


50048-AF-40

PT-2



SECRET

D

RED REGISTRY

Department of External Affairs

Subject:

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AT THE CANADIAN
PERMANENT
DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL FILE

File No. 50048-AF-40

Volume TWO

From JANUARY 1, 1962

To Apr 30/63

Date	Referred To	Returned	Date	Referred To	Returned					
<p><i>Replaced by</i> <i>10-4-UNO</i></p>			<p><i>X 11</i> <i>272487</i></p>							

ACCESS TO INFORMATION
L'ACCES A L'INFORMATION
EXAMINED BY / EXAMINE PAR: *[Signature]*
DATE / DATE: *2/18/82*

DECLASSIFIED

50048-AF-40-31A-84005

FILE NO. *3004/11/80*

PLEASE KEEP ATTACHED TO TOP OF FILE

FILE CLOSED

THIS FILE IS TO BE USED FOR
REFERENCE PURPOSES ONLY.

ALL FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE
IS TO BE PLACED ON THE
APPROPRIATE FILE WITHIN
THE NEW FILE SERIES.

10-7-UNO

10-7-UNO

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

*File
9K 19/6/63*

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: Permanent Mission of Canada to the
..... United Nations, New York,

Reference: Your Letter 188 of March 15.....

Subject: Attaché Case.....

.....
.....

Security: Unclassified.....

No: 312.....

Date: April 30, 1963.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AS-40	
64	45

References

... We are returning Form Ext. 27R acknowledging receipt of Attaché Case No. 389. Two keys, Nos. 389 and 391, were also received. However, only key No. 391 will open the case. We are therefore returning key No. 389 and should be grateful if an additional copy of key No. 391 could be supplied.

*M Keyes
Please do
Alec...
all this
6/3/63*

[Signature]
Permanent Mission

*Ext file key
no. 391
sent 19/6/63*

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to
the United Nations, New York.

Reference: Your Let. DS-529 of Sept. 25/62

Subject: Schedule for Security Guards

RESTRICTED

Security:.....

No:..... 308

Date: April 26, 1963

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail: Air bag

Post File No: 14-5-1

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
64	

References

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(B)

*Mr Andrews
2 July
11/5/63*

We enclose a copy of the schedule for
our security guards based on the new shifts, for your
information.

W. Barton
Permanent Mission.

Internal
Circulation

D

Distribution
to Posts



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY
APR 31 10 02 AM '63

Restricted

Security Guards' Duty Schedule for the period ending May 5, 1963.

<u>Day</u>		<u>Name</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Hrs worked</u>		
Mon	April 29	Mr Jones	0001 - 0930	9½		
"	" 29	" Lensdale	1730 - 2400		6½	
"	" 29	" Broughal	Off Duty			
Tues	" 30	Mr Broughal	0001 - 0930		9½	
"	" 30	" Jones	1730 - 2400	6½		
"	" 30	" Lensdale	Off Duty			
Wed	May 1	Mr Lensdale	0001 - 0930		9½	
"	" 1	" Broughal	1730 - 2400		6½	
"	" 1	" Jones	Off Duty			
Thurs	" 2	Mr Jones	0001 - 0930	9½		
"	" 2	" Lensdale	1730 - 2400		6½	
"	" 2	" Broughal	Off Duty			
Fri	" 3	Mr Broughal	0001 - 0930		9½	
"	" 3	" Jones	1730 - 2400	6½		
"	" 3	" Lensdale	Off Duty			
Sat	" 4	Mr Lensdale	0001 - 0800	8		
"	" 4	" Broughal	0800 - 1600		3	
"	" 4	" Jones	1600 - 2400	8		
Sun	" 5	Mr Lensdale	0001 - 0800	8		
"	" 5	" Broughal	Off Duty			
"	" 5	" Jones	1600 - 2400	8		
				48	38½	33½

2nd Week

Restricted

Security Guards' Duty Schedule for the period ending May 12, 1963.

<u>Day</u>			<u>Name</u>	<u>Period</u>		<u>Mrs worked</u>	
Mon	May	6	Mr Lonsdale	0001 - 0930	9½		
"	"	6	" Broughal	1730 - 2400		6½	
"	"	6	" Jones	Off Duty			
Tues	"	7	Mr Jones	0001 - 0930		9½	
"	"	7	" Lonsdale	1730 - 2400	6½		
"	"	7	" Broughal	Off Duty			
Wed	"	8	Mr Broughal	0001 - 0930		9½	
"	"	8	" Jones	1730 - 2400		6½	
"	"	8	" Lonsdale	Off Duty			
Thurs	"	9	Mr Lonsdale	0001 - 0930	9½		
"	"	9	" Broughal	1730 - 2400		6½	
"	"	9	" Jones	Off Duty			
Fri	"	10	Mr Jones	0001 - 0930		9½	
"	"	10	" Lonsdale	1730 - 2400	6½		
"	"	10	" Broughal	Off Duty			
Sat	"	11	Mr Broughal	0001 - 0800		8	
"	"	11	" Jones	0800 - 1600		8	
"	"	11	" Lonsdale	1600 - 2400	8		
Sun	"	12	Mr Broughal	0001 - 0800		8	
"	"	12	" Jones	Off Duty	-	-	
"	"	12	" Lonsdale	1600 - 2400	8		
					48	38½	33½

3rd Week

Restricted

Security Guards' Duty Schedule for the period ending May 19, 1963.

<u>Day</u>			<u>Name</u>	<u>Period</u>		<u>Hrs worked</u>	
Mon	May	13	Mr Broughal	0001 - 0930	9½		
"	"	13	" Jones	1730 - 2400		6½	
"	"	13	" Lonsdale	Off Duty			
Tues	"	14	Mr Lonsdale	0001 - 0930		9½	
"	"	14	" Broughal	1730 - 2400	6½		
"	"	14	" Jones	Off Duty			
Wed	"	15	Mr Jones	0001 - 0930		9½	
"	"	15	" Lonsdale	1730 - 2400		6½	
"	"	15	" Broughal	Off Duty			
Thurs	"	16	Mr Broughal	0001 - 0930	9½		
"	"	16	" Jones	1730 - 2400		6½	
"	"	16	" Lonsdale	Off Duty			
Fri	"	17	Mr Lonsdale	0001 - 0930		9½	
"	"	17	" Broughal	1730 - 2400	6½		
"	"	17	" Jones	Off Duty			
Sat	"	18	Mr Jones	0001 - 0800		8	
"	"	18	" Lonsdale	0800 - 1600		8	
"	"	18	" Broughal	1600 - 2400	8		
Sun	"	19	Mr Jones	0001 - 0830		8	
"	"	19	" Lonsdale	Off Duty		-	
"	"	19	" Broughal	1600 - 2400	8		
					48	38½	33½

50048-AW-40
43

Ottawa, April 24, 1963

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The Canadian Embassy, Helsinki, Finland

April 26

We are forwarding by (*17* Courier) the following:-

3 Keys for lock 22A 281

Reference your letter No. 139 of April 17/63

file up

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and return the original form Ext. 27R.

Return to Rm. 382 D.L.(2) East Block

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in good order.

Place Date Signature

50048-AS-40	
2	-

Ottawa, April 23, 1963.

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

**TO: The Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.**

We are forwarding by (Courier ⁵⁰) the following:-

Apr 24

2 keys for Attaché Case No.389

(Attaché Case is being sent separately by Surface M)

Please refer to your letter No.188 of March 15/63.

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and return the original form Ext. 27R.

J. E. Reyes

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Return to rm.382, D.L.(2) E.B.

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in good order.

RMU
New York

Place

Key # 389 returned as defective
Key # 391 opens case properly.
April 25/63

Date

W. J. Holmes

Signature

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: ..The Permanent Mission of Canada to ...
.....the United Nations, NEW YORK.....

Reference:.....

Subject:..Combination of Security Containers..
.....
.....

Security:.....SECRET.....

No:.....252.....

Date:.....April 4, 1963.....

Enclosures:.....2.....

Air or Surface Mail:....Air Bag.....

Post File No:..11-4.....

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
45	50

References

Mr. Gagne
16/4

This is to certify that:

- (a) The settings of all the security combination locks in use at this Mission have been changed as required in the Security instructions.
- (b) The new settings are enclosed in the attached envelope, addressed to the Departmental Security Officer, which has been prepared and sealed as prescribed in section 408.6 of the Security Manual.
- (c) The official record of such combinations is kept at this post in accordance with section 409.7 of the Security Manual.
- (d) All spare security combination padlocks in the custody of this Mission have been set on the neutral combination 10-20-30, and each lock is properly labelled to show the combination on which it is set.
- (e) All the combination locks in the custody of this Mission are in good working order and no difficulty was experienced with any of them since their combination settings were last reported.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]
Permanent Mission

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: Permanent Mission of Canada to the
...United Nations, New York...

Reference: Your letter DS-129 of March 8/63

Subject: Attaché Case

Security: Unclassified

No: 188

Date: March 15, 1963

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No: 13-1-2

Ottawa-File No 30048-AF-40 50048-AS-40	
43	50

References

*M. G. ...
20/3/63 137*

We were disappointed to learn that the Despatch Case described in our requisition is no longer available. However, we are most interested in obtaining an Attaché Case for the Ambassador's use and Mr. Tremblay would be very pleased to be issued one of the type described in your letter under reference. If this Attaché Case is provided in different sizes, we should be pleased if you would send us one approximately 18" x 11" x 5 1/2".

file up

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Internal Circulation

Sent 23/4/63

W. J. Helmes
Permanent Mission

*No. 389
with 2
Keys*

D

Distribution to Posts



10-1-31

10-1-31

Yours faithfully,
[Signature]

10-1-31

10-1-31

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text, possibly a letter or report]

[Faint text, possibly a signature or name]

NO ENCLOSURES
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY
APR 20 10 45 AM '63

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO:.....The Permanent Mission of Canada to the
.....United Nations, New York.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:.....Your requisition No. 3 of Feb. 7/63.....

Subject:.....Attache Case.....

Security:.....UNCLASSIFIED.....

No:.....DS-129.....

Date:.....March 8, 1963.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....Air.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
17	

References

We regret that the Despatch Case referred to in your requisition under reference is no longer supplied by the department. The Attache Case now in use has a single Ace Lock with a catch at either end, is brown in colour and has the words "Gov't. of Canada - Department of External Affairs" engraved on the front. Please inform us if this Attache Case meets with Mr. TREMBLAY'S approval, and if so we will endeavour to send him one without delay.

Internal Circulation

Supplies & Properties

J. TREMBLAY

J. Tremblay
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Distribution to Posts

Ottawa, March 6, 1963.

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
TO: The Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

We are forwarding by (Courier ³⁰) the following ^{March}

1 key No. 10A567

50048-AF-40	
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Please refer to your letter No. 120 of Feb. 15, 1963.

file

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When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and return the original form Ext. 27 R.

D

D. G. Reyes


Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Return to rm. 382, D.L. (2) E.B.

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in good order.

NYC 14 Mar 63 *[Signature]*
Place Date Signature

RECEIVED [illegible]



EXTRAIT DES REGISTRES
REGISTRY
MAY 20 10 39 AM '83

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

7/20
g/r 6/3/63

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: Permanent Mission of Canada to the
United Nations, New York.

Reference: Our Letter No. 582 of Aug. 17, 1962.

Subject: Local Security Arrangements -
Request for extra key.

g/g 6

Security: SECRET

No: 120

Date: February 15, 1963.

Enclosures: none

Air or Surface Mail: Air bag

Post File No:


Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-10	
17	50

References

We have now had some experience with the system of locking doors at all times when staff members are out and believe that it has significantly increased our office security.

2. We should like to make one small request concerning the office occupied by the Counsellor. He gains access to his office through the office of his secretary who carries the key to her office. This means that if she is not in the office, the Counsellor has to make two trips to the key board - to get the extra key and to return it after having used it. I wish to request an additional key for the lock on the secretary's door so that both the counsellor and his secretary would then be able to carry keys for this door, and we would still have one extra key on the key board.

3. The lock is Yale model No. 084 and the lock number is 10A567.



Mr. Keyes sent 6/7/63 - S.K.
ask you
ask Mr. Lewis
to make this
as soon as possible
W.H. Barton
Permanent Representative.
PRD
20/2/63

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

NO EXCISE

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: Departmental Security Officer, Ottawa

Security... PERSONAL/CONFIDENTIAL

Date... February 8, 1963

FROM: Regional Security Officer, London

Air or Surface... air

No. of enclosures.....

The documents described below are for your information.

Despatching Authority... (Signed) E. S. TATE

50048 File
Copenhagen

Copies	Description	Also referred to:
1	letter RSO-64 of February 8 re: Security Guard Schedule, Copenhagen <i>Ym</i> Francis Anderson <i>11/1</i>	Also referred to: 50048-AA-40 2 - <i>[Signature]</i> Even fiercer than ours <i>[Signature]</i>

INSTRUCTIONS

1. This form may be used in sending material for informational purposes from the Department to posts abroad and vice versa.
2. This form should *NOT* be used to cover documents requiring action.
3. The name of the person responsible for authorizing the despatch of the material should be shown opposite the words "Despatching Authority". This may be done by signature, name stamp or by any other suitable means.
4. The form should bear the security classification of the material it covers.
5. The column for "Copies" should indicate the number of copies of each document transmitted. The space for "No. of Enclosures" should show the total number of copies of all documents covered by the transmittal slip. This will facilitate checking on despatch and receipt of mail.

bcc: D.L.(2) Division

February 8, 1963.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Roger,

Thank you for your letter of January 31 in which you make some very interesting observations on the problems arising from the three-guard schedule which the Department has instructed shall be put into effect. I assure you that I am only too familiar with these objections to the proposed schedule and that similar complaints to those contained in the memorandum submitted by your guards have been encountered from other European missions.

