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
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
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EXAMINED BY EXAMINE PAR:
R. B. Reynolds
DATE / DATE:
July 5, 1989

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FILE No. 50219-AE-40

False Jacket No. Vol. 1



FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE
SEE NEXT PART OF FILE

D. L. 1117/A.C. Brown/ew
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER



Canadian Embassy.....
Washington, D.C.....

Security: ...TOP SECRET.....

No.: DL-...1734.....

Date: December 28, 1955.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Our Letter No. DL-1647 of.....
December 1, 1955.

Subject:.....
Meeting of Consultation.....

Ottawa File No.	
50219-AE-40	
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References

The two binders which we sent you for use at the Meeting of Consultation each contained two documents with blue tags attached, requesting that the documents be returned to Defence Liaison (1) Division of the department. We should be grateful to have these documents back as we undertook to return them to the persons from whom they were borrowed.

G. IGNATIEFF
for the

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

TOP SECRET

D. L. (1)/K.C.Brown/ew

50219-AE-40
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Ottawa, December 28, 1955

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVERT A SECRET

Dear General Foulkes,

Meeting of Consultation - December 5,
1955

I attach a copy of despatch No. 2047 of December 21, 1955, from Mr. Heeney, forwarding the Canadian Record of the recent Meeting of Consultation.

2. Mr. Heeney has asked us to let him know of any revisions in the record which we may consider to be desirable. I have queried points in paragraphs 10 and 32 and have pencilled in possible changes in paragraphs 26, 37 and 40, on which I should be grateful to have your comments. I should also be glad to have any other comments or changes which may occur to you.

3. It occurs to me that it might be desirable to send copies of the despatch and of the Record of the meeting, when this has been amended, to the Prime Minister, Mr. Pearson, Mr. Campney, the Deputy Ministers of Finance, Defence Production and Northern Affairs, to the Chairman, Canadian Section, PJBD, and to the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee. I should be grateful to know if this meets with your approval.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

General C. Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO, CD.,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a, Ontario.

D. L. (1)/K.C. Brown/ew

TOP SECRET

50219-AE-40
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Ottawa, December 28, 1955

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REPUT A SECRET

Dear Mr. Bryce,

Meeting of Consultation - December 5,
1955

I attach a copy of despatch No. 2047 of December 21, 1955, from Mr. Heeney, forwarding the Canadian Record of the recent Meeting of Consultation.

2. Mr. Heeney has asked us to let him know of any revisions in the record which we may consider to be desirable. I have queried points in paragraphs 10 and 32 and have pencilled in possible changes in paragraphs 26, 37 and 40, on which I should be grateful to have your comments. I should also be glad to have any other comments or changes which may occur to you.

3. It occurs to me that it might be desirable to send copies of the despatch and of the Record of the meeting, when this has been amended, to the Prime Minister, Mr. Pearson, Mr. Campney, the Deputy Ministers of Finance, Defence Production and Northern Affairs, and to the Chairman, Canadian Section, PJED. I should be grateful to know if this meets with your approval.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Mr. R. B. Bryce,
Secretary to the Cabinet,
Privy Council Office,
O t t a w a, Ontario.

Defence Liaison (1) / R. E. Brown / ew

File

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: Under-Secretary

RL

Security TOP SECRET

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

Date December 28, 1955

REFERENCE: **DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**

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50219-AE-40		
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..... **REDUIT A SECRET**

SUBJECT: ... Meeting of Consultation ... December 5, 1955

I attach a copy of despatch No. 2047 of December 21, 1955, from Mr. Heeney, forwarding the Canadian Record of the recent Meeting of Consultation.

2. Attached also for your signature, if you agree, are letters to Mr. Bryce and General Foulkes. You will note that these letters ask for their concurrence in the reference of Mr. Heeney's despatch, including the Record, to a number of people outside this department. I propose also to send complete copies to Mr. Norman Robertson, Mr. Wilgress and Mr. Charles Ritchie, and copies of the sections on the Far East to Mr. Davis in Tokyo and to Mr. Escott Reid.

S. J. [Signature]

Defence Liaison (1) Division

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Ext. 18

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OTTAWA FILE
No. **50219-AE-40**

Despatch No. *2064*

Date... **December 27, 1955**.....

9. 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....

Subject: **Meeting of Consultation - December 5.**

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The Minister
Mr. Menzies ✓
Mr. Holmes ✓
 Copies Referred
 To *Sec. to Cab.* ✓
Far Eastern ✓
Commun.
D.L. 2-V
C.C.O.S. ✓
Lindsay

Paris
Canberra
Wellington
New Delhi ✓
Hanoi ✓

No. of Enclosures
Phnom Penh
Vientiane
Saigon ✓

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Post File
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At the meeting of consultation of December 5 (our despatch No. 2047 of December 21) it was arranged that Mr. Leger should meet separately with Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs to discuss the work of the International Commissions in Indochina. The meeting took place on December 6 and the highlights of it were covered in our telegram No. 2010 of December 7. We thought you might wish to have for your records a fuller account of what was said. This despatch, therefore, includes a more detailed account of the meeting. I accompanied the Under-Secretary together with another officer of the Embassy; Robertson had with him three officers of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs.

2. Robertson expressed the appreciation of the United States Government for the Canadian work on the International Commissions in Indochina. It was hard to imagine, he said, what the state of affairs would be if it had not been for the patient and objective work of the Canadian Commissioners. The United States Government had been disappointed in the Indian attitude displayed in the Commission. While the State Department had not expected Mr. Nehru to sanction his representatives to take a strong anti-Communist line, it had hoped that Indian policy in the Commissions would have been more objective than it had turned out to be. The attitude of the Polish representatives on the Commissions came as no surprise. They were following the dictates of their Communist masters. In spite of some of the disappointments which had been experienced, it was the United States view that the Commissions should be kept functioning until they finished their tasks.

3. Leger thanked Robertson for his flattering references to the work of the Canadian Commissioners. He said he was certain that the State Department was aware of the general attitude of the Canadian Government towards service on the Commissions. Canadian representatives would stay in Indochina as long as they were able to contribute something; on the other hand, the Canadian Government would willingly withdraw its representatives if such a withdrawal served the common cause. He went on to speak of the current activities of the Commission in Vietnam. The nature of the work of that Commission was changing. The military phase

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of the Commission's work was over. There was not much further that could be done on the freedom of movement issue. The Commission now had to be concerned with problems arising out of relations between the governments of North and South Vietnam. It seemed evident that if the Commission in Vietnam were to continue, ways and means would have to be found of keeping the Indians on the Commission. The Indian Chairman of the Commission was most unhappy with the lack of co-operation offered by the Diem government. This was a matter which was not alone of concern to the Indian Government. Indeed, the United States Ambassador in Saigon had more than once urged on Diem the desirability of offering the maximum co-operation possible to the Commission. In spite of all that had been done by other interested governments, it was conceivable that the Indians might declare their intention in the next few months to withdraw from the Commission. If, therefore, it was in the common interest to retain an international Commission in Vietnam, it was equally in the common interest to do all that was possible to keep the Indians on the present Commission.

4. The Under-Secretary went on to say that Canadian experience on the Commissions in Indochina, taken together with the recent discussions between Mr. Pearson and Mr. Nehru on the future of the Commissions, made it evident that there was a link between the problems of the Commissions in Vietnam and Laos, "a link which was closer than you would like". The Canadian Government would like the Commissions to operate under their separate terms of reference. Other interested parties, the Chinese and the Indians, saw the problems in the three Indochinese states as inter-related. Whatever one's view might be then on the separation of the three Agreements, the fact that the Chinese and the Indians linked the settlements in the three states could not be ignored.

5. Against this background, Leger went on, it was possible that certain decisions taken in Laos would precipitate a crisis in Vietnam, Indian withdrawal from the Commission, a stepping-up of subversive activities in South Vietnam, or even the renewal of hostilities by the Vietminh. The Canadian Commissioners in Vietnam and Laos would continue to press for as satisfactory settlements as were possible in the two states. The Canadian Government was, however, hesitant to go too far too fast.

6. Robertson said that the United States Government did not see any legal justification for connecting the Vietnam and Laos cease-fire agreements. United States officials realized why the Communists might wish to link the issues in the two countries. Their object was the subverting of all Indochina by whatever means came to hand. Robertson pointed out that, even at the Geneva Conference, there had never been any question/^{but} that the Royal Government's authority should extend over a unified country. For that reason, the terms of the Laos agreement were quite different from those of the Vietnam agreement. The hard fact was that the Pathet Lao had defied the agreement reached at Geneva. It seemed regrettable that the Commission in Laos could not find it possible to make a strong statement upholding the Royal Government's rights. Developments over recent months had all tended to place the Pathet Lao on an equal basis with the Royal Government when in fact the Pathet Lao were nothing but rebels. A de facto division of Laos would fit the Communist book completely. The two northern provinces, bordering as they did on Communist China, constituted a classic Communist forward

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base. The recent Russian attitude with respect to Berlin was analogous. Communist strategy the world over was to get whatever toe-hold was possible in an important area and then gradually to extend their influence into neighbouring non-Communist territory. Robertson expressed the hope that the Indians could be influenced to join with Canada in support of a Commission resolution endorsing the Royal Commission's right to administer all of Laos and censuring the Pathet Lao for their failure to live up to the Geneva Agreement.

7. Turning then to Vietnam, Robertson said that the Canadian Government would be familiar with United States efforts to convince Diem of the desirability of offering to the Commission whatever co-operation he thought possible. It had to be borne in mind that Diem had grown in stature in part at least by defying Western advice. It was a fact too that Diem did not accept the Geneva Agreement and had made his stand in opposition to the agreement at Geneva. The division of Vietnam which had been settled upon at Geneva was the work of Mendes-France and Chou En-lai. Not even Dong, the Vietminh Foreign Minister, had been present when the armistice line was drawn. The bargain reached at Geneva had been one which gave North Vietnam two million more inhabitants than it should have had and further provided for national elections which would have resulted in the automatic turn-over of all of Vietnam to the Communists. Diem and his associates saw clearly the nature of the bargain and were almost psychopathic in their opposition to this division of Vietnam by alien powers. Diem had not the slightest intention of falling into the trap set for him at Geneva.

8. Robertson went on to say that there had been an exchange of views between the North and the South through the medium of letters and radio broadcasts. Even the Geneva Declaration had not specified that North-South consultations had to be face-to-face consultations. Throughout most of the past year Diem had been concerned with the gigantic problem of establishing himself. At the same time he had had to do battle with the sects and to deal with the immense refugee problem. The recent referendum had given Diem some breathing space. Robertson did not believe, however, that Diem would make any further decisions on the matter of electoral consultations until after an Assembly had been convened in South Vietnam.

9. The United States Government, Robertson said, had faced many difficulties in attempting to convince Diem of desirable courses of action. Diem was not amenable to other people's opinions when he thought he was right. This stubborn quality had been both an asset and a drawback to Diem. The United States Government had no power to force Diem to certain courses of action and in any case did not deal with allies in that way. The ultimate United States sanction was of course the withdrawal of United States financial support from Diem. Such an action, however, would lead to a collapse of non-Communist power in Vietnam, which would not serve United States interests. Diem was well aware of this fact.

10. Robertson said the State Department would like to see Diem consult with the Vietminh about the machinery of nation-wide elections. It was certain that Diem would insist on free elections. There never had been, however, free elections in a Communist-dominated area. So the prospects of nation-wide elections in the foreseeable future were not bright.

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The United States hoped at the same time that Diem would find it possible to co-operate with the International Commission in matters of administration and security. In the United States view, the Commission performed an extremely useful service and no opportunity was lost to convey this view to Diem. The essential problem facing interested free world governments in this area was to work out some plan which would avoid handing Vietnam to the Communists. If the Communists gained control of Vietnam, it would be their first step towards gaining control over all of Southeast Asia.

11. The Under-Secretary said that it seemed to him that the Canadian and United States Governments did not hold separate views on the basic issues. We would both insist on free elections in Vietnam. We agreed on the desirability of Diem offering co-operation to the Commissions. We both saw the value of his consulting with the Vietminh so that the latter could not win the propaganda battle by default. It seemed that we did not really even disagree on the fact that a link existed in the minds of other interested parties between the settlements in Vietnam and Laos. Our agreement would be complete if we could agree that the Canadian representative should always go as far as the Indian traffic would bear. The Canadian worry was that, if one went further, the Indians would withdraw and the Commissions would collapse.

12. Robertson ended the exchange of views answering a question I put to him as to whether it was the United States view that the continued presence of the Commissions in Indochina contributed to stability in the area. He said it was indeed the view of the United States Government that the Commissions were a constructive and contributory factor to stability in the area. The main objective of United States policy in Southeast Asia as elsewhere was to avoid war so long as honour and principle could be maintained. The mere presence of Commissions on which there were Communist representatives made it less likely that Communist forces would renew open hostilities. The United States would be disturbed if the Commissions were to go suddenly from the scene. The question remained, however, as to "how far you can go". (Robertson did not elaborate further on this statement). Perhaps, he said finally, the free world could only play for time. He was reminded in this context of an old Chinese proverb: "What is the cure for muddy water?", and the answer, "Time alone".

D. P. Murray.

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OTTAWA FILE	
No. 50219-AE-40	
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
TOP SECRET	

Ext. 1

Despatch No. 2047
Date.....December 21..1955:....

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

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Reference.....
Subject:.....Meeting of Consultation of December 5.....

27 DEC 1955

Copies Referred To.....

No. of Enclosures
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Post File
No.....

The meeting of consultation with the United States authorities took place on December 5. I attach for your information four copies of our record of the meeting. The record follows the customary pattern in that it is as close to a verbatim account of what was said on each side as it was possible to make. It is not an agreed record with the United States side. The records which each side kept have, however, been compared in draft and there are now no significant differences in them. I should be grateful if you would let me know of any revisions which may be considered necessary in Ottawa.

2. While the preparatory arrangements were being made we sensed a lack of any real enthusiasm among United States officials for the meeting of consultation. There was, however, a definite and evident change of heart in the two or three days immediately preceding the meeting. Certainly, a first-class team was fielded on the United States side. We have reason to believe as well that the discussion at the meeting served to sustain the interest of senior United States officials and to confirm them in the belief that periodic consultations of this sort between our two countries were important.

3. We believe that the meeting served a useful purpose even though some of the same deficiencies as characterized earlier meetings of consultation were apparent. The most obvious of these was the inclination of the participants on the United States side to read from prepared briefs. The discussion of the Far Eastern situation, and particularly of policy towards China, however, represented a welcome break in the pattern. We would hope that the kind of exchange which took place on this subject could come to be representative of the kind of exchange which future meetings of consultation might provide. There was relatively little discussion of Soviet intentions and capabilities, particularly in the political field. There were probably two reasons for this - the broad measure of agreement between us and the time involved in discussion of the other main items on the agenda.

4. This most recent meeting again confirmed us in the belief that what we get out of these meetings of consultation bears direct relationship to the strength of

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views we bring to the meeting. It is not essential that the Canadian participants attempt to supply new information on specific topics of international concern. It is important, however, that the Canadian side have a definite and logically argued view on a specific subject if we hope to get a significant response from the United States side. The presentation of our views at this meeting on the matter of the recognition of China and the situation in the offshore islands is a good example of what we have in mind. As we have suggested in separate correspondence since the meeting (our telegrams 2051 and 2052 of Dec. 16), there is much to be said for developing further with the State Department the views on China which were briefly exchanged at the meeting.


5. Specifically, this most recent meeting of consultation provided us with an opportunity - (a) to reveal the concern of the Canadian Government at the cost in terms of money and manpower of our joint programme for the air defence of the continent and to indicate our need for United States understanding and assistance in specific aspects of our joint programme; (b) to put to the United States side our views on the necessity of further examination of a bilateral system of alerts procedures; and (c) once again to point up the differing views of the Canadian Government on certain aspects of the China problem. Discussion of these topics was not of course exhausted at the meeting but we think a sound groundwork was laid for further discussion of the topics in the months ahead. We should mention too that the meeting led to separate conversations between the Under-Secretary and interested State Department officers on Indochina and on Europe-after-Geneva. These talks might, of course, have been arranged whether there had been a meeting of consultation or not, but we are inclined to believe that they were the more useful because they followed up general points raised at the meeting of consultation.

6. As you know, I have at times been somewhat dubious of the value of continuing these periodic meetings of consultation. With this last meeting in mind, however, I would recommend that we do continue the practice. The Under-Secretary invited his United States colleagues to hold the next meeting in Canada and we think there is much to be said for this. A meeting in Canada, we hope, might serve to free the United States participants from their overly-intimate attachment to briefing papers, psychologically at least, and this would be a good thing. Our purpose, it seems to me, should continue to be that of making the meetings into an informal and free exchange of views among senior officers of both governments rather than simply a meeting where formal briefs are read or tabled. The only danger we foresee in making arrangements for a meeting outside the United States lies in the possibility that the pressure upon senior officials here might lead to the fielding of a United States second team. Finally, I think one procedural suggestion might be considered before another meeting of consultation is planned, and that is, that the discussion period should perhaps be divided somewhat more definitely than has been the case. Continental defence will continue to be a subject of prime

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importance for discussion at these meetings. There might be something to be said, therefore, for planning the meeting so that continental defence could be discussed prior to, or following, a lunch period. Other topics in the field of international political problems could then be taken up somewhat separately from this concrete bilateral problem.

D. P. Murray.

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TOP SECRET

Record of the Meeting of Consultation Between
Representatives of the Canadian and United
States Governments Held on Monday, Dec. 5, 1955

The meeting which was held in the State Department under the chairmanship of Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., the Under-Secretary of State, was attended by:

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. R. Douglas Stuart, United States Ambassador to Canada
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Livingstone T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Mr. Gordon Grey, Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Mr. Charles Sullivan, Chief, Policy Division, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defence
Mr. Robert G. Miner, Officer in Charge of Commonwealth Affairs

for the United States Government, and by

Mr. J. Leger, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Mr. A.D.P. Heeney, Canadian Ambassador to the United States
Mr. R. B. Bryce, Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary of the Cabinet
General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff
Mr. G. P. de T. Glazebrook, Minister, Canadian Embassy, Washington
Rear Admiral H. G. DeWolf, Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington
Mr. J. J. McCardle, Canadian Embassy, Washington.

for the Canadian Government.

2. The agenda of the meeting consisted of three items:

- (a) Continental Defence
- (b) Soviet Intentions
- (c) The Situation in the Far East

3. Mr. Hoover welcomed the Canadian visitors. Mr. Leger expressed his appreciation at having the opportunity to discuss matters of mutual concern with his United States colleagues. Mr. Hoover suggested that he might lead off with a few general remarks. Mr. Leger agreed.

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INTRODUCTION

4. Mr. Hoover thought that the timing of this meeting of consultation was most propitious in that the meeting followed upon the Geneva meeting of the Foreign Ministers and came just before the NATO ministerial meeting. Before the meeting got to the agenda, he would like to speak briefly of the Geneva meeting and the forthcoming NATO ministerial meeting.
5. There had been no specific progress on the individual agenda items as Geneva. No solution had been achieved of the problems of the reunification of Germany. It was made apparent at Geneva that the USSR would not release its hold on East Germany. What bothered the Russians was obviously not concern for Soviet security but the prospect of a relaxation of the Soviet grip on East Germany. The Soviet stand on disarmament was essentially negative. Molotov repeated the arguments set out in the Soviet paper of May 10 and was extremely critical of the proposals for aerial inspection made by President Eisenhower at the Summit Meeting. Consideration of the question of East-West contacts was stymied by the Russians. They rejected the concrete proposals put forward by the West. Their real fear seemed to be the effect which freedom would have on the peoples under their control. They would only consider a narrow field of contacts which would offer advantage to them.
6. It was Mr. Dulles' general view that the Russians had been more unyielding at Geneva than might have been anticipated. They showed no willingness to offer even minor concessions. This unyielding attitude suggested that the "Geneva spirit" was on the whole regarded by the Communists as a relative liability to their cause. The relaxation of tensions implicit in the "Geneva spirit" created difficulties for the USSR in dealing with its satellites. It seemed clear that the Soviet Union had come to the conclusion that any weakening of its hold on East Germany would have a bad effect on its position with respect to the satellites. It was Mr. Dulles' view, however, that in spite of the lack of progress at Geneva, the meeting had been useful. It had provided for a confrontation of views in such a fashion that there could be no misunderstanding of each other's views. By revealing the positions of the parties most clearly it had provided the basis for a more accurate judgment of the future than would have been possible if the meeting had not been held. There was effective tripartite co-operation at the Geneva meeting, probably more effective than at any other such meeting. There had been no agreement to another meeting. In the United States view there would be no purpose in scheduling another meeting unless there was a change in the world situation or in the Soviet attitude. The United States anticipated that there would be another meeting of this sort sometime in the future but at present the United States had no idea as to the timing of such a meeting. The meeting had re-enforced the United States view that the strength of the free world partnership must be maintained. The maintenance of this strength was likely to be the only thing which would bring about a change in the Soviet attitude.
7. Turning then to a brief consideration of the NATO ministerial meeting, Mr. Hoover said that the United States would carry to that meeting its belief that the Soviet purpose of seducing world domination remained unchanged.

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The Russians were pursuing less crude methods than they had employed in the past but their purpose remained the same. Against this background it was apparent that the preservation of NATO was an essential need. It seemed more than ever important that NATO military strength should be maintained. The long-haul concept was a valid concept. It seemed equally clear that NATO should play its part in bringing about an awareness in the free world that current Soviet tactics did not represent a change of Soviet objectives. These tactics should be resisted and the members of NATO should stand together wherever that was possible.

CONTINENTAL DEFENCE

8. The meeting then turned to consideration of the first item of the agenda, continental defence, and Admiral Radford spoke first. He said the probable development of the early warning system for the continent could be considered under two major headings - (a) warning of attack from the air, and (b) warning of attack from the sea. So far as the first was concerned, the United States envisaged no major changes in the next five years in the early warning systems currently being constructed. There would have to be, however, technical improvements, one of which would be with respect to automatic alarm systems. It was estimated that the land-based system could be brought to 100% efficiency in the next five years. On the other hand, the seaward system could probably only be brought to 80% efficiency and would have even less efficiency in bad weather. It was apparent that other means beyond those already planned were required for the seaward detection of an enemy force.

9. At present the seaward extensions of the Early Warning System in the Pacific were planned to run from Kodiak to Hawaii and in the Atlantic from Newfoundland to the Azores. The United States Joint Chiefs were considering changes in both seaward extensions. In the Pacific it seemed likely that they would recommend the line running from Adak to Midway Island. This would provide for greater protection. It would also allow the use of the Aleutians as a land base for part of the system. This change in plan had not yet been approved by the United States Joint Chiefs and before approval in its final form the change would be discussed with the Canadian authorities. So far as the Atlantic extension was concerned, he was aware that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff were not satisfied with the present plans. There was some difference of opinion as well among the United States military. The USAF had favoured a line running from Greenland to the Azores. The U.S. Navy was not happy with the choice of Greenland. Alternatives to the current plans were being studied. The U.S. Navy preferred a completely different plan which would run the line from Greenland to Iceland to the island chain off the northern United Kingdom. The main objection of the Continental Defence Command was that such a line was open to "spoofing". Admiral Radford said he himself had some preference for the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. system. It did emphasize the political importance of keeping Iceland in the free world camp and recent political developments there troubled him a great deal. In time, consideration would have to be given to the detection of long-range missiles. Admiral Radford said he believed it would be possible to do this with additional equipment.

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10. Submarine-launched missiles presented an even more complicated problem and at the moment the best defence against them seemed to be the destruction of the submarine itself. To achieve this purpose improved airborne, surface, and subsurface detection methods were required. With the advent of nuclear-powered submarines significant technical advances would be required. Anti-submarine operations would continue to be less effective in the higher latitudes because of winter weather and the band of poor SONAR conditions. By 1960 LOFAR would be installed in the ocean areas. There would, however, be serious deficiencies in the system. CODAR might help to remedy some of these deficiencies and it was expected that this technique would be in operational status by 1960.

11. In general terms then, in the next five years completion of the early warning systems which are now being established was the goal. Qualitative improvements in the systems should be the major objective.

12. In the field of research and development of weapons employed in continental defence, the inadequacies of present radar detection systems was of the greatest concern. To overcome low altitude inadequacies, the USAF had programmed 64 low altitude radar gap fillers scheduled to begin operations by June 1956 with 161 additional gap fillers to begin operations by June 1957. So far as high altitude radar problems were concerned, there was a programme for a high-powered FPS-3 radar to begin operations by June 1956 to provide overlap coverage in the system at approximately 60,000 feet by mid-1957. A new radar programme (AN/FPS-7) now in production will become operational in late 1957 and be completed by late 1959 with radar to provide coverage up to 100,000 feet at 160 nautical miles. By 1960 it was estimated that airborne early warning and control aircraft would have a detection range of 150 nautical miles covering the horizon from sea level to 60,000 feet and with a capability of controlling 10 interceptions simultaneously and of integration into the land-based SAGE system.

13. The U.S. Navy had also programmed improved equipment both airborne and shipborne. In addition to some types of airborne equipment programmed by the USAF, plans existed for the installation of a limited number of ultra-high frequency radars to enhance detection capability in conditions of high sea and stormy weather. Cruisers and larger vessels would also be equipped with search radars having a range of 200 nautical miles against a B-47 target and a range of 50 miles for destroyer escort and smaller vessels. Submarine radar ranges should be 35 to 50 miles. Admiral Radford spoke next of improved aircraft and control equipment. The USAF was planning to integrate the SAGE system as part of Continental Air Defence commencing in 1957 and to be completed in 1960. The schedule provides 70 sets by the end of fiscal year 1956, and a further 18 sets by the end of fiscal year 1958. The U.S. Navy was improving the intercept capabilities of picket ships by development of the Electronic Display System. The link in the acquisition and control system represented perhaps the most serious deficiency, and accelerated programmes are under way to improve the situation mainly by increasing radar power output and employing larger antennas. The USAF contemplated a change-over to the time-divided link during the period 1958-60.

14. Admiral Radford turned then to consideration of the aircraft programme for the next five years. The following new all-weather interceptor aircraft would be integrated into the

/80 additional sets by end of fiscal year 1957,

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Continental Air Defence System to replace current subsonic all-weather interceptors:

- (a) The F-102A, a supersonic single place all-weather fighter which would be operational by mid-1956, with a combat ceiling of 53,500 feet and a speed of mach 1.2 and equipped with 6 FALCON missiles and 36 2-inch rockets;
- (b) The F-102B, due in late 1958, with an effective combat capability at 60,000 feet, a speed of mach 2, and approximately the same armament as above;
- (c) The XF-103, an experimental plane whose first flight would be made in late 1957, with a performance ceiling of 80,000 feet, a speed of mach 3.7, and a combat radius of 375 nautical miles;
- (d) The F-100C, a superior fighter-bomber equipped with the FALCON or SIDEWINDER missile which would be used to augment the regular air defence forces and which should be operational by mid-1957.
- (e) The F-104A weapons system to provide daylight and limited night defence against ~~every~~ fighter and bomber aircraft. It should have a combat ceiling of 60,000 feet, a speed of mach 2, and a radius of action of approximately 815 miles. The first operational squadron was expected early in 1957.

15. There was in the planning stages a long-range interceptor aircraft with a radius of 1,000 nautical miles and a combat ceiling of at least 60,000 feet, which would not be operational before 1960, and a mid-range interceptor with a combat radius of 350 nautical miles, a combat ceiling of 75,000 feet and a speed of mach 2.5. The U.S. Navy was developing a fighter aircraft with a speed of 1130 knots and a combat ceiling of from 35,000 to 55,000 feet.

16. In the field of aircraft armament the following developments were included in the programme:

- (a) The FALCON missile (USAF) with a speed of mach 3 and a range of one to five miles; expected to be operational in 1956.
- (b) The F-8V3 (USN) equipped with 4 SPARROW missiles and SIDEWINDER missiles, both of which were difficult to jam electronically; the missiles were expected to be effective against targets flying well below 1,000 feet.

17. In the field of surface-to-air missiles, the following were planned for integration into the air defence system:

- (a) Nike "B" - with a range of 50 nautical miles, a ceiling of 80,000 feet, and capable of bearing an atomic warhead. It could be ready by 1958 to 1960;
- (b) "Hawk" - with a range of 13 nautical miles and capable of engaging 1,000 knot targets at altitudes from 50 feet to 45,000 feet. It was estimated to have a kill rate of 80%;

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- (c) "Terrier" - with a range of 10 nautical miles and a ceiling of 40,000 feet. It was also useful for low altitude kills since it will be able to engage targets at altitudes down to within 1.5 degrees from the horizon;
- (d) BOMARC - a long-range missile now under development. Initially it was to have a range of 125 nautical miles and a ceiling of 60,000 feet, which it was hoped could be extended to 250 nautical miles with a ceiling of 80,000 feet. Its speeds would range between mach 2.65 and mach 3;
- (e) TALOS (USAF) - a land-based missile which was regarded as an interim development to that of the BOMARC. It could be equipped with a nuclear warhead and should be available in 1958; it was hoped the missile would eventually have a range of 100 nautical miles and an altitude capability of 70,000 feet.

18. Considerable work was being done in the field of mines and by 1960 there should be a new family of such devices which were capable of being launched from supersonic aircraft as well as from surface vessels and submarines. It was planned as well that by 1960 an improved under-water sound surveillance system would be in operation. Added to these developments would be the "Betty", an anti-submarine atomic depth charge, and "Lulu", another 1200-lb. atomic depth charge. It was expected as well that homing torpedoes would be developed to a greater extent.

19. Admiral Radford said that he preferred not to deal with the question of alerts at this time since he had discussed the problem in general terms recently with General Foulkes, and the matter was under consideration by the two Air Staffs.

20. General Foulkes said he had no substantial comment to make on the programme outlined by Admiral Radford. Canadian authorities were somewhat anxious about the sea wings of the Early Warning System. They were not happy at the termination in Newfoundland of the three land-based Early Warning Systems. At present the important bases in Newfoundland had a maximum of four minutes early warning. This gap occurred on the most logical route for bombers from the Murmansk area. The Canadian authorities liked the look of the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. line.

21. Admiral Radford repeated his concern over the situation in Iceland. Political developments there, he thought, might create a real difficulties.

22. General Foulkes expressed the opinion that the early warning system devised to offer warning of air attacks should not be isolated from the system devised to warn of seaward attacks. It seemed to him that there was a possibility of combining the systems devised for sound surveillance, the picket ship system and the air defence warning systems.

23. General Foulkes then ~~sent on to~~ outlined current Canadian thinking on continental defence. He said that the progress on both the DEW line and the Mid-Canada line had been mentioned at the last meeting of consultation. There was no need to go over the same ground again. He would simply repeat that both lines were expected to be in operation by 1957.

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There had been difficulties last winter, particularly in the matter of sea transport. A thorough study of the problem of resupply, particularly of the western section of the DEW line, was required and a group of experts from both countries had it under consideration. Last winter's experience made it clear that as much use as possible should be made of the Mackenzie River system. An early warning operational group had been set up in New York to work out operational plans and procedures which would ensure that the DEW, Mid-Canada, and the PINETREE systems were fully integrated. Some changes were being recommended in the security policies covering the system. It was the Canadian belief that reasonable and wise publicity about the early warning system would add to its value as a deterrent. Amendments were being suggested which would allow for conducted visits of members of the press and it was hoped that the first visit would take place in March or April of next year.

24. Agreement had been reached on the agencies for operating and maintaining the early warning system for the first three years. The civilian organizations which built the lines would be allowed an opportunity to make them work. It was expected that a contract for a civilian organization to operate the Mid-Canada line would be negotiated shortly.

25. There seemed to be no outstanding bilateral problems in relation to the early warning system except the possibility that the enemy might be able to "spoof" these lines and create alarms which might bring the system into disrepute. He had raised with Admiral Radford about a month ago the question of arrangements for assessing and clearing alarms which might be created in the system. It was always possible that flights of geese might trigger parts of the system. It seemed essential that procedures should be worked out so that these alarms could be cleared at a fairly high level to avoid alarming the general public. The danger that more panic than assurance might be created in the public mind had to be avoided.

26. The Air Defence Commanders in both Canada and the United States were authorized to call ^{such an} (a simple alert).
X am alert of the air defence system
Under existing arrangements the calling of ^{such an} (a simple) alert in one country would automatically call an alert in the other. In the Canadian view it seemed a bit too risky to allow this decision to be taken in isolation. There should be clear association with other items of intelligence such as "Y" reports on signal activity in the air-fields in Siberia and Murmansk and by consultation. In the Canadian view it seemed that the possibility should be investigated of consultation on at least the Chiefs of Air Staff level before action was taken to declare a simple alert. There was a clear association between tactical information and strategic planning. There was room for joint endeavour in this field and there should be some preparations made to deal with the problem in the not too distant future.

27. Admiral Radford interposed to say that the Chiefs of the two Air Staffs were reviewing the details of the calling of alerts. He believed, therefore, that detailed examination of this question might be put off until the consultations between the Air Chiefs had been completed.

28. General Foulkes went on to say that a reappraisal of the Canadian air defence efforts had just been completed. The reappraisal had been necessary because of the considerably

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increased costs of developing in Canada a supersonic fighter to come into service some time around 1962. It was found that the development of this fighter would cost approximately \$300 million, and that when produced it would cost approximately \$3 million a copy. This, along with other requirements for continuing to modernize the air defence system, had created some alarm within the Canadian Government regarding the future costs of air defence. To continue with the present plans would seem to require a doubling of the air defence budget in the next five years.

29. Some of the major points which emerged from the Canadian reappraisal should be mentioned for they had an impact on the joint plans for the defence of North America. They created, as well, serious problems for the solution of which United States assistance might have to be sought. The basis of the reappraisal was the assumption that by mid-1959 the USSR could by a major effort launch an attack on North America which would be much more damaging than had been considered possible heretofore. With a major effort the USSR could launch approximately 600 long-range bomber aircraft against North America, including 200 jet heavy bombers and about 400 medium bombers, perhaps not all carrying atomic bombs. While little was known of Soviet capability in the field of air-refueling which would be essential in such an operation, it was considered that this technique was one with which the Russians could soon become familiar. It appeared evident that the deterrent and war-making capacity of the North American continent could not tolerate more than 50 to 100 thermo-nuclear bombs. This meant that more than 500 of the potential Soviet bombers would have to be destroyed en route, in the perimeter regions beyond the built-up areas of North America.

30. These facts had the effect of greatly expanding the area to be defended from the original conception of defending the heavy industrial heartland of Canada and the United States. The vital target area was now a continuous zone extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific and penetrating deep into the southern regions of the United States. Furthermore, long-range capability of the latest Soviet jet bombers was so increased that attacks on the North American continent could come not only from the north but also from the east and west, and perhaps some day from the south. It was obvious that there was now a requirement to achieve a marked increase in the probability of inflicting destruction on an attacking bomber force. One of the most promising ways of achieving this appeared to be the introduction into the air defence system of guided missiles both air-to-air and surface-to-air. The development of the air defence system was affected by two prime considerations:

- (a) the immediate need for substantial improvement in the protection afforded vital target areas; and
- (b) the need to ensure to the maximum possible extent that any expenditure of resources in the immediate years ahead should continue to serve a useful purpose after the introduction of long-range missile defences.

In other words, any new air bases, especially in Canada, should be established with a view to the possibility of their being converted to ground-to-air missile bases at minimum expense. The air defence of North America required that forces

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in being at war stations in peacetime as well as in war be at a high standard of training and in continuous readiness. The air defence system must be such that it would convince the Russians that we had the ability to preserve and protect the retaliatory capacity of North America. The task of defending these bases should take priority over the task of protecting centres of population because the bases were essential to the deterrent which we hoped would be the sure way of avoiding catastrophe.

31. The most urgent requirements in Canada stemming from these concepts were:

- (a) the extension of the base complex across the country from which defending forces could intercept, identify and destroy enemy bombers or other weapon carriers well in advance of the vital target area and where possible beyond the settled parts of Canada in order to minimize the effects of fall-out;
- (b) the extension of contiguous radar cover and the introduction of suitable automatic data handling facilities to allow the forces of this base complex to perform their tasks efficiently;
- (c) the improvement of the present all-weather fighter (CF-100) to give it increased altitude; and its re-equipment with an air-to-air missile (SPARROW II) which would give it a capability against Russian bombers until a supersonic fighter can be produced.

32. These conclusions required extension of the Canadian base complex to a total of 15 bases across the country and would require additional squadrons and radar. It had been decided not to rely on auxiliary forces for the front line defence of North America. This decision would involve the introduction of further regular squadrons to the Canadian air defence system. Joint studies now showed that it would be necessary to introduce 26 additional heavy radars into the system, of which 13 would be introduced between now and 1958. ^{Should?} This would give us the capability of intercepting beyond the settled part of Canada and would provide high cover from 20,000 to 60,000 feet. However, it would still leave a considerable gap below 20,000 feet in low cover between the mid-Canada line and the PINETREE system. This would involve the introduction of 120 unmanned gap-filler radars behind the mid-Canada line.

33. The likelihood of mass attack on the continent necessitated the abandonment of the manual system of control and the introduction of the semi-automatic guidance devices and computers to provide a semi-automatic ground environment. This ground environment, known as SAGE, was well advanced in the United States and it would appear advisable to adopt SAGE in the areas of Canada contiguous to the United States. It was expected that a combination of SAGE and BADGE, a less sophisticated and cheaper system which could be used in the northern regions would have to be introduced by Canada.

34. Finally, it was the Canadian belief that there should be greater collaboration between Canada and the United States in developing counters to electronic counter-measures, i.e., highly effective radar jammers which might be used by the enemy. This was a highly classified subject. It was a vital matter, however, to Canada as it was to the United States, and a solution to the problem should be worked out together.

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35. General Foulkes said that the following requirements would have to be met to give effect to this revised air defence concept:

- (a) six additional regular fighter squadrons; it was hoped that three could be created in 1955-56 and three in 1956-57;
- (b) an increase of 10 interceptor bases to cover the whole of Northern Canada, to be sighted and planned so as to be capable of handling surface-to-air guided missiles as and when they might be introduced into the system sometime after 1962;
- (c) introduction of 26 additional heavy radar units plus more than 120 gap fillers; 13 of these heavy radars should be introduced by 1958 and would give a capability of carrying out initial intercepting^{ions} about the Mid-Canada line;
- (d) the introduction of a semi-automatic ground environment tied in with the U.S. system of SAGE with a less sophisticated system in the more isolated parts of Canada;
- (e) the further improvement of the present all-weather fighter (CF-100) to give greater altitude, and the introduction of an air-to-air guided missile into this aircraft; it appeared that the U.S. Navy SPARROW II missile met Canadian requirements and it was hoped that this missile could be introduced into both the present fighter and the supersonic fighter now under development; Canada could not afford the luxury of several types of air-to-air missiles;
- (f) the continued development of the supersonic fighter (CF-105) equipped with air-to-air guided missiles capable of carrying atomic warheads; it was hoped to have the supersonic fighter introduced into the system sometime after 1961;
- (g) the introduction into the Canadian air defence system sometime after 1962 of ground-to-air long-range missiles of the BOMARC type;
- (h) the much closer integration of the air defence systems of Canada with that of the United States and the introduction of a system of command and control which would be politically acceptable to both countries; Canadian military authorities were ~~were~~ convinced that the operational control of the whole system should be vested in one commander; consideration was being given on the military level to the working out of a system of operational control which would avoid the use of the term "command"; "command" implied control of logistics, which was not necessary and created a great many political difficulties, particularly in peacetime.

36. The programme was exceedingly expensive and almost beyond Canadian capacities in financial, technical and scientific skills. It was the Canadian desire to do as much as possible of this programme without outside assistance but this might mean the curtailment of Canadian defence activities

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in Europe. The Canadian Government was loath at this particular time to suggest a cut in its commitments in Europe to make way for further developments in North American defence. It was aware in addition that, because of the accident of geography, Canada was perhaps spending more on continental defence than would otherwise be the case. Canadian authorities considered that the first step that should be taken was to ensure that there was no duplication of effort in the field of air defence development so that more funds would be available for actual procurement. This meant that there should be a readiness to share completely development secrets which affected air defence. Besides working out joint operational plans, Canada and the United States should be working out joint integrated weapons systems for air defence. At senior levels it was perhaps accepted that all development information on air defence should be freely shared but this did not always hold true at the working level.

37. General Foulkes said that the specific assistance which was required by Canada was the following:

- (a) all possible assistance in the adaptation of the U.S. Navy missile SPARROW for use in the present Canadian all-weather aircraft; (Admiral Radford agreed that this assistance would be provided);
- (b) access to all the plans, specifications and manufacturing know-how so that these missiles could be produced in Canada;
- (c) at a later stage information and specifications on atomic warheads for this type of weapon;
- (d) further help in the introduction of ^{a semi-automatic data transmission} the SAGE system especially in areas contiguous to the United States;
- (e) close collaboration in the field of electronic counter-measures;
- (f) since Canada would be unable to devote any facilities to ground-to-air guided missiles of the BOMARC type and would have to rely entirely on the United States for the introduction of these guided missiles into the air defence system of Canada some time in the future, information on sightings and layouts would be required earlier so as to ensure that any new bases built in Canada could be such that they could accommodate and use this type of weapon.

38. The necessity of an effective air defence system was fully recognized by the Canadian Government. Almost 50% of the Government's budget was devoted to the Air Force and the bulk of that amount was ear-marked for air defence. At the same time the Canadian Government was conscious of its commitments to NATO. General Foulkes believed that Canada might be able to offer some help to its NATO partners in the building of an integrated air defence system in Europe. About two years from now when the time came to begin the production of the supersonic fighter (CF-105) the Canadian Government would, however, be faced with some awkward decisions.

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39. Mr. Bryce said that many Canadians thought it curious that United States servicemen had to be brought to Canada while at the same time Canadian servicemen were being sent to Europe. There was no present disposition on the part of the Government to change this state of affairs but a real problem existed.

40. Admiral Radford said that the United States problems were similar to those outlined by General Foulkes. He said in addition that the NATO problem concerned him and he at times wondered if NATO could have an effective air defence system.

(on Europe)?

41. General Foulkes said he thought that an early warning system could be put across Europe relatively easily and at a cost not much above \$100 million. The area to be covered was after all not larger than the Province of Ontario. Perhaps North America could provide the electronics equipment for such a system. The object would be the introduction of guided missiles into the European system. He thought the Germans would not spend money simply to provide for interceptions at the Rhine. The European air defence system would probably be based not on interceptor fighters but on guided missiles.

ALERTS SYSTEM

42. Mr. Leger said that the Canadian authorities welcomed recent developments for tripartite discussions on indications of Soviet aggression in the NATO area. His present concern, however, was with the problem of alerts procedures in relation to North American defence arrangements. The general problem, he pointed out, was how to reconcile the necessities of military planning with the ultimate responsibility of governments for decision. The technical arrangements which were worked out in 1952 between Canada and the United States had a limited usefulness but were inadequate to meet Canadian requirements especially in the light of our growing inter-dependence in the field of air defence. Mr. Leger said that he planned to leave a brief working paper for consideration by the United States authorities. The essence of this paper was that the United States and Canadian Governments should agree that they would invariably and immediately inform each other when they received information of a kind which, when examined, might cause either to conclude that there was a likelihood of hostilities occurring in which North America would likely be attacked.

43. Mr. Heeney said that the immediate and practical problem in relation to the air defence of North America and the inter-dependence of Canada and the United States in this field was a bilateral one. A strong case could be made for the necessity of setting up arrangements between us for the exchange and assessment of indicator intelligence. If the Canadian Government did not have the necessary background information it would be more difficult to get the kind of decision in an emergency which the United States might wish. Mr. Heeney added that the Canadian authorities remained interested in the consideration of alerts procedures on a tripartite (United States-United Kingdom-Canada) and multilateral (NATO) basis.

44. General Foulkes said he thought that indicator intelligence was vital in order that the Canadian air defence system could operate at peak efficiency.

