher allied level and assigned under operational control as required.

2. The organization of land forces must provide the capability to conduct successful operations in all forms of conflict as well as in a wide range of environments without major change in organization and equipment. This multi-capability is achieved by organizing units and formations with the following combat functions; firepower, mobility, protection,

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intelligence, command and control, communications and combat service support. Special grouping of forces and the provision of special equipment may be required under certain functional or environmental conditions.

503. HIGHER FORMATION COMMANDS (ARMY GROUP TO CORPS)

1. General. The army group, the army and the corps are the largest land force operational formations. None has a fixed composition. Each is organized to accomplish specific tasks or missions and each can serve as the army component of a joint or combined force. Although there are some exceptions, the normal practice within NATO is to have only one level of command between corps and theatre. This level is called army group.

2. Army Group. An army group is normally organized to direct the operations of two or more corps. Its responsibilities are primarily tactical and include planning and the allocation of resources. In most cases within NATO the army group headquarters will be a combined headquarters. In the case where an army headquarters is established, the army group will direct the operations of two or more armies.

3. Army. An army may be organized to direct the operations of two or more corps, particularly if the number of corps controlled by an army group becomes too large. If established, the army directs tactical operations and may provide for combat service support of its formations. In a Canadian context an army is more likely to be established to serve as a national command when one or more corps are fielded. In this instance its responsibilities are primarily administrative in nature.

4. Corps. The corps is the principal combat formation. Its organization varies depending upon the task. The corps consists of a variable number of divisions and other combat, combat support and combat service support units. The corps has tactical and combat service support functions.

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504. LOWER FORMATION COMMANDS (DIVISION TO BRIGADE)

1. Division (General). Divisions are lower formation commands. Unlike higher formations they normally have fixed organizations based on their roles. Like the corps they have tactical and combat service support functions. Divisions usually conduct operations as part of a corps. Exceptionally, they may form the army component of a joint or combined force. The Canadian Army may field the following types of division;

- a. Independent Mechanized Infantry Division,
- b. Mechanized Infantry Division, and
- c. Armoured Division.

2. Independent Mechanized Infantry Division. This division is formed from within corps resources and is essentially a mechanized infantry division suitably reinforced to handle its independent mission. A typical independent division would have to be augmented with those combat support and combat service support elements which would normally have been provided by corps.

3. Mechanized Infantry Division. The mechanized infantry division consists of mechanized infantry brigades, with a predominance of mechanized infantry units. It is capable of covering extended frontages, relatively deep areas of responsibility and of operating widely dispersed. The vehicles of the formation provide a high degree of tactical mobility while offering reasonable armoured protection. The division is ideally structured to physically control ground and to destroy the enemy in close combat. With its shock effect and firepower it can operate effectively with armoured divisions. The bulk and weight of its vehicles make it difficult to move strategically.

4. Armoured Division. The Armoured Division consists primarily of armoured brigades, with a predominance of armour units. The inherent

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mobility, firepower and armoured protection of the formation enable it to cover a large part of the battle area. The division is ideally structured to conduct aggressive action in all types of operations, particularly in conjunction with mechanized infantry divisions. The armoured division, because of its mass and firepower produces considerable shock action and this makes it a powerful offensive force. As is the case with the mechanized infantry division, it is difficult to move strategically.

5. Brigade Group and Brigades (General). Brigade groups and brigades are the basic army formations. They normally have fixed organizations based on their roles. Brigade groups contain a mixture of combat arms, combat support arms and usually some combat service support elements. Brigades are a grouping of combat arms units with little if any integral combat support or combat service support. The Canadian Army may field the following types of brigade groups/brigades;

- a. Independent Mechanized Infantry Brigade Group,
- b. Corps Mechanized Brigade Group,
- c. Armoured Cavalry Brigade Group,
- d. Airborne Brigade Group,
- e. Mechanized Infantry Brigade, and
- f. Armoured Brigade.

6. Independent Mechanized Infantry Brigade Group. This formation is formed on the same basis as the independent division. It is a mechanized infantry brigade suitably reinforced with combat support and combat service support to enable it to fulfil its independent mission.

7. Corps Mechanized Brigade Group. This formation is a corps resource. It contains a mixture of manoeuvre units with a predominance of mechanized infantry units with some combat support elements. It is capable of performing a variety of tasks including blocking, counter attacking and rear area security.

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8. Armoured Cavalry Brigade Group. This formation is a corps resource. It contains a number of manoeuvre units with a predominance of armour and armoured reconnaissance units. It also possesses some integral combat support and combat service support elements. It is capable of performing a variety of tasks including; covering force, blocking and rear area security.
9. Airborne Brigade Group. This formation is especially trained and equipped to conduct airborne and airmobile operations. It contains an appropriate mixture of combat arms, combat support and combat service support units. The airborne brigade group has a greater degree of strategic mobility than other formations, however its tactical mobility is relatively restricted and it requires reinforcement to provide it capabilities for sustained combat comparable to that of a mechanized infantry brigade.
10. Mechanized Infantry Brigade. This formation contains a mixture of manoeuvre units with a predominance of mechanized infantry units. Combat support and combat service support are provided by division.
11. Armoured Brigade. This formation contains a mixture of manoeuvre units with a predominance of armour units. Combat support and combat service support are provided by division.
12. Note. The formations discussed above are all arms groupings. Formations based on one arm, eg., Artillery, are covered in appropriate branch manuals.

Section 2 - The Combat Arms

505. GENERAL

1. The combat arms are distinguished by their ability to close with the enemy in combat. Their missions may be: to destroy or capture the enemy;

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secure or deny terrain; protect a larger force; or gain information. They use both direct and indirect fire. Combat arms are trained, organized and equipped to operate in direct contact with the enemy. The combat arms are artillery, armour and infantry.

2. Cooperation of the three combat arms is essential. Whether tanks are supporting infantry or vice versa, neither will go into battle without the other. Equally as important, neither will be committed without properly planned artillery fire support.

3. In executing manoeuvre it must be emphasized that casualties vary directly with the time that troops are exposed to effective fire. The greater the speed of the attack, the shorter the time the troops will be exposed. When tanks get into dangerous situations infantry and artillery will provide mutual support. When the infantry is driven to ground, direct fire from tanks and indirect fire from artillery come into play.

506. ARTILLERY

1. General. Artillery provides the principal fire delivery systems of land forces. Artillery units are equipped with guns, howitzers, rockets, or guided missiles. They support the other combat arms by neutralizing or destroying with fire those targets most likely to hinder operations.

Artillery forces include field artillery and air defence artillery.

2. Field Artillery Units. The role and tasks of field artillery are as follows:

a. Role. To assist in the defeat of the enemy by indirect fire.

b. Tasks. The major tasks of field artillery are:

- (1) Close Fire Support. Fire support to the other arms including the provision of observation, liaison, communications and the coordination of all indirect fire and close air support.

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- (2) Interdiction. This is designed to harass, disrupt, delay, and isolate those enemy forces not directly in contact with friendly forces, but which could in the near future influence the conduct of military operations.
- (3) Attrition. The aim of attrition is to cause casualties to enemy personnel and equipment in order to reduce the combat power of enemy formations.
- (4) Counter Battery. This includes the counter gun and counter multiple rocket launcher/mortar tasks. While both are divisional tasks, it is normal for close support artillery of brigade or brigade groups to carry out the counter mortar/multiple rocket launcher tasks. General support assistance to brigades is provided by divisional and higher artillery. Both tasks include the requirements for target acquisition and retaliatory systems.
- (5) Coordination. The artillery commander at every level of command is responsible for the coordination of all land, sea and air fire support available at that level.
- (6) Target Acquisition. This is the detection, identification and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.

3. Air Defence Artillery Units. The roles and tasks of air defence artillery are as follows:

a. Role. To prevent the enemy from interfering with ground operations from the air.

b. Tasks. The major tasks of air defence artillery are:

- (1) Early Warning. Detect, identify and track airborne systems and then warn appropriate air defence units of anticipated threat.

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- (2) Area Defence. Provide area air defence coverage against attacking aircraft with a secondary requirement to engage transiting formations of aircraft.
- (3) Point Defence. Protect specific important point targets against hostile aircraft.
- (4) Air Space Control. Participate in the control of battle area air space.

507. ARMOUR

1. General. Armour conducts highly mobile land warfare, primarily offensive in nature and characterized by mounted combat through the use of armoured fighting vehicles and aircraft. Armoured forces include tank and reconnaissance units.

2. Tank Units. The role, tasks and principles of employment of tank units are as follows:

- a. Role. To defeat the enemy through the aggressive use of firepower and battlefield mobility.
- b. Tasks. The major tasks of tank units are to:
 - (1) fight as covering troops in various types of operation;
 - (2) conduct the advance to contact;
 - (3) effect the assault on, and the destruction of, the enemy;
 - (4) exploit the effects of mass destruction weapons;
 - (5) penetrate, exploit and conduct pursuit operations; and
 - (6) counter-attack and block.
- c. Principles of Employment. The major principles of tank employment are:
 - (1) tanks do not fight alone, but operate in conjunction with infantry and the support of other arms;
 - (2) tanks fight by means of manoeuvre;

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- (3) whenever possible, tanks should be superimposed on the anti-armour framework rather than embedded in it to keep them relatively free to concentrate, strike, regroup and make full use of their battlefield mobility;
- (4) tanks should be used in mass;
- (5) tanks must make maximum use of ground for protection.

3. Reconnaissance Units. The role and tasks of reconnaissance units are:

- a. Role. To obtain and relay timely information about the enemy and the ground, and to provide the basis of battlefield security.
- b. Tasks. The major tasks of reconnaissance units are to:
 - (1) participate as covering force troops;
 - (2) provide surveillance of obstacles, gaps, rear areas, etc.;
 - (3) reconnoitre counter-attack and blocking position routes;
 - (4) participate as security forces;
 - (5) conduct route, zone and area reconnaissance;
 - (6) reconnoitre enemy positions; and
 - (7) perform utility tasks including movement control, liaison, radiation/chemical monitoring, regulating tasks, refugee control, etc.

508. INFANTRY

1. General. The essential characteristic of the infantry is its ability to fight in all types of terrain, under all conditions of weather and to move and fight with any means of mobility provided. Infantry can fight mounted in armoured vehicles or dismounted on foot. Alone among the combat arms, infantry are capable of holding ground.

2. Role. The role of the infantry is to close with and destroy the enemy.

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3. Tasks. The major tasks of the infantry are to:
- a. defend a position by the holding of ground;
 - b. destroy the enemy in close combat;
 - c. act as all or as part of a reserve with a mission to counter-attack or block;
 - d. mutually support the other combat arms and combat support arms;
 - e. establish surveillance;
 - f. participate as covering force troops;
 - g. conduct security missions;
 - h. participate in the advance to combat;
 - j. exploit the effects of mass destruction weapons; and
 - k. conduct airmobile and airborne operations.

Section 3 - The Combat Support Arms

509. GENERAL

The combat support arms, although not normally in direct contact with the enemy, provide immediate specialist support to the combat arms. Combat support arms are capable of fighting, however, this is secondary to their supportive function. The combat support arms are; combat engineers, signals, intelligence, and tactical aviation.

510. COMBAT ENGINEERS

1. Role. Combat Engineers fulfil two roles:
- a. Primary Role. The primary role of combat engineers is to assist friendly troops to live, move, and fight and to assist in denying the same ability to the enemy.
 - b. Secondary Role. The secondary role of combat engineers is to fight as infantry in the defence when necessary.

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2. Tasks. The major tasks of combat engineers are:

a. Mobility Tasks. These tasks include;

- (1) engineer reconnaissance of obstacles and routes;
- (2) preparation of crossing sites;
- (3) construction and repair of bridges and roads; and
- (4) breaching and clearing of obstacles beyond the capacity of the supported force.

b. Counter mobility Tasks. These tasks include:

- (1) creation or improvement of barriers beyond the capacity of the supported force, particularly the laying of minefields; and
- (2) demolitions.

c. Survivability Tasks. These tasks include:

- (1) construction of field fortifications; and
- (2) preparation of positions.

d. Other Engineer Tasks. These tasks include:

- (1) repair of damage;
- (2) construction and improvement of military installations;
- (3) provision of potable water;
- (4) provision of engineer information on the terrain; and
- (5) development of forward support areas for rearming and refuelling.

511. SIGNALS

1. Role. The role of Signals is to provide commanders and their staffs the means to exercise command and control and to deny and exploit the enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum through electronic warfare.

2. Tasks. The major tasks of signals are:

- a. the provision of advice to commanders and staffs on all aspects of signals;

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- b. the operation and engineering and technical control of communications including;
 - (1) net radio,
 - (2) trunk systems, and
 - (3) dispatch service.
- c. the conduct of electronic warfare;
- d. provision of automatic data processing in support of command and control;
- e. first line repair of radio equipment and first and second line repair of telecommunications and cipher equipment; and
- f. provision of support to and local defence of formation headquarters.

512. INTELLIGENCE

- 1. Role. The role of intelligence is to provide the commander with that intelligence essential to the accomplishment of his mission.
- 2. Tasks. The tasks of intelligence are to:
 - a. advise the commander and staff on intelligence requirements;
 - b. collect information from all sources and process it to produce intelligence;
 - c. disseminate timely intelligence; and
 - d. provide intelligence advice.

513. TACTICAL AVIATION

- 1. Role. The role of tactical aviation is to support ground forces by providing aerial firepower, reconnaissance and mobility.
- 2. Tasks. The major tasks of tactical aviation are:
 - a. reconnaissance and observation;
 - b. direction and control of fire;
 - c. provision of anti-armour and other fire support;

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- d. tactical airlift of troops and equipment;
- e. conduct of counter mobility actions;
- f. logistical airlift;
- g. command and liaison support; and
- h. casualty evacuation.

Section 4 - The Combat Support Services

514. GENERAL

1. Combat support services are those elements whose primary missions are to provide combat service support in a theatre of operations. All service support personnel are trained soldiers, however combat service support units have a limited fighting capability because of their role and would normally only do so in self-defence.
2. Combat support services perform functions that are essential to the conduct of sustained combat operations. The major support services are; logistics, medical, land ordnance engineering, administration and military police.

515. LOGISTICS

1. General. Logistics are concerned with the maintenance and movement of forces. The four component services of logistics are; transportation, supply, finance and food services.
2. Transportation. The role of this service is to provide all aspects of transportation support to land forces including, the movement control and traffic functions, and the carriage of designated quantities of combat supplies and other material.
3. Supply. The role of this service is to receive, hold and provide for the replenishment of repair parts, a selected range of general and technical

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stores and equipment, together with bath, laundry and limited decontamination services.

4. Finance. The role of this service is to provide all aspects of pay and non-public fund financial support to land forces.

5. Food. The role of this service is to ensure the efficiency of food service support to land forces by the provision of cooks and messing supervisors.

516. MEDICAL

The role of the medical service is to conserve land force manpower.

517. LAND ORDNANCE ENGINEERING

The role of the land ordnance engineering service is to maintain the operational readiness of land force equipment and vehicles.

518. ADMINISTRATION

The administrative service include postal and personnel administrative support to land forces together with civil-military cooperation. The role of these component services are self-evident.

519. MILITARY POLICE

1. Role. The role of the military police is to:

- a. provide commanders with an essential element of command and control;
- b. assist formations and units in operations; and
- c. assist with the maintenance of morale and discipline within the forces.

2. Tasks. The major tasks of the military police are;

- a. traffic control,
- b. prisoner of war handling,
- c. refugee and straggler control,
- d. nuclear radiation and chemical monitoring,

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- e. criminal investigation,
- f. assistance in the maintenance of security, and
- g. operation of field detention facilities.

520. MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES

In addition to the foregoing services, ground forces also receive support from chaplain, dental, band, legal, personnel selection, physical education and recreation, and public affairs services. The role and tasks of these services are self-evident.

Section 5 - Mobilization

521. GENERAL

1. Like most countries Canada's army-in-being has insufficient resources to meet anticipated wartime tasks. Indeed, few countries, if any, can afford the expense of maintaining, in peace, a sufficiently large defence establishment, and an appropriately equipped industrial base to meet likely operational tasks in a high intensity conflict. The solution historically has been to plan for the act and process of mobilization.

2. In a general context mobilization is an act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national resources. In a more narrow military context, mobilization is the process by which armed forces, or parts of them, are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes assembling and organizing personnel, supplies and material for active military service.

522. CONCEPT

1. General. The Regular Force constitutes the force-in-being and it could undertake limited tasks in Canada or abroad without augmentation. Any commitment of significant size or duration would, however, require a rapid

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increase in resources. These additional resources would have to come primarily from the Reserve Force, which can only be placed on regular service by an Order-in-Council. Further expansion beyond the resources of the total force would require at least partial national mobilization including possibly the imposition of compulsory service.

2. Mobilization would be conducted in phases beginning with the alert phase, followed by an operational phase, and dependent upon the scope of mobilization, an expansion phase.

3. Alert Phase. The alert phase begins on declaration of an emergency and terminates with the opening of hostilities or the beginning of the operational phase. The major actions taken during the alert phase are:

- a. the initiation of the alert system;
- b. the consideration of all mobilization and other alert measures listed in the mobilization plan and selective implementation of these measures;
- c. the augmentation to war establishment level, on a selective basis, of all units that are required at the beginning of the operational phase;
- d. the provision of initial replacements to operational commanders; and
- e. the increase of voluntary enrolment quotas subject to decisions taken on the need for compulsory service.

4. Operational Phase. The operational phase begins with the opening of hostilities or operations and terminates when the initial operational commitments are either completed or expanded. The major activities taking place during the operational phase are:

- a. the conduct of operations as directed by National Defence Headquarters or the appropriate allied commander;

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- b. the completion of war establishment augmentation begun during the alert phase;
 - c. the provision of trained replacement personnel to make up losses in all units due to battle attrition and administrative factors;
 - d. the provision of replacement material and other logistical support to committed forces;
 - e. the provision of replacement units; and
 - f. the mobilization of civilians to permit the continuation of initial operational commitments after the resources of the Reserve Force have been committed.
5. Expansion Phase. The expansion phase begins with the mobilization of large numbers of civilians and the acceleration of defence production in preparation for an increase in the war effort.
6. The transition from the operational phase to the expansion phase may not be very clear, since some or all of the operational commitments undertaken during the operational phase may continue into the expansion phase. This may be happening while mobilized civilians and all available reservists are being trained for a subsequent increase in the scope of these operations.
7. An outline plan for this phase will be prepared in peacetime with detailed planning being done during the alert and operational phases. Peacetime planning will emphasize interdepartmental coordination in preparation for;
- a. mobilization of personnel,
 - b. expansion of defence production, and
 - c. activation or expansion of national emergency agencies in accordance with the Government Emergency Planning Order.

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523. PLANNING

1. The mobilization process involves the adoption and gradual implementation of readiness measures and could lead to total national mobilization. The mobilization plan, therefore, indicates how the nation intends to bridge the gap between the peacetime resources available at any given time and the resources required to satisfy predetermined mobilization objectives.

2. A comprehensive mobilization plan must cover the following major steps:

- a. confirm operational commitments;
- b. identify operational capabilities;
- c. identify support capabilities;
- d. develop war establishments for all capabilities;
- e. determine attrition rates and replacement needs;
- f. establish a concept for control and movement of replacements;
- g. establish a military occupational structure for mobilization;
- h. convert establishments to reflect the revised military occupational structure;
- j. prepare emergency training standards;
- k. identify resources required beyond peacetime levels;
- m. prepare personnel augmentation plans;
- n. establish emergency enrolment standards and procedures;
- p. establish recruiting policies and plans;
- q. determine the additional training resources required;
- r. establish an effective Supplementary Reserve;
- s. determine the tasks and structure of the Primary Reserves;
- t. establish a Reserve training policy;
- u. establish an equipping policy for Regular and Reserve Forces;

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- v. identify material procurement options;
- w. prepare transportation plans;
- x. develop administrative and legislative procedures for; voluntary enrolment, activating the reserves and implementing compulsory service;
- y. define manpower control and distribution procedures;
- z. monitor the development of automated data processing systems for personnel control;
- aa. propose adjustment to total force levels as required;
- ab. determine other defence infrastructure requirements including accommodation and facilities;
- ac. encourage civilian preparedness through the Inter Department Committee on Emergency Planning;
- ad. propose increase preparedness of defence industry; and
- ae. revise existing defence plans.

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CHAPTER 6

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

Section 1 - Combined Forces

601. GENERAL

A combined force is a military force composed of elements of two or more allied nation-states. A joint force is one comprised of more than one service. A force may be both joint and combined, eg., Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT).

602. INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES

1. The Canadian Army will normally operate outside of Canada under the auspices of one of the following:
 - a. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); or
 - b. The United Nations (UN).
2. In addition to the above involvement, arrangements exist for Canadian troops to operate in close cooperation with United States forces in the defence of North America.
3. International agreements set forth the organization, the degree of authority for commanders and the procedures for establishing unity of effort. A military alliance stemming from an international agreement is usually supervised by a committee composed of civilian deputies of state and their military assistants. On occasion, agreements have designated one nation as the administrator, or executive agent to control the military alliance.

603. THE NATURE OF COMBINED FORCES

1. Serious problems may be encountered in combined forces operations. These can occur because of personality conflicts among the various national

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commanders, or because one nation perceives it is receiving a disproportionate share of casualties, or because of a host of other reasons. These problems may be exacerbated by the following differences in national make up:

- a. Sociological. These include all or any of language, religion, customs, educational standards, culture and economics;
- b. Political. These include the forms of government involved, respective aspirations, relative stability, international prominence, geographical position and power base, both real and potential;
- c. Military. These include differences in doctrine, procedures, traditions, ethics, equipment, training, standard of combat service support, etc.

2. There are no easy solutions to these problems given our experience in two world wars. Certainly cooperation must exist and national authorities must work together in a spirit of accommodation. More often than not, a face to face, frank, but dispassionate discussion, can produce results. Certain problems can be overcome organizationally by dividing the theatre of operations into national areas of responsibility. Although this limits uniformity and flexibility, it does provide for the utmost preservation of national integrity. This was the system favoured in the Second World War.

604. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Combined forces within NATO use the following terms to specify command and control relationships; these are listed in order of precedence by authority;

- a. Full Command,
- b. Operational Command,
- c. Operational Control,

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d. Tactical Command, and

e. Tactical Control.

} these terms are not used in Canadian
Army national doctrine.

2. The degree of authority granted to commanders of combined forces may vary from one command to another, and will almost invariably be different in peace and war. The degree of authority will normally change at an appropriate stage of NATO military alert.

3. All nations, including Canada, reserve the right to control certain aspects of their forces committed to combined operations; thus participating nations retain "full command" of their troops. In order to guarantee national integrity, Canadian formations are normally assigned to combined forces under "operational command" or "operational control". In the former relationship a proviso precludes the separate employment of components of the units/formations concerned.

4. Logistical relationships will need special treatment because the logistical support of combined forces in a NATO context is a national responsibility. Also, logistical relationships are often dependent on factors other than the immediate tactical situation.

5. For each operational relationship the staff must notify the degree of logistical command. This will be done after consultation between the staff at allied headquarters and national authorities. Logistical command relationships may vary from complete responsibility to responsibility for selected aspects only, eg., daily maintenance.

6. When Canadian troops are committed to a theatre of operations under an allied commander, it will be normal to establish a national command in the theatre. The commander of this command will fulfil national responsibilities including the provision of logistical support to Canadian formations. International arrangements will likely be made for the provision of mutual logistical support.

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Section 2 - NATO (General)

605. GENERAL

Canada is a founding member of NATO, an organization which is primarily, although not exclusively, a military alliance. The area covered by NATO exceeds eight and one half million square miles. NATO has a large active joint and combined military organization, and an extensive structure to carry out its functions.

606. THE CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION

1. The fifteen member governments of NATO consult and coordinate their policies through the medium of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC is the highest authority in NATO. It normally meets twice a year at ministerial level. (Spain may soon become the sixteenth member of NATO).
2. In permanent session the NAC meets weekly. The permanent representatives are at ambassadorial level. When integrated defence matters are discussed, the fourteen permanent representatives (ie without France), meet as the Defence Planning Committee, (DPC).
3. To assist them in carrying out their roles, the NAC and DPC have established a number of committees. These committees, which cover the whole range of NATO activities, meet under the chairmanship of a member of the international staff.
4. The Secretary General of NATO chairs both the NAC and the DPC. He also directs the International Secretariat whose staff is drawn from member nations.

607. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

1. The NAC and DPC receive their military advice from the Military Committee (MC), which is the highest military authority in NATO. The MC

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consists of the Chief of Defence Staff or equivalent of the member countries of the DPC. The Chiefs are permanently represented at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The MC meets at the military permanent representative level weekly and at the Chiefs of Defence Staff level triannually.

2. The MC is chaired by a military officer elected by the Chiefs of Defence Staff. He serves for a two year term that can be extended for one year.

3. The MC is assisted by an integrated International Military Staff that is headed by a Director who is elected by the committee. He may be from any of the member nations, other than that represented by the chairman.

4. In addition to providing military advice to the NAC and DPC, the MC translates NATO political policy into military policy and provides strategic direction to the major NATO commands. This ensures that military operations are coordinated and contribute effectively to alliance objectives. In peace, the MC approves and coordinates war planning, studies the required force structure and considers other matters such as nuclear arms control. The MC evaluates the stated needs of major NATO commanders and reconciles them with overall requirements. The MC is also responsible for a number of smaller, but important agencies, such as the NATO Defence College in Rome, which helps to prepare officers for positions on NATO staffs.

608. MAJOR NATO COMMANDS

1. NATO military forces are grouped into three major NATO commands as shown in Figure 6-1.

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


Figure 6-1 Major NATO Commands

2. In addition to the above commands, the Canada - United States Regional Planning Group coordinates NATO defence efforts on Canadian and American territory.

609. ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

1. General. ACE is responsible for the defence of NATO land territory in Europe. Its major subordinate commands are shown in Figure 6-2.




Figure 6-2 ACE Major Subordinate Commands

2. AFNORTH. This command is the theatre of operations covering Denmark and Norway as well as the Baltic approaches. It contains most of the armed forces of Denmark and Norway as well as German land, sea and air forces.

3. AFCENT. This command is the theatre of operations covering the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Federal Republic of Germany. Its principal subordinate commands are Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), Central Army Group (CENTAG) and Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE). The organization of AFCENT is shown in Figure 6-3.

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


Figure 6-3 AFCENT Organization

- a. NORTHAG. This army group is responsible for the defence of the sector north of the Gottingen-Wege axis.
- b. CENTAG. This army group is responsible for the defence of the rest of the theatre of operations.
- c. AAFCE. This air formation provides air support in the theatre of operations.

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4. AFSOUTH. This command is responsible for the defence of Italy, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and safeguarding communications in the Mediterranean and the Turkish territorial waters of the Black Sea. It contains land, sea and air forces from Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey, as well as the US 6th Fleet and British naval forces.

5. AMF. This a quick reaction force of brigade size and supporting fighter squarons. It is capable of reinforcing any area of ACE, but concentrates on the northern and south-eastern flanks.

Section 3 - NATO (CFE)

610. GENERAL

1. CFE is a command of the Canadian Forces. Its role is to provide combat ready land and air forces for employment in central Europe.

2. In peace CFE is organized as shown in Figure 6-4.





Figure 6-4 CFE Organization (Peace)

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3. In war, CFE is organized as shown in Figure 6-5.



Legend: F - full command
x - operational command

Figure 6-5 CFE Organization (War)

611. 4 CANADIAN MECHANIZED BRIGADE GROUP

1. In peace, 4 CMBG is under full command of Commander CFE, the national commander. In war, the formation is assigned to the operational command of CENTAG. Operational control in turn may be delegated to either a US or GE corps or further delegated to one of their respective divisions. In each instance liaison officers are exchanged between headquarters and appropriate channels of communications are established.

2. Throughout the operational assignment communications are maintained between HQ CFE and HQ 4 CMBG. In peace, 4 CMBG maintains permanent liaison with HQ CENTAG, HQ 2 (GE) Corps, HQ 7 (US) Corps, and HQ 4 (GE) Division.

612. 1 CANADIAN AIR GROUP

The command and control arrangements for 1 CAG are similar to those for 4 CMBG. In peace the group is under full command of Commander CFE. In war, operational command is vested with 4 ATAF.

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Section 4 - NATO (Northern Flank)

613. GENERAL

At an appropriate stage of NATO military alert Canada commits forces to SACEUR for employment on the northern flank of the alliance. These forces include the Canadian Air Sea Transportable Brigade Group (CAST), an infantry battle group (AMF) (L) and two fighter squadrons. A Canadian Support Group, in effect a small theatre base, is also deployed, but remains under national command.

614. CAST BRIGADE GROUP

1. The CAST Brigade Group is based on an existing formation located in Canada. It comprises three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance squadron, an artillery regiment and appropriate combat support and combat service support units.

2. On deployment, the Commander of the CAST Brigade Group is both a formation commander and a national commander. If committed, the formation would fight in Norway as part of 6 (NO) Division.

615. ACE MOBILE FORCE (LAND)

Canada commits an infantry battlegroup to the AMF(L). This force is primarily a deterrent force designed to display NATO solidarity, although it is prepared to fight if necessary. The battlegroup may be deployed in Norway or the Zealand area of Denmark.

Section 5 - NATO (North American Regional Defence/Other)

616. REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP

1. General. Early in World War II Canada and the United States agreed that in all probability a threat to either nation in North America would

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simultaneously threaten the other nation. In this light it was obviously important that arrangements be made for the integration of defence of the maritime approaches, the air space and the continental land mass of North America. Until the creation of NATO these activities were pursued bilaterally.

2. Subsequent to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, regional defence activities were fitted into the overall NATO structure. Thus currently, although North American regional defence is essentially a bilateral arrangement, it comes under the auspices of NATO.

617. ORGANIZATION

1. In the absence of an immediate major regional threat in contrast to the other major areas of NATO, eg, Central Europe, Canada and the US have not developed a regional command structure. There is no Commander-in-Chief North America or joint/combined headquarters. Important decisions must be agreed between the nations, either government to government or, more frequently, between the military forces of both countries.

2. Organizationally, three major committees exist, these are:

- a. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence. This is a bilateral civilian and military body which advises the Canadian Prime Minister and the American President on military and civilian measures for North American defence.
- b. The Canada - US Military Cooperation Committee. This is a bilateral military committee which advises the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff and the American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on regional defence matters. This committee also conducts the day to day coordination of high level activities such as the preparation of operational plans.

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- c. The NATO Canada - US Regional Planning Group. This agency has the same membership as the above committee. Its role is to relate Canada - US regional defence to the overall NATO structure.

618. DEFENCE PLANS

There exist a number of plans in support of the Canada - US Basic Security Plan. In general terms the Canadian Army, in conjunction with US forces, must be prepared to defend Canada, the continental United States and Alaska. Should operations be required on Canadian territory, Canada is responsible for providing the basis of the combined force headquarters.

619. OTHER

1. UN. Although not a military organization, the UN from time to time sponsors peacekeeping forces in various parts of the world. Canada, as a middle power, has a strong vested interest in peace and consequently has participated in most peacekeeping operations. It is reasonable to assume that such participation will continue. Peacekeeping operations are discussed in greater detail in CFP 301.
2. Commonwealth. Canada as a member of the Commonwealth could conceivably participate in a combined force established by the member nations of the organization. Participation, should it occur, would likely be at the lower end of the spectrum of military conflict.
3. Miscellaneous. Canadian troops could possibly be committed to operations on a bilateral, regional, or on some other basis. History tends to suggest that it is difficult to forecast where Canadian servicemen might be involved and under what circumstances.

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CHAPTER 7

A THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

Section 1 - Territorial Organization

701. GENERAL

1. It is unlikely that a theatre of operations would involve only Canadian Forces. However, should such a contingency arise, the theatre would be organized on the pattern followed by NATO. The NATO theatre territorial organization has been largely influenced by US Army concepts.

2. When formed, a theatre of operation will usually be under the command and control of a combined headquarters established by international agreement. A theatre is normally divided geographically into a combat zone (CZ) and a communications zone (COMMZ). The CZ is that area required by combat forces for the conduct of operations; it is the territory forward of corps rear boundaries. The COMMZ is the rear part of a theatre that is behind and contiguous to the CZ. The COMMZ contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field force. (See Figure 7-1).

3. Initially, a theatre of operations may consist of a CZ with combat service support provided by facilities and installations outside of the theatre. The primary reason for designating a COMMZ is to reduce the CZ commander's responsibilities, allowing him to concentrate on the planning for, and conduct of, operations.

4. The authority that establishes a theatre will: designate the commander; assign tasks or missions; determine the force structure; assign or direct the allocation of forces; designate the area of responsibility; and may appoint a deputy commander.

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


Figure 7-1 Territorial Organization of a Theatre of Operations

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5. The development of a theatre without established facilities may result in a different form of territorial organization, particularly if operations are likely to be of short duration. Support base development will be minimal, and it may not be necessary to establish distinct areas for a CZ and a COMMZ. In some cases, hostilities may require that the logistic base be located off shore, or on a different land mass entirely.

Accordingly, the territorial organization of a theatre will depend upon the situation, the type of conflict, the operational environment, the nature of planned operations, and the stage and extent of planned theatre development.

702. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMBAT ZONE

1. The CZ includes the ground, air and sea areas within which the commander can directly influence the progress or outcome of operations by manoeuvring his forces and by delivering fire with fire support systems under his control or command. It may also include any areas necessary for the operation or support of naval and air forces assigned to the theatre. Its size depends on; the task or mission, organization and equipment of the force involved, whether the operational environment is nuclear or non-nuclear, enemy capabilities, the physical environment and international agreements or other political considerations.

2. The organization of the CZ may require the establishment of subordinate commands by the theatre commander. When this occurs, areas of responsibilities must be clearly delineated.

703. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

The COMMZ is located directly behind the CZ. Its rear boundary is normally the rear boundary of the theatre. The COMMZ provides the connecting link between the CZ and participating nations. National theatre commanders and their headquarters will normally be located in the COMMZ. At the same time, some elements whose major function is combat, such as air

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defence artillery units, may also be located in the COMMZ. The COMMZ should include sufficient area, without congestion, for its combat service support installations and other units.

704. COMMAND/STAFF STRUCTURE

1. The commander of a theatre of operations is responsible for the conduct of all military operations in the theatre. Thus, land, sea and air elements assigned to the theatre will come under his command. The commander is usually selected from the service primarily responsible for operations.
2. The command structure established must ensure centralized direction of the overall operation. However, it must also provide the maximum degree of decentralized execution to provide flexibility and freedom of action to subordinate commanders. Clear lines of control and positive delineation of command responsibility are required. The span of control must be manageable and the theatre should contain a minimum number of command echelons.
3. The task of organizing a theatre of operations may be complicated by national policy differences and by conceptual differences in the assigned service components. Accordingly, the staff organization must include personnel who have wide knowledge and experience in their own service and who are thoroughly familiar with the methods, capabilities and characteristics of other assigned services or national forces.
4. The theatre commander is provided with a joint/combined staff composed of officers from all nations and services within his command. He is authorized to organize his staff as he deems necessary to discharge his responsibilities. Within NATO it is normal to adopt a staff organization which includes the following branches; (J indicates joint staff)
 - a. J1 - Personnel,
 - b. J2 - Intelligence,

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- c. J3 - Operations,
- d. J4 - Logistics, and
- e. J5 - Civil-Military Cooperation.

705. NUMBERED ARMIES AND ARMY GROUPS

1. If there is more than one Canadian corps in the theatre, it will be normal to create a numbered army as a national and/or operational command. For example, in World War II, First Canadian Army consisted primarily of 1st and 2nd Canadian Corps, plus some Army troops. Numbered armies, in turn, were grouped together in army groups such as 21 Army Group commanded by Field Marshall Montgomery. Such formations were not organized as fixed establishments and regroupings were frequently made in accordance with the changing tactical situation.

2. The level of headquarters above corps should be capable of controlling the land/air battle. Thus, preferably, a corps would be commanded directly by the theatre commander who also directs air force operations. This might be difficult to achieve in all cases, as the task of coordinating the operations of several corps and supporting air forces might be too unwieldy. In such cases, it will be necessary to establish armies and possibly army groups. The headquarters of these higher formations should be co-located with the headquarters of the supporting tactical air force to ensure effective control over the land/air battle.

3. Modern logistic and administrative systems above corps are organized to satisfy national and geographic considerations. Therefore, higher formations, when organized, would not normally have responsibility for administrative support. They could, however, establish priorities for support to meet operational needs.

706. MUTUAL SUPPORT

1. General. Land forces and other service elements operate as a team in

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the theatre of operations. Economy dictates minimum duplication of effort. Combat service support, long range communications, strategic air and sealift are usually organized on a national basis to support national forces. Environmental elements will provide mutual support as directed by the theatre commander.

2. Army Support. Army support to other services in the theatre includes long range artillery and missile fire, operations against land objectives, intelligence, rear area security, air defence and civil-military cooperation.

3. Naval Support. Naval support includes ship borne air defence, surface protection of coastal flanks and naval gunfire and missile support. In addition, naval forces maintain the sea lines of communications with the attendant responsibilities of anti-submarine protection and mine sweeping.

4. Air Support. Air support includes offensive air support, air defence, and air transport.

Section 2 - Operational Considerations

707. GENERAL

The principles discussed below apply to that level of command providing operational direction and long range planning guidance to a number of corps employed in an established theatre of operations.

708. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. General. Success in battle is achieved through offensive action. Offensive operations are undertaken to destroy the enemy's capability to resist and to seize terrain.

2. Tasks. Corps tasks should be stated in broad terms to provide corps commanders maximum flexibility and freedom of action. Missions assigned to

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attacking forces generally contain terrain objectives. The destruction of the enemy is normally necessary to accomplish the mission and should always be considered implied, if not stated.

3. Assignment of Areas of Responsibility. To facilitate control and to provide sufficient manoeuvre space for each corps to execute its tactical plans, the higher commander will assign areas of responsibility designated by lateral and rear boundaries. When establishing lateral boundaries the joint commander should focus on major features of the area, eg, major road networks, communications centres, hills, significant obstacles, etc. Major consideration must also be given to the capabilities and limitations of the units that constitute the corps and the nature of the enemy threat. Once assigned, adjustment of corps boundaries is a matter of coordination between corps and higher headquarters.

4. Corps rear boundaries are established to provide sufficient space to employ the committed divisions, the corps reserve, units of the corps service command and any theatre combat service support units required to operate in corps rear areas. As corps rear boundaries delineate the CZ from the COMMZ, the requirements of the latter must also be taken into account.

5. Allocation of Combat Power. Prior to deployment, corps will be organized based primarily on an analysis of tasks, enemy, terrain and availability of forces. Accordingly, the assignment of additional troops to corps by the joint commander, at least initially, will be minimal. There may be, however, some unassigned combat or combat support arms units in the theatre. These may be assigned to corps, maintained as a reserve, or committed to rear area security tasks.

6. The joint commander should maintain a reserve of combat units with which he can influence the battle. When such a reserve is released, it will normally be passed to the corps to which it is committed.

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7. Offensive Manoeuvre. The joint commander must manoeuvre his corps in such a manner as to impose his will on the enemy, creating conditions that permit him to gain an advantage and ensure achievement of the objective.

There are four basic forms of manoeuvre;

- a. the frontal attack,
- b. the envelopment,
- c. the turning movement, and
- d. the penetration.

8. The selection of a form of manoeuvre by the joint commander is influenced by an analysis of the objective, terrain, population, degree of urbanization, climatic conditions, available time, disposition and capability of forces, administration and the enemy. The joint commander will rarely specify the form of manoeuvre to be employed by corps. However, the assignment of tasks, areas of responsibility and combat power available, may impose conditions that dictate the adoption of a specific form of manoeuvre.

709. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. General. Defensive operations must be conducted with ingenuity and aggressiveness. These operations are undertaken to prevent the enemy from seizing terrain or breaking through into a defended area. They aim to break the enemy attack, destroy his forces and stop him from accomplishing his aim.

2. Tasks. Corps tasks should be stated in broad terms to allow corps commanders maximum latitude in the development of their plans. The joint commander will designate the forward edge of the battle area, corps boundaries and theatre vital ground. At the same time he will task each corps to defend its area of responsibility.

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3. Assignment of Areas of Responsibility. Force limitations or extended frontages may require the joint commander to determine where he must defend in strength and where he must employ economy of force measures. Analysis of the terrain, enemy and his own force capabilities will be the key factors in determining areas of responsibility.
4. Allocation of Combat Power. The joint commander must visualize how each corps might defend its area of responsibility by relating the capabilities of each type of division in the corps to the terrain and the expected enemy threat. This estimation may result in the shifting of forces between corps to achieve the best possible mixture and balance of combat power. The joint commander should constitute a reserve with which he can influence the battle.
5. Conduct of the Defence. There are no specific types or forms of defence. In each case the joint commander must appreciate the pertinent factors and conduct his defence in such a way as to defeat the enemy. The plan will depend upon the mission given and the higher commander's concept of operations.
6. Employment of the Reserve. The reserve should be located where it is expected it can most effectively influence the battle. This will be determined by an estimation of the enemy threat and the capability of each corps to counter it. Tasks for the reserve should be given in priority and plans should be prepared accordingly. The reserve will normally be released to a corps for employment. The reserve may also reinforce a corps that sustains heavy casualties due to nuclear or conventional fire prior to the actual engagement of forces. In all cases the joint commander should attempt to reconstitute a reserve once his initial reserve is committed.

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710. DELAY AND WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS

1. General. Delaying operations are those in which a force gains time by inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy, thus slowing his advance. If necessary, the delaying force gives up terrain. In principle, it avoids becoming decisively engaged. The purpose of the withdrawal is to disengage from an enemy force in accordance with the commander's will. In a withdrawal the force seeks to break contact.

2. Planning/Conduct. The joint commander will normally develop the plan for an operation involving more than one corps. The plan would include the time until which areas of responsibility must be defended, time by which new positions must be defensible, major routes, allocation of forces to each corps and control means such as phase lines and boundaries. Because of the requirement for decentralized execution, the joint commander will retain only minimal forces under his direct control.

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CHAPTER 8

COMMAND AND CONTROL IN BATTLE

Section 1 - The Commander

801. GENERAL

1. Command is the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. This authority, which derives from law and regulation, is accompanied by commensurate responsibility that cannot be delegated. The commander alone is responsible, under all circumstances, for the success or failure of his command.
2. In discharging his responsibility, the commander exerts authority to direct those actions and to establish those standards that ensure accomplishment of his tasks or mission. In doing so, the soundness of his judgement and the principles and techniques that he employs, determine the effectiveness of his leadership.
3. Leadership is the main ingredient of command. It is an extension of the commander's self, his personality and his character. In exercising leadership, the commander must project his character and personality to create a positive impression on the individuals and units of his command. His actions must inspire and motivate his command with the will to succeed under the most adverse conditions.

802. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

1. The overriding responsibility of the commander is to achieve his mission, as successfully as possible, with a minimum loss of life and expenditure of resources.
2. Secondly, the commander must provide for the welfare of his troops. He must assure them that hardship and sacrifice will not be need-

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lessly imposed, and that their well-being is of major concern to him.

Section 2 - The Exercise of Command

803. GENERAL

1. The successful commander assures the accomplishment of his mission through personal presence, observation, delegation of authority and supervision. He does not over-supervise. While his direct personal touch with subordinates is essential, he must establish policies within which his staff can take action during his absence. He fosters initiative and self-confidence in subordinate commanders by permitting them appropriate latitude within the scope of their responsibilities.

2. Modern warfare demands prompt action, decentralization and a high degree of individual initiative. Detailed instructions must frequently give way to broad direction that subordinates can interpret and implement.

804. PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND

1. The principles for the exercise of command are:

- a. Unity of Command. Only one person can be responsible for an organization and he should have only one superior. A single commander, vested with the requisite authority and resources, must provide direction, and be responsible for, each military operation.
- b. Effective Span of Control. There is a limit to the number of elements that a commander can effectively direct. This limit is determined by an analysis of the following factors; capacity of the commander, ability of subordinates, and the complexity and scope of operations.
- c. Adherence to the Chain of Command. There must be strict adherence to the chain of command. Violation of this principle

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usurps the prerogatives of the intermediate commander concerned. and abrogates his authority without diminishing his responsibility. In the rare situation when it might be necessary to bypass the chain of command, it must be re-established as quickly as possible and the intermediate commander advised of the action taken.

- d. Delegation of Authority. The commander must decide the degree of authority that he can delegate to his staff and subordinate commanders. The degree of authority that can be delegated is determined by an analysis of the following factors; the importance and/or complexity of the matter under consideration, the ability of the subordinate, the time available and the capacity of the commander.
- e. Continuity of Command. Continuity of command must be maintained. The commander must state a clear policy for the emergency succession of command in the event that he, his subordinate commanders, or their respective headquarters become casualties.

805. FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND

1. The role of the commander is expressed in terms of a number of functions to be performed. The commander's critical functions are to:
 - a. know the situation;
 - b. make decisions;
 - c. assign missions;
 - d. allocate resources; and
 - e. direct, sustain and motivate forces.
2. To carry out the above functions, each commander should normally think two levels below and one level above his own command.

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806. THE COMMAND PROCESS

1. The above functions are integrated into a command process and the commander exercises command by:

- a. Estimating the Situation. This activity starts the command and control process and provides the foundation for planning and action.
- b. Planning. This activity proceeds from the latest estimate of the situation, to a determination and comparison of courses of action, to the commander's selection of the best course. The commander's decision is then expressed as his concept of operations, supplemented as necessary by staff planning guidance. From this, the staff develops a detailed plan.
- c. Issuing Orders. Orders convert plans into direction and instructions for action. They are the means by which the commander conveys his will to his subordinates. The mission is the essence of every order; it must be clearly stated by the commander himself. Orders must include both the tasks the commander wants his subordinates to execute and the resources he is allocating them to do so.
- d. Coordinating. The commander must coordinate the efforts and activities of subordinates and flanking elements. Coordination includes re-allocation of resources as the situation develops.
- e. Supervising. This activity completes the command and control process. At the same time it continues it, because its results provide input to a new estimate of the situation. The purpose of supervision is to check the effects of staff planning. This ensures that orders are carried out in accordance with the plan and determines if any adjustments to the plan are necessary.

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Supervision can be enhanced by control measures, reports, visits and the use of liaison officers.

807. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. The concept of operations is the commander's general idea of how he sees the battle being fought. The commander normally presents his concept verbally and in sufficient detail to ensure that subordinate commanders and staff understand exactly what they must do. To ensure coordination and control during battle and to mitigate the effects of interrupted communications, subordinates must fully understand the concept of operations before the battle begins.

2. The commander's concept of operations is critical in that it provides guidance for planning prior to battle and the framework for action once the battle begins. Inevitably, in war, communications will be interrupted, commanders will be killed, and carefully designed plans will require modification. Subordinate commanders who fully understand the intent of their superior commander will inherently have the freedom of action to intelligently fight the battle and attain success, notwithstanding the confusion of the battle.

808. THE LOCATION OF THE COMMANDER

1. The commander must give some thought as to where he should locate himself during operations. The primary consideration should be his ability to perform his functions. A commander who is well forward, but who lacks the communications and facilities to control, is as poorly placed as the commander who is back at his headquarters with the command and control apparatus, but who has lost the feel of the battle. The commander must strike a balance by considering the following factors; type and complexity of operation, the coordination requirement, the current and potential effectiveness of the command and control system, and his ability to influence the outcome of the battle.

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2. The commander should make regular visits to his subordinate formations and units. This will enable him to see at first hand the state of his command and just as importantly it will enable him to be seen by his troops. Visits should be brief, but well planned. The commander should take advantage of opportunities to speak to all ranks of the command both individually and collectively. Leadership styles will vary, but every commander must seek to convey a sense of urgency to his subordinates.

809. COMMAND OF JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

1. The requirement for unity of effort in joint and combined operations is best achieved by the designation of a single commander. The commander must be provided authority and resources commensurate with his responsibilities.

2. Joint and combined forces are characterized by certain inherent differences that exist in the military systems of the component forces. Divergences exist in doctrine and procedures. Differences in political systems, religion, language, cultural backgrounds, standard of living and philosophies may add complexity to the force.

3. The joint/combined force commander must recognize and appreciate those divergencies and variations that may cause misunderstanding and differences of opinion. He must combine tact with determination and patience with enthusiasm to ensure maximum operational effectiveness of the force. If necessary, he must be prepared to subordinate his own ideas and procedures in order to achieve unity of purpose. However, he must also ensure that limited interpretations of national interests are not permitted to preclude proper decisions. He must insist on the exercise of command through established channels, regardless of the difficulties imposed by procedural differences and language barriers.

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Section 3 - The Staff

810. PURPOSE OF STAFF

The staff exists to provide advice and assistance to the commander and to provide support to subordinate commanders.

811. TYPES OF STAFF

1. The commander's staff is generally divided into three broad categories:

- a. Personal Staff. This staff provide assistance to the commander in meeting his personal needs. The personal staff consists of aides such as aide-de-camp, executive assistant, etc. The commander may also have officers, directly responsible to him, carrying out functions, such as special liaison duties, over which he wishes to exercise personal supervision.
- b. General Staff. The general staff advise the commander and assist him in making and implementing decisions by analysing, planning, coordinating, supervising and controlling. They also support the subordinate commanders by amplifying the commander's policies and by providing guidance and direction when appropriate. The general staff are normally organized into functional sections or branches such as operations, logistics, etc.
- c. Special Staff. Special staff provide the commander with assistance in professional, technical and other specific areas included in, but more specialized than, the broad fields of interest of the general staff. The special staff consists of combat, combat support and combat service support advisors. Their duties include the provision of technical, tactical, and

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administrative advice and recommendations to the commander, subordinate commanders and other staff officers. They assist in the preparation of the parts of estimates, plans and orders in which they have primary interest and coordinate and supervise the activities for which they are responsible throughout the formation. They have direct access to their branch superiors at the next higher headquarters on technical or purely branch matters. The advisors may have the dual role of advising the commander and his staff as well as commanding their own formations or units. While they do not necessarily command all elements of their branch in a formation, they are responsible for technical control of all branch resources.

812. FUNCTIONS OF THE STAFF

1. The staff embodies no authority within itself. Its authority is derived from the commander and is exercised in his name.
2. It is the task of the staff to collect and analyse the information and intelligence on which the commander bases his plan and decisions, to do the detailed planning for him and to transmit his instructions quickly and accurately to subordinates. The staff's main functions are to:
 - a. gather information;
 - b. appraise;
 - c. anticipate;
 - d. inform;
 - e. recommend;
 - f. order (on behalf of the commander);
 - g. supervise; and
 - h. coordinate.

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813. STAFF SYSTEMS (ALLIES)

1. General. Staff systems vary from country to country, however there is little difference in the basic elements that exist. Canadian allies employ one of the following staff systems;

- a. the British System, and
- b. the Continental System.

2. The British System. The British System historically has been based on three branches:

- a. "G" or General Staff. "G" Staff is responsible for planning and conduct of operations, training and intelligence.
- b. "A" or Adjutant General Staff. "A" Staff is responsible for personnel management.
- c. "Q" or Quartermaster General Staff. "Q" Staff is responsible for supply, transport, non-tactical moves, quartering, etc.

3. This system is also known as the branch primacy system as the operations branch has primacy overall and is responsible for staff coordination. Most Commonwealth countries use this system or a variation of it.

4. The Continental System. This system is based on the five branches listed below; (G indicates general staff)

- a. G1 - Personnel,
- b. G2 - Intelligence,
- c. G3 - Operations,
- d. G4 - Logistics, and
- e. G5 - Civil-Military Cooperation.

5. In this system branches have equal status and branch heads report to a chief of staff who is responsible for coordination. Most NATO countries use this system. It is also used in most large joint/combined

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headquarters. A typical corps headquarters based on the continental system is outlined below in Figure 8-1.




Figure 8-1 Organization of a Typical NATO Corps Headquarters (Combined Staff)

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814. STAFF SYSTEM (CANADIAN)

NOTE: The CDC in its Eighth Meeting decided that the Canadian Army staff organization would be based on the continental staff system. The details of the staff system have not yet been developed, but they are likely to follow the thrust outlined below. The following "doctrine" has been taken largely from the System Study. Like all doctrine presented in this draft it is subject to approval by the CDC.

1. General. A staff organization is based on the role and requirements of the commander. Command is the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. The commander, alone, is therefore responsible for making the plan of battle and for inspiring and directing the men who execute it. The staff, which manages the machinery of command and control, serves the commander and on his behalf coordinates and helps to control the military forces under his command. It is the task of the staff to collect and analyse the information on which the commander bases his plans and decisions, to do the detailed planning for him and to transmit his instructions quickly and clearly to subordinate units and formations. The commander will decide to what extent he can delegate authority to his staff, but he cannot delegate his responsibility.

2. Main Features. The Canadian Army staff is organized on a variation fo the Continental Staff System. The main features of the Canadian staff system are:

- a. deputy commanders are provided at all levels;
- b. at corps level the organization is based on five distinct branches (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil-military cooperation);
- c. below corps level the five branches converge into two branches: operations, which includes intelligence; and administration,

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which include personnel, logistics, and civil-military cooperation;

- d. operations branch primacy is maintained at all levels including corps - this means that the senior operations staff officer is responsible for the coordination of staff effort - at division/corps level a chief of staff is provided to assist in this function;
- e. principal staff officers are normally one rank lower than the commanders of subordinate formations or units; and
- f. the system is inherently flexible and can accommodate changes in the number and designation of branches and in the rank of various staff officers. For example, a tasking to a division may create the requirement for a separate branch for civil-military cooperation. Also, the requirement to facilitate interoperability may prompt adjustments, particularly for independent brigade groups and divisions.

Section 4 - Organization for Command and Control

815. HEADQUARTERS

1. Besides his staff, the commander must be provided with additional personnel, equipment and communications to support him and his staff, ie., a headquarters. A headquarters is the basic facility used for planning, monitoring and controlling all types of operations. It is comprised essentially of staff and communications groups. Because of their size and vulnerability, large formation headquarters are decentralized. Elements of the headquarters concerned with fighting the battle are located forward, whereas those concerned with administration are located to the rear.

