

D-1-5(e) 1960-63-65-66-67  
DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements -  
Storage of Nuclear Weapons in Canada  
for Use by U.S. Forces

**TOP SECRET**

FILE NO. D-1-5(e)

1960-63-65-66-67

**PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE  
CANADA**

**SUBJECT**

DEFENCE

Canada-US Arrangements

Storage of Nuclear Weapons in Canada for Use by U.S. Forces

EXEMPTED RECORDS FOR FILE D-1-5(e) 60-67

Date	Description of Item	Date	Description of Item
1960-67	<u>Complete File</u> Defence Canada-US Arrangements Storage of Nuclear Weapons in Canada for Use by U.S. Forces 15 (1) (a) (d)  File to remain in PCO Review again		

## CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Name or Subject	File No.
<u>DEFENCE - Canad-US Arrangements - Storage of Nuclear Weapons in Canada for Use by U.S. Forces</u>	<u>D-1-5(e)</u>
Regarding	Date

See also: T-1-2(a) (for discussion on Storage of nuclear weapons in Canada  
for use by U.S. Force by U.S.-Canada Working Group on  
Principles of Co-operation)

**SEE**

Name or Subject

File No.

D-1-30

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE



CANADA

BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

SECRET

RECORD OF CABINET DECISION

Meeting of July 26th, 1967

(Cab. Doc. 439-67, July 20 & 440-67, July 19)

Agreement Between Canada And The United States For  
The Storage Of Nuclear Weapons At A United  
States Leased Base In Newfoundland For  
The United States Forces

The Cabinet approved the recommendations of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, as endorsed by the Cabinet Committee on External Affairs and Defence that

(a) the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to sign on behalf of the government of Canada an Agreement with the United States for the storage of nuclear weapons at a United States Leased Base in Newfoundland for the United States Forces, it being understood that no authority would be sought from the Governor in Council as the Agreement would remain secret;

(b) a contingency statement as attached to Cabinet Document 439/67 of July 20 be approved for possible future use in public statements in case of "leaks" in relation to the storage of the weapons at the base.

D. J. Leach,  
Supervisor of Cabinet Documents.

July 31st, 1967.

CABINET DOCUMENT  
No. 439167

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

D-1-5(e)

SECRET

July 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET

Agreement Between Canada and the United States  
for the Storage of Nuclear Weapons at a United  
States Leased Base in Newfoundland for the  
United States Forces

OBJECT

To seek approval for signing an Agreement with the United States Government providing for the storage of defensive airborne nuclear ASW weapons at a United States Base in Newfoundland, for United States anti-submarine forces stationed at the Base and earmarked for the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

BACKGROUND

The Cabinet agreed on November 1, 1966, that:

- (a) The United States be permitted to store airborne nuclear weapons at a U.S. Leased Base in Newfoundland, subject to the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory Agreement; and
- (b) the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to negotiate ad referendum to the Cabinet an Agreement for this purpose with the U.S. Government, such Agreement to be consistent with and not to exceed the provisions of existing Canada-United States Agreements on nuclear weapons.

FACTORS

2. Agreement has been reached ad referendum with United States officials which is consistent with and does not exceed the provisions of existing Canada-United States Agreements on nuclear weapons. The draft Agreement is patterned after the Canada-U.S.A. Exchange of Notes of September 28 and 30, 1963 (as amended by an Exchange of Notes of September 17, 1965 concerning consultation on and authorization for the use of nuclear weapons) setting out the conditions under which the storage of nuclear air to air defensive weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Bases for United States forces was permitted by Canada. The

SECRET

conditions set out in the draft Agreement are exactly the same as those contained in the 1963 Agreement; there are some changes in wording in the draft Agreement but these are the result of differences in the factual situation and they do not lead to any differences in the conditions under which the weapons are permitted to be stored. The draft Agreement, for instance, refers to airborne nuclear anti-submarine warfare weapons while the 1963 Agreement was concerned with nuclear air to air defensive weapons. There is no specific mention of NORAD in the proposed Agreement since the forces in question are not under NORAD Command but under U.S. National Command. However the draft Agreement has retained the same controls concerning authorization and possible use as those related to NORAD forces.

#### PUBLICITY

3. The proposed Agreement to permit storage of airborne nuclear ASW weapons is classified "Secret". The United States proposed that the fact of the Agreement should be classified and that there should be no public announcement concerning the Agreement. This was tentatively agreed and an appropriate contingency statement has been drawn up to meet possible leaks. Attached as Annex "A" is the text of such a contingency statement which has been agreed to by the United States. The statement makes clear that the new Agreement is designed to meet a new threat and that it is a transfer of a commitment from one base (Harmon, which is being closed down this year) to another. To conform with standard security requirements, the statement does not, however, identify the bases involved.

#### CONCLUSION

4. The draft Agreement is consistent with and does not exceed the provisions of existing Canada-United States Agreements on nuclear weapons. In addition, although the forces involved are under U.S. National Command, the draft Agreement places the same conditions on and applies similar authorization procedures to the possible employment of the nuclear weapons as apply to NORAD forces under joint Canada-United States Command.

5. It is recommended that the Cabinet agree that:

(a) The Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to sign the proposed Agreement on behalf of the Government of Canada, it being understood that no authority will be sought from Council since the Agreement is to remain "Secret";

(b) the contingency statement attached as Annex "A" be approved for use in public statements in case of leaks.

*Paul Martin*

Secretary of State for  
External Affairs

SECRET

ANNEX "A"

AGREED CONTINGENCY PRESS STATEMENT

U.S. rights to maintain nuclear storage facilities for U.S. aircraft at a leased base in Newfoundland have been relinquished by the U.S. Government. Meanwhile, the threat to this continent persists and there is a NATO requirement to have nuclear weapons available to U.S. aircraft. The Canadian Government has agreed to a transfer of nuclear storage rights to another leased base to facilitate this requirement.

This transfer does not involve the provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.

The employment of the weapons is subject to the same controls already in effect for NORAD defence weapons.

Question: What are the controls for NORAD defence weapons which the Minister has just mentioned?

Answer: The Prime Minister has explained what these controls are in a press release on August 16, 1963.

\* Briefly, it means that nuclear warheads cannot be used operationally without the authorization of the Canadian Government.]

\* The State Department has expressed the hope that the Government of Canada will not feel called upon to make this statement because of the likelihood that such a statement would create difficulties for the United States in negotiations now going on with another country (presumably Germany).

DECLASSIFICATION NOTICE

Cabinet Document Number: 440-67.

Subject File Number: D-1-5 (e)

DECLASSIFIED - MARCH 3, 1998

For authority, please refer to the February 16, 1998 letter on file 1935-2.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

D-1-5(e)

S E C R E T

July 19, 1967.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET:

Agreement between Canada and the United States  
for the Storage of Nuclear Weapons at a United  
States Leased Base in Newfoundland for the  
United States Forces

At a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on External Affairs and Defence on July 18, the Committee had for consideration a memorandum signed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence (Cab. Doc. 421/67, May 29), seeking approval of the text of a secret agreement with the United States Government providing for the storage of defensive airborne nuclear Anti-Submarine Warfare weapons at a United States Leased Base in Newfoundland for United States anti-submarine forces stationed at the base and earmarked for the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

The Committee agreed that the Secretary of State for External Affairs submit a new memorandum to the Cabinet on the above-mentioned subject (Cab. Doc. 439/67, Jul. 20, attached), and agreed to recommend that on this basis the Cabinet approve

- (a) signature of the proposed agreement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on behalf of the Government of Canada, it being understood that no authority will be sought from Council since the agreement is to remain secret; and
- (b) a contingency statement (Annex "A" to Cab. Doc. 439/67, Jul. 20, attached) for possible future use in public statements in the case of 'leaks' in relation to the storage of the weapons at the base.

P. M. Pitfield,  
Secretary,  
Cabinet Committee on External Affairs  
and Defence.

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFICATION NOTICE

Cabinet Document Number: 439-67.

Subject File Number: D-1-5(e)

DECLASSIFIED - MARCH 3, 1998

For authority, please refer to the February 16, 1998 letter on file 1935-2.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

SECRET

July 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET

Agreement Between Canada and the United States  
for the Storage of Nuclear Weapons at a United  
States Leased Base in Newfoundland for the  
United States Forces

OBJECT

To seek approval for signing an Agreement with the United States Government providing for the storage of defensive airborne nuclear ASW weapons at a United States Base in Newfoundland, for United States anti-submarine forces stationed at the Base and earmarked for the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

BACKGROUND

The Cabinet agreed on November 1, 1966, that:

- (a) The United States be permitted to store airborne nuclear weapons at a U.S. Leased Base in Newfoundland, subject to the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory Agreement; and
- (b) the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to negotiate ad referendum to the Cabinet an Agreement for this purpose with the U.S. Government, such Agreement to be consistent with and not to exceed the provisions of existing Canada-United States Agreements on nuclear weapons.

FACTORS

2. Agreement has been reached ad referendum with United States officials which is consistent with and does not exceed the provisions of existing Canada-United States Agreements on nuclear weapons. The draft Agreement is patterned after the Canada-U.S.A. Exchange of Notes of September 28 and 30, 1963 (as amended by an Exchange of Notes of September 17, 1965 concerning consultation on and authorization for the use of nuclear weapons) setting out the conditions under which the storage of nuclear air to air defensive weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Bases for United States forces was permitted by Canada. The

SECRET

conditions set out in the draft Agreement are exactly the same as those contained in the 1963 Agreement; there are some changes in wording in the draft Agreement but these are the result of differences in the factual situation and they do not lead to any differences in the conditions under which the weapons are permitted to be stored. The draft Agreement, for instance, refers to airborne nuclear anti-submarine warfare weapons while the 1963 Agreement was concerned with nuclear air to air defensive weapons. There is no specific mention of NORAD in the proposed Agreement since the forces in question are not under NORAD Command but under U.S. National Command. However the draft Agreement has retained the same controls concerning authorization and possible use as those related to NORAD forces.

### PUBLICITY

3. The proposed Agreement to permit storage of airborne nuclear ASW weapons is classified "Secret". The United States proposed that the fact of the Agreement should be classified and that there should be no public announcement concerning the Agreement. This was tentatively agreed and an appropriate contingency statement has been drawn up to meet possible leaks. Attached as Annex "A" is the text of such a contingency statement which has been agreed to by the United States. The statement makes clear that the new Agreement is designed to meet a new threat and that it is a transfer of a commitment from one base (Harmon, which is being closed down this year) to another. To conform with standard security requirements, the statement does not, however, identify the bases involved.

### CONCLUSION

4. The draft Agreement is consistent with and does not exceed the provisions of existing Canada-United States Agreements on nuclear weapons. In addition, although the forces involved are under U.S. National Command, the draft Agreement places the same conditions on and applies similar authorization procedures to the possible employment of the nuclear weapons as apply to NORAD forces under joint Canada-United States Command.

5. It is recommended that the Cabinet agree that:

(a) The Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to sign the proposed Agreement on behalf of the Government of Canada, it being understood that no authority will be sought from Council since the Agreement is to remain "Secret";

(b) the contingency statement attached as Annex "A" be approved for use in public statements in case of leaks.

*Paul Martin*

Secretary of State for  
External Affairs

SECRET

ANNEX "A"

AGREED CONTINGENCY PRESS STATEMENT

U.S. rights to maintain nuclear storage facilities for U.S. aircraft at a leased base in Newfoundland have been relinquished by the U.S. Government. Meanwhile, the threat to this continent persists and there is a NATO requirement to have nuclear weapons available to U.S. aircraft. The Canadian Government has agreed to a transfer of nuclear storage rights to another leased base to facilitate this requirement.

This transfer does not involve the provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.

The employment of the weapons is subject to the same controls already in effect for NORAD defence weapons.

Question: What are the controls for NORAD defence weapons which the Minister has just mentioned?

Answer: The Prime Minister has explained what these controls are in a press release on August 16, 1963.

\* /Briefly, it means that nuclear warheads cannot be used operationally without the authorization of the Canadian Government.]

\* The State Department has expressed the hope that the Government of Canada will not feel called upon to make this statement because of the likelihood that such a statement would create difficulties for the United States in negotiations now going on with another country (presumably Germany).

## CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Name or Subject

File No.

DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements -Storage  
of Nuclear Weapons in Canada

D-1-5(e)

Regarding

for Use by U.S. Force -

Date

Memo ref'g to memorandum from Minister of Nat. Defence & Secy. of State for External Affairs for approval at <sup>mtg. of</sup> Cab. Cttee on External Affairs & Defence, July 18 proposing Canadian note be sent to U.S. Ambassador in Ottawa re agreement btw Canada & U.S. for storage of nuclear weapons at U.S. leased base in NFLD for use of U.S. forces - commenting - July 18, 1967

### SEE

Name or Subject

File No.

P.M. Pitfield to  
P.M.

D-1-14

D R A F T

SECRET

XA to

July 18, 1967

reproduce

D-1-5 (e)

*See-Beijing*

*This is a draft*

*has no status. (M)*

MEMORANDUM TO CABINET

*PCO file*

Agreement Between Canada and the United States  
for the Storage of Nuclear Weapons at ~~U.S.A.~~ *United States*  
~~Naval Base, Argentia, Newfoundland,~~ *Naval Base, Argentia, Newfoundland,* for the  
United States Forces

OBJECT

To seek ~~an~~ approval of the text of an Agreement with the United States Government providing for the storage of defensive airborne nuclear ASW weapons at ~~the~~ *re* United States ~~Naval Base, Argentia,~~ *Naval Base, Argentia,* Newfoundland, for United States anti-submarine forces stationed at the Base and earmarked for the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

BACKGROUND

The Cabinet agreed on November 1, 1966, that:

- a) The United States be permitted to store airborne nuclear weapons at the U.S. Naval Base at Argentia, Newfoundland, subject to the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory Agreement; and
- b) The Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to negotiate ad referendum to the Cabinet an Agreement for this purpose with the U.S. Government, such Agreement to be consistent with and not to exceed the provisions of existing Canada - United States Agreements on nuclear weapons.

FACTORS

2. Agreement has been reached ad referendum with United States officials which is consistent with and does not exceed the provisions of existing Canada - U.S. Agreements on nuclear weapons. The draft Agreement is patterned after the Canada - U.S.A. Exchange of Notes of September 28 and 30, 1963 (as amended by the Exchange of Notes of September 17, 1965) setting out the conditions under which the storage of nuclear air to air defensive weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Bases for United States Forces was permitted by Canada. The conditions set out in the draft Agreement are exactly the same as those contained in the 1963 Agreement; there are some changes in wording in the draft Agreement but these are the result of differences

in the factual situation and they do not lead to any differences in the conditions under which the weapons are permitted to be stored. The draft Agreement, for instance, refers to airborne nuclear ASW weapons while the 1963 Agreement was concerned with nuclear air to air defensive weapons. There is no specific mention of NORAD in the draft Agreement since the forces at ~~Argentina~~ <sup>the base in question</sup> are not under NORAD Command but under U.S. National Command.

3. The fact that the draft Agreement is dealing with U.S. forces under U.S. National Command and not NORAD forces has not, however, affected the application to the draft Agreement of the basic principles set out in the Agreement of September 17, 1965 concerning consultation and the authorization for use of the weapons. The draft Agreement has retained the same controls concerning authorization and possible use as those related to NORAD forces. These procedures provided for prior consultation between the two Governments.

PUBLICITY

4. Cabinet also agreed on November 4 with the United States proposal that the eventual Agreement to permit storage of airborne nuclear ASW weapons should remain classified "SECRET" and that, while there should be no public announcement, an appropriate contingency statement should be agreed between the two countries to meet possible --- leaks. Attached as Annex "A" is the text of such a contingency statement which has been agreed to by the United States. The statement makes clear that the new Agreement is designed to meet a war threat and that it is a transfer of a commitment from a base (Harmon, which is being closed down this year) to another. To conform with standard security requirements, the statement does not, however, identify the bases involved.

CONCLUSION

5. The Committee on External Affairs and Defence have carefully considered this matter and have concluded that the proposed Agreement is consistent with and does not exceed the provisions of existing Canada - U.S. Agreements on nuclear weapons.

6. It is recommended that the recommendations of the Committee on Defence and External Affairs concerning this proposed Agreement be approved and that the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to sign the Agreement on behalf of the Government of Canada, it being understood that no authority will sought from Council since the Agreement is to remain secret.

**DECLASSIFICATION NOTICE**

Cabinet Document Number: 421-67.

Subject File Number: D-1-5 (e)

**DECLASSIFIED - MARCH 3, 1998**

For authority, please refer to the February 16, 1998 letter on file 1935-2.

SECRET

May 29, 1967.

CABINET DOCUMENT

No. 421/67

MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
AND DEFENCE

Agreement between Canada and the United States  
for the Storage of Nuclear Weapons at a United  
States Leased Base in Newfoundland for the  
United States Forces

OBJECT

To seek approval of the text of a secret Agreement with the United States Government providing for the storage of defensive airborne nuclear ASW weapons at a United States Leased Base in Newfoundland for United States anti-submarine forces stationed at the Base and earmarked for the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

BACKGROUND

The Cabinet agreed on November 1, 1966, that:

- (a) The United States be permitted to store airborne nuclear weapons at a U.S. Leased Base in Newfoundland, subject to the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory Agreement; and
- (b) the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to negotiate ad referendum to the Cabinet an Agreement for this purpose with the U.S. Government, such Agreement to be consistent with and not to exceed the provisions of existing Canada - United States Agreements on nuclear weapons.

FACTORS

General

2. Agreement has been reached ad referendum on the draft text of an Agreement which is classified "Secret" (attached as Annex "A" to this Memorandum), and the U.S. Embassy is authorized to sign the Exchange of Notes constituting the Agreement as soon as the Government of Canada is ready to do so.

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SECRET

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3. The draft Agreement is consistent with and does not exceed the provisions of existing Canada - United States Agreements on nuclear weapons. The draft Agreement is patterned after the Canada - U.S.A. Exchange of Notes of September 28 and 30, 1963 (as amended by the Exchange of Notes of September 17, 1965) setting out the conditions under which the Government authorized the storage of nuclear air to air defensive weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon for United States air defence forces. The conditions set out in the draft Agreement are substantially the same as those contained in the 1963 Agreement; there are some changes in wording as a result of differences in the factual situation but they do not involve any differences in the conditions under which the weapons are permitted to be stored. The draft Agreement, for instance, refers to airborne nuclear ASW weapons while the 1963 Agreement was concerned with nuclear air to air defensive weapons. There is no specific mention of NORAD in the draft Agreement since the forces in question are not under NORAD command but under U.S. national command. In time of war this command would be a NATO command, i.e., Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

#### Authorization

4. The fact that the draft Agreement is dealing with U.S. forces under U.S. national command and not NORAD forces has not however affected the application of the basic principles set out in the Agreement of September 17, 1965 concerning consultation on and authorization for use of the weapons. The relevant provision is paragraph 6 of the draft Agreement:

(a) It defines the conditions under which the United States may release the weapons for alert loading, airborne patrol, or possible employment. These are identical to those set out in the 1965 Agreement governing employment of nuclear weapons by NORAD, i.e., Defence Condition I (a strategic attack against North America is imminent) or Higher State of Alert (a strategic attack is occurring) or in the emergency circumstances set forth in paragraph 8 (a) of the 1965 Agreement (cases of surprise attack);

(b) It provides that in these circumstances, when there is time for consultation, authorization for employment will be given at the time;

(c) It also stipulates that, if prior consultation is not practicable, the Prime Minister will provide to the President of the United States "timely authorization". Paragraph 6 does not itself constitute timely authorization. This is not defined and remains a matter to be resolved between the Prime Minister and the President; as was the case for the 1965 Agreement;

..13

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(d) It provides that the weapons will be employed in accordance with the U.S. Navy rules and procedures. (We have ascertained from the U.S. Navy that these rules are even more stringent than those under which the NORAD forces are operating.)

