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2007-03-06

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PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

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28-6-1-Tudman Peace Mission

VOLUME

23

External Affairs
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SUBJECT/SUJET

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LE DEVOIR

DATE

FEB
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L'OTAN envisage la fusion des négociations américano-soviétiques de Genève

BRUXELLES (AFP) — L'OTAN envisage une fusion des négociations américano-soviétiques de Genève sur les euromissiles (INF) et sur les armes intercontinentales (START) interrompues unilatéralement par l'URSS, à la fin de 1983, après le début du déploiement des Pershing-2 et des missiles de croisière américains en Europe, a-t-on appris de source diplomatique à Bruxelles.

Un groupe d'experts de l'OTAN met actuellement au point un document sur les avantages et les inconvénients d'une telle fusion.

Le principal mérite de celle-ci serait d'abord la simple reprise du dialogue entre les deux super-grands sur l'équilibre de la terreur nucléaire, a-t-on ajouté de même source.

Véritable serpent de mer depuis l'ouverture des deux négociations (novembre 1981 pour les INF et juin 1982 pour les START), cette fusion éventuelle sera le thème central d'une réunion à haut niveau, aujourd'hui à Bruxelles, des spécialistes du groupe consultatif spécial venus des capitales des pays de l'OTAN.

Le secrétaire d'État adjoint américain pour les affaires européennes, M. Richard Burt, doit présider la réunion du groupe, la première depuis le 11 janvier dernier.

Fusion ou pas fusion? La question sera enfin examinée à la lumière du changement intervenu au Kremlin avec l'arrivée de Constantin Tchernenko, à la place de Youri Andropov qui avait interrompu les négociations.

Pour l'OTAN, une fusion INF-START permettrait à l'URSS de regagner la table des pourparlers sans « perdre la face » après avoir claqué la porte à Genève, le 23 novembre pour les euromissiles et le 8 décembre pour les START, a-t-on indiqué de source diplomatique.

On ne s'attend toutefois à aucun résultat rapide d'une éventuelle fusion dans l'une ou l'autre des catégories d'armes considérées, même si, selon le négociateur américain aux START, le général Edward Rowny, les deux parties avaient fait dans ces pourparlers « davantage de progrès qu'il n'est généralement admis » avant leur suspension par Moscou.

Les négociations sur les euromissiles sont pour leur part « mortes et enterrées dans leur forme initiale », a-t-on ajouté de source diplomatique, l'URSS ne les ayant toujours considérées que comme « un moyen d'empêcher le déploiement des nouvelles fusées de l'OTAN tout en maintenant le monopole de ses SS-20 braqués sur l'Europe ».

A l'issue de la série d'entretiens qu'ont eus à Moscou plusieurs dirigeants occidentaux avec M. Tchernenko après les funérailles de M. andropov, et en dépit de l'évocation par le nouveau numéro un soviétique de la « détente » nécessaire dans les relations Est-Ouest, on ne s'attend donc pas, au siège de l'OTAN, à un quelconque changement prochain de la position de l'URSS à Genève.

Quelles que soient ses intentions, a-t-on souligné de source diplomatique, le Kremlin attendra le résultat des élections présidentielles américaines de novembre prochain avant d'infléchir sensiblement sa position dans un sens ou dans l'autre.

Enfin, a-t-on ajouté, une fusion ne pourrait en aucun cas satisfaire l'exigence de l'URSS de comptabiliser les forces nucléaires stratégiques indépendantes de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne dans le marchandage.



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NOTE ALLER RETOUR

Feb. 20

FROM
DE CMR/Brunton

File No. (originator) — Dossier n° (source)

TO
A IDDZ/Smith

File No. (addressee) — Dossier n° (destinataire)

Subject - Objet

Privy Council Office Correspondence

Would you please check your records to see if a reply was done to the letter from Lord Olam (re: PM's visit to China), which was referred to you December 29, 1983 from the Privy Council Office (PCO#3348 069). Could you please forward a copy of the reply to CMR (B-3).

Signature

Date February 22, 1984 Telephone 3-6487

Reply - Réponse

Copy of our draft letter addressed to PMO was sent to your division two days ago (Feb. 20, 1984) to the attention of Mr. Johnston.

IDDZ/C. Forgues

Signature

Date February 22, 1984 Telephone 5-5912

ADDRESSEE
DESTINATAIRE

Please add reply — Keep this copy and return copy 2 to originator.
Inscrire la réponse — Garder cette copie et expédier la copie 2 à l'initiateur

IDDZ/J.McNee/5-5912/cf *Johnston*

c.c. EA/CMR/Johnston
Ref.: PMO No.3348 069

DRAFT LETTER

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

Dear Lord Oram:

Thank you for your letter of December 2. I was most interested to learn of your question in the House of Lords on my visit to Peking.

I went to Peking as part of my current initiative whose aim, in part, is to catalyse political leaders into devoting their personal attention to the cause of peace.

Like you, I am persuaded that China has a very key role to play in global affairs. As one of the five nuclear weapon states, China has a direct responsibility for nuclear disarmament. When Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Ottawa in January of this year I found that he had warmed somewhat to my proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers. I suggested that the five might hold preliminary discussions at the United Nations in New York to prepare the ground for an eventual conference to limit strategic arsenals.

*Peter
Secretary
Council
member*

... Given your interest in these questions I am enclosing a copy of Hansard of January 17 which contains my introduction of Premier Zhao and his address to the Canadian Parliament.

January 17, 1984

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APPENDIX

ADDRESS

of

ZHAO ZIYANG

Premier of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China

to

Both Houses of Parliament

in the

House of Commons Chamber, Ottawa

on

Tuesday, January 17, 1984

[Translation]

His Excellency, the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China was welcomed by the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, and thanked by the Honourable Maurice Riel, Speaker of the Senate and the Honourable Lloyd Francis, Speaker of the House of Commons.

Hon. Lloyd Francis (Speaker of the House of Commons): I now invite the Right Honourable the Prime Minister to introduce His Excellency, the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

Right Hon. P. E. Trudeau (Prime Minister): Mr. Speaker of the Senate, Mr. Speaker of the House of Commons, Premier Zhao Ziyang, distinguished guests, honourable members of the Senate and the House of Commons, Canada and this Parliament are greatly honoured today to have in our company a most distinguished guest, the Premier of the People's Republic of China.

[English]

Mr. Premier, I welcome you on behalf of the people of Canada. You have come to a land of icy skies and snowy ground and you have come as a friend. This is a unique and momentous occasion. It is unique because it is the first time that a Chinese Premier has come to Canada and the first time that a high official of the People's Republic of China has addressed us. It is momentous because this occasion constitutes a recognition of the very special ties which unite our two nations and underscores the fact that Canada's relations across the Pacific are an increasingly important factor in our foreign and economic policies.

Canada is a very young country by Chinese standards. Two hundred years ago, Ottawa was a clearing in the woods. Two thousand years ago, China was at the height of civilization. Chinese artists and philosophers produced works still regarded as masterpieces today. During the dark and middle ages in Europe, a steady flow of Chinese inventions and processes

enriched our civilization; the compass, gunpowder, silkmaking and printing, for example. During the enlightenment Chinese artistic design took the salons of Europe by storm.

China, as the middle kingdom, has always played a pre-dominant role in the world. During many periods in its history its influence had spread well beyond the boundaries of Asia. Certainly today China has regained its full eminence as a force to be reckoned with in world affairs. Its strong leadership role in the Third World, its advocacy of better North-South and South-South relations, for example, are well known and widely respected. China's strong opposition to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its support for the Cambodian coalition government are equally important in the Asian balance of power.

We in Canada share many of China's concerns and attitudes on these questions and consider close consultations such as we have this morning with the People's Republic of China as an important part of our foreign policy. We are proud of having established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1970, and are extremely pleased that since then our bilateral relationships have achieved such variety, depth and warmth. Over the years many have contributed to the relationship both in China and in Canada. Today I pay tribute to them. We speak often of Norman Bethune and of Chester Ronning and rightly so. But going back even into the 19th Century there were thousands of others whose work has brought us to where we are today.

When I made an official visit to China in 1973, the current phase of our relations was very much in a formative stage. Nevertheless, a number of understandings were reached, the fruits of which we are seeing today. In areas of family reunification, of cultural and sporting and academic exchanges, substantial and in some cases dramatic progress has been made. To cite just three examples, as of the end of last year, some 22,000 Chinese have been reunited with their relatives in

Canada. Over 1,300 scholars and students from China have been received by Canadian educational institutions. Scores of prominent Canadian and Chinese artists and sports teams have performed in each other's country.

Like so many Canadians, as a young boy I was utterly taken with the mystery and excitement of Chinese history and geography and steeped myself in your myths and traditions. Later, I began what has been a life-long fascination with your philosophers, artists, strategists and historians. It seemed obvious to me even then that to the extent that the world could not benefit from Chinese experience and vision it would be a poorer place.

It was therefore with particular satisfaction that I found myself in a position to initiate the process which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries. I hope that experience helped to speed China on the course which returned your country to the world stage and once again enabled its wise counsel to be heard in the community of nations. Some of the most valued memories of my visit to China in 1973 include the opportunity to meet Chairman Mao Tse-tung, to discuss politics with Chou En-Lai far into the night, and to be accompanied on my travels to the south of China by Chairman Deng Xiaoping whose wise opinion on world affairs I have always respected.

[Translation]

A country of great tradition, China has, as I remarked earlier, been the origin of many scientific discoveries for hundreds of years. Canada still has much to learn from China, but nevertheless, there are areas in which Canada could make a very useful contribution to your modernization program. I am thinking, for instance, of a number of high technology sectors, as well as the development of your resources, especially the oil and gas industry, both on the mainland and offshore.

In the space of nearly fourteen years, Canada's trade with the People's Republic of China has grown until today that country has become our fifth largest market. Chinese exports to Canada have also risen significantly over the years and this trend should continue.

[English]

Mr. Premier, if harmony distinguishes our bilateral relationships, the same cannot be said for the international climate within which the future of that relationship must unfold. There is abroad, especially since the beginning of this decade, a growing uneasiness with the direction of international affairs, particularly the state of relations between the superpowers. Our people are concerned about the future and most of all about the prospect of war in a nuclear age.

Mr. Premier, we are faced with a daunting challenge. Either this generation of leaders must reduce the number of nuclear weapons and prevent their spread, or we bequeath to our children a future where the chances of global destruction increase every day. Yet it would be a dangerous fallacy to

expect stability to be achieved only through numerical adjustments and technological containment, however significant.

It is at least equally important to bring about a fundamental change in attitudes and intentions if we are to assure the peace we all so desperately seek. Over the last few months I have sought to draw attention to the gravity of the present situation and to influence the trend of East-West relations. I have been voicing the concerns of a great many Canadians who are deeply troubled by uncertainty over superpower intentions and by fears of growing nuclear arsenals whose destructive potential already defies comprehension.

Premier Zhao, I have sought counsel with many statesmen and world leaders on these matters. You and I have discussed, both here and in Beijing, the role that political leadership must play in reducing international tensions. We live in a multipolar world and China is one of its essential compass points. We in Canada highly value the opinions of China on the urgent questions of international security. Your weight is undeniable in any global reckoning.

China must take its full place in the world community. China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has responsibilities of leadership in the task of reducing the threat of nuclear war. Indeed, the United Nations Charter confers special rights and veto powers on the permanent members of the Security Council who, not incidentally, constitute the nuclear weapons fraternity. These rights and privileges in maintaining international security also confer special responsibilities. But, of course, the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament lies with the superpowers. With nuclear arsenals which could threaten life on earth many times over, they have heavy responsibilities not only to each other but to all of us. We cannot wait until the United States and the Soviet Union however, pursuing some internal superpower logic, are ready to reach agreement. We must demonstrate our stake in their deliberations and force their attention to the threat to which they subject the rest of mankind.

All nations and all political leaders have the duty to do what they can to stop the nuclear arms race and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus we can take some satisfaction in the knowledge that, at a time when virtually all arms control negotiations have broken down, the foreign ministers of East and West are now gathering in Stockholm to discuss security and confidence-building measures in Europe. Let us hope that the period of megaphone diplomacy may be coming to an end.

Mr. Premier, the history of your country is measured in millenia. You know that on issues of war and peace there are no permanent solutions. Peace must be continuously constructed, nurtured and maintained through the efforts of honest men seeking happiness, prosperity and, in the nuclear age, the survival of their people. Thus, the quest for peace is never-ending. In this sense, our talks this morning and your presence in this Parliament, Premier Zhao, are important building blocks for peace. For do we not both represent men and women of goodwill?

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[Translation]

Mr. Speaker, it is with immense pleasure that we welcome today. Mr. Zhao Ziyang, premier of the People's Republic of China.

(Applause)

[English]

[Simultaneous interpretation]

His Excellency Zhao Ziyang (Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China):

Mr. Speaker of the Senate,

Mr. Speaker of the House of Commons,

Mr. Prime Minister,

The Honourable Members of Parliament,

I have come to visit your country at the kind invitation of Prime Minister Trudeau, bringing with me the deep friendship of the one billion Chinese people for the Canadian people. I feel greatly honoured to have this opportunity of speaking to this august gathering.

Contacts between the Chinese and Canadian peoples began over two hundred and fifty years ago. At that time, tens of thousands of Chinese came to Canada and joined the Canadian people in developing this country. Many Canadian friends also went to China to live and work there. When the Chinese people were in times of difficulty, Dr. Norman Bethune gave up his life for Chinese people's cause of liberation. In October 1970, the People's Republic of China and Canada formally established diplomatic relations, thus ushering in a new stage in the friendship between our two peoples. Sino-Canadian friendship has since then developed steadily, contacts have increased, and exchanges and co-operation have expanded. Many Members of the Canadian Parliament and friends from all walks of life have worked unrelentingly for and made valuable contributions to all this. Reviewing the past and looking into the future, we are fully confident of the bright prospects for the expansion of Sino-Canadian friendly relations and co-operation.

Now I would like to take this opportunity to speak about China's foreign policy and some related questions.

What is the fundamental principle of China's foreign policy? To answer this question briefly, it is independence. We do not attach ourselves to any big power and are not subject to any big power's will. We have determined our foreign policy in line with our judgment on international affairs formed according to the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and those of the world people.

It includes the following points: (1) to develop relations with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence; (2) to strengthen solidarity with the other Third World countries and friendship with the people of all countries; and (3) to oppose hegemonism and safeguard world peace.

You all know that in modern history China was badly bullied and oppressed by foreign powers, and the Chinese people waged long and bitter struggles and ultimately won

national independence at tremendous costs. Therefore, we are jealous of our own independence and at the same time highly respect the independence of other countries. Back in the early 1950s China initiated the Five Principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, as norms guiding international relations. It is on these principles that we have handled our relations with other countries. We will never contravene these principles; nor do we want to see them violated by other countries in their mutual relations.

It is gratifying that the above-mentioned principles have been adhered to by both China and Canada in their mutual relations. The state of Sino-Canadian relations shows that countries with different social systems should and can live together in amity and co-operation to mutual benefit. We will work with Canada for the sustained development of our friendly relations and co-operation in the interest of the well-being of our peoples and the prosperity of our countries.

China is seeking to develop relations on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence with all countries, which include the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union. China has all along valued Sino-U.S. relations. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence are acknowledged as norms guiding Sino-U.S. relations in the 1979 communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The United States recognizes that there is but one China, that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China and that Taiwan is a part of China. It has stated that it has no intention to infringe upon China's sovereignty and interfere in China's internal affairs.

Relations between China and the United States have made fairly big progress since the establishment of Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations. However, there have also been ups and downs, and twists and turns. The main obstacle is the question of Taiwan. During my visit to the United States I held friendly, candid and serious talks with President Reagan and other leaders of the U.S. Government. The American side once again affirmed the above principles. We hope that the two sides will work together, strictly abide by the mutually agreed principles in their action and truly fulfil commitments already made, so that Sino-U.S. relations may take the path of steady development.

We also sincerely wish to see normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. The present state of Sino-Soviet relations is not to the benefit of world peace. We are trying to maintain normal relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. This requires the removal of the three obstacles to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations: First, the Soviet Union must stop supporting Viet Nam in its aggression against Kampuchea; second, it must withdraw its troops from Afghanistan; and third, it must withdraw its forces from the Sino-Soviet border and Mongolia.

China and the Soviet Union have already held three rounds of consultations. However, the Soviet side has thus far evaded discussing these three questions which threaten China's security. Although Sino-Soviet relations have somewhat improved in recent years, greater efforts by the two sides are called for if Sino-Soviet relations are to be really normalized.

I also want to say a few words about Sino-British relations. Negotiations are going on between the two sides to resolve the Hong Kong question which is left over from history. Hong Kong was occupied by Britain after the opium war. China has decided to resume exercise of its sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. We have adopted the following policies which we believe are reasonable: Hong Kong will become a special administrative region of China to be administered by the Hong Kong people themselves; the current social and economic systems and lifestyle will remain unchanged; Hong Kong will maintain its financial independence and its status as a free port and international financial centre; Hong Kong will maintain and develop its economic and cultural relations with foreign countries; the interests of the residents and foreign investors in Hong Kong will be fully protected. Hong Kong's prosperity and stability will not be affected.

All these will be guaranteed by a basic law of Hong Kong to be enacted by the National People's Congress, the supreme organ of power in China, which will take into full account the opinions of people of all walks of life in Hong Kong. I believe the question of Hong Kong can be resolved through negotiations between China and Britain.

China is a developing socialist country. We share similar historical experiences and face the same task of economic development. We firmly support the other Third World countries in their just cause of safeguarding national independence and developing their national economies. We are in favour of increased South-South co-operation, improving North-South relations and establishing the new international economic order through global negotiations. The Chinese Government appreciates the efforts made by the Canadian Government for pushing North-South dialogue forward and improving North-South relations. China will persist in its policy of opening to the outside world, strengthen economic co-operation of equality and mutual benefit with both developing and developed countries, and do its part in promoting world economic prosperity. We hope Sino-Canadian economic co-operation may set an example of co-operation between developing and developed countries.

We believe that only when the principles of peaceful co-existence are universally respected can our planet enjoy genuine and lasting peace. Unfortunately, not every country is willing to observe these principles. Hegemonist acts of strong countries humiliating the weak, rich countries oppressing the poor and big countries bullying the small, keep occurring from time to time. Therefore, we firmly oppose hegemonism. We are against hegemonist actions no matter where and by whom they are committed. China will never seek hegemony. We have declared many times that if China ever pursues hegemonism,

other countries should also take it to task. Without opposing hegemonism, international justice cannot possibly be upheld, nor world peace be maintained.

The present international situation is indeed disturbing. There are so-called "hot-spots" in many areas in the world. The nuclear arms race between the two superpowers is becoming white-hot. The struggle over the deployment of intermediate missiles has aggravated the situation in Europe where two military blocs confront each other. Under these circumstances, the people of various countries strongly demand the stopping of the nuclear arms race and realizing disarmament. This is entirely justified. We appreciate the efforts made by Prime Minister Trudeau to safeguard world peace, relax international tension and promote nuclear disarmament. We support his appeal for the participation of more political leaders in the world in the cause of safeguarding world peace. We would like to continue consultations with Canadian leaders on these issues. We hope that all peace-loving countries and people will go into action and urge the two nuclear powers which possess over 90 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons to stop their nuclear arms race, resume disarmament talks, hold discussion in earnest and take the lead in agreeing on measures of drastically reducing nuclear arms so as to create the condition for joint nuclear disarmament by all the nuclear countries.

The Honourable Members of Parliament, China takes the maintenance of world peace as a major objective in its foreign policy, not only because we need a peaceful international environment in which to modernize our country, but also because we are fully aware that the people of the world cannot afford to undergo the scourge of another world war. World peace and stability are the common desire of the people of all countries. So long as the people all over the world get united in defending peace, a new world war can be prevented.

I wish to take this opportunity to point out that a strong and prosperous China not only is in the interest of the Chinese people, but also contributes to world peace and stability. Now, more and more countries and regions hope to develop trade and economic co-operation with China and are highly interested in China's economic co-operation with China and are highly interested in China's economic policy. China's policy of opening to the outside world is not an expedient measure but a long-term national policy. While adhering to self-reliance, we also pay attention to importing advanced foreign technology and equipment and making use of foreign funds. In the next ten years we will give priority to energy, transportation, communication, and import key equipment and technology for upgrading about 400,000 enterprises. In all these areas, Canada has its strong points and experience. On our part, we also have many products which Canada needs. I am convinced, as time goes on, our areas of co-operation will become still more broader. Let us make further efforts to this end.

The Honourable Members of Parliament, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, Peng Zhen, has invited the Canadian Parliament to send

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a delegation to visit China at an appropriate time. I am sure you will be warmly welcomed by the Chinese National People's Congress, the Chinese Government and the Chinese people.

Thank you!

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear!

[Translation]

Hon. Maurice Riel (Speaker of the Senate): Mr. Speaker of the House of Commons, Mr. Premier of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Prime Minister of Canada, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour to thank you, Mr. Premier of China, for the words of wisdom and encouragement you have just spoken before our two Houses of Parliament.

The philosophy that emerges from the outline you gave of your country's foreign policy and its peace objectives, your relations with the United State of America, with the Soviet Union, with Great Britain on the matter of Hong Kong, with Third World countries, and the North-South dialogue, seems very similar to what we in Canada believe, and in your comments on the policy and peace initiatives undertaken by our own Prime Minister, you expressed the same principles, and despite the immense distances that separate us, this is an example of the profoundly human solidarity that exists between our two peoples who are united in a common desire for peace.

Peace in our time, Mr. Premier, is not a vain ambition, and we are happy to hear that you share this ideal with our Prime Minister and with all Canadians, and you have come to us over the oceans, despite our cold Canadian winter, to announce before this Parliament that your people share our ideals. We find this very comforting, and urge you to tell the people of China that we are with them in this search for peace, and that Canadians are supporting the efforts of our Prime Minister, despite inevitable obstacles, to achieve a lasting peace at this point in the world's existence.

Thank you Mr. Premier for your visit and for the gesture you made today with reference to the cordial relations we have with China.

[English]

We wish to thank Your Excellency for your visit, for the gesture you have made and for the good words you have said to help the world along the road to peace. Thank you again.

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear!

Mr. Lloyd Francis (Speaker of the House of Commons): Mr. Speaker of the Senate, Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Premier of China, Members of the Senate and the House of Commons, it is a great honour for me on behalf of Members of our Houses of Parliament and guests assembled to express our appreciation of the Address we have heard from the Premier of the People's Republic of China. We welcome him to Canada as a representative of the most populous nation on earth and also as a friend.

The establishment of diplomatic ties between our two countries in 1970 was an important step leading to the resumption by China of its prominent role in the international community. Since that time there have been, as has been mentioned, an increasing number of exchanges between Canada and the People's Republic in the fields of arts and culture, science and technology, education, medicine, sports, tourism and, of course in economic areas. Canada's exports of well over \$1 billion annually testify to the value of China as a trading partner.

In addition to continued economic co-operation we are encouraged by China's support for efforts to bring lasting international peace and stability.

[Translation]

Last year, a delegation of Canadian parliamentarians went to China to increase our knowledge of each other's country, to consolidate our friendship and to explore other avenues for co-operation between our two countries. All members of the delegation were absolutely delighted with their visit.

[English]

In keeping with the warm relationship which has developed between our two countries, we are honoured to receive our distinguished visitor in our capital.

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear!

Mr. Speaker: The meeting is now adjourned.

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
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
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


PMO Ref. No: ... 3348 069

We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could prepare a draft reply to the attached letter and return it to me directly by _____ with a copy to CMR/Johnston. It should be prepared as if for the Prime Minister's signature, although I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 593-5776.



Joseph P. Caron
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)
PCO/Judy Cameron
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

TO/A: Mr. Fowler\	
CC: Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)	
RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE: Lord Oram	DATE: December 2, 1983
SUBJECT/SUJET: PM's visit to China	
CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE: 3348 069	

Judy Cameron

DATE: December 15, 1983

- ☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.
- ☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.
- ☐ REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.
RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.
- ☐ NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.
AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

From LORD ORAM



House of Lords

2 December 1983

Mr Pierre Trudeau
Prime Minister's Office
Houses of Parliament
Ottawa, Canada


Dear Mr Trudeau,

I thought you would be interested in the brief question which was asked in the House of Lords yesterday on the subject of your recent visit to Peking. (see Column 809)

It was understandable that Lord Whitelaw did not know the outcome of your visit but I am wondering whether you issued any statement about your conversations in Peking, or alternatively, if there are no objections by reason of protocol, whether you could let me have a personal note.

In the last eighteen months I have paid two visits to China and I therefore very much welcomed your initiative because I am convinced that China has a most important role to play in world affairs which is not yet sufficiently recognised by other nations.

Yours sincerely,



Oram

Lord Oram

ORIGINAL TO *R. Fowler*
ORIGINAL ENVOYÉ À
C.C. P.M.O. FILE
C.C. DOSSIERS C.P.M.

Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, we are very grateful to the noble Viscount for repeating the Statement. Would he agree that the Commonwealth and these periodic summit conferences are of real value, notwithstanding some of the obvious limitations of an association of this nature? Is he aware that we welcome the measure of agreement which emerged on a number of subjects: for example, on apartheid and on Namibian independence through the implementation of UN Resolution 435? Will he give an undertaking that Her Majesty's Government will continue to pursue this matter with vigour?

The Statement which he has just read refers to linkage. Will he confirm that we are not committed to the principle of linkage, and that we reject it? It is important that the Government should make that point absolutely clear. Was the question of South African aggression against neighbouring states discussed in the conference, and did Her Majesty's Government have any proposals to make to deal with that? We welcome the agreement—also referred to in the Statement—that the emphasis in Grenada should be, “on reconstruction, not recrimination”, and on the establishment of an interim civilian administration on the island.

The Statement also refers to assistance to Grenada. What assistance did the summit conference have in mind, and what contribution are her Majesty's Government making expected to make? Is the noble Viscount aware that we also welcome the reference in the Statement to the Goa declaration on the problems of small states, and the proposed study by the Secretary-General of their special needs? Can he confirm that we are supporting the Trudeau initiative, about which, according to the press, there was some doubt at some stage?

Is he aware that we also support the initiative proposed to deal with the problems of Cyprus and the setting up of the action group? Although the United Kingdom cannot sit as a member of the group, because this country is a guarantor, will he confirm that we shall continue to work for a just solution as one of the guarantor powers?

Can the noble Viscount confirm whether it is true that there was in fact a good deal of disagreement about a new Bretton Woods conference, and that the Prime Minister exercised the veto on 10 occasions? If this is true it shows that the Prime Minister behaved at the summit as she does in the Cabinet of which the noble Viscount is a distinguished member. Did she oppose the initiative for a conference on the international economic situation, and will Her Majesty's Government support that? May I say that we on this side most warmly welcome the call by the conference on the United States and Soviet Russia to resume a genuine political dialogue. Will the Government continue to work for a meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Andropov?

Lord Diamond: My Lords, I, too, should like to thank the noble Viscount for being good enough to repeat this important Statement in your Lordships' House. I want to underline a good deal of what has already been said. In particular, I want to underline what the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, has said about the welcome we give to the fact that the

Prime Minister was able to find the time to go and encourage the holding regularly of these Commonwealth conferences, to which we attach enormous importance.

Is the noble Viscount aware that we welcome many of the paragraphs included in the Statement? For example, we welcome the willingness to consider sympathetically Grenadan requests for assistance. Is he aware that we further welcome the importance put on establishing a constructive dialogue between East and West? It would be difficult to attach too much importance to that Statement, so vital is it in the current situation in the world. Is he aware, too, that we welcome in the Statement the recognition of the need for the Bretton Woods institutions to be adapted and better equipped to deal with the problems of the international economy?

I hope that the noble Viscount is pleased with the number of examples that I have given of the way in which we welcome points in the Statement. Is he aware that it is not unusual to put the welcoming parts first and to go on, secondly, to those parts for which one has less than a full welcome? Therefore, will the noble Viscount say a good deal more about the things which are hinted at in the Statement and which are expressed in other media as being areas of disagreement? In particular, will he say whether the Prime Minister regards herself as *primus inter pares*—

Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: *Prima.*

Lord Diamond: My Lords, I am grateful for the lesson in refreshing my knowledge of the classics. Perhaps I was referring to the phrase *primus inter pares*, and to the non-sexual nature of a Prime Minister. Will the noble Viscount therefore say whether the Prime Minister regards herself as limited to that responsibility and attitude in dealing with the Commonwealth Conference, as all Prime Ministers hitherto have considered themselves *primae inter pares*?

Viscount Whitelaw: My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their response to the Statement and for the general welcome they have given to the holding of a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, and its value. It is very easy to point to the resolutions as being compromises or, in some cases, as not meaning very much, but surely the important point is that the conference provided the opportunity to have a dialogue and discussion with many nations from different parts of the world which hold totally different points of view on many issues of world-wide significance. The fact that the 48 nations of the Commonwealth, so diverse as they are, can come together and have a dialogue and discussion is surely of great value. Those who criticise these conferences for not coming to more concrete conclusions sometimes claim at the same time how vital it is that there should be dialogue and discussion in the world. They cannot have it both ways. If, therefore, dialogue and discussion take place on this scale, surely it is of value to the world and to the Commonwealth. I know that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister feels very strongly that this is the case.

That covers the welcome which both noble Lords have given to various parts of the communiqué. 000299

[VISCOUNT WHITELAW.]

Perhaps I may now turn to some of the detailed points. The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, asked me about the problems in South Africa and Namibia, and the linkage with Angola. As my right honourable friend made clear, we have to accept that that linkage exists in other people's minds and that we shall not solve the problem until we can find a way of getting round it. We are ready to do so and we are seeking to do so. Certainly we support Mr. Trudeau's initiative.

So far as Grenada is concerned, we have given an undertaking that we shall be prepared to help, with others, in such matters as policing and elections. I believe noble Lords will agree that this country has considerable experience in these matters, as my noble friend Lord Soames made so clear in Zimbabwe, and we could again give help, if required. I would give the same answer to the noble Lord, Lord Diamond. We have already promised some £750 million of overseas aid, and—I believe the figure is not £750 million but £750,000? I will find the correct answer and give it to your Lordships.

As to the question of disagreement, to which both noble Lords referred and in particular the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, who asked whether the Prime Minister regarded herself as *primus inter pares* at the Commonwealth Conference, I would reply to both noble Lords in the same sense: wherever the Prime Minister is, whether she is in Cabinet in this country, at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference or anywhere else, she shows herself to be an outstanding and a very great leader, which is of great value to this country. Much of the success of the conference was due to the Prime Minister exhibiting those very qualities.

Lord Oram: My Lords, we understand that Mr. Trudeau left the conference and went to Peking in order to seek Chinese help in bringing the two superpowers into a better state of relationship. Can the noble Viscount say whether Mr. Trudeau went, so to speak, as an envoy from the conference or whether he went to Peking on his own initiative? Did Mr. Trudeau return to the conference and report to his colleagues, and, if so, to what effect?

Viscount Whitelaw: My Lords, Mr. Trudeau went on this tour on his own initiative, but he had had the benefit of discussions with his colleagues at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. Naturally, the talks would be held in the light of the knowledge he had gained from his Commonwealth colleagues. Perhaps I could say at this point that the previous answer I gave was wrong. The figure was £750,000, not £750 million.

Baroness Vickers: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether he heard the early morning broadcast which said that Mr. Mugabe and the Prime Minister had had a very agreeable discussion which would make a great difference to their friendship in the future?

Viscount Whitelaw: My Lords, I am glad to be able to inform my noble friend and the House that I understand that the Prime Minister and Mr. Mugabe

had a very useful exchange of views. The Prime Minister said this morning how pleased she was to have heard on the radio that Mr. Mugabe also thought that to be the case. It may help my noble friend and the House to know that the question of the air force officers, naturally, was paramount in the discussions. A fourth officer was released following the recommendation of the review tribunal. My right honourable friend understands that the appeal of the remaining three officers will come before the review tribunal in the same way, so we continue to hope for their early release.

Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, may I put two supplementary questions to the noble Viscount? First, I see that, very rightly, they are looking forward to elections in Grenada. May I ask the noble Viscount whether the intention is that the elections should be held before the American troops evacuate the island, or afterwards? If afterwards, will the elections be held in the presence of a Commonwealth force? Will somebody keep order during the elections? My second question is related to the assistance given to small states and to the general idea that the Commonwealth should in certain circumstances act in much the same way as the President of the United States acted in regard to Grenada.

Viscount Whitelaw: My Lords, on the noble Lord's second point, which I shall answer first, this matter was remitted for study by the Commonwealth Secretary-General. No further decisions were taken. It is for the Secretary-General to report his conclusions as a result of his study. I do not wish to make further commitments beyond that. The noble Lord's first point has certainly not been discussed or decided. Everybody hopes—it is known that the United States Government so hope—that it will be possible for United States forces to be withdrawn from Grenada as soon as possible. The question of assistance and who would take over has still to be discussed in a wider forum than the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. It is for the Governor to decide when he thinks it would be best to hold the elections; but we remain ready to help, should we be required to do so, in the conduct of those elections, or with any policing problems which might arise.

Lord Soames: My Lords, in view of the welcome so very rightly given by the conference to the Grenada request for future Commonwealth assistance, was it at any time considered during the conference that gratitude should be expressed to the United States for the assistance they gave to Grenada in their hour of greatest need?

Viscount Whitelaw: My Lords, I must answer my noble friend by saying that if this was discussed during the conference it did not appear in the communiqué. I have no knowledge of what was said during the detailed discussions.

Lord Brockway: My Lords, may I, from the Back-Benches, repeat my thanks to the noble Viscount for repeating this Statment and congratulate the Government on the very full report which they have made to

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A OG2

February 20, 1984

IDDZ-0193

Mr. Marc A. Schindler
2724 Farriers Lane
Gloucester, Ontario
K1T 1X8

Dear Mr. Schindler:

The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. MacEachen, has asked me to reply to your letter of 7 February concerning the Prime Minister's recent visit to Eastern Europe.

I wish to assure you that we are under no illusions about the Eastern European countries' strict alliance with the Soviet Union. But this is not to say that they are without influence on the Soviet Union or that the Eastern countries are monolithic in view. Romania is, of course, the clearest example of a member of the Warsaw Pact which has followed a highly independent approach in foreign policy.

We think it important to open lines of communication with Eastern Europe while recognizing that the West's relationship with the Soviet Union is central.

Yours truly,

L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

m No. <i>Marc A. Schindler Ont.</i>			No. A 05662
Subject Sujet <i>PM's remarks during his peace initiative about East European influence with USSR</i>			Action div./Dir. responsable
Letter dated/Lettre en date du <i>84-02-07</i>	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA <i>84-02-16</i>	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. <i>84-02-16</i>	<i>IDDZ</i> Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s)
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par			<i>84-02-23</i>
Comments/Commentaires			

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu <i>Feb 17 1984</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable <i>J. McNEE</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition <i>IDDZ 1173</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date <i>Feb 20 1984</i>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

5-1047

AR-100 5862

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Marc A. Schindler
2724 Farriers Lane
Gloucester, Ont.
K1T 1X8

7 February 1984


Hon. Allan MacEachen, M.P.
Secretary of State for External Affairs
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario

Dear Mr. MacEachen;

It has recently been reported that you stated in an interview that the Eastern European satellites have sufficient influence with the Soviet Union to influence the U.S.S.R. with respect to the disarmament issue.

I would like to know if you honestly feel that countries with a foreign power's tanks stationed in their forests have any real chance of influencing that foreign power, or are we to take your remark in the spirit of good honest fun that this latest joke by the Prime Minister is meant?

Yours sincerely,



Marc A. Schindler

P.S. I am serious about the joking aspect of Mr. Trudeau's world trip. Seeing it as his last, ironic hurrah is the most honourable interpretation, since, I would remind you, the threat of nuclear was just as serious when your party was not foredoomed to oblivion. Nasty sense of humour, though, you people seem to have!

cc: Hon. Sinclair Stevens, M.P. (York-Peel) S. of S. for External Affairs-in-Waiting



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

MESSAGE

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Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

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TO/À
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SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0181 20FEB84

TO BNATO

INFO HAGUE BONN

REF OURTEL IDDZ0177 17FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

WOULD APPRECIATE IF YOU COULD ARRANGE TRAIN RESERVATIONS FOR SMITH
AND CALDER FROM BRUSSELS TO HAGUE ON TUES 28FEB AFTER LUNCH AND
FROM HAGUE TO BONN ON WED 29FEB LATE AFTERNOON. CODING IS
014-186-186-000-2301.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG Connick/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG G.J. Smith



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
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SECURITY
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REF OURTEL IDDZ0177 17FEB

REF

---PM INITIATIVE:THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

SUBJ/SUJ

FURTHER TO PARA4 REFTTEL,PLEASE RESERVE TWO SWB AT DURRANTS HOTEL,
GEORGE STREET, FOR NIGHTS OF MAR 01 AND 02.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G. J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

G. J. Smith

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Mr. Smith
Ed
file

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BNATO YBGR6186 20FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO NDHQOTT/DSTRATA

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0177 17FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

TWO SWBS RESERVED ROYAL WINDSOR NIGHT OF 27FEB.PASSES HAVE BEEN
REQUESTED AND WILL BE AVAILABLE MAIN ENTRANCE.

CCC/054 211700Z YBGR6186

Mr Smith

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C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BNATO YBGR2081 20FEV84

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO HAGUE BONN LDN GENEV CANMILREPNAFO BRU MOSCO ROME VMBFR PARIS
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DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR FPR RBR RBD UGB URG RGB RCD ZSP ZSI
SCS SCD

---INITIATIVE DU PREMIER MINISTRE-COMPTRE-RENDU DE RBD AU SPC
RESUME:COMPTRE-RENDU DONNE PAR HANCOCK(RBD)20FEV SUR VISITE DU
PREMIER MINISTRE EN RDA,TCHECOSLOVAQUIE ET ROUMANIE AINSI QUE
SUR SON PASSAGE A MOSCU POUR LES FUNERAILLES
D ANDROPOV,HABILEMENT RELIES A L ETUDE OTAN SUR LES RELATIONS
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DU REP BRITANNIQUE)DES PREOCCUPATIONS A L EGARD DES DECLARATIONS
DU PREMIER MINISTRE AU COURS DE SON PERIPLE EN EUROPE DE L EST
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CONCRETES DU PREMIER MINISTRE RELATIVES A LA TECHNOLOGIE STRA-
TEGIQUE AU PASSAGE PROCHAIN A L OTAN DE CALDER ET SMITH ET
A RAPPELE QUE BUT PREMIER DU PREMIER MINISTRE ETAIT DE DONNER

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PAGE DEUX YBGR2091 CONF

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TRAITE AVEC ASSURANCE DES PREOCCUPATIONS
FONDEES LE PLUS SOUVENT SUR DES RAPPORTS DE PRESSE EST-EUROPÉENS
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L ALLIANCE. SOMME TOUTE, UNE OPERATION DE MISE EN CONFIANCE REUSSIE
ET PLEINEMENT APPRECIEE.

2. RAPPORT: BIEN QU EXERCICE HILEX AIT COMMENCE 20 FEV A 07:30,
C EST AVEC BEAUCOUP D INTERET QUE MEMBRES DU COMITE POLITIQUE A
HAUT NIVEAU ONT ECOUTE COMPTE-RENDU DE HANCOCK DU VOYAGE DU PREMIER
MINISTRE EN EUROPE DE L EST ET A MOSCJ. AU COURS D UNE PRESENTATION
D UNE QUARANTAINE DE MINUTES, HANCOCK A EXPLIQUE LE POURQUOI D UNE
VISITE EN EUROPE DE L EST ET LES RAISONS AYANT PRESIDE AU CHOIX
DES TROIS PAYS. IL A SITUE MESSAGE DU PREMIER MINISTRE DANS CONTEXTE
TANT DE L EVOLUTION RECENTE DES RAPPORTS EST-OUEST QUE DE LA
POLITIQUE DE L ALLIANCE, NOTAMMENT LA DECLARATION DE BRU.
IL A RELEVÉ LA SUBTILE DIFFERENCE ENTRE LE DISCOURS PUBLIC ET LA
DISCUSSION EN PRIVE AVEC LES DIRIGEANTS EST-EUROPÉENS, SOULIGNANT
LES CONVERGENCES COMME LES DIFFERENCES DANS LES REACTIONS A
PRGUE, BERLIN-EST ET BUCHAREST ET EN A TIRE QUELQUES CONCLUSIONS
GENERALES DONT (A) LA MARCHE DE MANOEUVRE ACCRUE EN EUROPE DE
L EST LIEE A L INCERTITUDE A PROPOS D ANDROPOV; (B) DES DIFFICULTES
PERCEPTIBLES AU CHAPITRE DU CONTRE DEPLOIEMENT; (C) UNE IMPRESSION

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PAGE TROIS YBGR2091 CONF

DE NOSTALGIE A L EGARD DU PRAGMATISME D ANDROPOV QUE LES EUROPEENS DE L EST CONNAISSAIENT ET DONT LES EXPERIENCES AU PLAN ECONOMIQUE PRESAGEAIENT UNE COMPREHENSION DES MODELES DIFFERENCIES DU DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE EN EUROPE DE L EST;(D)LA SUGGESTION, SI IMPRESSIONNISTE FUT-ELLE D UNE FLEXIBILITE POSSIBLE DANS LES APPROCHES ET(E)SOMME TOUTE,UNE CONFIRMATION QUE LA POLITIQUE DE DIFFERENCIATION ETAIT SANS DOUTE BONNE MAIS U ELLE DEVAIT ETRE PEAUFINEE.

3.DU PASSAGE DU PREMIER MINISTRE A MOSCOJ,HANCOCK A TIRE QUELQUES EXTRAPOLATIONS PERSONNELLES.SELON LUI,LES FIDELES D ANDROPOV NE SERAIENT PAS NECESSAIREMENT PERDANTS ET,PLUTOT QU UNE DIRECTION COLLEGIALE,CE SERAIT UNE COALITION INCERTAINE QUI POURRAIT PRESIDER AUX DESTINEES DE L URSS:EN UN MOT, DE L ANDROPOVISME SANS ANDROPOV.LES CHANGEMENTS PROFONDS DANS LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST SUR TOUS LES PLANS(A L ORIGINE DE LA DEMARCHE DU PREMIER MINISTRE)EXIGEAIENT UN RETOUR AUX BASES FONDAMENTALES.LES REGLES DU JEU AVAIENT CHANGE ALORS MEME QUE LE CIT HOMO SOVIETICUS FINCIT FAISAIT PREUVE D UN ECLECTISME NOUVEAU ET D UN OPPORTUNISME PLUS JUDICIEUX. ON SE TROUVAIT AUJOURD HUI A LA CROISEE DES CHEMINS.LE SENS MEME DU MOT DETENTE N ETAIT PLUS CE QU IL DECRIVAIT JADIS ET IL N EXISTAIT PLUS DE CADRE POLITIQUE APPROPRIE POUR EN REDEFINIR LES TERMES.C ETAIT EN CE SENS QUE L ALLIANCE SE DEVAIT DE

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PAGE QUATRE YBGR2081 CONFID

PRENDRE EN COMPTE TOUS LES FAITS RELIES AUX RAPPORTS EST-OUEST
ET D'EN DECANTER L'ESSENTIEL POUR L'ETUDE SUR LES RELATIONS
EST-OUEST. CE FAISANT, HANCOCK A MIS L'ACCENT SUR NOTRE CONCEPTION
DE CITE HARMEL 2 FINCIT ET SUR L'INTERET TOUT PARTICULIER DU
GOUVERNEMENT POUR CETTE ETUDE.

4. AU COURS D'UNE INTERVENTION INSISTANTE ET PRESQUE HOSTILE,
VOILEE PAR UN TON AMICAL, LE REP BRITANNIQUE A REMERCIÉ HANCOCK
DE SA VENUE A L'OTAN RENDUE CITE INDISPENSABLE FINCIT APRES LES
RAPPORTS DE PRESSE SUR LA VISITE DU PREMIER MINISTRE EN
EUROPE DE L'EST. CE RAPPORT CITE RASSURANT FINCIT ETAIT NECESSAIRE
ET IL ETAIT HEUREUX D'APPRENDRE QUE PREMIER MINISTRE TUDEAU AIT
EXPOSE LES PAYS DE L'EST CITE A LA LOGIQUE DE L'OTAN FINCIT. IL
SOHAITAIT TOUTEFOIS D'AVANTAGE D'ASSURANCES SUR LES POINTS
SUIVANTS:

(A) ETAIT-IL EXACT QUE LE PREMIER MINISTRE AIT MIS SUR UN PIED
D'EGALITE LA DECLARATION DE PRAGUE ET LA DECLARATION DE BRUXELLES
ALORS QU'UNE N'AVAIT QUE VALEUR DE PROPAGANDE TANDIS QUE
L'AUTRE APPELAIT SOIGNEUSEMENT A UNE REPRISE DU DIALOGUE?

(B) ETAIT-IL EXACT QUE LE PREMIER MINISTRE AIT JUGE QUE LA
PROPOSITION DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE SUR LA LIMITATION DE LA GUERRE
CHIMIQUE AU SEUL THEATRE EUROPEEN ETAIT UNE PROPOSITION PLUS FA-
CILE A METTRE EN OEUVRE QUE LA LIMITATION GENERALE MISE DE L'AVANT
PAR L'OUEST?

...5

PAGE CINQ YBGR2081 CONF

(C)ETAIT-IL EXACT QUE LE PREMIER MINISTRE AIT DIT DE LA DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE QU'ELLE ETAIT CITEE D'UNE INHERENTE ABSURDITE FINCI?

(D)LE PREMIER MINISTRE S'ETAIT-IL AVANCE AUPRES DE SES INTERLOCUTEURS DE L'EST DANS UNE DISCUSSION DES 3/3 PROPOSITIONS CANADIENNES DESTINEES AU CD A GENEVE?PAR AILLEURS,QUELLE ETAIT LA NATURE DES CONSULTATIONS PREVUES AVEC LE RDA SUR LE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS?

5.HANCOCK NE S'EST NULLEMENT MIS SUR LA DEFENSIVE ET,APRES AVOIR INDIQUE QUE TOUTE PERSONNE SE RENDANT EN EUROPE DE L'EST DEVAIT COURIR LE RISQUE DE VOIR SES PROPOS TRANSFORMES OU ADAPTES DANS LES MEDIA LOCAUX,IL A PRECISE QUE LE PREMIER MINISTRE AVAIT CONSTATE QUE LA DECLARATION DE PRGUE QUAND ELLE ETAIT DEGAGEE DE SON CONTEXTE ET DE SES ELEMENTS EVIDENTS DE PROPAGANDE,POSSEDAIT DES ELEMENTS QUI VALAIENT LA PEINE D'ETRE RELEVES A TITRE DE POINT DE DEPART MAIS IL N'ETAIT NULLEMENT QUESTION DE TRAITER LES DEUX DECLARATIONS,BRUXELLES ET PRGUE, SUR UN PIED D'EGALITE.

6.S'AGISSANT DE LA GUERRE CHIMIQUE,RBD RENVOYA LA QUESTION AUX EXPERTS MAIS SOUTINT QUE LE PREMIER MINISTRE NE S'ETAIT NATURELLEMENT PAS AVENTURE A PRIVILEGIER UNE DEMARCHE PAR RAPPORT A CELLE QUI RECUEILLAIT L'ADHESION DE L'ALLIANCE.SUR LA DISSUASION, LE PREMIER MINISTRE N'AVAIT Cesse DE SITUER SON INITIATIVE DE

...6

PAGE SIX YB3R2081 CONFD

PAIX DANS LE CONTEXTE DE L ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE.IL AVAIT SIMPLE-
MENT MIS L ACCENT SUR LE VOLET DE PAIX DU DICTON CI SI
VIS PACEM,PARA BELLUM FINCIT.QUANT AUX 3/3 PROPOSITIONS
SPECIFIQUES,LE PREMIER MINISTRE AVAIT CLAIREMENT INDIQUE SON
SOUHAIT DE CONSULTER SES ALLIES D ABORD;EN EURO E DE L EST,IL
S ETAIT CONCENTRE SUR LA DIMENSION POLITIQUE DU DIALOGUE EST-
QUEST.TOUTEFOIS,IL ETAIT DE NOTORIETE PUBLIQUE QUE DES PROPOSI-
TIONS CANADIENNES ALLAIENT VOIR LE JOUR DANS CE DOMAINE.QUANT
AUX CONSULTATIONS SUR LE DESARMEMENT,LA RDA REPRESENTAIT UN
INTERLOCUTEUR SIGNIFICATIF ET IL ETAIT NORMAL QUE LES DEUX
PAYS PROCEDENT A UN ECHANGE DE VUE SUR LEURS POSITIONS RESPECTIVES
MAIS IL N ETAIT PAS QUESTION QU ILS S ERIGENT COMME PORTE-PAROLE
DES DEUX ALLIANCES.

7.LE REPRESENTANT DES PAYS-BAS SE DEMANDAIT SI UN MESSAGE CLAIR
EMANAIT DES PAYS DE L EST VISITES PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE,QUI
AURAIT ETE TELEGUIDE PAR MOSCOU,SOIT SUR LES MBFR,LES CSBM OU
ENCORE LES FNI ET LES START.PAR AILLEURS,IL AVAIT DES DOUTES SUR
LA MARGE DE MANOEUVRE REELLE DES PAYS DE L EUROPE DE L EST DONT
LES DIRIGEANTS JOUAIENT BIEN LA COMEDIE.LE REPRESENTANT ESPAGNOL
SE DEMANDAIT QUELLE PLACE LA DIFFERENCIATION ENTRE EUROPE DE
L EST ET URSS DEVAIT AVOIR DANS L ETUDE CIT HARMEL 2 FINCIT.
LE REPRESENTANT FRANCAIS,TOUT EN SALUANT LA VOLONTE DE DIALOGUE
AVEC L EST,QUI DEVAIT ALLER AU DELA DES SEULES QUESTIONS DE
...?

PAGE SEPT YBGR2081 CONF

DESARMEMENT, NE CACHAIT PAS LES PREOCCUPATIONS DE SES AUTORITES EU EGARD A CERTAINES DES INITIATIVES DU PREMIER MINISTRE. IL NOTA FORT A PROPOS QU'ALORS QU'AU COURS DE LA CAMPAGNE SOVIETIQUE CONTRE LES FNI, L'URSS AVAIT MENACE D'UNE DETERIORATION GRAVE LES RAPPORTS EST-OUEST, AUJOURD'HUI, LE DEPLOIEMENT ENTAME, L'EST SEMBLAIT NE PAS TENIR RANCUNE A L'OUEST ET SE MONTRAIT PRET AU DIALOGUE. LA FERMETE DE L'ALLIANCE AVAIT DONC ETE UNE OPERATION PAYANTE. LE REPRESENTANT AMERICAIN A SALUE CIT LA NOBLESSE D'ESPRIT FINCI MANIFESTE DANS LA DECLARATION DU PREMIER MINISTRE A LA CHAMBRE LE 09FEV MAIS A RAPPELE LES PREOCCUPATIONS AMERICAINES A PROPOS DES TROIS PROPOSITIONS CANADIENNES DE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS. IL A CONCLU EN SALUANT LES CONSULTATIONS PREVUES A CET EFFET A L'OTAN.