Perhaps it would be best if I answered the questions you raised and then comment on the guards' submission. First of all the three-guard schedule set out in the Department's letter number DS-272 of September 25 has been generally instituted throughout all the European posts. One or two posts have voiced objections to the institution of a two-guard per night schedule and in all these instances the objections have been fundamentally similar to those raised by your guards.

In my opinion I do not think you would get a very favourable reaction from the Department if you raised the points mentioned by the guards in their memorandum. They are all familiar and in the opinion of the Department and I may say in my own opinion have not too much validity. The first major point concerns the guard who goes on duty after a few drinks with another guard. Surely it is reasonable to require that the guards go on duty cold sober. It is at least reasonable to require that on the occasions when he has to relieve another guard around midnight he should not spend the evening drinking with associates.

that
The second point is to the effect that every guard works every Saturday, Sunday and public holiday without exception. This objection does not take into account the so-called Vienna schedule need not be adhered to rigidly, but can be modified to provide the occasional weekend.

The contention that a two-guard check does not apply in Copenhagen because all security containers are inside the vault completely misses the point of periodical inspections. Intrusion into the strong room area is only one thing the guards are required to furnish protection against. Intrusions into the offices for installation of eavesdropping devices has to be guarded against and in fact any indication whatever ~~that~~ an attempt at clandestine or forceful entry of the premises. I am rather disturbed

A.B. Roger, Esq.,
Second Secretary and Consul,
Canadian Embassy,
Copenhagen.

at the assumption that there is little point in a second man checking the premises because a search has been done after departure. This implies that the guards spend the rest of the sixteen hours on duty sitting in the reception room and human nature being what it is I cannot but believe that they take the opportunity for a brief forty winks.

I agree that domestic life does suffer to a considerable extent from the sort of schedule a security guard must work, but this is true throughout the entire service and all guards were warned of this fact when they were engaged. In any event, as I suggested earlier in this letter, some occasional modification of the schedule will mitigate the most drastic implications of the three-man schedule.

In their conclusion, the guards observe that on the previous schedule a man started duty at 1700 hours "sober, alert, and ready for a night's duty." I have two observations on this point. The first is that while he may be alert at 1700 hours, he certainly is not at 0300 hours and that whether he starts duty at 1700 hours or 2300 hours, he certainly ought to be sober.

I hope I have not sounded unsympathetic to your problems in this matter because I fully realize how difficult this problem can be for you. The only suggestion I can make is that you should point out to the guards that others are working under identical conditions, not merely in Europe but all over the world where we have missions and that in the great majority of instances and under conditions not vastly different from those existing in Copenhagen all the problems which they have postulated have been overcome. Please let me know if you have any more difficulties and I shall endeavor to be of any help that I can.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) E. S. TATE

E. S. Tate.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO:.....The Permanent Mission of Canada to the
.....United Nations, New York.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Security:.....UNCLASSIFIED.....
No:.....~~DS-~~ 63.....
Date:.....Feb. 5, 1963.....
Enclosures:.....
Air or Surface Mail:.....Air.....
Post File No:.....

Reference:.....Your letter No. 857 of Dec. 12, 1962.....
Subject:.....Attache Case.....
.....
.....

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
50048-AS-40	
43	

References

We have exhausted our supply of Attache
Cases. However, immediately upon replenishment
of our stock, your requisition will be met.

J. TIMMERMAN

J. Timmerman
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

SECRET

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York.

Reference:
Subject: Combination of Security Containers.

Security:
No: 20
Date: January 10, 1963.
Enclosures: 2
Air or Surface Mail: Air bag
Post File No: 11.4

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
43	43

*m. Safford
for 01/11/63*

135

References

This is to certify that:

- (a) The settings of all the security combination locks in use at this Mission have been changed as required in the Security Instructions.
- (b) The new settings are enclosed in the attached envelope, addressed to the Departmental Security Officer, which has been prepared and sealed as prescribed in section 108.6 of the Security Manual.
- (c) The official record of such combinations is kept at this post in accordance with section 409.7 of the Security Manual.
- (d) All spare security combination padlocks in the custody of this Mission have been set on the neutral combination 10-20-30, and each lock is properly labelled to show the combination on which it is set.
- (e) All the combination locks in the custody of this Mission are in good working order and no difficulty was experienced with any of them since their combination settings were last reported.

Internal Circulation

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W. H. Barton
Permanent Mission.

Distribution to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to
the United Nations, NEW YORK.

Reference:.....

Subject:..... Requisition for Attaché Case

Security:..... UNCLASSIFIED

No:..... 857

Date:..... December 12, 1962.

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-10	
14	50

Mr. Lafont 12/4

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To our PMO 19/12/62

Attached is a requisition for an attaché case requested by Mr. Tremblay for his official use.

2. It would be appreciated if you would forward this case as soon as possible.

Reply sent Feb. 5/63

[Signature]
Permanent Mission

Enclosure kept in 382 - 14

file

Internal Circulation

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Distribution to Posts



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DEC 19 10 41 AM '72

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

Secret

File
[Signature]

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: Permanent Mission of Canada to the
United Nations, New York

Reference: Your letter DS-462 of October 11, 1962

Subject: Security Arrangements

Security:.....

No: 733.....

Date: October 23, 1962.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
43	50

33

References

The T-4 shredder is in operation and we are entirely satisfied with it. It has been placed in the communications room and the communications staff are now immediately destroying all their waste, including used tapes and carbons. This has greatly reduced the pressure on the larger shredder, especially since the tapes had to be put through the larger machine three times. Using the T-4 shredder for the carbons has the further advantage that the operators are no longer troubled by staining dust. This was a serious problem when the carbons had to be put through the larger shredder twice. We are trying to eradicate this completely by ordering experimentally a plastic bag which will fit over the top of the waste container inside the shredder and which will make it possible to empty the container completely into the bag without any spillage. The T-4 shredder has also increased office security, as waste now is destroyed immediately.

2. Regarding the arrangement for individual office keys, we have carefully considered with the Ambassador the feasibility of requiring all key-holders to return keys to the guard every evening. In the very particular circumstances that apply in this Mission, the Ambassador considers that enforcement of this procedure would create serious complications in the office. It would also possibly provide less security since officers would not be in the habit of carrying their office keys with them at all times and might take less care of them. The Ambassador therefore feels that the best and most effective security would be achieved if we were to adopt the system set out in paragraph 2(a) of our letter No. 582 and we propose with your concurrence to apply this system at this Mission.

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Internal Circulation

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Distribution to Posts

Mr Andrews
220
30/11/62

[Signature]
Permanent Mission

NO ENCLOSURES

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

OCT 30 1 53 PM '62

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text, likely the main body of a letter or report.]

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text, likely the main body of a letter or report.]

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text, likely the bottom portion of a letter or report, including a signature area.]

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York

Security: RESTRICTED

No: DS-468 508

Date: Oct. 17, 1962

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your letter of Sept. 25/62

Subject: Combination Changes

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
14	14

References

Thank you for sending us your new combination settings. However only the list containing the combination changes need be inserted in the envelope and the envelope when sealed should then be attached to a numbered letter for onward transmission to Ottawa. The proper procedure for forwarding new combination settings to Ottawa is outlined in Section 408.6 of the Security Manual. Furthermore it would also be appreciated if the combination settings of all security locks in your mission could be reported to us under cover of one numbered letter instead of two as is presently the case.

Internal Circulation

J. TIMMERMAN

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

Distribution to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: Permanent Mission of Canada
to the United Nations, New York

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your message 1557 Sept. 24/62

Subject: Security Arrangements

Security: SECRET

No: DS- 46 562

Date: Oct. 11, 1962

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
43	50

References

We hope the model T-4 shredder you recently received will solve the problem of destroying your communication tapes. As with the larger T-3 model it is important that automotive engine oil be applied liberally to the blades of the cutting head after each fifteen or twenty minutes of use. We should like to receive whatever comments you may have on either its effectiveness or limitation.

2. Regarding Para 2(a) of your letter No. 582 we feel that the security keys of your mission should be turned over to the guard at the close of work and that a daily key log should be maintained for record purposes. We realize of course, that yours is a special case and that it would be impractical, under conditions described in your letter, for an officer to return to the mission for the sole purpose of handing in his key. When this happens however the key log will indicate that the key was retained overnight. Whatever latitude you permit should apply only to your officers of course.

Internal Circulation

J. TIMMERMAN

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Distribution to Posts

50048-AF-60
LT SE

FM PERMISNY OCT9/62 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 1709

REF OURTEL 1557 SEP24

MISSION SECURITY

WE ARE ANXIOUS TO HAVE ANSWER TO OURTEL UNDER REF SO THAT WE CAN
APPLY COMPLETE SECURITY COVERAGE.

...

NUMBERED LETTER

To: The Permanent Mission of Canada to the
United Nations, New York, N.Y.

Security: SECRET

No.: F- 541

From: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Date: October 4, 1962.

Reference: Our telegram F-1199 of August 22, 1962.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Subject: Local Security Arrangements.

Post File No.:

Ottawa File No. 50048-AF-40 3722 P-1-10

References

As a result of an improvement in the financial situation of the maintenance primary we now find that we will have sufficient funds to enable you to proceed with the installation of a security grille gate and the changing of the locks on the two existing gates in the Registry and Concentre.

2. We are, therefore, raising an authority in the amount of \$250.00 U.S. to cover this work.

Original signed by
J. A. ZOUBIE

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Mr. Francis
Mr. Andrews
Mr. Keyes G.K.

to see & file
9/10

Internal
Circulation

D. L. (2)
Division

Distribution
to Posts

50048-AF-40	
14	50

FM PERMISNY SEP25/62 SECRET

TO EXTERNAL 1557 PRIORITY

REF OURTEL 1482 SEP17.

OFFICE SECURITY

THANKS FOR KEYS SHREDDER ETC

2. HAVE YOU OVERLOOKED REQUEST IN PARA2(A) OF OURLET 582 AUG17?

IS OUR PROPOSAL ACCEPTABLE?

3. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY OBJECTIONS TO OTHER PROPOSALS IN THIS SAME

LET AS WE ARE HOLDING UP REPRODUCTION OF STANDING INSTRUCTIONS

UNTIL APPROVAL GIVEN.

*Rep Made
into Intermission
Chain*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

SECRET

TO: The Canadian Permanent Mission
New York

Security: DS- 529

Date: Sept. 25, 1962

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Enclosures: Air
Air or Surface Mail:

Reference: Duties and Employment of Security
Subject: Guards

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
14	50

References

A number of our missions which have security guards on their establishment have raised certain problems concerning them with the Department, with the Regional Security Officer, London or with members of the Inspection Service. Although we have dealt with these problems on an individual basis, we thought that all missions which have guards might be interested in some of the observations we have made.

THREE GUARD SCHEDULES

2. At some of our three guard posts the guards have been working 15 or 16 hour shifts, or have been pressing for permission to work such shifts. We consider that the alertness of the guards will suffer if they work for double shifts. We have had guards fall asleep, become ill, have an accident or in other ways get into difficulties during the course of their shifts. Such problems have been more likely to occur during a longer shift, and the consequences are likely to be more serious. We also consider that there is a good deal of merit in having the windows, doors, keys and containers etc thoroughly checked each night by different guards at different times. For these reasons we have required that no guards work longer than 9 or 10 hours at a spell.

3. In the Security Manual we included a specimen three guard schedule. A number of guards have complained that this does not permit them to take much time away from the post. We have no objection to their working out their own schedules, provided that they do not work longer than 9 or 10 hours at the most in one shift or any 24 hour period and that all guards work an equal length of time in any 3 week period. As an example we attach a schedule which was worked out by our Embassy in Vienna. You will note that in every three week period each guard has two days off on two occasions and one day off on one occasion. For obvious reason it is impossible to take Saturday or Sunday off, but the guards are enabled to take equivalent time-off in the middle of the week.

TWO GUARD SCHEDULES

4. The two guard duty schedule laid down in the Security Manual was intended primarily to be used at three-man posts when one guard was on leave or absent for a temporary period. Unfortunately, owing to a shortage of personnel which may continue for some time in the present austerity period, some of our posts have been assigned only two guards for lengthy periods. The temporary schedule, which requires each guard to work every day, and to put in an average of 50 hours weekly, has therefore been somewhat unpopular. The hardships caused by this schedule may be alleviated by allowing

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

- 2 -


guards to sleep part of the nightshifts on the premises, using an alarm clock to wake up for periodic checks, by reducing slightly the number of hours they are required to work in the evening, and by arranging on occasions for other members of the mission to undertake spot checks on week-ends, so that the guards will not have to come in. As noted in the Security Manual, however, it is important that the premises not be left empty for more than three consecutive hours, and that the spot checks be varied in both length and timing. Any further suggestions which missions may have to reduce the inconvenience of two guard schedule will be appreciated. We hope of course to bring all missions up to their established strength as soon as possible and thereafter to keep them up to strength at all times.

