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Vol 27

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EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR
M. Boudoin
DATE *2007-03-05*

DEPARTMENT
OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINISTÈRE
DES
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT
MESURES
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

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668

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À MINA

FROM/DE IDNZ

SUBJECT/SUJET PM's initiative.

ATTACHMENT
PIÈCE JOINTE 1

DISTRIBUTION	RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions)
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MINA (2)
FILE

CMR
FPR

ACTION/SUITE À DONNER

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REQUIRED BY/DEMANDÉ POUR

L.A. Delvoie
L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working
Group

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EXT 401

MINA (2).

FILE

CMR

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IDDZ/J. McNee/5-5912/cf

IDDZ/MASTER FILE
DIARY

IDDZ-0107
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

Mr. Ralph Surette
Box 20, Salmon River Dr.
R.R. 1
Dartmouth
Nova Scotia
B2W 3X7

FEB. 8 1984
FEB.

Dear Mr. Surette:

Thank you for your letter of January 19 and for your support for the Prime Minister's initiative and my own effort to try to halt and reverse the deteriorating trend in East-West relations.

It is clear that the Prime Minister has been voicing the deep concerns of a great many Canadians when he has argued the urgent necessity of restoring a constructive relationship between East and West based on mutual interest.

Although your proposal of joint action by a "third force" of non-nuclear states has a certain attraction, in the end I am not persuaded that it would be the right course to attempt. The nub of the problem is that I very much doubt that either of the superpowers would accept such a force as a mediator. Also, Canada, as a firm member of NATO and hence an aligned nation, would have some difficulty in approaching an ally such as the USA in the context of a non-aligned group.

Rather than promoting action by a group of states, the Prime Minister has argued that all states should in their own relations with the USA and USSR do what they can to bring pressure to bear on the superpowers. I do agree with you that world opinion does matter and can make a difference.

FEB 10 1984
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AR-AU 5233
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...

I am enclosing, for your information, a copy of my speech in the House of Commons on January 24 in which I reported on Canada's efforts to ameliorate the international security situation.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by
Original signé par
ALLAN J. MacEACHEN

Allan J. MacEachen

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ed jobs for himself and three other people. That is the kind of initiative we see in Canada.

If the Department of National Revenue received any direction from this Government, its auditor would have seen the ridiculous situation in which he was placing this young man and those who work for him. He would have seen that these people were going to be put out of work and added to the unemployment insurance rolls. He could have seen the drive that this man had, the initiative he had to get his business going. He was not prepared to listen to him.

People do not want welfare or unemployment insurance. I ask Hon. Members to stop and think about this for a minute. Just think if tomorrow you were told that you were out of a job and had to go on unemployment insurance. How could you face your wife and children? Imagine how this would undermine and individual's feeling of self-worth. Imagine how it would undermine someone's confidence to have to say "Daddy hasn't got a job" or "My spouse cannot support me; he is no longer the breadwinner, he is on unemployment insurance".

No wonder child abuse is increasing, as well as marriage breakdown. This is happening at a time when we have the resources, education and wherewithal. If only people would sit down together and work out their problems. We have had a confrontational government for the past six or seven years, not government by co-operation. The Prime Minister said over national television that co-operative federalism is dead. If co-operative federalism is dead, Canada is dead. We have not seen the last of separatist movements springing up on the East Coast, West Coast of central Canada.

In some areas that I represent, people are saying that if they do not soon get a fair shake, they are going to separate. They are ready to give it another chance, but not ready to do that indefinitely. We have the resources and we have educated people. We have people with enthusiasm, initiative and energy. What we need is a government that governs in a co-operative way, not by confrontation.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Questions, comments?

Hon. Allan J. MacEachen (Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs): Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) leaves late today to pursue his efforts for peace and security. Just over the weekend I returned from the Conference on Security and Disarmament in Stockholm. I was pleased to have associated with me at least meeting a number of my fellow parliamentarians, including the Right Hon. Member for Yellowhead (Mr. Clark), the Hon. Member for Thunder Bay-Aitikokan (Mr. McKee) and the Hon. Member for New Westminster-Coquitlam (Miss Jewett). It is in the context of these events that I would like to make some comments to the House as we pursue this debate on the Address in Reply.

May I begin by drawing attention to the fact that it is well-known to all Members that since the period toward the end of the 1970s there has been a steady deterioration in what we describe as East-West relations, or the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the NATO

countries and the Warsaw Pact countries. It became obvious that quite a number of contradictions had developed within the concept of détente. On the Soviet side, that concept in its view was not incompatible with an arms build-up and with different treatment of human rights from what the West had expected. Certainly the events in Afghanistan and Poland had their own impact upon the state of East-West relations. Indeed, by last summer, relations had deteriorated so badly between the United States and the Soviet Union that high-level dialogue had virtually ceased. That had not even happened during the bombing by the United States of North Viet Nam. Meanwhile, the allies in NATO countries developed their minimum response to the Soviet military build-up, particularly the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II missiles in response to the deployment of the SS-20s by the Soviet Union. That occurred in the face of worry in many countries, a worry based upon the fear that these developments were inexorably leading to military confrontation and possibly war.

• (1700)

That is the state of affairs which is well known to us. It was addressed, for example, last May at Williamsburg by the seven leaders of the industrialized countries. I mention that meeting because it was the first time that these leaders at their summit addressed international security questions. At the summit at Williamsburg they issued a declaration which developed from a suggestion that had been made by Canada and carried through the meeting by the Prime Minister. That declaration was quite important because it contained two very important elements which have been, in a sense, the basis of policy on the part of Canada certainly and of some other countries since the Williamsburg Summit. The leaders at that time undertook to maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat and to ensure peace. That was, in a sense, the deterrent aspect of the policy.

The second aspect was that the summit leaders undertook to devote their full political resources to reducing the threat of war. That was a very important message carried from Williamsburg throughout the world, that the leaders of all these countries had determined that their full political resources were to be used in that direction. We all know that a month later that basic message was endorsed in the communiqué by the NATO foreign ministers at their meeting in Paris.

We had this double-track policy very much on our minds when we decided to accept the American request to test the Cruise missile in Canada. When we made that decision, we determined at the same time that we would carry forward as much as we possibly could the political commitment which had been made at Williamsburg. On the day we took the decision on the Cruise missile, I wrote to Secretary Shultz and said that we were prepared to approve the testing as a contribution to alliance solidarity in the negotiation of a verifiable agreement on medium-ranged nuclear weapons. We also recognized an even greater obligation to join in the search for a secure peace. I also noted in that letter to Secretary Shultz, which was made public, that it was the Government's firm intention to redouble

its efforts in the coming months to contribute to the progress and eventual success of current negotiations.

We know the series of negotiations that were under way at that time. I believe it is within that context that we can understand the Prime Minister's efforts, particularly the launching of his peace effort in his speech at Guelph on October 27. The Prime Minister made five specific proposals in that speech, but the main message, which he underlined, was the necessity for a jolt or an injection of high-level political energy to speed the course of negotiations on nuclear arms control, on conventional arms reduction and on military confidence-building measures. That was the main thrust of the Prime Minister's message, to try to get a jolt of energy into a system which had become virtually paralysed, where dialogue had virtually ceased and where rhetoric had been built up almost as the main instrument of diplomacy.

I will not mention all the elements of the Prime Minister's speech, but I will refer to two aspects of it. One concerns his suggestion of raising the nuclear threshold in Europe by reaching agreement on a balance of conventional forces in Europe. There was good reason why the Prime Minister should have referred to the Mutual Balance Force Reduction talks, the MBFR talks as they are called. There was good reason for his mention of them because they had been ongoing for almost ten years and had not yet reached the results which had been hoped for initially. The second point in that speech which I want to mention was his desire to give additional or real political impetus to the Stockholm conference on military confidence-building measures and disarmament. I mention these two aspects of the Prime Minister's speech, namely the MBFR and the Stockholm conference, because they have a lot to do with the current political dialogue between the East and the West.

The December meeting of the NATO foreign ministers held in Brussels offered an opportunity for the ministers and the governments represented there to make a response to the then current situation. Deployment had begun. The talks between the Soviet Union and the United States had been broken off or were about to be broken off, and we were meeting in that particular difficult context. It is true that a number of Parliaments in Europe had endorsed deployment very strongly, but it is also true that public opinion was greatly concerned at the difficult situation which existed. I think the NATO meeting was very important. The first thing the ministers did was to issue what was described as the Brussels Declaration. A communiqué was also issued but there was a shorter document called the Brussels Declaration which was intended to summarize the attitude of the West at the present time toward eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the Brussels Declaration the ministers acknowledged their respect for the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests and reiterated earlier pledges to seek security on the basis of a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. They also affirmed their intention to do their utmost to sustain a safe and peaceful future and to work with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states to achieve a balanced and constructive relationship based, as the

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Brussels Declaration said, on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity.

• (1710)

I thought these were all very important concepts that were declared by the NATO governments to the world as the basis of a future relationship with eastern countries. The ministers closed with an appeal for an open, comprehensive, political dialogue. That is what the Prime Minister seeks, and I am sure it is sought by every Member of the House of Commons and every Canadian who is concerned about the future of the world and the necessity for asserting ourselves in the interests of peace.

The second statement that the ministers made dealt with MBFR negotiations stalled now for 10 years, with eastern proposals on the table but with no comprehensive western response as yet. The ministers agreed to review the state of negotiations and determine whether they could be moved forward. It is to be hoped they can be resumed later this year and that at that time western NATO ministers will be able to make a response to the eastern proposals that would ensure progress. At least, that is the view of Canada. It is also the view of Canada that at a certain point the ministers might consider their own presence at these talks. The circumstances would have to be right. The possibilities for some progress would have to be assured, but it seems to me this is another forum in which a jolt of political energy could usefully be made evident.

A further decision taken at the December meeting had to do with the Stockholm conference. It was agreed that the conference should be launched at the ministerial level; that politicians ought to attend; that it ought not to be left to bureaucrats and ambassadors, no matter how important they are, but that politicians ought to go in order to underline the importance they attach to a comprehensive dialogue in the interests of peace. That was decided by NATO ministers and, as a result, the eastern European ministers, including Mr. Gromyko, were present at the Stockholm conference. I may say a word about that later but I think all those present would agree that it was important that ministers attend, that politicians attend. Not only were there speeches, there were numerous bilateral dialogues that took place on the margins of the Stockholm meeting.

At NATO the fourth important decision that was taken was to conduct a review of the current state of East-West relations. That review was first suggested by the foreign minister of Belgium, Mr. Tindemans, who referred back to the Harmel report and thought the political aspects of it ought to be revisited and that NATO had to review, at least in my view he was attempting to ask NATO to update, its assessment of the current situation in view of the deployment and other developments, and to look to the future as to what ought to be on the agenda of East-West relations. That review has to be carefully conducted and it has to be done in a way that will also give a message of importance to the world.

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I came away greatly encouraged by the results of the NATO meeting. NATO ministers were confident in the unity of the alliance even though they realized it had been put under great stress in the past year. The efforts to weaken the alliance had backfired and, as a result, it was stronger and more confident than ever. It was therefore in a position to give some very strong messages to the world, especially to the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, that it was prepared to engage in what I have described as an open, comprehensive political dialogue.

I will now say a word about the Stockholm conference, Mr. Speaker. It arose out of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the subsequent Madrid conference where it was agreed that it would be important to convene a special conference in Stockholm. The object of this conference would be to develop and expand on the regime of military confidence building measures laid down in 1975 as a means of reducing suspicion and making arms reductions in Europe on the conventional side easier to achieve. Stockholm was important because it occurred at a time of de-tension when all other negotiations were in suspense—START, INF and the MBFR. There was no East-West forum and Stockholm was the occasion when some sort of dialogue was to be resumed.

I do not want to bore Hon. Members by repeating the speech I gave at Stockholm but I think I should refer to one or two points.

I certainly expressed the view that acrimonious rhetoric at this time was futile and that we needed to deepen and restore civilized dialogue; that we should make every effort to ensure that this conference succeeded; that we have to avoid rehearsing old grievances; that we have to adopt a businesslike approach and we have to register some practical achievements. These practical achievements could include more openness about basic military information; earlier notice of a wider range of military activities; mandatory rather than voluntary exchanges of observers at important military activities, and ways to verify any agreements reached.

I made another point that I think is important for politicians like us, and that is, that we should not let this conference drop out of sight and leave it entirely to officials. At a certain point ministers ought to be prepared to return to the conference and to ensure that it continues to have the political momentum that I think it achieved that first week in Stockholm.

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear!

• (1720)

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Speaker, before I begin my own remarks, I would like to put one or two questions to the Minister. First, I would ask the Minister if he has given any thought to making a reference to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence—whose illustrious Chairman is sitting almost beside the Minister—so that we may have a parliamentary discussion in that forum on the very topic to which the Minister has been referring today in his remarks. Can we have that reference at an early opportunity?

Mr. MacEachen: Well, Mr. Speaker, I am open to any suggestions regarding a reference on the question of East-West relations or peace, security, disarmament and peacekeeping. If Hon. Members are agreed on an enterprise of this kind, I certainly would co-operate. However, we would certainly have to see the terms of reference and have some discussions about it. I believe it would be a good thing for parliamentarians to keep an eye on this question of East-West relations and what ought to be done about it. It seems to me to be inconsistent to argue at Stockholm, as I did, that ministers ought to monitor the progress of that conference to ensure that every effort was expended to make it succeed, and at the same time to say there should be no opportunity for Hon. Members of the Canadian House of Commons to do similar things.

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Speaker, if the Minister would permit just a very simple follow-up question; would he assure us that any such attempt to get a reference such as I have referred to will have his support and, hopefully, with his support we will be able to get the other Hon. Members of the House to agree to it?

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to take an open attitude on that question. If we can decide on a reference which will facilitate discussion, I will look at it quite sympathetically. However, I would like to see what the reference is. I would like to talk to the Chairman of the Committee to find out what the work program of that Committee is and whether a reference would be useful at the present time.

Mr. Stevens: I can assure the Minister, Mr. Speaker, and I know the Chairman will certainly back me up on this, there is all kinds of time available to that Committee to handle the reference which might be forthcoming.

Mr. Minister, we are all deeply concerned about the tensions in the world today and, in particular, the unfortunate breakdown of negotiations between the major powers. However, something which has always startled us is the fact that there is no ambassador for disarmament, which is a role, and certainly an office, which I believe most people feel would be quite helpful at the present time. But while that office is allowed for in the structuring of the Minister's Department, it is not filled at the present time. Could the Minister indicate to the House why there is in fact no ambassador for disarmament? And may we expect not only an early appointment of such an ambassador, but also the assurance that he will have ample funding and staff to ensure he could play a truly meaningful role in this whole broad question of disarmament?

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, the Hon. Member has referred to the deep tensions which exist in the world, and I agree that they do exist. They were attested to at the Stockholm conference by the very tough speech made by Mr. Gromyko from the rostrum. It was quite tough. The substance of his analysis did not vary in what he said from the podium and what was stated to me in private, and it did reflect the tensions which the Hon. Member mentions. However, I should think it important to register what I consider to be a decided

May 24, 1984

COMMONS DEBATES

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improvement in certain quarters. The speech made by the President of the United States and the speech made by Mr. Shultz, in my opinion, were relatively moderate. And just a day or so ago, Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom expressed her view that there was a distinct change in policy from Washington and she appealed for further dialogue with the East. I believe that the more that is done, the more we will be able to influence the Soviet Union at this stage to change, possibly, its perceptions of the West and of the United States. It must work both ways. Western leaders can have an impact, and that is why I came away saying that if it were possible, it would be urgent for the Prime Minister and other leaders to go to Moscow to have discussions.

With respect to the ambassador for disarmament, Mr. Speaker, the post is vacant. However, the Hon. Member need not be worried because we have been devoting, in a sense, in the past several months the full resources of the Department and, indeed, of the Government on the question of disarmament.

Miss Jewett: Even the Prime Minister.

Mr. MacEachen: The Prime Minister, as the Hon. Member says, is a prime ambassador for disarmament. Therefore, because we have devoted so much of our resources—and the Prime Minister—to this activity, I am not apologetic about the vacancy. The vacancy will be filled. I am searching for the best possible person to fill this job, and when I conclude that I have that person, the appointment will be made. In the meantime, do not feel that disarmament is being neglected. It has never had the impetus it has received in the last several months.

Mr. Ogle: Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the Deputy Prime Minister one question, at least. He spoke about the problems of East-West. I was happy to hear his statements. The problem, I believe, between East-West many times is a misinterpretation of facts. I feel that in Central America right now there is the major problem of the traditional injustices of many kinds being called an East-West confrontation.

Has the Deputy Prime Minister talked to the American Secretary of State on his recent visit in Stockholm about that particular problem? Again, I would request the Deputy Prime Minister to seriously think of visiting that area himself so that we Canadians can have a uniquely Canadian policy on Central America. I would also like to say that I was happy that the money was released for Nicaragua and that aid has gone there.

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, I did not have an opportunity to raise the question of regional conflict with Secretary Shultz at Stockholm. We have done that in the past. We have discussed our differences on the subject of Central America. The Hon. Member is quite correct in saying that it has become a focus of East-West interest or rivalry. That is a fact. However, I certainly take the view that the surest way to bring about peace and security in that part of the world, is to deal with the basic economic and social problems and the political problems. For that reason we have argued against third-party

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military intervention. I have made these points to Mr. Shultz on more than one occasion. Our policy is not identical to that of the United States.

[Translation]

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. It being 5:30 p.m., it is my duty, pursuant to Standing Order 42(4), to interrupt the proceedings and to put forthwith every question necessary to dispose of the amendment or amendments now before the House.

• (1730)

[English]

The question is on the amendment. Mr. Mulroney, seconded by Mr. Nielsen, moved:

That the Address be amended by adding the following words:

"This House regrets to inform Your Excellency that your Government is incapable of providing leadership and direction in the social and economic affairs of the nation and has lost the confidence of this House and of the Canadian people and therefore requires that an election be called in accordance with the Canadian custom, practice and tradition of holding a general election at least every four years".

All those in favour of the motion will please say yea.

Some Hon. Members: Yea.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: All those opposed will please say nay.

Some Hon. Members: Nay.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: In my opinion, the nays have it.

And more than five Members having risen:

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Call in the Members.

The House divided on the motion (Mr. Mulroney), which was negatived on the following division:

(Division No. 10)

YEAS

Messrs.

Althouse	Ellis	Howie
Andre	Blzinga	Huntington
Anguish	Epp	Jarvis
Beatty	Fennell	Jelinek
Benjamin	Forrestall	Jewett (Ms.)
Blackburn	Fraser	Keeper
Blenkarn	Fritz	Kempling
Busley	Friesen	Knowles
Cardiff	Gamble	Kristiansen
Clark	Guss	Lambert
(Yellowhead)	Gilchrist	Lawrence
Clark	Greenaway	Lewis
(Brandon-Souris)	Gurbin	Lewycky
Coates	Gustafson	MacDonald (Miss)
Cook	Halliday	(Kingston and the Islands)
Cooper	Hamilton	MacDougall
Corbett	(Qu'Appelle-Moose	Malone
Crombie	Mountain)	Mayer
Crosby	Hamilton	Mazankowski
(Halifax West)	(Swift Current-Maple	McCain
Crouse	Creek)	McCaish
Dantzer	Hargrave	McGrath
Darling	Hawkes	McKenzie
Deans	Heap	McKinnon
de Jong	Hess	McKnight
Dick	Hnatyshyn	McLean
Dunn	Hovdebo	McMillan



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES
ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

From De Ralph Surette N.S.		No. No A 05233
Subject Sujet re peace initiatives etc.		Action div./Dir. responsable IDA 1DD2
Letter dated/Lettre en date du 84-01-19	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. 84-01-24
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par		Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s) 84-01-31
Comments/Commentaires		

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu January 25/84
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

5-1047

EXT 439 (83/3)

RETURN TO MINA REGISTRY WHEN ACTION COMPLETED
RETOURNER AU REGISTRE DE MINA LORSQUE L'ACTION EST COMPLÉTÉE

Seen by / vu par
Kenzie MacKinnon

*Reg
for Act*

Box 20, Salmon River Dr.
R.R. 1, Dartmouth
Nova Scotia
B2W 3X7
Jan. 19, 1984

The Hon. Allan MacEachen
Deputy Prime Minister
Minister of External Affairs
Ottawa

Dear Mr. MacEachen:

I'm a veteran freelance journalist whose name you may have come across in the past. I haven't always been kind to your government, although I fully applaud your peace initiatives.

In that connection I wish to propose to you what I believe is an urgent idea. Mr. Trudeau and yourself, it seems to me, have not yet followed your own logic to the end. If you did, the initiative would surely find a new life.

Mr. Trudeau says that the issue of disarmament is "too important to be left to the superpowers." Most of the world would probably endorse that statement. The conclusion to be drawn from it is that you should, instead of flying solo, be trying to organize the world's non-nuclear states into a third force, a formal body that would insist on mediating between the superpowers, perhaps even arbitrating--a role which no existing institution, including the U.N., is now suited to fill.

It seems to me that the world is thirsting for such a presence as reasonable people everywhere are appalled at the superpowers' puerile attitudes of one-upmanship.

A third force, even if it failed in its mediating objectives, would provide, by its very formation, a psychological jolt that might very well get the superpowers to negotiate more seriously on their own as they felt more keenly the weight of world opinion pressing down on them.'

The fact that some Warsaw Pact governments are complaining publicly about Soviet rockets on their soil might indicate that participation in such a third force is possible from Eastern Europe. Interest from Third World countries, I would think, was amply demonstrated at the Commonwealth Conference in New Delhi.

Sooner or later, I believe, some government or individual will emerge on the world scene and bring about such a nonaligned organization. The Government of Canada could play that role now that you already have the world's attention to some degree.

Yours Sincerely,

Ralph Surette
Ralph Surette


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10 9 Surette,
Keele

File Number: _____
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Référé à: _____
Charged to: _____
À la charge de: _____

O/SSEA

C/REGISTRY





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HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK - BRIEFING NOTE
DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES - NOTES D'INFORMATION

Section

IDDZ

Subject/Highlights Sujet/Points saillants

Prime Minister's comments at Davos regarding certain aspects of USA
defence policy and NATO strategy

Source

All major Canadian media

Assessment Evaluation

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

In the course of a panel discussion on international security held in Davos, Switzerland on January 28, the Prime Minister made a number of comments and raised several questions about the USA's commitment to use of nuclear weapons in defence of Western Europe and about the continued viability of NATO's doctrine of flexible response. Some of the Prime Minister's comments were challenged by former French Prime Minister Raymond Barre and by USA Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam. The PM's remarks are likely to be regarded as unwelcome in Washington and in many Western European countries, because they will be seen as weakening the credibility of the Western deterrent in the eyes of the Soviet Union and its allies.

Suggested Reply Réponse suggérée

(The following line in answer to questions on this subject has been approved by the Prime Minister):

"The strength of Western societies is best demonstrated by our readiness to conduct an open discussion of goals and strategies. The Prime Minister did no more than bring to the symposium -- a wide-ranging and informal Saturday session -- a number of ideas and issues currently being discussed by specialists in the field of international security. Canada has traditionally encouraged an active USA engagement in Europe and, of course, our commitment to NATO and its policies remains unchanged."

Prepared by / Préparé par

L. A. Delvoire

Division Direction

IDDZ

Date

January 30/84

Tel. no. N° de té

995-5912

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CABINET DU
SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MEMORANDUM

To
A Office of the Under-Secretary

From
De MINA

Security
Sécurité UNCLASSIFIED

Reference
Référence Date January 30, 1984

Subject
Sujet Parliamentary Report - January 30

DPM/SSEA (2)
MINA (11)
MINE/Jalbert/
Laverdure
MINT/Burbridge/
MacDonald
PMO/Fairbairn
PCO/Adam/Fadden/
Elcock/Mitchell

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CMR (2)
DMT
DMF
CCB
CCBR
SFB
TFB
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NAX
PED
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PPD
PSD
RBD
RCD
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FPR
ACB
ADA
APD
APZ
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ON THE HILL

The House met at 11:00 to consider an Opposition motion "that the House endorse a programme to be incorporated into the forthcoming budget that will: 1) provide for employee consultation in the introduction of technological change; 2) provide flexible work arrangements to minimize job losses; 3) ease the impact on employees affected by technological change; 4) expand necessary retraining programs; 5) encourage technological changes that promote new products, industries and jobs."

Friday, debate continued on the Second Reading of Bill C-21 (Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programmes Financing Act, 1977, Measure to Amend).

Q.P. questions of Departmental interest: PM'S STATEMENTS AT DAVOS; TRADE QUOTAS

Member Statements of Departmental interest: Dave Nickerson made a statement about Canada's silence on the increasingly protectionist policies of the US. Concern was expressed regarding recent US limits on copper imports. Mr. Nickerson impressed upon the Govt the need to make representations to the US govt that such actions would be considered by Canada to be an unfriendly gesture. Stan Hudecki, once again, brought the attention of the House to the case of Professor Massera who has been imprisoned and tortured in Uruguay. He expressed his disquiet over the treatment Professor Massera has received and sought to have vigorous govt protests made on the Uruguayan's behalf.

SENSE OF THE HOUSE

Two issues dominated the House today - the Prime Minister's Peace and Security comments at Davos elicited strong and critical reaction from the Conservatives. Equally critical but much more emotional were the comments of several leading Conservative MPs regarding the alleged breach of a citizen's right to communicate in confidence on public matters with Ministers of the Crown and their officials, and the alleged impugning of the Leader of the Opposition's motives in raising this tax matter with the Dept of Finance. At the end of Question Period, Jake Epp rose on a point of order to continue debate on the policy implications of the Mulroney/Lalonde debate.

PM'S STATEMENTS AT DAVOS

Sinclair Stevens led off the questioning by focusing on the "Prime Minister's public musings" at Davos, especially his exchanges with former Prime Minister of France Raymond Barre and US State Dept Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam. Mr. Stevens said that these comments raised doubt as to Canada's commitment

to the NATO countries and cast a serious cloud over the credibility of NATO's policies and strategy. Acting PM Pepin, in reply, pointed out that all leaders realized that nuclear war would be a disaster for the world and said that the PM was only trying to stress this--"a questioning of our NATO policy does not imply a change in the policy." When asked what the Govt intended to do to reassure the world of Canada's continued commitment to NATO, Minister Pepin stated that this type of assurance was unnecessary and said that democracies could handle this type of criticism. He also mentioned that the Leader of the Opposition, in his Dec/83 foreign policy speech, had encouraged such an open and frank debate of Nato policies. To this remark, Minister Sinclair noted that as a head of govt, Mr. Trudeau, per force, was speaking as a member of NATO; "thus, how can we expect our allies to trust Canada when the PM has publically questioned NATO's policies?"

Erik Nielsen continued the onslaught in reply to Minister Pepin's comment that "our allies have a sufficiently high opinion of us that they will not think that we have changed our policy. Discussion, disagreeing with allies is not a bad thing, discussions with friends are not unfriendly." To which Mr. Nielsen replied that such discussions should go on in private and that when the PM embarked on his peace initiative, it was with the intention of decreasing tension and increasing dialogue. In view of the highly critical remarks of the PM, tension had increased and dialogue decreased. Minister Pepin insisted that this type of dialogue was good and it was advantageous to have it in a public forum.

IMPORT QUOTAS


A question was raised by Michael Wilson regarding import quotas which was held for the reply by the Minister for International Trade. Ed Lumley did reply to the second part of the question dealing with possible joint action with the US to encourage industrial development. He stated that the Member was two years behind the times and that the Govt had taken many initiatives and put 25,000 people back to work.

Another "hot" issue in the House concerned the exchange in the House last week between Minister Lalonde and the Leader of the Opposition, Brian Mulroney, with regard to correspondence that Mr. Mulroney was alleged to have written regarding "tax breaks for the rich." After an exchange between Jake Epp and the Acting PM concerning Govt policy on the release of letters from members of the public and Mr. McGrath and the Acting PM concerning when such release is morally acceptable in a free and democratic society, Minister Lalonde rose and expressed his regrets to the House. He also apologized to Mr. Mulroney for the incident, noting that the representations of Mr. Mulroney to the Dept of Finance had been oral, not written, as the Minister had first stated in the House.

Other questions concerned unemployment and what people should do if they were about to run out of unemployment insurance with no prospect of a job. Ian Deans noted the problem of "paying for new initiatives" to help these unemployed and suggested a redirecting of funds from "less worthy projects." Mr. Lalonde answered questions on falling farm incomes and fuel taxes for farmers. To both questions he replied that the matters would be considered for inclusion in the forthcoming budget. Our multicultural background, with reference to celebrating holidays which have cultural significance to individuals, e.g. Chinese New Year, was discussed in Question Period and commented on by Members in oral statements.

The Leader of the NDP Party asked a question on the right of individuals to participate in decisions on technological change and was told by Minister Gray that the subject had been discussed with senior members of labour and they did not wish to be involved.

Ray Hnatyshyn raised the issue of taxation again and training of tax officers. He told the House that Minister Bussières had consented to show the training film, as requested, but that it would be shown in camera and no press would be allowed. The Acting PM again replied to this question by stating that an inquiry was being conducted into certain practices of the Taxation Dept and the Minister National Revenue would cooperate in any way possible.


D. Colin Robertson
Departmental Assistant

TO/A * DOSSIER

FROM/DE * FPR

REFERENCE *
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT *
SUJET
Radio-Canada CBOF-08H15-"Présent"
25 janvier 1984
Initiative de paix du Premier ministre Trudeau

Security / Sécurité	NON CLASSIFIÉ
Accession / Référence	
File / Dossier	
Date	30 janvier 1984
Number / Numéro	FPR-0098

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PROGRAM:

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DATE:

DATE: Le 25 janvier 1984

NETWORK / STATION:

RESEAU / STATION:

RADIO CANADA/CBOF

TIME:

HEURE: 8h15

CBOF: Monsieur Trudeau en visite chez les satellites du
 bloc soviétique. Ce matin, d'Ottawa, j'interroge
Monsieur John Noble, porte-parole du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
du Canada. Monsieur Noble, notre Ministre des Affaires Etrangères,
Monsieur MacEachen a déclaré hier à la Chambre des Communes que les
pays de l'Ouest sont maintenant dans une bonne position pour engager
un dialogue politique ouvert et compréhensif avec l'Union Soviétique.
Mais comment peut-on dire ça après ce qui s'est passé à Stockholm?

NOBLE: Mais je crois c'est sur la base de la déclaration de
 Bruxelles, de l'OTAN au mois de décembre que l'OTAN
a lancé un appel au dialogue et ça a été suivi comme vous le
savez la semaine passé par le discours du Président Reagan, cette
semaine par le discours du Premier Ministre Thatcher en Angleterre...

CBOF: Mais par un discours très dur de Monsieur Gromico (?)
 aussi, on voit mal comment on serait maintenant plus
proche d'un dialogue?

...2

NOBLE: Mais Monsieur Gromico à part de son discours dur, il a eu des entretiens privés avec la plupart de ses homologues de l'OTAN, par Monsieur Schultz, par Monsieur MacEachen, Sir Geoffrey Howe (?). Alors il a parlé à... il a parlé d'une façon assez dure aussi en privé mais quand même le dialogue a été relancé disons.

CBOF: Je lis une dépêche de la presse canadienne sur ce que Monsieur MacEachen a dit hier en Chambre et on y dit à propos de la visite de Monsieur Trudeau dans les pays communistes Monsieur MacEachen dit que sa mission doit être perçue dans le contexte d'un effondrement prochain des relations (inaudible). Est-ce que je lis bien? Est-ce qu'il y a danger d'effondrement en ce moment, plus grave encore?

NOBLE: Non, je ne crois pas. Il y a pas un danger, mais Monsieur MacEachen quand il a rencontré Monsieur Gromico, il a trouvé que Monsieur Gromico avait des impressions très fausses de l'image... mais avec quelle image des pays de l'OTAN vis-à-vis l'Est. Alors donc il croit qu'elle est plus nécessaire que jamais que Monsieur Trudeau, que toute en politique de l'Ouest s'en va dans les pays de l'Est pour leur dire exactement, pour expliquer quelle est la politique de l'OTAN, quelle est la politique américaine et que nous sommes ouverts par un dialogue avec eux, nous tous voulons la paix.

CBOF: Donc, c'est l'essentiel de la tâche de Monsieur Trudeau

...3

Czechoslovaquie, en Roumanie, en Allemagne de l'Est, de les convaincre que Monsieur Reagan et l'Occident sont beaucoup plus parlables qu'il ne le croit?

NOBLE: Oui, je crois c'est certainement un début et d'ailleurs Monsieur Trudeau n'a pas encore rencontré les gens de Czechoslovaquie, quoi. Il a eu des entretiens avec tous les hommes de l'Europe de l'Ouest, la Chine, le Japon, le Président Reagan, Monsieur Schultz, les pays du tiers monde, nouvelles données avec le Commonwealth. Alors donc, le seul grand taux qui se pose dans son projet mondial pour la paix, c'est les pays de l'Europe de l'Est et comme vous le savez, il aurait bien souhaité à se rendre à Moscou mais avec la santé de Monsieur Andropov, c'est pas possible de... pendant un certain temps donc, il a décidé de se rendre plutôt dans d'autres cités de la Czechoslovaquie.

CBOF: Mais quand Monsieur Trudeau va se faire demander entre quatre yeux, est-ce que vous croyez vous vraiment sincèrement à la bonne foi des Etats-Unis et de Monsieur Reagan, qu'est-ce qu'il va répondre?

NOBLE: Je crois qu'il va répondre certainement oui, qu'il y a eu un changement net dans la position américaine exprimée dans les déclarations publiquement qui datent depuis le discours de Monsieur Reagan aux Nations-Unies au mois de septembre suivies par son discours au Parlement japonais, par son discours la semaine passé et c'est ce qui a réflété dans les positions

...4

Américaines à Stockholm et ailleurs aussi.

CBOF: Pourtant, dans La Prasda (?) encore hier, Monsieur Andropob dit, nous n'acceptons pas, nous ne pouvons pas accepter que l'Ouest négocie à partir d'une position de forces. Or, c'est précisément la politique de Monsieur Reagan même s'il change un peu son discours et qu'il atténue le ton?

NOBLE: Mais c'est une question de force, mais c'est sur une base d'égalité. Nous ne cherchons pas l'Ouest une supériorité sur les forces des soviétiques et donc, nous sommes prêts à gager.... mais un débat d'égalité d'un équilibre puis c'est assez important et je crois que c'est important pour nous et aussi important pour les soviétiques qui se rendent compte que nous sommes pas là pour leur y dominer, quoi.

CBOF: Est-ce que dans les trois pays que Monsieur Trudeau va visiter, il y en a un qui vous paraît plus important que l'autre ou s'il s'agit simplement de leur faire faire à tous les trois le même message à Moscou?

NOBLE: Mais je crois il y a la Roumanie qui a un peu le genre de Canada dans l'OTAN quoi, que parce que la Roumanie suit une politique un peu plus indépendant des autres pays de l'Europe de l'Est que des autres. Mais dans le monde de l'Est et Czechoslovaquie sont deux pays, le parc de Yougoslavie ou les missiles soviétiques seront déployées contre les missiles Cruise

...5

Perching II. Alors donc, c'est un peu pour convaincre certains gens où il y a des missiles, il y aura missiles du côté soviétique qui seront déployés, de se rendre compte que c'est bien important d'arriver à une négociations où on élimine le plus tôt possible tous ces installations de ces missiles.

CBOF: Monsieur John Noble, merci beaucoup.

* * *

file

TO/À • USS DMF
FROM/DE • CPD

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET • Speech for Prime Minister on
Return from Europe

Security/Sécurité UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date January 30, 1984
Number/Numéro CPD-0092

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Bob Fowler called me at home yesterday evening. Unfortunately, I was out, but my ten-year-old daughter took the message. The message, as best she could transcribe it, was that the Prime Minister was happy with the speech, but he apparently wanted a more philosophical ending. I am trying to reach Fowler and Hancock in Germany to see whether I can't get a little clearer intelligence. In any case, I am in the meantime working on a more uplifting message at the end of the speech.

P. Heinbecker

Paul Heinbecker
Chairman
Policy Development Secretariat

pm *Delors*

U *max*

File

CONFIDENTIAL

January 29, 1984

Memorandum for the Prime Minister
c.c. Ted Johnson

Your Remarks and the Symposium:
Anticipated Questions in the House of Commons

Media Coverage

Initial news coverage varies widely in tone. Both CBC-TV and CTV Saturday night news reports were critical. David Halton says you committed a "big gaffe" by publicly criticizing NATO's first strike doctrine. He concludes your remarks will infuriate Washington and destroy the initiative's credibility there. Bob Evans of CTV had a similar report, running Barre's view that questioning doctrine hurts the Alliance's credibility.

On the print side, CP filed a straightforward and balanced account of the event. The lead para. stated: "Prime Minister Trudeau said today that he isn't sure a U.S. President would risk nuclear war to save Western Europe from a Soviet invasion." He goes on to say you questioned "the very basis of NATO's defence policy in Europe". He uses extensive quotes from the exchange with Barre and then concludes with your suggestion in your earlier remarks that success at MBFR "might negate the need for NATO's first-use policy". The Sunday Star's Bob Hepburn concentrated on your exchange with Dam on the quality versus quantity of nuclear stockpiles. While the Toronto Sunday Sun, predictably enough, took a UPI story from a non-Canadian reporter based in Europe, and ran a headline: "PET in NATO row; questions U.S. desire to defend Europe"; and in an editorial, says you have damaged the Alliance and given the Russians a political weapon.

Radio news was lead-item along the lines of the CP story, over the week-end.

.../2

-2-

In summary, the story is a major one back home, that has not yet reached its full media coverage potential because of the limited impact of weekend newscasts and the very few Sunday papers. The story will grow on Monday when the Opposition takes to the attack on the issue in Question Period, and Allies begin to respond in the media. At this moment, there seems no particular advantage in meeting the press to elaborate on your Saturday comments, before your already scheduled meeting with the press on Tuesday in East Berlin.

There are several options:

a) Silence: see how it plays. Problem is likely criticism in the House and possible enquiries from allied governments.

b) Dismissive:

"The Prime Minister did no more than bring to the Symposium -- a wide-ranging and informal Saturday session -- a number of ideas and issues currently being discussed by specialists in the field of international security. Canada has traditionally encouraged an active USA engagement in Europe and, of course, our commitment to NATO remains unchanged".

c) Unrepentant:

"The strength of Western societies is best demonstrated by our readiness to conduct an open discussion of goals and strategies. Canada's continuing commitment to NATO and its policies does not mean that they cannot be questioned or debated in informal settings such as the Davos Symposium.

../3

-3-

d) Minimalist:

"The Prime Minister's remarks were made in an informal context. Canada's long-standing commitment to NATO and its purposes remain unchanged.

RECOMMENDATION:

In light of the broad media coverage of your remarks, as well as the State Department reaction that the U.S. commitment to Europe remains unchanged, we recommend that a statement be made, preferably in the House tomorrow. Perhaps a combination of options (c) and (b) in that order.

If you agree we will pass this line to Joyce Fairbairn for the use of the Acting Prime Minister or Acting SSEA.

R.R.F.

Coleman/Hancock/Smith

MASTER FILE

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

January 28, 1984.

Memorandum for Peter Hancock

Subject: Prime Minister's Visit To The GDR - Approach

After only two months in a country of second accreditation, I am not in a strong position to assess the most profitable approach the Prime Minister should adopt in pursuit of his peace initiative during his visit to the GDR.

2. At the same time, in my previous capacity and current role, I have had an opportunity to spend perhaps five hours in personal conversation with Mr. Honecker.
3. As is to be expected he is a faithful disciple of the Soviet line, although his views are inevitably tempered by the reality and emotion of the special nature of inter-German relations.
4. He is the personification of the GDR and all other officials pale by comparison no matter what their position.
5. He is undoubtedly responsible for the harsher aspects of the GDR regime (and there are many); at the same time the GDR is now the tenth most industrialized nation in the world with a per capita income above that of the United Kingdom.
6. The GDR lies at the edge of East-West confrontation and it is, therefore, particularly sensitive to the ebb and flow of East-West relations and the rise and fall of fortunes between the super-powers.
7. Mr. Honecker will inevitably blame the sad state of East-West relations on the West and particularly on the Reagan Administration. His line generally parallels that of Mr. Andropov and Mr. Gromyko.
8. He is, however, a personable personality who is invariably well-briefed and speaks with the authority no one else in the GDR enjoys or pretends to.
9. The Chairman is also an ardent advocate of the GDR line that there is a degree of independence between bilateral relations and the international atmosphere and that an improvement in the former can have a favourable impact on the latter.
10. In this context the 1983 signature of a bilateral long-term trade agreement and a grains agreement have produced a new and most favourable factor in our bilateral relations.

- 2 -

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

11. This is dramatically reinforced by the Prime Minister's visit to Berlin East, the first by a NATO Head of Government. The GDR authorities are thoroughly enthralled not only by the precedent but by the fact that it is Mr. Trudeau whose stature in Eastern Europe, including the GDR, is one of admiration and respect despite differing social systems and military alliances.

12. This is abundantly evident in the flexibility displayed by the GDR authorities in the arrangements for the Prime Minister's program as exemplified by their willingness to forego those protocol functions which would enhance (even by implication) Berlin East's status as the "Hauptstadt der DDR" and their determination to meet the Prime Minister's wishes for both the official and informal aspects of his program.

13. In my view the Prime Minister is currently in a unique position to pursue his peace initiative in a most conducive atmosphere despite the considerable constraints existent on Mr. Honecker and his regime.

14. They fully expect the Prime Minister to outline the various facets of his initiative whether it is attractive from a GDR viewpoint or Warsaw Pact perspective or not. Where possible, and given the constraints under which they must operate, we believe they will give the Prime Minister the advantage of any doubt.

15. We would recommend that the Prime Minister not hang back on any subject on the grounds it might be distasteful to his hosts. Rather there is much to be gained by pushing where possible and as diplomatically as the enhanced atmosphere of Canadian-GDR relations may allow.

16. Mr. Honecker is more than willing to discuss any subject even though it is clear from the outset there will be no meeting of minds. To the Chairman (as to us) the important thing is to discuss the issues no matter how disparate views may be. Only then will there be a better understanding of one another's position.

17. It would be misleading to expect a dramatic breakthrough during the Prime Minister's visit. On the other hand the current atmosphere is most conducive to a frank exchange of views (which inevitably will be forwarded to Moscow with utmost haste) and we would encourage the Prime Minister to follow suit in terms in keeping with his initiative.

18. Although Mr. Honecker may disagree in predictable terms, our experience is that he will listen very closely and convey any messages to those who really count.

... 3

- nothing to be gained
- construction of power → not to
in mind of our enemies, not
for our people.
- ^{other} not to think, to remain. No need to change
not.
- must not to look like attack on
alliance
- ^{other} not to think, to remain. No need to change
not.

- very much key, of balance in the
highly down, T of power,
highly under the shield

Thurs
T Feb

∴ great of our power, better,
will be the best way.

- still not sure

- see intention to do curriculum must
be done

- debate on 2 planes of power.
settle. object of it was
around of our eyes

- but not to, under each. the NS to be
blinded by H.R.

- present our defence of certain values

the distinction of power (political and moral)

- not in future, → 5 power.