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45. Mr. Heeney said it was hoped that the Canadian working paper mentioned by Mr. Leger would provide the basis for a discussion of the principles of an improved alerts procedure between the two countries. Such discussions could perhaps best be confined to two representatives from each country. He was inclined to believe that the subject could be most effectively examined in an atmosphere of informality and would not require the presence of specialized intelligence experts. Mr. Hoover and Admiral Radford agreed that there would be value in consultation of this kind and each agreed to appoint a representative.

46. The meeting then moved on to consideration of the next item on the agenda. (Mr. Gray had to leave at this point.)

SOVIET INTENTIONS

47. Admiral Radford said that until the 22nd of November 1955 there had been no concrete evidence that the Soviet Union had detonated a true thermo-nuclear device. It now, however, had to be conceded that the Soviet Union had the capability of a device of a yield up to one megaton. Taking this information into consideration it could be estimated that the yield of the Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs was increased by a factor of 10. By mid-1956 it was estimated that the Soviet stockpile would include bombs with yields from $\frac{1}{2}$ kiloton to 10 megatons. The Soviet Union had now to be credited with the ability to equip weapons with nuclear warheads. In addition, there was evidence to indicate that Russian capabilities in the field of missile development was a good deal more advanced than was the case when this matter was considered at last year's meeting of consultation. It was estimated that by 1960 an inter-continental ballistic missile could be in the hands of one Soviet operational unit. These estimates of Soviet weapon development were a matter of dispute among the various intelligence agencies of the United States.

48. So far as the Red Army was concerned, the one change of significance since our last discussion had been the broadening of its doctrine to include the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

49. A greater stress had been laid on the offensive capabilities of the Soviet Navy. The Soviet submarine force was growing at the unprecedented rate of 70 submarines per year. Such a growth made the United States effort look small indeed. It was estimated that the Soviet Navy had 300 submarines available now. The possibility existed that most of these had missile-launching capabilities. This growth of naval strength made more important recent developments in Iceland which could only be thought of as discouraging.

50. The Soviet air force had been rebuilt since World War II. By 1960 it could be in a position to challenge allied superiority in the field of nuclear air power. It was estimated that the Soviet air force had 10,000 jet fighters, 3,000 jet light bombers, 1,100 piston medium bombers, 200 jet medium bombers, 20 to 30 jet heavy bombers, and 20 to 30 turbo-jet heavy bombers.

51. It was the United States estimate that in the next five-year period there would be no substantial change in the Soviet objective of world domination. It was estimated,

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however, that this objective would be sought not by military action but by covert subversion and infiltration. If, however, war were to come as a result of Soviet miscalculations, or through a series of counteractions which were not intended to lead to general war, it was estimated that the pattern would be along the following lines: the primary thrust would be nuclear air strikes against the SAC carrier force and other elements of the retaliatory power of North America; key industrial atomic and industrial facilities of North America would also be prime targets; the Soviet Union was credited with the capability of clandestine detonation of nuclear devices in key facilities in the United States; there was a good deal of argument among United States authorities as to how this latter problem should be handled; submarine-launched missiles might also be used and by the end of the period the Soviet Union might have the capability of the limited use of an inter-continental ballistic missile; an attack on North America would probably be coupled with an attempt to overrun Europe, seize Korea, seize or neutralize Japan, overtly support the Communist regime in Indochina, overtly and covertly gain control in Burma, Thailand, Malaya, and possibly Formosa, and possibly action in the Middle East; the possibility of sneak attacks on United States bases abroad could not be ruled out; the element of surprise in this case would be uppermost in the minds of the Soviet planners and their plan would be to strike a quick knock-out blow.

52. In attempting to erect a defence against these Soviet capabilities, we would face a problem of tremendous complexity. Since the element of tactical surprise would be of prime importance to the success of a Soviet attack, the requirement existed for an air warning system which could not be broken. It should extend from surface level to beyond the known range of any Soviet bomber. It must be backed up with an improved weapon system which would have more depth than currently programmed. It was required that our weapons have a range of 1,400 to 1,500 miles at all altitudes and that they be capable of causing the maximum attrition to an enemy force before it reached the continental shores. This was essential to avoid the hazards of fall-out. More effective measures were required to counter the submarine threat. The object must be to destroy the submarine rather than the missile it carried.

53. The Soviet threat was such as to call for the virtual elimination of all present deficiencies in our joint air warning system and the building of a weapons system to extend 1,500 miles out from the prime targets in Canada. The weapons system must be made invulnerable to electronic counter-measures and made up of a family of weapons which would complement and supplement each other. Missiles should be equipped with nuclear warheads. Even with maximum progress it would not be possible to make North America invulnerable. The necessary defence would be extremely expensive both in terms of money and manpower. Nor could it be such as to weaken offensive capabilities.

54. General Foulkes said he had no general comment to offer on the views put forward by Admiral Radford. Mention of the submarine threat, however, did bring to mind a difference of view which existed between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and SACLANT. It was the view of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that our defence should be related to the immediate threat of submarine-launched missiles rather than to defence against the

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enemy's use of submarines in a war of attrition. Admiral Radford said he knew there was some disagreement in this field and he was personally inclined to a view close to that of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. General Foulkes thought that, if this view was sound, consideration should be given to the effect which it would have on what our naval potential should be. This raised the question of priorities in naval development.

55. Mr. Hoover asked Admiral Radford whether it was his estimate that our capabilities were not such as to prevent a surprise attack from the Soviet forces. Admiral Radford said he was not entirely satisfied with our capabilities in this respect. It seemed likely that we would have warning of a Soviet massing for attack but he could not be certain. General Foulkes said that he thought that in this context the study of traffic on the Soviet airfields was of great importance. Increased efforts must be made to analyze this traffic.

56. Admiral Radford said the Russian defence effort was continuing at an unprecedented rate in the fields of materiel, aircraft, ships, tanks, etc. They were building a number of heavy cruisers which would not make a significant contribution to the kind of war we were talking about. It was possible that these cruisers were being built for cold war purposes, i.e., for impressive visits to uncommitted states. Soviet shipyards were engaged almost entirely on naval building. The Soviet merchant marine could only be increased if it was built outside the Soviet Union. For this reason therefore there should be no relaxation of strategic controls. Mr. Hoover commented that the importance of strategic controls was evident not only in this field but in such subsidiary fields as copper wire. Any outside assistance which relieved the pressure on the Soviet economy of the immense defence effort was not in our interests.

57. The discussion then turned to the third item on the agenda.

THE FAR EAST

58. Admiral Radford said that, since he had to leave the meeting shortly, he might give briefly his appreciation of the situation in the Far East and especially of the Chinese Communist threat. During 1955 the Communist Chinese had started ten new air bases between Shanghai and Canton. Three of these had been completed and it was estimated that all would be completed by April 1956. The thickest concentration of these bases was in Fukien province directly opposite Formosa. The techniques employed by the Chinese in building these bases were modern. The rate of progress of the building indicated that the Chinese were giving high priority to their construction. If this rate of progress was continued, the Chinese Communists could gain control of the air over the Formosa Straits from the Nationalist Chinese and, indeed, could present the United States with a major problem. It was not certain that all of the air bases under construction had been detected.

59. The Chinese Communists' early warning system was excellent and in some specific aspects was even better than that which we were developing jointly in North America. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the Nationalist Chinese, even when supplied with modern U.S. planes, to make survey

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flights over the mainland. The Chinese Communists had shown the capability of tracking planes flying at up to 50 thousand feet. There was increasing evidence of a Chinese Communist ability to make interceptions.

60. The Chinese Communists had an air force of 2,000 planes, some 1,100 of which were MIG types. A few MIG 17's had been sighted in the Shanghai area. They had more than 300 Soviet jet bombers (IL-28's), some 240 piston bombers, and a few TU-4 Soviet bombers. They were credited with having 13 submarines. Chinese Communist ground forces between Shanghai and Canton were estimated at approximately 600,000. This total was made up of over 500,000 field forces and more than 80,000 public security forces.

61. The situation in Korea was becoming increasingly difficult. The United States was being forced to withdraw air squadrons because, under the terms of the Armistice Agreement, they could not be re-equipped and brought up to date. The Communists had not abided by the terms of the Armistice and in the matter of aircraft alone had introduced more than 400 modern aircraft into North Korea. At the moment the Armistice terms did not hamper the re-equipment of ground forces in South Korea but the same problem would occur in future with respect to the ground forces as was now occurring with respect to the air forces. Numbers of forces alone did not give an accurate picture. It was true that Chinese Communist forces had been withdrawn but they had been withdrawn only into Manchuria. The Chinese Communists therefore had the capability of rapidly reintroducing large ground forces into North Korea. At the moment it was estimated that there were between 350,000 and 400,000 Chinese Communist ground forces in North Korea.

62. Mr. Bryce asked Admiral Radford if he estimated that the Chinese Communist build-up was directed only against Formosa.

63. Admiral Radford replied that the Chinese Communists were getting into the position of being able to challenge even the United States in the Formosa Straits. He went on to say that he felt certain that the Chinese Nationalists would want to strike at the airfields if aircraft were put on them. At the moment there did not seem to be any permanent stationing of aircraft on two of these three completed fields. The Nationalists had been pressing all along for agreement to strike at the fields in the process of construction.

64. Mr. Robertson interposed to draw the meeting's attention to a recent statement by Communist Chinese Vice-Premier Chen Yi in an interview with the press in East Berlin. He had indicated that there were two ways that the liberation of Formosa could be achieved - (a) by the voluntary evacuation of United States military power from Formosa; and (b) by Chinese Communist armed attack on Formosa. He had then gone on to outline the Chinese Communist build-up on the mainland opposite Formosa.

65. Admiral Radford said that, while he had stressed the build-up of Chinese Communist air power opposite Formosa, this was only part of the Chinese Communist build-up. Heavy artillery was being installed in large quantities. Amphibious craft were being built and a submarine force was being developed with Russian assistance much more quickly than had been anticipated.

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66. Mr. Leger asked whether there had been any increase of military action around Quemoy and the Matsu Islands.

67. Admiral Radford said that there had been artillery duels recently. The Chinese Communists were building a causeway to one of the smaller islands north of Quemoy as a supply route for heavy artillery which was being installed on the small island. The Nationalist forces had fired on the causeway and as a result there was a four- to five-hour artillery engagement on December 4. In general terms there had been a stepping up of artillery exchanges recently.

68. In response to a further question from Mr. Leger, Admiral Radford said that almost one-third of the Nationalist Chinese army was disposed on the island groups. Approximately 7 divisions of Nationalist troops were on the islands. This was an increase from the number on the islands early this year. Mr. Leger asked if this would not make the problem of the eventual withdrawal of the Nationalists from Quemoy and the Matsus even more difficult than it had been.

69. Admiral Radford gave it as his opinion that the Nationalists would not withdraw their forces from the islands. For reasons other than military reasons, he believed they could not afford to do so.

(Admiral Radford left the meeting).

70. Mr. Robertson said that the Communist Chinese had never indicated any interest in Quemoy and the Matsus except as stepping-stones to the liberation of Formosa. There were those who had argued that, if the offshore islands were turned over to the Communists, tension in the area would be relieved. It was the United States view that a turn-over of the offshore islands to the Communists would not deter the Communists from continuing their campaign to liberate Formosa. The prime objective of the Chinese Communists was to remove the military deterrent to their plans to dominate Asia which now existed on Formosa by reason of the presence there of Nationalist Chinese and United States armed forces. Evacuation of the offshore islands would not therefore relieve the tensions in the area.

71. Mr. Heeney said that some allies who took a different view of the offshore islands did so on the grounds that there was a political distinction between their status and the status of Formosa.

72. Mr. Robertson said that the United States made a political distinction in this respect and had not included the offshore islands in the territory covered by the U.S.-Nationalist China Mutual Defence Treaty. It was Communist China and not the United States which had given the offshore islands a special status. The Communists constantly referred to them as stepping-stones to the prime target, the liberation of Formosa. It was in these circumstances that the President had asked Congress for authority to engage United States forces in defence of the islands if necessary. Mr. Robertson went on to say that United States policy with respect to Formosa had two legal aspects. There was first the fact that the juridical status of Formosa had never been settled. The Japanese gave up

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- 18 -

the title to it in the Peace Treaty but the title had not been passed to China. Even George Yeh, the Nationalist Foreign Minister, had said recently before the Legislative Yuan that the Nationalists had "possession but not title" to Formosa. Up to 1949 the Chinese Communists had never claimed Formosa but had supported the idea of an independent Formosa. It was only after the Nationalist Government had gone to Formosa that the Chinese Communists changed their tune. It was quite clear that they were interested in it only in order to get rid of the military deterrent which it posed to their expansionist policies. The second thing to be borne in mind was that the United States recognized the Nationalist Government as the government of China and had with the Nationalists a mutual defence treaty covering the area which was under the control of the Nationalist government.

73. The primary objective of the United States in the discussions with the Chinese Communists at Geneva, Mr. Robertson continued, was to avoid war in the Formosa Straits. The other important objective of these talks was to gain release of U.S. nationals held in Communist China. What the United States was seeking was the agreement of the Chinese Communists to a renunciation of force in the Formosa area. It did not ask the Chinese Communists to change their objectives but simply to agree not to pursue those objectives by force. The Communists insisted that the liberation of Formosa was a domestic matter and refused to move from that view. The United States believed, however, that nothing could be more international than the problem of Formosa, since that problem involved the possibility of war.

74. In response to a question from Mr. Heeney as to whether or not the Chinese Communists were likely to continue the negotiations at Geneva, Mr. Robertson said that there was every indication that Peking did wish the talks to continue. The Chinese Communists at Geneva were using the normal Communist tactics (tactics which they employed in the brain washing of prisoners-of-war), alternating between the tough and conciliatory line. At last Thursday's meeting, for example, the Chinese Communist representative had been very conciliatory. This had followed other recent meetings in which he had been unbending and vituperative. The United States intended to hold to its primary objective - that of seeking to avoid war in the Straits.

75. Mr. Hoover said that no one situation in the area, whether it be Korea, Formosa, or Indochina, could be isolated. Dealings with the Chinese Communists over any one issue affected the whole Far East. The object must be to keep Japan, the Philippines and Southeast Asia free. The Chinese Communist objective was to gain control of free Asia. No situation therefore could be viewed in isolation from another on the rim of Asia.

76. Mr. Leger recalled that on February 16, 1955, Mr. Dulles had informed Mr. Pearson that he thought the United States would be able to persuade the Nationalist Chinese to evacuate Quemoy and the Matsus in due course, that is, in six months to a year. Admiral Radford's information with respect to the increase of Nationalist forces on the offshore islands suggested that this hopeful line was no longer valid. Indeed, the problem of the offshore islands seemed more acute

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- 19 -

now than it had been earlier this year. If present developments in Canadian policy continued, there could be very disturbing consequences.

77. Mr. Robertson thought the problem of the Formosa Straits would not be settled by Nationalist withdrawals from the offshore islands. It was not possible for the United States to dissociate its policy from the policy pursued by the Communists. So long as the Communists treated the offshore islands as stepping-stones to the liberation of Formosa, the withdrawal of Nationalist forces from the islands did not make sense. He did not believe that Chiang Kai-shek would agree to withdraw his forces, nor did he believe that in present circumstances President Eisenhower would recommend such a withdrawal. He emphasized that there had been no suggestion from any Chinese Communist sources at any time that a relieving of tension in the Straits would result from a withdrawal of Nationalist troops from Quemoy and the Matsus. This matter was not being talked about at Geneva since the United States had indicated that it would not discuss there the interests of third parties.

78. Mr. Heeney said it seemed then that the United States view was not now what it had been when Mr. Dulles spoke to Mr. Pearson in February. The Canadian view had been and was that the extremely dangerous feature of the situation in the Formosa Straits was the face-to-face confrontation of opposing forces in the offshore islands. It had been the Canadian hope that withdrawal of the Nationalist Chinese would reduce the tension in the area sufficiently to make progress possible on the task of reaching a settlement of the final status of Formosa perhaps as an independent country. It was a shock to find that Nationalist withdrawal seemed now less likely than it had been earlier this year.

79. Mr. Robertson said that in the intervening months the threat from the mainland had increased. The Chinese build-up on the coast opposite Formosa had gone on apace throughout these months and the obvious objective of the build-up was an attack on Formosa. All evidence pointed to a most aggressive intention on the part of the Chinese Communists. The United States did not consider that the turnover of the offshore islands would satiate the Chinese Communists. Developments then in the ensuing months had altered the United States view. Developments had certainly altered Chiang Kai-shek's view and the United States was having the greatest difficulty in restraining the Nationalists from taking action in the face of the Chinese Communist build-up.

80. Mr. Leger said that his United States colleagues would be familiar with the Canadian position as to eventual recognition of Communist China. It had been stated a number of times in public and in private by Mr. Pearson. If the relative quiescence of the Chinese Communists was to continue, that is, a lack of aggressive action on their part, it was possible that in the months ahead the Canadian Government would be closer to a decision to recognize. When one related that process of Canadian thinking to the United States exposition given at this meeting of the military build-up both on the mainland and in the offshore islands, the contradiction was flagrant. It seemed essential that our two governments should get together to straighten out this contradiction. In the meantime, he said he had wished to bring up the subject at this meeting in order that there would be no misunderstanding on the United States side as to how Canadian minds were working.

- 20 -

81. Mr. Robertson said that it seemed to him that one of the differences between the views of the two governments in this context stemmed from their evaluation of the situation. In the United States view, the Chinese Communists were being anything but quiescent. There was no indication of the Chinese Communists having abandoned their objective of taking over Asia. They continued to maintain up to 400,000 troops in North Korea and had sent in modern combat materiel. In North Vietnam since the Geneva Conference the effective force of the Vietminh had been doubled, with equipment and assistance from the Chinese and other Communist sources. In Laos there was evidence of Communist Chinese and Vietminh direction of the Pathet Lao. With respect to Formosa, the Chinese Communist objective of liberation remained. It was extremely disturbing to hear of the possibility of Canadian recognition of a regime which showed every intention of continuing its aggressive policies.

82. Mr. Sullivan interposed to point out that the United States was particularly concerned by the activities of the Chinese Communists among the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Among this community the Chinese Communists exploited the threat of their military strength. It seemed to United States observers that the collapse of Southeast Asia would follow quickly upon the fall of Formosa. It was certainly a fact that Chinese Communist activity in Malaya amounted to para-military operations.

83. Mr. Hoover said that it was in Malaya where the wealthiest overseas Chinese community lived that Chinese Communist blackmail was most apparent. The Communists there pressed the argument of the inevitability of Chinese Communist military control being exercised in Malaya and called on these local Chinese to make their peace with the Chinese Communist regime now. The effectiveness of their arguments could only be heightened if Communist China were recognized by important Western powers.

84. Mr. Robertson said he wished to clear away any misapprehension that might exist (and did exist in the minds of friendly powers throughout the world) that the United States was planning a deal with the Chinese Communists at Geneva. This was not so. The United States Government did not contemplate the recognition of Red China and was not approaching contemplation of recognition. There was no pressure from anyone in the United States Government to this end nor was there any difference of opinion between the political parties in the United States on the matter of the recognition of Communist China in the present circumstances. Reverting to a remark by Mr. Heeney earlier that Quemoy and the Matsu Islands belonged to the Chinese mainland, Mr. Robertson said he believed that the view that one took of this question depended largely upon whom one recognized as the government of China.

85. Mr. Heeney said it seemed then that the Geneva talks could not in the United States view lead to a political settlement.

86. Mr. Robertson said the United States had entered the talks at Geneva in the hope that they might lead to a reduction of tension. It was not impossible that they could lead to a conference - not a bilateral conference between the United States and Communist China - but a conference of interested parties. There was no evidence so far, however, that the Communists were seriously seeking a reduction of tension in the Straits.

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87. Mr. Heeney said that there could be no misunderstanding of United States views on the subject.

88. Mr. Hoover said that he thought that the objective of the Communists in the Far East as elsewhere was to cause political difficulties between the Western partners. A difference of view between Canada and the United States on the matter of recognition would be high on any priority list of Chinese Communist objectives. It seemed essential to him that Canadian and United States views on this vital matter should not diverge seriously.

89. It was agreed that there was much to be said for continuing the discussion of the Far Eastern situation, and particularly the role of the International Commissions in Indochina. Arrangements were agreed upon for a further meeting on December 6 between Mr. Leger and Mr. Robertson. Arrangements were made as well for Mr. Leger to discuss German matters with Mr. Merchant.

90. The meeting ended with expressions from both sides of the value of meetings such as this. It was agreed that the matter of publicity would be handled as on past occasions. The response to any questions from the press would be that the meeting had provided for routine consultation between the two governments on matters of common interest.

91. Mr. Leger said that he hoped it might be possible to hold the next such meeting of consultation in Canada.

December 5, 1955.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security..... *Top Secret*

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

50219-AE-40		
94	✓	✓

Type of Document *LR*..... No. *✓*..... Date *Dec 20 1955*.....

From *E.A.*.....

To *A.D.P. Henry, Washington*.....

Subject:

*Alerts procedures (to be discussed
at Meeting of Consultation)*

Original on File No. *50030-AB-4-40*.....

Copies on File No.....

Other Cross Reference Sheets on.....

Prepared by *Defence Registry Div.*.....

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security..... *Top Secret*

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REQUIT A SECRET**

50219-AE-40		
94	✓	✓

Type of Document... *Ld* No. Date... *Dec 19 1955*

From: *E.A.*

To: *Bryce - Privy Council*

Subject:
*Meeting of Consultation in Washington
to discuss alerts procedures.*

Original on File No. *50030-AB-4-40*

Copies on File No.

Other Cross Reference Sheets on

Prepared by... *Alfonso Registry DN*

COPY

COPY NO. *26*...OF 35 COPIES

original on 50030-AB-9

FM EMBASSY WASHINGTON DEC 15/55
TO EXTERNAL OTTAWA 2044

50219-AE-40	
129	50

TOP SECRET. ONE OF TWO.

REFERENCE: YOUR TELEGRAM NO. DL-2081 OF DEC. 10/55

SUBJECT: MEETING OF CONSULTATION: ALERTS.

WE GAVE YESTERDAY TO MINER IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT THE FORMULA AS AMENDED. WE FOUND THAT MINER (WHO WAS THE RECORDING SECRETARY AT THE CONSULTATION MEETING) REGARDED THIS FORMULA AS CLEAR AND DEFINITE AND THEREFORE AS HELPFUL. HE ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CONSULTATION MEETING HAD AGREED THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD APPOINT A CIVIL AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO DISCUSS BILATERAL ALERTS ON THE BASIS OF THE CANADIAN FORMULA.

2. WE SUGGESTED THAT A MEETING BETWEEN THESE FOUR PEOPLE MIGHT USEFULLY TAKE PLACE IN JANUARY IN WASHINGTON. WHEN MINER ASKED FOR ANY SUGGESTIONS ABOUT THE TYPE OF PERSONS, WE SUGGESTED THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE SUCH AS WOULD MAKE THE CONVERSATION TOO TECHNICAL, BUT SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY INFORMED ON INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURES AND CHANNELS OF EXCHANGE.

3. FOR THE CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES, WE WOULD BE INCLINED TO SUGGEST THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JIC AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF GENERAL FOULKES MIGHT COME FOR THE MEETING RATHER THAN THAT THE CHANCERY AND THE JOINT STAFF SHOULD SUPPLY REPRESENTATIVES. THE REASON FOR THIS SUGGESTION IS THAT SUCH OFFICIALS FROM OTTAWA WOULD BE FULLY AWARE NOT ONLY OF THE CANADIAN REQUIREMENTS, BUT OF THE

COPY

PAGE TWO 2044

EXACT RESULTS WHICH WERE DESIRED.

4. WE HAVE NOW INFORMED THE BRITISH EMBASSY THAT THIS DISCUSSION ON BILATERAL ALERTS WAS HELD AT A MEETING PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH CONTINENTAL DEFENCE. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT OUR CONCERN FOR BILATERAL PROCEDURES DID NOT IN ANY WAY LESSEN OUR INTERESTS IN THE TRIPARTITE SUGGESTION.

5. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE PROCEDURE AGREED FOR THE BILATERAL PROBLEM MIGHT USEFULLY BE APPLIED, AND PROBABLY LATER, TO THE TRIPARTITE SCHEME. WE WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT IT BE LEFT TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE TO CONSULT WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, ALTHOUGH YOU MAY WISH TO KEEP CANADA HOUSE INFORMED.

6. WHEN WE TALKED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT EARLIER ABOUT THEIR AIDE MEMOIRE OF NOVEMBER, IT WAS INDICATED THAT THE LACK OF CLARITY WAS IN PART DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM PAPER TO WHICH IT WAS AN ANSWER. WE HAVE, THEREFORE, EXPLAINED THIS TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THEY COULD GET THEIR PROPOSAL MORE COMPLETE BY COVERING POINTS WHICH YOU HAVE COVERED IN YOUR FORMULA FOR THE BILATERAL PLAN. THIS, OF COURSE, NEED NOT NECESSARILY RESULT IN A FURTHER FORMAL DOCUMENT, BUT SHOULD BE AVAILABLE WHEN TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS ARE PLANNED.

7. FROM THE VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS WE HAVE HAD HERE WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT A FORMAL REPLY TO THE UNITED STATES AIDE MEMOIRE SHOULD NOT BE MADE AT THIS TIME, BUT THAT WE SHOULD LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OFFICIALS MODELLED ON THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AND WITH MORE COMPLETE PROPOSALS PREPARED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM (AND ACCEPTABLE TO OURSELVES). A.D.P. HEENEY.

FILE COPY

Security TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

OUTGOING *8.13*

File No. 56219-AE-40	
129	SD

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD. OF. POST., WASHINGTON, D.C.

UNCLASSIFIED TO SECRET
SECRET A SECRET

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER

XXXX

No. *DL 2081*

Date

DECEMBER 10, 1955

For Communications Section Only

Priority

.....

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

G. IGNATIEFF

(Name Typed)

Div... *D.L.(1)/elb*

Local Tel... *3402*

APPROVED BY

JULES LÉGER

(Signature)

(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution: /

S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.

Done.....

Date.....

Copies Referred To:

Mr. Bryce

Gen. Foulkes

Done Dec 12/55

BJN

Done.....

Date.....

Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

REFERENCE: YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2016 OF DECEMBER 9, 1955

SUBJECT: MEETING OF CONSULTATION

FOLLOWING FROM THE UNDER-SECRETARY, BEGINS:

THE AMENDMENT TO THE FORMULA WHICH I MADE IN THE TEXT AS YOU HAVE IT OCCURS AT THE END OF PARAGRAPH 1, WHICH SHOULD CONCLUDE WITH THE WORDS "IN WHICH NORTH AMERICA WOULD LIKELY BE ATTACKED", FOLLOWING THE WORDS "HOSTILITIES OCCURRING".

2. IN THE MEMORANDUM ON ALERTS PROCEDURES, COVERING THE FORMULA, I CHANGED THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4 TO READ "WE WELCOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS FOR TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS ON INDICATIONS OF SOVIET AGGRESSIONS IN THE NATO AREA.

3. HAVING IN MIND THE DESIRABILITY OF MAKING PROGRESS IN TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS, I WONDER WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT EXPLAINING FRANKLY TO MAKINS THAT THE QUESTION OF ALERTS WAS DISCUSSED IN OUR LATEST SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS, (ON WHICH I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE KEPT THEM INFORMED IN THE PAST) BUT STRESSING THAT THE ALERTS QUESTION WAS RAISED SOLELY IN RELATION TO OUR JOINT CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE ARRANGEMENT. ENDS.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

~~FILE COPY~~
Reference
~~COPY~~

Mr. Walker

50219-AE-40
129 | 50

FM EMBASSY WASHINGTON DEC 9/55
TO EXTERNAL OTTAWA

Copy on 50030-AB-

SECRET. 2016.

*File
KCF*

REFERENCE: YOUR DL-2039 OF DEC 2/55

SUBJECT: MEETING OF CONSULTATION

FOLLOWING FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY, BEGINS:

WE DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE THE COPY OF THE FORMULA ON
ALERTS WHICH YOU AMENDED WHILE HERE. POSSIBLY THIS WAS
RETURNED WITH YOUR OTHER PAPERS. WOULD YOU BE GOOD ENOUGH
TO SEND US THIS DOCUMENT OR THE AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXT AS
WE HAVE IT. ENDS. A.D.P. HEENEY.

FILE COPY

Security RESTRICTED

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

File No.	
50219-AE-40	
52	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, washington, D.C.

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER

XXXXX

No. DL-2040

Date

DECEMBER 2, 1955

For Communications Section Only

Priority

REFERENCE: YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1974 OF NOVEMBER 30, 1955

ORIGINATOR

SUBJECT: VISIT OF UNDER-SECRETARY TO WASHINGTON

(Signature)

G. IGNATIEFF

(Name Typed)

D.L.(1)/elb

Div.

Local Tel. 3402

BEGINS:

FOLLOWING FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM MACDONNELL,

BEFORE LEAVING FOR NEW YORK THE UNDER-

SECRETARY INDICATED THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS OUTLINED

IN YOUR MESSAGE UNDER REFERENCE WERE ACCEPTABLE TO HIM.

APPROVED BY

(SGD) R. M. MACDONNELL

(Signature)

(Name Typed)

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Internal Distribution:

S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.

Done.....

Date.....

Copies Referred To:

Done.....

Date.....

T.O.R./T.O.
 COMMUNICATIONS
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE COPY

Security **TOP SECRET**

DEC 2 17 30 '55
MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

File No. 50219-AE-40	
171	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST **DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET**
 WASHINGTON **REDOUBT A SECRET**

Message To Be Sent	No. DL- 2039	Date DECEMBER 2, 1955	For Communications Section Only
AIR CYPHER EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER			
Priority IMMEDIATE	REFERENCE: OUR LETTER NUMBER DL-1647 OF DECEMBER 1, 1955 SUBJECT: MEETING OF CONSULTATION, DECEMBER 5. FOLLOWING FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM MACDONNELL: THE MINISTER HAS APPROVED THE GENERAL LINE PROPOSED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF NOVEMBER 30 WHICH IS INCLUDED IN THE BINDER ATTACHED TO OUR LETTER UNDER REFERENCE. HE THOUGHT HOWEVER THAT THE WORD "POSSIBILITY" IN PARAGRAPH ONE OF THE FORMULA ANNEXED TO THE MEMORANDUM WAS PERHAPS TOO VAGUE TO INDICATE THE NATURE OF OUR REQUIREMENTS. BRYCE AND LEGER, WHO HAD A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, WERE INCLINED TO FEEL THAT THE WORD "LIKELIHOOD" MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE IN THIS AND FOULKES CONTEXT. THEY WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU/BEFORE THE MEETING THE BEST WAY TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF ALERTS, AND PARTICULARLY TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THE ADVISABILITY OF TABLING THE FORMULA AT THE MEETING. YOU MIGHT HAVE A FEW EXTRA COPIES OF IT MADE WITH THE SUGGESTED CHANGE.		
ORIGINATOR (Signature) J.M. Teakles/ew (Name Typed) Div. D.L. (1) Local Tel. 7921			
APPROVED BY (SGD) R. M. MACDONNELL (Signature) (Name Typed)			
Internal Distribution: S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.			
Done..... Date.....			
Copies Referred To:			
Done..... Date.....			

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE COPY

Security RESTRICTED

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No.	
50219-AE-40	
90	58

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS,.....
NEW YORK

Message To Be Sent		Date	For Communications Section Only
AIR CYPHER	No: JK 190	December 2, 1955	
EN CLAIR			
CODE			
CYPHER			
Priority	REFERENCE:		
IMPORTANT (SGD) R. M. MACDONNELL	SUBJECT: MEETING OF CONSULTATION IN WASHINGTON		
ORIGINATOR	<p>FOLLOWING FOR LEGER FROM MACDONNELL, BEGINS:</p> <p>HEENEY HAS ADVISED THAT THE TIME OF MEETING HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD TO 9:15 A.M. AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT MONDAY, DECEMBER 5 TO ENABLE ADMIRAL RADFORD TO ATTEND. HEENEY HAS SUGGESTED PRELIMINARY TALK WITH ALL CONCERNED AT 9:00 P.M. SUNDAY AT THE RESIDENCE.</p> <p>BRYCE AND GENERAL FOULKES HAVE BEEN ADVISED.</p>		
(Signature)			
G. IGNATIEFF			
(Name Typed)			
Div. D.L. (1)/elb			
Local Tel. 3402			
APPROVED BY (SGD) R. M. MACDONNELL			
(Signature)			
(Name Typed)			
Internal Distribution:			
S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.	SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS		
Done.....			
Date.....			
Copies Referred To:			
Done.....			
Date.....			
Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)			

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security..... *TOP SECRET*

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

<i>50219-AE-40</i>		
<i>90</i>		<i>90</i>

Type of Document..... *Brief* No..... Date..... *2 Dec 1955*
 From..... *Gen Faulkes*
 To.....

Subject:
*Brief for Meeting of Consultation -
 Continental Reference*

Original on File No..... *50209-40*
 Copies on File No.....
 Other Cross Reference Sheets on..... *50210-40*

[Signature]

Prepared by..... *[Signature]*000049

NUMBERED LETTER

TO:.....
The Canadian Embassy
.....
Washington
FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.
Reference:.....
Our telegram No. DL-2026 of
Subject:..... November 30, 1955.
.....
Meeting of Consultation
.....

Security:..... TOP SECRET
No:..... DL-1647
Date:..... December 1, 1955
Enclosures:..... 2
Air or Surface Mail:.....
Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50219-AE-40	
52	50

References

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
~~REBUT A SECRET~~

Attached for your use at the Meeting of Consultation on December 5, is the binder referred to in paragraph 4 of our telegram under reference. Attached also is a second binder for the use of whoever accompanies you to the meeting.

Internal Circulation

G. IGNATIEFF
for the
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Note: There is a binder with copies of the documentation in the file packet.

Distribution to Posts

Defence Liaison (1)/K.C.Brown/ew

50219-AE-40	
90	50

11.11.1955

Mr. [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED TO [illegible]
LEVEL 1 SECRET

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

/s/ G. IGNATIEFF
for the [illegible]

Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: Defence Liaison (1)

Security Top Secret

Date December 1, 1955

FROM: European/R.A.D.Ford

File No. 50219-AE-40		
✓	✓	✓

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of November 22

SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

In connection with Item III of the forthcoming meeting of consultation in Washington, I am enclosing six copies of each of the following for inclusion in the briefs:

File ReB

- (a) Soviet Intentions--virtually the same as our telegram of November 28 to CANAC on Soviet policy trends, for the Working Group.
- (b) Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, Item I, Germany and European Security--the most important section of our assessment of Geneva.

R.A.D.F.
R.A.D.F.

Enc. 6

December 1, 1955.

SECRET

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129	✓

File
KcB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

NOTES FOR THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION

CHINA

Sino-U. S. Negotiations. The Sino-United States negotiations in Geneva appear to have reached an impasse with little immediate prospect of early agreement on any of the points at issue. The American position is that little advance can be made until the remaining United States nationals in Chinese custody have been released. At the same time the American negotiators are endeavouring to reach agreement with the Chinese on a joint declaration renouncing the use of force as a means of settling disputes and, in addition, are seeking information on their service personnel who have been missing since the Korean war. Chinese objectives continue to include the removal of the Seventh Fleet and United States personnel from the Formosa theatre, the abandonment of the embargo on trade with China and a meeting between Mr. Chou En-lai and Mr. Dulles. They are not averse to a joint declaration on the renunciation of force in settling disputes but have made it clear that they regard Formosa as an internal matter which would not be covered by such a declaration.

2. If the Geneva negotiations break down, the Chinese could argue with considerable force that this has happened because the Americans refused to negotiate seriously. Chou En-lai and other prominent Chinese Communist officials have recently expressed impatience with the lack of progress in Geneva and the British Chargé d'Affaires in China has reported a growing impression in Peking that the Americans entered into negotiations with the sole purpose of securing the release of American prisoners and with no thought of negotiating on other problems.

3. Because the failure of negotiations in Geneva might well lead to a renewal of the crisis over the Off-shore islands, we are increasingly concerned about American tactics in their negotiations with the Chinese and think that the following questions might be raised:

- A. What are the prospects of achieving further concrete results from the negotiations with

- 2 -

the Chinese Communists in Geneva?

- B. Do the Americans intend to press for full satisfaction on the release of all U. S. prisoners in China and on their service personnel missing since the Korean war before reaching any compromise understandings with the Chinese Communists on other substantive questions. ✓
- C. If so, do they think the Chinese will continue to negotiate indefinitely and would a breakdown in negotiations be of serious concern to them?
- D. If negotiations are broken off is there not a risk that the Chinese will step-up their pressures on the Off-shore islands.

4. Strategic Controls on Trade - We have said that we would not take the initiative in the Paris Consultative Committee in re-questioning a review of the China list but we do favour its revision to correspond with the Soviet list. As we consider inevitable a revision of controls to the same level for both areas, we might question the Americans on when they will be willing to discuss such a reduction of the China list to the Soviet level. ✓

5. Declaration on the Renunciation of Force as a Method of Settling Disputes. So far, agreement on a declaration renouncing the use of force in settling disputes has been impossible because the Chinese refuse to include in this category Formosa, which they regard as an internal Chinese affair. In view of this obstruction, we might ask the Americans if they see any prospect of reaching agreement with the Chinese on a joint declaration.

6. High Level Meeting. - The Chinese have consistently sought a meeting between Mr. Chou En-lai and Mr. Dulles through which, they insist, settlement of the Formosa problem is possible. It would be worth knowing if the Americans consider the prospects of settling the immediate points at issue sufficiently hopeful to warrant consideration being given to the holding of such a meeting in the foreseeable future. Are the Americans of the opinion that the Chinese are seeking such a meeting as a face saving device to permit China's acceptance of the status quo on Formosa for the time being?

7. Coastal Islands. - On February 16, 1955, Mr. Dulles informed Mr. Pearson that he thought the United States would be able to persuade the Nationalist Chinese to evacuate the Quemoy and Matsu Islands in due course. However, on May 5th, 1955, he told both

- 3 -

The United Kingdom and Australian Ambassadors in Washington that in the light of the Robertson-Radford report on Formosa he had concluded it would be impossible to force the Chinese Nationalists to leave the off-shore islands without grave risk. He thought that the passage of time would reduce the importance of the islands to the Nationalists and that they might then be induced to evacuate. He elucidated to the Australian Ambassador that the period he had in mind was six months to one year. As more than six months have elapsed since then with no apparent diminishment in Nationalist China's determination to hold these islands, you could ask what pressures and inducements have been brought to bear on the Nationalists to bring about their evacuation and what is the current U. S. estimate of the time required to accomplish this end.

Long-Term Considerations - Formosa. Leaving aside the question of the Quemoy and Matsu coastal islands, it would be worth while to learn how far American official consideration has gone in connection with the ultimate disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores. Are they thinking in terms of a "Two Chinas" solution or have they an alternative.

Arthur Hengis

FAR EASTERN DIVISION.

50219-AE-46
129 | 5B

FM EMBASSY WASHINGTON

TO EXTERNAL OTTAWA

RESTRICTED 1974 NOV. 30/55

SUBJECT: VISIT OF THE UNDER-SECRETARY TO WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY, BEGINS:

WE HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN ABLE TO COMPLETE DETAILED PLANS FOR YOUR PROGRAMME HERE, BUT THE FOLLOWING WILL PROBABLY GIVE YOU SUFFICIENT INDICATION.

2. ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 5 WE SHOULD LIKE FIRST TO DISCUSS WITH YOU AND MR. BRYCE SOME OF THE CURRENT QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. LATER IN THE MORNING WE PLAN TO SPEND APPROXIMATELY AN HOUR AND A HALF IN A MEETING WITH ALL THOSE WHO WILL BE PARTICIPATING IN THE CONSULTATION MEETING LATER IN THE DAY. THE CONSULTATION MEETING ITSELF IS SET FOR 2.30 P.M. AND AFTER THAT THERE ARE NO FURTHER BUSINESS APPOINTMENTS.

3. ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 6 WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU CONSULAR QUESTIONS, ABOUT WHICH THERE HAS BEEN PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE. IN THE AFTERNOON WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL AGREE TO MEET ALL THE CHANCERY OFFICERS TOGETHER, AND ALSO SPEND SOME TIME VISITING THE VARIOUS SECTIONS OF THE CHANCERY.

4. WE HAVE NOT PLANNED AS YET ANY CALLS AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT AS WE HAD HOPED TO SECURE THE RELEVANT PEOPLE FOR LUNCH ON TUESDAY. HOWEVER, WE HAVE RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES HERE AND MAY SUGGEST YOUR MAKING ONE OR TWO CALLS. WE ARE HOPING TO ARRANGE A BRIEF CALL ON GOVERNOR SHERMAN ADAMS. NO MEETINGS HAVE BEEN ARRANGED FOR SUNDAY.

ENDS.

FILE COPY

Security .. **SECRET**

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No. 50030-AB-4-40 50219-AE-40	
94	52

Copy on 50030-AB-4-40

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE HEAD OF POST, CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON

Message To Be Sent	
AIR CYPHER	
EN CLAIR	
CODE	
CYPHER	XX

No. DL-2026	Date NOVEMBER 30, 1955.
-------------	----------------------------

For Communications Section Only

Priority
<i>IMPOR. TANT.</i>

REFERENCE: YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1961 OF NOVEMBER 29

ORIGINATOR
(Signature)
K.C. BROWN/TH
(Name Typed)
Div. D.L.(1)
Local Tel. 6205

SUBJECT: MEETING OF CONSULTATION

I AGREE THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO SUGGEST ANY FORMAL CHANGE IN THE AGENDA TO WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS AGREED, THAT IS:

APPROVED BY
JULES LÉGER
(Signature)
JULES LÉGER
(Name Typed)

- (A) CONTINENTAL DEFENCE
- (B) SOVIET INTENTIONS
- (C) SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

Internal Distribution:
S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.
Mr. G.G. Crean
Done... <i>JLB</i>
Date... <i>11.12.55</i>

2. WOULD YOU PLEASE TELL THE STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMALLY THAT WE INTEND TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF ALERTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSION OF CONTINENTAL DEFENCE.

Copies Referred To:
Mr. R.B. Bryce
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Done... <i>JLB</i>
Date... <i>11.12.55</i>

3. ~~FOUR~~ REFERENCE WILL NATURALLY BE MADE AT THE MEETING TO THE TRIPARTITE APPROACH ON ALERTS, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE FAVOURABLE NATURE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S AIDE-MEMOIRE OF NOVEMBER 18. HOWEVER, WE SHALL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS THE AIDE-MEMOIRE EVEN IN GENERAL TERMS ON DECEMBER 5 AS IT WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION HERE AND CONSULTATION WITH UNITED KINGDOM AUTHORITIES. ~~IN ANY CASE I DO NOT THINK THAT THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR DISCUSSING THE TRIPARTITE QUESTION.~~

SECRET

- 2 -

WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SEND YOU SOME PRELIMINARY DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS ON THE AIDE-MEMOIRE BEFORE NEXT WEEK.

4. AS REGARDS ALERTS IN RELATION TO CONTINENTAL DEFENCE WHICH WE DO WANT TO DISCUSS, I AM CONSULTING THE MINISTER ON EXACTLY ^{what} ~~which~~ WE SHOULD SAY. A BINDER CONTAINING A COPY OF MY MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER ON THIS SUBJECT, TOGETHER WITH A NUMBER OF BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS FOR THE MEETING, WILL BE SENT TO YOU IN TOMORROW'S BAG.

5. THERE IS NO NEED FOR YOU TO MENTION THE EISENHOWER QUESTION TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT UNLESS YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY DONE SO. IN THAT CASE, YOU COULD SAY THAT WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE RESULTS OF THE REVIEW OF DISARMAMENT BEING CONDUCTED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF MR. STASSEN SO AS TO BE ABLE TO CO-ORDINATE OUR THINKING PREPARATORY TO THE RESUMPTION OF THE WORK OF THE U.N. SUB-COMMITTEE.

6. IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO YOU COULD NOW GIVE THE STATE DEPARTMENT THE NAMES OF THE CANADIAN PARTICIPANTS INCLUDING MR. BRYCE, GENERAL FOULKES AND MYSELF FROM OTTAWA, AND OF COURSE YOURSELF AND WHOMEVER YOU WISH TO HAVE WITH YOU FROM THE EMBASSY. ~~LEGER~~ *Foukes suggests that you might wish to be accompanied by Sparling - Léger.*

50219-AE-40
129 | ✓
TOP SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Ottawa, November 30, 1955.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Meeting of Consultation - December 5, 1955

File
KCB

As you know, a meeting of consultation is to be held in Washington next Monday, December 5. Hoover, Radford, Grey (Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs), Robertson, Elbrick and Miner will be taking part on the United States side. Bryce, Foulkes and I, with Heeney, will be the Canadian participants.

2. The Americans have agreed to our suggestion that the main topics for discussion should be (a) continental defence, (b) Soviet intentions and the effect of the Geneva conferences on Western defence programmes, and (c) the situation in the Far East. We may also refer to the disarmament problem, principally in order to elicit, if we can, some information about the conclusions of the task forces set up under Mr. Stassen.

3. On topics (b) and (c) we shall, of course, try to get some further indication of United States thinking and intentions and I would propose that we should comment along lines which you have already approved. It is topic (a), however, which I expect to occupy most of our attention, and I should like to outline briefly, for your approval, the approach which we propose to take on this subject.

4. We had thought that we should begin by emphasizing our desire to discuss the general trends in North American defence and to take a long-term view. We would then focus attention on three particular aspects of the problem.

5. First, we would raise the question of anticipated developments and programmes for the North American early warning system during the next five years in the light of the probable budgetary situation. We would seek to get

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30.11.59 (us)

their views on the magnitude and nature of continental defence, and would probably hope to get some light on whether any budgetary reductions would affect the United States contribution to it.

6. Second, we would refer to developments in the weapons system in the next five years. This follows directly from our initiative at the last meeting of consultation in September 1954. You may remember that at that meeting General Foulkes suggested that the stage was rapidly being reached where the development of a suitable weapons system for the defence of North America must be a joint operation in almost every respect. He proposed a series of joint studies with a view to finding a joint approach to the implementation of a revised weapons system. Radford later assured Foulkes that as soon as the legal difficulties had been overcome (by the conclusion of an Agreement for Co-operation in the Field of Atomic Defence) such studies could be included in the regular joint machinery for continental defence planning, or could be carried out as a separate operation. I understand that General Foulkes will press at this meeting for an understanding that there will be no restrictions of any kind on the exchange of this sort of information between the forces of the two countries.

7. Third, we intend to discuss the problem of alerts procedures in relation to North American defence arrangements. The general problem, of course, is how to reconcile the necessities of military planning with the ultimate responsibility of governments for decision; specifically, it is how to ensure that the Canadian Government has the information it would need to arrive at independent conclusions in an emergency regarding the operation of the continental air defence system and the deployment into or over Canada of the Strategic Air Command. The meetings of consultation themselves were instituted in 1951 in order to discuss developments in the international situation which might give rise to the necessity for the use of atomic weapons. Though we should certainly continue to make use of this good informal channel whenever occasion demands, the meetings of consultation were not designed and would not be suitable to deal with the specific and urgent problems which would arise in an emergency. The technical arrangements which were worked out in 1952, to ensure prompt consideration by the Canadian Ministers concerned

of United States requests for overflight of Canada by certain types of military aircraft, also have a limited usefulness but are clearly inadequate to meet Canadian requirements especially in the light of our growing interdependence on air defence. What is needed is an arrangement for the exchange and evaluation of strategic information of a kind which might lead to a decision to take emergency measures or even to go to war, and a firm understanding on the necessity for consultation at the highest political levels of the two governments on the action to be taken as a result of that information.

8. We believe that the time is propitious for raising this matter in Washington. The United States Government has just agreed in principle, after six months consideration, to the procedure which was proposed by the United Kingdom authorities, after consultation with us, for dealing on a tripartite basis with indications of Soviet aggression in the NATO area. The essence of this procedure was, you will recall, that such information would be exchanged automatically, and that the heads of government or foreign ministers of the three countries would then consult as to their assessments of the situation, and discuss possible action, before proposals for action were put to other friendly governments. It was the intention of the United Kingdom authorities, if the United States Government agreed to the principle, to propose working out an urgent or telescoped procedure between the three parties to deal with surprise attacks, and also to propose elaborating later a parallel procedure for other areas of the world such as the Middle East and Far East. The United States reply, however, says that "no decision should be taken at the present time about the possible adaptation of these procedures to other areas of the world", and proposes that there be further exploration between the State Department and the two Embassies in Washington of "the procedures for political consultation".

9. We would not wish to get involved at the meeting of consultation in a discussion of the tripartite procedure, or to prejudice in any way the talks which we will no doubt wish to have later with both parties on this procedure. It might help to avoid any possible unfortunate impression if we were to explain frankly to the British after the meeting that the question of alerts was discussed in our consultations with U.S. officials in relation solely to our joint continental air defence arrangements.

10. On the other hand, the growing interdependence of Canada and the United States in the air defence field makes it essential, in my view, that we seek to obtain now a firm understanding on the procedures to be adopted in this context, not related (as the tripartite procedure is) to the NATO system of alerts or to any particular set of circumstances. We propose, therefore, if you agree, to put to the Americans for their consideration a formula in the terms set out in the annex to this memorandum.

agree

J.L.

*now are pretty safe
that checks with develop*

TOP SECRET

1. The United States and Canadian Governments agree that they will invariably and immediately inform each other when they receive information of a kind which, if examined, might cause either to conclude that there was a possibility of hostilities occurring.
Excluded
2. The criterion for passing information of this kind between the two Governments might be defined as the receipt of information which could call for rapid action on the part of the intelligence authorities in Canada or the United States; this could, although not necessarily, coincide with the calling of a "crash" meeting of the United States Watch Committee or Intelligence Advisory Committee, or the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee.
3. Under such a criterion, the Governments agree that, for the duration of the incident calling for such action, the United States and Canadian authorities, particularly the intelligence authorities, will automatically pass to one another all the relevant information, including the background necessary to understand the problem and their respective assessments of the problem.
4. Where consultation at a higher level, including Ministers, also became necessary, such an arrangement should ensure that Ministers would be fully in possession of the necessary facts upon which to base their consultations.

*In intelligence
community they will
do it*

TOP SECRET

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MEMORANDUM

Alert Procedures

The general problem is how to reconcile the necessities of military planning with an ultimate responsibility of governments for decision. From our point of view specifically a formula must be found to ensure that the Canadian Government has the information it would need to arrive at independent conclusions in an emergency regarding the operation of the continental air defence system and the deployment into or over Canada of the Strategic Air Command.

2. The technical arrangements now in operation were worked out in 1952; these are related to United States requests for overflight of Canada by certain types of military aircraft. In this field they are useful but are clearly inadequate to meet Canadian requirements especially in the light of our growing interdependence on air defence.

3. With the setting up of our radar lines in northern Canada, we will eventually obtain most valuable tactical information; what is needed now is an arrangement for the exchange and evaluation of strategic information, information of a kind which might lead to a decision to take emergency measures.

4. We welcome the ^{recent developments} ~~acceptance~~ by the United States of the ~~procedures~~ for tripartite discussions on indications of Soviet aggression in the NATO area. We are not concerned, however, with this aspect of the problem of alerts but solely on the more restricted aspect of the question related to the problem of alerts on continental defence.

5. We believe that the growing interdependence of Canada and the United States in the air defence field makes it essential in the interest of both countries that we obtain a firm understanding on the procedures to be

/adopted

2.

adopted in this context, it being understood that they are in no way related to the NATO system of alerts or to no particular set of circumstances.

6. Attached is a formula which might be considered in this respect.

to be left as a working paper

J.L.

TOP SECRET

FORMULA

1. The United States and Canadian Governments agree that they will keep each other informed when they receive information of a kind which, if examined, might cause either to conclude that there was a likelihood of hostilities occurring in which North America would be involved.

*likely to
attacked*

2. The criterion for passing information of this kind between the two governments is defined as a receipt of information which would call for rapid action on the part of the intelligence authorities in Canada or the United States; this could, although not necessarily, coincide with the calling of a "crash" meeting of the United States Watch Committee or Intelligence Advisory Committee, or the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee.

3. Under such a criterion the Governments agree that for the duration of the incident calling for such action the United States and Canadian authorities, particularly the intelligence authorities, will automatically pass to one another all the relevant information, including the background necessary to understand the problem and their respective assessments of the problem.

4. Where consultation at a higher level, including Ministers, also becomes necessary, such an arrangement should ensure that Ministers would be fully in possession of the necessary facts upon which to base their consultations.

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Mr. Walker

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Refer

Mr. Bryce
Gen. Foubert
Mr. Crean
done 11/2/55

50030-AB-4-40

files
KEB

FM EMBASSY WASHINGTON
TO EXTERNAL OTTAWA

SECRET. 1961. NOV. 29/55.

REFERENCE: LETTER UNDER-SECRETARY TO AMBASSADOR OF NOV. 19.
SUBJECT: MEETING OF CONSULTATION.

I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE, AFTER HAVING SEEN OUR TELEGRAM NO 1945 OF NOV. 23, THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT ELASTICITY IN THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DISCUSSIONS AT THE CONSULTATION MEETING TO AVOID SUGGESTING ANY FORMAL CHANGE IN THE AGENDA WHICH IS NOW AGREED.

2. IF DESIRED, YOU COULD TOUCH ON THE EISENHOWER PLAN FOR AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE IN CONNECTION WITH CONTINENTAL DEFENCE.
3. THE ALERTS QUESTION, SIMILARLY, COULD COME UP NATURALLY IN CONNECTION WITH CONTINENTAL DEFENCE, THOUGH I WOULD SUGGEST THAT - IN VIEW OF THE RELATIVE SHORTNESS OF THE WHOLE MEETING - WE SHOULD AVOID DETAILED EXAMINATION OF PROCEDURE.
4. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO MAKE A REFERENCE TO THE SUGGESTED TRI-PARTITE ARRANGEMENT FOR ALERTS. WE HAVE BEEN HAVING, INCIDENTALLY, SOME INFORMAL TALKS WITH STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS IN AN EFFORT TO CLARIFY THE MEANING OF THE RECENT AIDE MEMOIRE ON THIS SUBJECT.
5. WE SHALL TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY OF LETTING THE STATE DEPARTMENT KNOW INFORMALLY THAT BOTH THE EISENHOWER AND THE ALERTS QUESTIONS MAY BE BROUGHT UP IN GENERAL TERMS IN RELATION TO THE FIRST ITEM. A.D.P. HEENEY.

50219-AE-40
129 | ✓

SECRET

November 29, 1955.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

Notes for Meeting of Consultation in Washington,
December 5, 1955.

File
ReB

INDOCHINA

Our objectives in Indochina in the next few months are:

- (a) to consolidate the military armistice on the existing truce lines; and
- (b) to avoid crises in relation to the political aspects of the Indochina settlement; and
- (c) to keep the International Commissions in Vietnam and Laos in being for some time yet to bolster with their authority the maintenance of the truce lines.

We assume that in general the United States agrees with these objectives.

2. In Vietnam, the pursuit of these objectives does not pose particularly difficult problems so far as we ourselves are concerned in our position on the International Commission. We have taken the view that the political settlement in Vietnam is not the business of the present International Commission but is the responsibility of the Geneva Conference co-Chairmen and the Geneva Conference Powers: consequently, the Commission has been able to concentrate on the task of consolidating the armistice. It should be possible to continue this task over the next few months if the Indians make no move to withdraw from the Commission. The Indians may be persuaded to stay with the Commission:

- (a) if the State of Vietnam extends to the Commission a fair measure of practical co-operation in connection with the carrying out of the Cease-Fire Agreement;

29.11.53/05

- 2 -

- (b) if the State of Vietnam can be persuaded to go through some more convincing motions of (even long distance) consultation with the Viet Minh on elections.

If these conditions can be met, it may be possible to educate the Indians to live with and accept the values of a firmly based military armistice even though a large piece of unfinished business remains on the political side.

3. In Laos, the problem is more complex for ourselves as well as others. This is partly because we have held to the view that the International Commission in Laos is competent to deal with those aspects of the political settlement which are covered by the Cease-Fire Agreement. Up to the present it has not been desirable in Laos to draw a distinction between the achievement of a firmly based military armistice and all aspects of the working out of a political settlement. ✓

4. In a strictly Laotian context there is much to be said for the exploitation of the situation created by Pathet Lao intransigence. For some time we have been manoeuvring for Indian support for Commission action which would reassert the RIG's right to the re-establishment of its administration in the two northeastern provinces and fix the blame for the present deadlock with respect to a political settlement squarely upon the Pathet Lao. The question now is whether this line should be carried a stage further - whether the December 25 elections should be regarded as the political settlement, the achievement of which would remove the basis for Pathet Lao sanctuary in Phong Saly and Sam Neua.

5. Quite apart from the fact that Indian support for the adoption of this attitude by the Commission cannot be counted upon, it is possible that such action by the Commission (or the expression of this view by the Canadian delegation) might not be wholly advantageous in the long run with respect to the achievement of the objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 above. If the RIG were given Commission (or even just Canadian) support for regarding the holding of general elections in the areas it controls as the fulfilment of its obligations under the Geneva settlement; it would be in a position to argue that the terms of Article 14 no longer apply, and so to deny the theoretical

- 3 -

basis for the military status quo, which would have a very unsettling effect on the armistice. Furthermore, the RIG might be tempted to step up military pressure on the Pathet Lao with the objective of asserting its sovereignty over the two northeastern provinces. While any resulting military action might not be on a large scale, on the other hand it would be inconsistent with the idea of a firmly established military armistice and might also be sufficient to bring about greater (and less well concealed) Viet Minh military support for the Pathet Lao.

6. There is also the possibility that in these circumstances either the RIG, or possibly the Thai Government, might make appeal to SEATO. This would face SEATO members with an awkward problem. On the one hand, SEATO members - in order to bolster up the organization's prestige - might not wish to ignore an appeal of this kind. On the other hand, the entry of SEATO into the situation, particularly when combined with an increase in Viet Minh military support to the Pathet Lao, might subject the armistice settlement to a more serious threat than has so far developed.

7. We think it wise for us to stop short of seeking Commission recognition of the December 25 elections as the political settlement envisaged in Article 14 of the Cease-Fire Agreement for Laos, and even for our not recording this view in a minority Canadian interpretation. To achieve the objectives outlined in paragraph 1 above it might be wiser/unfinished political business in Laos as a counter to unfinished business of the same kind in Vietnam.

8. We must recognize that in any case the Indians are unlikely to agree to recognition of the December 25 elections as fulfilment by the RIG of its obligations with respect to a political settlement under the Cease Fire Agreement. Another aspect of the problem therefore is whether it is worth while our parting company with the Indians on this point.


9. We may assume that when India originally accepted responsibilities on the Commission in Indochina it did so on its own assumption that the political watershed between the communist and non-communist worlds in South-east Asia would be along the Vietnam/Cambodian-Laotian border. While

to
recognize

on the one hand some Indians seem still to be thinking in these terms (e.g. Mr. Parthasarathi's conversation with the American Consul General in Madras), on the other hand Mr. Nehru in his interview with Mr. Pearson did not react strongly to the idea that we might have to live with a divided Vietnam and a divided Laos for some time to come. There is no question that the Indians relate the situation in Laos very closely to that in Vietnam. Consequently, if we are to induce them to accept the semi-permanent division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel, with a political settlement to be worked out by peaceful means and the Viet Minh meanwhile restrained by the Cease Fire Agreement, it may be desirable for us in Laos to settle for the military status quo, with a political settlement still to be worked out and the RIG restrained by the provisions of Article 14 of the Laos Agreement. Firm support by western governments for the maintenance of the military armistice on existing truce lines and the settlement in due course by peaceful means of political problems in both Vietnam and Laos should accord well with Indian enthusiasm for Locarno-type security arrangements in South-east Asia. With full scope for future discussion of both the Laotian and Vietnamese political problems, the Indians may be persuaded to accept the military status quo as the most stable type of arrangement now available in Indochina. The Chinese Communists and the Viet Minh will accord far greater respect to the truce lines if Indian moral authority upholds them, than if the Indians were to withdraw from the Commissions.

Arthur Keynes

Far Eastern Division.

SECRET

, November 25, 1955

Dear Mr. Bryce,

Attached is a copy of telegram No. 1945 of November 23 from Washington concerning the meeting of Consultation. Paragraph 3 of the telegram states that the meeting will be at 2.30 p.m. on December 5.

2. The telegram apparently crossed my letter of November 19 to Mr. Heeney concerning the agenda for the meeting. As stated in my letter of November 19 to you on the same subject, I think it would be desirable for Mr. Heeney to give the State Department *our* *views on* our proposed agenda in writing before the meeting. This would of course not limit in any way the subjects which might be raised or the informal character of the meeting. I should be glad to know if you agree.

3. Paragraph 3 of telegram No. 1945 lists the United States participants in the meeting as follows: Hoover, Radford, Grey (Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs), Walter Robertson Burke Elbrick, and Robert Miner (Officer in Charge of Commonwealth Affairs). I should be grateful to know if you agree that Mr. Heeney could now inform the State Department that the Canadian participants will include Mr. Heeney, General Foulkes, yourself and myself.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Mr. R. B. Bryce,
Secretary to the Cabinet,
Privy Council Office,
O t t a w a, Ontario.

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SECRET	

, November 25, 1955

Dear General Foulkes,

Attached is a copy of telegram No. 1945 of November 23 from Washington concerning the meeting of consultation. Paragraph 3 of the telegram states that the meeting will be at 2.30 p.m. on December 5.

2. The telegram apparently crossed my letter of November 19 to Mr. Heeney concerning the agenda for the meeting. As stated in my letter of November 19 to you on the same subject, I think it would be desirable for Mr. Heeney to give the State Department *our* proposed agenda in writing before the meeting. This would of course not limit in any way the subjects which might be raised or the informal character of the meeting. I should be glad to know if you agree.

3. Paragraph 3 of telegram No. 1945 lists the United States participants in the meeting as follows: Hoover, Radford, Grey (Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs), Walter Robertson, Burke Elbrick, and Robert Miner (Officer in Charge of Commonwealth Affairs). I should be grateful to know if you agree that Mr. Heeney could now inform the State Department that the Canadian participants will include Mr. Heeney, Mr. Bryce, yourself and myself.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

General C. Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO, CD,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a, Ontario.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

Mr. Ignatieff *Mr. [unclear]* *25/11/55*

TO: UNDER SECRETARY

Security SECRET

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

Date .. November .. 25, 1955

REFERENCE:

File No.		
50219.AE-46		
94	✓	✓

SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation

Attached is a copy of telegram No. 1945 of November 23 from Washington which as you will see must have crossed your letter of November 19 to Mr. Heeney concerning the agenda for the Meeting of Consultation.

File Ke B

2. Attached also for your signature if you approve are letters to Mr. Bryce and General Foulkes.

[Signature]
Defence Liaison (1) Division

25.11.28(06)

FILE COPY

~~COPY~~

See Index

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50219-AE-40
129 | 50

FROM: EMBASSY WASHINGTON

TO: EXTERNAL OTTAWA

SECRET. 1945. NOV. 23/55. 28 NOV 1955

REFERENCE: OUR TELEGRAM NO. 1928 OF NOV. 22/55.

SUBJECT: MEETING OF CONSULTATION.

File kept

OUTERBRIDGE HORSEY TOLD US TODAY THAT THE SUBJECTS WE HAD SUGGESTED FOR THE CONSULTATION MEETING WERE SATISFACTORY TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENTS. THESE ARE THE ONES MENTIONED IN THE UNDER-SECRETARY'S LETTER TO GENERAL FOULKES OF SEPTEMBER 27 AND ARE IN BRIEF:

- (A) CONTINENTAL DEFENCE.
- (B) SOVIET INTENTIONS.
- (C) SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST.

2. FROM THE AMBASSADOR'S CONVERSATION WITH MERCHANT (OUR TELEGRAM NO. 1691 OF OCT. 5) AND A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION BETWEEN GLAZEBROOK AND HORSEY, THE TYPE OF APPROACH AND DISCUSSION THAT YOU HAD IN MIND ARE WELL UNDERSTOOD. IT IS NOT INTENDED, OF COURSE, THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANYTHING LIKE A FORMAL AGENDA AND IT IS ASSUMED THAT ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS OR ASPECTS OF SUBJECTS MAY BE RAISED DURING THE COURSE OF THE MEETING.

3. THE MEETING ON DECEMBER 5 WILL BE AT 2.30 P.M. THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPANTS WILL BE: HOOVER, RADFORD, GREY (ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS), WALTER ROBERTSON, BURKE ELBRICK, AND ROBERT MINER (OFFICER IN CHARGE OF COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS).

SECRET

50219-AE-111	
CD	50

Ottawa, November 23, 1955

Dear General Foulkes,

I refer to my letter of October 27, informing you that the United States authorities were agreeable to the holding of the next meeting of consultation on Monday, December 5, provided that it did not conflict with the date for the NATO Ministerial meeting.

2. I have now heard from Washington that the State Department regards December 5 as the definite date for the meeting.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

General C. Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO, CD.,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a, Ontario.

Defence Liaison (1)/K.C.Brown/ew

50217-1AE-410	
90	50

SECRET

Ottawa, November 23, 1955

Dear Mr. Bryce,

I refer to my letter of October 27, informing you that the United States authorities were agreeable to the holding of the next meeting of consultation on Monday, December 5, provided that it did not conflict with the date for the NATO Ministerial meeting.

2. I have now heard from Washington that the State Department regards December 5 as the definite date for the meeting.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Mr. R. B. Bryce,
Secretary to the Cabinet,
Privy Council Office,
O t t a w a, Ontario.

Defence Liaison (1)/K.C.Brown/ew

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

File please

TO: UNDER-SECRETARY

Security **SECRET**

Date **November 23, 1955**

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No. **50219-AE-110**

REFERENCE:

90	90	
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SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation

We have received confirmation from Washington that the State Department regards December 5 as the definite date for the Meeting of Consultation. Attached for your signature are letters to Mr. Bryce and General Foulkes containing this information.

2. I should be grateful to know if you would like me to have any administrative arrangements, such as travel arrangements and hotel bookings, made for you or other people travelling from Ottawa to Washington for the meeting.

L. J. [Signature]
Defence Liaison (1) Division

23.11.51 (JCS)

FILE COPY
COPY

107 ✓

50219-AE-40	
129	50

FROM: EMBASSY WASHINGTON

TO: EXTERNAL OTTAWA

File
Re B

SECRET. NO. 1928. NOVEMBER 22, 1955.

REFERENCE: YOUR TELEGRAM NO. DL-1960 OF NOV 21, 1955.

SUBJECT: MEETING OF CONSULTATION.

**THE STATE DEPARTMENT REGARD DECEMBER 5 AS THE DEFINITE
DATE FOR THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION.**

Defence Liaison (1) / K.C. Brown / ew

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: European Division

Security TOP SECRET

Date November 22, 1955

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No.	50219-AE-40
	SECRET 52

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation.

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET

Attached is a copy of the proposed agenda for the next Meeting of Consultation in Washington on December 5, 1955. Mr. Leger will be attending this meeting.

2. I should be grateful if you would consider what briefing should be prepared on Item III -- Soviet intentions and the effect of the Geneva Conferences on Western defence programmes -- and get in touch either with me or with Mr. Brown.

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NOV 23 1955

L. J. ...
Defence Liaison (1) Division

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
RESULT A SECRET**

TOP SECRET

November 22, 1955

**PROPOSED AGENDA FOR MEETING OF
CONSULTATION IN WASHINGTON ON
DECEMBER 5, 1955**

I Continental Defence

- a) Anticipated developments and programmes for the North American early warning system to 1960, on land and with regard to the seaward extensions, in the light of the probable budgetary situation.
- b) Developments in the weapons system to 1960.
- c) Alerts

II Implications for the Canada-U.S. area of President Eisenhower's proposal for exchange of blueprints and aerial reconnaissance.

III Soviet intentions and the effect of the Geneva Conferences on Western defence programmes.

IV The situation in the Far East.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: Far Eastern Division *file*

Security TOP SECRET

Date November 22, 1955

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No.		
50219-AE-40		
52	52	

REFERENCE: DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REQUIT A SECRET

SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation

Attached is a copy of the proposed agenda for the next Meeting of Consultation in Washington on December 5, 1955. Mr. Leger will be attending this meeting.

2. I should be grateful if you would consider what briefing should be prepared on Item IV -- The situation in the Far East -- and get in touch either with me or with Mr. Brown.

P. Prater
Defence Liaison (1) Division

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REMIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

November 22, 1955

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR MEETING OF
CONSULTATION IN WASHINGTON ON
DECEMBER 5, 1955

I Continental Defence

- a) Anticipated developments and programmes for the North American early warning system to 1960, on land and with regard to the seaward extensions, in the light of the probable budgetary situation.
- b) Developments in the weapons system to 1960.
- c) Alerts

II Implications for the Canada-U.S. area of President Eisenhower's proposal for exchange of blueprints and aerial reconnaissance.

III Soviet intentions and the effect of the Geneva Conferences on Western defence programmes.

IV The situation in the Far East.

FILE COPY

Security **SECRET**

MESSAGE FORM

OUTGOING *q.s*

File No.	
50219-AE-40	
90	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST

..... WASHINGTON

Message To Be Sent	No.	Date	For Communications Section Only
AIR CYPHER EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER	DL-1960	NOVEMBER 21, 1955	
Priority	<u>REFERENCE:</u>		
ORIGINATOR	<u>SUBJECT:</u> MEETING OF CONSULTATION		
(Signature)K.C. Brown/ew..... (Name Typed)	SINCE IT IS NOW ALMOST CERTAIN THAT THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING WILL BE HELD ON DECEMBER 15, CAN YOU CONFIRM MONDAY, DECEMBER 5 AS THE DATE FOR THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION? 2. A LETTER CONCERNING THE AGENDA IS GOING TO YOU TODAY.		
Div....D...L...(1).....			
Local Tel....6205.....			
APPROVED BY JULES LÉGER (Signature)			
(Name Typed)			
Internal Distribution: S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.	SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS		
Done.....			
Date.....			
Copies Referred To:			
Done.....			
Date.....			

TOP SECRET

Refer to: Mr. Crean ✓
File 50030-AB-40

*Done
Nov. 22/55
EW*

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Ottawa, November 19, 1955.

Copy on 50030-AB-4-40

50219-AE-40	
52	50

Dear Mr. Heeney,

Meeting of Consultation

I am enclosing a copy of General Foulkes' letter of October 27 to me and of the letter in reply which I am sending him today.

I should be glad to receive any comments which occur to you. When I have heard from Mr. Bryce and General Foulkes, I think it might be desirable if you gave our proposed agenda for the meeting of consultation (see paragraph 10 of my letter to General Foulkes) to the State Department in writing. Would you agree with this?

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

A.D.P. Heeney, Esq.,
Canadian Ambassador,
Washington, D.C.

copy under letter to:

Mr. Bryce
Mr. Heeney

TOP SECRET

c.c. to Mr. Crean ✓
file 50030-AB-40

*Done
Nov. 22/55
EW*

Ottawa, November 19, 1955.

Copy on 50030-AB-4-40

50219-AR-40
58 | 50

Dear General Foulkes,

I am most grateful for your letter of October 27, enclosing a copy of your memorandum on your discussions with Admiral Radford and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in Washington on October 18. I have noted with interest the views expressed on a variety of subjects of concern to this Department.

2. As regards the organization of the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group, I presume that whatever arrangement is worked out will require the formal approval of the Chiefs of Staffs Committees of the two countries.

3. With the next meeting of consultation now only a little over two weeks away, I am particularly concerned to obtain agreement on how the Canadian side should approach the subject of alerts. You will recall that, when I wrote to you on September 27 concerning the agenda, I suggested we should discuss the "relationship between the NATO alerts and North American air defence". On further consideration, and in the light of the continued failure of the State Department to inform us of the attitude of the U.S. authorities to the proposed negotiation of tripartite arrangements, I am now of the opinion that we should raise quite separately at the meeting of consultation the question of alerts in North America, without reference to the tripartite approach. This is a different question for us from that of NATO alerts, in view of our direct interest in developments which might alert the continental air

General Charles Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa, Ontario.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
RESTIT A SECRET...2

defence system including developments in the Far East. I think this could be explained quite frankly to the U.K. Embassy in Washington after the meeting, without fear of prejudicing our relations with the U.K. in the intelligence field.

4. I understand, as I believe Mr. Crean and Mr. Bowen told you the other day, that there is a good likelihood that the State Department will be replying to the tripartite approach before the meeting of consultation, but I do not think this should affect the discussion of North American alerts at the meeting of consultation.

5. With respect to the question of North American alerts, while I agree that it is important that we receive tactical information through the United States defence system and our own which may lead to an alert, this, I should think, would be provided automatically through the standard operating procedures already in effect between the Services and Agencies of the two governments.

6. The much more important question from the point of view of the Government, however, is what arrangements can be made for the receipt of strategic information which might lead to a decision to take emergency measures, or even go to war. Despite Admiral Radford's negative attitude on the question of strategic warning, I believe we must raise at the meeting of consultation the question of the extent to which United States plans take into account essential Canadian interests. The information which we have both received through the Director of J.I.B. suggests that at least the CIA, the Air Force and the State Department would be sympathetic to our problem. In raising the matter, however, I believe we should be very precise as to what the Canadian Government's requirements are, and I accordingly suggest that a formula based on the following premises should be put forward at the meeting:

- (a) Present arrangements in the Agreed Minute of 1951, for consultation on the imminence of war, while valuable, are of a general and informal nature.
- (b) If the Canadian Government is likely to be implicated in any military emergency involving the North American air defence system, it is essential, in order that it may decide on the necessary

emergency measures, that it have in its possession essentially the same information as is possessed by the United States Government.

- (c) There must also be an opportunity for consultation between the two Governments on the basis of facts available to both. Although the exchange of information between agencies of the two Governments is already extensive, there is no provision at the present time, other than the Agreed Minute of 1951, for consulting on various levels on the measures to be taken during a period of apprehended hostilities.

7. I suggest that we should then go on to state the following formula:

TOP SECRET

(i) 1. The United States and Canadian Governments agree that they will invariably and immediately inform each other when they receive information of a kind which, if examined, might cause either to conclude that there was a possibility of hostilities occurring.

(ii) 2. The criterion for passing information of this kind between the two Governments might be defined as the receipt of information which could call for rapid action on the part of the intelligence authorities in Canada or the United States; this could, although not necessarily, coincide with the calling of a "crash" meeting of the United States Watch Committee or Intelligence Advisory Committee, or the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee.

(iii) 3. Under such a criterion, the Governments agree that, for the duration of the incident calling for such action, the United States and Canadian authorities, *particularly* will automatically pass to one another all the relevant information, including the background necessary to understand the problem and their respective assessments of the problem.

the intelligence authorities

(iv) 4. Where consultation at a higher level, including Ministers, also became necessary, such an arrange-

ment should ensure that Ministers would be fully in possession of the necessary facts upon which to base their consultations.

8. As I said above, I think it would be wise if we refrained from referring during the meeting of consultation to the previous joint Canada-United Kingdom approach on this topic. We should, if possible, obtain agreement to a formula of this kind and agree to let the mechanism be worked out by those designated by both Governments, preferably the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the Canadian JIC. We should, however, avoid getting bogged down in procedural details, since it appears to be partly as the result of consideration given by the IAC to procedural problems that the previous Canada-United Kingdom approach evoked a negative response.

9. I should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible whether you agree with, or have any suggestions concerning, the formula I propose. It will, I believe, be necessary to obtain concurrence from the Ministers concerned before proceeding to Washington.

10. In the light of the exchange of views which has taken place on the agenda for the meeting of consultation suggested in my letter of September 27, would you now be prepared to agree that Mr. Heeney should give the State Department the following proposed agenda?

I Continental Defence

- a) Anticipated developments and programmes for the North American early warning system to 1960, on land and with regard to the seaward extensions, in the light of the probable budgetary situation.
- b) Developments in the weapons system to 1960.
- c) Alerts

- 5 -

TOP SECRET

- II Implications for the Canada-U.S. area of President Eisenhower's proposal for exchange of blueprints and aerial reconnaissance.
- III Soviet intentions and the effect of the Geneva Conferences on Western defence programmes.
- IV The situation in the Far East.

11. I am sending copies of this letter to Mr. Bryce and Mr. Heeney for their comments, and am taking the liberty of sending them at the same time a copy of your letter under reference.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

TOP SECRET

refer to: Mr. Crean ✓
File 50030-AB-40

*Done
Nov. 22/57
fu*

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
ABOUT A SECRET

Ottawa, November 19, 1955.

Copy on 50030-AB-4-40

50219-AE-40	
52	50

Dear Mr. Bryce,

Thank you for your letter of October 31 concerning the forthcoming meeting of consultation in Washington.

I am enclosing a copy of General Foulkes' letter of October 27 to me and of the letter in reply which I am sending him today.

I should be glad to receive any comments which occur to you, and to know in particular if you agree that Mr. Heeney should now give the State Department in writing our proposed agenda as set forth in paragraph 10 of my letter to General Foulkes.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

M. B. Bryce, Esq.,
Secretary to the Cabinet,
East Block,
Ottawa, Ontario.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TO: The Under-Secretary

TOP SECRET

Date Nov. 19, 1955.

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No.

50219-AE-40

REFERENCE:

Copy on 50030-AB-4-40

129	✓	✓
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SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation.

Attached for your signature, if you agree, is a letter to General Foulkes, dealing primarily with the forthcoming meeting of consultation in Washington. Attached also for signature are letters to Mr. Bryce and Mr. Heeney, requesting their comments on the correspondence with General Foulkes.

File KeB

2. The letter to General Foulkes deals particularly with alerts and suggests, as you have already agreed, that we should confine our approach to this subject at the meeting of consultation to the problem of alerts procedures in relation to North American defence, avoiding reference to the previous Canada-United Kingdom approach.

3. With reference to the Canada-U.K. approach, you might like to read the attached personal letter of November 15 to Mr. Crean from the Director of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, in which Mr. Bowen reports on his recent trip to Washington. His statement in paragraph 2 that the State Department wishes to keep this subject in civil and not in military channels is of particular interest. The State Department reply does not, however, appear to be coming as quickly as Mr. Bowen was led to think it might.

[Signature]
Defence Liaison (1) Division.

P.S. These are the papers we talked about Saturday morning
[Signature]

21.11.5/55

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security *Top Secret*

50219-AB-40		
90	90	

Type of Document... *Memorandum* ... No. *—* ... Date... *18 Nov 55*
 From... *C. C. Brown*
 To... *Top. Security*
 Subject: *Alerts*

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

Original on File No... *50030-AB-4-40*
 Copies on File No.....
 Other Cross Reference Sheets on.....

Prepared by... *[Signature]*

TOP SECRET

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE



BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

D.L. (1) D.
McBrown

Ottawa, October 31st, 1955.

File
McB

50219-AE-40
129 | 129

Jules Leger, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Leger:

Re: Meeting of consultation in Washington

Thank you for your note of October 20th and the exchange of telegrams with the Embassy in Washington on this subject.

I agree with your suggestion in paragraph 3 of this letter that the question of U.S. defence communications in Canada can better be dealt with through other channels. It is neither primarily a military nor a foreign policy issue and I think it will take some further sorting out in any event before we are ready to deal with it. You will recall that at the last meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee we did not get any very definite decision on this point, except that we would apply the three years clear operating period to the United States for the rearward communications of the DEW line as well as the rest of that line.

Yours sincerely,

R. B. Boyce

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REDUIT A SECRET

1.11.8(55)

Defence Liaison (1)/J.M.Teakles/ew

SECRET

, October 27, 1955

50219-AE-40	
124	50

Dear Mr. Bryce,

This is to confirm the information which we have received from Washington concerning a date for the proposed meeting of consultation. Mr. Heeney was told that Monday, December 5, would be satisfactory to the United States authorities, provided of course that it did not conflict with the date (yet to be fixed) for the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Mr. R. B. Bryce,
Secretary to the Cabinet,
Privy Council Office,
East Block,
O t t a w a, Ontario.

Defence Liaison (1)/J.M.Teakles/ew

SECRET

50219-AE-40	
129	50

, October 27, 1955

Dear General Foulkes,

This is to confirm the information which we have received from Washington concerning a date for the proposed meeting of consultation. Mr. Heeney was told that Monday, December 5, would be satisfactory to the United States authorities, provided of course that it did not conflict with the date (yet to be fixed) for the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

General C. Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO, CD.,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a, Ontario.

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27.10.23(55)

Defence Liaison (1)/K.C. Brown/ew

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

FILE COPY

TO: ...UNDER-SECRETARY.....

TOP SECRET

Security

Date October 26, 1955

.....

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division.....

File No.

~~50015-E-40~~
50219-AE-40

REFERENCE:

129	✓	✓
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SUBJECT: ...Alerts Procedures..... *original on 50015-E-40*

Copy on 50030-AB-Y-40

At his Joint Staff briefing on October 21, General Foulkes referred to his conversations last week in Washington with Admiral Radford, and mentioned the subject of alerts procedures in particular. Radford apparently said something to the effect that the tri-partite approach to the question contained in the United Kingdom working paper, on which we have been awaiting a reply from the State Department since last April, had been turned down by the Pentagon although this decision had not yet been communicated to the State Department. (This is in line with information concerning the attitude of the Pentagon which has reached this Department through intelligence channels.) According to Radford the U.S. Joint Chiefs were reluctant to agree to consultation on a tri-partite basis in view of the difficulties of obtaining co-ordination inside the United States Governmental machine, in particular between the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. General Foulkes then asked Radford if the United States would be willing to work out Canada-U.S. alerts procedures in the continental defence context. General Foulkes emphasized that decisions to declare alerts in Canada could only be taken at the highest level and that if the continental air defence system was to operate effectively it was essential that procedures should be worked out for full consultation leading up to the declaration of alerts in Canada and the United States. Radford agreed

...2

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

that this was desirable in the case of tactical, but not necessarily of strategic, warning. Radford gave no explanation as to how to distinguish between strategic and tactical information in this context.

3. While we should perhaps not read too much into these off-the-cuff remarks by General Foulkes, I suggest that we should keep them in mind in preparing for the next meeting of consultation. You will recall that one of the proposed agenda items is the relationship between the NATO alerts system and North American air defence. We have consistently taken the line that the tri-partite approach to this matter is the best one; but regardless of how that stands at the time, I think it is most desirable to raise at the meeting of consultation the question of procedures for declaring alerts in North America. Indeed, it might be better tactics to change the agenda item to something like "Alerts procedures in relation to North American defence". It would then be possible to lead up to discussion of tri-partite arrangements, or not, as appeared to be desirable.

4. If we intend to go ahead with the discussion of alerts at the meeting of consultation, I would recommend that we inform the U.K. Foreign Office that we are doing so. In informing them we might say that we find it necessary to discuss alerts in the context of continental defence, and it is not intended to cut across in any way the joint approach already made in Washington on NATO alerts.

5. I am disturbed by the distinction which Radford seems to have made between tactical and strategic warning. If he has in mind limiting the exchange of information to what comes off the radar system and the like (for which arrangements of course already exist), he is placing in jeopardy the 1951 agreement to institute the meetings of consultation, which in effect are intended to give us some strategic warning of the imminence of an atomic war. What is needed now, perhaps, is to re-assert the underlying purpose of the 1951 agreement and to consider whether existing arrangements are adequate to ensure that we fully exchange information upon which to base a judgment of the imminence of war. The possibility is now much greater

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- 3 -

than it was then, in the event of war, of U.S. atomic weapons being not only deployed but also employed over and in Canada. The Canadian Government is surely entitled to insist that any decision we might be asked to take authorizing the employment of U.S. atomic weapons over or in Canada should be based on the fullest possible exchange of information and consultation between the two governments. If you agree, I shall give further consideration to the manner in which this question might be approached at the meeting of consultation.

6. As the next step, I propose drafting for your signature a letter to General Foulkes (with copies to Mr. Heaney and Mr. Bryce) asking him what he learned about the alerts from Admiral Radford, and requesting his comments on the ideas in paragraphs 3 - 5 above. I should be grateful to know if this meets with your approval.

7. This memorandum was prepared in consultation with Mr. Crean.

G. IGNATIEFF

Defence Liaison (1) Division

P.S. I have just seen Mr. Heaney's letter of October 25 to you (attached). The information in it conforms with that which we already had.

Defence Liaison (1)/J.M.Teakles/ew

Telegram No. 1742 enclosed.
Telegram No. G-1691 enclosed.
Letter dated September 29, 1955 to Mr. Leger from G. Foulkes.
Telegram No. DL-1747 attached also.

TOP SECRET

50219	AE+40
6	SD

, October 20, 1955

Dear Mr. Bryce,

Thank you for your letter of October 17 concerning the proposed meeting of consultation in Washington.

2. I think you will be interested in the attached copies of telegrams exchanged recently on this subject with Mr. Heeney. I told Glazebrook that I agreed in general with Mr. Heeney's comments on the agenda, and he no doubt conveyed this to General Foulkes. I have not yet heard the results of General Foulkes' conversation with Admiral Radford.

3. I should be glad to have your views on the specific suggestion made by General Foulkes, that the question of United States communications in Canada be raised at the meeting. My own tentative view is that it might be advisable to leave this matter to be dealt with in due course through the normal channels. I should of course be glad to have any other comments, that may occur to you, on the agenda.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

R. B. Bryce, Esq.,
Secretary to the Cabinet,
Privy Council Office,
O t t a w a, Ontario.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REQUI A SECRET

20.10.34(05)

TOP SECRET

D.L. (1) 21.

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE



BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

*File
Jan*

Ottawa, October 17th, 1955.

Jules Leger, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

50219-AE-40
129 | 50

Dear Mr. Leger:

I am writing to confirm the information I gave you orally that I would be glad to fall in with whatever arrangements you and General Foulkes wish to make regarding the date of another meeting of consultation in Washington, which was referred to in your letter of September 27th.

I shall think further about the agenda. I would think that it may be influenced by our discussions on the CF-105. It occurs to me that it might be desirable to have a brief talk about general attitudes toward the Soviet Union, having in mind the developments that are taking place in our activities in this field.

Yours sincerely,

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REDUIT A SECRET

18.10.8(05)

FILE COPY

Security **TOP SECRET**

MESSAGE FORM

OUTGOING

File No.	
50219-AE-40	
6	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST

WASHINGTON

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER

No. **DL-1747** Date **OCTOBER 14, 1955**

For Communications Section Only

REFERENCE: YOUR TELEGRAM NO. G-1691 OF OCTOBER 5.

Priority **IMMEDIATE**

SUBJECT: MEETING OF CONSULTATION.

ORIGINATOR

(Signature) **J.M. Teekles/ew**

(Name Typed)

Div... **D.L.(1)**

Local Tel... **7921**

FOLLOWING FOR AMBASSADOR FROM UNDER-SECRETARY, BEGINS:

1. GENERAL FOULKES HAS ARRANGED TO HAVE TALKS WITH UNITED STATES DEFENCE OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 17 AND 18 ON SOME OF THE URGENT PROBLEMS OF CONTINENTAL DEFENCE. HE INTENDS TO RAISE WITH ADMIRAL RADFORD INTER ALIA THE THREE POINTS MENTIONED IN MY LETTER TO HIM OF SEPTEMBER 27.

APPROVED BY **JULES LEGER**

(Signature)

(Name Typed)

2. FOULKES HAS AGREED TO THE LIST OF TOPICS WHICH I SUGGESTED FOR THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION, AND HAS HIMSELF SUGGESTED ADDING TWO OTHER TOPICS:

a) "THE QUESTION OF THE EFFECT WHICH PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S BLUEPRINT AND ^{AERIAL} ~~AERO~~ RECONNAISSANCE SCHEME MAY HAVE ON AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS ON CANADIAN TERRITORY AND JOINT CANADA/UNITED STATES INSTALLATIONS ON CANADIAN TERRITORY."

b) "PROGRESS REPORTS ON THE DEW LINE AND THE MID-CANADA LINE, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CANADIAN ANXIETY REGARDING THE UNITED STATES DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS IN CANADA."