QUARTERLY REPORTS

5. A number of our posts have asked their senior guard to prepare a report on the security of the Chancery at the end of each quarter. These reports have included comments on the work of the guards, including a summary of the occasions on which the guards have been below strength or have been forced to work overtime for other reasons; a summary of the security infractions during the period, including the names of the individuals responsible, and suggestions for reducing the number; a report on the condition of physical security equipment at the post, such as the shredder or incinerator, the door locks and the security containers, with recommendations for overhaul or replacement if appropriate; and recommendations for improving the general security of the post. You might wish to ask your senior guard to prepare such reports, if he is not already doing so in order to give him a regular opportunity to express his views on the security conditions of the missions. We would be happy to receive the first one or two of the reports for whatever comments we have to make on them, but do not intend to make it a requirement that they be sent regularly to Ottawa. We assume of course that the post security officer will relay promptly to the Regional Security Officer in London or to the Departmental Security Office in Ottawa any worthwhile suggestions which the senior guard may have for improving the security of the mission. Copies of the reports should, of course, be placed on file for use when your post is inspected.

ADDITIONAL EMPLOYMENT

6. A number of guards, particularly at the smaller missions, have complained that they are not given sufficient duties to keep them employed during their hours of work. We have noted that a number of posts have overlooked Appendix VI of the Security Manual, which contains an aide memoire for the non-technical searching of premises for the detection of intrusion devices. The Post Security Officer should ensure that all the guards are familiar with this aide memoire, and should work out with the senior guard a schedule whereby all of the sensitive office and the non-sensitive offices adjoining them are inspected by the guards, on a regular basis, and the results entered in the log book. As noted in the Security Manual other, non-security duties may also be assigned the guards, provided these do not interfere with their primary tasks of ensuring the security of the mission. It is of course essential that security guard logs be kept right up to the minute, in the greatest detail, and be regularly seen by the post security officer.


Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Week	Name	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
1.	A.	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400	OFF	0845 - 1700	0845 - 1700
	B.	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845	OFF	OFF	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400
	C.	OFF	OFF	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845
2.	B.	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400	OFF	0845 - 1700	0845 - 1700
	C.	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845	OFF	OFF	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400
	A.	OFF	OFF	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845
3.	C.	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400	OFF	0845 - 1700	0845 - 1700
	A.	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845	OFF	OFF	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400	1700 - 2400
	B.	OFF	OFF	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845	0001 - 0845

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO THE
UNITED NATIONS, New York.

Reference:.....

Subject:.....Taylor Safe:..New Combination.....

.....Settings.....

Security:.....**SECRET**.....

No:.....643.....

Date:.....September 19, 1962.....

Enclosures:.....1.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....**Air bag**.....

Post File No:.....**11-4**.....

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-10	
14	30

References

J. G. 25/11/62

In accordance with Section 407.3 of the Security Manual, the combinations of the Taylor Safe have been changed to-day and are attached to this letter in a sealed envelope addressed to the Departmental Security Officer.

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Carl B...
Permanent Mission.

Internal Circulation

D

Distribution to Posts

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

SEP 25 9 06 AM '62

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1962

SEP 25 1962

TO: [Illegible]
FROM: [Illegible]
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security **SECRET**

50048-AF-40		
43		✓

Type of Document..... as indicated below No..... Date.....

From.....

To.....

Subject:

a letter from Mr. Paul Tremblay, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, NYC, of August 17, 1962, re security of long distance conversations between Ottawa and NYC;

our memorandum to Communications Division of September 6 on the same subject;

our reply to Mr. Tremblay of September ¹⁴~~12~~, 1962

Original on File No..... 7110-B-40

Copies on File No.....

Other Cross Reference Sheets on.....

Prepared by..... Elsa Bruer

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FM: EXTERNAL OTTAWA	DATE	FILE		SECURITY
	18/9/62	50048-AF-40		RESTD.
TO: PERMIS N.Y.	NUMBER	43	52	COMCENTRE USE ONLY
	DS-314	PRECEDENCE PRIORITY		
INFO:				

Ref.:

Subject: SECURITY

~~SECRET~~ SHREDDER TO ARRIVE NEW YORK C.N. EXPRESS
WEDNESDAY. KEYS IN NEXT BAG.

LOCAL
DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG. NAME R.J. ANDREWS/kh	D.L.(2) DIVISION	2-7996	J. TIMMERMAN SIG. NAME J. TIMMERMAN 000393

50048-AF-40

Ottawa, Sept. 18, 1962

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations
New York.

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We are forwarding by (Courier 150) the following: -

1 key -23A719

5 keys -6A073

Sept 19

13

SEP 23 1962

Please refer to your letter No.600 of Aug.24/62

file and

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and return the original form Ext. 27R.

Return to rm.319,D.L.(2) E.B.

[Signature]
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in good order.

Permis, New York

2/9/62

[Signature]

Place

Date

Signature

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

SEP 26 11 18 AM '62

ACTION COPY

AKH

50048-AF-10	
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EP 18

FM PERMISNY SEP17/62 SECRET

TO EXTERNAL 1482 OPIMMED

REF OURLETS 582 AUG17 600 AUG24 AND DOBELL-TIMMERMAN TELECON
OFFICE KEYS

COULD WE PLEASE HAVE REPLIES TO ENQUIRIES RE OFFICE KEYS.

COMMENCEMENT OF ASSEMBLY MAKES NEED URGENT. WE ESPECIALLY REQUIRE
EXTRA KEYS FOR COMCENTRE DAY LOCK.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

FILE
 SSEA
 USSEA
 CIRCULATION
 DIARY
 S & P

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ad
for

FM: EXTERNAL OTT

DATE	FILE	SECURITY
SEPT 17 1962	9722-1170 50048-AA-10 17	UNCLAS

TO: PERMIS NY

NUMBER	PRECEDENCE
1323 F-	

INFO:

Ref.: URLET 613 OF AUGUST 29.

Subject: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS - CHANCERY

EXPENDITURE \$100 FOR ITEMS LISTED YOUR PARA 2 APPROVED.

cc: D.L. (2) Division- Reference your memorandum of September 13

Mr Francis
Mr Andrews

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION NO - STANDARD DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG J.A. Zoubie/ad NAME.....	S & P	2-3979	Original signed by J. A. ZOUBIE SIG..... NAME... H.A. Zoubie.....

17/9

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

File
[Signature]

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to
the United Nations, New York.

Reference: Our letter No. 582 of August 17,
1962

Subject: Local Security Arrangements

Security: SECRET
No: 613
Date: August 29, 1962.
Enclosures: none
Air or Surface Mail: Air bag
Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
14	50

[Handwritten signature]

TO:
SEP 6 1962
REGISTRY

References

D-2
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(13)

*Copy to S & P
with our memo
of 13/9/62*

We now have estimates for the several installations we propose to make for increasing office security.

- (a) Anti-intrusion chain on existing main door:
We have installed this ourselves and charged the cost of the chain to the office Blanket Authority.
- (b) Peephole on existing main door: We shall install this ourselves and charge the cost of the peephole to the office Blanket Authority.
- (c) Peepholes with wide angle lenses inside the Communications Room and Registry: We have been given an estimate of \$25.00 each for installing two peepholes. Total: \$50.00. We consider this work is essential, for reasons set out in previous letters.
- (d) Extension on existing bell to shredding room:
We have done this work ourselves and charged the cost of the bell to the office Blanket Authority.
- (e) Grilles between ceiling and false ceiling from line room to Communications room and from mail room to Registry: We have been given estimates of \$25.00 for each room. Total: \$50.00. We recommend strongly that this work should be done, particularly since you were not able to authorize the installation of the grille over the sliding panel leading into the line room from the corridor. It is now feasible to climb through the sliding panel and the vent in the ceiling and gain access to the Communications room.

2. Could you please inform us by telegram whether we have authority as follows:

\$50.00 for grilles in ceiling,
\$50.00 for peepholes.

We should very much like to have this work completed before the Assembly begins.

[Signature]
Permanent Mission. 000398

Internal Circulation

[Handwritten initials]

Distribution to Posts

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

SEP 5 11 55 AM '62

NO ENCLOSURES

(1) [Illegible text]

(2) [Illegible text]

(3) [Illegible text]

(4) [Illegible text]

(5) [Illegible text]

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

NUMBERED LETTER

M. D. ...
M. Keys
SECRET

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to the
United Nations, New York.

Reference:
Subject: Request for: (1) extra key for day
lock on main door of Mission. Key No. 23A719. (2) Extra keys for
day lock on Line Room door, Communications Centre - Key No. 6A073.

Security: SECRET
No: 600
Date: August 24, 1962
Enclosures: none
Air or Surface Mail: Air bag
Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
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g29

References

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(13)
AUG 29 1962

We should be grateful if you would provide us with an additional key for the newly-installed Yale 048 lock on the main door of the Mission. When we receive the extra key we shall place it, together with a key for the night lock, in a wax sealed envelope and deposit both in the Consulate General for emergency purposes only.

2. A Yale 048 lock has now been installed on the door of the Line Room of Communications Centre. This measure will provide daytime security only. As the door is also fitted with a key-operated Yale lock designed to give basic protection, especially during the silent hours, we see no objection to each member of Communications Section having a key for the new lock. We, therefore, will need five additional keys which we would appreciate receiving as soon as possible. This lock replaces the snap lock built into the door handle which has until now been used to provide daytime security.

1 Key - 23A719
5 Keys - 6A073
Keys sent
18/9/62
usf

John Doherty
Permanent Mission.

file
usf

NO ENCLOSURES

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

AUG 29 1 40 PM '62

NO ENCLOSURES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

RE: [Illegible]

[Illegible text]

[Illegible text]

Supplies and Properties Division

Restricted

August 24, 1962

D.L.(2) Division

Permis N.Y. Letter 561 of Aug. 16/62

50048-AF-40	
17	✓

Shredder

... Attached is a copy of the letter under reference. We feel that the difficulty the mission is facing in disposing of very large quantities of classified waste can be solved by an additional shredder. Would you therefore arrange for the small T-4 model to be supplied to the mission as soon as possible.

J. TIMMERMAN

D.L.(2) Division

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

S.S.E.A.
U.S.S.E.A.
CIRCULATION
S. & P.
PROPERTIES
DIARY

File

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DATE	FILE	SECURITY
AUG 22/62	9722 F-1-40 50048-AF-40 ✓	SECRET

FM: EXTERNAL GTT

TO:	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE
PERMANENT MISSION, NEW YORK	F- 1199	PRIORITY

INFO:		
-------	--	--

Ref.: YURTEL 1263 AUG 14/62

Subject: LOCAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

REGRET SHORTAGE FUNDS NECESSITATES POSTPONING THIS WORK. WILL PROVIDE FUNDS 63 - 64 ESTIMATES.

Mr Andrews:

In note in relation to my memo to you of today
J 23/8

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

NO STANDARD - LOCAL DONE BY DIVISION

cc: D.L. II ✓

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG. NAME J. A. ZOUBIE/rz	S. & P.	2-3979	Original J. A. ZOUBIE SIG. NAME J. A. ZOUBIE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

SECRET

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to the
United Nations, New York.

Reference: Your Letter DS-386 of July 26, 1962.

Subject: Local Security Arrangements

Security:.....

No:..... 582

Date: August 17, 1962.

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail: Air bag

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.

50048-AF-40

14

5-0

References

Thank you for your letter under reference commenting on our various proposals for increasing the security of the Mission. We are assuming that, where you have not commented on a suggestion of ours, you approve our introduction of it. We are therefore seeking estimates and requesting authority for expenditure for the following installations:

- (a) A peephole and an anti-intrusion chain on the existing main door.
- (b) An extension on the existing bell to the shredding room. (This is even more important while the office is still split into two sections.)
- (c) Peepholes with wide-angle lenses into the Communications room and the Registry.
- (d) A grille over the panel for passing telegrams to the Communications staff.
- (e) Key locks on the grille doors leading to the Communications room and Registry.
- (f) A new day lock on the main door with only three keys (one for the guards, one for the Communications Centre and one to be placed in a sealed envelope in the Consulate General).
- (g) Grilles between ceiling and false ceiling from line room to communications room and from mail room to Registry.

2. We would like to take up the following points raised in your letter under reference:

- (a) Key system. We accept your objections to a master key system. We should like instead to suggest that keys for all offices should be permanently retained by the incumbent of the office as is the practice in Ottawa. This would avoid the need for the guard opening office doors in the morning, and offices would remain locked until occupied. During the day officers may be in and out of the building as many as ten times, often rushing out at the last moment. It is extremely unlikely that we would be able satisfactorily to ensure that each officer left the key to his office on the key

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AUG 23 1962

Internal Circulation

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Distribution to Posts

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY

AUG 23 3 00 PM '62

NO ENCLOSURES

board each time he went out of the office. Especially during the General Assembly, meetings may last considerably longer than anticipated and officers may leave directly from the United Nations building either to go home or to a reception. If by accident they had taken their office key with them, this would mean keeping it during the night. It is also unlikely that officers would always pick up the key from the board when they entered the office in the morning, and would therefore not close their office each time that they went out. For all of these reasons, we should like to suggest that officers should be made responsible for the safekeeping of their own office keys. We realize that there are objections to this proposal, but we consider that on balance and taking into account the working conditions at this Mission this system would increase our security more than a key board system would. We should of course maintain a key board for the second key to each office and for the other security keys.