### Publicity

5. Cabinet also agreed on November 2 with the United States proposal that the eventual Agreement to permit storage of airborne nuclear ASW weapons should remain classified "SECRET" and that, while there should be no public announcement, an appropriate contingency statement should be agreed between the two countries to meet possible leaks. Attached as Annex "B" is the text of such a contingency statement which has been agreed to by the United States. The statement presents the new Agreement as a transfer of a commitment from a base (Harmon, which is being closed down this year) to another. To conform with standard security requirements, the statement does not, however, identify the bases involved.

6. The risks of leaks are real as the existence of the nuclear facilities are likely to become known to civilians working on the base or living nearby. There is also a risk of leaks involved in the development of emergency plans for the protection of the general public in the event of an accident since development of these plans would normally require contacts with the local civilian authorities. However, the chance of a serious accident at the storage base being very slight because of the elaborate safety precautions being taken, and given also the considerations of national security requiring that the Agreement remain secret, the Atomic Energy Control Board has agreed to cooperate and assist the Department of National Defence in providing the best protection possible for the general public with the least risk of a leak.

### CONCLUSION

7. The attached draft Agreement is consistent with and does not exceed the provisions of existing Canada - U.S. Agreements on nuclear weapons. In addition, although the forces involved are under U.S. national command, the draft Agreement places the same conditions on and applies similar authorization procedures to the possible employment of the nuclear weapons as apply to NORAD forces under joint Canada - U.S. command.

8. It is recommended that the Committee recommend to Cabinet that:

(a) the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to sign the proposed Agreement on behalf of the Government of Canada, it being understood that no authority will be sought from Council since the Agreement is to remain "Secret";


../4

SECRET

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(b) the contingency statement attached as Annex "B" be approved for use in public statements in case of leaks.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Secretary of State for  
External Affairs

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Minister of National Defence

SECRET

ANNEX "A"

DRAFT CANADIAN NOTE TO THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR  
IN OTTAWA

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Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to recent discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of North American defences through the storage of airborne nuclear anti-submarine weapons in Canada for the use of United States forces. In the discussions, particular account was taken of the recommendation by the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, that such weapons should be available in Canada to United States forces which are earmarked for his operational control in the event of war.

As a result of those discussions, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of airborne nuclear anti-submarine weapons in Canada for United States forces in accordance with the following conditions and at a site to be agreed.

- (1) Unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, and "United States" means the Government of the United States of America. The weapons under consideration are such airborne nuclear anti-submarine weapons as may from time to time be made available to United States forces in Canada.

SECRET

-2-

- (2) Ownership and custody of these weapons shall remain with the United States. United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. The cost of the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States.
- (3) The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage site in accordance with the terms of existing agreements.
- (4) The safety procedures for storage, maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear weapons will be at least equivalent to U.S. standards and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada, taking into consideration classified (atomic) information which can be transferred under existing agreements between the two Governments.
- (5) Authorization of transportation of these weapons in Canadian territory will be subject to the requirements of Canadian law. The United States will be responsible for transportation between

SECRET

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the United States and the agreed site, including security during transit.

- (6) The weapons will be released by the United States for alert loading, airborne patrol or employment, only
- (i) upon Defence Condition One or a higher state of alert as authorized by both Governments for CINCNORAD as provided in the Agreement of September 17, 1965 between the two Governments;
  - (ii) in the emergency circumstances set forth in paragraph 8 (E) of the Agreement of September 17, 1965 between the two Governments;
  - (iii) when otherwise authorized by both Governments.

Authorization for the employment of the weapons will be effected by the Canadian Government under the conditions specified in (i) and (ii) above. To provide for the emergency circumstances set forth in (ii) above in which prior consultation is not practicable, it is agreed that the Prime Minister, acting on behalf of the Government of Canada, will provide to the President of the United States timely authorization for the employment of these weapons.

The weapons will be employed in accordance with the United States Navy rules of interception and engagement and the United States Navy nuclear weapons employment procedures.

- (7) The provisions of this Agreement will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the weapons

SECRET

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to the United States at any time at the request of the United States.

- (8) The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice.
- (9) Supplementary arrangements between the appropriate military authorities of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

I have the honor to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your reply shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

SECRET

DRAFT REPLY BY UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO NOTE  
FROM THE CANADIAN MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to your Note \_\_\_\_\_ of  
\_\_\_\_\_ proposing on behalf of the Government  
of Canada the conditions under which the storage of airborne  
nuclear anti-submarine weapons in Canada for the use of  
United States forces would be permitted.

I am pleased to inform you that the conditions  
set forth in your Note are acceptable to my Government.  
My Government further agrees that your Note and this  
reply shall constitute an agreement between the two  
Governments effective today.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my  
highest consideration.

SECRET

ANNEX "B"

AGREED CONTINGENCY PRESS STATEMENT

U.S. rights to maintain nuclear storage facilities for U.S. aircraft at a leased base in Newfoundland have been relinquished by the U.S. Government. Meanwhile, the threat to this continent persists and there is a NATO requirement to have nuclear weapons available to U.S. aircraft. The Canadian Government has agreed to a transfer of nuclear storage rights to another leased base to facilitate this requirement.

This transfer does not involve the provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.

The employment of the weapons is subject to the same controls already in effect for NORAD defence weapons.

Question: What are the controls for NORAD defence weapons which the Minister has just mentioned?

Answer: The Prime Minister has explained what these controls are in a press release on August 16, 1963.

\* Briefly, it means that nuclear warheads cannot be used operationally without the authorization of the Canadian Government.]

\* The State Department has expressed the hope that the Government of Canada will not feel called upon to make this statement because of the likelihood that such a statement would create difficulties for the United States in negotiations now going on with another country (presumably Germany).

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

July 7, 1967.

Mr. Beavis:

*pb* *file*

Mr. Pitfield brought the attached memorandum to the P.M. back and said that he would rather you kept it for now.

Mr. Pitfield also said that he would like you to arrange a meeting of the Committee "with all reasonable despatch".

~~Thurs 13/7~~ out  
Tues 18/7 at 4 pm  
in PCC - to be  
confirmed.

VW

PM  
Martin  
Hellyer  
Papier  
Connolly?

D-1-5 (2)

000030

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE



BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF CABINET DECISION

Meeting of November 1st, 1966  
(Cab. Doc. 555-66, Sept. 28)

Storage Of Nuclear Weapons At U.S. Naval Base,  
Argentia, Newfoundland, For United States Forces

(Previous reference Oct. 27 (morning session))

The Cabinet, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence agreed that:

(a) the United States be permitted to store airborne nuclear weapons at the United States Naval Base at Argentia, Newfoundland, subject to the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory agreement; and

(b) the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to negotiate, ad referendum to the Cabinet, an agreement for this purpose with the United States Government, such agreement to be consistent with and not to exceed the provisions of existing Canada-United States agreements on nuclear weapons.

D.J. Leach,  
Supervisor of Cabinet Documents.

November 14th, 1966.

FOR ACTION  
POUR CONSIDÉRATION  
IMMÉDIATE

TOP SECRET

DATE

July 7, 1967

TO - A

Mr. D. B. Beavis, Privy Council Office

SIGNATURE

SEE ME  
ME VOIR

DRAFT REPLY,  
PROJET DE RÉPONSE

COMMENTS  
COMMENTAIRES

Attached are the following  
documents:

a) Memorandum to Cabinet Committee  
on External Affairs and Defence,  
50 copies of which we are  
forwarding to Mr. Leach today.

b) Sanitized copy of Memorandum to  
P.M. containing two annotations  
made by P.M. on original.

Defence Liaison (1) Div: J. S. Nutt

SIGNATURE

000032

TOP SECRET

May 26, 1967.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Agreement between Canada and the United States  
for the Storage of Nuclear Weapons at U. S. A.  
Naval Base. for United  
States Forces

On November 1, 1966, Cabinet agreed that the United States be permitted to store airborne nuclear weapons at the U.S. Naval Base and authorized the Secretary of State for External Affairs to negotiate, ad referendum to the Cabinet, an Agreement for this purpose.

-- 2. You will find attached the text of an Agreement which we consider to be satisfactory and which the United States Ambassador is authorized to sign on behalf of his Government. The draft Agreement is consistent with and does not exceed the provisions of existing Canada - U.S. Agreements on nuclear weapons. Indeed, we would point out that, although the draft Agreement deals with U.S. forces under U.S. national command, it has nevertheless retained the same controls concerning the possible use of the weapons as those in effect for U.S. forces in Canada assigned to NORAD as contained in the Agreement of September 17, 1965 with the United States.

OK  
-- 3. We would suggest that in obtaining Cabinet's approval of this Agreement, we adopt the same procedure as we did for seeking Cabinet's approval of the 1965 Agreement on consultation and authorization for use of nuclear weapons by NORAD forces, namely that first approval of the Cabinet Committee on Defence and External Affairs be sought. This could be done, if you agree, on the basis of the attached memorandum which we have signed. You will note that the memorandum and the draft Agreement itself do not mention the name of the base where the weapons will be stored. This is for security reasons. The base will however be designated as the agreed site under the Agreement in a letter marked to be signed simultaneously with the Agreement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

.. / 2

30-5 70 (cas)

- 2 -

4. Once the Cabinet Committee's approval has been obtained, it might be sufficient to seek Cabinet's approval on the basis of a summary version of the Memorandum to the Committee, together with the report of the Committee's Secretary simply stating that the matter has been considered by the Committee and listing the Committee's recommendations without attaching the text of the draft Agreement.

5. There is also the supplementary element of the "timely authorization" which is required by paragraph six of the draft Agreement. This was also a feature of the 1965 Agreement. In the case of the 1965 Agreement, since we were dealing with NORAD forces, both your timely authorization and that of the President were addressed to CINCNORAD. In this case since the forces in question are under U.S. national command, the draft Agreement provides that the timely authorization be addressed to the President of the United States. As you know, the timely authorization is applicable to cases of emergency and particularly surprise attack as defined in the 1965 Agreement where prior consultation would not be possible. Attached for your approval if you agree is the text of the timely authorization which has been approved by the U.S. Government and which is along the same lines as that provided under the 1965 Agreement. This would be provided to the U.S. Ambassador at the same time as we sign the Agreement. You will note that the text is intended to ensure that your authorization will take place simultaneously with and not prior to that of the President.

6. In 1965 the text of the timely authorization was considered as highly sensitive and only the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Minister of National Defence, and the Chief of the Defence Staff were made aware of its content. The same procedure was followed in the United States. This explains why we are not suggesting that the text be presented to the Cabinet Committee and Cabinet.

7. Do you agree with the above suggestions?

*Agreed  
L. B. P.*

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
PAUL MARTIN

---

Secretary of State for  
External Affairs

*Signed: PAUL HELLYER*

---

Minister of National Defence

SECRET

May 29, 1967.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
AND DEFENCE

Agreement between Canada and the United States  
for the Storage of Nuclear Weapons at a United  
States Leased Base in Newfoundland for the  
United States Forces

OBJECT

To seek approval of the text of a secret Agreement with the United States Government providing for the storage of defensive airborne nuclear ASW weapons at a United States Leased Base in Newfoundland for United States anti-submarine forces stationed at the Base and earmarked for the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

BACKGROUND

The Cabinet agreed on November 1, 1966, that:

- (a) The United States be permitted to store airborne nuclear weapons at a U.S. Leased Base in Newfoundland, subject to the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory Agreement; and
- (b) the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to negotiate ad referendum to the Cabinet an Agreement for this purpose with the U.S. Government, such Agreement to be consistent with and not to exceed the provisions of existing Canada - United States Agreements on nuclear weapons.

FACTORS

General

2. Agreement has been reached ad referendum on the draft text of an Agreement which is classified "Secret" (attached as Annex "A" to this Memorandum), and the U.S. Embassy is authorized to sign the Exchange of Notes constituting the Agreement as soon as the Government of Canada is ready to do so.

.. / 2

SECRET

- 2 -

3. The draft Agreement is consistent with and does not exceed the provisions of existing Canada - United States Agreements on nuclear weapons. The draft Agreement is patterned after the Canada - U.S.A. Exchange of Notes of September 28 and 30, 1963 (as amended by the Exchange of Notes of September 17, 1965) setting out the conditions under which the Government authorized the storage of nuclear air to air defensive weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon for United States air defence forces. The conditions set out in the draft Agreement are substantially the same as those contained in the 1963 Agreement; there are some changes in wording as a result of differences in the factual situation but they do not involve any differences in the conditions under which the weapons are permitted to be stored. The draft Agreement, for instance, refers to airborne nuclear ASW weapons while the 1963 Agreement was concerned with nuclear air to air defensive weapons. There is no specific mention of NORAD in the draft Agreement since the forces in question are not under NORAD command but under U.S. national command. In time of war this command would be a NATO command, i.e., Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

#### Authorization

4. The fact that the draft Agreement is dealing with U.S. forces under U.S. national command and not NORAD forces has not however affected the application of the basic principles set out in the Agreement of September 17, 1965 concerning consultation on and authorization for use of the weapons. The relevant provision is paragraph 6 of the draft Agreement:

(a) It defines the conditions under which the United States may release the weapons for alert loading, airborne patrol, or possible employment. These are identical to those set out in the 1965 Agreement governing employment of nuclear weapons by NORAD, i.e., Defence Condition I (a strategic attack against North America is imminent) or Higher State of Alert (a strategic attack is occurring) or in the emergency circumstances set forth in paragraph 8 (a) of the 1965 Agreement (cases of surprise attack);

(b) It provides that in these circumstances, when there is time for consultation, authorization for employment will be given at the time;

(c) It also stipulates that, if prior consultation is not practicable, the Prime Minister will provide to the President of the United States "timely authorization". Paragraph 6 does not itself constitute timely authorization. This is not defined and remains a matter to be resolved between the Prime Minister and the President; as was the case for the 1965 Agreement;

.. / 3

SECRET

- 3 -

(d) It provides that the weapons will be employed in accordance with the U.S. Navy rules and procedures. (We have ascertained from the U.S. Navy that these rules are even more stringent than those under which the NORAD forces are operating.)

Publicity

5. Cabinet also agreed on November 2 with the United States proposal that the eventual Agreement to permit storage of airborne nuclear ASW weapons should remain classified "SECRET" and that, while there should be no public announcement, an appropriate contingency statement should be agreed between the two countries to meet possible leaks. Attached as Annex "B" is the text of such a contingency statement which has been agreed to by the United States. The statement presents the new Agreement as a transfer of a commitment from a base (Harmon, which is being closed down this year) to another. To conform with standard security requirements, the statement does not, however, identify the bases involved.

6. The risks of leaks are real as the existence of the nuclear facilities are likely to become known to civilians working on the base or living nearby. There is also a risk of leaks involved in the development of emergency plans for the protection of the general public in the event of an accident since development of these plans would normally require contacts with the local civilian authorities. However, the chance of a serious accident at the storage base being very slight because of the elaborate safety precautions being taken, and given also the considerations of national security requiring that the Agreement remain secret, the Atomic Energy Control Board has agreed to cooperate and assist the Department of National Defence in providing the best protection possible for the general public with the least risk of a leak.

CONCLUSION

7. The attached draft Agreement is consistent with and does not exceed the provisions of existing Canada - U.S. Agreements on nuclear weapons. In addition, although the forces involved are under U.S. national command, the draft Agreement places the same conditions on and applies similar authorization procedures to the possible employment of the nuclear weapons as apply to NORAD forces under joint Canada - U.S. command.

8. It is recommended that the Committee recommend to Cabinet that:

(a) the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to sign the proposed Agreement on behalf of the Government of Canada, it being understood that no authority will be sought from Council since the Agreement is to remain "Secret";


../4

SECRET

- 4 -

(b) the contingency statement attached as Annex "B" be approved for use in public statements in case of leaks.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Secretary of State for  
External Affairs

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Minister of National Defence

SECRET

ANNEX "A"

DRAFT CANADIAN NOTE TO THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR  
IN OTTAWA

---

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to recent discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of North American defences through the storage of airborne nuclear anti-submarine weapons in Canada for the use of United States forces. In the discussions, particular account was taken of the recommendation by the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, that such weapons should be available in Canada to United States forces which are earmarked for his operational control in the event of war.

As a result of those discussions, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of airborne nuclear anti-submarine weapons in Canada for United States forces in accordance with the following conditions and at a site to be agreed.

- (1) Unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, and "United States" means the Government of the United States of America. The weapons under consideration are such airborne nuclear anti-submarine weapons as may from time to time be made available to United States forces in Canada.

SECRET

-2-

- (2) Ownership and custody of these weapons shall remain with the United States. United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. The cost of the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States.
- (3) The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage site in accordance with the terms of existing agreements.
- (4) The safety procedures for storage, maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear weapons will be at least equivalent to U.S. standards and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada, taking into consideration classified (atomic) information which can be transferred under existing agreements between the two Governments.
- (5) Authorization of transportation of these weapons in Canadian territory will be subject to the requirements of Canadian law. The United States will be responsible for transportation between

SECRET

-3-

the United States and the agreed site, including security during transit.

- (6) The weapons will be released by the United States for alert loading, airborne patrol or employment, only
- (i) upon Defence Condition One or a higher state of alert as authorized by both Governments for CINCNOHAD as provided in the Agreement of September 17, 1965 between the two Governments;
  - (ii) in the emergency circumstances set forth in paragraph 8 (E) of the Agreement of September 17, 1965 between the two Governments;
  - (iii) when otherwise authorized by both Governments.

Authorization for the employment of the weapons will be effected by the Canadian Government under the conditions specified in (i) and (ii) above. To provide for the emergency circumstances set forth in (ii) above in which prior consultation is not practicable, it is agreed that the Prime Minister, acting on behalf of the Government of Canada, will provide to the President of the United States timely authorization for the employment of these weapons.

The weapons will be employed in accordance with the United States Navy rules of interception and engagement and the United States Navy nuclear weapons employment procedures.

- (7) The provisions of this Agreement will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the weapons

SECRET

-4-

to the United States at any time at the request of the United States.

- (8) The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice.
- (9) Supplementary arrangements between the appropriate military authorities of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

I have the honor to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your reply shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

SECRET

DRAFT REPLY BY UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO NOTE  
FROM THE CANADIAN MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to your Note \_\_\_\_\_ of  
\_\_\_\_\_ proposing on behalf of the Government  
of Canada the conditions under which the storage of airborne  
nuclear anti-submarine weapons in Canada for the use of  
United States forces would be permitted.

I am pleased to inform you that the conditions  
set forth in your Note are acceptable to my Government.  
My Government further agrees that your Note and this  
reply shall constitute an agreement between the two  
Governments effective today.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my  
highest consideration.

SECRET

ANNEX "B"

AGREED CONTINGENCY PRESS STATEMENT

U.S. rights to maintain nuclear storage facilities for U.S. aircraft at a leased base in Newfoundland have been relinquished by the U.S. Government. Meanwhile, the threat to this continent persists and there is a NATO requirement to have nuclear weapons available to U.S. aircraft. The Canadian Government has agreed to a transfer of nuclear storage rights to another leased base to facilitate this requirement.