- Intellectual progress. (understand the - we now have the 000771
on the way)

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

19. Your visit will do wonders in terms of the bilateral relationship and we look forward to it with great anticipation.

A. P. McLaine

needs well,
primary, dramatic, not hard in style.
but doesn't end up where we
want it to

- attempt to elaborate on some program.
- doesn't have really what seemed to be.
- how change shifts line between public & private.
- doesn't seem real credit, if he's - started
initiative
- in secret of initiative & makes it fruitful
- example what not outside, political
- should be 2 parts a) center of much work,
this not open to do a deal.
political thinking
b) what left to do now and doing
started.
- when does initiative go from here,
Ed's role, some of it current program
attained - still, more, others table.
in Geneva.
- 5 power: now - how of P.D.C. & then of
own allies, how 'what change' now
P.D.C. will not say or less, if
P.D.C. covers them
- hope for progress in A.C. for P.D.C., Centre (don't know where it)
hope to be more concrete on others
- 2nd part of initiative & when do we go from here
- only now a urgent thing = almost to do carefully
is to continue with P.D.C. now; work with
others, (talked 05.05, saying the, in how work & do, meaning new
political course, when we can't think & say & others & then come



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FEB 7 1984
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Mr. Ralph Surette
Box 20, Salmon River Dr.
R.R. 1
Dartmouth
Nova Scotia
B2W 3X7

Dear Mr. Surette:

Thank you for your letter of January 19 and for your support for the Prime Minister's initiative and my own effort to try to halt and reverse the deteriorating trend in East-West relations.

It is clear that the Prime Minister has been voicing the deep concerns of a great many Canadians when he has argued the urgent necessity of restoring a constructive relationship between East and West based on mutual interest.

Although your proposal of joint action by a "third force" of non-nuclear states has a certain attraction, in the end I am not persuaded that it would be the right course to attempt. The nub of the problem is that I very much doubt that either of the superpowers would accept such a force as a mediator. Also, Canada, as a firm member of NATO and hence an aligned nation, would have some difficulty in approaching an ally such as the USA in the context of a non-aligned group.

Rather than promoting action by a group of states, the Prime Minister has argued that all states should in their own relations with the USA and USSR do what they can to bring pressure to bear on the superpowers. I do agree with you that world opinion does matter and can make a difference.

.../2

FEB 1 1984
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IDD

- 2 -

... I am enclosing, for your information, a copy of my speech in the House of Commons on January 24 in which I reported on Canada's efforts to ameliorate the international security situation.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by
Original signé par
ALLAN J. MacEACHEN

Allan J. MacEachen

The Address—Mr. MacEachen

ed jobs for himself and three other people. That is the kind of initiative we see in Canada.

If the Department of National Revenue received any direction from this Government, its auditor would have seen the ridiculous situation in which he was placing this young man and those who work for him. He would have seen that these people were going to be put out of work and added to the unemployment insurance rolls. He could have seen the drive that this man had, the initiative he had to get his business going. He was not prepared to listen to him.

People do not want welfare or unemployment insurance. I ask Hon. Members to stop and think about this for a minute. Just think if tomorrow you were told that you were out of a job and had to go on unemployment insurance. How could you face your wife and children? Imagine how this would undermine and individual's feeling of self-worth. Imagine how it would undermine someone's confidence to have to say "Daddy hasn't got a job" or "My spouse cannot support me; he is no longer the breadwinner, he is on unemployment insurance".

No wonder child abuse is increasing, as well as marriage breakdown. This is happening at a time when we have the resources, education and wherewithal. If only people would sit down together and work out their problems. We have had a confrontational government for the past six or seven years, not government by co-operation. The Prime Minister said over national television that co-operative federalism is dead. If co-operative federalism is dead, Canada is dead. We have not seen the last of separatist movements springing up on the East Coast, West Coast of central Canada.

In some areas that I represent, people are saying that if they do not soon get a fair shake, they are going to separate. They are ready to give it another chance, but not ready to do that indefinitely. We have the resources and we have educated people. We have people with enthusiasm, initiative and energy. What we need is a government that governs in a co-operative way, not by confrontation.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Questions, comments?

Hon. Allan J. MacEachen (Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs): Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) leaves late today to pursue his efforts for peace and security. Just over the weekend I returned from the Conference on Security and Disarmament in Stockholm. I was pleased to have associated with me at least meeting a number of my fellow parliamentarians, including the Right Hon. Member for Yellowhead (Mr. Clark), the Hon. Member for Thunder Bay-Atikokan (Mr. McRae) and the Hon. Member for New Westminster-Coquitlam (Miss Jewett). It is in the context of these events that I would like to make some comments to the House as we pursue this debate on the Address in Reply.

May I begin by drawing attention to the fact that it is well-known to all Members that since the period toward the end of the 1970s there and has been a steady deterioration in what we describe as East-West relations, or the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the NATO

countries and the Warsaw Pact countries. It became obvious that quite a number of contradictions had developed within the concept of détente. On the Soviet side, that concept in its view was not incompatible with an arms build-up and with different treatment of human rights from what the West had expected. Certainly the events in Afghanistan and Poland had their own impact upon the state of East-West relations. Indeed, by last summer, relations had deteriorated so badly between the United States and the Soviet Union that high-level dialogue had virtually ceased. That had not even happened during the bombing by the United States of North Viet Nam. Meanwhile, the allies in NATO countries developed their minimum response to the Soviet military build-up, particularly the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II missiles in response to the deployment of the SS-20s by the Soviet Union. That occurred in the face of worry in many countries, a worry based upon the fear that these developments were inexorably leading to military confrontation and possibly war.

• (1700)

That is the state of affairs which is well known to us. It was addressed, for example, last May at Williamsburg by the seven leaders of the industrialized countries. I mention that meeting because it was the first time that these leaders at their summit addressed international security questions. At the summit at Williamsburg they issued a declaration which developed from a suggestion that had been made by Canada and carried through the meeting by the Prime Minister. That declaration was quite important because it contained two very important elements which have been, in a sense, the basis of policy on the part of Canada certainly and of some other countries since the Williamsburg Summit. The leaders at that time undertook to maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat and to ensure peace. That was, in a sense, the deterrent aspect of the policy.

The second aspect was that the summit leaders undertook to devote their full political resources to reducing the threat of war. That was a very important message carried from Williamsburg throughout the world, that the leaders of all these countries had determined that their full political resources were to be used in that direction. We all know that a month later that basic message was endorsed in the communiqué by the NATO foreign ministers at their meeting in Paris.

We had this double-track policy very much on our minds when we decided to accept the American request to test the Cruise missile in Canada. When we made that decision, we determined at the same time that we would carry forward as much as we possibly could the political commitment which had been made at Williamsburg. On the day we took the decision on the Cruise missile, I wrote to Secretary Shultz and said that we were prepared to approve the testing as a contribution to alliance solidarity in the negotiation of a verifiable agreement on medium-ranged nuclear weapons. We also recognized an even greater obligation to join in the search for a secure peace. I also noted in that letter to Secretary Shultz, which was made public, that it was the Government's firm intention to redouble

ary 24, 1984

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its efforts in the coming months to contribute to the progress and eventual success of current negotiations.

We know the series of negotiations that were under way at that time. I believe it is within that context that we can understand the Prime Minister's efforts, particularly the launching of his peace effort in his speech at Guelph on October 27. The Prime Minister made five specific proposals in that speech, but the main message, which he underlined, was the necessity for a jolt or an injection of high-level political energy to speed the course of negotiations on nuclear arms control, on conventional arms reduction and on military confidence-building measures. That was the main thrust of the Prime Minister's message, to try to get a jolt of energy into a system which had become virtually paralysed, where dialogue had virtually ceased and where rhetoric had been built up almost as the main instrument of diplomacy.

I will not mention all the elements of the Prime Minister's speech, but I will refer to two aspects of it. One concerns his suggestion of raising the nuclear threshold in Europe by reaching agreement on a balance of conventional forces in Europe. There was good reason why the Prime Minister should have referred to the Mutual Balance Force Reduction talks, the MBFR talks as they are called. There was good reason for his mention of them because they had been ongoing for almost ten years and had not yet reached the results which had been hoped for initially. The second point in that speech which I want to mention was his desire to give additional or real political impetus to the Stockholm conference on military confidence-building measures and disarmament. I mention these two aspects of the Prime Minister's speech, namely the MBFR and the Stockholm conference, because they have a lot to do with the current political dialogue between the East and the West.

The December meeting of the NATO foreign ministers held in Brussels offered an opportunity for the ministers and the governments represented there to make a response to the then current situation. Deployment had begun. The talks between the Soviet Union and the United States had been broken off or were about to be broken off, and we were meeting in that particular difficult context. It is true that a number of Parliaments in Europe had endorsed deployment very strongly, but it is also true that public opinion was greatly concerned at the difficult situation which existed. I think the NATO meeting was very important. The first thing the ministers did was to issue what was described as the Brussels Declaration. A communique was also issued but there was a shorter document called the Brussels Declaration which was intended to summarize the attitude of the West at the present time toward eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the Brussels Declaration the ministers acknowledged their respect for the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests and reiterated earlier pledges to seek security on the basis of a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. They also affirmed their intention to do their utmost to sustain a safe and peaceful future and to work with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states to achieve a balanced and constructive relationship based, as the

Brussels Declaration said, on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity.

• (1710)

I thought these were all very important concepts that were declared by the NATO governments to the world as the basis of a future relationship with eastern countries. The ministers closed with an appeal for an open, comprehensive, political dialogue. That is what the Prime Minister seeks, and I am sure it is sought by every Member of the House of Commons and every Canadian who is concerned about the future of the world and the necessity for asserting ourselves in the interests of peace.

The second statement that the ministers made dealt with MBFR negotiations stalled now for 10 years, with eastern proposals on the table but with no comprehensive western response as yet. The ministers agreed to review the state of negotiations and determine whether they could be moved forward. It is to be hoped they can be resumed later this year and that at that time western NATO ministers will be able to make a response to the eastern proposals that would ensure progress. At least, that is the view of Canada. It is also the view of Canada that at a certain point the ministers might consider their own presence at these talks. The circumstances would have to be right. The possibilities for some progress would have to be assured, but it seems to me this is another forum in which a jolt of political energy could usefully be made evident.

A further decision taken at the December meeting had to do with the Stockholm conference. It was agreed that the conference should be launched at the ministerial level; that politicians ought to attend; that it ought not to be left to bureaucrats and ambassadors, no matter how important they are, but that politicians ought to go in order to underline the importance they attach to a comprehensive dialogue in the interests of peace. That was decided by NATO ministers and, as a result, the eastern European ministers, including Mr. Gromyko, were present at the Stockholm conference. I may say a word about that later but I think all those present would agree that it was important that ministers attend, that politicians attend. Not only were there speeches, there were numerous bilateral dialogues that took place on the margins of the Stockholm meeting.

At NATO the fourth important decision that was taken was to conduct a review of the current state of East-West relations. That review was first suggested by the foreign minister of Belgium, Mr. Tindemans, who referred back to the Harmel report and thought the political aspects of it ought to be revisited and that NATO had to review, at least in my view he was attempting to ask NATO to update, its assessment of the current situation in view of the deployment and other developments, and to look to the future as to what ought to be on the agenda of East-West relations. That review has to be carefully conducted and it has to be done in a way that will also give a message of importance to the world.

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I came away greatly encouraged by the results of the NATO meeting. NATO ministers were confident in the unity of the alliance even though they realized it had been put under great stress in the past year. The efforts to weaken the alliance had backfired and, as a result, it was stronger and more confident than ever. It was therefore in a position to give some very strong messages to the world, especially to the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, that it was prepared to engage in what I have described as an open, comprehensive political dialogue.

I will now say a word about the Stockholm conference, Mr. Speaker. It arose out of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the subsequent Madrid conference where it was agreed that it would be important to convene a special conference in Stockholm. The object of this conference would be to develop and expand on the regime of military confidence building measures laid down in 1975 as a means of reducing suspicion and making arms reductions in Europe on the conventional side easier to achieve. Stockholm was important because it occurred at a time of de-tension when all other negotiations were in suspense—START, INF and the MBFR. There was no East-West forum and Stockholm was the occasion when some sort of dialogue was to be resumed.

I do not want to bore Hon. Members by repeating the speech I gave at Stockholm but I think I should refer to one or two points.

I certainly expressed the view that acrimonious rhetoric at this time was futile and that we needed to deepen and restore civilized dialogue; that we should make every effort to ensure that this conference succeeded; that we have to avoid rehearsing old grievances; that we have to adopt a businesslike approach and we have to register some practical achievements. These practical achievements could include more openness about basic military information; earlier notice of a wider range of military activities; mandatory rather than voluntary exchanges of observers at important military activities, and ways to verify any agreements reached.

I made another point that I think is important for politicians like us, and that is, that we should not let this conference drop out of sight and leave it entirely to officials. At a certain point ministers ought to be prepared to return to the conference and to ensure that it continues to have the political momentum that I think it achieved that first week in Stockholm.

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear!

• (1720)

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Speaker, before I begin my own remarks, I would like to put one or two questions to the Minister. First, I would ask the Minister if he has given any thought to making a reference to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence—whose illustrious Chairman is sitting almost beside the Minister—so that we may have a parliamentary discussion in that forum on the very topic to which the Minister has been referring today in his remarks. Can we have that reference at an early opportunity?

Mr. MacEachen: Well, Mr. Speaker, I am open to any suggestions regarding a reference on the question of East-West relations or peace, security, disarmament and peacekeeping. If Hon. Members are agreed on an enterprise of this kind, I certainly would co-operate. However, we would certainly have to see the terms of reference and have some discussions about it. I believe it would be a good thing for parliamentarians to keep an eye on this question of East-West relations and what ought to be done about it. It seems to me to be inconsistent to argue at Stockholm, as I did, that ministers ought to monitor the progress of that conference to ensure that every effort was expended to make it succeed, and at the same time to say there should be no opportunity for Hon. Members of the Canadian House of Commons to do similar things.

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Speaker, if the Minister would permit just a very simple follow-up question; would he assure us that any such attempt to get a reference such as I have referred to will have his support and, hopefully, with his support we will be able to get the other Hon. Members of the House to agree to it?

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to take an open attitude on that question. If we can decide on a reference which will facilitate discussion, I will look at it quite sympathetically. However, I would like to see what the reference is. I would like to talk to the Chairman of the Committee to find out what the work program of that Committee is and whether a reference would be useful at the present time.

Mr. Stevens: I can assure the Minister, Mr. Speaker, and I know the Chairman will certainly back me up on this, there is all kinds of time available to that Committee to handle the reference which might be forthcoming.

Mr. Minister, we are all deeply concerned about the tensions in the world today and, in particular, the unfortunate breakdown of negotiations between the major powers. However, something which has always startled us is the fact that there is no ambassador for disarmament, which is a role, and certainly an office, which I believe most people feel would be quite helpful at the present time. But while that office is allowed for in the structuring of the Minister's Department, it is not filled at the present time. Could the Minister indicate to the House why there is in fact no ambassador for disarmament? And may we expect not only an early appointment of such an ambassador, but also the assurance that he will have ample funding and staff to ensure he could play a truly meaningful role in this whole broad question of disarmament?

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, the Hon. Member has referred to the deep tensions which exist in the world, and I agree that they do exist. They were attested to at the Stockholm conference by the very tough speech made by Mr. Gromyko from the rostrum. It was quite tough. The substance of his analysis did not vary in what he said from the podium and what was stated to me in private, and it did reflect the tensions which the Hon. Member mentions. However, I should think it important to register what I consider to be a decided

improvement in certain quarters. The speech made by the President of the United States and the speech made by Mr. Shultz, in my opinion, were relatively moderate. And just a day or so ago, Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom expressed her view that there was a distinct change in policy from Washington and she appealed for further dialogue with the East. I believe that the more that is done, the more we will be able to influence the Soviet Union at this stage to change, possibly, its perceptions of the West and of the United States. It must work both ways. Western leaders can have an impact, and that is why I came away saying that if it were possible, it would be urgent for the Prime Minister and other leaders to go to Moscow to have discussions.

With respect to the ambassador for disarmament, Mr. Speaker, the post is vacant. However, the Hon. Member need not be worried because we have been devoting, in a sense, in the past several months the full resources of the Department and, indeed, of the Government on the question of disarmament.

Miss Jewett: Even the Prime Minister.

Mr. MacEachen: The Prime Minister, as the Hon. Member says, is a prime ambassador for disarmament. Therefore, because we have devoted so much of our resources—and the Prime Minister—to this activity, I am not apologetic about the vacancy. The vacancy will be filled. I am searching for the best possible person to fill this job, and when I conclude that I have that person, the appointment will be made. In the meantime, do not feel that disarmament is being neglected. It has never had the impetus it has received in the last several months.

Mr. Ogle: Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the Deputy Prime Minister one question, at least. He spoke about the problems of East-West. I was happy to hear his statements. The problem, I believe, between East-West many times is a misinterpretation of facts. I feel that in Central America right now there is the major problem of the traditional injustices of many kinds being called an East-West confrontation.

Has the Deputy Prime Minister talked to the American Secretary of State on his recent visit in Stockholm about that particular problem? Again, I would request the Deputy Prime Minister to seriously think of visiting that area himself so that we Canadians can have a uniquely Canadian policy on Central America. I would also like to say that I was happy that the money was released for Nicaragua and that aid has gone there.

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, I did not have an opportunity to raise the question of regional conflict with Secretary Shultz at Stockholm. We have done that in the past. We have discussed our differences on the subject of Central America. The Hon. Member is quite correct in saying that it has become a focus of East-West interest or rivalry. That is a fact. However, I certainly take the view that the surest way to bring about peace and security in that part of the world, is to deal with the basic economic and social problems and the political problems. For that reason we have argued against third-party

military intervention. I have made these points to Mr. Shultz on more than one occasion. Our policy is not identical to that of the United States.

[Translation]

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. It being 5:30 p.m., it is my duty, pursuant to Standing Order 42(4), to interrupt the proceedings and to put forthwith every question necessary to dispose of the amendment or amendments now before the House.

• (1730)

[English]

The question is on the amendment. Mr. Mulroney, seconded by Mr. Nielsen, moved:

That the Address be amended by adding the following words:

"This House regrets to inform Your Excellency that your Government is incapable of providing leadership and direction in the social and economic affairs of the nation and has lost the confidence of this House and of the Canadian people and therefore requires that an election be called in accordance with the Canadian custom, practice and tradition of holding a general election at least every four years".

All those in favour of the motion will please say yea.

Some Hon. Members: Yea.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: All those opposed will please say nay.

Some Hon. Members: Nay.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: In my opinion, the nays have it.

And more than five Members having risen:

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Call in the Members.

The House divided on the motion (Mr. Mulroney), which was negatived on the following division:

(Division No. 10)

YEAS

Messrs.

Althouse	Ellis	Howie
Andre	Elzinga	Huntington
Anguish	Epp	Jarvis
Beatty	Fennell	Jelinek
Benjamin	Forrestall	Jewett (Ms.)
Blackburn	Fraser	Keener
Blenkarn	Fretz	Kemeling
Bosley	Friesen	Knowles
Cardiff	Gumbie	Kristiansen
Clark	Guss	Lambert
(Yellowhead)	Gilchrist	Lawrence
Clark	Greenaway	Lewis
(Brandon-Souris)	Gurbin	Lewycky
Coates	Gustafson	MacDonald (Miss)
Cook	Halliday	(Kingston and the Islands)
Cooper	Hamilton	MacDougall
Corbett	(Qu'Appelle-Moose	Malone
Crumbie	Mountain)	Mayer
Crosby	Hamilton	Mazankowski
(Halifax West)	(Swift Current-Maple	McCain
Crouse	Creek)	McCuish
Dantzer	Hargrave	McGrath
Darling	Hawkes	McKenzie
Deans	Heap	McKinnon
de Jong	Hecs	McKnight
Dick	Inatyshyn	McLean
Dunn	Hovdebo	McMillan



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

n		No. A 05233
Subject Sujet Ralph Surette N.S. re peace initiatives etc.		Action div./Dir. responsable IDA IDBZ
Letter dated/Lettre en date du 84-01-19	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. 84-01-24
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par		Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s) 84-01-31
Comments/Commentaires		

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu January 25/84
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable John G. Fee
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition Ack Letter IDBZ 0107
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date February 7 1984
<div> ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

5-1047

Seen by / vu par
Kenzie MacKinnon

*Reg
for Action*

Box 20, Salmon River Dr.
R.R. 1, Dartmouth
Nova Scotia
B2W 3X7
Jan. 19, 1984

The Hon. Allan MacEachen
Deputy Prime Minister
Minister of External Affairs
Ottawa

Dear Mr. MacEachen:

I'm a veteran freelance journalist whose name you may have come across in the past. I haven't always been kind to your government, although I fully applaud your peace initiatives.

In that connection I wish to propose to you what I believe is an urgent idea. Mr. Trudeau and yourself, it seems to me, have not yet followed your own logic to the end. If you did, the initiative would surely find a new life.

Mr. Trudeau says that the issue of disarmament is "too important to be left to the superpowers." Most of the world would probably endorse that statement. The conclusion to be drawn from it is that you should, instead of flying solo, be trying to organize the world's non-nuclear states into a third force, a formal body that would insist on mediating between the superpowers, perhaps even arbitrating--a role which no existing institution, including the U.N., is now suited to fill.

It seems to me that the world is thirsting for such a presence as reasonable people everywhere are appalled at the superpowers' puerile attitudes of one-upmanship.

A third force, even if it failed in its mediating objectives, would provide, by its very formation, a psychological jolt that might very well get the superpowers to negotiate more seriously on their own as they felt more keenly the weight of world opinion pressing down on them.

The fact that some Warsaw Pact governments are complaining publicly about Soviet rockets on their soil might indicate that participation in such a third force is possible from Eastern Europe. Interest from Third World countries, I would think, was amply demonstrated at the Commonwealth Conference in New Delhi.

Sooner or later, I believe, some government or individual will emerge on the world scene and bring about such a nonaligned organization. The Government of Canada could play that role now that you already have the world's attention to some degree.

Yours Sincerely,

Ralph Surette
Ralph Surette


000782

70-8 Surette
Raeph

File Number: _____
No de dossier: _____
Referred to: Sean
Référé à: _____
Charged to: _____
A la charge de: _____

O/SSEA

C/REGISTRY





MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

31 JAN 84 00 26 12

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

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TO/À

TO PMDELBERLIN/FOWLER/SMITH

INFO

DISTR

INFO WSAW BUCST WSHDC PMOOTT/SMITH PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON

REF

DISTR MINA DMF IFB UGB IDR IDA FPR

SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE:SUPPORT OF JAYCEES INNATL

WORLD PRES OF JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INNATL, JOE MURPHY OF IRELAND, IS AT PRESENT IN OTT. AT LUNCH HOSTED TODAY BY HON HERB GRAY HE INFORMED US THAT HE INTENDED TO ENDORSE PM PEACE INITIATIVE QUOTE PUBLICLY AND FORMALLY UNQUOTE AT PRESS CONF TO BE HELD HERE LATER THIS AFTERNOON.

2. AS YOU DOUBTLESS KNOW, JAYCEES INNATL BOASTS 600,000 MEMBERS IN 87 COUNTRIES.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A. Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG L.A. Delvoie

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TO WSHDC CNGNY SEATL BNATO CHCGO INGLS SFRAN ATNTA BOSTN CLVND BFALO
DALAS DTROT MNPLS NRLNS PHILA PRMNY DUBLN HAGUE HSNKI LDN BGRAD BRLIN
BONN BUCST BPEST COPEN MOSCO OSLO PRGUE STKHM VIENN WSAW ATHNS GENEV
PARIS ROME PEKIN CNBRA TOKYO WLGTN ANKRA LSBON BRU MDRID DELHI IMMED
INFO CANDELDAVOS NDHQOTT/DGINFO

DISTR IDR CPD IDA UGB UGP URD URR RBP RBR RCM IMU PPR PPP MINA RWP

FPR EDDZ

---PM PEACE INITIATIVE/DAVOS

FOLLOWING EXCHANGE IN HOFC QUESTION PERIOD 30JAN84

QUOTE SINCLAIR STEVENS:...MY QUESTION IS DIRECTED TO THE ACTING PM
HE UNDOUBTEDLY NOTED OVER THE WEEKEND THE PUBLIC MUSINGS OF HIS PM,
PARTICULARLY THOSE DURING AN EXCHANGE WITH MR RAYMOND BARRE IN DAVOS,
SWITZERLAND, IN WHICH THE PM APPEARS TO BE QUESTIONING NATO STRATEGY
AND POLICY, IN FACT, RAISING SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
CANADA'S POSITION IN NATO COUNCILS THEMSELVES.

WOULD THE ACTING PM INDICATE WHETHER HIS PRIME MINISTER WAS GIVING
PUBLIC EXPRESSION TO VIEWS HELD IN NATO COUNCILS BY THE CANADIAN
GOVERNMENT, OR WAS THIS INDEED SOME TYPE OF NEW GOVERNMENT POLICY?
JEAN-LUC PEPIN:...MOST WORLD LEADERS GO AROUND THESE DAYS SAYING
THAT A NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BE SO DISASTROUS THAT NO/NO SIDE COULD
EXPECT TO WIN. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR PRIME MINISTER, TRYING HARD TO
FOSTER THE NEED FOR POLITICAL ENERGY, IS PRESENTING A NUMBER OF

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SPECIFICS ABOUT PARITY IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY STRENGTHENING AND THAT SORT OF THING. SO ONE MIGHT NOT/NOT BE SURPRISED THAT IN TAKING PART IN A SYMPOSIUM OR SEMINAR IN DAVOS, SWITZERLAND, HE WOULD NOT/NOT HESITATE TO TACKLE SOME OF THE GREATEST PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY THE INTRICACIES OF EVEN OUR NATO POLICIES. THAT IS WHAT HE HAS DONE. HE HAS RAISED DEBATES WHICH ARE IN THE MINDS OF SPECIALISTS AND NON-SPECIALISTS IN THE WORLD TODAY, AND THAT OF COURSE IMPLIES NO/NO RELAXATION, NO CHANGE IN OUR NATO POLICIES WHATSOEVER.

STEVENS:...IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE PRIME MINISTERS FF-THE-CUFF REMARKS, IF YOU LIKE, HAVE HAD AN IMPACT ON NATOS CREDIBILITY ITSELF, SUCH AN IMPACT THAT AT THE MOMENT OF THEIR BEING STATED THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT THE IMPRESSION BEING LEFT, WOULD THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER INDICATE WHAT STEP HIS GOVERNMENT NOW PLANS TO TAKE TO PUBLICLY REASSURE THE WORLD OF OUR COMMITMENT TO NATO AND OUR ALLIES, AND THAT WE ARE FULL PARTNERS IN AND COMPLETELY SUPPORTIVE OF THE POLICIES OF NATO ITSELF?

PEPIN:...I DO NOT/NOT THINK THIS IS NEEDED, REALLY. THE PRIME MINISTER, ALL THROUGH HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN LEADERS, HAS REPEATEDLY SAID THAT CANADA STOOD WITH NATO. HE HAS PRESENTED HIMSELF AS A NATO MAN, SO I DO NOT/NOT THINK THIS IS NEEDED. THERE IS INDEED A DEBATE

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THAT CAN TAKE PLACE, AND MY HON FRIEND CAN AGREE OR DISAGREE, ABOUT THE VERY DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT I CALL THESE INTRICACIES, THESE DEBATABLE POINTS IN NATO POLICIES.

IN DAVOS THE PM SAID THAT DEMOCRACY CAN TAKE THAT KIND OF DEBATE. I AM RATHER SURPRISED AT THE CHASTISING TONE OF THE HON MEMBER OF THE OPPOSITION, THE CRITIC ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IN A SPEECH ON DECEMBER 4 HIS OWN LEADER SAID: QUOTE I WOULD CALL ON THE SSEA TO GO FURTHER IN A NON FIRST STRIKE POLICY BY URGING CONSIDERATION OF THAT POLICY AT THE UPCOMING NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING UNQUOTE. EVERYBODY THINKS HE MEANT A NON FIRST USE. HIS OWN LEADER APPEARED TO BE SUGGESTING THAT THERE SHOULD BE A DEBATE OF THESE NATO POLICIES AND THAT IS WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER DID IN DAVOS. STEVENS: THE ACTING PM... APPEARS TO BE FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT AS A HEAD OF STATE THE PM IS SPEAKING FOR A COUNTRY THAT IS AN ALLY WITHIN THE NATO ALLIANCE. HOW CAN WE EXPECT THOSE ALLIES TO TRUST CANADA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA AS SUCH AN ALLY WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER PUBLICLY QUESTIONS NATO AND NATOS DETERRENT POSITION IN EUROPE ITSELF? MR SPEAKER, THE GOVERNMENT HAS LEFT A SERIOUS CLOUD OVER THE QUESTION OF NATOS CREDIBILITY AS A RESULT OF THE IRRESPONSIBLE MUSINGS OF THE PM IN SWITZERLAND.

PEPIN:... I HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THAT THIS IS A DEBATABLE SUBJECT. MY HON FRIEND SEEMS TO BE SAYING THAT THE SUBJECTS ARE SO SERIOUS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT/NOT BE DEBATED IN FRONT OF CHILDREN. THAT IS

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NOT/NOT THE CASE.THEY ARE BEING DEBATED NOW BY SPECIALISTS AND NON SPECIALISTS.THE WILLINGNESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO LIVE UP TO ITS COMMITMENT RESPECTING USE OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE ARE BEING QUESTIONED NOW. OUR ALLIES HAVE A SUFFICIENTLY HIGH OPINION OF US NOT/NOT TO THINK THAT WE ARE CHANGING OUR POLICY ON NATO,AFTER THE PM HAS REPEATEDLY SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT/NOT THE CASE,JUST BECAUSE IN DAVOS THE PM INDULGED IN A DISCUSSION IN FRONT OF A VERY SOPHISTICATED AUDIENCE WHICH WAS ASKING HIM QUESTIONS ON SOME OF THE GREAT ISSUES OF OUR TIME.

ERIK NIELSEN:...ON THE BASIS OF WHAT THE PM SAID IN DAVOS,HOW CAN WE COME TO ANY OTHER CONCLUSION THAN THAT QUESTIONS ARE BEING ASKED CONCERNING OUR MEMBERSHIP IN AND SUPPORT OF THE POLICIES OF NATO?IN SWITZERLAND THE PM ENGAGED IN A PUBLIC ALTE CATION WITH AN AMERICAN STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL,DISCREDITED NATO POLICY AND PROVIDED A PLATFORM FOR SATELLITE LEADERS TO DENOUNCE THE WEST. CAN THE ACTING PM EXPLAIN HOW THAT HAS HELPED THE PROSPECT OF WORLD PEACE?

PEPIN:...MY HON FRIEND SEEMS TO BE SAYING THAT INDLUGING IN DISCUSSINS AND OCCASIONALLY DISAGREEING WITH FREINDLY STATES IS BAD. MEMBERS HERE ARE ASKING EVERY DAY WHETHER THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IS MAKING SUFFICIENTLY STRONG REPRESENTATION TO THE UNITED STATES ON A NUMBER OF PROTECTIONIST MEASURES WHICH THEY ARE NOW TAKING.

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PAGE FIVE SCS0287 UNCLAS

HAVING A DISCUSSION WITH A FRIEND IS NOT/NOT CONSIDERED TO BE UNFRIENDLY.AS A MATTER OF FACT IS CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE VERY FRIENDLY BECAUSE YOU TRUST THAT HE WILL UNDERSTAND THE CASE WHICH YOU ARE MAKING.

NIELSEN:...THAT KIND OF DISCUSSION GOES ON EVERY DAY OF THE WEEK, EVERY WEEK OF THE MONTH AND EVERY MONTH OF THE YEAR,BUT IT GOES ON IN PRIVATE RATHER THAN IN PUBLIC WITH THE HEADS OF STATE OF ONE OF OUR ALLIES.

NIELSEN:...WHEN THE PM EMBARKED ON HIS PEACE INITIATIVE,HIS STATED INTENTION WAS TO DECREASE TENSIONS AND INCREASE DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.IN HIS REMARKS IN SWITZERLAND LAST WEEKEND,THE PM WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL IN PUBLIC OF NATO POLICIES.WOULD THE ACTIN PM NOT/NOT AGREE THAT THESE INDICRETEE MUSINGS OF CANADAS PM HAVE DAMAGED THE CREDIBILITY OF HIS INITIATIVE,DECREASED DIALOGUE AND INCREASED TENSIONS AMONG THE NATO NATIONS ALONE?

PEPIN:...THE REPETITION OF THE QUESTION MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN ANCHORING THE PREOCCUPATION IN THE MINDS OF AUDITORS AT THIS POINT.HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT/NOT CHANGE THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER WHICH IS THAT THERE IS A GOOD DEBATE TO BE HAD AS TO THE USEFULNESS OF BRINGING THESE MATTERS UP IN PUBLIC.OBVIOUSLY THE PM THOUGHT THAT PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES COMMENDED THAT HE SHOULD TALK ABOUT THESE THINGS IN PUBLIC.MY HON FRIEND WILL AGREE THAT HE HAS SIMPLY ELEVATED TO THE PUBLIC LEVEL DISCUSSIONS THAT ARE TAKING PLACE IN PUBLIC BY A NUMBER

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PAGE SIX SCS0287 UNCLAS

OF SPECIALISTS AND NON SPECIALISTS.MY HON FRIEND CAN ASK THE SAME
QUESTION AGAIN AND I WILL ANSWER IN THE SAME WAY AGAIN.INDEED THERE
IS A DISCUSSION ON THAT BUT THE PM HAS SAID IN DAVOS THAT THE
DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM COULD TAKE THAT KIND OF DISCUSSION.END QUOTE.

UUU/104 302339Z SCS0287

MF

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM EXTOTT RCD0027 30JAN84

TO PMVBRLIN DELIVER BY 310900

INFO WSAW BUCST LDN BPEST

DISTR IFB IFD USS DMF RGB RBD RBR IDDZ IDR IDA RCR

---BRITISH ENQUIRY ABOUT PMS IMPRESSIONS RE EAST EUROPEAN

VISIT FOR MRS THATCHER

UK HICOMMER CALLED RCD TODAY TO CONFIRM THAT MRS THATCHER WOULD BE VISITING HUNGARY 02-04FEB. HE WAS ASKED BY LDN TO ENQUIRE IF PM TRUDEAU HAD ANY IMPRESSIONS OR THOUGHTS FOLLOWING HIS TOUR TO EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS WHICH HE MIGHT WISH TO SHARE AND WHICH MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO HER ON HER VISIT TO BUDAPEST.

2. IF PM AGREES MSG, WHICH COULD BE CONVEYED VIA HICO LDN, SHOULD REACH MRS THATCHER NO/NO LATER THAN 13 HRS GMT 02FEB.

3. MORAN INDICATED THAT PMS STATEMENTS DAVOS AND OTHER MATERIAL AVAILABLE TO PRESS HAD BEEN PASSED TO MRS THATCHER.


CCC/104 302349Z RCD0027

TELEGRAM RETRANSMIT FORM

COMCENTRE:

Please repeat telegram number WOGRO181
FROM PRGUE DATED 30 JAN 84
Classification CONFIDENTIAL (copy attached)
Action TO PRMNY MDRID LSBON ROME ATHNS ANKRA
COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE VMBFR GENEV
INFO _____

DISTR _____

J. McNee  IDDZ 5-5912 07 FEB 84
Authorizing Officer Division Phone Date

NOTE: It is the responsibility of the authorizing officer to
attach a copy of telegram to be repeated to this form.

ACTION
SUIVE A DONNER

MF
ED

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRGUE WOGRO181 30JAN94

TO EXTOTT/IDZ PRIORITY

INFO STKHM/SCDEL BUCST WSAW MOSCO WSHDC LDN PARIS BNATO BPEST BGRAD
BONN NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN
PMDEL/BRLIN

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBR RBD RBP XDV RCR RCM RSR

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IN TERMS OF HIS OBJECTIVES,PMS VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA
WAS DEFINITE SUCCESS.HE TOLD HIS HOST,PM STROUGAL,THAT
CDA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA BORE NO/NO HOSTILITY TO ONE ANOTHER BUT
AS MEMBERS OF OPPOSING MILITARY ALLIANCES FACED PROSPECT OF
FIGHTING EACH OTHER AND BEING DESTROYED IF WORLD WAR III BROKE
OUT.SYMBOL OF THEIR MTG THEREFORE MEANT GREAT DEAL TO HIM.HE
CALLED ON CZECHOSLOVAK POLITICAL LEADERS TO JOIN HIM IN ENERGIZING
STKHM AND VIENN NEGOTIATIONS IF WORK OF MILITARY ACCOUNTANTS
BOGGED DOWN.OTHERWISE NO/NO NEW GROUND WAS BROKEN.BOTH PM
STROUGAL AND PRESS HUSAK STUCK TO THEIR BRIEFS AND OFFERED NO/NO
ORIGINAL INSIGHTS OR INTERPRETATIONS OF WPO VIEWS ON EAST-WEST
RELATIONS NOR ON NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEV,STKHM AND VIENN.
THROUGHOUT THEY BLAMED USA ADMIN FOR CRISIS IN INNATL
RELATIONS.STROUGALS COMMENTS,PARTICULARLY THOSE IN TOAST AT
DINNER,INCLUDED ANTI-AMERICAN REHTORIC;CZECHOSLOVAK SIDE
WAS EVIDENTLY DETERMINED NOTXNOT TO DIVERGE FROM MOSCO/WPO
LINE.TRUDEAU RESPONDED BY POINTING TO FUTURE,AND NEED FOR

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PAGE TWO WOGR0181 CONF

POLITICAL LEADERS TO WORK TOWARDS IMPROVING EAST-WEST DIALOGUE TO ENSURE VARIOUS DISMARMAMENT PROPOSALS, INCLUDING SOME IDEAS IN PRGUE DECLARATION, WERE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED. ALTHOUGH BOTH STROUGAL AND HUSAK WELCOMED TRUDEAU WITH FIRM WORDS, BY LATTER PART OF MTGS ICE WAS MELTED, CONFIDENCE SEEMED ESTABLISHED AND CONVERSATION FLOWED MORE EASILY. PM RECEIVED PERSONAL COMPLIMENTS AND WORDS OF SUPPORT FOR HIS EFFORTS FROM BOTH. (WE UNDERSTAND PMDEL WILL PROVIDE SUMMARY/ASSESSMENT OF BOTH OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS).

2. CZECHOSLOVAKS WERE CLEARLY PLEASED WITH PM TRUDEAU'S PRESENCE IN PRGUE. IT WAS FIRST VISIT EVER BY CDN PM TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND ONLY SECOND BY NATO PM SINCE SOVIET INVASION OF 1968 (BRANDT WAS HERE IN 1973). VISIT WAS WELL PUBLICIZED LOCALLY AND OFFICIAL COMMENTARIES ON PM TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE HAVE BEEN FAVOURABLE. MTGS WITH PRESS ON 25 JAN AND 26 JAN WERE WELL ATTENDED AND THERE WERE NO/NO SURPRISES. SIMILARLY NO/NO PROBLEMS AROSE IN PROGRAM, INCLUDING VISIT TO AUSTERLITZ (SLAVKOV) BATTLEFIELD NEAR BRNO. CZECHOSLOVAK MINS WERE OUT IN FULL FORCE AT AIRPORT ON ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE, AND AS WELL AT OFFICIAL DINNER. TRUDEAU WITH CDN SECURITY OFFICER AND PERSONAL STAFF STAYED IN KRAMAR VILLA (OFFICIAL GUEST HOUSE), WHICH HAS MARVELLOUS VIEW OF PRGUE AND VLTAVA, AND PM HAD TWO SHORT SIGHTSEEING WALKS. OTHER OFFICIALS WERE ASSIGNED TO HOTEL PRAHA, NEW LUXURIOUS 125 ROOM HOTEL FOR USE OF

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PAGE THREE WOGR0181 CONFD

CENTRAL CTTEE AND OFFICIAL GUESTS. IT WAS ONE OF FEW INSIDE LOOKS
WESTERN DIPLOS HAVE HAD OF HOTEL WHICH WAS EMPTY BUT FOR 12 CDN
GUESTS.

3. BILATERAL RELATIONS DID NOT/NOT FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN
PMS DISCUSSIONS BUT WERE RAISED BY BOTH HUSAK AND STROUGAL AND
LATER BY PRESS. TRUDEAU RESPONDED APPROPRIATELY INDICATING THAT
FROM TIME TO TIME IT WAS NECESSARY FOR POLITICAL LEADERS TO ENERGIZE
EFFORTS OF OFFICIALS TOWARDS IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS.
HANCOCK (RBD) HAD SEPARATE MTGS WITH MFA AND MFT OFFICIALS CONCERNED
WITH RELATIONS WITH CDA. THERE SHOULD BE GOOD OPPORTUNITIES FOR
BILATERAL FOLLOW-UP IF WE ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED AS PMS VISIT HAS
HAD IMPORTANT IMPACT HERE.

4. IN BROAD TERMS OF POLITICAL IMPACT, ASSESSMENT OF VISIT
WILL HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL IT CAN BE SEEN IN CONTEXT WITH VISITS TO GDR
AND ROMANIA, AND PROBABLY BEYOND THAT TO SEE WHETHER IT HAS ANY
NOTICEABLE EFFECT ON EASTERN POLICIES. BUT THIS WAS NOT/NOT
VISITS OBJECTIVE AND IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IT HAS MADE ITS MARK BY
SHOWING LEADERS THERE IS A NATO HEAD OF GOVT PREPARED TO TALK TO THEM
ABOUT PEACE.

CCC/175 3016302 WOGR0181

MP

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT FPR 0102 30JAN84

TO MINDEL DAVOS DELIVER BY 310700

DISTR IDA LIDDZ MINA MINE RSR RSD

REF OURTEL FPR 0094 29JAN; PMO TEL 09031 28JAN

---PRINT MEDIA CONVERAGE: DAVOS SYMPOSIUM

SUMMARY: AS ANTICIPATED IN OUR REFTTEL, SSEA AND CANDEL RECEIVED MINIMAL ATTENTION IN 30JAN PRESS WHICH WAS DOMINATED BY PMS REMARKS AT DAVOS ON NATO AND INTL SECURITY (REF PMOTEL FOR DETAILS).

SSEAS COMMENTS ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE/MOSCOW VISIT (FEATURED BRIEFLY IN GLOBE AND GAZETTE - SEE PARA 2 BELOW) WERE USED BY PRESS TO FUEL SPECULATION AS TO PMS RETIREMENT PLANS. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THERE WILL BE MUCH FURTHER COVERAGE-LET ALONE, SUBSTANTIAL COVERAGE- ON DAVOS IN WAKE OF PMS APPEARANCE AT SYMPOSIUM.

2. REPORT: FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF 30JAN PRESS FEATURING SSEA:

(A) GLOBE ARTICLE ENTITLED QUOTE TRUDEAU IS URGED TO DECIDE ON FUTURE UNQUOTE. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER MACEACHEN, TRAVELLING WITH MR TRUDEAU IN SWITZERLAND, SEEMED TO RAISE THE POSSIBILITY ON FRIDAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL STAY ON FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL MORE MONTHS. HE TOLD REPORTERS A PRIME MINISTERIAL VISIT TO MOSCOW COULD COME QUOTE WITHIN THIS YEAR UNQUOTE IF IT CANNOT BE ARRANGED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. ASKED ABOUT THE REMARK, MRS. CAMPAGNOLO YESTERDAY SAID SHE HAD NO IDEA WHETHER MR MACEACHEN WAS SIGNALING THAT MR TRUDEAU INTENDS TO STAY ON.

