

JIC Summary

PT. 8

JIC

Summary Vol. 8

Issue 169 to 184

## REDI Binding Covers

Can be made in all sheet sizes and capacities from 1" to 6" with Standard Fastener centres of 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ ", 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ ", 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ ", 7" and 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ ".

Unless otherwise specified fasteners with (B-2 $\frac{3}{4}$ ") centre will be supplied for sheet sizes up to 6", (D-4 $\frac{1}{4}$ ") centre for sheet sizes 7" to 10" (H-8 $\frac{1}{2}$ ") centre for sheet 11" to 14". All covers are punched to take any of these centres within the cover size. Tang capacities of 2" supplied on 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ " centres, all larger centres with 3" capacity.

Due to the many combinations in which these Covers can be made we have adopted the following representative letter and figure symbols to cover grades, sheet sizes, centres and capacities, a number to represent any particular one of thousands of combinations can be easily ascertained from the illustration as shown below:

### COVER GRADES

Grade "V"	200 lb. Filetex	} With double ply binding bars.
Grade "HV"	300 lb. Filetex	
An extra tough fawn coloured paper material, especially adapted for office file requirements.		
Grade "C"	.012 Leatheroid	} Double ply binding bars.
Grade "HC"	.023 Leatheroid	
An extra strong terra cotta coloured paper material of leather appearance and wearing qualities.		
Grade "GW"	Green Pressboard Covers — Blue cloth bound binding bars. Red Pressboard can also be supplied, change "GW" to "RW" if red is wanted.	
Grade "CV"	Leatheroid with Filetex Lining — Canvas hinge.	
Grade "F"	Full black cloth — Board covers.	
Grade "J"	Full canvas — Board covers. Colours: Maroon, Green, Blue black, Light blue, Fawn and Brown. (Specify colour, otherwise Maroon will be supplied).	
Grade "SY"	Full Black grained imitation leather, stiff board covers.	
Grade "FY"	Full Black Seal grained imitation leather, flexible covers. (Grades SY and FY can be supplied in dark red or green when specified.)	

### SHEET SIZES

Side Binding	Size Number	End Binding	Size Number	FASTENER		TANG CAPACITIES	
				Centre to	Symbol	Capacity	Symbol
8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1600	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1610	2 $\frac{3}{4}$ "	B	1"	1
8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 7"	1601	7" x 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1611	4 $\frac{1}{4}$ "	D	2"	2
9 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 6"	1602	6" x 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1612	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	E	3"	3
10" x 7"	1603	7" x 10"	1613	7"	G	4"	4
10" x 8"	1604	8" x 10"	1614	8 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	H	5"	5
11" x 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1605	8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 11"	1615			6"	6
12" x 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1606	9 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 12"	1616				
13" x 8"	1607	8" x 13"	1617				
14" x 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1608	8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 14"	1618				

### HOW TO ORDER BY LETTER AND FIGURE SYMBOLS

Place in order as shown below:

- (1) Give letter or letters representing grade of cover wanted.
  - (2) Give number representing sheet size.
  - (3) Give letter representing Fastener centre.
  - (4) Give number representing capacity.
  - (5) Colour wanted.
- (Viz.) If covers are required in full green canvas to take sheet 14" x 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ " centre to centre, capacity 3", your order would read:
- Canvas Grade (J)  
 Sheet size 14" x 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " (1608)  
 Fastener centre 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ " (D)      No. J-1608-D-3 Green  
 Capacity 3" (3)  
 Colour (Green)

Should the same type of binder be required with 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ " centre, maroon colour, your order should read No. J-1608-H-3 Maroon.

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**SECRET**

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**9 December 1955**

# **JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY**

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SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. Transfer of Soviet Minesweepers  
to the Western Baltic

(SECRET)

A Soviet minesweepers unit of ten or twelve vessels of the T-43 class has been permanently transferred from the Central Baltic area to Swinemunde and Warnemunde. The move took place in August or September of this year.

COMMENT: This transfer is considered to represent a significant augmentation of Soviet minesweeping capabilities in the Western Baltic area and adjacent Danish waters.

2. Changes in Soviet Logistical Doctrine  
due to the Atomic Threat

(SECRET)

An article in a classified military document written by a Soviet Major General, said to be a logistics expert, recommends certain changes in Soviet logistical doctrine.

These may be summarized as follows:

An increase in depth of division and army rear areas by approximately 10 to 15 miles.

An increase in the use of motor transport for supply purposes.

The abandonment of the policy of concentrating service units and installations well forward.

The author makes recommendations specifically in order to:

Enable a commander to take advantage of the protective features of terrain.

Permit a wider dispersion of supply dumps.

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Reduce the dependance on vulnerable railroads for the movement of supplies.

COMMENT: Hitherto Soviet teaching on the depth of rear areas has varied according to the tactical situation.

In defence and withdrawal army areas up to a depth of 65 miles behind the forward lines are specified. These are usually subdivided into regimental and divisional areas of up to 9 and 16 miles deep respectively leaving the army areas 40 miles in depth.

In preparations for attack the depth is reduced as much as possible and regimental areas as a rule are not de-limited.

It is not clear from the present article whether the recommended increases are applicable in both phases of war, but in view of the overriding need for dispersion in face of an atomic threat this would seem likely.

The recommendations on the increased use of motor transport would seem to apply mostly to army rear areas where as far as is known railways carry the bulk of supplies. Within divisional areas trucks are used exclusively.

Although this article was written in 1953 there is no information to show whether any of these recommendations have been incorporated into current Soviet doctrine.

### 3. Satellite Army Field Training

(SECRET)

The field-training season of the European Satellite Armies has ended, and troops have returned to their permanent garrisons. These armies follow the general pattern of the Soviet Army's annual training cycle, beginning with individual training in winter garrisons. Satellite tactical units move to the field in May, and training progresses during the summer from small-unit exercises through regimental and divisional exercises, and in a few cases, to culmination in corps-level manoeuvres at the end of the training season in the autumn.

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Combined Soviet-Satellite and inter-Satellite field training was considered possible this summer, following the formation of the unified Soviet Bloc military command last May in Warsaw. The only reports of such activity, however, are unconfirmed. It was determined that one such report was inspired by what appeared to be a small-scale demonstration by East German signal units in the Weisswasser training area in the southeast portion of East Germany. This demonstration, witnessed by Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak, Roumanian and Hungarian observers, was given in September or October.

COMMENT: The level of training reached by the Satellite Armies this year varied somewhat from that attained in previous years. There is no evidence that the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak Armies tried to conduct manoeuvres on as high a level as in previous years. The East German, Polish, and Roumanian Armies, on the other hand, showed some improvement in both the level and the standard of training this year. The Albanian and Hungarian Armies apparently maintained about the same training levels as in earlier years.

It had been expected that in 1955 increased attention would be given to training under simulated atomic-warfare conditions. The Commandant of the Czechoslovak Cadet Infantry School stated to a group of Western Attaches during a recent visit that training in defence against atomic warfare is now standard and that Czechoslovak forces now have atomic weapons. According to available information, however, only the East Germans and the Poles conducted this type training this year.

On the basis of information received to date, field-training activities in the various Satellite countries may be summarized as follows:

Albania. - This year's field training in the Albanian Army emphasized small-unit training in guerrilla-type warfare. As in previous years, regiment-level exercises were held. According to one report, a four-day manoeuvre took place during July in an area west and south of Tirana. Three infantry regiments participated, along with support troops. Reportedly, however, no aircraft or armour took part in this manoeuvre.

Bulgaria. - There is no evidence at this time to indicate that field training in the Bulgarian Army reached corps level, as it has in each of the last three years. Regiment-level exercises, observed in the western and central parts of the country during the early part of September, represent the highest level of training reported thus far this year.

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Czechoslovakia. - Line units of the Czechoslovak Army are believed to have conducted regimental and in a few cases divisional exercises this year. The general level probably was a little below that of last year. The standard of training, also, may have been somewhat lower than in 1954. Some troops apparently did not go to the field at all since more men remained at their permanent stations throughout the summer months this year than last. The return of all troops to their winter quarters was not completed until the middle of October, about two weeks later than last year.

East Germany. - The 1955 field training conducted by the East German Garrisoned People's Police indicated continued improvement in that force. Engineer training, particularly river-crossing exercises, was on a substantially larger scale than in 1954. Defence against atomic attack was stressed throughout the training year. Up to early September, only one or two regiments of a division, rather than the entire division, were being rotated at one time to major training areas; this action conformed to the practice of earlier years. Most elements of all divisions are believed to have been in the field, however, in late September and early October. It is possible that the field training in some areas reached division level.

Hungary. - The small amount of information available on Hungarian Army field training indicates that activity this summer corresponded generally with that of last year. Unit manoeuvres probably were held on reinforced-regiment level. One of two division manoeuvres may have occurred, but there has been no conclusive evidence on this subject.

Poland. - The Polish Army finished its field training in late September with a three-week corps-level manoeuvre, held in western Poland. A simulated atomic explosion in connection with a training exercise, reported by the Polish press, may have been a part of this manoeuvre. Division-level exercises were conducted in other parts of the country. The Polish Army's field training this year corresponds in general with that of 1954 although no corps-level activity was noted last year. In addition, more emphasis was placed on individual proficiency than in previous year. Better training of members of crew-served weapons and increased attention to special operations were noted.

Roumania. - It is believed that field training in the Roumanian Army this year was substantially improved over that of last year. Division-level manoeuvres were held, and one or two corps-level

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manoeuvres may have been attempted. Apparently all the line units were in the field this summer and returned to their home stations by the end of October. No evidence is available to indicate that joint air-ground exercises or tactical atomic exercises were undetected in any of the large areas to which Western officials are denied access.

#### 4. Albanian Army Reorganization

(SECRET)

The reorganization of the Albanian Army into corps and brigades which began in late 1953 has been completed. The changes effected by this reorganization are:

- a. Formation of two administrative corps headquarters.
- b. Redesignation of the three infantry divisions to brigades.
- c. Inactivation of the mortar regiment subordinate to General Headquarters.

COMMENT: Prior to this reorganization, it was believed that the Albanian Army included three infantry divisions, three infantry brigades, one coast artillery brigade, one medium artillery regiment, one anti-aircraft artillery regiment, one tank regiment, and one mortar regiment.

Even though each corps headquarters now has three brigades subordinate to it, the corps are considered to be little more than training directorates at present. Before the reorganization, the infantry divisions and brigades were directly subordinate to General Headquarters. The infantry regiments previously held as subordinate to the three infantry divisions are now probably the subordinate infantry battalions of the brigades. It is believed that the equipment and personnel of the former General Headquarters Mortar Regiment have been distributed to the infantry brigades.

This reorganization probably was designed to:

- a. Achieve greater tactical flexibility, important in the difficult and mountainous terrain of Albania where the road and communications network is extremely limited.

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- b. Offset the shortages of trained personnel and modern equipment.
- c. Obtain a more effective organization for guerrilla-type warfare.

The brigades are believed capable of expansion to divisions upon mobilization. It is not believed that the reorganization has affected the over-all Army strength of approximately 30,000.

5. Albania Announces Reduction in  
Term of Military Service

(CONFIDENTIAL)

It has been announced in Albania that the Council of Ministers has decided to reduce the term of compulsory military service to two years for personnel assigned to infantry, artillery, signal, engineer, chemical, and rear service units and to three years for "other specialized branches". It was also reported that soldiers demobilized as a result of the decision of the Council of Ministers to reduce the Armed Forces strength by 9,000 are being welcomed back to their home towns and given jobs.

COMMENT: These reports are the first indications that the Albanian Government may be implementing the announced decision of last September to reduce Armed Forces strength by 9,000 by the end of 1955. However, the reported information is not conclusive on this point for the following reasons:

- a. Since 1951 there has been abundant evidence that the term of service until recently was two years for the infantry and other basic branches and three years for specialized branches, with possibly four years for the Navy.
- b. One recent report states that the term of service was extended by one year in all branches following the "summit" conference at Geneva last summer. If this is true, a reduction to the normal two years at this time (with three years for specialized branches) would not affect the basic Army strength estimate of 30,000.

The report of arrival of released soldiers at their home towns could refer to those men regularly scheduled for release this autumn and does not necessarily reflect an actual Armed Forces strength reduction.

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6. Hungarian Reduction of  
Armed Forces Strength

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The Hungarian Armed Forces reportedly will be reduced "on an individual-selection basis" in compliance with the Decree of the 7th September, 1955, which called for a cut of 20,000 men before the end of 1955. According to Hungarian officials, the reduction is to be divided equally among all arms and services, including the Air Force, and will be effected both by discharges and by reduction of this year's conscript call-up. No units are to be inactivated, but some will be understrength.

COMMENT: This is the first indication of the means by which the proposed strength reduction in Hungary might be implemented. The report, while possibly true, is somewhat vague and lacks detail.

It is not clear whether the Frontier Guard and Interior Guard are considered as "armed forces" for the purpose of this reduction. However, if they are, the Army's proportionate share of the reduction would be approximately 75 percent or 15,000 men. Such a reduction would lower the estimated strength of the Army from approximately 150,000 to approximately 135,000. If, on the other hand, the Frontier and Interior Guards are not considered in this proposed reduction, then the Army's proportionate share would be approximately 92 percent or 18,5000 men, thus lowering the estimated strength of the Army to 131,500.

7. Romania Announces Reduction in  
Terms of Conscript Service

(SECRET)

Reductions in the terms of conscript service for most branches of the Roumanian Armed Forces and militarized security forces have been announced by the Government. These reductions are to be effected during the period 1st December 1955 to 1st November 1956.

The announcement continued the following additional details:

- a. The period of active military service is reduced from three to two years for Armed Forces conscripts, troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and of labour units.
- b. Air Force, antiaircraft, and Frontier Troop personnel will continue to serve for three years.

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- b. The term of service for conscripts in the Naval Forces is reduced from four to three years.

COMMENT: Before this announcement, the Chief of the General Staff of the Roumanian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Ion Tutoveanu, was quoted as stating that the recently announced 40,000-man reduction in Armed Forces strength had been completed but that no decision had been reached on methods of implementing the directive to reduce terms of military service.

Announcement of reductions in the terms of Roumanian conscript service evidently is supposed to represent implementation of a crent order to the Minister of Armed Forces to submit proposals on this subject.

The announced effective dates for the term-of-service reductions, as well as General Tutoveanu's comment, indicate that these reductions are not related to the previous commitment to cut the strength of the Armed Forces by 40,000 by the 1st December 1955.

To date, there has been no indication of any decrease in the size of the Roumanian Armed Forces.

8. New Rocket Launchers in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

(SECRET)

A new type of rocket launcher reportedly is being allocated to Soviet tank divisions in East Germany, according to reports received. Nine unidentified truck-mounted, multiple-rocket launchers, with a "single bank of rails", were observed being unloaded from a train on the 7th October at garrisons of the 10th Guards Tank Division west of Berlin. The launchers reportedly were mounted on ZIS-150 trucks, which had two seats on each side directly behind the cab. On the 16th October, 27 x 132 mm. rocket launchers (M-13) reportedly were shipped from the same location to the Soviet Union.

COMMENT: This is the first evidence that the 132-mm. rocket launcher, which has been standard in Soviet tank and mechanized divisions is being replaced by a new Soviet rocket launcher. The description of the truck, with the seats behind the cab, would indicate that these are new launchers. It is currently believed that the new divisional launchers are to be the 220-mm. (12-round) field rocket launcher M1953,

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first observed in Moscow in late 1953, and the 150-mm. (16-round) field rocket launcher M1954, first observed in the 7th November, 1954 Moscow parade. Both these new rocket launchers have two banks and both are mounted on the ZIS-151 truck.

The fact that the new launchers arrived only a few days before the older launchers were shipped out is a further indication that M-13 launchers are being replaced. Issue of the new truck-mounted multiple-rocket launchers of larger calibers, together with the recent expansion of divisional rocket launcher battalions from two batteries to three, is an additional manifestation of increasing firepower, characteristic of the current Soviet re-equipment and reorganization program.

9. East Germany Establishes Ministry of State Security

(CONFIDENTIAL)

According to an official press release, a reorganization within the East German Government, announced on the 26th of November, 1955, included the raising of the Secretariat for State Security to Cabinet rank. The announcement stated that creation of the Ministry of State Security was "a measure to strengthen and improve the work of the State apparatus". The former State Secretary, veteran Communist Ernst Wollweber, is now Minister of State Security.

COMMENT: The new Ministry controls the Border Police, the Interior Troops, the Transportation Police, and the plainclothes police. The Ministry is ostensibly responsible for the maintenance of border and internal security in East Germany, although much of this responsibility still rests with Soviet security troops.

The raising of the security organ of the East German Government to Cabinet rank probably indicates that East Germany is to be given greater responsibility for security matters. This step would be consistent with the recent Soviet grant of "sovereignty" to East Germany. East German security forces have been expanded since May 1955, apparently in anticipation of the assumption of more important duties. Last September, the Soviet began turning over full responsibility for border security to East German Border Police in certain areas.

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Creation of the Ministry of State Security is a follow-up to the action taken on the 15th of August of this year, when the State Secretariat for State Security and the Main Administration for Garrisoned People's Police were separated from the Interior Ministry and made independent organs. The Main Administration for Garrisoned People's Police is expected sooner or later, to be made the Ministry of Defence.

The status of the security apparatus of East Germany is now the same as it was in June 1953. After the riots of the 17th June, 1953, the Ministry of State Security, then headed by Wilhelm Zaisser, was made a State Secretariat of the Interior Ministry. At the same time, Zaisser was replaced by Wollweber, who has greatly improved the efficiency of East German security forces.

10. Norwegian-Soviet Talks

(SECRET)

A Norwegian delegation, led by Prime Minister Gerhardsen, and Mr. Skaug, the Minister of Commerce, visited Moscow November 10th and talked with leading Soviet officials, including Bulganin, Khrushchev and Mikoyan. The discussions covered a wide range of subjects and on the whole the Norwegian Prime Minister that the trip had been well worth-while.

During the visit the two countries signed a three-year trade agreement largely on the basis of present trade relations. They also agreed to establish a committee of experts to investigate the development of power on the Pasvik River boundary. The Soviet leaders did not seem very interested in promoting cultural exchanges although they did not object to Mr. Gerhardsen's suggestion for long-term exchanges of scientists and students. While they denied knowledge of more than one Norwegian prisoner still in the Soviet Union the Soviet officials promised to make inquiries. They also expressed concern that Norway might alter its 1949 decision not to permit foreign troops on Norwegian soil, but Mr. Gerhardsen assured them that so long as there was no aggression against Norway his government would continue this policy.

In informal conversations the Soviet leaders mentioned the possibility of establishing a neutral zone on each side of the northern border within which control posts could be set up. They also remarked that the Soviet Union would never permit Germany to be re-united if that meant the elimination of the social system of the GDR and the joining of NATO.

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They added that in view of recent disagreements they preferred to let the questions of Germany and disarmament rest for the time being. Mr. Gerhardsen's impression was that while Khrushchev was important as the mouthpiece for the controlling group, Bulganin wielded the most power.

### SOUTHEAST ASIA

#### 11. Emergency in Malaya-Strength of Opposing Forces

(SECRET)

A recent re-assessment of the strength of the Chinese-led Malay Races Liberation Army in Malaya shows that on the 9th of October, 1955 the total was reduced to approximately 2,900, a reduction of 75 percent compared with the peak strength of the Malay Races Liberation Army in 1951.

Malaya Security Force strengths are shown as follows:

Ground Forces	:	38,000
Police Force	:	23,000
Home Guard	:	162,000
Special Constables	:	24,000

COMMENT: The total for the Malay Races Liberation Army is hard-core only, and does not include the strength of the Min Yuen (People's Movement), a clandestine organization among the Chinese civilian population, which works in support of the terrorists, chiefly with logistic support but also occasionally with acts of violent sabotage. Its strength is unknown but it is thought to number at least 20,000. The Malay Races Liberation Army and the Min Yuen are over 95% Chinese manned.

With the Malaya Security Force, part of the police force assists the Ground forces in the active pursuit of the terrorists, the remainder operate on the ordinary "beat" in villages and towns. The Home Guard are part-time and unpaid, normally on duty only at night and patrol in the immediate vicinity of their respective villages. The Special Constable is used as an escort for outlying estate owners, guarding coolie quarters, periodic road, gate and food checks. The overall duty of the three civilian groups is to secure bases so that the Ground forces can concentrate on operations against the terrorists.

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12. Defection Within Vietnam National Army

(SECRET)

Reports show wavering and uncertain allegiance in units of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects integrated in the Vietnam National Army .

541 Battalion (Hoa Hao), one of the two units of 10th Independent Regiment, with the Regimental Commander, Colonel Nguyen Van Hue, deserted on the 22nd November with its weapons.

General Headquarters, Vietnam National Army are uncertain of the loyalty of 57 Regiment (Hoa Hao), some of whose members are agitating for the release of their Commander General Ngo, who they erroneously believe is being held as a Government prisoner in Saigon.

Unconfirmed reports tell of considerable desertion's from 58 Regiment (Cao Dai) to the anti-government Dai Viet. This regiment was recently moved from its traditional area North of Saigon to the demarcation line area.

COMMENT: These reports involving all or part of three of the four sect regiments aligned with Vietnam National Army illustrate the limited value of these units to Vietnam National Army and the lack of progress in the plans to reindoctrinate sect troops and to disperse them among non-sect units. As only sect units are involved it does not appear to reflect any overall deterioration of the morale and loyalty of the Vietnam National Army.

Though it is not considered that these defections seriously alter the Government's position relative to the sects it does show their limitations in enforcing internal security. A solution to the problem of the sects does not appear likely in the near future. Actions of this type, on occasion, are without doubt a deliberately planned means of gaining arms for the still dissident elements of the sects and Viet Minh agents.

13. Progress in Reorganization  
of Vietnam National Army

(SECRET)

Division and regimental staffs of six light divisions of the Vietnam National Army have recently completed their training course at a joint United States-French Instruction Mission school.

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All regular units of the Vietnam National Army are expected to be equipped with United States weapons and equipment by the end of 1955.

COMMENT: The Vietnam National Army order of battle of four field divisions, six light divisions, and the 39 remaining independent battalions organized into 13 independent regiments, is now nearing completion, with present overall strength of approximately 150,000. Delay is still being caused by the continued employment of battalion groups in operations against dissident sects.

A recent report suggests that training officers feel that at least six months will be required to raise the standard of training to the level attained under the French. This would indicate, though divisional formations have been organized, some time must elapse before the Vietnam National Army can be regarded as having real value to the defence of the country.

The light division is smaller than the field division (5,245 compared with 8,598 authorized strength) and is to be used primarily in difficult terrain. For this reason they have little organic motor transport, no artillery, and a reduced complement of divisional troops.

Sufficient weapons and equipment should be available within the country now.

#### FAR EAST

#### 14. Communist China-Compulsory Military Service

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The Compulsory Military Service Law implemented 1st November, 1955 by the Chinese Peoples Central Government has replaced the interim conscription programme instituted in September, 1954. No announcement has been made of the numbers to be called up during the period of November, 1955 to end of February, 1956 but, during the period, November, 1954 to end of February, 1955, a reported 10,500,000 youths in the 18-22 age group registered and 450,000 were inducted. An annual intake of 500,000 to 600,000 would permit a continuous turnover of 20 to 25 percent into agriculture and industry following the now stabilized three year tour in the Army, while maintaining the total Army strength at some 2,500,000.

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Time expired soldiers will go to Class I Reserves, and though during the next two years many of those released from active service will not be suitable for Class I Reserves owing to age or physical condition, beginning in 1957-1958 with the release of those inducted in late 1954 and early 1955, the reserve force will become an important part of the Chinese Communist military system. In addition to the Class II Reserve has been created to give Military training to persons exempt from active service in peacetime, such as only sons and certain categories of students.

COMMENT: It has taken over a year of intensive propaganda to prepare the people of Communist China for universal compulsory military service in fact and not only in name although much "volunteer" service in Korea was compulsory, some recalcitrants being forced to enlist in the Army for committing the misdemeanour of failure to volunteer. Though the Communists are firmly in control of the country they by no means include all of China's some 600 million people, and no doubt enforced conscription, together with pressure to serve in the Peoples (part-time) Militia, provides a good opportunity for wider indoctrination of the masses.

15. Increased Sea Training for the Chinese Communist Navy (SECRET)

During recent months increasing numbers of ships have been sighted exercising together, particularly off Tsingtao where almost daily two destroyers, two or three submarines and a number of LST's sail in the morning and return in the evening. The largest sighting off Tsingtao to date is two destroyers, three or four submarines, six LST's, one gunboat and six ML's or MGB's, although recently a moderately reliable report stated that ten submarines were at sea on two out of three successive days.

COMMENT: Although much equipment in Chinese Communist Navy ships is of an elementary nature by modern standards there is no doubt that their efficiency in weapon and ship handling is continuously improving, and that should the occasion arise they will be able to give a good account of themselves.

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SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. Arctic Atomic Ship - A Moscow Project (UNCLASSIFIED)

According to two leading Soviet marine engineers, the Soviet Union will commission in "the not too distant future" an atomic-powered merchant liner especially adapted for Arctic navigation. Such a vessel, the engineers say, would be propelled by a nuclear reactor of 200,000-kilowatt capacity. The ship would be equipped with high-pressure steam nozzles to melt the ice and would realize the ancient Russian dream of regular sea transportation from Archangel to Vladivostok via the Arctic Ocean.

M. Chernov, deputy chairman of the Scientific-Technical Council of the Soviet Ministry of River Fleet, and A. Bogdanov, marine engineer, present their conception of the trans-Arctic liner in a long article in the current issue of Tekhnika Molodezhi, engineering and scientific journal. (The journal is a monthly magazine for youth, published by the Central Committee of the Komsomol, or Young Communists.) The craft would have the hull of an icebreaker; the superstructure would be low and streamlined to minimize resistance to Arctic winds. The engineers believe it should have an optimum displacement of 25,000 tons and maximum speed of about 24.3 knots.

2. BISON Heavy Bomber (SECRET)

Some of the Bison aircraft flown in the 1955 Air Shows have shown a difference in configuration to the remainder which appear to be the same as the prototype of 1954. The differences amount to:

- (a) New wing plan form.
- (b) A large bulge on the bomb bay doors.
- (c) The pear-shaped bulge under the tail turret was missing on those aircraft with the modified bomb-bay doors.

COMMENT: (a) The new wing plan consists of an increase in area made possible by increasing the average chord of the inner half of the outer wing, i.e., in the flap area. The resulting increase is 110 sq. ft. which reduces the wing loading from 100 pounds per square foot to 97 pounds per square foot. The whole of this area increase is in the flap area, so that the flap effectiveness is considerably increased, resulting in improved control on landing and take off.

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(b) The bulge on the bomb bay is at least 10 feet long and could be necessitated by the coverage of an extra-large weapon or some equipment external to the weapon itself.

(c) The absence of the rear pear-shaped bulge may be the result of an attempt to 'clean up' the tail section. Aerodynamically, the tail section of the Bison is not as good as it could be. However, this modification would probably necessitate internal modification to the turret operating mechanism. In general, it appears that the differences between the two series of aircraft were probably introduced to control stability or control problems.

3. Swept Wing Ilyushin Light Bomber (IL 28).

(UNCLASSIFIED)

An article in a Czech magazine "Wings of the Fatherland" compares Western and Soviet air doctrine of World War II and re-iterates the Soviet basic dogma that the primary function of an Air Force is direct cooperation with, and the support of, the ground forces. In the course of the argument for this theory, reference is made more than once to the new swept wing Ilyushin bomber designed for use with the assault forces.

(SECRET)

COMMENT: Similar articles naming an Ilyushin swept wing light bomber have appeared in other aero-periodicals including the German "FLUGWELT" and U.S. "Aviation Week". During the past year a swept wing aircraft about the size of the IL-28 was seen in the landing pattern of Ramenskoye, the Soviet ministry of aircraft production development centre. The report that this aircraft was using a twin wheel assembly would suggest a light bomber size, at least, and eliminates the Flashlight, the only other known possibility. This information accords with a previously published estimate that the Soviets will produce a swept wing light bomber and that it will appear in service by 1956.

4. Incident at Czechoslovak Legation

(SECRET)

On October 26 a refugee from Czechoslovakia now living in Toronto, [REDACTED] called at the Czechoslovak Legation under an assumed name and enquired about "return to the homeland". His subsequent charges that officials in the Legation tried to enlist him as a spy were widely reported in the Toronto Star and other newspapers and were mentioned in a previous weekly divisional note.

On November 2 an official of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry in Prague called on our Charge d'Affaires and made an oral protest about the

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██████████ incident describing it as a "regrettable provocation" and making several vague charges about a "breach of diplomatic immunity", and "slandereous press campaign" and asserting that the "return to the homeland" campaign has been carried out in a "completely legal and open manner and with the knowledge of Canadian authorities".

Our Charge d'Affaires has been instructed to reply orally to several points in the Czech protest, making it clear that there was no question of the Canadian Government's having failed to protect the Czech Legation against a breach of diplomatic immunity and that the newspapers were free to comment on ██████████ statements as they wished. Our Charge d'Affaires will also emphasize that the Department has had only limited knowledge of the activities of the Czech Legation in its return to the homeland campaign, that it has not expressed any approval of the campaign and that it wishes to know how exactly the Legation has been attempting to persuade former Czech nationals to return.

#### SOUTHEAST ASIA

##### 5. Poor Rice Harvest in Southeast Asia

(SECRET)

First estimates of this year's rice harvest from major producers in Southeast Asia indicate that rice production in the area has declined sharply in 1955 compared with previous years, due mainly to drought and adverse weather conditions. Total output of paddy for the year ending August 1955 has been estimated at 97.5 million tons (excluding China) compared with 106.7 million tons in 1954, a decline of nearly 10%. The countries where rice production dropped the most are: Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, India and Pakistan. The rice crop in Burma, however, was good; a fact which will add to Burma's problem of disposing of her already huge rice surplus. To all appearances, Burma's most important customers - Pakistan, Indonesia and Japan - (but excluding India) will have reduced rice requirements this year due to adequate stocks or increased production.

COMMENT: Despite the general decline in rice production in Southeast Asia, it is unlikely that there will be any real rice shortage in the area during the current crop year, largely due to the fact that Burma and Thailand have accumulated such large surpluses. Thailand will probably be able to dispose of most of her rice surplus this year by selling it to Cambodia, Laos and her traditional markets in British Southeast Asia. The prospects for Burma are less promising.

The hardest hit area in North Vietnam where there have been four successive crop failures due to drought or flood conditions.

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It is estimated that 41% of the rice crop has been affected by these adverse conditions. Despite the fact that these crop failures have resulted in near famine conditions in some areas, there is no evidence to indicate that North Vietnam may endeavour to obtain, either from Burma or on the world rice market, the large quantities of rice needed for normal requirements. In the meantime, North Vietnam appears to be receiving sufficient shipments of rice from the Soviet Bloc (including Communist China) and from South Vietnam to cover its bare minimum requirements. Some of the Soviet Bloc shipments came from Burma.

6. Frances-Vietnamese Forces in South Vietnam (SECRET)

The strength of the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) in Indo China at 1st November, 1955 was as follows:

Total French and Colonial forces:	29,000
Indigenous units	<u>2,000</u>
Total Strength	<u>38,000</u>

Reduction during the month of October was 7,000 French and Colonial troops and 2,000 indigenous. Except for rear parties Tourane has now been entirely evacuated by the French Expeditionary Corps.

COMMENT: It is not known what is intended as the future of the French Expeditionary Corps in South Vietnam. Permanent installations have been and are being built in the Baria-Cap St Jacques area, to which it may withdraw as a Seato force if approved by the French and South Vietnamese Governments.

As a matter of interest the strength of the corps at 1st December, 1954 was.

Total French and Colonial forces:	108,296
Indigenous units	<u>30,490</u>
Total strength	139,786

FAR EAST

7. Japanese Military Advisory Group (RESTRICTED)

The Director of the Defence Agency, Shigemasa Sunada, has formed a Military Advisory Group consisting now of fourteen Second World War

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Generals and Admirals, and it is intended later to include civilian technical experts. Sunada and his Advisory Group are confident that Japan will be the first nation to have an integrated Self Defence Force composed of ground, sea and air components under one headquarters; that is to say, no separate Army, Navy, or Air Force.

COMMENT: Biographies so far received on nine of the Advisory Group members indicate that they are men of wide military experience and maturity. The majority are in their late sixties. They may base their decision on the memory that a contributing factor to Japan's defeat was the rivalry between the Army and the Navy, (the Air Force not existing as a separate entity).