Internal Distribution: S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.

Done... **DONE - COMM. SECTION**

Date... **17 55**

Copies Referred To:

Done.....

Date.....

- 2 -

3. HE HAS ALSO SUGGESTED, WITH REGARD TO THE THIRD TOPIC MENTIONED IN MY LETTER, THAT "WE MIGHT TRY TO DISCREETLY FIND OUT WHETHER THE AMERICAN OFFICIALS CONSIDER THAT, AS A RESULT OF THE OGDENBURG AGREEMENT, AND PARTICULARLY ^{THE} ACCEPTANCE BY THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT OF THE PROPOSALS TO CONTINUE COLLABORATION ON NORTH AMERICAN DEFENCE, THEY FEEL THAT THERE IS AN OBLIGATION ON CANADA TO BACK UP ^{THE} UNITED STATES IF IT GETS INTO WAR OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA".

4. I SHALL BE SENDING YOU OUR COMMENTS ON HIS SUGGESTIONS, BUT WOULD OF COURSE APPRECIATE ANY OBSERVATIONS YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE. *Leiger*

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INCOMING MESSAGE

D. L. (1) 2.

FILE COPY

FROM: EMBASSY WASHINGTON

*File
line*

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

50219-AE-40

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

129

SD

Priority

System

No. G-1691

Date October 5, 1955.

CYPHER-AUTO

Departmental Circulation
MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S

Reference: Your EX-1309 of July 25.

Subject: Meeting of consultation.

Following for the Under-Secretary, Begins:

Yesterday, October 4, when I was seeing Livingston Merchant about European security, I thought it wise to take the opportunity to mention the next meeting of consultation. His reactions were entirely favourable.

*Copy referred to Mr Boyce under letter
his
...*

2. I said that we had been thinking of a meeting some time about the middle of November, that is between the Foreign Ministers' meeting at Geneva and the North Atlantic Council meeting in December. I went on to describe the subject matter which we had been thinking of suggesting (along the lines of your letter of September 27 to Foulkes). I was able to add one or two suggestions about those who might attend and expressed the hope that we could avoid "set pieces" and make our exchanges wholly informal.

3. Merchant agreed that a meeting should be held in the fairly near future and seemed to go along with my suggestions concerning its nature and agenda. He thought, however, that the middle of November would be too soon. They were counting on three weeks "give or take a few days" for the Geneva meeting and thought it would be best if our meetings were held after there had been time for them to sort out the results in a preliminary fashion. This would bring the date somewhere about the beginning of December.

4. Hoover is now off on a shortened tour of the Far East but will be back in Washington before the Dulles Party leave for Europe on October 22. Merchant will have a chance of exploring with him then the fixing of a target date for our meeting of consultation. But I think we can count on early December as the time which would best suit the United States officials involved.

5. You might let me know whether this would suit you and those who would be coming from Ottawa. Foulkes is to be in Washington next October 17 I believe. We can discuss this with him then. Ends. A.D.P. Heenev.

References
*I spoke to Mr Henry re date. He is to discuss matter with Mr Foulkes. I told him the December was a bit late & might conflict with next NATO ministerial meeting.
I also spoke to Mr Boyce who has no objection as to date.*

sh.

X

Done

Date

11-10-1565



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF ~~W.K.C.D.~~

OTTAWA

*File
Leger*

29 September, 1955

50219-AE-40
129 | SD

Dear Mr. Leger:

Thank you very much for your letter of 27 September. Regarding the proposed meeting of consultation to be held mid-November, I am in agreement with the suggested time of the meeting as mid-November. By that time I hope that we will have had a series of military discussions with the Cabinet Defence Committee and be in a much better position to explain to our American opposite numbers the Canadian Government view on Canadian participation in North American air defence. I agree with your suggested list of topics for discussion as outlined in paras. 4, 5 and 6.

In regard to continental defence, as I explained to you on the telephone, I am arranging to come back from Europe via New York and Washington so that I can have talks with the United States defence officials on 17 and 18 October on some of the urgent problems of continental defence before this matter is discussed at Cabinet Defence Committee. I intend to raise with Admiral Radford the very points which you have mentioned in your sub-paras. (a), (b) and (c) and this should be a good preparation for further discussions and reports on progress at the meeting for collaboration in mid-November. I understand that the question of alerts has been held up in the Pentagon and I hope to find out from Admiral Radford just what the difficulties are.

The second and third topics are more political than military; but in regard to the situation in the Far East we might try to discreetly find out whether the American officials consider that, as a result of the Ogdensburg Agreement and particularly the acceptance by the Canadian Government of the proposals to continue collaboration on North American defence, they feel that there is an obligation on Canada to back up the United States if it gets into war outside the NATO area. You will recall that I raised this subject at some of our previous discussions and the attitude of the U.S. military authorities has always been that the previous arrangements made in 1947 for continuing collaboration on defence of North America take precedence over the arrangements made later for the defence of the Canada-US Regional Group as part of NATO.

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Jules Leger, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa, Ontario.

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*Copy referred to
Mr. Boyd under
letter.
Leger*

29-9-58 (JS)


TOP SECRET

- 2 -

I have two further suggestions to make for consideration in connection with the agenda. The first one is to raise the question of the effect which President Eisenhower's blueprint and aerial reconnaissance scheme may have on American installations on Canadian territory and joint Canada-US installations on Canadian territory. The second subject is that it might be useful to have progress reports made on the DEW Line and the Mid-Canada Line, with particular reference to the Canadian anxiety regarding the U.S. development of communications in Canada. This part of the problem of the development of U.S. communications in Canada would be a very suitable subject for Mr. Bryce to initiate.

I am sending you an extra copy of this letter which you may wish to send to Mr. Bryce.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Charles Foulkes". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name and title.

(Charles Foulkes)
General.

Defence Liaison (1)/J.M.Teakles/ew

PERSONAL AND TOP
SECRET

Ottawa, September 29, 1955.

50219-AE-40
52 | 50

Dear George:

I enclose for your information a copy of the letter which the Under-Secretary sent on September 27 to General Foulkes, with a copy to Mr. Bryce.

As you will see, it is based in large part on the comments made in your letter of September 22 to George Ignatieff.

Yours sincerely,

J. M. TEAKLES

G. P. de T. Glazebrook, Esq.,
Canadian Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET TOP SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

50219-AE-40
129 | 40

OTTAWA,
September 27, 1955.

Dear General Foulkes,

You will recall that in a letter dated July 20, 1955, you informed me of your agreement with the proposal that a meeting of consultation should be held this fall. I then sent a telegram (No. EX-1309 of July 25) to our Ambassador in Washington, informing him of our agreement.

2. We have recently been giving some thought to the agenda and timing of such a meeting. It seems to me that it might be more fruitful if it were held after the Foreign Ministers' conference at Geneva, which is to begin on October 27, and after the next meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which is to be held from October 31 to November 3, 1955. I would suggest mid-November as a suitable time, and I should be glad to know whether this would be satisfactory to you.

3. As regards the agenda, I believe that it is important for us to suggest informally to the United States authorities not only the subjects we would like to discuss, but also the kind of discussion we would hope to have. I would hope that we might insinuate the idea that the meeting of consultation, being informal, at a high level, and not involving commitments, should be of a character quite different from the ordinary and more formal exchanges of views. It does not follow, of course, that we need set out in detail, in our advance approach, all the sub-headings we might wish to raise at the meeting.

4. I would suggest that the first general topic for discussion should be continental defence. This is bound to be an increasingly important subject at meetings

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General Charles Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,
O t t a w a.

28.9.2(05)

of consultation as the Soviet capability of attack against North America grows. While we would want to emphasize our desire to discuss the general trends in continental defence and to take a long-term view, there are three particular aspects of the problem on which it seems to me that we might concentrate:

(a) anticipated developments and programmes for the North American early warning system to 1960, on land and with regard to the seaward extensions, in the light of the probable budgetary situation. We would want to get their views on the magnitude and nature of continental defence, and would probably hope (whether we mentioned this in advance or not) to get some light on whether any budgetary reductions would affect the United States contributions.

(b) developments in the weapons system to 1960. This follows directly from our initiative at the last meeting of consultation on September 24, 1954, and from the letter which you wrote as a result to Admiral Radford on September 30, 1954. The subsequent conclusion of the Agreement for Co-operation in the Field of Atomic Defence has removed the legal difficulties in the way of the joint programme you suggested. It seems to me that the initiation now of a joint study of this kind is urgently required from the Canadian point of view.

(c) relationship between the NATO alerts system and North American air defence. The problem I have in mind here, of course, is how to cope with the inaction in Washington on the proposed negotiation of tripartite arrangements to warn of impending aggression against the NATO area. I think it is most important to get on with the discussion of alerts measures and procedures for declaring alerts in North America, including the exchange of indications intelligence on the Far East, but I also think that we should be careful not to prejudice the success of the

tripartite approach or our relations with the United Kingdom in the intelligence field. How this problem is handled might depend on whether before the meeting we hear from the State Department their views on the tripartite suggestion.

5. As a second general topic, I would suggest Soviet intentions in the light of recent developments, with particular reference to their effect on Western defence programmes. In this subject I think it is very important to get beyond the usual platitudes and to try to find out what the thinking really is at the highest levels of the United States Government. We might, for example, get some inkling of what the United States intends to do about its bases in Europe and the Middle East, given the present range of aircraft and the political developments in those parts of the world. We might also try to get some more definite idea of what the United States expects to achieve in the field of disarmament. And there is the broader question, what kind of Western defences may be expected in the next few years against what kind of possible Soviet attack?

6. The third general topic might be the situation in the Far East. Like the second topic, this is obviously related to the basic purpose for which the meetings of consultation were instituted, i.e. to discuss developments in the international situation which might give rise to a necessity for the use of atomic weapons. Perhaps it would be best to confine the discussion to China. I would hope that we might get some idea of United States intentions on such questions as the future of Formosa and the recognition of the Communist government, although I think it would be well not to hint at this beforehand.

7. These suggestions are, of course, tentative, and the agenda would have to be reviewed and possibly revised just before the meeting in the light of current developments in the international situation. In view of your imminent departure, however, I thought I should put them to you now, and I would very much appreciate any comments or suggestions you may have. I am sending a similar letter to Mr. Bryce.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

50219-AE-40
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TOP SECRET

OTTAWA,
September 27, 1955.

Dear Mr. Bryce,

As you will see from the attached copy of a letter to General Foulkes, we have been giving some thought to the advisability of proposing another meeting of consultation in Washington in the fairly near future.

2. I should welcome any suggestions which may occur to you, either as to the agenda or timing. I should also be glad to know whether, if such a meeting were held in mid-November, you would be able to attend.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

R. B. Bryce, Esquire,
Secretary to the Cabinet,
Privy Council Office.



PERSONAL AND
TOP SECRET

UPGRADED TO SECRET
RELEVÉ À SECRET

*File
Tui*

Washington, D. C.,
September 22, 1955.

50219-AE-40
52-50

Dear George,

As I mentioned on the telephone, Arnold and I went over the tentative topics you had in mind for the consultation meeting and I will try to reproduce his ideas.

2. First, he suggested that the meeting might best be after the PJBD meeting, which would take it to, say, mid-November or slightly earlier. Your first impression on the telephone was that probably this would be all right at your end.

3. As to the nature of the meeting, we feel that the absence of Bedell Smith will leave a very bad hole which no one else can quite fill. You remember that Smith was at last September's meeting which was deliberately held before Smith went away. However, the change in management makes it all the more important for us to suggest informally to the State Department not only the subjects, but the kind of discussion we would hope to have. There has been a tendency always in the past to begin with what is really a shortened intelligence appreciation. This tends to be a major bore and when you get on to a subject like Soviet intentions, they simply repeat all the platitudes which are all too familiar in the kind of intelligence papers that can be agreed on. We would hope to insinuate the idea that the consultation meeting, being informal at a high level and not involving commitments, should be of a

G. Ignatieff, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa, Ontario.

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TOP SECRET

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character quite different from the ordinary and more formal exchange of views. Last year I recall that there was interesting discussion when we got down to exchanges between the leading actors.

4. Arising out of this is the approach to the agenda. As I mentioned on the telephone, we would assume that for purposes of your own interdepartmental studies you may well want to spell out in some detail the sub-headings under the headings, but that for our approach to the United States officials on agenda we might use a slightly different technique.

5. We agree here with all the general subjects you have suggested and I will try to give you Arnold's views on them.

(a) Continental Defence:

Without disagreeing with the three aspects you gave us, he would suggest that we should indicate to the Americans that we want particularly to discuss the general problems in this subject, and that we would hope to take a long-range look. We would, at the meeting, want to draw attention to the trends in continental defence and mention certain problems which occur to us. We would, for example, want to get their views on the magnitude and nature of continental defence. We would probably hope (whether we mentioned this before or not) to get some light on whether any budgetary reductions would affect the United States contributions. Indeed, there is of course a possibility that even with an unchanged budget, the proportion allotted to continental defence might change.

He would agree entirely with your doubts expressed on the telephone as to how we handle the alerts question. Probably this must come up in some way and how it is handled might depend on what will happen between now and November, whether we hear from the State Department then views on the tripartite suggestion.

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- 3 -

Arnold thought that it might be necessary at the meeting itself to draw attention to the general problem involved in having large United States forces in Canada. This, of course, is not an agenda item but might be mentioned.

(b) Soviet Intentions:

We would be inclined not to attach this too closely to the Geneva conference, although that aspect is bound to come up. Similarly, we would be inclined not to stress the President's so-called disarmament proposal. In this subject it is particularly important that we should get away from the usual formulas and take a hard look at Soviet capabilities and intentions. Related to that would be what you mentioned, the Western defence programmes, and we might get some inkling of what the United States intends to do about its bases in Europe and the Middle East. Given the new range of aircraft, will all these bases have the same essentiality? From another point of view, will political developments in North Africa and the Middle East allow the retention of the bases, even if they are regarded as essential? More broadly, what kind of Western defences may be expected in the next few years against what kind of possible Soviet attack? Remembering the original "alarm bell" object of these meetings, what is the particular United States view on the possibility of a Russian attack?

(c) The Situation in the Far East:

Arnold suggested this would probably best be confined to China. Last year we had quite a merry controversy on this, but the same circumstances do not exist at the present time. However, it is certainly an important subject and I would personally wonder whether it might get into some discussion of United States policy on recognition, the two Chinas, and all the rest of that very controversial field. Obviously we will not hint at this beforehand but hope that something might come out. You may remember that last year Bedell Smith made a remark off the cuff to the effect that he hope we realized that the Administration was not as blind as it might appear; that they did realize that there was a Communist Government in Peking.

- 4 -

6. You mentioned the Alsop article on the Killian Committee. The bulk of this article goes back to the argument of whether or not the Soviet Union is ahead, or going to be ahead, of the United States in air power. We attempted some general analysis of United States views on this in our despatch on United States defence policy (1084 of June 27, 1955). Much more detailed information has been sent up by Philip Uren, the JIB Liaison Officer in the Central Intelligence Agency. For your own information, I had in June, and still have, the impression that United States intelligence made a very bad estimate of the speed at which the Soviet Union could produce inter-continental bombers and that, further, they had written down too much Russian capacity to get to the front in quality. The Pentagon has blown hot and cold on this according to the effect they wanted to produce, e.g., to encourage the budget or to reassure the public. I would not pretend to guess at the validity of the Alsop article except to suggest that it is an over-simplified picture. Not nearly enough is known about the ability of the Russians to make the best use of what are evidently very modern heavy bombers. Furthermore, the calculations in numbers have been a little misleading. If the Americans had stuck to the contracts they had made for production of bombers, and if the estimates of Russian production are anywhere near right, it would be possible and perhaps probable that the Russians would get ahead. On the other hand, the Pentagon orders were not based on the capacity of American industry and, I gather, if enough money were voted that a considerable increase in numbers would be, from the point of view of industry, quite feasible.

7. This is a very general impression and you might like to get Bill Crean's current views.

8. I hope this will give you enough to go on, but it would certainly be helpful to us as you go along if you would care to drop me a line with your thinking on how the planning for the meeting could best be worked out.

Yours ever,



G. de T. Glazebrook.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO:the Under-Secretary.....

Handwritten initials: AL

Security TOP SECRET

Date September 16, 1955

FROM:Defence Liaison (1) Division.....

Handwritten: File June

File No.	
50219-AE-4	
5050	

REFERENCE: Your memorandum of September 10.....

SUBJECT:Proposed Meeting of Consultation.....

Vertical stamp: DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET

I note that Mr. Heeney has suggested that plans might be made to hold the next meeting of consultation in Washington at the end of October. I agree that such a meeting might be useful, but the choice of dates might be affected by two other meetings. One is the Foreign Ministers' Conference, which will begin in Geneva on October 27, and the other is the Permanent Joint Board on Defence meeting on October 31 - November 3. It occurs to me that the meeting of consultation might be somewhat more fruitful if it could take into account developments at these other two meetings.

2. The following is a possible agenda for the meeting of consultation, which I have worked out in consultation with Mr. Crean, Mr. Ford and Mr. Menzies:

1) Continental Defence

(a) Anticipated developments and programme for the North American early warning system to 1960 in the light of the probable budgetary situation:

- (i) on land;
- (ii) seaward extensions.

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TOP SECRET

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- (b) Developments in the weapons system to 1960 -- discussion of possibility of a joint study of an integrated North American air defence weapons system now that the agreement for co-operation in the field of atomic defence has been made.
 - (c) Relationship between NATO alerts system and North American air defence
- 2) Soviet intentions and the effect of the Geneva Conference(s) on Western defence programmes *(including document)*
 - 3) The situation in the Far East.

3. Continental defence is, I imagine, bound to become increasingly important at meetings of consultation as the capacity of Soviet attack on North America from the air grows. On Item 1(a), I think it is most desirable to try to get some idea, even of the most tentative kind, of the effect which possible reductions in the U.S. defence budget may have on their planning for continental defence.

4. Item 1(b) follows directly from our initiative at the last meeting of consultation on September 24, 1954. As agreed at the meeting, General Foulkes wrote to Admiral Radford on September 30, 1954, suggesting the following course of joint action by the U.S. and Canadian military:

- "(a) Initiate a joint study to define clearly the effects of fall-out. This will have to be a scientific study, and the security difficulties imposed by your present regulations are appreciated.
- "(b) After the effect of fall-out has been defined clearly enough for military understanding, initiate a study on the effects of fall-out on the present plans for the defence of North America.

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- "(c) After the effects of fall-out on present plans are clarified, pursue a re-examination of our weapons system for the defence of North America.
- "(d) Finally, resulting from the above, initiate a study to determine a joint approach for the implementation of a revised weapons system."

The subsequent conclusion of the Agreement for Co-operation in the Field of Atomic Defence has removed the legal difficulties in the way of this programme. The adoption now of a joint programme of this kind, which is urgently required from the Canadian point of view, should also act as a spur to our own National security Policy study.

5. Mr. Crean is preparing a separate memorandum on Item 1(c). The problem here is how to cope with the inaction in Washington on the proposed negotiation of tripartite arrangements to warn of impending aggression against the NATO area. We feel it is most important to get on with the discussion of alerts measures and procedures for declaring alerts in North America, including the exchange of indications intelligence on the Far East, but we do not wish thereby to prejudice the success of the tripartite approach or our relations with the United Kingdom in the intelligence field.

6. Also on Item 1(c), you will recall the discussion on February 18, 1955, between Mr. Pearson and Mr. Campney of problems which might be posed for Canada if the United States were to become involved in hostilities over the Chinese off-shore islands. (The threat of hostilities there is not as great now as it was then, but the problems which might arise for Canada on the outbreak of hostilities in the Far East, involving the United States, still remain.) It was these problems which led Mr. Pearson and Mr. Campney to decide on February 18 that you should explore with Mr. Heeney the

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advisability of holding another meeting of consultation. It was also agreed on February 18 "that General Foulkes would explore the possible effects of United States precautionary alert measures on Canada; and that a review should be made of existing arrangements for authorizing United States flights."

7. I should perhaps also remind you that, in commenting on the record of the February 18 meeting, Mr. Heeney wrote on March 4 as follows:

"No doubt they (the Americans) would be prepared to accept the theoretical position of a threat of Soviet intervention and to examine the questions you pose in that light. But having got this far, I believe there would then ensue, more likely than not, something like a detailed examination of Canadian capabilities for early warning and continental defence. In that event I assume we would have to admit limitations in our present ability to carry out the plans which have been prepared in these two respects. Moreover, would we not perhaps be inviting as well even further suggestions as to actions which might be taken by the Canadian Government to provide against the very circumstances we had earlier suggested?"

Nevertheless, my own feeling is that the question of alerts in relation to continental defence is so important and urgent that it should be discussed at the next meeting of consultation -- in such a way, of course, as to minimize the possible disadvantages mentioned above.


8. Items 2 and 3 of my suggested agenda relate obviously at this time to the basic purpose for which the meetings of consultation were instituted; i.e., to discuss developments in the international situation which might give rise to the necessity for the use of atomic weapons. The agenda would obviously have to be reviewed and possibly revised just before the meeting in the light of current developments in the international situation.

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9. If you agree, as the next step I propose that letters based on this memorandum should be sent to General Foulkes and Mr. Bryce. You will no doubt also wish to consult the Minister before he leaves Ottawa, as to the desirability of holding a meeting at this time, before we reply to Mr. Heeney.



Defence Liaison (1) Division

Security **S E C R E T**

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No.	
50219-AE-40	
111	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Message To Be Sent	No. EX-1309	Date July 22, 1955	For Communications Section Only
AIR CYPHER			SENT - JUL 25 1955
EN CLAIR			
MODE			
CYPHER			

MODE: **XXX**

REFERENCE: Your WA-1174 of July 14.

SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation.

Priority

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)
W.H. Barton

(Name Typed)
D.L. (1)/kb
Div.....
Local Tel. **7509**

APPROVED BY

(Signature)
[Signature]
(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:
S.S.E.A. U.S.S.E.A.
one to S. July 26/55
European Division

Date **July 26**
KB

Copies Referred To:
C.C.O.S. (1 copy)

Done **KB**
Date **July 26/55**

We agree that a meeting of consultation this autumn would be useful but I believe that early September may be a bit too soon. Some time will be required to assess the significance of the Big Four discussions, ~~which will be going on this summer.~~ Moreover, we think it would be useful if the studies on Canadian security policy were under way before we talked to the Americans because a number of specific questions may emerge which we will wish to consult with them. Finally, General Foulkes will be absent from Ottawa until September 15. We suggest, therefore, that a date later in September would be desirable.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

File WAB

SECRET

M. Borden

20 July, 1955.

f.4.

Dear Mr. Leger:

50219-AE 40
6150

With reference to your letter of 18 July, 1955, regarding a meeting of consultation, I agree with your proposal that a meeting of consultation should be held in the fall and also agree with your suggestion that a date later in September will be more suitable.

I expect to be out of Ottawa until after 15 September.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Leger

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JUL 21 1955

Jules Leger, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
East Block,
Ottawa, Canada.

S E C R E T

*Done
KB
July 19/55* Referred to
European Div

50219-AE-40
111 50

Ottawa, July 18, 1955.

Dear General Foulkes,

Attached is a copy of telegram No. WA-1174, dated July 14, 1955, from Mr. Heeney proposing a meeting of consultation in the early autumn, perhaps in September. Also attached is a copy of telegram No. WA-1172 which is referred to by Mr. Heeney in his telegram.

2. I believe that a meeting of consultation this autumn would be useful but I am inclined to think that early September may be a bit too soon. Some time will be required to assess the significance of the Big Four discussions which will be going on this summer. Moreover, I believe it would be helpful if the studies on Canadian security policy were under way before we talked to the Americans, because a number of specific questions may emerge on which we will wish to consult with them.

3. I propose therefore, if you agree, to tell Mr. Heeney that we welcome the idea of a meeting of consultation this fall in principle and that any date later in September would be satisfactory to us.

Yours sincerely,

J. LÉGER
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

General Charles Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa, Ontario.

18.7.26 (145.)

INCOMING MESSAGE

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DL(1) Johnston ORIGINAL

Messrs Ford Roy

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON.

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

50219-AE-40

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

52 | *50*

Priority

System

CYPHER-AUTO

No. WA-1174

Date July 14, 1955.

Departmental Circulation

THE MINISTER
UNDER-SEC'Y
ASSOC/U/SEC'Y
ASSIST/U/SECS
POL COOR SECT.

Reference: Our teletype WA-1172 of July 14.

Subject: Meetings of consultations.

Addressed External WA-1174, repeated Dominion London (for the Minister) No. 45, (Ottawa, please pass to London).

After my conversation with Mr. Stassen and others on disarmament in the State Department yesterday, I took the opportunity to raise with the United States group he had with him the possibility of a "meeting of consultations", perhaps in the early autumn. Several of the United States group had participated in previous meetings.

2. The United States officials present agreed that it would probably be useful to have such a meeting, perhaps in the early autumn. There have been a number of developments since our last meeting which might well be the subject of useful discussion.

3. Would you be good enough to let me have your views (and those of General Foulkes.) If we are to arrange such a meeting I would be inclined to suggest September. A.D.P. Heeney.

NOTE: Above telegram passed to London as requested.

Communications Section.

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DONE - COM. SEC. SECTION

19 JUL 1955

JUL 15 '55

References

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TOP SECRET

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Ottawa, March 11, 1955

50219-AE-46
6 50

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,
Department of National Defence,
O t t a w a.

Problems which might be posed for Canada, if
the United States were to become involved in
hostilities over the Chinese off-shore islands.

I refer to my note of February 21 attaching a
copy of a letter to the Canadian Ambassador in Washington,
together with enclosures, on the above subject.

I now attach for your information a copy of
Mr. Heeney's reply.

R. A. MacKAY

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

11.3.31(05)

TOP SECRET

50219-AE-40
6150

Ottawa, March 10, 1955.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

My dear Colleague,

I wish to refer to the discussion which we had on February 18 on certain problems which might arise, if the United States were to become involved in hostilities over the Chinese offshore islands.

As agreed, a copy of the Departmental paper which was read at our meeting and notes on our discussion were sent to the Canadian Ambassador in Washington for his information and comments.

I now enclose for your information a copy of a letter received by the Department from Mr. Heeney which, I think, will be of interest to you.

Yours sincerely,

L. B. PEARSON

The Honourable R. O. Campney,
Minister of National Defence,
"A" Building,
O t t a w a.

Defence Liaison(1)/G. Ignatieff/HF

File

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

March 10, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MACKAY

50219-AE-40
66

Problems which might be posed for Canada if the United States were to become involved in hostilities over the Chinese offshore islands

I have assumed that Mr. Heeney's letter to you should be brought to the attention of the Minister and that he would wish to refer a copy to Mr. Campney. I have consulted Mr. Teakles and Mr. Crean on the comments contained in the memorandum to the Minister.

*Sent to
Minister
11.3.55*

GI

G. Ignatieff

10.3.55 (U.S)

50219-A/E-40
6 | 6

File 62

TOP SECRET

*circulate -
copies of this
with enclosures to
DLI done
DL - Feb. 14/55
For East
-R.*

March 10, 1955.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REQUIT A SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Problems which might be posed for Canada if the United States were to become involved in hostilities over the Chinese offshore islands.

As agreed at your meeting with Mr. Campney on February 18 on the above subject, a copy of the Departmental paper dated February 17 and notes on your discussion with Mr. Campney were sent to Mr. Heeney.

2. We have now received comments from Mr. Heeney. These comments contain the information, received through Admiral de Wolf, that the United States military authorities are of the opinion: "first, that a major attack on the Nationalist held offshore islands is unlikely" and further "that if such an attack were made in force, and if the Nationalist defences were supported by the United States, no immediate problem of Soviet armed intervention would likely arise". On the latter point, the Departmental memorandum did not assume that there would be armed Soviet intervention, but only that such intention could not be ruled out, consequently the United States might take this possibility into account and carry out certain precautions which might pose problems for Canada in the field of Continental defence. An immediate intervention in any case is unlikely, and ultimately intervention would probably depend on the extent of United States action against the Chinese mainland.

3. I thought that you would probably wish to pass this letter on to Mr. Campney for his information. A covering letter is therefore attached for your signature, if you agree.

4. I draw your attention, however, to the fact that Mr. Heeney mentions the projected study on national security policy, which he was told about when he visited the Department recently.

*10-3-13/55
10.3.55/05*

R.A.H.
h J. L.

Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]
D [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]



File
in

TOP SECRET

Washington, D. C.,
March 4th, 1955.

50219-A		E-49	
6			SB

Dear Mr. MacKay:

We have given careful thought to the questions raised in your letter of February 21st and in the two memoranda attached to it concerning the problems which might arise out of hostilities over the Chinese offshore islands. We have consulted closely with Admiral DeWolf.

2. I might first make one or two comments which occur to us on the External Affairs paper attached to your letter.

(a) In Section I of this memorandum, it is stated that "if the Chinese Communists attack the islands and if the Chinese Nationalists request help, the United States Government is expected to give it". It is my understanding that the United States Administration has made it abundantly clear that they would assist the Chinese Nationalists in the defence of the islands if that assistance were needed. This means, I suggest, that the decision lies with the United States and not (as might be taken from the language of the memorandum) with the Chinese Nationalists.

(b) In Section II of the memorandum, the reference is to the Matsu Islands. I presume that the same argument would apply to Quemoy.

(c) The third paragraph of Section IV of the memorandum is put in a way with which I could not agree. Perhaps it is difficult to draw any simple distinction between political/

R. A. MacKay, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada.

8. 3. 38(US)

- 2 -

political and military considerations; but I do suggest that the morale of the Nationalist forces is at least as much a military as a political problem. I know that there is a difference of opinion between the United States and the United Kingdom observers on the morale of the Chinese Nationalist troops. Whatever may be the correct interpretation, it is still, I believe, true that the United States Administration is concerned with what they believe to be a serious problem. The Chinese Nationalist forces have already suffered a series of setbacks which have threatened maintenance of their morale. There is a large military force on Quemoy and, rightly or wrongly, the United States authorities believe that to withdraw that force at the present time and virtually under pressure from the Chinese Communists, would put a strain on morale so serious that it might prove to be the last straw.

3. Admiral DeWolf has learned informally from Admiral Anderson the general approach of Admiral Radford and the Joint Chiefs of Staff towards one aspect of the problem raised in your letter and enclosure. The military authorities are of opinion, first, that a major attack on the Nationalist-held offshore islands is unlikely. They believe, further, that if such an attack were made in force, and if the Nationalist defence were supported by the United States, no immediate problem of Soviet armed intervention would likely arise. In implementation of expressed readiness to assist the Chinese Communists, the Soviet Government might expand its programme of providing materiel. Some question of military assistance would no doubt arise but would not, United States authorities believe, be an immediate one.


4. Given this situation, I would doubt the desirability of asking for an early meeting of consultation. It seems to me that there would be little advantage, and possible serious disadvantage, in calling/

- 3 -

in calling such a meeting. First of all, I presume that the same opinion as was expressed by Admiral Anderson to Admiral DeWolf would be advanced by the United States representatives at the meeting. [No doubt they would be prepared to accept the theoretical position of a threat of Soviet intervention and to examine the questions you pose in that light. But having got this far, I believe there would then ensue, more likely than not, something like a detailed examination of Canadian capabilities for early warning and continental defence. In that event I assume we would have to admit limitations in our present ability to carry out the plans which have been prepared in these two respects. Moreover, would we not perhaps be inviting as well even further suggestions as to actions which might be taken by the Canadian Government to provide against the very circumstances we had earlier suggested?]

5. It is my opinion, therefore, that we might re-consider the desirability of a meeting of consultation, at least in the immediate future. In the account you sent me of the meeting between the Minister, Mr. Campney and others, General Foulkes indicated the existence of problems in instituting a precautionary alert. It occurs to me that a study you spoke of in this connection (jointly by National Defence and External Affairs) - perhaps expanded to include related problems - might well be completed in Ottawa before any decision is reached on discussions with United States authorities. When this study had been completed, we would be in a better position to look again at the desirability or otherwise of placing our cards on the table at a meeting of consultation. G

Yours sincerely,



A. D. P. Heeney.

TOP SECRET

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REDUIT A SECRET

February 23, 1955.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

50219-AE file
SP

Proposed Visit of General Foulkes to Washington

General Foulkes telephoned me yesterday afternoon to say that Admiral De Wolf, on his instructions, had sounded out the Pentagon about a visit from General Foulkes to discuss issues arising out of the Far Eastern situation. Admiral De Wolf has reported that the Pentagon did not appear to see much point in a meeting at this time. They implied that the military situation along the China coast was less serious than press headlines would indicate. They said that while there was some build-up of Communist forces, it did not seem to be of such a nature as to indicate an early attempt against Matsu and other islands held by the Nationalists and that if an attack were contemplated by the Communists, the U.S. authorities expected to have warning. General Foulkes said that he understood that Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was absent, presumably accompanying Mr. Dulles to the Bangkok meeting.

*no
he didn't
go*

RAM

fr J. L.

23-2-30 (SS)

23-2-4 (SS)

Security **TOP SECRET**

hli RMM

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No.	
50219-AE-40	
6	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

WASHINGTON, D.C.

~~UNCLASSIFIED TO SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Message To Be Sent	No. <i>Ex 340</i>	Date	For Communications Section Only
AIR CYPHER		February 22, 1955	SENT - FEB 22 1955
EN CLAIR			
CODE			
CYPHER	<i>Cesta</i>		

AIR CYPHER	
EN CLAIR	
CODE	
CYPHER	<i>Cesta</i>
Priority	XXX

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT:

To Glazebrook from MacKay.

Referring to my telephone conversation Saturday last with Mr. Heeney, the Minister has now decided we should not seek meeting of consultation at present time. After discussion with Admiral De Wolf, General Foulkes has also decided not to go to Washington at present.

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)
R.A. MacKay/ag

(Name Typed)
Div. **USSEA**
Local Tel. **4803**

APPROVED BY
RMM

(Signature)
(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:
S.S.E.A. *Done P. H. Feb 23/55*
U.S.S.E.A.
Mr. Squeliff

Done. *SD*
Date. **22.2.55**

Copies Referred To:

Done.....
Date.....

22.2.39(us)

RECEIVED
COMMUNICATIONS
DIPLOMACY AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1955 FEB 22 PM 2:47

Handwritten notes:
Mackay
1/27/55

decided not to go to Washington at present.
With Admiral de Mott, General Loukes has also
consultation at present time. After discussion
now decided we should not seek meeting of
Saturday last with Mr. Heeneley, the Minister has
referring to my telephone conversation
of Glasgow from Mackay.

SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA
CANADA
1803
NSSEV
B.A. Mackay
XXX

FEBRUARY 22 1955

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 1011

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

50217-AE	40
61	50

~~NO INFORMATION TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC
RÉSERVÉ À UN SECRET A~~

Ottawa, February 21, 1955

Dear Mr. Heeney,

Current developments in the coastal islands of China and what we have learned about U.S. intentions in the event that these should be attacked by Communist Chinese forces, have prompted the examination of the possible consequences for Canada if the United States Government were to become involved in hostilities with Communist China. A departmental paper has been prepared, in which some of these possibilities are analyzed. A preliminary discussion between Mr. Pearson and Mr. Campney took place on the basis of this paper on February 18. A copy of the departmental paper and notes on the discussion are attached. These notes have not been seen by the Ministers and have not been agreed with the Department of National Defence.

2. In view of the stated government position, which as you know was made clear to Mr. Dulles by the Minister in their meeting on February 16, that if hostilities were to develop over the coastal islands, the United States Government would likely have to act alone, the consequences for Canada have been examined in the limited context of certain precautionary measures which the United States Government may wish to take in the field of continental defence.

3. We recognize, of course, that the possible consequences, particularly of a political nature, may

Arnold D. P. Heeney, Esquire, Q.C.
Canadian Ambassador
Canadian Embassy
Washington, D. C.

... 2

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

be wider than that. It may well be, for instance, that one of the principal considerations in the minds of the Communist leaders in pressing the issue of Formosa and the coastal islands at this time, is the desire to isolate the United States from her principal allies. This will obviously have repercussions upon NATO which are not being overlooked, but which are not considered in the present paper.

4. The desirability of taking every opportunity of impressing our American friends with the possible consequences upon their allies of any trouble they may get into over the coastal islands, was one of the main reasons why the Minister thought that the possibility of holding another meeting of consultation in the near future should be explored. Following telephone conversations between you and Mr. Leger and myself, the Minister has reconsidered the question of a meeting, and has decided that we should not ask for one at the present time.

5. It would be useful to us to have your comments on the enclosures to this letter.

Yours sincerely,

R. A. MacKAY

R. A. MacKay

TOP SECRET

50219- AE-40
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February 21, 1955

The Chairman
Chiefs of Staff
Department of National Defence
O t t a w a

Problems which might be posed for Canada, if the United States were to become involved in hostilities over the Chinese off-shore islands.

I attach for your information a copy of my letter to the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, forwarding a copy of the External Affairs Paper which was discussed by Mr. Pearson and Mr. Campney last Friday, together with a copy of the notes on this discussion.

G. A. MEYER



Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Defence Liaison (19) G. Ignatieff/bjk

Mr Teaker
Mr Batten
Mr Paul
file 50219-AE-40

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

**UPGRADED TO SECRET
REQUI A SECRET**

TO:the Under-Secretary.....

Security TOP SECRET.....

Date February 21, 1955.....

FROM: ...G. Ignatieff.....

File No.		
50219-AE-40		
6		6

REFERENCE:

Subject: Problems which might be posed for...
Canada, if the United States were to

~~SECRET~~ become involved in hostilities over the Chinese off-shore.....
islands.

I attach for signature, if you approve,

—
Sent 22.2.55

(1) copy of a letter to Mr. Heeney, forwarding a copy of the departmental paper on the above subject and notes of the discussion between Mr. Pearson and Mr. Campney thereon; and

—

(2) copy of a letter to General Foulkes, forwarding a copy of your letter to Mr. Heeney together with its enclosures.

G.I.

G. Ignatieff

22.2.55 (us)

Defence Liaison (1)/G. Ignatieff/bjk

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

file in

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REBUT A SECRET**

TO: Dr. MacKay

Security TOP SECRET

.....

Date February 21, 1955

FROM: .G.. Ignatieff.....

File No.
50219-AE-40

REFERENCE:

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Subject: ... Problems which might be posed for
Canada if the U.S. were to become
~~involved~~ ... involved in hostilities over the off-shore islands.....

Following up Friday's meeting, *and* our
subsequent discussion, I attach

- (1) draft of a letter to Mr. Heeney, and
- (2) draft of a letter to General Foulkes (*prepared by Bill Barton*)

2. I should also like to know whether you
or the Under-Secretary have any changes to suggest
in the record of the discussion.

G.I.
G. Ignatieff

21.2.16(05)

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

February 18, 1955.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

50219-AE-40 *File*
6/6

Items for discussion with
Mr. Campney and General Foulkes, 11.30
February 18.

It is suggested that the main item for discussion is the question of Canadian policy in the event that hostilities develop over the coastal islands of China. A paper prepared by Mr. Ignatieff is attached.

I suggested to General Foulkes that it might be useful at the meeting to consider a reply that might be made to Mr. Argue's questions in the House about atomic weapons. Presumably National Defence will draft the reply but it might be useful for us to put in some suggestions at this stage. I attach three alternative drafts to question 2 (marked item 2).

It might also be a useful action for you to raise the question of the Joint Study Group with National Defence. We have had no reply to either your first or second letter.

RAM
/s/ J. L.

18-2-4(65)

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*

Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

OFFICE OF THE UNDER-SECRETARY

ITEM 1

000142

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 17, 1955

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES

Problems which might be posed for Canada, if the United States were to become involved in hostilities over the Chinese offshore islands

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET

I Background

Information has been received that there is a considerable concentration of Chinese Communist forces opposite the Matsu Islands, including a substantial number of planes and a large fleet of junks. There is a consequent possibility of United States air and naval forces in the area becoming involved in hostilities in support of Chinese Nationalist forces. Under the Congressional resolution, the President may employ United States armed forces not only to defend Formosa and the Pescadores, but also "such related positions and territories" as he judges to be necessary for that purpose. These include the offshore islands. From what is known about United States intentions, it seems likely that the United States military authorities would ignore harassing air raids and shelling against the islands. If the Chinese Communists attacked the islands, and if the Chinese Nationalists requested help, the United States Government is expected to give it. It is understood that a formal National Security Council decision has been taken to that effect. Because of the geographical proximity of these coastal islands to the mainland, there is a risk that action taken by United States forces in support of the Nationalists for the defence of the islands might extend hostilities to the mainland. This paper is intended as an analysis of the type of problems which might be posed for the Canadian Government in the event that the United States were to become involved in hostilities over the offshore islands and is not intended as an appreciation of the current situation or anticipated developments.

II Possible extent of involvement of the United States in military action

Warlike activities arising from possible attacks by the Communist Chinese forces against the Matsu Islands might lead to the following contingencies:

- (a) Local armed encounters limited to the Matsu Islands and involving the use of local United States forces only, acting in support of Chinese Nationalist forces to repel attempts at landing;
- (b) extension of the armed encounters to the mainland, involving counter-action by local United States forces against concentrations of Chinese Communist ground, naval and air forces and supplies or "hot-pursuit" of Communist aircraft;
- (c) general war between the United States and China.

(Because of the geographical location of these islands, contingencies 1 and 2 might tend to merge).

III Possible consequent approaches to the Canadian Government from the United States Government

Although the Sino-Soviet Treaty specifically provides for Soviet intervention only in the event of attack by Japan or an ally of Japan, it must be assumed that the possibility of Soviet support in the form of military intervention cannot be ruled out by the United States Government in their evaluation of the risks. This consideration presumably accounts for the caution with which the United States military authorities are conducting their activities in relation to the Chinese offshore islands. No precise information is available on Soviet intentions. The Malenkov administration was thought to be exercising a restraining influence on the Chinese Communists. The new Soviet Premier Bulganin, in a statement in Moscow on February 15, made at a reception marking the fifth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, said: "China knows it can look to us not only for sympathy but for help. This help will be forthcoming whenever necessary".

Possible United States approaches to the Canadian Government, therefore, will probably be based on the assumption that if the United States forces were to become involved in hostilities against the Chinese Communist forces, there would be at least a risk of Soviet military intervention. It must be assumed, therefore, that in addition to deployments of United States forces in support of any military action that may be undertaken against Chinese Communist forces in the area, the United States Government may take certain precautionary measures against the possibility of Soviet intervention.

The nature of the possible approaches which might be expected from the United States Government in relation to each of the contingencies set out under II above include the following:

Contingency 1 (fighting limited to the offshore islands):

- (a) request for overflight of Canadian territory for precautionary deployments of SAC aircraft and nuclear weapons to bases in Alaska;
- (b) precautionary alert of continental air defence.

Contingency 2 (extension of fighting to the mainland):

- (a) a full alert of continental air defence;
- (b) precautionary deployment of SAC aircraft and weapons to Goose Bay.

Contingency 3 (general war between the United States and China):

Request for cooperation in full mobilization measures of continental air defence and probable request for activation of base facilities, in addition to possible requests for overflights preparatory to making air strikes.

IV Canadian Attitude

The Prime Minister defined the Canadian attitude in a statement in the House of Commons on February 14, when he said: "I should also like once more to emphasize this; Canada has no commitments regarding collective security in the Far East, and indeed no commitments of any kind in respect of the Formosa area except those which arise out of our membership in the United Nations". This statement confirmed the Government's attitude as first given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the House of Commons on January 25, when he said: "Although we are not involved in United States commitments in this area, we are of course deeply concerned over the dangerous situation existing there and we, with other free governments, are anxious that steps should be taken to bring to an end the fighting which has now been taking place for some time along the China coast".