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2. Formation headquarters normally have the ability to form sub-headquarters as follows:

- a. Tactical Headquarters. A small element comprising the commander, selected staff officers and advisors and an appropriate security force, may be deployed forward of the main headquarters to allow the commander to exercise closer personal control over the battle for a limited period of time, either from the ground or the air.
- b. Step-Up/Alternate Headquarters. To ensure continuity of operations during movement and to maintain continuity of control when the main headquarters cannot operate because of enemy action, a step-up, or alternate headquarters is deployed. This headquarters contains duplicates of essential staff, communications facilities, vehicles and communications personnel. It operates until the main headquarters is re-located or re-established and is ready to resume control of operations.

816. GROUPINGS

1. There are five major groupings in a formation headquarters; these are;

- a. Command Group,
- b. Operations Centre Group,
- c. Combat Support Group,
- d. Communications Centre Group, and
- e. Local Administration and Defence Group.

2. Command Group. The composition of the command group will vary, but it will generally consist of the commander, a staff officer(s), the artillery commander and combat support commanders as required. The group is sited where the commander can best exercise control of the battle, normally

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adjacent to the operations centre or forward as part of a tactical headquarters.

3. Operations Centre Group. The operation centre is the hub of any headquarters and the commander should never be out of direct contact with it during the battle. It is the focal point for all branches of the staff and provides the facility for effective coordination.

4. Combat Support Group. Headquarters of combat support elements may be co-located with headquarters groups. The role of these headquarters is three fold:

- a. to advise the commander;
- b. to support the general staff and subordinate commanders; and
- c. to command their units within the formation.

At main headquarters, elements of these staffs are established to complement the operations centre, eg., fire support coordination, offensive air support, etc.

5. Communications Centre Group. Radio communications for the command of a formation are normally provided in the operations centre, however the electronic warfare threat may well make it desirable to locate these emitters remotely. Should this be done, spare radio sets must still be provided as emergency back-up. The remainder of the communications facilities provided to service a formation headquarters are normally located in the communications centre with remote terminals provided to the operations centre as necessary. These facilities include message centre, common user teleprinters, cryptographic facilities and the telephone exchange. The staff message centre which provides registration, distribution and reproduction facilities, is usually co-located with the communications centre.

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6. Local Administration and Defence Group. The elements of this group provide for the administration and local defence needs of the headquarters.

817. COMMUNICATIONS AND LIAISON

1. Communications. The maintenance of adequate communications for effective command and control is a vital requirement of war. Communication systems may be disrupted by enemy fire and by electronic counter-measures and by the effects of electro-magnetic pulse, following nuclear weapon detonation. Commanders should ensure that clear directives are issued to take this into account. The responsibility for establishing communications is:

- a. from top down, for communication links;
- b. from left to right; and
- c. from the supporting to the supported unit/formation.

2. Liaison. The purpose of liaison is to facilitate coordination and successful joint action. Liaison detachments must have their own transportation means and telecommunication links to their headquarters. Liaison detachments may require a foreign language capability when working with allies. There is a requirement for reciprocal liaison where:

- a. forces are working under a headquarters different from the one to which they are usually assigned;
- b. a formation is placed directly under command of a NATO headquarters, or of a headquarters of a different nationality; and
- c. when brigades or higher formations of different nations are adjacent.

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CHAPTER 9

STAFF PLANNING

Section 1 - Introduction

901. GENERAL

1. A staff planning process at any level of headquarters, like an estimate of the situation, is a procedure for deciding what has to be done and how to do it. It is a logical sequence of collective reasoning leading to a solution.

2. In a large complex organization, such as a theatre of operations, it is not possible for one individual to estimate the complete situation. Even in lower formations, such as divisions and brigades, many of the factors can be extremely complicated. Commanders who become enmeshed in detail may lose sight of the aim. Detailed examination of factors must, therefore, be carried out by the staff.

902. THE STAFF

1. In addition to the three categories of staff discussed in Chapter 8; personal, general and special staff, the staff at the headquarters of an allied theatre of operation might be organized as:

a. An Integrated Staff. A staff in which only one officer is appointed to each establishment position, regardless of service or nationality; or

b. A Parallel Staff. A staff in which one officer from each nation, or service, is appointed to an establishment position.

2. The staff might also be described as; joint, if formed from two or more services of the same country, or; combined, if formed from personnel of two or more nations. When working within NATO, or bilaterally with US

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forces, the staff will be organized on the continental system with the following staff branches or divisions. (J indicates joint staff).

- a. Personnel Branch (J-1). This branch formulates policies and supervises the execution of administrative arrangements regarding individuals, including civilians and prisoners of war. Since many of the problems confronting this branch are of a national or service nature, full consideration must be given to the policies of participating nations and services.
- b. Intelligence Branch (J-2). This branch provides intelligence on the theatre of operations, and on enemy locations, activities, capabilities and intentions.
- c. Operations Branch (J-3). This branch assists the commander in the control of operations, beginning with planning, and carrying through until specific operations are completed. Thus, this branch plans, coordinates and integrates the conduct of operations.
- d. Logistics Branch (J-4). This branch plans, coordinates and supervises supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, construction and other combat service support activities. The branch also advises the commander of the capability of logistical forces to support proposed plans. Again, many of the problems confronting this branch are unique to certain nations and/or services, therefore full consideration should be given individual national and service policies.
- e. Civil-Military Cooperation (J-5). This branch deals with the activities undertaken between military commanders and national authorities, be they military or civil. In some cases, this function will be handled by the military and/or civil authority of the nation(s) in which the theatre of operations is located.

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NOTE: Additional staff branches might be organized based on the commander's requirements. For example, the long term planning function might be taken from the Operations Branch and handled by a separate Plans Branch.

903. THE PLANNING SEQUENCE

1. General. Every plan is the responsibility of a specific commander. Its development will vary depending upon who the commander is and the composition of his staff. In joint and combined headquarters, these factors are more significant because national and service procedures may differ considerably. In an established headquarters many of the common procedures will be detailed as standard operating procedures.
2. Stages. Whatever the working technique within a headquarters, a plan should be developed through the same stages as an estimate of the situation. These stages are:

- a. understand the situation;
- b. define the aim;
- c. examine the factors;
- d. determine and analyse possible courses of action;
- e. select the best course of action; and
- f. prepare the plan.

Section 2 - Understand the Situation/Define the Aim

904. UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION

1. At the theatre level, understanding the situation involves knowing:
 - a. the strategic aims and restrictions of the superior political authority,
 - b. the capabilities, limitations, disposition and intentions of the enemy, and

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- c. the resources available, particularly combat forces, their capabilities and limitations.

905. DEFINE THE AIM

1. This stage of the planning sequence is critical, indeed so critical, that most armed forces consider it to be a component of the master principle of war. The commander should carefully select his aim and understand its implications. At a very high level, his aim may not be given to him. He may have to deduce it from available information. In such cases, his aim should become clear from an analysis of his assigned tasks.

2. Task analysis can be thought of as a preliminary estimate of the situation. The commander should do this estimation with his principal staff officers. It should result in a general concept of the operation which outlines:

- a. what must be done;
- b. why it must be done.
- c. when it must be done;
- d. who will do it; and
- e. how it will be done, in general terms.

906. PLANNING GUIDANCE

1. Once the general concept of operation has been derived, it will be necessary to issue planning guidance. This may range from a few words to several key subordinates, to the issue of a formal planning directive. In a higher formation headquarters this directive might include;

- a. a statement of the commander's intent, his mission and the major tasks,
- b. a statement of any assumptions and/or limitations on the above, and
- c. any unique factors, such as political considerations, restrictions on the use of certain weapons and ammunitions, etc.

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2. Planning guidance may also be issued as an outline plan. Such a plan should include the salient features or highlights of a course of action.

Section 3 - Examination of Factors

907. GENERAL

Although the commander should have examined the major factors affecting the attainment of his aim in his initial estimate of the situation, many detailed factors must be studied by the staff. Each staff branch should examine their respective areas of interest to assess their impact on the aim. This examination may be done in the form of a staff check or an estimate. When appropriate, it may indicate which of several courses of action can best be supported. At lower levels, it may consist of simple, rapid calculations. At higher levels, it may be necessary to carry out a more detailed and formal estimate of the situation.

908. PERSONNEL FACTORS

1. Personnel factors to be considered include;
 - a. strengths of assigned forces,
 - b. estimated casualty rates, and
 - c. availability of replacements.

909. INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

1. A commander should have already considered the enemy during his initial analysis. Ideally, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance elements would have been in full operation before the situation developed. Regardless, the intelligence staff should continue to examine the enemy in relation to the commander's aim.
2. Intelligence factors to be considered include;
 - a. theatre characteristics -

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- (1) geography, including topography and hydrography,
- (2) climate and weather,
- (3) transportation routes and resources,
- (4) telecommunication resources and facilities,
- (5) political situation, and
- (6) economic, sociological, scientific and technological conditions;

b. enemy situation -

- (1) strength,
- (2) composition, location and disposition,
- (3) movement and activities,
- (4) logistical strength,
- (5) major resources including missiles, aircraft and ships, and
- (6) nuclear, chemical, biological and electronic warfare capability and intentions; and

c. enemy unconventional warfare and psychological situation -

- (1) guerrillas,
- (2) nature and extent of psychological warfare effort, and
- (3) subversion and sabotage.

910. OPERATIONAL FACTORS

1. The operations staff will have involvement across the entire spectrum of staff interest in order to provide coordination. They must act as a focal point for all staff activity.

2. In addition to an interest in the broad range of factors, the operations staff will consider in detail;

- a. size and nature of assigned friendly forces,
- b. state of training,
- c. morale,

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- d. possible groupings and tasks,
- e. timings, and
- f. supporting and/or contingency plans.

911. LOGISTICAL FACTORS

1. At theatre, or joint force level, logistical factors are often critical in assessing the viability of a plan. Some of the factors which must be considered are;

- a. the requirements and availability of all supply commodities including; ammunition, fuel, rations, defence stores and specialist equipment,
- b. the extent of air, sea and land transportation resources and networks,
- c. the degree of medical support available, and
- d. base development requirements.

Section 4 - Courses of Action

912. DETERMINE/ANALYSE COURSES OF ACTION

1. An examination of the factors should lead the staff to the possible courses of action. Although the planning process is developed sequentially, quite frequently a potential course of action will be dismissed early in the planning process. For example, logistical estimates may eliminate a certain course of action prior to the formal consideration of courses. Thus the planning process is dynamic, or integrated in execution, rather than strictly sequential.

2. The dynamic nature of the planning process demands that there be careful coordination by the operations staff. They should synthesize the information produced by the respective staff branches and outline the

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possible courses of action. In some cases, particularly in a headquarters in which the commander and his staff have worked together for sometime and have developed a high degree of mutual confidence, it is possible that only one feasible course of action will emerge. Regardless of the number of viable courses of action, they must then be assessed in relation to the degree to which they satisfy the commander's aim.

913. SELECTING A COURSE OF ACTION

Whether there are several courses of action or only one, it is the sole responsibility of the commander to decide what must be done. He may make a personal, final estimate of the situation, weighing the various factors as appropriate; or, he may have his staff prepare a detailed written estimate; or, he may direct further studies. Regardless of the approach taken, a course of action must ultimately be selected and direction given to the staff to prepare a detailed plan.

Section 5 - The Plan

914. GENERAL

Preparation of the plan is the last stage of the staff planning process. The plan is prepared by the operations staff assisted by the other staff branches as required.

915. FORMATS

The commander's plan may be issued to subordinate formations in one of the formats described below:

- a. Letter of Instruction. This format has been used for many years in the US Forces and it may be encountered by Canadians working in NATO or involved in Canada - US bilateral operations. It is a directive used to provide guidance for military operations which are normally broad in scope and extended in time.

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- b. Operation Plan. This is a plan for a single or series of related operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is in the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation, plan, is usually used instead of, order, to indicate long term planning. If an operation plan is put into effect at a prescribed time, it then becomes an operation order.
- c. Operation Order. This is a directive, normally written, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.
- d. Operation Instruction. This instruction, normally written, is an abbreviated operation order. It is used to give a subordinate considerable latitude in the conduct of the operation, or when time precludes the writing of a detailed order. This format is primarily used by Commonwealth forces, including Canada.

Section 6 - The Theatre Campaign Plan

916. GENERAL

1. The theatre commander receives direction in the form of a strategic plan, a letter of instruction, or other orders from a national command or international treaty authority. Regardless of format, the direction should provide a strategic concept and should specify forces for each service component.
2. The strategic military objective assigned to the theatre commander will usually grant considerable latitude in the details of its accomplishment. Based on these broad instructions, the theatre commander will prepare a campaign plan.

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3. The theatre campaign plan is normally prepared to cover long range strategic missions. It is based on the strategic assessment of the situation. The purpose of the plan is to outline the strategic decisions made by the commander and to provide a long term view of projected operations. This should enable subordinate commanders to have sufficient time for planning and preparation.

917. INTELLIGENCE

1. The headquarters of a theatre of operations is primarily concerned with strategic planning. To plan and prepare for missions, the commander must possess timely intelligence of the enemy, the theatre of operations, the civil population and other factors of the operational environment. This intelligence requirement exists in peace and war.

2. Peacetime intelligence programmes focus on world-wide intelligence requirements. National agencies produce intelligence on the capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions of potentially hostile powers. They aim to provide early warning of the nature of an impending attack. These agencies also develop descriptive studies of foreign countries and likely theatres of operation.

3. In wartime, the intelligence effort concentrates on current and potential enemies. The theatre commander will require up-to-date intelligence on enemy dispositions, composition, capabilities, limitations and likely courses of action.

4. The theatre commander provides direction for and coordination of the intelligence effort of his forces. Service component commanders maintain their own intelligence functions, however, the theatre commander may establish a theatre intelligence organization from forces assigned under operational command.

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918. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. There are many factors involved in the organization of forces at the theatre level. The mission, political and economic constraints, relationships between the host country and allied nations in a theatre, the enemy situation, attitude of the civilian population, climate, geography, local resources, transportation and communication facilities, base development, the psychological impact of the military presence, nature of operations and forces available are all key issues. An analysis of these factors will lead to the territorial organization, the assignment of tasks, the allocation of forces and the development of the campaign plan.

2. The theatre commander's plans should provide sufficient guidance for the component forces to conduct operations that ensure unity of effort. The plans define the magnitude of tasks in terms of area, operational scope and combat service support requirements. Subordinate commanders usually do not prepare orders and plans to cover the entire time span or scope of the campaign plan. They plan in detail for those initial actions for which intelligence is available and which they may be called on to execute early. For operations which will occur later in the campaign plan, they conduct long range planning.

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CHAPTER 10

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Section 1 - Introduction

1001. GENERAL

Command and control systems comprise five elements; personnel, procedures, equipment, facilities and communications. The communications element must be an effective system, if the other elements are to work together. A communication system is pervasive; it extends from national command through all levels of command and administrative services within a theatre of operations.

1002. THE THREAT

1. General. The potential enemy define their tactical electronic warfare doctrine as, "radio electronic combat" (REC). REC is a combat support system, which focuses primarily on the target, rather than on the means of attacking it. This means that all forms of reconnaissance, including; satellite, shipborne, ground, air, radio and radar, will be combined with all forms of physical and electronic attack in one coordinated system.
2. The REC threat embraces three general areas:
 - a. intelligence gathering and target acquisition, through the interception of radio nets and through radio and other electronic emitter locating techniques;
 - b. intrusion and deception, which aims to spread confusion; and
 - c. direct attack, by jamming or fire.
3. In addition to the REC threat, the orderly exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum is threatened by the proliferation of electronic systems which could result in massive mutual interference.

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4. Target Priorities. Likely REC target priorities are:
- a. Nuclear Weapon Systems. Included are the means of delivery, storage areas and associated control systems.
 - b. Artillery. This includes artillery associated communications and target acquisition systems.
 - c. Command and Control Systems.
 - d. Airborne Radars and Ground to Air Communications. Forward air control links may receive special emphasis.
 - e. Covering Force Rear Links.
 - f. Air Defence Systems. Targets include communications equipments, and radars used for detection, fire control and target acquisition.
 - g. Reserves. These are probable targets, particularly at a time when they are about to be employed.

Section 2 - System Characteristics and Outline

1003. SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

1. Good communications will be necessary to counter the threat and to facilitate effective command and control. The commander and his staff must be able to: collect the data to formulate a plan; issue detailed orders; and supervise the execution of those orders. Communications are the medium through which these tasks are accomplished.
2. An effective communication system has the following characteristics:
 - a. High Availability. This is the ability of the user to complete a communication at first try without restriction. The allocation of a degree of high availability is determined by the relative importance of the command or staff appointment.

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- b. Security. Physical security of equipment and cryptographic protection of transmissions must be provided.
- c. Flexibility. The system must cater to changing requirements without losing effectiveness. The system must enable the commander to project his personality, thus influencing the battle, while meeting the staff requirement for transmission of detailed data.
- d. Simplicity. The system must be so designed that it may be operated by users with minimum training.
- e. Rapidity of Service. Communications must be passed at a speed appropriate to the operational requirement.
- f. Accuracy. Communications should be passed as error-free as technically possible. Critical circuits should be identified for application of error detection and correction equipment.
- g. Interoperability. The system must be interoperable with other national and allied command and control systems.
- h. Maintainability. The maintenance capability of the system should be such that the out-of-service time of a communication link does not seriously jeopardize command and control.
- j. Economy. The system must not demand an inordinate share of resources relative to the force it supports.
- k. Capacity. The system must be capable of handling the traffic load of the user.
- m. Mobility. The system should not restrict the user from deploying anywhere in the theatre of operations.
- n. Survivability. The system must be sufficiently robust so as not to inhibit the user from carrying out his role. It should also

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be resistant to electronic counter-measures, radiation and electro-magnetic pulse.

p. Redundancy. The system must continue to function despite damage or partial destruction through enemy action or other causes such as atmospheric interference and technical failure.

q. Practicality. Equipments must be suitable for their role in terms of weight, portability, range, power consumption, etc.

1004. SYSTEM OUTLINE

1. General. A communications system is a network of different means of communication interconnected to provide an effective command and control apparatus. The various means of communications are combined so that the disadvantages of one means are offset by the advantages of another.

2. The Canadian communication system is compatible with allied theatre communication networks. It comprises the following elements;

- a. personal contact,
- b. net radio,
- c. an area trunk system,
- d. a signals dispatch service, and
- e. system control.

3. Personal Contact. This is the simplest and most effective means of communication. It is virtually free from enemy interference and potentially permits the best understanding between the parties involved. Orders which are only partially understood can be clarified or amplified. Through personal contact, the commander is most able to project his personality and assess the impact of his orders on his subordinates.

4. Personal contact may also be achieved through the use of liaison officers. Although this method is not as direct as that described above,

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it does permit a free flow of information between the sender and the receiver. A well trained and experienced liaison officer can be very effective in communicating both the substance and the spirit of the commander's orders.

5. Net Radio. This is the most common means of communications found within army field formations. The equipment may vary from small pocket-size radios, with a range of a few hundred metres, to large multi-vehicle stations, with the capability of communicating around the world. It can be used to carry voice, morse code, teletype, facsimile, video, or digital data traffic. The characteristics of net radio are:

a. Strengths

- (1) Everyone receives all messages.
- (2) It is extremely flexible, equally serving static and mobile users and it easily caters to rapidly changing situations.
- (3) It is simple to use and it is economical in terms of manpower, training, and equipment.

b. Weaknesses

- (1) The capacity is limited because only one station can transmit at a time.
- (2) It is very vulnerable to REC and to atmospheric interference.

6. Area Trunk System. This system provides manual and automatic telephone, teletype, facsimile and data communications between and within army field formations and units. The system consists of the following:

- a. message handling facilities, which permit access to the system; provide sorting between users and give a storage and forward capability;

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- b. a transmission system which interconnects all parts of the system, using primarily cable and radio relay, but also possibly using radio and satellite;
 - c. single channel radio access which allows the user to have the same telephone facilities while mobile, as he has while in his static headquarters;
 - d. a facility which allows a limited number of combat net radio stations to make calls; and
 - e. a control system which plans and supervises deployment, operations and maintenance.
7. The characteristics of the area trunk system are:
- a. Strengths
 - (1) It has high capacity in that most links are multi-channel and can serve several users at the same time.
 - (2) It is reliable because of its capacity and its built-in redundancy.
 - b. Weaknesses
 - (1) It is expensive in manpower and equipment.
 - (2) It lacks mobility as a great deal of planning is required before links can be moved.
8. Signals Dispatch Service. This service is required to carry large volumes of relatively low precedence traffic between headquarters. In many instances, particularly at higher formation level, when large, complex, or bulky documents must be passed, the signals dispatch service is faster than electronic communications systems. Dispatch riders may use aircraft, boats, or vehicles in providing the service. The service is generally reliable, but delivery can be risky in situations where secure and passable routes

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cannot be assured. Although the service is simple to establish, it is relatively slow.

9. System Control. System control refers to the management of the communication system - the total system. The complementary facilities of net radio, area trunk and signals dispatch service should be examined together, to allow in time of failure, damage or destruction, a recommendation and decision on priorities for restoration. The control organization must be able to cope with frequent network configurational changes, damage to facilities and disruption of the control system itself. In addition, users move through the area and they must be located by the same directory address, regardless of their physical method of connection to the system.

10. This communications management is exercised through a hierarchical structure consisting of three levels as follows:

- a. System Executive and Planning. This level carries out long term planning and issues executive instructions.
- b. Operational System Control. This is the level at which technical management carries out the executive instructions.
- c. Facilities Control. This is the level at which detailed engineering of links and installations takes places, along with local control and user assistance.

Section 3 - Communications within a Theatre of Operations

1005. TYPES OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMANDS

1. Normally four distinct communications commands will operate within a theatre of operations. Each will have its own command and staff structure

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and each may have certain responsibilities to any, or all of the others.

The four commands are;

- a. the host nation's national communications command,
- b. the theatre communications command,
- c. the national command communications of nations committing forces to the theatre, and
- d. the army and air force tactical communications networks.

1006. HOST NATION COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND

1. The host nation's communications command provides fixed and mobile communications support to its own national forces, including; combat forces, supporting bases, reserves and home guard. It also supports other government departments as required. It may, in conjunction with the national defence headquarters, assume control of the civil telecommunications network.

2. The host nation communications command is usually responsible for:

- a. the control and allocation of radio frequencies to all national and allied forces within the nation's boundaries and for the coordination of frequencies for international communications, through an allied agency;
- b. the provision of access to the national civil telecommunications network for allied forces and for international long line and satellite circuits, normally through an allied agency; and
- c. the integration of purely national communications facilities with the theatre system.

1007. THEATRE COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND

1. Theatre commands, army groups and tactical air forces are provided with communication commands or signal support groups. These forces are

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usually based on elements of the host nation's communications command, augmented by the resources of other participating nations.

2. The theatre communications command and signal support groups will, on behalf of their subordinate formations, coordinate frequency assignment and the use of the host nation facilities with the host nation communications command.

1008. NATIONAL COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Each nation contributing forces to a theatre is responsible for its own purely national command communications. Such communications are normally provided by a strategic communications command. In many cases, this will involve leasing long lines or satellite channels from the host nation and then terminating those channels with national equipments.

2. The national command system will normally extend from its national defence headquarters, through the national strategic system, to the headquarters of the national force commander and down to the headquarters of the senior national component commanders as shown in Figure 10-1.




Figure 10-1 National Command Communications

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3. Except for the provision of radio frequencies, the installation and operation of the national command system is a purely national matter. Equipment, personnel and facilities are normally not available for use by other organizations in the theatre.

1009. ARMY AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. Within army formations and tactical air forces, a distinct signals command and staff structure exists to support operations. At each army group and tactical air force there is a chief signal officer who is responsible for all communications and electronic matters. He and his staff are responsible for the integration of national tactical systems of both army and air forces, and for the integration of the tactical systems into the multi-national theatre communications command.

2. Tactical communications are tailored to meet the needs of the forces assigned to a theatre. A single system may be used by more than one nation. Alternatively, two distinct systems may be hooked together as is the case in Germany, with the Canadian system being connected to the American and German systems.

3. Above corps level, radio nets are normally point-to-point circuits to handle high volume teletype or data communications. Voice radio is usually only provided as a back up to trunk systems. Tactical air radio nets are provided by an air support signal squadron which is part of an allied tactical air force. This unit provides radio nets between deployed army tactical headquarters, airfields and air force headquarters for the tasking and control of tactical air support.

4. Within NATO, various Standard Operating Agreements (STANAGs) exist which provide the minimum scales of communications to be provided between forces. These STANAGs form the basis for signal staff planning in an allied force at all levels.

Section 4 - Theatre Army Electronic Warfare

1010. GENERAL

1. Introduction. Military forces have increased their dependence on electronic equipment and the electro-magnetic spectrum for exercising command and control of manoeuver forces, weapons systems, logistical support, etc. Commanders must therefore consider the use of the electro-magnetic spectrum as an integral part of combat operations. Similarly, the commander who can selectively deprive the enemy of the use of the electro-magnetic spectrum has an important military advantage.
2. The battle for the electro-magnetic spectrum is called electronic warfare. It is the use of electro-magnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electro-magnetic spectrum and the action taken to retain its use by friendly forces.
3. The aim of electronic warfare is to provide the supported formation commander with:
 - a. timely information on the enemy;
 - b. increased combat power by provision of a capability to disrupt the enemy's use of the electro-magnetic spectrum at critical times in the battle; and
 - c. continued use of the electro-magnetic spectrum despite REC.
4. Divisions of Electronic Warfare. The divisions of electronic warfare are:
 - a. Electronic Warfare Support Measures. These are the actions taken to search for, intercept, identify and locate the source of radiated electro-magnetic energy for the purpose of obtaining information on the immediate enemy threat. They provide a source

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of information, and subsequently intelligence, for operational decision-making for activities such as; target acquisition and unit deployment or redeployment, as well as electronic counter and counter-counter-measures.

- b. Electronic Counter-Measures. These are the actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electro-magnetic spectrum by jamming and deception.
- c. Electronic Counter-Counter-Measures. These are the actions taken to ensure that friendly forces may make effective use of the electro-magnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of REC. These measures may be technical, (eg, equipment capability), procedural, (eg, anti-jamming drills, training, discipline of operators), or, operational, (eg., emission control).

5. Electronic Warfare Units. At the theatre level, strategic and tactical electronic warfare units may be established in the theatre communications command. Their number, organization and equipment will be determined by the tasks assigned by the theatre commander.

1011. CONDUCT

- 1. The theatre command will establish broad policies within which subordinate formations will conduct their operations. The staff at this level will be responsible for the collection, collation, interpretation and dissemination of strategic electronic data and intelligence.
- 2. Signal intelligence and electronic warfare units will execute electronic support and counter-measures in response to tasking received from the operations and intelligence staffs of supported formation headquarters. Counter-counter-measures are taken by all users of the electro-magnetic spectrum.

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3. Electronic warfare operations must effectively support combat operations. The electronic warfare plan must be developed early and it must be fully integrated into the overall operational plan. It must be continuously updated to ensure that support measures provide the right type of information and that counter and counter-counter-measures do not impose unnecessary restrictions on friendly operations.

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CHAPTER 11

AIR SPACE CONTROL

Section 1 - Introduction

1101. GENERAL

1. There are many potential users of the air space above the combat zone (CZ):

- a. The air force commander requires use of the air space to get his aircraft to and from the target area.
- b. The air defence commander must use the air space to engage enemy aircraft.
- c. The army commander wants to employ his helicopters for fire support, reconnaissance and logistical lift.
- d. The medical commander wants to move casualties to various levels of medical installation by air medical evacuation.
- e. The artillery commander wishes to fire his weapons, immediately, in response to requests for fire support.
- f. The logistics commander wants to move supplies and replacements by the most direct air routes and without time consuming restrictions.

2. Experience has shown that unless the use of this air space is coordinated, serious problems may occur as a result of mutual interference. Effective control of the use of air space must therefore be of prime concern to all commanders.

1102. PURPOSE

1. An air space control system (ACS) should be designed to achieve;
 - a. minimum risk to friendly aircraft,

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- b. minimum restrictions on air defence weapons,
- c. separation, whenever possible, of air and land operations in the air space, and
- d. a planned, procedural system.

1103. SCOPE

1. General. Air space control entails the coordination of four major tasks; air defence, air traffic regulation, tactical mission control and fire support coordination.
2. Air Defence. Air defence artillery units are controlled from formation headquarters. These headquarters are key air space control facilities in the forward area. They become integral parts of the ACS by virtue of their inclusion in the area air defence system.
3. Air Traffic Regulation. Regulation of air traffic will include land and air force command and control facilities. Air force facilities may include reporting centres and posts, direct, air support centres and tactical air control parties. Land force facilities may include flight operations centres, flight control centres, navigational aids and terminal facilities.
4. Tactical Mission Control. Formation operation centres control tactical operations. Each centre will include an element to assist in the coordination of the use of air space.
5. Fire Support Coordination. Indirect fire support depends upon the tactical situation, hence, it is generally not predictable. It poses a threat to aircraft at low altitudes in the immediate vicinity of firing unit locations and in impact areas. With the exception of these two areas, the risk to aircraft is relatively low.

1104. PREMISES

1. There are two main premises in air space control:

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- a. Restrictions cannot be avoided. This will affect where aircraft can fly and when land-based weapons can fire.
- b. The ACS must be effective under all conditions.

1105. CONCEPT

1. Air space control in the CZ provides increased operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, integrated and flexible use of air space. The authority to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations is vested only in the joint/combined force commander.
2. The air space control authority (ACA) is that subordinate commander designated by the joint/combined force commander to assume responsibility for the ACS.
3. The ACS is a complex of organizations, personnel, facilities, policies and procedures. Control facilities are linked with each other and with the ACA by communications and/or procedures to form an integrated ACS. The system operates in response to the ACA and an air space control plan.
4. The following command and control relationships pertain:
 - a. The ACA and the ACS enhance the joint/combined force commander's ability to employ forces. Hence, they should not be considered entities, separate and apart from the mission, authority and organization of the commander.
 - b. In appointing the ACA, the commander does not alter the existing command relationship with subordinate commanders. Accordingly, the senior commander retains all elements of operational command authority over subordinate commanders, and they in turn, retain all elements of assigned operational authority.
 - c. The authority delegated to the ACA allows him to plan, organize and operate the ACS.

NOTE: See Figure 11-1 for a diagrammatic view of the concept in a NATO context.

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AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM CONCEPT




Figure 11-1 Air Space Control System Concept

Section 2 - Principles and Organization

1106. PRINCIPLES

1. General. Principles of air space control are discussed in terms of operations and procedures.
2. Operations. The following principles should be adhered to in all types of tactical operations:
 - a. All army, navy and air force air space users are likely to interact, therefore, all users should be incorporated in the ACS. Each user should participate in the planning for the use of the air space.
 - b. Air space control should be performed in close coordination with air defence activities.
 - c. Air space should be used with minimum restrictions, consistent with the degree of risk considered acceptable by the joint/combined force commander. It is not the intent, nor is it desirable, to individually control all offensive and defensive forces.
 - d. Full positive and full procedural control represent the extremes of a spectrum of control methods. The air space control plan must accommodate any combination of such methods between these extremes. The ACS must have the means to respond to the complex, dynamic and fluid nature of modern combat.
 - e. Among users of the air space, commonality of the following is a particular importance; navigational/geographical referencing, identification procedures, weapon control orders and terminology.

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- f. Indirect fire will not normally be stopped to allow for aircraft movement.
 - g. Optimum use should be made of radar and other electronic systems for air space control, consistent with REC considerations.
3. Procedures. The following principles apply to procedures:
- a. Procedures must accommodate both planned and immediate response missions.
 - b. Procedures must be simple; undue restrictions should not be imposed. Areas to be avoided should be identified, so that flexible routing may be accomplished.
 - c. Procedures do not deny the right of self-defence to any air space user.
 - d. Procedures should be flexible to accommodate various navigation, sensor and weapon systems.
 - e. Procedures should take in to account the differing capabilities and requirements of the participating nations.
 - f. Procedures should recognize the limited time available for air defence engagements because of the inherent flight characteristics of modern combat aircraft and missiles.
 - g. Procedures should be compatible between air traffic control units, air defence agencies and tactical elements.

1107. GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANIZATION

- 1. General. There are four geographical elements of air space control;
 - a. air space control area,
 - b. air space control sub-area,
 - c. high density air space control zone (HIDACZ), and
 - d. temporary air space restrictions.

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2. Air Space Control Area. An air space control area is the basic geographical element of an ACS in the joint/combined force commander's area of responsibility. The ACA will plan and coordinate air space control operations in the control area using the facilities of subordinate commanders.

3. Air Space Control Sub-Area. An air space control sub-area is a segment of the air space control area. The number of sub-areas established will depend upon the commander's capabilities, the combat situation, geographical factors, the complexities of air space control and air defence requirements.

4. High Density Air Space Control Zone (HIDACZ). A HIDACZ may be established when the level and intensity of operations dictates the need for special air space control measures to prevent, or minimize, mutual interference between users. The number of zones established will depend upon the combat situation, the air traffic control problem and the requirements of fire support coordination.

5. Temporary Air Space Restrictions. Temporary restrictions may be imposed on defined segments of air space in response to specific requirements, eg, search and rescue, air refuelling areas, "weapons free" areas, etc. These restrictions may include;

- a. restricted operations areas,
- b. low level transit routes,
- c. time slots, and
- d. air speed control.

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Section 3 - Responsibilities

1108. COMMANDER, MAJOR NATO COMMAND

The commander of a major NATO command, such as SACEUR, is responsible for providing broad air space control policy guidance, whether or not operational command authority has been assigned to a lower level. He is also responsible for coordinating his planning with other major NATO commands, or non NATO nations, particularly in areas of possible overlap of responsibilities and authorities.

1109. JOINT/COMBINED FORCE COMMANDER

1. The joint/combined force commander will direct the general priorities for the use of air space. He will assign responsibility for air space control to the designated ACA. As he assigns missions and tasks to subordinate commanders, he will also determine priorities for the use of air space.

2. During operations the joint/combined force commander will monitor the ACS to ensure that it operates in accordance with the direction and priorities that have been established. He will also resolve conflicts which may arise between his subordinate commanders and the ACA.

1110. AIR SPACE CONTROL AUTHORITY

1. The ACA is responsible for the ACS. His appointment is based on the following considerations:

- a. capability of conducting planning for the ACS with the component services of the command;
- b. capability to assume responsibility for the operation of the system;
- c. air defence capabilities and responsibilities; and

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- d. availability of facilities for control, surveillance, identification, etc.

2. Because of these considerations and the fact that air space control primarily affects air operations, the air commander is normally appointed the ACA. However, such factors as air/aviation resources, primary mission and air space control capabilities may indicate that another commander should be appointed.

3. The ACA has the following planning responsibilities:

- a. plan and establish an ACS which is responsive to the needs of the joint/force commander and the air space users;
- b. develop coordinating policies and regulating procedures necessary to effect unity and standardization in the air space control area;
- c. determine the requirements for the separate designation of air space control sub-areas and measures such as HIDACZs;
- d. develop or approve plans and promulgate instructions for air space control in designated HIDACZs, restricted operational areas and temporary air space restrictions;
- e. anticipate and plan for sub-areas of high user activity; and
- f. recognize and cater to special requirements of major air space users.

4. During the conduct of operations the ACA will supervise the operation of the ACS. Specifically, he will:

- a. promote the safe, efficient and flexible use of the air space;
- b. redesignate or modify the air space control plan, procedures and measures as required by the tactical situation;
- c. coordinate the establishment of terminal control zone and airport traffic control areas;

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- d. integrate and coordinate the ACS with any existing civil, national, or international air traffic control system;
- e. authorize deviations from established policies and procedures; and
- f. coordinate with the air defence commander and other affected subordinate commanders.

1111. ARMY GROUP COMMANDERS

1. Army group commanders are responsible for:
 - a. ensuring that air space control requirements of their corps commanders are met;
 - b. coordinating with respective air force commanders on air space control measures to meet army group requirements;
 - c. incorporating approved air space control arrangements in operational directives;
 - d. coordinating ACA requirements with subordinate formations; and
 - e. providing resources for air space control.
2. Coordination is facilitated by; co-locating key air traffic control, air defence, air operations tasking, and fire support coordination agencies; establishing communications between these facilities; and/or by exchanging liaison officers. At formation level, air space control is fulfilled through the establishment of an air space control centre within the structure of the fire support coordination centre.

1112. CORPS COMMANDERS

1. The corps commanders are responsible for:
 - a. submitting air space control requirements, eg, requests for weapons free zones, to army group headquarters;
 - b. coordinating air defence artillery and friendly air traffic, eg, offensive air support and tactical aviation, within approved HIDACZs, through a designated agency;

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- c. coordinating air defence artillery outside of HIDACZs and weapons free zones; and
- d. ensuring that subordinate formations comply with current air space control measures.

1113. LOWER FORMATION COMMANDERS

The commander divisional artillery is responsible to the division commander for air space control. He will usually delegate the coordinating function to the divisional air defence officer, normally the commanding officer of the air defence artillery regiment. At brigade level, this task is performed by the battery commander of the point missile battery.

1114. AIR SPACE CONTROL FACILITY

- 1. Each air space control facility should:
 - a. coordinate air defence, tactical air support, surface fire and air traffic information;
 - b. coordinate, assemble and display relevant air space activity data;
 - c. advise local commanders of possible conflict between friendly users and obtain priorities for each of the major users;
 - d. minimize risk to high priority systems by the use of positive and/or procedural control measures;
 - e. inform air space users of the priorities in force and planned control procedures;
 - f. liaise with adjoining facilities to ensure mutual awareness of planned activity; and
 - g. seek guidance from higher authority when unable to resolve conflicting priorities.

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1115. MILITARY AIR ROUTES

When a specified NATO formal alert measure(s) has been declared, civilian and military air traffic may be subject to special routing while transiting potential CZs. These routes will pose unique problems to the ACA and, consequently, they should be planned and coordinated separately. In war, coordination between major NATO commands and agencies responsible for air traffic control service external to CZs will be established and detailed in the appropriate Military Committee document.

Section 4 - Planning

1116. GENERAL

1. Control Spectrum. The two methods of control, positive and procedural, must be fully compatible. Their relative significance at any time will depend on the facilities which can be made available and the degree of hostile interference. In practice, the operational situation will almost certainly demand a mixture of the two methods. Procedural control can always be exercised, although positive control will provide more flexible use of the air space. The collective capabilities and the spectrum of control methods should be considered when planning and operating the ACS.
2. System Structure. The initial requirement in establishing an ACS is to identify those elements which will be integrated into the system. As well, it will be necessary to determine those elements which could be made available from areas external to the operational command area. These could include;

- a. control agencies/facilities (to include maritime and airborne),
- b. communications,
- c. surveillance and identification resources, and

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- d. procedures applicable to both electronic and non-electronic control measures.

1117. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. General. The following considerations should be made in planning for air space control:

- a. inclusion of both peace and war activities, to include; peacetime training, activities undertaken in times of tension, initial combat operations with forces-in-being and subsequent combat operations with reinforcement forces;
- b. consideration of all likely users or influences operating within the air space including air traffic, air defence weapons, surface fire and electronic warfare influences;
- c. requirements of existing defence plans;
- d. accommodation, not only of planned operations, but also of immediate operations which may generate unforeseen requirements.

2. Continuity of Operations. Continuity of air space control operations involves:

- a. the ACA establishing procedures for alternate control for areas adversely affected by REC or a degraded electronic environment,
- b. provisions in the air space control plan through which subordinate commanders can request adjustment of the plan because of unforeseen situations. Such changes would be approved by the ACA providing:
 - (1) they are in keeping with overall operational requirements;
 - (2) they are compatible with the requirements of other subordinate commanders operating in that and adjacent operational command areas; and
 - (3) they are endorsed by appropriate specialists.

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- c. specific provision in the air space control plan for the emergency resolution of subordinate commander's requests for temporary modification of air space restrictions.

3. Designation of Air Space for Specified Missions. The ACA may designate air space for a specified mission to another commander. In this situation, the ACA will temporarily designate that commander as an ACA for that air space. He will coordinate with the designated ACA to ensure: unity of effort and minimal interference along adjacent boundaries; agreement on procedures for coordination of flight information; clearance of aircraft to enter and depart adjoining air space; and the corresponding coordination of air space control services.
4. Risk Considerations. The air space control plan must impose minimal constraints on air space users consistent with the degree of risk that the joint/combined force commander considers acceptable.
5. Identification. Normally, electronic methods will provide the most rapid and reliable means of identification and employment of friendly aircraft. As continuous electronic monitoring and identification are not always practicable, or possible, procedural methods must be developed. Identification methods must be compatible with those required for air defence to ensure timely engagement of enemy aircraft, conservation of air defence resources and reduction of risk to friendly forces.

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CHAPTER 12

AIR DEFENCE

Section 1 - Introduction

1201. GENERAL

1. Counter air operations are those conducted to acquire and maintain air superiority. They are classified as "offensive" and "defensive" operations. Defensive counter air operations are collectively called air defence.

2. Objective. Air defence encompasses active and passive measures designed to achieve:

- a. In Peace. Continuous surveillance of the approaches to friendly air space and sea lines of communication so as to provide early warning of air attack.
- b. In War. A favourable air situation by preventing, nullifying, or reducing the effects of enemy air attack.

1202. THE RELATIONSHIP OF AIR DEFENCE TO THE TOTAL BATTLE

1. Air defence provides a secure base from which all other forces can operate. A high state of readiness during peace limits the opportunity for an enemy to succeed with a surprise air attack. As well, air defence contributes to the attrition of enemy air forces and, in doing so, allows greater freedom of action to friendly forces.

2. Air defence is a joint service responsibility whereby all air defence forces are employed within a theatre air defence plan. Although both the army and the air force can defend against the threat at all levels, the army has the primary responsibility to provide defence against the low-level air

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threat and the air force has the major responsibility to counter the medium and high-level threat.

1203. PRINCIPLES OF AIR DEFENCE

1. The principles of air defence are listed below:
 - a. The air defence weapons of all services should be employed in an integrated manner. Air defence must be coordinated with tactical operations on, and over land and sea.
 - b. Air defence forces must be equipped and trained to operate effectively in a electro-magnetic environment.
 - c. States of readiness must be defined to enable air defence forces to achieve their objectives. In addition, peacetime planning must encompass procedures which provide a smooth transition to war in the shortest possible time.
 - d. There must be close coordination within and between air defence regions to give a united response to any threat and to ensure the most effective use of air defence resources.
 - e. Active and passive air defences must be considered complementary parts of an overall air defence capability.

Section 2 - The Threat

1204. GENERAL

1. The potential enemy is able to mount a sophisticated air threat to friendly ground forces. This threat can be assessed in terms of;
 - a. reconnaissance,
 - b. fighter ground attack,
 - c. helicopters,

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- d. airborne operations,
- e. missiles, and
- f. radio electronic combat (REC).

1205. RECONNAISSANCE

1. Aerial reconnaissance vehicles will be active before and after major operations and will be employed on a regular basis during routine operations. Their purpose will be to:

- a. gain information on force dispositions and to keep track of troop and logistics movements;
- b. determine location and types of air defences;
- c. obtain post-strike information, including damage assessment, for subsequent target engagement, or for exploitation by ground forces;
- d. find and identify targets;
- e. relay radio communications for aircraft returning from beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA); and
- f. provide weather information for mission planning.

2. Tactical air reconnaissance can be carried out by specially equipped photographic reconnaissance aircraft, fighter aircraft, helicopters, light observation aircraft, drones and remotely piloted vehicles. Aerial vehicles will use television cameras, radars, radios, infra-red and thermal imagery equipments to acquire information. Visual methods of reconnaissance will also be employed. In most cases the enemy will receive the information while the reconnaissance system is still in flight.

3. Enemy aerial reconnaissance has the capability to operate on a theatre-wide basis. Photographic reconnaissance aircraft will normally be used to obtain information in division and corps rear areas and in the

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communications zone while light observation aircraft and helicopters will generally be restricted to the immediate vicinity of the FEBA.

1206. FIGHTER GROUND ATTACK

1. Aircraft not initially involved in the battle for air superiority will normally be assigned to targets in depth beyond the range of artillery. They will prefer to operate at low altitudes because of the effectiveness of air defence at medium and high altitudes. They will probe to discover weak points in the air defence and then attack through them.
2. Enemy aircraft will employ a variety of weapons. Guns, rockets, napalm and air-to-surface missiles will be used against point targets, while bombs and cluster type munitions will usually be used against area targets.
3. The priority target for enemy aircraft will be aircraft and airfields with the aim of achieving air superiority. Other targets will include nuclear weapons and their delivery means and storage areas, mechanized/armoured forces, headquarters, communication centres and administrative installations.

1207. HELICOPTERS

1. Their number and characteristics make the attack helicopter the primary air threat in the forward area. They will attack at tree-top level or lower. They will fly nap-of-the-earth, pop-up, fire and reposition. They may employ machine guns, rockets, cannons and anti-tank guided missiles, including the "fire and forget" variety.
2. Advanced helicopters will have an all-weather capability. They will possess improved and stabilized multi-sensor sights, night vision sights, laser range finding, target acquisition radar, computerized fire control systems and a REC capability.
3. Attack helicopters, accompanied by scout helicopters, will fly in formations of two to four aircraft. They will engage targets at ranges from

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less than one kilometre up to five kilometres. The average engagement range is expected to be three and one half kilometres.

4. In addition to tasks of reconnaissance and attack, helicopters may also be employed in airmobile assaults to seize important targets up to 100 kilometres beyond the FEBA. This type of operation is normally done in conjunction with a ground attack involving a link-up. Operations might be designed to seize vital ground or other key terrain. Command and control facilities and service support units are also likely objectives.

1208. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Airborne assaults may involve up to divisional size forces attempting to seize objectives up to 300 kilometres beyond the FEBA. As troop carriers will have to fly at low levels to avoid air defences, an airborne operation may be preceded by heavy air defence suppression attacks along the intended route. Missions will include establishing bridgeheads, securing crossing sites, seizing vital ground or key terrain, destroying nuclear delivery means, etc.

1209. MISSILES

Missiles, whether fired from the air or from the ground, pose an increasingly important threat. They have ranges from one or two kilometres to hundreds of kilometres making them a tactical and strategical threat. They can be equipped with a variety of warheads; high explosive, nuclear, chemical, and they are effective against point and area targets.

1210. RADIO ELECTRONIC COMBAT (REC)

Fixed or rotary wing attack aircraft may carry electronic counter measures (ECM) equipment which provides a self-screening, jamming capability. Dedicated ECM aircraft will carry jammer equipment with a given number of aircraft emitting on a random basis. Aircraft can also be used to deliver remotely operated ECM devices.

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Section 3 - Active and Passive Air Defence

1211. ACTIVE AIR DEFENCE

1. General. Active air defence is the action taken to destroy or reduce the effectiveness of enemy air attack. It includes such measures as the use of aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, ECM and surface-to-air guided missiles. It also includes the small arms fire of ground forces firing in self-defence.
2. Functions. Active air defence resources must cater to the following functions:
 - a. detection, identification and assessment of targets;
 - b. transmission of information, including target information;
 - c. assignment and control of weapons and engagement of targets; and
 - d. routing, recognition and recovery of aircraft.
3. Components. Active air defence resources may be provided by all services. Space systems may also be available. Components of the active air defence system are:
 - a. Weapon Systems. These include fighter/interceptor aircraft, attack helicopters and surface-to-air weapons, including, low, medium, and high-level air defence artillery and small arms.
 - b. The Ground Environment. This component includes;
 - (1) control and reporting agencies, together with sensors which include;
 - (a) early warning and surveillance systems,
 - (b) other netted civil and military sensors,
 - (c) low-level and/or mobile radar systems,
 - (d) Ballistic Missile Early Warning System,

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(e) identification systems and electronic warfare support measures.

(2) communications systems, and

(3) data processing facilities.

c. Contributing Systems. These include;

(1) airborne early warning,

(2) air defence artillery command and control systems, eg, unit operations centres,

(3) civilian and military air traffic control agencies, and

(4) satellites.

1212. WEAPON SYSTEMS

1. General. All weapon systems have limitations such as range, reaction time and flexibility of operation. Active air defence demands a mixture of systems so that the disadvantages of one are offset by the advantages of another. This balance is required not only between aircraft and surface-to-air weapons, but also between the specific types of fighter aircraft and air defence artillery.

2. Army air defence weapon resources are grouped in the following systems;

a. area missile systems, including, high, medium and low-level missiles,

b. point gun systems,

c. point missile systems, and

d. other resources, including attack helicopters and small arms.

3. Area Missile System. This system is required to defend large area targets, especially in the rear areas, against air attack. At the upper end of the weapon spectrum, and within NATO, the Nike Hercules is the theatre, high-level area missile. It is capable of firing conventional and nuclear

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warheads and it has a range of 140 kilometres. Weapons such as the Hawk provide medium-level coverage. These weapons are normally controlled at corps level. They have a range of approximately 40 kilometres. There are a variety of low-level systems designed to operate under the umbrella of the medium and high-level weapons. These low-level weapons form the backbone of air defence in the forward area.

4. Point Gun Systems. These are required to defend relatively small, and in many cases, mobile, point targets. They are primarily required in the forward area to counter short-range helicopter attacks, where time of reaction and the volume of fire are critical.

5. Point Missile Systems. These are required to defend mobile and stationary point targets. Their primary purpose is to defeat medium-range helicopters in the forward area, where high, single shot accuracy over ranges in excess of gun capabilities, are essential.

6. Other Systems. There is an increasing role for attack helicopters in air defence, particularly against enemy helicopters. As well, small arms fire, in volume, has been effective against air attack.

1213. GROUND ENVIRONMENT

1. Where practical, all air defence agencies and sensors should be integrated to provide an effective ground environment system. Efficient control of air defence resources relies on the provision and exchange of timely information. This information must include air defence warnings that allow air defence resources to be placed at appropriate readiness states and permit early target assignment. The exchange of timely information demands the provision of an adequate target tracking capability within systems and the ability to relay this information utilizing automated data processing systems. Secure communications systems to connect the control agencies are

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essential. The ground environment system must possess a high degree of survivability.

2. Air defence sensors normally perform specific surveillance or control functions. Surface-based systems have limitations in range, low-level capability, vertical coverage, target discrimination and the provision of height data. Equipments operate on widely differing frequencies, and as a consequence, have different susceptibilities to REC. Similarly, the electronic counter-counter-measure capability varies from system to system. Therefore, to provide the spectrum of cover required for air defence, a number of complementary systems are necessary. These range from a mixture of static and mobile equipments to Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems. Systems should be netted to enable air defence information to be gathered and disseminated under all operational conditions and to provide mutual support.

1214. CONTRIBUTING SYSTEMS

1. Airborne sensors serve to overcome range and low-level detection limitations inherent in a surface-based sensor system. The introduction of airborne early warning aircraft and integration of the information gained into the ground environment by digital data links will extend detection ranges and increase the reaction time. At the same time, the threat from low-level surprise attacks will be significantly reduced.

2. Artillery air defence command and control systems must be provided to complete the essential link with the ground environment. As well, civilian and military air traffic control facilities may have information or capabilities of value to the air defences and therefore these should also be incorporated into the overall air defence system.

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1215. TYPES OF ACTIVE AIR DEFENCE

1. To provide effective air defence a balanced mixture of the following deployment options is required:

- a. Area Defence. A posture designed for the defence of a broad area. A specialized application of area defence, where resources are disposed in line to prevent enemy penetration to rear areas, is known as belt defence.
- b. Point Defence. A posture designed for the protection of a more limited area, normally in defence of the vital elements of a force and important installations in the rear areas.
- c. Self-Defence. A posture developed by units to defend themselves against direct attack through the use of organic weapons.

1216. PASSIVE AIR DEFENCE

1. General. Passive air defence means and measures are required to reduce the effects of air attack. They do not involve the employment of weapons. They are required at all levels and will involve the efforts of both military and civil organizations.

2. Means. The means available to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air action are developed initially in peacetime and include:

- a. provision of mobility wherever possible;
- b. hardening of resources, including protection against electro-magnetic pulse;
- c. provision of an airfield damage repair capability;
- d. protection of equipment, eg., revetting;
- e. provision of decoy equipment and facilities;
- f. provision of nuclear, biological and chemical defensive equipment and facilities;

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- g. provision of sufficient resources to allow for redundancy of systems and equipments;
 - h. provision of explosive ordnance reconnaissance/disposal resources;
 - j. camouflage and tone-down in the visual, infra-red, radar spectra; and
 - k. provision of alert and warning systems.
3. In addition to the advance provision of physical means of improving survivability against air attack, a number of measures can be taken as the threat develops. These include:
- a. dispersal, vertically and horizontally;
 - b. adoption of a comprehensive electro-magnetic emission control policy;
 - c. the netting of available communications and sensor systems;
 - d. exercising mobility; and
 - e. concealment and camouflage.

Section 4 - Conduct of Air Defence

1217. HOSTILE CRITERIA AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

To be effective, control procedures must be centrally imposed on all weapon systems. This further requires the definition of standardized hostile criteria and rules of engagement. Imposition of rules of engagement by the air defence commander will be based on his estimate of the tactical air situation.

1218. EMPLOYMENT OF AIR DEFENCE RESOURCES

1. General. Early warning of enemy attack is vital if defence in depth is to be obtained. Active air defences should be deployed so as to permit

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the interception of intruding enemy aircraft and missiles as far forward as possible. Engagement should continue through to the enemy's weapon release point, and beyond this, if tactically acceptable.

2. Fighter/Interceptors. These air defence aircraft may be employed on the following tasks:

- a. Interception. These missions may involve the scramble of aircraft from a high state of readiness or the diversion of aircraft from combat air patrols. Interceptions may be made with the assistance of air defence radars, however fighters should be prepared to operate autonomously.
- b. Combat Air Patrol. These missions are mounted to enable rapid reaction to enemy intrusion and may be positioned well forward of areas to be defended. Patrols may also be conducted over a specific area, in support of friendly air or surface forces, over critical areas of a CZ, over land/air/sea corridors, or along a political border.
- c. Air Escort. These missions are flown in support of other aircraft.

3. Surface-to-Air Weapons. The employment of these weapons will be to a large extent dictated by their initial deployment into area or point defence positions. The combined effect of the separate systems will be at its greatest when they can be integrated into the overall air defence effort. When this cannot be achieved, they should be coordinated as fully as possible. The optimum capability of each system occurs at different ranges and heights and only through coordination can they be mutually supported and provide the best possible cover.