#### 8. Sino-United States Geneva Negotiations

(SECRET)

Despite current optimistic press reports, the United States and Chinese positions in the Geneva negotiations have not altered appreciably in recent weeks and there appears to be little hope of early agreement on any of the points at issue. The Americans are continuing to seek a joint declaration with the Chinese on the renunciation of force in settling disputes. At the same time they are insisting on the release of the remaining seventeen prisoners in Chinese hands before proceeding to the settlement of other problems. They are also pressing for information on their service personnel who have been missing since the Korean war. Chinese objectives continue to include the removal of the Seventh Fleet and U.S. personnel from the Formosa theatre, the abandonment of the U.S. embargo on trade with China and a meeting between Mr. Chou En-lai and Mr. Dulles. They are not averse to joining the United States in renouncing the use of force in settling disputes on the understanding that any such declaration would not cover Formosa which they regard as an internal matter.

The British Charge d'Affaires in Peking has received official permission to visit and correspond with American prisoners and to render financial assistance to any requesting such help for repatriation purposes. To date only one prisoner has written requesting a visit and a member of the British staff was to see him on November 15. In attempting to contact the remaining prisoners the Charge d'Affaires has met with growing obstruction from the Chinese and has suggested that they are using this method to increase pressure on the Americans negotiating at Geneva. He has also expressed concern over the course of the Geneva negotiations as the impression in Peking appears to be growing that the United States entered into negotiations with the sole purpose of securing the release of American prisoners and with no thought of settling other outstanding problems. Chou En-lai has said that he sees no reason to continue discussions in Geneva unless agreement can be reached on a high level meeting. The British

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Charge d'Affaires feels that a breakdown of the talks might lead to a recrudescence of Peking's more violent attitude on Formosa and other problems.

9. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission - Korea (CONFIDENTIAL)

There has been no changes in the legal status of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission since it was established under the Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27th, 1953, although there is no doubt that its authority and effectiveness, never very impressive, have been declining rapidly. From the legal point of view the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is a creature of the Military Armistice Commission composed of the two sides in Korea. It was originally given the function, inter alia, of stationing neutral nations inspection teams (NNIT's) at five ports of entry in South Korea and five in North Korea to check against violations of the Armistice Agreement. It was also to have ten mobile NNIT's stationed in or near the demilitarized zone.

Both the United States (acting for the UN side in Korea) and the two non-communist members of the Commission (Sweden and Switzerland) are anxious, although for different reasons, to reorganize the Commission. The Americans see no other solution to the problems created by Syngman Rhee's hostility towards the Commission than the withdrawal of all fixed teams to the demilitarized zone or, better still, the abolition of the Commission itself. The Swedes and Swiss are anxious to escape the responsibility for certifying that no violations of the Armistice have been committed in North Korea. The communist side managed from the start to muzzle the Commission in North Korea so effectively that the certificates which the Swiss and Swedes are obliged to sign and forward regularly to the Military Armistice Commission are acknowledged even by themselves to be worthless. They reject, however, the idea of withdrawing unilaterally from the Commission at the insistence of the United States.

The first proposals for a reduction in the Commission's functions were made last May 3rd when the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission itself proposed that the permanent teams from two ports of entry in the North and two in the South be withdrawn, and that the remaining six teams be composed of delegates of two nations only, i.e., one communist member and one Swede or Swiss. The United States, acting for the UN side accepted this proposal in late August.

Concurrently however, the United States has been urging the Swedes and Swiss to withdraw completely from the Commission or else to find some other solution to the problem posed by the stationing of permanent

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teams in South Korea. Accordingly, on October 20, the Swedes proposed to the other members of the Commission that all fixed teams be abolished and the Swiss are supporting this proposal. The Czechs and Poles are opposing it and it is clear that the communists wish to retain at least one fixed team on each side of the cease-fire line. The Commission has served communist purposes so well that it is not to be expected that they will agree to abolish it or accept drastic limitations of its functions without considerable resistance. Discussions on the basis of the Swede-Swiss proposals are now going on in the Commission but we do not know the result. If the Swedes and Swiss fail to gain acceptance of their proposals, it is quite possible that the United States will act unilaterally to move the fixed teams in South Korea to the demilitarized zone.

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**COPY N° 98**

ISSUE NO. 182

25 November 1955

# JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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Issued weekly under the authority of  
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National Defence Headquarters  
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SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. Russian Atomic Test

(SECRET)

The fifth nuclear test in the current Soviet series occurred at 0400 - on Tuesday 22 November, 1955. The Semipalitinsk testing area was used for this explosion and the size is reported to have been between one and one, a half megatons.

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2. Transfer of Naval Vessels to the Pacific Fleet

(SECRET)

It has now been confirmed that the following naval vessels were transferred to the Pacific Fleet via the Northern Sea Route this summer:-

- 2 Sverdlov class cruisers, believed to be hull numbers VIII and X, originally from the Baltic.
- 1 Tallin<sup>n</sup> class destroyer, believed to have been built at Molotovsk.
- 12 Kola class escorts.
- 1 Submarine Depot Ship, the NEVA, which was transferred from the Black Sea to the Northern Fleet in April, 1955.
- 12 Kronstadt class coastal escorts.
- 12 T-43 class Fleet Minesweepers.
- 5 Small auxiliaries.
- 2 "Z" class submarines.
- 10 "W" class submarines.

COMMENT: This is regarded as a final assessment of the composition of the 1955 Northern Sea Route naval transfer.

The appearance of Tallin<sup>n</sup> class destroyer from Molotovsk provides the first evidence that this class is being built in the North. It is expected that further Tallin's from the Molotovsk yard may appear in the Northern Fleet.

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3. Large Unidentified Hull in Leningrad

(SECRET)

According to observations made during the visit of R.N. ships to Leningrad in October, the large vessel which has occupied a slip in the Baltic Shipyard for over three years is definitely not an aircraft carrier. Its displacement is estimated at about 22,000 tons, compared with 15,000 tons for "Sverdlov" class cruisers.

COMMENT: It may be possible to decide on the type of this vessel after its launching, which is expected to take place in the spring of 1956.

4. Soviet-Polish Naval Exercises in the Baltic

(SECRET)

On 22nd October 1955 a joint Soviet-Polish naval exercise took place in the Swinemunde area. Participating units were:

3 Kronstadt-class a/s escorts

7 or 8 minesweepers of the T. 301-class

15 MTBs

3 Polish landing craft.

COMMENT: The exercise had the character of a landing operation. Smoke was used to a large extent in the landing area. The crews and participating troops were all wearing gas masks and yellow rubber-like overalls. The special dresses the crews and troops were wearing might indicate an exercise for landing operations in areas contaminated by nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons.

5. Development of Iron Ore in the Northwestern Region of European Russia.

(SECRET)

A new iron and steel plant was commissioned at Cherepovets 59°N 37°54'E, in August 1955. The basic raw materials being used are enriched iron ores from the Kol'skiy Poluoostrov, and coal from the Pechora area.

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COMMENT: The principal reason for the Cherepovets development is that long hauls of iron and steel to Leningrad will be considerably reduced over routes already over-crowded.

Initially, the capacity planned for the plant was to be 1.2 million tons of pig iron and 2 million tons of steel.

The development of an iron and steel plant at Cherepovets, which has been planned since 1941 is indicative of the Soviet desire to exploit local resources where they exist. It may well be as a result of official concern over growing demand on the supplies in the more heavily developed areas of the Ukraine and the Urals.

The Cherepovets plant is a new departure from Soviet practice in that it is located a relatively long way (950-1,200 miles) from its sources of supply but close (300 miles) to the consuming centre at Leningrad.

6. East Germany Restricts Youth

(SECRET)

Travel into Berlin and vicinity by East German males of military age is being checked closely, and police permission is required for movement into this area. East German Border Police and regular police at check points in and around Berlin have been ordered to detain all youths who cannot show "valid proof" of the necessity for travel into the area, and to return them to their homes if such "proof" is not forthcoming.

Press reports have stated that all passengers under twenty-five years of age on East German trains into Berlin are being taken off the trains for intensive interrogation regarding the purpose of their travel.

COMMENT: An East German Government order, reportedly effective as of 31st October, forbids visits to Berlin by members of the armed or police forces, and similar regulations apply to functionaries of the Social Unity (Communist) Party (SED) and the East Germany Government and to employees of important state industries. Official concern over the great number of young men fleeing to the West undoubtedly prompted the extension of restrictions to this group.

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The weekly total of males of military age fleeing to West Berlin reached a 1955 high of 1,502 in the week ending 12th October. During subsequent weeks, the figure successively decreased, probably as a result of increased restrictions imposed by East German authorities. During the week of 4th-10th November, a total of 3,665 refugees reached West Berlin, only 644 of whom were males in the 17-24 age group.

7. Withdrawal of Soviet Independent Guard Battalions from Zonal Borders - Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (SECRET)

Soviet Independent Guard Battalions are being withdrawn from zonal borders and their responsibilities transferred to East German border guard units.

There is some evidence that these Soviet units are being returned to the Soviet Union.

COMMENT: Independent Guard Battalions were formed in 1952 from Soviet rifle regiments, for the purpose of guarding in cooperation with East German Police the boundaries between the Soviet occupied zone and the zones of the occupying Western Powers.

Although these units are army units they are officered predominantly, if not exclusively by MVD officers.

If these units are now being returned to the Soviet Union they may represent a contribution from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany towards the general strength reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces announced last August.

8. Reported Allocation of Forces to Soviet Bloc Unified Command - Czechoslovakia (SECRET)

According to an unevaluated report, six of the fourteen Czechoslovak Army divisions (including 2 rifle, 2 mechanized, and 2 tank) have been placed under the direct command of the Soviet Bloc unified command established last May. Fighter units of the Czechoslovak Air Force in Bohemia similarly were allocated. All of the allotted units will remain in Czechoslovakia as integral parts of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces.

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Colonel-General Bohumir Lomsky, the present Czechoslovak First Deputy Minister of National Defence, reportedly has been assigned as the permanent Czechoslovak representative to the Bloc's combined staff. Eleven other ranking Czechoslovak officers also were attached to the combined staff, including three colonel-generals, two major generals, four colonels, and two lieutenant-colonels.

COMMENTE. Although the report has not been confirmed, most of the details on units and personalities mentioned are believed correct. Allocation of some Soviet and Satellite units to a combined force has been expected for some time, as the Warsaw Pact specifically provides for such action. The Pact also provides for participation, at the top command level, of every Satellite Defence Minister or his representative.

A previous dispatch reported the allocation of five Czechoslovak Army divisions to the Soviet-Satellite Unified Command. This report identified the allotted divisions as the 1st and 2nd Rifle Divisions and the 8th Mechanized Division, held as organic to the Czechoslovak II Corps, and the 3rd and 4th Tank Divisions, believed to be under direct control of the Minister of Defence.

General Lomsky apparently will represent Defence Minister Army General Alexej Cepicka at the Command's headquarters in Moscow. He is highly favored by the regime and is considered to be second only in Cepicka in the military hierarchy. The eleven other high-ranking officers who reportedly were attached to the unified command are drawn from various branches and probably will participate in staff work connected with the development and possible wartime role of Czechoslovak forces.

9. Roumania Announces Reduction in  
Terms of Military Service

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The Central Committee of the Roumanian Workers Communist Party and the Council of Ministers have announced a decision to reduce the term of service for conscripts in the military forces. The Government has ordered the Roumanian Minister of Armed Forces to submit proposals to effect this reduction.

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COMMENT: There is no indication of the amount of reduction in the term of service contemplated in the announcement. The current term of Army service is believed to be two years, although there are numerous unconfirmed reports that it has been increased to three years. The term of service in the Navy and in the Air Force is normally one year longer than in the Army.

No direct relationship between this announcement and the proposed strength reduction of 40,000 in the Roumanian Armed Forces can be established as final plans for the reduction in the term of service have not yet been announced, while the strength reduction is to be effected by 1st December 1955.

10. Bulgaria Reduces Term of Military Service

(CONFIDENTIAL)

A reduction in the term of conscript service for all personnel of the Armed Forces, including Interior and Labor Troops, was decreed by the Praesidium of the Bulgarian National Assembly on 15th October this year. This reduction is to be effective on 1st May 1956.

The term of service for the Army Ground Forces will be two years, except for anti-aircraft artillery personnel, who will serve three years. Personnel of the Air Force, Labor Troops, and Interior Troops also will serve for two years, except aviation specialists of the Air Force, who must serve three years. Navy service will be three years, instead of the previous four, except for personnel assigned to coast artillery and pioneer units, who will serve a two-year tour of duty.

COMMENT: This reduction in the term of conscript service may be related to the Armed Forces' strength reductions announced by Bulgaria in September following the Summit Conference and the resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and Greece. Announcement of the strength reduction of 18,000 men, however, set a target date of 26th December 1955, which is inconsistent with the 1st May 1956 date for the reduction in the terms of service.

The Bulgarian action brings Armed Forces' terms of service in Bulgaria into line with those of most of the other European Satellites.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

11. Burma's Economic Difficulties

(SECRET)

Burma's economic difficulties are daily becoming more acute while her financial position is steadily deteriorating. The budget deficit for the 1954-55 fiscal year, ending September 30th, approximated US \$40 million, while an equal deficit is estimated in the current budget for 1955-56. In order to conserve scarce foreign exchange reserves, the new budget provides for restrictions on imports of consumer goods, a measure which has caused a sharp rise in domestic prices.

The main cause behind Burma's financial difficulties is a lack of markets for her major export--rice--following a substantial decline in the level of the world price for its commodity, combined with increased competition in the world rice market from non-Asian countries.

Burma is naturally dependent upon the proceeds of the rice sales to finance her 8-year economic development programme which was formulated in 1952 when the rice market was particularly buoyant. In the past, rice exports have accounted for 80% of Burma's export earnings, and 40% of total Government revenue.

COMMENT: Contrary to popular opinion, Burma's financial difficulties have not been much alleviated by the disposal of large quantities of rice to the Soviet Bloc, due to the fact that these countries have not supplied, in any quantity, the goods and equipment which Burma actually needs.


The real solution to her problems would be for Burma to concentrate on diversifying national production in order to reduce her dependence upon rice exports and at the same time decrease her heavy import requirements for consumer goods. Strict economy as well as strenuous efforts to increase production are required if Burma is to overcome her present difficulties.

Moreover, Burma is in urgent need of more capital. Colombo Plan and U.N. aid alone are not sufficient. Last month, the Burmese Government concluded technical and financial aid agreements with Japan

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: 

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FROM:

As known 17, Nov 55.

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| <input type="checkbox"/> Note and File                  | <input type="checkbox"/> Take Appropriate Action |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Note and Return                | <input type="checkbox"/> As Requested            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Please Speak                   | <input type="checkbox"/> For Information         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Please Answer                  | <input type="checkbox"/> For Your Comments       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> For Your Approval              | <input type="checkbox"/> For Signature           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply For My Signature |  |

COMMENTS:

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 Police F 23,000  
 HGA 162,000  
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and India. Furthermore, Prime Minister U. Nu, on his recent visit to Moscow, requested economic and technical assistance from the USSR: a marked departure from his previous policy of strict neutrality.

Before any industrialization plan for Burma can be implemented, however, the guerillas, who not only create a drain on the Burmese treasury but also control many areas from which necessary raw materials are extracted, must be eliminated.

12. Malayan Amnesty

(CONFIDENTIAL)

It is now nearly two months since the Government of the Federation of Malaya declared an amnesty in order to end the 8 year "emergency". The amnesty which offers a complete pardon to the terrorists and promises that they will be integrated into Malayan Society in return or an unconditional surrender fulfils the pre-election promises of the Alliance Party which won 51 out of 52 seats in the first national elections held last summer. Although the British gave only a half-hearted consent to the suggestion of an amnesty, the new Government, aware that the granting of full self-government to Malaya, tentatively scheduled for 1959, would be conditional upon an improvement in the internal security of the Federation have done everything in their power to assure the success of the amnesty. Yet in spite of the generous terms and the wide publicity which the amnesty has been given, surrenders of Communist terrorists have not increased and even the Alliance has been forced to admit that results have been disappointing.

The surrenders since the beginning of September represent only about one per cent of the 3,000 Communist terrorists believed to be still in the jungle. The Alliance is pledged to increase the struggle against the Communists if the amnesty fails. However, no one looks forward to the resumption of an intensified struggle against the Communists. It has taken nearly 8 years to whittle their forces down from 8,000 men to their present strength, even though there are reported to be nearly a quarter million troops presently in Malaya engaged in actively combatting the guerillas.

It is therefore not surprising that the Alliance leaders felt a resurgence of hope when they received a letter from Chin Peng, the Secretary-General of the Malayan Communist Party who has apparently been directing Communist operations in Malaya from the other side of the Thai border for several years. The letter proposed a meeting between the

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Communist leaders. On October 17th, shortly after the letter was received, a meeting was held between Chan Tien, a close associate of Chin Peng, and I.S. Wiley, the British Deputy Police Commissioner, and Too Joon Hing, the Deputy Minister of Education in the Federation. Arrangements were made for a meeting to take place probably in late November or early December to be attended by Chin Peng himself and by Tengku Abdul Rahman, Chief Minister of Malaya, Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, President of the Malayan Chinese Association, and Mr. David Marshall, Chief Minister of Singapore. One of the conditions put forward by Chin Peng was that no British are to be present at this meeting.

COMMENT: Although the British have up to now discouraged any meeting between the terrorists and the Malayan Government, it appears that they are agreeable to this encounter which offers the only alternative to a renewed and necessarily prolonged military offensive against the Communists. Theoretically the Malayan leaders are only meeting Chin Peng in order to explain the terms of the amnesty to him. Yet it is obvious that the Communists will try to turn the meeting into some form of negotiations in an effort to secure recognition of the MCP as a legal political party in return for abandoning their jungle guerilla tactics. It is believed that the Communists wish to re-direct their efforts in Malaya towards subversion and infiltration and to abandon open warfare which is gaining them nothing. They have already secured a foothold for subversive activities in the Chinese middle schools and the trade unions as the Singapore strikes in the early summer show. Moreover, the MCP is now the only Communist party engaged in open warfare and hence it is out of line with the other Communist movements in Asia, providing a source of embarrassment for the Communist parties and governments who seek to establish friendly relations with non-Communist states. There can be little doubt, therefore, that the MCP will attempt to turn the forthcoming talks into a "little Panmunjon" and it remains to be seen how effectively the newly elected leaders of Malaya and Singapore will be able to resist such a development.

13. Ground Strengths in Korea

(SECRET)

Total Communist Armed strength in North Korea is held at 687,000; including the North Korean Army, 329,000; 15,500 North Korean Security Troops (under the Ministry of the Interior), and 1,300 USSR technicians and advisors; plus forces of the Chinese Communist Army totalling 341,000.

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United Nations Command strength is carried at 753,000; made up of Republic of Korea ground forces 685,000; U.S, 57,000; British Commonwealth 5,000; and other U.N. contingents, 6,000 approximately. These figures include Korean base and service troops.

COMMENT: This is the first instance since cessation of hostilities in June 1953 that the overall strength of the Communists in Korea has fallen below that of the United Nations Command.

However, while the reduction in Chinese local strength may be indicative of increased Chinese confidence in North Korean ability to hold any immediate attack from the South or a Chinese appreciation of the unlikelihood of such action, formidable Chinese forces remain in Manchuria and could at comparatively short notice restore the manpower balance in their favour.

14. Chinese Withdrawals from Korea

(SECRET)

Further to the confirmed withdrawal of six Chinese Communist divisions from Korea during the period 10<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> of October, it is now accepted that these formations made up 24 and 54 Chinese Communist Armies. One previously unidentified army reported as having withdrawn in April 1955 is now identified as 68 Chinese Communist Armies.

COMMENT: Now in Korea are five remaining Chinese Communist Armies including fifteen infantry divisions and supporting troops; together with the North Korean Army which has nineteen infantry divisions, plus the seven infantry brigades on coastal defence, and supporting troops.

Of the total of thirty-four enemy infantry divisions in Korea eighteen (nine Chinese and nine North Korean) together with supporting arms are in front line positions immediately North of the Demilitarized Zone. These could be reinforced by a total of six Chinese and ten North Korean infantry divisions during a two to eight day period from forces locally available in Korea with no serious weakening of coastal defenses. Reinforcements of up to six more Chinese Communist Armies could, it is estimated, be moved from Manchuria into Korea within six days.

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The Communists probably appreciate that in the eventuality of an attack from the South, forces immediately available on the Demilitarized Zone are sufficient to hold any South Korean or United Nations offensive until the arrival of reinforcements would permit a counter attack.

15. Highway Construction in China

(SECRET)

It was planned to construct some 2,800 miles of new motorable roads in 1955. These routes are to be located mainly in industrial and mining areas, and in national minority regions; however, exact areas are not known. Possible areas are the Chiu - Ch'yan, Dzungaria, Tsaidam, Turfan, and Szechwan basins. Provincial press reports have indicated that roads are planned to serve the minority regions in the southwestern provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechwan, and also in Tibet.

COMMENT: Indications are that the current road works programme involves mainly the improvement of existing and newly completed roads rather than actual additions to the road network. Top priority, previously accorded roads to or within the border regions, is now apparently to be given to roads serving industrial and mining areas.

16. Transportation Build-up in Fukien

(SECRET)

Chinese Communist Navy personnel recently captured by Nationalists report intensified efforts to build-up the transportation network in Fukien province. They report that "more than 100,000" civilians have been mobilized to rebuild the highway from Amoy to Changting and to construct a railroad connecting Amoy with Kiangsi Provinces.

COMMENT: This appears to be the railroad connecting Amoy and Foochow with the Shanghai - Peking - Chuchow line at Kueichi. It may indicate an intensified effort to complete the project before the estimated target date of late 1956. Completion of this line and reconstruction of the highway to Changting would strengthen the airfield complex opposite to Formosa by lessening dependence on coastal shipping for logistical support.

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17. Udon-Naung Kai Railway

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The new Udon-Naung Kai railway was opened on 15th September 1955 providing direct rail connections between Bangkok and the Laotian communities of Than Dua and Vientiane. Full operation of the transportation link between the two countries awaits reinforcement of the ferry slip on the Thai side of the Mekong River, but this should be completed in the very near future.

COMMENT: The new rail line will be a great benefit to landlocked Laos in getting goods to and from foreign markets without having to depend on the much longer haul through Cambodia and South Vietnam.

18. Autonomy for Sinkiang

(SECRET)

Since October 1st, 1955, the province of Sinkiang has been declared an autonomous region to be known as the Sinkiang-Uighur (Turki) Autonomous Region.

Sinkiang still remains an inseparable part of China under the control of the Central Government. It will send deputies to the Chinese National People's Congress and will be represented on the Minorities Affairs Commission of Congress.

COMMENT: The setting up of Sinkiang as an autonomous region is in keeping with the Chinese Communist pattern of government for minority groups within greater China. There are now over 80 autonomous regions in China with Sinkiang becoming the largest.

The decision to make Sinkiang an autonomous region appears to have required four years of careful preparation. Several small autonomous areas had been established within the province for the benefit of racial minority groups, and so the grant of autonomy to the whole province is the culmination of this policy. It represents a concession to the Uighurs or Turkis who form about 75 per cent of the total population of Sinkiang. It is assumed that the small autonomous areas will not be supplanted by the new regime but, rather, will be subject to it.

The Central Government of Communist China will retain its control over the province through the appointment of officials. Already the non-communist Chairman of the Sinkiang Provincial Government

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(now abolished) has been replaced in the new regime by the vice-chairman who is Communist. Furthermore, 1,000 officials from the Central government departments have been transferred to Sinkiang.

The whole development reflects the confidence of the Central Government to hold its control over the province, and does not indicate a growth of Soviet control in that area. Rather, it is the political counterpart of the economic control that the Central Government gained when the controlling interests of the three joint Sino-Soviet companies were transferred to China.

There is no indication of any large scale exploitation of Sinkiang's potential natural resources at the present time. Because of the lack of adequate transportation facilities, any development is most likely to be in the agricultural sector of the economy rather than in the industrial.

#### MIDDLE EAST

#### 19. Modernization and Development of the Israeli Railways (SECRET)

The line from Na'an to Beersheba is due to be opened in January, 1956; it is being built with dual purpose of accelerating the exploitation of the Mineral Resources of the Dead Sea and opening up the Northern area of the Negev, which, when irrigated, will become an important agricultural area.

Future projects include the connection between the two terminal stations at Tel Aviv (to enable trains to travel from Haifa to Jerusalem via Tel Aviv) the extension of the Beersheba line to Kurnub, and the conversion to standard gauge of the 105 cm. gauge line from Haifa to Afula and possibly Beisan. Other possible projects are the extension of the Beersheba line from Kurnub to Sdom on the Dead Sea, and the construction of a line from Sdom to the port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aquaba.

The modernization plan also includes complete conversation of the sytem from steam to diesel motive power.

COMMENT: These improvements will not only be an aid to the national economy; they will provide additional logistical support to Israeli forces in the event of operations against neighbouring Arab countries.

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EUROPE

20. General Franco Reviews the Spanish Fleet

(SECRET)

On October 8th the Spanish Fleet put to sea to be reviewed by General Franco and to carry out some exercises. The fleet consisted of:-

5 Cruisers	1 Transport
12 Destroyers	1 Tanker
2 Frigates	1 Netlayer
2 Corvettes	1 Tug
2 Minesweepers	

The following points in connection with the review and the exercises are of interest:-

- (a) The average age of the cruisers was 26 years, and that of their Commanding Officers 53.
- (b) The average age of the destroyers was 22 years and that of their Commanding Officers 45½.
- (c) Their surface gunnery at a range of five miles in daylight was quite effective.
- (d) Refuelling and replenishment at sea exercises were efficiently carried out, which indicates that the Spanish Navy envisages operations at a reasonable distance from the mainland.
- (e) Cruisers were used to simulate aircraft carriers although the Spanish Navy has little hope of acquiring either a fleet air arm or an aircraft carrier in the foreseeable future. This suggests that the Spanish Navy may be preparing itself for absorption into a NATO force.

COMMENT: Some steps are being taken to reduce the deficiencies of the Spanish Navy. In line with overall military aid programme to Spain, the United States agreed in April, 1955, to make some 25 millions

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available for the modernization of 24 destroyers and smaller type ships. There is also a new construction programme for 9 destroyers and a number of small submarines but progress has been slow.

21. The Dulles-Franco Talks in Madrid

(CONFIDENTIAL)

According to information received from our Embassies in Madrid and Washington during the one-day visit to Madrid of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles had a cordial conversation with General Franco. Among the subjects discussed were the following:

- (a) General Franco asked whether the "spirit of Geneva" would alter United States efforts to "liberate the captive peoples" behind the iron curtain. Mr. Dulles promised that the United States would not be a party to any deal which would "perpetuate their enslavement".
- (b) The Middle East situation was reviewed and Mr. Dulles expressed the hope that Spain would cooperate in preventing the situation from deteriorating further. General Franco's response did not go beyond an assurance of cooperation.
- (c) North African problems were discussed and Mr. Dulles said that there was a need for Spain to pursue a common policy with France. General Franco said Spain had no intention of taking any initiative in this area.
- (d) General Franco spoke in his "passionate desire" for Spain to be admitted to the United Nations as soon as possible. Mr. Dulles was somewhat pessimistic about the immediate prospects.
- (e) NATO was barely mentioned but Mr. Dulles was said to have reaffirmed that the United States would support a Spanish application for membership if other members of NATO should agree to her admission.
- (f) General Franco expressed hope that United States economic aid would continue. Mr. Dulles promised that it would but gave no hint that aid would be increased.

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**SECRET**

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# **JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY**

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Ottawa

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SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. Moscow Celebrates 38th Anniversary of October Revolution (CONFIDENTIAL)

Moscow's celebration of the 38th Anniversary of the October Revolution was highlighted by the customary parade in Red Square and by speeches by Marshal G.K. Zhukov, Minister of Defense, and L.M. Kaganovich, First Deputy Prime Minister. Preliminary reports of the parade indicate that no unusual or new military equipment was observed.

Marshal Zhukov's address, delivered in Red Square on 7 November, briefly reviewed Soviet successes in industry and agriculture and Soviet efforts to promote "peaceful coexistence". He declared that, "while strengthening the cause of peace, the Soviet people do not forget that there are those reactionary elements in certain capitalist countries which are ... trying to wreck the cause of peace". He assured the Soviet people that the "personnel of our Armed Forces will continue insistently to raise their fighting efficiency".

Kaganovich delivered the major speech of the celebration at the Bolshoi Theater on the eve of the anniversary. It was a lengthy resume of the internal and external accomplishments of the Revolution and the Soviet State. Kaganovich declared that the Soviet Union does not need to interfere in the domestic affairs of other States since revolutionary ideas know no frontiers, travelling "throughout the world without visas and fingerprints". The 19th Century, he added, was the century of Capitalism, whereas the 20th is the Century of Communism.

Kaganovich also reviewed at some length Soviet efforts to ease international tensions. He stated: "We have done and are doing everything in the interests of peace and, of course, not from weakness...but aware of our growing power".

COMMENT: This is the first Moscow parade in several years that has failed to reveal any new weapons or equipment. Zhukov's and Kaganovich's speeches reiterated the current Soviet themes dealing with East-West relations, and neither provided an indication of a change in Soviet policy. Kaganovich's display of revolutionary zeal was to be expected in a celebration of the October Revolution.

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2. Soviet Atomic Test

(SECRET)

The fourth explosion in the current Soviet nuclear test series occurred at dawn on Sunday, November 6th in the general area of the Semipalitinsk testing ground. Preliminary indications are that this explosion was an air burst and had an energy yield between 100 k.t. and 1000 k.t.

COMMENT: It seems likely that this will prove to have been a boosted explosion with a thermonuclear component, but this cannot be established until an analysis is completed. As this was probably an airburst explosion, it can be assumed that the device was dropped from an aircraft and must be viewed as a deliverable weapon.

3. The ninth Sverdlov class cruiser to be built in Leningrad was expected to join the fleet about a year ago, but it is still fitting out.

COMMENT: The delay has been caused either by some radical alteration to the original design or by the pressure of work on tankers fitting out in the same yard.

4. Increased Merchant Shipbuilding Activity in Leningrad

(SECRET)

Most of the "Sverdlov" class cruisers now in service have been built in two Leningrad shipyards. One of these yards started to build tankers of 10,000 dead weights tons towards the end of 1953. The other launched its last Sverdlov this summer and is now also building tankers, of about 3,500 gross registered tons.

Building sites in the Sudomekh submarine yard which have been used until recently for M V class coastal submarines and "Q" class medium submarines are now occupied by small surface vessels, probably not naval craft.

A new shipyard has been identified, which is building small tankers or river craft.

COMMENT: It is apparent that important Leningrad shipyards can now be spared for merchant ship construction.

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5. Civil Air Agreements between the Soviet Union and Finland and Yugoslavia (SECRET)

Two civil air agreements have recently been signed in Moscow which will result in the establishment of reciprocal air services between the Soviet Union and two European countries outside the Soviet Bloc. The first was signed in September between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and provides for regular services between Moscow and Belgrade by civil aircraft of both countries. The second, signed in October, is between the Soviet Union and Finland and similarly provides for an exchange of services.

COMMENT: The news of these agreements follows closely the announcement of a civil air agreement between the Soviet Union and India. This means that within the last few months the Soviet Union has signed agreements with three nations outside the Soviet Bloc whereby aircraft of these nations will fly regularly into the Soviet Union. Such flights, have not been made previously.

The agreement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union may be part of the Soviet campaign to re-establish friendly relations with Yugoslavia. Early in 1955 aircraft of the Soviet Civil Air Fleet began a weekly service to Tirana, Albania, via Belgrade, but there has been no Moscow-Belgrade service as such.

The Soviet Civil Air Fleet has been flying between Moscow and Helsinki since the end of the war but the service has not been reciprocal. It now appears, however, that aircraft of Finnair, the Finnish state airline, are to fly to Moscow.

6. Soviet-India Civil Air Agreement (SECRET)

It has been announced that the Soviet Union and India have signed an agreement for a regular air service from Moscow to Delhi, via Tashkent.

COMMENT: If this agreement envisages, as it presumably does, Indian aircraft flying into the Soviet Union, it will be the first case of civilian aircraft of a country outside the Red Bloc being allowed to fly on regular civil air services into the Soviet Union. It is only within the past year that agreements have been signed between the Soviet Union and its Communist neighbours, the European Satellites and China, whereby aircraft of the latter now fly on regular runs into the Soviet Union. Prior to these agreements Soviet civil aircraft flew into China and the Satellites but reciprocal arrangements did not exist.

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This will be the fourth, and longest, flight route for Soviet civil aircraft outside the Red Bloc. At present Helsinki, Belgrade and Kabul are the only cities outside the Satellites and China served by the Soviet Civil Air Fleet.

