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File No. Dossier 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION  
Volume 19 From-De 83-11-22 To-À 83-11-27

~~SECRET~~

2003

CLASSIFIE  
MGID

VOLS ACCESSION NO. 18821

ATIP  
SCREENING

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TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT  
MEASURES  
PLANS AND PROPOSALS  
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION ( INITIATIVES )

DESARMEMENT  
MESURES  
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS  
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX ( INITIATIVES )

gbc

Retention period-Période de retention:

20Yrs ( 7A-13D ) J

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
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ACCESS TO INFORMATION  
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EXAMINED BY / EXAMINE PAR  
DATE  
E 16/ly  
April 20/06

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

2003



 Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada

# CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM / À COMPTER DU 82-11-22 TO / JUSQU'AU 83-11-27

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR	
FILE NO. - DOSSIER N° <u>28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission</u>	VOLUME <u>12</u>



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche


18 Nov 83 1201 032 10

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ  
C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0163 27NOV83  
 TO/À TO PMDEL/TOKYO ATTN/R.R.FOWLER  
 INFO  
 DISTR DISTR PEKIN PGB PPR PER  
 REF ---LETTER TO CHINESE PREMIER ZHAO  
 SUBJ/SUJ

DELIVER BY 1800 <sup>1300</sup>

*28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission*

PRIME MINISTER, PERHAPS INADVERTENTLY, DID NOT/NOT SIGN LETTER TO  
 PREMIER ZHAO, TEXT OF WHICH HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED TO CHINESE ON NOV 9.  
 PRESUMABLY, PEARSON/SMITH CAN BRING SIGNED COPY WITH THEM TO PEKING.  
 TEXT IS IT FOLLOWS:  
 2.COMCENTRE PLSE COPY ATTACHED TEXT AND NOTE THAT THE ADDRESS ~~IS~~ HAS  
 TO BE WRITTEN AT THE END OF THE TEXT.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG J. CARON/ cf

IDDZ

995-5912

SIG *L.A. Delvoie*  
L.A. DELVOIE

000304



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

November 9, 1983

Dear Mr. Premier:

For some months now I have been deeply concerned by the state of East-West relations and by the international security situation. I have been particularly troubled by the absence of any high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. My concerns have been sharply increased in recent weeks by the tragic destruction of a civilian passenger aircraft, by events in Lebanon, and by developments in Grenada.

I have come to the conclusion that action must be taken in the cause of peace to arrest the deterioration in both the state and climate of international relations. I have developed a number of ideas and proposals which I hope may go some way towards achieving this objective. In the days ahead I shall be discussing some of these ideas with European leaders in order to elicit their views and reactions, and to seek their support for my general plan of action.

I would welcome the opportunity to obtain your views and those of your government regarding my proposals. While I very much look forward to discussing these matters when you visit Ottawa in two months' time, I think there would be merit in having my thinking outlined to you at an earlier date.

His Excellency Zhao Ziyang  
Premier of the People's Republic of China  
Peking

- 2 -

I would therefore propose to send a personal representative to Peking to review with your senior officials a range of proposals which I have in mind. These include an approach to political confidence-building and ways of taking a global approach to the limitation of nuclear weapons, including both the key role of all five nuclear powers and the vital question of nuclear non-proliferation.

I attach the highest importance to an exchange of views with the Government of the People's Republic of China on these vital questions, as I indicated to Foreign Minister Wu in Ottawa last month, and I hope that it will be possible for your government to receive my personal representative within the next two to three weeks.

I take this opportunity, Mr. Premier, to send you my best personal wishes.

Yours sincerely,

UNQ, UOTE

The Sunday Sun, November 27, 1983

# Crisis in the woods

Last week a federal minister, Ed Lumley, suggested I switch emphasis. Turn from zealotry for policies to improve wood supply across the country. "That's a long-term matter."

"What's crying for understanding and action," said Lumley, "is not the growing crisis in raw wood but the disappearance of markets for our paper and lumber. Pulp and paper mills have been popping up all over the world, many designed by Canadians. I could see the threat two years ago. Now the effects are at hand. Many of our biggest mills are getting desperate for sales. The number one economic issue for me is not industrial strategy or regional developments, it's the crisis of competition in wood products in world markets."

...

A sound source says a serious appraisal of the possibility women troops could serve in combat roles is under way. It's being done under the auspices of the department of national defence, rather than by its personnel. The motive, as it came to me, stressed pragmatic considerations. That is, the broad governmental responses to the women's movement are pushing the services towards enlisting more and more females. If too large a proportion of the defence forces comes to have a minus utility in combat situations the readiness and flexibility of the whole is skewed.

Talking of defence, last week a journalist from Washington phoned. He'd seen Jean-Jacques Blais, our defence minister, performing in Washington a few days before. He said to me: "He seemed so cheerful and naive I felt I had to ask a domestic journalist how he got the job and whether there's more there than I could see?"



JEAN-JACQUES BLAIS  
"Cheerful and naive"

Answer: Decent chap; got popped into cabinet because the PM liked his stance on French-language education in Ontario; a minor disaster at post office; a maladroit stonewaller as solicitor-general; a pleasant parrot of able mandarins at supply and services; and as defence minister, as light as the last one but less vulnerable and indiscreet. Concluding point: Trudeau, has never wanted a strong-willed, extremely competent defence minister.

...

A Brian Mulroney ploy of last week won't be a big blip on the public record but it has had a volcanic effect in Quebec. He's hoisted the Grits,

## DOUGLAS FISHER



especialy Marc Lalonde, on Bill S-31.

The first public victim we could see was Judy Erola. She writhed around the front bench double-talking why the country was not to get the legislation. The bill would block huge funds controlled directly or indirectly by provincial governments from attaining effective ownership of large corporations whose jurisdiction fall in the federal domain. For example, railways — CP Ltd!

Tories, led by Joe Clark, had criticized the bill in the months it was banging around the Senate but it's fair to say their stance was not seen as adamant.

Meanwhile, pride in Quebecers was at work, spreading beyond the separatists to provincial Grits and Francophone business leaders.

S-31 was becoming a popular issue. The Feds pushing Quebecers down ... in aid of mighty Anglo corporations!

When Liberal backbenchers came back to caucus from home bases they told PM and cabinet the heat was rising. Let's hang the bill out to dry.

Don't fret, said Big Marc. The Tories are being put on side. Mulroney's getting some phone calls. So are John Crosbie and Mike Wilson.

So the boys subsided and the talk was so strong the bill might be banged through this session. Ah, Mulroney. The sneak. He may be a pal of Paul Desmarais and Power Corp. but he also chats with Robert Bourassa. Twenty-four hours after Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's out of the country, Mulroney makes a root and branch condemnation of S-31. Thus in Quebec he has the credit as the stopper. The protesting Grit MPs get only embarrassment.

...

Over several years this column has poked skepticism at all the money and press releases of praise the feds have put out for Telidon. It was a big item in proving how "with it" our masters are. David Thomas, in his new book, *Knights of the New Technology*, argues that the Telidon balloon is bursting. It's been oversold both as a piece of technology and as a system of providing computer-stored information.

My skepticism came not from the technology. I've been a librarian. As custodians, arrangers and purveyors of information, librarians are usually dubious about optimists who foresee millions eager to have access to files.

Québec, Le Soleil, vendredi 25 novembre 1983


28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission



### Blais satisfait du CF-18

Le ministre de la Défense nationale, M. Jean-Jacques Blais, a fait l'éloge du CF-18 au Parlement, hier, quelques moments après avoir fait l'essai de l'appareil commandé à 138 exemplaires. Le ministre a dit que les récentes failles découvertes dans les supports des moteurs n'étaient que d'"un millième de pouce" et que, de toute façon, leur réparation était aux frais du manufacturier.

NATIONAL DEFENCE  
INFORMATION SERVICES  
PRESS INDEX SECTION  
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
DATE:



DÉFENSE NATIONALE  
SERVICES D'INFORMATION  
SECTION DU RECUEIL DE  
COUPIRES DE JOURNAUX  
QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DE LA DÉFENSE  
NATIONALE

TORONTO STAR, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1983

# Friends sometimes say No

"My country, right or wrong," has been an American political slogan for 150 years. But when a Canadian who aspires to be Prime Minister echoes that same wholeheartedly pro-U.S. sentiment, saying in effect "Their country, right or wrong," we get a bit queasy.

Yet Opposition Leader Brian Mulroney gave the impression of saying just that, in his Toronto speech this week to one of the biggest Tory gatherings on record. Mulroney promised, sensibly enough, to work for "close, harmonious and privileged" ties with our U.S. neighbors. But he went on to add that "If our friends need the benefit of the doubt from time to time, so be it; I'm going to do it."

The Canadian public might well ask, the benefit of what doubt?

Mulroney's remark comes on the heels of an ill-advised U.S.-led invasion of Grenada. It follows the Reagan administration's not-so-covert efforts to topple Nicaragua's left-wing junta, while propping up right-wing regimes in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. And it follows a year of ferocious Red-bashing by a U.S. administration that seems to care little about keeping open some lines of communication with the other superpower.

At its best, Canadian foreign policy has always recognized that the U.S. is our closest friend and most important ally. But since World War II,

Canada has carefully nurtured a foreign policy that is also independent, cautious and sensible in its own right. We have disagreed with the Americans on a number of important issues — and, as often as not, we have been proved right.

In 1960, the Conservative Diefenbaker government courted U.S. ire by resisting American pressure not to trade with Communist China. In 1965, the Liberal Pearson government became the first Western administration to openly criticize U.S. policy in Viet Nam. In 1970, the Trudeau government became the second Western nation, after France, to establish formal diplomatic relations with Communist China.

In each case, the U.S. would later come round to Canada's view. In each case Canada's independent and forward-looking foreign policy helped pave the way to better international relations. That would not have been the case had we been parroting back official U.S. policy.

The United States has always been, and will remain, our close friend and neighbor. But sometimes, friendship means speaking up when you believe your friend is wrong. We hope the Leader of the Opposition is not seriously suggesting that a Canadian government under his leadership would become a Yes-man or foreign policy appendage of the United States.

TORONTO STAR, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1983

## \$400,000 sought to buy a slice of flying history

By Ron Lowman Toronto Star

Wanted: Someone with \$400,000 (U.S.) to spare, perhaps a fighter pilot, who has made it big since World War II and remembers with great affection the aircraft he flew.

Purpose: To acquire for the non-profit Canadian Warplane Heritage Foundation one of the few

Hawker Hurricane fighters left.

It's owned by Scottish millionaire aircraft-museum owner Sir Willie Roberts, 47, who bought it 14 years ago, and put it in trust for his 12-year-old son, Jamie, two years ago. Because of Jamie's lack of interest and the skyrocketing costs of insuring the Hurricane, Sir Willie wants to sell it.

"He's willing to let it return to Canada for \$100,000 less than what he's asking elsewhere," said Dennis Bradley, president of the foundation, from his Mount Hope headquarters near Hamilton. "It's on top of our want list, but we simply don't have the money. If anybody can spare a few bucks, we'd give it a good home."

The Hurricane was used as a wartime trainer in the Canadian west and appeared in the movie Battle of Britain. Sir Willie lavished money on it and had it totally restored to first-class flying shape, Bradley said.

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1-Trudeau  
Peace  
mission

*MT*  
COPY DELIVERED TO  
D.O. AT 271545

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FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0107 27NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 271500

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/HUDON PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON/CARON PRMNY  
WSHDC LDM BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU BREEC BNATO ROME GENEV PEKIN  
TOKYO CNBRA WLGTN

DISTR MINA USS DMF DMT IFB IMD IMU IMC IDD LDR IDA RGB PSD  
RCD FPR UGB URR ETC CPD

---CHOGM AND PM INITIATIVE:GOA COMWFL DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY

FOLLOWING IS TEXT

CHOGM

NEW DELHI-1983

THE COMMONWEALTH GOA DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

AS WE MEET TOGETHER IN INDIA AT THE END OF 1983, REPRESENTING  
A QUARTER OF THE WORLDS PEOPLE, FROM EVERY CONTINENT AND MANY  
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IN THE CONTEXT OF HEIGHTENED TENSIONS AND THE  
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PAGE TWO PMDL0107 UNCLAS

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ONLY THUS, CAN A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE BE REBUILT IN PLACE OF THE PREVAILING ONE OF FEAR AND MISTRUST. IN ALL THESE PURSUITS, WE EMPHASISE THE SUPREME IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL WILL.

WE, THEREFORE, WELCOME PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S CALL FOR A NEW POLITICAL DIMENSION IN THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WE SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS TO RESTORE ACTIVE POLITICAL CONTACT AND

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PAGE THREE PMDL0107 UNCLAS

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PAGE FOUR PMDL0107 UNCLAS

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UUU/282 271830Z PMDL0107

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FILE	23-3-1983
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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0107 27NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 271500

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/HUDON PCCOTT/OSBALDFSTON/CARON PPMNY

WSHDC LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU BREEC BNATO ROME GENEV PEKIN

TOKYO CNBRA WLGTN

DISTR MINA USS IMF IMT IFB IMD IMU (IMC IDE LDP IDA RGB RSD

RCD FPR UGB URR ETC CPD

---CHOGM AND PM INITIATIVE:GOA COMWEL DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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UUU/282 271830Z PMDL0107

*MF  
hd*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

**PERS INFO / RENS PERS.**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDFELDFLHI PMDL0095 27NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ/DELVOIE

FROM SHENSTONE

REF YRTEL IDIZ0218 25NOV

---PM INITATIVE:NON-PROLIFERATION

MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR PAPER. I FULLY SHARE YOUR CONCERNS, BUT  
PM APPARENTLY DEVELOPED THINKING ALONG LINES MENTIONED ON PLANE  
FROM TOKYO AND COULD NOT/NOT BE GAINSAID.

2.YOUR PAPER WILL BE PASSED TO FOWLER TONIGHT ON RETURN FROM  
GOA SO THAT IT WILL BE AVAILABLE DURING PEKING TRIP. I REMAIN HERE.

3.AS NOTES YOU PREPARED FOR PM WERE CIRCULATED TO OTHER MEMBERS OF  
CHOGM I THINK THAT POSITION INDICATED THEREIN ON NON-PROLIFERATION  
CAN STILL BE REGARDED AS OUR BASIC VIEWPOINT AT ANY RATE FOR  
PUBLIC PURPOSES.

CCC/068 271330Z PMDL0095

28-6-1 - Bureau Peace  
Mission

*MF*

*Mr Delvoie*

*Shall I take this on, consulting  
George?*

*Jim 28.11.*

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0072 27NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON

---REPLIES TO PMS OCT25 LETS

*28-6-1- Trudeau Peace  
Mission*

RATHER THAN SHOW PM REPLIES AS THEY COME IN, WOULD PREFER TO  
PRESENT HIM ON RETURN TO OTT WITH MEMO CONTAINING SUMMARY RPT  
SUMMARY OF REPLIES COVERING FULL TEXTS. SUMMARY MIGHT ALSO TOUCH  
ON REACTIONS FROM OTHERS AND GENERAL TENOR OF MANNER IN WHICH  
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA HAS TREATED INITIATIVE IN  
GENERAL AND WAY IT WAS PLAYED AT CHOGM IN PARTICULAR.

CCC/090 270556Z PMDL0072

BHannor + W. Emory

- Gender pilot : Stokes ?

- Nadeau ; re suit ?

brief book

- mention MBFR

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**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*M/F*  
Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time 0900

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4176 26NOV83

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ) DELIVER BY 280900

*28-6-1 - Judeau Peace Mission*

INFO PEKIN/PMDEL DIMMED BNATO WSHDC LDN PEKIN PRMNY BRU PARIS BONN

ROME TOKYO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/CIS PCOOTT/CARON TAVIV DERUT

CHOCMDELDELHI/FOWLER

DISTR MINA DMF IDA IDR UGB URR ZSI RBR RBD GMR GGB

---PM INITIATIVE:CALL ON KORNIENKO

TALKS WERE HELD AT MFA BETWEEN 1000/1215 25NOV.SOVIET SIDE LED BY KORNIENKO(FIRST DEPUTY FORMIN)INCLUDED SUSLOV(HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT)AND THREE OF HIS ASSTS INCLUDING VICTOR SUKHODREV. CDN SIDE LED BY PEARSON INCLUDED AMB ROBERTS,SMITH,ARCHDFACON AND MUNDELL.

2.KORNIENKO SAID HE WAS READY TO LISTEN ATTENTIVELY AND THEN TO EXCHANGE VIEWS.HE ADDED THAT GROMYKO WAS VERY BUSY BUT WOULD RECEIVE CDNS AT 1500 FOR SHORT MTG.

3.PEARSON SAID THAT HE HAD COME TO MOSCO BECAUSE PM WANTED HIS IDEAS AND HIS RECENT ACTIONS TO BE PRESENTED IN PERSON TO SOVIET GOVT AND BECAUSE HE WAS MOST INTERESTED IN RECEIVING THEIR VIEWS AND THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON EVENTS.PM WAS CONSIDERING ANTROPOV INVITATION TO VISIT USSR.

4.HE THEN DESCRIBED PM INITIATIVE.HIS MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO RESTORE MEASURE OF POLITICAL CONFIDENCE SINCE HE BELIEVED CURRENT INNATL SITUATION WAS DANGEROUS,NOT/NOT JUST IN EUROPE BUT WORLDWIDE.HAVING BEEN IN OFFICE SINCE 1968 AND GIVEN CDAS CREDIBILITY IN BOTH EAST AND WEST,HE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS HIS DUTY TO TRY TO IMPROVE CLIMATE.HIS MOTIVES WERE SINCERE AND WERE NOT/NOT INSPIRED BY DOMESTIC

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POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

5. MAIN THRUST OF PM INITIATIVE WAS AN EFFORT TO INJECT HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL IMPETUS INTO FURTHERING EAST/WEST UNDERSTANDING; TO IMPROVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES; AND TO INCREASE ATTN GIVEN TO EACH SIDES INTENTIONS RATHER THAN TO CONCENTRATE EXCLUSIVELY ON EACH OTHERS CAPABILITIES. PEARSON THEN EXPLAINED IN GREATER DETAIL TRENDS AND THEMES OUTLINED IN PMS SPEECH IN MTL AND ADDED THAT CDA WAS WORKING TOWARD ELICITING NATO RESPONSE TO WPOS MOST RECENT MBER PROPOSAL. KORNIENKO ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF REF TO QUOTE MINISTERIAL OR HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL ATTENDANCE AT THE OPENING OF THE CDE AT STKHM UNQUOTE. PEARSON RESPONDED THAT PM HOPED FOR ATTENDANCE BY AT LEAST FORMINS.

6. TURNING TO POSSIBILITY OF PRIME MINISTERIAL VISIT TO MOSCO, PEARSON SAID THAT PM THOUGHT SUCH A VISIT MIGHT HELP IMPROVE EAST/WEST RELATIONS BUT THAT HIS DECISION WOULD BE BASED UPON WHETHER OTHERS AND PARTICULARLY SOVIET GOVT BELIEVED THAT THERE COULD BE USEFUL RESULTS FROM SUCH A MTG. IF PM WERE TO CONCLUDE THAT HE SHOULD ACCEPT ANDROPOVS INVITATION HE WOULD BE FLEXIBLE AS TO TIMING BUT THOUGHT THAT VISIT SHOULD BE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.

7. PEARSON CONTINUED BY DESCRIBING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ASSOCIATED WITH PM INITIATIVE IN DETAIL AND SAID THAT PAPERS ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS WOULD BE CIRCULATED IN SUITABLE FORUM IN NEW YEAR. (WE DID NOT/NOT HAND OVER PAPER ON FIVE-POWER CONF.) FINALLY HE TOUCHED UPON RESPONSES

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FROM OTHER CAPITALS AND SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT PM EXPECTED NO/NO  
MIRACLES BUT HOPED TO START A PROCESS.

8.KORNIENKO SAID HE HAD CAREFULLY READ PMS SPEECHES BUT THAT  
PRESENTATION HAD BEEN MOST USEFUL.SOVIET UNION SHARED PMS ALARM AND  
WISHED TO AVOID MILITARY CONFRONTATION.SPECIFIC IDEAS PRESENTED WOULD  
NEED CAREFUL STUDY BEFORE THERE COULD BE SPECIFIC RESPONSES BUT HE  
WISHED TO GIVE SOME GENERAL VIEWS ON PMS OVERALL THEME:

(A)INTENTIONS VERSUS CAPABILITIES:USSR BELIEVED IN TAKING ACCOUNT  
OF FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF EACH SIDE AND IN PERSONAL HIGH-LEVEL  
CONTACTS TO ESTABLISH THESE INTERESTS.DIFFICULTY TODAY HOWEVER IS  
THAT THERE ARE NO/NO SUCH MTGS BUT EVEN SO INTENTIONS OF USA GOVT  
ARE EVIDENT.USA PROCEEDS FROM A VIEW OF USSR AS CONCENTRATION OF EVIL  
AND THIS IS NOT/NOT JUST RHETORIC.QUOTE WE FEEL THIS IN OUR NEGS,  
WE FEEL IT ON OUR OWN SKIN UNQUOTE.IT IS NOT/NOT POSSIBLE TO HAVE  
RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATES ON THAT BASIS.THERE CAN BE NO/NO  
COMPROMISE BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL.ESPECIALLY WHEN ALL THE GOOD IS ON  
ONE SIDE AND ALL THE EVIL ON THE OTHER.WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF MTG  
OF LEADERS OF THE USA/USSR WHEN THE GOOD/EVIL SYNDROME IS IN PLAY?  
NO/NO PROGRESS WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.WHEN  
PRESIDENT(USA)SAYS USSR IS A KIND OF HISTORICAL MISTAKE AND TOTALLY  
EVIL THERE IS NO/NO SENSE IN HAVING ANY MTGS AT ALL.WE COULD SEARCH  
FOR TEN YEARS FOR SOME NOTION OF EQUAL SECURITY BUT FAIL IF THERE  
IS NO/NO READINESS ON OTHER SIDE TO REACH AGREEMENT.THIS DOES NOT/NOT  
MEAN WE ARE AGAINST MTGS BUT THE USA MUST DECIDE THAT IT WANTS TO

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LIVE IN PEACE AMONG EQUALS—NOT ONLY WITH THE USSR BUT WITH OTHERS.  
(B) SPECIFIC PROPOSALS: THIS USA ATTITUDE IS NOW PRISM THROUGH WHICH  
WE VIEW EVENTS INCLUDING YOUR PMS PROPOSALS. FOR EXAMPLE FORMINS AT  
MBFR. WHAT WOULD BE THE USE WITH CURRENT AMERICAN ATTITUDES? PM  
WISHES TO COME HERE IF IT WOULD BE QUOTE USEFUL UNQUOTE. THAT IS OUR  
ATTITUDE TO EAST/WEST MTGS. TALK FOR THE SAKE OF TALK IS NOT/NOT  
WORTHWHILE.

(1) ASAT: WE WERE PREPARED TO TALK SERIOUSLY AND WE DID UNTIL ARRIVAL  
OF REAGAN ADMIN. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO TRY AGAIN.

(2) CTB: WE HAD VIRTUALLY REACHED AGREEMENT, WITH ONLY MINOR PROBLEMS  
REMAINING, BETWEEN USSR/USA AND USSR/USA/UK. THEN PRES REAGAN BROKE OFF  
TALKS. USA DID NOT/NOT ADVANCE A TOUGHER POSITION, JUST STOPPED TALKING.  
WE HEARD THAT PENTAGON HAD SAID NO/NO TO ANY AGREEMENT. WE BELIEVE  
THEY HAVE NO/NO DESIRE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT.

(3) VERIFICATION: IT IS SAID THAT USSR IS NEGATIVE ABOUT VERIFICATION,  
HAS ANYONE, PERHAPS ARCHDEACON, READ THE 1974 AND 1976 TREATIES? (HE  
SAID HE HAD AND OUTLINED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF THRESHOLD AND  
PEACEFUL USES TREATIES.) THEY WERE GOOD TREATIES WITH ON-SITE  
INSPECTION BUT USA HAD NOT/NOT RATIFIED THEM. (PEARSON ASKED WHY USA  
REQUEST OF SIX MONTHS AGO FOR INCREASED VERIFICATION HAD NOT/NOT BEEN  
ACCEPTABLE TO USSR. KORNIENKO RESPONDED THAT USA WANTED TO START AGAIN  
FROM SCRATCH, WHEREAS TREATIES THEMSELVES ALLOWED FOR FURTHER  
DISCUSSION OF ITS PROVISIONS WHEN EITHER SIDE FELT IT NECESSARY.

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QUOTE I CITE THIS AS AN EXAMPLE, WE ARE EQUALLY STRONGLY FOR VERIFICATION WHEN IT AFFECTS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONTROL OF ARMS. BUT ABSTRACT DISCUSSIONS OF VERIFICATION ARE NOT/NOT OF INTEREST TO US. UNQUOTE.

(4) SUMMATION: QUOTE I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT WHAT IS LACKING IN THE USA/USSR RELATIONSHIP IS THE WILL TO WORK FOR MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS BECAUSE WE MUST LIVE TOGETHER IN THE SAME WORLD. YOUR PRESENCE HERE TODAY SHOWS THE SORT OF ATTITUDE THAT IS NECESSARY IF EAST/WEST RELATIONS ARE TO IMPROVE. UNQUOTE.

9. PEARSON ASKED FOR USSR ATTITUDE TO PMS FIVE NWS PROPOSAL. KORNIENKO SAID USSR HAD POSITIVE ATTITUDE, HAVING PROPOSED SOMEWHAT SAME IDEA FIFTEEN YEARS AGO. HE NOTED THAT PEKIN WANTED FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN SUPERPOWER ARMS BEFORE CHINA WOULD AGREE AND THAT FRENCH WERE NOT/NOT CRAZY ABOUT IDFA EITHER.

10. HE SAID THAT FROM SOVIET POINT OF VIEW USA AND UK MISSILES WERE IN SAME TARGETTING COMPUTER-FRENCH BEING SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT. THEY ARE NOT/NOT LARGE BY COMPARISON TO SUPERPOWERS BUT THEY ARE FORCES OF CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH AND THEY ARE INCREASING. THEREFORE THERE WAS NEED FOR QUOTE EQUIVALENT UNQUOTE TO THEM AS LONG AS WE LIVE IN THIS MAD-MAD WORLD AND THESE WEAPONS WERE NOT/NOT LIQUIDATED. IDFA ALSO WOULD BE LOOKED AT THROUGH THE QUOTE PRISM UNQUOTE REFERRED TO EARLIER.

11. PEARSON SAID THAT AS HE UNDERSTOOD KORNIENKO LITTLE WOULD BE

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POSSIBLE UNLESS USA CHANGES ITS ATTITUDE. KORNIEENKO SAID QUOTE YES BUT WE MUST NOT/NOT UST SIT AND WAIT, WE MUST TRY TO INFLUENCE THEM TO CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE. UNQUOTE

12. PEARSON SUGGESTED THAT THERE MUST BE TALKS TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL. KORNIEENKO SAID YES BUT NOT/NOT JUST TALK FOR THE SAKE OF TALK. WE CANNOT SMILE AND CONTINUE TO TALK DURING INF DEPLOYMENT. PEARSON ASKED ABOUT START. KORNIEENKO SAID DECISION FOR MOMENT WAS TO CONTINUE BUT THAT INF DEPLOYMENT HAS CHANGED STRATEGIC SITUATION BECAUSE MISSILES IN EUROPE WHICH REACH USSR ARE THE SAME AS MISSILES BASED IN USA FROM SOVIET POINT OF VIEW.

13. PEARSON NOTED THAT PMS FIVE NWS PROPOSAL WAS DESIGNED TO ALLOW FOR TALKS TO CONTINUE DESPITE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES. KORNIEENKO RESPONDED AGAIN THAT TALK FOR THE SAKE OF TALK WAS A WASTE OF TIME.

14. SMITH INTERJECTED TO RESTATE PMS DESIRE TO RESTORE SOME EAST/WEST DIALOGUE AND SUMMARIZED AGAIN PMS CONCEPT. KORNIEENKO RESPONDED THAT HE HAD NOT/NOT SAID NO/NO TO ANY OF IDEAS PROPOSED, HE HAD SAID ONLY THAT SOVIET UNION WOULD LOOK AT THEM THROUGH THE QUOTE PRISM UNQUOTE.

15. ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT, PEARSON SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH UNEXPECTED EVENTS. KORNIEENKO SAID THIS WAS MORE TECHNICAL MATTER ALTHOUGH USSR DID NOT/NOT DISREGARD IT. THERE WAS DIRECT LINE TO WSHDC AND IT WAS BEING IMPROVED. THERE HAD BEEN TALKS WITH USA IN AUG AND BOTH SIDES WOULD MEET AGAIN AT BEGINNING OF NEW YEAR. WHILE EXISTENCE OF HOT LINE HAD NOT/NOT PREVENTED ANY CRISIS IT HAD BEEN QUOTE OF CERTAIN USEFULNESS UNQUOTE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED PEARSONS

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POINT OF THAT IT WOULD NOT/NOT PREVENT CRISES BUT COULD PREVENT CRISES  
FROM GETTING WORSE.

16. PEARSON ALSO MENTIONED TO KORNIENKO THAT PM, IF HE CAME, WOULD  
WANT TO RAISE ONE OR TWO BILATERAL ISSUES. AMB ROBERTS WOULD BE  
FOLLOWING THESE UP. PEARSON ALSO RAISED BILATERAL ISSUES PRIVATELY  
WITH SUSLOV.

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CLASSIFIED

*Fowler*  
*USS*  
*5703016*  
*COLEMAN*  
*FILE*

PERSON	NAME	NUMBER	EXTENSION
REVISION	DATE	INITIALS	DATE
ACC	REF	DATE	
FILE	DOSSIER		
28.6.1-Trudeau Peace mission			

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4173 26NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 280900  
INFO CHOGMDELDELHI/FOWLER DELIVER BY 270900 BNATO WSHDC  
LDN PEKIN PRMNY BRU PARIS BONN ROME TOKYO HAGUE NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/  
CPP/CIS PCOOTT/CARON TAVIV BERUT  
DISTR MINA DMF IDA IDR UGB URR ZSI RBR RBD GMR GGB  
REF QURTEL XYGR9907 25NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE: VIEWS OF ARBATOV

AT RECEPTION OFFERED BY AMB FOLLOWING PEARSONS MTGS WITH GROMYKO AND KORNIENKO 25NOV, DIRECTOR OF USA-CDA INSTITUTE, GEORGI ARBATOV, (WHO HAD MET WITH PM TRUDEAU IN TOKYO 19NOV) MADE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT NEUTRAL SOVIET REACTION TO PMS INITIATIVES AND POSSIBLE VISIT TO MOSCO:

(A) THAT WE SHOULD NOT/NOT BE DISAPPOINTED BY ABSENCE OF POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM GROMYKO, THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES IN PROVIDING RESPONSE OF ANY KIND AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT IN TIME;

(B) ONE REASON WAS ANDROPOVS HEALTH, HE WAS NOT/NOT ABLE TO ATTEND MTGS AND WAS OBLIGED TO DO BUSINESS ONLY BY PHONE, THIS COMPLICATED DECISION-MAKING PROCESS;

(C) ANDROPOV HAD LONG LIST OF PENDING ENGAGEMENTS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, HE HAD ONLY RECEIVED KADAR FROM AMONG SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THERE WAS CERTAIN OBLIGATION TO SEE OTHERS ONCE HIS HEALTH IMPROVED, THIS MIGHT POSSIBLY COMPLICATE TIMING OF TRUDEAU VISIT;

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(D) SECOND MAIN POINT WAS UNCERTAINTY IN MOSCO OVER HOW TO RESPOND TO USA FOLLOWING COLLAPSE OF INF NEGOTIATIONS, THERE WAS DIVIDED OPINION WITH SOME PERSONS IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP FAVOURING MORE ROBUST RESPONSE TO USA ACTIONS, GENERAL VIEW WAS TO WAIT AND SEE HOW EVENTS WOULD DEVELOP OVER NEXT TWO-THREE WEEKS AND WHETHER ACTION-REACTION CYCLE WOULD SET IT, THERE WAS ALSO CONCERN THAT USA MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATING FURTHER ACTION IN MIDEAST OR NICARAGUE, USSR HAD QUOTE RECEIVED CERTAIN INFO AND INDICATIONS THAT NEW WAR COULD BREAK OUT IN MIDEAST IN NEXT FEW DAYS UNQUOTE, HE DID NOT/NOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER DETAILS;

(E) USSR WAS BY NATURE CAUTIOUS AND CONSERVATIVE AND IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO ASSESS TRUDEAU INITIATIVE, IN THIS REGARD IT HAD BEEN VERY IMPORTANT FOR GROMYKO TO HAVE HEARD DIRECT FROM PMS PERSONAL REP.

2. POINT WAS MADE TO ARBATOV, WHICH HE SAID HE REGISTERED, THAT LACK OF POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE IN NEXT FEW WEEKS PARTICULARLY TO VISIT BY TRUDEAU COULD BE USED BY SOME OF THOSE CRITICAL OF PMS INITIATIVE TO POINT OUT FRUITLESSNESS OF DEALING WITH USSR AND THAT THIS IN TURN COULD WELL WORK AGAINST SOVIET BEST INTERESTS. SAME POINT WAS ALSO MADE TO SUSLOV, HEAD OF MFA SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT. CCC/095 261205Z XYGR4173

*MSF*  
*[Signature]*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4174 26NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 280900

INFO PEKIN/PMDFL DELIVER BY 281500

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

BONN LDN WSHDC PARIS ROME BNATO PRMNY PEK TOKYO BRU HAGUE

PCOOTT/CARON NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/CIS

DISTR MINA DMF IFB RBD RBR ITA ITP ZSI UGR URR

REF OUPTEL XYGR9907 25NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:PEARSON MTG WITH GROMYKO

SUMMARY: PEARSONS FORTY-FIVE MINUTE MTG WITH SOVIET FORMIN GROMYKO WAS STRAIGHT-FORWARD WITHOUT ACRIMONY. GROMYKO REGISTERED HIS QUOTE REGRET UNQUOTE THAT CDA HAD LEVNT ITS AUTHORITY AND SIGNATURE TO INF DEPLOYMENT BUT OTHERWISE SUBJ OF INF DID NOT/NOT ARISE DIRECTLY NOR WERE THERE ANY OTHER DISCORDENT NOTES. INVITATION FOR PM TO VISIT MOSCO WAS REAFFIRMED BUT THERE WAS QUESTION OF TIMING AND THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE FURTHER DISCUSSION ABOUT THIS. GROMYKO SAIT USSR WAS FOLLOWING SPEECHES AND ACTIONS OF PM CLOSELY AND APPRFCIATED HIS VIEWS BUT IT HAD TO DEAL WITH SITUATION IN WHICH USA WAS ACTING ON DIFFERENT BASIS. USSR HAD HAD SAD EXPFRIENCE WITH CONTACTS ON HIGH LEVEL AND USA HAD USED GENEV NEGS AS QUOTE SCREFN TO COVER MILTARISTIC ACTION UNQUOTE. USSR THEREFCRE WAS QUOTE RESERVED UNQUOTE ABOUT IDEA THAT HIGHER THE LEVFL OF CONTACT THE BETTER. GROMYKO DREW ATTN TO ANDROPOVS STATEMENT OF 24AUG WHICH WAS QUOTE REBUFF UNQUOTE TO WSHDCS AGGRESSIVE POLICIFS BUT ALSO EMPHASIZED PEACEFUL LINE OF USSR TO EUROPE AND OTHER STATES AS WELL AS TO

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DISARMAMENT.

2.REPORT:GROMYKO WAS FRIENDLY AND ANIMATED DURING FORTY-FIVE MINUTE CONVERSATION WITH PEARSON AFTERNOON 25NOV.GROMYKO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY RYZHOV(DEPUTY FORMIN),SUSLOV(HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT)AND THREE OTHERS FROM SUSLOVS DEPT.CDN SIDE INCLUDED AMB ROBERTS,SMITH AND ARCHDEACON AS WELL AS FMB COUNS MUNDELL.GROMYKO SAID HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON MORNING DISCUSSIONS WITH FIRST DEPUTY FORMIN KORNIENKO AND THAT PEARSON HAD HIS FULL ATTN.

3.PEARSON SAID HE WAS HERE AS REP OF PM AND HAD COME TO MOSCO AT PMS REQUEST TO SPEAK TO SOVIET LEADERSHIP ABOUT HIS CONCERNS WITH SITUATION IN WORLD AND PARTICULARLY STATE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. PM HAD RECEIVED INVITATION TO VISIT USSR AND WAS CONSIDERING IT POSITIVELY.PM HAD ASKED HIM TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER VISIT WOULD BE USEFUL TO UNDERTAKE.GROMYKOS VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION WOULD BE APPRECIATED.IN TERMS OF TIMING PM WAS CONSIDERING END DEC OR BEGINNING JAN.REASONS WHY HE WANTED TO COME WAS NOT/NOT ONLY HIS INITIATIVE BUT BECAUSE HE WAS CONCERNED THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN USSA-USSR HAD DETERIORATED MARKEDLY OVER PAST FEW MONTHS.NEWS THIS WEEK CONFIRMED THIS OPINION.IN NO/NO SENSE WAS PM TRYING TO ACT AS MEDIATOR.RATHER HE BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR STATESMEN TO SPEAK DIRECTLY TO THEIR OPPOSITE NUMBERS AND TO COMMUNICATE THEIR OPINIONS. IF PM CAME HE WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK ABOUT EAST/WEST TENSION;DANGER OF ACCIDENT,MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISCALCULATION;DANGER OF NUCLEAR

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PROLIFERATION; CONCEPT OF MUTUAL SECURITY; AND WHAT WOULD BE BASIS FOR RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST/WEST REFLECTING MUTUAL INTERESTS. PM WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXPLORE CERTAIN OF HIS IDEAS INCLUDING FIVE-POWER CONF AT SOME TIME IN FUTURE, SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO START. PM WAS ALSO WONDERING WHETHER SENIOR POLITICAL FIGURES WHOULD NOT/NOT ATTEND STKHM MTG AND GROMYKOS OWN VIEW ON THIS SUBJ WOULD BE WELCOME. PM ALSO THOUGHT IT WOULD MAKE SENSE FOR FORMINS TO ATTEND AND ATTEMPT TO GIVE IMPETUS AND SENSE OF URGENCY TO NEGS ON MBFR. PM HAD NO/NO ILLUSION OF ONE MAN OR ONE COUNTRY ACHIEVING GREAT DEEDS BUT HE AND CDA DID HAVE RESPECTABLE CREDENTIALS TO BRING ABOUT AN EASING OF TENSION. PM HAD VISITED EUROPE, HAD WRITTEN TO REAGAN AND WOULD PROBABLY GO TO CHINA THIS WEEKEND. PEARSON SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE GROMYKOS ASSESSMENT ABOUT THIS AND PROSPECTS FOR EAST/WEST RELATIONS IN IMMED FUTURE.

4. GROMYKO SAID HE HAD LISTENED TO WHAT PEARSON HAD TO SAY AS WELL AS KORNIENKOS BRIEFING. IN TERMS OF PMS VISIT, HE WISHED TO CONFIRM INVITATION. USSR ATTACHED IMPORTANT SIGNIFICANCE TO IT BUT THERE WAS QUESTION OF TIMING AND HE WOULD COME BACK TO IT QUOTE WITH DUE ACCOUNT OF ALL RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES UNQUOTE. HE ADDED QUOTE I THINK THE PM WILL MEET THIS WITH UNDERSTANDING UNQUOTE. ON FIVE-POWER CONF HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS WAS NOT/NOT OFFICIAL PROPOSAL BUT THOUGHTS AND IDEAS PM WISHED TO EXPRESS. QUESTION HE WISHED TO ASK WAS THAT INSTEAD OF HAVING DIFFERENCES OVER RATIO X, MIGHT THERE NOT/NOT BE FIVE TIMES X DIFFERENCES. EXPERIENCE OF PRESENT DAY GENERATION OF STATESMEN SHOWED THAT NO/NO SPECIFIC GROUP, WHETHER IT BE 3, 4, 5 OR 2, ALWAYS GIVES

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POSITIVE RESULTS. IT IS A COMPLICATED QUESTION. ONE CAN PRODUCE POSITIVE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF A FIVE-POWER CONF AND ONE CAN PRODUCE NEGATIVE ARGUMENTS AGAINST IT AS WELL. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING HOWEVER THAT NO/NO OFFICIAL REPLY WAS REQUIRED RIGHT NOW. PARTLY RELATED TO THIS SUBJ AND PARTLY RELATED TO OTHERS, GROMYKO SAID HE QUOTE REGRETTED THAT CDA HAD PUT ITS AUTHORITY AND ITS SIGNATURE BEHIND DEPLOYMENT OF INF IN EUROPE UNQUOTE. IN ENGLISH HE REPEATED QUOTE I REGRET THAT UNQUOTE.

5. GROMYKO WENT ON TO SAY USSR WAS CLOSELY FOLLOWING SPEECHES, STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS OF PM. QUOTE WE NOTE THAT HE HAS BEEN SAYING THAT NUMBERS AND RATIOS ARE BEING DISCUSSED CURRENTLY AND THAT ONE SHOULD REPLACE THIS WITH DISCUSSION ABOUT TRUST, INTENTIONS, GOALS, PURPOSES AND CONFIDENCE UNQUOTE. WE UNDERSTAND THIS HE SAID AND IT IS NOT/NOT DEVOID OF SPIRIT OF REALISM AND REASONABLENESS. WHAT NATO IS DOING NOW HOWEVER, AND ITS MAIN FORCE IS IN WSHDC, IS OPERATING IN AREAS OF SPECIFICS SUCH AS PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES. THESE ARE VERY MATERIAL THINGS WITH NO/NO SPACE FOR NOBLE IDEAS ABOUT INTENTIONS. QUOTE THESE ARE DROPPED IN THE WASTEBASKET UNQUOTE. IS IT NOT/NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY WE WILL NOT/NOT BE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TAKE ON OBLIGATIONS ABOUT THIS? THEY DO NOT/NOT WANT TO HEAR ABOUT THIS HOWEVER. THEREFORE HOW CAN USSR RID ITSELF FROM DISCUSSING SPECIFIC FIGURES WHEN ALL THESE SPECIFIC THINGS (MISSILES) ARE DIRECTED AGAINST IT. THERE IS SOME POSITIVE GRAIN OF

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TRUTH IN THIS IDEA BUT AS EXAMPLE OF NON-FIRST USE SHOWS WE CAN SEE HOW SOME PEOPLE ARE TREATING NOBLE IDEAS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES JUST IMAGINE WHAT SITUATION WOULD BE IF USSR ON ITS OWN IN ANY FORUM, OF FIVE OR TEN OR WHATEVER, MADE STATEMENTS ABOUT NOBLE GOALS OF RATIOS, SHOWING TRUST, AND NOT/NOT USING FORCE WHILE ALL OTHERS PRETENDED NOT/NOT TO HEAR AND PROCEED FROM ENTIRELY MATERIALISTIC BASIS OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT. COULD WE ACHIEVE MOVEMENT FORWARD IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES QUOTE I DO NOT/NOT THINK SO UNQUOTE. USA PRESIDENT DOES NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND ANYTHING OTHER THAN MISSILES, SENDING MARINES TO BERUT, HOW MANY SHIPS SHOULD BE OFF LEBANON, HOW TO USE FORCE IN NICARAGUA OR GRENADA. THERE ARE THIRTY COUNTRIES OUTSIDE OF USA IN WHICH THERE ARE HALF A MILLION USA SOLDIERS. THESE ARE NOT/NOT REFLECTIONS OF NOBLE IDEAS BUT MATERIAL IDEAS. THAT IS HOW WE SEE THINGS.

6. IF ONE TAKES IDEA OF OPENING CDE AT A HIGH LEVEL AND SIMILAR IDEA AT MBR AND IF IT IS TAKEN IN ISOLATION MAYBE IT IS NOT/NOT SO EASY TO OBJECT TO IN NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT IT IS BETTER TO HAVE A HIGH RATHER THAN LOW LEVEL. BUT BEFORE WE TAKE ANY DECISION WE HAVE TO LOOK AT IT FROM THE LEFT, RIGHT, ABOVE AND BELOW IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHAT IS THE ACTUAL SITUATION USSR IS FACED WITH.

7. GROMYKO STATED QUOTE WE HAVE HAD SAT EXPERIENCE WITH CONTACTS OF THIS KIND UNQUOTE. THESE CONTACTS HAVE BEEN USED AS SCREEN TO COVER MILITARISTIC ACTION. IN GENEV, QUOTE WE ARE CONVINCED TODAY AS WE WERE BEFORE THAT IT WAS USED AS A SCREEN UNQUOTE. WE SAW THIS BEFORE

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BUT HOPED AT SOME POINT WSHDC WOULD BE MORE OPEN TO FACTS AND TRUTH. THIS WAS QUOTE ABSOLUTELY NOT/NOT THE CASE UNQUOTE.WE ARE THEREFORE QUOTE RESERVED UNQUOTE ABOUT IDEA OF THE HIGHER-LEVEL CONTACT THE BETTER.WE WILL LOOK AND SEE WHAT TO DO ABOUT STKHM AND VIENN BUT SO FAR SEE NO/NO DESIRE OR INTENTION BY WEST TO MOVE FORWARD AT VIENN. ABSOLUTELY NOT.

8.GROMYKO ADDED THAT WE APPRECIATE WISH OF PM TRUDEAU TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AND REDUCE TENSIONS.IT SHOWS THERE ARE STILL SOME STATESMEN WHO APPRECIATE CURRENT DANGER.WE VALUE THAT.HE IS MAN OF BROAD EXPERIENCE,CAPABILITY AND OUTLOOK.ALL HIS STATEMENTS HOW THIS. PLEASE HOWEVER TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR CARES AND WAY OF THINKING. ANDROPOVS STATEMENT OF 24NOV IS ESSENCE OF OUR POLICY.IT IS A QUOTE RESOLUTE REBUFF UNQUOTE TO WSHDCS AGRESSIVE POLICIES.IT CALLS A SPADE A SPADE BUT IT ALSO EMPHASIZES PEACFFUL LINE OF USSR TO EUROPE AND TO OTHER STATES AND ITS POLICY OF DISARMAMENT.SO APAPT FROM REBUFF TO USA OTHER SIDE IS EQUALLY EMPHASIZED.HE STRESSED THAT HE WISHED TO BRING THIS POINT TO PEARSONS ATTN.

9.PEARSON SAID HE WOULD RREPORT TO PM WHAT GROMYKO HAD TO SAY. HE INTERPRETED GROMYKOS REMARKS TO MEAN THAT USSR WILL CONSIDER PMS IDEAS FROM VARIOUS POINTS OF VIEW BUT THAT GROMYKO WAS SCEPTICAL OF VALUE OF HIGH-LEVEL MTGS.WE UNDERSTAND THAT BUT WE PAVE HAD LOW-LEVEL IN MBFR FOR TEN YEARS AND BELIEVF TIME IS NOW REPE FOR HIGH-LEVEL IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE BETTER RESULTS OR AS A MINIMUM FOR STATESMEN TO BETTER UNDERSTAND ISSUES.GROMYKO REPEATED THAT HIS ...7

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THOUGHTS GO IN DIRECTION HE INDICATED.

10. ON VISIT BY PM, PEARSON SAID WE WOULD REMAIN IN TOUCH. GPOMYKO  
RESPONDED THAT THIS QUESTION WOULD BE SUBJ OF FURTHER  
CLARIFICATION; TO MAKE IT MORE SPECIFIC ISSUE WAS ONE OF TIMING. USSR  
RETAINED WARM MEMORIES AND SATISFACTION WITH PMS FIRST OFFICIAL  
VISIT IN 1971. VISIT HAD BEEN OF INTEREST AND PRODUCTIVE. AS FINAL  
POINT, PEARSON MENTIONED THAT PM HOPED TO MAKE PERSONAL CONTACT  
WITH ALL FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT WITHIN  
MONTH OF SO PM WOULD HAVE VISITED ALL EXCEPT FOR USSR.

CCC/144 280630Z XYGR4174

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1- Trudeau  
Peace  
Mission

MF  
ED

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4173 26NOV83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 280900

INFO CHOGMDELDELHI/FOWLER DELIVER BY 270900 BNATO WSHDC

LDN PEKIN PRMNY BRU PARIS BONN ROME TOKYO HAGUE NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/

CPP/CIS PCOOTT/CARON TAVIV BERUT

DISTR MINA DMF IDA IDR UGB URR ZSI RBR RBD GMR GGB

REF OURTEL XYGR9907 25NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE: VIEWS OF ARBATOV

AT RECEPTION OFFERED BY AMB FOLLOWING PEARSONS MTGS WITH GROMYKO AND KORNIENKO 25NOV, DIRECTOR OF USA-CDA INSTITUTE, GEORGI ARBATOV, (WHO HAD MET WITH PM TRUDEAU IN TOKYO 19NOV) MADE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT NEUTRAL SOVIET REACTION TO PMS INITIATIVES AND POSSIBLE VISIT TO MOSCO:

(A) THAT WE SHOULD NOT/NOT BE DISAPPOINTED BY ABSENCE OF POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM GROMYKO. THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES IN PROVIDING RESPONSE OF ANY KIND AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT IN TIME;

(B) ONE REASON WAS ANDROPOVS HEALTH. HE WAS NOT/NOT ABLE TO ATTEND MTGS AND WAS OBLIGED TO DO BUSINESS ONLY BY PHONE. THIS COMPLICATED DECISION-MAKING PROCESS;

(C) ANDROPOV HAD LONG LIST OF PENDING ENGAGEMENTS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. HE HAD ONLY RECEIVED KADAR FROM AMONG SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THERE WAS CERTAIN OBLIGATION TO SEE OTHERS ONCE HIS HEALTH IMPROVED. THIS MIGHT POSSIBLY COMPLICATE TIMING OF TRUDEAU VISIT;

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MOITDA  
SUITE A DERNIER

PAGE TWO XYGR4173 CONF

(D) SECOND MAIN POINT WAS UNCERTAINTY IN MOSCO OVER HOW TO RESPOND TO USA FOLLOWING COLLAPSE OF INF NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WAS DIVIDED OPINION WITH SOME PERSONS IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP FAVOURING MORE ROBUST RESPONSE TO USA ACTIONS. GENERAL VIEW WAS TO WAIT AND SEE HOW EVENTS WOULD DEVELOP OVER NEXT TWO-THREE WEEKS AND WHETHER ACTION-REACTION CYCLE WOULD SET IT. THERE WAS ALSO CONCERN THAT USA MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATING FURTHER ACTION IN MIDEAST OR NICARAGUE. USSR HAD QUOTE RECEIVED CERTAIN INFO AND INDICATIONS THAT NEW WAR COULD BREAK OUT IN MIDEAST IN NEXT FEW DAYS UNQUOTE. HE DID NOT/NOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER DETAILS:

(E) USSR WAS BY NATURE CAUTIOUS AND CONSERVATIVE AND IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO ASSESS TRUDEAU INITIATIVE. IN THIS REGARD IT HAD BEEN VERY IMPORTANT FOR GROMYKO TO HAVE HEARD DIRECT FROM PMS PERSONAL REP.

2. POINT WAS MADE TO ARBATOV, WHICH HE SAID HE REGISTERED, THAT LACK OF POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE IN NEXT FEW WEEKS PARTICULARLY TO VISIT BY TRUDEAU COULD BE USED BY SOME OF THOSE CRITICAL OF PMS INITIATIVE TO POINT OUT FRUITLESSNESS OF DEALING WITH USSR AND THAT THIS IN TURN COULD WELL WORK AGAINST SOVIET BEST INTERESTS. SAME POINT WAS ALSO MADE TO SUSLOV, HEAD OF MFA SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT. CCC/095 261205Z XYGR4173

INFO

*MF*  
*2*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PEKIN WJGR0902 26NOV83

TO PMDELDELHI FLASH

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ

28-6-1-14  
Peace  
mission

---PM INITIATIVE: VISIT TO CHINA 28-29NOV-ADMIN ARRANGEMENTS  
HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH MFA, PROTOCOL DEPT, AND FOLLOWING ARE  
ADMIN ARRANGEMENTS THAT ARE BEING MADE FOR PRIME MINISTERS  
DELEGATION.

(A) ROOM ASSIGNMENT-AT STATE GUEST (DAIYUTAI) DEL WILL OCCUPY BLDG  
NO 15/15, PRESS WILL BE IN BLDG NO 16/16 WHICH IS ADJACENT. BLDG  
HAS TWO FLOORS AND MOST OF DEL WILL OCCUPY SECOND FLOOR. PM HAS  
THREE-BEDROOM SUITE (1522/1522), BEDROOM CLOSEST HAS BEEN ASSIGNED  
TO JUSTIN (1521/1521) AND ONLY OTHER BEDROOM IN SAME CORRIDOR  
(1520/1520) HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO JE JOHNSON, SUITE AT END OF HALL  
HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO PEARSON (1523/1523) AND SUITE ON ANOTHER  
CORRIDOR HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO FOWLER (1528/1528). OTHER ROOMS IN  
CORRIDOR ARE ASSIGNED AS FOLLOWS: CARTER (1524/1524), ARCHDEACON  
(1525/1525), SMITH (1526/1526), JOHNSTONE (1527/1527). ON FLOOR BELOW  
THERE IS ONE BEDROOM (1505/1505) ASSIGNED TO DURDIN AND SUITE  
1506/1506. SUITE WILL BE OCCUPIED BY EMBASSY OFFICER WITH SITTING  
ROOM BEING USED AS OFFICE.

2. COLEMAN HAS BEEN ASSIGNED ROOM IN SEPARATE BLDG NO 16/16 TO BE  
OCCUPIED BY PRESS. HE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED SUITE 1621/1621.

(R) OFFICE-OFFICE WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH TYPEWRITER (ORATOR REQUEST

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PAGE TWO WJGR0902 UNCLAS

NOTED)AND CABINET WITH PADLOCK.IT WILL BE STAFFED WITH SECRETARY FROM APPROX 07H00 TO 22H00.OFFICE TEL NO IS 868-831/868-831 EXT 1506.THERE IS LIKELY TO BE SOMEBODY IN ATTENDANCE IN THIS ROOM ON ALMOST TWENTY-FOUR HOUR BASIS.SUGGEST CALLS TO MEMBERS OF PARTY MIGHT BFST BE DIRECTED TO IT.

(C)BREAKFAST-MFA HAVE ASKED TO KNOW IF PM, MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY AND PRESS WOULD WISH BREAKFAST ON ARRIVAL.OUR RESPONSE IS THAT THEY WILL LIKELY HAVE BREAKFAST ON AIRCRAFT.IF WE ARE WRONG AND GROUP WISHES BREAKFAST ON ARRIVAL PLS INFORM ASAP.

(D)BAGGAGE-WE ASSUME PMS PERSONAL BAGGAGE WILL BE CARRIED IN AIRCRAFT CABIN.CHINESE WILL MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IT EITHER TO BE TAKEN IN PMS CAR OR IN FOLLOWING VEHICLE WHEN HE TRAVELS FROM AIRPORT TO GUEST HOUSE.LUGGAGE FROM HOLD WILL BE BROUGHT SEPARATELY BY TRUCK.CHINESE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF YOU ARE CARRYING GOOD DEAL OF LUGGAGE IN ORDER THAT APPROPRIATE TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE(APPROX NO OF PIECES).

3.EMB STATIONERY SUPPLIES PRESENTLY AT ROCK BOTTOM.PLS ASK PARTY TO BRING SEVERAL IBM CORRECTIBLE TYPEWRITER RIBBONS TOGETHER WITH ONE BOTTLE VELLUM CORRECTION FLUID IF POSSIBLE.

GAUVIN

UUU/002 260820Z WJGR0902

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**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**CONFIDENTIEL** **CDN EYES ONLY**

RETURN TO REVOYER AU	2100	FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORIE AU DOSSIER
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28-6-1-Trudeau		
Peace Mission		

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY  
FM EXTOTT IDDZ0218 25NOV83  
TO PMDELDELHI/SHENSTONE ONLY DELIVER BY 260900  
FROM DELVOIE  
REF PMDEL TEL 0082 25NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:NON-PROLIFERATION

AM SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY IMPLICATIONS OF CONTENTS OF PARA ONE REF-  
TEL.ELEMENTS OF CONDITIONALITY WHICH IT SUGGESTS MIGHT BE INTRO-  
DUCED INTO ADHERENCE TO NPT SEEM TO BE VERY MUCH AT VARIANCE WITH  
WELL-ESTABLISHED CDN GOVT POLICY.I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT PM BE  
MADE FULLY AWARE OF THIS IN EVENT HE MAY BE CONSIDERING GIVING  
FURTHER CURRENCY TO THIS IDEA IN HIS DISCUSSIONS IN GOA OR IN  
CHOGM DECLARATION OR COMMUNIQUE.AM REPEATING BELOW TEXT OF PAPER  
PREPARED TODAY AT MY REQUEST BY DEPTL NPT EXPERTS.I BELIEVE THAT  
ESSENTIALS OF THIS TEXT SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO PMS ATTENTION IN WHAT-  
EVER MANNER YOU CONSIDER MOST SUITABLE.SHOULD YOU REQUIRE FURTHER  
AMPLIFICATION ON ANY OF THESE POINTS, YOU MAY WISH TO CONSULT DOUG  
HAMLIN OF HIGH COMMISSION,WHO IS FULLY CONVERSANT WITH OUR NPT  
POLICY.BEST REGARDS.

2.TEXT BEGINS.NEW QUOTE IMPORTANT NUANCE UNQUOTE REPORTED PARA ONE  
REFTEL LEADS US TO RAISE ONCE AGAIN FOR PMS ATTN EXTREME CONCERN  
FELT IN OTT TO EFFECT THAT CDA,HAVING BEEN CONSISTENTLY IN FOREFRONT  
OF THOSE COUNTRIES GIVING MOST FERVENT SUPPORT TO NPT,MAY BECOME  
IDENTIFIED WITH FINAL CHOGM TEXT(EITHER DECLARATION OR COMMUNIQUE)

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PAGE TWO IDDZ0218 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

PLACING FUTURE OF THAT INVALUABLE TREATY IN JEOPARDY.

3.IT IS OF COURSE WIDELY RECOGNIZED NPT IS BASED ON TWO UNDERTAK-  
INGS:(A)NWS UNDERTAKE NOT/NOT TO TRANSFER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR NUCLEAR  
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES TO NNWS(ARTICLE 1),TO MAKE AVAILABLE POTENTIAL  
BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES(ARTICLE 5),AND TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS  
IN GOOD FAITH ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES RELATING TO CESSATION OF  
NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AT EARLY DATE;AND(B)NNWS UNDERTAKE IN TURN NOT/  
NOT TO DEVELOP OR ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE  
DEVICES(ARTICLE 2),AND TO ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL THEIR NUCLEAR  
ACTIVITIES(ARTICLE 3),WHILE NOT/NOT FOREGOING INALIENABLE RIGHT OF  
ALL PARTIES TO ENJOY BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY  
(ARTICLE 4).THUS THERE IS RECOGNITION IN TREATY OF BARGAIN BETWEEN  
NWS(WHO PROMISE TO DISARM) AND NNWS(WHO PROMISE NOT/NOT TO DEVELOP  
OR ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY).GIVEN LACK OF MAJOR AND  
SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT SEVERAL NNWS PARTY TO  
NPT(EG MXICO,YUGO)HAVE IN FACT RAISED AT NPT REVIEW CONFS CONCERN  
THAT FAILURE OF NWS TO LIVE UP TO THEIR SIDE OF BARGAIN MAY LEAD  
NNWS PARTIES NOT/NOT TO HONOUR THEIR SIDE.TO COUNTER THIS CDA AND  
LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES HAVE ARGUED THAT NPT DOES AT LEAST PROVIDE  
MAJOR LEVER TO PRESSURE NWS TO HONOUR THEIR COMMITMENT AND THAT IT  
IS MAJOR INNATL INSTRUMENT TO PREVENT NWS PROBLEM FROM BECOMING EVEN  
WORSE BY ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATION IN WHICH THERE WOULD  
BE MORE NWS IN ADDITION TO FIVE RECOGNIZED BY TREATY(INDIA IS DE

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THREE IDDZ0218 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY  
FACTO NOW SUCH PROBLEM). MOREOVER, SEVERAL NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS (CDA AND  
AUSTL) ARGUE THAT EXISTENCE OF NPT IS ESSENTIAL PRECONDITION FOR  
THEIR GOVTS TO SATISFY CONCERNS OF THEIR PEOPLES OVER PROLIFERATION  
RISK ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR NUCLEAR EXPORTS. IT IS THEREFORE CORNER-  
STONE OF CDN NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY IN BOTH VERTICAL AND HORIZON-  
TAL SENSES AND IS FUNDAMENTAL TO CDN NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY. THIS IS  
BACKGROUND (WELL KNOWN TO YOU) WHICH IS BASIS FOR COMMENTS IN NEXT  
PARA.

4. CONCEPT OF NPT CONDITIONALITY RAISED IN PARA ONE REFTEL THUS COULD  
ADD LEGITIMACY TO ARGUMENT BY STATES NOT/NOT PARTY TO NPT (EG INDIA,  
ARGEN) THAT THEY REFUSE TO FOREGO NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR QUOTE PEACEFUL  
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE UNQUOTE CAPABILITY SINCE NWS HAVE NOT/NOT DISARMED.  
WHILE THIS WOULD BE BAD ENOUGH IT MAY ALSO ENCOURAGE SOME NNWS  
PARTY TO TREATY TO RECONSIDER THEIR ADHERENCE TO TREATY. RESULT COULD  
BE THAT IN EFFORT TO CATCH RELATIVELY FEW (ALTHOUGH IMPORTANT)  
COUNTRIES OUTSIDE CURRENT WIDELY ACCEPTED INNATL NON-PROLIFERATION  
REGIME WE WOULD HAVE ENCOURAGED DISINTEGRATION OF NON-PROLIFERATION  
FRAMEWORK BASED ON THAT TREATY. CONDITIONALITY OF ADHERENCE ALSO  
WOULD FALL FAR SHORT OF INNATL COMMITMENT TO NON-PROLIFERATION SEEN  
AS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE BASIS FOR NUCLEAR COMMERCE (IN WHICH WE HAVE  
MAJOR STAKE) WHICH BY NATURE OF EQPT AND MATERIALS INVOLVED IS LONG  
TERM. NEGATIVE IMPACT ON IAEA SAFEGUARDS REGIME WHICH RELIES LARGELY  
UPON NPT MUST ALSO BE GIVEN FULL WEIGHT.

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PAGE FOUR IDDZ0218 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY  
5. AS FINAL POINT WE HAVE PLACED GREAT WEIGHT (BOTH IN GENERAL TERMS  
AND IN CONTEXT OF OUR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY AS IT RELATED TO  
NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND OUR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS COVERING SUCH EXPORTS)  
ON EXISTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF NPT WHICH ESTABLISHES CLEAR AND SUB-  
STANTIVE PROCESS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM TREATY. CONDITIONALITY CONCEPT  
CALLS THAT PROCESS INTO QUESTION. TEXT ENDS.  
CCC/046 252356Z IDDZ0218

**ACTION**  
**NOTE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM DELHI PMDL0082 25NOV83

TO EXTOTT LDDZ MINA

INFO PCOOTT/CARON

DISTR DMF IMD IMU IDD IDR RGB RBR RCP UGB URR

---PM INITIATIVE AT CHOGM:SITREP

PM INTRODUCET DISCUSSION OF WORLD POLITICAL TRENDS ON AFTERNOON  
OF NOVEMBER 23. TEXT OF SPEAKING NOTES PREPARED FOR HIM WAS  
DISTRIBUTED TO DELEGATES BUT HE DID NOT/NOT STICK STRICTLY TO  
THIS VERSION. IMPORTANT NUANCE CONCERNED NTP. HE SAID HE WOULD  
LIKE TO SEE A WAY OF ENFORCING THAT PACT BY TELLING NUCLEAR  
POWERS THAT IF THEY LIVED UP TO THEIR UNDERTAKING TO REDUCE THEIR  
WEAPONS THEN NON NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD BE PREPARED NOT/NOT TO  
BECOME NUCLEAR POWERS ON CONDITION THAT SAVINGS MADE BY NUCLEAR  
POWERS WOULD BE TURNED TO CAUSE OF DEVELOPMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART.  
DURING YEAR AND HALF WHICH REMAINED BEFORE NTP REVIEW CONFERENCE  
EFFORT COULD BE MADE TO USE THAT INSTRUMENT AS LEVER BY EACH SIDE  
IN ORDER TO MAKE WORLD LESS VULNERABLE TO NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION. PM  
LOOKED TOWARD FORUM WHERE THERE COULD BE DISCUSSION OF PROPOSAL  
THAT COUNTRIES MIGHT ADHERE TO NTP CONDITIONALLY PROVIDING AS  
CONDITION THAT BY TIME OF NTP REVIEW CONFERENCE OR NEXT CHOGM  
NUCLEAR POWERS HAD REDUCED THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS IN ACCORD WITH  
COMPACT AT BASIS OF NTP. PM ENDED BY SAYING HE HAD A BRIEF DRAFT  
STATEMENT FOR CHOGM WHICH HE MIGHT SHOW TO SECRETARIAT.

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P. E TWO PMDL0082 CONF

2. LATER HE GAVE RAMPHAL SUGGESTED TEXT ALONG LINES OF VERSION YOU HAD DRAFTED FOR HIM. HE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED (BUT IN END DECIDED AGAINST) AMENDING POINTS 5 AND 6 TEXT TO ACCORD WITH HIS POINT ABOUT CONDITIONAL ADHERENCE TO NTP.

3. REACTION BY NUMEROUS HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WAS FAVOURABLE TO HIS GENERAL PRESENTATION, WHICH WAS FOCUS OF WHOLE ENSUING DISCUSSION. KAUNDA SUGGESTED THAT SMALL GROUP OF COMMONWEALTH STATES JOIN PM TRUDEAU IN PROMOTING INITIATIVE. PM REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR SOME ASPECTS OF INITIATIVE (EG ASAT PROPOSAL AT UN) BUT NOT/NOT ON ASPECTS OF PROPOSAL HAVING TO DO WITH NATO OR WARSAW PACT, SUCH AS CDE OR MBFR.

4. MRS GANDHI WAS CRITICAL OF NTP ASPECT AND MRS THATCHER IN PREDICTABLY VIGOROUS INTERVENTION INDICATED THAT SHE DID NOT/NOT FULLY AGREE WITH PMS SUGGESTION OF FIVE POWER SUMMIT OF NUCLEAR POWERS. IDEA OF SUCH SUMMIT COULD BE LAUNCHED ONLY ONCE AND ONLY AFTER A GREAT DEAL QUOTE BOTTOM-UP PREP UNQUOTE. SHE DID NOT/NOT WISH TO CAUSE SPLIT WITHIN NATO BY MAKING SUGGESTION THAT OTHER MEMBERS COULD NOT/NOT AGREE TO.

5. DISCUSSION (MOST OF IT POSITIVE ON INITIATIVE) CONTINUED FOR MOST OF THURSDAY MORNING AFTER WHICH GRENADA WAS TAKEN UP. LATER SECRETARIAT PROVIDED PM WITH OUTLINE OF POSSIBLE STATEMENT, DIFFERING VERY SUBSTANTIALLY FROM HIS OWN TEXT, BUT INCLUDING NTP CONDITIONALITY AS WELL AS NEW ELEMENTS SUCH AS NON-VIOLENCE AND SUPPORT FOR UN. IT

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PAGE THREE PMDL0082 CONF

ALSO INCLUDED STATEMENT THAT COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS SUPPORTED PM TRUDEAUS EFFORTS. HE ACCEPTED IT WITH MINOR REVISIONS. SUBSEQUENTLY A REVISED DRAFT WAS SHOWN TO US WHICH WE WERE TOLD WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO INDIANS; IT DELETED MENTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION AND SLIGHTLY WEAKENED BUT STILL RETAINED EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO PM TRUDEAUS EFFORTS. AGAIN PM ASSENTED. (WE WERE NOT/NOT ABLE TO RETAIN COPIES OF EITHER TEXT). FURTHER REVISION IS DUE TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO HOG TODAY IN GOA FOR DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE ISSUANCE OVER WEEKEND. ALTERNATIVELY IT MIGHT BE ISSUED TUESDAY ALONG WITH COMMUNIQUE COVERING SPECIFIC REGIONAL SUBJECTS (GRENADA, CYPRUS, NAMIBIA, ETC.)

6. IN SHORT WE ARE LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM CHOGM WITH SUBSTANTIVE DECLARATION WHICH WHILE NOT/NOT DIRECTLY MODELLED ON PMS PROPOSALS IS IN GENERAL ACCORD WITH THEM AND WILL CONTAIN SPECIFIC INDICATION OF SUPPORT OR WELCOME FOR HIS EFFORTS.

