

CLASSIFIED

File No. Dossier 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
Volume 13 From-De 83-12-01 To-À 83-12-05

CLASSIFIÉ
MGID

2003

ACCESS TO INFORMATION
L'ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION
EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR
DATE
E. Kelly
Apr. 20/06
VOLS ACCESSION NO. 18823

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES (

DESARMEMENT
MESURES
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

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Retention period-Période de retention:

20Yrs (7A-13D) J

DUMMY ACC:98-28

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DEPARTMENT
OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

SEMI ACTIVE
CLOSED
TERMINAL

2003



Government of Canada
Gouvernement du Canada

CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM À COMPTER DU	83-12-01	TO JUSQU'AU	83-12-05
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AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR	
FILE NO. - DOSSIER N° 28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission	VOLUME 14

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned 1DDZ

Person CF

Local Time 130

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM WSHDC UNGR2494 05DEC83
TO EXTOTT 1DDZ UGB FLASH
INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR URR DMF IFB USS
---PMS VISIT TO WSHDC

RETURN TO RENNVOYER AU		0100	FOR FILING FOUR - ETRE PORTE AU DOSSIER
ACC	REF	DATE	
FILE		DOSSIER	
08-6-1-Trudeau		Peace	
Mission			

MTG TODAY WITH JIM MEDAS PRODUCED CONFUSED PICTURE RE POSSIBILITIES
FOR PMS VISIT TO WSHDC.

2. IT TURNS OUT USA IS PROPOSING A ONE HOUR SUBSTANTIVE MTG NOT/NOT
AS PREVIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD A WORKING LUNCH. MEDAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT USA
HAD PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED IDEA OF WORKING LUNCH BUT SAID THAT WAS NOT/
NOT THE PROPOSAL. IN MEDAS VIEW SOLID ONE HOUR SUBSTANTIVE MTG (WHICH
HE SAID WAS DEPARTURE FROM PRESIDENTS PRACTICE OF 20 MINUTE MTGS) IS
WHAT INITIATIVE DESERVES MORE THAN THE KIND OF LESS CONCENTRATED FORM
TALK THAT WOULD GO WITH A LUNCH.

3. DATES USA IS NOW PROPOSING FALL INTO THREE CATEGORIES:

CATEGORY 1: MOST DESIRABLE. TIME AVAILABLE IS PRIME TIME I.E. 11:00 A.M.
THESE DATES ARE 13, 14, 15 DEC. WE SAID 13 DEC IS NOT/NOT POSSIBLE.

CATEGORY 2: LESS DESIRABLE TIMES AVAILABLE WERE DESCRIBED AS QUOTE
CATCH AS CATCH CAN UNQUOTE. THESE DATES ARE 19, 21 AND 23 DEC.

CATEGORY 3: QUOTE COMPLICATED UNQUOTE BUT MEDAS CLD. NOT/NOT DISMISS
THEM AS ALTOGETHER IMPOSSIBLE. TIME AVAILABLE IS NOW LESS THAN ONE
HOUR AT INCONVENIENT TIMES. THESE DATES ARE 16 AND 20 DEC.

4. MEDAS SAID TIME AVAILABLE TO BOOK THESE TIMES WAS VERY LIMITED AND
RESPONSE REQUIRED TODAY. PLS ADVISE ASAP.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2494 CONF

5. AS YOU MAY EXPECT, WE ALLOWED AS TO HOW THESE THINGS WERE ALWAYS COMPLICATED TO WORK OUT BUT THAT THEIR OFFERING 20 AND 16 DEC TO OTHERS AT SAME TIME HAD PERHAPS MADE IT MORE SO. MTG OF AN HOUR AT MID-DAY WLD SEEM PRODUCTIVE FOR PM TRUDEAU AND PRES REAGAN TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF SUCH IMPORTANCE. ANYTHING LESS WLD BE MUCH LESS PRODUCTIVE IN SUBSTANCE AND IN ALL HONESTY WLD BE PRESENTATIONALLY AWKWARD FROM SEVERAL POINTS OF VIEW.

CCC/086 251801Z UNGR2494

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

R E S T R I C T E D

FM POECD WFGR3729 05DEC83

TO EXTOTT L IDR

INFO PARIS WSHDC BNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL

DISTR IFB RGB RCD IDD IDZ IDR EER

REF JENKINS/SMITH TELECON 02DEC

---SEC WEINBERGER ON PMS INITIATIVE

WEINBERGER SPOKE TO ATLANTIC INSTITUTE FOR INNATL AFFAIRS IN PARIS
02DEC.SPEECH AND QUESTION PERIOD THAT FOLLOWED WERE ON RECORD AND
WIDELY COVERED BY EUROPEAN AND USA JOURNALISTS.

2.SPEECH CONTAINED NO/NO SURPRISES AND IS SUMMARIZED IN 03DEC ISSUE
INNATL HEPALD TRIBUNE.COMMON THREAD THROUGH HIS REMARKS WAS NEED
TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH.IN HIS VIEW PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL
NEGOTIATIONS BETTER NOW THAN EVER.SOVIET RETURN TO NEGOTIATING TABLE
WOULD BE QUOTE PERHAPS MATTER OF MONTHS UNQUOTE.

2.PARTICIPANT IN ATLANTIC INSTITUTE SEMINAR WEINBERGER WAS
ADDRESSING ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT OF PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE.
WEINBERGER REPLIED HE WAS NOT/NOT FAMILIAR WITH ITS DETAILS.HE
KNEW CDN PM HAD BEEN TRAVELLING IN A QUOTE QUEST FOR PEACE UNQUOTE.
WEINBERGER COULD QUOTE SUPPORT ANY QUEST FOR PEACE UNQUOTE.

3.WEINBERGER RESPONSE DID NOT/NOT PROVOKE ANY FURTHER QUESTION ON
PMS INITIATIVE AND AS FAR AS WE KNOW HAS NOT/NOT BEEN PICKED UP
IN FRENCH PRESS OR USA PRESS IN EUROPE.

CCC/027 051539Z WFGR3729

28-6-1- TRUDEAU PEACE
MISSION
20 1 1 1
2 1 9

Mr. ~~Frans~~ (O/R)
Stille
6/12/83



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

MGTC/DIARY/CHRON/CIRC/FILE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 5 DEC 83 17 44 72 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT PER0492 05DEC83

TO/A TO LDN **IMMED**

INFO
DISTR DISTR IDDZ

REF REF IDDZ TEL 0242 02DEC

SUBJ/SUBJ ---PM INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH US AND UK

GRATEFUL YOU PASS REFTEL ASAP TO PER/DAVIDSON ATTENDING INTELLIGENCE
CONSULTATIONS IN LDN BEGINNING TODAY.

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

FILE

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG RP MCDUGALL

PER

6-1989

SIG for R.H. DAVIDSON



EG52

MGTC M-FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

6 DEC 83 01 18Z 12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0247 05DEC83

TO/À

TO BNATO/DELVOIE PRIORITY

INFO

DISTR

INFO PC00TT/FOWLER

REF

DISTR RGB UGB URR RCR

SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE

FLWG POINTS WERE ADDED TO BRIEFS PREPARED FOR THE SSEA/SHULTZ AND

SSEA/HOWE BILATERALS:

2.COMCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACHED QUOTE OUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE ...
TO UNQUOTE.

28-6-1- Hudson
Peace
Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG G. SMITH

- 2 -

- Proposal envisages state-to-state rather than bloc-to-bloc negotiations. Aggregation of British and French forces with those of United States is not implied. Indeed, proposal if accepted would erase any prospect of aggregation.
- While the Prime Minister has suggested that these negotiations begin as soon as possible during course of next year, it is not intended that such talks occur without adequate preparation at lower levels, or that such talks should take place precipitously.

Our impressions of the "neutral" Soviet response were:

- NOTE*
- (a) The visit of Mr. Trudeau's emissary occurred the day after Andropov's statement of November 24 on INF. Although Gromyko and Kornienko said they had read the PMS statements and followed his actions closely their "neutral" response to his proposals may be due to a "policy review" which they hinted may be underway on INF, the results of which are not yet clear. It may be they will harden their response ~~of this~~ ^{IF THEY} and draw the conclusion that their message has not "registered" in the West.
 - (b) Uncertainty over Andropov's health overshadows all their decisions; one Soviet interlocutor told us Andropov's illness was "painful", but not serious and that he was only able to do business by telephone. It was suggested that he might be able to return to work in a minimum role sometime after December 20.
 - (c) They would welcome a Trudeau visit, but timing is a problem (due to Andropov's health). Gromyko appeared to be almost pleading that we not press them immediately to set a date; sometime early in January may be possible.

- 3 -

- (d) They will not want to do anything to improve the chances of President Reagan's re-election;
- (e) They do not think it possible to have a rational relationship with the US when the US views them as the concentration of evil. The Soviets will view the PM's initiative through the "prism" of this American attitude to them.
- (f) They did not threaten to pull out of any other negotiations although on START Kornienko said INF deployment has changed the strategic situation because the missiles in Europe which reach the USSR are the same missiles based in the USA, from the Soviet point of view.

UNQUOTE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

5 DEC 83 21 31Z 10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0246 05DEC83

TO/À

TO PEKING

INFO

DISTR

FOR GAUVIN

REF

FROM
---PERSONAL MSG

SUBJ/SUJ

SORRY AND THANKS FOR QUICK ACTION. MY FEET WERE OBVIOUSLY NOT/NOT ON
GROUND. BEST REGARDS.

PEARSON

28-6-1-1 Nuclear Peace
mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

G. Pearson / SG
SIG

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

[Signature]

file

CONFIDENTIAL

December 5, 1983

IDDZ-0245

MEMORANDUM TO MR. R. R. FOWLER

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace mission

Reference: PMDEL LDN telegrams 8543 and 8544 of December 5

Subject: PM Initiative: Next Steps

On the basis of your first telegram under reference and of debriefings which I have had with Geoffrey Pearson and Gary Smith, I think that it is necessary that the Task Force and senior officials of the Department of External Affairs get together with the Prime Minister as soon as possible to discuss the next steps in the Prime Minister's initiative. In view of the fact that the Prime Minister will be fully taken up with domestic affairs this week and that both de Montigny Marchand and I will be absent in Europe over the next few days, I would suggest that we aim for a meeting on or after December 14.

On reading your two telegrams under reference, it would appear that there has been some breakdown in communications between the Prime Minister's Delegation and Ottawa regarding the objectives which Mr. MacEachen will be pursuing at the NATO Ministerial Meeting this week. Taking as our base the letters which the Prime Minister sent to NATO Heads of Government on November 17, Mr. MacEachen and we have been operating on the understanding that he will be pursuing the Prime Minister's initiative on two fronts in Brussels, i.e. the CDE and the MBFR negotiations. To the best of our understanding, it is not Mr. MacEachen's intention to raise formally with his NATO colleagues the question of a revision of NATO strategy. In view of my departure for Brussels within the next thirty minutes, the best I can offer to do personally is to show the text of your second telegram under reference to Mr. MacEachen, while suggesting that you discuss the matter with Gary Smith, who will be sitting in for me, immediately upon your return to Ottawa.

On points of substance, I believe it would be premature for Mr. MacEachen to raise the question of a review of NATO strategy at this Ministerial Meeting, especially in light of what we know of USA thinking and of


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- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

the views communicated to the Prime Minister by several European leaders regarding the timing of his initiative. As to the possibility of holding a NATO Summit in Canada in the spring, you should know that the only country to have semi-declared itself as a possible host for the spring NATO Ministerial Meeting is the USA. American domestic political realities may well dictate that the USA fight hard to host the spring meeting, whether at Ministerial or Head-of-Government level.

I hope we will have an opportunity to discuss the longer term aspects of "next steps" on my return from Brussels December 11.



L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: PCO/Osbaldeston

EA/DMF/IFB/IDR

DND/Anderson

CTION
SUITE A DONNER

Ref: *cc, to*
**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

*I F B
IDDZ/Smith
R*

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELLDN PMDL8543 05DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDD7/ONLY DELIVER BY 050900

INFO PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON/ARCHDEACON/ONLY

REF WSHDCTEL UNGR2492 02DEC

---INITIATIVE;MESSAGE FROM PM TO DPM/SSEA IN ADVANCE OF NATO
MINISTERIAL

AT LUNCH BETWEEN KUWAIT AND LDN,PM HAD OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS NEXT
STEPS WITH MASSE,SHENSTONE AND FOWLER.PM WAS SORRY TO LEARN HE
WOULD NOT/HAVE OCCASION TO DISCUSS WITH DPM/SSEA ON MONDAY
DECEMBER 5 EVENING INITIATIVE STRATEGY AND TACTICS FOR THE NATO
MTG(INCLUDING MEETING WITH SHULTZ DECEMBER 9).HOWEVER,HE BELIEVES
IT IS VITAL THAT HIS AND MACEACHENS THINKING BE CONGRUENT FOR THIS
KEY NEXT STEP.HE IS NOT/NOT,OF COURSE,AWARE OF WHAT ARE DPM/SSFAS
PLANS FOR MEETING;ALTHOUGH WE HAVE,OF COURSE,SHOWN HIM SUCH
TELEGRAPHIC TRAFFIC AS WE RECEIVED RELATIVE TO PREPARATIONS FOR
NATO MINISTERIAL AND SHULTZ BILATERAL(NB WSHDC REYTEL 2492 OF 2 DEC
83).HE UNDERSTANDS DPM/SSEA WILL PROMOTE INITIATIVE,GIVE ACCOUNT
OF PROGRESS TO DATE,URGE ON ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP HIS VIEW THAT
POLITICAL VIGOUR MUST BE INJECTED INTO EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP
(STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF HIGH LEVEL CDE OPENING JANUARY 19 AND
EVENTUAL MBFR MEETING)STRESS IMPORTANCE OF BRINGING EARLY SIGNIFICANT
POSITIVE CHANGE TO TREND LINE IN SUPER POWER RELATIONS AND ABOVE
ALL,SUGGEST/PROPOSE NEED FOR EARLY NEW LOOK AT NATO STRATEGY.(WHILE,

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PAGE TWO PMDL8543 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

NOT/NOT OF COURSE IMPLYING ANY DISAGREEMENT WITH DEPLOYMENT NOW IN PROGRESS), NEEDLESS TO SAY PM HOPES MACHEACHEN AND BLAIS MIGHT RETURN FROM NATO MEETING WITH INFO REGARDING STATE OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP WHICH WILL ASSIST WITH PLANNING FOR TOUCHING THE MOSCOW BASE.

2. PM HOPED TO CALL DPM/SSEA IN BRUSSELS SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN TO OTTAWA DEC 5 BUT APPRECIATES LITTLE USEFUL CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED OVER NON/NON SECURE LINE.

3. HE HAS ASKED, THEREFORE, THAT YOU DRAFT MESSAGE FROM HIM TO SSEA IN BRUSSELS WHICH WOULD HIGHLIGHT HIS OWN VIEW OF IMPORTANCE OF THESE OBJECTIVES AS WELL AS ANY OTHERS YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE. PM WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER DRAFT ON TUESDAY AM (BEFORE CABINET AT 11:00 AM).

4. WE ARE PASSING BALL TO YOU AS WE ARE SIMPLY NOT/NOT AWARE OF WHAT DPM/SSEA MAY HAVE IN MIND OR HOW HE HAS BEEN BRIEFED. WHILE PM IN NO/NO WAY WISHES TO SUGGEST TO DPM/SSEA THE OBVIOUS, HE NEVERTHELESS WANTS MR MACEACHEN TO BE AWARE HOW IMPORTANT PM CONSIDERS NATO MINISTERIAL WILL BE TO FUTURE OF INITIATIVE. INCIDENTALLY, PM IS CONSIDERING SENDING SECOND LETTER TO NATO LEADERS, FOLLOWING MINISTERIAL WHICH WOULD PROVIDE UPDATE ON INITIATIVE AND FULLER DETAILS OF PM/SSEAS CALL FOR REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY.

CCC/253 050812Z PMDL8543

Ref to IFB
IBD2/Smith

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELLDN PMDL8544 05DEC83

TO EXTOTT/IDD7 DELIVER BY 050900

INFO PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON/ARCHDEACON WSHDC BNATO MOSCO BONN PARIS LDN
PEKIN

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDA IDD IDR UGB

REF WSHDC UNGR2492 02DEC

---INITIATIVE;NEXT STEPS

AS YOU ARE AWARE,PM HAS AGREED TO SEE REAGAN FOR MTG AND LUNCH ON
(A)TUESDAY DECEMBER 20 OR FRIDAY(DEC 16).(INCIDENTALLY,HE DID NOT/NOT
AGREE,AS NOTED IN REFTTEL EVEN QUOTE IN REAL EXTREMIS UNQUOTE TO
HAVING DEC 13(DAY OF HIS MAJOR TORONTO SPEECH)PUT TO AMERICANS.
GRATEFUL IF EMB WSHDC COULD CLARIFY THIS ASAP WITH AMERICANS).
FURTHER TO DELVOIE/SMITH SUGGESTION IN FOWLER/SMITH/DELVOIR TELCON
DEC 2,PM AGREES IF REAGAN MTG IS SECURED FOR DEC 20.TO LEAVE WHITE
HOUSE FOR NYORK WHERE HE HOPED HE MIGHT MEET WITH UN SEC GEN LATER
THAT AFTERNOON.IN THIS CASE HE WOULD REMAIN THAT NIGHT IN NYORK AND
WOULD BE PREPARED TO RECORD INTERVIEW WITH ABC OR NBC MORNING SHOW
DEC 21 BEFORE RETURNING TO OTTAWA.WERE PRESIDENT REAGAN TO SELECT
OPTION OF DEC 16,PM WOULD RETURN DIRECTLY TO OTTAWA FROM WHITE
HOUSE,LEAVING SEC GEN AND US TV TO LATER DATE;POSSIBLY MID-JANUARY.
2.PM AGREES THAT BY END DEC WE SHOULD BE IN POSITION TO A)CONFIRM
ATTENDANCE AT DAVOS SYMPOSIUM(JAN27-29),TOWARDS WHICH HE IS LEANING,
B)DECIDE AT LEAST TENTATIVELY WHETHER JAN VISIT TO MOSCOW WOULD BE
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PAGE TWO PMDL8544 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

FEASIBLE, PRODUCTIVE AND DESIRABLE. (IF VIEW THEN IS THAT HE OUGHT TO GO (AND HE DOES NOT/NOT SEE HOW INITIATIVE COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED UNLESS HE DOES GO SOMETIME IN NOT/NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE), THEN HE MIGHT CONSIDER MAKING TRIP TO MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING DAVOS, SAY JAN 30/31. (COMMENT: BUOYED BY OUR SUCCESS IN KEEPING PEKING TRIP FROM PRESS FOR ONE FULL WEEK WE ARE NOW RASH ENOUGH TO HOPE WE CAN KEEP THIS TYPE OF PLANNING INFO SECRET. GRATEFUL YOUR EVERY ASSISTANCE)).

3. PM WILL BE VISITING NYORK TO ATTEND NAC PERFORMANCE OF QUOTE RENALDO UNQUOTE AT MET ON JAN 19. IF SEC GEN AND AMERICAN TV INTERVIEW HAD NOT/NOT BEEN FACTORED IN TO DEC 20 TRIP TO MEET REAGAN. THEN PM WOULD CONSIDER SCHEDULING THEM JAN 19/20 IN NYORK. HIS PREFERENCE WOULD BE, AS STATED EARLIER, TO DO THESE EVENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH DEC TRIP, AND TO FACTOR SPEECH III INTO JAN VISIT TO NYORK. PM APPRECIATES NEED FOR PUBLIC YET PRESTIGIOUS VENUE (AND, YET ANOTHER BLOCK BUSTER SPEECH). GRATEFUL YOU EXPLORE WITH CNGNY, EMB WSHDC AND UGB POSSIBLE OPTIONS ALONG WITH OUTLINE FOR SPEECH TO BE THE SUBJECT OF EARLY MEMO. SPEECH COULD THUS BE SCHEDULED EITHER AT LUNCH ON THURSDAY JAN 19 OR AT LUNCH FRIDAY JAN 20 FOLLOWING WHICH HF WILL LIKELY FLY TO VANCOUVER WHERE HE WILL GIVE DINNER FOR VISITING PRC PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG.

4. REGARDING HALF QUOTE END GAME SCENARIO UNHALF QUOTE, WE DISCUSSED VARIOUS OPTIONS INCLUDING (A) ENDING INITIATIVE WITH SPEECH III

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PAGE THREE PMDL8544 CDN EYES ONLY

(NOT/NOT ENOUGH)PARTICIPATION IN SORT OF CONSCIOUSNESS RAISING GROUP TRAVEL SUGGESTED BY KAUNDA AT CHOQM(WELL NIGH IRRELEVANT TO CURRENT EXERCISE)(C)PARTICIPATION IN EFFORTS OF PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR WORLD ORDER(AGAIN NOT/NOT ENOUGH AND NOT/NOT NOW TO BE PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED)AND(D)CONVENING OF CANCUN TYPE OF ENCOUNTER AMONG 15-25 COUNTRIES,INCLUDING FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS-PERHAPS IN CANADA,IN MONTEFELLO,IN SPRING(TOO IMPRECISE,TOO LITTLE TIME TO ORGANIZE,TOO UNCERTAIN OF OUTCOME).MOST ATTRACTIVE SUGGESTION DISCUSSED WAS POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING NATO SUMMIT IN EARLY SPRING IN CANADA TO CONSIDER THE PARAMETERS FOR THE REVISION OF NATO STRATEGY WHICH DPM/SSEA WILL PROPOSE AT THIS WEEK'S NATO MINISTERIAL.

5.WHILE NOT/NOT DISCUSSED IN DETAIL,BUT STILL VERY MUCH IN PMS MIND, AS AT LEAST ONE POSSIBLE END TO EXERCISE WOULD BE PUBLIC ENUNCIATION OF STATEMENT OF AGREED PRINCIPLES BETWEEN SUPER POWERS ALONG LINES PROPOSED BY HEAD AT WILSON HOUSE.

CCC/253 050812Z PMDL8544

file

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
mission

CONFIDENTIAL

December 5, 1983

IDDZ-0244

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R. R. Fowler)

Initiative: East-West Relations - Soviet Perspective

We attach for your information two interesting assessments of the current Soviet perspective on East-West relations, which were prepared at our request by Robert Ford and Peter Roberts. The final paragraphs of both papers are directly relevant to the future of your initiative on East-West relations and international security.

L. A. Delvoie
L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: PCO/Osbaldeston

IFB/Shenstone

DND/Anderson

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PARIS WIGR5417 30NOV83

TO EXTOTT RBR DEL BY 300900

DISTR MINA LIDDZ IDR RBRD

REF YOURTEL RBR2687 25NOV OURTEL WIGR5400 28NOV

--- FROM SPECIAL ADVISER ON EAST WEST RELATIONS: EST-WEST RELATIONS:

SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

FROM SOVIET POINT OF VIEW DEVELOPMENTS MUST BE PROCEEDING AS THEY EXPECTED SINCE THEY SURELY GAVE UP HOPE SOME MONTHS AGO THAT THEY COULD STOP DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES IN EUROPE AND SINCE AN AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT US MISSILES WOULD HAVE CUT GROUND FROM BENEATH FEET OF PEACE MOVEMENT. IT WOULD, IN SOVIET AND PEACE MOVEMENT PERSPECTIVE, HAVE SANCTIONED SOMETHING THEY BOTH HAD VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED. SUSPENSION OF GENEVA TALKS AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SOVIET MISSILES AS COUNTER-MEASURE SIMPLY HAD TO BE CARRIED OUT TO MAKE SOVIET POSITION AND THREATS CREDIBLE.

2. WHAT HAPPENS NOW IS GOING TO BE COMPLICATED BY UNCERTAIN HEALTH OF ANDROPOV. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE BELIEVED FOR SOME TIME THAT HIS POWER IS LIMITED AND HIS REGIME TRANSITIONAL. HE HAS NOT HAD THE TIME TO COUNTER HIS RELIANCE ON THE KGB AND MILITARY BY BUILDING HIS OWN POWER BASE IN THE PARTY STRUCTURE AND HIS FAILING HEALTH MUST MAKE THIS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO DO. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO THINK IN TERMS OF THE MILITARY RUNNING

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PAGE TWO WIGR5417 CONF

THINGS. AS SOME ANALYSTS SEEM TO BELIEVE, THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT ANDROPOV'S POLITICAL POSITION DEPENDS ON THEIR SUPPORT AND THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THEIR INFLUENCE HAS INEVITABLY INCREASED. IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO TAKE ANY DECISIONS WHICH WERE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED BY MILITARY.

3. GIVEN THE MOOD THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MUST NOW BE IN, I THINK IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THERE CAN BE ANY PROPER APPRECIATION OF WESTERN ANALYSIS OF HOW CRISIS HAS DEVELOPED. THE WESTERN LOGIC OF HOW US HAD TO RESPOND TO DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF ENTIRE NEW GENERATION OF WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND LATER IN ASIA CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY THEM NOW. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN EARLIER ON BUT BY NOW FEAR, ANGER AND EMOTION HAVE, I AM SURE, QUITE BECLOUDED THEIR JUDGMENT.

4. ADDED TO THIS IS THE NEW EXPERIENCE OF HAVING TO DEAL WITH AN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WHICH IS IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED AND DETERMINED TO STRENGTHEN AMERICAN MILITARY MIGHT. WHILE THEY HAVE IN THE PAST BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO AMERICAN ELECTION RHETORIC, THE WAY IN WHICH THE AMERICAN LEADERS HAVE ADDRESSED SOVIET LEADERSHIP NOT ONLY TOUCHED ON RAW NERVES, REINFORCED THEIR CONSTANT FEELING OF INFERIORITY VIS-A-VIS THE US, GAVE THEM THE IMPRESSION THAT USHDC WAS NOT PREPARED TO TREAT WITH THEM AS EQUALS, BUT REINFORCED THEIR HABITUAL PREOCCUPATION WITH THE FEAR THAT THE USA DID REALLY

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PAGE THREE WIGR5417 CONF

INTEND TO SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

5. IT IS POINTLESS TO SAY THAT MUCH OF THIS WAS DUE TO SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THE IDEOLOGICAL ROLE, ON THEIR UNCOMMITTING DRIVE TO INCREASE AND IMPROVE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND THEIR ANTI-WESTERN ACTIVITIES IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD. THEY ARE SIMPLY BLIND TO THIS JUST AS MANY IN THE WEST ARE BLIND TO LEGITIMATE SOVIET PREOCCUPATIONS.

6. NOW THAT THE SITUATION HAS FURTHER DETERIORATED I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING ARE PRINCIPAL SOVIET CONCERNS.

7. FIRST AND FOREMOST, THEY DEFINITELY DO NOT/NOT WANT A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE USA AND I THINK THEY WILL BE CAREFUL NOT TO PROVOKE THE AMERICANS IN AREAS THEY CONSIDER OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE LATTER AND OF MARGINAL INTEREST TO THEMSELVES. I.E. LATIN AMERICA, SOUTHERN AFRICA ETC.

8. SECOND, ANY FAINT HOPE THAT THEY WOULD MODIFY THEIR POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN WILL DISAPPEAR. THEY ARE NOT/NOT GOING TO LEAVE AND THERE MAY EVEN BE AN INCREASED EFFORT TO CRUSH THE REBELS. SIMILARLY THEIR HOLD ON POLAND VIA JARUZELSKI WILL NOT BE LIFTED AND CONTROL OF EASTERN EUROPE REINFORCED.

9. THIRD, THE MAIN AREA OF ACTIVITY WILL BE WESTERN EUROPE. THEY WILL TRY, AS MEANS GIVE UP THEIR ATTEMPTS TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN USA AND ITS ALLIES. AFTER ALL THEIR MAIN FOREIGN POLICY AIM IN THE

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PAGE FOUR WIGR5417 CONF

LAST 40 YEARS HAS BEEN TO SECURE THE REMOVAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM EUROPE AND THE WEAKENING OF WESTERN EUROPE. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO PREVENT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE INF MISSILES THEY MUST CONSIDER THAT THEIR VERY PRESENCE IN EUROPE IS GOING TO PROVIDE THEM WITH A CONSTANT AND VERY PROMISING WEAPON FOR DIVIDING THE ALLIES. THE WEAPON OF FEAR HAS ALWAYS BEEN A STRONG ONE AND I IMAGINE IT WILL BE USED RUTHLESSLY AND SKILLFULLY. IF IT DOES NOT WORK THEY WILL HAVE LOST NOTHING.

10. THE FOURTH AREA OF MAJOR CONCERN MUST BE CHINA AND JAPAN -- THE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM AND OF BOTH WITH THE USA. IN SPITE OF THEIR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CHINA THEY CAN HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF ACCOMPLISHING MUCH IN THE PERIOD OF GREATEST DANGER WHICH LOOMS AHEAD. AND THE EMERGENCE OF JAPAN AS A MILITARY POWER ALLIED TO THE USA AND INDEED NATO AS A WHOLE INCREASES THE PROSPECT FOR THE SOVIETS THAT THE NIGHTMARE OF ENCIRCLEMENT WITH WHICH THEY HAVE FOR SO LONG FRIGHTENED THEMSELVES BECOMES MORE OF A REALITY.

11. THERE CONTINUES TO BE PERSUASIVE OBJECTIVE REASONS FOR SOVIETS TO SEEK A INF AGREEMENT -- THEIR REAL APPREHENSION ABOUT THE PERSHING II; THE SHIFT IN THE CO-RELATION OF FORCES, AS THEY SEE IT, IN FAVOUR OF THE WEST; AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES IN THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY. BUT OBJECTIVE FACTORS ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE VERY IMPORTANT

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PAGE FIVE WIGR5417 CONFD

IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IN THE FIRST PLACE A STRONG MAN AT THE HEAD OF THE STATE AND PARTY WOULD BE A NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR REVERSING OR MODIFYING THE PRESENT SITUATION, AND ANDROPOV IS CLEARLY NOT THE MAN. NOR IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT OF JOCKEYING FOR POWER IN THE NEXT SUCCESSION STAKES IS IT VERY LIKELY THAT RADICAL MODIFICATIONS CAN TAKE PLACE. THIS WILL THEREFORE MAKE IT PROBABLE THAT NO/NO REAL DIALOGUE CAN OCCUR UNTIL THE SOVIET POLITICAL SCENE IS CLEARER.

12. THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY ALSO TO CONSIDER THAT IT IS FUTILE TO TRY TO EFFECT A DEAL WITH REAGAN UNTIL US ELECTION PICTURE IS LESS OBSCURE, I.E. UNTIL HE TAKES DECISION ON RUNNING FOR SECOND TERM AND IN CASE OF AFFIRMATIVE WHETHER HE SEEMS LIKELY TO WIN. UNTIL THIS IS CLARIFIED, AND UNTIL THEIR EFFORTS TO SUBORN WESTERN EUROPE FAIL I SEE LITTLE CHANCE OF SOVIETS MODIFYING THEIR PRESENT STANCE. (I AM ASSUMING THAT WESTERN EUROPE WILL NOT/NOT SUCCEED TO SOVIET THREATS ON BLANDISHMENTS. IF SOVIETS ARE EVEN PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL IN WEAKENING WESTERN EUROPE'S RESOLVE THEN SOVIET TACTICS WILL HAPPEN).

13. THE DANGER IN THE COMING YEAR OR SO RESTS ON THE POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY IN THE USSR WHICH MAKES IT ALMOST INEVITABLE THAT THE MILITARY ELEMENT WILL REMAIN THE MAJOR FACTOR IN DETERMINING FOREIGN POLICY; SOVIET DETERMINATION TO DELAY NEW INITIATIVES UNTIL THEY

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PAGE SIX WIGR5417 CONF

SEE WITH WHOM THEY ARE GOING TO HAVE TO DEAL IN THE USA IN THE NEXT YEARS; AND A DELIBERATE STEPPING UP OF ACTIVITIES INTENDED TO WEAKEN WEST EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE IN THE TRANS-ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

14. SOVIET FRUSTRATION MUST BE ENORMOUS. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THEIR HISTORY THEY HAVE ACQUIRED MILITARY STRENGTH COMPARABLE TO THE UNITED STATES AND YET THEY FIND THEMSELVES UNABLE TO UTILIZE THIS TO ACHIEVE THE POLITICAL PARITY WITH USHDC THEY SO DESPERATELY DESIRE, OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO EXTEND SOVIET POLITICAL INFLUENCE GLOBALLY EXCEPT IN MARGINAL WAYS. AND YET, THEY HAVE TO MAKE OUT A WAY OF LIVING WITH THE AMERICANS SINCE ONLY THE USA IS COMMITTED TO THE CONTAINMENT OF SOVIET EXPANSION AND IS THEREFORE THE KEY TO SOVIET POLICIES. THEIR POLICIES TOWARDS OTHER COUNTRIES ARE ALL SUBORDINATED IN VARYING DEGREES TO THIS OVERWHELMINGLY IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP, A RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE ON ICE FOR SOME TIME.

15. THE SOVIETS WILL COME BACK TO THE INF TALKS IN GENEV BUT NOT BEFORE THE CONDITIONS HAVE OUTLINED ARE FULFILLED, NOT, IN OTHER WORDS, FOR SOME TIME. IN THE INTERIM THEY WILL ACT TOUGH, BUT I DO NOT THINK THEY WILL PUSH THE CONFRONTATION FAR. THE SOVIET MILITARY WANT ALL THE PANOPLY OF MILITARY MIGHT BUT THEY HAVE NOT SHOWN MUCH DISPOSITION TO RISK USING IT. I DOUBT IF THEY WILL DO SO NOW UNLESS PUSHED BY THE CIVILIAN LEADERS FOR STRICTLY INTERNAL ...?

PAGE SEVEN WIGR5417 CONF

REASONS, AND EVEN THAT IS A FAIRLY REMOTE CONTINGENCY.

16. THEY WILL ALSO TRY IN THIS PERIOD OF HIATUS TO CONTINUE MORE OR LESS NORMAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATO COUNTRIES AND INDEED DISCUSS WITH THEM ARMS REDUCTION PROBLEMS WITH THE AIM PRIMARILY OF SWINGING PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST AN ALLEGEDLY RIGID AND DANGEROUS AMERICAN POSITION. WHILE EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO PREVENT THE CREATION OF A SIEGE MENTALITY IN THE USSR, AND THEREFORE A DIALOGUE OF SOME SORT IS NECESSARY. THE DANGER WILL ALWAYS EXIST THAT THE SOVIETS WILL INTERPRET FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF NATO COUNTRIES AS REINFORCING THEIR BELIEF THAT THE AMERICANS CAN EVENTUALLY BE WORN DOWN. THEREFORE POSTPONING THE DAY WHEN THEY FINALLY DECIDE TO TALK SERIOUSLY AND RATIONALLY WITH THE UNITED STATES. AND THAT, AFTER ALL, IS THE REAL AIM.

FORD.

CCC/074 301534Z WIGR5417

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4187 30NOV83

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 300900

DISTR LIDDZ MINA IDR RBRD

REF YOURTEL RBR0686 25NOV

---EAST-WEST RELATIONS, MOSCO PERSPECTIVE

OUR COLLECTIVE THOUGHTS ON THIS SUBJECT ARE SET OUT IN OURTEL XYGR4123 OF 15NOV83 WHICH WAS DRAFTED BY MUNDELL BUT CONSIDERED CAREFULLY BY GREY AND ME. ALTHOUGH THAT TEL DEALS MAINLY WITH INF, IT IS REALLY AN ESSAY ON THE SOVIET VIEW OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND IN MY OPINION A COMPREHENSIVE ONE. I HOPE YOU WILL TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT WHEN PREPARING PAPERS FOR DPM/SSEA. HOWEVER, SINCE YOU ARE KIND ENOUGH TO ASK FOR MY PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION, I WILL SET DOWN SOME THOUGHTS WHICH ARE CERTAINLY NOT/NOT IN CONFLICT WITH XYGR4123, BUT PERHAPS DIFFERENT IN EMPHASIS.

2. I AM CONVINCED THAT PRESENT TENSION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS STEMS ESSENTIALLY FROM SOV MISCALCULATION, FIRST WHEN THEY EMBARKED ON THEIR INF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IN 1972, AND SECOND WHEN THEY BEGAN TO DEPLOY THE RESULT, THE SS20, IN 1977. THE MISCALCULATION WAS THAT BECAUSE THE WEST HAD ACCEPTED SOVIET MISSILES POINTED AT WESTERN EUROPE FOR TEN YEARS PREVIOUSLY, IT WOULD CONTINUE TO ACCEPT THEM IN IMPROVED FORM. THEY DID NOT/NOT OFFER TO NEGOTIATE EITHER DEVELOPMENT OR DEPLOYMENT, AND THEY DID NOT/NOT ANTICIPATE THAT ABOUT THIS TIME THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES, IN THE ...2

PAGE TWO XYGR4187 CONF

PERSON OF HENRY KISSINGER, WOULD DISCOVER A CREDIBILITY GAP, A GROWING UNEASE ON THE PART OF WEST EUROPEANS (ESPECIALLY WEST GERMANS) THAT THEY MIGHT NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO COUNT ON AMERICAN NUCLEAR SUPPORT IN FACE OF SOVIET ATTACK OR NUCLEAR INTIMIDATION. HELMUT SCHMIDT THEN DESCRIBED HOW THIS CREDIBILITY GAP, GROWING AS THE NEW SOV WEAPONS WERE DEPLOYED, WOULD LEAD TO QUOTE DECOUPLING UNQUOTE AND THW WEAKENING IF NOT/NOT DISINTEGRATION OF THE ALLIANCE IF SOMETHING WERE NOT/NOT DONE ABOUT IT. THUS THE RUSSIANS HAVE TO CONTEMPLATE DISAGREEABLE REALITY THAT THEY BROUGHT ON THEMSELVES NOT/NOT ONLY THE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES, BUT THAT THEY MAY ALSO HAVE CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN IN 1981. I BELIEVE THE ARABS SAY THAT ANY FOOL CAN GET A DONKEY UP A MINARET, BUT IT TAKES A WISE MAN TO GET HIM DOWN. ESSENCE OF PRESENT SOVIET POSITION, AND THEIR VIEW OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH USA AND THE WEST GENERALLY, IS THAT THEY ARE NOW WONDERING HOW TO GET THEIR DONKEY DOWN.

3. OF COURSE IN PUBLIC, AND PROBABLY IN PRIVATE TOO, THEY BLAME THE WEST FOR THEIR PREDICAMENT. MARSHAL USTINOV, IN A LONG ARTICLE PUBLISHED 19 NOV 83, POINTS OUT THAT SOVIET-FRG COMMUNIQUE, SIGNED IN 1978, SPOKE OF EQUALITY OF FORCES IN EUROPE. IF YOU WERE AFRAID OF THE SS20, WHY DID YOU NOT/NOT SAY SO THEN, THE MARSHAL IS ASKING. IN TALKING TO PEOPLE LIKE ME, SOVIET APOLOGISTS SUCH AS ARBATOV AND YAKOVLEV INSIST THAT THE SS20 SCARE, THE CREDIBILITY GAP AND QUOTE DECOUPLING UNQUOTE WERE ALL INVENTED AFTER THE FACT TO JUSTIFY DEPLOYMENT, RATHER THAN THE OTHER WAY AROUND. PUT

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PAGE THREE XYGR4187 CONF

THOSE ARGUMENTS CAN BE DISMISSED. THE SOVIETS NEGLECTED TO TAKE SUFFICIENT ACCOUNT OF PROBABLE WEST EUROPEAN REACTION WHEN THEY BROUGHT OUT THEIR NEW WEAPONS.

4. THE PERIOD OF INF NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE SEEN IN TWO (OR MORE) WAYS. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HARTMAN SEES IT VERY SIMPLY: THE SOVIET MILITARY WERE IN CHARGE AND TOLD THE NEGOTIATORS THAT IN NO 'NO CIRCUMSTANCES WERE THEY TO AGREE TO DEPLOYMENT OF A SINGLE USA MISSILE. (THAT DOES NOT/NOT SQUARE WELL WITH THE WALK IN THE WOODS FORMULA). SOVIET INSISTENCE ON COUNTING BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES WAS AN OBVIOUS RED HERRING. I SEE IT DIFFERENTLY. SOVS ARE WELL AWARE OF SERIOUS TALK ON BOTH SIDES OF ATLANTIC ABOUT EUROPEANS ACCEPTING MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN DEFENCE. BOTH THE PROVISION OF HARDWARE AND THE TAKING OF DECISIONS. WHEN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES ARE MODERNIZED, THEY WILL EACH BE FORMIDABLE. NOBODY WOULD PREDICT NOW THAT THEY MIGHT ONE DAY FORM THE BASIS OF A UNIFIED EUROPEAN DETERRENT, BUT IT IS A POSSIBILITY SOVS WOULD TIE THEIR HANDS VIS-A-VIS THE USA, ONLY TO FIND YEARS LATER THAT THREAT CAME FROM ANOTHER QUARTER. THIS IS WHY CONCEPT OF EQUAL SECURITY, AS THEY UNDERSTAND IT, IS NOT/NOW WHOLLY IRRATIONAL, EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE UNREASONABLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW.

5. I BELIEVE SITUATION I HAVE DESCRIBED TO BE AT HEART OF PRESENT EAST-WEST TENSION, RUSSIANS ARE ANGRY AND FRUSTRATED ABOUT INF, AND WONDERING WHERE TO GO NEXT. IT DOES NOT/NOT HELP THAT THEY MAINLY THEMSELVES TO BLAME. BUT THERE IS ANOTHER BIG ELEMENT, WHICH

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PAGE FOUR XYGR4187 CONF

IS THE REAGAN ADMIN, OR RATHER THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE REAGAN ADMIN. THEIR DISLIKE AND DISTRUST OF ADMIN IS GENUINE, PROFOUND AND VOICED WITH SHRILL ITERATION. ANDROPOVS 15 NOV STATEMENT ANNOUNCING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM INF TALKS CONTAINS PARA TO EFFECT THAT USA HAS DECLARED A QUOTE CRUSADE AGAINST SOCIALISM AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM UNQUOTE, AND IS BASING ITS POLICIES ON THIS QUOTE RECKLESS PREMISE UNQUOTE. WATCHING SOVIET TV IN PAST TEN DAYS I HAVE NOTED HOW CONSISTENTLY THIS PASSAGE IS PICKED OUT FOR EMPHASIS IN FACTORY MEETINGS ETC. I THINK WE HAVE TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. WHAT REALLY WORRIES THEM IS WELL-DOCUMENTED DESIRE OF SOME MEMBERS OF ADMIN TO QUOTE DO TECHNOLOGICAL END-RUN UNQUOTE (WSHDC TEL UNGER2461 23 NOV 83), AND THUS GAIN UPPER HAND. SOVIETS KNOW THAT USA FINDS THEIR ANTI-SATELLITE PROPOSAL UNACCEPTABLE AND WILL NOT/NOT BE SURPRISED WHEN THEY LEARN THAT OURS TOO IS UNACCEPTABLE IN WSHDC. IN PROPAGANDA HERE IT IS CONSTANT THEME THAT USA IS SEEKING NOT/NOT PARITY BUT SUPERIORITY. GEORGIY ARBATOV, WHOM WE DO NOT/NOT HAVE TO BELIEVE ALL THE TIME BUT WHO MUST ALWAYS BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AMERICANS HERE THINK OF HIM AS TOTALLY VENAL PROPAGANDIST) SAYS IN HIS RECENT BOOK QUOTE THE GOAL IS MILITARY SUPERIORITY. I THINK THEY SERIOUSLY BELIEVE IN IT AND ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE IT UNQUOTE. AND ON NEXT PAGE QUOTE CHALLENGED BY USA AS WE WERE AFTER WORLD WAR II, WE HAD TO REGARD DEFENSE AS OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY. HE FEELS LIES TRUE ORIGIN OF THE ARMS RACE. IT WAS, AND STILL IS, IMPOSED ON US UNQUOTE. ONE CAN TAKE THE QUOTE CHALLENGED UNQUOTE PART WITH GRAIN OF SALT, BUT THAT THE MODERN CHALLENGE TO KEEP UP TECHNOLOGICALLY ...5

PAGE FIVE XYGR4187 CONFD

IS A SEVERE PROBLEM FOR SOVS CANNOT, I THINK, BE DISPUTED. PROSPECT OF SPENDING BILLIONS OF STAR WAR TECHNOLOGY MUST BE DAUNTING TO THEM. WHETHER THEY THINK THAT USA MILITARY SUPERIORITY, ONCE GAINED, WOULD THEN BE USED IN QUOTE CRUSADE UNQUOTE AGAINST THEM ONE DOES NOT/NOT KNOW. IT IS A CHANCE THEY WILL NOT/NOT TAKE. GRENADA CAPER WAS USEFUL TO THEM AND THEY HAVE EXPLOITED IT TO FULL. BUT IT MUST ALSO HAVE WORRIED THEM AS SIGN OF NEUROTIC BEHAVIOUR WHICH WOULD REGARD AS CHARACTERISTIC OF THIS ADMIN. MORAL OF THIS IS THAT THEIR POLICIES WILL BE CALCULATED IN PART ON DESIRE TO DENY REAGAN ANYTHING WHICH WOULD HELP TO REELECT HIM. AS I READ USA NEWSPAPERS REAGAN POLITICAL ADVISERS SEEM TO THINK THAT WHAT THEIR MAN NEEDS MOST TO WIN IS SOME KIND OF ACD AGREEMENT OR TANGIBLE PROGRESS TOWARDS ONE. I THINK SOVIETW WILL GO FAR OUT OF THEIR WAY TO DENY HIM THIS. IF NEVERTHELESS HE IS REELECTED, THEY WILL OF COURSE HAVE TO RECONSIDER.

6. I RETURN TO SOVIET MISCALCULATION. TEN YEARS AFTER THEY LAUNCHED THEIR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, THEY FIND THEMSELVES NO/NO MORE SECURE THAN THEY WERE, POSSIBLY LESS. THANKS TO THEIR ACTION, WORLD ITSELF IS LESS SECURE. PEACE MOVEMENT IN WEST HAS PROVEN ITSELF IF NOT/NOT PAPER TIGER AT LEAST NOT/NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO TAKE ON POPULARLY ELECTED GOVTS WITH MANDATE TO TACKLE DEFENSE PROBLEMS. SOVS ARE GENERALLY PERCIVED AS HAVING NEGOTIATED IN BAD FAITH (THEIR POSITION NEVER RELLY CHANGED THROUGHOUT INF TALKS) AND THEY EVEN FAILED TO PERSUADE MOST PEOPLE OF THEIR REAL CONCERN ABOUT BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES. THAT IS, I THINK, SITUATION THEY ARE IN, AND IT

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PAGE SIX XYGR4187 CONF D

WILL ALONG WITH WAY THEY PERCEIVE REAGAN AND HIS CLOSE ADVISERS, SHAPE MOST OF WHAT THEY DO IN FOREIGN POLICY FIELD, ESPECIALLY EAST-WEST, OVER NEXT YEAR OR MORE.

7. BUT EVENTUALLY THEY WILL HAVE TO RETURN TO TABLE. I THINK THEY WILL NOT/NOT RETURN TO INF TABLE AS IT WAS. WHETHER THEY TRY TO INCORPORATE INF WITH START OR INTEREST THEMSELVES IN FIVE-POWER NEGS AS PROPOSED BY PM, I SUSPECT THEY DO NOT/NOT YET KNOW. THEY HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT NATO DEPLOYMENT CHANGES SITUATION IN START TALKS IN THAT PERSHING 2 AND CRUISE ARE, FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW, STRATEGIC (SINCE THEY WILL LAND IN THE SOVIET UNION) AND WILL THEREFORE MODIFY SOV POSITION. IT IS SHORT STEP FROM THERE TO DEMAND THAT BRIT AND FRENCH FORCES (ALSO STRATEGIC BECAUSE SEA BASED) SHOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED.

8. THIS IS DILEMMA FOR PMS MISSION. SOVS WILL BE GLAD ENOUGH TO HAVE DIALOGUE WITH PM AND OTHER ALLIES OF USA. BUT I DOUBT IF ANY AMOUNT OF URGING WILL PROPEL THEM INTO DIALOGUE WITH USA ITSELF UNTIL THEY HAVE ANALYSED CONSEQUENCES OF INF FAILURE, STRAIGHTENED OUT THEIR LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS, AND ASSURED THEMSELVES THAT THEY HAVE DONE ALL THEY CAN TO HELP BRING ABOUT REAGAN'S DEFEAT. I THINK WE CAN SAFFELY IGNORE SOMEWHAT SILLY CONVERSATIONS NOW TAKING PLACE BETWEEN GROMYKO AND HARTMAN (SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED ON THIS POINT BY REAGAN) CONCERNING SHARPLY IDEOLOGICAL TONE OF CURRENT PROPAGANDA ON BOTH SIDES. SOVS ARE AS WOUNDED BY BY REFS TO QUOTE CLOSING PAGE OF HISTORY ON THEM UNQUOTE AND QUOTE LEAVING THEM IN ASHCAN OF HISTORY UNQUOTE AS WE WERE A FEW ...7

PAGE SEVEN XYGR4187 CONF

YEARS AGO BY KHRUSHCHEVS DECLARATION THAT QUOTE WE WILL BURY
YOU UNQUOTE.SUCH REMARKS ARE CHILDISH AND DIVORCED FROM REALITY.
AND IT IS A PITY WE HAVE GONE BACK TO THEM.REALITY IS NOT/NOT
WHAT THEY SAY ABOUT ONE ANOTHER BUT WHAT THEY THINK ABOUT ONE
ANOTHERS INTENTIONS.MAKING MOST GENEROUS POSSIBLE ALLOWANCE
FOR RHETORIC AND MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY,I THINK NEVERTHELESS THAT
SOVS DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE PRESENT USA ADMIN IS INTERESTED IN
CAPPING ARMS RACE ON BASIS OF EQUALITY.HOWEVER DEFINED.IF PM
WERE CONVINCED OTHERWISE.IT WOULD BE USEFUL INDEED FOR HIM TO
COME HERE AND SAY SO TO ANDROPOV.SUCH AN ASSERTION FROM CDN PM
WOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY HERE AND MIGHT LEAD TO EXAMINATION OF
SOVIET ASSUMPTIONS,AND EVEN(DESPITE WHAT I SAY ABOVE)TO FURTHER
EXAMINATION WITH USA ITSELF.SOVS,DESPITE ALL EFFORT THEY PUT INTO
FATHOMING EVENTS AND PERSONALITIES IN USA,AND CHARACTER OF COUNTRY
ITSELF,ARE ALWAYS LOOKING THROUGH GLASS DARKLY.THEY ARE TOO
IMPRESSED BY OMINOUS SOUNDS UTTERED BY HAWKS IN ADMIN,AND
BADLY INFORMED,INDEED CONFUSED BY THEIR OWN PROPAGANDA.ABOUT
COUNTER-BALANCES WHICH EXIST.IF WE SEE SITUATION DIFFERENTLY,AS I
THINK WE DO,I CAN IMAGINE NOTHER MORE USEFUL THAN TO TALK,AT
LEVEL OF HEAD OF CDN GOVT,ABOUT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF PRESENT
USA POLICIES,SIGNIFICANCE OF RHETORIC,AND POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD
ROBERTS.

CCC/095 300945Z XYGR4187



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

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TO/À

TO VMBFR

INFO

DISTR

HAMMOND ^{FROM} DE DELVOIE

REF

DISTR IDRT ~~FRANCIS~~

SUBJ/SUJ

REF YOURTELS XTDR210 AND 211 22NOV

---MBFR AND NAC MINISTERIAL

MANY THANKS FOR EXCELLENT REFTELS.THEY WERE OF GREATEST HELP TO US
IN PREPARING FOR NAC MINISTERIAL.REGARDS.

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

L.A.Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

SIG L.A.Delvoie

03 DEC

CONFIDENTIAL

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

MF
RD

SUBJECT: ATTENDANCE AT THE SUPER-RESTRICTED SESSION

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOR USNATO: WE UNDERSTAND THERE WAS SOME FEELING AT THE PERMREPS LUNCH ON NOVEMBER 29 THAT ATTENDANCE AT THE SUPER-RESTRICTED SESSION OF THE NAC MINISTERIAL SHOULD BE BROADENED. YOU SHOULD MAINTAIN OUR EARLIER POSITION AGAINST EXPANSION FROM THE ONE-PLUS-ONE FORMULA, ARGUING THAT SUCH A STRICT LIMITATION ON ATTENDANCE IS CONDUCIVE TO BETTER DISCUSSION AMONG THE MINISTERS.