B. HANCOCK A INDIQUE QUE, SANS QU'IL Y AIT EU DE VERITABLE SIGNAL DE LA PART DES DIRIGEANTS DE L'EUROPE DE L'EST, ILS AVAIENT TENU A PROJETER UNE IMAGE RESSURANTE ALORS QUE LE CONTEXTE NE LES Y OBLIGEAIT PAS. SUR LA DIFFERENCIATION, AUTANT CELLE CI ETAIT CLAIRE ENTRE L'URSS D'UNE PART, ET EUROPE DE L'EST, DE L'AUTRE, AU TANT IL FALLAIT TROUVER UNE FACON DE FAIRE RESSORTIR LA NATURE DISTINCTE DE CHAQUE PAYS SANS PORTER PREJUDICE A L'ENSEMBLE. C'ETAIT UN ASPECT QU'UN DOCUMENT CONFIDENTIEL SUR LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST POUVAIENT FAIRE RESSORTIR MAIS QU'IL Y AURAIT AVANTAGE A TEMPERER DANS TOUT DOCUMENT PUBLIC. ENFIN,
...8

PAGE HUIT YBGR2081 CONFD

SI LE LANGAGE DE LA FERMETÉ DE LA DOUBLE DÉCISION AVAIT ÉTÉ
PAYANT, IL NE FALLAIT PAS POUR AUTANT S'ATTENDRE À CE QUE L'URSS
METTE FIN À SA PROPAGANDE INTENSE MÊME SI LES NÉGOCIATIONS
START/INF REPRENAIENT DE PLUS BELLE.

9. EN CONCLUSION, SI EN DEHORS DU BRITANNIQUE, IL Y A UNE
BIENVEILLANCE ET UNE SYMPATHIE RÉELLE POUR L'INITIATIVE DU
PREMIER MINISTRE DANS SON CARACTÈRE POLITIQUE, AUTANT LES
RÉTICENCES SONT GRANDES DES QU'IL S'AGIT DES PROPOSITIONS
CONCRÈTES.

CCC/298 210850Z YBGR2081

AC..ON
SUITE A DONNER **CDN EYES ONLY**
RESERVE AUX CDNS

MF
D

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM LDN XNGR04033EB84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ PRIORITY

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/_CPP/DNACPOL BNATO BONN PARIS ROME HAGUE

BRU WSHDC GENEV VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL SPORE/MARCHAND

DISTR MINA DMF RCR RGB RCD RBD RBR IFB IDD IDA IDR

---PMS INITIATIVE:DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH

MARCHAND HAD LUNCHEON TALK 17FEB WITH JULIAN BULLARD,DEPUTY TO
PERMANENT SECTY AND POLITICAL DIRECTOR FCO,WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL
HELP TO QUIETEN BUT PROBABLY NOT/NOT SILENCE FCO RUMBLINGS ABOUT
PMS INITIATIVE AND HIS REPORTED REMARKS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

2.BULLARD ADMITTED HE HAD THAT MORNING BEEN PRIMED Y FCO OFFICERS
ON THEIR CONCERNS.HE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR NEGATIVE FCO VIEW OF
CDN INTENTIONS TO PUT STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL ISSUES BEFORE CD AND
PMS REMARKS SEEMINGLY SUPPORTIVE OF WPO PRAGUE DECLARATION.DMF
COMMENTS EASED CONCERNS ON THESE TWO JOINTS.PASSING ALLUSION WAS
MADE TO PMS DAVOS COMMENTS BUT MATTER WAS NOT/NOT PURSUED.REMINDER
WAS MADE OF UK DISCONTENT WITH FIVE NUCLEAR POWER PROPOSAL BUT
BULLARD INDICATED POSSIBILITY OF THOMPSON,PERM REP IN NY,LOOKING
AT IDEA OF UN SEC GEN EXPLORATION OF FIVE POWER CONTACT.

3.BULLARD INITIALLY REMARKED ON CHANGES IN WESTERN OUTLOOK ON
EAST/WEST RELATIONS SINCE HE HAD LAST MET DMF IN NOV.ALL NATO
LEADERS HAD TAKEN UP POPULAR THEME OF PROMOTING DIALOGUE.ANDROPOV

...2

PAGE TWO XNGR0403 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

FUNERAL HAD PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY TO REPEAT STOCKHOL MESSAGE AT
LEVEL OF HEADS OF GOVT. MOVEMENT SOUGHT BY PM TRUDEAU IN OCT HAD
BEEN SURPRISINGLY SWIFT AS WESTERN GOVT LEADERS FELT NEED TO MEET
PUBLIC ANXIETIES. MRS THATCHERS STANCE HAD KEPT A PACE. USA ADMIN WAS
PROBABLY RIGHT TO LOOK NOW TO PERIOD WHERE MESSENGERS (SUCH AS
SCOWCROFT) WOULD PROMOTE CONTACT RATHER THAN PRESSING FOR PREMATURE
SUMMIT. USA/NATO SHOULD EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES OF STATE/INF MERGER
ON LINES WHICH MIGHT FACILITATE EARLIER SOVIET RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS.
(WHEN DMF SUGGESTED FORMULA MIGHT HAVE TO BE FOUND TO DEAL WITH
PROBLEM OF UK AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES, BULLARD INSISTED DIRECT
COUNTING MUST BE AVOIDED BUT ACCEPTED USA COULD MAKE ALLOWANCES FOR
UNSTATED REASONS BUT HE WAS UNSURE THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO
SO.)

4. AT EARLY JUNCTURE IN CONVERSATION, BULLARD RAISED MATTER OF FCO
UNEASE WITH ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS OF PM'S INITIATIVE AND HIS REMARKS
IN EASTERN EUROPE. CDN PURSUIT IN CD OF PROPOSALS WHICH TOUCHED
DIRECTLY ON USA/NATO SECURITY INTERESTS BEFORE THESE PROPOSALS HAD
BEEN THOROUGHLY EXAMINED IN CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES HAD RAISED
CONCERNS IN NUMBER OF CAPITALS. DMF REPLIED THAT PROPOSALS HAD BEEN
AVAILABLE TO NATO ALLIES SINCE AUTUMN AND WOULD BE EXAMINED
THOROUGHLY IN NATO SHORTLY. CDN EXPERTS WOULD ALSO VISIT PRINCIPAL
NATO CAPITALS WHERE THIS HAD NOT/NOT YET BEEN DONE. CDA WOULD TAKE
...3

PAGE THREE XNGR0403 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

ALLIES VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE CIRCULATING PAPERS IN GENEVA.
INTENTION WAS NOT/NOT TO TABLE PROPOSALS BUT TO MAKE AVAILABLE
VIEWS TO DELEGATIONS AS CONTRIBUTION TO ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSION.
DMF REGRETTED EARLIER OPPORTUNITY HAD NOT/NOT BEEN FOUND TO HAVE
CDN REPS VISIT LDN TO DISCUSS MORE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF PMS
INITIATIVE.HE SAID FAILURE TO INCLUDE LDN IN BRIEFING ARRANGEMENTS
AFTER PMS EASTERN EUROPEAN TOUR WAS UNFORTUNATE OVERSIGHT.BULLARD
SEEMED SOMEWHAT MOLLIFIED BY THIS EXPLANATION SAYING HE WOULD
WELCOME CDN EXPERTS COMING TO LDN.

5.BULLARD SAID REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO PM ABOUT MERITS OF WPO
DECLARATION HAD BEEN PUZZLING.CDN PM APPEARED TO BE PLACING HIMSELF
EQUIDISTANT IN EAST/WEST RELS.DMF PLACED REMARKS IN CONTEXT,
EXPLAINING PM HAD MADE POINT EAST HAD IGNORED POSITIVE MESSAGES IN
NATO DECLARATION AND HAD HIDDEN IN INVECTIVE WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN
SOME ACCEPTABLE POINTS OF PRAGUE DECLARATION.IN ARGUING FOR
DIALOGUE,PM WAS PREPARED TO RECOGNISE UNCONTENTIOUS WPO POINTS
RATHER THAN FOCUS ON ONLY WHAT WAS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO NATO.PMS
PURPOSE WAS TO ARGUE FOR LESS RHETORIC AND MORE COMMUNICATION,NOT/
NOT TO ENDORSE PRAGUE DECLARATION.BULLARD SAID THIS PUT MATTER IN
BETTER PERSPECTIVE.

6.DMFS REFERENCE TO PROPOSAL FOR TALKS AMONG FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS
INITIALLY DREW RESPONSE OF QUOTE THATS SOMETHING ELSE WE DO NOT/NOT

PAGE FOUR XN3R0403 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

LIKE UNQUOTE,BUT BULLARD SHOWED INTEREST IN CHINESE
REACTION DURING ZHAO VISIT.DMF REFERRED TO PMS DISCUSSIONS WITH
PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND ENQUIRED WHETHER UK COULD ENTE TAIN IDEA OF
RESPONDING TO INVITATION OF UN SECGEN FOR EXPLORATORY CONTACTS
AMONG FIVE SC MEMBERS.BULLARD INDICATED HE WOULD NOT/NOT WISH TO
PURSUE IDEA AT THIS TIME AT LDN END,BUT THOUGHT EXAMINATION DF
POSSIBILITIES AND RAMIFICATIONS MIGHT ATTRACT THOMPSON,UK PERM
REP IN NY,WHO WAS EX ARMS COOTROLLER ALSO INTERESTED IN UN ROLE.
DMF HOPED THOMPSON WOULD BE ENCOURAGED.BULLARD SAID HE KNEW OF
NO/NO SOUNDING OF THOMPSON BY SECGEN(SEE ALSO O RTEL XN3R0402
21FEB FOR REMARKS MADE BY CARTLEDGE,FCC ASST UNDERSECTY FOR
DEFENCE,PREVIOUS DAY TO BEATTIE ON MBFR AND ASAT.)

CCC/083 211115Z XN3R0403

ACTION
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o m F

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BGRAD ZLGR3328 20FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PRGUE WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME BONN HAGUE BRU BNATO PRMNY
PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA MOSCO WSAW BPEST BUCST NDHQOTT/ADM POL/CPF/CIC
PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBR IBRD RBP RBT ZSP ZSI IDD IDA
IDR FPR

REF OURTEL ZLGR3194 31JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:YUGO PRESS COVERAGE

FOLLOWING FROM YUGO PRESS SERVICE TANJUG:

TEXT BEGINS:

TRUDEAU CONVINCED IN SUCCESS OF HIS INITIATIVE

WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 17(TANJUG)-AFTER HIS TALKS AT THE KREMLIN
WITH NEW GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY KONSTANTIN
CHERNENKO, THE CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER, PIERRE TRUDEAU, IS CONVINCED
THAT HIS PEACE INITIATIVE BEGINS TO LIVE.

TRUDEAU ADDED THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESS OF HIS INITIATIVE
ARE NOW MUCH GREATER THAN A FEW WEEKS AGO.

TRUDEAU BASES HIS CONVICTION ON WHAT HIS PARTNERS IN TALKS,
CHERNENKO AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, HAVE STATED IN
RELATION TO HIS INITIATIVE. CLAIMS ARE THAT THEY SAID THAT TRUDEAU'S
DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE IS USEFUL AND PRACTICAL.

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PAGE TWO ZLGR3328 UNCLAS

TRUDEAU EMBARKED ON HIS PEACE INITIATIVE A FEW MONTHS AGO WITH THE AIM OF DOING SOMETHING TOWARDS EASING THE CURRENT TENSION IN THE WORLD WITH THE HELP OF OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE TWO SUPER POWERS.

TRUDEAU BELIEVES THAT THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT/NOT BE THE AFFAIR OF THE TWO BIG POWERS ALONE, AND THEREFORE THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS CONTROLLING AND LIMITING NUCLEAR ARMAMENT WOULD BE THE CONVENING OF A SUMMIT OF FIVE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS: THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

TRUDEAU HAS ACQUAINTED A LARGE NUMBER OF STATESMEN WITH HIS INITIATIVE. CHERNENKO WAS THE LATEST WITH WHOM TRUDEAU DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT.

TRUDEAU FURTHER SAID THAT CHERNENKO POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTS THE RETURN OF THE TIMES OF DETENTE, THE WAY THEY WERE IN 1975 WHEN THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE WAS HELD.

CHERNENKO ENCOURAGED TRUDEAU TO CONTINUE WITH HIS INITIATIVE, AGREEING WITH TRUDEAU'S OPINION THAT IT REPRESENTS A CHANCE FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST.

UUU/096 201300Z ZLGR3328

ACTION
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C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BNATO YBGR2081 20FEV34

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO HAGUE BONN LDN GENEV CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO ROME VMBFR PARIS
OSLO COPEN ATHNS NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/DIPOL/CPD/D TRAT/CIS PRMNY
STKHM/SCDEL WSHDC PMOOTT/AXWORTHY PCOOTT/FOWLER PRGUE BPEST BGRAD
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR FPR RBR RBD UGB UR3 RGB RCD ZSP ZSI
SCS SCD

---INITIATIVE DU PREMIER MINISTRE-COMpte-RENDU DE RBD AU SPC
RESUME:COMpte-RENDU DONNE PAR HANCOCK(RBD)20FEV SUR VISITE DU
PREMIER MINISTRE EN RDA, TCHECOSLOVAQUIE ET ROUMANIE AINSI QUE
SUR SON PASSAGE A MOSCU POUR LES FUNERAILLES
D ANDROPOV, HABLEMENT RELIES A L ETUDE OTAN SUR LES RELATIONS
EST-WEST(HARMEL 2)A SUSCITE AUPRES DU COMITE POLITIQUE A HAUT
NIVEAU DE L OTAN(SPC)A LA FOIS DES ELOGES ET DES REMERCIEMENTS
SUR CARACTERE OPPORTUN DE L INFORMATION PRODIGUEE AINSI.S EST
AUSSI FAIT JOUR EXPRESSION PARFOIS POINTILLEUSE(NOTAMMENT DE PART
DU REP BRITANNIQUE)DES PREOCCUPATIONS A L EGARD DES DECLARATIONS
DU PREMIER MINISTRE AU COURS DE SON PERIPLE EN EUROPE DE L EST
TELLES QUE RAPPORTEES PAR LA PRESSE TANTOT OCCIDENTALE, TANTOT
EST-EUROPÉENNE.HANCOCK A REPORTE DISCUSSION DES 3 PROPOSITIONS
CONCRETES DU PREMIER MINISTRE RELATIVES A LA TECHNOLOGIE STRA-
TEGIQUE AU PASSAGE PROCHAIN A L OTAN DE CALDER ET SMITH ET
A RAPPELE QUE BUT PREMIER DU PREMIER MINISTRE ETAIT DE DONNER

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PAGE DEUX YBGR2091 CONF

UNE IMPULSION POLITIQUE AU DIALOGUE EST-WEST. HANCOCK A AINSI
TRAITE AVEC ASSURANCE DES PREOCCUPATIONS
FONDEES LE PLUS SOUVENT SUR DES RAPPORTS DE PRESSE EST-EUROPÉENS
FEBRILEMENT RAPPORTES PAR AMBASSADES DES PAYS MEMBRES DE
L ALLIANCE. SOMME TOUTE, UNE OPERATION DE MISE EN CONFIANCE REUSSIE
ET PLEINEMENT APPRECIEE.

2. RAPPORT: BIEN QU EXERCICE HILEX AIT COMMENCE 20 FEV A 07:30,
C EST AVEC BEAUCOUP D INTERET QUE MEMBRES DU COMITE POLITIQUE A
HAUT NIVEAU ONT ECOUTE COMPTE-RENDU DE HANCOCK DU VOYAGE DU PREMIER
MINISTRE EN EUROPE DE L EST ET A MOSCOU. AU COURS D UNE PRESENTATION
D UNE QUARANTAINE DE MINUTES, HANCOCK A EXPLIQUE LE POURQUOI D UNE
VISITE EN EUROPE DE L EST ET LES RAISONS AYANT PRESIDE AU CHOIX
DES TROIS PAYS. IL A SITUE MESSAGE DU PREMIER MINISTRE DANS CONTEXTE
TANT DE L EVOLUTION RECENTE DES RAPPORTS EST-OUEST QUE DE LA
POLITIQUE DE L ALLIANCE, NOTAMMENT LA DECLARATION DE BRU.
IL A RELEVÉ LA SUBTILE DIFFERENCE ENTRE LE DISCOURS PUBLIC ET LA
DISCUSSION EN PRIVE AVEC LES DIRIGEANTS EST-EUROPÉENS, SOULIGNANT
LES CONVERGENCES COMME LES DIFFERENCES DANS LES REACTIONS A
PRAGUE, BERLIN-EST ET BUCHAREST ET EN A TIRE QUELQUES CONCLUSIONS
GENERALES DONT (A) LA MARGE DE MANOEUVRE ACCRUE EN EUROPE DE
L EST LIEE A L INCERTITUDE A PROPOS D ANDROPOV; (B) DES DIFFICULTES
PERCEPTIBLES AU CHAPITRE DU CONTRE DEPLOIEMENT; (C) UNE IMPRESSION
...3

PAGE TROIS YBGR2081 CONF

DE NOSTALGIE A L'EGARD DU PRAGMATISME D'ANDROPOV QUE LES EUROPEENS DE L'EST CONNAISSAIENT ET DONT LES EXPERIENCES AU PLAN ECONOMIQUE PRESAGEAIENT UNE COMPREHENSION DES MODELES DIFFERENCIES DU DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE EN EUROPE DE L'EST; (D) LA SUGGESTION, SI IMPRESSIONNISTE FUT-ELLE D'UNE FLEXIBILITE POSSIBLE DANS LES APPROCHES ET (E) SOMME TOUTE, UNE CONFIRMATION QUE LA POLITIQUE DE DIFFERENCIATION ETAIT SANS DOUTE BONNE MAIS QU'ELLE DEVAIT ETRE PEUFINEE.

3. DU PASSAGE DU PREMIER MINISTRE A MOSCOU, HANCOCK A TIRE QUELQUES EXTRAPOLATIONS PERSONNELLES. SELON LUI, LES FIDELES D'ANDROPOV NE SERAIENT PAS NECESSAIREMENT PERDANTS ET, PLUTOT QU'UNE DIRECTION COLLEGIALE, CE SERAIT UNE COALITION INCERTAINE QUI POURRAIT PRESIDER AUX DESTINEES DE L'URSS: EN UN MOT, DE L'ANDROPOVISME SANS ANDROPOV. LES CHANGEMENTS PROFONDS DANS LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST SUR TOUS LES PLANS (A L'ORIGINE DE LA DEMARCHE DU PREMIER MINISTRE) EXIGEAIENT UN RETOUR AUX BASES FONDAMENTALES. LES REGLES DU JEU AVAIENT CHANGE ALORS MEME QUE LE CIT HOMO SOVIETICUS FINCIIT FAISAIT PREUVE D'UN ECLECTISME NOUVEAU ET D'UN OPPORTUNISME PLUS JUDICIEUX. ON SE TROUVAIT AUJOURD'HUI A LA CROISEE DES CHEMINS. LE SENS MEME DU MOT DETENTE N'ETAIT PLUS CE QU'IL DECRIVAIT JADIS ET IL N'EXISTAIT PLUS DE CADRE POLITIQUE APPROPRIE POUR EN REDEFINIR LES TERMES. C'ETAIT EN CE SENS QUE L'ALLIANCE SE DEVAIT DE

...4

PAGE QUATRE YBGR2081 CONF

PRENDRE EN COMPTE TOUS LES FAITS RELIES AUX RAPPORTS EST-OUEST
ET D'EN DECANTER L'ESSENTIEL POUR L'ETUDE SUR LES RELATIONS
EST-OUEST. CE FAISANT, HANCOCK A MIS L'ACCENT SUR NOTRE CONCEPTION
DE CITE HARMEL 2 FINCIT ET SUR L'INTERET TOUT PARTICULIER DU
GOUVERNEMENT POUR CETTE ETUDE.

4. AU COURS D'UNE INTERVENTION INSISTANTE ET PRESQUE HOSTILE,
VOILEE PAR UN TON AMICAL, LE REP BRITANNIQUE A REMERCIÉ HANCOCK
DE SA VENUE A L'OTAN RENDUE CITE INDISPENSABLE FINCIT APRES LES
RAPPORTS DE PRESSE SUR LA VISITE DU PREMIER MINISTRE EN
EUROPE DE L'EST. CE RAPPORT CITE RASSURANT FINCIT ETAIT NECESSAIRE
ET IL ETAIT HEUREUX D'APPRENDRE QUE PREMIER MINISTRE TUDEAU AIT
EXPOSE LES PAYS DE L'EST CITE A LA LOGIQUE DE L'OTAN FINCIT. IL
SOHAITAIT TOUTEFOIS D'AVANTAGE D'ASSURANCES SUR LES POINTS
SUIVANTS:

(A) ETAIT-IL EXACT QUE LE PREMIER MINISTRE AIT MIS SUR UN PIED
D'EGALITE LA DECLARATION DE PRGUE ET LA DECLARATION DE BRUXELLES
ALORS QU'UNE N'AVAIT QUE VALEUR DE PROPAGANDE TANDIS QUE
L'AUTRE APPELAIT SOIGNEUSEMENT A UNE REPRISE DU DIALOGUE?

(B) ETAIT-IL EXACT QUE LE PREMIER MINISTRE AIT JUGE QUE LA
PROPOSITION DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE SUR LA LIMITATION DE LA GUERRE
CHIMIQUE AU SEUL THEATRE EUROPEEN ETAIT UNE PROPOSITION PLUS FA-
CILE A METTRE EN OEUVRE QUE LA LIMITATION GENERALE MISE DE L'AVANT
PAR L'OUEST?

...5

PAGE CINQ YBGR2081 CONF

(C) ETAIT-IL EXACT QUE LE PREMIER MINISTRE AIT DIT DE LA DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE QU'ELLE ETAIT CITEE D'UNE INHERENTE ABSURDITE FINCI?

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5. HANCOCK NE S'EST NULLEMENT MIS SUR LA DEFENSIVE ET, APRES AVOIR INDIQUE QUE TOUTE PERSONNE SE RENDANT EN EUROPE DE L'EST DEVAIT COURIR LE RISQUE DE VOIR SES PROPOS TRANSFORMES OU ADAPTES DANS LES MEDIA LOCAUX, IL A PRECISE QUE LE PREMIER MINISTRE AVAIT CONSTATE QUE LA DECLARATION DE PRAGUE QUAND ELLE ETAIT DEGAGEE DE SON CONTEXTE ET DE SES ELEMENTS EVIDENTS DE PROPAGANDE, POSSEDAIT DES ELEMENTS QUI VALAIENT LA PEINE D'ETRE RELEVES A TITRE DE POINT DE DEPART MAIS IL N'ETAIT NULLEMENT QUESTION DE TRAITER LES DEUX DECLARATIONS, BRUXELLES ET PRAGUE, SUR UN PIED D'EGALITE.

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DES DEUX ALLIANCES.

7.LE REPRESENTANT DES PAYS-BAS SE DEMANDAIT SI UN MESSAGE CLAIR
EMANAIT DES PAYS DE L EST VISITES PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE,QUI
AURAIT ETE TELEGUIDE PAR MOSCOU,SOIT SUR LES MBFR,LES CSBM OU
ENCORE LES FNI ET LES START.PAR AILLEURS,IL AVAIT DES DOUTES SUR
LA MARGE DE MANOEUVRE REELLE DES PAYS DE L EUROPE DE L EST DONT
LES DIRIGEANTS JOUAIENT BIEN LA COMEDIE.LE REPRESENTANT ESPAGNOL
SE DEMANDAIT QUELLE PLACE LA DIFFERENCIATION ENTRE EUROPE DE
L EST ET URSS DEVAIT AVOIR DANS L ETUDE CIT HARMEL 2 FINCIT.
LE REPRESENTANT FRANCAIS,TOUT EN SALUANT LA VOLONTE DE DIALOGUE
AVEC L EST,QUI DEVAIT ALLER AU DELA DES SEULES QUESTIONS DE

...7

PAGE SEPT YBGR2081 CONF

DESARMEMENT, NE CACHAIT PAS LES PREOCCUPATIONS DE SES AUTORITES
EU EGARD A CERTAINES DES INITIATIVES DU PREMIER MINISTRE. IL
NOTA FORT A PROPOS QU ALORS QU AU COURS DE LA CAMPAGNE SOVIETIQUE
CONTRE LES FNI, L URSS AVAIT MENACE D UNE DETERIORATION GRAVE LES
RAPPORTS EST-OUEST, AUJOURD HUI, LE DEPLOIEMENT ENTAME, L EST SEMBLAIT
NE PAS TENIR RANCUNE A L OUEST ET SE MONTRAIT PRET AU DIALOGUE.
LA FERMETE DE L ALLIANCE AVAIT DONC ETE UNE OPERATION
PAYANTE. LE REPRESENTANT AMERICAIN A SALUE CIT LA NOBLESSE D ES-
PRIT FINCIT MANIFESTE DANS LA DECLARATION DU PREMIER MINISTRE A
LA CHAMBRE LE 09FEV MAIS A RAPPELE LES PREOCCUPATIONS AMERICAINES
A PROPOS DES TROIS PROPOSITIONS CANADIENNES DE CONTROLE DES ARME-
MENTS. IL A CONCLU EN SALUANT LES CONSULTATIONS PREVUES A CET
EFFET A L OTAN.

B. HANCOCK A INDIQUE QUE, SANS QU IL Y AIT EU DE VERITABLE
SIGNAL DE LA PART DES DIRIGEANTS DE L EUROPE DE L EST, ILS AVAIENT
TENU A PROJETER UNE IMAGE RESSURANTE ALORS QUE LE CONTEXTE NE
LES Y OBLIGEAIT PAS. SUR LA DIFFERENCIATION, AUTANT CELLE CI
ETAIT CLAIRE ENTRE L URSS D UNE PART, ET EUROPE DE L EST, DE
L AUTRE, AU TANT IL FALLAIT TROUVER UNE FACON DE FAIRE RESSORTIR
LA NATURE DISTINCTE DE CHAQUE PAYS SANS PORTER PREJUDICE A
L ENSEMBLE. C ETAIT UN ASPECT QU UN DOCUMENT CONFIDENTIEL SUR
LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST POUVAIENT FAIRE RESSORTIR MAIS QU IL Y
AURAIT AVANTAGE A TEMPERER DANS TOUT DOCUMENT PUBLIC. ENFIN,

...8

PAGE HUIT YBGR2081 3ONFD

SI LE LANGAGE DE LA FERMETÉ DE LA DOUBLE DÉCISION AVAIT ÉTÉ
PAYANT, IL NE FALLAIT PAS POUR AUTANT S'ATTENDRE À CE QUE L'URSS
METTE FIN À SA PROPAGANDE INTENSE MÊME SI LES NÉGOCIATIONS
START/INF REPRENAIENT DE PLUS BELLE.

9. EN CONCLUSION, SI EN DEHORS DU BRITANNIQUE, IL Y A UNE
BIENVEILLANCE ET UNE SYMPATHIE RÉELLE POUR L'INITIATIVE DU
PREMIER MINISTRE DANS SON CARACTÈRE POLITIQUE, AUTANT LES
RÉTICENCES SONT GRANDES DES QU'IL S'AGIT DES PROPOSITIONS
CONCRÈTES.

CCC/298 210850Z YBGR2081

[Handwritten signature]
Mr. Calder to see

dmf

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0398 20FEB84

TO EXTOTT *[initials]* IDDDZ DELIVER 201600

INFO BNATO HAGUE BONN GENEV CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO ROME VMBFR
PARIS OSLO COPEN ATHNS NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/DIPOL/CPD/DSTRATA/
CIS PRMNY STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDAO IDAN IDR SCS

REF YOURTEL IDZ0177 17FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS:LDN BRIEFING

FCO/MOD WILL WELCOME SMITH/CALDER BRIEFING U2MAR.THEY NOW SUGGEST
PLANNING ONLY ONE MTG TO INCLUDE REPS MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,AS WELL
AS FOREIGN OFFICE(HEADS,ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT,AND DEFENCE
DEPTS),AT WHICH BOTH SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS AND BROADER INITIATIVE
QUESTIONS CAN BE DISCUSSED.SHOULD FURTHER TIME BE REQUIRED,MTG
CAN BE RECONVENED WITH APPROPRIATE COMPOSITION AFTER LUNCH WHICH
WE HAVE IN MIND HOSTING.

2.WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE IN-HOUSE DISCUSSION AT
HIGHCOMM BEFORE PROCEEDING TO FCO,AND WOULD THUS HOPE SMITH/CALDER
COULD CALL AT MISSION AT 09H30 02MAR.

3.REFTEL MADE NO/NO REQUEST IN LDN FOR ACCOMMODATION.IF REQUIRED,
PLEASE CONFIRM ACCORDINGLY.

CCC/170 201747Z XNGR0393

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0358 20FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO MOSCO WSAW PRGUE BPEST BGRAD BNAIO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME
GENEV VIENN VMBFR NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/CIS/CPD/ORA E PCOOTT/FOWLER
STKHM/SC DEL

DISTR DMF RGB IFB RBD IDD LIDDZ IDR RBP RGX IDA RBRD ZSP ZSI

REF MOSCO TEL XYGR0172 27FEB BNAIO TEL YBGR0099 27JAN

---USSR RELNS WITH WSAW PACT ALLIES:ROMANIA

THERE IS NO/NO DOUBT THAT ROMANIA HAS ENJOYED GREATER LEEWAY IN HER
FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE 60S THAN AFTER WORLD WAR II. IF ONE REMEMBERS
THAT WHEN CHURCHILL SUGGESTED TO STALIN A QUOTE DIVISION OF
RESPONSIBILITY UNQUOTE IN THE BALKANS IN SEPT 1944 AND PROPOSED A
90 PERCENT PREDOMINANCE FOR RUSSIA IN ROMANIA AND 90 PERCENT OF THE
SAY IN GREECE FOR UK AND 50-50 IN YUGO, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE
HAS BEEN A CONSIDERABLE EROSION OF SOV DOMINANCE SINCE. ROMANIA
REMAINS PREDOMINANTLY IN RUSSIAN SPHERE BUT HAS DEVELOPED OVER THE
LAST 20 YRS A FOREIGN POLICY OF HER OWN. EVEN ON ISSUES CONSIDERED
ESSENTIAL BY THE USSR, ROMANIA HAS ADOPTED DIVERGENT POSN. THUS SHE
HAS DISAPPROVED INVASION OF CZECH, OF AFGHAN AND OF CAMBODIA. AS
POINTED OUT IN MOSCO REFTTEL, SHE HAS ALSO DIPLO RELN WITH ISRAEL AND
DEVELOPED QUOTE COOPERATIVE UNQUOTE RELNS WITH PRC. S SCHISM WAS
DEEPENING BETWEEN USSR AND PRC.

2. WE WOULD ARGUE THAT THESE DIFFERENCES IN FOREIGN POLICY ARE MORE

...2

PAGE TWO UY3R0358 CONFD

THAN ANNOYING FOR USSR AND ARE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF REST OF
WSAW PACT.OF COURSE BASIS OF THESE DIVERGENCIES REST ON ROMANIAN
CONCEPTION OF NATL SOVEREIGNTY AND ON ROMANIAN INSISTENCE THAT ITS
RESPECT IS PARAMOUNT.

3.ON THE OTHER HAND,IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISCOVER ANY LEEWAY IN
DOMESTIC POLICY.IT COULD EVEN BE ARGUED THAT STRICT ORTHODOXY
MAINTAINED IN ROMANIA IS PRICE PAID FOR RELATIVE FREEDOM OF HER
FOREIGN POLICY.RATIONALE WOULD BE THAT USSR IS THUS DEPRIVED OF ANY
PRETEXT TO INTERVENE IN ROMANIA AND MUST THEREFORE REFRAIN FROM
CONCRETE ACTION AGAINST ROMANIAN REGIME WHICH WOULD BE SEEN AS CRUDE
SOVIET IMPERIALISM IF EVER USED.OTHER EXPLANATION WHICH DOES NOT/NOT
CONFLICT WITH PREVIOUS ONE IS THAT PRESENT ROMANIAN REGIME NEEDS
TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT REPRESSIVE POLICY TO ENSURE ITS OWN
SURVIVAL AND PURSUIT OF ITS POLICIES OF RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF MEGA PROJECTS.

4.AS FOR ROMANIAN POLICY ON INF,IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE CONTINUING
PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN HAS DISTURBED THE POPULATION AND HAS INCREASED
ITS ANXIETY.AS A RESULT POPULATION IS WORRIED NOT/NOTONLY ABOUT
AMERICAN DEPLOYMENT BUT IS ALSO WELL AWARE OF SOVIET ACTION IN THAT
FIELD.ITS POLICY HAS CONTINUED TO DIFFER FROM REST OF WSAW PACT IN
SENSE THAT IT ALSO ADDRESSED QUESTION OF SOVIET DEPLOYMENT AND ALTHO
AGREED WITH USSR THAT FRENCH AND BRIT NUCLEAR FORCES HAD TO BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT,SUGGESTED THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE ONLY IN AN ULTERIOR
...3

PAGE THREE UYGR0358 CONFD

PHASE, IN A VAGUE AND INDEFINITE FUTURE.

5. REGARDING ECONOMIC FACTOR, THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO NEED FOR GROWING SOVIET STRESS ON CLOSER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN COMECON AND CONSEQUENT DOWNGRADING OF ECONOMIC TIES WITH WEST. BECAUSE OF POOR MANAGEMENT OF HER EXTERNAL DEBT, ROMANIA HAS LOST HER CREDIT WORTHINESS WITH WESTERN BANKS AND WESTERN GOVTS AND IN SPITE OF IMPROVED PERFORMANCE IN LAST TWO YRS HAD TO CONSIDERABLY INCREASE HER TRADE WITH USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE. IN LAST TWO YRS HER SHARE OF TRADE WITH USSR WENT UP FROM 21 PERCENT TO APPROX 27 PERCENT AND TOTAL SHARE OF TRADE WITH EUR, INCLUDING USSR, WENT FROM 33 PERCENT TO ABOVE 40 PERCENT. ROMANIA ALSO HAD TO ACCEPT INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN SOME COMECON JOINT PROJECTS AND IS TRYING TO SECURE MORE ENERGY AND RAW MATERIALS FROM USSR (SEE CORTTEL UY3R0241 15FEB). WE DO NOT/NOT SEE THESE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AS A REACTION TO TWO-TRACK DECISION OR IMPOSED BY SOV UNION BUT AS A RESULT OF DISASTROUS ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT. IT IS, OF COURSE, QUITE POSSIBLE THAT GREATER ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY ON USSR WOULD LEAD TO A GRADUAL REALIGNMENT OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY ALONG SOVIET LINES ALTHO IT IS NOT/NOT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR UP TO WHAT EXTENT. ROMANIA HAS ALREADY PAID PRICE FOR HER RELATIVE INDEPENDENCE AND HER PRESENT LEADERSHIP MIGHT BE WILLING TO GO ON SINCE NATIONAL INDEPENDANCE IS MAJOR COMPONENT OF ITS LEGITIMACY. YEARS OF HARDSHIP, PAST AND TO COME, MIGHT HOWEVER PERSUADE POPULACE THAT PRICE IS TOO HIGH. A CURRENT JOKE STATES QUOTE WE SHOULD BE

...4

PAGE FOUR UYGR0358 CONF

INVADED BY THE RUSSIANS, WE COULD THEN EAT LIKE CZECHS AND HAVE PPTS
LIKE HUNGARIANS UNQUOTE. OF COURSE REGIME DOES ITS BEST TO MAKE SURE
THAT POPULACE IS NEVER GIVEN SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY.

CCC/181 210900Z UYGR0358

12
C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0349 20FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 200900

INFO PCOOTT/PETTIGREW

DISTR RGB IFB IDDZ RBRD

REF YOURTEL RBR0327 16FEB

---PMS INITIATIVE:THANK YOU NOTES TO ROM LEADERS

AS YOU PRESUMED SENTENCE REFERRED TO ROM POET ISTRATI,WHO WAS
DISCUSSED DURING OFFICIAL DINNER WITH RADULESCU AND I BELIEVE
ON ANOTHER OCCASION.SUGGEST YOU REPLACE LAST THREE SENTENCES
OF THIS PARA BY FOLLOWING TEXT:

CIT JESPERE QUE NOUS AURONS UN JOUR LOCCASION DE POURSUIVRE NOS
ECHANGES IE VUES,NON SEULEMENT SUR LA REPLACE DU DIALOGUE EST-OUEST
ET AUTRES QUESTIONS INTERNATIONALES MAIS EGALEMENT SUR PANAIT ISTRATI
DONT VOUS CONNAISSEZ SE BIEN LOEUVRE.JE GARDE UN EXCELLENT SOUVENIR
DE CE TROP BREF SEJOUR ET COMPTE BIEN REVENIR VISITER VOTRE PAYS
LUN DE CES JOURS.FINCIT.

CCC/181 201055Z UYGR0349

1002

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM DALAS YM3R0324 20FEB84

TO EXTOTT (IDA

INFO WSHDC CONGENS PMO/JTT

DISTR IDD IDR URR U3P SCS

---P.M. PEACE INITIATIVE

OTHER BOOT DROPPED IN DALLAS FEB13/84 WHEN DALLAS M RNING NEWS PUBLISHED ITS EDITORIAL ON PM'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE. AS SUCH, IT IS FAR MORE TYPICAL OF REGIONAL SCEPTICISM TOWARD ANY CONTROL OF ARMS IN FACE OF EVIL SOVIET THREAT, THAN MORE EXPECTANT APPROACH OF DALLAS TIMES HERALD REPORTED EARLIER. BUT AS GORDIE HOWE WOULD SAY QUOTE BOOS COUNT TOO UNQUOTE.

2. TEXT BEGINS QUOTE TALK, TALK, TALK PARAGRAPH AFTER A 35-MINUTE TALK WITH NEW SOVIET LEADER KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO, CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU BELIEVES HIS PROPOSAL FOR ARMS-CONTROL TALKS AMONG THE FIVE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS QUOTE BEGINS TO LIVE UNQUOTE. FOR HIS PART, CHERNENKO OBLIGED WITH DIPLOMATIC NICETIES ON THE IMPORTANCE OF QUOTE DIALOGUE UNQUOTE AND THE QUOTE USEFULNESS AND PRACTICALITY UNQUOTE OF TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE. TRUDEAU SAYS THAT CHERNENKO AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO SEEMED CONCILIATORY.

BUT OTHERS, INCLUDING MANY IN THE CANADIAN PARLIAMENT, MAY BE FORGIVEN FOR VIEWING SUCH CONCILIATORY TONES WITH SKEPTICISM. CONCILIATORY IS THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT THE SOVIETS WERE AT TALKS TO REDUCE BOTH INTERMEDIATE AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES.

PAGE TWO YMGR0324 UNCLASS

THEY FINALLY WALKED OUT OF BOTH, REJECTING REPEATED U.S. OFFERS AFTER REJECTING OUR INITIAL ZERO OPTION OFFER, I.E., FOR NO DEPLOYMENTS OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY EITHER SUPERPOWER. EVERY SOVIET PROPOSAL, HAD IT BEEN ADOPTED, WOULD HAVE LEFT THE SOVIETS WITH FAR GREATER SUPERIORITY THAN THEY NOW ENJOY.

AS FOR THE BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO FIGURE INTO THE BALANCES, EUGENE ROSTOW, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, NOTING IN QUOTE THE NEW REPUBLIC UNQUOTE THE QUOTE OPENLY CYNICAL UNQUOTE NATURE OF THE SOVIET POSITION, POINTS OUT THAT QUOTE SOVIET SPOKESMEN FREELY CONCEDE THAT THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES DO NOT CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION UNQUOTE. MANY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFULS, BY THE WAY, SEEM BLISSFULLY IGNORANT OF THAT.

IN SUM, GIVEN THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, TRUDEAU'S IDEA OF ADDING BRITAIN, CHINA AND FRANCE TO THE TALKS SEEMS QUIXOTIC. CHERNENKO, AFTER ALL, TOLD HIM NOTHING SPECIFIC, SO AS YET WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SITUATION TRUDEAU HIMSELF DESCRIBED LAST APRIL WON'T CONTINUE UNDER THE NEW SOVIET LEADER: QUOTE NOBODY SEEMS TO BE PROTESTING THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MORE THAN 300 SS20'S, EACH WITH THREE WARHEADS (AIMED AT WESTERN EUROPE). UNQUOTE.

...3

PAGE THREE YMGR0324 UNCLASS

LET US PROVIDE AN UPDATE: LAST TIME WE LOOKED, THE NUMBER OF
SS20'S WAS UP TO 373, AND GROWING AT ABOUT THE RATE OF ONE MISSILE
AND THREE WARHEADS A WEEK. UNQUOTE TEXT ENDS.

UUU/825 201945Z YMGR0324

ACTION
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**CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE**

FM MOSCO XYGR0239 20FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF FPR RBR RBD

---PMS INITIATIVE:MTG WITH CHERNENKO

AT 17/17FEB MTG OF HANCOCK AND AMB WITH SUSLOV AND OTHER MFA
OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS BILATL ISSUES, THERE WAS BRIEF REVIEW
OF PMS VISIT. WE THANKED SUSLOV FOR HELP SOVS HAD GIVEN DURING
VISIT (AND INDEED THEY WERE VERY EFFICIENT AND THOROUGH), BUT
MOST SIGNIFICANT REMARK WAS SUSLOVS TO EFFECT THAT HE WAS SURE
PM WLD CONSIDER HIS MTG WITH CHERNENKO TO BE QUOTE ENOUGH FOR
NOW UNQUOTE. WE TOLD HIM THAT AT PRESS CONF PM HAD SPOKEN OF
COMPLETING A CYCLE OF ACTIVITY BY HIS MTG WITH CHERNENKO, AND
WE DOUBTED IF HE WLD BE ASKING TO SEE GENSECTY AGAIN IN NEAR
FUTURE.

CCC/144 201420Z XYGR0239

mf

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM STKHM/SCDEL SCDL0172 20FEB84

TO BNATO DELIVER BY 210900

INFO CANMILREPNATO VMBFR WSHDC BONN PARIS GENEV LDN MOSCO

EXTOTT/IDA NDHQOTT/CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR IDAO IDAN ^CIDDZ IDR RGX RBD

---STKHM CONF:WESTERN CAUCUS 20FEB:PROPOSED NATO MTG DATES

FOLLOWING LENGTHY DISCUSSION, WESTERN CAUCUS AGREED TO PROPOSE

20MAR FOR DEBRIEFING MTG FOR NAC AND 03MAY FOR FORWARD LOOKING

STRATEGY NAC MTG. NAC MTG WOULD BE PRECEDED BY INFOR AL MTG 02MAY.

CHAIRMAN OF DAY, LUXEMBOURG, WILL BE PASSING THOSE DATES TO NATO

THROUGH HIS DEL.

CCC/152 201700Z SCDL0172



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Consultations with USA officials re PM's Initiative

13 City and Country/Ville et pays Depart Ottawa - Eastern	14 Dates Feb. 21	15 Additional Information/Renseignements supplémentaires (circle ONE in each Category) (Dans i, ii et iii, encercler la réponse appropriée.)	
Airlines afternoon flight		(i) Type of Travel: Insp (RIP only) i) But du voyage: Insp. (RIP seulement)	
Arrive Washington, D.C.	Feb. 21	Liaison/Liaison	
		Conf/Conf.	
(NO ACCOMMODATION REQUIRED)		Training/Formation	
		Other/Autre	
Depart Washington, D.C.	Feb. 22	(ii) ADMship ii) SMA	PFZ PTD PFG IFB
Eastern Airlines evening flight		PFC PUA PTE	
Arrive Ottawa	Feb. 22	PTT PUM PUR	
		(iii) Overtime/Leave Implications iii) Répercussions en termes d'heures suppl./de congés	YES NO OUI NON
		(iv) Estimated Total Cost iv) Coût total prévu	\$

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1 Name/Nom Dr. Kenneth CALDER		2 Division/Direction IDDZ	
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		Training/Formation			
		Other/Autre			
Depart Washington, D.C.	Feb. 22	(iii) ADMship ii) SMA	PFZ	PTD	PFG
Eastern Airlines evening flight			PFC	PUA	PTE
Arrive Ottawa	Feb. 22		PTT	PUM	PUR
		(iii) Overtime/Leave Implications iii) Répercussions en termes d'heures suppl./de congés	YES OUI	NO NON	
		(iv) Estimated Total Cost iv) Coût total prévu	\$		

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Mr. Calder

ce D.D.



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TRANSMIS PAR LE CABINET
DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT
AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES
DOSSIERS DU MINISTÈRE -
LETTRES

5-2723

To/A
AU

IDA *IDR*

☒ FOR INFORMATION AND ANY NECESSARY ACTION
POUR EXAMEN ET SUITE À DONNER, S'IL Y A LIEU

☐ THIS LETTER HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED
ON A ACCUSÉ RÉCEPTION DE CETTE LETTRE

☐ BY TELEPHONE/PAR TÉLÉPHONE

☐ BY LETTER (Copy attached)/PAR LETTRE (Copie-jointe)

REMARKS/REMARQUES

[Signature]

Signature

84-2-21

Date

EXT 251

THE SENATE OF CANADA



LE SÉNAT DU CANADA

Ottawa
Feb. 17, 1984

To: Members of

Standing Committee on External Affairs
and National Defence;
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs;
Special Senate Committee on National Defence;
Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association;
Canada/United States Parliamentary Association;
Canadian Parliamentary Helsinki Group.

In view of the peace initiative of Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the break-down of disarmament negotiations at Geneva, and the tensions between the super-powers - United States and the Soviet Union, I am taking the liberty of sending to the members of the above committees copies of charts showing the balance of the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe and the range of missiles and weapons as well as the Warsaw Pact avenues of approach.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Paul Yuzyk".

Senator Paul Yuzyk





Figure 1
The strategic imbalance between West and East














Figure 3
Balance of forces in Central Europe

NATO		Warsaw Pact
35 divisions		95 divisions
7,600		25,500
19,350		43,600
4,050		17,500
1,900		3,990

1) tanks
2) armored vehicles
3) artillery
4) tactical fighter planes

Source: Defense White Book, 1983, West German Defense Ministry.






Figure 4
Balance of forces in Northern Europe

NATO		Warsaw Pact
13 brigades		9 divisions
100		1,700
150		4,700
500		2,000
85		600

1) tanks
2) armored vehicles
3) artillery
4) tactical fighter planes

Source: Defense White Book, 1983, West German Defense Ministry.


Figure 5
Balance of forces in Southern Europe

NATO		Warsaw Pact
45 divisions		69 divisions
5,150		15,300
10,500		30,500
6,200		12,000
900		2,300

1) tanks
2) armored vehicles
3) artillery
4) tactical fighter planes


Source: Defense White Book, 1983, West German Defense Ministry.

Figure 7
Tanks in Europe



Source: Defense White Book, 1983, West German Defense Ministry.


Figure 8
Armored personnel carriers in Europe



Note: This includes only armored vehicles capable of accompanying tanks in battle.

Source: Defense White Book, 1983, West German Defense Ministry.

Figure 9
Artillery in Europe
(Artillery, multiple rocket launchers, mortars)



Source: Defense White Book, 1983, West German Defense Ministry.



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

TRANSMITTAL NOTE AND RECEIPT
NOTE D'ENVOI ET REÇU

File No. — N° du dossier

TR # 8049 of Feb. 24, 1984

TO — À

Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, OTTAWA (IDDZ)

ORIGINATOR AND ADDRESS — INITIATEUR ET ADRESSE

J. H. Taylor
Canadian Permanent Representative
on the North Atlantic Council
BRUSSELS

Security Classification — Classification de sécurité

☐ Confidential
Confidentiel ☐ Secret ☐ Top Secret
Très Secret

☒ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ With Enclosure(s)
Avec annexe(s) ☐ Without Enclosure
Sans annexe

QUANTITY
QUANTITÉ

REFERENCE/COPY NO. — N° DE RÉFÉRENCE

DESCRIPTION

Subj: PM Initiative

1 copy of letter from FRG Permanent Representative to Canadian Permanent
Representative, NATO

Originator's Signature — Signature du l'initiateur

Received By — Reçu par

J.H. Taylor Signature

Feb. 24/84

Date

Signature

Date

GC 44A
7540-21-874-1328

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ADDRESSEE—SIGN AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR—DESTINATAIRE—SIGNER ET RENVoyer À L'INITIATEUR

2

cc OH 1002 tfile DJ

DER STÄNDIGE VERTRETER
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
IM NORDATLANTIKRAT

Brussels, 17 February 1984

Dear Gf,


I have noted with great interest Prime Minister Trudeau's statement which you were kind enough to forward to me under cover of your letter dated 13 February 1984.

Our embassy in Ottawa has reported in detail about your Prime Minister's statement and the debate in the House of Commons of 9 February 1984.

Prime Minister Trudeau's meeting with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 14 February 1984 has shown that our governments are in very close touch with each other with regard to the important questions of international cooperation and East-West relations.

Yours sincerely
H. Genscher

His Excellency
Mr. James H. Taylor
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of Canada
to the North Atlantic Council



Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

C O N F I D E N T I A L

18 FEB 84 1202 36Z 10

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0178 17FEB84

TO STKHM/SCDEL

INFO BONN PARIS WSHDC GENEV VMBFR BNATO LDN NDHQOTT/ CPP/DNACPOL/

DSTRATA

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RCD RCR RBD RBR IFB IDR IDA IDD

REF YOURTEL SCDL0156 17FEB

---PM INITIATIVE-CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES

UNFORTUNATELY, PRESSING ENGAGEMENTS HERE PREVENT ANY PROLONGATION
OF EUROPEAN VISIT BEYOND FIVE DAYS ALREADY SCHEDULED.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G. J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. Delvoite



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REF OURTEL IDDZ0168 16FEB, YOURTEL YBGR6181 17FEB, **LDN TEL XNGR0385**
17 FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED PARA ONE YOUR REFTEL SOUNDS FINE.WE EXPECT
OPENING COMMENTS BY SMITH/CALDER TO RUN 15-20 MINUTES AND THEN TO
BE FOLLOWED BY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS.HOW LONG THAT WILL TAKE WILL
DEPEND IN PART ON EXTENT TO WHICH ALLIES WISH TO ADD TO REMARKS
ALREADY CIRCULATED.WILL ARRIVE BRU AM MON 27FEB AND DEPART AFTER
LUNCH TUES 28FEB FOR HAGUE.GRATEFUL YOU BOOK TWO SWB AT ROYAL
WINDSOR FOR NIGHT OF 27FEB.

2.FOR HAGUE:PROPOSE MTGS WITH DUTCH WED AM,29FEB,DEPARTING FOR BONN
AFTER LUNCH .PLEASE BOOK SUITABLE HOTEL (2 SWB) FOR 28FEB.

3.FOR BONN:PROPOSE MTGS WITH FRG OFFICIALS THURS AM,01MAR,DEPARTING
FOR LDN LATE AFTERNOON.GRATEFUL YOU BOOK TWO SWB FOR 29FEB.

4.FOR LDN:WILL ARRIVE PM 01MAR AND WILL BE AVAILABLE FULL DAY FRI
02MAR FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH UK OFFICIALS.WILL DEPART LDN SAT
03MAR.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

Gary J. Smith

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. Delvoire

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TO/À

TO BGRAD/HANSON ONLY

INFO

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DE DELVOIE

REF

REF YOURLET OF 06FEB

SUBJ/SUJ

---ASSIGNMENT

BUREAU PERSONNEL SITUATION AND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUMMER 1984 STILL NOT/NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR.AM THEREFORE STILL NOT/NOT IN POSITION TO MAKE FIRM PROPOSAL.UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,I WOULD NOT/NOT WISH YOU TO PASS UP CROSS-POSTING WHICH WOULD REPRESENT A VERY LOGICAL NEXT STEP IN YOUR CAREER.THEREFORE SUGGEST YOU MAKE YOUR DECISION ON MERITS OF OFFER WITHOUT ANY SENSE OF OBLIGATION TO IDD.KEEP ME POSTED.REGARDS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A.Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG *L.A. Delvoie*
L.A. Delvoie

000350

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

February 17, 1984

IDDZ-0175

Ms. Irene Mock
1114 McQuarrie Avenue
Nelson, B.C.
V1L 1B2

Dear Ms. Mock:

The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. MacEachen, has asked me to reply to your letter of January 23.

We are very appreciative of your support for the Prime Minister's efforts to reverse the deteriorating trend in East-West relations and to work for increased international security. It is clear that he is raising the deep concerns of a great many Canadians when he argues the urgent necessity of lessening international tensions and squarely facing the problems of nuclear disarmament.