7. NOTE THAT ABOVE CAPSULE SUMMARY OF PMS REMARKS DWELLS ONLY ON NEW ELEMENTS. HE PRESENTED OTHER IDEAS IN LINE WITH SPEAKING NOTES ALTHOUGH IN DIFFERENT FORM AND ORDER. DEL WILL RETURN WITH FULL SECRETARIAT RECORD OF DEBATE.

CCC/068 251237Z PMDL0082



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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25 NOV 83 23 56 20

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C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0218 25NOV83  
TO PMDELDELHI    **DELIVER BY 260900**  
FOR SHENSTONE ONLY DE DELVOIE  
REF PMDEL TEL 0082 25NOV

28-6-1-Tudman Peace Mission

---PM INITIATIVE:NON-PROLIFERATION

AM SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY IMPLICATIONS OF CONTENTS OF PARA ONE REF-  
TEL.ELEMENTS OF CONDITIONALITY WHICH IT SUGGESTS MIGHT BE INTRO-  
DUCED INTO ADHERENCE TO NPT SEEM TO BE VERY MUCH AT VARIANCE WITH  
WELL-ESTABLISHED CDN GOVT POLICY.I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT PM BE  
MADE FULLY AWARE OF THIS IN EVENT HE MAY BE CONSIDERING GIVING  
FURTHER CURRENCY TO ~~THESE NOTIONS~~ <sup>THIS IDEA</sup> IN HIS DISCUSSIONS IN GOA OR IN  
CHOGM DECLARATION OR COMMUNIQUE.AM REPEATING BELOW TEXT OF PAPER  
PREPARED TODAY AT MY REQUEST BY DEPTL NPT EXPERTS.I BELIEVE THAT  
ESSENTIALS OF THIS TEXT SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO PMS ATTENTION IN WHAT-  
EVER MANNER YOU CONSIDER MOST SUITABLE.SHOULD YOU REQUIRE FURTHER  
AMPLIFICATION ON ANY OF THESE POINTS, YOU MAY WISH TO CONSULT DOUG  
HAMLIN OF HIGH COMMISSION,WHO IS FULLY CONVERSANT WITH OUR NPT  
POLICY.BEST REGARDS.

2.TEXT BEGINS.NEW QUOTE IMPORTANT NUANCE UNQUOTE REPORTED PARA ONE  
REFTEL LEADS US TO RAISE ONCE AGAIN FOR PMS ATTN EXTREME CONCERN  
FELT IN OTT TO EFFECT THAT CDA,HAVING BEEN CONSISTENTLY IN FOREFRONT  
OF THOSE COUNTRIES GIVING MOST FERVENT SUPPORT TO NPT,MAY BECOME  
IDENTIFIED WITH FINAL CHOGM TEXT(EITHER DECLARATION OR COMMUNIQUE)

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PAGE TWO    121    10  
IDDZ0218    CONFD    CDN    EYES    ONLY

PLACING FUTURE OF THAT INVALUABLE TREATY IN JEOPARDY.

3. IT IS OF COURSE WIDELY RECOGNIZED NPT IS BASED ON TWO UNDERTAKINGS: (A) NWS UNDERTAKE NOT/NOT TO TRANSFER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES TO NNWS (ARTICLE 1), TO MAKE AVAILABLE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES (ARTICLE 5), AND TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES RELATING TO CESSATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AT EARLY DATE; AND (B) NNWS UNDERTAKE IN TURN NOT/NOT TO DEVELOP OR ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (ARTICLE 2), AND TO ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL THEIR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES (ARTICLE 3), WHILE NOT/NOT FOREGOING INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ALL PARTIES TO ENJOY BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (ARTICLE 4). THUS THERE IS RECOGNITION IN TREATY OF BARGAIN BETWEEN NWS (WHO PROMISE TO DISARM) AND NNWS (WHO PROMISE NOT/NOT TO DEVELOP OR ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY). GIVEN LACK OF MAJOR AND SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT SEVERAL NNWS PARTY TO NPT (EG MEXICO, YUGO) HAVE IN FACT RAISED AT NPT REVIEW CONFS CONCERN THAT FAILURE OF NWS TO LIVE UP TO THEIR SIDE OF BARGAIN MAY LEAD NNWS PARTIES NOT/NOT TO HONOUR THEIR SIDE. TO COUNTER THIS CDA AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES HAVE ARGUED THAT NPT DOES AT LEAST PROVIDE MAJOR LEVER TO PRESSURE NWS TO HONOUR THEIR COMMITMENT AND THAT IT IS MAJOR INTL INSTRUMENT TO PREVENT NWS PROBLEM FROM BECOMING EVEN WORSE BY ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATION IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE MORE NWS IN ADDITION TO FIVE RECOGNIZED BY TREATY (INDIA IS DE

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PAGE THREE IDDZ0218 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

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FACTO NOW SUCH PROBLEM). MOREOVER, SEVERAL NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS (CDA AND AUSTL) ARGUE THAT EXISTENCE OF NPT IS ESSENTIAL PRECONDITION FOR THEIR GOVTS TO SATISFY CONCERNS OF THEIR PEOPLES OVER PROLIFERATION RISK ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR NUCLEAR EXPORTS. IT IS THEREFORE CORNERSTONE OF CDN NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY IN BOTH VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL SENSES AND IS FUNDAMENTAL TO CDN NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY. THIS IS BACKGROUND (WELL KNOWN TO YOU) WHICH IS BASIS FOR COMMENTS IN NEXT PARA.

4. CONCEPT OF NPT CONDITIONALITY RAISED IN PARA ONE REFTEL, THIS COULD ADD LEGITIMACY TO ARGUMENT BY STATES NOT/NOT PARTY TO NPT (EG INDIA, ARGEN) THAT THEY REFUSE TO FOREGO NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR QUOTE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE UNQUOTE CAPABILITY SINCE NWS HAVE NOT/NOT DISARMED. WHILE THIS WOULD BE BAD ENOUGH IT MAY ALSO ENCOURAGE SOME NNWS PARTY TO TREATY TO RECONSIDER THEIR ADHERENCE TO TREATY. RESULT COULD BE THAT IN EFFORT TO CATCH RELATIVELY FEW (ALTHOUGH IMPORTANT) COUNTRIES OUTSIDE CURRENT WIDELY ACCEPTED INNATL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME WE WOULD HAVE ENCOURAGED DISINTEGRATION OF NON-PROLIFERATION FRAMEWORK BASED ON THAT TREATY. CONDITIONALITY OF ADHERENCE ALSO WOULD FALL FAR SHORT OF INNATL COMMITMENT TO NON-PROLIFERATION SEEN AS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE BASIS FOR NUCLEAR COMMERCE (IN WHICH WE HAVE MAJOR STAKE) WHICH BY NATURE OF EQPT AND MATERIALS INVOLVED IS LONG TERM. NEGATIVE IMPACT ON IAEA SAFEGUARDS REGIME WHICH RELIES LARGELY UPON NPT MUST ALSO BE GIVEN FULL WEIGHT.

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Department of External Affairs



Canada


Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

November 25, 1983.

IDDZ-0216

Mr. Serge Kozlovski  
5114 Cote St. Antoine  
Montreal, Quebec  
H4A 1N7



Dear Mr. Kozlovski:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, permit me to reply to your letter of October 31 in which you express support for the Prime Minister's current set of initiatives aimed at enhancing the level of dialogue between East and West.

You will be pleased to know that the Prime Minister has received many letters such as yours, fully supporting the effort which, it is hoped, will lead to some movement in the international dialogue on arms control and disarmament. Like you, many have offered to lend their good offices for further advancing these efforts. I can assure you that the Prime Minister greatly appreciates the support. It is the concern of Canadians such as yourself which he is endeavouring to bring to the attention of many of the world leaders. While the results of these efforts have yet to emerge, there is no question that the effort has to be made.

Your letter also raises several new points regarding your proposal for the establishment of a U.N. Emergency/Peace Keeping Force. These have been brought to the attention of the Department of External Affairs, which had taken note of your previous recommendations.

Thank you for expressing your interest in this most important endeavour.

Yours sincerely,

L.A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

*M. Fiele*

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

K1A 0G2

November 25, 1983.

IDDZ-0215

Mr. J.R. Vallentyne  
Canada Centre for Inland Waters  
867 Lakeshore Road  
P.O. Box 5050  
Burlington, Ontario  
L7R 4A6

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace  
Mission

Dear Mr. Vallentyne:

Thank you for your letter of November 2 addressed to the Prime Minister and containing reports on the consequences of nuclear war. These have been brought to the attention of the members of the Task Force. You will be interested to know that many people, some in the government such as yourself, others outside, have taken the time to provide the Prime Minister and the Task Force with ideas and background material.

They have tended to reconfirm that Canadians are seriously concerned with the parlous state of international relations and the need for Canadian initiatives.

Thank you for writing.

*Yours sincerely  
L.A. Delvoie*

L.A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

REFERRED BY THE OFFICE  
OF THE SECRETARY OF  
STATE FOR EXTERNAL  
AFFAIRS, MINISTER'S  
REGISTRY - LETTERS

TRANSMIS PAR LE CABINET  
DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT  
AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES  
DOSSIERS DU MINISTÈRE -  
LETTRES

5-2723

To/À  
AU

~~IDA~~

~~IDDZ~~

All task  
force  
members  
5 feb  
m

7/12/83

FOR INFORMATION AND ANY NECESSARY ACTION  
POUR EXAMEN ET SUITE À DONNER, S'IL Y A LIEU

THIS LETTER HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED  
ON A ACCUSÉ RÉCEPTION DE CETTE LETTRE

BY TELEPHONE/PAR TÉLÉPHONE

BY LETTER (Copy attached)/PAR LETTRE (Copie-jointe)

REMARKS/REMARQUES

Signature


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Da

RR #1, Fanny Bay, B.C.VOR 1W0.  
November 25, 1983.

Pierre Elliot Trudeau,  
Prime Minister,  
Ottawa, Canada.



Dear Mr. Trudeau,

I'm sure millions of Canadians, as well as many more millions around the world, are watching, in prayerful anticipation, as you move among the world's leaders with your peace initiative. I feel that your intellect and background fit you for the formidable task of providing leadership at a time when the alternatives to working towards a peaceful coexistence are depressingly bleak.

I hope that you will gather sufficient support for your initiative that your Government is able to respond to the wishes of the majority of Canadians and make Canada a truly Nuclear-free zone, including reversing its decision to test the American (its not a NATO weapon) Cruise Missile. Only then, I believe, could we appear credible to all nations.

Wars have begun, in the past, because countries were prepared for war. Let us, Mr. Trudeau, with determined leadership from you, prepare for peace. Let us get out of this rotten game and work as a country to further the cause of justice in the world - the only way to peace. Surely the issues are ~~at~~ above politics - the survival of our fragile Spaceship Earth.

I urge your Government to allow Canadians who wish to show tangible support for peace initiatives, to direct their taxes, proportionately, to peaceful, rather than military uses, through the creation of a Peace Tax Fund. This money could go to the establishment of conflict-resolution studies at all educational levels. Our first installment is awaiting such legislation, with eager anticipation.

Jim Lunam joins me in wishing you every success in your current work and heartfelt thanks for your laudable efforts.

C.C.  
Hon. Alan Mac Eachen  
Mr. Bussières  
Mr. Ray Skelly M.P.

Sincerely

*Margaret Lunam*  
Margaret Lunam

*Jim Lunam*  
Jim Lunam M.D.

RR #1, Fanny Bay, P.C. NOR IWO.  
November 22, 1983.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY  
PRIME MINISTER  
DEC 2 1983  
CABINET DU VICE-  
PREMIER MINISTRE

MF



United States Embassy  
Ottawa, Canada, K1P 5T1

# BACKGROUND

(83-73)

(11-25-83-POL)

## CHRONOLOGY: U.S., SOVIET ARMS CONTROL POLICIES

IN LIGHT OF THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT SUSPENDING NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA ON LONGER-RANGE INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES (LRINF) BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE COURSE OF THE TALKS AND THE ANNOUNCED POLICIES OF THE PARTICIPANTS IS MADE AVAILABLE.

NEGOTIATIONS ON LONGER-RANGE INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES:

28-6-1: Trudeau Peace Mission

UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 1979 --- NATO ELABORATES "TWO-TRACK" DECISION: TO NEGOTIATE TO BRING DOWN LEVELS OF LRINF OR ELIMINATE LRINF MISSILES ON BOTH SIDES, AND TO MODERNIZE NATO FORCES IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS IF NECESSARY.

NOVEMBER 1981 --- REAGAN ANNOUNCES "O-O" PROPOSAL, TO ELIMINATE ENTIRE CLASS OF U.S. AND SOVIET LAND-BASED, LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES. NATO WOULD NOT DEPLOY COUNTERPART SYSTEMS IF USSR WOULD ELIMINATE THE SYSTEMS IT HAD DEPLOYED.

FEBRUARY 1983 --- U.S. REITERATES CRITERIA FOR REACHING AGREEMENT IN LRINF TALKS:

- 1) EQUALITY OF RIGHTS AND LIMITS BETWEEN U.S. AND USSR;
- 2) EXCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT THIRD COUNTRY, I.E., BRITISH AND FRENCH, NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCES FROM ANY AGREEMENT;
- 3) AGREED-UPON LIMITS MUST BE APPLIED ON A GLOBAL BASIS; NO SHIFT OF SOVIET LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES FROM EUROPEAN USSR TO ASIAN USSR;
- 4) NO WEAKENING OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT FORCES;
- 5) EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES.

MARCH 1983 --- NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS REJECT SOVIET "SUB-CEILING" AS LEAVING THEM WITH MORE SS-20'S THAN WHEN NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN.

MARCH 1983 --- GIVEN SOVIET REFUSAL TO ELIMINATE ITS LRINF SYSTEMS IN RETURN FOR NONDEPLOYMENT OF COUNTERPART NATO SYSTEMS, AS CALLED FOR IN THE "O-O" PROPOSAL, U.S. PROPOSES "INTERIM AGREEMENT." UNDER IT,

(MORE)

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U.S. OFFERS TO REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES IF SOVIETS WILL REDUCE THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THEIR LRINF MISSILES TO AN EQUAL LEVEL ON A GLOBAL BASIS. U.S. INDICATES IT PREFERS "0-0" AS IDEAL EVENTUAL SOLUTION TO LRINF PROBLEM.

SEPT. 1983 --- REAGAN SPEECH AT U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ANNOUNCES NEW U.S. INITIATIVES WHICH ADDRESS SPECIFIC SOVIET CONCERNS:

1) A WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE LRINF AIRCRAFT IN THE INF TALKS, EVEN THOUGH U.S. CONTINUES TO SEE SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS AS PRIMARY THREAT TO WESTERN SECURITY.

2) WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN INF ARRANGEMENT PROVIDING EQUAL GLOBAL LIMITS, A COMMITMENT NOT TO OFFSET THE TOTAL SOVIET DEPLOYMENT BY U.S. DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE.

3) WILLINGNESS, IF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IS REACHED, TO APPORTION U.S. REDUCTIONS APPROPRIATELY BETWEEN PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES.

OCTOBER 1983 --- U.S. STATES ANDROPOV PROPOSAL CONTAINS SHORTCOMINGS BECAUSE IT STILL INSISTS UPON USSR BEING COMPENSATED FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH STRATEGIC FORCES THROUGH ITS INF DEPLOYMENTS AND CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT NO U.S. DEPLOYMENTS OCCUR. PROPOSAL TO FREEZE LRINF DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIAN USSR APPEARS TO RECOGNIZE U.S. VIEW THAT LRINF MUST BE TREATED ON A GLOBAL BASIS. U.S. IS SEEKING DETAILS OF SOVIET PROPOSAL ON AIRCRAFT.

--- U.S. NOTES THAT SOVIET THREAT TO END NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE APPEARANCE OF U.S. MISSILES IN EUROPE IS UNJUSTIFIED, AS U.S. HAS NEGOTIATED FOR TWO YEARS WHILE SOVIET SS-20 LEVELS ROSE DRAMATICALLY.

--- U.S. ANNOUNCES WITHDRAWAL OF 1,400 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM EUROPE, WHICH, COMBINED WITH 1,000 WEAPONS WITHDRAWN IN 1980, WILL REDUCE NATO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE BY MORE THAN ONE THIRD FROM 1979 LEVEL.

NOVEMBER 1983 --- U.S. PROPOSES INTERIM GLOBAL CEILING OF 420 WARHEADS ON LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES, WHILE STRESSING WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER OTHER LEVELS OF REDUCTIONS. THIS PROPOSAL EQUATES TO A GLOBAL LIMIT OF 140 SS-20 LAUNCHERS. IN OCTOBER 1983 THE USSR PROPOSED TO LIMIT ONLY THEIR SS-20 FORCE IN RANGE OF EUROPE TO 140 LAUNCHERS WITH 420 WARHEADS.

--- DELIVERIES OF FIRST GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES BEGIN IN GREAT BRITAIN.

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(MORE)

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USSR

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1977 -- SOVIET UNION BEGINS DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20 MISSILES IN EUROPEAN USSR.

DECEMBER 1978 --- 70 SS-20'S, WITH 210 WARHEADS, NOW DEPLOYED IN EUROPE AND ASIAN USSR.

OCTOBER 1979 --- BREZHNEV PROPOSES SOVIET FREEZE OF SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS IF NATO DEPLOYS NO COUNTERPART SYSTEMS.

JULY 1980 --- SOVIETS FINALLY AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS ON INF, HAVING PREVIOUSLY REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE UNLESS NATO ABANDONED "TWO-TRACK" DECISION.

OCTOBER 1980 --- PRELIMINARY U.S. SOVIET TALKS ON INF.

DECEMBER 1980 --- 200 SS-20'S, WITH 600 WARHEADS, NOW DEPLOYED IN EUROPEAN AND ASIAN USSR.

NOVEMBER 1981 --- INF TALKS BEGIN IN GENEVA.

DECEMBER 1981 --- 270 SS-20'S, WITH 810 WARHEADS, NOW DEPLOYED IN EUROPEAN AND ASIAN USSR.

MARCH 1982 --- 300 SS-20'S WITH 900 WARHEADS, NOW DEPLOYED IN EUROPEAN AND ASIAN USSR. SOVIETS ANNOUNCE "MORATORIUM" ON DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPEAN USSR, BUT DEPLOYMENTS CONTINUE AS MISSILE SITES UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN EUROPEAN USSR ARE FINISHED AND ACTIVATED AND NEW SITES ARE BEGUN IN EASTERN USSR WHOSE MISSILES CAN REACH NATO TARGETS.

DECEMBER 1982 --- ANDROPOV PROPOSES "SUB-CEILING," ALLOWING USSR TO DEPLOY LRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE EQUAL TO THEIR COUNT OF 162 BRITISH AND FRENCH STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. 162 TRIPLE-WARHEAD SS-20'S CAN HIT A TOTAL OF 486 TARGETS; 162 BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILES CAN ONLY HIT 162 TARGETS. NO U.S. LRINF MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE WOULD BE ALLOWED, UNLIMITED SOVIET SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS PERMITTED IN ASIAN USSR.

MARCH 1983 --- 351 SS-20'S, WITH 1,053 WARHEADS, NOW DEPLOYED IN EUROPEAN AND ASIAN USSR.

APRIL 1983 --- FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TERMS U.S. "INTERIM SOLUTION" UNACCEPTABLE. REITERATES SOVIET POSITION THAT NO U.S. DEPLOYMENTS MUST OCCUR, AND THAT SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS BE TIED TO SOVIET COUNT OF BRITISH AND FRENCH STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

MAY 1983 --- ANDROPOV INDICATES WILLINGNESS TO COUNT WARHEADS AS WELL AS MISSILES AT TALKS. REITERATES THAT NUMBER OF SS-20'S IN EUROPEAN USSR WOULD BE KEYED TO SOVIET COUNT OF BRITISH AND FRENCH STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. REFUSES TO ADDRESS SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIAN USSR, TO WHICH SOVIET MISSILES WITHDRAWN FROM EUROPEAN USSR COULD BE MOVED, WITH POTENTIAL FOR QUICK MOVEMENT BACK TO EUROPEAN USSR.

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AUGUST 1983 -- ANDROPOV PROPOSES TO LIQUIDATE LAUNCHERS AND MISSILES TO SOVIET COUNT OF U.K. AND FRENCH LEVELS, PROVIDED THE U.S. CANCELS DEPLOYMENTS OF PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES.

OCTOBER 1983 -- SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTRY STATES THAT USSR IS PREPARING TO DEPLOY "OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL" MISSILES IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS PART OF "PLANNED COUNTERMEASURES" TO U.S. DEPLOYMENTS.

OCTOBER 1983 -- ANDROPOV PROPOSES MODIFIED VERSION OF DECEMBER 1982 "SUB- CEILING," BY ANNOUNCING THAT USSR IS WILLING TO REDUCE NUMBER OF SS-20'S IN EUROPEAN USSR TO 140 WITH 420 WARHEADS TO MATCH SOVIET COUNT OF BRITISH AND FRENCH WARHEADS. ANDROPOV OFFERS TO FREEZE THE NUMBER OF SS-20'S DEPLOYED IN ASIAN USSR, ONCE AN INF AGREEMENT LIMITING EUROPEAN-BASED SYSTEMS IS IMPLEMENTED, AS LONG AS U.S. DEPLOYS NO SIMILAR WEAPONS IN THAT REGION. ANDROPOV ALSO ANNOUNCES "ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY" ON THE ISSUE OF COUNTING INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT, ALTHOUGH DETAILS ARE NOT PROVIDED. ANDROPOV ANNOUNCES THAT START OF DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. LRINF MISSILES "WILL MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTINUE THE INF TALKS."

NOVEMBER 1983 -- 360 SS-20'S, WITH 1,080 WARHEADS, NOW DEPLOYED IN EUROPEAN AND ASIAN USSR.

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STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (S.T.A.R.T.)

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UNITED STATES

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JANUARY 1981 -- PRESIDENT REAGAN ANNOUNCES THAT U.S. WILL ABIDE BY UNRATIFIED SALT II TREATY, EVEN THOUGH IT DID NOT MEANINGFULLY LIMIT THE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. SOVIETS MAKE RECIPROCAL COMMITMENT.

MAY 1982 -- PRESIDENT REAGAN'S EUREKA COLLEGE SPEECH, HIS FIRST COMPREHENSIVE SPEECH ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IN THE SPEECH, REAGAN PROPOSES S.T.A.R.T. TALKS.

JUNE 1982 -- FIRST ROUND OF S.T.A.R.T. TALKS. U.S. PROPOSES LIMIT OF 850 DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES FOR EACH SIDE, AS WELL AS A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS BY ABOUT ONE THIRD TO 5,000 FOR EACH SIDE (NO MORE THAN HALF OF WHICH ARE TO BE DEPLOYED ON INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES -- ICBMS.)

-- U.S. ALSO PROPOSES THAT DISCUSSION OF AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT BE POSTPONED TO THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

JUNE 1983 -- REAGAN ANNOUNCES CHANGES IN U.S. S.T.A.R.T. NEGOTIATING POSITION DESIGNED TO INCREASE FLEXIBILITY AT THE S.T.A.R.T. TALKS:

MORE)

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1) RELAXATION OF PROPOSAL LIMITING EACH SIDE TO TOTAL OF 850 BALLISTIC MISSILES; LIMIT OF 5,000 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS FOR EACH SIDE WOULD REMAIN AS CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE PROPOSAL.

2) AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS ALL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, RATHER THAN LIMITING THE FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS TO BALLISTIC MISSILES.

3) AN EQUAL CEILING FOR BOTH SIDES ON THE NUMBER OF HEAVY BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES CARRIED BY BOMBERS BELOW THE NUMBER ALLOWED IN THE SALT II TREATY.

4) AN OFFER TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO LIMIT THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY AND POTENTIAL OF BALLISTIC MISSILES. U.S. NOTES THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE INSUFFICIENT BECAUSE THEY DO NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES, WHICH ARE THE MOST DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS, NOR DO THEY CALL FOR SUFFICIENTLY SIGNIFICANT CUTS.

OCTOBER 1983 --- U.S. INCORPORATES THE "BUILD-DOWN" CONCEPT INTO ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION ON BALLISTIC MISSILES BY PROPOSING:

1) LINKING REDUCTIONS TO MODERNIZATION BY USING VARIABLE RATIOS WHICH IDENTIFY HOW MANY EXISTING NUCLEAR WARHEADS MUST BE WITHDRAWN AS NEW WARHEADS ARE DEPLOYED.

2) PROVISION FOR A GUARANTEED ANNUAL PERCENTAGE BUILD-DOWN OF APPROXIMATELY FIVE PERCENT.

3) A PROVISION WHICH INSURED THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD BE PAGED BY WHICHEVER OF THE TWO ABOVE PROVISIONS WOULD PRODUCE THE GREATER REDUCTIONS.

--- IN ADDITION, U.S. PROPOSES TO DISCUSS CONCURRENTLY A BUILD-DOWN OF BOMBERS; ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CRUISE MISSILES AND U.S. ADVANTAGES IN BOMBERS, IN WAYS THAT PROVIDE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY FOR EACH SIDE CONSISTENT WITH MOVEMENT TOWARD A MORE STABLE BALANCE OF FORCES.

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USSR

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1982 --- SOVIET UNION CRITICIZES U.S. PROPOSALS AS SEEKING TO LIMIT THEIR LAND-BASED SYSTEMS WHILE NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONSTRAINING U.S. BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES.

JUNE 1982 --- FIRST ROUND OF S.Y.A.R.T. TALKS. USSR PROPOSES THAT EACH SIDE BE ALLOWED AN AGGREGATE OF 1,800 STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES (ICBM LAUNCHERS, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS, AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS). SOVIETS ALSO PROPOSE AN UNDEFINED AGGREGATE LIMIT ON "NUCLEAR CHARGES" (MISSILE WARHEADS AND BOMBER WEAPONS). SOVIETS PROPOSE BAN ON ALL CRUISE MISSILES WITH RANGES IN EXCESS OF 300 KILOMETERS.

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SUMMER 1983 -- FOURTH ROUND OF S.T.A.R.T. TALKS. USSR ADJUSTS ITS POSITION TO CONFORM MORE CLOSELY TO U.S. POSITION ON SOME SECONDARY ISSUES.

OCTOBER 1983 -- AUTHORITATIVE UNSIGNED "PRAVDA" ARTICLE CRITICIZES THE U.S. "BUILD-DOWN" PROPOSAL, BECAUSE IT WOULD UNFAIRLY CONSTRAIN SOVIET ICBMS.

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**SECRET**

28-6-1-Thudreau  
Peace  
Mission

*Fowler*  
*Stewart*  
*A. Johnson*  
*McD*

S E C R E T

FM BNATO YBGR7134 25NOV83  
TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 251300  
INFO DELHI/PMDL BONN BRU WSHDC MOSCO VMBFR GENEV PARIS HAGUE OSLO  
COPEN ATHNS MDRID LSBON CANMILREPNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER LDN ROME  
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/CORAE/DSTRATA/DNACPOL/CIS  
DISTR MINA DMF IDA RCR RBR ZSI ZSP CPD RGX IDRL IDRA IDDZ IFB  
---INF NEGOTIATIONS:NITZE BRIEFING TO COUNCIL 25NOV  
SUMMARY:CHIEF USA INF NEGOTIATOR NITZE BRIEFED COUNCIL 25NOV ON  
SOVIET DISCONTINUANCE OF INF NEGOTIATING ROUND 23NOV AND EVENTS  
LEADING UP TO IT.HE MADE CLEAR RUSSIANS SIMPLY COULD NOT/NOT BRING  
THEMSELVES TO ACCEPT ANY AGMT THAT WOULD, IN THEIR EYES,BLESS  
DEPLOYMENT OF EVEN SINGLE USA LRINF MISSILE IN EUROPE.IT WAS NOT/NOT  
CLEAR TO NITZE WHETHER RUSSIANS WOULD SEEK NOW TO MERGE INF WITH  
START BUT HE CLEARLY WOULD NOT/NOT FAVOUR SUCH A COURSE.PORITION OF  
USA INF DEL WILL REMAIN IN GENEV TO DEMONSTRATE USA READINESS TO  
RESUME NEGS AT ANY TIME;ENTIRE SOVIET DE DEPARTS FOR MOSCO 26NOV.  
(FULL TEXT OF NITZE PRESENTATION BY BAG TOGETHER WITH ADDENDUM  
OUTLINING IN MORE DETAIL EVOLUTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.)  
2.REPORT:NITZE REVIEWED SOVIET AND USA STATEMENTS IN NEGS 23NOV.  
SUBSTANCE OF THESE STATEMENTS RE SOVEIT DISCONTINUANCE OF ROUND  
AND USA REGRET ARE FAMILIAR TO YOU.NITZE ALSO REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS  
IN NEGS SINCE GLITMAN BRIEFING TO COUNCIL 14OCT(SEE OURTEL YBGR6987  
17OCT).HERE AGAIN DETAILS WILL BE FAMILIAR TO YOU ON BASIS OF SCG  
...2

PAGE TWO YBGR7134 SECRET  
AND OTHER REPORTS SINCE THEN.

3.NITZE MENTIONED MEETING PRIVATELY WITH SOVIET NEGOTIATOR  
KVITSINSKIY SEVERAL TIMES DURING CURRENT ROUND.IN ADDN TO  
DISCUSSING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FORMAL POSITIONS OF TWO SIDES,THEY  
DISCUSSED IN THESE PRIVATE TALKS ADDL POTENTIAL WAYS OF BRINGING TWO  
SIDES TOGETHER,NAMELY NITZE/KVITSINSKIY(A)QUOTE REVISITED IF ONLY  
BRIEFLY UNQUOTE WALK-IN-THE-WOODS JOINT PACKAGE;(B)DISCUSSED SOVIET  
REFS TO AN APPROACH THAT WOULD RESULT IN 54 SS20S VS NO/NO USA  
DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE;(C)KVITSINSKIY RAISED POSSIBILITY OF REACHING  
AGMT BY EQUAL REDUCTIONS.RE WALK-IN-THE-WOODS PACKAGE,NITZE TOLD  
KVITSINSKIY HE HAD HEARD SOME SOVIET SPOKESMEN WERE QUOTE AS SAYING  
PACKAGE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE AS BASIS FOR NEGS IF USA FORMALLY  
PROPOSED IT.KVITSINSKIY STATED THAT SOME ON SOVIET SIDE WERE SPEAKING  
OUT OF TURN AND THAT,EVEN IF PROPOSED BY USA,MOSCO WOULD REJECT  
WALK-IN-THE-WOODS PACKAGE IN ITS ENTIRETY.RE 54 TO ZERO FORMULA,  
NITZE TOLD KVITSINSKIY HE HAD HEARD THIS APPROACH HAD BEEN SUGGESTED  
BY CERTAIN SOVIET SPOKESMEN.KVITSINSKIY REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO/NO  
SUBSTANCE TO WHAT THOSE PEOPLE WERE SAYING BECAUSE SOVIET MILITARY  
WOULD NOT/NOT THINK OF ACCEPTING A NUMBER AS LOW AS 54.EQUAL  
REDUCTIONS APPROACH WAS INITIALLY RAISED BY KVITSINSKIY IN AN  
INFORMAL CONVERSATION 26OCT.HE SUGGESTED USA PROPOSE BOTH SIDES  
AGREE TO REDUCE BY 572 WARHEADS AND SAID THIS WOULD LEAVE USSR WITH  
APPROX 120 SS20S AND NO/NO USA DEPLOYMENTS.FURTHERMORE,KVITSINSKIY  
...3

PAGE THREE YBGR7134 SECRET

SA IT COULD BE COUPLED WITH AN AGMT TO DEAL WITH UK AND FRENCH FORCES IN FUTURE NEGS. NITZE INFORMED THAT INS SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS HE ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATION OF THIS INFORMAL SUGGESTION. THEN, AT PRIVATE MTG 13NOV KVITSINSKIY INFORMED NITZE THAT HE HAD RECD INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCO THE NIGHT BEFORE OFFICIALLY AUTHORIZING HIM TO SAY THAT IF USA WERE FORMALLY TO PROPOSE EQUAL REDUCTIONS OF 572 WARHEADS IN EUROPE RUSSIANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT. DETAILS OF IDEAS ADVANCED BY KVITSINSKIY AT 13NOV MTG WILL BE FAMILIAR TO YOU AS WELL AS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS BETWEEN THEN AND 23NOV DISCONTINUANCE OF INF NEGOTIATING ROUND. ONLY NEW ELABORATION IN THIS REGARD WAS NITZE COMMENT THAT ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS HE MET WITH KVITSINSKIY 19NOV AND HANDED OVER PAPER EXPLAINING WHY SOVIET EQUAL REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

4. NITZE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WHILE PLENARY AND PRIVATE DISCUSSION DURING LATEST ROUND DID NOT/NOT LEAD TO DEFINITIVE SOLUTION, THEY DID SUCCEED IN NARROWING DIFFERENCES ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF CONVERGENCE RE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF NEGS AND ON LIMITATION ON LRINF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, ALTHOUGH POSNS OF BOTH SIDES REMAINED UNAGREED. SOVIET INITIATIVE OF 13NOV INDICATED RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN OUTCOME BASED ON AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT RATIONALE FOR ISSUE OF UK/FRENCH FORCES COMPENSATION, PROVIDED IT SIMILARLY RESULTED IN LARGE SS20 FORCE IN EUROPE AND NO/NO USA DEPLOYMENTS. CRUCIAL ISSUE

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BETWEEN BOTH SIDES THUS REMAINED THAT OF CONTINUING MONOPOLY OF SOVIET LRINF MISSILE FORCES IN EUROPE. IN ADDENDUM TO NITZE PREPARED TEXT, HE CONCLUDED THAT ABSENCE FROM 13NOV INITIATIVE OF EXPLICIT COMPENSATION FOR UK/FRENCH FORCES IN INF SUPPORTED USA VIEW THAT PAST SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THIS WAS ONLY A PRETEXT FOR MAINTAINING INF MONOPOLY. MOREOVER, MANNER IN WHICH RUSSIANS ADVANCED IDEA AND THEN ATTRIBUTED IT TO USA SERVED ONLY TO CALL INTO QUESTION SERIOUSNESS OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING APPROACH THUS FAR IN NEGS.

5. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS EMERGED FROM SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION: PART OF USA INF DEL WILL REMAIN IN GENEV TO DEMONSTRATE READINESS TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY TIME. ENTIRE SOVIET DEL DEPARTS FOR MOSCO 26NOV.

6. KVITSINSKIY WAS CAREFUL TO LEAVE OPEN CONTINUATION OF INF TALKS OR THEIR MERGER WITH START. HE DID NOT/NOT INDICATE IN ANY WAY THAT THEY SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO START. NITZE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THERE WAS DIVIDED OPINION ON SUBJ IN MOSCO AND RUSSIANS HAD NOT/NOT MADE UP THEIR MINDS WHAT TO DO. USA DEPUTY INF NEGOTIATOR GLITMAN POINTED OUT HOWEVER THAT IN START RUSSIANS HAD LAID GROUNDWORK FOR POSSIBLE MERGER BY INCLUDING IN THEIR NEGOTIATING POSN, BAN ON GLCM, REFERENCE TO PII AS STRATEGIC, AND CALL FOR AGMT NOT/NOT PLACE STRATEGIC MISSILES IN THIRD COUNTRIES FROM WHERE THEY COULD REACH EITHER COUNTRY.

7. NITZE SAID NOTHING WAS TO BE DEDUCED FROM CURRENT START ROUND

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PAGE FIVE YBGR7134 SECRET

ENDING DURING WEEK BEGINNING 27NOV, SINCE IT NORMALLY WOULD CONCLUDE THEN. USA HAD SUGGESTED IT CONCLUDE 29NOV, RUSSIANS HAD TALKED ABOUT LATER SO THEY MAY AGREE ON 01DEC. SHOULD RUSSIANS ANNOUNCE THAT THEY WOULD NOT/NOT AGREE TO RESUMPTION DATE WOULD HOWEVER REPRESENT CHANGE.

8. NITZE WAS ASKED HOW USA WOULD REACT IF RUSSIAN START NEGOTIATORS SOUGHT INCREASINGLY TO DISCUSS INF IN THAT FORUM. HE SAID THIS WOULD NOT/NOT BE HARD TO HANDLE; IT WOULD BE EASY TO SAY INF ISSUES WERE MATTERS FOR ANOTHER NEGOTIATION. RUSSIANS REGARDED ANY SYSTEM THAT COULD STRIKE OTHER SIDE AS STRATEGIC. THE CONCEPT OF MERGER WORRIED NITZE VERY MUCH SINCE RUSSIANS WOULD ON THAT BASIS FEEL THEIR POSN WAS RIGHT AND HENCE, ONLY CHOOSE TO DISCUSS SYSTEMS THAT COULD REACH SOVIET TERRITORY, IE USA FORWARD-BASED AIRCRAFT, GLCM, PII, UK/FRENCH FORCES WHILE EXCLUDING COMPARABLE AND OTHER SOVIET SYSTEMS TARGETTED ON EUROPE ON BASIS THAT THEY COULD NOT/NOT REACH USA. HE SAID ON THIS BASIS USA SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION IN INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE SYSTEMS BECAUSE OF THE IMBALANCE, BASED ON SOVIET DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, IN EUROPE. NITZE SPOKE OF STRAIGHTFORWARD BALANCE REPRESENTED BY TWO SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS-USA/USSR BALANCE IN LRINF IN INF TALKS AND USA/USSR BALANCE IN INTER-CONTINENTAL RANGE SYSTEMS IN START.

9. WHILE KVITSINSKIY HAD MADE REFS TO MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES HE WAS CAREFUL NOT/NOT TO GET INTO DETAILS. ASKED IF PROPOSED SOVIET MILITARY  
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COUNTERMEASURES WOULD AFFECT STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM NITZE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT/NOT CLEAR WHAT SYSTEMS RUSSIANS HAD IN MIND TO DEPLOY ON SUBMARINES OFF USA COAST. DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET SLCM, WHILE POSING CERTAIN PROBLEM, WOULD NOT/NOT REPRESENT CHANGE IN KIND OF PROBLEM USA ALREADY FACED, IE THREAT FROM SOVIET SUBMARINE MISSILES. NITZE SAID SOME HAD SAID RUSSIANS WOULD DEPLOY 572 ADDITIONAL WARHEADS IN EUROPE DIRECTED AGAINST EUROPEAN TARGETS AND 572 WARHEADS AGAINST USA. HOWEVER, WHEN ONE CONSIDERED 10,000-20,000 SOVIET WARHEADS ALREADY THREATENING USA, ADDITIONAL 572 DID NOT/NOT SUBSTANTIALLY ALTER STRATEGIC SITUATION.

10. OUR QUERY WHETHER NITZE CONSIDERED RUSSIANS SAW IN IT THEIR INTEREST TO REACH INF AGMT ELICITED INTERESTING REPLY. NITZE IMPRESSION WAS THAT DURING FIRST YEAR OF NEGOTIATIONS USSR WAS EXPLORING WHETHER OR NOT/NOT SOME POSSIBILITY OF AGMT WAS IN THEIR INTEREST. SINCE 1982, PRIOR TO WALK-IN-THE-WOODS, HOWEVER, USSR HAD BIG REVIEW AND CONCLUDED IT WOULD RATHER SEE USA DEPLOY IN ABSENCE OF AGMT THAN ACCEPT AGMT WHICH BLESSED USA DEPLOYMENTS. HENCE DURING LAST 16 MONTHS USSR WAS OPERATING ON BASIS OF THAT POLITICAL DECISION, HOPING TO UNDERMINE EUROPEAN AND USA SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYMENT, AND NOT/NOT WITH INTENT OF GETTING AGMT ON ANY OTHER BASIS. KVITSINSKIY HAD TOLD NITZE SOME TIME AGO OF THREE POLITICAL IMPERATIVES WHY USSR COULD NOT/NOT BLESS DEPLOYMENT OF SINGLE USA LRINF MISSILE IN EUROPE: (A) IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE IN MOSCO, IN BUREAUCRATIC TERMS

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PAGE SEVEN YBGR7134 SECRET

OF ARRIVING AT SUCH A DECISION;(B)IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE VIS-A-VIS WPO ALLIES(DESPITE NITZES COMMENT THAT MANY OF THEM DID NOT/NOT SEEM TO WANT DEPLOYMENTS)AND(C)IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IN TERMS OF USSR FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATES BEYOND WPO, IE PEACH MOVEMENT AND COMMUNIST PARTIES.

11.NITZE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET WHAT WAS BEHIND SOVIET ADVANCEMENT AND THEN DISOWNMENT OF 13NOV INITIATIVE.HE SUGGESTED THREE POSSIBILITIES,WITH HIM PERSONALLY GIVING MOST WEIGHT TO SECOND OF THEM:(A)IT MAY REPRESENT DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN SOVIET MILITARY AND POLITICAL ELEMENTS OF MOSCO DECISION-MAKING APPARATUS.PERHAPS CIVILIAN ELEMENTS FOUND IT EASIER TO GET CONSENSUS TO AUTHORIZE 13NOV INITIATIVE ON BASIS OF KVITSINSKIY MISREPRESENTATION OF WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED UP TO THEN IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH NITZE.ATTRIBUTION OF IDEAS TO NITZE,ONCE REJECTED BY USA,COULD THEN BE USED TO PORTRAY APPARENT SPLIT BETWEEN NITZE AND WSHDC.(B)NITZE SPOKE OF STRUCTURAL PROBLEM IN NEGNS WHEREBY EITHER SIDE ALWAYS HAD TO GUARD AGAINST MAKING CONCESSIONS WITH AIM OF MOVING NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD ONLY TO HAVE OTHER SIDE POCKET CONCESSIONS WITHOUT ANY RECIPROCAL COMPROMISE.THIS HAD HAPPENDED FREQUENTLY IN SALT I AND II.HENCE NITZE HAD CONCLUDED BEFORE WALK-IN-WOODS THAT ONLY IF OVERALL PACKAGE COULD BE WORKED OUT AND CONCURRENT AGMT TO IT IN TOTO COULD PITFALLS BE AVOIDED.(HE SAID BY THE WAY THAT WALK-IN-WOODS FORMULA CAME CLOSER THAN ANYTHING ELSE

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PAGE EIGHT YBGR7134 SECRET

DONE IN GENEV INF NEGGS).SOVIET REJECTION OF THE UK/FRENCH FORCES RATIONALE AND THEIR SWITCH TO THE EQUAL REDUCTIONS APPROACH(WHICH UNTIL THEN HAD NOT/NOT BEEN USED BY RUSSIANS)IN THE 13NOV INITIATIVE EXPOSED CLEARLY RUSSIAN INTEREST IN ONE-SIDED OUTCOME. GIVEN THAT USA WAS APT TO POCKET SOVIET ABANDONMENT OF UK/FRENCH FORCES RATIONALE,RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE TO IMMEDIATELY DISOWN IDEA IF IT APPEARED DOUBTFUL OFFER WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY USA.(C)PERHAPS ENTIRE OPERATION WAS DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE BUNDESTAG INF DEBATE IN HOPE USA WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE FULLY INFORMED ALLIES OF SOVIET INITIATIVE,NOTABLY FRG,IN GOOD TIME SO FRG OPPOSITION COULD CLAIM IMPROPER THINGS WERE GOING ON BEHIND FRG BACK AND HENCE REINFORCE THEIR DEMAND FOR POSTPONEMENT IN DEPLOYMENTS.

12.NITZE DID NOT/NOT SEE CLEAR LINK BETWEEN CEAUSESCU PROPOSAL TO EXCLUDE UK/FRENCH FORCES ISSUE FROM INF NEGOTIATIONS AND SOVIET 13 INITIATIVE.

13.NITZE CONSIDERED THAT RUSSIANS HAD COME TO UNDERSTAND WEIGHT OF ALLIANCE POSN RE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF INCLUDING UK/FRENCH FORCES IN INF NEGOTIATIONS,BOTH ON BASIS OF INTRINSIC ARGUMENTS AND POLITICAL REALITIES.HENCE RUSSIANS REALIZED THEY WERE ON A BAD WICKET ON THIS, WITHOUT OF COURSE ACKNOWLEDGING THIS FACT.

CCC/054 251632Z YBGR7134

Rec'd 1.15 p.m. 25/11/83  
AC

*MFE*

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR9907 25NOV83

TO EXTOTT EDDZ DELIVER BY 251200

INFO DELHI/PMDEL DELIVER BY 252100 BNATO-WSHDC PRMNY PEKIN BRU

BREEC LDN PARIS BONN ROME TOKYO NDHQOTT/ADM/POL/DG PCOOTT PMOOTT

DISTR MINA MINE MINT DMF IDA IDR UGB URR ZSI RBR RBD

---PMS INITIATIVE:PEARSON VISIT TO MOSCO 24-26NOV

PEARSON WAS FORMALLY WELL RECEIVED BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES.OFFICIAL  
MTGS INCLUDED TWO-HOUR MORNING SESSION WITH FIRST DEPUTY FM KORNIENKO  
ASSISTED BY MFA SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT CONTINGENT LED BY DEPT HEAD  
SUSLOV.OFFICIAL LUNCH WAS HOSTED BY DEPUTY FM RYZHOV.LATTER ALSO  
ATTENDED FORTYFIVE MINUTE AFTERNOON MTG WITH FM GROMYKO.

2.ATMOSPHERE AT ALL MTGS WAS COURTEOUS,OPEN,EVEN FRIENDLY.IT WAS  
OBVIOUS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS HAD CAREFULLY STUDIED PMS TWO MAJOR  
SPEECHES AND OTHER RELATED PUBLIC STATEMENTS.KORNIENKO WAS NOTABLY  
ATTENTIVE TO PEARSONS PRESENTATION OF RATIONAL FOR PMS INITIATIVE AS  
WELL AS TO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS/IDEAS WHICH PM HAS PUT FORWARD,IN HIS  
RESPONSE,KORNIENKO EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF AND SYMPATHY FOR OR  
REASONS FOR PMS INITIATIVE.WHILE AVOIDING HYPERBOLIC LANGUAGE,  
KORNIENKO STRESSED THAT QUOTE BASIS UNQUOTE AND ORIENTATION  
OF WSHDC POLICIES MUST CHANGE IF CONTACTS AT HIGH AND HIGHEST  
LEVELS WERE TO BE PRODUCTIVE.USSR WAS NOT/NOT INTERESTED IN TALK FOR  
SAKE OF TALK;MTGS AND CONTACTS COULD BE USEFUL ONLY IF SIDES INVOLVED  
HAD GENUINE INTEREST IN REACHING DECISIONS AND AGREEMENTS IN SPIRIT  
OF MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION.SUCH SPIRIT,WHICH KORNIENKO SAID HE SENSED

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission.

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PAGE TWO XYGR9907 CONF

AT OUR MTG, WAS TOTALLY ABSENT IN THEIR MTGS WITH USA OFFICIALS. ON ALL ELEMENTS OF PMS INITIATIVE KORNIENKO WAS STUDIOUSLY NON-COMMITTAL. HE EXPLICITLY SAID HE WAS QUOTE NOT/NOT SAYING NO/NO UNQUOTE TO ANY OF PMS IDEAS; HE WAS NOT/NOT AUTHORIZED TO SAY EITHER YES OR NO/NO AND WAS SIMPLY TRYING TO EXPLAIN PERSPECTIVE FROM WHICH SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER THEM.

3. GROMYKO WAS IN GOOD FORM: RELAXED AND ALMOST VOLUBLE. BUT ON SUBSTANCE OF PMS PROPOSALS HE WAS VERY CAREFUL AND SOMETIMES NEGATIVE. IN MORE NEGATIVE TONE THAN KORNIENKO HE DECLARED THAT USSR EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH REAGAN ADMIN HAD SHOWN USELESSNESS OF TALKS AT ANY LEVEL. USA TOO OFTEN USED SUCH TALKS AS SCREEN OR COVERUP FOR THEIR OWN QUOTE VERY MATERIAL UNQUOTE MILIT ARISTIC ACTIONS. (IN ADDITION TO MX AND EUROMISSILES, HE CITED USA ACTIONS IN LFBANON, NICARAGUA, GRENADA.) HE REGISTERED SOVIET QUOTE DEEP REGRET UNQUOTE THAT CDA WAS AMONG THOSE SUPPORTING DEPLOYMENT OF NEW USA NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. RE FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR CONF IDEA, WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD WAS BEING FLOATED AS IDEA RATHER THAN FORMAL PROPOSAL, HE WAS RESERVED THOUGH HE DID NOT/NOT SPECIFICALLY REJECT CONCEPT, HE IMPLIED THAT IF BILATERAL NUCLEAR NEGS PRODUCED X COLLISIONS AND DISAGREEMENTS, FIVE-POWER CONF MIGHT PRODUCE FIVE TIMES X COLLISIONS. ON HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AT STKHM CDE OPENING AND AT MBFR HE WAS NON COMMITTAL, BUT LEANING NEGATIVE. RE POSSIBLE VISIT BY PM TO USSR HE WAS ESPECIALLY CAUTIOUS. HE REAFFIRMED SOVIET

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PAGE THREE XYGR9907 CONFID

INVITATION. HE HAD WORDS OF HIGH PRAISE FOR PM TRUDEAU AS PERSON AND EXPERIENCED STATESMAN. BUT HE SAID THAT QUESTION OF TIMING OF ANY VISIT MUST BE LEFT OPEN FOR TIME BEING.

4. WE SUSPECT SEVERAL INTERRELATED FACTORS ACCOUNT FOR OVERALL NON-COMMITTAL SOVIET REACTION AT THIS TIME TO PMS INITIATIVE AND RELATED IDEAS: (A) IMMEDIATE PREOCCUPATION WITH HANDLING FALLOUT FROM TERMINATION OF INF TALKS (B) UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ANDROPOV'S PRESENT AND FUTURE HEALTH (C) PREPARATIONS FOR PARTY PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION WHICH NOW SEEM CERTAIN TO BE HELD IN MID OR LATE DEC; AND (D) INSTINCTIVELY CAUTIOUS SOVIET APPROACH TO ALL NEW IDEAS, PARTICULARLY ANY WITH MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS. PEARSON MENTIONED THAT PM WOULD PROBABLY BE GOING TO PEKIN THIS WEEKEND AND WOULD WITHIN NEXT MONTH OR SO PROBABLY HAVE VISITED LEADERS OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS EXCEPT USSR. SUCH INFO MAY HELP FOCUS SOVIET MINDS ON VISIT PROSPECTS BUT AT MOMENT, EARLY, CLEAR SIGNALS ON TIMING FOR ANY VISIT SEEM UNLIKELY.

5. SUBSEQUENT INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS WITH SOV OFFICIALS MADE CLEAR THAT ANDROPOV FACTOR IS MAJOR SOURCE OF UNCERTAINTY, AND THAT FOR THIS REASON, NO/NO CLEAR SIGNALS ON TIMING OF POSSIBLE VISIT ARE LIKELY IN NEAR FUTURE.

6. MORE DETAILED REPORT TO FOLLOW.

CCC/144 251700Z XYGR9907

28-6-1-Tudor Peace  
mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR7131 25NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO CANMILREPNATO BRU PMDEL/DELHI BUCST WSHDC LDN PARIS PCOOTT/  
FOWLER BONN TOKYO PEKIN PRMNY WSAW PRGUE BGRAD BPEST MOSCO COPEN  
GENEV HSNKI LSBON STKHM HAGUE VIENN ROME NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DGIS/  
DMPOL/PPP/DNACPOL/CORAE/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR MINA DMF RBR RBD RGB RSD RBRD IDA ZSP ZSI FPR RBP

REF OURTEL YBGR7091 08NOV

---INF DEPLOYMENT:CEAUSESCU POSITION

FRG DEL INFORMED 22NOV THAT CHANCELLOR KOHL WILL RESPOND TO  
CEAUSESCU LET OF 04NOV ON BASIS OF FOLLWOING ELEMENTS:

2.QUOTE

(A)THE PROPOSAL MADE IN THE LETTER THAT THE SOVIET UNION  
SHOULD GIVE UP ITS DEMAND FOR THE INCLUSION OF THE  
BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS  
IS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE.IF THIS DEMAND WERE IN  
FACT DROPPED,THIS COULD CLEAR THE WAY TO EARLY  
AGREEMENT IN GENEVA.

(B)IT IS NOT/NOT CONSISTENT THAT,AT THE SAME TIME,  
CFAUSESCU ADVOCATES THAT THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT  
OF US INF IN EUROPE SHOULD BE POSTPONED.SUCH A  
POSTPONEMENT WOULD REDUCE THE CHANCES FOR A BALANCED  
AGREEMENT.

(C)THE FACT THAT DEPLOYMENT IS ABOUT TO BEGIN DOES NOT/NOT

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PAGE TWO YRGR7131 CONF D

RENDER A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IMPOSSIBLE.

MR CEAUSESCUS ATTENTION WILL BE DRAWN TO THE  
CORRESPONDING STATEMENTS BY THE ALLIANCE ON THE CON-  
TINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WESTERN READI-  
NESS TO REMOVE SYSTEMS AFTER THEIR DEPLOYMENT.

(D) THERE WILL BE A POSITIVE COMMENT ON THE PROPOSAL  
FOR A US-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETING.

(F) ON THE OTHER HAND, A MEETING OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES  
OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT HARDLY APPEARS SUITABLE  
TO PRODUCE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO AGREEMENT ON INF.

(F) THE DEPLOYMENT OF US INF IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE NON-  
PROLIFERATION TREATY.

(G) THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY HAS RENOUNCED NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS. THIS GIVES US A CLAIM NOT/NOT TO BE THREATENED  
BY OTHERS WITH SUCH WEAPONS. THE SOVIET INF REPRESENTS  
SUCH A THREAT.

(H) THE LETTER WILL UNDERLINE AGREEMENT IN ONE ESSENTIAL  
POINT: THAT THE MUTUAL RENUNCIATION BY THE UNITED  
STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION OF THE WHOLE WEAPON  
CATEGORY OF LAND-BASED LRINF WOULD BE THE BEST  
SOLUTION.

UNQUOTE.

CCC/070 251459Z YBGR7131

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace  
Mission

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT IDR4525 25NOV83

TO PMDELDELHI DELIVER BY 260900

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV  
PARIS HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS WSAW PRGUE PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER/CARON  
PMOOTT/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADM POL/DACPOL/DNACPOL/ CPP/DSTRATA/CIS  
DISTR IDD IDRA IDRL IFB MINE MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD  
RCD RSDCPD ZSICSP URR URT URE LCD LSD IDDZ FPR  
REF OURTEL IDR4491 24NOV

---INF:SUSPENSION OF TALKS:ANDROPOV LET TO PM

DURING CALL ON RBD,SOVIET CHARGE D AFFAIRES NOVIKOV(WHO HAD BEEN  
CALLED IN TO RECEIVE NOTE ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION),DELIVERED LET TO  
PM ON SUSPENSION OF INF NEGOTIATIONS.TEXT FOLLOWS:ASSUME YOU NOW HAVE  
TEXT OF ANDROPOV 24NOV STATEMENT TO WHICH LET REFERS.

2.TEXT BEGINS.QUOTE

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER,

I AM WRITING TO YOU IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE  
GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRG,BRITAIN AND ITALY TO START THE DEPLOYMENT  
OF US MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES ON THEIR TERRITORIES.

OUR POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THIS STEP,AS WELL AS INFORMATION ON  
THE RETALIATORY STEPS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE TO TAKE,ARE  
PROVIDED IN THE ATTACHED STATEMENT.

IT MAY BE ONLY REGRETTEED THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ABOVE COUNTRIES  
HAVE MADE TOGETHER WITH THE USA A CHOICE LEADING TO ACCELERATION OF

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PAGE TWO IDR4525 RESTR

TENSIONS, TO A NEW, EXTREMELY DANGEROUS ROUND OF THE ARMS RACE. AND IT WAS DONE WITH GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENSUING CONSEQUENCES.

BOTH MILITARY-STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE WORLD HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY UPSET. THE SOVIET UNION WILL NATURALLY DRAW NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS FOR ITS POLICY FROM THIS DEVELOPMENT IN GENERAL.

WE WOULDNT LIKE HOWEVER TO VIEW THE PRESENT SITUATION AS IRREVERSIBLE. IF A DIFFERENT, MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TO SECURITY ISSUES TAKES THE UPPER HAND IN THE WEST, IF IT DISPLAYS WILLINGNESS TO RESTORE THE SITUATION THAT EXISTED BEFORE THE DEPLOYMENT OF US MISSILES IN EUROPE, THIS WOULD HAVE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE ON OUR PART.

WITH RESPECT,

Y. ANDROPOV

NOVEMBER 24, 1983

UNQUOTE. TEXT ENDS.

CCC/Ø14 252339Z IDR4525

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace  
Mission

S E C R E T

FM EXTOTT IDR4502 25NOV83

TO PMDELDELHI

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV  
PARIS HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS WSAW PRGUE PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER/AXWORTHY  
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DACPOL/DNACPOL/PPP/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IDRA IDRL IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD  
RCD RSD CPD ZSI CSP URR URT URE LCD LSD LIDDZ FPR

REF OURTEL IDR4491 24NOV

---INF:SUSPENSION OF TALKS:ANDROPOV STATEMENT 24NOV

AT ORIGINATORS REQUEST,CORRECT FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA3 REFTTEL TO  
READ QUOTE ANDRCPOV STATEMENT,IN DESCRIBING CONTINUATION OF TALKS  
AS IMPOSSIBLE,IS TOUGHER THAN THAT OF SOVIET NEGOTIATOR,BUT REPEATS  
LANGUAGE HE USED IN 26OCT PRAVDA INTERVIEW.

CCC/202 251955Z IDR4502

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FM BUCST UYGR3039 25NOV83  
TO EXTOTT RBR

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE  
WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV TOKYO WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM CNBRA  
HSNKI/CDEDEL WLGTN VIENN DELHI PEKIN PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/  
ADMPOL/PPP/DGIS PRMNY VMBFR  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDD IDR  
IDA IDDZ RBRD IDX ZSP RBP ZSI

REF OURTEL UYGR2967 22NOV YOURTEL RBR0652 23NOV

---INF NEW ROM INITIATIVE(SUITE)

IN TRANSMITTING THEIR POSITIVE RESPONSES TO ROMS, FELLOW NATO AMBS  
(DUTCH, FRG) WERE GIVEN FURTHER INFO ON ENVOYS SLATED TO VISIT NATO  
AND WSAW PACT CAPITALS. NOW APPEARS FOUR DISTINCT GRPS OF ENVOYS WILL  
DEPART THIS WEEK IF ALL AGMTS TO VISITS RECD. DOLGU HAS ALREADY LEFT  
FOR MOSCO AND EVEN IF AMERICANS NOW GIVE POSITIVE ANSWER UNLIKELY  
HE CAN LEAVE FOR NORTH AMERICA BEFORE NEXT WEEK. SECOND GRP HEADED BY  
AMB BRAD (PRESENT HEAD OF INFO AND CULT MFA AND PREVIOUS AMB TO ATHNS)  
ALREADY LEFT, VISITING ATHNS 24NOV, BONN 25NOV BRU 27NOV AND ITALY  
29-30NOV. THIRD GRP HEADED BY AMB GEORGIO SLATED TO VISIT SPAIN AND  
PORTUGAL. FOURTH GRP APPARENTLY STILL BEING FORMED.

2. FRG STILL APPEARS ONLY STRONG SUPPORTER OF INITIATIVE. MTG OF DEL  
WITH AMB RUTH AND RUTHS SLATED RETURN VISIT IN DEC APPEARS TO HAVE  
DOSE OF POSTURING FOR INTERNAL FRG POLITICS. DEPLOYMENT OF INF ALONG

...2

PAGE TWO UYGR3039 CONFD

WITH CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON NEW INITIATIVE TO HALT ARMS RACE COULD EXPLAIN FRG POSITION.

3. ASIDE FROM DOMESTIC POLITICAL BENEFIT VISIT COULD HAVE FRG BELIEVES INITIATIVE CONTAINS NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ELEMENTS. FIRST, THEY SEE IT AS REQUIRING MORE FROM USSR THAN USA. SECOND, THEY BELIEVE ROMS FEEL THAT THEY ARE NOW BEING PUSHED INTO CORNER AND SOV NUCLEAR ARMS AND TROOPS MIGHT SOON BE SLATED FOR BULGARIA THUS LEAVING ROM AS ONLY WSAW PACT COUNTRY WITHOUT SOV PRESENCE ON ITS TERRITORY. THIRD, THERE IS AMOUNT OF WISHFUL THINKING THAT STRAINS IN WPO CAN BE EXPLOITED AND THUS WIDEN DIVERGENCES BETWEEN ROMS AND USSR. WE HAVE SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

CCC/181 251332Z UYGR3039

WASHINGTON

TELETYPE

UNCLASSIFIED

~~OTT 003/2~~

CHCGO YFCR2977 25NOV83

~~WSH 002/2~~

EXTOFF IDDZ

WSHDC - 002/26

28-6-1 - Judeau Peace mission 1/2

UCP URR IDA SCS ZSP ZSL

PMS INITIATIVE

ATTACHED IS ARTICLE QUOTE CRITICAL NUCLEAR TIMES UNQUOTE WHICH  
APPEARED IN THE CHCGO TRIBUNE 24NOV83.

P.S.  
Did you like  
a copy?  
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TOP/100  
COMMUNICATIONS  
NOV 28 15 19 83  
CANADIAN EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON

1/2

*[Signature]*  
D.E. Lysne

General Relations

(312)  
427-1031

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D.E. Lysne

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~~07 00372~~

2/2

# Critical nuclear times C.A.I.C.A.G.O TRIBUNE 24.11.83

With British and West German parliamentary approval of the first deployment of American cruise and intermediate range Pershing 2 missiles in Europe having resulted in a Soviet walkout from the arms control talks in Geneva, tensions have never been higher over the issue of nuclear arms.

The 236-226 West German Bundestag vote Tuesday in favor of the Pershings was decisive yet dangerously divided, with former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's Social Democrats abandoning him to turn almost en masse against deployment. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is resolute in pressing ahead with deployment but is taking enormous abuse from leftists in her parliament. Mass protest demonstrations in both countries and in Italy continue. The Soviets can only be encouraged—in both their intransigence and their support of the divisive Western European peace movements.

The United States, which a year ago was being roundly criticized for inflexibility, has taken the initiative and continues to offer reasonable compromises and arms reduction plans. But its latest offer, calling for both sides to reduce their European nuclear missile arsenals to a maximum of 420 warheads—a substantial reduction from what is now being put in place—was rejected by the Russians after only 35 minutes of "deliberation."

The Soviets appear to be caught in a paralysis of policy. This is in large part because of the illness and lengthy incapacitation of President Yuri Andropov. It also stems from the fact that the Soviets' overriding interest from the beginning has been in maintaining

Soviet nuclear superiority in Europe, not in arms control or reduction, no matter what vague promises they make to Europeans.

Deployment must now inevitably proceed. It will prompt some dramatic Soviet counter-measures, both in Eastern Europe and the Atlantic. The West is going to go through a tense and dangerous time. The Soviets likely will not be able to resume useful negotiations until they become convinced of the West's seriousness and improve their own moribund internal political situation.

Into this tense situation steps Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who proposes a conference of the world's five major nuclear powers next year aimed at reducing their nuclear arsenals. He claims support for the idea from Brussels, the Hague, Bonn, Paris, London and Rome.

With feelings running as high as they are now, obviously no European leader would publicly come out against such an effort, but it's a monumentally unworkable idea. Britain has indicated that it might be interested in throwing its few submarine missiles into the negotiating pot, but the independence of France's nuclear force, which includes land-based missiles, is a longstanding tenet of French national policy. China's strategic needs are so different and its nuclear force is so overwhelmed by the Soviets' that it could not participate very usefully in Mr. Trudeau's talks.

No breakthrough can come without hard bargaining between the two superpowers. Putting three more chairs at the table will only complicate that.

2/2

28-6-1 - Hussein Peace  
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IMU1995 25NOV83

TO PRMNY GENEV VIENN DELHI/PMDEL/SHENSTONE/STANFORD KWAIT LDN IMMED  
INFO BNATO BREEC BERUT TAVIV CAIRO JEDDA AMMAN BGHDD WSHDC MOSCO  
PARIS BONN TOKYO PEKIN BDGTN ATHNS ANKRA DELHI PMOOTT/FOWLER  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IDF IDD LIDDZ IMD GGB GMD CPD CMR ZSI MGT MGTC  
LCD LCR RFB RBD RBR

---PM VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST:UN ISSUES:TRAFFIC

AS YOU MAY KNOW PM ON RETURN FROM CHGOM IN DELHI DEPARTING WED  
30NOV 0800 HRS WILL BE VISITING ABU DHABI WED/THUR 30NOV-01DEC,  
MUSCAT FOR DAY THUR 01DEC, ABU DHABI FRI 02DEC, BAHRAIN MORNING OF  
SAT 03DEC, KUWAIT SAT/SUN 03-04DEC, STOPPING IN LDN SUN 04DEC  
ARRIVING IN OTT AFTERNOON MON 05DEC. ONLY MOST URGENT TRAFFIC ALERT-  
ING PM DEL TO IMPORTANT UN MATTERS SUCH AS MIDDLE EAST SUBJECTS  
SHOULD BE SENT TO PM DEL/ATTN SHENSTONE/STANFORD AS FOLLOWS  
(LOCAL TIME):

-DELHI UP UNTIL TUES 29NOV, DELIVER BY 292000

-IN ABSENCE OF CDN MISSION IN ABU DHABI, MUSCAT AND BAHRAIN TRAFFIC  
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO QUOTE T.T. PMDEL (COUNTRY) DE OTT UNQUOTE  
AND MGTC WILL AUTOMATICALLY FORWARD TO PMDEL UP UNTIL SAT 03DEC  
DELIVER BY 030200 OTT TIME. (SHOULD ADDRESS BE OBSOLETE MGTC WILL  
AUTOMATOICALLY SEND TO NEXT POST. BECAUSE OF LIMITED CAPACITY ONLY  
EMERGENCY/EMERGENCY TRAFFIC SHOULD USE THIS CHANNEL OTHERWISE IT  
SHOULD BE SENT TO KUWAIT FOR PMDEL ARRIVAL.

-KUWAIT UP UNTIL SUN 04DEC, DELIVER BY 040800

-LDN UP UNTIL MON 05DEC DELIVER BY 050900 - OTHERWISE OTT.

CCC/202 252157Z IMU1995

*Action*

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace  
Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT FPR1126 25NOV83

TO DELHI/PM DEL

INFO BNATO WSHDC CNGNY PRMNY MOSCO PEKIN BRU BREEC LDN PARIS BONN  
ROME TOKYO GENEV NDHQOTT/ADM/POL/DG PCOOTT PMOOTT/FOWLER  
DISTR MINA MINE MINT DMF DMT IDDZ IDA IDR UGB URR ZSI IDR RBR  
---PMS PEACE INIT-CHOGM AND GRENADA

CBC NEWS NOVEMBER 25, 0800-PM PEACE INITIATIVE-CHOGM

CBC:THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL SAYS MR TRUDEAU SHOULD BE  
ENCOURAGED BY THE SUPPORT FOR HIS PEACE INITIATIVE FROM OTHER  
COMMONWEALTH LEADERS.THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT CONFERENCE IN NEW  
DELHI HAS ENDED ITS FORMAL SESSIONS TO ALLOW INFORMAL TALKS IN  
THE COASTAL RESORT OF GOA.

B KELLEHER:THE COMMONWEALTH LEADERS TAKE ONLY ONE OFFICIAL EACH  
WITH THEM TO THEIR CUSTOMARY WEEKEND RETREAT AND IT'S THERE  
DURING INFORMAL TALKS THAT THEY USUALLY DECIDE WHAT SHOULD BE  
SAID IN THIS FINAL COMMUNIQUE.AS THE LEADERS BROKE UP IN NEW  
DELHI TO GO TO GOA,THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL,SONNY  
ROMPHAL BRIEFLY MENTIONED PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S PEACE  
INITIATIVE,SAYING THERE HAD BEEN SUPPORT AND WELCOME FOR IT,AND MR  
TRUDEAU HAD GOOD REASONS TO BE ENCOURAGED.THE SHARP DISAGREEMENT  
OVER GRENADA THOUGH WENT PUBLIC TODAY AS PRIME MINISTER EUGENIA  
CHARLES OF DOMINICA STRONGLY DEFENDED THE INVASION AT A NEWS  
CONFERENCE,SAYING THE GRENADIAN GOVERNOR GENERAL HAD SENT A

...2

PAGE TWO FPR1126 UNCLAS

SECRET MESSAGE BEFORE HAND APPEALING FOR SOMETHING TO BE DONE. PM CHARLES GIVES A NEW REASON WHY CANADA WAS NOT/NOT WARNED IN ADVANCE. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, SHE SAYS, WAS NOT/NOT THAT EAGER TO GET INVOLVED AND I ONLY FOUND OUT THAT THEY WOULD GET INVOLVED A FEW HOURS BEFORE THE INVASION BEGAN. THERE WAS JUST NO/NO TIME TO TELL CANADA.