;. FOR NATO CAPITALS: AS APPROPRIATE, EMBASSIES SHOULD APPROACH PRIVATE STAFF OF FOREIGN MINISTER TO INDICATE OUR POSITION ON THIS ISSUE AND ASCERTAIN HIS WISHES ON THE QUESTION OF ATTENDANCE AT THE SUPER-RESTRICTED SESSION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SHULTZ

SUBJECT: DECEMBER 8 SCG MEETING

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. PLEASE INFORM SCG REPRESENTATIVES THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD BURT WILL CHAIR AN SCG MEETING THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 8 ON THE MARGINS OF THE NAC. THE MEETING WILL BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE NAC OPENING CEREMONY (APPROXIMATELY 0945) WHEN MINISTERS ARE IN SUPER-RESTRICTED SESSION, AND WILL CONCLUDE BY 1200. BURT'S PRESS CONFERENCE WILL IMMEDIATELY FOLLOW THE SCG MEETING. THE PROPOSED SCG AGENDA IS AS FOLLOWS:

- OPENING REMARKS
- NAC COMMUNIQUE
- PRESS STATEMENT
- FUTURE WORK

CONFIDENTIAL

MT
Dec. 5

SHULTZ/MACEACHEN BILATERAL - PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

28-6-1-Tynderdale
mission

Your meeting with Secretary Shultz should have three purposes: (a) to outline the PM's concerns and the nature of his initiative; (b) to brief him on the reactions the PM has had to-date from consultations; and (c) to elicit reactions to and support for the initiative.

You might wish to begin by explaining the PM's point of departure:

- Canada is fully committed to the Alliance. We abide by and fully support NATO's "two-track" decision of 1979 and our decision to permit the testing of the cruise missiles in our airspace.
- The PM's initiative does not in any way cut across either of these decisions.

You might then outline the PM's initiative. Secretary Shultz will have been briefed on the initiative as we have briefed the US embassy and Deputy Assistant Secretary Medas. You might touch on the main points:

- The central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation.
- We are convinced of the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. There is a need for a political framework for arms control and other negotiations between the two sides.
- The PM is interested in seeing with certain Western European countries if by opening lines of communication to Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.

- 2 -

- The initiative does involve a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit, then reduce strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and attract new NPT signatories (c) MBFR - a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals and a meeting in Vienna at the Foreign Minister level (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level to give it political impetus.
- Also related to the initiative, but not pursued publicly with other governments, the PM has made public proposals on (a) mobility of ICBMs (b) high altitude anti-satellite systems (c) verification of new weapons systems by national technical means.
- These measures have merit in themselves and progress on any of them would contribute to improving East-West dialogue. But the initiative, which is primarily political, does not stand or fall on the acceptability of any one specific proposal.

You may then wish to brief Mr. Shultz on the results of the PM's consultations with other governments to-date:

- European allies: in a visit to France, Belgium, FRG, UK, Italy and the Netherlands in early November the PM found encouraging support for his initiative. The Europeans shared his analysis of the dangerous prevailing state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.
- The French were generally supportive, with reservations as to timing. The Germans were positive and generally supportive (and have subsequently endorsed the five power conference idea). The British were generally supportive of the broad purpose, but have reservations about specific proposals (especially the five power conference). The Dutch and Belgians

- 3 -

reacted very positively, with some reservations as to timing (they think such an initiative may be most needed in the spring of 1984 once INF deployments are well underway). The Italians were generally supportive. (Also, we have had very positive and fully supportive written responses from the Danes and Norwegians and a very positive reaction from the Spaniards.)

Our embassy in Washington has briefed the State Department on the results of consultations with Japan, CHOGM, China and the Soviet Union.

- Japan: PM Nakasone was very receptive and fully supportive when the PM visited Tokyo on November 19.
- Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed PM Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security.

The Chinese are supportive of the broad political purpose, but do not support the proposal for a five power conference. Deng told the PM that the chief cause of the arms race was the superpowers; primary responsibility for disarmament is theirs. He said that the first priority is finding ways to concentrate pressure on the superpowers to reduce their arms. He stressed that China's nuclear arsenal was only symbolic, but it did act as a deterrent. Deng disapproved of the NPT and said that China would not sign it, though they would not engage in proliferation. He did not share the PM's assessment of the dangers of horizontal proliferation as few would become nuclear weapon states.

They see the danger of war as real, but the outbreak of nuclear war was constrained by: (a) nuclear deterrent of China and France (b) allies of USA and USSR did not want war (c) peace movements (d) superpowers' awareness that most of their populations would be killed in a nuclear war. Deng stressed that another important kind of pressure on the superpowers was for countries to follow independent foreign policy e.g. De Gaulle in the 1970s. He said that the USSR was still being very aggressive, but certain recent actions of the US had been of the same character e.g. US policy in Central and Latin America (the US should have remained neutral in the Falklands). The US had done certain things this year "which arouse our attention".

- 4 -

The Soviet response to the PM's emissary was interested, but neutral. Secretary Shultz will be aware of what the Soviets told Pearson as our embassy in Washington briefed the State Department along these lines:

Gromyko told the PM's emissary that they have had "sad experience" with high-level contact with the US, hence they were "reserved" about the argument that the higher level of contact the better. He argued that the US had used the Geneva negotiations as a screen to cover militaristic action and drew attention to Andropov's statement of August 24 which they characterized as a rebuff to aggressive American policies and a peaceful line to Europe and other states and on disarmament.

While Gromyko appreciated the PM's view of the importance of replacing discussion of numbers and ratios of weapons with consideration of trust, intentions and goals, but NATO led by Washington by deploying Pershing and Cruise missiles was acting on a different basis. He said that the West's rejection of a declaration of non-first use of nuclear weapons showed how we treat noble ideas and he regretted Canada's support for INF deployment.

On the call for a five power conference, Gromyko was non-committal, saying there were advantages and disadvantages.

He was reserved on the idea of high-level presence at the CDE opening and at MBFR. On MBFR he saw no desire by the West to move forward at Vienna.

Gromyko restated Andropov's invitation to the PM to visit Moscow, but there was a question of timing and account would have to be taken of all relevant circumstances (this we read as basically a matter of Andropov's health).

Our impressions of this neutral Soviet response were:

- (a) The visit of Mr. Trudeau's emissary occurred the day after Andropov's statement of November 24 on INF. Although Gromyko and Kornienko said they had read the PMs statements and followed his actions closely their "neutral" response to his proposals may be due to a "policy review" which they hinted may be underway on INF,

- 5 -

the results of which are not yet clear. It may be they will harden their response of this draw the conclusion that their message has not "registered" in the West.

- (b) Uncertainty over Andropov's health overshadows all their decisions; one Soviet interlocutor told us Andropov's illness was "painful", but not serious and that he was only able to do business by telephone. It was suggested that he might be able to return to work in a minimum role sometime after December 20.
- (c) They would welcome a Trudeau visit, but timing is a problem (due to Andropov's health). Gromyko appeared to be almost pleading that we not press them immediately to set a date; sometime early in January may be possible.
- (d) They will not want to do anything to improve the chances of President Reagan's re-election;
- (e) They do not think it possible to have a rational relationship with the US when the US views them as the concentration of evil. The Soviets will view the PM's initiative through the "prism" of this American attitude to them.
- (f) They did not threaten to pull out of any other negotiations although on START Kornienko said INF deployment has changed the strategic situation because the missiles in Europe which reach the USSR are the same missiles based in the USA, from the Soviet point of view.

- 6 -

You may wish to conclude by:

- Following your proposals to NAC, underlining the importance we attach to (a) getting the Stockholm meeting off to a good start by having high level presence at the opening and (b) giving impetus to MBFR.
- Urging Secretary Shultz to give American support to the PM's effort, in particular, to attempts to create conditions which will be more propitious to dialogue between the superpowers and his overall prescription, even if they have reservations on specifics.
- Asking which subjects President Reagan is most likely to want to pursue when the PM visits Washington.

file

December 5, 1983


NOTE FOR MR. SMITH and MR. CARON

Rouse of the U.S. Embassy phoned me at 12:15 to say that in addition to the dates already proposed for the P.M.'s Washington visit (December 14 and 15) there might also be openings on December 19, 21 and 23. It would be up to us to propose morning or afternoon times which might be convenient to the P.M. on those dates.

Rouse stressed that with the passage of every hour the President's schedule filled up more and more and therefore that it would be important to try to get a reaction out of the Prime Minister's Delegation as soon as it reaches Ottawa this afternoon.

[Signature]

L.A.D.



c o p y

No. Pol 200/83
- 2 enclosures -

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to submit herewith a letter received by telex from the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Helmut Kohl, to the Prime Minister of Canada, The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

A courtesy translation is attached.

The Embassy would appreciate if this letter would be conveyed to its high destination and avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, December 5, 1983

(L.S.)

Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Ontario

Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Chancellor

Bonn, 5 December 1983

His Excellency
The Right Honourable
Pierre-Elliott Trudeau,
P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L., M.A., F.R.S.C.,
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa

Dear Pierre,

Thank you very much for your letter of 18 November 1983 informing me of the course and results of your trip to Europe and of your future intentions. I wholly agree with you that, in view of the tense East-West relationship, it is urgently necessary to impart fresh impetus to the dialogue between East and West and to work for the creation of a climate of trust. For us Germans, a dialogue with the East is of central importance and has long been the guiding principle of our policy.

Our policy aimed at detente will be successful if the West shows unity in the now necessary implementation of the NATO double-track decision. Systematic execution of the Alliance's decisions of 12 December 1979 in the face of powerful pressure constitutes a great success for the Alliance.

However, at the same time we must make it clear to the East that we are prepared for dialogue and co-operation at all levels. We must also convince our own publics of this. Our citizens are prepared to shoulder the burdens we need to incur to assure our defence. They will do so all the more readily if our defence efforts are accompanied by lasting endeavours for arms control and accommodation with the East.

The forthcoming ministerial meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels affords us an excellent opportunity to send a clear signal to the East of our will for genuine and lasting detente.

As long as the continuation of the Geneva INF talks is in doubt, it is all the more important to make use of existing forums for arms control. These include the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. I advocate high-ranking representation of the participating countries at the opening ceremony. Hans-Dietrich Genscher will speak in Stockholm on behalf of the Federal Government.

The CSCE process, of which the CDE is a product, is yielding stabilizing effects for East-West relations. Madrid has shown that agreement is possible even at a difficult juncture. The CSCE and the CDE demonstrate that the dialogue continues despite the interruption in Geneva. We must use the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document as a comprehensive programme for giving substance to East-West relations.

A new Western initiative is required at the MBFR talks in Vienna. The three rounds of negotiations this year were increasingly determined by the Eastern proposals of February and the draft treaty of June. However, it is in our own interest to hold the discussions in Vienna on the basis of our own, Western concept. Purely reactive arguments confined to defending our draft, which is now over a year old, are not suitable for this purpose. We, too, are therefore advocating a new Western initiative at the negotiations and will gladly discuss with our partners the ideas that we have already developed on this subject.

The Federal Government supports every attempt at consolidating and strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. I also feel it is worth considering

- 3 -

your proposal of a conference of the five nuclear powers as a forum to consider arms control measures in respect of the nuclear potentials of Britain, France and China. This would also do justice to the undertaking entered into in Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty by the signatory states.

Direct contact between President Reagan and General Secretary Andropov is important for East-West relations. A well-prepared summit meeting, which - as you know - I have repeatedly advocated in Washington and Moscow both in private and in public, could contribute towards mutual understanding.

Yours sincerely,
(sgd.) Helmut Kohl,
Federal Chancellor

Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Der Bundeskanzler

Bonn, den 5.12.1983

Seiner Exzellenz
dem Premierminister von Kanada
Herrn Pierre Elliott Trudeau,
P.C., Q.C., M.P., LL.L., M.A., F.R.S.C.
Ottawa

Lieber Pierre,

Vielen Dank für Ihr Schreiben vom 18. November 1983, in dem Sie mich über den Verlauf und die Ergebnisse Ihrer Europareise und über Ihre weiteren Absichten informieren. Ich stimme Ihnen ohne Einschränkung darin zu, dass es angesichts des angespannten Ost-West-Verhältnisses dringend geboten ist, dem Dialog zwischen Ost und West neue Impulse zu geben und uns für die Herstellung eines Klimas des Vertrauens einzusetzen. Für uns Deutsche ist der Dialog mit dem Osten von zentraler Bedeutung und seit langem Leitlinie unserer Politik.

Unsere auf Entspannung gerichtete Politik wird Erfolg haben, wenn der Westen bei der nun notwendig gewordenen Durchführung des NATO-Doppelbeschlusses Geschlossenheit zeigt. Die konsequente Durchführung der Bündnisentscheidungen vom 12. Dezember 1979 trotz starken Drucks ist ein grosser Erfolg für die Allianz.

Zugleich ist jedoch erforderlich, dass wir dem Osten unsere Bereitschaft zum Dialog und zur Zusammenarbeit auf allen Ebenen deutlich machen. Dies müssen wir auch gegenüber unserer Öffentlichkeit überzeugend bekunden. Unsere Bürger sind bereit, die für die Sicherung unserer Verteidigung nötigen Lasten mitzutragen. Sie tun dies umso eher, wenn unsere Verteidigungsbemühungen von nachhaltigen Anstrengungen um Rüstungskontrolle und Ausgleich mit dem Osten begleitet sind.

- 2 -

Der bevorstehende NATO-Ministerrat in Brüssel gibt uns die ausgezeichnete Gelegenheit, an den Osten ein klares Signal des Willens zur echten und dauerhaften Entspannung zu richten.

Solange die Fortsetzung der Genfer INF-Verhandlungen in Zweifel steht, ist es umso wichtiger, die vorhandenen Rüstungskontrollforen zu nutzen. Dazu gehört die Konferenz über vertrauens- und sicherheitsbildende Massnahmen und Abrüstung in Europa. Ich befürworte eine hochrangige Vertretung der Teilnehmerstaaten an der Eröffnung. Hans-Dietrich Genscher wird für die Bundesregierung in Stockholm sprechen.

Der KSZE-Prozess, aus dem die KVAE hervorgeht, entfaltet stabilisierende Wirkungen für das Ost-West-Verhältnis. Madrid hat bewiesen, dass auch in einer schwierigen Phase Einigungen möglich sind. KSZE und KVAE demonstrieren: trotz der Unterbrechung in Genf geht der Dialog weiter. Wir müssen die Schlussakte von Helsinki und das Madrider Schlussdokument als umfassendes Programm für eine inhaltsreiche Gestaltung der Ost-West-Beziehungen nutzen.

Bei den MBFR-Verhandlungen in Wien ist eine neue westliche Initiative erforderlich. Die drei Verhandlungsrunden dieses Jahres wurden zunehmend durch die östlichen Vorschläge vom Februar und den Vertragsentwurf vom Juni geprägt. Unser Interesse muss es aber sein, die Diskussion in Wien auf der Grundlage unseres eigenen, westlichen Konzepts zu führen. Hierzu ist eine rein defensive Argumentation, beschränkt auf die Verteidigung unseres nun schon mehr als ein Jahr zurückliegenden Entwurfs, nicht geeignet. Wir setzen uns daher ebenfalls für einen neuen westlichen Verhandlungsschritt ein und sind gerne bereit, mit unseren Partnern Vorstellungen zu erörtern, die wir zu diesem Thema bereits entwickelt haben.

Die Bundesregierung unterstützt jeden Anstoss zur Festigung und Stärkung des internationalen Nichtverbreitungs-Regimes.

- 3 -

- 3 -

Ich halte auch Ihren Vorschlag einer Konferenz der fünf Nuklearmächte für erwägenswert, für die Frage der rüstungskontrollpolitischen Behandlung der Nuklearpotentiale Grossbritanniens, Frankreichs und Chinas eine Perspektive zu schaffen. Dies würde auch der Verpflichtung der Unterzeichnerstaaten aus Artikel VI des Nichtverbreitungsvertrages Rechnung tragen.

Für die Beziehungen zwischen West und Ost ist der direkte Kontakt zwischen Präsident Reagan und Generalsekretär Andropow bedeutsam. Ein gründlich vorbereitetes Gipfel-treffen, für das ich mich, wie Sie wissen, mehrfach und auch öffentlich in Washington wie in Moskau eingesetzt habe, könnte zum beiderseitigen Verständnis beitragen.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Helmut Kohl,

Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Courtesy translation

Dear Colleague:

At the forthcoming ministerial meeting of the NATO Council I regard it as especially important that the Alliance gives a clear sign of its unity and solidarity and at the same time makes it clear that the Alliance is ready for negotiations, dialogue and co-operation with the East.

For this purpose I have proposed a separate political declaration to be issued in addition to the joint communique.

The first draft of such a declaration has already been submitted at Brussels. I should appreciate if you could strongly support such a political declaration and instruct your Permanent Representative at Brussels accordingly.

I am looking forward to meet you at Brussels on December 8, 1983.

Yours sincerely,

Hans-Dietrich Genscher

c o p y

No. Pol 201/83
- 2 enclosures -

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to submit herewith a letter received by telex from the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.

A courtesy translation is attached.

The Embassy would be most grateful if the letter could be conveyed to its high destination and avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, December 6, 1983

(L.S.)

Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Ontario



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
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OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF STATE EXTERNAL RELATIONS - ACTION REQUEST
CABINET DU MINISTRE D'ÉTAT (RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES) - FICHE DE SERVICE

From/De DR. ROBERT M. LAXER	No. N° 01408	Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINE by / L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINE avant Date 12-12-83
Letter dated / Lettre en date du UNDATED	Date received in MINE / Date de réception à MINE 29-11-83	Date sent to Division / Date d'envoi à la direction 05-12-83
Action Division / Direction responsable IDA 1002	Information Division(s) Direction(s) informée(s)	Referred by / Référée
Subject / Sujet CANADA'S THIRD TRACK TO PEACE	Comments / Commentaires	

ACTION REQUIRED / ACTION REQUISE

☐ Reply for minister's signature
Réponse pour la signature du ministre

☐ Reply for the signature of
Réponse pour la signature de

☐ Reply by division
Réponse de la direction

☒ Note and file
Noter et mettre au dossier

☐ Draft reply to be incorporated in letter by Minister's staff
Projet de réponse requis pour inclusion dans lettre rédigée par les assistants du Ministre

ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINE REGISTRY (5-7221)

LE REGISTRE DE MINE DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT (5-7221)

28-6-1- Trudeau
Peace
Mission

FOR DIVISIONAL USE
POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIRECTION

Date received in Division / Date reçu à la direction

December 7/83

Action officer / Agent responsable

V Smith

Disposition and date / Disposition et date

Noted and filed

For MINE use / Pour utilisation de MINE

001032



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

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OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF STATE EXTERNAL RELATIONS ACTION REQUEST
CABINET DU MINISTRE D'ÉTAT (RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES) – FICHE DE SERVICE

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Action Division / Direction responsable DDA IDBZ	Information Division(s) Direction(s) informée(s)	Referred by / Référée
Subject / Sujet CANADA'S THIRD TRACK TO PEACE	Comments / Commentaires	

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- ☐ Reply by division
Réponse de la direction
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ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINE REGISTRY (5-7221)

LE REGISTRE DE MINE DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT (5-7221)

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Support Canada's 'Third Track' to Peace


Your efforts to help reduce the threat of a nuclear holocaust deserve the wholehearted support of all Canadians. This worthy goal unites us all, regardless of region, creed, class or political inclination. We support your peace mission to seek a consensus among national leaders to bring humanity's deep desire for survival to bear on the stalled negotiations on nuclear arms control in Geneva.

Some of the signers of this letter oppose you on your decision to permit testing of the cruise missile in Canada. Some others have proposed that Canada become a 'nuclear-free zone' which would challenge the right of the United States unilaterally to decide our fate through its military dominance of NATO and NORAD. Still others were originally willing to leave it to the military strategists to decide on the best course. But our faith has finally worn too thin to leave our fate to others alone.

Canadians are eager to banish the nightmares of children who, for the first time in history, fear their lives are to be snuffed out before they have lived out their natural span of years. We wish you success in your search for Canada and for humanity. We urge all Canadians to put aside partisan differences and petty criticisms. We must rise to the high level of consensus by which our country, through its Prime Minister and its people, can play an honourable role in helping to assure peace and good will to all men and women.

Professor Michael Bliss
Professor James B. Conacher
Professor Ramsay Cook
The Hon. Walter Gordon
Mel Hurtig
Chancellor George Ignatieff
Professor William Kilbourn
Robert M. Laxer, Ph.D., Convenor
Professor Kenneth McNaught
Walter Pitman

Committee for the Canadian Third Track for Peace
Dr. Robert M. Laxer, Convenor
68 Castle Knock Road
Toronto, Ontario M5N 2J7



Canada

Canada

TO/À Dossier

FROM/DE FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET Radio-Canada Téléjournal-
Mission de paix du Premier ministre

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
mission

Security/Sécurité	NON CLASSIFIE
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	5 décembre 1983
Number/Numéro	FPR-1166

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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JOURNAL
CIRC
DOSSIER

Ce qui nous amène à parler de la mission de paix du Premier ministre où cette mission marque un temps d'arrêt. Hier à Abu Dhabi, M. Trudeau déclarait qu'il n'était pas certain de pouvoir entamer la deuxième étape de sa démarche qui devrait, en principe, le conduire à Moscou et à Washington; du moins, en tout cas, pas avant de connaître les réactions aux propositions que le Canada doit faire à l'OTAN, jeudi prochain. Jean-Michel LePrince a obtenu l'essentiel du contenu de ces propositions et il nous dit quelles sont les conditions nécessaires à la poursuite du plan de paix après le rejet des principaux pays intéressés de la plupart des éléments que M. Trudeau leur a soumis.

J.-M. LePrince: Première proposition: la tribune de négociations des cinq possesseurs d'armes nucléaires rejetée par la France, la Grande-Bretagne et la Chine si les deux grands ne posent pas le premier geste; renforcement du traité de prolifération rejeté par l'Inde et les non-alignés pour les mêmes raisons; interdiction des armes extra-atmosphériques, les Etats-Unis viennent tout juste de lancer leur programme d'armement antisatellite. Reste le déblocage des négociations sur les armes classiques, le Canada n'a pas encore rendu public ses propositions.

Trois refus sur quatre propositions, ça peut paraître beaucoup mais ici à Ottawa on refuse de s'alarmer, on souligne que ce qui compte, c'est moins le contenu de la démarche de la mission Trudeau. Elle consiste à amorcer seulement la reprise du dialogue Est-Ouest.

Sa mission pourrait s'arrêter là, M. Trudeau en a convenu à son départ de Chine. A présent, les leaders qu'il a rencontrés sont libres de lancer leurs propres initiatives de paix ou d'embarquer avec lui.

.../2

FPR-1166

...2

Pour que la seconde phase commence, selon M. Trudeau, il faut qu'il se passe quelque chose à présent. Ici, à Ottawa, sous la direction de Louis Delvoie, spécialiste du désarmement aux Affaires extérieures, le groupe de travail spécial formé par le Premier ministre en septembre se réunit tous les jours, même en son absence. Il guette le moindre signe d'ouverture de Moscou ou de Washington. Pour Washington et l'OTAN, tout se jouera à la réunion ministérielle le 8 décembre où Allan J. MacEachen va présenter deux propositions. D'abord, élever au niveau des ministres des Affaires étrangères la conférence de Stockholm en janvier sur la confiance dans les relations Est-Ouest. Quant aux négociations de Vienne sur la réduction des armes conventionnelles, Radio-Canada a appris qu'Allan MacEachen allait aussi chercher à les élever au niveau ministériel, tout en demandant à l'Occident de répondre immédiatement aux propositions soviétiques de février. Elles portent sur un traité de réduction mutuel des effectifs à 900,000 hommes en Europe centrale et sur un système de vérification du traité.

L'idée générale de tout ça, c'est que n'importe quel progrès sur un front quelconque aura des effets bénéfiques sur toutes les autres négociations. Si du côté de Washington on appuie sans réserves, du moins officiellement, le plan Trudeau, on refuse d'en parler davantage sous prétexte que ça déjà été fait une fois par l'Ambassadeur Robinson dans un journal. A l'Ambassade soviétique, par contre, on discute librement et on affiche même un certain enthousiasme. Mais comme les Etats-Unis, les Russes considèrent la mauvaise foi de l'autre comme le seul obstacle. Reste évidemment le facteur Andropov. Jusqu'au dernier moment, un éventuel voyage de M. Trudeau à Moscou sera conditionné par cette inconnue: qui va-t-il y rencontrer si Andropov n'est pas visible et peut-il se contenter d'un remplaçant à défaut d'un successeur?

Jean-Michel LePrince, à Ottawa.

Le directeur des
pour relations avec les media,

D. J. Noble
John J. Noble

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR8677 05DEC83

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---NAC MIN MEETING: PROPOSED GERMAN DECLARATION

FOLLOWING IS GERMAN PROPOSED ^{GERMAN} POLITICAL DECLARATION

~~CIRCULATED DEC 05 P.M. TEXT BEGINS QUOTE~~

FOR THREE AND ONE-HALF DECADES, THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
HAS BEEN DEDICATED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN FREEDOM.
THE FRAMEWORK OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY WHICH IT HAS BUILT
HAS ENSURED THE LONGEST PERIOD OF STABILITY IN THE HISTORY
OF MODERN EUROPE.

WE, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SIXTEEN COUNTRIES OF
THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT TO
THE BONN DECLARATION ISSUED BY THE HEADS OF STATE AND
GOVT OF THE MEMBER STATES ON 10 JUN, 1982. WE DO
NOT/NOT THREATEN ANYONE WITH EITHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS. WE SHALL ALWAYS OPPOSE EXTERNAL THREATS OR
INTIMIDATION. WE DO NOT/NOT ASPIRE TO SUPERIORITY, NOR WILL
WE TOLERATE THE SUPERIORITY OF OTHERS OVER US. OUR PRECEPT
IS, NOW AS EVER: NONE OF OUR WEAPONS WILL EVER BE USED
EXCEPT IN RESPONSE TO ATTACK. WE EXPECT THE LEGITIMATE

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR8677 CONF

SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN AND THE AMERICAN MEMBERS OF OUR ALLIANCE TO BE RESPECTED ON EQUAL TERMS AND TO THE SAME EXTENT THAT WE RESPECT THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EUROPE CAN ONLY BE GUARANTEED THROUGH EUROPE'S FIRM LINKAGE TO THE UNITED STATES.

PURSuing OUR COMMITMENT TO DIALOGUE AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A MORE PRODUCTIVE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION THE THREE-YEAR MADRID FOLLOWUP MEETING OF THE THIRTY-FIVE NATION CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. STANDARDS RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALL SIGNATORY COUNTRIES WERE REVIEWED AND THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR THE STKH Conference ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE WAS ADOPTED.

PURSuing OUR COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN OUR DEFENSE FORCES AT THE LOWEST LEVEL NECESSARY FOR DETERRENCE, THE GOVTS CONCERNED HAVE DECIDED IN OCT ON A SIGNIFICANT FURTHER REDUCTION OF THE STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PAST YEAR HAVE BEEN BASED UPON THE CLOSEST AND MOST INTIMATE CONSULTATIONS AMONG US. WE ARE DETERMINED TO FURTHER THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF

...3

PAGE THREE YBGR8677 CONF

THE ALLIANCE AND EUROPEAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION, AND HAVE THEREFORE AGREED TO HOLD ADDITIONAL INFORMAL MEETINGS OF ALLIANCE FOREIGN MINISTERS.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOUBLE-TRACK OF THE ALLIANCE OF 12DEC 1979 IS A FURTHER MANIFESTATION OF OUR FIRM WILL TO ENSURE OUR SECURITY AND AT THE SAME TIME TO ACHIEVE EQUILIBRIUM AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL THROUGH ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. WE REAFFIRM THAT EVERY AMERICAN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE DEPLOYED NOW CAN BE REMOVED IN CONSEQUENCE OF AN EQUITABLE NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT. WE WOULD WELCOME A CORRESPONDING SOVIET DECLARATION ON THE SOVIET MISSILES THAT HAVE LONG BEEN DEPLOYED AND CONTINUE TO BE DEPLOYED. IT REMAINS OUR GOAL THAT IN THE FUTURE THERE SHOULD BE NEITHER SOVIET NOR AMERICAN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES. WE ALSO AGREE TO A LIMITATION OF THESE AMERICAN AND SOVIET WEAPONS AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT WE COLLECTIVELY CALL ON THE SOVIET UNION TO RETURN TO THE INF-NEGOTIATIONS. WE EXTEND TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES THE OFFER TO WORK TOGETHER WITH US TO BRING ABOUT A LONG-TERM CONSTRUCTIVE AND STABLE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP ON THE BASIS OF EQUILIBRIUM, MODERATION, AND RECIPROCITY.

...4

PAGE FOUR YBGR8677 CONFD

WE ADVOCATE AN OPEN, COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

WE SHALL NEVER BE THE FIRST TO LEAVE THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

WE ARE PREPARED FOR COMPREHENSIVE COOPERATION-POLITICALLY,

CONOMICALLY, AND CULTURALLY, TO THE BENEFIT OF

MANKIND AND FOR THE PRTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT.

THE NATIONS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ARE CONVINCED

THAT THE COMING YEAR OFFERS OPPORTUNITIES FOR BUILDING

ON THIS BASIS A MORE BALANCED AND CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST

RELATIONSHIP. WE APPEAL TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW

PACT TO UNDERTAKE JOINT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN:

-THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED
FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR).

-THE ENDEAVOURS FOR A COMPLETE BAN ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS.

-THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START).

WE ARE RESOLVED TO USE THE STKHM CONFERENCE,

WHICH WILL COVER ALL OF EUROPE, AS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY

TO BROADEN THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE ON SECURITY ISSUES, TO

NEGOTIATE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AND ENHANCE

STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

WE ASSURE EVERYONE IN EAST AND WEST THAT WE SHALL DO

OUR UTMOST TO CREATE STABLE FOUNDATIONS NOW FOR A SAFE

AND PEACEFUL FUTURE IN WHICH THERE IS NO/NO FEAR FOR SURVIVAL

AND IN WHICH HUMAN RIGHTS ARE RESPECTED. ~~UNQUOTE.~~

CCC/298 051817Z YBGR8677

PAGE TWO YBGR8675 CONF

THEIR MEETING OF 8 AND 9DEC,1983.

ARMAMENTS CO-OPERATION

MINISTERS EXAMINED THE REPORT BY THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS.THEY NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE PROGRESS MADE IN IMPLEMENTING THE CNAD FOLLOW-ON PROGRAMME TO THE BONN AND LUXEMBOURG MEETINGS,((AND ALSO NOTED AS A PART OF THIS PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE THE CO-ORDINATION OF ARMAMENTS PLANNING PROCEDURES WITH THE OTHER DEFENCE PLANNING PROCEDURES OF THE ALLIANCE.))

REAFFIRMING THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF EVER-TIGHTENING EQUIPMENT BUDGETS MINISTERS NOTED CONTINUING CNAD EFFORTS TO FOCUS ON PRIORITY AREAS OF ACTIVITY,AND IN PARTICULAR TO IDENTIFY OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPLOITING KEY EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES.THEY NOTED THE INTENTION OF THE CNAD TO EXAMINE((ISSUES SURROUNDING THE APPROPRIATE SHARING OF THESE TECHNOLOGIES,))OR((THE VARIOUS PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH EXPLOITATION))AND TO CONSIDER ALSO ((THEIR PROTECTION))OR((THE PROTECTION OF THESE TECHNOLOGIES)) IN THE CONTEXT OF PREVENTING THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY RELEVANT TECHNOLOGY TO THE WARSAW PACT.

MINISTERS NOTED CNAD EFFORTS TO FOSTER CLOSER CO-OPERATION ((NOT/NOT ONLY BETWEEN GOVT AND INDUSTRY,BUT))OR((NOT/NOT ONLY BETWEEN GOVTS,AS PROVIDED IN THE MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING SIGNED

...3

PAGE THREE YBGR9675 CONFD

BY VARIOUS MEMBER COUNTRIES,BUT ALSO))BETWEEN INDUSTRIES THEM-
SELVES,((AND,IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE,
WELCOMED THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE AIR-TO-AIR WEAPONS FAMILY.))
((ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE
MINDFUL THAT THE EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN
TERMS OF SOCIAL HARDSHIP ARE MUCH MORE ACUTELY FELT IN GREECE,
PORTUGAL AND TURKEY THAN ELSEWHERE IN THE ALLIANCE,MINISTERS
RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF INCREASED ALLIED ASSISTANCE IN ORDER
TO HELP THESE COUNTRIES IN THEIR EFFORTS TO BUILD A FIRM AND
SECURE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION AND ENCOURAGE THEIR HOPE FOR A MORE
PROSPEROUS FUTURE.WHILE STRESSING THE ALLIANCES SENSITIVITY TO THE
ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF ITS LESS DEVELOPED MEMBER COUNTRIES,WITH A
GDP PER CAPITA FAR BELOW THE NATO AVERAGE,MINISTERS UNDERLINED
ONCE MORE THE NEED FOR ENHANCED ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
SUPPORT,BOTH BILATERALLY AND THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE NATL
ORGANIZATIONS.))

COMMITTEE ON THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN SOCIETY(CCMS)

MINISTERS TOOK NOTE OF THE SECRETARY GENERALS ANNUAL
REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CTTEE ON THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN
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ITS ACTIVITIES AT A HIGH LEVEL.THE DELIBERATIONS ON THE
FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE COMMITTEES ACTIVITIES HAVE RESULTED IN
AGREEMENT ON THREE NEW STUDIES DEALING,RESPECTIVELY,WITH
ASSESSMENTS OF THE RISKS OF TOXIC PRODUCTS,TRAINING IN THE

...4

PAGE FOUR YBGR8675 CONFD

ENVIRONMENTAL FIELD AND METHODS OF COMBATING FOREST FIRES.TWO
NEW SEMINARS HAVE BEEN ORGANISED.FINALLY,THREE EARLIER PILOT
STUDIES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

MINISTERS NOTED THE REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN.IN VIEW OF THE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL IMPACT ON
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COUNCIL IN PERMANENT SESSION TO CONTINUE TO CONSULT ON THE
QUESTION AND TO SUBMIT FURTHER REPORTS AT THEIR FUTURE MEETINGS.
UNQUOTE.

CCC/298 051501Z YBGR8675

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR8675 05DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 051200

INFO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DIPOL/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA IDD IDDZ RBR IDA PSR EER FPR IDRL IDRA

REF OURTEL 8674 05DEC

---NAC MINISTERIAL MTG BRU:AGREED MINUTES

BELOW IS TEXT OF AGREED MINUTES AS CIRCULATED BY
I/S AFTER SPC DISCUSSION DEC1. A NUMBER OF BRACKETS
HAVE BEEN INSERTED IN SECTION DEALING WITH ARMAMENTS
COOPERATION AS RESULT OF UK AND BELGIUM PROPOSALS FOR
MOST PART AIMING AT DELETION OF WHAT THEY CONSIDERED
UNNECESSARY LANGUAGE. SECTION ON ECONOMIC COOP AND
ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IS IN BRACKETS SIMPLY
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT/NOT DISCUSSED BY SPC. SECTIONS ON
CCMS AND SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN HAVE HARDLY
BEEN LOOKED AT AT END OF LONG SPC DRAFTING SESSION WITH
MOST DELS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. HAVE SOWN AGREED
MINUTES TO VIC MILNE AND WITH YOUR COMMENTS, IF ANY,
ARE CONFIDENT WE CAN MANAGE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. DO
NO/NOT EXPECT ANY PROBLEM WHATSOEVER OVER FINAL
APPROVAL OF AGREED MINUTES DEC8/9.

2. TEXT BEGINS QUOTE:

IN ADDITION TO THE COMMUNIQUE, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
DECIDED TO PUBLISH THE FOLLOWING EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES OF

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR8675 CONF D

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PAGE THREE YBGR9675 CONF

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PAGE FOUR YBGR8675 CONF

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UNQUOTE.

CCC/298 051501Z YBGR8675

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PAGE THREE PMDL8544 CDN EYES ONLY

(NOT/NOT ENOUGH)PARTICIPATION IN SORT OF CONSCIOUSNESS RAISING GROUP TRAVEL SUGGESTED BY KAUNDA AT CHOGM(WELL HIGH IRRELEVANT TO CURRENT EXCERCISE)(C)PARTICIPATION IN EFFORTS OF PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR WORLD ORDER(AGAIN NOT/NOT ENOUGH AND NOT/NOT NOW TO BE PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED)AND(D)CONVENING OF CANCUN TYPE OF ENCOUNTER AMONG 15-25 COUNTRIES,INCLUDING FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS-PERHAPS IN CANADA,IN MONTEBELLO,IN SPRING(TOO IMPRECISE,TOO LITTLE TIME TO ORGANIZE,TOO UNCERTAIN OF OUTCOME).MOST ATTRACTIVE SUGGESTION DISCUSSED WAS POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING NATO SUMMIT IN EARLY SPRING IN CANADA TO CONSIDER THE PARAMETERS FOR THE REVISION OF NATO STRATEGY WHICH DPM/SSEA WILL PROPOSE AT THIS WEEKS NATO MINISTERIAL.

5.WHILE NOT/NOT DISCUSSED IN DETAIL,BUT STILL VERY MUCH IN PMS MIND, AS AT LEAST ONE POSSIBLE END TO EXCERCISE WOULD BE PUBLIC ENUNCIATION OF STATEMENT OF AGREED PRINCIPLES BETWEEN SUPER POWERS ALONG LINES PROPOSED BY HEAD AT WILSON HOUSE.

CCC/253 050812Z PMDL8544

MF

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER
CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

28-6-1-1 Judeau Peace
mission

C O N F I D E N T I E L ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

DE PARIS WIGR5466 05DEC83

A EXTOTT UDDZ

INFO LDN BONN TOKYO BRU HAGUE BNATO ROME VMBFR MOSCO TOKYO PEKIN
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD PCOOTT/FOWLER/CARON

DISTR MINE USS DMF IFB RGB UGB RCD RBD RCR RBR CPD URR IDR IDA

--- INITIATIVE DU PM - POSITION FRANCAISE

RESUME: AVONS RECUEILLI AUPRES DU QUAI (ANDREANI) REACTION LA PLUS
SUPSTANTIELLE A DATE SUR INITIATIVE DU PM. TOUT EN PARTAGEANT
PREOCCUPATIONS QUI MOTIVENT INITIATIVE ET RECONNAISSANT PERTINENCE DE
ANALYSE DU PM SUR DEGRADATION DES RAPPORTS E/O, POSITION FRANCAISE SE
FAIT TOUTEFOIS PLUS RESERVEE ET NUANCEE LORSQU IL S AGIT DES MOYENS
PROPOSES. C EST AINSI QU UN RAPPEL A ETE FAIT DES CONDITIONS EMISES PAR
FRANCE POUR SA PARTICIPATION A CONFERENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NU-
CLEAIRES ET DONT ELLE NE SAURAIT S ELOIGNER. PAR AILLEURS, FRANCE
N EST PAS CONCERNEE PAR MBFR ET N EST PAS PARTIE AU NPT BIEN QU ELLE
EN RESPECT DEJA PLEINEMENT L OBJET. QUAI EMET DES DOUTES SUR IDEE
CDNNE CONCERNANT MOBILITE LIMITEE/VERIFICATION ET REITERE PREOCCU-
PATION DEJA EMISE AU SEIN DE CD SUR ASAT.

2. RAPPORT; AMB DUPUY A RENCONTRE 03DEC M. ANDREANI (DIR DES
AFFAIRES POLITIQUES AU MRE) A DEMANDE DE CE DERNIER, POUR RECUEILLIR
COMMENTAIRES FRANCAIS CONCERNANT INITIATIVE DU PM. SOULIGNONS D ORES
ET DEJA QUE M. ANDREANI NOUS A LIVRE PENDANT LES 75 MINUTES DE CET

...2

PAGE DEUX WIGR5466 CONF ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT
ENTRETIEN, UN COMMENTAIRE POINT PAR POINT CONSTITUANT SANS DOUTE
MISE A JOUR LA PLUS DETAILLEE QUI NOUS AIT A DATE ETE FOURNIE DE
POSITION FRANCAISE SUR INITIATIVE DU PM DEPUIS.RENCONTRE AVEC
PRES MITTERRAND.

3. CONCERNANT ANALYSE ET MOTIFS PRESIDANT A INITIATIVE DU PM,
ANDREANI A PRECISE QU IL CONVENAIT DE DISTINGUER ENTRE CIT CAUSES
PROFONDES ET CELLES PLUS SUPERFICIELLES FINCIT QUI ONT CONTRIBUE
A PRESENTE SITUATION DE TENSION ET A DEGRADATION DES RAPPORTS
ENTRE E/O. REPRFNANT EN SUBSTANCE ARGUMENTATION DEJA TENUE PRECE-
DEMMENT, ANDREANI CONSTATE QUE CRISE DES EUROMISSILES/DIFFICULTES
DANS NEGS DE GENEVE NE SONT QUE DES EMANATIONS RECENTES DE DIVER-
GENCES REMONTANT A PLUSIEURS ANNEES AUPARAVANT ET QUI DECOULENT
SOMME TOUTE DE DIFFERENCES DIVERSES TANT CULTURELLES QUE POLITIQUES
ET MEME IDEOLOGIQUES/DOGMATIQUES ENTRE E/O,OU PLUS SIMPLEMENT ENTRE
EUA/URSS.

4. SELON ANDREANI, IL CONVIENT DE DISTINGUER TROIS NIVEAUX:(A)
CELUI DES AFFAIRES COURANTES; (B) DES FORA INTERNATIONAUX; (C) DU
DIALOGUE A HAUT NIVEAU. SUR LE PREMIER, ANDREANI CONSTATE QUE MALGREE
LES DIVERS REGAINS DE TENSION, RELATIONS COMMERCIALES/SCIENTIFIQUES/
CULTURELLES N ONT JAMAIS TOTALEMENT CESSE ENTRE E/O ET QUE CELA S
APPLIQUE EGALEMENT AUX RELATIONS EUA/URSS.CHACUN A CONTINUE D EN
RETIRER SON PROFIT A SON RYTHME MEME AU MOMENT DE SANCTIONS ECONOS(RE

...2

PAGE TROIS WIGR5466 ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

CONTRAT CEREALIER AMERICAIN/GAZODUC). A CE NIVEAU, ET PARFOIS SANS ANALOGIE AVEC CONTEXTE POLITIQUE, TOUT A PROCÉDE SUR UN MODE DU CIT BUSINESS AS USUAL FINCIT. DEUXIEMEMENT, AU NIVEAU DES DIVERSES INSTANCES INNATALES, START SE POURSUIVENT MALGRE INTERRUPTION DES DISCUSSIONS FNI.CDE DEMARERA COMME PREVU EN JANVIER, ETC. CE QU IL CONVIENT DE RETENIR C EST QU IL Y A MALGRE TOUT UN CERTAIN DIALOGUE QUI SE POURSUIT. QUANT AU DIALOGUE POLITIQUE A HAUT NIVEAU, IL EST VRAI QU UNE RENCONTRE EST PEU PROBABLE ENTRE REAGAN/ANDROPOV. MAIS IL FAUT RECONNAITRE QUE LA RESPONSABILITE D AMELIORER CE DIALOGUE INCOMBE EN PRIORITE AUX DEUX GRANDS QUI ONT EN MAINS LES ELEMENTS DETERMINANTS POUR CE FAIRE. PRENANT EXEMPLE DU LIBAN, ANDREANI A SOULIGNE QUE FRANCE AVAIT A PLUSIEURS REPRISES ENCOURAGE ET INCITE EUA A DES CONTACTS/CONSULTATIONS AVEC URSS ET QU ELLE RECIDIVERA D AILLEURS EN CE SENS.

5. POINT IMPORTANT, NOTE ANDREANI, EST DE NE PAS TOMBER DANS PIEGE DE LA PEUR QUE URSS ENCOURAGE SURTOUT EN EUROPE PAR FNI AUPRES DES OPINIONS PUBLIQUES ET PAR PACIFISME INTERPOSE. EN FAIT, DECISION DE URSS DE SE RETIRER DE GENEVE EST SELON LUI NON RAISONNABLE D AUTANT QUE EUA POUR LEUR PART ONT POURSUIVI NEGS MALGRE DEPLOIEMENT EN COURS DES SS-20. URSS VEUT EN FAIT EMPOCHER BENEFICES DE LA PEUR SANS FAIRE LA GUERRE. ATTITUDE FRANCAISE EN LA MATIERE EST DONC DE NE PAS DRAMATISER LA SITUATION

...4

PAGE QUATRE WIGR5466 CONF ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

ET ANDREANI RECONNAIT QUE PM CDN, TANT DANS SES INTENTIONS QUE SON ANALYSE, TEND A EVITER UNE TELLE APPROCHE.

6. SECOND TEMPS DU COMMENTAIRE DE ANDREANI A PORTE SUR MOYENS ENVISAGES PAR PM CDN. CONCERNANT IDEE D UNE CONF DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES, IL A RAPPELE TROIS CONDITIONS DEJA CONNUES POSEES PAR FRANCE AVANT QU ELLE NE S ASSOCIE A UNE TELLE CONFERENCE.

OR ANDREANI DIT CRAINDRE DANS CONTEXTE ACTUEL QUE TELLE CONFERENCE N AIT PRECISEMENT POUR OBJET ET OBJECTIF CE QUE FRANCE POSE COMME CONDITIONS. CELA DIT, FRANCE N EXCLUT PAS DE S ASSOCIER A UNE TELLE CONFERENCE MAIS DES GESTES DEVRONT ETRE POSES PAR DEUX SUPERPUISSANCES DANS LE SENS D UNE REDUCTION DES POTENTIELS NUCLEAIRES. CONTRAITEMENT A LA CHINE (RE REDUCTION DE 50 POURCENT) CE N EST PAS UNE QUESTION DE PROPORTIONS PRECISES PREALABLES. PRESENTEMENT, FRANCE CRAINT QU EN S AMENANT AVEC SON PETIT ARSENAL DESSERVANT SES FINS NATIONALES, L ON NE FIXE DES QUOTAS SUR UN DISPOSITIF QUI N EST QU UN MINIMUM ESSENTIEL POUR TOUTE CREDIBILITE. PAR AILLEURS, UNE CONFERENCE A CINQ NE DEVRAIT PAS INTERFERER AVEC START. RESULTATS INTERESSANTS DANS NEGS START, CONFIRMANT REDUCTION EFFECTIVE. POURRAIENT CREER TERRAIN PLUS FAVORABLE A CONFERENCE ELARGIE BIEN QU IL S AGISSE DANS CE CAS (START) D UNE NEG BILATERALE QUI NE DOIT PAS ETRE CONFONDUE POUR AUTANT.

7. CONCERNANT MBFR, ANDREANI A RAPPELE QUE FRANCE N ETAIT PAS/PAS

...5

PAGE CINQ WIGR5466 CONF ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

PARTIE A CETTE NEGOCIATION ET DONC QU IL NE LUI APPARTENAIT GUERE DE COMMENTER IDEE D Y INSUFFLER UNE NOUVELLE VITALITE POLITIQUE. IL A INDIQUE TOUTEFOIS QUE IDEE DU PM ETAIT INTERESSANTE MAIS PAS NOUVELLE. ANDREANI A SOULIGNE QUE FRANCE FONDAIT ESPOIR SUR CDE ET A RECONNU QUE DES RESULTATS POSITIFS A STKHLM SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES DE RENCONTRER UNE DES CONDITIONS POSEES PAR FRANCE POUR CONFERENCE DES CINQ NUCLEAIRES (RE CONVENTIONNEL). EN FAIT, SELON ANDREANI, CDE PEUT COEXISTER AVEC MBFR BIEN QU IL S AGISSE DE DEUX NEGS DIFFERENTES.

8. SUR NPT, FRANCE N EST PAS SIGNATAIRE DU TRAITE CIT MAIS EN RESPECTE PLEINEMENT L OBJET FNCIT. ANDREANI A DIT COMPRENDRE NOTRE SOUCI D ETENDRE ADHESIONS AU TRAITE. LA AUSSI, C EST LARGEMENT UNE AFFAIRE QUI CONCERNE AU PREMIER CHEF DEUX SUPER-PUISSANCES BIEN QU IL FAILLE EGALEMENT COMPRENDRE PREOCCUPATIONS DES PAYS TIERS.

9. QUANT A MOBILITE/VERIFICATION LIMITEE, ANDREANI DIT NE PAS TRES BIEN COMPRENDRE INFLUENCE D UN TERME SUR L AUTRE D AUTANT QUE L ON SEMBLE CONCEVOIR COMME UNE CHOSE ACQUISE POSSIBILITE DE VERIFICATION, CE QUI N EST PAS LE CAS (RE CDE). IL N EST PAS ASSURE QU UNE LIMITATION DE MOBILITE NE SIMPLIFIE POUR AUTANT VERIFICATION, D OU SES RESERVES.

10. ENFIN CONCERNANT ASAT, RAPPEL FUT FAIT DE INTERET CONSTANT

...6

PAGE SIX WIGR5466 CONF ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

EXPRIME PAR FRANCE DANS CE DOMAINE PARTICULIEREMENT A CD OU TRAVAIL DEVRAIT S Y POURSUIVRE POUR AUTANT QUE EUA ET URSS FASSENT PREUVE D INTERET ET SOIENT DISPOSES EN CE SENS.

11. SUR QUESTION DES ABM, ANDREANI A RESERVE SES COMMENTAIRES JUSQU A CE QU IL AIT PU PRENDRE CONNAISSANCE PLUS PRECISEMENT DES INTENTIONS AMERICAINES.

12. COMMENTAIRES: COMME LE CONSTATEZ POSITION DU QUAI EST DONC LARGEMENT EMPREINTE DE RESERVES ET DE NUANCES ESSENTIELLEMENT SUR MOYENS ENONCES POUR METTRE EN OEUVRE INITIATIVE DU PM. TELS COMMENTAIRES NE PEUVENT ETRE PLEINEMENT APPRECIES SANS UNE REFERENCE SUR SA SITUATION PARTICULIERE ET SPECIFIQUE SUR CHACUN DES CHAPITRES. EN RESUME DISONS QUE FRANCE ADOPTERA ATTITUDE PLEINEMENT NON/NON PREJUDICIALBE A INITIATIVE CDNNE MAIS NE S ENGAGERA PAS SUR LES MOYENS SANS QUE LES RISQUES DE COMPROMETTRE SA SPECIFICITE ET SES ACQUIS NE SOIENT DAVANTAGE DISSIPES OU QUE LES DEUX SUPER-GRANDS AIENT FAIT BOUT DE CHEMIN QU IL LEUR APPARTIENT DE FAIRE ET DONT ILS ONT PRIME RESPONSABILITE.

CCC/027 051710Z WIGR5466

28-6-1-1 Judeau Peace
Mission.

S E C R E T

FM EXTOTT IDR4649 05DEC83

TO BNATO

INFO BUCST LDM PARIS MDRID LSEON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO
BRU HAGUE WSHDC MOSCO GENEV WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM VMBFR
PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/CPD/DGIS PRMNY
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDD IDRA
IDA IDDZ RBRD IDX ZSP RBP ZSI
REF YOURTELS UYGR3047 28NOV UYGR3068 30NOV

---INF:ROM INITIATIVE:SPECIAL ENVOY TO USA AND CDA

DOLGU MET USA ASST SECTY BURT ON 01DEC.FOLLOWING INFO RECEIVED FROM
USA EMB.

2.TEXT BEGINS.QUOTE

3.ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD BURT MET FOR ONE AND A
HALF HOURS WITH ROMANIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
CHFORGHE DOLGU ON DECEMBER 1.AMBASSADOR MALITZA AND
MR RACEANU,ROMANIAN MFA OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF NORTH
AMERICAN AFFAIRS,ACCOMPANIED DOLGU.CEAUSESCU SENT
DOLGU TO MOSCOW LAST WEEK AND THE U.S.THIS WEEK TO
PRESENT HIS NEW IDEAS ON INF THAT WERE IN THE NOVEMBER
25 ROMANIAN PARTY DECLARATION ON MISSILES.DISCUSSION
TODAY FOCUSED EXCLUSIVELY ON INF ISSUES.DOLGU IS ALSO
MEETING WITHACDA DIRECTOR KENNETH ALDEMAN AND UNDER
SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON

...

PAGE TWO IDR4649 SECRET

4. WHILE IN MOSCOW DOLGU MET WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNYENKO WHO REPEATED TO HIM THE ANDROPOV NOVEMBER 24 STATEMENT. ACCORDING TO DOLGU, KORNYENKO DID NOT/NOT RULE OUT RESUMPTION OF THE INF TALKS, BUT THE SOVIETS DO NOT/NOT INTEND TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS TO RESTART THE TALKS. KORNYENKO ALSO ASSURED DOLGU IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT/NOT DEPLOY ANY NEW SS-20 MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN USSR AFTER THE MARCH 1982 PREZHNEV MORATORIUM WAS ANNOUNCED.

5. DOLGU DID NOT/NOT HAVE ANY NEW POINTS BEYOND THOSE INCLUDED IN THE ROMANIAN NOVEMBER 25 DECLARATION. HE SAID THAT CEAUSESCU WAS PRESENTING THESE AS A POSSIBLE MEANS TO BREAK THE IMPASSE IN INF NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT THE ROMANIANS DO NOT/NOT HAVE GREAT AMBITIONS FOR THEIR PROPOSALS. THE ROMANIANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SOVIETS RETURN TO GENEVA AND SIGN AN INF AGREEMENT THAT WOULD LEAD TO A MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS.

6. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE CORDIAL WITH A FREE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS ON INF. BURT FIRMLY STRESSED OUR INABILITY TO ACCEPT THE ROMANIAN PROPOSALS, BUT EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THEIR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS TO RETURN TO GENEVA. THERE WERE NO/NO DISCUSSIONS OF

...3

PAGE THREE IDR4649 SECRET

U.S./SOVIET SUMMITS OR HIGH-LEVEL NATO/WARSAW PACT
MEETINGS.DURING THE DISCUSSIONS,BURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING POINTS:

SOVIET CLAIMS REGARDING SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS AFTER
BREZHNEV MORATORIUM ARE NOT/NOT TRUE.DEPLOYMENTS
CONTINUED AT BASES ALREADY UNDER CONSTRUCTION A THE
TIME.

THE BEGINNING OF U.S.DEPLOYMENTS IS NOT/NOT
DESTABILIZING.RATHER THE DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20S WAS THE
DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF FORCES.

AN EQUITABLE,VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT IS THE ONLY WAY
TO STOP U.S.DEPLOYMENTS.A POSTPONEMENT OR PAUSE IS
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S.AND OUR NATO ALLIES.

WE AGREE WITH ROMANIAN GOAL OF ESTABLISHING A
MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL
OF ARMAMENTS.

IF THE U.S.IS FORCED TO DEPLOY ALL 572 LRINF
MISSILES TO EUROPE,WE WILL STILL HAVE FEWER NUCLEAR
WARHEADS IN EUROPE--DUE TO STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS
ALREADY MANDATED--THAN IN DECEMBER 1979 AT THE TIME
OF THE DUAL TRACK DECISION.

SOVIETS MADE A MAJOR BLUNDER IN THINKING THEY COULD
PREVENT DEPLOYMENT OF U.S.MISSILES TO EUROPE BY
STALLING AND NOT/NOT NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY.

...4

PAGE FOUR IDR4649 SECRET

--AFTER TWO YEARS THE SOVIETS STILL WANT QUOTE HALF-ZERO UNQUOTE OUTCOME, THAT IS, A MONOPOLY OF LRINF FORCES.

--U.S. CANNOT/NOT ACCEPT SITUATION OF LARGE NUMBER OF SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES TARGETED ON NATO ALLIES WITH NO/NO OFFSETTING U.S. DEPLOYMENTS. A SOVIET MONOPOLY IS UNACCEPTABLE.

--EVEN UNDER A ZERO/ZERO OUTCOME FOR LRINF SYSTEMS, SOVIETS WOULD HAVE OVERWHELMING NUMBERS OF WARHEADS COVERING WESTERN EUROPE COMPARED TO NUMBERS OF UK/FRENCH FORCES.

--ALL PARTIES MUST MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT AN AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE IF THE SOVIETS WILL RETURN TO GENEVA AND NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY.

WITHOUT U.S. DEPLOYMENTS, THE NON-NUCLEAR MEMBERS OF NATO WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT.

THE U.S. AND OUR NATO ALLIES WILL NEVER ACCEPT COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES IN BI-LATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.

--U.S. WOULD NOT/NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS TO COAX THE SOVIETS BACK AS THAT WOULD ENCOURAGE SOVIETS TO STAY AWAY LONGER HOPING FOR MORE CONCESSIONS.

UNQUOTE. TEXT ENDS.

CCC/081 052130Z IDR4649

MF

R E S T R I C T E D

FM POECD VFGR3729 05DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO PARIS WSHDC BNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPO

DISTR IFB RGB RCD IDD IDZ IDR EER

REF JENKINS/SMITH TELECON 02DEC

---SEC WEINBERGER ON PMS INITIATIVE

WEINBERGER SPOKE TO ATLANTIC INSTITUTE FOR INNATL AFFAIRS IN PARIS 02DEC. SPEECH AND QUESTION PERIOD THAT FOLLOWED WERE ON RECORD AND WIDELY COVERED BY EUROPEAN AND USA JOURNALISTS.

2. SPEECH CONTAINED NO/NO SURPRISES AND IS SUMMARIZED IN 03DEC ISSUE INNATL HEPALD TRIBUNE. COMMON THREAD THROUGH HIS REMARKS WAS NEED TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH. IN HIS VIEW PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS BETTER NOW THAN EVER. SOVIET RETURN TO NEGOTIATING TABLE WOULD BE QUOTE PERHAPS MATTER OF MONTHS UNQUOTE.


2. PARTICIPANT IN ATLANTIC INSTITUTE SEMINAR WEINBERGER WAS ADDRESSING ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT OF PM TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE. WEINBERGER REPLIED HE WAS NOT/NOT FAMILIAR WITH ITS DETAILS. HE KNEW CDN PM HAD BEEN TRAVELLING IN A QUOTE QUEST FOR PEACE UNQUOTE. WEINBERGER COULD QUOTE SUPPORT ANY QUEST FOR PEACE UNQUOTE.

3. WEINBERGER RESPONSE DID NOT/NOT PROVOKE ANY FURTHER QUESTION ON PMS INITIATIVE AND AS FAR AS WE KNOW HAS NOT/NOT BEEN PICKED UP IN FRENCH PRESS OR USA PRESS IN EUROPE.

CCC/027 051539Z VFGR3729

28-6-1-1 Trudeau
Page
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM EXTOTT PER0492 05DEC83
TO LDN IMMED
DISTR IDDZ



REF IDDZ TEL 0242 02DEC

--PM INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH US AND UK

GRATEFUL YOU PASS REFTEL ASAP TO PER/DAVIDSON ATTENDING
INTELLIGENCE CONSULTATIONS IN LDN BEGINNING TODAY.

CCC/291 051744Z PER0492

External Affairs Canada
Affaires extérieures Canada

MESSAGE

ACTION

SUITE A DONNER

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	RESTRICTED	12	10
FM/DE	LNGLS XGR 368 5DEC/83		
TO/A	EXTOTT IDDZ		
NFO	WSHDC PCOOTT/FOWLER		
DISTR	MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR SCD SCS		
REF	OURTEL 351 22NOV83		
SUBJ/SUJ	---ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: PM'S INITIATIVE		
<p>1.FURTHER TO OUR REFTEL, THE ATTACHED SELF-EXPLANATORY LETTER MAY --- BE OF INTEREST.</p>			

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
mission

DRAFTER/REDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIVISION

161 500/200

APPROVED/APPROUVE

SIG

SIG

JON C. LEGG

2
2

WARREN CHRISTOPHER

November 30, 1983

400 SOUTH HOPE STREET
LOS ANGELES 90071-2899
(213) 699-6000

1800 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036-5597
(202) 457-5300

Jim Sutcliffe Nutt, Q.C.
Consul General of Canada
510 West Sixth Street
Los Angeles, California 90014

Dear Jim:

Thank you ever so much for your
letter of November 22 enclosing Prime Minister
Trudeau's follow-up statement on his return
from Europe.

It is a brilliant statement--one
of the most comprehensive I have seen on global
security problems. I am particularly glad
to note the emphasis given by the Prime Minister
to "horizontal" proliferation. The world
needs to be reminded of the tremendous risk
involved in this kind of proliferation because,
as the Prime Minister implies, the deterrence
tends to be less effective in this sphere.
Of course, the related problems are--to borrow
the Prime Minister's excellent praise--"laminated
together, as they are in real life."

I hope it will be possible for us
to have lunch together with Mr. Frank King
in January, as we discussed earlier.


With personal regards.

Sincerely,

Chris

Warren Christopher

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM WSHDC UNGR0191 05DEC83
TO EXTOTT URR
INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR DMF UGB IDDZ IDR MINA
--SEN MATHIAS



REPUBLICAN SEN CHAS MATHIAS(MD)TOLD GOTLIEB ON WEEKEND THAT HE
WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO SEE MR TRUDEAU IN OTT SOMETIME IN EARLY
JAN.AS YOU KNOW,SEN MATHIAS,A SENIOR MEMBER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
CTTEE,IS A HIGHLY INTELLIGENT,RESPECTED AND INFLUENTIAL WSHDC
POLITICAL FIGURE.WE UNDERSTAND HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS EAST-WEST
RELATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER.GOTLIEB TOLD MATHIAS THAT HE WOULD
RELAY MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER WHO KNEW OF AND RESPECTED HIS
VIEWS.GOTLIEB ADDED HE FELT SURE PM WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE HIM
IF HIS TIMETABLE PERMITTED THIS AND THAT HE WOULD GET BACK TO
HIM.PLS ADVISE IN DUE COURSE.

CCC/241 062039Z UNGR0191

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM WSHDC UNGRO190 05DEC83

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN VMBFR
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ADMPOL/CPP/DIPOL/DSTRATA

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RBD RCR RCD RSR RSRD CPD IDDZ

REF OURTELS UNGRO188 29NOV UNGRO186 25NOV

---USA-USSR RELATIONS

ASST SEC BURT REPORTED TO GOTLIEB THAT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN WITHIN STATE TO POSSIBILITY OF MODIFYING KIND OF DISCOURSE WITH SOVIET UNION THAT ADMINISTRATION HAS ENGAGED IN TO DATE.STATE BELIEVES THAT EVIDENCE,INCLUDING RECENT CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMB HARTMAN AND GROMYKO IN MOSCO,SUGGESTS SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN SHAKEN AND CONFUSED BY ADMINISTRATION RHETORIC SEEMING,AS IT DOES, TO QUESTION LEGITIMACY AND SURVIVABILITY OF SOVIET REGIME.SHULTZ HAS NOT/NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO PUSH IN DIRECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT IN NEAR FUTURE NOR IS IT CLEAR WHETHER PRES WOULD AGREE IN ANY EVENT.WHITE HOUSE WITH EXCEPTION OF BUSH,IS NOT/NOT PARTICULARLY ENERGIZED BY ISSUE OF USA-USSR RELATIONS.WHETHER OR NOT/NOT FORM OF DIALOGUE IS CHANGED AND WILLINGNESS TO TALK IS INDICATED,USA WILL NOT/NOT BE DISPOSED TO OFFER SIGNIFICANT NEW ACCOMMODATION OR CONCESSIONS TO USSR.WELL-INFORMED INSIDER LARRY BARRETT,TIME WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENT,WHO HAS JUST COMPLETED INTENSIVE INTERVIEWS,CONFIRMS TO GOTLIEB PRIVATELY THAT WHITE HOUSE LINE WILL REMAIN HARD AND SHULTZ WILL REMAIN VERY COMFORTABLE WITH IT.

...2

001067

PAGE TWO UNGRO190 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

2.BURT BELIEVES INITIATIVE IN USA-USSR RELATIONS LIES MAINLY WITH SHULTZ NOW.WHILE SHULTZ MAY WELL COME TO ADVOCATE A MORE MODERATE LINE AND EXPLORATION OF SOME AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST,BURT BELIEVES THERE WILL BE OPPOSITION FROM WEINBERGER AND SOME IN NSC.MACFARLANE IS UNLIKELY TO WEIGH HEAVILY AGAINST IMPROVED DIALOGUE ALTHOUGH HE NEEDS TO SHOW CREDIBILITY WITH HARD LINERS.THERE IS CLOSE TO CONSENSUS THAT USA NOW TALKS FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH AND USA POLICY SHOULD REFLECT THIS FACT.THERE WILL ACCORDINGLY BE NO/NO DISPOSITION TO ADVANCE SIGNIFICANT NEW CONCESSION IN ARMS-CONTROL OR IN OTHER AREAS OF RELATIONSHIP.BUT BURT BELIEVES THERE IS GOOD PROSPECT SHULTZ WILL BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE PRESIDENT TO MODERATE QUALITY OF DISCOURSE IN COMING MONTHS AND TO INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE REFLECTING RECOGNITION OF SOVIET LEGITIMACY AND BASED ON MUTUALITY OF INTEREST.

3.BURT BELIEVES BEST APPROACH FOR PM TRUDEAU TO TAKE IN DIALOGUE WITH PRESIDENT IS TO ENCOURAGE PRESIDENT TO EXPRESS HIS OWN VIEWS AND REVEAL HIS OWN THINKING.DIALOGUE THAT MIGHT INADVERTENTLY PUT REAGAN ON DEFENSIVE WOULD RESULT IN MEMBERS OF REAGAN TEAM RESPONDING AND PRESIDENT WITHDRAWING FROM REAL DIALOGUE WITH PRIME MINISTER.

4.PLS TREAT THIS INFO AND SOURCES WITH GREAT DISCRETION.

5.INCIDENTALLY,BURT ALSO SAID ARMAND HAMMER HAS BEEN IN STATE DEPT LAST WEEK AND INFORMED THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN APPT TO SEE ANDROPOV 17DEC.THIS CONFIRMED OTHER INFO THAT ANDROPOV CAR HAD BEEN SEEN RECENTLY IN MOSCO INCLUDING SIGHTING OF ANDROPOV BY RELIABLE INDIAN AMBASSADOR TO USSR TO EFFECT SOVIET LEADER WAS NOW CLOSE TO BEING UP AND AROUND.

CCC/086 051810Z UNGRO190

001068

BURROUGHS DEX 3500

P.5

1/2

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(212) 246-7424

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ACTION
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Our file/no. dossier:

NYC

211

28-6-1- Trudeau
Peace
Mission

NO.

GRPA-15

DATE

05 DEC 83

PAGES

2

(incl. cover)

(y compris la page
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General
DU : Consulat général du Canada
NEW YORK

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M./Mad.

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A : M./Mad.

MCDUGALL

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PER

Phone :

Téléphone :

6-1989

Subject :

Objet :

NEW YORK TIMES 4 DEC 83

PEKING HEARS TRUDEAU'S BID FOR FIVE-NATION
TALKS

ORIGINAL AS IS

2/2


YT, 4/12/83, p. 2E

Peking Hears Trudeau's Bid for Five-Nation Talks

6-19

Peking Hears Trudeau's Bid for Five-Nation Talks

For China, Disarmament Begins Away From Home



Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping with Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau in Peking last week.

By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN

PEKING — When Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau brought his proposal for a five-nation disarmament conference to Peking last week, he got little more than tea and sympathy. The Chinese leadership praised Mr. Trudeau's efforts but told him the Soviet Union and the United States had to reduce their nuclear weapons first.

China, which many experts rank third as a world nuclear power, is a wild card in the disarmament game. It refuses to be drawn into arms control negotiations or nonproliferation treaties. It protests the deployment of Soviet missiles along its northern frontier, but its own nuclear armaments, which it calls modest and strictly for self-defense, have disconcerted the Kremlin and influenced the Soviet-American strategic arms reduction talks.

China's posture is an extension of its ideological outlook, in which the Soviet Union and the United States both present hegemonic threats. There is no use in discussing disarmament, Peking reasons, until the superpowers start destroying their nuclear weapons. China espouses universal disarmament in theory. But practical doubts were raised recently in the party's theoretical journal *Red Flag*, which contended it was

"impossible to reduce armed forces and dismantle weapons in a thorough way when imperialism and hegemonism still exist."

China has paid increasing attention to the issue lately. Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian proposed at the United Nations General Assembly in September that the Soviet Union and the United States should reduce their nuclear warheads and delivery systems by half, after which a conference of all countries with nuclear arms could be convened to discuss broader reductions. This was slightly more flexible than Peking's old demand that the Soviet Union and the United States destroy half their nuclear weapons before a conference could be considered. But the cuts that Peking wants go well beyond anything Moscow and Washington have discussed in their many rounds of negotiation.

It remains unclear who would join such a conference besides the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France and China, which admit to having nuclear weapons. Would China also insist upon countries suspected of having them, such as India, Israel and South Africa? China has said that nuclear disarmament must go hand in hand with any cutback in conventional weapons, and include the withdrawal of all troops from foreign territories. Such prerequisites are complicated by Peking's unwillingness to acknowledge its nuclear poten-

tial. Chinese delegates participating in a Tokyo antinuclear conference in August refused to sign the final document because, they said, "the declaration put China on a par with the two superpowers."

Peking has expressed support for Western Europe's pacifist movement, which the People's Daily said shows "a legitimate desire to maintain peace and prevent nuclear war." But there have been hints that China is not entirely unhappy with the deployment of new American missiles in Western Europe. When Gaston Thorn, the President of the European Community, recently visited Peking, he said Deng Xiaoping, China's leader, had told him the deployment was "inevitable."

China's paramount concern is that the arms race not spill over into Asia. One precondition for more normal relations with the Soviet Union is a sharp reduction in the Soviet SS-20 missiles along the border. Peking was not satisfied with Yuri Andropov's assurances in August that Soviet missiles removed from Europe in an arms agreement would not be shifted to Asia. The Japanese Foreign Ministry disclosed last week that the number of SS-20's in northern Asia had already been increased from 108 to 117.

Deploring the breakdown of the Geneva talks on intermediate-range missiles in Europe, Wang Zhenyu, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, said last week that "China, as an Asian country, also opposes the Soviet-U.S. arms race in Asia. We hold that the nuclear weapons already deployed in Asia should be drastically reduced or dismantled." China said in August that it wanted to join the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, which would increase its access to Western technology. But Peking made clear it would not submit to the agency's international inspections. Past reports that China had secretly sold enriched uranium to South Africa and Pakistan have been vehemently denied.

The absence of guarantees against such exports is the principal reason why Washington has not allowed China to buy American nuclear power technology.

China's leadership considers its nuclear arsenal the cheapest and fastest deterrence against aggression. Defense ranks last in China's "four modernizations" drive, behind agriculture, industry and science. Defense Minister Zhang Ailing suggested last March in the journal *Red Flag* that the limited resources available be used to improve nuclear warheads, missiles and fuel.

The London-based Institute of Strategic Studies has estimated that China has several hundred nuclear weapons. It successfully launched a land-based intercontinental missile in 1980, rocket carrying several satellites in 1981 and other missile from an underwater submarine in 1982. A simulated nuclear explosion highlighted big-scale army maneuvers last year in northern China.

Mr. Zhang quoted Lenin as saying that an army that did not want to master all the new weapons and fighting methods was foolish. "We hardly resemble the Russians. It suggests China is not quite the bystander it claims to be."

TO/À FILE

FROM/DE FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

CBC As it Happens:
Prime Minister Trudeau's Peace Initiative
Interview - W.H. Barton and Mr. Doran

28-6-1- Trudeau
Peace
Mission

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
December 4, 1983
Number/Numéro
FPR-1161

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ANNEXES

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CBC: As the Parliamentary Session drew to a close this week, Prime Minister Trudeau was in China promoting his Peace Initiative. Tomorrow Mr. Trudeau, his son Justin and their entourage, return to Ottawa where there will be tough questions about his mission's accomplishments.

CBC: While Mr. Trudeau's efforts have been politely welcomed, they have also been viewed with skepticism. We are joined this morning, from our Washington studio, by Charles Doran, Director of the Centre for Canadian Studies at Johns Hopkins University. In Ottawa, William Barton, a former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations.

CBC: Gentlemen, the Prime Minister has just spent five weeks travelling around the world trying to sell his peace plan. How do you assess this mission. First, Mr. Doran in Washington?

C.D.: I think the timing of it was important, because he was letting people know that the arms control talks were in fact failing before many others were really aware of this. Secondly, there is some very important substance in these proposals. There are also some difficulties.

CBC: Mr. Barton in Ottawa?

WHB: Yes, I agree with what Mr. Doran has said. I think I wouldn't call it so much a proposal as an initiative to draw attention to the need for something. Because when you get down into the details, that's where you run into problems.

CBC: Well, let's look at the core of the Prime Minister's plan and one of the initiatives was to hold a conference of the five nuclear powers. Is that a realistic proposal?

...2

FPR-1161
December 4, 1983

- 2 -

WHB: Well, in my experience, No. The Chinese, for example, or the Russians, or at least the French, unless they have changed their views completely and I don't think they have, take the view that they wouldn't even sit down with the other three until the British, and in particular, the Americans and the French had, in effect, come down to the scale where the Chinese and the French are. So, you have got a situation where they won't talk, to start with. That assumes that the Russians and the Americans would be prepared to have the French and the Chinese and, for that matter, the British sit around with them. I think they take the view that their discussions are at a different level.

CBC: Mr. Doran, what is your view on this proposed Conference?

C.D.: I think the format for the five power approach was not very helpful. First of all, the nature of the problem is far different, I think, for the super-powers than it is for the others. Secondly, the other members that were asked to participate have rather politely, but nonetheless clearly, indicated that they don't want to participate. They prefer to be outside of this dialogue. Thirdly, if it is difficult to get two participants to talk seriously about arms, it would probably be considerably tougher to get all five.

CBC: Gentlemen, the reception given to the Prime Minister's initiative appears, at least from here, to be a cautious one. Mr. Barton you have been a diplomat for this country, how do you interpret what has been said by the Commonwealth leaders and the super-powers?

WHB: Well, I think each one of them sees it in terms of their own national interests. Each one of them has reservations about parts of it. For example, you talk about the Commonwealth. Well, one of the things Mr. Trudeau mentioned was to invigorate the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But some of the most active dislikers and opposition to the NPT come from Commonwealth countries and particularly India. More and more countries regard that Treaty as a bill of goods that they were sold and so for us to talk about that as a component of the plan leads to reservations and general expressions of belief in peace and nuclear disarmament, but makes them express their views in generalities rather than in particular.

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FPR-1161
December 4, 1983

- 3 -

CBC: Mr. Doran, how do you interpret Washington's reaction to the Prime Minister's Peace Initiative?

C.D.: I think that the feeling here is going to be one of some caution in terms of response, because for one thing, as Mr. Barton pointed out, some of the details are not clear in terms of implication. The notion of involving five powers for example, is not something which would be looked upon very favourably here. There was some uncertainty with regard to this conventional, the way in which to deal with the conventional imbalance. On the other hand, there is appreciation with the notion that something ought to be done to sustain the atmosphere of communciation, at least, in a period when things are going so badly in the other arms control area. But I think there will be caution in responding to the details. In fact, what one will see is not much public discussion but there will be communication in other channels.

CBC: Gentlemen, was this the right move at the right time? Mr. Barton?

WHB: There is always the right time for that kind of move. because I mean of course obviously if there is a mood of sweetness, harmony and light, that perhaps isn't called for but that's not usually the case. I think that in particular at a moment like this, when the level of, the temperature, is perceived by people to have greatly increased its importance. I don't know what the clock on the cover of the Atomic Energy magazine is at at the moment, the one that used to go at five to nine, or at five to twelve, and was moved around, but I would have thought that it must be moving closer and closer to midnight and it is time to take the kind of initiative that Mr. Trudeau did. I just hope that he will sustain it and that he will enlist the aid of others.

CBC: Mr. Doran?

C.D.: I think that the ideas are very important; that the timing was critical. I think it is important to emphasize that this is to complement the on-going talks and in no sense get in the way of those talks. Therefore, what it does in fact is to focus people's attention on what is important in a period when this kind of support is needed.


...4

FPR-1161
December 4, 1983

- 4 -

WHB: I would agree.

CBC: Gentlemen, thank you for talking with us this morning. Mr. Barton in Ottawa, thank you.
Mr. Doran in Washington, thank you.



D. Buckley-Jones
Deputy Director
Media Relations Division

MF

Sec 8 sent DPM & AND

9 to RINA
E
T de

On December 4, Mr. Mulroney put forward seven arms control initiatives. These are listed below with our comments.

1. Call on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence to undertake immediately both a foreign and defence policy review, with special reference to existing zones of tension in the world and to examine and promote disarmament discussion in Canada.

COMMENT:

The Standing Committee already has a reference related to peacekeeping. Another reference to review foreign and defence policy would be a decision for DPM/SSEA.

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

2. Call on our government to resume Canada's leading role in promoting nuclear non-proliferation among those countries which now possess nuclear technology and which have the potential of developing non-peaceful uses of such technology. Further, call for continued support for full scope safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear exports.

COMMENT:

Strengthening the non-proliferation regime of the NPT is one of the basic elements of the PM's initiative. It was stressed in both the PM's Guelph and Montreal speeches and was pursued by the PM at the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi.

Canadian government policy on nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear weapon states is to require ratification of the NPT or an equivalent binding commitment. Canadian nuclear exports are conditional on all states accepting in a bilateral agreement additional requirements designed to minimize the proliferation risk.

3. Call on our government to send an all party delegation -- at the highest levels -- to attend the conference on disarmament in Europe taking place in Stockholm in January; and encourage the use of this as a forum for discussion of disarmament issues and the promotion of measures for building confidence between East and West and the achievement of meaningful progress in arms control.

- 2 -

COMMENT:

Parliamentary observers have attended previous CSCE meetings, but they have not been part of the official delegation. To include parliamentarians in the official delegation as full-time working members would be for the DPM/SSEA to decide bearing in mind that this will be a long-term conference. The first task of this conference will be to agree on confidence and security building measures.

4. Call on the Secretary of State for External Affairs to urge consideration of a non-first-strike policy at the upcoming NATO foreign ministers meeting.

COMMENT:

"First strike" normally refers to the initiation of war through a massive surprise attack with nuclear weapons. Canada, the United States and all the European members of NATO adhere to a no "first strike" policy as is consistent with the obligations under the UN Charter. "First use" is normally used in a more restrictive sense to refer to the introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict. At present NATO reserves the right to use any means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in response to aggression. Such a policy enhances deterrence because it leaves a potential aggressor uncertain as to how NATO would respond while being certain that it would. In this situation no potential aggressor can count on using conventional forces without nuclear risk.

The Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO. As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. The conclusion we draw is that the best way to raise the nuclear threshold is to establish a more reasonable balance of the conventional forces on each side.

The simple, though expensive, answer is for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. This is a last resort. The far more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels.

5. Call for the immediate re-appointment of an ambassador for disarmament, to give priority to encouraging support for the UN disarmament campaign.

- 3 -

COMMENT:

The appointment of an ambassador for disarmament is currently under consideration. In the interim, the PM's initiative is testimony to the importance the government attaches to disarmament.

6. Call on the Soviet Union to return to the INF disarmament talks in Geneva, failing which consideration be given to seeking a forum under which all disarmament talks can take place.

COMMENT:

The Government has already regretted the interruption of the talks and urged the Soviets to return. The PM has proposed a conference of all five nuclear powers to limit their nuclear arsenals. We do not consider it appropriate to combine all arms control and disarmament negotiations in one forum as that would create an impossible agenda.

7. Encourage efforts, both at the UN and regionally, to restrict the transfers of conventional arms especially to areas of conflict.

COMMENT:

Canada has strict controls on the export of military equipment; we oppose the introduction of offensive military equipment in areas of conflict.

TO/À
FROM/DE
REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT •
SUJET

FILE
FPR

28-6-1-1 Mulroney
Peace
Mission

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
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ENCLOSURES
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IDR

CTV: In Toronto, Conservative Leader Brian Mulroney, unveiled his own peace plan today. It creates a major role for the Tories ex-leader, Joe Clark. Our reporter Jim Munson has this on Mulroney's first major policy initiative.

J.M.: The scene was Maple Leaf Gardens where the World Congress of Free Ukrainians gathered to remember the millions who were killed by the Russians in 1933. Mulroney, with wife Mila by his side, walked into the Gardens knowing this audience would welcome his peace proposals. It is a 7-point arms control and disarmament plan with former leader Joe Clark taking on a leading role. Clark will meet with international experts and world leaders and then report his findings to Mulroney. Other major points: the Soviet Union should return to the disarmament talks in Geneva. Failing that, another forum should be considered. External Affairs Minister MacEachen should urge NATO, at the up-coming meeting in Brussels, to consider a non-first nuclear strike policy: The re-appointment of the Canadian disarmament ambassador to the U.N. An all-Party delegation at the highest level should be sent to January's Stockholm Conference on disarmament in Europe. Restrict conventional arms, especially in areas of conflict. Parliament's External Affairs and Defence Committee should undertake immediately a policy review. Mulroney's peace plan comes at a time when the Prime Minister is ending the first phase of his world tour for peace and is designed to show Canadianshe, too, has a policy.

PC Ldr: "We've got to walk this road together, and I tell you I am like many of you here today. I have three young children at home and I want to leave for them a world free of the menace of nuclear war".


J.M.: Recently, Mulroney has been under attack in various political circles for being a leader without a policy. His aides are now confident that this initiative

FPR-1160

December 4, 1983

- 2 -

will put an end to that criticism. Also, there are hints of more policy statements in the future and they will deal with domestic issues.
Jim Munson, CTV News, Toronto.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "D. Buckley-Jones". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name and title.

D. Buckley-Jones
Deputy Director
Media Relations Division

28-6-1-17
Hudson Peace
Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMDELKWAIT PMDL0164 03DEC83

TO EXTOTT XDV IMMED

INFO PMOOTT/JOHNSON/JCOLEMAN/DURDIN PCOOTT/FOWLER LDN IMMED

RCMPOTT/5 VIP IMMED TT 437 SQN TRENTON IMMED DE CAF

DISTR GMR MGTC MGT IDDZ ZSEO

---PMS VISIT TO ASIA/GULF NOV/83

PM AND DEL ARRIVED KWAIT AS SCHEDULED 03DEC. ACCOMMODATED AT
SALAAM PALACE GUEST HOUSE PHONE 843400. DEL OFFICE EXT 204. MEDIA
ACCOMMODATED AT HILTON PHONE 2533000. AIRCREW AT SHERATON
422055.

2. DEPARTING 04DEC 1200 HRS FOR LDN.

UUU/090 031425Z PMDL0164

INFO

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HRARE WUGR4110 02DEC83

TO DELHI

INFO EXTOTT (IMC

---CHOGM-TRUDEAU INITIATIVE

REF PARA 3 DELHI TEL2717 30NOV. AS I WOULD NOT/NOT WISH TO SEE MY
FUTURE CHIEF, SEC GEN RAMPHAL, TIED TO THIS PARTICULAR NON-STARTER
MIGHT RECALL TO DRAFTER OF THIS EXCELLENT REPORT ON CONF (WHICH
CAPTURES FACTS AND SPIRIT SO ABLY) THAT IDEA OF QUOTE LETS ALL JOIN
THE PARTY UNQUOTE INITIATIVE CAME FROM PRES KUANDA IN HIS FIRST
INTERVENTION OF CHOGM EXECUTIVE SESSION

MCLAREN

CCC/138 050710Z WUGR4110

310270

~~20-1-11~~
CC 23-3-83

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE
MISSION



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0242 02DEC83

TO/À

TO WSHDC LDN *IMMED.*

INFO

INFO DNATO MOSCO BONN PARIS PEKIN PC0017/FOWLER

DISTR

REF

DISTR MINA USS DMF RBR IDA IDD IDR UGB URR RBD PER

SUBJ/SUJ

REF OURTEL IDDZ0232 OF 01DEC

---PM INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH US AND UK

FLUG ARE POINTS YOU MAY DRAW ON I. BRIEFING STATE DEPT AND FCO ON RESULTS OF PM'S VISIT TO CHINA, PEKING, CHONG AND HIS PERSONAL ENIS-SARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. HE WILL BE GIVING DPM/SSEA ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR HIS MTGS WITH SHULTZ AND HOME.

1. JAPAN:

PM. MAKASONE HAS VERY RECEPTIVE AND FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF ALL THE PM'S PROPOSALS (PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION, AND ON MBFR AND CDE).

2. COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED PM TRUDEAU GOA DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. QUOTE

3. THE CHINESE ARE SUPPORTIVE OF THE BROAD POLITICAL PURPOSE, BUT DO NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE POWER CONFERENCE AT THIS STAGE PRIOR TO SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTION BY THE SUPERPOWERS. DENG TOLD THE PM THAT THE CHIEF CAUSE OF THE ARMS RACE WAS THE SUPERPOWERS; PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISARMAMENT IS THEIRS. HE SAID THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY IS FINDING WAYS TO CONCENTRATE

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG *...CILE*

IDDZ
995-5912

995-5912

SIG L.A. DELVOIE

MESSAGE PREPARATION

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Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO 1DDZ0242 CONF

121

10

A CONCERTED EFFORT IS REQUIRED TO RESTORE CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE TO THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ONLY THUS, CAN A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE BE REBUILT IN PLACE OF THE PREVAILING ONE OF FEAR AND MISTRUST. IN ALL THESE PURSUITS, WE EMPHASISE THE SUPREME IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL WILL. WE, THEREFORE, WELCOME PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S CALL FOR A NEW POLITICAL DIMENSION IN THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WE SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS TO RESTORE ACTIVE POLITICAL CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS AMONG ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS AND ARE WILLING TO HELP THESE AND OTHER SUCH EFFORTS IN ALL APPROPRIATE WAYS. AS PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI HAS SO CONSISTENTLY EMPHASISED, THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN SECURING WIDER PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT IS THE STOPPING OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THESE ARE ESSENTIAL STEPS FOR PROGRESS AND WORKING TOWARDS THE WORLD'S RELIEF FROM THE MENACE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR WIDER SPREAD. UNQUOTE

3. THE CHINESE ARE SUPPORTIVE OF THE BROAD POLITICAL PURPOSE, BUT DO NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE POWER CONFERENCE AT THIS STAGE PRIOR TO SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS BY THE SUPERPOWERS. DENG TOLD THE PM THAT THE CHIEF CAUSE OF THE ARMS RACE WAS THE SUPERPOWERS; PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISARMAMENT IS THEIRS. HE SAID THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY IS FINDING WAYS TO CONCENTRATE PRESSURE ON THE SUPERPOWERS TO REDUCE THEIR ARMS. HE STRESSED THAT CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL WAS ONLY SYMBOLIC, BUT IT DID ACT AS A DETERRENT. DENG DISAPPROVED OF THE TPT AND SAID THAT CHINA WOULD NOT SIGN IT,

...3

Page two and succeeding pages are to be identified as per the following examples:

PAGE TWO MGT0159 UNCLAS
PAGE THREE AP00012 CONFD PERS INFO
PAGE FOUR FP01469 RESTR
PAGE FIVE GP00036 SECRET

NOTE: Classifications on page two and succeeding pages are abbreviated (except SECRET) and not spaced out.

La page deux et les pages suivantes seront identifiées conformément aux exemples suivants:

PAGE DEUX MGT0159 NONCLAS
PAGE TROIS AP00012 CONFD RENS PERS
PAGE QUATRE FP01469 RESTR
PAGE CINQ GP00036 SECRET

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Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE THREE 100Z0242 CONF

12

10

THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN PROLIFERATION. HE DID NOT SHARE THE PHS ASSESSMENT OF THE DANGERS OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AS FEW WOULD BECOME NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

RISKS

THEY SEE THE DANGER OF WAR AS REAL, BUT ~~THE OUTBREAK~~ OF NUCLEAR WAR WAS CONSTRAINED BY: (A) NUCLEAR DETERRENT OF CHINA AND FRANCE (B) ALLIES OF USA AND USSR DID NOT WANT WAR (C) PEACE MOVEMENTS (D) SUPERPOWERS AWARENESS THAT MOST OF THEIR POPULATIONS WOULD BE KILLED IN A NUCLEAR WAR. DENG STRESSED THAT ANOTHER IMPORTANT KIND OF PRESSURE ON THE SUPERPOWERS WAS FOR COUNTRIES TO FOLLOW INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY E.G. DE GAULLE IN THE 1970 S. HE SAID THAT THE USSR WAS STILL BEING VERY AGGRESSIVE, BUT CERTAIN RECENT ACTIONS OF THE US HAD BEEN OF THE SAME CHARACTER E.G. US POLICY IN CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICA (THE US SHOULD HAVE REMAINED NEUTRAL IN THE FALKLANDS). THE US HAD DONE CERTAIN THINGS THIS YEAR QUOTE WHICH UNQUOTE.

4. THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED, WHILE THEIR REACTION TO THE INITIATIVE WAS NEUTRAL AS THEY SAID THEY VIEW THE INITIATIVE THROUGH THE PRISM OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE USA. THEY DO NOT THINK THERE IS A BASIS FOR ANY NEGOTIATIONS IF ONE SIDE VIEWS THE OTHER AS QUOTE EVIL UNQUOTE.

GRONIKO TOLD THE PHS EMISSARY THAT THEY HAVE HAD QUOTE SAD EXPERIENCE UNQUOTE WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT WITH THE US, HENCE THEY WERE

...4

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Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
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PAGE FOUR 10020242 CONF

12

10

QUOTE RESERVED UNQUOTE ABOUT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE HIGHER LEVEL OF
CONTACT THE BETTER HE ARGUED THAT THE US HAD USED THE GENEVA RECO-
TIATIONS AS A SCREEN TO COVER MILITARISTIC ACTION AND DREW ATTEN-
TION TO ANDROPOV S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 24 WHICH THEY CHARACTERIZED
AS A REBUFF TO AGGRESSIVE AMERICAN POLICIES AND A PEACEFULLINE TO
EUROPE AND OTHER STATES AND ON DISARMAMENT.

WHILE GROMYKO APPRECIATED THE PR S VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF REPLA-
CING DISCUSSION OF NUMBERS AND RATIOS OF WEAPONS WITH CONSIDERATION
OF TRUST, INTENTIONS AND GOALS, BUT NATO LED BY WASHINGTON BY
DEPLOYING BERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES WAS ACTING ON A DIFFERENT
BASIS. HE SAID THAT THE WEST S REJECTION OF A DECLARATION OF NON-
FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOWED HOW THE WEST TREATED NOBLE
IDEAS AND HE REGRETted CANADA S SUPPORT FOR INF DEPLOYMENT.

ON THE CALL FOR A FIVE POWER CONFERENCE, GROMYKO WAS NON-COMMITTAL,
SAYING THERE WERE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES.

HE WAS RESERVED ON THE IDEA OF HIGH-LEVEL PRESENCE AT THE CDE
OPENING AND AT 1002.00 1002.00 HE SAW NO DESIRE BY THE WEST TO MOVE
FORWARD AT VIENNA.

FOR USHDC:

RE PEKIN TEL 0921 30NOV WE HAVE NO/NO OBJECTION TO YOU PASSING
CONTENTS ^{OF PARAS 1 TO 5} TO STATE DEPT (AND PRESSURE ^M CHINESE MEANT IT TO BE PASSED
ON).

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MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
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SECURITY/SECURITE	UNCLASSIFIED
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0241 02DEC83
TO/A	TO USHDC WNY CUNY LON PARIS MADRID LONDON BOEN ROME ATHENS ANKRA
INFO	COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE TOKYO PEKIN MOSCO DELHI CLVND ATNTA BOSTON
DISTR	BUFLO CHCGO DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS PHILA SFRAN SEATL BNATO
REF	---
SUBJ/SUJ	<p>PM INITIATIVE-CHRONOLOGY</p> <p>FOLLOWING FOR REFERENCE ARE MAJOR EVENTS IN PMS PEACE INITIATIVE.</p> <p>1)PM MTG IN OTT WITH DPM/SSEA, MND AND SENIOR OFFICIALS(SEP21)</p> <p>2)DPM/SSEA MTG <u>IN HALIFAX WITH SEC SHULTZ (OCT 16)</u></p> <p>3)PM LETS TO ALL NATO HEADS OF GOVT(OCT22-25)</p> <p>4)PM SPEECH AT GUELPH UNIV(OCT27)</p> <p>5)PM LETS TO SOVIET AND CHINESE LEADERS(EARLY NOV)</p> <p>6)PM MTGS WITH PRES MITTERRAND, PM LUBBERS, QUEEN BEATRIX, PM HARTEN</p> <p>HH THE POPE, PM CRAXI, PM THATCHER(NOV08-11)</p> <p>7)PM SPEECH IN MTL(NOV13)</p> <p>8)PM MTG WITH PM NAKASONE(NOV19)</p> <p>9)PM PERSONAL ENISSARY(GEOFFREY PEARSON)VISITS TO PEKIN(NOV21-22)</p> <p>AND TO MOSCO(NOV25-26)</p> <p>10)PM PARTICIPATION CHOGM IN N DELHI(NOV22-27)</p> <p>11)PM VISIT TO PEKIN(NOV28-29)</p> <p>12)DPM/SSEA SPEECH IN CHCGO(NOV29)</p> <p>13)DPM/SSEA PARTICIPATION IN NATO MINISTERIAL MTG(DEC8-9)</p> <p>14)PM MTGS OVER SIX WEEKS PERIOD WITH ROBT MCNAMARA, GEN ROGERS,</p> <p>GEN BRENT STOUTCROFT, GEORGE KEENAN, MEMBERS OF HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY</p> <p>GROUP, GEORGI ARBATOV(OCT-NOV)</p>

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG P. Gossage/sc

IDDZ

5-5913

SIG L.

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~~IN RE DELVOIE~~

M. ARCHDEACON

~~G. SMITH~~

K. CALDER

L. HAGEN

J. MCNEE

001092

Sheila
Pls perambate
DPM/SSEA INTERVIEW WITH "THE JOURNAL" ON PM'S INITIATIVE.
1100 HRS DECEMBER 2, 1983. DATE FOR BROADCAST NOT YET
ANNOUNCED. *2B-6-1-Rudeau Peate Mission*

The following is a transcript of the DPM/SSEA's remarks for
"The Journal" ^{INTERVIEW BY SUSAN REISER} which will be part of a piece on the PM's initia-
tive. Members of the Task Force were photographed by "The
Journal" in their lair, but no interviews were given by Task
Force members.

- We're looking for any insight you could provide into the thinking and the events of the time, the key meetings and so on. I mean, Susan will run you through them. Whatever insight you can provide beyond the ordinary would be great.
 - In other words if you're a little more forthcoming than you normally are.
 - I've always been most forthcoming, haven't I?
 - Yes, well when John said to me.. at first I had asked if we could sit down and have a little off-the-record conversation and he said basically (garbled) on the record.
 - I have never been present when he's given a more detailed off the record- than on the record.... - that doesn't mean he hasn't done it... - okay.
 - You were at the Versailles Summit as the Minister of Finance?
 - Yes
 - When the Prime Minister went off to a NATO government meeting? Can you think back that far?
 - Yes, I can think back that far.
 - That's where I want to get.
 - I don't know whether I can tell you very much about that but I'm prepared to try. I am prepared to be very forthcoming: so/forthcoming you'll think I've concealed everything.
- RECEIVED In 1981 there was a rare meeting of NATO heads of government and it was supposed to provide an opportunity for the leaders to really sit down and think about NATO for the 80s. As I understand it, it was just another example of people posturing; what is your recollection of that meeting? - of the NATO heads of government meeting? You wouldn't have been there..

SSFA: I wasn't there, but I certainly know what the Prime Minister thought about it, because he has referred to it more than once since then and that was that the NATO heads of government didn't either have the opportunity or didn't take advantage of the opportunity to have a real dialogue about the fundamentals, and that has been one of the concerns that the Prime Minister has had, that the heads of government - particularly at that meeting, that type of dialogue did not take place; that it was fairly cut and dried, that whatever interventions were made in the form of set speeches and very little interchange or debate, or contesting of concepts, unlike, as he often points out, the atmosphere that exists at the Commonwealth, where there is truth in (the) dialogue, or the atmosphere I think that prevailed at the Williamsburg summit.

REBER:- Well, let's go on/Williamsburg. What is the difference between the NATO heads of government meeting and the Williamsburg meeting? How would you characterize the Williamsburg meeting, when the security issue was discussed?

SSFA:- It was a real debate. It was a very tough debate. It was strong and firm, and decisions taken by individual leaders. Unlike previous summits that I attended, this one really did represent the very fundamental showing of opinion, and emotions.

REBER:- What kind of beating did the Prime Minister have to take to get - well, both of you for that matter, in order to get the kinds of wording that you eventually got in the security communiqué?

SSFA:- We had been determined before we went to Williamsburg that we wanted to highlight the ~~sense~~ that the peace side, ^{or} the negotiating side, of the two track decision. Not everybody at the Williamsburg is a member of NATO; the Japanese certainly are not, but, and it's because of that initiative taken by the Prime Minister and the Canadian delegation that there was that phrase, that expression, that we would devote all our political resources to the achievement of peace, and in the world. I think that is a good reflection of the concern that had developed in the Canadian government before the Summit and that continued to develop, particularly as we discussed the question of the testing of the Cruise missile in Canada, that every time, even a year ago, when we authorised -

- 3 -

I think it was a year ago this month - we authorised that negotiations commence for a framework of an agreement. At that time there was concern expressed as to what Canada could do to give voice, and give leadership on the negotiating track or the peace track of the two track decision.

~~Riesler~~ - At Williamsburg, though, you also got a taste of perhaps some of the other countries' reactions to Canada being involved. Didn't Mrs Thatcher call the Prime Minister somewhat naive in his attitude?

~~SSER~~ - Well, I don't remember those words...

~~Riesler~~ - She was quite forceful in disagreeing...

~~SSER~~ - There was a certain amount of misunderstanding about the Canadian intention, of Canadian purpose, at least there was a debate over the inclusion of the French and British systems, and what we were attempting to assert in the communiqué was a clarion call to the world that this group was interested in peace, and in attempting to undertake reasonable negotiations with the Soviet Union. We argued that therefore it didn't add to the communiqué to make references to items that were presently under negotiation, namely that British and French inclusion. I think some members of the summit thought that we were advocating - that the Prime Minister was advocating - that indeed these be thrown into the INF negotiations. It was not our intention but I think that created a bit of a reaction based on that fear. But there's no question that I talked about the NATO summit and Williamsburg.. I didn't ^{at} intend NATO summit, but the Williamsburg/^{summit} was a lively event and it justified the preparations I think, or the intentions of the President of the United States, who wanted to have it that way. ^{Hayhoe} He had more than he had bargained

- 4 -

for, probably did.

REISER: What did the Prime Minister mean, when he himself sort of acknowledged that he said more or less we have to bust our ass or our bloody ass for peace? What was he saying to the leaders at that point?

SSEA Well, I think it speaks for itself. What did he mean? I think that we were into the year of the deployment leading up to the deployment, the decision which we support, but at the same time there is a deep anxiety about arms build-up, and the public opinion in the world, western countries, is upset, I think, if not upset apprehensive. And therefore it ought to be seen by public opinion that the leaders were truly concerned about peace, and we ought to make every ~~public~~ manifestation about our public concern, that it was not - I don't think the concern is fictitious or that it's synthetic or built up just for posturing purposes. I think the concern is real on the part of the leaders. Therefore we ought to manifest that concern so that the public will at least have a conviction that on the Western side we do in truth want negotiated arms reductions, which is a route to peace.

REISER It must have taken a toll on you - I suppose on your conscience, yours and the Prime Minister's and others who truly believe in arms control and disarmament in a non-nuclear world, to have to accept the Cruise nuclear missile testing, which was an escalation in the arms race. As a means of still being part of the dialogue.

SSEA Well, I don't think the decision to test the Cruise is an escalation in the arms race at all.

REISER Deployment is not an escalation.

SSEA I think that deployment itself is the placing obviously of ne

weapons in response in Europe to the SS20 and fears that had been...

REISER: Nevertheless, it's a new weapon...
deployment

SSEA: Yes, it's a ~~new form~~ of weapons in Europe. If you want to describe that as an escalation of the arms race, it's questionable. The purpose of the deployment is basically to succeed at the negotiating table. The threat to deploy brought the Russians to the negotiating table. Believe you me, if we hadn't shown some determination, I doubt that the Russians would have stayed at the negotiating table. So in the...

REISER: They're not there anyway.

SSEA: They've left. They've left because of the statements which they made prior to the deployment. They were determined to prevent the deployment, to break the will of the alliance through their influence on public opinion in the West, and they failed. I think that if we have any hope it seems to me of succeeding in reducing arms, we're not going to succeed by getting on our knees, or begging, for arms control or reductions. It has to be in the vital interests of the Soviet Union also to enter into these agreements, so I think if you look at it more deeply you may find that it's not quite as visible ~~as~~ an escalation as you think.

REISER: But, in terms of Canada's position, though, just looking at this as a very narrow Canadian viewpoint, it would seem to be a contradiction, after all these years and the trouble we've gone to be a non-nuclear power to now have to have the most modern of nuclear weapons being tested over our soil.

SSEA: Well, we are testing guidance systems for nuclear capable aircraft, let's put it that way. It's a guidance system; there are no nuclear weapons aboard, it's unarmed, and it's not a precedent,

- 6 -

because we have certainly permitted nuclear capable aircraft¹⁶ test
and fly around Canada in certain areas. The Americans and the
Germans, I believe the British. So that this step is not a change,
I think it follows from what we've done in the past. We're not a nuclear
weapons country at all and we don't intend to be.

REISLER: But did it encourage you to dig in your heels more and pursue
the other side of the NATO two-track decision, which is the nego-
tiations?

SSEA: Well, I think that if you referred to the letter that I wrote
to George Schultz in July when we finally decided to test the Cruise,
agreed to receive a proposal from the United States, it's in that
letter I made it clear to him that because of this, Canada not only
had a greater right to pursue its peace aims but also had a greater
obligation and I gave him advance... you know, that that was our
intention, we wanted to be consulted on these questions and we were
indicating what our views were to be in the future.

REISLER: In the fall and early September when you went through your
normal sort of discussion with your Department about the priorities
in the next few months and the new year, this peace.. the whole idea
of what we do in the disarmament, that was part of the discussions?

SSEA: Yes, it has been a recurring theme in my discussions with
departmental officials over more than the past year. For example,
what can we do through NATO for example, to influence the INF
talks. Because the United States is the leader of the talks, but
it consults with the other members of the alliance. I have been
preoccupied... we've been doing our level best in preparing for
these consultations so that we were having the maximum effect,
whether we were indeed creative enough in providing proposals in

the INF and we did have a series of deep briefings ~~on~~ by the best strategic analysts in the government on all these arms proposals. I met with the American negotiators last ^{February} ~~year~~ in Europe, I met the Russian negotiators at the INF talks, ~~so that~~ in an effort to get a better understanding of the process and see what Canada might be able to do.

REISLER Did you have to overcome some resistance on the part of some people in External Affairs who take the view that there's nothing Canada can do vis a vis the INF talks?

SSEA I think that there is a debate as to the extent Canadian influence, whether in the INF talks, because of the structure, because there are so many countries involved in the consultations, whether Canada alone would have a marked influence. My own view is that we do have a political influence and ought to use it as much as possible. We're not ~~a~~ big. ~~and~~ I don't think that our role ought to be measured in terms of the number of tanks we have on the fields of Europe, that we have a political role, a political standing, that we ought to exploit.

REISLER Obviously your views prevailed, because we moved a head.

SSEA Well, we moved ahead, and I think one of the things, at least I've clarified in my own mind, and I think the Prime Minister did too, in his mind, is ~~that~~ why should Canada try to come up with better arms control proposals. There are good ones on the table now, and we couldn't likely be more creative than the Americans or the Russians, or the Europeans. You know, there are good proposals that have been put forward. Therefore, we shouldn't in a sense be blaming ourselves or feeling guilty that we couldn't come up with the answer that would settle the question at the INF.

RE: Is that what was frustrating the people who were sort of resisting Canada's....?

SSEA: Well, I think that is probably part of it; probably they had a more realistic view as to what one might come up with in the field of arms control. In this particular effort of the Prime Minister, we are not coming up with a better mousetrap, so to speak. We're taking a political route; certainly we're not trying to inject new proposals into the INF talks. When I say we're not trying to come up with a better mousetrap someone else hasn't thought about. We're taking a political route with a number of specifics in the proposal.

Re: Alexander Haig said recently on the Journal that Prime Minister Trudeau was a friend and an experienced statesman but then, not mentioning him by name he went on to worry aloud about people who, though they have the best intentions, end up by bringing about the results they don't want, which would be disunity and break-up of the alliance. How - does it worry you, that a man of that stature - a former Secretary of State - is saying these things, that the Prime Minister is somewhat well-intentioned but could end up splitting up the alliance?

SSEA: Well, ~~I know that~~ I worry if General Haig has the view that the Prime Minister's efforts is a threat to the solidarity of the Alliance. I think that would be a most unfounded fear on his part. If the idea is that the United States should play a ^{he} ~~he~~ hegemonic role, then that's not in the spirit of the alliance itself. I think it is the responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Government of Canada to the Canadian people to do what it can. We are involved, as part of the alliance, we make a big investment in

efence, we pay a lot of attention to the alliance; we've now decided to test the Cruise missile; it wasn't very popular. We weren't heralded from the housetops because of that decision. We did it to discharge our responsibilities to NATO, and as a neighbour to the United States. Basically a NATO obligation. So I don't put much stock in that, quite frankly. That's what the general means, that this initiative is somehow hostile to the spirit of the alliance. I think quite the contrary.

REISLER: The cruise testing wasn't popular; the Prime Minister's is, in fact popular. It would be hard to disapprove of peace initiatives in this day and age. Did you perhaps have that at the back of your mind? I'm not saying you're not committed to the process, but you must have felt a little better about going with the current, ^{at least} the Canadian current, in embarking on this mission? (2)

SSEA: I think that the first point, on the Cruise, the polls have shown that more and more Canadians seem to accept the necessity of doing it than did at the beginning. But I think that the Prime Minister's effort couldn't have matched more perfectly the circumstances which we face at the present time. There was KAL, the downing of the Korean airliner, that sent fear waves around the world, there's the break-off of the INF talks, all of that underlines, it seems to me, the necessity of trying to get an opening to the Soviet Union, trying to get a dialogue, and trying to lower the tensions or improve the climate or whatever series of expressions you want to use. I think that the Prime Minister's initiative from that point of view is absolutely perfect.