- (b) Combination of Communications Centre Vault Door. We should like to propose a compromise suggestion for the safekeeping of the combination to the Communications room vault door. A copy of that combination is now being retained in a sealed envelope in a Chubb Cabinet in the Registry. Only the guards and the Registry staff know in which Cabinet this has been placed. We are also prepared to conceal the combination for the Registry vault door, by relating it in some way to the combination of the guard's cabinet. The same combination would be set on the cabinet in which the Communications centre vault door combination had been placed. This system should provide additional protection. Someone seeking to enter the Communications centre would have to know: (a) in which cabinet the combination was placed; (b) the ~~key~~^{code} to the registry vault door combination; and (c) the combination of the guard's cabinet and (d) the ~~key~~^{code} to the combination of the cabinet in which the combination was placed. Our main desire is to make sure that the system will not break down in the event of an emergency, because of a memory failure. Naturally if the envelope with the combination were to be opened by the guard in the event of an emergency, it would be noted in the log book and resealed in the Security Officer's presence.
- (c) Head of Mission's Security Container. At present the combinations of all cabinets of officers are placed in a sealed envelope in the Taylor safe in the Registry. If we were not authorized to retain a copy of the combination for the Head of Mission's cabinet in a sealed envelope in the Guard's cabinet, ~~and~~ the guard, if asked to open it, would first have to find someone who could open the Registry Taylor safe for him and would then have to open the envelope with all of the combinations. Moreover during the weekend Registry personnel may not be available, and it would then be impossible for him to open it. Our suggestion was made because from past experience the Head of Mission has requested the guard to open his cabinet as many as 20 or 30 times a year. We felt that by isolating its combination we would at the same time make it possible for the Head of Mission's request to be fulfilled immediately, and at the same time limit the

- 3 -

guard's knowledge to the combination of the one cabinet. Of course, he would be required to state in the log that he had opened the cabinet and the combination would have to be resealed in the presence of the Security Officer. (We have not considered asking the Head of Mission himself to remember the combination, since his cabinet is regularly opened by his secretary and the only way for him to remember would be by writing it down. It was to avoid writing it down that we suggested it be held in a sealed envelope.)

- (d) Book Cypher Material. We are doubtful of the advantage of placing the OTP's and book cypher material in the Taylor safe in Registry. The safe has a limited amount of space and there is more top secret material, which we consider has priority, than will go into that safe. Nor do we consider that the danger of a lockout on the Communications centre vault door is serious. There is no danger of losing the combinations as we keep a copy in the Registry safe. If the door were to jam, it would then have to be opened by a technician who would presumably be available immediately. Even if it were to be drilled, the delay would amount at most to only a few hours.


Permanent Mission.

Field
[Signature]

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

RESTRICTED

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to
the United Nations, New York.

Reference: Your Letter DS-384 of July 25, 1962.

Subject: Shredder

Security:.....

No:..... *561*

Date:..... August 16, 1962.

Enclosures:..... none

Air or Surface Mail:..... Air bag

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AP-40	
14	25

[Handwritten mark]

References

We are very pleased with your suggestion that you send us a T-4 model shredder. We plan to place this in the Communications Centre and Communications staff are willing to carry out the immediate destruction of tapes and other material produced in their section. The destruction of tapes should alone significantly lighten the work of destruction, since this material is at present being processed three times in the larger machine.

2. We are hopeful that you will be able to send us the T-4 shredder by early September so that we can have it in operation before the seventeenth session begins.

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(3)
AUG 20 1962

Internal Circulation

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[Signature]
Permanent Mission

NO ENCLOSURES

Copy with memo to S&P

[Signature]
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Distribution to Posts

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGISTRY
AUG 20 11 03 AM '62

NO ENCLOSURES

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TO :

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50098-AF-
14 | 50

FM PERMISNY AUG14/62 SECRET

TO EXTERNAL 1263 PRIORITY

REF OURLET 367 MAY29 AND YOURLET DS386 JUL26

LOCAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

CANNOT RPT NOT PROCEED WITH INSTALLATION OF SECURITY GRILLE GATE
AND CHANGING LOCKS ON TWO EXISTING GATES UNTIL AUTHORITY REQUESTED
IN OURLET UNDER REF RECEIVED.

Mr Keyes:

E/h 20/8/62

*Would you please look into this
and speak*

*J
15/8*

*copy sent
to Mr. Zoub
for action*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York

Security: S.E.C.R.E.T.

No: DS-386

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Date: July 26, 1962

Enclosures:

Reference: Your letter No. 377 of June 4, 1962

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Subject: Local Security Arrangements

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
50048-13-40	
14	50

References

We have reviewed the various points raised in your letter under reference as well as the attachments.

2. FRONT DOOR

We have agreed with the suggestion of Supplies and Properties Division that the main door be a double door. We have asked that one side of the door be secured by tower bolts and the other side equipped with the locks you have suggested. In effect one door only will be used. We agree with the limitation you have placed on the front door key.

PARAGRAPH 3(e)

We agree with the suggestion that an extension to the main entrance bell be installed in the area where shredding is done.

PARAGRAPH 6

If the corridor leading to the present registry becomes a means of internal communication after the reconstruction has been completed, will this not involve the use of your recently suggested U.N. Registry as part of the same means of communication? If this is so, traffic through the U.N. Registry would seem undesirable although acceptable in the security sense providing no Canadian classified documents are ever stored there. We would agree to the installation of a lock on the door to the mail room as suggested.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

- 2 -

PARAGRAPH 8

The principal objection to a master key system would be that the loss or compromise of the master key would compromise all security locks and result in costly re-pinning of the locks and the cutting of new keys. While there is much to be said for the convenience of a master key for a mission of your size you might wish to consider both this and the cost involved in having the system installed.

PARAGRAPH 5

In applying the recommendation that office doors should be locked during temporary absences, there is of course no objection to members of the mission carrying keys for their individual offices during the daytime. They should be returned to the key board in registry during daytime absences however and to the security guard on leaving the mission in the evening. The guards will maintain a key-log for this purpose.

PARAGRAPH 9

We feel that the security guard log book should be examined daily. However if the pressure of other duties prohibits this, the verbal reports made by the security guards in the morning (or by telephone during the night) should not be in lieu of log entries. All incidents should be recorded in the log.

PARAGRAPHS 13 and 14

We agree that in the event of fire in the registry or communication centre the security guards should have ready access to both combinations. We would suggest that they be encoded by the addition of a number known to all three security guards (the combination of each vault could be added to the combination of their own cabinet and the sum of each recorded). The records of these combinations should be placed in separate sealed envelopes and initialed by the security officer. If it should be necessary to make use of them a log entry should be made by the guard and the envelope resealed by the security officer.

.../3

- 3 -

PARAGRAPH 15

We appreciate the convenience of having the security guard open the container for the head of mission. However as it does violate the basic "need to know" principle we feel the practice should be discouraged.

PARAGRAPH 16

We agree with your placing a record of the registry Taylor Safe in the communication centre Taylor Safe and vice versa. Both combinations should be held in sealed envelopes.

PARAGRAPH 20

We would agree to the relocation of the switch-board so that it faces the entry door. This will no doubt contribute to the control of the many visitors.

2. Your Post Security Orders and Standing Orders for Security Guards have been reviewed and were found to be most comprehensive. We should like to make the following comments:

PARAGRAPH 17 - (Standing Security Orders)

As an additional precaution and if there is sufficient room in the Taylor Safe in Registry you may wish to place the one-time pads and book cypher material, wrapped and sealed, in the Taylor Safe in Registry. This would provide a second means of secure communication should you ever be faced with a temporary lock-out on the vault door of the communications area.

PARAGRAPH 21

Our own feeling on emergency destruction is that once such a decision has been arrived at, destruction should begin with the higher classifications rather than with the less important files. The decision to destroy the material which provides your secure means of communication would, of course, be dictated by circumstances.

PARAGRAPH 29

As stated above there is no objection to members of the mission carrying security keys which give access to their offices. These could be obtained in the morning either from Registry or the security guard and an appropriate entry made in a key control sheet. The guard will be responsible to see that the keys are turned in at the close of the day and an appropriate entry made in the key log. When members leave the mission during the daytime the keys could be replaced on the board in registry.

A. R. FRANCIS

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

000413

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to the
United Nations, New York

Reference:

Subject: Combination of Security Containers

Security:..... Secret

No:..... 489

Date:..... 13 July, 1962

Enclosures:..... 2

Air or Surface Mail:..... air

Post File No:..... 11.4

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
27	50

July 13/62

References

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This is to certify that:

- a. the settings of all the security combination locks in use at this Mission have been changed as required in the Security Instructions.
- b. the new settings are enclosed in the attached envelope addressed to the Departmental Security Officer, which has been prepared and sealed as prescribed in section 108.6 of the Security Manual.
- c. the official record of such combinations is kept at this post in accordance with section 109.7 of the security manual.
- d. all spare security combination padlocks in the custody of this Mission have been set on the neutral combination 10-20-30, and each lock is properly labelled to show the combination on which it is set.
- e. all the combination locks in the custody of this Mission are in good working order and no difficult was experienced with any of them since their combination settings were last reported.

Internal Circulation

D

Charles Stedman
Permanent Mission

Distribution to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM:

Reference:

Subject:

Security:
No.:
Date:
Enclosures:
Air or Surface Mail:
Post File No.:

Ottawa File No.	

The following information has been obtained from the records of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, in connection with the above mentioned matter.

On 10/10/50, the following information was received from the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, in connection with the above mentioned matter.

The following information was received from the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, in connection with the above mentioned matter.

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The following information was received from the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, in connection with the above mentioned matter.

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References

Internal
Classification

Classification
by Date

ACTION COPY

50048-AF-10
49150

FM PERMINY JUL11/62 RESTD

TO EXTERNAL 1111

REF YOURTEL DS274 JUL10

SHREDDER

SERIAL NO3776.FULL REPORT IN OURLET 469. JUL9

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W.A. [Signature]
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JUL 12 1962

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to
the United Nations, New York.

Reference: Your Telegram DS-273 of June 27, 1962
and Mr. Timmerman's personal letter to
Subject: Halstead of April 28, 1961.

Security:

No: 469

Date: July 9, 1962.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air bag

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	CC 50048-AF-40
	3607-40
	43(27)

SHREDDER

*Mr. Timmerman's copy
file 17*

References

Our shredder is model No. 350, 220 volts,
3 h.p. and has a cutting width of 2 m.m. Ser. # 3776

2. Since receiving your telegram under reference we carried out two further tests - one to check our results in handling typical waste and a second, shredding clean paper under conditions presumably comparable to those described in your letter under reference. The results with typical waste were the same as those we reported to you in our Letter 432 of June 18. With clean paper we achieved comparable results to those mentioned in your letter under reference. We were able to put 4 lbs. of bond twice through the machine in 5 minutes. We also experimented putting a number of sheets through the machine at the same time. We were only able to put 14 pages through the machine and even then the machine was obviously under strain and could not have continued at the same pace. It actually jammed with 15 pages. Possibly when the knives were new the machine could have taken a few more pages.

3. The following factors perhaps explain the smaller results which we have achieved in handling regular waste:

- (a) Confidential waste is often crumpled or torn into small pieces or stapled together. It has to be flattened out before being fed into the machine, and only a few sheets of crumpled paper will fit into the machine at one time. Tapes take longer, not only because they have to be fed through the machine three times but also because they are rolled in communications and have to be unrolled, a process which takes considerable time.
- (b) Apart from regular paper, the stencils used in communications and some of the special paper which they use have to be fed through the machine one at a time and very carefully.
- (c) The efficiency of the machine deteriorates progressively in use and it has to be

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JUL 11 1962

Internal Circulation

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Distribution to Posts

NO ENCLOSURES

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[The body of the document contains several paragraphs of text that are extremely faint and illegible due to low contrast and poor scan quality. The text appears to be a formal letter or report, but the specific content cannot be discerned.]

NO ENCLOSURES
302 JUL 18 PM 1:51

stopped in order to cool it down and also to permit brushing and oiling.

- (d) Possibly the knives have become slightly dulled through use.

4. In spite of these difficulties and the considerably smaller capacity of the machine than you had originally anticipated, we are convinced that it is useful. It has been of advantage in reducing the accumulation of waste and in saving the labour and expense of sending waste to Washington for destruction.



Permanent Mission.

50048-AF-40	
43	✓

Ottawa, June 19, 1962.

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

**TO: THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA to THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK.**

We are forwarding by (Courier ¹⁰²) the following:-

June 2d

1 (One) 197 deadlock with 2 keys Nos. 4A572

Please refer to your tel. No.958 of June 15/62

filed

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JUN 27	

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and return the original form Ext. 27R.

F. G. Reyes

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Return to rm.319,D.L.(2) E.B.

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in good order.

_____	_____ <i>June 21-62</i>	_____ <i>M. A. Doyens</i>
Place	Date	Signature

D

FILE COPY

50048-	AF-40
27	J. Andrews:

*file
WJ*

J 18/6

FM PERMISNY JUN15/62 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 958
MISSION SECURITY

IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE SECURE LOCK INSTALLED ON FIRE EXIT DOOR IN SOUTHWEST CORNER OFFICE PREMISES PRIOR TO ALTERATIONS IN OFFICE LAYOUT WHICH WE HOPE TO COMMENCE NEXT TWO WEEKS. FOR THIS PURPOSE WE WILL REQUIRE ONE 197 YALE DEADLOCK-KNOB OPERATED WITH CYLINDER AND TWO KEYS. PLEASE FORWARD LOCK BY COURIER BAG NOT RPT NOT LATER THAN JUN21. INSTALLATION SCHEDULED JUN23 AT APPROX DOLLARS 10. PLEASE AUTHORIZE EXPENDITURE.

*Se
18/6*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to the
United Nations, New York.

Reference:

Subject: Combinations in Communications
Centre.

J.L.

Security: **SECRET**

No: *395*

Date: June 11, 1962.

Enclosures: *1*

Air or Surface Mail: **Air bag**

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-10	
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References

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JUN 18 1962

Attached in a sealed envelope are the
new combinations for the security containers in the
Communications Centre other than the Taylor Safe.

file up

W. Barton
Permanent Mission.

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to Posts

022 JUN 18 PM 12:23

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

File
[Signature]

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to the
United Nations, New York.