No information is available as to whether Air-India aircraft will fly into the Soviet Union only as far as Tashkent or whether they will continue on to Moscow. In any case it is presumed that Soviet aircraft of the Civil Air Fleet will fly to Delhi.

It will be interesting to see what type of aircraft the Soviets use on their Moscow-Delhi flights. Their main civil aircraft at present are twin engined COACHES and CRATES. These would not show up well in comparison with Air-India's Super Constellations. Possibly the Soviets will use their new twin-jet transport of Comet size, the CAMEL, which was unveiled at the Tushino air show in July of this year, and which they have indicated will be used on flights outside the Soviet Union.

7. Soviet Plans for Research in the Arctic.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

V. Burkhanov, who heads the Northern Sea Route Administration, outlined the Soviet plans for research in the Arctic during the International Geophysical Year, 1957-58. Investigations in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions he said, constitute an independent sector in the plans for the International Geophysical Year. The Soviet Union, whose northern borders stretch for many thousands of kilometers in the waters of the Arctic Ocean, will take a most active part in the program of scientific work in the Arctic.

It is planned that investigations will be carried out at over 100 stationary polar stations and five observatories of the Arctic Research Institute of the Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route. These observatories are situated in Barentsburg on Spitsbergen, in the Tikhaya Gulf of Franz Josef Land, on Dickson Island, in Tiksi Gulf, and in Port Pevek. All five observatories lie beyond the Arctic Circle, between 70 and 81 degrees north latitude.

Research work under the program of the International Geophysical Year will also be carried out by three large scientific stations drifting on ice floes in the central Arctic basin. These are the stations North Pole-4 and North Pole-5, which have been in operation for quite a period of time,

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and a drifting station to be organized soon, North Pole-6. It will continue along the course negotiated in 1950-51 by the station North Pole-2, which drifted in the region of the "pole of relative inaccessibility".

The Arctic Ocean will also be studied with the aid of so-called mobile research detachments. It is planned that these detachments will carry out in the central Arctic basin observations at over 500 points. They will be transported to the ice floes by aircraft. Extensive use of polar aviation will also be applied for regular weather research among the meridians, along which the program of the International Geophysical Year provides for systematic observations. These flights will include the geographic North Pole itself.

In addition, aerological, meteorological, oceanographic, and other scientific research will be carried out by sea expeditions from ships of the Soviet Arctic Fleet. During the summer months, among other ships, the Diesel-electric ship *Ob*, will take part in Arctic research work in the Northern Hemisphere.

In the central Arctic basin and in the northern parts of the Arctic seas it is planned to make use of automatic radiometeorological stations, which will function without attendance.

COMMENT: The expansion of Arctic regions forecast by Bukhanov is an extension of the work carried out during the last few years. The statement reveals Soviet plans for three drift stations operating simultaneously and not two as had been announced earlier.

A working model of an automatic weather reporting station was shown to a United States delegation which visited Moscow in 1946, and the equipment has been in use for a good many years. It is not known how good it is.

#### 8. Soviet Genetics.

(RESTRICTED)

On October 27 the 100th birthday of the Soviet plant breeder Michurin was celebrated in the Bolshoi Theatre with great pomp. It seems that everybody who is important in government, party or science was present. Academician Lysenko figured particularly prominently in the proceedings and made one of the two major speeches of the evening.

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COMMENT: The re-emergence to apparent favour and prominence of Lysenko is interesting. Lysenko's views on genetics, which had endeared him to Stalin, are considered nonsense by Western concepts. While Michurin was a sound practical plant breeder, Lysenko is generally regarded as a charlatan, and it seemed that his star was on the decline after Stalin died, Soviet scientist visitors to the United Kingdom were anxious to confirm this view.

The re-emergence of Lysenko leads to the speculation that there may arise a double standard in science, one for external consumption, and one for home use.

9. Samples of Soviet Orbit Food

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Two samples of rye-bread and one of wheat-flour bread of Hungarian origin were examined. Both are hearth-type loaves. This type of loaf is not strictly comparable to more common kinds of bread sold in North America, but would be classed as a specialty bread. These loaves were made of good quality flour and the wheat flour bread appeared to have been prepared with sugar, milk and 3-4% of fat. This bread must be considered as satisfactory in every respect.

Seven different items of canned foods of Polish and Soviet Russian origin were also examined. The steel sheets used in the cans was probably tinned by mechanical dipping, and showed attack by the food. The content of the cans was found to be under pressure, presumably because the cans were not exhausted before sealing. There were no thermophilic bacteria, however other micro-organisms were found in excessive amounts. Most cans contained excessive quantities of filth.

The quality of the foods in the cans would have been graded as substandard in this country, and their appearance was generally not pleasing. Sulphite was used as a preservative, and the contents of some of the cans were below the stated weight. Some of the foods also had materials other than disclosed on the label, added to them. The canning methods employed are considered to be some 50 years out of date by North American standards.

In view of the above it is considered that the items examined could not be legally imported or sold in North America.

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10. Soviet Inquiries to Canadian Shipbuilders

(SECRET)

The Commercial Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa has authorized the East West Export Import Co. Ltd. of Vancouver to secure price offers from various Canadian shipbuilders for the following:

- (i) Floating docks of 1500/3000 tons capacity;
- (ii) Sea salvage vessels, tug type, for use in Soviet Far Eastern waters;
- (iii) Salvage ships for emergency salvage service, speed 17-18 knots;
- (iv) Twin screw lake or river tugs, 400 h.p.;
- (v) Light ships (for use in Baltic, Barents and Okhotsk Seas).

All the vessels are to have their hulls strengthened against ice. They are also to be fitted out with the most up to date radar and other equipment.

COMMENTS: Apart from the floating docks which are under embargo the only embargo features of the above vessels are strengthening of the hull against broken ice and certain kinds of equipment, such as, radar and navigating instruments.

While previous inquiries have been made to Canadian shipbuilders no orders have yet been placed in Canadian yards.

An interesting feature of the most recent inquiries is the fact that they were timed to coincide with the review of the draft Canadian-Soviet trade agreement now being undertaken in Ottawa. The agreement if concluded will give the Soviet Union most favoured nation treatment in matters of trade and shipping on the understanding that the Soviet Union will buy upwards of 300,000 tons of wheat annually for the next two or three years.

Most of the above small vessels could be made in Satellite shipyards, which, up to the present time, have been engaged on orders for the Soviet Union. As the Satellite yards become free of Soviet orders they are offering to build small ships for underdeveloped countries.

It may be noted, in passing, that the two principals of the East West Export Import Co. Ltd., set up over a year ago, are known Communists.

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11. Soviet Plans Long Range Flights to Anarctica

(SECRET)

The Soviet Union has revealed plans to establish two routes for regular flights to the Soviet Antarctic base to be established on Knox Coast, Antarctica, for the International Geophysical Year, (1957-58). One route would run over Africa, via Cairo and Capetown, and the other via India, Singapore and Australia (Perth).

The Soviet government is seeking rights to operate four-engined aircraft of unspecified types over various countries along the routes including Turkey, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, India and Australia.

The entire air operation will be under I.T. Spirin, a leading Soviet Arctic navigator and presently professor of polar navigation in the Voroshilov Military Air Academy.

COMMENT: Flights to the Antarctic, involving as they would air distances of about 9,000 nautical miles, would permit the Soviets to complement polar flying experience gained in the Arctic, and would give Soviet airmen valuable transoceanic and intercontinental experience. As far as is known, Soviet aircrews have not received any experience of this kind.

The statement that the aircraft are to be four-engined is of interest since the Soviet Union is not known to have any operational four-engined transports, either military or civilian. It is possible that the aircraft in mind may be Bulls converted to a transport role.

Diplomatic hurdles may be encountered in obtaining air rights and landing privileges since the Soviet Union is not a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The Russians will no doubt make use of the arguments that the flights will be undertaken by civilian aircraft engaged solely in a peaceful scientific mission. Should the Soviet Union join ICAO, which would oblige the Soviets to permit other nations to conduct civil air flights in the Soviet Union, the problem of air rights and landing privilege would be eliminated. The Soviet Union may at present be more interested in joining ICAO than it has in the past.

12. East Germany Assumes Border Responsibilities

(SECRET)

The East German Border Police assumed responsibility for patrolling certain East German areas. The headquarters of Border Alert Units assuming this responsibility are located at Blankenfelde (near Berlin) and at Gardelegen and Brabow (near the West German border).

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Soviet Border Troops in these areas have not yet been withdrawn; however, they appear to be acting as advisors and have been observed spot checking the performance of the East German units.

In connection with the assumption of border patrol duties, the East German regime has been reported to have directed the strengthening of the Border Police.

COMMENT: The transfer of border responsibilities is a further Soviet effort to force Western acknowledgement of East German sovereignty, restored by the Soviet-East German treaty of 20th September, 1955.

Other reports indicate that, except for major crossing points, Soviet Border Troops are to be withdrawn from the entire western border of East Germany. Under the terms of the treaty, East Germany was to assume control of its frontiers and of the lines of communication between it and West Germany.

The estimated strength of the East German Border Police was increased from 25,000 men to 30,000 earlier this year. A further expansion now appears likely.

A fresh recruiting drive is expected to begin in the near future and one unconfirmed report indicates that the East German Border Police may be given priority.

13. Restrictions on travel in East Germany (CONFIDENTIAL)  
by Allied Personnel

Since the granting of sovereignty to the German Democratic Republic by the Soviet government, the latter has been making strenuous efforts, to a large extent by means of the interpretation of technicalities, to force the Allies to deal directly with the East German Government presumably in the hope that the former will eventually recognize the German Democratic Republic.

COMMENT: The latest effort on the part of the Soviets involves an attempt to narrow their definition of military traffic in order to confront the Allies with constantly increasing East German authority.

It will be recalled that the Soviet - German Democratic Republic treaty of 20th September, 1955, made provision for the "temporary" retention by the Soviet authority of the responsibility

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for Western military traffic to and from Berlin while all other traffic was relegated to East German control.

The general problem of travel documentation in Germany represents a useful handle which the Soviets are exploiting to deal directly with the East German regime.

14. East Germany - Increased Restriction  
on Travel to Berlin

(SECRET)

Effective at midnight on 23rd October, 1955, increased restrictions on travel between the Soviet Zone of Germany and Berlin were put into effect.

COMMENT: It is believed that the responsibility for enforcing these additional restrictions will rest with the East Germans. The purpose of this action is probably twofold:

- (a) To contribute to the Soviet-East German campaign of asserting East German Sovereignty.
- (b) Reduce the number of refugees, particularly young men of military age, fleeing from East Germany through the West Berlin Refugee Centre to West Germany.

15. Frescos Ground Target Attacks

(SECRET)

Three probable Fresco aircraft were seen in East Germany diving from 5000 to 1000 feet at a 60° angle of dive, firing at ground targets from 4000 feet until just before the pullout. This is the first report of Fresco aircraft carrying out air-to-ground firing exercises in the Satellite areas.

COMMENT: The reporting agency suggests that since the Fresco is primarily a high altitude interceptor this activity indicates that Frescos will also be used on low level missions. It is further suggested that this sighting tends to, "support the conjecture that the tactical air army fighter regiments may have been assigned the secondary role ground attack thus presaging the eventual disappearance of Soviet ground attack units as a separate and distinct entity".

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While the exercise does, to some extent, support that conjecture, it should be remembered that the conversion from FAGOTS to FRESCOS in the western Satellite areas is still a relatively recent operation and it is reasonable to conclude that pilots flying a new type of aircraft will first fire their guns at ground targets before launching into air-to-air firing exercises.

16. Review of 1955 Soviet Manoeuvres in East Germany

(SECRET)

The autumn manoeuvres of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany were conducted this year from the 19th September to the 12th October. As in 1954, major elements from only five of the six ground armies in the Soviet Zone held manoeuvres. The other army, the Second Guards Mechanized Army, had previously carried out division-controlled exercises in late August and early September, but its units remained at home stations during the regular manoeuvre period.

The major manoeuvre activity this year was provided by the Third Shock and Eighth Guards Armies. The mechanized armies, in general, with the exception of the Second Guards Mechanized Army, carried out reinforced-division exercises. Each of these consisted primarily of a cross-country tactical march and bivouac and in many cases terminated in a river-crossing. The manoeuvres of the Eighth Guards and Third Shock Armies, however were Army-controlled, with elements from all subordinate line divisions participating.

The Eighth Guards Army is believed to have carried out the larger of the two Army-controlled manoeuvres between the 8th and the 12th of October, southwest of Jena. It consisted of an attack by a reinforced mechanized division against a corps defensive position. The manoeuvre appears to have emphasized the defensive aspect--specifically, the withdrawal of a mechanized security force through the main line of resistance, occupied by two rifle divisions, to a position in the second echelon of the defense.

The Third Shock Army manoeuvre, on the other hand, consisted of a corps attack and river crossing against a single defending mechanized division. This manoeuvre was held between the 24th and the 29th September near Magdeburg. Heavy air participation was observed throughout, and at least one small drop of about 300 parachutists was made, apparently in conjunction with the manoeuvre. In both the Third Shock and Eighth Guard Army manoeuvres, helmets with red stars indicated the attacking force, while white star tactical markings represented the defenders.

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COMMENT: On the basis of reports received, the following conclusions may be drawn regarding the 1955 Soviet manoeuvres in East Germany:

- a. In general, they resembled the known pattern of recent years, particularly 1954, with regard to time, size and location.
- b. This year's manoeuvres provided the Soviet Forces in Germany with an opportunity to employ tactically those new items of military equipment which have arrived in the Zone during recent months. Such items as T-54 tanks, amphibious vehicles, 150-mm. rocket launchers, and 240-mm. mortars were employed in conjunction with the manoeuvre play.
- c. Air participation, which was noticeably lacking in the 1954 autumn manoeuvres, was extensively employed this year on a scale comparable to that of 1953 and earlier. The last drop of a similar small number of paratroops during manoeuvres took place in 1952.
- d. Engineer bridging activity, which has played a prominent role in Soviet manoeuvres of recent years, was conducted on a reduced level this autumn. Both the major river crossings were made over existing bridges and ferries. The increased amphibious capabilities in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany brought about by substantial imports of new amphibious vehicles may explain partly the reduced emphasis on bridging operations this year.
- e. Nuclear implications were evident in some of the exercises. Signboards showing simulated radioactive areas were observed in at least two of the 1955 manoeuvre sites.
- f. The manoeuvre play apparently stressed camouflage and dispersion. a number of moves were made at night under blackout conditions, and excellent use was made of natural camouflage during daylight movement as well as in assembly areas.
- g. Traffic control and motor movements were poorly coordinated. Although fewer mechanical breakdowns were noted than in former days, march discipline was generally lacking. Columns of vehicles often were observed travelling bumper to bumper, and roads frequently were blocked by two columns advancing in the same directions. In at least one instance, three columns tried to cross the same intersection simultaneously, resulting not only in complete confusion, but in heated arguments among column commanders.

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- h. Individual and small-unit orientation may also have been deficient in some instances. Groups of Soviet soldiers were seen wandering about, obviously lost, in several of the exercises.
- j. Security and alertness were not as good as last year.

However, despite these deficiencies of training, also noted in previous years, the over-all mission in every instance appears to have been accomplished.

### SCANDINAVIA

#### 17. Finland Membership in The Nordic Council

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Finland has been welcomed into the Nordic Council to the considerable satisfaction of all the nations concerned--Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland. Finnish membership is not likely to cause any tangible changes in the aims or operation of the Council because Finland has maintained close liaison with the Council and has been participating in most of its projects. Moreover, the legislation providing for Finland's accession specifically states that Finland will not cooperate in discussions of any major political or military-strategic problems. The enthusiasm for this move has been dampened somewhat by the recollection that Finland obtained Soviet approval before joining the Council. At a special meeting of the Council representatives of the member governments sought means of achieving closer cooperation, particularly in the economic field where the development of a common Nordic market was one of the principal objectives. The next session of the Council in January, 1956, will consider Nordic cooperation in research on the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy.

### WESTERN EUROPE

#### 18. Spanish Destroyer Building Programme

(SECRET)

Spain has nine destroyers building. Six of these are of the Audaz class (1,106 tons standard displacement). The other three destroyers are of

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the Oquendo class, which were laid down in 1951 and launched this year. It is probable that these ships will receive modern American guns and equipment before being commissioned. Meanwhile the present particulars of these ships are:-

Full load displacement	2,680 tons
Length overall	381 ft. 10 ins.
Beam	36 ft. 1 in.
Draught	12 ft. 4 ins.
Designed speed	39 knots
Endurance	5,000 miles at 20 knots
Armament	Six 4.7", Six 40 mm One triple and two double torpedo tubes. Depth charges

Spain also has the following Spanish-designed submarines either building or planned:-

- (a) 6 Midget Submarines - Three of these are known to have been laid down. They are snort-fitted and 45 ft. in length.
- (b) 6 Coastal Submarines - One of these is known to have been laid down. They are to have a surface displacement of 250 tons.
- (c) 4 Submarines - The particulars of these boats are:-

Displacement (surface)	710 tons
Length overall	220 ft. 2 ins.
Beam	20 ft. 7 ins.
Draught	14 ft. 2 ins.

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Surfaced speed	17.5 knots
Submerged speed	8 knots
Armament	One 3.5", One 20 mm
	Five 21" torpedo tubes
	with 5 reloads

COMMENT: The Spanish navy is badly in need of modern ships and equipment. The above is part of a modernization programme based partly upon United States funds. There are many units in the Spanish navy long overdue for retirement but hitherto there have been no funds available for construction on new ships.

#### MIDDLE EAST

#### 19. Military Agreement between Egypt and Syria (CONFIDENTIAL)

A military agreement between Egypt and Syria was initialled in Damascus on October 20th. Under the terms of the agreement, which have now been published, the two contracting parties consider any armed aggression committed against one of them or their troops as directed against both. The pact provides for the creation of a Joint Supreme Council composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of War of both countries, which would be assisted by a Joint War Council consisting of the Syrian and Egyptian Chiefs of Staff. There will also be a joint command whose commander-in-chief will be appointed and will be responsible to the Supreme Council.

COMMENT: The implications of this pact for Israel are obvious. It is probable that Egypt is attempting to take advantage of the prestige it has acquired from the Communist arms deal to strengthen its position in the Arab League by a series of bilateral military agreements rather than by trying to resuscitate the languishing proposal of a tripartite pact between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. There have been reports that Egypt is attempting to negotiate similar military agreements with Saudi Arabia and with Lebanon. The Egypt-Syria military agreement has been generally applauded in Arab countries with the exception of Iraq, which probably regards it as an attempt to undermine the Baghdad Pact (Turkey-Iraq-United Kingdom-Pakistan-Iran).

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

20. Raising of a Volunteer Civil Defence Force in Burma (CONFIDENTIAL)

A Volunteer Civil Defence Force has been organized, with effect from the 1st of October 1955, to assist the Rangoon Police in securing the suburbs of that city from dacoits and insurgent raids. The volunteers will train and work under the supervision of the Rangoon Police.

All men between 18 and 40 will be eligible to join. The police will arrange to supply these volunteer units, which will have a strength of some 100-200 each, with arms and emergency facilities such as cars and telephones where required.

COMMENT: A similar scheme was proposed in 1952 but did not materialize. The local police force is quite inadequate to control the current wave of robberies, smuggling and hold ups by bands of dacoits on the outskirts of the city of Rangoon.

However, unless the arms, ammunition and volunteers are closely supervised, there is a strong chance that the scheme will backfire, due to the big demand and high prices offered for ammunition and small arms.

21. Internal Security Measures in Cambodia (SECRET)

The Cambodian Government has formed a Joint Security Committee to deal with the internal security problem in Cambodia. Initial steps in the new plan include:-

Reinforcement of the Home Guard to permit village-level self-defence against bandits; Increase in the strength of Provincial Guards and Police; Plans for joint operations of all forces under Joint Staff and Command; System of bounties and reward for persons capturing or killing bandits.

Khim Tit, a Privy Councillor, stated that he had been made Chief of Staff of the Joint Security Committee by the Prime Minister, Norodom Sihanouk.

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(unless otherwise classified)

COMMENT: The two principal Cambodian bandit leaders; Cyda, in the Voeune Sai area northeast Cambodia; and A Seap, in Kompong Speu Province, west southwest of the capital Phnom Penh; have had little opposition from Government forces in the past, and it is possible that the formers recent attack on Voeune Sai and the success of a centralized control during the General Election, when a former war-lord, Dap Chhuon, was entrusted with the coordination of internal security, has lead to the formation of the new body: Without positive Government action, dissident elements could develop into a major security problem.

22. Appointment of Chief of Staff, Indonesian Army (CONFIDENTIAL)

The Indonesian Cabinet has announced the appointment of Colonel Abdul Harris Nasution as Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army.

COMMENT: This appointment settles one phase in the long drawn-out disagreement between the Government and Army leaders. It is still not thought to be the best choice. Colonel Simbolon, present commander of Territory I (North Sumatra) was first choice for the job, but his appointment was opposed by President Sukarno on the grounds that, since Colonel Simbolon was a Christian, his appointment would give offense to orthodox Moslem leaders. Colonel Simbolon was the senior serving Army officer and has a reputation for efficiency and forthrightness.

Colonel Nasution was Army Chief of Staff from the transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch in December 1949 until the 17th November (1952) affair caused his resignation three days later. Colonel Nasution was placed on the inactive list in January 1953. In 1954 he organized and became chairman of the "Association of Supporters of Indonesian Freedom" and anti-Communist pro-Army political party. According to incomplete election returns in West Java, Colonel Nasution has apparently been elected to Parliament as the leading candidate of Supporters of Indonesian Freedom.

President Sukarno seems to have permitted his fear and distrust of Colonel Simbolon to weigh against his active dislike of Colonel Nasution.

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(unless otherwise classified)

23. Reorganization of Indonesian General Staff (SECRET)

According to Lieut-Col Kartakusuma, who is at present head of the Organization and Training Branch of the Indonesian General Staff, plans are under way for the reorganization of the Indonesian Army. This will occur initially within the General Staff.

The staff will be reduced from six to four sections by removal of the sections dealing with Territorial Affairs and Organization and Training. The four sections will now be designated;

A/C of S I (Intelligence)  
A/C of S II (Plans, ops, Trg and Org)  
A/C of S III (Personnel)  
A/C of S IV (Logistics)

Territorial reorganization is contemplated to bring about disposal of units throughout Indonesia, on the basis of requirements for the various territories, of which there are seven. Officer postings, which have been held to a minimum since 1950, will be for a maximum of two or three years.

COMMENT: The Indonesian Army Officers Association have long wished to reorganize the Army on Western lines. It is of interest to note that Lt Col Kartakusuma and Lt-Col Mokoginta (who will be responsible for drawing up the plans for this reorganization and who will become Deputy Chief of Staff I and II respectively) and Lt-Col Chandra Hassan, (who will be A/C of S II) are Indonesia's only graduates of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

24. Reorganization of the Viet Minh Army (SECRET)

A Coastal Command Directorate has been created to coordinate the activities of Coastal Defence regiments employed in the surveillance of territorial waters.

The Infantry school, formerly situated in China, has been transferred to North Vietnam and is probably at Son Tay, North-West of Hanoi. Deserters claim that manoeuvres up to divisional scale with artillery cooperation are being carried out with increasing frequency. Practice anti-aircraft exercises took place throughout North Vietnam early in September, and an effective anti-aircraft warning system is alleged to have been set up.

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(unless otherwise classified)

COMMENT: The above information has come from French authorities, regarded as reliable, and illustrates the progress of the reorganization of the Viet Minh Army, which has been taking place since the cease fire in July 1954.

Although the Infantry School has moved to North Vietnam, it is believed that higher training and technical training is still carried out in China.

25. French-North Vietnam Commercial Agreement (SECRET)

A Trade and Financial agreement was finalized on the 14th of October, 1955, between the French Government (through the Sainteny Mission) and the North Vietnam Government. The agreement, in force for a period of one year (subject to renewal by agreement of the two governments) covers an exchange of goods to the value of \$ 3 million. French francs are the medium of exchange, and goods will be carried, as far as it is possible, in French ships.

In the list of items to be exchanged by North Vietnam, consisting mainly of agricultural items (soy beans, tea, linseed) and handicraft goods, the only significant item is anthracite coal. The French, in turn, will provide mostly manufactured articles, as well as food, pharmaceutical and chemical products, construction material, hardware and some machinery and spare parts.

COMMENTS: The amount of the present agreement is extremely small when compared with the value of French trade with North Vietnam in 1953, which has been estimated at approximately \$ 60 million. North Vietnam is now dependent on China and the Soviet Union for essential supplies as well as for economic and technical aid and there is little scope left for trade with the French or any other non-communist country.

The Vietminh have little interest in signing a trade agreement with France, except for reasons of prestige. France, for its part, must have few illusions about its economic role in North Vietnam where French interests have been successively squeezed out, first in Hanoi and then in Haiphong. However it still apparently wishes to maintain at least a minimum of trade and commercial contacts through the unofficial economic mission in Hanoi.

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FAR EAST

26. Chinese Communist Armour

(SECRET)

Total Chinese Communist Armoured elements, at the close of hostilities in Korea were estimated to consist of three divisions and five independent regiments. During the following year there were reports of armour as organic to certain formations. Recent identifications confirm two tank regiments organic to two army headquarters and to sixteen infantry divisions in addition to those elements existing in mid June 1953. Equipment of all armoured units in the Chinese Communist Army is estimated to total about 1,160 medium tanks (T34-85s), 44 heavy tanks (JS-2), 44 self propelled guns (JSU-122) and 105 armoured cars of various types.

Chinese tactics, modelled on those of the Soviet Union, are beginning to show divergencies from the latter as Chinese commanders gain experience. One major divergence appears to be a Chinese belief in the use of armoured divisions to break through the enemy's infantry crust in deep penetrations while Soviet doctrine advocates deep thrusts after the enemy crust has been penetrated by infantry elements. The Chinese armoured division is not normally considered as infantry support, this role being that of independent tank regiments and of organic armour.

COMMENT: Chinese divergencies from proven Soviet doctrine must of necessity be based on theoretical reasoning rather than as the product of battle experience with modern armour in its deep penetration role, and may be indicative of an independence of spirit as much as of sound military reasoning. The Chinese, will probably continue to expand their armoured strength and by accepting, at least for the present, the main principles of Soviet armoured tactics, develop an effective armoured force.

27. Chinese Withdrawals from Korea

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The last elements of the six divisions of Chinese Communist Forces scheduled to leave North Korea during October, are reported by Radio Peking to have left Korea through the port of Sinuiju on the 25th October 1955. The Chinese also stated that the Neutral Nations Inspection Team located at that port inspected every coach on the departing trains and made a head count of units crossing the border.

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COMMENT: Though the reports of the Neutral Nations Inspections Team are not at hand, the Chinese broadcast is accepted as being substantially true. The Chinese are at pains to point up the present contrast between inspection routine in North and South Korean, in which there has come about a startling change. Whereas formerly the teams in the North could observe virtually nothing of importance in the flow of men and materials while those in the South were shown a fair amount, the reverse is now the case though there is far from complete freedom of inspection in the North.

As a result of this withdrawal the number of Chinese divisions in North Korea is accepted as 15 instead of 21, and the accepted armies reduced from seven to five. Which armies (and which divisions) are not yet known, nor is their destination. They will be carried as unlocated in China.

#### SOUTH AMERICA

##### 28. Light Destroyer Launched for Venezuela

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The Aimirante Brion, fourth of six light destroyers being built in Italy for the Venezuelan Navy, was launched at Leghorn on the 4th of September. These 1300-ton, 32-knot ships are armed with two twin 4" mountings, 12 close range anti-aircraft guns, three torpedo tubes, and A/S weapons.

It is understood that all six ships will be further modified by the addition of further Sonar equipment - before final delivery. Subsequently they will work up in Italian waters before sailing in company for Venezuela, where they are unlikely to arrive before the end of 1956.

COMMENT: In possession of considerable oil revenues, Venezuela has made rapid progress in building up a small but modern navy since World War II. She already has 2 new destroyers (over 2000 tons) built in the United Kingdom in 1953 and a third is on order. The addition of submarines and transport ships is also planned.

NOTE: Recipients will note that there was no issue of the Summary last week.

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*Miss Bullen*

**SECRET**

**COPY N° 98**

Issue No. 180

4 November 1955.

# **JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY**

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SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. New Soviet Destroyer Class

A new Soviet destroyer class has been observed in the Kronshtadt/Leningrad area. The destroyer has a flush deck construction and a distinctive cutaway stern. Preliminary data are:

Length: 300 feet  
Displacement: 3,000 tons  
Main armament: 4 x 100mm dual purpose in twin turrets  
4 x 76mm ant-aircraft in twin mountings  
57mm or 37mm anti-aircraft - unknown number  
8 x 21 inch torpedo tubes in quadruple mountings  
Mine rails fitted  
Maximum speed and horse-power unknown  
Radars on both masts - types unknown  
Radar gunnery control in domes on A and Y turrets  
Special features: Just after the main mast a heavy derrick or boom is fitted and on the starboard side an unidentified object 12 - 14 meters long. This device may have been fitted for carrying and handling a midget submarine or for guided missile firing purposes.

COMMENT: This could be the follow-up programme on the Kola's.

2. Airfield Development in the Crimean Peninsula during 1954-1955

(SECRET)

On the basis of several observations made by reliable sources, it is evident that the Crimean Peninsula has been provided during the past two years with at least five improved jet fighter or jet light bomber or long range bomber airfields. The airfields concerned are:

- a. Sarabuz (45 07N-33 59E) where a new 8,200 foot runway was observed in June 1955;
- b. Dzhankoy (45 41N-34 25E) which was noted to be under construction in August 1954, and which is now known to be capable of handling jet fighter aircraft;

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- c. Simferopol (45 56N-34 04E), which probably has had its runway lengthened and re-surfaced and which is currently in use by IL-28/Beagle and MIG-15/Fagot aircraft;
- d. Feodosia/Karogoz (45 04N-35 11E) which was probably completed during 1954 and which now has a runway of approximately 8,000 feet in length.

COMMENT: There are 18 airfields and 6 flying boat bases on the Crimean Peninsula. All of these air facilities have good road, rail and/or water access. The airfield development program, which has been carried out in the Crimean Peninsula during the past two years indicates that the Soviets are fully cognizant of the strategic location of this area. It is significant that bombers staged out of the Crimea would be within an easy striking distance of all bases in the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea areas as well as of bases located in all Western European and Middle East countries. These airfield development activities are consistent with the present Soviet policy of providing the airfields in the peripheral areas of the USSR with permanent landing surfaces.

3. Previous Reports of Heavy Bombers Towing  
or Refuelling Fighters believed Inaccurate

(SECRET)

Analysis of all reports of fighters escorting, or being towed or refuelled by heavy bombers indicates that in all instances the fighters were probably flying formation on the bombers during air rehearsals.

On 5th May a fairly reliable source reported that at 10;30 the lead Bison in a formation of nine Bisons near Moscow was towing or refuelling 4 small fighters attached by dark coloured cables or refuelling pipes. The same bomber formation was reported over Moscow by three reliable sources within the next five minutes but without the fighters. It seems most unlikely that if the small aircraft were attached in anyway they could disappear so quickly. On June 7 a reliable source reported that one of 2 Bisons observed was either towing or refuelling two MIG type fighters. The same source reported on 24 June that observation through field glasses of a Bear followed closely by 4 Frescos (MIG-17s) revealed that these aircraft were not on a tow line as has been suggested previously.

COMMENT: It seems both unlikely and hazardous for the leading aircraft in a formation of 12 heavy bombers to be refuelling fighters. The leading Bear in the Tushino air display July 3rd was clearly escorted by 4 Frescos and practice formations of this type have been observed with both Bison and Bear. It seems likely that the phenomenon reported above was simply escort fighters practicing station keeping and the dark coloured tow lines may have been unburnt fuel tracers from the four turbojets.

#### 4. Soviet Drift Stations

(UNCLASSIFIED) E.I. Tolshchikov, speaking over the Soviet Home Service on October 17 stated that Drift Station SP-4 would remain in operation for another year or more. On the other hand the expediency of retaining SP-5 was questionable; it was possible that this station would be taken off and a new one (SP-6) organized in a new area.

(CONFIDENTIAL) COMMENT: SP-4 is now about  $85\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}\text{N}$  in the area of the international date line. The floe on which it is located has been moving fairly rapidly in a region which appears to be of great interest to the Soviets.