I found your letter to the Prime Minister most interesting. While it has been argued that the nation state is a somewhat outmoded political institution in the late twentieth century, the Canadian government's approach has been aimed at trying to make our existing international institutions and system work better, rather than in proposing the radical and perhaps utopian solution of world government. The difficulties the United Nations has encountered in resolving conflicts would suggest that we are still far from the day when the concept of world government might win widespread acceptance.

In his current initiative the Prime Minister has been attempting to open lines of communication with the East; to catalyze other political leaders into devoting their resources to the cause of peace; to achieving more propitious conditions for a constructive working relationship between the superpowers. Our view is that this is the most fruitful approach for Canada to take in present circumstances.

Yours sincerely,

L.A. Delvoze
Chairman
Task Force Working Group



External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

From Irene Mock BC		No. A 05450
Subject Sujets Suggestions on broadening PM's Peace Initiative.		Action div./Dir. responsable IDD EDB
Letter dated/Lettre en date du 84-01-23	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA 84-02-06	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. 84-02-06
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par		Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s) 84-02-13
Comments/Commentaires		

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu February 7 1984
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable J. G. / C.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition 1002-0175
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date Feb 17 1984
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

5-1047

AR-A0 5450
1 DD

IRENE MOCK
1114 McQUARRIE AVE.
NELSON, B.C. V1L 1B2

23 Jan 84


· Honourable Mr. Allan MacEachen
Minister of External Affairs
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A6

Dear Mr. MacEachen:

Enclosed please find my letter to Mr. Trudeau regarding ways in which his "Peace Initiative" could be broadened to perhaps improve its reception by the nuclear nations. I have suggested to him, in this letter, the possibility of a world government --not unlike the proposal made by Parliamentarians for World Order.

I would be interested to know what you think of my letter and recommendations.

Sincerely,


Irene Mock

/ IRENE MOCK
1114 McQUARRIE AVE.
NELSON, B.C. V1L 1B2

23 January 1984

The Honourable Pierre Elliot Trudeau
Prime Minister
Parliament Bldgs.
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A6

Dear Mr Trudeau:

I am writing you for two reasons: first, to support your Peace Initiative, and second, to suggest ways in which its reception by the nuclear powers may perhaps be enhanced.

Given that there are two opposed realities in the world today -- that of nuclear extinction and that of national sovereignty -- one must propose nuclear disarmament within a context that speaks to both realities. The abolition of nuclear weapons (or decrease in numbers of them) while it of course eliminates the threat of extinction, doesn't particularly solve the problems of resolving disputes and differences among sovereign nations. It is for this reason that Peace Initiatives, such as the one you have proposed, need to go a step further.

The early founders of "deterrence theory" understood the aforementioned dilemma well. Political scientist Bernard Brodie argued, in fact, as early as 1946 (in The Absolute Weapon) that nuclear weapons were so terrible that their very existence discouraged their use. "...as nearly certain as possible...the aggressor who uses the bomb will have it used against him." He knew and stated he knew that winning a nuclear war was impossible, and his concession to having such weapons around, therefore, was to insure the prevention of war to begin with.

Brodie's opponent in the nuclear debate, J. Robert Oppenheimer, felt differently. He did not believe that the presence of such weapons would be enough to deter their use, no matter how devastating their effects. Oppenheimer is quoted by Brodie as saying that the bomb "is a weapon for aggressors, and the elements of surprise and of terror are as intrinsic to it as are the fissionable nuclei" --whereupon Brodie disagrees, arguing once again that "fear of retaliation" will avert nuclear war.

In the long run, it appears that Oppenheimer is the visionary. Brodie did not, for example, understand how recent technological advances in accuracy would mean a change in policy: the targetting of missile silos instead of cities (the strategy of counterforce). He did not understand that the spiraling arms race would evolve into nations competing not for equivalent strength, but superiority: first-strike capabilities. He did not envision the flaw in deterrence theory, that a balance of nuclear forces does not make a world more stable or safe, because it does not resolve the very problems nation states have co-existing. It does not address the problem of resolving differences. Previously, wars addressed this problem and were fought successfully to this end --but nuclear weapons since they can never be used successfully

-2-

(to "win" at the cost of annihilation would not mean winning anything)-- nuclear weapons have undone the institution of war as a means of resolving disputes between nations.

Back in 1946, men such as Oppenheimer and Einstein foresaw this and suggested, in fact, that a world government might be necessary to act as arbiter in disputes between nations. Einstein wrote as early as Sept. 29, 1945 --less than two months following the bombing of Hiroshima -- "At the present high level of industrialization and economic interdependence, it is unthinkable that we can achieve peace without a genuine supranational organization to govern international relations."

And in June of 1946, Einstein said in an interview: "Our defence is not in armaments, nor in science, nor in going underground. Our defense is in law and order."

In replying to critics, he again reaffirmed:

"A 'sophisticated' person might well comment: 'We have been working toward the same goal by means of small, patient steps, which, in view of human psychology, is the only possible method. But I, the so-called 'idealist' regard this attitude as a fatal illusion. There is no gradual way to secure peace. As long as nations have no real security against aggression, they will inevitably continue to prepare for war. And, as history has proven conclusively, preparation for war always leads to actual war. When the North American Colonies united and created a central government in Washington, it came about not through a slow process but through a resolute and creative act.'"

Mr. Trudeau, I feel that I could go on, but perhaps the point I am trying to make is already well taken: we need some institution of government, of central justice or in Einstein's words, "a genuine supranational organization" --world government--to insure that sovereign nations can co-exist in the world. I ask you to seriously consider a recommendation to this effect with your Peace Initiative so that nuclear nations can give up their arms --or slowly decrease their numbers --with the assurance that another, more creative force will guarantee peaceful co-existence in the world.

To substantiate the practical application of such a request, I have enclosed for you a Document entitled "An action program for world security: A message from Parliamentarians for World Order" which was presented in May 1982 to both the U.S. and USSR by a five-continent delegation of legislators. Douglas Roche, MP, is the International Chairman of Parliamentarians for World Order.

Thank you very much for your time in reading this letter. I personally wish you the best.

Sincerely,

Irene Mock

c.c.: Allan MacEachen, Minister External Affairs
Pauline Jewett, External Affairs Critic
Lyle Kristiansen, MP (Kootenay-West)

000355

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER

JAN 30 1984

CABINET DU VICE-
PREMIER MINISTRE



External Affairs
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FAK SIMILE

MESSAGE

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SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	12	10
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REF	---PR INITIATIVE: TEXT FOR MARTENSON		
SUBJ/SUJ	PLUG TEXT IS FOR SUBMISSION TO UNDER SEC GEN MARTENSON AS CONTRI- BUTION TO UN JOURNAL QUOTE DISARMAMENT UNQUOTE - 11 PAGES (CONCENTRE PLSE SEND THE FAXSIMILE ENCLOSED.)		

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DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

[Signature]
J. G. G. G.

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

000357

EXCERPTS OF PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S REMARKS IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON PEACE AND SECURITY, OTTAWA,
FEBRUARY 9, 1984

WHEN THE FIRST ATOMIC BOMB EXPLODED IN A NEW MEXICO DESERT IN 1945, LIFE ITSELF CHANGED. MAN GAVE HIMSELF THE POWER OF HIS OWN DESTRUCTION.

NEVER AGAIN WOULD CHILDREN BE FREE FROM FEAR OF THE BOMB. NEVER AGAIN WOULD WE PARENTS BE ABLE TO REASSURE THEM. NOR TO CALM OUR OWN ANXIETIES.

A NUCLEAR WAR WOULD MAKE NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SIDES OF THIS HOUSE ON WHICH WE FIND OURSELVES, BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG, BETWEEN RICH OR POOR, BETWEEN EAST OR WEST, NORTH OR SOUTH.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXIST. THEY PROBABLY ALWAYS WILL. AND THEY WORK, WITH HORRIBLE EFFICIENCY. THEY THREATEN THE VERY FUTURE OF OUR SPECIES. WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO MANAGE THAT RISK. NEVER AGAIN CAN WE PUT THE TASK OUT OF OUR MINDS; NOR TRIVIALIZE IT; NOR MAKE IT ROUTINE.

NOR DARE WE LOSE HEART.

MANAGING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR IS THE PRIMORDIAL DUTY OF BOTH EAST AND WEST. BUT CANADIANS ARE CONCERNED THAT THE SUPERPOWERS MAY HAVE BECOME DIVERTED FROM THIS ELEMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY. THAT THEY MAY BE TOO CAUGHT UP IN IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION, IN ENDLESS MEASUREMENTS OF PARITY, IN TRIALS OF STRENGTH AND WILL. CANADIANS ALSO KNOW IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY TO EXPECT THAT ANIMOSITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WILL SOMEHOW DISAPPEAR THIS SIDE OF THE POINT OF NO RETURN.

- 2 -

THE EXPERTS WOULD HAVE US BELIEVE THAT THE ISSUES OF NUCLEAR WAR HAVE BECOME TOO COMPLEX FOR ALL BUT THEMSELVES. WE ARE ASKED TO ENTRUST OUR FATE TO A HANDFUL OF HIGH PRIESTS OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY. AND TO THE SCIENTISTS WHO HAVE TAKEN US FROM ATOM BOMBS TO THERMONUCLEAR WARHEADS, FROM MISSILES WITH ONE WARHEAD TO MISSILES WITH TEN AND MORE, FROM WEAPONS THAT DETER TO WEAPONS THAT THREATEN THE EXISTENCE OF US ALL.

CANADIANS, AND PEOPLE EVERYWHERE, BELIEVE THEIR SECURITY HAS BEEN DIMINISHED, NOT ENHANCED, BY A GENERATION OF WORK SPENT ON PERFECTING THE THEORIES AND INSTRUMENTS OF HUMAN ANNIHILATION.

BUT TECHNOLOGICAL PUSH TOO OFTEN FINDS A SYMPATHETIC POLITICAL PULL. IT IS LEADERS WHO DECIDE ON DEFENCE BUDGETS AND RESEARCH BUDGETS. IT IS LEADERS WHO MUST DIRECT; IT IS LEADERS WHO MUST ASSERT THEIR WILL FOR PEACE, OR SCIENCE WILL DEVISE EVER MORE LETHAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

CANADIAN SECURITY IS AT STAKE; AND CANADA HAS EARNED THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD, IN PEACETIME AND IN WAR. THOUSANDS OF CANADIANS FOUGHT AND DIED IN TWO WORLD WARS THAT CANADA HAD NO HAND IN STARTING. WE HELPED TO SHAPE THE POST-WAR WORLD -- AT BRETTON WOODS WHERE THE WORLD BANK WAS LAUNCHED; AND AT DUMBARTON OAKS AND SAN FRANCISCO, WHERE THE UNITED NATIONS WAS BORN.

WE ADVOCATED UNIVERSAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE

- 3 -

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -- WHEN IT WAS NOT ALWAYS POPULAR TO DO SO. AS PRIME MINISTER DIEFENBAKER DEMONSTRATED WITH RESPECT TO CUBA. AS PRIME MINISTERS ST. LAURENT AND PEARSON DEMONSTRATED IN HELPING NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES GAIN ADMISSION TO THE UN. AND AS MY GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATED IN RECOGNIZING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND ITS RIGHT TO A SEAT ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

CANADA EMERGED FROM WORLD WAR II AS ONE OF THE VERY FEW NATIONS WITH BOTH TECHNOLOGY AND RESOURCES TO BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT WE HAD SEEN THE TERRIBLE NATURE OF THESE WEAPONS AND THEIR WORK. SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENTS, THEREFORE, RENOUNCED THIS NUCLEAR OPTION, AND APPLIED CANADIAN SKILLS TO THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. IN PLACE OF A NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCE, WE JOINED WITH OTHERS IN SYSTEMS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY -- IN THE UN, IN NATO, AND IN NORAD.

WE HAVE DONE MORE THAN LOOK TO OUR DEFENCES. WE HAVE ADDRESSED THE CAUSES OF INSECURITY AND INSTABILITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE THIRD WORLD. EAST-WEST AND NORTH-SOUTH ARE THE FOUR POINTS OF THE POLITICAL COMPASS OF OUR MODERN AGE. THE PROBLEMS OF THE SOUTH CANNOT BE SOLVED IN THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS ON GLOBAL SECURITY. MASSIVE MILITARY EXPENDITURES ARE DISTORTING ECONOMIC POLICIES AND DIVERTING RESOURCES AWAY FROM GLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THIS IN TURN IS WORSENING THIRD WORLD INSTABILITIES THAT ENSNARE EAST AND WEST AND ADD TO THE INSECURITY OF US ALL.

- 4 -

LAST FALL I SPOKE OF AN OMINOUS RHYTHM OF CRISIS. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE CONFLUENCE OF THREE POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS TRENDS -- THE RESORT TO FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES, THE RISK OF THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE WORSENING STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. I DECIDED TO PRACTICE WHAT ALL SEVEN LEADERS OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES HAD PROCLAIMED LAST SUMMER AT WILLIAMSBURG: "...TO DEVOTE OUR FULL POLITICAL RESOURCES TO REDUCING THE THREAT OF WAR".

I DECIDED TO USE CANADA'S INFLUENCE TO CALL INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO THE DANGER, TO TRY TO INJECT HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL ENERGY INTO EAST-WEST RELATIONS, TO TURN THE TREND LINE OF CRISIS, TO WORK AT THE CROSSROADS OF COMMON INTEREST BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

I PROPOSED THAT THE MEGAPHONES BE PUT AWAY, THAT AN ARMISTICE BE DECLARED IN THE WAR OF IDEOLOGY AND RECRIMINATION, THAT AN END BE MADE TO MANICHAISM ON BOTH SIDES; THAT WE EXERCISE LEADERSHIP, AND APPLY STATECRAFT, IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS -- THE MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP THAT WE HAVE.

THE INITIATIVE

SINCE LAST FALL I HAVE TAKEN THAT MESSAGE TO PARIS, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS AND ROME; TO THE VATICAN, TO BONN, TO LONDON AND TO ZURICH. I PRESENTED IT IN TOKYO, AND TO THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN NEW DELHI. TO PEKING, TO WASHINGTON, AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS. I MET WITH LEADERS IN PRAGUE, EAST BERLIN AND

- 5 -

BUCHAREST, TO ENSURE THAT OUR MESSAGE WAS HEARD IN THE HIGHEST COUNCILS OF THE WARSAW PACT.

AT EACH STEP ALONG THE WAY, MY MESSAGE WAS STRAIGHTFORWARD. CANADA WAS NOT LOOKING FOR A SEAT AT THE SUPERPOWER TABLE. BUT OUR LIVES AND OUR FUTURE WERE ON THAT TABLE, AS WERE THOSE OF THE NINE-TENTHS OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION LIVING OUTSIDE THE USA AND THE USSR. WE ALL HAD A RIGHT AND A RESPONSIBILITY TO INVOLVE OURSELVES, TO PRESS THOSE AT THE TABLE TO REMEMBER THEIR OWN HUMANITY.

WE PROPOSED GIVING POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON MEASURES TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR IN EUROPE. WE INSISTED THAT BOTH SIDES INVEST POLITICAL EFFORT TO STIMULATE THE TALKS IN VIENNA ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS.

AMONG OTHER PROPOSALS WE SUGGESTED MEETINGS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS SO THAT A FORUM MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED WHEREIN TO NEGOTIATE GLOBAL LIMITS AND, EVENTUALLY, REDUCTIONS TO THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

WE URGED ACTION TO REINFORCE THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IN THE INTEREST OF SUPERPOWER, MIDDLE-POWER AND MICRO-STATE ALIKE. AND YET, AS LONG AS THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS SHOW LITTLE SIGN OF INITIATING THE REDUCTIONS CALLED FOR IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, WE RUN THE GRAVE RISK OF SEEING NUCLEAR WEAPONS SPREAD TO NEW REGIONS AND TO OLD RIVALRIES.

- 6 -

ABOVE ALL, AT EACH STEP ALONG THE WAY I URGED POLITICAL LEADERS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES PERSONALLY; TO PUT PEACE AT THE TOP OF THEIR AGENDA; TO EXERCISE THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THE CURRENT DANGEROUS SITUATION DEMANDS -- TO RESTART THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

MISPERCEPTIONS AND MISTRUST ON BOTH SIDES RUN DEEP. BUT I BELIEVE WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE SIGNS OF PROGRESS.

IN REFLECTING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF MY TALKS IN EASTERN AND WESTERN CAPITALS ALIKE, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE. LET ME SUGGEST TEN PRINCIPLES OF A COMMON BOND BETWEEN EAST AND WEST:

1. -- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT A NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT BE WON.
2. -- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT A NUCLEAR WAR MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT.
3. -- BOTH SIDES WISH TO BE FREE OF THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL WAR OR OF SURPRISE ATTACK.
4. -- BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THE DANGERS INHERENT IN DESTABILIZING WEAPONS.
5. -- BOTH SIDES UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR IMPROVED TECHNIQUES OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT.

- 7 -

6. -- BOTH SIDES ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE AWESOME CONSEQUENCES OF BEING THE FIRST TO USE FORCE AGAINST THE OTHER.
7. -- BOTH SIDES HAVE AN INTEREST IN INCREASING SECURITY WHILE REDUCING THE COST.
8. -- BOTH SIDES HAVE AN INTEREST IN AVOIDING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES, SO-CALLED HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION.
9. -- BOTH SIDES HAVE COME TO A GUARDED RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS.
10. -- BOTH SIDES REALIZE THAT THEIR SECURITY STRATEGIES CANNOT BE BASED ON THE ASSUMED POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF THE OTHER SIDE.

AS DECALOGUES GO, THIS MAY SEEM MODEST. BUT I WONDER, IN THIS PERIOD WHEN THERE ARE POSITIVE SIGNS OF EMERGENCE FROM A TIME OF CRISIS, WHETHER THERE IS NOT SOUND PURPOSE IN GOING BACK TO BASICS. BEGINNING AGAIN, WITH A COMMITMENT TO PRINCIPLES WHICH CAN BE SHARED. FINDING A PLACE TO START -- SURVEYING A LITTLE COMMON GROUND ON WHICH TO STAND.

THEREFORE, WE INTEND TO DRAW ON THESE TEN PRINCIPLES, TO DEVELOP ELEMENTS OF A COMMON PURPOSE AMONG THE LEADERS OF EAST AND WEST.

- 8 -

I SHALL BE WRITING TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND TO PRESIDENT ANDROPOV, TO LEADERS IN BOTH ALLIANCES, AND TO OTHER STATESMEN, TO PROPOSE THAT THESE ARE PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH BOTH SIDES CAN BUILD. BECAUSE THERE ARE POINTS OF AGREEMENT AS WELL AS DISAGREEMENT. THERE IS A WAY AROUND THE IMPASSE OF RECENT MONTHS. THERE ARE SIGNS OF PROMISE AND I BELIEVE THAT THE TREND-LINE OF CRISIS HAS TURNED.

.....

THE TASKS AHEAD

WE HAVE INJECTED POLITICAL ENERGY INTO EAST-WEST RELATIONS. BUT POLITICAL ENERGY IS NOT, BY ITSELF, ENOUGH. IT MUST BE NOURISHED BY IMAGINATION, FORTIFIED BY PERSISTENCE, AND CONFIRMED BY ACTION. IMAGINATION TO FIND NEW IDEAS, WHICH BREAK OLD DEADLOCKS AND ADDRESS EMERGING DANGERS. PERSISTENCE TO NEGOTIATE NEW AGREEMENTS AND TO MEET THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGY. ACTION IN THE FORM EVEN OF SMALL STEPS AS EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH. ACTION ON SPECIFIC TASKS SUCH AS DEVELOPING THE MEANS TO VERIFY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, OR IN REGULARLY SCHEDULED CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

IN THE MONTHS AHEAD CANADA WILL BUILD ON THE PROGRESS SO FAR ACHIEVED, TO ENSURE THAT OUR IDEAS ARE FURTHER DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED. WE HAVE NO MONOPOLY OF PROPOSALS, NOR DO WE EXPECT THEM TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE OVERNIGHT. WHAT COUNTS IS THAT SOME, THOUGH BY NO MEANS ALL, OF THE KEY EAST-WEST INDICATORS SHOW THAT THEIR DOWNWARD COURSE HAS BEEN ARRESTED.

- 9 -

IN THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO NEXT YEAR'S REVIEW OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PRESS BOTH SIDES TO KEEP THE NPT BARGAIN. FOR SECURITY IS INDIVISIBLE. IF COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT NOW HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACQUIRE THEM, THEN EVERYONE'S SECURITY WILL BE DIMINISHED.

THE BASIS OF THE NPT BARGAIN WAS THAT THE NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS IN RETURN FOR THE NON-NUCLEAR POWERS NOT BUILDING THEIR OWN, AND THAT BOTH WOULD COOPERATE IN SHARING THE BENEFITS OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. THUS THE CURRENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES BEAR AN IMMENSE RESPONSIBILITY IN PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

CONSEQUENTLY, WE MUST ALSO CONTINUE TO PRESS OUR PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. IT IS A CONCEPT WHOSE LOGIC IS COMPELLING. THOSE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ARE, AT THE SAME TIME, THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEY HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES AS WELL AS VETOES.

THIS IDEA WILL TAKE HOLD SLOWLY, TO BE SURE, AS NEW IDEAS DO. BUT I BELIEVE THAT IT WILL TAKE HOLD. FOR EXAMPLE: ACCIDENT, MISCALCULATION, CRISIS, SYSTEMS FAILURE -- THESE ARE NUCLEAR PERILS WHICH ALL OF THE FIVE POWERS MUST COPE WITH. AND WHICH THEY HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO MANAGE COOPERATIVELY. I SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT AN EARLY FOCUS OF FIVE-POWER CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE CRISIS MANAGEMENT; PARTICULARLY THE HANDLING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCIDENTS, AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS.

- 10 -

AMONG THE FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES, THE TWO SUPER-POWERS HAVE BY FAR THE LARGEST ARSENALS. THEY BEAR A CORRESPONDING RESPONSIBILITY TO APPLY THE SAME GENIUS TO REDUCING THEIR ARMS AS THEY DID TO BUILDING THEM. THEY MUST NOT LET THEIR VIEWS OF EACH OTHER'S MORALITY AND LEGITIMACY PREVENT AN EARLY RESUMPTION OR ARMS CONTROL TALKS. IT IS VITAL THAT THEY RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING AND REDUCING INTERMEDIATE RANGE AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THROUGHOUT MY OWN PERSONAL EFFORTS TO SUBJECT THE SCIENCE OF WAR TO THE ART OF POLITICS, I HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED BY THE SUPPORT OF MANY CANADIANS, AND ENCOURAGED BY THEIR GOOD WISHES. I THANK THEM NOW ... AND ASSURE THEM, AS WELL AS THIS HOUSE, THAT THE WORK WE HAVE STARTED WILL CONTINUE. THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA IS COMMITTED TO THESE PURPOSES AND WILL CARRY THEM FORWARD.

BUT WE CAN CARRY THEM ONLY SO FAR WITHOUT THE COLLABORATION OF THOSE WHO OWN AND CONTROL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BECAUSE IT IS THE NUCLEAR POWERS, AND ABOVE ALL THE SUPERPOWERS, WHO BEAR THE GREATEST RESPONSIBILITY. LET IT BE SAID OF THEM IN THE FUTURE THAT THIS WAS THE TIME WHEN THEIR POLITICAL JUDGMENT CONTROLLED THEIR TECHNOLOGICAL GENIUS, WHEN THEIR BEST INTEREST SERVED THE COMMON GOOD. LET HISTORY SURVIVE, THAT IT MAY JUDGE THEM GENEROUSLY.

LET IT BE SAID OF THE OTHER NATIONS THAT THEY SAW THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITY TO WORK TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF ANNIHILATION, TO FOREGO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND TO SERVE THE PURPOSE OF A DURABLE PEACE.

- 11 -

AND LET IT BE SAID OF CANADA, AND OF CANADIANS:
THAT WE SAW THE CRISIS; THAT WE DID ACT; THAT WE TOOK RISKS;
THAT WE WERE LOYAL TO OUR FRIENDS AND OPEN WITH OUR
ADVERSARIES; THAT WE LIVED UP TO OUR IDEALS; AND THAT WE
HAVE DONE WHAT WE COULD TO LIFT THE SHADOW OF WAR.

- 30 -



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	18 FEB 84 02 39Z	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0173 17FEB84		
TO/À	TO WSAW		
INFO			
DISTR	INFO BONN WSHDC BNATO PARIS LDN VMBFR ROME PRMNY MOSCO BUCST BPEST		
REF	PRGUE BGRAD GENEV STKHM/SCDEL HAGUE BRU OSLO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/		
SUBJ/SUJ	DNACPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER		
	DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD RGB URR ZSI CPD RCR		
	REF YOURTEL UMGR0275 15FEB, BONN TEL ZQGR1020 08FEB		
	---PM INITIATIVE DEBRIEFING OF FRG-COMMENTS RE STATE OF BERLIN		
	IT IS OUR INTENTION, AT EARLIEST FREE MOMENT, TO PROVIDE BONN GROUP		
	ON BERLIN WITH RESULTS OF PMS EXPERIENCE IN EAST BERLIN. THIS WILL		
	INCLUDE THREE BASIC ELEMENTS: (A) COMMENTS ON INITIAL GDR EFFORTS TO		
	INCLUDE QUOTE NO - NO UNQUOTE EVENTS ON AGENDA, (B) NEW ELEMENTS WE HAD		
	TO DEAL WITH WHILE IN EAST BERLIN WHICH RAISED QUESTIONS IN MINDS		
	OF PM DEL AS TO WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE AVOIDED OR NOT/NOT AND WHICH		
	BONN GROUP SHOULD CLARIFY, AND (C) SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHAT POSITIVE		
	EVENTS MIGHT BE INCLUDED ON AGENDA THAT WOULD NOT/NOT CONTRAVENE		
	GROUND RULES ON BERLIN (EG VISITS TO MUSEUM AND HOUSE OF BERTOLD		
	BRECHT).		
	2. WE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH DRAFT OF THIS REPORT FOR YOUR COMMENTS AS		
	SOON AS IT IS COMPLETED.		
	3. AS FOR NEW ELEMENTS OR QUOTE NEW CURVES UNQUOTE MENTIONED IN BONN		
	REFTEL, IT WAS VIEW OF MEMBERS OF DEL TRAVELLING WITH PM THAT THESE		
	INCLUDED FOLLOWING ELEMENTS, ALL OF WHICH REQUIRE CLARIFICATION FROM		
	...2		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG  G.J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG  L.A. Delvoie



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO IDDZ0173 CONFD

12|

10

BONN GROUP:(A)PRESENCE OF ARMED GDR SOLDIERS ON GUARD AT SCHLOSS IN
PANKOW;(B)SIGNATURE OF GUEST BOOK IN HONECKERS OFFICE;(C)VISIT TO
BRANDENBURG GATE;(D)VISIT TO GDR PARLIAMENT WHICH INCLUDES REPS
FROM QUOTE CITY OF BERLIN UNQUOTE.

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

February 17, 1984

IDDZ-0172

Mr. Bernard E. Vanden
1068 Fisher Avenue
Ottawa, Ontario
K1Z 6P6

Dear Mr. Vanden:

Your letter to the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs of February 4 has been given to the Prime Minister's Task Force for reply.

One of the fundamental aims of the Prime Minister's initiative has been to open lines of communication with the East in the interests of improving East-West relations and, in particular, of trying to create more propitious conditions for a genuine superpower dialogue.

The Prime Minister has not tried to insert himself in the central nuclear negotiations between the superpowers. Our view is that there are certain matters that must be decided in bilateral Soviet-American negotiations.

The Prime Minister has just had a first meeting with the new Soviet leader, Mr. Chernenko, in which the Prime Minister did not seek to negotiate with the Soviets, but rather to argue the urgent necessity of re-establishing a constructive, long-term political relationship between East and West.

I should also note that since the beginning of his current initiative the Prime Minister has made clear that Canada stands as a loyal NATO ally; as recently as his speech in the House of Commons February 9, he reiterated Canada's commitment to NATO and its policies.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L.A. Delvoie".

L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

From 3 <i>Bernard E. Vanden Ont.</i>		No. No A 05593
Subject Sujet <i>Comments on PM's Peace Initiative.</i>		Action div./Dir. responsable <i>IDDZ</i>
Letter dated/Lettre en date du <i>84-02-04</i>	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA <i>84-02-13</i>	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. <i>84-02-13</i>
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par Comments/Commentaires		<i>84-02-20</i>

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu <i>February 14, 1984</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable <i>J. McNEE</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition <i>IDDZ-0172</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date <i>Feb 17 1984</i>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

5-1047

AR-A05593
1 DDZ.

Bernard E. Vanden
1068 Fisher Avenue
Ottawa K1Z 6P6
February 4, 1984

Honorable Allen J. MacEachen
Minister of External Affairs
Lester B. Pearson Building
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa
K1A 0G2

Dear Sir:

While our Prime Minister's intentions to involve himself in international nuclear arms politics are to be commended, his efforts could have the opposite effect of his declared intentions.

Canada's Prime Minister has done his rounds to every important relative leader save the Russian one. Without this visit his globe trot leaves the situation worse than when he started. The Russian leaders are aware of Mr. Trudeau's personality and his habit of making controversial statements when he is being frustrated. His divisive public utterances about his fellow NATO leaders can only strengthen Mr. Yuri Andropov's hand at any nuclear arms negotiations.

Mr. Pierre Trudeau is at the place where he is being manipulated and being used by the Russian leaders. NATO is a committee of self governing states, banding together for mutual military protection. Throughout all of history a committee has never started a war. History has shown that only a dedicated military leader has ever started a major war. The Warsaw Pact is no opposite number to NATO. It is Russia, pure and simple and Eastern European countries have no say on policy, can not produce their own atomic weapons or have the option to leave mother Russia's military organization.

The history of communist Russia has been to take every advantage from other countries and to negotiate hard where there is no advantage. Pierre Trudeau has nothing to negotiate with the Russians, he can only weaken NATO and thus increase the danger of nuclear war.

If Pierre Trudeau wanted to help the peace processes he

should get a lever. The best current lever would be to give effective assistance to the Afghanistan nation in the defence of their home land against Russian expansion.

The North Americans have have a double standard. They allow Russia to interfere in Central and other American areas and yet do not use a lever to protect their hemisphere.

Yours truly

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bernard E. Vanden". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Bernard" being more prominent and the last name "Vanden" following in a similar style.

Bernard E. Vanden

cc Governments of NATO countries
cc Mr Brian Mulroney MP

MASTER FILE

Mr. Smith

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned 1DD

Person 1100

Local Time

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6131 17FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 170900

INFO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS HAGUE
OSLO COPEN ATHNS NDHQOTT/ADM POL/DNACPOL/DIPOL/PPP/DSTRATA/CIS PRMNY
STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDAO IDAN IDR SCS

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0168 16FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

WE ARE PROPOSING THAT BRIEFING BE GIVEN AT REGULAR MTG OF POLITICAL
CTTEE(PAC),TUE 28FEB.HAVE SPOKEN TO PAC CHAIRMAN,CELLA,WHO SUGGESTED
BRIEFING COULD TAKE PLACE AT BEGINNING OF MTG WHICH COULD BE MOVED
UP TO 10:00 AM.

2.WE WOULD APPRECIATE INDICATION OF HOW YOU SEE BRIEFING BEING CAST.
DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE LENGTHY OR SHORT INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS?HOW LONG
WOULD YOU EXPECT BRIEFING TO LAST?AS WELL,PLS ADVISE ACCOMMODATION
REQUIREMENTS.

3.TRUST SMITH AND CALDER WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD OPEN FREE EVENING
TO REACQUAINT THEMSELVES WITH LOCAL ATTRACTIONS.

CCC/054 171400Z YBGR6181

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0385 17FEB84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 171400

INFO PARIS BONN WSHDC GENEV VMBFR BNATO STKHM/SCDEL

NDHQOTT/CPP/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RCD RCR RBD RBR IFB IDR IDD

REF YOURTEL IDDZ 0170 16FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH

WE HAVE CHECKED INFORMALLY WITH FCO DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL DEPTS, BOTH OF WHOM WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH SMITH AND DR CALDER DURING WEEK OF FEB 27 TO MARCH 2. WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF MONDAY, 27FEB (WHICH IS STILL UNCERTAIN, AND IN ANY CASE WOULD BE QUOTE BAD DAY UNQUOTE) BOTH JOHN WESTON AND MICHEAL PACKENHAM, HEADS OF DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL DEPTS, FCO, WOULD BE AVAILABLE; REPRESENTATIVES FROM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WOULD ALSO WISH TO SIT IN.

2. INITIAL THINKING IS TO HAVE TEAM MEET WITH TWO SEPARATE GROUPS, ONE TO DISCUSS SPECIFICS OF SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS, AND SECOND TO LOOK AT BROADER INITIATIVE QUESTIONS OF CONCERN TO BRITISH AS REFLECTED OURTEL 343 14FEB.

3. WE WILL AWAIT YOUR ADVICE AND THAT OF OTHER POST INCLUDED IN SMITH/CALDER ITINERARY BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER WITH FCO.

CCC/083 171650Z XNGR0385

MASTER FILE
Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

Mr. [Signature]

CANADIAN
HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON FILE CIRC DIARY

ORIG. NO. 75 D'ORIG.

'84 FEB 17 14:53

FAK 6/17
1/3

U N C L A S S I F I E D

FM LON XNCR 0379 17FEB84

TO EXTOTT/RBR

INFO ^{9H}PCOOTT/FOWLER DE OTT

DISTR RGB RBD RCR IDDZ IDR IDA ZSI IDD

---EAST/WEST RELATIONS: LONGER TERM BRITISH OBJECTIVES

FOLLOWING ARTICLE BY ANTHONY ROBINSON APPEARED IN 17FEB

FINANCIAL TIMES:

2.COMCENTRE PLS SEND BY FACSIMILE.

NOTE - UK is now suggesting
it initiated policy
review on E-W relations
last June.

SP
20/2/84
or

J R SCHRAM/mg

POL & ECON

370

R SCHRAM

Thatcher woos Moscow after change of heart

AT ANTHONY ROBINSON

NOT BY
MRS T.
BEFORE
CAN
PARLIAM-
ENT

6/17
2/3

Review
DEAN
IN
WNE

THE DEATH of Mr Yuri Andropov brought Mrs Margaret Thatcher to Moscow much sooner than she had anticipated. But when the news came she seized the opportunity with the same enthusiasm with which she grasped the hand of the new leader, Mr Konstantin Chernenko, this week in the Kremlin's glittering St George's Hall.

It provided the ideal opportunity to inform the Soviet leaders directly of the essence of one of the most thoroughgoing reviews of British East-West policy ever undertaken.

The decision to undertake the review was initiated by Sir Geoffrey Howe immediately after the Government's return to power last June. Its starting point was recognition of the fundamental difficulties of dealing with a great power founded on military strength and motivated by a revolutionary ideology.

The picture of the Soviet Union which emerged was of a vast country in which economic self-sufficiency went hand in hand with enormous inefficiency; a country with a long tradition of autocratic rule but now suffering from diminishing political appeal—both to its own people and world opinion outside. The problems had

become more intractable with the growth of Soviet military power, given a new post-war dimension by the existence of nuclear weapons.

The review, which covered economic, military, foreign affairs and other aspects, took advice from experts outside government. The basic conclusions, reached in the autumn, were not vitiated either by the Korean aircraft disaster or the Soviet walkout from the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks in Geneva.

The policy decision to change tack and press for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union was taken nearly six months ago and signalled in a series of speeches. Mrs Thatcher's presence in Moscow, however, put the message across directly—not only to the new Soviet leader but also to the Soviet people who had up until now been taught to see her as a vitriolic anti-Soviet shrew. She made a great impression on Soviet TV.

The fundamental lines of the new approach reflect, firstly, a desire to cut down the risk of mutual misunderstanding through more direct contacts, at several levels.

The second theme was recognition that arms control talks

alone were too narrow a basis for contacts. "The whole patient had to be taken into account, not just the worst symptoms," as one official said.

Given the Soviet Union's geographical position and world power interests it was also considered sensible to discuss regional issues like the Middle East, the Gulf, Central America and southern Africa.

The British Government clearly believes it is merely

common sense to recognise the Soviet interest in what happens in the Middle East, an area which, as the Soviets never tire of pointing out, lies close to their southern border.

This is not a view widely held in Washington which has sought to keep the Soviet Union out of the area since the Camp David agreements of 1977, with results now clear to all.

The Soviet Union's main aim is to have its interests recog-

nised by reconvening the 1973 Geneva conference on the Middle East and playing a co-chairman role with the U.S.

Whitehall's conception is more modest, but officials point out that, for example, the Soviet attitude towards replacing the multi-national force in Beirut with a UN force clearly has to be probed and its assent encouraged. The Soviet Union after all has a Security Council veto.

The review recognised the modest nature of UK-Soviet trade, less than 1 per cent of the UK's total trade, but something worth encouraging, so long as financial prudence and strategic interests were preserved.

Looking slightly further afield the review also concluded that the policy of treating East European countries as individual countries with their own national characteristics and interests should continue.

This did not mean ignoring the existence of legitimate Soviet security interests in the region but recognition of the fact that over the longer term countries which see themselves as lying in central rather than Eastern Europe should be encouraged to continue to develop their traditional ties with the Western half of the continent as well as their powerful neighbour to the East.

The review also confirmed that Britain, together with its allies, should continue to insist that Soviet and East European compliance with their treaty obligations to defend and preserve human rights was central to the whole question of trust and co-operation.

If the Soviet Union was ever allowed to treat Helsinki and Madrid as non-events there would be little point of going ahead with negotiations of more

In essence the target of the exercise in deep thinking which preoccupied Whitehall in second half of last year was to forge a new relationship, not by Britain alone but by the West as a whole, which was more realistic, both in its analysis of the underlying problems and the estimate of

potential gains, than the now discredited policy of détente.

The need for consistency over a lengthy period of time was recognised to be crucial. "We must avoid euphoria followed by disappointment," as a senior official put it.

"We have to learn to live better with each other, understand each other's legitimate security interests and dispel the Soviet fear that the West only wants to negotiate from a position of strength."

Policy has to be compatible both with the nature of the democratic process in the West and the slow pace of change in the Soviet system.

Put into the more homely image of British domestic policy officials point to the slowness and the difficulties the present government has faced in persuading the British electorate to accept, for example, "the virtues of privatising rubbish collection" and returning state enterprise to private hands.

Persuading the Soviet regime to change attitudes and suspicions which in many cases pre-date the revolution will take much longer and face more serious pitfalls. But in a dangerous nuclear world, Whitehall believes, it has to be tried.

F 6/12
3/3 on East-West relations

on East-West relations

Gorbachev emerges as number two in Politburo

MR MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, at 53 the youngest member of the 12-man Soviet politburo, appears to have won the first round in the manoeuvring for position after the appointment of Mr Konstantin Chernenko as the new Soviet leader, Anthony Robinson writes.

An official report of the proceedings of the central committee plenary meetings on Monday which ratified Mr Chernenko's selection showed that Mr Gorbachev formally closed the meeting "on behalf of the politburo."

The report said Mr

Gorbachev, summing up the proceedings, said "the plenum has passed in an atmosphere of unity and cohesion . . . questions of the succession of the leadership were solved with a feeling of major responsibility toward the party and people."

This emphasis on the unity of the party behind Mr Chernenko appears to be aimed at countering Western reports of a fierce struggle behind the scenes between the old guard and younger members of the politburo.

To underline the point Mr Gorbachev praised "the

unanimous election of comrade Chernenko, and said the plenum gave "full support" to the policy statements contained in Mr Chernenko's acceptance speech.

Soviet Press accounts of the meeting at the time, however, failed to mention Mr Gorbachev's role at the central committee meeting and reported only the speech of proposal by Mr Nikolai Tikhonov, the 78-year-old Prime Minister, and Mr Chernenko's own speech of acceptance. There was no explanation for this discrepancy.

Publication of the official

report strengthens the impression that Mr Gorbachev has emerged as the number two man in the Soviet leadership. The first sign came when he was allotted the honour of flanking Mr Chernenko on the other side of Mr Andropov's coffin during the funeral in Red Square on Tuesday.

Mr Gorbachev, who graduated as a lawyer and then went on to become an agricultural specialist, is the best educated man in the politburo. Mr Andropov appeared to be grooming him for the eventual succession.

R E S T R I C T E D

FM HAGUE YWGR0367 17FEB34

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO BONN LDN PARIS BRU BNATO COPEN OSLO MOSCO ROME STKHM STKHM/SCDEL
ANKRA BREEC ATHNS WSHDC MDRID LSBON NDHQTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/DNACPOL
PCOOTT/FOWLER PRMNY BERN GENEV BGRAD

DISTR RCD RGX IDA IDAM IDRA IDD RBD RCM RCR ZSP ZSI IFB RBR (IDDZ

DMF RGB RSD RSR

---INF/DUTCH PARLIAMENT ATTITUDE

SUMMARY:IN LONG PROTRACTED PROCESS OF DECIDING WHETHER
NETHS SHOULD DEPLOY INF ON ITS SOIL,PARLIAMENT SEEMS TO HAVE
TAKEN A POSITIVE STEP IN DEFEATING RECENTLY A LABOUR MOTION
CALLING FOR POSTPONEMENT,DECISION STILL REMAINS UNCERTAIN BUT
SUSPENSE SHOULD COME TO AN END BY NEXT JUNE.

2.REPORT:ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS WHETHER RECENT
DEFEAT IN DUTCH PARLIAMENT OF A LOBOUR MOTION CALLING FOR
DELAY IN SITING CRUISE MISSILES IN EUROPE REPRESENTS GOOD
OMEN FOR GOVT,FACT REMAINS THAT IT WAS DEFEATED BY OVER-
WHELMING MAJOIRTY,WITH EXCEPT OF THREE OF ITS MEMBERS,
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS(CDA)JOINED LIBERAL PARTY,DEMOCR T 66 AND
FOUR SMALL RIGHTWIN3 PARTIES TO DEFEAT MOTION.EVEN ONE OF
THE TWO CDAS DEFENCE SPECIALISTS,JOP DE BOER,WHO RECENTLY
HAD REPEATEDLY APPEALED FOR A DELAY,VOTED AGAINST MOTION,
ON GROUND THAT IT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS A CALL TO Q OTE
REJECT UNQUOTE ALL TOGETHER DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES IN THE
NETHS.HE SAID THAT CDA WAS COMMITTED TO AN AGREED DECISION-
MAKING PROCEDURE I.E. DEBATE AND VOTE BY PARLIAMENT AND
THEREFORE ISSUED SHOULD NOT/NOT BE PRE-EMPTED BY LABOUR MOTION.

...2

PAGE TWO YWGR0367 RESTR

3. REJECTION OF THIS MOTION DOES NOT/NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY THAT POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE MADE ANY PROGRESS IN THEIR THINKING PROCESS AND THAT THEY WOULD THEREFORE BE IN BETTER POSITION TO TAKE A CLEAR CUT DECISION. HOWEVER, ISOLATION OF LABOUR PARTY ON THIS ISSUE WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE THAT DELAY IN TAKING DECISION SEEMS NO/NOT LONGER POSSIBLE AND REGARDLESS OF RESULT, PARLIAMENT HAS FINALLY DECIDED TO TACKLE IT. MESSAGE SHOULD NOT/NOT BE LOST ON GOVT EITHER. PRIOR TO PRES MITTERRANDS VISIT TO THE NETHS, IN AN INTERVIEW GIVEN TO QUOTE LE MONDE UNQUOTE BY LUBBERS, PM SEEMED TO HAVE IMPLIED THAT DUTCH GOVT WAS STILL UNDECIDED ON WHEN DECISION ON INF SITING WOULD BE TAKEN. SOME COMMENTATORS THOUGHT THAT FOR PM LUBBERS JUNE WAS NO/NO LONGER TARGET DATE. PM WASTED NO/NO TIME IN DISPELLING THIS IMPRESSION AND REPEATED THAT ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT/NOT SAY WHAT RESULT OF VOTE WOULD BE, HIS GOVT WOULD ABIDE BY DECISION TO TAKE A VOTE BY NEXT JUNE.

4. ON A RELATED ISSUE, AS IF IN ANSWER TO PRES MITTERRANDS PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN MANNED SPACE STATION FOR MILITARY USE, THE SECOND CHAMBER APPROVED A MOTION CALLING FOR EFFORTS TO AN USE OF WEAPONS IN SPACE. MOTION WAS INTRODUCED BY LEADER OF DEMOCRAT 66 PARTY URGING TWO MAJOR SUPERPOWERS TO BRING ABOUT A TREATY BANNING TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO BE USED IN SPACE.

CCC/029 201330Z YWGR0367

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0235 17FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 170900

INFO BNATO IMMED ANKRA BRU ROME COPEN OSLO ATHNS MDRID HSNKI LSBON
HAGUE WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN PRGUE WSAW BPEST BUCST BGRAD STKHM
GENEV VIENN NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CIS PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR MINA MINE DMF IFB RGB ZSP ZSI L IDZ CPD

---PLENUM STATEMENT BY GORBACHEV

TASS REPORT PRINTED IN THURS CENTRAL PRESS ANNOUNCED PUBLICATION
OF BROCHURE COVERING 13FEB EXTRAORDINARY PARTY PLENUM. INTERESTING
POINT IN THIS WAS THAT A HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED PLENUM STATEMENT
BY GORBACHEV WAS LISTED AS BEING INCLUDED IN BROCHURE. ALTHOUGH
PUBLISHER SAYS THAT BROCHURE WILL NOT/NOT BE OUT IN STORES FOR
WEEK, AP OFFICE HERE OBTAINED ADVANCE COPY AND SHARED IT WITH
US. GORBACHEV STATEMENT IS IN FORM OF SHORT, CLOSING ADDRESS TO
PLENUM. GORBACHEV REFERS TO PLENUM HAVING BEEN HELD AT QUOTE
CRUCIAL MOMENT UNQUOTE AND SAYS IT WAS CONDUCTED QUOTE IN A
SPIRIT OF UNITY AND COHESION... AND QUESTIONS OF LEADERSHIP
SUCCESSION WERE DECIDED WITH SENSE OF GREAT RESPONSIBILITY
TOWARD THE PARTY AND PEOPLE UNQUOTE. FURTHER ON GORBACHEV SAYS
PLENUMS ADHERENCE TO LENINIST COURSE WAS MANIFESTED QUOTE IN
UNANIMOUS ELECTION OF COMRADE CHERNENKO AND FULL SUPPORT FOR
POSITIONS AND CONCLUSIONS REGARDING DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
POLICIES OF PARTY AND STATE EXPRESSED IN HIS SPEECH UNQUOTE. HE
CONCLUDES BY EXPRESSING POLITBUREAU'S CONFIDENCE THAT QUOTE MEMBERS
...2

PAGE TWO XYGR0235 CONF

OF CENTRAL CTTEE...WILL ACT IN A SPIRIT OF UNITY AND COHESION UNQUOTE.

2.STATEMENT WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO BE GORBACHEVS ENDORSEMENT OF CHERNENKO ELECTION AND RESEMBLES SIMILAR SUPPORT GIVEN TO ANDROPOV BY THEN RIVAL CHERNENKO AT TIME OF FORMERS ELECTION AS GEN SECT.SIGNAL IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO PARTY FAIRTHFUL(AND ESPECIALLY THOSE GORBACHEV SUPPORTERS AMONG THEM)THAT CHERNENKO ELECTION HAS BLESSING OF GORBACHEV AND THAT HE PRESUMABLY (AND BY EXTENSION ANDROPOV CAMP IN POLITBUREAU)HAS NOT/NOT SUFFERED AS RESULT OF THIS TURN OF EVENTS.PROMINENT PLACEMENT OF GORBACHEV IN LINE-UP AT FUNERAL EVENTS(HE WAS CHIEF PALLBEARER ALONG WITH CHERNENKO)UNDERScores HIS HIGH STANDING IN LEADERSHIP.STATEMENT COULD SERVE AS ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE THAT GORBACHEV DID NOT/NOT LOSE OUT IN LEADERSHIP CONTEST BUT RATHER AGREED AS PART OF COMPROMISE DECISION TO BIDE HIS TIME FOR MOMENT IN RETURN FOR CERTAIN CONSIDERATION.EXACT NAURE OF THIS CONSIDERATION IS MATTER FOR SPECULATION,BUT IT MAY INVOLVE ENHANCED STANDING FOR GORBACHEV IN HIERARCHY AND FIRST OPTION AT LEADERSHIP WHEN IT NEXT BECOMES OPEN(WHICH GIVEN CHERNENKOS APPOINTMENT IS LIKELY TO BE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER).MORE IMMED BENEFIT COULD BE GORBACHEV BECOMING PM IF TIKHONOV(73) WAS TO RETIRE OR BE MOVED OUT.SOME SORT OF DEAL HAS EVIDENTLY BEEN STRUCK AND ITS TERMS MAY VERY WELL BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO ANDROPOV GROUP AND POLICIES.

...3

PAGE THREE XYGR0235 CONFD

3.IT IS NOT/NOT CLEAR WHY GORBACHEV STATEMENT WAS OMITTED
FROM INITIAL INFO REPORT ON PLENUM.ISSUANCE OF SEPARATE
BROCHURE SUGGESTS THAT IT WAS FELT TO BE MATTER FOR ATTENTION
OF PARTY MEMBERS AND THAT BROAD PUBLIC NEED NOT/NOT BE
REMINDED THAT YOUNG ALTERNATIVE LEADER WAS AVAILABLE.

CCC/095 170950Z XYGR0235

Mr. Zilberstein
Mr. M. G. G. G.
Mr. C. G. G.
J. M. F.

BURROUGHS DEX 3500

P. 1

1/3

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**ACTION
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Our file/no. dossier:

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NO.

GRPA-*176*

DATE

17 FEBRUARY 1984

PAGES THREE

(incl. cover)

(y compris la page
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General
DU : Consulat général du Canada
NEW YORK

SECTION: General Relations &
Public Affairs/GRPA
Mr./Ms.
M./Mad. Weatherup

TO : Mr./Ms.
A : M./Mad.

Department:
Service : EXTOTT: LIDDZ

Phone
Téléphone :

Subject : NEW YORK TIMES 17 FEBRUARY 1984 (A-3)
Objet :


"TRUDEAU HAILS SESSION WITH CHERNENKO"

BURROUGHS DEX 3500

P. 2

2/3

THE NEW YORK TIMES



Trans via United Press International

Konstantin U. Chernenko, Soviet leader, greeting Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada in Moscow.

3/3

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1984

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A3

Trudeau Hails Session With Chernenko

By DOUGLAS MARTIN
Special to The New York Times

OTTAWA, Feb. 16 — Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau says his talks with Konstantin U. Chernenko, the new Soviet leader, suggested that Moscow might be prepared to accept the Canadian leader's proposal that the five major nuclear powers meet to discuss arms reductions.

The Prime Minister said Mr. Chernenko had commended his disarmament initiative for "its usefulness and practicality."

"Obviously, the initiative begins to live," Mr. Trudeau said Wednesday at a news conference in Moscow after meeting with Mr. Chernenko.

In Canada and elsewhere, Mr. Trudeau's disarmament effort has been criticized for reasons ranging from suggestions of political motivations by his ailing Liberal Party to suggestions that Mr. Trudeau is trying to win a Nobel Peace Prize as the cap to a long political career. In the face of such criticisms, the Moscow trip was hailed by Government officials today as a substantive accomplishment.

A 35-Minute Meeting

Mr. Trudeau met with Mr. Chernenko for 35 minutes. He said Mr. Chernenko indicated that he hoped to return to the sort of détente prevailing in 1975. He also suggested that the new leader might be in a better position to pursue peace than his predecessor, Yuri V. Andropov, who died last Thursday.

