

Department of External Affairs

File No. 11981 -40

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MEETING OF CUBAN OPPOSITION LEADERS Volume one
IN CANADA, Legal Aspects. From May 30/5

From May 30/53

To 12 Aug 1953

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INCOMING MESSAGE

COPY

FROM:
THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, HAVANA, CUBA.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

S E C R E T

File No.

11981-40

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| Priority | System | No. | Air No. 3 | Date |
| | CYPHER-O.T.P. | | | August 12, 1953. (Recd August 17, 1953) |

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A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD'N
SECTION

Reference: My telegram No. 39 of August 2nd.

Subject: Cuban Political Situation.

1. Since my telegram under reference the only public mention of Canada has been in the enclosed report published in the press on August 4th (see paragraphs 5 and 11). I have not, repeat not, been approached in any way by the Cuban authorities.

2. If you should decide to approach them in connection with this report I suggest it would be appropriate to do so in Ottawa, in view of their failure to deliver second note which they promised.

3. I am leaving on holidays tomorrow as indicated in my despatch D-200 of July 6th. I expect to be in Ottawa in mid-September when I hope to discuss this subject with you.

References

Done

Date

Done

Date

From "Información", August 4, 1953

REPORTS TO THE URGENCY COURT

Following is an official copy of the report submitted to the President of the Urgency Court of Santiago de Cuba by Colonel Alberto R. del Rio y Chaviano, chief of No. 1 "Maceo" Rural Guard Regiment.

1. "Mr. President of the Urgency Court. City. Sir, I have the honour to inform you that the full and detailed investigation conducted to this date into the unfortunate events that took place on the morning of July 26 of the present year, when groups armed with the most modern weapons of war attempted to capture through assault the "Moncada" Barracks, elicited the following findings:

2. "That, availing themselves of the occasion when carnival festivities are traditionally held around this time in the city of Santiago de Cuba, elements led by Carlos Prío Socarrás, Aureliano Sánchez Arango, Eufemio Fernández, a person by the name of Fidel Castro, who is known in both Havana and Santiago de Cuba, Juan Marinello Vidaurreta, Blas Roca, Emilio Ochoa Ochoa and several other leaders of the Communist, Auténtico and Ortodoxo parties, selected the dawn of July 26 to meet in this city and seize the "Moncada" Barracks by assault; and that these groups selected as center of operations a house on the highway leading to "Siboney" beach, in the Sevilla suburb in this city, at which place they were to map out their attack on the Barracks and seizure of the town, without any scruples or consideration for the customs or the laws governing warfare, and with instincts devoid of all piety and respect for the sick and the hospitals.

3. "That the place that had been designated as their center of operations was the house mentioned above, leased for a reported \$600.00 to set up therein a large-scale farm for the breeding of poultry and sale of eggs, for which purpose a few days previously they went through the motions of erecting several wooden sheds, which were not however finished, thus fooling the neighbours as to their real designs.

4. "That, on the day prior to the 26th as well as at dawn of the 26th, these agitators and disturbers of peace and order commenced arriving from Pinar del Rio, Matanzas and Camaguey, but mainly from Havana, their arrival in this city attracting no particular attention because of the festivities mentioned above; the arms themselves, the best part of them, that is, having been brought to this province by road. Special discretion was maintained with these groups of revolutionaries as to the nature of the revolt and the manner in which the attack on the Moncada Barracks was to be effected, for although many of them knew quite well that they had come to this province to fight a civil war, others had been humbugged into believing that the

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179 .12-cal. shells loaded with steel shot; one "Yale" key, 51 fired .12-cal. shells; one suitcase containing a Cuban flag, 24 Privates' caps, some with the Cuban coat-of-arms which would seem to have been purchased from the firms "Fernández", 367 Sol Street, and "Bello" of Havana; an empty valise; one rain coat; one woollen blanket like those used by the Cuban Army; another two empty valises; 20 metal magazines for .22-cal. cartridges; one pair of pliers; two sharp knives which served to murder two of the hospitalized soldiers; several Sergeant's and Corporal's stripes; 80 khaki-colour field shirts, some of them with Sergeant's and Corporal's stripes; 68 pairs of khaki-colour trousers; 48 olive-coloured neckties; 26 civilian trousers; four civilian jackets; several pieces of men's underwear; several pieces of regulation linen items such as worn by patients in the Civilian Hospital, where they changed from the clothes they were wearing into those of the patients; several red, black and white items of ladies' wear; three pairs of used shoes, two of which are men's and one ladies' shoes; four pairs of trousers and six blue jackets, all regulation items as issued to the police, one of these jackets with complete Major's insignias; several photographs, among these some of criminals and fugitives; two blue shirts such as worn by the police, with Major's insignias; two blue caps and one white one, all of these such as those worn by the Police, belonging to the ex-Major of the Santiago de Cuba Police, José M. Villa y Romero; one hand-saw, two brushes, one iron mace complete with handle; 120 .12-cal. shells, loaded; 23 pistol and revolver cartridges, of assorted calibers; 31 cartons filled with rubber gloves totalling 558 pairs, sizes 9 and 10, of Canadian origin.

12. "I wish to inform the Court that some of these .12-cal. shells were fired, scattered in the brush, as was one .22-cal. rifle, and that we are continuing the search for arms, which presumably the enemy must have abandoned in the countryside near Santiago de Cuba.

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seizing of the Barracks would amount to a joy-ride because the soldiers would join up with them the minute the attack was launched; the result of it all being that when these men realized the deceit and had to engage in earnest with all the soldiers in this Regiment, all of whom held firmly to their places of honour, some of the attackers deserted and still others who tried to escape were wounded by their leaders for refusing to put up a fight.

5. "That, based on the pieces of evidence that have been collected and are stored with the Quarter Master of this Command at the disposal of the Urgency Court, almost all the arms came from Montreal, Canada, which origin is proved by the wrappers and boxes containing the ammunition and it is therefore quite evident that the so-called Montreal Meeting was nothing but an insurrectional agreement designed to attack the territory of our country with Cubans and aliens, by which behaviour the honour of Cuba has been attacked.

6. "That all the individuals participating in the attack on the Moncada Barracks had been prepared and trained, by means of shooting drills, in the city of Havana, in Pinar del Rio, Artemisa, Santa Fé Beach and within the premises of the University of Havana.

7. "That the attack of these seditious elements on our Republican stability commenced in the early hours of July 26, when they left in a great number of cars travelling at high speed, their meeting place or center of operations which, as stated above, was the house on the Siboney highway and alighted near the Barracks, commencing with the occupation of the Civil Hospital, which they seized in a surprise movement and with complete disregard for the patients, and started firing towards the Barracks; while at the same time, under cover of the army uniforms that these men wore and which uniforms we have now seized, the attackers mingled with the troops of this army post, and by using their private counter-signs, entered the Barracks and cowardly murdered the sentries posted at the Camp's gates, thus producing natural confusion among the forces of this Regiment.

8. "That some of these attackers doffed their clothes while in the hospital and donned the tunics of the patients, the better to mingle and kill with the least risk. As mentioned above, these seditious elements had come armed with modern weapons, using "Remington" automatic rifles, that have now been seized, which fired the type of double-explosion bullet that has been banned from all wars because of the criminal and unnecessary damage that this ammunition inflicts. Guns loaded with shot were also criminally employed in this action, which guns the Court will have occasion to examine together with the other pieces of evidence that have been collected.

9. "That when, knives in hands, these evil Cubans and aliens made their surreptitious penetration into the military hospital, they opened up the abdomen of three patients, two of whom had been operated on only the day before and destroyed them with ferocious brutality. And that after a fight of more than four hours, when the forces of this Regiment succeeded in dislodging the seditious attackers from the Moncada Barracks, they scattered throughout the city and the neighbouring roads, leaving behind several dead and wounded, and fled with their weapons, which they must have hidden or tossed into the fields to enable them to reach places easily accessible and thus protect themselves from pursuit. Many of them have, however,

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taken to the woods and have offered resistance to the patrols and members of this command that are still chasing them. It should be mentioned at this point that many of the individuals who have been made prisoner, as well as some of the dead, wore a sort of brick-coloured rubber gloves in order, it is thought, not to get nitrate stains on their hands from firing their weapons. The undersigned also had the customs authorities show him the shipping manifests, from which he noted that there was a ship that brought in a large shipment of these gloves, some 700 or 800, which are identical to those used by the parties involved in the sedition, and of various sizes, nines and tens, which have now been seized and are at the disposal of the Court. I also wish to state that the armed groups that staged the attack seized the right wing of the Moncada Barracks, evidently with the purpose of obtaining the arms which were there and of defending themselves desperately with hand grenades, which have also now been seized by the authorities and are at the disposal of the Court, which purpose, however, they did not succeed in carrying out thanks to the tenacious resistance put up by our troops.

10. "I wish to state that the casualties of this military command to date are eighteen, and it is estimated that more than 400 to 500 men attempted to capture these Barracks and take over the public and administrative posts and offices of this province, in conspiracy with other persons and political leaders throughout the Island, for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government and consequently attacking the public peace."

In a further communication to this Court, Colonel Alberto del Rio y Chaviano, chief of the No. 1 "Maceo" Rural Guard Regiment, states as follows:

11. "In connection with the three reports which have been submitted to the Court dealing with the unfortunate events that took place in this city covering the attempt to capture the Moncada Barracks, staged on the 26th of this month by a considerable number of civilians carrying the most modern weapons of war, of Canadian origin, as is observed from the ammunition boxes and the arms, I have the honour to inform you that there are stored at the disposal of the Court all the arms, khaki-coloured uniforms such as those worn by the army, and blue coloured uniforms such as worn by the police, as well as all the other pieces of evidence seized by the authorities; which are listed as follows:

"15 "Remington" .22-cal. rifles, in perfect working condition; four .12-cal. automatic shotguns; eight .30-cal. "cracker" carbines; two .44 cal. Winchesters; two .30-cal. Springfields; one "Hayd" .44-cal. machine gun and magazine; five magazines loaded with .45-cal. bullets; 40 hand grenades; 109 bronze magazines loaded with "Super" double-explosion .22-cal. bullets; 720 .30 cal. cartridges, in their belts, for "cracker" carbines; 420 .30-cal. cartridges for "Springfield" rifles; one woollen sock filled with .22-cal. double-explosion bullets; two boxes of .38-cal. pistol cartridges; one box of .32-cal. pistol cartridges; two boxes of "Peters" .22-cal. cartridges; another 22 boxes of .22-cal. explosive bullets, and more than 300 .22-cal. bullets packed in bulk in a suitcase; a ring, apparently gold, with an amethyst; two pesos and four cents (\$2.04) in cash; 140 cartridge shells of various calibers; one pistol magazine of small caliber;

INCOMING MESSAGE

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| FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, HAVANA, CUBA. |
| TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA |

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| Security Classification | |
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| Priority IMMEDIATE | System CYPHER-O.T.P. | No. 39 | Date August 2, 1953 (rec'd August 3, 1953) |
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| Departmental Circulation |
| MINISTER UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC A/UNDER/SEC'S POL/CO-ORD'N SECTION |
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Reference: Your telegram No. 48 of August 1st.

Subject: Cuban Political Situation.

1. I think it would be unwise at this stage to approach the Minister of State. For the past four days we have seen no, repeat no, reference in Cuban Press to "Montreal made arms". Throughout there has been no, repeat no, implied criticism to the Canadian authorities. This being so, it seems to me that to take the initiative might easily arouse erroneous impression that we had a guilty conscience. In any case we would almost certainly be reminded that this revolt was organized at the Montreal conference.
2. The fact that we have not, repeat not, been approached since the revolt by the Cuban Government coupled with the failure of the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa to provide evidence you asked Campa for, seems to suggest that the next move is theirs.
3. If, however, newspaper criticism should develop reflecting Canada, your authority can be used to ask Minister of State for an explanation.
4. Meanwhile, in order to keep Canadian angle of this matter in proportion, it might be noted photographs have appeared during the past few days showing case of armaments prominently displaying Mexico as the source. Reference has also been made to Belgian-made rifles used by the revolutionaries and mountings imported from Central American countries along with a vast collection of rifles and shot guns of American Remington and Mossberg brands imported from unspecified source.
5. All these considerations suggest that in our own interest it is best for the time being, to let matters rest.
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| Priority IMMEDIATE | System CYPHER-O.T.P. | No. 37 | Date July 27, 1953. |
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Date

Reference:

Subject: Cuban Political Situation

1. A revolutionary movement against the Batista Government took place yesterday in Santiago de Cuba in Oriente Province and resulted in some eighty people being killed. It is rumoured that this was supposed to be a strategic action to allow landing of other revolutionary groups along the coast. The revolt has been quashed. The Batista Government appears to have the situation under control and has proclaimed suspension of civil guarantees for ninety days. In Havana today conditions appear normal. This morning's "Alberta", which is one of the newspapers supporting Batista, carries a story that ammunition found upon revolutionaries was made in Montreal and this was also given out by government controlled radio last night.

References

Done.....

Date

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY
HAVANA, Cuba

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| Message To Be Sent AIR CYPHER EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER | No. 47 | Date July 28, 1953 | For Communications Section Only |
| Priority | REFERENCE: Your telegram No. 37 of July 27, 1953 | | |
| ORIGINATOR (Signature) W.G. Stark/ab (Name Typed) American Div..... 7175 Local Tel..... | SUBJECT: Cuban Political Situation | | |
| APPROVED BY (Signature) E.A. Cote (Name Typed) | <p>Please report any further attempt by Cuban Government to link recent uprising with meeting of opposition leaders last month in Montreal. Should the allegation that the ammunition cases are marked "Made in Montreal" be repeated to you officially you should request evidence. The Canadian Government has no record of any shipments to Cuba other than to Cuban armed forces or government. <u>Cuban Embassy in Ottawa has not supplied any evidence that group actually purchased arms in Canada and as yet has not approached the Department regarding recent uprising.</u></p> | | |
| Internal Distribution: S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A. Pol. Coord. Economic Legal D.L. 2 | Done..... Date..... | | |
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MONTREAL GAZETTE, TUES. JULY 28th

MONTREAL AND THE REBELLION IN CUBA

Cuban Army officials declare that "great quantities" of ammunition, captured from rebels who attacked Army posts on Sunday, were marked "Montreal, Canada." This does not necessarily involve Montreal, or Canada, in a rather sticky Caribbean political mess. There is no law against selling ammunition to private individuals, if guarantees are obtained the ammunition does not eventually find its way into Communist countries.

But the link does draw Canadian attention southward to that rich and passionate island lying south of Florida.

Ever since Cuba obtained her independence from Spain as a result of U.S. intervention, at the beginning of this century, the island has been rocked by "revolutions". Many of them have not been revolutions at all, but mere garrison revolts favoring one leader or another.

A famous one occurred when Staff Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, back in 1933, led a group of non-commissioned officers into power as a military junta to replace the government of General Machado, whom a general strike had forced to flee the island. For ten years, Batista—who soon gained commissioned rank—selected and controlled the country's presidents. In 1940, he resigned his post as head of the Army and ran for president himself. At the end of his term, in 1944, he retired to Florida, returning in 1948 as an elected senator.

The time of revolutions seemed past. Cuba had had fairly orderly elections in 1940, 1944 and 1948, and expected another constitutional balloting in June, 1952. Batista claimed that the

current president, Prio Socarras, was planning to remain in power by arranging a "phony revolution." Batista forestalled any such event by a "revolution" of his own—in which two men were killed—in March, three months before the election date.

Since that time, Batista has operated as a dictator under an emergency decree, which gives him until November to restore law and order. At that time, new elections are to be held.

To identify the forces on either side and analyze their motives is a difficult matter. Batista officials say that Sunday's uprising was a combined Prio-Communist affair. Prio (he is the one in Florida now), says he had nothing whatever to do with the attempt to seize power.

However, Montrealers will recall that only last month, Prio Socarras and other exiled Cuban leaders met here to consolidate their forces against Batista. Other sources claim that the Communists who control Guatemala, another Caribbean state, are behind Prio in his efforts to unseat Batista (Batista has shown he is a determined anti-Communist). Another story has it that the Prio followers set up an air-base in the Mexican province of Yucatan, a half-hour's flight from Cuba.

The United States has recognized the Batista Government and the U.S. still retains the right to intervene in Cuba if help is needed in keeping the peace. All these factors have their influence on the conduct of Cuban affairs. But Batista, with his years of experience, seems solidly entrenched. It is unlikely that he will be overthrown before the November elections he has promised.


Cuba Agents Raid Red Headquarters, Close Party Paper

Havana, July 27. (P)—Military intelligence agents raided Communist headquarters today and closed down the party newspaper, Hoy, on charges of complicity in yesterday's short-lived revolt in Eastern Cuba.

President Fulgencio Batista imposed martial law over Cuba early today after his forces crushed an attempted rebellion, in which 54 persons were reported killed.

The Government has accused former President Carlos Prio Socarras of responsibility for the uprising, in which some 230 armed rebels attacked the Moncada army barracks at Santiago de Cuba and a rural guard post in the nearby town of Bayamo.

In New York, a high Cuban source who asked not to be identified said the revolt was led by young army officers and troops. He said the rebels also included navy men, one of whom was a retired lieutenant commander.



ANTI-BATISTANS IN MONTREAL: These 14 Revolutionary and Orthodox party leaders of Cuba are shown as they conferred at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in June, planning their next move to oust President Batista. Left to right, front row, are: Sr. Isidro Figeroa, Dr. Guillermo Alonso Pujol, Carlos Hevia, Dr. Emilio Ochoa, Dr. Carlos Prio

Socarras, Manuel A. de Verona, Dr. Jose Manuel Gutierrez Planes; back row: Antiogo Santiago, Dr. Juan A. Rubio Padilla, Dr. Aracello Azcuy, Dr. Raul de Juan, Javier Lescano, Jose Pardo Llada and Dr. Eduardo Suarez Rivas. A plot to overthrow President Batista and his regime was quelled with bloodshed yesterday. (Gazette Photo Service.)

Ammunition Labelled 'Montreal' Reported Used in Cuban Uprising

Was a plot to overthrow the Cuban government hatched in Montreal? Was ammunition from Montreal used in a revolutionary upheaval which failed?

These were questions asked here yesterday after President Fulgencio Batista slapped stern martial law over Cuba following an attack by some 230 armed rebels on two army posts in Eastern Cuba.

The Associated Press reported that army officials said "great quantities" of ammunition seized from the attackers were marked "Montreal, Canada."

Fifty-four persons were reported killed, including 35 of the attackers, 18 soldiers and a police sergeant.

The Government accused Former President Carlos Prio Socarras, ousted by Batista's coup in March, 1952, of attacks early Sunday on the Monchada Army Barracks at Santiago de Cuba and a rural guard post in the nearby town of Bayamo. The barracks commander, Col. Alberto Del Rio Chaviano, said the rebels hoped to launch a revolution to oust Batista.

"No Knowledge"

RCMP, shipping and diplomatic officials here professed no knowledge of the "Montreal, Canada" crates.