This transfer does not involve the provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.

The employment of the weapons is subject to the same controls already in effect for NORAD defence weapons.

Question: What are the controls for NORAD defence weapons which the Minister has just mentioned?

Answer: The Prime Minister has explained what these controls are in a press release on August 16, 1963.

★ Briefly, it means that nuclear warheads cannot be used operationally without the authorization of the Canadian Government.]

★ The State Department has expressed the hope that the Government of Canada will not feel called upon to make this statement because of the likelihood that such a statement would create difficulties for the United States in negotiations now going on with another country (presumably Germany).

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

*Mr. Pittfield*  
*20/11/67*  
*Mr. Johnson*  
*20/17/67*  
*+ file*

S E C R E T

May 25, 1967. *D-1-5(e)*

MEMORANDUM TO MR. ROBERTSON

FROM D. BEAVIS

Storage of Nuclear Weapons  
at Argentinia

I have been informed by Defence Liaison (1) Division in External Affairs that agreement from A.E.C.B. has been secured to the draft Agreement which you discussed with the Prime Minister on the 23rd and minuted back to me on the 24th. It is anticipated that the agreement of the Department of National Defence will be forthcoming tomorrow.

2. There is only one alteration, based on a security technicality, to the draft and that is the deletion of the name of the base from the Agreement. This technicality will be explained in the covering memorandum to the Prime Minister. It will not alter the substance of the Agreement in any way.

3. The Department of External Affairs hopes to have the memorandum to the Cabinet in final form either Friday or the 29th at the latest.

*DB*

D. B.

S E C R E T

D-1-5 (a)

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE  
OTTAWA

*M. Beavis*

TOP SECRET  
SECRET WITHOUT ATTACHMENT

*How is this coming,  
with  
24/6/67*

May 19, 1967.

*Penny Triller*  
*- case /*  
*Walt*

MEMORANDUM TO MR. ROBERTSON

FROM D. BEAVIS

Storage of Nuclear Weapons  
at Argentina

*Handwritten notes on left margin, possibly 'Karef' and other illegible scribbles.*

I have checked again with the Department of External Affairs on this matter in light of your instructions bearing on the Prime Minister's marginal note on your memorandum to him that he wants the matter speeded up. The Head of Defence Liaison (1) Division has informed me that the attached draft memorandum for Cabinet has been distributed to the only two departments concerned, National Defence and AECB. He anticipates that, despite the holiday on Monday, the agreement of the two departments will be obtained next week.

*Returned to DL-1 26/5 on request due to ZED control requirement in its present form DIS*

2. Contrary to the information from Mr. CADIEUX concerning the existence of a problem in relation to authorization for use of stored weapons, Mr. NUTT has informed me that the difficulty has been overcome.

3. The only remaining difficulty, which Mr. NUTT does not anticipate will impede the memorandum being put to Cabinet expeditiously, relates to the prospect of keeping the agreement and the storage of weapons secret. Paragraph 6 of the draft refers.

4. There apparently is also one minor point which involves clarification of some aspect of the proposed agreement which will require the concurrence of the United States, but, again, Mr. NUTT does not anticipate that this will occasion delay.

*Thurs 9 AM*

*DIS*  
D. B.

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER  
CABINET DU PREMIER MINISTRE

May, 9/67

MEMORANDUM

*M. Robertson*

---

**URGENT**

HENRY E. MACDONALD 000047

*Mr. Pearson*  
*See P.O.'s note. P.S.*  
*See how Campen coming*  
CONFIDENTIAL in S.A.

May 18th, 1967.

*MSK*  
*19/4/67*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Storage of Nuclear Weapons at Argentina

Since your enquiry of yesterday arising out of Mr. Butterworth's visit, I have checked with External Affairs to see where the Argentina question stands.

On November 1st, 1966, the Cabinet agreed that:

- (a) the U.S. be permitted to store airborne nuclear weapons at the U.S. Naval Base at Argentina, subject to the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory agreement; and
- (b) the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to negotiate, ad referendum to the Cabinet, an agreement for this purpose with the U.S. government, such agreement to be consistent with and not to exceed the provisions of existing Canada-U.S. agreements on nuclear weapons.

Since the above decision, the basis of agreement with the United States has been under discussion with the Departments concerned. According to Mr. Cadieux, a real problem has arisen in relation to the provision that should be made concerning the kind of authorization that would be required before there could be any use of nuclear weapons stored at the Argentina base. I can see that this could indeed be a real problem, although it should have been possible to work out some solution -- or alternatively to present the problem to Ministers for specific decision -- before this time. In any event, Mr. Cadieux has undertaken to go into the question immediately himself and to report on it.

*I want this to be hurried up*  
*EM*

Seen By  
L. B. PEARSON

*MSK*

CONFIDENTIAL

May 17th, 1967.

MEMORANDUM TO MR. ROBERTSON:

Storage of Nuclear Weapons at U.S. Naval Base, Argentia, Newfoundland, for U.S. Forces

You asked me this morning, as a result of a discussion with the Prime Minister by the Ambassador for the United States, to ascertain what the state of this particular problem was. I have been informed by Defence Liaison (1) in External Affairs that a draft memorandum is being circulated to departments concerned for comment after negotiations with the U.S. on this matter. This is consistent with the decision of Cabinet at its meeting on November 1st, 1966, when, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence, it was agreed that:

- (a) the U.S. be permitted to store airborne nuclear weapons at the U.S. Naval Base at Argentia, subject to the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory agreement; and
- (b) the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to negotiate, ad referendum to the Cabinet, an agreement for this purpose with the U.S. government, such agreement to be consistent with and not to exceed the provisions of existing Canada-U.S. agreements on nuclear weapons.

The Head of D.L.(1) anticipates that there will be no considerable delay in having the draft memorandum in final form for future consideration by the Cabinet. I have asked for a copy of the draft but have not yet received it. I thought in the meantime you might wish to be able to inform the Prime Minister in a general way where the matter stood.

DB

D.B.

**1966**

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF CABINET DECISION

Meeting of October 27, 1966. (morning session)  
(Cab. Doc. 555-66, Sept. 28)

Storage of Nuclear Weapons at U.S. Naval  
Base, Argentina, Newfoundland

The Cabinet agreed to consider further at  
a ~~later~~ meeting the proposal by the Secretary of State for External  
Affairs that approval in principle be given to the storage of  
defensive nuclear weapons at the U.S. Naval Base, Argentina,  
for use by the U.S. forces operating from that base.

D. J. LEACH

Supervisor of Cabinet Documents.

Privy Council Office,  
November 22, 1966.

*Mr. Stoner*

SECRET

October 27th, 1966.

*on Robertson  
to see  
yph  
AD*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Storage of U.S. nuclear weapons at  
Argentina

There is some uncertainty over the outcome of this morning's Cabinet discussion of this matter. Are we to conclude that the decision was deferred to next Tuesday, or that the recommendation was approved but not to be conveyed to the United States government until Tuesday?

Mr. Stoner and I would be grateful for your direction.

F.A.M.

FAM:aw

*Mary Macdonald called to say that the answer was that we should "do nothing" until Tuesday - the decision was "deferred" - I have left word for Basil.*

*Jan*

Oct 13/06

MEMORANDUM

Mr. Hodgson 13/06  
~~Mr. [unclear]~~  
to note

000053

~~SECRET~~

Ottawa, October 7th, 1966.

MEMORANDUM TO MR. ROBERTSON:

Storage of nuclear weapons at U.S. naval base, Argentia, Cab.Doc. 555/66, Sept. 28

The possibility of this requirement was noted only in passing in 1963 when nuclear weapons policy was being discussed. On May 14th of that year the Prime Minister said that President Kennedy, during the discussions at Hyannis Port, had agreed that the only nuclear weapons matters of immediate concern involved the four programs to which the Canadian forces were already committed, which were subsequently enumerated in the general agreement with the United States. President Kennedy at that time was reported to have regarded other possible requirements "as well as the U.S. request for storage of weapons at their leased bases in Canada" as having low priority.

Subsequently, on September 12th the same year, when it was decided to accede to a U.S. request for nuclear storage for interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon, it was noted that the possible needs of both countries for anti-submarine nuclear weapons should not be considered until Canadian naval policy had been reviewed. It might be of interest that, in agreeing to the storage of nuclear weapons for U.S. interceptors, the government was influenced by the feeling that the request could not logically be refused in the light of the decision already taken to acquire similar weapons for Canadian interceptors.

  
F.A.M.

ORANDUM

Copy of Handwritten Note

Prime Minister

See Mr. Milligan's note (attached).

The proposed notes came to us from the U.S. Embassy on June 28th - and now this is so urgent it cannot go to the proper Cabinet Committee.

This is a classic example of the kind of spurious "urgency" that undermines the whole Cabinet Committee system. You might want to use this - along with the Legislation Committee meeting of yesterday - in a lecture to Ministers.

I think the difference between 100 days delay and 107 is so slight that this should go to the Cabinet Committee.

R.G.R.

6.x.66

MEMORANDUM

MR. ROBERTSON

To raise with the Prime Minister.

Basil Robinson says that Mr. Martin feels some urgency about this (under the prodding of Mr. Butterworth, I believe).

Unless the Prime Minister wants the proposal to go to the External Affairs and Defence Committee (as we had planned), Mr. Martin would like it taken directly to Cabinet at the first opportunity.

F.A.M.

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE  
BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

MORANDUM

*M. Stille*

*- for your Cabinet Committee*

*MS*

000057

*Oct 20/66*

MORANDUM

*M*

*Robertson*

\_\_\_\_\_

MARY E. HARRISON 000058

MEMORANDUM

Prime Minister

- see Mr. Milligan's note (attached).

The proposed notes came to us from the U.S. Embassy on June 28 — and now this is so urgent it cannot go to the proper Cabinet Committee.

This is a classic example of the kind of spurious "urgency" that undermines the whole Cabinet Committee system. You might want to use this — along with the legislation Committee meeting of yesterday in a lecture to Ministers.

I think the difference between 100 days delay and 107 is so slight that this should go to the Cabinet Committee.

6/ x / 66.

W. H. P. 000059

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE  
BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

MEMORANDUM

Mr. Robertson - to raise with PM

Basil Robinson says that Mr. Martin feels some urgency about this (under the prodding of Mr. Butcherworth, I believe).

Unless the Prime Minister wants the proposal to go to the External Affairs and Defence Committee (as we had planned), Mr. Martin would like it taken directly to Cabinet at the first opportunity

J.R.M.


**DECLASSIFICATION NOTICE**

**Cabinet Document Number:** 555-66

**Subject File Number:** D-1-5 (e)

**DECLASSIFIED - JANUARY 24, 1997**

**For authority, please refer to the December 18, 1996 letter on file 1935-2.**



THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

SECRET

September 28, 1966

MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET

STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
AT U.S. NAVAL BASE, ARGENTIA, NFLD.  
FOR UNITED STATES FORCES

OBJECT

To seek approval in principle for an agreement with the United States Government providing for the storage of defensive airborne nuclear weapons at the United States Naval Base, Argentia, Newfoundland, for United States anti-submarine forces stationed at the base and earmarked for the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, (SACLANT).

BACKGROUND

2. Storage of nuclear anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weapons in Canada was first raised by the United States in late 1957, and a Cabinet decision of January 13, 1958 authorized bilateral discussions between Canadian and United States military authorities. In an aide-mémoire of April 9, 1959, the United States asserted that there existed an "urgent operational requirement" for the weapons at the U.S. Naval Base at Argentia, Newfoundland, but inter-governmental discussion of this requirement, and of the associated questions concerning the provision of nuclear weapons to Canadian forces and to other U.S. forces in Canada, was inconclusive until the assumption of office of the present Government. In May, 1963, the Canadian Government indicated that it was prepared to proceed with arrangements for the provision of nuclear warheads for existing Canadian nuclear weapons systems, and for the United States elements of NORAD located in Canada (the USAF fighter squadrons at Goose Bay and Harmon) but suggested that consideration of the provision of nuclear weapons for U.S. forces at Argentia be delayed. The U.S. agreed and an informal "moratorium" on the subject remained in effect until 1965, although through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and through direct military channels Canada was kept aware of the continued interest of the United States in the eventual storage of weapons at Argentia. Early this year the United States made known its intention to submit a formal request, and on June 28 the United States Embassy presented for consideration a draft Exchange of Notes.

FACTORS

3. a) The anti-submarine forces at Argentinia are now primarily intended to provide a defence against nuclear missile-launching submarines, which pose a direct threat to the areas of North America adjacent to the eastern seaboard. This is a threat which, unlike that of the manned bomber is steadily increasing. This defensive task is undertaken jointly by U.S. and Canadian anti-submarine forces assigned to SACLANT, who some years ago established, and continues to support, a military requirement that these forces be equipped with nuclear weapons. The U.S. forces concerned have been organized and equipped on the assumption that nuclear weapons will be available to them whereas this assumption has not governed the organization and equipment of Canadian anti-submarine forces. The effectiveness of the U.S. forces at Argentinia is therefore significantly impaired because such weapons could be supplied to them in any emergency only with considerable difficulty and delay, which could prove critical. A nuclear capability in being at Argentinia is considered by the United States to be a highly important increment of deterrence to missile attack on North America.
- b) On the basis of the 1941 agreements governing the United States presence at Argentinia, granting the U.S. rights of independent action over a broad range of military matters, a tenable but not conclusive legal argument can be advanced to support the contention that the United States does not require Canadian approval to store nuclear weapons there. Although the United States has never pressed the point, the argument remains available to them.
- c) Regardless of legal arguments, Canada's general political and military commitments, both in NATO and with regard to North American defence, must be taken into account in considering a long-established military requirement which is clearly related to both these areas of commitment.
- d) Failure to approve the request would be a serious matter in Canada's defence and general political relations with the United States.
- e) The foregoing considerations must of course be weighed in the context of the nuclear role considered appropriate for Canada. The position has been that Canada's nuclear role should not be expanded and should where feasible be reduced. It is arguable, at least, that Canada's nuclear role relates primarily to the nuclear capability of Canada's own forces, and that the

provision of defensive nuclear weapons for United States forces, stationed at bases leased in Canada, is only an indirect and less significant aspect of that role.

- f) Furthermore, we have at present a commitment with regard to the storage of nuclear weapons in Canada relating to the U.S. air defence squadrons hitherto stationed at Goose Bay and Harmon. As Harmon is being closed down this year the requirements for storage at that unit will lapse. The Argentinia proposal could be presented as a transfer of a commitment from Harmon to Argentinia on the basis that the increasing threat from missile launching submarines warrants such a transfer of commitment. Acceptance of nuclear weapons storage at Argentinia would not mean an increase in the number of storage sites in Canada in that the addition of Argentinia would be offset by the deletion of Harmon.
- g) The agreement now proposed by the United States would follow the principles established in existing Canada-U.S. agreements on nuclear weapons, and would grant to the United States at Argentinia only the rights they now enjoy at Goose Bay and Harmon. No new concessions would be involved. The essential principles of these existing agreements are the following:
- (1) the nuclear weapons remain the property of, and in the physical custody of, the United States;
  - (2) they will be released from storage to meet operational requirements only after consultation and with the approval of the Canadian government, if time permits such consultation; Canada thus has a veto on placing them in the hands of operational commanders, and consequently on their possible use, except
  - (3) where circumstances are such that consultation is not possible (actual or indisputably imminent nuclear attack on North America) the agreements specify that the Prime Minister and President will provide "timely authorization" to the commander concerned, CINCNOB. To cover the agreement now proposed, a similar agreement would be required with respect to SACLANC.
- h) It will be necessary that the agreement be classified, since the details of Canada-United States nuclear weapons arrangements are never made public. The U.S. has proposed that there should be no disclosure of the agreement. If the precedent

established in 1963 is to be followed, however, Parliament will need to be informed in general terms that agreement has been reached with the United States on the provision of nuclear weapons to United States anti-submarine warfare forces stationed in Canada. The terms of such an announcement will, of course, require careful consideration, including consultation with the United States which has indicated the desire that the location of the storage site not be made public.

#### CONCLUSIONS


4. Although for the reasons explained earlier in this memorandum Canada is only now being asked to agree, the storage of nuclear weapons for United States anti-submarine forces at Argentia is an established military requirement of long standing; indeed, the military justification is now greater than it was when the subject was first raised in 1957. Notwithstanding domestic factors, military and foreign policy considerations argue for acceptance of the proposal. Rejection would undoubtedly be taken very seriously by the United States, which would probably regard such action as evidence of Canadian unwillingness to share equitably in meeting important joint defence requirements. Acceptance of the proposal would not concede anything of principle which has not already been agreed upon with the United States. It could properly be represented as Canadian acceptance of a share in North American and NATO defence and as being at most an indirect element of the Canadian nuclear role. If necessary, acceptance could be presented as the transfer of an existing commitment from one area to another rather than as the acceptance of a new commitment.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended:
- a) that it be agreed in principle that the United States be permitted to store air-borne nuclear weapons at the United States Naval Base at Argentia, Newfoundland, subject to the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory agreement; and
  - b) that the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to negotiate, ad referendum to the Cabinet, an agreement for this purpose with the United States Government, such agreement to be consistent with and not to exceed the provisions of existing Canada-United States agreements on nuclear weapons.

---

Minister of National Defence

  
Secretary of State for  
External Affairs

**1965**

## CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Name or Subject

DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements -  
Storage of Nuclear Weapons in Canada for  
Use by U.S. Force -  
Regarding

File No.

D-1-5(e)

Date

July 12/65

re Authorization for the use of  
Nuclear Weapons - re govt.  
retaining control of the use of the  
weapons in question - encl. passage  
dealing with the situation in  
North America, and also with Cdn forces  
assigned to NATO in Europe -

### SEE

Name or Subject

P.M. from Hon.P.Martin

File No.

D-1-5(f)

**1963**

MEMORANDUM

Office of the Prime Minister

Ottawa,.....October 3/63.....

Mr. Robertson:

The Prime Minister told me last night that he would make the attached statement in the House Friday morning.

O.W.D.

000069

October 4/62

D-1-321

CONFIDENTIAL

*M. H. Duggan*  
*R*

STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

I wish to inform the House of a continental defense arrangement which the Government has entered into with the United States concerning the storage of nuclear warheads in Canada for United States interceptor aircraft stationed in U.S. leased bases in Newfoundland.

2. The arrangement which has been concluded was the result of negotiations to which I referred in the House on June 7, as recorded on page 790 of Hansard. It is in the form of an Exchange of Notes and specifies the conditions under which nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons will be stored for United States Air Force interceptor aircraft under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint North American Air Defence Command stationed at the United States leased bases in Newfoundland.

3. Under the arrangement, operational use of these defensive weapons would be governed by operational plans of NORAD approved by both Governments. In other respects as well, such as the strict safety measures which will apply, the terms now agreed parallel those relating to the conditions under which warheads will be made available to Canadian forces as announced on August 16. In accordance with the requirements of national security, military details cannot be made public.

4. This Exchange of Notes complements that of August 16 relating to Canadian forces, in that it will permit all NORAD air defense forces stationed in Canada, regardless of their nationality, to be equipped with weapons which, it has been agreed, are presently required for them to fulfil effectively

- 2 -

their role of protecting this continent against bomber attack. As a result, the Canadian and United States forces assigned to NORAD for the air defense of North America, wherever they are stationed, will have the same means at their disposal to discharge their defensive task -- a task which we all hope they will never be called upon to perform.