The drift of SP-5 has been much less satisfactory. Since early summer the station has moved gradually northwest to  $85\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}\text{N}$  but has remained in a small area north of the New Siberian Island; lately the drift has been westward towards Northland. This area is probably of less interest to the Soviets, and information on it can be obtained fairly readily by shore-based aircraft.

It is unlikely that the Soviets would abandon SP-5 due to the floe breaking up, in the past when this occurred they moved to an adjacent one.

#### 5. Coleopters

(UNCLASSIFIED) A lecture entitled "Vertical Take-Off Aircraft; the Coleopter as an Optimum Solution" was delivered to the aeronautics group, Society of German Engineers at the Technical University, Berlin - Charlottenburg on 20 June 55. In his lecture, Prof. Heinrich Hertel discussed the advantages of this aircraft over other types of V.T.O. machines. In a discussion following the lecture, it was stated that the French government had placed a contract for building a coleopter.

(SECRET) COMMENT: The coleopter is a radically new form of aircraft in which the power plant is combined with an annular wing to form a single unit. The wing, besides acting as the lifting surface (in horizontal flight) also serves as the duct for a propellor or the shell for a ramjet engine. In the latter case the main propulsion units is a turbojet engine, the ramjet being used only for very high speeds. The design is apparently the creation of a Germany engineer, Dipl. Ing. H. von Zborowski, who was at one time engaged in rocket propulsion work at B.M.W. Munich. He now heads his own aeronautical concern in France, which has several coleopter designs in the making. S.N.E.C.M.A. also is carrying out a design study and development program on a

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single jet machine. No coleopters, however, have been flown to date.

The main advantage of the coleopter over conventional aircraft, its exponents claim, is economic superiority. The annular wing configuration no doubt will mean less structural weight and reduced production costs, but at the expense of high drag and lower aerodynamic efficiency. As compared to a straight wing airplane of the same transport capacity, the coleopter is estimated to have 10-25% lower fuel consumption. These and other advantages will best be verified when a prototype has been built and flown extensively; first many technical and operational problems must be overcome and this in itself will prove costly. The machine, if successful, may have a definite application as a supersonic interceptor, either manned or pilotless - it is estimated that an interceptor powered with an ATAR 101E turbojet would climb to 49,000 ft in 2 minutes and have a top speed of Mach 2, (weights, armament, range were not specified)

Several types of V.T.O. aircraft have been successfully flown in the U.K. and U.S.A. and others are now in the development stage in these countries and also in Canada. No doubt the USSR is working along similar lines, and although little is known about their activities it is quite probable that their development program is abreast of that of the western countries. An Australian radio broadcast of 3 October reported that a bottle-shaped aircraft was observed being tested at a Russian air base near the Afghan border; this aircraft reportedly went up and down like an elevator, but the fact that the description bears a resemblance to the coleopter is interesting.

#### AFRICA

#### 6. Projected Railway Construction in Tropical Africa

(SECRET)

The following railways are planned:

##### 1. Northern and Southern Rhodesia

a. Sinoia-Kafue: This line would shorten by 500 miles the haul from the Northern Rhodesian copper belt to the port of Beira.

b. N.Rhodesia-Tanganyika: A 1200 mile railway from Kapiri Mposhi, north to Korogwe would connect the East African and Central African system, and open up new

2. Belgian Congo

a. Port Francqui-Leopoldville: This line would shorten travel time between Elisabethville and Matodi, reduce cost by eliminating two trans-shipments and avoid delays caused periodically by low water in the Kasai River.

b. Kindu-Ponthierville: This line would speed traffic by eliminating transshipments on the Congo River and on railroads in the eastern part of the Belgian Congo.

3. Mozambique: Vila-Luiza-Magude: This line would contribute to the successful operation of the Limpopo railroad by enabling traffic from the Rhodesias to enter Lourenco Marques by a less congested route than the main line from Moamba, which is on the direct route to the South African Railroads.

4. Angola: Magange-Luchico and Luanda-Caxito lines would permit development of agricultural and mineral areas north and east of Cuanoa.

5. French West Africa: Discovery of copper near Akjoujt and of iron ore near Fort Gouraud has led to consideration of their rail routes. From Fort Gouraud:

- a. via Spanish Sahara to Villa Cisneros
- b. via Spanish Sahara to Port Etienne
- c. to Port Etienne. by all Mauretanian route.

6. French Equatorial Africa: Discovery of manganese deposits in Gabon has occasioned planning of one of three routes. Franceville to:

- a. Ouendo (to Northwest)
- b. Mayoumba (Southwest)
- c. Loudima (South)

7. Southwest Africa: Southern Rhodesia-Walvis Bay. Purposes of this railway are:

- a. to provide means of which Rhodesian coal and mining concentrates could be shipped directly to Atlantic Ocean.
- b. eliminate shipment through non-British territory of valuable materials such as chrome and copper.

the area through which it would pass

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COMMENT: Expansion of railway facilities is an important phase in the economic improvement of all the countries of Africa. Many of the mentioned lines may never get beyond planning stage, but three may soon go into construction. The Sincioa-Kafue cut-off, the Vila Luiza-Magude line in Mogambique, and the Port Francqui-Leopoldville line in the Belgian Congo.

FAR EAST

7. Relations between the United States and Communist China

(SECRET)

The Sino-American talks which began at Geneva on August 1st are continuing and Ambassadors Johnson and Wang have now passed to Item 2 of their agenda, which concerns "other practical matters" at issue between the two countries.

The agreement reached earlier with regard to the repatriation of Chinese nationals in the United States and American nationals in China has not yet been fully implemented by the Chinese. This has led to a good deal of dissatisfaction on the part of the United States. There are still 19 Americans under arrest in China who are known to want to return to the United States, but the Chinese say that each of them is subject to judicial review before release. The State Department holds that this is merely an excuse for delay -- a cynical one at that -- and that political rather than judicial considerations are holding up their release. The Chinese make much of the fact that there are 47 other Americans in China who are free to leave whenever they choose. This group, however, is made up of the service deserters from Korea, fellow-travellers and individuals who have "gone native", and the State Department has never expressed any interest in them. The official United States position is, therefore, that, while discussions on Item 2 of the agenda are being held, the question of the repatriation of nationals is not yet closed.

Under Item 2 of the question of the renunciation of force in the Formosa Straits has been discussed and there will be discussion about the trade embargo against China and the possibility of a further high level meeting, presumably between Chou En-lai and Mr. Dulles. Nothing of major importance has yet emerged from the discussion under Item 2 but it is evident that some tough bargaining is going on. Mr. Dulles does not favour ambassadorial talks have been fully explored.

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(unless otherwise classified)

SOUTHEAST ASIA

8. French Union Forces in South Vietnam

(UNCLASSIFIED) It has been learned that French forces in Indochina are to be reduced by 15,000 men in order to reinforce the North African theatre. No dates for the proposed withdrawal have been given.

(CONFIDENTIAL) COMMENT: European and Colonial troops serving with the French Expeditionary Forces in all three States in Indochina are believed at present to number about 43,000. The announced reduction will therefore leave the French with between twenty-five and thirty thousand men in Indochina, plus about ten thousand Vietnamese and Associated States personnel incorporated in the Expeditionary Force.

NORTH AMERICA

9. Espionage in Canada

(SECRET)

Espionage activity involving the Soviet Union and the Satellites is being carried out in Canada. Typical methods of achieving their objectives involve exploitation of:

- a. persons having the same political ideology;
- b. persons having the same racial origin;
- c. persons with relatives behind the Iron Curtain;
- d. persons with personal weaknesses;
- e. persons believing Soviet Union "peace" propaganda;
- f. social approaches;
- g. mercenary sources.

COMMENT: Of the six countries involved, Rumania and Bulgaria have no diplomatic representation in Canada while Hungary is served only by the Polish Legation. The diplomatic strength (adults, including wives) of the Soviet Union in Canada fluctuates between 80 and 90, Czechoslovakia between 50 and 60 and Poland between 20 and 30.

S E C R E T

JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Corrigenda to Issue No. 180  
dated 4 Nov 55

Item 10. Labor-Progressive Party Strategy and Tactics

Classification of Item should be  
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10. Labor-Progressive Party Strategy and Tactics

(UNCLASSIFIED) Tim BUCK, L.P.P. National Leader, spoke to the pupils of the Combined L.P.P. Ontario and Quebec Provincial Schools at Grafton, Ont., during the latter part of July, 1955. In discussing the current L.P.P. program, he is reported to have said: "----in the path to Socialism, there is one fundamental applicable at all times, and that is the dictatorship of the proletariat, a requisite that is common to all working classes. The seizure of power is only the start. In some countries the bourgeois will remain stronger than the workers, unless the working class with its advanced detachments smashes the bourgeois apparatus. This is a first necessity. It is therefore necessary that our national Party program be written so that it cannot be identified with a foreign power."

"We are living in the dying days of capitalism and the revolution is just around the corner, but I do not want any of you to get any adventurous ideas; everyone should get prepared for the new era and study "Strategy and Tactics" (Chapter 7, Foundations of Leninism, by Stalin). Our program says that it is possible to achieve a peaceful transition to socialism, but nowhere in this program do we guarantee that there will be no violence. Will the U.S. imperialists stand by and watch us make a peaceful change? We must be prepared."

(SECRET) COMMENT: Although present Party propaganda would indicate that in Canada the Communists are endeavouring to make adjustments in accordance with the present "soft" policy of the Soviet Union, it appears that educational programs within the Party follow a different line. The original aim of establishing world communism still stands.

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→ Miss Coulter

**SECRET**

**COPY N° 98**

ISSUE NO. 179

28 October 1955

# JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. Anadyr - Leninka Airfield (SECRET)

Information from reliable sources has revealed the existence of a newly constructed and believed to be hard-surfaced runway of 8,000 ft in length at Anadyr Leninka (64°44'N-177°45'E in the Chukotsky Peninsula. The old runway, which is connected by a taxiway to the new one, is reported as being used for parking and servicing purposes.

COMMENT: The 8,000 ft long runway at Anadyr Leninka is the second landing facility of its kind which is known to exist in the Chukotsky Peninsula. The other 8,000 ft long runway is located at Provideniya Urel'ik Airfield (64°23'N-173°15'E).

The above information supports estimates on the existing Chukotsky Peninsula airfield capability of staging or handling medium and possibly heavy bomber aircraft on a year-round basis.

2. Sighting of Two CAMEL Aircraft (SECRET)

A recent visit by a reliable source to the Kyubishev East area revealed a previously unknown aerodrome some 20 miles east of Kyubishev.

In addition to 27 FRESCOS (MIG-17s), two CAMELS were seen on the aerodrome.

COMMENT: The CAMEL is a swept wing high speed passenger aircraft powered by two large gas turbines. Only one was previously seen, during the Moscow Air Day on 3 July 1955. Its general size, capacity and performance is estimated to be very similar to the British Comet Mk 3.

3. Third Factory Producing BADGER Aircraft (SECRET)

It is reliably reported that a BADGER aircraft has been observed near the assembly sheds of Factory 64, Voronezh (300 miles south of Moscow).

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(unless otherwise classified)

Two other large aircraft with swept tail fins were observed from a distance, on the factory airfield.

COMMENT: Factory 64 at Voronezh is known to have been producing IL-28 bombers until at least February 1955. In June a twin engine swept wing aircraft was first sighted outside the assembly sheds, but was thought to be either a FLASHLIGHT or a new swept wing light bomber.

The recent sighting appears to indicate that the aircraft being produced is the BADGER. The BADGER is already in production at two major bomber factories. The use of a third factory would result in a more rapid jet re-equipment of the medium bomber force than previously estimated.

4. Military Supply in East Germany

(SECRET)

The following reflects reported rail imports and exports of key military material for the month of June 1955 with totals for the first half of 1955:

	<u>June 1955</u>		<u>Totals for first Half 1955</u>	
	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Artillery (excl.SP)	585	12	1,229	75
SP guns	15	-	30	-
Tanks	237	-	1,286	42
Armoured Vehicles	98	-	602	-
Vehicles (MT etc)	843	258	4,667	1,463
Ammunitions (all types)Metric tons	9,360	2,205	49,785	4,515

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COMMENT: Ammunition

Ammunition imports for June 1955 were approximately 1000 metric tons above the average for the preceding five months. The total for the first six months of 1955 was approximately 11,000 metric tons more than the amount imported during the same period in 1954. It is estimated that the total for 1955 will amount to some 90,000 metric tons or a net gain of 15,000 metric tons over the 1954 import figure.

Of the total figure for 1955, the bulk, amounting to 38,450 metric tons was received by and distributed among nine German towns representing major ammunition depots.

Artillery

A sharp increase in the imports of artillery was noted during June. The total for the month represents the highest monthly import of artillery recorded this year. The total for the first half of 1955 was almost double that for the same period in 1954 and is only 300 short of the entire 1954 total. This indicates a considerable potential increase for 1955 over previous years.

Armour

The import of tanks for the first half of 1955 amounted to 1286 of which 1230 were believed to have been T-54/100 medium tanks, 12 heavy and 44 unidentified as to type. The total imports of T-54 tanks by the end of June 1955 amounted to 1257. The gain in tanks since 1954 is approximately 1200.

AFV's (other than tanks)

The imports of AFV's (ACP's and Armoured Scout Cars) during the period January to June 1955 was approximately 240 over that for the same period in the previous year. The total lack of exports of this type of vehicle, together with continuing imports, indicates that the availability of this item, as well as tanks, for the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany is being increased.

Of the 602 AFV's, 436 were identified as ACP's and 166 as Armoured Scout Cars.

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### Vehicles (Soft Skinned)

Monthly imports of vehicles continues in substantial quantities. The import figure of 843 for June 1955 closely approximates the monthly figures for the five preceding months.

The total for the period January to June 1955 amounts to approximately 4,700 of which about 3,500 were cargo vehicles, 280 command and reconnaissance vehicles (jeeps and sedans), 310 tractors and 551 special type vehicles such as radio trucks, ambulances, etc.

Exports of this equipment have been carried out in comparatively small quantities. By the end of June exports had amounted to only 1463 vehicles in approximately 30% of imports.

Although the intensity has somewhat decreased during 1955, it appears evident that the vehicle import programme initiated in late 1954 has continued. This programme has so far resulted in a net gain of approximately 3,200 vehicles.

### Conclusion

From the foregoing it is apparent that as a result of the re-equipment programme, the Soviet Union has substantially increased the mobility, firepower and armoured capability of its forces in East Germany.

#### 5. Soviet Navy - "Q" Class Submarines

(SECRET)

Three newly completed "Q" Class submarines were seen in Leningrad in June 1955. The submarines had a streamlined conning tower and two small-calibre (20-30 mm) guns. These guns are mounted one above the other forward of, and joined to, the conning tower.

COMMENT: Inadequate observation of "Q" Class submarines precludes a firm analysis of the characteristics of this class.

#### 6. Increase in Refugees from East Germany

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The number of East German refugees to West Germany has been on the rise since last February, according to United States officials in West Germany.

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The present weekly flow of approximately 5,000 refugees through Berlin is the highest since 1949, except for the six months preceding the June 1953 disturbances. In addition, many more refugees than in former years are going directly to West Germany without passing through Berlin.

Berlin refugee authorities believe that more people are leaving the Soviet Zone because they feel that the situation is hopeless and fear that the Government may institute sharper measures in the future to prevent their flight. The increase in escapees is also attributable, in part, to the belief that a compulsory conscription law is imminent.

COMMENT: During the first six months of 1955, approximately 125,000 East Germans, including 25,000 youths up to the age of 24, fled to West Germany, compared with about 195,000 during the entire preceding year. Many refugees have gone to West Germany to get better jobs and to escape the oppressive economic conditions in East Germany. Others fled because they resented the ever-increasing intrusion of the police State into every facet of their lives.

Pressure on young men of military age (17-24) to join the East German military forces and the growing belief that conscription is imminent have resulted in an increase in the proportion in this group from 17 percent in the first four months of 1955 to 25 percent in the next four months.

The steady upward trend in the refugee figures reflects mounting dissatisfaction with political and economic conditions in East Germany and a widespread conviction among the population that no satisfactory formula for German unification is in prospect.

7. Return of Porkkala to Finland

(SECRET)

Although the Finnish Chargé d'Affaires in Ottawa has assured us that the President of Finland made no secret agreements with the Soviet Union as the price for the return of the Porkkala base, it has since been disclosed in the Finnish Press that a number of other questions were discussed during the President's recent visit to Moscow. The Finns were naturally very pleased by the return of their base which dominates Helsinki but have also noted with satisfaction that their President did

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not neglect to raise with the Russians such other outstanding issues as Petsamo, Karelia, and probably Viipuri and the Saimaa Canal. Co-operation of Finland with the Nordic Council is also said to have been discussed. A usually reliable Finnish newspaper reported that "the solution of these problems was postponed for the future".

In returning Porkkala, the Soviet Union evidently wished to accomplish a double purpose. In Finland and Scandinavia generally, they hoped to create more genuine goodwill with the intention of reinforcing Swedish neutrality and if possible weakening Norwegian and Danish ties with NATO. In the world at large, they evidently wished to prepare the way for a propaganda campaign against United States overseas bases and Marshal Zhukov has already anticipated what is expected to be a main theme of the Soviet case when the four Foreign Ministers meet at Geneva.

As the Finnish Charge observed, the bill for the return of Porkkala will be presented not to the President of Finland but to the President of the United States.

8. R.C.A.F. Flight Berlin - Moscow 5th October 1955 (SECRET)

The following items are the highlights of a preliminary report on the R.C.A.F. C-5 flight to Moscow on the 5th October.

- (a) The Soviet navigator had a let-down procedure for Vnukovo aerodrome which appeared to be a square pattern using two or three beacons.
- (b) A herringbone complex was observed at approximately 320°M 20 NM from Vnukovo.
- (c) Mr. Swanson, a reporter, sighted over Moscow several delta wing aircraft similar to the British AVRO VULCAN.

COMMENT: (a) A GCA facility has been reported at Vnukovo for several years. Why the Soviets should be prepared to do a beacon let-down, in the event of Instrument Flight Rules weather, rather than employ GCA is not known, however, it suggests the possibility that the GCA has been installed for appearances only and is not normally in use.

(b) No comment pending further analysis.

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(c) It is not yet known whether Mr. Swanson compared the Soviet machine with the VULCAN from the point of view of general configuration only or whether he included size. This is the second sighting of delta wing aircraft. In September 1954, a member of the British Embassy in Moscow (an ex-air gunner) obtained a clear and definite sighting of a delta shaped aircraft with "bulbous nose and full wings". The aircraft was flying at approx. 6,000 ft and was probably heading towards Ramenskoye. There is little doubt that such an aircraft exists, even if only in prototype form and proves once more that the Soviets, during recent years have been at a development stage very similar to that of the west. This aircraft, together with BISON and BEAR proves that, at least, three parallel Heavy Bomber Projects have been in the development stage.

9. Mr. Pearson's Visit to the Soviet Union

(SECRET)

During his recent trip to the Soviet Union, from October 5th to October 12th, Mr. Pearson visited Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad and the Crimea. While there he met and had discussions with many leading Soviet officials.

In Moscow Mr. Pearson's talks with Mr. Molotov covered a wide variety of subjects, including the forthcoming Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting, disarmament, east-west contacts, the United Nations, Indo-China, and China. Molotov refused to be drawn into serious discussion and avoided any issues which might have provoked an argument.

Mr. Pearson's most important talks were with Krushchev and Bulganin in the Crimea on the last night of his visit. The Soviet leaders described NATO as an aggressive alliance against Russia, and said that the Soviet government would never agree to German re-unification and free elections as long as NATO existed in its present form. Khrushchev also declared that the Soviet Union might be prepared to accept the Eden proposals for European security if the number of countries undertaking mutual guarantees was increased to include 8 or 10; he added however that his government would want either both Germanys in the European security system or else neither. Mr. Pearson made it quite clear that NATO is an essential element in our defence and foreign policy and would remain so until international confidence reached the point where the United Nations could effectively guarantee international security.

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General discussions were held on the exchange of visits and information. Agreement in principle was reached as to the desirability of the freer flow of visitors and information. In particular, consideration will be given to technical co-operation in industry, transport, and agriculture and to the exchange of information on scientific research in Arctic regions. The joint communique issued on the conclusion of the visit refers to agreement on "visits by Parliamentary Delegations", but Mr. Pearson was careful to emphasize in his conversations that he was not able to commit Parliament to an exchange of delegations.

With regard to trade, nothing has yet been decided except that there are to be negotiations in Ottawa at a time to be arranged. The Soviet Union has suggested an exchange of most-favoured-nation treatment. We have made it clear that any agreement that may be reached must not give the Soviet Union more favourable terms than have been given to any country with which we have a trade agreement; that our export controls on strategic goods are not negotiable; and that the attitude of the Canadian Government towards a possible trade agreement will be affected by the prospect of a dependable outlet for our wheat.

10. Soviet Censorship and Security - Telecommunications

(SECRET)

At every level in the Soviet communications system representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have the functions of watching employees, checking the accuracy of records, censoring letters, telegrams and literature sent through the mails, and monitoring telephone calls. The direct wire connections established between Moscow and Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest, Sofia, and Tashkent are known to be equipped with speech privacy equipment. In time of military emergency, civil telecommunications facilities are used by Ministry of Internal Affairs signal troops who operate all signal communications facilities above army level.

COMMENT: The Ministry of Communications has a Deputy Minister for Special Communications, as well as the Deputy Minister for Posts and Telegraphs and the Deputy Minister for Radio Broadcasting and Communications. The staff of Special Communications is composed of members or units of Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel, and is integrated in every departmental level and communications centre. The cumulative effect of the omnipresent security viewpoint represented by these individuals has resulted in a communications system with a low rate of leakage of information, and a high resistance to sabotage.

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MIDDLE EAST

11. Syria - Arms from the Soviet Bloc

(SECRET)

On 27th of July 1955, 12 Syrian tank transporters were seen moving along the Damascus-Beirut road in the direction of Beirut. On 30th of July, presumably the same 12 vehicles were observed returning to Damascus, loaded with large wooden crates, marked "made in France". The crates were large enough to hold "Sherman type" tanks and later reports from Lebanon seem to indicate that the crates did in actual fact contain tanks for Syria. Most recent reports appear to confirm that Syria has received 45 tanks from Czechoslovakia and that these are now in Oatana, having arrived under the circumstances of the greatest secrecy.

COMMENT: The tanks are believed to be of German manufacture, made at the end of the second world war and probably re-conditioned by the Czechs. Recent unconfirmed reports seem to indicate that the Soviet Union has offered guns, tanks, machine guns and aircraft to Syria, payment for which could be made in pound sterling, dollar or Syrian raw materials. It would appear that the Soviet bloc, having successfully concluded its arms deal with Egypt in pressing home her advantage and influence within the Arab Countries.

FAR EAST

12. North Korea - Chinese Communist Withdrawal

(SECRET)

Neutral Nations Inspection Team reports state that the Chinese Communists have withdrawn 27,741 personnel from North Korea Team during 10th to 16th of October 1955. This figure is reported to conform exactly with information released by the Communists over Radio Pyongyang.

On 19th of October, the Communists announced that more than three Chinese Communist divisions had been withdrawn. Although Inspection Team statements do not confirm the movement of three such divisions, their

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reports for 17th-19th October have not yet been received and it seems probable that the Chinese announcement is correct.

COMMENT: The movements through 19th October represent approximately half of the six Chinese Communist divisions to be withdrawn from Korea, as forecast by the Communists on 29th September. On the basis of the number of personnel withdrawn to date, the movement may be completed by the end of October and may involve 80,000 to 100,000 troops. No unit identifications have yet been made.

The Chinese, who are known to oppose the abandoning of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, are probably making it possible for the teams to carry out what appear to be useful and accurate observations in order to make it more difficult for anyone to justify the withdrawal of the Supervisory Commission. The withdrawal of six Chinese divisions from Korea would leave some 15 Chinese divisions there, in addition to North Korean forces.

13. Japan - Service Representatives Aboard

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The newly formed Japanese Defence Board is now holding talks with the Japanese Foreign Office on the stationing of Self Defence Force officers with Japanese diplomatic agencies in the capitals of seven foreign countries in order to strengthen the information gathering activities of the Defence Board. The Defence Board is planning to inaugurate the system, which is regarded as meaning the revival of military attaches, in fiscal 1956 after completing revision of the Diplomatic Establishment Law. The seven countries to which Board officials would be despatched are Britain, France, Western Germany, Sweden, Turkey, Nationalist China and the United States.

The officers will be given the status of secretary of the diplomatic agencies. They will be assigned the task of keeping the Defence Board well informed on the military situation abroad and to help map out Japan's defence planning. For the time being, only one officer will be stationed in each of the seven countries. However, the Japanese Embassy in Washington will actually have two Defence Board officers as a Land Self Defence Board man has been filling the post of first secretary at the Embassy since the Self Defence Force was born in July last year.

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COMMENT: In March 1954 it was reported that such appointments, in effect of military attaches, were to be expected, but it is believed that so far none of these officers has been appointed. There is little doubt, that already some civilian officials in Japanese Embassies have been also responsible for military information.

14. Japan - Training of Foreign Forces

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The Japanese Government has given approval to the United States Forces for the training of Chinese Nationalist Forces, and other Asian forces receiving United States aid, to be trained in Japan. It is considered that only key personnel from these countries will be sent for training in Japan and will not include formations or units.

COMMENT: This has caused considerable press comment and anti-American comments from the two Socialist parties.

15. Japan - Proposed Home Defence Corps

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The Defence Board Director Sigemasa Sunda, has proposed a "Home Defence Corps" on the lines of a western Home Guard. An initial force of 20,000 is suggested, with the possibility of expansion among members of the Japanese Veterans Association from which it is planned to form the Corps. The Veterans Association formed in May 1955 now has a membership of over 1,000,000.

COMMENT: Such a development would be in keeping with the post-war trend in Japan of gradually restoring the military spirit to its former high place in the public esteem, and comes early enough to exploit the wartime experience of some of the veterans.

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*Miss G. L. L.*

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# JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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Ottawa

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SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. Railway Developments in Northern Soviet Union (SECRET)  
Solikamsk - Ust Kozhva Line

A repatriate reports that in 1954 a double-track line between Solikamsk and Cherdyn was being constructed. Also in December 1954 he worked on the construction of a double-track timber bridge over the Kama River, about 12 miles from Bondyug in an unknown direction.

It is believed that work on the line is now in progress from both ends, although actual linking up may still be some time off.

COMMENT: When completed, the line will provide a much more direct route between the Urals and the Northern Soviet Union than the existing one via Kotlas and Kirov, and will be particularly valuable for the transport of coal and oil from the Pechora coalfield to the Urals industries.

2. Soviet Difficulties in the application of (SECRET)  
Electronic Developments

A conference for representatives of manufacturing enterprises of the Soviet Ministry of Radio Engineering Industry was held in Leningrad June 3rd to 10th, 1955. Subsequently, the Soviet Press carried a number of criticisms which indicate areas in which difficulties are being experienced. Broadly, these seem to be the lag in incorporating into new production the research and developmental advances that have been made. One example is an improved capacitor developed within the Ministry of Radio Engineering Industry in 1952, which has not yet been produced. Another example is equipment for radio relay lines to link Leningrad and Kiev with Moscow for television broadcasting, as recommended by VNORiE (all Union Scientific Society of Radio Engineering and Electrical Communications) early in 1954, but has not yet been accomplished. Electronic computing machines were also mentioned as being urgently required but are not yet available in the numbers required.

COMMENT: The reconstitution of the Radio Technical Industry as a separate Ministry in January 1954 reflects the growing importance of this industry. Changes in top-ranking personnel indicate that the closest attention is being paid to improving its efficiency. At the present time demands are made upon it by the Ministries of Shipbuilding,

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of Aviation Industry, and of Defence Industry as well as by the Ministry of Communications and the Main Administration of Radio Information of the Ministry of Culture.

These demands have resulted in a continuously high rate of growth. Total output is six times the 1946 value. But it is still mostly absorbed by military requirements, which get 70% (compared with 30% in Canadian electronics industry). The dollar value of Soviet military electronics production is now estimated to be nearly one billion, compared with about two billion in the United States. The total Soviet electronics production is valued at about 1.2 billion, and still rising steadily, compared with 4.5 billion in the United States, which is a slight decrease during the last two years.

The shortcomings publicized indicate an effort to improve the quantity and quality of the Soviet electronics product. Bulganin in his speech of 4th July this year referred to the Radio Technical Industry as one of the worst examples of high losses from rejects. While new Soviet radars have been much in evidence during the past few years, and some electronics for guided missiles appear to be available, indications are that the industry will be under severe strain for some time to meet the rising demands of Soviet military and civilian requirements.

### MIDDLE EAST

#### 3. Ditching of Soviet Training MIG-15 Off Hamidiye-Turkey

(SECRET)

On the 27th September 1955 a U-MIG-15 with a crew of two ditched in the Black Sea off the Turkish Coast. The aircraft, is in fair condition, and the crew are in Turkish hands. The two man crew, Captain A.K. Mattalnikov, pilot, and Lieutenant V.I. Simrialov, observer, claim they were lost at the time of the crash.

The Turkish authorities report that:

- (a) The crew refuses to talk except in the presence of a Soviet attache.
- (b) The aircraft took off from Grozny at 1200 hours, and crashed near Hamidiye at 1300 hours on the 27th September 1955.
- (c) The Soviet attache will be permitted to visit the location of the aircraft, but will not be allowed within 10 metres of the aircraft.

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- (d) Turkish authorities have granted 3rd, 4th and 5th of October for further inspection of the aircraft.
- (e) Soviets will have access to aircraft on the 6th of October.
- (f) Matalnikov fought in Korea.

COMMENT: Preliminary examination of the aircraft by United States team disclosed:

- (a) U-MIG 15 is numbered 10606.
- (b) Believed to have crashed due to fuel exhaustion.
- (c) One 12.7 m.m. Berezina machine gun Model UBM-3 mounted under lower left nose section.
- (d) Main tank - 700 litre capacity.  
Saddle tank - 159 litre capacity (may have been removed)  
External tanks are in Turkish hands, however evidence indicates they are two standard 66 gallon (american) tanks.
- (e) Engine - RD-45F number 934559.
- (f) Communications equipment - Command receiver  
Radio compass  
4 channel VHF (SGR 522 type)  
Marker Beacon MRP-48P  
Radio altimeter.
- (g) Large number of technical pamphlets.

The Turks apparently desire to comply with protocol, however, their tactics appear slightly contradictory. They have refused the Americans permission to interrogate the crew and yet permitted them to examine the aircraft. At the same time they refuse to let the Soviet Attache examine the aircraft before the 6th of October.

It is not believed that the Turks will permit enough delay in returning the aircraft to the Soviets for a complete technical examination by United States and British team which was enroute Ankara on the 2nd of October.

Groznyy (approximately half-way between Astrakhan and Baku) is believed to be the base of a FAGOT (MIG-15) unit.

#### SOUTHEAST ASIA

#### 4. Visit of Burmese Military Mission to China

(SECRET)

A military mission left Burma for Peking on the 23rd of September 1955 at the invitation of the Chinese People's Government so as to arrive in time to attend the National Day celebrations on October 1st. The mission

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was led by Lieutenant-General Ne Win, supreme commander of the Burmese Armed Forces; it included the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Navy, two senior Army brigadiers and eight other officers, that is, virtually all the senior officers of the Burmese armed forces. General Ne Win is expected to return after a stay of some two weeks but the remainder of the party will probably stay in China for two months, during which time they will visit military establishments and travel extensively.

COMMENT: The initiative for this visit came from the Chinese, Chou En Lai having made the offer at the Bandoeng Conference. The powerful composition of the Mission may merely have been to demonstrate Burmese willingness to cooperate with the Chinese People's Government; it will however, provide the Chinese with a useful opportunity to impress the Burmese with the might of modern China's military resources. Previous Burmese experiences of Chinese military ability, as demonstrated by various Nationalist formations during the Second World War, were unlikely to leave an impression of the Chinese Army as anything but an undisciplined rabble. The visit may also have a restraining effect on Burma's move to approach the United States for a loan in the likely event that a similar approach to India fails.

5. Malaya - Results of the Amnesty to Date

(SECRET)

The results of the amnesty granted to the Communist terrorists in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore has not been spectacular. Ten persons have so far surrendered, of whom only three are terrorists of standing, in Malaya and none in Singapore.

After a lull following the announcement of the amnesty, some increase in terrorist activity has been noticed, particularly in Johore State.

In Singapore the Chief Minister, David Marshall, has agreed to cancel the Emergency Regulations Bill put into effect by the British at the beginning of the Emergency in 1948. He has however, submitted to the Legislative Assembly a "Public Security Ordinance" to replace the original Regulations. The People's Action Party is strongly against this Ordinance and has already begun to organize mass meetings of labour and students to protest. The chief target of the People's Action Party is that section of the Ordinance which would grant the Government the power of arrest and detention without trial of Communist subversives.