In the absence of any United Nations decision authorizing the United States to take military action in the defence of the offshore islands, and in the absence of any relevant treaty or collective security commitments binding Canada as indicated in these Government statements, it remains to examine to what extent, if any, Canadian interests or any principle are involved in determining what the reaction should be to the possible United States approaches outlined above.

It is difficult to identify any precise Canadian interests in the denial of the coastal islands to the Chinese Communists. The considerations governing United States interests in the islands appear to be political rather than strategic. The islands may have some tactical value as a site for early warning of attack from the mainland against Formosa and vice versa and for preventing Chinese Communist shipping from using the Formosa Strait. The military importance of the islands, however, is overshadowed by political considerations such as the possible effect of their loss on the morale of the Nationalists and upon United States prestige in the cold war.

If the question of principle is taken as a determining factor, the main consideration which would seem to arise is the "inherent right of individual and collective self defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations" (Article 51 of the United Nations Charter). If the risk of general war between the United States and Communist China were assumed to involve the risk of Soviet retaliation against the United States with nuclear weapons, the concept of collective self defence would presumably include the protection of United States nuclear retaliatory power as well as other measures of continental air defence. Thus, especially if there were any question of nuclear weapons being used in the event that the United States were to become involved in hostilities against Communist China, it would be difficult to distinguish between requests made by the United States Government to the Canadian Government which were related strictly to the hostilities with China, as distinct from precautionary measures which would have to be taken in anticipation of Soviet intervention.

The evidence available on the intentions of the United States Government, does not indicate the likelihood of the President authorizing the use of nuclear weapons in hostilities against Communist China. The President is on record with a number of statements showing his abhorrence of nuclear warfare, such as: "War would present us with only the alternatives in degrees of destruction, and there could be no successful outcome". The President, moreover, cannot be unmindful of the deplorable effect that the use of nuclear weapons against Communist China would have on Asian opinion. Nonetheless the advantages that could be gained by striking the first blow in nuclear warfare are such that if the United States Government were to apprehend the possibility of Soviet intervention, they would almost certainly take certain precautionary measures to prepare their defences including their retaliatory atomic potential.

This possibility would pose the most serious problem to the Canadian Government, in that precautionary measures of the types envisaged might lead to a chain reaction of events which would tend to precipitate general war, if the Soviet Union were to interpret such precautionary moves as indicating a risk of imminent attack. It is imperative, therefore, that in the event that the United States were to become involved in hostilities against Communist China, every effort be made to limit such hostilities and to bring them to an end without precipitating general war. For this reason all precautionary measures of continental air defence would have to be taken in such a way as not to provoke Soviet reactions and to avoid as far as possible drawing public attention to them.

V Conclusions

It would be premature to recommend any specific course of action in relation to the conjectural possibilities outlined above. As a basis for further consideration only and taking into account the arguments set out above, one possible course of action might be:

- (a) Accede to a request for the precautionary alerting of continental air defence;
- (b) accede to a request for overflights of Canadian territory for the limited purpose of precautionary deployments of SAC aircraft and weapons to Alaska and Goose Bay;
- (c) refuse overflights of Canadian territory, or the use of Canadian bases for the purpose of carrying out air strikes, and participation in any full mobilization measures for continental air defence, in the absence of a prior determination by the Canadian Government that general war is imminent.

ITEM 2

000147

FILE COPY

Extract from Questions asked by Mr. Argue
(Votes and Proceedings for February 15, 1955)

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- "2. Does Canada permit the transport of atomic bombs from any foreign country (a) into Canada; (b) through Canada? If so, from what foreign countries?"

Possible answers

- A. No specific reply can be given to this question on grounds of security. [It is not in the national interest to give a specific reply to this question.] It can be said, however, that any foreign country wishing to transport atomic bombs (a) into Canada; or (b) through Canada, would have to obtain the permission of the Canadian Government [in each case]. The decision of the Government would be determined in the light of the circumstances existing at the time.
- B. No specific reply can be given to this question on grounds of security. [It is not in the national interest to give a specific reply to this question.] All that can be said is that the rights of the Canadian Government have been fully reserved in this matter and no foreign government would be able to transport atomic weapons into or over Canadian territory without obtaining authorization in each case.
- C. The transport of atomic bombs into or through Canada would require the permission of the Canadian Government in each case. While it would not be in the public interest to state what action the Government might take in response to hypothetical requests from foreign governments, it can be said that the action would be taken in the light of the Government's responsibility for all military activities in Canadian territory and for the obligations which Canada has publicly assumed in agreements for the collective defence [of the free world].

TOP SECRET

50219 A E 4
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February 18, 1955

Problems which might be posed for Canada, if the United States were to become involved in hostilities over the Chinese off-shore islands

Notes on a discussion of the above subject, which took place between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence on February 18. General Foulkes, Mr. Leger, Dr. MacKay and Mr. Ignatieff were also present.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
RESULT A SECRET

The Ministers had as a basis for the discussion an External Affairs draft dated February 17, 1955, a copy of which is attached. These notes include comments on the various parts of the Departmental paper and the conclusions reached.

Background

Mr. Pearson said that Mr. Dulles in his talk with him on February 16 had confirmed the information about the concentration of Chinese Communist forces opposite the Matsu Islands. He had also given him the information about a formal decision of the National Security Council having been taken that, if the Chinese Communists attacked the coastal islands, and if the Chinese Nationalists requested help, the United States Government would give it. Mr. Pearson added that it was his understanding that as of that time this information had not been given to any other government.

General Foulkes confirmed the information about the concentration of Chinese Communist forces from military sources in Washington. Weather conditions at the present time, were favourable for an attack on the offshore islands, with visibility poor. There was some indication also that the Communist Chinese had been preparing for such an attack in addition to the evidence of concentrations. For instance, call signs had recently been changed and some I.L. 28 bombers had apparently been obtained from the Soviet Union. The 7th United States fleet, which was the only element of the United States forces immediately available to give support to the Chinese Nationalists, was in a difficult position to carry out this task without available ground forces. They would presumably have to limit their intervention to supporting Chinese Nationalist forces by shelling, bombing and strafing. It could not, therefore, be assumed that the 7th fleet would be able to ensure the denial of the offshore islands with immediately available forces at this time of year. Mr. Pearson said that he had emphasized to Mr. Dulles that if the United States became involved in hostilities over the Chinese offshore islands, they would have to act without Canadian support; indeed they would likely have to act alone. If they were to intervene it would seem essential at least that such intervention would be justified from the United States point of view by an expectation that it would be successful; otherwise, the consequences on United States opinion as well as Nationalist morale would be serious.

- 2 -

Possible extent of involvement of the United States
in military action

Mr. Leger asked whether the likelihood of hostilities being extended to the mainland was as great as indicated in the paper. Mr. Pearson said that if United States intervention was limited in the first instance to air and naval support, it was probable that armed encounters would extend to the mainland especially in the form of hot pursuit by United States aircraft.

Possible consequent approaches to the Canadian Government
from the United States Government

With reference to the applicability of a Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance on the possibility of Soviet intervention in the event that hostilities developed between the United States and Communist China, Mr. Pearson observed that the Chinese might claim Soviet support under the treaty on the grounds that the United States is an ally of Japan under the bilateral security agreement. It was difficult to say, however, what would be the reaction of the new administration in the Soviet Union.

Canadian attitude

Mr. Pearson confirmed that judging from what Mr. Dulles had said to him, political rather than strategic considerations governed United States interests in the coastal islands. Mr. Dulles had particularly stressed the possible effect of the loss of these islands on the morale of the Nationalists.

On the possibility of the United States using nuclear weapons in the event that they were engaged in hostilities against Communist China, Mr. Pearson asked whether the United States might not use tactical weapons, if the U.S. military authorities on the spot had them available. General Foulkes said that it was quite probable that tactical weapons were available to the 7th fleet.

Precautionary alert of continental air defence

Mr. Campney stressed that any precautionary measures would have to be taken in such a way, if possible, so as not to provoke Soviet reactions. General Foulkes outlined some of the difficulties of instituting even precautionary alert measures without some public attention being drawn to them. Present staffing of the early warning system was incomplete and he would have to ask the Chief of the Air Staff whether a precautionary alert could be instituted without calling up reserves. It would be difficult to call up reserves without drawing public attention to the alert measures. Consideration might be given to instituting exercises as a cover plan for such precautionary alert measures. It would also be necessary to restrict civil air traffic. Goose Bay might present a special problem since under conditions of alert it would have to revert to being a military airport. The United States might also wish to station extra interception squadrons there for its protection. Again it might be possible to do something in relation to Goose Bay under cover of an exercise. General Foulkes said it was desirable to review the possible effect on Canada of precautionary alert measures (in continental defence) which may be desired by the U.S.

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- 3 -

Precautionary deployments

If the United States wish to make precautionary deployments to Alaska and requested the right of overflight of Canadian territory, Edmonton would lie on the probable route. To avoid drawing public attention to such precautionary deployments, it might be necessary to persuade the United States to avoid Edmonton and make overflights on other routes. If it was envisaged that refusal would be given to the use of Goose Bay as an air base from which air strikes could be made in the event that the United States were at war and Canada was not at war, there would seem to be grounds for denying the right to make precautionary deployments of SAC aircraft and weapons to Goose Bay. It would make more sense from the United States point of view if all such precautionary deployments were directed to Alaska. General Foulkes said that it was obviously desirable to review existing procedures covering the authorization of United States aircraft.

The effects of United States precautionary measures on countries other than Canada

Mr. Pearson said that the discussion had indicated that despite the fact which he had emphasized to Mr. Dulles that the United States would likely have to act alone if hostilities developed over the offshore islands, the consequences of such trouble would seem to inevitably involve other countries. He asked what effect precautionary measures might have on the United Kingdom. General Foulkes said that problems would not arise in the same way in the United Kingdom, as they would not be involved in continental air defence precautionary alerts and the United States airfield bases in the United Kingdom were for use in support of SACEUR under NATO. Mr. Leger said that if the United States were to become involved in hostilities with Communist China the consequences could not be localized. If Canada were to be affected by precautionary measures of the type suggested, why should not other NATO allies? Mr. Pearson suggested that this was particularly relevant to an appreciation of the imminence of war and asked what the relation of these precautionary alerts might be to the question of the United Kingdom proposals for alerts and NATO alerts. General Foulkes said that the question of the relation of the United Kingdom alert proposals and the NATO alert system was currently under consideration. Mr. Pearson asked whether consideration should not be given to having another of the series of meetings of consultation in Washington on the risks of war. General Foulkes said that this might give him an opportunity of talking frankly with Admiral Radford about the whole question of precautionary measures. Mr. Leger said that he would consult Mr. Heeney about the desirability of holding such a meeting in the immediate future. It was recognized that there was a justification for further consultation with the United States authorities not only because of the risk of the United States becoming involved in hostilities, but also because Canada would be faced with a totally new situation in those circumstances. The United States would be at war and Canada not at war, and a whole set of new problems would evidently arise in connection with United States precautionary moves, especially against the possibility of Soviet intervention.

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Conclusions

- 1) It was agreed that notes on the discussion should be prepared, to be attached to the External Affairs paper;
- 2) that this record and the Departmental paper should be sent to the Canadian Ambassador in Washington for his information and comments;
- 3) that Mr. Leger would explore with Mr. Heeney the advisability of holding another meeting of consultation in Washington;
- 4) that General Foulkes would explore the possible effects of United States precautionary alert measures on Canada; and
- 5) that a review should be made of existing arrangements for authorizing United States flights.

7h
LN

the Associate Under-Secretary

TOP SECRET

February 17, 1955

Mr. G. Ignatieff

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BY A SECRETARY

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As requested, I have prepared a paper analysing some of the problems which might be posed for Canada if the United States were to become involved in hostilities over the Chinese offshore islands. Attached is a draft for your consideration. I have tried to incorporate the relevant points in the Minister's report of his conversations with Mr. Dulles which came in while the draft was being typed. I have also consulted Far Eastern Division and Defence Liaison (1) and (2) in the preparation of the paper.

2. I should like to have your comments on the paper and an indication of what you want to have done with it.

G. Ignatieff

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Canadian Ambassador,
Washington, D. C.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Our letter No. 1235 of October 15/54.

Subject: Arrangements Stemming from Meeting
of Consultation.

Security: TOP SECRET

No. 1427

Date: November 29, 1954.

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail: Surface

Post File No.

Ottawa File No.	
50219-AE-40	
93	40

References

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REBUT A SECRET

We have just received from General Foulkes under cover of a letter dated November 18 a copy of some further correspondence between himself and Admiral Radford as a consequence of the Meeting of Consultation held on September 24. A copy of this correspondence is attached for your information.

M. H. WERSHOF
FOR THE

Internal
Circulation

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Distribution
to Posts

CANADA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

CANADIAN SECTION

File on Meetings of Consultation file.

W.H.B.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
RESULT A SECRET

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
EAST BLOCK, PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS
OTTAWA

50219-AE-40
931 SD

TOP SECRET

26 November, 1954.

W.H.B.

Dear Mr. Barton:

I send you herewith the original of a letter from the Chairman, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, Top Secret, dated 18 November, 1954, with enclosures as stated; also a copy of my letter acknowledging receipt, which is self-explanatory.

I imagine that the members of the Canadian Section PJBD will know of this correspondence through their Service Chiefs, but to be certain of this please check with them individually.

Please place this and the previous correspondence received from General Foulkes on a separate file which I would be obliged if you would hold for me until I am able to return to my office. Copies of all communications presently on hand and subsequently received should be placed also on the file which you maintain as Secretary, Canadian Section, PJBD.

Yours sincerely,

A. G. L. McNaughton / per h.S.

A. G. L. McNaughton
Chairman, Canadian Section,
Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

W. H. Barton, Esq.,
Secretary, Canadian Section,
Permanent Joint Board on Defence,
Ottawa.

File
wrb
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

50219-AE-4
5052

TOP SECRET

26 November, 1954

Dear General Foulkes,

I am obliged to you for your top secret letter dated 18 November, 1954, to which was attached copies of your letters to and from Admiral Radford, Chairman U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 30 September, 1954, 10 November, 1954, and 17 November, 1954, all of which I have read with close attention.

Until I am able to return to my office this correspondence is in the custody of the Secretary, Canadian Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defence, who has been asked to insure that it is made known to the members of the Canadian Section PJBD in order that the Canadian Section PJBD may be in a position to take the matter in question up with the United States Section subsequently as the occasion may require.

I assume you will advise me in regard to Admiral Radford's reply to your letter of 17 November, 1954, when received.

Yours sincerely,

A. G. L. McNaughton
Chairman, Canadian Section,
Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

General Charles Foulkes,
Chairman, Canadian Chiefs of Staff,
Ottawa.

~~Handwritten notes:~~
D (11) ~~sub~~
m. Butler
WRB

He [unclear]

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TOP SECRET 50219 AE 40
WRB

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN CHIEFS OF STAFF

Note for file
Copy sent to
Can Ambassador
in Washington.
WRB

18 November, 1954.

- C. G. S.
- C. A. S.
- C. N. S.
- C. D. R. B.

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REQUIT A SECRET

50219-AE-40
581 7V

Continental Defence - Reappraisal of the Problem

1. You will recall that I reported to the Cabinet Defence Committee on 12 November the state of negotiations with the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff for further consultation on our mutual problems.
2. I am attaching herewith a copy of the original letter setting out our proposals to Admiral Radford, a copy of the reply from the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a copy of my reply in regard to the completion of the arrangements in order that discussions can begin.
3. In view of the security considerations involved, it is requested that this correspondence be given limited circulation.

Charles Roulkes
 (Charles Roulkes)
 General,
 Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

Copy to: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs ✓
 Secretary to the Cabinet
 Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Defence Production
 Chairman, Canadian Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

TOP SECRET

29.11.11/051

FILE COPY

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
RESULT A SECRET

17 November, 1954.

Dear

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 10, 1954, regarding the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff consideration of the problems raised in my letter of September 30, 1954.

It is noted with satisfaction that the U. S. Joint Chiefs agree with our contention that the problem of fall-out merits continued study and further that the U. S. military representatives are ready at any time to discuss fully the overall situation, plans and programmes for continental defence with the military representatives of Canada.

I further note that you mention that the U. S. law requires the prior completion of an agreement to co-operation between Canada and the U. S. under Section 144 b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 before weapons' effects can be discussed. In this regard we have under preparation a draft agreement at the present time which I hope will be ready for presentation to the appropriate officers of the U. S. Department of Defence within the next few days, and I understand that the negotiations for such a bilateral agreement will be handled with high priority. Further, it is my understanding that after the agreement has been accepted by the U. S. authorities it will then be in order to recommend suitable ways and means of carrying out the studies proposed in my letter of September 30, 1954.

Yours sincerely,

"Charles Foulkes"

Admiral Arthur Radford,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
The Pentagon,
Washington, D. C.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

10 November, 1954.

My dear General:

The U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully considered your letter of 30 September regarding the need for reappraisal of the problem of continental defense in the light of advances made by Soviet Russia in the fields of mass destruction weapons and delivery methods, as well as the possible effects of fall-out from high yield weapons.

The U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that the problem of fall-out from high yield weapons is a serious one and that the extent and effects of fall-out merit continued study. We do not feel, however, that this problem affects the objectives of our continental defense system, which is presently designed to provide the best feasible defense against delivery of all types of weapons. Plans and programs for continental defense are under constant study and revision, and U. S. military representatives are ready at any time to discuss fully and frankly the over-all situation, plans and programs for continental defense with military representatives of Canada. It appears, however, that if these discussions are to include weapons' effects, as suggested by your letter of 30 September, the U. S. law requires the prior completion of an Agreement of Cooperation between Canada and the United States under Section 144 b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. It is my understanding that negotiations for such a bilateral agreement will be handled on the government level with a high priority.

At such time as the necessary agreement is accomplished, studies such as you recommended can be included in the regular joint machinery for continental defense planning, or could be made the subject of separate studies should the Canadian Chiefs of Staff so desire.

Sincerely yours,

"Arthur Radford"

General Charles Foulkes, C B. , C. B. E. ,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,
Ministry of National Defense,
Ottawa, Canada.

TOP SECRET

COPY

FILE COPY

TOP SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

30 September, 1954.

Dear

As agreed at the meeting of consultation last Friday afternoon, I am setting out herein considerations and suggestions of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff regarding a re-appraisal of the problem of continental defence, particularly in view of the advances made by Soviet Russia in the fields of mass destruction weapons, bomber aircraft and the possible effects of fall-out of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff consider that we must assume that sooner or later the Russians will have accumulated sufficient information on fall-out to realize some of the potent advantages of this phenomenon. It is considered that the possible effects of fall-out may mean that the Russians will need fewer weapons and carriers to accomplish the same neutralization task of this continent than they previously estimated. Also, as the permissible error of weapon delivery has been greatly increased, it may reduce the need for highly skilled bomb aimers and for accurate blind-bombing radar equipment. Furthermore, this permissible error may simplify some of the problems of propulsion and guidance of intercontinental weapons and, if this is right, it may be possible for the Russians to significantly move ahead the timing of successful development of intercontinental weapons.

Taking into consideration all these factors mentioned above, Soviet Russia might be in a position where they may feel they have sufficient potential to render a crippling attack on the retaliatory capacity of North America and advance the date on which they may be prepared to risk a third world war. In view of this, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff consider that a re-appraisal of our position in regard to continental defence, taking into consideration the recent Soviet developments in the fields of mass destruction weapons and their carriers and the question of fall-out, is urgently required.

We consider that the problem of timing has serious implications for both Canada and the United States, but particularly for Canada, if the present arrangements for the production of our own air defence weapons are to be continued. As you are aware, in 1946 we took a decision to develop an all-weather fighter aircraft, the CF-100, for continental defence. This decision to develop an all-weather fighter in Canada was taken only after a very careful review of all the all-weather fighter aircraft being developed in the United States and the United Kingdom and it was found that none of the types under development would meet the requirements for continental defence in Canada. However, the specifications for this aircraft were written to meet the threat of the TU-4, but the predicted characteristics of the new Soviet Type 37 aircraft will render the CF-100 inadequate for this task. Last year we took a decision to produce a successor to the CF-100 and the specifications were drawn up before there was knowledge of the T-37. This new aircraft is expected to be able to deal with the T-37 type but it is not expected to be available for squadron use before 1959-60. Therefore, if Russia is able to produce sufficient

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Admiral Arthur Radford,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
The Pentagon,
Washington, D. C.

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- 2 -

T-37 aircraft to attack the North American continent before 1959-60, we will not have anything capable of dealing with this Soviet threat. Further, if inter-continental weapons are developed successfully by 1960 by the Russians, it is not considered that even this new type of aircraft could deal with this type of attack.

These implications affecting our own production of air defence weapons are mentioned to emphasize the need for more positive joint action in preparing to meet this potential new threat. In our opinion, there is not time for unilateral development and further, we have grave doubts as to whether there is sufficient scientific and technical ability available in Canada to achieve success in the more advanced fields of air defence weapons, such as air-to-air and ground-to-air guided missiles with atomic warheads, in time to meet this new threat. Because of these considerations, we are rapidly reaching the stage where the development of a suitable weapons system for the defence of the North American continent must be a joint operation between our two countries in almost every respect. Although we are well aware that there may be many difficult technical and legal obstacles to overcome to achieve such a joint development we feel, in spite of such difficulties, there is an urgent need to re-examine this problem together because if we do not succeed in obtaining the right answer in time, our survival may be in danger.

In the light of the above, and fully realizing that there may be many legal difficulties to overcome, we would like to make the following suggestions as to how this problem may be examined:

- (a) Initiate a joint study to define clearly the effects of fall-out. This will have to be a scientific study, and the security difficulties imposed by your present regulations are appreciated.
- (b) After the effect of fall-out has been defined clearly enough for military understanding, initiate a study on the effects of fall-out on the present plans for the defence of North America.
- (c) After the effects of fall-out on present plans are clarified, pursue a re-examination of our weapons system for the defence of North America.
- (d) Finally, resulting from the above, initiate a study to determine a joint approach for the implementation of a revised weapons system.

Since my return from Washington, I have been able to give this matter further study. I have recently learned that the Atomic Energy Commission have proposed a tri-partite conference on 18 October to discuss fall-out measurements and it may be possible to use an extension of this conference to provide the necessary information on fall-out which will be required for a re-appraisal of our continental defence problem. I have been examining some of the legal obstacles and I think it might be worth mentioning that there may be a possibility of resolving the legal obstacles by means of existing agreements we have for securing restricted data directly from the Atomic Energy Commission under Section 144A of the Atomic Energy Act, and that this channel might well be used for securing any additional information in regard to fall-out which is not obtained at the meeting to be held on 18 October.

I hope you will advise me of the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff after you have had time to give this problem due consideration.

Yours sincerely,

"Charles Foulkes"

TOP SECRET
000161

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Canadian Ambassador,
Washington, D. C.
FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.
Reference: Your Despatch No. 1723 of October
Subject: Arrangements Stemming from Meeting
of Consultation

Security: TOP SECRET
No: D- 1235
Date: October 15, 1954.
Enclosures: 1
Air or Surface Mail: Air
Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50219-AE-40	
6	50

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~~REQUIET A SECRET~~

References

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We have just received from General Foulkes a copy of a letter dated September 30, 1954, which he wrote to Admiral Radford as a consequence of the Meeting of Consultation held on September 24. A copy of this letter is attached for your information. *see Oct. 14 m*

M. H. WERSHOF
M. H. WERSHOF
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts



TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF
OTTAWA

DL(1)
File on Meetings of Consultation

14 October, 1954. *File*

50219-AE-40
93150

WRB

Dear Mr. Leger:

Thank you for your letter of 13 October, enclosing a copy of Despatch No. 1723 dated 4 October, 1954, and the record of the Meeting of Consultation held on Friday, 24 September. I will show Mr. Campney these papers.

Fes
11/12

Enclosed are two copies of my letter to Admiral Radford in order that you may forward one copy to Mr. Heeney. This letter was cleared with Mr. Bryce before despatch. I have already forwarded a copy to General McNaughton in case this matter is raised in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

Yours sincerely,

Charles Foulkes
(Charles Foulkes)
General,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Mr. Jules Leger,
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Copy sent to Embassy Washington Mr

TOP SECRET

15-1048(05)

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

September, 1954.

FILE COPY

Dear

As agreed at the meeting of consultation last Friday afternoon, I am setting out herein considerations and suggestions of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff regarding a re-appraisal of the problem of continental defence, particularly in view of the advances made by Soviet Russia in the fields of mass destruction weapons, bomber aircraft and the possible effects of fall-out of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff consider that we must assume that sooner or later the Russians will have accumulated sufficient information on fall-out to realize some of the potent advantages of this phenomenon. It is considered that the possible effects of fall-out may mean that the Russians will need fewer weapons and carriers to accomplish the same neutralization task of this continent than they previously estimated. Also, as the permissible error of weapon delivery has been greatly increased, it may reduce the need for highly skilled bomb aimers and for accurate blind-bombing radar equipment. Furthermore, this permissible error may simplify some of the problems of propulsion and guidance of intercontinental weapons and, if this is right, it may be possible for the Russians to significantly move ahead the timing of successful development of intercontinental weapons.

Taking into consideration all these factors mentioned above, Soviet Russia might be in a position where they may feel they have sufficient potential to render a crippling attack on the retaliatory capacity of North America and advance the date on which they may be prepared to risk a third world war. In view of this, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff consider that a re-appraisal of our position in regard to continental defence, taking into consideration the recent Soviet developments in the fields of mass destruction weapons and their carriers and the question of fall-out, is urgently required.

We consider that the problem of timing has serious implications for both Canada and the United States, but particularly for Canada, if the present arrangements for the production of our own air defence weapons are to be continued. As you are aware, in 1946 we took a decision to develop an all-weather fighter aircraft, the CF-100, for continental defence. This decision to develop an all-weather fighter in Canada was taken only after a very careful review of all the all-weather fighter aircraft being developed in the United States and the United Kingdom and it was found that none of the types under development would meet the requirements for continental defence in Canada. However, the specifications for this aircraft were written to meet the threat of the TU-4, but the predicted characteristics of the new Soviet Type 37 aircraft will render the CF-100 inadequate for this task. Last year we took a decision to produce a successor to the CF-100 and the specifications were drawn up before there was knowledge of the T-37. This new aircraft is expected to be able to deal with the T-37 type but it is not

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Admiral Arthur Radford,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
The Pentagon,
Washington, D. C.

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- 2 -

expected to be available for squadron use before 1959-60. Therefore, if Russia is able to produce sufficient T-37 aircraft to attack the North American continent before 1959-60, we will not have anything capable of dealing with this Soviet threat. Further, if intercontinental weapons are developed successfully by 1960 by the Russians, it is not considered that even this new type of aircraft could deal with this type of attack.

These implications affecting our own production of air defence weapons are mentioned to emphasize the need for more positive joint action in preparing to meet this potential new threat. In our opinion, there is not time for unilateral development and further, we have grave doubts as to whether there is sufficient scientific and technical ability available in Canada to achieve success in the more advanced fields of air defence weapons, such as air-to-air and ground-to-air guided missiles with atomic warheads, in time to meet this new threat. Because of these considerations, we are rapidly reaching the stage where the development of a suitable weapons system for the defence of the North American continent must be a joint operation between our two countries in almost every respect. Although we are well aware that there may be many difficult technical and legal obstacles to overcome to achieve such a joint development we feel, in spite of such difficulties, there is an urgent need to re-examine this problem together because if we do not succeed in obtaining the right answer in time, our survival may be in danger.

In the light of the above, and fully realizing that there may be many legal difficulties to overcome, we would like to make the following suggestions as to how this problem may be examined:

- (a) Initiate a joint study to define clearly the effects of fall-out. This will have to be a scientific study, and the security difficulties imposed by your present regulations are appreciated.
- (b) After the effect of fall-out has been defined clearly enough for military understanding, initiate a study on the effects of fall-out on the present plans for the defence of North America.
- (c) After the effects of fall-out on present plans are clarified, pursue a re-examination of our weapons system for the defence of North America.
- (d) Finally, resulting from the above, initiate a study to determine a joint approach for the implementation of a revised weapons system.

Since my return from Washington, I have been able to give this matter further study. I have recently learned that the Atomic Energy Commission have proposed a tri-partite conference on 18 October to discuss fall-out measurements and it may be possible to use an extension of this conference to provide the necessary infor-

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- 3 -

mation on fall-out which will be required for a re-appraisal of our continental defence problem. I have been examining some of the legal obstacles and I think it might be worth mentioning that there may be a possibility of resolving the legal obstacles by means of existing agreements we have for securing restricted data directly from the Atomic Energy Commission under Section 144A of the Atomic Energy Act, and that this channel might well be used for securing any additional information in regard to fall-out which is not obtained at the meeting to be held on 18 October.

I hope you will advise me of the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff after you have had time to give this problem due consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Original signed by
Gen. Charles Foulkes

Security ..TOP..SECRET.....

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No.	
50219-AE-48	
6	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: ...HEAD.OF.POST,.....
WASHINGTON,..D..C.....

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
~~EXEMPT A SECRET~~

Message To Be Sent	<i>EX</i> No. <i>1876</i>	Date October 13, 1954	For Communications Section Only SENT - OCT 13 1954
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AIR CYPHER	
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REFERENCE: Your Despatch No. 1723 of October 4, 1954.

Priority
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SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation with U. S. officials on September 24, 1954.

ORIGINATOR

 (Signature)

 W. H. Barton
 (Name Typed)
 Div. D..L...(1)/jt.....
 Local Tel....7509.....

We note that in the record of the Meeting of Consultation, Mr. Leger is not listed as attending the meeting. We have amended the copies you sent us and assume that you will do likewise. We have also changed the word "radios" in paragraph 51 (b) to "radars".

APPROVED BY
Benjamin Rogers
 (Signature)

 (Name Typed)

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL
 AFFAIRS

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, October 13, 1954.

Dear General Foulkes,

I attach for your information, and to show to Mr. Campney if you think he would wish to see it, a copy of Despatch No. 1723 dated October 4, 1954, enclosing the record of the Meeting of Consultation held on Friday, September 24, 1954.

2. I should like to endorse the suggestion made by Mr. Heeney in the final paragraph of his letter that this Department be supplied with all the relevant correspondence between you and Admiral Radford on this matter. As Mr. Heeney points out, both the Department of External Affairs and the State Department will be greatly interested and directly involved in developments arising out of the suggestions you made at the meeting.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Jules Leger

General C. Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D.,
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Department of National Defence,
"A" Building,
Ottawa.

13.10.53(US)

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to Mr. Holmes
Mr. Chapdelaine
Mr. Wessell
Mr. Rogers.

As WTB copy

Ext. 18

OTTAWA FILE
No. 50219 AE 40

Despatch No. 1723

Date. October. 4. 1954.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,

Reference... Our Despatch No. 1687 of September 27, 1954.

Subject: Meeting of Consultation with United States officials on September 24, 1954.

I attach four copies of the record of the meeting of consultation between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments which was held on Friday, September 24. Highlights of the meeting were dealt with in our despatch under reference. The record has been compared with the record kept on the United States side and there are no major discrepancies between the Canadian and the United States records.

2. The attachment is almost a verbatim record of the meeting rather than a report on it and hence is lengthy. It is a record, however, worth reading for it throws light on the thinking of senior administration officials which underlies United States policy towards Europe and the Far East. The meeting, I believe, was one of the most useful of such meetings I have attended.

3. In the light of the decisions reached at the nine-power meetings in London, the discussion of the European situation outlined in the attachment may seem to be only of historical interest. On the other hand, it was not in any sense an academic discussion. It revealed what continues to be a basic element of United States policy towards Europe, the necessity of European integration involving France and Germany as a base for the defences of Europe against Soviet expansionism. European leaders should be under no illusions. If they fail in the implementation of a united European approach to the problem of Soviet expansionism they must expect increasing disillusionment on the part of both United States military and civilian authorities and a strengthening of the influence of exponents in the United States Government of the theories and practice of peripheral defence.

4. It was agreed that the suggestions made by General Foulkes at the meeting with respect to continental defence (paras. 54 to 57) should now be put to Admiral Radford in a personal letter from General Foulkes - the next step to be decided upon later. I assume that you will arrange to send us copies of all the relevant correspondence on this matter. I believe it is essential that we should be kept informed at all stages as to where the matter stands in order that we can discuss the subject intelligently with the State Department. The State Department, I am certain, will be greatly interested and directly involved in developments arising out of the suggestions made by General Foulkes since they will affect the defence policies of the Canadian and United States Governments.

Copies Referred To

No. of Enclosures

Post File No.

A. P. Murray

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Record of the Meeting of Consultation
Between Representatives of the Canadian
and United States Governments held on
Friday, September 24, 1954.

The meeting which was held in the State Department under the Chairmanship of General Walter Bedell Smith, the Under-Secretary of State, was attended by

Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under-Secretary of State Designate,
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Mr. Walter J. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs,
Mr. Walworth Barbour, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs,
Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Director, State Department Policy Planning Staff,
Mr. G. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, State Department,

for the United States Government, and by

Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, Canadian Ambassador to the United States,
General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff,
Mr. R. B. Bryce, Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet,
Mr. G. P. deT. Glazebrook, Minister, Canadian Embassy,
Rear Admiral H. G. DeWolf, Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington,
Mr. J. J. McCardle, Canadian Embassy,

for the Canadian Government.

2. The agenda of the meeting consisted of four items,

- (a) the situation on the China coast as a result of Communist attacks on Quemoy Island,
- (b) Europe after EDC,
- (c) Soviet intentions and the Soviet threat, and
- (d) continental defence.

Situation on the China Coast

3. At the invitation of the Chairman, Admiral Radford outlined the military situation on the China coast in the light of recent Communist Chinese attacks on Quemoy Island. Three island groups off the Chinese mainland, Quemoy and its outlying islands, the Matsu Islands - 150 miles to the north - and the Tachen Islands - a further 200 miles north - were held by Nationalist Chinese forces. Quemoy was the

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best defended of the three. It was garrisoned by one corps of Chinese Nationalist forces, reinforced with artillery elements, a total of 53,000 personnel. The action, begun in August, had died down considerably in recent weeks until September 22 when Quemoy was subjected again to heavy Communist artillery barrage. The Nationalist Chinese air force was keeping up its regular attacks on shipping concentrations around Amoy harbour and on gun emplacements on the mainland.

4. The Communists would be faced with a tough fight if they attempted to take Quemoy. Communist forces had suffered losses of some 10,000 personnel in their last attack on the island in 1948. United States authorities were not sure but that the Communists had launched their attacks on Quemoy as a smoke-screen for an intended attack on the Tachen Islands. In the latter instance Communist air power from the Shanghai district could be employed, whereas in the vicinity of Quemoy the Communists had no air fields in operational condition. The Tachen Islands were less well defended than Quemoy. Nationalist forces on the islands consisted of one division of regular troops which had been trained and equipped by the United States plus some 3,000 or 4,000 guerrillas. The islands could not be held without outside assistance to neutralize the Communist air power which could be brought to bear on the islands.

5. In answer to a question from Mr. Heeney concerning the implications of the Communist attacks on Quemoy for the defence of Formosa, Admiral Radford said that the attacks might be the first step of a Communist drive against Formosa. However, the biggest factor in the attacks seemed to be psychological, on the one hand to honour the public pledges of the Communist Chinese Government to retake Formosa and on the other to weaken the morale of Formosa's defenders. There were, of course, obvious military objectives involved. The Nationalists, by their ability to control Quemoy and its outlying islands had been able to stop all Communist shipping from using the excellent facilities of Amoy harbour. It was known that most of the logistic support for any Communist Chinese air force in Fukien Province would have to come by sea and in the present circumstances this would be impossible.

6. Mr. Robertson stressed the unfortunate psychological impact on the Nationalist Chinese cause which would be occasioned by Communist Chinese successes in taking Quemoy. It would tend to confirm some public estimates of the weakness of Nationalist Chinese forces. In addition to the obvious loss of face for Nationalist China it would involve the very practical loss of some 50,000 trained troops. So far as the Communists were concerned, a successful attack on Quemoy would free one of the best harbours on the China coast for use in assembling the necessary strength to launch an all-out attack on Formosa itself.

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7. The Chairman then spoke in more general terms of United States policy towards Communist China. The United States Government was not blind to the realities of the situation. Communist China would not cease to exist by reason of its non-recognition by the United States. The United States Government deplored the aggressive policies of the Communist Chinese Government and, with its allies, had fought against the implementation of those policies in Korea. Communist China was in a different stage of revolution than was the Soviet Union. The latter was better able than Communist China to accept a state of relative quiescence in its relations with the outside world. The revolutionary momentum which had brought the present leaders of China to power had not yet been lost.

8. The Chairman thought that the first adverse press comment on Mr. Attlee's visit to Communist China had been balanced off by later and more favourable comment. The United States Government and the United States public should appreciate the effort which Mr. Attlee had made at his advanced age to accompany Mr. Bevan on the trip and in that manner to ensure that something other than a purely Bevan report on the trip was made to the world at large. Mr. Attlee was a sensible man who had rendered a real service to the United States and the free world and it was indeed fortunate that he had made the trip.

9. Mr. Heeney pointed out that Canada's position with respect to Communist China lay somewhere between that of the United Kingdom and the United States. Canada had not recognized the Communist Government but, just before the Korean war broke out, the disposition had existed within the Canadian Government to recognize the facts of Chinese political development no matter how distasteful they might be. There remained in Canada a solid body of opinion of this temper. It was the stated policy of the Canadian Government to consider the establishment of relations with the present Government of mainland China if and when that Government had purged itself of its iniquities. Public opinion in Canada on the subject of Communist China was noticeably different than that in the United States even though it did not go as far as that in the United Kingdom.

10. The Chairman said he understood the Canadian position, and added that United States policy was not inflexible. For example, the United States Government has been requested by the United Kingdom Government to consider some moderate relaxation of current trade restrictions with respect to Communist China. The Chairman said that he had told the United Kingdom Ambassador that the United States could not give favourable consideration to such a relaxation at least until after the passage of the foreign aid bills at the next session of Congress. He hoped that if the United Kingdom pressed the matter it would be possible to have a study made which would result in much the same course of action as that taken in the

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recent past in connection with easing the restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe. The United States had followed this course of action with respect to Eastern Europe, despite doubts as to the wisdom of the action, in deference to the importance of United States-United Kingdom relationships. The United Kingdom had likewise been willing on a number of occasions to meet the United States point of view on Asian matters despite doubts which existed in the United Kingdom of the wisdom of those views. There was then a full realization by the two Governments of each other's problems. The Chairman did not anticipate that serious friction between the Governments would develop over the question of Communist China.

11. The question of the admission of Communist China to the United Nations could be expected to come up annually and it might be anticipated that the majority against admission would decrease each year. It was not beyond the bounds of possibility that the day would come when public and political opinion in the United States might be brought to accept the necessity of admitting Communist China to membership in the General Assembly. The Chairman saw no likelihood, however, that United States opinion could be brought around to accepting the necessity of Chinese Communist membership in the Security Council. Attention would have to be given to the problem of how to deal with this situation.

12. In reference to a question from Mr. Heeney as to Communist Chinese motives in the current attack on Quemoy, the Chairman quoted the opinion of a United Kingdom observer, with which he agreed. There was a possibility that the Communists would undertake an attack on Formosa itself even though it would be destined to failure. The failure could be portrayed as a failure in the face of over-whelming odds represented by the presence of the United States Seventh Fleet. By such tactics Communist China would hope to emphasize divisions in the free world coalition and especially differences between the United Kingdom and the United States. To a lesser degree the same arguments might be applied to Communist tactics with respect to Quemoy.

13. Mr. Robertson said he could not understand by what process of mental gymnastics members of the United Nations could take action to permit Communist Chinese membership even in the General Assembly, so long as the U.N. resolution declaring Communist China to be an aggressor remained on the record. Nor could he see how the resolution could be withdrawn in the light of Communist violation of the terms of the armistice agreement in Korea and refusal to negotiate any kind of acceptable compromise there. Either the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions passed by the Organization meant something or they did not. If the latter was the case serious doubts would arise as to the value of the Organization as a whole. The Chairman and Mr. Heeney agreed that the aggressor resolution as it stood was a legal barrier to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Mr. Heeney believed that some modification in the resolution would be necessary before any action could be taken

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on the admission of Communist China. He referred again to the Canadian Government's position that no consideration would be given to the question of recognition of Communist China or its admission to the United Nations until the Communist Chinese Government had given some solid indications of an intention to conduct its international relationships by peaceful means.

Europe After EDC.

14. The Chairman called on Mr. Bowie to outline the United States attitude on the problems of European integration and German rearmament. When Mr. Bowie asked for some indication as to the extent to which he should go into details of the United States position, Mr. Heeney outlined briefly the information which had been made available to the Canadian Government on the situation arising out of French failure to ratify the EDC Treaty. He said that much of the general information had come from the welter of reports from Canadian missions in Europe. So far as the United States attitude was concerned, the Canadian Government was extremely grateful for the frankness with which senior State Department officials had spoken to the officers of the Embassy. He understood that United States representatives would go to the nine-power London meetings with an open mind and prepared to accept any formula acceptable to London, Paris and Bonn which offered hope for genuine Franco-German co-operation in the defence of Europe.

15. Mr. Bowie then went on to speak of the views which Chancellor Adenauer had expressed to Mr. Dulles in the course of the latter's recent visit to Europe. Chancellor Adenauer had made it clear that, in his view, the future of Europe depended upon a genuine Franco-German rapprochement leading to an organic unity of Europe. So far as German domestic needs were concerned it was essential that some move be made which would point to the eventual restoration of sovereignty for Germany. Finally German re-armament would have to be achieved in a fashion which would not foreclose on a genuine integration of Europe. Chancellor Adenauer's personal order of priority then was, first to find a suitable basis for Franco-German co-operation, second to provide some means by which sovereignty could be restored to Germany and third to give detailed attention to the problem of German re-armament.

16. The Chancellor was suspicious and distrustful of the methods used by Mendes-France in his handling of the EDC issue and yet he continued to stress the importance of Franco-German rapprochement. He was prepared to go far to meet the genuine fears of France if he could be convinced that Mendes-France was equally seriously interested in achieving a basis for Franco-German co-operation. He had expressed considerable doubts that France really desired such co-operation.

17. The United States Government for its part was disappointed in the latest proposals put forward by Mendes-France and especially in the lack of attention paid in them to problems of the admission of Germany to NATO and

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German re-armament. The United States realized that Mendes-France would face a difficult parliamentary situation on the question of the admission of Germany to full membership in NATO. On the other hand, the Mendes-France approach with its emphasis on inspection and controls was, in the United States view, too negative an approach. It was thought possible that at the London meetings the French proposals could be modified and made acceptable if Mendes-France came to London prepared to be flexible. Upon one's assessment of Mendes-France's sincerity in achieving at London a real basis for Franco-German co-operation would depend in large measure one's assessment of the likely success of the London meeting. United States representatives were going to the London meetings assuming that Mendes-France had a sincere desire to achieve results but were prepared to recognize that this assessment might be in error.

18. The Chairman said that Mendes-France's description of the French plan at Strasbourg had not been encouraging. The French demarche had been received by the State Department only twenty-four hours in advance of the Strasbourg speech and had not itself been encouraging. The question remained as to whether what Mendes-France presented at Strasbourg were final terms or whether they were general suggestions allowing for compromise and modification. If they were the former the situation would be a repetition of what happened at Brussels when the French proposals were presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Mendes-France had later interpreted his failure to achieve acceptance of French proposals on the grounds that his Benelux colleagues refused to negotiate.

19. The Chairman spoke of an exclusive interview which Mendes-France had had with a United States correspondent recently in which he had outlined French requirements so far as European integration was concerned. While the State Department had been pledged to secrecy on the content of the interview pending its publication, it was interesting to record that the interview had been granted solely on the understanding that it would be published in the United States before the nine-power meeting in London got under way. Mendes-France's arguments were directed to a United States audience and an advance text of the interview was to be in Mr. Dulles hands before he took off for London.