Mr. Trudeau said the new leader was "not particularly an Andropov man — he goes back to Brezhnev and the days of détente — therefore he doesn't have to be saddled with specific positions." The Prime Minister said Mr. Chernenko spoke from notes and specifically encouraged Mr. Trudeau to continue his initiative.

"The General Secretary began, practically, by saying that political dialogue was important, that he valued the Canadian initiative for its usefulness and practicality," Mr. Trudeau said.

A principal part of Mr. Trudeau's agenda has been to persuade the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France to get together and discuss strategic arms cuts. He suggested that the Russians might be "supportive" but provided no details.

The initiative has drawn criticism at home for ignoring Parliament and the normal mechanisms of Government, for sometimes running counter to the policies of the United States and other allies, and for its strong political flavor. A Gallup Poll issued this week shows Mr. Trudeau's approval rating climbing from 30 to 40 percent since the effort began.

"We regret his disrespect for Parliament," Brian Mulroney, leader of the opposition Progressive Conservative Party, said last week while also endorsing the effort.

could agree on," he said.

He also said the two Soviet leaders accepted his view that a "window of opportunity" exists for better East-West

relations. He quoted Mr. Gromyko as saying, "Yes, there is that window of opportunity and we want to make sure that you put something into it, too."

Suggestion From Gromyko

At the Moscow meeting, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, specifically urged that Western nations respond to an eight-month-old Russian proposal to reduce conventional forces when negotiations on that topic resume next month in Vienna.

Mr. Trudeau said both Mr. Chernenko and Mr. Gromyko appeared to make every effort to be conciliatory. He said "they didn't return once" to the issue of the Russians' having left the negotiations in Geneva on reducing European missiles or to "former opinions they have expressed about President Reagan, and so on."

Mr. Trudeau said the Russians made no specific reference to any particular forum such as the Geneva talks except for the reference to the Vienna meeting. "There was a great openness and effort to indicate that they wanted the dialogue to remain open in whatever forum, in whatever way that both sides

REMEMBER THE NEEDLE!

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ACTION
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INFO BONN PARIS WSHDC GENEV VMBFR BNATO LDN NDHQOTT/_CPP/DNACPOL/
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DISTR MINA DMF RGB RCD RCR RBD RBR IFB IDR IDA IDD

REF BONN TEL ZAGR1047 16FEB

---PM INITIATIVE-CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES

I WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SMITH TO INCLUDE
VISIT TO SKTHM IN HIS ITINERARY, ESSENTIALLY TO BRIEF NATO CAUCUS.
I HAVE DELIBERATELY AVOIDED ANY ATTEMPT TO BRIEF ALLIANCE
COLLEAGUES COLLECTIVELY HERE, PARTLY BECAUSE OF OUR SOURCES OF
INFORMATION ARE PROBABLY INCOMPLETE AND THERE WOULD THEREFORE
BE RISKS INVOLVED IN UNINTENTIONALLY GENERATING MISUNDERSTANDINGS.
WHERE INDIVIDUAL DELS HAVE ASKED FOR INFORMATION (AS HAVE FRG,
NETHS AND USA, IN PARTICULAR), I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO SUPPLY IT ON
BASIS OF AVAILABLE TELEGRAMS. HOWEVER, A FULL AND AUTHORITATIVE
DISCUSSION IN CAUCUS (POSSIBLY WITH A WRITTEN BACKGROUND BRIEF
THAT COULD BE HANDED OUT) WOULD UNQUESTIONABLY BE WELL RECEIVED.
RELIANCE ON NATIONAL CAPITALS TO BRIEF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES
HERE IS NOT/NOT ALWAYS ADEQUATE AS NATURE OF ENQUIRIES I HAVE
RECEIVED HAS SHOWN.

2. IF SMITH WERE TO COME TO STKHM FOR PURPOSES MENTIONED ABOVE,
I WOULD ALSO ASK THAT WE CONSIDER COMPARABLE BRIEFING TO THE
INTERESTED SWEDISH MFA AUTHORITIES WHO PROBABLY HAVE AT LEAST
AS MUCH INTEREST IN SUCCESS OF PMS INITIATIVE AS MANY OF THE
NATO ALLIES.

CCC/006 171405Z SCDL0156

ACTION
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FM MOSCO XYSV0009 17FEB84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ MGTC

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PARIS ROME PRMNY VMBFR GENEV WSAW PRGUE BPEST BGRAD STKHM/SCDEL

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---PM MTG WTH CHERNENKO-SUMMARY HIGHLIGHTS

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SUBJECT/SUJET

LE MONDE

DATE

FEB
FEV 17 1984

M. Trudeau croit à un retour de l' « esprit Brejnev » dans les relations Est-Ouest

Le président Reagan a déclaré, mercredi 15 février, que le nouveau secrétaire général du PC soviétique, M. Constantin Tchernenko, semblait « disposé à nouer des rapports plus constructifs avec les Etats-Unis ». Parlant après la rencontre à Moscou entre M. Tchernenko et le vice-président M. George Bush, il a ajouté : « J'ai l'impression que la nouvelle direction soviétique s'efforce de mettre une sourdine à la rhétorique, afin d'explorer les voies susceptibles de promouvoir un dialogue plus constructif. (...) Il n'y a pas de moment plus propice que maintenant. Les Américains ont toujours été prêts à rencontrer les Soviétiques, à mi-chemin pour trouver des solutions aux nombreux problèmes qui nous opposent et parvenir à un accord équitable sur le désarmement. Si la nouvelle direction soviétique décide de se joindre à nous dans un élan de bonne volonté, nous pouvons réaliser de bonnes choses ensemble. »

Cependant, M. Tchernenko, qui a poursuivi mercredi ses entretiens avec les dirigeants étrangers venus assister aux obsèques de Iouri Andropov, a dénoncé, avec M. Fidel Castro, « les intrigues agressives de l'impérialisme américain ».

De notre correspondant

Moscou. — Dans le district moscovite de Proletarski, une ouvrière d'une usine de roulements à billes a été choisie pour remplacer Iouri Andropov, qui était candidat dans cette circonscription aux élections au Soviet suprême du 4 mars prochain. La vie reprend donc son cours normal à Moscou, tandis que les derniers chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement étrangers quittent la capitale soviétique.

Le dernier dirigeant occidental à partir a été M. Trudeau, qui avait rencontré, mercredi 15 février, M. Tchernenko. Le premier ministre canadien a, semble-t-il, bénéficié d'un traitement de faveur. Un compte rendu succinct de son entretien avec le nouveau secrétaire général est publié ce jeudi en première page de la Pravda. M. Trudeau est ainsi mis sur le même pied — du moins typographiquement — que quatre amis et alliés de l'URSS qui ont droit, ce jeudi, au même honneur : MM. Castro (Cuba), Truong Chinh (Vietnam), Ortega (Nicaragua) et Karmal (Afghanistan).

Ce compte rendu fait référence à la nécessité de « revenir sur le chemin de la détente ». M. Trudeau, lors d'une conférence de presse, a également relevé que son interlocuteur avait, à plusieurs reprises, employé cette expression. « Je crois qu'il y aura une continuité avec l'esprit de Brejnev, qui était un esprit de détente », a déclaré le premier ministre canadien. M. Trudeau a décrit M. Tchernenko comme un homme « pratique, solide et réaliste qui va droit au but ».

Le général Zia-Ul-Haq n'a pas eu droit au même traitement. L'occasion était pourtant bonne de reprendre contact avec le président pakistanais, dont le pays sert de base

arrière aux maquisards afghans. En novembre 1982, Iouri Andropov lui avait accordé quarante minutes d'entretien, malgré la présence de dizaines d'autres dirigeants étrangers venus aux obsèques de Brejnev. A l'évidence, l'Afghanistan était alors au centre de ses soucis.

Les responsables soviétiques — en tout premier lieu M. Gromyko — en ont-ils tiré depuis la conclusion qu'il était inutile de parler au président pakistanais ? Toujours est-il qu'ils lui ont infligé cette fois une humiliation de taille.

M. Zia-Ul-Haq, qui avait fait connaître son désir de rencontrer M. Tchernenko après les cérémonies de la place Rouge, est resté pour cela jusqu'à mercredi à Moscou. Non seulement l'audience n'a pas été accordée, mais il n'y a même pas eu de réponse formelle à sa requête. Cela peut signifier aussi que M. Tchernenko, au moins dans l'immédiat, est beaucoup moins préoccupé par le dossier afghan que ne l'avait été son prédécesseur.

Le compte rendu de l'entretien entre MM. Tchernenko et Karmal, chef du Parti afghan, outre les formules habituelles sur l'« amitié traditionnelle » entre les deux pays et l'« atmosphère chaleureuse » de la rencontre, indique seulement que « les relations soviéto-afghanes et la situation autour de l'Afghanistan » ont été évoquées, la situation intérieure afghane relevant évidemment de la seule souveraineté de Kaboul...

DOMINIQUE DHOMBRES.



TO/À : IDDZ
FROM/DE : G. Pearson

MF
W

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET : Canadian Institute for International
Peace and Security.

Security/Sécurité	RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	February 16, 1984
Number/Numéro	

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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I attach a short follow-up to my report of January 27, suggesting a revised mandate for the Institute and a way of beginning to implement his mandate. In any event, I think it desirable that you consider soon the relationship of the Disarmament Fund to this development, including the question of research priorities and the demands being made by universities and others for new funding.

G. Pearson

G. Pearson
Institute for Research
on Public Policy

February 16, 1984

Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security: Mandate

In my report of January 27, 1984 on this subject I suggested the following mandate for the Institute:

- (a) to survey and examine critically the ideas and proposals relating to international and Canadian security held by Canadians;
- (b) to make available to the public the main findings of research and investigation into these questions in other countries, especially as they affect east/west relations;
- (c) to stimulate and enhance Canadian research and teaching by bringing together scholars, officials, journalists and educators to discuss specific issues and projects, and by making funds available for research (criteria to be established);
- (d) to bring to the attention of the government those ideas and proposals it believes merit political response.

After further discussion with the newly created Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, and with others, I think the above terms of reference require some modification. The chief concerns are that the Institute should avoid competing with existing centres/universities for personnel and funds and that it should not appear to be advocating specific policies. It is clear also, however, that an institute which engages only in data collection and the holding

- 2 -

of conferences would not attract either scholars from Canada and abroad who wish to do serious research, or those who are primarily interested in a wider spectrum of activities. The latter include the peace research and human rights movements, and the advocates of a major Canadian role in east/west relations (stimulated by the Prime Minister's peace initiative). The government will be under growing pressure to facilitate and finance east/west exchanges and meetings of all kinds, to fund chairs and courses of "peace" studies, and to explain its policies.

In view of these disparate and conflicting priorities, the role of the new Institute might best be one of bringing people together, providing information and advising on research priorities, both in government and outside. Its duties in this respect might resemble those of the Science Council. It would not do major research of its own and it would not advise on policy, but it would have sufficient funds to contract for research, to subsidize meetings and conferences and to bring scholars to Ottawa for short term assignments. It would focus on political issues, mainly of an east-west character, that have relevance to Canadian policy over the longer-term. A list of possible projects is attached.

However, in view of the growing demands being made on government to assist and to fund independent initiatives and research, it might be agreed as a first step that a small committee, perhaps three or four persons, would be created to consider these demands and the resources both in and out of government available to meet them, and to recommend ways of proceeding in future, including the precise role of the new Institute. At the same time the

- 3 -

government would request the committee to bear in mind the following general purposes for a new Institute:

- (a) to advise the government on a continuing basis of the research being done in Canada and abroad on issues of special relevance to Canadian security.
- (b) to recommend how government funds might best be spent to encourage research of special interest to it.
- (c) to collect and disseminate information and opinion on international peace and security for the benefit of the public.
- (d) to bring together scholars, the media, officials and others to investigate and report on specific issues.
- (e) to publish the results of these investigations in a form that is widely available.

The committee might report by the end of June. The Department of External Affairs would continue to fund projects in the usual way, but would reserve judgement on major grants for chairs and centres of peace and disarmament studies until the committee had reported. The Department of the Secretary of State, which has launched a major programme for the creation of centres of specialization at universities, would refer to the committee any applications bearing on this area of research.

Geoffrey Pearson

POSSIBLE RESEARCH PROJECTS

1. A study or survey of current views on the feasibility and implications of "Star Wars" weapons.
2. A study of the political and technical feasibility of:
 - (a) a total ban on ASAT weapons
 - (b) a ban on high altitude ASAT weapons
 - (c) a ban on particle beam, high energy and other possible new ABM technologies.
3. A study of the impact of new or emerging technologies on mutual deterrence.
4. A study of the current situation and possible developments in the field of ASW.
5. A study of the comparability of military power - e.g. weapon systems and other elements.
6. A study of concepts of parity in weapons and military forces.
7. A study of the concepts and definition of security.
8. A study of Canadian attitudes to the interrelationship of disarmament, development and international security.
9. A study of Canadian views on national security and alliance security.
10. A study of the norms and limits of solidarity and dissent in an alliance relationship.
11. Sources of superpower differences and hostility - historical, ideological, geopolitical, psychological, economic, etc.
11. What role can Canada play in promoting East-West understanding and reducing misunderstandings?
13. How best to promote knowledge and understanding in Canada of questions concerning the arms race, disarmament and international security?
14. How can Canada best contribute to the World Disarmament Campaign?
15. A study of an optimum posture for Canadian defence and national security.

February, 1984.

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SUBJECT/SUJET

PUBLICATION

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IDD RBR

NEW YORK TIMES

DATE

FEB
FEV 16 1984

FRENCH OPTIMISTIC ON ARMS PARLEYS

Leaders, Back From Moscow, Expect Russians to Return to the Bargaining Table

By JOHN VINOCUR

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Feb. 15 — French officials, back in Paris after meetings with the Soviet leaders in Moscow, said today that they had the clear impression the Russians would soon return to nuclear arms talks with the United States.

A high-level official said this analysis was based partly on the tone of the discussions in Moscow on Tuesday and on what France sees as signs of change in Soviet attitudes.

A French delegation headed by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy and Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson met for 40 minutes with Konstantin U. Chernenko, the new Soviet leader, and with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

One official familiar with the content of the talks said he felt Soviet readiness to return to the Geneva arms negotiations was now very real.

He said he believed Soviet-American nuclear discussions would develop in the next few months. Moscow broke off talks on middle-range nuclear weapons in November, and has said since then that it will not return to them in their previous form. The Soviet delegation also left the talks on strategic, or long-range, weapons subsequently, but without foreclosing their resumption.

Resumption Before U.S. Election

The French official said he thought the new talks on nuclear weapons would start before the Presidential election campaign goes into full swing in the United States. He said he had the impression that the Russians thought President Reagan would be re-elected.

Some French sources try to minimize reports from Moscow on French television that Mr. Chernenko appeared fatigued and halting in his appearances during Yuri V. Andropov's funeral. At close range, the sources said, Mr. Chernenko gives an impression of robustness.

He was described as having read from a prepared text, in the manner of Leonid I. Brezhnev, during his meeting with the French leaders. Mr. Gromyko was said to have played an active role in the conversation.

Western military sources in Moscow said Tuesday that Russians had told them Mr. Chernenko has emphysema. And today the former British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, a physician, said in a radio interview after returning to Britain from the funeral that Mr. Chernenko has emphysema.

The French view on the likelihood of

a return to nuclear arms talks became known as Vice President Bush arrived for talks with President François Mitterrand that French aides said would deal mainly with Lebanon.

The French are reported irritated about the circumstances of the announcement of the pullback of United States troops from Beirut airport. The French suggest that no serious consultation had occurred and that the American decision had been relayed more as a closed matter than as a subject for discussion between the two principal Western allies in the multinational force in Lebanon, to which Britain and Italy have also contributed.

A source familiar with the French Government's attitude said the American pullback would shake the confidence of Arab and other third-world allies in United States commitments.

Another view of the French attitude was that the American decision would permit France to make the same choice soon while deflecting attention and responsibility to the United States. For the time being, Mr. Mitterrand has ordered the French contingent to maintain its positions in Beirut.

Bush Is Cautious on Arms Talks

Mr. Bush, after his meeting with Mr. Mitterrand, was asked at a news conference whether he had detected during his conversations in Moscow a willingness to resume arms control talks.

"I can't say that I did," he replied. "But I didn't detect an unwillingness. I can't say willingness, but I also don't want to leave the wrong impression. My view is that there will be a resumption of talks. But I can't say out of that

meeting I detected a schedule or an agenda or anything of that nature. But I did detect on their part an interest in arms reduction."

The French official back from Moscow said the conviction that Soviet-American arms talks would resume was a basic change in the French analysis.

The French had thought that the talks would resume only after a gradual increase in Soviet-American contacts on nonmilitary issues.

The official said he now believed that Mr. Gromyko's presence in Stockholm last month at the start of the East-West talks on security and confidence-building measures in Europe signaled a change in course. The deployment of the new American missiles in Europe, Mr. Gromyko's meetings in Stockholm with Western foreign ministers, expressions of Western interest in developing contacts, and the possibilities opened by the change in Soviet leader all contributed to what France now regards as a Soviet opening, he said.

In Stockholm, Mr. Cheysson was the first Western Foreign Minister to confer with Mr. Gromyko. Mr. Cheysson said then that he saw no likelihood of an early return to negotiations.

France, which has supported the Western missile deployment as a counterbalance to the buildup of Soviet SS-20's targeted on Western Europe, has tried to improve relations with the Soviet Union. A visit here by a Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister, Ivan V. Arkhipov, has run parallel to efforts by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to develop British contacts with the Russians.

T. M. de la

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PM-PEPIN-PEACE, BGT, 0355

BUDGET

BY JOYCE NAPIER

MONTREAL (CP) - JEAN-LUC PEPIN, FEDERAL MINISTER OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS, SHRUGGED OFF CRITICISM OF PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S PEACE INITIATIVES THURSDAY, SAYING THE PRIME MINISTER HAS A BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING NOW THAN AFTER HE RETIRES.

TRUDEAU'S MISSION, LAUNCHED LAST FALL, TRIGGERED CHARGES BY SOME CRITICS THAT HE WAS USING THE PLAN TO ENHANCE HIS POLITICAL POSITION AND HELP THE LIBERALS INCREASE VOTER SUPPORT.

THOUGH PEPIN ACKNOWLEDGED TRUDEAU IS BELIEVED TO BE THE FIRST WORLD LEADER TO UNDERTAKE SUCH A MISSION WHILE STILL IN OFFICE, HE SAID THE PRIME MINISTER'S CHANCES OF SUCCEEDING ARE "EMPHASIZED" BY HIS POSITION.

"TRUDEAU DIDN'T WAIT UNTIL HE WAS COMFORTABLY RETIRED TO GO ON HIS MISSION," SAID THE MINISTER.

SPEAKING TO A CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CLUB, PEPIN ACKNOWLEDGED HE ONLY BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH THE SUBJECT OF TRUDEAU'S PEACE PLAN "SEVEN DAYS AGO" WHEN HE WAS ASKED TO DELIVER "THIS SPEECH."

"SOME OF YOU ARE PROBABLY BETTER ACQUAINTED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S PEACE INITIATIVE THAN I AM," HE TOLD THE 150 MEMBERS GATHERED IN A DOWNTOWN HOTEL.

PEPIN SAID THE PEACE PLAN IS RARELY DISCUSSED AT CABINET MEETINGS. MINISTERS AND LIBERAL MPS HAVEN'T BEEN CONSULTED ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMINGS AND GOINGS.

GET MEDAL

BUT HE TOLD AN AMUSED AUDIENCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS THAT "THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD GET AN OLYMPIC GOLD MEDAL FOR THE PHYSICAL EFFORT THAT WENT INTO BRINGING HIS PLAN TO TERMS."

PEPIN TOLD REPORTERS LATER THE PEACE DRIVE DOESN'T CONTRADICT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POSITION OF ALLOWING THE TESTING OF THE UNITED STATES CRUISE MISSILES IN WESTERN CANADA.

"WHEN YOU WANT PEACE, YOU PREPARE FOR WAR AND PEACE," HE SAID, NOTING THAT THE LATEST PUBLIC OPINION POLLS SUGGEST 54 PER CENT OF CANADIANS ARE IN FAVOR OF THE TESTING.

THOUGH 52 PER CENT OPPOSE THE TESTS, PEPIN SAID "IF PEOPLE AGREE ON THE OBJECTIVE (OF PEACE), THEY MAY SOON AGREE ON THE MEANS TO GET THERE."

PEPIN TEASED HIS AUDIENCE ABOUT TRUDEAU'S SHORT VISIT WITH NEW SOVIET LEADER KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO ON WEDNESDAY.

THE MEETING WAS "USEFUL, BUT THAT'S ALL WE HAVE FOR TONIGHT, WORDS."

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PM-PEPIN-PEACE: BGT: 0355

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From — De <i>A. Després - 10R</i>

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*Voici le résultat de nos
efforts avec M. Pepin. Nous avons
essayé d'enregistrer son discours qui
comprend plusieurs approximations !
En général, il s'est bien défendu.*

Després

NOTES POUR UNE ALLOCUTION DE
L'HONORABLE JEAN-LUC PEPIN
MINISTRE DES RELATIONS EXTERIEURES
AU CLUB DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Montréal, le 16 février 1984

Les propositions canadiennes de paix

On ne parle bien que de ce qu'on a bien étudié, à quoi on a beaucoup réfléchi à son bureau et dans l'action.

Malheureusement, je n'ai à mon crédit que d'avoir expliqué à quelques chefs d'Etat, et en termes très généraux, "l'initiative Trudeau" et d'avoir lu des dépêches et analyses du ministère des affaires extérieures.

Cela ne fait pas de moi un spécialiste des relations est-ouest au chapitre de la défense et du désarmement, un sujet qui, un peu en profondeur, devient très technique.

Deux conséquences: 1) je suis accompagné d'un fonctionnaire, M. Després, qui évidemment doit être très prudent; 2) j'aurai plaisir et profit à vous écouter, certains d'entre vous ayant suivi ces questions depuis longtemps.

A. Le pourquoi et le quoi de l'initiative Trudeau

(Je laisse tomber l'historique, sauf pour souligner l'importance du Sommet de Williamsburg, le "bust your ass" que M. Trudeau a pris très au sérieux.

1. Le pourquoi de l'initiative

a) la détérioration des relations est-ouest

Relatif... Le pire moment depuis... la crise cubaine de '62?

- 2 -

A souligner: l'effet cumulatif et ton: la diplomatie du mégaphone... (le pettage de bretelles)

- . l'Afghanistan et la Pologne
- . le Boeing 007 coréen (l'accident?)
- . l'invasion de la Grenade (la position canadienne: l'épuisement des recours selon les prescriptions de la Charte des Nations Unies)
- . la lenteur des négociations diplomatiques de paix: MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) (10 ans sans accord) CSCE (3 ans à Madrid) et l'interruption des négociations INF (Intermediate Nuclear Force) et START (Strategic Arms Reduction). Frustration.
- . l'aggravation de la situation au Moyen-Orient, en Amérique centrale, en Afrique du Sud (ou "présence" soviète ou cubaine)
- . les incertitudes du pouvoir en URSS
- . la supériorité des forces de Varsovie, le déploiement des missiles en Europe

b) l'opinion publique, un peu partout, au Canada en particulier, a peur de l'attaque préventive ("first strike," "first use"), de l'accident nucléaire...

d'autant plus que le gouvernement, fidèle au "two tracks" de l'OTAN, accepte l'essai du missile Cruise, d'autant plus que le mouvement pacifiste grandit. Monsieur Trudeau comprend cela.

c) plus fondamentale une conception canadienne (et parlant trudeauiste) du rôle des puissances moyennes (la paix est trop importante pour être reléguée aux seules super-puissances)

d'autant plus que la diplomatie de la paix et de la guerre est par essence excessive (discours de la Chambre des communes) et qu'il faut la calmer

.../3

- 3 -

- d) une conception de la diplomatie canadienne (associée au nom de Pearson) fondée sur notre activisme, notre rationalité (Gorbatchev) (le "two tracks" est essentiellement canadien (si vis pacem para bellum et pacem), notre droit de parole (discours de la Chambre des communes) (passage un peu lyrique)

Nous sommes géographiquement entre les 2 grands, ethniquement et politiquement en Europe, industriellement entre le nord et le sud, etc... Nous payons nos taxes au monde!

- e) la personnalité de M. Trudeau

Chez lui quelques grandes inspirations de philosophie politique qui jouent ici:

- . les poids et contrepoids, le non noir et blanc, qui l'a toujours conduit à garder ses ouvertures"...
- Il cherche à en tirer parti.
- . la primauté du politique ("pas pour administrer les affaires courantes")
- . le style direct, personnel — il dit qu'il n'est pas diplomate... il est à sa façon "Laissez tomber les notes"

- f) Si vous ~~insistez~~, la baisse de la popularité du Parti Libéral au Gallup!

2. Le quoi de l'initiative

a) Le but principal

. renverser les tendances

- de croire à l'équilibre de la terreur
- de s'en remettre aux super puissances
- de laisser aux experts (mon expérience de Madrid - CSCE) aux "nuclear accountants"
- de dire plus que ce que l'on pense et peut... (le mégaphone) (~~son voyage en Europe de l'Est~~)

.../4

- . de rétablir la volonté politique, l'énergie politique, le dialogue (le "multilogue")
- . réfléchir, discuter, explorer toutes les avenues
- . surtout de rétablir la confiance et les instruments de la confiance (Stockholm)... pour éviter les surprises
- . démontrer aux Russes que des portes sont ouvertes, que l'ouest ne cherche pas à les isoler, que la coopération est aussi dans leur intérêt..

C'est surtout sur cela que M. Trudeau demande à être jugé!

b) Les propositions spécifiques

M. Trudeau: 1) sait que très discutable que les "spécificités" vont jouer... 2) croit à l'effet global et ^ucommutatif et à l'interdépendance des voies... (pas souvent compris) 3) caractère évolutif de l'initiative (se précise en avançant) *Aspect expérimental -*

1) Une conférence des 5 puissances nucléaires

- . pour limiter les armes nucléaires stratégiques
- . sans porter ombrage aux négociations à deux (USA et URSS) (START & INF)
- . idée générale: égalité USA-URSS et rapport (pourcentage pour les 3 autres en tenant compte des "intérêts nationaux")
- . cet équilibre établi on s'attaquera à la réduction (du plafond au plancher)

2) Un effort commun pour renforcer le traité de non-prolifération (119 ont signé)

- . convaincre certains de signer (v.g. Brésil, Argentine), surtout les petits Etats pour élargir l'intérêt
- . de mieux respecter les obligations découlant...
- . stimuler le transfert de technologie à des fins pacifiques
- . établir le rapport désarmement-développement — pour intéresser les L.D.C.s

- 5 -

- 3) Faire progresser les négociations MBFR (à Vienne)
entre les deux blocs sur les forces conventionnelles,
en stimulant la réponse de l'Ouest aux propositions
de l'Est.

Pas seulement équilibre mais parité et réduction

(2 choix: i) augmentation des forces conventionnelles...
avec effets

ii) réduction mutuelle et équilibrée

"Relever le seuil nucléaire", i.e. retarder le point,
le moment où il faut utiliser les armes nucléaires...
(le "first use" de l'OTAN)

- 4) Hausser, pour éviter l'enlisement, le niveau de la
participation politique à la Conférence de Stockholm
sur les mesures de sécurité, de "confiance" et de
désarmement en Europe ("confidence and security
building") (C.S.C.E.)

Sur les mesures de confiance (1ère phase) qui permettent
de réduire l'armement (2e phase) (à Vienne)

Conférence de Stockholm

- . Fort importante. Alors que MBFR s'intéresse aux actifs
militaires, cette conférence, la plus politique de toutes,
s'intéresse aux intentions
- . Elle cherche à réduire les malentendus, les fausses per-
ceptions de danger. Son but est d'augmenter la transpa-
rence, la visibilité... de briser la spirale de "l'inflation
militaire"... en établissant des règles de conduite (pour
les forces terrestres en Europe)
- . Le sujet déjà couvert par la convention de Helsinki (1975)
mais d'une façon partielle (déclaratoire seulement) embryon-
naire et d'ailleurs mal observée.

- 6 -

- . Chaque pays ou groupe de pays a présenté ou présentera ses propositions (CSM) à Stockholm essentiellement sur trois thèmes:

information: composition, location, manoeuvres,
prévisions..

stabilization: ratification...

vérification: attachés, observateurs, inspections,
observations..

Encore faudra-t-il décider si ces mesures sont déclaratoires ou "politiquement obligatoires."

- . L'OTAN cherche à présenter des propositions communes.

5) D'autres mesures reliées à la stratégie de l'asphyxie (étouffer dans l'oeuf de l'application militaire du développement technique) proposée par M. Trudeau en 1978

- interdire l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude parce qu'ils menacent l'ensemble des moyens de communication pour la "gestion des crises"

Privés de leur réseau de communications, les Etats risquent de paniquer.

- exiger que tout système d'armement stratégique soit entièrement vérifiable par les moyens techniques nationaux (i.e. satellites, surveillance électronique, "agents")

Mise au point du contrôle en même temps que la mise au point du système

- 7 -

- limiter la mobilité des missiles balistiques inter-
continentaux (ICBM)
 - si trop mobiles: pas contrôlables
 - si trop fixes: risque qu'on cherche à s'en défaire
avant qu'ils tombent aux mains de
l'ennemi

B. La réaction à l'initiative Trudeau

1) L'effort

- . considérable, physiquement d'abord. Si Trudeau n'a pas le prix Nobel de la Paix, il mérite une médaille des jeux olympiques!
- . la technique de l'effort: le discours, les lettres, les visites, le discours et les lettres!
les visites personnelles, informelles, sur une période de temps limitée, aux chefs de gouvernements, d'organismes internationaux, aux spécialistes, aux intellectuels... aux électeurs.
- . M. Trudeau a acquis une connaissance approfondie du sujet dans tous ses aspects.
Est-il le seul politicien en exercice, de mémoire d'homme, que l'ait fait — les autres attendent la retraite (exception? Carter à Camp David? plus limité et fait venir à lui)
- . On l'accuse de ne pas avoir engagé ou suffisamment engagé:
 - les autres chefs de partis canadiens
(M. Mulroney après l'avoir regretté s'est lancé dans une accusation de négligence militaire.)
 - ses ministres (mon expérience (Colombie, Antilles, Sénégal, Mali...))
 - le Parlement (2 ou 3 débats, plusieurs questions)
 - la population (le handicap de la période pré-électorale)
 - et trop le Parti Libéral: réunion de Montréal
(Rentre le 11 novembre, il repartait le 17)
Il aime bien "polir" ses discours même quand il les improvise!

- 8 -

l'accusation suppose un certain mépris des partis politiques)

Et il avait d'autres choses à faire ^{au} ~~un~~ plan interne.

2) La réaction

- . très large accord sur l'analyse de la gravité de la situation
- sur le besoin de rétablir le dialogue politique.
- . il serait intéressant mais difficile pour quelqu'un qui n'a pas participé personnellement, et diplomatiquement dangereux, d'analyser la réaction particulière de chaque gouvernement visité (évidemment basée sur toutes sortes d'intérêts, de convictions, des perceptions et des préjugés,) aux propositions spécifiques.

"Les politicologues s'y intéresseront, j'espère."

- . Les réserves portent sur le timing (après Slant, après le déploiement, après la rencontre des 2...) et les conditions (réduction de 50%)

3) Le résultat (évidemment trop tôt pour en bien juger)

- . M. Trudeau "optimiste sans illusion" au point de départ et tout au long.
- . Sur le but principal nul doute que l'effet a été très positif sur la population canadienne et les hommes politiques étrangers.

Contribution certaine à la prise de conscience des dangers et des besoins et à certains gestes bien qu'il reste difficile d'établir des pourcentages d'influence dans certaines décisions (et de départager l'influence canadienne et l'influence de l'initiative Trudeau)

- . Décision des Ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie d'aller à Stockholm (où les 2 blocs sont présents) avec un ensemble de mesures de "confidence building" (proposition canadienne)
(rencontre (Schultz et Gromyko rétablissement dialogue interrompu...))

- 9 -

- . Décision de l'OTAN de revoir la position sur les négociations des MBFR qui reprendront le 16 mars, Canada) revisite du rapport Harmel de 1967 et en général sur le besoin de détente (déclaration de Bruxelles)
- voyage de Margaret Thatcher en Hongrie!
- . La rencontre d'hier à Moscou (Tchernenko):
 - l'initiative Trudeau est "utile et pratique"
 - Tchernenko n'est pas revenu sur le passé, dit Trudeau
 - nécessité de "la détente" (plusieurs fois, dit Trudeau)
 - "nécessité de réduire la menace nucléaire de manière significative"
 - *insistance de C sur principe d'égalité entre les superpuissances*
 - URSS prête à reprendre les négociations avec les pays de l'Ouest "n'importe où de n'importe quelle façon sur laquelle les deux parties pourraient s'entendre (va contre le départ russe des réunions de l'I.N.F.)"
 - ~~des fenêtres~~

Speech by the Honorable Jean Luc Pepin *Ministre des Relations
Discours par l'honorable n. 1. Ministère des Relations Extérieures*
14 février Club des Relations Internationales
Mesdames et Messieurs,

J'avoue que je suis un peu inquiet en vous adressant la parole.

D'abord, je n'ai rien de sensationnel à vous dire, contrairement à l'invitation qu'on vient de me faire. Deuxièmement, vous travaillez sur ce congrès depuis sept mois. Moi, je travaille depuis sept jours sur mon discours. Il y a devant moi des personnes éminemment qualifiées qui vous adresseront la parole d'ailleurs, demain je pense. Et c'est toujours un peu intimidant pour un politicien de parler devant des experts. Parce que, pour bien parler de ce sujet-là qui est les propositions de paix du Canada, il faudrait avoir réfléchi beaucoup plus que je ne l'ai fait, il faudrait aussi avoir participé soi-même aux négociations que M. Trudeau a engagées depuis quelques mois. Vous savez peut-être qu'en politique, aujourd'hui, quand vous êtes ministre, il y a certains sujets sur lesquels vous devez devenir sinon aussi experts, presque aussi experts que les spécialistes. Dans mon cas, j'étais devenu assez compétent sur la question du *Chou*, du Nid-de-Corbeau, et autres choses semblables où, simplement par la fréquentation quotidienne du sujet et des grands spécialistes et l'enquête quotidienne, on devient très compétent. Tout ça pour vous dire que, sur le sujet dont je traite ce soir, je n'ai que les connaissances acquises il y a 20 ans. *quand* J'enseignais ce sujet-là. Je n'ai que l'expérience d'avoir expliqué les propositions de M. Trudeau à certains chefs de gouvernement au cours de certains voyages que j'ai faits récemment. Je n'ai que l'expérience d'avoir lu les dépêches venant d'un peu partout au cours des nombreuses visites que M. Trudeau a faites dans les semaines récentes.

Donc, je ne suis pas un spécialiste, je ne suis pas un général, je suis un généraliste. Alors, je vais vous parler de ces choses-là en termes très généraux mais non sans avoir souligné d'abord que si on veut approfondir le moindre de ces sujets-là, très rapidement on entre dans des questions d'une technique très avancée. Je pense que vous en êtes conscients. Je voulais simplement vous le répéter. Il y a deux conséquences à *ça* ~~cela~~.

La première, c'est que je suis accompagné d'un fonctionnaire, M. Després, qui va monter à l'estrade après que j'aurai terminé.

C'est un fonctionnaire qui traite de ce sujet-là aux *Ministère des* Affaires extérieures. Alors, vous voyez comment je suis prudent. Jean-Luc

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acteur! A ce moment-là, c'est moi qui ait eu à traiter de ce problème-là. Ceux qui m'ont vu ont peut-être compris que je prenais une position très ^{très} prudente. J'ai été le premier à parler d'un accident. Ça m'a valu un amoncellement de lettres, de personnes enragées qui ont dit que je n'avais aucune colonne vertébrale, des choses comme ça et, vous vous rappelez les mots que même le gouvernement du Canada a employés pour qualifier cet acte. Donc, il y avait, il y a un ton dans les relations internationales très acerbe, très direct, très fort. Je rappelle l'invasion de la Grenade, la position du Canada vous la connaissez dans ce domaine-là, dans cette affaire-là étant que les parties en cause ceux qui ont fait l'opération "rescue", l'opération ^{de} sauvetage, n'ont pas d'après nous épuisé tous les moyens des règlements pacifiques des conflits comme nous y engage la charte des Nations-Unies. La lenteur des négociations diplomatiques de paix, le AMFR disant dans un accord le CSCZ, la conférence pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe, trois ans, la conférence de Madrid, trois ans. Vous imaginez la frustration de ceux qui y étaient. ~~une~~ interruption plus récente des négociations INF et des négociations START. Encore une fois, vous voyez le caractère pas mal négatif de tous ces événements, très négatif de tous ces événements. L'aggravation de la situation au Moyen-Orient, en Amérique centrale, en Afrique du Sud, où il y a continuellement un caractère Est-Ouest, Où il y a, sinon une rivalité, du moins, une perception que les Russes ou d'autres font là des choses qui ne sont pas très catholiques. Je pense également à l'incertitude du pouvoir en URSS qui vient de se terminer. Je pense à la supériorité des forces de Varsovie, au déploiement des missiles en Europe qu'on vient d'invoquer, je pense aussi au réarmement ou à la force du ~~ré~~ ^{l'}armement américain qui, vu de l'autre côté, paraît comme étant une volonté américaine d'établir sa supériorité dans ce domaine. Alors tous ces événements-là, ensemble,

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vous donnent une bonne raison ~~de xxxxxxxxxx~~ que justifiait
l'initiative de ^{du gouvernement du Canada} paix de M. Trudeau.

1P de cette initiative c'est la situation de l'opinion
publique au Canada. Un peu partout, mais au Canada, en
particulier, puisque ma perspective en est une du Canada.
Un peu partout dans le monde on a peur de l'attaque
préventive. On a peur de l'accident nucléaire. D'autant
plus que le gouvernement du Canada fidèle aux "two tracks",
aux deux voies de l'OTAN, accepte ~~de~~ ^{le} faite ~~le fait~~ du missile Cruise.
D'autant plus que le mouvement pacifiste au Canada grandit,
M. Trudeau ayant compris tout ça, évidemment. Plus

1Q fondamentale encore comme raison de l'initiative du gouvernement
du Canada c'est peut-être une conception canadienne du rôle
des puissances moyennes dans le monde du rôle des puissances
moyennes en ce qui a trait au maintien de la paix, en
particulier. Et, alors, ce rôle-là consiste à dire, de
façon schématique, que la paix est une chose trop importante
pour être reléguée exclusivement aux superpuissances. Une
chose tellement importante que les puissances moyennes
en particulier doivent s'en occuper d'une façon très
immédiate et très constante. D'autant plus que la diplomatie
de la ~~fin~~ ^{paix et} de la guerre est ~~essence~~ ^{paraissant} excessive. Dans son
discours de l'autre jour, à la Chambre des communes, M.
Trudeau disait qu'il y ^a avait une forte différence entre
la façon des leaders de l'Europe de l'Est de parler en
public et de parler en privé. Et ça c'est, encore une fois,
c'est une observation à faire; dans ces questions-là ^{très très souvent} on
emploie le tambour de ~~la~~ résonance.

1P Une autre raison de
l'intervention de l'initiative de M. Trudeau c'est
évidemment une conception de la diplomatie au Canada
associée à la personne de M. Pearson qui ~~consiste à dire que~~
~~qu'il~~ ^{15.05} consiste à être d'abord extrêmement actifs. Nous sommes
actives ^{15.05} en politique extérieure. Je pense que dans tous les
pays du monde où vous allez aller quand vous rencontrerez des
gens qui parlent de ce sujet-là, ils vont reconnaître que
le Canada a une présence considérable dans le monde pour

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pour un pays de 25 millions d'habitants. Nous avons aussi une assez bonne réputation ^{du} côté de notre diplomatie, Je pense par exemple à ce que le Russe ~~d'~~ambassadeur Gorbatchev disait à Mme Sauvé. Quand Mme Sauvé est allée en URSS dernièrement avec une délégation de parlementaires, M. Gorbatchev a félicité le Canada pour ~~la~~ ^{sa} conduite de politique extérieures qui, disait-il a un caractère de rationalité remarquable. Alors donc cette diplomatie du Canada active, rationnelle, elle réclame continuellement le droit de parole. A ce sujet-là vous avez vu dans le discours de M. Trudeau récemment en Chambre un passage qui est à mon avis très, très beau, où M. Trudeau dit que nous avons payé nos droits à la communauté internationale, Nous payons nos taxes universelles, par conséquent, nous avons le droit de parole. Nous sommes juridiquement pris entre les deux ^{plus} grandes puissances du monde, nous sommes ethniquement, politiquement en Europe, nous sommes industriellement entre le nord et le sud et par conséquent nous avons acquis le droit de parole et nous allons nous en servir. Finalement, comme raison de l'initiative de Trudeau, la personnalité de M. Trudeau lui-même. Ce n'est pas, je pense, une des raisons fondamentales. Je donne plus d'importance à mes autres raisons ^{justifiées} ~~le~~ au fait que le monde avait atteint un degré d'angoisse assez considérable, la tradition diplomatique du Canada, le fait que nous ayons droit de parole, etc. ~~la~~ sont des raisons à mon avis plus importantes. Mais la personnalité de M. Trudeau joue un rôle, ici. Dans un grand nombre de situations, vous avez pu observer un certain nombre d'inspirations philosophiques de base chez M. Trudeau: La première, c'est la fameuse application du principe des poids et ~~xxxxxxx~~ des contrepoids. M. Trudeau est disciple de Poluvius qui avant Jésus-Christ avait fait une théorie de la nécessité d'équilibrer les choses continuellement, ~~et~~ M. Trudeau pratique cette philosophie constamment mais en politique extérieure surtout. Il garde ses ouvertures, il garde ses possibilités continuellement disponibles. Un autre aspect de sa personnalité qui se

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qu se reflète dans l'initiative dont je parle c'est sa conviction, un peu féroce, de la supériorité du politique sur l'administratif. C'est un terme que M. Trudeau répète très souvent, un terme très fort, à mon avis. Répétant continuellement que nous ne sommes pas en politique pour faire l'administration des affaires courantes, nous sommes en politique pour faire les grands changements pour mener les grandes batailles. Aussi joue un rôle son style direct, personnel. Il a dit récemment qu'il n'était pas diplomate mais il l'est à sa façon. Comme vous le savez, je pense qu'il va laisser une empreinte assez importante dans ce domaine-là, non seulement par ses idées mais par son style. Laissez tomber les notes, on va se parler dans le nez. C'est une façon d'aborder la diplomatie qui est évidemment fort intéressante.

P → Maintenant, qu'est-ce que c'est l'initiative Trudeau? Le quoi. Le but principal, on vous l'a dit souvent, je le répète, c'est renverser les tendances. Alors, quelles sont ces tendances? De croire à l'équilibre de la terreur, de s'en remettre aux superpuissances, de laisser ça aux experts. En passant, je vous raconte une expérience que j'ai vécue à Madrid pour illustrer ce thème, le thème de laisser ça aux experts. A la conférence de Madrid, à la conférence de la sécurité et de la coopération en Europe, j'étais avec les membres de la délégation du Canada, évidemment, et le chef de la délégation étrangère s'est amené et nous a déclaré tout ça si c'était comme révolutionnaire; "j'ai un problème épouvantable, mon ministre a décidé ^{d'en faire} son propre discours". Effrayant comme idée. Comme le ministre a fait un excellent discours, après la réunion, après le discours du ministre, je me suis précipité pour féliciter le ministre de son discours et je me suis retourné vers le chef de la délégation de ce pays pour le féliciter de l'aide qu'il avait sûrement apportée à son ministre dans son entreprise.

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Je dis ça comme illustration de ce thème qu'il^y avait une
tendance, pour les politiciens c'est une paresse à
laisser ^{quelques-uns} ces questions si importantes. ^{et d'autres qui a eux-mêmes les plus du peuple} Alors de dire
également la tendance de dire moins ^{que} de dire plus
que ce qu'on pense et l'initiative de M. Trudeau consiste
à rétablir ~~à rétablir~~ la volonté politique, l'énergie
politique comme il l'appelle ça, le dialogue politique
qu'un ami appelle le multilogue politique parce qu'il
a plus de deux qui sont en cause. Surtout de rétablir
la confiance et les instruments de la confiance c'est
le but de la conférence de Stockholm pour éviter les
surprises c'est aussi je pense que M. Trudeau lui-même
l'a illustré très bien au cours de son plus récent voyage,
de démontrer aux Russes que les portes sont ouvertes que
l'ouest ne cherche pas à les isoler, que la coopération est
aussi dans leur intérêt. C'est je pense sur ce but
principal de son initiative. ^{Il} y'a deux buts dans l'initiative
de Trudeau. ^{Il} y'a ce but principal que je viens de définir
^{Il} y'a des buts secondaires auxquels je passe maintenant.
^{Il} Alors quels sont les buts secondaires ou les propositions
spécifiques? Quelques observations d'abord. M. Trudeau
sait très bien que les objectifs spécifiques que je vais
mentionner sont fort discutables, il sait très bien que
tout ça n'a pas une vérité d'évangile. Il croit aussi
à l'effet global et à l'effet ~~compensatoire, non pas~~
~~compensatoire, à l'effet~~ cumulatif des propositions spé-
cifiques que je vais mentionner maintenant. Je dis ça
en le soulignant parce que très souvent dans la presse
on oublie qu'il y a une certaine interdépendance entre
les différentes propositions que M. Trudeau a faites
récemment. Et troisièmement comme observation c'est le
caractère évolutif de l'initiative de M. Trudeau. C'est
à remarquer au début, ~~au début~~ ses idées étaient X et
elles se sont précisées elles se sont amplifiées à mesure
que ses voyages se présentaient. Il y a un aspect expé-
rimental dans l'entreprise dans l'initiative de M. Trudeau

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qui je pense vaudrait la peine d'être souligné. 1 Quelles sont maintenant les propositions spécifiques elle-mêmes je les résume avec des chiffres cinq, cent dix neuf, deux, trente cinq. 5, 119, 2, 35 c'est la façon que j'ai de mémoriser ces choses là. Le cinq est évidemment la conférence qu'il a proposée des cinq puissances nucléaires dans le but évidemment de limiter les armes nucléaires stratégiques sans porter ombrage aux négociations à deux, les négociations de l'INF et du START et l'idée générale ici, l'idée générale c'est d'établir le principe de l'égalité entre les Russes et les Américains et ensuite d'établir le principe de la proportion ou d'un quotient ou d'un pourcentage valable pour les trois autres. C'est ça qui est l'idée fondamentale de cette conférence c'est pour établir un équilibre, c'est pour établir un barem entre les cinq puissances nucléaires.

→ Alors cet équilibre établi, le principe visant on s'attaquera après ça à la réduction elle-même, En d'autres termes on va faire un plafond puis après ça on verra à s'occuper du plancher, voilà une façon imaginaire de décrire ces choses là. On peut se demander pourquoi cet intérêt de M. Trudeau dans cette conférence des cinq puissances nucléaires, qui d'après plusieurs serait au centre même de ce qu'on appelle l'initiative de M. Trudeau? Eh bien pendant l'explication facile c'est la suivante et je pense qu'elle est vraie, pendant longtemps, ~~pendant longtemps~~ on a concentré sur les deux grandes puissances et les efforts nucléaires des trois autres étaient, le mot fort c'est insignifiant étaient peu importants comparés à l'effort américain et russe. et par conséquent on n'oubliait cet aspect des trois autres puissances nucléaires dans l'effort de désarmement ou de contrôle des armements. Eh bien, il s'est produit, ~~il s'est produit~~ une certaine prise d'importance de l'Europe dans ces problèmes là à la suite des événements que vous connaissez et il est concret que deux de ces trois grandes puissances c'est à dire la France et le Royaume-Uni

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sont dans l'Europe, que leur force nucléaire augmente que les prévisions sont qu'elles vont continuer à augmenter et à devenir de plus en plus perfectionnées et ~~que~~ par conséquent à cause justement de l'augmentation des forces nucléaires françaises et anglaises, à cause de l'importance de l'Europe, il devient de plus en plus important d'associer les autres à l'effort de contrôle des armements nucléaires parmi les cinq puissances. C'est comme ça que je m'explique cette chose j'espère que ça vous suffit comme explication moi ça me suffit en tout cas. Ça m'explique pourquoi, pourquoi on s'est moins préoccupé des trois et exclusivement des deux ça explique pourquoi aujourd'hui il devient plus important d'établir des proportions entre les cinq eux-mêmes. Alors ça c'est le premier élément des propositions spécifiques de M. Trudeau. Le deuxième élément le 119, alors je répète 5, 119, le 119 c'est évidemment l'effort commun pour renforcer le traité de non-prolifération que 119 on signé jusqu'à maintenant. L'effort consisterait à convaincre d'autres de signer cet accord surtout les petits états de façon à élargir l'intérêt du monde dans le désarmement et le contrôle des armes. De les amener à mieux respecter les obligations ceux qui ont signer qu'ils ont contractées. De stimuler le transfert de technologie à des fins pacifiques et aussi non sans importance, et M. Trudeau l'a souligné quelques fois d'établir le rapport entre désarmement et développement pour intéresser les pays en voie de développement. Alors l'idée ici c'est de dire surtout aux petits pays surtout aux pays en voie de développement c'est de dire écoutez vous avez un intérêt vous autres personnel au désarmement, au contrôle des armes, puisque ce que, du moins en principe, ce qu'on ne dépensera pas pour acheter des armes eh! bien ça sera y'a possibilité du moins qu'une partie de ces sommes là soient mises à votre disposition pour votre développement. Alors ça c'est le deuxième élément, le deuxième volet de l'initiative de Trudeau, c'est à dire, le renforcement du traité de non-prolifération. Le troisième, ~~le troisième~~

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c'est faire avancer, faire progresser les négociations MBFR à Vienne, Négociations comme vous le savez entre les deux blocs sur les forces conventionnelles et M. Trudeau dixit de stimuler la réponse de l'ouest aux propositions de l'est dans ce domaine là. On m'a expliqué il y a quelques minutes que ces propositions de l'est étaient essentiellement des propositions que l'ouest a faites il y a quelques mois et que l'est a reprises à son compte en les amendant à des fins particulières. Alors ici, ~~ici~~ ça c'est le problème de base la réduction des armes nucléaires non seulement la parité mais la réduction aussi entre les deux blocs.

Il s'agit comme vous le savez de relever le seuil nucléaire c'est à dire le moment où, de retarder le point, le moment où il faudra utiliser les armes nucléaires. Alors en d'autres termes on baisse, ~~on baisse~~ avec une réduction des armes conventionnelles les possibilités qu'il y a surtout s'il y a la parité entre les deux blocs, les possibilités qu'on soit forcé de part et d'autre à utiliser les armes nucléaires. C'est la troisième partie de l'initiative de Trudeau,

R La quatrième c'est de hausser pour éviter qu'elle s'enlise le niveau de participation politique à la conférence de Stockholm. Alors vous savez tous ici puisque vous vous préparez à cette réunion depuis plusieurs mois, c'est pour ça que le 35 ici c'est le nombre des pays de la conférence de Stockholm, Cinq c'est le groupe des nucléaires, 119 c'est le groupe de non-prolifération, 2 c'est les deux blocs du MBFR et 35 c'est le nombre de pays à la conférence de Stockholm qui se tient présentement. Cette conférence de Stockholm, à mon avis, est d'une importance considérable.