PM CHARLES: QUOTE... I KNEW THAT CANADA WOULD NOT/NOT WANT TO BE INVOLVED IN THE ACTION, BUT THAT WAS NO/NO REASON WHY WE SHOULDN'T INFORM THEM BECAUSE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CANADA AND I THOUGHT THAT ANOTHER PRIME MINISTER HAD INFORMED HIM. I DID MYSELF TRY AND DIDN'T SUCCEED UNQUOTE.

B KELLEHER: EARLIER IT HAD BEEN SAID THAT PM CHARLES COULD NOT/NOT FIND MR. TRUDEAU'S TELEPHONE NUMBER OR THAT CANADA HAD NOT/NOT BEEN CONSULTED BECAUSE IT HAD NEVER BEEN INTERESTED IN CARIBBEAN SECURITY. BRIAN KELLEHER, CBC NEWS, NEW DELHI.

D BUCKLEY-JONES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MEDIA RELATIONS DIVISION  
UUU/064 251550Z FPR1126

INFO

*MF*  
*28*

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY  
FM PFKIN WJGR0896 25NOV83  
TO PMDELDELHI FLASH  
INFO MOSCO/PEARSON EXTOTT IDDZ/DELVOIE IMMED  
REF OURTEL WJGR0895 24NOV

28-6-1 - Trudeau  
Peace  
Mission

---PMS VISIT TO CHINA

MFA CALLED ME AT 0830 25NOV TO PROVIDE RESPONSE TO MY ENQUIRY OF  
LAST NIGHT ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF PMS AIRCRAFT FLYING RTE DELHI-  
BEIJING IE OVER TIBET. MFA OFFICIAL SAID WAS NOT/NOT POSSIBLE TO  
APPROVE REQUEST AS THERE WERE NO/NO BEACONS OR NAVIGATIONAL AIDS  
ALONG PROPOSED ROUTING AND THEREFORE NO/NO ASSISTANCE COULD BE  
OFFERED BY CHINESE AUTHORITIES TO AIRCRAFT. MOREOVER OFFICIAL SAID  
TRAVEL VIA ROUTING SUGGESTED BY CHINESE (IE OVERFLYING BURMA) WOULD  
NOT/NOT TAKE MUCH LONGER THAN RTE OVERFLYING TIBET.

2. I SHOULD ADD THAT MFA IS CONTINUALLY PRESSING US FOR FINAL  
DECISION ABOUT ROUTE OF AIRCRAFT IN ORDER THAT APPROPRIATE CIVIL  
AND MILITARY AVIATION AUTHORITIES CAN BE ALERTED. ALSO THEY ARE  
MOST ANXIOUS TO KNOW FINAL DECISION REGARDING SIZE OF PRESS DEL.  
BECAUSE OF LIMITED ACCOMMODATION IN PEKING THEY HAVE OTHER DEMANDS  
FOR SECOND VILLA AT GOVT GUEST HOUSE THEY ARE HOLDING FOR  
JOURNALISTS IT HAS APPROX TWELVE ROOMS EACH WITH TWO BEDS).  
PLS LET US KNOW BY RETURN FLASH IF WE SHOULD TAKE IT.

GAUVIN

CCC/002 250245Z WJGR0896

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*Mr. Gossage OF*

*28-6-1- Trudeau Peace  
mission*

*+ MF*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM HAGUE YWGR0771 25NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BONN BRU BNATO LDN BREEC ROME PARIS MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER  
NDHQOTT/MDN/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB IFB IDD IDR IDA RGB PCD RSR RSD RCP RBE  
---DUTCH PRESS REACTION TO PM MONTREAL SPEECH

DUTCH MEDIA REACTION TO PMS SPEECH NOV13 HAS BEEN MINIMAL.  
TEXT OF SPEECH AND SUMMARY WERE SENT TO CONTACTS AMONG 25  
LARGEST NATIONAL AND REGIONAL DAILIES IN NETHS IN ADDITION  
TO NATIONAL WIRE SERVICE, FOREIGN NEWS AGENCY REPS, RADIO AND  
TELEVISION. DURING THIS PERIOD, MEDIA ATTENTION WAS LARGELY  
FOCUSSED ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL CRISIS SURROUNDING WIDE-SPREAD  
STRIKES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

2. NEVERTHELESS, DUTCH MEDIA STILL RETAINS SOME INTEREST IN PMS  
INITIATIVE GENERALLY. THERE HAVE BEEN NUMBER OF REPORTS ON HIS  
MTGS IN JAPAN WITH NAKASONE AND ARBATOV AND HIS APPT OF  
SPECIAL ENVOY TO MOSCO AND PEKIN.

UUU/155 250937Z YWGR0771

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace  
mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT RBR0687 25NOV83

TO PARIS/FORD DELIVER BY 280900

DISTR IDDZ MINA IDR RBRD

---EAST-WEST RELATIONS:MOSCO PERSPECTIVE

IN PREPARATION FOR NATO MINISTERIAL AND MEETING WITH SHULTZ,  
DPM/SSEA HAS ASKED FOR YOUR PERSONAL ANALYSIS OF SOV PERSPECTIVE  
ON STATE OF AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN LIGHT  
OF COLLAPSE OF INF,PMS INITIATIVE,GENERAL BREAKDOWN IN DIALOGUE  
AND GROWING MISTRUST BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS,ETC.

2.FOCUS SHOULD BE ON HOW SOVS LIKELY TO CONDUCT RELATIONS WITH  
WEST IN SHORT TO MEDIUM FUTURE;SOV FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS AND  
OBJECTIVES,SOVIET INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED EAST-WEST  
DIALOGUE,PROSPECTS FOR RETURN TO INF TALKS AND STEPS THEY MAY BE  
PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE TO LESSEN EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

3.GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD PREPARE AND FORWARD BY TEL BY 300900.

4.RE CONTRACT:REGRET DELAY BUT WORK IS PROCEEDING.PROPOSAL WILL  
BE REVIEWED BY TREASURY BOARD NEXT WEEK.WE HOPE TO HAVE FORMAL  
PROPOSAL READY FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION SHORTLY.MANY THANKS FOR  
YOUR COOPERATION.

CCC/202 252354Z RBR0687

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Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT RBR0686 25NOV83

TO MOSCO/ROBERTS DELIVER BY 280900

DISTR (IDDZ MINA IDR RBRD

---EAST-WEST RELATIONS: MOSCO PERSPECTIVE

IN PREPARATION FOR NATO MINISTERIAL AND MEETING WITH SHULTZ, DPM/SSEA HAS ASKED FOR YOUR PERSONAL ANALYSIS OF SOV PERSPECTIVE ON STATE OF AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF COLLAPSE OF INF, PMS INITIATIVE, GENERAL BREAKDOWN IN DIALOGUE AND GROWING MISTRUST BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS, ETC.

2. FOCUS SHOULD BE ON HOW SOVS LIKELY TO CONDUCT RELATIONS WITH WEST IN SHORT TO MEDIUM FUTURE; SOV FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS AND OBJECTIVES, SOV INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED EAST-WEST DIALOGUE, PROSPECTS FOR RETURN TO INF TALKS AND STEPS THEY MAY BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE TO LESSEN EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

3. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD PREPARE AND FORWARD BY TEL BY 300900.

CCC/202 252354Z RBR0686



PAGE TWO UNGR0186 CONFD

STATE DEPT MTG RECENTLY CONVENED BY SEC SHULTZ. ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY INCONCLUSIVE, THERE WAS SOME SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OR COMMENTS IN NEAR FUTURE THAT WOULD SIGNAL USA DESIRE FOR STEADY DIALOGUE IN AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. THESE SOURCES POINT TO A DIVIDED WHITE HOUSE WITH SUPPORT FOR SUCH APPROACH FROM MRS REAGAN, DEEVER AND MACFARLANE, WHILE OPPOSITION COMES FROM USUAL QUARTERS HERE (NAMELY DEFENCE).

3. THERE IS ALSO SOME RECENT EVIDENCE OF SOVIET DESIRE TO KEEP LINES OPEN. AFTER RECENT BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINE IN ATLANTIC AND ITS REMOVAL BY CUBAN TUG TO CUBA, SOVIETS TOLD USA THAT THEY CONTINUE TO RESPECT 1962-1970 USA/USSR AGREEMENT, NOT TO STATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CUBA. ALSO USSR WAS PLANNING RETURN VISIT TO RECENT KENNEDY VISIT TO MOSCOW ON SUBJECT OF NON-PROLIFERATION. RETURN VISIT TO WSHDC BY SOVIET EXPORTS ON PENTAGONS CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS PROPOSAL WAS ALSO EXPECTED. THESE LAST TWO USA INITIATIVES CAN BE REGARDED BY SOVIETS AS SIGNS OF USA WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE AREAS OF JOINT INTEREST. IF SOVIETS DONT CANCEL THEIR RETURN VISITS IN LIGHT OF INF WALKOUT, THIS WILL BE ENCOURAGING SIGN.

4. OUR INTERLOCUTORS ALSO POINT TO POSITIVE FORCES FAVOURING DIALOGUE, INCLUDING MR TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE, MRS THATCHERS DISPATCH OF MINISTER OF STATE TO MOSCOW AND EXPECTED RETURN VISIT OF KORNIENKO, AND RECENT FRENCH-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS OF FRENCH ATTITUDES TO INF PROCESSES. THEY SUGGEST IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN EFFORTS TO

...5

PAGE THREE UNGR2186 CONF

ENCOURAGE USA LEADERSHIP TO MOVE IN DIRECTION OF NEW TYPE OF DISCOURSE AND PURSUIT OF JCINT INTERESTS.

5. SHULTZ IS RECOGNIZED AS POTENTIALLY MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE SOURCE OF INFLUENCE ON REAGAN BUT CUR INTERLOCUTORS POINT TO RELUCTANCE SO FAR ON HIS PART TO WEIGH IN HEAVILY THROUGH SOME LACK OF SELF-CONFIDENCE IN THESE AREAS OF FOREIGN POLICY. NEVERTHELESS, PROGNOSIS FOR SOME IMPROVEMENT MIGHT BE MORE POSITIVE THAN GENERALLY CONCEDED, IN VIEW OF GROWING SELF-CONFIDENCE OF REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND BELIEF THAT THEY ARE STRENGTHENING USA DEFENCE, CREDIBILITY AND DETERMINATION. SOME CONSIDER THAT NEXT USSR MOVES WILL BE OF KEY IMPORTANCE. IF THEY BECOME TOO STRIDENT OR THREATENING, CHANCES OF ANY USA SHIFT OF NUANCE ARE DIMINISHED.

CCC/231 252246Z UNGR2186

NNNNAZUFW

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

PD  
1007

\* FBIS 089

XINHUA COMMENTS ON REASONS FOR GENEVA TALKS SUSPENSION

04251651 BEIJING XINHUA IN ENGLISH 1612 GMT 25 NOV 83

(TEXT) BEIJING, NOVEMBER 25 (XINHUA CORRESPONDENT TANG SHAN) AS THE SUSPENSION OF THE HITHERTO TWO-YEAR-OLD SOVIET-U.S. GENEVA TALKS SHOWS THAT INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR MISSILES ARE SO INSTRUMENTAL TO THE CONTENTION OF THE TWO PARTIES FOR MILITARY SUPREMACY IN EUROPE AND THAT EITHER SIDE HAS BEEN USING THE TALKS AS SOME SORT OF JUSTIFICATION FOR ITS FURTHER BUILD-UP OR AS A CHANCE, IF THERE WERE ANY, TO WEAKEN ITS OPPONENT.

BOILING IT DOWN, THE HAGGLING OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS HAS FOCUSED ON WHETHER THERE IS A BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES IN EUROPE.

THE SOVIET UNION SAID "YES" AND INSISTED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DEPLOY NO MORE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. IN THAT ARGUMENT, MOSCOW TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE 162 MISSILES POSSESSED BY BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

THE UNITED STATES, ON THE OTHER HAND, HELD THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS IN THE LEAD AS FAR AS THE LAND-BASED MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES ARE CONCERNED, AND INSISTED ON THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF 572 MISSILES TO MATCH THE SOVIETS' STRENGTH IF THE TALKS FAILED. IT CONTENDED THAT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES ARE HERE "INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCES" THAT SHOULD IN NO WAY BE INCLUDED IN THE SOVIET-U.S. TALKS.

THE FACT IS THAT DURING THE LAST DECADE, THE SOVIET UNION, BY EXPLOITING THE PROCESS OF "DETENTE", HAS BUILT UP ITS MILITARY STRENGTH IN A BIG WAY. IT HAS CAUGHT UP WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS FIELD. IN ADDITION, IT HAS SILENTLY DEPLOYED A LARGE NUMBER OF NEW LAND-BASED INTERMEDIATE MISSILES. THUS, IN EUROPE, THE SOVIETS ARE NOT ONLY SUPERIOR TO THE AMERICANS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCE, BUT ALSO IN THE AREA OF LAND-BASED MISSILES.

TO TACKLE THIS SITUATION, THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) DECIDED TO DEPLOY 572 U.S. MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, A1 PERISHING II MISSILES AND 454 CRUISE MISSILES, IN EUROPE IF THE TALKS AT GENEVA TURNED OUT TO BE FRUITLESS. ALL THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS RAISED DURING THE TALKS WERE ALSO AIMED AT DESTROYING THE SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN THE LAND-BASED MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES.

THE SOVIETS, IN ORDER TO KEEP UP THEIR SUPERIORITY, WOULD RATHER HAVE ITS MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES REDUCED TO 140 ON CONDITION THAT THE UNITED STATES DEPLOY NO NEW MISSILES. TO JUSTIFY ITS POSITION, IT INSISTED THAT THE FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS A COUNTER-PART OF THEIRS.

EUROPE IS THE PRINCIPAL COCKPIT IN WASHINGTON-MOSCOW GLOBAL CONTEST IN WHICH MILITARY MIGHT IS DECISIVE. THEIR CONTEST ON EUROMISSILES IS IN FACT ONE FOR SUPREMACY IN EUROPE.

BY TRYING HARD TO GAIN NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE THE SOVIET UNION AIMS TO PLACE ITSELF IN A POSITION DETERRENT ENOUGH TO KEEP WESTERN EUROPE IN LINE, OR IN CASE OF WAR, POWERFUL ENOUGH TO OVERWHELM IT WITHOUT HAVING TO FIGHT. MOSCOW'S CONVULSIVE EFFORT TO PREVENT WASHINGTON FROM DEPLOYING INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES HAS BEEN NONE OTHER THAN A STRUGGLE TO WEAKEN THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE, UNHOOK WESTERN EUROPE FROM ITS PARTNER ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC MILITARILY AND THWART THE NATO STRATEGY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE UNITED STATES HAS STUCK TO THE DEPLOYMENT PLAN NOT ONLY AS A COUNTER-MEASURE AGAINST THE EXISTING SOVIET SS-20'S, BUT ALSO AS A MEANS TO MAINTAIN ITS LEADING ROLE IN NATO AND AN ASSURANCE TO ITS ALLIES OF THE RELIABILITY OF ITS NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. IT IS WASHINGTON'S DESIRE TO SEE A WESTERN EUROPE UNYIELDINGLY FACING THE SOVIET NUCLEAR PRESSURES.

VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL STRATEGIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES; THE UNITED STATES HAS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE 80'S SHIFTED FROM A GENERAL POLICY OF DETENTE AND CONCESSION TO ONE FOR CONFRONTATION WITH MOSCOW ON THE BASIS OF STRENGTH. TO DEPLOY MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE IS PART OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORT TO GET AN UPPER HAND OVER MOSCOW MILITARILY IN THEIR ALL-ROUND ANTAGONISM.

BEING A SUPERPOWER ITSELF, THE SOVIET UNION IS OF COURSE NOT READY TO GIVE IN. WHILE DECLARING THAT IT WILL NOT ALLOW ANYONE TO GAIN THE MILITARY SUPERIORITY, MOSCOW PLEDGES TO STRENGTHEN ITS MILITARY NIGHT "AT ALL COSTS."

THE QUESTION THAT DRAWS ATTENTION NOW IS: WHAT IMPACT THE SUSPENSION OF THE GENEVA TALKS MAY HAVE ON THE WORLD SITUATION?

UNDOUBTEDLY U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS WILL BECOME MORE TENSE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. BUT WHETHER RELATIONS WILL BE ALLOWED TO DRIFT AWAY FROM THE CURRENT GENERAL PATTERN OF CONFRONTATION PLUS DIALOGUE IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT.

IN ANY CASE THE SUSPENSION OF THE GENEVA TALKS SHOWS THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS ARE AS FERVENT IN INCREASING THEIR ARMS AS THEY ARE INSINCERE IN REDUCING THEM. THE CONTINUATION OF THEIR ARMS RACE, THE ESCALATION OF THEIR NUCLEAR CONTEST IN PARTICULAR, WILL CERTAINLY LEAD TO GREATER TURBULENCE AND INSTABILITY IN THE WORLD, PROVOKING STRONGER OPPOSITION FROM THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD WHO ARE LONGING FOR PEACE AND SECURITY.

25 NOV 2007Z NB

Division 71088  
Person CF  
Local Time 1445

*Handwritten initials*

Rec'd 3.00pm 25/11/83

*Handwritten mark*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

**CORRECTED COPY  
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE**

CORRECTED COPY

FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0086 25NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/HUDON FLASH

MOSCO PEKIN DELIVER BY 260830 EXTOTT MINA/DPM/DUDOIT

DISTR FPR XDV

REF OURTEL PMDL0081 25NOV

---PM VISIT TO PEKIN

BURMESE OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCES NOW RECEIVED. CDN PRESS TRAVELLING  
WITH PM WERE INFORMED AT 2330 HRS LOCAL THAT PM WOULD TRAVEL  
TO PEKIN 27NOV-29NOV.

UUU/282 251930Z PMDL0086

*Handwritten note in box:*  
28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace mission

*MF*  
*JD*

**INFO**

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0083 25NOV83

TO MOSCO FLASH

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ

REF YRTEL XYGR4168 25NOV

---PM DEL COMPOSITION

MASSE HAS INSTRUCTED THAT PEARSON ANS SMITH ARE TO PROCEED  
TO PEKING.

CCC/068 251254Z PMDL0083

28-6-1 - Bureau Peace  
Mission

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

November 25, 1983.

IDDZ-0213

Prof. H. Wisemen and  
Prof. F. Boehnert  
Chairmen  
University of Guelph  
College of Social Science  
Department of Political Studies  
Guelph, Ontario  
N1G 2W1

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace  
Mission

Dear Professors:

In the absence of the Prime Minister, I would like to reply to your letter of November 2. I am also attaching a reply to the letter addressed to the Prime Minister by Metta Spencer on behalf of the Non-Governmental Organizations represented at the Guelph Conference.

Having had the pleasure of attending part of the Guelph Conference with the Prime Minister, I can confirm that in terms of organization, theme, seriousness of purpose and the high level of attendance, the Conference served as the ideal forum for undertaking the peace initiative. Guelph University and the organizers of the Conference have played an important role in launching this endeavour.

I would be grateful if you could convey the attached letter to Ms. Spencer for transmittal to the concerned NGOs.

Yours sincerely,

L.A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

**SUITE A DONNER**

Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

*MF*  
*MD*

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

**S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY**

FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0081 25NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ/DELVOID ONLY FLASH PEKIN FLASH MOSCO/SMITH ONLY FLASH  
PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/HUDON ONLY FLASH EXTOTT DPM/SSEA/DUDOLT ONLY FLASH  
FPR/NOBLE ONLY FLASH

FROM COLEMAN

*28-6-1-Thudeau Peace Mission*

---PM VISIT TO PEKING

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF RELEASE TO BE ISSUED IN DELHI 26NOV, AT TIME TO BE DETERMINED WHEN NECESSARY FLIGHT CLEARANCES ARE CONFIRMED, BUT PROBABLY AROUND 0400 OTTAWA TIME. WE WILL INFORM YOU WHEN TO RELEASE. GUARD AGAINST PREMATURE RELEASE. WE WANT THE MEDIA IN DELHI TO RECEIVE FIRST BEFORE WE RELEASE IN OTTAWA OR ELSEWHERE.

2.TEXT:

THE PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH WORLD LEADERS ON HIS PEACE INITIATIVE, HE WILL VISIT PEKING FROM NOV 28-29. HE WILL MEET THERE WITH PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG.

THE PRIME MINISTER WILL DEPART NEW DELHI ON SUNDAY EVENING, NOVEMBER 27 AND WILL RETURN ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 29.

LE PREMIER MINISTRE A ANNONCE AUJOURD HUI QUE, DANS LE CADRE DE SES CONSULTATIONS AVEC DES LEADERS MONDIAUX CONCERNANT SES INITIATIVES DE PAIX, IL EFFECTUERA UNE VISITE A PEKIN LES 28 ET 29 NOVEMBRE. IL Y RECONTRERA M. ZHAO ZIYANG, PREMIER MINISTRE DE LA CHINE.

...2

PAGE TWO PMDL0081 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

LE PREMIER MINISTRE QUITTERA LA NOUVELLE-DELHI LE DIMANCHE 27 NOVEMBRE AU SOIR ET SERA DE RETOUR LE MARDI 29 NOVEMBRE.

2. PRESS LINE IS AS FOLLOWS, IN RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE QUESTIONS:

(A) WHY NOW? WHILE THE CHINESE PREMIER IS STILL COMING TO OTTAWA IN JANUARY, PM IS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS EARLIER OPPORTUNITY RATHER THAN WAITING ANOTHER TWO MONTHS TO DISCUSS HIS INITIATIVE WITH THE CHINESE. WHEN PEARSON DISCUSSED INITIATIVE WITH CHINESE ON HIS EMISSARY MISSION, WE SUGGESTED AN EARLIER MEETING, AND THE DATES ANNOUNCED WERE MUTUALLY AGREEABLE.

(B) CHINESE INTEREST IN INITIATIVE. CHINESE WERE INTERESTED ENOUGH TO SEE TRUDEAU PERSONALLY. WE WILL NOT/NOT CHARACTERIZE THEIR RESPONSE BEYOND THAT.

(C) REASON FOR LATE ANNOUNCEMENT OF TRIP: WE HAD TO AWAIT PEARSON REPORT FROM HIS PEKING VISIT; AND WE ONLY JUST TODAY GOT THE NECESSARY FLIGHT CLEARANCES OVER COUNTRIES ENROUTE TO CHINA FROM DELHI.

(D) OTHER POINTS: (1) THIS TRIP DOES NOT/NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY THAT PM WOULD GO TO MOSCOW AFTER PEARSON REPORTS FROM THERE. (2) MRS GANDHI AND THE COMWEL SEC GEN WERE INFORMED THIS MORNING AND WERE NOT/NOT OFFENDED AT HIS LEAVING CHOGM EARLY. MRS GANDHI IS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS RETURN TO DELHI.

CCC/068 251305Z PMDL0081

ACC	REF	DATE
<del>20-1-11</del>		DOSSIER
cc 23.3-1983		

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTCTT IDDZ0210 24NOV83

TO PMDEL/DELHI/FOWLER/SHENSTONE DELIVER BY 250800

INFO PCOOTT/CARON NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD PEKIN MOSCO

DISTR MINA DMF IFB UMC IDR IDA ETN

REF OUR MEMO IDDZ132 14NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:STATEMENT AND DECLARATION AT CHOGM

UNDER COVER OF REF MEMO WE PROVIDED DRAFT FOR PM STATEMENT ON QUOTE  
WORLD POLITICAL SCENE-GLOBAL TRENDS AND PROSPECTS UNQUOTE.IN ORDER  
TO KEEP DPM/SSEA INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS,WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO  
KNOW WHETHER PMS INTERVENTION WAS ALONG LINES SUGGESTED IN OUR DRAFT  
OR WHETHER SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES WERE MADE.IN LATTER CASE,GRATEFUL YOU  
PROVIDE ASAP FULL TEXT OF FINAL VERSION OF STATEMENT ON WHICH PM  
BASED HIS INTERVENTION.

2.GRATEFUL ALSO FOR SITREP ON WHERE MATTERS NOW STAND RE EVENTUAL  
CHOGM DECLARATION ON INNATL PEACE AND SECURITY.

CCC/273 241503Z IDDZ0210



MESSAGE

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 24 NOV 83 23 03z 12 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0217 24NOV83  
 TO/A TO PMDEL/DELHI  
 INFO INFO WSHDC  
 DISTR DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB IDD URD URR  
 REF  
 SUBJ/SUJ ---LETTER FROM VP BUSH

*28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace mission*

PMO RECEIVED THIS AM LETTER ADRESSED TO PM FROM USVP BUSH  
NOVEMBER 15. TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:

(COMCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACH QUOTE TO UNQUOTE).

**DATED**

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <i>J. Caron</i> J. CARON	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG <i>L.A. Delvoie</i> L.A. DELVOIE



THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1983

The Right Honorable  
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, P.C., M.P.  
Prime Minister of Canada  
Ottawa

*Quote*  
"


Dear Pierre:

Your Embassy was kind enough to send me a copy of your address at Guelph of October 27. I recall with pleasure our conversation on the subject of East-West relations, and was most impressed by the way you had expanded these thoughts in your address.

There is a sense of tension in the world -- much of it, I believe, growing out of Soviet reluctance to adjust to a U.S. which is now more actively espousing vital free world interests. You are perfectly right in asserting that increased tension must not be allowed to choke off dialogue, and I believe it is highly useful for statesmen like yourself to work actively to see if new forms of dialogue can be developed.

Thank you very much for sharing your speech and you have my best wishes as you seek to implement its central concerns.

Sincerely,

  
George Bush

*P3*

*sorry we missed  
on Maine -*

*||*  
*Unquote*



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 24 NOV 83 19 20 7 10

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SUBJ/SUJ

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RSD RSR IDA IDR  
REF YOURTEL XGGR 1092 23 NOV  
---PM INITIATIVE: SPANISH INTEREST ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WE AGREE WITH THE LINE YOU TOOK IN RESPONDING TO YANEZ QUERIES ON THE PM INITIATIVE. TO CONFIRM:

- 1) THERE IS NO/NO CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN PM TRUDEAU S INITIATIVE AND CEAUCESCU.
  - 2) PM INITIATIVE IS NOT/NOT LINKED TO THE INF TALKS AND HAS A BROADER PURPOSE THAN ENCOURAGING INF NEGOTIATIONS, HENCE WE DO NOT/NOT ANTICIPATE THAT THE PM S INITIATIVE WILL CHANGE ITS FOCUS NOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE INTERRUPTED THE INF TALKS.
  - 3) PM WILL NOT/NOT ATTEND INAUGURATION OF ARGENTINIAN PRESIDENT. RECOMMENDATION BEFORE SSEA IS THAT HE NOMINATE A MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUE TO ATTEND.
  - 4) AS INDICATED IN PM S 17 NOV LET TO PRES GONZALEZ, SSEA WILL PROPOSE HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL PRESENCE FOR CDE OPENING IN JAN AT NAC MTG IN DEC. ~~(FOR YOUR INFO ONLY, IT HAS NOT/NOT YET BEEN DECIDED WHETHER TO PROPOSE HEADS OF GOVT OR FOREIGN MINISTERIAL PARTICIPATION).~~
2. AT THIS TIME THERE ARE NO/NO PLANS FOR A SECOND VISIT TO WESTERN

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  J.A. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG  L.A. DELVOIE



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PAGE TWO    IDDZ0215    CONFIDENTIAL

12|

10

EUROPE, BUT SHOULD ONE MATERIALIZE WE WOULD, OF COURSE, GIVE CONSIDERATION TO INCLUDING MADRID.



MESSAGE

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24 Nov 83 20 12 10 z 10

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ ~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ CDN EYES ONLY

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SUBJ/SUJ REF YOURTEL TOKYO UIGR2549 23NOV

28-6-1-Tudor Peace Mission

---PM INITIATIVE:DPM/SSEA INVOLVEMENT

THANKS FOR HELPFUL REFTEL.CURRENT PLANS CALL FOR DPM/SSEA TO  
(A)ADDRESS PM INITIATIVE IN SPEECH WHICH HE WILL MAKE TO CHICAGO  
BRANCH OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 29NOV (B)BRIEF USA PRESS ON  
INITIATIVE EITHER IMMEDLY BEFORE OR AFTER CHICAGO SPEECH (C)TAKE UP  
CDE AND MBFR PROPOSALS AT NAC MINISTERIAL ON 08DEC AND (D) DISCUSS  
INITIATIVE WITH SEC STATE SHULTZ AT BREAKFAST MTG IN BRU ON 09DEC.  
2.OTHER IDEAS UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
L.A.Delvoie/sc SIG	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> SIG L.A. Delvoie



MESSAGE

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SECURITY /  
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TO PMDEL/DELHI/3 DELIVER BY 250800

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~~FOWLER ONLY DE DELVOIE~~

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INFO PEKIN/AMB ONLY MOSCO/SMITH ONLY

SUBJ/SUJ

~~DISTR MINA/DUDOIT ONLY~~

FROM DELVOIE

---PM INITIATIVE: VISIT TO CHINA

IN ORDER TO ENSURE CONSISTENCY BETWEEN APPROACHES TAKEN IN DELHI AND OTT, GRATEFUL TO KNOW (A) EXACTLY WHEN IS IT PM DELS INTENTION TO INFORM CDN PRESS PARTY AND OTHERS OF VISIT TO CHINA, AND (B) WHAT PRESS LINE WILL BE TAKEN BY PM DEL.

2.AM KEEPING TOM AXWORTHY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

24 NOV 83 151032  
28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

L.A. Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

*L.A. Delvoie*  
SIG L.A. Delvoie

FPR-J NOBLE-5-1874-AH

Canada Canada

TO/A FILE  
FROM/DE FPR

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
November 24, 1983
Number/Numéro
FPR-1124

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE  
SUBJECT •  
SUJET  
SCRUM: SSEA November 24, 1983  
Andropov's statement

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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EXT 407

PCOOTT PMOOTT/Fowler

Q. The reason I wanted to ask you a question was that Mr. Andropov's come out with a statement saying something to the effect that missiles in the seas and the ocean would respond to the Pershing-2's. In other words, he could deploy more missiles in the seas and the ocean. The other thing is, that the Geneva talks couldn't be held or that they are irrevocable...?

SSEA Well, at one time you may remember, the Soviet Union refused to begin the talks, the Geneva talks. It took quite some time to get them to the table. They did come to the table and I think they will come back to the table, in due course.

Q. So you don't take his threat very seriously then? You don't think he is actually going to hold to that?

SSEA I believe that they will find it impossible to maintain, indefinitely, the view that they will not continue these negotiations. Why have they stopped the negotiations? Presumably, because deployment is about to begin. That is their reason, but keep in mind that while these negotiations have been going on, and they have been going on for some time, the Soviet Union itself has been deploying new missiles. So it is a bit contradictory to have deployed these missiles during the negotiations and then when the other side begins deployment, to stop the negotiations. Is there a double-standard there?

Q. What do you think about the increased threat posed by the deploying of more missiles by submarines in the sea, and so forth, as Mr. Andropov has suggested? North America now seems to be more threatened, does that bother you?

SSEA Well, it bothers me to hear talk about more deployment, more missiles, silos. The purpose of these talks is to try and get a mutually-agreed level of arms. Of course it is bothersome and it is worrisome. It has to be dealt with. But the way to deal with it is through resumed negotiations.

- 2 -

Q. So is this the price we have to pay for taking a hard line in relation to our negotiations?

SSEA You know, the Soviet Union attempted for some time now, through various efforts with public opinion to get the allies not to deploy. They failed. Deployment will go ahead. The British Parliament has taken a positive vote. The Italian Parliament, the German Parliament, all of these countries have said Yes, we are going ahead, despite the efforts of the Soviet Union. So, it is understandable that the Soviet Union will require a little time to re-assess its strategy, which in this case was to try to get the Western democracies to say, We won't deploy. They have refused to say that, and that has been a defeat for the Soviet Union.

Q. If they do deploy more, do you see a threat that perhaps the NATO countries will want to add even more missiles to their arsenal than the ones they already have?

SSEA I don't think that will be the outcome that the NATO Alliance would want to reach.

Q. Does this failure of the Soviet policy up to now augur well there for Prime Minister Trudeau's peace initiative?

SSEA I stated yesterday, that the break-down or the cessation, or the interruption in the arms talks is an added reason, and gives added urgency for the effort that the Prime Minister is undertaking. It seems to me that what is happening now, as demonstrated with great clarity, the timeliness of what the Prime Minister is doing.

Q. Meanwhile, have you read Mr. Pearson's Moscow Report?

SSEA Not yet. He hasn't been there yet, or has he?



John J. Noble  
Director  
Media Relations Division

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

*WCF*  
*WJ*

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DISTR MINA DMF DMFX RSD RSR IDR IDA  
RWF OSLO TEL WGGR4346 23NOV  
---PM INITIATIVE

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

UNFORTUNATELY, DINNER WITH NORWEGIAN PM 22NOV DID NOT/NOT LEND ITSELF TO DISCUSSION OF PMS INITIATIVE. I KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT PM WILLOCH HAS BEEN MAKING FAVOURABLE REFERENCES TO INITIATIVE IN HIS PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS HERE WITH SENIOR NATO OFFICIALS.

2. THERE WAS IN FACT NO/NO GENERAL DISCUSSION AT DINNER, ONLY AN EXCHANGE OF TOASTS BETWEEN PM WILLOCH AND SEC GEN FOCUSING ON INF. THIS WAS PROBABLY INEVITABLE. NORWEGIAN PM HAD ARRIVED LATER THAN PLANNED DIRECT FROM HIS ONE-VOTE VICTORY IN NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT AND ON EVENING BEFORE CRUCIAL VOTE IN BUNDESTAG. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, INF WAS UPPERMOST IN PM WILLOCHS MIND AND IN MINDS OF MOST OF THOSE PRESENT.

3. IN HIS TOAST, PM WILLOCH SUGGESTED HIS ONE-VOTE VICTORY SHOULD NOT/NOT BE MISUNDERSTOOD. ALL NORWEGIAN POLITICIANS KNEW GOVT COULD MUSTER MAJORITY WHICH, ALTHOUGH BARE MINIMUM, WAS SECURE. THEREFORE, HE SUGGESTED, SOME OPPOSITION VOTES HAD BEEN CAST AGAINST INF IN KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WAS SAFE TO DO SO: THAT OPPOSITION COULD HAVE SATISFACTION OF VOTING AGAINST DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT RUNNING ANY

...2

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ACTION  
ZITE A DONNER

PAGE TWO YBGR8136 CONFID

REAL RISK OF HINDERING IT.

4. INDICATIONS WE ARE RECEIVING HERE OF NORWEGIAN ATTITUDES SQUARE ENTIRELY WITH PARA4 OSLO REFTEL. AS REPORTED ELSEWHERE, WE EXPECT TO HEAR NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR INDICATE SUPPORT FOR POSITIVE MOVEMENT IN MFR WHEN THIS QUESTION IS REVIEWED HERE 25 NOV, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT/NOT EXPECT HIM TO GO SO FAR, AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE TO SUPPORT MTG OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

TAYLOR

CCC/070 241257Z YBGR8136

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NOV. 25 10:27 PERMANENT MISSION OF CDA GENEVA

P.002

MESSAGE

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28-1-1-CDA

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SECURITY/  
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

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TO EXTOTT/IDDZ

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DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB URR RGB RBR RBD RCD RSD RSR IDD IFB IDR IDA

---ARMS TALKS GENEVA

REPORT DATE-LINED GENEVA FROM TODAY'S INTERNATIONAL HERALD  
TRIBUNE ENTITLED "RUSSIANS FULFILL THREAT TO QUIT TALKS IN GENEVA  
ON EUROMISSILES".

28-6-1 = Judeau Peace Mission

GVA 005/24

PAGE 1 OF 3

NOV. 25 '83 10:27 PERMANENT MISSION OF CDR- GENEVA

P.003

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INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE - November 24, 1983

2/3

# Russians Fulfill Threat to Quit Talks in Geneva On Euromissiles

By William Drozdiak

*Washington Post Service*

GENEVA — The Soviet Union on Wednesday fulfilled its threat to break off negotiations to limit intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

Following a 25-minute session with his U.S. counterpart, Paul H. Nitze, the Soviet Union's chief negotiator, Yuli A. Kvitsinsky, emerged from the U.S. mission here and declared: "The present round of negotiations has been discontinued, and no date has been set for a resumption."

At a press conference later, Mr. Nitze read a prepared statement saying the United States "profoundly regrets" the Soviet action, which he said was "as unjustified as it is unfortunate."

U.S. officials said the breakdown in the talks on the European-based missiles did not necessarily presage a halt to a parallel set of negotiations on strategic global weapons known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, or START. U.S. and Soviet delegations still intend to hold their next session in that forum on Nov. 29.

It has been widely speculated that the two sets of negotiations would be combined next year if the Russians carried out their pledges to walk out of the talks on intermediate-range missiles. But Mr. Nitze stressed Wednesday that it was "not inevitable" that such a merger would occur.

The Soviet walkout was anticipated following the vote in the



Paul H. Nitze

West German parliament to endorse immediate deployment of Pershing-2 missiles, which were reportedly scheduled to begin arriving in West Germany Wednesday.

Last Tuesday, Mr. Kvitsinsky told Mr. Nitze that the arrival in Europe of missiles with a "short flight time to the Soviet Union" would be the determining factor, according to sources close to the U.S. delegation. The Pershing-2 missiles based in West Germany

(Continued on Page 2, Col. 1)

3/3

(Continued from Page 1)  
would take 12 to 13 minutes to strike Soviet targets.

At the session Wednesday, which was the shortest in the two-year negotiations, Mr. Kvitsinsky read the same statement he gave to reporters and then announced it would be futile to break into working groups as the two delegations usually do. Mr. Nitze agreed, and the delegations ended their meeting with a round of handshakes in a mood that participants described as "solemn and gloomy."

Despite his disappointment in seeing the talks suspended, Mr. Nitze said he felt "a great deal was achieved." He said that "progress has been made on almost all of the issues, but the one thing that has remained constant on the Soviet side has been their demand that there be a continuation of militarily significant deployment of SS-20s and that there should be absolutely no deployments of countermissiles on our side."

He said that when the talks were proposed in 1979, the Soviet Union had already deployed 140 SS-20 systems and persisted in building up its arsenal to the current level of 360 of the missiles, which are capable of carrying three warheads each.

"This continuing Soviet buildup

has not prevented the United States from pursuing these negotiations and making every effort to reach an equitable agreement," Mr. Nitze said.

He contended that the United States "stands ready to halt or reverse its deployments" if a compromise could be achieved that would reduce or eliminate intermediate-range missile forces.

But unfortunately, he said, the Soviet Union has "rationalized the suspension of these negotiations on the grounds that approval by NATO governments of U.S. missile deployments and U.S. deployments of those missiles make continuation of such talks impossible."

The collapse of the talks, according to sources close to the U.S. delegation, was all but assured following controversy over an informal suggestion by Mr. Kvitsinsky. During a two-hour walk in a Geneva park with Mr. Nitze on Nov. 13, the Soviet negotiator hinted that if the United States proposed to eliminate 572 systems on each side by dropping Western deployment plans if the Soviets reduced SS-20 missiles to 120, the Kremlin would accept the offer.

He also indicated the Russians would consent to drop their key demand calling for British and French missiles to be counted in the Geneva talks if such systems

would be included in another arms control forum.

Moscow first denied that such an overture was floated and later contended that Mr. Nitze had actually initiated such ideas and not Mr. Kvitsinsky.

U.S. officials said Mr. Nitze was "furious over what he saw as outright Soviet deceit" and an effort to spread confusion among the Western allies. Mr. Nitze declined to go into detail about the matter at his press conference Wednesday, saying simply that "Soviet statements on this subject are completely contrary to fact."

The breakdown in the Geneva talks will focus attention on whether the Russians will now carry out threats of taking further military preparations such as moving more short-range nuclear missiles into East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

U.S. and European military specialists concede that the Russians may also decide to push ahead actively with new plans to deploy sea-launched cruise missiles.

Most ominous, from a U.S. viewpoint, would be deployment of so-called "depressed trajectory" sea-launched missiles that could hit important U.S. targets on the East Coast within the same short time that Pershing-2 missiles in West Germany can hit the Soviet Union.

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace  
mission

S E C R E T

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TO PMDELDELHI DELIVER BY 250900

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REF OURTEL IDR4477 23NOV

---INF:SUSPENSION OF TALKS:ANDROPOV STATEMENT 24NOV

SUMMARY: IN OUR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, ANDROPOV STATEMENT (OPERAT-  
IVE PORTION IN FOLLOWING PARAS) IS PERHAPS TOUGHER AND EARLIER THAN  
EXPECTED. BUT CONTAINS NOTHING THAT WAS NOT/NOT ANTICIPATED AND  
PUPUBLICLY FORESHADOWED IN PREVIOUS SOVIET STATEMENTS. HAVING PUELICLY  
THRFATENED COUNTERMEASURES, SOVIETS HAD LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO FOLLOW  
THROUGH. SIGNIFICANTLY, STATEMENT DOES NOT/NOT EVOKE LINKAGE TO  
START. MEFR, OR CCSBMDE.

2 REPORT: ANDROPOV ANNOUNCED FOLLOWING FOUR DECISIONS: QUOTE  
FIRST: SINCE THE USA BY ITS ACTIONS HAS WRECKED THE POSSIBILITY OF  
ACHIEVING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORD AT THE TALKS ON QUESTIONS OF  
LIMITING NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE AND SINCE THEIR CONTINUATION IN  
THESE CONDITIONS WOULD ONLY BE A COVER FOR ACTIONS BY THE UNITED  
STATES AND A NUMEER OF OTHER NATO CTRIES AIMED AT UNDERMINING

. 2

PAGE TWO IDR4491 SECRET

EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERS IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PARTICIPATE FURTHER IN THESE TALKS.

SECOND: THE COMMITMENTS UNILATERALLY ADOPTED BY THE SOVIET UNION WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF CREATING MORE FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR ACHIEVING SUCCESS AT THE TALKS ARE AEROGATED. THE MORATORIUM ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR IS THEREBY ABROGATED.

THIRD: BY AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVTS OF THE GDR AND THE CSSR THE PREP-ARATORY WORK BEGUN SOME TIME AGO, AS WAS ANNOUNCED, FOR THE SITING OF ENHANCED-RANGE OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES ON THE TERRITORY OF THOSE CTRIES WILL BE ACCELERATED.

FOURTH: SINCE BY SITING ITS MISSILES IN EUROPE THE UNITED STATES IS INCREASING THE NUCLEAR THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION, CORRESPONDING SOVIET MEANS WILL BE DEPLOYED IN OCEAN REGIONS AND SEAS TAKING THIS CIRCUMSTANCE INTO ACCOUNT. IN TERMS OF THEIR CHARACTERISTICS THESE MEANS OF OURS WILL BE EQUAL (ADEQUATE) TO THE THREAT CREATED FOR US AND OUR ALLIES BY THE AMERICAN MISSILES BEING SITED IN EUROPE. UNQUOTE

3. AFTER THREATENING IN INCREASINGLY SPECIFIC TERMS TO SUSPEND INF TALKS IF WFSTERN DEPLOYMENTS PROCEEDED, SOVIET ACTION 23NOV WAS INEVITABLE IF THEY WERE NOT/NOT TO LOSE CREDIBILITY. INITIAL SOV STATEMENT IN GENEV SAID ONLY THAT CURRENT ROUND HAD BEEN SUSPENDED AND THAT NO/NO DATE HAD BEEN SET FOR RESUMPTION. ANDROPOV STATEMENT

PAGE THREE IDR4491 SECRET

IN DESCRIBING CONTINUATION OF TALKS AS IMPOSSIBLE.

4. SOVIETS HAD ALSO THREATENED PREVIOUSLY TO END THEIR MORATORIUM ON INF DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE. NEVERTHELESS, ALTHOUGH MORATORIUM WAS ANNOUNCED IN MAY82, SOVIETS CONTINUED AFTERWARD TO COMPLETE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ADDITIONAL FOUR BASES WITH TOTAL OF 36/36 MISSILES. DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIAN USSR NEVER CEASED.

5. SOVIET PROGRAM TO MODERNIZE SCUD AND FROG MISSILES WHICH HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN EASTERN EUROPE SINCE 1960S (BY REPLACING THEM WITH SS-21 AND SS-23 MISSILES) HAS BEEN UNDER WAY FOR SOME YRS. OVER 30/30 SS-21S ARE ALREADY DEPLOYED IN GDR. SOME SS-12/22 MISSILES COULD BE REDEPLOYED FROM WESTERN USSR TO EASTERN EUROPE, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD BE OF LITTLE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

6 SOVIETS HAD ALSO THREATENED COUNTERMEASURES QUOTE HAVING TERRITORY OF USA ITSELF IN VIEW UNQUOTE. REF TO DEPLOYMENT IN OCEANS AND SEAS MAY MEAN DEPLOYMENT OF SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, WHICH WOULD BE LOGICAL STEP AND CERTAINLY LESS PROVOCATIVE THAN EG ATTEMPT TO DEPLOY LAND-BASED MISSILES IN CUBA.

7. SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE WAITED UNTIL FIRST NATO INF BECAME OPERATIONAL IN DEC BEFORE ANNOUNCING COUNTERMEASURES. THEY MAY, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO HARBOUR SOME SMALL HOPE OF GENERATING SUFFICIENT PUBLIC PRESSURE IN WEST TO FORCE HALT TO DEPLOYMENTS BEFORE ANY NATO MISSILES BECOME OPERATIONAL. IF SO, THEY WOULD WANT TO GIVE ANNOUNCEMENT OF COUNTER-

...4

PAGE FOUR IDR4491 SECRET

MEASURES MAXIMUM TIME IN WHICH TO WORK ON PUBLIC OPINION. INTIMIDATING TONE OF STATEMENT AND DECLARATION THAT BIASING CTRIES, TOGETHER WITH USA, ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SITU, COMBINED WITH PROMISE TO RETURN TO STATUS QUO ANTE IF NATO DOES SO, SEEMS CALCULATED FOR PUBLIC EFFECT.

8. DESPITE PREVIOUS HINTS THAT START, MBFR, OR CCSBMDE WOULD ALSO BE AFFECTED BY NATO DEPLOYMENTS, THERE IS NO/NO MENTION OF SUCH LINKAGE IN ANDROPOV STATEMENT. SOVIETS MAY BE SAVING RETALIATION IN THESE FORUMS UNTIL NATO MISSILES BECOME OPERATIONAL. ON OTHER HAND, THEY MAY WISH TO PRESERVE OPTION OF EVENTUALLY DEALING WITH INF IN AN EXPANDED START IF CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES BECOME OPERATIONAL, WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR USSR TO RETURN TO INF TABLE.

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28-6-1 - Hudson Peace  
Mission

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

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Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

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PEKIN NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/CPP PCOOTT/CARON

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REF YOURTEL IDDZ159 17NOV OURTEL XNGR4108 16NOV TOKYO TEL UIGR2548  
23NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:BRITISH REACTION

SUMMARY:IN PARTICULARLY FRANK AND FIRM PRESENTATION,FCO DEFENCE  
DEPT OFFICIALS HAVE READ US PORTIONS OF BRIEFING ON PRIME MINISTERS  
INITIATIVE AGREED INTERDEPARTMENTALLY AT SENIOR LEVELS FOR PM  
THATCHERS USE AT CHOGM.OFFICIALS PLACED COMMENTS IN CONTEXT OF  
GENERAL RECOGNITION THAT TWO PMS AGREED BROADLY ON NEED FOR HIGH  
LEVEL POLITICAL INITIATIVE AND QUOTE SENSIBLE AND PRAGMATIC  
DIALOGUE UNQUOTE,AND THEY EMPHASIZED BROAD AGREEMENT HERE WITH  
MAJOR PORTIONS OF PMS GUELPH SPEECH.NONETHELESS,BRIEFING NOTES  
INDICATE THAT REACTION AT OFFICIAL LEVEL TO SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT  
PROPOSALS IS NOT ENCOURAGING.CLEAR IMPLICATION IS THAT FURTHER  
WORK IS REQUIRED BOTH TO ENSURE ESSENTIAL POLITICAL IMPETUS AND  
DIRECTION IS GIVEN TO BRITISH OFFICIALS TO EXAMINE PROPOSALS  
FUPTRER,AND THAT TECHNICAL DETAILS AND QUESTIONS CURRENTLY  
CLOUDING OFFICIALS PERCEPTIONS OF PROPOSALS. ARE CLARIFIED.

...2

MONDA  
A 3102

PAGE TWO XNGR4188 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

2. REPORT: FCO DEFENCE DEPT, ACTING WITH CONCURRENCE OF SOVIET AND NUCLEAR ENERGY DEPTS, HAVE GIVEN US FRANK AND NOT PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING APPRAISAL OF MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND FOREIGN OFFICE VIEWS ON SPECIFICS OF PM INITIATIVE. READING FROM BRIEFING ON INITIATIVE PREPARED FOR MRS THATCHERS USE AT CHOGM, OFFICIALS ASSURE US THAT FOLLOWING COMMENTS HAVE BEEN CLEARED TO SENIOR LEVELS AND REFLECT VIEWS OF BOTH MINISTRIES.

3. AS PRIME MINISTERS RECENT SPEECH TO LORD MAYORS BANQUET, AND NOW HER SPEECH AT CHOGM HAVE REFLECTED, SHE AGREES WITH SUBSTANCE OF PMS GUELPH SPEECH INsofar AS IT REFLECTS NEED TO BALANCE FIRM AFFERENCE TO WESTERN PRINCIPLES AND SECURITY WITH HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL INITIATIVE TOWARDS QUOTE SENSIBLE, PRAGMATIC DIALOGUE UNQUOTE. WHILE DIALOGUE WILL NOT IN ITSELF LEAD TO BETTER EAST/WEST RELATIONS, PM THATCHER QUOTE IS COMMITTED TO WORKING IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY TO REDUCE RISKS OF WAR AND AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH INCREASE THOSE RISKS UNQUOTE. TO THIS EXTENT, BRITISH AND CAN VIEWS LARGELY COINCIDE. (IN THIS CONTEXT IT MAY BE WORTH NOTING THAT FCO MINISTER LUCE IS QUOTED BY LONDON TIMES AS RESPONDING TO SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM INF TALKS WITH COMMENT QUOTE CERTAINLY ANY PROPOSALS SUCH AS THOSE FROM MR TRUDEAU MUST BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED UNQUOTE).

4 ON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, HOWEVER, UK REACTION IS CONSIDERABLY LESS

...3

PAGE THREE XNGR4198 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

POSITIVE, AND ON FIVE POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE AS SKETCHED OUT IN PAPER LEFT FOR PERM SEC ACLAND BY PM DEL, RESPONSE IS BLUNTLY NEGATIVE: QUOTE THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY WE CAN SUPPORT THIS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND AS PRESENTLY DEFINED UNQUOTE. OBSERVING THAT FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF SETTING RATIOS IS IN ITSELF NOT NEW CONCEPT (IT WAS FIRST RAISED AT CHATHAM HOUSE), OFFICIALS TOLD US FRANKLY THAT UK HAS FOR SOME TIME AND IN CONSIDERABLE DEPTH BEEN EXAMINING RANGE OF QUESTIONS SURROUNDING INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND ITS ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL. AND WHILE THEY CANNOT NOW DIVULGE WHERE EXAMINATION HAS GOT TO, NOR EVEN WHAT THEIR SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS ARE, QUOTE WE HAVE GOT GOOD SECURITY REASONS FOR NOT GOING BEYOND HOWE FORMULA UNQUOTE. (THIS REFERS TO STATEMENT SECRETARY HOWE MADE TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHEN HE SAID THAT QUOTE WE HAVE MADE CLEAR, THAT IF SOVIET AND US STRATEGIC ARSENALS WERE TO BE VERY SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED AND IF NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES HAD OCCURRED IN SOVIET DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, BRITAIN WOULD WANT TO REVIEW HER POSITION AND CONSIDER HOW BEST SHE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO ARMS CONTROL IN LIGHT OF REDUCED THREAT UNQUOTE). SIGNIFICANT PHRASE IN HOWE FORMULA IS QUOTE IF NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES HAD OCCURRED IN SOVIET DEFENCE ABILITIES UNQUOTE. OFFICIALS SEE THIS AS QUOTE SERIOUS FLAW UNQUOTE IN CDN PAPER, AND POINT OUT THAT LEVEL OF BRITISH DETERRENT MUST BE DETERMINED AS MUCH OR MORE AS

PAGE FOUR XNGR4188 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

FUNCTION OF SOVIET DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGY THAN OF OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL.

QUOTE QUESTION OF WORKING OUT MINIMUM NECESSARY DETERRENT IS COMPLEX; WE ARE GIVING IT CONTINUOUS AND INTENSIVE THOUGHT, AND WILL NOT BE DRAWN IN PUBLIC ON HOW OR WHEN THIS WILL DEVELOP UNQUOTE. RELATED QUESTION OF LEVEL OF RATIO IS ALSO MAJOR CONCERN; WHILE OFFICIALS APPRECIATE CDN ASSURANCES THAT PROPOSAL ALLOWS FOR RATIOS TO BE NEGOTIATED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NEED FOR MODERNIZATION, QUOTE ONCE RATIOS ARE ESTABLISHED, IF WE ARE TO LOOK FOR ARMS REDUCTION ON PART OF SUPERPOWERS, WHAT WILL THAT DO TO UK DETERRENT? UNQUOTE.

5. ON THREE MILITARY TECHNOLOGY PROPOSALS, OFFICIALS MERELY OBSERVE THAT BRITISH ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED, AND THAT MAJOR CDN DISCUSSIONS MUST BE WITH USA. OFFICIALS DID WONDER ALOUD HOWEVER ABOUT WHAT THEY SEE AS POSSIBLE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN SUGGESTION IN FIVE POWER PAPER THAT USING WARHEAD AS UNIT OF COUNT WOULD HAVE VIRTUE... OF ENCOURAGING MOVE TOWARDS A LESS VULNERABLE, SINGLE WARHEAD SYSTEM AND AWAY FROM VULNERABLE AND DESTABILIZING MIRVED SYSTEMS. WITH ARGUMENT IN VERIFICATION PAPER OF NEED TO LIMIT GEOGRAPHIC AND FREQUENCY MOBILITY.

6. ON ASAT PROPOSALS, OFFICIALS HERE ARE CAUTIOUS; AGAIN OBSERVING THEY ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED, THEY ALSO NOTE THAT IT IS USA QUOTE WHOSE ASSETS ARE AT STAKE UNQUOTE. POINTING OUT THAT SOVIETS

PAGE FIVE XNGR4188 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

HAVE ALREADY TESTED THIS TYPE OF WEAPON, THEY SEE CDN PROPOSAL AS OFFERING SOVIETS OPPORTUNITY TO QUOTE DRIVE WEDGES UNQUOTE.

RATHER THEY BELIEVE EFFORTS SHOULD BE CONTINUED IN CD CONTEXT WHERE THEY OBSERVE WEST AND NNA ARE GENERALLY IN AGREEMENT, WITH SOVIETS BEING ODD MAN OUT.

7. CCSEMDE: OFFICIALS HERE HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY WITH QUOTE EARLIER UNQUOTE SUGGESTION THAT HEADS OF GOVT MIGHT LAUNCH CCSEMDE: THEY SEE THIS AS RAISING PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS, AND THUS AS BEING RISKY IN TERMS OF OVERLOADING CSCE PROCESS POLITICALLY. BRIEFING EXPRESSES CONCERN THAT PLACING TOO MUCH POLITICAL EMPHASIS ON STOCKHOLM MIGHT DETRACT FROM HUMAN RIGHTS ELEMENTS OF CSCE PROCESS. ON OTHER HAND, PROPOSAL THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS OPEN STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE STRIKES MORE POSITIVE NOTE: OFFICIALS TELL US THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE HAS NOT YET COMMITTED HIMSELF, (HE IS WAITING TO SEE WHETHER SHULTZ AND GROMYKO AGREE TO IT), BUT THAT IN ANY CASE BRITAIN WILL BE REPRESENTED AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

8. MBFR: INITIAL REACTION HERE WAS TO QUERY WHETHER CDA HAD A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL. OBSERVING THAT IDEA OF MINISTERS MEETING IN MBFR CONTEXT WAS NOT NEW (CURRENT SDP LEADER DAVID OWEN SUGGESTED THIS WHEN HE WAS FOREIGN MINISTER) BRIEFING ARGUES THAT SCOPE FOR BREAKTHROUGH AND MOVEMENT IS CURRENTLY VERY LIMITED QUOTE UNLESS

...6

PAGE SIX XNGR4188 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

WE ARE PREPARED TO ABANDON KEY NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES AND TAKE LEAP OF FAITH UNQUOTE. LATEST EASTERN POSITION MAY CONTAIN ADVANCE. AND UK WANT TO RESPOND TO IT; THEY THUS AGREE THAT NATO EVALUATION OF MFR PROCESS WOULD BE TIMELY. ON OTHER HAND, THEY SEE NO EVIDENCE NOW THAT MTG OF FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE LIKELY TO SATISFY EXPECTATIONS IT WOULD RAISE UNLESS THERE WERE SHIFT AWAY FROM QUOTE WHAT NATO HAD PREVIOUSLY REGARDED AS SIGNIFICANT ISSUES OF SECURITY INTEREST UNQUOTE.

9. NPT: BRIEF SUGGESTS THAT IN HIGHLIGHTING PROPOSED FAILURES OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, WE WOULD ONLY REFLECT AND ENCOURAGE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHO OPPOSE NPT. QUOTE ACTUAL FACTS OF LIFE ARE QUITE DIFFERENT: THERE IS NO LOGICAL LINKAGE BETWEEN HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL PROLIFERATION; POTENTIAL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES ARE NOT BEING RESTRAINED OUT OF FRUSTRATION WITH WEAPONS STATES FAILURE TO ACHIEVE DISARMAMENT; THEY ARE TAKING DECISIONS ENTIRELY FOR THEIR OWN STRATEGIC INTERESTS UNQUOTE. BRIEFING GIVEN PRIME MINISTER RECOMMENDS STRONGLY AGAINST DISCUSSING NPT IN CPOGM CONTEXT, OR WITH MRS GHANDI IN NEW DELHI.

10. COMMENT: IT WILL BE CLEAR FROM FOREGOING AND FROM REPORTS OF THATCER/TRUDEAU TALKS IN LDN, THAT BEFORE WE CAN EXPECT MUCH SUPPORT FROM BRITISH FOR PM INITIATIVE, CONSIDERABLE EFFORT WILL BE REQUIRED IN TWO DIRECTIONS: FIRST, WE MUST WORK TO OBTAIN

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POLITICAL COMMITMENT FROM PM THATCHER AND HER MINISTERS TO PREMISE THAT SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS COULD OFFER PROMISING, EVEN NECESSARY AVENUES FOR ACHIEVING AGREED GOAL OF IMPROVEMENT IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. SECOND, WE WILL HAVE TO EXPLAIN MORE FULLY TO OFFICIALS. TECHNICAL DETAILS OF PROPOSALS, AND TO ANSWER SPECIFIC UK MOD AND FCO OBJECTIONS. IN LATTER CONTEXT, WE WOULD SUGGEST IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE TECHNICAL EXPERTS TEAM VISIT BRITAIN IN NEXT FEW WEEKS. SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM INF TALKS HAS INCREASED GENERAL CONCERN HERE OVER PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS, AND TIME WOULD THUS SEEM TO BE RIPE TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATION OF PM DEL IN TOKYO TEL UIGR2548 23NOV, TO MAKE FURTHER EFFORT TO EXPLAIN DETAILS OF CDN PROPOSALS TO UK OFFICIALS AND MRS THATCHER.

CCC/224 241528Z XNGR4188

- Supplement
- Arsenic put together
  - ↳ what is German proposal.
- Arsenic → in clear terms

- what distinguishes from general fair power reduction
- focus on limits as in Salt I
- only in second tranche would we focus on reductions -
- emphasize limits in 1st, have limits/cutbacks/ratios.

① - C.D. - Supplicatini → 3 pages for IDA  
↳ discuss with IDA. - Christoff

*MF*  
*hd*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace  
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM TOKYO UIGR2576 24NOV83

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ)

INFO MOSCO WSHDC BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY

NDFQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP PCOOTT

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGB RBR UCB URR RCR ZSI PGB PED PER

REF OURTELS UIGR2529(NOTAL) UIGR2530 23NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE

REFTELS SHOULD READ QUOTE FROM PEARSON UNQUOTE.

CCC/232 240145Z UIGR2576

Refcc to: MINA

DMF

UGB

URR

FPR

INFO

+ file  
ID

NONCLASSIFIE

DE PMOOTT PM01414 24NOV83

PMDELDELHI/FOWLER/JOHNSON/COLEMAN/SMITH

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ

REF ENTREVUE AVEC AMBASSADEUR ROBINSON

LE JOURNAL LA PRESSE DU 241183, SOUS LA SIGNATURE DE

GILBERT LAVOIE, PUBLIE UN ARTICLE INTITULE CIT SELON

L'AMBASSADEUR AMERICAIN PAUL ROBINSON, WASHINGTON N A

PAS DE RESERVES FACE A LA CROISADE TRUDEAU FINCIT.

CET ARTICLE N A PAS ETE REPRIS PAR LA PRESSE ANGLOPHONE.

J'AI TOUTEFOIS ATTIRE L'ATTENTION DE CP SUR LE CONTENU

DE L'ARTICLE EN QUESTION.

VOICI LE TEXTE INTEGRAL DE CET ARTICLE:

CIT OTTAWA-L'AMBASSADEUR DES ETATS-UNIS AU CANADA, M. PAUL

ROBINSON, SOUHAITE QUE LE PREMIER MINISTRE TRUDEAU

SE RENDE JUSQU'A MOSCOU DANS LE CADRE DE SA MISSION DE

PAIX INTERNATIONALE, ET IL NIE DE FACON CATEGORIQUE QUE

WASHINGTON AIT DES RESERVES FACE A CETTE INITIATIVE DU

CHEF D'ETAT CANADIEN.

M. ROBINSON ESPERE PAR AILLEURS QUE M. TRUDEAU RENCONTRERA


LE PRESIDENT REAGAN CIT LE PLUS TOT POSSIBLE FINCIT

SUR LE SUJET, MAIS IL PRECISE QU'AUUCUNE DATE N A

ENCORE ETE ARRETEE POUR UNE TELLE REUNION.

C'EST CE QUI RESSORT D'UNE ENTREVUE ACCORDEE HIER PAR

...2



CRM

PAGE DEUX PM01414 UNCLAS

M. ROBINSON A LA PRESSE A SON BUREAU DE L'AMBASSADE.  
CIT LES MERITES DE CETTE INITIATIVE DE PAIX, ENTREPRISE  
PAR UN HOMME DE LA STATURE INTERNATIONALE DE M. TRUDEAU,  
PARLERONT D'EUX MEMES. JE N'Y VOIS RIEN DE NEGATIF;  
J'ESPERE QUE CELA PORTERA FRUIT, ET J'AI TENDANCE A  
CROIRE QU'IL EN SORTIRA QUELQUE CHOSE DE BON, FINCIT A  
DECLARE L'AMBASSADEUR.

M. ROBINSON A SOUTENU QUE LES MEDIA CANADIENS ONT EXAGERE  
L'IMPORTANCE DES CRITIQUES FORMULEES A L'ENDROIT  
DE M. TRUDEAU PAR DES REPRESENTANTS DU PENTAGONE  
LA SEMAINE DERNIERE A L'OCCASION D'UNE CONFERENCE  
A NEW YORK. IL A DECLARE QU'IL S'AGISSAIT LA DE  
MILITAIRES PEU IMPORTANTS QUI NE REPRESENTAIENT  
EN RIEN LES VUES DE L'ADMINISTRATION REAGAN.  
RAPPELANT QUE LES CRITIQUES DE CES MILITAIRES  
PORTAIENT SUR LA FAIBLE CONTRIBUTION DU CANADA  
A L'OTAN, L'AMBASSADEUR A RECONNU L'EXISTENCE  
D'UNE TELLE OPINION AUX ETATS-UNIS, MAIS IL A  
DECLARE QU'ELLE ETAIT DEPASSEE PAR LES EVENEMENTS.  
CIT ON RECONNAIT QUE LE CANADA S'EFFORCE MAINTENANT  
DE FAIRE D'AVANTAGE. FINCIT.

M. ROBINSON ESTIME QUE LE RETARD CANADIEN DES  
ANNEES PASSEES EN MATIERE DE CONTRIBUTION MILITAIRE

PAGE TROIS PMO1414 UNCLAS

A L OTAN N EST PAS UN ATOUT DANS LA MISSION DE  
PAIX DE M.TRUDEAU.CIT CELA N AIDE PAS LE CANADA,  
MAIS JF NE DIRAIS PAS QUE CELA LUI NUIRA.CE N EST  
PAS PARCE QUE LE CANADA N A PAS CONTRIBUE SUFFISAMMENT  
DANS LE PASSE QUE LES AUTRES PAYS REFUSERONT  
D ECOUTER M.TRUDEAU.FINCIT.

L AMBASSADEUR AFFIRME NE PAS PARTAGER LES CRAINTES  
DE CEUX QUI AFFIRMENT QUE L INITIATIVE DE PAIX DE  
M.TRUDEAU SERA PERCUE COMME UN AFFAIBLISSEMENT  
DE L OTAN PAR LES SOVIETIQUES.CIT CELA NE DEVRAIT  
PAS ETRE UNE RAISON POUR NE PAS ALLER A MOSCOU.  
HELMUTT KOHL EST ALLE A MOSCOU ET IL NE S EST  
RIEN PASSE.MAIS QU AVONS-NOUS A PERDRE?.JE N AI  
PAS DE CRAINTES.SI NOUS AVIONS PEUR QU UNE TELLE  
DEMARCHE N AFFAIBLISSE L OTAN NOUS LE DIRIONS  
PUBLIQUEMENT.MAIS L OTAN EST PLUS FORTE QUE LE GENS  
LE PENSENT.FINCIT.

COMMENTANT A TITRE D EXEMPLE LES ACTIVITES DES  
MOUVEMENTS PACIFISTES,M.ROBINSON AFFIRME QUE  
L OUEST NE S EST PAS LAISSE INFLUENCER CIT PAR  
LES TENTATIVES SOVIETIQUES DE NOUS EMPECHER DE  
D'PLOYER LES FUROMISSILES.

AU CANADA,C EST ENCOURAGEANT DE VOIR QUE LES

...4

PAGE QUATRE PMO1414 UNCLAS

MANIFESTATIONS D AVRIL CONTRE L ESSAI DU MISSILE  
DE CROISIERE N ONT RECUEILLI QUE 80,000 PARTICIPANTS  
DANS TOUT LE PAYS.VOUS POUVEZ REGROUPER  
TOUT CE MONDE POUR UNE PARTIE DE PALLE...ET LA  
DERNIERE MANIFESTATION EN OCTOBRE N A REUNI QUE  
30 000 PERSONNES.FINCIT.

L AMBASSADEUR SOUTIENT QUE SEULE UNE ATTITUDE  
FERME PERMETTRA D EN ARRIVER A UN DEBLOCAGE AUX  
NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE,ET IL ESTIME QU IL FAUDRA  
ATTENDRE LE DEPLOIEMENT DE 100 A 200 MISSILES  
AVANT DE VOIR L UNION SOVIETIQUE FAIRE DES OFFRES  
SERIEUSES DE NEGOCIATIONS.CIT JE SUIS PERSUADE  
QUE LE PRESIDENT REAGAN SERA REELU AUX PROCHAINES  
ELECTIONS SUR DEUX POINTS BIEN PRECIS:L AMELIORATION  
DE L ECONOMIE,ET DES ACTIONS PRECISES DANS  
LE BUT D EN ARRIVER A UNE REDUCTION DE L ARMEMENT  
NUCLEAIRE.FINCIT,AJOUTE-T-IL.