20. Mr. Heeney spoke of the deep concern which the situation in Europe following French rejection of the EDC Treaty caused for the Western allies. This was shared by Canada. The Canadian Government realized the grave disappointment which the United States Government must have experienced at the failure of the French to ratify the EDC Treaty and was deeply conscious of the efforts which the United States Government had devoted to the objective of genuine European integration. The Canadian Government shared the United States view on the necessity of greater European integration and the defeat of the EDC Treaty had come as a shock to the Canadian Government. The stability of Western Europe was possibly the most important consideration in Canadian foreign and defence policy. To a certain extent then, Canada's pre-London position was much the same as that of the United States. Canadian

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representatives would approach the meetings with an open mind not ruling out any formula which might appear to provide a basis for genuine Franco-German co-operation.

21. At the same time, the Canadian Government had grounds for concern in the limited information coming to it of the re-appraisal of the United States thinking with respect to Western Europe which seemed to be taking place. At this most critical time in the formation of United States policy German popularity seemed to have soared to new heights and French stock to have fallen to an all-time low. It was evident that, unless some new and satisfactory arrangements for genuine Franco-German co-operation could be arrived at speedily, the Administration would face great difficulties in the forthcoming session of Congress. While the grounds for United States skepticism as to French intentions and capabilities were well understood by the Canadian Government and were in fact shared to some extent, nevertheless, the Canadian Government attached critical importance to the maintenance of France in the political and military coalition of the free world. Perhaps the information as to French intentions which had come to the Canadian Government was not quite as pessimistic as that received by the United States.

22. The Canadian Government was given some advance knowledge of what was contained in Mendes-France's Strasbourg speech. At the same time the Canadian representative at NATO in Paris had been assured that France accepted the necessity of German membership in NATO, and that this was an integral part of the French approach to the problem. The Canadian Government believed that both France and Germany must be part of NATO and hoped that the main feature of any substitute for the EDC would be an Atlantic feature. From the reports which it had received, the Canadian Government got the impression that Chancellor Adenauer was less than enthusiastic at the approach to the problem through the Brussels Treaty. The Chancellor seemed to be worried that United Kingdom participation in an enlarged Brussels Treaty might in fact put a ceiling on European integration in contrast to what would have been possible under the terms of the EDC Treaty.

23. The Chairman said that the United States Government had let both the German and French Governments know that the United States would support any solution arrived at in London which was acceptable to both parties. The United States preferred some formula which would provide for the admission to NATO of Germany simultaneously with her adherence to the Brussels Treaty. Time was running out for Chancellor Adenauer and if Adenauer were gone the difficulties of achieving a settlement in Europe would be increased tremendously. The Chairman would be highly pessimistic of Europe's future with a German national army rattling about in it. Yet this development could not be prevented unless something was done soon. The possibility could not be ruled out that the Soviet Union might make a dramatic move to attract the Germans. There were already groups in Germany, although they constituted

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only minority groups at the moment, who believed that they could make terms with the Russians. It was their opinion that after a relatively brief period of difficulty the German tail could wag the Russian dog. The Chairman said that while he regarded this as a completely mistaken interpretation such opinion did exist.

24. If, at the London meetings, France exercised its veto on European integration by calling for restrictions on Germany which Chancellor Adenauer could not accept, it might be necessary for the Western alliance to follow "the tactic of the vacant chair" for a time. There were alternatives, of course, and on some of these the United States had reached a large measure of agreement with the United Kingdom. It was the Chairman's personal view that the Spanish bases treaty had changed the strategic picture considerably. There were other developments in addition, the more forthcoming attitude of such Middle Eastern countries as Iran and Iraq and the Turkish-Pakistan agreement, which strengthened this personal view. These developments might make possible an alternative strategy for the defence of Europe even though it would be infinitely less satisfactory than that which had been envisaged as arising out of ratification of the EDC Treaty.

25. Mr. Leger believed that France would not agree to the Brussels Treaty formula unless the United Kingdom were more closely tied to it. Canada had never been completely convinced of the United Kingdom argument that Commonwealth responsibilities made it impossible for the United Kingdom to involve itself too closely in the defence of Europe. Canada would, in fact, welcome a closer integration of the United Kingdom in European defence if that would solve the problem of Franco-German co-operation. The Canadian Government believed that Mendes-France might be willing to stake the life of his Government on acceptance by the French parliament of any solution reached at the London meetings. There was no way to be sure, however, of this.

26. Mr. Bowie said that Mr. Eden, in his recent conversations with Mendes-France, had been assured that the latter would put a package deal to the French parliament as a matter of confidence and that the package would include acceptance of a revised Brussels Treaty, German admission to NATO and the restoration of German sovereignty. No mention had been made by Mendes-France of discriminatory restrictions against Germans.

27. The Chairman reminded the meeting that Mr. Churchill had never really believed in the EDC Treaty but had deferred, with many personal reservations, to the advice of his Cabinet on the matter. He was now, however, strongly in favour of solution of the problem through an expanded Brussels Treaty and the concurrent admission of Germany to full membership in NATO.

28. Mr. Leger was sure the Chairman would realize what special problems were created for Canada when the fate of France was under consideration and it was conceivable that Canada might not be completely in step with the United

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States and the United Kingdom in these circumstances. It was worth remembering that, no matter how low French morale might be at this moment, it was as high as ^{any} morale in Europe would be if France were excluded from full participation in the Western alliance. The influence of a neutral France over its immediate European neighbours would be tremendous, and the alternative strategy touched on by the Chairman would in fact effectively neutralize France. Such a neutralization of France would be the first step towards the neutralization of Europe. In West Germany and the Benelux countries such a development would cause extreme anxiety and bring morale to the low point at which it now stood in France. Canada would hope and expect that this situation could not be allowed to develop.

29. The Chairman appreciated these arguments fully. It was for just such reasons that the United States would negotiate with the French without any spirit of resentment. The United States Government had been shocked, not so much at the failure of EDC as it had been at the methods employed by Mendes-France. This was particularly true after the personal assurances which he had offered senior United States representatives. His actions at Brussels and before the French parliament invited rejection of the EDC. It was the United States view that he should have made a stronger effort on behalf of the Treaty even though it might still have been defeated. French actions with respect to Indo-China were equally disturbing. Mendes-France seemed to have forgotten that Indo-China existed. The United States Government knew full well the problems presented for France here as well as in Europe. On the other hand the United States had invested heavily in Indo-China, in money, in military aid and in political support. Soldiers had every right to ask United States political advisers if, in the light of recent developments in Europe and in Indo-China, France could be considered sufficiently stable as a base of operations through which the soldiers could run their major lines of communication. If no such assurance could be offered, another look at the agreed strategy for the defence of Europe might be necessary. The last war had been fought without much French support except that of the Resistance which, in any struggle with the Soviet Union would, of course, be on the other side.

30. Mr. Heeney said that it was only fair to point out the great anxiety which would be aroused in Canada and elsewhere in the alliance by any such basic revision in United States strategy for the defence of Europe. It was essential that, in spite of the justifiable impatience and disappointment which the United States and other Western Governments felt over the behaviour with respect to Europe and Indo-China of successive French Governments, every effort continue to be made to bring the French along with us. The alternative might well be the loss of whatever chance existed to have France an effective partner in any durable European alliance. And for Canada there could be no durable alliance without France.

31. The Chairman agreed that neither diplomats nor soldiers could afford the luxury of impatience. For the United States, however, immediate problems were involved.

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Vast amounts of United States funds had been spent in Indo-China, and the Administration had gone far out on a limb before Congress to support French actions in Indo-China. Both he and Admiral Radford had gone before Congressional committees to give enthusiastic support to the Navarre Plan for bringing the war in Indo-China to a successful conclusion. It had been a good plan on paper and if energetically pursued would have produced a position of strength for the French. It was not carried out energetically. If an American general had been in place of the French commander responsible for the prosecution of the Navarre Plan he would have been court-martialled. The Administration had pinned a lot of faith on the necessity and the possibility of genuine Franco-German accord. The United States security investment in Europe could not be protected by the United States alone. If the London talks failed the Administration would face real trouble in Congress. There was relatively firm agreement with the United Kingdom on what the first alternative would be. No alternatives under consideration, however, would rule out France if she were willing to participate effectively. Every alternative would be pursued, so far as the United States was concerned, with extreme caution for the Administration was acutely aware of the dangers of engendering European neutrality by any hasty actions which might seem to run counter to Europe's best interests.

32. Admiral Radford stressed the shortness of the time in which some concrete action would have to be taken. The United States had immense military commitments in Europe and he was fearful that the Pentagon could not get Congressional sanction for their continuance, unless some satisfactory evidence could be produced of a willingness on the part of Europe to assist in its own defence. The period of manoeuvre could only be until defence expenditures came before Congress early next spring.

33. Mr. Bowie stressed the United States belief that Chancellor Adenauer also had only limited time, possibly only a matter of months. He went on to say that Chancellor Adenauer was somewhat fearful that acceptance of an enlarged Brussels Treaty might lead to difficulties if the United Kingdom placed too stringent limits on the extent of its co-operation with the Treaty Group. It was possible, therefore, that the United Kingdom attitude in this context would create a problem. Canada and the United States might be able to help to prevent this problem from arising. Mr. Heeney said that Canada was looking for a satisfactory pragmatic solution to the problem and might not be as wedded to the idea of integration per se as the United States Government and Chancellor Adenauer might be.

34. Admiral Radford expressed the fear that in the effort to get a political settlement, arrangements might be agreed to which would make defence of Europe impossible.

35. General Foulkes agreed with Admiral Radford that time was an important factor. The military might have to accept something less in the way of political settlement than was desirable and it should be borne in mind that there were limits as to what political arrangements were defensible. He thought that General Gruenther at the moment was labouring under severe psychological handicaps in building the strength of NATO. The attitude of the

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red pencil was everywhere evident in the desire of governments to cut down their commitments and this psychology could well ruin the Western efforts of the last four years to build up a position of strength in Europe.

36. France could not be written off as a partner in the defence of Europe. It was essential to the plan under which General Gruenther now operated to have depth. General Foulkes could not visualize any successful tactics against Soviet forces without French real estate under our control. The state of morale in the French General Staff had always been a problem. The difficulties stemmed from the division between deGaullist and Vichy supporters. One of the main purposes of the EDC had been to attempt to revivify the French esprit de corps by throwing the French General Staff into competition with other General Staffs within the alliance. There could be no improvement in the military capabilities of the French army until the esprit of the officer corps was strengthened. No matter what the condition of the French army was at the moment, the alliance could no more do without the ten French divisions than it could do without the twelve German divisions.

37. There was a new danger arising out of the recent studies of the effects of atomic fall-out that a further wave of neutralism might soon sweep over Europe. It could be expected that the effects of fall-out would soon become better known to the public and might well engender the belief that it would be better to be a live Communist than a dead Westerner. The urgency therefore of some definitive action to weld France and Germany together in the defence of Europe could not be over-stressed.

38. The recent action of the United States Chiefs of Staff in informing NATO that no further progress could be made in capabilities studies until the German situation was clarified was but one indication of the need for urgent settlement. If it was impossible to proceed with the capabilities study NATO efforts would grind to a halt and the hard work of the post-war years would all have been in vain. The military might have to accept some unpleasant political realities but it was essential that the NATO spirit be kept alive.

39. The Chairman brought this portion of the discussion to a close with an expression of the hope that we would not have to accept a situation similar to that which Churchill had described in another day as the lowest common denominator of all our apprehensions.

Soviet Intentions and the Soviet Threat.

40. Mr. Bowie said that there had not been much change in the United States estimate of Soviet intentions since the last meeting of consultation. A summary of the latest agreed intelligence would soon be printed for

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distribution to the Canadian Government.

41. There seemed to be no prospect of major instability in the Soviet regime. Any conflicts for power or policy differences within the ruling group would probably be resolved within the confines of that group. There was no change in Soviet relations with the satellite countries. Possible friction between the Soviet Union and Communist China might develop but it was estimated that the cohesive forces in the alliance over-balanced the divisive forces. Internally it was thought that the chief emphasis would continue to be placed on heavy industry although no substantial increase in military expenditures was expected within the next year. The Soviet Union would continue to be plagued with agricultural problems. [It was estimated that the Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons would be increased. It was also estimated that there would be an increase in the capabilities of the Soviet Union to deliver nuclear weapons. There was no evidence of any likely change in Soviet policy which would make war more imminent. On the other hand, there were no signs that the Soviet Union had any intention of moderating the cold war even though it involved the continual risk of world conflict. It was not thought that the Soviet Union would be deterred by fear of the outbreak of a general war from acting to counter any moves by the free world which it considered would pose an imminent threat to Soviet security. The Soviet Union would probably remain extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest in which it would expect to be subjected to nuclear attack. The Soviet Union might estimate, however, that its increasing strength in nuclear weapons would serve to balance out the advantage formerly held by the West and leave the Soviet Union in a commanding position because of its preponderance of ground forces. The Kremlin might be led to the belief that, because of the growth of Soviet nuclear strength, there would develop an increasing reluctance on the part of the United States and its allies to risk a general war.]

42. The United Kingdom estimate of Soviet intentions was in substantial agreement with this United States estimate. Possibly the United Kingdom estimate laid greater emphasis on the prospect of a split between China and the Soviet Union. There was a tendency also in the United Kingdom estimate to place more faith on negotiation as a means to settle cold war problems.

43. Mr. Barbour suggested that Soviet tactics rather than Soviet policy might give us cause for concern. The appearance of flexibility and apparent reasonableness on the part of the Soviet Union created difficulties especially in its effect on neutralist nations. It had been discovered at Berlin, however, that when the chips were down the Soviet Union was not willing to move towards a real compromise. The Western Powers would have to continue to attempt to reveal, despite the appearance of surface reasonableness, that the Soviet Union remained committed to its long-stated policies. Mr. Heeney commented that there seemed to be no difference in the Canadian estimate of the situation.

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44. The Chairman spoke briefly of the latest Soviet explosion of a nuclear weapon and said that although detailed consideration had not yet been given to the explosion by United States authorities a few preliminary observations occurred to him. The explosion had occurred at a place where there had been no previous experiments. It occurred when other top Communist brass were visiting the Soviet Union. It might, therefore, have been a demonstration to impress the visiting satellite representatives. There was some reason to suspect, in addition, that the weapon had been a guided missile with an atomic warhead. Mr. Bryce indicated that he had heard similar opinions expressed by experts in Canada.

45. In the absence of Admiral Radford from the meeting for a few moments, the Chairman mentioned two recent actions taken by the United States Government which might be of interest to the meeting, one concerning Trieste and the other flood relief in India. The prospects for a settlement of the Trieste question looked good. It was to assist in a solution of this problem that Mr. Murphy, the Deputy Under-Secretary, had made his recent visit to Europe. He had gone to Yugoslavia as the allied spokesman for a common plan. His visit to Bonn had been merely a covering operation. Mr. Murphy's discussions with Tito were in the nature of a final bid and he got a quick and favourable decision from Tito.

46. The Chairman indicated that the United States had a week ago made a formal offer of flood relief to India on a government-to-government basis with no strings attached. It was suggested by the Indian Ambassador that the offer might be made to the Red Cross which in turn would offer aid to India. The United States Government had refused to accept this camouflage on the grounds that the Indian Government should be able to accept an act inspired only by humanitarian motives. No reply had been received as yet from the Indian Government. The Indian Ambassador at the same time had given some mild indications of Indian interest in participating in a programme for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

47. Admiral Radford then spoke of the United States estimate of the Soviet threat to North America. The one big change in the situation since the last meeting of consultation he said had been the appearance of the latest Soviet jet bombers at the Soviet air show last May Day. They seemed to indicate that the Soviet Union had given up on the development of turbo-jet planes and was concentrating on twin-engine and four-engine jets. Display of the latter suggested that the Soviet Union was progressing faster and further than the West's development of this type of aircraft. He, himself, had found it hard to believe the evidence of his experts that the Soviet Union could be so far ahead in the production of big jet aircraft. An exhaustive research was being conducted of the whole jet programme in the United States. "While it was possible that the planes which were seen at the Soviet air show were not equipped with the big engines for which they were obviously built, their appearance was very disturbing indeed. If the rate of Soviet progress of the last two years was continued over the next three years it could

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have a serious impact on the extent of the Soviet threat to North America. Except in the field of jet aircraft, there was no great change in the estimated strength, disposition and intentions of the Soviet armed forces. General Foulkes said that Admiral Radford's estimate coincided with that held by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. A discussion ensued between General Foulkes and Admiral Radford as to whether the Soviet T-31 aircraft may be used for refueling jet aircraft while in flight. Admiral Radford went on to say that it was one of the most disturbing features of the situation that in spite of the fact that the new engines must have been developed over a three or four year period there had been no advance intelligence from anywhere in the free world on the new aircraft. The Chairman added some remarks in this context which were not for the record.

Continental Defence: Report on the Mid-Canada Line.

48. General Foulkes distributed two maps to the meeting diagramming the early warning chains completed, under construction and proposed, in Canada, and went on to report on the progress on the mid-Canada line.

49. At the last meeting of consultation in March the progress in reconnaissance and planning on the early warning chain had been reported. The reconnaissance of the line had just been commenced and a joint System Engineering Group had been set up to agree on operational requirements and specifications for equipment and actual siting of the stations. At that time he had expressed the hope that the chain would be in operation by the end of 1956. In spite of increased difficulties of physical siting and of differences of technical views it was still the hope of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that the line would be in operation by late 1956. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff had produced an estimate of costs on the line in July and the Canadian Government had decided to proceed with the chain as a Canadian project. The Canadian Government had seen advantages in one authority for the line in that decisions could be arrived at more expeditiously. The work had been placed with one contractor. Sooner or later a decision had to be taken to stop development and get into production and it was thought that this decision could be taken easier if only one authority was involved. Some arbitrary decisions have had to be taken by the Canadian Chiefs but the chain will meet the operational requirements of both air forces.

50. The reconnaissance was now finished and detailed maps were being prepared. The engineering studies had been completed and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had settled on the type of early warning network to be employed. Five plans for linking the line on the east and west coasts with the seaward extensions were now before the USAF. The material for construction of the stations would be stockpiled this winter by tractor train and actual construction would commence in the spring. A test section was being

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assembled for final trials of equipment. The siting of the line was such that as and when improvements were made, new equipment could be installed.

51. Four systems had been studied:
- (a) The Mark I Doppler System of two lines with stations 35 miles apart and the lines two miles apart.
 - (b) The Mark II Doppler System in line with inverted stations giving the same results as two lines of stations. These were supplemented by identification radios at the gates of most heavy traffic.
 - (c) A composite line consisting of the Mark II Doppler System with radios every 120 miles, and finally,
 - (d) The Lincoln Composite System consisting of a single line of radios 100 miles apart with low cover provided by the Doppler System.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff had decided on September 21 that the Mark II Doppler System would be used. It gave cover from 200 to 60,000 feet. It was less susceptible to false alarm from birds. It was cheaper to construct and operate and it could be operated with teletype communication. It would require the disciplining of civilian flying in peacetime which was felt to be essential in easing the strain of wartime identification.

52. General Foulkes indicated that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had been somewhat concerned with the gap in early warning which existed between Labrador and Greenland. At present there would be only five to ten minutes early warning for the important United States bases in Newfoundland. Admiral Radford indicated that no firm answer could be given at the moment as to what was regarded as practical in this respect by the United States Chiefs of Staff but indicated that the matter was under intensive study.

Press Release on the Distant Early Warning Line.

53. Agreement was reached on the wording of the proposed joint announcement by the two Governments with respect to the agreement in principle between them on the need for construction of the distant early warning line across the far northern part of North America. The Canadian draft statement with one change suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff was accepted and it was agreed that the release should be made at noon on September 27.

Revised Weapons System.

54. General Foulkes said that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had been giving some thought to the problem of re-appraisal of continental defence in the light of the rather meagre information which had been made available to them regarding the effects of atomic fall-out. It had to be assumed that sooner or later the Russians would have accumulated as much information on fall-out as is

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available to our side. Mention of fall-out had already been made in Pravda and it had to be assumed that some day the Russians would realize the advantages of the discovery for them. This could have a very serious effect on the joint arrangements between Canada and the United States for the defence of North America. It might mean that the Russians would need fewer bombers to accomplish the same task of neutralization than they required earlier. The permissible error of weapon delivery was greatly increased and might therefore reduce the need for highly skilled bomb-aimers and for accurate blind-bombing radar equipment. These two factors together, that is, smaller requirements of bombs and aircraft and the reduction in requirements of skilled personnel and technicians, might bring the Soviet Union to believe that it had sufficient potential to conduct a crippling attack on the United States retaliatory capacity. This realization might advance the date on which the Soviet Union would be prepared to risk a third world war. Reduction in the permissible error of weapon delivery might affect the schedule of inter-continental weapons. Many of the problems of propulsion and guidance of inter-continental weapons would be simplified if the fall-out effect of atomic weapons was taken into consideration. If this theory was substantiated, it might be possible for the Russians to move ahead the development of inter-continental weapons now estimated for the period between 1960 and 1962 to perhaps 1959 to 1960. Western calculations on Russian achievements in the aeronautics and thermo-nuclear fields have been in error in the past and this might prove to be the case with respect to inter-continental weapons. These factors taken together have led the Canadian Chiefs of Staff to believe that a re-appraisal of joint plans for continental defence taking into consideration the effect of atomic fall-out was urgently required.

55. The problem of the speed of Soviet development of new weapons had serious implications for both Canada and the United States but particularly for Canada, especially if the present arrangements for development and production of its own air defence weapons was to be continued. Even the present situation gave some cause for alarm. In 1946 the Canadian Government had taken a decision to develop an all-weather fighter aircraft for continental defence. Its specifications were written to meet the threat of the TU-4. It took until 1954 to put this aircraft into Canadian fighter squadrons. By the end of 1954 a fairly reasonable defence could be provided, therefore, against the TU-4. However, the Russian introduction of the Type-37 and Type-39 aircraft, if the assessment of the experts regarding these aircraft was correct, made inadequate the CF-100 aircraft which was just being delivered to Canadian squadrons. It was thought to be as much as 5,000 feet short of the T-39's ceiling. Last year the Canadian Government took a decision to produce a successor to this aircraft and the specifications were drawn up before there was any knowledge of the T-37. It was not expected to be available for squadron use much before 1960. If the Russians, therefore, were able to

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produce sufficient T-37 aircraft to attack North America before 1960 there would be nothing capable of dealing with the threat. Furthermore, if inter-continental weapons such as the ballistic rocket were developed by 1960 even the new Canadian fighter aircraft could not deal with them.

56. General Foulkes said that he mentioned these difficulties to emphasize the need for more positive joint action in preparing to meet the new threat, in which in the opinion of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff there was no time for unilateral development of new weapons. There was some doubt, in addition, as to whether there was sufficient scientific technical ability available in Canada to go ahead in these more advanced fields of air defence weapons. He said he was speaking now of sophisticated types of air-to-air and ground-to-air guided missiles with atomic warheads. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff considered that the stage was rapidly being reached where the development of a suitable weapons system for the defence of North America had to be a joint operation in almost every aspect. General Foulkes said he was well aware that the suggestion raised many technical, legal and political obstacles. On the other hand he believed that if the obstacles were not surmounted our joint survival might be in danger. General Foulkes made four suggestions as to how the problem might be attacked:

- (a) There should be a joint study to define clearly the effects of fall-out. This would have to be a scientific study and would raise security difficulties under United States regulations.
- (b) After the effect of fall-out had been defined clearly enough for the military to understand it there should be a study of the effect of fall-out on the plans for the defence of North America.
- (c) When the effects of fall-out on joint plans for the defence of North America were considered the weapons system should be re-examined in the light of the considerations which had been arrived at in the first two studies, and,
- (d) There should be a further study to find a joint approach to the implementation of the revised weapons system.

57. General Foulkes said that it would not be enough to meet the problem for the United States to assume the responsibility of developing the weapons system and then providing Canada with the weapons. An aircraft industry had been developed in Canada for defensive purposes which could not be abandoned. Purchase from the United States of the bulk of the weapons to be used by Canadian forces would soon cause serious financial problems for Canada. If the full support of the Canadian people was to be

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achieved the matter would have to be put to them as a joint effort. Finally if Canadian forces were to operate the new weapons then Canadian technicians and scientists should take part in their development and the Canadian defence industries should take some part in their production.

58. The Chairman said that his personal reaction to the suggestions made by General Foulkes was favourable. He thought that if the suggestions were raised formally with the United States Government it would be possible to remove any security barriers which exist. Admiral Radford agreed with the Chairman and suggested that the matter might be raised in the P.J.B.D.

59. General Foulkes and Mr. Heeney thought that the Chiefs of Staff channel might be a better channel to use to initiate the approach. After some discussion it was agreed that the matter should be raised with Admiral Radford in a letter from General Foulkes.

60. In the course of the discussion Mr. Bryce underlined the concern of the Canadian Government with the future of the Canadian aircraft industry. He said, in addition, that it had been extremely difficult to convince Ministers of the Canadian Government that there was no alternative to Canadian development of the supersonic aircraft.

61. The Chairman said that while he would not wish to minimize the difficulties of implementing the suggestions made by General Foulkes, he thought that something could be worked out. The problem of gaining Congressional sanction for United States co-operation with the United Kingdom on intelligence matters had seemed equally difficult at first but after some convincing Congress had decided to "interpose no objections" to the exchange of information.

62. Some brief attention was devoted to next steps so far as the distant early warning line was concerned. It was agreed on both sides that current progress on the planning of the line was completely satisfactory.

63. Mr. Leger said that, as the United States representatives knew, Canada had reluctantly accepted the invitation offered by the Geneva Conference powers to serve on the International Supervisory Commissions in Indo-China. Much of the time of the Commissions so far had been taken up with necessary administrative arrangements. The Canadian Government would, however, make every effort to keep United States authorities informed of any important developments of substance arising out of the work of the Commissions. He said that so far the Polish members had not caused any difficulties.

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64. Admiral Radford informed the group that since the last meeting of consultation a unified command for continental defence had been established within the United States services. It was expected that this re-organization would assist in the speedier handling of matters connected with continental defence.

65. The meeting ended with expressions from both sides of the value of meetings such as this.

Washington, D.C.
October 1, 1954.

Defence Liaison (1) W.H.Barton/jt

TOP SECRET

50219-A	E-40
6	50

Ottawa, October 1, 1954.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Dear General Foulkes,

Meeting of Consultation

Attached is copy No. 2 of Despatch No. 1687 of September 27, 1954, from our Ambassador in Washington reporting on the Meeting of Consultation which was held in Washington on September 24 and which you attended.

2. In view of Mr. Campney's absence from the city I have not referred a copy of the Despatch to him. You might wish to show him your copy on his return.

Yours sincerely,
M. H. WERSHOP

FOR THE

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

General C. Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D.,
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Department of National Defence,
"A" Building,
O t t a w a.

Defence Liaison (1) W. H. Barton/jt

TOP SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Ottawa, September 30, 1954.

Secretary to the Cabinet,
Privy Council Office,
East Block,
O t t a w a.

50219-AE-40	
6	50

Meeting of Consultation

Attached is copy No. 3 of Despatch No. 1687 of September 27, 1954, from our Ambassador in Washington reporting on the Meeting of Consultation which was held in Washington on September 24 and which you attended.

2. In view of the interest of the Prime Minister in the subject matter of the meeting you might wish to show your copy of the despatch to him.

M. H. WERSHOF

FOR THE

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

COPY NUMBER 7

Refer

~~Sec/Cabinet Copy 3~~
~~Min of Nat Defence~~
CCOS - Copy 2 } Done wmb

File wmb

Ext.

OTTAWA FILE
No. 50219 AE-40

Despatch No. 1687
Date. September 27, 1954.

Seen by USSEA

50 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, WASHINGTON, D.C.
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....

Subject: Meeting of Consultation.....

The meeting of consultation between Canadian and United States officials took place on Friday, September 24. You will remember that it has been the practice for each side to keep its own records of these meetings and then to compare the two records so that no glaring inconsistencies exist. It will be some time before we are in a position to forward our record of the meeting to you.

2. The main topics dealt with at the meeting were (a) the situation on the China coast and at Quemoy, (b) Europe after EDC, (c) Soviet intentions and the Soviet threat to North America, and (d) continental defence.

3. Discussion of the Communist Chinese threat to Quemoy and Formosa confirmed the estimate which we have sent you in other correspondence that no final decision has been taken by the United States Government as to whether United States forces should assist in the direct defence of Quemoy. Admiral Radford made one point which was new to us and that had to do with the possibility that current Communist Chinese attacks on Quemoy might well be a covering operation for a planned attack on the Tachen Islands further to the north which were not, and could not be, nearly as well defended by Nationalist forces. Admiral Radford said that an anxious eye was being kept on this possibility by both Nationalist Chinese and United States authorities. Bedell Smith spoke in more general terms of United States policy towards Communist China and the burden of his remarks was that if it were not for the strong views on China held in Congress the Administration's policy could be a good deal more flexible. He believed that Mr. Atlee had rendered a real service to the United States and other Western Powers by his decision to accompany Bevan to Communist China and by the report which he had made on the trip. Bedell Smith said that it was not without the bounds of possibility that in the relatively near future United States public opinion might be brought around to accepting the necessity of admitting Communist China to membership in the General Assembly. He saw little hope, however, that the United States could agree to Communist Chinese membership on the Security Council and he thought that some attention

Copies Referred To.....

No. of Enclosures.....

Post File No.....

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would have to be given to how this situation could be dealt with. Incidentally, these remarks obviously horrified Walter Robertson, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs who attended the meeting.

4. Discussion of the failure of the French to ratify the EDC Treaty and of the subsequent problems raised with respect to German re-armament and the possible admission of Germany to NATO confirmed our impression that the French stock is at an all-time low among senior officials of the United States Government both civilian and military. The Under-Secretary and I, without minimizing in any way the difficulties which the current French attitude posed for the United States and other members of the Western alliance, made every effort to impress our United States colleagues with the Canadian view that there was no alternative to French participation in the defence of Europe. Bedell Smith assured us that in spite of French actions in the recent past both with respect to European problems and Indo-China, the United States representatives would go to the nine-power meetings in London with an open mind and would be prepared to accept any formula which would be satisfactory to both Germany and France. Quoting Mr. Churchill's words of another day Bedell Smith expressed the hope that at London we would not have to be satisfied with "the lowest common denominator of all our apprehensions".

5. In spite of his assurances concerning the open-minded approach of United States representatives to the London meetings, Bedell Smith went on to stress that in the United States view time was running out for Chancellor Adenauer. He said that if at the London meetings there could not be found a formula for Franco-German co-operation in the defence of Europe the Western alliance "might have to follow the tactic of the vacant chair" for a time and there was no doubt that in Bedell Smith's mind the vacant chair would be that which France could not or would not occupy. It was his "personal view" that the Spanish bases treaty had changed the strategic picture in Europe significantly. It was possible he thought that attention would have to be given to an alternative strategy for the defence of Europe which would be "infinitely less satisfactory" than the strategy which would have been based on the EDC Treaty had France ratified it.

6. There was little new in the United States estimate of Soviet intentions or in Admiral Radford's appreciation of the Soviet threat to North America. So far as continental defence was concerned agreement was reached on the issuance of a press release by the two governments with respect to the distant early warning line. Your draft text was accepted with one alteration (our telegram No. WA-1682 of September 25). Bedell Smith and Admiral Radford were quick to agree that General Foulkes' suggestions concerning a truly joint approach to a North American weapons system should be brought up formally for consideration by the United States Joint

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Chiefs of Staff. They indicated that, in spite of the real difficulties which would arise for the United States because of security regulations, some solution to these difficulties could be achieved.

7. This will be the last meeting of consultation under the chairmanship of Bedell Smith and we note this fact with deep regret. There is no doubt that he is one of the ablest United States officials we are ever likely to come in contact with. Furthermore he has been particularly well disposed to Canada. He is to continue on in an advisory capacity to the Administration but I am sure his departure from day to day contact with the policies of the United States Government will become apparent. We can only hope that his successor in the position of Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., who attended this meeting, was impressed with the degree of frankness with which Bedell Smith conducted the meeting and will follow that practice when he presides at the next meeting of consultation.

D. P. Hurley

50219-AE-40
93. SD

OUTGOING

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST,
..... WASHINGTON, D. C.

Message To Be Sent
AIR CYPHER
EN CLAIR
CODE
CYPHER *Auto*
XXX

No. *EX 1715* Date September 20, 1954

For Communications Section Only
~~SECRET~~ - SEP 20 1954

REFERENCE: Your WA-1609 of September 16, 1954.

SUBJECT: Meetings of Consultation.

Priority
..... IMPORTANT... *mw*

ORIGINATOR
.....
(Signature)
.. W. H. Barton
(Name Typed)
Div.. D.L.(1)/jt
Local Tel... 7509

APPROVED BY
M. Densho
.....
(Signature)
.....
(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:
S. S. E. A. - U. S. S. E. A.

Done... *J. G. L.*
Date... *Sept 21/54*

Copies Referred To:

Mr. Bryce

Done... *J. J.*
Date... *Sept 20/54*

FOLLOWING FROM THE UNDER-SECRETARY
Bryce and I have decided to go to
Washington on the Colonial Air Lines "Eagle"
plane leaving here at 3.15 p.m. Thursday after-
noon and arriving at Washington at 6.30 p.m.
Please make hotel reservations for Bryce at the
Shoreham for Thursday and Friday. Foulkes is
going to Washington on Wednesday and we under-
stand a hotel reservation has already been made
for him.

2. Thank you very much for your invita-
tion to me to stay with you and to come to the
dinner on the evening of the twenty-fourth. I
accept both of these invitations with pleasur

3. Bryce plans to return to Ottawa b
Colonial on Saturday morning. I propose to
in Washington until Saturday evening, return
to Ottawa by the evening train.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNA

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

RECEIVED
EXTRADITION
AFFAIRS

SEP 20 12:47

Defence Liaison (1) W. H. Barton/jt

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

File with

TO: The Under-Secretary.....

Security .TOP..SECRET.....

Date...September. 20,..1954.

FROM: Defence Liaison (L) Division.....

File No.		
50219-AE-49		
6		6

REFERENCE:

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVERT A SECRET**

SUBJECT: Meetings of Consultation.....

As background information for your meeting in Washington on September 24, I thought it might be useful to you to have a brief account of the origins of the Meetings of Consultation. In January 1951, the United States Department of State, on behalf of the Defence Department, approached the Canadian Ambassador in Washington for a "canopy agreement" which would give blanket approval for the deployment of certain weapons over Canadian territory and at United States bases in Canada, subject to routine flight clearances through U.S.A.F.-R.C.A.F. channels. In return for the granting of such permission, the Department of State undertook to hold frequent discussions with the Department of External Affairs on the developments in the international situation which might give rise to the necessity for the use of atomic weapons.

2. The Canadian Government, in reply, accepted the offer to participate in discussions on the world political situation, but stated that the deployment of special weapons would have to be considered, case by case, at the government-to-government level. It undertook to seek to answer any such requests promptly. The substance of this reply was covered by an "agreed Minute" which was exchanged informally between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Pearson at a meeting in Washington in June, 1951.

3. The political discussions referred to above were initiated in February, 1951, and have been held intermittently since that time. The United States carries on similar consultations with the United Kingdom Ambassador, but has resisted suggestions that they might be conducted on a tripartite basis


20.9.35/05

- 2 -

on the ground that they might be misunderstood by the French. The United States has been aware that except on matters of Continental Defence, the United Kingdom and Canadian Ambassadors have followed the practice of comparing notes subsequent to such meetings. The State Department has indicated that it does not object to this.

4. Previous to the meeting held in March, 1954 (which was the first since the Republican Administration took office) the discussions had tended to be generalized, touching superficially on trouble spots all over the world. The March, 1954 Meeting, for the first time, dealt with a subject of direct and immediate importance to Canada, i.e. continental defence.

5. I am attaching the file with the record of the March 1954 meeting (see Flag "A"). You may wish to read it over prior to your visit to Washington.


Defence Liaison (1) Division.

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

file WRB

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification	
SECRET	
File No.	
50219-AE-40	
6	50

Priority IMPORTANT	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-1618	Date September 17, 1954.
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Departmental
Circulation

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD'N
SECTION

Done ~~done-comms-section~~

Date SEP 17 54

Reference: Our WA-1609 of September 16, 1954.

Subject: Meetings of consultation.

The United States representatives at the meeting will be Bedell Smith, Hoover, Radford, Merchant, Walter Robertson, Bowie, and perhaps one or two others.

2. There is provisional agreement that the three main subjects to be discussed should be:

- (a) Quemoy and the China Coast.
- (b) Problem resulting from the failure of EDC.
- (c) Continental defence.

3. We have hinted that a comprehensive tour d'horizon would be time-consuming and that while there may well be subjects which would come up as related to these three main headings, we would hope that the discussion could be mainly confined to them.

4. This appeared as satisfactory to the State Department officials we spoke to, subject to confirmation by Bedell Smith.

5. We assume that on the first two subjects, the Americans would lead off and that on the third, there would be a discussion (the extent of which would depend on the time remaining) of the threat and the means of defence. While it has not been mentioned, it seems likely that the United States members of the meeting might wish to discuss DEW.

References

Done

Date

Ext. 230 (rev. 10/53)

12.9.35(US)

CLEARED
COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 SEP 17 PM 1:40

INCOMING MESSAGE

File
WMS

ORIGINAL

FROM:

THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification	
SECRET	
File No.	
50219-AE-40	
6	50

Priority IMPORTANT	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-1609	Date September 16, 1954
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Departmental Circulation
MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD'N
SECTION

Done _____
Date SEP 17 '54

Reference: Telephone conversations with the Under-Secretary September 15 and 16.

Subject: Meetings of Consultation.

As you know, the suggestion arising out of my conversation with the Under-Secretary of State on September 14 that a meeting be held has resulted in the afternoon of Friday, September 24 being fixed for this purpose.

2. Bedell Smith is anxious to give a lunch before the meeting for the two new Under-Secretaries. This would include Foulkes and Bryce as well as Leger and two or three of us from the Embassy; also Radford and the principal people taking part in the meeting on the United States side. It would be at one o'clock at Blair House and we would proceed directly afterward to the State Department for the meeting.

3. After my conversation this morning with Leger I am confirming the date of the meeting and accepting the invitation to lunch.

4. It is important that the Canadian participants should go over the matters likely to be discussed before we meet the Americans. I suggest, therefore, that Foulkes, Leger and Bryce should be available for a meeting at the Embassy not later than eleven a.m. September 24. This will mean that the Ottawa party would have to fly down the preceding day unless they come very early the Friday morning by special aircraft.

5. Glazebrook will be discussing with Hayden Raynor this afternoon the agenda and procedure for the meeting and we shall be sending you a telegram on this tomorrow with any suggestions we may have. Thereafter we shall expect to receive from you any comments or further proposals you may have. This should be, it seems to me, a good opportunity for probing informally into United States thinking, and I hope we shall be able to contribute something ourselves.

6. What about hotel accommodation for Foulkes and Bryce? I am hoping that Leger will stay with me and come to the men's dinner which I am having on Friday night the 24th for Mr. Walter Harris (black tie).

References

Done _____

Date _____

17.9.7(us)

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 SEP 17 AM 8:51

Defence Liaison (1)/W.H.Barton/jf

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REQUIET A SECRET

TOP SECRET

File No. 50219-AE-40

Ottawa, March 16, 1954.

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,
Department of National Defence,
"A" Building,
Ottawa, Ontario.

50219-AE-40
6 50

United States-Canada Meeting of Consul-
tation on March 4, 1954

I am enclosing for your attention a copy of despatch No. 440 of March 9, 1954 and two copies of the report of the meeting of consultation between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments, held on Thursday, March 4, 1954. I should be grateful if you would show this despatch and the enclosure to Mr. Claxton, if you think he would wish to see them.

R. A. MACKAY

Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

INCOMING MESSAGE

COPY

Original on 50209-40

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

S E C R E T

File No.

50219-AE-40

50 50

Priority IMPORTANT	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-414	Date March 11, 1954.
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Departmental Circulation

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD 'N
SECTION

Reference: Our WA-412 of March 11.

Subject: Public statement on continental defence.

This telegram contains excerpts from representative Cole's letter of March 5, to the State Department which is mentioned in our telegram under reference. You will note the forthright views put forward by representative Cole and will appreciate the difficulties for the State Department in framing a suitable reply.

2. Representative Cole stated that he would "appreciate a report on the status of our negotiations with Canada concerning the establishment of an early warning line for continental defence". He went on to indicate his growing concern over the weakness of United States continental defence in light of the known capabilities of the Soviet Union for atomic attack. "I, therefore, deem it of the highest importance that we quickly come to an agreement with the Canadian Government on an early warning line and then take all steps necessary to make this line operational."

3. Representative Cole indicated that he appreciated the difficulty and complexity of inter-governmental negotiations on matters of such importance. He continued "I understand we have so far failed to reach an agreement with Canada on how the responsibility for manning and equipping such a line would be divided". The letter is concluded with the following sentence "I am frankly not now satisfied in my own mind that we are attacking them (the problems of negotiation) with the full sense of urgency they merit. I urge that all possible priority be given to the negotiations with Canada and that we do everything in our power to bring these negotiations to a speedy and satisfactory close."

Done _____

Date _____

References

Done _____

Date _____

INCOMING MESSAGE

COPY

Original on 50209-40

FROM:
THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification
S E C R E T
File No.
<i>50219-AE-40</i>
<i>50 50</i>

Priority IMPORTANT	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-413	Date March 11, 1954.
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Departmental Circulation

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/GO-ORD 'N
SECTION

Date _____

Reference: Our WA-412 of March 11.

Subject: Public statement on continental defence.

The following is the text of the State Department draft reply to representative Cole, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, which is mentioned in our telegram under reference. It bears the State Department security classification "secret". Text begins:

My dear Mr. Cole:

Reference is made to your letter dated March 5, 1954, the receipt of which has been acknowledged by telephone, regarding our negotiations with Canada concerning the establishment of an early warning line for continental defense.

This matter is one which, as you know, has been receiving the constant attention of all the interested departments within the United States Government, with a view to determining what actions may be necessary to improve our continental defense against air attack. The United States is in close and continuous consultation with the Canadian Government on this and on all phases of defense. When the Canadian Prime Minister visited the United States in May of 1953, he explored various proposals with the President. Again when President Eisenhower visited Ottawa in November of 1953 continental defense was foremost amongst the subjects discussed, and complete agreement was reached between the two governments on the need for effective measures against air attack. Since that time I have been giving this matter my close personal attention in various stages of discussion with the Canadians.

The Permanent Joint Board of Defense, United States-Canada, which is the primary organization for the consideration and recommendation of joint measures for the defense of the two countries keeps the progress on this important matter under continuous and searching review.

The cooperation received from the Canadian Government has been prompt and effective. Action has already

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References

Date _____

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been initiated by the RCAF and by the USAF which are the agencies of the two governments charged with the responsibility of carrying out the necessary construction and operation of a sub-Arctic early warning line. Preliminary surveys are going forward on the ground and studies are proceeding with all priority with a view to selecting the necessary types of equipment and communications. I may say that all aspects of this important project are going forward with the sense of urgency which they merit, and with all practicable dispatch consistent with orderly planning and sound administration. There are, of course, many problems in arranging a cooperative project of such magnitude where many agencies of two governments are involved. I assure you that these problems are being solved in a spirit of the utmost frankness and harmony, and I am confident that arrangements will be made which are completely satisfactory to both governments. In addition, studies are being pressed forward with respect to a more distant early warning line in the Canadian Arctic. These investigations, designed to determine the feasibility, have not yet been completed.

I shall appreciate it if you will maintain the above-mentioned information in confidence for the present in view of the need for security and in the light of our continuing discussions with the Canadians. It is expected that the two governments will in the near future be able to issue a joint public statement, outlining the progress which has been made towards the establishment of an early warning line. I am sure you are already familiar with the extensive radar installations in Canada which have been completed or are in the process of construction under previous agreements with the Canadian Government.

Your interest in writing is much appreciated. I can assure you that this department is fully aware of the necessity and the vital importance of taking necessary measures for continental defense.

Sincerely yours,

Acting Secretary.

Text ends.