COMMENT: Although the response to the amnesty offer, on which no time limit is set, has been poor, it was never thought that surrenders would be numerous nor that the hard core of the terrorists would leave the jungle. The surrender rate may increase with time.

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Jehore State has always had a bad record and as the state with the highest per cent of Chinese population it was to be expected that trouble would continue in that area.

The People's Action Party had made strenuous efforts to remove all Governmental authority curbing Communist activity in Singapore and had some success in making Marshall agree to revoking the Emergency Regulations. Marshall may be forced to modify his Ordinance; should his own Labour Party desert on the issue Singapore will be left without any legal protection from Communist manoeuvring.

6. South Vietnam - Operations against the Binh Xuyen (CONFIDENTIAL)

Vietnamese National Army began an operation against the Binh Xuyen on 21st and 22nd of September 1955, designed to clear the shipping channel to Saigon and to stop Binh Xuyen firing on river traffic. The Vietnamese National Army, cooperating with the Vietnamese Navy, put a force of twelve battalions and five batteries of artillery into the field. The Western half, in conjunction with Vietnamese Navy assault craft, carried out a series of landings, the Eastern half operated along the road Long Thanh - Barie (East of Saigon to North-West of Cap St Jacques). The total strength of the Binh Xuyen was estimated at 1,200 with 22 river craft of various kinds including four "monitors" equipped with turrets and 20mm guns.

Vietnamese Navy craft were extensively used during the operation to bloc water approaches and a total of six small vessels have been sunk so far by the Binh Xuyen apparently using 57mm recoilless rifles.

It is reported that negotiations between a Binh Xuyen leader and Vietnamese National Army representatives have led to the surrender of 400 Binh Xuyen on 6th of October 1955.

COMMENT: The Binh Xuyen were river pirates before their successes in running organized vice and gambling in Cholon. In consequence it is not expected that the current operation will succeed in putting them out of action entirely. If true, the reported defection of 400 men will reduce the extent of their activities and perhaps reduce also the scale from its previous level of assaults on merchant ships to attacks on junks and small river craft.

7. Status of Route Nationale Number One in North Vietnam (SECRET)

The Viet Minh are giving high priority to the rehabilitation of the section of Route Nationale Number One which runs from Mu-Nan-Kuan

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(formerly Chen-Nan-Kuan) on the Chinese border, through Hanoi to the demarcation line at the 17th parallel. The Viet Minh regard improvement of this route as a matter of some urgency, since engineering difficulties will prevent the re-opening of the railway from Hanoi south to the 17th parallel for some time.

COMMENT: Route Nationale Number One has only limited value as a military supply route at present and its full rehabilitation will take considerable time to complete. However, lower construction standards may be accepted to expedite completion. Presumably the Viet Minh want the road available in order to take advantage of, and possibly to influence, the outcome of the South Vietnam elections in 1956.

FAR EAST

8. Communist China - High Command

(CONFIDENTIAL)

On the 23rd of September 1955 the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China approved the appointment of the following ten senior generals each to the rank of Marshal of the People's Republic of China.

Each of the new marshals is also Vice Chairman of the National Defence Council.

Chuh Teh	Vice Chairman, People's Republic of China; Member Politburo; Appointed in 1931 Commander in Chief Chinese Communist Army.
Peng Teh-huai	Vice Premier of China; Minister of Defence; Member Politburo; formerly Command 1st Field Army.
Lin Piao	Vice Premier of China; Member Politburo; formerly Command 4th Field Army.
Liu Po-cheng	Member Central Committee; Chief General Training Department People's Liberation Army; Command 2nd Field Army.
Ho Lung	Vice Premier of China; Member Central Committee; Chairman Physical Culture and Athletic Commission; formerly and 2nd Field Army.
Chen Yi	Vice Premier of China; Member Central Committee; Mayor of Shanghai; formerly Command 3rd Field Army.

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Lo Jung-huan      Member Central Committee; Vice Chairman, Standing Committee National People's Congress; Chief, General Political Department and General Cadres Department; formerly Political Commissar 4th Field Army.

Hsu Hsiang-chien      Member Central Committee; Deputy Command North China Military area; formerly Chief of Staff Ground Forces.

Nieh Jung-chien      Member Central Committee; Deputy Chief of Staff, Ground Forces; Command North China Troops.

Yen Chien-ying      Member Central Committee; Chief, Armed Forces Supervision Department; Command 4th Field Army.

COMMENT: The appointment of these very senior officers to the rank of Marshal is probably a matter of honour only and does not imply any new responsibilities. It may be an indication that they, as individuals, may expect gradually to be relieved of active military associations while still contributing to the People's Republic as elder military statesmen.

The continuity of Chinese senior commanders is without equal in any other country. All ten of these new Marshals (and many others in front rank) took high command responsibility in the renowned Long March of 1934 to Shensi from Kiangsi, with the possible exception of Chen Yi who appears to have remained behind in Kiangsi in command of guerrilla forces there. Chu Teh at that time had already been Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Forces for three years and he is still at the top of the armed forces. All, without exception, have maintained unbroken service ever since, spending almost all their time in active operations against the Japanese, Chinese Nationalists, or United Nations' forces in Korea.

Mao Tse-tung, himself a military veteran of the Long March, which he planned in cooperation with Chu Teh, had already by then (1934) assumed a political leadership as chairman of the Kiangsi Soviet, and soon thereafter he became supreme politico-military commander.

9. Chinese Communist Artillery - Quemoy Area

(CONFIDENTIAL)

During the one month of September 1955 the Chinese Communists are reported to have fired more artillery rounds (1899) against the Chinmen Islands (Quemoy) than were fired during the previous six-months (1147). Gun positions to the number of some 116 occupied and 460 unoccupied have been identified by aerial photography in the area opposite the Chinmens, and it is estimated that the Chinese Communists have between 160 and 200 artillery pieces in the area including 76.2-mm, 122-mm and 152 mm weapons.

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Critical terrain features opposite the Chinmens have been heavily fortified, more than 1,100 pillboxes having been identified on the two islands of Amoy and Kulanghsu.

The Artillery activity appears to be in the nature of harrassing fire on roads, beaches and ridgelines and has probably been for the purpose of artillery registration and training.

COMMENT: The Communists retain the capability of initiating a successful attack against the Chinmens (providing the latter are unsupported by United States armed forces). The increase in artillery activity is not considered an indication of intention to attack. The extensive fortifications in the area may be made with a view to defence and as a means of stimulating public interest in the armed forces including both regular forces and the Peoples' Militia (Home Guard) by thus calling attention to the presence of the United States seventh Fleet in Formosan waters.

10. Renewed Huk Activity - Philippines

(SECRET)

In spite of the recent success of the Magasaysay regime against Huk insurrection, there was a fresh outbreak in Southern Luzon in September 1955, involving the deaths in ambush of some eleven men of the Philippine Army.

In July this year a coded message was found on a killed Huk leader indicating that the Huks are maintaining contact with the Chinese Communist Party through the Chinese Communist Party of the Philippines, and other reports over the past six months indicate that the Chinese Communist Party of the Philippines is having a greater influence over the insurgents.

COMMENT: It is believed that the fresh attacks are designed to weaken Magsaysay's government before the elections scheduled for November.

The Huk situation was lately considered to be well in hand, with only an estimated 1,000 hard-core remaining, largely due to lack of supplies. If the affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party of the Philippines and Chinese Communist Party becomes firmer the insurgents could obtain the needed supplies from them.

Until this year, there was virtually no cooperation between the Communist Party of the Philippines, of which the Huks are the military arm, and the Chinese Communist Party of the Philippines. Each party has been reserved for their respective races with little contact between them. Both parties are legal, though the Huk military arm has been outlawed.

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*Miss Cullen*

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# JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. Soviet Pacific Fleet Additions

(SECRET)

Recent reports from American sources now indicate the composition of forces transferred to the Pacific Fleet via the Northern Sea Route to be two Sverdlov Class cruisers, the depot ship Neva accompanying two "Z" Class and 10 "W" Class submarines, one Tallin Class destroyer, 12 Kola Class escorts, 12 Kronstadt Class coastal escorts, five auxiliaries and eight unidentified probable mincraft.

COMMENT: This represents the strongest reinforcement of the Pacific Fleet to have taken place so far.

2. Unidentified Submarine Contacts

(SECRET)

On 7th September, a Dutch P.2V5 engaged in a Londonderry joint air exercise sighted a snort and periscope in position 56° 12' N., 07° 03' W. A sonobuoy pattern was laid, cavitation was heard for twenty minutes and a revolution count of 90 was obtained. On 21st September the outline of a submerged submarine was sighted by an aircraft of 737 Squadron in position 55° 23' N., 06° 38' W. The submarine was snorting intermittently and was subsequently tracked for an hour and twenty minutes by an E.C.M.- fitted Avenger. On neither of the above occasions were British or N.A.T.O. submarines in the area.

COMMENT: The two sightings were made by experienced crews and represent unusually well verified contacts of unidentified submarines. It appears likely that a Soviet submarine was carrying out a patrol in the Northern Ireland area.

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3. Reduction of Soviet Armed Forces

(SECRET)

The Soviet military attache to the UK, Major General Rogov, in a recent conversation with the UK military attache designate to Moscow made statements to the effect that:

- (a) Very few Soviet infantrymen now march since the majority are motor transport-borne;
- (b) the proposed reduction in the Soviet army would mainly affect the rifle divisions.

COMMENT: The first item raises no new points since the energetic programme of motor transport supply has obviously been aimed at increasing the mobility of the army generally and it is known that rifle divisions have received or are receiving their fair share of motor transport.

It is not known how much of the reduction figure of 640,000 applicable to the Armed forces generally will be applied to the army. Whatever the final assessment is, however, it is logical that the infantry should be the first to suffer since it is easier to train and equip an infantryman than a soldier of the more technical arms and services.

4. Distribution of T-34 Tanks - Possible Allocation to Kazernierte Volks Polizei (KVP)

(SECRET)

A report based on the observation of two shipments of T-34 medium tanks during the summer may indicate the possibility that these tanks are being allocated to the Kazernierte Volks Polizei (KVP).

COMMENT: Since the introduction of the new T-54 medium tank in Group Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), the distribution and reallocation of T-34 tanks, which are being replaced by the former, has been a matter of some conjecture since very few T-34 tanks have been shipped to points outside East Germany.

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Although the precise military status of East Germany in the East European Defence Organization has not yet been defined, the transfer of these medium tanks to the KVP - which represents an army in everything but name - would seem to be a logical action on the part of the Soviet Government since there is little doubt that the KVP has been taken into account by the Soviets in their planning and assessment of Satellite military potential.

Since the Warsaw Treaty specifically calls for "measures" to be taken by the participants to strengthen their defensive power, the reallocation of T-34 tanks to not only the KVP but other Satellites may well represent some of these measures.

5. Shipments of Heavy Tanks or Self Propelled Guns (SUS) (SECRET)  
into Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG)

Since June of this year a number of shipments of what has variously been described as heavy tanks, new heavy tanks, and other designations have been observed in Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG).

The distribution of these vehicles include six locations in which Heavy Tank/Self Propelled Gun Regiments and Tank Divisions are normally stationed.

COMMENT: The number of these unidentified vehicles observed to date amount to 257 of which the largest consignment (94) was despatched to the location of an element of a tank division. It is conceivable that these vehicles may be new heavy tanks since these are known to exist. On the other hand the possibility that they may be self propelled guns should not be ruled out. This latter possibility would conform to the programme of general up-gunning of artillery elements of formations.

6. East German Legislation Creating Armed Forces (CONFIDENTIAL)

The East German Parliament has passed an amendment to the Constitution providing a legal basis for creating national armed forces.

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The Volkskammer (Parliament) took this action immediately after ratifying the Soviet-East German Treaty on Mutual Relations, which was concluded in Moscow on September 20th.

The amendment to the Constitution asserts that "service in defense of the fatherland...is an honorable duty for citizens of the German Democratic Republic" and that the "Republic has responsibility for legislation on the defense of the homeland and the civilian population". It further provides that the "organizing of service for military defense...will be governed by decisions of the Council of Ministers". Deputy Prime Minister Willi Stoph, who introduced the amendments in parliament, was quoted by the East German press as saying that the "passage of this amendment does not yet mean the introduction of military conscription". The reporting officials noted that news of the constitutional amendment was not played up in the East German press, nor was its relation to the Soviet Treaty emphasized.

COMMENT: Ratification of the Soviet-East German Treaty was a mere formality, and the action to make constitutional provision for armed-forces legislation had been anticipated in statements made by the East German leaders during the Moscow talks. Little remains, other than the promulgation of the necessary decrees by the East German Council of Ministers, to redesignate the existing ground and naval "police" units and "air clubs" officially as national Armed Forces. Removal of the Kazernierte Volks Polizei (KVP) from the Ministry of Interior last June left the Main Administration for the KVP (HVKVP) an independent agency which needs only to be named a Ministry of Defense to become one.

Stoph's assertion, quoted by the press, that conscription would not be immediate apparently was designed to soften the impact of this unpopular measure on the East German population. Reports have indicated that the campaign to obtain KVP recruits by voluntary enlistment is bogged down; therefore, sooner or later, conscription must be introduced if the East German armed forces are to be maintained at strength. If conscription is instituted, the increasing proportion of military-age males in the growing number of East German refugees to the West probably will expand further. Stoph is the likely candidate for Defense Minister when a Defense Ministry is created. In reporting on Stoph's role in the Moscow talks, the East German press described him as the "individual primarily concerned" with East Germany's security. However, this was only the most recent of many indications of his role.

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7. New Scientific City near Moscow

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Dr. Wilder Penfield recently paid a visit to the Soviet Union. One day during his stay in Moscow he was told that most of the members of the Academy of Sciences were out of town to look over the location for a new city to be built to house the Academy of Sciences and its laboratories. He was told that the site selected was about sixty miles from Moscow.

COMMENT: This is the first time we have heard of Soviet plans to construct such a Center. While we do not know the reasons for these apparently very ambitious plans, they could be simply a desire to provide better accommodations for the Academy, or be due to requirements of dispersing in case of a nuclear attack on Moscow.

8. International Radio Broadcasting and Jamming

(CONFIDENTIAL)

An article entitled "Propaganda on Three Fronts" reviews the present state of international broadcasting, and Communist jamming. The "third front" refers to anti-colonialism. A table transmitter facilities is given. Canadian international facilities are approximately correct, two transmitters each 100 Kilowatts broadcasting in 15 languages for a total of 13 hours per day. The Soviet Union facilities are given as 50 transmitters of up to 3000 watts power, broadcasting 24 hours a day, with a total of 34 languages (3 more than the Vatican uses). One thousand jamming stations are said to be in use in the Communist bloc for preventing reception of Western broadcasts. Jamming interference is said to have become effective as follows: Soviet Union 1949, Poland 1951, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania in 1952, East Germany 1954.

COMMENT: International broadcasting has increased steadily since 1946, reflecting in its programs the changes in international tension. Listening to foreign radio broadcasts is not a criminal offence in the Soviet Union, as it was in Germany in wartime. The huge Soviet jamming program, which is about the size indicated in the article, has never been officially admitted by the Soviet Union even in the face of accusations at international radio broadcasting conferences. It is estimated that 250 high power jammers capable of long range jamming by sky-wave are included in the Soviet jamming organization, as well as

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the local jammers near large communist cities. These facilities, if applied to Western strategic military communications could result in a serious drop in efficiency. Present estimates of the magnitude of the Soviet effort are \$70,000,000 worth of equipment, an annual operating cost of \$17,000,000 and a force of 2000 technicians.

9. Proposed Reduction of Bulgarian Armed Forces (SECRET)

On 20th September 1955 the Bulgarian Council of Ministers issued a decree announcing that the country's armed forces would be reduced by 18,000 men by 31st December 1955.

COMMENT: Bulgaria is the last of the Satellite states, with the exception of East Germany, to follow the Soviet lead in announcing a reduction in armed forces. The proposed reduction, which would cut the personnel strength of the Bulgarian armed forces from an estimated 236,000 to 218,000 or by about 8 percent of present strength, is proportionately well below those announced by the Soviet Union and the other Satellites. Even if the bulk of this cut is absorbed by the Army (present strength 170,000), it is considered that, by applying cuts mainly to headquarters, service and ancillary units, and with approximately 500,000 trained army reserves who could be mobilized quickly in time of war, this could be effected without a significant loss in military effectiveness.

The lower proportional reduction announced by Bulgaria may be attributable to her strategic location bordering on three non-bloc countries, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Two of these, Greece and Turkey, are traditional enemies.

MIDDLE EAST

10. Israeli Air Development (SECRET)

During the months of July and August 1955 the U.S. licensed the following items for export to Israeli.

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20 Rocket launching kits for F-51 (Mustang)  
100 Packard Merlin V-1650-7 engines for F-5 (Mustang)

The Israeli Air Force also is purchasing 40-82 Fairchild Packets (Flying Boxcars) replacing Dakotas now in service. In addition 3 Noratlas aircraft have been ordered from France one (1) of which already has been delivered.

COMMENT: The above information indicates the extent to which Israel intends to go in putting every available aircraft in combat readiness. Israel possesses 64 F-51 aircraft 16 of which, up to now, might be considered operational. With the acquisition of the new engines and the rocket kits the Israeli Air Force will be in position to increase its ground attack potential formidably by Middle East standards.

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Miss Bullen

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# JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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## SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

### 1. Technical Analysis of Soviet Radio Receivers (CONFIDENTIAL)

Recent samples of the "Muskvich" 4 tube broadcast receiver, the RIGA - 10 10-tube all wave receiver, and the RODINA 7-tube all wave batter receiver, and the A-5 five wave band automobile receiver have been analyzed. Rugged construction, generous electrical specifications, and increasing quality of electrical components are noticeable. There is a marked difference between the cheap sets and the luxury quality sets.

COMMENT: In order to meet the requirement for military electronics, only 30% of production is allowed to reach civilian consumers. (For comparison, the Canadian percentage for civilian use is 73%). Examination of both broadcast receivers and military receivers made over the past 7 years has shown a steady trend toward better quality components, capable of meeting Western military specifications. Military receiver components by about 1950 were reaching a satisfactory standard. The latest Soviet civilian sets now contain many components as good as those in Western military receivers. Some of them appear to be surplus items from Soviet military electronics procurement programs. Solid mechanical construction, thorough inspection, and conservative electrical specifications tend to make Soviet receivers reliable in operation. It seems that as well as increasing its output 3 times since 1950, the Soviet electronics industry has succeeded in improving its quality.

### 2. New Sverdlov Cruiser Sighted (SECRET)

Recent sightings have confirmed the appearance of a new Sverdlov class cruiser working up in the White Sea off Archangel.

COMMENT: This is the second Sverdlov class cruiser to be built at the yard at Molotovsk and to go into service with the Northern Fleet.

### 3. Soviet Infra Red Equipment (SECRET)

A number of recent reports indicate that infra red equipment is now in use in Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Extracts are:

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(unless otherwise classified)

- a. GRIEBEN - May, 1955 - reported night firing by JSU-122's (self-propelled guns) on unlighted targets.
- b. NEU-GLIENICKE - June, 1955 - Reported night firing (2200 to 0200 hrs) by T-54 tanks. Box-like devices 20x24x6 inches were hanging at the rear of turrets.
- c. GRIEBEN - July, 1955 - Reported night firing by JS-2 tanks on unlighted targets.
- d. Associated Press - August, 1955 - Bonn security officials reported as saying, "Soviet tanks in East Germany are being equipped with infra red sights which allow faultless target shooting at night."
- e. September, 1955 - Source reports T-54 tanks fitted with infra red sighting device.

COMMENT: In view of the recognized Soviet capability of producing infra red equipment, these reports are strong evidence that such equipments are actually in use in the Soviet Army in East Germany.

The use of infra red equipment would greatly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of armour in night operations.

#### 4. Gun Stabilization on T-54 Medium Tank

(SECRET)

A T-54 Medium Tank was observed firing both its main and secondary armaments while on the move at Wittstock in East Germany.

The observers were impressed with the performance and steadiness of the weapons firing while the tank was moving cross country at an approximate speed of 15 mph.

COMMENT: This incident tends to confirm reports from other sources that the T-54 is fitted with turret stabilization gear.

The presence of turret stabilization would represent an increase in the capabilities of the new Soviet medium tank and in the effectiveness of its 100 mm main armament.

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WESTERN EUROPE

5. West German Air Force -  
United States Assistance

(SECRET)

"The Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement has been signed and is expected to be ratified by the Bundestag this year. In anticipation of that event a tentative training assistance plan is being developed by the United States pursuant to which 80% of the West German Air Force pilot requirements and 95% of German Air Force technical training requirements can be fulfilled by utilization of training facilities at United States bases in the Federal Republic. It is contemplated that the fields at Furstenfeldbruck, Landsberg, and Kaufbeuren would meet the requirement. Logistic support would be provided by the base at Erding."

The full airforce training program may be completed within three to five years. On the 16th September the commander of the United States Advanced Planning Group, Bonn, stated that the United States would be willing to hand over, "lock stock and barrel" the above four bases to the West German Air Force provided satisfactory negotiations could be completed.

COMMENT: The planned build up of the West German Air Force calls for an operational strength of 1326 aircraft made up of 4 Fighter Groups, 3 All Weather Fighter Groups, 8 Fighter Bomber Groups, 3 Recce Groups and 2 Transport Groups. The total personnel strength is to be 80,000 with approximately 20,000 civilians in the supply and maintenance units.

It is estimated that the Germans will require 54 operational airfields, 3 flying schools, 2 technical schools and 4 air depots. The German Government has accepted the recommendation of AIRCENT and will house each flying squadron on a separate airfield as defense against nuclear warfare.

Both the procurement of aircraft and the training of personnel will of necessity be dependent on foreign assistance. The provision of aircraft through NATO allocation of F84's and F86's has already been discussed. The above report is, however, the first firm indication of the proposed training scheme that is scheduled to formulate a front line German Air Force by 1960.

6. Soviet Arms and Equipment for Austria

(SECRET)

An official of the National Defence Department of Austria, informed a Western official in Salzburg that arrangements have been made to obtain the following equipment from the Soviet Union:

10,000 carbines  
10,000 machine pistols  
4 batteries of German and Soviet  
76-mm howitzers  
28 T-34 tanks  
8 propeller-type training aircraft.

The equipment was not further identified.

According to a press despatch dated the 3rd October, 1955, an eight-man Austrian delegation left Vienna on 2nd October, 1955 for Szombathely, a Hungarian frontier town, to receive the arms and equipment.

It is also reported that an Austrian official had previously mentioned to a Soviet official that his government would receive military assistance from the United States and France, and suggested that the Soviet Union also supply military equipment for Austria's post-war army. No request for a training mission was made and none was offered.

The Austrian Government's request for Soviet arms and equipment can be interpreted as a precautionary measure, to avoid Russian accusations that Austria is accepting armament only from the West, thereby not adhering to her avowed policy of neutrality.

#### 7. Air Developments in Greece

(CONFIDENTIAL)

All three Sabre squadrons of the Greek Air Force will be based at Elevisis (AKR ELEVIS) during October 1955. Four NATO airfields are being constructed in Greece. These are:

- A. Tanagra - Future home base for 341st Sabre Squadron; this base will be available in December, 1955; it is 13 miles east of Thebes at (23:15E - 39:25N).
- B. Mikra - Future home base planned for 342nd Sabre Squadron; this base will be available for use in December, 1956; the base is 5 miles south of Salonica (22:50E - 40:45N).
- C. Preveze - Future use unknown; this base will be available after December, 1956; location is at (20:25E - 39:20N) the Amurakikos bay on the Ionian sea.
- D. Andravidha Base for planned gunnery range operations in Peloponnesus. This base may be available after December, 1956; the base will be at (21:15E - 37:50N); planned position of the gunnery range is unknown at the present.

COMMENT: The current tension in Cyprus may have thrown the above scheduled airbase construction program out of gear. This, of course, would keep the Greek Air Force fighter strength centralized at Elefsis without bases to which to deploy in event of air attack in that area.

## AFRICA

### 8. Ethiopian Army - Rotation of Troops from Korea (SECRET)

The 4th Battalion of the Ethiopian Imperial Bodyguard arrived back in Addis Ababa from Korea on 7th August, 1955, having been relieved by one company of the 5th Battalion of the Bodyguard which left Ethiopia in June, 1955.

COMMENT: The 4th Battalion of the Bodyguard left Ethiopia to relieve the 3rd Battalion on 8th June, 1954. Since Ethiopia's offer to UN in December, 1951 to send a contingent for use in Korea, the strength of the Ethiopian force has been kept constant at about 1,200. All reinforcements have been drawn from the Imperial Bodyguard and the total number of troops to have served in Korea to date is approximately 4,800. The strength of the relief company mentioned above is 250.

The Imperial Bodyguard of some 5,500 all ranks has recently been made an integral part of the Ethiopian Army. Despite its experience, better pay, and conditions of service, it is feared that the Bodyguard may before long go to "seed" and become indistinguishable from the inefficient regular army.

## SOUTHEAST ASIA

### 9. Food Shortage in Laos (CONFIDENTIAL)

Evidence is accumulating from reliable sources that the food situation in Laos has deteriorated considerably in recent months. A grave shortage of rice, the staple food, exists over almost the whole country, with famine conditions prevailing in the northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, and in parts of the southern provinces of Saravane and Attopeu.

Even in the Mekong basin, where rice is usually plentiful, the local inhabitants are reportedly beginning to move into the towns in search of food, though with little success.

These shortages are the result of two years of drought, which have seriously reduced crop output, especially of rice. Local food reserves, which are difficult to accumulate at any time in a subsistence economy, are believed to be negligible, while shortage of funds and other commercial difficulties have apparently restricted purchases from Thailand, the normal source of rice imports. The signing of a customs agreement between Laos and Thailand on 8th July this year, may ease some of these difficulties.

COMMENT: The United States is doing what it can to organize relief supplies, and small quantities of rice have already been brought from Bangkok to Vientiane for distribution: over one thousand tons of rice has been dropped by parachute into these areas by the United States. These shipments, however, will provide only limited assistance, particularly since road transport to the more inaccessible districts is difficult in the current rainy season, which will last until the end of October, and many of the famine areas are virtually without communications. No large-scale relief can therefore be expected until the harvesting of the crop in September-October, and increasing hardship and famine seem inevitable.

#### 10. Internal Security in South Vietnam

(SECRET)

HQ Vietnamese National Army have announced that, following on the calling off of operations in the South West, Ba Cut's main forces have once again occupied their former areas and are in the process of reforming. Their fighting strength is estimated to be about 4,000. In addition, the forces of Tran Van Soai (the other principal Hoa Hao leader) are estimated at 7,000 and are also reported to be reforming on the South edge of the Plain of Junks and in the ricefields between the Mekong and Bassac Rivers. Ba Cut is alleged to be receiving the support of the Viet Minh in the Camau Peninsula and possibly to have effected a liaison with the Cao Dai through the Plain of Junks area.

COMMENT: The Vietnamese National Army forces involved in the original attempt to clear South and South-West Vietnam involving some 30 regular infantry battalions have been broken up and the units dispersed for training. It is now to be hoped that the Hoa Hao do not undertake any large scale operations whilst this training is being carried out, as reports indicate that the remaining static posts in the area are in fact now isolated garrisons and Government control is no more than that once exercised by the French over the Hanoi-Haiphong perimeter before the Cease Fire. The position has deteriorated since May, 1955,

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(unless otherwise classified)

when the Binh Xuyen were driven out of Saigon, and it appears that the South Vietnam Government may be forced to make a deal with the sects if the government forces are ever to establish conditions favourable to their regime.

FAR EAST

11. Chinese Nationalist Army

(SECRET)

The Chinese Nationalist Army is believed to have a strength of between 350,000 and 400,000, and to include the equivalent of some thirty infantry divisions and an armoured component of two divisions. In addition there are several independent regiments, an airborne force of some 1,000, and several "regiments" composed entirely of officers. The Marine Corps consists of one division and one independent brigade. Guerrilla units carried in the spring of 1955 at 17/18,000, are believed to be in the process of being absorbed into the regular forces.

Garrisons on the offshore islands are carried as consisting, on Quemoy of six infantry divisions and two tank battalions (60/70,000) and on the Matsu group of three regiments (10,000).

COMMENT: It is believed that through United States assistance in equipment and in training some portion of the Chinese Nationalist Army has reached a reasonable standard of efficiency, with a well trained nucleus of perhaps 60/70,000 including probably virtually all the marines and most of those recruited locally in Formosa. For the most part, however, the Nationalists are an aging force with uncertain motivation.

12. Philippines - Huk Situation

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Insurgent Huk influence in the Philippines is reported to be decreasing owing to continued pressure by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in cooperation with the civil authorities. The heaviest Huk concentrations are now in the south central and southeastern parts Luzon where Huks continue capable of sporadic raids and ambushes conducted by small armed groups. On the remaining islands the Huk are considered to have no military capabilities.

Kidnapping by the Huks for ransom has become more frequent in remote areas indicating their acute need for money and supplies. However, Huk emphasis is continuing to shift from open violence to the probing for

vulnerabilities in the Magsaysay administration and the exploitation of the growing Philippine spirit of nationalism.

COMMENT: The Magsaysay administration has continued the land resettlement program initiated when Magsaysay was Minister of Defence. This program, which has done much to wean away luke-warm Huk adherents, has been supplemented by an amnesty extended to insurgents not guilty of specific crimes. Meanwhile, there has been an increased capability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to protect those among the population whom the Huks had terrorized into providing supplies and support. Other reasons for the decline in Huk military activity may be found in action taken by the insurgents themselves to play down overt insurrection and to concentrate on the penetration of labour groups and other quasi-legal dissidence. This change of emphasis may be compared to a similar trend among the insurgents in Malaya and, while both instances reflect increased efficiency in anti-bandit measures by government forces, both also reflect a possible common policy among the insurgents. In both areas the insurgents are linked to international Communism and to Chinese expansion (in Malaya almost 100%).

Though there has been a considerable reduction in the numbers of hard-core Huks and though some of the leaders have been captured or killed many of the major personalities are still at large.

### 13. Philippines - Moro Banditry

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Hadji Kamlon, dissident, leader of approximately 1,000 Moro outlaws, is reported to have surrendered unconditionally to Philippine military authorities. Units of The Armed Forces of the Philippines have been engaged for the past two years in hunting Kamlon and their failure up until now has provided political ammunition for opposition to the Magsaysay government. Kamlon has surrendered twice since 1948 and both times was released on parole. Each time he has broken his parole and resume his outlaw activities.

COMMENT: More than 1,000,000 followers of the Moslem faith are concentrated on Mindanao (largest of the islands of the Philippines) and the Philippine Government's reported indifference and neglect of this minority may have been used by Kamlon to justify his parole breaking and outlawry.

If the Armed Forces of the Philippines are successful in stamping out Moro dissidence it would release for use in the Anti-Huk campaign Armed Forces of the Philippines and constabulary units until now required in the Moro operation.

Kamlon's past record of parole - breaking and the history of Moro banditry do not however lead to the conclusion that Moro dissidence will be permanently eradicated. Moro banditry has been traditionally a way of life in the Southern Philippines since early times and up until the present day had little other than purely local political significance. The present danger is that Moro dissidence, in reflecting alleged suppression of a minority within a democracy, is particularly suited to Communist exploitation and, thus could provide a militant link between the Moros and the Huks.

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# JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. Underwater Nuclear Explosion in the Soviet Union (SECRET)

On 21 September at 0500Z the Soviet Union detonated and underwater nuclear device in the Novaya Zemlya area. The energy of the explosion was of the order of 20 kilotons.

COMMENT: The point of explosion (72N, 51E) is in the Arctic Ocean in the Barents Sea, Kara Sea area some 600 miles NE of Murmansk. This location fulfils many of the requirements for a suitable test area. It is relatively free of built up areas, is well removed from areas where the West could obtain direct intelligence and is adequately served for communications and supplies.

That this was an underwater burst (shallow) is deduced from the fact that seismic and acoustic signals were of approximately equal strength. A high air burst gives a low seismic reading while a deep underwater burst gives a low acoustic reading.

Soviet interest in an underwater burst is logical at this point of their test program from both defensive and offensive points of view. Their relatively few deep water ports could be exposed to underwater atomic attack and both the United Kingdom and United States are similarly vulnerable.

The airborne cloud of fission products is not expected to be large and a Canadian intercept may be difficult. Present meteorological conditions however will cause the cloud to move relatively quickly and it may reach the Canadian area by the end of this week.