A QUELS RESULTATS POURRAIT MENER L INITIATIVE DE  
PAIX DE M.TRUDEAU,DANS UN TEL CONTEXTE?.L AMBASSADEUR  
ROBINSON SE MONTRE BEAUCOUP PLUS VAGUE  
LORSQU ON LUI POSE UNE TELLE QUESTION.CIT LE  
PREMIER MINISTRE RECONNAIT QU IL Y A UNE IMPASSE

PAGE CINQ PM01414 UNCLAS


QUI NE PERSISTERA PAS SELON MOI. MAIS JE PENSE  
QU'IL A RAISON D'ENTREPRENDRE CETTE INITIATIVE  
AFIN D'AMÉLIORER LE CLIMAT. NOUS SOMMES D'ACCORD  
AVEC UNE TELLE DÉMARCHE; J'AI VU LA LETTRE QUE  
LE PRÉSIDENT REAGAN A ENVOYÉE À M. TRUDEAU, ET  
JE PUIS VOUS DIRE QUE LE PRÉSIDENT APPUIE FORTEMENT  
SON INITIATIVE. FIN DE L'ARTICLE.

UUU/075 241648Z FM01414

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT FPR1124 24NOV83

TO PMDEL/DELHI DELIVER BY 250900



INFO PNATO WSHDC CNGNY PRMNY MOSCO PEKIN BRU BREEC LDN PARIS BONN  
ROMF TOKYO NDHQOTT/ADM/POL/DG PCOOTT PMOOTT/FOWLER GENEV  
DISTR MINA MINE MINT DMF IDDZ IDA IDR UGB URR ZSI RED RER  
---SCRUM:SSEA 24NOV,PMS PEACE INITIATIVE/ANDROPOV STATEMENT  
SCRUM:SSEA 24NOV 1500 HRS ANDROPOVS STATEMENT

QUESTION:THE REASON I WANTED TO ASK YOU A QUESTION WAS THAT  
MR ANDROPOVS COME OUT WITH A STATEMENT SAYING SOMETHING TO THE  
EFFECT THAT MISSILES IN THE SEAS AND THE OCEAN WOULD RESPOND TO THE  
PERSHING-2S.IN OTHER WORDS,HE COULD DEPLOY MORE MISSILES IN THE  
SEAS AND THE OCEAN.THE OTHER THING IS,THAT THE GENEVA TALKS COULDNT  
BE HELD OR THAT THEY ARE IRREVOCABLE...?

SSFA:WELL AT ONE TIME YOU MAY REMEMBER,THE SOVIET UNION REFUSED TO  
BEGIN THE TALKS,THE GENEVA TALKS.IT TOOK QUITE SOME TIME TO GET  
THEM TO THE TABLE.THEY DID COME TO THE TABLE AND I THINK THEY WILL  
COME BACK TO THE TABLE,IN DUE COURSE.

QUESTION:SO YOU DONT TAKE THIS THREAT VERY SERIOUSLY THEN?YOU DONT  
THINK HE IS ACTUALLY GOING TO HOLD TO THAT?

SSFA:I BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN,  
INDEFINITELY,THE VIEW THAT THEY WILL NOT/NOT CONTINUE THESE NEGOTIAT-  
IONS WHY HAVE THEY STOPPED THE NEGOTIATIONS?PRESUMABLY,BECAUSE  
DEPLOYMENT IS ABOUT TO BEGIN.THAT IS THEIR REASON,BUT KEEP IN MIND

PAGE TWO FPR1124 UNCLAS

THAT WHILE THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN GOING ON, AND THEY HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR SOME TIME, THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF HAS BEEN DEPLOYING NEW MISSILES. SO IT IS A BIT CONTRADICTORY TO HAVE DEPLOYED THESE MISSILES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEN WHEN THE OTHER SIDE BEGINS DEPLOYMENT TO STOP THE NEGOTIATIONS. IS THERE A DOUBLE-STANDARD THERE? QUESTION: WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE INCREASED THREAT POSED BY THE DEPLOYING OF MORE MISSILES BY SUBMARINES IN THE SEA, AND SO FORTH, AS MR ANDROPOV HAS SUGGESTED? NORTH AMERICA NOW SEEMS TO BE MORE THREATENED. DOES THAT BOTHER YOU?

SSFA: WELL, IT BOTHERS ME TO HEAR TALK ABOUT MORE DEPLOYMENT, MORE MISSILES, SILOS. THE PURPOSE OF THESE TALKS IS TO TRY AND GET A MUTUALLY-AGREED LEVEL OF ARMS. OF COURSE IT IS BOTHERSOME AND IT IS WORRISOME. IT HAS TO BE DEALT WITH. BUT THE WAY TO DEAL WITH IT IS THROUGH RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS.

QUESTION: SO IS THIS THE PRICE WE HAVE TO PAY FOR TAKING A HARD LINE IN RELATION TO OUR NEGOTIATIONS?

SSFA: YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET UNION ATTEMPTED FOR SOME TIME NOW, THROUGH VARIOUS EFFORTS WITH PUBLIC OPINION TO GET THE ALLIES NOT/NOT TO DEPLOY. THEY FAILED. DEPLOYMENT WILL GO AHEAD. THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT HAS TAKEN A POSITIVE VOTE. THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT, THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT. ALL OF THESE COUNTRIES HAVE SAID YES, WE ARE GOING AHEAD, DESPITE THE EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION. SO, IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL REQUIRE A LITTLE TIME TO RE-ASSESS ITS STRATEGY, WHICH IN THIS CASE WAS TO TRY TO GET THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

PAGE THREE FPR1124 UNCLAS

TO SAY WE WONT DEPLOY. THEY HAVE REFUSED TO SAY THAT, AND THAT HAS BEEN A DEFEAT FOR THE SOVIET UNION.

QUESTION: IF THEY DO DEPLOY MORE, DO YOU SEE A THREAT THAT PERHAPS THE NATO COUNTRIES WILL WANT TO ADD EVEN MORE MISSILES TO THEIR ARSENAL THAN THE ONES THEY ALREADY HAVE?

SSEA: I DONT THINK THAT WILL BE THE OUTCOME THAT THE NATO ALLIANCE WOULD WANT TO REACH.

QUESTION: DOES THIS FAILURE OF THE SOVIET POLICY UP TO NOW AUGUR WELL THERE FOR PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAUS PEACE INITIATIVE?

SSEA: I STATED YESTERDAY, THAT THE BREAK-DOWN OR THE CESSATION, OR THE INTERRUPTION IN THE ARMS TALKS IS AN ADDED REASON, AND GIVES ADDED URGENCY FOR THE EFFORT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS UNDERTAKING. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW, AS DEMONSTRATED WITH GREAT CLARITY, THE TIMELINESS OF WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS DOING.

QUESTION: MEANWHILE, HAVE YOU READ MR PEARSONS MOSCOW REPORT?

SSEA: NOT/NOT YET. HE HASNT BEEN THERE YET, OR HAS HE? UNQUOTE.

UUU/149 242346Z FPR1124

*Mr. Gossage JR*  
*JD*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FXTOTT FPR1122 24NOV83

TO PMDELDELHI DELIVER BY 250900

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

INFO BNATO WSHDC CNGNY BRU BREEC MOSCO PEKIN LDN PARIS BONN TOKYO  
GENEV

DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF DMT SCI SCS IDDZ IDA IDD UEG URR

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:COMWEL CONF

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF BRIAN KELLEHERS NEWS ITEM BROADCAST ON  
CBC 0800 HRS NEWS 24NOV83 QUOTE

CFC:THE PRIME MINISTERS QUEST FOR PEACE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST  
APPEARS TO BE GAINING GROUND WITH ASIAN LEADERS.THE PRIME MINISTER  
OF JAPAN,MR NAKASONE,AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CHINESE  
COMMUNIST PARTY,HU YAOBANG,SAY THEY AGREE TO SUPPORT CALLS MADE BY  
OTHERS FOR PEACE IN ASIA AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.NEITHER OFFICIAL  
SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE CANADIAN PEACE INITIATIVE.HOWEVER,MR  
TRUDEAU MET WITH MR NAKASONE LAST SATURDAY,AND ITS BELIEVED HE  
ASKED THE JAPANESE LEADER TO CONVEY ELEMENTS OF HIS PEACE PLAN TO  
THE CHINESE OFFICIAL.MEANWHILE,MR TRUDEAU IS URGING COMMONWEALTH  
LEADERS TO RAISE THEIR COLLECTIVE VOICE AGAINST THE ARMS RACE.THE  
COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN NEW DELHI HAS GONE INTO ITS SECOND DAY  
OF DISCUSSION OVER INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS.BRIAN KELLEHER IS  
COVERING THE CONFERENCE AND HAS THIS REPORT:

PAGE TWO FPR1122 UNCLAS

BRIAN KELLEHER: LET US RAISE OUR VOICES AGAINST THE ABSURDITY OF THE ARMS RACE. THAT WAS PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S APPEAL TO THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE TODAY AS IT CONTINUED PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND HOW TO REDUCE IT. COMMONWEALTH OFFICIALS SAY MR TRUDEAU TOLD TODAY'S MEETING THAT THE COMMONWEALTH CAN HELP TO IMPROVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. COMMONWEALTH LEADERS COULD JOIN IN SPEAKING OUT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO BRING ABOUT A PSYCHOLOGICAL SHIFT ON THE PART OF THE SUPERPOWERS. IF THEY COULD BE INDUCED TO STOP FEARING EACH OTHER AND TO STOP BUILDING UP THEIR WEAPONS, THEN REAL TALKS COULD START ON REDUCING ARMS. CANADIAN OFFICIALS SAY THE SOVIET WALK-OUT AT THE GENEVA ARMS TALKS IS ONE OF A SERIES OF STEPS THAT WILL PROBABLY INCREASE TENSIONS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, BUT AT SOME POINT THE SUPERPOWERS WILL HAVE TO TONE DOWN THAT TENSION AND THAT'S WHERE MR TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE COMES IN. COMMONWEALTH OFFICIALS SAY THAT UNDERLYING THE WHOLE DISCUSSION TODAY WAS MR TRUDEAU'S IDEA OF THE SO-CALLED THIRD RAIL OF POLITICAL ENERGY AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO SHIFT THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUPERPOWERS. QUOTE LET US RAISE OUR VOICES AGAINST THE ABSURDITY OF THE ARMS RACE, UNQUOTE WAS THE QUOTE ATTRIBUTED TO MR TRUDEAU BUT THE SPECIFICS OF HOW COMMONWEALTH LEADERS COULD DO THAT WILL PROBABLY NOT BE DECIDED UNTIL THE LEADERS HAVE THEIR CUSTOMARY PRIVATE RETREAT THIS WEEKEND. AT THIS CONFERENCE, THE RETREAT IS TO TAKE PLACE IN GOA, A TWO-HOUR FLIGHT TO THE SOUTHWEST FROM NEW DELHI. BRIAN KELLEHER, CBC NEWS, NEW DELHI. UNQUOTE

UUU/189 241903Z FPR1122

**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS**

28-6-1-Tudorau Peace  
Mission

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PFKIN WJGR0894 24NOV83

TO PMDELDELHI FLASH

INFO MOSCO/PEARSON/ARCHDEACON/SMITH ONLY EXTOTT LDDZ/DELVOIE ONLY  
IMMED

RFF OURTEL WJGR0886 24NOV

---PM INITIATIVE-VISIT TO CHINA NOV28/29

IN VIEW OF SHORT TIME BEFORE PM ARRIVES MFA IS ANXIOUS TO HAVE  
ANSWERS TO VARIOUS QUESTIONS OFFICIALS HAVE RAISED WITH US IN  
PAST TWO DAYS. COULD WE PLS HAVE BY 09H00 25NOV, ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING:

- (A) A/C ROUTING AND ARRIVAL TIME.
- (B) FULL NAMES AND TITLES OF MEMBERS OF PMS PARTY.
- (C) NUMBER, AGENCY AND NAMES OF MEDIA REPS.
- (D) FUEL AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR A/C.
- (E) PMS WISHES FOR AM 28NOV.

CCC/002 240845Z WJGR0894

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PEKIN WJGR0886 24NOV83

TO PMDELDELHI FLASH

INFO MOSCO/PEARSON/ARCHDEACON/SMITH ONLY EXTOTT /IDDZ/DELVOIE ONLY  
IMMED

28-6-1-*Trudeau Peace mission*

REF OURTEL WJGR0877 24NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:VISIT TO CHINA NOV28/29

FURTHER TO OUR CONTACTS WITH PROTOCOL,MET EARLY THIS AM ASST  
MIN ZHU QIZHEN WHO WAS UNAVAILABLE YESTERDAY.

2.ZHU WAS NOT/NOT YET SURE WHETHER PM ZHAO ZIYANG WOULD RECEIVE  
PM IN MORNING OR AFTERNOON OF 28NOV.AS FOR DENG XIAO PING REQUEST  
HAS BEEN MADE AND IF DENG SEES PM IT WILL MOST LIKELY BE AFTER  
1000 AM ON 29NOV.(PERSONALLY I BELIEVE WE CAN TAKE IT FOR GRANTED  
THAT DENG WILL RECEIVE PM BUT WILL CONFIRM ASAP).ZHU ASKED IF PM  
WOULD WISH TO HAVE TOUR OF MAIN SITES OF PEKIN WITH HIS SON ON  
FREE MORNING OR FREE PART OF AFTERNOON OF 28NOV.

3.REGARDING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF PMS VISIT TO CHINA,ZHU SAID  
WE ARE FREE TO DO IT WHENEVER WE WISH BUT REMINDED ME OF CHINESE  
PRACTICE TO ANNOUNCE VISIT ONE DAY BEFORE IT TAKES PLACE.(I WAS  
RELIEVED BECAUSE I HEARD ON BBC THIS MORNING THAT PM TRUDEAU WAS  
COMING TO CHINA).PLS ADVISE WHEN YOU INTEND TO OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCE  
VISIT BECAUSE OF CTV AND CEC REPS HERE IN PEKIN WHO WILL NO/NO  
DOUBT HAVE HEARD BBC REPORT.

4.I RAISE AGAIN POSSIBILITY OF ENLARGING PRESS PARTY BEYOND SIX

...2

PAGE TWO WJGR0884 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

OR SEVEN. ZHU SAID THAT BECAUSE OF SCARCITY OF ACCOMMODATION IN HOTELS, IF PRESS PARTY IS LARGER THAN SIX OR SEVEN IT WILL HAVE TO BE ACCOMMODATE IN SEPARATE GUEST HOUSE AT YUAN 6000/6000 (APPROX CDN DLRS 3700/3700) PER DAY REGARDLESS OF NUMBER. IF PRESS IS CONFINED TO SIX OR SEVEN THEY WILL BE ACCOMMODATED, IF PM HAS NO/NO OBJECTION, IN PMS GUEST HOUSE AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE BUT AT SAME RATE AS NORMAL HOTEL ACCOMMODATION, IE BETWEEN YUAN 100 AND 150, APPROX CDN DLRS 100.

CCC/002 240315Z WJGR0886

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM VMBFR XTDR0214 24NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 240900

INFO ENATO DELIVER BY 241330

CANMILREPNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN NDHQOTT/ CPP/DNACPOL

DISTR IFB IDD IDDZ IDRZ IDRL IDA IDAO IDAN

--MBFR: NAC MINISTERIAL

TEXT OF ORAL REPORT TO NAC TO BE DELIVERED BY AMB BOSS AGREED BY AHG SUMS UP CURRENT STATE OF NEGS AND ASSESSES LATEST EASTERN PROPOSALS IN NON-CONTROVERSIAL AND BALANCED TERMS THAT BREAK NO/NO NEW GROUND. CRUX OF REPORT, AT LEAST FOR THOSE WHO HOPE THAT EFFORTS WILL BE LAUNCHED TO DEVELOP NEW WESTERN NEGOTIATING INITIATIVE, IS ITS CONCLUDING PARA WHICH ONCE AGAIN (I.E., FOR THE THIRD TIME) RECOMMENDS REVIEW BY THE COUNCIL OF OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN VIENN.

2. CONCLUDING SECTION OF REPORT, WHICH IS ALL THAT WARRANTS REPEATING BY TEL, IS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE THE EAST HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WILL NOT/NOT ENGAGE IN A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION MEASURES BEFORE RECEIVING A WESTERN ANSWER TO ITS PROPOSALS. THE EAST ALSO CONTINUES TO DEMAND WESTERN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO THE BASIC APPROACH INHERENT IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS PACKAGE OF THIS YEAR BECAUSE AS THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION STATED, THERE IS QUOTE NO/NO OTHER WAY OUT OF THE LABYRINTH OF USELESS AND HOPELESS DATA DISPUTES UNQUOTE. WESTERN NEGOTIATORS IN VIENN ARE OF THE OPINION THAT A TIMELY EVALUATION BY THE COUNCIL OF THE ALLIANCE'S NEGOTIATING POSITION IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN VIENN IS NEEDED. UNQUOTE.

CCC/076 241225Z XTDR0214

28-6-1-Tyudeau Peace  
mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0066 24NOV83

TO EXTOTT CPD

DISTR DMF RBD IMD IMC PSR (IDDZ CCB

REF YOURTEL CPD0181 21NOV

---PMS RESPONSE TO WELCOME ADDRESS

YOUR PROMPT RESPONSE GRATEFULLY RECEIVED. PM EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ALTERNATIVE TEXT WHICH HE FOUND MORE TO HIS LIKING. ALTHOUGH HIS EXTEMPORANEOUS ADDRESS FOLLOWED DIFFERENT FORMAT HE DREW ON TEXT FOR A NUMBER OF IDEAS AND CONCEPTS.

UUU/090 250344Z PMDL0066

**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS**

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0061 24NOV83

TO PEKING/AMB ONLY FLASH

INFC MOSCO/PEARSON/ARCHDEACON/SMITH ONLY

EXTOTT IDDZ/DELVOIE ONLY IMMED

---PMS VISIT TO CHINA

1. FOLLOWING IS DEL AS APPROVED BY PM:

A. RIGHT HONOURABLE PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU (A)

PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA

B. MR ROBERT R. FOWLER

ASSISTANT SECRETARY TO THE CABINET

FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

C. MR J. E. JOHNSON

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

D. MR G. SMITH

DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL DIVISION

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

E. MR R. COLEMAN

PRESS SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER

F. MR B. V. JONSTONE

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

G. MISS M. DURDIN

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

H. INSPECTOR G. CARTER

SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

A) ACCOMPANIED BY SON JUSTIN (AGE 11)

2. PASSPORT DETAILS FOLLOW BY SEPARATE TEL.

CCC/068 240850Z PMDL0061

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

28.6.1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

*MF*  
*rd*

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

FM TOKYO UIGR2519 23NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ DELIVER BY 230900

INFO PMDELDELHI/FOWLER DELIVER BY 230900

WSHDC MOSCO BNATO ROME BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY PEKIN LDN

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGE RER UGE URR RCP ZSI RCD RCR

REF YOURTEL WJGR0865 21NOV XNGR4158 22NOV

---PMS MTG WITH GEORGI ARBATOV

I LEAVE DECISION ON CLASSIFICATION OF FIRST REFTEL TO PMDELDELHI.

I DID NOT/NOT UTILIZE CEO CLASSIFICATION AS MTG HAS BECOME PUBLIC

AND ARBATOV'S VIEWS ABOUT ANDROPOV'S HEALTH MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR

POSTS LIKE LDN, WSHDC AND BNATO WITH THEIR CONTACTS. DISCUSSION

BETWEEN PM AND ARBATOV SHLD OF COURSE BE GUARDED AND TREATED AS

CEO

PEARSON

CCC/232 230230Z UIGR2519

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*Mr. Calder*  
*Pet's speak*

C O N F I D E N T I A L CANADIAN EYES ONLY

FM WSHDC UNGR2468 23NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

28-6-1-1 Hudson Peace Mission

INFO MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN VMBFR

CANMILREPNATO ECNN LDN GENEV STKHM NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/DNACPOL/CID/

CORAF/ADMPOL/CPD/DIPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA USS EMF IFB URGB URR RGB UGB RBR IDD IDR IDA IDRA IDRL

RGX RBD RCR RCD RSR RSRD CPD

RFF OURTEL UNGR2449 18NOV

---MFR:USSR VIEWS

SUMMARY: THERE IS A STRONG GROUP WITHIN ADMIN WHO IS APPOSED TO MFR ON GROUNDS IT IS A FLAWED NEGOTIATION THAT UNDERCUTS USA POLICIES OF IMPROVING CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE IN EUROPE AND SHOWING STRENGTH TO USSR. THERE IS SMALLER GROUP INCLUDING SEC SHULTZ WHO SEES VALUE IN MFR AS MEANS OF KEEPING LINES OF COMMUNICATION OPEN WITH EAST. OTHERS SEE NEED FOR IT IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS. FRG PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE THIS SUMMER WAS VERY NEARLY SUCCESSFUL BUT FAILED BECAUSE OF PERCEIVED NEED OF IDEOLOGICAL CONSISTENCY RE VERIFICATION. PERHAPS PMS INITIATIVE CLD INDEED HELP PUT LIFE INTO MFR BUT WE MUST EXPECT TO BE RESISTED BY MEMBERS OF ANTI-MFR GROUP.

2. RFPOR: IN LIGT OF HAAS COMMENTS TO EMB ON MFR (PARA 8 OF REFTL) WF SOUGHT OUT FRIEND WHO HAS LONG EXPERIENCE IN USA MFR POLICY WHO PROVIDED US FOLLOWING OUTLINE ON CURRENT THINKING WITHIN ADMIN ON MFR.

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RECEIVED  
MONTREAL  
JAN 10 1982

PAGE TWO UNGR2468 CONFD CEO

3. THERE IS A LARGE GROUP OF STRATEGIC THINKERS IN USA ADMIN, INCLUDING PFRLE. BURT AND HAAS, WHO ARGUE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: (I) THERE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN LIMITATIONS TO THE MBFR PROCESS, ITS AREA OF APPLICATION IS TOO LIMITED, VERIFICATION CAN NEVER BE ADEQUATELY ASSURED AND IT PUTS RESTRICTIONS ON OUR FORCES; (II) IT IS THEREFORE A FLAWED NEGOTIATION; (III) USA INITIALLY ENTERED MBFR PROCESS BECAUSE OF CONGRESSIONAL (MANSFIELD) PRESSURE TO LIMIT USA TROOP COMMITMENTS IN EUROPE. THIS PRESSURE NO/NO LONGER EXISTS; (IV) IF PRESSURE STILL EXISTED MBFR WLD NOT/NOT RESPOND TO IT BECAUSE MEFR HAS BEEN MORIBUND SO LONG; (V) ALLIES ARE NOT/NOT SHOWING INTEREST IN PROCESS. THEY HAVE NOT/NOT RAISED ISSUE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL FOR A LONG TIME; (VI) USA FOR POL AND DEFENSE PRIORITIES ARE (1) TO IMPROVE CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE IN EUROPE AND (2) TO SHOW STRENGTH TO THE USSR. THE MBFR UNDERCUTS BOTH OF THESE GOALS.

4. OUR CONTACT SAID THAT IN THEIR HEART OF HEARTS THIS GROUP WLD LIKE TO CALL OFF MBFR. SINCE THIS IS NOT/NOT POLITICALLY POSSIBLE THEIR TACTIC IS TO DO AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE.

5. THERE IS ANOTHER GROUP, MORE APPROPRIATELY A COALITION, OF ARMS CONTROLLERS SUCH AS RON LEHMAN OF NSC, POLITICALLY ORIENTED PEOPLE SUCH AS JUDGE CLARK AND PRAGMATISTS SUCH AS SHULTZ WHO SEE VALUE IN MBFR PROCESS EITHER (A) AS HELPFUL POLITICALLY FOR RE-ELECTION OR (B) AS A MEANS OF ENSURING SOME CONTINUITY IN EAST-WEST RELS.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2468 CONFD CEO

6. OUR CONTACT SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF FRG INITIATIVE THIS SUMMER TFFY COME VERY CLOSE TO GETTING CHANGE IN USA POSITION, AND PERHAPS EVEN YET ALL HOPE IS NOT/NOT LOST. FRG PROPOSAL WAS NOT/NOT SPELLED OUT TO EMB BUT WE WERE TOLD IT WAS PRESENTED TO NSC AS BEING A PROPOSAL THAT DID NOT/NOT COMPLETELY REMOVE THE DATA PROBLEM AND ONE WHICH WLD HAVE ALLOWED MORE WORK TO BE DONE ON VERIFICATION ISSUES. PROPOSAL WAS KILLED BY IDEOLOGICAL RESISTANCE, HOW, THE ARGUMENT WENT, CLD REAGAN ADMIN, AFTER ITS PAST POSITIONS, APPEAR TO FALL OF THE DATA ISSUE (QUES)

7. WE ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY WAY CDA CLD NOW HELP PUSH THE FRG INITIATIVE OR SCMETHING SIMILAR. OUR CONTACT SAID THAT HAVING BEEN TOLD NO/NO ONCE BY THE REGAN ADMIN FRG CANNOT/NOT GET TOO FAR OUT FRCNT BUT THAT FRG MAY BE WILLING TO WORK WITH CDA ON THE IDEA. IN ANY CASE PMS INITIATIVE CLD WELL, IF PURSUED, HAVE BENEFICIAL EFFECT. USA WILL CHANGE ITS MEFR POSITION ONLY IF THE ALLIES OR CONGRESS PUSHES IT HARD.

8. USA WILL BE BRIEFING ALLIES ON ITS OFFICIAL VIEWS ON MEFR AT NAC 25NOV. BASIC COMPONENTS OF USA BRIEFING WILL BE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) WEST SHLD NOT/NOT OVER-EMPHASIZE RECENT EASTERN MOVES; (F) WE STILL HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THE DATA ISSUE; (C) EAST HAS MOVED TOWARDS THE WEST SOME ON THE VERIFICATION ISSUE BUT IT WLD BE A MISTAKE TO THINK WE ARE NEAR TO RESOLVING THIS QUESTION; (D) WE SHLD PRESS FOR MORE EASTERN MOVEMENT ON VERIFICATION; (E) THERE MAY BE SOMETHING WE CAN DO IN RESPONSE TO EAST IN OUR ASSOCIATED MEASURES PACKAGE.

CCC/231 232257Z UNGR2468

MF

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*Mr. Calder*  
28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace  
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2461 23NOV83

TO FXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 231730

INFO PMDELDELHI/FOWLER MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU

PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY TOKYO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDR IDA RGB RBR URR RCP ZSI UGB CPD

REF TOKYO TEL UIGR2529 23NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE:MOSCO VISIT,CRITICAL VIEW OF USA POLICIES  
28NOV VISIT TO WSHDC BY CALDER AND HAGAN SHLD GIVE CLEARER  
INDICATION OF USA REACTION TO SPECIFICS OF PMS PROPOSALS ON  
TECHNICAL LEVEL.REACTIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED SO FAR HAVE NOT/NOT  
GONE INTO DETAILS OF USA OBJECTIONS,APART FROM OBSERVATIONS  
PROPOSALS WILL NOT/NOT FLY,OR WILL PLACE PRESSURE ON USA AT  
INOPPORTUNE TIME,OR CUT ACROSS USA CRITICAL PATH.

2.ASST SECY BURT HAS ON TWO OCCASIONS(ONCE TO AMB AND ONCE TO  
MND BLAIS)SAID HOWEVER THAT THERE ARE HARD OBJECTIONS TO THE  
SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS.HE HAS SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE ASAT  
PROPOSAL SAYING USA WILL REJECT IT BECAUSE IT HAS HOPES OF  
ACFIEVING MAJOR SUCCESS IN SPACE THAT WILL GIVE USA UPPER HAND.  
SUFFOCATION WLD CUT ACROSS USA PROGRAMS TO USSR ADVANTAGE.

3.PURTS COMMENTS REFLECT DEGREE TO WHICH THE PRESIDENTS STAR WARS  
SPEECH AND THE INITIATIVE IT SPAWNED HAVE PERMEATED OFFICIAL  
THINKING.THE IDEA OF DOING A TECHNOLOGICAL END RUN ON THE SOVS

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2461 CONF

PERSISTS IN THIS ADMIN. THIS IS PART OF THE PROBLEM.

4. TO SOPHISTICATED CRITICAL OBSERVERS, ANTI-SAT PROGRAM CLD  
RFPRESENT TO ADMIN HARDLINERS MEANS WHEREBY USA CAN GET AROUND  
ANTI-ABM AGREEMENT AND UNDERTAKE SERIOUS WORK ON SUCH THINGS AS  
CHEMICAL LASERS WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE BE PROHIBITED.

5. ADMIN CRITICS, SUCH AS JOHN STEINERUNER OF BROOKINGS, ARE VERY  
WORRIED ABOUT SORT OF SIGNALS THIS IS SENDING TO SOVIET UNION.  
THEY CONSIDER CDA SHOULD MAINTAIN PROPOSAL TO CUT OFF WORK ON  
ANTI-SAT TECHNOLOGY.

6. THEY ALSO ATTACH SIGNIFICANCE TO RECENT REVISIONS TO CDA  
ESTIMATES ON SOVIET DEFENCE SPENDING. IN THEIR VIEW, SOVIETS APPEAR  
TO HAVE DECIDED BETWEEN 1968 AND 1971 TO CUT BACK CAPITAL SPENDING  
IN DEFENCE BUT BECAUSE OF SLUGGISHNESS OF SOVIET SYSTEM, IMPACT OF  
THESE DECISIONS HAS NOT/NOT REALLY BEEN NOTICED UNTIL QUITE  
RECENTLY. SOVIET SYSTEM HAS IN FACT RESISTED FOR LAST DECADE  
MILITARY PRESSURE FOR UPTURN IN SPENDING ON WEAPONS SYSTEMS.  
IMPACT OF REAGAN ADMIN EXCESSES OF RHETORIC AND PROGRAMS SUCH  
AS ANTI-SAT WEAPONRY IS TO TIP HAND IN USSR IN FAVOUR OF THOSE  
WHO WANT GREATER SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING. SOVIET HARDLINERS CAN  
POINT TO PATTERN COMPOSED OF PROPOSALS FROM USA IN ARMS CONTROL  
NEGS, SUCH PROGRAMS FOR ARMS BUILDUP SUCH AS ANTI-SAT, P2 DEPLOYMENT,  
AND OVERALL RHETORIC TO BUILD CASE THAT USA IS AIMING AT FIRST

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PAGE THREE UNGR2461 CONFD

STRIKE CAPABILITY OF ITW OWN.EVENTUAL SPACE SHUTTLE BASED WEAPONS  
COULD NOT/NOT DEFEAT MASSIVE ICBM ATTACK FROM USSR BUT COULD  
CONCEIVABLY HAVE EFFECT ON RESIDUAL RESPONSE TO FIRST STRIKE.  
ADMIN WLD CONSIDER SUCH CLAIMS GROUNDLESS,OF COURSE.HOWEVER,  
STFINBRUNER CONSIDERS CLAIMS WLD BE AT LEAST AS CREDIBLE IN USSR  
AS BASIS FOR NEW FILLIP TO ARMS RACE,AS WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY  
THESIS WAS HERE.

7.ALL OF THIS CONVINCES SUCH CRITICS RETURN TO SOME FORM OF CLIMATE  
IN WHICH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS POSSIBLE TO BE VITAL.BIZARRE EVENTS  
SURROUNDING RECENT INF OFFERS AND DENIALS AND DEMARCHES IN ALLIED  
CAPITALS AND COUNTER-DEMARCHES REVEAL TO THESE CRITICS(WHO  
INCIDENTALLY DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE ADMIN SIDE OF STORY AND CONSIDER  
NITZE MUST HAVE BEEN TOYING WITH 572 PROPOSAL AS SOMETHING TO BE  
TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN MODIFIED FORM)BOTH HOW BADLY USA-USSR BILATERAL  
SIT REALLY IS,AND HOW LITTLE CHANCE THERE IS RIGHT NOW FOR  
PRODUCTIVE ARMS CONTROL NEGS.THEY BELIEVE THERE IS NO/NO ONE IN  
ADMIN ABLE BY QUALIFICATION OR BY DISPOSITION TO APPRECIATE QUOTE  
AMERICAN ERROR UNQUOTE EXCEPT POSSIBLY THOSE ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL  
SIDE WHO MUST REALIZE THAT BY SPRING ARMS CONTROL WILL BECOME THE  
MAJOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE.QUESTION THEY ASK IS WHETHER USA  
JUDGEMENT WILL NOT/NOT BECOME DIVISIVE ISSUE IN ALLIANCE BEFORE  
THEN.

CCC'230 232131Z UNGR2461



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

24 NOV 83 15 03 40

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0210 24NOV83 *Deliver by 250800*

TO/À TO PMDEL/DELHI/ ←

INFO FOR FOWLER AND / SHENSTONE

REF INFO PCOOTT/CARON NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/ CPP PEKIN MOSCO

SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA DMF IFB IMC IDR IDA ETN

REF OUR MEMO IDDZ132 14NOV

*28-6-17 - Trudeau Peace Mission*

*ci 23-3-1983*

---PM INITIATIVE:STATEMENT AND DECLARATION AT CHOGM

UNDER COVER OF REF MEMO WE PROVIDED DRAFT FOR PM STATEMENT ON QUOTE  
 WORLD POLITICAL SCENE-GLOBAL TRENDS AND PROSPECTS UNQUOTE. IN ORDER  
 TO KEEP DPM/SSEA INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO  
 KNOW WHETHER PMS INTERVENTION WAS ALONG LINES SUGGESTED IN OUR DRAFT  
 OR WHETHER SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES WERE MADE. IN LATTER CASE, GRATEFUL YOU  
 PROVIDE ASAP FULL TEXT OF FINAL VERSION OF STATEMENT ON WHICH PM  
 BASED HIS INTERVENTION.

2. GRATEFUL ALSO FOR SITREP ON WHERE MATTERS NOW STAND RE EVENTUAL  
 CHOGM DECLARATION ON INNATL PEACE AND SECURITY.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
L.A. Delvoie/sc SIG	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> SIG L.A. Delvoie

*Mr. Mc Nee*

*28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission*  
*for action pls*  
Division Phono  
Person  
Local Int  
1520

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE MDRID XQGR1092 23NOV83

A EXTOTT (IDDZ LIVRAISON 231500

DELHI/FOWLER LIVRAISON 240900

INFO LDN PONN ANKRA COPEN OSLO HAGUE WSHDC TOKYO PEKIN CNGNY PRMNY

MOSCO DELHI BRU VIENN VMEFR PARIS LSBON ROME ATHNS BUCST WSAW

BPFST PRGUE BGRAD

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA FPR RSR RCR RCM

RFD RFR

REF NOTRETEL (1082 21NOV A DACCA)

---INITIATIVE DU PM-INTERET ESPAGNOL

COMME NOUS L AVONS RAPPORTE PLUS TOT, PRESIDENT ESPAGNOL PREND  
INTFRFT CATIF DANS PROGRES INITIATIVE DU PM. DE NOUVELLES PREUVES  
NOUS EN FURENT DONNEES CE MATIN LORS RENCONTRE FORTUITE AVEC  
Y.A. YANEZ BARNUEVO DIRECTEUR DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES A LA  
PRESIDENCE (EQUIVALENT AU POSTE DE BOB FOWLER).

2. YANEZ BARNUEVO A D ABORD VOULU NOUS ASSURER QUE DELAI DU PRESIDENT  
GONZALEZ A REpondre A LETTRE DU 25 OCT DU PM AVAIT POUR SEULE CAUSE  
ABSENCES REPETEES DU PRESIDENT EN DEHORS DU PAYS (AUTRICHE, PORTUGAL)  
ET QUE REponse A DEUXIEME LETTRE, CELLE DU 16 NOV, DEVRAIT DEJA ETRE  
A OTTAWA LORS DU RETOUR DU PM LE 05 DEC. IL EST EVIDENT (YANEZ  
BARNUEVO EN A DISCUTE AVEC PRESIDENT) QU INITIATIVE TRUDEAU TOUCHE  
CORDE SENSIBLE ICI ET SOULEVE REEL INTERET, COMME EN TEMOIGNENT

...2

----- bono/9 noivivd  
PAGE DEUX XQGR1092 CONF

NOIDA  
A 2112

QUESTIONS SUIVANTES DE NOTRE INTERLOCUTEUR: A) Y A-T-IL COORDINATION  
ENTRE INITIATIVE TRUDEAU ET CELLE DE CEAUCESCU OU SONT-ELLES  
MENEES EN PARALLELE? NOTRE RESPONSE: PARALLELE. B) SUITE A RUPTURE DES  
NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE SUR DESARMEMENT, PM VA-T-IL ELARGIR SA MISSION  
POUR FAVORISER LEUR RELANCE? NOTRE REPOSE: CE SONT DEUX EXERCICES  
DISTINCTS MAIS SOULEVERONS QUESTION AVEC OTTAWA. C) PM IRA-T-IL A  
L INTRONISATION PRESIDENT ARGENTIN 10 DEC? CE SERAIT EXCELLENTE  
OCCASION RENCONTRER GONZALEZ POUR ECHANGES DE VUES SUR INITIATIVE  
PM. SELON INTERLOCUTEUR, VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH, PM MAUROY, SOARES, CRAZI  
SERONT LA. NOTRE RESPONSE: PROBABLE QUE NON, VERIFIONS AVEC OTTAWA.  
D' REFERENCE DU PM A PRESENCE POLITIQUE A HAUT NIVEAU POUR CONFERENCE  
DE STOCKHOLM EN JANVIER DOIT-ELLE S INTERPRETER COMME PARTICIPATION  
DES PM OU DES MINISTRES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES? NOTRE REPOSE: C EST A  
VOIR, LORS SOMMET OTAN EN DEC.

3. APPRECIERIONS VOS COMMENTAIRES SUR QUESTIONS SOULEVEES. NOTRE  
INTERLOCUTEUR S INTERESSAIT VIVEMENT AUSSI A SAVOIR SI PM FERAIT  
DE NOUVELLES CONSULTATIONS EN EUROPE AU RETOUR DE NEW DELHI. NAVONS  
RIFM AVANCE MAIS CONTINUONS DE CROIRE QU UNE VISITE DE TRAVAIL A  
MADRID LORS PROCHAINE RONDE DE CONSULTATIONS EUROPEENNES SERAIT  
BENEFIQUE.

CCC/290 231730Z XQGR1092

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace  
Mission

INFO

**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS**

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM DELHI WBSV1903 23NOV83

TO PEKIN DELIVER BY 240800

INFO EXTOTT INDZ/DELVOIE ONLY MOSCO/PEARSON/ARCHDEACON/SMITH ONLY IMMEDIATE  
REF PMDEL0053 NOV23

---PM INITIATIVE: VISIT TO CHINA NOV28-29

FURTHER TO PEK TEL WJGR0880 23NOV CLAIMING GARBBLE PORTION

COURTEL. HEREWITH RPT OF PARA IN QUESTION:

VI) PROPOSED ITINERARY (ALL TIMES LOCAL)

NOV27/27 DEPART GOA 1300 HRS

ARRIVE DELHI 1500 HRS

DEPART DELHI 1630 HRS

ARRIVE PEKIN 2300 HRS

CCC/090 231040Z WBSV1903

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace  
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM STKHM UDGR1123 23NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 231000

INFO LDN PMDELHAKA WSHDC INATO VMBFR PRMNY PMDELDELHI

NDHQOTT/PPP/CORA/DSTRATA/DGINFO/DSPP

DISTR IDOZ IDAN IDAO IDR

---POST 1945 CONFLICT STATISTICS

UNFORTUNATELY SIPRI INFO IS OUT OF DATE(1975)AND THEY NO/NO  
LONGER DO SUCH SURVEYS BECAUSE OF DEFINITION PROBLEMS AND BECAUSE  
OTHER INSTITUTIONS ARE NOW DOING SURVEYS.SIPRI USES INFO FROM  
CENTRE FOR DEFENCE, WSHDC WHOSE FIGURES YOU ALREADY HAVE.

CCC/152 231000Z UDGR1123



PAGE TWO FPR1119 UNCLAS

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IT HAS NEVER BEEN PART OF THE NATO POLICY TO GIVE THE SOVIET UNION THE MONOPOLY OF THESE MISSILES IN EUROPE, TO DENY THE UNITED STATES ANY DEPLOYMENT WHATSOEVER, AND THAT IS REALLY THE CRUX OF THE ISSUE AS IT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD BY THE SOVIET UNION.

Q. DOES THIS WALK-OUT COMING WITH THE REACTION TO PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE INDICATE ANYTHING ABOUT THE SOVIETS' GOODWILL OR INTENT. IN YOUR OPINION? HAS YOUR OPINION CHANGED IN ANY WAY AS A RESULT OF THESE TWO EVENTS? DO THEY REALLY WANT A DISARMAMENT, OR IS IT LESS LIKELY THAT..

SSEA. WELL, I THINK THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF, MAYBE MISUNDERSTANDING IS NOT/NOT QUITE THE RIGHT WORD, BUT A GOOD DEAL OF ALLEGATIONS BY ONE GROUP TO THE OTHER THAT MAY BE THAT OTHER GROUP IS NOT/NOT SERIOUS. ONE WONDERS NOW WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WANTS TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT; THEY'VE BROKEN-OFF NEGOTIATIONS, THAT IS A SERIOUS MOVE. WHEN I MENTIONED THE PRESIDENT, I MEANT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: OR WHETHER IT IS A DRAMATIC GESTURE THAT WILL BE FOLLOWED UP BY RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS. I HOPE THAT THIS WILL BE THE CASE. BUT WHAT I THINK WE ALL OUGHT TO UNDERSTAND IS THE SOVIET UNION AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAS MAINTAINED CONSISTENTLY THE VIEW THAT IT OUGHT TO HAVE, BE PERMITTED TO HAVE, LAND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT/NOT HAVE ANY. THAT HAS NEVER BEEN ACCEPTABLE, EITHER TO THE UNITED STATES OR ITS ALLIES IN NATO.

...3

PAGE THREE FPR1119 UNCLAS

Q. DOES THIS MOVE BY THE SOVIET UNION PROMOTE A CLEAR POSSIBILITY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IS GETTING FURTHER SPLIT FROM ITS OWN PUBLIC, FROM ITS OWN VOTERS? THAT IS, THERE SEEMS TO BE A SPLIT INTERNATIONALLY, TO SOME DEGREE?

SSFA. NO, I THINK ITS A VERY DIFFICULT QUESTION. WHAT SHOULD IT HAVE KEPT, WHAT WOULD IT HAVE REQUIRED TO HAVE KEPT THE SOVIET UNION AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE? IT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED PRESUMABLY A DECISION BY THE ALLIES, NOT/NOT TO DEPLOY OR TO POSTPONE DEPLOYMENT, THAT WOULD HAVE MEANT, IN MY VIEW, A POLITICAL VICTORY FOR THE SOVIET UNION THAT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE MANY YEARS TO RECOVER FROM, AND I...

Q. MR. MACEACHEN, DO THESE EVENTS BRING A GREATER SENSE OF URGENCY TO BETTERING THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, THAT YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT?

SSFA. WELL, I THINK THAT, AS I SAID SO OFTEN IN THE HOUSE, THAT THERE ARE GOOD ARMS PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. AT ONE TIME, THE VIEW WAS IF WE COULD JUST THINK UP A MORE INGENIOUS COUNTER-PROPOSAL, MAYBE IT WOULD BRING THE THING OFF, I DONT THINK THATS VERY VALID. THEREFORE, WHAT HAS TO BE DONE IS THE TRY TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL ATMOSPHERE AND IMPROVE THE TRUST THAT EVEN A LITTLE BIT, AND THE GOOD FAITH OF THE OTHER NEGOTIATORS, BECAUSE I DONT THINK THERE IS A DEEP MUTUAL TRUST THAT WOULD LEAD TO QUICK RESULTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

...4

PAGE FOUR FPR1119 UNCLAS

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY INDICATION FROM MR. PEARSON AS TO WHETHER HIS TRIP TO CHINA WAS A SUCCESS, WHETHER THERE WILL BE A MEETING WITH MR. TRUDEAU AND THE CHINESE LEADERS ON HIS PEACE INITIATIVE?  
SSEA. I HAVE NOT/NOT RECEIVED A REPORT YET FROM MR. PEARSON. I HAVEN'T READ A REPORT. THERE IS ONE AVAILABLE BUT I'LL HAVE A CHANCE TO DO THAT. HE WILL BE BACK IN OTTAWA AND HE WILL BE ABLE TO REPORT ON HIS VISIT TO CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL.

Q. DO YOU THINK ONE CONSIDERATION COULD BE THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF GOING TO MOSCOW?

SSEA. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS NOT/NOT MADE A DECISION TO GO TO MOSCOW. THAT WOULD DEPEND ON A NUMBER OF CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT CERTAINLY, IT IS A PROSPECT THAT OUGHT TO BE AT LEAST CONSIDERED, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT HE WILL HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS BY MID-JANUARY WITH ALL THE LEADERS OF THE SUPER-POWERS, WITH THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SOVIET UNION. SO, THAT THAT IS A PROSPECT THAT HAS TO BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE PEACE INITIATIVE.

Q. ...INSTALLATION HOSTILE

DO YOU EXPECT ANY HOSTILE

SSEA. NO, I DON'T THINK THERE WOULD BE A HOSTILE REACTION. IF THAT IS THE CASE, THEN THE ATMOSPHERE IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT THAN I THINK IT IS. THEN IT IS BAD ENOUGH.

...5

PAGE FIVE FPR1119 UNCLAS

Q. HAS PRESIDENT REAGAN AGREED TO A MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU?HAS THERE BEEN A DATE SET?

SSEA. NO, THERE IS NO/NO DATE TO MY KNOWLEDGE.THERE HAS BEEN AGREEMENT ABOUT A MEETING,BUT NO/NO DATE.UNQUOTE.

UUU/Ø14 232236Z FPR1119

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PEKIN WJGR0880 23NOV83

TO PMDELDELHI FLASH

INFO MOSCO/PEARSON/ARCHDEACON/SMITH ONLY EXTOTT (L)DDZ/DELVOIF ONLY  
IMMED

RFF OURTEL 0877 23NOV YOURTEL PMDL0053 23NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:VISIT TO CHINA-NOV28/29

FOLLOWING DISPATCH OF REFTEL WE HAD MTG WITH SENIOR PROTOCOL DEPT  
OFFICIAL WHO WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PMS PROGRAM.HIS COMMENTS  
SUPPLEMENTS THOSE IN REFTEL:

(A)CONTACT CONFIRMED THAT PMS DEL WOULD BE ACCOMMODATED AT STATE  
GUEST HOUSE.HE REFERRED TO HOTEL ACCOMMODATION PROBLEMS IN PEKIN  
AND SAID THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP MEDIA PARTY AS  
SMALL AS POSSIBLE.HE SUGGESTED THAT IF NO/NO MORE THAN SIX OR  
SEVEN JOURNALISTS CAME THEY COULD BE ACCOMMODATED ALSO AT STATE  
GUEST HOUSE IF PM HAD NO/NO OBJECTION.IF SO JOURNALISTS WOULD BE  
EXPECTED TO PAY THEIR OWN EXPENSES.IF LARGE GROUP CAME CONTACT  
WARNED IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO FIND HOTEL ACCOMMODATION THIS  
LATE IN DAY.

(B)MEDIA REPS-MFA WILL REQUIRE NAMES AND AGENCY AS WELL AS PASSPORT  
DETAILS.

(C)AIRCRAFT CREW WILL PROBABLY BE ACCOMMODATED AT AIRPORT HOTEL.

(D)ROUTING--CONTACT WAS NOT/NOT COMPETENT TO COMMENT ON ROUTING  
SUGGESTED REFTEL.HOWEVER HE PROMISED TO CONSULT WITH APPROPRIATE

...2

PAGE TWO WJGR0880 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

AUTHORITIES AND GET BACK TO US. HE DID SAY THAT DIRECT ROUTING DELHI-PEKIN WOULD ONLY CAUSE CHINESE PROBLEMS IF IT DEVIATED FROM INTERNATL AIR ROUTES. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR AIRCRAFT TO FLY DELHI-PEKING CROSSING SINO/BURMESE BORDER AND OVER FLYING KUNMING AND WUHAN. ARRIVAL TIME PEKING IN YOURTEL FMDEL0053 CORRUPT. PLS REPEAT.

F) PROGRAM--CONTACT CONFIRMED THAT PM WOULD BE RECD BY PM ZHAO ZIYANG WHO WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY HOST BANQUET FOR PM EVENING OF 28NOV. CONTACT ASKED IF PM WOULD WISH SON JUSTIN TO ATTEND. BANQUET WOULD BEGIN APPROX 1900 HRS AND WOULD LAST APPROX TWO HOURS. CONTACT SUGGESTED THAT MTG WITH PM ZHAO ZIYANG BEGIN AFTER LUNCH 28NOV. HAS PM ANY WISHES FOR AM 28NOV OR WILL HE WISH TO REST? CONTACT PROMISED TO ADVISE US LATER ABOUT CALL ON DENG XIAO PING.

GAUVIN

CCC/002 230910Z WJGR0880

28-6-1 - Judau Peace Mission

**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS** INFO

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PEKIN WJGR0877 23NOV83

TO PMDFLDELHI FLASH

INFO MOSCO/PEARSON/ARCHDEACON/SMITH ONLY IMMEDIATE

EXTOTT IIDZ/DELVOIE ONLY

**FOR**  
**ONLY**

REF PMDL0053 23NOV

---PMLINITIATIVE: VISIT TO CHINA-NOV28/29

HAVE REQUESTED MTG WITH ASST MIN ZHU QIZHEN THIS AFTERNOON. UNTIL THEN WISH TO ANSWER TENTATIVELY SOME OF YOUR QUERIES ON BASIS OF OUR EXPERIENCE HERE AND WILL CONFIRM AFTER MTG WITH ZHU.

A) PMS DEI EXCEPT PRESS WILL MOST LIKELY BE ACCOMMODATED AT GUFST HOUSE. PRESS PARTY SHOULD IF POSSIBLE BE LIMITED TO MINIMUM BECAUSE OF GREAT DIFFICULTY IN FINDING HOTEL ACCOMMODATION.

B) CHINESE ARE PAST MASTER AT KEEPING LID ON NEWS AND WILL DO SO UNTIL YOU CONFIRM TIME THEY SHOULD FEEL FREE TO ANNOUNCE VISIT. THEREFORE AS MATTER OF COURTESY TO THEM, LEAK SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

C) CALL FROM ZHU NOT/NOT WU REPRESENTS OFFICIAL AGREEMENT TO PMS VISIT. UNABLE TO CONFIRM YET WHETHER PM WILL MEET ZHAO AND DENG.

D) STOPOVER OF TWO NIGHTS AND ONE AND HALF WORKING DAYS NOT/NOT EXCESSIVE BUT HOPE TO BE ABLE TO BE MORE PRECISE

...2

SECRET

PAGE TWO WJGR0877 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

ABOUT PROGRAM AFTER SEEING ZHU.

F) MAY WE KNOW ASAP FUEL AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR AIRCRAFT.

F) REGARDING VISAS WE WILL REQUEST MFA TO ADVISE THEIR EMIASSY  
IN DELHI.

G) PENDING MTG WITH ZHU HAVE ALREADY INFORMED MFA OF NAMES OF  
DEL MEMBERS AND DETAILS CONCERNING AIRCRAFT

GAUVIN

CCC/299 230734Z WJGR0877

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace  
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM VMEFR XTDR0213 23NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 230900

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN NDHQOTT/

CPP/DNACPOL

DISTR IFB IDD IDDZ IDRA IDRL IDA IDAO IDAN

REF BNATO TEL YEGR7120 22NOV

---MEFR--ORAL REPORT AND NAC MINISTERIAL

FOR REASONS WE HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED WE FULLY AGREE WITH REFTEL THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO PURSUE IN NAC ON 25NOV IDFA THAT NATC RESPONSE BE FOLLOWED BY MTG IN VIENN AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. AT SAME TIME WE WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE HELPFUL TO USE 25NOV ORAL REPORT AND RESULTING DISCUSSION TO TRY TO GIVE IDEA OF NATO REVIEW OF WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION TO DEVELOP SOME KIND OF WESTERN RESPONSE TO EASTERN MOVE A PUSH FORWARD.

2. ONE WAY TO DO THIS WOULD BE TO POSE QUOTE LEADING QUESTIONS UNQUOTE TO FRG RAPPORTEUR (AMB BOSS) ABOUT. FOR EXAMPLE, (1) CURRENT STATE OF NEGS, (2) WHERE WE CAN GO FROM HERE AND (3) WHETHER IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE REF IN NAC MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE ON IMPORTANCE WEST ATTACHES TO MAINTAINING DIALOGUE IN MBFR FORUM. THIS WOULD ENABLE AME BOSS IN HIS REPLIES TO GO AS FAR AS HE DARES IN REFLECTING FRG VIEWS ON NEED TO LOOK CONSTRUCTIVELY FOR NEW NEGOTIATING MATERIAL IN LIGHT OF TACTICAL SITU CREATED BY EASTERN PROPOSALS.

...2

PAGE TWO XTDR0213 CONF

3. AT ANY RATE AME BOSS (PLS PROTECT) HAS TOLD ME THAT HE IS HOPING THAT SOMEONE, QUOTE LIKE THE CANADIANS GIVEN THE PMS SUGGESTIONS UNQUOTE, WILL TRY TO QUOTE START BALL ROLLING UNQUOTE IN THIS WAY.

4. WE VENTURE THIS SUGGESTION BECAUSE IT HAS LONG BEEN PRACTICE FOR VMBFR TO SUGGEST QUESTIONS THAT YOU AND BNATO MIGHT CONSIDER USEFUL DURING CONSIDERATION OF AHG ORAL REPORT.

CCC/060 231050Z XTDR0213

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission  
Rec'd & (already rec'd)

25/11/83 - 1.15 p.m.  
23/11/83).  
Division Phoned  
Person  
Local Time

*[Handwritten signature]*

**ACTION**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR0184 23NOV83

TO EXTOTT URR MINA IDDZ DELIVER BY 231700

INFO MOSCO BNATO

DISTR USS DMF IDR RGB RBR RCP UGB CPD

---CDN INITIATIVE:DPM/SSEA CHCGO SPEECH

ON BASIS OF MANY DISCUSSIONS IN PAST WEEK IN WSHDC WITH SOVIET EXPERTS, JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS CONCERNING CDN INITIATIVES AND EAST-WEST SITUATION, I THINK IT WOULD BE TIMELY FOR DPM/SSEA TO MAKE SOV-USA RELATIONS A CENTRE-PIECE OF HIS CHCGO TALK. IN THIS CONTEXT CDN INITIATIVES WILL BE HIGHLIGHTED.

2. BASIC POINTS TO HAVE EMERGED FROM TEXTS AND OBSERVATIONS IN CONTEXT OF INITIATIVES WHICH CLD DESERVE PARTICULAR STRESS MIGHT BE THE FOLLOWING:

- (1) CDAS CONCERNS AND INITIATIVES ARE AIMED AT PROMOTING NEW TYPE OF DISCOURSE BETWEEN USA AND USSR (AND EAST AND WEST GENERALLY):
- (2) NEW TYPE OR LEVEL OF DISCOURSE IS BASED ON RECOGNITION OF MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS;
- (3) ON BASIS OF POLITICAL REALISM AND WESTERN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH AND WITHOUT NAIVETE ABOUT NATURE OF SOVIET SYSTEM, A NUMBER OF AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST CAN BE IDENTIFIED;
- (4) THESE ENCOMPASS CRISIS COMMUNICATION, NON-PROLIFERATION, RESTRAINT IN THIRD-WORLD CONFLICT AREAS, MUTUAL SECURITY AND FREEDOM FROM FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK OR ACCIDENTAL WAR;

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR0184 CONFD

(5) THAT A SPECIAL AREA OF MUTUALITY OF INTEREST IS IN TAPERING OFF AND ENDING THE ARMS RACE;

(6) OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE IN NEW TYPE OF DISCOURSE IS NEED TO BASE IT ON RESPECT OR AT LEAST REESTABLISH MEASURE OF RESPECT FOR LEGITIMACY OF SOVIET SYSTEM, WHATEVER WE THINK OF ITS VALUES, EFFICIENCY OR FAILURES;

(7) THAT NEW TYPE OF DISCOURSE WOULD ITSELF BE POLITICAL ACT OF HIGH SIGNIFICANCE (AND PERHAPS MOST WE CAN HOPE FOR IN VERY NEAR FUTURE);

(8) THAT FIVE POWER NUCLEAR CONF, SUFFICATION STRATEGY (INCLUDING CUTTING-OFF OF WORK ON HIGH ALTITUDE DEFENSE SYSTEM) ALL BE SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT;

(9) THAT SPECIAL REPONSIBILITIES OF FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL WHO ARE ALSO NUCLEAR POWERS PUT ADDED ACCENT ON NEED FOR THEM TO ADDRESS SUCH ISSUES AS NON-PROLIFERATION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT ON AN URGENT BASIS.

2. AS A RESULT OF NUMEROUS AND WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSIONS THE EMB HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN REGARDING CDN INITIATIVE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ADDITIONAL REFERENCES TO SOME OF THESE IDEAS WILL APPEAR IN POLITICAL COLUMNS IN FORESEABLE FUTURE. IT WOULD IN OUR VIEW BE ESPECIALLY TIMELY TO HAVE THIS CENTRAL THEME ADDRESSED BY A PROMINENT WESTERN POLITICAL FIGURE IN PRESTIGIOUS USA FORUM. COMING FROM A CDN I BELIEVE THEY WOULD BE GENERALLY WELL-RECEIVED BY THOUGHTFUL AMERICANS ALTHOUGH MOSTLY NOT/NOT APPLAUDED BY THE ADMINISTRATION AT THIS TIME

GOTLIEB

CCC/230 232134Z UNGR0184

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• FBIS 119

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

JB  
PD  
1002

XINHUA VIEWS EUROMISSILE ISSUE

04231910 BEIJING XINHUA IN ENGLISH 1830 GMT 23 NOV 83

(\*COMMENTARY: DANGEROUS GAMBLE -- THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EUROMISSILES\* AA XINHUA HEADLINE)

(TEXT) LONDON, NOVEMBER 22 KXINHUA CORRESPONDENT CHENG KEXIONG) -- THE SOVIET DELEGATE TO THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE TALKS IN GENEVA TODAY ANNOUNCED HIS COUNTRY'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TALKS AND THE TALKS SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY, THUS SETTING THE STAGE FOR GREATER CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE QUESTION OF EUROMISSILES.

THE EUROMISSILE HAS BECOME A REALITY IN THE LIFE OF THE EUROPEANS WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST BATCH OF CRUISE MISSILES IN BRITAIN IN MID-NOVEMBER. THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT HAS APPROVED THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. MISSILES IN ITS COUNTRY AND THE FEDERAL GERMANY'S BUNDESTAG (FEDERAL ASSEMBLY), AFTER TWO DAYS OF DEBATE, ALSO APPROVED A RESOLUTION TODAY TO STATION U.S. MISSILES ON ITS SOIL.

WITH THIS, THE SOVIET UNION LOOKS SET TO GO AHEAD WITH ITS ANNOUNCED "COUNTER-MEASURES."

THE ARRIVAL OF THE EUROMISSILES MARKED THE DANGEROUS ESCALATION OF THE SOVIET-U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND THE DETERIORATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. IT ADDED A NEW ELEMENT OF INSTABILITY TO THE UNREST IN EUROPE, AND MADE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN NATIONS MORE COMPLICATED. IT ALSO BROUGHT ABOUT A NEW UPSURGE IN THE POPULAR ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT.

SO LONG AS THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, SEEK HEGEMONY, THERE CAN BE NO TRANQUILITY IN THE WORLD. AS EUROPE IS THE FOCUS OF THEIR CONTENTION, EACH OF THEM ATTEMPTS TO GAIN NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE.

IN 1977, THE SOVIET UNION BEGAN TO DEPLOY ITS SS-20 MISSILES WHICH CAN HIT ANY TARGET IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM WITHIN THE SOVIET BORD<sup>ER</sup>, AND THE MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD DEPLOYED IN EUROPE WERE NO MATCH FOR THE NEW SOVIET MISSILES. THE UNITED STATES WAS WORRIED THAT MOSCOW WOULD CARRY OUT NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL BY VIRT OF ITS NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE, AND ACCORDINGLY SPLIT EUROPE AND DISINTEGRATE NATO. THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES HAD RECOURSE TO CRUISE MISSILES AND PERSHING-2.

SS-20, CRUISE AND PERSHING-2 MISSILES ARE ADVANCED MILITARY WEAPONS, OF COURSE, HOWEVER, THEY ARE ALSO POLITICAL WEAPONS OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS FOR SUPREMACY IN EUROPE.

ON THE ONE HAND, THE SOVIET UNION IS TRYING IN EVERY WAY TO THWART THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF NEW U.S. MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ITS SUPERIORITY ACHIEVED BY DEPLOYING SS-20'S. THE UNITED STATES, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS DETERMINED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT UNLESS THE SOVIET UNION DISMANTLES ITS SS-20'S. THAT IS WHY THEIR GENEVA TALKS ON EUROMISSILES HAVE GOT NOWHERE AFTER MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED MEETINGS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS.

FOR WASHINGTON, THE EUROMISSILE HAS AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON ITS POSITION AS LEADER OF THE ALLIANCE WITH WESTERN EUROPE. IT HOPES THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE AND PERSHING-2 MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE WILL NOT ONLY STRENGTHEN ITS COMPETITIVENESS IN THE CONTEST WITH MOSCOW BUT ALSO HELP TO PREVENT NEUTRALISM FROM GAINING GROUND IN WESTERN EUROPE.

FACED WITH THE SOVIET NUCLEAR MENACE ON THE ONE HAND AND AN ISOLATIONIST TREND IN THE UNITED STATES ON THE OTHER, LEADERS OF SOME WEST EUROPEAN NATIONS WELCOME THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW U.S. MISSILES IN THE HOPE THAT IT MAY BIND WASHINGTON TO ITS COMMITMENT SO THAT WESTERN EUROPE MAY NOT BE ABANDONED IN CASE AGREEMENT IS REACHED SOMEDAY BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS.

HOWEVER, AS THE TIME CAME TO START THE PROJECTED DEPLOYMENT, WHAT HAPPENED RECENTLY HAS ADDED MUCH TO THEIR CONCERN. THE UNITED STATES, REGARDLESS OF ITS WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES' OPPOSITION, INVADDED GRENADA, AND IS NOW CONCENTRATING ITS FORCES IN THE TURBULENT MIDDLE EAST. NOW, WITH THESE MISSILES ON THEIR SOIL BUT UNDER THE CONTROL OF AMERICANS, WHO CAN GUARANTEE THAT WASHINGTON WILL LISTEN ATTENTIVELY TO THE OPINIONS OF ITS WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES BEFORE PRESSING THE BUTTON OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON WHEN AN EMERGENCY COMES IN THE SOVIET-U.S. CONTEST FOR HEGEMONY? SINCE THE THEORY OF "A LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE" HAS BEEN ADVOCATED BY SOME PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES, AND IN CASE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PUTS IT INTO PRACTICE, WHAT WILL BE THE RESULT?

THESE CONCERNS ARE NOT ONLY HAUNTING THE PUBLIC AND THE OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE BUT ALSO MAKING THOSE IN POWER THINK HARD.

WHILE THE EUROMISSILE ISSUE HAS AGGRAVATED TENSIONS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER RECENTLY REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF COEXISTENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WEST ON THE EARTH. SHE STATED THAT SHE WOULD HAVE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS AT A PROPER TIME AND ANNOUNCED THAT SHE WOULD VISIT HUNGARY EARLY NEXT YEAR. WHAT SHE HAS SAID INDICATED SOME CHANGES IN THE ANGLO-U.S. AND ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS.

THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE BRITISH OPPOSITION PARTIES IS MORE OBVIOUS. AFTER A PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE, THE OPPOSITION PARTIES UNANIMOUSLY VOTED AGAINST THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES AND OPENLY DEMANDED BRITISH INDEPENDENCE FROM ITS U.S. AND EUROPEAN ALLIES, AND CALLED FOR DOUBLE CONTROL OF CRUISE MISSILES.

THE EUROMISSILE ISSUE HAS EVOKED STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION IN WESTERN EUROPE. MILLIONS OF EUROPEANS DEMONSTRATED AGAINST U.S. AND SOVIET MISSILES. NO DOUBT, THE ANTI-NUCLEAR PEACE MOVEMENT HAS AN IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN WESTERN EUROPE.

IT IS NOT WITHOUT REASON FOR EUROPEANS TO WORRY ABOUT THE ESCALATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. WITH THE ARRIVAL OF U.S. MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE, THE SOVIETS WILL SURELY MAKE SOME RESPONSE. IN ADDITION TO BUILDING UP ITS SS-20 MISSILES, THE SOVIETS WILL WORK ON A NEW GENERATION OF MISSILES TO FIGHT FOR SUPERIORITY OVER THE UNITED STATES. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WILL DEPLOY NEW MISSILES AT PLACES NEARER TO WESTERN EUROPE, SUCH AS CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. THE CONFRONTATION OF U.S. AND SOVIET MISSILES WILL ONLY CREATE MORE THREATS TO EUROPE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD.

THE PROCESS OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF EUROMISSILES INDICATES THAT BOTH SUPERPOWERS SET STORE BY MILITARY STRENGTH, AND THAT IS WHERE THE DANGER OF THE POLITICAL GAMBLE LIES.

23 NOV 2054Z WW

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**CONFIDENTIEL**

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RECEIVED		FOR DOSSIER
FILE	28.6.1 Trudeau Peace	
DOSSIER		

*FOWLER*  
*USS*  
*COLEMAN*  
*SHEALSTONE*  
*FILE*  
*MISSION*

CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM WSHDC UNGR2461 23NOV83  
 TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 231730  
 INFO PMDELDELHI/FOWLER MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU  
 PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY TOKYO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CPD  
 DISTR MINA USS DMF IDR IDA RGB RBR URR RCP ZSI UGB CPD  
 REF TOKYO TEL UIGR2529 23NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE: MOSCO VISIT, CRITICAL VIEW OF USA POLICIES  
 28NOV VISIT TO WSHDC BY CALDER AND HAGAN SHLD GIVE CLEARER  
 INDICATION OF USA REACTION TO SPECIFICS OF PMS PROPOSALS ON  
 TECHNICAL LEVEL. REACTIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED SO FAR HAVE NOT/NOT  
 GONE INTO DETAILS OF USA OBJECTIONS, APART FROM OBSERVATIONS  
 PROPOSALS WILL NOT/NOT FLY, OR WILL PLACE PRESSURE ON USA AT  
 INOPPORTUNE TIME, OR CUT ACROSS USA CRITICAL PATH.  
 2. ASST SECY BURT HAS ON TWO OCCASIONS (ONCE TO AMB AND ONCE TO  
 MND BLAIS) SAID HOWEVER THAT THERE ARE HARD OBJECTIONS TO THE  
 SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS. HE HAS SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE ASAT  
 PROPOSAL SAYING USA WILL REJECT IT BECAUSE IT HAS HOPES OF  
 ACHIEVING MAJOR SUCCESS IN SPACE THAT WILL GIVE USA UPPER HAND.  
 SUFFOCATION WLD CUT ACROSS USA PROGRAMS TO USSR ADVANTAGE.  
 3. BURTS COMMENTS REFLECT DEGREE TO WHICH THE PRESIDENTS STAR WARS  
 SPEECH AND THE INITIATIVE IT SPAWNED HAVE PERMEATED OFFICIAL  
 THINKING. THE IDEA OF DOING A TECHNOLOGICAL END RUN ON THE SOVS  
 ...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2461 CONF  
 PERSISTS IN THIS ADMIN. THIS IS PART OF THE PROBLEM.  
 4. TO SOPHISTICATED CRITICAL OBSERVERS, ANTI-SAT PROGRAM CLD  
 REPRESENT TO ADMIN HARDLINERS MEANS WHEREBY USA CAN GET AROUND  
 ANTI-ABM AGREEMENT AND UNDERTAKE SERIOUS WORK ON SUCH THINGS AS  
 CHEMICAL LASERS WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE BE PROHIBITED.  
 5. ADMIN CRITICS, SUCH AS JOHN STEINBRUNER OF BROOKINGS, ARE VERY  
 WORRIED ABOUT SORT OF SIGNALS THIS IS SENDING TO SOVIET UNION.  
 THEY CONSIDER CDA SHOULD MAINTAIN PROPOSAL TO CUT OFF WORK ON  
 ANTI-SAT TECHNOLOGY.  
 6. THEY ALSO ATTACH SIGNIFICANCE TO RECENT REVISIONS TO CDA  
 ESTIMATES ON SOVIET DEFENCE SPENDING. IN THEIR VIEW, SOVIETS APPEAR  
 TO HAVE DECIDED BETWEEN 1968 AND 1971 TO CUT BACK CAPITAL SPENDING  
 IN DEFENCE BUT BECAUSE OF SLUGGISHNESS OF SOVIET SYSTEM, IMPACT OF  
 THESE DECISIONS HAS NOT/NOT REALLY BEEN NOTICED UNTIL QUITE  
 RECENTLY. SOVIET SYSTEM HAS IN FACT RESISTED FOR LAST DECADE  
 MILITARY PRESSURE FOR UPTURN IN SPENDING ON WEAPONS SYSTEMS.  
 IMPACT OF REAGAN ADMIN EXCESSES OF RHETORIC AND PROGRAMS SUCH  
 AS ANTI-SAT WEAPONRY IS TO TIP HAND IN USSR IN FAVOUR OF THOSE  
 WHO WANT GREATER SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING. SOVIET HARDLINERS CAN  
 POINT TO PATTERN COMPOSED OF PROPOSALS FROM USA IN ARMS CONTROL  
 NEGS, SUCH PROGRAMS FOR ARMS BUILDUP SUCH AS ANTI-SAT, P2 DEPLOYMENT,  
 AND OVERALL RHETORIC TO BUILD CASE THAT USA IS AIMING AT FIRST  
 ...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2461 CONF

STRIKE CAPABILITY OF ITW OWN. EVENTUAL SPACE SHUTTLE BASED WEAPONS  
COULD NOT/NOT DEFEAT MASSIVE ICBM ATTACK FROM USSR BUT COULD  
CONCEIVABLY HAVE EFFECT ON RESIDUAL RESPONSE TO FIRST STRIKE.  
ADMIN WLD CONSIDER SUCH CLAIMS GROUNDLESS, OF COURSE. HOWEVER,  
STEINBRUNER CONSIDERS CLAIMS WLD BE AT LEAST AS CREDIBLE IN USSR  
AS BASIS FOR NEW FILLIP TO ARMS RACE, AS WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY  
THESES WAS HERE.