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1219. CENTRAL AND AUTONOMOUS CONTROL

Most air defence weapon systems are capable of autonomous operations when centralized control fails. Some low-level systems, particularly those organic to ground manoeuvre forces, normally operate in this mode.

Nevertheless, it is essential to coordinate the fire of these resources, at least by procedural means, with overall air defence operations, in order to permit the safe passage of friendly aircraft.

1220. AREA CONTROL OF WEAPONS

1. General. To capitalize on the complementary capabilities of the various weapon systems, complete integration or at least coordination is necessary. In addition to the air space control measures outlined in the preceding chapter, air defence operations areas and weapon engagement zones may be designated.
2. Air Defence Operations Area. This is a geographical area within which procedures are established to minimize interference between air defence and other operations. Within this area a number of additional control designations may be defined; air defence action area, air defence area, air defence identification zone and fire power umbrella.
3. Weapons Engagement Zones (WEZ). These zones are a volume of air space within which a specific type of weapon is preferred for use in an engagement. Use of WEZs does not preclude engagement of high priority targets by more than one type of weapon system if centralized direct control is available. Established zones may include:

- a. Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ). These will be established where no effective surface-to-air capability is deployed.
- b. High Altitude Missile Engagement Zone (HIMEZ). These are normally applied to long-range surface-to-air missiles. They will limit the volume of air space within which these weapons may

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conduct engagements without direction from the authority establishing the HIMEZ.

- c. Low Altitude Missile Engagement Zone (LOMEZ). This zone establishes control over engagements by low and medium-altitude missiles. The same considerations pertinent to the FEZ and HIMEZ apply. The LOMEZ will normally extend beyond the FEBA.
- d. Short-Range Air Defence Engagement Zone (SHORADEZ). Areas of low-level air defence employment may fall within a LOMEZ or a HIMEZ. Some areas may be defended solely by low-level air defence resources. Because centralized control over these weapons may not be possible, these areas must be clearly defined and promulgated so that friendly aircraft can avoid them.

1221. CONTROL OF FIGHTER OPERATIONS

1. Intercept. Fighter interception missions are tasked by the agency controlling the specific sector of operations. Where possible fighters will remain under the close control of the initiating control agency, although this control may be transferred to adjacent sectors of responsibility if required. Control of an intercept may be terminated when the fighter is in contact with the target or when the environment precludes positive direction by the controlling agency. In the latter case, alternative procedures, such as a provision of a broadcast of enemy activity, would be automatically instituted by the controlling authority or the aircrew to provide for autonomous or semi-autonomous action.

2. Combat Air Patrol. Direction of intercepts from a combat air patrol may be provided by a controlling agency, or fighters may operate autonomously when targets are detected by the aircraft's sensors.

1222. FIRE CONTROL OF SURFACE-TO-AIR WEAPONS

1. Means of Control. Fire control of surface-to-air weapons is achieved by:

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a. Assignment of Weapons Status. Degrees of weapons' status

include:

- (1) "weapons free", meaning weapons may fire at any aircraft not identified as being friendly;
- (2) "weapons tight", meaning weapons may fire only at aircraft identified as being hostile; and
- (3) "weapons hold", meaning weapons may fire only in self-defence or in response to an order.

b. Fire Control Orders. These are orders given to direct or to inhibit firing by surface-to-air weapons units based on rapidly changing battle situations. These orders may be issued regardless of the weapons status in effect. These orders are:

- (1) "engage", meaning units will fire at specified targets.

This order cancels any previous fire control order given to that unit;

- (2) "cease engagement", meaning units will stop activity against a specified target. This order may be used to re-allocate fire against a higher priority target, or to preclude undesired simultaneous engagement of a target by more than one weapon system; and

- (3) "hold fire", meaning an emergency stop firing, to include the destruction of missiles already launched. This order may be used to protect friendly aircraft or for other safety reasons.

2. Control of Medium and High-Level Surface-to Air Missiles. The firing of these missiles is controlled by the ground environment through the medium of data link or voice facilities of the missile command and control system.

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3. Control of Low-Level Air Defence Artillery. It may not always be possible to incorporate all short-range air defence weapons into the overall air defence plan. In some cases the only centralized control over the firing of these weapons will be the imposition of rules and procedures by the regional air defence commander.
4. Low-level air defence artillery units in defence of rear area installations, such as airfields, should be integrated into the centralized air defence command and control system. Control for some weapons may be less sophisticated than that which is possible for medium and long-range weapons, but it should be nonetheless adequate.
5. Low-level air defence artillery units organic to land manoeuvre forces will be positioned tactically by the land force commander. These units must be responsive to the air defence needs of the supported force, but where possible they should also contribute to the integrated air defence of the area. Rules and procedures imposed by the regional air defence commander are binding on these units. Liaison between these units and the central air defence command and control system may be the primary means for the dissemination of weapon control status, early warning information and friendly air activity information.
6. Self-Defence. All units must be capable of self-defence against air attack by using their organic weapons. The permanent control status for self-defence weapons is, "weapons hold".

Section 5 - Command and Control

1223. GENERAL

Air defence operations are an integral element of theatre operations and cannot be considered in isolation from the strategic air, tactical air,

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maritime and land battles. The air defence command structure must operate with air defence forces and other organizations provided by allies. It must therefore be capable of rapid reaction and be flexible in its operation.

1224. AIR DEFENCE GROUND ENVIRONMENT (ADGE)

1. Command and control of air defence forces is exercised at several levels through a series of agencies collectively known as ADGE. The major components of ADGE are;

- a. The Regional Air Operations Centre (RAOC),
- b. The Air Defence Operations Centre (ADOC), and
- c. Sector Operations Centres (SOCs).

2. The Regional Air Operations Centre. Major Subordinate Commanders, such as Commander Allied Forces Central Europe, exercise operational command over their command through a RAOC. Interconnected with all adjacent and subordinate ADOCs, the RAOC maintains a timely assessment of the air situation in its area of responsibility. As one of its major functions, the RAOC assists in coordination of overall air activity in the region with the ground combat plan.

3. The Air Defence Operations Centre. The ADOC, together with the Air Command Operations Centre (ACOC), forms the command post through which a Principle Subordinate Commander, such as Commander Central Army Group, exercises operational control over his command. He will decide upon the appropriate stages of readiness and he will direct the subordinate SOCs accordingly. The ADOC/ACOC coordinate their tactical activities with designated army groups. Certain functions of the ADOC/ACOC may be combined into a Joint Command Operations Centre (JCOC).

4. Sector Operations Centres. SOCs are established below army group level. Tactical command over designated air defence command forces is

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vested with the sector commander. He will maintain a constant watch over the air situation in his area of responsibility and he will direct the appropriate tactical action in response to hostile air activity. The degree of detailed control which must occur at this level can only be successful if an exceptionally high level of coordination is established with each of the corps operating in the sector. This level of coordination dictates the establishment of an Air Defence Operations Liaison Team (ADOLT) at corps headquarters level to communicate with the SOC and the corps air defence centre.

5. Additional Components. The ADGE may include the following additional components within a sector:

- a. Control and Reporting Centres (CRCs). CRCs exercise tactical control of air defence resources as delegated by the SOC. If the tactical situation should so dictate, one of the CRCs may be designated as an alternate SOC.
- b. Control and Reporting Posts (CRPs) and Reporting Posts (RPs). CRPs and RPs complete the static elements of the ADGE. Their number and specific functions are determined by the special situation within their respective sector. In addition to the fixed assets of the ADGE, there may be transportable elements designated as CRPs and mobile Forward Air Control Posts (FACPs).
- c. Airborne Air Control Facilities. Such facilities may also be associated with ADGE.

1225. FORMATION LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL

At corps level, operations are integrated with those of the ADGE through the ADOLT. Below corps level, control is exercised by artillery air defence commanders who establish an appropriate air defence control cell as a component of the fire support coordination centre (FSCC).

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
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NOTE: See Figure 12-1 for a simplified overview of the air defence command and control system.

FORMATION HIERARCHY

AIR DEFENCE HIERARCHY



NOTE: The RAOC and JCOC are integral to their respective formations. The SOC and its subordinate agencies are separate entities of the air defence command and control structure.

Figure 12-1 Simplified and Typical Air Defence Command and Control System

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CHAPTER 13

TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS

Section 1 - Introduction

1301. GENERAL

1. Modern battles are fought and won by land and air forces working together. The interaction and cooperation between them extends into almost every function of combat.
2. Tactical air support of land operations encompasses those air activities that are conducted to influence a land battle. Those activities include the following air operations;
 - a. counter air,
 - b. air interdiction (AI),
 - c. tactical air transport, and
 - d. offensive air support (OAS), which includes, close air support (CAS), battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and tactical air reconnaissance (TAR).

1302. THE NATURE OF TACTICAL AIR POWER

1. Characteristics. Tactical air power has the following characteristics:
 - a. Medium of Operation. Air power differs from land and sea power in that air space offers the least natural obstacle to mobility. All forces and targets, land, sea and air, can be subjected to air attack, provided the weapon system survives and it has the necessary range.
 - b. Range. The range of tactical air power is such that it can extend to, and even into, the strategic arena. Within a theatre

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of operations any target is open to attack by air power.

- c. Speed. Tactical aircraft possess great speed. In a theatre of operations, particularly in Europe, most targets can be reached within an hour's flying time.
- d. Flexibility of Roles. Most aircraft can be readily reconfigured in order to perform a variety of roles.
- e. Flexibility of Firepower. Aircraft can carry a variety of weapons and deliver a tremendous volume of firepower. Weapons available for air delivery range from a psychological warfare leaflet through to nuclear weapons.
- f. Mobility. Aircraft can be strategically moved to a theatre of operations with relative ease. Within the theatre they can quickly shift air power from one location to another.
- g. Quick Reaction. The range, speed and mobility of aircraft means that they can be in action in a very short time.

2. Limitations. Notwithstanding its capabilities, tactical air power has certain limitations:

- a. Vulnerability to Enemy Action. Aircraft are vulnerable to enemy action while on the ground. This risk has been significantly reduced by the installation of hardened shelters, base dispersal and by maintaining a percentage of aircraft on constant alert. Destruction or damage to air bases may impede the conduct of air operations. As well, enemy air defences can be expected to take a toll of friendly aircraft, regardless of the effectiveness of air defence suppression systems.
- b. Weather and Darkness. These factors will degrade tactical air support, although technology has made great strides in overcoming these problems. Developments in inertial systems, radar, infra-

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red and light intensification have given the latest tactical fighter aircraft the capability for night or day interdiction, reconnaissance and counter air missions, regardless of weather conditions. CAS, at night, will continue to be difficult, primarily because of control problems.

- c. Availability. Cost, complexity and demand will limit the availability of aircraft. This limitation can be partially overcome by establishing priorities and by adhering to them.

1303. PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT

1. Command of the Air. The first aim of an air force is to win general air superiority. It is not an end in itself; it is the means of gaining freedom of action to allow armed forces to impose their will upon the enemy. Without air superiority, few land operations can be brought to a successful conclusion.
2. Offensive Employment. Offensive employment, through the exercise of initiative and surprise, is a principle for the use of any weapon. Only offensive action achieves decisive results. Air weapons, with their capability to mass and accurately deliver a concentration of fire against targets from widely dispersed locations, allow objectives to be achieved in minimum time. Speed, manoeuvrability, deception and innovative tactics will surprise the enemy and frequently overcome a numerically superior force.
3. Centralized Command and Control. Any command system should be designed to use the full capabilities of the force concerned. Those forces whose mission or capabilities transcend the responsibilities and boundaries of a particular formation should remain under the central direction of a higher authority. Control of tactical air must be retained at the highest level which can effectively task air units. Execution of missions should be

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done on a decentralized basis. As well, at any given level of command, the land commander should deal with only one air commander.

1304. THREAT

In addition to the air threat outlined in the preceding chapter, aircraft operating beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) will encounter multiple, complementary and redundant layers of air defence. Potential enemy air defence systems range from large numbers of simple, vehicle-mounted, manually-aimed, heavy machine guns, through radar directed, anti-aircraft artillery, to a full spectrum of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. The SAMs, many of them highly mobile, have engagement patterns which provide mutual support and overlapping coverage of the forward battle area from extremely low altitude up to altitudes above those where attack missions operate.

Section 2 - Command and Control

1305. GENERAL

Tactical air support operations may be carried out independently, or in conjunction with other air and army forces, to achieve a common objective. When operations are conducted in support of ground forces, the air plan must be established in consultation with the ground commanders.

1306. ORGANIZATION OF THEATRE AIR FORCES

1. General. Under the theatre air commander there are normally three main functional commands;

- a. Theatre Airlift Force,
- b. Theatre Air Defence Force, and
- c. Tactical Air Force(s).

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2. See Figure 13-1 for a diagrammatic view of the organization of theatre air forces in relation to other theatre forces.




Figure 13-1 Organization of Theatre Air Forces

3. Theatre Airlift Force. The theatre airlift force provides intra-theatre air transportation. It works directly under the control of the theatre air commander and provides air transportation for all services in accordance with the priorities that are established by the theatre commander.

4. Theatre Air Defence Forces. A recent development in theatre air organization has been the introduction of a separate air defence force. Air defence was previously the responsibility of tactical air forces, but the increasingly difficult air defence problem, and the requirement to integrate air defence with overall theatre operations, indicated the need for an independent organization. The air defence force controls all air defence activities within the theatre.

5. Tactical Air Force. A tactical air force is the offensive support element of the theatre air force. Tactical air forces, in the pure sense,

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exist only with NATO forces in Europe. Elsewhere, their place has been taken by composite air forces which normally have the following elements:

- a. a reconnaissance element, consisting of tactical and fighter reconnaissance aircraft;
- b. an air defence element, consisting of radar control and reporting facilities, interceptor fighter squadrons and SAMs;
- c. a tactical bomber element, to conduct offensive counter air operations, AI and on occasion, pre-planned CAS;
- d. a tactical fighter element, to conduct counter air, AI, CAS and reconnaissance tasks; and
- e. an air transport element, consisting of tactical transport, both fixed and rotary wing, for intra-theatre logistical lift.

6. There may be one or more tactical air forces in a theatre depending upon the size of the theatre, enemy air and ground strengths, dispositions and other factors. Usually, there is a tactical air force for every army group. To achieve a close operational relationship between ground and air forces, the army group/tactical air force headquarters will be collocated and they will jointly man an operations centre.

1307. TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN NATO

1. There are three tactical air forces committed to NATO:
 - a. 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (2 ATAF), composed of Belgian, Dutch, British and German units;
 - b. 4th Allied Tactical Air Force (4 ATAF), composed of Canadian, American and German Units; and
 - c. Allied Air Force Southern Europe, composed of Portuguese, Greek, Turkish, Italian and American Units.
2. Traditionally, 2 ATAF has supported Northern Army Group and 4 ATAF has supported Central Army Group. Both tactical air forces report to Allied

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Air Forces Central Europe, which is the theatre air force headquarters of the central European theatre of operations.

1308. BASIC AIR/GROUND ORGANIZATION

An air/ground organization, where the highest tactical headquarters is at army group/ATAF/naval task force level, is illustrated in Figure 13-2.




FIGURE 13-2 — BASIC AIR/GROUND ORGANIZATION

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1309. COMMAND, CONTROL AND LIAISON AGENCIES

1. Theatre Headquarters Level. The following control agencies will normally be found at theatre level:

- a. The Joint Planning Staff. This staff prepares contingency plans to implement the policy of the theatre commander. These plans designate the forces which will be controlled at theatre level and allot resources to subordinate commanders.
- b. The War Room. This is the centre of information on current operations.
- c. The Joint Reconnaissance Intelligence Board. This agency coordinates and assigns priorities for the air reconnaissance requirements of the three services.
- d. The Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre. This centre is responsible for providing intelligence from the results of air reconnaissance. It also includes imagery interpretation facilities.
- e. The Air Transport Control Movement Centre. This centre coordinates and assigns priorities for air transport support in accordance with the general guidance provided by the theatre commander. It also coordinates the movement of externally controlled air transport into, and out of, the theatre.
- f. Other agencies may be formed at theatre headquarters if required. They include a Joint Intelligence Committee, a Joint Signals Board and a Joint Movement Coordinating Committee.

2. Formation Headquarters Level. The following control agencies will usually be found at formation level.

- a. Joint Command Operations Centre (JCOC). The JCOC controls current operations at joint force headquarters level. Its functions are:

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- (1) to provide information on which the commander(s) can formulate joint policy;
 - (2) to prepare plans for joint action to implement policy; and
 - (3) to coordinate action with that of externally controlled forces.
- b. The JCOC will normally review operations, information on enemy positions and intentions, and future plans on a daily basis. As well, the JCOC will:
- (1) allocate the air effort to counter air, AI, tactical air transport and OAS by sorties, percentage of capability, or by general priorities;
 - (2) review requests for pre-planned offensive air and transport support;
 - (3) allot air effort to subordinate land formations; and
 - (4) select secondary targets to be engaged by aircraft which are unable to attack their primary targets.
- c. Air Command Operations Centre (ACOC). The ACOC is the air force tasking agency of the JCOC. The ACOC is capable of control, direction and tasking of all air operations, however the functions of specific operations are normally delegated to subordinate tasking agencies such as the air defence and air transportation operations centres.
- d. Allied Tactical Operations Centre (ATOC). ATOCs have tactical control of the forces allocated by the ATAF. Their functions are to:
- (1) conduct tactical planning in coordination with the Air Support Operations Centres (ASOCs);
 - (2) task flying units; and

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(3) direct execution of immediate OAS missions to flying units and coordinate details with assigned agencies.

- e. Air Support Operations Centre (ASOC). This agency, located at corps HQ, coordinates requirements for OAS and tasks the reconnaissance and attack aircraft allotted to it by the ACOC. Its composition will vary according to the scale and variety of forces involved. The tactical air force will provide officers for tasking aircraft, target evaluation, weapon analysis and meteorological advice. The corps will provide staff officers who have the formation commander's authority to allot priorities for support according to the tactical situation. Naval representation will be included, if naval aircraft are involved.
- f. Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). The TACP is an air support control agency provided at land force formation headquarters at which there are no air force tasking agencies. TACPs are usually provided at divisional, brigade and battalion level. Their task is to provide air advice, coordinate air movement in the forward area, take control of OAS aircraft at designated points and direct CAS as required.

3. Liaison/Control. The following types of specially trained officers are employed in the control of aircraft, or, on liaison duties associated with OAS missions:

- a. Air Liaison Officers (ALO). These are air force officers assigned to land formation headquarters. They function as the principal air advisor to the commander and staff of the assigned formation.
- b. Ground Liaison Officers (GLOs). These are army officers appointed to represent land forces at attack and reconnaissance

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aircraft airfields, on aircraft carriers and at some air force headquarters. Carrier-borne GLOs (CBGLOs) and air reconnaissance LOs (ARLOs) are specialized GLOs.

- c. Forward Air Controllers (FACs). The primary responsibility of the FAC, who can be an officer from any service, is to direct the action of aircraft engaged in CAS. The FAC operates from a forward position, either from the ground or the air.

Section 3 - Counter Air/Air Interdiction/Tactical Air Transport Operations

1310. COUNTER AIR OPERATIONS

1. General. Counter air operations are designed to gain and maintain a favourable air situation to the degree that enemy air forces are prevented from interfering effectively with sea, land and air operations. They include offensive and defensive strikes against any element of the enemy's air capability in the air or on the ground. They are primarily mounted to destroy, disrupt or limit air power as close to its source as possible.
2. Counter air operations will be the predominant role of tactical air forces in the initial stages of a battle against an enemy with an effective air force. The maintenance of a favourable air situation will probably require the continuation of counter air operations on varying scales throughout subsequent phases of battle.
3. Categories of Counter Air Operations. The categories of counter air operations are:
 - a. Offensive Counter Air Operations. These include; attacks by bomber and ground attack aircraft on enemy airfields, aircraft on the ground, missiles sites, units of the control and reporting system, and supporting installations.

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- b. Defensive Counter Air Operations. These are commonly termed air defence. See Chapter 12.

1311. AIR INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

1. These are missions that are flown deep in the rear of the enemy. They aim to impede or restrict the movement of enemy forces, reinforcements and supplies in the enemy's area of operations.
2. It is more economical to locate and attack targets such as armour, road transport, or fuel supplies at their source, or when travelling along the lines of communication, than it is to locate and attack them deployed in battle areas. AI, therefore, will likely be concentrated in the enemy's rear areas. Targets will include communication centres, bridges and main supply routes. Normally railways will present the most lucrative targets for air attack but, in less developed theatres, their place may be taken by motor, river, or even human transport.
3. Daylight attacks will force the enemy to increase movement during darkness. AI operations should therefore be conducted on a 24 hour-a-day basis.

1312. TACTICAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

1. Airlift operations provide for the air movement of personnel, supplies and equipment into, out of, or within a theatre by rotary or fixed wing transport aircraft. Tactical operations involve the provision of airlift for;
 - a. airborne and airmobile operations,
 - b. logistical airlift,
 - c. casualty evacuation, and
 - d. special missions.

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Section 4 - Offensive Air Support Operations

1313. GENERAL

1. OAS operations are conducted in direct combat support of ground forces. They include CAS, BAI and TAR missions.

2. OAS Planning Lines. The following planning lines are used in OAS operations:

- a. Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT). This is a line which indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any military operation at a specific time. FLOT information is provided to OAS units via the assigned GLO or ARLO.
- b. Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). This is a line established by the appropriate ground commander to ensure coordination of fire not under his control, but which may affect current tactical operations. Supporting land, sea and air forces may engage targets beyond the FSCL without prior coordination with the ground commander, provided that the attack will not produce adverse surface effects short of the line. Attacks against surface targets, short of the FSCL, must be coordinated with the appropriate ground force commander. Assigned GLOs/ARLOs also provide FSCL information to supported air units.
- c. Reconnaissance Interdiction Planning Line (RIPL). This is a line established at ATAF/army group level. It is coincident with the corps line of intelligence and planning responsibility (the forward edge of the area of influence). Short of the RIPL, the corps commander has the primary responsibility for nominating

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targets which have a direct bearing on the land battle (BAI). AI missions are flown forward of the RIPL as jointly planned by the ATAF/army group. Such missions may also be flown short of the RIPL, if coordinated with the appropriate corps commander.

NOTE: See Figure 13-3 for diagrammatic view of OAS planning line relationships.




Figure 13-3 OAS Planning Line Relationships

3. OAS Planning Concept. The basic planning concept for OAS is continuous dialogue and coordination between appropriate land and air headquarters. A typical planning flow is outlined below:

- a. The theatre air commander allocates his conventional attack resources by function (OAS, counter air, AI) in accordance with the guidelines established by the theatre commander. The conventional attack resources are then apportioned by the ATAFs in consultation with army groups, with OAS sorties being made available to the corps commanders.

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- b. Army group commanders determine the priorities for the allocation of the OAS effort to each of their corps having considered the threat and organic resources available to each formation.
- c. Once the ATAF commanders have received the air directive and have determined the apportionment of effort, army groups will present them with plans and intentions including corps OAS sortie priorities. The ATAFs examine their ability to match these requirements, and then in conjunction with army groups, determine OAS sortie allocations.
- d. The attack resources within the allocation of OAS will be used in either CAS or BAI. These air resources will normally be employed between the FLOT and the RIPL.
- e. For planning purposes, the ATAF and army group further agree on the division of OAS effort into aircraft for immediate alert and pre-planned sorties.
- f. Army groups then advise their corps/ASOCs of the allocation and ATAFs direct their air bases/units accordingly, normally through a subordinate tasking agency called an ATOC. The ASOCs are then formally advised via an ATOC tasking order.
- g. CAS and BAI sortie priorities will be established by corps. Exceptionally, an army group commander may wish to give a BAI target a priority or coordinate a BAI target across corps/army group boundaries.
- h. As the battle develops the army group commander may require additional OAS resources. If such resources are not available, he may adjust his own OAS allocation after consulting with the ATAF.

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- j. The ASOC has direct contact with army fire support agencies and is responsible for ensuring that OAS is employed effectively.

The land force commander at corps level and below should consult with his air representative (ASOC commander, ALO, or FAC as appropriate) on all matters concerning OAS. Corps/ASOCs must keep their army group/ATAF up-to-date on their BAI planning activities. This will ensure coordination with all other air activity in the area.

4. Requesting OAS. Requests for OAS may be initiated at any land level of command. ALOs, TACPs, FACs at their respective echelon of command advise and assist in the transmission of requests for OAS. The two types of air request are:

- a. Pre-planned. These requests are initiated well in advance of a foreseen requirement. They are normally passed up through the land forces command net to the JCOC level. The request is reviewed and approved or denied at each army higher command echelon.
- b. Immediate. These requests are normally passed up to the ASOC on the air request net. Requests are monitored at each army higher command echelon and they are deemed approved unless monitoring headquarters intervene within a specified time.

NOTE: See Figure 13-4 for a simplified view of pre-planned and immediate air request procedure.

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


Figure 13-4 Pre-Planned and Immediate Air Request Procedure

1314. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

1. General. CAS is air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces. It requires detailed integration of each air mission with the manoeuvre of those forces. The firepower and mobility of aircraft in the CAS role can make an immediate and direct

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contribution to the land battle. When targets in the area are inaccessible or invulnerable to the available surface-based weapons, they may be within the capability of attack aircraft. Furthermore, it may not always be possible to achieve the desired concentration of fire on some targets unless the firepower of both surface-based weapons and CAS aircraft is effectively integrated. Augmentation of the firepower of surface forces by CAS can contribute decisively during breakthroughs, counter-attacks, enemy assaults and surprise attacks. CAS is particularly important to offset shortages of surface firepower during the critical landing stages of airborne, airmobile and amphibious operations.

2. Control and Coordination. Approval of CAS requests is given by the higher command level's fire support coordination agency, either by passing on the request (pre-planned) or by silence (immediate). If approved by the JCOC, the mission will normally be flown under the control of an FAC, but there may be circumstances where procedural control, without an FAC, is used.

1315. BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION

1. General. BAI is air action directed against enemy forces and resources that are in a position to directly influence land operations, but which are not yet directly engaged. BAI missions thus provide the ground commander with an important means of attacking the enemy in depth throughout the area of influence.

2. BAI is used to isolate the enemy first echelon from his reinforcements and reserves, disrupt his resupply system and generally restrict his freedom of action. Missions are flown against targets located on either side of the FSCL. Unlike CAS missions, which must be integrated with the ground commander's manoeuvre plan, BAI missions are only coordinated in joint planning. Compared with AI, BAI contributes directly

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to the land battle in the short term, whereas AI contributes indirectly over a longer term.

3. Considerations. Joint planning of targets is required to ensure the effective use of BAI missions. Examples of BAI targets include armour, vehicles, troops, road junctions, bridges, major weapon sites, etc. Planning for targets prior to the outbreak of hostilities will be especially valuable. During operations, immediate BAI requirements may be satisfied by using aircraft on ground or airborne alert or by diverting airborne aircraft. If possible, CAS aircraft should have a planned BAI target which could be attacked if the CAS mission cannot be performed or if the aircraft is diverted.

1316. RELATIONSHIP OF CAS, BAI, and AI

Figure 13-5 helps to explain the relationship between CAS, BAI and AI.

	Close Air Support	Battlefield Air Interdiction	Air Interdiction
Target	Directly affecting friendly operations		Indirectly bearing on friendly operations
Area	In contact or close proximity to friendly forces	Either side of FSCL, but not close proximity to friendly forces	Beyond FSCL
Coordination Requirements	Detailed integration with manoeuvre of surface forces	Joint planning/coordination	
		at ASOC/corps level	above ASOC/corps level
Control	Positive or procedural control	No control required	

Figure 13-5 Relationship of CAS, BAI and AI

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1317. TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE

1. General. TAR is the acquisition of intelligence in support of armed forces operating on land. It aims to provide timely and accurate tactical information on the location, composition, activities and movements of enemy forces. It is also used to determine the results of air attacks or strikes. Additionally, there may be a requirement for TAR over friendly territory, especially after a nuclear exchange when communications are likely to be inadequate. TAR may be conducted on specific pin-point targets, areas, or lines of communication.

2. Categories of TAR. TAR missions fall into one of three categories, depending on the planning time available:

- a. Reconnaissance Programme. These missions are assigned and planned as completely as possible during peacetime to provide for a rapid response in various military contingencies.
- b. Pre-Planned Missions. These are missions tasked in advance of operations. They specify targets and allow more time for gathering target information and selecting optimum tactics.
- c. Immediate Support Missions. These are missions provided to meet specific requests which arise during the course of the battle. Planning is compressed in order to give a rapid response.

3. Types of Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance can be divided into three basic types; visual, imagery and electronic.

- a. Visual. This is the quickest method of gathering intelligence from a reconnaissance aircraft. Information is passed while the aircraft is still in flight so as to reach the requestor as quickly as possible.
- b. Imagery. Permanent record imagery is obtained through conventional photography and infra-red and radar sensors.

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Photographic techniques may be vertical, oblique (forward or side facing) or panoramic, depending upon the position of the camera relative to the target. Infra-red line scan is a passive reconnaissance sensor that provides a record of thermal radiation from the terrain and from objects on the terrain. Side-looking airborne radar is an active, all weather sensor which records radar imagery from the ground. Normally, when imagery means are used, only the intelligence information gleaned from the mission is forwarded to the requestor, rather than the imagery itself.

- c. Electronic. Tactical electronic reconnaissance systems are used to passively detect, locate and identify enemy radars and to update the enemy electronic order of battle.

Section 5 - Related Activities

1318. SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENCES (SEAD)

1. Targets with a high priority for destruction by friendly fighter ground attack will naturally be those for which the enemy has a high priority for preservation. Such targets will likely be well defended. The enemy can be expected to employ a mixture of early warning/acquisition radar, fire control radar, anti-aircraft and SAMs. Air superiority cannot be achieved unless SAM suppression is carried out. As reliable air support to the ground commander cannot be effected until local air superiority is gained, it is imperative that suppression be carried out prior to the conduct of CAS missions.
2. SEAD must be considered an integral part of OAS and not as a separate element. Although it is primarily an air force responsibility, the ground commander should contribute to SEAD in support of CAS missions when

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possible. In some instances, it may be possible to employ attack helicopters on this task.

1319. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS

1. Nuclear arms development has resulted in the availability of smaller sized, low-yield weapons which can be used in tactical air operations. The various types of weapons available and their effects provide a wide range of options to a commander. In general, nuclear weapons may be applied to tactical operations in much the same manner as other weapons with due regard for their increased destructive power and unique effects such as nuclear radiation.

2. NATO relies on nuclear weapons for deterrence both in the ultimate and escalating sense. Because of their politically sensitive nature, the decision to employ such weapons in tactical air operations would be made at the highest national political level.

1320. SPECIAL MISSIONS

1. Electronic Warfare (EW). EW activities of all three services should be mutually supporting to enhance effectiveness and to avoid mutual interference. EW aircraft may be provided in support of land operations.
2. Other Special Missions. Aircraft may be provided in support of special operations associated with clandestine and psychological warfare.

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CHAPTER 14

REAR AREA SECURITY AND DAMAGE CONTROL

Section 1 - Introduction

1401. GENERAL

1. The Rear Area. This is the geographic space within a command where the majority of the combat support and combat service support functions are performed. This area is usually to the rear of combat areas. The rear areas normally include division rear, corps rear and the communications zone (COMM Z).
2. Rear Area Security (RAS). This consists of those measures taken to minimize the effects of an enemy attack. It may be conducted prior to, during and after enemy action. Air defence is a vital element of RAS, however, as the doctrine for this function was presented in Chapter 12, it will not be discussed further in this chapter.
3. Rear Area Damage Control (RADC). This consists of those measures taken to minimize damage due to hostile action, or natural or man-made disasters. It attempts to preclude damage and to aid in the continuation or restoration of combat operations and service support activities.

1402. THE REAR AREA THREAT

1. The threat in the rear area is extensive. It includes sabotage by fifth columnists, infiltration by long-range patrols, major enemy penetrations, the employment of scatterable mines, attacks by tactical aircraft and nuclear strikes. The potential enemy can be expected to make liberal use of chemical munitions. He has a significant amphibious capability which in certain theatres of operations will pose problems in the rear areas. The enemy will be particularly active in operations which are

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designed to sever or disrupt lines of communication because of their potential impact in the forward areas. In addition to the broad range of threats likely to be encountered, special attention should be paid to the airmobile/airborne threat.

2. Airmobile/Airborne Assault. This type of assault is the most serious conventional threat to the rear areas. The potential enemy is capable of mounting up to divisional size airmobile/airborne assaults, although targets are normally assigned to regimental or battalion size forces. Targets such as vital ground, key terrain, major logistical and administrative installations, nuclear delivery means, bridges, etc will be attacked throughout the rear areas. Link-up with ground forces, or extrication, would take place within two to three days.

1403. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. The salient features of the concept of operations for RAS and RADC are as follows:

- a. Rear area threats cannot be ignored; they must be countered. As a minimum, RAS operations must keep the enemy off balance and preclude him from conducting successful operations. RADC operations must strive to minimize the effects of enemy attack or man-made disasters.
- b. RAS and RADC must be planned and conducted in similar fashion to any other military operation.
- c. The responsibility for both tasks is combined at all levels. At theatre level, in the COMM Z, the responsibility is that of the host nation national command, or the theatre army area commander. At corps level, the responsibility normally lies with the commander of the corps service command (COSCOM) and at divisional level, it normally lies with the commander of the divisional service group (DISGP).

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- d. Each commander is responsible for the entire rear area at his respective level of command. For example, the commander of the DISGP is responsible for the total divisional rear area, not just the divisional administrative area. Sub-areas of responsibility may be allocated. Lodger units, regardless of parent command, are responsible to the rear area commander, insofar as RAS and RADC are concerned.
- e. A rear area security and damage control centre (RASDCC) is established at each rear area commander's headquarters to exercise control over RAS and RADC.
- f. Combat service support units are normally only responsible for their own self-defence, although they may be required on occasion to provide quick reaction forces to deal with low-level threats outside of their unit areas, eg, a small enemy patrol. Major RAS tasks must be handled by combat forces. RADC is normally conducted by technical personnel, possibly working in conjunction with indigenous civilian agencies and labour forces.
- g. For each particular task or operation a task force is assembled. The size and nature of the task force will vary depending upon the threat. Whenever possible, full use should be made of civilian, para-military and service units in order to free combat troops for front-line duty.
- h. On occasion, RAS operations may be too large for the security force to deal with them. In such cases, the formation commander may group additional forces with the rear area commander, or, he may consider the threat serious enough to incorporate it into the main battle.

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Section 2 - Planning

1404. GENERAL

1. Planning for RAS and RADC is initiated at theatre level. Theatre headquarters will issue broad policy guidance, particularly with respect to channels of communication, host nation responsibilities and coordination requirements. The theatre commander assigns RAS and RADC responsibilities in the COMM Z to the theatre army area commander(s) if a host nation(s) does not have this responsibility.
2. At corps and divisional level, commanders will estimate the threat to the rear area at each stage of an operation and will group combat forces with the rear area commander as deemed appropriate. Commanders of COSCOMs and DISGPs, or their deputies, will then prepare their own plans in conjunction with the commander of the grouped combat forces based on formation orders. Operations will be controlled through the respective RASDCCs.
3. Task force commanders will prepare their plans and units within the rear area will prepare for their own self-defence. All units will normally be required to provide reconnaissance and relief teams or quick reaction forces on an on-call basis in accordance with standard operating procedures (SOPs) and the RAS and RADC plans.

1405. ORGANIZATION OF A RASDCC

1. Corps. The individual responsible for detailed control of RAS and RADC is known as the RASDC Officer. He is responsible to implement the policies of the commander COSCOM and to keep him informed of the situation. In order for him to carry out his duties the RASDCC is organized into four sections as shown in Figure 14-1.

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


Figure 14-1 Corps Level RASDCC

- a. Rear Area Security Operations Section. This section controls the activities of those units/forces designated for RAS tasks. It also controls the activities of RADCO units/elements which may be activated for RAS purposes.
 - b. Intelligence and Plans Section. This section has the responsibility of collecting intelligence and preparing contingency plans. The section is manned with officers with expertise in intelligence, nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, engineering functions, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), military police activities, etc.
 - c. Administration and Logistics Section. This section provides service support to the centre.
 - d. Rear Area Damage Control Operations Section. This section provides planning, supervision, inspection and command and control for area damage control task forces when activated.
2. Division. At divisional level, the RASDCC is a small cell composed of several officers and intelligence support staff. The RASDCC may be augmented by other elements of the DISGP on an as-required basis.

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1406. DETAILED PLANNING OF RAS

1. Responsibilities of Formation Commanders. Formation commanders will assess the threat to their rear areas and will prepare RAS and RADC plans accordingly. These plans follow the format of an operation order and are issued as annexes to the formation operation order.

2. In grouping forces for RAS, the formation commander considers the threat, his concept of operations and the extent and nature of essential security tasks. Troops for RAS may be drawn from the following sources;

- a. combat units of the formation; at corps level, particularly the Armoured Cavalry Brigade Group and the Corps Mechanized Brigade Group, and at divisional level, particularly the Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment,
- b. units provided by higher formation,
- c. higher formation units in location or in transit,
- d. combat support and combat service support units in location, particularly replacement holding units and military police elements, and
- e. indigenous para-military forces (subject to legal status).

3. Responsibilities of Rear Area Commanders. Rear area commanders are responsible for the entire formation rear area. Although much of the detailed planning is done by the RASDCC in conjunction with the grouped security forces, the rear area commander should:

- a. provide a concept of operations;
- b. sub-divide the area of responsibility as appropriate;
- c. state major and/or vital tasks;
- d. group forces;
- e. issue coordinating instructions;
- f. advise command and control arrangements; and
- g. specify unique service support details.

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4. Responsibilities of RAS Task Force Commanders. Task force commanders are responsible for the implementation of the RAS plan. They reconnoitre assigned areas to determine the key terrain to be defended, the location of installations, likely enemy drop zones and landing areas, and assembly areas. Based on intelligence and other information, commanders familiarize themselves with the capabilities of insurgency forces and the enemy airmobile/airborne assault potential. Based on their reconnaissance and study of the enemy's capabilities, together with a consideration of troops available and the mission, commanders develop their own battle plans.

5. Major components of the plan include:

- a. surveillance of the entire area of responsibility;
- b. counter attack of airborne or airmobile forces;
- c. counter guerrilla activities;
- d. control of the civilian population in conjunction with CIMIC authorities;
- e. protection of critical rear installations and lines of communication;
- f. the detailing of alert and warning systems; and
- g. contingency plans for all likely tasks, including:
 - (1) relief and rescue of attacked installations and units;
 - (2) route patrolling and convoy protection;
 - (3) surveillance of possible assembly areas for guerillas or infiltrators;
 - (4) defence of drop and landing zones; and
 - (5) finding, fixing and destroying enemy forces operating in the rear area.

6. Plans should make the maximum use of helicopters and other available aircraft to maintain air patrols between observation posts (OPs), road

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blocks and defensive positions and to airlift elements of the reserve to engage enemy forces or to reinforce units in contact. Plans must provide for rapid reaction in all likely contingencies.

7. RAS task force commanders must coordinate with:

- a. Units in Location. While units are responsible for their own local security, task force commanders must coordinate with them and assist them in defence planning. Liaison must be maintained to advise these units of the situation and to obtain information concerning enemy activity in their area.
- b. Intelligence and CIMIC Agencies. These agencies will provide valuable intelligence on enemy capabilities and intentions. CIMIC agencies will advise on the status and capabilities of indigenous forces and resources.
- c. Air Force and Air Defence Units. These units will be a vital source of early warning information on enemy air and airmobile operations.

8. The RAS task force commander must establish a responsive early warning system which incorporates primary and alternate means of communication. All rear area units and installations must be integrated into the communication networks. Reporting procedures should be established which provide for communications checks at frequent intervals employing both primary and alternate means. Provision should be made to contact those stations which do not report at the prescribed time. This can be done by stand-by air or ground units.

9. The RAS task force commander may establish a series of defensive positions. If the area is too large for this method, sub-units may be assigned surveillance sectors which they cover with OPs and mobile patrols, while a large highly mobile reserve is maintained centrally for deployment

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to any part of the area of responsibility. OPs are used to maintain observation over routes, installations, drop and landing zones. If the area is very large, it may be necessary to divide the reserve into groups and locate them at key points. The RAS force commander, however, must retain control of all reserve groupings so that he may employ them separately or in mass.

10. A unit escorting convoys through threatened areas usually employs its main strength in the forward part of the formation, while maintaining a sizeable reserve to deal with problems if the forward element is committed. The escort force will make provision for all-around security. Air patrolling of routes will normally allow for a more rapid movement of convoys.

11. RAS plans must provide for the prompt integration of transitting or lodger units. Communication and liaison arrangements will be major concerns.

1407. DETAILED PLANNING OF RADC

1. General. RADC plans are prepared in a similar sequence to those of RAS. Rear area units furnish personnel, equipment and specialized assistance as prescribed in formation/unit SOPs modified as necessary by the current RADC plan.

2. RADC measures provide for, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:

a. Prior to an Attack

- (1) clear lines of authority and responsibility down to the lowest level;
- (2) communications and a warning system(s) for the reporting of nuclear detonations, radio-active fallout, and biological and chemical attacks;

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- (3) proper dispersion within and between installations;
- (4) preparation of plans and procedures, to include reporting of information required for post-strike analysis;
- (5) organizing, equipping and training of personnel in RADC operations;
- (6) appropriate use of cover and concealment;
- (7) allocation, organization and full utilization of available transportation nets and equipment, to include alternate plans; and
- (8) deception measures.

b. During and After an Attack

- (1) the restoration of operations at damaged, high priority installations;
- (2) rapid assessment of the damage and its immediate effect on operations;
- (3) control of personnel and traffic, either in coordination with the local civilian authorities, or, by the military alone, when such control is essential for the continued conduct of operations and the civilian police are inoperative;
- (4) route reconnaissance and clearance;
- (5) fire prevention and fire fighting;
- (6) first aid and casualty evacuation;
- (7) warning and protection against chemical, biological and radiological hazards;
- (8) emergency supply of food, clothing and water;
- (9) explosive ordnance reconnaissance and disposal;
- (10) initiation of salvage operations; and

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- (11) decontamination of vital areas contaminated with radio-active material or chemical or biological agents.

1408. RAS AND RADC TASK FORCE CONSIDERATIONS

1. RAS and RADC task forces are developed from military and, when possible, indigenous elements. The commander must consider all available resources before establishing task force structures.
2. Local police and other para-military elements will frequently be available for employment on RAS and RADC tasks. Early clarification of the positions, responsibilities and authority of these elements in emergencies will reduce possible confusion and/or duplication. Special consideration for their employment should include the following:
 - a. Designated elements must be responsive to the demands of the task force commander.
 - b. Caution must be exercised in the assignment of indigenous elements to tasks requiring specialized equipment or skills. Commanders may be required to provide selected items of equipment and conduct training to ensure such elements are capable of responding in a chemical, biological and radiological environment.
 - c. The impact of using local civilian resources must be carefully assessed, particularly as it affects the viability and tranquility of the indigenous population. Critical resources which cannot be totally depleted for RAS and RADC include;
 - (1) medical personnel and facilities,
 - (2) police elements,
 - (3) public transportation facilities,
 - (4) stocks of food, clothing, and
 - (5) shelter.

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d. Guerrilla forces, which have been uncovered in enemy occupied territory, may be assigned RAS tasks. These forces are adapted by experience and training for use in counter guerrilla operations.

e. Use of local military, para-military, or civilian forces must be cleared through appropriate CIMIC and/or legal agencies.

3. The size and number of task forces will depend upon the nature of the threat, the size of the rear area, available forces and the concept of operations. Task force compositions may have to be readjusted as the threat materializes. Other considerations are:

a. Task forces must be manageable within the command and control capabilities available in the area.

b. In large areas, task forces may have to be divided to ensure adequate response time.

c. Task forces should be no larger than necessary because they represent a drain on the energy and resources of the area.

Activation of RAS and/or RADC elements in combat service support units will likely degrade their ability to fulfil their primary mission.

d. The provision of aviation support will reduce the size of task forces.

e. Task forces must be prepared to act while they are being deployed. They cannot wait until the arrival of the slowest component element. For example, an enemy force may be found and fixed at an early stage in the operation, with subsequent destruction occurring when the bulk of the countering force is assembled.

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- f. Whenever possible, RAS elements should not be earmarked for RADC duties, and vice versa, as both tasks will frequently occur simultaneously.

Section 3 - Conduct

1409. GENERAL

1. The successful conduct of RAS and RADC is largely contingent upon the receipt of early warning. Generally the more quickly the threat is apprehended, the easier it is to deal with and the least effective it will be. Information on a potential threat may come from the RASDCC, air force and air defence units, any rear area unit, elements of the task force, or from local civilian agencies.

2. Following the receipt of early warning, a typical sequence of events might include:

- a. immediate notification of the threat to the RASDCC with onward transmission to formation headquarters, higher administrative command and adjacent rear areas as appropriate, based on the significance of the threat;
- b. early confirmation by the element in contact as to the size, nature and intentions of the enemy threat;
- c. dissemination of warning to likely targets and the implementation of increased readiness by self-defence forces;
- d. maintenance of contact by the reporting element and local efforts made to fix the enemy;
- e. the detailing of forces by the task force commander to fix the enemy, if necessary, and to destroy him - this to be achieved without compromising the overall security mission;

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- f. detailed forces conduct normal tactical action to destroy the enemy;
 - g. the RASDCC to be kept informed of all significant developments; and
 - h. the RASDCC monitors situation and advises concerned agencies accordingly (RAS and RADC operations may affect the civilian population, military police activities, communications, re-supply convoys, units transitting the area, etc.)
3. A large number of RAS and RADC tasks may occur simultaneously. It is therefore important that forces be employed judiciously. Reserves should be reconstituted whenever possible. Task force commanders requiring additional resources should state their requirements as early as possible.

1410. SPECIAL TASKS

1. Protecting Lines of Communication. The techniques of guarding lines of communication vary with the terrain, road and rail net, length of the lines of communication and the type of enemy activity expected. The following techniques form the basis of plans to secure lines of communication.
 - a. If lines of communication are short, subordinate units of the RAS task force may be assigned areas of responsibility. Small security forces are placed on dominating terrain features overlooking likely enemy approaches along the route. The commander maintains a centrally located and highly mobile reserve to counter enemy threats that may develop.
 - b. If the lines of communication are long and must be guarded over a great distance, both flanks of the route are covered by a series of OPs to warn of enemy approach. The remainder of the RAS force may be employed to patrol the line of communication and escort

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vehicles moving through the area, or, it may be positioned as small reserves at locations along the line of communication. The security force commander must control reserve groupings so that he can employ them singly or in mass. Contingency plans must be prepared to commit the reserve in areas of enemy activity.

Helicopters may be employed to increase the mobility of dismounted elements of the reserve or to provide early warning.

2. Protecting an Installation. An installation in the rear area may be of such importance as to warrant protection beyond the capability of the local commander operating the installation. Additional forces should be attached to the local commander for this purpose. As an alternative, the commander of the RAS forces may be charged with the responsibility of the installation defence.

3. Security Against Airborne Attack, Airmobile Attack, and Guerilla Operations. When protecting a rear area against enemy airborne/airmobile attack or guerrilla operations the commander deploys his troops to best counter the enemy threat. He establishes OPs to view likely drop zones and landing areas where these forces may assemble. He dispatches necessary patrols in the area. Whenever possible, a small reserve is retained in a central location, prepared to move rapidly to any part of the area. When the size of the area and the lack of troops preclude the holding of a reserve, threatened areas are reinforced by security forces which are located in proximity to the threatened area and which are not actively engaged with the enemy.

4. The key to success against airborne or airlanded forces is rapid deployment and the placing of maximum fire on the airborne or airmobile forces during the early phases of the landing. Consequently, rapid movement

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to attack enemy forces is of paramount importance and piecemeal commitment may be required.

5. Action against forces conducting guerrilla operations includes defensive actions to prevent or minimize their effectiveness and offensive actions to destroy them. These forces must be detected early, taken under fire and attacked rapidly to destroy them.

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CHAPTER 15

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

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CHAPTER 16

CIVIL - MILITARY COOPERATION AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT

NOTE: A Canadian concept for Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) has not yet been developed. However, a CIMIC study has been commissioned for 1983 and this study should provide a concept from which doctrine can be developed and presented. Consequently, Chapter 16, which follows this note, is not official doctrine. It is an educated guess as to what Canadian doctrine might be. It is based primarily on STANAGs and US military publications modified as necessary by a Canadian perspective. Chapter 16 may be used as a professional study reference pending publication of formal doctrine.

Section 1 - Introduction

1601. GENERAL

1. CIMIC is concerned with the relationship between allied armed forces and indigenous authorities and population. It includes all actions jointly taken by military commanders and national authorities, in peace and in war, which have a bearing on that relationship.
2. The CIMIC authority of military commanders will vary depending upon the situation. The three broad environmental categories of CIMIC are:
 - a. Friendly Territory. The degree of CIMIC in a friendly territory is normally limited by an agreement between the concerned parties. When an adequate civil administration exists, the commander may limit his CIMIC activities to maintaining proper relations between his forces and the local inhabitants and the procuring or utilizing of local resources to support his military operations. The CIMIC activity level in friendly territory is generally low.

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- b. Liberated Territory. The level of activity increases in liberated territory as a number of public functions such as transportation, utilities, etc., may have to be re-established. The territory liberated by military operations should be returned to the control of the appropriate central government as soon as that government is able and willing to assume responsibility for the administration of the area. Until that time, the commander administers the area in accordance with the dictates of international law and bearing in mind the inherently friendly disposition of the populace.
- c. Occupied Territory. For occupied territories, CIMIC activities are performed on behalf and in support of the established military government. The commander of an occupying force has the right, within limits set by international law, to demand and enforce such obedience from the inhabitants of an occupied area as may be necessary for the accomplishment of his mission and the proper administration of that area.

1602. OBJECTIVE

- 1. The objective of CIMIC is to contribute to the defence of allied and occupied territory and population. As well, effective CIMIC has the strategic value of indicating to potential adversaries that Canada and her allies can quickly harness their full national strength in support of a flexible strategy.
- 2. The objective is achieved through mutual assistance and support between military commanders and national authorities in order to make optimum use of military and civilian resources. If properly utilized, the economic, political and industrial base of the nation can contribute significantly to allied defence efforts.

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1603. ACTIVITIES

1. The major activities undertaken in support of CIMIC are:
 - a. provision of civilian support for, and prevention of civilian interference with, tactical and logistical operations;
 - b. provision of, or support for, the functions of government for a civilian population;
 - c. maintenance of effective community relations;
 - d. conduct of military civic action programmes;
 - e. participation in a population and resource control programme; and
 - f. support of civil defence.

1604. PRINCIPLES

1. CIMIC should be based on the following principles:
 - a. CIMIC is a function of command. All commanders must have an appreciation of their responsibility in this field.
 - b. Allied forces, located in the territory of an allied nation, should enjoy the same legal protection as the national armed forces of that country. All legislative action to this effect should be taken prior to the deployment of troops.
 - c. Agreements and arrangements concluded in peace should be based on forecasted operational requirements.
 - d. Allied forces should give assistance to national authorities on condition that:
 - (1) the national situation has important ramifications for common defence;
 - (2) the conduct of military operations will not be compromised; and
 - (3) the form of assistance is mutually agreed upon.

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- e. In concluding agreements and arrangements, allied military negotiators should ensure that freedom of action is retained in those areas in which it is impossible to coordinate action.
- f. Hostilities will invariably result in numerous pressing and unforeseen problems. Commanders must be prepared to deal with CIMIC situations in a forthright and flexible manner.
- g. Whenever possible, CIMIC is effected through, and with, existing or re-established civilian authorities.

1605. CONCEPT

- 1. The salient features of the CIMIC concept are:
 - a. Allied national governments retain full sovereignty over their territories and population. Allied forces must therefore deal with national armed forces who normally plan and conduct CIMIC on a territorial basis.
 - b. CIMIC is planned and conducted as a joint military - civilian effort. Military commanders must assume the initiative for CIMIC activities. Detailed CIMIC planning is carried out by the G/J 5 staff branch.
 - c. CIMIC is established in peace and caters to the contingencies of war. It may not be possible to effect CIMIC after the outbreak of hostilities if the infrastructure is not already in place.
 - d. The Army will normally be assigned responsibility for CIMIC because of its unique ability to control the ground and the populace.
 - e. The theatre commander will normally retain some CIMIC authority such as liaison at the national government level and the negotiating authority for international agreements. He will delegate authority to subordinate commanders as appropriate and

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he will define to what extent and degree this authority may be sub-delegated. All delegations of authority must be accompanied by the transmission of appropriate policy guidance, orders and instructions.

- f. Within a theatre of operations it will be normal to establish a theatre CIMIC command, particularly in those theatres which encompass more than one country. The political structure, the physical features of the theatre and the military situation may dictate the need for regional CIMIC commands. Where possible, these are established in consonance with political boundaries.
- g. CIMIC organizations range in size from platoons to brigades. They are command and control elements only. Each CIMIC unit is uniquely established with functional teams assigned in accordance with the anticipated requirement. A CIMIC battalion in the communications zone (COMM Z) may therefore range in size from a skeletal organization providing advice and liaison, to a large organization capable of supporting or performing civil functions for a medium-size city, small province or comparable political entity. A CIMIC battalion, supporting a tactical formation such as a corps, may also range in size from a small unit with liaison responsibilities to a major organization with companies and platoons attached to divisions and brigades respectively.
- h. The main categories of CIMIC functional teams are; governmental, economic, public facilities and cultural (arts, monuments and archives, religious relations, etc.) These functions are carried out by individually designed functional teams, operating either on an area basis or in support of tactical formations.

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- j. CIMIC units in support of tactical formations perform recurring operations and move with the formation being supported. In a fluid situation they will normally initiate only limited emergency activities in an area. The continuation or extension of these activities will be carried out by those CIMIC units which are assigned to areas on a more static, permanent basis.