INCOMING MESSAGE

Original on 50209-40

COPY

FROM:

THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification	
SECRET	
File No.	
50219-AE-4	
52	52

Priority	System	No.	Date
IMPORTANT	CYPHER-AUTO	WA-412	March 11, 1954

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC A/UNDER/SEC'S

POL/CO-ORD'N SECTION

Reference: Our telegram WA-397 of March 10.

Subject: Public Statement on Continental Defence.

Raynor, Director of the State Department's office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, gave us, late on March 10 a draft of a possible State Department reply to representative Cole's letter mentioned in our telegram under reference. The text of the draft reply is included in a following telegram. In addition, Raynor let us take notes on representative Cole's letter itself and these are contained in a separate following telegram.

2. Raynor emphasized that the draft reply has been cleared only to his level in the State Department. He has reason to believe that it will be satisfactory to the joint chiefs. It has not, however, been seen yet by more senior officers in the State Department or the Department of Defence. The draft, therefore, must be regarded as a preliminary one even though Raynor did not anticipate any serious objection to it by his superiors.

3. Raynor said that because our two governments were cooperating so closely in the joint effort to improve the defences of the continent, and since representative Cole's letter dealt primarily with that joint effort, the State Department thought it was only reasonable and courteous that Canadian comments on the reply be sought. The State Department would like to know whether the Canadian authorities would have any serious objections, either to the substance of the draft reply or to the method of answering representative Cole's query.

4. We said that, of course, the draft would have to be seen in Ottawa before any Canadian comment could be offered on it. We told Raynor that we thought it would be possible to get informal Canadian comments on the draft at the official level but we did not think it likely that the formal concurrence of the Canadian Government would be forthcoming. We expressed the view that you would probably wish to have every precaution taken that the letter sent to representative Cole could not be regarded in any sense as the product of joint authorship. The letter was after all a request by a United States Congressional Representative for information, as to what the United States was doing to advance the cause of better continental defence and concerned the Canadian Government only indirectly. Raynor seemed to appreciate these points.

Date

References

Date

- 2 -

5. You may be interested in a few of our preliminary comments on the draft reply. In general terms it strikes us that the draft reply is so vaguely phrased as not to constitute too great a problem so far as Canadian interests are concerned. This vagueness leads us to wonder whether representative Cole will be satisfied with a reply along these lines. Even with this general view in mind, we believe certain improvements in the text, from our point of view, could be made. The reference in the last sentence of the fourth paragraph to the attention being given to the more distant early warning line may cause some concern. It may be possible, in addition, to improve on the drafting of the two preceding sentences which deal with the difficulties "in arranging a co-operative project of such magnitude". These sentences suggest that the problems of principles between governments. Some balance might be added if reference were made to difficulties and delays caused by the purely technical problems which must be solved before any early warning line can be established. In the fifth paragraph reference is made to the possible issuance of a joint public statement by the two governments on the progress in establishing an early warning line. I believe that the references made to this matter in the recent meeting of consultation were in more general terms and not related to any particular warning line. I am not certain, in addition, that in the thought which you have given to this matter you have considered the issuance of a joint statement. You may simply have had in mind an agreed statement.

6. As we suggested in our telegram under reference representative Cole's query seems to us to increase the urgency of some public announcement being made by the Canadian and United States Governments concerning improvements in continental defence. It would obviously be much more desirable that a progress report on Canadian activities be made public by Canadian authorities than through congressional leaks of information. Raynor told us he is certain that Bedell Smith holds the same view.

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7. The State Department is under compulsion to reply promptly to congressional enquiries and have, therefore, expressed the hope that we will be able to offer Canadian comment by Monday, March 15, at the latest. I would be grateful, therefore, if you could let us have your instructions as to:

- (A) Whether views should be expressed to the State Department on the draft reply to Cole;
 - (B) If so, what those views should be;
 - (C) Whether they should be made under conditions, e.g. that no reference be made to any Canadian consultation;
 - (D) Whether these views should be defined, e.g. as informal and official (without ministerial sanction?)
-

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

COPY OF 23 COPIES.

FROM: *File*
 THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.
Copy on 50209-40
 TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification
TOP SECRET
File No.
50219-AE-40
57 50

Priority	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-397	Date March 10, 1954. <i>g-3</i>
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Departmental Circulation
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 UNDER/SEC 3
 D/UNDER/SEC 4
 A/UNDER/SEC'S 5
 POL/CO-ORD'N 6
 SECTION 7

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one ~~DOE~~-COMM'S SECTION

Reference:
Subject: Meeting of consultation, March 4,-- Public statement on continental defence.

Following for the Acting Under-Secretary, Begins:

You will remember the discussion at the meeting of consultation with United States authorities on March 4 concerning the desirability of the issuance of a public statement or a press release on the progress of joint Canadian-United States efforts to strengthen the defences of the continent.

2. Our record of the meeting of consultation, which we should be able to send you in the next few days, contains two references to the discussion on this point. The first reads, "The Chairman suggested that the possible issuance of a press release (on continental defence) might be considered by the Canadian and United States authorities." The second reference reads, "The meeting ended with agreement on both sides that no mention of these meetings of consultation should be made in any public statement but that responsible authorities in both countries might be asked to cooperate in the preparation of a draft press release or public statement concerning the progress of installations for continental defence."

3. While a comparison of the Canadian and United States records of the meeting was being made at the State Department on March 9, Raynor informed us of a development which suggests that early attention should be given to the release of some information on the work being done with respect to continental defence. He said that the State Department had received a letter from representative Cole, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, asking why more was not being done to improve continental defences. The State Department had been unsuccessful in attempting to convince representative Cole to delay the sending of his letter. Some reply would have to be sent to him in the very near future.

11 MAR 1954

References
 Min. of Nat Def
 CCOS - 5 copies
 American Div
 DL (2)
Done 11/3/54 pt.

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4. No final decision has been reached in the State Department as to what reply should be sent to representative Cole. It is possible, however, that within a day or two a draft of the State Department reply will be shown to us. It is not clear whether the State Department will seek Canadian concurrence to their reply. If that should be the case, we shall consult you before offering any Canadian comments on the letter.

5. Raynor was of the opinion, with which I agree, that the sooner some agreed public announcement is made by the Canadian and United States Governments concerning improvements in continental defence the less difficulties will be caused our governments. No matter what security classification is given to the State Department's reply, the danger always exists of a congressional leak. You may also have some draft statement in mind which you could send us for discussion with United States authorities. Ends.

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 MAR 11 AM 9:12

FILE COPY TOP SECRET

Report of the Meetings of Consultation
Between Representatives of the Canadian
and United States Governments held on
Thursday, March 4, 1954.

The meeting which was held in the State Department under the Chairmanship of General Walter Bedell Smith, the Acting Secretary of State was attended by

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff,
The Honourable John A. Hannah, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel),
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under-Secretary of State,
Mr. Robert Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, and State Department representative on the National Security Council Planning Board,
Mr. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, State Department,
Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs to the Secretary of State,

for the United States Government, and by

Mr. A.D.P. Heeney, Canadian Ambassador to the United States,
General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff,
Mr. R. A. MacKay, Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Mr. R. B. Bryce, Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet,
Mr. G. P. deT. Glazebrook, Minister, Canadian Embassy,
Rear Admiral H. G. DeWolf, Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington,
Mr. J. J. McCardle, Canadian Embassy,

for the Canadian Government.

2. The agenda of the meeting consisted of two items,

- (a) review of the Berlin Conference and its implications respecting the United States estimate of Soviet intentions,
- (b) the new U.S. military strategy and its implications, particularly regarding continental defence.

Introduction

3. The Chairman opened the meeting by referring to a conversation which he had been having with General

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Foulkes as to the desirability of issuing some public statement by the Canadian and United States Governments outlining the progress which had so far been made in the building up of the defences of the continent. He suggested that any such public announcement should be drafted with a view to anticipating criticisms that not enough was being done in this vital field. The Chairman suggested that the possible issuance of a press release might be considered by Canadian and United States authorities.

4. The Chairman then went on to mention the various and important demands on the time of senior officers of the State Department. He indicated that it now seemed likely that Mr. Dulles would have to remain in Caracas at the current meeting of the Organization of American States for a longer period of time than had been anticipated, probably until the fate of certain proposals which would constitute a political Monroe Doctrine against the international Communist conspiracy was decided. He said that the United States, while it had not outlawed the Communist party, was well aware of the infiltration which had been achieved in the Western Hemisphere by the agents of international Communism. In the circumstances, therefore, Mr. Dulles would probably stay only a short time at the Geneva Conference and Bedell Smith would remain there indefinitely as Head of the United States delegation.

5. The Chairman, referring to the Berlin Conference, said that it had been quite impossible to resist French pressures for discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Conference which had been agreed on at Berlin, although it was recognized by the three Western Foreign Ministers that such a discussion was not without grave danger. In Indo-China the Navarre Plan was being implemented successfully. French military authorities were confident of eventual victory in Indo-China. However the press had over-played the "real estate" victories of the enemy, and this press coverage, together with other factors, had made it difficult to refuse a high-level discussion of the situation in Indo-China. The Navarre Plan would not come to full flower this fighting season. The plan envisioned the development of 54 native battalions by the end of this year and further battalions next year which would constitute a satisfactory posture of strength vis-a-vis the enemy. The French military authorities, he said, were now convinced, as they had not been in the past, of the fighting quality of properly trained native battalions.

6. The Chairman said that the United States Government was fully aware that great pressure for a negotiated settlement in Indo-China would develop at Geneva, before the necessary strength was built up to permit acceptance of a sound solution of the problem. The whole subject was under the most intensive study within the United States Government and the problem of what attitude the United States would eventually take was as yet unsolved. The idea of agreement to a

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coalition government in Indo-China would appear tempting at Geneva but so far as the United States was concerned was unacceptable since it would be the beginning of the end of anti-Communist rule in Indo-China. The military authorities of the United States Government regarded any artificial division of the country as completely unacceptable especially since there was no fixed line of battle as there had been in Korea. The Chairman indicated that the United States Government would be grateful for any views the Canadian Government might wish to present on the matter.

Berlin Conference.

7. Mr. Bowie presented the conclusions of the United States Government on Soviet intentions as they had been revealed at the Berlin Conference.

8. The European objective of the Soviets had been revealed as an unshakeable intention to maintain the present Soviet military and political position in Germany and Austria at all costs. This determination was especially evident with respect to the Austrian Peace Treaty. The concessions offered by the three Western Foreign Ministers and by the Austrian authorities, although generous in the extreme, had no effect on the Soviet position. Molotov argued that no Austrian Peace Treaty was possible because of the imminence of EDC and the resultant possibility of an anschluss. United States authorities regarded his arguments on this score as completely insincere and simply advanced in an attempt to mask the real determination of the Soviet Union not to budge from Austria. The objective was perhaps not so clear in the discussions with respect to East Germany because of the many side issues which were involved, but the United States representatives were convinced that the Soviet Union was not prepared to agree to anything which would lead to the end of its control in East Germany. The Soviet Union would not be satisfied with any European security guarantee. United States representatives thought it probable that even if the Soviet Union were prepared to agree to a neutralization of Germany, it would not agree even within that framework to the liquidation of the East German regime.

9. The second main objective of the Soviet Union at Berlin had been the defeat of EDC. Mr. Bowie indicated that there was evidence that the USSR genuinely feared German re-armament as a threat to its security and that this was the essential reason for the Soviet position with respect to EDC. Molotov made it clear that the only safeguard acceptable to the Soviet Government, so far as Germany was concerned, was Soviet control of ^{any} all German Government. Democratic processes might be good enough for other people or for other governments but were not suited to this situation so far as the Soviet Government was concerned. Molotov, in private discussions, made clear the Soviet belief that if EDC were defeated in 1954 it would be consigned to the archives.

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An intensive drive by the Soviet Union in this calendar year to defeat EDC might therefore be expected. So far as tactics were concerned the Soviet representatives completely disregarded the opinion of both East and West Germans and focused attention on French opinion. They attempted by every means to exploit the French fear of a rearmed Germany and to prove that, in this instance at least, the French interest lay in combining with the Soviet Union to exert strict control over Germany. Some attempt was made to appeal to opinion in the United Kingdom favourable to the neutralism of Germany. United States representatives regarded this as only incidental to the main effort directed at the French.

10. Soviet intentions with respect to Far Eastern matters might be classified under two headings: the drive for recognition of the Government of Communist China, and a possible genuine interest in some high-level meeting on Far Eastern matters. The attempt to gain recognition for Communist China seemed to be one of Molotov's main tasks. In every possible and some impossible circumstances Communist China was mentioned. This effort was most ridiculous in Molotov's suggestion that the United States and Communist China might be associated as observers in any scheme designed to guarantee European security. It was impossible to know whether this effort was made simply to placate Communist China or because the Soviet Union felt a real need for Chinese partnership. There were some grounds, although this was less certain, for the belief that the Soviet Union was genuinely interested in the convocation of a high-level meeting on Far Eastern subjects. The best evidence of this was Soviet acceptance of the restricted agenda and Soviet agreement to a meeting on Korea, under conditions which the Communist representatives at Panmunjom had refused to accept. Until the last moment Bidault had held out for conditions which would have allowed discussion of Indo-China only after a satisfactory discussion of the Korean situation and after Chinese assistance to the Viet Minh had been brought to an end. However the French Government "caved" and Bidault found himself unable to resist the Molotov offer which eventually was adopted. Bidault realized that discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Conference involved grave dangers for France but yet he could not be put in the position of resisting any move to bring an end to the Indo-China war. One could only speculate as to Molotov's motives in this regard but it seemed reasonable to suppose he had one or all of the following objectives:

- (a) To convene a meeting in which France would participate and in which a possible settlement in Indo-China could be used as a lever to pry the French away from acceptance of EDC.
- (b) A real desire to bring about more settled conditions in the Far East because of Soviet

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uneasiness that the trouble spots there were getting somewhat out of control.

- * / would be made under the present circumstances
- (c) To provide for a conference on Indo-China which could only be to the advantage of the Communists since almost any settlement which would lead to difficulties between France and the Associated States and eventually to Communist control of the whole peninsula.

11. Other less important indications of Soviet intentions were revealed at Berlin. Molotov made many efforts to split the three Western Ministers, not only on EDC and the Five Power Conference but also on such matters as the promise of increased East-West trade. The conduct of the Soviet representatives throughout the Conference suggested some desire on their part for a relaxation of tensions, in that their manner was not so pugnacious as usual. However it was evident that while the Soviet representatives might be seeking to lower the atmosphere of tension they were not prepared to give anything for such a relaxation. It was possible, of course, that their somewhat more restrained conduct of business was meant merely to contribute material for the use of their peace propagandists. The stress laid by Molotov on the desirability of holding further Big Power meetings was evident but the motives behind this move were not clear. Molotov may have hoped to divide the Western Foreign Ministers by his vague suggestions as to what might be accomplished at additional Big Power meetings, or his efforts may have been designed to prevent a clear-cut breaking-point on the problem of a European settlement which would tend to crystallize Western opinion against Soviet intransigence. Finally Molotov's references to disarmament were interesting but there was little to guide the Western delegates as to their real meaning. It was possible that they were merely designed for the use of Communist peace propagandists.

12. Aside from these indications of definite Soviet intention, Mr. Bowie indicated that he brought away three main impressions from the meeting;

- (a) that there was a Soviet desire to keep the door of the conference room open;
- (b) that the Soviet attempt to reduce tension without modifying its foreign policies might be a possible indication of the growing importance of Soviet domestic problems, and
- (c) that the Soviet stand with respect to East Germany and especially Austria might indicate the growing influence of the Soviet Army on Soviet policy, since the Army was in the best position to assess the effects on other Soviet satellites of any restrictions on Soviet military activity in these two areas.

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13. The Chairman then turned to consideration of the situation in the Middle East. He outlined the course of events which had led to the recent announcement of United States military aid to Pakistan within the framework of the Turkish-Pakistan Agreement. About a year and a half ago the Pakistan Government had informed the United States Government that it would have to reduce its defence forces by two divisions because the economy could not support them. At that time the Pakistan representatives had also indicated, however, that their country was "prepared to stand up and be counted" as a foe of communist imperialism but that it could offer little practical assistance without military aid from the United States. The United States Government was faced with a dilemma. It was thoroughly alive to the difficulties which would arise in United States-Indian relations as a result of United States military aid to Pakistan, which would be regarded by the Indian Government as a breach in the Asiatic neutrality bloc. The United States Government could not, however, in view of its stated objectives, refuse to accept the support of a willing ally in the fight against Communist imperialism. Further, the United States Government had made it clear that it did not accept the concept that neutrality was possible in the event of the outbreak of a major war. It was the United States' view, and it had been stated many times publicly, that no neutrality bloc could act as a bridge between the Free and the Communist worlds. The United States Government did indicate, however, that it would find it easier to grant military aid to Pakistan if it could be done within the framework of some area defence agreement under the United Nations.

14. The Chairman digressed for a moment to indicate to the meeting the general thinking of the United States Government with respect to a Middle Eastern Defence Organization. He said that the original concept of a Middle Eastern Defence Organization had had to be discarded or at least indefinitely delayed. It might be possible to arrive at an agreement involving "bits and pieces of the Middle East" but even this was uncertain. However, an agreement of the Northern tier of nations in the Middle East, that is Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan, did seem possible and practical. The present Government of Iran was more favourably disposed towards the West than the Mossadegh Government had been. Iran need no longer be written off and might join in an area defence agreement at the proper time. The Government of Iran, however, had been unable to go far publicly in this respect because of its dispute with the United Kingdom over an oil settlement. The Chairman said that within the last day or two there had been some evidence that an Anglo-Iranian agreement was in sight which would involve operation of the oil fields by

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a consortium made up 40 percent by the Anglo-Iranian Company, 40 percent by United States companies, and 20 percent by French companies and Royal Dutch Shell. So far as Iraq was concerned there was some willingness on the part of its Government to participate in an area defence agreement but the basic hostility between Iraq and Israel created political difficulties. The Chairman suggested that, while this basic hostility existed and was fanned by violent speeches made for domestic political consumption by leaders on both sides, there were grounds for belief that the situation would ease in the not too distant future. In the circumstances the United States Government had welcomed the association of Turkey and Pakistan, the two ends of the line, as a step towards the future development of a broader area agreement among the Northern tier of nations. The Chairman said that only thirty million dollars had been requested of Congress for United States military aid to the Middle East. He believed it would be better spent in Pakistan and Turkey than spread thinly throughout the whole area. The United States Government regretted that President Eisenhower's message to Mr. Nehru had not been accepted in the spirit in which it was written but was happy that Indian reaction had not been sharper. He expressed the gratification of the United States Government for the attitude which had been taken publicly by the Canadian Prime Minister in this matter.

The New United States Strategy.

15. Admiral Radford introduced the second item on the agenda with an analysis of United States defence policy. Between the end of the last war and the beginning of 1950 the United States followed a policy of defence retrenchment which left her in an extremely weakened condition at the time of the outbreak of the Korean war. He said it was fortunate that the Communists chose to move aggressively before "we had cut our heads off". In addition the aggression occurred in the one place, Korea, where the United States could fight. Within a year United States military strength had been increased from less than a million and a half to three and a half million men. This had been possible only because of the large reserve of trained manpower which existed in the United States as a result of World War II. United States military authorities realized that there was something essentially unfair in once again placing the burden of combat on men so recently exposed in World War II and who, although they could be regarded as trained reserves, had become a bit rusty. It was not long before the inequities of this situation were brought to the attention of Congress which passed legislation limiting the service of these reserves to two years. By the end of 1952 and especially in 1953 the period of obligatory service for a large percentage of the reserves came to an end and a very high proportion of them elected to return to civilian life.

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16. Concurrently with the build-up of manpower, there had been a tremendous build-up in war materiel towards a peak emergency to come in 1954. It was evident to the authorities by 1952 that this planned build-up could not be achieved because it was being done under conditions of only partial mobilization. It could only have been achieved within a controlled economy. Ultimately, therefore, the objective was moved from 1954 to 1955 and then to 1956. However, United States military authorities were well aware that there was a need for planning beyond the period of most intense crisis. It was obvious, therefore, that no matter what Administration had assumed office last year, planning for the "long pull" would have had to be a main effort. In April of last year, therefore, President Eisenhower had put the task to the new Chiefs of Staff of building a defence machine for the United States within the economic resources of the country and not requiring deficit financing for its support.

17. Admiral Radford said that military planners traditionally are not required to take economic factors into their military consideration. In this case, however, the service chiefs agreed that a sound economy was as integral a part of national security as was the military establishment. Admiral Radford said that he, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, found it easy to agree to this concept since he was convinced that United States military aid to its allies had been an important factor in preventing further Soviet expansion. It was not difficult, he said, to get the agreement of the Chiefs of Staff. It was with the idea that the military establishment of the United States should be built without prejudicing the health of the national economy that the Chiefs of Staff took their "new look" at United States defence requirements. The service chiefs arrived at a figure of thirty-four to thirty-five billion dollars and this was regarded by the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget as an amount which would be considered a reasonable annual outlay for the purely military functions of the United States Defense Department. The Chiefs of Staff were aware that an additional five to six billion dollars, annually, would be available for military aid and expenditures on atomic energy.

18. Another factor, which had had to be taken into consideration in the reassessment made by the service chiefs, was that of manpower. It had been possible between 1950 and 1953 to bring service strength up to 3 1/2 million personnel by the draft, by voluntary enlistment in the Air Force and Navy, and by calling on the reserve pool. It was, however, a fortuitous circumstance that that reserve pool existed. It is estimated that approximately 1 million men turn 18 each year in the United States of which 700,000 to 800,000 can be considered prospective additions to the armed forces. In their reassessment of United States defence strength the service chiefs estimated

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that the maximum defence forces which could be maintained over an indefinite period based on this United States manpower pool and without dipping into reserves would have to be limited to approximately 3 million personnel. There may be some change in this situation in 1960 when it is estimated that the manpower pool will take a significant jump. Admiral Radford indicated that while manpower, therefore, was a factor, cost was the most important factor which was taken into consideration by the service chiefs. They came up, therefore, with these figures which have now been made public: i.e. Army - approximately 1 1/2 million men; Air Force - 975,000; Navy and Marine - 800,000. The service chiefs agreed to these manpower ceilings, however, on the understanding that they were valid only if the world situation did not deteriorate significantly and if certain overseas commitments were to be reduced. In addition the service chiefs were able to assume that they would be permitted to use atomic weapons when that use seemed desirable and particularly in support of ground troops (i.e. the tactical use of the atomic bomb).

19. He said that the service chiefs still have not finished their study of the reserve structure. It was for this reason that they wanted to get back into the United States as much as possible of the United States Army in order that it could devote attention to building up a reserve structure which would be capable of producing trained manpower under conditions of emergency mobilization. No recommendations have yet been made to Congress on the reserve structure. However, the military authorities believe that any new plan should require reservists to join reserve units during the six year period in which they are obligated to be a part of the United States Reserve Army. While the obligation exists at the moment that soldiers discharged from active service continue in Reserve status for six years, an insignificant number of these reservists became associated with reserve units. The service chiefs are well aware that the voluntary enlistment rate in the Air Force and the Navy was kept up only because of the pressure of the draft and because a shooting war was going on in Korea. With reductions in monthly draft calls and the ending of the fighting in Korea, the Navy and the Air Force may have a good deal of trouble reaching the manpower ceilings which have been established. Finally the service chiefs are acutely aware that there is a lack of re-enlistment and believe that more inducement must be offered if the quality of the services (aside from the quantity) is to be increased. It is re-enlistments which increase the quality of an Army not first enlistments or draftees. In the short run therefore the problem of maintaining the desired qualitative standards, especially in the Air Force and the Navy, is more one of obtaining trained manpower than of appropriations. He pointed out the obvious inconsistency of the present circumstances in which, under GI benefits, an individual is given \$6,000. if he leaves the service and only \$300 if he re-enlists. This factor of increased quality is of special importance in the field of continental defence where the first requirement is to have a large organization of highly trained individuals of above-average intelligence. The increasing technical complications of Air Force operations underline the need for re-enlistments.

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Discussion of Soviet Intentions and the new United States Strategy.

20. The meeting then proceeded to discuss the briefs which had been presented by Mr. Bowie and Admiral Radford. The Chairman emphasized his opinion that not too long a period of time should be allowed to elapse between these meetings. Mr. Heeney recalled the original purpose of the meetings, pointing out that they had been begun in a time when international tensions seemed somewhat greater than at the moment, and when it seemed possible that the United States Government might feel compelled, at short notice, to employ the atomic bomb. The decision to hold periodic meetings of "consultation" developed from views exchanged between President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Prime Minister St. Laurent in December 1950. These meetings had been designed to provide for informal exchange of information and views and for a review of the "danger spots" with particular reference to situations in which the United States might consider using the atomic bomb.

21. Mr. Heeney indicated that, from the Canadian side, there seemed to be nothing of importance to add to Mr. Bowie's interpretation of the Berlin Conference. He did ask, however, whether other United States sources of intelligence supported the general proposition that seemed to be accepted by the West, that international tension was now less than it had been even though Soviet long-term objectives had not changed. The Chairman thought that this was true when the usual limitations on intelligence estimates were taken into consideration. He stressed, however, that while there might be some indication of relaxation in tension, we were faced for an indefinite period with the threat of possible Soviet aggression which was serious enough to make it imperative that we be given the maximum of warning of any indications of the possible renewal of direct Soviet aggression. He thought that the view was somewhat less strongly held that we might be exposed to a sudden and surprise attack, "say the day after to-morrow", but not to the extent of reducing the sense of urgency concerning the development of the necessary continental defence.

22. Admiral Radford pointed out that the Canadian authorities were aware of the United States military estimate that the Soviet Union was unlikely to launch a war of aggression within the next three years. They were also aware, however, that it was the United States military estimate that the Soviet Union had the capability of launching a war any time and that one could not discount the dangers of an accidental outbreak of war. He was anxious, he said, that no doubt should be left in anyone's mind as to how the United States military regarded the idea that tension had been relaxed. He suggested that the relaxation of tension was more

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in our minds than in the minds of Soviet planners and that the Soviet Union was keeping up a pressure on the West which should cause us as much concern today as it did three years ago. In those three years, of course, Western strength had grown more rapidly relative to Soviet strength, but since Soviet strength had never been seriously reduced after World War II, this should be cold comfort to us. He envisioned the Soviet threat as a three-pronged offensive on the psychological, economic and military fronts. It was possible, with some assurance, to estimate the military threat. It was almost impossible to estimate the extent of the psychological and economic threat and it was here that he thought the West would have its greatest problems.

23. The Chairman elaborated on Admiral Radford's point. He said that in the United States estimate the Soviet Union would not actively seek to launch a war in the next three years. On the other hand there was no significant change in Soviet foreign policy, even though that policy involved the possibility that the Soviet Union would be led into war. As time went on continued Soviet adherence to such policies might in fact make more acute the danger of the sudden outbreak of war. He stressed the difficulty of defining relaxation of tension, but however it was defined, it should not be interpreted by the West as grounds for any decrease in Western defence efforts.

24. Mr. Heeney expressed general agreement with this United States estimate. He then turned to a discussion of the implications of the new United States strategy for its allies. He recalled that in the formative years of NATO, Canadian representatives had done all they could to assist their United States colleagues in encouraging efforts on the part of the alliance to build up its strength. At the last Council meeting, however, the emphasis was shifted from the concept of the particular year of crisis to that of the "long pull" and it was agreed, with the full concurrence of the United States, that more consideration would have to be given to the economic basis of the NATO defence effort. This emphasis on better defence for less cost, taken together with public discussion of the United States "new look" in defence strategy, has raised in the minds of some of our European colleagues the fear that the United States might be embarking on a policy of gradual disengagement from its commitments abroad and turning away, in some measure at least, from support of the concept of collective security. Some chose to interpret the scheduled withdrawal of two United States divisions from Korea as further evidence of disengagement. While Canadian authorities could appreciate the factors which had led to certain re-adjustments in United States defence strategy, it was often difficult to combat such interpretations of United States intentions by friends in ignorance and by enemies in malevolence who criticized the United States.

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It was in this respect that these meetings of consultation were so important. They provided the Canadian authorities with an opportunity to get further information at a high level on the motives which underlay United States policy re-adjustments and put them in a better position to answer the questions posed by their European colleagues. He was certain that the United States Government appreciated the necessity of consultation with its allies on matters of such extreme importance as United States defence strategy. Without consultation the allies of the United States might be kept in as much doubt as the potential aggressor as to the real intentions of the United States.

25. The Chairman said he was fully aware of the problem raised by Mr. Heeney for United States representatives were faced with similar questions at every turn. He said he thought he would be breaking no confidence in referring to a comment made by President Eisenhower at a meeting earlier that day of the National Security Council. The Council was considering the first long-term planning paper (and the Chairman emphasized it was the first such paper) designed to present United States policy objectives not in terms of the next year or the current budget or the present Administration, but in terms of the long-range interests of the United States. The President had commented that responsible United States authorities would be fools if they did not realize that United States planning has to be in generations, in the same sense as Soviet planning had been since the success of the Revolution. The Chairman assured the meeting that United States commitments to NATO and EDC were as firm as they had ever been. He said, however, that because people must be constantly reassured, even of the obvious, the United States Government intended to reaffirm publicly these commitments in the not too distant future.

26. The Chairman said that while the United States Government fully appreciated the important implications that United States defence policy had for NATO and EDC, it also seemed reasonable that the European allies should take into account the emergency build-up of United States defence forces between 1950 and 1953, the amount of foreign military aid granted by the United States, its contributions in manpower and money to NATO, and the expense of United States support of the French in Indo-China. All these efforts had cost a great deal of money and there were Europeans who worried about economic collapse in the United States. It was in these terms that the new look in United States defence had to be explained to the European allies of the United States. He hoped that on their side they realized how important it was that France ratify the European Defence Community treaty this year. They must also be convinced that the late awakening of the United States to an awareness of the paucity of its continental defences was not a return to isolationism. The shoring up of those defences in the face of known Soviet capabilities was an act

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of pure military prudence and of vital importance to the defences of the Western world. Mr. Heeney asked if it was correct to assume that the United States continued to place the same weight as in the past on NATO as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. The Chairman replied that such an assumption was correct.

27. Admiral Radford pointed out that NATO and the United States had no alternative to the "long pull" and that the West must continue to live with the Soviet threat. The West is stronger than it was a few years ago and to the degree that it is stronger, there is probably some relaxation of tension. But there has been no removal of threat. A world divided between two powerful antagonists is not a happy world, but a situation of tension is preferable to atomic warfare. In his estimate a world divided between two major powers, in one of which only the desire for peace exists, is much more exposed to the danger that war will break out than is a world divided between two powers, both of which are ready for a war but which are prepared to exist without it under conditions of constant tension. The Chairman supported Admiral Radford's argument by referring to the fact that it was the lack of a power balance which in two instances led to the outbreak of major world wars. Any sense of security would be false unless it is firmly based on increased and increasing allied strength.

Continental and Civil Defence.

28. General Foulkes said he would like to express on behalf of the Canadian services their appreciation for the willingness of the United States authorities to convene such meetings of consultation as this. Following along the line of thought which Mr. Heeney had developed, it would be much easier to deal with questions concerning the new United States defence policy which might be asked by European colleagues when opportunities such as this meeting were presented at which the Canadian authorities could learn more about United States intentions. In addition, United States views put forward at these meetings were obviously of great importance to Canadian planners as they tackled the problems of how best to provide adequate defences for Canada. He went on to refer to the problem of providing appropriate civil defence for Canada in the light of the increased capabilities of the Soviet Union to launch a successful atomic attack on the continent. He expressed the hope that it might be possible to issue some public statement on the work which had already been done on the mid-Canada early warning radar chain before the United States film on the 1952 hydrogen bomb test at Eniwetok was made available for public showing. The Chairman said that public showing of the film was still being delayed in spite of pressure from civil defence authorities for its release. In this the State Department have supported the Defense Department's view that it should be held up until at least after the Geneva Conference.

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In answer to a question by Mr. Heeney as to why there seemed to be a "second round" of articles in the press on continental defence, the Chairman said he thought civil defence authorities were responsible. They had found that they had to scare people thoroughly if they were to get their appropriations through Congress. It went even further than the question of money, in that civil defence authorities were finding it very difficult to interest the citizenry in the subject. This was one of the reasons why these authorities were pressing so vigorously for the release of the film. State Department and Defense Department authorities, however, were concerned that the use of such a scare technique might get out of hand and result in impossible demands being made upon the Government for expenditures in the field of continental defence. Mr. Bryce said that the same problem of perspective existed for the Canadian Government and asked if any decisions had been taken in the United States as to the limitation of the size of urban areas or the dispersion of industry and government.

29. Admiral Radford said that in his opinion civil defence authorities should concentrate on building up a sound professional staff and should leave the "arm waving and emotion" to voluntary organizations. He said that there had already been pressure for large-scale civil defence exercises in the United States but that the Defense Department was attempting to have them delayed, for in his opinion they were likely to give rise to more trouble than they were worth. The Chairman said that the United States Government was working on the problem of dispersion of industry and government. In this field the generous loan and depreciation benefits granted to new industries which would locate themselves in relatively isolated areas was a powerful lever. No steps were being taken to limit the size of urban areas, primarily because no one had been able to decide how it could be done successfully. Admiral Radford said that the whole question of dispersal of industry had to be most carefully considered, for it was important that highly industrialized centres not become pockets of depression. Most of the plans offered for really large-scale dispersion were simply not realistic. The natural trend in industry siting at the moment was on the outskirts of large cities. Some workers travelled as much as 30 and 40 miles from the large cities in which they lived to the plants in which they worked. It was the height of foolishness to locate a plant 30 or 40 miles from the city for its protection while the workers required to operate the plant lived in congested cities exposed to the most disastrous effects of atomic bombing. The Chairman referred to the war-time experience of the Allies in Germany where it was finally decided that the human element was the only really vulnerable one in German aircraft production. Only when German aircraft workers were seriously discommoded did production fall off. Bombing of the plants alone had very little effect.

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30. General Foulkes said that he was coming around to the view that civil defence must be brought in line with our present thinking of the Soviet capabilities to attack the continent. In Canada and, so far as he knew, in the United States present civil defence activity followed the lines of that carried out in London during the last war. It was what he called the "village pump system", i.e. local civil defence organizations working in their immediate areas. In the changed circumstances brought about by the possible use of the atomic bomb the civil defence organization would go up with the rest of the town. There was, it seemed to him, a need for a civil defence organization which could be moved from place to place and which was controlled centrally. Survival would be the dominating factor in the first 30 days of atomic attack and it was essential, therefore, that some civil defence organization should be capable of reducing the impact immediately the war broke out. He wondered if it might not be possible to use the bulk of the static armed forces in the country for this work, those who, for example, would normally be concerned with handing out quartermaster stores and administering large army camps. So far as he could see some such organization would be the only alternative to an expansion of a permanent civil defence organization of the type presently in existence. He thought that mobile columns might be organized whose task it would be immediately upon the outbreak of war to transport such members of the armed forces as had been assigned civil defence duties to areas of greatest need. In addition prior attention would have to be given to the dispersal of hospital supplies and protective equipment.

31. Admiral Radford said he was in complete agreement with this concept of a civil defence organization. The Chairman said he would certainly like to have these views on paper for examination by the United States authorities. It was pointed out by General Foulkes and Mr. Bryce that these ideas did not have Canadian Government approval but were merely the preliminary opinions of the Chiefs of Staff. However, they agreed that some consideration might be given to passing the views in writing and informally to the United States authorities.

Early Warning.

32. General Foulkes said that the Canadian authorities felt that they had increasing reason for concern that little if any warning would be given before a Soviet attack. The extent of the warning which might be expected obviously had an important bearing on defence planning. In recent conversations with General Gruenther it had been indicated that probably three days' warning was all that could be expected. Admiral Radford said that at the moment, because of the lack of adequate early warning systems on this continent, the United States Joint Chiefs are assuming that they would be given no warning whatsoever of an attack. So far as

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NATO was concerned, he too had been talking to General Gruenther and found his worry to be that even if he had three to five days' warning he would probably be unable to use it since he would not be able to convince some of his European colleagues of the imminence of attack. They might even argue that to make such overt moves as would be necessary to reduce the success of a surprise attack would only serve to ensure that that surprise attack take place. The problem in the United States to which the Joint Chiefs had been giving some thought was over what period of time could an alert status be maintained. Could you, for example, have every one on 100 percent alert for a few days or weeks, with reductions in the degree of alert as the danger passed? What they really hoped to evolve was a degree of alert which could be maintained successfully in this country without loss of public interest over an indefinite period.

33. Both sides agreed that the problem of what degree of warning we would get of a Soviet attack was one to which a great deal of thought had to be devoted.

34. General Foulkes said that this problem of time of warning was of immediate concern to the Canadian service authorities. With Canadian air squadrons in Europe the problem was one of achieving maximum flexibility. If we were assured that adequate warning would be given it would not be necessary to have stations fully manned and it would be possible to rotate personnel in such a manner as to do away in large measure with the need for permanent housing in Europe for dependents.

Reserves for Europe.

35. The problem was also directly relevant to the question of getting reserves to Europe in time to stem the initial Soviet ground attack. If there was not sufficient warning to get reserves to Europe, not only would we be at a serious disadvantage in ground strength but even the effect of the tactical use of atomic weapons would be seriously lessened by our inability to force the enemy to concentrate. There was a question in his mind also as to whether the strategic reserve to be built up in the United States would be of any use in Europe if there was to be no warning or very little warning. Admiral Radford agreed on the importance of as much advance warning as possible. The question of supplying reserves to Europe was one which gave him great concern. It was "fantastic" in his opinion to believe that the U.S. NATO commitment of two divisions by D+30 days could be honoured. The best that could be done in the most ideal circumstances would be the provision of these two divisions in D+45 to D+60 days. The aim of the NATO defence organization was the provision of balanced collective forces and in his opinion the European allies must be brought to realize that it was their job to provide the bulk

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of the ground troops which would meet the initial attack of the enemy. In this context, of course, a German contribution of manpower was essential. He said that when he spoke of the tactical use of the atomic bomb he had in mind a deep tactical offensive use which was something short of strategic bombing and something more than tactical bombing in front of our own troops. He thought it was important that in our planning we did not give the enemy more capability than he had. For example, he said that some of the Soviet planes which alarmed us so far as continental defence was concerned are the same planes which alarmed General Gruenther in Europe. In NATO we are fully aware of the logistic problems which will have to be met in keeping our forces supplied. The enemy will have many of the same problems and there are grounds for thinking that we are solving them faster than he is.

36. He summed up his appreciation of this situation in the following terms: If NATO was ever to be the instrument in the defences of the free world which it was supposed to be it would soon have to have a German military contribution. The United States was prepared for the indefinite future to maintain the present level of its forces in Europe. Any additional power which NATO needed from outside Europe could not be in the form of ground troops, at least in the initial stages. It was nonsense to believe that reserves could be moved from the United States in time to have any effect on the early stages of the battle. On the other hand the Air Force was highly mobile and could bomb both strategically and tactically almost from the outset of the war.

37. The new Chiefs of Staff had, in their reassessment of United States defence strength, also stressed the importance of a build-up of a strategic reserve of men and materiel in the United States. While some of that reserve strength would probably be moved to support the NATO ground effort as soon as such a move was possible, some elements of it would be kept for eventual use against the Soviet Union in the right place at the proper time. A build-up of Western strength on the ground in Europe which might eventually lead to stalemate with Russian forces would not serve the purposes of the West. The new Chiefs of Staff had believed, therefore, that they must have immediate control of sufficient reserve strength so that it could be committed where it would best serve the interests of the free world.

38. General Foulkes agreed that in the initial stages at least any Russian ground attack would have to be met with the NATO troops on the ground and NATO commanders could not plan on the usefulness of reserves from overseas. Some discussion ensued between the Chairman, Admiral Radford and General Foulkes as to the possibility of stockpiling equipment in Europe for reserves in order that the personnel might be moved quickly by air. Admiral Radford said that there was no present intention on the part of the United States

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authorities to stockpile equipment in this fashion. The Chairman said that more attention would have to be given to the problem of marrying up troops and stockpiled supplies.

Mid-Canada Early Warning Line.

39. General Foulkes then gave the meeting a progress report on the mid-Canada early warning radar line, pointing out that it was not, as some people tended to regard it, a southern line but one which bordered on the sub-Arctic. With the aid of a map he indicated the progress of the site survey now underway on which the RCAF and USAF have co-operated. Before dealing in detail with the site survey, he recalled for the meeting the requirements which had been set up for the radar line to meet requirements up to 1960; that it must be capable of handling aircraft at speeds up to 550 knots, flying singly or in groups, from 200 ft. to 65,000 ft.; that the interval between the stations be not more than 30 miles; that information that the line had been crossed had to reach Air Defence Command headquarters within three minutes; and that it had to be capable of discerning friend from foe, even though it was essentially a warning line and not an identification device. To assist in the identification process it would be necessary to introduce conventional scanning radar at certain points across the line. Canadian authorities favoured the setting up of a number of gates in the line through which all friendly aircraft would have to pass. Not only would this help in the identification of friend and foe, but it would introduce a flying discipline for civilian aircraft in time of peace, which would be useful in time of war. He said that Canadian authorities thought that in peacetime the line would serve the civil purpose of locating lost aircraft. If an aircraft did not use the gates someone would be sent up to investigate.

40. General Foulkes went on to indicate the progress of the site reconnaissance in the various sectors of the line. Work on the Atlantic and Pacific sectors would be delayed somewhat because of heavy snows, but the reconnaissance of the other three sectors would probably be completed by the end of this month. The difficult location of the line might prove valuable in the long run in that the possibility of sabotage would be reduced. Some of the line would, for example, have to be serviced by helicopter. A target date of June 1st had been set for the completion of reconnaissance of the whole line. It was estimated that the line, or a major part of it, would be in operation by the end of 1956. Individual sectors of the line might be put in operation as they were completed without waiting for the whole line to be completed. It was estimated that 400-500 men would be sufficient to operate the whole line. Tests of a pilot model of the line would probably be run in March. The line when completed would provide at least three hours early warning in Canada and more extended warning in the United States. Admiral Radford expressed enthusiastic interest in the

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North-South line running south from Churchill since it was the first indication he had had that such a line was being built.

41. Admiral Radford said that the United States Service chiefs were anxious to proceed rapidly but surely with the development of adequate early warning systems, although there had been some attempt to stampede them into acceptance of schemes of unproven reliability and practicability. General Foulkes said that the Service authorities in Canada had the same aim and hoped therefore to be able to test the mid-Canada line before giving attention to any more distant early warning system. The question of some public statement on the progress of the work was raised again, and Admiral Radford gave General Foulkes a draft press release which, it was proposed, might be released by Senate Armed Services Committee with respect to the briefing it had received from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on the problem of continental defence. Admiral Radford said that it was completely innocuous, but he would not agree to its release until it had been discussed with Canadian authorities.

42. General Foulkes made reference to one final point with respect to continental defence which was of some concern to Canadian authorities. The Canadian public would be inclined to question any development which would require the presence in Canada of USAF squadrons for the purposes of continental defence when a Canadian air division was in Europe. While this could be explained in military terms, it was not politically desirable. The Chairman and Admiral Radford said they fully appreciated the Canadian problem.

43. The meeting ended with agreement on both sides that no mention of these meetings of consultation should be made in any public statement, but that responsible authorities of both countries might be asked to co-operate in the preparation of a draft press release or public statement concerning the progress of installations for continental defence.

Washington, D.C.

March 11, 1954.

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TOP SECRET

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FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

D-1
①
② Reference.....
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④ Subject: U.S.-Canada Meeting of Consultation of March 4.....
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15 MAR 1954

I wanted to give you some preliminary comments on the meeting of consultation with the United States authorities which was held in the State Department on March 4. Since I am leaving Washington today on my western tour, this despatch will be held so that it may go to you with our final record of the meeting. I have seen and approved a draft of the record, but since it is customary to compare our notes with those kept on the United States side, so that our two records are in no substantial disagreement, it will be a few days before our record can be put in shape for transmission to you with this despatch.