7. ALL OF THIS CONVINCES SUCH CRITICS RETURN TO SOME FORM OF CLIMATE  
IN WHICH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS POSSIBLE TO BE VITAL. BIZARRE EVENTS  
SURROUNDING RECENT INF OFFERS AND DENIALS AND DEMARCHES IN ALLIED  
CAPITALS AND COUNTER-DEMARCHES REVEAL TO THESE CRITICS (WHO  
INCIDENTALLY DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE ADMIN SIDE OF STORY AND CONSIDER  
NITZE MUST HAVE BEEN TOYING WITH 572 PROPOSAL AS SOMETHING TO BE  
TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN MODIFIED FORM) BOTH HOW BADLY USA-USSR BILATERAL  
SIT REALLY IS, AND HOW LITTLE CHANCE THERE IS RIGHT NOW FOR  
PRODUCTIVE ARMS CONTROL NEGS. THEY BELIEVE THERE IS NO/NO ONE IN  
ADMIN ABLE BY QUALIFICATION OR BY DISPOSITION TO APPRECIATE QUOTE  
AMERICAN ERROR UNQUOTE EXCEPT POSSIBLY THOSE ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL  
SIDE WHO MUST REALIZE THAT BY SPRING ARMS CONTROL WILL BECOME THE  
MAJOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE. QUESTION THEY ASK IS WHETHER USA  
JUDGEMENT WILL NOT/NOT BECOME DIVISIVE ISSUE IN ALLIANCE BEFORE  
THEN.

CCC/230 232131Z UNGR2461

INEC

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

28-6-1-Thudreau Peace Mission

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0053 23NOV

TO PEKING/GAUVIN ONLY FLASH

INFO MOSCOW/PEARSON/ARCHDEACON/SMITH ONLY IMMEDIATE

EXTOTT LEDZ/DELVCIE ONLY

REF YOURTEL WJGR0871 22NOV

---PM INITIATIVE: VISIT TO CHINA NOVEMBER 28/29

1. FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED REFTEL

A) COMPOSITION OF DEL;

(I) PM. JUSTIN. MASSE, FOWLER, JOHNSON, COLEMAN, JOHNSTONE.

CARTER TOTAL 8/8.

PEARSON/SMITH AND PROBABLY ARCHDEACON WE BELIEVE WOULD JOIN SEPARATELY FROM MOSCOW AND RETURN FROM PEKING DIRECT TO OTTAWA.

(II) SIZE OF ACCOMPANYING PRESS DEL WILL BE ANYWHERE FROM POOL OF 6/6 TO FULL CONTINGENT OF 25/25. (IF LATTER WE WOULD ADD DURDIN PMO TO HANDLE LARGER GROUP). WE WILL NOT/NOT BE IN POSITION TO ADVISE SIZE OF PRESS CONTINGENT AT LEAST UNTIL WEDNESDAY EVENING. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU EXPECT FINDING HOTEL ACCOMODATION WILL BE DIFFICULT.

B) DETAILS OF AIRCRAFT

I) FLIGHT NUMEER-CAM3880

II) COMMANDER MAJOR WHITMAN-CREW TOTAL 11/11

III) TYPE OF AIRCRAFT AND REGISTRATION NUMBER BOEING 707-13702

...2

PAGE TWO PMDL0053 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

IV) RADIO CALL SIGN-CAM3880

V) CONFIRM NO/NO MUNITIONS OF WAR, PHOTOGRAPHIC OR ANTI-ELECTRONIC  
MEASURES EQUIPMENT CARRIED

VI) PROPOSED ITINERARY (ALL TIMES LOCAL)

NOV27/27 DEPART GOA 1300 HRS

ARRIVE DELHI 1500 HRS

DEPART DELHI 1630 HRS

ARRIVE PEKING 2399 HRS

NOV29/29 DEPART PEKING 1530 HRS

ARRIVE DELHI 1900 HRS

VII) ROUTINGS-AIRCRAFT NAVIGATOR USING CHARTS AVAILABLE TO HIM  
RECOMMENDS USING ROUTING DIRECT PEKING/DELHI AS FOLLOWS:

DELHI W37 HW DIRECT 3100N 8000E

DIRECT WUZ DIRECT TYN DIRECT VYK

DIRECT TO PEKING ENTER CHINESE AIRSPACE

AT 3100N 8000E TAKE OFF PLUS 40 MINUTES.

TIMINGS MUST BE CONSIDERED TENTATIVE IN THAT

A) IT HAS ONLY BEEN CLEARED IN GENERAL TERMS WITH PM

B) WE ARE NOT/NOT AWARE OF MRS GANDHI'S PLAN FOR SUNDAY AFTERNOON  
IN GOA. HOWEVER WE ANTICIPATE THERE WILL BE NO/NO SIGNIFICANT  
REASONS FOR NOT/NOT LEAVING GOA AT NOON.

C) F0EING 707 MAY NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO OPERATE OUT OF GOA AS IT MAY

...3

PAGE THREE PMDL0053 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

NOT/NOT HAVE PROPER EQUIPMENT TO HANDLE PMS AIRCRAFT. AIRCRAFT.  
RUNWAY MAY BE TOO SHORT TO TAKE OFF WITH FULL FUEL LOAD AND  
AIRCRAFT WOULD THEN HAVE TO:

MAKE STOP IN DELHI FOR FUEL. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WILL BE  
REQUIRED TO ASK INDIANS TO ADVANCE PMS DEPARTURE (NOW SET FOR  
1600 HRS) EARLIER FOR DELHI.

SHOULD CHINESE NOT/NOT GRANT DIRECT ROUTING CONSIDERABLE TIME COULD  
BE ADDED TO FLIGHT IN ORDER TO OVERFLY ADDITIONAL 6/6 COUNTRIES  
AND ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCES AT VERY LAST MINUTE.  
DELHI/PEKING DIRECT IS ESTIMATED AT 4 1/2 HOURS WHEREAS ENTER VIA  
SHANGHAI COULD BE AS MUCH AS 16/16 HOURS. IT IS THEREFORE VERY  
IMPORTANT THAT WE BE GIVEN AS DIRECT A ROUTING AS POSSIBLE. USUAL  
PROCEDURE FOR CANADIAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT ENTERING CHINESE AIRSPACE  
IS PROVISION OF CHINESE NAVIGATOR. IS THIS ESSENTIAL AND COULD  
NAVIGATOR BOARD FLIGHT IN DELHI?

WILL REQUIRE HOTEL ACCOMMODATION FOR DEL. PRESS WOULD NOT/NOT  
HAVE TO BE ACCOMMODATED AT SAME HOTEL. WILL GUEST HOUSE BE  
OFFERED?

IF WE CAN HOLD STORY UNTIL THEN, PM WOULD NOT/NOT MENTION HIS  
DEPARTURE FROM CONFERENCE TO MRS GANDHI UNTIL FRIDAY EVENING IN  
GOA. IDEALLY, CANADIAN PRESS CONTINGENT WOULD BE INFORMED IN DELHI  
SAME TIME. WHILE WE ARE BY NO MEANS CERTAIN OUR SHIP WILL NOT/NOT

...4

PAGE FOUR PMDL0053 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

LEAK, DO YOU THINK CHINESE WOULD AGREE TO KEEP MATTER QUIET UNTIL A  
SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT (IF THEY DO SUCH THINGS) COULD BE MADE  
FRIDAY EVENING.

REYOURTEL WJGR0973 OF 22NOV. DOES CALL FM WU REPRESENT QUOTE OFFICIAL  
AGREEMENT UNQUOTE WHICH YOUR WJGR0871 HAD NOT/NOT ANTICIPATED UNTIL  
NOV 23 OR 24? THEREFORE GRATEFUL YOU CONFIRM ASAP WHETHER PM WILL SEE  
BOTH ZHAO AND/AND DENG. THIS SCENARIO CALLS FOR TWO NIGHTS AND A  
WORKING DAY AND A HALF IN PEKING. IS THIS EXCESSIVE? IDEALLY THERE  
WOULD BE TWO EVENTS ON MONDAY (SAY, MEETING WITH ZHAO AND DINNER) AND  
MEETING WITH DENG SCHEDULED FOR TUESDAY MORNING.

SENDING BY FOLLOWING TEL PASSPORT DETAILS FOR DEL AND ALL/ALL MEDIA  
NOT/NOT WITHSTANDING (A) (II).

CCC/068 230503Z PMDL0053



MESSAGE

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23 Nov 83 23 23z 10

SECURITY /  
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE  
TO/A  
INFO  
DISTR  
REF  
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0209 23NOV83  
TO MOSCO *Delvoie leg 240900*  
*FOR PEARSON/SMITH*  
INFO PMDELHI WSHDC BNATO PEKIN  
DISTR DMF IDA ~~MRCF~~ URR RBR IDA  
REF TEL FM TOKYO UIGR2529 OF NOV 23

*28-6-1-Thudau Peace Mission*

---PM S INITIATIVE: MOSCO VISIT

OUR RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS POSED IN YOUR REFTEL ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1) FIVE POWER CONFERENCE: IT SEEMS TO US THAT PM MADE OUR POSITION ON TIMING QUITE CLEAR WHEN HE SAID QUOTE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THE COURSE OF THE COMING YEAR UNQUOTE. WE HAVE, OF COURSE, ALWAYS RECOGNIZED THAT CONCLUSION OF FIVE POWER LIMITATION AGREEMENT MIGHT HAVE TO AWAIT OUTCOME OF START. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, OTHER QUESTIONS, E.G. INCLUSIONS/EXCLUSIONS, WHICH FIVE POWERS WOULD HAVE TO SETTLE WHICH THEY COULD BEGIN TO DISCUSS NOW. ACT OF BEGINNING SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE SIGNIFICANT. IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO KNOW NUMERICAL VALUES OF RATIOS BEFORE DISCUSSING WHETHER SUCH APPROACH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

2) ASAT: OUR PROPOSAL WAS DESIGNED TO BE MORE NEGOTIABLE THAN THAT OF USSR AND COULD BE PRESENTED TO THEM AS FIRST STEP TOWARDS THEIR OBJECTIVE. COMPREHENSIVE ASAT BAN IS, ACCORDING TO OUR INFO, UNACCEPTABLE TO USA. PUBLIC RATIONALE USA HAS USED TO JUSTIFY THAT OPPOSITION IS BASED ON EXISTING USSR CAPABILITIES AT LOWER ALTITUDES AND, THEREFORE, DOES NOT APPLY TO OUR PROPOSAL. OUR PROPOSAL MAY BE NO

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

*K. Calder*  
K. CALDER

IDDZ

5-5912

*L.A. Delvoie*  
L.A. DELVOIE



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0209 CONFIDENTIAL

12

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MORE ACCEPTABLE TO USA BUT IF THAT IS SO USA WILL HAVE TO DEVELOP  
NEW PUBLIC RATIONALE FOR REJECTING IT.

3. ACCORDING TO IDA CDA HAS NOT YET SPOKEN AT UNGA ON SOVIET DRAFT  
TREATY. WERE <sup>WE</sup> TO DO SO WE WOULD PROBABLY SUGGEST THAT ELEMENTS OF

SOVIET PROPOSAL ARE ONE-SIDED IN IGNORING EXISTING SOVIET SYSTEM  
WHILE FOCUSING ON US DEVELOPMENTS. WE WOULD PROBABLY ALSO <sup>DINT</sup> ~~PRIEST~~

OUT THAT <sup>THERE ARE</sup> UNCERTAINTIES IN SOVIET PROPOSAL IN RELATION TO VERIFICATION  
AND DEFINITION.

4. MOBILITY: WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT MOBILE WEAPONS ARE UNVERIFIABLE.  
WE DO BELIEVE THAT MOBILITY MAKES VERIFICATION MORE DIFFICULT. OUR  
PROPOSAL REFERS TO MIDGETMAN ON USA SIDE AND ON NEW MOBILE ICBM  
BEING DEVELOPED BY SOVIETS.

5. EXCHANGES: WE WOULD PREFER YOU EXPRESS HOPE RATHER THAN EXPECTA-  
TION OF GENEXAG MIXED COMMISSION MEETING IN 1984. WE REMAIN COMMIT-  
TED TO DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE PROGRAMME OF DEMONSTRABLE  
BENEFIT TO CANADA AS DIRECTED BY CABINET. FACT REMAINS, HOWEVER, THAT  
CANADIAN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY IS NOT/NOT PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE,  
EVEN BY RECEIVING SOVIETS, IN EXCHANGE PROGRAM. COMMUNITY HARBOURS  
TWO MAIN CONCERNS: A. EXCHANGES IN PAST HAVE BEEN ONE-SIDED WITH  
VERY LITTLE BENEFIT TO CANADIANS. B. HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION, ESPECIAL-  
LY SAKHAROV, IS NOT IMPROVING. TO GAIN NRC/NSERC COOP, THEY FIRST NEED  
SOME ASSURANCE THAT PROBLEMS WHICH PLAGUED EARLIER CONTACTS WILL BE  
REDUCED. TO THIS END, WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH SANDT MINISTER JOHNSTON

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PAGE THREE IDDZ0209 CONFIDENTIAL

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WHO IS PREPARING COMPENDIUM OF SCIENCE COMMUNITY CONCERNS WHICH WE  
WILL BE ASKING AMB ROBERTS TO TRANSMIT TO GORBACHEV (WHO ORIGINAL-  
LY REQUESTED INFO). AT SAME TIME, SOV PERFORMANCE IN NEGOTIATING AND  
IMPLEMENTING SCIENCE COMPONENT OF ARCTIC EXCHANGES WILL BE TEST OF  
INTENTION FOR CANADIAN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY. SOV HAVE NOT NOT REPLIED  
TO CDN PROPOSALS ALTHOUGH RESPONSE QUOTE VERY SOON UNQUOTE HAS BEEN  
FREQUENTLY PROMISED SINCE SEP83. ANY OR ALL OF ABOVE COULD BE USED  
WITH SOV AUTHORITIES. HOWEVER, THIS MATTER WILL BE PURSUED AS PART  
OF OUR ONGOING AGENDA AND WE CONTINUE TO BE OF VIEW THAT REFERENCE  
TO BILATERAL TOPICS DURING OUR TALKS IN MOSCOW SHOULD BE KEPT TO  
MINIMUM. WE WOULD STILL, OF COURSE, WISH YOU TO TAKE OPPORTUNITY TO  
FLAG, AS DISCUSSED WITH RBD/RBR, FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND KAL COMPEN-  
SATION ISSUES.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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23 Nov 83 22 120 22 10

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ  
CONFIDENTIAL CDN EYES ONLY

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0208 23NOV83  
TO/À TO LDN  
INFO  
DISTR INFO WSHDC MOSCO BNATO ROME BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY TOKYO DELHI  
REF PEKIN NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP  
SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGB RBR UCB URR RCP ZSI RCD RCR  
  
REF YOURTEL XNGR4158 22NOV  
  
---PMS MTG WITH GEORGI ARBATOV  
  
YES/YES.

*28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace mission*

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
L.A. Delvoie/sc SIG	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> L.A. Delvoie

202-61-~~Museum Peace~~ 205  
Mission

202-613

TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S OPENING REMARKS AT  
THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN NEW DELHI, INDIA,  
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1983

TRANSCRIPTION DES COMMENTAIRES DU PREMIER MINISTRE À LA  
CÉRÉMONIE D'OUVERTURE DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES CHEFS DE  
GOUVERNEMENT DU COMMONWEALTH, NEW DELHI, INDE, LE 23 NOVEMBRE 1983

Madam Chairman, distinguished colleagues and friends, Secretary General, ladies and gentlemen, if it be true that the difference between the politician and the statesman is that the former worries about the next election and that the latter is concerned with the next generation. If that be true, then we are fortunate indeed to be meeting at a Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting.

The very nature of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) inspires us to set aside the attitudes and the generalities whereby problems are often avoided, because through the agenda and the format we are challenged every time we do so. The agenda is so structured that we are turned away from the kind of question that we have to deal with daily in our own nations, or indeed, often between us, bilaterally, and we are guided towards the kind of problem, that great swirl of problems which sometimes threaten to engulf mankind. And as for the format, well, we meet between leaders of sovereign nations, we communicate with each other in the same language, and we know that sophistry can be challenged in our discussions in a much more forthright way than even in our more vital democratic forums -- because in this forum, we are challenged by equals and not by Official Oppositions, or by media who often have an anti-establishment bias.

.../2

-2-

So, we are fortunate to be meeting here and yet we are challenged to be statesmen and women because we meet - as several of my colleagues mentioned this morning - at particularly perilous times in the life of our planet. Perilous economically and perilous politically, and particularly dangerous, as you pointed out, Madam Chairman, because of the threat of a nuclear holocaust which indeed enjoins us not to be concerned about the next generation, but to be concerned about all generations - that is to say the future of mankind. But to say no to annihilation is not sufficient to make statesmen out of us. We must also provide the alternatives. And I believe that they can be found in the sense of dialogue, in the sense of understanding which flows from tolerance, which flows from the belief that diverse beliefs, diverse and divergent ideologies still can be transcended by what mankind hold in common. And in that sense we are here to bear witness, by our deeds, to the fundamental unity of the human family.

We are fortunate too to be meeting in this great country because its contribution to modern statescraft has been to demonstrate that out of the diversity of language, religion, ethnic origin, culture, economic and political difference, out of that diversity can be born one of the most vibrant democracies, this great democracy of some 800 million people. Reference was made to Indira Gandhi's distinguished father and how his decision, politically agonizing though it must have been, was a brilliant act of statescraft multiracial Commonwealth. That principle of his action was inspired by India's first Prime Minister's sense of tolerance, and no doubt it came - as has been mentioned this morning - in a body-politic which had been inspired by the great Mahatma Gandhi whose spirituality and moral courage helped the founding of this nation.

.../3

-3-

You, Madam Chairman, in a speech in 1968 indicated how that spirituality was founded on the Hindu texts, sacred texts, of Hinduism but also on the teachings of Christianity and of Islam, and there too is a reconciliation of differences which can guide us.

So, Madam Chairman, we are fortunate to be meeting in India and I believe we are fortunate to be meeting under your chairmanship. You have shown, in the past year, through your leadership to the non-aligned nations, that they can follow paths of moderation and of realism. You have shown, in those summits you convened in New York - and to which the Secretary General has made reference - that the straightforward approach of the Commonwealth, the no-nonsense format can be of great use even to the rather stultifying atmosphere of the United Nations.

In these things, we are grateful to be here, Madam Chairman, we thank you for bringing us together. It has been said that the highest form of hope is despair overcome. And representing, as we do, one quarter of the human race, I think that my best response to your address, Madam Chairman, would be to wish that these following days can permit us to give that kind of hope to our brothers and sisters of the world.

-30-

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You, Madam Chairman, in a speech in 1968 indicated how that spirituality was founded on the Hindu texts, sacred texts, of Hinduism but also on the teachings of Christianity and of Islam, and there too is a reconciliation of differences which can guide us.

So, Madam Chairman, we are fortunate to be meeting in India and I believe we are fortunate to be meeting under your chairmanship. You have shown, in the past year, through your leadership to the non-aligned nations, that they can follow paths of moderation and of realism. You have shown, in those summits you convened in New York - and to which the Secretary General has made reference - that the straightforward approach of the Commonwealth, the no-nonsense format can be of great use even to the rather stultifying atmosphere of the United Nations.

In these things, we are grateful to be here, Madam Chairman, we thank you for bringing us together. It has been said that the highest form of hope is despair overcome. And, representing, as we do, one quarter of the human race, I think that my best response to your address, Madam Chairman, would be to wish that these following days can permit us to give that kind of hope to our brothers and sisters of the world.

-30-

*Mr Delvise*

*J. Gandhi*

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING  
NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 23-30, 1983

PROVISIONAL TIMETABLE

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

Tuesday, November 22

- 1430 - Meeting of Senior Officials at Vigyan Bhavan
- 1730 - Prime Minister's aircraft arrives New Delhi
- 2000 - Dinner for Senior Officials by Indian Foreign Ministry at Oberoi Hotel (Lounge Suit)
- 2030 - Prime Minister's meeting with Secretary-General Ramphal

Wednesday, November 23

- 0815 - Invitees other than Heads of Government at
- 0845 - Conference Hall (Gate Number 2)
- Each Delegation allowed six places plus High Commissioner
- 0850 - Commonwealth Secretary-General arrives
- 0855 - Indian Prime Minister arrives
- 0900 - Heads of Government arrive and are received by
- 0920 - Commonwealth Secretary-General in Lounge
- 0925 - Heads of Government and Commonwealth Secretary-General move from Lounge to Rostrum in main Conference Hall
- 0943 - Indian National Anthem
- 0945 - Opening Session

The Opening Session will be in the presence of a large number of invited guests and the media. PM Gandhi will be in the chair and give the Address of Welcome followed by that of the Secretary-General. In addition there will be five speeches in reply. The Prime Minister has been asked by Sonny Ramphal to deliver one of these. The formal photograph of Heads of Delegation will be taken immediately following the speeches.

.../2

- 1100 - The First Session (expected to be short) will consider the Agenda and the suggested guidelines on Style and Format (for Heads of Government and Commonwealth Secretary-General only)
- 1230 - Secretary-General's reception at Vigyan Bhavan  
This will include the Indian and world press
- Lunch
- 1500 - Second Session commences with discussion of the World Political Scene. Prime Minister will be lead speaker
- 1730 - Reception for Heads of Government by President of India at Rashtrapati Bhavan
- 2000 - Banquet given by the Queen for Heads of Government and spouses (Black tie or national dress and decorations)

Thursday, November 24

- 0930 - Executive Session
- 1215 - Visit to Trade Fair Exhibition followed by Prime Minister's Lunch for Caribbean Group
- 1500 - Executive Session
- Audience for Prime Minister with the Queen  
(alternative is Friday)
- 2030 - Dinner for Heads of Government given by PM Gandhi at Ashoka Hotel followed by cultural program (Lounge suit)
- Dinner for Foreign Ministers by Indian Foreign Minister Rao at Maurya Hotel (Lounge suit)

Friday, November 25

- 0930 - Executive Session
- 1200
- 1230 - Heads of Government fly to Goa for Retreat  
(approx)
- 1500 - Arrive Goa (Fort Aguada Hotel)  
(approx)
- 1900 - Queen's reception for Foreign Ministers, High Commissioners and Senior Officials (Lounge suit)

FAA.26<sup>?</sup>

*restricted access*

CONFIDENTIAL

Sunday, November 27

- 0830 - Senior Officials depart for Agra
- 1800 - Return to Delhi
- 1830 - Heads of Government return from Goa
- 2000

Monday, November 28

- 0930 - Executive Session
- 1200
- 1230 - Lunch hosted by Mrs. Thatcher for 21 Heads of Government, including Prime Minister (Antigua and Barbuda to Malaysia)
- 1500 - Executive Session
- 2000 - Dinner and cultural program for Foreign Ministers and Senior Officials at Trade Fair Exhibition (Lounge suit)

Tuesday, November 29

- 0930 - Executive Session
- 1500 - Executive Session
- 1700 - Closing press conference chaired by PM Gandhi and the Secretary-General, and release of Communiqué

Following this any Head of Delegation may give a press conference or call upon their officials to do so

Wednesday, November 30

- 0930 - Leave Delhi for the Gulf States

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELROME PMDL0006 10NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 100830

INFO PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON/DURAND

FROM FOWLER

REF FOWLER/DELVOIF TELCON 29NOV

---PM INITIATIVE: TOUCHING THE PEKIN BASE

YOU ARE AWARE THAT PM BELIEVES THAT THERE IS LOGIC IN HAVING PERSONAL EMISSARY WHO HAS BFEN DFIGNATED TO EXPLORE TRUDFAUS POSSIBLE VISIT TO MOSCO TAKE ON A SIMILAR VISIT TO PEKIN AND THAT PM BFLIEVES IF GEOFF PEARSON IS PREPARED TO GO TO MOSCO HE MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER PEKIN. PM IS AWARE OF PROPOSAL WHEREBY PEARSON (PERHAPS ACCOMPANIED BY MEMBER OF TASK FORCE) MIGHT ACCOMPANY CHOGM DELEGATION TO TOKYO FOR MEETING WITH PM NAKASONE ON 19NOV AND PROCEED FROM JAPAN TO PEKIN FOR SUCH CONSULTATIONS.

2. FROM THE OUTSET PM AND OSBALDESTON HAVE BEEN CONCERNED THAT 8-DAY CHOGM PLUS ATTENDANT TRAVEL TO BANGLADESH AND THE PERSIAN GULF NOT/ NOT ONLY KEEP PM TOO LONG AWAY FROM BUSINESS OF CDN GOVT BUT ALSO DETRACT FROM IMPACT AND URGENCY OF PEACE INITIATIVE. THUS WE CAN HARDLY ADD TO IT INFRARY. WE CONSIDERED WHETHER PM MIGHT LEAVE INDIA AND CHOGM IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING RESTRICTED SESSION OF HEADS OF GOVT TO BE HELD IN GOA 26-27NOV TO UNDERTAKE INITIATIVE RELATED ACTIVITIES; THEREBY MISSING FINAL 2 DAYS OF CHOGM. WE HAD INITIALLY REJECTED THIS SCENARIO IN THAT (A) IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PROGRAM

...2

PAGE TWO PMDL0006 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

LONG IN ADVANCE WITHOUT MAINTAINING SPONTANEITY OF GESTURE AND WITHOUT COMPROMISING BOTH CANADA'S COMMITMENT TO COMMONWEALTH AND INTEGRITY OF MRS GHANDI'S MEETING, AND (B) TO DO SO WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REQUIRE CANCELLATION, SINE DIE, OF VISIT TO GULF STATES AND THIS AGAINST SOMEWHAT UNHAPPY BACKGROUND OF MANY CANCELLATIONS AND RESCHEDULINGS OVER PAST FEW YEARS.

3. PM BELIEVES THAT IF INITIATIVE IS TO BE FULLY CREDIBLE, AND PARTICULARLY IF PROPOSAL RELATING TO FIVE POWER NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS IS TO HAVE CHANCE OF SUCCESS HE MUST CONSULT WITH ALL 5 NUCLEAR POWERS. HE WILL OF COURSE HAVE CONSULTED WITH FRANCE AND UK DURING CURRENT EUROPEAN TRIP AND HE IS TAKEN WITH IDEA THAT INITIATIVE—OR AT LEAST CURRENT PHASE OF INITIATIVE—SHOULD CONCLUDE WITH VISITS TO BOTH SUPER-POWERS, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON (IN NO PARTICULAR ORDER). PM APPRECIATES, OF COURSE, THAT CHINESE PREMIER ZHOU WILL VISIT OTTAWA IN MID-JANUARY AND WHILE THIS WILL AFFORD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS INITIATIVE WITH SENIOR MEMBER OF CHINESE GOVT, THE TIMING IS SOMEWHAT TOO LATE AND THE LEVEL OF THE INTERLOCUTOR NOT PERFECT.

4. THUS BEARING IN MIND THE ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT OF SPONTANEITY, PM WISHES US TO CONSIDER WHETHER PEARSON MIGHT EXPLORE 20 OR 21 NOV WITH CHINESE IN PEKING POSSIBILITY THAT TRUDEAU COULD COME TO PEKING FROM DELHI MON MONDAY 28 NOV WITH A VIEW TO CONSULTING WITH SENIOR MEMBERS OF PRC GOVT (INCLUDING DENG) AND RETURN TO EITHER PICK-UP DEL IN DELHI

...3

PAGE THREE PMDL0006 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

30NOV OR, MORE LIKELY, PROCEED DIRECTLY TO ABU DHABI FOR SCHEDULED  
BEGINNING OF PROGRAM THERE ON 30NOV. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS  
AS TO: A) WHETHER THIS MAKES SENSE FROM A SUBSTANTIVE, INITIATIVE  
RELATED, POINT OF VIEW; B) FROM A CHOGM POINT OF VIEW AND C) WHETHER IT  
IS LOGISTICALLY FEASIBLE IE CAN IT BE DONE? IF SO, HOW?).

CCC/050 100816Z PMDL0006



TO/A  
FROM/DE

*ACS*  
IDDZ RBR URE URT CPDS LCR  
IDR JLE IDA CPOS GMR

*MF*

*Mr. McAtee*

Security/Sécurité	<i>De Spoke</i>
Accession/Référence	<i>ED</i>
File/Dossier	
Date	November 23, 1983
Number/Numéro	URR-995

REFERENCE  
RÉFÉRENCE  
SUBJECT  
SUJET

Our Memo 948 of October 28, 1983  
SHULTZ/MACEACHEN BILATERAL:  
BRUSSELS, DECEMBER 9, 1983

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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*28-6-1 - Nuclear Peace Mission*

The purpose of this memorandum is to confirm URR consultations with all addressees and to request contributions to the briefing material to be prepared for the next bilateral between the DPM/SSEA and U.S. Secretary of State Shultz scheduled to take place on the margin of the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels, December 9. Since the breakfast meeting is expected to last one hour, we will only be preparing brief scenarios. East/West relations and the PM's initiative is the one single item that can be expected to take up most of the time.

In order to be able to put together the briefing book for submission to the DPM/SSEA by December 2, it is absolutely essential that contributions be received in URR by the end of November 28 on word processing with the work slips attached so that last minute changes can be made.

Scenario contributions must be a maximum of two pages with the exception, if necessary, of the PM's Peace Initiative.

The following contributions are hereby solicited from the lead divisions:

<u>Division</u>	<u>Subject</u>
<u>Multilateral</u>	
IDDZ/RBR	East/West Relations: P.M.'s Peace Initiative
IDA/IDR	Arms Control: INF, START, MBFR, CDE
GMR	Middle East
LCR	Grenada/Nicaragua

.../2

- 2 -

RESTRICTED

Bilateral

URE

Current Environmental Issues

URT/CPOS


Current Trade Issues

IDR

Current Defence Issues

URT/JLE

Extraterritoriality/Unitary  
Tax



M.G. von Nostitz  
Director  
United States General  
Relations Division

MF  
JD

November 23, 1983

Note to DPM/SSEA  
from: IDDZ-Gossage

Subject - Chicago Speech, PM Initiative and U.S. Media

1. U.S. Media Reaction to PM Initiative

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace  
mission

- Basic Coverage

Most major print dailies have adequately and positively covered the substance of the PM's two speeches - the New York Times devoting front page treatment to the second speech. The Wall Street Journal provided a factual summary following the second speech, and noted rather sarcastically his swing through Europe on the editorial page. The Chicago Tribune, among other majors took a basic Reuters story of the second speech, and the Christian Science Monitor and Washington Post have covered both on inside pages. James Reston mentioned the initiative favourably in the context of a longer column on East-West. The speeches have been considered newsworthy and have been so covered. Administration reaction has not been covered or probed as in Canada.

- Serious Comment

There have been number of encouraging editorials in newspapers outside the majors (The Los Angeles Times, the Milwaukee Journal, the Dallas Times Herald, and the Seattle Post Intelligencer). The tone of these pieces is typified by the November 4 Milwaukee Journal (background material provided by Chicago):

"If he (PM) can cleanse the polluted atmosphere of East-West nuclear diplomacy and help achieve a new arms agreement, he will end his career with a magnificent flourish"

- 2 -

2. U.S. Media Attitudes

The majority of senior columnists, editorial writers and diplomatic correspondents in the United States have been silent on the substance and process of PM's program. Briefings with senior U.S. press by the Ambassador, senior officials in Washington and New York uncovered the following attitudes to the initiative:

- they are skeptical that the administration could be brought onside.
- they are preoccupied with covering the primordial role of their own government in arms control talks and with their administration's very different approach to relations with the Soviet Union - their normal leftish tendencies were severely tested by overwhelming public support for the Grenada adventure.
- they are convinced that "nobody is home" in the Kremlin and that the PM may lack an interlocutor for a key element of his plan.
- they assume that other NATO allies, however much domestic difficulty they are having, are playing to the overall U.S. tune, and would not be/should not be distracted by new ideas.
- they have difficulty seeing the PM as a major player in this field - not because of our alleged lack of commitment to NATO - but because we are not seen to have a track record, and because the fact that this may be the PM's swansong is well known.

-3-

3. DPM/SSEA Meeting with Chicago Media

There is considerable interest in Chicago media circles in the PM's initiative. The Chicago Tribune, the major daily, covers Canadian affairs well in its editorial pages, and has dealt twice with Canada's defence roles in op-ed columns. Richard Perle was a recent visitor and received wide media coverage for his East-West views.

In addition, Kevin Klose, who covers Canada for the Washington Post is stationed in Chicago, and correspondents of the Wall Street Journal and Christian Science Monitor, as well, possibly as local CBS can be expected to attend and ask "big" questions.

In sum, Chicago, while not a national media centre is influential nationally and this can be considered as a capitol opportunity to reinforce the PM's and government's concerns on Peace and Security. While major national attention to the initiative will await a PM visit to Washington, we can gather respectable coverage locally and in one or two nationally influential papers on this go round.

4. Suggested Media Approach

The DPM/SSEA should bear in mind that knowledge of the details of the initiative will be limited amongst many of the press who attend this kind of luncheon, and he should therefore emphasize the range and depth of consultations underway.

Following are other themes that could be developed in answer to media questions which try to strike a balance between "pressuring" the administration and strongly making our case:

- 4 -

- the PM is putting his considerable seniority and international reputation at the service of peace making. Not a new role for him or for Canada. He is doing something no other leader in the western alliance could credibly do. He and Canada have a track record.
  
- he is right now, at CHOGM, discussing non-proliferation - one of several elements of his programme, but one which addresses perhaps one of the deepest anxieties felt by all nations - the risk that a nuclear war could be triggered by a third party's irrational resort to use of such a weapon in a regional conflict.
  
- His interest is less in pushing individual prescriptions to reduce East-West tensions, more in encouraging politicians to address the dangerous political issue of lack of East-West dialogue. There are any number of fora in which dialogue could be reopened and built on.
  
- Canada does not in any way question the U.S.'s absolutely central role in negotiating directly with the Russians to reduce the threat of nuclear war. We completely support their efforts at the INF and START. But we are convinced that there is a role for other powers in working to improve the chances of success at these negotiations. How can Canada and the European NATO allies be bystanders when a nuclear war would be fought on or over our territories. The PM is searching for parallel kinds of dialogue between the two blocs that can increase confidence, and allay fears that world problems only have military solutions. This is the deeper purpose of his initiative which he himself is working on with governments on both sides.

-5-

- Can the PM get Reagan and Andropov together? The PM does not see himself as a go-between. This is not shuttle diplomacy. He would like to create a political atmosphere in which such a meeting could be held with some chance of success.

-If you are asked about the PM going to Moscow you might surmise that given that the PM has an invitation, he could accept it with the feeling that just the fact of the visit itself might contribute to reducing tensions. But it is too early to tell.

-As for a visit to Washington, this is in the early stages of planning. He and the President agree it would be useful, and it is critical that the PM have a chance to discuss his mission face to face with the President in the near future.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À MINA/Robertson

FROM/DE IDDZ

SUBJECT/SUJET Suggested reply to Questions in  
The Senate November 17 on The  
Prime Minister's Initiative.

Security Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
File Dossier	
Date	November 23, 1983.

ATTACHMENT  
PIÈCE JOINTE

DISTRIBUTION	RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions) RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION (Noms des individus/Directions)	ACTION/SUITE À DONNER
MINA/Robertson		<div data-bbox="889 554 1385 766" data-label="Text"> <p>28-6-1-Tudor Peace missions</p> </div>
URR	URR	

REQUIRED BY/DEMANDÉ POUR

  
L.A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINÉ AU DOSSIER

EXT 401

The Prime Minister's initiative on East/West relations and international security was discussed by the Deputy Prime Minister/Secretary of State for External Affairs and the American Deputy Secretary of State in the course of consultations on November 15.

The Secretary of State of External Affairs outlined the Prime Minister's primary purpose, which is to arrest and reverse the downward trend in East/West relations and thus reduce international tensions and the risks of confrontation. He referred to the Prime Minister's proposals, which relate to the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West and include a series of arms control and disarmament proposals.

The American government's official position is general support for the broad purposes of the Prime Minister's initiative, although they have queried some of the specific proposals. It was agreed there would be further discussions and consultations on these points.

It is hoped that a meeting between the Prime Minister and President Reagan can be arranged in the near future. Arrangements have not been made at this time for a meeting with Chairman Andropov.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR7122 23NOV83

TO EXTOTT ICR DELIVER BY 230900

28-6-1 - Nuclear Peace  
Mission

INFO DELHI/PMDEL BONN BRU WSHDC MOSCO VMEFR GENEV PARIS HAGUE  
OSLO COPEN ATHNS MDRID CANNILREPNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER LDN ROME  
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/CORAE/DSTRATA/DNACPOL/CIS  
DISTR MINA DMF IDA RCR RBR ZSI ZSP CPD RGX IDRL IDRA IDDZ IFB  
REF OURTEL YBGR7121 23NOV

---SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP MTG 22NOV

DRAFT INF PASSAGE FOR NAC COMMUNIQUE

PLS FIND BELOW QUOTE DRAFT INF PASSAGE FOR NAC COMMUNIQUE UNQUOTE  
REFERRED TO IN SUMMARY OF REFTEL

2.QUOTE:

THE ALLIANCE REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE GOAL OF A  
BALANCE OF FORCES IN INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES WITH  
THE SOVIET UNION AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. IT REITERATES  
ITS STRONG PREFERENCE THAT THIS GOAL BE ACHIEVED THROUGH  
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR. THIS HAS BEEN THE OBJECTIVE OF  
THE ALLIANCE EVER SINCE THE PARALLEL AND COMPLEMENTARY PROGRAM  
OF INF ARMS CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION WAS ADOPTED IN THE 1979  
DUAL-TRACK DECISION. THE PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SCG IS A  
COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT OF ALLIANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT  
DECISION AND THE CONDUCT OF THE GENEV NEGOTIATIONS BY THE  
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR7122 CONF

THE ALLIANCE HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS ENDURING COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF FORCES THROUGH THE VIGOROUS USA NEGOTIATING EFFORT IN GENEV AND THROUGH THE PARALLEL INF DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM. UNFORTUNATELY, NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEV HAVE NOT YET ACHIEVED CONCRETE RESULTS DUE TO SOVIET EFFORTS TO BLOCK USA DEPLOYMENTS ALTOGETHER, WHILE INSISTING UPON THE MAINTENANCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET MONOPOLY IN LRINF MISSILES. AS A RESULT OF THE USA INITIATIVES ANNOUNCED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN ON SEP26, ALL THE ELEMENTS FOR AN EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT ARE ON THE TABLE. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT CAN BE ATTAINED IF THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO (RETURN TO GENEV AND) TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE PRECONDITIONS. (NEGOTIATIONS ON INF SHOULD RESUME AT AN EARLY DATE TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE RESULTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.)

INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES ARE PROCEEDING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEC 1979 DECISION. DEPLOYMENTS WILL CONTINUE ON SCHEDULE IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL RESULT IN GENEV OFFSETTING THE NEED FOR DEPLOYMENTS. AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR, DEPLOYMENTS CAN BE HALTED, MODIFIED OR REVERSED WHEN AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT IS REACHED. THE ALLIANCE CONTINUES TO SEEK THE ELIMINATION OF THE ENTIRE CATEGORY OF LAND-BASED LRINF MISSILES, OR, AT A MINIMUM, AN INTERIM AGREEMENT AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. THE ALLIANCE WILL CONTINUE THE PROCESS OF INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS ON ALL ASPECTS OF INF. UNQUOTE.

CCC/298 231134Z YBGR7122

MF  
LD

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

NONCLASSIFIE

DF ATHNS ZFGR5773 23NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ LIVRAISON 230900

---INITIATIVE DU PM:DISCOURS MONTL

N AVONS PAS RECU VERSION ANGLAISE DU DISCOURS DU 13NOV,  
POURTANT PREFERAELE EN GRECE A CELLE EN FRANCAIS QUI NOUS  
EST PARVENUE.A MOINS QUE DATE D ENVOI PAR VALISE DE VERSION  
DEFINITIVE PREVUE PARA 1/1 VOTRETEL 01467 15NOV N ASSURE  
RECEPTION PROCHAINE,PRIERE NOUS RETRANSMETTRE VOTRETEL IDDZ0128  
12NOV

UUU/038 230830Z ZFGR5773

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace  
mission

**ACTION  
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*ky*  
28-6-1 *Tudouau Peace mission*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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INFO DELHI DELIVER BY 231200 DHAKA LDN LAGOS CNBRA WLGTN BNATO

PRMNY PCOOTT/CARON WSHDC

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IMD UGB UGR RCP PPR PSR GGB RGB RCR GAA

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0191 19NOV

---CHOGM:PMS INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELNS AND INTERNATL SECURITY

REFTEL RECD 22NCV TOO LATE TO CONVEY INFO BUT TEXT DELIVERED TO

MFA 230900.A/DIR LEGAL AND INNATL ORGS DIV CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD

NEED AND UNDERTOOK TO ARRANGE IMMED TRANSMISSION TO HEAD OF

TANZ DEL TO CHOGM.

CCC/194 230759Z YNGR4657

28-6-1 Trudeau Peace mission

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ACTION  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM OSLO WGGR4346 23NOV83

TO PMEELDELHI DELIVER BY 240900 EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO VMEFR ENATO

DISTR MINA DMF DMFX RSD RSR IDR IDA

---PM INITIATIVE

MFA TODAY PROVIDED COPY OF PM WILLOCHS REPLY TO PMS NOV17 LETTER AS REPORTED IN IDDZ0206.

2. PM WILLOCH WILL HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO DISCUSSION OF PMS INITIATIVE AT NATO AMBS DINNER NOV22 IN BRUSSELS ASPECT WHICH MEVIK OF MFA APPRECIATED. IN RESPONSE TO QUOTE PERSONAL SUGGESTION UNQUOTE MEVIK EXHIBITED COMMENT MADE EARLIER BY PM WILLOCHS STATE SECTY COLDING THAT INSPIRED PRESS QUESTION MIGHT PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR WILLOCH TO MAKE SOME PUBLIC SUPPORTIVE COMMENT ON PMS PROPOSALS. THIS IDEA EMERGED FROM RECOGNITION THAT COMPETING INTERNATIONAL EVENTS AND NOV21 NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON FUNDING OF NORWEGIAN SHARE FOR INF MISSILE INFRASTRUCTURE HAD TENDED TO DISTRACT LOCAL PRESS. DESPITE PROVISION OF TEXTS BY EMBASSY, DAGBLADET, MORGENBLADET AND STATE NATL TELEVISION HAD GIVEN ONLY LIMITED COVERAGE TO MONTREAL SPEECH. MEVIK AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR ANY ENDORSEMENTS OF PMS INITIATIVE TO BE REINFORCED BY PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY GOVT LEADERS IF IT WERE TO DEVELOP MOMENTUM NEEDED TO INFLUENCE TREND OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS. IN ABSENCE OF WILLOCH IN BRU MEVIK COULD NOT/NOT HOWEVER PROMISE WHETHER HE WOULD TAKE TO IDEA OF MORE

...2

PAGE TWO WGGR4346 CONF

ACTIVE PUBLIC STANCE.

3. MEVIK HIMSELF SHORTLY TO BE ANNOUNCED AS AMBASSADOR TO STOCKHOLM CONF. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT EEC HAD TAKEN DECISION FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS TO TAKE PART IN INAUGURAL MTG AND WHILE WSHDC HAD SO FAR SEEMED UNDECIDED AS TO WHETHER SCHULTZ WOULD DO SO, HE THOUGHT THAT IN THE EVENT HE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO STAY AWAY. OBVIOUSLY NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MIN STRAY WOULD BE THERE.

4. TO SUM COMMENT NORWEGIAN ATTITUDE TO PMS INITIATIVE, IT HAS BEEN ACCORDED OFFICIAL SUPPORT, IS APPRECIATED BY POLITICAL LEADERS INCLUDING MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY (LABOUR) BUT IS NOT/NOT YET AT FOCUS OF MUCH PUBLIC ATTENTION. NORWEGIAN PUBLIC OR OFFICIALS DO NOT/NOT YET SEE CAUSE TO CLIME ON ANY BANDWAGON BUT MIGHT BE DISPOSED TO DO SO IF ONE SHOULD COME IN SIGHT AND THEY THUS AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS

WARDROPER

CCC/061 231508Z WGGR4346

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM TOKYO UIGR2549 23NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ DELIVER BY 230900

INFO MOSCO CHOGMDELDELHI/FOWLER PEKIN

FROM SMITH

*MF*  
*28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace mission*

---INITIATIVE:REQUEST FOR INFO AND SUGGESTIONS

GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD PROVIDE US WITH INDICATION OF DPM/SSEA INVOLVEMENT IN INITIATIVE IN NEAR FUTURE.WILL HE:

A)BE IN TOUCH WITH SHULTZ ON 28NOV IN CHICAGO EITHER BY PHONE OR IN PERSON TO BRIEF SHULTZ ON VISITS TO EUROPE AND JPN. PEARSON MISSION TO CHINA AND USSR AS WELL AS TO INFORM HIM OF PM VISIT TO PEKING;

B)BE HAVING MTG WITH NATO AMES IN OTT PRIOR TO 08DEC BRU MTG IN ORDER TO PUSH MBFR AND CDE PROPOSALS;

C)BE FOLLOWING UP ON IDEA OF VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE IN JAN AND POSSIBLE INVITATION OF ROMANIAN FM TO OTT?

2.AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE THERE STILL HAS NOT/NOT BEEN ANYTHING SUBSTANTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE ON INITIATIVE.

MAYBE EFFORT CAN BE MADE BY EMB PARIS TO SPEAK WITH COLUMNIST FLORA LEWIS,WHO IS BASED IN PARIS,WITH OBJECTIVE OF GETTING HER TO WRITE SOMETHING POSITIVE BEFORE 08DEC NAC MTG.

3.HOW ABOUT UN AS POSSIBLE FORUM FOR THIRD SPEECH PRIOR TO XMAS. IT WOULD GET GOOD MEDIA COVERAGE AND BE OPPORTUNITY TO TOUCH BASE AND OBTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM UN SECGEN.ALTERNATIVE MIGHT BE UN ASSOCIATION IN CDA OR CIIA AUDIENCE.

4.CHEERS.

CCC/195 230748Z UIGR2549

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**  
**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

*28-6-1-Trudeau Peace mission*

FM TOKYO UIGR2548 23NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDEZ DELIVER BY 230900

INFO WSHDC MOSCO PEKIN PARIS BONN ROME BNATO BRU HAGUE CHOGMDFLDELH/

OSFALDESTON/FOWLER/JOHNSTONE DELIVER BY 231200

PCOOTT/CARON NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBR RSR UGF URR RCR RGI RSD RBD

FROM SMITH

---PM INITIATIVE: THATCHER ON 5 POWER CONFERENCE

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS RECORD OF TRUDEAU-THATCHER CONVERSATION THIS  
SUBJ ON 11NOV.PM DID NOT/NOT HAVE REAL OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN  
DETAILS OF HIS PROPOSAL FOR 5 POWER CONFERENCE TO MRS THATCHER  
AS SHE RPTDLY INTERRUPTED HIS PRESENTATION.COMMENTS SHE MADE  
APPFARED TO REPRESENT MISUNDERSTANDING OF PROPOSAL SHE MAY HAVE  
OBTAINED BEFOREHAND FROM HER OFFICIALS.MAIN WORRY SHE EXPRESSED WAS  
THAT UK FORCES NOT/NOT BE AGGREGATED WITH THOSE OF FRANCE AND USA  
TO EQUAL THOSE OF SOVIETS AND REQUIREMENT FOR MODERNIZATION OF  
UK FORCES TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE DETTERENT.FURTHER EFFORT TO EXPLAIN  
DETAILS OF CDN PROPOSAL TO UK OFFICIALS AND MRS THATCHER WILL BE  
REQUIRED.

2.REPORT: SUBJ OF 5 POWER CONFERENCE WAS TOUCHED UPON ONLY BRIFFLY  
IN PRE-LUNCHEON TETE-A-TETE AT 10 DOWNING ST 11NOV AND THEN ONLY  
BY MRS THATCHER WHO SAID SHE WAS NOT/NOT AT ALL SURE SHE LIKED  
FIVE-POER PROPOSAL IN THAT SHE CONSIDERED TIMING WAS NOT/NOT RIGHT.

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PAGE TWO UIGR2548 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

HER NEGATIVE REACTION BEFORE PM TRUDEAU HAS OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT GENERAL OUTLINE AND DETAILS OF CDN PROPOSAL MAY WELL HAVE RESULTED FROM BRIEFING SHE RECEIVED IN ADVANCE FROM HER OFFICIALS WHICH DID NOT/NOT PROPERLY CHARACTERIZE CDN POSN).

3.PM TRUDEAU RETURNED TO SUBJ TOWARD END OF LUNCHEON(WHICH DEALT MAINLY WITH GRENADA AND COMWEL)BUT WAS INTERRUPTED BY MRS THATCHER WITH COMMENT QUOTE PIERRE,I TOLD YOU I DO NOT/NOT LIKE THIS IDEA UNQUOTE.PM COUNTERED THAT QUOTE YOU DO NOT/NOT LIKE IT BECAUSE POINT BEHIND IT IS THAT IT WILL CALL ON YOU TO COUNT AND LIMIT YOUR STRATEGIC MISSILES UNQUOTE.THATCHER RETORTED THAT REQUIREMENT TO CALL ON UK MISSILES TO BE COUNTED IS BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT USSR IS ON ONE SIDE AND UK,FRANCE AND USA ARE ON OTHER.PM SAID HE WAS NOT/NOT MAKING THIS ASSUMPTION.THATCHER REMARKED THAT UK STRATEGIC FORCES WERE DEFENSIVE ONLY AND WERE THREAT TO NO/NO ONE.SOVIET MISSILES ON OTHER HAND WERE THREATENING AND WE COULD NOT/NOT AGREE TO LET USSR EQUATE 3 WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ITS OWN ARSENAL.PM SUGGESTED THAT BEFORE SHE DESTROYED HIS ARGUMENTS SHE SHOULD FIRST LISTEN TO THEM.HE SAID HE HAD MADE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT SOVIETS HAD NO/NO RIGHT TO COUNT UK,FRENCH AND USA STRATEGIC SYSTEMS TOGETHER.CHINA FOR ITS PART HAD PROPOSED FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE IF USA AND USSR WOULD CUT THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES IN HALF.PM STRESSED HIS PROPOSAL ENVISAGED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN 5 SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT NATIONS.NOT/NOT ON A BLOC TO FLOC BASIS. HE REALIZED UK NUCLEAR FORCES WERE NOT/NOT INTENDED TO WIN A

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NUCLEAR WAR BUT TO DETER ONE BY HAVING CAPABILITY TO CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE TO USSR.

4. MRS THATCHER SAID THERE COULD BE A FIRST STRIKE SCENARIO. PRFSUMABLY SHE COULD PUT HER FINGER ON NUCLEAR BUTTON WERE UK TO IE ATTACKED. PM REPLIED THAT HE WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE THE CONTRARY. THAT THESE WEAPONS WERE QUOTE SECOND STRIKE UNQUOTE TO BE USED ONLY AS A DETERRENT FORCE. THATCHER THEN SUGGESTED CHINA MIGHT LAUNCH A FIRST STRIKE. SMITH NOTED THIS MIGHT BE QUESTIONABLE AS SOVIETS HAD NUCLEAR RETALIATORY CAPABILITY THAT COULD DO MASSIVE DAMAGE TO CHINA. MRS THATCHER RESPONDED THAT CHINESE HAD DIFFERENT VALUES THAN PEOPLE IN WEST; CHINA HAD A BILLION PEOPLE MANY OF WHOM WOULD SURVIVE NUCLEAR ATTACK; ONE HAD TO REMEMEER THAT THINGS WERE GROWING AGAIN ONE YEAR AFTER HIROSHIMA WAS ATTACKED. (LATTER REMARK CAUSED CERTAIN AMAZEMENT AROUND TABLE AND SLIGHT PAUSE IN CONVERSATION.) PM TRUDEAU THEN POINTED OUT THAT CHINA WOULD NOT/NOT WIN A NUCLEAR WAR AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT/NOT START ONE. ACCORDINGLY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS IT POSSESSED WERE NOT/NOT FIRST STRIKE.

5. PM WENT ON TO REFER TO RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER NPT AND CONCERN ABOUT HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION. WORLD WAR THREE WAS UNLIKELY TO START BETWEEN USA AND USSR BUT AS RESULT OF PROLIFERATION OF WFAPONS INTO UNSTABLE ENVIRONMENTS IN THIRD WORLD AREAS. THATCHER COMMENTED THAT THOSE COUNTRIES DID NOT/NOT HAVE QUOTE OUR NATL SENSE OF RESTRAINT UNQUOTE. PM COUNTERED THAT MOST NATIONS WOULD LIKE TO

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SURVIVE NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST. THATCHER SAID SHE DID NOT/NOT ACCEPT PMS LOGIC THAT THERE SHOULD BE FIVE POWER CONFERENCE JUST BECAUSE OF RISK OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION. PM ASKED HER TO HEAR HIM OUT; THAT HIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT/NOT A NON SEQUITER. NPT PARTIES HAD AN OBLIGATION AND THERE WAS AN OBLIGATION ON UK AS WELL UNLESS IT SIGNED TREATY IN JEST. FIRST WAS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND SECOND WAS TO SHARE NUCLEAR BENEFITS. OBLIGATION TO REDUCE WAS PRIMARILY ON USA AND USSR AND NOT/NOT UK AND FRANCE. THATCHER SAID SHE WAS FEARFUL ABOUT IDEA UNTIL UK HAD ACHIEVED MINIMUM LEVEL OF NUCLEAR FORCES ESSENTIAL TO MAINTENANCE OF UK DETERRENT. PM SAID UK AND FRANCE COULD INCREASE ITS NUCLEAR FORCES UNDER TERMS OF HIS PROPOSAL. HE RECOGNIZED UK REQUIREMENT FOR MODERNIZATION AND HIS PROPOSAL WOULD ALLOW IT TO REACH ITS NECESSARY MINIMUM. THATCHER RPTD AGAIN THAT UK WAS OPPOSED TO ANY PROPOSAL THAT WOULD AGGREGATE WESTERN FORCES WITH THOSE OF USSR. SHE ACKNOWLEDGED CONCERN HOWEVER ABOUT HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION. PM SAID SHE WAS BRINGING QUOTE WATER TO HIS MILL UNQUOTE. NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES NEEDED TO BE GIVEN AN INCENTIVE TO REDUCE BY 5 NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.

LUNCHEON ENDED WITH MRS THATCHER'S COMMENT THAT CONVENING OF A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE WOULD NOT/NOT INFLUENCE PEOPLE SUCH AS GHADAFI.

6. ON WAY OUT IT WAS STRESSED TO SIR ANTHONY ACLAND (FCO PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY) THAT MRS THATCHER HAD NOT/NOT GIVEN PM OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN HIS PROPOSAL IN DEPTH AND THAT CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY MRS

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THATCHER ABOUT AGGREGATION AND NON-INCLUSION OF UK FORCES IN INF  
HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN ACCOUNT OF IN PMS PROPOSAL. HE WAS TOLD THAT  
WORKING PAPER ON 5 POWER PROPOSAL WOULD BE LEFT WITH HIGH  
COMMISSION FOR FOLLOW-UP PURPOSES WITH HIM. HE APPRECIATED THIS INFO  
AT LUNCHEON HE HIMSELF HAD MADE POINTED REF TO MRS THATCHERS HABIT  
OF INTERRUPTING OTHERS BY REMARKING IN MANNER THAT COULD BE  
OVERHEARD QUOTE NOW YOU SEE WHAT I HAVE TO DEAL WITH UNQUOTE).  
HF MADE ADDITIONAL COMMENT THAT UK MODERNIZATION PROGRAM HAD TO  
BE SUFFICIENT TO HANDLE ANY POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT BY SOVIETS  
IN ABM FIELD.

7. SUB OF MBFR WAS NOT/NOT DISCUSSED IN ANY DETAIL EXCEPT FOR  
PASSING REF BY PM WHEN EXITING THAT HE HAD PROPOSAL TO MAKE  
IN THIS AREA ABOUT INJECTING POLITICAL ATTN INFO NEGOTIATION AND  
WOULD BE FOLLOWING THIS UP WITH HER LATER. REPORT ON EARLIER  
TETE-A-TETE WHEN CPE STKHM MTG WAS DISCUSSED IS CONTAINED IN  
REPORT LEFT WITH YOU BY FOWLER.

CCC/232 230809Z UIGR2548

CONFIDENTIAL  
NOV 23 12 57 PM '83  
6-1 - Trudeau  
Peace  
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM TOKYO UIGR2530 23NOV83

TO CHOGMDELDELHI/FOWLER IMMED

INFO MOSCO WSHDC BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY

NDHQOTT/ADMPO/CPD PCOOTT

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA IDDZ RGB RBR UCB URR RCR ZSI PGB PED PER

REF PEKIN TEL WJGR0874 22NOV

---PM INITIATIVE: CHINESE RESPONSE

I WAS RECEIVED WARMLY IN PEKIN AND EXPECT THAT CHINESE WILL GO OUT OF THEIR WAY TO FACILITATE DIALOGUE WITH PM WHOM THEY RPTDLY STRESSED IS GOOD AND OLD FRIEND OF CHINA HAVEING ESTABLISHED DIPIO RELNS WITH PEKIN AND BEING FIRST CDN PM TO OFFICIALLY VISIT CHINA. WHILE CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT WITH DENG XIAOPING MAY BE DELAYED, IT APPEARS TO ME PROBABLE THAT PM WILL SEE HIM.

2. YOU WILL HAVE NOTED THAT CHINESE RESPONSE TO SPECIFICS OF INITIATIVE IS GUARDED. WIDE-RANGING AND SPONTANEOUS SURVEY OF EAST/WEST RELNS BY FOREIGN MINISTER WAS NOTABLE FOR ITS PESSIMISTIC EVALUATION OF USA/SOVIET POLICIES, ESPECIALLY THAT OF USSR. CHINESE DO NOT/NOT APPEAR TO ANTICIPATE EARLY AGMT ON INF OR START, NOR/NOR ON SOVIET TROOP DEPLOYMENTS NEAR CHINA OR IN AFGHANISTAN. MINISTER REITERATED CHINESE VIEW THAT CONVENING OF 5 POWER CONFERENCE MTG SHOULD ONLY TAKE PLACE AFTER SUBSTANTIVE REDUCTIONS OF SUPER-POER ARMAMENTS. WEAKNESS OF CHINESE ARGUMENT IS THAT THEY HAVE NO/NO ANSWER TO QUESTION OF HOW THESE REDUCTIONS ARE TO BE OBTAINED EXCEPT THROUGH PRESSURE OF QUOTE WORLD OPINION

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UNQUOTE. PRESUMABLY THEY THINK THAT THREAT OF THIRD COUNTRY,  
INCLUDING CHINESE, MILITARY POTENTIALS WILL BRING ABOUT CHANGE IN  
SUPER-POWER ATTITUDES.

3. ISSUE WHICH WE MIGHT EMPHASIZE IS NEEDED TO PREVENT HORIZONTAL  
PROLIFERATION. CHINESE RPTD WELL-KNOWN VIEWS ON NPT, BUT THEY MAY  
BE READY TO LISTEN MORE CAREFULLY NOW TO ARGUMENTS FOR ADHERENCE.  
THEY MUST WISH TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION AS MUCH AS OTHER NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS STATES AND MOST KNOW THAT INDIA AND OTHERS WILL NOT/NOT  
WAIT INDEFINITELY FOR GREAT POWERS TO DISARM BEFORE THEY DO DOWN  
SAME ROAD. AT SAME TIME CHINESE WILL BE LOATHE TO ABANDON VIEW  
THAT TREATY IS DISCRIMINATORY AS LONG AS IT ERECTS NO/NO BARRIERS  
TO SUPER-POWER ARMS RACE. IF LATTER CAN BE LTD BY AGMT GOING BEYOND  
SALT LIMMIS CHINESE MIGHT BE WILLING TO LOOK MORE POSITIVELY  
AT NPT. FIVE POWER CONFERENCE COULD BE DEFENDED AS COMPLEMENTARY  
MEANS OF SETTING SUCH LIMITS, ALTHOUGH START WILL REMAIN PRINCIPAL  
VEHICLE FOR DOING SO.

CCC/232 230630Z UIGR2530

*Peurson*

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace  
mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FM TOKYO UIGR2529 23NOV83  
TO EXTOTT LDDZ DELIVER BY 230900  
INFO PMDELDELHI MOSCO WSHDC BNATO PEKIN  
DISTR RBR IDA

---PMS INITIATIVE: MOSCO VISIT

GRATEFUL YOU TRY TO PROVIDE BY THU, OR AT LATEST FRI AT 0900 HRS  
MOSCO TIME, RESPONSE TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WHICH I EXPECT SOVIETS  
TO RAISE DURING MY VISIT THERE.

1) FIVE POWER CONFERENCE - TIMING OF THIS CONFERENCE IS CRUCIAL TO  
RECEPTION OF IDEA BY NWS. CHINESE TOLD ME THAT SUPERPOWERS WOULD  
HAVE TO REDUCE STRATEGIC INVENTORIES SUBSTANTIALLY (FIGURE OF 50  
PERCENT WAS NEGOTIABLE THEY SAID) BEFORE THEY WOULD ATTEND. FRENCH  
HAVE ADOPTED SOMEWHAT SIMILAR POSN. OUR BRIEFING MATERIAL SUGGESTS  
THAT INF AND START AGMTS WOULD BE DESIRABLE, PERHAPS EVEN ESSENTIAL,  
PRE-CONDITION IN ORDER TO SET QUANTITATIVE LIMITS TO SUPERPOWER  
WEAPONS. PM HAS SAID PUBLICLY HOWEVER THAT CONFERENCE SHOULD MEET  
IN 1984. QUESTION IS THEREFORE HOW RATIOS COULD BE WORKED OUT, OR  
WHETHER ANYONE WOULD AGREE TO DO SO, UNLESS QUANTITATIVE LIMITS HAD  
ALREADY BEEN AGREED FOR USA/USSR. PRESUMABLY WE ARE UNLIKELY TO GET  
START AMGT IN 1984, ALTHOUGH INF AGMT MIGHT BE REACHED SOONER.

2) ASAT-SOVIETS HAVE TABLED COMPREHENSIVE TREAT AT UNGA WHICH WE  
REGARD AS GENERALLY COMPATIBLE WITH CDN OBJECTIVES. THEY WILL ASK  
US WHY WE ARE PROPOSING MORE LTD CONCEPT. PRESUMABLY WE BELIEVE  
THAT SOVIET DRAFT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO USA, BUT CAN WE BE CONFIDENT

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THAT OUR PROPOSAL IS ANY MORE SO? WHAT HAVE WE SAID AT UNGA ON SUFJ,  
IF ANYTHING?

3) WHAT SCVIET WEAPONS SYSTEMS DO WE THINK MIGHT BE UNVERIFIABLE  
BECAUSE OF MOBILITY? WHAT ABOUT MIDGETMAN? DO YOU PREFER THAT SUCH  
QUESTIONS BE EVADED FOR TIME BEING? IF SO, WHEN DO YOU EXPECT TO  
PROVIDE MORE DETAILED EXPLANATIONS FOR GOVTS CONCERNED?

4) EXCHANGES: PM IS CONCERNED THAT POLITICAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING  
PROCESS INCLUDE EXCHANGES. I SHALL SAY, IF YOU AGREE, THAT CDA LOOKS  
FORWARD TO NEGOTIATING NEW AGMT ON THIS SUBJ IN 1984.

CCC/232 230619Z UIGR2529

*Person*

28-6-1 TRUDEAU PEACE  
OUTLET MISSION  
44

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

**FM BGRAD ZLGR5134 22NOV83**

**TO EXTOTT (REF)**

*File SC*

INFO LDN WSHDC PARIS BONN BNATO MOSCO EPST EUCST WSAW  
PRGUE GENEV ATHNS ROME HSNKI STKHM VIENN DELHI  
PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/PPP/DCIS VMFR  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RED FPR IDR  
IDA IDD RBRD IDX IDDZ ZSP ZSI REP  
REF OURTEL ZLGR5132 21NOV

---PMS DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE:YUGOSLAV INTEREST  
DURING NOV21 CALL ON MFA UNDERSECTY KOMATINA(SOON TO  
BECOME SEC GEN OF UN CTTEE ON DISARMAMENT),HE MENTIONED  
THAT HE WAS WRESTLING WITH REPLY TO LET FROM PM GANDHI  
ASKING FOR VIEWS ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED FROM HER UNGA  
SUMMIT.KOMATINA SUPPOSED THAT WE HAD RECEIVED SIMILAR  
QUERY AND WONDERED IF PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE WOULD BE  
RELEVANT TO OUR REPLY.HE WONDERED,INDEED,HOW PMS  
INITIATIVE WAS FARING.FROM YUGOSLAV POINT OF VIEW IT  
WAS RIGHT IDEA AT RIGHT TIME AND THEY WISHED IT EVERY SUCCESS.  
2.I REFERRED TO WHAT I KNEW OF PMS MTL SPEECH,IN  
PARTICULAR TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR MTG OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS.KOMATINA  
IMMEDLY ASKED WHETHER THIS IDEA HAD BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO  
PRES MITTERAND.I SAID THAT I DID NOT/NOT KNOW,BUT  
VENTURED OPINION THAT PM WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE MADE IT PUBLIC

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PAGE TWO ZLGR5134 CONFID

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IN WAY HE DID IF HE KNEW MITTERAND TO BE CATEGORICALLY  
OPPOSED. KOMATINA ASKED TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS  
IN PMS INITIATIVE, AND I UNDERTOOK TO PASS ON FURTHER INFO  
AS IT BECAME AVAILAELLE TO US. GIVEN YUGOSLAV INTEREST AND  
CENTRAL ROLE IN NAM, I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KEEP THEM  
AU COURANT AT LEVEL OF FRANKNESS AT LEAST SLIGHTLY BEYOND  
WHAT IS ALREADY IN PUBLIC REALM, EVEN IF PM DOES NOT/NOT  
ENVISAGE INCLUDING THEM IN HIS CONSULTATIONS (WHICH I SEE  
NO/NO COMPELLING REASON FOR HIM TO DO).

3. BEFORE ASKING ABOUT PMS INITIATIVE, KOMATINA DISCUSSED  
IN SOME DETAIL YUGOSLAV ASSESSMENT OF WPO REACTION TO  
NATO INF DEPLOYMENT. THEIR INFO WAS, HE SAID, THAT  
HUNGARY, DDR, AND POLAND ALL WANTED INF NEGS TO CONTINUE  
EVEN AFTER DEPLOYMENT. SO, THEY BELIEVED, DID GROMYKO. FOR  
REASONS OF PRESTIGE, HOWEVER, USSR COULD NOT/NOT LET TALKS  
GO ON AFTER OUR DEPLOYMENT AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. IT  
WAS THEREFORE LIKELY THAT GENEVA INF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD  
BE BROKEN OFF-TO BE SUCCEEDED SOME WEEKS OR MONTHS LATER  
BY THEIR RESUMPTION IN SOME OTHER FORM. PERHAPS IT SHOULD  
BE ONE THAT APPROACHED QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
GLOBALLY-WITHOUT SUBDIVISION BETWEEN INTERMEDIATE AND  
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. PERHAPS THERE SHOULD BE MORE PARTICIPANTS  
(HE DID NOT/NOT MENTION BRITISH OR FRENCH, BUT NO/NO

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DOUET HAD THEM IN MIND). IN ANY CASE, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT NEGOTIATING PROCESS WOULD CONTINUE. HE WAS ALSO SURE THAT MOSCO INTENDED TO CONTINUE IT. AS SOME SOVIET REP HAD SAID (I AM NOT/NOT SURE TO WHOM), DEPLOYMENT, WHILE EAD, WOULD NOT/NCT BE END OF WORLD.