~~That's 25 minutes.~~

-10 -

REISLER

The Meech Lake meeting -in early October there was a meeting a Meech Lake - what was the spirit like? what can you tell me about that meeting? Obviously it was the meeting that launched everything to where it is today.

SSEA

The meeting at Wilson House took place, I think in September.

REISLER

There was one that followed where there were Ambassadors, from NATO, from Washington, from Europe..it was where the group from External Affairs came up with 20-odd ideas that the Prime Minister could do and batted it around..

SSEA

The task force which had been set up previously had put together a series of ideas . They were ideas that were within reason. Some of them may not have been implementable, some were politically acceptable in terms of the world political situation. It was at that meeting at Wilson House that this group did try to winnow out among all these ideas what might be the best - the best chance - the most sensible - the best chance of success, and if you ask about the atmosphere, the atmosphere was businesslike, I think all of us were pleased with the outcome of the meeting, because the more fearsome ideas seemed not to fly. That was good as far as I was concerned because I did think that some of the proposals would have made life difficult for Canada and maybe the alliance. It might have had some of the effects that General Haig would fear. People are very sensitive at the moment as to what might have the effect of breaking or undermining the solidarity. So the meeting was very good. We all felt better about it.

~~- Did ... you left almost at the starting line~~

REISLER

Did, Was it like being at the...~~you left almost being at the~~ starting line of a race, or was it...I'm just trying to get a sense of ...now you have your marching orders... what was it

001102

- 11

like?

~~SSEA~~ Well, I think ~~that the main...~~ there were two aspects to the meeting. One was the _____ side and the other's what you do about it. And I think the second part probably evolved later about the number of people and when the Prime Minister would see them. He's been to Europe, he's been to the Commonwealth, Japan, China, and these were major... He's sent letters to the NATO Alliance, all of these matters weren't dealt in details and agreed upon at Willson House but they eventually were decided upon all in the overall I think spirit of the conclusion of our discussions and anything that could be done to move the situation ^{would} ~~will~~ be helpful. Even the little bit. Who knows? what impact this will have in the next six months or a year. Who knows who else might pick it up? Some other Western states might pick up the same idea. Several might. It might be an encouragement to get us out of this sort of ^f groove we're in.

Reister At the time of that meeting, none of this was ^{really} ~~public~~, so what were the concerns you had as you went through it in terms of the proposals you made or the profile the Prime Minister was taking and the risks? What were the cost-benefit things you were examining at that point?

SSEA \ Well, I think that the cost-benefit aspect was the impact on our relations obviously with our allies, with the United States, with the other members of the Alliance. That had another aspect in addition to Canada's interests, whether these ideas would have some response from the Alliance and from others, whether they would have a response from the Canadian public, although one didn't know at that point. One had to be unsure. Certainly I was as to what the response was. I knew that it was, it might be, I knew that it would be answering

a very profound desire among Ministers and among the Caucus who returned again and again to the idea that we ought to do something and that the Prime Minister should try and do something personally. That~~x~~ certainly was in the background but was put flesh on at Wilson House later.

REISER. So you didn't/^{yet} know if Canadians would respond with their habitual cynicism?

SSEA Well, one didn't know what the media would do with it, whether it would not be destroyed by a very cynical media. And that didn't happen, I'm pleased to say.

REISER. The media has reported though that you've been basically flying by the seat of your pants, so to speak on this. Is that correct?

SSEA: Well ~~I don't think that~~ eh I think that there was careful preparation, that we had a very sophisticated task force; we had our own general thoughts for weeks and months; we had a very sophisticated task force; we had those notions tested and reviewed among our most experienced diplomats who know the situation in various countries. So that doesn't look to me like flying on the seat of your pants to make those very careful preparations. I suppose one could say, yes, you fly on the seat of your pants when you don't know what the ultimate outcome will be and we don't know and we can't know.

REISER This has been a Canadian effort, well let me start again. In hindsight, would it have been better for the Prime Minister to make his second speech to Parliament and not in front of the Liberal Party fund raising dinner in Quebec City?^(sic)

SSEA: Well, it may be, I've been asked about that and I sort of think that's a bit picky, ~~that~~ It has become more and more

13.

acceptable, not only to make political speeches at so-called non-political gatherings, but it's also more acceptable to deal with serious subjects with political audiences instead of beating hell out of your opponents. It's refreshing for a change to have a series of proposals put forward to the Party faithful but I don't think that's a major or was a major problem.

RISLER: But one is left with the impression sometimes that the Prime Minister and perhaps you people who are in the twilight of your political careers are doing this more in a personal sense rather than a Canadian sense. That you could have done more to use Parliament as a platform and have the whole of the House of Commons backing you rather than your departments and what you can command with your office.

SSEA: Well I think that it's in a sense regrettable what has happened in Parliament over the years. At one time when ^{the} Prime Minister ^{or EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER} ~~was~~ returned from a major visit there was a statement in the House and a series of statements and generally the effort was to deal with foreign policy in a reasonably non-partisan way. I think if you go back over the past 10 years particularly you will find that the efforts that Prime Minister has made to report to the House and deal with foreign policy issues have been received with a barrage of not pronouncements on foreign policy but a barrage against the Prime Minister and his style of conducting himself when he's abroad and so on and it become nonsense ~~to~~ ^{to} I've said that in the House and I regret it but I think that ~~it~~ unless the atmosphere has changed, if the Prime Minister had come into the House and made a statment on motions it would have been

14.

turned into a political attack. I hope I'm wrong but eh .

REISLER: And that would have then jeopardized the whole. [?]

SSEA: Well I think that I would like us to come back to the day when foreign policy issues can be discussed through these statements that used to take place in an effort to show unity around common principles which used to be the case rather than heighten the political element of it.

REISLER: Can you, this is a general question but, can you give explain what is driving the Prime Minister on this subject, what his motivating him? Is there a way of capturing that?

SSEA: I think that he's driven by concern about the present situation. I think he's had as you know a special interest in disarmament questions which just didn't begin this fall. It has been rather well established well in the past so that it is an issue that has occupied him over the years, so I think he's been driven by that. I don't think that he's been driven by the expectation that some how this initiative will change the political atmosphere in Canada. I certainly don't feel that. I think it has been a very valuable initiative in itself and if it improves the political situation so much the better, if not I think it will have been very worthwhile.

REISLER: When you say the political atmosphere, your talking about the Liberal Party standing in the country, is that what you mean?

SSEA: Well, that would be part of it.

- Two things that we touched on ???????? you didn't.....
you can touch on that John Gray story that External Affairs is dragging on this one and it was only when the initial proposal

15.

and only when the Prime Minister perhaps/^{or} yourself got tough in effect and threatened to set the thing up through the Prime Minister's office that there was movement. And the other ??? is the Thatcher/Trudeau confrontation at Williamsburg, a specific comment on that.

SSEA: I have another thing coming up don't I?

- They haven't shown up yet.

- 5 minutes Joan you said 10 minutes

- I know well we abused you but nevertheless....we can use it.

SSEA: Straight to the archives.

- It will not. I told this to Betty Stevenson, she got a place. Never mind I'll tell you after, won't waste time.

RENEE. One of the newspapers reported that the Prime Minister got a little ~~but~~ frustrated with the Department of External Affairs because of dragging its heels in coming up with some proposals for him and he almost threatened to set up a task force I guess out of his own office. How accurate is that?

SSEA: I don't think that's accurate at all. The Prime Minister certainly didn't threaten to setup a task force out of his own office. I don't think it could provide a task force ~~to~~^{to do} this kind of work. When the notion of a task force was suggested at one of our meetings I certainly thought it was a good idea and I made the proposals in detail that were accepted and that formed the basis or formed the structure of the task force so I think the department has responded very well to this challenge. And I'm delighted that we set up the task force in the way we did because the department and other departments, the Department of National

Defence, the PCO have demonstrated quite a high degree of professionalism in supporting this effort. I think it has been a very good experience.

~~Raised~~: If they were really keen they could have done something like this right after Williamsburg though. Why wait until ~~a~~ a plane is shot down?[?]

SSEA: Well of course, ~~one~~ I don't think the plane itself was the cause of them doing this. I think that maybe it would have been better to have done it some time ago, but it's been done and I think at a very good time.

~~Raised~~: What do you recall about the exchange between Prime Minister Thatcher in Williamsburg?

SSEA: Well there was an exchange. These meetings are confidential. I can't tell you what was said, but it was [^]long and it was ~~was~~, I think, characteristic of the type of exchange that the Prime Minister of Canada and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have. They're both good debaters, have firm views and when they're dealing with serious matters they express their views ~~and some people, I must say,~~ let me give you one insight that after that morning session of the leaders when we discussed the security passages of the Williamsburg declaration, there were a number of people going around with long faces saying well this has done such terrible damage - the idea that such emotions and such feelings and such words have been said. Well I took quite an opposite view. I thought it was quite healthy and I thought it was quite the way that a summit should operate and that people should know and hear each other and that it probably made for a better atmosphere, and it did.

17.

REISLER: Was the fundamental disagreement, if one could put it that way, between them have to do with their analysis of the objectives of the Soviet Union, of what the Soviet Union is after? I think there's a real split with some people thinking the Soviet Union is a kind of Nazi expansionist but like Hitler trying to a big land grab, country after country after country and others who see the Soviet Union as perhaps being somewhat defensive on security defensive.

SSEA: I just say that the discussion wasn't of that length that one could conclude what the basis of, what was deep down that came out. I just can't say that.

REISLER So it wasn't about ideology, they weren't you know...

SSEA: Well you made a rather profound statement about philosophical differences

REISLER Well actually I shouldn't have said so much.

SSEA: between, that might have occurred and the discussion didn't give me an opportunity to confirm that. I can't say.

It may have been in someone's mind but I can't say from the discussion. And I'm not going to say any more because I've said enough.

- I should tell you that I had to..... Betty Stevenson was interviewed a couple of times on the program and for reasons that have nothing to do with her, I forget she was matched with somebody, whatever, that neither times did this interview get used. So I went knocking on her door a couple of weeks ago for an interview for something I was doing and I promised her, I said, I've never had a story that didn't go on the air and I've never lost a Minister in the story. So she looked at me somewhat skeptically. However, last week I delivered Betty Stevenson so what I'm saying


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Le texte de la déclaration du porte-parole du Ministère
des Affaires Etrangères

Ankara, le 2 décembre 1983

TRADUCTION NON-OFFICIELLE



Les vues du Gouvernement Turc concordent avec des éléments que contiennent les propositions de Monsieur le Premier Ministre Trudeau. En effet, le manque d'un dialogue complet entre les Gouvernements des Etats-Unis d'Amérique et l'U.R.S.S. est une particularité négative de notre temps.

Monsieur Trudeau rend un service important tant sous l'optique de la paix mondiale que par une initiative courageuse basée sur une logique solide.

Sans doute, serait-il tôt pour attendre des résultats immédiats de l'initiative. Aussi, les grandes puissances n'auraient-elles pas trouvé l'occasion de réagir promptement. Pour tant, nous ne pouvons qu'exprimer l'admiration pour cette initiative, d'autant qu'elle vient à un moment opportun où l'on constate une atmosphère tendue entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et l'U.R.S.S. et qu'elle peut rendre une contribution à la détente.



TO/À TRANSCRIPT

FROM/DE FPR

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RÉFÉRENCE

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The following is a transcript of the DPM/SSEA's remarks for "The Journal" interview by Susan Reisler which will be part of a piece on the Prime Minister's initiative. Members of the Task Force were photographed by "The Journal" in their lair, but no interviews were given by Task Force members.

Reisler: In 1981 there was a rare meeting of NATO Heads of government and it was supposed to provide an opportunity for the leaders to really sit down and think about NATO for the '80s. As I understand it, it was just another example of people posturing; what is your recollection of that meeting? -- of the NATO Heads of government meeting? You wouldn't have been there...

DPM/SSEA: I wasn't there, but I certainly know what the Prime Minister thought about it, because he has referred to it more than once since then and that was that the NATO Heads of government didn't either have the opportunity or didn't take advantage of the opportunity to have a real dialogue about the fundamentals, and that has been one of the concerns that the Prime Minister has had, that the Heads of government -- particularly at that meeting, that type of dialogue did not take place; that it was fairly cut and dried, that whatever interventions were made in the form of set speeches and very little interchange or debate, or contesting of concepts, unlike, as he often points out, the atmosphere that exists at the Commonwealth, where there is truth in (the) dialogue, or the atmosphere I think that prevailed at the Williamsburg summit.

Reisler: Well, let's go on to Williamsburg. What is the difference between the NATO Heads of government meeting and the Williamsburg meeting? How would you characterize the Williamsburg meeting, when the security issue was discussed?

.../2

FPR-1157

- 2 -

December 2, 1983

DPM/SSEA: It was a real debate. It was a very tough debate. It was strong and firm, and decisions taken by individual leaders. Unlike previous Summits that I attended, this one really did represent the very fundamental showing of opinion, and emotions.

Reisler: What kind of beating did the Prime Minister have to take to get -- well, both of you for that matter, in order to get the kinds of wording that you eventually got in the security communiqué?

DPM/SSEA: We had been determined before we went to Williamsburg that we wanted to highlight the peace side, or the negotiating side, of the two track decision. Not everybody at the Williamsburg is a member of NATO; the Japanese certainly are not, and it's because of that initiative taken by the Prime Minister and the Canadian delegation that there was that phrase, that expression, that we would devote all our political resources to the achievement of peace, and in the world. I think that is a good reflection of the concern that had developed in the Canadian government before the Summit and that continued to develop, particularly as we discussed the question of the testing of the Cruise missile in Canada. Every time, even a year ago, when we authorized -- I think it was a year ago this month -- we authorized that negotiations commence for a framework of an agreement. At that time there was concern expressed as to what Canada could do to give voice, and give leadership on the negotiating track or the peace track of the two-track decision.

Reisler: At Williamsburg, though, you also got a taste of perhaps some of the other countries' reactions to Canada being involved. Didn't Mrs. Thatcher call the Prime Minister somewhat naive in his attitude?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I don't remember those words...

Reisler: She was quite forceful in disagreeing...

DPM/SSEA: There was a certain amount of misunderstanding about the Canadian intention, or Canadian purpose, at least there was a debate over the inclusion of the French and British systems. What we were attempting to assert in the communiqué was a clarion call to the world that this group was interested in peace, and in attempting to undertake reasonable negotiations with the Soviet Union. We argued that therefore it didn't add to the communiqué

.../3

FPR-1157

- 3 -

December 2, 1983

to make references to items that were presently under negotiation, namely that British and French inclusion. I think some members of the summit thought that we were advocating -- that the Prime Minister was advocating -- that indeed these be thrown into the INF negotiations. It was not our intention but I think that created a bit of a reaction based on that fear. But there's no question that I talked about the NATO Summit and Williamsburg... I didn't attend NATO Summit, but the Williamsburg Summit was a lively event and it justified the preparations I think, or the intentions of the President of the United States, who wanted to have it that way. Maybe he had more than he had bargained for, probably did.

Reisler: What did the Prime Minister mean, when he himself sort of acknowledged that he said more or less "we have to bust our ass or our bloody ass for peace?" What was he saying to the leaders at that point?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think it speaks for itself. What did he mean? I think that we were into the year of the deployment leading up to the deployment, the decision which we support, but at the same time there is a deep anxiety about arms build-up, and the public opinion in the world, Western countries, is upset, I think, if not upset, apprehensive. And therefore it ought to be seen by public opinion that the leaders were truly concerned about peace, and we ought to make every manifestation about our public concern, that it was not -- I don't think the concern is fictitious or that it's synthetic or built up just for posturing purposes. I think the concern is real on the part of the leaders. Therefore we ought to manifest that concern so that the public will at least have a conviction that on the Western side we do in truth want negotiated arms reductions, which is a route to peace.

Reisler: It must have taken a toll on you -- I suppose on your conscience, yours and the Prime Minister's and others who truly believe in arms control and disarmament in a non-nuclear world, to have to accept the Cruise nuclear missile testing, which was an escalation in the arms race. As a means of still being part of the dialogue.

DPM/SSEA: Well, I don't think the decision to test the Cruise is an escalation in the arms race at all.

Reisler: Deployment is not an escalation.

DPM/SSEA: I think that deployment itself is the placing

.../4

FPR-1157

- 4 -

December 2, 1983

obviously of new weapons in response in Europe to the SS-20s and fears that had been...

Reisler: Nevertheless, it's a new weapon...

DPM/SSEA: Yes, it's a deployment of weapons in Europe. If you want to describe that as an escalation of the arms race, it's questionable. The purpose of the deployment is basically to succeed at the negotiating table. The threat to deploy brought the Russians to the negotiating table. Believe you me, if we hadn't shown some determination, I doubt that the Russians would have stayed at the negotiating table. So in the...

Reisler: They're not there anyway.

DPM/SSEA: They've left. They've left because of the statements which they made prior to the deployment. They were determined to prevent the deployment, to break the will of the Alliance through their influence on public opinion in the West, and they failed. I think that if we have any hope it seems to me of succeeding in reducing arms, we're not going to succeed by getting on our knees, or begging, for arms control or reductions. It has to be in the vital interests of the Soviet Union also to enter into these agreements, so I think if you look at it more deeply you may find that it's not quite as visible an escalation as you think.

Reisler: But, in terms of Canada's position, though, just looking at this as a very narrow Canadian viewpoint, it would seem to be a contradiction, after all these years and the trouble we've gone to be a non-nuclear power to now have the most modern of nuclear weapons being tested over our soil.

DPM/SSEA: Well, we are testing guidance systems for nuclear capable aircraft, let's put it that way. It's a guidance system; there are no nuclear weapons aboard, it's unarmed, and it's not a precedent, because we have certainly permitted nuclear capable aircraft to test and fly around Canada in certain areas. The Americans and the Germans, I believe the British. So that this step is not a change, I think it follows from what we've done in the past. We're not a nuclear weapons country at all and we don't intend to be.

Reisler: But did it encourage you to dig in your heels more and pursue the other side of the NATO two-track decision, which is the negotiations?

.../5

FPR-1157

- 5 -

December 2, 1983

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think that if you referred to the letter that I wrote to George Shultz in July when we finally decided to test the Cruise, agreed to receive a proposal from the United States, it's in that letter I made it clear to him that because of this, Canada not only had a greater right to pursue its peace aims but also had a greater obligation and I gave him advance... you know, that that was our intention, we wanted to be consulted on these questions and we were indicating what our views were to be in the future.

Reisler: In the fall and early September when you went through your normal sort of discussion with your Department about the priorities in the next few months and the new year, this peace... the whole idea of what we do in the disarmament, that was part of the discussions?

DPM/SSEA: Yes, it has been a recurring theme in my discussions with departmental officials over more than the past year. For example, what can we do through NATO for example, to influence the INF talks. Because the United States is the leader of the talks, but it consults with the other members of the Alliance. I have been preoccupied... we've been doing our level best in preparing for these consultations so that we were having the maximum effect, whether we were indeed creative enough in providing proposals in the INF and we did have a series of deep briefings by the best strategic analysts in the government on all these arms proposals. I met with the American negotiators last February, in Europe, I met the Russian negotiators at the INF talks, in an effort to get a better understanding of the process and see what Canada might be able to do.

Reisler: Did you have to overcome some resistance on the part of some people in External Affairs who take the view that there's nothing Canada can do vis-à-vis the INF talks?

DPM/SSEA: I think that there is a debate as to the extent Canadian influence, whether in the INF talks, because of the structure, because there are so many countries involved in the consultations, whether Canada alone would have a marked influence. My own view is that we do have a political influence and ought to use it as much as possible. We're not big. I don't think that our role ought to be measured in terms of the number of tanks we have on the fields of Europe, that we have a political role, a political standing, that we ought to exploit.

.../6

FPR-1157

- 6 -

December 2, 1983

Reisler: Obviously your views prevailed, because we moved ahead.

DPM/SSEA: Well, we moved ahead, and I think one of the things, at least I've clarified in my own mind, and I think the Prime Minister did too, in his mind, is why should Canada try to come up with better arms control proposals. There are good ones on the table now, and we couldn't likely be more creative than the Americans or the Russians, or the Europeans. You know, there are good proposals that have been put forward. Therefore, we shouldn't in a sense be blaming ourselves or feeling guilty that we couldn't come up with the answer that would settle the question at the INF.

Reisler: Is that what was frustrating the people who were sort of resisting Canada's...?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think that is probably part of it; probably they had a more realistic view as to what one might come up with in the field of arms control. In this particular effort of the Prime Minister, we are not coming up with a better mousetrap, so to speak. We're taking a political route; certainly we're not trying to inject new proposals into the INF talks. When I say we're not trying to come up with a better mousetrap someone else hasn't thought about. We're taking a political route with a number of specifics in the proposal.

Reisler: Alexander Haig said recently on The Journal that Prime Minister Trudeau was a friend and an experienced statesman but then, not mentioning him by name he went on to worry aloud about people who, though they have the best intentions, end up by bringing about the results they don't want, which would be disunity and break-up of the Alliance. How -- does it worry you, that a man of that stature -- a former Secretary of State -- is saying these things, that the Prime Minister is somewhat well-intentioned but could end up splitting up the Alliance?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I worry if General Haig has the view that the Prime Minister's efforts is a threat to the solidarity of the Alliance. I think that would be a most unfounded fear on his part. If the idea is that the United States should play a hegemonistic role, then that's not in the spirit of the Alliance itself. I think it is the responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Government of Canada to the Canadian people to do what it can. We are involved, as part of the Alliance, we make a big investment in defence, we pay a lot of attention to the Alliance; we've

.../7

FPR-1157

- 7 -

December 2, 1983

now decided to test the Cruise missile; it wasn't very popular. We weren't heralded from the housetops because of that decision. We did it to discharge our responsibilities to NATO, and as neighbour to the United States. Basically a NATO obligation. So I don't put much stock in that, quite frankly. That's what the General means, that this initiative is somehow hostile to the spirit of the Alliance. I think quite the contrary.

Reisler: The cruise testing wasn't popular; the Prime Minister's is in fact popular. It would be hard to disapprove of peace initiatives in this day and age. Did you perhaps have that at the back of your mind? I'm not saying you're not committed to the process, but you must have felt a little better about going with the current, at least the Canadian current, in embarking on this mission?

DPM/SSEA: I think that the first point, on the Cruise, the polls have shown that more and more Canadians seem to accept the necessity of doing it than did at the beginning. But I think that the Prime Minister's effort couldn't have matched more perfectly the circumstances which we face at the present time. There was KAL, the downing of the Korean airliner, that sent fear waves around the world, there's the break-off of the INF talks, all of that underlines, it seems to me, the necessity of trying to get an opening to the Soviet Union, trying to get a dialogue, and trying to lower the tensions or improve the climate or whatever series of expressions you want to use. I think that the Prime Minister's initiative from that point of view is absolutely perfect.

Reisler: The Meech Lake meeting -- in early October there was a meeting at Meech Lake -- what was the spirit like? What can you tell me about that meeting? Obviously it was the meeting that launched everything to where it is today.

DPM/SSEA: The meeting at Willson House took place, I think in September.

Reisler: There was one that followed where there were Ambassadors, from NATO, from Washington, from Europe... It was where the group from External Affairs came up with 20-odd ideas that the Prime Minister could do and batted it around.

DPM/SSEA: The task force which had been set up previously

.../8

FPR-1157

- 8 -

December 2, 1983

had put together a series of ideas. They were ideas that were within reason. Some of them may not have been implementable, some were politically acceptable in terms of the world political situation. It was at that meeting at Willson House that this group did try to winnow out among all these ideas what might be the best -- the best chance -- the most sensible -- the best chance of success, and if you ask about the atmosphere, the atmosphere was businesslike. I think all of us were pleased with the outcome of the meeting, because the more fearsome ideas seemed not to fly. That was good as far as I was concerned because I did think that some of the proposals would have made life difficult for Canada and maybe the Alliance. It might have had some of the effects that General Haig would fear. People are very sensitive at the moment as to what might have the effect of breaking or undermining the solidarity. So the meeting was very good. We all felt better about it.

Reisler: Was it like being at the... starting line of a race, or was it... I'm just trying to get a sense of... now you have your marching orders... what was it like?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think there were two aspects to the meeting. One was the side and the other's what you do about it. And I think the second part probably evolved later about the number of people and when the Prime Minister would see them. He's been to Europe, he's been to the Commonwealth, Japan, China, and these were major... He's sent letters to the NATO Alliance, all of these matters weren't dealt in details and agreed upon at Willson House but they eventually were decided upon all in the overall I think spirit of the conclusion of our discussions and anything that could be done to move the situation would be helpful. Even the little bit. Who knows what impact this will have in the next six months or a year. Who knows who else might pick it up? Some other Western states might pick up the same idea. Several might. It might be an encouragement to get us out of this sort of groove we're in.

Reisler: At the time of that meeting, none of this was really public, so what were the concerns you had as you went through it in terms of the proposals you made or the profile the Prime Minister was taking and the risks? What were the cost-benefit things you were examining at that point?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think that the cost-benefit aspect was the impact on our relations obviously with our

.../9

FPR-1157

- 9 -

December 2, 1983

allies, with the United States, with the other members of the Alliance. That had another aspect in addition to Canada's interests, whether these ideas would have some response from the Alliance and from others, whether they would have a response from the Canadian public, although one didn't know at that point. One had to be unsure. Certainly I was as to what the response was. I knew that it was, it might be, I knew that it would be answering a very profound desire among Ministers and among the Caucus who returned again and again to the idea that we ought to do something and that the Prime Minister should try and do something personally. That certainly was in the background but was put flesh on at Willson House later.

Reisler: So you didn't yet know if Canadians would respond with their habitual cynicism?

DPM/SSEA: Well, one didn't know what the media would do with it, whether it would not be destroyed by a very cynical media. And that didn't happen, I'm pleased to say.

Reisler: The media has reported though that you've been basically flying by the seat of your pants, so to speak on this. Is that correct?

DPM/SSEA: Well I think that there was careful preparation, that we had a very sophisticated task force; we had our own general thoughts for weeks and months; we had a very sophisticated task force; we had those notions tested and reviewed among our most experienced diplomats who know the situation in various countries. So that doesn't look to me like flying by the seat of your pants to make those very careful preparations. I suppose one could say, yes, you fly on the seat of your pants when you don't know what the ultimate outcome will be and we don't know and we can't know.

Reisler: This has been a Canadian effort, well let me start again. In hindsight, would it have been better for the Prime Minister to make his second speech to Parliament and not in front of the Liberal Party fund raising dinner in Quebec City? (sic)

DPM/SSEA: Well, it may be, I've been asked about that and I sort of think that's a bit picky. It has become more and more acceptable, not only to make political speeches at so-called non-political gatherings, but it's

.../10

FPR-1157

- 10 -

December 2, 1983

also more acceptable to deal with serious subjects with political audiences instead of beating hell out of your opponents. It's refreshing for a change to have a series of proposals put forward to the Party faithful but I don't think that's a major or was a major problem

Reisler: But one is left with the impression sometimes that the Prime Minister and perhaps you people who are in the twilight of your political careers are doing this more in a personal sense rather than a Canadian sense. That you could have done more to use Parliament as a platform and have the whole of the House of Commons backing you rather than your Department and what you can command with your office.

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think that it's in a sense regrettable what has happened in Parliament over the years. At one time when the Prime Minister or External Affairs Minister returned from a major visit there was a statement in the House and a series of statements and generally the effort was to deal with foreign policy in a reasonably non-partisan way. I think if you go back over the past 10 years particularly you will find that the efforts that the Prime Minister has made to report to the House and deal with foreign policy issues have been received with a barrage of not pronouncements on foreign policy but a barrage against the Prime Minister and his style of conducting himself when he's abroad and so on and it become nonsense. I've said that in the House and I regret it but I think that unless the atmosphere has changed, if the Prime Minister had come into the House and made a statement on motions it would have been turned into a political attack. I hope I'm wrong but...

Reisler: And that would have then jeopardized the whole...?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think that I would like us to come back to the day when foreign policy issues can be discussed through these statements that used to take place in an effort to show unity around common principles which used to be the case rather than heighten the political element of it.

Reisler: Can you, this is a general question but, can you explain what is driving the Prime Minister on this subject, what is motivating him? Is there a way of capturing that?

DPM/SSEA: I think that he's driven by concern about the present situation. I think he's had as you know

.../11

FPR-1157

- 11 -

December 2, 1983

a special interest in disarmament questions which just didn't begin this fall. It has been rather well established well in the past so that it is an issue that has occupied him over the years. So I think he's been driven by that. I don't think that he's been driven by the expectation that somehow this initiative will change the political atmosphere in Canada. I certainly don't feel that. I think it has been a very valuable initiative in itself and if it improves the political situation so much the better. If not, I think it will have been very worthwhile.

Reisler: When you say the political atmosphere, you're talking about the Liberal Party standing in the country, is that what you mean?

DPM/SSEA: Well, that would be part of it.

Reisler: One of the newspapers reported that the Prime Minister got a little bit frustrated with the Department of External Affairs because of dragging its heels in coming up with some proposals for him and he almost threatened to set up a task force I guess out of his own office. How accurate is that?

DPM/SSEA: I don't think that's accurate at all. The Prime Minister certainly didn't threaten to set up a task force out of his own office. I don't think it could provide a task force to do this kind of work. When the notion of a task force was suggested at one of our meetings I certainly thought it was a good idea and I made the proposals in detail that were accepted and that formed the basis or formed the structure of the task force. So I think the Department has responded very well to this challenge. And I'm delighted that we set up the task force in the way we did because the Department and other Departments, the Department of National Defence, the PCO have demonstrated quite a high degree of professionalism in supporting this effort. I think it has been a very good experience.

Reisler: If they were really keen they could have done something like this right after Williamsburg though. Why wait until a plane is shot down?

DPM/SSEA: Well of course I don't think the plane itself was the cause of them doing this. I think that maybe it would have been better to have done it some time ago, but it's been done and I think at a very good time.

.../12

FPR-1157

- 12 -

December 2, 1983

Reisler: What do you recall about the exchange between Prime Minister Thatcher and Mr. Trudeau in Williamsburg?

DPM/SSEA: Well, there was an exchange. These meetings are confidential. I can't tell you what was said, but it wasn't long and it was, I think, characteristic of the type of exchange that the Prime Minister of Canada and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have. They're both good debaters, have firm views and when they're dealing with serious matters they express their views. Let me give you one insight that after that morning session of the leaders when we discussed the security passages of the Williamsburg declaration: there were a number of people going around with long faces saying well this has done such terrible damage -- the idea that such emotions and such feelings and such words have been said. Well, I took quite an opposite view. I thought it was quite healthy and I thought it was quite the way that a Summit should operate and that people should know and hear each other and that it probably made for a better atmosphere and it did.

Reisler: Was the fundamental disagreement, if one could put it that way, between them have to do with their analysis of the objectives of the Soviet Union, of what the Soviet Union is after? I think there's a real split with some people thinking the Soviet Union is a kind of Nazi expansionist bit like Hitler trying to a big land grab, country after country after country and others who see the Soviet Union as perhaps being somewhat defensive on security defensive?


DPM/SSEA: I just say that the discussion wasn't of that length that one could conclude what the basis of, what was deep down that came out. I just can't say that.

Reisler: So it wasn't about ideology, they weren't, you know...

DPM/SSEA: Well, you made a rather profound statement about philosophical differences.

Reisler: Well, actually I shouldn't have said so much.

DPM/SSEA: ... between, that might have occurred and the discussion didn't give me an opportunity to confirm that. I can't say. It may have been in someone's mind but I can't say from the discussion. And I'm not going to say any more because I've said enough.


John Noble
Director
Media Relations

001122

Delvoie
Gow
Smith

Ottawa, December 2, 1983.

Dear Mr. Deputy Minister:

At a question period in the Senate, which by the way is unusual for mexican standards, Bernardo Sepúlveda mentioned the risk of a nuclear holocaust and the urgent need for disarmament.

I think this can be interesting for you in the light of Mr. Trudeau's peace initiative.

L. C. - tmg

001123

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

We also denounced, strongly, the risk of a nuclear holocaust and the crippling consequences of said threat upon the international coexistence. In face of the danger of a war of extermination, we have been obstinate defenders of peace. Unfortunately, at present it seems that the margins of negotiation on disarmament are narrowing and the ways of rationality are closing. In view of this uncertainty and to the threat of destruction, Mexico maintains the moral and political demand that the super-powers celebrate as soon as possible agreements conducive to a complete and general disarmament. I informed that on disarmament matters as it has been done in the past, particularly by promoting the Treaty of Tlatelolco, we will continue to perform a useful role to guarantee our own survival.

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EMBAJADA DE MEXICO

OTAWA, CANADA

Mr. de Montigny Marchand,
Deputy Minister.
Department of External Affairs.
Ottawa, Ont.

DMF

Fahseen M. Basheer

**Ambassador of the Arab Republic
of Egypt to Canada**

Office: 234-4931

Residence: 745-6849

001126

SUNDAY STAR, DECEMBER 4, 1983/FS

The search for Mideast peace

By H.E. Tahseen M. Basheer
Special to The Star

Returning from Egypt recently, one would get the impression that Canada is playing a dramatic role in the Middle East; for on his recent visit to Near Eastern capitals, Canada's deputy prime minister and secretary of state for external affairs, Allan MacEachen, carried with him a Canadian message of the search for peace in our tormented area, based on moderation and respect for the rights of all sides including the recognition of Palestinian rights and the acceptance of Israel.

MacEachen's style of charm and perseverance afforded him the opportunity to speak on these delicate subjects but, more importantly, to be listened to. The Canadian voice carried weight because Canada is seen as a friend of both Arabs and Israelis, and this point was driven home when MacEachen explained the Canadian position, which is grounded in international law but is equally based on a sense of fair compromise:

- The Arab states must recognize Israel.
- Israel must recognize the right of the Palestinian people to have a country of their own on the West Bank and Gaza, and both sides have to weave steadily the texture of a new era of peace in the Middle East.

Lebanon has to be given a chance to emerge from the rubble, by asking all foreign troops to leave — Israeli troops, who entered Lebanon uninvited in June, 1982, must return to their homes. The Syrian forces, which were invited by Lebanon and the Arab countries, have to know that they have overstayed their invitation and also have to leave.

Element of balance

The fact that some elements of the Canadian policy on the Middle East raise protests from one side to another attests to the element of balance which is crucial to finding the right solution. We in Egypt, who pioneered against all odds the road to peace in the Middle East, know that to have a stable and comprehensive peace all issues have to be squarely addressed, and all sides to the conflict have to participate.

The crucial concerns of the Palestinians, the Israelis, the Syrians, Jordanians and Lebanese, have to be met, and solutions that have the possibility of acceptance and growth must embody these concerns. Essential elements to resolve the conflict include: recognition, security, participation. This has to express itself in a formula that represents a balance between the different elements, because excess security on one side would only mean the excess of insecurity of the others.

Recognition of one side has to be reciprocated by recognition from the other side, and the difficulty we face is how to define a political dynamism that can successfully incorporate all of these elements. This is why we need the active participation not only of the superpowers, but of all peace-loving nations who enjoy credibility in our region, to help bridge the gaps while we build this structure of peace.

The majority of us were stunned in the summer of 1982 by the escalation and proliferation of violence in the Middle East, and this situation continues today. It is too tragic and too painful to ponder, but difficult as it may be, one has to deliberate as to lessons

Canada can help
bridge gaps while all
sides in the conflict
seek a stable formula,
writes the Egyptian
ambassador in Ottawa



Tahseen Basheer: Ambassador took part in talks in Cairo between External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen and Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali.

that are emerging from these challenging problems.

The lesson I can detect is more sobering, and hopefully more rewarding, in the long term, for what we see is a failure of those who opted to use violence as a means of achieving their political ends. It is tragic that the heavy price has to be paid by the innocent and the non-participant, but those who carried the gun have equally wounded themselves.

Israel with its might army, in comparison to the Palestine Liberation Organization forces, declared it would weed out terrorism through the convenient and seemingly limited "Operation Peace in the Galilee." Alas, it turned out to be an operation of massive violence that included the invasion by Israel of an Arab capital; the tottering balance that existed in Lebanon collapsed, thus releasing the "genie" that has proven very difficult to contain. The violence that accompanied this operation and which is still unfolding is greater than any violence witnessed in Lebanon before; the irony is that Israel lost more than 500 of its young men, who otherwise would not have been killed.

Public opinion in Israel has condemned this waste of Israeli lives. The Palestinians, who have been demanding recognition of their political rights and have been the recipients of massive injustice, are too traumatized to ponder on how to move against tremendous odds. Those of them who carry the gun might

envisage an illusion of liberation; but the irony is that the gun is incapable of achieving liberation.

The world, the Arabs, and particularly Israel, owe the Palestinians a duty to help them take the risk of peace, instead of plunging further into despair. The case for Palestinian rights, in its legal, political and human aspects, should not be dwarfed by all the clamor in the Middle East; for when the dust has settled, the rights of the Palestinian people will remain: to their land on the West Bank and Gaza, their right to self-determination, and their right to be like all other people — independent and active in building their own future.

Without addressing this issue, we cannot hope to achieve any stability in our region.

Today, when the Palestinians do not pose a threat to any state in the area, it is time for Israel to face this problem openly and to declare itself, not as a force of occupation and annexation but as a country that respects the rights of others on the basis of independence and equality. The Israeli government cannot cover up what has been happening in the West Bank and Gaza with a smokescreen of argumentation. The policy of escalating settlements is illegal, inhuman and disastrous to the cause of peace. It will turn the Israelis from free people into "occupiers;" not only will it brutalize them but it will also make their acceptance in the Middle East impossible to achieve.

Tremendous hurdles

As an Egyptian, I believe that Egypt works actively for peace. Despite all the obstacles, peace is here to stay. Yet a policy of peace has to overcome all these tremendous hurdles before we can rest assured that peace is stable, not only in the political sense but equally in the hearts and attitudes of all the peoples of the area.

Canada and the Canadian people represent an example of peaceful living in North America. They have managed to live in peace with the superpower to the south, the United States, and the superpower to the west, the Soviet Union. Canada has achieved the formula of commitment to peace that could be emulated in our area.

The Canadian people can join with other peace-loving countries in creating a force that is needed to shore up the diplomatic efforts in search of peace in the Middle East. Peace is too important to be left to politicians and diplomats alone. The people of the world have to be involved.

While Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau is endeavoring to channel every effort into a new world peace commitment, we need similar efforts to salvage all previous Middle East peace initiatives: United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, Camp David Accords, the Fez plan, the Reagan initiative. A new formula that combines the essence of these efforts into a comprehensive, effective momentum for Arab-Israeli peace.

I see in the Middle East the possibility, not of an impending Armageddon, but the opportunity to build a new Middle East where Israeli and Palestinian can live independently, side by side in peace and harmony; where the genius of the Arabs and the Jews can fulfill itself through mutual cooperation; for we have to learn from history that the only way to build a right and peaceful



الخارجية
سفارة جمهورية مصر العربية
ن أوتاوا

THE EMBASSY OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
454 LAURIER AVENUE EAST
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1N 6R3

BY HAND

Mr. de Montigny Marchand,
Deputy Minister - Foreign Policy (DMF)
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
Sussex Drive,
OTTAWA.

001128

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---PROPOSAL FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTRES

WE ARE FAXING TO YOU PRESS RELEASE AND REPORT ISSUED BY SENATORS
SAM NUNN AND JOHN WARNER RECOMMENDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CRISIS
MANAGEMENT CENTRES LINKED TO POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF
USA AND USSR.

2. TO SOME EXTENT PROPOSALS AND PURPOSES OF CENTRES REFLECT THE
IMPROVED HOT-LINE PROPOSALS USA HAS MADE TO USSR, BUT THIS CONCEPT
GOES BEYOND USA GOVT PROPOSALS AND INDEED WELL BEYOND TRADITIONAL
DIPLOMACY. MAIN ORIGINAL FEATURE IS JOINTLY-MANNED ASPECT. AMONG THE
AUTHORS OF THE REPORT ARE BILL HYLAND, BRENT SCOWCROFT AND JAMES
SCHLESINGER.

3. AMB WAS TOLD BY HYLAND THAT PRES HAD REACTED WITH CONSIDERABLE
INTEREST TO THIS PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE THAT MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE
ACTUAL PROPOSAL IS THE THEME OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT, AND THAT IT IS
THIS ASPECT THAT APPEALS TO PRES REAGAN. PM MAY THEREFORE WISH TO
CONSIDER PICKING UP THAT THEME IN HIS DISCUSSIONS HERE, THOUGH
ADMIN TAKES LINE THAT IN TERMS OF CRISIS COMMUNICATION, LITTLE
EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT USA-USSR RELATIONS ARE PROBLEM. WE SHALL REPORT
MORE ON THIS NEXT WEEK.

CCC/241 022259Z UNGR2489

External Affairs Canada / Affaires étrangères Canada

MESSAGE

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Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

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SECURITY / SECURITE: UNCLASSIFIED - FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

M/DE: FM WSHDC POL0542 02DEC83

O/A: TO EXTOTT/IDUZ

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RE: --NUNN/WARNER PROPOSAL ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTRES - 9 PAGES

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Sam Nunn

UNITED STATES SENATOR
WASHINGTON, D. C.
(202) 224-3741

EMBARGOED UNTIL
Wednesday, November 23, 1983, 10:00 a.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
Contact Ed Nagy 224-3521 or
Pete Loomis 224-6290

NUNN AND WARNER PROPOSE NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION SYSTEM

Washington, D.C.---U. S. Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and John Warner (R-VA) today released a report proposing the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers in Washington and Moscow. The report was prepared by the Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction, which was organized in November 1982 by Nunn and Warner to examine alternative means of reducing the risk of nuclear war.

The report released today emphasized that "there are an increasing number of scenarios that could precipitate the outbreak of nuclear war that neither side anticipated or intended, possibly involving other nuclear powers or terrorist groups." To address that risk, the report proposes the establishment of two centers that "...would maintain a 24-hour watch on any events with the potential to lead to nuclear incidents."

According to the report, the centers "...would be designed to reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism, to build confidence between the two sides, and to avoid the buildup of tensions that could lead to confrontation."

The centers would be linked directly to political and military authorities in both countries. In the event of an emergency, the personnel in charge of the centers would have direct access to each nation's highest political authority.

As outlined in the report, the potential functions of the centers would include:

1. To discuss and outline the procedures to be followed in the event of possible incidents involving the use of nuclear weapons;
2. To maintain close contact during incidents precipitated by nuclear terrorists;
3. To exchange information on a voluntary basis concerning events that might lead to nuclear proliferation or to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or the materials and equipment necessary to build nuclear weapons, by sub-national groups;
4. To exchange information about military activities which might be misunderstood by the other party during periods of mounting tensions;

FROM THE OFFICE OF SAM NUNN - U.S. SENATOR - GEORGIA

JAMES F. BRIDGEMAN, STAFF INSTRUCTOR AND CHIEF COURSEMAN
JACOB G. MOORE, STAFF INSTRUCTOR FOR THE MINORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

A NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION SYSTEM

**Report of the Nunn/Warner
Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction**

November 1983

52.9

A Nuclear Risk Reduction System

With but few exceptions, the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to avoid confrontations entailing the risk of nuclear war. There are compelling reasons, however, for concern about the two nations' ability to avoid nuclear crises in the future.

The emergence of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at the end of the Second World War as the only two remaining great military powers virtually assured a continuing national rivalry that would dominate global politics. The fundamental antagonisms in values and objectives between the United States and the Soviet Union continue to make certain that, regardless of their common recognition of some shared interests (such as avoiding nuclear war), the relationship will remain competitive for many years to come.

The global ideological and political struggle between ourselves and the Soviet Union is superimposed on an increasingly fractious and troubled world. International and national conflicts--particularly in the Third World--offer tempting opportunities for military or political exploitation and often lead to the involvement of the great powers on opposing sides of these disputes. In certain circumstances, such interventions have the potential to escalate to nuclear confrontations.

The 1973 crisis in the Middle East vividly demonstrated how quickly, and how far, such situations can escalate. The two great powers' involvement began with emergency transfers of weapons, shifted rapidly to the use of their own air and naval forces to protect those shipments, and ended with mutual threats of direct military intervention to protect their respective clients. At the height of the crisis, there were even hints that such interventions might include, or eventually escalate to, the use of nuclear weapons.

There are an increasing number of circumstances that could precipitate the outbreak of nuclear war that neither side anticipated nor intended, possibly involving other nuclear powers or terrorist groups. There has been a relentless dispersion of the know-how, equipment and materials necessary to fabricate nuclear devices. In addition to the five declared nuclear powers, two more nations--India and Israel--are assumed to be in a position to assemble a weapon on short notice, and may already have covert stocks of nuclear devices. India, of course, has already detonated one device.

These threshold nuclear powers may be joined by at least one, and possibly two, more nations (Pakistan and South Africa) before the end of this decade. Perhaps as many as five others (Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, South Korea and Taiwan) could be in a similar position before the year 2000. Still other countries, such as Germany, Japan and Sweden, have the financial, industrial, and technological potential to fabricate nuclear weapons; they lack only the political will to do so.

At the request of Senator Nunn, General Richard Ellis, when he was commander of the Strategic Air Command, undertook an evaluation of the possibility of a third party triggering a superpower nuclear exchange under a variety of scenarios. Unfortunately, this SAC evaluation showed that there are real and developing dangers in this area.

The spread of nuclear know-how, equipment, and materials also suggests a rising danger of nuclear terrorism. While the specific risk that in any one year any particular sub-national group or rogue national leader might acquire a nuclear device is, no doubt, a low probability, the cumulative risk covering all such groups over ten or twenty years may be very great indeed. Once in the hands of such an individual or group, the potential for lawlessness would be unlimited--including extortion, revenge, or an attempt to trigger a nuclear conflict between the superpowers.

In our view, the dangers implicit in this partial catalogue of potential nuclear flashpoints indicates the necessity of the two great powers initiating discussions aimed at establishing an explicit and comprehensive system for the prevention and containment of nuclear crises.

Recent Proposals and Studies

In 1982, Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga), John Warner (R-Va), and the late Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wa), introduced an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act requiring the Defense Department to evaluate several proposals aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear confrontations. Later that year, Senators Nunn and Warner organized the Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction.

In addition to the two Senators who serve as co-chairmen, the working group includes eight former civilian and military officials and technical experts. William Hyland, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, serves as the group's Secretary. The other members are James Schlesinger, the former Secretary of Defense; Brent Scowcroft, President Ford's National Security Advisor; General Richard Ellis, former Commander of the Strategic Air Command; Bobby Inman, formerly Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; William Perry, formerly Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; Don Rice, President of the Rand Corporation; and Barry Blechman, a senior fellow at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In early 1983, a Defense Department study prompted by the previously mentioned legislation was released. It recommended that the existing U.S.-Soviet "Hot Line" be upgraded with a facsimile link, that an additional communications channel be installed between the Pentagon and the Soviet Defense Ministry, and that high speed communications links be established between each government and its embassy in the other's capital. These proposals were endorsed by President Reagan in May. They are now the subject of discussions between the two governments.

709

The proposals put forward by President Reagan are positive steps toward the development of a comprehensive system to assure the avoidance of nuclear confrontations. But there are also crucial political aspects to the problem of preventing nuclear crises. These elements can be addressed only through more comprehensive arrangements involving the designation of particular representatives and facilities in both nations that would be assigned specific responsibilities for preventing nuclear crises.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

To begin, the United States and the Soviet Union might agree to establish separate national nuclear risk reduction centers in their respective capitals. These centers would maintain a 24 hour watch on any events with the potential to lead to nuclear incidents.

The nuclear risk reduction centers would have to be linked directly--both through communications channels and organizational relationships--to relevant political and military authorities. Thought might also be given to the assignment of liaison officers to the counterpart center in each capital. If this practice proved successful, it might be possible at some future time to move toward jointly manned centers in the two capitals.

An alternative arrangement would envision the creation of a single center, staffed by military and civilian representatives of the two nations, at a neutral site. Such an arrangement might facilitate closer cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but at the cost of diminished access between the surveillance center and the two governments themselves. This and other trade-offs between these two potential arrangements require more study.

Each center would be manned by a series of watch officers who would report through normal military and political channels. In addition, each side would designate a specific high level official to direct its center and to carry out those specific negotiations and exchanges of information as were agreed to in establishing the centers. Procedures would be established to assure that in the event of an emergency, the designated representatives would have direct access to each nation's highest political authority.

Direct communications links would be established between the two centers. These should definitely include print and facsimile channels. Consideration might also be given to the establishment of voice and perhaps even tele-conferencing facilities, as well. There are obvious dangers in such "real-time" communications, including the greater difficulty of intragovernmental coordination and a greater risk of imprecision or misunderstanding, but these may be offset by the far more rapid exchange of large amounts of information which would become possible.

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The establishment of these centers could contribute significantly to a reduced risk of nuclear incidents. They could be used for a range of functions, most of which would take place routinely in normal times, and would be designed to reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism, to build confidence between the two sides, and to avoid the build-up of tensions that could lead to confrontation. It would probably be best to define the functions of the nuclear centers narrowly at first, expanding them as experience demonstrated the value of the enterprise.

Possible Functions of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Among the potential functions of the centers would be the following:

First, to discuss and outline the procedures to be followed in the event of possible incidents involving the use of nuclear weapons. Among the contingencies that might be explored would be unexplained explosion of a nuclear device, a terrorist threat to explode a nuclear weapon unless certain demands were met, the discovery that a nuclear weapon was missing, and similar possibilities. The discussion of these contingencies could provide a script which might be followed should the event actually occur. Although neither side could be expected to commit itself to follow these scripts under all circumstances, the existence of such an agreed routine might facilitate appropriate actions.

Second, to maintain close contact during incidents precipitated by nuclear terrorists, thus facilitating cooperative actions to defuse the incident, and specifically, to avoid the danger that the explosion of a nuclear device by a terrorist group might lead to a nuclear confrontation between the great powers.

Third, to exchange information on a voluntary basis concerning events that might lead to nuclear proliferation or to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or the materials and equipment necessary to build weapons, by sub-national groups. Obviously, care would have to be taken in any such exchange to avoid compromising intelligence sources and methods. Still, this type of U.S.-Soviet cooperation would clearly be in their mutual interest, and could increase both nations' ability to contain any such threats. There have been precedents for cooperation between the two as concerns the spread of nuclear weapons, and there is also precedent in the Standing Consultative Commission established by the 1972 SALT Agreements for the confidential exchange of technical and sensitive information.

9 p 9

Fourth, to exchange information about military activities which might be misunderstood by the other party during periods of mounting tensions. At times of mounting political tensions, the existence of independent nuclear risk reduction centers might facilitate the exchange of information about military activities which might otherwise be misinterpreted and contribute to escalating suspicions and fears. Such an exchange of information would have to be made on a voluntary basis. Even so, such an exchange could help to dampen the more extreme fears and actions that could otherwise result from international conflicts. Such a system would, of course, require checks and safeguards against the possibility that disinformation would be deliberately or accidentally fed into it, leading to confusion or delays in decision-making.

Fifth, to establish a dialogue about nuclear doctrines, forces, and activities. These exchanges might include the notifications required under the 1971 "Accidents Agreement" and any future arrangements requiring the prior notification of missile flight tests and strategic exercises. But they could go beyond this to include discussions of any strategic practices of the two sides which implicitly raise a danger of misinterpretation or misunderstanding. Consideration also could be given to using this forum to maintain an agreed data base on the strategic forces of the two sides, a necessary element for virtually any strategic arms control agreement.

Prospects and Possibilities

A strong foundation has been laid for the proposals in this report. There have been more than 20 bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements to which both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are parties, that establish requirements for exchanges of information, the prior notification of certain events, the establishment of special communications links, the designation of representatives to negotiate technical aspects of the two nations' nuclear relationship, and cooperation on proliferation issues. The 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, which has all but eliminated what had been frequent and dangerous confrontations between the two great powers, is an excellent example of what can be accomplished.

But what already has developed on an ad hoc basis is far from comprehensive in its coverage of potential problems. Moreover, the actual use or implementation of these agreements has been limited. The current system is particularly deficient in that it does not deal adequately with the growing danger of nuclear terrorism.

We suggest that by establishing the nuclear risk reduction system described in this report, the ability of both nations to contain escalation would be greatly enhanced. The proposal deserves serious consideration by the governments of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and by the citizens of both nations.

ACTION
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---PMS INITIATIVE-FRG VIEWS

SUMMARY:FRG SUPPORTS AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF PMS INTITIAE
INT IS GENERAL LINES AND IS FOLLOWING CLOSELY ITS DEVELOPMENT
AND RECEPTION ELSEWHERE.OFFICIALS HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS,NOTING EG THAT SOME ARE ESSENTIALLY FOR OTHER
COUNTRIES TO TAKE UP(FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONF)OR THAT
SUBSTANCE NEEDS TO BE AGREED BEFORE DECISION ON POLITICAL
INPUT IS MADE(MBFR).THEY THUS SEE DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING LINKAGE
BETWEEN PMS CALL FOR POLTIICAL DIALOGUE AND ELEMENTS TO GIVE
SUBSTANCE TO ANY SUCH DIALOGUE.