ORIGINAL DAMAGED

ORIGINAL DAMAGED

SECRET

October 3rd, 1963.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

I attach a copy of the draft note on the storage of nuclear weapons at U.S. leased bases which was approved by Cabinet for negotiating purposes on September 22nd, 1959, and a copy of the revised draft prepared in the light of the U.S. comments on the earlier text, which was approved by Cabinet for negotiating purposes on March 22nd, 1960. A comparison of the latter document with the text which was finally approved by the Cabinet last week and has now been signed, shows the two to be identical in substance (and, to a large extent, in actual wording) in most, if not all significant respects. This identity of substance extends to the scope (i.e. the description of the weapons and locations); the retention of ownership by the United States; safety requirements; the requirement of joint authorization for use; and the provision for review and termination of the agreement.

One difference between the two texts must be noted. The draft approved on March 22nd, 1960 provided, in paragraph 3(b), that "pursuant to its obligations under paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this Annex, Canada will provide a representative or representatives at each base." The agreement, as signed, makes no such provision. It had been felt in External Affairs that, as a practical matter, this provision was pointless since nowhere did the agreement provide any basis on which such representatives could perform an effective controlling role. However, the responsible officers in External Affairs say that, should it be considered necessary, they would expect the U.S. government to agree readily to the addition of such a provision.

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PAGE CONTENT - 2 -

A further caveat might be made. The drafts of 1959 and 1960 provided that the United States would retain only "ownership", rather than "ownership and custody" as specified in the agreement that has now been signed. This was a matter of deliberate policy on the part of the previous government and reflected a particular meaning attached by them to the word "custody".

F.A. Milligan.

pc file

*W. H. ...*

SECRET

October 3rd, 1963.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

I attach a copy of the draft note on the storage of nuclear weapons at U.S. leased bases which was approved by Cabinet for negotiating purposes on September 22nd, 1959, and a copy of the revised draft prepared in the light of the U.S. comments on the earlier text, which was approved by Cabinet for negotiating purposes on March 22nd, 1960. A comparison of the latter document with the text which was finally approved by the Cabinet last week and has now been signed, shows the two to be identical in substance (and, to a large extent, in actual wording) in most, if not all significant respects. This identity of substance extends to the scope (i.e. the description of the weapons and locations); the retention of ownership by the United States; safety requirements; the requirement of joint authorization for use; and the provision for review and termination of the agreement.

One difference between the two texts must be noted. The draft approved on March 22nd, 1960 provided, in paragraph 3(b), that "pursuant to its obligations under paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this Annex, Canada will provide a representative or representatives at each base." The agreement, as signed, makes no such provision. It had been felt in External Affairs that, as a practical matter, this provision was pointless since nowhere did the agreement provide any basis on which such representatives could perform an effective controlling role. However, the responsible officers in External Affairs say that, should it be considered necessary, they would expect the U.S. government to agree readily to the addition of such a provision.

*This is Miss Campbell's idea.*

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- 2 -

A further caveat might be made. The drafts of 1959 and 1960 provided that the United States would retain only "ownership", rather than "ownership and custody" as specified in the agreement that has now been signed. This was a matter of deliberate policy on the part of the previous government and reflected a particular meaning attached by them to the word "custody".

F.A. Milligan.

Draft of Sept 21, 1959.

SECRET

STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON  
AIR FORCE BASE  
NEGOTIATING DRAFT

I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of the continental air defences by a gradual increase in the numbers of air defence weapons with nuclear capability. These discussions have taken into account recommendations by CINCNORAD as to the immediate military requirement for the storage at certain points in Canada of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons.

Recognizing the need to strengthen the continental air defences against the threat which exists, and realizing that the full potential of air-to-air defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons in Canada in accordance with the conditions set out in the attached Annex.

I have the honour to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your Reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

S E C R E T

A N N E X

1. The weapons under consideration are such defensive nuclear air-to-air weapons as may from time to time be made available to the forces under the command of CINCNORAD.
2. These weapons will be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon Airforce Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.
3. Arrangements for the physical security for the storage sites will be the joint responsibility of the Governments of the two countries. Safeguards in the design and handling of these air defence weapons to minimize the possibility of accidental explosion and to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be the responsibility of the United States Government and will be subject to the approval of the Canadian Government.
4. Ownership of the nuclear warheads shall remain with the United States Government in accordance with United States law.
5. Transportation to or from storage facilities of these weapons and warheads through Canadian airspace will be governed by Canadian Government regulations. Import and export of these weapons will be subject to Canadian Government regulations, and detailed procedures will be negotiated between the appropriate Government Departments.

- 2 -

6. Joint responsibility for the removal from storage sites and for the use of these weapons will be shared by the Canadian and United States Governments. They will be used only in situations of grave emergency and in accordance with plans and procedures governing the operations of the North American Air Defence Command as approved by the two Governments.
7. Any test firing of these weapons which may be required will take place outside of Canada.
8. The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed annually by the two Governments and may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice.
9. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between authorized agencies of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

CAB, Doc. 67-60.  
March 2, 1960.

APPENDIX "A"

S E C R E T

REDRAFT OF THE ANNEX TO  
THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE  
WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

(In this Annex, unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, "United States" means the Government of the United States of America, "NORAD" means the North American Air Defence Command established by Canada and the United States in an exchange of Notes dated 12 May, 1958, and "CINC NORAD" means the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD.)

The weapons under consideration are such nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to United States Forces under the operational control of CINC NORAD.

2. Ownership of these weapons shall remain with the United States in accordance with United States law. They may be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.

3. Arrangements for the storage of these weapons will be a joint responsibility of Canada and the United States, to be carried out as follows:

(a) The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas, i.e. the Agreement of March 27, 1941 concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base and the exchange of Notes of December 5, 1952 in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay;

(b) Pursuant to its obligations under paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this Annex, Canada will provide a representative or representatives at each base.

4. Safeguards in the design of the weapons will be the responsibility of the United States. The procedure for handling the weapons to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storage and salvage will be at least equivalent to United States standards.

5. The transport of these weapons in Canadian territory will be carried out in accordance with Canadian law and with procedures agreed between the appropriate agencies of both Governments.

- 2 -

6. Approval of the use of these weapons will be a joint responsibility of the two Governments. The weapons will only be used in situations of grave emergency in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of NORAD.

7. The removal of these weapons, either for logistic or operational reasons, from the areas utilized by United States Forces (as provided in the Agreement of March 27, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base, and the exchange of Notes dated December 5, 1952 in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay), will require the approval of the Canadian Government in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Annex.

8. Any test firing of these weapons which may be required will take place outside of Canada.

9. The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice.

10. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between authorized agencies of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

S E C R E T

DRAFT CANADIAN NOTE CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT  
GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

No.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of the continental air defences by an increase in the numbers of air defence weapons with nuclear capability. These discussions have taken into account recommendations by the Commander-in-Chief, NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE COMMAND, as to the immediate military requirement for the storage at certain points in Canada of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons for United States forces under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defence Command.

As a result of these discussions, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base for United States forces in accordance with the following conditions:

- 1) Unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, "United States" means the Government of the United States of America, "NORAD" means the North American Air Defence Command established by Canada and the United States in an Exchange of Notes dated May 12, 1958, and "CINCNORAD" means the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD. The weapons under consideration are such nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as

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may from time to time be made available to United States forces under the operational control of CINCNORAD.

- 2) Ownership [and custody] of these weapons shall remain with the United States. United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. [The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon.] These weapons may be stored within the leased area at Goose Bay and at the leased base at Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.
- 3) The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas, i.e., the Agreement of March 27, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base and the Exchange of Notes of December 5, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay.
- 4) The safety procedures for storage, maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear weapons will be at least equivalent to U.S. standards, ~~will conform with Canadian law~~ and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada, taking into consideration classified (atomic) information

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[The MB-1 Agreements, of June 30, 1962 and June 1, 1962, shall apply to the removal of these weapons for operational reasons from the areas utilized by U.S. forces at Hamon and Goose Bay under existing agreements between the two Governments.]

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which can be transferred under existing agreements between the two Governments.

- 5) Authorization of transportation of these weapons in Canadian territory will be subject to the requirements of Canadian law. The United States will be responsible for transportation between the United States and storage sites in Canada including security during transit.
- 6) The release of warheads to meet operational requirements will be the subject, where practical, of prior inter-governmental consultation. They will be used, when authorized by both governments, only in accordance with procedures established by CINCNORAD and, in particular, the removal of these weapons for operational reasons from the areas utilized by United States forces (as provided in the Agreement of March 27, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base, and the Exchange of Notes dated December 5, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay) will be in accordance with the conditions and procedures set out in the MB-1 Overflight Agreement dated June 30, 1959, as amended by the Exchange of Notes dated June 1, 1962.
- 7) The provisions of <sup>[this agreement]</sup> paragraph 6 above will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the weapons to the United States at any time at the request of the United States Government.
- 8) The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two governments at the request of either government

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S E C R E T

and after such review may be terminated by either government upon six months' notice.

- 9) ~~Supplementary arrangements or administrative agree-~~  
~~ments between appropriate~~ <sup>Emilitary</sup> ~~authorities~~ of the two governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

I have the honour to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF CABINET DECISION

Meeting of September 26, 1963.

Storage of nuclear warheads at Goose Bay and  
Harmon Air Force Base for United States  
Forces

(Previous reference Sept. 12)

The Cabinet approved the note concerning the storage of defensive nuclear weapons for United States forces at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, as negotiated with the United States authorities, and agreed that the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to sign on behalf of the government.

(An order in council authorizing signature was passed accordingly; P.C. 1963-1439, Sept. 26).

  
Registrar of the Cabinet.

Privy Council Office,  
October 3rd, 1963.

SECRET

RECORD OF CABINET DECISION


Meeting of September 12th, 1963.  
(Cab. Doc. 241-63, Sept. 9)

Storage of Nuclear Warheads in Canada for  
United States Forces

(Previous reference Aug. 16th)

The Cabinet agreed,-

- (a) that the U.S. be informed that it would expedite agreement concerning U.S. requests for nuclear storage for U.S.A.F. interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon if negotiations were restricted to that particular requirement; and
- (b) that it be proposed to the U.S. government that negotiations be resumed on the basis of the draft attached as Annex A to the Prime Minister's memorandum to Cabinet dated September 9th, 1963 (Cab. Doc. 241-63), it being understood that any agreement reached would be ad referendum to both governments.

  
Registrar of the Cabinet.

Privy Council Office,  
September 17th, 1963.

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DECLASSIFICATION NOTICE

Cabinet Document Number: 241/63  
Subject File Number: D-1-5(e)

DECLASSIFIED - FEBRUARY 23, 1994

For authority, please refer to the February 15, 1994 letter on file 1935-2.

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

D-1-5(e)

SECRET

September 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO CABINET

Storage of Nuclear Warheads in Canada  
In Support of United States Forces

On May 7 the Cabinet Defence Committee approved a draft agreement providing for the storage of nuclear warheads at Goose Bay and Harmon for United States Air Force interceptors for negotiating purposes, the text of which is to be found at Annex "A". This draft was based on a Canadian draft Exchange of Notes which was virtually agreed in 1960 and which has been reviewed and brought up to date. As in the bilateral agreement concerning nuclear warheads for the Canadian forces, custody of the weapons would remain with the U.S.; safety provisions and transportation of the warheads in Canada would be subject to Canadian requirements, and supplementary technical arrangements would be authorized. Use of the weapons by U.S. interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon would be related to the agreement dated June 30, 1959, as amended June 1, 1962, whereby U.S. nuclear armed interceptors stationed in the United States may overfly and land in Canada when an attack is imminent.

2. The draft at Annex "A" was submitted to Cabinet on May 9. Cabinet decided that the Prime Minister should inform President Kennedy that the Canadian Government was studying the U.S. request to store nuclear missiles at Goose Bay and Harmon for USAF interceptors. At his meeting on May 10, 11, 1963 with President Kennedy at Hyannis Port, the Prime Minister accordingly stated that "there were other aspects of the nuclear problem which did not involve commitments by Canada but on which it would be possible to go ahead after the basic bilateral agreement had been signed." He mentioned as first among these aspects, "the question of the storage of nuclear warheads for United States interceptor squadrons at Goose Bay and Harmon." The Prime Minister also referred to "the interest of the United States in having the right to disperse United States interceptor squadrons to Canada, adding that from a Canadian point of view this presented certain problems which were related to Canadian forces in Europe..."

3. On July 18 the Cabinet decided that consideration of the U.S. request for an agreement to authorize the storage in Canada of nuclear warheads for U.S. forces be deferred until the Parliamentary recess.

4. Meanwhile, on July 11 the visiting United States' team, which was in Ottawa for the negotiation of the Canada/U.S. nuclear stockpile agreement, informally presented an entirely new draft agreement (Annex "B") intended to provide for storage in Canada of nuclear warheads in support of U.S. forces.

5. The latest U.S. draft is substantially different from the Canadian draft appearing in Annex "A" in that:

- a) It does not deal only with United States interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon but,

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according to its Annex, would cover

- (i) air-to-air missiles for USAF interceptor aircraft;
  - (ii) nuclear depth charges for anti-submarine warfare aircraft;
- b) it closely parallels the language used in the agreement concluded on August 16, 1963 making provision for the nuclear requirements of Canadian forces.

6. The draft at Annex "B" is thus broader than that at Annex "A", in that it would provide an umbrella under which storage could be provided for USAF interceptor aircraft anywhere in Canada which indirectly raises the question of dispersal of USAF interceptor aircraft in Canada. In addition, it deals with anti-submarine warfare weapons. Furthermore, having been patterned on the Canada/U.S. agreement of August 16, 1963, it introduces a good deal of standard NATO language into an agreement which does not relate to NATO requirements. However, the U.S. draft does contain a number of points which it is considered could be usefully incorporated in the Canadian draft. These have been added to the text of Annex "A" as originally drawn and are underlined.

7. Negotiation of a broad agreement at this time would presumably require that the various implications of the broader draft be considered in the light of the current review of defence policy. On the other hand, the negotiation of an agreement granting permission to arm nuclear-capable USAF interceptors already in Canada could be proceeded with forthwith. In addition such an agreement can be reasonably supported on the grounds that

- 1) the storage of nuclear warheads at Goose Bay and Harmon was agreed in principle by the previous government;
- 2) it is logical that NORAD interceptors in Canada should have access to the same weapons, regardless of whether the aircraft are RCAF or USAF;
- 3) USA nuclear armed interceptors based in USA are already authorized to overfly Canadian territory in an emergency.

8. It is therefore recommended:

- a) that the U.S. be informed that it would expedite agreement concerning U.S. requests for nuclear storage for USAF interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon if negotiations were restricted to that particular requirement;
- b) that for this purpose Canada would be prepared to resume negotiations on the basis of the draft attached at Annex "A", it being understood that any agreement reached would be ad referendum to both Governments.

"L. B. Pearson"

Chairman, Cabinet Defence Committee

D R A F T

S E C R E T

May 7, 1963  
(Revised August 29, 1963)

PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT  
GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

No. \_\_\_\_\_

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of the continental air defences by an increase in the numbers of air defence weapons with nuclear capability. These discussions have taken into account recommendations by the Commander-in-Chief, NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE COMMAND, as to the immediate military requirement for the storage at certain points in Canada of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons for United States forces under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defence Command.

As a result of these discussions, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base for United States forces in accordance with the following conditions:

- 1) Unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, "United States" means the Government of the United States of America, "NORAD" means the North American Air Defence Command established by Canada and the United States in an Exchange of Notes dated May 12, 1958, and "CINCNORAD" means the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD. The weapons under consideration

SECRET

- 2 -

are such nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to United States forces under the operational control of CINCNORAD.

- 2) Ownership and custody of these weapons shall remain with the United States. United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. These weapons may be stored within the leased area at Goose Bay and at the leased base at Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.
- 3) The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas, i.e., the Agreement of March 27, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base and the Exchange of Notes of December 5, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay.
- 4) The safety procedures for storage, maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear weapons will be at least equivalent to U.S. standards, will conform with Canadian law and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada, taking

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- into consideration classified (atomic) information which can be transferred under existing agreements between the two Governments.
- 5) Authorization of transportation of these weapons in Canadian territory will be subject to the requirements of Canadian law. The United States will be responsible for transportation between the United States and storage sites in Canada including security during transit.
  - 6) The release of warheads to meet operational requirements will be the subject, where practical, of prior inter-governmental consultation. They will be used, when authorized by both governments, only in accordance with procedures established by CINCNORAD and, in particular, the removal of these weapons for operational reasons from the areas utilized by United States forces (as provided in the Agreement of March 27, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base, and the Exchange of Notes dated December 5, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay) will be in accordance with the conditions and procedures set out in the MB-1 Overflight Agreement dated June 30, 1959, as amended by the Exchange of Notes dated June 1, 1962.
  - 7) The provisions of paragraph 6 above will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the weapons to the United States at any time at the request of the United States Government.

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- 8) The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two governments at the request of either government and after such review may be terminated by either government upon six months' notice.
- 9) Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between appropriate authorities of the two governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

I have the honour to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

ANNEX B

SECRET

UNITED STATES DRAFT

I have the honor to refer to Articles 20 and 21 of the communiqué issued by the North Atlantic Council on December 19, 1957, and the discussions which have taken place between the appropriate authorities of the Canadian and US Governments regarding the general principles under which nuclear warheads may be stored in Canada in support of US forces.

It is the understanding of my Government that in the course of these discussions agreement was reached regarding these general principles. In order to implement this agreement, my Government suggests the following arrangements:

1. The United States may establish and maintain stockpiles of nuclear warheads for the use of United States Forces deployed in Canada in respect of the weapons and weapons systems shown in the attached Annex "A", which may be amended from time to time by agreement between the two governments. In this agreement, the expression "Nuclear Warhead" includes the associated weapon where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components.

2. Stockpiles of nuclear warheads, to meet the needs of approved defense plans, will be established at locations to be determined by the Allied Commanders concerned in accordance with their approved plans and in agreement with Canadian and US military authorities, or as determined by the US and Canadian military authorities when appropriate.

3. Except as otherwise agreed, the costs of construction, administration and maintenance of these storage sites and associated facilities, including those required for the support of the United States custodial and support personnel, shall be borne by the United States. Provision, without cost to the United States, of land required will be the responsibility of Canada. To the extent that the North Atlantic Council approves the establishment of nuclear stockpile sites under NATO common infrastructure, the apportionment of costs will be subject to NATO infrastructure procedures. Installations and facilities for nuclear warhead storage and maintenance will be built and maintained to satisfy NATO or United States standards and criteria as applicable.

4. It is recognized that the custody of any stocks of nuclear warheads will be the responsibility of the United States and that United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO status of forces agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon.

5. The release of warheads to meet operational requirements will be the subject, where practical, of prior intergovernmental consultation. They will be used, when authorized by both governments, only in accordance with procedures established by the appropriate Allied Commander. The agreement, initially concluded on June 30, 1959 between the United States and Canada concerning the conditions by which United States interceptor aircraft, under the operational control of the North American Air Defense Command, are authorized to carry nuclear air-to-air defense weapons over Canadian territory, shall apply to United States interceptor aircraft under the operational control of the North American Air Defense Command which are deployed to facilities in Canada.

6. Except as otherwise agreed between the appropriate United States and Canadian military authorities, external security for all nuclear weapons in storage or during movement in Canada is the responsibility of the United States. The details of external security arrangements, where

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stockpile sites are located on facilities jointly used by the United States and Canada, will be determined by the United States and Canadian military authorities in accordance with the directives of the Allied Commander concerned where appropriate.