4. KOMATINA BELIEVED THAT SS20 DEPLOYMENT HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN BY SOVIET MILITARY, RIDING ROUGHSHOD OVER WARNINGS THAT POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES WOULD ENSUE. GENERALS HAD EVIDENTLY THOUGHT THAT THEY COULD CARRY OFF SS20 PROGRAMME AS NOTHING MORE THAN QUOTE MODERNIZATION UNQUOTE WITHOUT ANYONE REALLY NOTICING. THEY HAD BEEN WRONG. KOMATINA THOUGHT THAT SOVIET OFFER TO REDUCE NUMBER OF SS20S TO 140 REFLECTED TACIT ADMISSION BY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THAT BALANCE HAD INDEED BEEN UPSET BY SS20 DEPLOYMENT.

5. IN DISCUSSING VARIOUS FORMS OF NEGS ON DISARMAMENT, KOMATINA DOUETED THAT USSR WOULD ABANDON START OR MBFR TALKS EVEN IF THEY WALKED OUT OF INF NEGS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS ONE RESPECT IN WHICH PATTERN OF SALT AGMTS WAS OUT DATE. THEY COULD BE VERIFIED BY NATL TECHNICAL MEANS. ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY/MOBILITY MADE THIS NO/NO LONGER POSSIBLE. VERIFICATION MEANS WOULD BE KEY ISSUE IN FUTURE TALKS.

6. NOT/NOT BEING EXPERT IN DISARMAMENT MATTERS I DO NOT/NOT

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KNOW HOW MUCH OF THIS IS NEW OR INTERESTING. PUT REPORT IT  
FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH. KOMATINA, FORMER YUGOSLAV PERMREP  
IN NY. IS THOUGHTFUL AND ARTICULATE ON MATTERS PERTAINING  
TO DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT. HE IS ALSO CLEARLY INTERESTED  
IN AND SYMPATHETIC TO PMS INITIATIVE.

FRASER

CCC/148 221500Z ZLGR5134



MESSAGE

28-6-1-~~NEW~~ PEACE  
MISSION

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ  
R E S T R I C T E D

FM/DE FM EXTOTT RSR0380 22NOV83

TO/A TO COPEN STKHM OSLO

INFO  
DISTR ---PMS INITIATIVE

REF DELVOIE(DDX)DEBRIEFED THREE NORDIC AMBASSADORS AT THEIR REQUEST

SUBJ/SUJ ON PMS INITIATIVE.FOCUS WAS ON REACTIONS IN EUROPEAN CAPITALS TO

FIVE MAIN POINTS OF INITIATIVE.ALSO TOUCHED ON KENNETH DAM VISIT

TO OTT,AND PMS PERCEPTIONS OF CDE IN STKHM.IDDX STRESSED PRINCIPLE

FOCUS OF INITIATIVE IS POLITICAL,NOT ARMS CONTROL.THOROUGH

DEBRIEFINGS DID NOT/NOT INTRODUCE <sup>NEW</sup> INFO.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

*[Signature]*  
SIG D MCCUE/YDL

RSR

6-1892

*[Signature]*  
SIG J LORANGER



*JL*

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

FACSIMILE

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU  
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PEACE MISSION

SECURITY  
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDR4452 22NOV83

TO/À

TO ~~EXTOTT~~ /COL MORRISON  
*PRNNY*

INFO

DISTR

---CDN DEFENCE AND PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

*EU/du*

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

J. R. FRANCIS / RÉ  
SIG

IDR

2-7921

Original signed by  
J. R. FRANCIS

SIG

308822

28-6-1

~~Red~~

JB

File

~~SECRET~~

22-11-83

28-6-1 - TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PEKIN WJGR0874 22NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 220900

CHOGMDELDELHI/FOWLER DELIVER BY 230900

INFO TOKYO/PEARSON/SMITH DELIVER BY 230900

MOSCO WSHDC BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE ERU PRMNY

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD PCOOTT/OSFALLESTON

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGB RBR UCB URR RCR ZSI PGB PED/PER

---DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PEARSON AND CHINESE OFFICIALS 21NOV  
SUMMARY:DURING VISIT TO PEKIN PEARSON HAD LENGTHY MTG WITH MFA  
OFFICIALS FOLLOWED BY MTG WITH FM WU XUEQIAN.DISCUSSION SHOWED  
CHINESE OFFICIALS HAD STUDIED TEXT OF PMS TWO MAIN SPEECHES  
WITH GREAT CARE.FM WAS FULLY BRIEFED ON PROPOSALS AND BOTH HE  
AND HIS OFFICIALS WERE FRANK IN THEIR COMMENTS.CHINESE WERE  
CAREFUL NOT/NOT TO TAKE POSN ON PMS PROPOSAL FOR CONFERENCE OF  
FIVE POWERS AND BOTH FM AND HIS OFFICIALS REFERRED TO PROPOSALS  
FM HAD ADVANCED IN HIS SPEECH TO UNGA.SUPERPOWERS WHO POSSESSED  
95 PERCENT OF WORLDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD TO TAKE FIRST STEP  
IN REDUCING NUCLEAR ARSENALS.WU WONDERED IF EITHER WAS SINCERELY  
INTERESTED IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.EVEN WHILE THEY ENGAGED IN  
NEGOTIATIONS,ARMS RACE WENT ON.TO ACHIEVE REAL AND EFFECTIVE  
DISARMAMENT MEASURES SUPERPOWERS HAD TO BE PRESSURED TO NEGOTIATE  
IN GOOD FAITH.OTHER THAN TO SUGGEST WORLD OPINION BE MOBILIZED AND  
TO REFER TO SUGGESTIONS IN HIS UNGA SPEECH WU HAD NO/NO OTHER

PAGE TWO WJGR0874 CONF

THOUGHTS TO OFFER ON HOW TO ACHIEVE THIS. PEARSON WILL BE OFFERING FURTHER COMMENTS ON DISCUSSIONS FROM TOKYO.

2. REPORT: ON 21 NOV PEARSON AND SMITH WERE RECD FOR TWO AND HALF HRS IN MORNING BY MFA OFFICIALS LED BY ZHU QIZHEN, ASST FM AND DIRECTOR OF MFAS AMERICAS AND OCEANIC AFFAIRS DEPT, AND SUBSEQUENTLY FOR ONE HR IN AFTERNOON BY FM WU XUEQIAN. HAVING OUTLINED IN DETAIL PMS PROPOSALS FOR MFA OFFICIALS PEARSON CONCENTRATED DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH FM ON PROPOSAL FOR CONF OF FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES (NWS) AND INVITED FM TO COMMENT ON IT AND ON INTERNATL SITU. HE DID AT LENGTH.

3. WU AGREED WITH CONCERNS PM HAD EXPRESSED ABOUT PRESENT INTERNATL SITU. USA/USSR RELATIONSHIP WAS DESCRIBED AS ONE OF TENSE CONFRONTATION ESPECIALLY OVER DEPLOYMENT OF INF SYSTEMS IN EUR. NEITHER APPEARED READY TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS AND NO/NO PROGRESS WAS EXPECTED AT GENEVA NEGNS. MORE SERIOUS QUESTION WAS WHETHER OR NOT/NOT EITHER WAS SINCERELY INTERESTED IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.

4. WU SAID DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO WSHDC SECTY OF STATE SHULTZ TOLD HIM HE HAD READ WUS SPEECH TO UNGA BUT COULD NOT/NOT ACCEPT WUS PROPOSAL THAT USA CEASE TESTING, DEVELOPING AND MANUFACTURING NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SHULTZ ADDED THAT USA WAS TESTING MANY TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (WU USED WORD MINIATURE TO DESCRIBE THEM) AND PROGRAMME WAS NECESSARY IF USA WAS TO DETER USSR. LATTER WAS ALSO TESTING ADVANCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCLUDING RECENTLY NEW TYPE OF

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PAGE THREE WJGR0874 CONFD

CRUISE MISSILE.

5.WU WAS VERY SKEPTICAL ABOUT CHANCES FOR ANY PROGRESS AT GENEVA INF NEGNS.TALKS WERE PROCEEDING BUT MORE IMPORTANT ARMS RACE WAS CONTINUING WITH PERSHING II AND ADL SS20 DEPLOYMENT IN PROSPECT. INDICATIONS WERE THAT EACH SIDE WAS TRYING TO GAIN UPPER HAND.WHAT COULD OTHERS DO IN THIS SITU?CHINESE ASSESSMENT WAS THAT ARMS RACE WOULD CONTINUE AND SO WOULD TENSION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

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PAGE FOUR WJGR0874 CONF

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PAGE FIVE WJGR0274 CONF D

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PAGE SIX WJGR0874 CONFD

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PAPER LEFT WITH ZHU BY PEARSON AND SMITH).

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PAGE SEVEN WJGR0874 CONF D

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16. FM MADE INTERESTING OBSERVATION ON RECENTLY CONCLUDED SINO/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS. WHEN PEARSON ASKED HIM HOW SOVIETS HAD RESPONDED TO CHINESE PROPOSAL THAT TROOP LEVELS ALONG SINO/SOVIET AND SINO/MONGOLIAN BORDERS BE REDUCED, WU SAID USSR HAD SUGGESTED MILITARY GROUP BE FORMED TO STUDY TROOP LEVELS ALONG SINO/SOVIET BORDER. NO/NO MENTION HAD BEEN MADE BY SOVIETS OF SS20S. HOWEVER CHINESE REACTION WAS THAT THIS WAS NOT/NOT TIME TO HAVE SUCH STUDY GROUP SINCE SOVIETS WERE REFUSING TO DISCUSS WAYS OF REMOVING THREE OBSTACLES (SOVIETS TAKE VIEW THAT PRESENCE OF THEIR TROOPS IN MONGOLIA IS ISSUE INVOLVING THIRD COUNTRY AND NOT/NOT APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR SINO-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS).

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**ACTION  
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Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

*MF*  
*AD*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PEKIN WJGR0874 22NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ DELIVER BY 220900

CHOGMDELDELHI/FOWLER DELIVER BY 230900

INFO TOKYO/PEARSON/SMITH DELIVER BY 230900

MOSCO WSHDC BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE ERU PRMNY

NTFQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP PCOOTT/OSFALDESTON

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGB RBR UCB URR RCR ZSI PGB PED PER

---DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PEARSON AND CHINESE OFFICIALS 21NOV

SUMMARY: DURING VISIT TO PEKIN PEARSON HAD LENGTHY MTG WITH MFA

OFFICIALS FOLLOWED BY MTG WITH FM WU XUEQIAN. DISCUSSION SHOWED

CHINESE OFFICIALS HAD STUDIED TEXT OF PMS TWO MAIN SPEECHES

WITH GREAT CARE. FM WAS FULLY BRIEFED ON PROPOSALS AND BOTH HE

AND HIS OFFICIALS WERE FRANK IN THEIR COMMENTS. CHINESE WERE

CAREFUL NOT/NOT TO TAKE POSN ON PMS PROPOSAL FOR CONFERENCE OF

FIVE POWERS AND BOTH FM AND HIS OFFICIALS REFERRED TO PROPOSALS

FM HAD ADVANCED IN HIS SPEECH TO UNGA. SUPERPOWERS WHO POSSESSED

95 PERCENT OF WORLDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD TO TAKE FIRST STEP

IN REDUCING NUCLEAR ARSENALS. WU WONDERED IF EITHER WAS SINCERELY

INTERESTED IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. EVEN WHILE THEY ENGAGED IN

NEGOTIATIONS, ARMS RACE WENT ON. TO ACHIEVE REAL AND EFFECTIVE

DISARMAMENT MEASURES SUPERPOWERS HAD TO BE PRESSURED TO NEGOTIATE

IN GOOD FAITH. OTHER THAN TO SUGGEST WORLD OPINION BE MOBILIZED AND

TO REFER TO SUGGESTIONS IN HIS UNGA SPEECH WU HAD NO/NO OTHER

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PAGE TWO WJGR0874 CONF

THOUGHTS TO OFFER ON HOW TO ACHIEVE THIS. PEARSON WILL BE OFFERING FURTHER COMMENTS ON DISCUSSIONS FROM TOKYO.

2. REPORT: ON 21 NOV PEARSON AND SMITH WERE RECD FOR TWO AND HALF HRS IN MORNING BY MFA OFFICIALS LED BY ZHU QIZHEN, ASST FM AND DIRECTOR OF MFAS AMERICAS AND OCEANIC AFFAIRS DEPT, AND SUBSEQUENTLY FOR ONE HR IN AFTERNOON BY FM WU XUEQIAN. HAVING OUTLINED IN DETAIL PMS PROPOSALS FOR MFA OFFICIALS PEARSON CONCENTRATED DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH FM ON PROPOSAL FOR CONF OF FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES (NWS) AND INVITED FM TO COMMENT ON IT AND ON INTERNATL SITU. HE DID AT LENGTH.

3. WU AGREED WITH CONCERNS PM HAD EXPRESSED ABOUT PRESENT INTERNATL SITU. USA/USSR RELATIONSHIP WAS DESCRIBED AS ONE OF TENSE CONFRONTATION ESPECIALLY OVER DEPLOYMENT OF INF SYSTEMS IN EUR. NEITHER APPEARED READY TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS AND NO/NO PROGRESS WAS EXPECTED AT GENEVA NEGNS. MORE SERIOUS QUESTION WAS WHETHER OR NOT/EITHER WAS SINCERELY INTERESTED IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.

4. WU SAID DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO WSHDC SECTY OF STATE SHULTZ TOLD HIM HE HAD READ WUS SPEECH TO UNGA BUT COULD NOT/NOT ACCEPT WUS PROPOSAL THAT USA CEASE TESTING, DEVELOPING AND MANUFACTURING NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SHULTZ ADDED THAT USA WAS TESTING MANY TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (WU USED WORD MINIATURE TO DESCRIBE THEM) AND PROGRAMME WAS NECESSARY IF USA WAS TO DETER USSR. LATTER WAS ALSO TESTING ADVANCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCLUDING RECENTLY NEW TYPE OF

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PAGE THREE WJGR0874 CONFD

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CCC/002 221025Z WJGR0874

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PEKIN WJGR0873 22NOV83

TO PMDELHAKA/FOWLER ONLY FLASH

INFO CHOGMDELHI/FOWLER ONLY DELIVER BY 221600

TOKYO/PEARSON ONLY MOSCO/ARCHDEACON ONLY EXTOTT IDDZ/DELVOIE ONLY

REF OURTEL WJGR0871 22NOV

---PM INITIATIVE-VISIT TO CHINA 28-29NOV

ZHU QIZHEN, ASST FOREIGN MINISTER, PHONED ME THIS AFTERNOON TO  
CONFIRM THAT PMS VISIT WOULD BE WELCOME. HE SAID TIMING WAS  
SUITABLE TO CHINESE AUTHORITIES.

2. AWAITING INFO REQUESTED PARA TWO MY REFTTEL.

GAUVIN

CCC/002 220655Z WJGR0873

PLEASE GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO DISTR OF THIS TEL

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PEKIN WJGR0871 22NOV83

TO PMDEL DHAKA/FOWLER ONLY FLASH

INFO CHOGMDELHI/FOWLER ONLY DELIVER BY 221600

TOKYO/PEARSON ONLY MOSCO/ARCHDEACON ONLY EXTOTT LIDDZ/DELVOIE ONLY

REF YOURTEL PMDL0051 22NOV

---PM INITIATIVE-VISIT TO CHINA 28-29NOV

PEARSON AND SMITH WERE TOLD AT AIRPORT BY CHINESE OFFICIALS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FOR TOKYO 22NOV THAT QUOTE BECAUSE OF CERTAIN INTERNAL PROCEDURES THAT HAD TO BE FOLLOWED UNQUOTE OFFICIAL AGREEMENT WOULD NOT/NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR PMS PROPOSED VISIT TO PEKIN UNTIL WED 23NOV OR THURS 24NOV.HOWEVER,THEY WERE TOLD THAT UNOFFICIALLY CHINESE AGREED TO VISIT AND WE WERE ASKED TO PROCEED WITH MAKING APRANGEMENTS.ALTHOUGH WE HAVE ASKED FOR APPOINTMENTS WITH BOTH ZHAO AND/AND DENG,MFA OFFICIALS CANNOT/NOT SAY AT THIS TIME WHETHER BOTH WILL RECEIVE PM.I SHALL PRESS THEM FOR THIS INFO AND ADVISE YOU ASAP.

2.MAY WE HAVE DETAILS ABOUT COMPOSITION OF PARTY AND AFOUT AIRCRAFT. TO REQUEST AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE FROM CHINESE AUTHORITIES WE NEED FOLLOWING INFO:

- (A)FLT NUMBER
- (B)NAME OF AIRCRAFT COMMANDER AND NUMEER OF CREW
- (C)TYPE OF AIRCRAFT AND REGISTRATION NUMEER
- (D)RADIO CALL SIGN

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SECRET  
CDN EYES ONLY  
PAGE TWO WJGR0871 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

(E) CONFIRMATION THAT NO/NO MUNITIONS OF WAR, PHOTOGRAPHIC OR  
ANTI-ELECTRONIC MEASURES EQPT WILL BE CARRIED

(F) PROPOSED ITINERARY

(G) PROPOSED ROUTING.

GAUVIN

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*mf*  
*E*

INFO

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PEAIN WJGR0868 22NOV83

TO MOSCO IMMED

INFO EXTOTT LDDZ TOKYO

REF YOURTEL XYGR4142 21NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:PEARSON VISIT TO MOSCO

PEARSON AND SMITH SCHEDULED TO ARR MOSCO THURSDAY 24NOV VIA

JAL441 FROM TOKYO ETA 1615.ETD EVENING OF SATURDAY 26NOV.

CCC/299 220654Z WJGR0868

MF  
W

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE ROME WTGR0433 22NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ RCR GMR LIVRAISON 230900

INFO VATCN LDN BONN WSHDC HAGUE IRU MOSCO PARIS BNATO NDHQOTT/MND/  
CDS/ADMPOL/CP

SAC MILAN DE ROM

DISTR MINA USS IMF UGI IFF IDD IDR IDA RGF RCD RSR RBR ZSS ZSI GMD  
RFF NOTRETEL WTGR0432 22NOV

---RAID SUR BAALBEK ET REEXAMEN ITALIEN DE LA FORCE MULTINATIONALE  
RESUME: SITOT RECOMPOSEE, SITOT L UNITE DU GOVVT CRAXI EN POLITIQUE  
ETRANGERE SEMBLE VOLER DE NOUVEAU EN ECLATS A LA SUITE DU RAID  
FRANCAIS SUR BAALBEK. SENSIBLE A LA CONDAMNATION DE CETTE ACTION  
PAR LE VATCN, DEMOCRATIE CHRETIENNE S EST MAINTENANT RALLIEE AU MAE  
ANDREOTTI POUR DEMANDER LE REEXAMEN DE LA PARTICIPATION ITALIENNE  
A LA FORCE MULTINATIONALE (FMN) DE BERUT. LA FRANCE EN A COMPROMIS  
LA NEUTRALITE ET, POUR ANDREOTTI TOUT AU MOINS, SEMBLE AVOIR BASCULE  
VERS LA PROPENSION AMERICAINE A L AVENTURISME. PLUS PROFONDEMENT,  
LA POLARISATION S EFFECTUE SUR LA CONCEPTION DE LA CONDUITE DES  
RELATIONS EST/OUEST: ATOUR D ANDREOTTI, LES PARTISANS D UNE  
CERTAINE PRUDENCE PAR RAPPORT AUX INITIATIVES AMERICAINES ET  
DU MAINTIEN DE CONTACTS AVEC DES PAYS COMME L URSS OU LA SYRIE;  
SANS CHEF AUSSI IDENTIFIABLE, LES PARTISANS D UN LIEN ATLANTIQUE  
PRESQU INCONDITIONNEL. D ENFANT TERRIBLE SOUS LES GOVVTs PRECEDENTS,  
CRAXI RISQUE DE DEVOIR SE CONTENTER DU ROLE DE MEDIATEUR.

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MOITDA  
SUIVE D'UN

PAGE DEUX WTGR0433 CONF D

2. RAPPORT: LE SOMMET SEMESTRIEL ITALO-FRANCAIS DE VENISE, LES 17-18 NOV, AURA PLUTOT SERVI DE CAISSE DE RESONNANCE A UN DESACCORD ENTRE LES DEUX PAYS SUR LE ROLE DE LA FMN ET A UNE DEPLORABLE POLEMIQUE ENTRE MINISTRES ITALIENS AU SUJET DE LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE DU MAE ANDREOTTI.

3. DANS SON ENSEMBLE, OPINION ET GOUVT ONT RESSENTI COMME UN CAMOUFLET L'ABSENCE DE PREAVIS DE L'OPERATION FRANCAISE CONTRE LES CHIITES DE BAALBEK, MENE E A QUELQUES HEURES DU DEBUT DES ENTREVUES. CONTRAIREMENT AUX EUA, ET, SEMBLE-T-IL, A ISRAEL, GOUVT MITTERRAND N'A PAS CONSULTE SES HOTES ITALIENS, PARTENAIRES DANS LA FMN. QU'IL AIT OMIS DE LE FAIRE PARCE QU'IL SAVAIT QUE CRAXI AUSSI BIEN QU'ANDREOTTI S'Y SERAIENT OPPOSES, NE FAIT QUE SOULIGNER LA DIVERGENCE ENTRE ROME ET PARIS SUR LA CONCEPTION MEME DE CETTE FORCE.

4. POUR LA DIPLOMATIE ITALIENNE, COINCEE ENTRE UNE OPINION PEU FAVORABLE A LA PRESENCE D'UN CONTINGENT A BEHUT ET UN PARTI COMMUNISTE NETTEMENT CONTRAIRE, PARTICIPATION A LA FMN A ETE JUSTIFIEE PAR SA NEUTRALITE, SON CONCOURS AU SALUT DES POPULATIONS CIVILES ET SA CONTRIBUTION POSSIBLE A LA FORMULATION D'UNE SOLUTION NEGOCIEE. AU COURS DE SES CONSULTATIONS AVEC LES PAYS ARABES A L'AGNU ET, PLUS RECENTEMENT, A DAMAS, GIULIO ANDREOTTI S'ETAIT APPLIQUE A OBTENIR CONFIRMATION DE CETTE PERCEPTION DE LA FORCE ET PARTICULIEREMENT DU ROLE ITALIEN. MEME APRES LES ATTENTATS CONTRE

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PAGE TROIS WTGR0433 CONF

AMERICAINS ET FRANCAIS, LA RENCONTRE DES MAE DES PAYS MEMBRES AVAIT POUR ANDREOTTI CIT REJOINT UN ACCORD A L EFFET QUE LE MAINTIEN DE LA FMN DEPENDAIT D UNE INITIATIVE POLITIQUE. CETTE INDICATION EUT L EFFET POSITIF DE MENER QUELQUES JOURS PLUS TARD A UNE PREMIERE ENTENTE ENTRE LES FACTIONS LIBANAISES FINCIT, QUI S EST REVELEE FAVORABLE AUX CONSULTATIONS DE GENEV. SELON CETTE CLE DE LECTURE, LES REPRESAILLES FRANCAISES DE BAALBEK ONT DONC ROMPU UN PROCESSUS DE PACIFICATION D UNE EXTREME SENSIBILITE.

5. PRISONNIER DE SON ROLE PENDANT LE SOMMET, PM CRAXI TENTA DE SON MIEUX DE MANIFESTER SA COMPREHENSION POUR LA POSITION DE LA FRANCE ET DE SAUVER CE QU IL POUVAIT DES CONSULTATIONS BILATERALES ET COMMUNAUTAIRES. PAR UN RENVERSEMENT DES ROLES, CE SPECIALISTE DE LA PROVOCATION ASSUMAIT UNE RESPONSABILITE DE MODERATEUR. PLUS QU A LA CONFERENCE DE PRESSE EN CONCLUSION DU SOMMET, LES NUANCES DE SA POSITION ONT ETE FORMULEES DANS UN EDITORIAL DE L ORGANE SOCIALISTE AVANTI DU 20 NOV: CIT SI PERSONNE NE PEUT SINCEREMENT S INDIGNER CONTRE L ACTION DE L ARMEE FRANCAISE CONTRE DES TERRORISTES ET DES ASSASSINS, NOUS NE POUVONS QU EXPRIMER NOTRE PREOCCUPATION DEVANT TOUT CE QUI POURRAIT EXACERBER LA SITUATION AU LIBAN FINCIT.

6. POUR LE VIEUX SORCIER DE LA POLITIQUE QU EST ANDREOTTI, CETTE DECOUVERTE DE LA LITOTE PAR CRAXI ETAIT TROP BELLE. EN QUELQUES MOTS, PAR CONVICTION ET PAR SAGACITE, IL SUT SE DEMARQUER DU PRESIDENT DU

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PAGE QUATRE WTGR0433 CONF

CONSEIL ET RAPPELER LA POSITION ORTHODOXE DE L ITALIE SUR LE LIBAN.  
IMPLICITEMENT MAIS CLAIREMENT IL CONDAMNA LE RAID SUR BAALBEK.  
POUR UN INSTANT, LE GOUVT SEMBLA SE DECOMPOSER DEVANT LA PRESSE.  
DANS UNE VERITABLE INVECTIVE, LE TRES ATLANTISTE MINISTRE DU BUDGET  
PIETRO LONGO ACCUSA LE MAE DE DENATURER LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE  
DE L ITALIE ET SE DECLARA EN DESACCORD CIT AVEC LA QUASI TOTALITE  
DES ACTES ET DES ATTITUDES D ANDREOTTI FINCIT.

7. PERDANT IL Y A DIX JOURS DEVANT L ASSAUT CONJUGUE DE CEUX QUI  
LUI REPROCHAIENT SES CONTACTS SYRIENS, SA CONDAMNATION DE  
L INTERVENTION AMERICAINE A GRENADE ET LA PRESENCE DE L AMBASSADEUR  
D ITALIE SUR LA PLACE ROUGE POUR LA COMMEMORATION DE LA REVOLUTION  
D OCT. ANDREOTTI REPEND AINSI L ASCENDANT. L UN APRES L AUTRE,  
TOUS LES DIRIGEANTS DE LA DEMOCRATIE CHRETIENNE, SON CRITIQUE LE  
PLUS VIRULENT EMILIO COLOMBO COMPRIS, SE RALLIENT A SA CONDAMNATION  
ET EXIGENT UN REEXAMEN DE LA PARTICIPATION ITALIENNE A LA FMN.  
L UNITE DU PRINCIPAL PARTI POLITIQUE ITALIEN SE REFAIT DERRIERE  
LUI. ET IL SE MERITE EN MEME TEMPS L APPUI TACITE DES COMMUNISTES.  
8. LE DEBAT A DONC FLAMEE SUR UNE QUESTION QUI TOUCHE D ABORD  
LA PRESENCE ITALIENNE A BERUT MAIS QUI REJOINT DE FAIT LA  
CONCEPTION MEME DES RAPPORTS EST/OUEST. POUR ANDREOTTI, LE RAID SUR  
BAALBEK REPRESENTE UN PEU LA PARANGON DE TOUT CE QUI DEVRAIT ETRE  
EVITE DANS LA GESTION D UNE CRISE: LE SACRIFICE DE LA RATIONALITE  
AU SENTIMENT, SI JUSTIFIE SOIT-IL: LE COUP D ECLAT QUI COMPROMET

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PAGE CINQ WTGR0433 CONFD

LES EFFORTS LES PLUS PATIENTS ET LES PROGRES LES PLUS MINIMES  
QUI SONT SOUVENT LES SEULS MOYENS DE DESAMORCER UN ENGIN.

9. SUR LA FMN, ANDREOTTI A DONC MARQUE UN POINT NON NEGLIGEABLE.

REFUSSANT MAL A SE DEGAGER DE L'APPUI GENANT QUE LUI MANIFESTAIENT

LES ATLANTISTES INCONDITIONNELS, CRAXI A EU QUELQUE MAL A AFFIRMER

SON AUTONOMIE. MAIS IL A EU LA SAGESSE DE S'ASTENIR DE LA MELEE

ET DE FAIRE AUCUNE DECLARATION DEPUIS LA CONCLUSION DU SOMMET.

CE N'EST QU'HIER SOIR, 21 NOV., QUE PARTI SOCIALISTE A EMIS UNE BREVE

DECLARATION DANS LE SENS DE L'APAISEMENT. SON SECGEN ADJOINT

CLAUDIO MARTELLI A CONSTATE LA LEGITIMITE DES INTERROGATIONS SUR

LE ROLE ET L'AVENIR DE LA FMN. EN MEME TEMPS, PRESIDENTE DU CONSEIL

INDIQUAIT QUE QUESTION SERAIT A L'ORDRE DU JOUR DE LA PROCHAINE

REUNION DU CABINET. PRUDENCE SEMBLE ENFIN PREVALOIR DE LA PART

DES PRINCIPAUX INTERESSES ET SOLUTION DE COMPROMIS SERA MISE AU

POINT. MAIS REACTION QUASI EPIDERMIQUE QU'ANDREOTTI SEMBLE SUSCITER

CHEZ SES ADVERSAIRES CONSTITUE UNE GARANTIE QUE LA POLITIQUE

ETRANGERE DEMFURERA A L'AVANT PLAN.

CCC/191 230840Z WTGR0433

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM VMBFR XTDR0209 22NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 220900

INFO BNATO

DISTR IDDZ

RFF YOURTEL IDR4357 16NOV

---MFR AND NAC MINISTERIAL

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELS CONTAIN DRAFT BRIEF AND DRAFT TALKING POINTS AS REQUESTED. BRIEF WHEN TYPED UP WILL AMOUNT TO ABOUT FOUR AND HALF PAGES, WHICH I TAKE IT IS NOT/NOT TOO LONG FOR TOPIC ON WHICH MINISTER IS TO MAKE MAJOR INTERVENTION.

2. I HAVE REPEATED TEXTS TO BNATO SO THEY WILL BE ABLE GIVE THEIR VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS.

3. GRATEFUL TO LEARN WHETHER DRAFTS FILL THE BILL AND TO RECEIVE FOR MY OWN GUIDANCE COPIES OF BRIEF AND TALKING POINTS IN FORM IN WHICH THEY ARE ULTIMATELY APPROVED

HAMMOND

CCC/076 220758Z XTDR0209

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0204 22NOV83

TO PMDEL/DELHI DELIVER BY 230800

DISTR DMF IDA MRCP URR

REF TEL FM ROME WTGR0432 OF 21NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:ITALIAN VIEWS

IN COURSE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON INF,14-16NOV,CRAXI,AS REPORTED BY EMBASSY ROME,REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO PROPOSALS WHICH PM PUT FORWARD DURING HIS VISIT TO ROME.CRAXI RECALLED IN PARTICULAR THAT PM TRUDEAU HAD ENVISAGED INSTITUTION DURING FORTHCOMING YEAR OF FORUM IN WHICH FIVE DECLARED NUCLEAR POWERS COULD CARRY OUT NEGOTIATIONS ON GLOBAL LIMITS TO ARMAMENTS.THAT QUESTION,CRAXI SAID,COULD NOT BE IGNORED OR PUT ASIDE INDEFINITELY,AS IF IT DID NOT EXIST.CRAXI ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE HAD AGREED WITH TRUDEAU IN ROME ON TIMELINESS AND USEFULNESS OF GIVING RENEWED POLITICAL IM,PUSLE TO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN MINISTER OF NATO AND WSAW PACT.IN SAME SPIRIT,HE UNDERLINED THAT CDE CONFERENCE IN STKHM WOULD OFFER SIMILAR POSSIBILITIES OF POLITICAL ACTION. HE WARNED AGAINST DANGERS OF HORIZONTAL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.HE CONCLUDED BY ASSERTING THAT QUOTE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ITS INFLUENCE AND OF ITS CCNCRETE AND EFFECTIVE POSSIBILITIES OF INITIATIVE,THE ITALIAN GOVT ACTS,AND WILL CONTINUE TO ACT,IN SUCH A WAY AS TO OVERRIDE SITUATIONS OF CRISIS,TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS OF CONFLICTS AND TO REDUCE CONFRONTATION AND TENSION.ALONG WITH THE

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PAGE TWO IDDZ0204 CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY MEASURES WHICH GUARANTEE IT, PEACE MUST BE CONSOLIDATED  
THROUGH THE ORGANIZATION OF A DIFFERENT START HALFQUOTE STRUCTURE OF PCI  
ITI-

OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP END HALFQUOTE AND A MORE INTENSIVE  
DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND OF COOPERATION  
IN GENERAL.

CCC/277 222344Z IDDZ0204

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT CPD0184 22NOV83

TO PMDEL/DELHI DELIVER BY 230800

DISTR DMF RBD IMD IMC PSR (IDDZ CCB

REF OURTEL CPD0181 22NOV

FOLLOWING IS FRENCH TEXT OF NOTES FOR PMS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  
FORWARDED TO YOU IN OURTEL CPD0181 22NOV.CIT:

NOTES POUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE

REUNION DES CHEFS DE GOUVERNEMENT DES PAYS DU COMMONWEALTH NEW DELHI  
MADAME LA PRESIDENTE,ETC.

JE VOUS REMERCIE POUR CES GENTILS MOTS DE BIENVENUE.C EST LA  
PREMIERE FOIS QUE LES CHEFS DES PAYS DU COMMONWEALTH SE REUNISSENT  
EN INDE.POUR MOI,UN RETOUR EN INDE EST TOUJOURS UNE ESPECE DE  
PELERINAGE.PLUS DE 30 ANNEES SE SONT ECOULEES DEPUIS L EPOQUE OU,  
JEUNE HOMME,J AI DEPOSE MON SAC DANS UNE RUE DE DELHI.MAINTENANT,  
TOUT COMME VOUS,MON FARDEAU EST PLUS LOURD:JE SUIS RECONNAISSANT DE  
L APPUI ET DE LA COMPREHENSION DE VIEUX AMIS.JE SUIS REVIGORE PAR  
L ESPRIT DE FRATERNITE QUI REGNE AU SEIN DU COMMONWEALTH.

ENSEMBLE,NOUS REPRESENTONS 46 NATIONS ET LE QUART DE LA POPULATION  
MONDIALE.C EST CE QUI FAIT DE NOS REUNIONS BIENNALES UN VERITAELE  
LIEU DE RENCONTRE DE L HUMANITE.CES REUNIONS SONT CIT L AGORA FINCIT  
DU NORD ET DU SUD,OU NOUS POUVONS DISCUTER HONNETEMENT,TOUT EN  
RESPECTANT NOS DIVERGEANCES ET EN BATISSANT SUR NOTRE CIT COMMUNIS  
SENSUS FINCIT EN TANT QUE MEMBRES D UNE SOCIETE GLOPALE.

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PAGE TWO CPD0184 RESTR

CETTE ANNEE, NOUS ACCUEILLONS PARMI NOUS ANTIQUA ET BARBUDE, LES ILES MALDIVES ET SAINT-CHRISTOPHE-ET-NIEVES. LEUR PRESENCE NE PEUT QU'ENRICHIR. NOUS COMPTONS BIEN NOUS ATTIRER LEUR AMITIE ET LEUR DEMANDER CONSEIL.

LE COMMONWEALTH PERMET DE SITUER LES QUESTIONS GLOBALES DANS UNE PERSPECTIVE PARTICULIERE. IL S'AGIT DE LA VISION UNIQUE D'UNE COMMUNAUTE DONT NOUS AFFIRMONS ET RENOUVELONS CONSTAMMENT LES VALEURS ET LES TRADITIONS. LA MAGIE DU COMMONWEALTH RESIDE NON PAS DANS NOS INSTITUTIONS PARTICULIERES, MAIS DANS NOS ATTITUDES.

LE MONDE A BESOIN DE NOTRE GENEROSITE D'ESPRIT ET DE NOTRE DETERMINATION COMMUNE. EN SEPTEMBRE DERNIER A NEW YORK, MADAME LA PRESIDENTE, VOUS AVEZ INNOVE. VOUS AVEZ INTRODUIT LA SIMPLICITE ET LA FRANCHISE DU COMMONWEALTH DANS L'ATMOSPHERE TENDUE DES NATIONS UNIES.

L'AN DERNIER, VOUS AVEZ DIRIGE AVEC MODERATION ET REALISME LE MOUVEMENT DES PAYS NON-ALIGNES, PRETE A PRENDRE DES MESURES CONSTRUCTIVES. CES QUALITES NOUS SERVIRONS TOUS PUISQUE L'INDE DEVIENDRA EN JANVIER MEMBRE DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE DES NATIONS UNIES.

NOS MEILLEURS VOEUX VOUS ACCOMPAGNENT DANS CETTE ENTREPRISE, CAR NOUS CROYONS TOUS QUE LA SECURITE GLOBALE EST UNE RESPONSABILITE COLLECTIVE. A L'HEURE ACTUELLE, LA TRISTE PERSPECTIVE D'UN AFFRONTEMENT NUCLEAIRE MENACE TOUTES LES NATIONS. POURTANT, QUE POUVONS-NOUS Y REPONDRE, NOUS QUI NE PARLONS PAS POUR LES SUPERPUISSANCES? COMME LE PERSONNAGE TESS DANS L'OEUVRE DE HARDY, NOUS NOUS SENTONS OBLIGES

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PAGE THREE CPD0184 RESTR

D EMPRUNTER UNE VOIE DANGEREUSE CONTRE NOTRE GRE.

SI NOUS VOULONS REVENIR DANS LA BONNE VOIE ET CHANGER CE CLIMAT D HOSTILITE, NOUS DEVONS COMMENCER PAR COMMUNIQUER. SANS COMMUNICATION, IL NE PEUT Y AVOIR DE COMPREHENSION, DE NEGOCIATION SIGNIFICATIVE, NI DE SECURITE DURABLE POUR L HUMANITE.

EN TANT QUE DIRIGEANTS DU COMMONWEALTH, NOUS POUVONS ET DEVONS ENCOURAGER LE DIALOGUE POLITIQUE.

NOUS POUVONS TENTER DE MODIFIER L ATMOSPHERE DE MEFIANCE ET D AFFRONTEMENT QUI REGNE DANS LES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES. NOUS POUVONS PROCLAMER L INTERET LEGITIME DE TOUTES LES NATIONS A L EGARD DE LA SECURITE GLOBALE. NOUS POUVONS RECOMMANDER LA MODERATION ET LA COMPASSION. NOUS POUVONS OEUVRER EN VUE DE RESTAURER LA CONFIANCE ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST.

NOUS NE DEVONS PAS ETRE IRREALISTES. IL Y A UNE LIMITE A CE QUE NOUS POUVONS FAIRE ICI A NEW DELHI. NOUS POUVONS TOUTEFOIS COMMENCER A RENVERSER CETTE TENDANCE QUI NOUS EXPOSE A UNE INCERTITUDE GRANDISSANTE ET A DES DANGERS DE PLUS EN PLUS NOMBREUX. C EST DANS CET ESPRIT QUE J ABORDE NOTRE REUNION CETTE SEMAINE. JE SUIS IMPATIENT D ENTAMER LES DISCUSSIONS. FINCIT.

CCC/149 222043Z CPD0184

*Ms. Caron*  
*for action pls*  
*PC*

**FACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**  
R E S T R I C T E D

FM PMDELHAKA PMLLPPTU WWNOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 221200

INFO WSHEC PCOOTT/CARON

FRO FCWLER

---THE DAY AFTER THE DAY AFTER

GRATEFUL YOUR VIEWS ON PUBLIC IMPACT OF THIS MUCH AWATED AND  
PROBABLY OVER ANTICIPATE MEDIA EVENT. HOWEVER IN AFTERMATH THIS  
PROGAM AND OTHER EXELLENT DOCUMENTARIES SUCH AS GWYNN DWYERS  
QUOTE WAR UNQUOTE AND VARIOUS QUOTE JOURNAL NQUOTE PIECES, IS NORTH  
AMERICAN PUBLIC AWARENESS/ANGST RIING?

CCC/090 221250Z PMDL0057

CC 1DDZ / DELVOIE MF

NOV 24 1983

**CORRECTED COPY**  
**EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE**

→ cc: IDDZ/Delvoie  
FPR/JJ Noble:nl  
24NOV83

CORRECTED COPY

UNCLASSIFIED (ORIGINAL MAY HAVE BEEN RECEIVED WITH PAGES MISSING)

FM PMDELDHAKA PMDL0056 22NOV83

TO PMOOTT/HUDON IMMED

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ

DISTR FPR

---PM SCRUM

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF PM SCRUM FOLLOWING AMTG WITH REPS  
OF THE GOVT OF BANGLADESH IN DHAKA, 21NOV. PLEASE RELEASE.

TEXT BEGINS:

Q. WHAT WERE THE MAIN ISSUES THAT YOU DISCUSSED WITH GEN ERSHAD  
TODAY?

A. WE SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME ON INNATL PROBLEMS--NORTH  
SOUTH PROBLEMS AND EAST-WEST PROBLEMS. WE TALKED OF KAMPUCHEA,  
AFGHANISTAN, THE MIDEAST, AND OTHER SUCH TROUBLE SPOTS. IT GAVE ME  
AN OCCASION TO EXPLAIN ON BEHALF OF THE CDN GOVT THE PEACE  
INITIATIVE THAT I HAVE BEEN PURSUING FOR THE PAST FEW WEEKS. WE  
ALSO DISCUSSED SOME BILATERAL SUBJECTS, THOUGH I MUST SAY THEY HAD  
BEEN DEALT WITH MORE EXTENSIVELY BY OFFICIALS BEFORE THE GENERAL AND  
I ENTERED THE ROOM, SO THE ACCORDS WE HAVE JUST SIGNED WERE PREPARED  
IN ADVANCE. BUT WE TOOK SOME TIME TO EXPLAIN EACH OTHERS COUNTRY TO  
EACH OTHER. FOR INSTANCE, WE WERE VERY INTERESTED IN HEARING THE  
POINT OF VIEW OF YOUR MINISTER OF FINANCE ON THE NORTH-SOUTH SUBJ  
AND THE INNATL FINANCIAL SITUATION AND WE DISCUSSED THAT FOR A  
WHILE. WE DID THE SAME THING WITH YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER: SEEING THE  
APPLICATIONS OF BANGLADESHI FOREIGN POLICY IN VARIOUS PARTS OF  
THE WORLD. THATS ABOUT A SUMMARY OF WHAT WE DISCUSSED TODAY.

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PAGE TWO PMDL0056 UNCLAS

Q. WHAT ECONOMIC ISSUES DID YOU DISCUSS WITH BANGLADESH?

A. WELL, WE DISCUSSED THE WORLD FINANCIAL SITUATION AND WE DISCUSSED THE WAY IN WHICH INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS MIGHT OR COULD BE REFORMED—THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK. WE TALKED ABOUT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND THE REASONS WHY, IN THE PAST, WE SEEMED TO HAVE FAILED TO FIND COMMON GROUND BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH TO BEGIN THE GLOBAL DIALOGUE, THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH, BUT AS I WAS SAYING TO YOUR COLLEAGUE, WE ALSO GOT INTO PROBLEMS NEAR AT HOME, AND WE HEARD FROM THE MINISTER OF FINANCE ABOUT THE INVESTMENT NEEDS AND PLANS FOR BANGLADESH. WE HEARD FROM YOUR MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE ON PROGRESS OF LAND REFORM. WE HEARD ABOUT THE DESIRE OF YOUR MINISTER OF FINANCE TO BALANCE INVESTMENT ON INFRASTRUCTURE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL INVESTMENT. THOSE ARE THE GENERAL SUBJECTS WE DISCUSSED.

Q. PRIME MINISTER, ON YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE. WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE YOUR MTG WITH MR (GEORGI) ARBATOV IN TOKYO THE OTHER DAY? WAS HE SUPPORTIVE IN ANY WAY AND DID HE GIVE ANY INDICATION OF WHAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S POSITION WOULD BE ON YOUR INITIATIVE?

A. ON THE LATTER QUESTION, THE ANSWER IS NO/NO. HE DID NOT/NOT PURPORT TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. ON THE FIRST QUESTION, THE SUPPORT WAS, I SUPPOSE, SOMEWHAT MUTED, TO BE FRANK. MR ARBATOV IS SOMEWHAT PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND HE DIDN'T SEEM TO ENTERTAIN GREAT HOPES THAT I WOULD BE

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PAGE THREE PMDL0056 UNCLAS

ABLE TO CONVINCING THE USA TO BE, TO USE HIS WORDS, MORE REASONABLE. IN OTHER WORDS, HE EXPRESSED THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA AS BEING VERY WILLING TO SEEK AN AGREEMENT, BUT BEING MET WITH A NEGOTIATOR WHO WAS NOT--AND I AM, OF COURSE, PARAPHRASING MR ARBATOV--THESE ARE NOT/NOT MY THOUGHTS.

Q. PRIME MINISTER, COULD YOU DESCRIBE TO US WHAT KIND OF ROLE YOU THOUGHT MR ARBATOV WAS PLAYING? WAS HE IN FACT ACTING AS A EMISSARY FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, OR WAS HE ACTING ON A TOTALLY FREELANCE BASIS?

A. PERHAPS NEITHER ONE NOR THE OTHER. CERTAINLY NOT AS AN EMISSARY, BECAUSE I UNDERSTAND HE HAD BEEN IN TOKYO FOR SOME TIME AND WAS GOING TO REMAIN THERE FOR A WHILE. IN OTHER WORDS, HE HAD NOT/NOT COME TO TOKYO WITH ANY SPECIAL MSG FOR ME OR, AS FAR AS I KNOW, ANY SPECIAL PLAN TO MEET ME. HE JUST HEARD I WAS IN TOWN, LET US KNOW THAT HE WOULD MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE. AND SINCE EVENTUALLY I WILL PERHAPS BE HEARING FROM OR EVEN EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP--AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET UNION--I THINK HE WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT, IF I WANTED TO PURSUE THE DISCUSSION, HE WAS AVAILABLE. AS MY WHOLE INITIATIVE IS IN TRYING TO LOWER THE TENSIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST I THOUGHT IT MADE SENSE FOR ME TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM SINCE HE WAS MAKING HIMSELF AVAILABLE--MUCH AS I HAVE TALKED TO A CERTAIN NUMBER OF AMERICANS OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS ON THE SUBJECT OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

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PAGE FOUR PMDL0056 UNCLAS

Q. PRIME MINISTER, DO YOU THINK HE WAS PRIVY TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIPS THINKING ON YOUR INITIATIVE?

A. I HAVE NO/NO PARTICULAR REASON TO THINK THAT MR ARBATOV IS SAID TO BE CLOSE TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BUT, I RPT, HE DIDNT INDICATE THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF MR ANDROPOV OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT.

Q. PRIME MINISTER, LAST NIGHT IN YOUR BANQUET SPEECH, YOU SAID THAT YOUR COUNTRY WOULD MAINTAIN HIGH LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION IN BANGLADESH. WOULD YOU KINDLY SPELL OUT THE SPECIFIC FIELDS WHERE YOU ARE OING TO COOPERATE WITH BANGLADESH, OR ARE GOING TO HELP BANGLADESH, OR GIVE LIGHT ON THE AGREFMENTS YOU HAVE JUST SIGNED WITH THE BANGLADESH HEAD OF GOVT.

A. THE GENERAL AREAS WHERE WE EXPECT TO COOPERATE MORE INTENSIVELY ARE IN TRANSPORTATION, AGRICULTURE AND FOOD RESOURCES. THOSE ARE THE THREE LEVELS ON WHICH, ON A GOVT TO GOVT BASIS, WE ARE PURSUING DISCUSSIONS. BUT THE AID MONEY WHICH IS AVAILABLE TO BANGLADESH WILL NOT/NOT NECESSARILY ALL BE SPENT IN THOSE AREAS BECAUSE, AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE MET THIS MORNING WITH CDN BUSINESSMEN WHO ARE HERE, AND THEY HAVE VERY WIDE RANGING INTERESTS. FOR INSTANCE, ONE WAS FROM A VACCINE INSTITUTE, ANOTHER WAS FROM AN ENGINEERING FIRM INTERESTED IN ENERGY, AND SO ON. SO, THESE ARE AREAS WHERE WE MAY BE CALLED ON TO COOPERATE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES, BUT THEY WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE CHOICES YOUR OWN GOVT MAKES IN FOLLOWING ITS OWN PRIORITIES, AND THEY WILL BE DETERMINED ALSO BY THE FUNDS AVAILABLE FROM INNATL INSTITUTIONS LIKE THE WORLD BANK, THE

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PAGE FIVE PMDL0056 UNCLAS

ASIA DEVELOPMENT BANK, AND SO ON. BUT, ONCE AGAIN, THE GOVT TO GOVT PRIORITIES HAVE BEEN PINPOINTED TO SUCH AREAS AS TRANSPORTATION, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE.

Q. PRIME MINISTER, WHAT IDEALLY WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE COME FROM THE PEARSON/SMITH MISSION TO PEKING AND MOSCOW? AND, HAVING MET MR ARBATOV AND SENT YOUR EMISSARIES NOW TO MOSCOW, DOES THAT SEEM TO MAKE IT MORE LIKELY THAT YOU WILL YOURSELF BE GOING AT SOME POINT TO MOSCOW?

A. I CANT SAY. I THINK THE EMISSARY IS SOMEWHAT THE EQUIVALENT OF THE CONTACTS THAT WE HAVE HAD WITH, SAY, WASHINGTON THROUGH OUR EMBASSY OR EVEN THROUGH THAT MTG THAT MR MACEACHEN HAD WITH SEC OF STATE SHULTZ. ITS SOUNDING OUT HOW THOSE POWERS ARE REACTING TO MY PEACE INITIATIVE, ANSWERING THEIR QUESTIONS, EXPLAINING WHAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO. EVENTUALLY, WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE A JUDGMENT ON WHETHER A PERSONAL MTG BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THOSE COUNTRIES AND MYSELF IS WARRANTED. I CERTAINLY DONT WANT TO GO THERE IF MY EMISSARIES SAY, YOU KNOW, QUOTE THEYRE NOT/NOT INTERESTED AT ALL. AT THIS STAGE-THEY SEEM TO THINK THAT EAST-WEST TENSIONS ARE SO HIGH AND THAT THEY CANNOT BE BETTERED UNQUOTE, WHICH, AS I HINTED A MOMENT AGO, SEEMED A LITTLE BIT THE ATTITUDE OF MR ARBATOV HE WASNT A DISCOURAGING CONTACT, BUT HE DIDNT SEEM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE LOWERING OF TENSIONS. BUT I AM PERHAPS NOT/NOT AS PESSIMISTIC AS HE IS, AND THAT IS WHY I AM WAITING TO HEAR FROM MR PEARSON AND MR SMITH AFTER THEY HAVE MADE THOSE VISITS.

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Q.FROM BANGLADESH YOU ARE GOING TO DELHI TO ATTEND THE COMMON-WEALTH MTG.WOULD YOU PLEASE SAY WHAT ISSUES WILL DOMINATE THE CONFERENCE OF COMMONWEALTH HEADS IN DELHI.

A.I THINK THE FIRST COUPLE OF DAYS WILL BE TAKEN UP WITH THE PROBLEM OF POLITICS IN THE WORLD TODAY AND TALKING OF INNATL RELATIONS.I WOULD EXPECT THAT WE WILL BE SPENDING SOME TIME TALKING ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE WORSENING STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS WHICH,I HOPE,WILL GIVE ME THE OCCASION TO PROPOSE AT LEAST SOME ASPECTS OF MY PEACE INITIATIVE TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMONWEALTH SUMMIT.BUT WE WILL CERTAINLY BE LOOKING AT SPECIFIC AREAS:WHETHER IT BE THEMIDEAST OR AFGHANISTAN, KAMPUCHEA,CENTRALAMERICA-PROBABLY GRENADA WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SOME DISCUSSION,SINCE WELL HAVE MANY OF THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES THERE.I THINK THAT WILL BE THE ORDER OF THE DAY FOR THE FIRST COUPLE OF DAYS...PERHAPS I SHOULDNT OMIT NAMIBIA WHICH WILL CERTAINLY BE DISCUSSED UNDER THE POLITICAL HEADING.AS A MEMBER OF THE CONTACT GROUP,CDA OR BRITAIN WILL BE ASKED,AS WELL AS THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS,WHAT WE SEEM TO BE HEADING FOR IN SOLVING OR NOT SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF NAMIBIA.

THEN,I WOULD EXPECT THAT MOST OF THE NEXT TWO DAYS WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE INTERNATL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS.THERE,WE WILL GET TO THE HELLINER REPORT WHICH HAS BEEN PRODUCED AT THE REQUEST OF THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN SEP.IT WAS REFERRED TO US.WE WILL BE DISCUSSING THAT WHICH,AS YOU KNOW,IS A REPORT ...7

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A. THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION IS NO/NO. I HONESTLY HAVEN'T ASKED. I DON'T THINK THERE IS MUCH CLARIFICATION NEEDED.

Q. EXCEPT YOU SAID THE OTHER DAY THAT THE REMARKS DIDN'T SEEM TO JIVE WITH WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD BEEN SAYING AND I WONDERED IF YOU HAD ATTEMPTED TO GET SOME CLARIFICATION ON JUST WHETHER THE RIGHT HAND KNEW WHAT THE LEFT WAS DOING.

A. IT ISN'T QUOTE THE LEFT HAND AND THE RIGHT HAND UNQUOTE—I THINK IT IS THE RIGHT HAND AND THE LEFT TOE. YOU KNOW, YOU CAN'T REALLY ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO WHAT SOME MID-LEVEL OFFICIAL FROM THE PENTAGON THINKS ABOUT MY PEACE INITIATIVE, PARTICULARLY WHEN HE PURPORTS TO TALK ABOUT THE EUROPEAN RECEPTION OF IT. I MAY BE OUT OF CONTEXT HERE, BUT I CAN'T SEE THAT IT MATTERS VERY MUCH WHAT, ONCE AGAIN, A THIRD-RATE--I MEAN, A THIRD-LEVEL--OFFICIAL FROM THE PENTAGON THINKS ABOUT MY PEACE INITIATIVE.

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PAGE EIGHT PMDL0056 UNCLAS

Q. APPARENTLY, THERE WERE STATE DEPT OFFICIALS THERE AS WELL, SIR.

A. WELL, THE RIGHT ONE, MAYBE.

Q. PRIME MINISTER CAN YOU SHED ANY LIGHT ON THE CONDITION OF MR ANDROPOV, THE GREAT MYSTERY AS TO WHY HE HASNT APPEARED IN PUBLIC.

IN OTHER WORDS, DO YOU KNOW IF MR ANDROPOV IS IN ANY SHAPE TO RECEIVE YOU, SHOULD YOU WANT TO GO THERE?

A. I HAVE NO/NO IDEA. MR ARBATOV GAVE THE USUAL EXPLANATIONS: HE WAS ILL-HE TOOK A LONG TIME RECOVERING FROM A COLD-AS HE RECOVERED HE WENT INTO A REST PERIOD AND VACATION, AND THATS IT. IM NOT/NOT GIVING YOU THAT AS ANY NEWS OR SAYING WHETHER IT HAS MUCH FOUNDATION OR NOT/NOT. MR ARBATOV DID SAY THAT HE HAD NOT/NOT SEEN MR ANDROPOV FOR A WHILE, BUT HE CERTAINLY EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT, HAVING BEEN INVITED TO THE SOVIET UNION BY MR ANDROPOV, IT WAS VERY LIKELY THAT MY LETTER TO HIM WOULD BE FAVOURABLY RECEIVED AND RESPONDED TO IN TERMS OF A VISIT.

Q. WOULD YOU BE CONTENT, SIR, TO GO TO MOSCO AND SEE SOMEONE ELSE, OTHER THAN MR ANDROPOV?

A. THE QUESTION IS PRETTY HYPOTHETICAL. I DONT EVEN KNOW IF THE RESPONSE THAT I WILL GET THROUGH MR PEARSON AND MR SMITH WILL BE MORE ENCOURAGING THAN SEEMED TO BE THE ATTITUDE OF MR ARBATOV, AND, THEREFORE, I DONT KNOW IF I WILL WANT TO GO TO MOSCO. BUT IF I DO, I WOULDNT THINK THAT I HAD TO SEE ANDROPOV IF ANDROPOV ISNT SEEABLE. THERE IS A CERTAIN NUMBER OF LEADERS THERE, MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO. IT WOULD BE IN KEEPING CERTAINLY WITH MY FEELING OF

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UUU/090 220035Z PMDL0056

**CORRECTED COPY  
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE**

*ME*  
*2* INFO

CORRECTED COPY

UNCLASSIFIED (ORIGINAL MAY HAVE BEEN RECEIVED WITH PAGES MISSING)

FM PMDELDHAKA PMDL0056 22NOV83

TO PMOOTT/HUDON IMMED

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ

DISTR FPR

---PM SCRUM

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF PM SCRUM FOLLOWING AMTG WITH REPS  
OF THE GOVT OF BANGLADESH IN DHAKA, 21NOV. PLEASE RELEASE.

TEXT BEGINS:

Q. WHAT WERE THE MAIN ISSUES THAT YOU DISCUSSED WITH GEN ERSHAD  
TODAY?

A. WE SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME ON INNATL PROBLEMS--NORTH  
SOUTH PROBLEMS AND EAST-WEST PROBLEMS. WE TALKED OF KAMPUCHEA,  
AFGHANISTAN, THE MIDEAST, AND OTHER SUCH TROUBLE SPOTS. IT GAVE ME  
AN OCCASION TO EXPLAIN ON BEHALF OF THE CDN GOVT THE PEACE  
INITIATIVE THAT I HAVE BEEN PURSUING FOR THE PAST FEW WEEKS. WE  
ALSO DISCUSSED SOME BILATERAL SUBJECTS, THOUGH I MUST SAY THEY HAD  
BEEN DEALT WITH MORE EXTENSIVELY BY OFFICIALS BEFORE THE GENERAL AND  
I ENTERED THE ROOM, SO THE ACCORDS WE HAVE JUST SIGNED WERE PREPARED  
IN ADVANCE. BUT WE TOOK SOME TIME TO EXPLAIN EACH OTHERS COUNTRY TO  
EACH OTHER. FOR INSTANCE, WE WERE VERY INTERESTED IN HEARING THE  
POINT OF VIEW OF YOUR MINISTER OF FINANCE ON THE NORTH-SOUTH SUBJ  
AND THE INNATL FINANCIAL SITUATION AND WE DISCUSSED THAT FOR A  
WHILE. WE DID THE SAME THING WITH YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER: SEEING THE  
APPLICATIONS OF BANGLADESHI FOREIGN POLICY IN VARIOUS PARTS OF  
THE WORLD. THATS ABOUT A SUMMARY OF WHAT WE DISCUSSED TODAY.

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0-7-83

PAGE TWO PMDL0056 UNCLAS

Q.WHAT ECONOMIC ISSUES DID YOU DISCUSS WITH BANGLADESH?

A.WELL,WE DISCUSSED THE WORLD FINANCIAL SITUATION AND WE DISCUSSED THE WAY IN WHICH INNATL INSTITUTIONS MIGHT OR COULD BE REFORMED--THE IMF,THE WORLD BANK.WE TALKED ABOUT INNATL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND THE REASONS WHY,INTHE PAST,WE SEEMED TO HAVE FAILED TO FIND COMMON GROUND BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH TO BEGIN THE GLOBAL DIALOGUE,THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS.THIS WAS DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH,BUT AS I WAS SAYING TO YOUR COLLEAGUE, WE ALSO GOT INTO PROBLEMS NEAR AT HOME,AND WE HEARD FROM THE MINISTER OF FINANCE ABOUT THE INVESTMENT NEEDS AND PLANS FOR BANGLADESH.WE HEARD FROM YOUR MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE ON PROGRESS OF LAND REFORM.WE HEARD ABOUT THE DESIRE OF YOUR MINISTER OF FINANCE TO BALANCE INVESTMENT ON INFRASTRUCTURE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL INVESTMENT.THOSE ARE THE GENERAL SUBJECTS WE DISCUSSED.

Q.PRIME MINISTER,ON YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE.WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE YOUR MTG WITH MR(GEORGI)ARBATOV IN TOKYO THE OTHER DAY?WAS HE SUPPORTIVE IN ANY WAY AND DID HE GIVE ANY INDICATION OF WHAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIPS POSITION WOULD BE ON YOUR INITIATIVE?

A.ON THE LATTER QUESTION,THE ANSWER IS NO/NO.HE DID NOT/NOT PURPORT TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.ON THE FIRST QUESTION,THE SUPPORT WAS,ISUPPOSE,SOMEWHAT MUTED,TO BE FRANK.MR ARBATOV IS SOMEWHAT PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND HE DIDNT SEEM TO ENTERTAIN GREAT HOPES THAT I WOULD BE

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ABLE TO CONVINCING THE USA TO BE, TO USE HIS WORDS, MORE REASONABLE. IN OTHER WORDS, HE EXPRESSED THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA AS BEING VERY WILLING TO SEEK AN AGREEMENT, BUT BEING MET WITH A NEGOTIATOR WHO WAS NOT--AND I AM, OF COURSE, PARAPHRASING MR ARBATOV--THESE ARE NOT/NOT MY THOUGHTS. Q. PRIME MINISTER, COULD YOU DESCRIBE TO US WHAT KIND OF ROLE YOU THOUGHT MR ARBATOV WAS PLAYING? WAS HE IN FACT ACTING AS A EMISSARY FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, OR WAS HE ACTING ON A TOTALLY FREELANCE BASIS?

A. PERHAPS NEITHER ONE NOR THE OTHER. CERTAINLY NOT AS AN EMISSARY, BECAUSE I UNDERSTAND HE HAD BEEN IN TOKYO FOR SOME TIME AND WAS GOING TO REMAIN THERE FOR A WHILE. IN OTHER WORDS, HE HAD NOT/NOT COME TO TOKYO WITH ANY SPECIAL MSG FOR ME OR, AS FAR AS I KNOW, ANY SPECIAL PLAN TO MEET ME. HE JUST HEARD I WAS IN TOWN, LET US KNOW THAT HE WOULD MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE. AND SINCE EVENTUALLY I WILL PERHAPS BE HEARING FROM OR EVEN EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP--AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET UNION--I THINK HE WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT, IF I WANTED TO PURSUE THE DISCUSSION, HE WAS AVAILABLE. AS MY WHOLE INITIATIVE IS IN TRYING TO LOWER THE TENSIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST I THOUGHT IT MADE SENSE FOR ME TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM SINCE HE WAS MAKING HIMSELF AVAILABLE--MUCH AS I HAVE TALKED TO A CERTAIN NUMBER OF AMERICANS OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS ON THE SUBJECT OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

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Q.PRIME MINISTER,DO YOU THINK HE WAS PRIVY TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIPS THINKING ON YOUR INITIATIVE?

A.I HAVE NO/NO PARTICULAR REASON TO THINK THAT.MR ARBATOV IS SAID TO BE CLOSE TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BUT,I RPT,HE DIDNT INDICATE THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF MR ANDROPOV OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT.

Q.PRIME MINISTER,LAST NIGHT IN YOUR BANQUET SPEECH,YOU SAID THAT YOUR COUNTRY WOULD MAINTAIN HIGH LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION IN BANGLADESH.WOULD YOU KINDLY SPELL OUT THE SPECIFIC FIELDS WHERE YOU ARE OING TO COOPERATE WITH BANGLADESH,OR ARE GOING TO HELP BANGLADESH,OR GIVE LIGHT ON THE AGREFMENTS YOU HAVE JUST SIGNED WITH THE BANGLADESH HEAD OF GOVT.

A.THE GENERAL AREAS WHERE WE EXPECT TO COOPERATE MORE INTENSIVELY ARE IN TRANSPORTATION,AGRICULTURE AND FOOD RESOURCES.THOSE ARE THE THREE LEVELS ON WHICH,ON A GOVT TO GOVT BASIS,WE ARE PURSUING DISCUSSIONS.BUT THE AID MONEY WHICH IS AVAILABLE TO BANGLADESH WILL NOT/NOT NECESSARILY ALL BE SPENT IN THOSE AREAS BECAUSE,AS YOU KNOW,I HAVE MET THIS MORNING WITH CDN BUSINESSMEN WHO ARE HERE,AND THEY HAVE VERY WIDE RANGING INTERESTS.FOR INSTANCE,ONE WAS FROMA VACCINE INSTITUTE,ANOTHER WAS FROMAN ENGINEERING FIRM INTERESTED IN ENERGY,AND SO ON.SO,THESE ARE AREAS WHEREF WE MAY BE CALLED ON TOCOOPERATE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES,BUT THEY WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE CHOICES YOUR OWN GOVT MAKES IN FOLLOWING ITS OWN PRIORITIES,AND THEY WILL BE DETERMINED ALSO BY THE FUNDS AVAILABLE FROM INNATL INSTITUTIONS LIKE THE WORLD BANK,THE

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A. I HAVE NO/NO IDEA. MR ARBATOV GAVE THE USUAL EXPLANATIONS: HE WAS ILL-HE TOOK A LONG TIME RECOVERING FROM A COLD-AS HE RECOVERED HE WENT INTO A REST PERIOD AND VACATION, AND THATS IT. IM NOT/NOT GIVING YOU THAT AS ANY NEWS OR SAYING WHETHER IT HAS MUCH FOUNDATION OR NOT/NOT. MR ARBATOV DID SAY THAT HE HAD NOT/NOT SEEN MR ANDROPOV FOR A WHILE, BUT HE CERTAINLY EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT, HAVING BEEN INVITED TO THE SOVIET UNION BY MR ANDROPOV, IT WAS VERY LIKELY THAT MY LETTER TO HIM WOULD BE FAVOURABLY RECEIVED AND RESPONDED TO IN TERMS OF A VISIT.

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UUU/090 220035Z PMDL0056

PLEASE GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO DISTR OF THIS TEL:

**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS**

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELDHAKA PMDL0051 22NOV83

TO PEKIN/GAUVIN/PEARSON ONLY DELIVER BY 220830

INFO EXTOTT MINA/DUDOIT ONLY CHOGMDELHI/OSBALDESTON/SHENSTONE ONLY

MOSCO/ARCHDEACON ONLY

DISTR IDDZ/DELVOIE ONLY

REF YOURTEL WJGR0867 21NOV

---PM INITIATIVE - VISIT TO CHINA NOV28-29

GRATEFUL YOU CONFIRM ASAP WHETHER CHINESE WILL RECEIVE PM NOV28-29

AND WHETHER HE WILL BE RECEIVED BY ZHAO AND/AND DENG.

2.PMDEL CAN RECEIVE MSGS IN DHAKA TO APPROX 1400 LOCAL TIME 22NOV.

AFTER THAT PLEASE ADDRESS ANY MSGS TO CHOGMDELHI/FOWLER ONLY.

3.PM CONSIDERS IT VITAL THAT WORD OF HIS POSSIBLE VISIT TO PEKIN

NEXT WEEK NOT/NOT LEAK(AS DID STORY RE EMISSARIES TO PEKIN AND

MOSCO).UNTIL HE IS READY TO ANNOUNCE IT WHICH WILL NOT/NOT BE UNTIL

HE HAD HAD CHANCE TO EXPLAIN TO MRS GHANDI WHY HE MAY BE LEAVING HER

MTG(A MTG AT THE OUTSET OF WHICH HE WILL BE PLAYING KEY ROLE AND

MTG AT WHICH HE HOPES TO SECURE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT FOR HIS

INITIATIVE).DOUBTFUL HE WILL BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH GANDHI

BEFORE THUR OR FRI,THUS EVERY ATTEMPT MUST BE MADE TO HOLD INFO

THROUGH END OF WEEK IF PM IS TO AVOID ANY RISK OF BEING ACCUSED

OF SABOTAGING CHOGM.

4.FOR IDEZ:(DELVOIE)PLEASE INFORM AXWORTHY(PMO)OF EVOLVING

DEVELOPMENTS AND ABOVE INFO.

5.FOR MINA:(DUDOIT)PLEASE INFORM DPM/SSEA.

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RESERVE AUX CDNS  
CDN EYES ONLY

PAGE TWO PMDL0051 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

6. IF CONFIRMATION RECEIVED WE WILL ADVISE FROM DELHI RE SIZE AND  
PPT DETAILS (FOR VISAS WHICH WE HOPE MIGHT BE GRANTED ON ARRIVAL)  
OF PM DEL AS WELL AS OF ANY ACCOMPANYING PRESS.