Reference:.....

Subject: Taylor Safe: New Combination Settings

Security: SECRET

No: 382

Date: June 8, 1962.

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail: Air bag

Post File No: 11 x 4

Ottawa File No.	
50048 AF-10	
14	52

[Handwritten initials]

References

The door of the Taylor Safe in the Registry of this Mission has now been repaired by Mosler Safe Co., New York.

2. In accordance with Section 407.3 of the Security Manual, the combinations of the Taylor Safe have been changed to-day and are attached to this letter in a sealed envelope addressed to the Departmental Security Officer.

[Signature]
Permanent Mission.

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Internal Circulation

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Distribution to Posts



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Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

1992 JUN 13 PM 2:20

1992 JUN 13 PM 2:20

50048-AF-10
141

Ottawa, June 6, 1962.

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The Permanent Mission of Canada, to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

SURFACE MAIL

We are forwarding by () the following:-

44 - June 7/62

25 (Twenty-Five) 048 locks with 2 keys each.

Nos. 21A248, 23A407, 22A875, 21A573, 21A203, 23A102, 23A390,
16A352, 22A377, 20A522, 19A348, 23A695, 21A666, 21A442, 10A567,
16A060, 1A506, 21A545, 21A474, 13A754, 23A922, 21A603, 19A856,
18A693, 16A530.

Please refer to our tel.No.DS-257 of June 1, 1962.

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and
return the original form Ext. 27R.



Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Return to rm.319, D.L.(2) E.B.

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in
good order.

_____ June 11-62 _____ M. J. Burgess
Place Date Signature

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Supplies and Properties Division

SECRET (with attachment)
Unclassified without

June 6, 1962

D.L.(2) Division

Pennis NY letter 367 of May 29, 1962

50048-AF-40	
43	—

Security arrangements - Chancery

...
Attached is a copy of the letter under reference. We agree to the modifications and request that you raise the necessary authority.

J. TIMMERMAN

D.L.(2) Division

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

File
~~SECRET~~ without DS-55
~~SECRET~~

NUMBERED LETTER

Mr Francis:

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to
the United Nations, New York.

Reference: Your Letters DS-155 of Mar. 5/58,
DS-396 of Jul 9/59, DS-55 of

Subject: Feb. 1960 and DS-196 of Apr. 27/61.

Local Security Arrangements

Security:.....
No:..... 377
Date: June 4, 1962
Enclosures: 5
Air or Surface Mail: Air bag
Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-42	
27	52

References

Our review of security procedures at this Mission has now been completed. This letter is intended to inform you of actions taken in accordance with instructions in your letters under reference or of alternative suggestions which we have to make. Enclosed with this letter are draft local standing security orders, local standing orders for guards, a check list to be completed by guards when changing combinations, and a memorandum for Parliamentary Observers and others not cleared for classified material who are attached to this Mission for General Assembly or for conferences. Also returned is *enclosure* to your letter DS-55 as requested in paragraph 7 of that letter. The standing orders are drafted on the assumption that our recommendations are accepted. In the event that you should modify any of our suggestions, adjustments may be required on the standing orders.

Placed on file

2. We deal below with a number of specific problems under clearly marked headings.

FRONT DOOR (Reference your letter DS-196)

3. With the acquisition of the remaining space on the 28th floor of this building, we have drawn up a reconstruction programme to be undertaken this summer which would reduce the number of entrances from four to two. The back entrance to our new section will be kept permanently locked. This change will considerably improve our security. Supplies and Properties Division has recommended for the main door a double door as being more impressive. We have proposed a single door for reasons of security. We recommend the installation on this door of one dead-latch lock and one spring-latch lock. We agree that the dead-latch lock should normally be locked at 1900 hours except when there are two security guards on duty, which will probably be the case during the General Assembly. No keys will be issued to members of the staff for either of these locks. The only exception will be keys retained by the guards, and one key for each lock in Communications for emergency purposes, to be retained in the Taylor safe. Occasionally during the summer holiday period when there are only two security guards, which means carrying out spot checks on Sundays, a Communicator may be alone in the office. If he is required to go to the United Nations for an emergency telegram, he needs a key to regain entry to the office.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

4. We propose to introduce the following additional security features:

- (a) that the door should be equipped with a strong compressor so that it will snap security shut when only the spring-latch lock has been locked. (The reasons are explained in the section on cleaning of offices in the standing security orders.) (This is a new recommendation.)
- (b) We agree that the door should be equipped with a strong anti-intrusion chain.
- (c) We agree that the peep-hole should be installed in the door;
- (d) We agree that separate keys for each of the two locks should be placed in the safe of the Consulate-General in case of a lock-out.
- (e) We suggest that when the new bell for the main entrance is installed, an extension should be installed so that it rings in the area where shredding is done. The machine is noisy and a guard working there during quiet hours might not hear the doorbell. (This is a new recommendation.)

OFFICE DOORS (Reference your letter DS-196)

5. We agree with your recommendation that spring-latch locks should be placed on all office doors and that the doors should be locked when offices are empty unless classified material has been locked up. We have already asked for authority to apply this recommendation.

6. The corridor which leads to the Registry and to Communications Centre will, after the reconstruction, become an internal means of communication with the new section of the office. It is therefore no longer feasible to consider locking this area. We propose to remove the dead-latch lock on the door leading to this area and to install a similar type of lock on the present door leading to the Mail Room. As you will note from the standing security orders, if the Registry is vacant during working hours, the gate on Registry proper and this door leading to the Mail Room are to be locked. The lock on the outside door will also give additional security to the Registry area during quiet hours. Could you indicate whether you approve of this new recommendation?

KEY SYSTEM

7. The system for handling keys is set out in the standing orders.

8. We should also like to recommend that there should be a master key for the offices (excluding external doors, the Registry and the Communications area). This would make it unnecessary for the guard accompanying the cleaning staff during the evening to carry the key board. It would also facilitate his opening offices when members of the staff arrive in the morning. We also believe that

Mr. Keyes /

- 3 -

providing a master key for the guard would decrease the danger of a member of the staff taking a key out of the building.

GUARDS (Reference your letter DS-196)

9. Since the visit of Mr. Andrews the Security Guards have been maintaining a log book in detail. We propose that the Head Guard should present the log book personally to the Post Security Officer once a week. In this very busy Mission it is not feasible for the Post Security Officer or his Deputy to examine the log book daily. We are aware that there are dangers in not examining the log book daily, but to limit this danger the duty guard is instructed to bring any suspicious event to the attention of the Post Security Officer the following morning - unless he has already done so by telephone during the night.

10. Guards are no longer leaving the office on weekends to take lunch and will not be permitted to do so in future.

11. The Security Guards have been equipped with a security container in which they can keep their equipment and any classified material which may have been left over night. An office has been allocated to them as a guard room. Unfortunately during the Assembly they will not be able to use this office and will have to keep their container in the Mail Room.

PEEPHOLES FOR REGISTRY AND COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE

(Reference your letter DS-196)

12. We are attracted by your suggestion of putting a peep-hole between the wall of the Mail Room and Registry and another between the Line Room and Communications Centre. We would recommend in the latter case that there should be some means of closing the peep-hole from inside the Communications Centre so that during the summer, for example, when there are only two guards on duty and the guards are carrying out spot checks over some weekends, it would be possible to make sure that no one could see through the peep-hole. We are seeking an estimate of the cost of installing these two peep-holes and we will ask for authority when we have it. Once these peep-holes have been installed, it will no longer be necessary for the Security Guards to open the Registry vault door to scan the Communications Centre through the wicket between these two rooms.

COMBINATIONS (Reference your letter DS-196)

13. We have been concerned about the need to gain speedy access to Registry and the Communications Centre in the event of (a) fire or (b) surreptitious entry through a window. We should like to recommend that a copy of the combination of the vault door of Registry should be placed in a sealed envelope in the cabinet of the Security Guards. This combination would only be used in the event of an emergency and its use would be reported the following morning to the Post Security Officer.

14. We should like to suggest a slightly more complicated system for the vault door of the Communications Centre. At present the combination of this door is known

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only to the members of the Communications Centre staff. In the event of an emergency it would be necessary to call one of the members of that staff to the office before any action could be taken. We propose that the combination for this door might be placed in a cabinet in Registry. To secure it the guard would have to open the vault door of Registry. He would know which cabinet contained the combination for the Communications Centre vault and he would also know, although again there would be no written indication, that the cabinet in question had the same number as the vault door of Registry.

15. We also wish to recommend that a copy of the combination for the Head of Mission's cabinet should be placed in an envelope in the Guards' cabinet. As the Head of Mission has his cabinet opened regularly for him, he has not known the combination. Yet he frequently came to the office on a Sunday and asked the Security Guard to open his cabinet for him. Since we propose to retain combinations for officers' cabinets in the Taylor/safe in the Registry and since the guard will not have the combination for this safe, it would be necessary for him if he is asked to open that cabinet to call the Head of Mission's secretary or a member of the Registry staff unless there is a copy in their cabinet.

16. We should like to take advantage of the fact that we have two Taylor safes in the offices, each in a secure area. We propose that combinations for containers and the Taylor safe in the Registry should be kept in the Taylor safe in the Communications Centre and vice versa. This would greatly reduce the danger of a lockout. It would also mean that if it were necessary in an emergency to gain access to the cabinets or the Taylor safe in the Registry we could turn to the Communications staff if no member of Registry could be found. Since there are seven Communications Centre personnel, the likelihood of finding at least one of them would be much greater.

17. We have now arranged that guards destroy their records of the combinations as soon as they have set them. We have also taken steps to restrict any single combination to a maximum of six cabinets in Registry. In changing the combinations the guards are conforming with Departmental instructions. With a large office staff the changing of combinations is best done during the quiet hours. We have made an exception of the Taylor safe, which is changed during office hours and checked as an added protection against a lockout.

18. We shall proceed immediately with the repair of the Taylor safe in Registry. Once this has been completed, we shall be in a position to make more use of the Taylor safe for Top Secret documents.

RECEPTION ARRANGEMENTS

19. We intend to revise considerably the reception arrangements during the period of the General Assembly in order to secure better coverage not only of visitors to the office but of members of the staff. We propose to do this principally by asking the Social Secretary to act as a receptionist and to sit in the enlarged reception area between 9.00 and 11.30 a.m. and 2.15 and 3.45 p.m. This

will leave the telephonist free to handle the switchboard which is extremely busy during the period of the General Assembly. The receptionist will be responsible for checking all members of the staff in and out. (This will, incidentally, have other advantages for us.) She will also ask members of the staff whether they have left their keys in the key box. During the morning period a guard will also be available to escort visitors.

20. We have recommended in our telegram 848 of May 29 that our present switchboard should be replaced by a larger one. We intend to place the board directly facing the door. The telephonist will no longer have to turn at a 90° angle every time she handles a call. This will make it possible for the telephonist throughout the year, and during the General Assembly when the special receptionist is not on duty, to check all persons in and out of the office. At present it is quite feasible for someone to walk past the telephonist if she is busy at the board. (This is a new proposal and we should be grateful for your comments.)

REGISTRY PROCEDURE (Reference your letter DS-196)

21. We have decided that it is not feasible to exclude members of the staff and particularly officers from the Registry at all times. It is desirable from the point of view of efficient filing that there should be close contact between Registry personnel and officers. We recognize, however, that especially during the General Assembly it is undesirable to have frequent movement into the Registry. You will note that our standing security orders have been drafted to discourage entry into the Registry. We have also adopted your proposal to put up racks for mail and unclassified documents. We have one rack for the old section of the office and one for the new section. The confidential messenger attached to the Registry during the General Assembly is also under instructions to make frequent deliveries of classified documents.

CONFERENCE ROOM (Reference your letter DS-55)

22. We have carried out one of the suggestions in your letter under reference, by filling the gaps beside the air-conditioning and other pipes close to the heating and air-conditioning system. We do not think that much value would be gained by removing the library (we do not have enough space elsewhere) and we should like to recommend that the telephone (which is useful) and the electric clock should be left where they are. Our principal reason for these suggestions is the fact that the conference room is never used for confidential discussions. It is used almost exclusively for briefing sessions during the General Assembly which are attended by all staff members and observers, so that highly confidential information is not revealed, and for giving talks to visiting groups. The main protection in any case will be the increased control of access to the conference room.

HOLE IN FALSE CEILING (Reference your letter DS-55)

23. We are requesting estimates for placing grills over the holes in the wall above the false ceiling between the Mail Room and the Registry and the Line Room and Communications Centre.

24. As you will note we have adopted and are applying or preparing to apply almost all of your recommendations in your letters under reference. We have included a few new suggestions of our own in which we would like to have your approval or comments. We should also be pleased to have your comments on our draft standing security orders for the Mission and for the guards.



Permanent Mission.

SECRET

THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

STANDING SECURITY ORDERS

The Standing Security Orders and chapters 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 of the Department's Security Instructions are to be read by all Canadian members of the Mission on their arrival at the Post and at least once every six months thereafter. Normally this will be during January and July. The Mission is required to certify twice a year to the Department that this procedure has been carried out.

2. Special problems of a security nature arise at this Mission because during the period of the General Assembly the staff is enlarged by a substantial delegation with accompanying observers. The Mission also, from time to time, provides office space for officials of other Canadian Government Departments who may be representing Canada at U.N. conferences, committees, etc. During the period of the General Assembly certain revisions of the normal security procedures will be introduced to cope with the special problems created.