2.REPORT:WE MET WITH SCHAUER,MFA DIR GEN FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
TO OBTAIN A READING OF CURRECT FRG VISIES ON PMS INITIATIVE.
DISCUSSION CONFIRMED THAT GERMAN REMAIN POSITIVELY DISPOSED TOWARDS
PMS INITIATIVE.HIS GENERAL ANALYSIS OF SITUAITON IS SIMILAR TO THFIRS.
AND HIS CALL FOR HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL ENAGEMENT ISD ONE THEY CAN

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PAGE TWO ZQGR4119 CONF

READILY ENDORSE, AS IT IS ONE THEY MAKE REGULARLY THEMSELVES. THEY ARE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENT OF INITIATIVE CLOSELY AND REQUESTED INFO ON RECEPTION PM RECEIVED IN TOKYO, PEKIN ETC. GRATEFUL RECEIVE LINES OF BRIEFING WE CAN PASS ONE.

3. ON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS GERMAN HAVE QUESTIONS AND BECOME SOMEWHAT MORE CAUTIOUS. EXCEPTION IS LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION IN STKHM. THEY HAVE FROM OUTSET BELIEVED CDE SHOULD OPEN AT FM LEVEL. GENSCHER WILL DEFINITELY BE IN ATTENDANCE.

4. ON MBFR SCHAUER SAID THAT SUBSTANCE SHOULD DETERMINE MIN INVOLVEMENT, NOT/NOT VICE VERSA. IN OTHER WORDS WEST SHOULD FIRST DECIDE CONTENT OF ITS RESPONSE TO EASTERN PROPOSALS, DECIDE FURTHER HOW THIS RESPONSE SHOULD BE MADE AND ONLY THEY DECIDE WHO SHOULD MAKE IT. FRG AGREED TIMELY RESPONSE SHOULD BE MADE TO EASTERN PROPOSALS BUT NEITHER USA NOR UK APPEARED READY AT THIS POINT TO MAKE IT. FRG WOULD BE READY FOR DISCUSSION OF CDN IDEAS ON MBFT AT NATO MIN DECS-9 IF MINA WERE TO RAISE THEM. SCHAUER SAID MBFR HAD NOT/NOT BEEN RAISED DURING UK/FRG SUMIT (OURTEL ZQGR4083 10 NOV) AND WAS TOUCHED ON ONLY BRIEFLY DURING FR/FRG SUMMIT (OURTEL ZQGR4107 29 NOV) /

5. ON IDEA OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONF SCHAUER SAID FRG WAS OF COURSE IN PRINCIPLE IN FAVOUR OF SUCH CONF TAKING PLACE. HOWEVER FRG WAS NOT/NOT NUCLEAR POWER, HAVING RENOUNCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ITSELF, AND IT WAS ULTIMATELY QUESTION THAT NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD DECIDE. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT UK/FRG/CHINESE REACTION HAD BEEN HE ASSUMED FR
...3

PAGE THREE ZQGR4119 CONF

REACTION WAS SIMILAR TO MITTERANDS UN SPEECH IE POSITIVELY
DISPOSED IN PRINCIPLE BUT SETTING OUT THREE TOUGH CONDITIONS
BEFORE FR COULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY SUCH CONF.UK POSITION,JUDGING
FROM HOW SPEEC TO UN,SEEMEND TO BE SIMILAR.

6.SCHAUERS REACTION TO SUFFOCATION OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS
WAS SIMILAR,IE FRG HAD NO/NO INTENTION OF PRODUCING SUCH SYSTEMS
AND IT WAS ESSENTIALLY QUESTION TWO SUPERPOWERS HAD TO DECIDE
BETWEEN THEMSELVES(ON THESE SPFCIFIC SUFFOCATION IDEAS,AS WELL AS
MBFR,WE WILL BE TOUCHING BASE WITH FRED RUTH AND HIS PEOPLE FOR
MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS).

7.SCHAUER ALSO TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE FRG VIEWS ON USSR WALKOUT
IN GENEV.HE SIAD SOVIETS WOULD COME BACK TO INF NEGS QUOTE SOMEWHERE,
SOMEHOW UNQUOTE.PERHAPS NOT/NOT IN GENEV,PERHAPS IN CONJUNCTION WITH
START.USSR HAD STRONG INTEREST IN AGREEMENT ON INF AND WOULD BE BACK.
DEPLOYMENT WAS DEFEAT FOR USSR,BUT POLITICALLY THERE WAS LITTLE THEY
COULD DO.THEY CONTINUED TO SHOW GREAT INTEREST IN CDA.GDR REACTION
TO DEPLOYMENT HAD BEEN MEASURED AND CAUTIOUS.FOR ALL THESE REASONS,
FRG THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT NAC MAKE FIRM BUT POSITIVE STATEMENT
AT NEXT WEEKS MTG,PERHPAS IN FORM OF SEPARATE STATEMENT.(BNATO HAS
REPORTED FRG NATO DEL HAS RAISED THIS POSSIBILITY).

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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—PM INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH US AND UK

FLWG ARE POINTS YOU MAY DRAW ON IN BRIEFING STATE DEPT AND FCO ON RESULTS OF PM S VISIT TO CHINA,PEKING,CHOGM AND HIS PERSONAL EMIS-SARY S VISIT TO MOSCOW.WE WILL BE GIVING DPM/SSEA ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR HIS MTGS WITH SHULTZ AND HOWE.

1.JAPAN:

PM NAKASONE WAS VERY RECEPTIVE AND FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF ALL THE PM S PROPOSALS (PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION,AND ON MBFR AND CDE.

2.COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED PM TRUDEAU S INITIATIVE IN THE GOA DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. QUOTE A CONCERTED EFFORT IS REQUIRED TO RESTORE CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE TO THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.ONLY THUS,CAN A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE BE REBUILT IN PLACE OF THE PREVAILING ONE OF FEAR AND MISTRUST.IN ALL THESE PURSUITS,WE EMPHASISE THE SUPREME IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL WILL.WE,THEREFORE,WELCOME PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU S CALL FOR A NEW POLITICAL DIMENSION IN THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.WE SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS TO RESTORE ACTIVE POLITICAL CONTACT

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PAGE TWO IDDZ0242 CONF

AND COMMUNICATIONS AMONG ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS AND ARE WILLING TO HELP THESE AND OTHER SUCH EFFORTS IN ALL APPROPRIATE WAYS. AS PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI HAS SO CONSISTENTLY EMPHASISED. THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN SECURING WIDER PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT IS THE STOPPING OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THESE ARE ESSENTIAL STEPS FOR PROGRESS AND WORKING TOWARDS THE WORLD'S RELIEF FROM THE MENACE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR WIDER SPREAD UNQUOTE

3. CHINA: THE CHINESE ARE SUPPORTIVE OF THE BROAD POLITICAL PURPOSE, BUT DO NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE POWER CONFERENCE AT THIS STAGE PRIOR TO SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS BY THE SUPERPOWERS. DENG TOLD THE PM THAT THE CHIEF CAUSE OF THE ARMS RACE WAS THE SUPERPOWERS; PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISARMAMENT IS THEIRS. HE SAID THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY IS FINDING WAYS TO CONCENTRATE PRESSURE ON THE SUPERPOWERS TO REDUCE THEIR ARMS. HE STRESSED THAT CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL WAS ONLY SYMBOLIC, BUT IT DID ACT AS A DETERRENT. DENG DISAPPROVED OF THE NPT AND SAID THAT CHINA WOULD NOT SIGN IT, THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN PROLIFERATION. HE DID NOT SHARE THE PM'S ASSESSMENT OF THE DANGERS OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AS FEW WOULD BECOME NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

THEY SEE THE DANGER OF WAR AS REAL, BUT RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR WAS CONSTRAINED BY: (A) NUCLEAR DETERRENT OF CHINA AND FRANCE (B) ALLIES OF USA AND USSR DID NOT WANT WAR (C) PEACE MOVEMENTS (D)

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PAGE THREE IDDZ0242 CONF

SUPERPOWERS AWARENESS THAT MOST OF THEIR POPULATIONS WOULD BE KILLED IN A NUCLEAR WAR. DENG STRESSED THAT ANOTHER IMPORTANT KIND OF PRESSURE ON THE SUPERPOWERS WAS FOR COUNTRIES TO FOLLOW INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY E.G. DE GAULLE IN THE 1970 S. HE SAID THAT THE USSR WAS STILL BEING VERY AGGRESSIVE, BUT CERTAIN RECENT ACTIONS OF THE US HAD BEEN OF THE SAME CHARACTER E.G. US POLICY IN CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICA (THE US SHOULD HAVE REMAINED NEUTRAL IN THE FALKLANDS). THE US HAD DONE CERTAIN THINGS THIS YEAR QUOTE WHICH AROUSE OUR ATTENTION UNQUOTE.

4. THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED, WHILE THEIR REACTION TO THE INITIATIVE WAS NEUTRAL AS THEY SAID THEY VIEW THE INITIATIVE THROUGH THE PRISM OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE USA. THEY DO NOT THINK THERE IS A BASIS FOR ANY NEGOTIATIONS IF ONE SIDE VIEWS THE OTHER AS QUOTE EVIL UNQUOTE.

GROMYKO TOLD THE PM'S EMISSARY THAT THEY HAVE HAD QUOTE SAD EXPERIENCE UNQUOTE WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT WITH THE US, HENCE THEY WERE QUOTE RESERVED UNQUOTE ABOUT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE HIGHER LEVEL OF CONTACT THE BETTER. HE ARGUED THAT THE US HAD USED THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AS A SCREEN TO COVER MILITARISTIC ACTION AND DREW ATTENTION TO ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 24 WHICH THEY CHARACTERIZED

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PAGE FOUR IDDZ0242 CONFD

AS A REBUFF TO AGGRESSIVE AMERICAN POLICIES AND A PEACEFUL LINE TO EUROPE AND OTHER STATES AND ON DISARMAMENT.

WHILE GROMYKO APPRECIATED THE PM'S VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF REPLACING DISCUSSION OF NUMBERS AND RATIOS OF WEAPONS WITH CONSIDERATION OF TRUST, INTENTIONS AND GOALS, NATO, LED BY WASHINGTON, BY DEPLOYING PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES WAS ACTING ON A DIFFERENT BASIS. HE SAID THAT THE WEST'S REJECTION OF A DECLARATION OF NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOWED HOW THE WEST TREATED NOBLE IDEAS AND HE REGRETTED CANADA'S SUPPORT FOR INF DEPLOYMENT.

ON THE CALL FOR A FIVE POWER CONFERENCE, GROMYKO WAS NON-COMMITTAL, SAYING THERE WERE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES.

HE WAS RESERVED ON THE IDEA OF HIGH-LEVEL PRESENCE AT THE CDE OPENING AND AT MBFR. ON MBFR HE SAW NO DESIRE BY THE WEST TO MOVE FORWARD AT VIENNA.

FOR WSHDC:

RE PEKIN TEL 0921 30NOV WE HAVE NO/NO OBJECTION TO YOU PASSING CONTENTS OF PARAS 1 TO 5 TO STATE DEPT (AND PRESUME CHINESE MEANT IT TO BE PASSED ON).

CCC/302 030211Z IDDZ0242

TRANSCRIPT

FROM/DE • FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

CBC TV - JOURNAL - December 1, 1983
Interview with General Alexander Haig

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Peace
Mission.

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ENCLOSURES
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Barbara Frum: General Haig is in Montreal tonight on a speaking engagement. Welcome, General Haig.

Alexander Haig: Thank you, Barbara.

Frum: Where is this Washington-Moscow showdown heading?

Haig: Well, I don't anticipate a showdown. Clearly over the last two years there's been a very substantial cooling off of relationships but a showdown I don't anticipate. I think both of the superpowers are fully aware of the consequences in the nuclear age of a confrontation and that will be the ultimate guide.

Frum: If the protests in Europe continue and if the Soviets see some benefit in staying away from the table -- they surely must be enjoying your discomfiture right now -- what is Washington's next move to get them back to the table?

Haig: Well, I don't think Washington has a next move. I think the current hiatus in the theatre arms talks have not been matched by a hiatus in the strategic talks, which are continuing. And after all, the Soviets have always wanted just one venue. So they have a practical objective as well as a political/psychological objective in this recent walk-out.

Frum: But it's not as though they've just walked out. They say, SS-21s are on the way, SS-22s. I know the Administration says they were coming anyway, but into East Germany and on the submarines off the American coast, that seems like another ratchet up, and how are you going to stop that?

Haig: Not at all, Barbara. And that's the phony aspect of what I call the new Soviet blackmail. When I

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FPR-1155

- 2 -

December 1, 1983

was in NATO, in 1975, I raised the alarm about the deployment of the SS-20s and the development and soon-to-be-deployed systems for the FROGS and SCUDS, the SS-21s and the SS-23s. They spent billions of rubles for these things years ago. There was no question but that they were going to deploy, unless they had been constrained by arms control.

Frum: Let me ask you then maybe a broader question. How do you read Soviet intentions at the moment? Not just in arms talks, their long-range goals. This Administration talks so much about the Soviet threat. In your mind, what is the nature of this threat?

Haig: Well, there're 3 schools of thought. One is the Columbia adviser to Jimmy Carter who believed we are on a converging path with the Russians. I reject that. The other is the devil theory, that the Soviets are out to take over the world, devil take the hindmost. I reject that too. My basic assessment is that they are seeking the expansion of Marxist-Leninist systems throughout the world. One only needs look at their activity in the Third World since 1975 to get a feel for that. But it is always going to be cautious, taking targets of opportunity and moving where Western resolve is lacking or Western passivity dominates the region.

Frum: When you argued so hard for the deployment of the Pershings and the cruise, you must have thought that they provided some functions. Somebody somewhere in the Pentagon must think that the Soviets have got some intentions in Europe.

Haig: No. The basic facts are that if we permit... our deterrent is based on at least equivalence in like systems, equivalence in like systems with the Soviet Union. If we permit them to deploy 360 ballistic threats against every capital in Western Europe without a corresponding Western response...

Frum: Then, what would happen?

Haig: Then blackmail would be the rule of the day.

Frum: And what does that mean?

Haig: And every incursion the Soviets wish to make in political or military terms, will be dominated by these imbalances and the outcome which would be catastrophic for the West.

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FPR-1155

- 3 -

December 1, 1983

Frum: What do you think would happen? What do you anticipate? What's your scenario?

Haig: My scenario is Soviet blackmail. Not the employment of the systems, but a cocked... We've seen it already. The priorities or the superiorities they enjoy today in theatre systems is contributing to Soviet blackmail. The walk-out from these talks, the intimidation of Western Europe that if we deploy countering systems which were justified by Soviet, not Western activity, then the Soviets are going to deploy more. Well, they were going to deploy more anyway. You talked about the cruise missiles against the United States, or submarine-launched systems. Every intelligent estimate I have seen suggests that the Soviets are building at the highest rate their military-industrial complex is capable of producing.

Frum: Let me ask this as clearly as I can. Do you think their goal is to split the Western Alliance? You haven't said that?

Haig: Absolutely. That's their primary objective. To split Europe from the United States. That's their strategy in the arms control area. And it's vitally important that we show them that they are not going to get away with that and that the time has long since come that they sit down and negotiate fairly for substantial reductions.

Frum: Do the recent public opinion polls in Germany not alarm you? This apparent trend in Germany towards neutralism, towards nationalism. The hints that the Belgians and the Dutch fear that if they were obliged to deploy today, their governments would fall? Do you not see this as a long-term possibility?

Haig: Well, if this question, which is extremely sensitive, is handled clumsily and irresponsibly, and if the leaders of the various countries concerned don't have the courage to address these questions with moderation but with persistence among their electorate, why, anything could happen. But thus far we fortunately have been armed with some pretty sensible leadership in Western Europe and I don't see the trend getting out of hand.

Frum: General Haig, the fact is that those allied leaders that you're counting on are under enormous pressure from within. You know, when you've got a million people in the streets, whether you start a deployment or not, that pressure could continue. The Soviet Ambassadors are visiting every one of your allies this week, saying that you are the belligerent force, you're the people who believe in winnable nuclear war. Do you think that their political nerve is going to hold?

FPR-1155

- 4 -

December 1, 1983

Haig: I'm very confident that their political nerve will hold. I do think it's important that the United States in its leadership role demonstrate a forthcoming position on the question of arms control. I felt in the early period, as Secretary of State, that we were too slow in getting to the negotiating table. I was criticized for that among some of the President's colleagues. But I tell you, there's one reality of democratic societies and that is that democratic leaders must be perceived by the electorate to be trying. And if we ever project a lack of interest in making progress, then the leader is going to lose his support and fall from power, as he should.

Frum: General Haig, that's why I asked you about perceptions, because one could argue that people do not think that this Administration is trying.

Haig: Well, I suppose there're two reasons for that. One is justified by some of the rhetorical excesses and some of the lack of discipline in the Administration, especially in the Defence Department. But also there's a great tendency to overlook the fact that President Reagan has been more than flexible. He's put a set of proposals forward, one after another. As a matter of fact, many of the serious Europeans with whom I talk, are concerned he's getting too flexible. And that in itself would be a disincentive for the Soviets to really seriously negotiate, if we're going to keep giving concessions unilaterally.

Frum: Now, that's some choice. Too hard at the start, and then too flexible at the end and looking as though the government perhaps has not got a long-term plan.

Haig: Well. I have made it a habit not to get into detailed criticisms of my own country when I am abroad, and I don't want to do that tonight. But clearly I was uncomfortable with some of the policies. I was most uncomfortable about populist trends, and that is the tendency to conduct policy day to day in order to bolster the popularity of the President. I am a great believer in the philosophy of Edmund Burke and that suggests that political leaders don't get up every morning and put their finger to the wind to see what people want, and then rush to policies that feed that appetite. They'd rather follow the dictates of their conscience and when on occasion that is an unpopular move, to take it and take the risks at the ballot box.

.../5

FPR-1155

- 5 -

December 1, 1983

Frum: General Haig, I'd like to pursue some of these issues further but first we have to take this break.

Frum: Talking to General Alexander Haig about U.S. foreign policy. I want to ask you about the role that our Prime Minister is playing at the moment. I know that you feel in a foreign country you want to be polite, and that he's a friend of yours.

Haig: That's right. He is.

Frum: Fine, but the question remains. Is what he is doing, what he calls his pilgrimage of peace, is that a useful service to the Alliance? Or, perhaps, a damaging one?

Haig: Well, I think, and I've said this to the press earlier today, that when world statesmen, and Mr. Trudeau is certainly that, one of the most experienced leaders who remains on the Western scene, when he engages his energies in a quest for peace and international stability, one cannot be critical. I would hope that in that process he would do it in concertion, in coordination with his other allied partners, to be sure that we don't end up with a cacophony of peace efforts.

Frum: Is that the risk he is running?

Haig: No. It's far too early to say and I wouldn't want to present myself as an expert on Mr. Trudeau's peace proposal.

Frum: But there are some critics here, and as we have already heard in the State Department, possibly the Pentagon, who believe that what he's doing is not useful. That here's this guy, implicitly going around the world saying that the Americans cannot control nuclear arms talks anymore, they are not doing a good enough job. Isn't that the implicit criticism that something else has to come forward?

Haig: I would not engage in value judgments on Mr. Trudeau's activities. I would suggest, however, that as one who's been involved in the arms control process since 1969, through SALT I, Vladivostok, SALT II, I think I have some experience in dealing with the Soviet Union on arms control. And it's been my experience that they

.../6

FPR-1155

- 6 -

December 1, 1983

are never going to be impressed by a West which unilaterally flagellates itself and conducts unilateral disarmament. They're just going to continue to build and bank and blackmail. It's very important that we in the West never indulge in naive thinking in an environment as dangerous as this. And above all, to never break the link between the deterrent that has preserved the peace for 35 years in Western Europe and globally, in superpower terms, with some pie-in-the-sky scheme which, while well motivated, would bring about the very outcomes that their proponents seek to avoid.

Frum: Now, between the lines of not just that but many other statements about the allies coming out of Washington, one senses that some at least in this Administration and maybe in earlier ones think that the allies are a little soft, a little on the side of sort of appeasing, perhaps? Is that too harsh? If we woke you in the middle of the night, would you ever admit to such a thought?

Haig: Well, let me tell you, I lived for 5 years in Europe, in command of the combined armies of the Alliance. I've never viewed our Western European partners as soft and I've never viewed them as pacifistic or finlandized. I have viewed them as frightened. And when we, on this side of the Atlantic, conduct our affairs in such a way that we frighten them, either because we are not doing enough or, perhaps, because we are treating less than seriously the importance of maintaining peace, rhetorical excesses or talks about winning nuclear wars, that frightens them.

Frum: I promised to talk a little bit about Latin America. You who are so known for your sensitivity to the European sensibility, there is an awful lot of criticism coming out of Europe that the invasion of Grenada was a mistake, that somehow there's the evidence to prove that the fate of the world, the fate of Europe is no longer safe in American hands? Is that what they've been telling you as well?

Haig: No, it is not. As a matter of fact, I just came back from Europe and I just came back from Asia. And without exception, the officials with whom I spoke said, thank God, the United States has finally recognized the danger and has been willing to take a courageous course. And what am I saying?

.../7

FPR-1155

- 7 -

December 1, 1983

Frum: Well, courageous, you know, to defeat seven hundred Cubans?

Haig: Well, somebody said the Providence police force could do that and that's true. But I think it's long since past the time when those of us in this hemisphere, in Canada and in the United States recognize that what we are witnessing, and what we've witnessed since 1975 in Angola, was the perversion of the historic quest for social justice by a Soviet Union which is moving through proxies and in some instances directly, in the developing world, to create totalitarian models responsive to Soviet influence and control. If we permit that to happen unchallenged, that is, historic change, desirable as it may be, through rule of force and bloodshed, then we are endorsing an extremely dangerous world in which the breakdown of peace and stability is inevitable.

Frum: Let me ask you, then, because there's been considerable speculation, that Nicaragua's next. Is it?

Haig: Oh, I hardly think so. In fact, as a matter of... I would never favour the use of American Armed Forces in Nicaragua. I've always said it's like Vietnam. The problem in Vietnam was that the Americans failed to recognize who was the bankroller of this activity. This is a problem between the Soviet Union and Cuba, not a group of misled revolutionaries in Nicaragua. And the United States' policy should be addressed to Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Frum: That's what I wanted to ask you. You said you wouldn't support it. Do you think this Administration intends...

Haig: No.

Frum: ... military intervention in Nicaragua?

Haig: No. I do not. I think the President would shy from that, if only for populist reasons, like he would the plague with an election coming.

Frum: All I'll ask you, just to wrap up, one final question, if I could. There are a lot of people, whether you like it or not one could say, that think that the nuclear fuse is now much too short. They don't want to live at the level of apprehension that they now feel.

.../8

FPR-1155

- 8 -


December 1, 1983

They can topple governments, they can crack alliances, if they choose to. Do you share their nightmare, that honourable, decent, good-meaning, well-intended individuals like you, could trip the world into war through miscalculation, through accident? That's their nightmare scenario. Do you share it?

Haig: Let me tell you my nightmare. My nightmare is that naiveté in the United States, the superpower, on this question, could unilaterally deprive itself of the peacekeeper, if you will, and that is our deterrent, in such a way that insecurities would develop throughout the world, and there would be a massive proliferation in nuclear arms to Third World countries. There's the greatest danger for nuclear conflict. And what a degree of courage and responsibility that requires of the United States. And that's why these good connotations in your question just simply cannot be harboured in the nuclear age. We can't disinvent nuclear weapons. They're here and the Soviets have them. We must conduct ourselves in such a way to get reductions worldwide and not in such a way that we increase proliferation or permit the Soviets to enjoy superiority.

Frum: General Haig, thank you so much for talking to us tonight in Montreal.

Haig: It's been a pleasure to be with you, Barbara.



John Noble,
Director
Media Relations

Dec. 2

Peter Hancock (RBD) would like to be included on distribution
of all telegrams & other correspondence of substance.

sc

P.S. Mr. Delvoie: At his request, I sent him copy of your
memo on "British Views on East-West Relations" ~~another~~
~~with a copy of the British Embassy in~~
~~Moscow.~~

OFFICE
OF THE
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CABINET
DU
SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT
AUX
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

FILE

TO/A: 1002

Date 2/12/83

FROM/DE: MINA/Dudchit

REFERENCE/RÉFÉRENCE:

SUBJECT/SUJET: Minister's decision/Décision du Ministre

Seen by the SSEA.

28-6-1 - Bureau
Peace
Mission

RESTRICTED

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs

PM Initiative: Your interview with "The Journal"

We attach, as requested, a chronology of events directly related to the Prime Minister's initiative on East-West relations and international security.

In background briefings for the press, we have usually taken the line that while specific actions relating to the Prime Minister's initiative were started in September of this year, the evolution of the Prime Minister's thinking and concerns can be traced on the public record through: (a) his speech to UNSSOD II in 1982; (b) his speech at Notre Dame University in 1982; (c) his statements and role at the Williamsburg Summit; and, (d) his statements following the KAL airliner incident.

Cruise decision: letter to Shultz

L.A. Delvoie
L.A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

cc: DMF/Mr. Marchand
FPR/Mr. Noble ✓

ORIGINAL WITH SSEA
ORIGINAL AVEC SEAE

file

RESTRICTED

IDDZ-0240

December 2, 1983

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs

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L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
TAsk Force Working Group

cc: DMF/Mr. Marchand
FPR/Mr. Noble

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

A Chronology of Events

- (1) DPM/SSEA luncheon with PM (Sept 8)
- (2) DPM/SSEA meeting on arms control with Departmental officials (Sept 12)
- (3) DPM/SSEA meeting with PM (Sept 20)
- (4) PM meeting in Ottawa with DPM/SSEA, MND and senior officials; creation of Task Force (Sept 21)
- (5) PM meeting at Meach Lake with DPM/SESEA, MND, senior officials and ambassadors; review and selection of options; extension of existence of reconfigured Task Force (Oct 7)
- (6) DPM/SSEA meeting in Halifax with Secretary Shultz (Oct 16)
- (7) PM letters to all NATO heads of government (Oct 22-25)
- (8) PM speech at Guelph University (Oct 27)
- (9) PM letters to Soviet and Chinese leaders (early November)
- (10) PM meetings with President Mitterrand, PM Lubbers, Queen Beatrix, PM Martens, HH the Pope, PM Craxi, PM Thatcher (Nov 8-11)
- (11) PM speech in Montreal (Nov 13)

- 2 -

- (12) PM letters to all NATO heads of government (Nov 17-18)
- (13) PM telephone conversation with President Reagan (Nov 17)
- (14) PM letters to PM Hawke and PM Muldoon (Nov 18)
- (15) PM meeting with PM Nakasone (Nov 19)
- (16) PM personal emissary (Geoffrey Pearson) visits to Peking (Nov 21-22) and to Moscow (Nov 25-26).
- (17) PM participation CHOGM in New Delhi (Nov 22-27)
- (18) PM visit to Peking (Nov 28-29)
- (19) DPM/SSEA speech in Chicago (Nov 29)
- (20) DPM/SSEA participation in NATO ministerial meeting (Dec 8-9)
- (21) PM meetings over six weeks period with Robert McNamara, General Rogers, General Brent Scowcroft, George Kennan, members of Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Georgi Arbatov (Oct-Nov)

DMF
↓

IDDZ

FROM/DE

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

Meeting with the Romanian Emissary Dolgu,
December 5: PM Initiative.

file
28-6-1-1 - European
Peace
Mission

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	December 2, 1983.
Number/Numéro	DMF-0237

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

-1-

DISTRIBUTION

RBR

As requested, attached is a brief note on
the PM's initiative in preparation for your meeting with
the Romanian emissary Dolgu on December 5.

Louis A. Delvoie
Louis A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

*P. R. Separate notes on the Romanian
initiative and on Canada-Romanian
relations have been forwarded by the
European Branch. hq*

NOTES ON PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE ON
EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Purpose and Proposals

The Prime Minister's principal purpose is to arrest and reverse the downward trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce the international tensions and risks of confrontation to which this trend has given rise.

The Prime Minister's chief proposal relates to the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the superpowers; to create a political framework for ongoing sectoral or technical negotiations between the two sides.

Subsidiary to this is a series of proposals in the field of arms control and disarmament which have substantive merit in themselves, and which, if they permitted sectoral progress, would contribute to improving the general climate in East-West relations:

- (a) A comprehensive approach to the limitation and then the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals by means of a conference of the five nuclear weapons states (USA, USSR, UK, France, China).
- (b) A concerted endeavour at the political level to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and especially to increase the number of states adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty prior to the NPT Review Conference in 1985.

- 2 -

- (c) A substantive Western response to the proposals put forward earlier this year by the East in the MBFR negotiations, and the injection of political momentum into these negotiations by means of a Foreign Ministers meeting in Vienna to coincide roughly with the tabling of a new Western proposal.
- (d) The inauguration of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) at senior political level in order to give this important conference political impetus at the outset (complementarity of military confidence building and political confidence building).

Although not integral to his initiative as pursued personally with other governments, the Prime Minister has also put forward publicly proposals relating to:

- (a) the mobility of ICBMs
- (b) high altitude anti-satellite systems
- (c) the verification of new weapons systems by national technical means

Programme

The Prime Minister's public programme has so far involved giving speeches in Guelph (October 27) and Montreal (November 13). His diplomatic and/or private programme has included:

- (a) letters to all NATO heads of government (October 22-25).

- 3 -

- (b) letters to Soviet and Chinese leaders (early November).
- (c) meetings with President Mitterrand of France, Chancellor Kohl of the FRG, PM Lubbers and Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, PM Martens of Belgium, HH the Pope, PM Craxi of Italy, PM Thatcher of the UK, PM Nakasone of Japan, President Kaunda of Zambia, General Ershad of Bangladesh, Commonwealth Heads of Government in New Delhi, Premier Zhao of China.
- (d) private meetings with Robert McNamara, General Rogers (SACEUR), George Kennan, General Brent Scowcroft, members of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Georgi Arbatov.
- (e) further letters to all NATO heads of government (November 17-18).
- (f) telephone conversation with President Reagan (November 17).
- (g) letters to PM Hawke and PM Muldoon (November 18).
- (h) the dispatch of a personal emissary (Geoffrey Pearson) to Moscow and Peking (November 21-27).
- (i) participation in Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and furthering initiative in that forum.
- (j) DPM/SSEA will propose that NATO give political impetus to the Stockholm CDE conference and the MBFR negotiations.

- 4 -

Next Steps

It is likely that a meeting with President Reagan can be arranged before Christmas; a possible subsequent visit to Moscow is under consideration.

Reactions

The reactions of governments which have so far given an indication of their thinking about the PM's initiative may be very roughly summarized as follows:

<u>USA</u>	:	Generally supportive of broad purpose, but serious reservations about some specific proposals
<u>France</u>	:	Positive and generally supportive, with reservations as to timing
<u>FRG</u>	:	Positive and generally supportive
<u>Belgium</u>	:	Very positive, with some reservations as to timing
<u>Holland</u>	:	Very positive, with some reservations as to timing
<u>Italy</u>	:	Generally supportive, but no very well-defined reaction
<u>UK</u>	:	Generally supportive of broad purpose, but reservations about some specific proposals
<u>Norway</u>	:	Very positive and fully supportive

- 5 -

Spain : Very positive

Greece : Very positive

Denmark : Very positive and fully supportive

Japan : Very positive and fully supportive

USSR : Interested and cautiously positive

PRC : Mildly supportive of broad political purpose, but
with reservations on specific proposals

CHOGM : Commonwealth leaders specifically endorsed the Prime Minister's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security: "We... welcome Prime Minister Trudeau's call for a new political dimension in the quest for international security. We support his efforts to restore active political contact and communications among all the nuclear weapon powers and are willing to help these and other such efforts in all appropriate ways."

Canadian Public Opinion, to judge by CBC Radio's "Cross Country Check-Up" and letters to the editor, is very much in favour of the initiative.

- 5 -

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CONFIDENTIAL

December 2, 1983

IDDZ-0238

Memorandum for the Minister of State
(External Relations)

PM Initiative on East-West Relations
and International Security

We attach some brief notes on this subject
for your meeting with the Romanian emissary Dolgu,
Monday December 5.

L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: DMF/Mr. Marchand

IDDZ/J. McNee

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
DOLGU VISIT - POINTS FOR TOAST.

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission.

- This visit comes at a particularly good time as we are concerned at the prevailing international tensions and the worsening trend in East-West relations.
- Both Romania and Canada have launched initiatives to address this situation.
- Prime Minister Trudeau's aim is to inject political energy into a debate which has become dominated by counting of weapons rather than discussion of intentions.
- We are convinced of the need for high-level dialogue between East and West and between the superpowers in particular.
- We hope that we can improve the climate for better communication between Moscow and Washington

SPEAKING NOTES FOR THE PM

TECHNOLOGY RESTRAINTS



1. Proposal: A Ban on the Testing and Deployment of High-Altitude Anti-Satellite Systems (ASATs)

You may wish to:

- Comment on the importance of satellites generally for the maintenance of the stability of deterrence and the verification of arms control agreements.
- Note the particular importance of high-altitude command and control satellites for ensuring the effective functioning of deterrence. Emphasize U.S. reliance on such systems, noting that it is greater than for USSR.
- Express recognition of the importance the U.S. attaches to matching existing Soviet ASAT capabilities through developing its own low-altitude anti-satellite program.
- Suggest that in view of these factors it would be valuable to commence negotiations designed to reach an agreement to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems.
- ^{re} Emphasize degree to which this proposal recognises existing US programs, and the extent to which the resulting agreement would protect key U.S. command and control satellites.
- Note that agreement to seek negotiations on this proposal would demonstrate to many the seriousness with which the U.S. approaches arms control efforts.

- 2 -

2. Proposal: Restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs

You may wish to:

- Recognize value of both Superpowers moving to mobile missiles in view of the degree to which such movement would help alleviate fears of a first strike.
- Recognize as well requirement to be able to verify the deployments of mobile missiles if arms control agreements are to be meaningful or attainable.
- Suggest, therefore, the value of negotiating limits on ICBM mobility to enhance verification without increasing vulnerability.

3. Proposal: Requirement that future strategic weapons systems be verifiable by National Technical Means (NTMs)

You may wish to:

- Emphasize importance of verification to ensure negotiability of meaningful arms control agreements.
- Recognize value of co-operative and/or on-site verification measures, where negotiable.
- Suggest that a valuable complement to co-operative and/or on-site inspection would be to require that strategic weapons systems not covered by such measures be designed so as to be verifiable using National Technical Means (NTMs).
- Explain that parties to such an agreement would be required to demonstrate the verifiability of their proposed forces to the other party.

Action

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---ARTICLE LA TRIBUNE DES NATIONS

CI-JOINT COPIE D UN ARTICLE PARU DANS LA TRIBUNE DES NATIONS DE
NOV/DEC CONCERNANT LA VISITE DU PM TRUDEAU EN NOVEMBRE DERNIER.
COMCENTRE TRANSMETTRE PAR BELINO.

2B-6-1 = Trudeau Peace Mission

[Signature]

001171

La voie du Canada

Le Premier ministre canadien, M. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, a pris la parole, le 27 octobre, à l'université de Guelph (Ontario), à l'occasion d'une conférence sur la paix et la sécurité. Son discours prononcé, M. Trudeau — avant même de connaître les réactions des deux supergrands —, a voulu s'informer de l'attitude des principaux pays européens. C'est ainsi qu'il a entrepris un voyage privé, de quelques jours, qui l'a conduit de Paris à Londres, en passant par La Haye, Bruxelles, Rome et Bonn, voyage présenté à Ottawa comme un « pèlerinage pour la paix et le désarmement ».

Nous croyons intéressant de relever les points les plus importants de son discours, qui marque une nouvelle approche du dialogue Est-Ouest.

« **J**E constate que notre attachement à l'Europe refait vigoureusement surface quand il est question de paix et de sécurité... »

« ... La participation du Canada aux deux guerres mondiales du siècle, son statut de membre fondateur et de partenaire loyal de l'O.T.A.N., sa décision de procéder à l'essai de missiles de croisière en territoire canadien, sont autant de preuves que nous reconnaissons l'interdépendance entre notre sécurité et celle de nos alliés européens... »

« ... Notre politique étrangère a toujours reposé, et repose encore solidement, sur notre fidélité à l'Alliance atlantique, et sur notre association avec les Etats-Unis pour la défense du continent nord-américain... »

« ... Nous refusons d'être des partenaires silencieux dans les organismes dont nous sommes membres, car le silence équivaudrait à renoncer à nos responsabilités face à la crise. Nos engagements internationaux sont clairs, car nous sommes profondément conscients de vivre dans un monde où l'interdépendance est la règle. Nous ne craignons pas de négocier avec ceux qui pourraient nous menacer, car cette crainte trahirait un manque de confiance dans le pouvoir vital de nos valeurs propres... »

« ... Je suis profondément troublé par le climat d'acrimonie et d'incertitude qui règne à l'heure actuelle, par l'état alarmant des relations Est-Ouest, par les risques de confrontation entre grandes puissances, et par l'écart qui se creuse entre stratégie militaire et objectifs politiques. Cette situation témoigne du besoin impérieux d'affirmer la primauté de l'esprit de l'homme sur les engins de guerre... »

« ... Un grand nombre de nouvelles sources de pouvoir ont fait leur apparition, créant ainsi de nouveaux centres de pouvoir fondés sur le pétrole, la main-d'œuvre à bon marché ou l'hégémonie régionale. Nous parlons d'un

monde multipolaire, ce qui semble indiquer qu'aucun pays ne peut vivre isolément, et qu'aucune puissance ne peut vraiment prétendre à la suprématie. Mais, surtout à l'heure actuelle, on peut affirmer, avec autant de vérité, que les rapports entre grandes puissances sont tout aussi dominateurs et déterminants qu'ils l'étaient au cours des années cinquante, alors que nous disposions uniquement, pour appréhender la réalité, du modèle bipolaire qui nous paraît aujourd'hui trop simpliste. Certaines de ces doctrines stratégiques visent, de



façon louable, à relever le seuil nucléaire, c'est-à-dire à retarder, voire prévenir le recours tragique aux armes nucléaires en cas de conflit en Europe. Faut-il en déduire que la limitation des armes nucléaires a pour objet de livrer notre monde à la guerre classique ?... »

« ... Le débat concernant les relations économiques entre l'Est et l'Ouest, qui resurgit à toutes les réunions des pays occidentaux, pose la question fondamentale, et non encore résolue, du degré d'interdépendance économique souhaitable entre les deux systèmes... »

« ... Par nature, les relations Est-Ouest ont tendance à échapper à toute gestion et à tout contrôle. Elles s'inspirent d'idéologies et de modèles de civilisations opposées et, de part et d'autre, elles sont capables de semer la destruction sur tous les continents... »

« ... Il ne me viendrait pas à l'esprit de considérer les deux superpuissances sur le même pied au plan moral. Néanmoins, elles font partie, l'une et l'autre, d'un univers à part, et leur perception du monde est telle que même les événements les plus lointains peuvent menacer leurs intérêts ou leurs associés... »

« ... Je m'inquiète du fait que nous consacrons beaucoup trop de notre temps à dénombrer les armes de chaque partie, et trop peu à essayer de découvrir les intentions qui déterminent leur utilisation. Nous réussirons peut-être un jour à bloquer le potentiel nucléaire des deux camps à un niveau bien inférieur... »

La fin du discours est consacrée aux actions possibles pour améliorer les rapports Est-Ouest.

« ... Nous mettons beaucoup d'espoir dans la conférence sur le désarmement en Europe, qui doit débiter à Stockholm en janvier prochain. Le Canada fera tout en son pouvoir pour que cette conférence soit fructueuse. Nous sommes conscients du besoin de convenir de mesures d'ordre militaire propres à susciter la confiance. Mais ces négociations, si importantes soient-elles, ne répondront pas à nos aspirations si elles se déroulent dans un vide politique. L'équilibre précaire de la sécurité en Europe ne peut pas reposer uniquement sur une ou deux séries de négociations. Celles-ci doivent s'appuyer sur un climat de compréhension stable entre l'Est et l'Ouest, qui suppose la reconnaissance réciproque des besoins légitimes de sécurité, un dialogue permanent à un haut niveau et une attitude ferme dans la gestion des crises. »

Qu'en sera-t-il de ces initiatives ? Nous ne manquerons pas d'en suivre l'évolution.

28-6-1-*Judeau Peace mission*

R E S T R I C T E D

FM MOSCO XYGR4190 02DEC83

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 020900

INFO BNATO IMMED

WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN PRGUE WSAW BUCST BPEST BGRAD HSNKI

POCOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CIS

DISTR DMF RGB RBD ZSP ZSI ZEP CPD(1DDZ

REF OURTE XYGR4141 17NOV

---CONVENING OF SUPREME SOVIET

IZVESTIA 01DEC CARRIED BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENT OF CONVENING OF
SUPREME SOVIET SESSION ON 28DEC(THUS MEETING CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT FOR TWO SESSIONS PER YEAR ALTHOUGH ONE DAY SHORT
ON STIPULATED 30 DAY NOTICE PERIOD).FOLLOWING NORMAL
PATTERN THIS SHOULD MEAN CONVENING OF PARTY PLENUM ON 26-27DEC.
LATE CONVENING OF PLENUM/SUPREME SOVIET SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN
INTENDED TO ALLOW ANDROPOV MAXIMUM RECOVERY TIME AND OUR GUESS
IS THAT HE WILL BE PRESENT ON THIS OCCASION.ON THIS ASSUMPTION
ANDROPOV MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO RECEIVE HIGH LEVEL FOREIGN
VISITORS IN FIRST HALS OF JANUARY.

CCC/095 021023Z XYGR4190

MR SMITH *action*

Refused
on tel 1002 0273

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1002 0242 20EC

FM BONN ZOGR4119 02DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO LDN WSHDC PARIS MOSCO BNATO ROME HAGUE MDRID BRU OSLO PRMNY
GENEV TOKYO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/CIS ADM PCOOTT/FOWLER

BAG LSBON DE OTT HSNKI WSAW PRGUE BPEST BGRAD ATHNS STKHM COPEN
DE PAR

DISTR MINA MINE USS DMF RGB IFB RCD RCM RSD RSR IDD IDA ZSI ZSP IDR
RCR

---PMS INITIATIVE-FRG VIEWS

SUMMARY:FRG SUPPORTS AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF PMS INTITIAE
INT IS GENERAL LINES AND IS FOLLOWING CLOSELY ITS DEVELOPMENT
AND RECEPTION ELSEWHERE.OFFICIALS HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS,NOTING EG THAT SOME ARE ESSENTIALLY FOR OTHER
COUNTRIES TO TAKE UP(FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONF)OR THAT
SUBSTANCE NEEDS TO BE AGREED BEFORE DECISION ON POLITICAL
INPUT IS MADE(MBFR).THEY THUS SEE DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING LINKAGE
BETWEEN PMS CALL FOR POLTIICAL DIALOGUE AND ELEMENTS TO GIVE
SUBSTANCE TO ANY SUCH DIALOGUE.

2.REPORT:WE MET WITH SCHAUER,MFA DIR GEN FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
TO OBTAIN A READING OF CURRECT FRG VISIES ON PMS INITIATIVE.
DISCUSSION CONFIRMED THAT GERMAN REMAIN POSITIVELY DISPOSED TOWARDS
PMS INITIATIVE.HIS GENERAL ANALYSIS OF SITUAITON IS SIMILAR TO THEIRS.
AND HIS CALL FOR HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL ENAGEMENT ISD ONE THEY CAN

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PAGE TWO ZQGR4119 CONFD

READILY ENDORSE, AS IT IS ONE THEY MAKE REGULARLY THEMSELVES. THEY ARE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENT OF INITIATIVE CLOSELY AND REQUESTED INFO ON RECEPTION PM RECEIVED IN TOKYO, PEKIN ETC. GRATEFUL RECEIVE LINES OF BRIEFING WE CAN PASS ONE.

3. ON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS GERMAN HAVE QUESTIONS AND BECOME SOMEWHAT MORE CAUTIOUS. EXCEPTION IS LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION IN STKHM. THEY HAVE FROM OUTSET BELIEVED CDE SHOULD OPEN AT FM LEVEL. GENSCHER WILL DEFINITELY BE IN ATTENDANCE.

4. ON MBFR SCHAUER SAID THAT SUBSTANCE SHOULD DETERMINE MIN INVOLVEMENT, NOT/NOT VICE VERSA. IN OTHER WORDS WEST SHOULD FIRST DECIDE CONTENT OF ITS RESPONSE TO EASTERN PROPOSALS, DECIDE FURTHER HOW THIS RESPONSE SHOULD BE MADE AND ONLY THEY DECIDE WHO SHOULD MAKE IT. FRG AGREED. TIMELY RESPONSE SHOULD BE MADE TO EASTERN PROPOSALS BUT NEITHER USA NOR UK APPEARED READY AT THIS POINT TO MAKE IT. FRG WOULD BE READY FOR DISCUSSION OF CDN IDEAS ON MBFT AT NATO MIN DEC8-9 IF MINA WERE TO RAISE THEM. SCHAUER SAID MBFR HAD NOT/NOT BEEN RAISED DURING UK/FRG SUMIT (OURTEL ZQGR4083 10 NOV) AND WAS TOUCHED ON ONLY BRIEFLY DURING FR/FRG SUMMIT (OURTEL ZQGR4107 29 NOV)/

5. ON IDEA OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONF SCHAUER SAID FRG WAS OF COURSE IN PRINCIPLE IN FAVOUR OF SUCH CONF TAKING PLACE. HOWEVER FRG WAS NOT/NOT NUCLEAR POWER, HAVING RENOUNCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ITSELF, AND IT WAS ULTIMATELY QUESTION THAT NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD DECIDE. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT UK/FRG/CHINESE REACTION HAD BEEN HE ASSUMED FR

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PAGE THREE ZQGR4119 CONF

REACTION WAS SIMILAR TO MITTERANDS UN SPEECH IE POSITIVELY
DISDPOSED IN PRINCIPLE BUT SETTING OUT THREE TOUGH CONDITIONS
BEFORE FR COULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY SUCH CONF.UK POSITION,JUDGING
FROM HOW SPEEC TO UN,SEEMEND TO BE SIMILAR.

6.SCHAUERS REACTION TO SUFFOCATION OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS
WAS SIMILAR,IE FRG HAD NO/NO INTENTION OF PRODUCING SUCH SYSTEMS
AND IT WAS ESSENTIALLY QUESTION TWO SUPERPOWERS HAD TO DECIDE
BETWEEN THEMSELVES(ON THESE SPECIFIC SUFFOCATION IDEAS,AS WELL AS
MBFR,WE WILL BE TOUCHING BASE WITH FRED RUTH AND HIS PEOPLE FOR
MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS).

7.SCHAUER ALSO TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE FRG VIEWS ON USSR WALKOUT
IN GENEV.HE SIAD SOVIETS WOULD COME BACK TO INF NEGS QUOTE SOMEWHERE.
SOMEHOW UNQUOTE.PERHAPS NOT/NOT IN GENEV.PERHAPS IN CONJUNCTION WITH
START.USSR HAD STRONG INTEREST IN AGREEMENT ON INF AND WOULD BE BACK.
DEPLOYMENT WAS DEFEAT FOR USSR,BUT POLITICALLY THERE WAS LITTLE THEY
COULD DO.THEY CONTINUED TO SHOW GREAT INTEREST IN CDA.GDR REACTION
TO DEPLOYMENT HAD BEEN MEASURED AND CAUTIOUS.FOR ALL THESE REASONS.
FRG THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT NAC MAKE FIRM BUT POSITIVE STATEMENT
AT NEXT WEEKS MTG,PERHPAS IN FORM OF SEPARATE STATEMENT.(ENATO HAS
REPORTED FRG NATO DEL HAS RAISED THIS POSSIBILITY).

CCC/005 051104Z ZQGR4119

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
RD
Division Phoned

Person

Local Time

CF
9:30

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR3080 02DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ WSHDC PRMNY

DELIVER BY 020900

INFO PCOOTT/CARON

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RBR

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0225 30NOV

---POSSIBLE VISIT BY ROMANIAN EMISSARY

VICE MIN GROZA ENQUIRED ABOUT OUR ANSWER TO ROM REQUEST. SHE WAS SOMEWHAT CONCERNED IN VIEW OF LITTLE TIME LEFT AND NEED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH VICE MIN DOLGU. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION YOUR REFTEL, I TOLD HER THAT ALTHO THERE WAS NOT/NOT YET A DEFINITE ANSWER FROM OTT, I UNDERSTOOD YOUR ATTITUDE TO BE POSITIVE AND THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE TO RECEIVE DOLGU AS SUGGESTED ON DEC5 AND 6. WHEN SHE ENQUIRED ABOUT PROBABLE INTERLOCUTORS, I MENTIONED TO HER DMF, IDD, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT ALL THIS WAS TENTATIVE.

2. TO ALLEVIATE HER CONCERN REGARDING COMMUNICATION WITH DOLGU, I SUGGESTED TO HER THAT OUR EMB IN WSHDC OR OUR PERMIS IN NY COULD BE IN TOUCH WITH ROM EMB OR WITH ROM PERMIS (DOLGU MIGHT BE IN NY 03DEC) AS SOON AS OUR MISSIONS SEE CONFIRMATION OF INVITATION AND PROGRAM FOR DOLGU. SHE EXPRESSED HER APPRECIATION BUT INSISTED THAT I SHOULD STILL ALSO LET HER KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE RESULTS OF DEMARCHE IN VIEW OF INTEREST OF HIGHER ROM AUTHORITIES HERE.

3. THEREFORE I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD INFORM, EVEN BY PHONE, WSHDC OR NY OF ANSWER TO YOUR REFTEL SO THAT ROM MISSIONS THERE COULD BE CONTACTED AS WELL AS BUCST AS SOON AS YOU HAVE DEFINITE ANSWER.

CCC/181 021220Z UYGR3080

28-6-1-*Peace Mission*

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2492 02DEC83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 031000

INFO BNATO MOSCO PMDELKWAIT BONN PARIS LDN PEKIN PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF RBR IDA IDD IDR UGB URR RBR PER

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:VISIT TO WSHDC

WE PASSED TO MEDAS THIS AFTERNOON PREFERENCE FOR 20DEC MTG HERE WITH REAGAN, WITH 16DEC AS AN ALTERNATIVE DATE, AND WITH 13DEC DATE BEING POSSIBLE FOR PM ONLY IN REAL EXTREMIS. MEDAS WAS GRATEFUL FOR EARLY RESPONSE.

2. WE HAD MET WITH MEDAS EARLIER TODAY TO DISCUSS DPM/SSEA-SHULTZ MTG, WHICH INEVITABLY WORKED INTO DISCUSSION OF PREPARATION FOR PM-REAGAN MTG LATER ON. MEDAS SAYS STATE DEPT CONSIDERS 09DEC MTG IN BRU BETWEEN DPM/SSEA AND SHULTZ WILL INEVITABLY CONCENTRATE VERY HEAVILY ON SORTS OF ISSUES WHICH PM TRUDEAU HAS BEEN DISCUSSING. WE SAID THAT DPM/SSEA WLD BE LOOKING TOWARD RELAXED EXCHANGE WITH SHULTZ AND WLD UNDOUBTEDLY WELCOME SECS OWN APPRAISAL OF THE STATE OF USSR-USA RELS AND WHERE WE ARE GOING IN EAST/WEST PROCESS IN LIGHT OF ALL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WE KNOW OF.

3. AS INDICATED IN OUR REFTEL UNGR2488 OF 02DEC, SHULTZ HAS NOW INDICATED PUBLICLY THAT HE PROBABLY WILL ATTEND CDE MTG 17JAN AND MEET WITH GROMYKO THERE. HOWEVER, DURING YESTERDAYS MTG WITH PRESS HE ALSO RESPONDED STRONGLY (IE ANGRILY) TO NOTION THAT IT MIGHT BE TIME TO QUIET QUOTE THE FLAMBOYANT RHETORIC AGAINST SOVIETS

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file
28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

PAGE TWO UNGR2492 CONF

RECEIVED A 27102

UNQUOTE.SAYING QUOTE IF YOU ALLOW YOURSELF TO ENGAGE IN A KIND OF WISHFUL THINKING AND BLISSFUL IGNORANCE OF WHAT THE REALITY IS. WHAT YOU'LL GET FOR THAT IS A GREAT BIG BUNDLE OF NO/NOTHING UNQUOTE. THIS SUBJ IS THEREFORE TO BE APPROACHED DELICATELY WITH SHULTZ AS ADMIN APPEARS TO BE INCREASINGLY DEFENSIVE ABOUT CHARGES THAT HARSH USA RHETORIC IS PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR CURRENT BAD STATE OF EAST/WEST RELS.