CCC/090 220046Z PMDL0051

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYSV0032 22NOV83

TO EXTOTT RBR MGTC IMMED

INFO WSHIC BNATO ANKRA WSAW IUCST RFFST IGRAD PCOOTT/FOWLER

EH AGRICOTT NRCOTT/GINGRAS DE OTT UFANEOOTT DE OTZ INAO TT DF OCI

CANPARLASS/IMRIE DE OTT

DISTR MINA MINT MINE USS DMT DMF XDX SID RED RGF RPT RBRD RBP ZSI

CPD IFE IDD ILDZ

REF OURTEL XYGR4148 18NOV, MGTC9162 21NOV

---NEW SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CDA, A.A. RODIONOV

AMEND DISTR LINE OF RFFTEL TO READ SAME AS THIS SVC.

2. FOR MGTC: PLSE PROTECT TO IFE.

CCC/095 220913Z XYSV0032



United States Embassy  
Ottawa, Canada, K1P 5T1

TEXT

*cc fin 6  
press*

*mf*

(82-101)

REAGAN PROPOSES MEASURES TO LESSEN WAR RISK  
-----

WASHINGTON -- PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS PROPOSED TO THE SOVIET UNION NEGOTIATION OF MEASURES TO LESSEN THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR.

IN A SPEECH TO THE NATION NOVEMBER 22, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD SENT A LETTER TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP PROPOSING ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MISSILE TEST FIRINGS, IMPROVEMENT OF THE DIRECT TELETYPE LINK BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE KREMLIN -- THE SO-CALLED "HOTLINE" -- AND ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF LARGE-SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS.

THE PRESIDENT REPEATED HIS CALL FOR "DEEP CUTS" IN THE NUCLEAR ARSENALS FIELDIED BY EACH SIDE, AND CALLED AS WELL FOR ADDITIONAL PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATING REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES EACH SIDE FIELDS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY.  
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THE WEEK BEFORE LAST WAS AN ESPECIALLY MOVING ONE HERE IN WASHINGTON. THE VIETNAM VETERANS FINALLY CAME HOME ONCE AND FOR ALL TO AMERICA'S HEART. THEY WERE WELCOMED WITH TEARS, WITH PRIDE AND WITH A MONUMENT TO THEIR GREAT SACRIFICES. MANY OF THEIR NAMES, LIKE THOSE OF OUR REPUBLIC'S GREATEST CITIZENS, ARE NOW ENGRAVED IN STONE IN THIS CITY THAT BELONGS TO ALL OF US. ON BEHALF OF THE NATION, LET ME AGAIN THANK THE VIETNAM VETERANS FROM THE BOTTOM OF MY HEART FOR THEIR COURAGEOUS SERVICE TO AMERICA.

SEEING THOSE MOVING SCENES, I KNOW MOTHERS OF A NEW GENERATION MUST HAVE WORRIED ABOUT THEIR CHILDREN AND ABOUT PEACE. AND THAT IS WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT TONIGHT -- THE FUTURE OF OUR CHILDREN IN A WORLD WHERE PEACE IS MADE UNEASY BY THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

A YEAR AGO I SAID THE TIME WAS RIGHT TO MOVE FORWARD ON ARMS CONTROL. I OUTLINED SEVERAL PROPOSALS AND SAID NOTHING WOULD HAVE A HIGHER PRIORITY IN THIS ADMINISTRATION. NOW, A YEAR LATER I WANT TO REPORT ON THOSE PROPOSALS AND ON OTHER EFFORTS WE ARE MAKING TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF OUR CHILDREN'S FUTURE.

2.

THE PREVENTION OF CONFLICT AND THE REDUCTION OF WEAPONS ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT PUBLIC ISSUES OF OUR TIME. YET, ON NO OTHER ISSUE ARE THERE MORE MISCONCEPTIONS AND MIS-UNDERSTANDINGS. YOU, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, DESERVE AN EXPLANATION FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT ON WHAT OUR POLICY IS ON THESE ISSUES. TOO OFTEN THE EXPERTS HAVE BEEN CONTENT TO DISCUSS GRANDIOSE STRATEGIES AMONG THEMSELVES, AND CLOUD THE PUBLIC DEBATE IN TECHNICALITIES NO ONE CAN UNDERSTAND. THE RESULT IS THAT MANY AMERICANS HAVE BECOME FRIGHTENED AND, LET ME SAY, FEAR OF THE UNKNOWN IS ENTIRELY UNDERSTANDABLE. UNFORTUNATELY, MUCH OF THE INFORMATION EMERGING IN THIS DEBATE BEARS LITTLE SEMBLANCE TO THE FACTS.

TO BEGIN, LET'S GO BACK TO WHAT THE WORLD WAS LIKE AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II. THE U.S. WAS THE ONLY UNDAMAGED INDUSTRIAL POWER IN THE WORLD. OUR MILITARY POWER WAS AT ITS PEAK, AND WE ALONE HAD THE ATOMIC WEAPON. BUT WE DID NOT USE THIS WEALTH AND THIS POWER TO BULLY, WE USED IT TO REBUILD. WE RAISED UP THE WAR-RAVAGED ECONOMIES, INCLUDING THE ECONOMIES OF THOSE WHO HAD FOUGHT AGAINST US. AT FIRST, THE PEACE OF THE WORLD WAS UNTHREATENED, BECAUSE WE ALONE WERE LEFT WITH ANY REAL POWER, AND WE WERE USING IT FOR THE GOOD OF OUR FELLOW MAN. ANY POTENTIAL ENEMY WAS DETERRED FROM AGGRESSION BECAUSE THE COST WOULD HAVE FAR OUTWEIGHED THE GAIN.

AS THE SOVIET'S POWER GREW, WE STILL MANAGED TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE. THE U.S. HAD ESTABLISHED A SYSTEM OF ALLIANCES WITH NATO AS THE CENTERPIECE. IN ADDITION, WE GREW EVEN MORE RESPECTED AS A WORLD LEADER WITH A STRONG ECONOMY AND DEEPLY-HELD MORAL VALUES. WITH OUR COMMITMENT TO HELP SHAPE A BETTER WORLD, THE U.S. ALWAYS PURSUED EVERY DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL FOR PEACE. AND FOR AT LEAST 30 YEARS AFTER WORLD WAR II, THE UNITED STATES STILL CONTINUED TO POSSESS A LARGE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OVER THE SOVIET UNION. OUR STRENGTH DETERRED -- THAT IS, PREVENTED -- AGGRESSION AGAINST US.

THIS NATION'S MILITARY OBJECTIVE HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO MAINTAIN PEACE BY PREVENTING WAR. THIS IS NEITHER A DEMOCRATIC NOR A REPUBLICAN POLICY. IT IS SUPPORTED BY OUR ALLIES AND MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, IT HAS WORKED FOR NEARLY 40 YEARS.

WHAT DO WE MEAN WHEN WE SPEAK OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE? CERTAINLY WE DO NOT WANT SUCH WEAPONS FOR THEIR OWN SAKE. WE DO NOT DESIRE EXCESSIVE FORCES, OR WHAT SOME PEOPLE HAVE CALLED "OVERKILL". BASICALLY, IT IS A MATTER OF OTHERS KNOWING THAT STARTING A CONFLICT WOULD BE MORE COSTLY TO THEM THAN ANYTHING THEY MIGHT HOPE TO GAIN. AND, YES, IT IS SADLY IRONIC THAT IN THESE MODERN TIMES IT STILL TAKES WEAPONS TO PREVENT WAR. I WISH IT DID NOT.

WE DESIRE PEACE, BUT PEACE IS A GOAL NOT A POLICY. LASTING PEACE IS WHAT WE HOPE FOR AT THE END OF OUR JOURNEY; IT DOES NOT DESCRIBE THE STEPS WE MUST TAKE, NOR THE PATHS WE SHOULD FOLLOW TO REACH THAT GOAL. I INTEND TO SEARCH FOR PEACE ALONG TWO PARALLEL PATHS -- DETERRENCE AND ARMS REDUCTION. I BELIEVE THESE ARE THE ONLY PATHS THAT OFFER ANY REAL HOPE FOR AN ENDURING PEACE.

AND LET ME SAY I BELIEVE THAT IF WE FOLLOW PRUDENT POLICIES, THE RISK OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT WILL BE REDUCED. CERTAINLY THE UNITED STATES WILL NEVER USE ITS FORCES EXCEPT IN RESPONSE TO ATTACK. THROUGH THE YEARS, SOVIET LEADERS HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED A SOBER VIEW OF NUCLEAR WAR; AND IF WE MAINTAIN A STRONG DETERRENT, THEY ARE EXCEEDINGLY UNLIKELY TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK.

NOW, WHILE THE POLICY OF DETERRENCE HAS STOOD THE TEST OF TIME, THE THINGS WE MUST DO IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE HAVE CHANGED.

YOU OFTEN HEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE IN AN ARMS RACE. THE TRUTH IS THAT WHILE THE SOVIET UNION HAS RACED, WE HAVE NOT. AS YOU CAN SEE FROM THIS BLUE U.S. LINE, IN CONSTANT DOLLARS OUR DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE 1960'S WENT UP BECAUSE OF VIETNAM AND THEN IT WENT DOWNWARD THROUGH MUCH OF THE 1970'S. NOW, FOLLOW THE RED LINE, WHICH IS SOVIET SPENDING. IT HAS GONE UP AND UP AND UP. IN SPITE OF A STAGNATING SOVIET ECONOMY, SOVIET LEADERS INVEST 12 TO 14 PER CENT OF THEIR COUNTRY'S GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN MILITARY SPENDING, TWO TO THREE TIMES THE LEVEL WE INVEST.

I MIGHT ADD THAT THE DEFENSE SHARE OF OUR UNITED STATES FEDERAL BUDGET HAS GONE WAY DOWN, TOO. WATCH THE BLUE LINE AGAIN. IN 1962, WHEN JOHN KENNEDY WAS PRESIDENT, 46 PER CENT, ALMOST HALF OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET, WENT TO OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE. IN RECENT YEARS, ABOUT ONE-QUARTER OF OUR BUDGET HAS GONE TO DEFENSE, WHILE THE SHARE FOR SOCIAL PROGRAMS HAS NEARLY DOUBLED. AND MOST OF OUR DEFENSE BUDGET IS SPENT ON PEOPLE, NOT WEAPONS.

THE COMBINATION OF THE SOVIET'S SPENDING MORE AND THE U.S. SPENDING PROPORTIONATELY LESS CHANGED THE MILITARY BALANCE AND WEAKENED OUR DETERRENT. TODAY, IN VIRTUALLY EVERY MEASURE OF MILITARY POWER THE SOVIET UNION ENJOYS A DECIDED ADVANTAGE.

THIS CHART SHOWS THE CHANGES IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF INTER-CONTINENTAL MISSILES AND BOMBERS. YOU WILL SEE THAT IN 1962 AND IN 1972, THE UNITED STATES FORCES REMAINED ABOUT THE SAME, EVEN DROPPING SOME BY 1982. BUT TAKE A LOOK NOW AT THE SOVIET SIDE. IN 1962, AT THE TIME OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THE SOVIETS COULD NOT COMPARE WITH US IN TERMS OF STRENGTH. IN 1972, WHEN WE SIGNED THE SALT I TREATY, WE WERE NEARLY EQUAL. BUT IN 1982, WELL, THAT RED SOVIET BAR STRETCHING ABOUT THE BLUE AMERICAN BAR TELLS THE STORY.

I COULD SHOW YOU CHART AFTER CHART WHERE THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF RED AND A MUCH LESSER AMOUNT OF U.S. BLUE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEPLOYED A THIRD MORE LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES THAN WE HAVE. BELIEVE IT OR NOT, WE FROZE OUR NUMBER IN 1963 AND HAVE DEPLOYED NO ADDITIONAL MISSILES SINCE THEN.

THE SOVIET UNION PUT TO SEA 60 NEW BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES IN THE LAST 15 YEARS. UNTIL LAST YEAR WE HAD NOT COMMISSIONED ONE IN THAT SAME PERIOD.

4.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS BUILT OVER 200 MODERN BACKFIRE BOMBERS -- AND IS BUILDING 30 MORE A YEAR. FOR 20 YEARS, THE UNITED STATES HAS DEPLOYED NO NEW STRATEGIC BOMBERS. MANY OF OUR B-52 BOMBERS ARE NOW OLDER THAN THE PILOTS WHO FLY THEM.

THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAS 600 OF THE MISSILES CONSIDERED MOST THREATENING BY BOTH SIDES -- THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES BASED ON LAND. WE HAVE NONE. THE U.S. WITHDREW ITS INTERMEDIATE RANGE LAND-BASED MISSILES FROM EUROPE ALMOST 20 YEARS AGO.

THE WORLD HAS ALSO WITNESSED UNPRECEDENTED GROWTH IN THE AREA OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES; THE SOVIETS FAR EXCEED US IN THE NUMBER OF TANKS, ARTILLERY PIECES, AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS THEY PRODUCE EVERY YEAR. WHAT IS MORE, WHEN I ARRIVED IN THIS OFFICE I LEARNED THAT IN OUR OWN FORCES WE HAD PLANES THAT COULD NOT FLY AND SHIPS THAT COULD NOT LEAVE PORT, MAINLY FOR LACK OF SPARE PARTS AND CREW MEMBERS.

THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP MUST NOT BE IGNORED. WE HAVE RECOGNIZED THE PROBLEM AND TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES WE HAVE BEGUN TO CORRECT THE IMBALANCE. LOOK AT THIS CHART OF PROJECTED REAL DEFENSE SPENDING FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. HERE'S THE SOVIET LINE. LET US ASSUME THE SOVIET'S RATE OF SPENDING REMAINS AT THE LEVEL THEY HAVE FOLLOWED SINCE THE 1960S. THE BLUE LINE IS THE UNITED STATES. IF MY DEFENSE PROPOSALS ARE PASSED, IT WILL STILL TAKE FIVE YEARS BEFORE WE COME CLOSE TO THE SOVIET LEVEL. YET THE MODERNIZATION OF OUR STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES WILL ASSURE THAT DETERRENCE WORKS AND PEACE PREVAILS.

OUR DEPLOYED NUCLEAR FORCES WERE BUILT BEFORE THE AGE OF MICROCIRCUITS. IT IS NOT RIGHT TO ASK OUR YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN IN UNIFORM TO MAINTAIN AND OPERATE SUCH ANTIQUES. MANY HAVE ALREADY GIVEN THEIR LIVES IN MISSILE EXPLOSIONS AND AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY THE OLD AGE OF THEIR EQUIPMENT. WE MUST REPLACE AND MODERNIZE OUR FORCES, AND THAT IS WHY I HAVE DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH THE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW ICBM KNOWN AS THE MX.

THREE EARLIER PRESIDENTS WORKED TO DEVELOP THIS MISSILE. BASED ON THE BEST ADVICE I COULD GET, I CONCLUDED THAT THE MX IS THE RIGHT MISSILE AT THE RIGHT TIME. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN I ARRIVED IN OFFICE, I FELT THE PROPOSAL ON WHERE AND HOW TO BASE THE MISSILE SIMPLY COST TOO MUCH IN TERMS OF MONEY, AND THE IMPACT ON OUR CITIZENS LIVES.

I HAVE CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT WE PROCEED TO PRODUCE THIS MISSILE, AND THAT WE BASE IT IN A SERIES OF CLOSELY-BASED SILOS AT WARREN AIR FORCE BASE NEAR CHEYENNE, WYOMING.

THIS PLAN REQUIRES ONLY HALF AS MANY MISSILES AS THE EARLIER PLAN AND WILL FIT IN AN AREA OF ONLY 20 SQUARE MILES. IT IS THE PRODUCT OF AROUND-THE-CLOCK RESEARCH THAT HAS BEEN UNDERWAY SINCE I DIRECTED A SEARCH FOR A BETTER CHEAPER WAY. I URGE THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO MUST PASS THIS PLAN TO LISTEN AND EXAMINE THE FACTS, BEFORE THEY COME TO THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS.

SOME MAY QUESTION WHAT MODERNIZING OUR MILITARY HAS TO DO WITH PEACE. WELL, AS I EXPLAINED EARLIER, A SECURE FORCE KEEPS OTHERS FROM THREATENING US AND THAT KEEPS THE PEACE. AND JUST AS IMPORTANT, IT ALSO INCREASES THE PROSPECTS OF REACHING SIGNIFICANT ARMS REDUCTIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, AND THAT IS WHAT WE REALLY WANT. THE UNITED STATES WANTS DEEP CUTS IN THE WORLD'S ARSENAL OF WEAPONS.

5.

BUT UNLESS WE DEMONSTRATE THE WILL TO REBUILD OUR STRENGTH AND RESTORE THE MILITARY BALANCE, THE SOVIETS, SINCE THEY ARE SO FAR AHEAD, HAVE LITTLE INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH US. IF WE HAD NOT BEGUN TO MODERNIZE, THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS WOULD KNOW WE HAD NOTHING TO BARGAIN WITH EXCEPT TALK. THEY WOULD KNOW WE WERE BLUFFING WITHOUT A GOOD HAND BECAUSE THEY KNOW WHAT CARDS WE HOLD --- JUST AS WE KNOW WHAT IS IN THEIR HAND.

YOU MAY RECALL THAT IN 1969 THE SOVIETS DIDN'T WANT TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY BANNING ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES. IT WAS ONLY AFTER OUR SENATE NARROWLY VOTED TO FUND AN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM THAT THE SOVIETS AGREED TO NEGOTIATE. WE THEN REACHED AN AGREEMENT.

WE ALSO KNOW THAT ONE-SIDED ARMS CONTROL DOESN'T WORK. WE HAVE TRIED TIME AND AGAIN TO SET AN EXAMPLE BY CUTTING OUR OWN FORCES IN THE HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL DO LIKEWISE. THE RESULT HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT THEY KEEP BUILDING.

I BELIEVE OUR STRATEGY FOR PEACE WILL SUCCEED. NEVER BEFORE HAS THE U.S. PROPOSED SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. NEVER IN OUR HISTORY HAVE WE ENGAGED IN SO MANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS AND TO FIND A STABLE PEACE. WHAT WE ARE SAYING TO THEM IS THIS: WE WILL MODERNIZE OUR MILITARY IN ORDER TO KEEP THE BALANCE FOR PEACE, BUT WOULDN'T IT BE BETTER IF WE BOTH SIMPLY REDUCED OUR ARSENALS TO A MUCH LOWER LEVEL?

LET ME BEGIN WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES THAT ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN GENEVA. AS I SAID EARLIER, THE MOST THREATENING OF THESE FORCES ARE THE LAND-BASED MISSILES, WHICH THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAS AIMED AT EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA.

THIS CHART SHOWS THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THESE SOVIET MISSILES. IN 1972, THERE WERE 600. THE UNITED STATES WAS AT ZERO. IN 1977, THERE WERE 600. THE U.S. WAS STILL AT ZERO. THEN THE SOVIETS BEGAN DEPLOYING POWERFUL NEW MISSILES WITH THREE WARHEADS AND A REACH OF THOUSANDS OF MILES -- THE SS-20. SINCE THEN THE BAR HAS GONE THROUGH THE ROOF -- THE SOVIETS HAVE ADDED A MISSILE WITH THREE WARHEADS EVERY WEEK. STILL YOU SEE NO UNITED STATES BLUE ON THE CHART. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET LEADERS EARLIER THIS YEAR DECLARED THEY HAD FROZEN DEPLOYMENT OF THIS DANGEROUS MISSILE, THEY HAVE IN FACT CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT.

LAST YEAR, ON NOVEMBER 18, I PROPOSED THE TOTAL, GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF ALL THESE MISSILES. I PROPOSED THAT THE U.S. WOULD DEPLOY NO COMPARABLE MISSILES -- WHICH ARE SCHEDULED FOR LATE 1983 -- IF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DISMANTLE THEIRS. WE WOULD FOLLOW AGREEMENT ON THE LAND-BASED MISSILES WITH LIMITS ON OTHER INTERMEDIATE-RANGE SYSTEMS.

THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS STRONGLY SUPPORT OUR INITIATIVE. THE SOVIET UNION HAS THUS FAR SHOWN LITTLE INCLINATION TO TAKE THIS MAJOR STEP TO ZERO LEVELS. YET I BELIEVE AND I AM HOPING THAT, AS THE TALKS PROCEED AND AS WE APPROACH THE SCHEDULED PLACEMENT OF OUR NEW SYSTEMS IN EUROPE, THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL SEE THE BENEFITS OF SUCH A FAR-REACHING AGREEMENT.

THIS SUMMER WE ALSO BEGAN NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS, THE PROPOSAL WE CALL START. HERE WE WERE TALKING ABOUT INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES -- THE WEAPONS WITH A LONGER RANGE THAN THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE ONES I WAS JUST DISCUSSING. WE ARE NEGOTIATING ON THE BASIS OF DEEP REDUCTIONS. I PROPOSED IN MAY THAT WE CUT THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THESE MISSILES TO AN EQUAL NUMBER, ROUGHLY ONE-

THIRD BELOW CURRENT LEVELS. IT ALSO PROPOSED THAT WE CUT THE NUMBER OF MISSILES THEMSELVES TO AN EQUAL NUMBER, ABOUT HALF THE CURRENT U.S. LEVEL. OUR PROPOSALS WOULD ELIMINATE SOME 4,700 WARHEADS AND SOME 2,250 MISSILES. I THINK THAT WOULD BE QUITE A SERVICE TO MANKIND.

THIS CHART SHOWS THE CURRENT LEVEL OF THE UNITED STATES BALLISTIC MISSILES, BOTH LAND AND SEA-BASED. THIS IS THE SOVIET LEVEL. WE INTEND TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS IT WOULD BE IN THEIR OWN BEST INTEREST TO REDUCE THESE MISSILES. LOOK AT THE REDUCED NUMBERS BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE UNDER OUR PROPOSAL -- QUITE A DRAMATIC CHANGE. WE ALSO SEEK TO REDUCE THE TOTAL DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF THESE MISSILES AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES.

IN 1977, WHEN THE LAST ADMINISTRATION PROPOSED MORE LIMITED REDUCTIONS, THE SOVIET UNION REFUSED EVEN TO DISCUSS THEM. THIS TIME THEIR REACTION HAS BEEN QUITE DIFFERENT. THEIR OPENING POSITION IS A SERIOUS ONE, AND EVEN THOUGH IT DOESN'T MEET OUR OBJECTIVE OF DEEP REDUCTIONS, THERE'S NO QUESTION WE'RE HEADING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. ONE REASON FOR THIS CHANGE IS CLEAR. THE SOVIET UNION KNOWS THAT WE ARE NOW SERIOUS ABOUT OUR OWN STRATEGIC PROGRAMS AND THAT THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE IN EARNEST.

7.

WE ALSO HAVE OTHER IMPORTANT ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS UNDERWAY. IN THE TALKS IN VIENNA ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, WE'VE PROPOSED CUTS IN MILITARY PERSONNEL TO A FAR LOWER AND EQUAL LEVEL. AND IN THE 40-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA, WE'RE WORKING TO DEVELOP EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE WHOLE WORLD REMAINS OUTRAGED BY THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES USE OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST DEFENSELESS PEOPLE IN AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA AND LAOS. THIS EXPERIENCE MAKES IRONCLAD VERIFICATION ALL THE MORE ESSENTIAL FOR ARMS CONTROL.

THERE IS, OF COURSE, MUCH MORE THAT NEEDS TO BE DONE. IN AN AGE WHEN INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES CAN SPAN HALF THE GLOBE IN LESS THAN HALF AN HOUR, IT'S CRUCIAL THAT SOVIET AND AMERICAN LEADERS HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHERS CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS.

LAST JUNE IN BERLIN, AND AGAIN AT THE U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, I VOWED THAT THE U.S. WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF ACCIDENT AND MISUNDERSTANDING AND THUS TO STRENGTHEN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION. SINCE THEN, WE'VE BEEN ACTIVELY STUDYING DETAILED MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THIS BERLIN INITIATIVE.

TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO ANNOUNCE SOME OF THE MEASURES WHICH I'VE PROPOSED IN A SPECIAL LETTER JUST SENT TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND WHICH I'VE INSTRUCTED OUR AMBASSADORS IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS. THEY INCLUDE BUT ALSO GO BEYOND SOME OF THE SUGGESTIONS I MADE IN BERLIN.

THE FIRST OF THESE MEASURES INVOLVES ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF ALL U.S. AND SOVIET TEST LAUNCHES OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES. WE WILL ALSO SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION OF ALL SEA-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES AS WELL AS INTERMEDIATE RANGE LAND-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE TYPE WE'RE CURRENTLY NEGOTIATING. THIS WOULD REMOVE SURPRISE AND UNCERTAINTY AT THE SUDDEN APPEARANCE OF SUCH MISSILES ON THE WARNING SCREENS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

IN ANOTHER AREA OF POTENTIAL MISUNDERSTANDING, WE PROPOSE TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE PROVIDE EACH OTHER WITH ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF OUR MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES. HERE AGAIN, OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO REDUCE THE SURPRISE AND UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING OTHERWISE SUDDEN MOVES BY EITHER SIDE.

THESE SORTS OF MEASURES ARE DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH THE IMMEDIATE ISSUES OF MISCALCULATION IN TIME OF CRISIS. BUT THERE ARE DEEPER, LONGER-TERM PROBLEMS AS WELL. IN ORDER TO CLEAR AWAY SOME OF THE MUTUAL IGNORANCE AND SUSPICION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, I WILL PROPOSE THAT WE BOTH ENGAGE IN A BROAD-RANGING EXCHANGE OF BASIC DATA ABOUT OUR NUCLEAR FORCES. I AM INSTRUCTING OUR AMBASSADORS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON BOTH STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE FORCES TO SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT ON AN EXPANDED EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION. THE MORE ONE SIDE KNOWS ABOUT WHAT THE OTHER SIDES IS DOING, THE LESS ROOM THERE IS FOR SURPRISE AND MISCALCULATION.

PROBABLY EVERYONE HAS HEARD OF THE SO-CALLED HOTLINE, WHICH ENABLES ME TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS. THE EXISTING HOTLINE IS DEPENDABLE AND RAPID -- WITH BOTH GROUND AND SATELLITE

8.

LINKS. BUT BECAUSE IT IS SO IMPORTANT, I'VE ALSO DIRECTED THAT WE CAREFULLY EXAMINE ANY POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE EXISTING HOTLINE SYSTEM.

NOW, ALTHOUGH WE'VE BEGUN NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE MANY PROPOSALS, THIS DOESN'T MEAN WE'VE EXHAUSTED ALL THE INITIATIVES THAT COULD HELP TO REDUCE THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL CONFLICT. WE'LL LEAVE NO OPPORTUNITY UNEXPLORED, AND WE'LL CONSULT CLOSELY WITH SENATORS NUNN, JACKSON, AND WARNER, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS WHO'VE MADE IMPORTANT SUGGESTIONS IN THIS FIELD.

WE ARE ALSO MAKING STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF WE SUCCEEDED IN REDUCING EXISTING ARSENALS ONLY TO HAVE NEW THREATS EMERGE IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD.

EARLIER I SPOKE OF AMERICAS CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II, OF ALL WE DID TO PROMOTE PEACE AND PROSPERITY FOR OUR FELLOW MAN. WELL, WE ARE STILL THOSE SAME PEOPLE. WE STILL SEEK PEACE ABOVE ALL ELSE.

I WANT TO REMIND OUR OWN CITIZENS AND THOSE AROUND THE WORLD OF THIS TRADITION OF AMERICAN GOODWILL BECAUSE I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECTS THE NUCLEAR FEAR IS HAVING ON OUR PEOPLE. THE MOST UPSETTING LETTERS I RECEIVE ARE FROM SCHOOLCHILDREN WHO WRITE TO ME AS A CLASS ASSIGNMENT. ITS EVIDENT THEY'VE DISCUSSED THE MOST NIGHTMARISH ASPECTS OF A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST IN THEIR CLASSROOMS. THEIR LETTERS ARE OFTEN FULL OF TERROR. THIS SHOULD NOT BE SO.

THE PHILOSOPHER SPINOZA SAID, "PEACE...IS A VIRTUE, A STATE OF MIND, A DISPOSITION FOR BENEVOLENCE, CONFIDENCE, JUSTICE." THOSE ARE THE QUALITIES WE WANT OUR CHILDREN TO INHERIT, NOT FEAR. THEY MUST GROW UP CONFIDENT IF THEY ARE TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF TOMORROW, AS WE WILL MEET THE CHALLENGES OF TODAY.

I BEGAN THESE REMARKS SPEAKING OF OUR CHILDREN AND I WANT TO CLOSE ON THE SAME THEME. OUR CHILDREN SHOULD NOT GROW UP FRIGHTENED. THEY SHOULD NOT FEAR THE FUTURE. WE ARE WORKING TO MAKE IT PEACEFUL AND FREE. I BELIEVE THEIR FUTURE CAN BE THE BRIGHTEST, MOST EXCITING OF ANY GENERATION. WE MUST REASSURE THEM AND LET THEM KNOW THAT THEIR PARENTS AND THE LEADERS OF THIS WORLD ARE SEEKING ABOVE ALL ELSE TO KEEP THEM SAFE, AND AT PEACE. I CONSIDER THIS TO BE A SACRED TRUST.

MY FELLOW AMERICANS, ON THIS THANKSGIVING, WHEN WE HAVE SO MUCH TO BE GRATEFUL FOR, LET US GIVE SPECIAL THANKS FOR OUR PEACE, OUR FREEDOM, AND OUR GOOD PEOPLE. I'VE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THIS LAND WAS SET ASIDE IN AN UNCOMMON WAY, THAT A DIVINE PLAN PLACED THIS GREAT CONTINENT BETWEEN THE OCEANS TO BE FOUND BY A PEOPLE FROM EVERY CORNER OF THE EARTH WHO HAD A SPECIAL LOVE OF FAITH, FREEDOM AND PEACE. LET US REAFFIRM AMERICAS DESTINY OF GOODNESS AND GOOD WILL. LET US WORK FOR PEACE, AND, AS WE DO, LET US REMEMBER THE LINES OF THE FAMOUS HYMN, "O GOD OF LOVE, O KING OF PEACE, MAKE WARS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD TO CEASE."

THANK YOU, GOOD NIGHT, AND GOD BLESS YOU.

- - - - -

*Sheila*  
*Pls do reply to all addressees*  
*saying "yes/yes"*

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS**

FM LDN XNGR4158 22NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ PRIORITY

INFO WSHIC MOSCO ENATO ROME BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY TOKYO

DELHI PEKIN NDHQOTT/AEMPOL/CP

DISTR IDDZ MINA DMF IDR IDA RGE RER UCB URR RCP ZSI RCD RCR

REF PEKINTEL WJGR0865 21NOV

---PMS MTG WITH GEORGI ARBATOV

WE ASSUME REFTTEL AND OTHERS REPORTING PMS CONVERSATIONS SHOULD  
BE TREATED AS CEO.

CCC/253 221048Z XNGR4158

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

23 Nov 83 00 12 30z 10

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ  
RESTRICTED

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0207 22NOV83

TO/À TO PMDEL/DELHI ATTN/FOWLER /DELIVER BY 231200

INFO INFO WSHDC

REF REF YOURTEL PMDLPPTU 22NOV

SUBJ/SUJ ---THE DAY AFTER:TWO DAYS LATER

TWIN AVALANCHES OF BIG MEDIA BUILD-UP PRIOR TO BROADCAST OF QUOTE THE DAY AFTER UNQUOTE (TDA) AND EXTENSIVE FOLLOW-UP COMMENTARY ON TELEVISION AND IN PRESS HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH IMPACT OF PROGRAM ITSELF FROM MEDIA ENVIRONMENT. NEVERTHELESS, AUDIENCE FIGURES WERE HIGHER THAN ANTICIPATED, WITH AN ESTIMATED 100 MILLION US VIEWERS. HAVE NOT SEEN INDEPENDANT FIGURES ON CANADIAN AUDIENCE BUT AS MEDIA BLITZ IN CANADA WAS AS INTENSE AS IN US, EXPECT PROPORTIONALLY SAME NUMBER OF CANADIAN VIEWERS WERE AWARE OF AND SAW PROGRAM (~~EXCEPT THOSE WITH GOOD TASTE WHO WATCHED CBC PRESENTATION OF OLIVIER S LEAR~~).

2. INEVITABLY, PROGRAM ITSELF WAS ALMOST ANTI-CLIMACTIC. USING WELL-HONED HOLLYWOOD TECHNIQUE OF THRUSTING <sup>TOGETHER</sup> VARIOUS SYMPATHETIC BUT OTHERWISE UNRELATED CHARACTERS IN TRAUMATIC CIRCUMSTANCES CREATED BY EXPLOSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (RATHER THAN HIJACK <sup>WED</sup> AIRPLANES OR TOWERING INFERNOS), PROGRAM FOCUSED ON SETTING UP AND THEN OBSERVING AFTERMATH OF NUCLEAR EXCHANGE BETWEEN US AND USSR. ~~MORE KUDOS GO TO MAKE UP DEPARTMENT THAN TO DIRECTORIAL EFFORTS,~~ <sup>IT</sup> WHICH SHOWED THE RESULTS OF NUCLEAR DEVASTATION AS AMESOME RATHER THAN TRULY HAIR-

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <i>J. Caron</i> J. CARON	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG <i>L.A. Delnoie</i> L.A. DELNOIE



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12 | 10

PAGE TWO IDDZ0207 RESTRICTED

RAISING.

3. MUCH MORE INTERESTING HAS BEEN PUBLIC COMMENTARY FOLLOWING BROADCAST. ABC, WHICH CARRIED TDA, INVITED 6/6 FOREIGN POLICY/MEDIA *PERSONALITIES* STARS (KISSINGER, MACNAMARA, BILL BUCKLEY, CARL SAGAN, ELIE WIESEL AND BRENT SNOWCROFT) TO ASSESS IMPACT OF PROGRAM AND DETERMINE IF PROPER MESSAGE WAS BEING CONVEYED. CHARACTERISTICALLY, KISSINGER QUICKLY CUT THROUGH CANT BY STATING THAT IF ONLY MESSAGE OF PROGRAM WAS THAT NUCLEAR WAR IS HORRIBLE, LITTLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN AMELIORATING PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF PROBLEM. HE REITERATED WELL KNOWN VIEW THAT ESSENCE OF PROBLEM IS MANAGEMENT OF US/USSR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AS ADJUNCTS TO THE FIRST. SNOWCROFT AND MACNAMARA, COMING FROM DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS, AGREED ON IMPORTANCE OF STRUCTURING NUCLEAR FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS BUT WITH OBJECTIVE OF PROTECTING DETERRENCE. BUCKLEY'S MESSAGE WAS THAT PROGRAM WOULD BE DISSERVICE TO UNITED STATES IF IT LED TO PACIFISM, IN LIGHT OF CONTINUING SOVIET THREATS.

4. GLOBAL TELEVISION, WHICH CARRIED PROGRAM *IN CDA* ~~FOR CANADIAN CONSUMPTION,~~ ~~HAD TO MAKE DUE WITH~~ *DO FEATURED COMMENTARY BY* PIERRE BERTON, CHARLES TEMPLETON, JIM STARK AND OTHERS. MUCH HAND-RINGING LED TO CONCLUSION THAT COUNTRY SUCH AS CANADA HAS A ROLE TO PLAY IN REDUCING TENSIONS. TEMPLETON AND STARK WERE PARTICULARLY SUPPORTIVE OF PM'S INITIATIVE, WITH LATTER ATTRIBUTING IT TO SUCCESS OF PEACE MOVEMENT.

...3



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PAGE THREE IDDZ0207 RESTRICTED

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5. AS YOU ACCURATELY POINT OUT IN REFTEL, PROGRAM IS ONLY ONE OF MANY  
ON WAR (NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL) IN PUBLIC EYE AT PRESENT. WE HAVE  
TO GO BACK TO 50 S DECADE <sup>ER</sup> TO OBSERVE COMPARABLE INTEREST WITH NUCLEAR  
MATTERS. MANY COMMENTATORS ARE CONCERNED THAT PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF  
THESE ISSUES MAY BE TOO SIMPLISTIC, AND MAY NOT LEAD TO HARD DECISIONS  
ON POLICY OPTIONS WHICH MIGHT REDUCE TREAT OF NUCLEAR DEVASTATION.  
OTHERS TAKE PERHAPS MORE SHORT-TERM VIEW THAT ANY EFFORT AT  
RAISING PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF THIS MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE IS WORTH  
WHILE.

6. ONLY TIME WILL TELL IF PUBLIC INTEREST WILL BE SUSTAINED. TDA  
HOWEVER HAS SERVED TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM. OTHER PROGRAMS, MOVIES, ETC  
WILL NOW HAVE TO TAKE UP BURDEN OF MAINTAINING PUBLIC INTEREST.  
ONE SHOULD NOT LOOK HOWEVER TO MEDIA ALONE TO CARRY FULL LOAD OF  
PUBLIC EDUCATION, FOR ITS ATTENTION, SOONER OR LATER, WILL INEVITABLY  
TURN ELSEWHERE.

*UNANSWERED QUESTION RAISED BY MANY  
COMMENTATORS REMAINS: IS THIS TYPE OF FILM  
LIKELY TO INDUCE RESOLVE TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT  
ARMS RACE, OR WILL IT SIMPLY ENGENDER ABJECT  
DESPAIR?*

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
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22 NOV 83 23 412

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 121 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0206 22NOV83  
TO/À TO PMDEL/DELHI **IMMEDIATE**  
INFO INFO OSLO MBFR/VIENN **BIATO**  
DISTR DISTR MINA DMF DMFX RSD RSR **IDR IDA**  
REF  
SUBJ/SUJ ---PM INITIATIVE

~~NORWEGIAN EMB ADVISE THAT PM INITIATIVE WAS SPECIFICALLY COMMENDED  
BY SEVERAL SPEAKERS IN DEBATE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN NORWEGIAN  
PARLIAMENT 21NOV.~~

2. FLWG IS REPLY FROM NORWEGIAN PM WILLOCH TO PM S 17NOV LET:

QUOTE

(COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED TEXT) UNQUOTE.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  J. A. MCNEE	IDDZ	995-5912	SIG  L. A. DELVOIE

ROYAL NORWEGIAN EMBASSY

ROYAL BANK CENTRE  
90 SPARKS STREET, SUITE 932  
OTTAWA, ONTARIO, CANADA K1P 5B4

*Mr. Caron*  
*Texte envoyé par téléc*  
*PM d'Indelhi. Pour les*  
*archives du PM*

*[Signature]*

XV-55/83

The Royal Norwegian Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to forward the text of a letter, dated November 22, 1983 to the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Pierre E. Trudeau, from the Prime Minister of Norway, Mr. Kåre Willoch. The letter is response to Mr. Trudeau's letter to Mr. Willoch of November 18, 1983.

The Royal Norwegian Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, November 22, 1983



The Prime Minister's Office, Oslo

Oslo, November 22, 1983

My Dear Prime Minister,

With reference to your letter dated 17 November 1983 I would like to offer the following comments concerning the inaugural meeting of the CDE and the MBFR negotiations:

The Norwegian Government attaches great importance to the forthcoming Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. It is our opinion that this Conference must be used to continue and intensify the East/West dialogue on security and disarmament. The successful preparatory meeting in Helsinki has paved the way for an orderly opening of the Conference. Consequently, Norway will support the proposal that all NATO members should be represented at a high political level, preferably at the level of Foreign Ministers, at the opening of the Stockholm Conference.

In the view of the Norwegian Government, the latest Eastern proposals in Vienna have underscored the need for a thorough evaluation of our own negotiating position in the MBFR. A strategy should be developed for making some real movement in the negotiations.

The Norwegian Government would like to associate itself with your proposal for a decision on a new Western initiative to be taken at the forthcoming NATO Foreign Minister meeting. But before we decide on a

The Right Honourable Pierre E. Trudeau  
Prime Minister of Canada  
Ottawa

- 2 -

follow-up meeting in Vienna at the Foreign Minister level, we ought to have a clear picture of the Western response. In principle we are positive to holding such a meeting, provided the conditions are favourable.

I look forward to remaining in close contact on the subject in the coming months.

Kåre Willoch /S/



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
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22 NOV 83 23	432
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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ	<del>CONFIDENTIAL</del> UNCLASS	12	10
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FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0205 22NOV83

TO/A TO PMDEL/DELHI DELIVER BY 230800

INFO INFO: WASHDC, BNATO, NDHQOTT/ADM POL/CPP/CORAE

DISTR DISTR DMF IDA MRCP URR

REF ---PM INITIATIVE:HIGH ALTITUDE ASAT

SUBJ/SUJ GLOBE AND MAIL PUBLISHED ARTICLE BY J.C.POLANYI, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, NOV 22 WHICH ARGUES STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF PM'S PROPOSAL FOR BAN ON HIGH ALTITUDE ASAT.ACCORDING TO POLANYI QUOTE THIS IS A SHREWD AND IMPORTANT INITIATIVE, OF A PIECE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S DICTUM THAT ONE MUST ACT EARLY IF ONE WANTS TO IMPEDE DANGEROUS NEW WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS.OF COURSE, TO ACT EARLY ONE MUST HAVE THE ABILITY TO SEE AHEAD.TOO OFTEN OUR GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED IN THIS. IT OBSERVES APPLAUSE NOW FOR ATTEMPTING TO TAKE THE LONGER VIEW ON A MATTER OF GRAVE CONCERN.UNQUOTE.

2.POLANYI GOES ON TO SAY QUOTE GIVEN THAT NEITHER THE SOVIET UNION NOR THE UNITED STATES HAS YET DESIGNED A TARGETS THAT CAN BE THREATEN HIGH-ALTITUDE TARGETS,MR.TRUDEAU'S ADVISORS HAVE POINTED TO THIS AS THE PLACE TO DRAW THE LINE.THEY HAVE CALLED FOR A BAN SPECIFICALLY ON HIGH-ALTITUDE ASATS.IT IS A SOUND TACTIC IN THAT THE TWO MILITARIES ARE MOST LIKELY TO BE PERSUADED TO FOREGO WHAT THEY DO NOT YET POSSESS,RATHER THAN TO SURRENDER WHAT THEY HAVE.IT IS AT THE SAME TIME A RISKY TACTIC,SINCE IT ATTEMPTS TO BAN MILITARY ACTIVITY - OR MORE CORRECTLY TO BAN WEAPONS - FROM ONLY A PART OF SPACE.ANYTHING WE DO IN THE WORLD OF MODERN WEAPONRY IS FRAUGHT

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 K.CALDER	IDDZ	995-5912	 L.A.DELVOIE



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0205 CONFIDENTIAL

12

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WITH RISK. HERE AT LEAST IS A PROPOSAL THAT WOULD HAVE US TAKE A  
MODEST RISK IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, NAMELY THE LIMITATION OF ARMS.  
FROM THIS STEP FURTHER STEPS CAN FOLLOW - INDEED IT IS IMPORTANT  
THAT THEY DO SO. UNQUOTE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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22 Nov 83 23 12 44z 10

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0204 22NOV83  
TO/À TO PMDEL/DELHI DELIVER BY 230800  
INFO  
DISTR DISTR DMF IDA MRCP URR  
REF REF TEL FM ROME WTGR0432 OF 21NOV  
SUBJ/SUJ ---PM INITIATIVE:ITALIAN VIEWS

IN COURSE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON INF, 14-16NOV, CRAXI, AS REPORTED BY EMBASSY ROME, REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO PROPOSALS WHICH PM ~~HAD~~ PUT FORWARD DURING HIS VISIT TO <sup>R</sup>ROME. CRAXI RECALLED IN PARTICULAR THAT <sup>PM</sup>TRUDEAU <sup>H</sup>HAD ENVISAGED INSTITUTION DURING FORTHCOMING YEAR OF FORUM IN WHICH FIVE DECLARED NUCLEAR POWERS COULD CARRY OUT NEGOTIATIONS ON GLOBAL LIMITS TO ARMAMENTS. THAT QUESTION, CRAXI SAID, COULD NOT BE IGNORED OR PUT ASIDE INDEFINITELY, AS IF IT DID NOT EXIST. CRAXI ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE <sup>H</sup>HAD AGREED WITH TRUDEAU IN ROME ON TIMELINESS AND <sup>E</sup>USEFULNESS OF GIVING <sup>N</sup>REVIEWED PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF NATO AND WSAW PACT. IN SAME SPIRIT, HE UNDECLINED THAT CDE CONFERENCE IN STKHM WOULD OFFER SIMILAR POSSIBILITIES OF POLITICAL ACTIONS. <sup>R</sup>THE WAINED AGAINST DANGERS OF HORIZONTAL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. HE CONCLUDED BY ASSERTING THAT QUOTE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ITS INFLUENCE AND OF ITS CONCRETE AND EFFECTIVE POSSIBILITIES OF INITIATIVE, THE ITALIAN GOVT ACTS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO ACT, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO OVERRIDE SITUATIONS OF CRISIS, TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS OF CONFLICTS AND TO REDUCE CONFRONTATION AND TENSION. ALONG WITH THE

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 SGT CALDER	IDDZ	995-5912	 SGT L.A. DELVOIE



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0204 CONFIDENTIAL

12

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SECURITY MEASURES WHICH GUARANTEE IT, PEACE MUST BE CONSOLIDATED  
THROUGH THE ORGANIZATION OF A DIFFERENT <sup>START HALF</sup> QUOTE STRUCTURE OF POLITI-  
CAL RELATIONSHIP <sup>END HALF</sup> QUOTE AND A MORE INTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC  
AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND OF COOPERATION IN GENERAL. <sup>UNQUOTE</sup>



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
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22 Nov 83 2321 422 10

SECURITY/ S E C R E T  
SÉCURITÉ / CDN EYES ONLY

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0203 22NOV83

TO/À TO PMDEL/DELHI DELIVER BY 23<sup>0800</sup>~~4000~~

INFO INFO PCOOTT/CARON

REF DISTR MINA DMF ETD ETN

SUBJ/SUJ REF YOURTEL PMDL0004 18NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:POSSIBLE DECLARATION BY CHOGM

FURTHER TO YOUR REFTEL IN WHICH YOU INDICATE THAT WORDS QUOTE OR  
OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES UNQUOTE WERE DELETED FROM POINT 6  
OF DRAFT DECLARATION, ~~AND AFTER DISCUSSION WITH DMF~~, WE WISH TO DRAW  
FOLLOWING POINTS TO YOUR ATTN:

(1)INDIA DETONATED A SO-CALLED PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE(PNE) IN  
MAY 1974 AND HAS CONSEQUENTLY REFUSED SINCE THAT TIME TO ACKNOWLEDGE  
THAT THERE IS NO/NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SUCH  
DEVICES.

(2)NPT,WHICH IS CORE OF CDA S NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY,SPECIFICALLY  
DEALS WITH QUOTE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES  
UNQUOTE.

(3)INDIA MIGHT WELL FIND IT <sup>EASIER</sup> ~~POSSIBLE~~ TO ACCEPT POINT 6 AS CONVEYED  
IN REFTEL,GIVEN THE SEMANTIC DISTINCTION INDIA MAKES BETWEEN NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS AND PNE S,I.E.IT COULD SIGN A DECLARATION RENOUNCING  
ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STILL RETAIN OPTION OF DETONATING  
PNE S.

(4)THIS MAY HOWEVER BE INTERPRETED BOTH BY INDIA IN CONTEXT OF OUR

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 SIG J McNeely XXXXXRRKXXRR/SC	IDDZ	5-5912	 SIG L.A. Delvoie



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow  
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PAGE TWO IDDZ0203 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

12|

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BILATERAL RELATIONS AND BY INNATL COMMUNITY IN CONTEXT OF OUR  
COMMITMENT TO NPT, AS CDA BACKING AWAY FROM NPT. AS RECENTLY AS PM S  
MTL SPEECH WE HAVE RESTATED CDA S COMMITMENT TO NPT.

(5) MAJORITY OF CWLTH STATES ARE NPT SIGNATORIES AND SEVERAL,  
AUSTRALIA AND NZ IN PARTICULAR, HAVE PARTICULAR ATTACHMENT TO NPT.  
A SHIFT FROM NPT LANGUAGE IN POINT (6) MAY CAUSE THEM DIFFICULTIES.

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 12 10

FM/DE **FM EXTOTT IDDZ0202 22NOV83**

TO/À **TO PDEL/DELHI DELIVER BY 230000**

INFO

DISTR **DISTR NIDA DNF ETD ETN**

REF **REF YOURTEL 2226 OF 22NOV**

SUBJ/SUJ **---PPLS REQUEST FOR BACKGROUND NPT INFO FOR CHOGM**

**0. PLUG ARE THE 119 NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES WHICH HAVE SIGNED AND RATIFIED THE NPT:**

**(CONCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED LIST)**

**2. PLUG CONHEL STATES HAVE SIGNED AND RATIFIED: ANIGUA AND BARBUDA, AUSTRALIA, BAHAMAS, BANGLADESH, BARBADOS, BOTSWANA, CANADA, CYPRUS, FIJI, GAMBIA, GHANA, GRENADA, JAMAICA, KENYA, LESOTHO, MALAYSIA, MALDIVES, MALTA, MAURITIUS, NAURU, NEWZEALAND, NIGERIA, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, ST. LUCIA, SIERRA LEONE, SINGAPORE, SOLOMON ISLANDS, SRI LANKA, SWAZILAND, TONGA, TUVALU, UGANDA (TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO HAS SIGNED BY NOT/NOT YET RATIFIED).**

**3. AS FOR CONHEL STATES WHICH HAVE NOT/NOT SIGNED THE NPT, THE GENERAL EXPLANATION THAT APPLIES TO MOST IS THAT THEY HAVE NO/NO NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND NONE PLANNED IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, HENCE JOINING THE NPT IS NOT/NOT A PRIORITY. FOR MANY IT IS ALSO A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE AS THEY ARGUE THAT THE NPT IS DISCRIMINATORY AS IT CREATES TWO ORDERS OF STATES. SEVERAL BLACK AFRICAN STATES HAVE ALSO ARGUED THAT UNTIL SOUTH AFRICA SIGNS THE NPT THEY WILL NOT/NOT GIVE UP THEIR RIGHT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PLUG CONHEL STATES HAVE NOT/**

D.2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <b>J.A. McNEE</b>	<b>IDDZ</b>	<b>995-5912</b>	SIG <b>L.A. DELVOIE</b>

## MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.  
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC  
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and " (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.  
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

## PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:  
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC  
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et " (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:  
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quant il comporte une signature.

**PARA 14**

Table 5

Annex on 31 December 1982 with respect to the signing of, the ratification of, or accession or succession to NPT by non-nuclear-weapon States and to the conclusion of safeguards agreements between the Agency and these States in connection with NPT

Non-nuclear-weapon States which have signed, ratified, acceded to or succeeded to NPT <sup>a</sup> (1)	Date of ratification, accession or succession <sup>b</sup> (2)	Safeguards agreement with the Agency (3)	INFCIRC (4)
Afghanistan	4 February 1970	In force: 20 February 1978	257
Antigua and Barbuda	1 November 1981		
Australia	23 January 1973	In force: 10 July 1974	217
Austria	27 June 1969	In force: 23 July 1972	156
Banamas	10 July 1973		
Bangladesh	27 September 1979	In force: 11 June 1982	301
Barbados	21 February 1980		
Belgium	2 May 1975	In force: 21 February 1977	193
Benin	31 October 1972		
Bolivia <sup>b</sup>	26 May 1970	Signed: 23 August 1974	
Botswana	28 April 1969		
Bulgaria	5 September 1969	In force: 29 February 1972	178
Burundi	19 March 1971		
Canada	8 January 1969	In force: 21 February 1972	164
Cape Verde	24 October 1979		
Central African Republic	25 October 1970		
Chad	10 March 1971		
China, Republic of	27 January 1970		
Colombia <sup>b</sup>			
Congo	23 October 1978		
Costa Rica <sup>b</sup>	3 March 1970	In force: 22 November 1979	278
Cyprus	10 February 1970	In force: 26 January 1973	189
Czechoslovakia	22 July 1969	In force: 3 March 1972	173
Democratic Kampuchea	2 June 1972		
Democratic Yemen	1 June 1979		
Denmark <sup>b</sup>	3 January 1969	In force: 21 February 1977	193
Dominican Republic <sup>b</sup>	24 July 1971	In force: 11 October 1973	201
Ecuador <sup>b</sup>	7 March 1969	In force: 10 March 1975	231
Egypt	26 February 1981	In force: 30 June 1982	302
El Salvador <sup>b</sup>	11 July 1972	In force: 22 April 1975	232
Ethiopia	5 February 1970	In force: 2 December 1977	261
Fiji	14 July 1972	In force: 22 March 1973	192
Finland	5 February 1969	In force: 9 February 1972	155
Gabon	19 February 1974	Signed: 3 December 1979	
Gambia	12 May 1975	In force: 8 August 1978	277
German Democratic Republic	31 October 1969	In force: 7 March 1972	181
Germany, Federal Republic of	2 May 1975	In force: 21 February 1977	193
Ghana	5 May 1970	In force: 17 February 1975	226
Greece <sup>b</sup>	11 March 1970	Accession: 17 December 1981	193
Grenada	19 August 1974		
Guatemala <sup>b</sup>	22 September 1970	In force: 1 February 1982	299
Guinea-Bissau	20 August 1976		
Haiti <sup>b</sup>	2 June 1970	Signed: 6 January 1975	
Holy See	25 February 1971	In force: 1 August 1972	187
Honduras <sup>b</sup>	16 May 1973	In force: 18 April 1975	235
Hungary	27 May 1969	In force: 30 March 1972	174
Iceland	18 July 1969	In force: 16 October 1974	215
Indonesia	12 July 1979	In force: 14 July 1980	283
Iran, Islamic Republic of	2 February 1970	In force: 15 May 1974	214
Iraq	29 October 1969	In force: 29 February 1972	172
Ireland	1 July 1968	In force: 21 February 1977	193
Italy	2 May 1975	In force: 21 February 1977	193
Ivory Coast	6 March 1973	Approved by the Board, Feb. 1983	
Jamaica <sup>b</sup>	5 March 1970	In force: 6 November 1970	265
Japan	8 June 1976	In force: 2 December 1977	255

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Jordan	11 February 1970	In force: 21 February 1978	258
Kenya	11 June 1970		
Korea, Republic of	23 April 1975	In force: 14 November 1975	236
<del>Kuwait</del>			
Lao People's Democratic Republic	20 February 1970		
Lebanon	15 July 1970	In force: 5 March 1973	191
Lesotho	20 May 1970	In force: 12 June 1973	199
Liberia	5 March 1970		
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	26 May 1975	In force: 8 July 1980	202
Liechtenstein	20 April 1978	In force: 4 October 1979	275
Luxembourg	2 May 1975	In force: 21 February 1977	193
Madagascar	8 October 1970	In force: 14 June 1973	200
Malaysia	5 March 1970	In force: 29 February 1972	182
Maldives	7 April 1970	In force: 2 October 1977	253
Mali	10 February 1970		
Malta	6 February 1970		
Mauritius	25 April 1969	In force: 31 January 1973	190
Mexico	21 January 1969	In force: 14 September 1973	197
Mongolia	14 May 1969	In force: 5 September 1972	188
Morocco	27 November 1970	In force: 10 February 1975	228
Nauru	7 June 1982		
Nepal	5 January 1970	In force: 22 June 1972	186
Netherlands	2 May 1975	In force: 21 February 1977	193
New Zealand	10 September 1969	In force: 29 February 1972	185
Nicaragua	6 March 1973	In force: 29 December 1976	246
Nigeria	27 September 1968		
Norway	5 February 1969	In force: 1 March 1972	177
Panama	13 January 1977		
Papua New Guinea	25 Jan 1982		
Paraguay	4 February 1970	In force: 20 March 1979	279
Peru	3 March 1970	In force: 1 August 1979	273
Philippines	5 October 1972	In force: 16 October 1974	216
Poland	12 June 1969	In force: 11 October 1972	179
Portugal	15 December 1977	In force: 14 June 1979	272
Romania	4 February 1970	In force: 27 October 1972	180
Rwanda	20 May 1975		
St. Lucia	28 December 1979		
Samoa	17 March 1975	In force: 22 January 1979	268
San Marino	10 August 1970	Approved by the Board, Feb. 1977	
Senegal	17 December 1970	In force: 14 January 1980	276
Sierra Leone	26 February 1975	Signed: 10 November 1977	
Singapore	10 March 1976	In force: 18 October 1977	259
Solomon Islands	17 June 1981		
Somalia	5 March 1970		
Sri Lanka	5 March 1979	Signed: 5 July 1980	
Sudan	31 October 1973	In force: 7 January 1977	245
Suriname	30 June 1976	In force: 2 February 1979	269
Swaziland	11 December 1969	In force: 28 July 1975	227
Sweden	9 January 1970	In force: 14 April 1975	234
Switzerland	9 March 1977	In force: 6 September 1970	264
Syrian Arab Republic	24 September 1969		
Thailand	7 December 1972	In force: 16 May 1974	241
Togo	26 February 1970		
Tonga	7 July 1971	Approved by the Board, Feb. 1975	
<del>Tuvalu and Niue</del>			

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Tunisia	26 February 1970		
Turkey	17 April 1980	In force: 1 September 1981	295
Tuvalu	19 January 1979		
Uganda	20 October 1982		
United Republic of Cameroon	8 January 1969		
Upper Volta	3 March 1970		
Uruguay	31 August 1970	In force: 17 September 1976	157
Venezuela	26 September 1975	In force: 11 March 1982	300
Viet Nam	14 June 1982		
<del>Yemen Arab Republic</del>			
Yugoslavia	3 March 1970	In force: 28 December 1973	204
Zaire	4 August 1970	In force: 9 November 1972	183

- a/ The information reproduced in columns (1) and (2) was provided to the Agency by the depositary Governments of NPT, and an entry in column (1) does not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the Secretariat concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
- b/ The relevant safeguards agreement was concluded in connection with both NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty.
- c/ The NPT safeguards agreement with Denmark (INFCIRC/176), in force since 1 March 1972, has been replaced by the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the Agency (INFCIRC/193) but still applies to the Faroe Islands.
- d/ An agreement had also been concluded in respect of the Netherlands Antilles (INFCIRC/229). This agreement entered into force on 5 June 1975.
- e/ The following States had signed NPT but not yet ratified it: Colombia, on 1 July 1968; Kuwait, on 15 August 1968; Trinidad and Tobago, on 22 August 1968; and the Yemen Arab Republic, on 23 September 1968.
- f/ The application of Agency safeguards in Greece under the agreement INFCIRC/166, provisionally in force since 1 March 1972, was suspended on 17 December 1981, at which date Greece acceded to the agreement of 5 April 1973 (INFCIRC/193) between the non-nuclear-weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the Agency.
- g/ The Agency was notified on 11 November 1982.



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PAGE TWO	IDDZ0202	CONFIDENTIAL	12	10
NOT SIGNED NPT (WITH INDIVIDUAL RATIONALE WHERE IT IS KNOWN):				
BELIZE				
GUYANA				
INDIA - HAS REJECTED SIGNING THE NPT (1) ON PRINCIPLE, BECAUSE THEY FIND IT DISCRIMINATORY AS IT CREATES TWO ORDERS OF STATES, (2) THEY REFUSE TO FOREGO THE BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. THEY HAVE ALSO ALLUDED TO THEIR PROXIMITY TO TWO NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES (USSR AND CHINA) AS AN ADDITIONAL REASON.				
KIRIBATI				
MALAWI - DOES NOT/NOT ATTACH HIGH PRIORITY TO THE NPT AND WISHES TO KEEP IN STEP WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS WHO DO NOT/NOT WANT TO SIGN UNTIL SOUTH AFRICA DOES.				
NAURU				
ST CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS				
ST VINCENT				
SEYCHELLES				
SOLOMON ISLANDS				
*TANZANIA				
UGANDA				
*ZAMBIA				
*ZIMBABWE				

...8

Page two and succeeding pages are to be identified as per the following examples:

PAGE TWO MGT0159 UNCLAS  
PAGE THREE AP00012 CONFD PERS INFO  
PAGE FOUR FP01469 RESTR  
PAGE FIVE GP00036 SECRET

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PAGE DEUX MGT0159 NONCLAS  
PAGE TROIS AP00012 CONFD RENS PERS  
PAGE QUATRE FP01469 RESTR  
PAGE CINQ GP00036 SECRET

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↓  
PAGE THREE IDDZ0202 CONFIDENTIAL

12|

10

\*THE SO-CALLED FRONT LINE STATES HAVE TAKEN THE LINE THAT THEY WILL  
NOT/NOT SIGN UNTIL SOUTH AFRICA DOES.

Page two and succeeding pages are to be identified as per the following examples:

PAGE TWO MGT0159 UNCLAS  
PAGE THREE AP00012 CONF PERS INFO  
PAGE FOUR FP01469 RESTR  
PAGE FIVE GP00036 SECRET

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**NOTE:** Les cotes de sécurité sont abrégées (à l'exception de SECRET) et non espacées à partir de la page deux.

CONFIDENTIAL

November 22, 1983

IDDZ-0201

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister and  
Secretary of State for External Affairs

PM Initiative on East-West Relations  
and International Security

As requested, we attach some brief notes on this subject for your appearance before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, on November 22.

L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

cc: DMF/Mr. Marchand

NOTES ON PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE ON  
EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Purpose and Proposals

The Prime Minister's principal purpose is to arrest and reverse the downward trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce the international tensions and risks of confrontation to which this trend has given rise.

The Prime Minister's chief proposal relates to the need to restore confidence and reestablish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the superpowers; to create a political framework for ongoing sectoral or technical negotiations between the two sides.

Subsidiary to this is a series of proposals in the field of arms control and disarmament which have substantive merit in themselves, and which, if they permitted sectoral progress, would contribute to improving the general climate in East-West relations:

- (a) A comprehensive approach to the limitation and then the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals by means of a conference of the five nuclear weapons states (USA, USSR, UK, France, China).
- (b) A concerted endeavour at the political level to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and especially to increase the number of states adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty prior to the NPT Review Conference in 1985.

- 2 -

- (c) A substantive Western response to the proposals put forward earlier this year by the East in the MBFR negotiations, and the injection of political momentum into these negotiations by means of a Foreign Ministers meeting in Vienna to coincide roughly with the tabling of a new Western proposal.
- (d) The inauguration of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) at senior political level in order to give this important conference political impetus at the outset (complementarity of military confidence building and political confidence building).

Although not integral to his initiative as pursued personally with other governments, the Prime Minister has also put forward publicly proposals relating to:

- (a) the mobility of ICBMs
- (b) high altitude anti-satellite systems
- (c) the verification of new weapons systems by national technical means

#### Programme

The Prime Minister's public programme has so far involved giving speeches in Guelph (October 27) and Montreal (November 13). His diplomatic and/or private programme has included:

- 3 -

- (a) letters to all NATO heads of government (October 22-25).
- (b) letters to Soviet and Chinese leaders (early November).
- (c) meetings with President Mitterrand of France,  
Chancellor Kohl of the FRG, PM Lubbers and Queen  
Beatrix of the Netherlands, PM Martens of Belgium,  
HH the Pope, PM Craxi of Italy, PM Thatcher of the UK,  
PM Nakasone of Japan, President Kaunda of Zambia,  
General Ershad of Bangladesh.
- (d) private meetings with Robert McNamara, General Rogers  
(SACEUR), George Kennan, General Brent Scowcroft,  
members of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Georgi  
Arbatov.
- (e) further letters to all NATO heads of government  
(November 17-18).
- (f) telephone conversation with President Reagan (November 17).
- (g) letters to PM Hawke and PM Muldoon (November 18).
- (h) the dispatch of a personal emissary to Moscow and  
Peking (November 21-27).
- (i) participation in CHOGM and furthering initiative in  
that forum.

### Reactions

The reactions of governments which have so far given  
an indication of their thinking about the PM's initiative may  
be very roughly summarized as follows:

- 4 -

USA: Generally supportive of broad purpose, but serious reservations about some specific proposals

France: Positive and generally supportive, with reservations as to timing

FRG: Positive and generally supportive

Belgium: Very positive, with some reservations as to timing

Holland: Very positive, with some reservations as to timing

Italy: Generally supportive, but no very well-defined reaction

UK: Generally supportive of broad purpose, but reservations about some specific proposals

Norway: Very positive and fully supportive

Spain: Very positive

Denmark: Very positive and fully supportive

Japan: Very positive and fully supportive

USSR: Interested and cautiously positive

PRC: Interested but non-committal

Media reactions vary greatly, but again can be very roughly summarized as follows:

Canada: Generally very positive, with occasional scepticism relating to PM's motives, standing, credibility, etc. Negative comments relate chiefly to choice of Liberal Party forum for Montreal speech

USA: Generally very positive, occasionally enthusiastic

Western Europe: Generally positive, occasionally tinged with scepticism

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COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING  
NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 23-30, 1983

PROVISIONAL TIMETABLE

Tuesday, November 22

- 1430 - Meeting of Senior Officials at Vigyan Bhavan
- 1730 - Prime Minister's aircraft arrives New Delhi
- 2000 - Dinner for Senior Officials by Indian Foreign Ministry at Oberoi Hotel (Lounge Suit)
- 2030 - Prime Minister's meeting with Secretary-General Ramphal

Wednesday, November 23

- 0815 - Invitees other than Heads of Government at
- 0845 - Conference Hall (Gate Number 2)
- Each Delegation allowed six places plus High Commissioner
- 0850 - Commonwealth Secretary-General arrives
- 0855 - Indian Prime Minister arrives
- 0900 - Heads of Government arrive and are received by
- 0920 - Commonwealth Secretary-General in Lounge
- 0925 - Heads of Government and Commonwealth Secretary-General move from Lounge to Rostrum in main Conference Hall
- 0943 - Indian National Anthem
- 0945 - Opening Session

The Opening Session will be in the presence of a large number of invited guests and the media. PM Gandhi will be in the chair and give the Address of Welcome followed by that of the Secretary-General. In addition there will be five speeches in reply. The Prime Minister has been asked by Sonny Ramphal to deliver one of these. The formal photograph of Heads of Delegation will be taken immediately following the speeches.

.../2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1100 - The First Session (expected to be short) will consider the Agenda and the suggested guidelines on Style and Format (for Heads of Government and Commonwealth Secretary-General only)
- 1230 - Secretary-General's reception at Vigyan Bhavan  
This will include the Indian and world press
  - Lunch
- 1500 - Second Session commences with discussion of the World Political Scene. Prime Minister will be lead speaker
- 1730 - Reception for Heads of Government by President of India at Rashtrapati Bhavan
- 2000 - Banquet given by the Queen for Heads of Government and spouses (Black tie or national dress and decorations)

Thursday, November 24

- 0930 - Executive Session
- 1215 - Visit to Trade Fair Exhibition followed by Prime Minister's Lunch for Caribbean Group
- 1500 - Executive Session
  - Audience for Prime Minister with the Queen (alternative is Friday)
- 2030 - Dinner for Heads of Government given by PM Gandhi at Ashoka Hotel followed by cultural program (Lounge suit)
  - Dinner for Foreign Ministers by Indian Foreign Minister Rao at Maurya Hotel (Lounge suit)

Friday, November 25

- 0930 - Executive Session
- 1200
- 1230 - Heads of Government fly to Goa for Retreat (approx)
- 1500 - Arrive Goa (Fort Aguada Hotel) (approx)
- 1900 - Queen's reception for Foreign Ministers, High Commissioners and Senior Officials (Lounge suit)

.../3

000610

Sunday, November 27

- 0830 - Senior Officials depart for Agra
- 1800 - Return to Delhi
- 1830 - Heads of Government return from Goa
- 2000

Monday, November 28

- 0930 - Executive Session
- 1200
- 1230 - Lunch hosted by Mrs. Thatcher for 21 Heads of Government, including Prime Minister (Antigua and Barbuda to Malaysia)
- 1500 - Executive Session
- 2000 - Dinner and cultural program for Foreign Ministers and Senior Officials at Trade Fair Exhibition (Lounge suit)

Tuesday, November 29

- 0930 - Executive Session
  - 1500 - Executive Session
  - 1700 - Closing press conference chaired by PM Gandhi and the Secretary-General, and release of Communiqué
- Following this any Head of Delegation may give a press conference or call upon their officials to do so

Wednesday, November 30

- 0930 - Leave Delhi for the Gulf States

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OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

Tuesday, November 22, 1983 at 10:30 a.m.  
Operations Centre Conference Room (A-8)

PROPOSED ORDER OF BUSINESS

1. Deputies' Priorities
2. Current Issues:
  - Grenada Situation Report Mr. Graham
  - Cyprus Report Mr. Molgat
  - Lebanon Situation Mr. Stanford
  - PM's Travel and Peace Initiative:
    - o Japan
    - o Bangladesh
    - o Pearson Mission
  - Nuclear Sales Abroad Mr. Campbell
  - Visits Management - 1984
    - o Prime Minister
    - o DEA Ministers
3. Cabinet Committee Schedule Mr. Shortliffe  
Parliamentary/Legislative Business Mr. Shortliffe
4. Other Business

*DEC. 19<sup>or 20</sup> - AUCTION WITH  
55179 IN CHAIR*



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SUJET • Operations Committee, Nov. 22, 1983

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
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Date	November 21, 1983
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... Attached (on the reverse side) is the proposed order of business for the Operations Committee meeting of November 22, 1983.