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PAGE TWO FPR0102 UNCLAS

(B) GAZETTE ARTICLE (BY CHRISTOPHER YOUNG, SOUTHAM NEWS) ENTITLED
QUOTE TRUDEAU GIVES HIMSELF GOOD MARKS IN ROLE AS PEACEMAKER UNQUOTE
SIGNIFICANTLY, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER ALLAN MACEACHEN BEGAN
REFERRING TO QUOTE THE CANADIAN PEACE INITIATIVE UNQUOTE -
EVIDENTLY A CALCULATED EFFORT TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR ITS CONTINUATION
UNDER ANOTHER PRIME MINISTER IF TRUDEAU RETIRES IN THE SPRING.
MACEACHEN IS LEADING THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE SYMPOSIUM RUN
ANNUALLY BY THE EUROPEAN MANAGEMENT FORUM IN THE SWISS SKI RESORT
OF DAVOS.

UUU/088 302331Z FPR0102

CONFIDENTIAL CORRECTED COPY
CORRECTED COPY EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

FM DELHI WBGR0054 30JAN84

TO EXTOTT PSR

INFO ISBAD CLMBO DHAKA WSHDC LDN PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA PRMNY HKONG
VIAEA GENEV STKHM/SCDEL BNATO MOSCO

DISTR MINA DMT DMF EFB ETD ETN PSD JCD JLE LIDDZ IDA

---MTG:PM GANDHI/IVAN HEAD

IVAN HEAD,WHO HAS BEEN IN DELHI FOR PAST WEEK IN CONNECTION
WITH OPENING OF IDRC REGIONAL OFFICE,MET MRS GANDHI 28JAN IN
COMPANY WITH HICOMMR.MTG LAST 45 MINUTES.DOMINANT TOPIC OF
CONVERSATION WAS THREAT POSED BY NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.

2.MRS GANDHI PREVIOUS DAY HAD MET AMERICAN PROF PHIL MORRISON
WHO HAD DISCUSSED WITH HER CARL SAGAN REPORT ENTITLED QUOTE
NUCLEAR WINTER PHENOMENON UNQUOTE.REPORT/DISCUSSION HAD
EVIDENTLY MADE STRONG IMPRESSION;PM IS LADYOF FEW WORDS IN HER
MOST TALKATIVE MOMENTS,BUT SHE DID SHOW HERSELF DURING SESSION
WITH HEAD TO BE SERIOUSLY PREOCCUPATED WITH ISSUE.SHE SAID THAT
MORRISON HAD SHOWN HER MAPS PORTRAYING EFFECTS OF FALLOUT
FOLLOWING NUCLEAR EXCHANGE;MAPS HAD INDICATED THAT HEAVILY
POPULATED INDIA/PAKISTAN AREA STOOD TO SUFFER MOST.

3.MRS GANDHI SAID SHE HAD SEEN FILM QUOTE THE DAY A TER UNQUOTE.
HEAD POINTED OUT THAT IT ENDED UP ON FALSE NOTE IN THAT RECENT
STUDIES SHOWED THAT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD PUT END TO ALL LIFE ON
GLOBE;FILM HAD SUGGESTED IT COULD SURVIVE.PM SAID SHE THOUGHT

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PAGE TWO WBGR0054 CONFD

FILM WAS QUOTE AS MUCH AS AMERICAN VIEWING PUBLIC COULD STAND
UNQUOTE. SHE ADDED THAT SHE HAD BEEN TO HIROSHIMA IN 1954. WHAT
SHE HAD SEEN THERE OF PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION AND OF SURVIVORS IN
HOSPITALS HAD BEEN MUCH WORSE THAN SCENES IN FILM.

4. THERE WAS BRIEF ANIMATED EXCHANGE OVER INCREASED THREAT DERIVING
FROM INTRODUCTION OF NEW WEAPONS, POSSIBILITY OF COMPUTER ERROR,
ETC. MOVES TO DEVELOP NEW SYSTEMS WERE IN HER VIEW QUOTE INSANE
UNQUOTE.

5. MRS GANDHI SHOWED KEEN INTEREST IN TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE.
HEAD AND HICOMMR BRIEFED HER ON CURRENT STATUS.

CCC/282 301113Z WBGR0054

The Brookings Institution



1775 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE N.W. / WASHINGTON D.C. 20036 / CABLES: BROOKINST / TELEPHONE: (202) 797-6000

Foreign Policy Studies Program

"Reflecting Canada's concern about current international tension, the Government will create a publicly funded centre to gather, collate and digest the enormous volume of information now available on defense and arms control issues."

Speech from the Throne, 7 Dec 1983

Analysis

1. Canada has the potential to make a major contribution to reducing international tension. But for this potential to be realised, Canada must be clear as to where it enjoys comparative advantage, and use that advantage to achieve things that others cant.
2. There already exists a number of well-respected, long-established, independently-minded and authoritative institutions in the field of collating, digesting and disseminating information on defense and arms control, and others are planned.

This is not a field where Canada enjoys a comparative advantage. Indeed, the opposite is true.

Since the desired information already exists, generous government investment in the appropriate subscriptions would make this information available to the Canadian people sooner, more efficiently, and at a fraction of the cost required to establish a new centre.

3. The key factor underlying current international tension is the Soviet-American relationship. The build-up in armaments and the confrontational behaviour of the two superpowers are merely symptoms of this underlying problem.

The centrality of the Soviet-American relationship and the shared responsibility for international tension is increasingly recognised by academic specialists in Soviet, international security, and foreign policy studies; by retired military officers and government officials working in the arms control field; and by the more perceptive world political leaders.

This shared responsibility is not, however, acknowledged by the majority of the West's political-military leadership, who prefer to place the full blame on Soviet shoulders. Nor is it recognised by the mass of the American electorate, whose opinion is so important to the shaping of US foreign policy.

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act / Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
20/2/84
cc: DMF
IFB URB
RBR UGB
RBR PCW/FOWLER/ARCHDALE
RBC
20/2/84

28 Jan.
MR DEWOLF
TO SEE

- 2 -

4. No vehicle exists in the West for the systematic study of Soviet-American relations.

To the extent the subject is addressed in the USA, it is mainly in books by retired government officials accounting for their stewardship, and in occasional articles which tend to be longer on description and prescription than analysis.

The approach to the subject is heavily influenced by shifts in the public mood towards Russia, and what comprises the current "aperture of permissible discussion". These changes in fashion also affect the funding of Soviet studies in the USA, and the effort devoted to analysing Soviet affairs.

5. Canada has a natural comparative advantage in the study of Soviet-American relations.

Canada has a sympathetic understanding of America's global interests and aspirations and, as a next door neighbour and fellow member of the capitalist system, it can view Russian behaviour through US eyes. The special expertise that Canada has developed on the domestic impulses of US foreign policy, and on the realities of the political process in Washington, provide a major advantage.

Canada is relatively weak in the field of Soviet studies, but this can be remedied fairly easily. Meanwhile, its own natural responses to US behaviour in the western hemisphere, make it better able to empathise with Soviet attitudes towards America and its behaviour on the global scene

6. The US people see Canadians as members of the same family group, and solidly pro-American. Canada is therefore the ideal venue for objective studies that will inevitably lay blame on both sides of the Soviet-American relationship.

The Soviets see Canada both as America's soft overbelly, and as a country that shares with Russia many of the same problems of high latitudes, harsh climate, raw materials and natural resources, and even nationalities. It was not for nothing that the Soviets added "and Canada" to the title of the "Institute for the Study of the USA" and, to the extent that they feel they can get a fair hearing in the West, Canada is that place.

Recommendations

1. Canada should establish an Institute for the Study of Soviet-American Relations, using the funds promised in the speech from the throne. The focus and title of the Institute should be quite specific, so as to attract people of the necessary calibre and to differentiate the Institute from the mass of centres already involved in international, defense and disarmament studies.
2. The purpose of the Institute would be to serve as the flywheel of the debate about our relations with the Soviet Union, both in the gyroscopic sense of keeping it balanced and on track, and in the inertial sense of ensuring the continuity and quality of our commitment to the problem, irrespective of fluctuations in political and academic fashion in the USA.

- 3 -

3. Although the Institute would be directly involved in the ongoing debate, its most important product would be case studies and analyses. One objective would be to build up an authoritative and unbiased record of the two side's perceptions and behaviour since World War II. Another objective would be to develop non-partisan analyses of contemporary aspects of Soviet-American relations, explicitly recognising the differing interests of the two sides. The Institute would publish a scholarly Journal of Soviet-American Relations, and would encourage contributions from observers in the non-aligned countries, as well as from members of the Soviet bloc.
4. The influence of the Institute would be directly related to the quality of its product and the calibre of its staff. Its analyses could be carried out both in-house and by contract with outside specialists. Members of the Institute could include Soviet citizens and ex-officials from the USA, but we must not confuse big names with good analysis, or with the influence that comes from a solid reputation for integrity, objectivity and perceptiveness.
5. To support the underlying purpose of this Institute, the Government should sharply increase the funding for Soviet and East European Studies in Canada, and should actively foster contacts between Canada and Russia at the personal and official level. These contacts should be persisted with, particularly at times when Soviet-American relations deteriorate, as after Afghanistan. The level of understanding of Soviet affairs in the West is dangerously low, and Canada is particularly well placed to remedy this situation by developing a special expertise in this area, comparable to the one it has in American affairs.
6. Care should be taken to explain to the various peace and disarmament groups that the new Institute is a direct response to their concerns about the danger of war, this being an area where Canada's special qualifications provide leverage, and allow it to play a direct role, rather than beating its breast on the sidelines. The Government should honour its promise in the speech from the throne by providing the various groups with free or subsidised subscriptions to the appropriate publications dealing with defense and arms control issues.

Michael McGwire
Senior Fellow
29 Jan 1984

ACTION
SEULE A DONNER

MF
hnd

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PMDELDAVOS PMDL0021 29JAN84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ PMOOTT-FAIRBAIRN DELIVER BY 300900

INFO WSHDC BNATO BONN LDN PARIS ROME HAGUE COPEN MDRID ANKRA

GENEV VMBFR MOSCO PRGUE WSAW BGRAD BPEST BUCST BERN

PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON AND ARCHDEACON NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DACPOL

PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/SMITH

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA FPR ZSI URR UGB RBR

REF OURTEL PMDEL0019 28JAN

---PMS REMARKS AT DAVOS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY:PRESS
GUIDANCE

WE FORWARDED MEMORANDUM TO PM THIS EVENING WHICH OUTLINED INFO
AVAILABLE TO PMDEL REGARDING CANADIAN PRESS REACTION TO HIS
REMARKS SATURDAY MORNING IN CONTEXT OF DAVOS SYMPOSIUM AND
RECOMMENDED OPTIONS FOR POSSIBLE PRESS STANCE IN DAVOS FOR
REMAINDER OF EASTERN EUROPEAN TRIP AND FOR USE IN OTTAWA.

2.AFTER REVIEWING OPTIONS RANGING FROM SILENCE(IE A TOTALLY
PASSIVE APPROACH)THROUGH A VERY LOW KEY RESTATEMENT OF CANADAS
COMMITMENT TO NATO DOCTRINE,TO A RATHER AGGRESSIVE ASSERTION
THAT DEMOCRACIES WERE STRONG THROUGH THEIR ABILITY TO DEAL
OPENLY WITH SUCH QUESTIONS,PM HAS OPTED IN FAVOUR OF THE
FOLLOWING LINE QUOTE "THE STRENGTH OF WESTERN SOCIETIES IS
BEST DEMONSTRATED BY OUR READINESS TO CONDUCT AN OPEN DISCUSSION
OF GOALS AND STRATEGIES.THE PRIME MINISTER DID NO MORE THAN

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PAGE TWO PMDL0021 CONF

BRING TO THE SYMPOSIUM--A WIDE-RANGING AND INFORMAL SATURDAY
SESSION--A NUMBER OF IDEAS AND ISSUES CURRENTLY BEING DISCUSSED
BY SPECIALISTS IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.CANADA
HAS TRADITIONALLY ENCOURAGED AN ACTIVE USA ENGAGEMENT IN
EUROPE AND,OF COURSE,OUR COMMITMENT TO NATO AND ^{Its} ~~TIS~~ POLICIES
REMAINS UNCHANGED"UNQUOTE.

3.IN TALKING TO MEDIA REPS HERE WE HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO
ASSERT THAT THEMES BROACHED AT DAVOS SYMPOSIUM HAVE NO PART
WHATEVER IN PACKAGE BEING DISCUSSED WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN
LEADERS.YOU MIGHT SO SAME SHOULD QUESTION ARISE.

4.GRATEFUL YOU BRING THIS LINE TO THE ATTENTION OF ACTING
PRIME MINISTER AND SSEA FOR POSSIBLE USE IN OR OUTSIDE HOUSE
OF COMMONS.

CCC/125 292210Z PMDL0021

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMDELDAVOS PMDL0020 29JAN84

TO PRGUE/FOR AMBASSADOR

INFO EXTOTT RGB

DISTR RBR RBP RBT IDDZ

---PMS VISIT

MANY THANKS TO YOU AND ENTIRE STAFF OF EMB FOR YOUR
SUPERLATIVE PERFORMANCE IN ORGANIZING FIRST EVER PM VISIT
TO PRAGUE. LET WILL FOLLOW BUT DID NOT/WANT TO DELAY FURTHER
IN SAYING HOW GRATEFUL WE ARE TO ALL OF YOU FOR YOUR FINE WORK.
BEST REGARDS.

UUU/125 292250Z PMDL0020

Copy sent to Parliament
Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs
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UGB
RGB
Done
30/1/84
AC

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM09031 28JAN84

TO PMDELDAVOS/COLEMAN

DELIVER BY 290900

INFO EXTOTT (IDDZ RBD FPR WSHDC MOSCO WSAW PRGUE BUCST BNATO
FROM SMITH

*See especially pp 1, 9,
10, 11*

hjd

INITIAL NEWS COVERAGE INTERPRETS PMS SYMPOSIUM COMMENTS IN NEGATIVE LIGHT. STORY WAS LEAD ITEM ON BOTH CBC AND CTV SATURDAY NIGHT, EACH RUNNING MORE THAN TWO MINUTES AND DRAWING HEAVILY ON DISPUTE BETWEEN PM AND DAM/BARRE. EVANS RAN DAM CLIP UNDERSCORING QUOTE MYTH UNQUOTE OF US NUCLEAR STOCKPILE AND PMS REBUTTAL REGARDING EFFECTIVENESS AND DEADLINESS, THEN SAID QUOTE BIG SURPRISE UNQUOTE WAS THAT PM WAS FIRST NATO LEADER TO QUESTION FIRST STRIKE DOCTRINE. HE THEN RAN BARRES VIEW THAT QUESTIONING DOCTRINE HURTS ALLIANCE CREDIBILITY. EVANS CONCLUDES THAT THE PMS JOST OF POLITICAL ENERGY IS LIKELY TO BECOME QUOTE A SHOWER OF UNWANTED SPARKS FROM WASHINGTON. UNQUOTE HALTON REPORTS THAT DAM QUESTIONED PM IN QUOTE POLITE BUT HARD UNQUOTE TERMS, CAUSING PM TO SUGGEST THE US IS QUOTE DISTORTING UNQUOTE WHEN TALKING OF REDUCTIONS. THEN, ACCORDING TO HALTON, PM COMMITTED QUOTE A BIG GAFFE UNQUOTE BY PUBLICLY CRITICIZING FIRST STRIKE DOCTRINE--A QUESTION BARRE SAID PM HAD QUOTE NO BUSINESS UNQUOTE RAISING. HALTON CONCLUDES THAT REMARKS WILL QUOTE INFURIATE WASHINGTON UNQUOTE AND DESTROY INITIATIVES CREDIBILITY THERE. ATTACHED IS TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FOR RELEASE 30JAN OR EARLIER ON DEMAND. FYI, NEWS REPORTS INDICATE THAT MME SAUVES CONDITION IS SERIOUS AND THAT SHE HAS BEEN READMITTED TO HOSPITAL.

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PAGE TWO PM09031 UNCLAS

TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTERS REMARKS AT A QUESTION AND ANSWER
SESSION AT THE DAVOS SYMPOSIUM, SWITZERLAND, SATURDAY, JANUARY 28, 1984
TRANSCRIPTION DES REMARQUES DU PREMIER MINISTRE LORS D UNE DISCUSSION
LIBRE AU SYMPOSIUM DE DAVOS (SUISSE) LE SAMEDI 28 JANVIER 1984

THREE QUESTIONS: FIRST, ACCORDING TO SOME OBSERVERS, THE MUTUALLY
ESCALATING AND HENCE, CONCERNING ARMS RACE BETWEEN THE US AND THE
SOVIETS SHOULD BE SEEN AS OUR ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO ACTUAL WAR. IT
SHOULD BE INSTITUTIONALIZED RATHER THAN ABORTED. WHAT DO YOU THINK?

THE SECOND QUESTION IS FROM ITALY: IS NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION
BENEFICIAL FOR THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH OBJECT TO THE MILITARY
INTERVENTION OF THE SUPERPOWERS?

AND THE THIRD QUESTION IS: YOU KNOW THE UNITED NATIONS WAS FOUNDED
IN ORDER TO MAKE IMPOSSIBLE THE USE OF FORCE IN RESOLVING CONFLICTS.
NOW WE HAVE NUMEROUS MILITARY CONFLICTS HAPPENING, ALL OF WHICH HAVE
HAPPENED OVER THE LAST YEARS. IS THE MONUMENTAL BUREAUCRACY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS OBSOLETE?

A. WELL, THE FIRST QUESTION, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, HAS TO DO WITH THE
ADVANTAGE OF AN ESCALATING—EVER-ESCALATING—ARMS RACE AS AN
ALTERNATIVE OF ACTUALLY GOING TO WAR. THAT SEEMS TO ME A STRANGE AND
CERTAINLY NOT/NOT ERRONEOUS PROPOSITION. PEOPLE ARM THEMSELVES IN
ORDER TO SEEK SECURITY. THEY ARM THEMSELVES BECAUSE THEY FEEL
ENDANGERED IN SOME WAY. IF YOU FEEL THERE IS NO/NO OTHER WAY TO
REDUCE YOUR FEELINGS OF INSECURITY BUT BY EVER ESCALATING THE
QUANTITY OF ARMS YOU HAVE, YOU ARE REALLY DENYING THAT IT IS POSSIBLE

...3

PAGE THREE PM09031 UNCLAS

TO FEEL SECURE AT A LOWER LEVEL OF ARMAMENT. GIVEN THE CERTAIN STATE OF ARMAMENT BETWEEN TWO POWERS, IF ONE SIDE FEELS INSECURE, HE HAS THE CHOICE OF EITHER INCREASING HIS ARMS OR GETTING THE OTHER SIDE TO REDUCE HIS ARMS.

THIS IS, IN THE CONVENTION AREA, THE DILEMMA WHICH IS BEING POSITED BY THE VIENNA TALKS. WE FEEL THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MORE CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH IN EUROPE AND, THEREFORE, WE, THE NATO COUNTRIES, HAVE THE CHOICE OF EITHER INCREASING OUR CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH OR GETTING THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE THEIRS. IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT I ENHANCED SECURITY CAN COME FROM EITHER OF THOSE TWO PROPOSITIONS, THE ONLY SENSIBLE COURSE TO TRY TO PURSUE IS TO TRY TO FIND GREATER SECURITY AT A LOWER LEVEL OF EQUILIBRIUM THAN AT A CONSTANTLY ESCALATING LEVEL OF EQUILIBRIUM. THAT IS WHY ARMS TALKS MUST EVENTUALLY LOOK FOR REDUCTION IN ARMS AND NOT/NOT AN EQUILIBRIUM AT A HIGHER LEVEL.

INDIDENTALLY, THAT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND WHEN WE ARE LOOKING AT FUTURE WARS. ESCALATION OF THE TYPE THAT IS SUGGESTED IN THIS QUESTION EVENTUALLY WILL MEAN WARS IN OUTER SPACE--OR, PERHAPS MORE REALISTICALLY, THE USE OF HIGH-ALTITUDE SATELLITES IN ORDER TO SEEK A MILITARY ADVANTAGE OVER THE OTHER SIDE. THAT IS TEN OR TWENTY YEARS DOWN THE ROAD; IT IS WHAT PEOPLE SOMETIMES UNDERSTAND BY STAR WARS. IT IS A FRIGHTENING PROSPECT FOR ALL OF US. IT WILL BE EXTRAORDINARILY COSTLY IF WE EVER CAN REACH THAT STAGE. IT IS LIKELY TO BE EXTRAORDINARILY DESTABILIZING.

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ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CANADIAN PEACE INITIATIVE IS TO SEEK SUFFOCATION OF FUTURE TECHNIQUES OF WAGING WAR.IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT THAT IS THE ONLY SENSIBLE DIRECTION IN WHICH HUMANITY CAN PROCEED: NOT/NOT TO INVOLVE EVER HIGHER DEGREES OF TECHNOLOGY AND ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF CAPITAL AND INGENUITY TO DRAW RESOURCES FROM THE PROGRESS OF HUMANITY,BUT TO MAKE WARS EVER MORE COSTLY AND TECHNICAL.I THINK THAT IS ENOUGH ON THE FIRST QUESTION.

THE SECOND HAD TO DO WITH NUCLEAR WARS IN PARTICULAR AND THE QUESTION WAS:QUOTE IS NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION BENEFICIAL FOR THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH OBJECT TO THE MILITARY INTERVENTIONISM OF THE SUPERPOWERS? UNQUOTE

WELL,NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION CAN BE OF TWO KINDS.

THE VERTICAL PROLIFERATION--WHICH REALLY MEANS THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE OTHER THREE,WHICH ARE NOT/NOT SUPERPOWERS BUT ARE NUCLEAR POWERS,WILL INCREASE THEIR QUANTITY OF ARMS AND THE DEADLINESS OF THEM,THEREFORE,THAT TYPE OF PROLIFERATION CANNOT/NOT BE BENEFICIAL TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH OBJECT TO THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OF THE SUPERPOWERS--AND THERE IS ANOTHER KIND OF PROLIFERAION WHICH IS THE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION--WHICH WILL MEAN THAT MORE AND MORE COUNTRIES WILL HAVE THE POSSESSION AND USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

I GUESS THAT IS THE KIND OF PROLIFERATION WHICH IS UNDERSTOOD HERE, THE FEELING BEING THAT THE MORE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE MORE THEY WILL BE ABLE TO DECIDE THE USE AND NON-USE OF THOSE WEAPONS IN ANOTHER WAR AND,THEREFORE,THEY GAIN SOME MEASURE OF

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INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SUPERPOWERS. THE PROPOSITION SOUNDS A LITTLE BIT PARADOXICAL BUT IN FACT--AND I PERHAPS MAKE THESE REMARKS FOR MY COLLEAGUES FROM THE THIRD WORLD--FROM DISCUSSIONS I HAVE HAD WITH MANY LEADERS OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, THIS SEEMS TO BE A LITTLE BIT THEIR VIEW: WHY SHOULD ONLY FIVE COUNTRIES HAVE THE NUCLEAR POWER? WHY SHOULDN'T MORE AND MORE OF US HAVE THE NUCLEAR POWER?

IT SEEMS A LITTLE BIT ABSURD WHEN YOU HEAR IT FOR THE FIRST TIME, BUT IT IS LINKED TO QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY. IT IS LINKED TO QUESTIONS OF STATUS. AND I THINK THE NUCLEAR POWERS ALL ABHOR THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE THAN THEMSELVES HAVING NUCLEAR ARMS. IT IS BAD ENOUGH THAT FIVE COUNTRIES HAVE NUCLEAR ARMS; IF TEN, TWENTY COUNTRIES HAVE NUCLEAR ARMS, OBVIOUSLY THE DANGERS OF A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST ARE ESCALATED. AND YET, THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ARE NOT/NOT IN A POSITION TO CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATE THIS TO THE OTHERS, PARTICULARLY IF THEY ARE NOT/NOT WHITE. THERE IS ALSO SOME RACIAL UNDERCURRENT HERE: YOU KNOW, WHY SHOULDN'T THE BROWN, THE BLACK OR THE YELLOW NATIONS ALSO HAVE WEAPONS IF THE WHITE NATIONS HAVE THEM?

THERE IS SOMETHING ABSURD IN IT, BUT THE REAL ABSURDITY IS THAT THE FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN ABLE TO LIVE UP TO THE UNDERTAKING OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY TO REDUCE THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TO REDUCE THE DEADLINESS--THOUGH IN SOME CASES THEY HAVE REDUCED THE QUANTITY OF THEM. AND BECAUSE THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS HAVE NOT/NOT LIVED UP TO THEIR UNDERTAKING, THE OTHERS, THE NON-SIGNATORIES OF THE NPT, HAVE SAID, QUOTE WELL, SINCE YOU CAN'T LIVE UP

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TO YOUR OBLIGATIONS, WE WILL SEEK TO ACQUIRE THE ATOM BOMB UNQUOTE.
SO YOU WILL HAVE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION.

IT MAY BE A WAY TO OBJECT TO THE MILITARY INTERVENTION OF THE
SUPERPOWERS—BUT NOT/NOT IN THE SENSE THAT YOU CAN DEFEND YOURSELF
FROM THE SUPERPOWER BECAUSE YOU HAVE A FEW DOZEN ATOMIC BOMBS, BUT
RATHER IN THE SENSE THAT YOU WILL BE ALSO THE MASTER OF THE SURVIVAL
OR DEMISE OF THE HUMAN RACE--WHICH SEEMS A WAY OF CUTTING OFF YOUR
NOSE TO SPITE YOUR FACE BECAUSE THE NON-SUPERPOWERS WILL ALSO DIE
IN A NUCLEAR WAR.

THE THIRD QUESTION WAS ON THE UNITED NATION AND WHETHER IT HAS
BECOME OBSOLETE BECAUSE THERE ARE SO MANY WARS. WELL, THE UNITED
NATIONS IS THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN. IT WOULD BE BETTER IF IT WORKED
MORE EFFICIENTLY, BUT IT IS BASED PRECISELY ON THE PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. IT HAS A COSTLY BUREAUCRACY, AS THE QUESTION
PUTS IT, WHICH IS APPLIED TO TRY AND SOLVE SOME OF THE DISPUTES. IF IT
WERE ON THE RECORD OF ITS QUOTE UNSUCCESS UNQUOTE IN TERMS OF
MILITARY CONFRONTATION, I SUPPOSE YOU COULD SAY IT HAS BEEN QUITE
INEFFECTIVE. BUT ONE MUST KEEP IN MIND THE VERY MANY OTHER FUNCTIONS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS INCLUDING, OF COURSE, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE GAP
BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH AND THE MARVELOUS WORK IT IS DOING IN THE
AREAS OF HEALTH, LABOUR RELATIONS, CARE OF CHILDREN, SPREADING OF
TECHNOLOGY, AND SO ON.

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THEREFORE, I CANT REALLY AGREE WITH THOSE WHO SAY IT IS OBSOLETE. I MUST SAY WE ALL HAVE A DUTY BECAUSE IT IS THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN TO MAKE IT MORE EFFECTIVE AND GIVE IT MORE MEANS OF BECOMING EFFECTIVE.BUT, THERE AGAIN, AS I SAID IN MY INTRODUCTION,THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE AN OBLIGATION WHICH IN MY VIEW,THEY HAVE NOT/NOT FULLY DISCHARGED.

KENNETH DAM -- I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A COMMENT UPON AN ASSUMPTION IN WHAT PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU SAID -- AT LEAST, IT SEEMS TO ME IT WAS AN ASSUMPTION IN WHAT HE WAS SAYING AND,INDEED,PERHAPS IT WAS EXPLICIT.LET ME SAY THAT,IN GENERAL,I AGREE WITH HIS OVERALL POSITION,BUT I MENTION THIS BECAUSE I THINK IT IS A WIDESPREAD MISCONCEPTION.

THE MISCONCEPTION IS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN STEADILY BUILDING UP THE NUMBER AND MEGATONNAGE OF ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.LET ME SAY THAT NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH.WITH REGARD TO NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,SINCE THE PEAK IN 1967,THE UNITED STATES HAS REDUCED BY ONE-THIRD THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ITS STOCKPILE.THERE WAS A RAPID DECREASE UNTIL ABOUT 1970,A SLIGHT BUILD-UP IN THE EARLY 70S AND,SINCE 1973 APPROXIMATELY,THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY DECLINE IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUR STOCKPILE.CONTRARY TO WHAT IS BELIEVED,GENERALLY,THE REDUCTION IN THE MEGATONNAGE OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE U.S. STOCKPILE HAS DECLINE,AND THE DECLINE HAS BEEN -- AS THE STATISTICIANS SAY --

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MONOTONIC SINCE 1965, I.E. IT HAS BEEN STEADY. THERE HAS AT NO TIME SEEN AN INCREASE.THERE HAS BEEN A 40 PER CENT D CREASE IN MEGATONNAGE SINCE 1970 AND THE DECREASE IS CONTINUING EVEN NOW.

THIS IS NOT ONLY TRUE WITH REGARD TO THE OVERALL U. . STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,IT IS ALSO TRUE WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.THERE WAS AN ALLIANCE DECISION IN APPROXIMATELY 1980 TO WITHDRAW 1,000NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM EUROPE, AND THAT WAS CARRIED OUT.THERE HAS BEEN A FURTHER DECISION JUST THIS PAST FALL, AT THE NATO MINISTERS MEETING IN MONTEBELLO,CANADA TO REDUCE A FURTHER NUMBER ON THE ORDER OF 1,400.SO, IT IS NOT/NOT TRUE THAT THERE HAS BEEN A BUILD-UP OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS EITHER GLOBALLY OR REGIONALLY IN EUROPE.AND I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS THAT MR.TRUDEAU HAS DISCUSSED, WHICH ARE VERY IMPORTANT,THAT WE NOT/NOT UNCONCIOUSLY GIVE SUPPORT TO WHAT I THINK IS A MUTH ABOUT THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR STOCKPILE.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU -- I AGREE WITH WHAT MR.DAM HAS JUST SAID AND,INDEED,I SLIPPED THAT INTO MY ANSWER.THOUGH, WHEN I SAID IN MANY INSTANCES WE HAVE REDUCED THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,THE QUESTION IS: HAVE WE REDUCED THEIR DEDLENESS AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS?THE WHOLE REASON FOR INTRODUCING THE CREUISE,FOR INSTANCE, IS TO MAKE THEM MORE EFFECTIVE.THE REASON WE WANT TO HAVE A PERSHING II AFTER PERSHING I IS TO MAKE IT MORE EFFECTIVE.

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IN THE CASE OF THE 1,000 REDUCTION DECIDED IN 1979 AND THE 1,400 DECIDED LAST OCTOBER 29, TO BE PRECISE, WE IN EFFECT -- LETS BE CANDID -- ARE WITHDRAWING WEAPONS THE USEFULNESS OF WHICH HAS CEASED IN GREAT PART. THEY HAVE BECOME OBSOLETE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THEY ARE CONTRARY TO OUR OWN STATED STRATEGY IN NATO. FOR INSTANCE, WHAT HAS BEEN REDUCED OR WILL BE REDUCED ESSENTIALLY IN GERMANY ARE THE HONEST JOHNS, THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRED FROM ARTILLERY SHELLS, AND ALSO THE LAND-MINE ATOMIC WEAPONS. I GUESS WHAT HAS BEEN DECIDED IS THAT NOT ONLY ARE THEY OBSOLETE BUT THAT THEY MAKE OUR FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IMPOSSIBLE. IF YOU HAVE AN ATOMIC LAND-MINE ON THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF WEST GERMANY, OBVIOUSLY IT MEANS THAT ANY OVERSTEPPING OF THAT LINE BY CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WILL DEPRIVE US OF RIGHT AWAY IF YOUR ARTILLERY IS OF A LIMITED RANGE AND IF YOUR CHOICE BUT TO HAVE EARLY FIRST USE, THEREFORE, WE WITHDRAW THESE. I THINK IT IS A VERY SENSIBLE AND IMPORTANT DECISION, BUT IT DOES RE-OPEN THE QUESTION OF QUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY. INCIDENTALLY, IT DRAWS US INTO THE WHOLE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE NATO OVERALL STRATEGY IS STILL THE RIGHT ONE.

IF I COULD COMMENT ON YOUR FIRST COMMENT ABOUT DE-COUPPING. I GUESS WHAT THE QUESTIONER REALLY MEANT WAS: IS THE UNITED STATES LIABLE TO START WORLD WAR III BECAUSE EUROPE IS BEING OVER-RUN? THAT IS WHY THE EUROPEANS ASKED FOR THE TWO-TRACK DECISION AND THAT IS WHY THE TWO-TRACK DECISION WAS TAKEN. BUT AS WE KNOW THE QUESTION ...10

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THAT IS BEING INCREASINGLY ASKED IS: YES, BUT WILL THE U.S. PRESIDENT REALLY ORDER A USE OF AN ATOMIC WEAPON, EVEN IN EUROPE, IF HE KNOWS IT IS GOING TO RESULT IN WORLD WAR III; I DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER OF THE PRESIDENT, BUT I GUESS ONE CAN SPECULATE AS TO WHETHER HE WOULD WANT TO START WORLD WAR III THROUGH IT ANYMORE THAN HE WOULD THROUGH START WEAPONS.

RAYMOND BARRE -- THANK YOU, MR. TRUDEAU. BUT, IF WHAT YOU SAY IS TRUE, THAT IS THERE IS INCREDIBILITY IN THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE IN ALL RESPECTS, AT THIS TIME IN EUROPE YOU WILL GET NEUTRALISM AND PACIFISM.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU -- I AM NOT/NOT ARGUING THAT THAT SHOULD BE THE COURSE. I AM ARGUING THAT OUR STRATEGY IS NOT/NOT NECESSARILY ONE WHICH LEADS US AWAY FROM THAT COURSE, IN FACT.

RAYMOND BARRE -- THE PROBLEM IS A PROBLEM OF CREDIBILITY. IF THERE IS A CREDIBILITY GAP, EUROPE IS IN VERY BAD SHAPE.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU -- WELL, ALL RIGHT. LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR CREDIBILITY, MR. BARRE. DO YOU THINK THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN ANSWER TO AN OVER-RUNNING OF EUROPE BY CONVENTIONAL SOVIET FORCES, WILL WANT TO START WORLD WAR III, AN ATOMIC WAR? YOU HAVE TO BELIEVE THAT IN ORDER TO NOT/NOT HAVE A CREDIBILITY GAP.

RAYMOND BARRE -- I WILL NEVER PUT THE QUESTION BECAUSE IF I PUT THE QUESTION, THERE IS NO/NO LONGER CREDIBILITY.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU -- WHICH IN RELIGIOUS TERMS IS AGNOSTICISM.

RAYMOND BARRE -- HAVE YOU READ PASCAL? JE PREND DE L'EAU BENITE

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ET JE M'ESSUIE.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU -- IT IS WHAT SOME WOULD CALL THE LEAP OF FAITH, BUT DEMOCRACIES DON'T WORK THAT WAY. PEOPLE ARE ENTITLED TO ASK QUESTIONS IN DEMOCRACY, OTHERWISE, THEY WILL NOT/NOT SUPPORT THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

RAYMOND BARRE -- JE M'EXCUSE D'ÊTRE SIMPLISTE.

(ED. NOTE: EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS ANSWERS THREE QUESTIONS IN TURN, THEN EACH IS ASKED TO RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION -- ONLY MR. TRUDEAU'S REPLY IS TRANSCRIBED.)

THERE IS A FINAL POINT I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE. THE QUESTION IS: WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT FROM THE VIEW POINT OF LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, (A) THE EAST-WEST MILITARY CONFRONTATION, OR, (B) THE INCREASING NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC GAP?

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU -- I CAN'T PRIORITIZE THEM. I HAVE NO/NO HESITATION IN SAYING THAT THE EAST-WEST TENSIONS OR CONFRONTATIONS ARE MUCH MORE SERIOUS THAN THE NORTH-SOUTH, FOR A VERY SIMPLE REASON: IT IS THAT THE NORTH-SOUTH PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED -- INDEED, IT IS AGGRAVATED IN SEVERAL WAYS WHICH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED THIS MORNING BY THE EAST-WEST TENSIONS OR CONFLICTS. WHEREAS, CONTRARILY, THEORETICALLY, YOU CAN SOLVE THE EAST-WEST QUESTION WITHOUT SOLVING THE NORTH-SOUTH ONE; BUT YOU CAN'T SOLVE THE NORTH-SOUTH ONE, WITHOUT SOLVING THE EAST-WEST ONE. THEREFORE, THE EAST-WEST ONE, IN MY VIEW, IS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT.

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ACTION
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---PMS REMARKS AT DAVOS ON INNATL SECURITY

THERE WAS SPIRITED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS DURING SESSION ON INNATL SECURITY AT DAVOS SYMPOSIUM JAN28 BETWEEN PM,USA DEPUTY SEC OF STATE KENNETH DAM AND EX-FRENCH PM RAYMOND BARRE WHO WAS SESSION CHAIRMAN.(WHILE ALSO MEMBERS OF PANEL,PMS OF TURKEY AND MALAYSIA DID NOT/NOT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN EAST/WEST DISCUSSION).ASPECTS OF DISCUSSION WHICH WILL LIKELY ATTRACT ATTENTION INCLUDE REMARKS BY PM ABOUT(A)INTERPLAY BETWEEN MBFR/NUCLEAR THRESHOLD/NON FIRST USE/NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE,(B)ISSUE OF QUOTE CREDIBILITY UNQUOTE OF EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE EG WOULD USA START WWII IN DEFENCE OF EUROPE?(C)DESTABILIZING NATURE OF USA QUOTE STAR WARS UNQUOTE CONCEPT JUXTAPOSED W TH PMS STRATEGY OF SUFFOCATION-PARTICULARLY CDN PROPOSAL FOR HIGH-ALTITUDE ASAT BAN,(D)INCREASING SOPHISTICATION OF ARMS RACE CONTRASTED WITH DAMS INSISTENCE THAT NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN USA ARSENAL WAS IN FACT DECREASING AND(E)SIGNIFICANCE OF NATOS WITHDRAWAL OF 2400 NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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PAGE TWO PMDL0019 CONF

2.PMOOTT/B SMITH - WILL PROVIDE YOU AND INFO ADDRESSEES WITH FULL TRANSCRIPT OF DISCUSSION.HE WILL ALSO PROVIDE TRANSCRIPT ON RESPONSIVE/RESPONSIVE BASIS TO MEDIA.IF QUERIED,YOU SHOULD INDICATE THE DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE IN PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF EUROPEAN MANAGEMENT FORUM WHICH IS DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE AN UNSTRUCTURED AND FREE-FLOWING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MATTERS OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONCERN.SUBJECTS DISCUSSED AS PER PARA1,FORM,OF COURSE,NO/NO PART OF SCENARIO FOR VISITS TO EASTERN EUROPE.

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TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE-CANADA FLT1 M. TRUDEAU N'A PAS "UNE APPROCHE OBJECTIVE" DE LA SITUATION INTERNATIONALE, SELON PRAGUE

George Mosco
725-3511 = Poste 475
Mr. McNeil to sec + file

PRAGUE, 27 JAN (AFP) - LE PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN, M. PIERRE-ELLIOTT TRUDEAU, N'A PAS "UNE APPROCHE OBJECTIVE" DE LA SITUATION INTERNATIONALE LORSQU'IL AFFIRME QUE "LES DEUX SUPER-PUISSANCES ASSUMENT LA MEME RESPONSABILITE" POUR LA TENSION DANS LE MONDE, A SOULIGNE VENDREDI RADIO-PRAGUE (OFFICIELLE).

DANS UN PREMIER COMMENTAIRE SUR LE SEJOUR MARDI ET MERCREDI A PRAGUE DU PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN, LA RADIO TCHÉCOSLOVAQUE A NEANMOINS AJOUTE QUE LA VISITE DE M. TRUDEAU AVAIT DEMONTRE "QUE TOUS LES PAYS DE L'OTAN NE SOUTIENNENT PAS LA POLITIQUE ULTRA-CONSERVATRICE ET MILITARISTE DES ETATS-UNIS".

EVOQUANT LA TENSION INTERNATIONALE, RADIO PRAGUE A ESTIME QUE "TANT QUE L'ON N'AURA PAS ETE JUSQU'AU FOND DU PROBLEME, IL SERA IMPOSSIBLE DE LE REGLER".

"LE PROBLEME, SELON RADIO-PRAGUE, C'EST QUE, POUR LE MOMENT, WASHINGTON N'A PAS ADOPTE DE MESURE CONCRETE ALLANT DANS LA BONNE DIRECTION", ET QUE "LES NOUVEAUX MISSILES AMERICAINS EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE MENACENT DIRECTEMENT LES PAYS SOCIALISTES".

"LES PAYS SOCIALISTES REAGIRAIENT DE MANIERE REALISTE SI LES ETATS-UNIS COMMENCAIENT A PASSER DE LA MILITARISATION AU DESARMEMENT", A ESTIME LA RADIO.

SUIVRA C/

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AFP 271603 GMT JAN 84

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TCHECOSLOVAQUIE-CANADA FLT2-DER M. TRUDEAU N'A PAS "UNE APPROCHE
OBJECTIVE"...

PRAGUE - "JUSQU'ICI, A CONCLU RADIO-PRAGUE, LE PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN
N'A PAS DEPASSE SON OMBRE, MAIS IL A FAIT PREUVE DE REALISME EN SE RENDANT EN
TCHECOSLOVAQUIE, ET EN APPRECIANT POSITIVEMENT LES PROPOSITIONS", DU PACTE DE
VARSOVIE, A CONCLU LE COMMENTATEUR.

LE COMMENTAIRE DE RADIO-PRAGUE EST LE PREMIER COMMENTAIRE TCHECOSLOVAQUE
OFFICIEL SUR LA VISITE DE M. TRUDEAU A PRAGUE OU AUCUN CHEF DE GOUVERNEMENT DE
L'OTAN N'ETAIT VENU DEPUIS 1973, LES AUTRES MEDIA SE SONT CONTENTES DE
REPRENDRE LES DECLARATIONS CANADIENNES SANS LES COMMENTER.

BN/PJL/ /C/

AFP 271626 UTC JAN 84

AFP 271629 GMT JAN 84

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TO/A • CANADIAN EMBASSY, PEKING
FROM/DE • Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, OTTAWA (PER)

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Thank-you letters for Deng Xiaoping
SUJET and Zhao Ziyang

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

Date
January 27, 1984

Number/Numéro
PER-0107

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

2

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MINA

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28-6-12
Please transmit the attached letters

...
from Prime Minister Trudeau through the
appropriate channels to Premier Zhao Ziyang
and Chairman Deng Xiaoping. They relate to the
Prime Minister's visit to China last November.

R. H. [Signature]
for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

January 13, 1984

My dear Premier,

I was pleased that during my recent trip to Asia you and Chairman Deng Xiaoping were able to receive me in Beijing at very short notice. As I mentioned to both you and Chairman Deng, China has a special role in the world as a nuclear weapons state. I was therefore particularly pleased to have the opportunity of a frank exchange with you and to be able to outline to you the reasons behind my initiative as well as to explain its various elements. I greatly valued your encouragement of my efforts.