7. The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads between the United States and the storage sites in Canada.

8. Where Canada is a joint user, with the United States, of the storage facilities, the division of responsibility for the support and external security of such facilities will be as agreed between the United States and Canadian military authorities.

9. The safety procedures for storage maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear warheads will be at least equivalent to United States standards and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada, taking into consideration classified (atomic) information which may be transferred under existing agreements between the two governments.

10. Supplementary arrangements required to implement this agreement will be negotiated between the appropriate military authorities of the United States and Canada.

11. Publicity concerning this agreement and its implementation shall be governed by the exchange of notes of February 19 and 24, 1951 concerning publicity relating to joint Canadian-United States defense plans and operations.

I propose that if the foregoing is acceptable to your government, this note and your reply indicating such acceptance will constitute an agreement between the two governments on this subject, the agreement to enter into force on the date of your note in reply.

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ANNEX A

1. Air-to-air missiles for USAF interceptor aircraft
2. Nuclear depth charges for anti-submarine warfare aircraft

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

SECRET

September 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO CABINET

Storage of Nuclear Warheads in Canada  
In Support of United States Forces

On May 7 the Cabinet Defence Committee approved a draft agreement providing for the storage of nuclear warheads at Goose Bay and Harmon for United States Air Force interceptors for negotiating purposes, the text of which is to be found at Annex "A". This draft was based on a Canadian draft Exchange of Notes which was virtually agreed in 1960 and which has been reviewed and brought up to date. As in the bilateral agreement concerning nuclear warheads for the Canadian forces, custody of the weapons would remain with the U.S.; safety provisions and transportation of the warheads in Canada would be subject to Canadian requirements, and supplementary technical arrangements would be authorized. Use of the weapons by U.S. interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon would be related to the agreement dated June 30, 1959, as amended June 1, 1962, whereby U.S. nuclear armed interceptors stationed in the United States may overfly and land in Canada when an attack is imminent.

2. The draft at Annex "A" was submitted to Cabinet on May 9. Cabinet decided that the Prime Minister should inform President Kennedy that the Canadian Government was studying the U.S. request to store nuclear missiles at Goose Bay and Harmon for USAF interceptors. At his meeting on May 10, 11, 1963 with President Kennedy at Hyannis Port, the Prime Minister accordingly stated that "there were other aspects of the nuclear problem which did not involve commitments by Canada but on which it would be possible to go ahead after the basic bilateral agreement had been signed." He mentioned as first among these aspects, "the question of the storage of nuclear warheads for United States interceptor squadrons at Goose Bay and Harmon." The Prime Minister also referred to "the interest of the United States in having the right to disperse United States interceptor squadrons to Canada, adding that from a Canadian point of view this presented certain problems which were related to Canadian forces in Europe...".

3. On July 18 the Cabinet decided that consideration of the U.S. request for an agreement to authorize the storage in Canada of nuclear warheads for U.S. forces be deferred until the Parliamentary recess.

4. Meanwhile, on July 11 the visiting United States' team, which was in Ottawa for the negotiation of the Canada/U.S. nuclear stockpile agreement, informally presented an entirely new draft agreement (Annex "B") intended to provide for storage in Canada of nuclear warheads in support of U.S. forces.

5. The latest U.S. draft is substantially different from the Canadian draft appearing in Annex "A" in that:

- a) it does not deal only with United States interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon but,

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according to its Annex, would cover

- (i) air-to-air missiles for USAF interceptor aircraft;
  - (ii) nuclear depth charges for anti-submarine warfare aircraft;
- b) it closely parallels the language used in the agreement concluded on August 16, 1963 making provision for the nuclear requirements of Canadian forces.

6. The draft at Annex "B" is thus broader than that at Annex "A", in that it would provide an umbrella under which storage could be provided for USAF interceptor aircraft anywhere in Canada which indirectly raises the question of dispersal of USAF interceptor aircraft in Canada. In addition, it deals with anti-submarine warfare weapons. Furthermore, having been patterned on the Canada/U.S. agreement of August 16, 1963, it introduces a good deal of standard NATO language into an agreement which does not relate to NATO requirements. However, the U.S. draft does contain a number of points which it is considered could be usefully incorporated in the Canadian draft. These have been added to the text of Annex "A" as originally drawn and are underlined.

7. Negotiation of a broad agreement at this time would presumably require that the various implications of the broader draft be considered in the light of the current review of defence policy. On the other hand, the negotiation of an agreement granting permission to arm nuclear-capable USAF interceptors already in Canada could be proceeded with forthwith. In addition such an agreement can be reasonably supported on the grounds that

- 1) the storage of nuclear warheads at Goose Bay and Harmon was agreed in principle by the previous government;
- 2) it is logical that NORAD interceptors in Canada should have access to the same weapons, regardless of whether the aircraft are RCAF or USAF;
- 3) USA nuclear armed interceptors based in USA are already authorized to overfly Canadian territory in an emergency.

8. It is therefore recommended:

- a) that the U.S. be informed that it would expedite agreement concerning U.S. requests for nuclear storage for USAF interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon if negotiations were restricted to that particular requirement;
- b) that for this purpose Canada would be prepared to resume negotiations on the basis of the draft attached at Annex "A", it being understood that any agreement reached would be ad referendum to both Governments.



Chairman, Cabinet Defence Committee

D R A F T

S E C R E T

May 7, 1963  
(Revised August 29, 1963)

PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT  
GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

No. \_\_\_\_\_

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of the continental air defences by an increase in the numbers of air defence weapons with nuclear capability. These discussions have taken into account recommendations by the Commander-in-Chief, NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE COMMAND, as to the immediate military requirement for the storage at certain points in Canada of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons for United States forces under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defence Command.

As a result of these discussions, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base for United States forces in accordance with the following conditions:

- 1) Unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, "United States" means the Government of the United States of America, "NORAD" means the North American Air Defence Command established by Canada and the United States in an Exchange of Notes dated May 12, 1958, and "CINC NORAD" means the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD. The weapons under consideration

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are such nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to United States forces under the operational control of CINCNOBRAF.

- 2) Ownership and custody of these weapons shall remain with the United States. United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. These weapons may be stored within the leased area at Goose Bay and at the leased base at Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.
- 3) The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas, i.e., the Agreement of March 27, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base and the Exchange of Notes of December 5, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay.
- 4) The safety procedures for storage, maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear weapons will be at least equivalent to U.S. standards, will conform with Canadian law and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada, taking

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- into consideration classified (atomic) information which can be transferred under existing agreements between the two Governments.
- 5) Authorization of transportation of these weapons in Canadian territory will be subject to the requirements of Canadian law. The United States will be responsible for transportation between the United States and storage sites in Canada including security during transit.
  - 6) The release of warheads to meet operational requirements will be the subject, where practical, of prior inter-governmental consultation. They will be used, when authorized by both governments, only in accordance with procedures established by CINCNORAD and, in particular, the removal of these weapons for operational reasons from the areas utilized by United States forces (as provided in the Agreement of March 27, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base, and the Exchange of Notes dated December 5, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay) will be in accordance with the conditions and procedures set out in the MB-1 Overflight Agreement dated June 30, 1959, as amended by the Exchange of Notes dated June 1, 1962.
  - 7) The provisions of paragraph 6 above will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the weapons to the United States at any time at the request of the United States Government.

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- 8) The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two governments at the request of either government and after such review may be terminated by either government upon six months' notice.
- 9) Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between appropriate authorities of the two governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

I have the honour to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

ANNEX "B"

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UNITED STATES DRAFT

I have the honor to refer to Articles 20 and 21 of the communique issued by the North Atlantic Council on December 19, 1957, and the discussions which have taken place between the appropriate authorities of the Canadian and US Governments regarding the general principles under which nuclear warheads may be stored in Canada in support of US forces.

It is the understanding of my Government that in the course of these discussions agreement was reached regarding these general principles. In order to implement this agreement, my Government suggests the following arrangements:

1. The United States may establish and maintain stockpiles of nuclear warheads for the use of United States Forces deployed in Canada in respect of the weapons and weapons systems shown in the attached Annex "A", which may be amended from time to time by agreement between the two governments. In this agreement, the expression "Nuclear Warhead" includes the associated weapon where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components.

2. Stockpiles of nuclear warheads, to meet the needs of approved defense plans, will be established at locations to be determined by the Allied Commanders concerned in accordance with their approved plans and in agreement with Canadian and US military authorities, or as determined by the US and Canadian military authorities when appropriate.

3. Except as otherwise agreed, the costs of construction, administration and maintenance of these storage sites and associated facilities, including those required for the support of the United States custodial and support personnel, shall be borne by the United States. Provision, without cost to the United States, of land required will be the responsibility of Canada. To the extent that the North Atlantic Council approves the establishment of nuclear stockpile sites under NATO common infrastructure, the apportionment of costs will be subject to NATO infrastructure procedures. Installations and facilities for nuclear warhead storage and maintenance will be built and maintained to satisfy NATO or United States standards and criteria as applicable.

4. It is recognized that the custody of any stocks of nuclear warheads will be the responsibility of the United States and that United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO status of forces agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon.

5. The release of warheads to meet operational requirements will be the subject, where practical, of prior intergovernmental consultation. They will be used, when authorized by both governments, only in accordance with procedures established by the appropriate Allied Commander. The agreement, initially concluded on June 30, 1959 between the United States and Canada concerning the conditions by which United States interceptor aircraft, under the operational control of the North American Air Defense Command, are authorized to carry nuclear air-to-air defense weapons over Canadian territory, shall apply to United States interceptor aircraft under the operational control of the North American Air Defense Command which are deployed to facilities in Canada.

6. Except as otherwise agreed between the appropriate United States and Canadian military authorities, external security for all nuclear weapons in storage or during movement in Canada is the responsibility of the United States. The details of external security arrangements, where

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stockpile sites are located on facilities jointly used by the United States and Canada, will be determined by the United States and Canadian military authorities in accordance with the directives of the Allied Commander concerned where appropriate.

7. The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads between the United States and the storage sites in Canada.

8. Where Canada is a joint user, with the United States, of the storage facilities, the division of responsibility for the support and external security of such facilities will be as agreed between the United States and Canadian military authorities.

9. The safety procedures for storage maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear warheads will be at least equivalent to United States standards and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada, taking into consideration classified (atomic) information which may be transferred under existing agreements between the two governments.

10. Supplementary arrangements required to implement this agreement will be negotiated between the appropriate military authorities of the United States and Canada.

11. Publicity concerning this agreement and its implementation shall be governed by the exchange of notes of February 19 and 24, 1951 concerning publicity relating to joint Canadian-United States defense plans and operations.

I propose that if the foregoing is acceptable to your government, this note and your reply indicating such acceptance will constitute an agreement between the two governments on this subject, the agreement to enter into force on the date of your note in reply.

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ANNEX A

1. Air-to-air missiles for USAF interceptor aircraft
2. Nuclear depth charges for anti-submarine warfare aircraft

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RECORD OF CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE DECISION

Meeting of July 16th, 1963.

Nuclear Weapons requirements of U.S. forces in Canada

The Committee agreed to consider further the proposal of the U.S. government for an Exchange of Notes providing for the storage of nuclear weapons for U.S. forces in Canada.

F.A. Milligan,  
Secretary.

Privy Council Office,  
July 22nd, 1963.

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July 12th, 1963.


MEMORANDUM TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

Mr. Martin and Mr. Hellyer have asked for a meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee on Tuesday afternoon, July 16th, to consider the following matters relating to Canadian requirements for nuclear weapons for forces in Canada and Europe:

- (1) Draft general agreement negotiated this week with United States officials;
- (2) Draft letter of understanding to accompany the general agreement;
- (3) Draft letter requesting United States assurances concerning the future of the BOMARC B system; and
- (4) Nature of public announcement to be made.

One additional matter has arisen as a result of the visit of the U.S. negotiating team, who have presented a new proposal respecting the storage of nuclear weapons in Canada to meet U.S. requirements, which goes beyond the previous U.S. draft proposal covering Goose Bay and Harmon Field. Mr. Martin does not propose that this be included in the agenda for next Tuesday but is likely to raise the matter at the meeting and to ask that a further meeting be scheduled at which the U.S. proposal would be considered.

F.A. Milligan.



*Prime Minister*  
*Seen*  
*MR*  
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Ottawa, June 28, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. R.B. BRYCE, SECRETARY TO THE CABINET

On May 22 you wrote to the Minister of External Affairs passing on a suggestion from the Prime Minister that Mr. Martin and Mr. Hellyer might bring forward at an early opportunity a proposal to proceed with negotiations with the United States for the stockpiling of nuclear weapons at Goose and Harmon.

2. To complete your records, you may wish to know that a draft memorandum to Cabinet in that sense was submitted to Mr. Martin on June 3. He decided however not to submit the memorandum to Cabinet at this time or to discuss the matter further with the Prime Minister since, at Hyannis Port, the Prime Minister had made it quite clear that a bilateral agreement concerning weapons for Canadian forces would have to be concluded before taking up the questions of United States requests in respect of their forces in Canada.

3. As the negotiations on the Canada-United States bilateral agreement have now reached an active stage perhaps there is no need to feel undue concern at the delay in dealing with the problem of Goose and Harmon.

*R.C.*  
R.C.

*1-12 P. C. O.*  
MR. MILLIGAN:

To see and return to  
me pls.

R.B.B.

*put in PM  
file.*

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PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

MEMORANDUM

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FOR MR. N.A. ROBERTSON:

The Prime Minister got this directly from Butterworth and Butterworth emphasized this was not an official note. Mr. Pearson wanted you, and I would think Ross Campbell, to see it.

We have not kept a copy here.

The Prime Minister has the original which he intends to show to Mr. Paul Martin.

R.B.B.

May 29/63

"MEMORANDUM NUCLEAR WARHEADS  
FOR UNITED STATES FORCES IN CANADA"  
May 26, 1963.

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●  
Mr. Bryce:

From the Prime Minister's  
Cabinet book.

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MEMORANDUM

NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR  
UNITED STATES FORCES IN CANADA

The United States position regarding the need to equip United States forces in Canada with nuclear weapons rests on a number of considerations:

I. The Continuing Soviet Manned-Bomber Threat

The manned-bomber threat will remain a significant element of the Soviet strike force through this decade. At present, we believe the Soviet Union can mount an attack of up to 200 bombers on two-way missions against North America.

II. The Soviet Submarine Threat

The Soviet submarine force is formidable and operates extensively in the North Atlantic area. Nuclear weapons are the best, if not the only, means of destroying fast-running submarines. Current conventional anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weapons (torpedoes) are unable to catch fast submarines and can be rendered ineffective by acoustic countermeasures. The nuclear depth charge overcomes both these deficiencies. Plans call for the storage of fifty ASW depth charges in support of twelve United States aircraft at Argentia; to ensure the nuclear support of these aircraft, nuclear weapons should be readily available to them.

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### III. Agreed Cooperative Arrangements

Certain rights and obligations were assumed by the United States and Canada under terms of the leased bases agreements, other bilateral arrangements for joint military planning and consultation, and the North Atlantic Treaty.

Particular obligations were assumed by both countries under the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) agreement. The Canadian Government, in formally proposing the establishment of NORAD, prefaced its proposal in part with the following statements:

"For some years prior to the establishment of NORAD, it had been recognized that the air defence of Canada and the United States must be considered as a single problem. However, arrangements which existed between Canada and the United States provided only for the co-ordination of separate Canadian and United States air defence plans, but did not provide for the authoritative control of all air defence weapons which must be employed against an attacker.

"The advent of nuclear weapons, the great improvements in the means of effecting their delivery, and the requirements of the air defence control systems demand rapid decisions to keep pace with the speed and tempo of technological developments. To counter the threat and to achieve maximum effectiveness of the air defence system, defensive operations must commence as early as possible and enemy forces must be kept constantly engaged. Arrangements for the co-ordination of national plans requiring consultation between national commanders before implementation had become inadequate in the face of a possible sudden attack, with little or no warning. It was essential, therefore, to have in existence in peacetime an organization, including the weapons, facilities and command structure which could operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air defence plan approved in advance by national authorities."

(The quotation is from Note No. 263, May 12, 1958 from Ambassador Norman Robertson to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; it and the United States reply of the same date constitute the basic NORAD

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agreement, still in effect. The texts of both have been published as TIAS 4031 in the Department of State series, "United States Treaties and Other International Agreements.")

#### IV. NORAD Requirements

A NORAD requirement was established for nine interceptor squadrons in Canada as part of the defense of the continent against a manned-bomber attack. Similarly, the BOMARC-SAGE system included two installations in Canada as well as the eight BOMARC sites in the United States.

The Royal Canadian Air Force has been able to fill the requirement for five of the nine interceptor squadrons in Canada. The United States has contributed an augmented or so-called double squadron of interceptors which is based at Goose Bay, Labrador and part of which is deployed to Ernest Harmon Air Force Base at Stephenville, Newfoundland.

The construction of the BOMARC sites in Canada, and the deployment of the missiles to them, has proceeded as agreed between the two Governments.

#### V. Technical Agreements

Since all planning had been on the basis of arming the forces of both countries with weapons systems which are ineffective without nuclear warheads and since the two Governments were cooperating within the framework set forth in the Canadian Note cited above, the United States had assumed that when the carriers were available the detailed technical agreements on the warheads themselves would already have been concluded so that the weapons systems could function as contemplated. At no time has the United

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States been informed by the Canadian Government of any intention to the contrary. The most recent affirmation to this effect is contained in the replies by the then Minister of National Defence in the House of Commons on January 21, 1963 to certain questions as listed below (quoted from Hansard, p. 2920):

USE OF NUCLEAR ARMS ON  
MISSILES AND PLANES

Question No. 1,235 - Mr. Matheson:

1. (a) When the government selected the Bomarc in September 1958, was the government aware that the maximum efficiency of this weapon depended upon the use of nuclear armament? (b) prior to acquiring the Bomarc in October 1961, did the government indicate to the U.S.A. or to NORAD that it was, or might be, unwilling to accept nuclear arms?
2. (a) When the government selected the CF-104 in July 1959, did the government know that the proposed role depended upon the use of nuclear weapons? (b) prior to acquiring the CF-104 in March 1961, did the government indicate to its NATO allies or NATO H.Q. that it was, or might be, unwilling to accept nuclear arms?
3. (a) When the government selected the "Honest John" in March 1960, did the government know that non-nuclear shells were impractical? (b) prior to acquiring the "Honest John" in August 1961, did the government indicate to its NATO allies or NATO H.Q. that it was, or might be, unwilling to accept nuclear arms?
4. (a) When the government selected the CF-101B in June 1961, did the government know that its proposed role depended upon the use of nuclear weapons? (b) prior to acquiring the CF-101B in July 1961, did the government indicate to its NATO allies or NATO H.Q. that it was, or might be, unwilling to accept nuclear arms?

Mr. Harkness: 1, 2, 3 and 4. (a) The government was aware that in each instance these weapons systems would reach their maximum effectiveness when armed with nuclear warheads or weapons.

(b) No.

Negotiations have proceeded intermittently on the necessary technical arrangements but have never been concluded. During these negotiations the United States asserted without contradiction that arrangements should be

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made for the supply of nuclear warheads to USAF interceptor squadrons stationed in Canada as well as to the RCAF interceptor squadrons stationed in Canada since both are integral parts of the NORAD planning and joint command.