They must have left Montreal as disguised cargo, an official suggested.

Acting Cuban Consul-General J. F. Castello said a news report was his first word of the revolution in his country. When asked last night of an Associated Press story of the shipping crates, he replied he had not heard of such a thing.

Exiled Cuban leaders met for more than a week at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in June and described their meeting as one to consolidate opposition to Batista and to plan a return of constitutional government in Cuba.

The two major parties at the meeting were the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Authentic) and the Cuban People's Party (Orthodox).

In a joint statement, at that time, the two parties said the conference

looked forward to establishment of national unity through elimination of the dictatorship of Batista.

"The Authentic and Orthodox Parties hope to arrive as a result of these meetings at an understanding and they are sure this will be the basis of a patriotic agreement of the opposition parties, which does not mean an electoral coalition in the future, because the ends that move them now are of a national character, for the defence of the constitution and the laws which have been violated," the statement said.

"We will endeavor to avoid for our country a fratricidal war to which Cuba is being led by this regime."

CONFIDENTIAL

July 7, 1953.

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MEMORANDUM FOR AMERICAN DIVISION

Meeting of Cuban Opposition Leaders in Montreal.

In your memorandum of June 24, 1953, in order to assist in determining what should be the Canadian policy concerning this and other similar cases which may arise, you have requested the views of this Division on the following questions:

Assuming that evidence were forthcoming to establish that a revolutionary group wanted to:

- (a) obtain arms from Canada;
- (b) overthrow a friendly government by force;
- (c) plot on Canadian soil to assassinate a friendly Head of State,

what in these circumstances,

- (i) should be the attitude of the Canadian Government under international law or the comity of nations; and
- (ii) what steps should Canada take under domestic law to prohibit the entry of such persons, deport them or prosecute them under the Criminal Code of Canada.

2. Responsibility under International Law:

The duty of a state to prevent the commission within its territory of acts injurious to foreign states does not imply an obligation to suppress all such conduct on the part of private persons as is inimical to or critical

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of the régime of a foreign state. In brief there appear to be only two instances where state responsibility is clearly engaged under customary international law:

- (1) A state has the duty of restraining persons resident within its territory from engaging in such revolutionary activities against friendly foreign states as amount to organized acts of force in the form of hostile expeditions against the territory of those states.
- (2) A state is also obliged to repress and to discourage activities in which attempts against the life of political opponents are regarded as a proper means of revolutionary action.

Oppenheim (International Law Vol.I (1947) at p.260) suggests that states may also be under a duty to prevent and suppress any subversive activity which involves wilful destruction or damage to public property of a foreign government, although he cites no authority for this contention.

3. At the present time the duty placed upon a state ^①to prevent subversive activity against a foreign government in the form of armed hostile expeditions or attempts on the lives of political leaders is derived from customary international law. From time to time attempts have been made at convential agreement:

- (1) Following the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in 1934 the League of Nations undertook the preparation of a Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism which was opened for signature in 1937. Article I affirmed "the principle of international law in virtue of which it is the duty of every State to refrain from any act designed to encourage terrorist activities directed against another State and to prevent the

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acts in which such activities take shape", while in succeeding articles the contracting parties undertook to prevent and punish various acts including:

(i) Acts causing death or injury to heads of states or to persons holding public positions when the act is directed against them in their public capacity;

(ii) Wilful destruction of or damage to public property of another state;

(iii) The manufacture, obtaining, possession or supplying of arms, ammunition or explosives with a view to the commission of an act of terrorism in any country.

Although signed by 20 states (not including Canada) this Convention has never come into force.

- (2) Article I of the Pan-American Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife of 1928 obliges the contracting parties to use all means at their disposal to prevent the inhabitants of their territory, nationals or aliens, from participating in, crossing the boundary or sailing from their territory for the purpose of starting or promoting civil strife. The parties also undertake to forbid, so long as the belligerency of the rebels has not been recognised, traffic in arms and war material except when intended for the government. This Convention is in force for the United States and certain of the Latin American states.

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- (3) The Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States prepared by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides that every state has the duty to prevent the organization within its territory of activities calculated to foment civil strife in the territory of another State.

what happened?
←

4. Professor Lauterpacht (Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States, Vol. 22 A.J.I.L. 1928 pp. 105-130), after examining the internal and international practice of states, concludes that apart from the duty of preventing hostile expeditions and attempts on the lives of political opponents, states are not bound to prohibit on their territory, the commission of acts injurious to other states. In particular, revolutionary propaganda does not fall within the scope of revolutionary acts which a state is bound to prevent.

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5. The duty of states with regard to hostile expeditions in time of peace is not a consequence of the other state's right of independence which cannot, logically, in any way be interfered with or impaired by acts of individuals but is rather the result of the well-established customary rule that the territory of a state must not be allowed to serve as a base for military or naval operations against another state. The law of hostile expeditions is nothing else than the law of neutrality in relation to an actual or impending civil war.

6. With regard to preparations and conspiracies to murder, a state is fully entitled to claim from other states a reasonable measure of protection from this particular kind of revolutionary activity. No unreasonable burden of specially protecting the life of foreigners abroad is thereby imposed upon a state. Its sole duty is to give foreigners abroad the same protection from assassination, not a greater or a special one, which it affords to those resident within its territory.

7. Apart from the two kinds of revolutionary activity referred to above, international law imposes no further obligations. All other forms of revolutionary action, cannot, if coming solely from private individuals, furnish a legitimate

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cause of complaint because the duty of respect which a state owes, in international law, to the constitution and government of another country is a negative one; it is not a duty of active protection of a regime which may be either distasteful to the overwhelming majority of its own citizens, or a matter of complete indifference to them. The foreign government itself must secure this end, either by adequately enforcing its own laws or else by creating reasonable conditions for the firm establishment of its constitution and government.

Conclusions:

8. Assuming that evidence were forthcoming to establish that a group of private persons within Canada were planning an organized act of force against a friendly foreign state in the form of a hostile expedition, or were plotting the assassination of a friendly Head of State or some other political opponent, the Canadian Government would be responsible in international law for preventing these acts and for punishing them if they occur. There is no rule of international law which obliges the Canadian Government to prevent the export of arms to a revolutionary group abroad. Canada could not be held internationally responsible in this regard although the Export and Import Permits Act of 1947 enables us to prevent and punish any such attempt.

9. Under customary international law therefore Canadian responsibility is limited to preventing and punishing the setting on foot of hostile expeditions or attempts on the lives of political opponents. Failure to exercise such responsibility would give grounds for a claim on the part of the injured state. A state is responsible if it culpably omits to prevent these acts on the part of private persons. It is equally responsible when, notwithstanding due diligence having been exercised, injurious acts have been perpetrated and the duty of the state is limited to apprehending and punishing the individuals responsible. Especially, the state will not escape liability if its government has failed to enact such laws as would enable the administrative or judicial authorities effectively to prevent or repress such acts.

- 6 -

10. International law is not concerned with the manner in which states elect to meet this duty so long as the laws are adequate to prevent hostile acts or to punish them after they have occurred. The Canadian laws appear to be adequate for this purpose. The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1937 makes it an offence for any person, within Canada, to prepare or fit out any military, naval or air expedition to proceed against the dominions of any friendly state. The export, or attempted export of arms, munitions or war material is controlled under the provisions of the Export and Import Permits Act of 1947. The possession of firearms and other offensive weapons without a permit or registration certificate is prohibited under Section 115-129 of the Criminal Code. Finally, although Canada has no duty in international law to prevent revolutionary propaganda, the publication of any libel on a person exercising sovereign authority over a foreign state is an offence under Section 135 of the Criminal Code.

Action under Domestic Law:

11. The second question concerns action which might be taken under Canadian domestic law when there are reasonable grounds for belief that a group of persons in Canada are raising a hostile expedition or plotting the assassination of a foreign political opponent. Any export or attempted export of arms from Canada for these purposes or with the aim of supplying arms to a revolutionary group abroad can be prevented under the Export and Import Permits Act, and the raising of a hostile expedition against a foreign state would be an offence under the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1937. In both cases the persons responsible would be subject to criminal proceedings under the Criminal Code.

12. As regards preventing the entry into Canada of such persons, Consular Division has pointed out in their Memorandum of June 23 to your Division, that under the Immigration Act 1952 it is mandatory for residents of all Latin American countries to obtain non-immigrant visas before entering Canada and therefore it would be possible to restrict the entry of undesirable visitors from these countries by refusing or deferring visas.

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- 7 -

13. Apart from visa control entry into Canada can only be prevented if the persons come within one of the prohibited classes listed in Section 5 of the new Immigration Act. The procedure is as follows:

If there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person seeking entry into Canada comes within one of the prohibited classes in Section 5 of the Act, either as the result of information given to the Immigration Branch or revealed in the examination by the Immigration Officer,

- (1) the person may be refused entry and returned to the country from which he entered Canada as a reject. In such a case there is a right of appeal but if the person entered from the United States it is customary to send him back to the United States pending consideration of his appeal.
- (2) the person may be detained by the Immigration Officer and reported to a Special Enquiry Officer. The Special Enquiry Officer has power to order the deportation of such a person if he decides after enquiry that the person comes within a prohibited class. An appeal may be taken against a Deportation Order to the Minister, whose decision is final.

It should be noted that there is one exception as regards the classes of prohibited persons listed in Section 5 of the Act. Section 5 provides that no person, other than a person referred to in Sub-section 2 of Section 7, shall be admitted to Canada if he is a member of any of the classes of persons referred to in that section. Sub-section 2 of Section 7 provides that the following persons may be allowed to enter and remain in Canada as non-immigrants:

- (a) persons authorized by the Minister to enter Canada for treatment and care at any health resort, hospital, sanitarium, asylum or other place or institution for their cure and care and, after entering Canada, while they are actually under such treatment and care;
- (b) persons passing in transit through Canada under escort or guard; and
- (c) holders of a permit.

- 8 -

As regards entry under permit, Section 8 of the Act provides that the Minister may issue a written permit authorizing any person to enter Canada or, being in Canada, to remain therein. The permit shall be expressed to be in force for a specified period not exceeding twelve months, and during the time that it is in force a permit stays the execution of any Deportation Order that may have been made against the person concerned. The Minister may at any time, in writing, extend or cancel a permit. Upon the cancellation or expiration of a permit, the Minister may make a Deportation Order respecting the person concerned and such person has no right of appeal from the Deportation Order and shall be deported as soon as practicable.

If, after a person has been permitted to enter Canada, a report or complaint is made to the Director of the Immigration Branch that such person was a member of a prohibited class at the time of his admission he may be deported under either of the following procedures:

- (1) The Director of Immigration, after receiving a report, will direct an enquiry to be held if he considers such action to be warranted. If the enquiry results in a decision by the Special Enquiry Officer that the person was a member of a prohibited class at the time of his admission into Canada an order for his deportation will be made. An appeal may be taken from the Deportation Order.
- (2) If the person is a non-immigrant the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration is empowered at any time to declare that he has lost his non-immigrant status and to make a Deportation Order against him. In this case there is no right of appeal. The Minister has full discretion, in such a case, to act at any time on whatever information he considers sufficient.

Deportation is normally carried out by Deportation Officers of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration who have authority to call upon any constable or Peace Officer (federal, provincial, or municipal) to execute a warrant or order made under the Immigration Act for the arrest, detention or deportation of any person.

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Conclusions:

14. As indicated above the simplest method of excluding persons from Latin American countries from entry into Canada when there are reasonable grounds for believing that they plan to obtain arms here, raise a hostile expedition or plot assassination, would seem to be by refusing to issue them non-immigrant visas for entry into this country.

15. Apart from visa control, entry can be refused if they can be brought within one of the prohibited classes, especially paragraph (m) of Section 5 - "persons who have engaged in or advocated or concerning whom there are reasonable grounds for believing they are likely to engage in or advocate subversion by force or other means of democratic government, institutions or processes, as they are understood in Canada". There are obvious difficulties in applying this test to the governments of some states.

16. Deportation after entry into Canada can be carried out if the persons were members of a prohibited class at the time of their entry into this country (or if they have, since their admission to Canada, become persons who, if they were applying for entry, would be refused admission by reason of their being members of a prohibited class other than those in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (s) of Section 5).

17. It should be noted that the ultimate decision as to whether a person comes within one of the prohibited classes rests with the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration since he has the final decision on any appeal against a deportation order. The Minister's discretion is particularly wide in the case of persons who have entered Canada as non-immigrants. He has, for example, the power to make a deportation order at any time, from which there is no appeal, against any

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non-immigrant who, in his opinion, engages in, advocates or is a member of or associated with any organization, group or body of any kind that engages in or advocates subversion by force or other means of democratic government, institutions or processes, as they are understood in Canada.

J. P. ERICHSEN-BROWN

Legal Division.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MEMORANDUM

TO: LEGAL DIVISION

Security

SECRET

Date June 24, 1953

FROM: American Division/E. A. Côté/JMB

File No: 11981-40
10231-40

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Meeting of Cuban Opposition Leaders in Montreal

From May 26 until May 29, 1953, some fourteen members of the Cuban opposition parties travelling on valid Cuban passports entered Canada as visitors. They held a series of meetings in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Montreal on the week-end of May 29 to June 2. On June 3 they issued the attached statement declaring their intention to set up a provisional government in Cuba as a first step towards restoring constitutional rule. The statement indicated that the two parties would not resort to violence in order to carry out their aims.

2. The Cuban government has made representations to our Embassy in Havana and the Department in Ottawa that the meeting of this group was not only a political one but that the group was planning to purchase arms in Canada, to overthrow the present government of Cuba by force and to assassinate President Batista. Attached is a translation of Note No. 1 given to the Secretary of State on June 15 by the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in Ottawa. An interim acknowledgment is being sent.

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3. As will be seen from this note, only the first assertion that members of the Prio Soccoras group are engaged in the illegal traffic of war supplies has some slight evidence to support it. We have asked Defence Liaison (2) Division to enquire into this and related aspects of the matter.

4. In order to ascertain what should be the Canadian policy concerning this and other similar cases which may arise, I wonder whether your Division would give us your considered views on a number of questions which might be summarized as follows: Assuming that evidence were forthcoming to establish that a revolutionary group wanted to

- (a) obtain arms from Canada;
- (b) overthrow a friendly government by force;
- (c) plot on Canadian soil to assassinate a friendly Head of State,

would you please advise

- (i) what should be the attitude of the Canadian government under international law or the comity of nations; and
- (ii) what steps Canada should take under domestic law to either prohibit the entry of such persons, to deport them or to prosecute them under the Criminal Code of Canada.

White

AMERICAN DIVISION

TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT RELEASED ON JUNE 3, 1953, BY CUBAN
OPPOSITION PARTY LEADERS AFTER THEIR MEETING IN MONTREAL.

To the Nation

The unconquerable will of the people of Cuba has rejected the illegal government, and has requested the return to a constitutional and democratic order, by means of a government which can hold free general elections. But the civic elements which ought to accomplish these aims have remained divided and isolated, thus contributing to perpetuate the Dictatorship, and lessening the public confidence in their purposes of liberation.

Confronted with these realities, the Cuban Peoples Party (Orthodox) and the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Authentic), realizing the citizens' decision in all its historic depth, have decided to make a constructive effort of patriotic unity in order to effect the desired change, and give the Provisional Government, to further its transitory aims, the popular support and guarantee of responsibility required by the great aspirations of the country.

Consequently, they have agreed on the following fundamental points:

First: To emphasize that the Cuban crisis can only be overcome by re-establishing the 1940 Constitution, which is a product of the free will of the people, and a depository of those traditions of civil government derived from the Independence Revolution, as embodied in the documents of Guainaro, Jimaguayú, La Yaya, and 1901.

Second: To ratify the statements by the National Executive Committees of both parties, to the effect that the regime presided by General Batista -- due not only to its violent origin, but to its dictatorial nature and its continued violation of the citizens' rights -- is not able to lead the people to restore their political institutions by means of elections.

Third: To consider it indispensable the establishment of a Provisional Government, which brings back the Electoral Law of 1943, and gives a full guarantee of official neutrality, in order to hold elections as soon as possible for all the offices of the State. In its origin and development this Government will follow the precepts of the Constitution; and within its transitory scope, it will try to rid Production, Labour, and particularly the popular classes, of the economic crisis with which they are burdened to-day, through the fault of the Dictatorship.

Fourth: The signatory parties flatly reject and condemn personal violence, gangsterism, and terrorist activities, as a form of struggle.

The Cuban Peoples Party (Orthodox) and the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Authentic) - after happily reaching this agreement which seeks the supreme common good - will appoint liaison committees, both at the national and the local levels, in order to articulate efficiently the indispensable efforts tending towards these aims. However, they will keep their organic individualities, emphasizing that they are not seeking electoral coalitions or agreements.

- 2 -

At the same time they request of all the truly democratic parties and national groups, and in general of all citizens, to cooperate in such a way as to widen and strengthen the unity of the people, in order to recover their constitutional institutions, and their sacred rights to Freedom.

And promising Cuba, for the day of its democratic revival, an era of peace and legality, with the soul untainted by hatreds and grudges, hoping for the union and friendship of all the Cubans, and asking the favour of God, we sign this charter in Montreal, Canada, on June 2, 1953.

Dr. Carlos Prío Socarras, Dr. Emilio Ochoa y Ochoa, Manuel A. de Varona y Loredó, José Pardo Llada, Guillermo Alonzo Pujol, Isidro Figuerola Bontempo, Carlos Hevia y de los Reyes Gavilán, José Manuel Gutiérrez Planes and Eduardo Suárez Rivas.

Ottawa, June 16, 1958.

The Hon. Secretary of State for
External Affairs,
Ottawa.

Sir:

I beg to express my deep appreciation for the friendly reception we have had in our last interview with Mr. J.S.A. Ritchie, Under-Secretary of your Department. The conversation took place in a spirit of comprehension and frankness and I, as well as those who accompanied me, were able to appreciate the cordial sentiments that animate your government to which, following instructions, I beg to submit the following considerations through your intermediary.

My government wishes to state emphatically that it does not pretend to ask any friendly government to apply measures which would tend to interfere with the individual liberty of any Cuban citizen abroad; to the contrary, it appreciates all the facilities that are being extended. But when attempts are made unilaterally to air publicly and openly our internal political differences, with the manifest disapproval of Cuban opinion, for the exclusive purposes of equivocal propaganda, my government, deeply regretting the attitude of those who act in this manner, cannot do other than submit to your Excellency certain background and concrete facts that have occurred without the knowledge or wish of your government which give rise to certain anxieties.

Some two months ago the international news agencies circulated throughout the American press the text of a declaration by Dr. Carlos Prío Socarrás, former president of Cuba, in which he announced that he was going to meet a number of representatives of certain circles politically opposed to my government. A few days after having been denied authorization to hold that meeting in the United States, Mexico, Guatemala, and other countries of the hemisphere, Montreal, Canada, was chosen as the place where the group was going to meet.