When we meet, I should like to inform you of the results of the meetings I have had with other leaders since we last met and to review some of the issues we discussed in November. I look forward to learning if you have had any further thoughts on my ideas, especially on the call for a conference of the five nuclear powers.

In the meantime I might note that the decisions of the recent NATO ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council regarding the Conference on Disarmament in Europe and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks have been particularly encouraging to me. I very much look forward to seeing you again.

Yours sincerely, *with personal*
regards.

Qin S. F.

His Excellency Zhao Ziyang
Premier, State Council
People's Republic of China
Beijing



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

January 23, 1984

Dear friend, Chairman Deng,

I first wish to thank you for having received me on such short notice. I was particularly pleased to be able to see you again and to have the occasion to talk about the present difficult international situation.

I have spoken to a number of leaders about my initiative and its various elements but I especially wanted to have the views of my Chinese friends. I greatly valued the opportunity to come to Beijing. While I understand your argument that your arsenal is largely symbolic, China is one of the five nuclear weapon states and hence has a special interest in the reduction of nuclear weapons.

Although I understand your reservations on the idea of a conference of the five nuclear powers at this stage, and I share your view that prime responsibility for nuclear disarmament rests with the superpowers, I am persuaded that, eventually, all five nuclear weapon states must come together to discuss these questions and that greater pressure can be brought to bear on the superpowers at, rather than away from, the negotiating table.

I am convinced that if a nuclear conflagration were to occur its effects would be global in scope and that no nation and no people would be spared.

Yours sincerely, *with warm
personal regards.*

Quin S. J.

His Excellency Deng Xiaoping
Chairman, Central Advisory Commission
Communist Party of China
People's Republic of China
Beijing

~~PLEASE RETURN TO IFB~~

January 27, 1984.

REPORT TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

MF
RD

Canadian Institute (Centre) for Peace and Security (Studies)

The purpose of this report is to recommend what action the Government might take to implement the commitment in the Speech from the Throne of December 7th "to create a publicly funded centre to gather, collate and digest the enormous volume of information now available on defence and arms control issues. Fresh ideas and new proposals, regardless of source, will be studied and promoted". Consultations have been held with appropriate officials in Ottawa, some MPs, a few NGOs and academics, and with policy research organizations in both Canada and the USA (list at Appendix A). Canadian embassies in London, Stockholm, Bonn and Paris have sought information about experience in those countries. It must be emphasized, however, that there has been insufficient time to consult closely or, in some cases at all, with the interested public or to make a thorough survey of both Canadian experience and experience outside Canada. The conclusions reached ought therefore to be regarded as preliminary and subject to review after further investigation. Indeed my first conclusion is that more time is required before the government makes final decisions.

What should such an Institute or Centre do?

There are four separate functions which might be performed by a public policy Institute or Centre devoted to the subject of Canadian and international

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security, including arms control and disarmament, defence, and east/west issues.

These are:

- (1) the collection, analysis and dissemination of information to the public;
- (2) issue oriented research both autonomously and by contract;
- (3) policy advice to the government;
- (4) the coordination and possibly funding of private sector research.

Those consulted were in general agreement that, unlike the USA or Western Europe, Canada is not well equipped to nourish public debate in this area, either in government or outside. However, there was no agreement on the right remedy. In particular, those who do this kind of research now at universities or research institutes fear that a new organization would compete with their own resources, given the fact that there are few persons capable of making a contribution to the debate who are not already employed, and that financial backing is difficult to secure. They would prefer that the government (a) improve its own capacities to conduct research and (b) help existing institutions outside government to do the same. The Donner Foundation, for example, which is the principal funding organization for this kind of research, is strongly of this view.

On the other hand, there is a widely held perception amongst NGOs associated with the "peace movement" that the government is not responsive to their concerns. They would view a new Centre/Institute with favour if it were

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outside government and engaged in vigorous advocacy of new ideas and proposals but at the same time did not detract from the sources of funding already available to them from government. They would also wish to see the new body engage in conflict research and the issues associated with east/west relations generally. There is interest in giving some permanent form to the Prime Minister's current peace initiative. Some would like the new body to report to Parliament rather than to the government, or to the Prime Minister rather than to DEA or DND.

There was little dissent from the view that the questions to be studied must have a Canadian dimension and look to the future. There was less need for the gathering of information about arms control globally, a function already performed by institutions elsewhere (in Stockholm, London and Washington mainly). It was suggested that a Canadian perspective on east/west relations, especially USA/USSR relations, would be valuable and that foreign scholars would be attracted more by this focus than by the "hardware" focus. It was thought essential by many that the Institute/Centre establish close relations with non-Canadian institutions and scholars.

Existing Resources

The government is increasing its capacity to do operational research, especially in the area of verification of arms control agreements. But these resources are still quite limited, and outside ORAE in DND, they tend to be non-renewable. Compared to our knowledge of United Nations procedures, especially

- 4 -

peace keeping, and some legal expertise, knowledge of the central issues of nuclear arms control, including Soviet approaches to arms control, is sparse. Despite the MSS programme of DND, it is my impression that only York University in association with the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies has managed to create a core centre of expertise in ACI issues and a publishing programme to match it, although Queen's has published a good deal of research.

There is much new interest, however. Carleton University has submitted a proposal for an ACD institute. New courses, and chairs of "peace studies" are to be created at several universities if funds can be found, and conferences are proliferating. The University of Toronto proposes to establish a national centre for the study of Soviet and east European security requirements. The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, funded by Donner, has opened its doors in Ottawa and has ambitious plans for research and public education. Its future is bound to depend on the degree of financial support it can obtain from the federal government. The demands on the Disarmament Fund, now reaching \$700,000, are therefore likely to grow. Yet, in the nature of things, this help will take time to have any impact. Moreover, dispersal of government funds over too wide a spectrum of interests may not lead to results the government can best use. The Secretary of State is apparently seeking Cabinet approval for funding of a series of Institutes or Centres of excellence at universities to do policy research on domestic issues, in part to remedy this deficiency.

There is little doubt therefore that more needs to be done. The questions to be answered are "by whom?" and "in what fields?" At present, the best

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sources of information are overwhelmingly non-Canadian, especially American. This is not surprising and is probably inevitable, but it means that the public judgement is shaped by USA perceptions of security, as reported in the media. The media in turn looks to American expertise in the universities and elsewhere to interpret the information available. While the government could do more to counter this tendency by providing better information and analysis, perhaps through some re-structuring of personnel resources and/or new procedures for reporting to Parliament, there is reason to believe, based on the opinions of many of those consulted, that neither the government nor the universities can provide the credibility which the public now seeks elsewhere.

Relationship to Government

As noted, a few of those consulted, especially in universities, regard the prospect of a new publicly funded organization without enthusiasm and would prefer that such funds be directed to their own institutions. However, the arguments in favour of a new public research institute outside government, as given for example by Ronald Ritchie in his report of 1971 on the Institute for Research on Public Policy, are impressive. The universities have not proved suitable for this kind of research in Canada, in part perhaps because government funds tend to be dispersed across the country, and in part because the Canadian academic community has not been attracted to these issues. A better case can be made for helping to consolidate independent institutes, such as CISS and CCACID. Indeed if these institutions were to suffer because of the new Institute/Centre there would be reason not to pursue it. Canada cannot afford

- 6 -

American extravagance in these matters, and could learn from the Europeans and Japan who have by and large concentrated their resources in government or in fairly modest centres of excellence which governments assist. There has not been time, however, thoroughly to investigate these European examples. In Washington the "think tanks" look askance at government funding, except for those who work mostly on government contracts, like Rand. Congress has not yet acted on the proposal for a Peace Academy which would have a mainly educational function, but may do so this year. If it does, pressure on the Canadian government will surely increase.

Most of those consulted agreed that the new organization must be perceived as outside government control. But there was also a sense that it ought to represent the public interest and thus perform an advisory function to government by such means as an annual report to Parliament, by involving the concerned public in its leadership and research, and by holding conferences and workshops. There was no consensus about the exact nature of the relationship, however, and there is certain to be continuing disagreement on the subject. The experience of the Consultative Group on ACD makes clear that those who wish to change government policy will not be satisfied with arrangements which do not appear to lead in this direction. A fairly flexible structure, related to government but not dependent on government except for financing, and with a board of directors which reflects both public and academic interests, would serve to mitigate these pressures.

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There was apprehension, as noted above, that the new body would absorb government funds to the detriment of recipients of current government grants. However, it was recognized that the Institute/Centre would at some stage have a role in stimulating research and must have a budget for this purpose.

For comparison purposes, three models might be considered - the North/South Institute, the Science Council and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

	<u>Budget</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Admin.</u>
N/S Inst.	\$700,000 (90% govt. grant)	15 plus 1 or 2 visiting fellows	Exec. Director & 30 member board
Science Council	\$4.2 million	67	27 member Council appointed by the government
SIPRI	about \$2 million Annual grant from Parliament	40	international board of 8 members appointed by government and advisory council of 25

All three organizations concentrate their activity on research which is published and thus serves an information purpose as well. The Science Council makes some use of consultants but the others rely on their own resources. SIPRI accepts no contracts from governments nor does it comment on Swedish government policy. The Science Council has an "advisory" role to government and parliament (copy of Act attached). The North/South institute analyses issues and "monitors" government policies.

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The Science Council was established by Parliament and reports to it through the Minister of State for Science and Technology. (The IRPP, however, was incorporated under Part II of the Corporations Act, and is not responsible to Parliament, although the government is represented on its Council of Trustees). The advantages of legislation are presumably national stature, some degree of parliamentary control, and secure financing. A requirement for all party support would also be an advantage. On the other hand, this approach can lead to delay and perhaps create rigidities in structure and procedures. The advantages of all party support could be secured in other ways, perhaps by requesting the Standing Committee for External Affairs and Defence to report on the subject before final decisions are made. As for funding, the new organization would have to depend on federal support if it were to grow but would not want to be perceived as a creature of the federal government. A federal endowment would be more acceptable in this context than a parliamentary appropriation.

CONCLUSIONS

1. General

There is growing public concern about security questions, to which the government has responded by increasing the funds available to support research and education and by seeking more help from universities and the business sector in the making of policy. However, there is no clear consensus about what the main issues and priorities ought to be, either in terms of policy (arms control or disarmament? peace keeping or deterrence?) or the means of achieving better

- 9 -

results. Policy is a matter for the government to decide. It seems clear to me that this function ought not to be obscured by creating a new institution which might appear to be advocating policies different from those of the government, or simply to be explaining government policies better. However, a new institution might be able to help the government by acting as a collector and transmitter of information and ideas from the private sector both at home and abroad. It would not simply be a relay. It would sift, collate and analyze such material, and publish it in readable form.

It may be asked why the government could not itself perform this function. The answer may be that it could but that public concern is such that it would not be satisfied that the government was in fact doing so. Thus a second function of the new institution would be to seek out and stimulate, as well as collect, information and ideas in the public domain. It would not itself advocate policy, but it would bring to bear a capacity for critical analysis of the issues. It would be both responsive to and a participant in the public debate.

For these purposes, the new institution would need a wide and flexible mandate, embracing the broad scope of international security issues as they affect Canada. No other organization outside government has now, or is likely to have, the capacity and means to do this. The new body would not displace existing resources, including university centres and courses, but could, if given sufficient funds, influence and bring together the research findings which are most relevant to government policy. It would not specialise in the "hardware" information available from other sources. Rather it would bring to bear a

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Canadian perspective on the "software" issues in east/west relations with a view eventually to establishing an international reputation for objective, creative thinking.

2. Mandate

The Institute/Centre would therefore have the following main objectives:

- (a) to survey and examine critically the ideas and proposals relating to international and Canadian security held by Canadians;
- (b) to make available to the public the main findings of research and investigation into these questions in other countries, especially as they affect east/west relations;
- (c) to stimulate and enhance Canadian research and teaching by bringing together scholars, officials, journalists and educators to discuss specific issues and projects, and by making funds available for research (criteria to be established);
- (d) to bring to the attention of the government those ideas and proposals it believes merit political response.

3. Methods of Operation

It is too soon to spell these out. A core staff might be gathered to undertake one or two concrete projects under (a) and (b) above, perhaps with the help of existing organizations and after a conference of those persons most likely

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to contribute to, and benefit from, the enterprise. However, at least initially, the main emphasis would be on public information and education, rather than on research. The latter, where required, would preferably be done on contract. The government will wish to consider what grants and contributions now made in this field might be delegated to the Institute/Centre. It will be important to avoid duplication and confusion. One rule of thumb might be that operational research continue to be done within government or on contract from government e.g., the verification fund, but that requests for funding of new institutes, chairs, courses, etc., be referred to the Institute/Centre.

The director should be free to decide the main activities under the guidance of a relatively small board, chosen for its competence. Fund raising would probably not be necessary, but means of raising extra funds might be investigated. There might be an annual report to Parliament on the basis of which the SCEAND could examine the activities of the Institute/Centre. This report might be tabled by the Prime Minister.

Administrative, publishing and overhead expenses would be less if cooperative arrangements were made with an existing organization like the IRPP or the Parliamentary Centre. These should be investigated.

Start-Up


As already noted, the terms of reference and modus operandi of the Institute/Centre require further consultation and thought. If it is decided to

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name soon a Chairman of the Board or Founding Committee and to commit funds, the announcement should be sufficiently general to allow room for change in the mandate suggested above. The part to be played by the SCEAND in this process has been raised with MPs, including Joe Clark, who can see advantages if there is time to organize hearings and submit a report before the summer. Alternatively, an interim board or council might itself organize meetings to this end, or commission a study. The question of legislation needs to be decided.

The Name

The choice of the term "institute" implies academic standards of research. The term "centre" gives greater scope for evolution and variety. An alternative might be "council". The phrase "peace and security", although hackneyed, seems to me best to cover the range of activities envisaged and to meet the various expectations of the public. The term "studies" fits better with an "institute" than with a "centre".


Geoffrey Pearson

APPENDIX A

Consultations were held with:

1. The Departments of External Affairs, National Defence, and the Secretary of State
2. CIDA
3. The PCO (machinery of government) and PMO
4. The Science Council and National Research Council
5. Senator Pitfield, Right Honourable Joe Clark, MP, Pauline Jewett, MP, Paul McRae, MP
6. The Institute for Research on Public Policy
7. Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade
8. North South Institute
9. Canadian Institute of International Affairs
10. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies
11. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament
12. The Canadian Donner Foundation
13. Canadian Labour Congress
14. Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
15. Professors Frank Griffiths of Toronto, Denis Stairs of Dalhousie, Regehr of Conrad Grebel College, George Ignatieff, Albert Legault of Laval, Henry Wiseman of Guelph, Rod Byers of York
16. Project Ploughshares
17. UN Association
18. Physicians for Social Responsibility
19. Peace Research Institute, Dundas
20. Committee for the Third Rail
21. Pugwash
22. Business Council on National Issues

- 2 -

23. USA
Arms Control Association, Brookings Institute, Peace Academy, Woodrow
Wilson Centre, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Views were received from or about:

1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
2. International Institute for Strategic Studies
3. UN Institute for Disarmament Research
4. Research Institute for Peace and Security, Japan
5. Research Institute for International Politics and Security, FRG

More information is required from:

1. Centres for strategic studies in Canada
2. Other NGO's
3. Members of Parliament
4. United Nations, USA and European Organizations

January 27, 1984.

MF
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The effort that failed

BY JEFFREY SIMPSON

OTTAWA

The Prime Minister's "peace initiative" moves the way a dead man's fingernails keep growing. There's no life left in the initiative — all of his substantive proposals have been rejected — but he keeps plugging.

Other world leaders publicly pat him on the back, but they don't like his ideas. None of the key players accepts the five-power disarmament conference. The Americans have rejected his ban on the testing of anti-satellite weapons; in fact, they tested another last weekend in California. The strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is going nowhere. And the Americans, according to reports from Washington, insist that NATO and the Warsaw Pact must agree on each other's force levels in central Europe, the sticking point for 10 years in the Mutual Balance Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna.

Battling zero-for-four on substance, Pierre Trudeau is now talking up the underlying theme of his initiative — the need for more dialogue between East and West. Indeed, his advisers insist the foreign ministers would never have attended the Stockholm Conference without Mr. Trudeau's initiative. In fact, the pressure of West Germany and France brought U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to Stockholm, not Mr. Trudeau.

In Western Europe and the U.S., Mr. Trudeau's initiative barely created a ripple of public interest. Yet in Canada, the support seems widespread. Certainly the opposition parties think so, or they would be lambasting him.

By taking the high ground of peace, Mr. Trudeau has apparently lifted himself above criticism. Some people, thinking this is his parting political shot, give him the benefit of all doubts. Others, alarmed by the international situation, are glad somebody, somewhere is doing something, no matter how ineffectually.

Canada has few chips to push onto the nuclear table. We are without nuclear weapons, and spend the second lowest per-capita amount on defence within NATO. We are a voice to be listened to rather than reckoned with, especially in Washington.

Without prior support of several West European countries, any Canadian initiative was bound to leave the Americans unmoved. Instead, the Prime Minister sprung his initiative on the West Europeans, believing he could persuade them of the imperatives of his mission.

As friends, they had to respond politely. But when they merely patted him on the back, he was left alone in Washington, a dispiriting place for a Canadian to be on such an issue.

In fairness, it's hard to conceive what might have interested the European Big Three. Any hint of delaying the Cruise and Pershing-2 deployments would have rung too many alarm bells within NATO. The idea of a nuclear disengagement zone in central Europe would have frightened the West Germans. A "no first use" policy for nuclear weapons would have knocked the props from NATO's strategic thinking.

All the Prime Minister achieved in Western Europe was to echo other voices encouraging dialogue between East and West. The French and West Germans, having sent senior ministers to Moscow before the Trudeau initiative, were already converts. Now British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher proposes to visit Hungary. And the Americans are shelving the "empire of evil" rhetoric in an election year.

Cynics who dismiss the Prime Minister's initiative as domestic politics in disguise are wrong, although the Liberals may use it later. But those who believe the initiative has accomplished anything substantive — or is accomplishing anything this week in Eastern Europe — are equally mistaken.

Trudeau sees 'cautious hope' for slowing of arms race

By CHARLOTTE MONTGOMERY
Globe and Mail Reporter

PRAGUE — Beneath the tough rhetoric of both East and West, a period of "cautious hope" has begun which makes a scaling-down of the arms race a possibility, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau said yesterday.

After a one-hour meeting with Czechoslovak President Gustav Husak, Mr. Trudeau told reporters they had agreed to support each other in efforts to influence progress at talks on conventional forces, which resume in Vienna in March, and at the current Stockholm conference on security and disarmament.

But Mr. Trudeau offered no details of how they might do that or of any agreements that, after two days here, might suggest an afterlife for his peace mission once his travels are completed. So far, the Prime Minister has been told that his initiative is appreciated and that it is useful. But those words, from Czechoslovak Premier Lubomir Strougal, are not greatly different from U.S. President Ronald Reagan's non-committal Godspeed, during a similar visit to Washington.

Mr. Trudeau played down the harsh tone struck by Mr. Strougal in a dinner toast on Wednesday. Privately, Czechoslovak leaders were creative in their discussion about

how they might help reduce tension and promote progress at the Vienna and Stockholm talks.

At the start of the question-and-answer session with Canadian and Czechoslovak reporters, the first since he left Ottawa on Tuesday, Mr. Trudeau appeared slightly exasperated. Although his eight-day tour to three Eastern-bloc countries is aimed at enlisting their support for his peace campaign, the first questions did not refer to his initiative.

Instead, he was asked to comment on Soviet and U.S. statements and on Soviet leader Yuri Andropov's peace initiative, rather than his own.

His role is not that of an intermediary between Mr. Andropov and Mr. Reagan, Mr. Trudeau replied. "I'm here as the leader of a sovereign nation, Canada, which is a member of an alliance and whose peoples are worried about the increase in tensions between . . . the Warsaw Pact on the one hand and NATO."

When a foreign reporter raised the subject of hockey, Mr. Trudeau used the comment to draw a parallel with his peace mission.

"I see the two superpowers like two hockey teams. They are supposed to play a peaceful game, but sometimes a fight breaks out and one side begins to strike the

other and the other side begins to strike back," he said.

"I suppose it's an academic question as to who strikes first. What is important is to stop the fighting and to get on with the game. . . . We are like the spectators or the referees at a hockey match. We are telling the players to get back to the table, get back to the game."

At dinner on Wednesday, Mr. Strougal criticized the United States as the cause of increasing missile deployment in Europe. Even the literature provided for reporters at their hotels took an anti-U.S. tone, explaining that Mr. Trudeau himself had once been blacklisted by the United States (this is denied by the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa) and that Canadians are indignant about testing the cruise.

But Mr. Trudeau told reporters yesterday that it is predictable there will be "some shouting to prove you are a tough guy and nobody can push you around."

Asked about the tone of Mr. Strougal's comments, Mr. Trudeau said: "It was true the words spoken by members of both sides are still a bit strident, though I would suggest less so than they were six to 12 months ago."

"I think we are in a period of cautious hope where trust can begin to be built. The language is slightly less sharp, but still ambiguous."

At the start of his meeting with the President, Mr. Trudeau joked with Mr. Husak that his year out of power had been "a good sabbatical" which he could recommend. "The difficulty when you leave (is) that you are never sure the place will still be there when you come back," he said.

Last night, Mr. Trudeau travelled to Zurich where he will spend the weekend at an international symposium and speak about his peace initiative. On Monday, he will resume his talks with leaders in East Berlin and then Romania. He will return home on Thursday.

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, K1A 0G2

January 27, 1984

Dear Professor Austin,

Thank you for your letter of October 27 addressed to the Prime Minister concerning the role of academic exchanges in improving dialogue between East and West.

I am heartened that the Prime Minister's remarks on reviving the impulse for dialogue struck a welcome chord with those having a special interest in Soviet and Slavic affairs. Certainly, academic exchanges are a vital component in the process of creating and institutionalizing such contacts. In this context, I am persuaded that they will contribute to greater civility and stability in our international relations.

Notwithstanding these convictions, there are obstacles to a full resumption of contacts. These are born of major differences between Canada and the USSR over the content and management of these exchanges, as governed by the General Exchanges Agreement. You are no doubt aware that the Canadian interest in social sciences and humanities and the Soviet focus on applied sciences are not matched by the corresponding state and academic institutions on either side. The conclusion is inescapable that, until the Canadian scientific and the Soviet humanities communities develop a fundamental stake in exchange programs, there will continue to be uneven and slow progress.

Professor Paul M. Austin
Chairman
McGill University
Department of Russian and Slavic Studies
1001 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, Quebec
H3A 1G5

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Canada has in fact offered to resume academic exchanges with the USSR, but the Soviet Government has, to date, not agreed to proceed on this basis. It continues to seek a full resumption of official exchanges. Unfortunately, there is little interest outside the Soviet and Slavic Studies community in Canada for such a resumption. We are looking for a way out of this apparent impasse, but it is clear that it will be a difficult process.

Nevertheless, I wish to assure you that the resumption of academic exchanges with the USSR is a bilateral priority and will be pursued.

Yours sincerely,

Louis Delvoie

Louis Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

*P. H. I very much regret the delay in
responding to your letter, which was
unfortunately misplaced on receipt and
only a few days later.*



Government of Canada
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0A3

le 24 janvier 1984

Cher M. Delvoie,

Veillez trouvez sous-pli une lettre adressée
au Professeur Paul Austin pour votre signature.

Bien à vous,

Joseph P. Caron
Politique étrangère et défense

Monsieur Louis Delvoie
Ministère des Affaires extérieures
Immeuble Lester B. Pearson
Tour "C" 5ième étage
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0G2



McGill
University

Department of Russian and Slavic Studies

REC'D. / REÇU

NOV 4 1983

Coordination

3306 008

27th October, 1983.

The Right Honourable P.E. Trudeau,
Prime Minister,
Office of the Prime Minister,
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0A2

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Your numerous remarks in recent weeks about the need for sensible dialogue between the West and the countries of the Socialist Bloc will be welcomed, I am sure, by many people in the academic world who have special interests in Russian and Soviet affairs. The calls for reasonable discussions with the Soviet Union will sound hollow, however, if we do not maintain at least the same degree of normal relations with the USSR as the other members of the Atlantic alliance. As you no doubt are aware, the Academic Exchange between Canada and the USSR is still under suspension, so it would seem that from the Soviet point of view, Canada is continuing to take a much harsher line than other members of NATO like Great Britain, the United States and West Germany who have continued to maintain their academic and scholarly contacts with the USSR. As long as we refuse to facilitate scholarly exchange between our two countries, the Soviet authorities may well doubt our good faith in calling for moderation and mutual understanding. Such a consideration is of course quite apart from the damage which this suspension is doing to scholarly research in the Russian and Soviet field. Our own graduate students are prevented from carrying out their research in the USSR, while older scholars are denied access to Soviet libraries, archives and institutions of advanced study and research. Both these groups watch with growing frustration as their colleagues in the United States and Great Britain as well as other countries in Europe continue to spend the necessary time in the Soviet Union to do their research in spite, one might note, of the rather bellicose words of some political leaders in these countries.

I do sincerely hope, Mr. Prime Minister, that the Government will soon move to an agreement with the Soviet Union in the academic field which

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Postal address: 1001 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, PQ, Canada H3A 1G5

ORIGINAL ENVOYÉ À

C.C. P.M.O. FILE

C.C. DOSSIERS C.P.M.


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will allow Canada to speak with a confident voice in the international community and to permit particularly our graduate students, the scholars of the future, access to the facilities they need for the furtherance of scholarly research on Russia and the Soviet Union.

Yours truly,



PMA/vh

Paul M. Austin
Chairman

c.c. Professor Nicholas Žekulin, President,
Canadian Association of Slavists

Professor Norman Pereira, Past President,
Canadian Association of Slavists

Professor Gleb Žekulin, Chairman of the
Committee on Academic Exchanges with the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
with the Canadian Association of Slavists

3

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

O/A:

Mr. Fowler

C:

Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

E: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:

Paul M. Austin

DATE:

October 27, 1983

SUBJECT/SUJET:

Academic exchange between Canada and the USSR

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:

3306 008

Judy Cameron

DATE: November 4, 1983

☐ **REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.**

RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

☐ **REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.**

RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.

☐ **REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.**

RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

☐ **NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.**

AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

(sent to office
of Herb Gray
27/1/84)

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. In the wake of the KAL downing, East-West relations appeared to have touched a low point. There has been little genuine political dialogue between the two sides and no real political framework for arms control and other negotiations. The Prime Minister is interested in seeing if more propitious conditions can be created for building a constructive, working relationship between East and West.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a political impetus by the West to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna to try to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe by achieving a stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm Conference at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

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CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1. Prime Minister's meeting with Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and senior officials; creation of Task Force (September 21)
2. Prime Minister meets at Meach Lake with Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence, senior officials and ambassadors (October 7)
3. Prime Minister's letters to all NATO Heads of Government (October 22-25)
4. Prime Minister's speech at Guelph University (October 27)
5. Prime Minister's letters to Soviet and Chinese leaders (early November)
6. Prime Minister's meetings with President Mitterrand of France, Prime Minister Lubbers and Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Martens of Belgium, His Holiness the Pope, Prime Minister Craxi of Italy, Chancellor Kohl of West Germany, Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain (November 8-11)
7. Prime Minister's speech in Montreal (November 13)
8. Prime Minister's meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone (November 19)
9. Prime Minister's personal emissary (Geoffrey Pearson) visits Peking (November 21-22) and Moscow (November 25-26)
10. Prime Minister participates in Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi (November 22-27)

- 3 -

- 11 Prime Minister's visit to Peking (November 28-29)
12. Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs participation in NATO ministerial meetings (December 8-9)
13. Prime Minister's meetings over six week period with leading experts on nuclear matters and East-West relations - Robert McNamara, General Rogers, General Brent Scowcroft, George Kennan, Members of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Georgi Arbatov. (October-November)
14. Prime Minister's visit to President Reagan in Washington (December 15)
15. Prime Minister's Meeting with U.N. Secretary General (January 11)
16. Visit of Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang (January 16-20)
17. Prime Minister's visit to Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania (January 24 - February 2).

REACTIONS

The Prime Minister has received encouraging support for the broad political purposes of the initiative in his consultations with European allies, the Chinese leadership, President Nakasone of Japan and President Reagan. The Prime Minister has found general agreement with his analysis of the dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.

- 4 -

Also, Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security which reflected the Prime Minister's analysis of the gravity of the current situation and the importance of applying political will to the quest for international security. U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has commended and encouraged the Prime Minister's efforts.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the Stockholm Conference, followed by a decision by the Warsaw Pact to have its ministers attend.
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO position on the MBFR negotiations;
- (c) the "Brussels declaration" which pledges NATO to work for "genuine détente" and constructive dialogue with the East in recognition of their mutual security interests and eschews any attempt to seek superiority.
- (d) a decision to review the state of East-West relations to search for ways in which they might be improved.

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT FPR0091 27JAN84

TO DAVOS/CANDEL DELIVER BY 230700

DISTR IDA IDDZ MINA MINE RSR RSD

---PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE: DAVOS SYMPOSIUM

SUMMARY: DAVOS RECEIVED WIDESPREAD BUT SUPERFICIAL COVERAGE IN 27 JAN PRESS (SEE PARA 3 BELOW); EXCLUSIVELY IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLES ON PMS MISSION TO EAST BLOCK WHICH WERE FEATURED (USUALLY FRONT PAGE) IN ALL MAJOR DAILIES. PRESS, WHICH DREW HEAVILY FROM CP WIRE STORIES (SEE PARA 4 BELOW), TENDED TO HIGHLIGHT QUOTE VACATION ASPECT UNQUOTE OF PMS DAVOS STOP-OVER, HOWEVER. SSEA RECEIVED ONLY SCANT REF AS HEAD OF CANDEL TO DAVOS SYMPOSIUM.

2. REPORT: HEADLINES AS FOLLOWS: (GLOBE) TRUDEAU SEES QUOTE CAUTIOUS HOPE UNQUOTE FOR SLOWING OF ARMS RACE/ (CITIZEN) TRUDEAU TAKES WEEKEND BREAK FROM PEACE INITIATIVE TALKS/ (GAZETTE) EAST-WEST THAW IS ON PM SAYS IN PRAGUE/ (DEVOIR) APRES PRAGUE, TRUDEAU EST MODEREMENT OPTIMISTIC/ (DROIT) TRUDEAU DIT AVOIR ARRACHE DES ENGAGEMENTS AUX TCHEQUES/ (PRESSE) LA GUERRE FERA PLUS MAL QUE LES BATAILLES AU HOCKEY.

3. DAVOS WAS MENTIONED BRIEFLY IN ALL DAILIES EXCEPT FOR CA PRESSE (ARTICLE BY GILBERT LAVOIE). BRIEF REF TO SSEA, AS H AD OF CANDEL TO DAVOS, WAS MADE ONLY/ONLY IN CITIZEN AND LE DROIT. CITIZEN ARTICLE (BY PAUL KORING) WAS ONLY/ONLY ARTICLE TO HAVE BEN FILED FROM DAVOS AND, THEREFORE, PROVIDED MOST BACKGROUND-HOWEVER GENERAL-

...2

PAGE TWO FPRO091 UNCLAS

ON SYMPOSIUM ITSELF. CITIZEN ARTICLE, LIKE MOST OTHERS, HIGHLIGHTED
QUOTE VACATION ASPECT UNQUOTE OF PMS STOP-OVER, NOTING THAT SSEA
QUOTE IS ALSO IN THIS PICTURESQUE SWISS VILLAGE AS LEADER OF A
DELEGATION OF 18 SENIOR CDN EXECUTIVES UNQUOTE.

4. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF CP WIRE STORIES WHICH FORMED BASIS
OF 27JAN PRESS:

(A) PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU, TAKING A BREAK, FROM HIS PEACE PILGRIMATE,
ARRIVED IN THIS SWISS RESORT THURSDAY FOR THREE DAYS OF SKIING AND
BUSINESS MEEINTS.

(B) TRUDEAU WHO PLANS TO ADDRESS AN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS FORUM
DURING HIS SWISS STAY AND MEET WITH A DELEGATION OF TOP CANADIAN
EXECUTIVES, FLEW TO DAVOS AFTER TWO DAYS OF TALKS WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIAN
LEADERS.

(C) CANADIAN OFFICIALS SAID TRUDEAU WILL ATTEND AT LEAST SOME OF THE
OPENING SESSSIONS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE IN DAVOS SPONSORED BY
THE EUROPEAN MANAGEMENT FORUM. TRUDEAU WILL ADDRESS THE MEETING OF
600 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LEADERS ON SATURDAY.

(D) EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER ALLAN MACEACHEN IS ALSO IN THIS
PICTURESQUE SWISS VILLAGE AS LEADER OF A DELEGATION OF 18 SENIOR
CANADIAN EXECUTIVES.

UUU/025 272216Z FPR0091

IN FD

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PCOOTT PC00087 27JAN84

TO PMDELDAVOS/FOWLER DELIVER BY 230900

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ RBR

REF OURTEL PC00081 26JAN

---PMS TOAST-BUCST

FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TEXT FOR PRESS USE OF PROPOSED REMARKS
FOR PMS TOAST IN BUCST REVISED TO CONFORM WITH FRENCH TEXT
TRANSMITTED YESTERDAY.

TEXT BEGINS:

PROPOSED TOAST FOR USE BY THE
PRIME MINISTER DURING HIS VISIT TO BUCST
FEBRUARY 1ST 1984

MR PRESIDENT, LET ME BEGIN BY EXPRESSING MY
DEEP APPRECIATION FOR YOUR KIND INVITATION AND FOR THE
WARM WELCOME YOU HAVE EXTENDED TO ME HERE TODAY. LET
ME ALSO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RECOGNIZE
AND APPLAUD YOUR TIRELESS EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF
INNATL PEACE AND STABILITY.

I HAVE TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY IN RECENT MONTHS
TO CONSULT WITH MANY STATESMEN AND WORLD LEADERS, AND
TO SUGGEST MEANS TO ALLEVIATE CURRENT GLOBAL TENSIONS.
I CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL TO INCLUDE BUCST IN MY

...2

PAGE TWO PC08084 CONF

ITINERARY, GIVEN YOUR OWN VERY WELCOME EFFORTS TO
REOPEN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

NINE YEARS AGO, MR PRESIDENT, WE MET AT
HSNKI TO SIGN THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONF ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. AT THAT TIME, YOU
RIGHTLY STATED:

QUOTE WE SHOULD NOT/NOT HARBOUR THE ILLUSION THAT WE
CAN NOW STAY STILL AND REMAIN SAFE...

HISTORY IS GOING TO JUDGE NOT/NOT ONLY THE
DOCUS WE SHALL SIGN AND THE STATEMENTS
MADE, BUT ALSO THE WAY IN WHICH EVERY ONE OF
OUR STATES, EVERY LEADER AND GOVT,

TAKES ACTION TO IMPLEMENT THESE DOCUS. UNQUOTE.

HOW PROPHETIC THOSE WORDS HAVE PROVEN TO BE.
THE DETERIORATION IN INNATL RELNS SINCE 1975
DEMONSTRATES THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SPIRIT OF
HSNKI TO THOSE TWIN DEMONS, FEAR AND SUSPICION.

MR PRESIDENT, OUR PEOPLES ARE ANXIOUS ABOUT
THE FUTURE AND, MOST OF ALL, ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF WAR
IN A NUCLEAR AGE. I UNDERSTAND AND SHARE THEIR UNEASE.

THERE WAS, I SUPPOSE, A TIME WHEN WAR WAS
SEEN AS A NOBLE ENDEAVOUR, WAGED FOR NOBLE PURPOSES.
UNLIKE OUR HSNKI FINAL ACT, INNATL LAW

...3

PAGE THREE PC00087 CONF

RECOGNIZED ONLY STATES AND THEIR INTERESTS, NOT/NOT
INDIVIDUALS. AS ENLIGHTENED A PHILOSOPHER AS
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU COULD STATE: QUOTE ON FAIT LA GUERRE
AUX ETATS, NON AUX PEUPLES. UNQUOTE.

BUT WE RECOGNIZE NOW--INDEED EVERY CONTINENT
HAS EXPERIENCED IT PAINFULLY IN THIS CENTURY--THAT
WARS ARE WAGED ON PEOPLE, CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AS WELL
AS COMBATANTS, AND NOT/NOT ON INANIMATE STATES.

WE RECOGNIZE ALSO THAT IT WOULD NOT/NOT MAKE
SENSE, IN A NUCLEAR AGE, TO DEBATE STRATEGIES FOR
VICTORY, SINCE THERE IS LITTLE POSSIBILITY ANY VICTOR
WOULD EMERGE FROM THE ASHES OF A THIRD GLOBAL
CONFLICT. IF OUR EFFORTS TO SAFEGUARD PEACE ARE NOT/NOT
SUCCESSFUL, THERE WILL BE NO/NO WINNERS, ONLY LOSERS.

THERE IS A WELL-KNOWN LATIN MAXIM THAT STATES:
QUOTE QUI DESIDERAT PACEM, PRAEPARET BELLUM UNQUOTE.
(LET HE WHO DESIRES PEACE, PREPARE FOR WAR.)
(VEGETIUS, 4TH C. A.D.)

THE PRINCIPLE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS
FOUNDED UPON THAT MAXIM. BUT IS THERE NOT/NOT A DANGER OF
BECOMING SO PREPARED FOR WAR, PSYCHOLOGICALLY AS WELL
AS MILITARILY, THAT WE LOSE SIGHT OF THE PROSPECTS OF
PEACE?

...4

PAGE FOUR PC00087 CONF

THE WHOLE WORLD IS NOW CONFRONTED WITH THE
FEARFUL REALITIES OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THE
PERSPECTIVE OF GLOBAL DISASTER MAKES IT COMPELLING FOR
US, POLITICAL LEADERS, TO FACE THE SITUATION BOLDLY.
WE CANNOT/NOT AFFORD TO HIDE BEHIND POLITICAL BOMBAST.

NEVER HAVE WE HAD SO MANY REASONS TO STOP
KILLING EACH OTHER. NEVER HAVE WE HAD SO MANY REASONS
TO FEEL A SENSE OF COMMON PURPOSE. EITHER THIS
GENERATION OF LEADERS TAKES EFFECTIVE ACTION TO REDUCE
THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENT THEIR SPREAD,
OR WE BEQUEATH TO OUR CHILDREN A FUTURE WHERE THE
CHANCES OF GLOBAL DESTRUCTION INCREASE EVERY DAY.

MR PRESIDENT, YOU AND I ARE BOTH AWARE OF
OUR IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES.
OUR COUNTRIES ARE MEMBERS OF OPPOSING MILITARY
ALLIANCES. BUT WE BOTH KNOW THAT WE CAN TRANSCEND OUR
DIFFERENCES. IT IS THOSE THINGS WHICH UNITE US THAT
MATTER, NOT/NOT THOSE THAT DIVIDE US.

AS MEDIUM-SIZE POWERS, WE CANNOT/NOT PRETEND TO
BE OR TO BECOME KEY PLAYERS IN THE DISARMAMENT DEBATE.
THE TWO SUPERPOWERS ARE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
CURRENT ARMS RACE AND IT IS ESSENTIALLY UP TO THEM TO
STOP THE NUCLEAR ESCALATION.

...5

PAGE FIVE PC00087 CONF

HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT/NOT MEAN THAT WE SHOULD SET ASIDE OUR SENSE OF IDEALISM AND RENOUNCE ANY EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT PEACE TO THIS GENERATION. IN COMING TO BUCST AND OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS, MY PURPOSE IS TO BUILD UPON AN ESTABLISHED TRADITION OF CONSULTATION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERNS.

BUT I SENSE THAT THE MOMENTUM OF CONSULTATION HAS BEEN LOST. IT IS MY HOPE THAT, THROUGH DIRECT PERSONAL CONTACT, THE LEADERS OF EAST AND WEST CAN ONCE AGAIN BRING DIRECTION AND DETERMINATION TO THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.

A DETERMINED EFFORT MUST ALSO BE MADE TO IMPLEMENT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HSNKI FINAL ACT CALLING FOR INCREASED PERSONAL CONTACTS AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. FOR NOTHING BREEDS MUTUAL FEAR AND SUSPICION AS MUCH AS ISOLATION. A COUNTRY THAT ISOLATES ITSELF FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD EXPOSES ITSELF TO CRUEL DISAPPOINTMENTS.

WE MUST, IN SHORT, BRING ABOUT A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS. BECAUSE A DURABLE PEACE CANNOT/NOT BE BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON NUMERICAL OR TECHNICAL ADJUSTMENTS, HOWEVER SIGNIFICANT, TO MILITARY STOCKPILES. SUCH A PEACE WOULD BE PRECARIOUS INDEED.

...6

PAGE SIX PC00087 CONF

MR PRESIDENT, I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT CDA AND ROMANIA HAVE A HISTORY OF FRUITFUL COOPERATION, AND NOT/NOT ONLY IN BILATERAL FIELDS. INDEED, WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER ON INNATL ISSUES OF PEACE, SECURITY, AND DISARMAMENT THROUGH SUCH FORA AS THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE CTTEE ON DISARMAMENT, AND THE CSCE.

I AM HEARTENED, MR PRESIDENT, BY THE FACT THAT WE SHARE SIMILAR OBJECTIVES: TO REDUCE INNATL TENSIONS, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND TO CREATE AN INNATL CLIMATE OF PEACE IN WHICH SECURITY AND PROSPERITY FOR ALL NATIONS BECOMES AN ATTAINABLE GOAL.

PERMIT ME TO PROPOSE A TOAST, MR PRESIDENT, TO YOU, TO CONTINUED FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN CDA AND ROMANIA, AND TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS FOR GLOBAL PEACE. UNQUOTE. TEXT ENDS.

CCC/204 272100Z PC00087



File

TO/À SCH
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Your memorandum SCH-19 of January 19
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT • PM Initiative
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
January 27, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0105

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

Further to your memorandum under reference, we attach for your retention one copy each of all the policy and briefing books prepared for the Prime Minister for his initiative on East-West Relations and International Security. These books cover the period October 1, 1983 to January 24, 1984.

2. We shall be sure to provide you with copies of any future books we may have occasion to produce.

L. A. Delvoie
L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

file

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0104 27JAN84		
TO/À	TO CANDEL DAVOS/FOULER/SMITH/ <i>NOBLE</i>		
INFO			
DISTR	DISTR MIMA RBR FPR		
REF	---PM INITIATIVE		
SUBJ/SUJ	FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COLUMN BY JEFFREY SIMPSON WHICH APPEARED IN TODAYS GLOBE AND MAIL UNDER HEADING QUOTE THE EFFORT THAT FAILED UNQUOTE. 2.TEXT BEGINS. (CONCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED) TEXT ENDS.		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A.Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG L.A.Delvoie

MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and " (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et " (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quant il comporte une signature.

The effort that failed

BY JEFFREY SIMPSON

OTTAWA

The Prime Minister's "peace initiative" moves the way a dead man's fingernails keep growing. There's no life left in the initiative — all of his substantive proposals have been rejected — but he keeps plugging.

Other world leaders publicly pat him on the back, but they don't like his ideas. None of the key players accepts the five-power disarmament conference. The Americans have rejected his ban on the testing of anti-satellite weapons; in fact, they tested another last weekend in California. The strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is going nowhere. And the Americans, according to reports from Washington, insist that NATO and the Warsaw Pact must agree on each other's force levels in central Europe, the sticking point for 10 years in the Mutual Balance Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna.