VI. United States Investment

Because of the nature of the threat, the United States, in accordance with the joint undertaking, proceeded with the provision of weapons to both United States and Canadian forces, with the deployment of United States forces to bases in Canada, and with the construction of storage facilities for warheads as well as other necessary facilities required for the operation of United States bases. Similarly, the United States has borne a large share (in some cases, two-thirds), of the cost of weapons supplied to Canadian forces, weapons which, of course, are ineffective or of very limited value without nuclear warheads.

VII. Consequences

The threat remains, but it is not being met.

A heavy investment of personnel and funds has been made in weapons systems which, in the absence of arrangements for equipping them with warheads, are of little value.

VIII. Remedy

Negotiations are now in progress regarding the provision of nuclear warheads for Canadian forces.

Similar negotiations (including similar arrangements for joint control if desired by the Canadian Government) are called for with regard to arrangements for the simultaneous supplying of United States forces in Canada with appropriate nuclear warheads.

Embassy of the United States of America,  
Ottawa, Canada, May 26, 1963

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Mr. Hellyer

SECRET

Ottawa, May 22nd, 1963.

The Honourable Paul Martin, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Martin:

I have spoken to the Prime Minister about your concern over the record of the Cabinet decision of May 9th, concerning the nuclear weapons agreements, and in particular the absence of an approval to proceed with negotiations with the United States for an agreement to stockpile air-to-air missiles on the leased bases at Goose Bay and Harmon Field for the use of the U.S. interceptors.

The Prime Minister recalled the discussion and felt that this point had not been fully covered in it as attention was naturally centred primarily on the agreement concerning the weapons for the Canadian forces and on the discussion he was to have immediately following that day with President Kennedy.

Mr. Pearson therefore suggested that you and Mr. Hellyer should bring forward at the first opportunity, either orally or preferably in writing, a suggestion that we now proceed with negotiations for this agreement for the stockpiling of the weapons for the U.S. squadron located at these bases.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Hellyer.

Yours sincerely,

RBB:aw

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
A. B. BRYCE

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May 21st, 1963.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRYCE:

My notes for the meeting of May 9th indicate that the decision on U.S. storage at Goose Bay and Harmon was deferred. The Prime Minister had brought out the point that a refusal to meet the U.S. request would mean that we would be accepting from the U.S. weapons for Canadian forces and denying them the right to have the same weapons for their own planes at Goose and Harmon. However, Mr. Pearson did not press the point and said that he would tell President Kennedy that we were still examining the request -- giving no commitment. Mr. Martin suggested at that point that U.S. requests should be looked at again by the Cabinet Defence Committee but this was not taken up. The matter was then dropped, and was taken up again only briefly when Miss LaMarsh asked about Canadian control over weapons stored at U.S. bases.



F.A.M.

MEMORANDUM

Mulligan

hooked over your notes  
very carefully to see if  
Cabinet has approved  
either directly or by inference  
the note to go to US about  
nuclear weapons at Zook  
& Harman. The US Ambassador  
says Pearson told them at  
Hyannis Port we would go  
ahead on this - Paul Martin  
thinks it was approved  
The R D does not cover it - nor  
do my notes (- may 9)

RBC 000120

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*  
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*  
**MEMORANDUM**

**Privy Council Office**

Ottawa.....May 21st, 1963.

FOR FILE

MR. CARDIN

For your information.

E.F.Gaskel<sup>7</sup>000121

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RECORD OF CABINET DECISION

Meeting of May 9th, 1963.  
(Cab. Doc. 23/63, May 8)


Report of Cabinet Defence Committee; nuclear  
weapons agreements

The Cabinet agreed,-

- (a) that the draft agreement concerning nuclear warheads for the Canadian forces be approved as a basis for negotiation with the United States, subject to the deletion of the proposed Annex and amendment of the first sentence of paragraph (1) to read approximately; "The United States shall provide and maintain stockpiles of nuclear warheads for the use of the Canadian Forces in respect of weapons and weapons systems as specified by agreement between the two countries from time to time.";
- (b) that the Prime Minister inform President Kennedy that the Canadian government is prepared to negotiate a general agreement concerning nuclear warheads for the Canadian Forces, to be followed by the negotiation of technical agreements relating to:
  - (i) The IM99B (Bomarc)
  - (ii) Air-to air missiles for the CF-101
  - (iii) Air-to-surface weapons for the CF104
  - (iv) The 762 mm Rocket (Honest John);
- (c) that the Minister of National Defence inquire into and report on the anti-submarine weapon requirements of the R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. with specific reference to,-
  - (i) modifications of ASW aircraft, undertaken or programmed, to permit the use of air-dropped nuclear weapons;
  - (ii) whether any commitment has been made to use nuclear weapons, and, if so how this commitment was made;
  - (iii) whether a requirement for air-dropped anti-submarine nuclear weapons is likely to develop in the near future, and the probable urgency of such a requirement;

- 2 -

- (d) that a general reference to defence policy be included in the Speech from the Throne; and,
- (e) that the Prime Minister inform President Kennedy that the Canadian government is studying the U.S. request for permission to stockpile air-to-air missiles on the leased bases at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland, for the use of U.S. interceptors.

  
Registrar of the Cabinet.

Privy Council Office,  
May 21st, 1963.

## DECLASSIFICATION NOTICE

Cabinet Document Number: 23-63

Subject File Number: → D-1-5 (e)  
D-1-5(f)

DECLASSIFIED - FEBRUARY 23, 1994

For authority, please refer to the February 15, 1994 letter on file 1935-2.

copy on D-1-5(2)

TOP SECRET

CABINET DOCUMENT

No. 23/63

Copy 14 of 40

Ottawa, May 8, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET

Nuclear Weapons Policy

With a view to fulfilling the nuclear commitments Canada has undertaken with respect to NATO and continental defence, the Cabinet Defence Committee has considered and approved draft agreements concerning nuclear warheads for Canadian forces in Europe and North America (attached as Annex A); and the storage of defensive nuclear weapons for United States interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland (attached as Annex B).

Both proposed agreements are designed to set out the general principles which are to govern the conditions under which stockpiles of United States weapons will be made available for the use of Canadian forces, and of United States forces in Canada. They will be followed by further technical agreements to be negotiated on a service-to-service basis, in respect of individual weapons systems.

Other outstanding United States requests include storage of anti-submarine nuclear weapons for the use of United States forces at Argentia and storage for SAC at Goose Bay. As there have been only preliminary discussions concerning these additional United States requests, further discussions will be necessary before consideration can be given to them. The attached proposals have therefore been confined to those weapons systems for which a clear commitment had been undertaken, or a clear justification existed for proceeding to early agreement with the United States.

...2

*Harold Morrison*  
*MacNamara*

TOP SECRET

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Subject to Cabinet approval, the Cabinet Defence Committee also agreed that:

- (a) the Canadian Ambassador in Washington should be instructed to inform the United States authorities in confidence of the action being taken by the Canadian Government towards resolving outstanding questions of nuclear policy;
- (b) following the initiation of negotiations by United States authorities, the Minister of National Defence seek assurances from the United States Secretary of Defence that no action is being contemplated by the United States, in respect of its own air defence forces, which might be construed as ~~seriously~~ discrediting any action taken by the Canadian Government to meet the requirements of its own air defence forces covered by the proposed agreement, particularly in regard to the BOMARC B missiles; and that no such action be taken by the United States authorities in future without prior consultation with the Canadian Government.

Recommendation

The Cabinet Defence Committee has therefore recommended that:

- (i) the draft agreements be approved;
- (ii) following the return of the Prime Minister from Hyannis Port the drafts be passed to the United States authorities under cover of the attached Note (Annex C) for consideration, with an invitation to the United States authorities to open negotiations when they have studied the Canadian drafts;

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- (iii) a negotiation team be established;
- (iv) matters relating to the proposed negotiations  
be classified "SECRET".

.....  
Chairman  
Cabinet Defence Committee

SECRET

DRAFT

ANNEX "A"  
May 7, 1963.

PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES  
CONCERNING NUCLEAR WARHEADS  
FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES

I have the honour to refer to Articles 20 and 21 of the communique issued by the North Atlantic Council on December 19, 1957, and to discussions which have taken place between the appropriate authorities of the Canadian and United States Governments regarding the general principles under which nuclear warheads will be made available for the Canadian Forces.

It is the understanding of my Government that in the course of these discussions agreement was reached regarding these general principles. In order to implement this agreement my Government suggests the following arrangements:

- (1) The United States shall provide and maintain stockpiles of nuclear warheads for the use of the Canadian Forces in respect of the weapons and weapons systems shown in the attached Annex "A", which may be amended from time to time by agreement between the two governments. In this agreement the expression "nuclear warhead" includes the associated weapon where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components.
- (2) Stockpiles of nuclear warheads will be established in quantities and at locations to be determined by the Allied Commanders concerned in accordance with their approved plans or by the Canadian and United States military authorities, as appropriate.
- (3) Except as otherwise agreed, the costs of construction, administration and maintenance of the storage sites and associated facilities, including those required for the support of the United States custodial and support personnel, shall be borne by Canada. Provision, without cost to the United States, of land required will be the responsibility of Canada. To the extent

SECRET

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that the North Atlantic Council approves the establishment of nuclear stockpile sites under NATO common infrastructure, the apportionment of costs will be subject to NATO infrastructure procedures. Installations and facilities for nuclear warhead storage and maintenance will be built and maintained to satisfy NATO or U.S. standards and criteria as applicable. Installations and facilities for normal logistic support (housing, messing, offices, etc.), which may not be specified under NATO criteria, will be provided and maintained as mutually agreed.

(4) It is recognized that the custody of any stocks of nuclear warheads provided by the United States will be the responsibility of the United States and that United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon.

(5) The release of warheads to meet operational requirements will be the subject, where practical, of prior inter-governmental consultation. They will be used as may be authorized by the Canadian Government and in accordance with procedures established by the appropriate Allied Commander or by the Canadian and United States military authorities as applicable.

(6) The United States will be responsible for the maintenance, modification and assembly of nuclear warheads, including the provision of personnel and technical equipment for the performance of these functions.

(7) External security for all nuclear warheads in storage or during movement is the responsibility of Canada within Canada and elsewhere as may be agreed. The details of external security arrangements will be determined by the United States and Canadian military authorities and in accordance with the directives of the Allied Commander, where appropriate.

(8) The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads between the United States and storage sites in Canada. Subject to the provisions of Article (4) above, Canada will be responsible for the transportation of nuclear warheads between

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points in Canada and elsewhere as may be agreed. In respect of Europe, the United States will be responsible for the movement of nuclear warheads into and from the ACE area. Responsibilities for movement within the ACE area will be as agreed between the appropriate U.S. and Canadian military authorities.

(9) Where necessary to meet the purposes of this agreement, a reliable system of signal communications will be established, operated and maintained in a manner to be agreed upon by the appropriate authorities of the two governments.

(10) Canada will be responsible for providing reasonable administrative and logistic support for the United States personnel described in Articles (3) and (4).

(11) Where Canada is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of storage facilities in Europe, the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of such facilities will be as agreed between the governments concerned and the appropriate Allied Commander.

(12) The safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear warheads will be at least equivalent to U.S. standards and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada, taking into consideration classified (atomic) information transferred under existing agreements between the two governments and the interests of other allied governments, as applicable.

(13) Supplementary arrangements required to implement this agreement will be negotiated between the appropriate military authorities of the United States and Canada.

(14) Canada and the United States will consult with regard to any notification or other form of diplomatic communication addressed to a third government concerning the proposed establishment of any stockpiles of nuclear warheads on its territory for possible Canadian use.

(15) Publicity concerning this agreement and its implementation shall be governed by the Exchange of Notes of February 19 and 24, 1951 concerning

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publicity relating to joint Canadian-United States defence plans and operations.

(16) The terms of this agreement may be reviewed by the two governments at the request of either government and after such review may be terminated by either government upon six months' notice.

I propose that if the foregoing is acceptable to your Government, this note and your reply indicating such acceptance will constitute an agreement between the two Governments on this subject, the agreement to enter into force on the date of your note in reply.

S E C R E T

ANNEX "A"

WEAPONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS

- 1) The IM99B (Bomarc)
- 2) Air-to-air missiles for the CF101
- 3) Air-to-surface weapons for the CF104
- ✓ 4) Air-dropped anti-submarine weapons  
for the RCN and RCAF
- 5) The 762 mm Rocket (Honest John)

SECRET

D R A F T

ANNEX "B"

May 7, 1963

PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT  
GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

No. \_\_\_\_\_

Sir:

I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of the continental air defences by an increase in the numbers of air defence weapons with nuclear capability. These discussions have taken into account recommendations by the Commander-in-Chief, NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE COMMAND, as to the immediate military requirement for the storage at certain points in Canada of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons for United States forces under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defence Command.

As a result of these discussions, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons in Canada for United States forces in accordance with the conditions set out in the attached Annex.

I have the honour to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

D R A F T

S E C R E T

ANNEX TO THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS  
AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

(In this Annex, unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, "United States" means the Government of the United States of America, "NORAD" means the North American Air Defence Command established by Canada and the United States in an Exchange of Notes dated 12 May, 1958, and "CINCNORAD" means the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD.)

The weapons under consideration are such nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to United States Forces under the operational control of CINCNORAD.

2. Ownership and custody of these weapons shall remain with the United States. They may be stored within the leased area at Goose Bay and at the leased base at Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.

3. The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas, i.e., the Agreement of 27 March, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base and the Exchange of Notes of 5 December, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay.

4. The safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear weapons will be at least equivalent to US standards, will conform with Canadian law and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada, taking into consideration classified (atomic) information which can be transferred under existing agreements between the two Governments.

S E C R E T

- 2 -

5. Authorization of transportation of these weapons in Canadian territory will be subject to the requirements of Canadian law.

6. The removal of these weapons for operational reasons from the areas utilized by United States Forces (as provided in the Agreement of 27 March, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base, and the Exchange of Notes dated 5 December, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay) will be in accordance with the conditions and procedures set out in the MB-1 Overflight Agreement dated 30 June, 1959, as amended by the Exchange of Notes dated 1 June, 1962.

7. The provisions of paragraph 6 above will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the weapons to the United States at any time at the request of the United States Government.

8. The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice.

9. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between appropriate authorities of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

DRAFT

S E C R E T

ANNEX "C"

No. \_\_\_\_\_

OTTAWA, May 7, 1963

Excellency,

I have the honour to transmit on behalf of the Government of Canada for the attention of the Government of the United States of America the --- attached draft Notes relating respectively to nuclear warheads for the Canadian Forces and to the storage of defensive nuclear weapons for United States interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The drafts take into account earlier discussions between the two Governments on these subjects.

I am also authorized to invite the United States Government to open negotiations on the attached draft agreements when they have been studied by the United States authorities.

The Canadian Government assumes that the negotiations would be secret and requests that there be no publicity concerning them except as agreed between the two Governments.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

H. E. W. Walton Butterworth,  
Ambassador,  
Embassy of the United States of America,  
100 Wellington Street,  
O T T A W A.

DECLASSIFICATION NOTICE

Cabinet Document Number: 3-63

Subject File Number: → D-1-5(e)  
D-1-6-D  
D-1-5(y)

DECLASSIFIED - FEBRUARY 23, 1994

For authority, please refer to the February 15, 1994 letter on file 1935-2.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

For CDC decision May 7<sup>th</sup> see file D-1-5(f)

S E C R E T

May 6, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE

CABINET DEFENCE  
COMMITTEE

Document No. D-3-63

Nuclear Policy

Pursuant to the Committee's directive of April 25, 1963, an inter-departmental committee of officials has considered Canadian requirements for nuclear weapons and U.S. requests for storage of nuclear weapons in Canada.

Regarding weapons for Canada, it has been concluded that the requirements for Canadian forces in Europe and North America can be dealt with in one agreement. Attached are copies of a U.S. draft originally submitted on October 14, 1959 and a redraft prepared by the inter-departmental committee (Annex "A"). The Department of National Defence prefers paragraph 4 in the U.S. draft to paragraph 5 in the redraft.

2

Regarding United States requirements in Canada:

- (a) A Canadian draft Exchange of Notes on storage for U.S. interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon, which was virtually agreed in 1960, has been reviewed and brought up to date and a revised version considered satisfactory for submission to the U.S. for comment is attached (Annex "B"). In this agreement the use of nuclear weapons by U.S. forces has been related to the existing agreement whereby U.S. interceptors stationed in the United States may overfly and land in Canada when an attack is imminent.
- (b) There have been only preliminary discussions on storage of ASW nuclear weapons at Argentia. It is recommended that the U.S. be invited to submit a draft agreement for Canadian consideration.
- (c) Regarding storage for SAC at Goose Bay, there is some indication that the U.S. has reduced the priority of the requirement. This aspect should be subject to further discussion with the U.S.

Recommendations

Subject to the Committee's approval of them, it is proposed that the draft agreements be submitted to the Cabinet together with recommendations that:

- after Hyannisport
- (a) the drafts be passed to the U.S. authorities for consideration;
  - (b) they be invited to open negotiations when they have studied the Canadian drafts;
  - (c) an inter-departmental negotiating team be established.

S E C R E T

- 2 -

- (d) negotiations be conducted in Washington and Ottawa as may appear convenient and appropriate.

Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

Minister of  
National Defence

ANNEX "A"

S E C R E T

UNITED STATES DRAFT  
OCTOBER 14, 1959

Acquisition of Nuclear Warheads  
and/or Weapons  
for Canadian Forces

CANADIAN RE-DRAFT  
MAY 3, 1963

Proposed Exchange of Notes  
Concerning Nuclear Warheads  
for the Canadian Forces

S E C R E T

UNITED STATES DRAFT  
October 14, 1959

CANADIAN RE-DRAFT  
May 3, 1963

SUBJECT

Preamble

I have the honor to refer to Articles 20 and 21 of the communique issued by the North Atlantic Council on 19 December 1957, and to conversations which have taken place between the appropriate allied commanders and the Government of Canada and the appropriate allied commanders and the Government of the United States regarding the stockpiling of atomic weapons for Canadian forces.

It is the understanding of my Government that in the course of these conversations agreement in principle was reached to the establishment of elements of a stockpile of atomic weapons to be provided by the United States in support of Canadian forces in Canada and Europe. In order to implement this agreement in principle my Government suggests the following arrangements:

Stockpiles

I have the honour to refer to Articles 20 and 21 of the communique issued by the North Atlantic Council on December 19, 1957, and to discussions which have taken place between the appropriate authorities of the Canadian and United States Governments regarding the general principles under which nuclear warheads will be made available for the Canadian Forces.

It is the understanding of my Government that in the course of these discussions agreement was reached regarding these general principles. In order to implement this agreement my Government suggests the following arrangements:

(1)

The United States shall provide and maintain stockpiles of nuclear warheads for the use of the Canadian Forces in respect of the weapons and weapons systems shown in the attached Annex "A", which may be amended from time to time by agreement between the two governments. In this agreement the expression "nuclear warhead" includes the associated weapon where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components.

UNITED STATES DRAFT  
October 14, 1959

CANADIAN RE-DRAFT  
May 3, 1963

SUBJECT

Location of Sites

(1)

(2)

The location of the stocks will be determined by the appropriate allied commander in agreement with Canadian and United States military authorities or by the latter authorities where there is no appropriate allied commander.

Stockpiles of nuclear war-heads will be established in quantities and at locations to be determined by the Allied Commanders concerned in accordance with their approved plans or by the Canadian and United States military authorities, as appropriate.