At the appointed time, in addition to the Ex-President (Dr. Prío Socarrás), the following persons came to Montreal: Dr. Guillermo Alonso Fajol, ex-Vice-President of Cuba; Manuel Antonio de Varela; Emilio Céspedes, Eduardo Suarez Nivas, Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla, Aureliano Sanchez Arango, Carlos Hevia, Luis Gustavo Fernandez, Jose Manuel Gutierrez, Ramiro Arango Alsina, Jose Pardo Llada, Colonel Rafael Izquierdo, Military Counsellor; there were about 40 of them all installed in the best hotels of the city.

On the day after the conference had started at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, two U.S. citizens arrived from the United States who, jointly with a Canadian citizen, form a company or syndicate called "Ferguson Associates" engaged in the illegal

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traffic of war supplies and weapons (U.S.) between the United States and Canada on the one hand, and various countries of Central and South America on the other. These gentlemen obtained and received financial guarantees concerning a transaction based on the immediate delivery of eight airplanes and 500 hand-operated machine guns. To the end of formalising the guarantees referred to, these persons accompanied Dr. Carlos Eric Socarras on his return trip to New York.

In spite of the fact that publicly the meeting was given out as being one of political agreement, in Montreal the principal questions discussed were the organization of an armed rebellion in my country and the assassination of the President of the Republic.

It is needless to add that the sources of information at the disposal of my Government deserve entire credence and the presentation of the facts has brought to light questions of the utmost gravity, the importance of which, I am sure, will not escape the appreciation of the Government of Canada.

I have been expressly instructed by my Government to transmit to Your Excellency its cordial wishes that our relations, both in the political and the economic fields, will continue to promote the traditional friendship between our two countries.

I take this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

(Sgd) Americo Cruz,
Charge d'affaires a.i.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTING SLIP

DATE **July 10, 1983**
SECURITY **Secret**

TO: ~~Legal Division~~

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FROM: **Am. Div. / C.O. Higgins / OP**

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☐ For Action

☐ For Comments

☐ For Approval

For Information and

File ☐

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COMMENTS: (This space is not for comments of a permanent character which should be formally recorded in a memorandum)

Also referred to:

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Pol. Co-ordination

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16 JUL 1983

DESPATCH

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador to Mexico

Reference: Your letter No. X-201 of June 15th.

Subject: Meeting of Cuban Opposition Party
Leaders in Montreal.

Security: Secret

No: 287

Date: July 2nd, 1953

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 255-A-46

Ottawa File No.

10224-40

11981-40

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References

I had an informal conversation yesterday with St. Oscar Crespo de la Serna of the Direccion General del Servicio Diplomatico, regarding the activities of Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras since he was ousted from the presidency of Cuba by General Fulgencio Batista.

2. Prio Socarras was granted political asylum by the Mexican Government shortly after Batista's successful coup of March 10th, 1952. At the time he was reminded that while welcome to this country he would be expected to refrain from any political activities that might have as its object the overthrow of the Batista regime.

3. In spite of this warning Prio is known to have plotted actively against Batista (it is even said that he had smuggled arms and some obsolete landing craft in Quintana Roo) with the result that he was called personally to the office of the Minister of the Interior and told in unequivocal terms that unless he ceased scheming against his successor his resident's permit would be revoked. Crespo de la Serna believes that it was shortly after that interview that Prio Socarras moved his headquarters from Mexico City to Miami.

4. With respect to the attempt to hold a meeting of Cuban opposition party leaders in Mexico, to which Mr. Alberto Campa made reference while he was in Ottawa, I learned from Crespo de la Serna that although no official request had been made for the holding of this meeting, the Mexican authorities had got wind of the intention of Prio Socarras' supporters and that, unofficially, it had been made clear to Prio Socarras that the Mexican Government did not want such a meeting to be held in Mexico.

5. The attitude of the Mexican Government towards political refugees has been defined on several occasions and is, generally speaking, the one adopted by the majority of Latin American countries. Mexico is willing and ready to grant asylum to persons or groups who find themselves at odds with the ruling regime in their own country but Mexico has consistently insisted that the authorities would not tolerate on the part of political refugees any activities obviously intended to subvert a government in power.

signed: C.P. Hebert
Ambassador

Internal
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Distribution
to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTING SLIP

DATE **July 20, 1968**
SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL

TO: ~~Internal Division~~ **J.P.**

(to see paras. 1-6)

FROM: **AN. CIV. / C.D. Macdonald, CP**

☐ For Signature

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For Information and

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COMMENTS: (This space is not for comments of a permanent character which should be formally recorded in a memorandum)

Also referred to:

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Finance

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Economic

C.C.C.D.

Pol. Organization

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Labour

Government

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All E.A. posts

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21 JUL 000032

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

DESPATCH

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, CANADIAN
EMBASSY, HAVANA, CUBA.

Reference:

Subject: General Developments in Cuba
during April and May, 1953.
.....
.....

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: D-189

Date: June 27, 1953

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

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| Ottawa File No. | |
| 11981-40 | |
| 16 | ✓ |

References

Washington
Mexico

I. POLITICS

During April and May there was a noticeable increase in Cuban political activity, culminating in the announcement of a meeting of opposition leaders in Montreal.

2. Although no one takes his protestations too seriously, Batista now says at every opportunity that elections will be held on June 1, 1954 without fail. In any case, he is going through the motions of attempting to form a loose sort of coalition of his own party and two or three others. The leaders of the Liberal Party, which since last October has shown increasing signs of willingness to co-operate with Batista, met with him on April 22 and agreed "to co-ordinate a victorious coalitionist candidacy in the coming elections". But Batista made it clear that for the time being this did not involve inclusion of Liberals in the Council of Ministers. On May 7, the small Democratic Party decided it was time to get on the bandwagon. After lunch at the Palace with Batista, its president announced that "the Democratic Party has offered its sincere and loyal assistance to President Batista". He added that neither the formation of a government coalition nor participation of his party in the government had been discussed but, to quote a press report, "he did not deny that this result finally might be reached". Although CTC Secretary General Mujal is being careful not to commit his Labour Party, suggestions continue to be made that he will be willing to support a coalition led by Batista - for a price. If Batista should succeed in forming a four-party coalition, the elections would probably be a three-cornered contest, with the PRC (Autenticos) and PPC (Ortodoxos) providing the opposition. (1)

3. The opposition was also by no means inactive, both legally and extra-legally. On April 21, 38 leading citizens filed with the Constitutional and Social Guarantees Tribunal an appeal against the Constitutional Statutes of April 4, 1952, claiming that all actions of the Batista government under the Statutes were invalid.

(1) Under present regulations, the PSP (Communists) is not large enough to be recognized as a legally constituted political party. 000033

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

- 2 -

On May 13, the Tribunal admitted the appeal for consideration and it was sent to the Supreme Court prosecutor for study and a report.

4. On April 5, the government frustrated plans for an equally fruitless extra-legal procedure. They arrested 46 persons, mostly students, said to be under the leadership of Professor Rafael Garcia Barcena, and accused them of plotting an armed assault on Camp Columbia, the military headquarters. A large amount of small arms and ammunition was found, together with a plan of revolutionary action. The government, which seeks every opportunity to discredit Dr. Prio, announced that the plotters were financed by him but no evidence has emerged to show that this was so. Certainly the plan, which was most amateurish, was not up to Prio's usual standard. On May 21, Barcena was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for his trouble and 12 others were sent to jail for shorter terms.

5. On April 29, the Mexico City newspaper "Ultimas Noticias" reported that three hundred armed mercenaries, financed by Dr. Prio, had gathered in the Yucatan Peninsula for an invasion of Cuba. I have already reported in detail on this episode as seen from Havana.⁽²⁾ It will suffice here to say that, despite the denials of the Cuban and Mexican authorities, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that something went on in Mexico City, in which Dr. Prio was involved, and to create the impression that the story about mercenaries in the Yucatan Peninsula is not a complete fabrication.

6. Meanwhile, the political opposition groups in Cuba renewed their attempts to reach agreement. The Communists continued to call for a United Opposition Front but with as little effect as before. The Orthodox Party was still split three ways into the Agramonte faction (sticking to the "anti-pactist" policy of Chibas and refusing to participate in elections), the Ochoa faction (prepared to co-operate to some extent with other opposition groups but unwilling to participate in elections) and the Fernandez Casas faction ("anti-pactist" and willing to participate in elections). While Fernandez Casas was trying without success to get Agramonte and Ochoa to subscribe to his point of view, elder statesman Cosme de la Torriente once more entered the fray. Over a period of several days toward the end of May, he conferred with leaders representing most of the opposition points of view in the hope of finding common ground. However he did not appear to be making progress and on May 28 the reason became apparent. Ex-president Prio flew from New York to Montreal where, according to an announcement, opposition leaders would meet to work out a policy for their opposition to the government. On May 30, the assembled leaders held the first of a series of meetings in the Ritz Carlton Hotel.

II. COMMUNISM

7. In recent months, less and less has been heard from the Cuban communists and at present they are exercising very little influence on developments here. For example, whereas a year ago they tried, although unsuccessfully, to parade on May Day, this year they made no effort to organize a parade or even a meeting.

(2) See my despatches No.D-160 of June 5 (paras. 9-10) and No. D-176 of June 20 (para.5).

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III. ECONOMIC

8. I suggested in my March report that until a number of questions were answered it would be difficult to forecast economic developments in Cuba with any certainty. It is still too early to answer most of the questions but what has happened would, I think, justify restrained optimism for the immediate future.

9. By far the most important economic development of the year occurred on April 14 with the sale to the United Kingdom of 1,000,000 tons of Cuban sugar for delivery before 1955, in addition to the sugar for which the United Kingdom had already contracted. The Cuban government announced it as "news of the highest national interest". It claimed that "elements anxious to provoke, for political reasons, the collapse of the national economy" were now frustrated and that the government's sugar policy was fully vindicated. Certainly the news had an immediate and salutary effect. The price of sugar on the world market, which had reached a low of 3.12¢ a pound, quickly rose by over .50¢ and there was talk of the immediate liquidation of the Stabilizing Reserve. In the flush of optimism, some pressure was exerted on the government to increase this year's sugar crop beyond 5,000,000 tons but Batista refused to do so.

10. Within a week after this good news, a variety of other encouraging announcements was made. It was stated that the Freeport Sulphur Company had discovered in Oriente province the largest nickel deposit ever proved outside Canada. Reports appeared that Axel Wenner-Gren, a Swedish industrialist, was in Havana to negotiate for the sale of the United Railways of Havana. A group of European financiers under the direction of the Baron Rothschild arrived in Havana with the reported intention of putting \$14,000,000 into the construction of a new Havana waterworks. The government announced plans for the development of Cuba's growing rice industry. The Tribunal of Accounts completed the registration of 990 agricultural implements and their distribution was begun to points from which small farmers would be able to obtain them on loan. (3) The government appointed a commission to consider ways and means of dealing with the problem of unemployment during the tiempo muerto and, as a first step, announced plans to undertake a two-year \$20,000,000 public works programme. This will be paid for over twenty years, the National Lottery contributing \$1,200,000 annually and the Treasury \$720,000. Finally, a scheme was announced for the so-called rehabilitation of the Treasury at a cost of \$100,000,000; this can only be attributed to an excess of enthusiasm as nobody had the slightest idea where such a large sum of money would come from.

11. On April 20, Dr. Gustavo Gutierrez, President of the National Economy Board, made a few sensible comments on the situation. He said that the unexpected relief to the Cuban economy resulting from the sale of sugar to the United Kingdom gave the government one more chance to implement some of the basic recommendations of the "Report on Cuba" published in 1951 by the International Bank. In particular, he referred again to Cuba's investment problem. He outlined the well-known impediments to investment here and emphasized the lack of adequate sources of credit. He admitted that the establishment in the last three years of the National Bank and of the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (BANFAIC) had helped but said that Cuba still needed an organization corresponding to the Commodity Credit Corporation in the

(3) See para. 3 of my despatch No. D-103 of April 11.

- 4 -

United States, a Land Credit Bank to facilitate the purchase of land and a National Financing Commission to provide funds for public works. The proposal to establish a National Financing Commission is, as you know, close to becoming a reality. (4) And the fact that the Canadian Life insurance companies doing business here have had to oppose the establishment of the Commission is a good illustration of the practical problems frequently connected with a project of this kind.

12. To sum up, the sale of sugar to the United Kingdom has quietened most of the alarmists. The figures for the first four months of the year indicate that economic activity is about 15% lower than it was at the same time a year ago but that it is higher than in 1951. The prophets of doom still find plenty to worry them in the prospects for the International Sugar Conference, in reports that other countries are growing increasing quantities of cane and beet sugar, in the threat of competition from manufacturers of artificial sweeteners in the United States and in the possibility of peace in Korea. But even they admit that the hardships of the tiempo muerto will probably be no worse than they were last year.

IV. LABOUR

13. The beneficent effects of the sale of sugar to the United Kingdom included an easing of tension in the sugar industry. Indeed the sale seemed to put the whole labour movement in a good frame of mind.

14. CTC Secretary General Mujal could not have been more co-operative with one and all. He issued a statement on April 20 congratulating Batista on the success of his sugar policy and opposing the suggestion that the 1953 sugar quota should be increased by 500,000 tons. He even went so far as to say that the CTC wished to encourage the establishment of new industries in Cuba and was therefore disposed to give all possible aid to the investment of capital for that purpose. This was quite a statement, considering the commonly held belief that the labour problem is one of the most serious, if not the most serious, impediment to foreign investment in Cuba. As further evidence of goodwill, Mujal cancelled the usual May Day parade at the request of the government. Instead, an uneventful rally was held in the Palace of Labour, with the Minister of Labour in attendance.

15. The CTC apparently continued to approve of Mujal's leadership. He was re-elected Secretary General in the course of its VIII National Congress held on May 4-7. In other respects, the Congress was uneventful and none of the resolutions adopted was out of the ordinary.

16. Finally, to really ice the cake, the government announced on May 7 that it would set up a Labour-Management Technical Committee to consider all matters affecting labour and management and to make recommendations concerning the expansion of existing industries and the development of new ones. The Committee is under the chairmanship of a government representative and contains leading figures from both business and the labour movement. Its establishment was well received on all sides and it might conceivably do some effective work.

(4) See my despatch No. D-157 of June 3.

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17. With the increased unemployment of the "dead season" in the offing, one wonders how long this sweetness and light can last. It reflects great credit on the ability of Dr. Carlos Saladrigas, the Minister of Labour, and must be very pleasant for the government.

V. INTERNATIONAL

Sugar

18. On April 2, the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced that an International Sugar Conference would be held in London commencing on July 13. Representatives of eight countries, including Cuba, met at a preliminary meeting in New York on May 6-7. Dr. Arturo Manas, the leading spokesman of the Cuban delegation, said afterwards that the Cubans were satisfied with the progress made.

United Kingdom

19. In the eyes of the Cubans, the sugar sale to the United Kingdom at least temporarily converted the British into fair-haired boys, a role to which they have not recently been accustomed. My United Kingdom colleague has told me that the British negotiators' primary object was to obtain the favourable price which they got - 2.75¢ a pound for the first 600,000 tons and 3.08¢ for the balance. They had only twenty-four hours in which to reach agreement on account of the timing of the United Kingdom budget and were therefore not able to get the desired undertaking from the Cubans to continue their tariff concessions in the present trade agreement between the two countries after its expiration. Nevertheless both sides were delighted with the results and expressed the hope that relations between the two countries would improve. They agreed that the United Kingdom question should not be raised in connection with the sugar talks but my United Kingdom colleague is hopeful that it may be settled soon. In addition, the Cuban Government announced on May 22 that a commercial mission, headed by Minister of Labour Dr. Carlos Saladrigas, would visit the United Kingdom to make a study of Anglo-Cuban trade relations.

Germany

20. After three months of negotiations in Bonn, the Cuban and West German governments on May 11 signed a Commercial Agreement and a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. The Agreement provided for the purchase by Germany of 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar by the end of 1955, in addition to the annual purchase of \$2,000,000 worth of a variety of other Cuban products. In exchange Cuba granted tariff concessions on over 90 items. It would appear that this was satisfactory to Cuba, particularly as there was some fear that, following the denunciation by West Germany last year of the previous trade agreement, it would not be possible to come to terms.

United States

21. Cubans continue to watch the development of the Republican Government's Latin American policy with great interest. On April 6-8, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, John Moors Cabot, managed to create a good impression here. I was pleased to have the opportunity of entertaining him at the residence. President Eisenhower's speech on April 12 to the Council of the OAS received

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favourable comment, as did his recommendation to Congress that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act be extended for one year. The Cubans are encouraged by these surface manifestations of the renewal of the Good Neighbour Policy but are undecided as to what this will mean when the chips are down.

Canada

22. This Embassy and the Canadian Government became involved in the Cuban political scene when, on May 29, I was informed that the Cuban Government would consider it as a friendly act if the Canadian Government were to prevent the meeting of Cuban opposition leaders in Montreal from taking place. (5)

(Sgd.) Harry A. Scott
Ambassador

(5) See my despatch No. D-160 of June 5.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTINE SLIP

DATE July 21, 1953
SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL

TO: ~~LEGAL DIVISION~~

file top.

FROM: American/G.G. Riddell/LG

☐ For Signature

☐ For Action

☐ For Comments

☐ For Approval

For Information and

File ☐

Destroy ☐

Return ☐

COMMENTS: (This space is not for comments of a permanent character which should be formally recorded in a memorandum)

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To see paras. 1-13; 22 of
Despatch No. D-197

Also referred to:

Trade and Commerce, Finance,
Bank, Export Credits,
C.C.O.S., R.C.M.P.,
Economic
Pol. Cord. Section
Labour
Commonwealth

21 JUL 1953

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

DESPATCH

SECRET

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.
THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, HAVANA, CUBA.

FROM:

Reference: My letter No. L-173 of June 18 and
previous correspondence.
Subject: Activities of ex-President Prio
Socarras

Security: D-176

No: June 20, 1953.

Date:

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

| | |
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| Ottawa File No. 10224-140 11981-40 | |
| 16 | ✓ |

References

You will by now have received my despatch No. D-160 of June 5, which contains most of the information asked for in paragraph 5 of your air letter No. 1 of June 12. It might be useful however to reiterate the information in my despatch with specific reference to your questions and to add what I can.

Question (a): We would like to know if you have any information as to the veracity of Campa's statements on the United States attitude towards the group.

As reported in paragraph 16 of my despatch, Alberto Campa took the same line with me as with Mr. Ritchie, expressing surprise that the Canadian authorities should have permitted the holding of a subversive meeting - especially since the United States, Mexican and Guatemalan governments would not permit such a meeting. (1) I asked Campa to clarify his statement and he finally said that he believed that the Mexican and Guatemalan authorities had specifically refused permission for the meeting to be held in their countries. Campa would not say however whether by this he meant that Prio had made a more or less formal application to them or whether they had simply refused to grant the necessary visas. Concerning the United States, Campa was even more vague. He said that he believed the United States authorities had made it clear to Prio following the Fort Worth and Mamaroneck incidents that they would not tolerate conspiratorial activities and that, in view of the nature of the proposed meeting, Prio decided there was too much risk of action against him under the Neutrality Act if it were held in the United States.