2. Transfer of Units of the Soviet Navy (SECRET)

Various sighting reports have confirmed the transfer of a number of naval units to the Pacific Fleet. The units involved are believed to be as follows:

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Two Sverdlov class cruisers.  
Twelve Fleet destroyers.  
Twelve Long Range new construction submarines  
comprising six "W" class and six "Z" class submarines.  
Twelve Kronstadt class destroyer escorts.  
One submarine tender.

It is possible that a number of landing craft were included in the transfer, though they do not appear to have been sighted in the Pacific.

The naval convoy departed Murmansk early in July and may be presumed to have reached Vladivostok early in September; the passage of the Northern Sea Route and the Bering Sea thus required almost exactly two months.

COMMENT: The Pacific Fleet has been very considerably strengthened by this transfer. Cruiser strength has been doubled; two modern Sverdlovs have been added to the two older Kirovs already in the Pacific.

The effectiveness of the thirty-four destroyers of varying ages already in the Far East has been considerably enhanced by the addition of twelve new destroyers.

No Kronstadts have previously been assigned to the Pacific whose escort force has hitherto consisted of nine Rigas and half a dozen older units.

The transfer has almost doubled the Pacific Fleet's new construction, long range submarine strength; where formerly there were three "Z"'s and ten "W"'s there are now nine "Z"'s and sixteen "W"'s.

3. Possible Shuffle of Senior  
Soviet Naval Officers

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Admiral Sergei Georgevich Gorshkov has been transferred from Commander-in-Chief Black Sea Fleet to Naval Headquarters in Moscow. It is believed that he has been appointed First Deputy Commander-in-Chief Naval Forces, the no. 2 position in the Soviet Navy. This position has been occupied by Admiral Nikolai Efremovich Basistiy.

COMMENT: Both men have been associated with the Black Sea area throughout their naval careers. Both are "genuine" naval officers with a long record of sea and administrative appointments. They have each received their full quota of honours, awards and publicity. Election to the Supreme Soviet indicates their political respectability.

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(unless otherwise classified)

Admiral Basistiy's future is not yet known. He still appears among the top three of the Soviet Navy.

No special significance can yet be attached to this move.

4. Exchange of Naval Visits between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union

(UNCLASSIFIED)

The British Naval Attache has reported that units of the British Fleet under the command of the Admiral of the Home Fleet would visit Leningrad about 15 October. Depending on the information which the British naval authorities are able to obtain on the depth of the river Neva, an aircraft carrier may be included in the British squadron. The British Naval Attache said that the Royal Navy would put on its best show and would bring with them a large number of brass bands.

The British Naval Attache also mentioned that a Soviet naval squadron, under the command of an Admiral of the Baltic Fleet, would pay a visit to London, probably also about 15 October, although this date is not yet definite.

COMMENT: This will be the second exchange of naval visits between the United Kingdom and a red bloc country this year. Early in July HMS Glasgow, a cruiser, paid a four day visit to Poland. She was the first RN warship to call at a Polish port since before the war. The visit was made on the initiative of the United Kingdom, but it is obvious that the Polish government was in full accord with the plan for an exchange of visits. In September the Polish destroyers Blyskawica and Burza called at Portsmouth for a visit of several days. The selection of these vessels was most apt since both served with the RN throughout the war. The impending exchange of visits with the Soviet Union continues the policy of encouraging the growing cordiality between east and west.

5. Soviet Relations with Scandinavia

(SECRET)

The Finnish President and Prime Minister have recently concluded an official visit to Moscow, and numerous press reports have discussed the negotiations which were conducted on the revision of the mutual defence alliance between the two countries, as well as the return to the Finns of Porkkala, a naval base leased in 1947 for fifty years.

The visit is one of three by heads of Northern European countries. The Norwegian Prime Minister intends to visit Moscow later this year, while the Swedish Prime Minister will be in Moscow in the spring.

The Norwegian public and press have generally welcomed the news of their Prime Minister's visit, interpreting it as a result of the lessening of tension between East and West. The non-political nature of the trip has been emphasized, and hope expressed that Norwegian prisoners still in Russian hands would be allowed to return home.

Rumours have been circulating that the Soviet Union would sound out their visitors' feelings as to substituting an independent Scandinavian Pact for NATO. Our Ambassador in Oslo reports, however, that almost all Norwegians have expressed their complete satisfaction with NATO and would not consider any Russian proposal for a neutral Scandinavia.

6. Soviet Scientific Conference on Automation (CONFIDENTIAL)

Apart from the claim to an automatic factory which takes in metal billets and puts out completed pistons, until last year little definite information has been available on automation in the Soviet Union. A conference sponsored by the Institute of Automatics and Telemechanics has now been held in collaboration with the Ministry of Consumer Goods Production. Another has been held by the Institute of Machine Construction, an affiliate of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The fundamental requirements for conversion to automatic factories have been indicated, applying the results already achieved. The scientific side recognizes the growing demand for automation, but considers that many difficulties in advanced theory of automatic machines still await solutions. Improvement in quality control, speed of operation, and general efficiency are considered to be the main advantages.

COMMENT: Automation can be conveniently divided into 3 kinds:

a) The automatic control of continuous flow processes, as in chemical and oil refining operations, has been improved over the past many years and is in general use both in the Soviet Union and Western countries. The electro-mechanical sensing devices and controls used have become standard items.

b) The mechanized assembly line using human operators to assemble the product of punch presses and lathes has been continuously developed over the past fifty years in the Western world and the past twenty-five years in the Soviet Union. Here Western countries have on the whole provided the model for Soviet advances. Recently, electronic controls using both paper tape and magnetic tape have become commercially available in the United States for the automatic operation of metal forming and cutting tools which supply finished pieces to the assembly line. These have not yet been reported in the Soviet Union.

c) The automatic factory is the third division. Special product design, high investment for tooling up, and quantity runs are features of this method. A home broadcast receiver was produced in Great Britain in 1946 in this way, but was not a commercial success. More recently in the United States, military electronics circuits have been designed by the National Bureau of Standards (project Tinker-Toy) for automatic production. The tools and methods are being stock-piled for use in case of war.

Successful Soviet construction of complicated auto-tracking radars, and possibly guided missiles, shows a practical mastery of fine automatic controls (servo-mechanisms).

The large number of trained engineers now becoming available in the Soviet Union would be required for carrying out the high level plan that have been reported for automatization of Soviet industry. Some of the difficulties of introducing automation may be solved with advantage by long-term overall planning. At the present time, one of the most crucial questions is the determination of a point in each industrial situation where automation becomes economical.

7. Soviet Interest in International Geophysics Year

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The Soviets have decided to take an active part in the International Geophysical Year. At a recent meeting held in Brussels the Soviets were represented by a sixteen member delegation who claimed that they did not have much to learn from the West about the Arctic since they were the experts. Nevertheless, they asked that they receive all relevant data obtained by the West.

The Soviets also propose to send a sizable expedition to the Antarctic. This has been much publicized, and the three stations they propose to open will put their effort in the same class as the American expedition.

COMMENT: Soviet activity at the International Geophysical Year confirms that they regard Arctic problems as being of prime importance. Their claim that they know more about the North than anybody else is likely right. Not only do they carry out a very large volume of work in the Arctic, and have 1,000 men at the Arctic Institute in Leningrad, but they also receive most of the results of Western work without releasing too much detail concerning theirs.

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8. Soviet Production of Nylon

(RESTRICTED)

Recently published Soviet scientific papers deal with the chemistry of caprolactam. This compound is an important intermediate in the production of perlon, the German equivalent to nylon. Together with certain other indications, this would point to Soviet plans to initiate production of nylon by the German method; such a step would be consonant with Soviet practice.

COMMENT: It has long been felt that the Soviet have a requirement for nylon, both for industrial application and military equipment, particularly for Arctic warfare, body armour, and similar items.

9. Electrification and Dieselization  
on the Soviet Railways

(SECRET)

Although steam will long remain the most important source of tractive power on the Soviet railways, considerable progress has been made in the electrification and dieselization of Soviet railways.

Although electrification began in the 1920's, by 1945, only 1,270 miles of electrified line were in operation. In the post-war period, 3,300 miles were to be converted. Although the actual achievement falls short of intentions, recent reports claim that about 2,600 miles of electrified line are now in operation. The most important project already finished is probably the 390 mile sector of the Trans-Siberian Railway between Novosibirsk and Omsk, which supports an extremely heavy traffic, and the most important area of future conversion will be the lines between this sector and the Volga.

Dieselization began much later, and has been introduced principally in the semi-arid trans-Volga and Central Asian regions, where watering difficulties are encountered. It is claimed that about 10% of total traffic is now handled by diesel or electric traction.

COMMENT: It is probable that electrification and dieselization will continue and possibly at a faster pace, as more hydro-electric power becomes available, and if the output of locomotives can be greatly increased as planned.

Electrification and dieselization will increase the capacities of the railways, but will also increase their vulnerability to attack. Large areas of electrified line can be immobilized by the destruction of the sources of power, and the flexibility of the relevant locomotive park will be reduced, and it is probable that sources of oil can be more easily destroyed than can sources of coal.

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(unless otherwise classified)

10. East Germany - Airfield Developments

(SECRET)

The current airfield development activities in Eastern Germany consist of:

- (a) The construction of four major airfields:
  - (i) Allstedt (51°23'N-11°27'E) with a projected 7,200 ft long runway,
  - (ii) Dresden/Klotsche (51°08'N-13°46'E) which appears to represent the site of the future East German Aircraft Industry centre,
  - (iii) Haina (50°59'N-10°29'E) which will have a 7,500 ft long runway,
  - (iv) Schlotheim (51°17'N-10°37'E) which is likely to be equipped with a long runway;
  
- (b) The improvement of three existing major airfields:
  - (i) Alt-Lonnewitz (51°33'N-13°13'E) which is having its 6,700 ft long runway resurfaced.
  - (ii) Grossenhain (51°19'N-13°33'E) where the existing paved runway is being extended from 5,900 ft to 7,600 ft and widened to approximately 600 ft.
  - (iii) Garz (53°53'N-14°09'N) which is undergoing a general improvement;
  
- (c) Plans to re-activate and possibly improve at least eleven former landing grounds.

Eastern Germany has already 32 major modern airfields, which is considerably more than is required by the Soviet Air Forces units currently based in the area.

The purpose of the renewed airfield construction and development efforts in Eastern Germany is not clear, but it could be motivated by the desire to:

- (a) Further strengthen the air defence of the western approaches to the Soviet Union proper;
- (b) Improve the air offensive capabilities against Western Europe;
- (c) Provide future East German Air Force with suitable air bases.

Whatever the reasons for the above outlined airfield development effort may be, they are not indicative of an early Soviet withdrawal from the East German area.

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*Miss Gullen*

**SECRET**

**COPY N° 98**

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23 September 1955.

# JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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Ottawa

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## SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

### 1. Soviet Chemical Materiel

(SECRET)

During a visit to the Soviet Advanced Infantry School the US Military Attache Moscow obtained the following information on a respirator and three flame throwers on which we hold no other information:

- a. Respirator - with cannister attached to facepiece.
- b. Flamethrower "A" was said to be for anti-personnel and anti tank use with a range up to 150 meters. The equipment had one cylinder about 9 inches in diameter and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  feet long and was mounted on a four wheel carriage. Fuel was said to be gas kerosene.
- c. Flamethrower "B" was specifically described as an anti tank weapon. It consisted of three cylinders (said to be the same as the single cylinder of type "A") mounted on a four wheeled carriage designed for conversion to skis. There were three barrels mounted to form a triangle. Range was said to be the same as type "A". A nameplate bore the designation "MO-22".
- d. Flamethrower "C" was not observed but a handbook on the operation of the flamethrower MFO-50 was noted.

COMMENT: The respirator is probably the new service respirator we have been expecting to see.

The two flamethrowers described are completely new to us. Presumably the MFO-50 is a third model also previously unknown.

This report confirms previous information that the Soviet has developed a new family of flamethrowers. It is probable that these new weapons will be issued to Soviet troops in the near future.

### 2. New Soviet Pistol

(SECRET)

During a visit to the Soviet Advanced Infantry School at Solnechnogorsk, new Soviet small arms were demonstrated for the US Military Attache. These included the previously reported SKS semi-automatic rifle, the AK submachine gun, and the RPL light machine gun. Also demonstrated was a new pistol, known as the "Stechkin". Calibre was stated to be 9mm

and the acquisition of a spent case confirms this. The pistol is capable of single shot or full automatic and is fed by a 20 round clip. The wooden carrying case can be attached as a butt. The military attache was allowed to fire five rounds from the weapon reporting it to be slightly larger but also lighter than the US .45 calibre, sitting well in the hand with less jump than the .45.

COMMENT: There have been numerous reports of a pistol carried in a wooden holster but this is the first time that it has been actually seen and handled. Previous reports indicated its calibre to be 7.62 mm, firing the new short rifle round. Examination of the spent case revealed the ammunition to be 9 mm rimless, not interchangeable with standard 9mm parabellum.

### 3. Release of Rocket Guidance Information to Soviet Radio Clubs

(UNCLASSIFIED) A 3½ page article in the August issue of the Soviet radio magazine "RADIO" gives the overall technical characteristics of several guidance and control systems. Emphasis is on ground to air anti-aircraft rockets carrying active radar homing heads, and ballistic rockets with accurate launching beam guidance. The effect of jamming of control signals is mentioned. The possibility of missiles homing on radar stations and airfield flying control towers is included. The introduction discusses instrumentation of artificial unmanned satellites, for the moon as well as the earth.

(CONFIDENTIAL) COMMENT: About 1950 this magazine carried the first Soviet popular technical information on radio location apparatus. Both the conical scan system which is used in the Soviet "Whiff" anti-aircraft fire control radar, and the V-beam height finding principal which is used on the widely installed "TOKEN" radars were included. At that time the rapid expansion of Soviet radar defences was creating a heavy demand for technicians. Many of those on duty today in the extensive radar deployment of the USSR must have had their introduction to radar in the DCSAAF radio clubs reached by "RADIO".

Assuming that the above release of radar information was for the purpose of stimulating interest and giving basic principles to the cadres of your enthusiasts who later were to fill a necessary role in servicing complex equipment in the armed services, similarly it could be deduced that the requirement for missile guidance technicians is growing in the USSR. Assuming development follows the time scale of the radar program, by 1958 a considerable number of new specialists will have reached competent trades qualifications, and by 1960 a large number of trained young men can be available.

#### 4. Return of Porkkala to Finland

(UNCLASSIFIED) Russia announced on 17 September that she planned to liquidate her naval base at Porkkala. It was stated that the withdrawal of Soviet forces would begin immediately.

(CONFIDENTIAL) COMMENT: Porkkala is situated about 25 miles west of Helsinki on the north shore of the Gulf of Finland. Article 4 of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of 1944 granted Russia a 50 year lease of the town and surrounding territory (an area approximately 20 miles across and 10 miles deep) and allowed her unimpeded access thereto. In succeeding years Porkkala was developed as a minor Soviet naval base. However, naval installations are not believed to be extensive and little naval activity, other than minesweeping, has emanated from this port. A small number of naval MIG-15's are based at Porkkala. However, excessive Soviet security arrangements have prevented the acquisition of much firm intelligence.

It was also during World War II that Russia acquired control of the Baltic states and in succeeding years developed Tallin as the headquarters of the Soviet North Baltic Fleet and a major naval base. Tallin is situated about 40 miles across the Gulf of Finland from Porkkala, and within Soviet territory. From a logistic point of view Tallin is thus a much more useful base for Russian naval operations in this area. It is therefore not surprising that little effort has been made to develop Porkkala. The return of this territory to Finland would constitute little or no strategic loss to Russia.

On the other hand, the reacquisition by Finland of Porkkala would be of considerable importance to her national self-respect. The Finns have already observed the current Russian policy of withdrawing troops from foreign bases and have expressed the hope that Porkkala also would be evacuated. Such an event is in line with Russia's present policy of amiability and can reasonably be expected.

#### 5. Soviet Ice-Breaker Reaches Furthest North Postion

(CONFIDENTIAL)

On 12 September the Soviet ice-breaker "Fedor Litke" on a voyage in Arctic waters reached position 83°11'N, 49°3'E, the furthest point north ever reached by a sea-going vessel under its own power. The "Fedor Litke" is carrying a high-latitude sea expedition of the Arctic Research Institute of the Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route (GUSMP)

COMMENT: Soon after its establishment, the GUSMP on several occasions endeavoured to penetrate the Northern reaches of Soviet eastern Arctic coastal seas in ice-breakers during the summer. None of these are known to have reached North of about 80° except in the region of Zemlya Frontsa Iosifa. No Soviet vessel is known to have navigated beyond the southern coasts of this archipelago.

(unless otherwise classified)

In the late thirties, consideration was given to the development of a shipping lane around the northern extremities of the Soviet Arctic archipelagoes, but, although a few vessels have navigated around the north of Novaya Zemlya, and have reached northerly points in Severnaya Zemlya, nothing further is known to have been done in this connection since 1945. In this instance, the "Fedor Litke" appears to be engaged on scientific research rather than on the exploration of a new route.

It is possible that the achievement of the "Fedor Litke" can be attributed in part to a gradual recession of the ice pack, as well as to superior knowledge of ice navigation in these waters.

6. Return to the Homeland Movement

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Several of the Iron Curtain countries have been attempting to persuade former citizens living abroad to return home. There have been several references to this campaign in Canadian newspapers, based on announcements made by the Czech and Polish Legations in Ottawa on statements made by people in Canada who have been approached. There has also been some correspondence directed to the Department of External Affairs on this subject. A watch is being kept lest attempts are made to exert improper pressure on Canadian citizens or on Canadian residents of East European origin. In a preliminary report on the Czechoslovak campaign to persuade people to return to take advantage of an amnesty, our Charge d'Affaires in Prague estimates that it is doubtful that fifty people have been persuaded to return to Czechoslovakia. Those returning have emphasized the "appalling conditions" which they found in the Western world, but our Charge d'Affaires doubts whether their statements have had much effect on the population of Czechoslovakia.

In line with this development is the announcement by the Soviet Union that an amnesty has been granted to all Soviet citizens who collaborated with the Germans during the war. The announcement encourages all such Soviet citizens now living abroad to return to their homeland where jobs will be furnished.

7. German-Soviet Talks

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The German-Soviet talks in Moscow ended on September 13 with an agreement to obtain the approval of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and of the Federal Republic Cabinet and Bundestag to the exchange of Ambassadors between the Federal Republic and the USSR. In agreeing to the establishment of diplomatic relations Chancellor Adenauer made it clear that the Federal Republic considered that the final German frontier remained to be settled by a peace treaty and that the Federal Republic did not recognize the German Democratic Republic.

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(unless otherwise classified)

The Soviet Union agreed to release the German prisoners of war still held by it but no mention was made in the final joint communique of the way in which this release would come about. Chancellor Adenauer referred earlier in the negotiations to 100,000 Germans missing in the USSR but the Soviet figure of between 9,000 and 10,000 may in fact be more accurate, since most of the "100,000" missing may be presumed dead. Premier Bulganin asked the Federal Republic to facilitate the return to the USSR of Soviet citizens still living in the Republic.

Chancellor Adenauer seems to have struck the best possible bargain from the German and Allied point of view that he could expect to make in the circumstances. The joint communique referred to the establishment of relations as helping "the solution of the principal national problem of the German people - the re-establishment of the unity of the German Democratic State," but in fact actual negotiations on reunification have been left to the Four Powers, and the Western position on how it should come about does not appear to have been compromised. Consideration is being given to sending a Canadian message to Chancellor Adenauer congratulating him on winning Soviet recognition for his Government and a promise of the return of German prisoners held by the USSR.

#### 8. Yugoslav-Soviet Economic Relations

(SECRET)

On 30 July 1955 the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia signed a complementary goods list, supplementary to the trade agreement of January 1955. The new list provides for an increase of \$12 million from the \$20 million of the January agreement. Yugoslavia will export caustic soda, calcium carbide, bauxite, hemp and meat, while the Soviet Union will export petroleum, cotton, paper, anthracite, synthetic rubber, tin and nickel.

It was simultaneously announced that the Soviet Union had cancelled a Yugoslav debt of \$90 million as recompense for the trade losses suffered through the break with the Cominform in 1948. The debts were incurred for goods exported to Yugoslavia before the break, and the subsequent cessation of all trade relations with the Soviet Union and the East European Satellites.

More recently, it has been announced that in January 1956 the Soviet Union will conclude three types of credit arrangements with Yugoslavia. The first, a straight credit agreement valued at \$54 million is to be used for the Yugoslav purchase of raw materials. The second, an undisclosed sum for financing investments is to be used for the construction of a nitrogen fertilizer and superphosphate plant, a sulphuric acid factory and the reconstruction of three small mines. The third, a currency or gold loan of \$30 million to the Yugoslav National Bank is to be used for short-term projects, i.e. to cope with any imbalance in trade. All three credits are to be used in the next three years.

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The Soviet Union has also made an offer to supply Yugoslavia with an atomic reactor and a cyclotron, but no agreement has been reached yet.

COMMENT: Although accompanied by a considerable propaganda effort, the scope of these agreements does not begin to approach the 1948 position, when almost 50 per cent of Yugoslav trade was with the USSR. It seems unlikely that the Yugoslavs will allow themselves to be placed in such a vulnerable position again in the foreseeable future.

The Soviet credit arrangements of some \$84 million are small when compared to the economic aid of \$1,400 million which Yugoslavia has received from the West since 1950. It seems likely that Yugoslavia will continue to rely on the West for most of its manufactured products.

The adequacy of the currency loan is debatable when linked with the balance of trade payments. Returns for 1954 show Yugoslav exports totalling \$232 million and imports \$333 million. A loan of \$30 million provides only a partial solution.

#### SOUTHEAST ASIA

##### 9. Threat of Famine in North Vietnam

(SECRET)

The Vietminh Flood Control Committee has issued an alert for flood danger in the Red River area. Should floods be serious and the harvest fail, this would be the fourth consecutive crop failure, and would undoubtedly result in serious famine and economic dislocation in North Vietnam.

COMMENT: Rice is the staple food of North Vietnam, but as the DR Government publish no official statistics, it is difficult to determine exactly what the rice position is at present. However, various estimates suggest that rice production in North Vietnam will amount to only some 1.2 million tons, compared to normal (1944-45) production of 2 million tons. For the year 1955-56, minimum rice requirements for North Vietnam at a bare subsistence level are estimated to be 1.4 million tons as opposed to a normal requirement of 2.6 million tons.

The DR Government has been and is making considerable efforts to increase the agricultural production of North Vietnam, through agrarian reform projects aiming at the extension of the land cultivated, and the re-building of irrigation canals and dikes to prevent floods. However, these efforts have to some extent been cancelled out by the increase in the population of the North.

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(unless otherwise classified)

Trade relations with South Vietnam (formerly the major supplier of rice to the North) have been completely interrupted, with the result that the DR has had to find other sources from which to acquire urgently needed rice imports. So far this year, the DR has announced the following shipments, all describes as "gifts to the people of Vietnam": 10,000 tons of rice from China; 10,000 tons from Poland; 20,000 tons from the Soviet Union (but coming partly from Burma); and 500 tons from Outer Mongolia. It is not yet clear what percentage of these shipments has arrived to date. The above imports would meet only the most immediate needs of the Democratic Republic, as minimum rice import requirements for 1955-56 have been estimated at 200,000 tons. Communist China, the logical supply source of rice for North Vietnam (while South Vietnam is closed) is now also experiencing difficulties with its rice crops, which may reduce the importance of this potential source of imports.

#### FAR EAST

##### 10. China-Coastal Islands Area

(SECRET)

During the past four months two Chinese Communist anti-aircraft divisions (each with a strength of 3,400) have moved from Korea into the area of the provinces of Chekiang and Fukien, opposite Formosa.

Also during the past four months, four Railway Engineer divisions (each with a strength of 8,000) have arrived in the same area from unknown locations. These formations are probably engaged on the construction of the railway from Kweichow to Amoy.

COMMENT: With the addition of the formations mentioned in the report, the major Chinese Communist formations opposite Formosa and the coastal islands are as follows:

- two Army Group headquarters
- five armies (each of three infantry divisions)
- one independent infantry division
- two anti-aircraft artillery divisions
- four railroad construction divisions
- one field engineer division
- four Public Security divisions.

Total ground force strength in the area is held at some 325,000, of which about 160,000 are stationed in the area immediately opposite Formosa.

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(unless otherwise classified)

There is no ground-force evidence of offensive intention with regard to Formosa. The Chinese Communists however, are virtually certain to plan an offensive-defence of their sensitive interior, notably of the Wuhan area, at least while international tension requires the presence of the US 7th Fleet near the China coast.

The Chinese Nationalists continue to file claims of the bombardment of Quemoy by Communist shore batteries, including a recent report that 200 rounds were received in one day (4 Sep 55). Though such claims are consistently exaggerated, there is reason to believe that some firing, presumably for local training, takes place. Now that the Korean Incident has simmered down, the threat of Western aggression via the so-called renegade Nationalists provides a useful spur to the Chinese nation-wide defence effort.

#### 11. Japan - Defence Planning

(SECRET)

A six-year defence build-up programme advanced by the Japanese Defence Board calls for an increase in the Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) to a total 180,000 (present strength 130,000) within three years, conditional on the withdrawal of US Security Forces in Japan. In addition to the increase in GSDF it is planned that there will be 20,000 on the reserve list. In the Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF) the six-year goal is 180 vessels including 20 Destroyers; six Destroyer Escorts, 18 frigates, two submarines, 50 mine sweepers, 24 patrol ships, 50 landing ships and others. The number of aircraft assigned to the MSDF would be 180 including anti-submarine planes. MSDF personnel would be 33,000 (present strength 16,000).

For the Air Self Defence Force (ASDF) it is planned to increase the total number of aircraft to 1,284 including 525 F-86-F fighters and 150 F-86-D all weather fighters, 54 fighter - reconnaissance planes, 48 C-46 transports, 230 T-33 jet trainers and others. Personnel strength of the ASDF would be increased to 38,000 (present strength 6,000).

COMMENT: Several plans ranging from short-term (one to two years) to long term (six years) have been advanced during the past two years. The present plan differs from previous proposals in that its fulfilment is conditional upon the withdrawal of US forces from Japan and the relief of the Japanese economy of the expense of providing facilities for the US garrisons.

These proposals should find favours with popular opinion in Japan in swelling national pride and in meeting real or fancied grievances against foreign troops, although many Japanese realize that in its present state Japan cannot assume responsibility for its own defence.

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There has been no mention of Okinawa so it is presumed that US forces, if they were to leave Japan proper, would still retain substantial air and ground forces there. Publications of the plan as giving purpose to the Self Defence Forces should give a needed fillip to recruiting which up until now has been only sufficient to meet normal wastage, and the slight increases which have been authorized in the past three years.

12. Korea - Opposing Strengths

(SECRET)

Total Enemy Strengths in Korea as at 12 Sep 55 were carried at:

Total North Korean Army	326,000
Total Chinese Communists Forces	441,000
Total Soviet Union Technical Troops	1,300
Total North Korean Security Troops	15,500
	<hr/>
	783,800

United Nations Command Strengths in Korea as at 31 July 55 were:

US Forces	62,000
Republic of Korea (Tactical Forces)	324,000
Republic of Korea (attached to US Forces)	17,000
ROK Marine Corps Division	27,000
Commonwealth Division	2,000
Turkish Armed Forces Command	5,000
Thailand Infantry Company	250
Ethiopian Infantry Battalion	250
Greek Expeditionary Forces	150
French Detachment	35
UN Service Elements	3,000
	<hr/>
	440,685

ROK Corps and Army Service,  
 Administrative and Support Units

324,000

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764,685

COMMENT: An increase of some 9,000 in North Korean Army strength over that reported six weeks ago is mainly accounted for by the acceptance of a re-organization in four of the seven independent infantry brigades. On the United Nations side, US forces have been reduced by about 2,000 the Commonwealth Division by 1,500, the Ethiopian Infantry Battalion reduced from 1,000 to 250 and the Greek Expeditionary Forces from 850 to 150. The Republic of Korea Army has been increased by some 4,000 to an overall total of 692,000.

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(unless otherwise classified)

13. North Korean Army Re-organization

(SECRET)

A re-organization in four of the seven North Korean Army (NKA) independent infantry brigades has raised the strength of the formations affected from an estimated average of 4,500 per brigade to 7,000. The brigades (20, 21, 22 and 26) are now carried as composed of three infantry regiments, four artillery battalions, an engineer company, a signals company and a training company. In addition a Self-Propelled gun battalion and a tank company formerly subordinate to 26 NK Brigade have been withdrawn to the "Armoured Pool" GHQ NKA.

COMMENT: This re-organization in effect raises these brigades to the status of weak divisions. NKA infantry divisions, of which there are nineteen, are carried at an average strength of 9,000, and differ in organization from the newly accepted brigade structure principally in that the divisions contain anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and reconnaissance elements. To date these supporting arms have not been accepted in the brigades. If, as seems likely, all seven NKA infantry brigades adopt the new organization, the NKA will be in a position to increase at short notice its number of infantry divisions to twenty-six. The change in brigade structure increases the capabilities of the NKA for offensive as well as defensive action. The brigades now employed in a semi-static coastal defence role could be rapidly deployed as field formations. Overall strength of NKA as a result of this re-organization is increased from 317,000 to 326,000. The increase in North Korean military capabilities to conduct the defence of North Korea could justify the return of additional Chinese troops to China in the near future.

14. South Korea-Korean Civil Assistance Commands

(RESTRICTED)

According to an announcement by HQ Eighth US Army in Korea, the Korean Civil Assistance Command (KCAC) will terminate its field operations programme 30 Sep 55. UN technicians at present assigned to KCAC HQ will continue to assist and advise officials in the ROK Government Ministries. As from 1 Oct 55 Korean municipal and provincial authorities will assume the work of the KCAC field teams (distribution of supplies to civilians).

COMMENT: Each of the five KCAC regional teams to be deactivated includes military and civilian specialists in the fields of Agriculture, Public Health, Public Welfare, Sanitation and Public Safety. Their replacement by Korean authorities is indicative of further administrative retrenchments by the US in Korea.

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CORRECTION

Joint Intelligence Summary. Issue No. 173, dated 16 September 1955.

Page 3. Item 5. French Air Force Planning.

Para. 2, at beginning of third line:

Delete: by January 1956. Insert: by January 1957.

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**COPY N° 98**

Issue No. 173

16 September 1955.

# JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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## SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

### 1. Native Soviet Transistors

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The first Soviet release of information on native transistors was made in the June 1955 issue of Radio. Both point-contact types, which were the original invention and junction types, which are later developments giving more power output, are listed. This is the eleventh article on transistors to appear in this magazine, since the first one in 1952. Previous articles seemed based on Western literature, where transistors were first described in 1950.

COMMENT: The first transistor pocket radio went on sale in the United States in the summer of 1955. Western transistorized military radios are still under development. Difficulties in mass producing standard moisture and heat proof transistors are being overcome gradually after intensive effort.

The discovery of transistors reported by Bell Telephone laboratories was greeted without enthusiasm by the Soviet technical press, which claimed prior establishment of the principle by a Soviet scientist thirty years earlier. However, it seems likely that Soviet technicians were surprised by the development of working transistors, and have had difficulty in copying the production work which has been going ahead rapidly in the Western countries. Nevertheless, in other original semi-conductor work, good results have been achieved, such as the development of a device which produces electric current directly from heat and can supply power for a home broadcast receiver directly from a kerosene lamp.

### 2. Ore Carrier Under Construction in Soviet Union

(SECRET)

A Swedish source, reported in the French press, says that an ore carrier of 10,000 dead weight tons (the first of a new series) has been laid down in the Baltic Yard, Leningrad, and will be completed by the end of 1955.

COMMENT: The Soviet merchant fleet needs ore carriers. In the past year or so the Soviet Union has been exporting manganese ore at the rate of 300-400,000 tons a year. In addition, the East European satellites have been replacing some Swedish iron ore with ore from Brazil, India, and China. This trade has been carried on partly in Polish-built bottoms, but Soviet built ships would be a welcome addition to both the export and import trade in ore.

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The Baltic Yard has been building Sverdlov class cruisers, W Class submarines, and a large unidentified vessel. The Marti Yard, Leningrad, which also built Sverdlovs at one time, has been building 10,000-ton tankers in the past few years. Therefore it is not unlikely that the Baltic yard should start to build ore carriers.

3. Indication of Possible Occupation of Gross Dolln Airfield by Badger Medium Bombers. (SECRET)

It has been reported that the main taxiway at Gross Dolln Airfield (53 02N - 13 32E) in Eastern Germany is to be widened in the near future. The addition of a 22 foot wide strip on each side will bring the total width of the taxiway to approximately 110 feet.