Battling zero-for-four on substance, Pierre Trudeau is now talking up the underlying theme of his initiative — the need for more dialogue between East and West. Indeed, his advisers insist the foreign ministers would never have attended the Stockholm Conference without Mr. Trudeau's initiative. In fact, the pressure of West Germany and France brought U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to Stockholm, not Mr. Trudeau.

In Western Europe and the U.S., Mr. Trudeau's initiative barely created a ripple of public interest. Yet in Canada, the support seems widespread. Certainly the opposition parties think so, or they would be lambasting him.

By taking the high ground of peace, Mr. Trudeau has apparently lifted himself above criticism. Some people, thinking this is his parting political shot, give him the benefit of all doubts. Others, alarmed by the international situation, are glad somebody, somewhere is doing something, no matter how ineffectually.

Canada has few chips to push onto the nuclear table. We are without nuclear weapons, and spend the second lowest per-capita amount on defence within NATO. We are a voice to be listened to rather than reckoned with, especially in Washington.

Without prior support of several West European countries, any Canadian initiative was bound to leave the Americans unmoved. Instead, the Prime Minister sprung his initiative on the West Europeans, believing he could persuade them of the imperatives of his mission.

As friends, they had to respond politely. But when they merely patted him on the back, he was left alone in Washington, a dispiriting place for a Canadian to be on such an issue.

In fairness, it's hard to conceive what might have interested the European Big Three. Any hint of delaying the Cruise and Pershing-2 deployments would have rung too many alarm bells within NATO. The idea of a nuclear disengagement zone in central Europe would have frightened the West Germans. A "no first use" policy for nuclear weapons would have knocked the props from NATO's strategic thinking.

All the Prime Minister achieved in Western Europe was to echo other voices encouraging dialogue between East and West. The French and West Germans, having sent senior ministers to Moscow before the Trudeau initiative, were already converts. Now British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher proposes to visit Hungary. And the Americans are shelving the "empire of evil" rhetoric in an election year.

Cynics who dismiss the Prime Minister's initiative as domestic politics in disguise are wrong, although the Liberals may use it later. But those who believe the initiative has accomplished anything substantive — or is accomplishing anything this week in Eastern Europe — are equally mistaken.



External Affairs Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

28 JAN 84 00 11z	
12	10

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ UNCLASSIFIED

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0103 27JAN84

TO/À TO CANDEL DAVOS/FOWLER/SMITH/*NOBLE*

INFO

DISTR DISTR MINA RBR FPR

REF ---PM INITIATIVE

SUBJ/SUJ FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF EDITORIAL WHICH APPEARED IN TODAYS OTTAWA
CITIZEN UNDER HEADING QUOTE DID TRUDEAU ANSWER BACK? UNQUOTE.
2.TEXT BEGINS.

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

TEXT ENDS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG L.A.Delvoie/sc	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> SIG L.A.Delvoie

Did Trudeau answer back?

What did Prime Minister Trudeau reply when Czech leaders accused the U.S. of creating danger by deploying cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in Western Europe?

Reports don't indicate that he said anything in defence of the NATO decision — Canada's decision — to counter the Soviet SS-20 threat in this way unless U.S.-Soviet agreement were reached before the end of 1983.

It may be understandable that Trudeau didn't wish to upset his hosts, whom he was trying to influence in favor of his peace initiative. But silence on vital matters such as this can be open to misinterpretation.

If our prime minister said nothing in defence of NATO — let alone in defence of the U.S. — on a matter so basic to the West's security, then Canada's loyalty to the North Atlantic Alliance is open to question. And a split Western alliance certainly won't help the cause of peace.

Czech Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal used a dinner toast to Trudeau to attack the Euromissile deployment. Yet the latter was made necessary by the refusal of the Soviets to reach any agreement with the U.S. to reduce or eliminate the Russian medium-range missile monopoly.

Strougal described the new U.S. weapons as "obviously first-strike missiles" aimed at his country "as a result of a flagrant American measure which is without precedent."

We hope our prime minister countered this inversion of the facts. Even assuming that his host knew the background of the SS-20 deployment that led to the NATO decision of 1979, he should have explained it yet again. That decision gave a four-year period for the Warsaw Pact superpower to negotiate away the proposed positioning of new U.S. missiles intended to catch up with Russia in part.

Or, if Trudeau didn't feel like defending NATO when in Prague, we trust that he at least explained that the West is still prepared to stop its current deployment and even withdraw the few Euromissiles already in place if the Soviets end their boycott of the Geneva talks and reach an honest agreement.

In his search for peace — as commendable as it is — our prime minister must not succumb to the temptation to assume the middle role of a mediator instead of that of a loyal member of NATO, which, like its allies, wants nothing more than an end to East-West confrontation.

It may be difficult, but the only way to reach the beginning of an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is for each side to understand the other's thinking, fears and motivations.

Strougal didn't lose the opportunity to explain his to Trudeau. But did Trudeau explain our side's preoccupations to the Czechs? And will he also do so to the East Germans?

External Affairs Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

B5/28/277

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

28 JAN 84 00 1242 10

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ UNCLASSIFIED

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0103 27JAN84
TO/À TO CANDEL DAVOS/FOWLER/SMITH/NOBLE
INFO
DISTR DISTR MINA RBR FPR
REF ---PR INITIATIVE
SUBJ/SUJ

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF EDITORIAL WHICH APPEARED IN TODAYS OTTAWA
CITIZEN UNDER HEADING QUOTE DID TRUDEAU ANSWER BACK? UNQUOTE.
2.TEXT BEGINS.

(CONCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

TEXT ENDS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A.Delvoic/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

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Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

January 27, 1984

IDDZ-0102

Mr. Marco Ermacora
921 Candra Rd
Montreal, Quebec
H3P 2J2

Dear Mr. Ermacora:

Thank you for your letter of January 25 with its documents and for your support for the Prime Minister's efforts to try to reverse the deteriorating trend in East-West relations.

It is clear that the Prime Minister has been voicing the concerns of a great many Canadians when he has argued the urgent necessity of working for peace and disarmament.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L.A. Delvoie".

L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

January 25, 1984

~~Mr. McNeil~~
~~Brief thanks + acknowledgements~~
~~for my signature plz~~

Dear Sir,

Your assistant suggested that I send you these documents for the Task Force's consideration. Their contents are, to me, of a profound nature, addressing the core philosophical issues, attitudes, and charges required for a meaningful and effective contribution to building a more peaceful world. They stress the bottom-line yet difficult and courageous art of acting on those subtle "leaps of faith" (as Mr Trudeau recently mentioned), of building trust between adversaries, of generating mutual goodwill and respect... authentic peace-making from the heart.

I very sincerely hope that they

will contribute to that quality of reflection
that leads to enlightened action

Sincerely yours,
Marco Ermacora

MARCO ERMACORA
921 CANORA RD
MONTREAL, QUEBEC
H3P 2J2

The Mo Tzu Project

Personal National Peace-finding

by Marlow Hotchkiss

"When I was a boy I wanted to get a Jew, cut it into little pieces, and give a piece to each of my friends. Now I feel that Jews are better than brothers."

—The Egyptian driver who took us to Sadat's tomb and later drove us from Cairo, across the Sinai desert, to Israel

"For the first few months in Vietnam we would cut the ears off enemy dead for souvenirs. But after a while we stopped. If I had the money, there's nowhere I'd rather go now than Vietnam. It's the most beautiful country, with the most beautiful people, I know."

—An American Vietnam veteran

IS THERE A WAY, this side of war, of bringing about such changes of heart? Where hostility exists, and willingness to enter into negotiations is lacking, how can such willingness be created? How can a drift toward belligerence be slowed and reversed? How can we convert relationships of domination/victimization into relationships of equality, mutuality, and reciprocity? How can we change enemies into adversaries, adversaries into rivals, and rivals into partners? What will it take for humankind to set aside war? What must we do to bring ourselves of age? Can we imagine a better "game" than war? What would you do if all war, and all threat of wars, disappeared?

In the summer of 1981, John Steiner and David Hoffman phoned long distance to Bob Fuller in Washington state. After five trips around the world and years of hands-on experience with conflict situations in Vietnam, Seattle's ghetto, and the Soviet Union, Bob was temporarily living in the country, sorting out his life.¹ John and David were calling with a question. California Governor Jerry Brown had suggested that the Regents of the University of California create a peace institute. Fearing yet another academic study group, the two asked Bob, what was *really* worth doing? What would make a difference? The search that summer for the essential questions and for some way to begin to answer them led Bob to conceive the Mo Tzu Project.

My own involvement began a few months later. On the eve of departing for a conference of millionaires who were looking for truly effective ways of funding peace on Earth, John patched

Cynthia Jurs and myself into a conference call with Bob up in Washington. In a half-hour conversation I understood the underlying premise of the project and realized that I had found the vision I was looking for. In that brief conversation I saw a way to move from merely thinking about war and peace to actually doing something about it. In the coming months I was to watch others make this same excited shift.

The name of the project invokes the spirit of Mo Tzu, perhaps the world's first "shuttle diplomat." In the fifth century B.C., during the time of Chinese history known as the Warring States period, Mo Tzu and a few of his followers — who believed in universal love — would travel on foot to the sites of developing conflict among the various feudal "states" and there attempt a kind of diplomatic aikido. If the opposing parties would not agree to sit down together, Mo Tzu would join the weaker, train them how to withstand a siege, and then again sue for a negotiated solution. Precisely what his magic consisted of is not known, but his willingness to personally commit himself to a vision of a unified world is inspiring.


1. For a recounting of Bob's family's journey to the U.S.S.R. and their insights into Soviet society, see "Our Enemies, Our Selves," Spring 1980 CQ.

You wish to make peace? Make peace. In the Mideast, in Ireland, amateurs can wade in where angels fear to tread and by their very directness surprise war, tempt it with a grander complexity than conflict, a more heroic endeavor.

The trip chronicled here took place shortly before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

—Stewart Brand

On April 1 of this year, Bob and his wife, Alia Johnson, and their two children boarded a plane for Cairo, together with Karen Fuller and John Fuller, a photo-journalist along to document the trip. Cynthia and I joined them two days later. David Hoffman met us in Jerusalem in mid-April. Our video team caught up with us in Dublin in early May. We were a total of twelve people.²



By the Suez Canal, a shockingly narrow body of water, Marlow Hotchkiss and Bob Fuller on the west side.

ALL PHOTOS BY JOHN FULLER

Our goal: an initial experience-gathering, shake-down trip to the Mideast and Northern Ireland. Our metagoal: to invent a better "game" than war.

Our purpose was to test ourselves and our ideas.

2. The makeup of our group was an interesting hodge-podge of talents and backgrounds, united by a common notion that individuals can make a difference in this world. Systematically, we were as follows:


Bob Fuller, 45, ex-theoretical physicist, ex-college president, father;
Alia Johnson, 34, poet, coeditor of *Evolutionary Blues*, mother;
Noah Johnson, 5, poet, grand inquisitor;
Adam Fuller, 3, would-be terrorist;
Karen Fuller, 21, graduate student in political science, specializing in China;
John Fuller, 35, filmmaker, photojournalist;
Cynthia Jurs, 26, healer, researcher on shamanism;
Marlow Hotchkiss, 43, ex-theater director, ex-conference director, father;
David Hoffman, 38, antiwar activist, coeditor of *Evolutionary Blues*;
Sarah Conover, 26, video producer;
Kim Spencer, 34, media networker, director of Internews, a television and cable production company;
Evelyn Messinger, 31, video editor, director.

To listen and learn. And where possible, to seek out and link up with those individuals who were themselves healers and networkers at a metanational level. Specifically, we went to the Mideast at this particular time to immerse ourselves in that conflict and to assess firsthand the emotional and political impact of Israel's return of the Sinai Desert to Egypt, as provided in the Camp David accords. And then onto Northern Ireland, calculating that direct personal experiences of two particular conflicts would, when compared, reveal some more universal, and usable, truths about warring.

It felt like no accident that within days of our arrival in Jerusalem, Bob followed a lead and met with Meron Benvenisti, a former deputy-mayor of Jerusalem who had finished, just the week before, a Ph.D. thesis with Roger Fisher of Harvard University's Negotiation Project, comparing the conflict in Israel with the conflict in Ireland. For us this contact was immediate, intimate, and important. His compassion and his metanational perspective are a model for other world leaders.

The meeting with Benvenisti confirmed the rightness of our itinerary and our commitment to ex-

Captured Egyptian (Soviet) tanks in the Sinai are used as targets by the Israeli army and air force.





Sahd, the Egyptian driver who wanted to cut a Jew, and Adam Fuller. Sahd's family lost many to the '67 war. Diplomats without portfolios but with three-year-olds make a different kind of contact.

ploring these issues firsthand. At some point it becomes dangerous to theorize about war and peace from the comfort of our living rooms. Dangerous because we risk losing touch with reality. In the middle of these conflicts, in the middle of these landscapes, when we are surrounded by the smells and colors and shapes of these people so different from ourselves, thinking itself becomes different, as do the thoughts. We discovered again the need to open ourselves, to let in the

strange and alien feelings, to identify, if only for the moment, with an Israeli's grief for a fallen son or a Palestinian's grief for a lost homeland. Only by joining, at least for the moment, in their feelings could we hope to speak back into these people's lives.

Alia developed a brief but significant relationship with Raymonda Tawil, Palestinian journalist, Christian, mother of six, a European-educated woman who is at once a loyal Palestinian and a friend to many Israelis. Alia: "Raymonda is a full-hearted heroine. She was an inspiration to me. Our talks kept being interrupted by developments in the tense situation there, police and bomb squads and telephone calls, but a moment of profound communication occurred when we talked about the new feminist books and the copy of *Evolutionary Blues* I had given her.³ The day we left Jerusalem for Ireland, a person from The Women's Voice, a women's center in Jerusalem, delivered to her a poem I had written about her work which begins:

3. *Evolutionary Blues: An Interhelp Quarterly*, David Hoffman and Alia Johnson, editors; \$14/year (4 issues) from *Evolutionary Blues*, P.O. Box 40187, San Francisco, CA 94140.

DIASPORA

(Excerpts from a letter to John Steiner from Marlow Hotchkiss upon the return of the Mo Tzu team from the Mideast in May, 1982.)

Dear John,

In the Holyland the battle between Good and Evil rages on. Someone lost the scorecards, however, and now no one can tell who is on which side

Retracing the Exodus, we traveled through the Sinai Desert from Egypt to Israel. Two weeks later, the Sinai itself traveled from Israel back to Egypt without even moving one stone. No matter which flag flies over this land, the Bedouins still bury their turds, like cautious cats. The Bedouins bring a nonpartisan continuity to the history of this place. Yes, this land is holy. But not exclusively so; as the astronauts discovered, and as any Indian has always known, *all* land is holy. Yet here the Jews and

Arabs, the children of Isaac and the children of Ishmael, both seem to feel that they separately hold the Divine Deed of Trust to this real estate and so rampage about, with transits and rifles, drawing and redrawing invisible political lines in the moving sands, unable, even with barbed wire and land mines, to deny the awe-inspiring bio-regional integrity of the place.

. . . The Jews are indeed a chosen people, but they have woefully underestimated the dimensions of the chosen land. It is planet-wide. For 4000 years, every time the Jews have come close to establishing a bona fide *physical* homeland, *in situ*, attached to the rocks, for more than three or four generations, God has swooped down and sent them running. It is at least possible that the combined message of 4000 years of dispersal is: Don't get too attached to the rocks! You have a mission to the world!

Shlomo Breznitz told us that Jews are a world superpower. The contribution of Jews ranges from monotheism to nuclear energy. It encompasses the subtlest insights into the nature of matter and reality and extends

to music, literature, economic systems, science, political philosophy, and psychology. For thousands of years, Jews have shown that it is possible not only to survive, but to flourish, create, contribute, and grow *without* a nation, without a political state. And this in spite of the worst examples of inhumanity on record, in spite of the worst prejudices, the worst discriminations, the worst genocidal acts in our planet's history. The Jews have proven that, against all odds and for thousands of years, a people can sustain themselves and contribute to the world without a national identity. In fact, the recent 33-year history of the state of Israel seems to me a tragic paradigm, telescoping what often takes centuries into three short decades, the degeneration of the high moral challenge Ben Gurion invoked at the beginning into the hyper-nationalistic behavior of racism, book banning, terrorist raids, news censorship, martial law, the ghettoization of the Palestinians, inquisitions, and paranoia mongering. And all of this is merely a holographic fragment of the prevailing degeneration pointing at a planetary holocaust.

Raymonda, you alchemist —
you transform hatred;
you stuff the mutant fruits of conflict
into the crowded basket of your heart;
you carry these heavy fruits
until you have the strength to eat them,
to digest them in your aching body
and reveal them
in your mind's light . . .

We found one person who very much shared our values and perspective — a welcome change in a land fraught with ideology. Professor Shlomo Breznitz studies human stress and the role of hope in the healing process. He had just completed an international conference about the shape of the world in the year 2000. The most moving thing this man told us was the story of his project to organize his friends to deliver in person, in their own Land Rover, relief food to the starving in Kenya. He knows that such actions are only symbolic relative to the immensity of the need, yet he knows also that the effort transforms the giver, and that transformed lives continue sending needed signals forever.

These descriptions leave out crucial interactions with many people. For example, David Shipler

of the New York Times; Simcha Flapan of the Israeli journal *New Outlook*; the "deposed" Mayor Tawil (no relation to Raymonda) of the West Bank town of El-Bira; Dr. Ruth Gavison, head of the Human Rights Movement in Israel; former General of the Israeli Army, now professor of Arabic literature, Matti Peled; former secretary-general of the Labor Party, "Lova" Eliav; and Jerusalem's mayor, Teddy Kollek, as well as dozens of "regular" people.

In a nutshell, what we did in Israel was to identify the 43, or is it 57, people who, in the sense of a web, represent the country. Of course there are important omissions — the full web may have 97 nodes. But we got to that point where the person we were talking to recommends that we see A, B, C, and D, and we've already seen B and C, so we go see D and he tells us to see A and B, and it all begins to close on itself like a mathematical structure. The shape and structure of Israel's political and moral dilemma became clearer. Having identified the web, and having seen the issues, we could then inject an idea or a question into the network and almost see it reverberate around. In many of these interactions, we felt that our contribution, if any, was not at all in a

(*Holocaust*: from *holo*, whole, plus *kaustos*, burnt; a spiritual offering, the whole of which is consumed.)

... The irony is that this history, the story of the Diaspora, contains the seeds of a possible answer to our present danger, the threat of nuclear annihilation. The model of the Diaspora, or rather of a massive, *consciously* undertaken dispersment of the richest, most creative, most compassionate and visionary, as well as the most serving and supportive and generous aspects of *any* and *all* of our world's cultures, could radically shift the thrust of our collective behavior from war making to healing, that is, to making whole again the bond of our common humanity and this humanity's bond with the force of life on this planet.

I'm writing to you, John, as a brother in kind, as a peace activist and planet healer, and as a Jew. You, more than anyone, have moved me beyond a concern with our nation's well-being to a concern for all nations, for the planet. You once remarked, "We are all Jews now, in a way; we are all victims of a possible holocaust, the holyland has been

taken away from us, no one is 'free.' " I no longer feel my nation represents me. I too have lost my homeland, yet I haven't moved. My identification with the Diaspora is deep.


Anyone, real Jew, or "circumstantial" Jew alike, with the direct personal experience of living their daily lives and making a contribution to those around them *without* the traditional underpinnings of a national identity is in a powerful position to be a guide on a journey beyond nationalism into identification with and service to the whole Earth. Planetary citizens. Who better can speak to the problems of family unity, cultural continuity, and the need for an ongoing sense of personal worth than the "victims" of the Diaspora? "Victims" here in quotes because it is precisely the shift from victim to creator that is being invoked. It is the shift from operating inside of divisive political boundaries, with all of the attendant *us-and-them* mentalities, to operating as part of a larger whole for the benefit of all the parts.

I know that you, with your experience as a networker and project supporter, can visualize the

steps from the philosophies underlying the metaphor of a consciously chosen Diaspora to the concrete day-to-day logistics needed to make something on this scale a reality. Who are the people, John, who see security in terms of *mutual* security, and who can behave in a compassionate and integrated way?

Who are the people who can lead us in the nuts-and-bolts tasks necessary to inspire enough people to relocate themselves, both physically and spiritually, in the name of creating a worldwide "we feeling"? What would the steps look like on the way to a Peace Corps of planetary proportions?

In Israel we met with Adin Steinsaltz, a physicist turned rabbi, who is singlehandedly translating the Talmud into modern terms. He points out, "Your life is not complete unless you perform a mission of saving the world in a bigger or smaller way." Our travels in the Mideast, and the recent escalation of egoism north of the Lebanese border, confirm for me the urgency of pursuing this line of thought further and of translating it into concrete, doable tasks. . . . □



In Londonderry (Derry to the Irish) British riot squads keep the "peace."

particular message, but in the medium -- in the fact of the project's very existence and peculiar approach. We were able to penetrate into the heart of the network of Israelis who could best inform our work, and who could, in turn, benefit from the perspective which Mo Tzu represents, not in the form of opinions uttered or advice given, but rather in the form of questions asked from a surprising or metanational point of view.

METADIPLOMACY

Some of our initial effectiveness in getting to see people and in moving quickly to a challenging level of dialogue once in the door comes from the very fact of the project's existence itself.

We are a small band of individuals, without any official group identity, traveling thousands of miles for months at a time, and at our own expense or with private funding, without government sanction, sans portfolio as it were, and coming only with questions rather than policies or advice, and speaking to that part of each person, beneath the public persona, that yearns intimately for a life with meaning, that knows there is something to contribute. Although at this point we are all Americans, we do not represent the United States in any nationalistic sense. We were not sent by the State Department. In both Israel and Ireland, after an initial flurry of confusion about the name of our group and who sent us, there was often a sigh of recognition, as though we had been awaited, and then an easy settling-in in order to talk about the really important things in life. People were grateful for our genuine desire to listen. The result was often an opening of the heart into which a new thought or image or possibility could enter.

In Ireland, using the opportunity for a television interview, David Hoffman set up a meeting with Dr. Garret Fitzgerald, until a few months ago the prime minister of the Irish Republic. Bob did the interviewing, with Kim on camera and Sarah and John on backup. Bob opened by describing something of our own work in Ireland

It is not for a lack of brilliant negotiators, humane legislation, and committed protestors that war persists.

and Israel and then began to ply Dr. Fitzgerald with questions. At one point, Fitzgerald sat up and remarked, "Why this isn't an interview at all, is it? This is rather discursive." Drawn into genuine dialogue, Bob and the prime minister explored the problems of war and peace. Sitting in the family room and surrounded by children, their encounter had an intimacy not usually found in interviews with politicians. When Bob obliquely suggested that Dr. Fitzgerald's passion to overcome the polarization and violence his country was suffering was related to his desire to resolve a conflict between his Protestant mother and his Catholic Republican father, tears came to the prime minister's eyes. As he brushed these aside, there was a warm acknowledgement that they had touched on the heart of the national dilemma.

It was a memorable interview for us all and will be an important part of our television documentary. It was moving to meet a wise statesman. And it was a valuable experience for Garret Fitzgerald as well. As Bob acknowledged, he was not just talking to his beloved Ireland; he was setting forth guidelines that could help resolve conflicts all over the world.

At first glance, Mo Tzu work looks like what has come to be called "track two diplomacy." Track one is, of course, the official State Department activity, with its attendant posturing, calculated news leaks, bluffs and threats of force, and endless closed-door meetings and secret headline tradeoffs. "A second diplomatic track can therefore make its contribution as a supplement to the understandable shortcomings of official relations, especially in times of tension. Track two diplomacy is unofficial, nonstructured interaction. It is always open minded, often altruistic, and . . . strategically optimistic. . . . Scientific and cultural exchanges are examples of track two diplomacy."⁴ While often unofficial and nonpartisan, these cultural

4. The phrase was coined by William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville in the article "Foreign Policy according to Freud," in *Foreign Policy*, No. 45, Winter 1981-1982.

The critical steps involve:
(1) identifying and embracing
the problem, (2) creating alternative
images of healing, and (3) repeating
the process.



In Ireland David Hoffman and Sarah Conover do
a man-kids-and-horse-in-the-street interview.

exchanges and scientific partnerships tend to be
co-opted by national policy. Conventional track
two diplomacy suffers, as the metaphor suggests,
from being parallel to official track Number
One diplomacy.

The Mo Tzu Project, and a growing number of
related efforts, such as the Esalen Soviet-American
Exchange Program, directed by Jim Hickman, and
International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War (IPPNW), operate outside of partic-
ular nationalistic goals and, in fact, are specifically
focused on transcending the egolike defensiveness
of modern nationhood. The physicians' group is a
case in point. A little over two years ago, two
doctors met at a conference, one a Russian, the
other an American, both cardiologists, doctors of
the heart. Out of their growing friendship a total
of six doctors came together and founded the
international organization, which is modeled after
Dr. Helen Caldicott's Physicians for Social Respon-
sibility. Since then, the IPPNW has grown to over
30,000 affiliated physicians. The group of six
appeared on Soviet TV, the *only* such appearance
of Americans ever to be featured on Russian tele-
vision. The group did a *Last Epidemic*-style
presentation of the consequence to a Soviet city of
a nuclear detonation.⁵ The response of the public
and the press was almost overwhelming. Something
is happening now in the Soviet Union which has
caught the government with its expectations down.
They're not sure whether they want to support a
grassroots antinuclear movement or not. And the
whole affair grew out of the intimacy and trust of
the friendship between one Russian and one
American. Most American and Soviet policy
makers have never personally met their counter-
parts. Most high-level American officials do not
have any intimate Russian friends and have never
visited the Soviet Union. What do you suppose
would happen if . . . ?

5. Kim Spencer's company, Internews, has arranged for
a translated version of this Soviet program to be aired
October 13 on PBS. Check your local listings.


PSYCHOTECHTONICS

BoB Fuller: "In my early twenties, I studied and
worked with many of the physicists who first
built nuclear weapons. The knowledge that these
weapons work, how they work, and what they
can do is lodged within me. When that secret
knowledge sits side by side with the 'secret' that
human beings love war, as well as hate it, one is
driven to look for a way out. That old familiar
impulse to escalate violence has come to a screech-
ing impasse against the 'nuclear ceiling.' People
sometimes want to fight, and when they fight
things sometimes get out of hand; but with
nuclear weapons, to let things get out of hand is
to commit suicide.

"Everything changed when we saw the planet as
one place. The view from space of the Whole
Earth, plus our global communications, have pro-
duced an awareness of the underlying geographical
and biological unity, which in turn is forming a
psychological and spiritual unity. This is a more
fundamental development than the Bomb. The
real issue isn't the Bomb.⁶ The Bomb is an
occasion, albeit a compelling one, forcing us to
reexamine our impulse to fight. The Bomb has
made the 'game' of war as unsafe for spectators
as for players. The Promethean theft 40 years
ago of God's nuclear fire is forcing us to rehead
His commandments.

"Even greatly reducing the nuclear arsenals would
still leave the world completely unsafe: nuclear
weapons will soon become available to many more
nations; conventional arms have become uncon-
ventionally lethal; and chemical and biological
warfare are developing rapidly. Making the Bomb
the issue and disarmament the goal has only
brought us to the point of realization that it is we
ourselves that are the source of danger. No one
will win the arms race, nor will anyone drop out.
The arms race is a race with our shadow. We can

6. See *Stopping the Unthinkable: The Opponents of
Nuclear War*, by Alia Johnson, Fall 1981 CQ.



The arms race is a race
with our shadow. We can
never outdistance the
fear of that part of
ourselves we have
projected onto others.

never outdistance the fear of that part of ourselves we have projected onto others: Americans on Russians, Jews on Arabs, Protestants on Catholics, whites on blacks."

Negotiation is not a real alternative to war. It is almost impossible to negotiate successfully with one's own projections. At best it becomes a means of postponing or sidestepping a given confrontation. Secret encounters between elite representatives rarely satisfy any of the deeper social and emotional needs of the population at large. More often than not negotiations lead to compromises and sellouts, such as the Camp David accords, where the more material (and mercenary) side of the equation — i.e., oil, dollars, arms, technologies, etc. — are opted for at the expense of personal self-esteem and national pride. What three million Israelis bought with Camp David and the Sinai was a promise to have 40 million Egyptians stay out of the war in Lebanon two months later. Most Israelis we spoke with remained suspicious and mistrustful of Egyptian motives, and many were deeply angry and ashamed at being forced — as they saw it — into returning the Sinai and abandoning Israeli settlements. If Camp David worked as conflict resolution, it did so at the expense of the Palestinians and with deep psychic damage to Israeli pride; and the conflict which was suppressed in one area seems to have erupted in another, like a systemic cancer being treated with iodine wherever it surfaces.

It is not for a lack of brilliant negotiators, humane legislation, and committed protestors that war persists. War, at least the old-fashioned war, has thrived because it addresses, if only in the short term, many of the deepest needs of collective groups of people, whether families or nations. And further, warring's ability to fulfill needs for individual self-esteem and a sense of national purpose is reinforced by a dynamic of deeply imbedded mental pictures and beliefs which color

and influence our subtlest thoughts and actions about war.

What is needed, then, is a shift at the most radical level in how we perceive ourselves and the purpose of our lives. The nature of this shift and the nuts and bolts steps needed to bring it off at the level of a worldwide project is at the heart of the Mo Tzu work.

Our behavior, both personally and nationally, happens inside a structure of beliefs, unconscious assumptions, ingrained habits, and predispositions. This structure of invisible patterns shapes our thoughts and behavior, which then contribute yet more habits and beliefs to the structure, shaping it in turn. This classic chicken-egg cycle operates out of sight and out of mind, and thus is completely "out of control" in a rational sense. In a nonrational sense, however, it is possible to knowingly change what we don't know. It is possible to change our minds about war.

Changing our human-racial mind about war, intervening in this increasingly deadly cycle of beliefs and behavior, requires a very special kind of aikido, of blending and redirecting. As with all living systems, not all points are equally susceptible to intervention. And not all interventions will have lasting or beneficial consequences. Once the English and Argentines start shooting at each other, it is too late to intervene in their basic perceptions of each other. But in the case of the smoldering conflicts in Northern Ireland, or the cold wars among the superpowers, the field is ripe for intervention. The experience on which our Mo Tzu efforts are based points to the structure of unconscious beliefs and assumptions, which we are born into and unknowingly pass on to our children, as the most viable entry point at which to intervene in the cycles of nationalism, aggression, arms races, and warring.

Winston Churchill observed, "We shape our buildings; then they shape us." The architecture we live inside of literally determines where we walk,

here we sit, what we can see and hear, how loud we can talk, how public or private we can be, and much of what we think and feel. And just as architectural space shapes our behavior and feelings, so there is an invisible architecture in the mental world shaping not only our thoughts and actions but our very perceptions of reality, of what's possible. *Psychotectonics* is the name Bob has created to describe the world mind, the whole of the structure of subconscious images, a phenomenon as enormous as the continental drift of tectonic plates, making up the edifice from which we view reality and even ourselves. We look out at life through the windows of perception from deep inside the temple or prison of our own pictures of reality. Normally we do not see our own eyes, the cornea and retina; we simply see what we are looking at. That there are "colors" in the spectrum of electromagnetic wavelengths that we cannot see escapes our notice. It is hard to know what we can't see, because we can't see it. The structure of our eyes limits and defines what we can observe. Likewise, we are normally not aware of our thinking; we simply have thoughts. And that these thoughts are limited by the structure of our "thinker" goes unthought.

An understanding of how our collective psychotectonic behavior/belief loops operate is absolutely crucial to bringing about any radical shift in our warring behavior and to any projects or peace movements directed at ending war. The efforts of lawmakers, negotiators, and protestors that try to change our warring activities without addressing the underlying psychotectonic determinants are simply greasing the karmic wheel, leaving us to repeat (and escalate) the horrors of the past. Conflict resolution, by participating in a system of checks-and-balances with hot and cold wars, functions as a kind of governor mechanism keeping the engines of destruction operating within tolerable limits. It is part of the machinery.

We need to remodel, not merely redecorate, the structure of our subconscious notions about who we are and how we get what we want. And we need to act fast.

The kind of psychotectonic shifts we are envisioning require that we go back to the original blueprints in order to successfully remodel our warring behavior. The blueprints in this case are the specific subconscious images we use to formulate our conscious ideas and actions about war. Some of these "basic truths" which we have created and which give rise to war might be stated as follows:

- There is not enough (food, love, time, money, land, etc.) for everybody.
- For me to win, you must lose.
- War is natural and inevitable.
- Differences are bad.
- There is a point where "I" leave off and "You" begin.

These and other notions lead to the too-familiar experience of separation, alienation, fear, and war. For those of us outside the Falklands/Malvinas crisis, Britain's and Argentina's behavior threw into tragic relief the underlying assumptions about how nations should act in the face of differences. From our easy viewpoint we could almost smell the dust rising from the antique Victorian engine of war as it was wheeled out of the attic. Only now, the same psychotectonics has armed itself with ICBMs and MIRVs, and in a war between the superpowers, there will be no one left to watch the evening news.

The depth and power of these subconscious images are so great and so much a part of our way of acting that we rarely notice them in ourselves. It is sometimes possible, however, to jar ourselves into seeing these patterns by immersing ourselves in someone else's conflict. This is what led Jerusalem's deputy-mayor, Meron Benvenisti, to pull himself out of the Arab/Israeli struggle and go to Northern Ireland in the hope of jolting his perceptions into a new understanding. This aspect of Mo Tzu work can only be done in the field, in the hot spots, as it were, for it is precisely the unsettling, confusing, culture-shocking differences met when grappling firsthand with a foreign culture and an alien conflict that crack open the doors of perception. Once opened, it is possible to glimpse some of the basic images on the blueprint which need to be changed.

The task then is to identify the psychotectonic images which, in a nuclear age, no longer serve us and which are propelling our species toward suicide, and to replace them with images which will promote healing on the planetary level and which will lead to the creation of a "we feeling," as Doris Lessing calls it,⁷ that will embrace the peoples of the world.

We are at the "brinkmanship" stage of human evolution. The short-term solutions of conflict resolution and strategic-arms limitations are running out. There is now no difference between short-term and long-term answers. The *only* possibility, short of divine intervention, is a quantum leap for humankind; the creation, in the next decade or two, of a sufficient "we feeling" so that our various nations' sense of security and well-being is experienced as *mutual* security and *mutual* well-being. One for all and all for One. The One being, of course, our Mother Earth.

What would such a project look like? What would its budget be? How long the timeline? What are the strategies and tactics needed? Who will define the essential questions? Who will answer?

These are the questions to be answered, and they

7. See *Shikasta: Canopus in Argos-Archives*, by Doris Lessing; 1979; \$10.95 postpaid from Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 400 Hahn Road, Westminster, MD 21157.

are no longer academic or philosophical. They are a matter of survival.

A body of knowledge, a technology, if you will, of how to create a psychotectonic shift has been developing simultaneously with and parallel to the development of the Bomb. Such seemingly divergent fields as high-energy particle physics, holistic cancer research, and numbers of spiritual and meditative disciplines have supplied us with insights into how we can change our own minds. The common thread which links these disciplines is a DNA-like entwining of two empirically demonstrable truths: everything in the universe is interconnected, and mental images create and alter physical reality. It has been demonstrated that our mental images can affect the behavior of subatomic particles, cancer cells, and human suffering. A new blueprint for how human beings deal with differences needs to be created. The means: replace the unconsciously generated images of separateness and hostility on the blueprint with consciously intended images of wholeness and cooperation. I am talking, of course, about love.

In this sense, the road from Hell must be paved with good intentions.

The power of consciously intended pictures, images, and visualizations to alter our behavior and our reality has been available to humanity for some time. Ancient yoga techniques can directly affect body metabolism, heart rate, and bleeding. The most dramatic examples today come from the relatively new field of holistic medicine. Clinics are teaching visualization techniques to deal with everything from stress to tumor reduction and tissue repair. The methods are simple and straightforward. In the case of cancer, for example, the patient might be instructed to create a picture in

their mind's eye of a tumor, with as much detail and anatomical accuracy as possible, and then to begin to imagine specific gradual changes and reductions leading to images of a whole and healthy body. The procedure would be repeated many times, perhaps over a period of many weeks, until the body's own healing process was mobilized. The critical steps involve: (1) identifying and embracing the problem, (2) creating alternative images of healing, and (3) repeating the process. And the cells respond.

Translating this process from the personal to the planetary scale is not as great a leap as it might first appear. The mechanisms are essentially the same, and any process which involves transforming the basic lenses through which we view reality is ultimately an intimate process, taking place inside you and me. The goal is not to change our policies about war by coming up with new policies but to change our warring behavior by changing ourselves. Healing. The word comes from Indo-European and Greek roots (*kail, koil*) by way of Old Middle German (*heil, heilen*) and means to make beautiful, to make whole. This is humankind's job now, to make whole and beautiful our planet.

To bring about such a shift at the psychotectonic level is a challenge worthy of our best leaders and philosophers. We will need to enlist the genius of committed psychologists, artists, filmmakers, media people, painters and poets, actors and playwrights, rabbis, priests, and gurus — all the image makers. The content of this shift will be a new set of healing images with which we replace our existing paradigms of dualities and warring. The emphasis here on replacing war with alternative activities and images, as opposed to simply doing away with war, is critical to our survival.

A Better Game than War

We shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.

Winston Churchill, Speech on Dunkirk, House of Commons, June 4, 1940

MUCH OF THE ANTIWAR movement, as well as the more recent antinuclear movement, rails at the military establishment with a righteous belligerence matched only by their foes. The goal seems to be to shut off war by throwing some large unspecified constitutional, or even revolutionary, switch. Yet if by magic all of our weapons were to disappear overnight, we would simply race to rebuild them unless this disappearance were accompanied by the psychotectonic shift I am here envisioning.

Peace activists have found a cause and purpose for their lives that galvanizes them to action and gives meaning to their efforts. They often fail, however, to identify with the presidents and generals and

soldiers and scientists and factory workers and writers and artists and just plain common folk whose sense of worth would be threatened if wars were to be ended outright.

For a long time and for many nations, the occasion for war was the occasion for the highest idealism, the greatest sense of purpose, the deepest sense of self-esteem, as well as being economically, scientifically, artistically, and religiously stimulating to a degree unmatched by many other undertakings.



Detail of The Battle of Bunker's Hill by John Trumble.

THE NATURE OF WAR

We all know how rotten war is, or so we claim. But how many can acknowledge our attraction to it? I am not building a case for war here. I merely want to point out that — until recently — as long as casualties on at least one side were less than a few percent of the population, war has been a human activity that mixes rewards and risks in such a fashion that societies keep going back for more. For a long time and for many nations, the occasion for war was the occasion for the highest idealism, the greatest sense of purpose, the deepest sense of self-esteem, as well as being economically, scientifically, artistically, and religiously stimulating to a degree unmatched by many other undertakings.

It is simply impossible to do away with war without replacing it with something that fulfills these profound human needs. Humanity will not let go of fighting without a fight, unless the needs for self-esteem and meaning in life are met.

An exception in our recent history proves the rule. Over a decade of painful soul-searching and bloody demonstrations we were able to close down the Vietnam War, to bring about a shift not only in official policy, but at the psychotectonic level of our internal images. We managed to take away the usual wartime images associated with self-esteem, national fulfillment, meaningful sacrifice, and heroism. The result in the case of many Vietnam vets was self-loathing, drug addiction, and suicide. Our nation had trained these men for a war which later we came to regret. Those of us in the antiwar movement who successfully protested that

war failed at the most rudimentary levels of compassion — we failed to be responsible for the victims of our success. We failed to offer them something better.

The antiwar movement has left us with a somewhat perverse koan: What do we have to *do* to have nothing happen?

On the psychotectonic level, we have been very successful at creating a wealth of images to reinforce our commitment to warring. Flag-raising on Iwo Jima, World War II aerial dogfights, and liberated populations throwing flowers at victorious troops are by now so deeply embedded in our national psyche that it is hard not to be moved or excited, even when these images pop up in contemporary space-fiction epics like *Star Wars*. But what images come to mind when someone says they're for *peace*?

Peace is not a visualizable goal. We have no universally held pictures of peace. Peace is simply the absence of war. Take away the images of war and you have peace. If you happen to be comfortably well off, with a nice home, a good job, a nice family and a beautiful yard, you will probably image peace as some extension of your status quo. But what about the people who are not at war with anyone but are starving to death or working 20 hours a day to feed their families? Peace as a goal will not work. We know now that images and visualizations are the crucial units of human creativity. Anything that cannot be pictured cannot be created. Conversely, *whatever* we can picture, we can create. The most urgent task right

The antiwar movement has left us with a somewhat perverse koan:
What do we have to do to have nothing happen?

We now realize that to deal with want, in any of its forms, is to bypass war;
and conversely, *not to deal with want is to court war.*

now for those of us who would heal this planet is to begin to identify the activities and images which will replace war.

In this context we can see and even appreciate nuclear weapons as driving the search for an alternative to war. We are now more threatened by our own defense mechanisms than we are by any external enemies, no matter what their politics. The bomb has become the single most potent spiritual stimulus in the world today. The message is clear: Replace our old *you-or-me* paradigm with *you-and-me*, or perish.

In a moment of divine inspiration, reading the Koran, Anwar Sadat realized that the Jews have always been around and aren't going to go away. He saw profoundly that what was needed was a shift from *Arabs-or-Jews* to *Arabs-and-Jews*. He got on a plane and flew to Jerusalem and embraced his enemy, a man he personally did not like. This act not only set in motion the political and diplomatic events which are still unfolding; it also contributed a new and important image to our collective picture of what's possible. Sadat saw that the completion of his part of the planet, the healing of the Mideast, making it whole and beautiful, demanded embracing the differences between Arabs and Jews. Completion demanded that he acknowledge that there was no clear point where Egypt leaves off and Israel begins. Egyptian and Israeli security and well-being are identical. An ecosystem is born.

There is today a great deal of knowledge and experience regarding the process of negotiation between antagonistic nations.⁸ Little of this knowledge can be used to alleviate ongoing tensions and conflicts, however, because there is lacking between most of the parties to conflicts the *sine qua non* of successful negotiation: *mutual respect*, or to put it another way, the willingness to see one's own culture and the rival culture as complementary, as each bearing an aspect of a larger truth, a truth that embraces both. Sadat contributed just this willingness to see Israel and Egypt as complementary parts of a larger whole. His vision is a challenge to all world leaders and to all planetary citizens.

War has often been a way to settle differences. As if differences needed to be settled. If each unique person or culture were understood and *felt* to be part of a larger, interacting whole, then

differences would become crucial and desirable. Hearts and brains and livers all have unique tissues and functions, but woe is the person who does not foster the well-being of all the parts.

What is the unique and special contribution of America to the world organism? And what is the Soviet Union's contribution? China's? Israel's? The Common Market's? Buddhism's? NASA's?

It seems so simple and obvious that in order to be whole and complete, the various parts need to be different and interdependent. This goes for people and planets alike. Steps to an ecology of being.

In this context war can be seen as an evolutionary step, a clumsy, infantile reaching out to relate and explore. The net result of Japan's attack on the United States and the ensuing five years of human atrocities has been 40 years of deepening interaction, economic and cultural stimulation, and human exchange. Fifty years ago, Japan and the U.S. might as well have existed on different planets. Yet the potential for this remarkable symbiosis existed before Pearl Harbor and before the atomic bomb.