Section 2 - Planning and Conduct of CIMIC Activities

1606. GENERAL

1. Because national governments retain sovereignty over their territory and population, allied forces conducting operations in those countries have the status of guests. Allied forces must therefore make all of their contacts for support through the national military commanders of host nations.
2. Many aspects of CIMIC are primarily legal in nature or have a legal basis. Therefore commanders should ensure that their operations and activities are planned and conducted with appropriate legal counsel.
3. All commanders must ensure that local territorial defence authorities are kept informed of the military situation and of operational plans. This information should be sufficient to permit the national authorities to make their own plans and to ensure optimum support of military operations.
4. It is imperative that subordinate commanders cultivate and maintain an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence with local national authorities. Disagreements should be referred to higher headquarters for resolution.
5. In the event that local national or civil authorities are unable to discharge their responsibilities, they may request assistance from allied

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commanders. In response to such a request, the allied commander may attach forces to the national territorial commander or assume operational control of available national forces. Every effort must be made to revert to normal relationships as quickly as possible.

1607. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1. The operational environment of CIMIC is determined by the following factors:

- a. National Infrastructure. This will range from highly developed with complex political, economic and social systems to developing or underdeveloped with only rudimentary political, economic and social systems.
- b. Duration. This will range from several years or decades pending resolution of major political, economic or military problems, to operations prompted by transitory emergency situations of short duration.
- c. Location. The location may be friendly, liberated or occupied territory.
- d. Public Opinion. The population may be openly hostile and resentful, apathetic, or enthusiastic and loyal.
- e. Military. Forces may range in size from small liaison agencies to large tactical formations. Weapons may be restricted to conventional arms or may involve the unlimited use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
- f. Legal. The legal basis may be an express provision of national law, international agreement or international law.
- g. Civilian Agencies. These may be able to fulfil governmental functions themselves or they may assist the military to do so.

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1608. CIVILIAN PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR

1. Civilian preparedness for war is primarily a national responsibility. Its objectives are:

- a. survival of the population;
- b. support of military operations;
- c. production and utilization of vital resources; and
- d. early recovery and rehabilitation of the country.

2. The ultimate success of military operations will depend upon the national will. Unless the civilian population is prepared to sustain the strain of war and is convinced that adequate measures have been taken for their protection, the psychological repercussions in wartime might be disastrous.

1609. CIMIC RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Theatre Level. The theatre commander may be required to:

- a. define and issue policy guidance;
- b. negotiate agreements and arrangements with host nation military authorities;
- c. ensure command and staff preparedness for wartime tasks;
- d. establish and maintain liaison with civil agencies;
- e. encourage and monitor status of civilian preparedness for war;
- f. reconcile differences occurring at formation level; and
- g. perform some or all of the functions normally exercised by the local government.

2. Formation Level. Subordinate commanders must take the initiative in CIMIC. In particular they are to:

- a. plan national/civil support of their operations and prepare CIMIC annexes to their operation orders and contingency plans as applicable;

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- b. be prepared to take action to safeguard the civilian population and to prevent it from interfering with military operations, should the measures instituted by the national authorities prove insufficient; and
 - c. render to the national authorities such assistance as may be requested, consistent with the military situation.
- 3. CIMIC Units. CIMIC unit commanders must:
 - a. furnish the supported formation with information, estimates and recommendations pertaining to CIMIC activities;
 - b. plan and supervise the training and operation of their own units including assigned functional teams; and
 - c. command attached CIMIC units.
- 4. All Units. All unit commanders retain a general responsibility for CIMIC and must ensure that their units are trained and prepared to participate in related support activities.

1610. FUNCTIONAL TEAMS

- 1. General. CIMIC functional teams vary in size and capability depending upon the requirement. These teams are made up of individuals who are technically qualified to advise or supervise each of the various functions which comprise the normal range of societal activities.
- 2. Each function is related to every other function to a certain extent, therefore, there must be careful coordination between teams. In addition, there is a requirement for extensive liaison with other military units, particularly those of intelligence, military police, medical, psychological, communications, construction and supply.
- 3. Governmental Functions. These functions deal with matters involving governmental activity or control, political activities, review and correction of actions of civil authorities in accordance with competent

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directives, and implementation of policy decisions. Their purpose is to promote or restore governmental stability. Governmental functions include;

- a. civil defence,
- b. labour (indigenous manpower),
- c. legal services,
- d. public administration,
- e. public education,
- f. public finance,
- g. public health,
- h. public law and order, and
- j. public welfare.

4. Economic Functions. These functions are concerned with the economic structure of the area as a whole. Their purpose is to develop direct support for the military effort from local resources and to discharge the commander's economic responsibility to the civil population and its government. The economic functions include:

- a. civilian supply,
- b. economics and commerce,
- c. food and agriculture, and
- d. property control.

5. Public Facilities Functions. These functions are concerned with the supervision and control of facilities such as water, gas, waste disposal, electrical and other power systems, communications and transportation. Their purpose is to introduce, or restore and operate such facilities.

6. Cultural. These functions are concerned with people, their rights, culture, religion, protection and control. They have special significance not only because of requirements under international law, but because of the

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profound effects they have on people's attitudes and allegiances. These functions include;

- a. cultural property (art, monuments and archives),
- b. public information (see Article 1613),
- c. displaced persons, refugees and evacuees, and
- d. religious relations.

7. Tailoring of Functional Teams. As a basis for estimating the number and types of functional teams required for an operation, the following should be considered;

- a. the type of CIMIC operation and the degree of control required,
- b. support available from non CIMIC units,
- c. number, size and density of population centres,
- d. attitude of the population,
- e. nature of economy (industrial, agricultural) and degree of economic development,
- f. governmental structure and stability,
- g. history of the area,
- h. accustomed standard of living, dietary habits and health conditions,
- j. labour potential and civilian supplies available,
- k. monetary stability,
- m. language of the area,
- n. religious entities, and
- p. extent of public communications, transportation and services.

1611. POPULATION MOVEMENT CONTROL

1. General. NATO maintains a "stay-put" policy that requires each country to do everything in its power to stop refugee movement within their own country and especially across international boundaries.

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2. In peace and war national authorities retain full responsibility for their civilian populations unless otherwise arranged for by special agreement.

3. Should uncontrolled movements of refugees occur, allied commanders must cooperate with and assist national authorities in preventing such movements from interfering with military operations. Commanders may assume control of population movements, if requested to do so by national authorities, or, in an extreme emergency. Such control should be handed back to national authorities as soon as possible.

4. All actions taken with respect to refugees must be in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the Hague Land Warfare Conventions and other rules of international law.

5. Responsibilities of National Authorities. National authorities should:

a. plan and implement measures for the:

- (1) enforcement of the "stay-put" policy;
- (2) evacuation of the civilian population (if necessary for its survival);
- (3) evacuation of dependants of their personnel living in other countries;
- (4) repatriation of foreign workers and other foreign nationals as bilaterally agreed;
- (5) control and security screening of refugees; and
- (6) accommodation, logistical support and protection of evacuees and refugees;

b. coordinate all national planning for the evacuation of the civilian population and the movement of evacuees and refugees with the allied commanders concerned; and

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- c. inform allied commanders about the population movement situation and associated matters.
- 6. Responsibilities of Allied Commanders. Allied commanders shall:
 - a. assist national authorities in their planning for the evacuation of the civilian population, dependants of their personnel and for the control of refugees;
 - b. on request, assist national authorities in the implementation of the above plans, insofar as they are compatible with the operational situation;
 - c. on request of the national authorities, assume or relinquish control of the civilian population;
 - d. keep national authorities up-to-date on the operational situation; and
 - e. provide national authorities with information concerning the adverse effects of the refugee situation on the preparedness or operations of the allied forces under their command.
- 7. Note. Assumption of direct control is a last resort to ensure the safety of the population and the conduct of operations. Allied commanders must inform the higher allied authority should they assume direct control of the civilian population.

1612. DAMAGE CONTROL

- 1. General. Damage control is a national responsibility except for those installations, facilities, transportation routes and communications systems utilized by allied forces. Such resources are the responsibility of the appropriate allied commander.
- 2. Planning and conduct of damage control operations must be carefully coordinated between allied forces and national authorities to ensure the optimum use of resources. Allied commanders should take the initiative in this regard.

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3. Assistance. Damage control assistance will be required in:

- a. the linking of allied forces and installations to the national civil or military warning systems for air, nuclear (including fallout), biological and chemical attack;
- b. fire fighting;
- c. clearance of vital streets and roads;
- d. restoration of essential telecommunication facilities;
- e. recovery and treatment of casualties;
- f. institution of public health measures for preventing or restricting epidemics and accidents;
- g. policing of damaged towns in order to prevent panic, looting and accidents;
- h. restoration of essential public utilities; and
- j. decontamination.

1613. PUBLIC INFORMATION

1. General. Public information is concerned with coordinating the operation of public and private communication media and assisting, directing or supervising the preparation and distribution of news through private and public agencies. Public information seeks to:

- a. assist in the provision of operations security;
- b. win and/or maintain public support for military operations (psychological consolidation); and
- c. maintain public morale through the provision of guidance, direction and news.

2. Concept. The degree to which public information is controlled will normally be a politically sensitive issue. The degree of control will depend upon; the political guidance provided by allied authorities and the host nation, the type of conflict, the operational environment and the

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military situation. A public information concept might include the following main features:

- a. A public information policy would be issued at theatre level based on political guidance detailed in a CIMIC agreement.
- b. Joint civil-military planning would usually occur at all levels. Control of public information in the combat zone (CZ) would normally be exercised by the senior military commander as here security requirements would be paramount. Control in the communications zone (COMMZ) would normally be the prerogative of the host nation national authorities.
- c. In the CZ the senior military commander, in conjunction with his public information advisor and host nation national (civil and/or military) information officers, would develop a public information policy by judiciously balancing the military requirement of security with the legitimate public need for information.
- d. The military commander would establish a joint information agency. Such an agency, headed by the commander's public information advisor would contain both military and civilian representation. It would include CIMIC, intelligence and psychological operations staff.
- e. The joint information agency would develop the commander's general policy into a detailed plan which would be issued as an annex to the formation operation order. This plan would deal with the following matters;
 - (1) status of media resources within the area,
 - (2) procedures for the accreditation of media representatives,
 - (3) censorship guidelines,

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- (4) authorities for the release of public information,
 - (5) timings/location of media briefings,
 - (6) control of the movement of media representatives including the detailing of restricted areas, and
 - (7) provision of administrative support to media personnel.
- f. In the COMMZ similar plans would be developed under the auspices of the host nation national authorities. Military representation would be included in national and/or allied information agencies.

Section 3 - Military Government

1614. GENERAL

1. The establishment and conduct of military government is one of the most demanding and challenging tasks that can be assigned to a commander. The task encompasses the spectrum of societal activities and calls for skills not normally associated with military undertakings.
2. This section of the chapter will only introduce the subject of military government. The planning for and conduct of this task will require the expertise of military and civilian specialist staffs and will be subject to the limitations imposed by international law, national law and other agreements.

1615. THE NATURE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1. A military government is a form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative and judicial authority over occupied territory. It is established and maintained for governing occupied enemy territory and allied or other territory recovered from an enemy unless this territory is the subject of a CIMIC agreement, or until the rightful authority is able to assume power.

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2. The authority of the occupying power is supreme over the occupied territory and population. Within the limits of international law, it may exercise the functions of government and exclude the local authorities. The intensity and extent of control will vary with circumstances and policy. Performance of some governmental functions by authorities of the previous government is not inconsistent with a military occupation, so long as the power to exercise supreme authority in the territory is maintained by the occupying power.

3. A military government is headed by a military commander who is appointed military governor. He exercises supreme authority over the civil population in accordance with the laws of war and directives received from his government or his superior.

4. Territory is considered occupied when troops have taken firm possession of such territory for purposes of holding it. The number of troops necessary to maintain the authority of the occupying power will depend on the density of the population, its degree of subservience, the nature of the terrain and similar considerations. It is not necessary that troops be physically present in all quarters of the occupied territory at all times. It is sufficient that the occupying force can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to any district to make its authority felt when necessary. A mere proclamation that certain areas are occupied, a so-called "paper occupation", is not sufficient; troops must be capable of exercising physical control throughout the area.

1616. BASIC PRINCIPLES

1. There are many basic principles applicable to the establishment of military government. They include:

- a. International law requires the occupying power, so far as it is able, to maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory.

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- b. No nation may expect to gain a lasting victory from modern warfare without taking into account the future activities and orientation of the enemy civil government and population.
- c. A military government cannot be improvised; it must be planned. As it is not a permanent regime, plans must be made from the outset for the transfer of power to civil authority.
- d. To be effective, military government must act as both the instrument and, if adequate guidance has not been provided, the creator of foreign policy.

1617. LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENT

- 1. General. The general principles of international law and applicable international agreements must be observed in the conduct of military government. The most important treaty provisions on the conduct of belligerent occupation are to be found in the Hague Convention (Law and Customs of War on Land 1907) and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 1949. CIMIC personnel must have a thorough understanding of this latter agreement since it is one of the primary legal sources governing the conduct of relations with the populations of belligerent and occupied territories.
- 2. Respect for Existing Law. By the terms of the Hague Convention the occupying power must respect the existing law "unless absolutely prevented" from doing so. Penal laws may be repealed or, suspended only in cases where they constitute a threat to the occupying power's security or an obstacle to the application of the Geneva Convention, ie, those penal laws which are in conflict with the humanitarian principles of the convention.
- 3. Treatment of Population. Under the Geneva Convention, fair, just and reasonable treatment of the population of occupied areas is required. In order to achieve political, economic and military objectives, it is

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important that the inhabitants do not become future enemies or permanent liabilities. Further, just treatment encourages the support and cooperation of the inhabitants and thereby reduces the burden of the occupying power. This policy does not prohibit punitive and disciplinary measures essential to good order, but it does forbid recourse to capricious or unnecessarily harsh treatment.

4. A "protected person" may be generally defined as a national of a country which agreed to the Geneva Convention of 1949 and who is currently under the governmental control of a party to a conflict or an occupying power of which they are not a national. No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and all measures of intimidation or terrorism are prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and their property are forbidden as is the taking of hostages. The importance of the recognition of human rights such as respect for persons and property rights, the sanctity of marriage, the inviolability of the home and freedom of religious worship cannot be over emphasized.

5. Protection of Cultural Property. Cultural property is that property of great importance to the heritage of a people. It includes monuments of architecture, art or history, archaeological sites, buildings which are of historical or artistic interest, works of art, manuscripts, books, scientific collections, archives, or reproductions of the above described property. Buildings used for cultural or religious purposes are also included.

6. Armed forces are bound to refrain from any use of cultural property and its immediate surroundings for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage, and to refrain from any act of hostility directed against such property. These obligations may be waived only in cases where

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military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver. Armed forces must also undertake to prohibit, prevent and if necessary put a stop to any form of theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against cultural property or religious edifices.

7. Publication of Regulations. The Geneva Convention of 1949 also provides that: "The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power shall not come into force before they have been published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language. The effect of these penal provisions shall not be retroactive". Accordingly, proclamations, ordinances, orders and instructions intended to be binding upon the inhabitants will be published in written form, both in English and in the language(s) of the inhabitants and dated. All such regulations addressed to the inhabitants are to be given the widest feasible publicity within their area of application.

1618. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. In addition to exercising the normal functions of government, commanders may have to establish policies and procedures on the following matters:

- a. apprehension and treatment of suspected war crime offenders,
- b. restricted zones,
- c. curfew restrictions,
- d. food rationing and distribution,
- e. proclamations,
- f. firearms control,
- g. identification papers,
- h. laissez-passer,
- j. employment of labour,
- k. right of assembly,

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- m. control of vehicles and other mechanical equipment,
- n. control of media resources, and
- p. currency and black market controls.

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PRINCIPLES OF WAR - COMPARATIVE TABLE

SER	NATO	CANADIAN ARMY	BRITISH ARMY	AMERICAN ARMY	GERMAN ARMY	RUSSIAN ARMY
1	Human Factors	Maintenance of Morale	Maintenance of Morale		Leadership	Morale
2	Selection and Maintenance of the Aim	Selection and Maintenance of the Aim	Selection and Maintenance of the Aim	Objective	Resolute Action	
3	Freedom of Action				Freedom of Action	
4	Concentration of Effort	Concentration of Force	Concentration of Force	Mass		Concentration
5	Economy of Force	Economy of Effort	Economy of Effort	Economy of Force		Economy of Force
6	Mobility			Manoeuvre		
7	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise (Deception)	Surprise and Deception
8	Intelligence					
9	Simplicity			Simplicity	Simplicity	
10	Maintenance of Forces					
11	Flexibility	Flexibility	Flexibility		Flexibility	Manoeuvre and Initiative

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ANNEX A

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SER	NATO	CANADIAN ARMY	BRITISH ARMY	AMERICAN ARMY	GERMAN ARMY	RUSSIAN ARMY
12	Cooperation	Cooperation	Cooperation		Cooperation	Combined Arms
13	Sustainability	Administration	Administration		Logistic Support	
14	Security and Protection	Security	Security	Security	Reconnaissance and Security	
15	Aggressive Action	Offensive Action	Offensive Action	Offensive		Offensive
16						Advance/ Consolidation
17						Adequate Reserves Annihilation
18					Risk Tasking	
19					Mutual Under- standing	
20				Unity of Command		

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ANNEX A

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ANNEX B

RELEVANT STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS

STANAG 2014	Operation Orders, Warning Orders and Administrative/Logistic Orders
STANAG 2079	Rear Area Security and Rear Area Damage Control
STANAG 2091	Population Movement Control
STANAG 2868	Land Force Tactical Doctrine (ATP 35A)
STANAG 2969	Command and Control of Armed Land Forces
STANAG 2994	Allied Publication on Command and Control
STANAG 3680	NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions for Military Use (AAP-6)
STANAG 3700	NATO Tactical Air Doctrine (ATP 33A)
STANAG 3736	Offensive Air Support Operations (ATP 27B)
STANAG 3805	Doctrine and Procedures for Air Space Control in the Combat Zone

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MEMORANDUM

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2910-CFP 300 (DLCD 4)

09 Feb 82

Capstone Manual ☐ Author (LCol Acreman)

INPUT TO CFP 300 - NORTH AMERICAN
REGIONAL DEFENCE

Ref: Telephone conversation Acreman/Diebel of 10 Dec 81

In accordance with the reference conversation please
find attached suggested text for the revision of CFP 300.

T.J. Kaulbach
for T.J. Kaulbach
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L.M. Diebel, Maj/2-8550/jm
Enclosure

Feb 82

CFP 300 REVISION

PROPOSED TEXT

NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL DEFENCE

Reference: CFP 300 Writing Plan, Chapter 6, Section 5

CANADA-US REGIONAL DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS

GENERAL

1. Early in World War II Canada and the United States agreed that in all probability a threat to either nation in North America would simultaneously threaten the other nation. In this light, it was obviously important that arrangements be made for the integration of defence of the maritime approaches, the airspace and the continental land mass of North America. Until the creation of NATO these activities were pursued as bilateral undertakings. Subsequent to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, regional defence activities were fitted into the overall NATO structure, ie, North America is one of the major areas of the Alliance. Currently regional defence activities are in fact bilateral while a somewhat "cosmetic" link or tie into NATO is carefully maintained.

ORGANIZATION

2. In the absence of an immediate overall regional threat and in contrast to other major areas of the NATO Alliance (eg, Central Europe), Canada and the US have not developed a regional command structure. There is no Commander-In-Chief North America nor is there a joint-combined HQ. Important decisions must be agreed between the nations, either government to government or, more frequently, between

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the military forces of both countries. To facilitate this three high level committees exist:

- a. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD).
A bilateral civilian and military body which advises the Canadian Prime Minister and the US President on military and civilian measures for North American defence.
- b. The Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee (CANUS MCC). A joint bilateral military committee which advises the CDS and the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on regional defence matters. The Committee also provides the day to day coordination of high level bilateral activities. The most important of these is the preparation of operational plans.
- c. The NATO Canada-US Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG). The membership of this agency is the same as the CANUS MCC. The role of Group is to relate Canada-US regional defence to the overall NATO structure. It completes the structure of NATO in the Western Hemisphere.

DEFENCE PLANS

3. Agreed arrangements for integrated defence are contained in the following important documents:

- a. Canada-US Basic Security Plan (MCC 100/....).
Developed by the MCC and approved by the CDS and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this is the de facto North American General Defence Plan.

.../3

- 3 -

- b. Canada-US Regional Defence Group, General Defence Plan (CUSRPG CDP). This document relates bi-lateral activities to NATO. Drafted by the CUSRPG it is approved by the Military Committee at NATO HQ.
- c. Supporting Plans. Prepared in response to the Basic Security Plan, supporting Plans are developed jointly by designated US and Canadian commanders (eg, Commander FMC, Commander US Readiness Command) or agencies; they outline procedures for dealing with the threat in each of the environments: The more important supporting plans are:
 - (1) Commander-In-Chief North American Aerospace Defence Command's Operation Plan 3000
(OPLAN 3000)
 - (2) The Land Operations Plan (LANDOP)
 - (3) Naval Plans
 - (a) Maritime Operations Plan (EAST)
(MAREASTOP)
 - (b) Maritime Operations Plan (WEST)
(MARWESTOP)

PA-2 2910-CFP 300 (Darty) ←
~~2910-CFP 301~~

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

10 January 1982

Distribution List

WRITING PLANS

CFP 300 - THE ARMY

CFP 301 - LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

- References: A. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD)/301 dated 13 November 1981
B. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (Arty) dated 1 December 1981

1. An Artillery Doctrine Coordination Conference was held at CLFCSC Kingston from 11 to 15 January 1981. It was chaired by the Director of Artillery and the following were in attendance:

- a. DLR 2 (D Darty)
- b. SSO Arty, FMC HQ
- c. Comd, Arty School, CTC
- d. Senior Arty DS, CFCSC
- e. Senior Arty DS, CLFCSC
- f. DLR 2-3
- g. SO Arty Doc, FMC HQ


2. The purpose of this conference was as follows:

- a. To consider the writing plans for CFP 300 and 301 (Reference A) and to review the comments on that plan at Reference B.
- b. To draft CFPs 306(1) and 306(2).


.../2

- 2 -

3. The drafts of the 306 series will be further staffed by the SO Arty Doc, FMC HQ. The aim of this letter is to circulate the recommendations that were agreed on the writing plans for CFP 300 and 301 which are at Annexes A and B respectively.


H.R. Wheatley
Colonel
Director of Artillery

for Chief of the Defence Staff


H.B. Ransome-Williams, Maj/2-0426/jm

Attachments: Annexes A and B

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CTC Gagetown	(Attn: Comdt Arty School)
CFCSC Toronto	(Attn: LCol T.A.H. Sparling)
CLFCSC Kingston	(Attn: LCol C.J. Mialkowski)

Internal

DLCD 4
SO Arty

Annex A
to 2910-CFP 300 (DARTY)
dated 20 January 1982

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE
WRITING PLAN FOR CFP 300

<u>SERIAL</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>CHAP/SECTION</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	-	Chapter Outline	Chapters 10 and 11 (Airspace Control and Air Defence) should remain as separate chapters. NGFS should not be a separate chapter but included in CFP 301.
2	4	5. 1c and 1d	Although it is agreed that artillery formations need not be treated separately, they should be included in the organizational diagrams that will accompany this section.
3	4	4. 2e	This sub-para should be split into two. (Field Artillery (includes locating) and Air Defence Artillery).
4	10	10. 1a	Although the NATO term is Control and is acceptable at this level of document, this sub-para should make it clear that the national term is Co-ordination.
5	11	11. 2b-f	The correct terms are as follows: b. Area Missiles (High Level) c. Area Missiles (Medium Level) d. Area Missiles (Low Level)

Annex A
to 2910-CFP 300 (Darty)
dated 20 January 1982

<u>SERIAL</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>CHAP/SECTION</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
			e. Point Missiles
			f. Point Guns
			It was agreed to delete "self defence" in front of "point missiles".
6	11	11. 3g	Delete "Management" and insert "Co-ordination".
7	11	11. 5	Delete Section 5 (included in Chapter 10).
8	12	12. 1k	Delete "SAM Suppression". The appropriate term at this level is "Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (JSEAD)".

Annex B
to 2910-CFP 301 (DARTY)
dated 20 January 1982

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE
WRITING PLAN FOR CFP 301

<u>SERIAL</u>	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>CHAP/SECTION</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	2	2. Part A 3g	This para should read "Corps Artillery" and artillery formations will be highlighted here.
2	4	2. Part C 3	Add new sub-para e "Point Missile Battery". This battery is under comd of the Bde Comd and not the CDA except for arty matters (Trg and policy).
3	5	3. 3 and 4	Arty formation HQs will be discussed under advisors para.
4	6	3. 5	Add new sub-para e "Advisors" to incl arty.
5	7	4	A recommended plan for this chapter is at Appendix 1 to this Annex.
6	9	5. 3e	Nuclear Fire Planning is the correct heading for this sub-para e. It includes nuclear target analysis.
7	11	6. 2h	Delete "The Appreciation", insert "The Estimate of the Situation".
8	11	6	Locating artillery should be shown in a source matrix, including artillery intelligence.
9	29	13. Part C 2	Add new sub-para "Fire Plan".
10	31	13. Part D 2	Add new sub-para "Fire Plan".

CHAPTER 4 - FIRE SUPPORT AND AIRSPACE CO-ORDINATION

SECTION	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	INTRODUCTION	401. General	Intro, aim, responsibility for FSC and ASC.
		402. FSCC	Elements Arty Supplement Ch 13.
		403. ASCC	Elements Arty Supplement Ch 12.
2	FIRE SUPPORT CO-ORDINATION	404. General	
		405. Allotment of Field Artillery	
		1. General	Includes locating artillery. Combination of comd and con terminology.
		2. Command Terminology	
		a. Under command	
		b. Under command for	
		c. Under command less	
		d. In location	
		e. With	
		3. Control Terminology	Principles - Allies Table in STANAG 2887 as Annex.

SECTION	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. General b. At Priority Call c. In Direct Support d. In Support 	
		4. Examples	
		406. Allotment of Air Defence Artillery	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. General 2. Command Terminology 3. Control Terminology 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. General b. Procedural c. Positive 	
		407. Allotment of Ammunition	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. General 2. Assessment of Requirement and Supply 3. Control 	
			To include examples.

SECTION	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
3	AIRSPACE CO-ORDINATION	408. Offensive Air Support	To be developed.
		409. Anti-Armour Support	To be developed.
		410. Fire Support Co-ordination Measures	
		1. General	Boundaries etc.
		2. Specific Measures	STANAG 2099.
		a. FSCC	
		b. NFL	
		c. FCL(?)	
		411. Fire Planning	
		1. General	DFs, Quick Fire Plans etc
		2. Fire Planning Process	
		3. Nuclear Fire Planning	
			To be developed from:
			- Arty Supplement Ch 12 ATP 40
			- Arty School - Div Arty All Phases of War - Oct

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B. L. O. O. herty

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National Défense
Defence nationale

PA 2910-CFP 300 TD 1327 (DMOT 2-2)

15 December 1981

Mobile Command Headquarters
St Hubert, PQ
J3Y 5T5

Attention: SSO CD Coord

WRITING PLANS
CFP 300 - THE ARMY

Reference: A. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD)/2910-CFP 301 dated 13 Nov 81

1. Further to the above Reference, the subject Writing Plan has been staffed for review within the Surgeon General Branch. The general consensus of the Branch review is that the plan is viable for the purpose intended.

C.J. Knight
Colonel

Director of Medical Operations and Training
for Chief of the Defence Staff

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National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

Quartier Général de la Défense Nationale
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0K2

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MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

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Writing Plan - CFP 300 - The Army

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DMOT 2
(through DPM)
R.V.

1. Ref has been reviewed by DPM.
2. The Plan is so general that specific comments are hard to formulate. The ref to "environmental considerations in the Chap 5, Sect 3, CSS discussion is open to interpretation. It is to be hoped that this will not be yet another dissertation on 'brown' versus 'green' CSS elements & try.
3. It is presumed that Chap 12, Sect 2 will incl a discussion of dedicated career arm resources.
4. There is no specific mention of NBCD, although this subj is quite prevalent in CFP 301.

2 Dec 81

Jamie Dowling
DPM 3
5-5205

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MEMORANDUM

2910-CFP 300 TD 1327 (DMOT 2)

24 Nov 81

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WRITING PLANS
CFP 300 - THE ARMY

Ref: A. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD) over 2910-CFP 301 13 Nov 81 (Copy encl)

1. The enclosed copy of Ref A is self explanatory. Addressees are requested to forward any comments/recommendations to DMOT 2 no later than 8 Dec 81.

G.H. Rice
G.H. Rice
LCol
DMOT 2
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
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1. Nil return or comment.



Helen F. Ott
Col
DNS
6-4016

07 December 81

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CFP 301 - LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

Ref: A. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD) over 2910-CFP 301 13 Nov 81 (Copy encl)

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DMOT 2

No comments on the writing plan however comment on text mentioning as per CFP 300 will apply. Required monitoring by whom?

25/11 *[Signature]*
OT 2.2

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CFP 301 - LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

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*The plan looks good.
No comment at this time.*

R.F.

OT 2-3

25 NOV 81

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P.A.

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CFP 300 - THE ARMY

CFP 301 - LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

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- References:
- A. Army Doctrine and Tactics Board SOPs issued under cover of NDHQ 2910-2 (CLDO) 30 May 80
 - B. Army Doctrine and Tactics Board Working Group Meeting, Lahr Germany 20-21 Oct 81

1. Enclosed please find a copy(s) of the writing plan for CFP 300-The Army and CFP 301-Land Formations in Battle. These writing plans have been forwarded for staffing in accordance with Reference A and the direction provided by Reference B.

2. CFP 300 and 301 are the "keystone manuals" of Army doctrine. All other Army manuals will subsequently be based on these two manuals. Primary inputs for the keystone manuals will be:

- a. ATP 35(A) (2nd Preliminary Draft) - NATO Land Force Doctrine;
- b. CFP 300 (Interim) - Conduct of Land Operations;
- c. CFP 301(1) (2nd Draft) - Formations in Battle;
- d. The Land Force Combat System Study distributed under cover of Secret FMC 3189-3-11 (CD) 5 Oct 81 and the operational concepts being developed from this study by NDHQ (DLCD 3); and the
- e. Army Combat Development Guide (Secret).

3. Reference will also be made to the ABCA Combat Development Guide (2000) (Secret), various related ATPs, STANAGs and staff colleges precis. Doctrinal references of major allies (UK, FRG, USA) will also be consulted

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
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4. Comments/recommendations are requested no later than 15 Dec 81. The keystone manuals author, LCol R.E. Acreman (Roger) can be reached at local 404. Comments should be directed to this Headquarters for the attention of SSO CD Coord.



T.F. deFaye
Lieutenant-Colonel
A/Deputy Chief of Staff Combat Development
for Commander Mobile Command

 Enclosure

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CFP 300 - THE ARMY

Preface

Chapter 1 - Canada and Its Armed Forces

Chapter 2 - The Nature of War

Chapter 3 - The Profession of Arms

Chapter 4 - The Operational Environment

Chapter 5 - Organization and Roles of the Army in the Field

Chapter 6 - International Military Organizations

Chapter 7 - A Theatre of Operations

Chapter 8 - Command in Battle

Chapter 9 - Staff Planning

Chapter 10 - Air Space Control

Chapter 11 - Air Defence

Chapter 12 - Tactical Air and Tactical Aviation

Chapter 13 - Communication Systems

Chapter 14 - Civil Military Cooperation/Military Government

Chapter 15 - Rear Area Security and Damage Control

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CFP 300 - THE ARMY (WRITING PLAN)

PAGE: 1

NOTE: Please make comments directly on this document where space allows

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
<u>Preface</u>				<p>a. <u>Aim.</u> To provide guidance on operations by the Army in the field.</p> <p>b. <u>Scope</u></p> <p>(1) Applicable to all levels of conflict.</p> <p>(2) Applicable to all levels of command in a theatre of operations.</p> <p>(3) Description of the politico-military interface.</p> <p>(4) Application of the principles/fundamentals of the conduct of military operations.</p> <p>c. <u>Context.</u></p> <p>d. <u>Terminology.</u></p>	Context will explain the relationship of CFP 300 to other manuals.
1	<u>CANADA AND ITS ARMED FORCES</u>	1	<u>National Objectives and Strategy</u>	<p>a. <u>National Objectives.</u></p> <p>b. <u>National Policy.</u></p> <p>c. <u>Foreign/Defence Policy.</u></p> <p>d. <u>Grand Strategy.</u></p> <p>e. <u>Military Strategy.</u></p>	<p>Terms are in a hierarchy. Grand strategy is said to be synonymous with alliance strategy (check definition Army Glossary).</p> <p>Refs: CSC 201/202 Defence in the Seventies CFP 165 CFP 300 (Interim)</p>

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
1 Cont'd		2	<u>The Army</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>The Legal Basis/NDA.</u> b. <u>The Army Role.</u> c. <u>The Organization for Control.</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> previous references and the NDA
2	<u>THE NATURE OF WAR</u>	1	<u>Conflict</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Characteristics of Conflict.</u> b. <u>Type of Conflict.</u> c. <u>Contemporary Peace (Detente/Cold War).</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> as above and ABCA CD Guide 2000
		2	<u>Military Power</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Characteristics of Military Forces.</u> b. <u>The Exercise of Military Power.</u> c. <u>The Employment of Military Forces.</u> 	
		3	<u>Principles of War (Canada)</u>	The ten principles of war as espoused by Canada.	CSC 201
		4	<u>Principles of War (Other)</u>	Eight additional principles enunciated by NATO.	ATP 35/ATP 35(A) - Land Force Tactical Doctrine Major power comparative chart to be included (will also include potential enemy principles of war)
3	<u>THE PROFESSION OF ARMS</u>	1	<u>Characteristics of the Profession</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Unique Character.</u> b. <u>Corporateness.</u> 	<u>The Profession of Arms</u> (Hackett) and various staff college compendiums on professionalism

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
3 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. <u>Knowledge.</u> d. <u>Self-Regulating.</u> e. <u>Concept of Service.</u> 	
		2	<u>Ethos of the Army</u>	<u>To be developed.</u>	Various background papers submitted in support of the Army Ethos Symposium and related texts such as <u>Crisis in Command</u> (Gabriel and Savage) - section will be brief
		3	<u>Leadership</u>	<u>To be developed.</u>	
4	<u>THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT</u>	1	<u>General</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Scope.</u> b. <u>Basic Considerations.</u> 	Previous references, particularly CSC 201/201
		2	<u>Elements of the Operational Environment</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>War Aims.</u> b. <u>Opposing Forces.</u> c. <u>The Theatre of Operations.</u> d. <u>Local Government and Population.</u> e. <u>Laws and Fortunes of War.</u> 	<p>Includes mention of the national will, terrain weather (physical environment)</p> <p>Include influence of NBCV, Geneva Convention and other International Protocols</p>

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
5	<u>ORGANIZATION AND ROLES OF THE ARMY IN THE FIELD</u>	1	<u>Formation Organization</u>	a. <u>General.</u>	will include organizational diagrams
				b. <u>Allocation of Forces.</u>	
				c. <u>Higher Formation Commands (Corps to Army Group).</u>	
				d. <u>Lower Formation Commands (Brigade to Division).</u>	
		2	<u>The Arms</u>	a. <u>General.</u>	roles, tasks, characteristics, employment
				b. <u>Basic Tasks.</u>	
				c. <u>Infantry.</u>	
				d. <u>Armour.</u>	
				e. <u>Artillery.</u>	
				f. <u>Engineers.</u>	
		3	<u>The Services</u>	g. <u>Signals.</u>	
				h. <u>Aviation.</u>	
				j. <u>Intelligence.</u>	
				a. <u>General.</u>	
				b. <u>Characteristics of Combat Service Support Elements.</u>	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
5 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. <u>Combat Service Support Units and Organizations.</u> d. <u>Control of Combat Service Support Activities.</u> e. <u>Environmental Considerations.</u> f. <u>Dispersion.</u> 	
		4	<u>Mobilization</u>	<u>To be developed.</u>	Based on MTF Study
6	<u>INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS</u>	1	<u>Combined Forces</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>International Alliances.</u> c. <u>Combined Forces Factors.</u> d. <u>Combined Forces Principles.</u> e. <u>Command and Control.</u> 	
		2	<u>NATO (General)</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Introduction.</u> b. <u>Civilian Organization.</u> c. <u>Military Committee.</u> d. <u>Major NATO Commands.</u> e. <u>Allied Command Europe.</u> 	<div style="border-left: 1px solid black; border-right: 1px solid black; height: 150px; margin: 0 auto; width: 20px;"></div> <p>to include organizational diagrams of ACE, APCENT</p>

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
6 Cont'd		3	<u>NATO (CEF)</u>		<div> </div> include organizational diagram and command relationship (peace and war)
		4	<u>NATO (CAST)</u>		
		5	<u>NATO (CANUS)</u>		
		6	<u>UN</u>	a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>The Nature of Peacekeeping.</u> c. <u>Basis of an International Presence.</u> d. <u>Command and Control.</u> e. <u>Cyprus - A Useful Example.</u>	Refs: CFP 165 CFP 300 (Interim)
7	<u>A THEATRE OF OPERATIONS</u>	1	<u>General</u>	a. <u>Area of War.</u> b. <u>Area of Operations.</u> c. <u>Theatre of War/Operations.</u>	<div> </div> CSC 202
		2	<u>Organization of a Theatre of Operations</u>	a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Organizational Principles.</u> c. <u>Organization of Subordinate Commands.</u>	Include diagram of territorial organization of theatre of operations

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
7 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> d. <u>Organization of the Combat Zone.</u> e. <u>Organization of the Communications Zone.</u> f. <u>Mutual Support.</u> g. <u>Command/Staff Structure.</u> h. <u>Numbered Armies/Army Groups.</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSC 201/202
		3	<u>Operational Considerations</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Offensive Operations.</u> c. <u>Defensive Operations.</u> d. <u>Retrograde Operations.</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSC 202
8	<u>COMMAND IN BATTLE</u>	1	<u>The Commander</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Leadership.</u> c. <u>Morale.</u> d. <u>Functions of the Commander.</u> 	<p>Stress the role of personality</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> include principle (philosophy) of Führen mit Auftrag

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
9	<u>STAFF PLANNING</u>	1	<u>Introduction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>The Staff System (Cdn).</u> c. <u>Planning Sequence.</u> 	<div style="border-left: 1px solid black; border-right: 1px solid black; padding: 0 10px;"> essentially as per CSC 202 including relevant annexes </div>
		2	<u>Understanding the Situation and Definition of the Aim</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Understanding the Situation.</u> b. <u>Definition of the Aim.</u> c. <u>Planning Guidance.</u> 	
		3	<u>Examination of the Factors</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Intelligence Factors.</u> c. <u>Logistical Factors.</u> d. <u>Personnel Factors.</u> 	
		4	<u>The Courses of Action</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Developing the Courses.</u> b. <u>Selecting a Course of Action.</u> 	
		5	<u>The Plan</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>The Joint Operations Plan.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
9 Cont'd		6	<u>The Theatre Campaign Plan</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Intelligence.</u> c. <u>Planning Considerations.</u> d. <u>Format.</u> 	essentially as per CSC 202 including relevant annexes
10	<u>AIRSPACE CONTROL</u>	1	<u>General</u>	a. <u>Introduction.</u>	
		2	<u>Responsibilities and Organization</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Responsibilities.</u> b. <u>Organization.</u> 	
		3	<u>Procedures</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Basic Considerations.</u> b. <u>Air Defence Operations.</u> c. <u>Flight Condition Factors.</u> d. <u>Control in a High Density Airspace Control Zone.</u> 	Refs: CSC 202 ATP 40 Relevant STANAGS
11	<u>AIR DEFENCE</u>	1	<u>The Threat</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Recce.</u> c. <u>Ground Attack.</u> d. <u>Airborne Operations.</u> 	CSC 202

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
11 Cont'd		2	<u>The Family of Weapons</u>	a. <u>General.</u>	CSC 202
				b. <u>High Level SAMs.</u>	
				c. <u>Medium Level SAMs.</u>	
				d. <u>Low Level SAMs.</u>	
				e. <u>Very Low Level SAMs.</u>	
				f. <u>Guns.</u>	
		3	<u>Command and Control</u>	a. <u>General.</u>	
				b. <u>Management of the Air Defence Battle.</u>	
				c. <u>Types of Defence.</u>	
		4	<u>Fire Control</u>	a. <u>General.</u>	
				b. <u>Hostile Criteria.</u>	
				c. <u>Weapons Control.</u>	
		5	<u>Airspace Control</u>	a. <u>General.</u>	
				b. <u>Geographical Control.</u>	
				c. <u>Target Assignment.</u>	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
12	<u>TACTICAL AIR AND TACTICAL AVIATION</u>	1	<u>Tactical Air</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Introduction.</u> b. <u>Principles for the Conduct of Tactical Air Operations.</u> c. <u>Tasks of Tactical Air Forces.</u> d. <u>Counter Air Operations.</u> e. <u>Air Interdiction.</u> f. <u>Air Recce.</u> g. <u>Close Air Support.</u> h. <u>Tactical Air Lift.</u> j. <u>Combat Air Support Functions.</u> k. <u>SAM Suppression.</u> m. <u>Nuc Weapons in Tactical Air Operations.</u> n. <u>Command and Control.</u> p. <u>Tactical Air Forces in NATO.</u> q. <u>Organization for Tasking and Liaison.</u> 	<p>Refs: CSC 202 ATP 27 ATP 33 Branch Study</p> <p>figure</p>
		2	<u>Tactical Aviation</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Introduction.</u> b. <u>Characteristics of Aviation Aircraft.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
12 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. <u>Roles and Tasks.</u> d. <u>Principles of Employment and Limitations.</u> e. <u>Command and Control.</u> 	
13	<u>COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS</u>	1	<u>Introduction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Principles of Communications.</u> c. <u>Methods of Communication and Their Characteristics.</u> 	
		2	<u>The Threat</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>EW.</u> b. <u>Interference.</u> c. <u>Conclusions.</u> 	CSC 202
		3	<u>Communications Within a Theatre of Operations</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Types of Signal Limits and Formations.</u> b. <u>Host Nation Communication Command.</u> c. <u>Theatre Communication Command.</u> d. <u>National Command Communications.</u> e. <u>Army and Airforce Operational Communications.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
13 Cont'd		4	<u>Theatre Electronic Warfare</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Staff Responsibility.</u> c. <u>EW Units.</u> 	Include glossary of signals terms as an Annex
14	<u>CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION/MILITARY GOVERNMENT</u>	1	<u>Introduction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Requirement for CIMIC.</u> c. <u>Objective and Concept of CIMIC.</u> d. <u>Principles of CIMIC.</u> 	
		2	<u>CIMIC Responsibilities of Commanders and Staff</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>CIMIC Responsibilities - Subordinate Commands.</u> c. <u>CIMIC Responsibilities - Army Group Commanders.</u> 	
		3	<u>Cooperation Between Allied Commanders and National Authorities</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Relationships and Responsibilities.</u> b. <u>Operational Planning.</u> c. <u>Civilian Preparedness for War.</u> d. <u>Areas of Cooperation Between Allied Commands and National Authorities.</u> 	CSC 202

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
14 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> e. <u>Security of Allied Forces.</u> f. <u>Use and Security of Communications.</u> g. <u>Maintenance of Law and Order and Government Control.</u> h. <u>Population Movement Control.</u> j. <u>Damage Control.</u> 	
		4	<u>Military Government</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>The Nature of Military Government.</u> b. <u>Definitions.</u> c. <u>Basic Principles.</u> d. <u>Limitations Imposed by International Law and Agreements.</u> 	
15	<u>REAR AREA SECURITY AND DAMAGE CONTROL</u>	1	<u>Introduction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Definitions.</u> b. <u>Agreements.</u> 	
		2	<u>Staff Responsibilities</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Commanders.</u> b. <u>HQ Staff.</u> c. <u>Unit Responsibility.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
15 Cont'd		3	<u>General Principles of Rear Area Security and Damage Control</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General Principles.</u> b. <u>Rear Area Security.</u> c. <u>Rear Area Damage Control.</u> 	CSC 202 STANAG 2079
		4	<u>Organization for the Execution of Rear Area Security and Damage Control</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Rear Area Operations Centre Organization.</u> c. <u>Rear Area Security and Area Damage Control Task Forces.</u> 	

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MEMORANDUM

2910-CFP 300 TD 1327 (DMOT 2)

24 Nov 81

Distribution List

WRITING PLANS
CFP 300 - THE ARMY

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Ref: A. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD) over 2910-CFP 301 13 Nov 81 (Copy encl)

1. The enclosed copy of Ref A is self explanatory. Addressees are requested to forward any comments/recommendations to DMOT 2 no later than 8 Dec 81.

G.H. Rice
G.H. Rice
LCol
DMOT 2
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G.H. Rice
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CFP 301 - LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

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- References:
- A. Army Doctrine and Tactics Board SOPs issued under cover of NDHQ 2910-2 (CLDO) 30 May 80
 - B. Army Doctrine and Tactics Board Working Group Meeting, Lahr Germany 20-21 Oct 81

1. Enclosed please find a copy(s) of the writing plan for CFP 300-The Army and CFP 301-Land Formations in Battle. These writing plans have been forwarded for staffing in accordance with Reference A and the direction provided by Reference B.

2. CFP 300 and 301 are the "keystone manuals" of Army doctrine. All other Army manuals will subsequently be based on these two manuals. Primary inputs for the keystone manuals will be:

- a. ATP 35(A) (2nd Preliminary Draft) - NATO Land Force Doctrine;
- b. CFP 300 (Interim) - Conduct of Land Operations;
- c. CFP 301(1) (2nd Draft) - Formations in Battle;
- d. The Land Force Combat System Study distributed under cover of Secret FMC 3189-3-11 (CD) 5 Oct 81 and the operational concepts being developed from this study by NDHQ (DLCD 3); and the
- e. Army Combat Development Guide (Secret).

3. Reference will also be made to the ABCA Combat Development Guide (2000) (Secret), various related ATPs, STANAGs and staff colleges precis. Doctrinal references of major allies (UK, FRG, USA) will also be consulted

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
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4. Comments/recommendations are requested no later than 15 Dec 81. The keystone manuals author, LCol R.E. Acreman (Roger) can be reached at local 404. Comments should be directed to this Headquarters for the attention of SSO CD Coord.



T.F. deFaye
Lieutenant-Colonel
A/Deputy Chief of Staff Combat Development
for Commander Mobile Command

 Enclosure

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CFP 300 - THE ARMY

Preface

Chapter 1 - Canada and Its Armed Forces

Chapter 2 - The Nature of War

Chapter 3 - The Profession of Arms

Chapter 4 - The Operational Environment

Chapter 5 - Organization and Roles of the Army in the Field

Chapter 6 - International Military Organizations

Chapter 7 - A Theatre of Operations

Chapter 8 - Command in Battle

Chapter 9 - Staff Planning

Chapter 10 - Air Space Control

Chapter 11 - Air Defence

Chapter 12 - Tactical Air and Tactical Aviation

Chapter 13 - Communication Systems

Chapter 14 - Civil Military Cooperation/Military Government

Chapter 15 - Rear Area Security and Damage Control

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CFP 300 - THE ARMY (WRITING PLAN)

PAGE: 1

NOTE: Please make comments directly on this document where space allows

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
<u>Preface</u>				<p>a. <u>Aim.</u> To provide guidance on operations by the Army in the field.</p> <p>b. <u>Scope</u></p> <p>(1) Applicable to all levels of conflict.</p> <p>(2) Applicable to all levels of command in a theatre of operations.</p> <p>(3) Description of the politico-military interface.</p> <p>(4) Application of the principles/fundamentals of the conduct of military operations.</p> <p>c. <u>Context.</u></p> <p>d. <u>Terminology.</u></p>	Context will explain the relationship of CFP 300 to other manuals.
1	<u>CANADA AND ITS ARMED FORCES</u>	1	<u>National Objectives and Strategy</u>	<p>a. <u>National Objectives.</u></p> <p>b. <u>National Policy.</u></p> <p>c. <u>Foreign/Defence Policy.</u></p> <p>d. <u>Grand Strategy.</u></p> <p>e. <u>Military Strategy.</u></p>	<p>Terms are in a hierarchy. Grand strategy is said to be synonymous with alliance strategy (check definition Army Glossary).</p> <p>Refs: CSC 201/202 Defence in the Seventies CFP 165 CFP 300 (Interim)</p>

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
1 Cont'd		2	<u>The Army</u>	a. <u>The Legal Basis/NDA.</u> b. <u>The Army Role.</u> c. <u>The Organization for Control.</u>	(L) } previous references and the NDA
2	<u>THE NATURE OF WAR</u>	1	<u>Conflict</u>	a. <u>Characteristics of Conflict.</u> b. <u>Type of Conflict.</u> c. <u>Contemporary Peace (Detente/Cold War).</u>	} as above and ABCA CD Guide 2000
		2	<u>Military Power</u>	a. <u>Characteristics of Military Forces.</u> b. <u>The Exercise of Military Power.</u> c. <u>The Employment of Military Forces.</u>	
		3	<u>Principles of War (Canada)</u>	The ten principles of war as espoused by Canada.	CSC 201
		4	<u>Principles of War (Other)</u>	Eight additional principles enunciated by NATO.	ATP 35/ATP 35(A) - Land Force Tactical Doctrine Major power comparative chart to be included (will also include potential enemy principles of war)
3	<u>THE PROFESSION OF ARMS</u>	1	<u>Characteristics of the Profession</u>	a. <u>Unique Character.</u> b. <u>Corporateness.</u>	<u>The Profession of Arms (Hackett)</u> and various staff college compendiums on professionalism

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
3 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. <u>Knowledge.</u> d. <u>Self-Regulating.</u> e. <u>Concept of Service.</u> 	
		2	<u>Ethos of the Army</u>	<u>To be developed.</u>	Various background papers submitted in support of the Army Ethos Symposium and related texts such as <u>Crisis in Command</u> (Gabriel and Savage) - section will be brief
		3	<u>Leadership</u>	<u>To be developed.</u>	
4	<u>THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT</u>	1	<u>General</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Scope.</u> b. <u>Basic Considerations.</u> 	Previous references, particularly CSC 201/201
		2	<u>Elements of the Operational Environment</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>War Aims.</u> b. <u>Opposing Forces.</u> c. <u>The Theatre of Operations.</u> d. <u>Local Government and Population.</u> e. <u>Laws and Fortunes of War.</u> 	<p>Includes mention of the national will, terrain weather (physical environment)</p> <p>Include influence of NBCW, Geneva Convention and other International Protocols</p>

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
5	<u>ORGANIZATION AND ROLES OF THE ARMY IN THE FIELD</u>	1	<u>Formation Organization</u>	a. <u>General.</u>	will include organizational diagrams
				b. <u>Allocation of Forces.</u>	
				c. <u>Higher Formation Commands (Corps to Army Group).</u>	
				d. <u>Lower Formation Commands (Brigade to Division).</u>	
		2	<u>The Arms</u>	a. <u>General.</u>	roles, tasks, characteristics, employment
				b. <u>Basic Tasks.</u>	
				c. <u>Infantry.</u>	
				d. <u>Armour.</u>	
				e. <u>Artillery.</u>	
				f. <u>Engineers.</u>	
				g. <u>Signals.</u>	
				h. <u>Aviation.</u>	
				j. <u>Intelligence.</u>	
		3	<u>The Services</u>	a. <u>General.</u>	
				b. <u>Characteristics of Combat Service Support Elements.</u>	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
5 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. <u>Combat Service Support Units and Organizations.</u> d. <u>Control of Combat Service Support Activities.</u> e. <u>Environmental Considerations.</u> f. <u>Dispersion.</u> 	
		4	<u>Mobilization</u>	<u>To be developed.</u>	Based on MIF Study
6	<u>INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS</u>	1	<u>Combined Forces</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>International Alliances.</u> c. <u>Combined Forces Factors.</u> d. <u>Combined Forces Principles.</u> e. <u>Command and Control.</u> 	
		2	<u>NATO (General)</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Introduction.</u> b. <u>Civilian Organization.</u> c. <u>Military Committee.</u> d. <u>Major NATO Commands.</u> e. <u>Allied Command Europe.</u> 	<div style="border-left: 1px solid black; border-right: 1px solid black; height: 150px; margin: 0 auto; width: 20px;"></div> <p>to include organizational diagrams of ACE, AFCENT.</p>

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
6 Cont'd		3	<u>NATO (CEF)</u>		<div> </div> include organizational diagram and command relationship (peace and war)
		4	<u>NATO (CAST)</u>		
		5	<u>NATO (CANUS)</u>		
		6	<u>UN</u>	a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>The Nature of Peacekeeping.</u> c. <u>Basis of an International Presence.</u> d. <u>Command and Control.</u> e. <u>Cyprus - A Useful Example.</u>	Refs: CFP 165 CFP 300 (Interim)
7	<u>A THEATRE OF OPERATIONS</u>	1	<u>General</u>	a. <u>Area of War.</u> b. <u>Area of Operations.</u> c. <u>Theatre of War/Operations.</u>	<div> </div> CSC 202
		2	<u>Organization of a Theatre of Operations</u>	a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Organizational Principles.</u> c. <u>Organization of Subordinate Commands.</u>	
					Include diagram of territorial organization of theatre of operations

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
7 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> d. <u>Organization of the Combat Zone.</u> e. <u>Organization of the Communications Zone.</u> f. <u>Mutual Support.</u> g. <u>Command/Staff Structure.</u> h. <u>Numbered Armies/Army Groups.</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSC 201/202
		3	<u>Operational Considerations</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Offensive Operations.</u> c. <u>Defensive Operations.</u> d. <u>Retrograde Operations.</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSC 202
8	<u>COMMAND IN BATTLE</u>	1	<u>The Commander</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Leadership.</u> c. <u>Morale.</u> d. <u>Functions of the Commander.</u> 	<p>Stress the role of personality</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> include principle (philosophy) of Führen mit Auftrag

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
9	<u>STAFF PLANNING</u>	1	<u>Introduction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>The Staff System (Cdn).</u> c. <u>Planning Sequence.</u> 	<div style="border-left: 1px solid black; border-right: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; min-height: 400px;"> essentially as per CSC 202 including relevant annexes </div>
		2	<u>Understanding the Situation and Definition of the Aim</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Understanding the Situation.</u> b. <u>Definition of the Aim.</u> c. <u>Planning Guidance.</u> 	
		3	<u>Examination of the Factors</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Intelligence Factors.</u> c. <u>Logistical Factors.</u> d. <u>Personnel Factors.</u> 	
		4	<u>The Courses of Action</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Developing the Courses.</u> b. <u>Selecting a Course of Action.</u> 	
		5	<u>The Plan</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>The Joint Operations Plan.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
9 Cont'd		6	<u>The Theatre Campaign Plan</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Intelligence.</u> c. <u>Planning Considerations.</u> d. <u>Format.</u> 	essentially as per CSC 202 including relevant annexes
10	<u>AIRSPACE CONTROL</u>	1	<u>General</u>	a. <u>Introduction.</u>	
		2	<u>Responsibilities and Organization</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Responsibilities.</u> b. <u>Organization.</u> 	
		3	<u>Procedures</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Basic Considerations.</u> b. <u>Air Defence Operations.</u> c. <u>Flight Condition Factors.</u> d. <u>Control in a High Density Airspace Control Zone.</u> 	Refs: CSC 202 ATP 40 Relevant STANAGS
11	<u>AIR DEFENCE</u>	1	<u>The Threat</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Recce.</u> c. <u>Ground Attack.</u> d. <u>Airborne Operations.</u> 	CSC 202

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
11 Cont'd		2	<u>The Family of Weapons</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>High Level SAMs.</u> c. <u>Medium Level SAMs.</u> d. <u>Low Level SAMs.</u> e. <u>Very Low Level SAMs.</u> f. <u>Guns.</u> 	CSC 202
		3	<u>Command and Control</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Management of the Air Defence Battle.</u> c. <u>Types of Defence.</u> 	
		4	<u>Fire Control</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Hostile Criteria.</u> c. <u>Weapons Control.</u> 	
		5	<u>Airspace Control</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Geographical Control.</u> c. <u>Target Assignment.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
12	<u>TACTICAL AIR AND TACTICAL AVIATION</u>	1	<u>Tactical Air</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Introduction.</u> b. <u>Principles for the Conduct of Tactical Air Operations.</u> c. <u>Tasks of Tactical Air Forces.</u> d. <u>Counter Air Operations.</u> e. <u>Air Interdiction.</u> f. <u>Air Recce.</u> g. <u>Close Air Support.</u> h. <u>Tactical Air Lift.</u> j. <u>Combat Air Support Functions.</u> k. <u>SAM Suppression.</u> m. <u>Nuc Weapons in Tactical Air Operations.</u> n. <u>Command and Control.</u> p. <u>Tactical Air Forces in NATO.</u> q. <u>Organization for Tasking and Liaison.</u> 	<p>Refs: CSC 202 ATP 27 ATP 33 Branch Study</p> <p>figure</p>
		2	<u>Tactical Aviation</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Introduction.</u> b. <u>Characteristics of Aviation Aircraft.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
12 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. <u>Roles and Tasks.</u> d. <u>Principles of Employment and Limitations.</u> e. <u>Command and Control.</u> 	
13	<u>COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS</u>	1	<u>Introduction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Principles of Communications.</u> c. <u>Methods of Communication and Their Characteristics.</u> 	
		2	<u>The Threat</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>EW.</u> b. <u>Interference.</u> c. <u>Conclusions.</u> 	CSC 202
		3	<u>Communications Within a Theatre of Operations</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Types of Signal Limits and Formations.</u> b. <u>Host Nation Communication Command.</u> c. <u>Theatre Communication Command.</u> d. <u>National Command Communications.</u> e. <u>Army and Airforce Operational Communications.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
13 Cont'd		4	<u>Theatre Electronic Warfare</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Staff Responsibility.</u> c. <u>EW Units.</u> 	Include glossary of signals terms as an Annex
14	<u>CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION/MILITARY GOVERNMENT</u>	1	<u>Introduction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Requirement for CIMIC.</u> c. <u>Objective and Concept of CIMIC.</u> d. <u>Principles of CIMIC.</u> 	
		2	<u>CIMIC Responsibilities of Commanders and Staff</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>CIMIC Responsibilities - Subordinate Commands.</u> c. <u>CIMIC Responsibilities - Army Group Commanders.</u> 	
		3	<u>Cooperation Between Allied Commanders and National Authorities</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Relationships and Responsibilities.</u> b. <u>Operational Planning.</u> c. <u>Civilian Preparedness for War.</u> d. <u>Areas of Cooperation Between Allied Commands and National Authorities.</u> 	CSC 202

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
14 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> e. <u>Security of Allied Forces.</u> f. <u>Use and Security of Communications.</u> g. <u>Maintenance of Law and Order and Government Control.</u> h. <u>Population Movement Control.</u> j. <u>Damage Control.</u> 	
		4	<u>Military Government</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>The Nature of Military Government.</u> b. <u>Definitions.</u> c. <u>Basic Principles.</u> d. <u>Limitations Imposed by International Law and Agreements.</u> 	
15	<u>REAR AREA SECURITY AND DAMAGE CONTROL</u>	1	<u>Introduction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Definitions.</u> b. <u>Agreements.</u> 	
		2	<u>Staff Responsibilities</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Commanders.</u> b. <u>HQ Staff.</u> c. <u>Unit Responsibility.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
15 Cont'd		3	<u>General Principles of Rear Area Security and Damage Control</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General Principles.</u> b. <u>Rear Area Security.</u> c. <u>Rear Area Damage Control.</u> 	CSC 202 STANAG 2079
		4	<u>Organization for the Execution of Rear Area Security and Damage Control</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Rear Area Operations Centre Organization.</u> c. <u>Rear Area Security and Area Damage Control Task Forces.</u> 	

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REF: FMC 2910 - CFP 300 (CD) OVER 2910 - CFP 301 13 NOV 81

1. FINAL PROMULGATION OF TWO KEYSTONE MANUALS WILL BE WELCOME
2. PARA 2 OF REF A SOMEWHAT MISLEADING. SUGGEST DOCTRINE OF BOTH PUBS SHOULD BE BASED ON CONCEPTS PRODUCED BY CBT SYSTEM STUDY TEAM AND BRANCH STUDIES WHO HAVE ALREADY REVIEWED ALL APPROPRIATE ALLIED PUBS AND PRODUCED A CANADIAN SYSTEM. BY BASING PUBS AT REF A ON CANADIAN CONCEPTS, DIALOGUE BETWEEN CONCEPT WRITERS AND DOCTRINE WRITERS SHOULD RESULT

REFERENCED LETTER PLACED ON

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SUBJECT — SUJET

Follow up action Writing Plans CFP 300 - The Army

DATED — DATÉE
24 Nov 81

REFERRED TO TRANSMISE À	REMARKS — REMARQUES (TO BE SIGNED IN FULL SHOWING APPOINTMENT, TELEPHONE NUMBER AND DATE) (ATTACHÉ DE SIGNATURE, FONCTION, NUMÉRO DE TÉLÉPHONE ET DATE)
DMOT-2	<p>1. Nil return or comment.</p> <p><i>Helen F. Ott</i></p> <p>Helen F. Ott Col DNS 6-4016</p> <p>07 December 81</p>

MEMORANDUM

PA → 2910-CFP 300 TD 1327 (DMAR)
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~~TD 1327~~

26 Nov 81

DMOT 2


WRITING PLANS

CFP 300 - THE ARMY

CFP 301 - LAND FORMATIONS IN BATTLE

Refs: A. 2910-CFP 300 TD 1327 (DMOT 2) 24 Nov 81
B. 2922-B-OG-301-001/FP001 TD 1327 (DMOT 2) 24 Nov 81

1. This directorate submits a nil return to Refs A and B.


R.A. Cunningham
Col
DMAR
5-6131



Canadian Armed Forces
Mobile Command

Forces armées canadiennes
Force mobile



FMC 2900-1 (Doc)

Mobile Command Headquarters
St Hubert, Que
J3Y 5T5

25 Nov 81

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1. In the initial assignment of NDID numbers to publications of the Land doctrine series (CFP 300 series) most of the publications were allocated a functional coding of "B-OL". Now, as a result of computer inability to accept the letter "O", many of the NDID numbers of publications are currently being converted to "B-GL", or "A-GL" etc.
2. While the conversion is in process this Headquarters is concerned that the users of this Command may not always be aware of the exact current NDID code for a publication. Rejected demands can result in loss of training time or delays in preparation of training programmes.
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4. Your assistance is requested to ensure that complications will not arise due to minor error in the functional coding. You may be assured of the cooperation of the CD Division Staff of this Headquarters in this matter should it be required.