Certains diront peut être que c'est la plus importante de toutes ces conférences qui ont eu lieu et qui ont lieu présentement, pourquoi ça? C'est sûrement la plus politique de toutes des conférences. Parce que dans les autres conférences on parle des actifs militaires des différents pays en cause. On se demande comment les réduire comment les limiter. Ici on parle des intentions des pays. On dépasse le côté si vous voulez purement équipement militaire

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pour entrer dans le domaine de la psychologie, pour essayer, pour se demander comment on peut empêcher des mal entendus, Comment on peut empêcher des suspicions, des préoccupations négatives de la part des différents pays. C'est ça que la conférence de Stockholm essaie de faire, Essaie d'établir la transparence, la visibilité, briser la spirale de l'inflation militaire en établissant des règles de conduite pour les forces terrestres en Europe d'abord, mais possiblement ailleurs aussi. Le sujet comme vous le savez avait déjà été couvert par la convention d'Helsinki en 75, Mais d'une façon partielle d'une façon également purement déclaratoire et n'avait pas été appliqué avec une énergie considérable aussi. Alors à Stockholm dans une première phase, ~~dans une première phase~~ on va discuter donc des moyens, ~~des moyens~~ d'augmenter la confiance. Il s'agit pas seulement de moyens psychologiques, il s'agit d'une série de moyens que j' ai dans mes notes, des moyens d'information comme la révélation de la composition, d'allocation, des manoeuvres, des prévisions militaires des pays en cause. Comme la vérification des observateurs, les inspecteurs etc., Alors l'idée, ~~l'idée~~ générale ici étant d'empêcher justement les malentendus, d'empêcher les préoccupations non justifiées. Alors voilà les quatre points essentiels des propositions de M. Trudeau. Il y en a une série d'autres qui relèvent des la stratégie de l'asphyxie que M. Trudeau avait proposés en 1978 et qui sont d'un caractère plus technique encore. Je les énumère seulement: interdire l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes anti satellites à haute altitude, pourquoi ça? C'est parce qu'ils menacent l'ensemble des moyens de communication pour la gestion des crises. ~~l'idée~~ L'idée c'est que si on permet de développer ces systèmes anti satellites à haute altitude eh! bien on va couper comme ça les possibilités d'information et de communication des pays en cause, et le danger c'est que couper de leurs communications ils paniquent et fassent des choses tout à fait peu recommandables. ~~Un autre aspect,~~ An autre aspect de cette série là exigeait que tout système d'armement stratégique

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soit entièrement vérifiable par les moyens techniques nationaux. C'est à dire satellites, surveillance électronique et agents. Ici l'idée ça serait que quand on développe un système, un système d'armement on développe en même temps les moyens de le contrôler. La troisième idée de cette série technique comme je l'appelle c'est limiter la mobilité des missiles balistiques internationaux et ici le problème fort complexe et vous le voyez maintenant pourquoi je disais au début que ça devient très technique, ça me dépasse de toute évidence, dès qu'on entre dans ces aspects tout à fait particulier. Il s'agit ici donc de limiter la mobilité des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux, parce que s'ils sont trop mobiles, ils seront pas vérifiables, puis s'ils sont trop fixes eh bien on risque que le pays en difficulté puisse les faire partir de toute façon pour ne pas qu'ils tombent dans les mains des ennemis. Alors voilà le quoi et le pourquoi de l'initiative de M. Trudeau en termes très généraux évidemment les seuls que je comprennent, j'espère que ça vous sert, moi en tout cas ça m'a servi de vous l'expliquer. Deuxièmement, ~~deuxièmement~~ qu'elle a été la réaction des différents pays surtout ceux qu'il a visités personnellement à l'initiative de M. Trudeau? L'effort, ~~l'effort~~ qu'il a fait ceux qui d'entre vous voyagent souvent savent ce que ça veut dire ^{que} de se ballader à travers le monde comme il l'a fait, l'effort qu'il a fait physiquement. Eh bien je dis que si M. Trudeau n'a pas le prix Nobel de la paix il mérite au moins une médaille des jeux olympiques pour l'effort qu'il a déployé au cours des semaines les plus récentes. Intéressant aussi pour les politologues d'analyser j'espère qu'il va y avoir des thèses de maîtrise au moins sur ces sujets là, la technique de l'effort qu'il a fait et qu'il fait. Ça commence par un discours et ensuite suivent des lettres envoyées aux différents intéressés, la visite elle-même, Un discours au retour et des lettres envoyées aux intéressés. Y'a une technique là de la négociation internationale qui m'apparaît très utile à étudier. Quand je regarde cette technique là je pense à Fred Perry qui m'a

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enseigné à jouer au tennis, et Perry disait que au tennis frapper la balle c'était presque sans importance. Ce qui est important c'est la préparation du coup et le follow-through après avoir donné le coup. Même chose en diplomatie, ce qui est important c'est la préparation, l'exécution est très importante de toute évidence mais la préparation et l'après-rencontre est évidemment d'une très très grande importance aussi. Alors ~~je parle~~, j'aimerais parler des visites. Le type de visites que fait M. Trudeau c'est donc très personnel, pas mal informel, un peu petit peu théâtral, juste ce qu'il faut et sur une période de temps, limitée. Faut que ça se fasse dans une période de temps assez limitée, ~~si c'est~~, Si c'est trop court ça moins d'effet, si c'est trop long l'effet, l'effet diminue également. Alors il a fait ces visites là comme vous le savez aux chefs de gouvernement, d'organismes internationaux, à des spécialistes du sujet, à des intellectuels, à des électeurs également. Je fais remarquer en passant que M. Trudeau a acquis une connaissance fort approfondie du sujet dans tout ses aspects. Je l'ai entendu parler de ces questions là, il en parle avec une abondance et une connaissance technique même. Ça rejoint ce que je vous disais au début. C'est que en politique aujourd'hui quand vous êtes en tant que politicien mêler à un sujet, comme celui là, il faut que vous puissiez acquérir, que vous ayez acquis une connaissance technique pas mal avancée quand même. En d'autres termes, si vous êtes celui qui doit négocier des sujets de cette complexité là, c'est évidemment essentiel d'en connaître les éléments principaux. Mais dans la diplomatie contemporaine c'est pas mal essentiel d'en connaître les détails technique aussi, évidemment moins que ceux qui vous conseillent, mais passablement en profondeur aussi. Je vous fait remarquer ça à titre d'ancien professeur de sciences politiques. Question intéressante aussi est-ce que M. Trudeau est-il le seul politicien, qui de mémoire d'homme, qui ait fait ce genre d'exercice là avant de passer à la retraite? Eh bien si vous regarder la majorité de ceux qui font des missions comme celle là, M. Pearson en tête, habituellement font ces

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choses là après être sortis de la politique active. Le seul exemple qu'on a pu me citer de chef actif, de chef en poste, qui a fait un effort semblable c'est le Président des Etats-Unis Carter au moment du Camp David. Mais c'est très différent comme style puisque dans son cas ça couvre un domaine beaucoup plus, ~~beaucoup plus~~ limité que l'initiative de M. Trudeau et il fait venir les autres à lui plutôt que d'aller les voir aussi. C'est ^{peut} ~~pas~~ être un détail mais qui vaut la peine d'être souligné en passant. On accuse M. Trudeau d'un certain nombre de choses au sujet de cette initiative. On l'accuse, ~~on l'accuse~~ de ne pas avoir impliquer, de ne pas avoir associer à son effort les chefs de partis du Canada. ^{ONS} ~~Discussions~~ sur ça. L'autre jour M. Mulroney en Chambre disait que il regrettait que les chefs de ~~partis~~ des autres chefs de partis n'ait pas été associés au Premier Ministre dans cet effort là disant que ça aurait aider le consensus au Canada à se développer. Mais quelques minutes après, comme vous l'avez vu, il est parti dans une condamnation du manque d'effort du Canada dans sa politique d'armement et sa politique militaire. Alors c'est peu probable que l'effort puisse se faire de façon conjuguée. On a regretté aussi que M. Trudeau, je dis ça en tant que professeur de sciences politiques, ~~et~~ pour ceux que ça intéresse ces questions là, qu'il n'a pas suffisamment associer ses ministres à la conduite de cet effort là. En ce qui a trait à M. MacEachen évidemment ça s'applique pas, ~~et~~ ^{Même} en ce qui a trait à moi parce que j'ai voyager passablement depuis quelques mois et partout où je suis aller en Colombie, au Brésil, dans les Antilles, je suis allé. J'ai parler de l'initiative de M. Trudeau et dans certains cas le chef du gouvernement du pays en cause, quelques jours ou quelques heures après, faisait une déclaration de sympathie à l'égard de l'initiative de M. Trudeau. On a regretté aussi qu'il n'implique pas suffisamment le Parlement dans cet effort là, c'est discutable aussi. Tout ce que je puis dire c'est qu'il y eu un certain nombre de débats, de discours d'abord en Chambre de M. Trudeau sur cette initiative là, ~~qu'il~~ y a eu quelques débats c'est surtout sur les essais

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~~les essais~~ du Cruise, mais ça portait quand même en partie sur l'effort de M. Trudeau. On a, on a regretté aussi que il n'ait trop intimement associé le Parti libéral à son initiative. Je dis ça en passant pour vous faire sourire. On a regretté par exemple que M. Trudeau ait fait un grand discours sur ce sujet là devant une convention à Montréal du Parti libéral. ^{ou} Réfléchissez un petit peu sur ça, Je pense que d'abord si vous regarder les dates M. Trudeau était rentrer de son voyage le 11, il repartait le 17, il avait plusieurs choses à faire et Ceux qui le connaissent savent très bien qu'il aime figner ses discours alors il y avait peu de temps pour lui pour se préparer. Et finalement je pense que plus fondamental que ça je pense qu'on aurait dû le féliciter de traiter d'un sujet aussi important devant une réunion partisane, ~~puisque~~, Puisque les partis politiques sont quand même des entités extrêmement importants dans un pays démocratique. C'est une condition même de la démocratie à mon avis. Alors qu'est-ce qu'il y a de mauvais à parler devant un parti politique d'un sujet d'une importance comme celle là? On aurait dû le féliciter plutôt que de réciter des choses que tout le monde voulait. Tout le monde voulait qu'il parle, Il leur a imposer si vous voulez un sujet d'une importance et d'un sérieux extraordinaire. Moi pour ma part j'ai regretté qu'on ait fait tellement de train là dessus. Quelle a été la réaction des pays visités et des autres aussi? Bien là je pense qu'on peut dire qu'il y a eu un très large accord sur l'analyse de la gravité de la situation et sur le besoin que souligne M. Trudeau d'une façon très forte de rétablir le dialogue politique. Il serait très intéressant mais il faudrait y passer pas mal de temps d'analyser la réaction de ~~chacun~~ de ces pays là, France, Italie, Commonwealth, Chine, URSS, Etats-Unis etc., D'analyser qu'est-ce qu'ils ont fait, qu'est-ce qu'ils ont dit et pourquoi ils ont dit ce qu'ils ont dit. Ça demanderait une analyse en profondeur que je ne peux pas, ~~que je ne peux pas~~ faire de toute évidence pour plusieurs raisons. La première

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c'est que ça prendrait beaucoup de temps, ~~et~~ la deuxième
ça serait diplomatiquement très dangereux pour moi et
pour ceux qui m'accompagnent. Dans chaque cas, ~~dans~~
~~chaque cas~~ c'est évident que si la réaction française
à l'égard de l'initiative de M. Trudeau sur ceci et sur
celà etc., parce qu'il y a des convictions en France il
y a des intérêts, y'a des préjugés en cause qui font qu'ils
ne voient pas les choses de la même façon que M. Trudeau
les voit. La majorité des réserves et j'ai lu à peu près
tout ce qu'il y a eu de télégrammes sur ce sujet là, la
majorité des réserves qui sont faites par les pays qui ne
sont pas d'accord sur les spécificités des propositions
que M. Trudeau fait. C'est que le timing n'est pas bon, c'est
pas le temps de faire ça maintenant. Attendons après la réunion
du MBFR, Attendons après la réunion du START, Voyons si
l'INF peut pas faire des choses avant, M. Trudeau n'a pas
raison sur les questions de timing, ou sur les questions
de conditions. ^{certain} Il y'en a qui seraient prêts à faire disons la
réunion, la conférence des cinq nucléaires, mais à condition
que, par exemple dans le cas des Chinois qui voulaient une
~~réunion de 50%~~ une réduction de 50% des armes avant le départ,
Alors chacun donc ayant des vues particulières. Tout ça pour
dire que M. Trudeau je pense aura eu un succès considérable
sur le but principal de son initiative mais beaucoup moindre
évidemment sur les propositions spécifiques qu'il a formulées
à ce moment là. ^{IP} Les résultats, ~~les résultats~~ un peu tôt pour
en juger. C'est évident que si ça, ces choses là devaient se
réaliser dans un mois, deux mois, un an, eh bien la vue qu'on
aura à ce moment là de l'initiative de M. Trudeau sera très
différente de celle qu'on a ce soir. C'est une vérité de
La Palice que je vous énonce là. ^P En ce qui a trait, le but
principal, je le répète autant au Canada que ailleurs dans
le monde je pense que il a gagné la sympathie. D'ailleurs
il était parti comme dirait l'ancien président Kennedy
avec un optimisme sans illusion, ^{Je pense} dans le sens qu'il était
optimiste mais qu'il n'avait pas d'illusions sur les difficultés
qu'il allait rencontrer sur son chemin. Je pense que la

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.../17

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contribution de l'initiative Trudeau est certaine en ce qui a trait à la prise de conscience des dangers et des besoins et on le voit aussi dans certains gestes qui ont été posés depuis. Mais ça évidemment si je vous dit que c'est important dans telle ou telle décision vous avez raison de me dire en retour que je suis sympathique évidemment à mon chef et que j'ai tendance à biaiser les choses en en ma faveur et en sa faveur. Mais je pense que l'histoire dira que certaines décisions, par exemple sur la participation des hommes politiques au sommet des Ministres des affaires extérieures à Stockholm, doit passablement à l'initiative de M. Trudeau. On vous dira que la décision de l'OTAN de revoir, de reviser ses vues et de participer le 16 mars à la réunion du MBFR doit pas mal, encore une fois c'est difficile de départager également ce que ces décisions là doivent à la position du Canada et à l'initiative de M. Trudeau. Il faut quand même mettre les choses en place. Alors tout ça pour, pour dire que je pense qu'on va reconnaître que ça eu un effet en général très bénéfique. Pour les spécificités comme dirait Joe Clark eh bien là il va y avoir autant d'opinions qu'il va y avoir de cerveaux en cause. La rencontre d'hier à Moscou à mon avis est très importante. M. Tchernenko disait à Trudeau que son initiative est "utile et pratique". Utile et pratique bon. Alors c'est des mots mais c'est bien, comme point de départ c'est bien. Le Secrétaire général n'est pas revenu sur le passé nous a dit M. Trudeau dans sa conférence de presse. ~~C'est important~~ à mon avis c'est important, mais l'histoire dira que c'est très important ou un petit peu important. Le fait qu'il n'ait pas, qu'il n'ait pas essayer de repasser, de remâcher tout le passé et les déclarations contre etc., est assez favorable également. La nécessité de la détente, M. Trudeau nous a dit que le Secrétaire général Tchernenko a répété plusieurs fois le mot de détente et ici, ~~ici~~ c'est un mot qui appartient aux années 70 comme vous le savez qui appartient à Breznev alors que peut être, peut être, consciemment, inconsciemment l'histoire dira que le Secrétaire général

.../18

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.../18

voulait laisser entendre à Trudeau qu'on revenait à la période précédente, peut être, peut être, peut être. C'est intéressant. Il nous faudra un Freud ce soir pour analyser tout ça en termes freudiens peut être aussi. Alors de toute façon la nécessité de la détente est une, plusieurs fois répétées comme dit M. Trudeau est importante à souligner pour nous. La nécessité "de réduire la menace nucléaire de façon significative", Ça s'est Tchernenko qui a dit ça, La nécessité je le répète de réduire la menace nucléaire de manière significative. Et son insistance continuelle sur l'égalité entre les deux grands, Ça aussi ça l'air de la parité à conférence MBFR. L'URSS dit-il encore prête à reprendre les négociations avec les pays de l'ouest : citation d'après M. Trudeau "n'importe où, de n'importe quelle façon sur laquelle les deux partis pourraient s'entendre". Ca ça m'a paru important parce c'est une négation, c'est un changement de position par rapport au départ des Russes de la conférence de l'INF. C'est eux, ~~c'est eux~~ qui ont quitté ; Tchernenko dit maintenant nous sommes prêts à retourner n'importe où n'importe quand etc., Ça m'a l'air assez important. Ça m'a l'air, si je juge seulement par les mots, Alors vous allez ~~et alors vous allez~~ me dire peut être que ce sont là des mots que les, qui ne signifient pas grand chose, ce sont des mots de politesse. Mais alors je dirai peut être que vous avez raison, on verra plus tard. Mais il y a je pense un caractère normatif dans les déclarations comme celles là et par conséquent elles ont leur portée. Ce sont, ~~ce sont~~ des mots que les chefs politiques prononcent mais comme le monde entier est au courant des mots que le chef politique a prononcés bien ça constitue pour lui un certain engagement pour l'avenir. Et voilà Mesdames et Messieurs je vous ai parlé du pourquoi, du quoi, du comment et des résultats de l'initiative de M. Trudeau. Merci.



TO/À ALL OFFICERS IDD

FROM/DE • J.R. Francis

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Val Morin Policy Conference
SUJET

*Mr. Smith
for info
J.R.*

IDR/J.R.Francis/2-7921/r1

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
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File/Dossier
Date
February 16, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDR-0576

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

1

DISTRIBUTION

IDDZ
IFB/Meadows

Mr. Shenstone will be attending a Senior Departmental Management Conference at Val Morin, March 7-9. The agenda for the meeting is attached.

2. As part of his preparations, Mr. Shenstone wishes to meet with all officers of the Bureau to discuss our preoccupations and priorities. The meeting will be at 1:00 p.m. February 28 in the Ops Centre Briefing Room on A-2. Bring your own lunch. With luck, coffee may be served by Mr. Meadows.

J.R. Francis,
Acting Director General,
Bureau of International
Security and Arms Control

Mr. Després
Mr. Barton
LCol. MacPherson
Mr. Herman
Mr. McCashin
Mr. Johnston
Miss Gibson

Mr. Chistoff
Mr. Cleminson
Mr. Snider
Mr. Uyeyama
Mr. Grinius

IFB/IDD Working lunch Ops Centre

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
Conf Room A-2

1300 28 Feb

Far Hills Inn, Val-Morin Station, P.Q.
March 7 - 9, 1984

Sign in Room

Wednesday	12:00	Arrival at Far Hills Inn
March 7	12:30	Lunch
	2:30	Introductory Remarks - Marcel Massé
	3:00	Conference Format - Rodger Schwass
	3:30	Small Groups: "The Situation We Are In And Where It Is Leading Us"
	5:00	Break
	6:00	Hospitality
	6:30	Dinner
	7:30	Plenary: "The Situation We Are In And Where It Is Leading Us"
	8:30	Small Groups: "Our Present Capacity To Deal With The Situation"
	10:00	Hospitality
Thursday	8:00	Breakfast
March 8	9:00	Small Groups: "Our Present Capacity To Deal With The Situation"
	10:00	Coffee
	10:15	Plenary: "Our Present Capacity To Deal With The Situation"
	11:00	Small Groups: "A Desirable Future For Canada And The Role Of The Department Of External Affairs In Achieving It"
	12:00	Lunch
	1:00	Small Groups: "A Desirable Future For Canada And The Role Of The Department Of External Affairs In Achieving It"
	3:00	Coffee
	3:15	Plenary: "The Desirable Future For Canada And The Role Of The Department Of Depart- ment of External Affairs In Achieving It"
	4:30	Break
	6:00	Dinner
	7:30	Small Groups: "Constraints And Obstacles To Achievement Of The Desirable Future"
	9:00	Plenary: "Constraints And Obstacles To Achieve- ment Of The Desirable Future"
	10:00	Hospitality



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Friday
March 9

8:00	Breakfast
9:00	Small Groups: "Removing The Constraints And Obstacles To The Achievement Of The Desirable Future"
10:45	Coffee
11:00	Plenary: "Removing The Constraints And Obstacles To The Achievement Of The Desirable Future"
12:00	Lunch
1:00	Small Groups: "An Action Plan For External Affairs"
3:00	Plenary: "An Action Plan For External Affairs"
4:00	Concluding Remarks - Marcel Massé
4:30	Conference Close

CC: MINA (3) EFB RBD
MINT (2) ETD RBT
MINE ETT RBP
PARL SEC JCX RGB
USS JCD
DMT JLE
DMF URR
FPR IDR
CPD IFB
CMRR (2) ~~IDDZ~~

Mr. R. R. Halpin
R.R. Halpin
USSR and Eastern European
Relations Division
996-3606

S E C R E T

February 16, 1984

RBR-0319

Memorandum for:
The Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs

c.c. Minister for International Trade
Minister for External Relations

SUBJECT: Gander Memorandum of Understanding

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is:

- to provide you with a paper outlining the salient facts and options for possible circulation to your colleagues on the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy and if you agree,
- to obtain your signature on a covering letter to Minister Axworthy.

BACKGROUND:

On November 1, 1983, the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning decided that you, in consultation with the Minister of Transport, should undertake an in-depth review of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Soviet and Canadian Governments regarding arrangements to expand facilities for Aeroflot in Gander, Newfoundland.

An options paper has been prepared without recommendations and with as few judgements on the respective options as appropriate. An earlier memorandum (ETT-2790 of December 16, 1983) provided you with the full background to the Gander MOU.

The issues before you can be summarized as follows:

- the MOU contains a balance of economic benefits to both sides.

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- 2 -

S E C R E T

- Gander will become heavily dependent on Soviet custom; indeed, more so now that Eastern Provincial Airways has transferred its headquarters to Halifax.
- Gander could become a lightning rod for sanctions against the USSR in periods of USA/USSR crises.
- Increasingly, Soviet authorities are coming to consider Gander a litmus test of Canadian intentions vis-à-vis our commitment to stability and predictability in our commercial relations. (As you are aware, both the Prime Minister and General Secretary Chernenko, during their meeting in Moscow, spoke of the importance they attach to developing our bilateral relations).
- Public concerns, voiced previously by American Ambassador Robinson, that Gander could be a staging base for arms transshipments or troops destined to Cuba or Latin America, might be reinforced. (In our view, these apprehensions are not justified; moreover, notwithstanding Ambassador Robinson's statements last autumn, there has been no indication that the USA would make an issue of this matter in our bilateral relations).

Pending receipt of your views, we have not shown this options paper to officials of the Department of Transport. We suggest, however, that Minister Axworthy should receive a copy as soon as possible, and in advance of its distribution to other Ministers. A letter to him is attached for this purpose. The paper could be circulated to your other colleagues immediately in advance of the Cabinet Committee meeting.

If it is decided to proceed with the MOU, signature could be done in Moscow by the Canadian Ambassador and the Soviet Minister of Civil Aviation unless Mr. Axworthy feels strongly it should be done in Ottawa in which case he and the Soviet Ambassador could sign.

D. Molgat
Assistant Deputy Minister
(Europe)

M. Shenstone
for de Montigny Marchand

S E C R E T
FOR MINISTERS EYES ONLY

GANDER MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
OPTIONS PAPER

PURPOSE

To outline the salient facts and options available to the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, in consultation with the Minister of Transport, with regard to the Gander Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) negotiated with the Government of the Soviet Union.

BACKGROUND

The MOU is not a treaty, but an agreement which:

- confirms a commercial agreement between Gander Aviation Ltd. and Aeroflot on the import and storage of Soviet aviation fuel for use by Aeroflot flights in transit through Gander to and from Cuba and other Latin American destinations;
- regularizes flight stop-overs between Moscow and Montreal (Mirabel) for the exchange of Soviet fishing crews whose vessels are undergoing maintenance and repair in St. John's.

An important Soviet interest in this project is to introduce its new prestige wide-bodied passenger Ilyushin (IL-86) jet on its Moscow-Havana route; the limited range of this aircraft (4200 kms) means that a stop-over in Gander is absolutely necessary.

The MOU was negotiated, but its signature, originally scheduled for the autumn of 1983, was postponed as a consequence of the destruction of the KAL passenger airliner. The principal Canadian measure -- the suspension of Aeroflot flights for sixty days -- lapsed as originally planned in November 1983. The claim for compensation for the families of the victims of the tragedy was lodged on December 21, 1983; however, the Soviet Government has not yet agreed to negotiate a settlement. It is unlikely to do so soon or, indeed, to state anything further until the other principal claimants (USA, Korea, Japan) have lodged their claims. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) investigated the tragedy, concluding

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that the Soviet Air Defence Force had shot down the plane which had wandered off course for reasons unknown but not suspicious, and will debate the report in Montreal beginning February 28.

TIMING

A decision is required before February 29, 1984 since the contractual commitments undertaken by Gander Aviation Ltd. and the Line of Credit negotiated with its backers (including the Newfoundland Development Corporation) will lapse at that time. Gander Aviation's President, Bill Bennet, has already obtained his final extension on these credits. He is seeking a meeting with the DPM/SSEA on or after February 21.

OPTIONS

A. Proceed with signature of the MOU:

- Pro:
- Gander Aviation Ltd. would proceed with construction plans creating immediate jobs and permanent employment for 60-90 persons at Gander and Lewisport, thus partially offsetting the loss of 300 jobs caused by the transfer of Eastern Provincial Airways (EPA) operations to Halifax.
 - Signature of the MOU will result in diversion of traffic from Shannon, Ireland to Gander, creating local economic benefit in the range of \$2.5 million annually.
 - The Soviet Government would be reassured about Canadian commercial reliability; suspicions that the Government blocks Soviet commercial initiatives for political reasons might be attenuated.
 - Aeroflot stopovers for the exchange of fishing crews would be regularized by this official "blessing"; this could in turn have a positive effect on the current Soviet inflexibility on fisheries negotiations and the St. John's ship repair programme for 1984 (although the Soviets have linked the latter, involving annual revenues of \$3 million and 100 jobs, more to the outcome of the fisheries negotiations).
- Con:
- EPA's pullout from Gander would leave this community even more dependent on Soviet custom, especially when Aeroflot flights through Gander on the Moscow-Havana route sharply increase.

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S E C R E T
FOR MINISTERS EYES ONLY

- In times of East-West crises, Gander could become a highly visible lightning rod for sanctions against the Soviet Union, e.g. cancellation of flights; expropriation or seizure of Soviet fuel.
- The USA may be concerned about the possibility of Gander's use as a Soviet staging base for military personnel destined for Cuba and Latin America.
- USA suspicions that the USSR could trans-ship arms to these destinations might be reinforced. (This concern is not warranted; first, these materials are more securely and economically shipped by sea; second, Canada can inspect any aircraft about which there are grounds for such suspicions.)

B. Cancel plans to proceed with signature of the MOU

- Pro:
- A potential political irritant with the USA would be avoided. (However, notwithstanding Ambassador Robinson's expressions of concern, there is no indication the USA, although it would obviously prefer abandonment of the project, will make an issue of it in our relations.)
 - If linked to a change in the Soviet position on the KAL compensation claim, refusal to accommodate Aeroflot in Gander would, judging by media comment and letters, be supported by the Canadian public.
 - Gander dependence on Soviet patronage would be avoided.
- Con:
- EPA's pullout in the absence of other economic relief for Gander would not be offset.
 - Gander Aviation Ltd. would incur actual business losses in the range of \$100,000 and, in addition, losses in anticipated revenue.
 - The Soviet Government would regard non-signature as a serious setback in bilateral relations after being told at the highest levels that Canada's objective is stability. Canadian commercial reliability in Soviet eyes would be injured, which could have an adverse affect on Canadian commercial initiatives in the important USSR market (fourth in export sales).

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S E C R E T
FOR MINISTERS EYES ONLY

C. Renegotiate the MOU

(i) Proceed with transit arrangements for fishing crew exchanges, but exclude service on flights to and from Cuba

Pro: - No further negotiation would be required; Canada could do so unilaterally through changes to the Aeroflot licence and immigration regulations.

- USA apprehensions about the use of Gander as a staging base for Latin America would be allayed.

- Gander dependency on Soviet custom would be virtually eliminated.

Con: - The economic benefit for Gander of the MOU would be jettisoned; the Latin American transit trade provides the construction jobs and permanent employment in the maintenance services industry.

- Canadian commercial credibility would be injured; the Soviet authorities would regard this as tantamount to not signing since we would be reneging on the earlier understanding and emptying the agreement of its real benefit for the Soviet Union (an ad hoc arrangement exists whereby scheduled Aeroflot flights to Mirabel could drop-off and pick-up fishing crews at Gander).

(ii) Improve the economic package for Canada by insisting upon the use of Canadian aviation fuel

Pro: - The MOU could eventually be signed and implemented and criticism could be deflected by reference to the increased benefit to Canada, particularly Newfoundland.

- All advantages of the present MOU would in theory be retained.

Con: - Canada, in a period of shortages, could not guarantee security of fuel supply.

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S E C R E T
FOR MINISTERS EYES ONLY

- Indeed, in a period of East-West tension, political pressure to deny fuel might well be formidable.
- A balance of benefits has already been struck; re-opening of these negotiations might require offsetting concessions in other areas.
- The Soviet authorities are unlikely to agree, especially since Soviet foreign currency shortages might preclude any such arrangement.
- This would be a calculated gamble involving the cost-benefit of a higher priced agreement for the Soviets versus the value they place on introduction of this new aircraft into its trans-Atlantic service.

D. Link signature of MOU to Soviet agreement to negotiate the KAL compensation claim

- Pro:
- Fault for the collapse of the MOU could be shifted to the Soviet Government.
 - The Canadian public would likely support such a linkage.
 - Such linkage is perhaps the only tangible leverage we have to induce the Soviets to negotiate a settlement of the claim.
- Con:
- The amounts involved (in terms of the claim vs potential benefits to the Gander economy) are disproportionate.
 - The USSR would reject such linkage as artificial.
 - Linkage would be inconsistent with the previous Government position that the claim and Canadian measures (e.g. Aeroflot suspension) were not linked.
 - Likelihood of compensation is remote and, if made, will occur only after years of negotiations, thus in effect, cancelling the MOU.

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S E C R E T
FOR MINISTERS EYES ONLY

- Canada is only one claimant and a relatively minor one. The USSR is unlikely to respond positively to linkage which would establish a precedent for settling other claims involving greater amounts such as in the cases of the USA and Korea.
- The loss of political "face" inherent in the compensation issue means that the Soviet position will be governed mainly by the strategy it adopts vis-a-vis the USA.
- Canadian efforts to imbue bilateral relations with greater stability and predictability would be regarded as hollow with potential consequences in other sectors.

Deputy Prime Minister
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Vice-premier ministre
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

SECRET
MINISTERS EYES ONLY

The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, P.C., M.P.
Minister of Transport
House of Commons
Room 135-EB
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

My dear Colleague,

On November 1, 1983, the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning directed that I undertake, in consultation with you, an in-depth review of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding between the Soviet and Canadian Governments regarding arrangements to expand facilities for Aeroflot in Gander, Newfoundland. I have inscribed this item on the agenda of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy for February 20. In this connection, I
.... enclose a briefing paper which outlines the available options which we may discuss at this meeting.

Yours sincerely,

Allan J. MacEachen

Encl.

Deputy Prime Minister
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Vice-premier ministre
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

SECRET
MINISTERS EYES ONLY

My dear Colleague,

On November 1, 1983, the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning directed that I, in consultation with the Minister of Transport, undertake an in-depth review of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding between the Soviet and Canadian Governments regarding arrangements to expand facilities for Aeroflot in Gander, Newfoundland. I have inscribed this item on the agenda of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy for February 20. In this connection, I enclose a briefing paper which outlines the available options which we may discuss at this meeting.

Yours sincerely,

Allan J. MacEachen

Encl.

TO/À TRANSCRIPT

FROM/DE FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • SCRUM - DPM/SSEA - 16 February 1984
SUJET Acid Rain - Mulroney Files - Prime
Minister Trudeau's Peace Initiative

Security/Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

Date

February 16, 1984

Number/Numéro

FPR-0175

ENCLOSURES
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DIV

Q.: ...acid rain be presented this week in Washington?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I haven't seen any note yet. I know that we intend to make a formal presentation but I haven't seen that and I haven't approved it yet so it won't be done this week.

Q.: What sort of action would you like the American government to take on acid rain at this moment?

DPM/SSEA: We would like them to cooperate with us in actual programs to reduce emissions rather than conduct further research into a subject which we think has been fully researched already and where action is urgently required.

Q.: Mr. MacEachen, there's been a lot of attacks by officials in the U.S. about Canada's stand on acid rain. How do you feel about them?

DPM/SSEA: I don't know of these attacks. I understand some comments have been made by members of the Congress. But Canada has been prepared to join with the United States, as a result of conversations with the provinces, to reach certain levels of reduction in emissions in the course of this decade. We're prepared to do that. We haven't been able to secure the acquiescence of the United States because there are deep divisions within that country as to what ought to be done at the present time. It's not a flaw in our process. It's a flaw in the processes in the United States.

Q.: Mr. MacEachen, were you surprised to find that the Tories had files on the Prime Minister?

DPM/SSEA: No, I wasn't at all surprised. I think it illustrates what a foolish subject this is. I think it is quite normal for them to have files on a political leader. I'm not surprised nor am I shocked.

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February 16, 1984

Q.: Well, do you think it's honourable? That's the question.

DPM/SSEA: I think that since as long as I've been around this place, political parties have kept files on the utterances, the public statements of their opponents. It will always be done. You want to know what they're saying about public issues. You know, I find that normal, professional work, particularly when this information is usually gleaned from the press and from the media, stories, reports that are published in the media. They're brought together and made available so that they can be used as reference. I don't find that dishonourable.

Q.: Does that include title searches on houses?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I'm not aware of any tile search on a house.

Q.: You say usually they come from public sources. Are there cases when they don't come from public sources?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I don't know of any other cases. I am not aware of any other source of information, except I do know, as was mentioned by the Prime Minister, that the Opposition employed, or a member of the Opposition employed, detectives a year or two ago to investigate events around the House of Commons. I don't know you'd put that in a file but it's a form of, presumably, information gathering that we've never used.

Q.: Is it ethically acceptable to have a public servant do it? It's not really a question of ...

DPM/SSEA: What is a public servant? We know perfectly well that Ministers, the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, have staff. Their job is to support their employers in political work and they're paid for by the public treasury. We all know that. There's nothing new about that. To my knowledge, no public servant who is operating under the Public Service Act has been asked to do any of this work.

Q.: How far can this information gathering go before it's unacceptable?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think that you members of the media have control over that. If you decide that certain pieces of information are unacceptable to put in the press or report, then you should stop it. We just rely on what

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February 16, 1984

appears in the media. You know, there's a big reference today to OPWATCH, as if it were a sinister espionage operation that might appear in one of John Le Carré's novels. Well, what is OPWATCH? It is a collection of clippings mainly and statements made and reports and so on, all from the public record.

Q.: Were all those files made public? Are there more Mulroney files that aren't...

DPM/SSEA: Well, I don't keep the files but we had a big debate yesterday about what was called by the press a covert intelligence-gathering operation. And we said, well let's take a look at it all and it was made available.

Q.: Should Mr. Mulroney release his file?


DPM/SSEA: Well, I think that's up to him. I think that's entirely up to him.

Q.: I'm still lost as to where the distinction occurs. Where does the political service become apolitical? How far down do you go?

DPM/SSEA: I think the Prime Minister went to some pains to explain the difference between the political staffs and the Public Service. There is an exempt staff in my office who do support me in my political work and that's been here since I've come to Ottawa 30 years ago. Every Prime Minister has had that, including Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Clark and probably Mr. King. I don't know if it went back that far.

Q.: Mr. MacEachen, what's the next stage in the peace initiative? Will you be having a meeting with the Prime Minister about that?

DPM/SSEA: As soon as we can get an opportunity, as soon as we can get off this wicket we're on, we'll have a chance to talk about the peace initiative. The Prime Minister just got back this morning. He's been in Cabinet all morning and he's been in the House. So we haven't had a moment. When we get a moment, we'll have a chat.


John J. Noble,
Official Spokesman
and Director,
Press Office

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO The Under-Secretary of State
À for External Affairs, Ottawa IDDZ

FROM Canadian Consulate General
De San Francisco

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT MORALITY AND THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE
Sujet

SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED
Sécurité

DATE Feb. 16/84

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Numéro

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ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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
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The attached interview which appeared this week in the San Francisco Chronicle may be of interest in light of the Prime Minister's peace initiative. It is an interview with two scientists at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in which they outline their view of their careers in the light of an address by Pope John Paul II to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences on November 12/83.


General

SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE - FEB. 15/84

MORALITY AND THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

BY GARY E. SWAN

Last November 12, Pope John Paul II addressed some of the most prominent scientists in the world on a subject that has become a focal point of modern Catholic morality — the nuclear arms race.

In unusually pointed language for a pope, John Paul called upon scientists to abandon their "laboratories and factories of death" and replace them with "laboratories of life."

The pope seemed to go a step further than the American Catholic bishops, who in a controversial pastoral letter last May had declared that the gospel of nuclear deterrence — by which a nation stockpiles weapons as a professed means to deter enemies from starting war — is no longer acceptable as a long-range national strategy in the absence of serious talks on arms reduction.

With its language and tone, the pope's address was carried by the 71 members of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences to nuclear research centers in this country. At Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, it has ignited discussion among the men whose job it is to design and build nuclear weapons.

The Chronicle recently had a two-hour discussion with two scientists at the laboratory who were educated in Catholic schools and are active in their local parishes.

Jim Hannon and Bill Zagotta, scientists and close friends, have questioned each other about the morality of their career work for more than 15 years.

Although they disagree, in part, on what conclusions to draw from the pope's statement, their thinking shows that they've made some of the choices John Paul says must be part of the scientist's search for truth.

Willard "Jim" Hannon, 45, has a doctorate in geophysics from St. Louis University, where he taught for four years before coming to Lawrence Livermore Lab in 1969. He currently heads the seismic monitoring research program in nuclear test ban treaty verification.

William "Bill" Zagotta, 47, has a master's degree in physics from DePaul. For 25 years he has worked in nuclear reactor theory and nuclear weapons design. His work at the Livermore lab over the last 15 years has been in nuclear design and predicting performance of nuclear weapons.

Here are excerpts from the discussion.

What do you think the pope was saying to you as nuclear scientists?

HANNON: I thought that an important part of what the pope had to say was "when it is all but inevitable that a certain part of scientific research will be used for the purposes of aggression, then a scientist must make a choice." And I think at this laboratory especially you have to make that choice.

And the bottom line is, 'You either work here very hard because you think you are working for peace, or you don't work here.' His statement is consistent with that charge.

Do you really think it is?

HANNON: I think that's exactly what he says, if you don't think you're working for peace, particularly in a situation like this where you could be working for very great destructive potential, then you ought to leave. That's what I use to decide whether I should stay or leave.

By and large I see effort here in the weapons area, a lot of people whom I respect I see doing really significant things in presenting the weapons, presenting the options which give us a long-term breathing spell.

ZAGOTTA: I don't interpret this as the pope saying this particular laboratory (should close). I think if he were saying that it would follow that people working at other weapons installations — tank makers, bullet makers — would be asked to terminate their work. After all, bullets are still being used to kill people these days. Nuclear weapons for almost 40 years haven't.

But the (pope's address) has caused a lot more people to raise questions about the kind of work that we do and whether I should be doing it.

My niece wrote me the other day for the first time in 15 years asking about this



'If we are ever to get to the halycon days where there are no nuclear weapons anymore, we still need to know what's possible, what potential adversaries might be doing.'

—BILL ZAGOTTA

and I wrote her back, pointing out that what I think the pope is trying to do is put himself in the solid tradition of being opposed to war and against arms.

It sounds like you're just saying 'well, sure, he's talking about laboratories as factories of death. But I don't see that as anything we're doing here. He must be talking about the other guy.'

ZAGOTTA: I don't think he's talking to us or the bullet manufacturers, frankly. I think what he's saying is that you should understand that the church comes from a peace tradition, that when we do allow for a theology that includes a just war it is very highly circumscribed. And he's going to make all the statements in the area of keeping that circle as small as he possibly can.

I don't justify my staying here by

saying 'well, the pope would have excluded Lawrence Livermore but would not have excluded the maker of Smith and Wesson.' That's not the distinction I make. I'm confident in my job that the important thing is to get where the pope wants to get, that we maintain stability and that requires an active laboratory, not only to keep the current arsenal in force but to monitor the technology.

If we were ever to get to the halycon days where there are no nuclear weapons anymore, we still need to know what's possible, what potential adversaries might be doing. Other idealists might believe that the world can get to a place where people wouldn't threaten each other on this kind of global scale. Frankly, that time has passed now.

I think the world is now committed to maintaining a laboratory like this. I don't think the world is committed to manufacturing nuclear weapons at anywhere near the rate we do now but I think doing the research, the kind of work we do, is something that we're going to have to do for quite a long time.

I think what the pope was saying was 'here's the fundamental principle. You'd better deal with that.'

Jim and I have been talking about these issues for quite some time. I always justify it on fairly narrow grounds which I was beginning to think were not really appropriate anymore, namely, that if I quit who would take my job and would the nation be any more secure or less secure. Well, it could be less secure in a number of ways. He may not do the job as well as I do.

The bishops' letter and all the flurry on nuclear weapons discussion in the last year have moved me to slightly different turf. I believe now that while I used to be tolerant of the idea that our deterrence was aimed at wiping out Soviet cities, I'm not so tolerant anymore. I'm now coming much closer to the point of view that says 'if the deterrence ever fails, using nuclear weapons is a dubious action, even in retaliation.'

It seems that the pope is saying a lot more than that. He's being as pointed as he can in pointing a finger at particular people in particular projects. And with the work that's done here, this must be one of them.

ZAGOTTA: If the pope were to say that working at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory is inconsistent with the church's view, I would take that under advisement very carefully. But I really don't think that's what he's doing here. He's annunciated a principle and the principle does not have a time scale.

If the United States had no nuclear weapons, the Soviets would be the only ones with a nuclear strike force. Would that be better for humanity than the current situation? I claim it wouldn't.

HANNON: The pope's statement has to be viewed in the context of all the other statements. There are things that make me believe that some things got lost in the translation.

But given those caveats, I think what's said in that letter does apply to us, applies in this sense, we are as close to working in a place that fits his definition as any that you can think of. I think what we, I, am being asked to do is to evaluate whether or not we fit that definition.

You think he's asking you to look at the particular projects in which you become involved?

HANNON: I think that's it. I think he is. Within the work we do, there are people leading projects, there are spokesmen for projects who can influence the way the project is proceeding. And if you find yourself in a project which is not particularly right, then you ought to find yourself another project and if the whole place is like that, then you ought to leave.

Don't you as a scientist know a lot more than you admit as to which uses the weapon can be put. You're sort of saying, 'I'm here as pure scientist and there's another guy who's pure politician, who puts my work to use.'

Don't you think that that's what the pope is saying. That you guys are playing a game here in telling the rest of us that there are political decisions being made with scientific discoveries.



'I'm not so sure you can use the argument to pursue a project, gaining knowledge as you go, which you are almost certain will lead to a weapon that will be used for the destruction of cities.'

—JIM HANNON

And he's calling upon you to tell the politicians to put your knowledge to good work...

ZAGOTTA: No, I don't think he's saying that. Yes, we do know. I think the scientists here, especially the good ones, get ahead of the military on frequent occasions in what the application of this idea is. I think there's plenty of history in which the scientists have developed ideas that the military didn't know how to use until the scientists told them how to use it.

But I would only answer your question with a question back: If you kill this research program you replace knowledge that was taken and put on the shelf for ethical reasons with ignorance. Do you think that's a better situation than the one we have? My answer is I'd rather take the knowledge, put it on the shelf, than re-

place it. Then the scientist has to go and lobby about how his ideas are used. But to reject his ideas before he knows whether they're going to work or not, I don't think is a particular service to anyone.

HANNON: It's a good argument. Where we might differ is the extent to which you have to take into account the probable end. I'm not so sure you can use the argument to pursue a project, gaining knowledge as you go, which you are almost certain will lead to a weapon that will be used for the destruction of cities. The research is justified, it's the context within which you do it...

ZAGOTTA: Well, at that point it becomes an action call. I think at the beginning of the project, even if you knew that it would destroy only pregnant women — just to take a ridiculous example — not knowing whether such a thing is possible or not is a worse situation than at least following the idea up to a certain point.

At another point, you may have to become the opponent of your own idea. And there's precedent for that. Certainly, in the '40s, there's precedent for it and I understand in the past year, this laboratory has lobbied against the deployment of some weapons. Weapons that we designed.

HANNON: That's an important part. Within the laboratory and within the principles that are stated there are really quite a spectrum of positions, some quite hawkish and some very dovish... The thing that one's being asked to do is make the judgment.

But isn't the pope going beyond laying out the tenets for those choices. Isn't he saying, 'I'm on the dovish side and if you're on the other side, you as Catholics have to get out.'"

HANNON: What he said was that we should refuse certain avenues of research, inevitably destined in the concrete of historical circumstances for deadly purposes. And I do not think that our work is inevitably destined in concrete historical circumstances for deadly purposes. On the contrary.

The people who want to do away with all nuclear weapons don't face up to the fact that without some kind of force capability we could repeat such things as what

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Morality and Nuclear Arms

From Page 1

happened to the Jews during World War II. Both sides face a risk, and the choices should be made with a fair amount of anguish.

Has the pope's statement been widely circulated?

HANNON: In the area I work in there is surprisingly not much discussion of nuclear weapons. Discussion doesn't take place as much as it should — although I'm not sure it takes place any more or less than it does in the population as a whole.

ZAGOTTA: No, but it should take place more than it does in the population as a whole.

HANNON: It's very hard. I think some of us here have the possibility of coming up with answers which we don't like and which would cause us to make major changes in lifestyle.

ZAGOTTA: Maybe we want to spend a minute doing this little exercise. What are the conditions under which you would change your job?

HANNON: I've thought about that. If I thought we weren't making any progress toward lessening our reliance on nuclear weapons over a period of a couple of years. And I thought it was our fault, that is, the United States' fault.

If I found myself being compromised, being told to say things I knew were untrue — not that that would happen at the laboratory but we're not entirely removed from political pressure — or if I found that people who I worked for, all the way up to the laboratory director, were saying things that I thought untrue...

There's another (reason for leaving) which is a little more remote and I'm not sure how I would convert this into action. If I see an environment developing in the nation as a whole which shows politicians are willing to use military force in a way that will clearly bring us closer and closer to nuclear war then I would seriously consider backing all the way down the chain. It would be very hard. I enjoy working here. There are good people and I think we have a chance to make a real contribution. But I think I would leave.

ZAGOTTA: Your list is surprisingly similar to mine.

The early days of the Reagan administration started to make me nervous. Since then, they've toned down their rhetoric substantially, but I think if they were continuing this rhetoric of fighting wars and continuing nuclear wars and then they missed an opportunity for an arms control agreement, I think then I would have had a first-class moral crisis.

At the other end of the problem, if I found intellectual dishonesty or a consensus inside the lab that nuclear weapons are usable or that they're being advanced beyond what their capabilities are or being designed specifically for city destruction, those kinds of things would cause me to leave.

You don't hear a lot of discussion but if you scratch a nuclear designer as he goes down the hall and you ask him why he's doing it, he'll probably give you a five-word answer immediately.

What five words?

ZAGOTTA: That we're trying to "make the world safe for democracy." If you probe him, he'll probably become inarticulate and choose not to talk about it for a variety of reasons. But I think people around here are introspective. I'm surprised with the number of people who agree with what the church is saying about deterrence. That it's not a tremendously good idea. Nuclear superiority, for example, I don't find to be a popular idea.

HANNON: Over the last 10 to 15 years, we've had representatives of various (antinuclear) groups, come to the house and we've brought people together from the lab. And almost without exception, people from the lab had thought about issues in more depth, especially the moral aspects and also had put it in historical context better than them (the antinuclear groups).

ZAGOTTA: You find out that they haven't done their homework. The fact is that the environment for arms control right now isn't right. The real major breakthrough of the kinds the popes have called for, I think isn't going to happen until — and in fact Pope John XXIII said this — isn't going to happen until a condition of mutual trust exists. And he's very pessimistic if you take his word literally.

The Pope on World Peace

The following are excerpts from Pope John Paul II's address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences on the role of the scientist in working for world peace:

"All knowledge takes its nobility and dignity from the truth that it expresses. Only in the unbiased pursuit of truth do culture and especially science preserve their freedom and are able to defend it from any attempt at manipulation by ideologies or powers.

"Members of the Academy, men of science, at this very grave moment of history, I ask from you the love of knowledge that builds peace.

"From the depths of centuries past there rises the voice of an unarmed prophet, Isaiah: 'They shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks.'

"Unarmed" prophets have been the object of derision in every age, especially on the part of shrewd politicians, the supports of power. But today must not our civilization recognize that humanity had need of them? Should not they alone be heard by the whole of the world's scientific community, so that the laboratories and factories of death may give place to laboratories of life?

"The scientist can exercise his freedom to choose the field of his own research. When, in a particular historical situation, it is all but inevitable that a certain form of scientific research will be

used for purposes of aggression, he must make a choice that will enable him to work for the good of people, for the building up of peace.

"By refusing certain fields of research, inevitably destined, in the concrete historical circumstance, for deadly purposes, the scientists of the whole world ought to be united in a common readiness to disarm science and to form a providential force for peace.

"Peace has to be ceaselessly built up. Peace is a continuous effort, which in so far as it is up to you, is entrusted to your research, to the technical applications that you must direct, through your authority, to the promotion of justice, with that freedom, that freedom of thought which enables you to make other choices when efforts are made to do you violence, in order to exploit your research and discoveries against justice and peace.

"It is an irreplaceable task of the scientific community to insure... that the discoveries of science are not placed at the service of war, tyranny and terror.

"Truth, freedom, justice and love: such, gentlemen, must be the cornerstones... for the success of the only war that must be fought, the war against hunger, disease and the death of millions of human beings whose quality and dignity of life could be helped and promoted with 7 percent of the amount spent each year for the incessant and threatening rearmament of the richest nations..."



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Rather interesting that this
USA report on Eastern European
attitudes refers to Thatchers
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EASTERN EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES

SOVIET INF POLICY IS HAVING UNEXPECTED REPERCUSSIONS ON SOVIET RELATIONS WITH ITS WARSAW PACT ALLIES. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKS AND EAST GERMANS, EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN

UNEXPECTEDLY RESTRAINED IN THEIR PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR COUNTERMEASURES, EVIDENTLY SEEKING A CAUTIOUS BALANCE BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR SOVIET SECURITY POSITIONS AND PRESERVATION OF THE BENEFITS OF WESTERN TIES. ON THE PRIVATE SIDE, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT SOME EAST EUROPEAN OFFICIALS ARE DISCONCERTED WITH MOSCOW'S DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH ITS COUNTERDEPLOYMENTS. MOREOVER, SOVIET PROPAGANDA AIMED AT RAISING WESTERN FEARS OF WAR HAS BACKFIRED TO SOME DEGREE BY PROMPTING PUBLIC CONCERNS IN EASTERN EUROPE ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERDEPLOYMENTS AND A PERCEIVED DRIFT TOWARD MILITARY CONFRONTATION. IN CONTRAST TO THE USUAL PRACTICE OF RESTRICTING PUBLIC CRITICISM OF OFFICIAL POLICIES, EAST EUROPEAN

SECRET

GOVERNMENTS HAVE ALLOWED SOME INF-RELATED PUBLIC CONCERNS TO BE VENTED, BOTH AS A PUBLIC SAFETY VALVE AND PERHAPS AS A WAY OF INFLUENCING MOSCOW TO PAY ATTENTION TO A POTENTIAL POLITICAL PROBLEM. INDEED, IT SEEMS THAT SOME EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY CONTAINING OPPOSITION TO COUNTERMEASURES. THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS NO INDICATION OF BACKING AWAY FROM COUNTERMEASURES, AND WE CANNOT EXPECT EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO RESIST SOVIET PRESSURE TO SUPPORT COUNTERMEASURES; NEVERTHELESS, THESE NEW DEVELOPMENTS COMPLICATE THE EASTERN RESPONSE TO NATO DEPLOYMENTS.

SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE

STEPS TOWARD COUNTERDEPLOYMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE HAVE BEEN INITIATED, WITH SOVIET MEDIA CLAIMING THAT "ENHANCED-RANGE OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL" MISSILES HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (GDR). SOME REPORTS, SUCH AS THE JANUARY 19 RED STAR ARTICLE ANNOUNCING THAT AN "OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL" MISSILE UNIT HAD BEEN DEPLOYED FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED. EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE SS-12/22 MISSILE HAS APPEARED IN EAST GERMANY, HOWEVER. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME SUCH EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN SPOTTED OUTSIDE THE USSR AND SIGNALS THE FIRST CONCRETE SOVIET STEP TOWARD IMPLEMENTING COUNTERMEASURES IN EASTERN EUROPE. PREPARATIONS FOR NEW DEPLOYMENTS ARE GOING FORWARD OUTSIDE OF EASTERN EUROPE AS WELL. IN LINE WITH SOVIET THREATS TO PLACE THE U.S. IN AN "ANALOGOUS POSITION," THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE DEPLOYING DELTA SUBMARINES OUTFITTED WITH SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBMS) SOMEWHAT CLOSER THAN USUAL TO THE U.S. EAST

COAST, AND GENERAL SUBMARINE ACTIVITY OFF U.S. TERRITORY IS AT ITS HIGHEST LEVEL IN SEVERAL YEARS. AS DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY, THESE DEPLOYMENTS APPEAR DESIGNED TO HAVE POLITICAL IMPACT AS THEY DO NOT SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE MILITARY THREAT TO THE WEST.

IN ADDITION TO THESE "COUNTERMEASURES", SS-20 BASE CONSTRUCTION IN THE ASIAN USSR IS CONTINUING. THE SOVIETS HAVE BROKEN GROUND FOR WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN ADDITIONAL SS-20 BASE IN THE EASTERN USSR (BARNAUL 4). WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS A COUNTERMEASURE PER SE, HOWEVER, NOR DOES IT FALL WITHIN ANY CATEGORY OF SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES AS DEFINED IN ANDROPOV'S NOVEMBER 24

STATEMENT.

CONFLICTING EASTERN EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICIES

THE LACK OF ENTHUSIASM IN EASTERN EUROPE FOR SOVIET-DECREED COUNTERMEASURES HAS BEEN UNDERSCORED IN MANY WAYS. ALTHOUGH THE DECEMBER 5-7 WARSAW PACT MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS IN SOFIA COULD HAVE BEEN USED AS A PLATFORM TO ENDORSE NEW SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS, THE OFFICIAL PRESS STATEMENT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE MADE NO REFERENCE TO COUNTERMEASURES. POLISH PARTICIPATION IN COUNTERMEASURES IS CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT. THE ROMANIANS HAVE BEEN UNUSUALLY ACTIVE ON THE INF QUESTION AND -- ALONE AMONG WARSAW PACT MEMBERS -- HAVE STATED PUBLICLY THAT BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE TO BLAME FOR THE HEIGHTENED TENSIONS THIS ISSUE HAS CAUSED IN EUROPE. CEAUDESCU HAS RAISED HIS CONCERNS OVER INF WITH HIGH-RANKING SOVIET OFFICIALS AT LEAST TWICE (IN MOSCOW LAST NOVEMBER, FOLLOWED BY EARLY FEBRUARY MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO IN BUCHAREST). HUNGARIAN PARTY LEADER KADAR HAS ALSO REPEATEDLY MADE HIS CONCERNS KNOWN TO THE SOVIETS. GDR FOREIGN MINISTER FISCHER CONCLUDED A LOW-KEYED JANUARY VISIT TO MOSCOW WITH A JOINT STATEMENT CAREFULLY REITERATING EAST GERMAN SUPPORT FOR SOVIET INF POLICY. WHILE SUPPORTIVE OF SOVIET POLICY, HOWEVER, HE EMPHASIZED THAT BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE WEST SHOULD BE RETAINED. OTHER NUANCES, SUCH AS BULGARIAN LEADER ZHIVKOV'S JANUARY 2 REMARKS TO THE SOFIA DIPLOMATIC CORPS THAT TENSIONS COULD BE REDUCED ONLY "THROUGH DIALOGUE" AND "AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE," SUGGEST EASTERN EUROPEAN CONCERNS THAT RELATIONS WITH THE WEST NOT BE SET BACK BY INF.

ZHIVKOV'S COMMENTS REFLECT THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES POSE FOR MANY EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. INDEED, BULGARIA IS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF HOW SOVIET POLICY ON INF CONFLICTS WITH OTHER FOREIGN POLICY GOALS -- BOTH OF THE SOVIETS AND OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. BULGARIA HAS BEEN MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE THIRD BASING COUNTRY FOR SOVIET MISSILES, BUT THAT ROLE WOULD APPEAR INCOMPATIBLE WITH LONG-HELD BULGARIAN INTEREST IN ESTABLISHING A BALKAN NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE (BNWFZ). IN ADDITION, SOFIA IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN EXPANDING ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE WEST AND WANTS TO AVOID ANY ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT UNDERCUT SUCH A STEP. THE SOVIETS HAVE APPARENTLY AGREED NOT TO PLACE THE BULGARIANS IN THE FOREFRONT OF INF COUNTERMEASURES, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF BASING MISSILES THERE EVENTUALLY.

WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ALL EAST EUROPEAN STATES ARE ANXIOUS TO AVOID A DOWNTURN IN BROADER EAST-WEST RELATIONS OVER INF. THIS IS EVIDENT EVEN IN THE GDR. FISCHER'S COMMENTS ON THE BENEFITS OF WESTERN TIES ARE INDICATIVE OF GDR ATTEMPTS TO INSULATE

INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS FROM INF DEVELOPMENTS. GDR COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER HONECKER HAS BEEN EQUALLY CAREFUL NOT TO CLOSE OFF DIALOGUE, STATING IN HIS NEW YEAR MESSAGE, FOR INSTANCE, THE NEED TO "LIMIT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE" ANY DAMAGE CAUSED BY INF DEVELOPMENTS TO RELATIONS WITH THE FRG. HONECKER HAS ALSO INDICATED A READINESS TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY ANY PROPOSAL DESIGNED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE FRG. EAST GERMAN REACTION TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CONCILIATORY JANUARY 16 SPEECH WAS LOW-KEYED, AND A NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS AFFECTING TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS AND CUSTOMS REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED WITH THE FRG AND WEST BERLIN. THUS, WHILE THE NATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS REQUIRES THE EAST GERMANS TO SUPPORT SOVIET INF POLICY PUBLICLY, GDR LEADERS HAVE TAKEN CARE TO SEE THAT PROFITABLE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST -- BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC -- NOT BE UNDERCUT.

HUNGARY IS FOLLOWING A SIMILAR POLICY. WHILE THE GDR HAS BEEN TAPPED TO DEPLOY SOVIET SRINF MISSILES, HUNGARY HAS BEEN QUICK TO DOWNPLAY ANY LIKELIHOOD OF A BASING COMMITMENT, NOTING THAT ITS GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION MAKES DEPLOYMENTS UNNECESSARY. HUNGARIAN LEADERS ARE OPEN ABOUT THEIR DESIRE FOR CONTINUED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS CHIEF GYULA HORN NOTED IN A DECEMBER 11 LA

STAMPA INTERVIEW THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DESIRED TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE WEST, A POINT UNDERSCORED BOTH BY FOREIGN MINISTER VARKONYI'S DECEMBER 20-21

-VISIT TO BONN AND BY BRITISH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S RECENT VISIT TO HUNGARY. IN LATE JANUARY, A U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION WAS RECEIVED WARMLY BY HIGH HUNGARIAN OFFICIALS, WHO STRESSED THEIR INTEREST IN EXPANSION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THEIR DESIRE TO SEE THE INF TALKS RESUMED. IN THOSE MEETINGS, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER NAGY NOTED HIS HOPE THAT U.S.-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS "MAY SET AN EXAMPLE FOR OTHER SOCIALIST STATES."

THE DOMESTIC FACTOR

. LESS THAN WHOLE-HEARTED EASTERN EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR COUNTERMEASURES ALSO MAY REFLECT INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY SOVIET ATTENTION TO WESTERN ANTI-INF GROUPS. ALTHOUGH DIRECTED AT WESTERN PUBLICS, SOVIET PROPAGANDA CHARACTERIZING GLCM AND PERSHING II MISSILES AS INCREASING THE DANGER OF WAR HAS RAISED SOME PUBLIC CONCERNS IN THE EAST THAT THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP HAS DETERIORATED BEYOND REPAIR. A JANUARY 4 LITERARY GAZETTE ARTICLE BY SOVIET POLITICAL SCIENTIST FYODOR BURLATSKIY DISMISSED FEARS OF WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. SIMILARLY, IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO BLUNT BURGEONING INDEPENDENT PEACE GROUPS WITHIN EASTERN EUROPE, A DECEMBER 13 ARTICLE IN THE SOVIET MILITARY NEWSPAPER KRASNAYA ZVEZDA COMMENTED THAT WESTERN ATTACKS ON COUNTERMEASURES WERE MERELY ATTEMPTS TO AROUSE NEGATIVE REACTIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE YOUNG. THESE COMMENTS POINT TO POSSIBLE SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT PUBLIC DISCONTENT OVER MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS.

. PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO DEPLOYMENTS HAS BEEN MOST VISIBLE AND INTENSE IN THE COUNTRIES SLATED TO RECEIVE SOVIET COUNTERDEPLOYMENTS. THE NOVEMBER 5 EDITION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY DAILY RUDE PRAVO NOTED RECEIVING LETTERS FROM READERS OPPOSED TO BASING MISSILES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. ALTHOUGH THOSE LETTERS -- SOME OF WHICH POINTED OUT THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COUNTERDEPLOYMENTS -- WERE NOT PUBLISHED, THE ARTICLE ITSELF WAS A TACIT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PUBLIC DISSENT TO THE CZECH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO BASE SOVIET MISSILES. PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION IS FURTHER CONFIRMED

BY NUMEROUS ACCOUNTS OF ANTI-COUNTERMEASURE PETITIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE BRNO REGION. MOREOVER, WHILE SOME COMPLIANT CZECH RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS HAVE ISSUED PUBLIC STATEMENTS OPPOSING NATO DEPLOYMENTS AND SUPPORTING COUNTERMEASURES, THE SYNOD OF THE EVANGELICAL CHURCH OF CZECH BRETHREN REFUSED TO SUPPORT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES. INSTEAD, IT PASSED A RESOLUTION IN EARLY DECEMBER CALLING FOR THE CESSATION OF BOTH NATO AND SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS. SUCH PUBLIC DISQUIET HAS MADE THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN GOVERNMENT INCREASINGLY SENSITIVE OVER INF, AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN RETICENT IN ACKNOWLEDGING THAT

SOVIET MISSILES ARE BEING BASED ON CZECH SOIL, DESPITE
SOVIET PRESS CLAIMS.

RELIGIOUS GROUP OPPOSITION TO DEPLOYMENTS HAS ALSO
SURFACED IN THE GDR, WHERE THE FEDERATION OF
EVANGELICAL CHURCHES HAS EXPRESSED TO HONECKER ITS
CONCERNS ABOUT PLANNED DEPLOYMENTS ON EAST GERMAN
SOIL. SEVERAL PROTEST MARCHES AGAINST MISSILE
DEPLOYMENTS IN EAST GERMANY HAVE BEEN HELD, AND
SPORADIC GRAFFITI WITH ANTI-COUNTERMEASURE SIGNS HAVE
APPEARED. THE GOVERNMENT'S COMPULSORY SIGNATURE
COLLECTION CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERDEPLOYMENTS
HAS MET WITH RESISTANCE, AND YOUNGER EAST GERMANS ARE
PARTICULARLY OUTSPOKEN AGAINST PLANNED SOVIET ACTIONS.
GDR LEADERS MAY BE ALLOWING A MEASURE OF PUBLIC DISSENT
IN ORDER TO BETTER MANAGE A POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME
SITUATION.

PROTESTS AGAINST INF COUNTERDEPLOYMENTS ARE NOT
LIMITED TO THE EAST EUROPEAN B;SING COUNTRIES. IN
HUNGARY, AS IN THE GDR, OPPOSITION TO A
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SIGNATURE COLLECTION CAMPAIGN IN
FAVOR OF "APPROPRIATE COUNTERSTEPS TO PRESERVE THE
MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER" IS WIDESPREAD, AND HUNGARY'S
PEACE GROUP FOR DIALOGUE MOVEMENT HAS HANDED OUT
LEAFLETS OPPOSING DEPLOYMENTS IN BOTH EAST AND WEST.
AT LEAST FOUR PERSONS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN JAILED FOR
ANTI-SOVIET MISSILE PROTESTS IN ROMANIA, WHILE IN
POLAND, CARDINAL GLEMP'S JANUARY 6 APPEAL AGAINST
MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS HAS BEEN CONSTRUED AS DIRECTED

TOWARD BOTH EAST AND WEST.

WORKING WITH THE EAST EUROPEANS

EASTERN EUROPEAN DISCOMFORT AT SOVIET INF POLICY WILL NOT DEFLECT MOSCOW FROM CARRYING OUT DESIRED MILITARY STEPS, INCLUDING THE OPTION OF NEW DEPLOYMENTS ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE. IT DOES DEMONSTRATE, HOWEVER, THAT COUNTERMEASURES EXACT SOME POLITICAL PRICE, SINCE THE MORE BELLICOSE THE SOVIET RHETORIC DIRECTED AT WESTERN EUROPE, THE GREATER THE CHANCE THAT IT WILL HAVE AN UNWANTED SPILLOVER EFFECT ON EASTERN EUROPE. THE EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, WHICH ARE STILL SADDLED WITH CONTINUING ALTHOUGH DIMINISHED PUBLIC DISQUIET OVER SOVIET POLICY IN POLAND, DO NOT WANT TO FACE A MAJOR NEW SOURCE OF WIDESPREAD PUBLIC CONCERN OVER INF.

THE COOL REACTION IN EASTERN EUROPE TO COUNTERMEASURES MAY INCREASE PRESSURE ON MOSCOW TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS. MOST EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS CLEARLY ARE EMBARRASSED AND DISPLEASED AT THE SOVIET WALKOUT FROM THE INF TALKS AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS RESUME. COMBINED WITH THE EAST EUROPEANS' DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AND EXPAND CONTACTS WITH THE WEST (PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE), THIS PRESENTS US AN OPENING TO USE WESTERN CONTACTS WITH THE EAST TO PRESENT OUR VIEW OF THE SITUATION AND REITERATE THE WEST'S DESIRE FOR AN ACTIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE. WHILE A PUBLIC CAMPAIGN WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, WE BELIEVE NATO MEMBERS SHOULD MAKE THE EFFORT TO PROVIDE EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WITH FACTUAL INFORMATION ON BOTH THE NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR OBJECTIVES; POINT OUT THE DAMAGING EFFECTS IN EAST AND WEST OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO CREATE TENSION; MAKE CLEAR OUR READINESS TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY TIME WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS; AND ENCOURAGE QUIET EFFORTS ON THEIR PART TO GET THE SOVIETS BACK TO THE BARGAINING TABLE.

END TEXT. SHULTZ

BT

#4238

NNNN

4 OF 4

SECRET

STATE 044238/04

DRAFT LETTER

Ref.: PMO No. 4009 033

Feb 12

Dear Mr. Gwyn,

Thank you for your letter of December 15 which I have read with care and for your support for our initiative.

I, too, am convinced of the urgent necessity of finding a way to encourage the superpowers to engage in genuine communication. We must recover the habit of consultation at the highest levels of the East-West system.

Your thoughts are interesting on the proposed five power conference and on how to exert influence on the superpowers to reduce their strategic arsenals. The point that non-nuclear states also have a stake and a right to express their views on nuclear armament is well-taken. But it will be difficult enough to convince the five to come together themselves, let alone to discuss their strategic arsenals with non-nuclear weapon states. I think it best for Canada and other non-nuclear powers to try to exert influence on the nuclear states to face up to the heavy responsibilities they bear to each other and to the world community.

As to how START and INF talks might be resumed, your suggestion of a new forum for these talks is

.../2

- 2 -

intriguing, but I do not think that Canada should try to insert itself at the negotiating table. There are certain matters which are essentially the preserve of the superpowers; our challenge is to try to make them recognize their over-arching political responsibilities.

Thank you for your thoughtful letter and for your support.

Yours sincerely,

P.E. Trudeau

DATE: 9 February, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. R. Francis (TDD)
Director General, International Security
and Arms Control Bureau

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

NICHOLAS GUYAN

PMO Ref. No: 4009-033


We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could prepare a draft reply to the attached letter and return it to me directly by February 29 with a copy to CMR/Johnston. It should be prepared as if for the Prime Minister's signature, although I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

Maurice D. Archdeacon
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)
PCO/Judy Cameron
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston



PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

TO/A: Mr. Fowler

CC: Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:
Nicholas Gwyn

DATE:
December 15, 1983

SUBJECT/SUJET:

PM's Peace Initiatives

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:
4009 033

Judy Cameron

DATE: January 10, 1984

☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.

☐ REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.
RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

☐ NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.
AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

4009 033

OTTAWA
December 15, 1983

Dear Prime Minister,

Madeleine and I have on several occasions talked about your peace initiative, which we both strongly support - as do so many other people. She suggested, and I agreed, that she give you this letter, of which she has a copy. It contains a few ideas that you may wish to consider along with other suggestions you have in mind.

The principal point I would make is to underline the importance of moving away from the present one on one super-power equation to something less sterile and more likely to produce agreement. Whatever Mr. Schultz may say to the contrary, the USA and the USSR do not communicate very much. It matters little that they have hot-lines, meetings, some trade, and the like. What counts is that when they are together, they seem to say little to one another that is of any value even to themselves. More significantly, they do virtually nothing that is beneficial to the rest of the world. They are our trustees - whether we like it or not - and they have taken rather poor care of their charge.

You refer, rightly, to the need for a 3rd rail of political energy. Once that third rail is in being, however, ways will have to be found to make its influence felt when the super-powers meet. But this third rail must not be outside the conference room. It must be inside. This essential factor is recognized in your proposal for a 5-power meeting. If there are others in the room with the USSR and the USA, the dynamic will inevitably change. (Indeed, studies show that even the silent presence of a third party can have mediative effects on parties in dispute.)

Some objections have apparently already been raised to the proposed conference and I do not want to add to them, especially as this idea is right in principle and it will

... 2

The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada

ORIGINAL TO

ORIGINAL ENVELOPE A

C.C. P.M.O. FILE

C.C. DOSSIERS C.P.M.

R. Fowler
** please see PM's not on envelope*

000460

- 2 -

be a major step towards understanding if the conference takes place. Apart, however, from the possibility that some of the 5 may not yet be willing to agree to attend, the proposal has, as I am sure you are aware, two inherent difficulties:

- a) Four of the powers are potential enemies of the Soviet Union. Thus, from the Soviet perspective, it may seem an intrinsically unbalanced grouping.
- b) More important, only states with nuclear weapons will participate. Though the 5 represent - in a manner of speaking - about 1.6 billion people, even that is a minority in the world. There is much to be said - more than has already been said - for ensuring that the interests of the rest of the world are adequately represented at the table. The presence of a state (or states) without nuclear weapons may well help to break the deadlock among the nuclear powers over which of them is to move first to reduce sharply its stockpile. The influence of non-nuclear participants is likely to be stronger if they already have the technical and resource capacity to arm themselves with such weapons. The 5 presumably do not want their "club" to grow.

Such participants might be selected from the allies of super-powers and/or the Third World - India being the most obvious candidate among the latter.

The vital thing is to prevent the 2 super-powers from excluding the rest of the world from the deliberations on these crucial issues, for when they are alone they achieve so little.

The second point concerns bringing about a resumption in the strategic arms and INF talks which have broken off in Geneva. It is a safe bet that public U.S. requests to the Soviet Union to return to the "bargaining" table will not cause the talks to resume; that may even delay resumption. A new factor will be required. Perhaps

... 3

- 3 -

a new format and new auspices will be effective. It has probably already occurred to you that in the present circumstances Canada has an unusual opportunity to assist, not only in reviving the talks but in setting them on a path that is likely to be more productive. Is it not in the logic of your initiative that Canada could invite the 2 parties to meet? I suspect that the Soviet Union would accept an invitation and that the United States could not refuse it. As the presidential election draws nearer, the pressure on Mr. Reagan to appear truly interested in peace will probably increase.

The invitation could be to meet in Canada during the Winter, (after the Stockholm Conference), under the auspices and with the participation of the Canadian government. Two other states which already accommodate much of the armed might of the 2 super-powers (the FRG and the GDR) might also be invited to participate. The level could be that of Foreign Ministers and the purpose would be to prepare a new (and more significant) round of talks. The new "Canada" round should include arrangements for the participation of other affected states, it being noted that every state is in some degree affected directly by both strategic and intermediate nuclear forces.

In reading about these matters over the past years, I have been struck, as you may have been, by the complexity and elaborateness of the technology of weaponry - by the vocabulary of war, as it were. On the other hand, there is a technology of peace; its vocabulary tends to be more familiar, though the concepts are relatively little understood or used. It is worth recalling Article 33 of the U.N. Charter which details some of the vocabulary of peace:

"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."


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- 4 -

Whatever the word for it, and I respect your aversion to having labels assigned to your initiative, the effort that you are engaged in is more than worthy of inclusion in this spectrum.

With every good wish for the success of your endeavour, for a Happy Christmas and a peaceful 1984!

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Nicholas Gwyn".

Nicholas Gwyn

cc. CMR/Johnston

IDDZ/J. McNee/5-5912/cf Feb. 16

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

Mon cher Emile,

Je te remercie infiniment de ta lettre du
19 janvier et de ton offre d'appui pour mon initiative
de paix.

L'appui de nombreux canadiens m'encourage
dans mes efforts et j'apprécie énormément ce que tu
as fait pour sensibiliser les membres de l'Association
de Droit International aux questions urgentes de
désarmement et de relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Je garderai à l'esprit la généreuse offre
d'aide de ton Association.

Monsieur Emile Colas, président
Branche canadienne
Association de Droit international
511 Place d'Armes
Bureau 100
Montréal (Québec)
H2Y 2Y7



Government of Canada
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0A3

Date: 3 February 1984

Ma (Mr) McNeil

MEMORANDUM TO: *Mr. R. Francis (I.D.D.)*
Director General, International
Security and Arms Control Bureau

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

EMILE COCAS

PMO Ref. No: 4031052

We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.


I would be grateful if you could prepare a draft reply to the attached letter and return it to me directly by 18 February 1984 with a copy to CMR/Johnston. It should be prepared as if for the Prime Minister's signature, although I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

Maurice D. Archdeacon

Maurice D. Archdeacon
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)
PCO/Judy Cameron
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston



Canada

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

TO/A:

Mr. Fowler

CC:

Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:

Emile Colas

DATE:

January 19, 1984

SUBJECT/SUJET:

Peace Initiatives

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:

4031 052

Judy Cameron

DATE: February 2, 1984

☐ **REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.**
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

☐ **REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.**
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.

☐ **REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.**
RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

☐ **NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.**
AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:



Association de Droit International

Branché Canadienne

(La Société Canadienne de Droit International)



Le 19 janvier 1984

Le Très Honorable
Pierre E. Trudeau
Premier Ministre
Hôtel du Parlement
Ottawa, Ontario

REC'D. / REÇU

FEB 2 1984

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**Rédacteur-en-chef de l'Annuaire canadien
de droit international**

M. le Prof. Charles BOURNE

Adresse:

3690 Peel
Montréal, Québec, H3A 1W9
Tél.: (514) 932-6721
932-6781

Mon cher Pierre,

Je suis avec beaucoup d'intérêt
les efforts que tu déploies en vue de trou-
ver une solution pacifique au conflit qui
oppose les deux Grands.

La course aux armements nucléaires
est démentielle et met en danger l'avenir
même de l'humanité. A une époque aussi
troublée que celle que nous connaissons,
il est urgent de faire appel à tous les
hommes de bonne volonté pour qu'ils se
manifestent et qu'ensemble ils imposent
aux dirigeants l'obligation de retrouver
une certaine santé afin d'éviter un
holocauste universel.

A titre de Président de la Branche
canadienne de l'Association de Droit Inter-
national (ILA), j'ai décidé de saisir les
membres de cette question afin que l'on
étudie les solutions que l'on peut proposer
dans le cadre du droit international et
des efforts d'information que l'on doit
utiliser afin de renseigner adéquatement
l'opinion publique du danger que l'on
court à très brève échéance.

Tu peux compter sur mon appui et
si tu crois que notre association en colla-
boration avec d'autres organismes voués
aux mêmes objectifs, tels le Conseil
canadien de Droit international et la
Commission internationale des Juristes,

- 2 -

peuvent être informés pour te permettre
de diffuser tes vues sur ces questions,
n'hésite pas de m'en faire part.

Dans l'attente de tes nouvelles,
je te prie de me croire,

Emile Colas
Ton tout dévoué,

Emile
Emile Colas, c.r., LL.D.
Président
Branche canadienne

/11

4031 052

le 1^{er} février 1984

Monsieur Emile Colas, président
Branche canadienne
Association de Droit international
511 Place D'Armes
Bureau 100
Montréal (Québec)
H2Y 2Y7

Monsieur,

Au nom du Premier ministre et en son absence,
je vous remercie de votre lettre du 19 janvier.

Soyez assuré que nous la porterons à son
attention dès son retour.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, l'expression de mes
meilleurs sentiments.

Directeur, correspondance,

Original Signed by
Original signé par

Marie-Andrée Bastien

L'original à R. Fowler
c.c. C. Viau
MAB/lc



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ C O N F I D E N T I A L 16 FEB 84 23 44Z 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0171 16FEB84
TO/À TO WSHDC DELIVER BY 170900
INFO
DISTR INFO MOSCO/PMDEL BNATO BRU BONN LDN PARIS GENEV STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/
REF FOWLER NDHQOTT/CPP/ADMPOL/CPP/CNADPOL/DSTRATA
SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RBR RBD IDR IDA ZSI ZSP RCR URR UGB CPD

REF OURTEL IDDZ0148 13FEB SMITH/LYSYSHYN TELECON 16FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS IN WSHDC

FURTHER TO REFTEL CON THIS IS TO CONFIRM SMITH/DR CALDER WILL BE
AVAILABLE IN WSHDC WED FEB 22 FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THREE SUFFOCA-
TION PROPOSALS (ON SUBSTANCE AS WELL AS FORUM)AS REQUESTED IN
REFTEL BY ROUSE.WE LEAVE IT TO STATE AND ^{ACDA}~~ASCD~~ TO DETERMINE LEVEL
AT ^{WHICH}~~WHICH~~ THEY WISH TO RECEIVE CDN TEAM.

2.IN ADDITION TO SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS,YOU SHD INFORM YOUR CON-
TACTS THAT WE ARE ALSO PREPARED:

A)TO TALK IN EXPLORATORY TERMS ABOUT MULTI-TIER^ED APPROACH TO 5
POWER CONFERENCE AND

B)TO DISCUSS ANY GENERAL ASPECT OF PM S INITIATIVE THAT THEY
MIGHT WISH TO RAISE.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G.J. SMITH

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

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MGTO/Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

MESSAGE

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Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L / C D N EYES ONLY

12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0170 16FEB84

TO/À

TO LDN DELIVER BY 170900

INFO

DISTR

INFO PARIS BONN WSHDC GENEV VMBFR BNATO STKHM/SC DEL

REF

NDHQOTT/CPP/DNACPOL

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RCD RCR RBD RBR IFB IDR IDA IDD

REF YOURTEL XNGRO343 14FEB, OURTEL IDDZ 0168 16FEB

---PM INITIATIVE: DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH

WE TAKE YOUR POINT ABOUT DESIRABILITY OF BROADLY BASED POLITICO-
MILITARY DISCUSSIONS WITH UK AS HAVE OCCURED IN ^APOST. UNFORTUNATELY
DELVOIE'S TIMETABLE WILL NOT/NOT PERMIT SUCH A VISIT ^NIS FORESEABLE
FUTURE. THEREFORE AS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN SMITH/SCHRAM TELECON AND
AS MENTIONED OUR REFTEL IT IS OUR INTENTION TO HAVE SMITH AND
DR CALDER VISIT LDN FOR CONSULTATIONS DURING WEEK OF 27 FEB - 2MAR.
THESE DISCUSSIONS WILL FOCUS ON THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS BUT
TEAM IS READY AND WILLING TO DISCUSS ANY OTHER ASPECT OF PM INITIA-
TIVE THAT UK OFFICIALS ^{IDENTIFY}MGHT ~~SO DESIRE~~, EITHER ON POLICY ^{OR} TECHNICAL
SIDE. WILL ADVISE YOU OF PROPOSED DATE ONCE WE HEAR FROM BNATO.

2. RE WESTON S COMMENTS YOU SHD BE AWARE THAT SMITH STOPOVERS IN

BONN AND PARIS AFTER PM'S EAST EUROPEAN VISITS WERE RELATED TO

A) FRG KEEP ^NINTEREST IN VISIT TO G^R PLUS ^{FACT} THAT THEY HAD ASKED

US TO PASS ON CERTAIN^N OF THEIR OWN VIEWS TO EAST~~ERN~~ EUROPEANS AND

B) ^{FACT} THAT FRANCE IS CURRENTLY PRESIDENT OF EC 10 AND RESPONSIBLE

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG G.J. SMITH

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG L.A. DELVOIE

000471



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0170 CONF/CEO

12

10

FOR PASSING INFO ON TO OTHERS VIA POLITICAL COOPERATION NETWORK.

3. ADDITION POINT ^{WORTH}~~WORTH~~ BEARING ^N~~IN~~ MIND IS THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE UK
SHD FEEL IT HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY CONSULTED. IN ADDITION TO YOUR
EXTENSIVE EFFORTS WE ^{WLD}~~WLD~~ NOTE FOLLOWING:

A) HANCOCK ^T~~AND~~ DITCHLY PARK IN MID-OCTOBER INFORMED SEVERAL UK
OFFICIALS OF GENERAL NATURE ^{OF} GUELPH SPEECH AND INITIATIVE;

B) PM WROTE TO MRS THATCHER ON OCT 25, PRIOR TO GUELPH SPEECH;

C) DMF HAD CONSULTATIONS IN LDN SHORTLY THEREAFTER;

D) PM MET IN LDN WITH MRS THATCHER ON 11 NOV;

E) PM WROTE AGAIN TO MRS THATCHER IN MID-NOV;

F) PM ^{SAW}~~WLD~~ MRS THATCHER EXTENSIVELY IN NEW DELHI AND HELD BILATERAL
CONVERSATION WITH HER;

G) WE BRIEFED UK HIGH COMMISSIONER ON INITIATIVE IN CONTEXT OF DPM/
SSEA VISIT TO LDN AND OFFERED TO SEND BRIEFING ^{TEAM}~~TEAM~~ TO UK; OFFER
INCIDENTAL ^y~~WAS~~ WAS NEVER TAKEN UP.

H) DPM/SSEA PAID OFFICIAL VISIT TO LDN IMMEDIATELY AFTER NATO NAC MTG
IN BRU ^{FOR mtg} WITH HOWE,

I) WE CALLED IN UK DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER JAN 19 TO INFORM HIM OF
EAST EUROPEAN TRIP ^{AND} ANDROPOV LETTER AND TO ANSWER ANY RELATED QUESTIONS

J) AMB McLAIN ^{WENT}~~WENT~~ TO CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO BRIEF UK AMB IN EAST
BERLIN OF PM VISITS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND GDR SO THAT FCO ^{WLD}~~WLD~~ HAVE
THIS INFO PRIOR TO MRS THATCHER'S VISIT TO HUNGARY.

...3

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PAGE THREE IDDZ 0170 CONF/CEO

4. WE SHD ADD THAT UNLIKE ALMOST EVERY OTHER NATO EMBASSY IN OTT,
UK HIGH COMMISSION ~~XXXX~~ HAS NOT/NOT ONCE SOUGHT BRIEFING ON I PM INITIA-
TIVE.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flècheSECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** NO/NO OTHER DISTR 17 FEB 84 00 06Z 12 10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0169 16FEB84

TO/À

TO GENEV/AMB BEESLEY

INFO

DISTR

From
DE SMITH

REF

DISTR IDD

SUBJ/SUJ

REF OURTEL 0168 16FEB, YOURTEL YTGR1001 14FEB

---PM INITIATIVE

THANK YOU FOR SUGGESTION OF VISITING GENEV TO OBSERVE CD. WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO DO THIS AND INDEED IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT I SEE CD IN OPERATION AT EARLY STAGE, BUT UNFORTUNATELY TIME CONSTRAINTS PRECLUDE ON THIS OCCASION.

2. GRATEFUL YOUR OFFER TO TRAVEL TO BRU BUT BELIEVE BRIEFING TEAM OF TWO MIGHT SUFFICE. WE WILL INFORM YOU ASAP OF DISCUSSIONS AND ANY FURTHER REACTION WE RECEIVE.

3. WOULD WELCOME HOWEVER ANY FURTHER COMMENT YOU OR SKINNER MIGHT WISH TO MAKE ON EITHER SUBSTANCE OF THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS OR USE OF CD AS FORUM, BEARING IN MIND REACTIONS TO DATE. YOU SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND IN THIS REGARD THAT WE WILL BE LEAVING OTT AFTERNOON OF TUES 21FEB FOR ^{CONSULTATIONS} ~~BRIEFING~~ IN WSHDC.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

Gary J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. Delvoie



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

16 FEB 84 23 43Z

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0168 16FEB84		
TO/À	TO BNATO DELIVER BY 170900		
INFO			
DISTR	INFO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS HAGUE		
REF	OSLO COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/		
SUBJ/SUJ	DNACPOL/DIPOL/PPP/DSTRATA/CIS PRMNY		
	DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDAO IDAN IDR SCS		
	REF OURTEL IDDZ0150 13FEB YOURTEL YBGR8541 14FEB		
	---PM INITIATIVE:THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS		
	BRIEFING TEAM WILL CONSIST OF TWO MEMBERS OF PM TASK FORCE (GARY J SMITH, DIRECTOR OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION, AND DR KENNETH J CALDER, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AT DND).		
	2. GRATEFUL YOU ADVISE ASAP WHICH DATE WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR CONSULTATIONS DURING WEEK OF MON 27FEB TO FRI 02MAR. ONCE YOU HAVE ADVISED DATE AT BNATO IT IS OUR INTENTION TO FIT IN BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN LDN, BONN AND HAGUE DURING SAME WEEK. FYI: WE INTEND TO HAVE BILATERAL IN WSHDC ON 22FEB.		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

Gary J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. Delvoie

TO/À PCO/Archdeacon

FROM/DE • IDDZ/McNee

REFERENCE • Your memorandum, Feb 1, 1984,
RÉFÉRENCE PMO Ref. No: 4017 003

SUBJECT • Letter to the Prime Minister from
SUJET George Haythorne.

Security/Sécurité	RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	February 16, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0165

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES


-1-

DISTRIBUTION

CMR/Johnston

Given Mr. Haythorne's ^aassociation with the Prime Minister as a deputy minister we have prepared the attached draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature.

... 2. Also attached for your information is a copy of the DPM/SSEA's reply to Mr. Haythorne.



John McNee
Task Force Working Group

P.S. Mr Delvoie has approved this text.



c.c. EA/CMR/Johnston

EA/IDDZ/J. McNee/5-5912

DRAFT LETTER

Ref. No: 4017 003

Mr. George V. Haythorne
2190 Alta Vista Drive
Ottawa, Ontario
K1H 7M1

Dear Mr. Haythorne:

Thank you for your letter of January 5 and for giving me your thoughts on an enhanced role for the United Nations in the search for nuclear disarmament before my meeting with the Secretary General last month.

I understand that Allan MacEachen has given you his views on the specific suggestions you have made.

I am persuaded of the importance of multilateral institutions in both the resolution of international conflicts and in disarmament. As earnest of this conviction, I have proposed that preliminary discussions amongst the five nuclear weapon states on a five power conference could begin at the U.N. in New York and our three specific arms control proposals - a ban on high-altitude anti-satellite, restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs, improvements in the verification ^{ability} of future strategic weapons - will be circulated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Thank you very much for your support for our efforts.

Yours sincerely,

P.E. Trudeau

- 2 -

anti-satellite systems, restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs, improvements in the verification of future strategic weapons - will be circulated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Thank you very much for your support for our efforts.

Yours sincerely,

P.E. Trudeau



Government of Canada
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0A3

Date: *February 1, 1984*.....

MEMORANDUM TO: *Mr. P. Francis (I.D.)*.....
Director General International Security
and Arms Control Bureau.....

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

Mr. George V. Hawthorne

PMO Ref. No: *H017 003*.....


We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for a reply (within seven working days) to the attached letter for signature at the appropriate level within the Department of External Affairs and with copies to PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier) and External Affairs/CMR/Johnston. I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

Maurice D. Archdeacon
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)
PCO/Judy Cameron
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston



Canada

000479

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

TO/A:

Mr. Fowler

CC:

Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:

George V. Haythorne

DATE:

January 5, 1984

SUBJECT/SUJET:

Peace Initiatives

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:

4017 003

Judy Cameron

DATE: January 17, 1984

☐

REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

☐

REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.

☐

REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.
RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

☐

NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.
AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

4017 013

2190 Alta Vista Drive 4017003
Ottawa K1M 7M1
January 5, 1984

Ms. Cecilia Viau
Prime Minister's Office
Parliament Buildings
Ottawa

Dear Ms. Viau,

I have written the enclosed letter today to Prime Minister Trudeau. To ensure it reaches him before his departure for New York, King Gordon, a friend over many years, has suggested I send the letter care of you.

My association with the Prime Minister has been mainly as Deputy Minister of Labour until 1969 and as a member of the Prices and Incomes Commission from 1969 until my retirement from the Public Service in 1972.

With many thanks,

Sincerely,


George V. Haythorne

ORIGINAL TO R. Fowler
ORIGINAL ENVOYÉE A
C.C. PARO FILS
C.C. DOSSIERS CCL

2190 Alta Vista Drive
Ottawa K1H 7M1
January 5, 1984

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau
Parliament Buildings
Ottawa

Dear Mr. Trudeau,

I am writing to express strong support of your excellent efforts to bring about a more realistic approach to world peace on the part of the United States and the USSR and a reversal of their present disastrous nuclear arms race.

I am pleased too you will be spending some time next week with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Especially in view of your encouraging responses from NATO and Commonwealth countries, China and Japan, it now appears timely to consider possible initiatives in the UN forum.

Following the Stockholm meeting this month I have wondered if Canada might consider sponsoring a resolution at the next meeting of the General Assembly or other appropriate UN organ designed to secure world wide endorsement of the principal steps you have proposed, including a nuclear weapons freeze.

The resolution might also recommend the creation of a special United Nations Agency, charged with developing and executing measures, in close cooperation with the US, USSR and other nuclear weapons countries, to ensure the freeze and to achieve a steady reduction in existing nuclear weapons leading to their total elimination within a reasonable period.

The Agency would require a policing power. Since sanctions are not, as yet, readily invoked and effective in the international community, provision would probably be needed for a speedy reference to the International Court or other International Judicial body with tough penalties for proven default.

I have wondered too if it might be recommended that this Agency or an existing UN body develop a workable world wide plan designed to balance agreed reductions in nuclear and other arms expenditures against other forms of productive employment aimed at cushioning reduced arms employment and increased contributions to world food, health and other programs urgently needed by seriously disadvantaged people particularly in developing countries.

Besides helping to advance your initiatives, action along these lines would serve to bolster

- 2 -

the current weakened position of the United Nations. I have been saddened to see this weakening occur after all the solid work Canada has done in the ILO and other UN bodies over many years.

Many factors have contributed to the diminished status of the UN. One of these clearly is the tendency often of countries to adopt narrow national or regional positions and of some Agencies to become politicized rather than focussing on the best interests of the whole of humanity. This turn of events calls not for retreat but for more resolute and bolder support of the UN on Canada's part.

My experience over much of the last ten years in Southern Africa, working with the governments of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, strongly suggests that steps to help the UN meet its urgent global challenges would be not only applauded but backed enthusiastically by these and other developing countries.

With kind regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,


George A. Haythorne

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6176 16FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR IMMED

INFO WSHDC MOSCO PARIS LDN BONN ROME PRGUE WSAW PRMNY BUCST
BPEST BGRAD HSNKI STKHM OSLO COPEN HAGUE BRU MDRID ATHNS VIENN
ANKRA PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA WLGTN NDRQOTT/ADMPOL/CIS PCOOTT
DITR DMF IFB RGB RBD ZSP ZSI ZEP RBT IDDZ CPD RBP

---USSR-CHERNENKO SUCCESSION

USA AND FRENCH REPS OFFERED SAME PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS AT POL CTTEE FEB14 ON CHERNENKO ELECTION.
USA REP SUGGESTED THAT APPT REPRESENTED PATH OF LEAST
RESISTANCE FOR CENTRAOL CTTEE AND SHOWED THAT THEY WERE
UNWILLING TO GRAPPLE WITH GENERATIONAL CHANGE IN
LEADERSHIP. POWER BROKERS HAD DECIDED THEY DID NOT/NOT
WANT YOUNGER MAN WHO MIGHT OVER TIME CHALLENGE THEIR
AUTHORITY, SOMETHING WHICH CHERNENKO WILL NOT/NOT DO.
INDEED CURRENT ARRANGEMENT WILL LIKELY REINFORCE PRACTICE
OF COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND WSHDC ANALYSTS WOULD NOT/NOT
BE SURPRISED TO SEE TROIKA ARRANGEMENT EMERGE. AS FOR
CHERNENKO HIMSELF, HE IS UNLIKELY TO EXERCISE MUCH
CLOUT IN FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY ON HOME FRONT HE
WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO PURSUE COURSE MAPPED OUT BY
ANDROPOV ALTHOUGH LESS INSISTENTLY THAN HIS PREDECESSOR.

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PAGE TWO YBGR6176 CONF

2. FRENCH ASSESSMENT FOLLOWED MUCH THE SAME LINES. IT
ALSO CALLED INTO QUESTION CHERNENKOS RELATIONSHIP WITH
ARMED FORCE. CITING TIKHONOV'S LAUDATORY REMARKS RE
CHERENENKOS MILITARY TALENTS - NOT READILY EVIDENT IN
ONE WHO HAD SPENT WW II BEHIND LINES IN PARTY
FUNCTIONARY ROLE--FRENCH REP SUGGESTED THAT ARMY MAY
BE LESS THAN FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF NEW PARTY CHAIRMAN
AND THAT HE IN TURN WILL BE TAKING CARE NOT/NOT TO
ANTAGONIZE ARMED FORCES.

CCC/298 161205Z YBGR6176

S E C R E T

FM WSHDC UNGR2052 16FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO MOSCO LDN PARIS BNATO BUCST BPEST PRGUE WSAW BGRAD PRMNY
GENEV STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADM POL/CPP BONN ROME
DISTR MINA MINE RGB RBRD RCD RSR URR UGB IDD IDA IDDZ ZSI DMF ZSP
---CHERNENKO/BUSH MTG

SUMMARY:USA VIEWS BUSH/CHERNENKO MTG AS HAVING BEEN VERY POSITIVE
IN TONE.USA WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH APPARENT WILLINGNESS OF
CHERNENKO TO LOOK FORWARD AND WORK TOWARDS DEVELOPING THE BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP WITH EXCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TWO SIDES APPEARED TO
HAVE SAME AGENDA.THE LETTER FROM PRES REAGAN THAT BUSH DELIVERED
WAS FORWARD LOOKING AND SAID THAT USA HAD SPECIFIC ITEMS THAT IT
WISHED TO DISCUSS WITH SOV UNION.VICE PRES BUSH AND SEN BAKER
THOUGHT THAT CHERNENKO WAS IN VERY GOOD HEALTH AND THAT HE LOOKED
AS YOUNG AS REAGAN.OTHERS THOUGHT HE LOOKED SOMEWHAT FRAIL.THERE
SEEMED TO BE A UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT THAT CHERNENKO WAS A MAN WHO
CLD GET ALONG WITH REAGAN.

2.REPORT:DEPT ASST SEC OF STATE PALMER TODAY PROVIDED FOLLOWING
BRIEFING ON CHERNENKO/BUSH MTG,IN RETURN FOR BRIEFING WE PROVIDED
ON TRUDEAU-CHERNENKO MTG FOR WHICH PALMER WAS VERY GRATEFUL.

3.LIKE HIS MTG WITH PM TRUDEAU,CHERNENKO BEGAN HIS MTG WITH VP BUSH
BY READING FROM SINGLE PAGE PREPARED FOR HIM.USA WAS UNABLE TO TELL
IF CHERNENKO READ PAGE VERBATIM OR SPOKE FROM TALKING POINTS.

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PAGE TWO UNGR2052 SECRET

CHERNENKO BEGAN BY SAYING HE HAD NOTED THAT THE TONE OF EAST/WEST RELS WAS BECOMING MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND STRESSED SOV DESIRE FOR PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE.SOV UNION WILL SAFEGUARD ITS INTERESTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF ITS ALLIES AND FRIENDS BUT THE SOV UNION HAS NO/NO DESIRE HOWEVER TO STRIVE FOR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.IT IS SOV DESIRE TO SUSTAIN BALANCE BETWEEN USSR AND USA.

4.CHERNENKO SAID THAT STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USA AND USSR WAS A SERIOUS CAUSE FOR CONCERN.USSR WAS WORKING TO DO WHAT IT CLD TO PREVENT ALIENATION.USSR IS IN FAVOUR OF IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP AND BELIEVES THAT THIS IS POSSIBLE.

5.CHERNENKO SAID THAT USA/USSR RELS MUST PROCEED FROM AN UNDERSTANDING OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.COMPETING IDEOLOGIES SHOULD NOT/NOT GET IN WAY OF A GOOD RELATIONSHIP.THE TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE STABILITY.IT IS UP TO THEM TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS TO IMPROVE INNATL TENSIONS.CHERNENKO SUGGESTED THAT IT WLD BE HELPFUL IF THE USA UNDERTOOK A POLICY OF NO/NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

6.CHERNENKO SAID THAT THERE IS A BROAD AGENDA THAT TWO COUNTRIES SHLD BE LOOKING AT INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT,SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER AREAS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES,REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND MORE GENERAL BILATERAL ISSUES.PALMER SAID USA WAS PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED BY CHERNENKOS REFERENCE TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS AS THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT OPEN RECOGNITION OF THE ROLE

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PAGE THREE UNGR2052 SECRET

THE TWO COUNTRIES MUST PLAY. THE BILATERAL AGENDAS OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS NOW HAVE ARE IDENTICAL EXCEPT OF COURSE FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE.

7. CHERNENKO STRESSED THAT THE SOV UNION DOES NOT/NOT BELIEVE IN THE INEVITABILITY OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IT AND USA.

8. VP BUSH REPLIED IN A GENERAL MANNER EXPRESSING USA DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELS. BUSH HANDED OVER A LET FROM PRES REAGAN WHICH PALMER SAID HAD BEEN DRAFTED IN STATE DEPT AND WAS VERY FORWARD LEANING. THE REAGAN LET STRONGLY STRESSED USA DESIRE TO CREATE MOVEMENT IN USA/USSR RELS AND WHILE IT DID NOT/NOT LIST SPECIFIC PROPOSALS SAID THE USA HAD SOME IDEAS IT WISHED TO DISCUSS WITH SOV UNION. PALMER SAYS THAT HE CANNOT/NOT BELIEVE CHERNENKO WLD NOT/NOT BE PLEASED BY THE LET. INCIDENTALLY, ANDROPOV HAD REPLIED IN POSITIVE WAY TO REAGAN PERSONAL LETTER MENTIONED IN DEC16 MTG WITH PM TRUDEAU (AND JUDGED VERY SECRET BY US) WHICH MADE POSITIVE REAGAN LET ON THIS OCCASION EASIER.

9. BUSH TOLD CHERNENKO THAT THE USA AGENDA FOR THEIR RELS ALSO INCLUDED ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AND REGIONAL ISSUES BUT THAT HUMAN RIGHTS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE. IT IS NOT/NOT A QUESTION OF INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOV UNION. THE USA DOES NOT/NOT WANT TO DO THAT. HOWEVER, THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE IS AN IMPORTANT ONE FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. PALMER SAID THAT BUSH MENTIONED SOME SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS CASES AND IMPLIED SHARANSKY AND

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR2052 SECRET

SAKHAROV WERE AMONG THEM. HE SAID THESE WERE RAISED NOT/NOT AS EXAMPLES OF THE PROBLEM BUT AS SPECIFIC CASES WHOSE RESLNS WLD ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF USA/USSR RELS.

10. BUSH SAID THAT THE USA DID NOT/NOT WISH TO POINT A FINGER IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND WERE HOPING FOR A NEW BEGINNING IN RELNS WITH SOV UNION.

11. CHERNENKO RESPONDED TO BUSH'S PRESENTATION WITHOUT NOTES. HE THANKED HIM FOR COMING TO MOSCO AND SAID THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT POSITIVE GESTURE. HE SAID HE AGREED WITH SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED BY BUSH AND REITERATED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONSHIP. HE SAID HE WLD STUDY REAGAN'S LET AND WLD RESPOND TO IT.

12. PALMER SAID THAT THERE WAS NO/NO MENTION AT THE MTG ABOUT A POSSIBLE SUMMIT BETWEEN CHERNENKO AND REAGAN NOR/NOR IN CONTRAST TO CHERNENKO'S COMMENTS TO PM TRUDEAU DID HE HARK BACK TO DETENTE OR TO AN EARLIER ERA OF BETTER RELNS. PALMER SAID THE USA WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE POSITIVE NATURE OF CHERNENKO'S COMMENTS. IT SEEMED TO STRIKE THE AMERICAN SIDE IN THE MTG THAT CHERNENKO DID NOT/NOT HAVE ANY INATE ANGER AT USA IN HIM. ACCORDING TO PALMER THIS ANTI-AMERICAN ANGER HAD BEEN RECOGNIZABLE IN BREZHNEV. IT WAS HARD TO TELL IF IT EXISTED IN ANDROPOV BECAUSE DEALING WITH HIM WAS LIKE DEALING WITH A ROBOT.

13. PALMER SAID THAT THE USA HAD SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT IMPRESSIONS OF ...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR2052 SECRET

CHERNENKOS HEALTH FROM THOSE WE HAD. HE DID HOWEVER NOTE THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE AMERICANS ON THIS SCORE. VP BUSH AND SENATE MAJORITY LEADER BAKER FELT THAT CHERNENKO WAS IN GOOD HEALTH. THEY SAID HE IS ALMOST AS YOUNG LOOKING AS REAGAN. HE IS VIGOUROUS, HAD GOOD COLOUR AND SEEMED TO HAVE A TWINKLE IN HIS EYE. HE WAS EXTREMELY CONFIDENT IN HIS DEPARTMENT AND QUOTE SEEMED TO HAVE NO/NO HANGUPS UNQUOTE. BOTH BUSH AND BAKER SEEMED TO FEEL THAT CHERNENKO WAS A MAN WITH WHOM REAGAN WLD FEEL COMFORTABLE. HIS QUOTE BODY LANGUAGE UNQUOTE WAS SUCH THAT REAGAN CLD RELATE TO. ANDROPOV AS NOTED ABOVE WAS CONSIDERED, COLD AND QUOTE UNRUSSIAN UNQUOTE. CHERNENKO ACCORDING TO BUSH AND BAKER WAS MORE IN THE MODE OF KRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV.

14. BAKER SAID HE HAD THREE MEMBERS IN HIS OWN FAMILY WITH EMPHESEMA AND IN HIS VIEW CHERNENKO DID NOT/NOT SUFFER FROM EMPHESEMA.