4.UNDOUBTDELY SHULTZ WILL HAVE HIS OWN SUGGESTIONS FOR BEST WAY TO APPROACH MTG WITH REAGAN.MEDAS SAYS THAT TWO BASIC PRESENTATIONAL EMPHASES WHICH WLD BE WELCOME TO AMERICAN SIDE AND WHICH WILL MAKE REAGAN AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE ARE(A)SOME ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT USA AND USSR ARE NOT/NOT FORM CDN VIEW CO-EQUALS IN BEHAVIOURAL SENSE AND(B)AFFIRMATION THAT WHOLE EXERCISE IS TO ASSIST PRES IN HIS PEACE EFFORTS AND NOT/NOT TO MOUNT PRESSURE AGAINST HIM AS PRESUMED MAN OF WAR.LATTER SUGGESTION IS ECHOED IN COMMENTS TO US BY FRIENDLY COMMENTATORS(E.G.HYLAND).WHILE THESE POINTS ARE INDEED CONSISTENT WITH PMS INITIATIVE WE THOUGHT IT USEFUL TO FLAG THEM AS GENERAL PREOCCUPATIONS OF ADMIN AT OUTSET.

5.THE MORE EXPLICITLY THESE POINTS ARE MADE TO REAGAN AND IN PUBLIC THE MORE THE USA WILL BE INCLINED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO PM AND THE INITIATIVE.IN MORE GENERAL SENSE,PM TRUDEAUS EFFORTS ARE ALREADY BEING BOTH BETTER UNDERSTOOD HERE AND RECEIVING MORE FAVOURABLE INTEREST,PARTICULARLY AS REVEALED BY QUESTIONING AT AMBASSADORS

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PAGE THREE UNGR2492 CONF

MEDIA BREAKFAST TODAY.OFFICIALS HERE DO SEEM TO HAVE GRASPED THAT PM IS NOT/NOT INJECTING HIMSELF INTO PRIVILEGED USA/USSR RELS AND IS NOT/NOT QUOTE RUNNING AGAINST REAGAN UNQUOTE.MEDIA INTEREST IS, AS YOU KNOW,BECOMING MORE PRONOUNCED AS WELL.WE NOTE THAT SHULTZ AND OTHER OFFICIALS ARE IN FACT GOING OUT OF THEIR WAY THESE DAYS TO TRY TO DESCRIBE EXTENT TO WHICH USA AND USSR HAVE COMMUNICATED ON POTENTIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND SHULTZS EFFORT YESTERDAY TO PROMOTE NOTION USA IS QUOTE READY FOR A REASONABLE DIALOGUE UNQUOTE WITH USSR,INCLUDING MTG WITH GROMYKO ON MARGINS OF CDE,SHOWS THAT ADMIN IS LIKELY TO BECOME MORE,NOT/NOT LESS,SUPPOTIVE OF BROAD EMPHASES OF WHAT PM IS DOING,THOUGH WE DOUBT IF THERE WILL EVER BE MUCH DISPOSITION TO PROVIDE HIM WITH EXPLICIT CREDIT,SINCE THAT WLD BE TANTAMOUNT TO ADMITTING USA HAD INDEED STOOD IN NEED OF A CORRECTIVE AND THIS ADMIN REMAINS STAUNCHLY CONVINCED THAT IT DOES DEAL,AND ALWAYS HAS DEALT,EFFECTIVELY WITH THE USSR.

CCC/059 022244Z UNGR2492

action

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2489 02DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BNATO MOSCO PMDELKWAIT PRMNY PEKIN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN
ROME HAGUE BONN PARIS LDN BRU NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD
DISTR IDA URR RBR RSR UGB MINA USS DMF IFB RGB IDD IDR URR
---PROPOSAL FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTRES

WE ARE FAXING TO YOU PRESS RELEASE AND REPORT ISSUED BY SENATORS
SAM NUNN AND JOHN WARNER RECOMMENDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CRISIS
MANAGEMENT CENTRES LINKED TO POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF
USA AND USSR.

2. TO SOME EXTENT PROPOSALS AND PURPOSES OF CENTRES REFLECT THE
IMPROVED HOT-LINE PROPOSALS USA HAS MADE TO USSR, BUT THIS CONCEPT
GOES BEYOND USA GOVT PROPOSALS AND INDEED WELL BEYOND TRADITIONAL
DIPLOMACY. MAIN ORIGINAL FEATURE IS JOINTLY-MANNED ASPECT. AMONG THE
AUTHORS OF THE REPORT ARE BILL HYLAND, BRENT SCOWCROFT AND JAMES
SCHLESINGER.

3. AMB WAS TOLD BY HYLAND THAT PRES HAD REACTED WITH CONSIDERABLE
INTEREST TO THIS PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE THAT MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE
ACTUAL PROPOSAL IS THE THEME OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT, AND THAT IT IS
THIS ASPECT THAT APPEALS TO PRES REAGAN. PM MAY THEREFORE WISH TO
CONSIDER PICKING UP THAT THEME IN HIS DISCUSSIONS HERE, THOUGH
ADMIN TAKES LINE THAT IN TERMS OF CRISIS COMMUNICATION, LITTLE
EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT USA-USSR RELATIONS ARE PROBLEM. WE SHALL REPORT
MORE ON THIS NEXT WEEK.

CCC/241 022259Z UNGR2489

action

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PEKIN WJGR0937 05DEC83

TO FXTOTT IDDZ/PEARSON

---PERSONAL MSG

ONE PAIR OF SHOES AND TWO PAIRS OF SHOE-TREES LEFT AT RESIDENCE.
WILL BE SENT TO YOU BY NEXT PERSON GOING BACK TO CDA. REGARDS.

GAUVIN

UUU/002 050802Z WJGR0937


M.F.

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

NONCLASSIFIE

DE LSBON XMGR0766 02DEC83

A EXOTT IDDZ



INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN LDN PARIS MDRID BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA
COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY WSHDC GENEV TOKYO
NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/PPP PCOOTT/FOWLER CHCGO LNGLS
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR FOR
REF NOTRETEL 0664 28OCT


---INITIATIVE DU PM-PAIX/SECURITE

EN PLUS DE NOUVELLES ET COMMENTAIRES CONCERNANT INITIATIVE TRUDEAU
DEJA NOTES TENONS A SIGNALER PARUTION DE GRAND REPORTAGE DANS
SECTION INNATLE DU DIARIO DE NOTICIAS DU 23OCT.DN DE LSBON POSSEDE
LA PLUS GRANDE CIRCULATION ET EST LE PLUS PRESTIGIEUX DES
QUOTIDIENS DU PORT.ARTICLE TITRE CIT UNE TROISIEME VOIE POUR LA
PAIX DU MONDE FINCIT A ETE ECRIT PAR REDACTEUR ANTUNES FERREIRA
SUITE A ENTRETIEN AVEC AMB.AUTRE ENTREVUE DE AMB CETTE FOIS
AVEC JOURNALISTE DE HEBDO POPULAIRE TEMPO A CONDUIT A PUBLICATION
DE LONG ARTICLE QUI PARAIT SUR CINQ COLONNES DANS TEMPO DU 30NOV.
2.AVEC PUBLICATION CES DEUX DERNIERS REPORTAGES AU SUJET INITIATIVE
DU PM SOMMES RAISONNABLEMENT SATISFAITS DE COUVERTURE OBTENUE A
DATE DANS MEDIA PORT.TELS RESULTATS CEPENDANT N ONT ETE OBTENUS QUE
SUITE A DISPONIBILITE DE RESUMES EN PORTUGAIS DES DISCOURS DU PM,
ET GRACE A CONTACTS PERSONNELS AUPRES DE RESPONSABLES DE PRESSE.
UUU/037 021130Z XMGR0766

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BRU ZVGR0563 02DEC83

A EXTOTT RBR



INFO LDN PARIS MERID BUCST LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO
HAGUE WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV TOKYO WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM
CNBRA HSNKI WLGTN VIENN PEKIN PCOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/
CPP/DGIS PRVNY VMBFR

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDD IDR IDA
IDDZ RBRD IDX ZSP RBP ZSI

REF BUCST TEL UYGR3039 25NOV

---NOUVELLE INITIATIVE ROUMAINE:VISITE EN BELGIQUE

RESUME:AU COURS D UNE PRESENTATION SANS AUTRE SURPRISE LORS DU
PASSAGE DE LA DELEGATION ROUMAINE A BRUX 27NOV,LES BELGES ONT
GAGNE LA CLAIRE IMPRESSION QUE LES ROUMAINS COMPTENT SOULEVER
LA QUESTION DES MISSILES FNI A STKHM.

2.RAPPORT:D APRES DE GRUBEN,RESPONSABLE DES QUESTIONS EST-
OUEST AU CABINET DU MIN DES AFFS ETRANGERES TINDEMANS,LA
PRESENTATION ROUMAINE DE LEUR PROPOSITION ETAIT SANS SURPRISE
ET CORRESPONDAIT A QUELQUES DETAILS PRES A LA DECLARATION DU
COMITE POLITIQUE EXECUTIF DU 25NOV(BUCST TEL UYGR3047 28NOV).
LES DELEGUES ROUMAINS ETAIENT TOUTEFOIS INCAPABLES D OFFRIR
PLUS DE PRECISIONS EN REponse AUX QUESTIONS POSEES PAR LES BELGES
ET DE CE FAIT CONFIRMAIENT L IMPRESSION BELGE QU ILS N AVAIENT
VRAIMENT PAS PENSE A TOUTES LES IMPLICATIONS DE LEURS IDEES.
LES ROUMAINS SE SONT MONTRES PAR EXEMPLE INCAPABLES DE PRECISER

...2

PAGE DEUX ZVGR0563 CONFD

COMMENT LEUR PROPOSITION QUE LES MISSILES SOVIETIQUES EN CONTRE
PARTIE AUX MISSILES FRANCAIS ET BRITANNIQUES, DOIVENT ETRE STATIONNES
A UNE DISTANCE DE LA FRONTIERE OUEST ALLEMANDE EGALE A CELLE ENTRE
LES MISSILES BRITANNIQUES ET FRANCAIS ET LE TERRITOIRE DE L UNION
SOVIETIQUE, POURRAIT ETRE APPLIQUEE PUISQUE LA PRESQUE TOTALITE
DES MISSILES DES DEUX PAYS ETAIENT A BORD DE SOUMARINS.

LE SEUL ELEMENT VRAIMENT NOUVEAU DANS LA PRESENTATION ROUMAINE FUT
L IMPRESSION TRES CLAIRE LAISSEE PAR EUX QU ILS COMPTENT SOULEVER LA
QUESTION DES NEGOCIATIONS FNI A STKHM DANS LE BUT D AIDER LES
SUPERPUISSANCES A SE METTRE D ACCORD.

CCC/030 021547Z ZVGR0563

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

Mr. Smith
For response in consultation with

C O N F I D E N T I E L ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

DE BRU ZVGR0562 02DEC83

A EXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO BNATO VMBFR PEKIN MOSCO LDN PARIS HAGUE OSLO COPEN BONN LEBON

MDRIP ATHNS ROME WSHDC GENEV NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD PCOOTT/FOWLER

PRMNY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFR RGB RCR RCD RSO RSR UGB URR IDD IDA DMFX

REF VOS TELS IDDZ0167 17NOV 0123 18NOV

---DEUXIEME LET DU PM SUR LES BELS EST/OUEST:REACTIONS

OFFICIEUSES BELGES

SOMMAIRE:AU NIVEAU OFFICIEL BELGE ON INDIQUE(1)SON ACCORD AVEC
L IMPORTANCE QU ATTACHE LE PM TRUDEAU AUX NEGOCIATIONS A STKHM
ET A VIENN DANS SES EFFORTS DE REACTIVER LE DIALOGUE EST/OUEST.

(2)QUE TINDEMANS EST EN PRINCIPE EN FAVEUR DE PARTICIPER A
L OUVERTURE A STKHM MAIS VEUT RESPECTER LE CONSENSUS DES DIX
OU DES QUINZE A CET EGARD.ET(3)QUE TOUT REPONSE DE LA PART DE
L OTAN AUX PROPOSITIONS SOVIETIQUES SUR LA REDUCTION MUTUELLE
ET EQUILIBREE DES FORCES A VIENN NE DEVRAIT PAS ETRE INTERPRETTE
COMME UNE DEVALORISATION OU L ABANDON DES PROPOSITIONS
OCCIDENTALES DEJA EXISTANTES.

2.RAPPORT:LORS D UN ENTRETIEN AVEC DE GRUBEN RESPONSABLE DES
RELATIONS EST/OUEST AU CABINET TINDEMANS.NOUS AVONS ESSAYE
D OBTENIR UNE REACTION INTERIM A LA LETTRE DU 17NOV DU PM AU

...2

PAGE DEUX ZVGR0562 ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

PM MARTENS ET D Y STIMULER UNE REPONSE. D APRES DE GRUBEN LE MAE BELGE N AVAIT PAS ENCORE EU LE TEMPS DE SE PENCHER SUR LA REPONSE. IL COMPTAIT LE FAIRE SOUS PEU. DE GRUBEN INDIQUE TOUTE FOIS A TITRE PRELIMINAIRE QUE LA BELGIQUE ETAIT SYMPATHIQUE AU DESIR DU CDA DE DONNER UNE IMPULSION POLITIQUE AUX NEGOCIATIONS A STKHM ET A VIENN. SELON L ANALYSE BELGE, LE DIALOGUE INDISPENSABLE ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST TROUVE LE MIEUX SA PLACE DANS LE CONTEXTE DE NEGOCIATIONS RELIEES AU PROCESSUS CSCE. CE PROCESSUS AVIT PRODUIT JUSQU ICI LES RESULTATS LES PLUS UTILES DE TOUTES LES NEGOCIATIONS EST-OUEST. DE L AVIS DES BELGES, LES NEGOCIATIONS A VIENN AINSI QUE LES NEGOCIATIONS A STKHM REPRESENTAIENT LA PARTI MILITAIRE DE CE PROCESSUS. POUR CETTE RAISON, LES BELGES PARTAGEAIENT L ANALYSE DU PM. 3. QUANT AUX PROPOSITIONS CONCRETES DU PM, TINDEMANS EST PRET A ALLER A STKHM POUR LA SEANCE INAUGURALE MAIS RESPECTERA TOUT CONSENSUS A CET EGARD QUI SE DEGAGERA AU SEIN DES DIX OU DES SEIZE. EN CE QUI CONCERNE LA SUGGESTION DU PREMIER MINISTRE DE REpondre AUX PROPOSITIONS SOVIETIQUES SUR LA REDUCTION MUTUELLE ET EQUILIBREE DES FORCES, DE GRUBEN VOULAIT S ASSURER QUE CETTE SUGGESTION N EQUIVALAIT PAS A L ABANDON OU LA DEVALORISATION DES PROPOSITIONS OCCIDENTALES AUXQUELLES LES SOVIETIQUES N AVAIENT PAS REpondU NON PLUS. CE POINT ETAIT PARTICUIEREMENT IMPORTANT AUX BELGES PUISQUE LA BELGIQUE AVAIT DES PROPOSITIONS SUPPLEMENTAIRES A FAIRE.

...3

PAGE TROIS ZVGR0562 ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

4.4. NOUS LUI AVONS REPONDU QU A NOTRE CONNAISSANCE. LE PM NE PROPOSAIT PAS L ABANDON DES POSITIONS ACTUELLES DES PAYS OCCIDENTAUX MAIS SIMPLEMENT UNE REPONSE RAPIDE ET CONSTRUCTIVE AUX PROPOSITIONS SOVIETIQUES AFIN DE TIRER LES NEGOCIATIONS DE LEUR ENLISEMENT ACTUEL. VEUILLEZ NOUS CONFIRMER SI NOTRE INTERPRETATIONS EST CORRECTE.

CCC/126 021442Z ZVGR0562

External Affairs Canada / Affaires étrangères Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

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ISTR ---NUNN/WARNER PROPOSAL ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTRES - 9 PAGES

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CANADA/EMERGENCY
WASHINGTON
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SIG R.J. LABYSHYN/th

2 de 9



Sam Nunn

UNITED STATES SENATOR
WASHINGTON, D. C.
(202) 534-6784

EMBARGOED UNTIL
Wednesday, November 23, 1983, 10:00 a.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
Contact Ed Nagy 224-3521 or
Pete Loomis 224-6290

NUNN AND WARNER PROPOSE NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION SYSTEM

Washington, D.C.--U. S. Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and John Warner (R-VA) today released a report proposing the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers in Washington and Moscow. The report was prepared by the Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction, which was organized in November 1982 by Nunn and Warner to examine alternative means of reducing the risk of nuclear war.

The report released today emphasizes that "there are an increasing number of scenarios that could precipitate the outbreak of nuclear war that neither side anticipated or intended, possibly involving other nuclear powers or terrorist groups." To address that risk, the report proposes the establishment of two centers that "...would maintain a 24-hour watch on any events with the potential to lead to nuclear incidents."

According to the report, the centers "...would be designed to reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism, to build confidence between the two sides, and to avoid the buildup of tensions that could lead to confrontation."

The centers would be linked directly to political and military authorities in both countries. In the event of an emergency, the personnel in charge of the centers would have direct access to each nation's highest political authority.

As outlined in the report, the potential functions of the centers would include:

1. To discuss and outline the procedures to be followed in the event of possible incidents involving the use of nuclear weapons;
2. To maintain close contact during incidents precipitated by nuclear terrorists;
3. To exchange information on a voluntary basis concerning events that might lead to nuclear proliferation or to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or the materials and equipment necessary to build nuclear weapons, by sub-national groups;
4. To exchange information about military activities which might be misunderstood by the other party during periods of mounting tensions;

FROM THE OFFICE OF SAM NUNN • U.S. SENATOR • GEORGIA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

NOVEMBER 23, 1983

Dear Mr. President:

We believe that, in addition to the communications links mentioned above, it would be beneficial to explore with Soviet leaders the possibility of establishing a more comprehensive nuclear risk reduction system, featuring the establishment of independent centers in the two capitals. The outlines and functions of such a system are described in the attached report of the working group which we co-chair. We respectfully commend it to your attention.

A NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION SYSTEM

**Report of the Nunn/Warner
Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction**

November 1993

5219

A Nuclear Risk Reduction System

With but few exceptions, the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to avoid confrontations entailing the risk of nuclear war. There are compelling reasons, however, for concern about the two nations' ability to avoid nuclear crises in the future.

The emergence of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at the end of the Second World War as the only two remaining great military powers virtually assured a continuing national rivalry that would dominate global politics. The fundamental antagonisms in values and objectives between the United States and the Soviet Union continue to make certain that, regardless of their common recognition of some shared interests (such as avoiding nuclear war), the relationship will remain competitive for many years to come.

The global ideological and political struggle between ourselves and the Soviet Union is superimposed on an increasingly fractious and troubled world. International and national conflicts--particularly in the Third World--offer tempting opportunities for military or political exploitation and often lead to the involvement of the great powers on opposing sides of these disputes. In certain circumstances, such interventions have the potential to escalate to nuclear confrontations.

The 1973 crisis in the Middle East vividly demonstrated how quickly, and how far, such situations can escalate. The two great powers' involvement began with emergency transfers of weapons, shifted rapidly to the use of their own air and naval forces to protect those shipments, and ended with mutual threats of direct military intervention to protect their respective clients. At the height of the crisis, there were even hints that such interventions might include, or eventually escalate to, the use of nuclear weapons.

There are an increasing number of circumstances that could precipitate the outbreak of nuclear war that neither side anticipated nor intended, possibly involving other nuclear powers or terrorist groups. There has been a relentless dispersion of the know-how, equipment and materials necessary to fabricate nuclear devices. In addition to the five declared nuclear powers, two more nations--India and Israel--are assumed to be in a position to assemble a weapon on short notice, and may already have covert stocks of nuclear devices. India, of course, has already detonated one device.

These threshold nuclear powers may be joined by at least one, and possibly two, more nations (Pakistan and South Africa) before the end of this decade. Perhaps as many as five others (Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, South Korea and Taiwan) could be in a similar position before the year 2000. Still other countries, such as Germany, Japan and Sweden, have the financial, industrial, and technological potential to fabricate nuclear weapons; they lack only the political will to do so.

At the request of Senator Nunn, General Richard Ellis, when he was commander of the Strategic Air Command, undertook an evaluation of the possibility of a third party triggering a superpower nuclear exchange under a variety of scenarios. Unfortunately, this SAC evaluation showed that there are real and developing dangers in this area.

The spread of nuclear know-how, equipment, and materials also suggests a rising danger of nuclear terrorism. While the specific risk that in any one year any particular sub-national group or rogue national leader might acquire a nuclear device is, no doubt, a low probability, the cumulative risk covering all such groups over ten or twenty years may be very great indeed. Once in the hands of such an individual or group, the potential for lawlessness would be unlimited--including extortion, revenge, or an attempt to trigger a nuclear conflict between the superpowers.

In our view, the dangers implicit in this partial catalogue of potential nuclear flashpoints indicates the necessity of the two great powers initiating discussions aimed at establishing an explicit and comprehensive system for the prevention and containment of nuclear crises.

Recent Proposals and Studies

In 1982, Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga), John Warner (R-Va), and the late Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wa), introduced an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act requiring the Defense Department to evaluate several proposals aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear confrontations. Later that year, Senators Nunn and Warner organized the Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction.

In addition to the two Senators who serve as co-chairmen, the working group includes eight former civilian and military officials and technical experts. William Hyland, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, serves as the group's Secretary. The other members are James Schlesinger, the former Secretary of Defense; Brent Scowcroft, President Ford's National Security Advisor; General Richard Ellis, former Commander of the Strategic Air Command; Bobby Inman, formerly Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; William Perry, formerly Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; Don Rice, President of the Rand Corporation; and Barry Blechman, a senior fellow at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In early 1983, a Defense Department study prompted by the previously mentioned legislation was released. It recommended that the existing U.S.-Soviet "Hot Line" be upgraded with a facsimile link, that an additional communications channel be installed between the Pentagon and the Soviet Defense Ministry, and that high speed communications links be established between each government and its embassy in the other's capital. These proposals were endorsed by President Reagan in May. They are now the subject of discussions between the two governments.

709

The proposals put forward by President Reagan are positive steps toward the development of a comprehensive system to assure the avoidance of nuclear confrontations. But there are also crucial political aspects to the problem of preventing nuclear crises. These elements can be addressed only through more comprehensive arrangements involving the designation of particular representatives and facilities in both nations that would be assigned specific responsibilities for preventing nuclear crises.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

To begin, the United States and the Soviet Union might agree to establish separate national nuclear risk reduction centers in their respective capitals. These centers would maintain a 24 hour watch on any events with the potential to lead to nuclear incidents.

The nuclear risk reduction centers would have to be linked directly--both through communications channels and organizational relationships--to relevant political and military authorities. Thought might also be given to the assignment of liaison officers to the counterpart center in each capital. If this practice proved successful, it might be possible at some future time to move toward jointly manned centers in the two capitals.

An alternative arrangement would envision the creation of a single center, staffed by military and civilian representatives of the two nations, at a neutral site. Such an arrangement might facilitate closer cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but at the cost of diminished access between the surveillance center and the two governments themselves. This and other trade-offs between these two potential arrangements require more study.

Each center would be manned by a series of watch officers who would report through normal military and political channels. In addition, each side would designate a specific high level official to direct its center and to carry out those specific negotiations and exchanges of information as were agreed to in establishing the centers. Procedures would be established to assure that in the event of an emergency, the designated representatives would have direct access to each nation's highest political authority.

Direct communications links would be established between the two centers. These should definitely include print and facsimile channels. Consideration might also be given to the establishment of voice and perhaps even tele-conferencing facilities, as well. There are obvious dangers in such "real-time" communications, including the greater difficulty of intragovernmental coordination and a greater risk of imprecision or misunderstanding, but these may be offset by the far more rapid exchange of large amounts of information which would become possible.

8 de 9

The establishment of these centers could contribute significantly to a reduced risk of nuclear incidents. They could be used for a range of functions, most of which would take place routinely in normal times, and would be designed to reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism, to build confidence between the two sides, and to avoid the build-up of tensions that could lead to confrontation. It would probably be best to define the functions of the nuclear centers narrowly at first, expanding them as experience demonstrated the value of the enterprise.

Possible Functions of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Among the potential functions of the centers would be the following:

First, to discuss and outline the procedures to be followed in the event of possible incidents involving the use of nuclear weapons. Among the contingencies that might be explored would be unexplained explosion of a nuclear device, a terrorist threat to explode a nuclear weapon unless certain demands were met, the discovery that a nuclear weapon was missing, and similar possibilities. The discussion of these contingencies could provide a script which might be followed should the event actually occur. Although neither side could be expected to commit itself to follow these scripts under all circumstances, the existence of such an agreed routine might facilitate appropriate actions.

Second, to maintain close contact during incidents precipitated by nuclear terrorists, thus facilitating cooperative actions to defuse the incident, and specifically, to avoid the danger that the explosion of a nuclear device by a terrorist group might lead to a nuclear confrontation between the great powers.

Third, to exchange information on a voluntary basis concerning events that might lead to nuclear proliferation or to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or the materials and equipment necessary to build weapons, by sub-national groups. Obviously, care would have to be taken in any such exchange to avoid compromising intelligence sources and methods. Still, this type of U.S.-Soviet cooperation would clearly be in their mutual interest, and could increase both nations' ability to contain any such threats. There have been precedents for cooperation between the two as concerns the spread of nuclear weapons, and there is also precedent in the Standing Consultative Commission established by the 1972 SALT Agreements for the confidential exchange of technical and sensitive information.

9 de 9

Fourth, to exchange information about military activities which might be misunderstood by the other party during periods of mounting tensions. At times of mounting political tensions, the existence of independent nuclear risk reduction centers might facilitate the exchange of information about military activities which might otherwise be misinterpreted and contribute to escalating suspicions and fears. Such an exchange of information would have to be made on a voluntary basis. Even so, such an exchange could help to dampen the more extreme fears and actions that could otherwise result from international conflicts. Such a system would, of course, require checks and safeguards against the possibility that disinformation would be deliberately or accidentally fed into it, leading to confusion or delays in decision-making.

Fifth, to establish a dialogue about nuclear doctrines, forces, and activities. These exchanges might include the notifications required under the 1971 "Accidents Agreement" and any future arrangements requiring the prior notification of missile flight tests and strategic exercises. But they could go beyond this to include discussions of any strategic practices of the two sides which implicitly raise a danger of misinterpretation or misunderstanding. Consideration also could be given to using this forum to maintain an agreed data base on the strategic forces of the two sides, a necessary element for virtually any strategic arms control agreement.

Prospects and Possibilities

A strong foundation has been laid for the proposals in this report. There have been more than 20 bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements to which both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are parties, that establish requirements for exchanges of information, the prior notification of certain events, the establishment of special communications links, the designation of representatives to negotiate technical aspects of the two nations' nuclear relationship, and cooperation on proliferation issues. The 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, which has all but eliminated what had been frequent and dangerous confrontations between the two great powers, is an excellent example of what can be accomplished.

But what already has developed on an ad hoc basis is far from comprehensive in its coverage of potential problems. Moreover, the actual use or implementation of these agreements has been limited. The current system is particularly deficient in that it does not deal adequately with the growing danger of nuclear terrorism.

We suggest that by establishing the nuclear risk reduction system described in this report, the ability of both nations to contain escalation would be greatly enhanced. The proposal deserves serious consideration by the governments of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and by the citizens of both nations.



MESSAGE

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---PM INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH US AND UK

FLWG ARE POINTS YOU MAY DRAW ON IN BRIEFING STATE DEPT AND FCO ON

RESULTS OF PM S VISIT TO CHINA,PEKING,CHOGM AND HIS PERSONAL EMIS-

SARY S VISIT TO MOSCOW.WE WILL BE GIVING DPM/SSEA ADDITIONAL POINTS

FOR HIS MTGS WITH SHULTZ AND HOWE.

1.JAPAN:

PM NAKASONE WAS VERY RECEPTIVE AND FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF ALL THE PM S
PROPOSALS (PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL
PROLIFERATION,AND ON MBFR AND CDE).

2.COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED PM TRUDEAU
S INITIATIVE IN THE GOA DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. QUOTE

~~3.THE CHINESE ARE SUPPORTIVE OF THE BROAD POLITICAL PURPOSE,BUT DO
NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE POWER CONFERENCE AT THIS STAGE
PRIOR TO SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTION BY THE SUPERPOWERS.~~

~~DENG TOLD THE PM THAT THE CHIEF CAUSE OF THE ARMS RACE WAS THE
SUPERPOWERS,PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISARMAMENT IS THEIRS.HE SAID
THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY IS FINDING WAYS TO CONCENTRATE~~

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

995-5912

SIG

L. A. DELVOIE



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0242 CONF

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A CONCERTED EFFORT IS REQUIRED TO RESTORE CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE TO THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ONLY THUS, CAN A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE BE REBUILT IN PLACE OF THE PREVAILING ONE OF FEAR AND MISTRUST. IN ALL THESE PURSUITS, WE EMPHASISE THE SUPREME IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL WILL. WE, THEREFORE, WELCOME PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S CALL FOR A NEW POLITICAL DIMENSION IN THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WE SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS TO RESTORE ACTIVE POLITICAL CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS AMONG ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS AND ARE WILLING TO HELP THESE AND OTHER SUCH EFFORTS IN ALL APPROPRIATE WAYS. AS PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI HAS SO CONSISTENTLY EMPHASISED. THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN SECURING WIDER PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT IS THE STOPPING OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THESE ARE ESSENTIAL STEPS FOR PROGRESS AND WORKING TOWARDS THE WORLD'S RELIEF FROM THE MENACE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR WIDER SPREAD. *UNQUOTE*

CHINA:

3. THE CHINESE ARE SUPPORTIVE OF THE BROAD POLITICAL PURPOSE, BUT DO NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE POWER CONFERENCE AT THIS STAGE PRIOR TO SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS BY THE SUPERPOWERS. DENG TOLD THE PM THAT THE CHIEF CAUSE OF THE ARMS RACE WAS THE SUPERPOWERS; PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISARMAMENT IS THEIRS. HE SAID THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY IS FINDING WAYS TO CONCENTRATE PRESSURE ON THE SUPERPOWERS TO REDUCE THEIR ARMS. HE STRESSED THAT CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL WAS ONLY SYMBOLIC, BUT IT DID ACT AS A DETERRENT.

DENG DISAPPROVED OF THE NPT AND SAID THAT CHINA WOULD NOT SIGN IT,

...3



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PAGE THREE IDDZ0242 CONF

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THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN PROLIFERATION. HE DID NOT SHARE THE
PM'S ASSESSMENT OF THE DANGERS OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AS FEW
WOULD BECOME NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

THEY SEE THE DANGER OF WAR AS REAL, BUT ^{RISKS} ~~THE OUTBREAK~~ OF NUCLEAR WAR
WAS CONSTRAINED BY: (A) NUCLEAR DETERRENT OF CHINA AND FRANCE (B)
ALLIES OF USA AND USSR DID NOT WANT WAR (C) PEACE MOVEMENTS (D)
SUPERPOWERS AWARENESS THAT MOST OF THEIR POPULATIONS WOULD BE
KILLED IN A NUCLEAR WAR. DENG STRESSED THAT ANOTHER IMPORTANT KIND
OF PRESSURE ON THE SUPERPOWERS WAS FOR COUNTRIES TO FOLLOW INDEPEN-
DENT FOREIGN POLICY E.G. DE GAULLE IN THE 1970 S. HE SAID THAT THE
USSR WAS STILL BEING VERY AGGRESSIVE, BUT CERTAIN RECENT ACTIONS OF
THE US HAD BEEN OF THE SAME CHARACTER E.G. US POLICY IN CENTRAL
AND LATIN AMERICA (THE US SHOULD HAVE REMAINED NEUTRAL IN THE
FALKLANDS). THE US HAD DONE CERTAIN THINGS THIS YEAR QUOTE WHICH
AROUSE OUR ATTENTION UNQUOTE.

4. THE SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED, WHILE THEIR REACTION TO THE INITIATI-
VE WAS NEUTRAL AS THEY SAID THEY VIEW THE INITIATIVE THROUGH THE
PRISM OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE USA. THEY DO NOT THINK THERE IS A
BASIS FOR ANY NEGOTIATIONS IF ONE SIDE VIEWS THE OTHER AS QUOTE
EVIL UNQUOTE.

GROMYKO TOLD THE PM'S EMISSARY THAT THEY HAVE HAD QUOTE SAD EXPE-
RIENCE UNQUOTE WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT WITH THE US, HENCE THEY WERE

...4



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QUOTE RESERVED UNQUOTE ABOUT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE HIGHER LEVEL OF CONTACT THE BETTER. HE ARGUED THAT THE US HAD USED THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AS A SCREEN TO COVER MILITARISTIC ACTION AND DREW ATTENTION TO ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 24 WHICH THEY CHARACTERIZED AS A REBUFF TO AGGRESSIVE AMERICAN POLICIES AND A PEACEFUL LINE TO EUROPE AND OTHER STATES AND ON DISARMAMENT.

WHILE GROMYKO APPRECIATED THE PM'S VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF REPLACING DISCUSSION OF NUMBERS AND RATIOS OF WEAPONS WITH CONSIDERATION OF TRUST, INTENTIONS AND GOALS, BUT NATO, LED BY WASHINGTON, BY DEPLOYING PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES WAS ACTING ON A DIFFERENT BASIS. HE SAID THAT THE WEST'S REJECTION OF A DECLARATION OF NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOWED HOW THE WEST TREATED NOBLE IDEAS AND HE REGRETTED CANADA'S SUPPORT FOR INF DEPLOYMENT.

ON THE CALL FOR A FIVE POWER CONFERENCE, GROMYKO WAS NON-COMMITTAL, SAYING THERE WERE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES.

HE WAS RESERVED ON THE IDEA OF HIGH-LEVEL PRESENCE AT THE CDE OPENING AND AT MBFR. ON MBFR HE SAW NO DESIRE BY THE WEST TO MOVE FORWARD AT VIENNA.

FOR WSHDC:

RE PEKIN TEL 0921 30NOV WE HAVE NO/NO OBJECTION TO YOU PASSING
OF PARAS 1 TO 5 M
CONTENTS TO STATE DEPT (AND PRESSURE CHINESE MEANT IT TO BE PASSED ON).



MESSAGE

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BUFLO CHCGO DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS PHILA SFRAN SEATL BNATO

SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE-CHRONOLOGY

FOLLOWING FOR REFERENCE ARE MAJOR EVENTS IN PMS PEACE INITIATIVE.

1)PM MTG IN OTT WITH DPM/SSEA,MND AND SENIOR OFFICIALS(SEP21)

2)DPM/SSEA MTG IN HALIFAX WITH SEC SHULTZ(OCT16)

3)PM LETS TO ALL NATO HEADS OF GOVT(OCT22-25)

4)PM SPEECH AT GUELPH UNIV(OCT27)

5)PM LETS TO SOVIET AND CHINESE LEADERS(EARLY NOV)

6)PM MTGS WITH PRES MITTERRAND,PM LUBBERS,QUEEN BEATRIX,PM MARTENS,
HH THE POPE,PM CRAXI,PM THATCHER(NOV08-11)

7)PM SPEECH IN MTL(NOV13)

8)PM MTG WITH PM NAKASONE(NOV19)

9)PM PERSONAL EMISSARY(GEOFFREY PEARSON)VISITS TO PEKIN(NOV21-22)
AND TO MOSCO(NOV25-26)

10)PM PARTICIPATION CHOGM IN N DELHI(NOV22-27)

11)PM VISIT TO PEKIN(NOV28-29)

12)DPM/SSEA SPEECH IN CHCGO(NOV29)

13)DPM/SSEA PARTICIPATION IN NATO MINISTERIAL MTG(DEC8-9)

14)PM MTGS OVER SIX WEEKS PERIOD WITH ROBT MCNAMARA,GEN ROGERS,
GEN BRENT SCOWCROFT,GEORGE KENNAN,MEMBERS OF HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY
GROUP,GEORGI ARBATOV(OCT-NOV)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

P. Gossage/sc

IDDZ

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SIG

L.A. Belvoie

Department of External Affairs



Canada


Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

December 12, 1983

IDDZ-0236

Mr. S.W. Stillich
President
S.W. Stillich and Associates
Suite 704 - 185 Bay Street
Toronto, Ontario
M5J 1K6



Dear Mr. Stillich:

Thank you very much for your letter of November 3 which provided the Prime Minister with suggestions on topics to be raised with German Chancellor Kohl in the context of the Peace Initiative.

As it happens, your letter was received after the Prime Minister had departed for Europe. Nevertheless, the interesting ideas it contains have been brought to the attention of members of the Prime Minister's Task Force on the Initiative.

Thank you for writing on this matter.

Yours very truly,

Louis A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group



MESSAGE

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TO WSHDC PRMNY CNGNY

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SUBJ/SUJ

LNGLS MNPLS PHILA SFRAN SEATL BNATO

---PM INITIATIVE-INTERVIEW WITH PM BY RICHARD GWYN

FOLLOWING IS EDITED TEXT OF INTERVIEW WITH PM WHICH APPEARED IN
TORONTO STAR THURSDAY. IT SUGGESTS THE PM IS FAR FROM DISAPPOINTED
WITH RESULTS SO FAR, ELABORATES ON IMPORTANCE OF NAC IN ADVANCING
INITIATIVE, AND UNDERLINES HIS COMMITMENT TO INITIATIVE IS
UNFLAGGING. THIS IS USEFUL PRESS RELEASE MATERIAL, OR COULD BE PASSED
TO PRINCIPAL MEDIA CONTACTS AS IS.

2. BEGINS.

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

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P. Gossage/sc

DIVISION/DIRECTION

IDDZ

TELEPHONE

5-5912

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L.A. Dextre

I'm not discouraged on peace bid: PM

The following is an edited transcript of a half-hour interview with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau by The Star's Ottawa editor Richard Gwyn. The interview was conducted in the prime minister's private cabin aboard the Air Force 707 on his return flight to New Delhi following his two-day visit to Peking.

In the interview, the various references to "at mid-day" and to "the press conference" are to comments made Tuesday to reporters by Trudeau immediately following his discussions with Chinese Chairman Deng Xiaoping.

Q You stressed the (NATO foreign ministers') meeting in Brussels several times. Will Foreign Minister Allan MacEachen be making some specific proposal, something new at that meeting?

A No. Not anything radically new. He will be culling from his opposite numbers the answer to the questions I put specifically in my communications to the 15 other NATO leaders when I wrote to them after my European trip saying: "Here are the things we discussed. Here are the suggestions I put forward. Time is running out. Will you be represented in Stockholm (at the European disarmament conference) — yes or no — at a political level?" and the same question eventually for Vienna (at the talks on East-West relations): Yes or no?

Q Back to this question of the difficulty of translating good will into actual action. Take the five-power conference. Does it frustrate you that the three other countries (Britain, France, China) have all said the problem lies with the two big guys, not with us?

A Well, it does not frustrate me. It is like your question: Well, does it discourage me? No, because that is what I expected them to say. These powers, these three nuclear non-superpowers, have stated their views on these things.

They have established policies, just as the United States and the Soviet Union have established policies. The name of the game is not to just talk to them once and see them change their mind. The name of the game is to, as I put it at the very outset, change the trend line.

Bring messages

And I think these three are, in a sense perhaps, falling under the same misperception as a lot of Canadians at the outset, who thought that I was setting myself out to reconcile the two superpowers and to bring messages to them and to try to explain one to the other.

And I think that I made it quite clear at the outset that that is not what I was trying to do. And when the three nuclear non-superpowers tell me we must first influence the two superpowers, I say "right," and that is what I am trying to do.

Now you tell me what you are trying to do to influence the two superpowers, and is not one way of influencing them to put the kind of proposition that I have explained?

Q Sir, to start. At mid-day you sounded a bit discouraged, a bit down. Are you?

A No I am not. I don't know how I could have sounded that way. No — things turned out about as I thought they would. Maybe they did not turn out the way you thought they would — you of the media. I know the words "are you discouraged?" came back both last night and today, but the answer is no.

Q Are you at all frustrated that you seem to be having difficulty translating political interest into political will, that is, expressions of good will and encouragement into an actual concrete commitment by the various leaders you have been seeing?

A Well, I guess we will see. There has been that expression of good will as you say, but my interpretation is that it is more than: "We can't go, but we wish you luck on your journey."

It would seem to me that the reception the initiative received at the Commonwealth meeting and their desire to explicitly support the initiative — which I certainly did not ask for, they supported it in the communique but, as I think I indicated, they volunteered around the table to come with me or assist me in whatever way I found useful — indicated that they were willing to do more than wish me well on my journey. They were prepared to take the risks of the journey with me.

Wished me well

As for the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) end of it, I guess the answer to your question will have to await the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in December. It is true to say that they all wished me well when I visited the various NATO countries in Europe.

We will see if they are also prepared to inject their political will along with the one I am trying to inject. But once again, the fact of issuing a special communique in Goa and associating themselves with my initiative and with specific aspects of it, to me, is an act of political will by some 46 political leaders.

So that is why I say it is not something I am doing alone. It is something they want to work at in whatever way they can.



**RICHARD
GWYN**

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I think the three — certainly (British Prime Minister) Margaret Thatcher and Chinese Prime Minister Zhao (Ziyang) — their reaction is explained in part by an apprehension that they both had that I was coming to them to tell them that they were naughty for being nuclear powers and that they should reduce their armament.

And most of their time was spent in defensively explaining to me that it was not "fair" to come to them until I convinced the superpowers. And it took a long while to get the message through that I really was not coming to the three to get them to reduce their level of armaments, even of nuclear armaments.

Put pressure

I was coming to the three so that they could put pressure on the superpowers to reduce their level of armaments to a level where it would be possible for the British, French and Chinese also to consider limiting or reducing theirs. And I think it was perceived completely differently when I explained that.

I think French President Francois Mitterrand understood that from the outset. And that is why he was the most positive of the three on the idea of a five-power meeting.

But as you know, the Chinese, long before I talked about a five-power conference, had talked about it and they said there should be one, but only after the two superpowers had agreed to reduce by half their nuclear weapons systems.

So the ideas that they are floating around — just like Mrs. Thatcher who kept saying again and again: "It is a great idea but it can only be used once, therefore don't force us to go to the table yet" — they are fine you know.

I am just begging: Don't take five years to do it. Help me create circumstances where we can get the two superpowers to make enough progress — or apparent willingness to progress — at Geneva that then you can sit down collectively.

You know that doesn't mean the five have to meet together in January or March, but it means that they must begin exploring together the need eventually for them to meet if indeed the three want to — to do to the two, what they are asking me to do to the two.

Q That five-power conference. Is it really an attempt to find some acceptable substitute for the Geneva talks?

A No, in no sense. The Geneva talks must go on. The two superpowers must reach agreement amongst themselves. They hold 95 per cent of the world's strategic arms. The other three only hold 5 per cent. So those talks must go on, but the perversity of the situation is that nobody can say how you can make them progress in Geneva.

And what I am trying to do, and what I think my colleagues are supporting me in, is to try to get movement out of those two superpowers.

No influence

As I told (Chinese) Chairman Deng (Xiaoping) this morning, I can talk to my NATO colleagues — and I have been talking to them and I can hopefully influence them — but I cannot talk to the Soviets and I cannot influence them as a member of an alliance unless I have some other movement.

Now what are you going to do? I leave them with the question and hopefully the dynamic works on its own.

Q What can you yourself now do? You are into stage two in your own phrase. Are you going to give another speech, a sort of Guelph, Montreal, a third speech of that series, that kind of thing?

A Well, in fairness, I won't be able to answer that until I have seen the reaction in Brussels. That is only a couple of weeks away and I will see. Maybe if we are, in our terms, successful in Brussels, I will be able to go on into stage two and maybe go to Moscow and say: "Well, look! Here is what happened in Brussels and, therefore, that means that they are prepared to politicize — shall we say — the Stockholm conference. What are you prepared to do?"

I may not even have to go to Moscow. Maybe Moscow will read

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The Toronto Star

DATE

DEC -1 1983

the communiqué out of Brussels and say it is obvious that we have to go, too. Conversely, if Brussels is a failure then I will have to go back to stage one and start talking the thing up again and saying: "Look, see here. It is all very well to tell me to keep on my political mission, but you let me down in Brussels, or you changed your mind, and what happened? And now that the Soviets have abandoned the table at Geneva, what do we do? Do we just sit on our hands and wait until after the next presidential election? Is that soon enough or should we make more efforts?"

So, I have no means of reading the signals of what will happen in Brussels. I do know that Allan MacEachen is determined to press them for answers.

Q You said today and several times earlier that you will only go to Moscow if you can do some good there. Surely, in fact, you have to go to Moscow because it is only by going there that you can find out if you can do some good.

A Yes, I think that is logically correct. But if, shall we say, because of President Yuri Andropov's state of health ... they are not in a position to take any positions on anything — I mean that is a hypothesis — then perhaps there would be no point in going.

Though, there is an argument for going one way or another in the sense that I have been talking of the need for dialogue and political communication.

Q In your stage two, the culminating points are of course Moscow and Washington. What is your thinking about the psychology and the practical considerations in which one you go to first,

and roughly what time you go to whichever you go to first and then whichever you go to second?

A Well, I think it was always quite clear that I wanted to see the lesser of the five nuclear powers before seeing the two superpowers.

And that is why I found it so helpful that the Chinese would see me now even though they are coming to Canada in a month and a half, because waiting for them for a month and a half would have meant perhaps only looking at Moscow in February and Washington in March and so on.

Whereas now, in a sense, timing has been telescoped. And I am very grateful for that. Of which of the two I would see first I can make an argument — and I probably will after the fact saying it was good that I saw so-and-so before so-and-so — but to be quite honest, it will depend on their own timing.

President Ronald Reagan has said he wanted to see me, President Andropov said he wanted to see me. I am available as of the middle half of December and I will go whenever any or either of them wants to see me.

But they have timings of their own and I certainly won't be choosy and sort of say: "Well, no, your date comes too soon Mr. so-and-so. I would rather see the other one first."

But as I began answering your question, you can make arguments for both. I think both would probably prefer to be the second to see me, in the sense that they would find out first what the other said. But in a sense, I have seen President Reagan a lot of times in the past few years. We know each other well.

So, if I had my druthers, I sup-

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The Toronto Star

DEC 1 1993

pose it would be better for me to see the Soviets first so that I could catch up on my knowledge of them rather than see President Reagan yet once again.

Q You have indicated that from some time from mid-December on you would be available to go to Moscow or Washington, in whatever order. In terms of the total span ahead of you for your mission to succeed or fail — however one defines success or failure — how long are you looking at roughly?

A I would guess that after I had seen those two — and I have just answered that I cannot nail that down within a month or two — but after I have seen the two superpowers, and now that I have seen so many of the non-aligned powers, it would be time to assess then what you call success or failure.

I, perhaps, put it in different terms because I don't think one will know whether I was successful or whether I failed, until one reads future events over the next many, many months.

What I mean to say is that in an operation like this, the process is the success in itself or the failure. You don't have to succeed in order to try, and you don't have to win in order to fight.

I think it is the debate itself which will or not have been started which is what I wanted to create — the political debate, the political input. Now that political input may take years, may take months, may take days.

But that will in a sense take place without me or certainly without me being the prime mover of it. It will be a dynamic of its own.

And that is what I hope will happen: That our peoples who all want peace — and that is certainly on both sides of the alliances — will see that their political leaders are actively negotiating — engaged, bargaining, participating.

Make it happen

And I think that will bring a change in the trend line, to use my expression again. It will mean that rather than sit back a bit helplessly as we all have been and seeing the things go from bad to worse ... we will be trying to make things happen. And I say it might be modest things like a political presence at Stockholm or a deadline given to the officials meeting there or a reporting process set up for Vienna.

In other words, the peace process will become part of our political preoccupations. It has been part of the political preoccupation of our peoples but we have been all somewhat helpless in saying, as I have heard here in China and as I have heard elsewhere: "You know, there is nothing we can do about it until the superpowers become more reasonable."

Well, I hold that there are things that we can do about it, to make the superpowers become more reasonable and we will see that, I suppose, after I have been to Moscow and after we have seen the answer in Vienna. I would suppose at that stage, some other operation will have to begin. Certainly, I can't go around, many, many months seeing the same people over again, repeating the same message.

If it hasn't taken a visible step of

its own, someone else will have to carry on. It may be Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda's suggestion for forming a group of nations. It may be Premier Zhao's suggestion for enlarging the group of five — I wasn't quite able to define what he meant in his own mind — but it sounded to me like a sort of Cancun (Mexico) type of summit where you would have the superpowers but several others.

These are all third stages or new operations which can only be put together after ... this one has shown what it leads to.

Q If you succeed — and I appreciate this can be modest or difficult to measure in the immediate — or if you fail but have clearly given it your best shot, will you have completed your mission as prime minister, your last mission as prime minister?

A Well, as I guess that is linked to your previous question of timing. I have always held from the outset ... that it did not matter too much whether the thing went on after I had ceased being prime minister.

I always held that I should start it while I am prime minister because then you can collect more IOUs and so on and perhaps be more convincing and have greater access.

But to take an example, which wouldn't help you in getting the answer you want to get, if this thing sucked me in for several years, and I am not going to be prime minister for several years, it doesn't mean that the thing would necessarily stop.

I think it had to start while I was prime minister. Now that is the general answer.

If you want me to be more precise, from the earlier dates I gave you, I suppose in a couple of months we will know if I can be more useful continuing or not.

And I don't know the answer to either now, I honestly don't. But I would guess that, as any political analyst would assume, if I am going to run again I should.

It doesn't mean I will, but that is what I would be thinking if I were advising from the outside.

Q You said at the press conference that you did not see your role as being that of an intermediary between the United States and the Soviet Union. But in fact, isn't an intermediary needed? I mean the two powers are still shouting at each other and it is going to take someone to go between them talking softly.

A Well, I still do not see myself as doing that. I don't have the skills. I don't have the taste. I don't want to waste my time explaining each to the other.

I have some ideas which I think stand or fall by themselves and if they want to listen to them and say: "Oh well, he is giving us a middle way between the other extreme," that is fine.

But I don't attempt to do that. I try to see what is reasonably possible and preach that. I don't have the talents of a diplomat.

I think that there should be some intermediaries. It is an important role. I think — for instance, when I am talking of the Warsaw Pact and NATO ministers meeting in either Stockholm or in Vienna — I think they will be intermediaries, somebody should be set up as intermediaries.

When arms are big business, wars become a way of displaying wares. They become real-life testing grounds. Each war is closely examined, not only for its tactical and strategic lessons but also for hints on market opportunities. It is merely good business practice for the British Ministry of Defence to arrange 'Floater 83', a floating exhibition of military equipment, hoping that the label 'proved in the Falklands' will help to increase arms sales in the Middle East. *Map 34: War Fair* looks at the South Atlantic war through the eyes of industrialists and importers, eyes which see little besides the equations of cost effectiveness. A cynic might be tempted to believe that war is becoming the pursuit of commerce by other means.

The world - the war-fare State

These excerpts, left and below, are from The WAR ATLAS, Armed Conflict - Armed Peace 1 3 by Michael Kidson and Dan Smith. A Pluto Press Project. Publisher Pan Books Ltd, Cavaye Place, London SW 10 9PG, U.K. £6. the inter-dependance of the super-power war machine.

A Commoner's Prayer for P.M. Pierre Trudeau, Canada. Paraphrased and plagiarised from an original by Jim World-Vote-on-Disarmament Stark of Operation Dismantle, Ottawa. (His world vote concept has just been introduced into U.N. committee by Costa Rica)

Our Pierre, who art in the Cabinet
Honoured by thy name
Thy re-election come
Thy policies be done on Earth
as they are done in Canada
Give us this day a U.N.
resolution for a U.N. Peace
Force,
And forgive us for not being
M.P.s,
As we forgive the nuclear
accountants who aren't M.P.s
either,
And lead us not into another
fruitless year at the U.N.,
But deliver us ordinary people
from our usual position of
powerlessness,
For thine is the minister's
job, the ability and the glory,
Not for ever and ever, of
course,
But them's the breaks in a
democracy.

Amen.

Mad Logic Dept.

Indeed, of the three main cruise types, the SLCM is playing the biggest part in the total U.S. program. The current program budget for the SLCM is US\$11.8 billion. This will buy 3,994 missiles by 1992. By contrast, the 560 GLCMs are expected to cost \$3.7 billion by 1986 and the 1,739 ALCMs will cost \$5.0 billion (this, of course, excludes the advanced stealth model). According to the JCPMO, all of the ALCMs and GLCMs are slated to carry thermonuclear warheads while only 758 of the SLCMs will carry them.

Financial Post Dec 83

The international military order, a hierarchy of power based on war, the threat of war and on permanent preparations for war, is one way of organising world affairs. It is not a productive, generous, humane or safe way. And it is not the only way. It is not often recognised for what it is: one of many options, created by the powerful for their own benefit and aggrandisement.

Its current costs are high; its potential costs are beyond reckoning. It has brought us close to catastrophe, and questions whether or not human society has a future at all, let alone an attractive one.