Costs of Sites and Associated Facilities

(2)

(3)

Except as otherwise agreed, the costs of construction, development and maintenance of the storage sites and associated facilities, including those required for the support of the United States special weapons custodial and support personnel, shall be borne by Canada. Arrangements for providing the land involved, without cost to the United States will be the responsibility of the Canadian Government. To the extent that the North Atlantic Council agrees to the NATO infrastructure funding of NATO atomic stockpile construction costs, for those installations constructed as part of the NATO infrastructure program, apportionment of costs will be subject to NATO infrastructure procedures. Installations and facilities for atomic weapons storage and maintenance will be built and maintained at least in accordance with NATO standards and criteria. Installations and facilities for normal logistic support (housing, messing, offices, etc.) will be built.

Except as otherwise agreed, the costs of construction, administration and maintenance of the storage sites and associated facilities, including those required for the support of the United States custodial and support personnel, shall be borne by Canada. Provision, without cost to the United States, of land required will be the responsibility of Canada. To the extent that the North Atlantic Council approves the establishment of nuclear stockpile sites under NATO common infrastructure, the apportionment of costs will be subject to NATO infrastructure procedures. Installations and facilities for nuclear war-head storage and maintenance will be built and maintained to satisfy NATO or U.S. standards and criteria as applicable. Installations and facilities for normal logistic support (housing, messing, offices, etc.), which may not be specified under NATO criteria, will be provided and maintained as mutually agreed.

*Additional costs to be incurred*

*556 m in 63-64  
15 m non-re current  
7 m re current P. a.  
possibly other costs  
(no dependent housing)*

*incurred 1400 <sup>edu</sup> personnel in all - U.S. personnel -*

UNITED STATES DRAFT  
October 14, 1959

CANADIAN RE-DRAFT  
May 3, 1963

SUBJECT

	(3)	(4)
Custody of Warheads	It is recognized that the custody of any stocks of atomic weapons provided by the United States will be the responsibility of the United States and that United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel in Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon.	It is recognized that the custody of any stocks of <u>nuclear warheads</u> provided by the United States will be the responsibility of the United States and that United States personnel will be provided for this purpose. The status of such personnel <u>in</u> Canada will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. <i>OK w/ PM</i>
Status of Personnel		

*control*  
~~joint resp. for foreign custody~~  
 - vs custody -

Release for Use	(4)	(5)
	When the weapons are released by appropriate authority they will be employed in accordance with procedures established by SACEUR in Europe, by SACLANT in the North Atlantic Ocean Area and in accordance with procedures governing NORAD's operations as approved in advance by both governments.	The release of warheads to meet operational requirements will be the subject, where practical, of prior inter-governmental consultation. They will be used as may be <del>authorized</del> authorized by the Canadian Government and in accordance with procedures established by the appropriate Allied Commander or by the Canadian and United States military authorities as applicable.

*AM... wants to*

UNITED STATES DRAFT  
October 14, 1959

CANADIAN RE-DRAFT  
May 3, 1963

SUBJECT

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Responsibility (5)  
for Maintenance, Modification and Assembly

United States forces will be responsible for the maintenance, modification and assembly of the atomic weapons, including the provision of personnel and technical equipment for the performance of these functions.

(6)

The United States will be responsible for the maintenance, modification and assembly of nuclear warheads, including the provision of personnel and technical equipment for the performance of these functions.

Security

(6)

External security for all atomic weapons in storage or during movement is the responsibility of Canada within Canada, and elsewhere as may be agreed. The details of external security arrangements will be determined by the appropriate United States and Canadian military authorities and in accordance with the directives of the allied commander, where appropriate.

(7)

External security for all nuclear warheads in storage or during movement is the responsibility of Canada within Canada, and elsewhere as may be agreed. The details of external security arrangements will be determined by the United States and Canadian military authorities and in accordance with the directives of the Allied Commander, where appropriate.

Movement to and from Canada

(7)

United States forces will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures, of the atomic weapons into Canada and from Canada. Canadian forces will be responsible for the transportation of weapons within Canada, subject always to the provisions of Article (3) above. United States forces will be responsible for the movement of the atomic weapons into the ACE area and from the ACE area. Responsibilities for movement within the ACE area will be as agreed between the appropriate United States and Canadian military representatives.

(8)

The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads between the United States and storage sites in Canada. Subject to the provisions of Article (4) above, Canada will be responsible for the transportation of nuclear warheads between points in Canada and elsewhere as may be agreed. In respect of Europe, the United States will be responsible for the movement of nuclear warheads into and from the ACE area. Responsibilities for movement within the ACE area will be as agreed between the appropriate U.S. and Canadian military authorities.

UNITED STATES DRAFT  
October 14, 1959

CANADIAN RE-DRAFT  
May 3, 1963

SUBJECT

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Communications (8)

A reliable means of signal communications will be provided, where necessary, by the Government of Canada to meet the purposes of this agreement.

(9)

Where necessary to meet the purposes of this agreement, a reliable system of signal communications will be established, operated and maintained in a manner to be agreed upon by the appropriate authorities of the two governments.

Administration (9)  
and Logistic  
Support for  
Personnel

Canada will, in general, provide at no expense to the United States Government reasonable administrative and logistical support for United States forces and dependents in support of Canadian units. This support will include common items of supply, organic transportation, and such other support as may be mutually agreed.

(10)

Canada will be responsible for providing reasonable administrative and logistic support for the United States personnel described in Articles (3) and (4).

Responsibility  
for Facilities  
in Europe

(11)

Where Canada is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of storage facilities in Europe, the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of such facilities will be as agreed between the governments concerned and the appropriate Allied Commander.

UNITED STATES DRAFT  
October 14, 1959

CANADIAN RE-DRAFT  
May 3, 1963

SUBJECT

Safety  
Procedures

(10)

Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage will be at least equivalent to United States standards and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate military representatives of the United States and Canada, taking into consideration classified (atomic) information which can be transferred under existing agreements between the two governments.

(12)

The safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear warheads will be at least equivalent to U.S. standards and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada, taking into **consideration** classified (atomic) information ~~which can be~~ transferred under existing agreements between the two governments and the interests of other allied governments, as applicable.

Supplementary  
Arrangements

(11)

Supplementary service-to-service arrangements, within the scope of this agreement pertaining to custody and control, the various delivery systems and associated installations, will be negotiated separately, as may be appropriate, between the designated military representatives of the United States and Canada.

(13)

Supplementary arrangements required to implement this agreement will be negotiated between the appropriate military authorities of the United States and Canada.

*of which the scope of the agreement*

*unmarked - EA should read before finalized - agreed*

Notification  
of Third  
Governments

(14)

Canada and the United States will consult with regard to any notification or other form of diplomatic communication addressed to a third government concerning the proposed establishment of any stockpiles of nuclear warheads on its territory for possible Canadian use.

*By*

Review and  
Termination

(15)

The terms of this agreement may be reviewed by the two governments at the request of either government and after such review may be terminated by either government upon six months' notice.

UNITED STATES DRAFT  
October 14, 1959

CANADIAN RE-DRAFT  
May 3, 1963

SUBJECT

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Final  
Paragraph

I propose that if the foregoing is acceptable to your Government, this note and your reply indicating such acceptance will constitute an agreement between the two Governments on this subject, the agreement to enter into force on the date of your note in reply.

I propose that if the foregoing is acceptable to your Government, this note and your reply indicating such acceptance will constitute an agreement between the two Governments on this subject, the agreement to enter into force on the date of your note in reply.

S E C R E T

ANNEX "A"

WEAPONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS

- 1) The IM99B (Bomarc)
- 2) Air-to-air missiles for the CF101
- 3) Air-to-surface weapons for the CF104
- 4) Air-dropped anti-submarine weapons  
for the RCN and RCAF
- 5) The 762 mm Rocket (Honest John)

ANNEX "B"

D R A F T

S E C R E T

May 3, 1963

PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT  
GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

No. \_\_\_\_\_

Sir:

I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of the continental air defences by an increase in the numbers of air defence weapons with nuclear capability. These discussions have taken into account recommendations by the Commander-in-Chief, NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE COMMAND, as to the immediate military requirement for the storage at certain points in Canada of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons for United States forces under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defence Command.

*As a result of this agreement*

Recognizing the need to strengthen the continental air defences against the threat which exists, and realizing that the full potential of air-to-air defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons in Canada for United States forces in accordance with the conditions set out in the attached Annex.

I have the honour to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

R A F T

S E C R E T

ANNEX TO THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS  
AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

(In this Annex, unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, "United States" means the Government of the United States of America, "NORAD" means the North American Air Defence Command established by Canada and the United States in an Exchange of Notes dated 12 May, 1958, and "CINCNORAD" means the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD.)

The weapons under consideration are such nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to United States Forces under the operational control of CINCNORAD.

2. Ownership and custody of these weapons shall remain with the United States. They may be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.

3. The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas, i.e., the Agreement of 27 March, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base and the Exchange of Notes of 5 December, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay.

4. The safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, delivery and salvage of nuclear weapons will be at least equivalent to US standards, will conform with Canadian law and will be the subject of arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada, taking into consideration classified (atomic) information which can be transferred under existing agreements between the two Governments.

5. Authorization of transportation of these weapons in Canadian territory will be subject to the requirements of Canadian law.

S E C R E T

- 2 -

6. The removal of these weapons for operational reasons from the areas utilized by United States Forces (as provided in the Agreement of 27 March, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base, and the Exchange of Notes dated 5 December, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Gosse Bay) will be in accordance with the conditions and procedures set out in the MB-1 Overflight Agreement dated 30 June, 1959, as amended by the Exchange of Notes dated 1 June, 1962.

7. The provisions of paragraph 6 above will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the weapons to the United States at any time at the request of the United States Government.

8. The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice.

9. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between appropriate authorities of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

MEMORANDUM

TO: MR. ROSS CAMPBELL

Security ~~SECRET~~

Date April 29, 1963

FROM: Defense Liaison (1) Division

File No.		

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: ~~ENGLISH WEAPONS~~; United States Storage Requirements in Canada

A. Goose Bay and Harmon

A Canadian draft Exchange of Notes, as approved by the Cabinet, was conveyed to the State Department in March 1960 (Annex A). The three basic principles underlying the draft are:

- (i) arrangements for storage will be the joint responsibility of the two Governments;
- (ii) responsibility for the removal from the base will be shared;
- (iii) responsibility will be shared for the use of the weapons.

At the Montebello meeting of the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence in July 1960, the United States representative said that the U.S. was prepared to accept the Canadian draft provided two points could be met:

CIRCULATION

A.R. Hensies  
Legal Div.  
(H. Charpentier)

- (1) that provision be made to ensure that the weapons could be returned to the United States at any time at the request of the United States Government;

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(ii) that more formal status be given the informal explanatory notes provided the State Department by the Canadian Embassy (see Annex B) relating to those paragraphs of the draft dealing with the proposed arrangements to cover joint responsibility for storage, for release from storage and for use of the weapons and their movement in Canada.

2. The following changes to <sup>the annex to</sup> the draft note might be considered. These suggestions would be consistent with the line we are considering for the draft agreement for provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in Canada.

- (i) We might agree to the insertion of "and custody" after "ownership" in paragraph 2.
- (ii) Paragraph 3 could be retained although it is questionable just what responsibilities a Canadian representative would have other than to provide a Canadian "presence" and a device for contending that storage is the joint responsibility of the two Governments. This may be desirable for presentational purposes.
- (iii) <sup>Para. 6</sup> This provision should be consistent with whatever comparable provision is agreed in the general agreement.
- (iv) <sup>Para 7</sup> It is doubtful whether ~~this provision~~ is really necessary. The weapons could not be removed from areas utilized by U.S. forces for operational purposes except as agreed under paragraph 6. They could not be removed for logistic purposes except in accordance with paragraph 5 which presumably will mean clearance under Schedule B of P.C. 2307 - the same kind of procedures currently governing SAC overflights.
- (v) The new <sup>para 8</sup> ~~provision~~ requested by the U.S. would not be necessary if paragraph 7 were to be deleted.

If the above suggestions were accepted, it is unlikely that the U.S. would require the proposed supplementary letter (Annex B).

### B. Argentina

3. There have been no formal negotiations with the United States concerning this matter. It was, however, discussed in a general way at both the Camp David meeting of the Ministerial

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- 3 -

Committee on Joint Defence in November 1959 and at the Montebello meeting of the same Committee in July 1960.

4. At Camp David, the discussions centred mainly around the question of controls. The United States side expressed the view that nuclear weapons carried on board United States Navy ships would not be regarded as having been removed from land storage sites. The Canadian side pointed out that, under these circumstances, the Canadian Government would not be able to exercise control over release from storage of weapons stored in Canada, a matter to which the Canadian Government attached importance. The United States side urged that an attempt be made to avoid imposing such conditions as would render the defensive use of the weapons more difficult. It was left that the question of controls would have to be further explored.

5. At Montebello, the discussion covered somewhat the same ground. It was generally agreed that the principles embodied in the proposed agreement on Goose Bay and Harpoon could be applied to storage at Argentia, but that the manner in which Canada could exercise joint control over the nuclear weapons once they had left Canadian territorial waters would also require further study.

6. Goose Bay for SAC

As is the case with storage at Argentia, there have been no formal negotiations regarding this question since this request was first made in the form of an Aide-Memoire handed to the Embassy in Washington by the State Department in December 1957. In January 1958 the Cabinet authorized service-to-service exploratory discussions but there have been no actual negotiations in either the diplomatic or military channel. There was a discussion of the matter at the Camp David meeting of the Ministerial Committee, on which occasion the United States side stressed the importance they attached to storage at Goose Bay of nuclear weapons for use by the Strategic Air Command on "reflex-strike" missions. The formal request had originally been made as part of a policy which, in the United States view, was becoming more valid as the Soviet missile threat grew in strength. The Canadian side expressed the view that storage for SAC in Canada would present great difficulties politically and made it clear that no decision could be taken "at this time".

DEFENCE LIAISON (1) DIVISION

ORIGINAL DAMAGED

APPENDIX "A"

S E C R E T

July 15, 1960

PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

No. \_\_\_\_\_

Sir:

I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of the continental air defences by a gradual increase in the numbers of air defence weapons with nuclear capability. These discussions have taken into account recommendations by CINC NORAD as to the immediate military requirement for the storage at certain points in Canada of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons.

Recognizing the need to strengthen the continental air defences against the threat which exists, and realizing that the full potential of air-to-air defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons in Canada in accordance with the conditions set out in the attached Annex.

I have the honour to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

Ambassador

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ANNEX A

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ANNEX TO THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS  
AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

(In this Annex, unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, "United States" means the Government of the United States, "NORAD" means the North American Air Defence Command established by Canada and the United States in an Exchange of Notes dated May 12, 1958, and "CINCNORAD" means the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD.)

1. The weapons under consideration are such nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to the United States forces under the operational control of CINCNORAD.
2. Ownership of these weapons shall remain with the United States in accordance with United States law. They may be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.
3. Arrangements for the storage of these weapons will be a joint responsibility of Canada and the United States, to be carried out as follows:
  - (a) The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements the leased areas, i.e. the agreement of March 27, 1941 concerning leased bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base and the Exchange of Notes of December 5, 1952 in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay;
  - (b) Pursuant to its obligations under paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this Annex, Canada will provide a representative or representatives at each base.
4. Safeguards in the design of the weapons will be the responsibility of the United States. The procedure for handling the weapons to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storage and salvage will be at least equivalent to United States standards.

5. The transport of these weapons in Canadian territory will be carried out in accordance with Canadian law and with procedures agreed between the appropriate agencies of both governments.

6. Approval of the use of these weapons will be a joint responsibility of the two governments. The weapons will only be used in situations of grave emergency in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of NORAD.

7. The removal of these weapons, either for logistic or operational reasons, from the areas utilized by United States forces (as provided in the agreement of March 27, 1941, concerning leased bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base, and the Exchange of Notes dated December 5, 1952 in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay), will require the approval of the Canadian Government in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Annex.

8. Any test firing of these weapons which may be required will take place outside of Canada.

9. The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two governments at the request of either government and after such review may be terminated by either government upon six months' notice.

10. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between authorized agencies of the two governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

\* Possible new provision to be inserted as paragraph 8.

" The above provisions will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the weapons to the United States at any time at the request of the United States Government. "

APPENDIX "B"

SECRET

July 15, 1960

DRAFT LETTER FROM  
THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON  
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(This letter would carry the same date  
as the Exchange of Notes)

Dear Mr. Secretary,

In connection with the Exchange of Notes taking place this day regarding the storage of air-to-air defensive nuclear weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, I am authorized by the Canadian Government to transmit to you the following comments on certain provisions in the annex to my Note. (The paragraph references which follow relate to the paragraphs of the annex.)

Paragraph 3:

The text of this paragraph states that the arrangements for the storage of these weapons will be a joint responsibility and then describes how this responsibility is to be carried out. The objective, so far as the Canadian Government is concerned, is related to its responsibility in respect of the provisions of the agreement regarding the circumstances under which the weapons may be removed from the base installations, and concerning safety standards. The statement that the United States for its part shall be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas is intended to specify its obligations as lessee in this matter.

Paragraph 5:

There are two elements involved in this paragraph:

- (1) authorization by the Canadian Government for the transport of nuclear weapons in Canadian territory in accordance with established practice (the procedure would be the same as prescribed in Schedule "B" to Order-in-Council P.C. 2307 of April 17, 1952, for Strategic Air Command overflights); and
- (2) any safety procedures applied by the Canadian authorities in accordance with requirements of the Atomic Energy Control Board and of the safety standards referred to in paragraph 4 of the draft annex.

It should be noted that the phrase "the transport of these weapons in Canadian territory" would include not only the movement of these weapons between

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Goose Bay or Harmon Air Force Base and the United States but also their movement between Goose Bay and Harmon.

Paragraphs 6 and 7:

These paragraphs should be considered in conjunction with paragraph 5. Paragraphs 5 and 6 set out the procedures which would govern transport of the weapons outside the base, either for logistic or for operational reasons, and paragraph 7 provides that removal of the weapons, either for logistic or operational reasons, will require approval of the Canadian Government in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6. In other words, the approval of the Canadian Government for transporting the weapons for logistic reasons (following the same procedure as prescribed for overflights under Schedule "B") would at the same time constitute approval for the removal of the weapons from the storage site. Similarly, the authorization of the Canadian Government for the use of the weapons would at the same time constitute authority for their removal from the storage site for this purpose.

Paragraph 7 provides that the area in which the United States Air Force is permitted to handle the weapons shall be "the area utilized by the United States forces" (i.e., the base). This phrase is suggested to provide language to permit practice alerts and to meet training requirements, i.e., practice in arming aircraft and taxiing down the runway but not taking off. A second point arises out of the United States view that the requirement of Canadian approval for removal of the weapons for operational use could seriously impair the ability of CINC NORAD to act rapidly in situations of grave emergency. The new draft deals with this by specifying that the approval of the Canadian Government will be given in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraph 6. These procedures are spelled out in the MB-1 Overflight Agreement of June 30, 1959, and in the Exchange of Letters of September 30/October 2, 1959 between Mr. Heeney and Mr. Herter concerning states of readiness. The Canadian Government regards the measure of control which it exercises through these agreements as essential.

Yours sincerely,

S E C R E T

May 1, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE

Nuclear Policy

Pursuant to the Committee's directive of April 25, 1963 an inter-departmental committee of officials has considered Canadian requirements for nuclear weapons and U.S. requests for storage of nuclear weapons in Canada.