2. This meeting was not, perhaps, wholly satisfactory in relation to Soviet intentions. But I am not sure that we could have expected much more on this subject and the meeting did have real value for us particularly in relation to continental defence. The "agenda" put forward by the State Department met the suggestions which we had made. It had seemed to us that, since the meeting was to be held so shortly after the Four Power meeting at Berlin, it would be natural for the U.S. side to start with a discussion of the results of that conference and so lead into the United States estimate of Soviet intentions as they were related to various trouble spots in the world. In the event Bowie told us little about the Berlin Conference that we did not know already through our normal contacts with the State Department and the examination of trouble spots did not produce much. A good deal more time might have been spent (though with what profit I do not know) on the political implications of the new United States strategy.

3. The most extensive discussion at the meeting concerned military matters. This was perhaps not surprising in view of the agenda and having in mind the military background of the Chairman. Admiral Radford's contribution to the discussion was interesting even though his prepared remarks on the new United States strategy contained a good deal of material which had already been made public, for example in the interview with Admiral Radford, published in the U.S. News and World Report of March 5. We were not

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able to explore very deeply Radford's thinking as to how United States atomic capabilities were to be applied to local incidents of aggression. (General Foulkes was to have a further discussion with Radford and possibly he was able to go into this subject more fully.) On the other hand Radford's forthright declaration of continued United States support of NATO was re-assuring although I am not certain that our European colleagues would have been similarly impressed. He said categorically that United States commitments to NATO would not be decreased but he also made it clear that they were not likely to be increased in any significant degree.

4. I believe that the progress report which we gave on Canadian activity with respect to the mid-Canada early warning line made a real impression on our United States colleagues. I believe that at this high level they appreciate now our intention to co-operate to the greatest extent possible in the better defence of the continent. Progress reports of this type given from time to time can, I believe, ease the work of those officials who are responsible for the detailed day-to-day work in this co-operative project.

5. You will note from the report of the meeting that our views on the Indo-China situation in relation to the forthcoming Geneva Conference were solicited and that General Foulkes was asked to put on paper some of his informal ideas on civil defence organization for the benefit of United States authorities. Bedell Smith did, too, express the gratification of the United States Government at the Canadian attitude towards the grant of United States military aid to Pakistan and especially for the remarks made by the Prime Minister while he was in India.


6. In summary, I think that the meeting added something to our store of knowledge on current United States thinking on the extent of the Soviet threat to the security of the free world and of the steps which can best be taken by the United States to counter-act that threat. I was encouraged, as I am sure you will be, by the fact that Bedell Smith expressed the emphatic opinion that not too long a period of time should be allowed to lapse between these meetings of consultation. They provide a good informal channel through which we gain access to the high level thinking of United States political and military authorities and, while some may turn out to be less useful than others, we should, I believe, continue to make use of them whenever we think the occasion demands. I have said before that I do not think we should debase the currency by having too many meetings of consultation but I think we must bear in mind the expressed willingness of the United States authorities and particularly the Under-Secretary of State, Bedell Smith, to arrange for the meetings whenever we want to have them.

7. We have in addition gained some experience in the procedural aspects of the meetings which may

...3

-3-

allow us to make better use of future meetings of consultation. I think, for example, we should tend to discourage the growth on the United States side of too great an emphasis on formal "briefing" of the meeting by some individual. It will always be necessary that someone lead off the proceedings but I believe that the sooner the discussion stage is reached at these meetings the better they are likely to be. This in turn leads me to believe that it would be wise to make the agenda items as general as possible so that we need feel less limited in our questions. Finally, I think there is something to be said for limiting even more strictly the numbers of those attending. The larger the meetings become the more difficult it is to achieve that intimacy and informality in discussion which is likely to make the consultations most useful to us.



(A.D.P.Heeney)

P.S. March 11. Six copies of our final record of the meeting of consultation of March 4 are attached. This record has been compared with the record kept on the United States side.

Please return to DLH



File seen by [unclear]

TOP SECRET

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Ottawa, March 8, 1954.

TOP SECRET

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

Honourable L.B. Pearson, P.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

50219-AE-40
6150

My dear Colleague:

Attached is a copy of General Foulkes' notes on his conversations in Washington on March 4 and 5, 1954.

You will see that there is a great deal of major interest here.

As you know, Dr. Hannah will be in Ottawa on Friday and I am having him to lunch as I understand you can't be in Ottawa at that time.

I have asked Dr. Hannah and General McNaughton to come with Mr. Stuart and myself to Churchill on March 27 and, weather permitting, further north. It should be a useful exercise.

Yours sincerely,

John Diefenbaker

*10.3.13(js)
9-3-9(55)*

FILE COPY

TOP SECRET

"Canadian Eyes Only"

NOTE:

Some of the information contained in this paper was secured on a personal basis on the understanding that its use would be seriously restricted. Therefore, this paper should not be circulated, nor should it be quoted in such a way as to reveal the source of the information.

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET
REQUIR A SECRET

Notes on Conversations held in Washington on
Thursday and Friday, 4-5 Mar 54Consultation Meeting 4 Mar 54

1. A Note on the consultation talks will be made by the Embassy within the next week. The only observations I wish to make at this time are as follows, the U.S. members were very affable and forthcoming in all the discussions. General Bedell Smith repeatedly mentioned that the US side value very much these exchanges and would be always prepared to have further talks. He was exceedingly frank in his discussion of US plans for aid to Pakistan and the US attempt to establish a block of friendly nations between Soviet Russia and the Indian Ocean to cover the flank of the NATO SouthEastern Command, in lieu of the Middle East pact which appears to be postponed for some time. He further explained the US views for marketing of Iranian oil.

2. In private conversation General Bedell Smith mentioned that the US was concerned about some adverse comment in NATO regarding the US statements on the "new look" and on continental defence. He said he knew that some NATO nations seek Canadian views on these matters and he was anxious to enlist our support. I suggested that it would be useful if Admiral Radford went to the CPX Exercise in April and was prepared to explain the "new look" insofar as it effects NATO and also queries on continental defence. While I knew that General Collins would be there, I felt the fact that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was attending would show US continued interest. General Bedell Smith spoke to Admiral Radford who has agreed to go to the exercise. I informed them of my intention to attend.

Discussion with General Twinning

3.

4. I then asked about further continental defence projects and he confirmed the views expressed in Canada two weeks earlier; that he has no immediate requests and agrees the Mongoose project with the seaward extensions are the first priority, and until these are well advanced he does not propose anything further.

Discussions with Mr. Hannah and Secretary Wilson

5. Mr. Hannah, Under-Secretary for Manpower and US Chairman designate of PJBD, attended the meetings of consultation. After the meeting he suggested he would like me to come back to the Pentagon and have a word with Mr. Wilson, as some of the matters that arose in the discussion would be of interest to Secretary Wilson. I drove back with Mr. Hannah, who appeared very keen to learn as much as possible about Canadian defence matters and mentioned he was visiting Ottawa next week-end. He has been very helpful to our staff in Washington in supplying information on manpower questions.

6. He mentioned the creation of new Reserve formations in the US and the legislation required to ensure that the vast number of trained men now being released from the forces was not lost. They propose seeking legislation to require all men released from service to serve for six years in the reserve, involving call-up for yearly training. This is an entirely new scheme not in any way connected with the National Guard.

Discussions with Secretary Wilson

I had only intended to make a formal call on the Secretary but Mr. Hannah mentioned several matters which we had dealt with at the consultation meetings and asked me to discuss them with the Secretary. I outlined the progress on the detailed siting of the Mongoose line and the general operation, location, etc., of this project. Secretary Wilson was very interested and asked about the Distant line and the Corrode Project. I emphasized that we still had worries about the Distant line, especially manpower implications which involved about 200 at each site. I pointed out we wished to try out the McGill fence idea on the Mongoose line and see if we could provide the warning by automatic means. I mentioned the problem of identification and the system of providing gaps covered by scanning radar. He asked a number of questions about the date the line would be in operation and he mentioned the need for a statement about progress to avoid more heat from "Alsops" that nothing was being done.

8. I then mentioned that we were not very happy about the report of the release of the film on the 'H' bomb explosion at Eniwetok, where an island disappeared. I thought this film might start a lot of hysteria which would not help our approach for an orderly and carefully planned defence. He said it was civil defence that wanted it and said he would do what he could to at least delay the release. This led to a discussion on the question of civil defence in the new concept of nuclear explosions. I mentioned that we were examining the problem of military support for civil defence now that the "parish pump" concept was outmoded, we were of the opinion that civil defence assistance will in most cases be required from outside the stricken community. This created a new problem for the Services who may be required to devote their major effort to support "National survival" in the first few weeks of a new war.

9. Secretary Wilson was very friendly and asked a lot of questions but I found him difficult to listen to as he would stop in the middle of a sentence and quite often would not finish the statement but go on with something else. When leaving he mentioned that they were wasting their time dealing with things like "Communist dentists" instead of being able to solve these kind of important problems.

10. On saying good-bye to Mr. Hannah, he mentioned his new job and that he has read the book put out by a US officer on the PJBD and loaned a copy to Admiral DeWold to read.

Discussions with Admiral Radford
0845-0930 hours Friday, 5 Mar 54

11.

12. I then raised several points in regard to the "new look" which I was not too clear about and which were not covered in the discussions the day before. The first point was "prompt retaliation at places of our choosing, etc". Admiral Radford explained that this was an effort to regain the initiative and not continue to be drawn into local aggressions on the ground of enemy choosing. It was designed mainly as a warning to the Communists that the US will not hesitate to risk a major war to prevent future aggression. This theory is based on the assumption that the Communists will not risk a major war unless they are prepared to wage an all-out war and it is in accordance with their preconceived plans. Admiral Radford continued by saying that the statement was meant mainly as a warning to the Soviets. He admitted that there were many practical difficulties in working out such a policy. I asked the question, "What about your allies in such circumstances?". He replied that of course they would have to be consulted and I replied that this appears to nullify the word "prompt" in the policy statement. I pursued the point by referring to the circumstances in case of hostilities again in Korea. Admiral Radford replied that he did not think that hostilities would be reopened but if I wanted to discuss this situation as a case in point he would go along. I suggested that if shooting started again in Korea, especially at night, who would know or who would admit who

opened the war. Who would they bomb with the A bomb - Peking, Seoul or Moscow. He agreed this would create a difficult problem and he replied that this was a case where the A bomb could not be used immediately, but he emphasized that if the Korean war reopened that the US could not accept the Yalu sanctuary and would insist in using all weapons at their disposal to bring the war to a speedy conclusion. However, he reiterated that A bombs would only be used against military targets and not against Chinese cities. He said that much more had been read into the statement of "places of our choosing" than was intended, and it did not imply bombing Peking and Moscow. Admiral Radford continued that he was convinced that the Chinese had only entered the Korean conflict after they had ascertained sufficient information from the UN and other sources such as India, that if they entered the Korean war there was little likelihood that the UN forces would extend the war to the mainland of China. Therefore, they were prepared to take a calculated risk fully expecting to be able to drive the UN forces into the sea with little risk of A bomb retaliation on the mainland of China. I then asked about the use of the A bomb in the event of further Chinese aid to Indo-China, here again he said it would be hard to prove further Chinese aid and there were no suitable targets on which to use A weapons.

13. By this time I was convinced that the statement about "prompt retaliatory action at places of own choosing" was mainly for propaganda purposes and would not be applied without consultation with allies.

14. Admiral Radford then mentioned forces in Europe and he re-affirmed that there are no plans for reduction of forces. After some prompting I found out that there are no plans for completing their Lisbon goals of an extra division and some additional aircraft. Admiral Radford did mention that they may not always have on the airfields in France all their aircraft, but he did not agree that this would lessen the US effort even in bad weather as some of the aircraft would be stationed in Spain, North Africa, as well as continental US.

15. He further discussed military assistance to civil defence and asked if I would let him have anything we finally decided. He mentioned that he had asked the Bureau of Roads to investigate the possibility of constructing any new "thru ways" near big US cities in the same manner as the German "autobahn", so that they could provide emergency fighter strips for dispersal of fighter forces in the event of attacks on US airfields.

16. Admiral Radford then mentioned that he understood that I was interested in the question of reduction of forces in Korea. He said he was pleased that I had not raised this at the consultation meetings as he had not completely cleared the matter with the State Department and that we could discuss it more fully privately. He first of all discussed the withdrawal of the two divisions which he claimed were extra to the US commitment. He explained these divisions had been brought in to bolster up the South Koreans at a time when it looked as if the South Korean front might collapse. He emphasized that the President had told Mr. Churchill about this in Bermuda and that Mr. Churchill had undertaken to advise the other members of the Commonwealth. I emphasized that we are not particularly pleased to be given news effecting our relations with the US via Commonwealth sources. He said he understood this position well but this was the action taken by the President. Admiral Radford confirmed that it was the US Chiefs of Staff plan to gradually reduce the ground forces in Korea to about a Corps plan of three or four divisions, of course including the Commonwealth division and other UN contributions. He mentioned that they will have to leave Air Forces to support the South Koreans for some time to come and further thought that a considerable Naval force will be left in these waters for a long time. He felt that the South Koreans could look after themselves with these 20 divisions and US air support provided that the Chinese stayed out. He said it will take some time to train the South Koreans for higher command and a UN command will have to stay there for sometime to come. He emphasized that the timing of the withdrawals had not been

decided and that no action would be taken until after the Geneva Conference. I emphasized the need for consultation even though we realized that the US was carrying the major share of the load it was still essential that our Government and Parliament should be told by other means than by reading it in the press. He was very emphatic that there would be consultation as soon as any question of timing was clear. I emphasized that while the detail of what type of troops should be withdrawn was a matter for military consultation between the members of the Commonwealth, the policy on reduction was a matter for political consultation with Canada direct.

17. Admiral Radford then raised again the desirability of an agreed statement being issued about "Mongoose" emphasizing progress. He said it would be most helpful to them as they were being pressed by Congressional groups as well as the press. Admiral Radford showed me a press release that a Joint Committee on Armed Services were proposing to issue about an investigation into continental defence. It was a very innocuous statement which mentioned the helpful co-operation of Canada, but nothing else which had any Canadian implication.

Discussions with General Lemnitzer

18. I asked General Lemnitzer about the cancellation of the vehicle contracts and explained the dilemma which this action had created for us. He explained that this was a unilateral action of Secretary Wilson without Army concurrence. He had just cancelled contracts and told them to get along with commercial vehicles. General Lemnitzer expects that after the heat is off they will have to start again. I asked if they had sufficient vehicles to meet their needs and he replied no, by no means.

19. He then explained the new Reserve system which I had previously heard about from Mr. Hannah. General Lemnitzer explained that they hope to produce 27 divisions, with permanent cadres. He was worried about getting Congressional approval for the six year obligatory service as well as annual call-up. He further emphasized that at present they were short of equipment for such an increase.

20. We then discussed the Korean withdrawal problem and he confirmed the views expressed by Admiral Radford. I reiterated our views on the need for early consultation and explained our difficulties of rotation, etc. He pointed out again that no decision would be made before the Geneva Conference was completed.

21. We then discussed the US commitment for three divisions by D plus 30. General Lemnitzer said he thought this commitment was unreal and he could not see how they could accomplish this timing even though they controlled their own shipping. He said the shipping for material was all in moth balls in the Hudson and would take some time to get ready. He thought D plus 60 more like a suitable timing. I asked about stockpiling equipment in Europe. He said they had not considered this and doubted if they could afford this as well as the equipping of reserve divisions. He said that providing the permanent cadres for the reserve divisions was going to tax their reduced manpower and he had doubts about 20 regular and 27 reserve divisions being achieved under the present ceiling.

Discussion with Colonel Graling

22. I saw Colonel Graling in General Lemnitzer's anti-room. He informed me that he was accompanying Mr. Hannah to Canada next week. He mentioned the question of a USAF Major-General in Ottawa to co-ordinate US-Cdn air matters. I gave him no encouragement and emphasized some of the difficulties. He stated that this matter would be pursued when the CAS went to Washington next week.

Discussion with General Collins

23. General Collins mentioned the Canadian mutual aid release of 54 and 110 F86 aircraft to NATO. He stated that we would receive their advice this week. The offer had been outbid and there may be a few squawks about it but the Standing Group had taken a realistic military appraisal including the views of SACEUR. He said that they were attempting to get only one or two types of fighter aircraft in each NATO country to assist in logistical support. The French were going to be kept on the Mystere, the Belgians and the Dutch were already included in the off-shore procurement programme for Hunters and Swifts. He expected that the final answer would be that the bulk of the F86's would go to Greece and Turkey. It is expected that the US will be prepared to give assistance in the maintenance of these aircraft now that they are going to Greece and Turkey. I emphasized the need to get this advice earliest as the 54 aircraft should be released before 31 March 1954.

Discussion with General Sir John Whiteley

24. I had some preliminary talks with General Whiteley and learned that he got very little out of Admiral Radford regarding the release of forces from Korea and was only told that if and when a decision was taken that he would be informed.

25. I then discussed with General Whiteley the difficulties regarding the elimination by the Americans of the security category of Restricted and the difficulties this is creating in regard to exchange of information. General Whiteley said he had put this question up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had not gotten very far with it, but he expected that they would soon find that the reclassification of all Canadian and US restricted documents would given them so much work that they would ask the Administration to allow them to re-introduce the security category of Restricted.

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
8 Mar 54

Security UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No. <i>50219-AE-40</i>	
<i>52</i>	<i>50</i>

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN CONSUL-GENERAL

..... NEW YORK, N.Y.

Message To Be Sent	No. <i>172</i>	Date March 3, 1954.	For Communications Section Only SENT MAR 3 1954
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AIR CYPHER	
EN CLAIR	X
CODE	
CYPHER	

Priority
.....

ORIGINATOR
R.A. MacKay/MGR
(Signature)
.....
(Name Typed)
USSEA
Div.....
Local Tel. *4803*.....

APPROVED BY
[Signature]
(Signature)
.....
(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:
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None
Done.....
Date.....

Copies Referred To:

Done.....
Date.....
Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: *Consultation meeting*

Following from Acting Under-Secretary. Begins.
I expect to arrive New York Friday afternoon from Washington. Please have someone arrange hotel accommodation over night *and advise me at Embassy.* Ends.

3.3.29(05)

RECEIVED
COMMUNICATIONS
GENERAL AFFAIRS

1954 MAR 3 PM 2:35

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180

NOV 1954

1954 MAR 3 PM 2:35

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1954 MAR 3 PM 2:35

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

File WMB

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

UNCLASSIFIED J2

File No.

50219-HE-yo

57 | 50

Priority	System EN CLAIR	No. WA-349	Date March 2, 1954.
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Departmental Circulation

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD 'N
SECTION

Reference: Your EX-328 of March 2.

Subject:

Single room with bath has been reserved for Dr. MacKay at the Dupont Plaza Hotel for the night of March 4.

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Done - COMM'S SECTION

Date: 3 MAR 1954

References

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Mr Barton
BR

SecurityTOP SECRET.....

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No. SD219-AE-40	
52	SD

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON

Message To Be Sent	No. EX-328	Date MARCH 2, 1954.	For Communications Section Only SENT - MAR 2 1954
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AIR CYPHER
EN CLAIR
CODE
CYPHER **AUTO**

REFERENCE: Your WA 321 of February 26.

Priority
Immediate
~~..... IMPORTANT~~

SUBJECT: Consultation Meetings.

ORIGINATOR

.....
(Signature)
W.H. BARTON
R.A. MACKAY/ysj
(Name Typed)

Div. **D.L(1)**

Local Tel.

1. The arrangements and agenda suggested by the State Department are satisfactory. We might also wish to raise if time permits question of implications of new weapons for major policy issues relating to civilian activities. We have no proposals to put forward on this question but would find it useful to know something of thinking of U.S. authorities on such problems as re-location of industry and evacuation of urban areas in order to reduce vulnerability of continent.

APPROVED BY

.....
(Signature)
.....
(Name Typed)

2. General Foulkes, Bryce and MacKay will go to Washington for meeting. Foulkes is making his own arrangements through the Joint Staff. Bryce and MacKay plan to go down Wednesday night train to New York and take early flight for Washington. You will be notified about expected time of arrival when reservations are secured. Bryce plans to return Thursday evening. Please arrange hotel accommodation for MacKay.

Internal Distribution:
S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A. ✓

Done. *msk*

Date. *Mar. 3/54*

Copies Referred To:

Done.

Date.

Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

2.3.2(US)

RECEIVED
COMMUNICATIONS
INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 MAR 2 PM 3:16

FILE COPY

R.A. MacKay/PS
TOP SECRET

March 1, 1954.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

50219 - AE - 40
6 6

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRYCE

Attached is a copy of telegram No. WA-321 of February 26 from Washington proposing an agenda for another consultation meeting on March 4. The Minister felt it desirable that you should go if possible. General Foulkes and I will also be in attendance. I wonder if you could call Miss Roe this afternoon and let her know whether it would be possible for you to go since we want to notify Washington.

R.A. MacKAY

R.A.M.

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

Copy No.../...of 21 copies.

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Security Classification

TOP SECRET

File No.

50219-AE-40
 52 50

FROM:

THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, CANADIAN EMBASSY
 WASHINGTON, D.C., U.S.A.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Priority

System

No. WA-321

Date February 26, 1954.

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER - AUTO

Reference: Our WA-286 of February 18 and telephone conversation - Glazebrook-Heeney - of February 26.

Subject: Consultation meetings.

Following for the Acting Under-Secretary from Glazebrook, Begins:

The State Department have just informed us that they would be glad to have a consultation meeting on Thursday, March 4, at about 2.30. This would be preceded by a lunch for all the participants given in Blair House by the Under-Secretary. The suggested agenda is:

- (a) A review of Soviet intentions in the light of the Berlin meeting. This would be introduced by Merchant and Bowie.
- (b) The new military strategy, i.e., "The New Look". This would be introduced by Radford.
- (c) Continental defence; also introduced by Radford.

I assume that these headings will be sufficient to enable you to make any preparations which you wish.

2. I have told the State Department that the time and agenda seem quite satisfactory but that I will finally confirm the time when I hear from you.

Departmental Circulation
 MINISTER 2
 UNDER/SEC 3
 D/UNDER/SEC 4
 A/UNDER/SEC'S 5
 POL/CO-ORD^N SECTION

Sum. 21

References

CLEARER
COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 FEB 26 PM 2 07

TO: [Illegible]

FROM: [Illegible]

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

RE: [Illegible]

DATE: [Illegible]

TIME: [Illegible]

PLACE: [Illegible]

STATUS: [Illegible]

CLASSIFICATION: [Illegible]

REFERENCE: [Illegible]

APPROVAL: [Illegible]

REMARKS: [Illegible]

INITIALS: [Illegible]

SIGNATURE: [Illegible]

DATE: [Illegible]

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CONFIDENTIAL

Refer: Commonwealth Div.
American Div.
Far Eastern Div.
European Div.
D. L. (2)

TOP SECRET

February 24, 1954.

File on
50219-AE-4
CWHB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Proposed Meeting of Consultation
in Washington

Not sent.
CWHB

50219-AE-40
6 | 6

Mr. Heeney has no doubt told you of the plan to hold another Meeting of Consultation in Washington early in March. Attached is a copy of Telegram No. WA-286 of February 18, 1954, outlining the details so far as they have been developed. I thought it might be useful to you to have our preliminary ideas on subjects which might usefully be considered at the coming meeting, in order that we might discuss them with Mr. Heeney and possibly with General Poulkes. These ideas are only tentative, and it is intended that detailed briefs would be prepared subsequently.

The "New Look"

2. I am sure we will wish to take the opportunity to find out how far the thinking of the U.S. Administration has progressed on the implications and practical working of the new U.S. strategy. It may be that firm conclusions on these matters have not yet been reached, but answers to questions along the following lines might help to throw some light on what the "new look" would mean for Canada.

- (a) Is the new strategy of relying on massive retaliatory power to apply throughout the world or only to selected areas?
- (b) Have any criteria been developed with which to judge whether an

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attack warrants U.S. atomic intervention or should be left to "local defence forces"?

- (c) By whom is the vital decision concerning the use of atomic retaliation to be taken?
- (d) What consultation is envisaged on these questions with the NATO allies of the U.S.?

Continental Defence

3. In discussions with officers of the U.S. Air Defence Command at the January meeting of the PJBD, the Canadian Section of the Board gained the impression that the U.S. Air Defence planners were coming to the view that it would be necessary to increase the depth of the interception and combat zone over this continent by moving the northern boundary of the area covered by G.C.I. radar as far north as the fifty-fifth parallel of latitude. Any such move would of course be followed by a general expansion of U.S. Air Defence forces in Canada.

4. I think it would be worth while to try to find out whether the views of the U.S. officials with respect to the scale and character of the Air Defence programme have changed in the four months since this subject was last discussed at a Meeting of Consultation.

Soviet Intentions

5. In the light of the Berlin Conference, it might be useful to have a U.S. assessment of Soviet military intentions. This would no doubt take into account the latest estimates of Soviet strength and allied holding or retaliatory power,

... 3.

which could affect both the necessity for U.S. and Canadian troops in Europe and the need for a German defence contribution.

Middle East Defence

6. Discussion on the subject of Middle East defence would be timely in view of the proposed treaty of collaboration between Pakistan and Turkey. Is it likely, for example, that NATO may, through this development, find itself implicated in the defence of the Middle East, and that the pact might in that sense be regarded as an extension of NATO? It might be that a discussion on this general subject would incidentally provide information on U.S. plans for aid to Pakistan, and the manner in which this will be accomplished to avoid disturbing Pakistan's sensitive neighbours, a subject on which we have asked questions in Washington, without getting much substance in reply.

Korea and Indochina

7. It would be of interest to know whether or not, in the opinion of the United States, the agreement of the USSR to meet at Geneva to discuss Korea and Indochina indicates a slowdown in the Communist drive in Southeast Asia. It would also be of interest to know of the U.S. views with respect to the reduction of forces in Korea, and what sort of a settlement might be reached in Indochina. In the discussion under this heading, it would be well to reaffirm the Canadian view that there should be full prior consultation before any strategy in Korea is put in training. Reference might also be made to the fact that Canada has no intention of getting involved in any commitment of forces to Indochina.

R. A. M.

Security *Secret*

MESSAGE FORM
 OUTGOING

File No.	
<i>50 319-AE-40</i>	
<i>57</i>	<i>50</i>

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The Canadian Ambassador,
 Washington, D.C.

Message To Be Sent	<i>EX</i> No. <i>274</i>	Date February 19, 1954.	For Communications Section Only SENT — FEB 19 1954
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AIR CYPHER
 EN CLAIR
 CODE
 CYPHER *AUTO*

REFERENCE: Your telegram No. WA-286 of February 18

Priority
IMMEDIATE..... *RAM*

SUBJECT: Consultation Meeting

ORIGINATOR

 (Signature)
 .. R.A. MacKay/JM
 (Name Typed)
 Div.....
 Local Tel.....

General Foulkes would be available
 for consultation meeting ^{during} first two weeks
 in March and as far as I know I would be
 if the Minister decided I should go. We
 have not yet given much thought to subjects
 but shall try to send you our views early
 in the week.

APPROVED BY

 (Signature)
 ... R.A. MacKay
 (Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:
 S.S.E.A. U.S.S.E.A.

Done..... *MacK*
 Date..... *Feb 22/54*

Copies Referred To:
 Done.....
 Date.....
 Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

19.2.24(js)

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL
FORWARDED TO
REDDIT SECRET

COPY NO. 1... OF 21 COPIES

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

Security Classification

TOP SECRET

File No.

50219-AE-40
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TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Priority
IMPORTANT

System
CYPHER-AUTO

No. WA-286

Date February 18, 1954.

Departmental
Circulation
MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD'N
SECTION

Reference: Your letter D-1425 of December 4, 1953.

Subject: Consultation Meetings.

J-15

Following for the Acting Under-Secretary, Begins:

Over the past month we have discussed informally with the State Department the time and scope of the next consultation meeting. Both State Department officials and ourselves feel that these meetings should not be dropped and it is now some time since one has been held, except explicitly on continental defence. It now seems possible that a meeting could be arranged for the last week in February or the first week in March, at which time Bedell Smith would, by his own wish, preside and Bowie would probably be available following his return from Berlin.

2. While we have not thought of such a meeting as being a series of questions to the United States representatives as to the meaning and application of the "new look" in their defence plans, we do feel that that subject is now so closely connected with the original object of consultation meetings that it must to some extent appear in a discussion. As you know, we have previously found no opportunity of having any full discussion on United States policy; and since that policy, as stated, is based so heavily on atomic power, it does seem to fit into purposes of consultation meetings.

3. Similarly while continental defence as such might not be a major subject of the meeting, this again can hardly be neglected in a general examination of defence questions. There seems reason to believe that the threat to this continent has altered significantly in the last few months. It may also be that the position of this continent as base for retaliation has also altered as a result of the development of weapons, aircraft, and strategy.

4. We would assume that the United States representation would include Bedell Smith and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; we would hope that on the Canadian side you yourself and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff would attend.

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Done
COMM'S SECTION

Date 19 FEB 1954

References

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5. I should be grateful if you would discuss this matter with General Foulkes and let me have your views. I had intended to discuss this matter with the Minister while he is here next week and would therefore be grateful for a reply from you by Monday morning. Ends.

CLEARED
COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 FEB 19 AM 9:25

1954 FEB 19 AM 9:25
I have reviewed the attached and find it to be a copy of a letterhead memorandum dated February 18, 1954, and captioned as above. The information contained therein is being furnished to you for your information.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO:.....The Canadian Embassy,.....
WASHINGTON, D.C.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.
 Your Letter No. 2242
 Reference:...of November 21, 1953.....
 Subject:.....Future Meetings of Consultation....

Security:.....TOP SECRET.....
 No:.....D. 1425.....
 Date:....December 4, 1953.....
 Enclosures:.....
 Air or Surface Mail:....Surface.....
 Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
51219-AE-40	
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DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
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References

I am glad to know that all concerned are in agreement that the Meetings of Consultation should revert to their original purpose, i.e., to provide an opportunity for the exchange of views on developments in the world situation which might necessitate the use of atomic weapons.

2. It seems to me that since these discussions will ordinarily be essentially political in character, there would not normally be any particular reason or advantage in having military representatives present. Perhaps this question could be determined meeting by meeting, depending on the subject matter.

3. I leave it to your discretion to decide whether or not it would be desirable to have a further meeting after the Bermuda Conference. I am inclined to think, however, that the State Department is unlikely to have anything new to offer which could not be passed on through ordinary diplomatic procedures.

Internal Circulation

E. S. A. RITCHIE



Under-Secretary of State
 for External Affairs

Distribution to Posts

7.12.14(05)

Ext. 180 C

DUPLICATE

OTTAWA FILE
No. 51219-AE-40

Original on 2247 50209-40

Letter
Despatch No. 2247
Date: November 21, 1953

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.
TO: THE/SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference: Your Letter No. D-1323 of November 18, 1953.

Subject: Future Meetings of Consultation.

I quite agree with you that the meetings of consultation which were resumed with such useful results on October 22 should now be continued but that they should revert to their original purpose to provide an opportunity for the exchange of views on developments in the world situation which might necessitate the use of atomic weapons. If for any special reason the subject of continental defence needs to arise again in these meetings, I am sure that there would be mutual agreement between the United States representatives and ourselves to discuss this subject. However, as you say, it is desirable that the existing channels, i.e., the PJBD and the regular diplomatic channels, should be used normally for this purpose.

2. From our talks with the State Department, and particular Mr. Arneson, I gather that these views are generally shared by them. They are quite prepared to have a further meeting, possibly after the tripartite conference at Bermuda. We gather that they have not yet resumed meetings of consultation with the British since the new Administration took over. I suppose that, in effect, some of the discussion at the Bermuda conference will take the form of the type of tour d'horizon which usually takes place at these meetings of consultation. I do not know whether you wish us to raise again the possibility of putting the meetings of consultation on a tripartite basis. Of course, if we are to discuss continental defence in such meetings, there might be a disadvantage in such an arrangement.

3. When we do have the next meeting, Mr. Arneson has suggested informally that Mr. Bowie, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, might make a more detailed statement on the developments in the world situation and the way in which the new Administration regards the various danger spots. We have not yet had the views of the new Administration in this way. I do think, however, that if we are to have this type of discussion, it would be useful to have some assistance from the Department in the form of questions that might be asked and if possible some comments on the way in which we regard some of the more important situations which might give rise to war.

4. As to participation in these meetings, I gather that the State Department are quite content to have General Foulkes and Admiral Radford participate in

Copies Referred To.....
No. of Enclosures
Post File No.....

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further meetings, if this is desired on our side. It seems to me that the participation of the Chiefs of Staff in these discussions is useful and should be encouraged.

(signed) A.D.P.Heeney

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Canadian Embassy,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Security: TOP SECRET

No: D-1373

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Date: November 18, 1953.

Enclosures:

Reference: Your Letter No. 2173 of November 11, 1953.

Air or Surface Mail: Surface

Subject: Future Meetings of Consultation

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.
50219-AE-40
52-50

Original on 50209-40

References

I should like to comment on the final paragraph of your Letter No. 2173, in which you express the view that unless there are other matters in the field of continental defence which require the immediate attention of the United States authorities at a high level, we should allow a little time to elapse before requesting any further meetings.

Internal Circulation

2. I think we should bear in mind that the original purpose of these meetings of consultation (which are essentially informal in character) was only to exchange views on developments in the world situation which might necessitate the use of atomic weapons. I do not question the propriety of discussing continental defence under this heading, and under the particular circumstances I think we were right in using the meeting as a means of notifying the United States Government of the Canadian decisions with respect to the Southern Early Warning Line. I wonder, however, if in future we should not limit the functions of these discussions solely to that of consultation, and make use of the channels established for the purpose (i.e., the PJBD and regular diplomatic channels), whenever we desire to take up any matter of policy with the United States Government. I agree with you that Meetings of Consultation should be held infrequently and only when there is an appropriate problem of great importance on which it is desired to exchange views.

3. I should be grateful for your comments on these thoughts regarding the purpose and character of the Meetings of Consultation.

C. S. A. RITCHIE

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Distribution to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA

Security:.....TOP SECRET.....

No.:.....2173.....

FROM:The Canadian Ambassador,.....

Date:.....November 11, 1953.....

WASHINGTON, D. C.
My teletype No. WA-2519
of November 4, 1953.

Enclosures:.....

Reference:.....

Air or Surface Mail:..Surface.....

Subject:.....Further Meeting of Consultation..

Post File No:.....

.....on Continental Defence.....

Ottawa File No.
50209-40 50219-AE-40
53-57

Original on 50209-40

References

I enclose for your information six copies of our record of the further meeting of consultation on continental defence which took place in the State Department on November 6.

2. Our notes were compared with those taken on the United States side and the records were found to be substantially in agreement.

3. There are two further points that I might make in comment on this meeting. There was no doubt about the sincerity with which General Bedell Smith and General Ridgway welcomed the prompt action taken in Ottawa as a result of the previous meeting of consultation on October 22. As evidence of the desire here to make rapid progress with the matter, you might be interested to know that a record of the meeting was requested from the State Department by the White House and by the Department of Defense early on Monday morning to enable the United States Joint Chiefs to deal with the matter without delay.

4. The second point, which is perhaps worth noting, is the forthcoming attitude of the United States authorities to the question of developing co-operation with the British and ourselves in the matter of training troops in atomic warfare. As it turned out, it was fortunate that General Foulkes raised the question at the meeting. The response was cordial and the prospects of our limited request being met seem to be good.

5. Because of the importance of the matter I thought it might be useful to report the record taken on the United States side of the understanding reached at the meeting on the next step to be taken. The record made by Mr. Arneson reads as follows:

"General Smith suggested that General Foulkes might reduce his requirements to writing and pass them on to General Ridgway on an informal basis. If it was found, after consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that further action was required by higher authority, the matter might be referred to the Special Committee of the National Security Council where it would be given, he was confident, prompt attention. This Committee could also consult with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy if this proved necessary."

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

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6. As you will see, the Under-Secretary, General Bedell Smith, expressed a willingness to have further meetings of this kind whenever we desire. Unless you believe there are other matters in this field which require the immediate attention of the United States authorities at a high level, I think we should allow a little time to elapse before requesting any further meetings. In my opinion the meetings should be called only when decisions on matters of real importance in the defence field are urgently required.

(Sgd.) A. D. P. Heeney.

No. 6 OF 10 COPIES

TOP SECRET

November 10, 1953.

**Record of the Meeting of Consultation Between
Representatives of the Canadian and United
States Governments on Continental Defence,
Friday, November 6, 1953.**

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RESULT A SECRET

The meeting which was held in the State Department under the Chairmanship of General Walter Bedell Smith, the Under-Secretary of State, was attended by

General Mathew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff,
United States Army,
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under-Secretary of State,
Mr. Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs,
Mr. Robert Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning
Staff of the State Department and State
Department Representative on the National Security
Council Planning Board,
Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Matters,
Mr. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of Common-
wealth and Northern European Affairs, State
Department,

for the United States Government and by

Mr. A.D.P. Heeney, Canadian Ambassador to the
United States,
Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the
Canadian Chiefs of Staff,
Rear Admiral H. G. DeWolf, Chairman of the Canadian
Joint Staff, Washington,
Mr. George Ignatieff, Canadian Embassy,
Mr. J.J. McCardle, Canadian Embassy,

for the Canadian Government.

2. The Chairman suggested that since the meeting had been called at the initiative of the Canadian Government it might be best if Mr. Heeney led off the discussion. Mr. Heeney said that the Canadian Government had requested this further meeting in order that United States authorities might be told immediately at a high level of certain conclusions which had been arrived at by the Canadian Government as a result of the earlier consultations on continental defence with United States authorities on October 22. He said that the informal and high level approach which had been made at that time by the United States Government had enabled Canadian officials to bring the matter to the attention of the Cabinet Defence Committee which had reached the following decisions:

- (a) The Canadian Government accepted the advice of the Canada-United States Military Study

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Group that an early warning line should be established along the 55th parallel of latitude.

- (b) The Canadian Chiefs of Staff should instruct the Canadian Section of the Joint Study Group to urge that the Study Group complete the selection and specifications of equipment for the early warning line.
- (c) The Royal Canadian Air Force in consultation with the United States Air Force should carry out a detailed survey of the proposed early warning line and the sites along it.
- (d) Canada should undertake the planning and construction of the early warning line without prejudice to any later decisions which might be taken on the division of costs. And,
- (e) The views of the Canadian and United States Governments on the need for additional warning facilities in the vicinity of the 55th parallel of latitude should be recorded in the Journal of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence at its next meeting.

3. Mr. Heeney said that, because of the importance attached to the problem of continental defence, the Canadian Government had acted with the greatest possible speed in order that the measures considered necessary by the two Governments might be instituted as rapidly as possible. The Canadian Government had been able to determine its policy quickly because the requirements had been evolved jointly from the earliest stages through the medium of the Canada-United States Military Study Group. The Canadian Government was of the further opinion that by vesting responsibility for construction of the early warning line in a single authority the project might be carried through with the greatest possible rapidity and administrative convenience. Mr. Heeney said that in the view of the Canadian authorities the importance of the subject had warranted the convening of this informal meeting even though it was realized that it would be necessary subsequently to make the arrangements more formal by discussion in the Permanent Joint Board of Defence and possibly by an exchange of correspondence between the Governments.

4. The Chairman expressed the gratification of United States authorities at the speedy action taken on this important matter by the Canadian Government. General Ridgway said he would anticipate that the reaction of the United States Chiefs of Staff to the Canadian proposals would be favourable.

5. General Forikos supplemented Mr. Heeney's remarks with a statement on behalf of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. He said that the new United States assessment of the risk of Soviet attack which had been outlined at the meeting on October 22 had been accepted by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that the new assessment of Russian capabilities

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created a requirement to have in operation by 1956 a reasonable early warning system and they considered that an early warning line along the 55th parallel, as recommended by the Canada-United States Military Study Group, was a reasonable project which could, if energetically pursued, be put into operation by 1956. The Chairman intervened to confirm the fact that the early warning line along the 55th parallel was the "southern line". It was agreed that certain misgivings existed on both sides with respect to the "northern early warning line", i.e. project CARRON.

6. General Foulkes said that it was the opinion of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that, even though Canada might take the initiative and leadership in the project, there should be the closest collaboration between the Royal Canadian Air Force and the United States Air Force in order that the early warning line would be sited in such a way as to provide an early warning which would be acceptable in all respects to the United States authorities. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff had already instructed the Canadian Section of the Joint Study Group to urge the Study Group to complete its recommendations on the selection and specification of the necessary equipment and it was hoped that the United States Chiefs of Staff would give similar instructions to the United States Section. He said that as soon as decisions had been taken on this point Canadian authorities would undertake to supply all the equipment so that there would be no delay in installing the line once the necessary construction work had been completed. He said it was the opinion of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that it might be possible to guarantee greater security for the project if responsibility for construction was assumed by a single rather than a joint authority.

7. It would only be possible to arrive at a firm estimate of the cost of the project when the site survey was completed and when final decisions were taken with respect to the selection and specification for the equipment. The question of cost-sharing could then be considered. It was the opinion of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff that responsibility for working out the details of the project might now be given to operating agencies which for Canada would be the Royal Canadian Air Force and for the United States might possibly be the United States Air Force. Canadian service authorities were prepared to carry on with the project as soon as the agreement of the United States Chiefs of Staff had been secured to the proposals made at this meeting with the understanding that the problem of cost-sharing would be considered when firm estimates were available. Any joint arrangements might be made formal through the Permanent Joint Board of Defence.

8. The Chairman said that what had been proposed seemed completely acceptable and it now remained to obtain the opinion of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible. General Midway said that he was in complete personal agreement with the proposals, but that he was not in a position at this meeting to commit the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his capacity

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as Acting Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff he undertook to call a meeting early next week with the purpose of getting the agreement of the Chiefs of Staff to the proposals.

9. General Foulkes commented on the usefulness of this type of high level and informal meeting. In this instance it had made possible prompt action by the Canadian Government on a subject which had been raised as a matter of urgency by the United States Government. He expressed the hope that if, in the future, a Canadian problem arose which required immediate attention it would be possible to arrange for a similar exchange of views. The Chairman said that he would be willing to meet at any time it was thought necessary, and also that he thought that the two meetings which had been held under his chairmanship had been useful. He pointed out that the President and the National Security Council were especially interested in the problem of continental defence and he was pleased that such satisfactory progress in the field could be reported to the President.

Training in Defence Against Atomic Warfare

10. General Foulkes said he would like to raise one further point which was related to the co-operation of the two governments in the defence of the continent. While he realized the legal limitations under the McMahon Act, it was increasingly difficult to explain why Canadian forces could not ^{obtain} facilities in the United States for training in defence against atomic weapons. If the Canadian forces were to be able to co-operate effectively with United States forces in defence against atomic attack on the continent it seemed essential that

- (a) they be provided with instruction for personal defence, and
- (b) that the adequacy of Canadian equipment in the event of atomic attack be tested.

General Foulkes said that he was not pressing for immediate action but that sooner or later something would have to be done to ensure the effectiveness of Canadian co-operation in the field of atomic defence. He wondered if it would be possible for the United States to permit access to United States training courses to a limited number of Canadian instructors and to provide opportunities for the testing of Canadian equipment.

11. General Ridgway said that he appreciated the difficulties being faced by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and that "short of going to jail" he would do everything possible to take care of any Canadian requests which might be made in this respect. The Chairman agreed with General Ridgway that an effort should be made to meet any reasonable Canadian requests in spite of the "ponderous and difficult machinery" which existed in the United States Government

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to clear the release of information in the atomic field. He suggested that General Foulkes might make his requests in an informal letter to General Ridgway. Whatever General Ridgway could not arrange himself could be passed to the Board made up of representatives of the President, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Defense and the State Department which could recommend release of atomic information. It might even be necessary to have a request examined by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. In any event, the Chairman said, he, as the representative of the State Department on the Board, would recommend favourable action on a Canadian request on the basis of the necessity of co-operation between the two Governments to meet the problems of continental defence. It was agreed, therefore, that General Foulkes would follow this course of action.