15. BUT PALMER CITED THE VIEWS OF AMB HARTMAN, THE DR WHO ACCOMPANIED BUSH TO SOV UNION AND THE PHOTOGRAPHER AT THE PHOTO SESSION WHO ALL FELT THAT CHERNENKO WAS INDEED FRAIL. HE WAS EXTREMELY CAREFUL IN HIS MOVEMENTS. NO/NOBODY ON THE AMERICAN SIDE NOTICED ANY APPARENT BREATHING DIFFICULTIES.

16. PALMER SAID THAT IT APPEARED TO BUSH AND BAKER THAT GROMYKO WAS PAYING MORE DEFERENCE THAN HE HAD TO BREZHNEV AT LEAST IN THE LATER YRS WHEN BREZHNEV WAS FAIRLY CHILDLIKE. AT THOSE TIMES GROMYKO WAS FAIRLY CONDESCENDING TO HIM AND EVEN FINISHED SENTENCES FOR HIM.

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR2052 SECRET

ON THIS OCCASION BREZHNEV DID NOT/NOT SAY ANYTHING EXCEPT AT THE VERY END EVEN THOUGH HE LOOKED A BIT UNCOMFORTABLE WITH SOME OF CHERNENKOS AD LIB COMMENTS.

17. WITH REGARD TO THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT SOV LEADERSHIP PALMER SAID THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN STRUCK AT HOW EXTENSIVELY THE TV HAD FOCUSED ON THE QUOTE OLD-GUARD UNQUOTE OF CHERNENKO, TIKHONOV, GROMYKO AND USTINOV. THE TV PICTURE WAS ALWAYS FRAMING THESE FOUR PEOPLE WHEN IT COULD HAVE CHOSEN ANY VARIATION. THE USA HAD ALSO NOTED THAT THESE FOUR WERE ON THE SAME SIDE WHEN THEY WERE CARRYING THE CASKET. THIS MADE THEM ALL VISIBLE TOGETHER. THE USA HAS HAD NO/NO STRONG INDICATIONS OF WHETHER OR NOT/NOT CHERNENKO WILL ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY AS WELL.

18. OVERALL, FIRST US REACTION IS, VERY POSITIVE, EVEN AFTER DISCOUNTING REQUIRED IN APPRAISING DISCUSSION HELD IN MARGINS OF STATE FUNERAL WHICH INEVITABLY SOFTENS DIFFERENCES. THERE WAS REAL INTEREST IN PM TRUDEAU REPORT AND PARTICULARLY IN WHAT CHERNENKO IMPLIED ABOUT USA. WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR SPEEDY AND SUCCINCT REPORT AND WOULD BE ABLE TO PUT TO GOOD USE HERE ANY FURTHER PASSABLE DETAILS. SPECIFICALLY, DID CHERNENKO USE WORD QUOTE DETENTE UNQUOTE SEVERAL TIMES AS CDN PRESS REPORTS SUGGEST. HE DID NOT/NOT DO SO WITH BUSH.

CCC/241 162351Z UNGR2052

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

1300
Run
Division Phoned

Person

Local Time

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR1047 16FEB84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 161200

INFO PARIS WSEDC GENEV VMBFR BNATO LDN STKHM/SCDEL NDHQOTT/CFP/
DNAPCI

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RCD RCR RBD RBR IFB IDR IDA IDD

REF YCURTEL IDDZ0150 13FEV LDN TEL 0343 14FEB

---PM INITIATIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES

WE THINK SUGGESTION OF SENDING OTT TEAM TO ALLIANCE CAPITALS
TO CONSULT ON PMS ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS IS A GOOD ONE AND
WOULD URGE THT BONN BE INCLUDED IN ANY TOUR. SMITHS BRIEFING
OF FRG GOVT OFFICIALS RELATED TO PMS EASTERN SWING AND CURRENT
STATE OF INITIATIVE, MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION TO GERMANS OF
SPECIFIC SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. FRG
HAS OF COURSE OFFERED IN BRU SOME COMMENTS, IN WRITING, ON THESE
PROPOSALS, THEIR INTEREST IS EXTREMELY HIGH. BROADENING TALKS
INTO MORE COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL/MILITARY FORMAT (LDN REFTTEL)
MIGHT ALSO BE WORTHWHILE. HOWEVER, FIRST PRIORITY HERE WOULD BE
FOR OUR EXPERTS TO PROVIDE GERMANS MORE DETAILED RATIONALE OF
AND INFO ON, SPECIFIC SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS, AND ENGAGE IN
DIALOGUE ON THESE WITH GERMAN EXPERTS.

CCC/005 161532Z ZQGR1047

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0354 16FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 160900

INFO BONN HAGUE BRU OSLO ATHNS MDRID LSBON ANKRA WSHDC BNATO
PARIS ROME PRMNY VMBFR GENEV WSAW PRGUE BPEST BGRAD STKEM/SCDEL
PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/AMDPOL/CFP/CORAE/DNACPOL/
DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR FPR RBR RBD RGB UGB UGR LSR

(IDDZ IFB ZSI CPD IDD RCR

REF OURTELS XNGR2056 21OCT XNGR0185 26JAN XNGR0325 13FEB

---EAST/WEST RELATIONS THATCHER/CHERNENKO TALKS AND LONGER TERM
BRITISH OBJECTIVES

SUMMARY:PM THATCHER CONVERSATION WITH GEN SEC CHERNENKO CAME OFF
ALMOST EXACTLY AS OFFICIALS HERE HAD INTENDED(SEE OURTEL 0325).

WHILE ACTUAL CONTENT OF TALKS WERE PREDICTABLY LIGHT.UK

OBJECTIVES WERE SIMILARLY MODEST.PM WAS ABLE TO CONVEY HER
CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO BROADER EAST/WEST DIALOGUE AND CONFIDENCE.
AND WAS ENCOURAGED BY CHERNENKOS BALANCED RESPONSE AT SAME TIME.
SHE MADE CLEAR TO PRESS FOLLOWING HER MEETING THAT SHE WAS
STILL QUOTE IRON LADY UNQUOTE AND THAT SHE HAD REMAINED FIRM
ON ESSENTIAL WESTERN PRINCIPLES.

2.REPORT:WHILE FCO DO NOT YET HAVE NOTES OF PMS TALKS WITH
CHERNENKO,THEY TELL US HER STATEMENT FOLLOWING HER MEETING

...2

PAGE TWO XNGR0354 CONF

PROVIDES GENERAL REFLECTION OF TENOR OF DISCUSSIONS. WHILE PM TOLD PRESS SHE WAS ANXIOUS TO KEEP CONTENT OF TALKS CONFIDENTIAL, OFFICIALS HERE FRANKLY ADMIT THIS MAY HAVE BEEN MORE BECAUSE NATURE OF OCCASION MADE SUBSTANCE RATHER LIGHT, THAN BECAUSE THERE WAS ANY PARTICULAR ISSUE SHE FELT SHE COULD NOT REVEAL.

3. TEMPERING HER LONGER TERM COMMITMENT TO MORE CONFIDENTIAL. PRAGMATIC EAST/WEST TIES BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT WITH WARNING THAT VISIBLE IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONSHIP WILL BE LONG TERM PROCESS, SHE SAID QUOTE IF THERE IS TO BE PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL WHICH I DEVOUTLY WANT IT WILL COME NOT THROUGH NEGOTIATING SKILL ALONE. BUT BECAUSE A BROADER UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REACHED THE AIM IS THAT BROAD UNDERSTANDING UNQUOTE. THIS COMMITMENT, HOWEVER, WHICH SHE DESCRIBED AS QUOTE GOAL WHICH ALL WESTERN LEADERS ARE READY TO WORK FOR UNQUOTE. MUST BE SEEN IN CONTEXT OF WHAT WILL BE QUOTE AT BEST A LONG SLOW TASK; THERE MAY BE SETBACKS AND INTERRUPTIONS BUT I EARNESTLY HOPE THAT SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY. IT WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE WE KNOW UNQUOTE.

4. AS TO PRIME MINISTERS LONGER TERM EAST/WEST OBJECTIVES AS THEY HAVE EVOLVED SINCE FULL EXAMINATION OF RELATIONSHIP BEGAN IN EARNEST EARLY LAST SEPTEMBER (OURTEL 2056 21 OCT) WE ARE SENDING BY SEPARATE TEL (XNGR 0355 16 FEB) TEXT OF ARTICLE BY RICHARD DAVY IN LONDON TIMES OF 16 FEB WHICH PROVIDES OBVIOUSLY WELL INFORMED SUMMARY.

CCC/170 161125Z XNGR0354

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT RBR0327 16FEB84

TO BUCST/HOP DELIVER BY 170900

INFO PCOOTT/PETTIGREW

DISTR RGB IFB IDDZ RBRD

---PMS INITIATIVE:THANK YOU NOTES TO ROM LEADERS

YOUR DRAFT LET FROM PM TO VICE-PRES RADULESCU CONTAINS FOLLOWING
PASSAGE:

QUOTE JE GARDE UN EXCELLENT SOUVENIR DE NOS CONVERSATIONS,
PARTICULIEREMENT LORS DE NOTRE DINER OFFICIEL.VOUS SEREZ MAINTENANT
ASSOCIE DANS MON SOUVENIR A CELUI DE PANAIT ISTRATI ET A LA
ROUMANIE UNQUOTE.

2.PRESUME SECOND SENTENCE REFERS TO ROM POET BUT REASON FOR REF
NOT/NOT CLEAR(WAS ISTRATI DISCUSSED DURING OFFICIAL DINNER?)
GRATEFUL YOU ELABORATE ON CONTEXT IN WHICH SUBJ MIGHT HAVE ARISEN
AND,IF POSSIBLE,REDRAFT SECOND SENTENCE ABOVE TO BETTER REFLECT
THIS.

3.GRATEFUL REPLY BY 200900 LATEST.

CCC/234 162306Z RBR0327

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT RBR0324 15FEB84

TO LDN BONN PARIS ROME DELIVER BY 170900

INFO MOSCO WSHDC HAGUE OSLO ATHNS MDRID LSBON ANKRA BNATO PRMNY
VMBER GENEV WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/DGIS/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB LIDDZ IDA IDR FPR RBRD RBD RGB UGB UGR RCR
REF MOSCO TEL XYGR0226 15FEB

---MTGS WITH CHERNENKO - EXCHANGE OF INFO

IF YOU HAVE NOT/NOT ALREADY DONE SO, GRATEFUL IF ACTION ADDRESSEES
COULD APPROACH APPROPRIATE HIGH LEVEL MFA OFFICIALS FOR EXCHANGE
OF INFO ON LEADERS PRIVATE MTGS WITH CHERNENKO.

2. FOR YOUR PART, YOU MAY DRAW ON REFTL TO BRIEF INTERLOCUTORS ON
PMS CONVERSATION NOTING PARTICULARLY PMS COMMENTS ON WESTERN
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE AND QUOTE WINDOW OF
OPPORTUNITY UNQUOTE WHICH WE SEE IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

CCC/024 162153Z RBR0324

External Affairs Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

FAX

FILE/DOSSIER

ACTION

MESSAGE

SUITE A DONNER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SECURITE	UNCLASSIFIED	PA-301	16FEB84	12
FM/DE	WSHDC	<i>MF</i> <i>23</i>		
TO/A	EXTOTT/IDDZ/UGP/FPR			
INFO				
DISTR				
REF				
SUBJ/SUJ	CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR ARTICLE: US SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL WSH POST ARTICLE: NEW SOVIET LEADER CONTINUES MTGS WITH DIGNITARIES			
COMCENTRE: PLS COPY TEXT				
BEST COPY AVAILABLE				

COMMUNICATIONS
FEB 16 21 55 '84
CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON
1/5

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG C. Garrard/sg

Public Affairs

X203

SIG P. Gossage

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

2/5

Subject
Sujet

Date 13/February/84 Publication Christian Science Monitor

US security and the lull in the search for arms control

The current breakdown in superpower dialogue offers an opportunity for both Reaganites and nuclear-freeze advocates to rethink some basic ends and means

By Elizabeth Pond

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

ALL the major superpower arms control talks are now in limbo.

Three of them were suspended by the Soviets in reaction to deployment of NATO's initial 41 Euromissiles last December: the intermediate-range nuclear forces (the Euromissile or INF talks), the strategic arms reduction talks (START), and the multilateral mutual and balanced (conventional) force reduction talks (MBFR). The Soviet Union has subsequently agreed to resume the MBFR talks in March.

Two other talks were in effect suspended earlier by the Americans: the antisatellite (ASAT) and comprehensive (nuclear) test ban negotiations (CTB). The reasoning was that a ban on the development of antisatellite weapons would disadvantage the technologically exuberant US more than the technologically sluggish Soviet Union and that more on-site inspection was needed for verification of the absence of underground nuclear tests.

The conspicuous vacuum in arms control leaves the 35-nation Stockholm conference that began this January as the only major East-West forum now discussing mutual military restraints. And the Stockholm conference is concerned only with the somewhat peripheral question of lessening the chances of any surprise attack in Europe. It is not designed to — nor could it ever — carry the burden once assigned to the 1970s' Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT, the forerunner of START) as the main pillar of superpower relations in the era of détente.

At its worst the current lull in arms control negotiations therefore represents a breakdown in superpower dialogue. At its best it offers an opportunity — both for Reaganites and for nuclear freeze advocates — to rethink some basic ends and means.

An afternoon — or even several evenings — of Great Decisions discussion hardly allows time to review the gamut of security and peace issues. But some focus can perhaps be achieved by looking first at the general issue of arms control and then at several specific negotiations.

What is needed now, suggests Lawrence Freedman, professor of war studies at King's College, London, is "a real effort to establish communication with the Russians not through arms control. This is the real opportunity now: to reorganize East-West relations on a more sensible basis and not to set arms to the fore of it."

What he means is that mutually agreed military restraint is too important to leave to the vagaries of changing political moods. Survival is a constant need for both East and West even — or perhaps especially — when the superpowers are in a period of confrontation, as they are now.

Insofar as arms control helps codify that restraint and encourage stability, it should stand on its own, independent of the ebb and flow of political tensions. Restraint prevails only in time of détente and vanishes in time of antagonism hardly helps contain the nuclear demon.

This at least has been the concept of arms control for 20 years. And it seems to have been adopted to a considerable extent by the Reagan administration, despite an initial instinct to arm first and negotiate only later.

Most of those who argue in principle that arms control saps the West's will to defend itself have been left out of the administration; with pragmatic insiders the conviction has grown instead that sensible arms control actually promotes security by increasing predictability and balance.

Because of this conviction — and, to be sure, because of the yearning of European publics and peace movements for a lessening of nuclear danger — the US has deplored the Soviet walkout from the START and INF talks.

The prospects for resumption of specific East-West arms control dialogue — and the issues the West is currently debating in each forum — look like this:

INF

Without a doubt the superpowers' intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations of the past two years have caught the public eye more than any other arms control talks. The reasons include:

1. The dramatic attempt by the Soviet Union — as NATO sees it — to achieve swift nuclear superiority in Europe on the cheap, by targeting 243, three-warhead, 3,000-mile-range SS-20 missiles on Europe (and an additional 135 on Asia) since 1977.

2. NATO's attempt to redress this imbalance by deploying in the mid-80s 572 intermediate-range, single-warhead Pershing II and cruise missiles against the 729 Soviet SS-20 European warheads — while simultaneously seeking to negotiate mutual limits on these weapons.

3. The resurgence of unilateralist, anti-nuclear movements in Europe, with record numbers of demonstrations after two decades of relative apathy about the subject.

The last Soviet offer before Moscow discontinued the talks in November was

140 Europe-targeted SS-20s with 420 warheads vs. no NATO intermediate-range missiles whatsoever, France's 18 existing land-based intermediate-range single-warhead missiles, and the additional 144 single-warhead submarine missiles of France and Britain.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

3/5

Subject

Sujet

Date

Publication

The Soviet Union says it will not resume negotiations until NATO removes all the initial 41 Pershing IIs and cruises deployed in West Germany, Britain, and Italy at the end of 1983. But East German leader Erich Honecker, a staunch Soviet ally who has proclaimed his wish to "limit the damage" of the missile clash, has said negotiations will be resumed "sooner or later," even if in some new forum.

The last American offer before the talks broke up was a global ceiling (for both Europe and Asia) of 420 warheads for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with no reference to British and French missiles. The US would deploy half of its total in Eu-

rope but would unilaterally waive deployment of the other half and would instead keep those missiles in reserve in the US.

Washington, on behalf of the West, says it is ready to resume negotiations at any time. The West trusts Mr. Honecker's judgment that Euromissile talks will be resumed at some point. Nonetheless, it believes that getting from here to there will be tricky, since Moscow has invested so much prestige in not returning to the table while Western deployment proceeds.

Talks or no talks, hopes of any separate agreement limiting Euromissiles have virtually vanished, however. The Western analysis is that the first "window of opportunity" for an agreement — prior to the start of NATO deployments, when Moscow might have hoped to limit those deployments — has passed without any serious Soviet interest in a deal.

The expectation now is that — for reasons of Soviet prestige — the next opportunity will not come until the West has enough missiles in place to destroy a symbolic few of its own along with the great many Soviet SS-20s that would have to be destroyed in any equalization of numbers.

START

Substantively, the outlook is better for strategic than for Euromissile arms control. But the strategic equation is the most complex of all the military balances. Because of this a strong political push has always been required to compel arms control agreement. That political push is precisely what is missing in the present period of confrontation.


On the strategic balance itself the two sides are roughly equal: The US has about 10,000 to the Soviet Union's 8,000 intercontinental warheads, while the Soviet Union has three times America's "throw weight."

With its giant, eight-warhead SS-18s, the Soviet Union currently has the theoretical potential for greater "first-strike" (surprise attack) damage of American missiles. But the US will acquire the theoretical potential for greater first-strike damage of Soviet missiles, as its highly accurate Trident II and MX come on line in the next few years.

By the late '80s this threat will be far worse for Moscow than for Washington, since the Soviet Union has three-fourths of its strategic missile force on vulnerable land-based missiles, while the US has only one-fourth of its missiles so deployed.

This mutual threat should eventually bring the Soviets to share the present American concern about the growing number of accurate first-strike weapons as well as about "crisis instability" — i.e., the risk of a "use 'em or lose 'em" miscalculation and a preemptive strike if either side

US negotiator Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart, Yuri Kvitsinsky, in Geneva before INF talks broke down



A major hitch, however, is that it is much more difficult for the Soviets to restructure their land-based missiles to make them more mobile than it is for the Americans to do the same, because of the Soviets' larger proportion of land-based missiles.

Nonetheless, there are two foundations on which could be built an agreement should the political will do so. One is the Soviet SALT II offer, the other is the American SALT II offer of a global ceiling.

The Soviet offer follows the pattern of the SALT II treaty, which both sides have agreed to observe even though the US Senate has not ratified it. The Soviet offer would reduce the SALT II framework, but the number of warheads would be no more than 4,000.

The American offer would cut down current strategic nuclear armaments in half — down to 4,000 war-

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

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Sujet

Date

Publication

heads each — over a decade. And it uses modernization — the usual sleeper in any arms control agreement — to help the build-down rather than evade it.

It would compel the dismantling of two old intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRVed warheads for each new one deployed as well as three-old-for-two-new submarine-launched ballistic missiles with MIRVed warheads. In any case, each side would have to dismantle at a minimum 5 percent of their old warheads per year.

Neither side has accepted the other's position as a basis for negotiation. But, given intensive negotiation — and the political will to agree — there would seem to be nothing intrinsically hostile to the other's interests in either proposal.

MBFR and the Stockholm conference

The lethargic 10-year-old mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna to reduce conventional forces in the front-line countries of East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Benelux nations are being superseded to some extent by the current Stockholm talks.

The Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is expanding the geographic area to cover all of Europe, including the portion of the Soviet Union west of the Urals. It will focus (at least in Western proposals) on measures designed to help detect and therefore avert surprise attack.

Proposals include advance notification of maneuvers below the threshold of 25,000 troops specified in the Helsinki agreement of 1975 — with mandatory on-site observation of the maneuvers by officers from the adversary alliance.

Soviet proposals in Stockholm are expected to concentrate on what the West views as grand and unrealistic propaganda schemes of nuclear-free zones and nonaggression pacts. Last summer there was a surprising signal of Soviet interest in expanding on-site observation behind adversary front lines, however — an interest some Western analysts believe is whetted by the prospect of inspecting new NATO "deep strike" conventional weapons in the 1990s.

ASAT

This is the joker in the pack, the one issue on which there could be a sharp clash of policy opinion in the US.

In the other nuclear building programs and arms control issues an American consensus has been hammered out, following the intercession of the Scowcroft presidential commission and Moscow's failure to negotiate intensively at either the START or INF talks.

But the Reagan administration enthusiasm for a new arms race in space without the fetters of any arms control treaty does not yet enjoy comparable bipartisan approval. The lines are just starting to form in this debate, but already the decision promises to be one of the most momentous ones for the rest of this century.

Basically, the Reagan administration would like to take weapons into space, for shooting down both ballistic missiles and satellites. Washington is confident it could surge

ahead of Moscow technologically — some US Air Force generals even talk of regaining nuclear superiority — and stay five or so years ahead of Moscow in a decade in which the computer revolution is still moving fast.

A major American ASAT test program is being conducted this year and next, for the first time in two decades. The current US and Soviet ASAT programs both exploit nonnuclear technology, so do not violate — yet — the ban on testing and deployment of nuclear weapons in space in the 1963 test ban treaty and 1967 outer space treaty.

The Soviet Union, which already has a slow, low-altitude ASAT capability, wants to avert this new US research and development cycle. The current Soviet weapons do not yet endanger the high, 21,000-mile-orbit geosynchronous satellites that so much of American navigation, intelligence, communications, and targeting now rely on.

The mobile, much swifter, and much more sophisticated ASAT weapon that the US intends to have operational by 1987 will not threaten the Soviet high-orbit electronic intelligence satellites either — but it does promise greater potential than the Soviet ASAT weapon by the 1990s.

An all-out arms race in space could overturn the whole postwar "balance of terror" of invulnerable weapons and totally vulnerable populations. It holds out the theoretical prospect at least of breaking out of the grim certainty that any nuclear attacker would be committing double suicide — a perversity that Western strategic analysts generally hold has preserved superpower peace and deterred nuclear war for the past 39 years.

Air Force champions of "the high frontier" contend that such a shift would be all to the good, since American technology should protect the American population while still holding the Soviet population hostage. European populations might still be hostage to the Soviet Union, but Americans would be safe, so long as the US remained the perpetual leader in the new race.

Some civilian critics foresee dangers instead in militarization of space. They believe it would destabilize superpower relations and heighten hair-trigger fears of some first strike so devastating that it would not allow for retaliation — and would thus undermine deterrence.

More concretely, they argue that the US would benefit far more by agreeing to halt development of all further ASAT capability than by inventing ingenious gadgets that the Soviets will always be able to duplicate five years later. A ban on the entire class of weapons would be possible at the present research stage, they contend. But it will not be possible once the genie has been let out of the bottle.

The consequences of such a Soviet-American competition could be grave for the US, the civilian critics say. Satellites are relatively fragile and easy to kill or blind, and there is every reason to believe that offensive technology, once begun, will always outpace defensive technology.

The US is much more dependent on satellites than the Soviet Union, however, and roughly equal Soviet and American ASAT capability would incapacitate many more American than Soviet eyes and ears in space.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

5/5

37443

Subject
Sujet

Date 16/2/84 Publication Washington Post

New Soviet Leader Continues Meetings With Dignitaries

MOSCOW, Feb. 15 (AP)—New Communist Party leader Konstantin Chernenko today denounced what he called "the aggressive intrigues of U.S. imperialism," but he also told Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau that he was interested in reviving detente.

Chernenko's 35-minute meeting with Trudeau concluded a two-day round of diplomatic talks with some of the more than 100 foreign dignitaries who came to Moscow to attend the funeral of president Yuri Andropov and meet his successor as party secretary general.

Chernenko's position on major disputes between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact appeared to reflect previous Kremlin policy, according to the few details of the meetings provided by the Soviet official news agency Tass and other sources. The accounts also indicated that the subjects and tone of the meetings reflected the state of relations between the Soviets and the individual nations.

Among the first to see Chernenko were Fidel Castro of Cuba and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, whose governments are the chief Soviet allies in the Western Hemisphere.

Tass said that in talking to Castro, Chernenko repeated the Soviet Union's "invariable solidarity with the Cuban people, who courageously oppose the aggressive intrigues of U.S. imperialism."

U.S. involvement in the volatile politics of Central America also was a main topic between Chernenko and Ortega, Tass said.

"Both sides strongly denounced Washington's intention to whip up tension, to interfere in the internal affairs of countries in that region and to impose its will on them," Tass said.

Vice President Bush, speaking in Rome, said his talk with Chernenko produced "a certain sense of optimism" on improving East-West relations.

"The talks were serious, nonpolemical—no inflated rhetoric," Bush said.

And in Bonn, a government spokesman said Chernenko's talks with Chancellor Helmut Kohl also indicated a concern for improved relations with the West.

"The leadership in Moscow desires East-West dialogue and is interested in good relations with the West, including the United States," said spokesman Peter Boenisch.

Trudeau noted that in his talks with Chernenko, "there was no return to the stridency we've heard

from both sides in the past. We agreed that there is a new openness in the world and it's up to the politicians to respond to it."

Talking about the breakdown in U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks, Trudeau called Chernenko a "new man" and added, "Therefore he doesn't have to be saddled with a specific position."

"There was a repetition of the use of the word 'detente' and a real continuity with the Brezhnev spirit," he said, referring to Leonid Brezhnev, Andropov's predecessor and Chernenko's mentor.

Trudeau said Chernenko talked "in general terms of the need to reduce nuclear arms in the world."

But he said the Geneva arms talks were not specifically mentioned.

The Soviets said during Andro-

pov's tenure that they would not return to the talks until NATO halts and rolls back its missile deployment program.

Tass reported yesterday that Chernenko took a harder line in meetings with leaders of West Germany and Italy, whose governments are deploying the NATO missiles.

Tass said Chernenko told Italian President Sandro Pertini that it was the fault of NATO and the United States that the Soviet Union walked out of the arms talks, a stand the Kremlin has taken for months.

The Soviet Union assigned first deputy premier Gaidar Aliyev, a Politburo member, to meet Chinese deputy premier and Politburo member Wan Li, the highest ranking Chinese official to visit Moscow in 20 years.



Peace MF
initiative

Department of External Affairs

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

February 16, 1984

Mr. Cameron C. Hillmer
121 Allan St., # 1203
Oakville, Ontario
L6J 3N3

Dear Mr. Hillmer:

The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. MacEachen, has asked me to reply to your message of February 1.

The judgment of the achievements of the Prime Minister's initiative is, of course, a matter for each person to decide. Our view is that there have recently been some encouraging signs of a change in the trend in East-West relations. As an example I mention NATO's Brussels declaration of December which pledged to work for "genuine detente" and a constructive relationship with the East. We do not pretend that Canadian efforts alone have been responsible for the recent improvement in East-West relations, but the Prime Minister's initiative has clearly contributed to a better climate between the two sides.

I should also mention that Canada's commitment to NATO and its policies remains unchanged. The Prime Minister reaffirmed this commitment as recently as his speech in the House of Commons on February 9.

Yours truly,

L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

HELLMER,

Dear Mr Hellmer,

The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of
State for External Affairs, ~~Mr~~ ^{Mr} MacEwen,
has asked me to reply to your message of
February 1.

The ^{judgment} ~~judgment~~ of the
achievements of the Prime Minister's
initiative is, of course, a matter for each
person to decide. Our view is that there
have recently been ~~some~~ some encouraging signs
of a change in the trend in East-West relations.
For example I mention NATO's ^{Brussels} declaration of
December which ~~it~~ pledged to work for "genuine
détente" and a constructive relationship with
the East. We do not pretend that Canadian
efforts alone have been responsible for the
recent improvement in East-West relations, ^{Ln. +}

2.

The Prime Minister's initiative has ^{clearly} contributed to
a better climate ~~to~~ ~~for~~ between the two sides.
~~As for~~

I should also mention that Canada's commitment
to NATO and its policies remains unchanged; ~~on~~
The Prime Minister reaffirmed this commitment
as recently as his speech ^{to} the House of Commons
on February 9

YT

LAD



Sheraton-Plaza 500

SHERATON HOTELS AND MOTOR INNS

500 WEST 12TH AVENUE

VANCOUVER 9, B.C., CANADA

TELEPHONE (604) 873-1811

Orthwell. Cab

Dear Mr MacEachron.

*How far are control over the P.M.
when he is overseas?*

*What a fool he made of himself
this week when he meddled in the affairs of NATO
of the U.S.*

*Yours truly
C. Hillmer*

To Canadian Electors

PEACE MISSION MANIPULATION

While Prime Minister Trudeau longs for peace, like all of us, his peace crusade, heralded as such a noble and virtuous endeavour, is already being blatantly used by the Liberal Party and the Liberal Press to manipulate the Canadian public.


Press releases covering his trip, whether they emanate from his Ottawa office, or from the press travelling with him, are attempting to create the impression that Mr. Trudeau's peace initiatives are successful, while, in fact, he has no concrete nor positive accomplishments. The Western Allies, United States, China, etc. have either politely listened or been tolerant toward him. Russia and her satellite countries have either been evasive or have made no plans to meet him.


Aided and abetted by the Liberal Press in Canada - eg. Toronto Star - Liberal politicians are already using the Peace Mission for political propaganda in Canada. A former Trudeau Cabinet Minister, Bryce Mackasey, and recipient of many Trudeau favours, is an example, as is the Minister of External Affairs, Allan MacEachen.

World Peace will never be accomplished by politicians talking and/or using peace for political purposes. World peace will only be obtained by the will and determination of all free people to remain strong and united and to ensure that their governments protect them in both conventional and nuclear arms. Russia only wants peace after she has spread the cancer of communism around the world. This, she has been doing for years in Africa and now Central America.

1 February 84

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
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The Honorable Elton Macdonald, M.P.
Minister of External Affairs
Ottawa
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ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

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**CDN EYES ONLY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

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---PM MTG WITH CHAIRMAN HONECKER 31JAN:COMPTE RENDU

FOLLOWING IS OUR BEST EFFORT AT PROVIDING VERB TIM TRANSCRIPT OF
TRUDEAU HONECKER MTG. NOTETAKERS POSITION AT BACK OF ROOM BEHIND PM
AND ENGLISH OF HONECKERS INTERPRETER PRESENTED CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES
AS YOU WILL SEE BUT FOR MOST PART WE BELIEVE TRANSCRIPT CLOSELY
REPEATS WHAT WAS SAID. WE HAVE COMMENTED IN BRACKETS WITHIN TEXT ON
FEW PASSAGES WHERE WE WERE REALLY UNCERTAIN. WE HAVE SPLIT UP SOME OF
LONGER INTERVENTIONS INTO NUMBERED PARAS FOR EASE OF IDENTIFICATION
SHOULD YOU WISH TO CHECK ON ANY POINTS (WE ARE KEEPING OUR NOTES).
FINAL PRODUCT CAN BE SENT BACK TO POST BY BAG.

FIRST SESSION

1. CHAIRMAN HONECKER: PM TRUDEAU AND CDN SIDE WELCOMED.

VISIT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEEPENING OF RELNS BETWEEN OUR TWO
COUNTRIES. IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERTAKE COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL
DIALOGUE. THIS DIALOGUE IS OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO EAST AND WEST AND
AT SAME TIME MARKS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE RELNS BETWEEN CDA AND
THE GDR.

INTRODUCTION OF GDR DEL (AS PROVIDED IN OFFICIAL PROGRAM).

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IT HAS BEEN EIGHT YEARS SINCE OUR FIRST MTG WHEN WE AGREED TO ESTABLISH DIPLO RELNS, BUT WE BOTH HAD THE IMPRESSION LAST NIGHT THAT WE WERE ACQUAINTED AND WE FELT AS THOUGH IT WAS NOT/NOT EIGHT YEARS BUT MUCH LESS SINCE WE LAST MET. A LOT HAS CHANGED IN THE WORLD, UNFORTUNATELY NOT/NOT FOR THE BETTER. THERE HAS BEEN A DRAMATIC DETERIORATION OF THE INNATL SITUATION, THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION HAS INCREASED. EUROPE IS CALLED UPON TO PUT A HALT TO THESE DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENTS AND YOU CAN REST ASSURED THE GDR WILL DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO THIS END.

DURING THE DAY YOU WILL GET AN IMPRESSION OF THE DEDICATION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE GDR TO WORKING TOWARDS PRESERVING PEACE IN THE WORLD.

2. WE HAVE FOLLOWED WITH GREAT ATTN YOUR PEACE MISSION AND THANK YOU FOR THE OFFER TO ACQUAINT US WITH YOUR PERCEPTIONS AND IDEAS. WE ARE CONVINCED THE VISIT AND OUR EXCHANGES WILL HELP TO DEEPEN RELNS BETWEEN THE GDR AND CDA. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT F CT. IT WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE IN THE EAST AND WEST CONTEXT TO THE DISMANTLING OF CONFRONTATION, PERMITTING BOTH SIDES TO REVERT TO PEACEFUL COOPERATION IN A NEW PERIOD OF DETENTE.

3. PM TRUDEAU: INTRODUCTION OF CDN DEL (AS PROVIDED IN OFFICIAL PROGRAM) THANKS FOR ACCEPTING THE VISIT ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. YOU HAVE TALKED ABOUT DIALOGUE. THE NEED FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE IS AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. IT IS A DEMONSTRATION OF YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE THAT YOU HAVE RECEIVED ME ...3

PAGE THREE UMGR0286 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

IN SUCH A FRIENDLY MANNER. THE PROCESS IS ALMOST AS IMPORTANT AS
SUBSTANCE. DIALOGUE MEANS CONTACT IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND ONE ANOTHER.
WE NEED TO EXPLAIN OUR POSITIONS. YOU HAVE ALLUDED TO NECESSITY FOR
DIALOGUE. WE SHARE THE SAME ANALYSIS. 81 AND 82 WERE YEARS WHEN TENSION
IN EAST-WEST RELNS INCREASED TO THE DANGEROUS STAGE. EVEN THE WORD
DETENTE YOU AND I HONOURED IN HSNKI HAS BECOME A DIRTY WORD IN
POLITICAL VOCABULARY. BECAUSE THERE WAS SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE OF DISTRUST
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WE NO/NO LONGER WANTED TO TALK OF DETENTE. THE
TWO SUPERPOWERS WERE NOT/NOT ONLY NOT/NOT MAKING PROGRESS BUT THE
LEADERS WERE NEGOTIATING THROUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS. WE ARE LIVING IN
A PERIOD OF MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY INTERSPERSED WITH LONG PERIODS OF
SILENCE. THERE HAS BEEN AN ABSENCE OF CONTACTS. MBFR HAS BOGGED DOWN.
AFTER MORE THAN 10 YEARS OF MTGS THERE IS NO/NO END INSIGHT.

4. IN THIS ATMOSPHERE OF TENSION AND MISTRUST SOME EVENTS LIKE THE
KAL DISASTER MAKE IT CLEAR TO MANY OF OUR POPULATIONS WE WERE LIVING
IN A PERIOD WHEN WAR COULD BE STARTED BY ACCIDENT. IN A NUCLEAR WAR
ALL WOULD BE DESTROYED. WE CANNOT/NOT TALK ABOUT A WAR ONLY BETWEEN
SUPERPOWERS BUT A WAR IN WHICH ALL HUMANITY WOULD BE ENDANGERED.
CDNS FELT ALTHOUGH WE WERE NOT/NOT AT THE TABLE IN GENEVA WE WERE
VERY MUCH INVOLVED IN THE RESULTS. THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
WAS TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT TO THE SUPERPOWERS ALONE. THE UN SEC GEN
PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT NOBODY GAVE THE RIGHT TO THE SUPERPOWERS
TO DECIDE THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY. THEREFORE I AM LOOKING FOR WAYS IN

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WHICH CDA CAN INVOLVE ITSELF IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN AN ACTIVE WAY.OUR MOST URGENT OBJECTIVE IS THE RESTORATION OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST PARTICULARLY AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL.WE HAVE OUR AMBS IN VIENN BUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT UP UNTIL NOW POLITICANS HAVE NOT/NOT FELT IT NECESSARY TO BECOME INVOLVED.AS FOR STKHM WE FEARED THAT THE SLOW AND UNPRODUCTIVE PROCESS WOULD BEGIN THERE AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE,FIRST WITHIN NATO,URGED OUR COLLEAGUES TO PARTICIPATE AT THE CONF AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL.THERE WAS OPPOSITION AT FIRST. THOSE WHO SUPPORTED THE IDEA MANAGED THEN TO CONVINCE THE OTHERS. THE SUPERPOWERS ARE INVOLVED IN A SIMILAR SITUATION.(THE NEXT PASSAGE IN UNCLER THE PM REFERRED TO THE FISCHER-SSEA MTG WHEN THEY DISCUSSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EMBS IN EACH OTHERS COUNTRY AND ALSO THE FACT THAT HE WAS IN BRLIN AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE).I REPEAT THE REALLY ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVE THAT THE CDN GOVT HAS TO RESTORE POLITICAL CONTACTS,TO ENSURE A JOLT OF POLITICAL ENERGY IN EAST-WEST TALKS,IN PARTICULAR TO ENSURE THAT HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS ARE REESTABLISHED BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

5.IT IS STATECRAFT WHICH BEGINS WITH A REALIZATION OF DIFFERENCES, ACCEPTS DIFFERENCES,AND FINDS ALLEYS OF COOPERATION TO THE ADVANTAGE OF BOTH SIDES.DIPLOMATS AND DISARMAMENT EXPERTS ARE COMPETENT,BUT UNLESS THEY RECEIVE POLITICAL DIRECTION THEY C NNOT/NOT PRODUCE RESULTS.THEY CAN PREPARE FOR THEIR POLITICAL LEADERS BUT LATTER MUST EVENTUALLY COME TOGETHER AND AGREE ON A COMMON OBJECTIVE.WE

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PAGE FIVE UMGR0286 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

HOPE THAT STKHM IS ONLY THE BEGINNING. IT WILL BE A LONG AND CAUTIOUS PROJECT. BY 1986 AN AGREEMENT IN CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IS EXPECTED BUT ONLY AFTER THAT DATE WILL THE CONFERENCE DISCUSS DISARMAMENT. WE MUST RESPECT THAT PROCESS. WE MUST RESPECT IT AS IT IS A PRODUCT OF A LONG AND COMPLICATED PROCESS AT MDRID. AS POLITICAL LEADERS WE MUST ENSURE PROGRESS CONTINUES IN STKHM. IF NECESSARY WE SHOULD BACK OUR MINISTERS OR PERHAPS HEADS OF GOVT THEMSELVES. AT THE SAME TIME COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD CANNOT/NOT WAIT UNTIL 1986 FOR PROGRESS IN VIENN ON CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. INF AND START MUST ALSO GET ON WITH THINGS. WE URGED OUR COLLEAGUES TO MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO ENSURE THE VIENN TALKS WERE RESUMED AND TO PREPARE FOR NATO TO BRING A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ANSWER TO THE WPO PROPOSALS ISSUED EIGHT MONTHS AGO. I BELIEVE THE WPO MADE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS AND WE MUST NOT/NOT WAIT TOO MANY MONTHS BEFORE ANSWERING. THE DEC NATO COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCED THAT MINS WOULD REVIEW THE SITUATION IN VIENN. CDA IS COUNTING HEAVILY ON THE ALLIES IN NATO TO SHOW DILIGENCE IN PROCEEDINGS IN VIENN. BONN IS COOPERATING QUITE CLOSELY WITH CDA TO UNLOCK THE SITUATION IN VIENN. I WAS ENCOURAGED TO READ THAT THE WPO HAS AGREED TO RESUME THE VIENN TALKS ON THE 16TH OF MARCH. I HOPE THAT CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO ENCOURAGING FOREIGN MINS TO ATTEND EITHER AT THE BEGINNING OF THE RESUM D SESSION OR NOT/NOT TOO LONG AFTERWARDS. I WANT PYESSURE ON THE POLITICAL LEADERS ON OUR SIDE TO ANSWER THE WPO PROPOSALS.

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6. IN PRGUE I POINTED OUT TO HUSACK THAT THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AT THE BEGINNING OF 83 PREVENTED NATO COUNTRIES FROM GIVING SATISFACTORY ANSWERS TO THE PRGUE DECLARATION. IT CONTAINED HOWEVER MANY POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS, THE MOST IMPORTANT BEING THE CALL FOR THE RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE. BUT IN 83 I THINK THE TIME WAS NOT/NOT RIGHT FOR AN OBJECTIVE EXAMINATION OF THE PRGUE DECLN OR EITHER OF THE MOSCO DECLARATION. ALONGSIDE OF SOME VERY PRODUCTIVE PROPOSALS THESE DECLARATIONS CONTAINED OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE. A YEAR LATER PROPOSALS IN THE DECLNS, INCLUDING THOSE RESPECTING THE VIENN TALKS OR CHEMICAL WARFARE OR THE RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE SHOULD BE DISCUSSED POLITICALLY. I UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET DEPARTURE FROM VIENN. IT WAS ALMOST INEVITABLE BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL POSITION TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES IN THE LAST TWO YEARS. ON ONE SIDE WAS THE NATO TWO TRACK DECISION AND ON THE OTHER THE WPO THREAT TO LEAVE THE TABLE. IT SEEMED TO US IN THE LAST MONTHS OF 1983 THAT THERE WOULD BE AN INTERRUPTION OF THE NEGS IN GENEV. THERE WAS A GREAT DANGER OF A COMPLETE LOSS OF CONTACT AND NEGS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND THAT IS WHY I TOOK UP AND AM PURSUING MY PEACE INITIATIVE. WE WERE ANXIOUS TO FIND A SAFETY NET FOR THE PERIOD OF 1984, TO PUT ON THE TABLE WAYS IN WHICH CONTACT COULD BE REESTABLISHED. THIS COULD BE DONE AT STKHM AND HOPEFULLY IN VIENN AND ALSO I ADVOCATED A MTG BETWEEN THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. I SUGGESTED TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT HE INVITE THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (THE FIVE NUCLEAR ...7

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POWERS) TO RETURN TO THE SPIRIT OF THE UN CHARTER WHICH GIVES THE FIVE SPECIAL RIGHTS AND IMPOSES UPON THEM SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS. THEY HAVE THE VETO RIGHT TO PREVENT ACTION BUT THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO ENCOURAGE ACTIONS IN LINE WITH THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE UN-THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. I COULD GIVE YOU DETAILS OF MY TRIPS TO PEKIN, WSHDC, LDN AND PARIS. IT IS HOWEVER THE INITIATIVE WHICH IS IMPORTANT IN ITSELF. THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS MUST LIVE UP TO THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE NPT. CHINA AGREES WITH THE SPIRIT OF THIS OBJECTIVE. THE FIVE POWERS HAVE A DUTY TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND ONLY IF THEY DO THAT CAN THEY ENJOIN THE REST OF THE WORLD NOT/NOT TO JOIN IN THE PROLIFERATION BY HAVING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. IN THIS RESPECT THE FIVE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT THAT THE HORIZONTAL SPREADING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD MAKE THE WORLD A MUCH MORE DANGEROUS PLACE, BUT THEY ARE IN NO/NO POSITION TO HALT SUCH A HORIZONTAL SPREAD IF THEY CANNOT/NOT AGREE TO HALT THE VERTICAL PROLIFERATION.

7. WE HAVE FOUND MUCH ENCOURAGEMENT BUT EVENTUALLY PEOPLE WILL BE ASKING FOR RESULTS. OUR COMING TOGETHER IS OKAY BUT WE NEED RESULTS IN CONCRETE. THERE ARE STKHM AND VIENN AND WE WILL ALSO TABLE BEFORE THE UN CTTEE PROPOSALS ON SUFFOCATION AIMED AT RENDERING IMPOSSIBLE THE NEXT TERRIBLE STAGE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY-THE INTRODUCTION OF ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS. THIS COULD BE A GREAT CAUSE OF INSTABILITY AND I APPEAL TO YOU AND OTHER LEADERS TO FIND WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS AGAINST THIS TYPE OF ARMAMENT IN THE FUTURE. THE SOVIETS HAVE ...8

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A PROPOSAL AGAINST SATELLITE WEAPONS.WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE
PROGRESS AS BOTH SIDES SAY THEY WANT THE SAME THING.IT IS DIFFICULT
TO CALL FOR COMPROMISE.A MEASURE OF TRUST AND RISK-TAKING WILL BE
REQUIRED.BUT THE ONLY WAY WE CAN DEVELOP TRUST IS BY KNOWING EACH
OTHER BETTER AND AGREEING ON CERTAIN BASIC PRINCIPLES IN INNATL RELNS.
WE DONT HAVE TO LIKE EACH OTHERS SYSTEMS,WE DONT HAVE TO LOVE ONE
ANOTHER BUT WE MUST RESPECT ONE ANOTHERS SECURITY INTERESTS.THE NATO
COMMUNIQUE IN DEC MEANT A TURNING OVER OF A NEW LEAF.WE WERE NOT/NOT
LOOKING FOR SUPERIORITY,ONLY EQUILIBRIUM.WE RESPECT THE SECURITY
INTERESTS OF WPO COUNTRIES.FROM THE OUTSET I KNOW WE HAVE DIFFERNT
INTERPRETATIONS I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR VIEWS.

8.HONECKER;I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT DIALOGUE LIKE THE ONE WE ARE
HAVING TODAY CAN BE REGARDED AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW TWO COUNTRIES CAN
GET ON PEACEFULLY.IT IS A SIGNAL OF REASON,GOOD WILL AND COMMON
RESPECT IN THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF MANKIND.I HAVE NOTED YOUR REMARKS
ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUES AND I CAN POINT OUT THAT YOUR OBSERVATIONS
REGARDING THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM CONTAINED THE VERY ELEMENTS ON
WHICH WE FEEL PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE SHOULD BE ATTACHED.WE MUST ACCEPT
THE EXISTENCE OF THE TWO POLITICAL BLOCKS.LIKE IT OR NOT/NOT WE SHALL
HAVE TO ESTABLISH SYSTEMS WHICH PERMIT LIVING TOGETHER SIDE BY SIDE
WITH EACH OTHER.THIS WAS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND OUR MTG IN HSNKI.
THIS IS THE CENTRE OF OUR ACTIONS.NOBODY WILL STAMP OUT THIS IDEA.
THERE IS A YEARNING OF MANKIND TO PREVENT A THIRD WORLD WAR WHICH
...9

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WOULD LEAD TO THE SELF DESTRUCTION OF MANKIND. ALL THAT SHOULD BE REASON ENOUGH FOR RESPONSIBLE HEADS OF STATE TO ENSURE THAT SUCH A CATASTROPHE COULD NOT/NOT OCCUR. WE TOO WERE AFFECTED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES. WE WERE REALLY FRIGHTENED BY THE PROSPECTS. WE CANNOT/NOT EXCLUDE SUCH A SITUATION. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE DISPLAY REALISM IN ALL OUR ACTIONS. I GATHER FROM ALL YOUR REMARKS ON CDAS POSITION THAT YOU EXHIBIT REALISM AND REASON. IN THE CURRENT COMPLICATED SITUATION IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO SEARCH FOR COMPROMISES. THERE IS GROWING INNATL TENSION INCREASING THE THREAT OF WAR. TO MAINTAIN PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE GOVT TO GOVT RELNS SHOULD ACHIEVE SPECIAL ATTN. I FEEL YOU HAVE CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE TERM DIALOGUE. IT IS MORE THAN JUST TALKING. YOU DONT HAVE TO LOVE EACH OTHER IT MEANS TO FIND WAYS AND MEANS TO AVERT PERMANENT DANGER-WAYS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES PEACEFULLY.

9. WE HAVE FOLLOWED WITH GREAT CONCERN THE AGGRAVATION OF THE INNATL SITUATION AND THE MOVE OF THE USA ADMINISTRATION FROM COOPERATION TO CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. YOU SAID DETENTE WAS A DIRTY IDEA-WE BELIEVE IT SIGNIFIES A RAY OF HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL FUTURE. IF YOU AWAKEN TO THE FULL MEANING TO THE TERM THEN DETENTE HAS BROUGHT MANY BENEFITS TO PEOPLE WHEN DETENTE W S PRACTICED. TRADE AND DIALOGUE WERE BETTER, CONTACTS IMPROVED. DEPLOYMENT HAS MEANT THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR CAPACITY FROM THE USA TO WESTERN EUROPE. IT IS A GREAT PROBLEM FOR MANY PEOPLE AND IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO

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TO UNDERSTAND WHY IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO LEAVE THE TRACK OF DETENTE. YOU SAID NATO IMPLEMENTED THE TWO TRACK DECISION. BUT THE SECOND TRACK WAS IMPLEMENTED AGAINST THE WILL OF 70 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE IN THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. THERE WERE GREAT OBJECTIONS IN FOUR NATO COUNTRIES AGAINST DEPLOYMENT ALTHOUGH IT IS SAID ELSEWHERE THAT FULL AGREEMENT WAS NECESSARY IN NATO TO IMPLEMENT THE DECISION. COUNTER MEASURES HAVE BEGUN AND NOW AT THE TURN OF 1983/84 WE ARE FACED WITH WHAT TO DO. SHOULD WE ALLOW DESTRUCTION TO TAKE ITS COURSE OR TRY TO STEM THE TIDE? STATEMENTS MADE BY US CALLING USSR AN EMPIRE OF EVIL AND MEASURES TAKEN THEREAFTER ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE HSNKI FINAL ACT. THEY ALSO CONFLICT WITH INNATL AGREEMENTS AND LAWS IN THAT THE USA IS STRIVING FOR INNATL SUPERIORITY. DECAPITATION STRIKE THEORY AND THE USA INTEREST RATE POLICY ARE BRINGING CONFUSION TO INNATL SITUATION.

10. GDR ARE ADVOCATES OF STRATEGY OF PEACE AND COOPERATION AND IS DETERMINED TO ALLOW NOTHING TO PREVENT IT FROM FOLLOWING THIS STRATEGY. PEACE IS THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH PEOPLE CAN LIVE A BENEFICIAL LIFE. MANKIND HAS NO/NO CHANCE TO SURVIVE WITHOUT PEACE. BOTH NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD BE VICTIMS. I HAVE CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE IDEAS YOU HAVE PUT FORWARD TODAY AND YOUR STATEMENTS IN DAVOS. I BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE FOR US SINGLY OR JOINTLY TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE. WE SHOULD NOT/NOT SPLIT THE WORLD INTO GOOD OR EVIL. PEACE AND SECURITY MUST BE ACHIEVED NOT/NOT BY ACTING AGAINST EACH OTHER ...11

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BUT BY ACTING WITH EACH OTHER.YOUR ACTIVITIES CONFIRMED BY WHAT WE HAVE HEARD THIS MORNING SUPPORT THIS PREMISE.WE SUPPORT YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE AND THE SPIRIT OF POLITICLAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING.WE AGREE WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE SITUATION IS DANGEROUS AND WITH YOUR AIM TO STOP THE ARMS SPIRAL,THE SPREAD OF NUCPEAR WEAPONS MUST BE HALTED.NUCLEAR ARSENALS MUST BE REDUCED.WE MUST RETURN THE PROPER MEANING TO DETENTE IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE AND ACCORD PRIORITY TO POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN NATIONS.CAUTION AND PRUDENCE ARE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS.REALISM IS ALSO IMPORTANT IN INNATL RELNS.