T.F. Defaye
Lieutenant Colonel
Senior Staff Officer Combat Development Coord
for Commander Mobile Command

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Mobile Command

Forces armées canadiennes
Force mobile



FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD)
2910-CFP 301

Mobile Command Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
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13 November 1981

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- References:
- A. Army Doctrine and Tactics Board SOPs issued under cover of NDHQ 2910-2 (CLDO) 30 May 80
 - B. Army Doctrine and Tactics Board Working Group Meeting, Lahr Germany 20-21 Oct 81

1. Enclosed please find a copy(s) of the writing plan for CFP 300-The Army and CFP 301-Land Formations in Battle. These writing plans have been forwarded for staffing in accordance with Reference A and the direction provided by Reference B.

2. CFP 300 and 301 are the "keystone manuals" of Army doctrine. All other Army manuals will subsequently be based on these two manuals. Primary inputs for the keystone manuals will be:

- a. ATP 35(A) (2nd Preliminary Draft) - NATO Land Force Doctrine;
- b. CFP 300 (Interim) - Conduct of Land Operations;
- c. CFP 301(1) (2nd Draft) - Formations in Battle;
- d. The Land Force Combat System Study distributed under cover of Secret FMC 3189-3-11 (CD) 5 Oct 81 and the operational concepts being developed from this study by NDHQ (DLCD 3); and the
- e. Army Combat Development Guide (Secret).

3. Reference will also be made to the ABCA Combat Development Guide (2000) (Secret), various related ATPs, STANAGs and staff colleges precis. Doctrinal references of major allies (UK, FRG, USA) will also be consulted

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
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4. Comments/recommendations are requested no later than 15 Dec 81. The keystone manuals author, LCol R.E. Acreman (Roger) can be reached at local 404. Comments should be directed to this Headquarters for the attention of SSO CD Coord.



T.F. deFaye
Lieutenant-Colonel
A/Deputy Chief of Staff Combat Development
for Commander Mobile Command

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CFP 300 - THE ARMY

Preface

Chapter 1 - Canada and Its Armed Forces

Chapter 2 - The Nature of War

Chapter 3 - The Profession of Arms

Chapter 4 - The Operational Environment

Chapter 5 - Organization and Roles of the Army in the Field

Chapter 6 - International Military Organizations

Chapter 7 - A Theatre of Operations

Chapter 8 - Command in Battle

Chapter 9 - Staff Planning

Chapter 10 - Air Space Control

Chapter 11 - Air Defence

Chapter 12 - Tactical Air and Tactical Aviation

Chapter 13 - Communication Systems

Chapter 14 - Civil Military Cooperation/Military Government

Chapter 15 - Rear Area Security and Damage Control

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CFP 300 - THE ARMY (WRITING PLAN)

PAGE: 1

NOTE: Please make comments directly on this document where space allows

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
<u>Preface</u>				<p>a. <u>Aim</u>. To provide guidance on operations by the Army in the field.</p> <p>b. <u>Scope</u></p> <p>(1) Applicable to all levels of conflict.</p> <p>(2) Applicable to all levels of command in a theatre of operations.</p> <p>(3) Description of the politico-military interface.</p> <p>(4) Application of the principles/fundamentals of the conduct of military operations.</p> <p>c. <u>Context</u>.</p> <p>d. <u>Terminology</u>.</p>	Context will explain the relationship of CFP 300 to other manuals.
1	<u>CANADA AND ITS ARMED FORCES</u>	1	<u>National Objectives and Strategy</u>	<p>a. <u>National Objectives</u>.</p> <p>b. <u>National Policy</u>.</p> <p>c. <u>Foreign/Defence Policy</u>.</p> <p>d. <u>Grand Strategy</u>.</p> <p>e. <u>Military Strategy</u>.</p>	<p>Terms are in a hierarchy. Grand strategy is said to be synonymous with alliance strategy (check definition Army Glossary).</p> <p>Refs: CSC 201/202 Defence in the Seventies CFP 165 CFP 300 (Interim)</p>

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
1 Cont'd		2	<u>The Army</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>The Legal Basis/NDA.</u> b. <u>The Army Role.</u> c. <u>The Organization for Control.</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> previous references and the NDA
2	<u>THE NATURE OF WAR</u>	1	<u>Conflict</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Characteristics of Conflict.</u> b. <u>Type of Conflict.</u> c. <u>Contemporary Peace (Detente/Cold War).</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> as above and ABCA CD Guide 2000
		2	<u>Military Power</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Characteristics of Military Forces.</u> b. <u>The Exercise of Military Power.</u> c. <u>The Employment of Military Forces.</u> 	
		3	<u>Principles of War (Canada)</u>	The ten principles of war as espoused by Canada.	CSC 201
		4	<u>Principles of War (Other)</u>	Eight additional principles enunciated by NATO.	ATP 35/ATP 35(A) - Land Force Tactical Doctrine Major power comparative chart to be included (will also include potential enemy principles of war)
3	<u>THE PROFESSION OF ARMS</u>	1	<u>Characteristics of the Profession</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Unique Character.</u> b. <u>Corporateness.</u> 	<u>The Profession of Arms (Hackett)</u> and various staff college compendiums on professionalism

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
3 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. <u>Knowledge.</u> d. <u>Self-Regulating.</u> e. <u>Concept of Service.</u> 	
		2	<u>Ethos of the Army</u>	<u>To be developed.</u>	Various background papers submitted in support of the Army Ethos Symposium and related texts such as <u>Crisis in Command</u> (Gabriel and Savage) - section will be brief
		3	<u>Leadership</u>	<u>To be developed.</u>	
4	<u>THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT</u>	1	<u>General</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Scope.</u> b. <u>Basic Considerations.</u> 	Previous references, particularly CSC 201/201
		2	<u>Elements of the Operational Environment</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>War Aims.</u> b. <u>Opposing Forces.</u> c. <u>The Theatre of Operations.</u> d. <u>Local Government and Population.</u> e. <u>Laws and Fortunes of War.</u> 	<p>Includes mention of the national will, terrain weather (physical environment)</p> <p>Include influence of NBCW, Geneva Convention and other International Protocols</p>

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
5	<u>ORGANIZATION AND ROLES OF THE ARMY IN THE FIELD</u>	1	<u>Formation Organization</u>	a. <u>General.</u>	will include organizational diagrams
				b. <u>Allocation of Forces.</u>	
				c. <u>Higher Formation Commands (Corps to Army Group).</u>	
				d. <u>Lower Formation Commands (Brigade to Division).</u>	
		2	<u>The Arms</u>	a. <u>General.</u>	roles, tasks, characteristics, employment
				b. <u>Basic Tasks.</u>	
				c. <u>Infantry.</u>	
				d. <u>Armour.</u>	
				e. <u>Artillery.</u>	
				f. <u>Engineers.</u>	
		3	<u>The Services</u>	g. <u>Signals.</u>	
				h. <u>Aviation.</u>	
				j. <u>Intelligence.</u>	
				a. <u>General.</u>	
				b. <u>Characteristics of Combat Service Support Elements.</u>	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
5 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. <u>Combat Service Support Units and Organizations.</u> d. <u>Control of Combat Service Support Activities.</u> e. <u>Environmental Considerations.</u> f. <u>Dispersion.</u> 	
		4	<u>Mobilization</u>	<u>To be developed.</u>	Based on MTF Study
6	<u>INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS</u>	1	<u>Combined Forces</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>International Alliances.</u> c. <u>Combined Forces Factors.</u> d. <u>Combined Forces Principles.</u> e. <u>Command and Control.</u> 	
		2	<u>NATO (General)</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Introduction.</u> b. <u>Civilian Organization.</u> c. <u>Military Committee.</u> d. <u>Major NATO Commands.</u> e. <u>Allied Command Europe.</u> 	<div style="border-left: 1px solid black; border-right: 1px solid black; height: 150px; margin: 0 auto; width: 20px;"></div> <p>to include organizational diagrams of ACE, AFCENT</p>

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
6 Cont'd		3	<u>NATO (CEF)</u>		<div> </div> include organizational diagram and command relationship (peace and war)
		4	<u>NATO (CAST)</u>		
		5	<u>NATO (CANUS)</u>		
		6	<u>UN</u>	a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>The Nature of Peacekeeping.</u> c. <u>Basis of an International Presence.</u> d. <u>Command and Control.</u> e. <u>Cyprus - A Useful Example.</u>	Refs: CFP 165 CFP 300 (Interim)
7	<u>A THEATRE OF OPERATIONS</u>	1	<u>General</u>	a. <u>Area of War.</u> b. <u>Area of Operations.</u> c. <u>Theatre of War/Operations.</u>	<div> </div> CSC 202
		2	<u>Organization of a Theatre of Operations</u>	a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Organizational Principles.</u> c. <u>Organization of Subordinate Commands.</u>	
					Include diagram of territorial organization of theatre of operations

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
7 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> d. <u>Organization of the Combat Zone.</u> e. <u>Organization of the Communications Zone.</u> f. <u>Mutual Support.</u> g. <u>Command/Staff Structure.</u> h. <u>Numbered Armies/Army Groups.</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSC 201/202
		3	<u>Operational Considerations</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Offensive Operations.</u> c. <u>Defensive Operations.</u> d. <u>Retrograde Operations.</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSC 202
8	<u>COMMAND IN BATTLE</u>	1	<u>The Commander</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Leadership.</u> c. <u>Morale.</u> d. <u>Functions of the Commander.</u> 	<p>Stress the role of personality</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> include principle (philosophy) of Führen mit Auftrag

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
8 Cont'd		2	<u>The Staff</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>The Staff System (Cdn).</u> c. <u>Staff System (Allies).</u> d. <u>Types of Staff.</u> e. <u>Functions of the Staff.</u> 	<div>Continental, UK, and Cdn adaptation</div> <div>as per previous references</div>
		3	<u>Command and Staff Relationships</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Chain of Command.</u> b. <u>Continuity of Command.</u> c. <u>HQ Organization and Operation.</u> d. <u>Liaison.</u> 	
		4	<u>Joint and Combined Operations</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Command of Joint/Combined Operations.</u> b. <u>The Staff of Joint/Combined Operations.</u> 	
		5	<u>Command at Higher Levels</u>		
		6	<u>Command at Lower Levels</u>		
		7	<u>Command During Battle</u>		

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
9	<u>STAFF PLANNING</u>	1	<u>Introduction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>The Staff System (Cdn).</u> c. <u>Planning Sequence.</u> 	<div style="border-left: 1px solid black; border-right: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; min-height: 400px;"> essentially as per CSC 202 including relevant annexes </div>
		2	<u>Understanding the Situation and Definition of the Aim</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Understanding the Situation.</u> b. <u>Definition of the Aim.</u> c. <u>Planning Guidance.</u> 	
		3	<u>Examination of the Factors</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Intelligence Factors.</u> c. <u>Logistical Factors.</u> d. <u>Personnel Factors.</u> 	
		4	<u>The Courses of Action</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Developing the Courses.</u> b. <u>Selecting a Course of Action.</u> 	
		5	<u>The Plan</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>The Joint Operations Plan.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
9 Cont'd		6	<u>The Theatre Campaign Plan</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Intelligence.</u> c. <u>Planning Considerations.</u> d. <u>Format.</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> essentially as per CSC 202 including relevant annexes
10	<u>AIRSPACE CONTROL</u>	1	<u>General</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Introduction.</u> 	
		2	<u>Responsibilities and Organization</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Responsibilities.</u> b. <u>Organization.</u> 	
		3	<u>Procedures</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Basic Considerations.</u> b. <u>Air Defence Operations.</u> c. <u>Flight Condition Factors.</u> d. <u>Control in a High Density Airspace Control Zone.</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Refs: CSC 202 ATP 40 Relevant STANAGS
11	<u>AIR DEFENCE</u>	1	<u>The Threat</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Recce.</u> c. <u>Ground Attack.</u> d. <u>Airborne Operations.</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSC 202

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
11 Cont'd		2	<u>The Family of Weapons</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>High Level SAMs.</u> c. <u>Medium Level SAMs.</u> d. <u>Low Level SAMs.</u> e. <u>Very Low Level SAMs.</u> f. <u>Guns.</u> 	CSC 202
		3	<u>Command and Control</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Management of the Air Defence Battle.</u> c. <u>Types of Defence.</u> 	
		4	<u>Fire Control</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Hostile Criteria.</u> c. <u>Weapons Control.</u> 	
		5	<u>Airspace Control</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Geographical Control.</u> c. <u>Target Assignment.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
12	<u>TACTICAL AIR AND TACTICAL AVIATION</u>	1	<u>Tactical Air</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Introduction.</u> b. <u>Principles for the Conduct of Tactical Air Operations.</u> c. <u>Tasks of Tactical Air Forces.</u> d. <u>Counter Air Operations.</u> e. <u>Air Interdiction.</u> f. <u>Air Recce.</u> g. <u>Close Air Support.</u> h. <u>Tactical Air Lift.</u> j. <u>Combat Air Support Functions.</u> k. <u>SAM Suppression.</u> m. <u>Nuc Weapons in Tactical Air Operations.</u> n. <u>Command and Control.</u> p. <u>Tactical Air Forces in NATO.</u> q. <u>Organization for Tasking and Liaison.</u> 	<p>Refs: CSC 202 ATP 27 ATP 33 Branch Study</p> <p>figure</p>
		2	<u>Tactical Aviation</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Introduction.</u> b. <u>Characteristics of Aviation Aircraft.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
12 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. <u>Roles and Tasks.</u> d. <u>Principles of Employment and Limitations.</u> e. <u>Command and Control.</u> 	
13	<u>COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS</u>	1	<u>Introduction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Principles of Communications.</u> c. <u>Methods of Communication and Their Characteristics.</u> 	
		2	<u>The Threat</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>EW.</u> b. <u>Interference.</u> c. <u>Conclusions.</u> 	CSC 202
		3	<u>Communications Within a Theatre of Operations</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Types of Signal Limits and Formations.</u> b. <u>Host Nation Communication Command.</u> c. <u>Theatre Communication Command.</u> d. <u>National Command Communications.</u> e. <u>Army and Airforce Operational Communications.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
13 Cont'd		4	<u>Theatre Electronic Warfare</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Staff Responsibility.</u> c. <u>EW Units.</u> 	Include glossary of signals terms as an Annex
14	<u>CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION/MILITARY GOVERNMENT</u>	1	<u>Introduction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Requirement for CIMIC.</u> c. <u>Objective and Concept of CIMIC.</u> d. <u>Principles of CIMIC.</u> 	
		2	<u>CIMIC Responsibilities of Commanders and Staff</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>CIMIC Responsibilities - Subordinate Commands.</u> c. <u>CIMIC Responsibilities - Army Group Commanders.</u> 	
		3	<u>Cooperation Between Allied Commanders and National Authorities</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Relationships and Responsibilities.</u> b. <u>Operational Planning.</u> c. <u>Civilian Preparedness for War.</u> d. <u>Areas of Cooperation Between Allied Commands and National Authorities.</u> 	CSC 202

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
14 Cont'd				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> e. <u>Security of Allied Forces.</u> f. <u>Use and Security of Communications.</u> g. <u>Maintenance of Law and Order and Government Control.</u> h. <u>Population Movement Control.</u> j. <u>Damage Control.</u> 	
		4	<u>Military Government</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>The Nature of Military Government.</u> b. <u>Definitions.</u> c. <u>Basic Principles.</u> d. <u>Limitations Imposed by International Law and Agreements.</u> 	
15	<u>REAR AREA SECURITY AND DAMAGE CONTROL</u>	1	<u>Introduction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Definitions.</u> b. <u>Agreements.</u> 	
		2	<u>Staff Responsibilities</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Commanders.</u> b. <u>HQ Staff.</u> c. <u>Unit Responsibility.</u> 	

CHAPTER	TITLE	SECT	TITLE	OUTLINE CONTENT	REFERENCES AND REMARKS
15 Cont'd		3	<u>General Principles of Rear Area Security and Damage Control</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General Principles.</u> b. <u>Rear Area Security.</u> c. <u>Rear Area Damage Control.</u> 	CSC 202 STANAG 2079
		4	<u>Organization for the Execution of Rear Area Security and Damage Control</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>General.</u> b. <u>Rear Area Operations Centre Organization.</u> c. <u>Rear Area Security and Area Damage Control Task Forces.</u> 	

PA

MEMORANDUM

~~2414-ATP-35(A)~~

~~3105-9~~

PA CFP 300 (DLCD)

PA 2910-CFP 300

17 Sep 81

DGLDO (thru DLCD)

REVISION OF CFP 300
("CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS") -
IMPLEMENTATION OF ATP 35(A)
("LAND FORCE TACTICAL DOCTRINE")

1. On 15 Sep DLCD 4 and DLCD 4-2 attended a special meeting of the ADTB Working Group at FMC HQ. The meeting was held at the suggestion of DLCD 4; the original aim was to discuss and reconcile the important or fundamental shortcomings of the First Draft NATO manual ATP 35(A). However prior to the meeting it became clear that none of the Canadian agencies (FMC, CTC, CFCSC and CLFCSC) reviewing ATP 35(A) had identified the kind of serious problems that required detailed examination and resolution by the WG.

2. In the absence of problems in ATP 35(A) doctrine, the proceedings were directed toward the implications of the implementation of ATP 35(A) and the revision of CFP 300. The situation in this respect can be summarized as follows:

- a. ATP 35(A) will probably be an approved document within two years. Although the draft will be revised, these revisions are unlikely to seriously alter the basic organization or doctrine of the first draft. Canadian ratification of ATP 35(A) will of course indicate that the manual has been implemented. Unless the requirement to implement it is anticipated and efforts are directed towards this in advance, implementation after ratification will entail a great deal of work and could present serious problems in resolving differences in doctrine.
- b. CFP 300, our Canadian capstone manual is in serious need of revision. LCol Acreman of the FMC HQ staff has been detailed to develop this revision. It may be practicable to redraft CFP 300 with a view to including the doctrine of ATP 35(A).

.../2

- 2 -

3. In the limited time available DLCD 4-2, SSO Doc Coord, SO Doc Coord and LCol Acreman examined ATP 35(A) vis à vis CFP 300 to analyze the impact of revision to incorporate the provisions of the NATO draft. The outcome of this review was that it would be practicable to incorporate ATP 35(A) into CFP 300.

4. The above conclusion was discussed at length with the WG. The following summarizes the agreement reached:

- a. LCol Acreman will proceed with the revision of CFP 300. A major aim of this revision will be the incorporation of ATP 35(A) into 300. Incorporation will be understood to mean:
 - (1) All significant ideas of the NATO manual will be included (the word idea here refers to any assertion of doctrine, eg, In the conduct of defence operations commanders must consider that any troops not actually in combat are a source of reserves).
 - (2) CFP 300 will follow as closely as possible the organization of doctrine established by ATP 35(A). This will have a significant impact on the organization of Canadian doctrine (eg, rather than four "phases" of war, we will think in terms of three "basic" operations: the defence, the offence and the delay). It will involve expansion of current discussions (eg, the meeting engagement) and the inclusion of areas not currently addressed in CFP 300 (eg, defence of coastal areas, amphibious operations).
- b. In developing this revision the author will identify differences in doctrine which are unwelcome to Canada. These should be tabled for discussion at the Oct ADTB WG meeting and, where it is deemed appropriate, Canada will seek revision of ATP 35(A) at the Nov meeting of the NATO Land Tactics Working Party. Where agreement to revision cannot be obtained, it may eventually be necessary for Canada to state a reservation to the final ATP.
- c. ATP 35(A) focuses on high intensity operations in the Central European Region; Canadian army doctrine must be more universal than this spectrum. As a result the revised CFP 300 will continue to address areas not included in ATP 35(A) (eg, Peacekeeping).

.../3


- 3 -

- d. If a successful revision of CFP 300 incorporating ATP 35(A) can be developed, the army will have a single "stand alone" high level doctrine manual; there will be no need to distribute ATP 35 or ATP 35(A) widely.
- e. The Canadian army accepts the advisability of adopting (on a case by case basis) more generally used NATO terminology in preference to current Brit-Canadian terms. As cases in point:
 - (1) We currently use "Start Line". Although this is an authorized NATO term, it is used by Canada and the UK only. The more generally used NATO term is "Line of Departure".
 - (2) Canada and the UK speak of the "appreciation" while the other nations speak (in English) of the "estimate".

Proposals for amendment of terminology will develop during the revision of CFP 300. These will be referred to the ADTB Terminology Subcommittee and as necessary to the WG.

5. Although it was not articulated during the proceeding of the WG meeting the inherent aim of this important staff action is to develop the basis of an army doctrine which will eventually produce officers who are equally familiar with Canadian and NATO land doctrine and who work with that doctrine using the NATO operational vocabulary.

6. The Secretary ADTB (D COS CD) will brief the Chairman (CLDO) on the results of this meeting, probably during the week 21-25 Sep.


T.J. Kaulbach
LCol
DLCD 4
2-8550


L.M. Diebel, Maj/2-8550/dd
DISTRIBUTION LIST (page 4)

- 4 -

DISTRIBUTION LIST

D COS CD
LCol Acreman
DLCD 3
LPC

MAIN FILE No. _____
DOSSIER PRINCIPAL

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

T.D. No. 1035 A
D.T.

TEMPORARY DOCKET DOSSIER TEMPORAIRE

2-2-81

[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Temporary Dockets are to deal WITH ONE CASE ONLY.
Les dossiers temporaires sont créés à l'égard d'un SEUL CAS.
2. T.D.'s NOT to be placed on main file UNLESS Records Management Office informed by File Control Form DND 710.
Ne PAS placer un dossier temporaire dans le dossier principal SANS en informer le Bureau de la gestion des dossiers au moyen de la formule DND 710.
3. T.D. No. together with main file number to be quoted on all correspondence originated.
Mentionner le numéro du dossier temporaire et le numéro de référence du dossier principal dans toute correspondance.
4. Action should be taken as soon as possible in order that main file may be kept up to date. If action cannot be taken within 48 working hrs., B.F. Docket.
Donner suite le plus tôt possible, afin de tenir le dossier principal à jour. Si non réalisable dans les 48 heures ouvrables, acheminer et inscrire une date de rappel.
5. T.D.'s to be requisitioned, passed, B.F.'d. etc., in the same manner as main files by means of Form DND 710.
Utiliser la méthode applicable aux dossiers principaux pour les demandes, acheminements, rappels, etc., des dossiers temporaires; employer la formule DND 710.

PA



National Defence
Défense nationale

5923-1000 (DPRC 3)

18 February, 1981

Commander
Mobile Command Headquarters
St Hubert, Quebec
J3Y 5T5

Attention: SO Doctrine Production
(Mr. Lajambe)

SERVICE CONTRACTS

Reference: FMC 2910-CFP 300 (DOC) 2 Feb 81

1. Further to our telecon of 12 February 1981, I am returning your letter (Reference) for further action. As discussed, the authorizing level for the proposed service contract with LCol (Ret) W.E. Hutchinson would be the Minister as LCol Hutchinson is considered to be a former senior government official and the value of the contract is over \$2,000 and under \$25,000.
2. There is a requirement to provide to the Deputy Minister, in regard to service contracts to be approved or recommended by the Minister, prior to the identification of a specific person to whom a contract would apply, the reason for the need(s), the time, the cost, the alternatives etc. In this way the Minister could give his approval in principle to the concept of the service contract in each situation. Following approval in principle being obtained, the normal documentation containing the name of the person to whom the service contract will apply should be forwarded in the normal manner. Confirmation of the availability of funds from local resources must be included in all requests for authority to enter into a service contract.
3. Any question on this subject should be addressed to the undersigned.

R. Archambault

R. Archambault

Directorate Personnel Requirements and Control
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Canadian Armed Forces
Mobile Command

Forces armées canadiennes
Force mobile



1035 A

FMC 2910-CFP 300 (DOC)

Mobile Command Headquarters

St Hubert, Quebec J3Y 9P5

J3Y 9P5

02 Feb 81

DPRC

Distribution List

SERVICE CONTRACT -
LCOL (RET) W.E. HUTCHINSON

Reference: A. NDHQ/DLCD 45144 211420Z Jan 81 (NOTAL) - on 2910-CFP 300

1. Authority is requested to enter into a service contract with LCol (Ret) W.E. Hutchinson for the purpose of rewriting and editing "CFP 300 Land Operations" a DND publication which is now only in embryo form.

2. The proposed provisions of the contract are provided in the Annex to this letter. The total cost of the contract will not exceed \$7,000. This sum includes possible claims for travel and lodging up to, but not in excess of \$500 to cover travel expenses from the author's place of residence in Victoria BC to FMC Headquarters, St Hubert, PQ.

3. The OPI at this Headquarters for further inquiries about the proposed contract is Mr. A. Lajambe, SO Doctrine Production (tel (514) 671-3711, ext 761).

135

C.G. Lewis
C.G. Lewis
Lieutenant-Colonel

Senior Staff Officer Combat Development Coord
for Commander

Attachments:

Annex A - Proposal to enter into a service contract
Appendix 1 - Travel schedule

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

External

→ NDHQ (DPRC)

*Original letter returned
revised. Held by DPRC
to FMC*

Information

External

NDHQ (DLP 4) - 20.11.80
CFC Toronto (less atts)
CLFCSC Kingston (less atts)

Internal

SSO Fin
SO Doc Coord (less atts)
SO Doc Prod

001857

ANNEX A

TO FMC 2910-CFP 300

DATED 2 FEB 81

SUBJECT: Authority to enter into a service contract.

PROPOSAL: To enter into a service contract with LCol (Ret) W.E. Hutchinson for the period commencing 1 Mar 81 to 31 Dec 81. The purpose is to conduct a major revision of the Army's capstone manual "CFP 300 Land Operations". This publication will be the key Canadian Army reference and source document, for all land tactical doctrine publications.

AUTHORITY: Government Contract Regulations

COST: The cost of the contract is \$6,500 plus an additional amount for travel expenses, not to exceed \$500, if required. The use of service air for two round trip flights from CFB Comox to Ottawa is also included as a separate item of the contract.

REMARKS: 1. The present draft of "CFP 300 Land Operations" has undergone a series of revisions by various serving officers who have undertaken the task as a secondary duty. Because the draft publication suffers from many deficiencies, not the least of which is a lack of consistency in style and content, it requires revision by a full time author.

- 2 -

2. The highest level of military doctrine and organization forms the setting for CFP 300. LCol Hutchinson by virtue of his recent experience on the staff of the Chief of Land Doctrine and Operations at NDHQ and of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College is well qualified to edit, review, and rewrite CFP 300 subject to the guidelines which will be provided to him by the Secretary of the Army Doctrine and Tactics Board.
3. LCol Hutchinson's task will be to write a revised draft publication in accordance with the guidelines and directives to be provided by the Secretary of the Army Doctrine and Tactics Board. The revised draft will then be reviewed by the Secretary and circulated for comment to the other members of the Board. The author will be required to adjust the revised draft to reflect approved amendments and to produce a final copy, ready for printing, subject to the final approval of the Secretary. It is estimated that the use of a contract author will considerably advance the development of lower level doctrine manuals currently due for revision, but which are being delayed by the current lack of progress with CFP 300. [The use of the contract author will also release several senior staff officers of NDHQ and FMC HQ from a secondary duty.]

.../3

- 3 -

4. The basis of the contract payments will be \$3,500 for completion of the first draft, and \$2,350 for satisfactory completion of the second draft. A final payment of \$650 will be made on final acceptance of the second draft by the Secretary of the ADTB. These sums are exclusive of travel costs.
5. It will be necessary for the author to visit the Secretary of the ADTB on two occasions for a duration varying from three to four days on each occasion. The first in order to receive direction and guidance in the aim, scope, military philosophy and constraints which will affect the preparation of the first draft. The second, will follow the printing and circulation for comment of the first draft and will be for the purpose of determining what changes are to be effected. Given that the author's permanent place of residence is Victoria B.C. it is proposed that he travel service air from Vancouver to Ottawa return for both visits. In circumstances where DND loddging is not or cannot be made available, a sum, not to exceed \$500, is to be provided for travel, lodging and incidental expenses. All claims are to be supported by receipts in accordance with current DND practice and rates. The travel plan is attached as an Appendix to this proposal.
6. The contract author will be responsible to meet all other costs, including those of a secretariae, or research nature.

APPENDIX 1

TO ANNEX A

TO FMC 2910-CFP 300

DATED 2 FEB 81

TRAVEL SCHEDULE - AUTHOR OF CFP 300

1st Journey

Victoria BC to St. Hubert (via Ottawa)

Victoria - CFB Comox BC - public tpt/POMC

CFB Comox - Ottawa Ont (Note 1) - service air-

Ottawa - St. Hubert PQ - public tpt

2-3 days visit at St. Hubert (Note 1)

St. Hubert PQ - Victoria BC (via Ottawa)

Return by same travel combination as for outward journey.

2nd Journey

(Same as first journey).

Total maximum anticipated travel time	4 days
Total duration of two visits with ADTB Secretary	6 days
Maximum travel, lodging etc allowances	\$500.00

NOTE 1: Lodging in DND accommodation if available.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ÉTAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES

SC 4649-4

FORT FRONTENAC
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
K7K 2X8

27 Jan 81

National Defence Headquarters
Department of National Defence
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

NDRMS/SQDDN 3-32

Referred to

Transm. 8

DLCD 4

Attention: DLCD-4

File No

Dossier No.

FR 4 1981

Charged to/Chargé à

REVISION OF CFP 300

References: A. 4649-4 22 Aug 80 / FMC was action Addressee
B. Telecon Allan/Diebel 26 Jan 81

1. Further to reference B, it is recommended that the writing mission for the author of the CFP 300 revision be prepared along the lines of reference A.

2. A suggested mission might be as follows:

"a. Mission. To revise CFP 300 with a view to removing material repetitive of ATP-35, to reducing verbiage, and to including new chapters on certain all arms functions.

b. Scope.

- (1) CFP 300 should not repeat material already contained in ATP-35 except where particular emphasis and clarification are required. It may be necessary in CFP 300 to refer the reader back to appropriate sections of ATP-35;
- (2) CFP 300 should deal with the principles, fundamentals, and roles of land operations leaving the detail of execution of the phases of war to CFP 301(1);

.../2

(2) DCOS CD FMC HQ

Yours for action


RESTRICTED

L M Diebel
L M DIEBEL
Major
A DLCD 4
6 Feb

RESTRICTED

- 2 -

- (3) Style. A point-form style should be used wherever possible and charts and illustrations should be increased;
- (4) Additional Chapters. See Pages 8 and 9 of Annex A to reference A."


J.H. Allan
Lieutenant-Colonel
for Commandant

c.c. S03 SD

RESTRICTED

PRE PRI	LMF L DIFF	CLASS	CIC CT	OSRI IDSO	SSN NSS	DATE	TIME HEURE	CLASS.	RC CD		

FOR COMMEN / SIGNALS USE - À L'USAGE DU CENTRE DES COMMUNICATIONS / TRANSMISSIONS

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UNCLAS		DLCD 45144	

FROM DE	NDHQ OTTAWA
TO-A	FMCHQ ST HUBERT/D COS CD
INFO	CFCSC TORONTO CLFCSC KINGSTON CFCSC FOR SSO LAND STUDIES CLFCSC FOR D COMDT SUBJ: REVISION OF CFP 300 REF: TELECON DIEBEL/LEWIS OF 191000 JAN 1. THIS MSG OUTLINES THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REF CONVER- SATION AND OUTCOME OF SUBSEQUENT CONSIDERATION AT FMC A. LCOL (RET) W.E. HUTCHINSON HAS OFFERED TO DRAFT CFP 300 REVISION DISCUSSED AT MOST RECENT ADTB WG MEETING. WORK WOULD BE DONE ON CONTRACT. COL HUTCHINSON IS AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AND PREPARED TO GUARANTEE ANY REASONABLE DEADLINE. HE IS WILLING TO VISIT OTTAWA, MONTREAL, KINGSTON AREA TO DISCUSS TASK IF DND MEETS COSTS. REQUIRES MINIMUM OF ONE WEEKS LEAD TIME FOR VISIT B. DLCD, FMC AND CLFCSC ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT OFFER

PAGE	1 OF 4	DRAFTER'S NAME NOM DU RÉDACTEUR	OFFICE BUREAU	TEL. - TÉL.			
FOR OPR'S USE À L'USAGE DE L'OPÉRATEUR	R T	DATE	TIME HEURE	SYSTEM SYSTÈME	OPERATOR OPÉRATEUR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION COTE DE SÉCURITÉ	SIGNATURE DE L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR

MESSAGE FORM
FORMULE DE MESSAGE

2910-CFP 300
FILE DOSSIER (DLCD 4)

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION COTE DE SECURITE	SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTION SPECIALE	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMÉRO DE L'EXPÉDITEUR	
UNCLAS		DLCD 45144	

FROM DE	
TO-A	
INFO	<p>SHOULD BE ACCEPTED</p> <p>2. IT APPEARS THAT THE TASK NOW IS TO AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE FORMALIZE AGREEMENT WITH COL HUTCHINSON AND GET WORK STARTED ON REVISION. THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS ARE OFFERED TO FACILITATE THIS</p> <p>A. THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR AN IMPROVED MANUAL IS A CLEAR DEFINITION/DESCRIPTION OF THE REQUIREMENT. ALTHOUGH THIS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH AND GENERAL DIRECTION WAS DEVELOPED FOR SSO DOC COORD AT MEETING 12-14 JAN, IT WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE EASILY INCORPORATED INTO SPECIFIC DIRECTION TO HUTCHINSON. PURPOSE THAT SECRETARY ADTB DEVELOP WRITTEN OUTLINE OF TASK AND THAT THIS BE REVIEWED BY CONCERNED AGENCIES. IN VIEW OF URGENCY, SUGGEST THIS REVIEW COULD MOST APPROPRIATELY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY MEETINGS OF REPS AT FMC HQ. ALTERNATIVE IS FOR AUTHOR TO VISIT EACH LOCATION. THIS IS POOR</p> <p>SECOND BEST</p>

PAGE 2	OF DE 4	DRAFTER'S NAME NOM DU RÉDACTEUR	OFFICE BUREAU	TEL. - TÉL.
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MESSAGE FORM
FORMULE DE MESSAGE

2910-CFP 300

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FROM DE	
TO-A	
INFO	<p>B. DOCTRINE BOARD SECRETARIAT SHOULD HANDLE ALL CONTACT WITH COL HUTCHINSON AND PROVIDE ADM SP FOR HIS WORK/TRAVEL. INCLUDING:</p> <p>(1) DEVELOPMENT, SUBMISSION FOR APPROVAL AND FUNDING OF CONTRACT</p> <p>(2) ARRANGEMENTS AND FUNDING OF NECESSARY TRAVEL</p> <p>(3) STAFFING OF DRAFT REVISION</p> <p>3. APPRECIATE THAT ALL CONCERNED ARE OVER COMMITTED AT THIS TIME AND THAT TD VISIT TO FMC MAY BE UNWELCOMED. ADDITIONAL TASK BUT ATTACHING PRIORITY TO THIS ACTIVITY NOW AND QUOTE GETTING IT RIGHT UNQUOTE WILL PAY IMPORTANT DIVIDENDS LATER. OUR AIM AT THE MOMENT SHOULD BE TO HAVE A REVISED SOUND CFP 300 IN HAND WHEN WE ARE READY TO BEGIN WORK ON THE THIRD (AND HOPEFULLY, FINAL) DRAFT OF 301(1) IN THE EARLY SUMMER</p> <p>4. DETAILS REF CONTRACT AUTHOR ARE: LCOL (RET) W.E. HUTCHINSON, 1241 SUNNYSIDE AVE, VICTORIA, BC, V8A 4A3</p>

PAGE 3 of 4	DRAFTER'S NAME NOM DU REDACTEUR	OFFICE BUREAU	TEL - TEL
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FOR COMMEN/SIGNALS USE - A L'USAGE DU CENTRE DES COMMUNICATIONS/TRANSMISSIONS

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INFO	PH GOVT NETWORK 569,384-6567

PAGE 4	OF DE 4	DRAFTER'S NAME NOM DU REDACTEUR L.M. DIEBEL MAJ	OFFICE BUREAU DLCD 4	TEL. - TEL. 2-8550				
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DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ÉTAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES

NDRMS/SGDDN 3-3-2

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Transmis à

SC 4649-4

FORT FRONTENAC
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
K7K 2X8

AUG 27 1980

22 Aug 80

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2910-CFP300

REVISION OF CFP 300

Charged to/Chargé à

Reference: FMC 2900-1 (CD) 9 Jul 80

1. CLFCSC was tasked at paragraph 34a of Item XIV of reference to review CFP 300 and CFP 301(1) with a view to removing redundancies and to recommending additions. It was realized after review of the manuals that the ideal approach would be to re-write CFP 300 completely and then to revise CFP 301(1) accordingly; however, such an approach was beyond both the mandate and resources of CLFCSC and this more limited approach was taken.

2. The task was approached as follows:

- a. ATP-35. This keystone NATO manual cannot be amended unilaterally by Canada and therefore must be taken as a given at this point. However, Canadian proposals for revision of ATP-35 should be put forward once CFPs 300 and 301(1) are issued in final form;
- b. Repetition. Since ATP-35 is the keystone doctrinal manual it follows that it will (should) be read before CFP 300 and in turn CFP 300 will (should) be read before CFP 301(1). Therefore, it was felt that if an aspect of doctrine was covered adequately in ATP-35 it should not normally be necessary to repeat the material in CFP 300 except in those cases where clarity or particular emphasis was required. In most cases a reminder to the reader of CFP 300 to review appropriate sections of ATP-35 would suffice;
- c. CFP 300. It was considered that CFP 300 should deal with the broad principles, functions and tactical roles of land forces and should indicate differences in doctrine from ATP-35 where required. Detailed conduct of the phases of war would be reserved for CFP 301(1).
- d. CFP 301(1). The revised draft of this CFP has not been received at this date and therefore only CFP 300 could be reviewed. It

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Major
DLP 4-2
29 Aug

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- 2 -


is recommended that a similar approach to that used for CFP 300 can be taken with CFP 301(1) once it is issued, and that FMC editors are the logical agents for that task. Certainly it is clear that priority should go to getting the two fundamental manuals, CFPs 300 and 301(1), in order before embarking on production of other manuals; and

- e. Style. Accuracy, brevity and clarity are the keys to good military writing. CFP 300 leaves something to be desired in regard to brevity and clarity. It is recommended that a point-form style is more appropriate than a narrative style. An example of the recommended style is shown for paragraph 102.1 and it is felt that the revision of the entire CFP using such a style is properly the task of a professional editor. Of course, not all paragraphs of the CFP are suited to the point-form style and editorial discretion will be required.

3. Recommended changes to CFP 300 using the above guidelines are shown at Annex A. If the approach taken at Annex A is considered acceptable, then it will be necessary to take the following steps:

- a. completion of the style revision of CFP 300 using the point-form model;
- b. writing of the additional chapters recommended in Annex A;
- c. proof-reading and final editing by professionals;
- d. circulation of a revised draft to ADTB members for comments;
- e. incorporation of comments from ADTB members as appropriate;
- f. circulation of a final draft for comments by ADTB members;
- g. final revision and issue of CFP 300.

It is recognized that the above steps will take some time but it is considered essential to aim for quality versus quantity. In the past the emphasis has too often been on rushing new manuals into print at the expense of quality.


J.H. Allan
Lieutenant-Colonel
CLFCSC Member
ADTB Working Group

Attachment: 1

ANNEX A - Proposed Revision of CFP 300

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INFORMATION

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ANNEX A
TO SC 4649-4
DATED 22 AUG 80

Proposed Revision of CFP 300

Serial	Chapter/Paragraph	Recommended Changes
1	Foreword/3	<p>a. <u>Line 1.</u> Delete "incorporates", insert "is based on."</p> <p>b. Add new sentence at end of para 3: "Material in ATP-35 is not repeated in CFP 300 except where necessary for clarity or emphasis and then usually in summary form. Readers should review ATP-35 before commencing CFP 300."</p>
2	Table of Contents	<p>If the proposed revisions in this annex are accepted then the Table of Contents will require revision at the end of the editing process. In particular, it is recommended that the ATP-35 Table of Contents does not need to be reproduced in CFP 300, (pp. xiii and xiv).</p>
3	1/102.1	<p>a. The current para 102.1 totals 99 words. The proposed revision below totals 66 words and is an example of the point-form style which I recommend be used throughout the CFP. Of course, not all paragraphs will be suited to the point-form style and editorial discretion will be required. Time did not permit the giving of more than one example of this style.</p> <p>b. <u>New para 102.1.</u></p> <p>"1. This manual is the fundamental doctrinal source for the Canadian Army, from which all other army doctrine flows. The major features of CFP 300 are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. coverage from highest to lowest command levels of military activities within a theatre;b. description of political-military inter-relationships;c. the organization of a theatre of operations; and,d. the application of principles and fundamentals to the conduct of various military operations."

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ANNEX A
TO SC 4649-4
DATED 22 AUG 80

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Serial	Chapter/Paragraph	Recommended Changes
4	1/102.2	<u>Line 1.</u> Delete "incorporates", insert "is based on."
5	1/102.3	Add to sentence after "Dictionary": "and CFP 121(5), Manual of Terminology."
6	2/204.3	The heading for this para should be changed to "Nuclear, Bacteriological and Chemical Warfare (NBCW)," since the para deals with the entire spectrum.
7	3/302.5	Add new sentence at start of para: "The word 'maintenance' is used here in the sense of all supply, reinforcement, moral and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to carry out its role."
8	3/304.1	In diagram after "Brigade" show: "/Brigade Group."
9	3/305.3	a. Add sentence at end: "A theatre of operations is shown in outline at Figure 1." b. The attached figure from CSC 202 can be used for Figure 1.
10	4/401.2.b.	Add at end: "Aviation."
11	4/401.2.c.	Add to sentence: "and thus for practical purposes qualify as combat support arms."
12	4/403.3.c.	This is, I believe, the first use of the term "counter-penetration" in the CFP. Throughout the manual "counter-penetration" must be replaced by "blocking operation" and "counter" by "block" depending on the context.
13	4/413.2	Delete "anti-tank", insert "anti-armour" in this para and throughout the manual unless the context clearly signifies "anti-tank" as opposed to "anti-armour."
14	4/420.3	a. At end of para add: "An outline organization of an area communications system is shown at Figure ____." b. The attached diagram can serve as the basis for the figure.

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ANNEX A
TO SC 4649-4
DATED 22 AUG 80

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
Serial	Chapter/Paragraph	Recommended Changes
15	5/	<p>a. This chapter needs to be rewritten completely to put administration in both the COMMZ and CZ into proper perspective. CSC 205, Administration in a Theatre of Operations, is a good basis for the rewrite and CFCSC is the logical OPI.</p> <p>b. In the rewrite it is recommended that:</p> <p>(1) Section 1 of current chapter remain as is except for the following change: Para 501.3. Change to: "3. This chapter states the principles of administration and outlines the administrative functions within the theatre."</p> <p>(2) Section 2 remain as is.</p> <p>(3) Section 3 be rewritten based on Chapters 3, 4, 7 and 8 of CSC 205.</p> <p>(4) Section 4 remain as is.</p>
16	6/601	a. Add new sentence at start: "Read Chapter 1 of ATP-35 before reading this chapter."
	6/602	b. Delete entirely
		c. Retain Sections 2-5 inclusive.
	6/Section 6	<p>a. Remove all of this section and replace with following: "628. Read paragraphs 117-118 of ATP-35."</p> <p>b. "629. Unallocated."</p>
	6/Section 7	<p>a. Remove all of this section and replace with: "630. Read paragraphs 121-124 inclusive of ATP-35."</p> <p>b. "631-633. Unallocated."</p>

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


FIGURE 1 TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF A THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

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ANNEX A
TO SC 4649-4
DATED 22 AUG 80

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Serial	Chapter/Paragraph	Recommended Changes
17	7/711.5	a. <u>Line 1.</u> Delete "may", insert "will".
	7/711.3	b. <u>Lines 1 and 2.</u> Delete "at divisional level and below."
18	8/810.1	At end of para add: "Deception operations are normally ordered, directed, and controlled at the highest levels, usually Corps or Army Group."
19	9/901.1	At start of para add: "Read Chapter 2 of ATP-35 prior to reading this chapter."
	9/902.2	Delete all less heading and insert: "See para 205 of ATP-35."
	9/902.3	Delete all less heading and insert: "See para 206 of ATP-35."
	9/902.4	Delete all less heading and insert: "See para 207 of ATP-35."
	9/902.6	Delete all less heading and last sentence of 902.6.b. and insert: "See para 209 of ATP-35."
	9/902.7	Delete all except heading and insert: "See para 210 of ATP-35."
	9/902.8	Delete all except heading and insert: "See para 211 of ATP-35."
	9/902.9	Change heading to "Security" and retain para.
	9/903	a. Retitle to "Concept of Defence." b. <u>903.1.</u> Delete all and insert: "1. Paras 212-214 inclusive of ATP-35 deal with two typical concepts of defence in the Central Region of NATO, the positional defence and defence based on mobility. In Canadian doctrine defence is treated as an entity and the terms "positional defence" and "defence based on mobility" are not used. Although defence itself is an entity, all defence concepts contain two complementary elements: the static

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TO SC 4649-4
DATED 12 AUG 80

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Serial	Chapter/Paragraph	Recommended Change
19	9/903 (cont'd)	<p>to provide the framework for controlling ground, and the dynamic to provide the destruction of the enemy. A commander's concept of defence will include both static/positional and dynamic/mobile aspects. The actual defence arranged will depend on the mission, the forces and time available, the ground, the relative combat power and mobility of the opposing forces, the air situation, and the likelihood of the use of NBCW."</p> <p>c. <u>903.2.</u> Delete.</p> <p>d. <u>903.3.</u> Delete.</p> <p>e. <u>903.4.</u> Delete.</p> <p>f. <u>903.5.</u> Delete.</p> <p>g. <u>903.6.</u> Delete.</p>
20	9/904	<p>a. Retitle to "Phases of the Defence," and throughout change "stages" to "phases."</p> <p>b. <u>904.1.</u> Retain except to change 904.1.a. to "Covering Force Action/Delay" and 904.1.b. to "Main Defensive Battle."</p> <p>c. <u>904.2.</u> Retitle to "Covering Force Action/Delay." Delete second sentence.</p> <p>d. <u>904.3.</u> Retitle to "Main defensive battle phase." In line two delete "areas", insert "ground."</p> <p>e. <u>904.5.</u> Delete in line one from "where" to "employed" inclusive.</p> <p>f. <u>904.6.</u> Delete.</p> <p>g. <u>904.7.</u> In line 1 delete "Whatever defensive concept is used."</p>

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ANNEX A
TO SC 4649-4
DATED 22 AUG 80

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Serial	Chapter/Paragraph	Recommended Change
20	9/905	<p>a. <u>905.1.</u> Change to: "1. <u>General.</u> The combat zone for defence as illustrated in Fig 9-1 is organized into a control line, The Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) and the three following areas: a. The Covering Force Area b. The Main Defence Area c. The Rear Area."</p> <p>b. <u>905.2.</u> Delete all except title and insert: "See para 216 of ATP-35."</p> <p>c. <u>905.3.</u> Delete all except title and insert: "See para 217 of ATP-35."</p> <p>d. <u>905.4.</u> Delete all except title and insert: "See para 218 of ATP-35."</p> <p>e. <u>905.5.</u> Delete all except title and insert: "See para 219 of ATP-35."</p>
	9/907	<u>907.</u> Delete all except title and insert: "See para 220 of ATP-35."
	9/911	<u>911.8.</u> Change "anti-tank" to "anti-armour."
	9/914	<p>a. <u>914.2.a.</u> Delete.</p> <p>b. <u>914.3.c.</u> In line 1 delete "If the defence is based on mobility."</p>
	9/915	<p>a. <u>915.1.</u> Delete all except title and insert: "See para 226 of ATP-35."</p> <p>b. <u>915.2.</u> Delete all except title and insert: "See para 229 of ATP-35."</p> <p>c. <u>915.3.</u> Delete all except title and insert: "See para 230 of ATP-35."</p> <p>d. <u>915.4.</u> Delete all except title and insert: "See para 231 of ATP-35."</p>
21	9/915	

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ANNEX A
TO SC 4649-4
DATED 22-AUG 80

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Serial	Chapter/Paragraph	Recommended Change
21	9/915 (cont'd)	e. <u>915.5</u> . Delete all except title and insert: "See para 232 of ATP-35."
22	9/916	a. <u>916.3.d</u> . Delete. b. <u>916.3.f</u> . Insert at start: "A control line marking." c. <u>916.3.m</u> . In line 2 delete "unit/."
23	9/917	Delete all except title and insert: "See paras 236 and 237 of ATP-35."
24	9/923	Delete all except title and insert: "See para 309 of ATP-35."
25	9/932	Delete all except title and insert: "See para 316 of ATP-35."
26	9/933	Delete all except title and insert: "See para 317 of ATP-35."
27	9/934	Delete all except title and insert: "See para 318 of ATP-35."
28	10/ 10/Section 3 10/Section 4 10/Section 5	<u>1001.1</u> . Insert at start: "Read Chapter 4 of ATP-35 before reading this chapter." a. <u>1018</u> . Delete all except heading and insert: "See paras 422-435 inclusive of ATP-35." b. <u>1024.4</u> . Delete all except heading and insert: "See para 451 of ATP-35." <u>1031</u> . Delete all except heading and insert: "See para 419 of ATP-35." <u>1033</u> . Delete all except title and insert: "See para 452 of ATP-35."