Is there some way, short of war, for the people of the U.S. and the people of the U.S.S.R. to become mutually interdependent (or to acknowledge the *existing* interdependence)? What is the larger whole that our countries are part of? How can we leap over a nuclear war and go directly to the business of completing, of healing, our potential?

Bob Fuller: "What conditions has the new game, the game that replaces war, got to meet? It must offer a sense of high purpose and glory to nations and wide participation and occasional exhilaration to individuals. It must be as challenging, as exciting, as demanding, and as important as war. It must deal with the fundamental needs of human existence, with the issues of material, psychological, and spiritual sufficiency, issues which have made so many wars feel like *just wars* to those fighting them.

"The activities that outmode and replace war must address our experience of incompleteness, whether it be of body, mind, or soul. No one activity will embody all these aspects. A great many activities, public and private, are under way, dealing with precisely these underlying causes of war. We now realize that to deal with *want*, in any of its forms, is to bypass war; and conversely, *not to deal with want is to court war.*"

Perhaps we can now glimpse the outlines of another grand human game on the horizon,

8. See *Getting to Yes* by Roger Fisher and William Ury, reviewed in Summer 1982 CQ.

coaxing us away from the thrills of the battlefield. It is the discovery and completion of one's self, as experienced in one's own culture, and of one's self as manifested in one's supposed enemy or shadow. People who have lived abroad, who have learned a new language, who have fallen in love with another culture, who have been moved and fulfilled in the Peace Corps, in a job in a foreign country, who have spent months getting to know a small Indian village while filming a documentary, who have emigrated to a new land and married a new culture — these folks have glimpsed a possibility: They have tasted of the fruit of completion. They have directly experienced themselves as larger, wiser, more useful, and expanded. They have discovered, after the initial culture shock, that these new, strange, alien people actually have something going for them. A new dance is born, with new partners. The transformation of the Vietnam veteran from a souvenir hunter into a lover points the way to a new game.

PAYING FOR THE NEW GAME

In 1967, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched a ten-year project to once and for all eradicate smallpox from the Earth. It was an audacious undertaking which most medical authorities said could never be done. After all, it had been tried before in the '50s and had failed. But in 1977, in a small Indian village, WHO recorded the *last* naturally occurring case of smallpox. Why did it take so long? We had had the technology since the 1800s. Why did it fail the first time? What was lacking? It turns out that the missing ingredient was *a picture of success*, a belief that it could be done, the will and intention to do it. This was supplied by Dr. Donald Hendersen, the project director. What worked, and what WHO and participating countries paid for, was Dr. Hendersen's good idea.

The initial funding for the Mo Tzu Project is likewise the funding of an idea. A small but growing group of courageous givers has deeply understood

the necessity of funding paradigm shifts. They fully comprehend that the road to "peace" must be paved with good intentions, and they are willing to pay for the paving. Most, in fact, are directly involved in the work itself.

But the world could absorb 300 dozen such Mo Tzu groups. Teams are needed right now in Argentina and England, East Timor, Iraq, Iran, Russia, China, the Sahel, the United States, Central America, Israel, South Africa, Vietnam/Cambodia, Poland, Ireland, etc. Teams should be multi-cultural in personnel and include appropriate language skills. Both funding and imagination will have to be found on a large scale.

Bob Fuller: "The defense departments of the world's sovereign nations are not providing additional security with the additional monies they are spending in the arms race. Imagine devoting 1 percent of the growing defense budgets of the world into fielding thousands of Mo Tzu teams. We would end up with our 'army' in Russia, China, etc., and with their 'armies' here. The training for such work would be harder and more demanding than boot camp, the camaraderie from having served together as rich and long lasting, the challenges as exciting and surely as important, and the 'casualties' virtually eliminated."

Our task, then, involves seeding the clouds of possibilities with new images of symbiosis, cooperation, and fulfillment, of individuals and cultures working together to complete ourselves and our planet. Completing ourselves is actually what we have always desired, what we have sought in vain through the crude instrument of war. We now have the wisdom and the techniques to create these nurturing and self-completing experiences directly. It is not the battling but the *surrendering* which opens the way for a new and deeper relationship, both personally and culturally. Let us skip the war and surrender to each other. We can at last reach our hands across the cultural gaps instead of hurling missiles. Let us heal ourselves while we have time. Let us make ourselves beautiful and whole. ■

The Most Radical Challenge to Capital

What one "has" only has meaning if Earth exists as a habitable planet. Capital means nothing at the heat of the sun. The American philanthropist needs to experience the sensation that actions may be now or never. The ultimate grant budget deadline remains unknown. Philanthropic actions now may influence the very survival or extinction of our species and other species innocent of human foible. Something darker than Murphy's law


approaches. Philanthropy may be at a crucible hour.

November 4, 1984 is an incredible distance away. Inauguration Day morning even farther. To help increase the chances of that afternoon ever appearing, philanthropists need to consider increasing the scope and focus of their giving. In the presence of 50,000 inherently unstable mechanical Frankenstein ovens, the "prudent person rule" for the management of capital requires constant radical exami-

nation. "Launch on warning" outmodes all clocks.

Even if American philanthropy were to deplete some of its capital (in addition to distributing normal income) over the coming two years, would this be too much? What is a new, adequate measure? Who can say what is enough? How much time do we have? What is a dollar value for giving the planet the chance for a future?

Skip Robinson (via
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Politics

BETWEEN RUSSIA AND AMERICA, SOMETIME IN THE NEXT 30 YEARS, THE PARAMOUNT HUMAN ISSUE OF NUCLEAR WAR IS GOING TO FIND ITS SOLUTION OR DISSOLVE US TRYING.

OUR ENEMIES OUR SELVES

by Robert Fuller

A two-part interview — part before and part after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Fuller is at present a Senior Researcher at Worldwatch Institute in Washington, D.C. He was President of Oberlin College from 1970 to 1974. Partly because of that experience he spent October and November of 1978 speaking and travelling in the Soviet Union. The first part of this article took place in June, 1979, as a syndicated radio interview with Michael Toms for New Dimension (a cassette of the full interview costs \$15.50 from New Dimensions, 267 States St., San Francisco, CA 94114).

In all of his efforts in recent years Fuller has an unhidden agenda — finding how to change the world's geopolitical habits away from war.

—SB

Michael Toms: Bob, you recently spent a few months traveling across Russia by train. Where'd you start?

Bob Fuller: We started in Berkeley, flew to Paris, and got on the train there. We rode — my wife, a child 1-½ years old, and I — from Paris up through Scandinavia and entered the Soviet Union in Leningrad, at the Finland Station, where Lenin entered. We continued by train to Moscow, flew a section of the country in the middle, and got back on the train at Lake Baikal and rode from there to the Pacific on the Trans-Siberian railroad.

Toms: How was the experience of Russia? What were some of the things that came out of it for you?

Fuller: It was the most arduous trip I've ever taken, and I've travelled a great deal. The Soviet Union is always very trying psychologically and physically. While on the Trans-Siberian railroad one of the main things to do is compare notes with other travelers, mainly Europeans of all nationalities. It was almost universally an experience of considerable difficulty, and yet a kind of a pioneering camaraderie emerges in the group of having endured the hardship, and so there's a continual exhilaration in the background of everything that buoys you up through this difficulty.

The difficulty is partly that you do feel you're under constant control. You're thrown back into that mentality of a second

grader on a class trip where the teacher is always yelling at you to get back in line. The Intourist guides control your movement and check on your passports and shake you awake at 3 in the morning in Novosibirsk to make sure that you are who you're supposed to be and that you're not leaving the aircraft and that your papers are in order. There's a stern quality about it that's the opposite of Italy for example.

The countryside is stern too. Moscow is muddy and cold in November, and Siberia of course is cold, but clean and fresh. But the train is wonderful. I want to tell you that if you ever get a chance to ride that train you want to do it. It's a great big train. They have a wider railroad gauge than we do, and it feels larger. Everyone has a bunk. You're ensconced in this little room and it's cozy, and you just sit there and look out the window at a million million birch trees going by. You feel the ups and downs and change of the topography as you go all the way across Europe and Asia, and finally, there's the Pacific.

It used to be when people said they went around the world they actually went around the

world, on the surface of the world, and so they got some ical feeling that the thing was round and bumpy and so on.

Toms: How about the people that you came in touch with?


Fuller: Well, the main thing you come away with on a visit of just a month is disappointment over the lack of reciprocity and mutuality in your interactions with people.

Toms: You have to be guarded in your conversation?

Fuller: You feel you have to be guarded, partly to protect them, because they may be being listened to. You also are unable really to loosen them up very much. It's said that there's two kinds of Russians -- daytime Russians and nighttime Russians.

The daytime Russians are guarded, and discussions with them are like negotiations. There is an extraordinary defensiveness that pervades their conversation. They assume that you are from a superior society, or at least that you think so, and that you don't recognize the good qualities of their society. So simple questions about their society are apt to produce sometimes preposterous replies. If you ask about mental health in the Soviet Union -- I asked that -- the reply from one person was that they have no mental illness in the Soviet Union; it's strictly a by-product of capitalism. That wouldn't be what most educated people there would say, but you can draw that kind of a response.

There's a real reluctance to get down and acknowledge the problems that confront their society. They're aware of the problems that we have, and I was very open in my talks about the problems that we have, but they're not able to respond in kind and address the ills of their society openly. So that's disappointing continually.



Fuller's travels in the USSR with his family.

The nighttime Russian, however is the fellow across the restaurant table who is drinking vodka and eating caviar and is very much like an Italian. I'm using that just loosely as a symbol of a person who's ready to be joyous and gay and fun-loving and singing and dancing and eating and drinking.

Toms: Is there any crossover between the two?

Fuller: Well, the same person can be a nighttime Russian and a daytime Russian. There was one moving crossover. I was there giving some talks on the state of American higher education in the last decade and some of the changes it had been through, and somehow the discussion worked its way around to the Second World War. I really shouldn't say "somehow," because all discussions with Russians work themselves around to the Second World War. It's reminiscent of discussions with Jews that sooner or later work themselves around to the Holocaust.

Until you've acknowledged the price Russia paid to win that war -- their loss of over 20 million dead -- until an American has acknowledged that, there's really no way you can discuss

anything. At one point in my discussion I did acknowledge the fact that although Americans lost a soldier probably in every small town in this country, the Russians lost a soldier in every family, that their human loss was a hundred times ours, and that our principal contribution wasn't in blood but in materiel. The Russians are very moved to discover that someone knows that and is willing to say it. It brought tears to the eyes of my hosts right there in midday in a formal setting where we were all being professors.

They knew and were very pleased about the fact that showing in the United States on television this fall was a series called "The Unknown War," narrated by Burt Lancaster. They knew all about it. They had already seen it and were thrilled to think that Americans were finally finding out what Russia experienced during the war. They go on to say, "We Russians, having known war and suffered as grievously as we have, how can you imagine that we would ever ever be involved in precipitating another one? It's you that we're worried about. You haven't suffered."

Toms: What do you think?

Fuller: I think it is a real danger



"All discussions with Russians work around to the Second World War." The USSR lost over 20 million dead. This photograph of Russian refugees fleeing Nazi troops is from "The Unknown War" - a 20-part series narrated by Burt Lancaster that was televised nationally last year. According to a press release from the distributor, Air

Time International, one American teenager commented, "The scene where the remnants of the orchestra were playing for the original audience, of which only a handful survived . . . when they showed all of the empty seats with the various instruments laid on them, I got to see the loss of life, not just hear someone read statistics."

that Americans haven't known the sufferings of war. I think the Russians in that sense have a much keener sense of what's at stake and what would be lost were there to be a war. That's a piece of wisdom that I'm glad exists on earth and I think they have more of that type wisdom than we do. That isn't the whole story though.

I have been using the word "Russian" loosely as referring to anyone in the Soviet Union. Actually that's a misuse. The Russians are a minority people in the Soviet Union, they're 47 percent or so, less than half. The other half consists of 20-odd different nationalities, different languages, different cultures, and different races. The Soviet Union itself is an empire, a colonial empire, with

the feature that it's a geographically contiguous colonial empire. It's not like the British empire which was spread out all over the world, but it's no less an empire for being contiguous. There's a lot of force used to hold that thing together.

Toms: Did you talk about that?

Fuller: You couldn't really talk about that. You see, they view it as held together not by force, not by the old imperial method, but held together by their ideology. That's why the ideology of communism must reign supreme, that's the justification for holding the whole thing together. It's the economic emancipation of all those colonial peoples that justifies the empire.

Toms: And justifies the use of

force without being blatant or stated as such. The end of economic equality justifies the military means?

Fuller: Precisely.

Toms: Did you find economic equality in the Soviet Union or did you find elite circles?

Fuller: There clearly are elite circles. There's a special lane in the highway for the use only of highest politicians. There're special stores where people with a certain kind of currency can buy special foods. It's not that they don't have privilege; they certainly do. On the other hand I have a sense that there is probably more economic equality in the Soviet Union than in the Western countries. It isn't entirely empty rhetoric at all that they talk about economic


equality as a fundamental human right.

See, the human rights that they promote are really *substantive* rights — rights of education, medical care, food, shelter, housing — fundamental human needs, really. These are I think fairly well attended to in what is in fact a developing nation. The Soviet Union is a developing nation in almost all respects. Only in the military and perhaps scientific fields is it a developed nation.

Our rights are what might be called *process* rights as contrasted with substance rights. They are guarantees of due process — freedom of speech and assembly and religion. They guarantee a certain kind of approach, or permit many approaches. The Russians are big on the substance rights and weak on the process rights and we're the reverse. Viewing it that way introduces a little more symmetry into the situation.

One of the things I was really looking for there was a way of seeing what they're doing that didn't make them the bad guy, that wasn't chauvinistic, and that had more of a sense of symmetry and fairness. Where there's so much human effort there's got to be something seriously valid that's motivating these people to do what they're doing and to have suffered as much as they have to do it.

We watched television in the hotel rooms there, and we were appalled by the amount of lies on it. Either they were showing beautiful scenes of Soviet national parks (which of course were not lies) or they were reporting political speeches. Even if you couldn't understand the words you could tell they were lies because the way people were moving their heads was so phony, like oratory in third grade. Then I came back to this country and turned on my television set and I realized that the amount of lying was approxi-



The broader-gauge Russian trains are also more comfortable. This electric locomotive allegedly was made from scrap metal collected by the school-children of Moscow.

mately equal, although the lying here is largely in the commercials. They have no commercials. So without even intending to find equality or some kind of symmetry in the television I was struck on my return with the fact that we weren't much better.

Toms: How would you say all this relates to nuclear war and its apparently increasing threat?

Fuller: That is partly the reason we wanted to go to the Soviet Union and experience it first hand. It's my feeling that it's fallen to our generation to deal with this question of nuclear weaponry. I was nine when the first atomic bomb was dropped. I'm sure anyone who was alive when the first bomb was exploded felt that sense going through their body and mind that this was a turning point for the world. And now 35 years later there are these enormous stockpiles of weapons that can end everything very quickly. A big war would be one in which nine out of ten people were killed whereas in the past very big wars only killed one out of ten people,

as in Russia and Germany in the Second World War. When war kills even one out of ten the experience of nations is that it's unacceptable.

However if a war kills one out of a hundred, it seems to have been the case that it was viewed as a fairly good game to play. A lot of energy and patriotism, a lot of things for the women to do too, and just high enough odds of death to be exciting and make it more or less worth while — higher odds than auto racing, but not so high as to be prohibitive. With one out of ten I think there's a crossover. It really begins to be seriously questioned. Now suddenly the technology makes it nine out of ten that are going to die. It's very difficult to assimilate that fact. I can't believe we've begun to assimilate it because we continue to stockpile weapons which might make it 92 out of 100 instead of "only" 90 out of 100. There's an absurdity that's entered, that proves we haven't got any kind of rational or lucid grasp on the matter.

Partly I wanted to go to Russia

to see my "enemy." I put "enemy" in quotes because I don't really believe the Russians are our enemy any more than we ourselves are our enemy. I think we're all in it together. Just as our generation has been chosen to deal with this question of nuclear war or to die trying, so too America and Russia have been chosen as the national contexts where this problem is going to find its resolution or not. Sometime in the next 30 years, centered on America and Russia, this paramount human issue is going to find its solution or dissolve us trying.

We take a little teeny nibble at it when we have a SALT treaty come down the pike and wonder whether or not to ratify the thing. But it's just the tiniest little sniff of the problem. It hardly even has a bearing on the question, but at least it's practice in dealing with the issues. We get another tiny whiff of the question when we have a Three Mile Island kind of thing that raises consciousness a little bit as to what's at stake, but actually the danger of the nuclear reactors is minimal compared to the danger of the nuclear weapons. Everybody knows that, it's just that nobody knows how to get a handle on the question of the weaponry.

It used to be that if you had an enemy and he was strong, the best thing you could do to protect yourself against him was to try to be as strong. But somewhere in the last 20 years that age-old, tried-and-true philosophy has gone awry; it doesn't work any more. It doesn't make one safer to be as strong as someone who's already a hundred times stronger than they need to be or can use.

Gregory Bateson says America and other countries are addicted to nuclear weapons, that is to say there are institutional cycles within our society which cause



The daytime Russian and the nighttime Russian — the one defensive, the other dancing.

us to continue to create nuclear weapons even though we don't need them. That way of thinking about it is very nice because it doesn't blame anybody. It doesn't blame the government. It doesn't blame the armaments makers alone. It points out that there is a whole cycle of activity which reinforces itself all the way around that cycle, so that untying the Gordian knot is just that. It's going to be the untying of a knot. It's not going to be the labeling of someone or some group as evil.

We can't end the nuclear war if we're going to continue to try and do it in the old-fashioned way of making somebody take the blame for it. It's in every cell of our bodies and every cell of our society, and it's a question of a disentangling that is almost so hard to do that we'd rather have a war than try. When you really get down into the paralyzing complexity and difficulty of negotiating through even something as small as a SALT treaty, you probably figure, my God I'd just as soon have a war as do that again. That's how hard it's going to be. I'm talking this way just to make it real about what we're up against.

Toms: I think of something that Krishnamurti once said. He said that the problems of the world are so complex that they require simple solutions.

Fuller: I think that's right. I think the solution will be simple. It's like any solution in mathematics — the solution finally beheld has a simplicity, but to get to it you can't be simple-minded. To get to it you've got to be complex-minded. You've got to know everything there is to know about the thing, and you have to have tried everything and made every conceivable mistake, and then the simple solution may present itself to you. As it did with relativity theory and many instances of mathematical discovery.

You can't just go in there and put your arm around the guy and say, "C'mon, you know we don't want this, neither of us leaders do, and neither of our peoples do, so let's just liquidate the whole mess." For some reason it doesn't seem that you can do that. It's still not clear to me why you can't do that. But even in personal relationships you really seldom can do that. You usually have to negotiate your way out of a fight with your spouse, and gradually



lay down your figurative weapons, and finally put your arms around each other. You usually don't just leap across with love.

Toms: Is it holding on to being right? Is it having to be right and the other person be wrong?

Fuller: That's an early stage of it for sure, where we're concerned about being in the right and looking okay. And there's a stage of fear that the other guy may not be trustworthy, that if you acknowledge you were wrong, he may record that, so to speak, and then throw it back in your face three weeks later.

Toms: So really, the essence is trust. . . .

Fuller: You do build up trust through a six-year-long negotiation process. You learn just when and to what extent you can trust your opponent and you also are trying to preserve the aspect of the truth you bear. We do bear some deep truth in our society, and I believe the Russian society bears some deep truth too, and you have to make space for that other guy's truth to exist. He's not going to lay down his arms until he's sure you're going to tolerate the truth he's discovered on Earth

through centuries of effort. The Russians want acknowledgment that the principle of substantive freedoms is in fact right in the world. My personal view is that it is right and that human needs are as important as our process-type rights. One possible way out of the impasse we're in, is for America to acknowledge that human needs must be guaranteed as well as human rights. We might join with the Soviet Union and/or China and guarantee a basic level of satisfaction of human needs on earth and make it our joint business that that level would be met. . . .

. . . instead, the USSR sent divisions of troops into Afghanistan to simplify its political behavior, setting off a blizzard of worldwide condemnation and economic retaliation. I phoned peace-maker Fuller for his thoughts.

SB: Bob, this is late January, 1980. The Soviet Union has invaded Afghanistan, Carter has stopped grain shipments and threatened a boycott of the Olympics, and there's talk of World War III and a general feistiness in the air. Does all


this seriously date your remarks to Michael Toms last summer?

Fuller: I think that the Soviet Union, just like the United States has in it a great range of views on foreign affairs. Surely there is a camp that would like to take over Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iran and Saudi Arabia. And surely there is also a camp that entered Afghanistan with the greatest trepidation. I think the total context gave the upper hand to those who would extend the empire by force in December and January. But the fact that they got the upper hand and acted on it doesn't mean that they'll retain the upper hand indefinitely and proceed to enlarge the area they've taken by force.

I think that Afghanistan, even if subdued militarily, is going to prove to be a drain on what is already a weak Soviet economy — a significant drain. The main thing about the Soviet Union right now, to my mind, is that it's stumbling economically, it's faltering politically, its own people aren't attracted by its ideology, and no one outside of its borders is attracted by its ideology. It cannot even present itself as living up to socialist ideals. The invasion of Afghanistan reveals it to the Third World as imperialistic in substance, not merely in name.

I think all these facts are going to conspire to take the upper hand away from the group that's acting imperialistically and shift it over to those who'd be cautious. So I'm not alarmed that this is the first of a stack of dominoes.

SB: I have entertained an alternative scenario, partly from your piece, which depicts the Soviet Union as having a severe national inferiority complex. What you've just said suggests that that's a situation getting far worse. Could one imagine a situation where it gets so much worse that they're in such an insane



Soviet TV has the same amount of lying as ours — theirs by the state sponsor, ours by the commercial sponsors.

corner that they feel there's nothing to lose by further violent behavior because they see there's nothing to be gained by any other kind of behavior? It might appear to them that their situation has been growing steadily worse while they were making their improving attempts.

Fuller: Yes. The one viable instrumentality that country has is its military right now. And pushed into a psychological corner on the economic front and the ideological front and in a world popularity contest, they might become kind of like a lion that the lion-tamer has mistakenly cornered, and thrash out with brute force. That is the danger with Russia right now. A good question in this context is, should we boycott the Olympics? Does that further humiliation enrage the lion — the bear? I'm not suggesting that I don't think we should boycott the Olympics. I think it's awfully hard to go ahead essentially playing games in a context of invasion of countries. And since the Soviet citizenry is not party

to world communications, this may be the only way that we have to communicate to them what their government is doing.

SB: I assume that the Soviet Union is not likely to pull out of Afghanistan, because that is to them an enormous loss of face. So they're there for the duration.

Fuller: Yes.

SB: What's your sense of the impact of our "economic sanctions" — cutting off the grain and so on?

Fuller: I think it'll have a definite effect. Already there's not that much meat in the Soviet Union, and this grain was to produce more meat. I think the Russian propaganda machine can use that almost to boost morale, in that old way that when you're really pressed by someone you can strengthen your inner resolve. Whether on balance it's a gain I don't know. It's also going to lead to more griping by Soviet citizens who are already fed up with being told they're a super-power and yet know that they're


eating less well than a third of the world's peoples.

I just hate the whole trend of things which is moving away from interaction and away from partnership on all these fronts and towards confrontation and towards putting the sub-group of their government that favors this into a position of saying, "I told you so. We'll never be able to cooperate with those Americans. We better go it alone and tough it out."

Imagine a successful Soviet Olympics in the summer of 1980 and imagine the sense of national pride that could have created and then how that might have emboldened them to risk more contact. I keep seeing them as an immature boy who lacks the maturity and sense of power to deal with the world in a wholesome fashion.

SB: What do you do with an immature boy?

Fuller: He's got to have some successful adult experiences. And that's what I had hoped the



The Soviet empire. The twenty or so different nationalities are kept in one geographically contiguous Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by military force or by ideology,

depending on your point of view. Afghanistan in 1980, like the Mongolian Republic, is not technically part of the USSR. Effectively, however, it is.

Olympics would be — a successful management experience on a global level where you're playing host to the world's nations and they tell you you were a good host and when they go away you feel you did something well. Now we're in a situation that's running just the opposite direction.

SB: Will Afghanistan be made part of the USSR?

Fuller: No, I think they'll leave it like Outer Mongolia, which is a separate sovereign nation in appearance and in the United Nations context but for all practical purposes is really run from the Soviet Union.

I think it's only over the longer run, over five years, that people will begin to wonder what real gain there was. Unless they do

push on to get a warm-water port or control over the Iranian oil, there won't be much geopolitical leverage out of having conquered Afghanistan, and I don't think they're going to push on to the Persian Gulf. I don't see them being willing to undertake that kind of risk right now.

If they were sufficiently cornered, they might. And there are those who say that by the mid-'80s they are going to be sufficiently cornered — by serious economic problems in their own country. They can live on their own oil all right, but they need to export about 4 million barrels of oil a day in order to get foreign exchange. They mine 11-12 million barrels a day and have 3-4 million barrels to spare, but they need

the foreign exchange even more than the oil. So they're going to be in a real jam quite soon apparently. That coupled with the general inefficiency of their economy and the bureaucracy and under-employment and lack of morale . . .

SB: That sounds like a scary entity to have that kind of military power. Scariest than us.

Fuller: Exactly.

SB: Do you have a sense at all of a Mideast conflict going inter-continental?

Fuller: If a Mideast conflict grew now, I think there would be great reluctance on both sides to let it go inter-continental.

SB: It could be nuclear without being inter-continental.

Fuller: I think it would stay local. It's my conviction that countries would not commit suicide over other people's turf. And the United States and the Soviet Union can exist without Middle Eastern oil. Japan may not be able to. Europe would sure suffer.

SB: I could see a balance point reached — assuming that everyone stays worried about public opinion. The Russians are down now because they're the military aggressor. The bad guy. I could see them out of despair or misplaced craftiness trying yet a further move, with, as is their style, a lot of military equipment and men. Which we would feel we had to counter, and not having the conventional weaponry at hand, we would hit them with tactical nuclear weapons. Then by being the first to use nukes, we would be bad guys, and the bad-guyness would balance out, we'd be back in cold war, and that would be that.

Fuller: That's a possible scenario. I don't think we would use nukes until it was a question of them taking over the whole Middle East and us coming away with nothing. And it could turn out that our conventional forces are adequate. I don't know how good they are. Anti-tank warfare may have developed to the point where electronics is the key to it all, and our stuff may be very good. One military policy guy I know was saying he felt the United States could hold southern Iran, where the oilfields are, if we had a few days' advance notice the Russians were coming.

SB: Is there any major shift coming within the Soviet Union? Either in terms of the increasing Asian component of their military, which they don't trust, or a political shift in the bureaucracy or in the multitudes of people? In Spain when Franco died everything changed. The

**THE RUSSIANS ARE BIG
ON SUBSTANCE RIGHTS
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same happened in China when Mao's generation died.

Fuller: I don't think that kind of a shift is coming. The Asian minorities are now a majority, but 98% of the powerful positions are held by the western Russians, so it's a full generation before the minorities that constitute the Soviet empire would have enough seats at the highest levels of government to affect policy — 25 or 30 years. But it could go the way the rest of the world is going — as symbolized by the American Black power movement — a growing tolerance and even respect for cultural difference. The USSR even has European minorities — in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — as well as Asian minorities of many different types and dozens of languages.

SB: What about the internal economic situation? Could that become enough of a bad trend where it would flip into something else. One hears of bits and pieces of free enterprise activities that work sort of well. If central planning continues to break down and they're in a non-enemy-produced corner and will try anything to keep the people fed — and they have this commitment to do so that you speak of — then could there be rather suddenly a Soviet form of free enterprise, not the disgusting capitalist kind at all, but the dialectic has taken a new turn, and they find a way to make it work without violating themselves?

Fuller: That's just how they would do it. In the context of socialism they would introduce a competitive and entrepreneur-

ial fringe element, which they've done already in agriculture. They have local plots which produce a disproportionately large fraction of their vegetables and poultry. That could be extended to other areas of the economy.

I think that historically the United States and other traditionally capitalist economies are moving toward more central planning.

Both trends are going on at once in opposite directions, making the two economies look more like each other.

SB: As they look more like each other, does that help or hinder the possibilities of dialogue?

Fuller: I think it helps.

That's the long-range convergence that could produce some more harmony on Earth. Right at this particular juncture in history it sounds like pie-in-the-sky. I don't mean to downplay the seriousness of these times. On the other hand I don't want to get mired in them either and forget what the real long-run purpose is. It's in that spirit that I'm saying these things.


Maybe instead of our waiting cynically for the expected Soviet peace offensive, we should beat them to the punch and launch one of our own. Not a diminution of the economic sanctions at this point, but an enormous increase in communications on all levels — political, military, and cultural. What we need to avoid is ostracizing or quarantining Russia right now. That tends to lead toward exacerbating a situation rather than toward reconciliation and peace.

Because of our power, Americans have a greater responsibility than just to our national ego. The whole exercise here is to translate our national confrontation into planetary terms — into protecting and enhancing everyone's well-being. ■

A Context for Destruction—or Connection

The nuclear weapons surrounding us reveal that the world is in a race between unexamined assumptions and a "new reality." Getting a grip on that reality can give us the choice: destroy each other or draw together?

by John E. Mack, M.D.



Pablo Picasso, *Guernica*. (1937, May—early June.) Oil on canvas, 11' 5 1/2" x 25' 3/4". On extended loan to The Museum of Modern Art, New York, from the estate of the artist.



This is not one of those zealous ban-the-bomb arguments that, for all their good intentions, leave you powerless. John Mack cuts deeper than zeal, to the reasons Americans and Soviets and others keep storing up immense bombs and, then, to what we all might do about our mutual danger. We share the observations of this distinguished physician and scholar with other graduates of the est training, not because he answers our questions but because he offers us the power to answer them ourselves.

—The Editors

It is not pleasant to contemplate the horror of nuclear annihilation, the destruction of all one loves. It is emotionally painful beyond words.

Yet the current direction of the arms race may well lead to the termination of life on this planet within the next few years. What stands in the way of our taking hold of this

reality, a situation created by human beings, and together with the Soviets reversing the present course of events?

The first task, I believe, is to recognize that despite the technical language associated with nuclear weapons development, production, and deployment, the problem is not fundamentally technological but psychological, born out of man's terror of his fellow man. It is our mutual fear and suspicion, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union, which has created the current impasse. But the monster we and the Soviets have created, the hair-trigger confrontation of one another with weapons carrying warheads that could destroy civilization in each country many times over, has created a new context, a new reality, that is far more difficult to absorb than the familiar tensions of international hostility.

National leaders, and the strategic-arms planners who advise them, are no more able to take in the horror of this reality—its full emotional implications—than are the rest of the citizenry. In fact, the awesome responsibilities which they carry may, by bringing them closer to the actual danger and its overwhelming impact, cause them to avoid more vigorously its real meaning. Yet these leaders who carry out the functions of providing national security are creating and implementing policies on behalf of all of

John Mack is professor of psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School. His biography of T.E. Lawrence, *A Prince of Our Disorder*, won the 1977 Pulitzer Prize.

us. Our nuclear policies reflect a national mentality, a national need. They are not likely to change until we as citizens begin to take charge of our destiny. To do so we must first be able to acknowledge the actuality of the nuclear danger.

Last November I took part in a two-day symposium in San Francisco in which about 1,000 people sat for two days and allowed themselves to experience a little of the nuclear reality.

This was one of a nationwide series of conferences on "The Medical Consequences of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War" that have occurred since February 1980 in Cambridge, Washington, and New York City, with more planned for Chicago, Los Angeles and other cities. A group of doctors called Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) persuaded the Harvard and Tufts medical schools to sponsor the first one; the San Francisco conference, organized by PSR and the Council for a Livable World Education Fund, was sponsored by the medical schools of Stanford and the University of California at San Francisco, and the School of Public Health of U.C. Berkeley. It was held in the War Memorial Veterans Building, where the United Nations Charter was signed in 1945.

These meetings are one way in which groups of physicians are seeking to make clear to government leaders and the general public that there would be no effective medical response to a nuclear war, and that no survival in a meaningful sense is likely following a nuclear attack launched by the U.S. and the USSR against each other. Physicians and medical organizations have assumed responsibility in this area partially in response to recent talk by public figures about winning or even surviving a nuclear war, comments that reflect widespread failure to comprehend the nuclear reality.

The physicians are seeking to prevent what Howard Hiatt, dean of the Harvard School of Public Health, called, in an editorial published November 21 in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, "the last epidemic."

The situation now: relaxing the bans on nuclear attack

The participants in the symposium gave each other a great deal of support, which I have found is essential if one is to participate in this emotionally painful and often exhausting work. This audience and similar groups have shown that we *can* become involved. The fact is that we *must* become involved, for the survival of civilization depends on it. Only with our own involvement can we begin to do something about the nuclear danger.

It is not really difficult to see how we got ourselves into this situation. Among the functions which citizens expect their government to perform for them, none

Physicians are seeking to make it clear that there would be no effective medical response to a nuclear war, and no survival in a meaningful sense is likely. It would be "the last epidemic."

ranks higher than national security. This security is generally believed to be provided by the presence of military forces and weapons of sufficient strength to deter an enemy, to protect the national homeland from armed attack. Since the end of World War II the centerpiece of American military strategic thinking has been the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems capable of destroying a potential aggressor should an attack appear imminent or be launched against us. Similar thinking has guided Soviet strategists.

For two decades it has been clear that the launching of a nuclear attack by one of the superpowers against the other would mean virtually certain destruction of one's own country, as each nation has possessed enough weapons to, in effect, destroy the other many times over, as well as much of the rest of the human race. This knowledge has caused the U.S. and the USSR to act cautiously in relation to each other. Through the threat of nuclear weapons the U.S. and the USSR have held each other and much of the world hostage, and, it may be argued, a major war has been deterred.


Underlying the strategic thinking on both sides until recently has been the assumption that a nuclear war once begun could not be controlled and that the launching of a nuclear attack must at all costs be prevented.

In the symposium in San Francisco, we heard data which show that this assumption—namely, that nuclear war must be

prevented—is in danger of being abandoned. Arms development and deployment are out of control, and, instead of providing security, proliferating weapons production by the U.S., the USSR, and other nuclear powers is daily increasing the likelihood of nuclear annihilation.

What would happen: blast, burns, disease, famine, chaos

The audience in San Francisco listened with close attention as experts in internal medicine, surgery, public health, nuclear physics, strategic planning, arms control, government intelligence, and military defense presented information which made it unmistakably clear that a nuclear war would cause deaths and agony on a scale beyond human imagination. The destruction of life and the suffering of survivors from blast, burns, radiation fallout and destruction of the ozone layer in the atmosphere would be on a scale such as to be virtually outside a human being's comprehension. The unlucky survivors would be plagued by cancer and long-term genetic effects for centuries to come. A single one-megaton bomb, for example, landing in or near a large American city, would not only incinerate hundreds of thousands if not millions of people. It would also create so many thousands of serious burn cases that the total medical facilities in the United States now available to care for them (even if the facilities were all left intact) would be overwhelmed hun-



David Alfaro Siqueiros. *Echo of a Scream*. 1937. Dico on wood, 48" x 36". Collection, The Museum of Modern Art, New York. Gift of Edward M.M. Warburg.

dreds of times over. In an actual attack, hundreds if not thousands of such bombs might be exploded.

The audience also heard military and strategic arms experts explain that no effective anti-nuclear defense is possible and that shelters near an explosion would become ovens, while their inhabitants farther away would emerge into a radioactive wasteland of ghastly suffering, a landscape without drinkable water, safe food, or a viable social, economic, or political structure.

The trap: stale assumptions

In spite of these realities, the military experts explained, nuclear arms production continues at an accelerated rate, and new weapons deployment is taking place, or being contemplated, that increases the likelihood of a nuclear war early in the course of a "conventional" war, or the likelihood of one being started by mistake.

If this is the reality we face—and the evidence presented at the symposium demonstrated convincingly that it is—then we are dealing with the most appalling sort of madness. For madness is nothing other than irrational behavior, in this instance the uncontrolled jeopardizing of human life on a scale never before contemplated.

My assignment, as the only psychiatrist on the program, was to look at the psychological burden which living with the imminent danger of nuclear annihilation is placing upon our nation, especially on our young people, and to attempt to locate the madness of the arms race.

On the first question I reported the findings of a study conducted by a Task Force of the American Psychiatric Association on "The Psychosocial Impacts of Nuclear Advances," which shows how deeply despairing, frightened, and hopeless about the future many adolescents feel as a result of living with the constant threat of nuclear war. We, as adults, cannot by and large share with teenagers the experience of the nuclear horror, as we are unable to face our own feelings about it or take responsibility for the monstrous situation we have created.

On the second question—the location of the nuclear insanity—the first thing to be said is that it is not to be found in individuals, except insofar as their thinking is frozen in a larger context, the collective mentality whose assumptions go unexamined. It is contained rather in the systems of thought, the context, the treadmill, the box, in which the nuclear powers are trapped. The madness lies in the unexamined conscious and unconscious assumptions that have traditionally governed the relationships between nations but which do not apply fruitfully to the new reality that has come into being in the age of nuclear weapons.

Young people: limiting their future

My involvement in the problem of nuclear proliferation did not begin until 1977, when Dr. Perry Ottenberg asked me to be part of a Task Force on the Psychosocial Impact of Nuclear Advances, established by the American Psychiatric Association Council on Emerging Issues. (In retrospect, the use of the word "advances" seems euphemistic.)

My initial response to the invitation was, I have since found, typical. This was certainly an important problem, I thought, but why now? The gut reaction was, "Oh my God, that's such an awful subject, and so complex. We should leave it to the experts who understand the technological aspects of the problem."

One fact, however, emerges from our Task Force study. Behind the technical language, the jargon, the acronyms, graphs, diagrams, statistics, and strategic discussions, the concepts underlying the arms race are not arcane or difficult. Some of the technology is complicated, but not the thinking related to its use. The emperor has no clothes.

Our studies showed that children and teenagers are clearly aware of the issues and live in fear of the nuclear threat. The Task Force questioned 1,000 grammar and high school students between 1978 and 1980 in the Boston area. Here are some of their answers to one of the questions:

Have nuclear advances affected your way of thinking about the future, your view of the world, time?

"I am constantly aware that at any second the world might blow up in my face. It makes living more interesting."

"...It is terrifying to think that the world may not be here in a half hour. But I am still going to live for now."

The established structure of relations among nations corresponds well to the self/other, good/evil, me-or-you thinking which dominates the human mind from early childhood. All value is contained in oneself and one's close family or group (those who are like me), and what is devalued or hated is to be located in the other, the alien person or group. In the case of relations among nations there are

"It gives me a pretty dim view of the world and mankind, but it hasn't really influenced me."

"I feel that the future is very unsettled and a nuclear war could destroy the world in a short time."

"It has shown me how stupid some adults can be. If they know it could easily kill them, I have no idea why they support it. Once in awhile it makes me start to think that the end of my time in life may not be as far off as I would like it to be."

These teenagers have not submerged or camouflaged their feelings of helplessness about the nuclear threat, as most adults have learned to do. They may be showing us that growing up in a world dominated by the threat of imminent nuclear destruction is having an impact on the structure of personality itself. We may be raising a generation of young people denied a basis for making long-term commitments and serviceable ideals, given over, of necessity, to doctrines of impulsivity and immediacy in their personal relationships and in their choice of activities, behaviors, occupations.

How can we help our young people grow into some promise of certainty and fulfillment unless we adults address the apathy and helplessness we experience in the face of the arms race and the threat of nuclear annihilation?

—J.M.

The author acknowledges his indebtedness to the other psychiatrists on the Task Force of the American Psychiatric Association on the Psychosocial Impacts of Nuclear Advances, from which these findings are drawn. They are Drs. Rita Roger, Chairwoman, Jerome Frank, William Beardsless, Doyle Carson, and Michael Mufson.

This material appears in more detail, along with other material on the subject, in the spring issues of the Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists. For information about it, or about the Bulletin, contact Beth Isacke, Associate Editor, Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, 1020-24 East 58th Street, Chicago, IL 60637.

those countries whose social, religious, and political systems are good, or friendly, or have interests in common with our own, in contrast to those who are regarded as alien, threatening or unfriendly, the "enemy" nations.

From the beginning of recorded history differences among national or ethnic groups have been settled by political negotiations, or, if these failed, by war. In order

to be prepared for war, and to ensure that one's own nation or group would survive in the event of an attack by an enemy power (nations rarely take responsibility for their own aggression), weapons have been developed in sufficient quantity to defend one's homeland or to give the leader and the citizens a feeling of safety. In this framework the production of more weapons or arms generally provides a greater feeling of protection.

The facts presented at the symposium demonstrated that in the case of nuclear arms this way of thinking is false and dangerous, and that just the opposite is so. The production of new weapons systems, such as the land-based MX missile, adds to the danger for our own country, since it provokes a further escalation of nuclear weapons development on the Soviet side and increases Soviet fear and distrust of American intentions. The directive issued by the Carter administration last summer introducing a policy of limited nuclear wars was shown to be based on a frightening illusion. For there is no policy in existence for limiting a nuclear exchange once started, or preventing its escalation to the point of total annihilation.

One also hears a good deal about "counterforce" strategies these days, attacks aimed not at cities or industry ("counter-value" strategies) but at military targets. But such strikes would also kill tens of millions of people on both sides and severely burn and maim millions of others. Once again, there would be no rational force, no reasoning command center available to limit the use of weapons to these or any other targets once the first nuclear weapons were fired.

Beyond illusions of strength to real strength: connections

The argument is often made that we are not concerned here with actual strength, for we know that we have many times more nuclear weapons available (perhaps 20,000 between us and the Soviet Union ready to be fired) than actually needed for any conceivable war-making purpose. Rather, it is the *perception* of strength or superiority on one's own or the other side which really counts. But this reasoning is also based on an illusion. Are we, for example, more threatened by the fact that the Soviets can annihilate us a thousand times over rather than a hundred?

The price paid for playing this dangerous game with illusions and perceptions is likely to be the destruction of our civilization. No, there is no security in more arms, only more danger. The only policy which can protect us is one based on the recognition that our security and the Soviet Union's are inseparably interlocked.

As each side can provoke an escalation on the other side that deepens our mutual danger, at the same time we can also create



Barbara Klutznick/Jerobeam, Inc.

the security of both our nations by devoting our full attention to the prevention of nuclear war and to disarmament. If we go, we go together. If we are to survive, we will survive together. Our destinies are linked. This is the new reality.

Yet despite these facts, which have been presented so clearly in San Francisco and at other symposia, one still hears from policy makers, arms strategists, and citizens alike strident talk of nuclear superiority, of "fighting" a nuclear war, of victory and winning, and of what life will be like *after* the attacks, as if there could be any "after" in a sane sense. Here are a few actual examples of such thinking from respected nuclear strategists:

"The question of military or political victory if deterrence fails would depend upon the net surviving destructive capacity of the two sides after the initial counterforce exchanges."¹

"The strategic doctrine adopted by the USSR over the past two decades calls for...not deterrence but victory, not sufficiency in weapons but superiority, not retaliation but offensive action."² (And, the argument is made, if this is so the United States should adopt a similar policy.)

"Any American president should know that the only kind of war his country can fight, and fight very well, is one where there is a clear concept of victory—alogically, the Marines raising the flag on Mt. Suribachi is the way in which a president should think of American wars being terminated."³

1. Nitze, Paul H.—*Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente*. Foreign Affairs, January 1976, 54(2):207-232, 213.