As stated in paragraph 15 of my despatch, the United States Embassy here expressed the view that Prio was afraid he might be deported for violating the Neutrality Act and also said that Pardo Llada, the No. 2 Orthodox leader, would probably be refused a visa for the United States if he should apply for one.

(1) As indicated in paragraph 18 of my despatch No. D-160, the Minister of State did not show surprise at the Canadian position and has been much more cordial than his son throughout.

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In reply to a direct question, the Secretary of this Embassy was told that, as far as the United States Embassy knew, no specific application was made to the United States authorities for the holding of this particular meeting in the United States. (2) You could presumably get more accurate information on this by enquiry from the State Department in Washington.

Question (b): Do you believe that Mexico forbade such a meeting?

I have nothing to add to the information in answer to question (b) above. No doubt our Embassy in Mexico City will be able to obtain a more accurate indication of the attitude of the Mexican authorities.

Question (c): Was there as Campa claimed prior publicity in Cuba of the fact that the meeting was scheduled to be held in Montreal?

As stated in paragraph 13 of my despatch, the first we knew of the proposal to hold a meeting in Montreal was on May 25, when three students came to this Embassy to enquire about visas. During the next three days, the press carried news of plans for a meeting but only on May 28, the day on which I sent you telegram No. 32, was it definitely stated that the meeting would be held in Montreal. There may for all I know have been vague references earlier to the desire of Prio to hold a meeting of opposition leaders but they did not come to the attention of this Embassy. I have enquired from a number of my diplomatic colleagues and have found that none of them was aware in advance of any suggestion that a meeting might be held in Montreal.

Question (d): The reaction in Cuba to the statement issued by the opposition leaders at the close of the meeting and what members of the group have returned to Cuba.

As mentioned in paragraph 22 of my despatch, the Montreal meeting was and still is front page news in the Havana press. Since my report on general developments in Cuba for the month of June, which should reach you at the same time as this despatch, will contain an analysis of the effect of the Montreal meeting on the political situation in Cuba, I shall not attempt to go into it here.

From the information available here, it appears that the following people who attended the meeting have returned to Cuba: Manuel Antonio de Varona; Eduardo Suarez Rivas; Dr. Emilio Ochoa; Dr. Jose Manuel Gutierrez; Jose Pardo Llada; Isidro Figueroa; Dr. Aracelio Azcuy Cruz; Antonio Santiago; Raul de Juan; Javier Lezcano. Juan A. Rubio Padilla, who is a professor at the University of Havana, is said to be in Miami and to be expected soon in Havana. The Cuban government announced that it would not prevent the return to Cuba of these men and so far has not interfered with them in any way. The remaining five men listed in my despatch - Dr. Carlos

(2) As reported in paragraph 1 of my despatch, Prio is surrounded wherever he goes by leaders of his own and other political parties opposed to the Batista régime and has frequently in the past met with them more or less formally, particularly in Miami, New York and Mexico City.

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Prio Socarras, Guillermo Alonso Pujol, Carlos Hevia, Dr. Luis Gustavo Fernandez and Rafael Izquierdo - are living in voluntary exile and are not expected to return to Cuba for the time being.

Question (e): Any information you might have about possible contraband shipments of Canadian arms to Cuba.

I have no information beyond that published on June 18 in the "Alerta" article which was sent to you with my letter No. L-173 of the same date.

2. I think two additional comments might be made at this stage. The first is that your air letter makes no reference to Mr. Delfin Pupo y Proenza, the Cuban Ambassador in Ottawa. Viewed from this distance, Pupo's position is unclear to say the least. For some reason, the Cuban authorities preferred to use me and then Alberto Campa to do the work which their own Ambassador in Ottawa would normally be asked to do. You will appreciate that my position would have been easier if in the first instance the Cuban government had used its own Embassy in Ottawa to express its surprise at what the Canadian Government was or was not doing.

3. The second comment is that there is no question of the seriousness with which the Cuban government views the meeting in Montreal. I was sufficiently impressed by this on May 29 to telephone to Mr. C.S.A. Ritchie within an hour after my interview with Alberto Campa. And the special trip to Ottawa of Alberto Campa bears it out. (3)

4. I should now like to comment on the "Alerta" article of June 18 which was sent to you under cover of my letter No. L-173. In the first place, I think it is safe to assume that this story of the Montreal meeting is the one the Cuban government wishes the public to believe. Only by comparing it with the other evidence at hand will it be possible to arrive at any conclusion as to how much of it is true. You no doubt have information not yet available to this Embassy which will permit you to judge for yourself. My own impression is that the story may well be true in essence, although in one place where the facts are known to this Embassy, the details are wrong. In paragraph 9, Aureliano Sanchez Arango's arrest in Jamaica is made public for the first time. It is not true however, as stated there, that he paid a fine. He was brought into court and given the option of paying £120 or spending one additional day in jail. He chose to remain in jail, after which he was deported to Mexico. (4)

5. Three additional points might be mentioned. The first arises out of the statement in paragraph 4 that Prio "flew direct from Miami to Mexico City to smother in 'incineratory smoke' the legal responsibilities with which his followers in Mexico were being charged". According to my United Kingdom colleague, he heard from the United Kingdom Embassy in Mexico City that the Mexican police did arrest Sanchez Arango and others and seized documents which linked them with plans to invade Cuba from the Yucatan Peninsula. Prio is said to have offered \$10,000 to the

(3) The fact that he went to Canada has been published but there has so far been no reference to his contact with the Canadian authorities.

(4) The same paragraph suggests that Sanchez Arango in fact got to Montreal. (See paragraph 14 of my despatch No. D-160).

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Mexican authorities for the release of his men. The Mexicans in turn told this to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and, when the Embassy did not raise the ante, took Prio's money and set the men free.

6. The second point has a bearing on Alberto Campa's allegation that the intention to hold the meeting in Montreal was common knowledge as early as March. If the statement in paragraph 4 is correct, the decision to hold a meeting of opposition leaders was not made until early in May.

7. The third point is the statement in paragraph 15 that September 4 or October 10 might be appropriate dates for an uprising and the description in paragraph 16 of how this might be conducted. Ever since the meeting, the air here has been full of speculation of this kind and this Embassy has received similar "inside" reports of a "strictly confidential" nature. The June 17 issue of "Visión", a Spanish-language magazine published in New York, reports that the revolution will begin sometime in July or August and that it will be launched from Guatemala, Yucatan or perhaps Costa Rica.

8. On the theory that where there is a lot of smoke, there may also be a small flame, I have attempted in the last few days to reach some conclusion concerning the possibility of disturbances in Cuba in the next few months. Until recently I was not prepared to take Prio's machinations seriously, even assuming that Batista's charges were true, because I had no reason to think that Batista, with the full backing of the armed forces, was in any danger of losing control of the situation. However, on June 18 I had a private discussion with a leading businessman and newspaper owner, who is well disposed toward this Embassy, the essence of which I think is worth reporting.

9. According to this man, Batista is unpopular with the Cubans, is becoming more so every day, and knows it. The armed forces are dissatisfied because he is attempting to rule with too light a hand and has not given them as much power as they expected. There are definite signs of defection and the situation has become so serious that Batista must purge the armed forces and set up a military dictatorship quickly if he is to remain in power. Furthermore, the popular dislike of Batista has been sharpened by the beginning of economic hardship and the fear of worse to come. Prio knows all this and believes that he has the power to set off a chain of events which will culminate in the downfall of Batista. Through the agency of Sanchez Arango, who is a fanatic, plans are being laid for landings by mercenaries at various points along the Cuban coast and for the dropping of bombs by aeroplanes operating from an airfield in Costa Rica.

10. My informant would not hazard a guess as to whether or not such an invasion could be successful and I certainly have no intention of indulging in star gazing on such slippery ground. My purpose is to let you know that a lot of people here think there will be trouble of some kind in the next few months and to warn you that, if trouble does develop, there may yet be public recriminations against the Canadian Government for having

* More recent information from Mr. Scott indicates he is not so exercised about this possibility. The possibility has not been removed entirely. See, also, paragraph 11 of dispatch D 117 of July 3, 1961.

July 14, 1961. S. L. 1961

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permitted the plans for it to be laid at the meeting in Montreal. However melodramatic this may appear to us, may I repeat that the Cuban government is taking it all very seriously and would, in my opinion, regard it as an unfriendly act if the Canadian Government were to permit a similar meeting to occur again. They can of course take the simple and direct action of cancelling the passports of those people whom they wish to prevent from attending such meetings but it is apparent that they believe the Canadian Government ought to take some action as well.

11. I am sure I do not need to emphasize this point any further, particularly in view of the statement in your air letter No. 1 that the Canadian Government would examine the possibility of preventing the re-entry into Canada of members of the group who were expected to return to renew their contacts with Canadian suppliers of arms. I have stressed it to this extent to ensure that you are under no misapprehension as to the state of affairs as I see it here. I am not an alarmist by nature. However, in view of what we have learned in the last three weeks, I think it well to foresee the worst that may happen so as to be prepared for it.

(Sgd.) H.A. Scott,
Ambassador.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

DESPATCH

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, HAVANA,
CUBA.

Reference:
Subject: General Developments in Cuba
during June, 1953.

Security:
D-197
No:
Date: July 3, 1953.
Enclosures:
Air or Surface Mail:
Post File No:

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| Ottawa File No. | |
| 11981-40 | |
| 16 | ✓ |

References

I. POLITICS

June will be remembered for some time here as the month of the Montreal meeting of opposition leaders. In Cuban eyes, this was at least as important as Batista's postponement of the elections on February 27.

2. Ever since he left Cuba over a year ago, ex-President Prio has frequently met, more or less informally, with other opposition leaders in Mexico City, Miami and New York. By the end of May, he apparently decided that he was ready to convene a formal, well-publicized opposition meeting. During the month, Dr. Guillermo Alonzo Pujol, Vice-President of the Republic under Prio and formerly a leader of the now extinct Partido Nacional Cubano, announced his allegiance to the PRC Autenticos, i.e. that element, under the presidency of Manuel Antonio de Varona, which refuses to participate in elections and supports Dr. Prio. Dr. Eduardo Suarez Rivas, who resigned the leadership of the Liberal Party in October when the party executive adopted a policy of participation in elections and co-operation with Batista, was also known to be in close touch with Prio. In addition, the circumstance which made the holding of the meeting really worth while was that Dr. Emilio Ochoa, the president of that faction of the Orthodox Party which said it was prepared to co-operate to some extent with other opposition groups but refused to participate in elections, was now willing to meet publicly with Dr. Prio.

3. I have listed elsewhere the people who, as far as I know, attended the meeting in Montreal.⁽¹⁾ It is sufficient to say here that from May 30 to June 3 six Autenticos and four Ortodoxos held a series of meetings in the Ritz Carlton Hotel and that a number of other Cubans were present without participating.

(1) See paragraph 14 of my despatch No. D-160 of June 5.

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Of the ten principles, the most important were the five mentioned in the previous paragraph, Carlos Hevia (PRC (Autentico) presidential candidate in the elections scheduled for June 1, 1952) and José Pardo Llada (No. 2 man in Ochoa's Orthodox group).

4. The announced purpose of the meeting was to work out a common policy of opposition to General Batista's government. On June 3, a statement, which the Cuban press quickly named the "Charter of Montreal", was issued over the signatures of five of the Autenticos and the four Ortodoxos.⁽²⁾ According to the statement, General Batista "is not able to lead the people to restore their political institutions by means of elections". In order to re-establish the 1940 Constitution, it is therefore necessary to set up a provisional government which will hold elections as soon as possible under the provisions of the Electoral Law of 1943. While the statement does not say how the provisional government is to be established, it "flatly reject(s) and condemn(s) personal violence, gangsterism and terrorist activities as a form of struggle". (However, it does not rule out counter-revolutionary action.) The two groups are to retain their independence but will set up liaison committees to co-ordinate their activities. Finally, all "truly democratic parties and national groups" are asked to co-operate "in order to recover their constitutional institutions".

5. From the time the meeting was first announced and the leaders began to gather in Montreal, the Cuban press and political leaders of all persuasions showed the greatest interest in it. Everyone had something to say; in fact, some people issued two and even three statements in the course of the first week of the month. There was of course no doubt about the disapproval of the government. General Batista said: "The Montreal meeting only represents shame and dishonesty. The people can expect nothing good from that extraordinary alliance. In the face of that monstrous abortion, our determination to defend order and decency in Cuba is firmer than ever". Minister of Information Ernesto de la Fe added that "what has really been agreed upon in Montreal is to intensify terrorism and create an atmosphere of insecurity in the nation" and warned that, while the government did not place great importance on the meeting, it was alert against any disturbance of the peace by the "apologists of apostasy" under the leadership of the "great incinerator". The Havana newspaper "Alerta", which fully supports the government, claimed that because of the nature of the meeting, its organizers "had to go to Canada, where they are unknown, to take advantage of the hospitality of that brotherly country, since the police were watching their activities in the United States and Mexico."

6. As might be expected, most of the other Cuban political elements which did not participate also condemned the meeting in one way or another. The most notable of these were ex-President Ramon Grau San Martin (leader of the PRC (Autentico) element which is willing to participate in elections),⁽³⁾ Dr. Roberto Agramonte (leader of the PPC (Orthodox) group which follows the "anti-pactist" policy of Chibas and refuses to participate in elections), Sr. Federico Fernandez Casas (leader of the "anti-pactist" PPC (Orthodox)

(2) Five representatives of each group were supposed to attend and sign the final statement but one of the Orthodox leaders, Dr. Pelayo Cuervo, was arrested before he could leave Havana on account of inflammatory statements which he had made on a television programme.

(3) See para. 5 of my despatch No. D-42 of February 13.

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group which is willing to participate in elections), Dr. Rafael Guas Inclan (leader of the Liberal Party group which is co-operating closely with Batista),⁽⁴⁾ Dr. Santiago Verdeja (leader of the Democratic Party group which is co-operating with Batista)⁽⁴⁾ elder statesman Cosme de la Torriente (the sponsor of the most recent attempt in Cuba to obtain co-operation between the opposition groups)⁽⁵⁾ and the communists.

7. Following their departure from Canada, some of the Montreal group attended meetings, both public and private, in New York City. Eventually they all returned to their original points of departure, either in the United States or in Cuba.⁽⁶⁾ The Cuban Government announced that it would not interfere with the return to Cuba of any of the group and none of those who returned had any trouble.

8. On their arrival in Havana, they were given ample opportunity by the press to explain their position. They were of course at pains to emphasize their intention of achieving their aims by peaceful means. They also said that they hoped for the adherence of opposition groups which were not represented in Montreal, except for the communists. In particular, it was evident that they wished to enlist the support of Dr. Grau San Martin in order to re-unite the Autentico Party. On June 19, Dr. Felix Lancis, who was Prime Minister under both Grau and Prio, visited Grau on behalf of Prio to try and win him over. To judge from the statement issued after their meeting, Lancis was unsuccessful. However, two other opposition leaders were more amenable. Nicolas Castellanos (former mayor of Havana and leader of the now extinct Partido Nacional Cubano) and Dr. José R. Andreu (leader of the Democratic Party group which refuses to participate in elections) were reported to be considering throwing in their lot with the Montreal group. By the month's end, pro-Prio groups had organized a number of unco-ordinated meetings but had very little of a concrete nature to show for their efforts.

9. As you are aware, the meeting had more sinister undertones than its organizers are willing to admit. I have already reported in detail on the activities of Dr. Prio leading up to the meeting⁽⁷⁾ and shall not cover that ground here. I have also reported to you the version of the meeting which Batista's government obviously wishes Cubans to believe.⁽⁸⁾ In addition, I have mentioned the article in the June 26 issue of "Visión,"⁽⁹⁾ claiming that there will be a revolution in Cuba sometime in July or August. On June 21, Batista told reporters that the counter-revolutionary plans agreed upon at Montreal had been in possession of the government for the previous four months. He said that they were fantastic in conception and "that the invasion of Europe by the Allies almost pales into insignificance in comparison." He also denied the statement in "Visión" that he spends \$25,000 daily on his spy service. He smilingly said: "It is greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless something is spent but not as much as that - not even monthly."

(4) See para. 2 of my despatch No. D-189 of June 27.

(5) See para. 6 of my despatch No. D-189 of June 27.

(6) See the answer to Question (d) in para. 1 of my despatch No. D-176 of June 20.

(7) See my despatch No. D-160 of June 5.

(8) See my letter No. L-173 of June 18 and paras. 4-7 of my despatch No. D-176 of June 20.

(9) Not June 17, as stated in para. 7 of my despatch No. D-176 of June 20.

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10. On June 23, Carlos Hevia in Miami made a small but notable contribution to the host of rumours which have been circulating. He told the International News Service that a friend of his "who is in intimate contact with the present government in Havana" had told him that a group of army generals was plotting the downfall of Batista and had intended to bring this about on June 15. Hevia did not explain why they had not carried out their intention but Minister of Information Ernesto de la Fe made the plausible comment that it may have been because there never was a plot. According to him, Batista carried out his coup d'etat with the assistance of the generals and any revolution on their part would be like "revolting against oneself". De la Fe went on to suggest that Prio and his followers stop plotting and return to Cuba, as they were free to do, where they would be allowed to conduct their political opposition to the government unmolested. The following day, Prio not surprisingly declined this invitation.

11. It is not easy to assess the month's developments. The Montreal meeting is clearly a landmark on the Cuban political scene but I am not yet sure in what direction it points. The publicity which it received here must have exceeded even Prio's hopes. However, if he believed that the Charter would become the rallying point for united opposition to Batista under his leadership, he will probably be disappointed. Grau San Martin holds the key to this situation and so far he has shown no desire to join Prio.

12. It is conceivable that as a result of the meeting the existing confusion in the opposition ranks may resolve itself to some extent. For example, one result of the meeting was to complete the break between Agramonte and Ochoa; and it has been suggested that Agramonte will soon be willing to join forces with Fernandez Casas. If this were to happen and if Grau San Martin were to continue his refusal to join Prio, I think it is quite possible that the Prio group might find itself without substantial support.

13. The average Cuban wants a peaceful solution to his country's present political dilemma. He is disturbed rather than pleased by signs of revolutionary plotting. As Batista has undoubtedly taken steps to deal with whatever concrete threat there was to his government, I am not too much concerned about the possibility of disturbances in the immediate future. It may well appear in retrospect that the month's events served to clear the air and that the Cuban ship of state was about to enter calmer water.

II. ECONOMIC

14. With the approaching end of Cuba's fiscal year on June 30, there was much speculation concerning the state of the Treasury. Government spokesmen have consistently refused to be pinned down. They claim with one breath that the Treasury is in good shape and with the next that the government's financial difficulties are entirely due to the malpractices of the Prio government. Although no reliable figures are available, it is estimated that government expenditures have exceeded the \$336,000,000 budget by as much as \$14,000,000. It is also suggested that in drawing up the 1952-53 budget the government did not take fully into account the adverse impact on the economy of the coup d'etat and of the restriction of the sugar crop, and that revenues for the year may not have exceeded \$300,000,000.