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ANNEX A
TO SC 4649-4
DATED 22 AUG 80

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Serial	Chapter/Paragraph	Recommended Change
29	Additions to CFP 300	<p>a. The above proposals for revising CFP 300 will suffice for a "quick-fix" but for the long term additional chapters/sections of CFP 300 are required.</p> <p>b. In particular it is considered that CFP 300 must contain amplification of the following chapters of ATP-35 in order to give a clearer concept of the Canadian approach to the various operations:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">(1) Chapter 5 of ATP-35 on Tactical Nuclear Operations is too general for teaching purposes and needs to be expanded along the lines of the Staff College precis on the subject;(2) Chapter 6 of ATP-35 on Biological and Chemical Warfare needs similar expansion;(3) Chapter 8 of ATP-35 on Electronic Warfare needs similar expansion;(4) Chapter 9 of ATP-35 on Land/Air Warfare needs expansion and in particular requires a section on the co-ordination and control of friendly aerospace (aerospace management);(5) Chapter 10 of ATP-35, Air Mobile Operations, needs expansion and should reflect the final ADTB direction on terminology for these operations;(6) Chapter 11 of ATP-35 on Airborne Operations needs amplification in line with the peculiar Canadian airborne capability;(7) Chapter 14 of ATP-35 concerning Fighting in Built-up Areas/Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain requires amplification in line with the Staff College precis on this subject;

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ANNEX A
TO SC 4649-4
DATED 22 AUG 80

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Serial	Chapter/Paragraph	Recommended Change
29	Additions to CFP 300 (cont'd)	<p>b. (8) Chapter 15 of ATP-35 concerning Crossing Breaching Operations requires amplification in line with the current Engineer proposal for revision of this doctrine;</p> <p>(9) There should be a new chapter in CFP 300 on Civil/Military Co-operation (CIMIC).</p> <p>c. None of the above proposed additions need be lengthy but should aim to resolve ambiguities in ATP-35 and to present Canadian approaches to these topics.</p> <p>d. It may be that all or none of the proposed additional chapters are required if CFP 301(1) contains the required information. Without the latest draft of CFP 301(1) being available it was impossible to make a final judgment in this area. Regardless, the approach of putting general principles and functions into CFP 300 a detailed execution into CFP 301(1) should be followed.</p>

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Canadian Armed Forces
Mobile Command

Forces armées canadiennes
Force mobile




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10 Jun 79

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FMC COMMENTS ON CFP 300 (INTERIM)
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

25 1979

- References:
- A. 2910-CFP 300 (DLP 4) of 1 Dec 78
 - B. DLP 45734 of 222120Z Mar 79
 - C. FMC Doc 09 of 221500Z Mar 79

File No
Dossier No... *2910-CFP300*

Charged to/Chargé à... *DLP*
25 May 79

1. The consolidated comments for FMC are enclosed as requested in References A and B. As will be noted from a perusal of our general and detailed remarks, we feel that CFP 300 requires considerable modification before it fully complies with the Army's requirement for a source document.

Revise para to explain why ATP-35 incl

2. Part of the difficulty of the present manual, it is felt, resides in its awkward structure. The twinning in one manual of two only partly complementary volumes, CFP 300 and ATP 35, leads to unnecessary repetition and detracts from its cohesiveness. CFP 300 it is felt should be able to stand alone as a source document.

Expands scope

3. Because of the probability that Canadian participation in any future mid or high intensity operations would take place alongside or as an integral part of a US, British, or German formation, consideration should be given to a brief description of the principal differences, in tactical concepts between the Canadian forces and our allies. This would also have the merit of introducing the requirement for inter-operability in certain operational scenarios.

4. The extensive and sometimes critical nature of our comments should not be permitted to obscure this Command's appreciation for the scope of the task faced by the authors nor the commendable effort they have made. The scope of our comments reflects the extraordinary importance which FMC attaches to CFP 300. This Headquarters will gladly provide any assistance that may be deemed necessary in the production of this publication.

[Signature]
J.T.F.A. Liston
Colonel

DCOS Combat Development & Training Development
for Commander

[Signature] Enclosure

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10-11-1974 (10-11-1974)

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DLP4

I have flagged the comments on CFP 300 & reviewed them in detail. Those that are marked with a check (✓) can usually be easily incorporated. Those that are marked with a "✓(?)" are to be examined & incorporated if appropriate. Those that are marked with an "X" or unmarked are not accepted for incorporation now. The rejections are made for a variety of reasons but the main ones are: that the reviewer has not justified the effort; or that the comment is NOT constructive.

If you would look them over & approve my recommendation, I will then process them & get on with the prep of the Greek edition of CFP 300.

Note esp the FMC comments on cl. 11
& my req for direction

11 Sep

[Signature]

001885

15 Jun 79

FMC COMMENTS ON CFP 300 (INTERIM)

CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

GENERAL

1. In general CFP 300 (Interim) does not meet the requirements of the Army. The aim is too limited and the scope too general. It duplicates, rather than expands on, ATP 35. This publication should provide the basic doctrine upon which the Army conducts war. It should provide the organizational framework of our forces in war, ie. division, corps or army and specifically explain how that organization will fight, whether operating alone or within our alliances. Such subjects as how the Army will convert from its peacetime status to a war footing (mobilization) should be included as well as the CDN philosophy for each phase of war (expanding on the thin veneer of ATP 35 e.g. GE vs the US approach on defence; attrition vs manoeuvre:) The Combat Development Studies have evoked a wealth of information and discussion in this regard. CFP 300 should provide the framework for CDN Army doctrine. In its present form it does not achieve this aim.

2. The standard of prose and grammatical construction in this manual are disappointing. As our keystone doctrine manual it should stand as a model of professional military writing. It should be easy to read and it should convey a strong message of military competence. It could be read by a variety of readers not just Army Officers: In its present state it will command a limited readership. Although one may not agree with the content and style of FM 100-5 the manual has been widely read and has resulted in much constructive professional discussion. Equally the German Army Field Manual 100/100 is a good example of effective military writing (even in English Translation). CFP 300 should have a similar impact on the reader.

3. Chapt 6 should be inserted after Chapt 1, to provide the general conceptional basis for the specific areas that follow.

4. Observations and comments on each chapter are dealt with separately by Chapter in the following pages.

CFP 301

Mob policy

SERIAL REFERENCE

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

CFP 301

Staff System. The Canadian Staff System, up to theatre level, should be described by sub-branch in the first chapter.

1 Art 101.

1. Aim. The aim is too limited! It should be more positive and state the basic doctrine on how the Army is organized, commanded and employed.

2. If CFP 300 is to achieve stated aim at para 101, then the scope at para 102 is right; but then the execution in subsequent chapters is somewhat short of the mark. This is no doubt implicitly recognized by the inclusion of ATP 35 as an addendum. There should be a Cdn interpretation of all subjects covered in the NATO doctrine manual (ATP 35) if the statement at para 102.1 "this manual is the source manual from which all other doctrine of the Cdn land forces is derived" is to be true. As it stands, large segments of subsidiary doctrine will have to take its source direct from ATP 35, which is either wrong or then negates the requirement for CFP 300. CFP 300 falls short of the mark in the fd of special operations which are covered in chapters 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of ATP 35. By contrast, Chap 11 treats mainly one aspect of special operations which does not fall out of ATP 35 but is an expansion of an unquoted ABCA paper on the subject.

3. Read "planning and conduct of land operations".

2 Art 102.

The aim of this manual should be "to provide Canadian Officers with a source of general knowledge for the planning and conduct of Army operations."

3 Art 102.

Scope. Too general! It should cover the relationship between Government and the Military, the Forces roles and tasks of the Army, relationship with the other services, details of alliances and specific details on mobilization and how the Army plans and conducts operations in all types of war.

4 Para 102.1
(line one)

Delete one of the two "manuals" and "other".
Delete "source manual"; insert "fundamental document".

5 Para 102.1
(line 7)

Delete last sentence or rewrite. Meaning is not clear.
Read "included therein".

6 Para 102.2

In view of chapter 11, might quote relevant ABCA papers.

7 Art 103.

Title of article should read "Definitions".

SERIAL REFERENCE

- 8 Para 103.3 Strategy should be defined before tactics and strategy can be compared.
- 9 Sect 2 Too general. Should be more specifically Canadian National and Defence Policy.
- 10 Sect 4 ABCA now defines conflict as high, mid and low intensity. Types A and B will soon been deleted by new ABCA agreement in near future.
- 11 Sect 4 Too general. Should contain Canada's Forces in peacetime and war, outlining the basis of mobilization. Where are the Reserves?
- 12 Para 107.1 (line 6) Read "materiel" vice "material".
- 13 Para 107.4 (lines 8 and 9) Sentence redundant: Delete.
- 14 Para 107.4 (lines 11-13) On the contrary, army tactics and organization are simple.
- 15 Art 108. This article is ambiguous. It could also be expanded to include the organization of the Army staff system.

I hope so too.

Policy void

✓

✓

?

If it were known...

SERIAL REFERENCE

CHAPTER 2

GENERAL. This Chapter is unduly vague and in its present form is not likely to be very useful.

- | | | | |
|-------|------------|---|---|
| 1 | Para 201.1 | Second sentence is too long and complicated. Recommend break down into sub-paras. | |
| ✓ | 2 | Para 201.3
(last line) | "Professional" is redundant. |
| | 3 | Para 202.2 | 1. This might be expanded to deal with relationship and div of responsibility and authority between civilian authorities and military commanders.

2. Last line: insert "types of" after "certain". |
| ✓ | 4 | Sub-para
204.2.a
(line 7) | After "allied forces must have" insert "an excellent intelligence organization,"..... |
| | 5 | Para 203.1 | Paragraph is verbose and complicated in structure. |
| ✓ | 6 | Sub-para
204.3.a | Title should read "Nuclear and Chemical Weapons". |
| | 7 | Art 204 | It could be argued that "opposing forces" could be better treated as one of the constant factors in combat as in chapter 6, and that one of the principal elements of the op environment is the military strategy adopted to carry out the policies discussed at Art 202 and which will influence the tactics to be followed. |
| | 8 | Para 204.1 | Lines 1, 4 and 11: delete "situations" and insert "conflicts" to agree with definitions in 106 para 1. |
| ✓ (?) | 9 | Para 204.3 | 1. Paragraph title to be changed to "Other Influences" as sub-paragraphs are a hodge-podge of topics. Sub-paragraphs should be titled with the major topic, i.e. Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons, etc. |
| | 10 | Sub-para
204.3c. | This sub-para is confusing. Troops must be conserved but once they are committed to battle, protection must be secondary to the mission. |
| ✓ | 11 | Sub-para
204.3.c. | Awkward sentence. Delete "for example whether it be" and insert simply "be it". |

SERIAL REFERENCE

- ✓ Correct 12 Sub-para 204.3.d. There is no Chap 13 in the manual. (last line).
- 13 Sub-para 204.3.d. Delete "various threats as they change" (line 2).
Insert "various threats as changes are identified."
- 14 Para 204.4 The last sentence does not use accepted terminology and is therefore subject to many interpretations. It would be better to refer to air superiority and to be more specific in the employment of air power; ie, CAS, BAI, recce, etc.
- 15 Art 205 1. Laws of War on Land. It is a misunderstanding of the international laws of war to state that they are "binding on all belligerents and neutrals alike".
2. These basic principles are products of European civilization and are limited to those states which subscribe to them. There are a great many parts of the third world where these laws are not acknowledged and certainly not observed. Reference to these laws should be qualified accordingly.
3. Reference should be made to CFP 122 Geneva Conventions where details may be found.
- ✓ 16 Para 205.2 Paragraph is verbose, labouring the point of the paragraph to the extreme.

SERIAL REFERENCE

CHAPTER 3

GENERAL

1. The general comments for Chapter 2 apply to this chapter as well. Land forces consist of soldiers, weapons, vehicles and equipment. What is the point of article 302? Article 304 should contain the organization of the Army.

2. There must be a section to indicate and describe the development of a theatre of operations. In other words starting with the arrival of combat elements and followed by creation of administrative areas as the combat elements move forward and finally developing into a full-fledged theatre of operations with all its components.

What is ACE today?

- | | | |
|----|-------------------------|---|
| 1 | Para 302.2 | Delete in its entirety, or use "Cbt Functions" as noted by the System Study |
| 2 | Para 302.3 | a. Third line: delete "avoid"; insert "negate".
b. Tenth line: "animal or vehicle" to be in parenthesis. |
| 3 | Para 302.4 | "Mass" is used as a noun and verb. Meaning is confusing. |
| 4 | Para 302.4 | Last line: "and" vice "or". |
| 5 | Para 302.5 | Fifth and eight lines: "personnel" vice "men". |
| 6 | Para 302.6 | First sentence is unnecessary. One does not co-ordinate things. One co-ordinates the actions of people. |
| 7 | Para 302.6.a | Between "and surveillance units" and "and providing headquarters" insert "intelligence specialist units," |
| 8 | Para 302.6.b. | Delete "The ability to interpret and co-ordinate" insert "The ability to plan collection, interpret and co-ordinate...." |
| 9 | Paras 302.6.b and 301.7 | Paras 6 and 7 deal with combat intelligence <u>not</u> command and control. Under either heading the content is inadequate. |
| 10 | Para 304.5 | Delete "different" and insert "several". After "in which case" insert "the headquarters may have a combined staff". |
| 11 | Para 304.6.a | Delete "sustaining ground combat" and insert "fighting". |

SERIAL REFERENCE

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|----|-----------------------------|---|
| 12 | Para 304.6.c. | <p>After "mechanized brigades" insert "on an equal or armour heavy basis".
Delete the sentence "the organic vehicles of..." and insert, "the tank is the principle fighting vehicle and its characteristics are, firepower, protection, mobility flexibility and shock action".
The sentence is meaningless.
It is primarily an offensive formation because it possesses more tanks than the mechanized division.</p> |
| 13 | Para 304.6.d
lines 8 - 9 | <p>1. This is an old cliché. Modern weaponry allow the AB division to become a powerful atk fm if desired. Also the inherent capability of AB division to carry out air mobile ops should be noted.</p> <p>2. "Staying Power" - What does it mean?</p> |
| 14 | Para 304.6.e | First sentence is redundant. See also remarks concerning sub-para 304.6.d. |
| 15 | Para 304.7b | This brigade group, by inference, seems to be a peacetime organization. If this is so, it should be clearly stated, emphasizing the normal wartime standard brigade. |
| 16 | Art 305 to 310 | <p>1. Sequence of explanation should be highest to lowest, political to fwd troops, therefore political appointment - - C in C to bases/communications zone to lines of communication to cbt zone.</p> <p>2. The concept of "national commander" and his rights and powers needs explanation.</p> |
| 17 | Paras 305.1.a and b. | Incorrect use of "joint". |
| 18 | Art 306. | Definition of "combat zone" not IAW AAP 6. |
| 19 | Art 310. | <p>1. It is important to expand this article in order to cover the aspect of rear area security in the communications zone. Very little, if any, doctrine exists in the Canadian Forces with regards to rear area security.</p> <p>2. As an altn to comments on art 108 (Serial 15 of Chapt 1) systems and Cdn Staff systems might be briefly described here including a discussion on how the two systems can be integrated.</p> |

SERIAL REFERENCE

CHAPTER 4

GENERAL

Sect 8 is not consistent with present aviation doctrine nor with that outlined in the "Air Support Study 1986 - 1995". Attached as Annex A is a revised Section 8 which more properly explains the basic principles of aviation employment in the land battle.

- | | | | |
|----------------------|----|-----------------------------|---|
| X | 1 | Para 401.1 | Last sentence: rewrite to reflect the "team" and the concept of "never" employing armour alone. |
| X | 2 | Para 401.2 | 1. The use of term "Contact Arms" and "Combat Arms" would be preferable here. Firmer guidelines must be provided for the distinctions.

2. Add new sub-para d: "While intelligence specialists and units are not "an arm" their provision of timely information regarding enemy activity and intention permits a commander to concentrate combat power at critical places and times." |
| X | 3 | Section 2 | This section should provide the framework upon which CFP 305(1) is based. It should include all of the taskings that armour will be given in the various operations and phases of war. |
| X | 4 | Para 402.2 | Because of Canada's close association with US forces, it could be useful to briefly outline the US "cavalry" concept. |
| X | 5 | Para 403.b | a. Fifth line: insert "usually" between "and" and "within".
b. Last line: delete "sets". |
| ✓ | 6 | Sub-para 403.2d | Fifth line: insert "quickly" after "regroup" The infinitive is split as it now stands. |
| X | 7 | Paras 403.3 404.2 and 404.3 | Simplify the paragraphs, listing points and avoiding repetition. |
| ? neither... nor 8 ✓ | | Para 405.1, (line 2) | "Indirect fire" definition of artillery does not apply to AD artillery. Definition should be reviewed. |
| X | 9 | Para 405.2 | We are not aware of the existence of fuel air explosives in the Artillery. |
| ✓ | 10 | Sub-para 405.3c | Second line: although drones are included in "aerial vehicles" "aircraft" is a far simpler word. |
| X | 11 | Sub-para 406.2c | Last line: a statement of the obvious; delete. |

SERIAL REFERENCE

- X
- 12 Sub-para 406.2.f. An arty regt, employed within the Div Arty as a CS regt will normally have CM radars; however it will not, under our doctrine have a sound ranging capability. The inclusion of a VLLAD Bty is a temporary, non-operational expedient in the absence of a proper AD Branch. References to both must be deleted.
- 13 Sub-para 406.3.b. The para is not definitive and may lead to a good deal of misunderstanding. Emphasis should be placed on the fact that artillery is a division level resource. A suggested new para 3.b. follows:
"b. To obtain full advantage of these characteristics, artillery is grouped within a Divisional Artillery organization as the normal minimum. Centralization of command, i.e. the authority to move and deploy the guns, ensures that the artillery's fire power can be concentrated in the right place at the right time and in sufficient quantity to produce a decisive blow. Control, i.e. the authority to order the fire of the artillery, is best exercised when decentralized to the subordinate commander in closest touch with the situation in the forward area. Control may be passed quickly to meet a sudden change in a tactical situation. Response, however, need not be delayed by unnecessary and time consuming movement of fire units."
- ✓ (C?)
- X
- 14 Sub-para 406.3.f. Delete lines three and four. After "main duties are to", insert, "engage targets by observed fire, provide battlefield surveillance and to advise the supported commander on fire support matters."
-
- 15 Sub-para 406.3.h. Delete sub-para. Info is contained in revised 406.3.b noted above.
- X
- 16 Para 408.2 This para appears to contain a mix of references to strategic and tactical systems and responses. Suggest it be revised to address a tactical level, IAW the thrust of the manual, or, be deleted.
- Territorial
- 17 Sub-para 408.4e State reason for last sentence.
- X
- 18 Sub-para 408.5.b. Delete reference to AD bty within CS Fd Arty regt.
- X
- 19 Para 409.1. 1. Role is not correctly stated: It should read, "The role of the Infantry is to close with and destroy the enemy". (Ref Infantry Study).

SERIAL REFERENCE

- ✓
X 20 Para 409.1. (Cont) 2. First sentence "in close combat" is repetitive and redundant.
3. Last line: "can" vice "may".
- X 21 Para 409.3 Delete "resources" and insert "components of the Army".
First line: delete "armoured"
- X 22 Para 410.1 Delete "machine guns" as the term "small arms" normally encompasses those weapons smaller than 20 mm.
- X 23 Para 410.2 Establish an organizational hierarchy: HQ — rifle coys, etc.
- X 24 Para 411.1 1. Replace "inf bn" wherever it appears with "inf units" which is a more generic term.
2. Second line: delete "compartmented".
3. Fifth line: "skillful" vice "wise".
- X 25 Sub-para 411.1.e. Delete and Substitute: "Vulnerability. The infantryman in the open is vulnerable to all types of fire and weapons effects. To minimize this weakness the infantryman must be skilled in preparing protective shelters, fieldcraft, camouflage and concealment. The effective use of ground for movement, firing positions, concealment and protection has a direct bearing on his survival and his ability to accomplish his task. When dug in the infantryman is relatively immune - - -"
- X 26 Para 411.3 Delete present para. Substitute:
Infantry has a predominant role in operations that take place in close terrain where fields of observation and fire are short and ground movement is restricted to foot travel: This includes urban areas, forests, jungles and mountains. To fight under these rough and sometimes austere terrain conditions requires the infantryman to have a high standard of physical fitness.
- X 27 Sect 5 1. The Army does not now have "anti-armour units. This should be noted.
2. While section 5 is supposed to describe anti-armour units, the emphasis is on the anti-armour plan.
- X 28 Art 413. Reference to "companies" and later to "anti-tank companies" in the same sentence leads one to believe that two separate and different organizations are being referred to.

SERIAL REFERENCE

- X 29 Para 415.1. The role of the engineers is not precisely stated. The current version is in the most recent Engineer CD Study.
- X 30 Para 418.2 (line 6) Last sentence appears to contradict statement of dual roles of Signals at art 418.1, line 1. It should be deleted.
- X 31 Para 418.3 Recommend text be changed to read: "The characteristics of an effective combat communications system are: ..." (Communications principles do not encompass the characteristics listed).
- ✓ 32 Para 420.2 First line. Delete "responsibility"; insert "authority". One cannot delegate responsibility, but one must delegate auth.
- X 33 Para 420.4 Second line. Delete "economy"; insert "diversity". The existence of diverse communications organizations tends to improve durability.
- 2 34 Section 8. Delete Section 8 in entirety. Substitute. new Section 8 attached as Appendix I.
- X 35 Para 421.1.c. (line 11) Wording is too restrictive; suggest it should read "might be used to place troops forward of the FEBA".
- X 36 Sub-para 422.1 (line 4) Read "The basic unit is a tactical ---". (Note also that the organization described herein is at variance with present reality).
- X 37 Art 424 (line 6) Flight paths need not avoid artillery and mortar fire unless the debris caused by the rounds may be ingested by the aircraft engines.
- X 38 Para 426.1. Delete "inferior" insert "independent". What about all arms training and SOPs?
- X 39 Para 427.2 (lines 2 - 7) 1. "built up easily" is poorly worded. Line 7, delete "consistency of method", insert "SOPs".
2. This paragraph should mention the temporary methods of groupings which are the battle gp and the cbt team.
- X 40 Para 428.3. (line 8) What is "armoured infantry"?
- ✓ 41 Para 429.2 Syntax of last sentence is defective.
- Alter ✓ 42 Para 429.3. (line 3) 1. This contradicts art 401.2 which states there are three cbt arms: armour, inf and arty.
2. Delete "Combat Arms", substitute "Contact Arms".

SERIAL REFERENCE

CHAPTER 5

- 1 Para 501.1 Second sentence: too long; restructure.
- ✓ 2 Para 505.1 Line 4. Comma after "disease"
- 3 Para 505.2 Delete "which are used should the system be disrupted". This application is not really required. An alternative is to reword the sentence to read: "should the evacuation system be disrupted."
- 4 Art 509.
(line 1 and
line 9)
 1. Delete "route reconnaissance, signing and traffic control; the custody of prisoners of war"
Insert. "route reconnaissance, route signing and traffic control; supervision of the custody of prisoners of war...."
 2. Delete "staff for traffic control, custody of prisoners of war,"
Insert "staff for traffic control, prisoners of war,"
 3. Line eight/nine: In strictest sense the Military Police are not responsible to the operations staff as the staff have no command function.
- 5 Art 511
 1. System of Supply. The description of the "normal" system of supply to a Canadian formation operating within an allied theatre (para 522.9) addresses an unlikely ally. The logistic pattern described appears to be based to a large extent on the Commonwealth or British one, long used as a teaching vehicle for Canadian Army Officers.
 2. It can reasonably be assumed that the likely allied theatre of the size described in this manual would be AFCENT and the most likely area of operations for a Canadian formation would be in Southern Germany, CENTAG. Accordingly, the allied logistic systems that a Canadian formation would most likely be concerned with are American or German, not British. Basically the Canadian System must be "neutral" and capable of being plugged into any likely allied system with the interposition of a FMSU"
 3. Supply. The description of "push" or "pull" systems is confusing unless the level of supply is being specifically discussed. At first or second line, we are basically a "pull" system for all items including combat supplies. It is only at a third line level that the system becomes one of "push". However, for special operations where large quantities may be required, combat supplies will be "pushed" forward.

SERIAL REFERENCE

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|---|----|-----------------------|---|
| ✓ | | Sub-para 511.2.c | Continue sentence with "and bulk fuel tanker" |
| ✓ | 6 | Sub-para 511.3.a | 1. For "each" substitute "most". (line 2).
2. (Line 8). After "level" insert "and below". |
| ✓ | 7 | Sub-para 511.3.b | (Last line) before "delivery" insert "demand and" |
| ✓ | 8 | Para 512.1 | 1. (line 2). After "air," insert "pipeline,".
2. line 4. for "stores" substitute "materiel". |
| ✓ | 9 | Para 512.2 | 1. Lines 1 and 2. After "second line" amend remainder of sentence to read "and third line (general and specialist transport".

2. <u>Transport</u> . Para 2 states that transport may be classed as first line, second line, third line, general and specialist transport. Although examples of specialist transport are listed, there is no explanation that general and specialist transport are two types of third line transport. |
| ✓ | 10 | Sub-para 512.2d | To clear by differentiate from sub-para 512.2d(5) suggest wording be changed to "marine transport". |
| ✗ | 11 | Sub-para 512.2.d.(1). | Should read "ambulance units". |
| ✗ | 12 | Sub-para 512.2.d.(3). | Should read "bridging units". |
| ✗ | 13 | Art 513 | "Laundry and Bath" is the traditional sequence of the terms. |
| ✓ | 14 | Sup-para 514.1.c. | Last line. Substitute "service support" for "services". |
| ✗ | 15 | New Art | Insert new art between 514 and 515, referring to salvage and provision of industrial gases. |
| | 16 | Art 515 | 1. This art purports to treat repair <u>and</u> recovery. There is precious little on recovery in this section.

2. It should be added that equipment beyond second line capability will be backloaded to third line facilities for repair and will not be returned to the unit but will be placed in the supply system. |

SERIAL REFERENCE

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|-------------------------------|----|----------------------|---|
| ✓ | 17 | Art 516 | It should be indicated that postal services within a division/brigade group are associated closely with transport and in fact form an integral part of a transportation company. |
| × | 18 | Para 517.2 | The utility of this paragraph is questionable. |
| × | 19 | Art 518 | It must be mentioned that CANEX supplies are part of the supply system and as such are handled at division/brigade group levels by the supply company. Resupply is handled the same way as general stores. "CANEX" however is a peacetime organization. The term "personal amenities" is preferred. |
| × | 20 | Chap 5
Para 519.2 | The treatment of the adm staff system without a proper ops staff equivalent at this point in the manual comes as a surprise and further reinforces comment made for Chap 1, Art 108 and Chap 7 Art 711. |
| × | 21 | New Art | Between Arts 518 and 519 insert reference to provision of indigenous labour. |
| X (again ref serial 20 above) | 22 | Para 519.2 | The treatment of the adm staff system without a proper ops staff equivalent at this point in the manual comes as a surprise and further reinforces comment made for Chap 1, Art 108 and Chap 7 Art 711. |
| | 23 | Para 521.3 | 1. The statement "supply points are provided on the basis of one for a brigade" is incorrect. Supply points are normally based on an average of <u>one per division</u> .

2. The term "Corps Service Command" should not be used. The US term "Corps Support Command (COSCOM)" should be adopted in Canada, otherwise we will have the same acronym describing two different organizational titles. Like-wise "Divisional Support Command (DISCOM)" or "Divisional Support Group (DISGP)" should be used; also supply point is the ABCA/ NATO/US term for a RP and should be substituted for RP wherever it appears. |
| | 24 | Art 522 | It is suggested that an article describing the "Communications Zone" be included. This article should follow immediately Article 521. |
| × | 25 | Para 522.1 | Line 3. After "of" insert "controlling their distribution and". |

D Log Ops to advise again on terminology

SERIAL REFERENCE

26 Para 522.1

1. Transportation of Materiel in a Theatre. The statement that "from a materiel point of view, once stores have arrived in a theatre, the problem is essentially one of transporting them to the ultimate user" is an over-simplification. The word "objective" should be substituted for "problem".
2. Transportation plays a critical role from the point an item leaves the national supply facility, when delivery into a theatre, moves through the theatre L of C and eventually arrives in the hands of the end user. However, it is not until combat supplies or other items designated for specific customers are picked up at corps or divisional supply points for delivery, that the problem is essentially one of transportation.

3. The problems of managing the 600,000 different items in a theatre and the 100,000 items that must be readily available (Para 511.3a) extends well beyond transporting them. A complex structure of HQs, specialist units, and systems must be established in the Comm Z and to a lesser extent in the Corps rear to ensure the vast tonnages and variety of grounded materiel are operationally ready. This materiel must be protected, correctly scaled and effectively controlled. It must be held and maintained in a manner rapidly responsive to the needs of users. A system of responding to specific requirements which is accurate and very prompt and (hopefully automated) must be set up and made to operate efficiently. In a theatre the ratio of grounded to mounted stocks is perhaps 30 to 1. Moving them to users is essential but managing them on the ground presents equally demanding problems. Continue paragraph with "Containerization is expected to provide additional benefits in this area in the future".

27 Para 522.2

X I can't imagine how!

28 Para 522.3

Aerial Resupply to a Theatre. The statement that "aerial delivery to a theatre of any size will be the preferential method of carrying a wide range of vital supplies and personnel", may indicate a preference, but should be qualified by the real limitations of this mode of transport. This should be qualified by an explanation that strategic air transport resources will always be limited by the number of cargo aircraft available and a multitude of ground support considerations. Given the very

SERIAL REFERENCE

X

large tonnages, especially of ammo and fuel (the two most vital supplies required to support mechanized formations) ships must be considered to be the normal method of resupply to a theatre of operations. Aside from those stocks already prepositioned, the bulk of supplies to a Canadian formation engaged in a high or medium intensity operation will be delivered to the theatre by ship. It may be possible, however, to support a light formation with vital supplies by air in a low intensity operation; or a larger formation for brief periods.

✓ 29 Para 522.4
(line 5)

Delete "the vicinity of".

X 30 Art 523.

Ref should be made somewhere in this article to the differences in repair criteria which would prevail on the battlefield as opposed to peacetime. For example a vehicle with a broken windshield or headlight might not be given any repair priority at all because it is still battle-worthy.

31 Figure 5-1,
(Page 5-24)

1. If the supply chain description at art 522 has been well understood, figure 5-1 includes several discrepancies:
- a supply arrow should join RP and div svc gp;
 - supply arrow between corps svc cmd, RP and supply depot should be deleted;
 - demand arrow between corps svc cmd and supply depot should be added;
 - a supply arrow should join supply depot and RP; and
 - line between RP and corps rear boundary is meaningless.
 - See comments at serial 23 concerning correct terminology.

2. BAA's, DAA's and the CMA should indicate Headquarters designated within them. The involvement of administrative staffs in each Headquarters in controlling stores and processing reinforcement and equipment demands at each level should also be indicated.

X 32 Para 523.1

Should note battle CAS.

✓ 33 Para 523.4
(line 5)

The word division should be added to read:
"division support group".

SERIAL REFERENCE

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|---|----|--------------------------|--|
| | 34 | Para 523.5 | The following statement must be added: "Before commencing cannibalization or destruction of friendly equipment, authority must be obtained from the formation headquarters". |
| X | | | |
| | 35 | Para 524.4 | This para leaves the impression that the medical service will take recovered casualties back as reinforcements. For clarification it should read: "Following hospitalization a serviceman may be returned to duty either directly from a medical treatment facility, or from a convalescent centre". |
| X | | | |
| X | 36 | Sub-para 525.3a (line 2) | Delete "command" substitute "replenishment". |
| X | 37 | Sub-para 525.3b. | Insert "in transit" after "meet". |
| ✓ | 38 | Figure 5-3, (Page 5-30) | This diagram without a legend is inadequate. |
| | 39 | Para 526.5 | Last line: Insert period after "injuries" and deleted remainder of sentence. Continue with "These complications will make additional demands upon time and equipment and require a higher level of training for personnel". |
| X | | | |
| X | 40 | New Sect 5. | The aspect of refugees is not covered in this chapter. Because of its importance, a section should be dedicated to this. |

CHAPTER 6

SERIAL REFERENCE

GENERAL

X 1. While there is a section on psychological warfare (section 9) there is nothing on the important subject of civil affairs and military government. The Canadian experience in Holland during the Second World War must be remembered and some doctrine must be provided.

X 2. Delete the word "constant" from the heading. It is unnecessary and misleading.

X 3. The subject of NBCW could be treated in this Chapter as a separate section.

X 1 Art 602. If the classification is arbitrary, then why use it? The definitions should indicate the source, ie. ATP 35 or AAP 6.

X 2 Art 603 These historical and philosophical thoughts add nothing to the stated principles of war. If anything they undermine the principles.

✓ (?) 3 Sect 3 This section is very illogical. What is the point? It looks somewhat like the factors to be considered in a military appreciation and presented in a philosophical manner.

✓ 4 Art ~~408~~⁶⁰⁸ Delete the word "answer" and insert "ensure" in line 3.

X 5 Art 610 This discussion of firepower should include some comments on area weapons and point weapons.

✓ (?) 6 Para 610.1 In the last sentence the term "aerial weapons" should be changed to read "air-to-ground weapons" in order to better meet the author's intent.

X 7 Para 610.2, Read "...indirect fire wpons and/or air interdiction mission".

X 8 Art 612 Protection is normally divided between passive and active measures. Furthermore, it would help the reader if the discussion of protection was consolidated as a whole. The elements discussed at sect 6 should be brought together with those discussed here.

✓ (?) 9 Sect 4 The subject of leadership is not well handled here. It is suggested that a cursory mention is required and the subject should be left to the leadership manuals.

SERIAL REFERENCE

✓ 10 Para 619.3

1. "in the handling of the job at hand" is redundant.
2. The syntax of the entire paragraph is faulty.

X 11 Art 622

MORALE - There is no mention of the vital factor of support (security) of the individual. For example, knowing you will be looked after if injured and believing that the home front supports you.

✓ 12 Art 623

First line: "indecisive" and "unable to decide" are the same; delete one.

✓(?) 13 Para 631.2

It might be useful to give a short definition of these types of air operation.

X 14 Para 631.3

The foundation of the TACs and air space control systems should be described herein.

Correct ref 15 Art 634.

1. This paragraph refers the reader to Chapter 14, which does not exist. If it is to be issued later, this should be stated.

2. Line 3. Delete "to the necessary degree" (unnecessary, and possibly undesirable depending on the outcome of the CDEW study).

3. Line 5. Delete all after "sources". Insert "; ie, to effect electronic counter-countermeasures. In addition, commanders may be allotted electronic warfare resources in support of their operations, either as organic units or as temporarily attached elements. Electronic warfare is discussed further in Chapter eight of ATP-35."

16 Section 9.

Title: delete "Psychological Warfare" substitute "Psychological Operations"

17 Art 635

Delete Art 635 and
Insert new Art:

✓(?) "1. Psychological operations are the planned use of propaganda and other measures directed towards enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to create attitudes and behaviour favorable to the achievement of political or military objectives. Psychological warfare is the use of those means in a declared emergency or war against an enemy or hostile group. More simply, it is a form of war in which the target is peoples' minds and the ammunition is ideas, words, and graphics. It is a broad subject which ranges from the highest levels of national or international government right down to the lowest tactical levels in the field. By necessity, treatment of the subject here may be in general terms only.

SERIAL REFERENCE

2. Psychological warfare is a supporting weapon that may be very successful when properly co-ordinated with combat. Its value has been proven in the past and its scope is likely to increase in the future. In many situations short of war, success hinges on winning the support of the population. Psychological operations are admirably suited to this task.

3. Defensive psychological operations are also important and may involve use of programs directed at friendly forces. More important, however, is maintaining high morale and conditioning our own troops regarding the methods used by the enemy."

18 Para 637.2

✓ (?)

Delete 637.2 and Insert new para:

"Psychological warfare cannot be waged without good intelligence. There must be basic knowledge regarding the national customs, superstitions, regional or tribal characteristics of hostile groups, and current knowledge regarding their mental condition, needs and susceptibilities. Some of this information may be acquired in peace by non-military means, and some of it will be collected through normal battlefield resources. Analysis of this data will attempt to discover exploitable psychological vulnerabilities in the selected target audience. Finally, intelligence must provide feedback regarding the relative effectiveness of the selected theme on the target audience".

CHAPTER 7

SERIAL REFERENCE

1 Art 702

The use of the word "reader" in article 702 paragraph 3 emphasizes the theoretical manner in which this publication has been written.

2 Para 702.4

Adequate arrangements must be made to guarantee that amendments to definitions by NATO or Canada are implemented in this CFP.

3 Sub-para
702.4.b.

1. Canadian interpretation is under review. It is probable that amtds will follow in due course.

2. The definition shown for "in location", is not IAW the Canadian definition as stated at Annex K to CFP 121(4). Suggest that the CLFSCC proposal be incorporated here at this time.

4 Art 711

This description of staff comes very late in the manual as it has already been discussed in part of the adm side. A proper description of all the sub branch of the staff should be included here. A typical corps or div HQ should be described.

5 Para 712.1

The third sentence is gratuitous. The fol sentence is recommended because it is shorter: "For instance, high ground is optimum for communications but unsuitable tactically or as a staff working area."

6 Art 714

Delete existing Section 3 insert the following:
"Information and intelligence are integral parts of all operations. Commanders require detailed and timely intelligence for planning, fighting and winning their battles. Therefore intelligence planning must start early and aim at determining the intelligence requirement flowing from the commanders mission so that the necessary collection effort may be planned and implemented, and timely intelligence produced. The first step in determining the intelligence requirement is to decide what level of enemy command has to be considered; what information is already known; and what information is missing. Subsequent steps are to acquire and up-date the necessary information so that enemy capabilities and courses of action may be determined and the likely enemy intention deduced. Consequently, collection planning, acquisition and processing of information, and the production and dissemination of intelligence must be continuous, related to the commander's mission and cover the commander's area of interest.

SERIAL REFERENCE

7 Art 715.

Delete existing Art 715 and substitute:
"INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT"

X
Every Commander is vitally interested in the area over which he can directly influence operations through firepower and manoeuvre units under his command. He is equally concerned about those adjacent areas from which an enemy commander can influence the battle. From an intelligence point of view the commander's intelligence requirement is usually concerned with acquiring timely knowledge of the enemy, weather and geographical features within that portion of the commander's area of interest occupied or controlled by the enemy."

7 Art 716.

X
In order for an intelligence collection system to reach its full potential, all sources and agencies capable of providing relevant information must be fully utilized and carefully co-ordinated. Formations and units under command will be tasked to provide information, and requests will be made to higher and flanking formations for additional information from resources under their command. Both positive and negative information is of value.

8 Para 717.1

✓ (C)
The definition and the steps of "Battle Procedure" should be identical in this publication and in CFP 303(2) Interim 2, Chapter 3, Section 1.

SERIAL REFERENCE

CHAPTER 8

GENERAL

X
Mention should be made of the open declaration by the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries to use chemical weapons in the early stage of any future battle.

X
Chapter 2 of ATP 35, identifies two significantly different defensive concepts: the "active defence" and "killing zone" concepts. Chapter 9 of CFP 300 seems to attempt to cover both these concepts without actually discussing them. It would help to clarify the "Canadian doctrine" if a short discussion of the two concepts were included in Chapter 9, with a statement of the Canadian position. This is considered important as it can have considerable influence on brigade and unit level organization of anti-tank resources, and on the concept of mechanized infantry roles in the anti-armour battle. Although this area should be treated extensively in CFP 301 it should merit some reference here.

- | | | | |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------|---|
| ✓(z) | 1. | Para 801.3
(line four) | Delete "the defenders' capability to retaliate though the threat forces place great emphasis" |
| X | | (line seven) | Delete "In addition, the threat forces will"
Insert "In addition, the threat force will" |
| X | | (line eight) | Delete "protect his advancing forces and he plans"
Insert "protect his advancing forces and attempt" |
| X | 2 | Para 802.1
(line two) | Delete "at the same time must guard against enemy"
Insert "at the same time must protect themselves from enemy" |
| X | 3 | Sub-para
802.2.b
(line one) | Delete "from all sources - direct observation, electromagnetic emissions,"
Insert "from all sources - human resources, electromagnetic emissions" |
| ✓
✓ | 4 | Para 802.3
(line five) | Delete "on his capabilities but must always try to assess his specific intentions"
Insert "on enemy capabilities, but must always try to assess the enemy's specific intentions" |
| X | | (line ten) | Delete - all after "possible to deduce"
Insert "enemy intentions in a certain sector. However it must be remembered that the enemy can and frequently will strive to deceive." |
| ✓ | 5 | Para 802.4 | Delete first sentence.
Insert "No matter how sound the collection effort, information and intelligence about the enemy will never be complete or entirely current." |

SERIAL REFERENCE

✓ (line four)

Delete "flexibility to allow them to be modified as more"

Insert "flexibility to allow modification as more"

6 Art 803.

Chapter 6 contains only one very short paragraph on intelligence. The aim and scope of Chapter 8 should be stated differently.

X How? 7 Para 804.2

Delete "Both information and intelligence can be"

Insert "Intelligence may be"

8 Para 804.3

Delete para 3

Insert new para 3.

"3. A large amount of information is acquired in times of peace from a variety of open and covert sources for conversion into basic intelligence. This basic intelligence is not significantly time-perishable and provides background and reference material for operations in war. The basic intelligence of NATO is provided by the discrete intelligence systems of member nations, often in response to requests from NATO staffs. Current intelligence is of a more transient or time-perishable nature and tends to be related to a specific situation or activity."

9 Para 804.4

Delete para 4

Insert new para 4.

"4. Strategic intelligence is concerned with data required for the formulation of policy or military plans at the highest national or international levels. Tactical intelligence is concerned with the acquisition of data for the planning or conduct of current operations by formations or units".

10 Art 805.

Insert the following: New Art 805:

"The production of intelligence is essentially a continuous cyclic activity which consists of defining

- the intelligence problem (DIRECTION)

- acquiring the necessary information to resolve the problem (COLLECTION);

- extracting intelligence from the acquired data (PROCESSING); and finally

- distributing intelligence in a useful form and timely manner to users (DISSEMINATION).

In order for the process to start, intelligence must know what is being planned. Thus the operational mission becomes the start point for the intelligence cycle. When time is short or events move rapidly initial intelligence planning may have to be based on the commander's intentions. Intelligence and operations are inseparably intertwined and their staffs must work closely together at all times.

SERIAL REFERENCE

- 11 Sub-para 806.1.a. Delete "The organization, capabilities deployments and intention of the enemy."
X Insert "The organization, strength, deployment, capabilities, and intention of the enemy."
- 12 806.3 (line one) Delete "During operations, when current and combat information"
X Insert "During operations, when current operational information"
- 13 806.6 (line one) Delete "POW Interrogation and Captured Material"
✓ Insert "POW Interrogation, Captured Documents and Material"
- X (line three) Delete "produce valuable combat information"
Insert "produce valuable information"
- X (line four) Delete "examination of captured material"
Insert "examination of captured documents and material"
- X Para 806.7 Sub-paras a to d should be defined.
- 14 Para 806.9 (line five) Delete "degree of accuracy, is the timeframe in which the information they produced must be used".
X Insert "degree of accuracy, is the repetitive nature of surveillance and the timeframe in which the information so produced must be used".
- 15 Para 806.11 (line two) Delete "collect information and intelligence and in times of peace operate independently. In wartime, it is anticipated that control of national intelligence resources will be retained by nations but that the".
✓ (7) Insert "collect information of intelligence value. It is anticipated that in wartime control of national intelligence resources will continue to be independently controlled by each nation, but that the..."
- 16 Para 807.2 (line seven) Delete "only assist in the first step of the process, they will not replace"
✓ Insert "only assist in some steps of the process, but will not replace"
- X (line nine) Delete "For this reason, whether the system used is manual or automated, it is most important that the information received by the staff is already in the standard form and that intelligence disseminated by them adheres to the agreed formats."
- 17 Para 809.2 (line three) Delete "done by intelligence staff"
X Insert "done by the counter-intelligence staff"

SERIAL REFERENCE

- X 18 Para 810.1 Delete "what system"
(line two) Insert "what systems"
- ✓ (line three) Delete "what means he neglects, since enemy"
Insert "what means he neglects. Enemy"
- 19 Para 810.2 Delete "effective than dummies which may not deceive
(line seven) well-trained and experienced imagery interpreters."
X Insert "effective than dummies. Dummy positions must
have realistic track patterns and signs of occupation if
well-trained and experienced imagery interpreters are to
be deceived."
- 20 Sect 3 The material should be written more positively stating
X the responsibilities of Command in regards to
intelligence.
- X 21 Sub-para "Intelligence liaison teams should be exchanged at all
811.4.b. levels of command". This is not an accurate statement.
- X 22 Art 812.3 Delete. Adds nothing to the Chapter.

SERIAL REFERENCE

CHAPTER 9

GENERAL

X Discussion of tactics of defensive and offensive operations is somewhat at variance with tactics taught at CTC and CLFCSC. Hopefully this manual, if accepted, will be used by everybody as a source document and thus prevent the teaching of various types of tactics in the forces.

X 1 Sub-para 902.4d

While tactical air and supporting aviation will be of great assistance in the defence, it should be stressed that circumstances may preclude their support. Air support should be considered a bonus and not essential to the defence.

X 2 Para 904.4

For clarity and to simplify later usage at this point the definitions of counter-attack and counter-penetration should be included.

✓ unoccupied space
3 Para 910.3

It is not clear if "gaps" here means a hole in the defences or a part of the counter-attack plan. If the latter is the intention, lanes should be mentioned as well.

✓ " 4 Para 911.7.d

Comment as above.

X 5 Art 912.

Within this art, or possibly as a separate art, the employment of FASCAM (family of scatterable mines) i.e., GEMIS, hel placed, arty delivered, etc, must be discussed. The thrust of the para(s) must be that
(1) regardless of delivery means they are MINES and must be treated as such in all aspects; and
(2) control must be centred at Div (or equivalent) level that possesses the ops, engr and other specialist advisors needed, as organic members of the commanders staff.

X Not at odds
Pulse = gp of planned
6 Art 913.

The concept, particularly as expressed in para 3, does not appear to be consistent with the pulse theory. Packages are prepared vice target lists per se. Packages are released vice a series of unrelated, individual warheads.

X 7 Sub-para 915.1.c

Delete "and aerial fire support means", a generic U.S. term for gunships. Insert after "artillery" - "air and aviation means".

X 8 Sub-para 915.1.f

Little mention is made of the employment of attack helicopters. Since Canadian Forces in Europe will undoubtedly be supported by attack helicopters, more discussion on the principles of employment and command and control measures would be useful.

SERIAL REFERENCE

- X 10 Sub-para 915.3.b In addition to morale, the mobility, flexibility and accuracy of close air sp should not be overlooked.
- 11 Sub-para 915.4.a The listing may lead to misunderstanding. If any sequence is used, "Nuclear delivery means" must be first and this should also include the ammunition storage area(s) for these systems. Similarly, critical points should be second.
- X
- ✓ 12 Sub-para 915.5.b(2) The barrier, not the barrier plan, is improved continually, and is ~~complemented~~ ^{strengthened} by scatterable mines.
- ✓ 13 Para 919.5 Heading should read "Use of Ground and Obstacles"
- 14 Sect 5. This section requires major rewriting. It should state the purposes of withdrawal and delaying operations, indicating how they fit into the overall conduct of the operations i.e. to gain time to allow preparation of a more suitable defensive position; to conform to flanking operations; etc. The type of forces should be stated and how the operation is conducted i.e. a series of blocking positions, intermediate position, demolitions etc. Article 938 should be included in an overall chapter on civil-military affairs. ATP 35 Chapter 3 is better-written.
- X Unable to identify
- 15 Para 927.4 This paragraph requires revision. It implies that the demolition firing party is under command of the rear-guard, that the rearguard commander has the authority to fire reserve demolitions, and that reserved demolition firing parties are available to create additional obstacles. The first two are neither necessary nor normally true, and the last is dangerously incorrect.
- X
- 16 Para 931.3 Delete "preparation" and insert "implementation". As in comment 5 above, the preparation of a barrier plan (i.e. on paper) is one thing; the implementation of the plan (i.e. the preparation of the barrier itself) is quite another.
- X Comment Not clear
- ✓ Add DND Form 17 Art 932 Reference should be made to the appropriate DND Form, not to STANAG and NATO forms.
- ✓ 18 Para 936.3 Delete "covered by obstacles for there is"
Insert "covered by obstacles or there is"

SERIAL REFERENCE

CHAPTER 10

GENERAL

Sections 1 to 4 are not considered to be as well or as clearly written as ATP 35.

- | | | | |
|---|---|--------------------------|---|
| X | 1 | Para 1010.3 | The term "reconnaissance by the air force" should be qualified; i.e. photo, visual, thermal, imagery, etc. |
| ✓ | 2 | Para 1011.3 | Delete fourth sentence.
Insert "Artillery forward observer(s) must be with the vanguard, prepared to call for and observe fire." |
| ✓ | 3 | Para 1021.4
(line 2) | Delete "controlled", insert "ordered". (line 2) |
| X | | (line 5) | Delete "battle groups";
Insert "brigades" |
| ✓ | 4 | Para 1032.4.
(line 4) | Amend to read "indirect fire support". |
| ✓ | | (line 5) | Delete "staged";
Insert "deployed". |

SERIAL REFERENCE

CHAPTER 11

GENERAL

1. A clear statement of the purpose of the chapter is lacking. See also comments at Serial 10, (page 1-2) concerning discontinued reference to definition of conflicts by ABCA.

2. This chapter marks the beginning of discussion in this manual of special operations. It is striking that it does not evolve from ATP 35, yet manages to miss all those aspects of special operation which ATP 35 covers very briefly. This is a serious weakness of the book which must be redressed.