2. Pipes, Richard—*Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War*. Commentary, July 1977, 64(1):31.

3. Gray, Colin S.—*Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory*. International Security, Summer 1979, 4(1):54-87, note #42, p. 71.

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If we go, we go together. If we are to survive, we will survive together. Our destinies are linked. This is the new reality.

It is not easy to explain what permits this kind of thinking. The second quotation above suggests that it occurs in response to similar thinking on the Soviet side. Certainly there are Soviet military strategists who hold such illusions of nuclear superiority and victory, and they stimulate similar thinking on our side. The Soviets would probably contend that such thinking occurs in response to the threat they perceive from our policies in the area of nuclear weapons development and deployment.


Breaking the grip of terror

The real problem, I believe, lies much deeper, and is contained in the human mind itself. The mentality of winning and losing, of victory or defeat, of we-or-they, is contained within the structures or patterns of human mental and emotional life. Such thinking is ever-present but emerges most intensely in times of personal threat and helplessness. I believe that the nuclear arms race creates just such a condition of terror and powerlessness.

We are a people accustomed to having things go our way and to winning in our dealings with other nations. We are unaccustomed to experiencing a sense of vulnerability and weakness and can become belligerent when we do. One of the speakers at the symposium, a retired rear admiral who had recently toured the veterans' organizations of the U.S., spoke of the mood of "spoiling for a fight" which he found in his travels across the country. It is enormously difficult to abandon this mentality.

The constant threat of a nuclear annihilation creates, I believe, a terror that is unfathomable and overwhelming, a fear that will not yield to any form of aggression or ordinary self-assertion, or to belligerent attitudes of winning and victory. A radical shift in thought, derived from the totally new reality that confronts us, is essential for our survival.

We must seek to embrace the terror and



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experience its validity, for the immediacy of nuclear death is real. That is the way it is. Only when we can honestly contemplate this horror can we begin to master it, to do something about it. Until we do so it "has" us and we are forced back by our latent terror to ever more primitive aggressive emotions or outmoded patterns of thought.

It might be useful, as I said at the symposium, to consider what seems to have happened among strategists and analysts who address questions of military security. (While it is probably true of Soviets as well as Americans, I refer to Americans, whose statements are more accessible to me.) When one considers that all share a common dedication to security, to deterrence, and to the desire to avert nuclear disaster, it is remarkable to find that they have split into two camps of almost diametrically opposite persuasion.

To keep identification of the two groups descriptive and to avoid a value connotation, I refer to them as "unthinkables" and "thinkables" rather than using such names as "liberals" and "conservatives" or "doves" and "hawks." Naturally, both sides are aware that a nuclear war could happen—that is, they can think about the possibility of it—so it is not in this sense that I use the term.

Rather, I would include as unthinkables those who believe a nuclear war, once begun, is likely to create a disaster of such magnitude that it is not meaningful to plan for its actual occurrence—that it must, in fact, be prevented at all costs.

The thinkables, in contrast, believe one should plan for nuclear war actually occurring, and even for its aftermath.

What can be said of the gulf between the thinkables and the unthinkables? At one level the differences might be reduced to the conviction on the part of the unthinkables that the thinkables are unrealistic about the realities and dangers of nuclear war, while the thinkables believe the unthinkables insufficiently appreciate the menace of the Soviet Union. But there is more to the problem than this.

Surely the gulf reflects different views of reality. These two groups live in, think from, and perceive different realities. From within their separate realities, I suspect, no amount of reasoned argument would persuade one side of the rightness of the other's position.

The condition which underlies the differing realities is common to both: the atmosphere of unbearable terror in which all the participants live. I suspect that it is a person's willingness or unwillingness to "hold" that terror emotionally, to experience the danger, which determines that person's reality.

It would appear that strategists of nuclear victory in our country and the Soviet Union, the thinkables, have in the short run successfully escaped the unbearable reality that confronts them as well as the rest of us. In thinking about nuclear war as if it could be won and survived, they take part in a collective delusion which is shared by a large portion of the strategic arms community in the U.S. and the USSR. Living close to the actuality of nuclear annihilation, as required by their responsibilities, the thinkables remove themselves from agonizing terror through the support provided by the reinforcing collective madness of people who think as they do, others who are trapped within the same psychotic context.

Get involved—but first, face the problem in ourselves

One of the best pieces of evidence I have found that this diagnosis is correct grows out of my personal experience in trying to confront the nuclear danger for myself. When first approached several years ago by my psychiatric colleagues to become a member of the American Psychiatric Association Task Force examining the nuclear danger, I denied its imminence. What I have learned on the task force, together with the chilling events of the past year (including much talk during the national election and since about nuclear superiority and winning) have helped me to overcome intense resistance to experiencing the nuclear danger as it really is, to begin to become involved.

Of course it is essential that we become involved, for the survival of all we care about depends on it. But first it is necessary to acknowledge and experience the true nature of the nuclear danger. Failure to do so will leave the field to the thinkables, who are planning not for prevention but for the eventuality of nuclear war. Once we are able to confront the problem within ourselves we will find those in the Soviet Union who are also able to do so and we will, I am certain, create others.

A group of prominent U.S. and Soviet doctors have, for example, met recently in Switzerland about the problem of nuclear

weapons. They have stated in a joint declaration that nuclear war between the superpowers would be an unparalleled disaster, and have launched a new organization called International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

Such participation by citizens is needed throughout the world if the catastrophe about which the U.S. and Soviet doctors speak is to be averted. To work for the survival of our planet is everyone's responsibility and opportunity. It is not too late to begin.

My thinking on this subject owes much to the pioneering work originated by the authors of GAP Report #57, Psychiatric Aspects of the Prevention of Nuclear War, 4:223-317, and to Jerome Frank. See his book, Sanity and Survival: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace (1967, Random House).

Contacts

The first colloquium of **International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War** is planned for late March at Airlie House near Washington, D.C. With encouragement from both the Soviet and U.S. governments, the organizers—cardiologists Bernard Lown and James Muller and radiologist Herbert Abrams of the Harvard Medical School and psychiatrist Eric Chivian of M.I.T.—plan to bring together some 60 American, Soviet, Japanese, and British doctors to discuss the medical history of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and to direct attention to the effects of a future thermonuclear war. As we go to press, many top medical leaders are saying they will attend. If you are a physician who would like further information about this conference and about what you can contribute to its discussions, write to:

International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War, Inc.
60-A Lewis Wharf
Boston, MA 02110

Further programs of **Physicians for Social Responsibility** include conferences in Seattle (April 18), Chicago (June 19, 20), Albuquerque (September), Los Angeles (October 31, November 1), and Houston (January). For information, write:

Physicians for Social
Responsibility, Inc.
P.O. Box 144
Watertown, MA 02172

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, K1A 0G2

January 27, 1984

Mrs. Carol Seaborn
Staff Advisor
Canada-US Interparliamentary Group
Parliamentary Centre for Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Trade
275 Slater Street, 5th floor
Ottawa

Dear Mrs. Seaborn,

Further to your memorandum of January 24,
I wish to confirm that I shall be pleased to brief
members of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary
Group on February 23.

As requested, I attach a short brief on the
Prime Minister's initiative on East-West relations and
international security.

As I explained to you on the phone, the
agenda items "Deployment of nuclear missiles" and "Arms
Negotiations" cover such a broad range of issues and
possibilities that it would be impossible to treat
them intelligibly in one or two short briefs. In lieu
of that, I attach a set of notes which cover most of
the main items, and on which you may wish to draw in
preparing briefs, if and when you get a better idea of
what specific topics are likely to come up under these
agenda items.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "L. A. Delvoie".

L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. In the wake of the KAL downing, East-West relations appeared to have touched a low point. There has been little genuine political dialogue between the two sides and no real political framework for arms control and other negotiations. The Prime Minister is interested in seeing if more propitious conditions can be created for building a constructive, working relationship between East and West.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a political impetus by the West to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna to try to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe by achieving a stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm Conference at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

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CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1. Prime Minister's meeting with Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and senior officials; creation of Task Force (September 21)
2. Prime Minister meets at Meach Lake with Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence, senior officials and ambassadors (October 7)
3. Prime Minister's letters to all NATO Heads of Government (October 22-25)
4. Prime Minister's speech at Guelph University (October 27)
5. Prime Minister's letters to Soviet and Chinese leaders (early November)
6. Prime Minister's meetings with President Mitterrand of France, Prime Minister Lubbers and Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Martens of Belgium, His Holiness the Pope, Prime Minister Craxi of Italy, Chancellor Kohl of West Germany, Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain (November 8-11)
7. Prime Minister's speech in Montreal (November 13)
8. Prime Minister's meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone (November 19)
9. Prime Minister's personal emissary (Geoffrey Pearson) visits Peking (November 21-22) and Moscow (November 25-26)
10. Prime Minister participates in Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi (November 22-27)

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- 11 Prime Minister's visit to Peking (November 28-29)
12. Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs participation in NATO ministerial meetings (December 8-9)
13. Prime Minister's meetings over six week period with leading experts on nuclear matters and East-West relations - Robert McNamara, General Rogers, General Brent Scowcroft, George Kennan, Members of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Georgi Arbatov. (October-November)
14. Prime Minister's visit to President Reagan in Washington (December 15)
15. Prime Minister's Meeting with U.N. Secretary General (January 11)
16. Visit of Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang (January 16-20)
17. Prime Minister's visit to Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania (January 24 - February 2).

REACTIONS

The Prime Minister has received encouraging support for the broad political purposes of the initiative in his consultations with European allies, the Chinese leadership, President Nakasone of Japan and President Reagan. The Prime Minister has found general agreement with his analysis of the dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.

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Also, Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security which reflected the Prime Minister's analysis of the gravity of the current situation and the importance of applying political will to the quest for international security. U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has commended and encouraged the Prime Minister's efforts.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the Stockholm Conference, followed by a decision by the Warsaw Pact to have its ministers attend.
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO position on the MBFR negotiations;
- (c) the "Brussels declaration" which pledges NATO to work for "genuine détente" and constructive dialogue with the East in recognition of their mutual security interests and eschews any attempt to seek superiority.
- (d) a decision to review the state of East-West relations to search for ways in which they might be improved.

CANADIAN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT POLICY

Canadian Position

The control and reduction of armaments form an important part of Canada's security policy. Canadian priorities remain: to strongly support negotiations to limit and reduce nuclear arms; to promote early progress towards the realization of a multilateral comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT); to assist in preparing a convention to completely prohibit chemical weapons; to promote the evolution of an effective non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty; to work towards the objective of prohibiting the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space; to participate actively in negotiations to limit and reduce conventional forces; to strive, step-by-step, to ultimately achieve general and complete disarmament, consistent with the legitimate security needs of states.

Pursuit of Priorities

The Government takes every opportunity to stress the importance it attaches to the continuation of the SALT/START process. In the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva Canadian expertise is being applied in the search for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and for a ban on chemical weapons. In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna, Canada is seeking to limit and reduce conventional forces in Europe.

Policy of Stabilization

The Prime Minister, in his address to the second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II) on June 18, 1982, proposed a "policy of stabilization", with two complementary components: the strategy of suffocation which seeks to inhibit the development of new weapons systems, and our current negotiating approach aimed at qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals designed to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels.

Strategy of Suffocation

The Prime Minister proposed a strategy of suffocation at the first UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. Its objective was to arrest the dynamics of the strategic nuclear arms race through

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the realization of four inter-related verifiable agreements designed to reduce the "technological impulse": a comprehensive test ban treaty; a ban on the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic weapons systems. As the Prime Minister has noted, "the strategy was never meant to be applied unilaterally". It was always envisaged within the context of negotiated agreements between the nuclear powers.

Pursuit of
the Strategy

The strategy of suffocation is being actively promoted in international fora, in particular at the United Nations. Moreover, we continue to contribute concretely to more specific discussions which deal with implementing elements of the strategy. Canada has called for the resumption of the UK-USA-USSR talks on a comprehensive test ban. In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva we are participating in the working group on a nuclear test ban and, also, in the work of the Seismic Experts Group which is developing an international verification system for an eventual test ban treaty. We have also continued our efforts to effect implementation of the second and third elements of the strategy. Although we are also doing our utmost with regard to the fourth element, agreements to reduce military budgets cannot be concluded until the USSR assumes a more open policy with regard to information about its military spending.

INF/START

Canada, having publicly urged for the past several years negotiations on reductions in nuclear weapons, fully supports USA efforts to make progress during negotiations with the USSR on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces to the lowest possible level. Canada has been an active participant in NATO consultations which followed the two-track decision of 1979 and led to the "zero option" proposal. While this is an ideal solution which would obviate the need for deploying

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new intermediate-range missiles in Europe, it has nevertheless become clear that it is unattainable at the present time. Consequently, Canada has given its support to a proposal for an interim agreement in these negotiations which, if accepted, would result in reductions of Soviet INF missiles already in place and in NATO missiles to be deployed. Canada warmly welcomed the commencement of negotiations to reduce strategic nuclear weapons (START) and has endorsed the US emphasis on reductions beginning with the most destabilizing systems, ICBMs, while not excluding other systems such as heavy bombers and cruise missiles which are of concern to the USSR.

Comprehensive
Test Ban

The realization of a verifiable multilateral Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to end all nuclear testing in all environments for all time, is a fundamental Canadian objective. Canada considers that, in working towards the objective of an effective CTBT, a substantive role for the Committee on Disarmament (CD) is vital. A working group on a nuclear test ban was established in the CD. In his address to the CD in February 1983 the Secretary of State for External Affairs urged that the slow start made by this working group be transformed into a record of real accomplishment of substantive work in 1983.

Non
Proliferation
Treaty

As a strong supporter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Canada is fully committed to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT also requires the sharing of knowledge regarding the peaceful use of nuclear technology, particularly to the energy-poor countries of the world. Canada is also fully committed to doing this, but only if the transfer of such nuclear technology is properly and adequately safeguarded. Canada's non-proliferation/safeguards policy has been developed to ensure that our nuclear exports do not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation.

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CW/BW
Agreement

With regard to the prohibition of the manufacture and testing of biological and chemical warfare agents, Canada adheres to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare, and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention which bans the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and provides for destruction of existing stocks. Canada is pursuing negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva towards a verifiable agreement which would supplement and strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on Chemical Weapons along the lines of the Biological Weapons Convention. Canada's Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament (CD) is chairing this year's (CD) working group on chemical weapons. There is hope that the CD will make concrete progress towards an agreement in this field.

Alleged
Use of CW

Canada has been concerned with the alleged use of chemical weapons in Laos and Cambodia since reports of the use of some variety of lethal or incapacitating agents began to be received from Laotian refugees in Thailand in 1976. In addition to humanitarian considerations, Canada has been concerned with the credibility of the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use of chemical weapons. To ensure that the extensive reports of the use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia were investigated, Canada co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in 1980 which established an international group of experts to investigate these reports, and a subsequent resolution in 1981 which extended the group's mandate. In March 1981, Canada had submitted to the UN Secretary-General information volunteered by refugees being interviewed by Canadian immigration officials at the Canadian Embassy in Thailand on the alleged use of chemical weapons. Three subsequent substantive studies were carried out by Canadian experts during 1982 and the results were made available to the UN Secretary General.

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UN Experts
Group Report
on CW use

After two years of investigation, the UN Experts Group tabled its report on alleged CW use without definitive results. The Group, in acknowledging that it had been unable to prove the allegations, nevertheless observed that it could not disregard the circumstantial evidence suggestive of the possible use of some sort of toxic chemical substance in several instances. Canada was, of course, disappointed that a definitive conclusion was not made regarding the central issue - whether or not chemical and/or biological weapons (CW/BW) have been used in Southeast Asia. Canada however recognizes the sensitivities involved in an international investigation and therefore considers the report to be useful in identifying problem areas. For example, the international experts group specifically identifies two of these: (a) inability to carry out on-site inspections and (b) the prolonged lapse of time between alleged exposure of victims and the conduct of medical examinations and interviews. This report will therefore be useful as a reference for experts to draw upon in the development of effective verification procedures.

ACD and
Outer Space

The Canadian Government is aware of and very concerned about arms control in the context of outer space. This concern has been expressed in the statements made by the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament in the First Committee during the 1980 and 1981 sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. It was also highlighted by Prime Minister Trudeau in his speech to the second UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II). He remarked that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty was "patently inadequate" and proposed that "an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space". In the 1982 summer session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, Canada submitted a working paper entitled "Arms Control and Outer Space" as a contribution to the task of defining the issues. Canada intends to participate actively on this issue in the CD and to work toward the objective set out by the Prime Minister.

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Public Role
in ACD

The Canadian Government believes that the public has a role to play in the general pursuit of disarmament and arms control. This role can be enhanced considerably if the public is able to discuss and debate the issues facing all of us in this field knowledgeably and intelligently. To this end, the Canadian Government is committed to encouraging greater public interest and participation in this country in disarmament education, information and research. This commitment has been reaffirmed publicly on a number of occasions since the first UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978. This commitment was first given substance with the appointment of an Ambassador for Disarmament, the establishment of a Disarmament Fund for public activities in this field, the printing of a regular newsletter on national and international disarmament and arms control activities, and the convening of a Consultative Group. In addition, greater distribution of information material and documents, participation in and financial assistance to annual Disarmament Week activities in Canada, and numerous speaking engagements across the country by the Ambassador for Disarmament are all examples of our growing encouragement of public participation in the discussion of this important topic. During UNSSOD II, an additional allocation of \$300,000 to support arms control and disarmament initiatives was announced. This will enable Canada to participate in the international seismic data exchange as part of the international verification procedures of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to play a more effective role in efforts toward a chemical weapons ban, and to increase the Disarmament Fund in order to assist research and teaching facilities in Canada. On March 9, 1983 Canada announced two financial contributions totalling \$100,000 to the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign. The contributions will directly promote research and public information activities throughout the world.

ANNEX I

Freeze

Freeze Concept

Regarding the suggestion that Canada support a nuclear freeze, one must first differentiate between several such propositions. Although an immediate nuclear freeze appears initially to be a simple and attractive proposal, there are aspects which tend to be overlooked and which could jeopardize the opportunity for real and significant arms reductions. Such a freeze could have the effect of locking in existing stockpile levels thus perpetuating the status quo without first ensuring that a balance exists. The side holding an advantage at the time of the imposition of a freeze would be disinclined to engage in further negotiations intended to achieve real and verifiable reductions of existing inventories of nuclear armaments. Canada's objective is balanced deterrence at lower levels of armaments. The Government considers that the negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) constitute realistic means of achieving real progress. It is essential, through such negotiations, to seek to establish a balance at the lowest possible level of weaponry and then institute a freeze at that reduced level.

UN Resolutions

Canada has for some years been calling for an approach to nuclear arms control which would halt the technological momentum of the arms race through the negotiation of a number of separate verifiable agreements by the nuclear powers, i.e. the Strategy of Suffocation put forward by the Prime Minister at the first UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978. At the UN General Assembly Canada voted against both the "nuclear arms freeze" resolution cosponsored by Mexico, Sweden and Ecuador and the "freeze on nuclear weapons" resolution sponsored by India, Liberia and Mali. The two resolutions called for a "package" approach, which would be neither practical nor realistic, rather than for the negotiation of separate agreements.

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Freeze
vs
Reductions

Canada has also urged the major nuclear powers to negotiate verifiable and balanced reductions to the lowest possible level of nuclear arms. An immediate global freeze would have the disadvantage of acting as a disincentive to negotiations on reductions of existing arsenals. Thus, these resolutions were not consistent with the policy of stabilization outlined by the Prime Minister at UNSSOD II in June 1982. Furthermore, accepting a freeze without verification would mean that compliance would be virtually impossible to ascertain.

ANNEX II

Global Referendum

Global Referenda

The Canadian Government does not support the idea of a global referendum on disarmament. The proposal fails to acknowledge that the current situation in the disarmament and arms control field is largely the result of the lack of adequate international security arrangements and confidence among states which would ensure their security and national integrity at lower levels of arms. In the absence of such arrangements and in the current atmosphere of mutual distrust, movement on this subject will only come about after long and difficult negotiations among the parties involved. Measures such as the call for a global referendum on disarmament will not solve these basic underlying problems which are preventing progress in this field. Real disarmament requires long and careful negotiations aimed at establishing mutual confidence and constructing adequate international security mechanisms to guarantee the safety of each state. A global referendum, if held, would represent an expression of public opinion in favour of disarmament, but could not be a substitute for actual negotiation of verifiable international agreements.

Alternatives to Referenda

If the idea of a referendum is above all to mobilize public opinion on arms control and disarmament issues, there are certainly better, and less expensive, ways of accomplishing this. There is a need, for example, for greater research on many arms control and disarmament subjects. Greater efforts in the area of public information and education aimed at raising the public's consciousness and understanding of the issues facing us in this field are also important. In these terms, an initiative which did not explore the specific questions concerning the relationship between peace, security and disarmament would be of little benefit to the public as an education tool, and given the costs that would be associated with the organi-

- 2 -

zation of such a referendum on a global basis, one must seriously consider that such resources might be better used in other areas.

Municipal
Referenda

If the idea of a referendum is above all to mobilize public opinion on arms control and disarmament issues, there are certainly better, and less expensive, ways of accomplishing this. There is a need, for example, for greater research on many arms control and disarmament subjects. Greater efforts in the area of public information and education aimed at raising the public's consciousness and understanding of the issues facing us in this field are also important. In these terms, an initiative which did not explore the specific questions concerning the relationship between peace, security and disarmament would be of little benefit to the public as an education tool, and given the costs that would be associated with the organization of such a referendum on a global basis, one must seriously consider that such resources might be better used in other areas.

ANNEX III

Military Exports Policy

Policy

With regard to the export of military and defence-related equipment to other countries, the existing Canadian policy on such exports is a restrictive one. In general, it is based on the principles that such equipment should not be supplied to countries considered as representing a military threat to Canada; to countries involved in hostilities or which may be involved in imminent hostilities; to those countries to which UN resolutions forbid the export of arms; or to régimes considered wholly repugnant to Canadian values and especially where such equipment could be used against civilians. Under the Export and Import Permits Act and by Cabinet decisions on the export of military equipment, defence-related materials sold outside Canada to all but a small number of friendly and stable countries must receive approval from both the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence, thus ensuring an evaluation of the political and security implications of such sales. Moreover, these decisions provide for careful screening of major military equipment exports to avoid the subsequent transfer of Canadian equipment beyond the specified, legitimate end user.

Nature of Exported Equipment

The great majority of Canadian military exports is equipment of a support nature -- electrical and electronics equipment, communications equipment, aerospace products and various parts, components and sub-assemblies. Nearly eighty percent of our exports of military equipment are to the United States and eligible NATO allies and are important contributions to overall security as well as being important to the continued economic viability of the companies involved and to the maintenance of employment in those industries.

Security Cooperation

Canada has no intention of engaging in the international trade in military equipment beyond that which is necessary to meet our overall responsibilities for the maintenance and supply of armed forces to meet

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the needs of Canadian and Western security and to contribute to international stability. However, Canada's security needs and our collective security commitments require this country to have well-equipped armed forces. Because of the large expenditures involved in the purchase of the necessary equipment, the Government considers it important that these expenditures result in as high involvement as possible by Canadian industry. It is, therefore, the Government's view that as long as our security needs make it necessary for us to cooperate with allied and friendly countries in the defence trade, common sense dictates that it be done on an economically viable basis.

Defence
Sharing

In order to rationalize the defence production which we undertake in support of our collective security commitments, Canada has, since 1959, participated in Defence Development and Production Sharing Arrangements (DDSA/DPSA) with the United States and our other alliance partners. These were undertaken by the government of the day in recognition of the fact that Canada could not continue funding the development of complex and high cost aerospace and electronics systems for the small domestic market. The decision to develop certain limited sectors of Canadian expertise has proven highly successful. The Canadian defence industry has established itself as a competitive producer of such diverse products as Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft, airborne reconnaissance vehicles, radio communications and flight simulators. The dual military-civilian application of such technology has allowed Canada to become a major competitor in both markets.

Technology
for Civilian
Purposes

Given that such development and production sharing arrangements put Canadian firms in direct competition with well established foreign manufacturers, often supported by government subsidies and military procurement programmes much greater than Canada's, the Government of Canada has provided domestic firms with financing

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assistance to compensate for these disadvantages. The eligibility criteria of this programme were expanded in 1968 to include civilian aerospace and avionics projects in recognition of the spill-over from military technology and Canada's increased ability to penetrate this broader market. In recent years this programme has increasingly emphasized more profitable civilian production in order to enhance the return to Canadians on their investment.

ANNEX IV

Non- First-Use of Nuclear Weapons

A mutual non-first-use agreement to reduce the threat of a pre-emptive strike, is essentially acceptance of the Soviet pledge at the second UN Special Session on Disarmament 1982. On the face of it, it sounds reasonable and superficially attractive. But virtually all the NATO members, including Britain, France, West Germany and the Scandinavian countries, have rejected it for very good reasons. First of all, one must question the real value of such a declaration in a crisis situation. Second, so long as the Soviet Union maintains vastly superior conventional forces and the West is not prepared to commit the additional financial resources required for greater Western conventional strength to balance Soviet superiority, it would not be in the West's interest to give up the option of possible first use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent should the Soviet Union contemplate an attack. The probability of such an attack may be minimal, but in a matter of this importance there are few military commanders, let alone government leaders, who are prepared to exclude the risk of it ever occurring, given Soviet behaviour elsewhere. This question was dealt with in the Prime Minister's speech to the second UN Special Session on Disarmament in New York:

"The plea is made, from time to time, in favour of an undertaking of non-first use of nuclear weapons. I have no quarrel with those making the plea, who are serious persons concerned about the horrendous implications of the outbreak of nuclear warfare. However, the Charter lays down that there shall be no first use of force--any force. This law binds all of us. I can see no need to re-enact the Charter. In fact, I can see enormous pitfalls in trying to diminish the Charter in one of its central affirmations by seeking to set an order of precedence among the various manifestations of the use of force. But let us recognize that arguments about first use do not really go to the heart of the matter. The real problem before us is how to break the arms spiral. We will not do that in circumstances where any of the parties feels deficient in its security. We arm

- 2 -

out of fear for our security and we will disarm only if we are convinced that the threat to our security has abated. Arms control, to be viable, must increase security, not reduce it."

ANNEX V

Nuclear Exports

Canada and the NPT

As a strong supporter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Canada is fully committed to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT also requires the sharing of knowledge regarding the peaceful use of nuclear technology, particularly to the energy-poor countries of the world. Canada is also fully committed to doing this, but only if the transfer of such nuclear technology is properly and adequately safeguarded. Canada's non-proliferation/safeguards policy has been developed to ensure that our nuclear exports do not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation.

CANDU Reactors

All CANDU reactors are fully safeguarded, and operate under strict international controls supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Indeed, Canadian safeguards are more comprehensive than those demanded by competing nuclear suppliers. Despite suggestions that these measures are too restrictive, the Government of Canada has consistently resisted pressures to downgrade its requirements.

Nuclear Reactors are not Weapons

It should furthermore be understood that nuclear reactors are by no means synonymous with nuclear weapons. CANDU reactor technology is designed exclusively for the generation of electrical power. To produce weapons grade materials, the spent reactor fuel must be reprocessed to extract plutonium. This process is technically sophisticated, enormously expensive, difficult to conceal and strictly regulated internationally. In the contemporary situation it is unlikely that sufficient quantities of plutonium could be diverted, reprocessed and a nuclear device constructed without these actions being detected by international authorities. Accordingly, the sale of CANDU reactors abroad cannot be equated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

ANNEX VI

Nuclear Testing

Canadian Priorities

Two top Canadian priorities are to promote the realization of a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) and the evolution of an effective nuclear non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Canada continues to pursue these priorities through participating actively in both bilateral and multilateral deliberations and negotiations.

Testing in the Atmosphere

Of the nuclear powers, the UK, USA and USSR have adhered to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and accordingly halted their testing in the atmosphere. France and China have not signed the treaty. France has, however, voluntarily refrained from conducting atmospheric tests since 1974, whereas China has continued such tests. Canada has repeatedly protested to the Chinese on their atmospheric testing which has contributed to the total radioactive contamination of the biosphere.

Underground Testing

All of the nuclear weapon states continue to test underground. Only a CTBT would halt all testing in all environments for all time. In the early years, after 1963, a few cases of "venting" did occur (resulting from explosions close to the surface), contributing slightly to radioactive contamination - only a small fraction of that which would have occurred had similar tests been held in the atmosphere. Technology has now advanced to the stage where in recent years underground tests seem to have been fully contained. Residues from earlier atmospheric nuclear tests conducted on various Pacific islands have resulted in radioactive material being deposited and some seepage into the Pacific Ocean has occurred.

IAEA Safeguards

The safeguards operations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA - Canada sits on its Board of Governors) help to ensure that nuclear materials and equipment intended for peaceful use are

- 2 -

not diverted. The IAEA also has nuclear safety and environmental protection responsibilities. The Agency has formulated basic safety standards for radiation protection. It has also issued regulations and codes of practice on specific types of operations, including in particular the safe transport of radioactive materials. The IAEA has also established a system to facilitate emergency assistance to member states in the event of radiation accidents.

ANNEX VII

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

General Canadian Views on NWFZ

Canada continues to promote an effective non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Consistent with this policy, Canada has been strongly sympathetic, in principle, to the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) where they command the support of the countries in the area and promote regional and international stability. While we have not considered such zones to be a fully satisfactory alternative to the ratification of the NPT by the countries of the areas concerned, we do believe that, in the absence of universal or near universal adherence to the NPT and provided certain principles are observed, the creation of such zones can make a significant contribution to the objective of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Canada has supported United Nations resolutions calling for such zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. We have also backed measures which would consolidate the establishment of a NWFZ in Latin America in accordance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in spite of Canadian opposition to a provision in the Treaty which allows for the explosion of nuclear devices for so-called peaceful purposes.

Canada as a NWFZ

The objective of any arms control and disarmament initiative, including the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ), is to enhance security. The Canadian Government continues to believe in the concept of mutual security - a collective effort to deter aggression or to counter it if it occurs. That is why we are in the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), which is also the framework for the NORAD agreement with the USA. The Alliance relies on a deterrent strategy in which nuclear weapons play an important part. This is unfortunately unavoidable in the world as we know it. The idea of a NWFZ for Canada, with all its implications, would be realistic only if the

- 2 -

Canadian Government were prepared to withdraw from the Alliance which has served us well and has helped to preserve peace for more than thirty years. The Canadian Government continues to believe that our defence partnership, cooperation and defence production sharing arrangements with our allies make a greater contribution to preserving peace and security than would our withdrawal into the isolation of a NWFZ. The Canadian Government does not support the idea of unilateral disarmament. To be effective, disarmament must be a two-way street. Therefore, until such time as disarmament is mutually agreed to by the great powers, it is necessary for us to maintain our support for our NATO alliance.

ANNEX VIII

Reallocation of Resources
(including Waldheim proposal)

Waldheim
Proposal

The proposal that Canada devote one-tenth of one percent of its defence budget to disarmament efforts reflects former UN Secretary-General Waldheim's 1978 suggestion that nations "devote to national and international disarmament efforts \$1 million for every \$1,000 million currently spent on arms". Dr. Waldheim's suggestion was ostensibly an attempt to gauge priorities against two goals in the security field. Dr. Waldheim called it "a moral and political objective to be implemented by each country within the framework of its national, regional and international disarmament potential". The first UN Special Session on Disarmament did not take up the Secretary General's suggestion. No country has either accepted or committed itself to implementing Dr. Waldheim's proposal. However, the Canadian Government is committed to encouraging greater public interest and involvement in research and public information activities, and has established a Disarmament Fund for this purpose. This modest, but growing, fund has been drawn upon to assist conferences and seminars on disarmament and arms control issues and to help publish and disseminate information to encourage a wider awareness of this subject. During UNSSOD II, an additional allocation of \$300,000 to support arms control and disarmament initiatives was announced. This will enable Canada to participate in the international seismic data exchange as part of the international verification procedures of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to play a more effective role in efforts toward a chemical weapons ban, and to increase the Disarmament Fund in order to assist research and teaching facilities in Canada.

Resources
from DND
to
Development

As for the transfer of financial resources from defence to other programmes, reductions in the National Defence Department's budget or manpower resources are unlikely without a significant improvement in the

- 2 -

international climate. Nevertheless, in spite of budgetary constraints, the Government has increased its appropriation for aid and development programmes. This is in accordance with Canada's commitment to have official development assistance reach a level of .5 per cent of GNP by 1985.

ANNEX IX

World Disarmament Campaign

Canada and the WDC

Canada played a leading part at UNSSOD II in achieving consensus on the guidelines for the World Disarmament Campaign. Indeed, it was a Canadian informal paper which formed the basis of the deliberations on this matter at UNSSOD II. The agreed guidelines call for the Secretary General to present the specifics of a UN programme as part of the World Disarmament Campaign and a report on the associated financial implications. They also provide for a review mechanism whereby the effectiveness of the Campaign can be examined periodically.

Canadian Contribution

The guidelines for the World Disarmament Campaign approved at UNSSOD II recognized the roles of member states as well as the UN system and non-governmental organizations in information, education and the promotion of public understanding and support for arms control and disarmament. During the course of UNSSOD II, a number of new initiatives in arms control and disarmament were announced, including an increase in the Disarmament Fund.

ANNEX X

Miscellaneous

Comprehensive
Programme of
Disarmament

The question of whether dates can be set for the conclusion of arms control and/or disarmament agreements is one which is central to the multilateral negotiations on a "comprehensive programme of disarmament" (CPD). The Canadian Government's view is that it would be unrealistic to adopt a CPD which sets rigid dates for specific agreements. The states involved in the negotiations must see it in their interest to conclude an agreement, and must do so in their own time. For example, Canada continues to urge the USA and the USSR to conclude a verifiable agreement on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. If a date for such an agreement were fixed, and it was subsequently not met, what would be gained? Canada will continue to make specific proposals to promote progress as quickly as possible toward arms control and disarmament in the nuclear and non-nuclear weapons categories, but it will not set dates for agreements to be concluded.

ISMA

Regarding the proposal that Canada support the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency (ISMA), it should be noted that having placed particular emphasis on the need for adequate means of verifying international agreements on disarmament and arms control, the Government is, in principle, sympathetic to such a concept. Indeed, Canada has cosponsored both General Assembly resolutions authorizing a group of government experts to carry out studies on the implications of an ISMA. Canada also cosponsored a further resolution at the 37th UN General Assembly in 1982. It should be recognized, however, that the financial and technical resources necessary to ensure that such a system operates effectively require the participation and co-operation of the two major nuclear powers. There are also associated problems concerning the sovereignty of nations and the legal status and authority

- 2 -

of remote sensing under international aegis. For example, there is a divergence of views as to whether such data and/or information could be openly disseminated or would have to be subject to a régime of prior consent. These legal, political and financial questions will require considerable study in order to determine whether remote sensing by satellite can be considered as a viable tool for the multilateral observation and verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. Since it would be designed for monitoring multilateral agreements, it could be argued that the proposal should be closely related to the successful negotiation of further agreements.

Peace
Tax Fund

With regard to a Peace Tax Fund, there is no provision in the Income Tax Act permitting individual tax-payers to determine the specific areas in which their taxes should be used. Any change in the allocation of personal taxes would involve an amendment to the Income Tax Act through parliamentary process. The Government does not believe that the Income Tax Act should be changed for purposes such as those outlined by your constituent.

World
Peacemakers'
Association

With respect to the proposal made by Dr. Norman Alcock and others for a "World Peacemakers' Association" composed of middle and smaller powers, I should point out that Canada already works closely with many countries in pursuing disarmament and arms control initiatives in such international fora as the United Nations General Assembly in New York, the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna, and the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to name only a few. The idea of a World Peacemakers' Association attempts to reach beyond contemporary security alliances without resolving the root problem of a lack of mutual confidence which gave rise to these alliances over thirty years ago.



Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade
Le Centre Parlementaire pour les Affaires étrangères et le Commerce extérieur

MEMORANDUM TO Mr. L.A. Delvoie January 24, 1984
Director General
International Security & Arms
Control Bureau (IDD)
Department of External Affairs

FROM Carol Seaborn
Staff Advisor
Canada-US Interparliamentary Group

RE Briefing of Canadian Parliamentary delegation in preparation
for the 25th annual meeting of the Canada-United States
Interparliamentary Group, to be held March 8 to 12, 1984

Thank you for agreeing to brief the Canadian MPs and Senators, prior to their meeting with US Senators and Congressmen. A copy of the draft agenda for this year's meeting is attached. You will note that the delegations will be divided into three committees for discussion purposes. Lists for the three committees are not yet available, nor have we been informed as to which Congressmen and Senators will be on the U.S. delegation.

As we discussed, you will be briefing the Canadian parliamentarians on Committee II on the multilateral defence issues, namely deployment of nuclear missiles, arms negotiations and the Trudeau initiative, all topics put on the agenda by the U.S. side. (See agenda item B. 2.)

The time of your luncheon briefing is Thursday, February 23 at 12:15 p.m. It will take place in Room 566 of the South Block (alternatively known as the Wellington Block or the old Met Life Building) on the southeast corner of Wellington and Bank Streets.

May I remind you that this year, the Parliamentarians have requested that briefers send me their background information and briefing notes well before their briefing day so they can be distributed to the delegates ahead of time. This is to enable the parliamentarians to read and inform themselves before your briefing. The idea is that your remarks could be limited to introductory remarks highlighting the situation, while a more thorough discussion of various aspects could be opened up through questions.

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- 2 -

I am sympathetic to your problems in presenting a comprehensive briefing paper on the arms negotiations issue. I will leave it to you to find some notes, maybe in point form which will remind the delegates of the different fora for negotiations and the most recent developments. I hope the other two aspects will not present the same problems.

Could I have these notes one week in advance of your briefing in both official languages, please?

If you have any problems or questions do not hesitate to call me (237-0143).

17/01/84

DRAFT AGENDA

for the 25th Annual Meeting of the

CANADA-UNITED STATES INTER-PARLIAMENTARY GROUP

Puerto Rico, March 8-12, 1984

COMMITTEE I - TRADE AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

1. The international economic climate
 - a) Prospects for world debt and trade
 - b) US and Canadian economic prospects
2. Bilateral free trade arrangements
 - a) Free trade - across-the-board or in specific sectors?
 - b) Discussion of possible sectors involved: automotive; steel; urban mass transit; petrochemicals; textiles and clothing; telecommunications equipment and computer services; forest products; agricultural machinery and equipment.
3. Specific trade issues
 - a) Communications: border broadcasting; copyright.
 - b) Extraterritoriality issues.
 - Export Administration Act
 - unitary taxation
 - U.S. subpoenas
 - c) Proposed legislation.
 - U.S. reciprocity and services bill
 - reform of dumping and countervail laws
 - reform of Canadian import law
 - d) Specific irritants: ITC investigation of fish; asbestos; potatoes.
 - e) Canadian tax on tourist literature.
4. U.S. and Canadian perspectives on revision of the CAP

- 2 -

COMMITTEE II - ENERGY, DEFENCE AND MULTILATERAL QUESTIONS

A. Energy

1. Natural gas

- a) pricing of exports; contracts.
- b) Alaska Gas Pipeline including the Alaskan alternative.

2. Electricity

B. Defence

1. Bilateral defence

- (i) Modernization of the North American Early Warning System.
- (ii) U.S. restrictions on sensitive military/industrial technologies.

2. Multilateral defence

Deployment of nuclear missiles; arms negotiation; the Trudeau initiative.

C. Multilateral issues (in conjunction with Committee III)

- 1. The Middle East.
- 2. Central America and the Caribbean: Grenada.

- 3 -

COMMITTEE III - ENVIRONMENT, BORDER ISSUES
AND MULTILATERAL QUESTIONS

A. Environment and border issues

1. Acid rain
2. Toxic wastes
3. The Garrison Commission
4. Flathead
5. The conclusion of the Ross Dam/Skagit issue
6. West coast salmon
7. Seaway navigation issues

B. Multilateral issues (in conjunction with Committee II)

1. The Middle East
2. Central America and the Caribbean: Grenada

PLENARY (Committees I, II, and III)

1. Making Canada's case in Washington: Is there any alternative to costly lobbying and to meeting the requirements of U.S. regulatory procedures? The examples of the lumber and potato cases.
2. Foreign aid:
 - (i) what is happening to public attitudes?
 - (ii) is it weakening some North American markets?

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



Mr. Smith
Mr. Calder
Mr. McMeek
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES
to see + file

TO
A Under-Secretary of State for External
Affairs, OTTAWA (RBR)

FROM
De Canadian Embassy - STOCKHOLM

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet Meeting between the Honourable
Allan J. MacEachen and Andrei Gromyko
Foreign Minister of the USSR

SECURITY
Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE

January 27, 1984

NUMBER
Numéro

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ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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Enclosed is the summary record of the SSEA's
discussions with Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister
of the USSR, at the Soviet Embassy, Stockholm,
January 19, 1984.

2. Although the SSEA saw and approved the
abbreviated version forwarded earlier by telegram
SCDL-0042 of January 19), he has not of course
seen this fuller record. You may wish to give him
an opportunity to review this text before giving it
further distribution.

[Signature]
Ambassador,

CONFIDENTIAL

Meeting between the Honourable
Allan J. MacEachen and Andrei Gromyko,
Foreign Minister of the USSR, at the
Soviet Embassy, Stockholm, on
January 19, 1984

The SSEA opened the substantive part of the meeting by suggesting that the agenda for the talks might cover East-West relations in general terms, and more specifically what Canada and the Prime Minister of Canada had been trying to do in this field recently; secondly, the Prime Minister's proposed visit to Moscow; third, the prospects for the Stockholm Conference; and fourth, bilateral questions.

Mr. Gromyko agreed to the suggested agenda without comment.

The SSEA then led off by thanking Mr. Gromyko for the meeting and moved immediately to the first agenda subject. The Prime Minister, he said, had spent much time in recent months on East-West relations because he was concerned with tensions in the world situation and what was undoubtedly a serious deterioration in the atmosphere. In the absence of a productive dialogue, the Prime Minister wondered whether there might not be things that Canada could do which could make a modest contribution to improving the atmosphere. One area in which we had been active was MBFR. We were aware of course of the Eastern European proposals, and for our part we were encouraging our allies to respond in kind. It might be possible indeed to do something in this context at the highest level. As far as the Stockholm Conference was concerned, Canada had been eager that it should be opened at the ministerial level, in order that it might constitute the beginnings of a renewed dialogue. We were pleased that the Gromyko-Shultz meeting had taken place and we hoped that it would lead to positive results. At Williamsburg in the spring, Prime Minister Trudeau had taken the lead and had attempted to impart a political impulse to international security questions. Finally, at the recent NATO meeting in Brussels we did manage to incorporate a number of useful ideas in the final communiqué. Canada had been uncomfortable with a number of aspects of American policy and more particularly, its strong rhetorical tone. Prime Minister Trudeau had made these views known to President Reagan and to other US leaders. In doing so the Prime Minister had attempted to moderate some the more extreme aspects of American thinking. We believed that his efforts have had some effect in the sense that, most recently, there had been some better signals emanating from Washington.