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15. At any rate, government spokesmen announced as long ago as last February that the forthcoming budget would be reduced to as little as \$280,000,000. As time passed, it became increasingly evident that, whatever their intentions and whatever the necessities of the situation, a reduction of \$70,000,000 in expenditures was not an easy matter, particularly in view of statements made by government leaders that, if at all possible, government employees would not be released. The Minister of Education announced that he intended to solve the problem as it affected his Department by introducing a new scale of salaries for teachers, which would greatly reduce the amounts paid to "specialists". This plan aroused general opposition and at the end of the month it was by no means clear whether the government was prepared to push it through.

16. Reports circulated that, because of the difficulty of drawing up the new budget, the government would be unable to approve it before July 1 and that the 1952-53 budget would remain in force for an additional three months. However, at its meeting on June 30 the Council of Ministers approved a budget figure of \$298,000,000 for the 1953-54 fiscal year and also a 10% reduction in the salaries of government employees. This is all the information which has so far been made available.

17. The following figures provide an interesting comparison between the situation in the Cuban sugar industry this year and in 1952:

| | <u>June 15, 1953</u> | <u>June 15, 1952</u> |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Number of mills finished Grinding | 158 (3 still grinding) | 139 (22 still grinding) |
| Sugar produced | 4,935,000 tons | 6,776,000 tons |
| | <u>June 18, 1953</u> | <u>June 18, 1952</u> |
| U.S. Market Price | | |
| U.S. Market Price | 5.54¢ a lb. | 5.66¢ a lb. |
| World Market Price | 3.55¢ a lb. | 4.15¢ a lb. |
| | <u>Jan. 1-June 18, 1953</u> | <u>Jan. 1-June 18, 1952</u> |
| Average U.S. Market Price | | |
| Price | 5.39¢ a lb. | 5.12¢ a lb. |
| Average World Market Price | 3.49¢ a lb. | 4.33¢ a lb. |

18. On June 29, the Ministry of Agriculture reported that the milling of Cuba's 1953 sugar crop by the island's 161 centrals was completed. The final figure for the crop has not yet been announced but is unofficially estimated to be only 15,000 long tons in excess of the 5,000,000 ton quota set by the government. I am told that as a result of the recent agreements for the sale of sugar to the United Kingdom and the West German Republic, all but 300,000 tons of this year's crop are now sold. This does not of course take into account the 1,400,000 tons still in the Stabilizing Reserve.

III. LABOUR

19. During the month there occurred a glaring example of the sort of labour problem which discourages foreigners from investing in Cuba. The Suwanee Train Ferry Lines of Jacksonville, Florida obtained permission from the Cuban authorities to institute a train ferry service between Fort Lauderdale, Florida and Havana. The company is reported to have invested \$3,000,000 in two ships and other equipment. A barge was sent to Havana loaded with steel for the construction of necessary dock facilities. The Havana dock

000049

- 6 -

workers refused to unload some of the steel and the barge had to return to Miami. The case received a lot of adverse publicity in the United States, with the result that President Batista ordered the Minister of Labour "to issue immediately whatever measures may be required to regulate work connected with the ferry system ---, protecting in these measures the just and human interests of the port workers but also taking into account the wider national interests which should be protected in order to ensure the development of our economy." Two weeks have passed and nothing whatsoever has been done.

20. Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of this incident is the attitude of CTC Secretary General Mujal. I reported recently that Mujal had expressed the desire of the CTC to give all possible aid to the investment of foreign capital in Cuba.⁽¹⁰⁾ Within a month his protestations have been put to the test and have proven to be worthless. On June 20, he supported the stand of the Federation of Maritime Workers, claiming that an increase in the sea train service between Havana and Florida would result in the displacement of a large number of port workers. He also took the opportunity of expressing his opposition to the rumoured decision of Batista's government to permit a needed reduction of 25% in the personnel of the United Railways of Havana as one of the terms of sale to the Swedish industrialist, Axel Wenner-Gren.

IV. INTERNATIONAL

United Kingdom

21. After four weeks in the United Kingdom, the Cuban Commercial Mission under the leadership of the Minister of Labour, Dr. Carlos Saladrigas, left for home on June 20. Both Saladrigas and a spokesman for the United Kingdom Government stated that the talks had been successful but made no reference to the possible renewal of the trade agreement between the two countries, which expires at the end of this year. According to my United Kingdom colleague, the reason for this is that the United Kingdom authorities do not want to renew the agreement and therefore would not accept the Cubans' proposal that they should discuss in concrete terms the quantities of sugar which the United Kingdom would buy from Cuba in future. Instead they hope to persuade the Cubans to issue a unilateral declaration that Cuba will continue its present trade concessions to the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom would remain free to purchase sugar wherever it wished and could more easily satisfy the demands of the British West Indian producers. My United Kingdom colleague admitted that his government did not intend to purchase much Cuban sugar in addition to that for which they have already contracted and that the Cubans probably suspect this. He also admitted that he did not think there is much hope of persuading them to make the desired unilateral declaration.

Latin America

22. Less than a week after General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla seized power in Colombia, Minister of State Dr. Miguel Angel Campa announced Cuba's recognition of the new government on June 19.

Canada

23. I have reported separately on the activities of this mission in connection with the coronation.⁽¹¹⁾

(10) See para. 14 of my despatch No. D-189 of June 27.

(11) See my despatch No. D-165 of June 9.

- 7 -

24. You are already full aware of developments following the request by the Cuban Government on May 29 that the Canadian Government prevent the meeting of Cuban opposition leaders in Montreal. These developments included the visit to Ottawa of Alberto Campa, the son of the Minister of State. I need only report here the following bit of typically Cuban political humour, which appeared in "Alerta" on June 18:

"President Gomez of Colombia has fled to the United States . . . It won't be long before he will be making an excursion to Canada".

25. As regards the future prospects of Delfin H. Pupo y Proenza, Cuban Ambassador to Canada, I have heard from a fairly reliable source that the Minister of Communications, Dr. Pablo Carrera Justiz, who is expected to retire soon from the Cabinet, has been offered the position of Ambassador to Canada but has turned it down.

Minister of State

26. It has been rumoured that the Minister of State, Dr. Miguel Campa y Caraveda, may soon be appointed Cuban Ambassador to Spain, possibly being replaced by Dr. Guillermo Belt, former Cuban Ambassador to Washington. I report this chiefly because the suggestion that Campa is being deposed on account of his obvious nepotism may be of interest to members of the Department who recently met his son in Ottawa. Since his return to Havana, Alberto Campa, who is not highly regarded here, both because of his inexperience and because of his rather surly manner, has been appointed Acting Under-Secretary of State by his father. A daughter of Campa's also holds the rank of cultural attache in the Cuban Embassy in Madrid.

(Sgd.) Harry A. Scott

Ambassador.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO:The American Division..... *Im. St. L.*

Security Restricted.....

Date June 23, 1953.....

FROM: ...Consular Division.....

File No.

11981-40

REFERENCE: Memo of June 10, 1953 from Legal...

16

✓

.....Division.....

SUBJECT: ..Rejection and Deportation of Non-immigrants.....

Legal Division
In consideration
of my recent
memo, please.
Calvert

American Dir

It is noted in the memo from Legal Division mentioned above that under the new Immigration Act it would be possible to refuse entry to Cuban opposition party members or to deport them after their entry to Canada if it could be claimed that they fall within the prohibited classes. I assume the question of whether or not opposition leader who entered Canada a few weeks ago or others in the same category should be admitted if they apply in future is now under consideration.

In this connection it may be of interest that under the new Immigration Act and Regulations it is mandatory for residents of all Latin American countries to obtain non-immigrant visas before entering Canada. As you are aware, under the former Act, citizens and long-time residents of American countries did not require visas to enter Canada as bona fide non-immigrants. Instructions concerning the new regulations are still under preparation for distribution to all Canadian posts and to British consular offices acting on our behalf. It is expected that this new procedure will be in effect within a month and it would then be possible to restrict the entry of Cuban nationals who may be deemed undesirable visitors by refusing or deferring visas. The implications of such action are, of course, not for this Division to speculate on, but if you would wish our assistance in preparing possible warning circulars, I should be pleased to discuss the problem further with you.

NOTE

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26 JUN 1953

Arthur S. ...
Consular Division.

000052

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO:The American Division.....

Security Restricted.....

Date June 23, 1953.....

FROM: ...Consular Division.....

File No.

11981-40

REFERENCE: Memo of June 10, 1953 from Legal...

16

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.....Division.....

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Hector Allard
Hector Allard

Consular Division.

000053

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

ROUTING SLIP

DATE

June 16

SECURITY

Rest.

TO:

Concussion

FROM:

Wolfe

☐ For Signature☐ For Action☒ For Comments☐ For Approval

For Information and

File ☐Destroy ☐Return ☐

COMMENTS: (This space is not for comments of a permanent character which should be formally recorded in a memorandum)

This was given to us by
Legal in reference to
whether the group of Cuban
Opposition leaders who met
recently in Montreal, could
have been refused entry or
could have been deported here.
Apparently the answer is yes to

.000054

Legal/J.O. Parry/DS

RESTRICTED

June 10, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR AMERICAN DIVISION

mail file

*To see
Lampson
return to
Mr. Stark
over*

Procedure in Denying Entry or
Departing Persons Under the
Immigration Act 1952

| | |
|----------|---|
| 11981-40 | |
| 16 | ✓ |

The following is a summary of the procedure laid down under the new Immigration Act 1952 (which came into force June 1, 1953) in denying entry to persons who seek to enter Canada, and in deporting persons who have previously been allowed entry into Canada. This procedure has been confirmed by officers of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

Procedure on Entry into Canada:

2. If there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person seeking entry into Canada comes within one of the prohibited classes, either as the result of information given to the Immigration Branch or revealed in the examination by the immigration officer,

- (1) The person may be refused entry and returned to the country from which he entered Canada as a reject. In such a case there is a right of appeal but if the person entered from the U.S. it is customary to send him back to the U.S. pending consideration of his appeal.
- (2) The person may be detained by the immigration officer and reported to a Special Inquiry Officer. The Special Inquiry Officer has power to order the deportation of such a person if he decides after inquiry that the person comes within a prohibited class. An

- 2 -

appeal may be taken against a deportation order to the Minister, whose decision is final.

Procedure After Entry into Canada:

3. If, after a person has been permitted to enter Canada, a report or complaint is made to the Director of the Immigration Branch that such person was a member of a prohibited class at the time of his admission he may be deported under either of the following procedures:

- (1) The Director of Immigration, after receiving a report, will direct an inquiry to be held if he considers such action warranted. If the inquiry results in a decision by the Special Inquiry Officer that the person was a member of a prohibited class at the time of his admission into Canada an order for his deportation will be made. An appeal may be taken from the deportation order.
- (2) If the person is a non-immigrant the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration is empowered at any time to declare that he has lost his non-immigrant status and to make a deportation order against him. In this case there is no right of appeal. The Minister has full discretion, in such a case, to act, at any time on whatever information he considers sufficient.

4. Deportation is normally carried out by deportation officers of the Immigration Branch who have authority to call upon any constable or peace officer (federal, provincial or municipal) to execute a warrant or order made under the Immigration Act for the arrest, detention or deportation of any person.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTING SLIP

DATE June 19, 1953
SECURITY RESTRICTED

TO:

Mr. Parry, Legal Division

FROM: European#B.A.Wallis#eh

☐ For Signature

☐ For Action

☐ For Comments

☐ For Approval

For Information and

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Destroy ☐

Return ☐

COMMENTS: (This space is not for comments of a permanent character which should be formally recorded in a memorandum)

Diary copy returned as requested. We are keeping a copy here.

msl.

000057

RESTRICTED

Diary Copy

June 10, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR AMERICAN DIVISION

Procedure in Denying Entry or
 Deporting Persons Under the
Immigration Act 1952

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| 11981-40 | |
| 16 | ✓ |

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- 2 -

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K. J. Burbridge

Legal Division.

c.c. Economic Division

Legal Division: S.O. 1000

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: ..American Division.....

Security .Restricted.....

Date ... June 10, 1953.....

FROM: ..Legal Division.....

File No.

REFERENCE: Meeting of Cuban Opposition.....

..... Leaders in Montreal.....

SUBJECT: Penalties under The Export and Import Permits Act, 1947.....

Under Section 13 of The Export and Import Permits Act of 1947, as amended by ch. 7 of the 1953 Statutes, the following offences and penalties are provided:

"13. (1) Every person who violates or contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or any regulation under this Act is guilty of an offence and

(a) may be prosecuted under the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to summary convictions and if convicted is liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months or to both fine and imprisonment; or

(b) may, at the election of the Attorney General of Canada or the Attorney General of the Province, be prosecuted under indictment and if convicted is liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both fine and imprisonment.

(2) A prosecution under paragraph (a) of subsection one may be instituted at any time within twelve months from the time when the subject matter of the prosecution arose."

E. J. BURBRIDGE

cc: Economic Division

Legal Division.

000060

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

DIARY COPY

TO: ...American Division.....

Security Restricted.....

Date: June 8, 1953:.....

FROM: Legal Division.....

File No.

11981-4D
16 ✓

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Export of Arms to Cuba.....

As stated in the memorandum from Economic Division the export of arms from Canada is restricted by the provisions of the Export and Import Permits Act, chapter 17 of the 1947 Statutes of Canada, as amended.

Export of Arms

Under Section 5 of the Act no person shall export or attempt to export from Canada:

(a) any goods included in a list established pursuant to Section 3(1) of the Act (arms, munitions, war materials or supplies, etc.); or

(b) any goods to a country named in a list established pursuant to Section 3(2) except under the authority of and in accordance with a permit issued under the Act. Section 7 provides that the Minister of Trade and Commerce or any person designated by him, may issue an export permit as required under Section 5 and may amend, suspend or cancel any such permit.

Control and Responsibility

Control and responsibility for preventing shipments from leaving Canada without proper permits rests with customs and police officials at the exit points, as stated in the memorandum from Economic Division.

Section 11 of the Export and Import Permits Act provides that all officers, as defined in the

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Customs Act, shall satisfy themselves that the exporter or importer, as the case may be, has not violated or contravened any of the provisions of the Act and that all the requirements of the Act have been complied with, before permitting the export or import of arms, munitions etc. Under the Customs Act, an "officer" means an officer of Customs and includes insofar as preventive measures are concerned, officers and N.C.O's of the R.C.M.P. employed in the preventive services of Canada and the captain or master or other person in charge of any vessel in the preventive services of the Government of Canada.

K. J. BURBRIDGE

Legal Division.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTING SLIP

DATE

SECURITY June 19, 1953

TO:

SECRET

Legal Division

FROM:

American/WG Stark/ab

☐ For Signature

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☐ For Comments

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COMMENTS: *(This space is not for comments of a permanent character which should be formally recorded in a memorandum)*

Also referred to:

USSEA

Mr. MacKay

D.L. 2

Economic

~~XXXXX~~

Commonwealth

Washington

RCMP

CCOS

T&C

Caracas

Bogota

Mexico

000063

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

DESPATCH

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, HAVANA, CUBA.

Reference: Your letter No. X-91 of May 6 and my
telegram No. 33 of June 3.
Subject: Activities of ex-President Prio
Socarras.

Security: SECRET

No: D-160

Date: June 5, 1953.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

11981-40

16

✓

References

Ever since Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras left Cuba following the overthrow of his government by General Batista on March 10, 1952, his activities have been followed with close interest and much speculation by all Cubans. He has made his headquarters in Miami but has also spent considerable time in both Mexico City and New York. Wherever he goes, he is surrounded by leaders of his own and other Cuban political parties which are opposed to the Batista regime. He has held frequent meetings with these leaders and has made no secret of the fact that he is attempting to organize effective opposition to the present government of Cuba. He has consistently maintained however that he is not plotting the overthrow of Batista by violence, as indeed he must do in order to avoid running afoul of the United States neutrality legislation.

2. General Batista on the other hand has tried to portray Prio's activities in sinister hues. It is obviously good tactics for him to say that there is no serious opposition to his government in Cuba and to blame any appearance of unrest on Dr. Prio. He therefore claims at every opportunity that Prio has for the past year been using the millions of dollars which he stole as President to finance a variety of schemes designed to create unrest in Cuba and disturb the national economy.

3. Although the opposition to Batista is certainly far more extensive than he would like to admit, his accusations appear to have something to them, in the light of the information outlined below.

4. To begin with, the Prio administration almost certainly followed the example of its predecessors in stealing large sums of money. One case which appears to be well authenticated is the theft of approximately \$20,000,000 in \$5 bills, which were certified to have been burned in 1949, but which were recently discovered to be still in circulation. (1) I see no reason to

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

(1) See paragraph 6 of my despatch No. D-103 of April 11.

-2-

doubt that a good share of this money found its way into Prio's hands.

5. In the past year, there has been considerable evidence of the formulation of plans to overthrow Batista's government or at least to create disorders in Cuba; and in almost every instance some connection with Prio has been more or less definitely established. The most interesting cases - by no means all of them - are mentioned below. The first was the theft last October 3 in the Western Hills Motel, Fort Worth, Texas from two Cubans, Manuel F. Madareaga and Candido de la Torre, of \$240,000. At the trial of one of the robbers early in April, de la Torre is reported to have testified that the money was given to Madareaga by Dr. Prio to "start a revolution in Cuba". In the opinion of the Political Counsellor of the United States Embassy here, sufficient evidence is available to connect Prio with the Fort Worth incident, although it is perhaps not sufficient to stand up in a court of law.

6. Another incident was the discovery on December 20 in Mamaroneck, N.Y. of a cache of arms, most of it surplus United States army material, which the police claimed had been gathered illegally for shipment to Cuba by supporters of Dr. Prio.⁽²⁾ One of those arrested was a Cuban named José Duarte, who was said to have rented a garage in which the arms were stored and also to have purchased an ocean-going cabin cruiser capable of carrying the arms to Cuba. According to the United States Embassy, sufficient evidence has come to light to link Prio directly with Duarte and these illegal arms.

7. During January, a series of incidents occurred which many people thought was destined to culminate in really serious disorders during the week of January 25 - February 1, when the centenary of the birth of Cuba's revolutionary hero, José Martí, was being celebrated.⁽³⁾ The government claimed that these incidents were fomented by the Prio group. Prio of course denied any connection with them. In this case I have no evidence either to confirm or deny the government's accusation.

8. On April 5, forty-six persons, mostly students, said to be under the leadership of Professor Rafael Garcia Barcena, were arrested in Havana and accused of plotting an armed assault on Camp Colombia, the military headquarters. A large amount of small arms and ammunition was found, together with a plan of revolutionary action against the government. As was to be expected, the government announced that the plotters were being financed by Dr. Prio and he in turn denied all knowledge of the conspiracy. He said that if he ever participated in an armed move against Batista's government, he would lead it himself.