STAFF MEMBERS WITH SPECIAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES

3. The Head of Mission is responsible for the security of the Mission. Mr. William Barton, the Deputy Head of Mission, is the Post Security Officer. He is responsible for supervising the activities of the Security Guards and for ensuring that the local Standing Security Orders and other security procedures are

- 2 -

observed.

4. Mr. Peter Dobell is Deputy Post Security Officer. He acts as the alternate to Mr. Barton and is specifically charged with maintaining the Task Book for the Security Guards, the nature of which is described in a subsequent paragraph.

5. All Canadian members of the Mission are responsible for ensuring that the security of the Mission is maintained and they should report immediately to the Post Security Officer or his deputy any breaches of security or any suspected breaches of security.

6. Three Security Guards are normally employed at the Mission. A fourth Guard is attached to the Mission during the period of the General Assembly. The principal task of the Security Guards is to maintain Mission security especially during the hours in which the office is unoccupied. Their main duties involve insuring that cabinets are locked, that the vault doors to Registry and the Communications Centre are secure and the doors to other areas of the office are locked, that no classified documents are exposed, no classified material is left in waste baskets and that any visitors to the office are carefully controlled. In addition to these regular tasks, they have additional tasks to carry out during the hours in which the office is unoccupied. These include the destruction of classified waste and the operation of the telephone switchboard. During the daytime the principal responsibility of the Security

- 3 -

Guard, while on duty, is to ensure that proper security is maintained.

7. Should a Canadian member of the staff consider that a task should be performed which is not specified in the above summary of responsibilities, they should direct their request to the Deputy Post Security Officer who, if he approves, will include the task in the Task Book. This could include repairing locks, adjusting combinations on locks and cabinets.

HANDLING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

8. The Registry is physically divided into three parts, the Registry proper, the Mail Room and the Documents Room.

9. Canadian members of the staff, apart from Registry personnel, should normally keep out of the Registry proper unless it is necessary for them to consult directly with Registry personnel or to examine Registry material themselves. Access to the Mail Room should be restricted to External Affairs employees and to the Military Adviser and his staff. They should enter the Mail Room as infrequently as possible.

Normally the distribution of documents from the Mail Room to the offices should be undertaken by one of the Registry staff.

10. During the General Assembly it is especially important to limit access to the Mail Room. There should be little need for access since confidential messengers are attached to the Delegation for the

- 4 -

purpose of carrying documents between the offices and Registry. During the General Assembly two mail racks for unclassified material are set up in each section of the office so that Observers and members of the Delegation may collect unclassified documents and personal correspondence without having to enter the Mail Room.

11. The Documents Room contains unclassified material only and no classified material should be taken into it.

CIRCULATION OF DOCUMENTS

12. Documents should only be circulated within the office by Registry Confidential Messengers, Officers or their Secretaries. Incoming letters containing personnel information should be referred in the first instance to the Administrative Officer who will indicate what circulation, if any, is to be given. Correspondence of a personal nature or marked "to be opened by addressee only" should be taken by hand to the Officer to whom it is addressed and under no circumstances should circulation be made.

13. Copies of documents marked Top Secret or Canadian Eyes Only should be circulated to the Head of Mission, Deputy Head of Mission and the Action Officer. The former material should be circulated in sealed envelopes. Top Secret documents and NATO COSMIC material should be returned to Registry for retention

- 5 -

in the Taylor safes at night. COSMIC material should be filed only in the Taylor safes. Insofar as possible Top Secret material should also be filed in the Taylor safe, and as a minimum in security containers rather than cabinets with bar and clasp locks.

CIRCULATION TO MILITARY ADVISER

14. Classified material may be circulated to the Military Adviser on the same basis as to other Officers of the Mission.

RETENTION OF MATERIAL OVERNIGHT

15. All offices are equipped with barred cabinets or security containers. Officers should not retain overnight in their offices Top Secret or other specially classified material such as COSMIC documents. This material should be returned to Registry.

16. The Taylor safe in Registry should be used to store COSMIC and Top Secret documents, combinations and other highly classified material.

17. The Taylor safe in Communications should be used to store highly classified material and, insofar as possible, ^{OTP's} the basic communications book and book cipher.

CLASSIFIED WASTE

18. Classified waste should at all times be retained in Registry and the Communications Centre. This will include all waste, classified or not, from the photostat machine.

- 6 -

19. Destruction should be carried out every night by the Security Guard on duty during the quiet hours. Communications tape ~~and microfilm~~ should be put through the shredder three times. Other material should be shredded twice. Shredded material, mixed up with other waste, is put out for pick up by the building cleaning staff.

20. During the General Assembly a special effort should be made not to fall behind on the daily shredding of waste. If it is not possible to destroy all waste during the quiet hours, the excess should be retained in Registry and sent to Washington for destruction.

EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION

21. As the Mission is located in an office building, it is not possible to consider emergency destruction by fire or chemicals. The only means is by the shredder, which is a slow process. In the event of an emergency if time permits, destruction should start with less important files. If time is short, Top Secret files, basic communications material and any other highly classified material stored in the Two Taylor safes, should be destroyed first.

DIPLOMATIC BAG

22. The Mission regularly sends and receives two diplomatic bags a week, on Mondays and Thursdays. The closing hour is 10.30 am. The bag is carried to the car by a Canadian staff chauffeur. If there are more bags than the driver can safely carry, he will be assisted

- 7 -

by a Clerk from Registry. The driver will drive directly to the Trans-Canada terminal at the airport. On leaving the car, he will go directly to a section of the baggage room where he will await the arrival of the courier. In the event that he has more diplomatic bags than he can carry, he will hire a skycap, making sure that the skycap never leaves his sight.

23. As soon as the courier arrives, the driver and the courier together return to the car and drive to the Eastern Airlines Terminal. They will then carry the bags (assisted by a skycap if there should be too many for both of them to carry) to the baggage room, where the driver will remain with the bags. The courier will go to the desk to be ticketed for Washington and to pay excess baggage. He will return to the driver, who will then take the bags intended for New York and carry them to the car. Once in the car, he will proceed directly to the office and carry them directly to Registry.

24. The driver accompanying diplomatic bags should at all times carry a letter signed by the Head of Mission identifying him as a diplomatic courier. The purpose of this letter is to provide him with protection in the case of an accident. In the event of a serious accident, the letter is also intended to ensure that a call is made to the Mission immediately so that the bags can be collected by another driver.

HANDLING OF TELEGRAMS

25. Telegrams sent from the Mission should normally be signed by the Head of Mission or the Deputy Head of Mission. After they have been signed, they will be taken to the Communications Room and handed to the Communications Clerk through the wicket. No member of the Canadian staff may enter the Communications Room with the exception of members of the Communications Centre staff, the Head of Mission, the Post Security Officer, Deputy Post Security Officer and any other member of the staff authorized to do so by one of the above.

26. Telegrams received in the Communications Centre will be duplicated in the Centre and passed through the wicket between the Communications Centre and Registry. Top Secret telegrams will be reproduced in five (5) copies and all copies will be numbered.

SECURITY OF OFFICES

27. The two most sensitive areas in the Mission are the Communications Centre and the Registry. For this reason access to these two areas is limited. Entry regulations during working hours have already been indicated above. The manner in which these regulations will be enforced is indicated in this section.

(a) Security of Communications Centre: The outer door of the Communications Section will be locked at all times. If it is necessary to speak to a member of the Communications Staff, this can be done by telephone or

- 9 -

by ringing the bell at the side of the wicket. Within the Communications Centre, the barred door between the Lineroom and the Communications Room is to be locked during working hours if there are no staff members in the section. At night when the Communications staff leave the section, the vault door and the barred gate are to be locked. The peep-hole into the main room from the Lineroom is to be closed if a guard is not to be on duty. The Security Guard has a key and the combination of the vault door if it should be necessary to gain access to the Communications Room in an emergency.

(b) Security of Registry: The outer door of the Mail Room and the barred door between the Mail Room and Registry proper are to be locked at any time during working hours when the Registry is not occupied. At night the vault door is to be locked. A copy of the combination is retained by the Security Guards in a sealed envelope in their barred cabinet. If it should be necessary to gain access to the cabinets or the Taylor safe, and the Registry staff cannot be located, copies of the combinations are kept in a sealed envelope in the Taylor safe in the Communications Centre which can be opened by a member of the Communications staff.

(c) Security of Offices: The doors of offices are to be locked at all times during the day when the occupants are absent and when confidential documents are exposed. This is especially important during the lunch hour. In the morning staff members will be let into

- 10 -

their offices either by the Security Guard or by securing a key from the keyboard, which is in the custody of either the Security Guard or, in his absence, the senior Registry Clerk. During the General Assembly, doors of offices of delegates who are not members of the Department will be opened when required by Confidential Messengers.

Occupants of offices on the south and western sides of the building should keep venetian blinds closed if classified material is exposed. If window cleaning or repair activities take place outside the window of any office, the blinds should also be closed.

KEY CONTROL

28. Locks are installed on all office doors. A keyboard with duplicate keys is retained during quiet hours by the Security Guards and during their absence by the senior Registry Clerk. No keys for either office doors or for the main door should be taken out of the office except in one exceptional circumstance noted below.

29. Immediately before the office opens Guards will open all office doors, excluding the Registry, the Communications area and those offices which are not being occupied. Once cabinets have been opened or classified material has been exposed, all members of the staff are responsible for locking their office doors if they should be out of their office. In order to re-enter it will be necessary either to have the Guard

- 11 -

open the door or to take a key from the keyboard. When taking a key, the name of the person taking the key and the key number must be recorded by the responsible staff member. The person taking the key should if possible return it immediately.

30. To ensure that keys are not taken out of the office, the Receptionist will also ask all members of the staff whenever they go out of the office if they have returned their keys. When the Security Guard comes on duty in the later afternoon he will make an immediate check to ensure that outstanding keys have been handed back. In the event that a staff member has a continuing need for a key, he or she will be responsible for returning it to the keyboard on leaving the office.

31. No keys are to be issued for either the night lock or the day lock on the front door. The night lock will normally be locked after 1900 hours, except during the General Assembly when a second Guard is on duty. If the Guard should be accompanying the cleaning staff before 1900 hours, he may set the day lock. In this case departing members of the staff should inform the Security Guard when leaving the office and make sure that the day lock has snapped shut as the door closes.

32. Keys for the two main door locks are held in communications. The Communications staff are as an exception permitted to take these keys out of the building if they are required to go to the U.N. for an

- 12 -

emergency telegram during a holiday when the guards may only be carrying out spot checks.

33. An extra set of keys for the main door is held in the Taylor safe of the Consulate General for use in the event of a lock-out.

COMBINATIONS

34. The Security Guards are responsible for changing the combinations of all locks except those in the Communications Section, which are changed by the Communications staff. The combinations are to be changed every three months and copies of the settings will be transmitted to Ottawa in a sealed envelope addressed to the Departmental Security Officer. Settings for the Taylor safe in the Communications Centre are sent separately. Copies of all combinations are to be retained in sealed envelopes in one of the two Taylor safes. The Mission is fortunate in having two of these safes, as this reduces the danger of a lock-out. Copies are to be retained as follows:

(1) copies of Communications combinations, including the vault door, in the Taylor safe in Registry;

(2) copies of the Registry combinations, including the vault door, in the Taylor safe in Communications;

(3) copies of combinations for cabinets in offices in the Taylor safe in Registry.

35. All staff members are expected to memorize the combination numbers for security containers coming under their responsibility. If it should be necessary to retain a record in a written form (other

- 13 -

than those retained in the Taylor safes), the method for doing so should be discussed with the Deputy Post Security Officer to ensure that it will not compromise the setting.

36. The only exceptions to the above regulations are the following:

(a) Registry Vault Door. A copy of this combination is kept by the Security Guards in a sealed envelope in their cabinet;

(b) Communications Vault Door. A copy of this combination has been placed in a sealed envelope in a cabinet in Registry and can in case of exceptional need be secured by the Security Guard;

(c) Cabinet of the Head of Mission. A copy of the combination of this cabinet is kept in a sealed envelope in the cabinet of the Security Guards as a convenience of the Head of Mission, in case he should wish to gain entry to his cabinet during days on which the office is closed.

CONTROL OF LOCAL STAFF

37. Members of local staff should not be permitted access to any office unless accompanied by a staff member. At this Mission the only persons coming within this category are the telephonist and, during the General Assembly, the extra chauffeurs.

SECURITY OF TELEPHONES

38. The office telephones have no special security. Therefore staff members should avoid dis-

- 14 -

cussing classified information on calls within the office or to other offices in New York City. Staff members should also keep in mind that long distance telephone calls, particularly those to Ottawa, should not be used to convey classified information.

CLEANING OF OFFICES

39. The cleaning of offices is carried out in the evening. Only one person does the work so that it is possible for the Guard continually to supervise that person. The Guard will at all times remain with the cleaning staff. If members of the staff are still working when the cleaning staff arrives, and there is no second Guard on duty, the Guard will lock the day lock and connect telephone lines to the offices which are occupied, including the Communications Centre. This will ensure that the Guard will not be obliged to leave the char staff during the cleaning process.

40. The main Communications Room is normally cleaned by the Communications staff. Approximately once a month the floor is washed and waxed by the char staff. All machines are covered and loose equipment is put away. No equipment is moved during the cleaning and a member of the Communications staff supervises the work. The Line Room is cleaned each evening by the char staff under the supervision of the Security Guard.

41. If window cleaners or labourers should come to do work in the building, their work will at all times be supervised. When it is known in advance that

- 15 -

this work is to be done, the Security Guards should arrange to cover the work. If window cleaners come unexpectedly, all documents in the offices in which they are to work will be put away and a member of the staff will be present while the windows are cleaned.