In April 1955, on at least five occasions a swept wing aircraft, believed to be a Badger, circled over Gross Dolln and then flew off in an easterly direction.

COMMENT: Since April 1955, Gross Dolin has been occupied by a Beagle regiment. However, its unique runway, 11,500 ft long and 16 in. thick, and the elaborate system of taxiways and other installations are well in excess of the requirements of this type of aircraft.

The above evidence may reflect a Soviet intention to base Badger aircraft at Gross Dolln. However, such a move would be a departure from the normal Soviet practice of deploying strategic bomber aircraft in the rear areas of the Soviet Union.

4. East Germany-Possible Submarine Depot Ships for Soviet Union (SECRET)

In mid-1955 the Neptun Shipyard, Rostock, will start building at least four 6,000(gross registered) tons freighters for the Soviet Union which will probably be used as submarine depot ships.

These will be in addition to the so-called schwimbrandwachen which are already in hand at the Neptun yard.

COMMENT: With the movement of a large number of submarines to the Northern Fleet over the past year or so, an increasing need will arise for base facilities, which can be met in large part by depot ships.

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WESTERN EUROPE

5. French Air Force Planning

(SECRET)

The French Air Force has been allocated 718 million dollars, representing 25.9%, of the total military budget for 1955. This sum less than the anticipated allocation has necessitated a revision in French Air Force expansion planning.

Current plans call for the front line increase of one additional squadron to a total of 38 by December 1955 and to a total of 48 squadrons by January 1956. Personnel strength will be simultaneously increased from 138,620 to 146,000.

No plans for expansion of the French Air Force after 1956 are now envisaged.

The French Defence Ministry announcement relating to the revised French Air Force plans included a statement to the effect that the western and south-western radar defenses would not be complete until after 1961.

The announcement also included a statement to the effect that the French Naval air arm is to be modernized by the replacement of all obsolescent aircraft by French built modern jet-types. This action will result in a decrease from the present 15 squadrons to newly equipped 10 squadrons.

A second new carrier of 22,000 tons and a "helicopter" carrier are also covered by the current estimates.

COMMENT: The announcement of the proposed construction of a second 22,000 ton carrier while the first, the Clemenceau, is under construction and is scheduled for 1958, is essential to meet the landing and take off requirements of the Aquilon (sea Venoms built under license in France) aircraft. The 40 Aquilon aircraft of the 75 ordered already in first line squadrons are shore based pending completion of the Clemenceau as the other French carriers, the Arromanches the Lafayette, the Bois Belleau and the non-operational Dixmude are unable to handle the aircraft. The Helicopter carrier is a development of the current usage of normal carriers for this specialized role. The French concept of the tactical requirement of such carrier is not known.

6. New Classes of Escort Vessels for France

(UNCLASSIFIED)

The French naval authorities recently announced that included in their 1955 building programme would be one sloop of the Union Francaise class and in the 1956 programme one escort of the new "Killer" type. Below are the announced details of these two new classes.

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The Union Francaise Escort Vessel. She is designed to be an escort vessel in time of war and to be able to carry a Commando unit of 60 men or important colonial officials in time of peace. She will also be able to operate a light helicopter. Her particulars are:-

Displacement	-	1,750 tons (dead weight tons)
Speed	-	25 knots
Radius of action	-	4,500 miles at 15 knots. 6,000 miles at 10/12 knots.
Armament	-	Three 100 mm. Two 30 mm Two torpedo tubes One 305 mm quadruple mortar.
complement	-	135 men.

The "Killer" type Escort. She is said to be of novel design and destined to play an offensive role by hunting submarines as opposed to a defensive role in convoy portection. Her particulars are:-

Displacement	-	2,000 tons (dead weight tons)
Speed	-	34 knots with the possibility of extended cruising at 30/32 knots
Radius of action	-	4,500 miles at 15 knots
Armament	-	Three remote controlled (probably 100 mm) with a rate of fire of one round per second. Two 30 mm Panoramic Sonar Attack Sonar Quádruple Mortar 2 sets of A/S/surface torpedo tubes.

#### SOUTHEAST ASIA

7. Alleged Viet Minh attacks on (CONFIDENTIAL)  
Cambodian Army outpost.

The special inspection team sent to Voeune Sai to investigate the allegation of the Royal Cambodian Government that Viet Minh troops had attacked the Army post there, has reported that the Government has exaggerated the size of the force and the extent of the attacks. All attacks were apparently made under cover of darkness and the attackers could not be identified. Contrary to a previous report it appears that no damage was suffered by the Cambodian Army unit or by local civilians

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and no prisoners were taken. Investigation of the village of Siempoy, (approx 45 miles NNW of Voeune Sai on the Laotian-Cambodian frontier) from which area it was alleged that five battalions of Viet Minh had crossed into Cambodia, was not possible as the helicopter was unable to find a place to land, owing to thick jungle. It was reported however that no sign of such a sizable force was seen nor was it considered likely that Siempoy, a village of some 100 habitants, would be able to provision such a force.

COMMENT: It is still considered that the attacks on Voeune Sai were undertaken by local troops acting in their own immediate interests to obtain food and weapons. That the attacking force contained Viet Minh local guerrilla leaders is likely since the latter have been present in the area, for at least eighteen months. The Cambodian Governments attempt to exaggerate the incident indicates their nervousness concerning the forthcoming General Elections which were due to be held on September 11th, and may have furnished an excuse for them to use repressive measures to control the electorate.

FAR EAST

8. Construction of very Long Runway at Lungchi Airfield in Southeast China

(SECRET)

According to information derived from photo interpretation the hard surfacing of the runway at Lungchi Airfield (25 34N - 117 40E), about 23 miles west northwest of Amoy is continuing and upon completion it will bring the length of the runway to 9600 ft.

COMMENT: This is the first indication of a very long runway appearing in the airfield buildup area opposite Formosa. A runway of such length will be capable of handling any type of aircraft now used by the Chinese Communist Air Force.

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# JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. Probable Electronic Equipment on Soviet Strategic Bombers (SECRET)

It is thought that the electronic equipment installed in the new Soviet bomber aircraft Bear (turbo-prop heavy bomber), Bison (heavy jet bomber) and Badger (medium jet bomber) will be basically similar and will consist of the following equipment:

- (a) VHF communication set - a four channel equipment is now standard on most Soviet aircraft.
- (b) HF voice communications set.
- (c) HF communications set.
- (d) HF or VHF airborne communications set.
- (e) MF receiver.
- (f) Intercommunication set.
- (g) VHF localizer beacon receiver.
- (h) MF automatic radio compass.
- (i) Marker beacon receiver.
- (j) Low and high altitude radio altimeters.
- (k) Distance measuring equipment.
- (l) Loran type long-range pulse-navigation receiver.
- (m) Improved blind bombing/navigation radar.
- (n) Tail fire control radar.
- (o) IFF transponder.

COMMENT: It should be stressed that the above list of equipment is mainly based on estimated requirements and a knowledge of equipment carried in earlier aircraft. Even where physical evidence, such as a radome is apparent, the associated equipment may not be immediately available for installation in all aircraft.

2. Probable Electronic Equipment on new Soviet Interceptor Aircraft (SECRET)

It is thought that the following electronic equipment will be installed in both new Soviet interceptor aircraft Farmer (trans-sonic day interceptor) and Flashlight (all weather interceptor):

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- (a) VHF communications set - most interceptors are now equipped with a four-channel equipment.
- (b) MF automatic radio compass.
- (c) Marker beacon receiver.
- (d) Low altitude radio altimeter.
- (f) HF voice communications set may also be fitted.

Flashlight may also be equipped with a VHF localizer beacon receiver and Distance Measuring Equipment.

Radar aids to interception will probably consist of:

- (a) In Farmer, an improved radar gunsight possibly giving maximum acquisition range of 13,000 yds and maximum lock-on range of 2,000 yds.
- (b) In Flashlight, a search and tracking radar with computing sight (operated jointly by pilot and radar operator). Possible performance - maximum acquisition range of 25 n.m., maximum lock-on range of 20 n.m.

COMMENT: This list of equipment is an estimate based on visible antennae, known Soviet equipment and estimated requirements. Even where physical evidence of an installation is apparent the associated equipment may not be immediately available for installation in all aircraft.

### 3. FRESCO Aircraft at Airfield in Austria

(SECRET)

On 11th August 1955, two MIG-type aircraft sighted at Wiener Neustadt Airfield, Soviet Occupied Zone Austria, were reported as being different from Fagot (MIG-15) aircraft based at this airfield. The aircraft were longer than Fagots and with somewhat pointed noses.

COMMENT: The description suggests that these aircraft are probably Fresco "D"'s (jet interceptor with radar gunsight). This is the first reliable report of Fresco aircraft in Austria. Recently, Fresco "D"'s have appeared at a base in East Germany and with Hungarian Air Force markings, at a base in Hungary.

The Fresco "D" is believed to be the Soviet interim stage to the all weather fighter.

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4. The Soviet 1954 Transport Plan

(SECRET)

It is estimated that the turnover of freight on Soviet railways increased in 1954 by 9% over 1953. This means that turnover had increased by 42% over 1950, and that the goal for 1955, the end of the Fifth Five Year Plan, has been achieved a year in advance.

Freight moved by sea increased by 18% over 1953, and that handled by river shipping increased 6%. The 1955 goal for sea transport was virtually achieved by the end of 1954, but river shipping is so far from its target that it is doubtful that it can achieve its plan by the end of 1955.

Freight moved by road increased by 66% over 1953. Such movements have increased by 259% since 1950, whereas the plan for the end of 1955 called for a mere 80-85%.

No data are yet available on air freight.

COMMENT: It thus appears that the economic growth of the Soviet Union during the present plan has not been hampered by existing transport facilities.

It would appear, however, that over-fulfilment of the plan for the railways, which still carry about 85% of all Soviet freight, does not indicate that all necessary and desirable goals have been achieved. Average daily car-loadings have increased about 10% in four years, and the average load per car has increased slightly. But premature fulfilment of the plan for freight turnover is almost certainly due to failure to reduce the average length of haul, which remains a serious problem. It is unlikely that this problem will be solved by the end of 1955, and it would appear that the railways must continue to operate for some years under great pressure.

5. Vacuum Tubes Development in East Germany

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The projects planned for 1955 at the East German plant Werk für Fernmeldewesen, Berlin, include three travelling wave tube developments for which 90,000 Marks each has been allocated and a carcinotron (new type tube suitable for broad - band jammers) development for which 80,000 marks has been allocated.

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COMMENT: In recent years the East German tube industry has been engaged in routine developments rather than high-priority tasks and many materials have been in short supply.

Both the travelling wave tubes and the carcinotron may have a direct application in decimetre (10 cms - 1m wavelength) communications equipment which is in quantity production in East Germany and some of which is supplied to the Soviet Union.

It is to be expected that active Soviet Union carcinotron development is under way, both in the low - power and high - power applications for communications and jamming respectively, but no evidence is yet available.

6. Poland - Development of Inland Waterways (UNCLASSIFIED)

Although details are scanty, specific information which has become available during the past year on the programme of work to improve the waterways network of Poland is as follows:-

- (a) Recent press and radio reports indicate:
  - (i) A dam has been built at Przewoz in the upper Vistula and that a second is nearing completion at Goczalkowice;
  - (ii) two dams, at Laczany and Dabie respectively, are under construction.
- (b) A new dam was observed in 1954 on the river Sola (tributary to the Vistula).
- (c) A new port for the Nowa Huta metallurgical combine is believed to have been completed.
- (d) It is possible that work may have begun on the Zeran-Zegrze canal or on the new port at Zeran.

COMMENT: Ambitious long term plans of the Polish government to improve the waterways network of the country include:

- (a) the building of dams and reservoirs in order to regulate both the upper Vistula and its tributaries, and the Western Bug between Serock and Terespol;

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- (b) a new canal connecting Zeran with Zegrze (on the River Bug);
- (c) a new port at Zeran (on the outskirts of Warsaw);
- (d) the deepening of the fairway in the middle course of the Vistula and the construction of a canal to link the upper Vistula with the Gliwice Canal and the Oder;
- (e) the reconstruction of the Bydgoszcz Canal and the canalised Notec.

The completion of these projects would create a network of high-capacity waterways embracing the most important areas of Poland and connecting them with the sea and inland waterway systems of Germany and the Soviet Union. The Vistula and Bug would be harnessed for the production of hydro-electric power, and additional benefits would be the prevention of flood damage and the provision of irrigation facilities.

From a strategic point of view, the importance of the Polish inland waterway system, particularly the east-west route across the country, would be greatly increased. The larger number of dams and locks, however, would render the network more vulnerable than it is at present.

#### WESTERN EUROPE

#### 7. Yugoslavia - Air Developments

(SECRET)

The French Government has agreed to let Yugoslavia produce Mystere aircraft under licence if financial arrangements now under discussion can be settled.

This is apparently the French air Industry's reaction to the recent British Hawker Hunter licence obtained by Yugoslavia. It appears that the British and French competition combined with Tito's political vacillation are providing Yugoslavian Air Industry with a rare opportunity for quick development regardless of which country gets the contract.

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8. Sweden - New Fighter in Production

(SECRET)

The new SAAB-32 (Lansen) all weather multi-purpose transonic jet fighter for the Swedish Air Force will soon roll off the production line at the Svenska Aeroplan factory located at Lingping, near Stockholm. The first fifty (50) aircraft will be powered by the RA-7, 7500 lbs SLST Rolls Royce Avon Turbojet engine. Subsequent aircraft will be powered by the more powerful RA-14, 9500 lbs SLST engine. RSAF Wing F17 (Royal Blokinge Attack Wing) located at Kallinge (64 41N - 15 17E) in North Central Sweden will be the first unit to receive the new fighter.

COMMENT: The SAAB-32 production was expected to be delayed because of engine surging and the recent crash of a SAAB-32 prototype. In view of the above information it is probable that the problem has been in the RA-14 Engine installation. The SAAB-32 is scheduled to replace the SAAB-29 as Sweden's first line fighter aircraft.

9. Portugal - Additions to the Fleet

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Four Ocean Minesweepers are being transferred to Portugal from the United States in 1955. The S. Jorge is already in service with the Portuguese Fleet, the Pico has been handed over to the Portuguese authorities at Seattle and the Graciosa and Corvo are still under construction. These ships have a full load displacement of about 650 tons, a speed of about 14 knots and are armed with a single Bofors.

NORTH AFRICA

10. French Air Strength in North Africa

(SECRET)

The French Air Force maintains the following units in North Africa:

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	<u>Role</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Aircraft Strength</u>
Operational	Day Fighters	(Mistral)			
	" "	Vampire 53	Oran/Algeria	2 Sqns	40
	" "	" "	Bizerte/Tunisia	2 Sqns	42
	Ground Attack (Piston)	(Flamant) MD 315	Blida/Algeria	3 Flts	30
	Transport	Dakota	Algiers/Algeria	1 Sqn	16
		Noratlas	Blida/Algeria	1 Sqn	12
		JU-52	Marrakech/Morocco	1 Flt	15
Reserve	Day Fighters	Thunderbolt	Oran/Algeria	1 Sqn	36
		Vampire 53	Rabat/Morocco	1 Sqn	12
Training		Vampire	Meknes/Morocco		130

COMMENT: Reference is made to the press reports relating to the use of Vampire aircraft in a ground support role in North Africa and suggesting that the Vampire squadrons were drawn from bases in France.

The above Air Order of Battle confirms that four operational Vampire Squadrons are permanently based in North Africa. This suggests that the Vampire Squadrons were available and that no aircraft were drawn from the French Air Force in Europe.

MIDDLE EAST

11. Israel - Arab League Air Developments

(SECRET)

The Israeli and Arab League Air Orders of Battle are as follows:-

The combined Arab States probably can raise and sustain for a limited time an attacking force of about fifty fighter aircraft. Maintenance is poor and pilot skill is low.

Israel probably can sustain an attacking force of approximately 30 fighter aircraft indefinitely. Maintenance is fair and pilots are combat trained under relatively high standards.

Israeli Meteor MK VIII aircraft and Egyptian Vampires have clashed on several occasions recently and the Israeli fighters have fared better each time.

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FAR EAST

12. China - Railway Five Year Plan 1953-1957

(SECRET)

The official figure published in July 1955 for new construction this year is 1,062 km. Of this, 992 km. can be accounted for from previous official announcements:

	<u>km.</u>
Lanchow/Sinkiang	267
Chengtu/Paochi (Southern sector)	170
Pingsiang/Anyuan (reconstruction)	8
Peking/Paotou (double tracking)	100
Peking/Hankow (double tracking)	140
Fengtai/Shacheng	63
Litang/Fort Bayard	244
	<u>922</u>

This leaves 70 Km. to be accounted for. This may represent construction on the Lanchow/Paotou line, the Northern section of the Chengtu/Paochi line, forestry lines and industrial spurs.

In addition, in July 1955, news was released of work on three hitherto secret lines: the Litang/Fort Bayard line which is complete; the Yingtan/Napping/Amov; and the Hsiaoshan/Ningpo lines. The lengths of these last two lines built in 1955 may prove to be about 440 and 138 Km. respectively (578 Km. total).

Thus it seems likely that the Chinese are likely to build some 1,640 Km. of track this year (1,062 + 578).

On 6th July 1955 it was announced that by the end of the Five Year Plan (31st December 1957) 4,000 Km. of new line and 10,000 Km. in all would have been added to the existing track.

The total track to be added by the end of 1955 will amount to some 6,850 Km. (5,210 from 1950-54 plus 1,640 estimated for 1955). This would leave 3,150 Km. to be added in 1956 and 1957. At the 1955 rate, their task for 1956-57 would seem well within their capacity.

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COMMENT: The interesting point noted in this source is the reference to the Yingtian/Nanping/Amoy line which heretofore was thought to be headed for Foo Chow.

13. North Korea - Intelligence Agencies

(SECRET)

Three intelligence collecting agencies in North Korea have now been identified in place of the former two. They are (a) Reconnaissance Bureau GHQ of North Korean Army, (b) Liaison Group, Korean Labour Party and (c) Social Security Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs. Functions and subordination of these agencies is believed to be as follows:

- (a) Reconnaissance Bureau GHQ North Korean Army (Subdivided into three departments)
- (i) 1st and 2nd Departments: the study of radio communications, some police control, overall guidance of tactical reconnaissance operations at divisional and brigade levels.
  - (ii) 3rd Department: selection and despatch of agents, organization of courier services between agents in South Korea and the Kaesong Headquarters. Strength 116 officers, 253 other ranks.
- (b) Liaison Group, Korean Labour Party (Largely a civilian organization, although commanded by a North Korean general; and has a military section with a strength of 103 officers and 239 other ranks.)
- engaged in espionage and subversive activities in South Korea; also maintains a courier service between agents in South Korea and Liaison Group KLP headquarters in Taesong-San.
- (c) Social Security Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs
- concerned mainly with counter-espionage and anti subversion activities.

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COMMENT: The Reconnaissance Bureau GHQ, North Korean Army and the Guerrilla Guidance Bureau were the two agencies formerly identified. While the title of the former has been retained, its duties have been more clearly defined. The Guerrilla Guidance Bureau is thought no longer to exist as such; before its present re-organization it was chiefly concerned with the control of guerrillas operating in South Korea Labour organizations. The study of radio communications by the Reconnaissance Bureau probably refers to the intercept of low level communications and such clandestine traffic as may occur in North Korea.

### SOUTH AMERICA

#### 14. Ecuador - Additions to the Fleet

(RESTRICTED)

The Hunt class Frigates Quantock and Meynell were ceremonially handed over to Captain Manuel Neito, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ecuadorian Navy, at Portsmouth on 16 August. They will be renamed the Presidente Alfaro and the Velasco Ibarra respectively. The former will sail for Ecuador with an Ecuadorian ship's company on 25 August. The latter will follow in about two months time.

COMMENT: This will be the first time that the Ecuadorian Navy has had a turbine driven ship. It has hitherto comprised an ex-American frigate, an ex-yacht, an ex-tuna fishing boat, a tug and six patrol launches.

### CANADA

#### 15. Canadian Delegation Disarmament Sub-Committee

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission reconvened in New York on August 29th in accordance with the agreement reached at the Big Four conference which took place in Geneva last July.

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The Americans obviously intend to put the emphasis on a "warning system" providing for the exchange of military blueprints and aerial surveys of national territories as suggested by President Eisenhower at Geneva. They think this should take precedence over the study of an elaborate disarmament programme such as the original Anglo-French plan. The Americans have suggested that the Sub-Committee concentrate on their new proposals and hope that the Assembly will be able to take action on them at its autumn session by urging the United States and the Soviet Union to implement the proposals between themselves as a first stage. At the second stage the United States plan might be extended to cover bases of the two countries abroad. The third stage might consist of the extension of the plan to other countries.

The British and the French are not too happy about the American approach. They are disturbed by the United States intentions to relegate earlier Western proposals to a "reserve and negative status". The French for their part intend to table comprehensive proposals amplifying the Anglo-French plan, and have already tabled the final text of the Faure plan. The British are concerned lest the Russians might succeed in dividing the West as a result of lack of co-ordination of Western plans, but are not apparently anxious to go into a detailed study at this particular stage of the Eden proposals.

In view of this the Canadian Delegation has been advised that we see merits in the United States suggestion that priority be given to the new American proposals since we consider that a detailed examination of the Faure proposals at this stage would appear undesirable. We think there may be ground for some successful bargaining in this direction provided, of course, the two major powers are not looking at the present exercise as just another opportunity for propaganda. We are concerned lest the American case might be presented in a manner which would place the whole debate in a propaganda context. In our view the plan should not, for instance, be presented as a sine qua non condition of any further progress in disarmament negotiations. Nor should it be inferred by the West that the Eisenhower programme is from now on the only conceivable field of discussion and one about which the other members of the Sub-Committee may be in a position to give immediate and final reactions.

It remains to be seen of course whether the Soviets will agree to limit discussions in the Sub-Committee to the new American proposals even though these embody some of their own proposals. They could legitimately ask that their own Geneva proposals be discussed also, not to mention their

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paper of May 10th which contains unacceptable political proposals. In his opening statement in the Sub-Committee the Soviet representative, Mr. Sobolev, restated without significant alternation the part of the Soviet proposals of May 10th dealing specifically with disarmament. He did not repeat the political proposals contained in the Soviet paper and his reference to the controversial question of bases was less specific than the relevant section of this paper.

Little progress is expected in the work of the Sub-Committee in view of the relatively short time left within which to report to the Disarmament Commission before the General Assembly debate.

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SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. Soviet Fighter Designated MIG-19 (SECRET)

It is reliably reported that Soviet officials at the Tushino Air Force Day display, 3 July 1955, referred to the MIG type fighters as MIG-19s. The difference was stated to be that the MIG-19 possessed much more power than the MIG-17. During aerobatics the aircraft seemed abnormally quiet.

COMMENT: There have been references to an aircraft designated MIG-19 for over a year. However, lack of evidence of a new aircraft suggested that it had not been taken beyond the prototype stage. This evidence indicates that the MIG-17 version with afterburner is probably designated MIG-19, the afterburners being inoperative during aerobatics would serve to muffle normal exhaust noises and explains the quietness of the engine.

2. FRESCO (MIG-17) Variants (SECRET)

A number of FRESCO (jet fighter) variants have been observed and have been given arbitrary designations as follows:

- FRESCO "A" - FRESCO as originally sighted with dive brakes aft.
- FRESCO "B" - Same as FRESCO "A" but with dive brakes moved forward.
- FRESCO "C" - Same as FRESCO "A" but with re-designed rear fuselage exposing the exhaust nozzle.
- FRESCO "D" - Same as FRESCO "C" but with a modified nose incorporating a small scanner for gun radar ranging with possibly a limited search capability.

All FRESCO aircraft are powered with the same engine but FRESCO C and D incorporate thrust augmentation giving an engine rating of 8,050 lbs sea level static thrust.

COMMENT: FRESCO C and D may have the Soviet designation MIG-19.

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3. FLASHLIGHT (twin-jet all weather fighter) Wing Tip Booms (SECRET)

The Soviet FLASHLIGHT (twin-jet all weather fighter) has identical booms projecting forward from the wing tips. These have been evaluated as possibly being twin pitot heads, where one boom would support the normal pitot-static head and the other would furnish pitot-static information to support sensing devices for angle of yaw and angle of attack.

COMMENT: The twin pitot head installations on the MIG-17 may have a similar function to that suggested for the twin boom on the FLASHLIGHT.

Research in the United Kingdom and United States has indicated a possibility of instrumenting an aircraft with two such booms, so that it may automatically follow another aircraft by the turbulence of its wake. Experimental flight tests have shown that very evident turbulence persists farther than 8000 ft behind a jet aircraft.

4. Improvement of Soviet Military Motor Transport in East Germany (SECRET)

Observations during the last year of non-armoured vehicles with Soviet units in East Germany indicate a substantial improvement in both quality and quantity of motor transport. During the period August 1954 to March 1955 inclusive, an estimated 12,000 vehicles were imported from the Soviet Union. Observations as of April 1955 indicate a possible increase of nearly 10,000 vehicles in operational use. Furthermore, the number of vehicles reported in new or better-than-average condition increased from 25 percent in July 1954 to 42 percent, in April 1955.

It is believed that a great proportion of major Soviet units in East Germany are now at, or close to war establishment in motor vehicles. However there are indications that the Rear Services of armies and of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany are still deficient of third line transport.

COMMENT: Contrary to estimates made in 1954 it is now believed that units and formations of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany are adequately supplied with motor transport to sustain offensive operations within the limits of supply organizations as known during the Second World War, provided army maintenance areas are supplied by rail.

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(unless otherwise classified)

5. Military Supplies EAST GERMANY

(SECRET)

Figures of imports and exports of military supplies and equipment into and from East Germany via Poland for the first four months of this year are as follows: (All figures are in metric tons.)

	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Ammunition	28,095	2,040
Artillery	554	63
Tanks	924	42
Armoured vehicles	256	0
Cargo vehicles	3,165	887

A comparison of these figures with the same period in 1954 shows that:

- (a) Those for ammunition are roughly the same.
- (b) Artillery imports have approximately doubled.
- (c) The number of tanks has substantially increased.
- (d) The cargo vehicle import is about three times that for the comparable period in 1954.

COMMENT: The introduction of new equipments combined with changes in the organization of certain units of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany may account for (b) above. Tank and Armoured Vehicle increases are probably due in the case of the former to the arrival of the new (T54) medium tank, while the imports of the latter consisting largely of Armoured Personnel Carriers are in conformity with the current re-equipment programme which has been developing steadily since the war.

The replacement of cargo vehicles which started late last year may explain their high import figures. It is estimated that the monthly import rate so far this year has been 200 per month. This indicates that the Soviets are continuing to eliminate their old lend-lease and other out-moded or unrepairable vehicles in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In general it seems probable that the Soviets are trying to complete their units in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany to strength and at the same time provide them with new equipments. Equipment made surplus by this programme may become available to meet the rapidly expanding requirements of the East German military forces.

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(unless otherwise classified)

WESTERN EUROPE

6. New Ships for Holland

(RESTRICTED)

During the last year five submarine chasers have joined the Royal Netherlands Navy. Names of these vessels, which were built in Holland under the offshore procurement programme, are FREYR, BALDER, BULGIA, HADDA and HEFRING.

Details are -

Full load displacement	225 tons
Standard displacement	146 tons
Length (o.a.)	120 ft.
Beam (extreme)	19 ft. 6 ins.
Draught	6 ft.
Speed	15.5 knots
Endurance	1,900 miles at 12.0 knots
Armament	One 40 m.m. Three 20 m.m. Two D.C. Throwers Two A.S.W. Rocket Launchers Eight Rockets
Complement	27 officers and men

During the same period six Ocean Minesweepers built in the United States and supplied under Mutual Defence Assistance Programme have been turned over. They were named ONVERSAAGD, ONVERSCHROKKEN, ONBEYREESD, ONVERMOEID, ONVERDROTEN, and ONVERVAARD.

Details of these Minesweepers are -

Standard displacement	665 tons
Length (o.a.)	172 ft.
Beam	36 ft.
Draught	10 ft.
Engines	Packard diesel
Max speed	2,400 nautical miles at 12 knots
Armament	One 40 m.m.

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(unless otherwise classified)

FAR EAST

7. Major Airfield Development in the  
Kwantung Peninsula, China

(SECRET)

According to reliable and accurate sources, major runway development in the Kwantung Peninsula was completed during the spring of 1955. New concrete runways, 8200 ft x 200 ft and 5700 ft x 190 ft, were constructed at Tuchengtsu (38 55N - 121 14E) and Sanshihlipu (39 17N - 121 46E) respectively. The concrete runway at Yingchengtsu (39 01N - 121 23E) airfield was extended to 6500 ft and the one at Pulantian (39 27N - 122 02E) was lengthened to 8200 ft and widened to 200 ft.

COMMENT: This recent airfield rehabilitation and construction activity represents a substantial improvement in the airfield potential in the Kwantung Peninsula area. The newly developed air facilities are strategically located for supporting any Communist forces in Korea and they could be utilized for mounting either offensive bomber or fighter defence operations.

8. Reconstruction of Ta-T'ung/Feng-Ling-Tu  
Railway (Tungpu Railway)

(SECRET)

Two surveying and designing teams have been working on improvements to the Ta-T'ung/T'ai-Yuan/Feng-Ling-Tu line. Preparations are being made to change the gauge from metre to standard (4'8½") to reduce gradients, and to repair and expand the stations with a view to increasing greatly the capacity of the line.

COMMENT: The T'ai-Yuan/Ta-T'ung section is of standard gauge. While the remainder is metre gauge. Ta-T'ung is only 78 miles from Tsining, the terminus of Russian broad gauge, and, since the curving and gradient specifications for broad and standard gauge are almost identical, it is possible for surveyors to prepare the Tungpu Railway for 5' gauge specification, in case an extension of this should be required later. An additional north/south line will ease the congestion in North China.

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When reconstruction of the Tungpu Railway is completed and the Lan-Chou/Pao-T'ou line finished, there will be four north/south main line railways in North China. A bridge across the Yellow River at Feng-Ling-Tu would present no major construction difficulties.

9. Japan - New Weapons for United States Forces

(SECRET)

On 29 July 1955, the arrival in Okinawa of 663 Field Artillery Battalion armed with 280 mm cannon that "can fire both high explosive and atomic shells" was announced. There was no mention whether atomic ammunition accompanied the cannon. On the same day, in Japan, a United States army spokesman told the press that 5 Field Artillery Battery, equipped with "Honest John" rocket launchers had been ordered to Japan.

COMMENT: There has been some popular reaction in Japan against the bringing in of "atomic" weapons. Though there has been no announcement that atomic war-heads or cannon shells have accompanied the weapons, the "Honest John" rocket can be employed with either conventional or atomic war-heads. Popular anxiety has been partially lulled by Mr. Hatoyama's reported announcement that atomic war-heads had not been brought into Japan but, if necessary for defence reasons, tactical atomic weapons would be stored in Japan.

Japanese Self Defence Forces at present consist of 130,000 men in the Ground Self Defence Force, 16,000 in the Maritime branch and some 6,000 in the Air Self Defence Force. These figures are exclusive of civilian personnel in the forces which total some 11,000.

United States ground force troops in Japan and Okinawa are believed to consist at present of:

- One infantry division
- One Marine division (equivalent)
- One Maritime Regimental combat team
- One Infantry Regimental combat team
- One tank battalion
- One field artillery battalion (280-mm)
- Three Anti-Aircraft Artillery groups.

and in Korea, two infantry divisions and two tank battalions.

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(unless otherwise classified)

Dissatisfaction in Japan with the continued presence of United States troops seems to be increasing. The use of the slopes of Mount Fuji as a United States artillery range is used as a point of dissension, and the extensions of airfield runways into agricultural land is meeting with opposition. A more realistic view held by many in Japan is that until the Self Defence Forces become capable of fulfilling their role, United States garrisons must be maintained.

The announced United States reason for bringing to Japan weapons which can be used in an atomic role is "in accordance with United States military policy of furnishing field commanders with the most modern weapons available", the increased capabilities of the new weapons could be used to justify a possible further reduction of United States ground force strength in the theatre including Japan. With this in view Japanese popular opinion may accept the stockpiling of atomic weapons. The announced presence of an atomic arsenal on Okinawa and Japan would probably also have a salutary effect on Communist China's relations with the West.

10. Republic of Korea - Military District System

(SECRET)

2 Republic of Korea Army which, following the disbandment of the United States Korean communications (K Com Z) in late June 1955, assumed logistical functions for the Republic of Korea armed forces now provides this support through a system of military district commands. All South Korea lying south of 8 Army Rear Boundary is divided into five geographical districts numbered 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 and becomes the Korean Zone of the Interior (ZI).