E.R. Johnston  
Director  
Senior Management Secretariat

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12 Purpose of Travel/Objet du voyage

Temporary duty on PM Task Force (IDDZ)

(ALL RESERVATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AND TICKET ISSUED BY EMB WSHDC)

13 City and Country/Ville et pays <b>EA#172 - 8:17 pm Depart Washington, D.C.</b>		14 Dates <b>Nov. 22</b>		15 Additional Information/Renseignements supplémentaires (circle ONE in each Category) (Dans i, ii) et iii), encercler la réponse appropriée.)	
<b>Arrive Ottawa - 9:30 p.m.</b>		<b>Nov. 22</b>		(i) Type of Travel: Insp (RIP only) i) But du voyage: Insp. (RIP seulement)	
<b>(Embassy Hotel reserved)</b>				Liaison/Liaison	
<b>EA#173 Depart Ottawa - 8:20 a.m.</b>		<b>Nov. 24</b>		Conf/Conf.	
<b>Arrive Washington, D.C.</b>		<b>Nov. 24</b>		Training/Formation	
				Other/Autre	
Certified as required by Sec. 25 (1) of the F.A. Act. Certifié conformément à para. 25 (1) de la loi sur l'admin. fin.				(ii) ADMship PFZ PTD PFG ii) SMA	
				PFC PUA PTE	
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				(iii) Overtime/Leave Implications YES NO iii) Répercussions en termes d'heures suppl./de congés OUI NON	
				(iv) Estimated Total Cost \$ <b>450</b> iv) Coût total prévu	

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REFERENCE •  
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SUBJECT • Radio-Canada - Le Point- 17 novembre 1983  
SUJET Le plan de paix de M. Trudeau

Security/Sécurité	NON CLASSIFIE
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	22 novembre 1983
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Le Premier ministre Trudeau entreprend donc aujourd'hui la deuxième étape de son périple de la paix autour du monde. Après l'Europe, la semaine dernière, en effet, aujourd'hui M. Trudeau s'en va au Japon puis, la semaine prochaine, New-Delhi, en Inde, où se tient la Conférence des pays du Commonwealth. Ce qui veut dire qu'au total M. Trudeau aura parlé de son plan de paix à plus de cinquante chefs d'Etat quand il va revenir à Ottawa, début décembre. Je vous rappelle brièvement les quatre points du plan Trudeau:

1er point: M. Trudeau propose aux cinq puissances nucléaires, les Etats-Unis, l'URSS, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et la Chine de négocier des limites à leur potentiel atomique sur la base d'égalité entre les deux grands d'abord, les Etats-Unis et l'URSS, et puis sur la base de limites proportionnelles pour les trois autres.

2ème point: M. Trudeau propose de renforcer le traité de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires de 1970 parce que plusieurs petits pays en effet sont en train de se doter d'armes atomiques, si ce n'est déjà fait dans certains cas, ce qui, selon M. Trudeau augmente les risques.

3ème point: la désescalade entre l'Est et l'Ouest en Europe. M. Trudeau propose qu'il y ait équilibre des forces conventionnelles; pour l'instant l'URSS en a plus que les pays d'Europe. M. Trudeau propose aussi qu'il y ait équilibre des forces nucléaires en Europe, ce que l'on appelle les euromissiles.

4ème et dernier point: M. Trudeau suggère que l'on arrête la course aux nouvelles techniques de guerre comme ces fameux systèmes anti-satellites à très haute altitude envisagés notamment par l'administration Reagan.

La semaine dernière les Européens avaient plutôt réagi favorablement au plan de M. Trudeau mais à Paris toutefois le président François Mitterand, dans un discours, a réaffirmé le refus de la France de participer

- 2 -

à un forum des cinq puissances nucléaires tant que les Etats-Unis et l'URSS, les deux grands, n'auront pas considérablement réduit leurs forces à eux.

Ce qui nous intéresse surtout ce soir c'est la réaction américaine à l'initiative de M. Trudeau, plutôt la quasi absence de réaction américaine. Rejoignons donc à Washington le ministre politique à l'Ambassade du Canada à Washington, M. Jeremy Kinsman.

Annonceur: M. Kinsman, est-ce qu'on considère à Washington, dans les milieux politiques, la démarche de M. Trudeau comme de l'ingérence dans la politique américaine.

Jeremy Kinsman: Non, je ne crois pas, Monsieur. Vous savez il y a plusieurs milieux politiques à Washington. De la part de l'administration, je crois que grosso modo on trouve que ce sont des efforts de la part de M. Trudeau qui sont bien utiles. Ils ont évidemment remarqué une détérioration eux-mêmes entre l'Est et l'Ouest et ces efforts sont considérés comme quelque chose d'utile.

A. Est-ce qu'on les prend au sérieux, vraiment, à Washington. Au gouvernement américain, est-ce qu'on prend ça au sérieux, le plan de M. Trudeau, les quatre points qu'il a énoncés.

J.K. Bien, les quatre points, vous savez dans le détail ne font pas de commentaires parce qu'en fait ils sont en négociation avec l'Union soviétique et ce serait une imprudence peut-être de dégager à Washington une opinion sur quelque chose de spécifique formellement avant qu'on ne connaisse l'opinion de celui avec qui on négocie.

A. Mais, est-ce qu'on ne devrait pas s'attendre au moins de M. Reagan à une déclaration quelconque ou de la part de M. Shultz, amis de quelqu'un de haut niveau à Washington qui commenterait publiquement cette initiative de M. Trudeau. Ça fait 21 jours déjà, on a rien entendu. On sait qu'il y a eu une lettre mais on en connaît pas le contenu.

.../3

- 3 -

J.K. Le contenu de la lettre, je crois, est dans le sens où ces efforts sont certainement vus de façon positive à Washington, dans l'ensemble des choses. Je devrais aussi vous confier que la presse américaine regarde les efforts de M. Trudeau aussi avec une attitude assez positive.

A. Il y avait hier à Ottawa une délégation de gens du State Department des Etats-Unis et il y a un haut fonctionnaire américain dont on ne connaît pas le nom mais qui aurait dit à des journalistes, en tous les cas, les journalistes l'ont cité: "Ce que le gouvernement américain n'aime pas dans la position de M. Trudeau c'est la prémisse selon laquelle il n'y a pas de volonté politique ni d'un côté ni de l'autre entre les deux grands pour vraiment dialoguer très sérieusement". Par conséquent, si on n'aime pas ces prémisses comment on peut accepter le reste du plan Trudeau à Washington?

J.K. Oui, je crois que c'est une analyse de prémisses qui ne fait qu'une analyse partielle, n'est-ce pas? D'abord, M. Trudeau n'envisage aucunement quelque ingérence que ce soit dans les négociations qui se déroulent actuellement entre les Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique. Ceci est clair et plus c'est clair à Washington, évidemment l'attitude sera très positive. Mais en ce qui concerne les prémisses, vu le fait que les Etats-Unis sont en négociations avec l'Union soviétique, ils ne veulent pas vraiment admettre quelque responsabilité que ce soit pour quelque détérioration que ce soit dans le climat actuel entre les deux pays, entre l'Est et l'Ouest, généralement. Je crois que c'est très normal pour un pays qui est dans une négociation.

A. Le président français, François Mitterrand, a déclaré que lui, en tous cas, refuserait de participer à un des points de M. Trudeau au forum des cinq puissances nucléaires. Est-ce que vous avez aussi l'impression qu'à Washington on refuserait de participer à une négociation d'un nouvel équilibre des cinq puissances nucléaires.

J.K. Non, pas du tout. Je ne veux pas vous corriger dans votre interprétation de ce qu'a dit M. Mitterrand mais je crois que si M. Mitterrand a justement dit, il a soulevé des conditions qui seraient nécessaires préalablement pour une telle participation,

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- 4 -

conditions qui ont été énoncées au Nations Unies.

A. En tous cas, l'impression qu'on a ici au Canada c'est que le Canada ne compte pas tellement dans la politique de M. Reagan en ces matières et que même la démarche de M. Trudeau ne semble pas l'impressionner beaucoup. On a l'impression qu'il se sera au moins prononcer là-dessus.

J.K. Bien, c'est mon impression. Vous voyez que les media américains qui sont pour la plupart maintenant responsables de disséminer quelque impression que ce soit, vous savez, ne sont pas souvent émus par des idées qui ont leur origine en dehors des Etats-Unis. Ils remarquent évidemment des tremblements de terre désastreux, des attentats quelconques, des guerres, mais des idées, alors ça c'est difficile à percer les media, les actualités télévisées aux Etats-Unis comme vous le savez très bien.

A. M. Kinsman, je vous remercie beaucoup.

Le directeur des  
relations avec les media

*D. Berkeley Jones*  
pour John J. Noble

FILE DIV DIARY 1DD2

IDA/D.A.SNIDER/6-1251/pec

Brief for NATO/MIN and  
Visit of Austrian SecGen

IDA-1316 28-4-6  
November 22, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY- BUILDING  
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE)

BACKGROUND

At the Second CSCE Follow-Up Meeting recently concluded in Madrid, one of Canada's objectives, shared by our NATO allies, was "to cooperate in efforts to relax East-West tensions by enhancing security and cooperation in Europe". This objective was partially achieved when the thirty-five CSCE participants adopted by consensus the mandate for a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) which will begin in Stockholm on January 17, 1984.

The aim of the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) is to strengthen confidence in order to pave the way to disarmament in conventional and, ultimately, nuclear weapons. Previous attempts to disarm, for instance at MBFR, by first dealing with capabilities and counting numbers which would later be verified, have not been able to break the arms spiral. One side, mistrusting the intentions of the other, attempts to redress perceived imbalances which prompts the other side to take counter measures. The root of this lack of confidence is not only concern about what the other side can do, but doubts about what it intends to do. CSBMs address intentions. If they were clarified, a normal pattern of military behaviour could be established. States would be confident that they are not threatened and that they could detect changes in intentions when one side broke the normal pattern of activities. In these circumstances, States would have the confidence to reduce forces to more stable and lower levels. Any force reductions, however, would be the subject of the second phase of the CDE. The mandate of the CDE does not specify any kind of armed forces. The West intends that the CDE should deal with conventional forces. The WPO and the NNA may wish to talk about nuclear forces as well.

The mandate, which is a compromise arrived at after three years of difficult negotiations, directs that the Conference will be carried out in two phases; the first will deal with Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Largely meeting Western views, these CSBMs are to be applicable to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, according to specific criteria: military significance, politically binding and provided with forms of verification according to their content. Although the text of the mandate follows essentially Western lines, there are sufficient

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ambiguities in it which will undoubtedly be exploited by the Soviet Union. They will try to introduce such declaratory measures as non-aggression pacts and to extend the CSBM zone into the North Atlantic. At the same time they can be expected to put up stiff opposition to the adoption of Western proposals designed to lead ultimately to a greater transparency in military activities. As a result of this diametrical difference in philosophy and objectives, the first phase of the Conference will be a prolonged one, lasting at least until the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting in 1986.

The West Europeans, in particular the Germans, have also placed great emphasis on the holding of a CDE. They wish to be able to demonstrate to their respective publics that despite any INF deployment they are making all possible efforts in the field of arms control. They would also like to be able to point to this new and on-going conference as evidence that INF deployment has not disrupted the political and arms control dialogue with the East. Other countries, however, such as the UK, have been quick to point out that the CDE should be seen as complementary to all ongoing arms control and disarmament efforts but not as a priority as in the same sense as INF/START.

At the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting the participating CSCE states will assess the progress achieved to date during the first phase of the Conference. Following the conclusion of the first phase the participants will decide a future CSCE Follow-Up Meeting the ways and appropriate means for the participating States to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe including the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next phase of the CDE. This condition was introduced at the insistence of the United States, which has serious reservations about the utility of negotiating arms control reductions on a consensus basis in a forum of 35 nations.

Complicating the CDE negotiations and frustrating those who are hoping for an early (by 1986) conclusion of Stage I will be the following factors:

- (a) the CDE will open at approximately the same time that the INF deployment will be commencing. Given their performance to date on this issue, the Soviet Union will use the event to propagandize. Because of the long-held desire of the USSR to have a European Security Conference (Litvinov made the first proposal in the 1930's), it is considered unlikely that it would boycott the CDE;

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- (b) due to the presidential election next year, the United States will avoid making major policy decisions from mid-July until at least mid-November and possibly until early in the new year (1985);
- (c) there is a body of opinion which believes that the present Soviet leadership is not in complete control of the military establishment. If this proves to be the case, the political leadership may not be able to make the necessary concessions in the CDE which the military perceive as compromising in any way its ability to wage war;
- (d) some NNA (notably Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) do not appear to have given full consideration to the implications to their national defence plans that the adoption of a set of concrete, militarily significant and verifiable CSBMs would have. Once the full realization strikes them, they too may be reluctant to make concessions because, unlike the members of the two alliances, they alone are responsible for their own defence;
- (e) the Maltese have demonstrated a propensity to misuse the consensus principle in pursuit of their own goals. It seems a certainty that they will do it again in the CDE.

The foregoing suggests that Stage I of the CDE will be a long (six years plus), sometimes acrimonious, and difficult conference. Success will come slowly, with the first signs unlikely to appear until 1986.

The Preparatory Meeting for the CDE was held in Helsinki from October 25 to November 11, 1983 and was played out in a low-key, business-like manner. From their performance, it was clear that the Russians, who are undoubtedly looking forward to the Stockholm Conference as a forum to publicize their special views on arms control, did not want anything to happen that would cast them in the spoilers role. Consequently, the Helsinki meeting proved an easier negotiation than anticipated. An agenda for the CDE, which for the most part reflects Western interests, was adopted and it was agreed that for the first year of the Conference there would be four sessions totalling twenty-nine weeks.

#### CANADIAN POSITION

During the first phase at Stockholm, Canada and the rest of our NATO allies will attempt:

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- (a) to undertake, in stages, new effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament;
- (b) to negotiate and adopt a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

An additional Canadian objective will be to strengthen our relations with Europe - the whole of Europe, including the Neutrals and Non-Aligned as well as the nations of Eastern Europe - by participating actively in and contributing to the deliberations and resolution of their political and security concerns. To achieve these goals, Canada and our allies in NATO will present a comprehensive package of mutually supportive CSBMs which, if adopted and implemented, could set the stage for meaningful arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Prime Minister Trudeau emphasized during his recent consultations with European leaders that active Canadian participation in the CDE is a significant factor in his initiative on international security. He has pointed out that should the INF deployments prove necessary, the Conference will have considerable symbolic significance for Western public opinion as demonstrating the renewed commitment of Western governments to disarmament. He also proposed that the CDE be given a visible political impetus at the outset by being inaugurated at the Head of Government or Foreign Minister level. From their comments, it is clear that the European leaders with whom he spoke shared the Prime Minister's views and it seems certain that all the Foreign Ministers of the EC-10 will attend the opening of the Conference. It remains to be seen whether the notion that the Conference be inaugurated at a higher level will gain support during the next few weeks.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---CDE/MBFR AND NAC MINISTERIAL

TAYLOR CONVEYED ELEMENTS OF PMS LET(FIRST REFTEL)TO COLLEAGUES AT PERMREPS LUNCHEON,22NOV.RE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AT INAUGURAL MTG OF STKHM/CDE CONFERENCE,NETH,DANISH,FRG AND SPANISH PERMREP SAID THEIR FOREIGN MINS HAD ALREADY TAKEN DECISION TO PARTICIPATE.(THIS OBVIOUSLY NOT/NOT COMPLETE LIST-FRENCH PERMREP DID NOT/NOT SPEAK). 2.RE PROPOSAL TO ENLIVEN MFR NEGOTIATION THROUGH APPLICATION OF POLITICAL CHARGE,REACTIONS WERE MORE GUARDED.UK PERMREP REITERATED EARLIER EXPRESSED VIEWS TO EFFECT THAT THEY WERE NOT/NOT SURE WESTERN RESPONSE TO EASTERN MOVE WAS CALLED FOR AT THIS TIME;WHAT EASTERN MOVEMENT HAD TAKEN PLACE COULD BE SEEN AS TESTIMONY TO EFFECTIVENESS OF WESTERN FIRMNESS.USA PERMREP SAID THEY SHARED UK VIEW AND WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY ON THIS AT FRI 25NOV COUNCIL MTG WITH AHG BRIEFING TEAM.FRG PERMREP,ON OTHER HAND,SAID THEY WERE IN FAVOUR OF LOOKING CONSTRUCTIVELY AT IDEA OF TAKING NEW INITIATIVE IN MBFR CONTEXT.THIS WAS NOT/NOT,HOWEVER,TO BE TAKEN AS COMMITMENT ON PART OF FRG TO CANADIAN SUGGESTION.THEY WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN LAYING EMPHASIS IN DEC NAC MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE ON IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING DIALOGUE

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PAGE TWO YBGR7120 CONF

IN MBFR FORUM. NETH PERMREP SAID THEY FAVOURED SOME KIND OF WESTERN  
RESPONSE TO EASTERN MOVE. NO/NO ONE WAS PREPARED TO GO SO FAR AS PM  
IN HIS LET TO EFFECT THAT NATO RESPONSE BE FOLLOWED BY MTG IN VIENN'  
OF WESTERN GROUP OF FOREIGN MINS.

3. EXCHANGE OFFERS FORESHADOWING OF LIKELY REACTIONS WE CAN EXPECT  
TO HEAR, ALBEIT IN MORE DETAILED AND CAREFUL FASHION, AT 25 NOV AHG  
BRIEFING TO COUNCIL. NER OF PERMREPS URGED THAT DISCUSSION OF CDN  
PROPOSAL BE PURSUED FURTHER--POSSIBLY DURING AHG BRIEFING--IN ORDER  
TO PREPARE GROUND FOR MINS DISCUSSIONS IN DEC. WE SEE CERTAIN DANGERS  
INT HIS--THE MAIN ONE BEING THAT SUBJ COULD BE SQUEEZED DRY BY  
OFFICIALS BEFORE MINS HAD OPPORTUNITY TO GET THEIR TEETH INTO IT.  
CONSEQUENTLY, WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT, HAVING DRAWN ALLIES ATTNS TO  
DPM/SSEAS INTENTIONS RE MBFR AT DEC NAC MINISTERIAL, WE LEAVE IT AT  
THAT. GRATEFUL YOUR VIEWS.

CCC/054 221706Z YBGR7120

FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BGRAD ZLGR5134 22NOV83

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INFO LDN WSHDC PARIS BONN BNATO MOSCO FPEST EUCST WSAW

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IDA IDD RBRD IDX IDDZ ZSP ZSI REP

REF OURTEL ZLGR5132 21NOV

---PMS DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE:YUGOSLAV INTEREST

DURING NOV21 CALL ON MFA UNDERSECTY KOMATINA(SOON TO

BECOME SEC GEN OF UN CTTEE ON DISARMAMENT),HE MENTIONED

THAT HE WAS WRESTLING WITH REPLY TO LET FROM PM GANDHI

ASKING FOR VIEWS ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED FROM HER UNGA

SUMMIT.KOMATINA SUPPOSED THAT WE HAD RECEIVED SIMILAR

QUERY AND WONDERED IF PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE WOULD BE

RELEVANT TO OUR REPLY.HE WONDERED,INDEED,HOW PMS

INITIATIVE WAS FARING.FROM YUGOSLAV POINT OF VIEW IT

WAS RIGHT IDEA AT RIGHT TIME AND THEY WISHED IT EVERY SUCCESS.

2.I REFERRED TO WHAT I KNEW OF PMS MTL SPEECH,IN

PARTICULAR TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR MTG OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS.KOMATINA

IMMEDLY ASKED WHETHER THIS IDEA HAD BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO

PRES MITTERAND.I SAID THAT I DID NOT/NOT KNOW,BUT

VENTURED OPINION THAT PM WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE MADE IT PUBLIC

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PAGE TWO ZLGR5134 CONFD

IN WAY HE DID IF HE KNEW MITTERAND TO BE CATEGORICALLY  
OPPOSED. KOMATINA ASKED TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS  
IN PMS INITIATIVE, AND I UNDERTOOK TO PASS ON FURTHER INFO  
AS IT BECAME AVAILABLE TO US. GIVEN YUGOSLAV INTEREST AND  
CENTRAL ROLE IN NAM, I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KEEP THEM  
AU COURANT AT LEVEL OF FRANKNESS AT LEAST SLIGHTLY BEYOND  
WHAT IS ALREADY IN PUBLIC REALM, EVEN IF PM DOES NOT/NOT  
ENVISAGE INCLUDING THEM IN HIS CONSULTATIONS (WHICH I SEE  
NO/NO COMPELLING REASON FOR HIM TO DO).

3. BEFORE ASKING ABOUT PMS INITIATIVE, KOMATINA DISCUSSED  
IN SOME DETAIL YUGOSLAV ASSESSMENT OF WPO REACTION TO  
NATO INF DEPLOYMENT. THEIR INFO WAS, HE SAID, THAT  
HUNGARY, DDR, AND POLAND ALL WANTED INF NEGS TO CONTINUE  
EVEN AFTER DEPLOYMENT. SO, THEY BELIEVED, DID GROMYKO. FOR  
REASONS OF PRESTIGE, HOWEVER, USSR COULD NOT/NOT LET TALKS  
GO ON AFTER OUR DEPLOYMENT AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. IT  
WAS THEREFORE LIKELY THAT GENEVA INF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD  
BE BROKEN OFF-TO BE SUCCEEDED SOME WEEKS OR MONTHS LATER  
BY THEIR RESUMPTION IN SOME OTHER FORM. PERHAPS IT SHOULD  
BE ONE THAT APPROACHED QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
GLOBALLY-WITHOUT SUBDIVISION BETWEEN INTERMEDIATE AND  
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. PERHAPS THERE SHOULD BE MORE PARTICIPANTS  
(HE DID NOT/NOT MENTION BRITISH OR FRENCH, BUT NO/NO

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PAGE THREE ZLGR5134 CONF

DOUET HAD THEM IN MIND). IN ANY CASE, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT NEGOTIATING PROCESS WOULD CONTINUE. HE WAS ALSO SURE THAT MOSCO INTENDED TO CONTINUE IT. AS SOME SOVIET REP HAD SAID (I AM NOT/NOT SURE TO WHOM), DEPLOYMENT, WHILE EAD, WOULD NOT/NCT BE END OF WORLD.

4. KOMATINA BELIEVED THAT SS20 DEPLOYMENT HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN BY SOVIET MILITARY, RIDING ROUGHSHOD OVER WARNINGS THAT POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES WOULD ENSUE. GENERALS HAD EVIDENTLY THOUGHT THAT THEY COULD CARRY OFF SS20 PROGRAMME AS NOTHING MORE THAN QUOTE MODERNIZATION UNQUOTE WITHOUT ANYONE REALLY NOTICING. THEY HAD BEEN WRONG. KOMATINA THOUGHT THAT SOVIET OFFER TO REDUCE NUMBER OF SS20S TO 140 REFLECTED TACIT ADMISSION BY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THAT BALANCE HAD INDEED BEEN UPSET BY SS20 DEPLOYMENT.

5. IN DISCUSSING VARIOUS FORMS OF NEGS ON DISARMAMENT, KOMATINA DOUBTED THAT USSR WOULD ABANDON START OR MBFR TALKS EVEN IF THEY WALKED OUT OF INF NEGS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS ONE RESPECT IN WHICH PATTERN OF SALT AGMTS WAS OUT DATE. THEY COULD BE VERIFIED BY NATL TECHNICAL MEANS. ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY/MOBILITY MADE THIS NO/NO LONGER POSSIBLE. VERIFICATION MEANS WOULD BE KEY ISSUE IN FUTURE TALKS.

6. NOT/NOT BEING EXPERT IN DISARMAMENT MATTERS I DO NOT/NOT

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PAGF FOUR ZLGR5134 CONF

KNOW HOW MUCH OF THIS IS NEW OR INTERESTING. PUT REPORT IT  
FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH. KOMATINA, FORMER YUGOSLAV PERMREP  
IN NY. IS THOUGHTFUL AND ARTICULATE ON MATTERS PERTAINING  
TO DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT. HE IS ALSO CLEARLY INTERESTED  
IN AND SYMPATHETIC TO PMS INITIATIVE.

FRASER

CCC/148 221500Z ZLGR5134

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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DGINFO/DSPP

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---POST 1945 CONFLICT STATISTICS:IISS

INFO RESEARCH OFFICER IISS TELLS US THEY DO NOT/NOT NORMALLY  
HAVE BREAKDOWN OF CONFLICT STATISTICS PRIOR TO IISS FORMATION  
IN 1958.SURVEY AT OUR REQUEST HAS YIELDED FIGURES SOMEWHAT  
HIGHER THAN THOSE IN REFTEL.IISS COUNTS TOTAL OF 300 CONFLICTS -  
SINCE 1945,INCLUDING 70 BORDER CONFLICTS;9 QUOTE BORDER CONFLICTS -  
TO MAJOR WARS UNQUOTE;TEN MAJOR WARS INVOLVING OUTSIDE POWERS, -  
AND 211 CIVIL WARS/INSURRECTIONS.CONFLICTS IN PROGRESS NUMBER  
14 IF NORTHERN IRELAND AND SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA DISTURBANCES ARE  
INCLUDED(OTHERS:CAMBODIA,AFGHANISTAN;GULF;MIDDLE EAST;NORTHERN  
ETHIOPIA/ERITREA;MOZAMBIQUE;ANGOLA;NICARAGUA;HONDURAS;EL  
SALVADOR;E.TIMOR;POLISARIO/N.W.AFRICA).GRENADA IS NOT/NOT COUNTED.  
CCC/253 221233Z XNGR4162

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ZDK

MESSAGE  
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---CHATHAM HOUSE DIRECTOR DAVID WATT WRITES ON INF AND DUAL CONTROL

Ref

FOLLOWING IS ARTICLE WHICH DAVID WATT HAS WRITTEN ON INF

Subj

DEPLOYMENT IN BRITAIN, AND TOPICAL QUESTION OF CONTROL OVER

MISSILES.

COMCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACHED ARTICLE

(BEST COPY AVAILABLE)

PREPARED BY

DIVISION/DIRECTION

FILE NO.

APPROVED BY

J. Schram

J. Schram

2/3

NNIR

David Watt

# The missile strategy that could misfire

The arrival of the cruise missiles at Greenham Common marks the inexorable climax of one of the most ridiculous tragicomedies in the history of the Western alliance - which is saying a good deal. Everything is topsy-turvy. Virtually nobody - left, right or centre - who has studied the matter is truly and honestly convinced that these weapons have a satisfactory military justification. On the contrary, if they have any effect it is probably to weaken the link between Europe and the American strategic deterrent. They frighten the Russians, of course, but at what a political cost!

The process of deploying them has destabilized West Germany, created havoc in the Low Countries, set the British in an upror and given the Soviet Union its best propaganda against the US for many years. Our politicians are having to grit their teeth and make speeches neither they or anyone else really believes, saying how splendid it all is and how much Nato security is enhanced by it. But it is perfectly obvious that if one takes into account the political divisions within the Alliance and the morale of public opinion, our security is weaker now than when the argument started.

This is the kind of mess competent politicians are supposed to keep us out of. So how did we get into it? The answer is that we were caught in a trap of our own contrivance. It is worth looking back to the debates of 1978 and 1979 (when the decision was cooking) for the rationale. The most important factors were:

- Chancellor Schmidt's neurotic view of United States leadership after Watergate - particularly President Carter's. Here were these new Soviet weapons, the SS20 and the Backfire Bomber, pointing at West Germany and there, with nothing to point back with except some old aircraft and the wavering finger of a discredited US chief executive.
- The desire of the US defence establishment - shared with Soviet strategic nuclear parity for the first time, to improve the credibility of American deterrence at the lower levels - i.e. at intermediate and battlefield range.

Reviewing the sequence of events, one can see that, as with most of the other great botches in history, everyone acted with the best of intentions. The execution of the operation was a disaster but there was nothing "wrong" with the objectives. It was obviously desirable to combine in one policy (a) maintaining a credible deterrent, (b) binding the defence of the US and Europe closer, and (c) achieving a better disarmament deal.

Credibility of the cruise as a deterrent and its credibility as a bargaining counter both depend on demonstrating its effective deployment. This means showing that it could really be used and this in turn means specifically taking the launchers out of their bases to their random firing positions in the English countryside on regular outings. If they are stuck permanently at Greenham Common or other US airfields and obviously cannot be moved, they are sitting ducks unusable for operational purposes.

On the other hand, if it is argued that they need be moved out only in time of acute crisis, that is an extremely dangerous doctrine, because it blurs the vital distinction between deployment and use. Every movement of the missiles would then be regarded by the Russians as the prelude to firing them and might therefore trigger off the nuclear war. For this reason the missiles' peregrinations about Britain must be seen both by the British and the Russians as being as natural as the regular flights of F111s with nuclear bombs aboard or the regular sailing of Polaris submarines from Holy Loch to their stations in the Atlantic.

And yet, in the present political climate, this is precisely what we cannot achieve. The kind of operation I have just described would invite constant obstruction and sabotage from the peace movement with every possibility of martyrdom and propaganda. Not only that it is doubtful whether the public at large could withstand the storm of anti-Americanism that would be unleashed. Naturally the truth would be that the mis-

ORIGINAL AS IS

● The desire of the US defence establishment, since the Soviet strategic nuclear parity for the first time, to improve the credibility of American deterrence at the lower levels - i.e. at intermediate and battlefield range.

● The related fear of the Americans that they were going to have no cards to play in the negotiation of the arms control negotiations.

All these factors pushed towards the modernization of those nuclear forces in Europe capable of reaching Soviet territory. The Nato High Level Group (of officials) which was set up to produce a policy, contained doubters. "But," they asked, "won't you actually make it look even less likely that the US President will press the button to fire intercontinental missiles from the US if he can confine a nuclear exchange to Europe?" "No," replied the modernizers, "not if you put your nuclear weapons on European land (as opposed to on submarines). If American weapons are involved early on in an attack on Europe and might even be overrun, the US is bound to escalate and the link with America and the defence of Europe is actually strengthened."

The famous "two-track" decision of December 1979 was the result - after which everything was totally immovable. Every change in the public position would undermine the West's bargaining hand with the Soviet Union; and since the main pressure for this was bound to come from the left, no NATO government dared be seen giving in to it for fear of raising US accusations of weakness and even neutralism.

movement with every possibility of martyrdom and propaganda. Not only that it is doubtful whether the public at large could withstand the storm of anti-Americanism that would be unleashed. Naturally the truth would be that the missiles were there because we asked for them, and would be almost impossible to fire without our consent. But that is not how it would appear.

It is when one looks at these practical political considerations that the attractions of some kind of joint Anglo-American physical control of the weapons, a dual-key system, become almost overwhelming. Of course it should not (as Michael Heseltine plausibly proclaims) be necessary to question the existing US undertaking to consult us before firing the missiles but now that the question has been raised, a political arrangement is probably the only thing that will actually produce the desired consensus.

The British Government rejects this solution because, if it did, the Americans would give us control only if we purchase the missiles, a gross move over. The British Government wants to demand that the Americans do something they are not doing in West Germany. Yet if now that we have the wretched weapons they are obviously useless and threaten in any case to go on poisoning our relationship with the US, both governments ought surely to regard the dual-key as the least of the available evils and the best way of achieving the objects for which so much political capital has been spent.

Philip Howard

*action*

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

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---INF:SOVIET AND USA MOVES

21NOV83 TASS WIRE SERVICE AND 22NOV83 PRAVDA PUBLISH SOVIET MFA  
OFFICIAL VERSION OF REPORTED INFORMAL NITZE/KVITSINSKI DISCUSSIONS  
ON POSSIBLE COMPROMISE INF PROPOSALS. THIS PUBLISHED VERSION  
FULLY CONFIRMS USA PREDICTIONS ON HOW SOVIET SIDE WOULD PUBLICLY  
HANDLE THESE QUOTE EVENTS UNQUOTE.

2. ARTICLE STATES THAT QUOTE SOME TIME AGO UNQUOTE NITZE INFORMALLY  
PUT TO SOVIET DEL QUOTE IDEAS UNQUOTE WHICH NITZE CONSIDERED MIGHT  
PROVIDE BASIS FOR COMPROMISE INF AGREEMENT. TSSE WOULD HAVE  
INVOLVED USA RENOUNCING DEPLOYMENT OF ALL MISSILES IT HAD PLANNED  
TO STATION IN EUROPE (QUOTE 572/572 UNITS UNQUOTE) WHILE USSR  
QUOTE WOULD LEAVE IN EUROPEAN PART OF THE COUNTRY SUCH A NUMBER OF  
SS-20 MISSILES WHICH WOULD BE AN ACTUAL EQUIVALENT OF THE MEDIUM  
RANGE MISSILES GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE NOW HAVE UNQUOTE. ARTICLE  
SAYS THAT QUOTE ON THE FACE OF IT THE OPTION SET FORTH BY PAUL  
NITZE COULD SEEM AN ACCEPTABLE FOUNDATION FOR A COMPROMISE  
SOLUTION UNQUOTE.

3. ARTICLE SAYS THAT, TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THIS WAS MERE TACTICAL

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PAGE TWO XYGR4155 CONFD

USA MOVE TO CREATE SEMBLANCE OF PROGRESS, NITZE WAS TOLD SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER THIS VARIANT BUT ONLY IF IT WERE OFFICIALLY PROPOSED BY USA SIDE.

QUOTE AND THE DESHONEST GAME OF THE AMERICAN SIDE BECAME INSTANTLY CLEAR. TELLING THE SOVIET SIDE NOTHING IN RESPONSE TO ITS EXPRESSED WISH TO HAVE AN OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF THE STATEMENTS OF THE CHIEF USA NEGOTIATOR, THE AMERICAN SIDE BEGAN TO SPREAD, INCLUDING AMONG THE USA ALLIES IN NATO, ALLEGATIONS THAT IT IS THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET, NOT/NOT THE USA DEL, THAT HAS PROPOSED SOME NEW VARIANT. IN THE PROCESS, IN ASCRIBING TO THE SOVIET DEL THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE VARIANT WHICH IN REALITY EMANATED FROM THE AMERICAN DEL, WSHDC, IN ADDITION, DOCTORED IT IN A MANNER SO AS TO CREATE A FALSE IMPRESSION OF THE USSR'S READINESS NOT/NOT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MEDIUM-RANGE MEANS. UNQUOTE.

4. ARTICLE CONCLUDES THAT THIS USA BEHAVIOUR, ABOUT WHICH SOVIETS HAVE INFORMED GOVTS QUOTE MISLED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE UNQUOTE IS ADDED EVIDENCE THAT USA IS NO/NOT SERIOUS ABOUT REACHING ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

CCC/144 221100Z XYGR4155

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4155 22NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 220900

DFLHI/PMDEL DELIVER BY 221800

INFO NDHQOTT/ADM POL/CPP/DNACPOL/CORAE/DSTRATA BNATO WSHDC

BONN LDN PARIS CANMILREPNATO PMOTT/FOWLER/ARCHDEACON TOKYO/PEARSON

DISTR MINA DMF IFB UGE RGE IDD IDDZ IDA IDR RBR

---INF:SOVIET AND USA MOVES.

21NOV83 TASS WIRE SERVICE AND 22NOV83 PRAVDA PUBLISH SOVIET MFA OFFICIAL VERSION OF REPORTED INFORMAL NITZE/KVITSINSKI DISCUSSIONS ON POSSIBLE COMPROMISE INF PROPOSALS. THIS PUBLISHED VERSION FULLY CONFIRMS USA PREDICTIONS ON HOW SOVIET SIDE WOULD PUBLICLY HANDLE THESE QUOTE EVENTS UNQUOTE.

2. ARTICLE STATES THAT QUOTE SOME TIME AGO UNQUOTE NITZE INFORMALLY PUT TO SOVIET DEL QUOTE IDEAS UNQUOTE WHICH NITZE CONSIDERED MIGHT PROVIDE BASIS FOR COMPROMISE INF AGREEMENT. TSSE WOULD HAVE INVOLVED USA RENOUNCING DEPLOYMENT OF ALL MISSILES IT HAD PLANNED TO STATION IN EUROPE (QUOTE 572/572 UNITS UNQUOTE) WHILE USSR QUOTE WOULD LEAVE IN EUROPEAN PART OF THE COUNTRY SUCH A NUMBER OF SS-20 MISSILES GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE NOW HAVE UNQUOTE. ARTICLE SAYS THAT QUOTE ON THE FACE OF IT THE OPTION SET FORTH BY PAUL NITZE COULD SEEM AN ACCEPTABLE FOUNDATION FOR A COMPROMISE SOLUTION UNQUOTE.

3. ARTICLE SAYS THAT, TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THIS WAS MERE TACTICAL

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PAGE TWO XYGR4155 CONFD

USA MOVE TO CREATE SEMBLANCE OF PROGRESS, NITZE WAS TOLD SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER THIS VARIANT BUT ONLY IF IT WERE OFFICIALLY PROPOSED BY USA SIDE.

QUOTE AND THE DESHONEST GAME OF THE AMERICAN SIDE BECAME INSTANTLY CLEAR. TELLING THE SOVIET SIDE NOTHING IN RESPONSE TO ITS EXPRESSED WISH TO HAVE AN OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF THE STATEMENTS OF THE CHIEF USA NEGOTIATOR, THE AMERICAN SIDE BEGAN TO SPREAD, INCLUDING AMONG THE USA ALLIES IN NATO, ALLEGATIONS THAT IT IS THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET, NOT/NOT THE USA DEL, THAT HAS PROPOSED SOME NEW VARIANT. IN THE PROCESS, IN ASCRIBING TO THE SOVIET DEL THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE VARIANT WHICH IN REALITY EMANATED FROM THE AMERICAN DEL, WSHDC, IN ADDITION, DOCTORED IT IN A MANNER SO AS TO CREATE A FALSE IMPRESSION OF THE USSRS READINESS NOT/NOT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MEDIUM-RANGE MEANS. UNQUOTE.

4. ARTICLE CONCLUDES THAT THIS USA BEHAVIOUR, ABOUT WHICH SOVIETS HAVE INFORMED GOVTS QUOTE MISLED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE UNQUOTE IS ADDED EVIDENCE THAT USA IS NO/NOT SERIOUS ABOUT REACHING ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

CCC/144 221100Z XYGR4155

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT MGTC2481 22NOV83

TO DACCA/PMDEL IMMED

INFO DELHI/CHOGM/SHENSTONE

DISTR DMF IDA MRCP LURR IDDZ

REF OURTEL IDDA0200 21NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENCE INFO(2)

AT ORIGINATORS REQUEST AMEND ORIG NBR AND SYMBOL TO READ

IDDZ/IDEZ0200.

UUU/088 221421Z MGTC2481

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2457 22NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO ENATO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS  
HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS PMDELDELHI MDRID/CSCE PRMNY/BEESELY  
PCOOTT/FOWLER/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/DACPOL/DNACPOL/PPP/DSTRATA/CIS  
DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RER RCR RSR RED RCT RSD  
CPD ZSI ZSP URR URT URE LCD LSD IDDZ  
REF YOURTEL IDR4430 21NOV

---INF:FURTHER SOVIET MESSAGE

SIMILAR DEMARCHE WAS MADE HERE. ONLY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TEXT IN  
REFTEL AND THAT PROVIDED TO USA ARE THE RESULT OF TRANSLATION.

(THESE ARE INTERESTING, SOMETIMES AMUSING, BUT HARDLY RELEVANT.)

USA IS BASICALLY PERPLEXED BY WHOLE EPISODE. OFFICIALS AGREE THAT IT  
STARTED OUT AS A DISINFO CAMPAIGN BUT WHETHER AIMED AT GOVTS OR  
PUBLIC IS NOT/NOT CLEAR. USSR WENT PUBLIC ONLY AFTER KOHL WENT PUBLIC  
IN MANNER THAT SUGGESTED USSR WAS WILLING TO LEAVE UK AND FR SYSTEMS  
OUT OF EQUATION. DENUNCIATION OF THIS LATTER IDEA BY USTINOV ALSO  
ADDS TO PUZZLEMENT FOR IT SEEMS USTINOV WAS DIRECTING HIS COMMENTS  
AS MUCH TO KVITSINSKY AS TO THE WEST.

2. WE ARE TOLD THAT WHEN KVITSINSKY AND NITZE MET 19NOV, KVITSINSKY  
WAS EXTREMELY SUBDUED AND DID NOT/NOT RESPOND IN ANY WAY TO NITZES  
COMPLAINTS ABOUT EVENTS OF THE PREVIOUS WEEK.

3. FOLLOWS IS TEXT OF PRESS GUIDANCE PREPARED AT STATE DEPT TODAY.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2457 CONF

QUOTE EUR PRESS GUIDANCE, NOVEMBER 22, 1983

TASS STATEMENT ON EQUAL REDUCTION OFFER

Q:--YESTERDAYS TASS CONTAINED A STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET FOREIGN  
MINISTRY CLAIMING THAT IT WAS AMBASSADOR NITZE, NOT AMBASSADOR  
KVITSINSKIY, WHO ORIGINATED THE INFORMAL PROPOSAL ON SS-20 REDUCTION  
AND THIRD COUNTRY FORCES LAST WEEK. CAN YOU COMMENT QUES

A:--THE TASS STATEMENT IS PLAINLY FALSE. THE CORRECT SEQUENCE OF  
EVENTS IS AS NOTED IN OUR STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 18. THERE WOULD BE  
NO REASON FOR THE UNITED STATES TO OFFER A PROPOSAL, FORMAL OR  
INFORMAL, WHICH WOULD BAR U.S. DEPLOYMENTS AND ALLOW THE SOVIET  
UNION TO MAINTAIN A LARGE MONOPOLY OF LRINF MISSILES.

CONTINGENCY Q AND A:

Q:--HAS THE FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT AS REPORTED IN TASS BEEN  
PRESENTED FORMALLY TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT QUES

A:--YES. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT YESTERDAY PRESENTED A DEMARCHE  
CONVFYING THE TEXT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT. THE UNITED  
STATES IS PREPARING A REPLY AT THIS TIME.

--THE UNITED STATES REITERATES THAT THERE IS NO FOUNDATION WHATSOEVER  
TO SOVIET ASSERTION THAT AMBASSADOR NITZE ORIGINATED THE INFORMAL  
PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINING A LARGE  
LRINF FORCE WHILE PROVIDING FOR ZERO U.S. DEPLOYMENTS.

UNQUOTE.

CCC/231 222145Z UNGR2457

Division Phoned 1DDZ  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time 221850

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

*MVF*  
*AD*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2453 22NOV83

TO EXTOTT 1DDZ URR DELIVER BY 221730

INFO MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY PEKIN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN  
ROME HAGUE BONN PARIS LDN BRU PMDELHAKA NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPCL/CP  
DELHI

REGAM CHCGO SFRAN LNGLS BOSTN DE WDC

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB URGF URR RGP UGE RFR IDD IDR IDA

REF PMDELHAKA TEL PMDL0057 22NOV

---THE DAY AFTER THE DAY AFTER

AFTER HAVING BEEN VIEWED BY MORE THAN HALF THE ADULT POPULATION,  
THE GENERAL INITIAL ALBEIT SUPERFICIAL REACTION TO QUOTE THE DAY  
AFTER UNQUOTE SEEMS TO BE ONE OF ANTICLIMAX.FIRST POLLS SHOW NO/NO  
GREAT SHIFT OF OPINION.THE FILM IS LESS GRUESOME THAN MANY EXPECTED  
ALTHOUGH NEVERTHELESS SOBERING IN IMPACT.IT HAS NOT/NOT CREATED A  
MASSIVE OUTCRY IN SUPPORT OF THE NUCLEAR FREEZE NOR ON THE OTHER  
HAND DID IT PROVIDE ANY JUSTIFICATION TO RIGHT WING POSTURING IN  
ADVANCE OF THE EVENT THAT THIS WAS THE RESULT OF SOME KIND OF PLOT  
TO WEAKEN AMERICA.PRES REAGAN HAS VIEWED FILM TWICE AND HAS(WISELY)  
CHOSEN NOT/NOT TO CONDEMN IT.

2.FUT THE FILM HAS MORE SHARPLY FOCCUSSED AMERICAN CONCERNS ON THE  
ARMS CONTROL ISSUE.IT WILL PROBABLY BE ANOTHER IMPORTANT STIMULUS  
TO USA PUBLIC TO CONSIDER WHAT CAN AND SHLD BE DONE.THAT THERE HAS  
NOT/NOT BEEN A QUOTE THE SKY IS FALLING UNQUOTE REACTION IS DUE

...2

Director General  
100-100  
PAGE TWO UNGR2453 CONF

LARGELY TO THE SUBDUED, LARGELY UNPOLEMICAL, AND OCCASIONALLY VERY WISE PANEL DISCUSSIONS THAT FOLLOWED THE SCREENING BOTH ON TV AND, WITH OTHER PANELS, ON MANY RADIO STATIONS. HENRY KISSINGER AND ROBERT MCNAMARA TOOK THE LEAD TO STRESS THE POINT (WHICH PRES REAGAN HAS TAKEN UP) THAT THE REAL QUESTION IS NOT/NOT WHETHER OR NOT/NOT NUCLEAR WAR IS HORRIBLE BUT HOW DO WE GO ABOUT AVOIDING IT. THE IMPORTANT PURPOSE IS TO BUILD STABILITY.

3. THE PROBLEM IS HOW DO YOU BEST BUILD THAT STABILITY AND NO/NO ONE PRESCRIPTION IS FAVOURED OVER ANY OTHER.

4. THE ADMIN HAS TAKEN THE LINE THAT ITS APPROACH IS THE RIGHT ONE. IT IS WORKING FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INDEED REAL CUTS IN ARMS. IT HAS TAKEN THE LINE THAT THE SITU TODAY IS NOT/NOT GRAVE. OTHERS OF COURSE FLATLY DENY THE ADMIN IS DOING ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT. BETWEEN THESE EXTREMES THERE ARE VARIOUS SHADES OF OPINION BEING EXPRESSED. THE MAIN POINT IS THAT THE ARGUMENT SEEMS TO BE PROCEEDING SOBERLY AND INTELLIGENTLY.

5. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE PRES REAGAN AND ADMIN WILL COME UNDER ADDITIONAL PRESSURE AND THE DISCUSSION SPAWNED BY THE FILM CLD WORK AGAINST THE IMAGE REAGAN HAS BEEN TRYING TO BUILD OF A MAN COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL. HE IS HAUNTED BY GHOSTS OF THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE: HIS OPPOSITION TO ALL PAST ACD AGREEMENTS, THE CURRENT STALEMATE IN INF TALKS, AND THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF AN ACD

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PAGE THREE UNGR2453 CONF

AGREEMENT IN THE NEXT YR.COMMENTS BY SOME OF HIS ADVISORS THAT SITUATION IS NOT/NOT REALLY SERIOUS AND THE PRESIDENTS OWN QUOTE WERE TRYING AS HARD AS WE CAN UNQUOTE,SOUND LIKE WHISTLING IN THE DARK TO MANY,IN THE FACE OF CURRENT EVENTS,AND OF VIEW OF HIS OWN POLLSTFRS THAT REAGAN REMAINS VULNERABLE ON PEACE AND WAR ISSUE.

6.WHILE THE POLLSTERS SUGGEST THAT PRES REAGAN MAY NEED AN ACD AGREEMENT FOR THE 84 ELECTIONS,AND MANY OBSERVERS SAY ONE IS NEEDED FOR INNATL STABILITY,THIS MESSAGE HAS SIMPLY NOT/NOT SUNK IN TO A WHOLE STRATA OF OFFICIALS(AND RELATED PLAYERS)WHO REMAIN CONVINCED THAT ADMIN HAS HIT ON THE RIGHT FORMULA FOR DEALING WITH THE RUSSIANS.WHAT QUOTE THE DAY AFTER UNQUOTE CLD DO IS INDIRECTLY INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THEM.

CCC/230 222151Z UNGR2453

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*MF  
RZ*

Division Phoned 1DD2  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time 221850

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2452 22NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 221730

INFO PMDELDHAKA/FOWLER MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU  
PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY TOKYO DELHI PCOOTT/OSFALDESTON NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/  
CPP

REGAM CHCGO SFRAN LNGLS BOSTN DE WDC

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGB RBR RGB URR RCP ZSI UGB

---PEACE AND SECURITY:IMPACT IN USA OF PM TRUDEAUS PROPOSALS

SUMMARY:IN OTHER TELS,WE HAVE IDENTIFIED SOME OF DIFFICULTIES WHICH  
SPFCIFIC PROPOSALS MADE BY PM IN TWO POLICY SPEECHES POSED FOR  
THOSE IN ADMIN IN CHARGE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.WE HAVE,WE THINK,  
MADE CLEAR TO ADMIN THAT PMS EFFORTS AND PURPOSES ARE GREATER THAN  
THE AGGREGATE OF THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AND ADMIN PROFESSES,VIA  
DAM AND EAGLEBURGER,TO SUPPORT THOSE BROADER PURPOSES,AT LEAST ON  
WAIT AND SEE BASIS.THERE IS GENUINE INTEREST IN SEEING WHAT PM  
CAN DISENGAGE FROM CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN MOSCO.

2.PUT CONTACTS IN ADMIN CONSIDER PM EFFORTS ARE PUTTING THEM  
UNDER UNWELCOME PRESSURE.HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL CONTACTS,AT MTG  
BETWEEN DPM/SSEA AND SHULTZ IN BRU,AND THEN BETWEEN PM AND REAGAN  
HIMSELF,WILL PROVIDE VITAL OCCASIONS TO EXPLAIN WHAT IT IS CDA IS  
DOING AND REALLY ADVANCE PM PURPOSES.BUT BETWEEN NOW AND THEN WE  
NEED TO REDUCE NEGATIVE STATIC FROM ADMIN AND INCREASE FAVOURABLE  
RFVIEWS FROM OUTSIDE ADMIN OF WHAT PM IS AIMING FOR.WE NEED TO

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2011 A 31132  
SECTION

benefit of the

on the

PAGE TWO UNGR2452 CONF

FIND BALANCE IN PROMOTING AIMS AND EFFORTS OF PM WHILE MINIMIZING PRESSURE ON ADMIN THESE REPRESENT, IN ADVANCE OF ACTUAL MTG WITH REAGAN, SINCE SUCH PRESSURE WOULD PREPARE REAGAN TO BE ON DEFENSIVE AT SUCH MTG MAKING IT LESS PRODUCTIVE. ULTIMATELY, PM HAS TO AIM AT INFLUENCING REAGAN HIMSELF.

3. REPORT: WE NEED TO PRESENT PMS EFFORTS HERE WITH FOCUS ON OBJECTIVE OF MOVING EAST-WEST SITUATION TO MORE STABLE AND PRODUCTIVE LEVEL. IT IS HARD TO DO WITH IDEOLOGICAL ADMIN SOME OF WHOSE MEMBERS SEE USA-USSR RELATIONS IN ZERO-SUM TERMS. AT PRESENT TIME, USA IS PROBABLY OPPOSED TO MOST, IF NOT/NOT ALL, OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS PM HAS MADE BECAUSE OF COMPETITIVE STANCE TAKEN TO USSR. PUT ALTHOUGH OFFICIALS UNDER REAGAN ARE HARDLINERS ABOUT USSR THEY DO WANT MORE PRODUCTIVE AND MORE PREDICTABLE RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION. WHAT WE MUST DO IS A) SEPARATE OVERALL EFFORTS FROM SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, AND HAVE THOSE PROPOSALS PURSUED BY CDA IN SPECIFIC FORA WHICH SPECIALIZE IN SUBJECT MATTER. 5-POWER CONFERENCE IS BIGGER THAN ANY FORUM AND THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AS PART OF GENERAL PROPOSITION, BUT POSSIBLY, WITH BROADER EMPHASES; AND B) AVOID SITUATING WHAT WE ARE DOING IN IMPLICIT OPPOSITION TO USA VIEWS, EVEN IF THIS IS DIFFICULT TO PULL OFF.

4. THERE IS DOCTRINAIRE DENIAL HERE THAT USSR-USA RELATIONS HAVE REACHED DANGEROUS POINT. OFFICIALS POINT TO MANY RECENT OCCASIONS

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PAGE THREE UNGR2452 CONF

WHEN COMMUNICATION HAS TAKEN PLACE TO FOREWARN USSR OF USA INTENTIONS. OFFICIALS ARE LED BY THESE COMMUNICATIONS TO BELIEVE THAT USA AND USSR DO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER. THEY BELIEVE THAT STRENGTH OF USA RESPONSE AND INTERVENTION OVER SOME INTERNATIONAL EVENTS SUCH AS KAL ISSUE AND GRENADA, HAVE ENHANCED THAT UNDERSTANDING AND HAVE LIMITED RISK OF MISCALCULATION.

5. ANALYSIS BY PM TRUDEAU CAN BE SEEN TO WORK IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. IN THIS SENSE, IT IS INIMICAL TO USA SELF-INTEREST AS EXPRESSED IN DOCTRINE PRESCRIBED ABOVE. HOWEVER, THERE IS ENOUGH RECOGNITION THAT THIS DOCTRINE DOES NOT/NOT CONFORM ENTIRELY TO REALITY TO GIVE CDA BENEFIT OF THE UNCERTAINTY AND TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT PM TRUDEAU CAN COME UP WITH, PROVIDED WE SOFT PEDAL EXTENT TO WHICH WE ARE CHALLENGING REAGAN ORTHODOXY. WE RECOGNIZE NEED TO PLACE SOME DISTANCE BETWEEN CDN EFFORTS AND ADMIN FOR CONSUMPTION ABROAD BUT THIS CAN BE OVER-STATED. PM TRUDEAU EFFORTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES.

6. OF COURSE, USA RECOGNIZES THEY ARE NOT/NOT ALONE IN THE WORLD WITH USSR ADVERSARY. IF PM TRUDEAU COMES UP WITH PLANS AND WORKABLE NEXT STEPS SUPPORTED BY OTHER IMPORTANT PLAYERS INCLUDING KEY EUROPEAN, THEN USA MAY BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG. PUT THE IMPORTANT POINT TO UNDERLINE IS THAT AT THIS MOMENT PM TRUDEAU'S ACTIVITIES ARE SEEN IN USA AS BEING ABSTRACT AND IMPLICITLY

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PAGE FOUR UNGR2452 CONF

DIVISIVE UNTIL THEY ACTUALLY BEGIN TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON USSR WILLINGNESS TO ACCOMMODATE WEST IN ONE SPECIFIC OR ANOTHER, WHICH OF COURSE WILL REQUIRE CORRESPONDING MOVEMENT FROM USA. IT IS ON THIS POLITICAL LEVEL THAT PM TRUDEAU'S ACTIVITIES WILL BE SEEN HERE AS BEING INTERESTING. MOST EXPERTS AND COMMENTATORS BELIEVE DANGER POINTS ARE IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS THAT COULD IGNITE AND IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. IT IS ON THESE SUBJECTS MANY WORRY MOST ABOUT LACK OF EFFECTIVE USA-USSR COMMUNICATION.

7. TO MOVE TO PRESCRIPTIONS, OUR SPECIFICALLY AMERICAN-ORIENTED PRIVATE AND PUBLIC STRATEGIES FOR EXPLANATION AND PROMOTION OF PM TRUDEAU'S ACTIVITIES SHOULD BUILD TOWARD TRUDEAU-REAGAN MTG. ON LEVEL OF PRIVATE CONTACTS WITH ADMIN, WE SHOULD MAKE SUBJECT LEAD ITEM IN MTG 12 DEC IN BRU BETWEEN SHULTZ AND DPM/SSEA. SECOND, WE SHOULD AVOID PUTTING PRESSURE ON ADMIN BETWEEN NOW AND MTG WITH REAGAN IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE PRE-DISPOSED THAT MTG AGAINST THRUST OF WHAT PM TRUDEAU IS TRYING TO DO. EVENTS AND DISCUSSIONS ELSEWHERE WILL TAKE PLACE, AND THEY SHOULD BE EXPLAINED IN WAY WHICH CONSISTENTLY RESPECTS KEY USA CONCERNS ON INSULATING INF DEPLOYMENT AND START TALKS. WE SHOULD NOT/NOT TRY TO CHANGE USA WORLD VIEW IN THE MEANTIME AND SHOULD EXPLAIN ON TECHNICAL LEVEL SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THAT PM TRUDEAU HAS SUGGESTED BUT NOT/NOT PUSH THEM ACTIVELY ON POLITICAL LEVEL BILATERALLY FOR TIME BEING. FEAR IN MIND PARTICULARLY THAT 5-POWER PROPOSAL RUNS AGAINST GRAIN HERE,

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PAGE FIVE UNGR2452 CONFD

EVEN IF SPECIFIC AGENDA IS ACCEPTABLE.

8. ABOVE ALL, WE SHOULD DEVELOP POLITICALLY NEUTRAL THEMES WHICH ARE ACKNOWLEDGED HERE TO BE MOST IN NEED OF INTERNATIONAL ACTION. OF THESE, TWO STAND OUT: NON-PROLIFERATION AND CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS AND MANAGEMENT. IT IS OUR ANTICIPATION THAT NOTION OF 5-POWER CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE BETTER CHANCE OF GAINING SUPPORT IF IT WERE DEVELOPED TO COVER AS WELL THESE TWO SUBJECTS RATHER THAN PLACING ALL OF ITS EMPHASIS ON STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS. THERE IS COMMON INTEREST AMONG FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS (WHO ARE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL) IN LIMITING PROLIFERATION. THERE IS ALSO SPECIFICALLY COMMON INTEREST BETWEEN USSR AND USA IN CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS AND MANAGEMENT, AN INTEREST WHICH IS OF COURSE SHARED BY OTHER THREE NUCLEAR POWERS AND BY MANY OTHERS BESIDES.

9. RE PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE USA PUBLIC IS DEEPLY AROUSED RIGHT NOW BY OVERALL THREAT POSED BY NOTION OF NUCLEAR WAR BY MISCALCULATION. OUR MESSAGE WILL HAVE MORE IMPACT IF IT EMPHASIZES THE BROAD THEME WHICH ENCOMPASSES HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AS WELL. IN DOING SO, WE CAN BUILD ENOUGH POSITIVE MOMENTUM BEHIND EFFORTS OF PM TO EARN BETTER HEARING LATER FOR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, OBLIGATORY VERIFICABILITY, AND OTHERS.

10. PUBLICLY, WE NEED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT OUR EFFORTS ARE NOT/NOT

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR2452 CONFD

TO PROMOTE PM TRUDEAU SPECIFICALLY, WHILE WE SEEK TO EARN MEDIA ATTENTION FOR WHAT HE IS DOING. THERE IS AN IMPORTANT STORY HERE FOR AMERICAN MEDIA BUT IT IS NOT/NOT NEWS PER SE. IT IS PART OF A DEEPER BACKGROUND OF RISING PUBLIC CONCERN IN OUR COUNTRIES WHICH PM TRUDEAU IS CORRECTLY REPRESENTING IN HIS EFFORTS. HIS ROLE AT CHOGM, AND ON NON-PROLIFERATION SPECIFICALLY, CAN EARN PLAUDITS BECAUSE FEW OTHERS ARE IN POSITION TO FILL IT. WE ARE DISCREETLY BUT ACTIVELY LOBBYING NUMEROUS PEOPLE IN MEDIA, WSHDC THINK TANKS, AND IN POSITIONS TO ADVISE ADMIN. TO PROMOTE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT PM IS DOING.

11. HOWEVER RIGHT PUBLIC AUDIENCES FOR DIRECT ADDRESSES ARE KEY REQUIREMENTS AT RIGHT TIME. FIRST, DPM/SSEA SHOULD GIVE PROMINENT HIGHLIGHT TO INITIATIVE IN HIS SPEECH TO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS IN CHCGO NEXT WEEK. THEN, PM SHOULD ACCEPT COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS THEM IN NYORK. DATE IN DEC HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF. WE DO NOT/NOT THINK HE SHOULD DO THIS PRIOR TO SEEING REAGAN BUT MTG WITH REAGAN COULD PRECEDE BY DAY SPEECH IN NYORK. SPEECH ITSELF SHOULD FOCUS ON THOSE BROAD THEMES OF OVERALL WORLD CLIMATE, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS, CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS AND MANAGEMENT AND PROLIFERATION.

CCC/230 222157Z UNGR2452

*Mr. Gossage*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BFALO ZXTD2389 NOV22/83

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ)

DISTR SCD SCI SCS UGP

REF CLVND TEL YGGR0987 NOV17/83

---PM'S MONTREAL SPEECH

WF AGREE WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH REFTL PARA 2. COMMUNICATIONS  
FACILITY OF OUR WP FOR OVERNIGHT AND WEEKEND TRANSMISSION GREATLY  
UNDERUTILIZED AND WE ARE RELUCTANT TO DISTRIBUTE COPIED TELEFES  
WHICH ARE MESSY AND UNPROFESSIONAL LOOKING. HOPE THIS WILL BE  
CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE MAJOR POLICY ANNOUNCEMENT.

UUU/860 222055Z ZXTD2389

*Action*

*MCWEE FOR ACTION*

*Done 22/11/83*

*[Signature]*

R E S T R I C T E D

FM DHAKA PMDL2226 22NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 221200

INFO CHOGMDELHI/FOWLER DELIVER 221200

DISTR IDA

---PMS REQUEST FOR BACKGROUND NPT INFO FOR CHOGM

PM WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING LIST OF 119 SIGNATURES OR NPT IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER; WITH CHOGM PARTICIPANTS LISTED SEPARATELY IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER (NB, ALSO, WHICH CHOGM PARTICIPANTS ARE NOT/NOT SIGNATORIES AND DO WE KNOW THEIR RATIONALE FOR WHY THEY HAVE NOT SIGNED).

CCG/012 221055Z PMDL2226

MF  
RD

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

**CDN EYES ONLY**  
**RESERVE AUX CDNS**

FM PMDELHAKA PMDL2223 22NOV83

TO EXTOTT PSR

INFO LDN LAGOS WLGTN CNBRA DSLAM LSAKA DELHI SPORE

DISTR IDDZ IFB RPD ETD CPD IMC IFB DMF IMD FPR

---PM VISIT TO EDESH:INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

DISCUSSIONS 21NOV INCLUDED SHORT TETE A TETE BETWEEN PM TRUDEAU AND CMLA ERSHAD ONLY FOLLOWED BY EXPANDED MTG FOR APPROX 85 MINS INVOLVING EDESH MINS AND OFFICIALS AND CDN OFFICIALS.INTERNATL SUBJS DISCUSSED INCLUDED N/S DIALOGUE,PM PEACE INITIATIVE AND EDESH PERSPECTIVE ON LINKAGE BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN,CAMBODIAN AND LEBANESE CRISES.

2.N/S DIALOGUE:AT REQUEST OF ERSHAD,PM GAVE BRIEF EXPLANATION OF CDN INTERPRETATION OF STATE OF PLAY IN N/S DIALOGUE.HE STATED THAT FOR CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME HE HAD FEARED THAT,IN PART BECAUSE OF INTRANSIGENT POSITION TAKEN BY SOME G77 MEMEERS,PROCESS WAS AT STANDSTILL.HOWEVER,PM WAS NOW SOMEWHAT MORE OPTIMISTIC AS BOTH INDUSTRIALIZED AND MAJORITY OF G77 SLEMED PREPARED TO SHOW GREATER FLEXIABILITY.CDA HOPED FOR PROGRESS AND EXPECTED THAT USEFUL DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO N/S DIALOGUE WLD OCCUR DURING CHOGM. SPEAKING FOR BDESHIS,FINMIN MUHITH POINTED OUT PARTICULAR PROELEMMS CAUSED BY DOWN TURN IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC SITU FOR COUNTRY LIKE BDESH.ADVERSE CHANGES IN TERMS OF TRADE HAD VASTLY OUTWEIGHED INCREASES IN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.HOWEVER,BDESH CONSIDERED THAT

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PAGE TWO PMDL2223 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

ONLY SENSIBLE APPROACH TO N/S ISSUES WAS TO PUT FORWARD MESSAGE OF QUOTE DIALOGUE AND CONCESSIONS UNQUOTE WHICH HE BELIEVE G77 WAS NOW TRYING TO DO.FM DOHA ALSO TOOK UP N/S ISSUES AND EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER LACK OF RESPONSE BY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES TO CONCERNS OF MODERATES AMONGST G77.DOHA CLAIMED THAT DURING ITS CHAIRMANSHIP OF G77 BDESH HAD SUCCEEDED IN OVERCOMING TENDENCIES TOWARDS RADICALIZATION.DOHA COMMENTED THAT COUNTRIES BELONGING TO BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH ELEMENTS OF DIALOGUE TENDED TO BECOME QUOTE OVER-LOADED WITH COMMITMENT TO THEIR CONSTITUENCIES UNQUOTE.A HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL STATEMANSHIP LEADING TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY WAS NECESSARY.FINMIN MUHITH ALSO RAISED POINT RE IMPORTANCE OF RESPONDING TO IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF LDCs THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LENDING INSTITUTIONS SO THAT A GREATER NET FLOW OF SUPPORT MOVED FROM NORTH TO SOUTH.PM TRUDEAU COMMENTED THAT BDESH APPEARED TO TAKE AN EVOLUTIONARY RATHER THAN A REVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ISSUES.PM ALSO OBSERVED THAT CDA AND BDESH AGREED ON THE URGENT NEED FOR IDA REPLENISHMENT AND BDESH ALSO SEEMED TO THINK THAT WHOLESALE CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS(EG IMF) WAS NOT/NOT CALLED FOR AT THIS TIME.MUHITH SAID HE SAW PROCESS OF EVOLUTION TAKING PLACE WITH SOME CHANGES BEGINNING TO OCCUR.

3.PEACE INITIATIVE:IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST FROM ERSHAD,PM TRUDEAU EXPLAINED ORIGINS OF HIS DECISION TO EMBARK UPON PEACE INITIATIVE. HE HAD BEEN PLEASED TO HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS SOME THOUGHTS

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WITH ERSHAD AND KAUNDA WHILE IN DHAKA AND HOPED TO QUOTE TEST SOME IDEAS UNQUOTE WITH COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS IN NEW DELHI. IT WLD BE NECESSARY TO CONSIDER WAYS IN WHICH NUCLEAR POWERS CLD BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT THEIR DUTY UNDER NPT. IF THEY DID NOT/NOT DO SO, PM FEARED THAT 1985 CONF REVIEWING NPT WLD BE EVEN LESS PRODUCTIVE THAN 1980 CONF. HE COMMENTED THAT NPT WAS IN DANGER OF BECOMING IRRELEVANT. IT MIGHT NO/NO LONGER HAVE RESPECT OF EITHER NUCLEAR POWERS OR SOME NEAR NUCLEAR POWERS. PM HOPED THAT COMMONWEALTH CONF WLD PROVIDE A FORUM TO DISCUSS ISSUES INVOLVED IN PEACE INITIATIVE. ERSHAD, AS HE HAD DONE PREVIOUSLY, EXPRESSED IN GEN TERMS ADMIRATION AND SUPPORT FOR PEACE INITIATIVE.

4. AFGHANISTAN/CAMBODIA/LEBANON: ONLY OTHER INNATL ISSUES TO RECEIVE ATTN AT EXPANDED MTG WAS CONCEPT PUT FORWARD BY FM DOHA CONCERNING THE LINKAGE BETWEEN LACK OF PROGRESS IN SOLVING THE CAMBODIAN AND AFGHANISTAN SITUS ON ONE HAND AND ON THE OTHER HAND THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON. DOHA CLAIMED THAT SOVIET POSITION ON BOTH CAMBODIA AND AFGHANISTAN HAD APPRECIABLY HARDENED AS A RESULT OF SITU IN LEBANON. HIS BASIC MESSAGE SEEMED TO BE THAT BOTH EAST/WEST TENSIONS AND SINO/SOVIET TENSIONS MILITATED AGAINST SOLUTION OF ASIAN PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA.

5. NO/NO OTHER INNATL ISSUES RECD ANY MORE THAN PASSING ATTN AT MTG. AT SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONF ATTENTION FOCUSED ON PEACE INITIATIVE INCLUDING PARTICULARLY PM DISCUSSION IN TOKYO WITH

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ARIATOV AND, TO LESSER EXTENT, CDN AID AND COMMERCIAL LINKS WITH  
BDESH.

6. AT END OF MTG, PM INVITED ERSHAD TO VISIT CDA QUOTE AFTER ELECTIONS  
ARF OVER UNQUOTE. ERSHAD ACCEPTED.

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