CONTROL OF VISITORS

42. Visitors to the office must at all times be accompanied. On being informed by the telephonist that a visitor has arrived, the Officer or his Secretary will go to the reception room. If a Guard is available he may accompany the visitors. If a meeting is being held the Officer responsible must make provision for non-Canadian members attending the meeting to be escorted to the Conference Room. Visitors should not be left alone in offices.

SOCIAL CONTACTS

43. All members of the staff should be aware of the following instructions issued by the Department with regard to social contacts with members of the staff or other nationals of any of the following countries: USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (including East Berlin), Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, Mainland China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Cuba;

"Personnel reporting on any contact with an official or national of a scheduled country should assess and report briefly on any or all of the following points concerning their interlocutors and the circumstances of the

- 16 -

meetings:

- (i) Physical description; dress taste, habits; mannerisms; defects of body; sobriety or in-sobriety qualified by degree (e.g. heavy drinker of beer); smoker (cigarettes or pipe), or non-smoker;
- (ii) Character appreciation to include any information on the person's morals; attention paid to women; enjoyment of parties;
- (iii) Ideology; does he talk politics and if so what viewpoint does he adopt?
- (iv) Relations with others; with any indication of probable or apparent status apart from official position. Does the person claim to know any other foreigners?
- (v) Relationship with wife and family.
- (vi) Background data, to include education; previous posts, and assignments.
- (vii) Command of languages, including accents.
- (viii) Topics discussed: (scientific, military, political, economic, etc.); degree of competence and education.
- (ix) Any apparent effort on the part of the person to single out specific topics or persons for conversation or to ask for anything (books, records, clothes, currency, etc.).
- (x) Information on wife.
- (xi) Any request or suggestion for introduction to anyone else or for information.

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- (xii) Possible change of attitude of the person since previous meeting if applicable.
- (xiii) Request or offer for other meeting or encounter; is relationship public and open or is there attempt to give it a clandestine twist or flavour? "

REMOVING DOCUMENTS FROM THE OFFICE

44. Officers should not normally take home documents to their residences. If it is essential, they may do so but they should not leave the documents in their residence. They should not take home documents carrying a classification higher than confidential.

RESTRICTED

INFORMATION REGARDING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The following notes are to assist you in understanding security arrangements at the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations.

The Mission handles a considerable volume of classified documents which it receives by diplomatic bag or cypher telegram. Most of this material is retained in the Mission, when it is placed in files in the Registry. The office also contains highly classified communications machines. To protect these documents and machines, it is necessary carefully to observe office security procedures, which have been devised in Ottawa and are applied at all Canadian Missions.

The main protection during working hours is gained by limiting access to the office other than the reception room. If you invite visitors to the office, would you please meet them at the reception room. Do not leave them alone and accompany them to the door when leaving. The receptionist will advise you by phone when they arrive. If you are reading classified documents when their arrival is announced, would you please cover them up.

All offices are equipped with locks. The doors will be opened each morning by the Security Guard before your arrival. If you should go out during the day, leaving classified documents exposed, would you please lock the door. If the Guard is not in the office to let you back in, there is a duplicate key in Registry.

- 2 -

A member of the Registry staff will be pleased to let you in.

I wish to caution you against using tele-phones either for local or long distance calls. They should not be used to convey classified information.

Personal mail and unclassified documents will be placed in a rack in a pidgeon hole marked with your name.

If your work should require the use of classified documents, these will be brought to your office and returned to Registry by a Confidential Messenger. Please be careful not to throw any classified documents into the waste baskets, even if it is intended for disposal. The paper should be placed in your out basket, from where it will be collected for disposal.

Over night and during the weekend a Security Guard is always on duty in the office. If you wish to enter the office during non-working hours, the Guard will let you in. You should ring the bell at the main door to attract his attention.

I should like to end with a word of caution concerning your contacts with other delegates at the United Nations. I should ask you to exercise discretion when discussing Canadian policy or reactions to developments at the United Nations. During the General Assembly many correspondents mingle with delegates and you may find your words quoted. The U.N. Press are as avid for news as they are anywhere else in the world.

- 3 -

If you have any questions concerning office security, Mr. Barton or Mr. Dobell, who are the Mission Security Officers, will be pleased to answer them.

PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS



MISSION PERMANENTE DU CANADA
AUPRÈS DES NATIONS UNIES

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

The bearer of this letter
Mr. _____ is an official
of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United
Nations whose responsibilities include the custody of
the Canadian Diplomatic Bags while driving between the
office of the Permanent Mission of Canada at 750 Third
Avenue and the airport in the New York City area, where
he meets the Canadian Diplomatic Courier flying between
Ottawa, New York and Washington, D.C.

While accompanying the diplomatic
bags he has the internationally recognized status of
Diplomatic Courier which includes immunity from arrest
and freedom from any interference with his person and
official papers.

In the event of an accident involving
serious injury to the bearer of this letter Mr. _____,
it should be appreciated if any-
one reading this letter immediately contact the Permanent
Mission of Canada at Wkon 6-5740. New York City Police
or Port of New York Authority Police officials, whoever
may have jurisdiction in this area, are requested to
take custody of any diplomatic bags in the bearer's
possession until they can be turned over to an official
of the Canadian Permanent Mission to the United Nations.

Ambassador

New York City.

NUMBERED LETTER

File
JA
280

To: ~~PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO THE UNITED~~
~~NATIONS, NEW YORK, N.Y.~~

From: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: ~~Your telegram No. 843 of May 29.~~

Subject: ~~Proposed Changes to the Office Premises.~~

Security: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

No: ~~F~~

Date: ~~June 4, 1962.~~

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: ~~Air~~

Post File No.:

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
9722-21-10	
43	✓

References

This will confirm our telegram of June 1 in which we recommended that you secure estimates for the repartitioning as discussed in a telephone conversation of the same date between Mr. Holmes and Mr. Zoubie.

2. For the record the following is the work which we are prepared to authorize:

- (a) The present west wall of the reception room to be removed and a new west wall to be constructed between the columns of the elevator shafts shown on your plan as numbers 68 and 71.
- (b) A double door to be installed in the above-mentioned wall. One of these doors should have an unobtrusive peep-hole unit attached. There should be vertical bolts, one at the top and one at the bottom of each door. (D.L. (ii) Division agree that with these bolts and one of our locks these doors should be quite secure.)
- (c) The south wall of the reception room should be projected westerly to meet the elevator wall near column 73. A single door should be located in this new wall section to match the one directly opposite it.
- (d) The door opening into the area newly leased should be moved down to the point where it becomes a projection of the north wall of the reception room to column 68.
- (e) An entrance should be put through the west wall of room 26. This should have a Dutch door with hinges on the inside as well as bolts in both sections.
- (f) The north wall of room 7 should be removed and the south wall of the ladies' washroom projected easterly to close off the corridor. This new section of wall should have a door in it similar to the one further down the same corridor.

Internal Circulation

D.L. (ii) Div.

Distribution to Posts

- 2 -

- (g) The door into the fire escape should be equipped with a panic bar, one of our locks and an alarm. (You should consult D.L. (ii) Division about these items.) We suggest that you do not install a door leading into the short corridor which ends at the fire escape. If it should develop that there is a draft from the fire escape the contractor should be asked to rectify the matter by making the door draft proof.
- (h) The steel shelving now attached to the south wall of the registry should be removed and re-installed as required in room 26.

3. With regard to the proposed use of room 26 as a U.N. documents room our objection to this had been based on the fact that it would do away with desk space for four people. Normally most missions tell us that they need more, rather than less, office space. However, we understand that you feel that you will be able to operate quite well without using this room for office purposes and as long as you are prepared to accept the responsibility for the elimination from the "office" category of this space we will withdraw our objection. We believe, incidentally, that your plan for removing the U.N. documents from the registry is a very good one as it should ease considerably the congestion in that room.

4. Still on the subject of room 26. D. L. (ii) Division has asked us to say that they hope room 26 will not become a short-cut to the rest of the chancery. They appreciate that this new doorway will provide a convenient avenue for bringing in and taking out the mail. They feel however that entry should be restricted. Otherwise unauthorized persons could gain entry to the security area.

5. You will note, of course, that we have not authorized the demolition of the wall between rooms 26 and 27. This is because we are going to be pressed for funds this year and are not anxious to undertake any more than we have to. Moreover, we now find that while the removal of the wall in question will give you more floor space it will actually produce less wall space for shelves, etc.! We suggest, therefore, that this proposal be dropped.

6. When you have secured at least two estimates of the work to be done please forward them, with your recommendations, to the Department. If we agree we will authorize you to proceed with the work.

Original signed by
J. A. ZOUBIE

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

File

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

		DATE	FILE	SECURITY
FM:	EXTERNAL OTTAWA	June 1, 1962	50048-AF-40	CONFID
			43	50
			NUMBER	PRECEDENCE
TO:	PERMIS NY		DS-257	PRIORITY
				COMCENTRE USE ONLY
INFO:				

Ref.: YOURTEL 696 AND 739

Subject: YALE LOCKS

WE PREFER YOU INSTALL YALE 0-48 -1 DEADLATCHES
 ON DOORS IN QUESTION. LOCKS GOING FORWARD TODAY.
 ARRANGEMENTS ARE UNDER WAY TO PROVIDE YOU WITH AUTHORITY
 TO HAVE LOCKS INSTALLED BY ALL-OVER LOCKSMITHS.

LOCAL
 DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG. <i>S/K</i> E. KEYES/KH NAME.....	D.L. (2) DIVISION	2-2817	J. TIMMERMAN SIG. J. TIMMERMAN NAME.....

000460

D.L.(2) Div/Div. Reyes, RN

Supplies and Properties Division

Confidential

May 31, 1962

D.L.(2) Division

Permis New York telegrams 6960 -

...

739 - Copies Attached

Yale Door Locks

50048-AF-40	
43	—

We are supplying 25 Yale 0-48 deadlatches to Permis New York for installation on office doors. The work is to be done by a local contractor, All-Over Locksmiths, and we should be grateful if you would arrange for the necessary authority. The cost of installing the locks will be \$125.00.

Handwritten signature

D.L.(2) Division

D.O.O.
File

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

		DATE	FILE		SECURITY
FM: EXTERNAL OTTAWA		May 30, 1962	50048-AF-40		CONFID
			55	14	
			NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY
TO: PERMISNY			DS-254	PRIORITY	
INFO:					

Ref.: YOURTEL 836 MAY 28/62

Subject: TAYLOR SAFE

PROCEED WITH REPAIR TO TAYLOR SAFE AS
 INDICATED IN YOUR TELEGRAM. AUTHORIZATION IS
 ORDER NUMBER EA-14264A.

LOCAL
 DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... NAME... E. KEYES/kh.....	D.L. (2) DIVISION	2-2817	SIG..... NAME... J. TIMMERMAN.....

000462

Supplies and Properties Division

Confidential

May 30, 1962

D.L.(2) Division

Permis N.Y. Telegram 836 May 28/62

58948-AF-40	
42	—

Taylor Safe

This is to confirm our request for authority to have the Taylor Safe in the Permis N.Y. registry repaired.


2. We have informed the mission that they may proceed with the repairs under Order No. ES-14264A.

J. TIMMERMAN

D.L.(2) Division

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

File


TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: Permanent Mission of Canada to the
 United Nations, New York.....

Reference:

Subject: Security Arrangements in
 Chancery Premises.....

Security: ... Secret

No: *367*

Date: May 29, 1962

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
<i>50048-AF-70</i>	
<i>4</i>	<i>14</i>

JZ

References

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 JUN 4 1962

*Copy a memo
 to S & P.
 6/6/62*

Internal Circulation

D

Distribution to Posts

You will recall that in your inspection report on security of our office premises you recommended certain changes be made in the locks on the grille gates immediately behind the vault doors in the Registry and Comcentre. You suggested placing a shield of some sort over the latch on the inside of the grille gate so that it could not be opened from the outside by the use of a ruler. We discussed such a change with the representative of Diebold Incorporated, the manufacturers of the grille gates and they recommended against placing a shield over the thumb latch on the inside as there would always be some possibility of injury to employees in the use of such an installation. They have recommended to us that the latch be removed and a lock installed which would be opened by a key the same as the lock on the front of each gate. The present type grille gate is absolutely useless as a security deterrent and the suggested installation will remedy this situation.

2. In your inspection report you pointed out the weakness of the existing panel board with spring catch which is used as a wicket to the line room of the Comcentre. Diebold Inc. have recommended the installation of a steel door and frame on the inside of this opening. The frame would be constructed of 2½" wide by ¼" bars electrically welded to fit around the existing opening. The door will be ¼" steel plate hung on a heavy continuous hinge and would swing into the room from right to left. The door would be locked by two heavy slide bolts located on the top and bottom front edge. They would anchor this door and frame to the wall with four ½" by 6½" long carriage bolts. The existing slide panel would be retained for daily use as the new steel door would be opened by the staff each morning and securely locked on their departure in the evening.

3. Diebold Inc. have submitted an estimate for both jobs on a straight time basis in the amount of \$250.00. Although they did not itemize their estimate, we understand that the changes in the grille gates will cost \$100.00 and installation of the steel door and

NO ENCLOSURES

1952 JUN 4 2PM 3 421

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frame in the Comcentre will cost \$150.00.