Even at the heart of the international military order, all is not well. The growing costs of military technology are imposing intolerable strains on the most powerful of states. Stockpiling the most destructive weapons provides no sense of increased security. Economic recession and political crisis provide irritants for the management of military alliance. Many governments, even where the military rule, cannot rely on more than a small elite of the armed forces. And disaffection and demoralisation may be rampant in the forces (see *Map 39: Achilles' Heel*), even where there are no major political disagreements between the military and the government. These are circumstances which may lead to desperate and dangerous actions. But they may also provide a moment in which the military role itself is questioned, challenged, changed.

Outside the military institutions a rebellion is going on against some of the consequences of the international military order, against the distortion of priorities evidenced by high spending on the military, against the view that more weapons provide more security. Growing numbers of people see themselves, not as the fortunate beneficiaries of a great deal of protection, but as the certain victims should permanent military confrontation spill over into hot war.

The movements shown in *Map 40: A New Order?* are recent and they are fragile entrants to the political stages of their countries. They have affected public attitudes about the new weapons at the forefront of an intensified arms race and military confrontation. But they face a powerful and sophisticated opposition capable of utilising a wide range of counter-tactics. So deep is the political entrenchment of the international military order that these movements have barely begun to shift state policies.

The leading military powers cannot get us out of the historic pit which they daily deepen. If there is to be an alternative, based on a greater respect for humanity and for our natural environment, it must come from a popular movement.

Once a system has been recognised for what it is, a matter of social and political choice, alternatives can be conceived. Millions of people now understand the dangers of continuing on our present path and are glimpsing the outlines of an alternative. They have decided that something can and must be done. That is no small thing.

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--PMS MTG WITH ZHAO ZIYANG

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DURING HIS MTG 28NOV WITH CHINESE PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG, PM DESCRIBED HIS INITIATIVE, MENTIONING PROPOSALS HE HAD ANNOUNCED IN GUELPH AND MTL SPEECHES, INCLUDING THAT FOR CONFERENCE OF FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. IN HIS REPLY ZHAO WELCOMED EFFORTS OF PM TO INVOLVE POLITICAL LEADERS MORE IN PROCESS OF IMPROVING EAST/WEST CLIMATE AND REDUCING TENSION IN INTERNATL SITUATION. HE SAID PMS PROPOSALS WOULD BE STUDIED BY CHINESE AUTHORITIES AND DISCUSSED WITH OTHERS INCLUDING THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. HOWEVER HE WAS UNSYMPATHETIC TO PROPOSAL FOR FIVE POWER CONFERENCE. SUPER POWERS WERE NOT/NOT SINCERE IN SEARCH FOR GENUINE DISARMAMENT. MAIN THREAT TO PEACE CAME FROM THEIR RIVALRY. REFERRING TO FMS UNGA SPEECH HE SAID CHINESE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN CONFERENCE BUT ONLY AFTER SUPERPOWERS REDUCED THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS BY HALF AS FIRST STEP. IF FIVE POWER CONFERENCE WERE HELD BEFORE THAT IT WOULD GIVE IMPRESSION THAT FIVE NWS NOT/NOT TWO SUPERPOWERS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR ARMS RACE. ON NPT HE SAID CHINA WOULD NOT/NOT ACCEDE TO TREATY. IT WAS MANIPULATED BY USA/USSR

...2

PAGE TWO WJGR0929 CONF CDN EYES ONLY
TO MAINTAIN THEIR NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY.

2.REPORT-PM OPENED DISCUSSION BY EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD DEVELOPED INITIATIVE TO REDUCE CONCERNS ABOUT HIGH STATE OF TENSION IN EAST/WEST BELNS AND TO INCREASE PARTICIPATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS IN REDUCTION OF TENSION.AT WILLIAMSBURG HE HAD ADVOCATED AND OBTAINED AGREEMENT FROM OTHERS THAN MORE ATTN SHOULD BE DEVOTED BY POLITICAL LEADERS TO QUEST FOR WORLD PEACE.MANY OF DISARMAMENT EFFORTS OF WPO AND NATO WERE NOT/NOT UNDER DIRECTION OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP BUT OF OFFICIALS.HE QUOTED AS EXALE MBFR DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD LASTED 10 YRS WITHOUT AGREEMENT BEING REACHED.HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT STOCKHOLM MTG WOULD EXPERIENCE SAME PROBLEMS AND NEGNS WOULD BE SLOW AND UNPRODUCTIVE IF THEY WERE NOT/NOT GIVEN AT OUTSET IMPETUS FROM POLITICAL LEVELS OF GOVT.IN START AND INF NEGNS, PM SAID WE HAD BEEN WITNESSING PROCESS DEVOTED TO DETAILS LIKE COUNTING OF WARHEADS AND MEASURING THROW-WEIGHT,ETC.POLITICAL WILL DID NOT/NOT SEEM EVIDENT ON PART OF EITHER SUPERPOWER.

3.IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT OFFICIALS TO REACH CONCLUSIONS CONDUCIVE TO SEARCH FOR PEACE IF POLITICAL AUTHORITIES DID NOT/NOT DIRECT THOSE PARTICIPATING IN NEGNS.CURRENT NEGNS SHOWED TENDENCY OF BOTH SIDES TO TALK TO EACH OTHER THROUGH MEGAPHONES.THERE WAS ALSO LACK OF GOODWILL.WHEN POLITICAL AUTHORITIES DID NOT/NOW WISH TO ACHIEVE RESULTS IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT NEGOTIATORS TO DO SO.ON IMF PM SAID FOUR YR DEADLINE DECIDED IN 1979 WAS NOW CLOSE.

...3

PAGE THREE WJGR0929 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

WE WERE NOT/NOT SEEING DECREASE IN TENSION BUT AN INCREASE AN HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR KAL INCIDENT, GRENADA, LEBANON AND NOW CYPRUS. THESE WERE ALL OCCASIONS WHEN TENSION WAS INCREASING AND PEACE RECEEDING. HE SAID WE HAD A DUTY TO IMPROVE EAST/WEST CONTACT IN ORDER TO REDUCE TENSION SO THAT AT LEAST, COMMUNICATIONS COULD BE RE-ESTABLISHED AT POLITICAL LEVEL.

4. ALTHOUGH IT WAS MEMBER OF ALLIANCE CDA NEVERTHELESS HAD GOOD CREDENTIALS TO EMBARK ON THIS EFFORT. PM NOTED CONTRIBUIONS OF HIS PREDEESSOR IN OFFICE, LESTER PEARSON. IN HIS RECENT MTGS WITH NATO COLLEAGUES AND WITH COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES IN NDELHI AND GOA PM SAID HE HAD FOUND DESIRE ON PART OF ALL THAT POLITICIANS SHOULD TAKE MORE INITIATIVE IN BEARCH FOR PEACE. HE DREW PREMIER ZHAOS ATTN TO GOA COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH SUPPORT HAD BEEN EYPRESSED FOR IDEA AND, IN PARTICULAR FOR HIS OWN INITIATIVE IN LIGHT OF HIS INTENDED VISIT TO CHINA. HE THOUGHT HE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL, SO FAR, BECAUSE NUMBER OF COLLEAGUES IN NATO AND COMMONWEALTH HAD AGREED THAT GREATER POLITICAL DIMENSION HAD TO BE INTRODUCED INTO EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP AND INTO SEARCH FOR PEACE.

5. PM THEN MENTIONED PROPOSALS HE HAD PUT FORWARD IN RECENT SPEECHES AND AT ZHAOS REQUEST BRIEFLY OUTLINED THOSE RELATING TO MPFR TALKS AND TO FORTHCOMING CDE MTG IN STOCKHOLM, AS WELL AS PROPOSAL RELATING TO HIGH ALTITUDE SATELLITES AND PROPOSAL FOR CONFERENCE OF FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.

...4

PAGE FOUR WJGR0929 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

6. ZHAO THEN RESPONDED TO PMS COMMENTS SAYING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD CONCERNS PM HAD EXPRESSED OVER DIRECTION OF INTERNATL SITUATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF ARMS RACE. EFFORTS OF PM TO INVOLVE POLITICAL LEADERS MORE IN PROCESS OF TRYING TO IMPROVE EAST/WEST CLIMATE AND IN REDUCING TENSION IN INTERNATL SITU WERE SUPPORTED BY CHINA.

7. HE THEN SET OUT CHINESE VIEWS ON CAUSES OF TENSION IN INTERNATL SITU. NEGOTIATORS IN VARIOUS FORUMS HAD FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY RESULTS. SUPERPOWERS HAVE THEIR OWN CALLATIONS AND WERE NOT/NOT SINCERE IN SEARCH FOR GENUINE DISARMAMENT. IN CASE OF INF USSR HAD WALKED OUT. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT PURPOSE OF EACH SIDE IN START AND MBFR TALKS WAS TO ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY OVER OTHER. THIS IS WHY AS TALKS WENT ON SO DID ARMS RACE. DURING NEGNS NUMBERS OF WEAPONS HAD INCREASED. THERE WAS A NEED TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SUPERPOWERS. POLITICAL LEADERS SHOULD UNITE TO EXERT POLITICAL AND MORAL PRESSURE TO COMPEL THEM TO CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE AND TO BREAK PRESENT DEADLOCK.

8. JUDGING FROM PAST EXPERIENCE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE OF EAST/WEST RELNS OR TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE BETWEEN TWO WITH REGARD TO DISARMAMENT. ZHAO SAID, FIRST POINT TO NOTE WAS THAT MAIN THREAT TO WORLD PEACE CAME FROM RIVALRY BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS IN EXPANDING RESPECTIVE ARSENALS. FOREIGN MIN WU XUEQIAN HAD RECENTLY SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL CHINESE POSN AT UNGA.

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PAGE FIVE WJGR0929 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

ZHAO SAID USA AND USSR HAD TO TAKE ACTION FIRST. ARSENALS POSSESSED BY BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CHINA BORE NO/NO COMPARISON IN NUMBERS TO TOTALS OF WEAPONS POSSESSED BY SUPERPOWERS. IF GAP CONTD BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS AND THREE OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE REALISTIC FOR FIVE TO MEET TO DISCUSS RATIO THAT SHOULD EXIST AMONG THEIR RESPECTIVE ARSENALS. MOREOVER IN ABSENCE OF GAP BEING NARROWED MTG OF FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES, AS PROPOSED, WOULD DIVERT ATTN FROM POLICIES OF TWO SUPERPOWERS. PUBLICS WOULD THEN BELIEVE THAT IT WAS BECAUSE FIVE HAD REFUSED TO MEET THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO DISARMAMENT. THIS WOULD NOT/NOT CONFORM TO REALITY OF SITUATION.

9. TURNING TO NON/NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, ZHAO REPEATED WELL-KNOWN CHINESE PUBLIC POSN THAT CHINA WAS NOT/NOT IN FAVOUR OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD NOT/NOT ENGAGE IN EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE PROLIFERATION. IT WOULD NOT/NOT ACCEDE TO NON/NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WHICH WAS MANIPULATED BY USA AND USSR TO MAINTAIN THEIR NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY AND TO ENABLE THEM TO BLACKMAIL OTHERS WHO HAD RIGHT TO SEEK TO ACQUIRE ON THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CHINA WOULD NOT/NOT JOIN TREATY BUT WOULD TAKE PRUDENT APPROACH TO PROLIFERATION ISSUE. IT WOULD NOT/NOT DISCUSS ISSUE OF NON/NO PROLIFERATION WITH SUPERPOWERS.

10. IF SUPERPOWERS DIS NOT/NOT AGREE TO TAKE FIRST STEP IN REDUCING SIZE OF THEIR ARSENALS IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR OTHERS TO

...6

PAGE SIX WJGR0922 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

TALK ABOUT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. HE PROMISED THAT PM PROPOSALS WOULD BE CAREFULLY STUDIED AND CHINA WOULD CONSULT OTHERS ABOUT THEM, INCLUDING THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES.

11. PM ASKED ZHAO HOW OTHERS COULD PUT PRESSURE ON SUPERPOWERS. WE SUGGESTED THAT CHINAS OWN PROPOSAL WAS WAY OF BRINGING PRESSURE ON EACH OF THEM. CHINAS POSN HE SUGGESTED, WAS NOT/NOT TOO DIS-SIMILAR FROM THOSE OF FRANCE AND BRITAIN. HE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT CHINA TO REDUCE ITS ARSENAL WHEN TWO SUPERPOWERS POSSESSED MORE THAN 95 PERCENT OF WORLDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

12. ZHAO THEN MADE SAME POINT THAT DENG XIAOPING MADE FOLLOWING DAY. CHINAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS HE SAID WERE ONLY SYMBOLIC. THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO SHOW CHINAS INDEPENDENCE. THERE WERE POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY WEAPONS. CHINA DID NOT/NOT INTEND TO DEVOTE MANY RESOURCES TO STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IN FUTURE. IT DID NOT/NOT HAVE CAPABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN ARMS RACE. HIGHER PRIORITIES WERE INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND GENERAL WELFARE OF CHINESE PEOPLE.

13. PM ASKED AGAIN IF THERE WERE WAYS OF BRINGING PRESSURE ON SUPERPOWERS MENTIONING THAT ONE OF HIS CONDITIONS FOR FIVE POWER CONFERENCE WOULD BE THAT EACH WOULD ACT AS SOVERIGN NATION NOT/NOT AS MEMBER OF ANY VLOC. WE SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NEITHER/NEITHER HAD RIGHT TO SEEK SUPERIORITY OVER OTHER. AS USSR SEEMED

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INTENT ON DOING WHEN IT INSISTED ON COUNTING FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS WITH USA TOTALS. SUPERPOWERS SHOULD BE EQUAL AND NEITHER SHOULD BE SUPERIOR TO OTHER.

14. EXPLAINING THAT WHEN HF TALKED OF AN ACCORD AMONG FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES HE DID NOT/NOT DO SO WITH INTENT OF REDUCING ARSENALS OF SMALLER COUNTRIES BUT INSTEAD TO SUGGEST THESE BE SET AT REASONABLE LIMITS. PERHAPS SOME OF SMALLER WEAPONS STATES WOULD NEED TO INCREASE NUMBERS OF THEIR SYSTEMS TO ASSURE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. PRESENTED IN THIS WAY PROPOSAL NEED NOT/NOT DIVERT ATTN FROM SUPER-POWER RIVALRY BUT COULD BRING PUBLIC ATTN TO BEAR ON FACT THEY WERE BEING UNREASONABLE IN MAINTAINING SUCH LARGE NUMBER OF WEAPONS GIVING THEM SPECIAL STATUS VIS-A-VIS OTHER THREE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.

15. ZHAO REPLIED THAT PM HAD RAISED QUESTION OF HOW TO APPLY MORE PRESSURE ON TWO OTHER POLITICAL LEARN WORLD, SHOULD BE MOBILIZED TO ENGAGE IN STRUGGLE, NOT/NOT ONLY IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNTRIES BUT IN OTHERS ALSO. HOWEVER HE REPEATED THAT ONLY AFTER TWO SUPERPOWERS HAD AGREED TO REDUCE THEIR ARSENALS COULD REDUCTIONS BY OTHER NWS BE DISCUSSED. THIS WOULD BE BETTER MEANS OF EXERTING PRESSURE ON TWO SUPERPOWERS THAN IDEA OF FIVE POWER CONFERENCE. HE MENTIONED AGAIN HIS VIEW THAT MTG OF FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES WOULD LEAVE IMPRESSION THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISARMAMENT IMPASSE RESTED NOT/NOT WITH TWO SUPERPOWERS BUT WITH

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PAGE EIGHT WJGR0929 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY
ALL FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.

16.ZHAO CONCLUDED SAYING CHINA APPRECIATED PMS CONCERNS AND
SUPPORTED HIS APPEAL TO HAVE MORE POLITICAL LEADERS ENGAGED IN
STRUGGLE.PMS SUGGESTIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERED AND OTHERS WOULD BE
CONSULTED.

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ R E S T R I C T E D

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0233 01DEC83

TO/À TO PMDEL/ ~~MSA~~ KWAIT

INFO INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY PCOOTT/CARON

REF DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB UGB RCD RBD CPD URR IDR IDA RCR

SUBJ/SUJ ---PM INITIATIVE - THE MEDIA SO FAR.

1. SUMMARY:

DOMESTIC COVERAGE OF TRIP REMAINS RESPECTFUL WITH ONLY ISOLATED NE-
GATIVE COMMENT. LITTLE DISPOSITION TO DISMISS EFFORT. PM QUOTES
HELPFUL IN ALL FILING SETTING HONEST TONE. STORIES SYMPATHETICALLY REFLECT
~~STORIES~~ TRIP'S UPHILL BATTLES. HOWEVER, INITIATIVE IS NOT YET ESTABLIS-
HED AS MAJOR STORY ON INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AGENDA, AT THE VERY TIME
WHEN BREAKOFF OF INF, GERMAN DEBATE, DEPLOYMENT, AND RENEWED QUOTE STAR
WARS UNQUOTE TALK FROM US ADMIN COULD HAVE PROVIDED CONTEXT. BENEFIT
OF THE DOUBT SHOULD REMAIN IN SCORECARD APPROACH THAT WILL INEVITA-
BLY FOLLOW WIND-DOWN OF STAGE ONE. MEDIA IN US AND ABROAD CONTINUE
ADEQUATE STRAIGHT COVERAGE OF HIGH POINTS OF MISSION. KRAFT AND
RESTON, PLUS SCATTERED SUPPORTIVES U.S. EDITORIALS (L.A. TIMES, MILWAU-
KEE JOURNAL, DALLAS TIMES, HERALD, SEATTLE POST) REMAIN ONLY SERIOUS
ANALYSIS. THIS IS DUE TO THE PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC NATURE OF THE TRIP,
AND LACK OF DETAILED PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM OTHER MAJOR PLAYERS. ASIDE
FROM THE MEAT IN THE SPEECHES (BOTH ADEQUATELY COVERED ABROAD) AND
THE TEXT OF THE GOA DECLARATION (WELL COVERED IN US AND BRITAIN),
THIS HAS BEEN A TRIP OF FEW NEWSWORTHY PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND

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DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

P. GOSSAGE

IDDZ

995-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



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~~OR~~ SUBSTANTIVE BREAKTHROUGHS. A CANADIAN PROCESS STORY HAS DIFFICULTY MAKING THE AGENDA OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIA, ESPECIALLY WHEN THAT AGENDA IS SO CROWDED. NEVERTHELESS, INTERNATIONAL INTEREST FOR A MORE PUBLIC, ^{EVEN} MORE PROVOCATIVE PHASE IS THERE. MAJOR U.S. NETWORK TV SHOWS, THE TODAY SHOW, GOOD MORNING AMERICA, MEET THE PRESS, AND FACE THE NATION IN THE PAST TWO DAYS HAVE, ~~IN UNPRECEDENTED NUMBERS,~~ ^{ED} MADE ~~FOR REQUESTS~~ ^{TO} INTERVIEWS THE PM ON THE INITIATIVE. IN ADDITION ABC QUOTE NIGHTLINE UNQUOTE WANTED THE DPM/SSEA TO BE INTERVIEWED ON CANADA'S IDEAS ^{ON} DISARMAMENT FOLLOWING HIS CHICAGO SPEECH THURSDAY. THIS IS THE BEST INDICATION THAT THE MISSION ^{HAS} ~~(UNTAPPED~~ ^{MADRE} MEDIA POTENTIAL, AND THAT THE GROUNDWORK HAS INDEED BEEN LAID.

REPORT:

1) CANADIAN MEDIA

EDITORIAL COMMENT HAS BEEN CONTINUOUSLY POSITIVE. OUT OF 17 SUCH COMMENTS FROM THE VANCOUVER SUN TO LE DEVOIR, LA PRESSE, THE GLOBE AND CITIZEN ONLY THE WINNIPEG FREE PRESS AND THE HALIFAX CHRONICLE HERALD WERE COOL. THE FINANCIAL POST IN A RARE EXCURSION INTO INTERNATIONAL COMMENT HEADED A SIGNED PIECE QUOTE TRUDEAU'S PEACE TRAVELS ARE WELL TIMED UNQUOTE. THE VANCOUVER SUN UNDER A HEADING QUOTE GIVE PEACE A CHANCE UNQUOTE CONCLUDES THAT THE INITIATIVE, HOWEVER DIFFICULT, IS QUOTE BOUND TO SUCCEED MORALLY UNQUOTE, AND IN A LATER EDITORIAL RESPONDING TO THE ANONYMOUS PENTAGON NAY-SAYERS STATES QUOTE THE IDEA OF DISCREDITING A MESSENGER OF PEACE, WHATEVER HIS

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PERSONA, IS ABSURD UNQUOTE.

DAY TO DAY COVERAGE HAS GIVEN THE TRIP AND THE INITIATIVE MORE THAN
THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT. POSITIVE NEWS OF EVEN MINOR BREAKTHROUGHS
AND SUPPORT ^{HAS} ~~HAVE~~ BEEN UNUSUALLY WELL REPORTED, ~~FOR INSTANCE~~. UNDER A
HEADING QUOTE US ENVOY HAILS PEACE PLAN UNQUOTE, THE OFTEN MALIGNED
AMBASSADOR ROBINSON WAS GIVEN FULL COVERAGE FOR HIS GOING QUOTE TO
GREAT LENGTHS TO REFUTE REPORTS THE US IS COOL TO TRUDEAU S PROPO-
SALS UNQUOTE. ^{TWO} ~~FOUR~~ OTHER WELL PLAYED HEADLINES INDICATE THE CANADIAN
MEDIA S STUNNING FAIRNESS. FOLLOWING THE DISAPPOINTING MEETING WITH
ARBATOV, THE NORMALLY CYNICAL FERGUSON STORY IS HEADED QUOTE SOVIET
RESPONSE FAILS TO DAMPEN PM S OPTIMISM UNQUOTE. LATER FOLLOWING THE
MEETING WITH ZHAO ZIYANG ^G IN PEKING THE JOHN GRAY STORY IS HEADED
QUOTE GOOD WISHES BUT NO COMMITMENT FOR TRUDEAU IN PEKING UNQUOTE.
EVEN BRIAN KELLEHER SEEMS CAUGHT UP SAYING IN A REPORT FROM INDIA
THAT THE PM PLAYED A QUOTE ENORMOUS UNQUOTE ROLE IN GETTING THE
PLAN ACCEPTED. FROM CHINA CTV REPORTED THAT THE PM WAS NOT QUOTE
TOTALLY UNQUOTE DISAPPOINTED AND INDICATED HE MAY HOPE THAT THE
SOLID ENDORSEMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH WILL BE ENOUGH TO INFLUENCE
WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

COLUMNISTS AND COMMENT HAVE BEEN BALANCED. CHARLES LYNCH WAS MORE
THAN NORMALLY FAIR IN ANALYSING THE VARIOUS SELF-INTERESTS OPERATING
AMONG THE PM AND THE LEADERS HE HAS TO CONVINCE. HE CONCLUDES QUOTE

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SOME GOVERNMENT HAS TO BE SEEN TO BE WILLING TO ABANDON ITS OWN
SELF INTEREST TO GET THINGS MOVING ...TRUDEAU SAYS IN THE NAME OF
CANADA HE IS WILLING TO DO JUST THAT - BUT EVEN IF HE IS TO BE
BELIEVED, HE CAN'T SUCCEED IF HE'S THE ONLY ONE. UNQUOTE IN A WELL
BACKGROUNDED AND APPEALING PIECE NOV.28 JOHN GRAY TRACES THE ROOTS
OF THE PM'S CONCERNS AND STATES QUOTE IN MANY WAYS IT IS A QUIXOTIC
CRUSADE, APPEALING FOR AN ACT OF FAITH IN A WORLD THAT MANIFESTLY
SHOWS LESS AND LESS. UNQUOTE TYPICAL OF COMMENTATOR'S GENERAL
UNWILLINGNESS TO FLATLY DISMISS THE INITIATIVE AS DOMESTIC ~~POLITICS~~ **POLITICUS**
IS GWYN'S COLUMN OF LAST WEEK IN WHICH HE WRITES: QUOTE THE
CRITICISM (THAT TRUDEAU IS PLAYING DOMESTIC POLITICS) IS APT. BUT IT
IS MIS-AIMED. UNQUOTE THEN HE ARGUES THAT THE PM IS SIMPLY USING
COALITION-BUILDING, GUILE AND EVEN REASONED LOGIC, ALL TRICKS OF AN
EXPERIENCED DOMESTIC OPERATOR, THIS TIME ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE.
IN SUM, THE COVERAGE IS UNUSUALLY GOOD, TO THE POINT WHERE SOME TORON-
TO STAR STAFFERS, FOR EXAMPLE THINK THE PAPER IS GOING OVERBOARD.
WILL IT TURN. ITS DOUBTFUL UNTIL FOLLOWING A REAGAN MEETING. WITH
THE DPM/SSEA AT NATO, AND DOMESTIC PREOCCUPATIONS SUCH AS THE SPEECH
FROM THE THRONE NEXT WEEK, THEN A POSSIBLE VISIT TO WASHINGTON, THERE
WILL BE SUSPENSION OF JUDGEMENT ON SUCCESS OR FAILURE, WIN OR LOSE,
EVEN IF THE SCORECARD OF WHO SUPPORTS WHAT CONTINUES TO FILL UP.

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2)US MEDIA

AS NOTED,THE MISSION HAS NOT MADE THE BIG AGENDA.BUT ITS GETTING
CLOSE.THE COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT AND DECLARATION WAS WELL COVERED BY
THE NY TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST AMONG OTHERS AND GAVE THE INITIA-
TIVE A BOOST ON A STAGE WHICH IS OF WORRY TO THE US.NY TIMES SUBSE-
QUENTLY COVERED THE CINA TRIP AND TRACED THE INITIATIVE BACK TO
GUELPH.A RATHER IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGH OCCURRED NOV.26 WHEN THE FI-
VE POWER PROPOSAL WAS WOVEN INTO A STORY IN THE NY TIMES FROM BONN.
QUOTE MR.KOHL S SECURITY ADVISERS HAVE BEEN STUDYING A PROPOSAL BY
PET OF CANADA FOR A CONFERENCE OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ...AND THE
ADVISORS S REACTION HAS BEEN FAVOURABLE UNQUOTE.THIS IS THE FIRST
TIME THE INITIATIVE HAS BEEN WOVEN INTO THE LARGER STORY OF
BREAKDOWN OF TALKS ETC.AUGERS WELL.AS DOES A REQUEST FROM TIME
TODAY FOR A 500 WORD PIECE BY THE PM ON HIS INITIATIVE AND THE
EARLIER MENTIONED FLOOD OF NETWORK INTERVIEW REQUESTS.
EDITORIALS AS MENTIONED ABOVE HAVE BEEN SCATTERED BUT LAUDITORY,
TYPIFIED BY THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL: QUOTE IF HE (PM) CAN CLEANSE THE
POLLUTED ATMOSPHERE OF EAST-WEST NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY AND HELP ACHIEVE
A NEW ARMS AGREEMENT,HE WILL END HIS CAREER WITH A MAGNIFICENT
FLOURISH UNQUOTE.ONLY THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE HAS BEEN NEGATIVE,CALLING
FIVE POWER QUOTE A MONUMENTALLY UNWORKABLE IDEA UNQUOTE AND ADDING,
IN AN ECHO OF THE JOE KRAFT COLUMN: QUOTE NO BREAKTHROUGH CAN COME

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WITHOUT HARD BARGAINING BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS UNQUOTE.

GENERALLY DAILY COVERAGE OF THE TRIP HAS BEEN SPARSE, SOME PAPERS
PICKING UP ROUTINE REUTERS STORIES FOR INSIDE PAGES, AND RADIO DOING
ONE LINERS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH DECLARATION AND THE TRIP TO PEKING.
THE TV NETWORKS IGNORED IT.

3) EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE

WHILE YOU WILL BE INFORMED OF OFFICIALLY COMPLIMENTARY COVERAGE IN
MOSCOW AND PEKING, YOU MAY NOT KNOW THAT THE TORONTO STAR COMMISSIO-
NED A LONG ARTICLE BY ONE ALEXANDER BOVIN OF IZVESTIA. IN IT, HE
SHARES THE PM'S ANALYSIS OF GROWING TENSIONS, AGREES TO HIS MAIN
IDEA, THEN GOES ON AT LENGTH TO BLAME THE US, DEPLOYMENT ETC. NOT
HELPFUL. THIS QUOTE EXCLUSIVE UNQUOTE LED THE TUESDAY STAR TO
BLACK LINE ON THE FRONT PAGE QUOTE SOVIETS COME OUT IN SUPPORT OF
TRUDEAU'S PEACE MISSION UNQUOTE. SUCH ENTHUSIASM ASIDE IF THERE IS
OUTRIGHT SUPPORT ELSEWHERE OR, IN MOST ALLIANCE CAPITALS, THE PRESS
ARE NOT REPORTING IT. PARIS REPORTS VIRTUALLY NO COVERAGE OF THE
TRIP OR FURTHER MENTION OF THE INITIATIVE AFTER THE PM'S VISIT THE-
RE.

THE BRITISH PRESS, ON THE OTHER HAND, COVERING THE COMMONWEALTH
CONFERENCE, WERE READY TO GIVE FULL CREDIT TO THE PM'S ROLE AND TO
THE INITIATIVE. BBC RADIO AND TV NEWS, AND ITV ALL REPORTED ON THE
PM'S ROLE IN THE DECLARATION AND ON HIS PLANS TO GO TO CHINA. THE

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TIMES, GUARDIAN, FINANCIAL TIME, TELEGRAPH AND EVEN THE DAILY MAIL
HIGHLIGHTED THE GOA DECLARATION AND THE PM S EFFORTS. THE DAILY
MAIL ~~PANCI-FULLY~~ HEADLINED QUOTE PEACE MISSION TO HALT ARMS RACE
UNQUOTE FROM AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH KAUNDA URGING A MISSION
OF FOUR LEADERS TO MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. DOWN IN THE STORY: QUOTE
TO PAVE THE WAY, CANADA S PM TRUDEAU HAS BEEN CANVASSING SEVERAL
CAPITALS FOR SUPPORT ...UNQUOTE THE DAY AFTER A FINANCIAL TIMES
HEAD WAS MORE REALISTIC: QUOTE COMMONWEALTH LEADERS SUPPORT TRUDEAU
ON EAST WEST RELATIONS. UNQUOTE THE MOST HELPFUL COVERAGE WAS IN
THE GUARDIAN WRAPPING UP THE CONFERENCE: QUOTE IT IS CLEAR THAT
MRS. THATCHER HAS BEEN PERSUADED TO SWALLOW HER WELL-KNOWN RESERVA-
TIONS ABOUT THE WHOLE IDEA BEHIND THE TRUDEAU MISSION UNQUOTE.



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08.6.1-Trudeau Peace

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TO/À TO PMDEL/MSCAT/SHENSTONE

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REF ---PM INITIATIVE/INTERNATL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOC (IPSA)

SUBJ/SUJ HAVE RECEIVED FOLLOWING LET TO YOU FM JOHN E TRENT, SEC GEN OF
IPSA:

2.QUOTE (COM CENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED BEGINNING QUOTE AS A
FOLLOW-UP...UNQUOTE AND ENDING QUOTE...TO HEAR FROM YOU UNQUOTE.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG M.R. Meadows/gd

IFB

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SIG M.R. MEADOWS



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FRANCESCO KJELLBERG

Institute of Political Science
University of Oslo
Box 1097, Blindern
Oslo 3, Norway

Tel: 02-466800

November 28, 1983

Mr. Michael Shenstone
Dept of External Affairs
Lester B. Pearson Bldg
125 Sussex Dr, Ottawa
K1A 0G2

Dear Michael:

As a follow-up to our telephone conversation, I am writing to confirm that the International Political Science Association would be willing to consider some form of collaboration with Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative to create a better climate for East-West negotiations, should this endeavor become a longer term undertaking. As you know, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to mobilize the international research community on a short term basis.

At its Executive Committee meeting on September 5th, prior to the announcement of Mr. Trudeau's undertaking, our Executive Committee had already agreed to investigate the possibility of a project to participate in the United Nations 1986 Year of Peace and also to see if we could help in some way to improve the negotiations and communications between the superpowers. The fact that a rather dubious, if not cynical, group of international scholars were willing to take this step is indicative of both the growing climate of fear and the thought that, given the current conditions, our Association might have something to offer.


With regard to East-West negotiations and communications, our first Vice-President, Dr. Georgii Shakhnazarov, a member of the foreign relations secretariat of the USSR Central Committee, led us to believe the Soviets would welcome this kind of initiative. Also, the leadership of the American Political Science Association is close to the Reagan administration. Jean Kirkpatrick is a political scientist whose husband was the Executive Director of the APSA for several decades. We will be holding a World Congress in the States in 1988, so you can see we are thinking about the long term.

Our thoughts have by no means crystalized at this point. However, some preliminary discussions have led us to conclude that we should operate at two levels, one to increase public knowledge and, the other, to increase face-to-face communications, in propitious, non-conflictual circumstances, between high level decision-makers and analysts from East and West. We thought that the latest developments in social science research could help to improve the nature of such meetings. We also thought that Canada,

probably twinned with a Socialist and an other non-aligned country could provide ideas, resources and the forum for a continuing series of such meetings. However, as I said, this is all very preliminary.

We will be continuing our thinking about specific possibilities and if your Task Force wishes to have further discussions, we would be pleased to hear from you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'John E. Trent', written over the typed name.

John E. Trent
Secretary-General



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---PM INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH USA AND UK

WE HAVE YOUR CONCERNS IN MIND AND PLAN TO DISTILL WHAT CAN BE PASSED
ON ~~FOR~~ ^{FROM} PM S VISITS, BUT WE PREFER TO AWAIT PEARSON S RETURN BEFORE
SENDING OUT GUIDANCE TO YOU.

28-6-1-Hudson Peace Mission

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L.A. DELVOIE



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SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE

PM S MONTL SPEECH ALREADY EN ROUTE TO YOU BY BAG.

2.WE NOTE YR WISH TO BE KEPT IN PICTURE.

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

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for 85EA/Hare Pilot

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PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

11 déc.

ISSUE

The purpose of this brief is to discuss the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. The PM is interested in seeing if by opening lines of communication to Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) MBFR - a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative, but not pursued personally by the PM with other governments, are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

- 2 -

Results of the PM's consultations with other governments to-date may be roughly summarized:

European allies have given encouraging support. The Europeans share his analysis of the dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.

The French were generally supportive, with reservations as to timing. Their statements on the five power conference have been contradictory. The Germans were positive and generally supportive (and have subsequently endorsed the five power conference idea). The British were generally supportive of the broad purpose, but have reservations about specific proposals (especially the five power conference). The Dutch and Belgians reacted very positively, with some reservations as to timing (they think such an initiative may be most needed in the spring of 1984 once INF deployment has taken place). The Italians were generally supportive and have publicly endorsed the idea of a five power conference. (Also, we have had very positive and fully supportive written responses from the Danes and Norwegians and a very positive reaction from the Spaniards.)

Our High Commission in London will have briefed the FCO on the visits to Japan, CHOGM, China and the Soviet Union.

PM Nakasone of Japan was very receptive and fully supportive when the PM visited Tokyo on November 19.

Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed PM Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security.

The Chinese are mildly supportive of the broad political purpose, but do not support the call for a five power conference or the NPT. They argue that the first priority is concentrating pressure on the superpowers to reduce their arms.

- 3 -

The Soviets are interested, but cautious and non-committal. They claim to have had sad experiences with high-level contact with the US, hence they were "reserved" about the idea of the higher level of contact the better. While they appreciated the PM's view on the importance of discussions of intentions and goals, they claimed that Washington, in deploying new missiles was acting on a different basis. They are non-committal on a five power conference and reserved judgement on high-level presence at CDE and MBFR. The Soviets said what was lacking in the superpower relationship was "the will to work for mutually-acceptable solutions".

Next Steps being considered, beyond the DPM/SSEA's proposals to NAC on MBFR and CDE, are a visit by the PM to Washington, likely before Christmas, and a possible subsequent visit to Moscow.

BRITISH POSITION

Mrs. Thatcher agrees generally with the PM's analysis of the need for high-level political initiative and she has recently publicly called for "sensible and pragmatic dialogue" between East and West. But they have serious reservations on specific proposals, especially on a five power nuclear conference.

Foreign Secretary Howe at the U.N. General Assembly said "if Soviet and US strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced and if no significant changes had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would want to review her position and consider how best she could contribute to arms control in light of reduced threat". Mrs. Thatcher stressed to the PM the need for modernization of the British strategic force.

TALKING POINTS

- The PM's starting point is that the initiative in no way cuts across Canada's commitment to Alliance, NATO's "two-track" decision of 1979 and our decision to permit testing of the cruise.
- It is not intended in any way to interfere in the START negotiations or the INF problem.
- We are glad that the British largely share our analysis of the prevailing dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for high-level political initiative and genuine dialogue with the East.
- The PM wants to see, with certain Western European allies such as the UK, if by opening lines of communication with Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.
- He will most likely visit Washington before Christmas and is considering a possible subsequent visit to Moscow.
- We believe that the specific measures proposed by the PM have merit and progress on any of them would contribute to improving East-West dialogue. But the initiative is primarily a political enterprise; it does not stand or fall on the acceptability of any one specific proposal.
- The Prime Minister's proposal on a five-power conference envisages setting limits only after a START agreement and after British and French modernization. First phase, following model of SALT I, would have as its objective setting limits; question of reductions would only arise at subsequent and much later stage.

- 2 -

- Proposal envisages state-to-state rather than bloc-to-bloc negotiations. Aggregation of British and French forces with those of United States is not implied. Indeed, proposal if accepted would erase any prospect of aggregation.
- While the Prime Minister has suggested that these negotiations begin as soon as possible during course of next year, it is not intended that such talks occur without adequate preparation at lower levels, or that such talks should take place precipitously.
- Our impressions of the "neutral" Soviet response were:
 - (a) The visit of Mr. Trudeau's emissary occurred the day after Andropov's statement of November 24 on INF. Although Gromyko and Kornienko said they had read the PMS statements and followed his actions closely their "neutral" response to his proposals may be due to a "policy review" which they hinted may be underway on INF, the results of which are not yet clear. It may be they will harden their response if they draw the conclusion that their message has not "registered" in the West.
 - (b) Uncertainty over Andropov's health overshadows all their decisions; one Soviet interlocutor told us Andropov's illness was "painful", but not serious and that he was only able to do business by telephone. It was suggested that he might be able to return to work in a minimum role sometime after December 20.
 - (c) They would welcome a Trudeau visit, but timing is a problem (due to Andropov's health). Gromyko appeared to be almost pleading that we not press them immediately to set a date; sometime early in January may be possible.

- 3 -

- (d) They will not want to do anything to improve the chances of President Reagan's re-election;
- (e) They do not think it possible to have a rational relationship with the US when the US views them as the concentration of evil. The Soviets will view the PM's initiative through the "prism" of this American attitude to them.
- (f) They did not threaten to pull out of any other negotiations although on START Kornienko said INF deployment has changed the strategic situation because the missiles in Europe which reach the USSR are the same missiles based in the USA, from the Soviet point of view.



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5 Departure Date/Date de départ Fm WSHDC: Dec. 01, 1983		6 Returning Date/Date de retour Fm OTTAWA: Dec 03, 1983.	
8 Travel Advance/Avance de voyage No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Non <input type="checkbox"/> Oui <input type="checkbox"/>		9 Taking Classified Papers Emporte des documents classifiés <input type="checkbox"/> ZSS	
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12 Purpose of Travel/Objet du voyage
Temporary duty on PM Task Force (IDDZ)
(ALL RESERVATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AND TICKET ISSUED BY EMB.WSHDC)

13 City and Country/Ville et pays WSHDC TO OTTAWA (Via Eastern Air Lines)		14 Dates Dec. 01, 83		15 Additional Information/Renseignements supplémentaires (circle ONE in each Category) (Dans i, ii et iii, encirclez la réponse appropriée.) (i) Type of Travel: Insp (RIP only) i) But du voyage: Insp. (RIP seulement) Liaison/Liaison Conf/Conf. Training/Formation Other/Autre (ii) ADMship PFZ PTD PFG ii) SMA PFC PUA PTE PTT PUM PUR	
OTTAWA TO WSHDC (Via Eastern Air Lines)		Dec. 03, 83		Training/Formation	
Certified as required by Sec. 25 (1) of the F.A. Act. Certifié conformément au para. 25 (1) de la loi sur l'admin. fin.				(iii) Overtime/Leave Implications iii) Répercussions en termes d'heures suppl./de congés YES NO OUI NON	
Nov. 30, 1983		Nov. 30, 1983.		(iv) Estimated Total Cost iv) Coût total prévu \$ 450	

16 For Deputy Head - chef adjoint
John McNee
Nov. 30, 1983
Date
Originator/Source
17 Approved and Certified that Funds are available and have been committed within the budget of the Bureau or Division concerned.
Approuvé: certifié en outre que des fonds sont disponibles et ont été engagés dans le cadre du budget du bureau ou de la direction en cause.
Nov. 30, 1983.
Date
ADM or A/USSEA/SMA ou SSEAE/S
(M. PERRON)

19 FE/CF Nov. 30, 1983 Date Recommended by Recommandée par L.A. Delyoie		Coding/Codage 014-825-825-034-0902 (Exp.) 0920 (ADM)	
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ME
18

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DE ATHNS ZFGR5797 01DEC83

A EXTOTT IDDZ LIVRAISON 010900

28-12-1-*Trudeau Peace Mission*

INFO LDN WSHC BONN ANKRA COPEN DUBLN OSLO HAGUE TOKYO PEKING PRMNY
CNGNY MOSCO DELHI BRU VIENN VMBFR PARIS LSBON MDRID ROME BGRAD PUCST
WSAW BNATO CANMILREPNATO GENEV PCOOTT/FOWLER PMDEL/KWAIT
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD


DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB UGB RSD RCD IDD IDR IDA FPR URR

REF NOTRETEL 5750 16NOV

---INITIATIVE PM:REPONSE PAPANDREOU

VOUS AUREZ SANS DOUTE EU CONNAISSANCE DE LA REPONSE, EN DATE DU
28NOV, DU PM PAPANDREOU AU PM TRUDEAU, TRANSMISE PAR LES SOINS
D AMB DE GRECE A OTT. MEDIA LUI ONT FAIT ICI UNE PLACE HONORABLE,
NOTAMMENT CHAINE ERT-2 AUX NOUVELLES TELEVISEES 30NOV PM ET DANS
DEUX QUOTIDIENS DE CE MATIN. CES REPORTAGES NE FONT ETAT NI DE
CONFIRMATION D APPUI DE PAPANDREOU AUX DEUX PROPOSITIONS PRECISES
DANS LETTRE 16NOV NI DE DESACCORD, EXPLICITE ET PREVISIBLE, DANS
REPONSE DE PAPANDREOU, AVEC LETTRE DU 25OCT SUR QUESTION DOUBLE
DECISION DE L OTAN. Y APPARAISSENT EN EVIDENCE LA COMMUNAUTE
D ANALYSE ET DE PREOCCUPATION VIS-A-VIS DETERIORATION DES RELATIONS
EST-OUEST; L AVIS DE PAPANDREOU QUE LE DEPLOIEMENT DES EURO-MISSILES
CREE UNE SITUATION QUALITATIVEMENT ET DANGEREUSEMENT D UN TOUT AUTRE
ORDRE; ENFIN L ASSURANCE DE L APPUI DE PAPANDREOU POUR EFFORTS DU PM
EN VUE DE RETABLIR CLIMAT DE CONFIANCE ET DETENTE.

CCC/216 011205Z ZFGR5797



C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDR4627 01DEC83

TO BNATO BONN DELIVER BY 020900

INFO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/DIPOL/DCPOL PCOOTT/CARON

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RGB RCD RCR/IDDZ FPR IDA

REF OURTEL 4530 29NOV

---NATO MINISTERIAL:SSEA/GENSCHER BILATERAL

WE DISCUSSED THIS WITH DPM/SSEA TODAY DURING PRE-NAC BRIEFING AND HE AGREES IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE BILATERAL WITH GENSCHER FOCUS-
SING ON EAST/WEST ISSUES.

2.MR.MACEACHEN WOULD LIKE TO INVITE GENSCHER TO BREAKFAST IN HIS SUITE AT AMIGO HOTEL COMMENCING EITHER 08:15 OR 08:30 HRS 08DEC. GRATEFUL YOU FOLLOW UP WITH YOUR CONTACTS TO SEE IF ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE PUT IN PLACE.

3.WE ARE THINKING OF TWO OR THREE OFFICIALS ACCOMPANYING EACH MIN. CDN SIDE WOULD INCLUDE DELVOIE AND EITHER AMB TAYLOR OR DUDOIT OR BOTH,IF GERMANS CAN ACCEPT THREE.WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE INDICATION IF THIS IS ACCEPTABLE,IF POSSIBLE BY 020900 OTT TIME.IF NOT/NOT, YOU CAN DISCUSS WITH SSEAS PARTY ON ARRIVAL 05 DEC.

CCC/003 012338Z IDR4627

003/1

28-6-1 - Bureau
Peace
mission

UNCLASSIFIED

CHCGO YFFC3050 01DEC83

EXTOTT 1DDZ/COSSAGE

WSHDC/PUBLIC AFFAIRS

URR UGP SCS SCD

PER PHONE REQUEST FROM EMBASSY

PEACE INITIATIVE COVERAGE

HEREWITH COPY OF CHCGO TRIBUNE COVERAGE OF DPM/SSEA'S CHCGO SPEECH.

2. EDITORIAL CHCGO TRIBUNE 24NOV83 ENTITLED QUOTE CRITICAL NUCLEAR
TIMES UNQUOTE.

3. FOREIGN NEWS ITEM ON PM'S VISIT TO CHINA WITH INFO OBTAINED AT
DPM/SSEA'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN CHCGO 29NOV83 APPEARED IN ONE EDITION
ONLY AND WILL BE OBTAINED.

4. AP, UP1 AND REUTERS ALSO FILED REPTS ON PM'S PEACE INITIATIVE
BASED ON DPM/SSEA PRESS CONFERENCE HERE.

E.W. Hornby

Public Affairs

(312)
427-1031

EWH
E.W. Hornby

Critical nuclear times

2/3

11/24/83

idea - 11/24/83

With British and West German parliamentary approval of the first deployment of American cruise and intermediate range Pershing 2 missiles in Europe having resulted in a Soviet walkout from the arms control talks in Geneva, tensions have never been higher over the issue of nuclear arms.

The 266 226 West German Bundestag vote Tuesday in favor of the Pershings was decisive and dangerously divided, with former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's Social Democrats abandoning him to turn almost en masse against deployment. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is resolute in pressing ahead with deployment but is taking enormous abuse from leftists in her parliament. Mass protest demonstrations in both countries and in Italy continue. The Soviets can only be encouraged—in both their intransigence and their support of the diverse Western European peace movements.

The United States, which a year ago was being roundly criticized for inflexibility, has taken the initiative and continues to offer reasonable compromises and arms reduction plans. But its latest offer, calling for both sides to reduce their European nuclear missile arsenals to a maximum of 420 warheads—a substantial reduction from what is now being put in place—was rejected by the Russians after only 6 minutes of "deliberation."

The Soviets appear to be caught in a paralysis of policy. This is in large part because of the illness and lengthy incapacitation of President Yuri Andropov. It also stems from the fact that the Soviets' overriding interest from the beginning has been in maintaining

Soviet nuclear superiority in Europe, not in arms control or reduction, no matter what vague promises they make to Europeans.

Deployment must now inevitably proceed. It will prompt some dramatic Soviet counter-measures, both in Eastern Europe and the Atlantic. The West is going to go through a tense and dangerous time. The Soviets likely will not be able to resume useful negotiations until they become convinced of the West's seriousness and improve their own moribund internal political situation.

Into this tense situation steps Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who proposes a conference of the world's five major nuclear powers next year aimed at reducing their nuclear arsenals. He claims support for the idea from Brussels, the Hague, Bonn, Paris, London and Rome.

With feelings running as high as they are now, obviously no European leader would publicly come out against such an effort, but it's a monumentally unworkable idea. Britain has indicated that it might be interested in throwing its few submarine missiles into the negotiating pot, but the independence of France's nuclear force, which includes land-based missiles, is a longstanding tenet of French national policy. China's strategic needs are so different and its nuclear force is so overwhelmed by the Soviets' that it could not participate very usefully in Mr. Trudeau's talks.

No breakthrough can come without hard bargaining between the two superpowers. Putting three more chairs at the table will only complicate that.

ORIGINAL AS IS

Ed

3/3

CHICAGO TRIBUNE 30NOV83

Foreign trade

Canadian official warns against trade protection

By Vincent J. Schodolski

ALLAN C. MacEachen, Canada's deputy prime minister and secretary of state for external affairs, cautioned Monday against protectionist sentiments, which he said could harm trade between the U.S. and Canada.

In remarks to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, MacEachen praised the Reagan administration's continued opposition to protectionism but said action by Congress to limit imports could not be ruled out.

"To its credit, your administration has stuck to its antiprotectionist guns, but Congress does not always supply compatible ammunition," he said.

"We must remain wary of protectionist impulses, which could precipitate a slide towards 'beggar thy neighbor' protectionism internationally, from which there can be no winner."

MacEachen described the state of U.S.-Canada relations as "in pretty good shape" and emphasized the importance of trade and investment between the two countries.

However, he said Canada "long ago learned that when the interests

of a foreign country are up in Congress against the constituency imperatives of a small group, or even one member, the foreign country, even your best friend and neighbor, is at a disadvantage."

Talking to reporters before his address, MacEachen said Canada was particularly concerned about U.S. limitations on imports of specialty steel, cement, fish and potatoes from Canada.

"There have been efforts in these areas to protect American markets from Canadian exports," he said. "I think we will continue to have them."

THE CANADIAN steel industry, which concentrated efforts on producing specialty steels, has been hit by the double blows of slumping demand and declining prices.

MacEachen said he was pleased with the cooperation the U.S. has shown in negotiations on reducing the threat of acid rain but he said Washington still had not taken the kind of action Canada had hoped for.

"Canada is ready," he said, "but we can't do it alone. Unless there is cooperation from the United States, we will still have an acid rain problem."

28-6-1 - Trudeau Place
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2485 01DEC83

TO EXTOTT RSR

INFO BNATO MOSCO PMDELKWAIT PRMNY PEKIN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN
ROME HAGUE BONN PARIS LDN BRU NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD
DISTR IDDZ URR RBR IDA UGB MINA USS DMF IFB RGB IDD IDR URR
---PMS INITIATIVE:LET FROM LUXEMBOURG PM

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LET RECEIVED AT EMB FROM LUXEMBOURG PM WERNER TO
PM TRUDEAU IN RESPONSE TO PMS LET OF 24OCT.ORIGINAL TO YOU BY BAG.
LET AS YOU WILL NOTE IS VERY SUPPORTIVE OF THE INITIATIVE BUT DOES
NOT/NOT GO INTO SPECIFICS.

TEXT BEGINS

QUOTE

MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE,

J AI L HONNEUR D ACCUSER RECEPTION DE VOTRE LETTRE DU 24OCT PAR
LAQUELLE VOUS AVEZ BIEN VOULU ME FAIRE PART DE VOS PREOCCUPATIONS
CONCERNANT LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST AINSI QUE DE VOS SUGGESTIONS POUR
REMEDIER A CETTE SITUATION.

JE PARTAGE ENTIEREMENT VOS SOUCIS SUR L ETAT INSATISFAISANT DES
RELATIONS ENTRE LES DEUX BLOCS AINSI QUE VOS DESIRS DE CHANGER CE
CLIMAT MALSAIN.EVIDEMENT,COMME VOUS L AVEZ REMARQUE VOUS-MEME.L ETAT
DE SANTE DE MONSIEUR ANDROPOV ET,PAR CONSEQUENT,SON EVENTUELLE INA-
BILITE DE CONTROLER COMPLETEMENT LES DECISIONS POLITIQUES NE NOUS
FACILITERONT PAS/PAS LA TACHE DE RETABLIR UN DIALOGUE POLITIQUE DE
HAUT NIVEAU.CE DIALOGUE DEVIENDRAIT,CEPENDANT,D AUTANT PLUS PRESSANT
SI LES NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE DEVAIENT ECHOUER.POUR LE MOMENT,TOUTE-

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2485 CONF

FOIS, L'ESPOIR RESTE QUE DE NOUVELLES PROPOSITIONS AMERICAINES POUR-
RAIENT QUELQUES PEU DEBLOQUER LA SITUATION A LA DERNIERE MINUTE.

DANS CE CONTEXTE, J'AIMERAIS SOULIGNER L'APPUI INCONDITIONNEL QUE LE
LUXEMBOURG DONNE A LA DOUBLE DECISION DE L'OTAN AU SUJET DES FNI. JE
SUIS CONVAINCU DE LA NECESSITE DU DEPLOIEMENT CONFORMEMENT AU CALEN-
DRIER PREVU, CAR TOUT REPORT DES PREMIERS DEPLOIEMENTS RISQUERAIT DE
FAIRE CROIRE A L'UNION SOVIETIQUE QU'UN NON-DEPLOIEMENT SERAIT POS-
SIBLE A OBTENIR SANS CONTRE-PARTIE DE SON COTE.