- ✓
- | | | |
|---|-----------------------------|--|
| 1 | Sect 1 | Title should be "Internal Security Operations". |
| 2 | Para 1102.2.
(last line) | There is no Chapter 12. |
| 3 | Para 1102.3. | No clear distinction is made between types A and B.
(See also page 1-2, serial 10) |
| 4 | Art 1104. | Comments could be more easily understood if they were under separate headings for an internal security uprising. Possible headings are:
- cell organization
- recruiting and undermining the authority of law and order;
- the terrorist stage (if used); and
- open warfare. |
| 5 | Para 1104.4 | Delete "Once this is completed obtain material support and tie down the security forces to static tasks."
Insert "Once this is completed, a campaign of terror may be launched aimed at:
a. securing the general support of the population;
b. coercing or discouraging loyal people from supporting the authorities;
c. discrediting the forces of law and order;
d. obtaining material support;
e. tying down security forces to static tasks. |
| 6 | Para 1104.5. | Make last sentence of 1104.4 the first sentence of 1104.5. |
| 7 | Art 1105.
(line 14) | Delete "in the organization, cells are kept small"
Insert "in the organization. Cells are kept small" |
| 8 | Art 1106. | Delete "cell will be highly trained"
Insert "cell may be highly trained" |

SERIAL REFERENCE

- | | | |
|----|---------------------------|--|
| 9 | Para 1107.1
(line 4) | Delete "without this formation and intelligence"
Insert "without this information" |
| 10 | Para 1107.5. | The first phrase should read: The revolutionary relies upon the civilian population to supply him with <u>shelter</u> , money, food, medical and other supplies. |
| 11 | Para 1107.6
(line one) | Delete "The denial of information and intelligence to the"
Insert "The denial of information of intelligence value to the " |
| 12 | Para 1110.2 | Line six: After "troops" add, "deployed in formed bodies". |
| 13 | Para 1111.4.
(line 5) | Delete "constant patrolling is"
Insert "Detailed intelligence records must be maintained and constant patrolling is" |
| 14 | Art 1120 | The stated Canadian preconditions for participation in peacekeeping should be stated. One of the points to be emphasized is agreement by both opposing parties to permit the operation of the international force. |

APPENDIX 1
TO FMC COMMENTS
DATED: 14 Jun 79

SECTION 8 - TACTICAL AVIATION

1. Tactical helicopter support for the land force commander is provided by the air element of the Canadian Forces. Tactical helicopter units have the role of augmenting the capability of the land forces, to conduct prompt and sustained land combat by providing mobility, firepower, and reconnaissance to defeat the enemy. They are normally equipped and organized to fulfil one or more of the following tactical functions:

- a. Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Helicopters are of great value to all units and to commanders in extending the range of reconnaissance and overcoming the restrictions to ground observation. In addition to human observers they can also carry radar, infra-red or thermal devices, and cameras.
- b. Observation of Fire. As part of the artillery fire control system, helicopters are used to extend the observation and direction of artillery fire. A certain number of LOH pilots are also trained as forward air controllers to direct fighter ground attacks.
- c. Tactical and Logistic Transport. Utility helicopters may be used to move troops, principally the infantry and its supporting weapons, across all types of ground and obstacles at relatively high speed, normally behind the FEBA, to: reinforce defensive areas; secure ground prior to a link-up; or to seize lightly defended objectives. Transport helicopters may also be used for troop transport or for rapid movement of artillery; however, these aircraft are most

APPENDIX 1
TO FMC COMMENTS
DATED:

valuable as a supplement to ground logistics transport.

They are able to carry most logistics loads and can meet unforeseen transport requirements, evacuate casualties quickly, and supply troops whose normal lines of communication may be cut.

- d. Liaison and General Utility. Helicopters are invaluable as command and control or liaison vehicles for commanders and staff officers and may also be employed in miscellaneous tasks such as laying line or scatterable mines, message-carrying, radio re-broadcast, radiation monitoring and traffic control.
- e. Fire Support. Attack helicopters armed with long range anti-tank guide missiles, rockets or guns may be used to destroy or disrupt enemy armour and mechanized forces. They may also provide direct fire support for airmobile operations.

422. EQUIPMENT AND ORGANIZATION

1. In order to support the land forces throughout the spectrum of combat, tactical aviation units are equipped with four types of helicopters as follows:

- a. a light observation helicopter for reconnaissance, direction of fire, command and staff transportation, liaison, etc (LOH).
- b. a utility tactical transport helicopter for the movement of combat troops, reconnaissance, provision of aerial command posts, medical evacuation, etc. (UTTH).
- c. a cargo helicopter for logistic resupply, the movement of artillery, certain troop movement, etc (MTH).

.../3

APPENDIX 1
TO FMC COMMENTS
DATED:

- d. an attack helicopter for aerial escort, aerial fire power, armed reconnaissance, etc. (AH).
2. Because of the vulnerability of the helicopter, and to ensure mutual support, helicopters risking contact with the enemy normally operate in pairs (LOHs and AHs). Although the nature of the employment of UTH and MTH aircraft usually necessitates the use of more than one aircraft.
3. The basic tactical helicopter unit is the squadron, consisting of one or more types of helicopters. Normally, for administrative convenience, squadrons will contain only one type of helicopter; however when tasks or circumstance dictate, more than one type of helicopter may be grouped in a squadron. For example the helicopter squadron in support of an independent brigade group may contain LOHs, UTHs, MTHs and possibly AHs.
4. Tactical helicopter resources are normally grouped at the lowest formation or unit that can reasonably expect to have a continuous requirement for these resources and where maintenance support resources can be made available. In most cases this will be at division level. Helicopter resources will usually be allocated under tactical control to those units or formations having a specific requirement limited by time or function. At each level the commander of the assigned aviation unit or formation acts as aviation adviser to the commander on the employment of helicopters.

.../4

APPENDIX 1
TO FMC COMMENTS
DATED:

5. Because of the flexibility inherent in aviation operations, tactical helicopter units will be dispersed throughout the battle area. Each unit will be self-sufficient for administration and logistics and must be capable of limited self-defence.

423. CHARACTERISTICS

1. Aviation units are to a large degree equipment oriented, providing highly specialized forms of support, with characteristics, capabilities and limitations which set them apart from most other combat and combat support units. When properly employed, the tactical helicopter squadron is a mobile and flexible unit possessing good communications and unique capabilities with which to support the land forces. Its limitations are:

- a. a heavy maintenance commitment and a requirement for a reasonably secure maintenance area;
- b. weather conditions which may affect helicopter performance (high temperature or altitude), or hinder efficient mission completion (low visibility); and
- c. vulnerability to air and ground fire during missions and at base. This vulnerability may be minimized by terrain flying techniques and the concealment and dispersion of aircraft on the ground.

424. CONCLUSION

1. The contribution of tactical aviation to the functions of land combat and its integration within the land battle is documented in the applicable Canadian Forces Publications. Specific reference to aviation operations is also contained in each of the combat arms doctrine publications.



National Défense
Defence nationale

2910-1 (Land)

Canadian Forces Command
and Staff College
215 Yonge Blvd
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M5M 3H9

10 May 1979

NDRMS/SCDDN 3-3-2

Referred to

Transmis à...

DLP4

CSO
MAI

25 1979

File No

Dossier No...

2910-CFP300

Charged to/Chargé à.....

National Defence Headquarters
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

Attention: Director Land Plans

CFP 300 (INTERIM)
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS


References: A. 2910-CFP 300 (DLP4) 1 December 1978.
B. Telephone conversation LCol Gervais/LCol Roy 29 April 1979.

1. As requested at Reference A, suggestions for changes are incorporated in this letter and the attached Annex A.
2. If CFP 300 is the Army's capstone doctrinal manual, then it should contain our philosophy and system of fighting wars. The doctrine it expresses should be applicable in general and limited, nuclear and conventional war operations, whether these operations be in the desert, in the jungle or in Europe.
3. The present manual, except for Chapter 11, is oriented almost exclusively toward general war in Europe. While the manual covering high intensity operations is required, the capstone manual should be more general in scope and provide those general principles and statements of doctrine from which the more specialized manuals can be derived.
4. If the above approach to a capstone manual is not followed it is suggested that CFP 300 contain a descriptive foreword stating that the manual is written for high intensity operations.
5. Annex A contains detailed substantial and editorial comments. In addition, it is felt that certain chapters of the manual have been developed in too much detail, and because the material has been drawn from a number of sources, there are inconsistencies. These problems are reflected in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10. The following is recommended:
 - a. Replace most of the content of Chapters 3 and 4 by Chapter 4 of CSC 201 - Land Operations.

.../2

- 2 -

- b. Exclude the detailed description of the administrative chain - Section 3 of Chapter 5 - which can form part of manual on administration and logistics. (Enclosed is an amended version of the original section using the correct terminology).
 - c. Reduce Chapter 9 and 10 to definitions and statements of principles, leaving the detail to other manuals such as the proposed Formations in Battle.
6. Finally, it is suggested that ATP-35 be deleted thus reducing the manual to a manageable size.


J.R. Beveridge
Colonel
Director A Division

ph Attachment: Annex A - Detailed Comments on CFP 300

Enclosure: Revised Section Three, Chapter Five of CFP 300

TO 2910-1 (LAND)

DATED MAY 1979

DETAILED COMMENTS ON CFP 300

REF			
CHAP	ART	PARA	COMMENT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	102	✓ 1	First sentence poor English, delete the word "other".
1	102	X 2	If ATP-35 is incorporated, why have it as an attachment?
1	103	X 3	Strategy should be defined in para 2 in order to make clear the comparison drawn in this para.
1	104	X 5	Why not also define the other options i.e. unilateralism and multilateralism?
1	104	X 1	'Sovereignty' is a better term than 'political independence'.
1	105	✓ 2	Poor wording in second sentence. Suggest the following "As a result, Canada's defence posture ensures Canadian security by purely national actions as well as the following: ---" --- but does it?
1	105	✓ 3	The statement does not flow from previous paras, nor is it highlighted enough. Suggest this be part of a new para 2 which incorporates the general idea stated in Art 104 paras 5 & 6 and apply it to Canada in order to make this statement as a supportable conclusion.
1	106	✓ 1b (?)	Last sentence should be expanded. It would also escalate if objectives were not limited, policy limitations waived or geographical limitations ignored.
1	108	-	A bit skimpy. The key elements that should be included are:
		X	a. the Canadian Land Forces are based on the Total Force Concept comprising both the regular and militia elements; and
		X	b. while limited in size during peacetime, the Canadian Land Forces must maintain, and be structured to maintain, an all purpose general combat capability.
2	202	X 1	Agreed but Not yet authorized First word in last sentence should be changed from "National" to "Political".
2	203	✓ 2 (?)	Should be included as part of para 1.
2	204	2a, b ✓	Why use of the term "allied forces"?
2	204	3b ✓	Should be sub-para a.
2	204	3 c&d ✓ (?)	Do not think these sub-paras say very much. Both could be replaced by a couple of straightforward sentences.
2	205	1 X	This general para is insufficient. This manual should give specific details as to what the various conventions and protocols are, their impact in general terms, and where full guidance and details may be found.

- 2 -

REF			
CHAP	ART	PARA	COMMENT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
2	205	2	Would flow better as one para rather than two sub-paras.
3	302	- X	I find this somewhat hard to follow as it talks in generalities. Why not deal in specifics,,and thus build up the basic land force structure that is used in the manual.
3	302	5 X	Maintenance is the wrong word as it has a more confined meaning to land forces i.e. LORE functions. A better term would be "Logistical and Administrative Support". Also, the third sentence should be changed to read "...creation of logistic and administrative units...".
3	302	6 ✓	First sentence has bad wording - coordination is not the sole or overriding rationale for command and control. Suggest the following: "There must be effective command and control in order for land forces to make the best use of its firepower, mobility, mass, and logistic and administrative support. The command and control system consists of three...".
3	302	✓6c	Do not understand "...as well as specialized communication units that have specific tasks".
3	302	7 X	Fail to see the purpose of this para unless it is changed from the general to the particular - Canada and her allies.
3	303	✓1a	Why just the Canadian Forces. Should we not use agreed NATO/ABCA terms? "forces of a single nation"
3	304	- X	In order to fulfill the advertised mandate of dealing with the link between political authorities and military commanders at the highest level, this section should deal with nations and allied political links within a theatre of operations. Not possible
3	304	6 ✓	Second sentence - "necessary combination" for what? Point that has to be made is that the division is the lowest level formation capable of fighting on its own. This is not just based on endurance which the third sentence implies. Its capability to operate independently is a function of having all the necessary elements - firepower, mobility, mass, command and control and logistic and administrative support. In smaller formations, some or all of these elements are too limited to permit independent operations - except on a limited scale. This is a key doctrinal point which Canada must not only recognize - but also apply in its policies and organizations.
3	304	6a-e ✓ X	Too generalized. For example, an infantry division has a predominance of infantry brigades - but nowhere does the chapter describe an infantry brigade. Feel it would be better to start at the bottom - unit level - and build up to division and corps. "for independent operations"

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001924

- 3 -

REF			
CHAP	ART	PARA	COMMENT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
3	304	7b X	The brigade <u>group's</u> ability to operate independently is limited by its lack of firepower, and mass. These limitations should be mentioned. Also, a division is not organized into brigade groups, but into brigades.
3	306	- X	Second sentence not complete - The combat zone also includes combat service support installations. Third sentence in error - the army group rear boundary could be in the communication zone.
4	401	X 2b	Combat support arms include intelligence.
4	402	X -	The role of armour should be stated here.
4	404	X -	This article will have to be <u>reworked</u> to incorporate the approved Armour Study's writing on heavier divisional recce forces conducting primarily security operations.
4	405	X 1	The role as stated is taken directly from current publications, but is different than that stated in the Artillery Study.
4	405	✓ 3	(1) The artillery is composed of two branches; field branch artillery, which includes field artillery and locating artillery; and air defence branch artillery.
		✓ (2)	(2) The artillery section is extremely long in comparison to the other arms. Could not some of the detail be left for subsequent chapters? Or another manual.
4	406	6 X	The reference to the use of nuclear fire in this sub-para and in other portions of the manual should be reviewed to ensure they are consistent with recent NDHQ direction; <i>What direction?</i>
4	406	2f ✓ (2)	Although headquarters batteries are addressed in the Artillery Study, they do not exist in present units, nor in the ORBATs taught at CFCSC or CLFCSC. Recent DARTY direction stated that, until the study is approved and war establishments officially amended, headquarters batteries will not be included in publications.
4	406	X 3h	<i>Direction pls</i> This paragraph is vague and confusing.
4	407	1 ✓	(1) Recommend that the first sentence be amended to read - "The main task of locating artillery is to establish the location of enemy guns, rocket launchers and mortars, and to control retaliatory fire brought to bear on them".
		✓	(2) In the second sentence recommend, "general" be inserted before "surveillance".

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001925

- (4) -

REF			
CHAP	ART	PARA	COMMENT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
4	407	X 2	This para does not include an explanation of survey or meteorological equipment. If it is not so intended, then the para heading should be re-stated.
4	407	✓ 3a	This statement is questioned. - <i>delete from text</i>
4	407	X 3b	Last sentence - "Counter-battery" should read "Counter-bombardment".
4	408	X 4d	The last three lines of the para should be reviewed. Are terms such as "long range", "quick reacting" and "portable" current terminology?
4	408	X 6a	Is there a difference between the enemy aircraft and hostile aircraft?
4	408	✓ 6d	Last sentence. Amend "must" to read "should".
4	412	- ✓ (c)	What is a formation anti-armour plan? It is suggested that the word plan be dropped, and the stress should be on coordinating anti-armour resources in support of the commander's plan for the defensive, offensive, or retrograde operation being conducted.
4	413	X 1	The author seems to have written off the future of the anti-tank gun - just when a need has been clearly identified in the urban areas and forests of Central Europe. Suggest the phrase "or gun" be added after "guided missile".
4	415	✓ 1	Poor paragraph structure. The roles should <u>be mentioned</u> before the fact that the roles require engineer presence to be <u>ubiquitous</u> . <i>using to</i>
4	415	2 ✓	The supply of engineer stores is mentioned. The CDC decided that this was a logistic function, not an engineer role. There is also an outstanding decision on who is responsible for decontamination - an all arms functions? - with specialized equipments held in logistics units - albeit manned by engineers. See Chap 5 Art 514. <i>Delete "sup of engr stores"</i>
4	417	X 2	Command and control of engineers require clarification, i.e. be more specific.
4	420	3 ✓	Last sentence. The flexibility of area systems is indisputable, but the economy vis à vis a chain of command system could be argued. Therefore, the words "economical" and "flexible" should be reversed.
4	420	8 ✓	This para mentions "principles of communications". Are these the same as "The principles used in the development or deployment of any combat communication system"? Common terminology required.
4	422	1 X	The term "attack helicopters" should be defined, by referring to Art 421 sub-para 1e. This para does a good job of describing the organization, except for attack helicopters. Would this not be the place to give the Canadian policy on where and at what level these belong? <i>If there were one</i>

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001926

- 5 -

REF			
CHAP	ART	PARA	COMMENT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
5	515	✓ 2	New LORE Manual CFP 314(1) provides new terms and definitions. <i>check terms</i>
5	519	✓ 2b	Add "laundry" after bath in fourth line.
5	519	✗ 3	Line four - Civil affairs has been replaced by the term civil/military cooperation staff (CIMIC).
5	520	-	Attached to the covering letter is Section Three with recommended hand written corrections. The corrected version illustrates the current terminology and responsibilities in the administrative chain.
-	525	-	
6	602	✗ 1a	Offensive operations to seize a geographical area seems to be ignored.
6	605	✗ b(2)	Should be "manoeuvre and movement" to conform with Art 602 and Art 611.
6	606	✓ 2b	Grammatically incorrect change to "b. short and clear orders which are issued...".
6	608	✓ -	Second sentence does not make sense.
6	608	✓ a(1)	Replace "telecommunications" with "communication".
6	614	✓ 5	Would read better if the phrase "Cross country" was removed from the first sentence.
6	633	✗ -	Replace the term "cooperation with civil authorities" by civil/military cooperation (CIMIC), the approved NATO terminology.
		46	
7	702	(5,6,7) ✗	Director of Artillery is currently reviewing the terms "Priority Call, Direct Support, Support" when used to control Field Artillery. It is recommended that these terms be listed separately for Artillery usage as well as generally shown.
7	710	✗ -	Canada is the Custodian Army for the QWG Concept Paper "The Staff Structure of an ABCA Force Headquarters 1986-95", which contains basic information at paragraph 13 of the concept paper which should be included in CFP 300.
-	711	✗ -	
8	810	-	The treatment of deception is inadequate. A section on deception should distinguish between strategic and tactical deception and should include planning considerations, the role of intelligence, deception operations. It is recommended that this section be re-written using Chapter 9 of CSC 204 - The Division - as a guide.
		✗	
9	901	✗ 1	The term "retrograde" should be adopted to conform with NATO terminology (CFP 121(4)).

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001927

-66 -

REF			
CHAP	ART	PARA	COMMENT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
9	903	X 3	Second last line on page 9-11. Delete "throughout wide areas of responsibility" and insert "mutually supporting" between "large that" and "concentrated firepower". It ties in better with the previously mentioned fundamentals.
9	904	X 2	A clear distinction must be made between guards and screens, and the two main tasks of the delaying stage must receive adequate treatment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. to delay the enemy in order to gain time to prepare defensive positions; and b. to attrite the enemy in order to strip away his reserve forces, force him to use uncommitted echelons, and disclose the point of his main effort.
9	904	X 5	Paragraph heading required.
9	905	X	Should come earlier in the chapter.
9	906	X 1	The approved NATO terminology for "key terrain" or "key area" should be referred to and used.
9	907	X 1b	Sequence is wrong. Should be as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) his concept of operations and key terrain; (2) his subordinates missions and tasks including boundaries and allocation of resources; (3) his obstacle, surveillance, ^{and} and fire plans; (4) location of reserves, counter attack and counter penetration routes; (5) alternate defensive positions in depth; (6) gun emplacements and locations required for other combat and combat support arms; (7) areas for command support elements; (8) supply and maintenance routes; and (9) designations of control and coordination lines and points.
9	908	X 4	Refer to comment above (9 (906)(1)).

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001928

- 7 -

REF			
CHAP	ART	PARA	COMMENT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
9	913	- ✓(3)	This section should be written in the context of the "conventional nuclear concept". Selected parts of Chapter 6, CSC 203 - The Corps should be included in this section.
9	914	✓ 2a	First sentence delete "mobile defence" and insert "defence based on mobility".
9	914	2d X	The idea of small packets plays into the Soviet tactics of echeloned forces. To be really effective, a guard must have sufficient strength to decisively defeat the first echelon and cause the enemy to commit his second echelon to <u>defeat</u> the guard. Small packets will be dealt with by the first echelon while second echelon forces <u>exploit gaps</u> to close with the FEBA. Unless a guard can accomplish this aim, then there is not a guard but a screen which only establishes contact in order to give the commander <u>information</u> . Canadian doctrine is weak in this area.
9	915	5b(2) X	New term "occupation plan" used without an explanation. <i>self-evident</i>
9	916	3d X	Annex K to CFP 121(4) still includes the term junction point, so it should be mentioned that coordinating point (NATO) and junction point (Cdn) are the same thing. <i>CFP 121(4) being cancelled. AAP6</i>
9	917	4 X	Rear area security is too important a subject for it only to be mentioned in this manual. Recommend the addition of one or two paragraphs using material at Chapter 3, CSC 203 - The Corps. <i>Subject of ATP-35 ch - to Pol</i>
9	921	2 X	The term anti-armour helicopter is used. Earlier, it was an attack helicopter. Common terminology required. <i>specific kind of attack - atk</i>
9	923	4 X	The statement contradicts to some degree what is said in article 906 about defending an obstacle - there it says keep back to avoid the heavy concentration of fire the enemy can bring to bear - here it states attack him while he is crossing. The doctrine should be more precise.
9	923	5 ✓	The term coordination point should be adopted instead of "co-ordination/junction points".
9	923	7 X	The effective use of supporting indirect fire weapons, close air support, mines and barriers should be mentioned as essential aids in achieving a clean break.
10	1009	1b X	The correct term is "Advanced Guard" from CFP 121(4) AAP6. Also Figure 10-1 on page 10-14, and elsewhere in Chapter 10.

001930

REF			
CHAP	ART	PARA	COMMENT
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)

military police, since many of the military police roles are operational in nature.

- b. Logistics. The logistics branch is concerned with those things which affect the material needs of groups of soldiers. The functions which it supervises include the provision of all supplies and stores, transport, bath ^{laundry} and decontamination, repair and recovery, water supply, and postal services.

3. A third miscellaneous group of functions cover both personnel and logistics aspects; and in addition may have operational implications. Representatives or detachments to handle these functions are not usually provided at the lower levels of command. They include the legal, welfare, civil/military cooperation staff (Cimic), civil affairs, public relations, and graves registration services. These functions are usually handled by staffs and detachments provided at and from the highest levels of command.

SECTION 3 - THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHAIN

*field bakery
production industrial gas &
printing*

520. GENERAL

This section deals in general terms with the movement of commodities of all types. The system for repair and recovery of equipment and the medical evacuation system are discussed after the supply system.

521. THE COMBAT ZONE

? 1. From rear to front, the combat zone will normally be sub-divided into army or corps ^{Support} maintenance areas, divisional administrative areas, and if there are independent brigade groups, brigade administrative areas. Within these areas, units integral to these levels of command have their administrative bases.

2. In army, or corps ^{Support} maintenance area, service units of various types receive commodities from the ^{Area Support Groups} advance depots, usually carried in army ^{force} transport. Army reception and reinforcement units receive reinforcements from transit camps in the communications zone. Hospitals and workshops receive personnel and equipment casualties from forward formations; POW camps receive ^{Pw} POW from corps ^{Pw.} POW cages.

3. In the Corps Service Command area there will not normally be depots containing large stocks of commodities. Certain reserves are held in composite groupings, dispersed to at least two locations. Administrative areas to serve corps troops, such as engineers and artillery, will be located as required. ^{Supply} Replenishment Points are usually sited well forward in the Corps ~~Service Command~~ area; points are provided on the basis of one for a ^{Division} ~~brigade~~, but the actual allocation of ^{Supply} Replenishment Points depends on the local circumstances. Other corps administrative installations, such as field hospitals, corps workshops, corps ^{Pw} POW cage, and the corps reinforcement unit and corps armoured delivery squadron are also deployed by the Corps Service Command.

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*We have done away with BAA's
it is now FAA and BAA is DAA if
needed*

4. Divisional or brigade administrative units are deployed where they must be to accomplish their tasks. Some elements must be in the forward area in immediate support of the fighting units. Medical staging facilities, second line repair facilities, and the second-line transport are usually gathered into a divisional or brigade group administrative area. Normally immediate stocks or reserves of material are held on vehicles there.

522. THE SUPPLY SYSTEM

1. The replenishment of land forces is the process of supplying their material requirements. From a material point of view, once stores have arrived in a theatre, the problem is essentially one of transporting them to the ultimate user. Refer to Figure 5-1.
2. Wheeled transport will undoubtedly lift the bulk of commodities within a theatre. Where rail facilities exist, they should be used as far forward as possible because of their ability to carry a large volume and to economize in the use of road vehicles.
3. As more air vehicles appear in the transportation system, it will be commonplace for many more items of equipment to be delivered by air. Aerial delivery to a theatre of any size will be the preferential method for carrying a wide range of vital supplies and personnel. Bulk supplies and reinforcements consigned to a theatre by air will arrive at airfields

in the base adjacent to transit camps and depots. Under some circumstances, aircraft with a STOL capability may lift specific loads of urgent items or designated personnel direct to airstrips in the Corps Service Command area or even further forward.

4. Air supply within a theatre will be from airfields in the base or advance sections to landing areas or airstrips in Corps Service Command using VTOL or STOL medium range aircraft. Such loads may also be air dropped direct to units. Divisional aircraft, predominantly medium helicopters, can lift supplies and personnel from the vicinity of the ~~Replenishment~~ ^{Supply} Points to unit administrative echelons. At times, slung loads may be lifted directly to unit fighting echelons.

^{Force (Theatre)}
5. ~~Army~~ headquarters is responsible for delivery to ~~Replenishment~~ ^{Supply} Points of all subordinate formations' requirements. This responsibility is executed by Headquarters Communications Zone. Double handling can be avoided by having road transport with stocks consigned to ~~Replenishment~~ ^{Supply} Points go right through to them rather than off-loading at a corps ~~supply depot~~ ^{support group} for example, where they must subsequently be reloaded into corps transport.

^{Supply}
6. ~~Replenishment~~ Points are sited by corps headquarters in consultation with divisions or brigade groups concerned. They are usually situated far enough forward that second line transport can conveniently complete a round trip, from ~~Replenishment~~ ^{Supply} Point forward to unit echelons and back

to base, as far as possible under cover of darkness. ^{Supply} ~~Replenishment~~
Point platoons, whose function is to organize the receipt, holding, and
issue of stocks, are composed of personnel representing the various
supply services, including medical.

7. Commodities and stores for divisions and brigade groups are collected
at ^{Supply} ~~Replenishment~~ Points by their second line transport, supplemented
when necessary by corps transport. The commodities and stores are then
taken forward to Delivery Points (DPs), where they are handed over to
units. Sub-units of divisional or corps troops, depending on the grouping,
draw from the most conveniently located DP as ordered by the formation
HQ.

8. DPs must be dispersed to facilitate quick collection by units and
to afford protection. These locations, which will change daily under
most conditions, are the points at which unit transport takes delivery
of commodities and stores. DPs may be composite points at which each
unit draws all its requirements or commodity points e.g. ammunition
point or a petrol point, at which units of a brigade or brigade group
can draw the required amount of a particular commodity. Bulk items,
such as artillery ammunition and POL for armoured units, may be delivered
to gun areas and tank harbours respectively in second line transport to
avoid double handling.

9. Figure 5-1 shows the normal system of supply to a Canadian forma-
tion operating within an allied theatre.




FIGURE 5-1 NORMAL SYSTEM OF SUPPLY TO A CANADIAN FORMATION
OPERATING WITHIN AN ALLIED THEATRE

523. REPAIR AND RECOVERY

1. Within the unit, when a piece of equipment needs repair, unit maintenance personnel must first examine it, decide what has to be done and do the first line repairs if they can.
2. If the equipment casualty is beyond the unit first line repair capability, it is reported to the supporting maintenance company or the formation headquarters giving a complete diagnosis. An appropriate repair team from the service battalion ^{maintenance battalion (D44P)} will be despatched to repair priority casualties in situ. Other casualties will be either evacuated or set aside at an equipment collecting point for subsequent back-loading. Policy decisions about repair responsibilities are based on the availability of spare parts and the time required to effect the repair.
3. Equipment back-loaded to second line repair facilities at brigade or division will be assessed by a technical officer and may be declared beyond local repair capability. Such equipment is usually recovered by or back-loaded to corps ^{near area} recovery resources to better equipped third line workshops in the corps administrative area. At this stage, authority is usually given to issue replacement equipment to the unit. Third line workshops can do some fourth line repairs, but most will be evacuated to fourth line workshops in the Communications Zone. If the equipment is obviously beyond local repair at the unit level, it can be declared so after inspection and a replacement issue may be authorized.*

No such
thing

Replacement
of equipment is only authorized if it goes beyond
the division near boundary.
5-25

4. When equipment has been repaired, it is returned to the unit or, if a replacement has been issued, to the appropriate supply organization at that level. At brigade or division level, repaired equipment would be passed from the maintenance company to the unit or the stores element of the service battalion or ~~service~~ ^{OK} group. Equipment repaired in third or fourth line workshops, for which units will normally have been issued replacements, is turned over to ~~Replenishment~~ ^{Supply} Points, corps troops supply companies, or ~~depots of the composite stores holding groups~~ ^{supply elements in the Area Support Groups} in the Communications Zone.

5. At any stage, if it has been certified as being beyond economical repair, equipment may be written off charge, and cannibalized for repair of other equipment of the same type. In the forward area, equipment is normally destroyed to prevent its falling into enemy hands.

6. Figure 5-2 shows the repair and recovery system used by a Canadian formation in an allied theatre.

524. CASUALTY EVACUATION

1. The clearance of casualties from sub-units to a central Unit Medical Station is a unit responsibility. Casualties are evacuated from the unit by ambulance, perhaps through a supporting evacuation station, to the brigade group or division medical facilities in the administrative area. Evacuation to this level is a brigade or divisional responsibility,




FIGURE 5-2 STAGES OF REPAIR AND RECOVERY OF CANADIAN EQUIPMENT WITHIN AN ALLIED THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

which may be augmented by ambulances from corps. Helicopter resources may be used at any stage of the evacuation process, often bypassing intermediate installations.

2. Corps is responsible for evacuating patients from forward medical stations to the field hospital in the corps administrative area or directly to the general hospital further to the rear. The field hospital is the most forward medical installation possessing a surgical capability. In some circumstances, it may be sited forward of the corps administrative area to permit patients to reach surgery earlier or an advanced surgical centre may be established at an existing division medical station using forward surgical and transfusion teams.

3. Corps or army transport moves patients from the field hospitals to general hospitals in the Communication Zone, or to airstrips for evacuation from the theatre. The total number of general hospital beds provided for a field force is dependent upon the size of the force and the holding policy for the theatre. Holding policy is expressed as a number of days; any patient expected to require longer than that period in hospital would ordinarily be evacuated from the theatre. With a longer holding policy fewer long-range evacuation facilities are required but more hospital beds must be provided.

4. Following hospitalization in the theatre, a patient may be returned to the reinforcement stream, either direct or through a convalescent

centre. To conserve strength in the theatre and to achieve an early return to duty, all patients should be treated as far forward as their condition will permit.

5. Figures 5-3 shows the evacuation system used by a Canadian formation operating within an allied theatre.

525. RESERVES

1. Reserves are quantities of stocks required to be held for use in emergency. Reserves are expressed in terms of a number of days' consumption for the force. They may be held at almost any level of command. Their use is sanctioned only in an emergency and on the order of the HQ controlling them.

2. Reserves are held to allow for:

- a. interruptions in the flow of men and materials from the rear, primarily those caused by enemy interference;
- b. loss of unit and formation stocks and equipment; and
- c. unforeseen demands.




FIGURE 5-3 A CANADIAN MEDICAL EVACUATION SYSTEM
OPERATING IN AN ALLIED THEATRE

3. Because conditions can vary so widely, no rigid rules can be laid down as to the quantity of reserves to be held in any particular place. In calculating the scale of reserves to be held at each level, consideration must be given to:

- a. a forecast of the maximum length of time the supply link between any two levels of command may be out of action;
- b. an allowance to meet losses; and
- c. an allowance to deal with unexpected demands.

4. Any material¹ reserve in the combat zone should be distributed between the unit, the division or brigade, the ^{Supply}~~Replenishment~~ Points, and as holdings in the corps combat reserves if these are established. Combat reserves do not form part of the normal system of maintenance. They are a forward holding of theatre stocks and will be established only if there is likelihood of a breakdown in the sources of supply or movement agencies in rear of the corps area. Formation HQ will order the use of these reserves only in an emergency.

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military police, since many of the military police roles are operational in nature.

- b. Logistics. The logistics branch is concerned with those things which affect the material needs of groups of soldiers. The functions which it supervises include the provision of all supplies and stores, transport, bath ^{*laundry*} and decontamination, repair and recovery, water supply, and postal services.

3. A third miscellaneous group of functions cover both personnel and logistics aspects; and in addition may have operational implications. Representatives or detachments to handle these functions are not usually provided at the lower levels of command. They include the legal, welfare, civil/military cooperation staff (Cimico), civil affairs, public relations, and graves registration services. These functions are usually handled by staffs and detachments provided at and from the highest levels of command.

SECTION 3 - THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHAIN

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*We have done away with BAA's
It is now FAA and BAA is OAA if necessary*

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~~Force (Theatre)~~
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~~Replenishment~~ ^{Supply}
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to base, as far as possible under cover of darkness. ~~Replenishment~~ ^{Supply}
Point platoons, whose function is to organize the receipt, holding, and
issue of stocks, are composed of personnel representing the various
supply services, including medical.

7. ~~Commodities~~ ^{Supply} and stores for divisions and brigade groups are collected
at ~~Replenishment~~ Points by their second line transport, supplemented
when necessary by corps transport. The commodities and stores are then
taken forward to Delivery Points (DPs), where they are handed over to
units. Sub-units of divisional or corps troops, depending on the grouping,
draw from the most conveniently located DP as ordered by the formation
HQ.

8. DPs must be dispersed to facilitate quick collection by units and
to afford protection. These locations, which will change daily under
most conditions, are the points at which unit transport takes delivery
of commodities and stores. DPs may be composite points at which each
unit draws all its requirements or commodity points e.g. ammunition
point or a petrol point, at which units of a brigade or brigade group
can draw the required amount of a particular commodity. Bulk items,
such as artillery ammunition and POL for armoured units, may be delivered
to gun areas and tank harbours respectively in second line transport to
avoid double handling.

9. Figure 5-1 shows the normal system of supply to a Canadian forma-
tion operating within an allied theatre.




FIGURE 5-1 NORMAL SYSTEM OF SUPPLY TO A CANADIAN FORMATION
OPERATING WITHIN AN ALLIED THEATRE

523. REPAIR AND RECOVERY

1. Within the unit, when a piece of equipment needs repair, unit maintenance personnel must first examine it, decide what has to be done and do the first line repairs if they can.

2. If the equipment casualty is beyond the unit first line repair capability, it is reported to the supporting maintenance company or the formation headquarters giving a complete diagnosis. An appropriate repair team from the service battalion/^{maintenance battalion (D449P)} will be despatched to repair priority casualties in situ. Other casualties will be either evacuated or set aside at an equipment collecting point for subsequent back-loading. Policy decisions about repair responsibilities are based on the availability of spare parts and the time required to effect the repair.

3. Equipment back-loaded to second line repair facilities at brigade or division will be assessed by a technical officer and may be declared beyond local repair capability. Such equipment is usually recovered by or back-loaded to corps recovery resources to better equipped third line workshops in the corps ^{near area} administrative area. At this stage, authority is usually given to issue replacement equipment to the unit. Third line workshops can do some fourth line repairs, but most will be evacuated to fourth line workshops in the Communications Zone. If the equipment is obviously beyond local repair at the unit level, it can be declared so after inspection and a replacement issue may be authorized.*

No such thing

Replacement of equipment is only authorized if it goes beyond the divisional repair boundary.

5-25

4. When equipment has been repaired, it is returned to the unit or, if a replacement has been issued, to the appropriate supply organization at that level. At brigade or division level, repaired equipment would be passed from the maintenance company to the unit or the stores element of the service battalion or ~~service~~ group. Equipment repaired in third or fourth line workshops, for which units will normally have been issued replacements, is turned over to ^{Supply} ~~Replenishment~~ Points, corps troops supply companies, or ^{supply elements in the Area Support Groups} ~~depots of the composite stores holding groups~~ in the Communications Zone.

5. At any stage, if it has been certified as being beyond economical repair, equipment may be written off charge, and cannibalized for repair of other equipment of the same type. In the forward area, equipment is normally destroyed to prevent its falling into enemy hands.

6. Figure 5-2 shows the repair and recovery system used by a Canadian formation in an allied theatre.

524. CASUALTY EVACUATION

1. The clearance of casualties from sub-units to a central Unit Medical Station is a unit responsibility. Casualties are evacuated from the unit by ambulance, perhaps through a supporting evacuation station, to the brigade group or division medical facilities in the administrative area. Evacuation to this level is a brigade or divisional responsibility,




FIGURE 5-2 STAGES OF REPAIR AND RECOVERY OF CANADIAN EQUIPMENT WITHIN AN ALLIED THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

which may be augmented by ambulances from corps. Helicopter resources may be used at any stage of the evacuation process, often bypassing intermediate installations.

2. Corps is responsible for evacuating patients from forward medical stations to the field hospital in the corps administrative area or directly to the general hospital further to the rear. The field hospital is the most forward medical installation possessing a surgical capability. In some circumstances, it may be sited forward of the corps administrative area to permit patients to reach surgery earlier or an advanced surgical centre may be established at an existing division medical station using forward surgical and transfusion teams.

3. Corps or army transport moves patients from the field hospitals to general hospitals in the Communication Zone, or to airstrips for evacuation from the theatre. The total number of general hospital beds provided for a field force is dependent upon the size of the force and the holding policy for the theatre. Holding policy is expressed as a number of days; any patient expected to require longer than that period in hospital would ordinarily be evacuated from the theatre. With a longer holding policy fewer long-range evacuation facilities are required but more hospital beds must be provided.

4. Following hospitalization in the theatre, a patient may be returned to the reinforcement stream, either direct or through a convalescent

centre. To conserve strength in the theatre and to achieve an early return to duty, all patients should be treated as far forward as their condition will permit.

5. Figures 5-3 shows the evacuation system used by a Canadian formation operating within an allied theatre.

525. RESERVES

1. Reserves are quantities of stocks required to be held for use in emergency. Reserves are expressed in terms of a number of days' consumption for the force. They may be held at almost any level of command. Their use is sanctioned only in an emergency and on the order of the HQ controlling them.

2. Reserves are held to allow for:

- a. interruptions in the flow of men and materials from the rear, primarily those caused by enemy interference;
- b. loss of unit and formation stocks and equipment; and
- c. unforeseen demands.




FIGURE 5-3 A CANADIAN MEDICAL EVACUATION SYSTEM
OPERATING IN AN ALLIED THEATRE

3. Because conditions can vary so widely, no rigid rules can be laid down as to the quantity of reserves to be held in any particular place. In calculating the scale of reserves to be held at each level, consideration must be given to:

- a. a forecast of the maximum length of time the supply link between any two levels of command may be out of action;
- b. an allowance to meet losses; and
- c. an allowance to deal with unexpected demands.

4. Any material⁴ reserve in the combat zone should be distributed between the unit, the division or brigade, the ~~Replenishment~~^{Supply} Points, and as holdings in the corps combat reserves if these are established. Combat reserves do not form part of the normal system of maintenance. They are a forward holding of theatre stocks and will be established only if there is likelihood of a breakdown in the sources of supply or movement agencies in rear of the corps area. Formation HQ will order the use of these reserves only in an emergency.

SECTION 4 - THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL,
AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

526. GENERAL

1. Large administrative installations will be profitable targets for nuclear attack as well as attack by aircraft carrying conventional weapons, by infiltrators, saboteurs and deep penetrations. Large concentrations of administrative or reinforcement personnel will offer lucrative targets for biological or chemical attack. The possibility of attack by these weapons emphasizes the need for administrative systems to be flexible and mobile and for installations and personnel to be protected. Flexibility depends on alternate command and control arrangements, adequate communications, adequate means of transportation, and dispersed administrative installations.

2. Proper planning should reduce the effects of such attacks. The use of alternative stocks and alternative routes of supply should help to maintain uninterrupted support of combat operations. The emphasis must lie on maintaining a flow of supplies rather than on building up stocks at all levels. Theatre reserves should be held as far forward as possible so that operations can be continued in the event of interruption of the flow over the lines of communication. When such disruption does occur the flow must be re-established as quickly as possible.

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
SUBJECT: CFP 300 (INTERIM)

REF: NDHQ 2910 CFP 300 (DLP 4) 1 DEC 78

1. REF DID NOT INCLUDE CDN AB REGT AS PART OF DISTRIBUTION OF SUBJ CFP
2. REQUEST CDN AB REGT BE SENT 6 COPIES OF SUBJ CFP ASAP AND BE INCLUDED ON FURTHER DISTRIBUTION LISTS

BT

00046



MEMORANDUM

PAV
2910-CFP 300 (DEW)

20 Mar 79

DLP

CFP 300 (INTERIM)
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATION

Ref: A. 2910-CFP 300 (DLP 4) 1 Dec 78

1. DEW agrees with subject document as long as it is planned to issue CFP 300 together with ATP-35.
2. There is one minor error in Section 8 of Chapter 6, namely, that EW is discussed in Chapter 8 of ATP-35.

G.W. Tahirali
G.W. Tahirali
LCol
DEW
2-7274

P.G. McMillan, Capt/DEW 2-2/2-8350/gmc

DGCEO Circ
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RCECG/422 SQN GAGETOWN

RCCKC/427 SQN PETAWAWA

RCEVCHA/430 ETAH VALCARTIER

RCWDG/447 SQN NAMAQ

RCCPUFA/450 SQN OTTAWA

RCFPCIA/444 SQN LAHR

INFO ZEN/FMCHO ST HUBERT

RCWBOCA/AIRCOM WINNIPEG

RCCWC/NDHQ OTTAWA

RCWDDPA/1 CBG CALGARY

RCEVCHA/5 GBC VALCARTIER

RCCKC/HQ SSF PETAWAWA

RCECG/CTC GAGETOWN

RCFPDJA/HQ 4 CMBG LAHR

BT

RESTRICTED PLANS 2017

PAGE 2 RCESCGA 0199 RESTRICTED

FMC FOR SSO DOC, AIRCOM FOR C AND D, NDHQ FOR DLP 3

SUBJ: CFP 300 (INTERIM) CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS - COMMENTS

REFS: A. NDHQ 2910-CFP 300 (DLP 4) 01 DEC 78 COVERING CFP 300

B. FMC DOC 09 231500Z MAR 79

C. AIRCOM D AND D 007 041535Z APR 79

REF A REQUESTS SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES TO NDHQ BY 16 MAR 79.

DATE NOW EXTENDED TO 01 JUN. REQ FWD YOUR COMMENTS TO HQ 10 TAG

NLT 01 MAY 79

BT

00199

RESTRICTED

2910-CFP 300

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RCWDDPA/HQ 1 CBG CALGARY

RCF PDJA/4 CMBG LAHR

RCWDDPA/1 CBG SIGS CALGARY

RCF PCIA/4 FD AMB LAHR

RCF PCIA/4 SVC BN LAHR

RCECG/403 SQN GAGETOWN

RCWDG/408 SQN NAMAQ

RCECG/422 SQN GAGETOWN

RCEVCHA/430 ETAB VALCARTIER

RCEVHMA/433 ETAC BAGOTVILLE

RCF PCIA/444 SQN LAHR

RCCPUFA/450 SQN OTTAWA

RCF HUA/CANCONCYP NICOSIA

CHIEF LAND DOCTRINE
AND OPERATIONS
MAR 26 1979

DLP

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RCF PBHA/128 AAD BTY BADEN

RCF PCIA/129 AAD BTY LAHR

RCF PCIA/RCD LAHR

INFO RCCWC/NDHQ OTTAWA

RCW BOCA/AIRCOM WINNIPEG

XMT 2 MP PL PETAWAWA

PPM 5 GBC VALCARTIER

1 CBG MP PL CALGARY

BT

UNCLAS DOC 09

NDHQ FOR DLP 4

SUBJ: COORDINATION OF COMMENTS ON CFP 300 LAND
OPERATIONS

REF: A. 2910-CFP 300 (DLP 4)

1. THE INTERIM PUBLICATION OF CFP 300 LAND OPERATIONS HAS BEEN RECENTLY DISTRIBUTED TO FORMATIONS UNITS AND BASES OF MOBILE COMMAND UNDER COVER OF REFERENCE A
2. ALL ADDRESSEES OF THIS COMMAND INTENDING TO SUBMIT

DLP4 (R)

I have spoken to Al
LYNMBE & you about this
evidence of misunderstanding.
If you see any possibility
of restricting comments, I would
be pleased. Otherwise for
info only & PA.
10 Apr 79

[Signature]
R-8550

(3) DLP4-2

We discussed
for PA at this time.

[Signature]
DLP4

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PAGE 001 UNCLAS

COMMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF
REFERENCE A WILL DO SO IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

A. UNITS OF FMC FORMATIONS AND FMC BASES COMMANDED BY
FMC FORMATION COMMANDERS WILL FORWARD THEIR COMMENTS TO
PARENT FORMATION HEADQUARTERS FOR CONSOLIDATION

B. FMC FORMATIONS WILL FORWARD CONSOLIDATED COMMENTS TO
THIS HQ

C. INDEPENDENT UNITS, CONTINGENTS, CFB SUFFIELD AND
MILITIA AREA HQS WILL FORWARD COMMENTS TO THIS HQ,


D. HQ 10 TAG WILL SUBMIT CONSOLIDATED COMMENTS OF AIR
UNITS TO THIS HQ WITH AN INFO COPY TO AIR COMMAND

3. COMMENTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THIS HQ ATTENTION

SSO DOCTRINE BY 1 MAY 79

BT

0001

PA


DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

CANADIAN LAND FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
COLLEGE DE COMMANDEMENT ET D'ÉTAT-MAJOR DES FORCES TERRESTRES CANADIENNES

SC 2900-1

FORT FRONTENAC
KINGSTON, ONTARIO
K7K 2X8

22 Mar 79

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

NDRMS/SGDDN 3-8-2

Referred to

Transmitted to

DLP-4

Attention: DLP-4

CFP 300 (INTERIM)
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

File No

Dossier No.

2910-CFP300

Charged to/Chargé à


Reference: A. 2910-CFP 300 (DLP 4) 1 Dec 78

1. The reference was not received until mid-Mar 79.
2. Although the deadline for comments has passed the following points are offered for the first amendment of CFP 300:
 - a. Page 3-14. The following sentence should be added to para 307: "The communications zone may also contain such combat units as air defence artillery, infantry and armour for rear area security tasks, airborne forces and fixed-wing attack aircraft".
 - b. Page 5-15. Some of the terms and statements in para 515.2 must be changed to conform to the new nomenclature included in para 301 of CFP 314(1) The Ordnance Engineering System. For example:
 - (1) change "First Line or Unit Repairs" to read "Level One Repairs",
 - (2) change "Second Line or Field Repairs" to read "Level Two Repairs",

.../2

- 2 -

- ✓ (3) change "Third Line or Intermediate Repairs" to read "Level Three Repairs", and
- ✓ (4) change "Fourth Line or Depot Repairs" to read "Level Four Repairs".
- c. Pages 5-20, 5-22, 5-23 and 5-24. The term "Replenishment Point" is used in various paras on these pages to describe what has been variously called a "Refilling Point", "Replenishment Park", "Support Point" and "Supply Point" in our army. The last term is the one currently in use at CLFCSC and CFSC. If "Replenishment Point" is the new, accepted term then a notification of this fact would be appreciated. If the subject is still open for discussion, then our preference is for "Supply Point".
- ✓ D Log Ops to review terms
- d. Page 5-27. The terms used in Figure 5-2 must be changed here and there to conform to the latest terms introduced in CFP 314(1) as outlined in sub-para b above.
- ✓ (?) e. Page 6-17. Change the last word in line 6 from "logistics" to "administration". The latter is the more comprehensive NATO term, and encompasses both logistics and personnel management.
- ✓ (?) f. Page 6-21. Amend the second last sentence of para 3 to read "Confidence in one's men and their training, fitness, morale and weapons will strengthen physical courage."
- ✓ g. Page 8-20. Change "sophisticated" to "technically complex" in para 812.c.
- ✓ h. Page 9-109. Insert "used or" before "evacuated" in the last line of para 2a.


J. H. Allan
Lieutenant-Colonel
for Commandant

2910-CFP 300
(DLP)

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FOR COMMEN/SIGNALS USE - À L'USAGE DU CENTRE DES COMMUNICATIONS/TRANSMISSIONS

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ROUTINE		222120 Z MAR 79	
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UNCLAS		DLP 45734	

FROM DE	NDHQ OTTAWA
TO-A	FMCHQ ST HUBERT
INFO	HQ SSF PETAWAWA
	1 CBG CALGARY
	5 GBC VALCARTIER
SUBJ:	CFP 300 (INTERIM) CONDUCT OF LAND OPS
REFS:	A. 2910-CFP 300 (DLP 4) OF 1 DEC 78
	B. FMC DOC COORD 14 OF 191400Z MAR 79
	C. SSF OPS 1417 OF 151340Z MAR 79
	REF A INVITED COMMENT ON ITEMS OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE SUBJECT MANUAL ^{TO} BE MADE BY 16 MAR 79. AS OBSERVED IN REFS B AND C LATE DISTRIBUTION RENDERED THE DEADLINE UNSUITABLE. FINAL PROCESSES WILL BE DELAYED. COMMENTS SHOULD REACH NDHQ/DLP BY 1 JUN 79

PAGE	OF	DRAFTER'S NAME NOM DU RÉDACTEUR	OFFICE BUREAU	TEL. - TÉL.
1	1	RG GRAHAM, MAJ	DLP	2-8550
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RCWDDPA/HQ 1 CBG CALGARY

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NDHQ FOR DLP 4


REFS: A. OPS 1417 151340Z MAR 79 (NOTAL)

B. TELECOM MAJOR WHITE-LAJAMBE OF 16 MAR 79

THIS HQ RECOMMENDS 1 JUN AS DATE FOR SUBMISSION OF
COMMENTS ON CFP 300 INTERIM LAND OPERATIONS

BT

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DLP

② DLP 4-2

1. Also note msg from
SSF (OP 1417) 151340Z Mar.
attached requesting
extension to some date.

2. Pls send reply to
TMC HQ and SSF HQ
authorizing extension
to 1 Jun 79 for replies.

3. We will use 1 Jun
as the new date and
answer any additional
requests on an individual
reply basis.

③

Replied by msg. DA
[Signature]

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21 Mar 79
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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File 2910-CFP 300

DLP

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FM HQ SSF PETAWAWA

TO RCESCGA/FMCHQ ST HUBERT

INFO RCCWC/NDHQ OTTAWA

BT

UNCLAS OPS 1417

FMCHQ FOR DCOS CD AND TD, NDHQ FOR DLP.

SUBJECT: CONDUCT LAND OPS

REF: 2910-CFP 300 (DLP 4) 1 DEC 78


1. CFP 300 (INTERIM) RECD THIS HQ 13 MAR 79 REQUESTING SUGGESTIONS
FOR CHANGE TO NDHQ BY 16 MAR 79.

2. 16 MAR DATE OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MEET. CONSIDER PUB
SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT TO WARRANT CLOSE STUDY.

3. REQUEST DATE FOR SUGGESTED CHANGES BE DELAYED TO 1 JUN 79

BT

00019



Replied by
msg. PAZ

② DLP 4-2
Agree. See
min 2 of on
FMC msg
DOC CODES 14
A14002 Mon
regarding action
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CANADIAN FORCES - FORCES CANADIENNES
PUBLICATION PRODUCTION - DEMANDE DE TRAVAIL D'ÉDITION

COMPLETE IN ACCORDANCE WITH C-01-000-100/AG-001
REMPLIR CONFORMEMENT À LA

DDDS - Project Number
N° DSDD du travail
A 0353601
Security Classification
Cote de sécurité
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10: DDOS PRODUCTION INFORMATION CENTRE (PIC) - AU: CENTRE D'INFORMATION SUR LA PRODUCTION (CIP) DU DSDD

SECTION 1: PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS - TRAVAIL DEMANDÉ

DDID IDENTIFICATION NO. N° D'IDENTIFICATION IDDN ▶ B-OL-300-000/FP-000 (INTERCOM) DEMAND APPROVAL CODE CODE D'AUTORISATION DES DEMANDES 04

TITLE OF PUBLICATION TITRE DE LA PUBLICATION ▶ CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

MANUSCRIPT PREPARED ON TPE
MANUSCRIT TRANSCRIT A L'AIDE DU
MATÉRIEL DE COMPOSITION ET D'ÉDITION
YES OUI ☐ NO NON ☒

THIS PUBLICATION SUPERSEDES
CETTE PUBLICATION ANNULE ET REMPLACE ▶ NIL

APPLICABLE SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT, SUBJECT
SYSTÈME, MATÉRIEL, OU SUJET PERTINENT ▶ N/A

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RE-IDENTIFICATION RENUMÉROTAGE ☐ RESCISSION ANNULATION ☐ EDITORIAL REVIEW REVUE DE FOND ET DE FORME ☐

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INSTRUCTIONS

Qty 790 required. Manuscript is camera ready,

For additional instructions see attached DSS 3149-2

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APPROUVÉE PAR | R.G. Graham Maj
SUB-SECTION HEAD - CHEF DE SOUS-SECTION | DLP 4-2 | 2-8550 | Dec 78 |
| APPROVAL (NEW ISSUE PUBLICATION) - APPROBATION (NOUVELLE PUBLICATION) | | | | |
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APPROUVÉE PAR | P.A. Roy LCol
SECTION HEAD - CHEF DE SECTION | DLP 4 | 2-8550 | Dec 78 |
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PRODUCTION PRIORITY - PRIORITÉ DE PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION DATE DATE DE DIFFUSION
APPROVED APPROUVÉE PAR J.K. Dangerfield Col DLP NOT LATER THAN AU PLUS TARD LE 15 Jan 79
DIRECTOR - DIRECTEUR

SECTION 2: DDOS ACCEPTANCE - APPROBATION DU DSDD

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N° IDDN, TITRE ET DATE | Sera Ricci
INDEXING OFFICER - RESPONSABLE DE L'IDDN | DDDS 2-5 | 2-9918 | 19 Dec 78 |

MEMORANDUM

PA
2910-CFP 300 (DMEP)

22 Nov 78

DLP

SELECTION OF FORMAT FOR CFP 300

Ref: A. 2910-CFP 300 (DLP) 16 Nov 78

1. The two options for the format of CFP 300 "Conduct of Land Operations" have been reviewed as requested in Ref A.
2. It is apparent that there is no difference in substance between the two versions and on balance this division favours Option B.
3. It is further considered that there is no need to canvass the members of the Army Doctrine and Tactics Board on issues such as this. The decision should have been made by the OPI.
4. As pointed out to DLP 4-2, you may wish to note that page 12-5 is missing from ATP 35 in Option B.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
C. A. LOWRY, COL

C.A. Lowry
Col
DGME0
2-7949

DCH Francis LCol/2-8385/bef

2910-CFP 300 (DLP) PA

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

16 November, 1978

Distribution List

CFP 300 (INTERIM)
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS
SELECTION OF FORMAT

Reference: A. DLP 49114 091855Z November, 1978

1. A decision as to the format in which CFP 300, "Conduct of Land Operations", will be issued will be sought at the 11-12 Dec 78 meeting of the Army Doctrine and Tactics Board (Reference A). One sample of each of the following two options is enclosed:

- a. Option A - An all-Canadian manual developed as a result of comments on the first draft circulated in Jan 78.
- b. Option B - A compound manual containing 11 unique Canadian chapters and incorporating the officially approved Allied Tactical Publication -35, "Land Force Tactical Doctrine".