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- 2 -

The SSEA informed Mr. Gromyko that the Prime Minister had been widely supported in his initiative by Canadian public opinion. He had also visited a number of countries: China, Japan, India and the USA to meet with President Reagan. In the same process and context, the Prime Minister would be interested in visiting Moscow. The SSEA referred to Mr. Andropov's letter to the Prime Minister and stated that while we appreciated and understood why it was not possible to set dates immediately, the Prime Minister's efforts could not be fully rounded unless he had an opportunity to meet Soviet leaders and he was therefore interested in visiting the Soviet Union. At the present time arrangements were being made for the Prime Minister to travel to Eastern Europe and the countries to be visited would be Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Romania. In making these visits, the Prime Minister was attempting to make contact in the countries concerned with the political leaders at the highest level in order to understand their positions better, and at the same time to demonstrate that at least one Western leader was genuinely interested in exploring ways of pursuing peace.

Mr. Gromyko replied immediately, not requiring a translation from English to Russian.

After expressing regrets at the shortness of the time available, Mr. Gromyko began immediately by saying that the relationships between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries were bad, and that USA-Soviet relations were "pretty awful, tense and ugly". He regretted that many countries gave erroneous explanations for this state of affairs. In general, the Soviet Government valued Canada's attitude in international affairs but "not always do we hear from Canada statements that are correct". "I recall the Canadian statement in Madrid." But Mr. Gromyko said that he did not wish to engage in polemics or to rehearse past history.

The present administration in the United States was "quite a phenomenon". It seemed to Mr. Gromyko that the Reagan administration saw itself as having a vocation to worsen relations with the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration was different from all other previous administrations since Roosevelt, in the sense that no other US administration had ever tried to roll back the relationship with the Soviet Union

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in its entirety. This administration did what it could to destroy rather than to create: "They rub their hands with glee if they can do something to worsen relations." Mr. Reagan seemed to believe that if he did not like socialism then socialism could have no right to exist. The Soviet Union could say, with equal justification, that we do not recognize his right to exist. This attitude could lead only to permanent tension; it was a grammar school approach to put it mildly, said Mr. Gromyko. The Soviet Union regarded the Reagan administration as mastodons, as something out of the remote past, from a previous historical epoch: "they are people not of this world." American policies stemmed from these concepts; in other words, the worse the law they adopted which ran counter to the Soviet Union, the better it was for them. The arms race was climbing, arms spending was increasing; the Americans wanted it to go even higher. They believed that then they would be able to act from a position of strength. This, Mr. Gromyko argued, was the cause of present tensions - and it would be a mistake to refer to it as "a philosophy" since that idea was too noble to be used to refer to U.S. thinking. "How can we stem these policies?" he asked. The Americans wanted to build a military tower from which they would be able to order everyone around, including the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union could not accept that. Mr. Gromyko said that no one had elected the Reagan administration to play this role. If anyone dared to refuse to bow to them they felt that they could use any means to make them do so - and any means were considered acceptable. "We cannot accept that," he repeated. We must maintain a position of equality. "We intend to talk but on the basis of equality"; and for the Soviet Union this demanded sacrifices in other areas of governmental responsibility, such as education and health care. He concluded his remarks by commenting that he had said nothing new, but nevertheless the Soviet analysis of the causes of present tension was as he had just outlined it.

The SSEA replied at length and began his comments by noting that Canada did not accept the point of view enunciated by Mr. Gromyko. Canada did not believe that there was - or should be - a "tower" to which others paid obedience. We believed firmly that the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe had a right to their way of doing things and their type of society without threat of interference or subversion by military or other means. We had made this point to the U.S. government.

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We believed that there had been some evolution in US attitudes recently; some moderating of the US position. "I have known Mr. Shultz for more than forty years, and I know him today as a force for moderation; I believe he is attempting to establish an equilibrium in the relationship." President Reagan's speech on the eve of the Stockholm Conference opening was surely an improvement and Mr. Shultz's statement here was more moderate than his words in Madrid. "That" Mr. Gromyko observed generally, "is more related to the music than to the contents." "Your speech here was pretty tough," the SSEA replied, and he went on to ask whether it should be seen as reflecting an unwillingness to participate fully in the Stockholm Conference. The question in our minds was how, in this forum, we could contribute to making some concrete improvements and taking some steps forward. The French Foreign Minister had described East-West relations as being/a state of deep crisis. Mr. Gromyko's analysis was very pessimistic. "How do we get out of this situation? How can the atmosphere be improved?" the SSEA asked. We did not seek superiority. In NATO there were not many who would contest the existence of the Soviet Union. Again Mr. Gromyko interjected a comment that the SSEA should "try to educate" the Americans. The SSEA did not pick up this remark, and concluded by noting that Canada could not live with the situation as he had described it; it must be changed. We must make an effort here in Stockholm and in Vienna. Surely we do not give up without trying? /in

Mr. Gromyko did not respond directly to the SSEA's question. Instead he turned to the disruption of the INF and START negotiations. "The Americans," he said, "have been arguing that the Soviet Union will return to these talks". This was cynical. They were attempting to delude themselves and others. The Americans pretended that nothing serious had happened. "Please," he urged the SSEA, "do what you can to explain to them that we will not allow them to fool other people into believing that we can go back to Geneva. They have made both INF and START impossible by their actions and their positions. If the Soviet Union were to return to the negotiating table we would become the willing accomplices of the Americans in the sense that people would see that nothing had in fact happened." All of this, Mr. Gromyko said, was related to considerations of U.S. domestic politics, and "... you know as well as I do what these factors are, of course."

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Mr. Gromyko then moved on to comment on the remarks made at the outset of the meeting by the SSEA concerning Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative. The Soviet Union valued the efforts being made by Mr. Trudeau because they proceeded from good intentions with respect to the difficult state of affairs pertaining throughout the world. "We will get in touch with you later regarding a meeting in Moscow."

The Soviet Union appreciated highly its relations with Canada and wished to see them developed further, especially in the trade and economic fields, and in questions related to Northern development. In a genial spirit Mr. Gromyko noted that this was because Canada did not pretend to dominate the Soviet Union.

The SSEA stated that Canada wanted a stable and consistent relationship with the Soviet Union. "I am glad to hear that," Mr. Gromyko interjected. Canada welcomed high level visits such as Mr. Gorbachev's as a contribution to developing such a relationship. The SSEA picked up on Mr. Gromyko's reference to the Canadian statement at Madrid and acknowledged that it had contained some strong comments, but Mr. Gromyko must bear in mind that it had been delivered in the immediate wake of a most unfortunate incident. While critical of Soviet actions, it had never challenged Soviet legitimacy. The SSEA continued by saying that there were some specific subjects that would have to be dealt with as part of any effort to improve and stabilize the Canada/USSR relationship. In this category were a number of humanitarian matters such as family reunification problems and the results of the Korean airliner incident, all of which could best be handled at the official level. Mr. Gromyko did not respond or react to any of these specific points.

The discussion ended on a positive note with the SSEA reiterating his earlier remarks concerning Canada's desire for a longer term stable relationship with the Soviet Union.

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---PMS INITIATIVE

THIS WILL CONFIRM THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS TO
CONTINUE SUPPLYING INFO ON PMS INITIATIVE, I SPOKE IN COUNCIL THIS
WEEK TO DRAW ATTENTION TO PMS CURRENT VISITS TO EASTERN EUROPE, HIS
INTERVIEW WITH NYT AND INITIATIVES ON MEASURES FOR RESTRAINING
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY. TEXTS AS SUPPLIED IN REFTELS HAVE BEEN
CIRCULATED.

2. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO SEND US PROMPTLY, AND AUTHORIZE US TO
CIRCULATE, ASSESSMENT OF VISITS TO EASTERN EUROPE WHEN IT BECOMES
AVAILABLE AS WELL AS TEXT OF STATEMENT IN WHICH PM REPORTS TO
PARLIAMENT IF THAT REMAINS HIS INTENTION

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RCR RSR RCD RSD CPD ZSP URT URE LCD LSD RGB

---CONSULTATIONS WITH USA ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

WHILE MEETING WITH DEPUTY ASST SECRETARY FOR CDN AFFAIRS ON OTHER
SUBJECTS, KINSMAN WAS ASKED TO MEET RIGHT AFTER WITH MARK PALMER,
DEPUTY ASST SECRETARY FOR SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.
BRIEFLY, PALMER'S MESSAGE WAS ONE OF KEEN INTEREST IN ADMIN IN PMS
TALKS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND IN WHATEVER EMERGES IN MOSCO. AS HE
PUT IT, REAGAN HAS NOW SENT SIGNALS TO MOSCO AND THEY ARE COMING
BACK POSITIVELY. THERE ARE GOOD PROSPECTS OF SOME ACTIVE SUPERPOWER
AND EAST-WEST DIPLOMACY IN COMING MONTHS, INCLUDING SERIOUS
CONSULTATIONS ON MIDDLE EAST. USSR IS REVIEWING POLICIES BUT PALMER
SAYS USSR DOES SEEM TO WANT TO GET BACK TO INF AND START TABLES
(ADMIN IS PRIVATELY OF TWO MINDS WHETHER IT WILL IN FACT TURN
OUT TO BE NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE TO MERGE THEM). IN THIS PERIOD IT
IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT USA AND CDA STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH
WITH EACH OTHERS THINKING. PALMER UNDERTOOK TO BRIEF US REGULARLY
AND THOROUGHLY ON THEIR OWN CONNECTIONS TO MOSCO.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1094 CONF

2.WE SAID THAT DPM/SSEA AND SHULTZ HAD RENEWED SUCH AN UNDERTAKING SEVERAL TIMES AND AS ALWAYS WE WELCOMED IT.WE HAD SOME DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENTIATION POLICY USA PRACTICES TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE (OURTEL 1079 25JAN).PALMER ACKNOWLEDGED DIFFICULTY IN RECONCILING WISH TO TREAT EASTERN EUROPEAN CAPITALS AS SEPARATE ENTITIES IN HOPE THIS MIGHT ENCOURAGE THEM TO BECOME AS SUCH ON ONE HAND,WITH EVIDENCE THEY DO NOT/NOT BEHAVE AS SUCH ON THE OTHER.ALSO, ENCOURAGEMENT HAS TO BE BALANCED AGAINST POSSIBLY GIVING MOSCO MORE AGGRESSIVE SIGNALS THAN EXERCISE WARRANTS.PALMER STRESSED IT IS IMPORTANT TO SPEAK FRANKLY TO EASTERN EUROPEANS ABOUT RESPONSIBILITIES OF EAST FOR DIFFICULTIES IN POLITICAL SIT.IF MENTION IS NOT/NOT MADE FIRMLY DURING VISITS OF OBJECTIONS TO SS-20 DEPLOYMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY MISUNDERSTAND.THIS IS PROBABLY SIGNAL TO YOU.

3.BASICALLY PALMER IS ALSO SIGNALLING THAT STATE DEPT EXPECTS TO BE BRIEFED ON PMS EXPERIENCES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.IN RETURN THEY WILL KEEP US IN CLOSER TOUCH WITH THEIR OWN THINKIN (THOUGH EAGLEBURGER HAS GENERALLY BEEN VERY GOOD ON THIS ANYWAY),PARTICULARLY IN WHAT WILL BE ACTIVE PERIOD.

4.THIS REINFORCES THE POINT THAT ACTING INTERNATIONALLY ENHANCES OUR POSITION WITH ADMIN ON FOREIGN POLICY.IT IS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF INTEREST IN PM INITIATIVE,AS WELL AS OF ITS RELEVANCE.

CCC/241 272329Z UNGR1094

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM GENEV YTGR0610 27JAN84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

INFO PMDELDAVOS IMMED BNATO WSHDC PCOOTT/FOWLER BONN LDN PARIS

NDHQOTT/ADM POL/CPP/DNACPOL

DISTR IDA IDR RSD RCD RBD

---PMS INITIATIVE-WEST BERLIN VIEWS

DURING VARIOUS CALLS IN WEST BERLIN EARLIER THIS WEEK, MUCH CURIOSITY AND OCCASIONALLY SOME NERVOUSNESS WAS DISPLAYED OVER PMS VISIT NEXT WEEK TO EAST BERLIN. VON WEIZSACKER, HOWEVER, WHOSE REACTION IS THE ONE THAT COUNTS, WAS FIRMLY POSITIVE IF NEVERTHELESS CAST WITHIN CAREFUL FRAMEWORK.

2. VON WEIZSACKER, GOVERNING MAYOR OF BERLIN-IE, EFFECTIVELY HEAD OF WEST BERLIN GOVT, AND WHO IS EXPECTED TO BE UNCONTESTED IN HIS BID FOR PRESIDENCY FOR FGR THIS YEAR, WAS GREATLY INTERESTED IN PMS INITIATIVE. AS I HAD BEEN FOREWARNED OF THIS, I GAVE HIM FULL ACCOUNT OF PURPOSE AND ELEMENTS OF INITIATIVE WITH STRESS ON DETAILED COINCIDENCES WITH POSITIONS OF CHANCELLOR KOHL. VON WEIZSACKER IS WELL INFORMED ON SECURITY ISSUES (HE HAS REPUTATION AS ONE OF PRINCIPAL THINKERS OF CDU PARTY) AND WHILE PREVIOUSLY UNFAMILIAR WITH DETAILS, HE QUICKLY ACKNOWLEDGED HIS CONCURRENCE WITH SUBSTANCE OF PMS INITIATIVE.

3. AS FOR VISIT TO EAST BERLIN, HE WAS INTERESTED IN RATIONALE FOR CHOICE OF PMS POINTS OF CONTACT IN EASTERN EUROPE BUT THEN CONFINED

...2

PAGE TWO YTGR0610 CONFID

HIMSELF TO COMMENTS ON EAST GERMANY. HE TOOK AS POINT OF COMMON DEPARTURE, WESTERN AWARENESS OF GDRS ATTEMPT TO USE WESTERN HIGH LEVEL VISITS TO SERVE ITS SEARCH FOR GREATER INNATL STATUS OF BERLIN. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THOSE WHO COULD USEFULLY DO SO TO SPEAK TO HONNECKER GOVT AND PM WAS AMONG FEW WHO COULD SUCCESSFULLY DO SO, AND HE THEREFORE FELT VISIT WOULD BE A GOOD THING.

4. WHEN VON WEIZSACKER HAD VISITED HONNECKER FIVE MONTHS AGO (A VISIT UNKNOWN TO ALLIED COMMANDERS IN ADVANCE AND A SUBJ THEREAFTER CAUSING SOME FRICTION WITH THEM) GDR HOG HAD URGED HIM TO ARGUE AGAINST USA DEPLOYMENT ON GROUNDS BOTH OF FEARS THIS WOULD CREATE IN GDR AND FACT IT WOULD LEAD TO SOVIET COUNTERDEPLOYMENT. VON WEIZSACKER RESPONDED TO EFFECT, GDR MUST THEREFORE UNDERSTAND, GIVEN PREVIOUS SOVIET DEPLOYMENT, WHAT FEARS FGR ALREADY HAD.

5. IT WAS TRUE THAT IN RECENT MONTHS NEGOTIATION OF INTER-BERLIN TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS HAD GONE IN UNPRECEDENTEDLY SMOOTH FASHION, VIZ. ESPECIALLY THE S-BAHN AGREEMENT. BUT MOST WERE ON MATTERS OF INTEREST TO GDR NOT/NOT FGR AND AMOUNT OF MONEY FGR WAS READY TO PAY SEEMED PRINCIPAL DETERMINANT OF SUCCESS.

6. THUS, GDR INTEREST LATELY SEEMED MORE IMMEDIATELY SELF SERVING THAN POLITICAL. HONNECKER HAD ALLEGEDLY PERSUADED USSR TO REPLACE ITS AMB IN EAST BERLIN WITH LONG TIME FRIEND OF HIS WHO IS APPARENTLY CONSIDERABLY LOWER LEVEL THAN PREDECESSORS. THIS FRIENDSHIP, HE

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PAGE THREE YTGR0610 CONF

EXPECTED, AND NOT/NOT ANY SOVIET DOWNGRADING OF INTEREST IN GDR,
EXPLAINED APPOINTMENT, THOUGH INCUMBENT MAY AT LEAST BE MORE
AMENABLE TO HONNECKERS INTERESTS. HE HAD MET SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
EAST BERLIN PREVIOUS DAY AND HE FOUND HIM NOT/NOT WELL INFORMED
AND UNIMPRESSIVE.

7. VON WEIZSACKER THUS HAD LITTLE EXPECTATION THAT GREATER GDR FEARS
OVER SECURITY SITUATION WOULD RESULT IN ANY GREATER EFFECTIVE
FREEDOM OF GDR MANOEUVRE; BUT HE DOES BELIEVE SORT OF DIALOGUE PM
WILL HAVE IS NECESSARY AND USEFUL WHEN PURSUED CAREFULLY AND BY
THOSE FEW WESTERN INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE COMPETENT TO DO SO, CONDITIONS
HE CLEARLY FELT WERE MET IN CASE OF PMS VISIT

MCPHAIL

CCC/198 271545Z YTGR0610

MF

INFC

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BERN ZNGR0276 27JAN84

TO CANDELDAVOS IMMED

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ

DISTR MINA RGB RGBD RSR FPR

---COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE-VISITE PMEN SUISSE

TEXTE DU COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE EMIS A BERNE 26JAN A 14H15 PAR

DEPARTEME FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

CIT LORS DE SON SEJOUR EN SUISSE,OU IL PARTICIPE AU SYMPOSIUM DE

DAVOS,M PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU,PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN,

RENCONTRERA LUNDI 30 JANVIER 1984 A ZURICH M PIERRE AUBERT,CHEF

DU DEPARTEMENT FEDERAL DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES.

MM TRUDEAU ET AUBERT AURONT DES ENTETIENS PORTANT SUR LA
SECURITE EN EUROPE ET,PLUS PARTICULIEREMENT,LA CONFERENCE DE
STOCKHOLM SUR LES MESURES DE CONFIANCE ET DE SECURITE ET LE
DESARMEMENT EN EUROPE(CDE).

LE PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN FERA PART AU CHEF DU DEPARTEMENT
DE SES PROPOSITION SEN VUE DE REDUIRE LES ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES ET DE
PROMOUVOIR LA PAIX ET LA SECURITE.FINCIT.

UUU/205 271233Z ZNGR0276

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0212 27JAN82

TO PMDELDAVOS DELIVER BY 271700

INFO EXTOTT 1DDZ

DISTR RBD RBR XDV

REF OURTEL UYGR0208 27JAN

---PM VISIT TO ROMANIA

HAD COORDINATION MTG WITH PROTOCOL AND MEDIA REPS CONCERNING UPCOMING VISIT. BECAUSE OF GROMYKO VISIT, WILL BE COMPLETING MOST ARRANGEMENTS ON MON WRAP-UP SESSION WITH MFA.

2. ANSWERS TO OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

A) TIPS TO DRIVERS, STAFF AT GUEST HOUSE ETC ARE EXPECTED. NORMAL GIFT IS EITHER KENT CIGARETTES OR ALCOHOL. A LITTLE MEMENTO FROM CDA FOR WOMEN COULD ALSO BE GIVEN.

B) HOTEL TRIUMF HAS NO/NO ADEQUATE FACILITIES FOR OFFICE. WOULD SUGGEST OFFICE BE SET UP IN CHANCERY (BETWEEN MEDIA HOTEL AND TRIUMF). ONLY OTHER CHOICE WOULD BE ROOM AT INTERCONTINENTAL OR PART OF RESTAURANT IN TRIUMF HOTEL.

C) ROMS HAVE ASKED IF BRIEFING BY CDN OFFICIALS WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER FIRST MTG. IF SO, WILL ALL MEDIA BE INVITED.

D) TO DATE AFP, ARD (WEST GERMAN TEL) AND REUTERS HAVE REQUESTED VISAS FOR CORRESPONDENTS.

E) AS ROMS WILL NOW BE PAYING FOR ONLY TEN PEOPLE IN GUEST HOUSE AND TRIUMF, WILL BE RENTING ADDITIONAL TWO VEHICLES FOR COLEMAN AND DURDIN.

...2

PAGE TWO UYGR0212 CONFD

WILL BOTH REQUIRE ACCESS TO GUEST HOUSE AND VENUE OF MTGS?

3.GRATEFUL RESPONSE BY 300900.

CCC/181 271500Z UYGR0212

mf
INFO

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0208 27JAN84

TO PMDELDAVOS DELIVER BY 271600

INFO EXTOTT 1DDZ

DISTR RBD RBR XDV

---PM VISIT TO ROMANIA:SECURITY

HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW WITH ROMS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING DEL AND AIRCRAFT.LEVEL OF SECURITY OFFERED IS EQUAL TO THAT GIVEN TO PRES CEAUSESCU QUOTE LEVEL O UNQUOTE.THIS LEVEL MEANS THAT NO/NO UNAUTHORIZED MOVEMENT OR CONTACT IS PERMITTED WITHIN A PERIMETER ESTABLISHED AROUND THE PM.

2.THE AIRPORT IS NORMALLY GUARDED BY A SPECIAL ANTI-TERRORISM UNIT OF ROM ARMY.DAY OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE SECURITY WILL EVEN BE INCREASED.ONLY INDIVISUALS WITH SPECIAL ID CARDS WILL BE ALLOWED IN AIRPORT.ROAD TO AIRPORT WILL BE CLOSED AT LEAST ONE HOUR PRIOR TO ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE.PEOPLE WITH ACCESS TO PM WILL ONLY BE OFFICIALS AND SECURITY GUARDS.AIRPLANE WILL BE GUARDED BY EXTRA UNIT WITH TWO PEOPLE ALWAYS LOCATED ON TARMAC NEXT TO AIRCRAFT.SECURITY HAS REQUESTED LIST OF PEOPLE OTHER THAN CREW WHO WILL REQUIRE ACCESS TO AIRCRAFT.

3.AT AIRPORT SPECIAL GUARDS BEING ASSIGNED TO SORTING BAGGAGE.AS YOU REQUIRED,WE HAVE INSISTED THAT PMS LUGGAGE BE PUT IN HIS CAR OR FOLLOWING ONE(AMB SIMARDS).ALTHO ROMS WANTED TO USE SEPARATE CAR FOR LUGGAGE TO PRECEED DEL TO GUEST HOUSE,WE REFUSED.

...2

PAGE TWO UYGR0208 CONFD

(ALLEN AND DESCHAMBAULT WILL MAKE TRANSFER.)

4. ALL CARS AND DRIVERS SUPPLIED BY ROMS ARE FROM SECURITY FORCES.

PM WILL TRAVEL IN RENAULT 18/DACIA 2000 AND REST OF DEL IN DACIA 1300.

MOTORCADE WILL BEGIN WITH TRAFFIC CONTROL CAR FOLLOWED BY PROTOCOL

VEHICLE, THEN PRINCIPAL VEHICLE WITH TWO ESCORT VEHICLES (F1 AND E2)

SLIGHTLY BEHIND AND TO SIDES. INSP CARTER WILL BE IN E2. BEFORE AMB

CAR WILL BE SPECIAL ANTI-TERRORIST CAR. AFTER AMB CAR REST OF DEL.

AN AMBULANCE WILL BE AT AIRPORT FOR ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE AND ANOTHER

STANDING BY AT ENTRANCE TO BUCST. A DOCTOR WILL BE IN MOTORCADE AND

SPECIAL UNIT OF SURGEONS WILL BE ON CALL FOR FULL TIME OF VISIT.

ROMS REQUEST PMS BLOOD TYPE AND TYPE OF GUNS IF ANY CARRIED BY TWO

SECURITY SGTS OR INSP.

5. GUEST HOUSE (PALAIS FLOREASCA) TO BE USED BY PM IS IN NEIGHBOURHOOD

OF PRES CEAUSESCU. AREA IS ALWAYS GUARDED AND ACCESS GIVEN ONLY TO

INDIVIDUALS WITH LEGITIMATE BUSINESS IN AREA. GUEST HOUSE IS ONLY

USED BY HEADS OF STATE AND AT SUCH TIMES ACCESS TO AREA IS FURTHER

RESTRICTED TO PEOPLE HAVING IDENTITY CARDS. SPECIAL PASSES MUST ALSO

BE PLACED ON VEHICLES. 24 HRS BEFORE ARRIVAL, RESIDENCE, GROUNDS AND

NEIGHBOURING AREAS ARE CHECKED FOR EXPLOSIVES AND CHEMICAL AND

RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL. AFTER CHECK, AREA IS COMPLETELY SEALED OFF.

ROMS STATION TWO SECURITY PERSONS FULL TIME IN BASEMENT OF GUEST

HOUSE.

6. FOR MTGS AND SCRUM AREAS SURROUNDING BLDGS ARE CLEARED OF

...3

PAGE THREE UYGR0208 CONFD

UNAUTHORIZED CARS AND INDIVIDUALS CAN BE BARRED FROM ENTERING HOTEL OR WALKING ON SIDEWALK NEAR BLDGS WHERE VISITS TAKE PLACE. SECURITY PEOPLE SAID IT TAKES ALMOST TWO HRS TO SECURE OUTSIDE OF A RESIDENCE AND LONGER FOR A PUBLIC PLACE. LUNCH IN RESTAURANT WILL REQUIRE SOME QUOTE DOIGTE UNQUOTE IN HANDLING SECURITY.

7. AS SECURITY EXTREMELY WELL ORGANIZED, RONS INSURING THAT NOT/NOT EVEN MINOR INCIDENT CAN OCCUR. COL OF SECURITY FORCES HAS EXTENDED INVITATION TO MEET WITH CARTER AS IT QUOTE MAY BE NECESSARY TO DISCUSS OTHER VISITS LATER UNQUOTE. ONE MEMBER OF TEAM WAS IN FACT PART OF 1980 PREPARATIONS FOR PRES CEAUSESCU. GRATEFUL YOUR RESPONSES ASAP TO QUESTIONS POSED ABOVE.

CCC/181 271350Z UYGR0208

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

55912
Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM LDN XNGR0195 27JAN84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 271500

INFO PARIS BONN BRU HAGUE ROME BNATO VMBFR WSHDC MOSCO TOKYO
PEKIN NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP PCOOTT/FOWLER BUCST WSAW BGRAD PRGUE
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB UGB RCD CPD URR IDA IDR RCR
REF OURTEL XNGR0141 20JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:BRITISH VIEWS

IN CONVERSATION ON OTHER MATTERS TODAY,FCO DEFENCE DEPT TOLD
US THAT THEY ARE RECOMMENDING TO FCO POLITICAL DIRECTOR THAT
UK PERM REP RAISE NEXT WEEK IN NATO CONTEXT,CDN INTENTION TO
TABLE THREE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS AT FORTHCOMING CD SESSION.
IF RECOMMENDATION IS ACCEPTED,BRITISH WILL ARGUE THAT INEVITABLE
INTRA-ALLIANCE DISAGREEMENTS ON PROPOSALS(PARTICULARLY THOSE
RELATING TO ICBM MOBILITY AND VERIFICATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS
SYSTEMS,BOTH OF WHICH CONTINUE TO CAUSE DIFFICULTY HERE)SHOULD
BE AIRED QUOTE AMONG FRIENDS IN NATO UNQUOTE,RATHER THAN IN
BROADER CD FORUM.PLEASE PROTECT

CCC/065 271702Z XNGR0195

INFO

MR DELVOYE

*Some re-writing has been done,
but no new ideas have been introduced in the
text.*

*Mr. M. M. M. M.
Shandy. To hold.
SD*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PC00TT PC00087 27JAN84

TO PMDELDAVOS/FOWLER

DELIVER BY 230900

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ RBR

REF OURTEL PC00081 26JAN

---PMS TOAST-BUCST

FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TEXT FOR PRESS USE OF PROPOSED REMARKS
FOR PMS TOAST IN BUCST REVISED TO CONFORM WITH FRENCH TEXT
TRANSMITTED YESTERDAY.

TEXT BEGINS:

PROPOSED TOAST FOR USE BY THE
PRIME MINISTER DURING HIS VISIT TO BUCST
FEBRUARY 1ST 1984

MR PRESIDENT, LET ME BEGIN BY EXPRESSING MY
DEEP APPRECIATION FOR YOUR KIND INVITATION AND FOR THE
WARM WELCOME YOU HAVE EXTENDED TO ME HERE TODAY. LET
ME ALSO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RECOGNIZE
AND APPLAUD YOUR TIRELESS EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF
INNATL PEACE AND STABILITY.

I HAVE TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY IN RECENT MONTHS
TO CONSULT WITH MANY STATESMEN AND WORLD LEADERS, AND
TO SUGGEST MEANS TO ALLEVIATE CURRENT GLOBAL TENSIONS.
I CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL TO INCLUDE BUCST IN MY

...2

PAGE TWO PC00084 CONF

ITINERARY, GIVEN YOUR OWN VERY WELCOME EFFORTS TO
REOPEN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

NINE YEARS AGO, MR PRESIDENT, WE MET AT
HSNKI TO SIGN THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONF ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. AT THAT TIME, YOU
RIGHTLY STATED:

QUOTE WE SHOULD NOT/NOT HARBOUR THE ILLUSION THAT WE
CAN NOW STAY STILL AND REMAIN SAFE...

HISTORY IS GOING TO JUDGE NOT/NOT ONLY THE
DOCUS WE SHALL SIGN AND THE STATEMENTS
MADE, BUT ALSO THE WAY IN WHICH EVERY ONE OF
OUR STATES, EVERY LEADER AND GOVT,

TAKES ACTION TO IMPLEMENT THESE DOCUS. UNQUOTE.

HOW PROPHETIC THOSE WORDS HAVE PROVEN TO BE.
THE DETERIORATION IN INNATL RELNS SINCE 1975
DEMONSTRATES THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SPIRIT OF
HSNKI TO THOSE TWIN DEMONS, FEAR AND SUSPICION.

MR PRESIDENT, OUR PEOPLES ARE ANXIOUS ABOUT
THE FUTURE AND, MOST OF ALL, ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF WAR
IN A NUCLEAR AGE. I UNDERSTAND AND SHARE THEIR UNEASE.

THERE WAS, I SUPPOSE, A TIME WHEN WAR WAS
SEEN AS A NOBLE ENDEAVOUR, WAGED FOR NOBLE PURPOSES.
UNLIKE OUR HSNKI FINAL ACT, INNATL LAW

PAGE THREE PC00087 CONF

RECOGNIZED ONLY STATES AND THEIR INTERESTS, NOT/NOT
INDIVIDUALS. AS ENLIGHTENED A PHILOSOPHER AS
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU COULD STATE: QUOTE ON FAIT LA GUERRE
AUX ETATS, NON AUX PEUPLES. UNQUOTE.

BUT WE RECOGNIZE NOW--INDEED EVERY CONTINENT
HAS EXPERIENCED IT PAINFULLY IN THIS CENTURY--THAT
WARS ARE WAGED ON PEOPLE, CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AS WELL
AS COMBATANTS, AND NOT/NOT ON INANIMATE STATES.

*"But whatever we might
have believed in the
past we recognize
now--"*

WE RECOGNIZE ALSO THAT IT WOULD NOT/NOT MAKE
SENSE, IN A NUCLEAR AGE, TO DEBATE STRATEGIES FOR

"Nor does it make sense."

VICTORY, SINCE THERE IS LITTLE POSSIBILITY ANY VICTOR
WOULD EMERGE FROM THE ASHES OF A ^{"the left"}THIRD GLOBAL
CONFLICT. IF OUR EFFORTS TO SAFEGUARD PEACE ARE NOT/NOT
SUCCESSFUL, THERE WILL BE NO/NO WINNERS, ONLY LOSERS.

*"The vocabulary of victor +
vanquished has been
emptied of all meaning."*

THERE IS A WELL-KNOWN LATIN MAXIM THAT STATES:
QUOTE QUI DESIDERAT PACEM, PRAEPARET BELLUM UNQUOTE.
(LET HE WHO DESIRES PEACE, PREPARE FOR WAR.)
(VEGETIUS, 4TH C. A.D.)

THE PRINCIPLE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS
FOUNDED UPON THAT MAXIM. BUT IS THERE NOT/NOT A DANGER OF
BECOMING SO PREPARED FOR WAR, PSYCHOLOGICALLY AS WELL
AS MILITARILY, THAT WE LOSE SIGHT OF THE PROSPECTS OF
PEACE?

...4

PAGE FOUR PC00087 CONF

THE WHOLE WORLD IS NOW CONFRONTED WITH THE
FEARFUL REALITIES OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THE
PERSPECTIVE OF GLOBAL DISASTER MAKES IT COMPELLING FOR
US, POLITICAL LEADERS, TO FACE THE SITUATION BOLDLY.
WE CANNOT/NOT AFFORD TO HIDE BEHIND POLITICAL BOMBAST.

NEVER HAVE WE HAD SO MANY REASONS TO STOP

(added) KILLING EACH OTHER. NEVER HAVE WE HAD SO MANY REASONS
TO FEEL A SENSE OF COMMON PURPOSE. EITHER THIS
GENERATION OF LEADERS TAKES EFFECTIVE ACTION TO REDUCE
THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENT THEIR SPREAD,
OR WE BEQUEATH TO OUR CHILDREN A FUTURE WHERE THE
CHANCES OF GLOBAL DESTRUCTION INCREASE EVERY DAY.

MR PRESIDENT, YOU AND I ARE BOTH AWARE OF
OUR IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES.
OUR COUNTRIES ARE MEMBERS OF OPPOSING MILITARY
ALLIANCES. BUT WE BOTH KNOW THAT WE CAN TRANSCEND OUR
(added) DIFFERENCES. IT IS THOSE THINGS WHICH UNITE US THAT
MATTER, NOT/NOT THOSE THAT DIVIDE US.

*"we cannot pretend that
no differences exist between
our two countries. We
embrace different political
& econ. ideologies."*

AS MEDIUM-SIZE POWERS, WE CANNOT/NOT PRETEND TO
BE OR TO BECOME KEY PLAYERS IN THE DISARMAMENT DEBATE.
THE TWO SUPERPOWERS ARE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
(added) CURRENT ARMS RACE AND IT IS ESSENTIALLY UP TO THEM TO
STOP THE NUCLEAR ESCALATION.

*"and they have the means, if they
chose to use them, to negotiate a reversal."*

...5

PAGE FIVE PC00087 CONF

(added) HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT/NOT MEAN THAT WE SHOULD
SET ASIDE OUR SENSE OF IDEALISM AND RENOUNCE ANY EFFORT
TO BRING ABOUT PEACE TO THIS GENERATION. IN COMING TO
BUCST AND OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS, MY PURPOSE IS TO
BUILD UPON AN ESTABLISHED TRADITION OF CONSULTATION ON
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERNS. (cut) "The process has been going on for some

BUT I SENSE THAT THE MOMENTUM OF CONSULTATION
HAS BEEN LOST. IT IS MY HOPE THAT, THROUGH DIRECT
PERSONAL CONTACT, THE LEADERS OF EAST AND WEST CAN ONCE
AGAIN BRING DIRECTION AND DETERMINATION TO THE
CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.

time now, particularly
through such fora as the
OSCE."

"We need to make"

A DETERMINED EFFORT MUST ALSO BE MADE TO
IMPLEMENT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HSNKI FINAL ACT
CALLING FOR INCREASED PERSONAL CONTACTS AND FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. FOR NOTHING BREEDS
MUTUAL FEAR AND SUSPICION AS MUCH AS ISOLATION. A
COUNTRY THAT ISOLATES ITSELF FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD
EXPOSES ITSELF TO CRUEL DISAPPOINTMENTS.

WE MUST, IN SHORT, BRING ABOUT A FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGE IN ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS. BECAUSE A DURABLE
PEACE CANNOT/NOT BE BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON NUMERICAL OR
TECHNICAL ADJUSTMENTS, HOWEVER SIGNIFICANT, TO MILITARY
STOCKPILES. SUCH A PEACE WOULD BE PRECARIOUS INDEED.

(added)

...6

PAGE SIX PC00087 CONF

MR PRESIDENT, I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT
CDA AND ROMANIA HAVE A HISTORY OF FRUITFUL
COOPERATION, AND NOT/NOT ONLY IN BILATERAL FIELDS. INDEED,
WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER ON INNATL ISSUES OF
PEACE, SECURITY, AND DISARMAMENT THROUGH SUCH FORA AS
THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE CTTEE ON
DISARMAMENT, AND THE CSCE.

I AM HEARTENED, MR PRESIDENT, BY THE FACT
"although our approaches are different, our objectives are similar :"
THAT WE SHARE SIMILAR OBJECTIVES: TO REDUCE
INNATL TENSIONS, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN EAST AND
WEST, AND TO CREATE AN INNATL CLIMATE OF PEACE
IN WHICH SECURITY AND PROSPERITY FOR ALL NATIONS
BECOMES AN ATTAINABLE GOAL.

PERMIT ME TO PROPOSE A TOAST, MR PRESIDENT,
TO YOU, TO CONTINUED FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN
CDA AND ROMANIA, AND TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR
EFFORTS FOR GLOBAL PEACE. UNQUOTE. TEXT ENDS.

CCC/204 272100Z PC00087

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MF
2

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELDAVOS PMDL0017 27JAN84

TO EXTOTT/IDBZ/DELVOIE ONLY DELIVER BY 271500

INFO MOSCO/AMB ROBERTS ONLY WSHDC/AMB GOTLIEB ONLY NATO/AMB
TAYLOR ONLY

DISTR DMF/MARCHAND ONLY IFB/SHENSTONE ONLY RBR/MAWHINNEY/MACE

---PM VISIT-MSG FROM MOSCO

PM PERSONALLY HAS INSTRUCTED THAT INFO CONTAINED BELOW IS NOT/NOT
TO BE RELAYED TO ANYONE ELSE(CDN OR ALLY)UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.
THIS MAY COME AT END OF VISIT TO BUCST BY WHICH TIME WE WILL
HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO ANALYZE IT IN CONTEXT OF WHAT,IF ANYTHING
ELSE,IS LEARNED IN EAST BERLIN AND BUCST.

2.AT PRAGUE AIRPORT LAST EVENING(JAN26)PRIOR TO DEPARTURE
CZECH PM STROUGAL HAD HALF HOUR TETE-A-TETE WITH PM TRUDEAU.
STROUGAL SAID THAT WHAT PM HAD TOLD THEM IN PRAGUE DURING
DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO LEADERSHIP OF WSAW PACT QUOTE
SO THAT THOSE WHO SHOULD KNOW,DO KNOW UNQUOTE.LEADERSHIP WAS
VERY SUPPORTIVE OF TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE AND MSG AND WERE OF
OPINION PM SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED.THEY WERE QUOTE VERY HAPPY
UNQUOTE WITH WAY IN WHICH TALKS HAD GONE IN PRAGUE.

3.STROUGAL THEN SAID HE HAD RECEIVED QUOTE MSG DIRECT FROM MOSCO
UNQUOTE WHICH HE HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO PASS TO PM.AUTHORITIES
IN USSR WANTED PM TO KNOW THAT HE STILL WAS VERY WELCOME IN
MOSCO,THAT THEY WANTED HIM VERY MUCH TO COME,BUT THAT PRES
ANDROPOVS HEALTH WAS QUOTE VERY SERIOUS UNQUOTE AND IN HIS
PRESENT CONDITION HE COULD NOT/NOT RECEIVE PM.PRESIDENT WAS

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PAGE TWO PMDL0017 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

SUFFERING FROM DIABETES WHICH HAS BROUGHT ON OTHER COMPLICATIONS SUCH AS KIDNEY TROUBLES. ONE PARTICULAR PROBLEM WAS WITH PRESIDENTS QUOTE MOVEMENT UNQUOTE (PM TRUDEAU SAID IT WAS NOT/NOT CLEAR WHETHER STROUGAL WAS REFERRING TO ANDROPOVS MOBILITY OR BOWEL MOVEMENT). STROUGAL ADDED THAT THIS INFO ON ANDROPOVS HEALTH WAS BEING PASSED TO TRUDEAU QUOTE IN STRICT CONFIDENCE UNQUOTE. TRUDEAU WOULD HAVE TO WAIT 6-8 WEEKS BEFORE HE COULD SEE ANYONE IN MOSCO. WHEN THAT TIME CAME, IF ANDROPOV COULD NOT/NOT SEE HIM, THEN OTHER MEMBERS OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD SEE HIM. TRUDEAU SAID STROUGAL DELIVERED ABOVE MSG IN QUOTE PALLBEARER TONE UNQUOTE.

4. STROUGAL WENT ON TO DELIVER EULOGY OF ANDROPOV, ABOUT HOW HE FELT ANDROPOV WAS PRAGMATIC AND WANTED TO GIVE NEW DIRECTION IN USSR ON BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY FRONTS, ANDROPOV WAS QUOTE VERY PROGRESSIVE IN INNATL RELATIONS UNQUOTE. ANDROPOV HAD STARTED WELL BUT NOW, ALTHOUGH HIS MIND WAS WELL, HIS BODY WOULD ALLOW HIM TO WORK QUOTE ONLY FEW HOURS EACH DAY UNQUOTE.

5. STROUGAL REFERRED TO ANDROPOVS LATEST APPEAL STRESSING THAT SOVIETS WANTED REAL MOVEMENT. HE PREDICATED THAT NOT/NOT IN JAN, FEB OR MAR BUT QUOTE IN FIRST HALF OF THIS YEAR UNQUOTE THAT MOSCO WOULD FIND ITS WAY CLEAR TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GENEV. MOSCO WOULD BE LOOKING FOR SOME QUOTE FACE-SAVING DEVICE UNQUOTE PERHAPS BY MERGING INF/START PACKAGE OF CSBMS THAT NATO HAD TABLED IN STKHM WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS HAD BEEN WELCOMED IN

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MOSCO.THERE WAS ENOUGH IN NATO PACKAGE TO SHOW WEST WANTED
MOVEMENT-THIS WAS QUOTE QUITE ENCOURAGING UNQUOTE.O MBFR,STROUGAL
SAID WPO WAS PREPARED TO MAKE QUOTE FURTHER PROPOSALS UNQUOTE IF
NECESSARY TO SHOW THEIR GOOD FAITH.HE HOPED THAT IN SOME WAY NATO
WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO SHOW ITS GOOD FAITH TOO,PARTICULARLY IN
FIELD OF NUCLEAR ARMS,MAYBE BY AGREING TO COMBINE INF/START.
(STROUGAL DID NOT/NOT STIPULATE THAT NATO HAD TO RETURN TO STATUS-
QUOTE ANTE ON INF).

6.STROUGAL SAID HE HAD STAYED BEHIND AFTER PMS MTG WITH PRES
HUSAK.THEY HAD BOTH BEEN IMPRESSED BY EARNESTNESS AND SERIOUSNESS
OF TRUDEAUS MSG.DIALOGUE WAS NECESSARY.SHULTZ-GROMYKO MTG HAD
BEEN USEFUL.STROUGAL REPEATED THAT HE WANTED PM TO KNOW THAT
THEY STILL HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT WESTERN INTENTIONS BUT THEY
WERE NOW ENCOURAGED BY WHAT THEY HAD HEARD FROM HIM AND BY
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

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INFO PMOOTT/JOHNSON/COLEMAN/DURDIN PCOOTT/FOWLER RCMPOTT/5VIP

WSAW BUCST TT 437 SQN TRENTON DE CAF

DISTR IDDZ RBR

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE

PM AND DEL ARRIVED DAVOS AS SCHEDULED 26JAN.PM ACCOMMODATED AT
BELVEDERE HOTEL PHONE(083)21281,DEL OFFICE ROOM 247.

2.DEPARTING DAVOS 30JAN FOR ZURICH.DEPARTING ZURICH 1500 FOR
EASTBERLIN.

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