COMMENT: There does not appear to be a "Communications Zone" which in normal United States practice would lie between the "Combat Zone" or "Forward Zone" and the "Zone of the Interior". This may be developed later on but in the present armistice situation this intermediate area is probably considered an added complication for the inexperienced Republic of Korea administration branches. Also it probably simplifies the United Nations task of maintaining a watch on any Republic of Korea tendencies to stockpile with a view to independent action. Republic of Korea Army has assumed full control of the port facilities of Pusan.

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NOTE: It is interesting to note, in connection with Republic of Korea military numbering system that number four is no longer used, thus conforming to what may become a tradition owing to the disloyal activities of 14 Regiment, South Korean Constabulary, who in October 1948 initiated the Yosu-Sunchon revolt.

11. Republic of Korea Reserve Formations

(SECRET)

The Republic of Korea Army on 5 July 1955 activated the last two of the ten reserve divisions provided for in the Republic of Korea/United States Agreement of August 1954. These two divisions (39 and 50) have been allotted to Military Districts 2 and 5 respectively.

COMMENT: The implementation of the reserve programme, which began in February 1955 has been completed in a much shorter period than had at first been deemed possible. The reserve divisions, however, are meagrely equipped compared to the active formations; for example, artillery support consists of one 12-gun 105 mm howitzer battalion per reserve division compared to the three 12-gun 105 mm howitzer battalions of the active divisions. The reserve programme is of considerable value as a means of retaining time-expired veterans in part-time military training.

One or more reserve divisions are stationed in each of the five newly organized Military District Commands.

12. Sino-Egyptian Trade Agreement

(CONFIDENTIAL)

A trade agreement was signed on 22 August 1955 between Communist China and Egypt. The agreement is to run for a three year period and at the same time a protocol to the agreement was signed designed to cover trade for the first year. The agreement provides for the most-favoured-nation treatment and the establishment of a commercial representatives office in each other's country. The protocol is arranged at a total value of \$56 million. The agreement has been declared to have developed from the economic cooperation resolutions adopted at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung. The first implementation of the agreement was the signing of a contract for the importation by Egypt of 60,000 tons of Chinese rolled steel.

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COMMENT: The agreement has been signed more with a view to cultivating friendly relations with Egypt than expanding trade. Owing to the shortage of steel in China and the strategic value of the commodity it appears unlikely that the Agreement can be considered solely on an economic basis. It is however, the first time that China has signed such an agreement with a Middle Eastern or African country.

The Agreement does not signify the commencement of Sino-Egyptian trade but rather an increase in total trade. Egypt requires new markets for its cotton and iron, tea, newsprint and silk products for domestic consumption. Previous to the signing of the Agreement a cotton agreement had been reached for the export of 8 million pounds of Egyptian cotton to China. The 1954 trade figures show a severe imbalance in trade with Egypt exporting \$11.4 million worth of goods and receiving only \$.8 million from China. While the agreement will attempt to equalize the trade between the two countries, it is unlikely that the total of \$56 million will be reached in the first year.

Egypt is one of the more important non-European countries trading with the Soviet Bloc, and the only one whose postwar trade with the area, has regained prewar levels. In 1954, Egypt exported goods valued at \$56 million to the Soviet Bloc and imported \$27 million worth. Exports consisted mostly of cotton while imports were mainly wheat, timber and cotton piece goods. Recently Egypt has signed two agreements to import petroleum products from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is Egypt's largest Bloc supplier, followed by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Roumania.

#### SOUTHEAST ASIA

#### 13. Alleged Viet Minh Guerrilla Attacks in Northeast Cambodia

(SECRET)

A Royal Cambodian Army outpost at Voemue Sai (275 Miles Northeast of Phnom Penh) is reported to have been attacked by a force "identified as Viet Minh" on August 14th and 17th. The post, held by elements of a Royal Cambodian Army infantry company repulsed the heaviest attack on August 17th, apparently taking some prisoners. Documents found on the

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the prisoners are reported to reveal their identity as "former Viet Minh guerrillas". The attacking force was originally described as 3-600 Pathet Lao troops which had crossed the South Laos border.

The situation on August 21st was reported calm and air OP flights failed to observe any unusual activity. Two Royal Cambodian Army infantry companies have been sent to Voeune Sai from Snoul. The current strength of Royal Cambodian Army and security forces in the area is estimated to be 1,150.

COMMENT: Voeune Sai, which has a population of 1,500, is the centre of a series of tracks linking the Plateaux region of South Central Annam and the Bolovens Plateau of South Laos with the Mekong Valley. The Plateaux region has been a Viet Minh stronghold for over nine years and it is quite probable that Viet Minh local guerrilla forces have remained there despite the evacuation demanded by the Geneva Agreement. Voeune Sai was captured by two battalions of the Viet Minh 101 Regiment, 325 Division, in early April 1954. It was thought at the time that the Viet Minh may have considered installing Son Ngoc Thanh as head of a Free Cambodian Movement with Headquarters there. It was also considered an extremely difficult area from which to dislodge Viet Minh troops owing to the very thick jungle. It is likely that this present attack was to obtain food or additional weapons and ammunition.

14. French Expeditionary Corps in Indo-China

(SECRET)

General Koenig, French Minister of National Defence, during a speech to the French Assembly, announced that the strength of the French Expeditionary Corps has been "momentarily fixed at a level of 55,000 men". This figure for budget planning purposes is the total fixed for 31 December 1955. Of the 55,000 men however, 14,000 are indigenous troops from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia serving in the French Expeditionary Corps. (Budget planning total as at 31 December 1954 was 165,000 so that the reduction during the year was 110,000.) In addition, 2,650 all ranks are listed as being on the strengths of the French training missions to S. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

COMMENT: French Expeditionary Corps strength at 1st July 1955 was estimated at 73,000, including indigenous troops and training missions; of which 12,500 all ranks were expected to be rotated during July

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leaving an approximate total of 60,500 by 1st August 1955. The current planning figure of 33,000 all ranks by the end of 1956 cannot be counted on as firm since the French Government has made it clear that it has no definite idea about when the whole of the French Expeditionary Corps may be repatriated or even if it will be..

The French Expeditionary Corps is at present formed into three infantry divisions in Vietnam, with headquarters respectively at Baria (near Cap St. Jacques), Saigon, and Tourane; and a General Reserve in the Cap St. Jacques area. The first two divisions have zones of action and a Divisional Commander can use all units in this area for security operations, the third division has an occupational role only since the Tourane base is shortly to be handed over to S. Vietnamese control.

#### 15. Military Situation in Laos

(SECRET)

A Laotian National Army column sent to recapture the outpost lost to the Pathet Lao on the night of August 12/13 is reported to have been attacked by Pathet Lao troops and forced to return to Muong Peun. Pathet Lao activity in the area indicates an effort to isolate the Laotian National Army garrison at Muong Peun and to constrict the perimeter in that area.

It is further reported that approximately half of the 4,500 Pathet Lao troops in Sam Neua Province are now in the Vicinity of Muong Peun, the remainder being located to the North and East. The Laotian National Army is believed, to have 2,400 troops at Muong Peun, an additional 1,500 (two battalions) in supporting positions astride the route to Muong Peun and a further two battalions (1,500 men) on the move from Xieng Khouang area towards the border of Sam Neua Province.

COMMENT: The continuing pressure on the Laotian National Army garrison is likely to be carefully controlled so as to take effect on the current political and military negotiations between the Royal Government and the Pathet Lao but not to provoke large scale military action or outside interference on the Laotian National Army side. Reports indicate that the Laotian National Army 1st Parachute Battalion, regarded as one of the better Laotian formations, was "routed" in the fighting between August 2nd and 13th; 27 men were killed, 50 are still missing and the two companies involved lost over 100 rifles. It would appear from this that the Laotian National Army's Value for war, which was assessed as low during the time French officers and non-commissioned officers were present, has not increased. Local actions can be expected to continue until negotiations are concluded.

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# JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. Solar Energy and Wind Power

In a previous article we pointed out that the Soviets are mass producing wind-powered generators. More recent sources state that some of these machines are equipped with flywheels which can store the energy from gusts of wind and supply uninterrupted power during a lull. Such generators could supply uninterrupted power in the KAZAKH SSR for 58% of the time.

The Soviets have developed several devices which utilize radiant energy from the sun. Soviet scientists have developed curved-mirror (paraboloïd) reflectors ten metres in diameter which produce 100 pounds of steam per hour at a pressure of 100 pounds per square inch. Such heaters have been used for the operation of canneries, for distilling water, operating refrigerators, and for heating the laboratory. A heater has recently been developed for a large industrial installation that produces 18 tons of steam per hour, or 33,000 tons per year.

In an other application, such heaters have been developed to make fresh water from salt water. A practical still of this type now produces 250 gallons of distilled water per day. This still proves to be the cheapest method of making distilled water for the livestock grazing in remote pastures, such as those of the Kara Kur desert. A still of this type has been used to make 75,000 tons of distilled water and 12,000 tons of ice a year.

Tashkent scientists have also developed an aluminium mirror, 4 feet in diameter, which produces 6 litres of water per day. On a sunny day it can do the work of a 600 watt electric stove. The Soviet State Optical Institute has constructed a number of solar kitchens using such mirrors and a larger one with a surface of 12 square metres which produces about 100 gallons of boiled water per day.

Still simpler installations, using flat glass heat collectors for warming water without boiling it, are cheap and practical for bath-houses, showers, laundries, dairies, and for sheep-washing. If steam temperatures are not necessary, simple exposure to the sun without curved mirrors gives ample heat. Such collectors of heat wave have an efficiency of 40 to 45 percent while the curved mirrors, which may concentrate sunshine from 50 to 500 times, have an efficiency up to 70 per cent.

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The production of electric power from solar radiation has, however, not been solved because of the difficulty of storing the energy obtained from the sun. The fluctuation with changes in the sunshine, the time of day and the season is a serious obstacle to the maintenance of a steady flow of electric power.

COMMENT: In view of the intermittent nature of the power supplied, the above mentioned generators are not considered suitable for operating military equipment, such as radars. For similar applications they may prove important in isolated localities, and in conserving other fuels. Since nuclear power stations are not considered to be economical below 35,000 - 50,000 kilowatts the two forms of power would be complementary rather than competitive

2. Proposed Reduction in Soviet Armed Forces

(SECRET)

On 13th August 1955, it was announced in a Tass press release that, with a view to promoting the relaxation of international tension and establishing confidence among the nations, the Soviet Government has decided to reduce the armed forces of the Soviet Union by 640,000 men by 15th December 1955. It is not clear whether the latter figure included the troops to be demobilized following the evacuation of Austria.

COMMENT: The total strength of the Soviet armed forces is estimated to be:

Soviet Army	2,800,000
Soviet Airforce	800,000
Soviet Navy	800,000
Security Troops	500,000
	<hr/>
	4,900,000

The proposed reduction of 640,000 represents an overall reduction of approximately 13 percent but in view of the present naval building programme and the emphasis being placed on development of an offensive and defensive air capability, it is presumed that the ground forces will absorb a higher percentage out than the other services.

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While Soviet regulations provide that personnel inducted into the ground forces will serve a two year term, the period of service has in the past run three years and longer. However, in the 1954 rotation of ground forces the 1931 and 1932 classes were released simultaneously, leaving the Soviets with an essentially three class Army (1933, 1934, and 1935) plus an undetermined number of specialists and career NCOs held over from previous age groups.

Present army strength is drawn from the following age groups, plus holdovers referred to in the above paragraph:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimated Number of Physically Fit Soviet Males</u>
1934	1,867,000
1935	1,787,000
1936	1,687,000
	<hr/>
	Total - 5,341,000

Under normal conditions of call-up and release, the 1934 class would be due for release and the 1937 class (1,541,000) for induction in the Fall of 1955.

Presuming the present forces are cut by 640,000 the reduction could be accomplished in two ways.

- (a) By early release of approximately half of the 1935 class now in service.
- (b) By deferment of personnel in the 1937 class due to be called-up.

Alternative (b) appears less likely as it would create a large block of untrained manpower of military age. Alternative (a) would reduce the period in service for a substantial number of personnel from 3 to 2 years, but would not reduce the numbers of trained reserves available for mobilization.

The proposed reduction could be accomplished without disbanding formations or units by placing units on a reduced personnel

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establishment. Such action would not seriously impair training or reduce Soviet offensive capabilities.

Assuming that the reduction is accomplished by some disbandment of formations and units, this would not appreciably reduce the Soviet threat to the West unless a significant reduction were made in Soviet garrisons in Satellite countries, particularly East Germany.

It is interesting that while the Soviet population over the past five years is believed to have increased from 200 to 215 million, the estimate of physically fit males liable for service has steadily decreased, due to declining birth-rates during the years 1933-1937.

1951	1,921,000
1952	1,868,000
1953	1,787,000
1954	1,687,000
1955	1,541,000

In the light of these figures it is possible industry and agriculture are coming into increasing conflict with the military on manpower requirements. While the military forces customarily provide considerable assistance to the civilian labour force, the productivity of these 640,000 men would be increased substantially by their absorption into the permanent labour force of industry and agriculture.

It is considered that the proposed cut in the armed forces can be made with no appreciable reduction in Soviet offensive capabilities and that, while this cut may be dictated mainly by economic necessity, its propaganda value will be exploited to the maximum.

### 3. Twin Rotor Soviet Helicopter

(SECRET)

Four twin rotor twin engine helicopters (given designation HORSE) flew at the Tushino Air Show 3rd July 1955 and landed on the airfield where they unloaded. Each helicopter discharged a jeep towing a 57 mm field gun with troops mounted, from a retractable ramp dropped from the tail.

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Yakovlev is named by the Soviets as designer of this aircraft and it is said that either engine can drive both rotors if necessary.

COMMENT: Preliminary photographic interpretation indicates that the HORSE fuselage is about 75 ft long. Attaché estimates had been 75-80 ft. The American built Piasecki YH16 40 passenger helicopter has a 78 ft fuselage, which indicates the HORSE is the size of the Piasecki helicopter although it resembles the smaller British built Bristol 173 helicopter in design.

Although HORSE carried exactly twice the 3200 lb load carried by the HOUND at Tushino, it is estimated that it is capable of lifting a cargo in the order of 8000 - 10000 lbs.

4. Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Austria

(SECRET)

An Order of the Day issued by the Soviet Defence Minister on 31st July in conformity with the proviso of the Austrian Treaty stated that all Soviet occupation troops would be withdrawn to the Soviet Union by 1st October 1955. In order to absorb these men, the Soviets announced their intention to demobilize an equivalent number of troops ahead of the normal discharge date.

Reports indicate that the withdrawal had started on 4th August 1955. The number of troops involved in the move is approximately 32,000 men, representing less than 1% of the Soviet Armed Forces. These troops make up the following three line divisions:

- (a) 13 Guards Mechanized Division
- (b) 95 Guards Rifle Division
- (c) 23 Anti-aircraft Artillery Division

The troops which have been withdrawn thus far number about 10,000 men and comprise the bulk of the 23 Anti-aircraft Artillery Division and small elements of the 13 Guards Mechanized Division. Comparatively few troops from 95 Guards Rifle Division and General Headquarters units of the Central Group of Forces have apparently been involved. It is rumoured that the 95 Guards Rifle Division would be the last formation to withdraw and that its evacuation would be completed by 23rd August 1955.

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Departing troops are routed via Hegyeshalom to Chop, the trans-shipment center on the Soviet-Hungarian border.

COMMENT: Although the official destination of these troops is the Soviet Union, there are indications that some if not all units may be intended as reinforcements for Soviet garrisons in the Satellites.

It is reported that Veszprem, Hungary, may be the new location of Headquarters, Central Group of Forces, and that some elements of troops from Austria may already have been transferred to Hungary.

One report mentions the arrival of a Soviet military train carrying tank troops at Guben, East Germany. This train was routed through South Poland and may possibly be the first indication of arrival of elements withdrawn from Austria. The routing of these troops through Poland suggests probable security measures to disguise the origin of troops.

5. Move of Soviet Army Line Divisions to Training Areas (SECRET)

Further to a previous report dated 12th August 1955, additional information has now been received on the position of Line, Artillery and Anti-aircraft Divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany in connection with training. This is as follows:

- (a) Of the Twenty-two Line Divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany the bulk of Twelve have moved to training areas away from their home stations.
- (b) The remaining Ten Divisions are either training at their home stations or in areas in the immediate vicinity of them.
- (c) No reports have been received of training being above battalion level.

Of the Two Artillery and Nine Anti-aircraft Divisions both the former are in field training areas while elements of the latter are rotating to and from Anti-aircraft ranges in East Germany.

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COMMENT: This overall training pattern differs only slightly from that of last year. It may be significant that all but one of the Line Divisions remaining in the vicinity of their home stations are units of the three mechanized armies stationed around Berlin. Of the Eleven Line Divisions which comprise these armies Two only have moved to field training areas, leaving Nine divisions, Four of which are within twenty miles of the capital.

6. Radar - Equipped Fresco (MIG-type fighter)

(SECRET)

Fresco (MIG-17) aircraft with radar equipment in the nose, have been sighted at Kecskemet, Hungary. Photographs indicated that the aircraft carried Hungarian national markings.

COMMENT: Kecskemet is a Hungarian Air Force fighter base and the location of a Hungarian Fighter Division Headquarters. These are the first Frescos to be supplied to any Satellite Air Force. Radar-equipped Fresco aircraft are probably intended to fill the role of interim all-weather fighters.

7. Designers of Soviet Strategic Bombers

(SECRET)

It is reliably reported that Soviet officials at the Air Show on Red Air Force Day 3rd July 1955 referred to Tupolev as the designer of two engine and four engine jet bombers, and to Miasischev as the designer of a four engine jet bomber.

An article in the Soviet press names Miasischev as the chief designer of a powerful new multi-engine aircraft with swept wings which droop. The aircraft is described as one "so badly needed" and as one which appeared singly during a public air display.

COMMENT: Miasischev was mentioned in Soviet radio broadcasts in connection with the May Day Air Show 1954, when the Badger (Type 39) and Bison (Type 37) first appeared. Badger is known to be a Tupolev design.

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Evidence that Miasischev is the designer of a 4 engine bomber appears to be confirmed by the Soviet press which indicates that it is the Bison.

By elimination, Tupolev becomes the designer of Bear (Turbo-prop bomber) which fits all the other evidence on this subject.

8. Possible Transfer of Soviet Warships to the Romanian Navy SECRET)

It has been reported that the Soviets, in the course of recent months, have transferred two destroyers and five modern submarines to Romania.

COMMENT: This is believed to be the first contribution to the build-up of the Romanian Navy.

WESTERN EUROPE

9. New Motor Minesweepers for Italy (RESTRICTED)

The Bambu, first of seven motor minesweepers building under the Offshore Procurement Programme at Monfalcone, was launched on 26th June last.

COMMENT: The other six ships will be named Ebano, Mango, Mogano, Palma Rovere and Sandolo. They are the offshore version of the Fiori class.

Details are:

Full load displacement	-	375 tons
Length	-	144 feet
Beam	-	27 ft. 4 ins.
Draught	-	13 ft. 5 ins.
Motors	-	Two Fiat diesels, 1320 H.P.
Armament	-	Two 20 mm (twin mounting)
Radar	-	American SO type

Moored, magnetic and acoustic sweeps.

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(unless otherwise classified)

10. French North African Situation

(CONFIDENTIAL)

A reliable observer of the Moroccan States reports that the Istaklal (i.e. extreme Nationalist) Party in Morocco says that the Party had issued orders for calm with effect from the arrival of Monsieur Grandval, the new French Resident General. The outbursts of rioting which had occurred since he had arrived were contrary to instructions, purely spontaneous and due to the bad behaviour of the police and the overcharged atmosphere.

The Istaklal Party knew that Monsieur Grandval had submitted a report to the French Government. If no solution had been produced by the French Government by August 20th (which is the anniversary of the deposed Sultan's enthronement) terrorism would be redoubled in the cities and guerilla warfare would break out in the mountains.

A further report states that one of the two remaining members of the Moroccan Communist Politburo has confirmed the opinion that widespread rioting would break out in Morocco on August 20th if no satisfactory solution were forthcoming by then.

COMMENT: These reports have been borne out by the latest press releases from French North Africa. On August 20th violent rioting broke out in French Morocco and Algeria. On August 22nd French troops emptied and razed by artillery fire nine suspected rebel hideout villages in Algeria in the area of Oued Zenati east of Constantine. French Legionnaires, under jet fighter cover, started a house to house cleanup of Oued Zem in central Morocco where nationalists reportedly massacred 42 French civilians. Unofficial estimates place the number of dead at 1,600. Among the latter is General Raymond Duval, commander of French troops in Morocco, who was killed in an airplane crash in the area of Oued Zem.

It is reported that on August 22nd two reinforcing French battalions arrived in Morocco and Le Bourget Airport in Paris was busy loading jeeps and automatic weapons aboard aircraft bound for Morocco and Algiers.

It is felt that the simultaneous outbreaks in Morocco and Algeria may have been the results of outside planning (probably by the Arab League) to sabotage the prospects of peace in Morocco afforded by the present talks between Moroccan and French leaders. Observers thought that the shift of some French troops from the Constantine area to Morocco and the border area may have been a factor in the rebel plans.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

11. Fighting in Northern Laos

(SECRET)

An unidentified Pathet Lao force surprised and captured a Laotian national army command outpost three miles southwest of Muong Peun in Sam Neua province on the night 12th and 13th August. Earlier attacks occurred between 3rd and 6th August on national army units southeast of Muong Peun. National army losses were seventeen killed, Pathet Lao losses unknown. A national infantry battalion southwest of Muong Peun has also reported harassing attacks for past ten days. It is unknown whether this is prelude to a major attack on Muong Peun or apprehension at the National Army buildup. There is no indication of Viet Minh preparations to reinforce Pathet Lao. Pathet Lao may hope to influence the deadlocked negotiations by force.

COMMENT: Fighting around Muong Peun has been sporadic since 8th July 1955, when Pathet Lao forces first began operations against the Laotian National Army in this area. As far as is known the casualties suffered by the Laotian National Army in these attacks are greater than those of the earlier skirmishes.

It is the opinion of reliable sources in Laos that the Pathet Lao were surprised by the Laotian National Army reaction to the initial July attack and by the adverse world wide publicity they received.

It is not thought that the actions of August 3rd-6th and 12th/13th are the prelude to all-out attack on Muong Peun but that they are indicative of apprehension at Laotian National Army build up and an attempt to intimidate the Laotian Government into a more acceptable frame of mind over the present dead lock in the negotiations.

12. Internal Security in South Vietnam

(SECRET)

The Government of South Vietnam has discontinued its main operation against the Hoa Hao. The remnants of the dissident leader Ba Cuts' forces are reported to have escaped in small groups to the Plaine des Joncs area, Northeast of the River Mekong near the Cambodian border.

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(unless otherwise classified)

Refugee villages on the outskirts of Saigon have been attacked by armed elements identified as the Binh Xuyen. The Binh Xuyen have also fired on shipping, using rifles, light machine guns and mortars. No vessels of nationality other than Vietnamese have been attacked in spite of heavy traffic on the river up to Saigon. The heaviest attack was at Pointe Bayau 27 miles from Saigon.

COMMENT: The Vietnamese National Army and Navy have expended considerable effort in their attempt to destroy the forces of the Hoa Hao leaders. Tran Van Soai and Ba Cut; some 30 battalions and the majority of the Navy being used in the operation. It is considered that the situation has not been improved by their efforts and should Ba Cut be able to establish himself in the Plaine des Joncs area the potential for terrorism and general instability in the Saigon area will increase. Though much reduced in numbers the Binh Xuyen are once again a force to be reckoned with. The dispersion of regular troops of the Vietnamese National Army is a serious deterrent to the successful implementation of the Joint United States-French training plan for the reorganisation of the Vietnamese National Army since these units cannot be spared from their present internal security duties.



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**ANNEX TOP SECRET**  
**COPY N° 98**

**ISSUE NO: 1693**

**19 August, 1955**

# **JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY**

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Issued weekly under the authority of  
The Joint Intelligence Committee  
National Defence Headquarters  
Ottawa

Item 2  
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**SECRET**

(unless otherwise classified)

SOVIET UNION AND SATELLITES

1. Transfers of Soviet Ships to the Polish Navy (SECRET)

Sightings of ships of the Polish Navy during their Navy Day on June 26th, and also during the visit to Gdynia of HMS Glasgow, confirm the additional transfer by the Soviets to the Polish Navy of five Kronstadt class coastal escorts and two further M Class submarines.

COMMENT: It is now apparent that the submarines transferred to the Polish Navy are M V Class and not M III and M IV classes as had hitherto been thought. The Polish Navy now consists of two destroyers, three large old submarines and six M V class submarines and 35 smaller craft. The first M V class submarines was transferred to the Polish Navy by the Soviets in June, 1954.

2. Soviet Jet Transport (SECRET)

On Red Air Force Day, July 3rd, the last aircraft in the Fly Past was an unscheduled twin engine jet transport, with wings slightly swept at no more than 20 - 30 degrees. The aircraft showed a marked similarity to the Badger (twin jet medium bomber) in overall size, position and shape of engine nacelles and in the configuration of the wing and the tail unit. The fuselage resembles that of the De Havilland Comet and there are four windows forward of the door and eight windows aft with a blank section over the wing.

The engines are smaller than those of the Badger, positioned well out from the fuselage and buried in the wings. Wheel nacelles in the wings are similar although smaller than those on the Badger.

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COMMENT: This aircraft designated Camel, has been evaluated as a medium jet transport capable of carrying 13,000 lbs freight or 44 passengers over a range of 2300 nautical miles. Such performance corresponds almost identically to that of the De Havilland Comet II. The twelve windows on the fuselage side signify a seating capacity of at least 36. The wheel nacelles indicate that the undercarriage is tricycle type, similar to that of the Badger.

Although the location of production has not been determined the many features common to both Camel and Badger suggest that they were both designed by Tupolev who is known to have designed the Badger. Evidence indicates that Camel will be used mainly on internal Soviet air routes.

3. Reduced Performance of Bisons Produced Prior to Mid-1956 (SECRET)

The appearance of 12 Bisons in the Red Air Force air display in July 1955 indicates that this aircraft has been put in serial production. Earlier estimates that Bison serial production would not begin until mid-1956 were based partly upon the knowledge that an engine of sufficient power to meet the design requirement could not be expected before 1957.

Evidence that serial production actually began shortly after construction of the prototype Bison indicates that production Bisons are being fitted with the same 18,000 lbs thrust engines which powered the prototype and power the Badger medium bomber.

Therefore Bisons delivered to units prior to mid-1956 will have performance reduced from that estimated for Bison with 20,500 lbs engines as follows: target altitude by 3000 ft, radius by 300 n.m., range by 700 n.m.

COMMENT: It is believed that the main production effort on Bison will not occur until after the more powerful engine becomes available. In the meanwhile the agreed (British American Canadian) performance estimates for the Bison (Brief 13-55 d/8 Feb 55) should be reduced as follows:

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Combat Radius (Two Way Mission)	2800 n.m.
Alt at Target	42,500 ft.
Combat Range (One Way Mission)	5400 n.m.
Alt at Target	47,000 ft.
Speeds	No change
Terminal altitude at target with 10,000 lb bomb	53,000 ft.
Terminal altitude at target with 3,000 lb bomb	54,000 ft.

This performance reduction may be eliminated by engine retrofit subsequent to Mid-1956.

'Altitude at target' is the greatest height attainable using cruise climb technique with normal power for optimum radius/range.

Terminal altitude is the greatest altitude attainable at a rate of climb of not less than 100 feet per minute, on a one way mission, with reduced reserves and using maximum power settings during the final climb.

The "altitude at target" figures more nearly represent the greatest altitude which an attacking force may normally be expected to attain. However, for defence planning purposes it has been necessary to estimate the maximum altitude which may be attainable, by varying the flight profile on a one way mission, should the tactic be adopted of attempting operations at the greatest height possible.

4. Visit of the United States Military Attache in  
Moscow to the Soviet Higher Officers' School

(SECRET)

On July 18th the US Army Attache to the Soviet Union and two assistants visited the Higher Officers' School at Solnechnogorsk situated about 40 miles north west of Moscow. The visitors spent six hours touring the installation and for a further four hours were entertained to a lavish banquet given by the School Commandant, a Lieutenant General.

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The American officers were invited to observe instruction in three classes, which included exterior ballistics, the application of Second World War battle experiences, and a map problem involving a regiment in the approach march. Numerous other classrooms were visited as well as other training facilities connected with the school.

A firing demonstration of various Soviet small arms was also presented for the benefit of the guests. Each Attache was permitted to fire five rounds with a pistol.

COMMENT: The trip to Solnechnogorsk was the first visit by the United States Army Attache to a Soviet military installation since the advent of the "cold war". This visit is obviously in keeping with the recent "new look" in Soviet policy toward the West in general and the United States in particular. Other foreign attaches have received similar invitations during the past year. The atmosphere was congenial at all times, and the Soviet staff at the school made every effort to be friendly. The assistant school commandant and a special briefing officer escorted the American party throughout their stay.

The tour appeared comprehensive and all questions were promptly answered by the Soviet officers.

The Higher Officers' School at Solnechnogorsk is essentially an advanced infantry tactics school. It operates three ten months courses--one each for regimental commanders, battalion commanders, and regimental staff officers. The total enrolment is about 300 students, and the school has a faculty of 55 instructors.

Further details of the visit are expected shortly.

5. Soviet Rocket Experiments in High Altitude Research (SECRET)

In a Pravda newspaper interview, dated August 15th, A.G. Karpenko, a Soviet space scientist, claims that in the Soviet Union animals have been carried to an altitude of 310 miles (500 kilometers) by radio-guided rockets. No further detail is available.

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COMMENT: Two design studies are known to have been going on about 1949 in the Soviet Union for a rocket of 600 miles range. One was prepared by German scientists, the other, known as Korolov's project, by the Soviets. Reports on the construction and firing of Korolov's rocket have been received, but are unconfirmed. Such a rocket if fired vertically could reach an altitude of 300 miles.

The maximum velocity of the claimed Soviet rocket would be 1.6 miles per second. For comparison, the maximum velocity of the U.S. Bumper project (250 miles altitude, no pay load) was 1.4 miles per second. The V-2 reached 1.0 miles per second.

Mice, and more recently small monkeys have been carried aloft about 70 miles in Aerobee high altitude research unguided rockets in USA.

Nothing is known of Soviet rockets designed like the U.S. Aerobee purely for high altitude research.

#### 6. Second Soviet Atomic Power Plant

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The Soviet Academy of Sciences atomic electric station has been reported on previously. Following the Moscow conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in July on this year, a Japanese scientist reported that he had visited the 'first Soviet atomic power plant' and had also seen the world's 'first atomic energy electric generation plant'. The first of these two plants was stated to be 36 miles from Moscow and is presumably the Academy of Sciences power station. The second was stated to be located about a three hour automobile ride to the southwest of Moscow.

This appears to have been one of the first references to this second plant. However in a press interview in July, Professor Henryk Niewodniczanski, director of a nuclear physics laboratory in Krakow, Poland referred to a visit to a Soviet atomic power plant whose location could correspond to the second plant referred to above. In the words of Professor Niewodniczanski the plant was located 'a hundred and some scores of kilometers away from Moscow (and was) operating in connection with (an) old power plant equipped with a turbine of 5,000 kw power fed by steam boilers heated by natural gas'. The atomic reactor was installed in a special building situated some distance from the power plant. The thermal output of the reactor was converted into steam in the special building and the steam piped across to the turbines of the generator.

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(unless otherwise classified)

COMMENT: While this evidence of a second atomic power plant is interesting, of more significance is the implication that the steam generated in the atomic reactor might be superheated by means of natural gas before going to the turbo-generator. It is the opinion of Canadian nuclear experts that the most efficient way of using steam obtained from an atomic reactor would be to superheat it with conventional fuels.

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A N N E X

to JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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1. Soviet Passive Listening Equipment

It has now been established that the six sites (five in Soviet occupied Germany, one in Soviet occupied Austria) containing electronic equipment are passive listening stations.

During an operation conducted in May 1955 against the site at Amstetten in Austria the equipment was observed to be taking bearings on radar signals from British radars taking part in the exercise. Also, on one site it has been established that the equipment is operated by personnel of a "Special Signals" Unit whose role corresponds to the British "Y" service.

COMMENT: The above facts together with the use of typical search serials and the absence of radio transmissions whilst the equipment is operating leave little doubt that their function is passive listening.

This equipment would form a useful addition to active radars used by the Soviet early warning system, particularly in wartime.