9. The next event worth reporting is the Yucatan episode which was the subject of your letter under reference. As far as I can tell, this began with the publication by the Mexico City Newspaper "Ultimas Noticias" on April 29 of a report that 300 armed mercenaries, financed by Dr. Prio, had gathered in the Ucatan Peninsula for an invasion of Cuba. The New York "Herald Tribune" report on May 3, which was enclosed with your letter, was based on a press release issued on May 2 by the Cuban Ministry of Information. This stated that

(2) See paragraph 1 of my despatch No. D-18 of January 13.

(3) See paragraph 2 of my despatch No. D-42 of February 13.

-3-

"the government of President Batista today learned through official channels of the detention by the Mexican authorities of the well-known agitator and confidant of Dr. Carlos Prio, Eufemio Fernandez". It further stated that Segundo Curti (former Minister of the Interior), Oscar Diaz (former army colonel), Juan Rios Montenegro and Candido de la Torre (former Havana city councillor)(4) had been detained. The press release claimed that "the occurrence in Mexico is simply one more link in the chain of international disturbances being produced by the so-called Caribbean Legion, which was also responsible for the events in Mamaroneck, N.Y." The following day, however, the Cuban authorities were apparently not so sure of the information received through their official channels. The Minister of the Presidency announced that "the government knows nothing official of the supposed conspiracy in Mexico" and the Cuban Ambassador in Mexico was reported as saying: "I have no direct knowledge of the case. It is simply a matter of speculation. I have received neither official nor unofficial notification of it." Mexican police and foreign affairs officials were also reported as denying any knowledge of the matter. And finally, Segundo Curti in Miami laughingly denied that he had been arrested in Mexico City, adding that the Cuban Minister of Information was obviously very poorly informed as he had not been in Mexico since February. The best retort that Minister of Information de la Fe was able to make was: "The news of the different arrests of Dr. Prio's followers in Mexican territory was transmitted by cable agencies of recognized integrity, which cannot be bought, as the millionaire ex-President is well aware."

10. The Secretary of this mission enquired from both the United States and United Kingdom Embassies here what information they had about the Yucatan affair and was told that it was very little beyond what had been published. The United States Embassy said they had no first-hand knowledge of what happened nor any evidence that Prio was connected with it. They said that they thought some people were questioned in Mexico City but that they were not held. In the United Kingdom Embassy, the Secretary was shown a letter of April 29 from the United Kingdom Embassy in Mexico City saying that the Dominican Ambassador in Mexico had informed the United Kingdom Embassy that Cuban exiles were forming groups in Yucatan and collecting arms. The letter stated that Eufemio Fernandez "of Caribbean Legion fame," and Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango(5) and some others were reported to have been arrested in the Hotel Continental, Prio's headquarters in Mexico.

11. The day after the conversations reported in the preceding paragraph, the United Kingdom Ambassador asked me to come to his residence. He told me in strict confidence that, several days before, the Governor of Jamaica had requested urgently by cable that an officer of the Embassy should come to Kingston at once. On his arrival there, the Secretary of the United Kingdom Embassy was shown the picture of a man whom he identified as Dr. Sanchez Arango. He was then told that this man had been arrested on arrival in Jamaica from Panama and that he had in his possession a number of documents linking him with a conspiracy against the Batista government, including

(4) See paragraph 5 above.

(5) For background on Dr. Sanchez Arango, see para. 4 of this Embassy's despatch No. D-284 of October 5, 1951.

-4-

one signed by Dr. Prio stating that Sanchez Arango was authorized by Prio to act as his representative in the organization of the revolutionary movement. Some days later, following consultation with the Foreign Office, the United Kingdom Ambassador was instructed to inform the Cuban Minister of State that Sanchez Arango had been arrested in Jamaica for being in possession of a false passport and for illegal possession of arms and that he was being deported. The Ambassador told this to Dr. Campa on the morning of Friday, May 29. At this point, I should like to emphasize my United Kingdom colleague's request that this information should be revealed to as few people as possible.

12. This information about Dr. Sanchez Arango lends credence to the repeated charges by Batista's government that he has visited Cuba frequently in a private aircraft which he flies himself and that he is Prio's contact man with the elements in Cuba which have been causing all the unrest.

13. One reason for reporting all of the foregoing has been to provide background for the Montreal episode. As indicated in my telegram No. 32 of May 28, this Embassy first became aware on May 25 that something was developing when three university students came to enquire about visas, saying that they wanted to attend a political meeting in Montreal; two of them, Aracelio Azcuy Cruz and Antonio Santiago were subsequently reported to be among those present in Montreal. During the next three days the press carried news of plans for a meeting and when on May 28 it was reported that Dr. Prio had flown from New York to Montreal, it seemed desirable to report the matter to you.

14. I shall not go into the political background of the meeting in this despatch as it is not important for the present purpose and since it can be dealt with more satisfactorily in a later despatch on political developments in Cuba. It is I think sufficient to say here that some of the leaders of the two most important political parties in opposition to Batista, the Autentico Party (PRC) and the Orthodox Party (PPC), met with the announced purpose of working out a common policy for their opposition to the government. According to press reports, the following attended the meeting:

Autenticos

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras | Former President of Cuba |
| Manuel Antonio de Varona | President of the PRC (Autenticos) |
| Guillermo Alonso Pujol | Vice-president under Prio |
| Eduardo Suarez Rivas | Former leader of the Liberal Party |
| Juan A. Rubio Padilla | Minister of Health under Prio |
| Carlos Hevia | PRC (A) presidential candidate in the elections scheduled for June 1, 1952. |

-5-

Ortodoxos

| | |
|---------------------------|---|
| Dr. Emilio Ochoa | President of the PPC (Ortodoxo) |
| Dr. Jose Manuel Gutierrez | |
| Jose Pardo Llada | Former member of the House of Representatives |
| Isidro Figueroa | PPC(0) labour representative |

One Orthodox leader, Dr. Pelayo Cuervo, did not attend because he was arrested before he could leave Havana. In addition, the following are reported to have been present without participating:

Autenticos

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Dr. Luis Gustavo Fernandez | Personal secretary to Prio |
| Rafael Izquierdo | Ex-colonel and personal aide to Prio |
| Dr. Aracelio Azcuy Cruz | Professionals' representative (see para. 13 above) |
| Antonio Santiago | Former Havana Councillor and youth representative (see para. 13 above) |

Ortodoxos

| | |
|----------------|-------------------------------|
| Raul de Juan | Professionals' representative |
| Javier Lezcano | Labour representative |

Dr. Sanchez Arango was also reported by some newspapers to have been in Montreal (see paras. 10 - 12 above) and the Havana newspaper "Información" published on June 2 a statement which he was supposed to have made to the press in Montreal. It was later denied that he had ever been there but this could easily have arisen from a desire by Prio to keep his presence secret. About half of these people went to Montreal from Havana, without any attempt being made to prevent them from leaving Cuba. Only Dr. Cuervo, whose arrest is mentioned above, was interfered with. The remainder, who are living abroad in voluntary exile, went directly from the United States.

15. As nearly as I can make out, the reason for holding the meeting in Montreal was that permission had been refused by the Mexican and Guatemalan authorities and Prio was afraid that, if it was held in the United States, he might be deported for violating the United States Neutrality Act. In addition, the United States Embassy told us that Pardo Llada would probably be refused a visa for the United States because of his previous communist affiliations. He apparently got to Montreal by flying in bond through the United States.

16. On May 29 when I arrived at the Embassy residence for lunch, I found a message from the Chief of Protocol that Alberto Campa, who holds the rank of Minister in the Ministry of State and is the son of the Minister of State, wished to see me at the residence as soon as possible. When Campa arrived, he explained that he was speaking for his father who was unavoidably prevented from coming himself. In essence, his purpose was to

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express surprise that the Canadian authorities should have permitted the holding of a subversive meeting, aimed at the overthrow of the Cuban government, and to state that the Cuban government would regard it as a friendly act if the Canadian Government would prevent the holding of the meeting. As I told Mr. C.S.A. Ritchie on the telephone an hour later, I explained to Campa that Cubans only require valid passports in order to enter Canada as tourists. Although he appeared to understand that there was a difference in this respect between Canada on the one hand and the United States, Mexico and Guatemala on the other, he did not accept this as an adequate explanation. He repeated that the meeting was subversive, that the United States, Mexican and Guatemalan governments would not permit such a meeting, that the Canadian Government should have known the attitude of the Cuban government and that they should therefore have prevented the meeting. I suggested that it might have been easier for the Canadian authorities to do something if the Cuban government had requested action in sufficient time through its Ambassador in Ottawa. I then added that, in the interests of friendly relations between our governments, I was anxious to do everything I could. I promised therefore to inform my government as soon as possible of the request of the Minister of State and to emphasize the serious view which the Cuban Government took of the situation.

17. Some light was possibly shed the following day on the timing of the approach to me by Campa by my conversation with the United Kingdom Ambassador reported in paragraph 11 above. It was immediately following my United Kingdom colleague's interview with the Minister of State that the Chief of Protocol tried first to get in touch with me. This timing would appear to fit too well for the two events to be entirely unrelated.

18. Following receipt of your telegram No. 39 of May 30, I went to see the Minister of State on June 1. As mentioned in my telegram No. 33 of June 3, he proved to be much more friendly than his son, who besides lacking diplomatic experience appears to be a rather dour individual. I further explained to him the Canadian Government's position as outlined in your telegram and he accepted it without question. He then revealed for the first time that the real cause for the concern of the Cuban authorities was their belief that the announced purpose of the meeting was only a camouflage and that Dr. Prio was really in Montreal to arrange for the purchase and shipment to Cuba of contraband arms. At this point I said, and he agreed, that I had now done everything I could under the circumstances. I suggested as tactfully as possible that, if he wished the Canadian authorities to act, it was still not too late for an official approach to be made by the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa to the Department. He replied that his reason for approaching me, rather than taking the normal action of instructing the Cuban Ambassador, was that the Cuban authorities have more confidence in this Embassy than in their representation in Ottawa.

19. On June 3, the Minister of State sent for me to say that his son was flying on the same day to Ottawa on instructions from President Batista. He was to explain the situation to the Canadian authorities and request their co-operation in preventing the shipment of contraband arms from Canada to Cuba. Dr. Campa did not tell me the details of the information which his son would be giving to the Department. He merely said that the Cuban Ambassador in Ottawa would be accompanying his son to the Department and that, in order to avoid publicity, enquirers would be told that his son was going to Ottawa for a medical consultation. I was told yesterday that Alberto Campa did in

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fact leave Havana by air on June 3. Presumably he has by now reached Ottawa.

20. The role in all this of Mr. Delfin H. Pupo y Proenza, the Cuban Ambassador in Ottawa, is by no means clear. As you know, this Embassy had had occasion to report on him a number of times in the past. In the context of this despatch, paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of my despatch No. D-382 of December 11, 1952 are of particular interest. As stated there, Mr. Pupo told me on December 10 that he was in Cuba to give a first-hand report to the President on the subversive shipment of arms from Canada to Cuba. He also admitted having been in touch with Dr. Prio in New York. I have since seen Mr. Pupo once when he made an appointment and came to see me at the chancery on May 9. At the time, there did not appear to be any particular point in his call and I therefore did not report on it separately to you. Although he talked on a number of subjects, he seemed once more to be chiefly concerned with the problem of subversive shipments of arms from Canada.

21. The events of the last few days have confirmed the impression gained by this Embassy months ago that Pupo was not highly regarded by the Cuban authorities. As reported in my telegram No. 33, the Minister of State told me that Pupo was being asked to explain why he was absent from Ottawa. This action was presumably taken on account of reports in the Havana press that Pupo had been in Montreal to welcome Dr. Prio on his arrival there. Whether or not Pupo was in Montreal, it is worth noting that, according to a United Press report of June 3 from Ottawa, Dr. Juan Vela, Commercial Attaché of the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa, denied that Pupo had had any contact with Prio. According to Dr. Vela, Pupo was in Toronto, I suppose for the opening of the International Trade Fair. In the last two days, various reports have appeared in the Havana press to the effect that Pupo and the Cuban Consul in Montreal, William Espinosa, have been recalled to Havana and that they had been relieved of their appointments. This is all unconfirmed however and the Minister of State told me yesterday that Pupo was not being recalled to Havana.

22. In conclusion, I should report that the Montreal meeting has been front page news in the Havana press for the past ten days. For better or for worse, Montreal and Canada have temporarily become household words here. So far there has been no public criticism of the Canadian Government for not preventing the meeting. What comment there has been is to the effect that Montreal now takes its place with Miami and New York among the cities where exiled Cubans have planned resistance to the government in power. Since many Cubans are sympathetic to the aims of the leaders who met in Montreal, it is conceivable that Canada has gained some prestige in certain quarters here. This is of course a subject on which I shall observe the utmost discretion.

23. In case there is any temptation to take these events more seriously than they merit, I think I might end with the comment of Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin that he couldn't see why the hot problems of Cuba needed to be discussed in a country as cold as Canada and by drawing your attention to the attached cartoon, which appeared in the Havana newspaper "Alerta" on June 3. The cartoon portrays two men talking in front of the Ritz Carlton Hotel. One of them says: "Haven't you noticed an increase in the tourist traffic recently?" To which the other replies: "Yes, and I have also noticed a tremendous odour of burnt bills around here."

Harry A. Scott,
Ambassador.

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| DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS | |
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| ROUTING SLIP | DATE June 19, 1953 SECURITY SECRET |
| TO: Economic Legal | |
| FROM: American/WG Stark/ab | |
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THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

HAVANA, Cuba.

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| 11981-40 | SECRET |
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June 19, 1953

4

Your despatch No. D-160 of June 5
and our telegram No. 33 of June 3.

air

Meeting of Cuban Opposition Party
Leaders in Montreal

10224-40

From my telegram No. 43 of June 11 and air cypher No. 1 of June 12, you will have learned of the main points brought up by Mr. Alberto Campa when he called on Mr. C.S.A. Ritchie and of the views expressed by the latter during the interview. For your further reference, however, I am attaching copy of a memorandum of the conversation which, together with the memoranda of June 5 and June 8 on the same subject, that have already been transmitted to you, should give you an appreciation of departmental opinion concerning the meeting of the Cuban opposition leaders.

2. It was agreed, during the conversation with Mr. Campa, that the Cuban Embassy would submit a general note on the Montreal meeting to be followed by further particulars regarding their allegations that arms were to be sent by contraband means to opposition groups in Cuba. Dr. Fupo left for New York the day after Mr. Campa's call on Mr. Ritchie due to "the sudden illness" of his mother and Dr. Cruz, acting as Charge, recently presented a Note, in Spanish, translation of which is attached.

3. You will observe that the Cuban Note gives little evidence of a concrete nature regarding arms shipments. This was brought to Dr. Cruz' attention and he is supposed to bring in some further details particularly as to the Canadian and United States citizens involved. Meanwhile it is our intention to reply to the Charge in a noncommittal manner.

4. As regards the Cuban Consul in Montreal, Mr. Espinosa, he was to be moved this week to St. Louis, Missouri. This was apparently to be a disciplinary action due to the fact that, not only did he exceed his duties by mingling freely with the Cuban group, but also that he disobeyed the Ambassador's instructions in this connection. Yesterday's Montreal papers, however, contained an announcement of his resignation and I attach a similar

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clipping from the OTTAWA CITIZEN of today. As for Dr. Pupo, he apparently did not make a very good impression on Mr. Campa who thought it strange that he did not maintain a residence in Canada and that he appeared to be absent so much of the time. Dr. Cruz privately is of the opinion that the Ambassador may be transferred elsewhere in a couple of months time. (I gather Dr. Cruz formed his opinion from remarks made confidentially to him by Mr. Campa and would not like to be quoted).

5. The Department is prepared to investigate as fully as possible the likelihood of contraband arms shipments being made to the Cuban opposition group. Attached is a list of shipments this year to Cuban armed forces, which shipments of course were made under the regulations of the Export and Import Permits Act, 1947. Dr. Cruz enquired as to the movement of Canadian military equipment to Guatemala or Costa Rica as he thought such exports might be diverted to Cuba, even though sent out through the proper channels. A check was made by Economic Division who reported:

"...To Costa Rica, we have approved three shipments of civilian aircraft parts, one valued at \$166 on May 7, 1952, another at \$52 on April 17, 1952, and one for \$25 on September 27, 1951. To Guatemala we have agreed to ship 30 riding horses (with accoutrements) on March 4 of this year. The last shipment before that was \$25 worth of aircraft parts in September 1950!..."

6. In so far as we are aware, no member of the group has attempted to return to Montreal although the Cuban Embassy is of the opinion that some may endeavour to do so later on in order to complete the arrangements for the purchase of arms. If you should hear any reference in Cuba to this would you let us know by telegram.

7. The information contained in your despatch under reference was read with much interest and I shall look forward to receiving your further comments as the subject develops.

E. A. BOTE

for the
Secretary of State for
External Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTE SLIP

DATE June 16/53
SECURITY SECRET

TO:
LEGAL DIVISION

FROM: AMERICAN Div.

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☐ For Action

☐ For Comments

☐ For Approval

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MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

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FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY

HAVANA, Cuba.

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| Message To Be Sent | | No. Air No. 1 | Date June 11, 1953 | For Communications Section Only SENT JUN 12 1953 |
| AIR CYPHER | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| EN CLAIR | | | | |
| CODE | | | | |
| CYPHER | | | | |
| Priority | | REFERENCE: Our telegram No.43 of June 11, 1953 | | |
| | | SUBJECT: Interview of Mr. Alberto Campa with Acting Under-Secretary. | | |
| ORIGINATOR WILLIAM G. STARK (Signature) WG Stark/ab (Name Typed) Div. American Local Tel. 7175 | | Mr. Ritchie informed Campa that Mr. Pearson had requested him to say that the Canadian Government deplored the meeting of Cuban opposition leaders on Canadian soil. We had always maintained the friendliest of relations with the Cuban Government. Campa mentioned his government was surprised that the Canadian authorities had permitted the meeting of the opposition leaders since the group had announced in March that it intended to meet in Montreal and had, before then endeavoured to meet in Miami and Mexico but, in both cases, those governments had denied permission without the necessity of the Cubans making any representations. Campa added that the United States Government had informed members of the group that they were free to visit the United States but would not be allowed to hold political meetings. Mr. Ritchie mentioned that although such a proposed meeting might have been public knowledge in Cuba it was certainly not known to the Canadian authorities. | | |
| APPROVED BY E.A. COTE (Signature) E.A. Cote (Name Typed) | | 2. Campa stated his government was convinced the reason the group had met in Canada was to contact a Canadian supplier of arms, shipments to be made through | | |
| Internal Distribution: S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A. Legal Economic Pol. Coord. | | | | |
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clandestine channels. Mr. Ritchie informed him of the Canadian system of controlling arms deliveries through the Export Permits Act and added that we would welcome any evidence regarding contraband shipments, which Campa agreed the Cuban Embassy would endeavour to supply.