11.YOU SUGGEST THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE HELD BETWEEN THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS,THAT SUPPORT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE NPT AND THAT ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS SHOULD BE BANNED.THESE ARE VERY IMPORTANT PROPOSALS. TO IMPLEMENT THEM IT IS NECESSARY THAT WE REVERT TO A SYSTEM OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING.IT WOULD BE FULLY IN LINE WITH THE PRINCIPLES GUIDING OUR ACTION FOR US TO ENCOURAGE DIALOGU BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR,TO CALL FOR A COMPLETE BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING,A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND TO REFUSE OURSELVES TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS YOU HAVE ENVISAGED YOURSELF FOR CDA.YOUR PROPOSALS REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT CORNERSTONE ON THE ROAD WE ARE PREPARED TO FOLLOW AS WELL. ONLY ADVENTURERS EMBARK ON A STAR WARS PATH INSTEAD OF PURSUING PEACE ON EARTH.THE PEOPLE OF THE GDR ARE GREATLY DISMAYED BY REPORTS THAT THE US HAS BEEN TESTING MISSILE SYSTEMS.

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12. YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH OUR PRGUE AND MOSCO PROPOSALS. THEY ARE STILL ON THE TABLE. THEIR LANGUAGE MAY BE IN HARSH TERMS BUT IN THE SIX MONTHS BETWEEN PRGUE AND MOSCO WE REITERATED MANY OF THE ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN VARIOUS NATO PROPOSALS. REGARDING VIENN, WE SUGGESTED A CEILING OF 900,000 ON BOTH SIDES. WE MET NATO COUNTRIES HALF WAY AND PROPOSED CERTAIN INSPECTION POINTS FOR VERIFICATION. UNFORTUNATELY WE HAVE HAD NO/NO ANSWERS. ANSWERS SHOULD BE GIVEN IN THE SPIRIT OF PEACEFUL, CO-EXISTENCE-WHAT IS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS NOT/NOT. WE CAN CONSIDER OTHER PROPOSALS. THE IDEA OF A FOREIGN MINS MTG IN VIENN IS WORTH CONSIDERING. WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT THE SIDES RETURN TO VIENN PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE IN A SERIOUS MANNER. ANSWERS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO WPO PROPOSALS BY THE MARCH 16 DATE. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT ON THEIR RETURN TO VIENN BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WHILE ATTEMPTS WERE BEING MADE BEHIND THE SCENES TO UPSET THE MILITARY BALANCE. A SMOKE SCREEN OF NEGOTIATIONS TO UPSET THE MILITARY BALANCE IS NOT/NOT ACCEPTABLE.

13. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE QUESTION OF FREEZING NUCLEAR ARSENALS NOT/NOT ONLY FOR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND TO THE RENOUNCEMENT OF THE FIRST USE, THE LATTER SO THAT NO/NO NUCLEAR WAR CAN ERUPT. WE ALSO SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLE OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE FOR ALL TYPES INCLUDING BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THIS WE SUPPORT THE PALME PROPOSAL. THE GDR HAS AGREED THAT ITS ENTIRE TERRITORY COULD BE COVERED BY SUCH A PROPOSAL. WE ALSO SUPPORT THE IDEA OF CONCLUDING A
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TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELNS.WE BELIEVE THIS COULD REPRESENT A STRONG ELEMENT IN EFFORTS TO SECURE PEACEFUL RELNS AND FURTHER COOPERATION AND ARE SURPRISED THAT THERE HAS BEEN HARDLY ANY RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL. WE DO BELIEVE SUCH A TREATY WOULD BE HELPFUL.WE AGREE TO THE BANNING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCLUDING THE DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING ARSENALS.WE HOPE FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN AREAS INCLUDING LATIN AMERICA,SOUTH AFRICA AND THE MID EAST.YOUR VISIT HAS A PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE AS IT GIVES US THE CHANCE TO DISCUSS FRANKLY ALL THESE QUESTIONS.IT CAN ALREADY BE SAID THAT WE SHARE VERY COMMON VIEWS ON MANY ISSUES.WE FORESEE A HORRIBLE FUTURE FOR MANKIND SHOULD THERE BE A WAR IN OUTER SPACE.WE ARE FOR THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE.THIS WOULD IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF MANKIND ON EARTH. THE FIRST JOINT US-USSR SPACE MISSION SUGGESTS PEACEFUL COOPERATION BUT WITH THE THREAT OF THE USE OF OUTER SPACE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES THERE IS A SUGGESTION OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT.US ACTIONS IN THIS REGARD ARE A PERVERSION OF HUMAN THINKING WHICH WE TRUST ARE A TEMPORARY PHENOMENON.

14.REGARDING DISARMAMENT WE ARE PROPONENTS OF THE MOST RADICAL STEPS. WE HAVE NO/NO DELUSIONS THAT THEY CAN BE ACHIEVED QUICKLY.TODAYS EXCHANGE IS OF GREAT VALUE BETWEEN NATIONS OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS.THIS IS THE ONLY AVENUE WE HAVE TO RENDER IMPOSSIBLE ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR.I TRUST OUR DIALOGUE WILL FURTHER OUR BILATERAL ...14

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RELNS AND WILL STRENGTHEN WORLD PEACE AND WILL LEAD TO A CONTRIBUTION TO DETENTE AND EAST-WEST COOPERATION. TODAY'S PRESS COVERAGE IS OPEN PROOF THAT WE DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE IN REVERTING TO THE ICE AGE BUT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO PROMOT DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. WE HOPE ALL AGREEMENTS INCLUDING HSNKI CAN BE HONOURED. UNFORTUNATELY SALT II WAS NOT/NOT RATIFIED BUT AT THE TIME OF ITS INCEPTION THE TREATY REINFORCED OUR HOPE THAT HEADWAY WAS POSSIBLE WITH REGARD TO PEACE AND SECURITY FOR ALL. WE SEE THE PUBLICATION TODAY OF THE SOVIET AIDE MEMOIRE TO THE USA REGARDING AMERICAN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN AGREEMENTS. I HAD QUOTE NO/NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE UNQUOTE OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE. THE US NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PREVIOUS TREATIES UNDERScored FOR ME THE DANGER OF TEARING TO PIECES THE MUTUAL NETWORK MONITORING THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE. THIS NON-COMPLIANCE IS INCREASING. ALL NATIONS BEAR A RESPONSIBILITY FOR VERIFICATION OF PEACE AND FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACEFUL RELNS. THIS IS LAID DOWN IN THE UN CHARTER. YOU MAY REST ASSURED THAT THE SAFEGUARDING OF PEACE WHICH IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TO INNATL COOPERATION WILL RECEIVE THE UTMOST PRIORITY-IS THE SUPREME GOAL OF THE GDR. THIS IS WHY WE FOLLOWED WITH SUCH GREAT INTEREST YOUR ACTIVITIES AND ARRANGED THIS MTG ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. YOUR INITIATIVE WHICH IS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO LDN, MOSCO, ETC IS A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO PREVENT THE WORLD EMBARKING ON A DANGEROUS COURSE AWAY FROM THAT WHICH WOULD LEAD THE WORLD BACK TO MUTUAL COOPERATION.

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15. TRUDEAU: THANK YOU FOR BEING SO SUPPORTIVE OF THE PROPOSALS PUT TO YOU. WE MUST LOOK AHEAD RATHER THAN BACKWARDS; BEHIND US IS A PERIOD WHEN BOTH SIDES FEEL THE OTHER HAS BEEN EITHER NEGLECTFUL OR ILL INTENTIONED WITH WORDS AND DEEDS. YOU HAVE CORRECTLY POINTED OUT CERTAIN ACTIONS AND OMISSIONS BY THE WEST NOT/NOT CONDUCTIVE TO PEACEFUL COOPERATION AND TO THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. WE HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT ACTIONS OR WORDS ON THE PART OF THE EAST WHICH HAVE BEEN AT LEAST PARTIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATMOSPHERE OF DISTRUST-AFGHAN, CAMBODIA, POLAND. THE SS 20S CAUSED MISTRUST IN THE WEST. AS FOR WORDS, I REALIZE WESTERN LEADERS HAVE USED EXCESSIVE AND INSULTING LANGUAGE. WE CAN ALSO FIND IN PRAVDA AND IN GROMYKOS AND ANDROPOVS SPEECHES A LACK OF RESPECT FOR WESTERN VALUES. THAT IS WHY YOU AND I CAN WORK POSITIVELY TOWARDS OUR COMMON GOAL SO THAT WE CAN EMERGE FROM A PERIOD OF MISTRUST. AT LEAST WORDS ARE BEGINNING TO CHANGE IN WSHDC. CONCRETE WORDS MUST HOWEVER BE FOLLOWED BY DEEDS. PRES REAGANS QUOTE EVIL EMPIRE UNQUOTE REFS ALSO MET WITH DISAGREEMENT IN THE WEST AND WE HAVE SAID SO PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY. THERE IS HOWEVER SOME CONSOLATION IN THAT HE IS NOT/NOT USING THESE WORDS ANYMORE. DETENTE WAS BANNED FROM THE NATO VOCABULARY. YOU WILL FIND IT REAPPEARING HOWEVER IN THE NATO DEC COMMUNIQUE. AGAINST FORMER TALK OF SUPERIORITY YOU WILL FIND WORDS OF EQUALITY AND EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN TWO SIDES. PRES REAGAN TOLD THE JPNSE DIET IN NOV THAT HE DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE A NUCLEAR WAR SHOULD BE FOUGHT OR IF FOUGHT COULD BE WON.

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AGAINST THE FORMER ISOLATION IN WHICH NATO HAD PLACED ITSELF IN RESPECT OF THE WPO I AM SURPRISED THAT I AM THE FIRST NATO HEAD OF GOVT TO VISIT THE GDR.MRS THATCHER WILL VISIT HUNGARY AND CRAXI WILL VISIT SEVERAL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.PERHAPS THIS IS A REALIZATION ON OUR PART THAT WE MUST BEGIN TO RELAX THE ATMOSPHERE AND PRACTICE DETENTE.SO FAR THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY WORDS.I UNDERSTAND YOU WANT TO RESERVE JUDGEMENT AS TO OUR SINCERITY TO SEE IF WORDS ARE FOLLOWED BY ACTIONS.THE ONLY CONCLUSION I CAN DRAW AT THIS TIME IS THAT AT LEAST OUR SIDE SHOULD FOLLOW UP ON SOME OF THE ACTIONS YOU HAVE PROPOSED.IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WORDS FROM THE EASTERN COUNTRIES WERE A LITTLE LESS STRIDENT.GROMYKO IN STKHM WAS SOMEWHAT MORE AGGRESSIVE THAN SHULTZ EVEN THOUGH IN THEIR PRIVATE MTGS BOTH REPORTED SOME PROGRESS.THERE IS NO/NO GUARANTEE THAT ACTIONS WILL FOLLOW WORDS BUT MORE RESPECT ON BOTH SIDES WILL ENHANCE THE ATMOSPHERE.WE SHOULD WORK TOWARDS PROGRESS IN THE AREAS WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MORNING AND MAYBE WHEN WE RETURN THIS AFTERNOON WE WILL BE ABLE TO DISCUSS CONCRETE PROPOSALS.THE PRGUE AND MOSCO DECLARATIONS CONTAINED CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS AND OTHERS OF A DECLARATORY NATURE COULD ALSO BE HELPFUL AT LEAST TO FORCE BOTH SIDES TO NEGOTIATE AND DISCUSS CONSTRUCTIVELY.THE HOPE I HAVE IS THAT DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES CAN ONLY REMAIN IN A WAR-LIKE STANCE FOR LIMITED PERIODS.PRES REAGANS CHANGE OF LANGUAGE IS ONE WHICH BRINGS HIM CLOSER TO THE BASIC WILL OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.I KNOW AMERICANS ...17

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WELL, THEY DONT WANT WAR. I KNOW THE WPO DOESNT WANT WAR EITHER. ITS PEOPLE HAVE SUFFERED TOO MUCH. I AM BASICALLY HOPEFUL THAT THERE IS CAUSE TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE AS ONE WHERE WE WILL FIND WAYS OF LIVING IN PEACE.

16. HONECKER: FULL AGREEMENT BETWEEN US IS NOT/NOT NECESSARY. IT IS IMPORTANT THOUGH THAT WE SHOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR THE FUTURE. ONE CANNOT/NOT HOWEVER FORGET THE PATH WHICH HAS PLUNGED US INTO THE MOST SERIOUS POST WAR CRISIS. WE BELIEVED WE WOULD NEVER RETURN THERE AFTER HAVING KNOWN THE DESTRUCTION AND TRAGEDY OF TWO WORLD WARS. I SAW THE US MOVIE QUOTE THE DAY AFTER UNQUOTE. IT DOES NOT/NOT DESCRIBE THE FULL REALITY OF A NUCLEAR STRIKE. BUT KNOWING THE REALITIES OF WAR IT WOULD BE USEFUL AT ANY RATE TO DISCUSS BASIC ELEMENTS AS TO HOW WAYS CAN BE FOUND GIVEN OUR MUTUAL RESPECT FOR DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS. YOU ARE CORRECT IN YOUR STATEMENT THAT US, CDA AND THE EUROPEANS DO NOT/NOT WANT WAR. BRLIN AFTER WWII BOMBING LOOKED LIKE THE CITIES IN QUOTE THE DAY AFTER UNQUOTE. AT THE TIME IT WAS DIFFI ULT TO BELIEVE THAT RECONSTRUCTION WAS POSSIBLE. THESE WERE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A WAR UNLEASHED BY HITLER. THUS DURING THE BOMBING RAIDS I FELT NO/NO HATRED AGAINST THE FLYERS, I WAS SIMPLY HOPING THAT HITLER WOULD SUFFER DEFEAT. WITH A NUCLEAR WAR THE RESULTS ARE HARDLY CONCEIVABLE. I DONT THINK THERE WOULD BE A DAY AFTER. THE PRGUE AND MOSCO DECLARATIONS WORDINGS CONTAIN NO/NO READY MADE FORMULATIONS. IT IS A FACT THAT AFTER THE DEPLOYMENT IN THE WEST AGAINST THE WILL OF THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE WE

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STATED THAT THE PRGUE AND MOSCO PROPOSALS WERE STILL VALID. THIS TESTIFIES TO OUR DETERMINATION AND WILL WHILE SHOWING RESPECT FOR DIFFERENT VIEWS AND OPINIONS. STILL WE ARE FULLY AGREED IN THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES OF MANKIND. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THIS YEAR THAT ALL OUR VIEWS POINT IN THE SAME DIRECTION TOWARDS THE RENUNCIATION OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACEFUL RELNS. I WAS ALSO ABLE TO COMPARE REPORTS OF THE GROMYKO/SHULTZ MTG WITH THEIR PUBLIC SPEECHES. SOME WORDS MIGHT HAVE APPEARED TOO HARSH. WE HAVE LET GO BY A CHANCE. WE MADE OUR PROPOSALS IN VIENN. THE LEAST ONE CAN EXPECT IS DISCUSSIONS ON THESE PROPOSALS FROM WHICH RESULTS WILL BE OBTAINED ONLY BY COMPROMISE. WE ALSO MADE OUR PROPOSALS ON INF AND START IN DUE TIME AND THE NEGOTIATORS SAT DEAF AND DUMB AT THE TABLE WHILE ONLY THE MEDIA WERE ACTIVE. WE EXPECT THEY COULD HAVE BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL IN DISCUSSIONS THAN OPEN DISPUTE. WE HAVE SIMILAR FEELINGS AND HOPES FOR STKHM AND VIENN AND AGREE TO WORK TOWARDS ACHIEVING POSITIVE RESULTS. BUT WITH EACH MONTHS PASSING WERE PASSING UP A CHANCE AND THIS IS COUNTER TO OUR OBJECIVES.

END OF MORNING SESSION. REPORT ON AFTERNOON SESSION WILL FOLLOW BY TEL 17FEB.

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FM MOSCO XYGR0229 16FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 160900

INFO PMOOTT/AXWIRTHY PCOOTT/FOWLER BONN BRU WSHDC BNATO IDN PARIS
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DISTR DMF IFB IDA (IDDZ IDR FER RBD RBG UGB ZSP ZSI

REF OURTEL 0226 15FEB

---PMS MTG WITH CHERNENKO SOVIET MEDIA REPORT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TASS ACCT OF 15FEB MTG BETWEEN PM AND NEWLY
ELECTED GENSEC OF CPSU ACCT WAS READ ON SOVIET TV NEWS PROGRAM

VREMYA 15FEB AND APPEARED 16FEB ON FRONT PAGE OF PRAVDA:

QUOTE/ON THE 15TH OF FEB THE GENSEC OF THE CC OF THE CPSU K U
CHERNENKO RECEIVED IN THE KREMLIN THE PM OF CDA P E TRUDEAU AND
HAD WITH HIM A CONVERSATION. TAKING PART IN THE CONVERSATION WAS
MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPSU. FIRST DEPUTY
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR. MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, A A GROMYKO.

2. K U CHERNENKO EXPRESSED GRATITUDE ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP FOR THE RESPECT SHOWN BY THE GOVT AND PEOPLE OF CDA FOR
THE MEMORY OF Y V ANDROPOV.

3. IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED
SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE INCREASED TENSION IN THE WORLD.
IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SOVIET UNION AND CDA CONFIRMED
THEIR READINESS TO STRIVE FOR A RETURN TO THE PATH OF
DETENTE AND THE CREATION AND PROMOTION OF CONFIDENCE IN

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PAGE TWO XYGR0229 UNCLAS

RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES.

4.THE SOVIET SIDE EMPHASIZED THAT THE USSR HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH ALL COUNTRIES WHICH SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON A FAIR AND EQUAL BASIS AND SHOULD BE AIMED AT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CONCRETE AGREEMENTS.

5.ALSO EXPRESSED WAS THE MUTUAL INTENT TO UTILIZE ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES FOR THE BROADENING AND DEEPENING OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND CDA.

6.IN THE CONVERSATION ALSO PARTICIPATING ON THE SOVIET SIDE WERE ASSTS TO THE GENSEC OF THE CC OF THE CPSU. A M ALEXANDROV AND VV PRIBYTKOV ON THE CDN SIDE ALSO PARTICIPATED THE DIRGEN OF A DEPT IN THE MFA OF CDA,P HANCOCK.AND THE CDN AMB TO THE USSR,P ROBERTS.UNQUOTE

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ACTION
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INFO BUCST PRGUE WSAW BNATO ATHNS BGRAD

DISTR RGB RCD RCR RBD RBR IFB IDR IDA

REF VOTRETEL

---VISITE DU PM EN EUROPE DE L EST

MAE A BEAUCOUP APPRECIE DE RECEVOIR BRIEFING. AMBS DE TURQUIE AVAIENT SOUMIS RAPPORTS QUE NOS INFOS COMPLETAIENT UTILEMENT.

2. GUVENER, CHEF DU DEPT D EUROPE DE L EST ET DE ASIE A SOULIGNE COMPLETE IDENTITE DE VUES AVEC CDA. AVANT TOUT, TURCS ETAIENT D ACCORD SUR STRATEGIE. IL ETAIT UTILE DE ROMPRE L ISOLEMENT DE CES PAYS IL FALLAIT LEUR PERMETTRE DE PRENDRE POSITION INDIVIDUELLEMENT MEME SI DEVIATION DE LA LIGNE DU PARTI N ETAIT PAS POSSIBLE.

3. EXPERIENCE TURQUE EN EUROPE DE L EST ETAIT LA MEME QUE LA NOTRE. AU DEBUT, INTERLOCUTEURS JOUAIENT LE DISQUE POUR BIEN DEMONTRER A MOSCO LA FIDELITE A L EVANGILE. PUIS, SANS ROMPRE SUR LE FOND AVEC L ORTHODOXIE, ILS SE DETENDAIENT. TURCS AVAIENT DES CONSULTATIONS AVEC ROUMANIE ET TCHECOSLOVAQUIE MAIS N AVAIENT PAS BEAUCOUP DE CONTACT AVEC ALLEMAGNE DE L EST. GIVE AND TAKE EN COURS DE DISCUSSION AVAIT LIEU SEULEMENT AVEC ROUMANIE. AVEC LES AUTRES PAYS, LES POSITIONS ETAIENT ETABLIES DE PART ET D AUTRE SANS QUE L ON TENTE VRAIMENT DE LES CONFRONTER.

4. TURCS EXPLIQUENT ACTIVISME DE CEAUSESCU ESSENTIELLEMENT COMME DERIVATIF A DIFFICILE SITU INTERIEURE. PROPOS TENUS AU PM SONT

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PAGE DEUX ZEGR0226 CONFD

SEMBLABLES A CEUX FORMULES LORS DE VISITE CEAUSESCU EN TURQUIE A L ETE DE 1983.OBSERVATION QU IL A FAITE EN PARTICULIER AU SUJET DES MISSILES AMERICAINS EN SICILE VIENT TOUT DROIT DE SA FIXATION SUR UNE ZONE NON NUCLEAIRE DANS LES BALKANS.CEAUSESCU PRETEND EN EFFET QU ON PEUT DE NUCLEARISER LES BALKANS PARCE QUE LES DEUX SUPER PUISSANCES S EQUILIBRENT AVEC DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES SUR LES FLANCS.CEAUSESCU A ESSAYE DE CONVAINCRE PRES TURC QUE PRESENCE D ARMES NUCLEAIRES SUR TERRITOIRE D UN PAYS AURAIT POUR EFFET D ATTIRER VERS LUI,LE CAS ECHEANT,UNE ATTAQUE NUCLEAIRE.EN BON MILITAIRE PRES TURC A REPONDU QU IL NE COMPRENAIT PAS LE RAISONNEMENT.A CE COMPTE LA,IL FAUDRAIT ELIMINER LES FORCES ARMEES ET LES BASES MILITAIRES CAR ELLES RISQUENT DE PROVOQUER UNE ATTAQUE DE L EXTERIEUR.

5.TURCS ONT L IMPRESSION QUE CEAUSESCU FAIT PREUVE DE PLUS D ORTHODOXIE SUR LES FNI DEPUIS LA VISITE DE GROMYKO

MATHIEU

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SUITE A DONNER

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FM PMOOTT PM00176 26FEB84

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ NDHQOTT/CPP

INFO MOSCO LDN PARIS PEKIN CNGNY BON LSBON MADRID BRU HAGUE

COPEN OSLO STKHM ROME ATHNS ANKRA BNATO VMBFR GENEV WSAW PRAGUE
BGRAD BUCST

TRANSCRIPT OF A SCRUM WITH THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING A MEETING
WITH KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE USSR, MOSCOW, FEBRUARY 15, 1984.

TRANSCRIPTION D UNE ENTREVUE SUR LE VIF ACCORDEE PAR LE PREMIER
MINISTRE A LA SUITE D UNE REUNION AVEC M KONSTANTIN TSCHERNENKO,
SECRETAIRE GENERAL DU PARTI COMMUNISTE DE L URSS, A MOSCOU, LE 15
FEVRIER 1984.

Q. CHRISTOPHER YOUNG, SOUTHAM NEWS: PRIME MINISTER, DOES
THIS TRIP COMPLETE OR END THE PHASE OF YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE AS FAR
AS THE TRAVEL PART OF IT GOES?

A. I CANT PREDICT WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY NEED FOR
FURTHER TRAVEL. ~~CERTAINLY IT COMPLETES ONE CYCLE.~~ AS WE LEFT EACH
OTHER, THE GENERAL SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT WE COULD MEET AGAIN AND
WE COULD CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE--CERTAINLY CANADA AND THE SOVIET
UNION. THERE ARE NO/NO PLANS FOR ANY MEETING AT THIS TIME.

Q. I DONT MEAN JUST THE SOVIET UNION. I MEAN OTHER WORLD
LEADERS.

A. WELL, THATS ALL I CAN THINK OF FOR NOW.

Q. JAN LASOWSKI, CBC: PRIME MINISTER, WHAT IS THE STATUS

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NOW OF YOUR PLAN TO HAVE LEADERS OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS COME TOGETHER FOR A SUMMIT CONFERENCE? IS THAT STILL A PRACTICAL IDEA AS FAR AS YOU ARE CONCERNED? DID MR. CHERNENKO HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY ABOUT IT, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER?

A. WELL I WAS ENCOURAGED THAT MR GROMYKO YESTERDAY IN THE STATEMENT REFERRED TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS AND I DID RETURN TO THAT TODAY IN MY DISCUSSIONS, URGING THEM THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL, ON SOME OCCASION, SHOULD GET THE FIVE TOGETHER SEEING AS THEY ARE, COLLECTIVELY, THAT THEY WOULD BE SUPPORTIVE OF IT. I HAVE NO/NO ANSWER TO THAT. WE WILL HAVE TO SEE HOW EVENTS DEVELOP.

I DID POINT OUT TO THEM THAT THERE WAS A POLITICAL WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS--THAT IS, BETWEEN NOW AND JUNE--WITH THE MBFR MEETING SCHEDULED FOR VIENNA IN MARCH, WITH THE NATO REVIEW OF EAST-WEST POLITICAL RELATIONS TO BE PRESENTED TO NATO IN MAY, WITH ANOTHER MONTH OR SO TO GO IN THIS STAGE OF THE MEETING IN STOCKHOLM, WITH AN ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN JUNE WHERE WE ALWAYS DO RETURN TO POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND EAST-WEST AND, PERHAPS, WITH THE FACT THAT, AFTER JUNE, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WILL BE IN FULL SWING. SO, I DID TRY TO IMPRESS ON THEM THAT THERE WAS A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY WHERE THE POLITICIANS COULD SEND SIGNALS AND MAKE POSITIVE GESTURES AND TAKE SMALL STEPS.

I THINK THAT ONE THAT WE MUST TAKE IS ON THE MBFR: WE MUST

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ANSWER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF LAST JUNE. MR GROMYKO, IN THE EXCHANGE THIS AFTERNOON, ALSO RETURNED TO THAT. I THINK THEY FIND IT VERY SIGNIFICANT. IT WILL BE SIGNIFICANT TO US, TOO, WHAT WE SAY THERE AND HE INSISTED ON REDUCTION OF ARMS--NOT/NOT INCREASE OF CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH, REDUCTION. THE WORDS BALANCE AND EQUILIBRIUM CAME BACK CONSTANTLY IN HIS OPENING, WELCOMING NOTES. THE GENERAL SECRETARY BEGAN, PRACTICALLY, BY SAYING THAT POLITICAL DIALOGUE WAS IMPORTANT, THAT HE VALUED THE CANADIAN INITIATIVE IN ITS USEFULNESS AND PRACTICALITY AND, AS I SUGGESTED EARLIER, SAID THAT WE COULD CONTINUE DIALOGUING ON THIS MATTER.

Q. JE CROIS QUE M MAUROY A PRESENTE (INAUDIBLE) IL EST UN HOMME OUVERT (INAUDIBLE). QUELLE EST VOTRE IMPRESSION DE LA PERSONNALITE DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL?

R. UN HOMME SOLIDE, REALISTE, QUI NE SE PERD PAS DANS LES MOTS. IL EST ARRIVE CERTAINEMENT DANS MON CAS DROIT AU BUT. IL A VOULU PARLER DE L INITIATIVE CANADIENNE DE RECHERCHE DE LA PAIX. IL EN A PARLE ABANDAMMENT. NOUS AVONS EU TRES PEU DE TEMPS POUR LES QUESTIONS BILATERALES. SIMPLEMENT, IL A EXPRIME LE VOEU QUE NOUS PUISSIONS LES POURSUIVRE A D AUTRES OCCASIONS, MAIS IL PARAISSAIT CERTAINEMENT SAVOIR LA OU IL VOULAIT ALLER, PAS DE FLOTTEMENT DANS LES PRINCIPES ET JE PENSE QU IL ETAIT REMARQUABLE EN CE SENS QU IL NE RECHIGNAIT PAS A PROPOS DU PASSE. IL N EST PAS REVENU SUR DES CONDITIONS ANTERIEURES,

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IL N A PAS PARLE DES INF, DU DEPLOIEMENT. IL N A PAS PARLE DU PRESIDENT AMERICAIN. IL EST VENU DROIT AU BUT. C EST UN HOMME PARFAITEMENT PRATIQUE ET JE SUIS CONVAINCU QUE (INAUDIBLE).

Q. MARK PHILLIPS, CBC: PRIME MINISTER, LET ME ASK A TWO-PART QUESTION. THE FIRST IS, DO YOU STILL CONSIDER YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE TO BE ALIVE AND, IF SO, WHAT IS THE NEXT STEP IN IT? AND, FOLLOWING UP ON YOUR PREVIOUS ANSWER HERE, IN THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S LACK OF REFERENCE TO SOME OF THE PROBLEMS IN NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL NOW, DID YOU CONCLUDE THAT HE WAS, THEREFORE, OPEN TO MOVING FORWARD IN THOSE AREAS OR OTHER TYPES OF TALKS?

A. AS FOR THE FIRST PART OF YOUR QUESTION, OBVIOUSLY THE WHOLE THRUST OF THE INITIATIVE WAS TO INJECT POLITICAL ENERGY, TO LOWER THE MEGAPHONES, AND THESE THINGS ARE HAPPENING. IN THAT SENSE, THE INITIATIVE IS NOT/NOT ONLY ALIVE, I GUESS ITS BECOMING PRACTICAL REALITY—NOW THAT WE ARE NOT/NOT SHOUTING, NOW THAT WE ARE TALKING, NOW THAT WE HAVE RETURNED TO THE POLITICAL CONTACT IN STOCKHOLM AND THAT WE WILL ALSO BE RESUMING IN VIENNA.

OBVIOUSLY, THE INITIATIVE BEGINS TO LIVE. HOWEVER, IT WILL DEPEND ON WHAT WE CAN DELIVER. GROMYKO TOOK ME UP ON MY WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY AND SAID QUOTE YES, THERE IS THAT WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY AND WE WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT YOU PUT SOMETHING INTO IT, TOO UNQUOTE. AND I SAID THAT I DID FEEL THAT WE HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO ANSWER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF LAST JUNE ON MBFR, BUT THAT IF THEY JUST LET US SEND ...5

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SIGNALS, AND NO/NO POSITIVE SIGNALS COME IN RETURN, THEN THAT WINDOW WOULD BE CLOSED.

SO I FEEL THAT THERE IS A DOUBLE RESPONSIBILITY. WE UNDERTOOK FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WITHIN NATO, WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, TO MAKE SURE THAT THE THRUST OF THE CANADIAN INITIATIVE TO ASSUME POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY WOULD VERY MUCH REMAIN ALIVE.

Q. ON THE SECOND PART OF THAT QUESTION, THOUGH, THE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE LACK OF REFERENCE TO THE TROUBLES OF THE PAST..?
A. I FOUND THAT A POSITIVE STEP, THAT THERE WAS NOT/NOT A RETURN TO THE RECRIMINATIONS AND THE STRIDENCY AND CERTAINLY NO/NO PRECONDITIONS. THEY STARTED, AS I SAY, TO TALK ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND HE MADE TWO CONDITIONS--BUT THERE WERENT PRECONDITIONS--THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED AS BETWEEN EQUALS, AND THE SECOND THAT THEY WOULD NOT/NOT DIALOGUE ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF DIALOGUE, THEY WOULD HAVE TO LEAD SOMEWHERE. THEY WOULD HAVE TO SHOW PROGRESS. AND AS I POINTED OUT, THATS A TWO-WAY STREET, WE TOO FEEL THAT WE HAVE SOME ANSWERS TO GIVE IN RETURN FOR THE SAME THING, BUT THE NATO REVIEW WHICH IS IN PROGRESS NOW AND WHICH WILL BE REPORTED IN MAY, WILL BE VERY MUCH INFLUENCED BY WHAT THEY ALSO DO.

I GUESS YOU ALL NOTED THAT IN YESTERDAYS SPEECHES THERE WAS AN APPARENT EFFORT--I THOUGHT IT WAS SIGNIFICANT--IN WHAT THEY DIDNT SAY, AS WELL AS WHAT THEY SAID. THEY DIDNT RETURN ONCE AGAIN TO INF, TO FORMER OPINIONS THEY HAVE EXPRESSED ABOUT PRESIDENT ...6

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REAGAN, AND SO ON. SO I BELIEVE THERE IS AN OPENNESS ON BOTH SIDES, A READINESS, AND IT WOULD BE FOR POLITICIANS EVERYWHERE TO RESPOND TO THE DESIRE--THE GOALS--TO USE THIS IMPROVED CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SAFETY NET THAT WE WERE LAYING OUT FOR POST-JANUARY 1 HAS PRODUCED ONE IN THAT SENSE.

Q. STUART GORDON, CNN: DID YOU TALK SPECIFICALLY ABOUT INF AND (INAUDIBLE) OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS, AND IF SO, DID HE GIVE YOU ANY IDEA THAT THEY MAY BE WILLING TO COMPROMISE THEIR POSITION?

A. I DON'T THINK THEY KNOW. WE DIDN'T TALK SPECIFICALLY ON THAT--CERTAINLY NOT/NOT THE INF--BUT THE GENERAL SECRETARY TALKED SPECIFICALLY OF THE NEED TO REDUCE THE NUCLEAR THREAT AND REDUCE THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR ARMS SIGNIFICANTLY IN A MAJOR WAY, HOPING FOR REAL PROGRESS.

Q. JEAN-PIERRE QUITTARD, RADIO-CANADA: IL Y A, EN CE MOMENT, DEUX ATTITUDES A MOSCOU. IL Y A DES OPTIMISTES QUI PENSENT QU'AVEC M. CHERNENKO IL VA Y AVOIR UN DIALOGUE, ET LES REALISTES QUI PENSENT (INAUDIBLE) QU'IL N'Y A RIEN A ESPERER. DANS QUELLE CATEGORIE VOUS SITUEZ-VOUS, LES REALISTES OU LES OPTIMISTES, ET QUELLE EST, POUR VOUS, L'IMPORTANCE DE CETTE NOUVELLE ELECTION POUR VOTRE CROISADE POUR LA PAIX?

R. JE VOUDRAIS ME CATEGORISER DANS LE GROUPE DES REALISTES. JE NE CROIS PAS A L'OPTIMISME. JE CROIS AU DESESPOIR

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SURMONTE, COMME DISAIT BERNANOS. JE CROIS QUE CE N'EST PAS UN RETOUR EN ARRIERE. C'EST UN REGARD EN AVANT MAIS CA NE VEUT PAS DIRE QU'IL Y AURA UN VIRAGE BRUSQUE. LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL A EMPLOYE A PLUSIEURS REPRISES LE MOT CIT DETENTE FINCI, ET JE PENSE QU'IL Y AURA UNE CONTINUITE AVEC (INAUDIBLE). EFFECTIVEMENT LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL M'A ACCUEILLI EN SE REFERANT A LA RENCONTRE QUE NOUS AVIONS EUE A HELSINKI EN 1975 ET DANS CE SENS-LA IL Y AURA UNE CONTINUITE, MAIS UNE CONTINUITE DANS LE DIALOGUE. C'EST LE MOT QU'IL A LUI-MEME EMPLOYE AU DEBUT. IL N'Y AVAIT PAS DE SENTIMENT DE RUPTURE, NI D'IMMOBILISME. IL FAUT ATTENDRE QUE NOUS AYONS FORME NOTRE OPINION. IL FAUT LAISSER PASSER LE TEMPS, LAISSER PASSER LES ELECTIONS. IL N'Y AVAIT RIEN DE CA. C'ETAIT MAINTENANT, C'EST (INAUDIBLE). ALORS IL FAUT REGARDER L'AVENIR AVEC L'ESPOIR.

Q. ET POUR VOTRE MISSION POUR LA PAIX, C'EST IMPORTANT?

R. MA MISSION, CE N'EST PAS IMPORTANT. CE QUI EST IMPORTANT, C'EST QUE LE MONDE, LES LEADERS POLITIQUES MARCHENT VERS LA PAIX. COMME IL ETAIT INDIQUE, ILS SEMBLANT, EUX, DISPOSES A MARCHER VERS LA PAIX SANS RECRIMINATION, SANS RESSASSER LES VIEILLES HISTOIRES. JE CROIS QUE C'EST AUSSI L'ATTITUDE DE L'ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE. NOUS L'AVONS INDIQUE ASSEZ CLAIREMENT A BRUXELLES, EN DECEMBRE, LORSQUE NOUS AVONS PARLE DU BESOIN DE RENOUER LE DIALOGUE SUR UN PIED D'EGALITE, NON SUR UNE BASE DE SUPERIORITE, DE SUPERIEUR A INFERIEUR. NOUS AVONS INDIQUE CLAIREMENT QUE NOUS ENTENDIONS

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RESPECTER LES INTERETS DE L AUTRE, COMME NOUS VOULIONS QU IL RESPECTE
LES NOTRES. CA, C EST UNE BASE POLITIQUE. DE NOTRE COTE, A CAUSE DE
L HIATUS DES DERNIERS MOIS, NOUS NE SAVIONS PAS COMMENT EUX ALLAIENT
(INAUDIBLE), MAIS MA CONCLUSION, C EST QU ILS SONT TOUT A FAIT SUR LA
MEME LONGUEUR D ONDES QUE NOUS. JE DOIS DIRE QU EFFECTIVEMENT CELA
PRENDRA UN PEU DE TEMPS.

Q. JOHN BURNS, NEW YORK TIMES: PRIME MINISTER, AS THE
HEAD OF A NATO GOVERNMENT THAT HAS SUPPORTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE
MISSILES IN EUROPE, DID YOU FIND IT NECESSARY TO SPEAK THE NATO
POSITION ON THIS OR TO ARGUE FROM A NATO POSITION FOR A SOVIET
RETURN TO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, IN PARTICULAR. AND THE SECOND PART
OF THE QUESTION, ON A DIFFERENT MATTER, DID MR CHERNENKO, AT ANY
POINT, CITE SPECIFICALLY THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF HIS PREDECESSOR,
MR ANDROPOV, ON THIS OR OTHER ARMS ISSUES? THE MOST RECENT MAJOR
SOVIET STATEMENT ON ARMS WAS ON JANUARY 25 BY MR ANDROPOV, AND IT
WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW IF HE IS CITING THAT IN REFERENCE TO
INF OR (INAUDIBLE)

A. THERE WAS NO/NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO INF. THERE WAS NO/NO
SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ANY PARTICULAR FORUM, GENEVA OR STOCKHOLM--
WITH THE EXCEPTION AS I SAID, OF VIENNA. YOU COULD INTERPRET MANY
OF THE THINGS HE SAID AS BEING CONDUCTED AT ONE OR OTHER OF THOSE
FORUMS. HE DID TALK OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES--THAT MIGHT BE
STOCKHOLM; HE DID TALK OF THE NEED TO REDUCE THE NUCLEAR ARMS
...9

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DRASTICALLY--AND THAT COULD BE GENEVA.BUT THERE WAS NO/NO INDICATION ON HIS PART THAT HE HAD CHOSEN A FORUM OR THE MESSAGE.

THERE WAS A GREAT OPENNESS AND EFFORT TO INDICATE THAT THEY WANTED THE DIALOGUE TO RESUME IN WHATEVER FORUM,IN WHATEVER WAY THAT BOTH SIDES COULD AGREE ON.

ON THE FIRST PART OF YOUR QUESTION,THE ANSWER IS NO/NO.I MADE NO/NO EFFORT TO JUSTIFY OUR PAST POSITION NOR/NOR TO ATTACK THEIRS.ON THE CONTRARY,I INDICATED THAT THE CDN INITIATIVE SPRUNG FROM THE ALMOST INEVITABILITY OF A DEADLOCK ARISING TOWARDS THE END OF 1983.AND IT IS BECAUSE IT WAS MORE AND MORE OBVIOUS,PARTICULARLY AFTER THE KOREAN AIRLINE DISASTER,THAT THERE WAS NOT/NOT A PERIOD OF FRUITFUL EXCHANGE,THAT THERE WOULD BE A KIND OF A BUILDUP TOWARDS THE DEADLINE THAT HAD BEEN SET IN DECEMBER 1979--THE DEADLINE OF DECEMBER 1983--THAT THE WHOLE CANADIAN INITIATIVE WAS BEING CONCERNED WITH WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER,TO FILL THAT VACUUM.WOULD BOTH SIDES SLAM THE DOOR AND TURN THEIR BACKS ON EACH OTHER FOREVER? WOULD THEY KEEP SHOUTING DURING THE WHOLE YEAR OF 1984 AND BEYOND? OR WOULD OUR SIDE SUGGEST THAT WE SET THE MEGAPHONES ASIDE AND BEGIN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS,AND WOULD THEIR SIDE RESPOND IN THE SAME WAY? WE WERE LOOKING BEYOND 1983 AND,IN MY TALKS WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY,I WAS LOOKING BEYOND 1983 BECAUSE WE ARE HERE AND NOW. ITS A SHORT WINDOW,AS I SAY,BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF JUNE.

Q. ANY REFERENCE TO MR ANDROPOVS STATEMENT?

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R. NO/NO REFERENCE, NO/NO QUOTED REFERENCE TO HIS STATEMENTS.

CERTAINLY NOTHING, AS I SAID EARLIER, RETURNING TO INF SPECIFICALLY. THE ONLY CONDITIONS THAT WE HAD HEARD. NO/NO PRECONDITIONS. THE ONE RETURN TO THE PAST, THE LINK TO THE PAST, AS I SAID EARLIER IN FRENCH, WAS TO DETENTE: AT THE 1975 MEETING WE HAD IN HELSINKI AND TO THE NEED TO RETURN TO THAT PERIOD.

Q. YOU SAID THAT IT WAS WHAT WAS LEFT UNSAID YESTERDAY WHICH YOU CONSIDERED IMPORTANT. I AM WONDERING IF YOU COULD DEFINE WHATEVER SIGNAL YOU MAY HAVE SEEN YESTERDAY OR MAY HAVE RECEIVED IN YOUR MEETING TODAY THAT WOULD SUGGEST A DEPARTURE FROM THE ANDROPOV PERIOD, AND WHAT FRESH OPPORTUNITIES YOU SEE NOW.

A. MR ANDROPOV HAD PRETTY WELL TO LIVE UP TO THE THREAT THAT HE HAD DELIVERED: THAT IF THE WEST DEPLOYED, THEY WOULD BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS. AND THE WHOLE QUESTION--PRACTICALLY THE SOLE QUESTION--IN OUR MINDS IS HOW CAN HE COME BACK TO THE TABLE AT SOME POINT HAVING SAID THAT HE WOULD LEAVE. AS CHURCHILL ALWAYS USED TO SAY, ITS EASIER TO LEAVE THAN TO COME BACK. YOU SAY, WELL THATS THE OPPOSITION THAT HES TALKING ABOUT. YOU KNOW, THEYVE LEFT THE TABLE, HOW DO THEY COME BACK? EVERYONE WAS CONJECTURING ON THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE AND WHAT WAY IT WOULD HAPPEN AND SO ON. WELL, THERES A NEW MAN THERE, A MAN WHO WAS NOT PARTICULARLY AN ANDROPOV MAN--HE GOES BACK TO BREZHNEV AND THE DAYS OF DETENTE--THEREFORE HE DOESNT HAVE TO BE SADDLED WITH SPECIFIC POSITIONS. I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT ...11

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THERE WILL BE A TURN-AROUND OR AN INTERRUPTION OF CONTINUITY, BUT THERE IS AN OCCASION TO RETURN TO THE TABLE, OR TO RETURN TO THE DIALOGUE IN (INAUDIBLE) AND I CANT BLAME THEM FOR SAYING QUOTE WELL OKAY, YOU'RE USING THE RIGHT WORDS NOW, BUT WHAT ARE GOING TO BE YOUR ACTIONS? UNQUOTE. WE USE THE SAME LANGUAGE WITH THEM, YOU KNOW. THEY'RE TRYING TO TALK TO YOU, BUT WHAT WILL YOU DO IN ACTIONS. BOTH SIDES ARE SAYING THE SAME THING: TALK, LOWER THE DECIBELS, (INAUDIBLE) SOMETHING TO TAKE A SMALL STEP. WE ARE TELLING THEM QUOTE WELL, YOU TAKE ONE, TOO UNQUOTE AND I THINK THAT IS OPEN OF US. ITS A NEW BALL-GAME, A NEW PITCHER.

1. NEWSWEEK: COULD YOU TELL US A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE WORKING STYLE BETWEEN MR CHERNENKO AND MR GROMYKO. DID CHERNENKO USE NOTES, HOW MUCH OF A LOAD DID HE CARRY AS OPPOSED TO MR GROMYKO AND WHAT WAS YOUR IMPRESSION OF CHERNENKOS ABILITY TO DEAL IN SPECIFIC TERMS WITH THE ISSUES INVOLVED.

A. WELL THATS A MORE DIFFICULT QUESTION. WE HAD THIRTY MINUTES TOGETHER, MORE OR LESS, AND AS YOU KNOW HALF OF IT IS TAKEN BY TRANSLATION, SO ITS PRETTY HARD TO FORM A DEFINITIVE JUDGEMENT. BUT CERTAINLY MR CHERNENKO HAD A PROGRAM. HE DID HAVE NOTES. HE HAD A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THINGS HE WANTED TO SAY. HE SAID THEM AND HE REPEATED SOME OF THEM, PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING ME TO PURSUE THE INITIATIVE. THEY FOUND THAT IT HAD VALUE, THAT IT WAS USEFUL AND PRACTICAL. PRACTICAL IS A WORD THAT CAME BACK SEVERAL TIMES. SO, I IMAGINE THAT HE KNEW WHAT HE WANTED TO SAY IN HIS SHORT PERIOD OF ...12

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TIME, AND I IMAGINE IT WAS THE SAME WITH THE OTHER LEADERS. HE WAS
CARRYING THE MAIN THRUST OF THE POLICY--THE MESSAGE THAT THEY
WANTED TO GET THROUGH; GROMYKO WAS MORE AD LIBBING AND REFERING A BIT
MORE TO THE ISSUES THAT I HAD RAISED.

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NEW YORKGeneral Relations &
SECTION: Public Affairs/GRPA
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M./Mad. WeatherupTO : Mr./Ms.
A : M./Mad.Department:
Service : EXTOTT:

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Objet :

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 16/2/84

" CHERNENKO RIPS M.S. "

2/2
DN 16/2/84



Konstantin Chernenko—blasts U.S.

Chernenko rips U.S

Moscow (UPI)—The Soviet Union's new leader, Konstantin Chernenko, attacked U.S. policy in Central America and the "aggressive intrigues of U.S. imperialism" in meetings yesterday with the leaders of Cuba and Nicaragua.

The official Tass news agency, reporting on Chernenko's meeting with Nicaraguan junta leader Daniel Ortega, said "both sides strongly denounced Washington's intention to whip up tension, to interfere in the internal affairs of countries in that region and to impose its writ on them."

Chernenko, who succeeded the late Yuri Andropov as general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, then met with Cuban President Fidel Castro and repeated Kremlin backing for Havana's opposition to "the aggressive intrigues of U.S. imperialism."

CHERNENKO'S ATTACK on the United States came less than 24 hours after he met with Vice

President Bush, who said the new Kremlin leader agrees that "constructive" steps are needed to halt the decline in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Chernenko's latest remarks indicated Central America remained one of the biggest obstacles, along with the Middle East and nuclear arms, toward improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

Chernenko also met with Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who is making an independent bid to ease superpower tensions.

"The general secretary talked specifically about the need to reduce the nuclear threat and reduce the number of nuclear arms significantly. He's hoping for real progress," Trudeau said.

Trudeau said that in his meeting with Chernenko, "There was no return to the stridency we've heard from both sides in the past."

Of the breakdown in U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks, Trudeau called Chernenko a "new man" and added, "therefore he doesn't have to be saddled with a specific position."

But in a meeting with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on Tuesday, Tass reported, Chernenko said the Soviets would not return to the Geneva talks until NATO removes all U.S. cruise and Pershing-2 missiles from Europe.

The talks on intermediate-range nuclear missiles and strategic arms broke down last November after NATO countries began deploying the first of 572 U.S. missiles planned to be installed in Western Europe.

**ACTION
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A EXTCTT/IDDZ

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN LDN PARIS LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS
ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY WSHDC GENEV
TOKYO STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MDN/CDS/ADMPOL/CP
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR UGB URR IDD IDA IDR
FPR RWP

---ESPAGNE - MISSION TRUDEAU

LENTEMENT LA MISSION DE PAIX DU PM TRUDEAU FAIT SON CHEMEN DANS
LA PRESSE ESPAGNOLE. CE MATIN 16FEV, LES DEUX PRINCIPAUX QUOTIDIENS
DE MDRID EN PARLENT DANS LE CONTEXTE DE L'ENTRETIEN DU PM AVEC
CHERNIENKO.

2. SOUS LA MANCHETTE CIT TRUDEAU CROIT VOIR UNE FENETRE OUVERTE
SUR L'ESPERANCE CIT VENTANA A LA ESPERANZA FINCI APRES SON
ENTREVUE DE 35 MINS AVEC LE LEADER SOVIETIQUE CONSTANTIN CHERNIENKO
SE MONTRE PARTISAN DUNE POLITIQUE DE DETENTE DURANT SES CONTACTS
AVEC LES DIRIGEANTS OCCIDENTAUX FINCI. LE CORRESPONDANT A MOSCOU
DE CIT EL PAIS FINCI ECRIT CE QUI SUIT:

CIT LE PM CDN PIERRE TRUDEAU FUT LE DERNIER DES DIRIGEANTS
OCCIDENTAUX A RENCONTRER LE NOUVEAU LEADER SOVIETIQUE CONSTANTIN
CHERNIENKO. SELON CE QUE TRUDEAU A DECLARE APRES UNE RENCONTRE DE
35 MINS, LE SEC GEN DU PCUS A FAIT PLUSIEURS REFS A LA DETENTE DANS
L'ESPRIT DE L'ERE DE LEONID BREZNEV, PRECEDESSEUR DE YURI ANDROPOV

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LE CHEF DU GOUVT CDN A PRESSE CHERNIENKO DE PROFITER DE LA FENETRE OUVERTE SUR L'ESPERANCE DURANT LES PROCHAINS MOIS. CIT LE SECGEN A UTILISE PLUSIEURS FOIS LE MOT DETENTE JE CROIS QU'IL CONTINUERA DANS LA FOULEE DE BREZNEV QUI EST CELLE DE LA DETENTE. FINCIT, DIT TRUDEAU. PIERRE TRUDEAU A CITE COMME OCCASIONS IMMEDIATES DE RECHERCHER LA DETENTE, LA CONFERENCE DE STOCKHOLM ET LA REUNION DE MARS A VIENNE SUR LES ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES. LE LEADER CDN A PRESENTE A CHERNIENKO SON PLAN POUR UNE CONFERENCE INNOUVELEE DES CINQ PUISSANCES ATOMIQUES. FINCIT.

3. DANS CIT ABC FINCIT LA MANCHETTE EST LA SUIVANTE: CIT CHERNIENKO FAIT ALLUSION A UN CLIMAT DE DETENTE DURANT SA RENCONTRE AVEC TRUDEAU. LE PM CDN NE CROIT PAS EN UN CHANGEMENT IMMINENT. FINCIT. LE CORRESPONDANT DE MOSCOU DE CE JOURNAL ECRIT:

CIT CHERNIENKO, NOUVEAU SECGEN DU PCUS, A PRIS EN MAIN IMMEDIATEMENT LES DOSSIERS DE POLITIQUE INNOUEE ET S'EST PRONONCE POUR LA DETENTE. MOT QUI SELON LES OBSERVATEURS ETAIT DISPARU DE LA TERMINOLOGIE DURANT LES QUINZE MOIS DU MANDAT DE YURI ANDROPOV. L'INSISTANCE DU NOUVEAU SECGEN A RECHERCHER UN CLIMAT DE DETENTE DANS LES RELATIONS EST/OUEST FUT CONFIRMEE PAR LE PM CDN PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU APRES SA RENCONTRE D'UNE DEMI-HEURE AVEC CHERNINENKO. CIT C'EST UN PAS EN AVANT. FINCIT. A SIGNALER LE PM CDN. CEPENDANT, IL S'EMPRESSA DE SIGNALER QUE CIT CECI NE VEUT PAS DIRE QU'IL FAUT S'ATTENDRE A UN CHANGEMENT BRUSQUE DE LA POSITION SOVIETIQUE. FINCIT.

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