2. CFP 300 has been developed to meet an urgent requirement to distribute throughout the Canadian Forces a keystone manual which explains how land operations are to be conducted by the army. This must be the source document to which all other land manuals can be related. CFP 300 will replace CFP 165 issued in 1967. Comments on the first draft distributed in Jan 78 have been incorporated wherever possible in both options.

3. The following factors have changed since the issue of the first draft:

- a. The official version of the NATO ATP 35 dated 3 April 1978 was approved for issue by all NATO nations.
- b. The Chairman of the Military Agency for Standardization issued a strong appeal to all NATO nations to implement this NATO land doctrine throughout national forces in a positive manner. Canada's position during development of ATP 35 has always been it is essential to NATO interoperability to implement, and be seen to be so doing, agreed NATO doctrine.

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4. Option A - An all-Canadian Manual

a. Advantage

- (1) The amendment process would be under Canadian control thus changes could be made quickly as the need was identified.
- (2) It would meet any requirement or desire for manuals to be all-Canadian.

b. Disadvantages

- (1) The draft as written does not fully reflect the Apr 78 edition of ATP 35. Some delay in issue will be caused by the need to rewrite sections of Chapters 11, 12 and 13.
- (2) It does not make the Canadian commitment to NATO interoperability as obvious as is possible and, perhaps, desirable.
- (3) If CFP 300 and ATP 35 are issued separately it will force the development and issue of amendments for two separate manuals.

5. Option B - A compound Canadian/ATP 35 Manual

a. Advantages

- (1) The manual would always be current with approved NATO doctrine and could be kept current with the least amount of Canadian staff effort.
- (2) It would be evident throughout the Canadian Forces that Canada was implementing Canadian doctrine.
- (3) As ATP 35 is further developed, the need for unique Canadian chapters should continually diminish.
- (4) It would provide a visible area of interoperability, even standardization, against which any agencies advocating Canadian disagreement would have to provide adequate justification.

b. Disadvantages

- (1) It would be difficult to insert any unique Canadian doctrine or Canadian amplification for operations considered in Chapters 11, 12 and 13 of the all-Canadian version.

- 3 -

- (2) There is the possibility that the time needed to obtain amendments to ATP 38 might force a need for interim Canadian amendments. However, the NATO Tactical Doctrine Working Party responsible for such amendments meets annually.

6. Because of the need for a current CF manual on this subject the intention is to issue CFP 300 in the format decided by the Army Doctrine and Tactics Board as an Interim Manual in late December. You will note that the covering letter to the manual outlines a procedure by which all recipients can have amendment input prior to printing of the final bilingual edition in April 1979.

7. Members of the Army Doctrine and Tactics Board who will not be sending a representative to the December meeting are requested to advise FMC HQ and/or NDHQ/CLDO of a choice of format by 8 Dec 78.

J.K. Dangerfield
for J.K. Dangerfield
Colonel
Director Land Plans
for Chief of the Defence Staff

Enclosures: 2

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D.T.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

TEMPORARY DOCKET DOSSIER TEMPORAIRE

3 May 78

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Canadian Armed Forces
Mobile Command

Forces armées canadiennes
Force mobile



FMC 2910-CFP 300 (Comm)

Mobile Command Headquarters
St Hubert, Quebec

J3Y 5TS

3 May 78

Trans.

DCEO

Distribution List

CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

File No
Dossier No.

MAY 4 1978

Charged to/Chargé à... DLP 28/3/78

- References: A. NDHQ 2910-CFP 300 (DLP), 9 January, 1978
B. NDHQ 2910-CFP 300 (DCEO), 20 January, 1978
C. NDHQ 2910-CFP 300 (DCEO), 20 February, 1978

1. References have now been reviewed from a Communications-Electronics viewpoint. The following comments are submitted in response to References B and C; Reference A comments were submitted separately.

REFERENCE B

2. The observations and recommendations in Annex A (less Appendix 1) are supported. They should be incorporated in Reference A.

3. Appendix 1 to Annex A improves on Reference A, and should be adopted with the following exceptions.

- a. Paragraph 418.2, Line 4. After "responsibility" add "of the staff".
b. Paragraph 419, Principles and Methods.

(1) It appears that the term "principle" is misused. For example, Paragraph 4, Line 1 states "There are three principle methods ..."; the appropriate word, however, is "principal" (meaning guideline). The "principles" listed in Paragraph 2 (Human, Procedural, and Characteristics) are considered factors, not principles.

(2) Paragraph 2c lists five "primary characteristics" of communications systems. Paragraph 3 lists three more "characteristics". It is suggested that the material be reorganized for better understanding, and explanations reduced or eliminated; however, many good comments are made (e.g. Paragraph 3c, on "information explosions").

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- (3) Paragraph 4a. The mobility of radio nets is not expressed as a flexibility advantage.
- (4) Paragraph 2b(1). Add a new sub-subparagraph:
"(d). main to rear".
- (5) Paragraph 2c. Add new sub-subparagraphs:
"(6) prioritized speed of service
(7) prioritized grade of service".

These degrees of service are essential to, and virtually unique to, military systems.

- (6) Paragraph 4, Line 1. Delete "methods". Insert "means of carriage". This change will improve understanding.
- (7) It is recommended that an additional paragraph be inserted after Paragraph 4, as follows:
"5. There are three principal forms of communications delivery:
 - a. voice (radio or telephone)
 - b. data (via visual display terminals)
 - c. hard copy (i.e. teleprinter page copy, or handwritten operator transcriptions of voice or international morse code, or courier carried page copy)."

REFERENCE C

4. The suggestion concerning Paragraph 917 (Page 3, Paragraph 3, Line 5) should be changed as follows: delete "provided with" and insert "may require". Support arms and services should not assume that the combat arms will provide their protection; the combat arms exist to destroy the enemy. The recommended change will prevent the protectionist concept from becoming doctrine.


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5. The suggestion on Page 4 concerning the title of Paragraph 1048 is not supported. Paragraph 1048 includes more than merely "command, control and communications".

6. Pages 5 and 6 recommend the addition of communications sub-paragraphs in Sections 2 and 4. It is suggested that a similar addition be made to Section 5 (Cold Weather Operations) to emphasize the higher failure rate of electrical storage batteries at low temperatures.

7. The observations and suggestions submitted in Paragraphs 2 and 3 above apply also to Annex B of Reference C.



J.G. Leech
Lieutenant-Colonel
Senior Staff Officer Communications
for Commander Mobile Command

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8 May 78 DCEO 2-2



Canadian Armed Forces
Mobile Command

Forces armées canadiennes
Force mobile



LAND
DOCTRINE AND
OPERATIONS

MAY 2 1978

EMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD&TD)

Mobile Command Headquarters
St Hubert, Que
J3Y 5T5

28 APR 78
NDRMS/SGDDN 3-32

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CFP 300 [FIRST DRAFT]
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

File No

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2910-CFP 300

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DLP 28/3/78

Reference: A. NDHQ 2910 CFP 300 (DLP) 9 Jan 78

1. Reference A has now been reviewed from a Communications - Electronics viewpoint. The following comments are submitted for consideration:

- a. The format (i.e., Table of Contents, page numbering, paragraph numbering and Headings) is much better than that of the US Army "How to fight" series: the user can easily and quickly locate essential information. CFP 300 is a useful reference manual, rather than a document read once per career.
- b. Paragraph 937, Lines 1 and 2. Delete "An operation ..." its passage." Insert "Formations and units participating in delaying and/or withdrawal operations must pass". This change will improve clarity.
- c. Paragraph 1406
 - (1) Lines 1 and 2. Delete "The tactical...this, he." Insert "The tactical commander controlling battlefield operations". Present wording is redundant.
 - (2) Line 8. Delete "manoeuvre". Insert "movement". By definition in ATP 35, "manoeuvre" "fire and movement".
- d. Paragraph 1407, Lines 2 and 3. Delete "high frequency". This phrase unnecessarily restricts the meaning of the sentence and is unnecessary.

② DLP4-2

for incorporation.

DP4

3 May 78

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- e. Paragraph 1408. Delete entirely. This chart does not appear to improve understanding. If paragraph 1408 is deleted the first four words ("As can be seen") of Paragraph 1410 must be deleted also.
- f. Paragraph 1410, Lines 9 and 10. Delete "and should be jammed routinely. As such". This phrase is repetitious, and the meaning may not always be appropriate. Deletion permits more flexibility in operations.
- g. Paragraph 1419. Delete entirely and insert the following replacement paragraph. The present paragraph is platitudinous and meaningless.

"1429. EW organizations require normal administrative support like any other unit, a factor easily overlooked by supported formations. In addition they need unique maintenance support for their unique, expensive electronics systems; this is best provided by integral maintenance service to second-line level".
- h. Paragraph 1420. This paragraph belongs in a Communications section under the heading "Electronic Counter-Countermeasures". It cannot be applied to an EW organization, except as regards its communications as for any other organization.
- j. Chapter 14 should eventually be rewritten; it is too verbose and offers little concrete information upon which to base decisions. A new chapter should await the outcome of EW studies and doctrine preparation now in progress.

2. These above comments complete the views of this Headquarters on the first draft of CFP 300 Conduct of Land Operations.


J.T.F.A. Liston
Colonel

DCOS Combat Development and Training Development
for Commander Mobile Command

.../3

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DOCTRINE AND
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FMC 2910-CFP 300

Mobile Command Headquarters 1978

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3 Apr 78

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→ National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ont
KIA OK2

Attention: DLP

CFP 300 1ST DRAFT
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

File No

Dossier No

Charged to/Chargé à DLP

APR 5 1978

2910-CFP300

28-3-78

References: A. Telecon Exley/Graham DLP 28 Mar 78
B. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD&TD) 25 Jan 78

1. Further to Reference A, attached are copies of comments received in this HQ as a result of Reference B. Though this late reply to your request is regretted, it is unavoidable. Even with this delay, it has not been possible to consolidate comments and produce detailed draft amendments. For future manuals of this scope and importance it is suggested that the tasking of a working group from primary user agencies be considered. The working group representatives would be responsible for preparation of draft amendments and would sit in some suitable location for as long as necessary to produce a revised draft.

2. The draft manual is largely satisfactory to the agencies who have reviewed it, with four exceptions:

- a. Repetition. The layout of the manual has caused considerable repetition and thus a larger manual than is seen to be necessary. The attached comments suggest a means of reducing the manual.
- b. The Defence. Though ATP 35 explains two concepts of defence, our Canadian "keystone" document could be less ambivalent and establish a firm Canadian doctrine. The present Chapter 9 reconciles the concepts rather well, but it falls short in failing to reflect the aggressive nature of defences based on mobility, and in putting inadequate emphasis on the applicability of the concepts to levels of command. Each infantry section, platoon, company, battalion battle is positional. Few Corps Commanders can afford that luxury. The Brigade is probably the lowest level at which a defensive based on mobility is feasible, and then only if the Brigade contains at least two armour units - one for support to battle groups, and one for reserve/counter-attack.

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- c. Air Support. As will be seen, 10 TAG has provided extensive comments which must presumably be reconciled with those of other agencies.
 - d. Administration and Logistics. There are many errors and omissions in this area. Terminology in particular is confused. British and American terminology is used interchangeably with no apparent discrimination. Detailed comments are very extensive and follow separately.
3. For resolution of comments, in view of the importance of this manual, it is suggested that the working group approach at para 1 above be used. Though this may delay publications somewhat, it has the potential to improve the eventual product considerably.
4. The question of security classification has been raised and must be conclusively addressed. Present regulations with regard to that classification are totally impractical in application. Given the unclassified nature of our Allies comparable publications and the ready availability of material in civilian publications, classification RESTRICTED is an exercise in futility. Indeed the whole question of a requirement for that classification must be examined.



J.T.F.A. Liston
Colonel

DCOS Combat Development and Training Development
for Commander Mobile Command

MEMORANDUM


FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CJ&TD)

30 Mar 78

SO Doc Production

COMMENTS CFP 300


1. In Chapter 1, the two following difficulties should be corrected:
 - a. Lengthy references to current Canadian defence policy;
 - b. At times unconventional outlines of standard strategic concepts.
2. Detailed Canadian defence policy (priority of roles etc) could, and probably will, change frequently. Our basic manual on the Army's "doctrine" should perhaps not be tied to such changing factors. Our philosophy should be such that it prepares officers to adapt to new roles; as such it must be general and concentrate on principles that will survive changes in defence priorities.
3. Strategic concepts (nature and causes of war, components of power etc) have become an academic discipline ("Strategic" or "War" studies). Chapter I should be reviewed by academics in this discipline so as to reflect a concise summary of the currently accepted concepts.
4. On the positive side, the treatment of the principles of war and of the "elements of tactics" in Chap 6 is quite attractive.
5. The chapters on the phases of war are receiving detailed study by the SSOs and I will forego comment at this time. However the reluctance to define a firm concept of defence cannot pass without mention.
6. In view of these concerns, comments from other sources, and the inadequate time for review, I wish you to recommend to DLP that a further draft be produced, or that revision of the interim manual be planned. A necessary preliminary must be the presentation of CFP 300 to Command Council.
7. Enclosed are detailed comments.


J.T.F.A. Liston
Col
DCOS CD & TD
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| PAGE | PARA OR COLUMN | LINE OR COLUMN | COMMENT | REASON |
|------|----------------|----------------|---|--|
| 1-2 | 6 | | Definition of Grand Strategy omitted - Should be included. | Although US does not recognize the concept, it is generally accepted elsewhere. |
| 1-5 | 106 | | This para should deal with defence objectives in general, and not with current Canadian policy. Defence objectives can range from "containment" through "dominance" "acquisition" and "destruction" | Canadian policy objectives can change. CFP 300 on the other hand is designed to set out principles. |
| 1-7 | Section 5 | Title | "Types", "levels" or "scales" are more suitable alternatives. | "Nature of conflict" implies a discussion of the causes or origin of conflict, which is only superficially mentioned in this section. It is essentially a definition of the levels of conflict. |
| 1-7 | 109 | Whole para | Delete or expand adequately. | The cause of war and determinants of its intensity has been a subject of intense study. These two paras fail to outline the problem usefully. |
| 1-8 | Section 6 | Complete | Revision required in order to stick to a general outline of the nature of military power. List the components of power and indicate to the reader how he can assess the relative military power of a country faced with a military objective. | CFP 300 should describe principles. In this section the nature of power is not adequately examined. While Canadian policy can be usefully used as an example, the section on military power should not be diverted into a discussion of specific policy. |

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| PAGE | PARA OR COLUMN | LINE OR COLUMN | COMMENT | REASON |
|--------------------|----------------|----------------|---|--|
| 1-10
to
1-14 | 114 | Whole
para | Flexibility, adaptability, operational readiness and combined forces are essentially characteristics of types of military force and should be discussed under that heading (i.e. para 112). | |
| 1-15 | 116 | Whole
para | The role of the Canadian Forces should be deleted from Section 7 - "The nature and role of land forces". | Section 7 starts off well but gets diverted into a discussion of current defence policy, and a re-definition of the levels of conflict.. |
| 1-15 | 116 | | Para 301 (Basis of Organization) should be included here. | The "combat functions" of land forces should be the basis of a section on the nature of land forces and should precede chapter 2 (operational environment). |
| 3-1 | 301 | Whole
para | a. Should be in Chapter I
b. Mass should be deleted
c. Protection or survivability should be included as an essential combat function. | "Mass" here, is another word for numbers. This concept is discussed under the principles of war (concentration, security, economy of effort). However "survivability" which would include armoured protection, NBCW protection (as well as, perhaps, the notions of durability in the face of casualties) is an accepted function. Note that page 6-12 lists protection, fire and movement as the tactical functions. Consistency requires that Chapter 3 provide the same approach. This concept also re-appear in examining the characteristics of the various arms. |



Air Command
10 Tactical Air Group

Commandement Aérien
10e Groupement Aérien Tactique



TAG 2910-1 (SSO Plans)

Headquarters
10 Tactical Air Group
St Hubert, PQ
J3Y 5T4
2/ Mar 78

Mobile Command
St Hubert, PQ
J3Y 5T5

Attention: SO Doc Prodn

CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

Reference: A. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD+TD) 25 Jan 78

1. A review of the subject publication has been completed as requested in Ref A. Unfortunately very few positive comments have been made. As with many new publications, it turns out to be repetitious and a poor lead-in to the 311 series and other air publications.

2. The comments have been divided in two sections, general and specific.

a. General Comments

- (1) a portion of the land operations normally managed at corps level are delegated to brigades and divisions,
- (2) the concept of the "air war" is not clearly identified, ie, a land officer using this manual as a training vehicle would expect close air support all the time,
- (3) helicopter operations are mentioned in various sections but with insufficient impact to be of value,
- (4) inference is made that command will always be exercised by a land commander,
- (5) the whole air input requires revision, the specific comments indicative of the extent.


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b. Specific Comments

- (1) Art 207. It is misleading to state that operations will succeed only if the enemy air forces are prevented from interfering. This is assuming that air superiority must be obtained first. The majority of airpower will be directed at gaining control of the air. Efforts may be directed to offensive counter air or defensive counter-air; however, close air support may not be available nor is it guaranteed. The close air support concept must be explained.
- (2) Art 328. The author shows little knowledge of our helicopter capabilities and of the total air flexibility in resupply.
- (3) Art 330. This paragraph gives a good description of casualty evacuation procedures. However, para 4 contains three ideas: move, number of beds, and holding policy. Para 7 should indicate that "were helicopters to be employed, they may be allocated under "tactical control" of the Field Ambulance or Field Hospital".
- (4) Chap 4, Sect 8 -- Tactical Aviation. The whole section may be Chap 1 of CFP 311 (5) Sections 1 to 3 inclusive.
 - (a) Art 422.1 Tactical helicopter support is provided by the air element not environment.
 - i. infra-red or thermal devices are not synonymous and should not be used as such;
 - ii. helicopters can adjust and control all indirect delivery weapons, not only arty fire,
 - iii. sub-para c is too vague; ie, the present wording is not accurate enough to properly define "Tactical and Logistic Transport",
 - iv. there is no "Fire Support" role for helicopters in the Canadian Forces, it is totally against our concept unless the author refers to AT helicopters or gunships,
 - (b) Art 423. The article is titled "Equipment and Organization" but deals more on command and control which is dependant on the roles assigned.
 - (c) Art 424. This Headquarters does not agree with the author's statement that the tactical helicopter squadron has "sufficient fire power" to protect itself. The statement is false and conducive to wrong assumptions by tacticians.

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- (d) Art 425. During a conflict, the employment of air-craft is controlled, not supervised.
- (5) Chap 6 Art 633.3 Airspace control guidance will be found in ATP 33/1.
- (6) Chap 8 Art 805. This is not considered an adequate definition of AIR SITUATION.
- (7) Chap 10. At this stage of the publication one gets the feeling that the author is becoming unconcerned and wants to bring the book to an end. The format is poor and the air input almost meaningless.
- (8) Chap 11. There is no helicopter input in the chapter. Mountain, desert, and arctic operations are not even considered.
- (9) Chap 16. Land-Air Battle.
 - (a) Much of the information should be placed as a section in lieu of Art 207.
 - (b) 1601.2 This doctrine is being revised and the procedures will be found in ATP 33 series.
 - (c) 1603.1 Close Air Support. A caution is required to indicate that close air support is a last effort when organic army firepower cannot neutralize the enemy. The resources available for CAS are rather restricted.
 - (d) 1603.5 Counter-Air operations is a pure air function which is not coordinated through the army.
 - (e) 1604.2 All electronic warfare is not integrated with the army.
 - (f) 1604.3 The first statement is not quite accurate and requires clarification.
 - (g) 1607.3 A scout helicopter is more properly referred to as a light observation helicopter.


for W.D. Simmons
Lieutenant - Colonel
for Commander 10 Tactical Air Group

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MEMORANDUM

FMC 2910-CFP 300 (Armd)

20 Mar 78

D Coa CD & TD

Distribution List

CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

Ref: A. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD&TD) of 25 Jan 78

1. Attached at Annex A are several comments which relate to the manual. Tardiness in reply is regretted.
2. It is understood that as a base document this manual should prove important. As well, it is considered that each chapter should stand relatively on its own and therefore a certain amount of redundancy is necessary. However, three major areas of concern are expressed as follows:
 - a. Length and redundancy. The manual is long and often repetitious within a given chapter. More scrutiny to reduce the size and redundancy is required. It cannot be produced in its present state without serious cuts.
 - b. Mobile Defence. As confusing and open to interpretation as any description of "defense based on mobility". In light of this and to avoid confusion with a covering force action, this whole concept must be more clearly expressed. At brigade level, I do not see mobile defense as possible. At higher levels, the concept makes more sense. This should be spelled out.
 - c. Armour and Reconnaissance. There is a tendency to consider tanks only as anti-tank weapons and, more seriously, to tend towards piecemealing and frequent grouping. Although intellectually satisfying, this is not foreseen as either tactically sound or practically feasible

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given the future battlefield. In reconnaissance, this idea of grouping is also a dangerous tendency and it is suggested it be deleted totally.

3. For your consideration.

E. Exley LCol.
E. Exley
LCol
SSO Armd
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SSO Arty
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| SERIAL NO. | COMMENT SUBMITTED BY | PAGE | PARAGRAPH OR COLUMN | LINE NO. OR COLUMN | COMMENTS | REASONS SUPPORTING THE PROPOSAL |
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| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
| 1 | SO ARMD DOC | 1-11 | 114.1 | Last Sentence | Suggest that "limitations on the degree of force" do "diminish the force". Suggest that "force" be deleted in last line. | |
| 2 | SO ARMD DOC | 3-2 | 301.B | Last Sentence | Delete "or" insert "and". | |
| 3 | SO ARMD DOC | 3-3 | 301.5B | | Reword. Heavy and unclear. | |
| 4 | SO ARMD DOC | 3-3 | 301.5C | Second Sentence | Should read "These means are provided by both the headquarters and their organic communications units, as well as by specialized communications units." Reason: Clarity. | |
| 5 | SO ARMD DOC | 3-4 | 302.1 | | Delete from "involving" to "in" and add "alone or in". Reason -Simplicity. | |

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| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
| 6 | SO ARMD DOC | 3-11 | 313.1 | 3 | Delete "with" insert "with
which" after "weapons". Grammar | |
| 7 | SO ARMD DOC | 3-19 | 322.1 | Second
Sentence | Not understood. Redo | |
| 8 | SO ARMD DOC | 3-30 | 329 | Title | Suggest "RESERVE STOCKS". "RE-
SERVE" has tactical significance
other than logistics. | |
| 9 | SO ARMD DOC | 3-30 | 329 through-
out | | Suggest that the "basic load"
concept, if it still applies, be
defined in this para. | |
| 10 | SO ARMD DOC | 3-33 | After para
330.8 | | Insert figure 3-3, not later on | |
| 11 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-4 | 403.3.d | | Within this para, it should not
be forgotten that tanks can
play a major role in the cover-
ing force or guard actions due
to their firepower and mobility. | |

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| | | | | | This should come out in the defense para. | |
| 12 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-6 | 404.2.b | | Delete from "and" to "situation". Troops should not be decentra-
lized under present doctrine. | |
| 13 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-6 | 404.3.a | Last Line | Delete "his" insert "the". | |
| 14 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-8 | 404.3.f | Last Sentence | Reword - not understood. Should be considered in light of serial 12 above. | |
| 15 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-14 | 407.1 | 4 | Spelling "meteorology". | |
| 16 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-16 | 408.3 | 2 | Air defense "positive" should read "passive"? | |
| 17 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-21 | 409.1 | | Review in light of Infantry Study. | |

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| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
| 18 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-21 | 409.3 | 1&2 | Review terminology of types of Infantry. See Infantry Study. | |
| 19 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-21 | 410.1 | 6 | Should be limit of <u>area of responsibility</u> . Suggest somewhere 5-6 kms ahead of FEBA. "Several thousand" is too vague. | |
| 20 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-22 | 410.3 | 1 | Spelling "possesses". | |
| 21 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-23 | 411.1.d | 8 | The ability to fight mounted must not be excluded. | |
| 22 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-24 | 411.1.e | 4 | Spelling "perilously". | |
| 23 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-26 | 411.6 | | Reword - Adds nothing as presently worded. | |
| 27 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-295 | 416.2 | | AVLB's located at brigade should be mentioned here. | |

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| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
| 28 | SO ARMD DOC | 4-41 | 429.4 | 9 | Believe should read "anti-tank" defences. | |
| 29 | SO ARMD DOC | 5-4 | 502.8 | | Whole para dealing with strategic considerations should come earlier possibly in introduction para 501. | |
| 30 | SO ARMD DOC | 5-6 | 506 | | Suggest this be reviewed as Chaplains should be with each regiment and battalion in war. <u>They are required.</u> | |
| 31 | SO ARMD DOC | 5-6 | 507 | | Same as para 30 | |
| 32 | SO ARMD DOC | 5-8 | 509.2 | | Provision must be made for crew testing and zeroing of major weapons, guns and tanks. This should occur in the rear area and means ranges and training. | |
| 33 | SO ARMD DOC | 6-10 | 506.5 | 7 | Delete "be" insert "by". | |

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| 34 | SO ARMD DOC | 6-12 | 607.1 | | Chapter should but does not follow the described order. | |
| 35 | SO ARMD DOC | 6-12 | 007.1.b(2) | | Should read "Firepower". | |
| 36 | SO ARMD DOC | 6-16 | 614.1 | 9-10 and 14-15 | Sentences 6 and 9 must be reworded. | |
| 37 | SO ARMD DOC | 6-22 | 620 | | Para 5 is missing | |
| 38 | SO ARMD DOC | 6-32 | Section 6 | | Repetitious when compared to 614 | |
| 39 | SO ARMD DOC | 6-36 | 631.4 and 631.5 | | Finally a difference is recognized between screen and guard and the requirement for reconnaissance "in force" when needed. Excellent! | |
| 40 | SO ARMD DOC | 6-40 | | | Section 8 - Why does it exist since Chapter 14 explains. | |

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| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
| 41 | SO ARMD DOC | 79 | 713.8 | 1 | "common" should read "conducted"? | |
| 42 | SO ARMD DOC | 7-13 | 719 | | Title should be "RECONNAISSANCE AND PLANNING" for consistency with above and content of para. | |
| 43 | SO ARMD DOC | 7-14 | 721.1 | | This para is not considered necessary. | |
| 44 | SO ARMD DOC | 7-14 | 725.6 | Last Line | Between "operations" and "so", insert "normally in the form of a warning order". | |
| 45 | SO ARMD DOC | 81 | SECTION 1 | | Should be significantly reduced in light of what follows in Chapter 8, especially 801 with 806. | |
| 46 | SO ARMD DOC | 8-13 | 807 | | This para lays out the organization of the chapter but it is considered that for reasons of logic the advance should pre- | |

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| | | | | | cede the attack. | |
| 47 | BO ARMD DOC | 8-31 | 816.2 | | This para should be redone. It tends to imply necessarily grouping. This para should be reworded to be less dogmatic and to stress the dangers of piecemeal use of tanks. | |
| 48 | BO ARMD DOC | 8-34 | 816.7 | | This para is very weak especially sub para b. Suggest that other economy of force missions be considered along with "deception" at higher levels. This tends to deal only with bde level roles. | |
| 49 | BO ARMD DOC | 8-36 | 817.4 | 3 | Reword last sentence. Reason - Grammar | |
| 50 | BO ARMD DOC | 9-13 | 904.6 | | "Ce qui se conçoit bien s'énonce clairement". One of the dangers of "defense based on mobility" | |

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| | | | | | is that the concept is unclear and too much mobility is assumed likely on the future battlefield. This concept must be more clearly stated as must the level at which this "mobility" applies. It is obviously open to vast interpretation if this para is retained as guidance. | |
| 51 | SG ARMD DOC | 9-17 | 905.4 | 3 | Again the question of decisive battle versus the concept of defense based on "mobility" requires clarity. | |
| 52 | SG ARMD DOC | 9-30 | 911.5 | Whole para | This should be rewritten. It is misleading and again leads to piece mealism. Concept should be relative to the "covering force" and not to "hit and run" tactics "throughout his advance". Also suggest that "separation between positions" does not necessarily | |

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| | | | | | <p>imply "decentralized control". On the contrary, where resources are limited centralized control in depth with the ability to react to a multiple number of threats may be the only way of defending. Caution is also to be used when employing tanks solely as anti-tank guns. This must be stressed since it is a recurring pit-fall not only in our doctrine but in our deployment on exercises.</p> | |
| 53 | BO ARMD DOC | 9-47 | §14.4.b | 3rd Sentence | <p>Suggest strongly that this be reconsidered. Regrouping as a practice is much more difficult to achieve than that which is suggested. The concept of a "viable reserve" cannot and should not depend on the ability to "regroup".</p> | |

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| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
| 54 | SO ARMB DOC | 9-48
9-49 | 914.5
914.6 | | Suggest that a successful counter-attack, like an attack, must be exploited and the enemy pursued in order to provide for the maximum destruction and disruption of the enemy and to afford time for reorganization of the main defensive area. This should be stressed. | |
| 55 | SO ARMB DOC | 949 | 915.1.d | | Suggest second sentence read "They should not normally be tasked with responsibilities which place a restraint on their ability to manoeuvre". | |
| 56 | SO ARMB DOC | 9-52 | 915.3.b | Second Sentence | Reword - Grammar | |
| 57 | SO ARMB DOC | 9-55 | 916.3.b
916.3.c
916.3.d | | A term in use as well is "junction point". (See para 923.5). The problem is the need for exchange of information at a | |

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| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
| | | | | | given level and hence the requirement for physical versus visual contact. Please clarify notwithstanding CFP 121(AAP 6). | |
| 58 | SO ARMD DOC | 9-68 | 923.5 | 4 | Predetermining the use of tanks as a "tank screen" is not considered sound doctrine. Suggest this be reconsidered. | |
| 59 | SO ARMD DOC | 10-7 | 1005.3.c | Last Sentence | Should read: "Crossing equipment should be made available to lead troops as soon as possible after breaching, such that the advance might be pursued with haste". | |
| 60 | SO ARMD DOC | 10-12 | 1006.6.b | | Suggest that in present environment of I2, the advantages of surprise achieved by darkness will be lost and, since control is easier by day, perhaps a re-think of this section is in order. | |

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| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
| 61 | 50 ARMD DOC | 10-14 | 1006.8 | GENERAL | A concurrent is necessary here on control and disersion in face of likely enemy artillery activity. | |
| 62 | 50 ARMD DOC | 10-17 | 1007.3 | 3rd Sentence | Suggest "night" be replaced by "limited visibility" to include use of smoke and the fact that under I2 and a full moon chances are about the same as by day. | |

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MEMORANDUM

PMC 2910-CFP 300 (Inf)

23 Mar 78

Distribution List

CFP 300 1ST DRAFT
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

Ref: A. PMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD & TD) 25 Jan 78

1. This draft manual has been reviewed, as requested, from a point of view of content. Therefore points of detail have not been commented on unless they are significant.
2. In general this draft manual satisfies the stated aim. It provides a sound basis for the professional officer to commence his study of land operations covering the whole spectrum of warfare. Since it is the keystone manual in the Land Force this fact should be stated, either in the Preface or the Introduction. Additionally the family of related manuals should be identified possibly in an annex.
3. Constructive comments on the content are:
 - a. the scope of the manual is too broad and this has caused it to be too long and too detailed. The writing style is academic and this has led to an over-abundance of descriptive narrative. FM 100-5 provides a reasonable model for this type of manual. It attempts to apply fundamental principles and precepts to the conduct of operations on the modern battlefield. Our manual should attempt to do the same otherwise it will only serve as a general military work and be of little value as a keystone doctrine manual.
 - b. Special conditions including types of terrain, that affect the conduct of offensive and defensive operations, should be included in the chapters dealing with these operations and not be the subject of separate chapters. This will reduce the repetition.
 - c. the lowest level of command at which various operations would be conducted should be identified to avoid confusion, eg delaying and mobile defence operations.


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- d. there is obvious repetition in Chapters 6, 7 and 12. It is suggested that Chapter 12 could be eliminated, and its content incorporated into Chapter 7 where necessary.
 - e. it is suggested that Chapter 13 be deleted. The subject is covered in applicable chapters throughout the manual. If necessary this treatment can be expanded in these chapters.
 - f. low intensity conflicts have been relegated to the last chapter. It is suggested that the author go one step further and remove this chapter. They are not war operations and the fundamental principles governing the conduct of land operations do not apply.
4. Despite the above comments the Author has done a praise-worthy job in writing/assembling this manual. The draft contains all the relevant material required and what remains to be done is to call out the non essential and repetitive parts. It is emphasized again that the form and style of the manual would be better received if they followed the FM 100-5 model.


P.A.E. Harrison
Maj
SO Inf Doc
462

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MEMORANDUM

FMC 2910-CFP 300 (Arty)


09 Feb 78

→ SO Doc Prod

CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

Reference: A. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD & TD) 25 Jan 78

1. Attached as Annex A are comments on subject CFP.


M.C. Brown
LCol
SSO Arty
240

Attachment

Annex A - Comments on CFP 300 (First Draft)

ANNEX A
TO FMC 2910-CFP 300 (AFTY)
DATED 9 FEB 78

COMMENTS ON CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)

| SERIAL
(a) | ITEM CFP 300
(b) | COMMENTS
(c) | REMARKS
(d) |
|---------------|-------------------------------------|--|---|
| 1 | Page 4-10
Para 406.2.d
Line 1 | Delete "connection" Insert "correction" | Spelling |
| 2 | Page 4-11
Para 406.2.e
Line 2 | Delete "two or more troops" Insert "one or more firing sections" | Takes into account six gun single fire unit |
| 3 | Page 4-11
Para 406.2.f
Line 7 | Delete "command and control battery includes a survey and sound ranging troop"
Insert "regimental headquarters battery includes a locating troop" | |
| 4 | Page 4-13
Para 406.3.f
Line 3 | Delete "occupation will be with fire plans and targets which are of immediate interest to those units"
Insert "duties will be to advise on fire support, provide continual observation and engage targets as they appear or as indicated by the supported arms commander" | |
| 5 | Page 4-14
Para 407.1 | Delete the first sentence. Insert "The main tasks of locating artillery is to obtain information about the enemy, with particular reference to the location of enemy weapons" | |

.../2

ANNEX A
TO FMC 2910-CFP 300 (ARTY)
DATED 9 FEB 83

-2-

COMMENTS ON CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)

| SERIAL
(a) | ITEM CFP 300
(b) | COMMENTS
(c) | REMARKS
(d) |
|---------------|--|--|--|
| 6 | Page 4-15
Para 407.2.b
Line 4 | and advising on the neutralization or destruction of enemy weapons

Delete "command and control battery in"
Insert "regimental headquarters battery of" | |
| 7 | Page 4-15
Para 407.3.b
Line 3 | Delete "Reconnaissance" Insert "Besides locating devices and other artillery sources, reconnaissance" | Line 4
Delete "," after photography |
| 8 | Page 4-15
Para 407.3.b
Line 6 | After "artillery." Insert "most of this information will be passed in the form of SHELLREPS, MORTREPS and results from crater analysis" | |
| 9 | Page 4-15
Para 407.3.c
Line 2 | Delete "both" Insert "two" | |
| 10 | Page 4-18
Para 408.4.d(3)
Line 9 | After "missiles" insert "or mobile guns" | |

ANNEX A
TO FMC 2910-CFP 300 (ARTY)
DATED 4 FEB 78

-3-

COMMENTS ON CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)

| SERIAL
(a) | ITEM CFP 300
(b) | COMMENTS
(c) | REMARKS
(d) |
|---------------|---|--|---|
| 11 | Page 4-20
Para 408.6.e
Lines 4, 5, 6 | Delete ", or are they normally sufficient to meet the air defence requirement." Insert period. | Meaning not clear. |
| 12 | Page 8-25
Para 814.2
Line 6 | Delete "artillery," Insert "artillery and mortars," | Page 9-29
Para 911.3.d states this again |
| 13 | Page 8-26
Para 814.4
Line 7 | Delete "location end" | |
| 14 | Page 8-27
Para 814.8
Line 2
Line 4 | Delete "or visual signal"

Delete "either of this fails." Insert "they fail." | |
| 15 | Page 8-27
Para 814.9
Line 2 | After reliability, insert "and flexibility in that it can be changed to an on-call programme if desired" | |
| 16 | Page 8-61
Para 830.3
Line 1 | Delete "place" Insert "pace" | Spelling |

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-4-

ANNEX A
TO FMC 2910-CFP 300 (ARTY)
DATED 9 FEB

COMMENTS ON CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)

| SERIAL
(a) | ITEM CFP 300
(b) | COMMENTS
(c) | REMARKS
(d) |
|---------------|---|---|--|
| 17 | Page 9-28
Para 911.1 | Delete "deployed" Insert "brought to bear" | Check punctuation |
| 18 | Page 9-29
Para 911.3.c
Line 1
Line 3 | Delete " <u>Protective Fire</u> " Insert " <u>Defensive Fire</u> "

Delete "Close protective Fire" Insert "close defensive fire" | |
| 19 | Page 9-29
Para 911.3.d
Line 1
Line 2 | Delete " <u>Counter-bombardment</u> " Insert " <u>Counter-battery</u> "

Delete "guns and mortars" Insert "indirect fire weapons" | |
| 20 | Page 9-32
Para 911.7
Line 4 | After "deployed", insert ",," | Punctuation |
| 21 | Page 9-32
Para 911.7.b
Line 2 | Delete "Protective Fire" Insert "Defensive Fire" | "Final protective Fire " is correct term |

MEMORANDUM

FMC 2910-5 (Engr)


27 February, 1978

SO Doc Prodn

CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

Reference: A. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD & TD) dated 25 Jan 78

1. Comments were requested on the subject publication by Reference A. Several minor comments are attached as Annex A.
2. Generally, it is felt that for a manual on "principles and precepts", it is somewhat lengthy and detailed. There is some redundancy within the manual itself, and when compared with other manuals (e.g. CFPs 301(1), 301(2), 301(3), 301(4)).
3. Chapters 6 and 7 could be combined in one chapter and reduced somewhat. Sections 6 through 9 of Chapter 6 are expanded upon in Chapters 12, 14, and 16.
4. Chapter 5, and Section 3, Chapter 15, are in excessive detail when it is considered that CFP 301(4), Administration in the Field, is available.


A. Leeper
LCol
SSO Fd Engr
581

Attachment:

Annex A - Comments

ANNEX A
TO FMC 2910-5 (ENGR)
DATED 27 FEB 78

COMMENTS

1. Article 313, para 3. Delete "field engineer squadron", insert "combat engineer regiment".
2. Article 416, para 1, line 1. Delete "field engineer regiment" insert "combat engineer regiment".
3. Article 416, para 1, line 3. After "a support squadron", add "an armoured engineer squadron".
4. Article 908, para 5a, last line. Delete "artificial", insert "man-made".
5. Article 915, para 5a. Delete "barriers and field fortifications", insert "obstacles and field defences".
6. Article 915, para 5b(1), line 5. Delete "barriers", insert "obstacles".
7. Article 915, para 5b(2). Delete all detail, and insert:

"(2). The obstacle plan will be coordinated with the occupation, fire, and anti-tank plans, and will be improved continually as the battle proceeds. Remotely delivered mines, will augment or complement obstacles. Obstacles to be effective must be covered by observation and fire".
8. Article 1048, para 1.b.(1). Delete "barriers", insert "obstacles".



National Défense
Defence nationale

2910-1

Tactics and Development Department
Combat Training Centre
Canadian Forces Base Gagetown
Oromocto, New Brunswick

EOG 2PO

7 March 1978


Headquarters
Mobile Command
St. Hubert, Quebec
J3Y 5T5

Attention: Mr. A. Lajambe, SO Doctrine Production

CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

References: A. FMC 2910-CFP 300 (CD & TD) 25 Jan 78
B. Telecon Mr. Lajambe/Maj Bianco 28 Feb 78

The first draft of CFP 300 - the Conduct of Land Operations has been reviewed by a number of agencies at CTC. The comments submitted thus far are attached. Other comments will be forwarded as they are received.


W.J. Pettipas
Lieutenant Colonel

for Commander Combat Training Centre

Enclosures: 6

② NTF

I'm glad to see Doc Seet
working so hard!



TACTICS AND DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

DS ARTY COMMENTS

CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)

1. Chapter 4, Art 405.1. It is questionable whether you neutralize rather than destroy when using precision-guided ammunition. Perhaps since we are considering future capabilities such as cannon launched guided projectiles, we should consider adding destruction as an application of fire of artillery?
2. Chapter 4, Art 405.1 and 405.2. There seems to be some confusion between terms role, tactical functions and application of fire in these paras.
3. Chapter 4, Art 405.7. The artillery corps used to be composed of field branch and air defence branch. Field branch included field artillery and locating artillery. Has this changed?
4. Chapter 4, Art 406.1.b. page 4-10 line 1. After "missile" add "and multiple barrel rocket launchers."
5. Chapter 4, Art 406.1.b. page 4-10 line 3. After "advisers to" add "supported".
6. Chapter 4, Art 406.2.a. page 4-10. This subpara should read "Field artillery units may be equipped with guns, howitzers, pack howitzers, mortars, rockets or guided missiles."
7. Chapter 4, Art 406.2.b. Why are four categories required? Since we or our allies don't have any delivery systems greater than 210mm would not the category heavy be sufficient to cover 161mm and above.
8. Chapter 4, Art 406.2.e. By stating each battery is composed of two or more troops, the impression that a battery consists of more than one fire unit is created. This is simply not true any more. All Canadian batteries are six gun single fire units now.

408 AIR DEFENCE ARTILLERY

| <u>Ref</u> | <u>Comment by Air Defence Wing Arty Dept CTC</u> |
|---|--|
| para 1 line 2/3
line 6/7
para 2 lines 5-8 | ADA does not deal with SSMS. Anti-missile defence so far is in the NORAD/SAFEGUARD and PVO STRANY anti-rocket forces context only.
Suggest all reference to it be deleted. |
| para 3 line 2. | "positive" to read "passive". |
| para 4 a, line 4
4 e, line 1 | "control and reporting system" should read "command and control system". |
| para 4 d,(1) & (2) | Should read:
"High-to-Medium <u>Level</u> AD"
"Low-to Medium <u>Level</u> AD" |
| para 4 f | Some further mention of EW should be made as an expansion of para 4 a,
e.g.
<u>Electronic Warfare</u>
ECM and ECCM measures must be used by all Air Defence components at all levels. |
| para 4 d(3)
line 5 | Should read:
"Their task may be further subdivided....."
Remainder talks about the US LOFADS system which is not necessarily accepted by all. |
| para 5 a, line 4 | Should read:
"..... and distribution of fire control systems". |
| para 6 a, (3) | "hostile air vehicles" may remain if RPVs are included. If not, should simply read "hostile aircraft". |
| para 6 e, line 5 | Change "or" to read "nor"

Para 6 generally well written |

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

2900-1 (22 FS)

22 Field Squadron
Canadian Forces Base Gagetown
Oromocto, New Brunswick
EOG 2FO
14 Feb 78


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Combat Training Centre
Canadian Forces Base Gagetown
Oromocto, New Brunswick
EOG 2FO

Attention: T & D DEPT (DS ARTY)

CFP 300 (1ST DRAFT)
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

Reference: 2910 (C of TD) dated 07 Feb 78

1. This unit submits the following comments:
 - a. Pg 10-9, para 3, line 4 - after "shallow" insert "water".
 - b. Pg 10-14, para 8a - There is an apparent conflict between para 8a and para 9. Suggest that the following be added to para 8a; "area through the crossing control group".
 - c. Pg 14-7, para 14.17a, line 3 - Delete "frequency" insert "frequently".


F.L. Jewsbury
Major
Commanding Officer
22 Field Squadron

MEMORANDUM

2910-1 (Tech Svcs)

10 Feb 78

DS Arty (T&D Dept)

CFP 300 (1ST DRAFT) CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS
COMMENTS FROM TECH SVCS DIV

Refs: A. FMC, 2910 - CFP 300 (CD and TD) 25 Jan 78

1. CFP 300 (1st Draft) has been given a cursory review. It was found to be very comprehensive pub that may obviate the need for detail in other CFPs relating to the land battle. Some gen comments follow.

2. The following comments are submitted:

- a. A pub such as this should be class "RESTD"; — WHY?
- b. While the doctrine for empl of armour is much improved in that "penny packaging" seems to be laid to rest, more emphasis should be placed on the lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War eg., inf must be incl in armd offensive fms since def locs can be expected to contain many AT wpns;
- c. Since "Adm" has been re-instated as a principle of war, "Intelligence" or "Information" should also be added due to its importance in the rapidly changing atmosphere of the modern battlefd.
- d. More thought must be given to the conc in depth of modern AT wpns so that adv is taken of their range while their vulnerability to confrontation is reduced and better coord of AT def is achieved through more cen comd and con; and
- e. More delineation is required to clarify the differences between routes, axes of adv and approaches to the vital grd.

3. If more clarification on the above comments is required, the Tech Svcs Div contact is the S02 Log loc 177.


R. L. Oliver

Maj
for SSO Tech Svcs

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ARMD DEPT COMMENTS

CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)

1. Chapter 4, Art 403.3b. The USAF can air lift tanks. Is the move of tanks by rail or ocean slow or is movement general by rail or ocean slow?

422 TACTICAL HELICOPTER SQUADRON

COMMENTS ON CFP 300 (FIRST DRAFT)

1. Chapter 4, Art 406(2). No mention of AOP helicopters and their principles of employment.

2. Section 5, Chap 4. No mention of Attack helicopters in anti-tank plan - but it is mentioned later in Chap 4, Sect 8.

3. Section 8 - Tactical Aviation

422 1.a. What type of radar??

1.b. Hel don't carry FAC's the pilots are FAC's.

1.c. Transport helicopter implies Chinooks -
their use forward should be considered very carefully.

423 Hel organization described is a standard
Brigade Group

- CMBG Hel organization is completely
different -

You seem to think they are same!!

424 It is questionable whether a Tac Hel Sqn
can protect itself for any significant
period of time.

repeat

425 All traffic coord through FSCG. Seems to
be some confusion between rotary/fixed wing
Air Traffic Control.

427 No mention of Tact Air at all.

429 No mention of Attack Helicopters or heliborne
carried tow to stop en tk threat.

Chap 8

834 No mention of helicopters for resupply.

Chap 9

904 Could use AH's etc for counter penetration
prior to c-attack.

911.8 Again no mention of AH's

Chap 10

1004.5 Could expand. Due to vulnerability of hel's -
could put limitations of their use in such
situations - especially since obstacles are
usually heavily covered by fire.

- On the other hand - hel's could be very
effective in seizing X-ings

1014.26 Air Mov Plan is made up by Air Mobile Commands

COMMENTS

Chapter 4

Section 3, Art 406.2 (Fd ARTY)

- does not incl principle of employing AOP (hels).

Comparable ARMOUR section does.

Section 5, Art 412 ANTI TANK

- No mention of anti tank hels on eqpt.

Section 8, TAC AIR (HELs)

422 1.a. Radar for surveillance?

b. Obs of Fire - Chge as noted.

c. Implies using Chinooks Forward. Implies deep pen across FEBA.

423 1 - Tac Hel Sqn org incorrect - org is for SBG = CBG which is explained as a "different" type of fm in introduction.

- Assumes that hels sqn should be under op con of Bde. - I think STALWART WARRIOR had more realistic command structure for hels. "Arty" makes pt about "command centralized at highest level - why don't we.

424 1 Tac Hel Sqn cannot self protect - should (must?) be co loc to other units.

425 I haven't seen these principles stated as such before - I thought the last theory was "big sky".

Section 9 - ARMS IN COOP

427 2 we're orphaned again!

429 Grouping

- add sufficient hel borne anti tk, and Att and heliborne
- TOW - req'd to stop deep tk pens when our forces in def.
- esp applicable in subpara 4.

Chapter 8

Section 3 -- The Advance

834 11 Adm Tpt -- should mention max possible employment of hel's.

Chapter 9 Defence Ops

Section 2 -- Defence

902.8 Good pt!

915.1 Defence Against Armour

e & f mention anti-tk hel's, but not Hel Tptd grd TOWs. This is the ideal environment for UTTH ops, since AA fire is at min, close contact to en is not desirable (TOW's must be concealed when contacted) and tremendous firepower can be conc in short time ahead of pen. Comb ops to grd and air (hel) TOW should be effective.

Chapter 10 Other Actions

1004.5 "Obstacles" esp artificial often heavily defended. Before getting carried away to using hel's to cross obstacles, let's make sure the grunts understand the ground rules & the vulnerability aspects. I felt this para is rather loose in definition.

Section 3 -- Airmobile Ops

1014 2.b. AMC is resp for AIR MOV PLAN -- this is not stated.

3.(a)using LO's again, incorrectly.

- somewhere should emphasize reqt for good drills.

COMMENTS BY MAJ AITKEN - SO CD COORD

1. I have reviewed CFP 300, First Draft. In general, I found it to be a very complete volume - I especially liked some of the less formal language (eg the analogy of the boxer) which tends to make it more readable.
2. I found the book to be more a collection of individual chapters, rather than a united text. This may rest be a bad thing, since I expect that it will be used chapter by chapter at staff colleges, etc.
3. Some specific comments as fol:
 - a. Pg 1-1 Art 102 para 2 - suggest ATP 35 should be mentioned;
 - b. Pg 1-3 Art 10 para 6a - the fewer "training" used in discussion of operations in foreign to my thinking. We usually say "ops" or "tr exs" differentrating between the two.
 - c. Pg 1-5 Art 106 - the objectives are not in order of privaty - perhaps this was done intentionally.
 - d. Pg 1-13 Art 114 para 3a - suggest "regular and reserve forces" and "mobilization" be defined here or before.
 - e. Pg 2-8 Art 209 - this should be expanded, if possible, to give a few examples of the laws, or a list of international conventions.
 - f. Pg 3-10, 3-11 Art 311 para 3-4 - perhaps definitions of under command, "under op command insp" should be included.
 - g. Pg 4-16 Art 408, para 3 line - delete "positive", in sent "passive".
 - h. Pg 4-17 Art 408 para 4a - after electronic warfare insert "support" add new sub para 4F - Electronic Warfare Support.
 - j. Pg 4-33 Art 419 para 5 (last line) after "... by bad weather" insert "and enemy action".
 - k. Pg 4-35 Art 422 para 1d - delete "radio relay" insert "radio rebroadcast".
 - m. Pg 4-32 Art 419 para 3 line 4 after "...drawbacks similar to" insert "though not as pronounced as".
 - n. Pg 6-22 - Draft missing part of Art 620, para 5!
4. Not many comments for such a thick volume, I'm afraid, but ...
5. May I have this copy of CFP 300 back?

Maj R.L. Aitken

SSO Cd Coord

COMMENTS BY MAJ LEHMANN - SO AIR DOC

1. I have read the air related section and find nothing objectionable. It is in line with ideas/concepts found in current pubs. Certainly no new ground is broken - motherhood.
2. It could be helpfull to indicate to the writers of amendment procedures in process. These amendments are well advanced and, I believe, will be ratified. A series of ATP-33 volumes will replace all NATO tactical Air Doctrine Publication. It does not comprise changes in substance only editorial. ATP-27 will become ATP-33/3 and ATP-40, ATP-33/1 the following articles (not necessarily exhaustive) are affected 16D.2, 1606, 1607.2 and 1608.2.

Maj Marc Lehmann

SO Air Doc

426

COMMENTS BY MR DOYD -- SO STDZN

1. Page 13-2 Art 1303.4.
 - a. Line 4. The meaning is not clear. I suggest that if the line was reworded "... obtaining protection from non-nuclear weapon effects ..." it would make more sense.
 - b. This paragraph is not well written, the last sentence bears no relation to the rest of the paragraph.
2. Page 13-2 Art 1304.2.
 - a. Line 3. Delete "hitherts employed" - nuc weapons used in during World War 2. Amend line to read: "any single non-nuclear weapon. This effect ..."
3. Page 13-12 Art 1308.2.
 - a. Line 4. Artillery what - staff? Regiment, Fire control centre? Target Analysis should be job of the SO NBC. He will need the co-opration and assistance of the Int Staff as well as the Arty Staff assigned to sp the fm Comd.
4. Page 13-15 Art 1310.2.
 - a. Lines 7, 8 & 9. Delete last two sentence, they are no longer correct. Replace with: "These agents initiate the eyes and breathing passager; as well some of them produce intense skin pain. While they are used primarily for training and net control they have been used tactically in the past and may be again used in the future. They can also be used with slower acting lethal agents to increase the effect."
 - b. Art 1310.3. I do not know where he got the "ten minute" rule. Chemical texts use the term "for a short time" for non-persistents. Strangely enough Mustard is classified as "non-persistent" by many authorities, yet its field persistency in temperate climates may be as high as three weeks. The only agent which would meet the ten minute rule under all conditions is HCN. Suggest that "ten minutes be replace with" a relatively short period of time.
5. Page 13-17 Art 13-11.
 - a. Lines 5 and 6. While I agree with the author, there is as yet no

.../2

- 2 -

• definite CA policy on protective collection for forward troops is still in the air. Note that it is a very expensive proposition.

6. Page 13-18 Art 1311.2.

- a. Line 3. Delete the word "all". I have yet to hear of a biological agent that destroyed property or equipment. The only materials that could be affected is food and animals, which are covered in the next sentence.

7. Page 13-19 Art 1311.5.

- a. Line 2. Second sentence is incomplete.

Mr. Boyd

SO Stzn

748

FILE
NUMBER/DOSSIER

2910-CFP300

Vol 2

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

CANADIAN FORCES PUBLICATIONS
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

FILE
NUMBER/DOSSIER

2910-CFP300

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