3. After expressing his reluctance and regret at having to say such things about Cubans and that he did not wish to involve ex-President Frio, Campa said his government believed the group was planning to assassinate President Batista. Mr. Ritchie said the Canadian Government would not tolerate the presence on Canadian soil of any group planning either the assassination of the President or the overthrow by arms of a friendly government. Campa said he believed members of the group would be returning shortly to renew their contacts with the Canadian suppliers of arms, and, in reply, the Acting Under-Secretary said the Canadian Government would examine the possibility of preventing their re-entry.

4. Mr. Ritchie then summarized the Canadian Government's attitude and Mr. Campa replied as outlined in my telegram under reference.

5. When reporting developments in Cuba we would welcome your views, particularly on the following:

(a) The United States Embassy here has expressed interest in this matter and we are keeping them advised. We would like to know if you have any information as to the veracity of Campa's statements on the United States attitude towards the group.

(b) Do you believe that the Mexicans forbade such a meeting? We are also enquiring from our Embassy in Mexico.

(c) Was there, as Campa claimed, prior publicity in Cuba to the fact the meeting was scheduled to be held in Montreal?

(d) Reactions in Cuba to the statement issued by the opposition leaders at the close of the meeting and what members of the group have returned to Cuba. A copy of the statement has been sent to you by airmail.

(e) Any information you might have about possible contraband shipments of Canadian arms to Cuba.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTING SLIP

DATE June 12, 1953
SECURITY SECRETTO: ~~Legal Division~~*MSJ*

FROM: American/WG Stark/ab

☐ For Signature☐ For Action☐ For Comments☐ For Approval

For Information and

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COMMENTS: (This space is not for comments of a permanent character which should be formally recorded in a memorandum)

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Also referred to:

Mr. Ritchie

Economic Division

Washington

Havana

Mexico

*Circulate and
return to
J.O. Parry**return*

115 JUN 1953

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June 12, 1953.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF MR. ALBERTO CAMPA
(SON OF THE CUBAN MINISTER OF STATE) WITH THE ACTING UNDER-SECRETARY

On June 8, Mr. Alberto Campa, who holds the rank of Minister in the Cuban Ministry of State, called on the Department to inform the Acting Under-Secretary of the views of his government in regard to the recent meeting of Cuban opposition leaders which took place in Montreal. He was accompanied by the Cuban Ambassador, Mr. Pupo y Proenza, and the Counsellor of the Embassy, Dr. Americo Cruz. Also present at the interview were Messrs. E.A. Cote and W.G. Stark of the American Division.

2. In anticipation of this visit our Ambassador in Havana telegraphed On June 3 to inform that the Minister of State, Dr. Miguel Campa, had sent for him to say that his son, Alberto Campa, was coming to Ottawa on instructions from President Batista. Dr. Campa told our Ambassador that the Cuban Government was satisfied that ex-President Prio and his associates hoped to arrange, while in Canada, for contraband shipments of arms and the purpose of his son's visit would be to ask the Canadian authorities to take all possible steps to prevent this.

3. The Acting Under-Secretary began the conversation by informing Mr. Campa that Mr. Pearson had asked him to say that the Canadian Government deplored the meeting of Cuban opposition leaders on Canadian soil. We had always maintained the friendliest of relations with the Cuban Government. Mr. Ritchie pointed out that as Cubans did not require a visa to enter Canada as visitors and that as we had no prior official knowledge of the purpose of the group's visit, it was difficult to take steps to prevent such a meeting being

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held. Mr. Campa said that the Cuban Government was surprised that the Canadian authorities had permitted the meeting as it was public knowledge in Cuba that the group had endeavoured to meet a couple of months previously, both in Miami and in Mexico, and that in both cases the United States or Mexican Government had denied permission, without any representations being made to these governments by the Cuban authorities. Mr. Campa added that the United States government had informed members of the group that although they were free to visit the United States they would not be allowed to hold any political meetings. Mr. Ritchie mentioned that although such a proposed meeting might have been public knowledge in Cuba it was certainly not known to the Canadian authorities and as the countries mentioned required visitors' visas it was easier for them to control the movements of such aliens. Mr. Campa seemed to understand this point. He then said that his Government was convinced the reason the group had met in Canada was to contact a Canadian supplier of arms, the shipment of which to Cuba was to be arranged through clandestine channels. Mr. Ritchie informed him of our system of controlling arms deliveries through the Export Permits Act, the fact that there was power under this law to seize contraband orders and to prosecute the shippers and that the Canadian Government would welcome any evidence which the Cuban Embassy could produce regarding this matter. Mr. Campa felt this might be difficult to secure but agreed that the Ambassador should provide the Department with whatever facts are available. Mr. Campa hinted that the contraband shipments might be disguised as deliveries to other Caribbean governments using the official agent of such governments as cover.

4. After expressing his reluctance and regret at having to say such things about Cubans, and that he did not wish to involve ex-President Prío, Mr. Campa said his government believed that the group was planning to assassinate President Batista. Mr. Ritchie informed Mr. Campa that the Canadian Government would not tolerate the presence on Canadian soil of any

-3-

group planning either the assassination of the President or the overthrow by arms of a friendly government. Mr. Campa said he believed members of the group would be returning shortly to renew their contacts with the Canadian sources which might furnish arms and in reply the Acting Under-Secretary said that the Canadian Government would examine the possibilities of preventing their re-entry.

5. Mr. Campa felt that one of the proofs of the subversive nature of the group's meeting was the fact that it was held in Canada because otherwise the group was quite free to meet in Cuba. It was embarrassing to the Cuban Government to have Cuba's internal affairs discussed abroad and it brought the whole country into disrepute. He said the freedom of Cuba's institutions could be seen by the fact that several of the group had returned unmolested to Havana.

6. Mr. Ritchie then summarized the Canadian Government's attitude towards the matter in that:

- (1) we appreciated Mr. Campa's visit and the opportunity it afforded to remove any possible misunderstanding between our two governments;
- (2) we deplored that the incident had occurred;
- (3) we had no prior official knowledge of the meeting or its purposes;
- (4) we would welcome any information regarding the contraband export of arms, evidence of which would be thoroughly investigated;
- (5) we would attempt to prevent the return of the group to Canada, were they coming to plot the assassination of the President or to carry on arrangements to purchase arms, which we would not tolerate.

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Mr. Campa in reply said:

- (1) he appreciated Mr. Ritchie's comments and would convey them to his father, the Cuban Minister of State;
- (2) the Cuban Embassy would send a note to the Department in general reference to the matter;
- (3) the Cuban Embassy would provide whatever evidence it could regarding contraband arms shipments and the Canadian contacts from whom purchases were to be made.

Later in the American Division Mr. Campa added the information that a revolution in Cuba was quite impossible. He gave an interesting version of Batista's coup d'etat: "It was a political transformation made with the consent of the people with the military standing by merely to ensure peace and good order".

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MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

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FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

HAVANA, Cuba

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| Message To Be Sent | | No. 43 | Date June 11, 1953³ | For Communications Section Only SENT JUN 11 1953 |
| AIR CYPHER EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER OTP | | REFERENCE: Your telegram No. 33 of June 3, 1953. | | |
| Priority E. A. COTE ...IMPORTANT..... | | SUBJECT: | | |
| ORIGINATOR WILLIAM G. STARK (Signature) ...WG. Stark/ab..... (Name Typed) Div....American..... Local Tel..7175..... | | As anticipated by you, Alberto Campa called on the Acting Under-Secretary on June 8. He was accompanied by the Cuban Ambassador, and the Counsellor of the Cuban Embassy. 2. The interview proceeded on a friendly basis and at the end Mr. Ritchie summarized the Canadian Government's attitude as follows: (1) we appreciated Mr. Campa's visit and the opportunity it afforded to remove any possible misunderstanding between our two governments; (2) we deplored that the incident had occurred; (3) we had no prior official knowledge of the meeting or its purposes; (4) we would welcome any information regarding the contraband export of arms, evidence of which would be thoroughly investigated; (5) we would attempt to prevent the return of the group to Canada, were they coming to plot the assassination of the President or to carry on arrangements to purchase arms, which we would not tolerate. | | |
| APPROVED BY E. A. COTE (Signature)E. A. Cote..... (Name Typed) | | | | |
| Internal Distribution: S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A. Legal Economic Pol. Coord. Sec. Done..... Date..... | | | | |
| Copies Referred To: Washington Done..... Date..... | | | | |

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3. Campa replied:

(1) he appreciated Mr. Ritchie's comments and would convey them to his father;

(2) the Cuban Embassy would send a note to the Department in general reference to the matter;

(3) the Cuban Embassy would provide whatever evidence it could regarding contraband arms shipments and the Canadian contacts from whom purchases were to be made.

4. Further details of the conversation are being forwarded to you by air cypher.

5. Campa left Ottawa today for New York. He plans to arrive Havana about June 13.

6. Please report on any developments in Cuba.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTING SLIP

DATE June 12, 1953
SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED

TO:

Legal Division

FROM: American/WG Stark/ab

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12 JUN 1953 000084

TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT RELEASED ON JUNE 3, 1953, BY CUBAN
OPPOSITION PARTY LEADERS AFTER THEIR MEETING IN MONTREAL.

To the Nation

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The unconquerable will of the people of Cuba has rejected the illegal government, and has requested the return to a constitutional and democratic order, by means of a government which can hold free general elections. But the civic elements which ought to accomplish these aims have remained divided and isolated, thus contributing to perpetuate the Dictatorship, and lessening the public confidence in their purposes of liberation.

Confronted with these realities, the Cuban Peoples Party (Orthodox) and the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Authentic), realizing the citizens' decision in all its historic depth, have decided to make a constructive effort of patriotic unity in order to effect the desired change, and give the Provisional Government, to further its transitory aims, the popular support and guarantee of responsibility required by the great aspirations of the country.

Consequently, they have agreed on the following fundamental points:

First: To emphasize that the Cuban crisis can only be overcome by re-establishing the 1940 Constitution, which is a product of the free will of the people, and a depository of those traditions of civil government derived from the Independence Revolution, as embodied in the documents of Guainaro, Jimaguay, La Yaya, and 1901.

Second: To ratify the statements by the National Executive Committees of both parties, to the effect that the regime presided by General Batista -- due not only to its violent origin, but to its dictatorial nature and its continued violation of the citizens' rights -- is not able to lead the people to restore their political institutions by means of elections.

Third: To consider it indispensable the establishment of a Provisional Government, which brings back the Electoral Law of 1943, and gives a full guarantee of official neutrality, in order to hold elections as soon as possible for all the offices of the State. In its origin and development this Government will follow the precepts of the Constitution; and within its transitory scope, it will try to rid Production, Labour, and particularly the popular classes, of the economic crisis with which they are burdened to-day, through the fault of the Dictatorship.

Fourth: The signatory parties flatly reject and condemn personal violence, gangsterism, and terrorist activities, as a form of struggle.

The Cuban Peoples Party (Orthodox) and the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Authentic) - after happily reaching this agreement which seeks the supreme common good - will appoint liaison committees, both at the national and the local levels, in order to articulate efficiently the indispensable efforts tending towards these aims. However, they will keep their organic individualities, emphasizing that they are not seeking electoral coalitions or agreements.


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At the same time they request of all the truly democratic parties and national groups, and in general of all citizens, to cooperate in such a way as to widen and strengthen the unity of the people, in order to recover their constitutional institutions, and their sacred rights to Freedom.

And promising Cuba, for the day of its democratic revival, an era of peace and legality, with the soul untainted by hatreds and grudges, hoping for the union and friendship of all the Cubans, and asking the favour of God, we sign this charter in Montreal, Canada, on June 2, 1953.

Dr. Carlos Prío Socarras, Dr. Emilio Ochoa y Ochoa, Manuel A. de Varona y Loredo, José Pardo Llada, Guillermo Alonzo Pujol, Isidro Figuerca Bontempo, Carlos Hevia y de los Reyes Cavilán, José Manuel Gutierrez Planes and Eduardo Suarez Rivas.

MONTREAL GAZETTE, June 6, 1953



THE CASE OF SENOR ESPINOZA JUNE 6

William Espinoza y Dominguez, Cuba's off-again-on-again consul in Montreal, has been reinstated again. At least, he was reinstated at the time this editorial went to the typesetter. This means that Espinoza has been fired twice and rehired twice in approximately 48 hours, because he went to Montreal Airport to receive Cuba's ex-president, Dr. Prio Socarras.

The delicacies of the matter have already been well publicized. Senor Espinoza, a veteran of 19 years in the Cuban diplomatic service, feels he was quite justified in meeting "a distinguished Cuban citizen" on arrival here.

The Batista Government, which ousted Dr. Prio's regime in a swift coup last year, doesn't see it that way at all. Dr. Prio now heads a coalition of anti-Batista parties and that, to the Batista regime, means he is no longer "a distinguished Cuban citizen."

What interests Montrealers more is the revelation that the refugee Cuban opposition leaders sealed their compact of union against Batista after a week-long conference in this city.

Is this legal? Can professed revolutionaries plot their next moves against a recognized government within Canada?

They can: Canada recognizes an old British tradition which permits political refugees to find sanctuary here. Many such, from many parts of the world, have lived here, just as the German revolutionary, Karl Marx, lived in England, or Lenin in Switzerland.

There is one provision: they must obey Canadian laws while they are here.

Criminals, of course, are in a different category. If the country where the criminal is wanted has an extradition treaty with Canada, then Canadian police, on the request of that country, put an alien under arrest and turn him over to police officers of his own country.

Political refugees, as long as they are abiding, have complete freedom. In the United States the same applies.

U.S. officials did not limit the freedom Papineau or Mackenzie when they fled to that country after the Rebellions in 1837.

Dr. Prio is equally free here.

SECRET

June 8, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING UNDER-SECRETARY

Meeting of Cuban Opposition Leaders in Montreal

The Facts

Our Ambassador in Havana advised the Department by telegram on May 28 that according to Cuban press and radio reports a meeting had been arranged in Montreal between leaders of the Authentic and Orthodox parties, which are the two largest opposition parties, in an effort to work out a common policy for their stand against President Batista's government. He telephoned the next day to tell you that he had been approached by a representative of the Cuban Minister of State who confirmed that this meeting was to take place and suggested that, as a friendly gesture, the Canadian authorities should intervene and have the meeting cancelled. You informed our Ambassador that the stand he had taken with the Minister of State about entry into Canada of Cuban political leaders was correct and that holders of valid Cuban passports did not require Canadian visas if they entered as visitors and that, normally, the only way in which their trip could be prevented would be for the Cuban authorities to cancel their passports and inform us to that effect. You advised the Ambassador that foreigners in Canada enjoy the same privileges and rights as Canadians of free speech and assembly and that under such conditions it would therefore not be possible for the Canadian authorities to intervene in the proposed meeting for the purpose of having it cancelled.

2. From approximately May 26 till May 29 about fourteen members of Cuba's opposition parties arrived in

2.

Montreal and were unmolested by Canadian immigration or police authorities. They were mainly representatives of the Authentic Revolutionary Party, the People's Orthodox Party and the Federated University Student group, including:

(a) for the Authentic party--

Dr. Carlos Prío Socarras, deposed as President by Batista,

Manuel A. de Varonha, President of the party,
Carlos Hevia, Presidential candidate in the July 1952 elections which Batista prevented from taking place,

Dr. Guillermo Alonso Pujol, ex-Vice-President;

(b) for the Orthodox party--

Dr. Emilio Ochoa,

Jose Pardo Llada, Left-wing leader;

(c) several student F.E.U. leaders and others.

3. The foregoing group held a series of meetings in the Ritz Carleton Hotel in Montreal over the weekend May 29 to June 2. They made no secret that these discussions were taking place and several reports under such headings as "Exiled Cuban Leaders Map Joint Fight Against Batista", "Two Cuban Parties Unite to Plan Batista Ouster" and a group photograph under the caption "Plan Cuban Coup" appeared in Canadian newspapers. On June 3 the group issued a statement declaring their intention to set up a provisional government in Cuba as a first step towards holding national elections and restoring constitutional rule. It added that "the Cuban crisis can be settled only through the restoration of the 1940 Constitution as the free expression of the people's will". The statement also indicated in the following terms that the two parties would not resort to violence to carry out their aims:

"The signatory parties reject and condemn criminal attempts against any person, gangsterism and terroristic activities as a form of struggle."

3.

Finally the group called on all democratic elements in Cuba to work united for the re-conquest of their constitutional institutions. The group then disbanded and, in so far as we are aware, have all left Canada for the United States and/or Cuba.

Future Events

4. A further telegram on June 3 from our Ambassador in Havana revealed that the Cuban Government's main concern was their suspicion that the group was trying to arrange contraband shipments of arms from Canada to Cuba and that the Minister of State, Dr. Miguel Campa, was sending his son, Alberto Campa (who holds the rank of Minister in the Ministry of State) to call on you and ask that the Canadian authorities take all possible steps to prevent this. Confidential sources confirm that the opposition is quite possibly considering the armed overthrow of Batista and for this purpose will endeavour to assemble and ship arms to Cuba. Representing his father, Mr. Alberto Campa may possibly pose questions as to what the Canadian Government would do in regard to a group of Cubans meeting on Canadian soil allegedly to plot the overthrow of a friendly government by:

- (a) the rousing of Cuban public opinion in such a way as to consolidate the opposition and turn out the present regime by democratic methods, or,
- (b) by instigating a revolutionary coup d'etat which would oust President Batista from power in much the same way as he seized it in March 1952.

Domestic Law

5. The Immigration Act, 1952, gives power both to prevent the entrance of any aliens to Canada and to deport them once they have arrived. The Act is quite clear in prohibiting the entry of persons who advocate

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suppression by force, or other means, of democratic government as understood in Canada (Section 5(m): it is not so clear as regards persons plotting the overthrow of a military dictatorship such as Batista's regime. However, we are not forced to admit any foreigner to our territory and should this group attempt to come here again they could be denied entry. Also members of such a group can be deported by the application of Section 7 (4) under which "the Minister may at any time declare such person ...to be a non-immigrant". By this means a visitor loses his non-immigrant status, does not acquire immigrant status and therefore has no standing and can be forced to leave. The Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Mr. Laval Fortier, when confirming this, stated, however, that his department would be reluctant to deport such a group under the provisions quoted.

6. Concerning the export of arms from Canada, the movement of such is restricted under Export Permits Act, 1947, and since 1948 shipments of military equipment have been allowed only if consigned to governments. The responsibility for ~~preventing such materials~~ from leaving Canada without proper permits rests with the customs and police officials at the border points and as far as we know there have been no evasions. The Act provides for penalties if such evasions are attempted. Only four shipments of arms to Cuba have been approved in 1953, all of which have been consigned to the Cuban armed forces. If, however, Mr. Campa could show proof that any arms have been shipped from Canada to unofficial destinations in Cuba you might ask him to give the evidence to you and offer to have the facts fully ascertained in Canada. For your convenience I am re-attaching the memorandum from Economic Division to you of June 4 on this subject.