CETTE DERNIERE REFLEXION ME SEMBLE AVOIR AUSSI UNE PORTEE SUR LE
TROISIEME ELEMENT DE VOS REFLEXIONS, C'EST-A-DIRE LE FAIT QUE LA
CONFIANCE DES UNS VIS-A-VIS DES AUTRES A SUBI UN NET REcul. IL EST
DONC D'UNE IMPORTANCE PRIMORDIALE QUE L'UNION SOVIETIQUE SE RENDE
BIEN COMPTE QUE LES DECISIONS DE L'OTAN NE SONT PAS/PAS DES PAROLES
EN L'AIR, INFLUENCABLES-VOIR MEME REVERSIBLES-PAR UNE HABILE MANIPU-
LATION D'UNE PARTIE DE L'OPINION PUBLIQUE DANS NOS PAYS, QUI SE SOUCIE
A TRES JUSTE TITRE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX ENTRE LES DEUX BLOCS. CETTE
FERMETE DOIT DONC, ELLE AUSSI, CONTRIBUER A CE QUE L'EST NE SE MEPRENNE
PAS/PAS SUR NOS VERITABLES INTENTIONS.

TOUTEFOIS, NOTRE OBJECTIF PRIMORDIAL EST, ET RESTERA, LE DESARMEMENT. A
CONDITION QU'IL ABOUTISSE A UNE REDUCTION EQUILIBREE ET VERIFIABLE
DES ARMES, QU'ELLES SOIENT NUCLEAIRES-STRATEGIQUES OU A PORTEE INTER-
MEDIAIRE-OU CONVENTIONNELLES. CONVAINCRE L'URSS ET SES ALLIES DE LA
SINCERITE DE CET OBJECTIF DOIT ALLER DE PAIR AVEC NOTRE RESOLUTION DE
RESTER FERME ET PARTANT CREDIBLES.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2485 CONFD

CECI M AMENE A UNE REFLEXION QUANT AU TON QUI CARACTERISE RECEMMENT LES PRISES DE POSITION DE PART ET D AUTRE DANS LA CONFRONTATION DES DEUX SUPERGRANDS ET J AIMERAIS CITER UNE PHRASE DU DISCOURS PRONONCE LE 20OCT PAR NOTRE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES,MADAME COLETTE FLESCH DEVANT LA CHAMBRE DES DEPUTES:CIT SANS ILLUSIONS QUANT A L INTENTION AVOUEE DE L UNION SOVIETIQUE DE FAIRE TRIOMPHER LE MARXISME-LENINISME DANS TOUS LES PAYS DU MONDE,NOUS DEVONS CEPENDANT DE NOTRE COTE AUSSI,EVITER CE QUI POURRAIT RESSEMBLER A L ESPRIT DE CROISSADE FINCIT.EN EFFET,IL ME PARAIT ABSOLUMENT IMPERATIF DE VEUILLER A CE QUE,DE PART ET D AUTRE,LE NIVEAU DES COMMUNICATIONS SOIT RAMENE D UN TON DE PROPAGANDE EXCESSIF A UN MODE PLUS SOBRE DE FORMULATION AFIN QUE LE DIALOGUE POLITIQUE PUISSE ETRE REPRIS.

JE VOUS FELICITE DONC,MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE,DE L INITIATIVE QUE VOUS VENEZ DE PRENDRE ET JE VOUS SOUHAITE QUE VOS PROPOSITIONS PUISSENT RENCONTRER L APPUI LE PLUS LARGE POSSIBLE.

JE NE PEUX QUE SOUSCRIRE ENTIEREMENT A VOTRE DESIR DE VOIR,A UNE ECHELLE GLOBALE,UNE LIMITE AUX ARMES NUCLEAIRES STRATEGIQUES ET MEME, DE PREFERENCE,LEUR REDUCTION.DE MEME,LE LUXEMBOURG A TOUJOURS APPUYE TOUT EFFORT VISANT A CONTENIR LA PROLIFERATION LATERALE DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES.

EN CE QUI CONCERNE LES NEGOCIATIONS MBFR,NOTRE PAYS Y PREND UNE PART ACTIVE EN DEBIT DE L IMPORTANCE REDUITE DE SES FORCES MILITAIRES.LES QUELQUES PROGRES,POUR LIMITES QU ILS SOIENT,QUI ONT PU ETRE ENREGISTRES RECEMMENT A VIENNE M INCITENT A NE PAS/PAS PERDRE TOUT ESPOIR

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR2485 CONF

POUR UN ABOUTISSEMENT DE CES NEGOCIATIONS. EN TOUT CAS, JE NE MANQUERAI PAS/PAS D INFORMER NOTRE DELEGATION A VIENNE DE VOS IDEES DANS CE DOMAINE.

FINALEMENT, IL RESTE A TROUVER UN MOYEN POUR SORTIR D UNE SITUATION QUI POURRAIT S AVERER ETRE UNE IMPASSE, QUE POURRAIT CONSTITUER LA REDOUTEE MAINMISE PLUS MARQUEE DES MILITAIRES SUR L APPAREIL SOVIETIQUE. JE SUIS D AVIS QUE LA PERIODE ACTUELLE DEVRAIT ETRE CELLE OU LES BASES POUR UN RENOUVELLEMENT DU DIALOGUE A HAUT NIVEAU DOIVENT ETRE CREEES, AFIN QUE CE DIALOGUE PUISSE SE POURSUIVRE DANS UN CLIMAT PLUS DETENDU, UNE FOIS QUE LA DIRECTION SOVIETIQUE PRESENTERA DE NOUVEAU UN VISAGE PLUS CLAIR ET DEFINI AU MONDE.

DANS CETTE OPTIQUE, JE PENSE QU IL EST NECESSAIRE DE PRESENTER AUX PAYS DE L EST UNE POSITION DE FERMETE ET DE RESOLUTION, MAIS AUSSI D EVITER TOUT EXCES DE FORMULATION QUI POURRAIT METTRE EN DOUTE NOS INTENTIONS ET ASPIRATIONS LES PLUS PROFONDES QUE SONT LE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX DANS LA LIBERTE ET LE DESARMEMENT LE PLUS COMPLET POSSIBLE.

TOUT EN VOUS REMERCIANT DE M AVOIR PROCURE CETTE OPPORTUNITE D EVOQUER QUELQUES CONSIDERATIONS SUR CES IMPORTANTS SUJETS, JE VOUS PRIE DE BIEN VOULOIR AGREER, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, L ASSURANCE DE MA TPES HAUTE CONSIDERATION ET DE MES SENTIEMENTS CORDIAUX.

PIERRE WERNER

PRESIDENT DU GOUVERNEMENT UNQUOTE

TEXT ENDS

CCC/086 012316Z UNGR2485

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

send to IDDZ

2/12/83

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

S E C R E T ENTRE CDNS SEULEMENT

DE ANKRA ZEGR1709 01DEC83

A EXTOTT IDD

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER DELHI LDN BONN WSHDC PEKIN MOSCO BRU VMBFR PARIS

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RSD RSR IDA IDR

---PROGRAMME DE PAIX DU PM-REACTION TURQUE

MAINTENANT QU ELECTIONS SONT PASSEES ET CHYPRE RALENTIT UN PEU, J AI
PU DISCUTER AVEC MINISTRE DES AFF ETRANGERES INITIATIVE DU PM.SA
REACTION A ETE TRES POSITIVE.

2.IL PARTAGEAIT SANS RESERVE ANALYSE DU PM.NS ETIONSSELON LUI EN
PRESENCE DU PIRE VIDE POLITIQUE ENTRE GRANDES PUISSANCES JAMAIS
RECONTRE.(PUISSANCES MOYENNES SE MEFAIENT AUSSI DU TROP BON DIALOGUE
ENTRE SUPER PUISSANCES MAIS LA N ETAIT PAS NOTRE PROBLEME
ACTUELLEMENT).QUELQU UN DEVAIT DONC PRENDRE L INITIATIVE.IL FALLAIT
DU COURAGE ET TRUDEAU L A EU.DANS CE GENRE D ENTREPRISE.RESULTAT NE
PEUT EVIDEMMENT ETRE IMMEDIAT.OFF THE RECORD,MINISTR SE DEMANDAIT
AUSSI SI JALOUSIES PERSONNELLES DES VIS-A-VIS DU PM EN EUROPE DE L
OUEST NE REISQUAIENT PAS D ENTRAVER LE MOUVEMENT.

3.TURQUIE N AVAIT POUR SA PART AUCUNE HESITATIONS A APPUYER EFFORT DU
CDA.MINISTRE A DONNE INSTRUCTION POUR QUE PORTE-PAROLE DES AFF
ETRANGERES REPONDE A TOUTE QUESTION,SPONTANEE OU PROVOQUEE,EN
CE SENS

MATHIEU

CCC/244 011309Z ZEGR1709

M.F.

CANADIAN
HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

LDN 5/6 MESSAGE

INFO

1/12

83 DEC -1 16:34

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY SECURITY

FM LDN XNFC1556 1DEC83

DELIVER BY 011600

BH
TO PHOOTT/GOSSAGE

PCOOTT/FOWLER DE OTT

INFO EXTOTT/100Z

DISTR MINA DMF IFB RBD RBR IDA IDR ZSI UGB URR RCR

---PRESS COVERAGE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE - PM'S INITIATIVE

PLEASE TRANSMIT ATTACHED DOCUMENTS VIA FACSIMILE

28-6-1-1 Bureau Peace
mission

[Signature]

2112

SUMMIT MEETING: It was REP that the Canadian PM, Pierre Trudeau, has called for a summit conference of the world's nuclear powers.

NEWS

NETWORKED REGIONALLY

RAD 4

2200-2215

13.11.83.

AN

COMMONWEALTH DECLARATION: JOHN SIMPSON REPS on the declaration on arms talks made by the Commonwealth leaders in Goa. He said the Canadian PM is en route to China to initiate peace talks.

NEWS

BBC TV 1

2210-2225

27.11.83.

CAN

COMMONWEALTH DECLARATION: It was REP that the Commonwealth leaders meeting in Goa have issued a declaration calling for East-West arms talks. It was said that the Canadian PM, Pierre Trudeau, is to make a 1 man peace mission to Peking tonight.

NEWS

ITV

2145-2200

27.11.83.

CAN

ARMS TALKS DECLARATION: It was REP that the Commonwealth leaders have issued a declaration on international security and details were REP of Pierre Trudeau's 'New International Dimension'.

NEWS

NETWORKED REGIONALLY

RAD 4

1800-1815

27.11.83.

CAN

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DECLARATION: JOHN OSMAN REPS on the declaration by Commonwealth leaders in Goa on international security. He said the declaration welcome the call from Canada for a new political dimension in the quest for international security.

NEWS

NETWORKED REGIONALLY

RAD 4

2200-2215

27.11.83.

3/12

The Guardian
24 Nov 83

Trudeau pledge plan

New Delhi: Commonwealth government leaders yesterday considered sending special emissaries to Washington and Moscow to express rising concern over super power tensions.

The Canadian Prime Minister, Mr Trudeau, who has described East-West relations as "dangerously confrontational," urged the 48-country Commonwealth summit to launch a new effort for peace.

Mr Trudeau proposed that nuclear countries should freeze their arsenals or accept a weapons ceiling, and called for a worldwide pledge by other countries to renounce the acquisition of nuclear arms. President Kaunda, of Zambia, said that a group of Commonwealth leaders should go to the

United States and the Soviet Union soon, to urge fresh efforts for dialogue and arms control. No decision is likely until the end of the seven-day meeting. "The discussion was marked by very deep concern and unease about the state of the world, the arms race, increased East-West tensions, nuclear proliferation, and aggression in the international system," the Commonwealth spokesman, Mr Charles Gunawardena, said.

Mr Trudeau also proposed a meeting of the five nuclear powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China. But Mrs Thatcher questioned whether such a meeting was timely, and said that any such talks would require careful preparation.

paintings look like ?).

Karsh's pleasure in life, on the contrary, lies in photographing the great. Eminence is enough; from Churchill to Castro he is in awe of them, and his photographs are very well designed to show their greatness as inviolable. Did he never photograph Richard Nixon? For Karsh, Camelot has survived Jack Kennedy. Even Ronald Reagan comes across as a prodigy of industry:

"The day I photographed the President," Karsh tells us, "he had accepted the resignation of Richard Allen as national security adviser, sworn in William Clark as his successor, and spent a two-hour working lunch with German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt — and still had enough resiliency to tell me two humorous anecdotes ..." Gee, Younsuf, no kidding?

Snowden

Hard details intrude on Commonwealth unity

By DAVID ADAMSON in New Delhi

THE opening day of the Commonwealth Summit yesterday was notable mainly as a demonstration of how difficult it is to get 47 states from practically every walk of political and economic life to agree on any step of practical importance.

Harmony resounded everywhere when it came to the broad, general matters, such as the need for nuclear disarmament and a Namibian settlement, but it was not long before the specifics began to cause discordant noises.

The major victim of these intrusions was the conference's hostess Mrs Gandhi, whose conception of a new world economic order put her on collision course with Mrs Thatcher, who has her own frequently-stated views.

Namibia hopes

But it was in her choice of Namibia as the central theme of the meeting that Mrs Gandhi experienced her major setback at the hands of political realists.

"I am sure this meeting would wish to give Namibia the central place that Zimbabwe was accorded in Lusaka (in 1979). That Summit was decisive in laying the basis for the transition to Zimbabwe's independence, so, let us hope, the New Delhi conference will be for Namibia, she said.

By the end of the day it was clear that there was little the conference could do to resolve a problem in which none of the most-directly concerned parties is a member of the Commonwealth.

Mrs Gandhi gave her endorsement to a Commonwealth study entitled "Towards a new Bretton Woods," which calls for an international conference on the reform of the world's financial and trading system.

Trudeau plan

That was promptly scotched by Mrs Thatcher in her crisp address at the opening session.

It was tempting, she said, to think that, because of current problems, there should be some grand design, some magic formula which would transform the scene. No such solution existed, she declared flatly.

During the afternoon, the heads of government gathered in a closed session led by Mr Trudeau, the Canadian Prime Minister, who is promoting an initiative intended to pump new energy into the East-West dialogue.

His central idea is a gathering of the five nuclear weapon states to consider how to give the rest of the world a lead by limiting their own over-proliferating weapons.

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Daily Telegraph
24/11/83

ORIGINAL AS IS

Peace mission to halt arms race

From JOHN DICKIE
in New Delhi

THE COMMONWEALTH Summit is being urged to send a mission of four world leaders to Russia and the U.S. to urge an end to the arms race.

The proposal will be formally tabled at the conference in New Delhi by Zambia's President Kaunda.

He told me: 'It may be the only way to save the world from nuclear holocaust.'

President Kaunda is suggesting four leaders for this crucial mission — Indian Premier Indira Gandhi, Canada's Pierre Trudeau, Australia's Robert Hawke, and Nigerian President Sheshu Shagari.

His plan was revealed on the day Russia broke off talks in Geneva on scaling down medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Several Commonwealth leaders, including Mrs Thatcher, are sceptical about the effectiveness of any appeal to Moscow and Washington now.

They are worried the mission might be rebuffed at a time when Mr Reagan is preparing for the next presidential election and when Mr Andropov is struggling to assert his authority in the Kremlin.

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

But there is an undeniable bandwagon among the 15 heads of State, 19 heads of Government and others here for something dramatic to be done.

President Kaunda is proposing the four Commonwealth leaders should go to Washington and Moscow to appeal directly to the American and Soviet Presidents to have an urgent meeting on the arms crisis.

Mr Kaunda told me: 'The two super-power leaders should be brought together and left on their own to tackle the problem they have largely created.'

When I asked President Kaunda how the West could trust Andropov, even if he agreed to destroy some of his SS 20 missiles, he said: 'Trust is the essence of this business. To get them together requires the creation of trust on both sides.'

Whether President Reagan would be ready to take the Russians on trust without some form of on-site inspection of missile sites is another matter.

But there is a feeling in many Commonwealth delegations that if sufficient pressure is mounted from governments here representing one quarter of the world's population, it could be a force

Turn to Page 2, Col. 1

DATE: Sunday 12, 13, Diary 19

Mission

Continued from Page One

difficult to resist, either in Washington or Moscow.

To pave the way, Canadian Premier Pierre Trudeau has been canvassing several capitals for support in a bid to break the deadlock between the super-powers.

As host at yesterday's opening ceremony, Mrs Gandhi warned: 'Peace is in peril. The arms race is very nearly out of hand.'

'Today we are being asked to live with nuclear weapons merely because they are there. Is it because the pursuit of power is the only concern? Have we lost all sensitivity and concern for human values?'

Despite her initial doubts, Mrs Thatcher agreed that doing something is better than doing nothing.

She appealed from the restraint for fresh efforts to 'lower tension and remove misunderstandings' between East and West.

'Increased contact does not of itself guarantee results, much less quick results,' she said. 'But it can ward off the worst dangers, and for that reason is worth pursuing.'

Russians 'will be back'—Page

FOUR

Daily Mail
24 Nov 83

ORIGINAL AS IS

6/12

Financial Times

24 Nov 83

ORIGINAL AS IS

Robert Mauthner reports on the New Delhi Commonwealth summit

Thatcher rejects Gandhi proposal

MRS MARGARET THATCHER, the Prime Minister, and Mrs Indira Gandhi, the Indian Premier, were involved in an early disagreement over the working of the International Monetary System, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, which opened yesterday.

In her welcoming address to the leaders and delegates from 42 members of the Commonwealth, Mrs Gandhi went out of her way to underline what she claimed to be the deficiencies of the institutions created by the Bretton Woods Conference nearly 40 years ago.

There was now increasing recognition that these institutions were not adequately equipped to deal with today's complex problems, the Indian Prime Minister said.

She sincerely hoped that the

Commonwealth leaders would endorse the suggestion of the non-aligned summit early this year that a new conference on money and finance for develop-

Mr Pierre Trudeau, Canada's Prime Minister, yesterday sought the backing of the Commonwealth summit for a meeting of the world's five nuclear powers aimed at halting the arms race, AP reports from New Delhi.

ment should be called, with universal participation.

Th proposal for a new monetary conference, which had already led to disagreement between Britain and Australia, on the one hand, and the other member countries at a Commonwealth Finance Ministers' meeting in Trinidad last September, was immediately rejected by

Mrs Thatcher.

Replying to Mrs Gandhi's welcoming address, the Prime Minister dismissed the suggestion in two short sentences. "I do not believe that the creation of new international institutions will solve our difficulties," she said. "After all, we already have many that we did not have at the time of Bretton Woods."

Nor was it possible to revert to a fixed exchange rate system, because countries ran their economies in such different ways that fixed exchange rates would not stick, Mrs Thatcher said.

The Prime Minister conceded, however, that existing international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) could be further adapted and deve-



Mrs Thatcher

loped

There can be little doubt that the proposal for a fundamental overhaul of the international monetary system, first put forward by Mr Robert Muldoon, the New Zealand Prime Minister, has the support of most of the Commonwealth members apart from Britain and Australia.

ORIGINAL AS IS

Financial Times

28/11/85.

Commonwealth leaders support Trudeau on East-West relations

BY ROBERT MAUTHNER IN GOA

THE HEADS of government of 45 Commonwealth states yesterday adopted a declaration on international security essentially endorsing attempts by Mr Pierre Trudeau, Canada's Prime Minister, to step up political efforts to halt the nuclear arms race and improve East-West relations.

The document, to be known as the Goa Declaration, was approved at the end of a relaxed weekend of talks in the Indian coastal resort.

Between sight-seeing, swimming, tennis and windsurfing, the Commonwealth leaders devoted about 11 hours to talks on Cyprus, Grenada, international security problems—particularly those of small states—and international economic issues.

A final communique will be issued at the end of the con-

ference setting out its conclusions in more detail.

Yesterday's declaration calls on the Soviet Union and the U.S. to summon up the "political vision" to achieve world peace instead of conducting disarmament negotiations merely at a technical level.

Their first objective, the declaration states, should be to work for the resumption of a genuine political dialogue. Commonwealth governments could make a substantial political contribution to these efforts.

Mr Trudeau left the conference for Peking; on the latest stage of his round-the-world trip to drum up support for his plan, which includes the calling of a special conference of the five nuclear states—the U.S., Soviet Union, Britain, France and China.

The security declaration incorporates the proposal by Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister, for an urgent study on how the security of small states can be ensured.

However, there is no specific mention of Grenada.

It is thought that, given the refusal of the East Caribbean states to accept any condemnation of the U.S. for its military intervention in Grenada, the communique will skirt round the issue.

The Commonwealth leaders also set up a high-level group on Cyprus, made up of Australia, India, Nigeria, Zambia and Guyana. This has been mandated to work in close association with the UN to try to resolve the problem of the Turkish Cypriot community's independence declaration.

8/12

4 The Daily Telegraph, Monday, November 28, 1983

COMMONWEALTH URGES U.S. AND RUSSIA TO TALK

By DAVID ADAMSON Diplomatic Correspondent
in Panaji, Goa

COMMONWEALTH leaders called on the Soviet Union and the United States yesterday to work for the resumption of a "genuine political dialogue" that would ease tensions.

The "Goa Declaration on International Security" came at the end of an unusually hard-working weekend "retreat" for the leaders. They appealed to the Superpowers to "summon up a political vision of a world in which their nations can live in peace."

It was essential to any enlargement of East-West understanding that contacts should be increased at a variety of levels.

The Commonwealth leaders said they believed their governments could make a practical contribution by encouraging the Superpowers and by themselves promoting a larger measure of international understanding as existed at present.

British sources expressed satisfaction with the declaration, which they called a "major achievement."

Response to Trudeau

The document is largely a response to the initiative of the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Trudeau, to provide a new dimension of political will to East-West relations.

His efforts are welcomed, although his central proposal—a meeting of the five nuclear-weapon States—gets only an oblique commendation. The declaration talks of supporting his efforts to "restore active political contact and communication" between the five States.

The Commonwealth leaders' anxieties over the weakening role of the United Nations in international affairs are expressed in a paragraph pledging their support for the principles of the United Nations Charter: There is, in our view, an urgent need to consider what practical steps can be taken to strengthen the United Nations system and to improve its capacity to fulfil the objectives of the Charter.

The British delegation was particularly pleased by the

declaration's endorsement of Mrs Thatcher's proposal that there should be an urgent study of the security problems of small states in the light of what happened in Grenada.

The leaders said they were concerned over the vulnerability of small states to external attack and interference in their affairs.

Grenada statement

It is expected that the Commonwealth leaders will release a statement on Grenada following the renewal of the summit conference in Delhi today.

The statement is expected to say that the Caribbean countries are united in their willingness to provide a policing force to replace the Americans in Grenada if a future Government in the island requests it.

The draft avoids any condemnation of the Americans for their intervention and appears to end the rift between the Caribbean countries.

Other developments have included the setting-up of a Commonwealth group at Heads of Government level which will seek a solution to the Cyprus crisis. The leaders involved are Mr Hawke (Australia), Mr Forbes Burnham (Guyana), Mrs Gandhi (India), Mr Kaunda (Zambia) and Mr Shagari (Nigeria). They are to hold their first meeting today.

Mr Trudeau was due to fly to Peking last night for talks on his proposal for a meeting of the five nuclear weapons States (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China). He returns to Delhi tomorrow when he will see Mrs Gandhi, the conference chairman.

Editorial comment—P16

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19

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1983

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GOA'S IVORY TOWER

MOST PEOPLE, invited to Goa for a weekend, would no doubt make much of the sea and the sand. It cannot be the ideal place for very rapid serious thinking. Needless to say, the Commonwealth leaders have spent the past few days there, if not exactly thinking, then putting the world to rights on a scale unprecedented even for them. Surrounded by expensive luxury, it must be very easy in such a place to forget the limits of one's powers and to issue Caesarean exhortations to the world.

There is no obvious harm in urging Russia and America to resume "a genuine political dialogue." This declaration will no doubt have plunged men in Moscow and Washington into a mood of deep self-recrimination. It was ludicrously described by British sources as "a major achievement," and is seen as something of a triumph for that master practitioner of summitry, Mr TRUDEAU, who has sheered off to Peking for a couple of days. Equally, one does not suppose that much damage will be caused by the setting up of a Commonwealth group which will try to solve the crisis in Cyprus. The leaders of Australia, Guyana, India, Nigeria and Zambia will address themselves to this problem. Can they honestly expect to succeed? Other than their membership of the Commonwealth, these five countries have nothing whatsoever in common with Cyprus, and their leaders have the least possible chance imaginable of reversing the status quo.

Such, of course, is the stuff of many summits where meaningless communiqués must be ritually produced. The difference is that as a group the Commonwealth has no power (having no proper unity) and its declarations are consequently more than usually empty. This fact must surely be perceived by the rest of the world. One wonders, therefore, whether Britain's interests are best served by identifying ourselves with lofty projects which the Commonwealth is in no position to prosecute. The Commonwealth is a legacy of Empire and a *folie de grandeur* in which Britain, the old mother country, can apparently reassume something of her old swagger. The paradox is that we are probably taken more seriously when we speak alone, or in conjunction with united and properly powerful voices, than when we wrap ourselves in Commonwealth accommodations. If a weekend in Goa has taught Mrs THATCHER that, it would have served its purpose.

The Guardian
29 Nov 83

Trudeau out to end arms race deadlock

From Patrick Keatley,
in New Delhi

The Prime Minister of Canada, Mr Trudeau, caused surprise during the final stages of the Commonwealth summit here by an abrupt and unscheduled departure for China, taking with him policy initiatives intended to help to break the present deadlock in negotiations between the nuclear powers.

As the mission was unanimously endorsed by the Commonwealth prime ministers and presidents meeting in what was called their "weekend retreat" at the coastal resort of Goa, it is clear that Mrs Thatcher has been persuaded to swallow her

fears to a task force on "the vulnerability of small states" which is to make a study of immediate problems such as Cyprus and Grenada.

The Goa document embodies Mrs Thatcher's sentiments when it refers to the build-up of nuclear arsenals and the urgency of resuming "genuine political dialogue," and goes on to say that it is essential to the enlargement of understanding that there should be increased contacts at a variety of levels between East and West.

The document calls upon the superpowers to resume discussions, declaring: "We believe it to be imperative that the Soviet Union and the United States should summon up the political vision of a world in which their nations can live in peace." It gives broad backing to Mr Trudeau's plan to bring all five of the nuclear powers together for negotiations.

Mr Trudeau will return to New Delhi several hours after the final ceremony, but in time to make a personal report on his mission to Mrs Gandhi.

When Mr Trudeau sits down with the Chinese leaders in Peking this afternoon, he will be arguing the merits of his proposal that China and the other four nuclear powers assemble at summit level to agree on a new approach to arms control negotiations.

Italy rebuffs warning on
missiles, page 8.

well-known reservations about the whole idea behind the Trudeau mission.

It is believed that the Commonwealth Secretary-General Mr Shridath Ramphal, has blurred what is in fact a U-turn for Mrs Thatcher by wrapping up the Trudeau plan in a three-page document entitled the Goa Declaration on International Security. The document praises the Thatcher plans for practical steps to re-open dialogue with the Warsaw Pact.

The Goa Declaration also re-

ORIGINAL AS IS

Financial Times Wednesday November 30 1983

OVERSEAS NEWS

Commonwealth leaders condemn S. Africa

BY ROBERT CAUTIONER IN NEW DELHI

THE COMMONWEALTH heads of government yesterday ended their week-long conference in New Delhi with a strong condemnation of South Africa, an offer of aid to Grenada and a demand for a withdrawal of the Turkish-Cypriot community's unilateral declaration of independence.

The final communiqué reflected a compromise between the views of the Western members of the Commonwealth and the developing states on most of the major issues discussed.

This was particularly true for the problem of Grenada, on which there had been a sharp difference of views between the African countries and India, on the one hand, and the Eastern Caribbean countries and Britain.

The former wanted the communiqué strongly to condemn the U.S. invasion of Grenada, while the latter, who had supported the U.S. intervention, refused to subscribe to such a text.

In the event, the communiqué confined itself to stating that "the emphasis should now be on reconstruction, not recrimination." While not specifically calling for the withdrawal of

U.S. forces from the island, the communiqué did look forward to Grenada's existence "free of external interference."

It also welcomed the intention of the interim civilian administration in Grenada to hold, as early as possible, free and fair elections.

The Commonwealth leaders, who noted the willingness of the Caribbean community to assist in the maintenance of law and order in Grenada if requested to do so, also expressed their readiness to provide assistance.

Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, professed herself well pleased that some of the more strident African calls for a condemnation of the U.S. invasion had been toned down in the conference's final conclusions.

The British Government had announced earlier that it was making a grant of £750,000 to Grenada, which is expected to be used for infrastructure projects.

Mrs Thatcher said she also found satisfaction that British and Australian caution over international monetary reform had won the day.

Mrs Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, who presided over the conference, implicitly

Mr Pierre Trudeau, the Canadian Prime Minister, returned virtually empty-handed to New Delhi last night, after a brief visit to Peking where he had tried to persuade China to participate in a conference of the world's five nuclear powers, Robert

Moushwar reports.

Zhao Ziyang, the Chinese Prime Minister, was reported to have told the Canadian Premier that China would only join nuclear disarmament talks after the U.S. and the Soviet Union had cut their nuclear arsenals by half.

admitted that the developing countries, which had demanded a new Bretton Woods conference and the creation of new monetary and trade institutions, had not got all they wanted.

On the other hand, she said she was satisfied that a consultative group of Commonwealth nations had been set up to study the problem of monetary reform. "We have to do things step by step," she added.

On South Africa, the communiqué used strong language to condemn the country's Apartheid policy of separate racial development, its "repeated violations of the territorial integrity of neighbouring states," and its blocking of Namibian independence. But it failed to suggest any practical remedies.

The attempt by South Africa and the U.S. to link Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola was firmly rejected.

The Commonwealth leaders also called for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and an end to all forms of South African assistance to "the subversive forces" in Angola.

But apart from urging the Commonwealth members of the five-nation contact group on Namibia-Britain and Canada—to exercise their influence on the other members such as the U.S. to secure the speedy implementation of the UN Security Council resolution on Namibian independence, the communiqué threatened only "appropriate measures" under

the UN Charter if South Africa did not comply.

The heads of government did, however, reaffirm their commitment to uphold their 1977 Glencree Declaration, under which they undertook to discourage any sporting contacts with South Africa.

Though the overwhelming majority of the participants rejected the South African proposals for constitutional reform, because the African majority was "wholly excluded from their scope," Britain expressed reservations on this part of the communiqué.

The Commonwealth leaders denounced the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence as "legally invalid" and reiterated the call for its non-recognition and immediate withdrawal.

They also called on all states not to facilitate or in any way assist the "illegal secessionist entity." Pledging their renewed support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus, the heads of government set up a high-level contact group on Cyprus.

The final communiqué incorporated the Goa Declaration on international security and a statement on economic aid published earlier this week.

10/12

Daily Telegraph 30/11/83

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Mr Trudeau, Canadian Prime Minister, discussing his plan for a five-nation nuclear disarmament conference with Chinese Vice-Chairman Teng Shiao-ping in Peking's Great Hall of the People yesterday.

72.1.4

the Economist
26 Nov - 2 Dec '83

father ever commanded, and by splitting Pakistan and helping to create Bangladesh in 1971 she gave India a regional dominance that it never enjoyed in Nehru's lifetime. But she still hankers for a role and a recognition beyond the subcontinent.

Mrs Gandhi seems to think that she can engineer a breakthrough in north-south economic relations. She called for an international monetary conference, a "new Bretton Woods", at the non-aligned summit in Delhi in March; she did so again at the United Nations in September, and yet again at this week's Commonwealth summit. A Commonwealth study group, consisting of experts from both north and south, has prepared a document called "Towards a New Bretton Woods", and Mrs Gandhi—allied in this case with New Zealand's prime minister, Mr Robert Muldoon—hopes that the 43 heads of government assembled in Delhi will endorse the idea of a world monetary conference. Mrs Thatcher stamped on the plan in her opening speech on Wednesday.

Another prospective Commonwealth initiative—for a peacekeeping force in Grenada—looks like lapsing into platitudes in Delhi because of disagreements within the group and between the hostess and the Commonwealth secretary-general, Mr Shridath Ramphal. All this makes the summit a shaky springboard for Mrs Gandhi's global aspirations. Still, the pomp of royal and stately visits takes Indian voters' minds off less pleasant matters. And the Commonwealth meeting has been cheap as circuses go: \$20m was spent readying Goa as a beachside retreat for Commonwealth leaders, compared with \$200m spent on last year's poorly attended Asian games.

Mrs Gandhi wears another international hat as current president of the non-aligned movement, and wants to use this group as well to get more international leverage for India. Her first major initiative as leader of the non-aligned group was to call for a north-south summit in New York to coincide with the session of the United Nations assembly. This proved a flop—not even one-fifth of the 101 non-aligned countries sent their heads of government, and not even one other Asian nation came. Only the presence of France's President Mitterrand and Canada's Mr Trudeau saved the meeting from being a fiasco. Mrs Gandhi's latest move has been to despatch a ministerial team of the non-aligned movement to try to heal the split within the Palestine Liberation Organisation. This does not look like having any greater success than the similar non-aligned team which had earlier sought to bring peace between Iran and Iraq.

India

A week in the sun

FROM OUR INDIA CORRESPONDENT

The Commonwealth summit in Delhi this week gives Mrs Indira Gandhi an opportunity—if a small one—to show that India is more than just a regional power. She has always aspired to the global stature once enjoyed by her father, Jawaharlal Nehru. Mrs Gandhi has built a far more powerful military machine than her

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—PMS MTG WITH ZHAO ZIYANG

DURING HIS MTG 28NOV WITH CHINESE PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG, PM DESCRIBED HIS INITIATIVE, MENTIONING PROPOSALS HE HAD ANNOUNCED IN GUELPH AND MTL SPEECHES, INCLUDING THAT FOR CONFERENCE OF FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. IN HIS REPLY ZHAO WELCOMED EFFORTS OF PM TO INVOLVE POLITICAL LEADERS MORE IN PROCESS OF IMPROVING EAST/WEST CLIMATE AND REDUCING TENSION IN INTERNATL SITUATION. HE SAID PMS PROPOSALS WOULD BE STUDIED BY CHINESE AUTHORITIES AND DISCUSSED WITH OTHERS INCLUDING THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. HOWEVER HE WAS UNSYMPATHETIC TO PROPOSAL FOR FIVE POWER CONFERENCE. SUPER POWERS WERE NOT/NOT SINCERE IN SEARCH FOR GENUINE DISARMAMENT. MAIN THREAT TO PEACE CAME FROM THEIR RIVALRY. REFERRING TO PMS UNGA SPEECH HE SAID CHINESE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN CONFERENCE BUT ONLY AFTER SUPERPOWERS REDUCED THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS BY HALF AS FIRST STEP. IF FIVE POWER CONFERENCE WERE HELD BEFORE THAT IT WOULD GIVE IMPRESSION THAT FIVE NWS NOT/NOT TWO SUPERPOWERS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR ARMS RACE. ON NPT HE SAID CHINA WOULD NOT/NOT ACCEED TO TREATY. IT WAS MANIPULATED BY USA/USSR ...2

PAGE TWO WJGR0929 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

TO MAINTAIN THEIR 'NUCLEAR' SUPERIORITY.

2. REPORT-PM OPENED DISCUSSION BY EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD DEVELOPED INITIATIVE TO REDUCE CONCERNS ABOUT HIGH STATE OF TENSION IN EAST/WEST BELNS AND TO INCREASE PARTICIPATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS IN REDUCTION OF TENSION. AT WILLIAMSBURG HE HAD ADVOCATED AND OBTAINED AGREEMENT FROM OTHERS THAN MORE ATTN SHOULD BE DEVOTED BY POLITICAL LEADERS TO QUEST FOR WORLD PEACE. MANY OF DISARMAMENT EFFORTS OF WPO AND NATO WERE NOT/NOT UNDER DIRECTION OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP BUT OF OFFICIALS. HE QUOTED AS EXALE MBFR DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD LASTED 10 YRS WITHOUT AGREEMENT BEING REACHED. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT STOCKHOLM MTG WOULD EXPERIENCE SAME PROBLEMS AND NEGNS WOULD BE SLOW AND UNPRODUCTIVE IF THEY WERE NOT/NOT GIVEN AT OUTSET IMPETUS FROM POLITICAL LEVELS OF GOVT. IN START AND INF NEGNS, PM SAID WE HAD BEEN WITNESSING PROCESS DEVOTED TO DETAILS LIKE COUNTING OF WARHEADS AND MEASURING THROW-WEIGHT, ETC. POLITICAL WILL DID NOT/NOT SEEM EVIDENT ON PART OF EITHER SUPERPOWER.

3. IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT OFFICIALS TO REACH CONCLUSIONS CONDUCIVE TO SEARCH FOR PEACE IF POLITICAL AUTHORITIES DID NOT/NOT DIRECT THOSE PARTICIPATING IN NEGNS. CURRENT NEGNS SHOWED TENDENCY OF BOTH SIDES TO TALK TO EACH OTHER THROUGH MEGAPHONES. THERE WAS ALSO LACK OF GOODWILL. WHEN POLITICAL AUTHORITIES DID NOT/NOW WISH TO ACHIEVE RESULTS IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT NEGOTIATORS TO DO SO. ON IMF PM SAID FOUR YR DEADLINE DECIDED IN 1979 WAS NOW CLOSE.

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PAGE THREE WJGR0929 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

WE WERE NOT/NOT SEEING DECREASE IN TENSION BUT AN INCREASE AN HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR KAL INCIDENT,GRENADA,LEBANON AND NOW CYPRUS. THESE WERE ALL OCCASIONS WHEN TENSION WAS INCREASING AND PEACE RECEEDING.HE SAID WE HAD A DUTY TO IMPROVE EAST/WEST CONTACT IN ORDER TO REDUCE TENSION SO THAT AT LEAST,COMMUNICATIONS COULD BE RE-ESTABLISHED AT POLITICAL LEVEL.

4.ALTHOUGH IT WAS MEMBER OF ALLIANCE CDA NEVERTHELESS HAD GOOD CREDENTIALS TO EMBARK ON THIS EFFORT.PM NOTED CONTRIBUTIONS OF HIS PREDEESSOR IN OFFICE,LESTER PEARSON.IN HIS RECENT MTGS WITH NATO COLLEAGUES AND WITH COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES IN NDELHI AND GOA PM SAID HE HAD FOUND DESIRE ON PART OF ALL THAT POLITICIANS SHOULD TAKE MORE INITIATIVE IN BEARCH FOR PEACE.HE DREW PREMIER ZHAOS ATTN TO GOA COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH SUPPORT HAD BEEN EYPRESSED FOR IDEA AND,IN PARTICULAR FOR HIS OWN INITIATIVE IN LIGHT OF HIS INTENDED VISIT TO CHINA.HE THOUGHT HE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL,SO FAR, BECAUSE NUMBER OF COLLEAGUES IN NATO AND COMMONWEALTH HAD AGREED THAT GREATER POLITICAL DIMENSION HAD TO BE INTRODUCED INTO EAST/ WEST RELATIONSHIP AND INTO SEARCH FOR PEACE.

5.PM THEN MENTIONED PROPOSALS HE HAD PUT FORWARD IN RECENT SPEECHES AND AT ZHAOS REQUEST BRIEFLY OUTLINED THOSE RELATING TO MFR TALKS AND TO FORTHCOMING CDE MTG IN STOCKHOLM,AS WELL AS PROPOSAL RELATING TO HIGH ALTITUDE SATELLITES AND PROPOSAL FOR CONFRENC OF FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.

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PAGE FOUR WJGR0929 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

6. ZHAO THEN RESPONDED TO PMS COMMENTS SAYING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD CONCERNS PM HAD EXPRESSED OVER DIRECTION OF INTERNATL SITUATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF ARMS RACE. EFFORTS OF PM TO INVOLVE POLITICAL LEADERS MORE IN PROCESS OF TRYING TO IMPROVE EAST/WEST CLIMATE AND IN REDUCING TENSION IN INTERNATL SITU WERE SUPPORTED BY CHINA.

7. HE THEN SET OUT CHINESE VIEWS ON CAUSES OF TENSION IN INTERNATL SITU. NEGOTIATORS IN VARIOUS FORUMS HAD FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY RESULTS. SUPERPOWERS HAVE THEIR OWN CALLATIONS AND WERE NOT/NOT SINCERE IN SEARCH FOR GENUINE DISARMAMENT. IN CASE OF INF USSR HAD WALKED OUT. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT PURPOSE OF EACH SIDE IN START AND MBFR TALKS WAS TO ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY OVER OTHER. THIS IS WHY AS TALKS WENT ON SO DID ARMS RACE. DURING NEGNS NUMBERS OF WEAPONS HAD INCREASED. THERE WAS A NEED TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SUPERPOWERS. POLITICAL LEADERS SHOULD UNITE TO EXERT POLITICAL AND MORAL PRESSURE TO COMPEL THEM TO CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE AND TO BREAK PRESENT DEADLOCK.

8. JUDGING FROM PAST EXPERIENCE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE OF EAST/WEST RELNS OR TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE BETWEEN TWO WITH REGARD TO DISARMAMENT. ZHAO SAID. FIRST POINT TO NOTE WAS THAT MAIN THREAT TO WORLD PEACE CAME FROM RIVALRY BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS IN EXPANDING RESPECTIVE ARSENALS. FOREIGN MIN WU XUEQIAN HAD RECENTLY SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL CHINESE POSN AT UNGA.

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PAGE FIVE WJGR0929 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

ZHAO SAID USA AND USSR HAD TO TAKE ACTION FIRST. ARSENALS POSSESSED BY BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CHINA BORE NO/NO COMPARISON IN NUMBERS TO TOTALS OF WEAPONS POSSESSED BY SUPERPOWERS. IF GAP CONTD BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS AND THREE OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE REALISTIC FOR FIVE TO MEET TO DISCUSS RATIO THAT SHOULD EXIST AMONG THEIR RESPECTIVE ARSENALS. MOREOVER IN ABSENCE OF GAP BEING NARROWED MTG OF FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES, AS PROPOSED, WOULD DIVERT ATTN FROM POLICIES OF TWO SUPERPOWERS. PUBLICS WOULD THEN BELIEVE THAT IT WAS BECAUSE FIVE HAD REFUSED TO MEET THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO DISARMAMENT. THIS WOULD NOT/NOT CONFORM TO REALITY OF SITUATION.

9. TURNING TO NON/NO-NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, ZHAO REPEATED WELL-KNOWN CHINESE PUBLIC POSN THAT CHINA WAS NOT/NOT IN FAVOUR OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD NOT/NOT ENGAGE IN EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE PROLIFERATION. IT WOULD NOT/NOT ACCEDE TO NON/NO-NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WHICH WAS MANIPULATED BY USA AND USSR TO MAINTAIN THEIR NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY AND TO ENABLE THEM TO BLACKMAIL OTHERS WHO HAD RIGHT TO SEEK TO ACQUIRE ON THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CHINA WOULD NOT/NOT JOIN TREATY BUT WOULD TAKE PRUDENT APPROACH TO PROLIFERATION ISSUE. IT WOULD NOT/NOT DISCUSS ISSUE OF NON/NO PROLIFERATION WITH SUPERPOWERS.

10. IF SUPERPOWERS DIS NOT/NOT AGREE TO TAKE FIRST STEP IN REDUCING SIZE OF THEIR ARSENALS IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR OTHERS TO

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PAGE SIX WJGR0922 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

TALK ABOUT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. HE PROMISED THAT PM PROPOSALS WOULD BE CAREFULLY STUDIED AND CHINA WOULD CONSULT OTHERS ABOUT THEM, INCLUDING THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES.

11. PM ASKED ZHAO HOW OTHERS COULD PUT PRESSURE ON SUPERPOWERS. WE SUGGESTED THAT CHINAS OWN PROPOSAL WAS WAY OF BRINGING PRESSURE ON EACH OF THEM. CHINAS POSN HE SUGGESTED, WAS NOT/NOT TOO DIS-SIMILAR FROM THOSE OF FRANCE AND BRITAIN. HE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT CHINA TO REDUCE ITS ARSENAL WHEN TWO SUPERPOWERS POSSESSED MORE THAN 95 PERCENT OF WORLDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

12. ZHAO THEN MADE SAME POINT THAT DENG XIAOPING MADE FOLLOWING DAY. CHINAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS HE SAID WERE ONLY SYMBOLIC. THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO SHOW CHINAS INDEPENDENCE. THERE WERE POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY WEAPONS. CHINA DID NOT/NOT INTEND TO DEVOTE MANY RESOURCES TO STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IN FUTURE. IT DID NOT/NOT HAVE CAPABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN ARMS RACE. HIGHER PRIORITIES WERE INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND GENERAL WELFARE OF CHINESE PEOPLE.

13. PM ASKED AGAIN IF THERE WERE WAYS OF BRINGING PRESSURE ON SUPERPOWERS MENTIONING THAT ONE OF HIS CONDITIONS FOR FIVE POWER CONFERENCE WOULD BE THAT EACH WOULD ACT AS SOVERIGN NATION NOT/NOT AS MEMBER OF ANY GLOC. WE SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NEITHER/ NEITHER HAD RIGHT TO SEEK SUPERIORITY OVER OTHER. AS USSR SEEMED ...7

PAGE SEVEN WJGR0929 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

INTENT ON DOING WHEN IT INSISTED ON COUNTING FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS WITH USA TOTALS. SUPERPOWERS SHOULD BE EQUAL AND NEITHER SHOULD BE SUPERIOR TO OTHER.

14. EXPLAINING THAT WHEN HE TALKED OF AN ACCORD AMONG FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES HE DID NOT/NOT DO SO WITH INTENT OF REDUCING ARSENALS OF SMALLER COUNTRIES BUT INSTEAD TO SUGGEST THESE BE SET AT REASONABLE LIMITS. PERHAPS SOME OF SMALLER WEAPONS STATES WOULD NEED TO INCREASE NUMBERS OF THEIR SYSTEMS TO ASSURE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. PRESENTED IN THIS WAY PROPOSAL NEED NOT/NOT DIVERT ATTN FROM SUPER-POWER RIVALRY BUT COULD BRING PUBLIC ATTN TO BEAR ON FACT THEY WERE BEING UNREASONABLE IN MAINTAINING SUCH LARGE NUMBER OF WEAPONS GIVING THEM SPECIAL STATUS VIS-A-VIS OTHER THREE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.

15. ZHAO REPLIED THAT PM HAD RAISED QUESTION OF HOW TO APPLY MORE PRESSURE ON TWO OTHER POLITICAL LEARN WORLD, SHOULD BE MOBILIZED TO ENGAGE IN STRUGGLE, NOT/NOT ONLY IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNTRIES BUT IN OTHERS ALSO. HOWEVER HE REPEATED THAT ONLY AFTER TWO SUPERPOWERS HAD AGREED TO REDUCE THEIR ARSENALS COULD REDUCTIONS BY OTHER NWS BE DISCUSSED. THIS WOULD BE BETTER MEANS OF EXERTING PRESSURE ON TWO SUPERPOWERS THAN IDEA OF FIVE POWER CONFERENCE. HE MENTIONED AGAIN HIS VIEW THAT MTG OF FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES WOULD LEAVE IMPRESSION THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISARMAMENT IMPASSE RESTED NOT/NOT WITH TWO SUPERPOWERS BUT WITH ...8

PAGE EIGHT WJGR0929 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

ALL FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.

16. ZHAO CONCLUDED SAYING CHINA APPRECIATED PMS CONCERNS AND
SUPPORTED HIS APPEAL TO HAVE MORE POLITICAL LEADERS ENGAGED IN
STRUGGLE. PMS SUGGESTIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERED AND OTHERS WOULD BE
CONSULTED.

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ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

28-6-1	Trudeau Peace Mission
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UNCLASSIFIED

FM PEKIN WJGR0928 01DEC83

TO FXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PMDELKWAIT MOSCO TOKYO WDC PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU

PRMNY PCOOTT/CAPON BONN BNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RBR PER PED RCR RGB RBR RBD ZSI

---PMS VISIT-CHINESE PRESS COVERAGE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF XINHUA ARTICLE APPEARING IN 30NOV PEOPLES DAILY ABOUT PMS DISCUSSIONS WITH DENG XIAOPING.QUOTE DENG XIAOPING,CHAIRMAN OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY,MET THIS MORNING CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND HIS ENTOURAGE.

DENG XIAOPING DISCUSSED WITH THE GUESTS SOME MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

DENG XIAOPING SAID:QUOTE PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU HAS BEEN MAKING EFFORTS TO EASE UP INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THESE EFFORTS ARE VERY IMPORTANT.UNQUOTE.

TRUDEAU SAID:CHINA DEMANDS THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS CUT DOWN ON THEIR NUCLEAR ARMAMENT AND CANADA QUITE APPRECIATE THIS. OUR COMMON GOAL IS TO RESPOND TO THE WISH OF THE WORLD PEOPLE FOR PEACE.

DENG XIAOPING SAID:WE SHOULD MAKE THE TWO SUPERPOWERS CONSTANTLY HEAR THE VOICES OF ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD OPPOSING THEIR NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.HE REITERATED CHINAS STAND ON DISARMAMENT.

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PAGE TWO WJGR0928 UNCLAS

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND HIS ENTOURAGE LEFT BEIJING FOR INDIA
THIS AFTERNOON BY PLANE.UNQUOTE.

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ARGUMENTATION
~~CAUSE~~ to note
section to
Smith

Mr. Smith

*To be followed up when
Michael Shonstone returns*
MS

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IFB0117 01DEC83

TO PMDELMSCAT/SHENSTONE

DELIVER BY 020800

DISTR IDDZ

--PM INITIATIVE/INTERNATL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOC (IPSA)

HAVE RECEIVED FOLLOWING LET TO YOU FM JOHN E TRENT, SEC GEN OF
IPSA:

2. QUOTE

AS A FOLLOW-UP TO OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, I AM WRITING TO
CONFIRM THAT THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER SOME FORM OF COLLABORATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE TO CREATE A BETRIMATE
FOR EAST-WEST NEGOCIATIONS, SHOULD THIS ENDEAVOR BECOME A LONGER
TERM UNDERTAKING. AS YOU KNOW, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT, IF NOT
IMPOSSIBLE, TO MOBILIZE THE INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH COMMUNITY ON
A SHORT TERM BASIS.

AT ITS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 5TH, PRIOR TO
THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF MR TRUDEAUS UNDERTAKING, OUR EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE HAD ALREADY AGREED TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A
PROJECT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 1986 YEAR OF PEACE
AND ALSO TO SEE IF WE COULD HELP IN SOME WAY TO IMPROVE THE
NEGOCIATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. THE FACT
THAT A RATHER DUBIOUS, IF NOT CYNICAL, GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL
SCHOLARS WERE WILLING TO TAKE THIS STEP IS INDICATIVE OF BOTH THE
GROWING CLIMATE OF FEAR AND THE THOUGHT THAT, GIVEN THE CURRENT
CONDITIONS, OUR ASSOCIATION MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING TO OFFER.

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PAGE TWO IFB0117 CONF

WITH REGARD TO EAST-WEST NEGOCIATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS, OUR FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT, DR GEORGII SHAKHNAZAROV, A MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SECRETARIAT OF THE USSR CENTRAL COMMITTEE, LED US TO BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WOULD WELCOME THIS KIND OF INITIATIVE. ALSO, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION IS CLOSE TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. JEAN KIRKPATRICK IS A POLITICAL SCIENTIST WHOSE HUSBAND WAS THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE APSA FOR SEVERAL DECADES. WE WILL BE HOLDING A WORLD CONGRESS IN THE STATES IN 1988, SO YOU CAN SEE WE ARE THINKING ABOUT THE LONG TERM.

OUR THOUGHTS HAVE BY NO MEANS CRYSTALIZED AT THIS POINT. HOWEVER, SOME PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS HAVE LED US TO CONCLUDE THAT WE SHOULD OPERATE AT TWO LEVELS, ONE TO INCREASE PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND, THE OTHER, TO INCREASE FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATIONS, IN PROPITIOUS, NON-CONFLICTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES, BETWEEN HIGH LEVEL DECISION-MAKERS AND ANALYSTS FROM EAST AND WEST. WE THOUGHT THAT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COULD HELP TO IMPROVE THE NATURE OF SUCH MEETINGS. WE ALSO THOUGHT THAT CANADA, PROBABLY TWINNED WITH A SOCIALIST AND AN OTHER NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY COULD PROVIDE IDEAS, RESOURCES AND THE FORUM FOR A CONTINUING SERIES OF SUCH MEETINGS. HOWEVER, AS I SAID, THIS IS ALL VERY PRELIMINARY.

WE WILL BE CONTINUING OUR THINKING ABOUT SPECIFIC POSSIBILITIES AND IF YOUR TASK FORCE WISHES TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS, WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO HEAR FROM YOU.

UNQUOTE

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