4. We should be pleased to receive your authority for this expenditure as soon as possible.



Permanent Mission

308 48-AF-70
14 | 14

ACTION COPY

FM PERSISNY MAY28/62 SECRET
TO EXTERNAL 836

J21

TAYLOR SAFE

TAYLOR SAFE LOCATED IN REGISTRY OF MISSION HAS GRADUALLY BECOME MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT TO OPEN AS SHOULDERS ON DOOR HINGES HAVE SLOWLY WORN UNTIL NOW DOOR HAS DROPPED DOWN SLIGHTLY AND WILL NOT RPT NOT CLOSE.

2.REP FROM MOSLER SAFE CO WHO SERVICE TAYLOR SAFES INFORMED US THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO REMOVE DOOR OF SAFE AND REPLACE WORN WASHERS WHICH WOULD RAISE DOOR AND ELIMINATE ITS PRESENT ILL FIT.MOSLER CO HAVE ASSURED US THAT THEY WILL MAKE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS TO ENSURE PROPER FIT AND EASE OF OPERATION.COST OF THESE REPAIRES INCLUDING MATERIALS AND LABOUR WILL BE DOLLARS 65 USA.AS THIS MATTER SHOULD BE ATTENDED TO IMMEDIATELY WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD SEND US YOUR AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS EXPENDITURE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3.WE SHOULD LIKE TO MENTION THAT THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH DIAL MECHANISM OF THIS SAFE.

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MAY 28

02# EA 14264-A

ACTION COPY

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50048-AF-10
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FM PERM Y MAY 11/62 SECRET

TO EXTERNAL 739

REF OURTEL 696 MAY 4 *First Rec'd in D-5/R*

INSTALLATION OF YALE SPRING LOCKS

WE HAVE NOW OBTAINED TWO ESTIMATES FOR INSTALLATION OF THESE LOCKS.

G AND G HARDWARE COMPANY, WHO WERE RECOMMENDED BY BUILDING MANAGEMENT, ARE ASKED DOLLARS TEN PER DOOR. AS THERE ARE APPROX. 25 DOORS

WHICH WILL REQUIRE YALE LOCKS, TOTAL COST WOULD BE DOLLARS TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY. ALL-OVER LOCKSMITHS, WHO WERE RECOMMENDED TO US BY

SILVER HARDWARE COMPANY WHERE WE PURCHASED OUR SARGENT AND GREENLEAF COMBINATION LOCKS, GAVE US A QUOTATION OF DOLLARS FIVE PER DOOR. WE

FEEL CERTAIN THAT WORKMANSHIP OF LATTER FIRM WOULD BE ADEQUATE AND WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD SEND US AUTHORITY IN AMOUNT OF

DOLLARS ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIVE FOR PAYMENT OF THIS WORK.

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MAY 11 1962

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F M PERMISNY MAY4/62 SECRET

TO EXTERNAL 696

REF YOURLET DS196 APR27/61

INSTALLATION OF YALE LOCKS

WE ARE OBTAINING AN ESTIMATE FROM A RELIABLE FIRM FOR THE INSTALLATION OF YALE SPRING LOCKS ON APPROX 24 OF OFFICE DOORS WITHIN THE MISSION. WE HAVE ON HAND SEVEN OF 048 YALE SPRING LOCKS AND TEN OF 042-1 YALE SPRING LOCKS. IN YOUR REPORT YOU HAVE RECOMMENDED THE INSTALLATION OF 048 YALE LOCKS ONLY AND WE ARE WONDERING WHETHER YOU WOULD AGREE TO THE INSTALLATION OF THE 042-1 YALE LOCKS THAT WE HAVE ON HAND AS THEY ARE VERY SIMILAR. IN LATTER CIRCUMSTANCE, WE WILL STILL REQUIRE ONE DOZEN ADDITIONAL 048 YALE LOCKS TO DO THE JOB AND PROVIDE SOME SPARES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF YOU WISH ALL INSTALLATIONS TO BE 048 YALE, WE WILL REQUIRE TWO DOZEN NEW LOCKS.

2. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD FORWARD THESE LOCKS BY BAG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

NUMBERED LETTER

To: Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL
No: F- 193

From: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Date: April 12, 1962

Reference: Your letter 123 of February 16.

Enclosures:
Air or Surface Mail: Air

Subject: Proposed Changes in the Office Premises.

Post File No.:

Ottawa File No. 50048-AF-40 -9722-P-1-40

References

We have now had an opportunity to study the proposals put forward in your letter under reference together with Mr. Zoubie's report on the inspection which he carried out last November. As stated in your letter not very many changes will be necessary. Since, however, we do not agree entirely with what you recommend it is proposed to discuss these matters hereunder and to outline our counter-proposals.

2. We agree that the reception room should be enlarged by moving the west wall out to where it will be between the two elevator shafts. We would prefer to have a door in both the north-west and south-west corners of the new reception room. We recommend that the entrance from the elevators be a double door on which the name of the Mission could be inscribed in both French and English.

3. The matter on which there seems to be the most disagreement concerns the use of the rooms shown on your plan as rooms 26 and 27. First of all, we feel that one important point has been overlooked with respect to room 27. It is our understanding that a separate room is required for the telephone equipment now located in that space and that it is very advantageous to have this "equipment room" as close as possible to the switchboard. We feel, therefore, that this room should be left as it is with one change, viz.: the door opening into hallway 28 should be walled in and a new door put into this room from room 26. This new door should probably enter from the eastern end of the wall between rooms 26 and 27. You should ensure that this doorway is large enough to allow entry of the "frames" and other telephone equipment which must be kept in that room. You know, of course, that the main reason for changing this entrance to room 26 is to add to the security of the registry and communications area.

4. One of the problems which was reported on by Mr. Zoubie was the shortage of space for filing cabinets in rooms 24 and 25. He recommended two solutions, viz.: the purchase of narrower filing cabinets for the storage in room 25 of the short UN documents and the enlarging of room 25 by moving the west wall between rooms 25 and 26 in a westerly direction until it joins the west wall of corridor 28. At the same time a new entrance to the enlarged room 25 should be created at the point where the wall between rooms 23 and 25 will be projected westerly across hallway 28. This entrance should be provided with a Dutch door having a narrow counter top on the lower portion.

Internal Circulation

D.L. (ii) Div.
Mr. Hunter.

Distribution to Posts

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

5. We will deal with the matter of procuring new filing cabinets in another letter.

6. We realize that as a consequence of the enlargement of room 25 that room 26 will be made smaller. However, according to the inspection report, scarcely any of the space directly in front of the present entrance to room 26 was being used as desk space. We understand that this area was occupied by a miscellaneous collection of shelves and boxes with the remainder of the room being taken up by four desks for four officers. It would seem, therefore, that little if anything will be lost by making room 26 smaller.

7. One matter which has not been raised before concerns the hallway which parallels room 7. We feel that since we are paying for this space we should make the maximum possible use of it. We propose, therefore, that the south wall of this hallway be taken down at least as far back as the storage room so that room 7 (which is reported to be small in any case) can be widened. It will probably be of no benefit to take down more of that wall as there should be a clear passageway to the exit at the end of that hall. There is no reason, however, why sets of shelves could not be attached to the south wall of the remainder of this hallway and this would probably be a good place to store some of the volumes of the library which are seldom consulted, i.e., Hansard for 1940, etc. The north wall of this hallway should be projected easterly until it meets the wall of room 4. There should be a door in this new wall to provide access to the toilets. The fire exit door should have a panic bar lock and an alarm on it.

8. We have discussed the telephone installation with the Communications Division. They suggest that you should have someone from the telephone company come in and advise you concerning any expansion of the present switchboard. They suggest that you should ask the telephone company representatives if an additional row or rows of internal extensions can be added to this present switchboard and if additional relays can be added to the "frames" in room 27. If this can be done we would avoid the heavy expense of replacing the present installation. We would be very interested to learn what they recommend.

9. Would you please examine our suggestions and let us have your comments as soon as possible. If you agree with what we propose it would be most helpful if you could get from Uris Brothers an indication of the approximate cost of making these changes.

10. One further point. In this letter we have used the numbering shown on the plans sent forward with your letter under reference. However, in order that all plans which the Department has may be as uniform as possible we initiated a numbering procedure some years ago. This involves starting at the lower left hand corner and proceeding in a clock-wise direction around the plan. For instance, the plan we now have in the Department of the chancery has the office of the Head of Mission shown as No. 1 and the reception room as No. 12. When you obtain a new set of plans from Uris Brothers would you please remember the plan as mentioned above. At the same time would you also supply us with a list of the occupants of all rooms. Please do not use names; we would prefer that the rank or position of the persons occupying these rooms be used.

11. In a later letter we propose to discuss redecoration of the chancery. We would welcome your suggestions in this regard.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
M GRANT

fu Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

000471

UNCLASSIFIED

Supplies and Properties Division

(Attention: Mr. Zoubie)

April 11, 1962

Defence Liaison(2) Division

50048-	AF-40
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Alterations - Permis N.Y.

Further to the conversation, between you and Mr. Andrews, we would agree that:

- (a) The present East-West wall between room 7 and the corridor be removed and the fire escape door provided with a panic bar lock and alarm.
- (b) The north wall of the corridor be continued to the wall of room 9.
- (c) The wall dividing the reception area from the present corridor be removed and the main entry moved and a new wall built between the two elevator shafts.
- (d) A door be installed dividing the reception area and the new area.
- (e) The door leading from the elevator lobby to the room used by the chauffeurs should be permanently locked.
- (f) The wall between room 14 and 15 be removed and a new wall built in line with the present corridor.

-2-

(g) The present door into room 13 closed and a new door placed in line with the division between room 21 and 15 . *new door to be dutch door*

(h) A new door be placed to give access to rooms 13 and 14 from the new area.

2. Would you please provide us with plans which will include the proposed changes and an attachment which will indicate the intended use or occupancy of the rooms.

3. Your plans are attached.

L. TIMMERMAN

Defence Liaison(2) Division.

Ottawa, April 6, 1962.

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
TO: The Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations
NEW YORK

We are forwarding by (*Surface 28*) the following: - *April 8*

900 Security Guard Log Sheets

50048-AP-10
L.P.

Please refer to your letter No.184 of March 13/62.

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and return the original form Ext. 27 R.

D. E. Keays

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Return to rm.319, D.L.(2) E.B.

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in good order.

Permis N.Y. Place *April 12/62* Date *J. Hartman* Signature

D

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: .. The Permanent Mission of Canada to the ..
..... United Nations, New York

Reference:.....

Subject:..... Combinations of Security Containers...
.....
.....

Security:..... **Secret**

No:..... **270**

Date:..... **5 April, 1962**

Enclosures:..... **2**

Air or Surface Mail:..... **air**

Post File No:..... **11.4**

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
4	50

References

This is to certify that:

J. P. Le Moine

- (a) the settings of all the security combination locks in use at this mission have been changed as required in the Security Instructions.
- (b) the new settings are enclosed in the attached envelope, addressed to the Departmental Security Officer, which has been prepared and sealed as prescribed in section 408.6 of the Security Manual.
- (c) the official record of such combinations is kept at this post in accordance with section 409.7 of the security manual.
- (d) all spare security combination padlocks in the custody of this mission have been set on the neutral combination 10-20-30, and each lock is properly labelled to show the combination on which it is set.
- (e) all the combination locks in the custody of this Mission are in good working order and no difficulty was experienced with any of them since their combination settings were last reported.

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Internal Circulation

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Distribution to Posts

W. H. Burtin
Permanent Mission

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Permanent Mission of Canada to
the United Nations, NEW YORK

Reference: Your letter DS-30 of January 24, 1962

Subject: Security Combination Settings

Security: SECRET

No: 75

Date: January 30, 1962

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 11-4

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AP-40	
14	30

References

Original

This is to certify that:

- (a) the settings of all the security combination locks in use at this mission have been changed as required in the security instructions.
- (b) the new settings are enclosed in the attached envelope, addressed to the Departmental Security Officer, which has been prepared and sealed as prescribed in section 408.6 of the security manual.
- (c) the official record of such combinations is kept at this post in accordance with section 409.7 of the security manual.
- (d) All spare security combination padlocks in the custody of this mission have been set on the neutral combination 10-20-30 and each lock is properly labelled to show the combination on which it is set.
- (e) All the combination locks in the custody of this mission are in good working order and no difficulty was experienced with any of them since their combination settings were last reported.

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FEB 6 1962

Internal Circulation

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W.H. Burtin
Permanent Mission.

Distribution to Posts

FEB 2 13 24.85

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Permanent Mission of Canada to
the United Nations, New York.

Security: RESTRICTED

No: DS-30

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Date: January 24, 1962

Enclosures:

Reference: Your letter No. 1 of Jan. 5, 1962

Air or Surface Mail:

Subject: Reporting of Combination Settings

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
55	52

References

We thank you for sending us your new combination settings. We noticed that 15 S&G padlocks were set on the same combination. This is contrary to the regulations as set out in section 407.6 (ii) of the security manual which states that no more than six containers, located in the security room, may be set on the same combination. In future when reporting new combination changes please refer also to sections 408.5, 408.6 and appendix IV (a) of the New Security Manual of Instructions. The following should also be typewritten on the face of the envelope: "Attachment to letter No. _____ of _____ date _____ from Permis New York".

J. R. FRANCIS

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

J17

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO
THE UNITED NATIONS

Reference:
Subject: COMBINATIONS OF SECURITY CONTAINERS

Security: SECRET

No:

Date: January 5, 1962.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: AIR

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AF-40	
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References

File no

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9 JAN 1962

Attached is a sealed envelope containing the combinations of the security containers in this Mission which were changed today.

W. Barton
Permanent Mission

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

1962 JAN 9 AM 10:21

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