Regarding weapons for Canada, it has been concluded that because of the disparity in requirements between NATO forces and NORAD forces, it would be simpler to proceed by means of two separate agreements, but that these should be submitted to the United States for comment simultaneously.

Attached are copies of the United States drafts for NATO forces and NORAD forces and the Canadian redrafts. (NOTE: Here would follow explanatory comments on points of substance, in particular on Canadian financial responsibility, custody, control of use and application of the agreements.)

Regarding United States requirements in Canada:

- (a) A Canadian draft exchange of Notes, attached, on storage for U.S. interceptors at Goose Bay and Harmon, which was virtually agreed in 1960, has been reviewed and is considered satisfactory for submission to the U.S. for comment, subject to the following amendments:  
(Here list any agreed amendments)
- (b) There have only been very preliminary discussions on storage of ASW nuclear weapons at Argentia. It is recommended that the U.S. be invited to submit a draft agreement for Canadian consideration.
- (c) Regarding storage for SAC at Goose Bay, if the U.S. requirement is still for peacetime storage, this

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- 2 -

would raise major policy questions as the weapons involved are outside the category of defensive weapons. There is some indication that the U.S. has reduced its requirement to emergency facilities only. This aspect should be subject to further approved discussion with the U.S.

Subject to the Committee's approval of them, it is proposed that the draft agreements be submitted to the Cabinet together with recommendations that

- (a) the drafts be passed to the U.S. authorities for consideration
- (b) they be invited to open negotiations when they have studied the Canadian drafts
- (c) that an inter-departmental negotiating team be established.

DECLASSIFICATION NOTICE

Cabinet Document Number: 55-63

Subject File Number: D-1-5 (e)

DECLASSIFIED - FEBRUARY 23, 1994

For authority, please refer to the February 15, 1994 letter on file 1935-2.

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Copy on D-1-5 (f)

SECRET  
No. 55463

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D-1-5 (e)

TOP SECRET

February 11, 1963.

MEMORANDUM TO CABINET:

Chronology of Events Relating to  
Canada-United States Discussions on  
Storage and Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons

On December 12, 1957 the Department of State informed the Canadian Embassy in Washington that the United States wished to discuss ways and means whereby certain nuclear warheads could be stored in Canada for United States use; and both in Canada and in Europe for the use of Canadian forces.

2. On October 15, 1958 the Cabinet authorized discussions for the purpose of finding out the terms and conditions under which it was proposed that warheads be stored in Canada for United States use and also under which they would be provided for use by Canadian forces.

3. The discussions which followed centred on storage in Canada for United States use and dealt particularly with three proposals as follows:

- (a) Storage at Goose Bay and Harmon of Nuclear Air-to-Air Weapons;
- (b) Storage of Anti-Submarine Weapons at Argentia;
- (c) Storage at Goose Bay for SAC.

Considerable progress was made on (a) in the course of 1960, but very little was done about (b) which raised various complications and (c) was not pursued.

4. When a new Minister of Defence was appointed in late 1960 he recommended deferring these questions of storage for United States use until the question of providing warheads for Canadian forces had been dealt with.

5. The broad policy framework was laid down by the Cabinet on December 6, 1960. At that time it was decided that discussions with the United States Government "concerning arrangements for the essential acquisition of nuclear weapons or warheads for use by the Canadian forces....may proceed as soon as they can be usefully undertaken with the acceptance of joint controls to be a basic principle"; the Cabinet also decided that "preparation should also continue to enable the Canadian forces to have the vehicles, missiles, bases, training and other requirements to enable them to be able to use nuclear weapons to be acquired from the United States under joint control arrangements, if and when the adoption of these weapons is considered necessary".

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6. Pursuant to this decision draft agreements were prepared in the form of an Exchange of Notes with an Annex setting out general principles which would govern the control and custody, etc., of warheads for Canadian forces both in Canada and in Europe. It included a number of schedules, one for each type of warhead, wherein the general principles as applied to each were spelled out in detail. Some of these schedules were reviewed by Cabinet but this work was never completed.

7. Finally on October 30, 1962, the Cabinet decided:

- " (1) That negotiations be undertaken with the United States Government to work out an agreement or agreements between the two Governments, under which:
- (a) Nuclear warheads would be held in storage for and made available to the Canadian forces in Europe under NATO Command for use in CF-104 aircraft and the Honest John rockets; and
  - (b) Nuclear warheads would be held on bases in the United States to be moved to Canada to be available to the RCAF for use in Bomarc missiles and interceptor aircraft, on request by the Canadian Government when war appears imminent, and
- (2) That such negotiations be commenced forthwith by Messrs. Green, Harkness and Churchill jointly with the Charge d'Affaires of the United States in Ottawa."

8. Pursuant to this decision, meetings were held in Ottawa with a United States negotiating team November 21 to 23 to examine studies which had been made by the U.S.A. Defence Department of the feasibility of airlifting complete warheads to Canadian bases. As these time factors did not come within the likely warning time of bomber attack (3 hours), further studies were carried out by the U.S.A. Defence Department of the possibility of airlifting only a part of the warhead, without which the part pre-positioned in Canada would be inoperable. On December 4, the U.S.A. negotiating team presented the results of these studies. They showed that using the "missing part" approach, and using a normal complement of four loading crews, all the Bomarcs in Canada could be made operational within one hour and 55 minutes to two hours and 10 minutes; and that all the MB-1 missiles for CF-101's in Canada could be rendered operational in less than two hours, the exact time depending upon the nature of the missing part selected.

9. At a meeting in Paris between Canadian and United States Ministers on December 14, the latter indicated that they were prepared to work out with the Canadian Government a stand-by arrangement for the arming of the Bomarcs and CF-101's in case of need. There was no suggestion at the time that the "missing part" proposal was incapable of meeting the requirements of effective defence. Nevertheless in mid-January the United States indicated that the proposal to airlift

- 3 -

missing parts to Canada would present operational difficulties and counter-proposed that the missing parts in respect of both systems be stored in Canada under either United States or Canadian custody. At the same time, the United States Government declared its readiness to continue the negotiations. Attached is a draft Aide-Memoire designed to convey the Canadian Government's readiness to resume the negotiations.

Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

ANNEX

TOP SECRET

DRAFT AIDE-MEMOIRE TO THE U.S.A. GOVERNMENT

On January 11, the Embassy left with the Department an Aide-Mémoire setting out the replies of the United States Government to a number of questions which had been posed at the last meeting of officials on December 4, 1962. Clarification of certain points made in the U.S. Aide-Mémoire of January 11 was requested by the Canadian side. This was supplied in the further Aide-Mémoire of January 15, 1963. The following Canadian comments are offered in connection with both documents.

(1) Reference has been made to the meetings between Canadian and United States Ministers in Paris on December 14, 1962, in terms which suggest that there may have been a Canadian misunderstanding as to the main U.S. preoccupation. The Canadian understanding of these talks was that the United States was prepared to work out with the Canadian Government a stand-by arrangement for the arming of the Bomarc's and CF-101's in case of need. There was no suggestion at the time that the "missing part" proposal was incapable of meeting the requirements of effective defence.

(2) The Aide-Mémoire of January 11 noted that if the "missing part" concept were to be applied, there was no practicable alternative to the umbilical cable for the Bomarc or the ejector rack cartridge for the CF-101. The Canadian side agrees with the judgment in respect of the Bomarc and is prepared to explore further the best means of reducing to a minimum the time required to make the CF-101 operational with the MB-1 missile.

(3) The Aide-Mémoire of January 15 asserted that the movement of missing parts to Canadian bases at a DEFCON level as low as four, while representing a considerable improvement in the operation of the "missing part" concept, would still be insufficient to meet an urgent and effective defence requirement. The latter was defined as "the ability to respond within likely time of any warning without running the risks of possible last-minute difficulties in moving missing parts to Canada in time of emergency". The Canadian side has the following comments to offer in this connection.

(a) A review of NORAD alerts shows that three times in the last six years NORAD has been placed on DEFCON-four alert in periods of sharply rising international tension (July 15 to August 2, 1958 - Lebanese crisis; May 1960 - U2 incident; October 1962 - Cuba crisis). On any of these occasions, which were not followed by immediate transition to higher states of alerts, the airlift of missing parts could in fact have been accomplished without encountering "last-minute difficulties in time of emergency".

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(b) Both of the Canadian delivery systems are effective only against bomber attack and the object of the negotiations to date has been to find the most effective arrangement for arming the Canadian delivery systems in under three hours, the likely warning time for impending bomber attack. The proposals under consideration as of the December 4, 1962 meeting of the negotiating teams demonstrated that it is possible to be well within this warning time.

(4) The U.S.A., in its Aide-Mémoire of January 15, has made a counter-proposal that essential missing parts be stored in Canada separately from the warhead, under either U.S.A. or Canadian custody. This counter-proposal fails to meet the Canadian objective of negotiating a stand-by arrangement which would not involve the storage on Canadian soil in peace-time of operational warheads.

It is noted from the Aide-Mémoire of January 15, that the United States Government had not thought of discontinuing the talks or of changing the channel of the talks. On its side, the Canadian Government is ready to continue the negotiations.

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, February 12, 1963



MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. BRYCE, SECRETARY TO THE CABINET

This is to confirm that Mr. Green signed the mimeographed copy of the Memorandum to Cabinet dated February 11, 1963, entitled "Chronology of Events Relating to Canada-United States Discussions on Storage and Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons".

*Rc*

R.C.

*advance  
copy  
w notes*

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

TOP SECRET

February 11, 1963.

MEMORANDUM TO CABINET:

Chronology of Events Relating to  
Canada-United States Discussions on  
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On December 12, 1957 the Department of State informed the Canadian Embassy in Washington that the United States wished to discuss ways and means whereby certain nuclear warheads could be stored in Canada for United States use; and both in Canada and in Europe for the use of Canadian forces.

2. On October 15, 1958 the Cabinet authorized discussions for the purpose of finding out the terms and conditions under which it was proposed that warheads be stored in Canada for United States use and also under which they would be provided for use by Canadian forces.

3. The discussions which followed centred on storage in Canada for United States use and dealt particularly with three proposals as follows:

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- (b) Storage of Anti-Submarine Weapons at Argentina;
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Considerable progress was made on (a) in the course of 1960, but very little was done about (b) which raised various complications and (c) was not pursued.

4. When a new Minister of Defence was appointed in late 1960 he recommended deferring these questions of storage for United States use until the question of providing warheads for Canadian forces had been dealt with.

5. The broad policy framework was laid down by the Cabinet on December 6, 1960. At that time it was decided that discussions with the United States Government "concerning arrangements for the essential acquisition of nuclear weapons or warheads for use by the Canadian forces... may proceed as soon as they can be usefully undertaken with the acceptance of joint controls to be a basic principle"; the Cabinet also decided that "preparation should also continue to enable the Canadian forces to have the vehicles, missiles, bases, training and other requirements to enable them to be able to use nuclear weapons to be acquired from the United States under joint control arrangements, if and when the adoption of these weapons is considered necessary".

*note: - NATO decision = Dec 57 - & Cabinet decision preceding  
- US - Com discussions Dec 58 & " decision of 000169  
Statement / Maclellan meeting*

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6. Pursuant to this decision draft agreements were prepared in the form of an Exchange of Notes with an Annex setting out general principles which would govern the control and custody, etc., of warheads for Canadian forces both in Canada and in Europe. It included a number of schedules, one for each type of warhead, wherein the general principles as applied to each were spelled out in detail. Some of these schedules were reviewed by Cabinet but this work was never completed.

7. Finally on October 30, 1962, the Cabinet decided:

- " (1) That negotiations be undertaken with the United States Government to work out an agreement or agreements between the two Governments, under which:
- (a) Nuclear warheads would be held in storage for and made available to the Canadian forces in Europe under NATO Command for use in CF-104 aircraft and the Honest John rockets; and
  - (b) Nuclear warheads would be held on bases in the United States to be moved to Canada to be available to the RCAF for use in Bomarc missiles and interceptor aircraft, on request by the Canadian Government when war appears imminent, and
- (2) That such negotiations be commenced forthwith by Messrs. Green, Harkness and Churchill jointly with the Charge d'Affaires of the United States in Ottawa."

8. Pursuant to this decision, meetings were held in Ottawa with a United States negotiating team November 21 to 23 to examine studies which had been made by the U.S.A. Defence Department of the feasibility of airlifting complete warheads to Canadian bases. As these time factors did not come within the likely warning time of bomber attack (3 hours), further studies were carried out by the U.S.A. Defence Department of the possibility of airlifting only a part of the warhead, without which the part pre-positioned in Canada would be inoperable. On December 4, the U.S.A. negotiating team presented the results of these studies. They showed that using the "missing part" approach, and using a normal complement of four loading crews, all the Bomarcs in Canada could be made operational within one hour and 55 minutes to two hours and 10 minutes; and that all the MB-1 missiles for CF-101's in Canada could be rendered operational in less than two hours, the exact time depending upon the nature of the missing part selected.

9. At a meeting in Paris between Canadian and United States Ministers on December 14, the latter indicated that they were prepared to work out with the Canadian Government a stand-by arrangement for the arming of the Bomarcs and CF-101's in case of need. There was no suggestion at the time that the "missing part" proposal was incapable of meeting the requirements of effective defence. Nevertheless in mid-January the United States indicated that the proposal to airlift

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Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

ANNEX

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(1) Reference has been made to the meetings between Canadian and United States Ministers in Paris on December 14, 1962, in terms which suggest that there may have been a Canadian misunderstanding as to the main U.S. preoccupation. The Canadian understanding of these talks was that the United States was prepared to work out with the Canadian Government a stand-by arrangement for the arming of the Bomarc and CF-101s in case of need. There was no suggestion at the time that the "missing part" proposal was incapable of meeting the requirements of effective defence.

(2) The Aide-Mémoire of January 11 noted that if the "missing part" concept were to be applied, there was no practicable alternative to the umbilical cable for the Bomarc or the ejector rack cartridge for the CF-101. The Canadian side agrees with the judgment in respect of the Bomarc and is prepared to explore further the best means of reducing to a minimum the time required to make the CF-101 operational with the MB-1 missile.

(3) The Aide-Mémoire of January 15 asserted that the movement of missing parts to Canadian bases at a DEFCON level as low as four, while representing a considerable improvement in the operation of the "missing part" concept, would still be insufficient to meet an urgent and effective defence requirement. The latter was defined as "the ability to respond within likely time of any warning without running the risks of possible last-minute difficulties in moving missing parts to Canada in time of emergency". The Canadian side has the following comments to offer in this connection.

(a) A review of NORAD alerts shows that three times in the last six years NORAD has been placed on DEFCON-four alert in periods of sharply rising international tension (July 15 to August 2, 1958 - Lebanese crisis; May 1960 - U2 incident; October 1962 - Cuba crisis). On any of these occasions, which were not followed by immediate transition to higher states of alerts, the airlift of missing parts could in fact have been accomplished without encountering "last-minute difficulties in time of emergency".

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(b) Both of the Canadian delivery systems are effective only against bomber attack and the object of the negotiations to date has been to find the most effective arrangement for arming the Canadian delivery systems in under three hours, the likely warning time for impending bomber attack. The proposals under consideration as of the December 4, 1962 meeting of the negotiating teams demonstrated that it is possible to be well within this warning time.

(4) The U.S.A., in its Aide-Mémoire of January 15, has made a counter-proposal that essential missing parts be stored in Canada separately from the warhead, under either U.S.A. or Canadian custody. This counter-proposal fails to meet the Canadian objective of negotiating a stand-by arrangement which would not involve the storage on Canadian soil in peace-time of operational warheads.

It is noted from the <sup>fully</sup> Aide-Mémoire of January 15, that the United States Government had not thought of discontinuing the talks or of changing the channel of the talks. On its side, the Canadian Government is ready to continue the negotiations.

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Copy on D-1-5(f)

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF CABINET DECISION

Meeting of February 8th, 1963.

Nuclear Weapons policy

The Cabinet agreed that the Secretary of State for External Affairs would produce a memorandum as soon as possible for consideration by the Cabinet, reporting upon the whole course of the negotiations with the United States on nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in Canada and elsewhere and for U.S. forces in Canada.

  
Registrar of the Cabinet.

Privy Council Office,  
March 7th, 1963.

**1960**

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Extract from Cabinet Decision - Meeting December 6, 1960 re:

Nuclear weapons policy; Irish Resolution at the United Nations  
and other aspects

The Cabinet agreed:

4. That an Agreement with the United States concerning the storage of defensive nuclear weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Field for the U.S. Air defence forces should not be concluded until after discussions with the United States on other matters had been concluded.

(See Record of Decision on File D-1-5(f))

*John*  
X.R. D-1-5 (f)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRYCE

Arrangements for Nuclear Weapons

I have flagged in the file of papers prepared for the Prime Minister's visit to Washington a summary of the present situation in respect of storage of nuclear weapons in Canada for US use and of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canada for Canadian use. The situation as described in this paper still obtains. That is, very briefly:

- a. The revised draft agreement on storage of air defence weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon is in the hands of the State Department and we are waiting for a considered US view on it;
- b. No action has been taken on the US requests for storage of weapons at Argentia and Goose Bay (SAC), first made in 1957;
- c. The draft general agreement on acquisition of weapons for Canadian use which was prepared by the Panel on Economic Aspects of Defence Questions in December, 1959, was sent to Mr. Pearkes, Mr. Green and Mr. Fleming. Mr. Pearkes agreed to it, Mr. Fleming had no comments and Mr. Green held it for further consideration. On January 18, 1960, in the Throne speech debate, the Prime Minister stated that negotiations were proceeding with the US

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"in order that the necessary weapons could be made available for Canadian defence units if and when they are required".

Later in January you conveyed to External Affairs three changes to the draft agreement to reflect the views of the Prime Minister on it. These amendments dealt with the question of joint responsibility for custody, Canadian responsibility for their use by Canadian Forces and provision for review and termination of the agreement. Mr. Robertson accordingly submitted a revised draft general agreement to Mr. Green with a covering memorandum (Flag 'B'), and asked Mr. Green if the department could now seek the comments of the State Department on the draft, or if he wished first to consult further with his colleagues.

I have been told that Mr. Green's reaction to this memorandum was that he did not want to proceed with the matter of acquisition until the agreement on storage of defensive nuclear weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon was concluded.

In a memorandum to Mr. Green of May 6, 1960, (a copy of which we do not have but which I have seen), Mr. Robertson referred to the revised draft agreement on acquisition submitted earlier, noted what Mr. Green had said about waiting for the Goose Bay-Harmon agreement, and pointed out that National Defence was worried because CF-104 aircraft were coming along and no provision had been made for equipping them with other than nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances, the Under-Secretary asked if Mr. Green would now like to proceed with the general agreement on acquisition. If so, it was suggested that officials should review the

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draft general agreement, prior to its submission to Cabinet, to make whatever minor changes in the text that were necessary to bring it into line with the new features which had been introduced into the Goose Bay-Harmon agreement.

Besides the files I have referred to I also attach a press report of Mr. Pearkes' statement in the Defence Expenditures Committee on "negotiations", and a copy of suggested answers to questions which might be asked in the House as a result of Mr. Pearkes' statement. These answers were prepared in External Affairs over the week-end at the request of the Prime Minister.



D.B.D.

June 21st, 1960.

# CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Name or Subject  
DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Storage  
of Nuclear Weapons in Canada for Use by  
U.S. Forces

File No.  
D-1-5(e)

Regarding

Date

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

FOR PREVIOUS SEE: D-28-3(g)

File No.

Date

## SEE

Name or Subject

File No.