International Law:

7. International law imposes upon a state the duty of restraining persons resident within its territory from engaging in such revolutionary activities against friendly states as amount to organized acts of force in the form of

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hostile expeditions against the territory of those states. It also obliges the state to repress and to discourage activities in which attempts against the life of political opponents are regarded as a proper means of revolutionary action.

8. Apart from this states are not bound to prohibit, on their territory, the commission of acts injurious to other states. In particular, revolutionary propaganda does not fall within the scope of revolutionary acts which a state is bound to prevent. A state must not be forced into the impossible position of a guardian of other states' constitutions and tranquility. The foreign government itself must secure this end, either by adequately enforcing its own laws or else by creating reasonable conditions for their firm establishment. In other words the duty of respect which a state owes, in international law, to the constitution and government of another country is not a duty of actively protecting, to an extent in excess of the irreducible minimum set out in the preceeding paragraph, a constitution or a regime which may be either distasteful to the overwhelming majority of its own citizens, or a matter of complete indifference to them.

9. Undoubtedly, a state may go beyond its international obligations and, in its own interest, put a check on such revolutionary activities as it is not in international law bound to prevent. For example, a state may not, from a variety of reasons, be disposed to tolerate within its borders revolutionary propaganda, even if not directed against its own government. But such repressive measures, dictated from motives of international comity or internal police, cannot be invoked as constituting a test of international obligation.

Political

10. President Batista is the present Head of State in Cuba but he obtained his position by a coup d'etat on March 10, 1952, when he overthrew the constitutionally elected President, Dr. Carlos Prío Socarras. Immediately

6.

afterwards Batista suspended the 1940 Constitution, dissolved Congress and announced the indefinite postponement of the June 1952 presidential elections. We recognized (de jure) the government of General Batista on March 27, 1952, as it appeared that he would retain control of the government for the foreseeable future and had agreed to honour Cuba's international commitments. The United Kingdom Government recognized Batista on March 26 and the United States Government on March 27, 1952. Shortly afterwards Constitutional Statutes to replace the 1940 Constitution were promulgated and the country is now governed by Batista as President supported by a Cabinet appointed directly by him. In addition there is an Consultative Council of 80 members who, however, have no legislative powers.

11. On February 27, 1953, Batista announced, with no previous warning, that the presidential elections which he had promised for November 15, 1953, would be postponed indefinitely but that Congressional elections would take place on June 1, 1954 and that he would remain as Chief of State until the Congress to be elected a year from now could set a time for presidential balloting. It would appear likely that the opposition parties have little chance to overthrow Batista as long as the latter continues to retain support of the army and police. Consequently it seems that the only way in which the opposition could be effective would be by armed intervention.

12. There seems little that Canadian authorities can do in connection with the meeting recently held in Montreal of Cuban opposition leaders unless proof is adduced that arms are being sent by contraband means from this country to Cuba. We can, of course, prevent the group meeting here again but as long as they stick to their declaration that their purpose is to secure Batista's overthrow by peaceful means--and we have no evidence that we can produce that they are taking other steps--Canadian public opinion might take it that we were interfering unduly to hinder the workings of a democratic group whose activities are suppressed not by constitutional means but by arbitrary methods on the part of the dictator-

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President. According to the practice of international law quoted above, it would seem that as long as we do not encourage such groups we cannot be deemed to have acted in an unfriendly manner towards the Cuban Government.

Conclusions

13. Bearing in mind the Minister's views, you may therefore wish to tell Mr. Campa that insofar as shipments of military equipment to a revolutionary group in Cuba are concerned, the Canadian Government only permits deliveries to friendly governments. If the Cuban Government can show any convincing evidence of contraband consignments, the matter would of course be fully investigated. As regards the meeting of opposition leaders to advocate a change of Government in Cuba by democratic means, while the Canadian Government would do nothing to encourage the meeting of such a group on Canadian soil, it would be contrary to Canadian practice to deny aliens the rights of free speech and private assembly while in Canada.

14. Should Mr. Campa volunteer that the opposition group is seeking to overthrow the Cuban government by force, you might find it useful to ask him to provide the Canadian Government with evidence that such is the case. The Canadian Government would, in that event also, carefully ascertain what it could do under such circumstances.

WILLIAM G. STARK

for E A Lodi

American Division.

(COPY/DS)

Source: The Immigration Act
and Regulations,
April, 1950.

NOTE: The Immigration
Act 1952, Statutes of
Canada Ch. 42, was
brought into force on June 1, 1952
PROHIBITED CLASSES by Order-in-Council
P.C. 1953-858 of

3. (1) No immigrant, passenger, or other person, unless he is a Canadian citizen, or has Canadian domicile, shall be permitted to enter or land in Canada, or in case of having landed in or entered Canada shall be permitted to remain therein, who belongs to any of the following classes, hereinafter called "prohibited classes":-

May 26,
1953

(a)

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
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(o) Persons who are members of or affiliated with any organization entertaining or teaching disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or advocating or teaching the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of Canada or of any other organized government, because of his or their official character, or advocating or teaching the unlawful destruction of property;

(p)

.....

Green Act
in force
June 1, 1953



CRIMINAL CODE

LIBEL ON FOREIGN SOVEREIGN

135. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to one year's imprisonment who, without lawful justification, publishes any libel tending to degrade, revile or expose to hatred and contempt in the estimation of the people of any foreign state, any prince or person exercising sovereign authority over such state.

Sources. - 1892 Code, s. 125; 1906 Code, s. 135.

It was not seditious libel at common law merely to provoke disaffection against a foreign government, since that would have no tendency to create disaffection among His Majesty's subjects, *R. v Antonelli* (1905) 70 J.P. 4. But publications tending to degrade or defame foreigners of importance might be libellous in England, since their tendency might be to involve her in disputes or war; *R. v Gordon* (Lord) (1787) 22 St. Tri. 213.

Jurisdiction. - The jurisdiction of the Court of sessions does not extend to this offence. S. 583 (b).

Annotations
Tremeeear's
Criminal Code

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTING SLIP

DATE June 8, 1953
SECURITY SECRET

TO:

Legal Division

FROM: American/WG Stark/ab

☐ For Signature☐ For Action☐ For Comments☐ For Approval

For Information and

File ☐Destroy ☐Return ☐

COMMENTS: (This space is not for comments of a permanent character which should be formally recorded in a memorandum)

Also referred to

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Economic

Havana

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JUN 1953

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SECRET

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| 11981-40 | |
| 16 | ✓ |

June 5, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING UNDER-SECRETARYMeeting of Cuban Opposition Leaders in Montreal

As requested I am attaching, for signature if you approve, a brief memorandum to the Acting Minister to which is attached copies of relevant telegrams and press clippings regarding the recent meeting of the Cuban opposition leaders in Montreal. A duplicate for the Acting Minister of Trade and Commerce is also included.

A further memorandum for your use regarding the political and juridical facets of the affair is being prepared.

E. A. COTE

American Division.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

SECRET

June 8, 1958.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING MINISTER

Subject: Meeting of Cuban Opposition
Leaders in Montreal.

On May 29 our Ambassador in Havana telephoned to tell us the Cuban Minister of State had informed him that a meeting of Cuban opposition leaders was to take place in Montreal and suggested that, as a friendly gesture, the Canadian authorities should intervene and have the meeting cancelled. The opposition group included Dr. Carlos Prío Socarras, deposed as President by Batista, Carlos Roviá, presidential candidate in the July 1958 elections which Batista prevented from taking place, presidents of the two main opposition parties, the ex-Vice-President and others. The Cuban Minister was told that holders of valid Cuban passports do not require Canadian visas if they enter as visitors and, normally, the only way their trip could be prevented would be for the Cuban authorities to cancel their passports and inform us to that effect. Foreigners in Canada enjoy the same rights as Canadians of free speech and assembly.

No official notice was received in the Department from the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa, either prior to the meeting or during its sessions. The Montreal Gazette on June 8, however, carried a picture of the group under the heading "Plan Cuban Coup" and an article entitled "Exiled Cuban Leaders Say Joint Fight Against Batista", the contents of the latter being reproduced in several Canadian papers. A statement issued at the end of the meetings said the group "will seek to set up a provisional government in Cuba as a first step toward holding national

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elections and restoring constitutional rule". The statement included an indication that the two parties would not resort to force; other sources, however, do not preclude the possibility of an attempt at an armed revolt.

A further telegram on June 3 from our Ambassador revealed that the Cuban Government's main concern was their suspicion that the group was trying to arrange contraband shipments of arms from Canada to Cuba and that the Minister of State, Dr. Campa, is sending his son to Ottawa to call on me and ask that the Canadian authorities take all possible steps to prevent this. As you know the export of arms is restricted under the Export and Import Act, 1947, and since 1948 shipments of military equipment have been allowed only if consigned to governments. The responsibility for preventing such materials from leaving Canada without proper permits rests with customs and police officials at the border points and, as far as we know, there have been no evasions.

I propose informing Mr. Campa of the foregoing, if and when he calls, and meanwhile we are examining the political and juridical effects of the presence of a group of foreigners on Canadian soil allegedly plotting the overthrow--possibly by force--of a friendly government. (We recognized the Batista Government on March 27, 1952). I am not aware what role is being played by the Cuban Ambassador but a press report from Havana states that he and the Cuban Consul General in Montreal are to be subject to a "routine investigation" for not having informed their Government of the meeting of political opponents.

Copies of the relevant telegrams exchanged with our Ambassador in Cuba are attached as also the press clippings listing the persons involved. Some of the Cuban group have already left Montreal for Cuba and/or the United States, and the remainder are expected to depart today or tomorrow.

(Sgd)

C. S. A. Ritchie

C. S. A. R.

INCOMING MESSAGE.

COPY

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, HAVANA, CUBA.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

11981-40

16

✓

Priority

System

No.

Date

CYPHER-O.T.P.

32

May 28, 1953.

Departmental
Circulation

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD'N
SECTION

Reference:

Subject:

Cuban Politics.

1. According to Cuban press and radio reports a meeting has been arranged in Montreal between leaders of the Authentico and Orthodox parties, which are the two largest opposition parties, in an effort to work out a common policy for their opposition to Batista's government. Among those reported as planning to attend are Millo Ochoa and Jose Pardo Llada representing the Orthodox party (see para 6 of my despatch No. D42 of February 13) ex President Carlos Prío Socarras, Carlos Hevia (Authentico presidency candidate in election scheduled for July 1, 1952), and Guillermo Alonso Fajol (Vice President of Cuba under Prío).

2. The only firsthand information we have is that three university students asked us about visas on May 25th saying they had to be in Montreal by May 28th for a meeting. We do not, repeat not, know why it is being held in Montreal.

References

Done

Date

Done

Date

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Security ... CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

| | |
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| File No. | |
| 11981-40 | |
| 16 | ✓ |

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, HAVANA, Cuba.....

| Message To Be Sent | | No. | Date | For Communications Section Only |
|------------------------|--|--|---------------|---------------------------------|
| AIR CYPHER | | 39 | May 30, 1953. | SENT--May 30, 1953. |
| EN CLAIR | | | | |
| CODE | | | | |
| CYPHER | | | | |
| Priority | | <u>REFERENCE:</u> Your telegram No. 32 of May 28 | | |
| IMPORTANT | | <u>SUBJECT:</u> | | |
| ORIGINATOR | | Following from Acting Under-Secretary, Begins: | | |
| (Signature) | | Stand you have taken with Minister of State | | |
| J. Leger/PS | | about entry into Canada of Cuban political leaders | | |
| (Name Typed) | | is correct. Holders of valid Cuban passports do | | |
| USSEA | | not require Canadian visas if they enter as | | |
| Div..... | | way | | |
| Local Tel..... 4803 | | visitors and, normally, the only/in which their | | |
| APPROVED BY | | trip could be prevented would be for the Cuban | | |
| C.S.A. RITCHIE.. | | authorities to cancel their passports and inform us | | |
| (Signature) | | to that effect. | | |
| (Name Typed) | | 2. As for meeting in Montreal, we have received no | | |
| Internal Distribution: | | official advance notice of the presence in Canada of | | |
| S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A. | | persons mentioned in your telegram No. 32. It is | | |
| Done..... | | therefore not surprising that no steps were taken to | | |
| Date..... | | follow up this matter. Unofficially, however, an | | |
| Copies Referred To: | | officer of the Department was told on May 28 by the | | |
| Done..... | | Counsellor of the Cuban Embassy here of the arrival | | |
| Date..... | | in Canada of ex-President Prio. Even had we been | | |
| Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52) | | notified, there is little that could have been done. | | |
| | | Generally speaking, foreigners residing in Canada | | |
| | | temporarily or permanently enjoy the same privileges | | |
| | | and rights as those enjoyed by all Canadians in- | | |
| | | cluding freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, etc. | | |
| | | Under such conditions it would therefore not be | | |

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possible for the Canadian authorities to take action along lines suggested by Minister of State to intervene in a private meeting for the purpose of having it cancelled.

3. These considerations might be of assistance to you in any future discussion with Minister of State; you need not re-open the subject, however, if he is already satisfied with the explanations you have given him.

INCOMING MESSAGE

COPY

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, HAVANA, CUBA

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

11981-40
16 ✓

Priority
IMMEDIATE

System
CYPHER-O.T.P.

No. 33

Date June 3, 1953.
(Rec'd: June 4, 1953.)

Departmental
Circulation
MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD' N
SECTION

Reference: Your telegram No. 39 of May 30th and No. 40
of June 3rd.

Subject: Cuban Politics

Following for C.S.A. Ritchie, Begins:

1. On May 31st I further explained to Dr. Miguel Campa, Minister of State, the Canadian Government's position as outlined in your telegram. This interview was much more friendly than the original one with Alberto Campa, the son of the Minister, whose call on me representing his father necessitated my telephone call to you on May 29th (the substitution of the son had been essential because the Minister himself was tied up with the President and they wanted immediate action) the Minister of State revealed for the first time that the Cuban Government's main concern was not, repeat not, the political discussion being held in Montreal but suspicion that real purpose for presence in Canada of various opposition leaders was to arrange contraband shipments of arms from Canada to Cuba. Dr. Campa also told me that their first approach to this mission by his son representing him was made because they had more confidence in us than in their own Ambassador in Ottawa.

2. At noon today the Minister of State sent for me saying that his son, who holds rank of Minister in the Ministry of State, is flying to Ottawa today on instructions from President Batista. According to Dr. Campa the Cuban Government is satisfied that ex-President Prio and his associates hope to arrange while in Canada for contraband shipments and the purpose of his son's visit is to ask the Canadian authorities to take all possible steps to prevent this. We do not, repeat not, know what detailed information Campa intends to give you in Ottawa.

3. Coupled with this development there has been considerable publicity in Havana newspapers regarding Pupo's absence from Ottawa and in one paper a Cabinet Minister is quoted as having stated that Pupo actually met the Prio party on arrival in Montreal. Whatever the real facts are Dr. Campa told me this morning that as a matter of disciplinary action enquiries are being made by the Ministry of State in regard to Pupo's absence

Done

Date

References

Done

Date

-2-

from his post. Dr. Campa said Pupo would be accompanying Campa's son to the department presumably tomorrow. In the light of the foregoing we do not know just where Pupo fits into the picture and we think it would be inadvisable to discuss with Pupo any aspect of Campa's visit in advance of his arrival.

4. We do not, repeat not, know whether Campa's terms of reference include investigating Pupo, but, having in mind influential position which this young man enjoys in the department under his father, we are inclined to think he will be reporting on Pupo to President Batista when he returns. You should be warned that Alberto Campa has had (little?) diplomatic experience and is not, repeat not, nearly as "simpatico" as his father. It will be obvious that Pupo is probably not, repeat not, in full possession of all the facts in this drama and that Campa may, for all we know, wish to speak without Pupo being present. Finally in order to avoid publicity we have been asked to observe the fiction that Alberto Campa is going to Canada for a medical consultation.

5. Up to time of despatching this telegram Campa's passport has not, repeat not, been presented for a visa. This may mean anything or nothing. Ends.

INCOMING MESSAGE

COPY

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, HAVANA, CUBA

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

11981-40

16

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Priority
IMMEDIATE

System
CYPHER-O.T.P.

No. 33

Date June 3, 1953.
(Rec'd: June 4, 1953.)

Departmental
Circulation
MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD'N
SECTION

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Subject: Cuban Politics

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Done

Date

Done

Date

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-2-

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5. Up to time of despatching this telegram Campa's passport has not, repeat not, been presented for a visa. This may mean anything or nothing. Ends.

INCOMING MESSAGE

COPY

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, HAVANA, CUBA.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

11981-40

16



Priority

System

No.

Date

CYPHER-O.T.F.

32

May 28, 1953.

Departmental
Circulation

Reference:

Subject:

Cuban Politics.

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORDIN
SECTION

1. According to Cuban press and radio reports a meeting has been arranged in Montreal between leaders of the Authentic and Orthodox parties, which are the two largest opposition parties, in an effort to work out a common policy for their opposition to Batista's government. Among those reported as planning to attend are Millo Ochoa and Jose Pardo Llada representing the Orthodox party (see para 6 of my despatch No. D42 of February 13) ex President Carlos Prio Socarras, Carlos Hevia (Authentic presidency candidate in election scheduled for July 1, 1952), and Guillermo Alonso Pujol (Vice President of Cuba under Prio).

2. The only firsthand information we have is that three university students asked us about visas on May 25th saying they had to be in Montreal by May 28th for a meeting. We do not, repeat not, know why it is being held in Montreal.

References

Done

Date

Done

Date

CONFIDENTIAL

Security

COPY

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

File No.

11981-40

16 ✓

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, HAVANA, Cuba

TO:

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER
EN CLAIR
CODE
CYPHER

No. 39

Date

May 30, 1953

For Communications Section Only

BENT--May 30, 1953

Priority

IMPORTANT

REFERENCE: Your telegram No. 32 of May 28

SUBJECT:

Following from Acting Under-Secretary, Begins:

Stand you have taken with Minister of State about entry into Canada of Cuban political leaders is correct. Holders of valid Cuban passports do not require Canadian visas if they enter as visitors and, normally, the only ^{way} in which their trip could be prevented would be for the Cuban authorities to cancel their passports and inform us to that effect.

2. As for meeting in Montreal, we have recieved no official advance notice of the presence in Canada of persons mentioned in your telegram No. 32. It is therefore not surprizing that no steps were taken to follow up this matter. Unofficially, however, an officer of the Department was told on May 28 by the Counsellor of the Cuban Embassy here of the arrival in Canada of ex-President Prio. Even had we been notified, there is little that could have been done. Generally speaking, foreigners residing in Canada temporarily or permanently enjoy the same privibeges and rights as those enjoyed by all Canadians including freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, etc. Under such conditions it would therefore not be

APPROVED BY

C.S.A. RITCHIE
(Signature)

(Name Typed)

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2.

possible for the Canadian authorities to take action along lines suggested by Minister of State to intervene in a private meeting for the purpose of having it cancelled.

3. These considerations might be of assistance to you in any future discussion with Minister of State; you need not re-open the subject, however, if he is already satisfied with the explanations you have given him.